MIGRATION ADMINISTRATION IN THE MAKING OF THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

By

Ella Margaret Fratantuono

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ABSTRACT

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In the second half of the nineteenth century, several million Muslims migrated from the Caucasus, Crimea, and Balkans into the Ottoman Empire. During the same era, the empire launched a series of economic, administrative, legal, and political reforms intended to increase the power of the central government. The reform era altered the relationship between state and subject, as state institutions became more visible in the population's everyday lives. Though scholars credit mass population movements with changing the ethnic fabric of the empire, few have described how official policies were employed to encourage migrant identification with the changing Ottoman state.

This dissertation analyzes migration and Ottoman migration administration in the five decades following the Crimean War (1853-1856). I explore the development of the immigrant as a social issue requiring administrative intervention within a modernizing state. Through an analysis of policy directives and official reports on migrant settlement, education, and health, I consider state strategies of population management and spatial organization. Migrants were potential tools in development projects and objects of assimilating reform, and migration administration reveals officials' concerns with developing techniques to encourage productivity and identification with the state. A history of late Ottoman Empire with a focus on migration and migration administration highlights mobility and space as critical to Ottoman governance.

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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

A.MKT.MHM – Sadaret Mektubi Mühimme Kalemi Evrakı

A.MKT.NZD – Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Nezaret ve Deva'ir Evrakı

A.MKT.UM – Sadaret Mektubi Umum Vilayet Evrakı

BEO – Babıali Evrak Odası

BOA – Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi

DH.MHC - Dahiliye Nezareti Muhacirin Komisyonu

DH.MKT – Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi

I.DH – İrade Dahiliye

I.EV – İrade Evkaf

IJMES – *International Journal of Middle East Studies*

I.MMS – İrade Meclis-i Mahsus

I.MVL – İrade Meclis-i Vala

I.ŞD – İrade Şura-yı Devlet

MVL – Meclis-i Vala Evrakı

PLK.P – Plan-Proje

ŞD – Şura-yı Devlet Evrakı

TKA – The Red Crescent Archives - *Türk Kızılay Arşivi*

Y.A.HUS – Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı

Y.A.RES – Yıldız Sadaret Resmi Maruzatı

Y.MTV – Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı

Y.PRK.KOM – Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Komisyonlar Maruzatı

Y.PRK.DH – Yıldız Perakende Dahiliye Nezareti Maruzatı

Y.PRK.ŞD – Yıldız Perakende Şura-yı Devlet Maruzatı

Y.PRK.UM – Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Umumi

Y.PRK.OMZ – Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Orman, Maadin ve Ziraat Nezareti Maruzatı

INTRODUCTION

Histories of states are histories of movement. Migration frames world history, highlighting short and long distance connections and remaining a consistent factor in social change. State histories deeply intertwine with migration experiences not only because people have long been "on the move" but also because modern states are defined by their capacity to organize the circulation of people, goods, and resources in and through their territories.[1] States' interest in controlling mobility is highly visible at border crossings, where "the international system of national containers [transforms] from vague and indeterminate concepts into experienced truths."[2] Concern with organizing movement gives states a sedentary bias, one that can seep into historians' approaches to the past.[3] State contours emerge through expulsions, forced sedentarizations, racialized immigrants, and migrant illegality, but official histories often require forgetting the population movements that have defined territorial and social boundaries.[4] The erasure of forced migrations helps to create the seemingly "natural" borders of contemporary nation-states. Movement and displacement are reduced to anomalous and unnatural conditions rather than recognized as an inherent feature of human history.[5]

In the second half of the nineteenth century, millions of Muslims migrated from the Crimean Peninsula, the Caucasus, and the Balkans into Anatolia. These migrations, a prelude to

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[1] Leslie Page Moch, *Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2003), 1; John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[2] Adam McKeown, *A Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 251.

[3] Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell, "Introduction," in *Homelands: War, Population, and Statehood in Eastern Europe and Russia, 1918-1924*, ed. Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 1.

[4] For a comparative discussion of state homogenization from the sixteenth century onwards, see Heather Rae, *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For a discussion of how border regimes and illegal movement constitute states, see Shahram Khosravi, '*Illegal' Traveller: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders* (Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2010).

[5] Liisa Malkki, "National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees," *Cultural Anthropology* 7.1 (1992): 24-44.

the forced migrations, ethnic cleansing, and genocides of the twentieth century, were a signal of modernizing states' developing ability to isolate, organize, and remove peoples. Scholars credit the mass migrations of this period with changing the ethnic fabric of the empire and creating a foundation for a religiously and ethnically homogenous Turkish state. Despite the historical significance of these movements, state attempts to incorporate migrants into the social and political landscapes of the empire have remained understudied. Overlooking histories of how migrants became subjects and citizens contributes to a view of sedentary and perpetual nation-states. In contrast, this dissertation emphasizes immigration as an essential element of this dynamic period, though it focuses on state responses to population movement rather than the act of migrating. Details about techniques of expulsion, numbers affected, experiences in travel, and logistics of arrival are not absent from this narrative, but they are not its central focus. Though concentrating on the aftermath of expulsion and death does not directly contribute to remembrance of the horrors of forced migrations, examining migration administration and settlement locates mobility at the center of changing relationships between the Ottoman state and its population.[6]

The Muslim migrations intersect with large historical processes in the Ottoman Empire, contributing to the empire's changing demographics and coinciding with Ottoman bureaucratic and administrative reforms. The movements and their aftermaths illuminate how new technologies and rationalities of governance contributed to an ability to contain and extract individuals as well as to promote their welfare and security. The Ottoman state's response to mass arrivals signaled the growth of its bureaucracy in ways that would affect its entire

[6] Recent events in Turkey, Russia, Crimea, Syria, and Iraq (e.g., the Sochi Olympics (2014), Russia's invasion of Crimea (2014), the Caucasian origin of the Boston Marathon bombers (2013), and mother tongue educational opportunities in Turkey) have created more visibility for these historical movements both 'on location' and in the American imagination. Nonetheless, much work remains to be done to address a knowledge-empathy gap toward Muslims and non-European migrants displaced in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

population. The act of caring for migrants changed at this moment, as the sheer number of border crossers, the destitute conditions they arrived in, and increased interest in population management contributed to new efforts to centrally coordinate immigrant arrival and settlement. Mass migrations also highlight the limits of the Ottoman state's organizational capacity. Countless migrants died in transit and after arrival, and individuals continued to slip through developing border regimes. Migration itself influenced the outcomes of Ottoman reforms, as individuals and groups exploited the gap between policy and governing capacity.

This dissertation explores the relationship between states and subjects, and, more narrowly, states and migrants, by examining Ottoman migration and settlement regimes from 1850 to 1910. In the rest of this introduction, I provide an overview of the many migrations occurring into, within, and out of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the contours of the reform era, a literature review, my thematic framework, and a chapter outline.

Migrations

Mobility and human migration are fundamental components of Ottoman history. Mobile Turkic groups established the state, and early Ottoman colonization policies moved nomadic and settled groups over long distances.[7] In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, "nomads facilitated the flow of goods and resources, made it possible for Ottoman troops to move quickly over long distances, and herded, gathered, planted, and manufactured valuable goods of

[7] Reşat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 18. For further assessment of the role of tribes in the establishment of the Ottoman State, see Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). For a discussion of state attempts to settle migrants in the sixteenth century, see Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983).

consumption and trade."[8] Beginning in the eighteenth century, Ottoman administrators made greater efforts to forcibly settle nomadic groups and increase the amount of cultivated land. Nevertheless, these settlement efforts were not widely effective until the late nineteenth century, and successful sedentarization of some tribes often required granting expanded rights to others.[9] Attempts to settle nomadic groups remained a key component of population management through the early Turkish Republican period.[10] Forced colonization and settlement schemes represent the long history of Ottoman attempts to coordinate mobility.

Figure 1: Ottoman Provinces, 1900. Source: *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, v. 2.

[8] Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, 34-5.
[9] Ibid., 18. Janet Klein also describes how attempts to coopt Kurdish leaders ended up reinforcing tribal structures. Janet Klein, *The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
[10] State-organized deportations of Kurdish tribes from southeastern Anatolia occurred in 1916, 1925, and 1934. These deportations were intended to Turkify both the territory and the people. Alongside Kurdish deportations, the CUP and RPP settled Turks in Eastern Provinces, particularly Diyarbekir. Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 107-169.

While migration remained an important internal feature of the Ottoman state, the Middle East remained a significant region in global patterns of migration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Scholars often portray Turkey as a relative newcomer to international migration, but the Ottoman Empire and Turkey "experienced an almost uninterrupted series of both mass inflows and outflows of people beginning in the last quarter of the eighteenth century."[11] Beginning with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, large groups of Muslims left areas of growing Russian influence and resettled in the Ottoman Empire. Kemal Karpat describes this as a several centuries long process of "general Muslim retreat from…Europe back towards the heartland of Islam in the Middle East."[12] Christian and Jewish populations took part in nineteenth century immigration to the Ottoman Empire and in informal population exchanges with the Russian Empire and Balkan nation-states.[13] Ottoman subjects also participated in internal labor migration and the great transatlantic economic migrations of the nineteenth century.[14] The end of the empire brought two forced migrations, the Armenian Genocide and the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange. Given the scope of migrations into and out of the Ottoman Empire, the empire is an overlooked component in global migration history and an important case study in evaluating state-migrant relations.

The increasing movement of peoples into and out of the Ottoman Empire signaled new relationships with states.[15] Episodes of forced assimilation and expulsion of populations do

[11] Ahmet Akgündüz, "Migration to and from Turkey, 1783-1960: Types, Numbers, and Ethno-religious Distinctions," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 24.1 (1998): 97-120.
[12] Kemal Karpat, "The Status of the Muslim under European Rule: The Eviction and Settlement of the Cerkes," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 1.2 (1979): 7.
[13] The number of Jewish migrants increased with the spread of Zionism, prompting Ottoman regulations against group immigration. Mim Kemal Öke, "The Ottoman Empire, Zionism, and the Question of Palestine (1880-1908)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES)* 14.3 (1982): 329-341.
[14] Kemal Karpat, "The Ottoman Emigration to America, 1860-1914," in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002): 90-131.
[15] The expulsion of Caucasians in the 1860s has been referred to as "perhaps the first full-scale ethnic cleansing, or genocide…in our modern era," and the Armenian Genocide was essential in Lemkin's development of the concept

predate the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Strategies of rule intended to create unified communities and assert the legitimacy of state-builders, or "pathological homogenization," characterized state-building attempts prior to the development of nationalism.[16] While the expulsion of peoples from states is not new, the techniques, capacity, and framework for defining political insiders and outsiders in the nineteenth century did differ from earlier patterns. Increased organizational capacity of the state allowed for devastating exclusion of certain groups.[17] Migrations themselves were one sign of increasing capacity "to count, to extract, and to exterminate" not only within imperial Russia but also in the Ottoman Empire, as the science of statistics increased the resolution of the bureaucratic gaze.[18] Migration and settlement are important lenses to consider developing state power. Before I describe nineteenth-century transformations in Ottoman governance, I will outline some of the major Ottoman migrations of the period.

Crimean Peninsula and Caucasus: 1860s

Motion characterized life in the Black Sea region for centuries, but these movements grew vastly in scale in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 1774 Treaty of Küçük

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in the 1940s. Dawn Chatty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Middle East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 94; Peter Balakian, "Raphael Lemkin, Cultural Destruction, and the Armenian Genocide," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 27.1 (2013): 57-89.

[16] Heather Rae, *State Identities*, 3.

[17] Categorizations and stereotypes of immigrant others are themselves a route to reify the homogeneity of the state and social body while expanding the technological apparatus necessary to keep migrants out. Paul Silverstein, "Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34 (2005): 363-384; Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," *Alternatives* 27(2002): 70-77.

[18] Peter Holquist, "To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia," in Ronald Suny and Terry Martin, eds., *A State of Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 112; Matthew Hannah, "Space and Social Control in the administration of the Oglala Lakota ('Sioux'), 1871-1879," *Journal of Historical Geography* 19.4 (1993): 412-432. Holquist emphasizes the role of military statistics in allowing the Russian state to conceptually map its population. "Knowing 'the population'" would make it possible to improve the lives of subjects, but statistical categorizations also allowed for the designation and deportation of "'harmful' or 'unreliable'" groups.

Kaynarca and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783 created increased pressure on Muslims in the peninsula, and perhaps several hundred thousand Crimean and Nogay Tatars immigrated to the Ottoman Empire in the several decades following the 1774 treaty.[19] In the early decades of the nineteenth century, the Russian and Ottoman Empires redistributed Christians and Muslims within border regions in an informal process of colonization and border securitization.[20] The Crimean War marked a shift in the scale of population redistribution. Between 1856 and 1862, nearly two-thirds of the Crimean Tatar population left the peninsula. The end of the Crimean War coincided with a redoubling of Russian efforts to control the Caucasus.[21] Historians have struggled to establish definitive figures, but perhaps 223,000 Tatars left Crimea for the Ottoman Empire during this period, and between 1861 and 1866 more than a million Circassians departed from the Caucasus.[22]

Although a general climate of fear, discrimination, and upheaval prompted movements from both the Crimean Peninsula and the Caucasus, the Russian Empire's policies and actions fluctuated according to time and location. Historians describe the mass migration of Crimean Tatars following the Crimean War as a complex and multi-causal phenomenon. In the decades prior to the war, Crimean Tatars faced land confiscations. Villages on the southern shore of the

[19] The largest estimate for this migration is 500,000. There is surprisingly little secondary literature mentioning this movement, and Fisher notes there is almost no evidence in the Ottoman archive responding to such a large number of arrivals. Alan Fisher, "Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the Years after the Crimean War," *Jahrburcher fur Geschichte Osteuropas* 35.3 (1987): 357.

[20] Mark Pinson, "Demographic Warfare – An Aspect of Ottoman and Russian Policy, 1854-1866" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1970). Mark Pinson describes redistribution of populations as a tactic of "demographic warfare" intended to solidify each state's position in border regions and to more clearly demarcate boundaries. Following the initial exodus of Tatars and Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783, officials attempted to repopulate the area with Greek and Armenian colonists. During and after the 1803 conquest of Ganja, located in contemporary Azerbaijan, Russians and Georgian auxiliaries in the Russian Army were encouraged to massacre Muslims, and Armenians were invited to settle there in their stead. Likewise, Georgians and Armenians were encouraged to settle in Georgia and Karabagh after Russian conquest. Pinson, "Demographic Warfare," 7.

[21] James Meyer, "Immigration, Return, and the Politics of Citizenship: Russian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39 (2007): 16.

[22] Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 67; 69.

peninsula were forcibly relocated during Ottoman-Russian wars. The Crimean War was particularly devastating to populations on the peninsula. Cossack squadrons exacerbated suffering by plundering Tatar villages and commandeered an estimated 40,000 cattle.[23] Crimean Tatars received minimal reparations from the Russian government.[24] During the war, 10,000-20,000 Tatars sought asylum in Allied territory and the Ottoman Empire.[25] This emigration and several small uprisings contributed to a narrative of Tatar disloyalty among some Russian officials.

The devastation of the war, deteriorating trust in the Russian-Tatar relationship, and social upheaval in the peninsula contributed to mass exodus in 1860. In 1859, 50,000 Nogay Tatars left the Kuban. The example of the Nogay Tatars and the beginnings of Circassian emigrations contributed to rumors among the Crimean Tatars of their imminent removal. These rumors worsened when Tsar Alexander II endorsed the 'voluntary emigration' of the Tatar population. Russian officials blamed emigration on religious fanaticism and Ottoman agents sent to attract Crimean Tatars, but observers also recognized the oppression faced by Tatars rendered the religious pull effective. As the number of Muslims fleeing the peninsula grew, the same landowning class that had originally encouraged Tatar migrations realized that the mass departure of the peasant population would be economically devastating. They applied pressure in St. Petersburg. The central government stopped issuing passports to Crimean Tatars, thus forcibly maintaining the remaining population.[26]

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[23] Hakan Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44.5 (2008): 755.
[24] Mara Kozelsky, "Casualties of Conflict: Crimean Tatars during the Crimean War," *Slavic Review* 67.4 (2008): 888.
[25] Kırımlı, "Emigrations", 755.
[26] Brian Glynn Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration from Nineteenth-Century Russia to the Ottoman Empire: A Critical Analysis of the Great Crimean Tatar Emigration of 1860-1861," *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 41.1 (2000): 79-108; Fisher, "Emigration of Muslims", 356-371; Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea," 751-773.

Like Tatars, Muslims in the Caucasus faced disruption from the war and Russian colonization. Far more so than they did with the Tatars, however, Russian officials viewed removal of the Muslim Caucasus population as essential to Russian state security. Whereas Tatars were a settled agriculturalist and urban society, Caucasian populations were mostly nomadic pastoralists. As such they were more impervious to Russian attempts to disarm them, and the mountaineers engaged in full-scale armed opposition to Russian forces. Many Circassian tribes converted to Islam in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Islam became an important rallying force in resisting foreign occupation, and Sheik Shamil became the most famous and successful of Caucasian resistance leaders. Muslim Caucasians assisted the Ottomans on the Caucasus front of the Crimean War, and following the war the Russian Empire launched a strong offensive, ultimately defeating Shamil in 1859. Once Shamil was removed, Russian officials continued their attempt to pacify Circassians. To a far greater extent than the forced migration of the Tatars, the 1861-1866 migrations of the Circassians and other Caucasus groups were an expulsion planned and enacted by the Russian Empire. Entire villages were destroyed. Conquered tribes, faced with a "choice" of resettlement in the Kuban valley in the north, military service in the Tsar's army, or conversion to Christianity, decided instead to immigrate to the Ottoman Empire.[27]

The Ottoman state was unprepared for the large number of migrants arriving in the early 1860s. After 1860 the Russian government formally approached the Ottomans about receiving several Circassian tribes. According to this agreement, the Ottomans anticipated the gradual immigration of 40,000 to 50,000 individuals. Thus, despite setting up an Immigrant Commission in 1860 in anticipation of the population influx, the Ottoman government was ill prepared to provide refuge, especially as the number of arrivals swelled to nearly 400,000 in the spring of

[27] Karpat, *Ottoman Population,* 69.

1864. Of the two million people who left the Russian Empire from 1858-1879, 30% died of malnutrition and disease.[28]

Balkans and Caucasus, 1870s-1880s

A second major migration followed the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878. Fighting during this war occurred in both the Western and Eastern Provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In the 1870s, Bulgarian revolutionaries took advantage of an insurrection in Bosnia to begin their own revolt. With forces already deployed in Bosnia, Ottoman officials decided to arm irregular troops (*başı bozuks*) comprised of Circassians and Turkish Muslims, who plundered Christian villages. Given Western outcry surrounding the behavior of the irregular troops and the Ottoman cancellation of debt payments, the British government initially determined to withdraw military support from the Ottomans. Serbia took advantage of the Bosnian and Bulgarian situation to invade in 1876, but the Ottomans defeated Serbia in a few months. Russia responded by declaring war on the Ottomans, and the Ottoman military was unable to match the Russians on either flank. In the West, the Russian approach to Istanbul was ultimately checked by British warships. In the East, soon after the start of the war, Kars and Erzurum fell to Russian forces. Ottomans dispatched Circassians and Abkhazians in the Caucasus and helped to foment revolt among Muslims in the Caucasus. The 1877-1878 war and its aftermath led to massive migrations from both theaters. A British report from the Black Sea port of Samsun in 1880 estimated there were 40,000 refugees from the Caucasus in the city.[29] The Treaty of Berlin established

[28] Ibid., 67.
[29] Ibid., 69. Based on records from the British Foreign Office, McCarthy estimates a total of 70,000 migrants arrived from the Caucasus during and immediately following the war. Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922* (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1995), 113. Other secondary sources do not offer aggregate estimates of emigration from the Caucasus in the years 1877-1880. Instead, like Karpat, they highlight snapshots based on individual sources from the Foreign Office or Ottoman state. Bilal Şimşir's three-

independence for Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro and autonomy for Bulgaria. İpek estimates 1,230,000 migrants arrived from the Balkans following the war.[30] Other estimates for the period range from one and a half to two million immigrants during the period.[31]

Aside from the two concentrated movements of the 1860s and 1870s, throughout the following decades Muslims continued to arrive from Russia and former Ottoman territories, with potentially 500,000 arriving from the Caucasus between 1880 and the start of WWI and others arriving from Crete and the Balkans.[32] Following the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, another half million Muslims took refuge in Istanbul and Anatolia. In total, from 1783 to 1913, some five to seven million Muslims immigrated to Ottoman Lands. 3.8 million of these migrants were former Russian subjects.[33] Mass migrations and loss of land radically changed the composition of the Ottoman population. Though the population of the empire in 1914, twenty six million, was approximately the same as it had been in 1800, population density effectively doubled during the period, as the empire's area decreased from 300,000 sq. km. to 1,300,000 sq. km.[34] In 1820 59.6% of population was Muslim. By 1890 76.2% of the population was Muslim.[35]

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volume collection provides many of examples of these primary source estimates. See Bilal Şimşir, *Turkish Emigrations from the Balkans*, 1, 2 & 3 (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 1989).

[30] Nedim İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, *1877-1890* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), 41.

[31] Karpat *Ottoman Population*, 70; Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, 117-118.

[32] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 70.

[33] Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms: 1812-1914," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2, ed. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 793.

[34] Ibid., 777.

[35] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 72.

Table 1: Mortality and Migration of Muslims.[36]

	Estimated Deaths	Estimated Refugees
Crimea, 1789-1800	--	200,000
Greek Revolution	25,000	10,000 (setting out)
Caucasian Wars, 1827-1829	Unknown	26,000 (surviving)
Crimea,1850-1862	75,000	300,000 (setting out)
Caucasus, 1860-1865	400,000	1,200,000 (setting out)
Bulgaria, 1877-1878	260,000	515,000 (setting out)
Eastern War 1877-1878	Unknown	70,000 (surviving)
Crete, 1898	---	87,000
Balkan Wars, 1912-1913	1,450,000	410,000 (setting out)
E. Anatolia, 1914-1921	1,190,000	900,000 (internal refugees)
Caucasus, 1914-1921	410,000	270,000 (setting out)
W. Anatolia 1914-1922	1,250,000	480,000 (setting out) 1,200,000 (internal refugees)
Total	5,060,000	5,668,000

The social structure of each migrant group to some extent conditioned newcomers' placement within the Ottoman Empire. Tatars settled mainly in Dobruca, a region in contemporary Bulgaria. By 1880, Tatars comprised 38% of the population of the region.[37] Initially Circassians settled in the Balkans as well as Anatolia. This pattern changed in the late 1860s, when newcomers were placed in Anatolia and the Levant. Given their history of armed resistance, Circassians were viewed as more disruptive to the populations among whom they were settled. Some historians speculate the placement of Circassians in Bulgaria contributed to

[36] Table adapted from McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 339. Historians have generated estimates of migrant flows during this period based on incomplete and piecemeal records generated by Russian and Ottoman officials, foreign consuls, and other observers. McCarthy's work has been called into question given his advocacy against recognizing the Armenian genocide, but his numbers are comparable to the other estimates I provide in Appendix A (Table 6). I strongly disagree with McCarthy's political position and advocacy, and I include this modified table solely as a quick reference highlighting the scope of Muslim migration during the period.
[37] Fisher, "Emigration of Muslims," 368.

growing nationalism in Balkans. Alan Fisher asserts the Circassians' "arrival [in Eastern Anatolia] more than likely helped set off the vicious struggles between nomad and settled, between Christian and Muslim, that were to characterize the remaining years of the nineteenth century."[38]

I have briefly outlined the range of conditions characterizing movements within the sixty-year period spanning 1850-1910. My focus on this period emerges from my interest in changing relationships between migrants and the state. The Ottoman Empire created an Immigrant Commission in 1860, reflecting the spirit of that era's administrative reforms. I choose to end the study in 1908, following the commencement of the Second Constitutional era. There are continuities in settlement policy and migrant administration following 1908, but there are also clear divergences. Though many administrative policies remained the same, the Committee of Union and Progress increasingly collapsed its bureaucratic oversight of the settlement of tribes and migrants.[39] Committee leaders also experienced an essential ideological break following the Balkan Wars. Loss of territory in the Balkans following this conflict was traumatic for ruling officials, and it encouraged an increased focus on Anatolia as the heartland of the empire.[40] As Turkism became an official ideology, migrants themselves questioned their role within Ottoman society.[41] Finally, engaging with the aftermath of migrations requires extending discussion past arrival and into the following years of migrant experience. Given the waves of immigrants

[38] Ibid., 370.
[39] The Committee of Union and Progress contributed to the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, and became the majority party in parliament following the reinstatement of the constitution.
[40] Ronald Grigor Suny, *"They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else": A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 183-188.
[41] See, for example, Mehmet Fetgerey Suenu, *Osmanlı Alem-i İçtimaisinde Çerkes Kadınları: Çerkeslik, Türklük* (İstanbul: Zarafet Matbaası, 1914). Members of the North Caucasian diaspora in Western Anatolia briefly attempted to advocate for a Circassian-Greek state and rebelled against Mustafa Kemal's National Movement. Ryan Gingeras, "Notorious Subjects, Invisible Citizens: North Caucasian Resistance to the Turkish National Movement in Northwestern Anatolia, 1919-1923," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40 (2008): 89-108.

arriving following the Balkan Wars, WWI, and the Turkish War of Independence, an ongoing focus on integration would require extending the scope of this dissertation by several decades.

Migration and Reform in the Late Ottoman Empire

The Muslim migrations capture the developing nature of governance in both the Russian and Ottoman Empires. As the Russian Empire underwent a period of bureaucratic expansion, asserting greater control over more peripheral areas, the Ottoman Empire was likewise in the midst of a reform era, which involved a radical, though gradual, restructuring of its bureaucracy. Both the expulsion and the resettlement of the migrants were part of larger strategies of population management, economic policy, and imperialism in an era when both governments were shaping distinctive methods of rule. Migration policies and movements reflected new goals of an Ottoman state responding to international political shifts, economic problems, and nationalist movements.[42]

Migrants entered the empire during an age of flux and reform, and Ottoman leaders had multiple motives for accepting migrants and refugees despite the state's limited finances. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire faced manpower shortages and lacked intensive cultivation of its arable land, and Ottoman officials viewed increasing the population as a route to improved defensive capacity and economic development.[43] Researchers have outlined several essential reasons for the Ottoman Empire's decision to accept large numbers of refugees. First, accepting migrants was a tactic intended to develop agricultural production and expand the tax base. Accepting the Muslim refugees fit into the state's liberal immigration policy of the mid-

[42] Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, 86.
[43] During the last century of its existence, the Ottoman Empire battled through ten wars and seven major insurrections. Within a fifty-year period (1810-1860), the empire lost territories in Egypt (1811), Bessarabia (1812), Serbia (1817), Greece (1828), Abaza and Mingrelia (1829), and Moldavia and Wallachia (1856). Quataert, "The Age of Reforms," 767.

nineteenth century. Immigrants were to be offered an initial payment, land and supplies, and tax breaks in hopes that the increased population would allow Ottomans to raise revenue. Raising revenue became an increasingly compelling concern, as eventually a quarter of state income went to servicing Ottoman debt.[44]

Second, Ottomans viewed the Muslim migrants as agents who could stabilize frontiers and serve in the military. Accepting Muslim migrants created an opportunity to adjust population distribution in provinces with significant Christian populations. This tactic reflected the threat of national separatist movements and the Great Powers' tendency to undermine Ottoman sovereignty by acting as protectors of the empire's Christian populations. A later decision to restrict the permission and benefits of immigration almost exclusively to Muslim migrants reflected the concern that invitations to Christians would allow European states more opportunities to undermine Ottoman sovereignty.[45] Population increase generated through immigration could also augment the strength of the Ottoman military.

Third, accepting Muslim refugees was a politically powerful statement of the Ottoman sultan's role as caliph and protector of a worldwide Muslim community. Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) in particular employed Pan-Islamism as an internal point of legitimacy among an increasingly Muslim majority state and as an international soft-power tactic against colonial states with significant Muslim populations. Rejecting the migrants would have undermined the Sultan's appeal among international Muslim communities.[46]

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[44] Engin Akarlı, "Economic Policy and Budgets in Ottoman Turkey, 1876-1909," *Middle Eastern Studies* 28.3 (1992): 457-458.
[45] Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 185-6.
[46] For an extensive discussion of Abdülhamid II's efforts to follow and control representations of himself and the empire see Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998).

Rationales for accepting migrants must be understood in reference to Ottoman responses to various threats to the empire's economic, territorial, and political security. Migrants' history after arrival is likewise tied to the course of Ottoman reform, of which the previously mentioned population and agricultural policies were one component.

The nineteenth-century migrations span the *Tanzimat* and the Hamidian eras, both of which were characterized by reform and extension of the central state. This reform period emerged out of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. A series of Ottoman defeats in the eighteenth century encouraged attempts to restructure the military, which in turn led to new efforts to establish efficient tax collection and administration. Reforms began with Sultans Selim III (r. 1761-1808) and Mahmut II (r. 1789-1839), but centralization efforts shifted to the bureaucracy in the early nineteenth century.

In 1839, Sultan Abdülmecid I promulgated the Gülhane Rescript, typically designated as the starting point for period of administrative reorganization and wide-ranging legislative changes known as the *Tanzimat* (1856-1876). The Tanzimat era saw the adoption of legal equality and representation among the empire's religious-administrative groups, which culminated in the 1876 constitution. Legal equality reflected reformers' attempts to respond to the spread of nationalism through fostering Ottomanism, a supranational identity, among the empire's inhabitants.[47] The 1876 constitution was short-lived, as Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1908) abrogated it two years later in the midst of the Russo-Ottoman war. Abdülhamid's reign is often depicted as representing a significant break from the liberal spirit of the Tanzimat era. Still, despite abrogating the constitution, Abdülhamid II continued the trajectory of centralizing reforms, particularly in fields such as education and surveillance that were intended to increase

[47] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 71-76, 106-108.

Ottoman security through intervening in and shaping subjects' lives and identities.[48] Following the Tanzimat era, rank and file bureaucrats subscribed to the belief that the state could organize outcomes of social and economic wellbeing for its subjects.[49] During both the Tanzimat and the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, standardizing curriculums, initiating a quarantine administration and sanitation regulations, developing a systematic census, and founding vocational orphanages were components of state centralization, attempts to render the population more legible, and endeavors in social engineering.[50]

Though the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods created change within the empire, reformers faced obstacles in enacting policy. Territorial loss functioned as an instigator in reform, but conflict with Russia and the spread of national separatist movements contributed to ongoing shrinkage of the empire's area. The Eastern Question, or the diplomatic wrangling of European powers over the potential demise of the Ottoman Empire, contributed to the rationale for increased European intervention in Ottoman reform and society. The Great Powers enacted change in the Ottoman Empire through capitulations and protectorships over non-Muslims, which tended to weaken Ottoman reforms and exacerbate separatism.[51] Just as the Ottomans signified the equality of their subjects through the Tanzimat reforms, the Great Powers increasingly intervened in the status of the empire's religious groups through the capitulations,

[48] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 11. See also Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire: 1839-1909: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline* (Leiden: Brill, 2001).
[49] Maurus Reinkowski, "The State's Security and the Subject's Prosperity: Notions of Order in Ottoman Bureaucratic Correspondence (19th Century)" in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 195-214.
[50] Notably, in 1879, Abdülhamid II ordered the establishment of sub-provincial offices to collect local statistics on a range of topics including numbers of prisoners, exported and imported goods, conditions of the forests, and numbers of students, which were then circulated through the Ministries of Commerce, Finance, Agriculture, Justice, and Education. Fatma Müge Göçek and M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Western Knowledge, Imperial Control, and the Use of Statistics in the Ottoman Empire," *Center for Research on Social Organization* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1993), 9-10.
[51] The capitulations were a series of legal and economic agreements protecting the extraterritorial rights of non-Ottoman subjects in the empire. The capitulations also offered tax and customs duties exemptions. The scope of the capitulations increasingly widened in the eighteenth century, and many non-Muslim Ottoman subjects ultimately accessed these exemptions.

and religious identity became a stronger source of political power.[52] The Treaty of Berlin put forward principles of representative government that further encouraged division of the population according to religion. Influenced by this threat and the increased proportion of Muslim subjects, Abdülhamid employed pan-Islamism to encourage the loyalty and cohesion of all Muslims within the empire.

Financial obstacles undermined the state's capacity to enact reform. Tanzimat reformers and Abdülhamid both faced monetary shortages.[53] The Ottoman Empire incurred a significant foreign debt for the first time following the Crimean War. The 1877-1878 war led to a major loss of the richest and most economically developed provinces in the empire. The Ottoman Public Debt administration retained control over a large segment of Ottoman revenue beginning in 1881.[54]

Economic, political, and territorial security concerns are essential to understanding the changing techniques of governance developed during late Ottoman rule. Efforts to reform Ottoman administrative structure, grow the economy, and counteract nationalism underlay attempts to settle nomadic groups, educate subjects, restructure land tenure, and expand mobility and communication via railways, roads, and telegraph lines. Despite obstacles, the post-Tanzimat

[52] Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000); Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2012).

[53] For example, officials reached broad consensus over the components of necessary reform in Ottoman Iraq from the 1870s through the 1910s but faced financial and political obstacles. Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 24-48.

[54] The OPDA's initial sources of revenue came from the salt and tobacco monopolies, stamp and spirits tax, fish tax, silk tithe, Bulgaria tribute, revenue from Eastern Rumelia, and Cyprus surplus. It later expanded into other sectors. For an extended discussion of the OPDA's founding and its role in peripheralizing the Ottoman economy, see Murat Birdal, *The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010.) Engin Akarlı's evaluation of Ottoman budgets shows that the Tanzimat, Hamidian, and Young Turk periods were characterized by officials' failure to extract enough revenue from the population, though the infrastructure created during the Hamidian period did improve agricultural production toward the end of his reign. See Engin Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1976) and Akarlı, "Economic Policy and Budgets," 443-476.

Ottoman state developed the infrastructural and administrative foundation of Ottoman successor states.[55] The push toward settling populations and registering land ownership was an essential component of Ottoman reforms, but this era was also characterized by state sponsorship and increased control over educational, health, and religious institutions. Aid and education were related tactics in an Ottoman effort to mold loyal populations both among local groups and the newly settled.[56] The extensions of these institutions promoted new relationships between rulers and ruled as the state gained greater power to intervene in individuals' lives.[57] Changes in Ottoman governance intertwine with migrants' experiences with state policies and officials.

Literature Review

Despite the ubiquity of migration within Ottoman history, Ottoman studies and migration studies have largely remained separate endeavors. The compartmentalization of forced migration, internal migrations, and nomadism, the prevalence of scholarship on the transatlantic corridor, and the peripheral status of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey in the global economy have rendered the Ottoman/Turkish experience outside key scholarly debates within migration studies.[58] Likewise, insights from migration studies have only lately been applied to analyze mobility in Ottoman and Turkish society. In recent years, historians have begun connecting population movements to major changes in Ottoman state and society, exploring how attempts to control mobility reflected new institutional capacities, and analyzing how migrants contributed to fault lines within late Ottoman and Turkish society. Recent research applying themes of

[55] Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2-5. See also Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq*.
[56] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 77.
[57] Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 13-15.
[58] The Armenian Genocide and the Population Exchange are exceptions. Both of these events have been important case studies for scholars developing frameworks and definitions to understanding all aspects of genocide and ethnic cleansing. See Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001) and Rae, *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples*.

globalization, transnationalism, mobility, and identity to analysis of movement in the late Ottoman Empire has built upon an important foundation of histories describing Russian and Ottoman policy, demographic change, and the scale and logistics of migrant arrival and settlement.

In analyzing policy toward Muslims within the Russian Empire, historians have considered whether Muslim emigrations reflected a deliberate and direct policy of expulsion. An initial historiographical debate addressed whether Muslims emigrating from Crimea and the Caucasus were religiously motivated. Characterizing these movements as indicative of religious fanaticism was a tactic in describing Muslims' disloyalty to the Russian state; fanaticism explained mass migration and exculpated Russian and later Soviet policies of population removal. Historians have addressed this narrative on two points. First, nationalities scholarship argued that Tatars and other populations had been unfairly cast as traitors.[59] Rather than fanaticism, migrants were motivated by the social disruption of colonization and violent oppression of the early to mid-nineteenth century.[60] Second, scholars have evaluated the incorporation of Islam into Russian governance of its Muslim populations and considered how Muslims leveraged Islam in participating in Russian rule.[61] More nuanced perspectives on colonization both undermine the narrative of long-term hostility or inevitable religious conflict among Russian officials and Muslim populations and offer a better framework to directly evaluate fluctuating Russian policy toward Crimean Tatars and Caucasus Muslims.

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[59] Alan Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1978).
[60] Kozelsky, "Casualties of conflict," 888; Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea," 751-773.
[61] Crews, Robert. *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); James Meyer, *Turks across Empires: Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian-Ottoman Borderlands, 1856-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); James Meyer, "Speaking Sharia to the State: Muslim Protesters, Tsarist Officials, and the Islamic Discourses of Late Imperial Russia," *Kritika* 14.3 (2013): 485-505. Rather than in conflict, Crews describes some Muslims as agents of the state. Meyer takes a more nuanced view in describing Muslims' use of aspects of Russian administration to carve out their own political spaces.

Analyses of Ottoman policy have prompted research into the political and institutional framework Ottoman officials established to disperse Muslim immigrants.[62] Historians continue to explore to what extent the movement of Muslims and Christians across the Ottoman-Russian border occurred through formal or informal population exchange.[63] Evaluation of immigration policy reveals the empire's shift from relatively liberal immigration policies to narrower criteria for entrance due to budgetary concerns, the threat of nationalism, and Muslim migrations alleviating the need to attract other newcomers.[64] The outcome of the Treaty of Berlin at the beginning of Abdülhamid II's reign contributed to the restriction of non-Muslim immigration. Likewise, losses in Balkan Wars catalyzed the Committee of Union and Progress' interest in Turkifying and Islamifying the Anatolian population.[65]

Discussions of Ottoman immigration policy have also engaged with questions of settlement and aid. Ahmet Eren's transliteration and exposition of key documents related to the establishment of the Immigrant Commission remains foundational in evaluating the Ottoman state's institutional response to mass migration.[66] In Eren's celebratory analysis, the migrations were important not only in their demographic aspect, but in highlighting "Turkey's" early commitment to protecting migrant rights and allowing freedom of entry to all without regard to

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[62] Pinson, "Demographic Warfare."
[63] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 67; Margarita Dobreva, "Circassian Colonization in the Danube Vilayet and Social Integration (Preliminary Notes)," *OTAM* 33/Bahar 2013: 1-4.
[64] Başak Kale, "Transforming an Empire: The Ottoman Empire's Immigration and Settlement Policies in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *Middle Eastern Studies* 50.2 (2014): 252-271. Kale describes restrictions on mass immigration of Jews during the Hamidian period as an example of this narrowing. She draws her data from Karpat, "Ottoman Immigration Policies and Settlement in Palestine," (783-799) and "Jewish Population Movements in the Ottoman Empire, 1862-1914" (146-168) in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
[65] Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918)* (İstanbul: İleteşim Yayınları, 2001).
[66] Ahmet Cevat Eren, *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri: Tanzimat Devri, Ilk Kurulan Göçmen Komisyonu, Çıkarılan Tüzüker* (Istanbul: Nurgök Matbaası, 1966). David Cuthell's analysis of the first five years of the Immigrant Commission is also exceptional. David Cameron Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonu: An Agent in the Transformation of Ottoman Anatolia, 1860-1866" (PhD Diss. Columbia University, 2005). I discuss his work at greater length in Chapter One.

religion, sect, and race.[67] Historians have built on his initial exposition of Ottoman state sources, elaborating Ottoman policy on a smaller scale by explicating state plans to distribute aid or create migrant villages.[68] They have also begun the important work of exploring the extent to which the Ottoman state was able to enact settlement policies, showing, for example, how Armenian, British, and Russian objections limited the success of Ottoman attempts to colonize Eastern Anatolia with Circassians.[69]

Alongside issues of policy, demography offers an important lens to consider social change. Kemal Karpat's work highlights the radical changes in population composition during the period. He estimates a rough total of 5,000,000 arrivals from the mid-nineteenth century through World War I.[70] Karpat's discussion reveals the difficulty of calculating exact numbers of immigrants and emigrants. The Russian and Ottoman Empire struggled to tabulate the number of people on the move from Crimea and the Caucasus, and population records were increasingly politicized in the nineteenth century. Historians can offer snapshots of the scale of movement through examining Ottoman records and dispatches from foreign observers.[71] Karpat emphasizes Ottoman census materials are likely to be the most accurate for estimating the population, as they

[67] Eren, *Türkiye'de Göç*, 92.
[68] Faruk Kocacık, "XIX. Yüzyılda Göçmen Köylerine İlişkin Bazı Yapı Planları," *Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi* 32 (1979): 415-426; Nedim İpek, "Göçmen Köylerine Dair," *Tarih ve Toplum*, 150 (1996): 15-21; Kemal Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism: The Crimean Emigration to Dobruca and the Founding of Mecidiye, 1856-1878," in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History*, 202-234.
[69] Georgi Chochiev and Bekir Koç, "Some Notes on the Settlement of Northern Caucasians in Eastern Anatolia and Their Adaptation Problems (the Second Half of the XIXth Century-Beginning of the XXth Century)," *Journal of Asian History* 40.1 (2006): 80-103. The role of other European Powers and the emerging Balkan states in the development and enactment of Ottoman policy has been more thoroughly analyzed in evaluations of the Population Exchange and the Armenian Genocide. See Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Onur Yıldırım, *Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of Populations, 1922-1934* (New York: Routledge, 2006).
[70] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*.
[71] I list and provide citations for these estimates in Appendix A, Table 6.

were intended for internal consumption and precise taxation rather than as routes to territorial or representative claims.[72]

Research into migrant transportation and aid contributes to historians' sense of the scale of population movements during the period. Faruk Kocacık, Abdullah Saydam, and Nedim İpek have provided essential detail regarding numbers, expenses, routes, and Ottoman attempts to coordinate funding and address migrant epidemics.[73] Their explications of Ottoman sources provide important groundwork for other historians to apply theoretical and analytical frameworks to the course and outcomes of the migrations.

Comprehensive frameworks reveal patterns in the causes of migration over time. For example, Kemal Karpat has evaluated the centuries long movement of Muslims from former Ottoman territories as a "Muslim retreat" analogous to and informed by Muhammad's *hijra* in the seventh century.[74] As I discuss below, Karpat has revisited this perspective in his numerous discussions of Muslim migrants.[75] In evaluating longer patterns of migration, typologies can distinguish migration systems based on analysis of voluntary or involuntary movement and chronological phases. İlhan Tekeli's work divides involuntary displacement in the region into six periods: the classical period of the sixteenth century, the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century, the early twentieth century prior to the creation of the Turkish state, and an early and late period within the Republic of Turkey. He distinguishes these periods based on four dimensions: causes, which he relates to state structures, rationalizations, which he relates to political regimes, the rights of the individual in relation to the state, and organization of

[72] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 4-7.
[73] Faruk Kocacık, "Balkanlar'dan Anadolu'ya Yönelik Göçler," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 1 (1980): 137-190; İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*; Abdullah Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri, 1856-1876* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997).
[74] The *hijra* refers to the flight of Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Yathrib (Medina) in 622CE. This foundational event marks year zero in the hijri calendar. The term *muhajirin* (migrants) designated Muhammad's followers from Mecca, who were respected for withstanding persecution for their belief in Islam.
[75] Karpat, "The Status of the Muslim under European Rule," 7.

resettlement.[76] While Tekeli's analysis is focused on state factors, Ahmet Akgündüz applies a world-systems framework, arguing the economic peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire structured movement. Ethno-religious, ideological, and cultural attributes influenced how various groups were affected by this peripheralization. Though his approach differs from that of both Karpat and Tekeli, Akgündüz's framework manages to encompass both the cultural and structural factors influencing the impetus for and directionality of migration.[77]

Evaluations of migrant routes and arrival add further nuance to the voluntary-involuntary analytical divide. By grappling with the question of coercion, scholars have assessed migrant agency and explored reasons migrants chose the Ottoman Empire as their destination. Karpat reads Circassian migration as an act of final resistance against the Russian Empire. In his reading, religion was a category of enforced otherness in the Russian Empire but it was also a resource within a shifting field of coercion and volition.[78] Karpat asserts resistance movements in the Caucasus arose in part through the appeal of a popular and egalitarian Islam, which helped to forge a common Caucasian or Circassian identity in the middle of the nineteenth-century. This new "social and political consciousness of being Muslim" contributed to the appeal of the Ottoman Empire for migrants.[79]

Investigations of migrant choice have also led to considerations of migration systems and the importance of networks. For example, scholars have examined how Crimean Tatars became receptive to an "imagined homeland/community" in the Ottoman Empire and explored why

[76] İlhan Tekeli, "Involuntary Displacement and the Problem of Resettlement in Turkey from the Ottoman Empire to the Present," Center for Migration Studies Special Issues: *Population Displacement and Resettlement: Development and Conflict in the Middle East* 11.4 (1994): 202-226.
[77] Akgündüz, "Migration to and from Turkey," 97-120.
[78] Karpat, "Status of Muslims," 11.
[79] Ibid., 10.

contemporary Circassians in Turkey continue to use the rhetoric of the Islamic homeland.[80] Chains of communication between earlier migrants and those remaining in the Crimea and Caucasus continued to initiate movement throughout the period.[81]

Reassessing state strength and migrant capacity for action likewise addresses the extent of coercion. For example, Meyer discusses Crimean Tatars' ability to navigate the loopholes of changing imperial definitions of citizenship. Even as the Ottoman and Russian Empires applied new tactics of counting and classifying populations, some individuals existed as subjects of both states and employed this dual jurisdiction to their advantage. Maintaining a dual "citizenship" worked for migrants in multiple ways, most notably in allowing for the ease of their return and for seeking protection from Russian consulates in times of legal trouble within the Ottoman Empire.[82] Thus, even while state political struggles between the empires contributed to the initiation of movement and paths to settlement, migrants' were able to benefit from jurisdictional overlap and navigate each state's increasing interest in classifying and settling its populations.

Meyer's depiction of migrant agency offers a rebuttal to previous assumptions of migrant integration. In a seminal text on Ottoman demographic and population history, Kemal Karpat writes of migrants from the Caucasus,

> Uprooted from their native places, deprived of their traditional tribal leaders, and fragmented into small groups for settlement, the Circassians integrated themselves rapidly into the large socio-political unit, that is, into a Muslim-Turkish nation formed under the Ottoman aegis. The linguistic differences between Circassians, ethnic Turks in Anatolia, and other refugees who had settled in Anatolia were superseded by common

[80] B. Glyn Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration," 104; Seteney Khalid Shami, "Prehistories of Globalization: Circassian Identity in Motion," *Public Culture* 12.1(2000): 183. In discussing "imagined communities," scholars are of course referencing Benedict Anderson's famous study of the modern origins of nationalism. Bendict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991).
[81] Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration," 105; Karpat, "Status of Muslims," 11.
[82] Meyer, "Immigration, Return, and the Politics of Citizenship," 24-25. This is a particularly interesting point given that European agitation on behalf of Ottoman subjects, particularly merchants, typically benefitted Christians rather than Muslims.

> religious and political ties as all of them were amalgamated into a single political and cultural entity.[83]

The influx of politically conscious Muslims changed the population dynamics and politics of the late Ottoman state, but Meyer's work responds to this assimilationist perspective through highlighting the dynamics of circular migration and return.[84] Evaluations of the persistence of migrant enclaves, variations in economic success, and obstacles to migrant settlement likewise enrich and complicate the narrative of incorporation.[85] Identification with migrant pasts emerged due to settlement in independent and remote villages within Anatolia.[86] Proximity to homelands and urban environments also allowed for the 'production of locality' and activation of place-based politics.[87] Analyses of diaspora or local identities offer promising routes to considering processes of change, moments of loyalty, and negotiated dynamics among migrants, the state, and other populations.

Scholars have begun to place mobility at the center of understanding late Ottoman history. Kasaba recasts nomads as essential to the structural integrity of the Ottoman Empire, not

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[83] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 75.

[84] Scholars focusing on intellectual movements such as Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism have explored intellectuals' ability to move across several empires and espouse various visions of group identity. See for example, A. Holly Shissler, 2003. *Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003). Meyer's work is one of the first to apply these frameworks to more run of the mill migrants. More recently, Karpat has described the process as Muslim migrant incorporation as "restructuring," to emphasize processes of change to which migrants contributed. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 344.

[85] Georgi Chochiev and Bekir Koc, "Some Notes on the Settlement of Northern Caucasians in Eastern Anatolia," 80-103. Margarita Dobreva's use of tithe registers to trace the economic trajectory of migrants in the Danube province reveals migrants' struggles persisted years after placement and may have undermined their adaptation to their new environments. Dobreva, "Circassian Colonization in the Danube Vilayet," 1-30.

[86] Brian Glynn Williams, "A Homeland Lost. Migration, the Diaspora Experience, and the Forging of Crimean Tatar Identity," (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin Madison, 1999); Georgi Chochiev, "On the History of the North Caucasus Diaspora in Turkey," *Iran and the Caucasus* 11.2 (2007): 213-226; Nejla Gunay, "The Migration and Settling of the Ashika Turks in the Late Period of the Ottoman Empire/Osmanlı'nın Son Döneminde Ahıska Türklerinin Anadolu'ya Göç ve Iskan," *Bilig* 61(2012): 121-142; Şerife Geniş and Kelly Lynne Maynard, "Formation of a Diasporic Community: The History of Migration and Resettlement of Muslim Albanians in the Black Sea Region of Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45.4(2009): 553-569.

[87] Pınar Şenişik, "Cretan Muslim Immigrants, Imperial Governance and the 'Production of Locality' in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 49.1 (2013): 92-106. Collected essays in Rene Hirschon's *Crossing the Aegean* offer similar insights into the persistence of migrant identities following the Population Exchange. Rene Hirschon, ed. *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey* (New York: Berghann Books, 2003).

just in its incipient years but throughout its six-century existence. Nonetheless, he notes the relationship between state and nomad changed over time as administrators redefined state structure and the relationship of the state to Ottoman subjects. While early migrations were fluid, relatively organic processes, the migrations of the last century of Ottoman rule represented the work of an inflexible state interpreting and valuing identity in a fundamentally new and different way.[88]

Migrations also highlight the changing role of the centralizing state, the imperial politics of the Eastern Question, and the growing importance of nationalism. The role of the state in creating boundaries and a developing sense of belonging tied to citizenship is essential to understanding the incorporation of Muslim migrants and the contexts for other forced migrations in the transition from empire to republic, as these events took place within an era of the growing importance of nationalism and the interference of the Great Powers.

Studies of state attempts to manage mobility provide insight into the changing nature of state power. Ottoman officials had long been interested in controlling subjects' movement, particularly beginning in the reign of Mahmut II, but the state's ability to support the efficacy and authority of such documents increased with the Tanzimat. The Ottoman state employed internal passes to control immigrants' and emigrants' movement, and in earlier periods had attempted to stem out-migration through limited issuing of passports.[89] Emphasizing the interest of the state in mobility reveals increased attempts to control internal and cross-border movement.[90] Rather than an attempt to curb all movement, Ottoman responses to illegal

[88] Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, 12.
[89] See Cristoph Herzog, "Migration and the State: On Ottoman Regulations Concerning Migration since the Age of Mahmud II," in *The City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the Making of Urban Modernity*, ed. Ulrike Freitag, Malte Fuhrmann, Nora Lafi, and Florian Riedler (London: Routledge, 2011), 117-134; Karpat, "The Ottoman Emigration to America, 90-131.
[90] Michael Christopher Low, "Empire and the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and Pan-Islam under British Surveillance, 1865-1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40 (2008): 269-290; Lale Can, "Connecting People: A

migration balanced an economic need for mobile labor with concerns that emigration could contribute to the spread revolutionary organizations.[91] The ability to manage migration reinforced the empire's claims to sovereignty. For example, the ability to manage migration after the formation of the Autonomous Province of Eastern Rumelia allowed Russia, Ottomans, and the provincial government itself to claim the administrative expertise of a 'civilized' state.[92] Ongoing analysis of how migrants fit into this era of social change will continue to illuminate the course and context of Ottoman reforms.

Ideally, studies of migration can illuminate migrant agency as well as structural factors influencing movement. Isa Blumi's recent analysis of Ottoman migration stresses the importance of reframing Ottoman history through refugees, and in so doing, asserting the agency of refugee communities in both the empire and its successor states. [93] His expansive definition of refugee includes all those in exile, collapsing 'spiritual', economic, and physical removal.[94] He emphasizes the experience of Ottoman labor migrants in transatlantic migrations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and focuses on the role of Anglo-European financiers and states in contributing to instability within the Balkans as a means to uproot a global working class. He highlights migrant agency through describing the rapid political activation of refugees

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Central Asian Sufi Network in Turn-of-the-century Istanbul," *Modern Asian Studies* 46.2 (2012), 384, 397; Christopher Gratien, "The Mountains are Ours: Ecology and Settlement in Late Ottoman and Early Republican Cilicia, 1856-1956," (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2015.)

[91] David Gutman, "Armenian Migration to North America, State Power, and Local Politics in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 34.1 (2014): 176-190.

[92] Anna Mirkova, "'Population Politics' at the End of Empire: Migration and Sovereignty in Ottoman Empire Rumelia, 1877-1886," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 55.4 (2013): 955-985. Michael Low has also described ways in which attempting to control pilgrimage and disease offered a route to undermine Ottoman sovereignty and control over the hajj. See Low, "Empire and the Hajj."

[93] Isa Blumi, *Ottoman Refugees, 1878-1939: Migration in a Post-Imperial World* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).

[94] In this, Blumi anticipates to some extent Thomas Nail's expansive definition of the "figure of the migrant", a political figure emerging through the forces of territorial, political, juridical, and economic expulsion. Within a "regime of social motion," expulsion refers to the "degree to which a migrant is deprived or dispossessed of a certain status in this regime." Thomas Nail, *The Figure of the Migrant* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 3.

in Kosovo and Southern Iraq. "Integrative politics" emerged as migrants adopted violence and Ottoman legislative language to assert claims over resources.[95]

Blumi's account asserts migrants as essential actors in this period and integrates Ottoman subjects' mobility into global history. In focusing on migrants as disruptors and emphasizing the instability of Ottoman rule, he critiques a reading of the Ottoman reform period, particularly following 1878, as one of increasing state control:

> The state, in other words, developed institutionally as a response to local instability. This dramatically changes how we study 'reform' in the Ottoman case specifically; and I would suggest it also challenges popular trends to link these new laws to a 'will to improve' as suggest first by Michel Foucault and later developed by James C. Scott. This means that the state was often compelled to use one community's resources to placate another's rebellion, a policy that created the conditions after 1900 for an endless spiral of violence, disgruntlement, and instability.[96]

Blumi argues challenges to state control undermine a narrative of the development of modern governance. His discussion of the state is a secondary argument of his work, which is focused instead on exploring the origins of nationalist violence and its activation by European Powers in service to the global economic regime. This approach overlooks essential governmental projects of the period. Blumi's attention to the role of refugee communities in forging their own histories is an essential corrective to histories devoid of migrant agency, but his analysis unnecessarily discounts Ottoman administrative responses as a factor framing migrant actions within the empire.

In their recent work on migration within Russian political space, Lewis Siegelbaum and Leslie Moch narrate migration experiences as "a function of the interplay of regimes and

[95] Blumi's evaluation of integration politics in Nis complements Oktay Özel's work on migration politics in Ordu. Both highlight how migrants and others responded to changes in local and regional power structures brought about by migrant settlement. Blumi, *Ottoman Refugees*, 48; Oktay Özel, "Migration and Power Politics: The Settlement of Georgian Immigrants in Turkey (1878-1908)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 46.4 (2010), 477-496.
[96] Blumi, *Ottoman Refugees*, 60.

repertoires of migration."[97] Migration regimes refer to state "policies, practices, and infrastructures designed to both foster and limit human movement," while repertoires refer to "migrants' own practices, their relationships and networks of contact that permitted adaptation to particular migration regimes."[98] Blumi's work is rich in its evaluation of migrant repertoires, but less invested in considering state regimes. Analysis of Ottoman migration and settlement regimes provides context to enrich Blumi's insightful juxtaposition of global financial systems and local responses. Evaluating the history and scope of migration administration in the Ottoman Empire highlights patterns of governance influencing episodes of resistance, articulations of power, and tactics of accommodation on the part of immigrants and officials.

Theoretical Approach

The analytical toolboxes of governmentality, legibility, and territoriality are useful in posing fundamental questions about the development and application of migration regimes. During the mid-nineteenth century, immigration emerged within the Ottoman Empire as a problem requiring coordinated, centralized intervention. The effort to organize immigration and settlement reflected one component of the Ottoman state's realignment of governance toward rational management of its population and the economy. This shift in qualitative concerns about the population reflected the emergence of modern statecraft, a process Foucault traces to the eighteenth century.[99] Population became "a kind of living entity with a history and a development, and with possibilities of pathology"; it became a knowable, with characteristics

[97] Lewis Siegebaum and Leslie Page Moch, *Broad is My Native Land: Repertoires and Regimes of Migration in Russia's Twentieth Century* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2014), 7.
[98] Ibid., 3; 5.
[99] Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell. Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 102.

that could be evaluated through statistics.[100] Statistics, discourses, and technologies of welfare contributed to the regulation of population health and the administration of life, or bio-politics.[101]

Attempts to manage the productive capacity of the state's human and natural resources rely on abstractions, simplifications, and standardizations to organize a diverse range of practices. Administrators "assess the life of their society by a series of typifications that are always some distance from the full reality these abstractions are meant to capture."[102] These typifications capture the information most essential to officials' goals.[103] Abstractions allow officials to replace the impenetrable logic of local contexts in order to govern legible populations and territories.

Governmentality has spatial manifestations.[104] Officials' interest in increasing the welfare and productive capacity of the population requires locating individuals within imperial space.[105] Territorialization, or "the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area" is essential to generating legible spaces and populations.[106] More so than just locating, organizing space is a route to shape behavior. Territorialization is an essential component of the disciplinary regulation of everyday life.[107] Matthew Hannah has described this regulation as occurring in a three-part "cycle of social control," composed of observation, judgment, and

[100] Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 107.
[101] Ibid., 94.
[102] James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 76.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Hannah argues, "Spatial issues lie at the heart…of national programs of territorial mastery. These issues concern … access to territory, …tension between the need for fixity and the need for mobility, …the centralization of control over social life, and the erection and contestation of boundaries at all scales." Matthew Hannah, *Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth Century America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 10.
[105] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish,* 141-147.
[106] Sack, Robert. *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 19.
[107] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1995): 125, 138, 215.

punishment.[108] The ability to engage in any one of these three components is limited by the scale of defined space accessed by authority; observation, judgment, and punishment are far easier to achieve within the confines of a prison cell than within a city or nation-state comprised of freely moving individuals.[109]

Governmentality, legibility, and territoritoriality provide a framework to consider the "mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents, and procedures" through which authorities sought to organize migration and settlement on an empire-wide scale.[110] I discuss the development of migration regimes through analyzing state generated sources such as settlement directives, official reports, and plans for migrant housing and villages. Regimes of government "elicit, promote, facilitate, foster, and attribute various capacities, qualities, and statuses to particular agents."[111] Ottoman authoritarian governmentality included attempts to create broad identifications with the Ottoman sultan and state.[112] Coordination and organization of migration and settlement emerged as tools officials used to influence behavior among newcomers and other subjects.

Where possible, I enrich my discussion of state directives, reports, and plans with analysis of immigrant petitions. During the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods, petitions remained an important point of connection between the population and the central state. Prior to the nineteenth-century extension of the telegraph and postal system, individuals had to dispatch messengers to present requests in the capital. Though administrative reform should have lessened

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[108] Hannah, "Space and Social Control," 413.
[109] Effectiveness and technology influence the effect of scale. Hannah, "Space the Structuring of Disciplinary Power: An Interpretive Review" *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 79.3 (1997): 171-180.
[110] Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, "Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government," *The British Journal of Sociology* 43.2 (1992): 175.
[111] Dean, *Governmentality*, 32.
[112] Dean defines authoritarian governmentality as "non-liberal and authoritarian types of rule that seek to operate through obedient rather than free subjects, or at minimum, endeavor to neutralize opposition to authority." Dean, *Governmentality*, 131. I found this useful characterization of Ottoman governance in Evered, *Empire and Education*, 13.

subjects' need to petition the center by standardizing and legitimizing provincial bureaucratic procedures, petitions remained an essential route for subjects to air grievances and a way to reinforce the primacy of the sultan as the ultimate dispenser of justice. Petitioning reflected a tacit or explicit acceptance of the expanding role of the central state in subjects' lives, but the insights petitions offer as historical sources are moderated by several factors.[113] First, though petitions became more affordable following the extension of the telegraph, costs affected the sending of petitions.[114] Wealthy individuals could send personal petitions, but groups of community representatives often dispatched petitions together as a way to defray costs and increase the likelihood of governmental redress. Second, petitioners frequently paid petition writers (*arzuhalci*) to write on their behalf. Formulaic language within letters and telegrams could thus represent writing conventions as well as petitioners' concerns.[115] Third, historians' access to petitions is mediated by the ways in which government clerks and officials recorded and archived incoming requests. Starting in 1813, answers to petitions were not stored within one specific ministry. Petitions exist in multiple archival locations and were often preserved as summaries in official responses rather than as an original text.[116] Given these constraints, I use petitions as a limited tool to further assess developing migration regimes. Regimes emerge and change in part through response to repertoires, and officials' reactions to the problems articulated in migrant petitions were factors in the extension and refining of administrative response.

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[113] Yuval Ben-Bassat, *Petitioning the Sultan: Protests and Justice in Late Ottoman Palestine, 1865-1908* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 3-4.

[114] Ibid., 34-35. In the mid-1890s, sending a telegram from Jerusalem to Istanbul would have cost at least 30-40 *kuruş* (5 *kuruş* +1 *kuruş* per word). Sending a telegram was less expensive than paying attorney and judicial fees within the *nizamiye* courts, but it was still a significant purchase. The monthly salary of a primary school teacher at that time was 150 *kuruş*. Ibid., 38.

[115] Ibid., 50-54. Literate petitioners would have also relied on the institutional knowledge of the *arzuhalci*. *Arzuhalci*s "allowed the petitioners to express their claims within a framework and mechanism authorized by the authorities while using the jargon, language, and codes of literary expression sanctioned by the Ottoman system." Ben-Basset asserts that familiarity with the language and codes of petition writing can allow historians to "hear the voices" of petitioners. Ibid., 51-52.

[116] Ibid., 45-48.

In his work on Ottoman refugees, Blumi critiques the Foucauldian framework, arguing transformation and reform emerged via local instability; however, it is possible to analyze governmentality without focusing on success in enacting governmental techniques.[117] The subtitle of Scott's *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Plans to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, highlights that failure accompanies "the will to improve" in twentieth-century states with a presence in their citizen's lives far beyond the institutional capacity of the Ottoman Empire. The act of governing relies on isolating and describing social problems and their solutions, while "the 'will to govern,' [is] fuelled by the constant registration of 'failure', the discrepancy between ambition and outcome, and the constant injunction to do better next time."[118] Discourses of failure can bring about retrenchment, expansion, proceduralization, and increased data collection. Official registration of failure influenced developments within migration and settlement regimes. The spread of disease in port cities, lack of infrastructure, banditry, official corruption, immigrants' petitions for resources, and moments of resistance to migrant settlement emerge within official reports and responses as problems to solve. Ottoman policy makers addressed these problems through designing further precautions, sharing information, redistributing administrators, and documenting and classifying the migrant population.

Argument

In applying governmentality to analyze the Ottoman Empire's migration regime, this dissertation builds on existing scholarship exploring the developing techniques of the modern

[117] Blumi, *Ottoman Refugees*, 60; Hannah, *Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory*, 25-26.
[118] Rose and Miller, "Political Power Beyond the State," 190-191. William Walters likewise emphasizes congenital limits in technologies of control. William Walters, "Reflections of Migration and Govermentality," *Movements* 1.1(2015): 6.

state and changing relationship of state and subject within the Ottoman Empire. Scholars of the reform era have opened new areas of social history to scrutiny through parsing Ottoman state actors' focus on the health, productivity, and loyalty of the populace. Entities like the army and vocational orphanages were emblematic of new conceptualizations of order/disorder, obedience/disobedience, security/danger and progress/decline as well as an outcome of state actors' developing goal of fostering productive subjects.[119] The censuses of nineteenth and early twentieth century are an indication of the Ottoman state's increasing search for legibility in order to shape the identities of its population, and newly initiated educational efforts are described as attempts at social engineering.[120]

Over the course of fifty years, over three million individuals migrated to the Ottoman Empire. Their arrival was a symptom of factors, such as Russian military strength, national movements, and territorial loss, instigating Ottoman reform. Migrants were objects of settlement, development, and civilizing policies and potential tools in Ottoman centralization strategies. They were also sources of complication and agents in the transformations of the period. Nevertheless, they are not often cast as central to histories of Ottoman reform. This dissertation is an attempt to redress that tendency and to show that migration administration offers another important lens to analyze late Ottoman governance.

Migrants' mobility made them a powerful tool for Ottoman officials. For this reason, the category of migrant within the Ottoman state has coherence beyond immigrants' definitional cross-border movement. Migrants were not unique in late Ottoman history in terms of their

[119] Nazan Maksudyan, "Orphans, Cities, and the State: Vocational Orphanages (*Islahhanes*) and Reform in the Late Ottoman Urban Space," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43(2011): 493-511.
[120] İpek K. Yosmaoğlu, "Counting Bodies, Shaping Souls: The 1903 Census and National Identity in Ottoman Macedonia," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38.1 (2006): 55-77; Eugene L. Rogan, "Aşiret Mektebi: Abdülhamid II's Schools for Tribes (1892-1907)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 28.1 (1996): 83-107.

encounter with assimilating reforms, but they are a model of this encounter. Migrants were accessible objects because of their perceived and facilitated rupture of alternative social ties. The destruction of migrants' social structure supposedly rendered them more amenable to identification with the state. Immigrants were also accessible because they passed through staging points, or "places through which individuals must pass *and be identified* in order to receive some service."[121] Staging points allow states to increase the resolution of their bureaucratic gaze.[122] These staging points occurred at the border, during settlement, and in the distribution of provisions. Finally, officials' placement of migrants allowed for reorganization of space in such a way as to create and manage specific behavioral outcomes among migrants and others. A history of late Ottoman Empire with an explicit focus on migration highlights mobility and space as critical to Ottoman governmentality.

Note on vocabulary: Ottoman vernacular allows for relative fluidity in categories of immigrant, emigrant, and refugee.[123] Even the term *muhacir*, laden with religious overtones of Muhammad and his followers' flight from Mecca to Medina, was broadly applied to non-Muslim arrivals. The term referred to individuals violently removed from their homes and those with relative ease of mobility across imperial borders. To some extent, using this term as an undifferentiated category allows a state classification to determine my analytical framework. Other researchers have begun the task of offering granular studies of specific migrant groups in specific locations. Though their research shows the importance of locality in determining policy outcomes, my goal is to navigate between discussions of governance on micro and macro levels.

[121] Matthew Hannah, "Space and the Structuring of Disciplinary Power," 176.
[122] Ibid.
[123] While asylum seeker, IDP, and refugee now have specific meanings tied to international refugee regimes, the term *muhacir* does not distinguish in any meaningful way between forced and unforced movement.

I have noted information about tribal or ethnic affiliation or place of origin if it appears in archival documents. In using this additional information, it is necessary to recognize that when officials saw fit to mention specific groups or characteristics, this information may provide historians with as much information about the concerns of the official as those of the individual or group he discussed.

Chapter Outline

The first chapter of my dissertation provides an analysis of Ottoman migration administration history. Three thematic chapters assess migrant settlement, health, and religion. These interconnected themes were articulated within immigration policy and integrated into broader Ottoman reforms. Alongside highlighting the relationship of migration administration and reform, each thematic chapter explores how officials attempted to organize space.

Chapter One, "**The Long, Retracting Arm of the State: Migration Administration in the Late Ottoman Empire**," is an institutional history of migration administration in the Ottoman Empire. The formation of the *Muhacirin Komisyonu* (Immigrant Commission) in 1860 revealed official recognition of migrants as requiring centrally planned management. The history of the Immigrant Commission and its later iterations offers a key route to understanding migrant-state interactions, as some of the clearest indications of state ideals are articulated through the administration's legal foundations. Exploring the ideal operations of the commission highlights the aspects of migration administration state officials saw as most essential, revealing the specific issues they recognized and the strategies they developed to resolve complications. Through analysis of the origins and history of the Immigrant Commission and state settlement directives, this chapter makes several arguments. First, decisions to dissolve the Immigrant

Commission contributed to a lack of continuity that exacerbated migrants' problems in securing provisions, permanent settlement, housing, and farming implements long after their initial arrival. Second, the development of migration administration contributed to a growing connection between the center and the provinces. Third, the development of an extensive migration administration lent new valence to the social category of refugee as laws and tactics structured elements of migrants' arrival, placement, and daily experiences in the first years of settlement within the empire.

Chapter Two, "'**Happy with Their Lots,' Unhappy with Their Plots: Contested Settlement**," traces the development and enactment of migrant settlement policy. I explore settlement policy as a data-driven process of matching individual migrants to territories. The type of data collected by the state and the ways in which migrants were categorized were responsive to financial limitations, local concerns, and state political interests. In the period from 1860 to 1908, officials sharpened their categorizations in order to more carefully locate migrants. Rather than merely placing migrants, officials developed plans to affect migrant behavior through designing villages and migrant housing. Motives for migrant settlement were closely related to land reform, one of the major projects of the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods. Migration and settlement contributed to the enactment of land reform in several ways. First, surveyors searching for available lands contributed to the mapping of Ottoman imperial space. Second, the increased demographic pressure of mass migration encouraged non-migrant land registration, rendering nomadic tribes and other groups more legible. Third, placing migrants in supposedly empty spaces disrupted communal land use, forcing the sedentarization of mobile groups. Though this chapter focuses on the development of state categories and the way those categories

contributed to enacting policy, I also suggest that local populations and migrants contested settlement outcomes by adopting state categorizations.

Chapter Three, "**Unsettling Environments: Health and Mobility**," explores health and environmental complications in Ottoman settlement. The importance of health concerns and policies has been almost entirely overlooked in histories of these migrations. Studies of migration have established how health regimes serve as machinery for state supervision and classification of newcomers, but the Ottoman example reveals how health remains a factor in relationships among state officials and migrants long after arrival. Health concerns perpetuated the state-migrant relationship, contributed to state officials' efforts to control migrant mobility, and complicated settlement efforts. Health issues and migration interacted in multiple ways, including through exacerbating logistical problems, requiring efforts to control contagion, and raising questions about the environmental suitability of potential areas of migrant placement. Ultimately, health and environmental factors became components in multiple stakeholders' responses to migrant settlement.

Chapter Four, "**Constructing Communities: Religion and Incorporation**," explores the importance of religion and education in community building, or migrant incorporation into empire-wide, trans-imperial, and face-to-face communities. Historians have emphasized the importance of religious identity in facilitating migrant integration into Ottoman society. This chapter assesses that claim through evaluating Ottoman reforms and migrants' requests for religious and educational resources. Through examining international contexts, state policies, and local distribution of resources, I argue religious identity was essential but not sufficient for migrant integration. Rather than a factor determining the incorporation of Muslim migrants, religious categorization and rhetoric were strategies of social organization used by officials and

migrants. Religion offered a pathway to creating change and community but it was not constitutive of communities themselves.

Episodes within nineteenth-century Muslim migrations to the Ottoman Empire are overshadowed in popular memory by the violent population upheavals of the twentieth century. At a moment when regions and states are once again overwhelmed by massive numbers of refugees, it is important to consider the long-term history of Ottoman state-building and migration. Due to their similar geographies and similar infrastructural problems, histories of mobility within the empire resonate with contemporary crises.[124] Refugees fleeing Syria and Iraq count among their ancestors forcibly settled nomads and forcibly removed Circassians, Chechens, Armenians, and others. As policy makers contemplate the future of Syria and the European Union, migrations are yet again central to the story of the making and unmaking of states. Through placing migration at the center of Ottoman history, I hope that this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the significance of population displacement and the resilience of those on the move.

[124] Refugees began fleeing Syria in 2011 as conflict between protesters and the government of the Syrian Arab Republic intensified, and ongoing insecurity within a multi-party civil war led to rapid increased in displaced individuals in 2013. UNHCR currently estimates nearly nine million Syrians are either displaced or have sought refuge in neighboring countries and elsewhere. Syrians are currently one of the most visible refugee populations. They comprise nearly one sixth of the 59.5 million people displaced worldwide. Roughly twenty million of these displaced individuals have registered as refugees. Within the region, four million individuals remain internally displaced in Iraq, one and a half million Palestinians reside in recognized refugee camps, and 2.59 million Afghans have sought refuge outside their country. "Figures at a Glance," United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed 24 May 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html; "Palestine Refugees," United Nations Relief and Works Agency, accessed 24 May 2016, http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees.

CHAPTER ONE

THE LONG, RETRACTING ARM OF THE STATE: MIGRATION ADMINISTRATION IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

When do migrants become a social issue eligible for state-driven solutions? The mid-nineteenth-century influx of refugees into the Ottoman Empire was neither the first time the state had welcomed large groups fleeing from elsewhere nor the first attempt at Ottoman "population politics" to facilitate state security. Despite these historical precedents, an independent institution for migration administration did not exist until the formation of an Ottoman Immigrant Commission on January 5, 1860. How did nineteenth century refugees come "to be constructed as a 'problem' amenable to a 'solution'"?[1] The commission arose through a confluence of increased mass immigration in the mid-nineteenth century and the shifting bureaucratic structure of the state during the same era. The formation of the *Muhacirin Komisyonu* (Immigrant Commission) revealed recognition of the migrant as deserving of centrally planned management and reflected a tendency to create state-based organizations to address specific issues such as sanitation or the census.[2] The development of an extensive migration administration lent new valence to the social category of refugee as laws and tactics structured elements of migrants' arrival, placement, and daily experiences in the first years of settlement within the empire. This chapter will explore the history of migration administration in the Ottoman Empire to evaluate state strategies and ideals regarding migrant settlement.

To date, the history of the Immigrant Commission and ensuing institutions has been mostly an ancillary component within larger works evaluating the course of refugee flight and

[1] Peter Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2.
[2] Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonu," 97.

settlement into the empire, and thus few historians have offered original research regarding the history of Ottoman migration administration itself. Eren's 1966 discussion of the commission remains the main source other historians have drawn upon in their narratives of the establishment of the organization.[3] Eren's ongoing influence arises because of his useful synthesis of migrant numbers and his inclusion of fully transliterated documents regarding the formation and later reorganization of migration administration. Even as historians have offered further insight into the operations, failures, and successes of migration and migrant settlement, they do not depart from the essentials of Eren's narrative.[4] Aside from these, David Cuthell's dissertation remains a unique effort in positioning the first iteration of the Immigrant Commission within the broader governmental changes of the period and in evaluating continuity of goals and ideology within the commission's day-to-day procedures. Though he focuses solely on the first years of the commission's operations as a stand-alone entity, his attempt to articulate both the broader goals of the commission and its daily functions offers a valuable approach, as policy ideals remained an important component in defining the relationship between migrants and state officials.

This chapter will extend the discussion of the model structure and functions of the commission and ensuing institutions through the end of the nineteenth century and into the beginning of the twentieth. Exploring the ideal operations of the commission highlights the aspects of migration administration officials saw as most essential, revealing the specific issues they recognized and the strategies they developed to resolve complications. In order to bring these ideals and policies to the fore, I will first explore the institutional history of the administration and then describe and analyze several directives that illuminate the operations of the central and provincial committees. This chapter will lay the groundwork for the rest of this

[3] Eren, *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri*.
[4] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*; İpek, *Rümeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*; Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*.

dissertation through considering shortcomings of Ottoman organization as state officials might have defined them. The history of the Immigrant Commission and its later iterations offers a key route to understanding migrant-state interactions, as some of the clearest indications of state ideals are articulated through the administration's legal foundations.

Demographic Anxieties and Trans-Imperial Population Politics

The history of Ottoman migration administration is best understood within larger trends in the empire's management of population. Ongoing concerns about population and territorial losses throughout the first half of the nineteenth century underlay the empire's liberal migration regime, epitomized in a post-Crimean War invitation to settlers from Europe and America. This invitation promised religious freedom, choice land, and tax exemptions to all who could prove that they had means and were willing to give allegiance to the sultan.[5] Following the Crimean War, the empire continued to lose land and subjects. As a result of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin, the empire ceded two-fifths of its territory and 5.5 million people.[6] The outcome of the Treaty of Berlin exacerbated Ottoman security and economic concerns. Faced with the threat of national separatist movements and foreign intervention, the empire shifted to a less liberal immigration policy in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Non-Muslim migrants, particularly in large numbers, were more frequently denied entry by the Ottoman state.[7]

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[5] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 62.

[6] Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,* vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 191. The Treaty of Berlin revised the Treaty of San Stefano, which was signed by the Ottoman and Russian Empires to end the 1877-1878 war. The other Great Powers deemed the Treaty of San Stefano too beneficial to Russia, as it allowed Russian control over Bulgaria. The terms were revised during the Congress of Berlin in June of 1878. A.L. Macfie, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923* (New York: Longman, 1996), 42-43. As a consequence of forfeiting the majority of its holdings in Europe, the empire lost its most arable lands and disrupted its internal commercial network. Quataert, "The Age of Reforms," 768.

[7] Kale, "Transforming an Empire," 252-271.

Strategic interest in population management was not unique to nineteenth-century immigrations. As early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both the Ottoman and Russian Empires attempted to sedentarize nomads as a component in establishing and safeguarding their borders.[8] Aside from sedentarization, population removal and colonization became increasingly visible tactics of state policy. Throughout the eighteenth century, Ottomans and Russians engaged in acts of "demographic warfare," described by Mark Pinson as exchanges "of populations, used to bolster the position of one state in territories either threatened by or recently acquired from the other state."[9] Through these informal population exchanges, Christians and Muslims swapped positions along the changing Ottoman-Russian border. The security concerns underlying tactics of demographic warfare translated to contexts outside the Ottoman-Russian border, as both the Russian Empire and Qing Empire engaged in similar colonization strategies along their shared borders after the 1860s.[10]

Policy makers recognized the importance of economic development for stability in their newly colonized border regions.[11] Nonetheless, security concerns overrode economic goals in Ottoman immigration policies. The extent of Tatar and Caucasian migrations took the Ottoman Empire by surprise, particularly in the 1860s. The ideal immigrant described in the 1857 invitation had a certain amount of wealth, which had to be proven to the Ottoman consul in the

[8] Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, 58; David Moon, "Peasant Migration and the Settlement of Russia's Frontiers, 1550-1897," *The Historical Journal* 40.4 (1997): 884.
[9] Pinson, "Demographic Warfare," 1.
[10] Adam McKeown, "Global Migration, 1846-1940," *Journal of World History* 15.2 (2004): 158. The encouragement of increased settlement in Siberia and Manchuria arose after China eased restrictions on internal mobility and Russian serfs were emancipated in 1861.
[11] Pinson, "Demographic Warfare," 8-16. Pinson notes Russian invitations were targeted toward skilled migrants, such as Bulgarian silk-weavers or individuals with naval expertise. Gifts of land and tax exemptions offered to settlers by both states were intended to entice colonists but also to establish an economically viable population along the border. The Russian Empire's repopulation of Buçak/Bessarabia after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-1812 was perhaps the era's most successful episode in terms of improving security and facilitating economic development. After removing 5,000 Muslim Nogay individuals, officials welcomed Bulgarians, establishing a new local administrative system to facilitate their settlement and self-sufficiency in the area. As a result, the number of Bulgarians in the region grew from 4,000 in 1809 to 25,000 in 1812.

country of application.[12] In contrast, the refugees were an intense drain on the Ottoman treasury, requiring assistance for transport, temporary and long-term housing, provisions, and farming supplies. Concerns about the cost to the central treasury, particularly when migrants remained in the capital, contributed to decisions to move migrants to the provinces as quickly as possible and remained a constant concern in addressing potential corruption.[13] Though the Muslim migrants generally required such assistance, they still offered essential and potentially immediate internal and external security benefits. Migrants were used as colonizers on border regions as an ongoing component of demographic warfare. They also became a crucial tool in sedentarizing nomads and an essential component in the extension of Ottoman central control over its provinces, as the Immigrant Commission deliberately settled immigrants in internal frontier zones on lands confiscated from nomadic pastoralists.[14] Economic success was an idealized component of immigration policy, but the sheer number of refugee arrivals and the relatively low-cost and low-time commitment of settlement for security purposes determined initial state responses.

Following the Treaty of Berlin, the distribution of groups within the Ottoman Empire became as essential to security as the colonization of border regions. The Russian-Bulgarian success in creating an autonomous Bulgaria was realized through the creation of a Christian Bulgarian majority via expulsions of Muslims during the 1877-1878 War, and this lent a new urgency to establishing numerical dominance throughout the empire. The Treaty of Berlin required Ottoman reform in its six eastern provinces, and specifically mandated increased

[12] Kale, "Transforming an Empire," 269. Each family had to prove they possessed 60 *mecidiye*, or roughly 1350 francs.
[13] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Komisyanlar Maruzatı (BOA.Y.PRK.KOM) 3.24, 16 November 1881, in *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* vol.1 (Istanbul: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2012), no: 21; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Yıldız Perakende Evrakı – Yaveran ve Maiyyet-i Seniyye Erkan-ı Harbiye Dairesi (BOA.Y.PRK.MYD) 3.11, 13 December 1883, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* vol. 2, no: 31. Public health concerns and the empire's international image also influenced the decision to quickly transfer migrants to settlement areas. I discuss these factors at greater length in Chapter Three.
[14] Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonu", 17; Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 85; Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, 104; 108-9. This issue is discussed at greater length in Chapter Two.

protection and representation for Armenian populations.[15] Sultan Abdülhamid II and state officials interpreted these reforms as the precursor to Armenian autonomy, and since representation was premised upon population numbers, gathering statistics was an intensely political issue and characterized by manipulation on the part of Ottoman census takers and religious communal organizations.[16]

While Ottomanism, or equality among ethnicities and religious groups, remained official policy, leaders increasingly believed the cohesion of the Muslim populace was essential to the future of the empire. The development of this Pan-Islamic ideology and the threat of European intervention in areas with a large proportion of Christians lent migrants an important role in enlarging the Muslim percentage of the population throughout Anatolia. This was a well-known policy within the bureaucracy by the last decades of the nineteenth century. For example, in 1890, officials in Muş, in Eastern Anatolia, noted the primary reason for settling migrants in the area would be to equalize the distribution of Christians and Muslims, as there were currently much more of the former.[17] Another specifically noted the imperial order encouraging the increasing of the Muslim population, and reported the decision of the Council of Ministers to settle migrants from the Caucasus in Erzurum, Van and Hakkari.[18] Security in terms of

[15] Dündar notes that although Van, Erzurum, Mamuretülaziz, Bitlis, Diyarbekir, and Sivas all contained a significant number of Armenians, though reliable population statistics do not exist for this area. An estimate given by the Armenian Patriarchate in 1878 estimated Armenians and other Christians constituted roughly two thirds of the population of the Six Vilayets, while Ottoman sources estimated non-Muslims comprised only one fifth of the population in the region. British and French estimates corresponded with the Ottoman estimate. See Fuat Dündar, *Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878-1918)*, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2010), 12-23.

[16] Dündar, *Crime of Numbers*, 27-31; Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 208-211. During this era, the Ottoman Empire was shifting from the *millet* system, or administration based on confessional community, to a shared administration system based on ethno-religious representation.

[17] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - İrade Dahiliye (BOA.I.DH) 1185.92756, 4 Zilkade 1307/22 June 1890. A similar discussion exists in Western Anatolia. For example, a decree from 1883 explicitly urges settling migrants to reinforce the Muslim community in the area and to address ongoing Greek banditry in a town in Western Turkey. BOA.I.DH 876.69927, 29 Rebiyülevvel 1300/7 February 1883.

[18] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evraki (BOA.Y.A.HUS) 314.13, 1312 Cemaziyülahır 02/1 December 1894. "*Anadolu'da bazı vilayat-ı şahanede nüfus-i İslamiyenin teksiri için...*"

population percentages contributed to an overall shift in Ottoman immigration and emigration policies. While Muslim refugees were not turned away, Jewish and European migrants were increasingly rejected in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman state also developed an exclusionary border regime in an attempt to prevent Armenian nationalists' entry and to reduce Armenian numbers in its Eastern provinces.[19]

The Ottoman State's initial response to the refugee influx was framed by security concerns, but settlement strategies and aid policies were also conditioned by the state's modernizing reforms and its changing approach to governance. Migration administration became intertwined in Ottoman efforts to craft a healthy, productive, and loyal populace, signaling the state's interest in qualitative as well as quantitative population concerns.[20] As I discuss below, the Immigrant Commission became an important center of calculation, and its branches emerged as important sites for gathering statistics intended to guide state policy and officials' actions. Religion emerged as a category to define insiders and outsiders and to isolate threats to the state and social body within the population or from space outside the boundaries of the state.[21]

Centralized migration administration arose during an era of ongoing population anxiety and efforts to organize development by the modernizing state. The extent of forced migration in the era, economic limitations, and security concerns contributed to a shift toward less liberal immigration policies. As a result, the economic promise of self-sufficient immigrants

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Chochiev and Koç note that despite a long-term plan to settle Muslim migrants in Eastern Anatolia, Russian and Armenian concerns and the difficult environmental and economic features of the region limited the numbers of settlers from the Caucasus. Chochiev and Koç, "Some Notes on the Settlement of Norther Caucasians in Eastern Anatolia," 85-91.

[19] Sinan Dinçer, "The Introduction of an Exclusionary Border Regime: The Ottoman Case (1890-1914)" (paper presented at the States, Boundary Making and Mobility Control: a Global Historical Perspective Workshop, Leiden University, Netherlands, December 12, 2014).

[20] Gülhan Balsoy, "Gender and the Politics of the Female Body: Midwifery, Abortion, and Pregnancy in Ottoman Society (1838-1890s)" (PhD diss., State University of New York, Binghamton, 2009), 24.

[21] Bigo notes that ideas of borders and security reinforce the understanding of the state as an "envelope" or "container," which immigrants penetrate. Migrants are defined in opposition to the ideal citizen, and so there presence threatens the social body. The very act of categorizing individuals as unable to enter thus reaffirms the coherence of the interior. Bigo "Security and Immigration," 67-70.

invigorating the Ottoman countryside was traded for the anticipated stability of a Muslim immigrant population. Under these circumstances, officials developed strategies to efficiently organize immigrant settlement and reduce overall cost to the state. As I discuss below, budgetary concerns also radically changed the institutions attached to administration itself.

Institutional History of Migration Administration

Narrating the history of Ottoman migration administration requires winding through multiple iterations of an organization whose personnel and responsibilities were attached to or split among various ministries over time. Throughout the fifty year period following the Crimean War, Ottoman migration administration gained and lost members and appeared and disappeared as an independent organization in response to fluctuating numbers of arriving refugees and financial constraints. These fluctuations and changes are themselves essential in considering outcomes of migrant settlement. The lack of stability within migration administration contributed to an inability to successfully organize migrants on arrival and to long-term complications in migrant placement. Aside from charting these fluctuations, this section also examines the presence of semi-official and private entities in migration administration.

As noted previously, the Ottoman state operated under a liberal immigration and refugee regime for several decades in the mid-nineteenth century.[22] The Immigrant Commission was founded in the winter of 1859-1860, but Ottoman interest in and organization of immigration also occurred in preceding years. The formal invitation to potential settlers advertised in European and American embassies and newspapers in 1857 aroused interest; however, the large

[22] Kale, "Transforming an Empire," 252-271.

numbers of refugees arriving in the ensuing decades rendered the invitation unnecessary.[23] Prior to 1860, the Ottoman state was open to refugees and welcomed Russian Jews and Old Believers.[24] During the pre-Commission era, Jewish and German migrants from Crimea were officially received alongside Tatars and offered equal settlement opportunities and resource allocation.[25] These refugee policies prompted small-scale and temporary solutions, as for example when the state established a short-term commission attached to the treasury for the Polish and Hungarian migrants arriving in the Ottoman Empire in 1849.[26] Likewise, as a component of its demographic warfare, the Ottoman state directed both Jewish and Muslim refugees from Crimea toward Dobruca, in contemporary Romania. The city of Mecidiye (Medgigia) was established through imperial decree in 1856, and is a unique and early case of Ottoman utilization of refugees to systematically plan and create an economic outpost in the region.[27] The planning of Mecidiye reflected a developing interest in carefully considered migrant settlement and urban planning; nevertheless, it was a continuation of the tendency to attend to migrant administration on a case-by-case basis.

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[23] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 62-63. Karpat describes the response to the decree as "overwhelming" and notes requests for more information were issued throughout Europe. Nevertheless, the Ottoman state viewed applications for permission to move into certain areas or by large groups with suspicion. A fair number of Russian Jews took advantage of the Ottoman state's liberal position in the 1870s and 1880s, but following the formal articulation the Zionist movement in 1897, the state forbade mass Jewish immigration to Palestine. (Ibid.)

[24] Old Believers are religious dissenters who separated from the Russian Orthodox Church in response to seventeenth century liturgical reforms. Many fled state oppression.

[25] Eren, *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri*, 50-52. Eren argues this open immigration policy reveals an underlying respect for migrant rights and equality among creeds. (p. 41). In particular, he emphasizes that the large number of Jewish migrants from Crimea were administered according to the same principles governing Muslim migrant settlement. (p. 50-52).

[26] Hungarian refugees, including most famously Louis Kossuth, fled following the revolutions of 1848. The majority of Hungarians were rank and file immigrants, but historians have focused attention on high profile individuals such as Kossuth and the history of the complex diplomatic situation following the Ottomans decisions to ignore extradition requests. See Karpat, "Kossuth in Turkey: The Impact of Hungarian Refugees in the Ottoman Empire, 1849-1851," in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002): 169-184.

[27] Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism," 202-234. The city took its name from the reigning Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839-1861). Newly established refugee villages frequently took the name of the Sultan, leading to the founding of a large number of "Mecidiye"s in the 1860s, "Aziziye"s (Sultan Abdülaziz, r. 1861-1876) in the early 1870s, and "Hamidiye"s (Sultan Abdülhamid II, 1876-1909) following the migrations from the 1877-1878 War.

Prior to the Immigrant Commission, migration remained an issue handled primarily on a local level, and city governments and village communities cared for migrants fleeing the Crimean War. The central state issued directives as needed to border provinces and migrants themselves applied to the state for assistance.[28] After the formation of the *Şehremaneti* in 1855, this organization played an essential role in receiving and transferring migrants from Istanbul, but the Ottoman state continued to lack a central organization and coordinated vision for migrant settlement.[29] In a pattern that would remain even after the founding of the commission, local leaders, particularly governors, were charged with key duties. Immediately following the Crimean War, the governor of Silistre received instructions for caring for the migrants, as this European province was a main area of refugee arrival.[30] By the end of the Crimean War in 1856, the main institutions participating in migrant organization and settlement were the *Şehremaneti*, the Trade Ministry (*Ticaret Nezareti*), and the Police Ministry (*Zaptiye Nezareti*). The *Şehremaneti* and Police Ministry were essential in organizing migration to and from Istanbul, while the Trade Ministry was more active outside the capital city, sending ministers to the provinces to assist in organizing migrant dispersal and to survey the economic situation of the locals and the availability and fertility of land.

A request to the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinance (*Meclis-i Vala-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye*) from the *Şehremaneti* for more personnel prompted the decision to create the Immigrant Commission. Noting that the *Şehremaneti* had settled 10,000 people between September of 1858

[28] Kocacık, "Balkanlar'dan Anadolu'ya Yönelik Göçler (1878-1890)," 157.
[29] The modern *Şehremaneti* and the Istanbul municipal council, which has been likened to the French "prefecture de la ville," was an entity in charge of tasks such as city cleaning and inspection of weights and measures in the markets and established as part of a larger overhaul of municipal government in Istanbul. In 1869 it became a position akin to mayor of the city. St. Yerasimos, "Shehir Emaneti," *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* Second Edition. Ed. by P. Bearman, et al. Brill Online, 2015.
[30] Eren, *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri*, 40-41. These instructions contained provisions similar to the invitation issued in 1857 and later efforts to facilitate migrant settlement, including tax breaks, the giving of land to farmers, and urban settlement of tradespeople.

and December of 1859 and that there were 15,000 individuals in Istanbul in the winter of 1859, the request sought extra personnel to organize the entity's finances. When this request came before the Council, the court resolved to create a new organization rather than adding staff, recognizing the increase in migrants and the wide array of duties already encompassed within the *Şehremaneti*.[31] The decision likely reflected as well an interest in creating a coordinated effort combining the management of migrants while they were in Istanbul with the reception and settlement of migrants in other ports. One reason to suspect this is because the commission was initially attached to the Trade Ministry, which had been responsible for coordinating the shipping of the migrants from coastal ports on the Black Sea, and was originally headed by the Governor of Trabzon, a center of migrant arrival.[32] The Supreme Council described the decision to create the Immigrant Commission and its initial structure in two resolutions. In these two resolutions, the enumerated tasks of the commission were to organize the dispersal and settlement of those arriving in Istanbul, to collect information and report on the migrants, to advertise the need for donations for the migrants, to collect and distribute these donations, and to publish in two newspapers, *Takvim-i vekai* and *Ceride-i Havadis*, the names and contributed sums of those giving assistance. The council added that the commission would meet everyday and should abide by the instructions and directions previously issued by the state. While the commission was initially attached to the Trade Ministry, it became an independent organization in July of 1861.[33]

The first commission was headed by Hafiz Pasha, governor of Trabzon, and included in its central personnel an appointee from the Trade Ministry and the army, as well as several

[31] Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*, 102-105.
[32] Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonu," 98-99. Cuthell argues the initial attachment to the Trade Ministry is reflective of the state's improvised response to migration. Those components of the state that had first contact with the migrants received the task of organizing them. In this case the Trade Ministry coordinated shipping of the migrants, and so Cuthell argues the placement of the commission in this Ministry was merely a holdover from the pre-Commission era.
[33] Eren, *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri*, 54-61; Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*, 105-106.

individuals known for their previous efforts in organizing immigration. An official appointed from the *Şehremaneti* functioned as a useful liaison between the two institutions, while a number of scribes were drawn from the Prime Ministry and Treasury. The organization went through many personnel changes, and four different individuals headed the organization in its first five years.[34] The Commission itself was responsible for arranging settlement, while the army was charged with mobilization of the migrants and provisioning the new settlers. Aside from the central organization in Istanbul, ministers were dispatched to areas of intense migrant arrival and settlement. These appointments were temporary and took place in areas such as Bursa, Biga, Selanik (Thessaloniki), Çatalca, Kütayha, Izmir, Adana, Tekfurdağı, Gallipoli, Sinop, Samsun, and Konya in the early 1860s. Branches of the Immigrant Commission were also set up in major centers like Trabzon and Samsun. Since migrants were transferred to locations and stayed as guests until permanent locations were determined for them, these ministers facilitated the migrants' transition from guest status to permanent status as soon as possible. Officials were also to organize the logistics of migrants' necessities and determine when to cut migrants stipends and provisions.[35] While this system of dispatching officials allowed for flexibility in the state's response to newcomers, it also reflected a broader lack of anticipation and administrative groundwork prior to migrant arrival, a key reason why some refugees remained tragically stranded in temporary housing for months.[36]

The commission was formed in response to a particular influx of migrants. Once the numbers of arrivals abated in 1865, budgetary concerns contributed to the decision to dissolve

[34] Hafiz Pasha (1860-1861), subsequently appointed as *Şeyhülharem*, İzzet Pasha (1862-1863), Vecihi Pasha (1863-1864), and Osman Pasha (1864-1865, also headed reorganized commission after 1865).
[35] Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonu," 110-113.
[36] Numerous migrant petitions asking to be removed from temporary settlement note delays of months and years, particularly after the 1860s migrations. See for example Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Meclis-i Vala Evrakı (BOA.MVL) 511.127, 25 Cemaziyülahır 1283/4 November 1866; BOA.MVL 533.109, 23 Muharrem 1284/27 May 1867; BOA.MVL 562.9, 13 Şaban 1284/10 December 1867. I discuss this topic at greater length in Chapter Two.

the independent committee. After its dissolution, the organization's responsibilities were split between the Ministry of Justice, which was responsible for caring for orphans, the Police Ministry, which dealt with matters of settlement and transfers, and the Supreme Council, which oversaw migrant issues in the provinces. The complete termination of the commission was short-lived, and ongoing complications related to migrant aid and settlement encouraged the renewal of the commission under the purview of the Supreme Council. The commission was retitled the *Muhacirin İdaresi* (Immigrant Administration), and aside from its director, Osman Pasha, included four scribes and one translator. When 4,000 families of Abkhazian migrants arrived in 1867, several more administrators and scribal retinues were deployed to Trabzon, Samsun, and Sinop. During the following year the *Muhacirin İdaresi* was also relocated from the Supreme Council to the newly formed Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*).[37] An investigatory committee and several more officials and police were employed in 1870 in response to ongoing difficulties. The *Muhacirin İdaresi* was dissolved again in 1875, and its tasks were redirected to an office within the Police Ministry. The administration did not become independent again until 1878.[38]

The influx of migrants following the 1877-1878 war renewed pressure to launch specific organizations to cater to the refugees' immediate needs and their settlement. In 1878, guidelines for a new migration administration were described in *Dersaadet Muhacirin İdaresi Talimatı* (the Istanbul Immigrant Administration Instructions), which created an independent institution, with two sub-branches for settlement and finances and twenty municipal branches. The instructions designated this central committee, the General Administration (*İdare-i umumiyye-i muhacirin komisyonu***)**, as the main office in communication with provincial governors and commissions. The General Administration also had a direct line to the twenty municipal branches within

[37] In 1867 the Meclis-i Vala-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye was split into the Şura-yı Devlet and the Divan-ı Ahkam-ı Adliye.
[38] Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*, 114-118.

Istanbul, revealing the focus of Istanbul for migrant movement and arrival and the acute awareness of migrant-related difficulties in the capital city.

Other institutions responded to the migrant influx and formed key linkages between aid efforts and the state-directed organization. These organizations tended to assist migrants during their time in Istanbul. For example, parliamentarians formed the *Muhacirine Muavenet Cemiyeti* (Immigrant Aid Society) to collect charity and dispatch personnel to assist migrants around the clock at Istanbul's Sirkeci pier. Once Sultan Abdülhamid II dissolved the parliament in February of 1878, the society continued its efforts under the name of the *İane-i Muhacirin Encümeni* (Council for Migrant Charity) and was attached to the Yıldız Palace-based *Umum Muhacirin Komisyonu* (General Migration Commission) until April of 1878.[39] At this time the Council's main duties were to provide provisions for migrants living in several neighborhoods within Istanbul. In August of 1878, the council was combined with the *İdare-i Umumiyye-i Muhacirin Komisyonu* (General Administration Migrant Commission). Similarly, the *Muhacirin-i İane Komisyonu* (Migrant Charity Commission), attached to the *Şehremaneti*, was created in August 1877 to collect and deliver donations to the General Administration and to investigate migrants' conditions in Istanbul.[40]

Alongside official bodies, privately run institutions attended to migrant needs. Nedim İpek suggests the International Committee for Migrant Assistance (Milletlerarası Muhacirler Yardım Komitesi/Comité International de secours aux réfugiés de provinces de L'Empire Ottoman) served to alleviate the burden of caring for the migrants for the Ottoman citizenry, who had already sacrificed a great deal to fund the army and hospitals during the war and were

[39] Yıldız Palace was the residence of Sultan Abdülhamid II. It became the de facto center of government as Abdülhamid wrested control from the Prime Ministry over the day-to-day operations of the empire.
[40] İpek, *Rümeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, 74-75.

suffering from an ongoing economic crisis.[41] The Austria-Hungary consul established the committee in January of 1878. Of its 83 members, 12 were consuls, 20 were traders, 15 were bankers, 5 were foreign reporters, and the rest were agents of companies or self-employed. No Ottoman Muslims were among the organizers. The Committee included three subcommittees, two in charge of gathering money in Europe and Istanbul and an executive committee. [42] The promotional committees received a significant response from European countries and, as the Immigrant Commission had done in the 1860s, published names of donors in local and international newspapers. Through these international contributions, the Committee opened nine hospitals with a total capacity of 770 beds, commanded fourteen bakeries, assisted in projects such as road construction and other public works, and supported migrants in several locations outside of Istanbul. As the major influx of migrants subsided and the international public lost interest in the crisis, the committee's resources contracted, and by the spring of 1878 its scale of operations was severely truncated.[43] Like several of the official migrant organizations, the International Committee lasted only a few years before being dissolved in the spring of 1879.

International charity efforts were ensconced in the politics of the Eastern Question. For example, the 1877-1878 war figured largely in contemporary debates within England regarding the British Empire's relationship to the Ottoman Empire. Though England ultimately assisted the Ottomans at the end of the 1877-1878 War, the country was no longer the strong supporter of Ottoman sovereignty it had been during the Crimean War.[44] The "Eastern Crisis," the "Bulgarian Horrors," and depictions of the "Terrible Turk" were utilized by William Gladstone to critique Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli's pro-Ottoman foreign policy and to mobilize popular support

[41] Ibid., 76.
[42] Kocacık, "Balkanlar'dan Anadolu'ya Yönelik Göçler," 159.
[43] İpek, *Rümeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, 76-77.
[44] Macfie, *The Eastern Question*, 38.

for the Liberal Party. While in the 1860s Western presses celebrated Caucasian mountaineers as freedom-loving savages fighting the Russian Empire, by the 1870s the same outlets held Caucasian refugees accountable for massacres of Christians in the Balkans. Despite the portrayal in English presses of the atrocities of Caucasian marauders and the Ottoman irregular (*başı bozuk*) forces, the Istanbul-based English ambassador Henry Layard's depictions of suffering during the war and among arriving refugees garnered sympathy.[45] Charity funds were set up for both Christian and Muslim refugees.

These charity funds were tied to the ideological underpinnings of the missionary spirit. The most well known of the English charities was the "*Sermaye-i Şefkat-i Osmaniye*," or Turkish Compassionate Fund. Formed in 1878, the organization collected donations and dispatched them to Layard. In its early years the fund received many contributions, allowing it to commandeer several bakeries and feed 10,000 migrants per day. Though overall interest in the fund and the plight of the refugees waned after a few years, the Turkish Compassionate Fund persisted for several decades beyond its inception, eventually becoming as much an entrepreneurial venture as a philanthropic one. Former migrants and other impoverished women were employed to produce embroidery sold in Europe and the United States. Textiles from the fund appeared in the 1890s at the Chicago World's Fair and in *The Decorator and Furnisher* magazine. Displays of the fund's products were accompanied by an origin story reducing the workers' agency and emphasizing the benevolence of the organization's leaders. Spokeswomen captured philanthropic ideals of the era, emphasizing the fund's motto as "work for the able-bodied, alms only for the sick, the aged, and infirm."[46]

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[45] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 141-149.

[46] Cariclee Zacaroff, "The 'Turkish Compassionate Fund,'" in *The Congress of Women: Held in the Woman's Building, World's Columbian Exposition, Chicago, U.S.A., 1893*, ed. Mary Kavanaugh Oldham (Chicago: Monarch Book Company, 1894), 618-622, accessed January 5, 2015,

While the international organizations for Ottoman refugees disappeared within a few years of the 1877-1878 crisis, Ottoman migration administration continued to respond to migrant flows. Several other institutions were created and dissolved as the Ottoman Empire faced intermittent immigrations caused by invasions, insurrections, and instability in the Balkans, Caucasus, and elsewhere. The General Migration Administration was abrogated in 1894 in response to reduction in immigration, and the work of the committee came under the purview of the Interior Ministry. In 1897, in response to the Ottoman-Greek war, Sultan Abdülhamid II founded and headed the *Muhacirin Komisyonu-i Alisi* (High Commission for Migrants), a twelve-member commission with appointees from the Military, Interior, Trade, and Forestry Ministries.[47] The *Trablusgarp ve Bingazi Mültecilerine Mahsus Komisyon* (Special Commission for Refugees from Tripoli and Benghazi) was formed in response to the 1911 Italian invasion and colonization of Libya. Beginning with the Balkan Wars, the Turkish Red Crescent also contributed to refugee relief. The Red Crescent, though defined as an independent and neutral organization in the Geneva Convention and International Red Cross and Red Crescent (IRCC) by-laws, closely coordinated its work with the Ottoman government.[48] At moments when refugees overwhelmed provincial administration, Red Crescent workers facilitated medical care and aid distribution.[49] Refugees recognized the Red Crescent as a potential source of aid and

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http://digital.library.upenn.edu/women/eagle/congress/zacaroff.html; Oliver Bell Bunce, "The Turkish Compassionate Fund," *The Decorator and Furnisher* 30.6 (1897): 172-174.

[47] Kocacik, "Balkanlar'dan Anadolu'ya Yönelik Göçler," 161.

[48] Hüsnü Ada, "The First Ottoman Civil Society Organization in the Service of the Ottoman State: The Case of the Ottoman Red Crescent (*Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti*)" (Master's Thesis, Sabancı University, 2004). Ada notes that the Red Crescent was officially established in 1877 in response to the 1875 conflict with Serbia and the 1877-1878 War; however, its duties during this conflict were strictly to provide medical care on the front lines of the conflict and to raise money for medical supplies. The organization was abrogated after the war, though it also contributed two hospital ships and medicine during the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 and three medical committees during the 1911-1912 War of Tripoli (p. 64).

[49] Türk Kızılay Arşivi (TKA) 14.263, 2 Kanunisani1328/13 January 1913; TKA 12.108, 12 Mart 1329/25 Mart 1913.

addressed requests for employment and money to the organization.[50] During the Balkan Wars, the Red Crescent set up temporary soup kitchens, hospitals, and housing for refugees in Istanbul at the request of the War Ministry.[51] Red Crescent workers addressed health concerns and battled against outbreaks of cholera and smallpox in migrants' temporary housing. The society also took up the effort to vaccinate migrants, a task made easier by migrants' confinement to mosques in Istanbul.[52]

Several new institutions became active after the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), notably the *İskan-ı Aşairin ve Muhacirin Müdüriyeti* (Directorate for Settlement of Migrants and Tribes), founded in 1914, and the *Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyeti Umumiyesi* (General Directorate for Tribes and Migrants), founded in 1916 and attached to the Ministry of Interior. Both of these institutions signaled a shift toward coordinated administration of all mobility in the empire, encompassing the organization of migrant settlement, the prevention of emigration from Ottoman lands, and the sedentarization and education of nomadic groups.[53] During the Turkish War of Independence the *Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyeti* became attached to *Sıhhiye ve Muavenet-i İctimaiye Vekaleti* (Authority for Social Health and Welfare).[54] The *Mübadele, İmar ve İskan Vekaleti* (Exchange, Development, and Settlement Authority) responded to the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, and the İskan Umum Müdürlüğü (The General Settlement Ministry) took over the Exchange Ministry's responsibilities in 1925.

The basic course of migration administrative institutions in the Ottoman Empire reflected responses to mass influxes, relied on contributions from private individuals, and attempted to

[50] TKA 12.102, 9 Mart 1328, 22 March 1912; TKA 43.197, 13 Teşrinievvel 1330, 26 October 1914.
[51] TKA 16.60, 28 Kanunisani1327, 10 February 1912; TKA 156.18, 5 Mart 1330, 18 March 1914.
[52] For example, Red Crescent doctors vaccinated three hundred fifty migrants in Istanbul's Aksaray neighborhood. Over a three day period in January, 1913 doctors vaccinated nearly nine hundred refugees staying in mosques in Istanbul's Fatih neighborhood. TKA 105.1, 31 Kanunievvel 1328, 13 January 1913; TKA 105.2, 5 Kanunisani 1328, 18 January 1913.
[53] Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası*, 60.
[54] Ibid., 62.

connect central organization with counterparts in the provinces. As seen in Figure 2, while the Immigrant Commission was obscure in the decade from the mid-1860s to the mid-1870s, another independent organization with similar functions formed in response to the large number of migrants following the 1877-1878 war. Even though state officials realized that the process of organizing and successfully settling migrants was a task that extended beyond the first few months of intense migrant arrival, its organization was repeatedly only responsive to new numbers. As with contemporary refugee crises, the catastrophe of migration remains an administrative issue only when highly visible. The height of international and local public concern, and therefore governmental concern, corresponded to episodes when refugees were located in port cities, particularly Istanbul, and thus attempts to organize and institutionalize migrant care were most intense in these moments, even though the fulfillment of migrant needs and success in the overall goals of increasing a productive Ottoman population could only be achieved through ongoing efforts. The initial invitation to European refugees with capital may have served as a successful route to increasing overall state revenue by the 1880s or 1890s; however, the numbers of newcomers and influx of migrants requiring stipends, provisions, and daily necessities required more resources than the financially strapped state could prioritize.



Figure 2: Migrant Institutions and Estimated Immigrant Arrivals. The creation of independent entities within the Ottoman government roughly corresponded to moments of mass immigration in 1860-1864, 1877-1878, and 1899. Gaps in the line graph occur where population data was not available. See Appendix A for methodology.

Administrative Organization and State Goals

Despite the proliferation of alternative organizations and shifting levels of personnel and administrative power, state institutions for migration administration remained fundamental in arranging arrival and settlement in both Istanbul and the provinces. This section will describe and analyze several state-issued decrees to consider state goals and strategies in organizing migration. In particular, I will use the extensive directive of 1878, which established the structure

and duties of the Istanbul Migration Administration, and a directive from 1889 addressing the organization of migrant settlement.[55] These decrees reveal the extent of this undertaking. Even though fluctuating levels of personnel and changes in allocated funding likely undermined the ability of officials to follow through with their mandate, the sets of instructions give a sense of how the administration could have functioned.

The structure of the *Muhacirin İdaresi*, as laid out in the 1878 directive, directed the general affairs and all issues regarding migrants to the umbrella organization, the General Administration for Migrants. This organization was comprised of two main branches, the *İdare-i Umur-ı İskaniye* (Settlement Affairs Administration) and the *İdare-i Umur-ı Hesabiye* (Accounting Affairs Administration). Aside from its twenty municipal offices, the institution also included an office devoted to issues of migrant health (*Muhacirin-i Umur-ı Sıhıyye*). The main administration and various offices were manned by Sultan's administrators (*memurin-i saltanat-i seniyye*) and reputable individuals from local and migrant communities (*muteberan-ı ahaliden ve muhacirin-i mevcudenin eşraf ve vücuhunden mürekkeptir*). All components of the organization were to be assembled each day, and the health commission was required to submit a weekly register of those migrants who had died and those who were currently hospitalized.

The fundamental responsibility of the Settlement Affairs Administration was to streamline the transfer of migrants to the branch offices and districts beyond Istanbul by providing detailed information regarding the migrants who would be sent to the provinces. This information encompassed numbers of individuals, their places of origin and intended settlement areas, and calculations of the aid they would require from each appropriate branch office. The

[55] Eren published a transcription and original copy of the 1878 directive regarding the Istanbul Migrant Administration (*Dersaadet Muhacirin İdaresi Hakkında Talimat*) in Eren, *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri*, 96-113. A transcription of the second directive, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Yıldız Perakende Dahiliye Nezareti Maruzatı (BOA.Y.PRK.DH) 2.93, is available in *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* v.1 (no:28).

Settlement Administration organized and paid for migrant passage to their area of dispersal as well as organized provisions for the trip. It also covered the expenses of those being housed temporarily, those who did not appear in the daily provisions register, and those "coming and going out of season."[56] The settlement office was also tasked with generating a complete monthly register showing the amount of provisions, neighborhood of settlement, and names of those receiving rations. This information was then submitted to the General Administration.[57]

The main occupation of the Accounting Affairs Administration was to produce, organize, inspect, and analyze counterfoils and registers of migrants' daily stipends, food allowances, and other expenses. The branch was also to investigate and aggregate state expenditures for migrants who had already arrived in the empire. Based on the number of instructions issued in regard to the accounting administration, it is clear that levels of expenditures were seen as a matter of concern. The details provided to the branch reflected an overall effort to battle corruption on the part of officials and fraud on the part of migrant recipients of aid through proceduralization. This is unsurprising given the limited finances of the state, existing corruption within the Ottoman bureaucracy, and the high levels of fraud plaguing the previous commission's aid effort.[58] Tactics to combat corruption included holding scribes accountable for any sort of inconsistency found within the registers, forbidding erasure and mandating all mistakes be struck out and rewritten, and clearly stating the proper disposal of all redeemed provisionary vouchers. In terms of addressing potential fraud on the part of the migrants, the instructions stipulated that in the case of any lost vouchers, migrants could receive another document only after the local

[56] Dersaadet Muhacirin İdaresi Hakkında Talimat (DMIHT) in Eren, *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri*, Article 38. "*...bu sınıftan vakitli vakitsiz gelip giden...*"
[57] Ibid., Articles 35-40. In Chapter Two I will focus on the state's development of categories used to describe the migrant population.
[58] Officials themselves commented on issues of corruption as they evaluated the limited success of the 1860s settlement effort. Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*, 111-112.

government investigated the situation. If the lost voucher reappeared, it would not be credited. All vouchers were to be stamped prior to distribution by the General Administration, the local imam or *muhtar* (district headman), or the correct office or branch.[59]

While the instructions to the financial branch underline the overall concern with reducing the state's financial burden and limiting corruption, the instructions to the General Administration reveal ideals regarding the distribution of aid to migrants. The official line was similar to the Turkish Compassionate Fund's mantra: "Work for the able-bodied, alms only for the sick, the aged, and infirm," and the directive reveals how migrants' individual and personal characteristics structured their opportunities within the Ottoman Empire. The writers of the directive note that it was necessary to provide assistance to those men who had neither family nor refuge and who lacked the strength for manual labor. However, they also expected there would be some for whom light work was a possibility, and various state offices were to inform the Immigrant Commission of any openings in order to facilitate the employment of those men. Individuals who were left without family or who were unable to work were also to be settled in more desirable areas such as the Black Sea coast and Aydın and Hüdavendigar provinces. The writers of the instructions made special note of the treatment of women. Similar to men who lacked the strength for labor, women, particularly those who had been exposed to violence or left without immediate relatives, and orphans would continue to be cared for by the state. Those women who were not in danger and had not settled with relatives were to be found protectors from either the migrant or local communities and employed in sewing uniforms for the army.[60] Of course, age also determined the allocation of aid. Another directive from 1878 specified

[59] DMIHT, Articles 19-32.
[60] Ibid., Articles 13-15.

adults in need would receive one and one-half pounds while children up to age ten would receive about three-fourths of a pound of daily bread provisions.[61]

Tiered systems of assistance offered a way to defray overall expenditures on migrant aid, but they also served as a tactic in creating stability and reducing unanticipated movement in cities and settlement areas. Ottoman officials were concerned with the potential disruption of mobile or unattached populations. Even in the eighteenth century, Ottoman officials were anxious about the potential of itinerants and internal migrants to disrupt Ottoman cities, while officials increased the extent of the pass system, outlawed vagrancy, and expanded the orphanage system during the Tanzimat era.[62] Providing aid to the unemployable or to single women reduced the likelihood of ongoing mobility by those groups. Aside from these preemptive actions to maintain stability, the directive also included tactics to reduce unwanted migrant movement throughout the empire, particularly after settlement. These punitive measures included penalizing those who returned to Istanbul after being sent elsewhere and those who moved illegally throughout the provinces. In both scenarios, migrants found outside their assigned locations would be refused transport and rent assistance and have their stipends abrogated.[63] The directive took a hard line on the ability of migrants to ask for particular settlement locations, emphasizing that migrants would be transferred and settled regardless of the presence of relatives elsewhere in the empire.[64] Other measures obliquely emphasized the power

[61] BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 1.26 in *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* v.1 (no:17). According to the directive, adults were entitled to one-half *kiyye* and children were to receive 100 *dirhem*. The *kiyye* was a unit of weight employed by the Ottomans, standardized in the nineteenth century to equal about 2.83 lbs. A *dirhem* (dram) is a 400th of a *kiyye*, or 3-4 grams.
[62] Betül Başaran, "Remaking the Gate of Felicity: Policing, Social Control, and Migration in Istanbul at the end of the Eighteenth Century, 1789-1793" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2006); Herzog, "Migration and the State," 117-134; Maksudyan, "Orphans, Cities, and the State," 493-511. Despite efforts to reduce illegal movement, mobility remained an essential component of Ottoman society throughout the era. See Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire.*
[63] DMIHT, Articles 17-18.
[64] Ibid., Article 40.

of state officials to determine and fix migrant mobility, referencing the tendency to disperse migrant settlement and the state's right to return a migrant to their country of origin.[65]

The 1889 directive, issued more than ten years after the Istanbul Migration Administration instructions, focuses on the process of migrant settlement in the provinces. The latter manual more clearly illustrates the relationship between the central and provincial administration alluded to in earlier directives. Though the 1889 directive echoes some of the same concerns as the 1878 instructions, regarding tiered assistance, corruption and fraud, and migrant mobility, the instructions also offer insight into an extensive network of commissions on various levels of state organization. Each provincial center hosted a commission, and sub-committees in each *liva* (administrative district) and *kaza* (sub-district) coordinated with the office in the provincial center. The commissions were integrated into the structure of the community through their membership. Aside from an appointed official and scribe, the commissions were comprised of one salaried official from the provincial center, one from the municipal council, the necessary number of scribes recruited from the area, and several distinguished and public-minded individuals from the community.[66]

Within this widespread and multi-tiered system, officials saw information and communication as key to creating a rapidly responding organization. Efforts to enumerate migrant populations were an essential component of the administration's responsibility at all levels. Settlement commissions and branch offices composed detailed registers of migrant names, origins, sex, and trade, and neighborhood administrative commissions catalogued the aid given to migrants until they became self-sufficient. Administrators in areas of migrant departure facilitated speedy settlement through communicating numbers and projected arrival times to

[65] Ibid., Article 44, 47.
[66] BOA.Y.PRK.DH 2.93, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* v.1, no:28, Articles 1, 2.

receiving areas ten to fifteen days prior to migrant arrival.[67] The effort to accelerate settlement arose from recognition of the dangers of delay, as several items within the directive sought to avoid interruption and hasten the pace at which issues moved through the bureaucratic structure. Delayed responses were a matter of life and death throughout the newcomers' arrival, transfer, and settlement, and administrators boarded migrants in guesthouses as soon as possible to protect them from the elements as they awaited settlement.[68] Information was also essential in facilitating easy passage and tactics to address migrant sickness. Migrants too sick for travel and their families would be contained temporarily. In the event that households had to move on without the patient, officials prepared a list showing the location and time of the migrants' departure as well as information regarding where they would be settled. Administrators placed this list among the sick migrant's personal effects to facilitate family reunification after patient convalescence.[69]

Individuals from receiving communities were integral to the structure of the local commissions and migrant transport, and officials anticipated and required the assistance of community members throughout the settlement process. Despite the urgency with which information, decisions, and supplies were to be communicated, officials recognized migrant transport would be held up at various stages. Just as concerns about corruption arose from previous experience, the concern with delay and realistic recognition that immediate settlement was impossible likely arose in response to the difficulties of previous immigration episodes. Administrators knew migrants would arrive in such numbers as to preclude immediate settlement, and so assigned communities to host their share of newcomers. These same communities assisted the migrants through employing them and building their houses, and in

[67] Ibid., Articles 15, 19.
[68] Ibid., Articles 5, 7, 17.
[69] Ibid., Article 16.

particular local notables and wealthy, civically minded "patriots" were responsible for hiring and hosting the newcomers and providing the materials for building migrant houses.[70] Administrators also realized migrants would not be capable of producing enough as farmers in the first year of settlement, and mandated that the people of the area help them in sowing and preparing the land.[71]

I have analyzed two directives to gain a better sense of the extent of the project prompted by migrant settlement. These directives provide a snapshot of state ideals, not all of which were put into practice. Despite these limitations, these documents highlight several issues. First, the directives reveal points of continuity and suggest the broad terms at in migrant settlement. As the focus on corruption and delay suggests, these later decrees are not removed from the context of previous migrations, and language and tactics are shared both between the directives and elsewhere. For example, a component within the 1889 instructions describes the ideal setting for migrant placement, noting that migrant villages should be located near water and forest and if at all possible in an elevated area.[72] These same characteristics were often the terms through which both migrants and state officials evaluated settlement locations in the 1860s and 1870s, as I discuss in chapter three. Furthermore, while the 1878 directive explicitly suggests that family/tribal reunification would not be a factor in determining migrant settlement, this was a reversal of an earlier directive, and may have been the outcome of the numerous petitions sent by

[70] Ibid., Article 29.
[71] Ibid., Articles 25, 26, 30.
[72] Ibid., Article 27. Though officials were quite practical regarding the likelihood of corruption, fraud, and delay, there was no comment on the fact that decent land was increasingly difficult to find. For a discussion of reduced availability of land following 1860, see Yucel Terzibaşoğlu, "Land-Disputes and Ethno-Politics: Northwestern Anatolia, 1877-1912," in *Land Rights, Ethno-Nationality and Sovereignty in History*, ed. Stanley Engerman and Jacob Metzer (London: Routledge, 2004), 153-180.

migrants on this topic in the 1860s.[73] Though the directives are not comprehensive, exploring their language sheds further light on terms all actors used in navigating settlement outcomes.

The directives are also useful in considering the growing connection between the center and the provinces. Just as infrastructure such as telegraphs and railroads added to both the institutional power of the state and its visibility, migration administration established the state and its projects outside of Istanbul. The conveyance and settlement of large groups of people exemplified this era of increased interconnectivity. Settling migrants in less populated provinces or changing the ethno-religious balance of particular regions is reminiscent of traditional Ottoman tactics like the *sürgün* or *derbend* system.[74] In both, moving and placing people were tactics to extend state power; however, the vast scale of population movement in the nineteenth century and the Ottoman state's growing bureaucracy created greater change, incorporating both migrants and local communities. Individuals were integrated into the state apparatus as civic-minded volunteers and committee members. Carts and animals were commandeered from other areas to facilitate migrant transportation from ports, and in times when administrators or police were lacking, notables and wealthy individuals were required to accompany migrant caravans and facilitate further resource requisition along their route. Migrants' presence in areas required allocation of non-migrant individuals' time, labor, and resources. Ultimately, as with other

[73] Another directive from 1878 states the officials would make an effort to reunite those separated during the settlement process. BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 1.26, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* vol.1, no. 17. Many of the petitions requesting reunification are in the collection of the *Meclis-i Vala* from the era when Osman Pasha's Immigrant Commission was attached to this entity. See for example BOA.MVL 505.109, 6 Cemaziyülevvel 1283/16 October 1866; BOA.MVL 511.92, 26 Cemaziyülahır 1283/5 November 1866; BOA.MVL 511.127, 25 Cemaziyülevvel 1283/5 October 1866; BOA.MVL 512.71, 2 Recep 1283/10 November 1866; BOA.MVL 525.109, 21 Şevval 1283/26 February 1867; BOA.MVL 528.130, 21 Safer 1284, 24 June 1867; BOA.MVL 532.32, 21 Muharrem 1284/25 May 1867.

[74] *Sürgün* was an Ottoman policy requiring long-distance migration by groups. It was used as both a punitive measure and a method to colonize newly conquered territories. The *Derbend* system was a communication-security tactic in which the Ottoman state settled nomadic tribes and other mobile groups along roads and passes. Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, 18;71.

components of change in this era of state building, local actors contributed to the outcomes of changing policies.

Conclusion

By considering the empire's general population politics during the late-nineteenth century, the institutional history of the Immigrant Commission, and the organizing principles and basic goals of that institution, I have attempted to answer the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: How did Ottoman immigrants become a social issue managed through state administration? The chapter also contributes to another, related question: What are the outcomes for migrants and the state in developing immigrant administration and policies? The establishment of the Immigrant Commission (*Muhacirin Komisyonu*) signaled a shift in official strategy. Rather than relying exclusively on local and regional arrangements, the Commission approached immigration as an issue deserving centrally coordinated management. This centralized administration was intended to facilitate immigrant incorporation through enumeration. Categorizing migrants according to class, sex, age, and religion rendered migrants legible. Attaching these categories to aid and other resources lent them material significance, helping to turn "state fictions" into the "reality they presumed to observe."[75] Decisions to abrogate migration administration contributed to a lack of continuity that exacerbated migrants' problems in securing provisions, permanent settlement, housing, and farming implements long after their initial arrival. Though policies for migrant assistance, administrative goals, and instructions for carrying out migrant settlement on the central and local levels were not always actualized according to state plans, they offer a foundation for assessing migrants' relationship to the state and their ongoing experience within the empire. The following chapters of this

[75] Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 24.

dissertation will rely on this foundation to assess settlement and integration history as outcomes negotiated by state actors, migrants, and local stakeholders.

CHAPTER TWO

'HAPPY WITH THEIR LOTS', UNHAPPY WITH THEIR PLOTS: CONTESTED SETTLEMENT

> It was through an array of everyday activities and processes, through struggles and accommodations played out on multiple levels and registers, that a spatial history of the state *took place*…It was, after all, through these bureaucratic encounters, quotidian interactions, and documentary exchanges that spaces were (re)assigned meanings and names, ordered and divided, naturalized, and signified, and, at least theoretically, constituted and regulated.[1]
>
> Craib, *Cartographic Mexico*

Settlement touches upon every component of migrant integration. Location necessarily affects heath, education, employment, and the distribution of resources, making the process of settlement essential in developing state-migrant relationships. In order to place individuals and groups, officials required an understanding of regional population distribution and records of the legal status of particular land parcels. Settlement therefore dovetailed with the effort to create legible populations, in which groups and individuals were locatable according to rational, standardized information. This effort in the late Ottoman state was closely linked with reforming the land regime, in particular the objective of registering individual land parcels. Immigrants became material in cataloguing and radically changing the composition and distribution of the population. Migrants were not a unique group in terms of the behaviors officials hoped to promote among subjects, but they were uniquely well suited to function as objects of governmental techniques and as tools to enact wider reform.

[1] Raymond B. Craib, *Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 13.

In this chapter I assess "how the state actually learn[s] about (i.e., construct[s]) society in order to decide just how to govern it."[2] In particular, I analyze governmental categories used to enact settlement and land reform. I explain the development of settlement regimes in response to financial and political challenges. Mass migrations were essential in increasing the Ottoman state's development of categories to "know" its land and people, but the development and application of these categories emerged to some extent in reaction to the repertoires of local actors.

I examine the development and enactment of settlement policy in four sections. In section one, I connect migrant settlement to Ottoman land reform. I outline motives of reform, consider how migrant settlement influenced its enactment, and outline how the category of "empty lands" featured as an essential component of settlement. In section two, I analyze Ottoman settlement policy by focusing on developing categories used to know the population. I describe how economic and political interests determined official approaches to arranging the population within Ottoman imperial space. In section three, I describe a large-scale settlement project initiated in the last decade of the nineteenth century. I highlight how territorial and population categories allowed one surveyor to conceptually empty space in order to fill it with migrants. Finally, in section four, I consider ways in which knowing the population and enacting settlement were processes filtered through local interests. Individuals in the provinces determined the central state's access to information, and migrants and non-migrants activated the state's language in order to pursue individual and group interests.

[2] Hannah, *Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory*, 25.

Reforming the Land Regime

Modifications in the land regime were an essential component of the legal changes of the Tanzimat. Drafted laws were intended to increase the density of cultivated land and the efficiency through which the state could gain tax revenues. The marquee component of this effort was the 1858 Land Code, an ambitious, though unevenly applied, attempt to register producers as small-scale landowners. The Land Code contributed to the legibility of Ottoman territory and population by establishing the legal mechanism for a standardized property regime.[3] The Code's legal infrastructure, coupled with land surveying and registration, attempted to "comprehensively link every patch of land with its owner—the taxpayer."[4] Through standardizing land categories and redistributing newly taxable lands, the law addressed diversions of tax revenue that emerged within the early Ottoman state and grew worse in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Categorizing the land also extended central control over territory. As a component in the "epistemological mastery of territory," the law abstracted and categorized both population and territory in order to address the productivity of each.[5] In this section, I outline the motives for land reform, its connections to migrant settlement, and the importance of "empty land" as a category facilitating the enactment of the Land Code and migrant placement.

[3] Scott emphasizes that the creation of a "uniform property regime" is an aspiration and necessary precondition of modern states. As state purposes "broaden" and "deepen", extending to manipulating the productivity of population and territory, the amount of knowledge and abstraction necessary to achieve those purposes likewise shifts. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 35; 52.
[4] Ibid., 44.
[5] Hannah, *Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory*, 40. For a discussion of how the mechanisms to govern the population (governmentality) are analogous to those used to 'understand' and 'control' territory, see Stuart Elden, "Governmentality, Calculation, Territory," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 25 (2007): 562-580.

Land Code of 1858

The Land Code of 1858 emerged as a creative synthesis of Islamic and European notions of property and the state, and it contributed to the transformation of property rights in the Ottoman Empire and its successor states.[6] In attempting to match individuals to registered plots, the code addressed issues of agricultural productivity, taxation, and security. These issues emerged from the classical land regime.

State ownership of cultivatable land was consistent with administrative tactics dating to the Arab conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries, in which conquered, arable land was rendered the property of the Muslim community and administered by the state. This understanding of the state's possession of land generated a distinction in rights of ownership, rights to use, rights to inherit, and rights to revenue. The Land Code engaged explicitly with the categorization of land, distribution of rights, and taxation underlying the classical Ottoman land regime. Within the classical period (c. 1300-1600), several different categories of land reflected differentiation in modes of use and taxation. Land categories included *miri* (public/state), *vakıf* (pious endowments) *mülk* (free-hold), *mevat* (reclaimable), and *metruke* (abandoned). The basic unit of this system throughout most of the empire was the *çift-hane*, or peasant household, established on *miri* land, which comprised ninety percent of the empire's area during its early centuries.[7] The *çift-hane* system reflected the entitlement of each peasant household to sufficient land for subsistence and taxation. The establishment of a *çift-hane* occurred through a *tapu* contract. The *tapu* contract functioned as a deed and registered the amount of anticipated tax

[6] Huri İslamoğlu, "Property as Contested Domain: A Reevaluation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858," in *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East*, ed. Roger Owen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 3-62.
[7] İnalcık, *Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol 1, ed. Halil İnacık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 105. The *çift-hane* referred to the labor capacity of a household (*hane*) and that of a pair of oxen (*çift*). There were many regional variations in land holding patterns.

revenue associated with a particular plot.[8] A *tapu* title included right of transfer, heritability, and approach to production on the land, but did not include rights to selling, endowment, or radical change in usage through construction. These limitations encouraged the preservation of the integrity of the land unit and maintenance of state's revenue.

By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, systemic issues had depleted Ottoman tax revenue. Despite its maintenance over essential ownership rights to *miri* land, the Ottoman state's decentralized approach to tax collection created tension within a system intended to maintain peasant productivity on small farms. In the early empire, state intermediaries (*sipahis*) received the conditional, non-inheritable right to derive income from peasant labor in return for furnishing a cavalry. As military needs shifted from an on-call cavalry to a standing army, the task of extracting taxes shifted to tax farmers, who received non-inheritable, temporary contracts with the state. The short-term nature of these contracts encouraged over-taxation, contributing to peasants' abandonment of land. In response, the state issued life-term contracts for collection, but poor accountability allowed these life-term tax collectors to develop greater control over rural land and revenue, contributing to the creation of powerful provincial notables (*ayan*). In the early nineteenth century, the central state attempted to undermine the *ayan*s' rural power through appointing salaried tax collectors (*muhassıl*), but this effort was mostly unsuccessful.[9]

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[8] This dual meaning emerges from the term *tapu* standing in for both *resm-i tapu*, referring to the worth or revenue of the land, and *tapuname* or *tapu senedi*, referring to the document. See Anton Minkov, "Ottoman *Tapu* Title Deeds in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Origin, Typology and Diplomatics," *Islamic Law and Society* 7.1 (2000): 2. Minkov argues the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century title deeds reflected legal changes of the seventeenth century, and therefore references to *tapu* as a deed prior to this era are inaccurate.

[9] Even in the nineteenth century, tax farming yielded 95% of the collected tithe. Quataert, "The Age of Reforms," 885. Although the office of the *muhassıl* was abrogated after just two years (~1839-1941), its emergence is tied to the reconfiguratıons of property relations initiated during the Tanzimat. The *muhassıl*'s responsibilities were extensive and included tax collection, surveying the population to assess tax responsibility, maintaining infrastructure, and furnishing a local police force. His power was checked by district tax councils, which included notables and other community leaders who likewise participated in assessing tax. The councils and other administrative institutions remained following the elimination of the *muhassil*. The creation of the *muhassil* also corresponded to a shifting mode of assessing tax from customary and *shar'i* taxes to a consolidated "collectively assessed tax." This communal tax was assessed at the individual and collective level; each individual was required

Long-term processes of re-categorizing land from *miri* status to endowments (*vakıf*/*evkaf*) and freehold (*mulk*) land likewise diverted state revenue. While Ottoman state law governed *miri* land, endowments and freehold were overseen via Islamic law. Both endowments and freehold land were inheritable and more difficult to directly tax, even while *çift-hane*s existed on *vakıf* land. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, as much as two-thirds of landed property fell into the *vakıf* category, representing an enormous loss of revenue from formerly *miri* lands. This diversion of revenue prompted the creation of a central administration for imperial endowments intended to shift the collection of *vakıf* revenue back to the central state.[10]

As with the reorganization of *vakıf* administration, the Land Code can be read as one element in an ongoing effort to address the empire's financial shortages through improved taxation. Tanzimat bureaucrats attempted to improve revenue collection by appointing salaried tax collectors, shifting land from tax exempt status, reforming excise taxes, and redistributing taxes toward urban populations, which had traditionally been exempt from most forms of taxation aside from consumption taxes.[11]

Land reform and tax reform were closely tied. The Land Code's requirement that individual users register title deeds increased the state's ability to tax the population through

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to render a specific share of their village's tax responsibility. In 1859, tax collection shifted to an individual income and property tax. Even while tax farming reemerged in 1841, the persistence of the tax councils increased the presence of civil officials in the countryside. Furthermore, tax councils remained a check on the power of the tax farmer, as they had the *muhassıl*. Mehmet Safa Saraçoğlu, "Letters from Vidin: A Study of Ottoman Governmentality and Politics of Local Administration, 1864-1877," (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2007), 50-64.

[10] John Robert Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire* (Leiden, Brill 1986), 69-83. Barnes describes a clear conflict in revenue collection and endowment creation, but this relationship may have been more complex. At times state officials recognized the benefits such institutions and their related infrastructure and capital provided to local economies. Zoe Griffith, "Bequeathing the Nile: Irrigation Waqfs and Political Challenges in Late-Eighteenth Century Egypt" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, November 2015).

[11] Stanford Shaw, "The Nineteenth Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6 (1975): 421.

establishing one to one relationships between subjects and the central state.[12] The effort to assign new taxes and standardize the collection of existing ones required new cadastral surveys, which assisted in the registration effort. Following 1858, the Ottoman state shifted the production of title deeds from local intermediaries to the centralized Imperial Cadastral Office, a shift that eliminated variations within *tapu* deeds.[13]

Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, concerns about military effectiveness had already encouraged tax reform, but the effort to enact these changes became particularly acute following the Crimean War. During the war, the Ottoman Empire entered into significant foreign debt for the first time in its history. The debt was exacerbated by the difficulties of collecting taxes and coordinating the tax-farming system. Thus, the initiation of large-scale migration coincided with a moment of revenue crisis, reinforcing the importance of migrant settlement in increasing the taxable population.

Legibility accompanying land reform facilitated tax collection; it also contributed to Ottoman security measures. Registering land offered a means to push back frontiers between the central state and areas of tribal control, extending Ottoman control to its boundaries.[14] By the end of the eighteenth century, tribes and provincial notables had created powerful alliances, undermining Ottoman provincial control in the east even as it lost territory in the west. Some tribes contributed to rural insecurity through extortion of the Ottoman postal system and peasantry. As tribes gained power vis-à-vis the central state, they raided settled villages,

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[12] *The Ottoman Land Code*, trans. F. Ongley, revised Horace E. Miller, LLB. London: William Clowes and Sons, 1892. Article 8 of the code reads, "The whole of the lands of a town or village cannot be granted *en bloc* to the whole of the inhabitants nor by choice to one, two, or three of them. Different pieces of land are given to each inhabitant, and title deeds showing their possession are delivered to them."

[13] Minkov, "Ottoman *Tapu* Title Deeds," 4.

[14] Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 6. The effort to demarcate and establish secure Ottoman control over its borders became increasingly important following the establishment of the Westphalian state system. See Reşat Kasaba, "Do States Always Favor Stasis? The Changing State of Tribes in the Ottoman Empire," in *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices*, ed. Joel Migdal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 27-48.

contributing to large movements from border areas and further undermining central control. The Ottoman sedentarization effort included military strategies, such as imprisoning unruly tribal leaders and blocking migratory paths. The Ottoman state's response also relied on collecting information and attempting to define nomads in individual rather than tribal terms through means of the census and land registration. Registering individuals would undermine the authority of chiefs and notables, though both parties often used the Land Code to register large tracts of land.[15]

Migrant Settlement, "Empty Lands", and Territorial Claims

Constant conflict and rural instability in the seventeenth and eighteenth century uprooted many peasants, who travelled to the cities rather than serve in the army or pay increased taxes necessary to support a growing urban population.[16] The liberal refugee policies and Immigrant Code of 1857 addressed this issue by encouraging settlement in the large reserves of uncultivated land in the empire.[17] Both land reform and migrant settlement addressed the issue of how to increase agricultural productivity in the abandoned countryside. Although land reform was intended to address urgent problems of taxation, productivity, and security, issues of finance and politics delayed its wide-scale implementation.[18]

Migrant settlement helped to expedite the implementation of the Land Code in several ways. First, intense pressure to settle migrants quickly encouraged officials to determine the availability and suitability of land. The settlement effort both relied on and contributed to the

[15] Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, 93-107.
[16] Ibid., 55-63. The upheaval of the era left many villages abandoned. Kasaba notes that in the early eighteenth century, a survey found that one third of the registered households (56 out of 170) remained in the district of Karesi. Kasaba, 60.
[17] The Immigrant Code was discussed at greater length in Chapter One. The code enticed settlers through distributing high quality land and offering a short-term military and tax exemption.
[18] Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq*, 24-48. When the law was implemented, its flexible application led to different outcomes even in the same province. Ibid., 73-74; Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 82-92.

infrastructure of registration and surveying. Second, demographic pressure encouraged increased registration among all segments of society.[19] Migrant settlement contributed to the state's sedentarization toolbox. Large-scale migrant settlement on nomadic routes was used to undermine tribal mobility in Southeastern Anatolia and the Levant.[20] As population pressure increased through loss of territory and immigration, semi-nomadic tribes "self-settled," paying registration fees and taxes to assert their claim over land.[21] Migrants were particularly useful in disrupting tribal society. Since migrants had been removed from their original communities, they were easier to treat as distinct households rather than existing groups. Officials encouraged the separation of migrant leaders from migrant communities to further dismantle hierarchical relationships and non-state directed loyalty among immigrants.[22]

Third, placing and registering migrants inscribed new boundaries in Ottoman space. Migrant settlement was a territorializing measure that increased knowledge of the location of the Ottoman population by limiting access to land. The Land Code, like other elements of law, emphasized the relationship between individual and state, extracting the individual from his/her "web of social relations," including "collective modes of living and production."[23] Migrants were easier to locate and establish as abstract individuals because they had already been 'extracted' from older social connections. Through registering individual migrant cultivators on particular plots, officials undermined claims based on collective land use.

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[19] Yucel Terzibaşoğlu, "Landlords, Nomads, and Refugees: Struggles over Land and Population Movement in North-Western Anatolia, 1877-1914" (PhD diss., University of London, 2003), 147. Sultan Abdülhamid II continued to operate under the assumption that there was quite a lot of empty land available even though local officials had informed settlement directors that there was little land available for migrant settlement in previous decades.
[20] Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonu", 175-178. For example, migrants were dispatched to Tripoli to facilitate settlement of the Urban tribes, İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, 159.
[21] Terzibaşoğlu, "Landlords, Nomads, and Refugees," 93;135.
[22] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - İrade Meclis-i Mahsus (BOA.I.MMS) 27.1189, 1 Recep 1280/12 December 1863.
[23] E. Attila Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations, Property and Law. An Analysis of the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45.6 (2009): 937.

Directives and other documents related to migrant settlement stipulated the importance of finding *arazi-i haliye* ("empty/vacant land"). A*razi-i haliye* ranged from environmentally reclaimable terrain to *miri* pastureland outside the demarcated (registered) boundaries of villages. Alongside *miri* land, some endowment (*mevkufe*) and abandoned (*metruke*) land was available to be repurposed for migrant settlement if no one had a legal claim to it.[24] Surveying abandoned plots and villages was an essential tool in finding more available land than that initially listed in deed offices.[25] Despite the frequency with which it was invoked, arazi-i haliye was a flexible descriptor rather than a coherent legal category.[26] Officials could use the label of *arazi-i haliye* to conflate vacant/uncultivated land with legally unclaimed land. In so doing, officials increased the stakes of land registration. The designating of land as empty removed or delegitimized other registered and unregistered claims on space.[27] Categorizing territory as available for migrant settlement thus promoted cultivation as an essential component in legal claims to access and use land.

Migrant settlement and the Land Code functioned together in changing the central state's knowledge about its territory and its population. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees following the Crimean War complicated the effort to settle economically self-sufficient households throughout the countryside, and in subsequent decades, changing ideology weighted migrants' religious affiliation in determining their right to entry.[28] Nevertheless, mass immigrations helped to shift the land reform from proclamation to application. Migrations may not have provided the original motivation for land reform, but they were essential in its

[24] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Yıldız Sadaret Resmi Maruzatı (BOA.Y.A.RES) 1.41, 2 Safer 1295/5 February 1878. The Land Code defined abandoned land as any which had lain fallow for three successive years, with exceptions for prolonged military service or cultivation strategies. Ongley, *The Ottoman Land Code*, article 68.
[25] BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 4.54, 15 Teşrinisani 1300/27 November 1884.
[26] Territoriality "helps to create the idea of socially emptiable space." Sack, *Human Territoriality*, 33.
[27] Terzibaşoğlu, "Landlords, Nomads, and Refugees," 133; 176-177.
[28] Discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four.

outcomes. Thus far I have considered the motives of the land code, the relationship between settlement and land reform, and the importance of the category of 'empty lands' in enacting both settlement and land reform. In carrying out land reform and settlement, officials engaged with land categories in order to render both territory and population legible. In the following section, I further evaluate the development and use of population categories that arose through the needs of the settlement process.

Planning Settlement

The Immigrant Code and the decision to accept Muslim migrants reflected the empire's liberal immigration and refugee regime. Liberal immigration policies promised increased state wealth through increased population, but settlement policies grappled with actually transforming population growth into revenue growth. Unlocking the wealth of the frequently destitute migrant population required significant initial investment by the state. Expenditures included transportation fees, temporary housing in port cities and provinces, food and fuel rations, daily stipends, and farming supplies. Food aid for migrants in 1856-1876 may have been as much as 60,000,000 kuruş, with migrants on average receiving aid for eight months.[29] In 1878, the daily stipends for migrants in Istanbul cost the state 15,000,000 kuruş over a six-month period.[30] Given the expenses associated with caring for migrants, officials realized that prosperity would not follow naturally from immigration. Instead, state officials developed proposals intended to

[29] Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*, 159. Saydam found and translated several estimates of costs to the state for the period of the early migrations. In 1860, the Treasury, Finance Ministry, and *Şehremaneti* spent 3,522,618.19 *kuruş* on migrants passing through Istanbul. From 1860-1865, the *Muhacirin Komisyonu* spent a total of 12,663,615.03 *kuruş*. Cities covered migrant expenditures through their own budgets. For instance, Amasya spent 2,794,013.09 *kuruş* up through February of 1864, while Trabzon diverted 1,264,632.25 *kuruş* to cover, among other things, transportation, officials' and scribes' salaries, burial garments (*bez*), wood, bread and other food, and medicine. In all, Saydam estimates that the Ottoman state would have saved approximately 700 million *kuruş* from 1856-1862. Saydam, 198-203.

[30] İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu Türk Göçleri*, 85.

efficiently supply migrants with land and resources. These proposals relied on systematically collecting and applying information about newcomers and the land in order to properly manage migrant placement.

Like the Land Code, settlement policies engaged with the project of mastering the territory, combining categorizations of space with categorizations of the migrant and non-migrant population. In this section I trace changes within settlement policy and its enactment to make two arguments. First, officials responded to ongoing challenges in settlement by consistently seeking to better collect information about migrants and land resources. Collecting information rendered migrants and territory rationally manipulable governmental objects. Second, the state's interest in and capacity to organize space through migrant settlement increased in the fifty-year period following the Crimean War. Increasingly, officials operationalized governmental discourses. In order to make these two arguments, I will first establish a framework for evaluating Ottoman settlement policy.

Evaluating Policy

I will describe and evaluate two vectors in order to trace how settlement policy changed over time. Given the tremendous loss of migrant life and other complications following migrant arrival, some historians have questioned whether the Ottoman state had a settlement policy, particularly in response to the 1860s migrations. Rather than a simple yes or no answer, this question is better understood in terms of placement-incorporation and articulation-enactment. I will rely on Marc Pinson's and David Cuthell's differing discussions of policy to illuminate points along both these vectors.

Marc Pinson's assessment is placement focused and assumes minimal articulation and enactment of policy. Pinson portrays the settlement of Tatars and Circassians in the Balkans as one more skirmish in Russian-Ottoman "demographic warfare," in which Ottoman officials employed migrants as a blunt tool to change the demographics of border regions:

> It is clear from the geographical distribution of the immigrants which was finally achieved, that by the end of the colonization process, there was some sort of plan for placing them. It appears very doubtful, however, that the matter had been fully thought through from the outset. With both the Tatars and the Circassians, the Ottomans appear to have had initially only such general policy considerations as increasing the Muslim population, and the supply of manpower for agriculture and the army, [and] only an approximate idea of where they wished to settle the immigrants.[31]

Even though Pinson recognizes general patterns in migrant placement, he argues this did not constitute an overarching policy. Instead, the state's responses remained improvised and localized. Officials could only operate with an "approximate" plan because they lacked the necessary statistical data to achieve targeted placement.[32]

In contrast, David Cuthell argues officials worked with a coherent policy. The clarity he finds emerges not from a specific document communicating settlement principles but rather in the accumulated decisions and actions of the Immigrant Commission itself. Officials lacked initial information about both land ownership and the immigrant population in 1860, but they attempted to gather data and differentiate among migrants according to short-term military

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[31] Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 143. I discuss Pinson's concept of "demographic warfare" at greater length in Chapter One.

[32] Ibid., 144-146. Pinson notes that this type of statistical data about the migrations would simply have been impossible to generate at the time, since Russian officials were expelling migrants too quickly to allow either side to enumerate the refugees. His emphasis on lack of policy is intended to address ongoing episodes of religious colonization in contrast to Tanzimat principles of legal religious equality and to critique the Ottoman state's utilitarian approach to its subjects. He writes, "Merely to satisfy these [general demographic and strategic] considerations, extensive planning for settlement would not have been necessary, as would have been the case, if the welfare of the subjects had been the primary or even major consideration. All the evidence points to the absence of extensive planning and preparation. The implication of this for the attitude of the ruler to the ruled requires no further clarification." (p. 146). Kocacık also emphasizes the lack of data available to officials, and blames the emergence of land disputes related to migrant settlement on lack of information and miscommunication in the Cadastral ministry. Kocacık, "Balkanlar'dan Anadolu'ya Yönelik Göçler," 168.

objectives and long-term integration and economic goals. Officials split the immigrant population according to origin and initially placed Caucasian migrants in militarily strategic locations within the European provinces.[33] Administrators also disaggregated immigrant flows in terms of social standing. Dividing the population served as a strategy to coopt the wealthiest migrants through placing them in urban settings and to employ lower level leaders to coordinate group placement. According to Cuthell, these sources not only reveal a general colonization plan but also speak to the effort to not only place migrants but also to shape their identities through placement. Successful differentiation of the population depended on rates of immigration; at moments of mass immigration the interest in moving migrants as quickly out of arrival centers undermined officials' abilities to differentiate.[34]

Pinson and Cuthell's perspectives reveal different positions in terms of placement-incorporation and articulation-enactment. Whereas Pinson focuses exclusively on placement, Cuthell recognizes a close relationship between placement and integration, arguing the success of migrant settlement in the 1860s contributed to the development of migrants as eventual "proto-citizens" and "loyal subjects" of the Ottoman sultan.[35] Their two positions highlight the importance of separately evaluating policy and its actualization. Pinson undermines the idea of policy through arguing officials lacked the capacity to enact it. In doing so he points to the very issue Ottoman officials themselves viewed as essential to carrying out their developing settlement plans: statistical knowledge about the incoming population. Cuthell recognizes the Immigrant Commission's ad-hoc responses and the insufficiency of Ottoman infrastructure, but still charts out a tendency toward division and distribution.

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[33] Pinson, "Demographic Warfare," 140-141. A major argument in Cuthell's work is that the focus on Rumelian settlement is misleading, as most migrant settlement was redirected toward the Anatolian Provinces after 1862. Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonu," 170-173.
[34] Cuthell, "Muhacirin Komisyonu," 132-156.
[35] Ibid., 17; 262.

Attention to the articulation-enactment vector expands my analysis of policy beyond notions of success or failure. Rather than "success" as a measure for evaluating the *existence* of policy, success and failure can be evaluated as intrinsic factors in developing policy. Evaluating policy in terms of both articulation and enactment is essential to recognizing the accumulated consistencies, changes, and affects in how officials sought to organize space through migrant placement. In the rest of this section, I will use instructions issued to settlement ministers to argue that settlement policy changed along both the articulation-enactment and placement-incorporation vectors from 1860 to the beginning of the twentieth century.

Locating Governmental Objects

Officials recognized the importance of knowledge in facilitating settlement. Finding available land and placing migrants within it required, at the very least, information about population distribution and the number of immigrant arrivals. Following the establishment of the Immigrant Commission, placing migrants became an empire-wide project of conceiving how best to arrange the population. Determining how to best enact migrant settlement required locating migrants "within a grid of specification."[36] The type of knowledge generated about the population changed in response to complications emerging during and after migrant placement. Factors of cost, terrain, population composition, and geo-strategic interests could be matched to migrant characteristics to affect the best outcomes. Thus, even while settlement was an empire-

[36] Hannah, *Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory*, 56. Hannah defines grids of specification as "coordinate systems on which to locate the objects of discursive formation and their features." In his history of the US census, Hannah describes, aside from a spatial coordinate system, grids of specification within the population schedules, including race, sex, age, occupation, dependency, and temporal grids of national progress, wealth, and agricultural expansion. These grids "structured the relation" between census and ideology. (p. 57-59). The Ottoman state generated statistics about other components of the population. In describing the Ottoman prison survey of 1912, Kent Schull notes the act of collecting information about the prison population according to detailed categories "divided the prison population into comprehensible parts while simultaneously totalizing it into an intelligible whole that Ottoman authorities could understand, control, and discipline." Schull, *Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire: Microcosms of Modernity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 67.

wide project, it was responsive to local contexts and regional concerns. Though I will not explore the articulation of policy on the local scale, I will constrain most of my discussion to the migrants settling in or emerging from Rumelia. Different grids of specification may have emerged in articulations and enactment of settlement in other regions, like Eastern Anatolia.

Rumelia was an initial locus for migrant settlement and economic development. As early as 1856, the Grand Vizier Mehmet Emin Ali Pasha, with the permission of Sultan Abdülmecid I, established the planned city of Mecidiye in Silistre for Tatar migrant settlement. The region had faced significant population decline due to wars in the decades preceding the Crimean War, and the plan to import Nogay and Crimean Tatars in the area was successful. According to population estimates in 1878, Tatars comprised roughly seventy-five percent of the district's 28,313 inhabitants.[37] Silistre Province was geo-strategically and economically vital. Following the Provincial Statute of 1864, Silistre was reconstituted with the *eyalets* of Nis and Vidin as Danube Province (*Tuna Vilayeti*) and became a showcase for Tanzimat reforms.[38] Following the Treaty of Berlin, the Danube Province was divided among Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Eastern Rumelia.

[37] Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism," 226. Karpat describes the founding of Mecidiye as a great success in "capitalistic economics and social engineering," as "by 1875, Mecidiye had become one of the most prosperous, sophisticated, and literate towns in the Ottoman state." (p. 228). At the time of its founding, Mecidiye and Dobruca fell within the boundaries of Silistra Province. In 1864 the town became part of the Danube Province. The ratio of Tatars and Circassians to the rest of the population was lower than the figures Karpat give for the district. Petrov provides population figures based on the 1866 Ottoman census that were published in 1874 in the provincial newspaper. The paper gave a very low figure for the province's combined Tatar and Circassian population, estimating they comprised 5.6% of the Danube Province's population. Milen V. Petrov, "*Tanzimat* for the Countryside: Midhat Paşa and the *Vilayet* of Danube, 1864-1868, (PhD diss. Princeton University, 2006), 68.

[38] Rogan notes that the 1864 Provincial Statute was intended to reorder the administrative structure in order to create a clear "hierarchy of administrative authority and accountability." Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 12. It also created representative councils. Danube Province became a prototype for administrative reform under the energetic governorship of Midhat Pasha. For information on the administrative structure of the Danube Province, see Petrov, "Tanzimat for the Countryside," 82-110. For a discussion of these reforms and their contributions to transformations in the administrative structure of Vidin *sancak*, see Saraçoğlu, "Letters from Vidin," 99-108.

Figure 3: The Balkans in the 1860s.[39]

Figure 4: Division of the Balkans Following Treaty of Berlin.[40]

[39] Michael Palairet, *The Balkan Economies c. 1800-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 35.

Though the Ottoman state eventually diverted more of the migrant population into Anatolia, migrant settlement in Silistre and elsewhere in Rumelia has attracted historian's attention because of the large numbers of Tatars arriving from 1856 to 1861, the prevalence of Circassian paramilitary groups in the Bulgarian Horrors, and migrants' perceived role in aggravating the development of nationalist movements the European provinces. It is useful to begin the discussion of settlement policy in this region because the earliest settlement directives focused on settlement there and because the loss of much of Rumelia following the 1877-1878 war was itself a factor in altering the relevance of characteristics officials used to locate migrants.

In the spring of 1860, just a few months after the establishment of the Migrant Commission, the Interior Ministry issued a directive to *Miralay* (colonel) Nusret Bey, describing his responsibilities as Immigrant Settlement Minister in Rumelia. In his new position, Nusret Bey was charged with dispersing immigrants from centers in Varna, Kostence, and Mecidiye and placing migrants in available imperial land (*arazi-i haliye-i miriye*) in Edirne, Silistre, and Vidin provinces. Vidin's governor had determined enough space existed in the province to accommodate 5,000-10,000 migrant households, as existing registers revealed the people of Dobruca had pasturelands beyond their immediate needs. Through combining the registers and ongoing investigations, Nusret Bey would both settle newcomers in appropriate areas and ensure land used and needed by the local population was not erroneously assigned to migrant settlers.[41]

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[40] Map adapted from Samuel Augustus Mitchell, *Map of Turkey in Europe*. Illustrating the Berlin Congress Treaty, July, 1878. (with) A map showing the relation of Cyprus to the adjacent coasts. (with) Map of Armenia to illustrate articles 58, 59, 60 of the Treaty of Berlin. 1880. David Rumsey Map Collection. 27 April, 2016. The Treaty of Berlin recognized the independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the autonomy of the Principality of Bulgaria, and the autonomy of the Province of Eastern Rumelia, which was united with Bulgaria in 1885.
[41] BOA.I.DH 460.30579, Muharrem 1277/August 1860. Cited in Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*, 100.

Once Nusret Bey and Vidin's governor had designated areas for settlement, Nusret Bey was to ensure that each of an estimated 25,000-50,000 individuals received environmentally suitable land.[42] He could either establish entirely new villages or distribute small groups of migrants in abandoned homes and lands in existing towns. The latter was a delicate procedure, as potential difficulties emerged through overburdening existing communities. To facilitate peace and comfort for migrants, the state, and existing residents, Nusret Bey had to avoid intensive settlement, particularly in Christian villages. When establishing migrant villages, Nusret Bey was to ensure the communities were designed in the 'new style' (*usul-ı cedid*), regularly arranging houses and creating the wide streets increasingly popular in Tanzimat-era city planning.[43]

Placing thousands of migrants in the province promised to be an expensive endeavor. Luckily, according to the directive, current migrants tended to be better off than their predecessors of recent years, as many had managed to sell off property in their homelands prior to departure. To reduce the cost of the settlement project, Nusret Bey was to distinguish among migrants based on their economic circumstances. Only those migrants in dire need of assistance were eligible for aid. Otherwise, wealthy migrants were to purchase their own provisions and agricultural equipment. Those in between these two extremes were to work as hired labor for wealthy migrants or established populations.[44]

The instructions highlight three factors that would remain constants in migrant settlement in the following decades. First, in its description of land surpluses and village planning, the

[42] These migrants would have been mostly Crimean Tatars. The role of the environment in complicating settlement is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.
[43] BOA.I.DH 460.30579 (1860). Tanzimat officials developed plans to modernize cities through systematic planning and organization of urban space. Karpat describes Mecidiye as an early effort to do this from scratch. Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism," 214. See also Çelik's discussion of urban planners' attempts to dramatically transform the capital. Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
[44] BOA.I.DH 460.30579 (1860).

instructions reflect how settlement relied on organizing space on imperial, provincial, and local scales. The instructions required finding "empty land" in the provinces and carefully distributing the population. Spatial organization emerged through categorizations. Officials classified types of land through two essential yet flexible attributes: availability and suitability. These categories, rather than fixed, were responsive to local context and ideological shifts.

Second, categorization extended beyond territory to migrant and non-migrant populations. Policies and their enactment relied on classifying individuals and groups based on a blend of religious and economic characteristics. The instructions acknowledge the ethno-religious makeup of the population in Varna, and encourage Nusret Bey to differentiate groups according to their resources. In a governor's assurance of land beyond the population's needs or in emphasizing environmental attributes of settlement areas, the productive potential of land was matched to the productive potential of people to be settled on it. The acts of categorizing land and classifying groups functioned together to enact settlement.

Third, large-scale settlement projects continued to require collecting massive amounts of data to ensure legal, equitable, rapid, and successful migrant placement. Nusret Bey relied on the land surveys carried out by the governor and his own efforts to evaluate areas for potential placement. By necessity, centrally generated settlement projects and land reform initiatives engaged with local populations. The attempt to administer migrant placement and enact policy relied on provincial actors well beyond 1860. The directive's engagement with the issue of harmonious settlement highlights how successful migrant placement required participation and cooperation of migrant and non-migrant populations.

Nusret Bey's instructions offer an articulation of the goals and expectations for large-scale migrant placement at the moment when the Ottoman state first attempted centrally

coordinated immigration and settlement. The directive formalized core principles of pre-Commission efforts. Instructions sent to the governor of Silistre in 1856 for settling Crimean Tatar migrants in Dobruca similarly required wealthy migrants to cover their housing and other expenses and emphasized the importance of placing migrants in environmentally appropriate locations.[45] Though the settlement initiative in 1856 was similar to the 1860 directive, Nusret Bey's role within the Migrant Commission allowed for far more expansive implementation. Rather than just the area around Silistre, his mandate extended to all the European provinces. As officials contemplated coordinated settlement and confronted the large numbers of arrivals, migrants became raw material to address broad goals and to enact targeted projects.

Subsequent settlement directives both reveal continuity in settlement goals and strategies and highlight how the state responded to ongoing complications and expenses. Categorizing migrants based on their wealth and projected productivity remained an essential route to disaggregating the population and defraying settlement costs. In response to the expenses and lack of completion of settlement, instructions in 1865 attempted to standardize the collection of this type of data in Danube Province. According to the instructions, officials were to divide the migrant population into four different types (*sınıf*) according to their wealth and potential productivity. The categorizations ranged from those who were independently wealthy to those who would require long-term or perpetual assistance from the state.[46] The instructions included a

[45] Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*, 119-120; Document cited in full in Eren, *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri*, 42-49. The instructions to the governor in Silistre did have some obvious differences from later endeavors. For example, these instructions encourage creating new villages rather than attempting to divide migrants and settle them in existing villages, a strategy that waxed and waned in importance and feasibility.

[46] BOA.I.MMS 133.5690, 16 Ramazan 1861/12 February 1865. Type One were those who did not need aid at all. Type Two were those who had found work after arrival. Type Three were those who were currently in need but who could become self-sufficient. Type Four were those who would require long-term assistance from the state, such as widows and those incapable of work. The Third and Fourth types were further divided into two sub-groups. "*...evvelki sınıfı hallen ve bedenen ianeden müstağni olarak ashab-i küdret ve servetten olanlardır. İkinci sınıfı bu taraflara vusulundan beri işini ve ziraat ve ticareti yoluna koymuş olan takımdır. Üçüncü sınıfı ashab-i ihtiyaçtan*

sample register (Table 2) to be distributed to all towns within the province in an effort to standardize these divisions, enumerate the migrant population, and record their profession or economic status.[47] Recording this information about the population would allow officials to determine the amount of food and other aid to distribute to those in need.

Table 2: **Sample Register: Migrant Types.** H = Household, M = Males, and F = Females. Original document reproduced in Appendix B.[48]

	Type 1			Type 2			Type 3: A			Type 3: B			Type 4: A			Type 4: B			Trade	Name
Entry	H	M	F	H	M	F	H	M	F	H	M	F	H	M	F	H	M	F		
1	1	3	2																Farmer	
2	1	2	3																Farmer	
3				1	5	2													Jeweler	
4				1	2	4													Jeweler	
5							1	3	2										Driver	
6							1	5	1										Driver	
7										1	3	2							Carpenter	
8										1	5	3							Carpenter	
9													1	0	4				---	Widow
10																1	5	2	---	

Officials also relied on local populations to assist in defraying the cost of migrant settlement. Sourcing expenses to host communities reduced expenditures by the central treasury. People in each town and village were required to contribute aid for migrant families. Non-migrant groups facilitated migrants' first few years in their new homes and even housed migrants for long periods of time. Even after migrants were transported from port cities to interior locations, they remained in temporary housing. "Temporary housing" ranged from short-term

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ise de elinden ya ziraat ve sanaat gelir veyahut vücutça kar ve kesbe elverir kimselerdir. Dördüncü sınıfcı ianeye muhtaç ... ve dul ve bikes nisvan ve ihtiyar ve sakat ve mariz ve amelimandalardır."

[47] I did not find any evidence to suggest that this register was distributed to other provinces, nor did I find any completed registers in the collection of the Immigrant Commission. Recording the population in this way may have been a one-time effort to resolve the issue of expenditures.

[48] BOA.I.MMS 133.5690 (1865).

stays in holding areas to any amount of time prior to migrants' completion of their new houses and attainment of deeds for their land. Though permanent settlement remained the main objective of settlement policies, stopgap measures addressing various stages of temporary housing were written into instructions from the early years of mass immigration. Nusret Bey's instructions emphasize his most essential task as settling migrants as quickly as possible to avoid problems that would arise if they were not settled prior to winter. In the case that migrants were not settled prior to winter, they could be hosted by their countrymen or others in Mecidiye or placed in tents.[49] Temporary housing was a necessary component in defraying costs and hosting migrants, but it yielded several complications.

Relying on locals to assist migrants required collecting information about the financial situation of locals as well as migrants. Hosting duties for established residents included assisting in building migrants' houses and tilling fields upon migrants' first arrival. Wealthier individuals were to employ migrants as sharecroppers and maintained until the migrants were provided their own tools. If the local population could not provide these services, the government would provide up to 250 kuruş per house.[50] Migrants' 'temporary/visitor' (*hal-i misafiret*) period was to last no more than one year in order to quickly reduce the burden to migrants, locals, and the treasury.[51] Despite the hope that temporary housing would be truly temporary, officials, migrants, and locals struggled with arrangements stretching beyond six months. A full-year of hosting migrants was a significant drain on local resources, and communities responded to delays. A petition submitted in the spring of 1867 by the 'long-term residents' (*ahal-i kadime*) of

[49] BOA.I.DH 460.30579 (1860). I discuss how climate and weather complicated settlement at greater length in Chapter Three.
[50] BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 1.26 (1878).
[51] The effort to get migrants farming within a year remained a consistent goal. See Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - İrade Melis-i Vala (BOA.I.MVL) 505.22848, 1864. Also cited in Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*, 111; BOA.Y.A.RES 1.41 (1878).

a village in Sivas Province requested their migrant guests be settled.[52] Since the migrants had arrived in winter, the already poor residents were burdened with housing and provisioning the visitors. The migration administration informed the governor of Sivas that the migrants must be settled without delay, as this long-term hosting was injurious to the residents.[53]

Petitions from migrants also attest to the fact that temporary arrangements persisted far longer than intended. Crimean and Circassian migrants sent petitions complaining of visitor status stretching for fourteen months in Kırk Kilise and a year and a half in Aydın Province.[54] A migrant in Bolu noted that his family had been 'visitors' for two years, and thus he had fallen into difficult times.[55] Both officials and migrants linked long-term provisional status to general difficulties through phrases underlining migrants' 'visiting and miserable state' or 'visiting and impoverished state.'[56] Officials recognized the difficulties of temporary settlement as a factor in some migrants' attempts to return home rather than prolonging their stay in the empire.[57]

Solving the issues accompanying temporary housing required officials to continue to gather information in order to reduce difficulties for locals and migrants. Directives limited each community's specific share of the migrant burden, for example, a regulation from 1863 established the ideal distribution as one migrant household per ten local families.[58] Settlement policies focused on facilitating migrants' entrance into the agrarian workforce as quickly as possible. Officials attempted to efficiently reduce migrants' transition time by collecting and

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[52] Documents from the 1860s also use the term *ahali-i mütevattin* (settled/resident people) to refer to host communities.
[53] BOA.MVL 533.109, 23 Muharrem 1284/27 May 1867. "*Böyle tul-ı müddet hal-i misafirette bırakılarak ahali-i kadimenin mutazarrır edildiği sahih...*"
[54] BOA.MVL 388.3, 6 Zilkade 1278/5 May 1862; BOA.MVL 504.44, 13 Cemaziyülevvel 1283/23 September 1866.
[55] BOA.MVL 511.127, 25 Cemaziyülahır 1283/25 4 November 1866.
[56] E.g. "*Muhacirinden ekserisi …hal-ı misafiret ve perişanda kalmalarıyla…*," BOA.I.MMS 22.962, 13 Zilkade 1277/23 May 1861; "*Kosova vilayeti dahilinde ve hal-i misafiret ve sefalet bulunan muhacirinin...*" Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Dahiliye Nezareti Muhacirin Komisyonu (BOA.DH.MHC) 2.86, 24 Mart 1296/5 April 1880.
[57] BOA.I.MMS 22.962 (1861).
[58] BOA.I.MMS 27.1189 (1863).

disseminating information regarding migrant numbers and destinations.[59] Officials intended migrants to fill a particular economic niche; a proper settlement policy addressed issues of housing, food, and work in the long-term.[60] Officials were precise in determining the amount of start-up funds and provisions the migrants would require to sustain themselves. From 1856 onwards, migrants were to be given farm animals, tools, and seed. According to instructions from 1878, each two households were to be given a pair of oxen. Each household should be comprised of five individuals, and if households were of different sizes, the distribution would be changed accordingly. Migrants also received five bushels of seeds to plant.[61]

The goal of efficient settlement contributed to the classification of the migrant population based on resources and economic roles, but economic factors were not the exclusive determinant of migrant categorizations. Categories were also responsive to shifting political ideologies. The loss of land following the Treaty of Berlin not only spawned a new flow of migrants into existing Ottoman territory but also contributed to a new emphasis on religion in distributing the migrant population.

Directives issued following the 1877-1878 war highlight how migrant classifications emerged through political and economic interests. In 1884, following a detailed investigation of the conditions of migrant settlement, a report issued from Yıldız Palace estimated over two million immigrants had arrived in the Ottoman Empire and suggested another ten million individuals could be settled on available lands. If taken at face value, this figure represented a twenty-five percent increase over the empire's estimated population of forty million.[62]

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[59] BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 1.26 (1878).
[60] BOA.I.MMS 133.5690 (1865). "*Muhacirin çerakesinin a'zam levazimi üç şey olup birincisi sukna ve ikincisi makulat ve üçüncüsü malzeme-i tayyişleri olan çift alatı ve hirfet ve sanayi edevatı gibi şeylerdir*."
[61] BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 1.26.
[62] Karpat's aggregated population estimates based on the 1881/2-1893 census show a population of 39,109,631 for the entire empire. This number includes special administrative and autonomous units, including Egypt, Tunisia, Eastern Rumelia, the Bulgarian Principality Crete, Bosnia and Herzegovinia, Cyprus, and Samos. If the population

Strikingly, rather than concerns about the potential social upheaval accompanying such a large and rapid increase in population and population density, the report offered a rosy projection of potential profit from such a turn of events:

> …Muslim migrants are emigrating to and taking refuge under the protection of the exalted Caliph. In this way the people of Islam are drawn under the royal wings, garnering innumerable benefits within a brief period of time, such as naturally augmenting the prosperity, industry, agriculture, and trade of the imperial lands and enriching the royal army through increased revenue for the imperial treasury and an abundant population.[63]

Issued eight years into the reign of Abdülhamid II, this statement speaks to the pan-Islamist trajectory of the Sultan's rule through asserting his position as Caliph and explicitly recognizing immigrants' Muslim status as essential to the benefits their settlement promised.[64] Aside from the ideological framing of the empire's religious identity and responsibility for Muslims, the report's depiction of immigration focuses on its economic components. Despite several decades of expensive migrant settlement, migration still "naturally" enriched the empire simply through population increase, as more people meant more soldiers and taxpayers.

Economic classifications were essential to settlement goals, and ethno-religious attributes became tied to economic concerns. Both immigration and settlement policies engaged with the language of moral responsibility while contributing to economic development. Facilitating immigration for Muslim co-religionists remained essential in state self-definition and legitimacy

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of these areas is subtracted, the population of the empire is approximately 28,000,000. A projected 25% increase via immigration is even more striking given that Karpat suggests immigrants already comprised nearly 30% of the Ottoman population in the 1880s. Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 150-151.

[63] BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 4.54, 15 Teşrinisani 1300/27 November 1884. "*…fevç-i muhacirin-i İslamiye zir-i saye-i hazret-i zulallahlerine hicret ve dahalet eylemektedir. Ahal-i Islamiyenin bu suretle taht-i cenah-i malukanelerinde ictima' eylemesi az zamanda memalik-i mahrusa-i şahanelerinin sera-pa mamuriyeti ve sanayi ve ziraat ve ticaretin bil-tab' çoğalması ve hazine-i celilelerinin tezyid-i varidatı ve kesret-i nüfus hasebiyle asaker-i malukanelerinin ziyadeleşmesi mesellu 'arz ve ta'dadı gayri kabil nice nice muhassenatı camıdır.*"

[64] I discuss the role of pan-Islamism in migrant-state interaction in greater detail in Chapter Four.

at home and abroad.[65] Still, economic concerns easily intertwined with religious rhetoric. For instance, an official plan issued in 1887 noted the responsibility of the Ottoman state to rescue 700,000 "courageous" Muslims facing oppression and extinction under Bulgarian (Christian) rule. The fulfillment of the state's "sacred duty" once again offered geopolitical benefit: the immigration of the Muslims to the Ottoman Empire would significantly undermine the revenues of Bulgaria and increase wealth and population in Anatolia.[66] The tone of these directives from the 1880s is strikingly different from Nusret Bey's cautious approach to settling Muslim migrants among Christian populations in 1860. Immigration policy prioritized economic and geopolitical concerns throughout the period. Economic and security interests structured efforts to organize the populations' relationship to the land and the state. Migrant aid and settlement endeavors prioritized similar interests, as settlement policies aligned with Ottoman reformers' attempts to augment agricultural production and increase central state control over provincial groups and individuals.

Organizing Space

Changes in categorization emerged in response to the need to reduce cost, alleviate difficulties for migrants and locals, and respond to political concerns. Articulation and enactment of policy occurred in combination with one another. Categories contributed to determinations of how space would be organized, and changes in categorization influenced the placement-

[65] As I mention in Chapter Three and expand upon in Chapter Four, the Sultan's status as caliph rendered his ability to provide for the material and moral wellbeing of Muslim migrants particularly urgent, especially as state Pan-Islamism became a more visible policy for engagement abroad and within the empire.

[66] BOA.Y.A.HUS 198.69, 26 Rebiyülahir 1304/22 January 1887. *O tarafların ahali-i İslamiyesi gayet şeci' adamlar olup miktar-i nüfus yedi yüz binden ziyade tahmin olunduğundan bu bunlar oralarda kaldıkları halde zulm ve gadr alında mahv ve münkarız olacakları cihetle kendilerine şu beliyyeden kurtarmak derece-i vucubda olduğu gibi bu kadar nüfus-i islamiyenin Bulgaristan ve Şarkı Rumeli'ye terk ile sair vilayet şahanede tevetunları Bulgaristan'ın vardatına hayliden hayli nakısa iras edip bizce ise tezayüd-i vardat ve nüfus mustelazim olacağından şık-ı sanisinin her halde ola ruchani bedihidir.*

incorporation vector, encouraging attempts to not only place migrants but to do so in order transform in behaviors. The development of more detailed categories allowed for greater attention to finding the best arrangement of the migrant population on an increasingly granular level.

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, officials attempted to disperse migrant populations to encourage stability and productivity in the countryside. The maintenance of harmonious relations between migrants and others was essential, given the role other communities played in migrant settlement. Thus, officials were concerned with determining ideal spatial relationships among migrants and other groups. This was essential when migrant families were placed in existing villages. For example, the instructions in 1860 stipulated only five to ten migrant households should be placed in each village.[67]

Directives encouraged limiting the number of migrants per village not only to reduce the burden on their hosts but also to generate certain behavioral outcomes. In the 1860s, the Supreme Council (*Meclis-i vala*) commented on the importance of dispersing 10,000 Nogay Tatar arrivals. Dispersing the arrivals would directly encourage their abandoning of particular tribal loyalties and forgetting their "ignorant customs."[68] The council compared integrating migrants through disrupting social structures to similar tactics used against tribes. A directive for settling migrants in the region of Canık, Bolu, Kastamonu, Sinop, and Amasya stressed the ideal ratio as one migrant household per five other families. Concerns that this could be too heavy a burden for the region's villagers were countered with the example of successfully settling 30,000-40,000 members of the Rusvan and Öşer tribes in Yozgat district without great strain to the area.[69]

[67] BOA.I.DH 460.30579 (1860).
[68] Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*, 132.
[69] BOA.I.MMS 27.1189 (1863).

Migrant villages were also established wholesale rather than attempting to distribute families among existing villages.[70] Efforts to organize space occurred not only in terms of determining the number of migrants to be sent to a particular region but also at the micro-level of the arrangement of streets and design of houses. The directive to Nusret Bey in 1860 encouraged him to establish migrant villages with regular and wide streets. In later decades, the use and dissemination of designs for migrant villages increased in number and detail.[71] A village plan for Cretan migrants in Tripoli (Lebanon) circa 1902 established a gridded settlement covering 56,448 meters. The blueprint plotted 208 houses, ten shops, a mosque, a school, a police station, and five wells (Figure 5). [72] Cadastral maps from villages established following 1878 indicates at least short-term success in distributing regular, gridded land parcels and housing to migrants.[73] Planning encompassed the organization of families as well as communities. Houses were designed to share walls in clusters of four (Figure 6). Planning of this kind promised efficient use of both cost and space. The housing grid located migrants in space, putting each family in a numbered, standardized structure. Like the individual migrant, the family was also rendered an abstraction with standardized and categorizable features. In planning the distribution of homes, schools, mosques, and police stations, migrant villages became sites to enact the spatial ordering necessary for surveillance.[74]

[70] See for example BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 1.26 (1878), which described procedures for registering new migrant villages.
[71] BOA.I.DH 460.30579 (1860).
[72] BOA.PLK.P 6502, 1319/1901. See also İpek, "Göçmen Köylerine Dair"; Kocacık, "XIX. Yüzyılda Göçmen Köylerine İlişkin Bazı Yapı Planları"; Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası*, 201-213.
[73] Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, "The Influence of Social Structure on Land Division and Settlement in Inner Anatolia," in *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives*, ed. Peter Bendict, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 33-35.
[74] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 196-198.



Figure 5: Detail: Blueprint of Migrant Village. Tripoli, c.1902. Image corresponds to upper right quadrant of a gridded plan for the entire village. Upper left corner shows standard house blueprint. Each rectangular block includes four houses. Each block of four houses is separated from the next block by an eight meter walking path.

Figure 6: Interior and Exterior Designs for Migrant Housing Block. Individual houses were 135m^2. PLK.P 6502.

Rather than evaluating the success or failure of settlement initiatives, I have analyzed the development of settlement policy through examining the categorizations the state used to know the migrant population. While 1860-1861 may have been a moment when the state was too overwhelmed with numbers to carefully assess migrants prior to arrival, in later decades officials sought to efficiently gather detailed information about migrants. The effort to collect more detailed information emerged in response to settlement challenges and changing politics. Increased information about the refugees also allowed for targeted placement, and policies shifted from merely evaluating regional placement to encouraging the organization of space at the level of the family. As officials attempted to organize migrant settlement at both regional and local scales, they sought to affect the behavior as well as the distribution of the Ottoman social body.

Enacting Settlement

By assisting in settling nomads, acting as an important military and paramilitary force, and reclaiming land for agriculture, migrant settlement offered a route to solve some of the largest political and economic problems of the Ottoman state. Though these tactics, goals, and benefits remained broadly applicable throughout the empire, more specific needs encouraged large-scale settlement projects with narrower objectives. The pace of migration allowed for ambitious projects intended to create rapid change. A large-scale migrant settlement scheme near the Eskişehir-Ankara railway reflected the convergence of migrant placement and provincial economic development. The project serves as a snapshot of the role of migration in Ottoman reforms and the ways in which spatial control was linked to economic objectives and facilitated through demarcating migrant space. The migrant in this capacity was a quantifiable abstraction,

human material useful in articulating and enacting spatial claims. Migrants served as a resource for officials envisioning change and contributed to settlement outcomes. This section evaluates the railroad settlement project as an example of how officials used classification to construct space as empty land in order to place migrants within it.

The Ottoman Empire joined the worldwide railroad boom after 1890. Foreign capital was essential in creating lines. European companies built all of the railways, aside from the notable exception of the Hejaz Railway. While the railroads were established in part to increase economic productivity, the economic benefits of the railways were undermined by the decision to focus on lines with greater military and political benefit rather than directly connecting Anatolia's most fertile areas to the capital and other arteries. This tendency increased the overall expense of projects and extended track into sparsely populated areas.

Though political and military objectives trumped economic interests, economic goals and development projects did accompany railroad construction. The Anatolian Railway Company, or CFOA (*Societe du chemin de fer ottoman d'Anatolie*), was formed in 1888 to extend an existing line from Istanbul and Izmit to Ankara and Konya. Laying track in Anatolia would help to increase exports and provide Istanbul with cheaper grain from Anatolia, resolving the capital's dependence on grain shipments from the European provinces and politically unstable regions. The Anatolian railway did increase the movement of goods from the interior to Istanbul and the international export market. The Ankara extension initially transported 34,000 tons of grain/year. This figure increased to 187,000 tons/year within the first decade of the twentieth century. The Ankara station was responsible for nearly 40% of all merchandise shipped to Istanbul on the railway.[75]

[75] Donald Quataert, "Limited Revolution: The Impact of the Anatolian Railway on Turkish Transportation and the Provisioning of Istanbul, 1890-1908," *The Business History Review* 51.2 (1977): 139-160. Rail-shipped wheat was

The extension of the line into less densely populated areas also encouraged the convergence of railroad construction and migrant settlement plans. In 1893 the Company completed the Ankara-Eskişehir portion of the line (Figure 7). Emphasizing the potential for economic development accompanying the rail, officials developed a settlement scheme ultimately intended to place tens of thousands of migrants in the region.

Figure 7: Ankara-Eskişehir Branch of Anatolian Railway. Shaded rectangles correspond to settlement maps in Figure 8 (Area A) and Figure 9 (Area B). Base map data from Google Maps.

The state initiated the large-scale settlement project in 1891. A group of surveyors, led by Ferik Muzaffer Pasha from the Military Inspection Committee, toured an area southwest of the city of Eskisehir to evaluate the region's *miri* farms. The group produced a map outlining the surveyors' route, the rough location of each farm, and the terrain (Figure 8). The twenty-three state farms designated by Ferik Muzaffer Pasha's team encircled a large area off limits to migrant settlement. Prior residents reserved claims to this area, and surveyors noted that any land

increasingly important in Istanbul markets following 1896, but Anatolian wheat did not have a significant impact on Istanbul's wheat consumption due to ongoing competition with imported flour.

not in use by current residents was inappropriate for farming. Aside from land belonging to current residents, the surveyors also avoided the large Hara-yı Hümayun, or Imperial Stud Farm. In total, the surveyors determined available lands would support the settlement of 2,525 households, or some 12,000-13,000 migrants.[76]



Figure 8: Map of *Miri* Farms along Projected Railroad. Labels correspond with the register in Table 3. I could not definitely locate plots 16 and 23. Y.PRK.KOM 8.14.

As I note prior in the chapter, settlement required determining the availability and suitability of land. Officials addressed the question of land availability through classification. In this case, the Pasha's team circumscribed settlements and an area devoted to an essential military purpose. The Pasha's investigations were crucial to the immediate effort to settle lands around

[76] BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 8.14, 16 Rebiyülevvel 1309/20 October 1891.

the railway and to more thoroughly surveying land for migrant settlement. Even as population density rose in the late nineteenth century, surveyors continued to demarcate supposedly empty land. In 1878, registers recorded 1,600,000 *dönüm*s Anatolia, while an 1892 report indicated 2,000,000 *dönüm*s of empty land in Anatolia. Ferik Pasha and his cohort were responsible for uncovering nearly half of this increase, as he discovered 390,000 *dönüm*s in Hüdavendigar and 600,000 in Ankara.[77] The act of finding land through categorization was vital to settlement, and in the 1891 report, the surveyors registered a total of 234,000 *dönüm*s of available arable land.[78] These numbers are even more striking given that population density increased throughout the period.

Aside from being available, settlement lands had to be viable. In recognizing the economic future of the migrants, officials attempted to select environmentally appropriate land for placement. Alongside the map, the surveyors provided a register recording the amount of arable land in each plotted *miri* farm, its projected capacity, and its environmental characteristics (Table 3). Based on these environmental characteristics, Ferik Muzaffer Pasha and his retinue identified the point of origin of migrant groups best suited to inhabit the area.[79] For example, surveyors designated Area 1, an elevated and forested region, as appropriate for migrants from the Balkans.

[77] Terzibaşoğlu, "Landlords, Nomads, and Refugees," 144-5.
[78] A *dönüm* is equivalent to 939.3 square meters.
[79] BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 8.14 (1891). "*Yüksek ormanlı mahalleden ibaret olduğundan Balkanlardan gelen muhacirinin iskanına müsaade olduğu*."

Table 3: Register: Available *Miri* Land. Numbers correspond to farms mapped in Figure 8. Area refers to amount of arable land in dönüms. Number of Towns and Households indicates each farm's projected capacity.[80]

Plot	Area	Towns	Households	Water Source	Distance to Forest	Landscape	Migrant Origin
1	2,000	1	20		Forested	High altitude	Balkans
2	10,000	1	100	Well water	1-2 hours		Dobruca
3	20,000	3	250	Flowing and well water	Distant		Filibe
4	15,000	4	200	Well water	Few hours		Dobruca
5	15,000	2	200	Fountains and well water	Few hours		Dobruca, Deliorman
6	35,000	2	250	Flowing and well water	Three hours		Kuban
7	7,000	1	100	Fountains and well water	2 hours		Dobruca
8	12,000	1	80	Fountains and well water	2 hours		Dobruca
9	25,000	1	150	Well water	2-4 hours		Dobruca, Deliorman
10	2,000	1	40	Springs and Fountains	Forested		Bosnia, Bulgaria
11	12,000	1	50	Springs and Fountains	Forested		Bosnia, Bulgaria
12	13,000	1	45	Springs and Fountains	Forested		Bosnia, Bulgaria
13	3,000	1	50	Springs	Forested	High Altitude	Mountains(?)
14	3,500	1	60	Springs	Forested	High Altitude	Mountains (?)
15	8,000	1	50	Fountains	Forested		Bosnia, Bulgaria
16	9,000	1	120	Fountains	Forested		Bosnia, Bulgaria
17	10,000	1	120	Fountains	Forested		Bosnia, Bulgaria
18	9,500	1	40	Springs	Forested	High altitude	Balkans
19	15,000	1	100	Fountains	Forested		Bosnia, Bulgaria
20	7,000	2	200	1.5 hours to flowing water(?)	Forested		Eastern Rumelia
21	7,000	1	200	Flowing water	Forested		Rumelia
22	2,000	1	50	Fountains	3 hours		Bulgaria
23	3,000	1	50	Fountains	3 hours		Bulgaria
	234,000	**31**	**2,525**				

[80] Y.PRK.KOM 8.14 (1891).

Ferik Pasha's detailed findings highlight the ambitious attempt to coordinate large-scale settlement. The register reveals officials assessed land in terms of both availability and suitability, both of which were flexibly applied categories. In previous years, settlement directives had outlined the importance of evaluating the arability of land and its proximity to fresh water.[81] In this case, surveyors narrowed their evaluation of the land's environmental attributes and capacity to ensure migrants' economic success through matching settlers' previous and future environments.[82] Aside from the economic wellbeing of the migrants, environmental attributes were an issue because of the value of certain resources, particularly state forestland. Migrant settlement close to state forests could lead to destruction of the woodlands as migrants established pastures or farmland.[83] Defining the land as environmentally suitable required further classification of the migrant population, and migrants' origins became shorthand to determine the easiest realization of their economic potential. Determining environmental suitability was also a method to reduce ongoing migrant mobility, as migrants were allowed to request alternative settlement locations if they could prove the climate or environment of assigned areas was inappropriate (see Chapter Three).

Viability of settlement also required the distribution of enough land for subsistence and taxation. Settlement efforts coupled migrants' needs with the maintenance of the *çift-hane* system, and migrant settlement offered a tool to maintain small-scale agricultural production. Officials developed precise ratios of people to area to determine the size of parcels; directives from 1879 address the amount of land to be distributed to migrants to facilitate their role as

[81] BOA.I.DH 460.30579 (1860).
[82] Regulations from 1913 also emphasize the importance of recognizing the 'racial and climatic characteristics' of refugee and nomad settlers. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İskan Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi*, 108-115. Quoted in Terzibaşoğlu, "Landlords, Nomads, and Refguees," 155.
[83] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Yıldız Perakende Evrakı - Orman, Maadin, Ziraat Nezareti Maruzatı (BOA.Y.PRK.OMZ) 3.2, 18 Cemaziyülahır 1319/2 October 1901; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi (BOA.DH.MKT) 2587.22, 11 February 1902, from *Belgerlerinde* v.1, no. 35.

agricultural producers. According to a decision rendered by the Council of State, the appropriate amount of land to provide each migrant family ranged from seventy to 130 *dönüm*s. Prior to this decision, some migrants settled in the provinces received much smaller plots of land that ranged from twenty to fifty *dönüm*s of land according to the size of the household. The council found that plots of this size were insufficient for farming and contradicted the definition of a farm established in the Land Code.[84] According to the Land Code, a farm (*çiftlik*) was an area that was "cultivated by means of a pair of bullocks", gave produce every year, and consisted "of about 70 to 80 *dönüm*s of superior, 100 *dönüm*s of middling, and 130 *dönüm*s of inferior land."[85] The Council's ruling on land parcels was disseminated to the Migrant Commission and Defter-i Hakanı. Another set of instructions in 1879 formally reiterated this standard for migrant farmers. Each household, defined as containing one to five male individuals, should receive a farm comprised of seventy to one hundred *dönüm*s of arable land. The entirety of this land allotment included both tillable land and newly opened pastureland.[86]

Despite the importance of determining proper land parcel size, the surveyors' attention to environmental suitability was not matched by their interest in equal land distribution. The register reveals a lack of equality, as average distribution to families ranged from thirty-five to 298 *dönüm*s (Table 4). This range was well outside the determined amount for proper settlement allotments.

[84] BOA.Y.A.RES 4.42, 12 Ramazan 1293/10 September 1879.
[85] Ongley, *Ottoman Land Code*, Article 131. This article also defined a *dönüm* as a "place of 40 square paces of medium length."
[86] BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 2.13, 4 Muharrem 1297/18 December 1879.

Table 4: Land Allotment per Household. Entries rounded to nearest whole number.[87]

Plot	Area	# Households	Amount/household
1	2000	20	100
2	10,000	100	100
3	20,000	250	80
4	15,000	200	75
5	15,000	200	75
6	35,000	250	140
7	7,000	100	70
8	12,000	80	150
9	25,000	150	167
10	2,000	40	50
11	12,000	50	240
12	13,000	45	289
13	3,000	50	60
14	3,500	60	58
15	8,000	50	160
16	9,000	120	75
17	10,000	120	83
18	9,500	40	238
19	15,000	100	150
20	7,000	200	35
21	7,000	200	35
22	2,000	50	40
23	3,000	50	60
Total	234,000	2525	93

It is unclear why Ferik Muzaffer Pasha's team established such a wide range in distribution. It is possible that the "area" listed by the surveyors referred exclusively to tillable land. In this case, the assignment of migrants to areas based on environmental origins could have allowed for migrants more accustomed to animal husbandry rather than agriculture to inhabit pastureland rather than tillable land.[88] Nevertheless, the data in the register does not immediately support this conclusion. Areas with similar environmental descriptions and migrant origins saw

[87] Y.PRK.KOM 8.14 (1891).
[88] Some land registers do include this distinction between arable land and grazing land.

significant fluctuations in land apportionment. For example, surveyors recorded the same attributes for plot #1 (100 *dönüm*s/household) and plot #18 (238 *dönüm*s/household). Plots #11 (240/household) and #12 (289/household) appeared environmentally identical with each other and plot #10 (50/household), which had one of the lowest average *dönüm*s/household.

Ferik Pasha's team initially focused on the area just west of Eskişehir, but the extension of the railway west toward Ankara encouraged ongoing demarcation of land for migrant settlement. Soon after Ferik Pasha's evaluation, individuals from the Ankara Province Migrant Settlement Committee (*Ankara Vilayeti İskan-i Muhacir Heyeti*) toured the district of Sivrihisar. While engaging with the physical characteristics of the district, the commissioner's report took a far more ethnographic tone, and he emphasized his familiarity with the conditions and mentality of the people of the province.

In terms of physical features, the commissioner emphasized the area's abundance of natural resources. As with the 1891 assessment, the report began by evaluating the quality of land intended for settlement; however, far more so than the earlier report, the 1893 assessment explored issues of human ecology. The surveyor reported the rail line would traverse several valley locations, where the air quality in the valleys was inferior to that of elevated areas. According to the surveyor, this state of affairs was the result of poor management. The low-lying riverbeds surrounding the rail line were never purified, and individuals' use of the land and water had exacerbated the issue. Locals had dammed the rivers for rice cultivation and other purposes, altering the course of the riverbeds, encouraging overflow, and giving rise to wetlands, all of which undermined the quality of the climate. Because the wetlands and climatic issues were the result of poor management, the surveyor confidently asserted that a little management and

minimal expense could improve the situation. Overall the region contained a wealth of underutilized natural resources.

The surveyor's confident assertion of the transformative power of proper land management likewise emerged in his discussion of social conditions within the province. The province's population was eighty-eight percent Muslim. Based on his tour, the surveyor observed that the people in the villages were generally hospitable and diligent in their religious duties. Inhabitants grew wheat, barley, and poppy, and raised a variety of animals, particularly Angora goats and sheep. In terms of available land, the administrator reinforced the thin distribution of people within the province and the existence of many abandoned or ruined villages. Large districts throughout the province frequently had 30,000-40,000, or at most 80,000 individuals, meaning the amount of people relative to the amount of land was extremely low. His observations ranged from merely optimistic to hyperbolic, as he boldly suggested millions of individuals could be settled within the province with minimal expense and complete ease so long as officials proceeded in accordance with the Immigrant Settlement Regulations.[89]

"Empty land" was a category removed from existing and alternative claims to spaces designated for migrant settlement. As I discuss below, disputes between former landholders, migrants, and officials indicate this category did not reflect actual land usage. Rather than a simple clerical error, erasing the presence of populations on land was an intentional act of legal and potentially physical removal. By the time empty lands were designated in settlement plans or recorded in disputes, administrators had already engaged in an act of (re)categorization. The archives tend to preserve this state category, and even when researchers are skeptical of the

[89] BOA.Y.PRK.UM 27.104, 29 Zilhicce 1310/14 July 1893. "…*20-30 saat tul ve urzunu havı olan bir kaza ahalisi nihayet seksen bin nüfus baliğ olur ki böyle vüsat araziye nisbetle gayet kalildir. Bineaen alehi dahil-i vilayette milyonlar ile nüfus iskan edilebiliyor. Ve gayet cüzi masrafla ve kemal sürat ve suhulet ile iskan edilmeleri için iskan-i muhacirin nizamnamesine tevfik hareket edilmekten başka esbab tahrisi hacet yoktur.*"

sudden emergence of large amounts of 'empty land', the route through which surveyors "found" land is difficult to uncover. For instance, in Ferik Pasha's report, he and his team marked spaces as off-limits for migrant settlement but also designated twenty-three areas of available state lands. Though the report is relatively rich in data about each *miri* plot's area and geographic characteristics, the surveyors give no indication as to whether other individuals or groups made use of the land for activities like summer pasturage.

While Ferik Pasha's 1891 report only tells us that he categorized the land, the 1893 report on Sivrihisar reveals an essential route through which administrators engaged in categorization. In this report, finding available land was tied to defining spaces as underutilized. Rather than just exploring land and marking boundaries, the settlement agent observed the people of the provinces. The surveyor gained expertise on social conditions through touring the villages and spending time among the inhabitants. This experience allowed him to paternalistically endorse the potential of the region's inhabitants while emphasizing their lack of productive economic behavior. Populations gained and lost access to land through administrators' evaluation of their economic activity. Put another way, officials determined the 'emptiness' of land according to the economic activity performed on it.

In describing the climate of the region, the surveyor faulted the local population for failing to clean the rivers and for growing rice. These activities promoted "personal gain" (*menafi-i zatiye*), but they contributed to climatic problems in the region. In general, the surveyor evaluated the inhabitants as well meaning but inept. Their economic inefficiencies extended into all areas of production. According to the surveyor:

> The people are endowed with kindness, but they did not know how to properly farm. They cannot properly profit from their animals…Because they are not inclined toward trade, it is as if trade is monopolized by Christians. Just a few shops manufacturing and selling the famous Angora wool and camlets remain. Consequently, the people of the

> province cannot be described as particularly poor or rich. They are happy with their lot. However, agricultural and trade transactions following the extension of the railroad produced readiness to progress.[90]

The inhabitants' inefficiency and ignorance contributed to the overall impression of land availability and economic potential within the province, and the extension of the railroad offered the ideal moment to improve the productivity of the existing population. Migrant settlement would assist not only in increasing the number of cultivators in the province, but also the quality of agriculture, as the migrants were far more skilled and efficient than the local inhabitants. According to the surveyor, the migrants coming from Bosnia and the European provinces were more knowledgeable, and so would contribute to the improvement of agriculture, industry, and trade.[91] The migrants' livestock and plowing technology was three to four times as efficient as the wooden plows and oxen used by the local population, and the migrants' livestock could be used in trade and moving goods after the farming season. The surveyor also concluded that the people of the province, recognizing all the benefits migrants would bring, were happy and exceptionally helpful since the immigrants' arrival.[92]

Migrant settlement served political and economic ends. In the surveyor's report, "the people" of the province, and particularly "the people" who would benefit from migration, almost exclusively refers to the Muslim population. The surveyor argued the connection of Ankara to Istanbul via rail meant the policy of increasing the Muslim population in the province would be beneficial. Migrants' engagement with trade would undermine the "Christian monopoly."

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[90] BOA.Y.PRK.UM 27.104 (1893). "*Ahali-i mevcude mukarim ahlak ile mütassef ise de ziraatı yoluyla bilmiyorlar. Ağnam ve keçiden hakkıyla istifade edemiyorlar sair hayvanlarının ecnas ve envai muhtaç islahdır. Ticarete meyl ve rağbet etmediklerinden umur-u ticariye Hristiyanlara mahsus ve münhasır gibider. Şuhret şair olan Angora sof ve şalisini imal ve füruht eden bir iki dükkan kalmıştır. Binabirin bu vilayet ahalisine fakir denilmez ise de zengin dahi değildir. Kanaatkardırlar. Ancak demiryolunun temdidinden sonra muamelat-i zirai ve ticariye terakki etmek istiadadını hasıl etmiş.*"

[91] Ibid. "*Bosna ve Rumeli kıtalarından gelen muhacirler ziraat ve sanat ve ticarette vukuf hasıl etmiş olduklarından muamalat-i zirai ve sanayi ve ticariyenin terakkisine çalışmaktadırlar.*"

[92] Ibid.

Placing a migrant population in the area would guarantee that Muslims garnered the improved trade possibilities brought by the rail. Useful populations were entitled to land, and categories used to determine who was useful encompassed both productivity and religion.

The commissioner emphasized that settlement and economic improvement could proceed quickly and with minimal expense so long as administrators closely followed the terms of the Migration Settlement Regulation. According to the Commissioner, officials in the province were unaware of the settlement regulations. This ignorance was the source of migrant poverty and undue expense, so upon arrival in Ankara the commissioner printed and disseminated the regulations. He then established Sivrihisar as a model area to apply them. Given the commissioner's belief in the power of sound management, it is no surprise that he portrayed his model application as a significant success. Within just one and a half months, he had constructed 700 houses. Whereas previous housing projects were marked by waste and sloppy construction, the houses the commissioner oversaw were solid, regularly placed, and nearly ready for use. In fact, he saw fit to suggest the migrant houses were superior to many existing non-migrant houses in the district. Moreover, through his careful method and efficient planning, he had saved the state several thousand gold coins.[93]

Despite the commissioner's rousing success, a settlement project of this size required ongoing effort. Even ten years following his initial surveys, Ferik Pasha continued to organize settlement and place thousands of migrants in the available land he had demarcated. A map he produced in 1901 details the varying level of completion of migrant housing in Sivrihisar and Haymana (Figure 9). According to an accompanying register, the map designated housing for 6,802 individuals or 1,407 families.[94]

[93] Y.PRK.UM 27.104 (1893).
[94] Ibid.



Figure 9: Map of Immigrant Housing. Ferik Pasha's map shows the completion of migrant houses along the railway. Each small box represents eight houses. Boxes with black and grey shading indicate completed and nearly completed housing. Y.MTV 218.79.

The Pasha was interested in maintaining the efficient, standardized approach to migrant housing established in the Settlement Regulation. The map and register included blueprints for rural and urban houses (Figure 10). The design for the village house is similar to those described in Sivrihisar in 1893. Each house included a main room, kitchen, and stable/manger. Roofs were constructed from earth, wood, or reeds, and walls were constructed from a blend of stone and sun-dried brick. 'Urban' houses, which were only constructed in one settlement on the southeastern side of Ankara, had space allotted for two main rooms and were constructed with brick roofs, sun-dried brick walls, and a stone foundation.



Figure 10: Blueprints for Migrant Housing.[95] Blueprint shows rural (left) and urban (right) housing designs.

By emphasizing the efficiency and savings attached to planned settlement, officials extended their interest in organizing space to the level of the family. Beyond registering individual ownership via deed, private and public spaces were constructed and arranged by officials like Ferik Pasha.[96] Moreover, in including a diagram of the houses alongside a register and map, the Pasha increased the sense of organized placement. When officials in the provincial center or Istanbul read the Pasha's report, they could not only consider the data in its raw form but also envision the physical structure of the village and each migrant's home.

The extension of the railway allowed for migrant settlement to directly promote economic development, providing an example of actualized settlement policy. Ferik Pasha's

[95] Ibid.
[96] This is not to say that plans became reality, or that migrants did not modify their homes just as they modified and expanded the fields they received.

correspondence relating to this effort highlights the categories officials could employ in placing migrants. Realizing Ottoman state objectives for the migrant population required specific information. While administrators lacked this information in the 1860s, by the 1890s and 1900s they were using it to plan and enact large-scale settlement projects.

Contesting Settlement

The act of collecting and acting on information required abstract categorization of both land and people. These types of state abstractions contributed to realities. In demarcating territory for migrant settlement based on ongoing and potential agricultural productivity, officials ignored and undermined alternative spatial claims. Still, the act of removing other claims was not one that proceeded unilaterally. The application of the Land Code and the placement of migrants were territorializing measures. Even while territory can appear to be "self-evident, necessary, or unquestionable", its "formation and maintenance" is derived through politics.[97] Local and imperial politics contributed to the changing territorial categorizations following the Land Code.

Migrant settlement contributed to means of knowing both the territory and the population. Thus far, I have described how officials surveyed land and categorized people to enact settlement. Settlement and land reform contributed to "contested, dialectical, and social (not merely technical) processes by which explorers, surveyors, cartographers attempted to define, codify, and naturalize space in cooperation and struggle with the people they encountered in the field."[98] Rather than a strict enforcement of settlement or the land law, participation in and contestations over migrant placement contributed to the ordering of space. Increased demographic pressure emerging from migrant settlement increased the prevalence of land

[97] David Delaney, *Territory: A Short Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 11.
[98] Craib, *Cartographic Mexico*, 2.

disputes. Categories used to divide the population and Ottoman territory became more powerful as individuals and groups begin to employ them to articulate their particular claims.

Settlement required participation on the part of migrants and prior inhabitants. Moments of cooperation, like prior residents contributing housing, labor, and capital to temporary and permanent migrant placement, could also become points of conflict in response to undue burdens. Local officials, newcomers, and long-term residents in the provinces engaged in the question of land availability before and after migrant settlement. Rumors of impending migrant settlement hastened the pace of registration; nomads and others who had expanded holdings by reclaiming abandoned land codified their claims and began to pay taxes.[99] Migrants also engaged in claiming and clearing land beyond that demarcated in settlement surveys. Settlement directives allowed migrants to independently find land, although regulations also discouraged this effort through denying settlement assistance to those who took this route.[100] Immigrants, local residents, and others contributed to settlement outcomes at three different phases.

First, local participation in settlement began with data collection. Ferik Pasha's maps and registers speak to the ambitious scale of state-organized settlement, but they also reveal the central state's dependency on provincial entities to enact settlement schemes. Local administrators from village councils to the *Tapu* Registry responded to the railroad settlement plan with their own estimates of land availability. After standardized acknowledgement of the Sultan's role in facilitating progress and prosperity and remarks about the benefits of migrant settlement, administrators reinforced the limited availability of land outside of that designated by the surveyors. Local entities both facilitated and obstructed the effort to find suitable land. For example, while Zir Kaza's Deed and Tax office had not found any available unregistered land,

[99] Terzibaşoğlu, "Landlords, Nomads, and Refugees," 135-137.
[100] BOA.Y.PRK.DH 2.93 (1889).

an investigation carried out by the district's Administrative Council discovered several areas where *tapu*s were in abeyance (*mahlul*). These neighborhoods would provide space for 80 households. Furthermore, the Council determined that by placing one to two migrant households within existing villages, the kaza could accommodate another ninety households.[101]

Second, local actors also complicated settlement efforts during distribution. Rather than disinterested actors, members of local settlement commissions, deed offices, and village councils used migrant settlement to find opportunities for individual or communal gain. Petitions and reports throughout the period highlight ways in which officials, migrants, and locals took advantage of settlement schemes. In 1868, more than 300 Circassian communal leaders assembled by *Mirliva* Musa Pasha addressed the problem of Circassian banditry near Sivas. The leaders proposed a plan to reduce lawless behavior through empowering local headmen and establishing prohibitive punishments for various crimes. While the leaders' solution addressed migrant villages' internal politics, they also blamed the behavior on officials' failures to properly carry out settlement goals.[102] According to the migrant leaders, carelessness and negligence on the part of officials caused many newcomers to remain in temporary settlement conditions for three to four years. These migrants' dire economic circumstances forced them to pursue illegal activities like brigandage.[103] The leaders requested that the Ottoman state dispatch more conscientious and honest settlement directors and incorporate migrant leaders into settlement commissions and local councils.[104]

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[101] BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 8.14 (1891).
[102] Georgi Chochiev, "XIX. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Kuzey Kafkas Göçmenlerin Toplumsal Uyarlanmasına Dair Bazı Görüşler," *Kebikeç* 23 (2007): 418-419. Chochiev's article summarizes and transliterates most of the leaders' petition.
[103] BOA.I.MMS 36.1481, 12 Cemazeyilevvel 1285/31 August 1868. "*Memurın-ı mumaileyhuma tarafından i'tina ve dikkat olunmadığından...ve muhacirinin ekserisi üç dört seneden beri henüz iskan ve tatvin olunmamayarak şurayı burayı gezip dolaşmakta oldukları cihetle...bazı'ları sirkat etmeğe mecburiyyet hasıl eylemektedir...*"
[104] Chochiev, "XIX. Yüzyılın," 419.

Musa Pasha continued to serve as a go-between for the Circassian migrants and the state. Two years later, he submitted another petition emphasizing the importance of careful settlement and recommending completely redoing settlement in the area to redistribute land. A directive issued in response to his petition attempted to address settlement failures. The directive focused on alleviating the issue through assessing whether some migrants had been given too much land. While Musa Pasha and the Circassian leaders viewed inequality as a source of unrest, the solution offered in the directive addressed agricultural productivity more so than equitable redistribution. Thus, the first step in rectifying the situation was correctly registering the existing migrant population. Assessment and redistribution would be based on whether migrant households were allowing some areas to remain fallow. Abandoned land could be redistributed to newcomers by local councils and with the assistance of trusted migrant leaders. Migrants would be issued deeds to further solidify their claims to land.[105]

The issues and response outlined in the directive following Musa Pasha's report were repeated in the prescriptions of an 1884 report on migrant settlement. According to the report, in "most provinces," migrant settlement was neither successful nor complete. The author blamed negligent officials and corrupt provincial notables, who he claimed used their wealth and positions in local councils to maintain their control over land. According to the report, migrants who were already settled were being removed through the machinations of the wealthy, and "as these conditions persist[ed], the migrants' ability to collect themselves and the state's ability to realize the anticipated benefits for the community and progress of Muslims [were] unattainable."[106] In response, the report emphasized that there were no legal conditions under which migrant villages could be destroyed, and it protected migrant settlers by indicating they

[105] I.MMS 38.1590, 26 Zilhicce 1286/29 March 1870. Document cited in Chochiev, "XIX. Yüzyılın," 419-420.
[106] Y.PRK.KOM 4.54 (1884). "*Bu ahval devam ettikçe muhacirinin kendilerini toplayabilmeleri ve devletçe içtima'i ve ittifak-i Müslim'inden müntezir olan fevaide dest-res olunabilmesi kabil değildir.*"

could not be charged as plaintiffs in cases emerging from their placement in designated areas. Aside from protecting those who were already settled, as in 1870, officials in 1884 sought unused land to facilitate rapid settlement of migrants without land. Once officials placed migrants, they were to immediately issue deeds to the settlers to prevent other claims on the land.[107]

The migrant leaders in Musa Pasha's Circassian delegation suggested corruption in land distribution could be addressed through appointing migrants to settlement commissions.[108] Still, Oktay Özel's detailed description of the machinations of the Çürüksulu Ali Pasha, a Georgian migrant originally settled in the Black Sea town of Ordu, shows migrant administrators could also operate with an individual agenda. After arrival in the empire, Ali Pasha was appointed as Commissioner for Migrant Settlement in the region. Rather than disinterested, Ali Pasha attempted to solidify his bid to become governor of Trabzon through maintaining the material wellbeing of the Georgian community. He facilitated Georgian migrants' independent search for and appropriation of land oftentimes in opposition to other groups in the area.[109]

Finally, local actors contested settlement following migrant placement. The increased pressure of the migrant population on 'empty lands' contributed to a growing number of territorial disputes.[110] Land conflicts were exacerbated by overlapping and contested jurisdiction, as local administrators, Nizamiye Courts, and Sharia Courts all played a role in both recognizing land claims and resolving disputes.[111]

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[107] Ibid.
[108] I.MMS 38.1590 (1870).
[109] Özel, "Migration and Power Politics," 480-482.
[110] Terzibaşoğlu, "Landlords, Nomads, and Refugees." Terzibasoglu notes that a land inspector in Sivas estimated that refugee-related issues comprised 90% of land disputes in the province. (p. 149).
[111] During the Tanzimat, new courts were established to try cases under the new legislative codes. The *nizami* (regular) courts also created a hierarchical structure for appeal. Barakat addresses the question of whether this dual court system created jurisdictional overlap. In the province of Salt, Sharia courts' recognition of small mortgages offered an administrative alternative to the deeds and registration. Nora Barakat, "Regulating Land Rights in Late

Settlement officials, particularly those appointed from the center, were suspicious of non-migrant land claims. Instructions call for investigating situations where non-migrants were preventing migrant settlement on unregistered lands or blocking migrant settlement near shared resources like forests and pastures. These types of claims were not prioritized over migrant placement.[112] A decision issued by the Council of State blamed notables for inciting non-migrants to bring suits against migrants.[113]

Given officials' suspicion of local claims preventing migrant settlement, administrators tended to favor migrants' claims when resolving disputes. For example, a petition from a Dagestani Sheik and fifteen households of his followers near Ünye alleged that people from a nearby village took over the migrants' designated land. Though the Sheik had received permission from the local council to settle his group in a particular area, the two-month dispute with the other villagers had left his group in "pitiable conditions." The neighboring villagers countered with a claim that the migrants' appropriated land had been under common use. The Meclis-i Vala reaffirmed the original decision designating the land as empty and intended for migrant use.[114]

Even under circumstances when the relationship between migrants and locals grew toxic, officials attempted to establish and maintain migrant placement. In a case from Düzce, Circassians from the Adil-Giray Bey group petitioned from the village of Istilli in Eskibolu to be reinstated in their homes following a violent dispute. According to an official, the group had been settled with sufficient land, seeds, and housing. Nonetheless, the migrants were dissatisfied

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Nineteenth-Century Salt: The Limits of Legal Pluralism in Ottoman Property Law," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 2.1 (2015): 101-119.

[112] BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 1.26 (1878).

[113] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Yıldız Perakende Şura-yı Devlet Maruzatı (BOA.Y.PRK.ŞD) 3.11, 11 Cemaziyülahır 1305/24 February 1888.

[114] BOA.MVL 493.25, 10 Zilkade 1282/27 March 1866. The Sheik and his retinue self-selected the area for settlement after rejecting their original settlement location based on climate. I discuss environmental factors in migrant settlement decisions in Chapter 3.

with their land apportionment, and they appropriated roughly 360 dönüms of the sown fields of a neighboring non-migrant group. Düzce's müdür and neighborhood council attempted to resolve the dispute through returning fifty to sixty dönüms of land to the wronged villagers. In response, a gang of migrants attacked and stabbed a member of the council and a villager. The instigators of the attack were transferred to Bolu, but the Meclis-i Vala found the Adil-Giray Bey group innocent based on their petition. After the migrants apologized and accepted their wrongdoing, they were reinstated in the village.

The bias toward maintaining migrants in place again appears on both the local and imperial levels. In reading the outcome of the case, one gets the impression that the Adil-Giray Bey group was 'difficult', since the migrants had come to Düzce after 'not agreeing' with their original settlement location near Çorum. In this case, local and imperial officials recognized that migrants had unjustly stolen land. Nevertheless, the original solution of the local officials was to return just one sixth of the land migrants had appropriated. Later, while the direct instigators were removed, other migrants who had not physically attacked villagers were allowed to remain and were still entitled to some of their wrongly appropriated fields.[115]

Officials also maintained migrants' presence on land they had unjustly appropriated through compensating legitimate non-migrant claims. In 1901, Cafer Bey, a landowner in Yenişehir, petitioned for restitution by arguing that he had not received enough payment for the land and that migrants had taken over area than originally agreed. Twenty years prior, the original settlement included forty-one migrant households on 3,670 dönüms of land. The community had grown in both population and size to 130 households and 4,850 dönüms. While officials agreed that the owner was entitled to the space, they hesitated to remove a migrant community that had been on the land for nearly two decades, especially since migrants had

[115] BOA.MVL 700.49, 24 Şevval 1281/22 March 1865.

dutifully worked the land and paid taxes throughout the period. Thus, the best solution was to purchase the land, especially since once the land was purchased, more migrants could be placed on it.[116] In a similar case from 1909, Dagestani migrants near Pazarköy appropriated extra land including mulberry orchards from a neighboring village. The people of the neighboring village submitted a petition and successfully established their legitimate claim to the trees. The matter was resolved by purchasing the land for the migrants.[117] In both these cases, migrants successfully exploited the tendency to award migrants' land regardless of its original availability.

Settlement officials' tendency to override claims that could delay settlement or uproot settled migrants meant the original designation of land as available was a powerful route to effect land transfer. This designation became even more powerful as directives closed other doors to legally disputing migrant settlement. The Land Code established a ten-year time period for disputing claims to land that was held by absentee owners or had passed to public auction due to lack of heir.[118] This ten-year period was reduced to two years for migrants in 1888 in a decision rendered by the Council of State. The Council determined that once migrants had used designated *mahlul* land for farming or building for two years, they were immune to suits. This decision supported migrant claims on two counts: first, because the land had been designated for migrants, and second, because migrants had begun to work the land in question. Aside from establishing migrant immunity, the council went on to dismiss and disputes brought against migrants in Sharia court. The council established that these cases should not be heard in the

[116] BOA.BEO 1676.125669, 1 Rebiyülevvel 1319/18 June1901.
[117] BOA.DH.MKT 2705.96, 1909.
[118] Ongley, *The Ottoman Land Code*. Article 20 reads, "Actions concerning Tapu land which has been held for ten years without opposition will not be heard without one of the legal disabilities…having ben proved…They will be heard up to ten years from the date of the cessation of such valid excuses, and after that time has passed they will not be heard. But if the defendant admits having unlawfully seized and cultivated the land, attention will not be paid to the lapse of time and possession, and the land will be taken and given to the owner."

Sharia courts, a decision that both addressed jurisdictional overlap and an ongoing reason for delayed migrant settlement.[119]

When officials designated an area as "empty" and placed migrants on it, they initiated a process that retroactively legitimated their initial assessment. Even when complaints lodged by locals and migrants revealed that migrants had been wrongly placed, officials preferred to leave migrants in place.[120] James Scott has observed that administrative categories are "partly fictional shorthand," but "backed by state power through records, courts, and ultimately coercion, these state fictions transformed the reality they presumed to observe."[121] Issuing deeds and court rulings offered a paper reality officials could employ to render migrant settlement legitimate. Migrant settlement increased pressure on land. Resulting disputes provided the impetus to enact the power of records and courts in determining legitimate claims.

Fictional shorthand also becomes reality as individuals adopt state language and administrative practices to articulate their claims. Earlier in this chapter, I discussed how officials categorized the population based on economic and religious characteristics. Yucel Terzibaşoğlu's research on land disputes in Western Anatolia reveals that both of these categories became components in how individuals and groups articulated claims. "Empty land" was conflated with uncultivated land, and productivity became tied to right to use. Thus, aside from registering land, migrants and others asserted claims on land by working it.[122] Western Anatolia had a large Christian population. As inter-communal relations worsened in the twentieth century, when Muslim refugees disputed Christian land claims, they increasingly did so in ethno-religious terms. By the 1910s, land conflict still revolved around the issue of

[119] BOA.Y.PRK.ŞD 3.11 (1888).
[120] For example, in the 1864 directive issued in response to Musa Pasha's petition, officials avoided redressing unequal land distribution and instead focused exclusively on finding abandoned land. BOA.I.MMS 38.1590 (1870).
[121] Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 24.
[122] Terzibaşoğlu, " Landlords, Nomads, and Refugees," 116.

ownership, "but the ethnic and religious identity of the title holder had become a criterion for the determination of the rightful owner."[123] Economic and religious categorizations used in appropriating lands became a useful way to claim land for migrants and others.

In this section, I have suggested how various individuals participated in migrant settlement. They contributed by collecting data, registering claims, and contesting migrant placement. Encounters with the state occurred on a personal and embodied level, whether in the figure of the surveyor who spent the night in the villages of Sivrihisar or by migrants themselves. Participation and contestation reveal the local concerns that contributed to extension of state categories and knowledge. It was not state imposition but rather an interaction between regimes and repertoires. Migrants, local councils, and host families engaged with the distribution of resources and adopted the language of the state to do so.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined settlement policy to consider how the state constructed the land and the people as objects capable of management. Prior to and alongside migrant settlement, Ottoman administrators attempted to transform property holding and taxation patterns throughout the empire. As with other reforms, the attempt to change the structure of land ownership contributed to the broader effort to address Ottoman military and economic weakness through centralization and administrative standardization. The relationship between land categorization and migrant placement highlights the connection between settlement projects and nineteenth-century attempts to administer and control the distribution and mobility of Ottoman subjects.

[123] Terzibaşoğlu, "Land Disputes and ethno-politics," 176.

Migrant settlement became an important route to increase the legibility of the entire population by contributing to the enactment of the 1858 Land Code. Though placing migrants contributed to the cataloguing and organization of space on imperial, provincial, and local scales, obstacles to settlement created spaces for migrants and other groups to contest and participate in the development and enactment of land reform.

CHAPTER THREE

UNSETTLING ENVIRONMENTS: HEALTH AND MOBILITY

In the summer of 1864, newspapers ranging from *The Times* in London to the *Christian Advocate and Journal*, a Methodist newspaper based in New York City, published an account on the plight of Circassians in the Ottoman Black Sea port town of Samsun. The Ottoman Sanitary Inspector in Samsun, a Monsieur Barozzi, penned the report, which presents an excruciating depiction of migrant suffering:

> Everywhere you meet with the sick, the dying, and the dead—on the threshold of gates, in front of shops, in the middle of streets, in the gardens, and the foot of trees. Every dwelling, every corner of the streets, every spot occupied by the immigrants has become a hotbed of infection…
> The encampments present a picture hardly less revolting. From forty to fifty thousand individuals in the most absolute state of destitution preyed upon by diseases, terminated by death, are cast there without bread, without shelter, without sepulcher…
> I once more repeat it, there are here between 70,000-80,000 immigrants; in a few days hence these will be doubled. How is it expected that such a mass of men should be kept in order – how are they to be fed and provided for! The situation is one pregnant with dangers; it is a calamity, a catastrophe, a scourge, this immigration thus left to itself.[1]

Barozzi's description was one of many issued by observers in Ottoman coastal cities in the midst of mass migrations of the early 1860s and late 1870s. During these migrations, refugees were violently removed from their homes, faced devastating travel conditions, and were greeted in the Ottoman Empire by overcrowded temporary holding areas. In the migrations of 1863-1865, the harsh conditions of leaving and arrival produced epidemics in port cities, and in the spring of 1864 as many as 500 migrants died per day in Trabzon. An estimated 30,000 Circassians died in

[1] "The Circassian Exodus," *Christian Advocate and Journal*, 7 July, 1864, 214, accessed April 13, 2011. A. Üner Turgay quotes the same account, which had been published in *The Times* in June of the same summer. See A. Üner Turgay "Circassian Immigration into the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1878," in *Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams*, ed. Wael B. Hallaq and Donald P. Little. Leiden: Brill, 1991: 204.

the city over the three-year period.[2] In March of 1878, after a particularly harsh winter, and at a time when Istanbul was besieged by epidemics of typhus, typhoid, and smallpox, twenty-five to thirty migrants died per day in the Ayasofya (Hagia Sophia) mosque complex alone, which held more than 10,000 refugees.[3] Upon arrival in the empire, migrants faced a state taxed to its utmost to provide food, housing, medicine, hospital beds, and burial services. In 1879, the Muhacirin İdare Komisyonu spent 70,000 *kuruş* per week on nine newly established refugee hospitals.[4] Despite these efforts, disease spread quickly through the squalid conditions of refugee encampments. In the initial scramble of the 1860s, refugees could be left for several days without food, and local administrators did not have enough funds or manpower to bury the rapidly rising number of bodies.[5] Barozzi and other frustrated observers criticized the Ottoman state for its failure to solve the crisis.

Given the scale of migrant suffering and descriptions like Barozzi's, historians recounting the health consequences of the migrations have focused on the devastating epidemics marking newcomers' arrival, seeking to describe the failures of the Ottoman response and tabulate loss of life. These histories are essential to considering how sickness and health measures conditioned migrant experience in port cities. Nevertheless, researchers have overlooked the importance of migrant health in Ottoman state-building efforts and the significance of health and environmental complications in medium and long-term processes of settlement and integration.[6]

The relationship between migrant health and mobility highlights an essential element of the Ottoman state-building effort. Public health concerns can be employed by states as a

[2] McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 37.
[3] İpek, *Rümeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, 90.
[4] Ibid., 105.
[5] Marc Pinson, "Ottoman Colonization of the Circassions in Rumeli after the Crimean War," *Etudes Balkaniques* 3 (1972): 74.
[6] Christopher Gratien's study of ecological change in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Cilicia is an important exception. He incorporates Muslim immigrants into his detailed environmental history of transhumance and settlement in the late Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic. Gratien, "The Mountains are Ours," 31.

component in "fixing populations," and are integral in the modern state's policing of migrant bodies.[7] The public health and sanitation regimes during the Ottoman reform period informed efforts to control contagion through quarantine and other boundaries on migrant mobility. Scholars of the reform era have parsed Ottoman officials' focus on the health, productivity, and loyalty of the populace to chart a shift from quantitative to qualitative population concerns.[8] Certification of doctors, vaccination regulations, sanitary inspections of urban space, and other components of health reform were essential in the developing apparatus of the modern state. Attempts to address migrant health through regulating migrant mobility likewise contributed to the state-building effort. Classifying spaces as insalubrious and groups as sick allowed the Ottoman state to delimit and assert control over individual access to urban and rural areas. This process of territorial classification and restriction of mobility was an essential step in the Ottoman state's expropriation of the right to determine legitimate movement.[9]

Descriptions of epidemics and quarantine highlight migrant experiences in their first months within the empire as an initial arena of migrant interaction with the Ottoman state. Still, health concerns and environmental issues persisted as factors in migrants' interactions with state officials. Migrants' tenuous conditions during their flight from the Caucasus, Crimea, and Balkans bled into experiences after arrival, including their journeys to temporary holding areas and designated settlement regions. Health concerns perpetuated the state-migrant relationship, contributed to state officials' efforts to control migrant mobility, and complicated settlement efforts. Health issues and migration interacted in multiple ways, including through exacerbating

[7] Tomas Balkelis, "In Search of a Native Realm: The Return of World War One Refugees to Lithuania, 1918-24," in *Homelands: War, Population, and Statehood in Eastern Europe and Russia 1918-1924*, ed. Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 85; Nadav Davidovich and Shifra Shvarts, "Health and Hegemony: Preventative Medicine, Immigrants and the Israeli Melting Pot," *Israel Studies* 9.2 (2004): 150.
[8] Balsoy, "Gender and the Politics of the Female Body," 24.
[9] Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*.

logistical problems, requiring efforts to control contagion, and raising questions about the environmental suitability of potential areas of migrant placement.

Restricting discussion of migrant health to the arrival phase obscures migrants' active participation in settlement through focusing on the inexorable spread of epidemics or the state's one-way imposition of quarantine measures. Public health concerns contributed to officials' efforts to control migrant mobility, but migrants and local populations could activate health and environmental rhetoric to affect settlement policies. A focus on health in the short and long-term highlights other elements, such as foreign observers, local populations, individuals involved in transport, and non-human factors, influencing developing migrant-state relationships. An examination of health issues and environmental difficulties broadens our view of various stakeholders' efforts to assert control over space. A more complete history of migrant integration connects arrival and settlement in considering the relationship between health and mobility.

Alongside depicting migrant suffering, Barozzi's report speaks to persistent themes in Ottoman responses to migrant health and sickness. First, as an Italian physician appointed by the Ottoman Quarantine Council (*Meclis-i Tahaffuz*), the doctor signified the international dimensions of the crisis. Second, Barozzi's newly created role as Samsun's sanitary inspector highlights the overlap between immigration and public health policies. Third, Barozzi's words underline the perception of migrant bodies as threats to public order and health. Physicians and officials claimed control over space and organized migrant mobility to address this threat. Finally, Barozzi's description reveals dynamics beyond the control of Ottoman officials ranging from the rate of immigrant arrival to ecological factors. Exploring migrant health after the epidemics and quarantines structuring their arrival highlights the continuity of these themes.

This chapter evaluates health and environmental factors in settlement outcomes.. The first half of the chapter explores Ottoman health reforms, migrant sickness, and environmental complications as components of migrants' initial experiences in the empire. The second half focuses on resettlement and negotiation, examining health and environmental factors as ongoing conditions in migrant settlement. Ottoman attempts to classify and control mobility were not simply top-down impositions on migrant and non-migrant populations. Throughout the chapter, I highlight officials, foreign physicians, consuls, migrants, local communities, and ecological constraints influencing health and settlement policy. In some respects, the narrative focuses on failures: moments of migrant sickness, loss of life, and long-term displacement. Still, I argue evaluating migrant health underlines a component of successful integration. Health concerns initiated an area of concentrated migrant-state interaction. Through requesting resettlement, migrants recognized the state's right to determine their movement, engaged with officials, and employed the vernacular of public health to articulate their concerns.

Protecting Wellness in the "Well-Protected Domains" [10]

Dr. Barozzi served as Sanitary Inspector in Trabzon for a total of two months; he performed the same role in Samsun for just twenty-two days.[11] Despite his brief appointment, his presence in the cities during the 1864 epidemic and the publication of his report make him an enduring figure in accounts of the period. Aside from the value of his detailed discussion of the conditions in Trabzon and Samsun, Barozzi's status as an appointee of the Quarantine Council and the wide circulation of his account reveal the international dimensions of migrant health. His

[10] The "well-protected domains" (*Memâlik-i Mahrûse*) is a term for the Ottoman Empire highlighted by Selim Deringil's *The Well-Protected Domains*.
[11] Özgür Yılmaz, "An Italian Physician in the Caucasian Migration of 1864: The Mission of Dr. Barozzi in Trabzon and Samsun," *Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies* 9.28 (2014): 37.

presence is also a useful symbol of changing Ottoman health and sanitation infrastructure. Together, these factors influenced migrants' initial experiences in the empire and their movement within Ottoman imperial space.

The nineteenth-century Ottoman state-building effort included attempts to standardize medical practice and monitor public health. Military and population goals prompted professionalization of medical practice and new standards in public health and sanitation. Sultan Mahmud II opened an Imperial Medical School in 1827, and establishment of the Civilian Medical School followed in 1866. These new institutions shifted training from a traditional apprentice-master system to one based on European curriculums.[12] Alongside changes in medical education, medical practice was increasingly regulated through laws requiring diplomas for all practicing physicians. Regulation and standardization were extended beyond physicians to the population through requirements such as universal child vaccination.[13]

Health measures contributed to changing use of and access to public space. Legislation throughout the second half of the nineteenth century elaborated guidelines for cleanliness in public places, such as new regulations on butchery and street cleaning.[14] Officials centralized sanitation and public health practices. Barozzi's stint as sanitary inspector in Samsun is characteristic of this change. Prior to the Tanzimat reforms, it was the responsibility of the *kadi* (judge) to maintain the cleanliness of neighborhoods; however, with the reorganization of

[12] Yesim Ulman, "Medical Modernization in 19th century Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the Introduction of Roentgen Rays in Turkey," in *Perilous Modernity: History of Medicine in the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East from the 19th century Onwards*, ed. Anne Marie Moulin and Yeşim Işıl Ulman (Istanbul: Gorgias Press and The Isis Press, 2010), 106.
[13] Nuran Yildirim, "Sağlıkta Devr-i Hamidi" (Health in the Hamidian Period) in *II. Abdülhamid Modernleşme Sürecinde İstanbul*, ed. Coşkun Yılmaz, Istanbul, 2011. Abdülhamid II also dispatched a team of Ottoman doctors to France to study the newly developed rabies vaccine, and he contributed to the development of an institute of bacteriology.
[14] Mehmet Mazak and Fatih Gürdal, *Tanzifat-I İstanbul Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Temizlik Tarihi* (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011), 117.

administrative units during the Tanzimat, local councils took on hygiene and inspection.[15] In the 1880s and 1890s, Ottoman engagement with developing theories of bacteriology and infection contributed to increased centralization of public sanitation.

Alongside population concerns, health reforms were important in asserting the Ottoman Empire's international standing. In the nineteenth century, as steam travel increased the flow of people and disease throughout the world, global leaders increasingly advocated for international cooperation to combat disease.[16] Cooperation offered an opportunity for the Ottoman Empire to position itself as a modern Muslim state, but European powers employed international coalitions to increase their influence in the empire. The creation of the Ottoman Quarantine Council (*Meclis-i Tahaffuz*) in 1838 was representative of the empire's effort to both protect the internal population of the empire and stem the spread of diseases like cholera to Western Europe. Given its international relevance, foreign doctors and delegates participated in the development and actions of the council. Major cholera epidemics on the continent in the 1830s and 1860s contributed to a shared effort to address the spread of disease across international borders.

Beginning in 1851, a series of International Sanitary Conferences highlighted Ottoman participation in the developing global effort to coordinate disease prevention and the empire's outsider status. Participation in the conferences offered a way for European border states like the Ottoman Empire to assert their status as "hygienically trustworthy, reforming, and modern."[17] Nonetheless, European participants also envisioned the Sanitary Conferences as a component of the civilizing mission. Sanitary Conferences, quarantine, and other health measures were a route

[15] Though Kadi is typically translated as judge, this does not do justice to the full range of kadi's traditional roles, which included not only legal judgment but also supervision of road maintenance, guilds, and markets, and service as public notary. E. Tyan and Gy. Kaldy-Nagy, "Ḳāḍī." *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* Second Edition. Ed. P. Bearman, et al. Brill Online, 2014. Accessed 18 April 2014.
[16] Valeska Huber, "The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851-1894," *The Historical Journal* 49.2 (2006): 453-476.
[17] Ibid., 463.

to exert influence over the Ottoman Empire and its territory in the midst of the Eastern Question.[18]

Ottoman officials recognized the importance of public health and sanitation in bolstering their status among Europeans and non-Ottoman Muslim populations. Officials were clearly aware of the international and internal political implications of aid.[19] Within the empire, during the 1893-4 and 1895 cholera epidemics, Abulhamid II crafted an aura of generosity and humanitarianism, while also censuring foreign newspapers and telegrams from abroad in an effort to downplay the extent of the suffering within Istanbul.[20] In the 1870s and 1880s, British concerns about Indian pilgrims' exposure to both disease and Ottoman Pan-Islamism encouraged their attempts to assert control over the pilgrimage. Ottoman claims of caliphal authority were undermined by inefficient care for pilgrims.[21] As with the *hajj* pilgrims, Ottoman competence in caring for Muslim migrants fleeing Russia was important in the state's claims to act as provider for the spiritual and material wellbeing of the international Muslim community. Thus, public health in general and migrant health in particular linked Ottoman claims of religious legitimacy with modern, efficient governance.

The global dimensions of quarantine and the Ottoman concern with image management through public health allowed European actors to directly and indirectly influence the Ottoman response to migrant sickness in port cities. Barozzi's time in Trabzon and Samsun and the widespread publication of his account highlight these influences. In 1863, the French Consul and other diplomats in Trabzon encouraged the Istanbul-based Quarantine Council to dispatch a

[18] Ibid., 460. As Nancy Gallagher's work on Tunisia reveals, myths of Muslim fatalism and European rescue reflected the realization that health measures offered an inroad to European control and could yield popular legitimacy. Nancy Gallagher, *Medicine and Power in Tunisia: 1780-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
[19] Deringil. *The Well-Protected Domains*, 143-4.
[20] Mesut Ayar, *Osmanlı Devletinde Kolera: İstanbul Örneği (1892-1895)* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2007), 210.
[21] Low, "Empire and the Hajj," 269-290.

representative to the overwhelmed coastal city. Foreign delegates bemoaned the loss of life and worried about the commercial implications of the migrations in Trabzon and Samsun.[22] In February of 1864, on the recommendation of French delegate Dr. Antoine Sulpice Fauvel, the Council appointed Barozzi to reinitiate quarantine measures for migrants in both Trabzon and Samsun. Prior to Barozzi's arrival, local officials and the Trabzon representative of the Immigrant Commission, Yaver Efendi, had established a hospital and attempted to quickly move migrants out of the cities. These efforts failed as the number of migrants in Trabzon approached 10,000. While in Trabzon and Samsun, Barozzi worked with and in opposition to local officials. Barozzi's ties to the foreign physicians and delegates of the Quarantine Council contributed to clashes over the enforcement of quarantine measures in Trabzon.[23]

In his description of human suffering, Barozzi emphasized the lack of governmental action and control in an "immigration thus left to itself."[24] Barozzi's words reflected his frustrations with the financial limitations of the central government and the behavior of local officials. The physician and European consuls blamed local corruption and ignorance in describing ongoing crises in the cities. In dispatches to Istanbul, the French consul accused Yaver Efendi of profiting from speculation and housing migrants within the city, contrary to quarantine protocol. Yaver Efendi defended the decision to house migrants in the city by pointing to the lack of temporary housing in the camps. He requested the removal of Barozzi in favor of a Muslim physician, suggesting cultural conflict over issues like burial practices for Muslim migrants.[25] In response to consular complaints, the Sublime Porte transferred Yaver Efendi and appointed another official more amenable to Barozzi's plans in his stead. Barozzi's

[22] Great Britain, *Papers Respecting the Settlement of Circassian Emigrants in Turkey.* London: Harrison and Son, 1864, No. 7.
[23] Yılmaz, "An Italian Physician," 5-44.
[24] "The Circassian Exodus."
[25] Yılmaz, "An Italian Physician," 36-38.

position and his conflict with Yaver Efendi highlight how foreign interests and personnel directly influenced Ottoman sanitation and quarantine efforts.

Given Ottoman concerns about their international image, foreign observers also indirectly influenced Ottoman health policy. Newspapers in Europe and the United States published Barozzi's account and closely followed the status of the exiles. Multiple ethno-linguistic groups were on the move throughout the region, but the story of the expulsion of nearly two million people from the North Caucasus captured worldwide interest in the 1860s. In the wake of the Crimean War, foreign observers emphasized the plight of Circassians in their fight against encroaching Russia, portraying the mountaineers as noble savages, "inflexible in their determination to live as freemen."[26] The mid-1860s was a high water mark in Circassian immigration, but the upheavals of the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-1888 initiated a second, larger migration and affected stereotypes surrounding the group. In the space of just twelve years, a positive portrayal of freedom-loving underdogs shifted to a description of Muslim gangs notoriously responsible for reprehensible violence against Christian villagers in the Balkans. In the spring of 1876, the Ottoman Empire armed Circassians and other Muslims to quell a nationalist revolt in Bulgaria. These irregular troops, or *başı bozuks*, proved difficult to control, and ultimately became notorious in the West for pillaging and massacring Christian villages.

Whether classifying migrants as noble or bloodthirsty, portrayals of the refugees could cast both Ottoman officials and the newcomers as uncivilized and lazy. As they had in the 1860s, Western observers in the 1870s commented on the sickness accompanying the refugees. A *New York Times* article from 1878, after lamenting the inconvenience of living close to the refugee populations, couples a description of disease with a statement on Ottoman ignorance:

[26] "The War in Circassia." *The Charleston Mercury* 27, February 1862, 4.

> Every khan and mosque is crowded with filthy men and women and children, many of them suffering from typhus and small-pox. The authorities are without a notion of the most elementary hygienic principles…The refugees are apparently as numerous as ever, and support their sufferings with so much resignation that people are beginning to think that they are rather glad of an excuse to be idle.[27]

This statement emphasizes the ignorance and impotence of Ottoman officials, mapping disgust with Ottoman officials and refugees onto ideas of civilization and efficacy. Instead of acknowledging potential trauma and feelings of helplessness, this observer bemoaned the tendency of the migrants to "pass the day basking in the sun like so many dogs!"[28] The poverty and illness of the refugee elicited revulsion.[29] Likewise, the refugee crisis reflected the failure of Ottoman medicine and lack of technological and scientific expertise needed to solve problems and prevent disease.

The politics of image control were a key factor in the provision of aid. Despite the difficulties any state would have found in coping with a great number of destitute, weakened migrants, Europeans could read in the refugees' illnesses the reflection of the "Sick Man of Europe's" enfeebled administration.[30] Likewise, refugee sickness undermined the Ottoman state's religious legitimacy claims. Removing refugees from crowded locations offered a potential solution to the spread of disease in congested temporary settlements. Still, transferring the newcomers from the cities also served to separate migrants from the watchful eye of local presses and an international audience.[31] Concerns about the visibility of impoverished migrants in Istanbul and other port cities influenced the attempt to quickly remove the newcomers to the interior.

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[27] "Giaours in Constantinople," *The New York Times*, 6 May, 1878, 1.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Another well-documented example of the tendency of observers and aid workers to view refugees with disgust as well as sympathy is that of the DPs. See Mark Wyman's *DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945-1951* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
[30] Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonu," 167.
[31] Ibid., 169-170.

Foreign personnel and portrayals of the refugees directly and indirectly influenced health policy, but many Ottoman officials shared foreign physicians' beliefs about appropriate tactics and sanitation measures to combat epidemic disease. Chief among these shared tactics was the attempt to control access to public space and remove potential vectors of disease through quarantine and cordon. Refugees seemed to pose a danger not only through threats of contagion but also because their discursive characterization as mobile, destitute individuals unnerved some reformers, prompting efforts to curb mobile marginalized populations and to integrate these groups into the social fabric.[32]

To return to Barozzi, one striking element of the Sanitary Inspector's account is his emphasis on the visibility of migrant bodies. He wrote, "individuals…encumber the squares, obstruct the streets, invade the inclosed [sic] grounds, penetrate everywhere, remain stationed there during the whole day, and retire only late after sunset."[33] These phrases chart collective concern with order in urban spaces shared by European and Ottoman observers. The British consul in Trabzon, Henry L. Bulwer, likewise articulated anxieties about the migrant menace. Bulwer estimated 25,000 migrants had arrived in Trabzon by April of 1864. In a letter to Earl Russell, ambassador in Istanbul, the consul warned, "the conglomeration of vast quantities of these people, who have no industrial habits, threatens the health and peace of any one locality."[34] Migrant bodies polluted the urban environment; the route to solving both disorder and disease lay in removing "out of place" migrants.[35] Barozzi described this effort in his report:

> Every dwelling, every corner of the streets, every spot occupied by the immigrants has become a hotbed of infection. A warehouse on the seaside, a few steps from the

[32] Maksudyan, "Orphans, Cities, and the State," 496.
[33] "The Circassian Exodus."
[34] Great Britain, *Papers Respecting the Settlement of Circassian Emigrants in Turkey.* London: Harrison and Son, 1864, No. 3.
[35] Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge, 2005 [1966]).

> Quarantine-office, hardly affording space enough for 30 persons, inclosed [sic] till the day before yesterday 207 individuals, all sick or dying. I undertook to empty this pestilential place…I then took steps for the evacuation of the town and the landing of the Circassians I had detained on board the eleven ships and seven cutters lying in the harbor. All the passengers were landed at Koomdjoogah [Kumcuğaz], a few miles distant from the town. It is to this locality I sent the 3,000 or 4,000 individuals I have during the last three days extracted from the dens they filled in the city.[36]

Demarcating alternative spaces outside towns as appropriate for migrants allowed for the removal of their bodies and the disorder caused by their presence. Barozzi's tactic of removal was a familiar but ultimately unsuccessful one, as the rate of migration rapidly increased in the spring of 1864.[37] Still, correspondence within the Ottoman government after Barozzi's stint in Samsun reveals broad agreement with the doctor's tactics.

In August of 1864, the *Meclis-i Vala* (Ottoman High Court of Justice) wrote to the office of the Grand Vizier and the governor of Canık, a district within Samsun Province, to discuss migrant arrival in the province. The court deplored the logistical problems contributing to migrant suffering, describing a situation in which more than 100,000 migrants were located just outside the city proper. The migrants' "distress increased daily." There was neither sufficient food or medical supplies nor enough boats to transfer the migrants elsewhere. Though exact numbers were unknown, the writer suggested 250-300 migrants died daily, and a lack of proper burial had brought about putrefaction of the migrant corpses. Increasing numbers of migrants crowded one another as their numbers swelled, and the writer noted that these conditions encouraged the spread of sicknesses including typhus, bouts of diarrhea, smallpox, and malaria.[38]

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[36] "The Circassian Exodus."
[37] Yılmaz notes that when Barozzi arrived in Trabzon in February, the city struggled to hold its roughly 12,000 immigrants. In April of 1864, as many as 6,000 migrants arrived per day in the city. Yılmaz, An Italian Physician," 22.
[38] BOA.MVL 685.30, 27 Rabiulevvel 1281/30 August 1864.

This report reveals how planning and logistical difficulties exacerbated migrant suffering, but further details reveal officials' approach to disease control and contagion. According to the report, migrants were suffering in temporary locations outside the city. Furthermore, migrants' entrance into the city and presence in the markets had spread typhus to the majority of shop owners. Thus, in order to aid the migrants and protect the town, the quarantine doctor recommended the migrants' removal to higher ground and the prevention of their entrance into the city.[39] The fact that these precautions were circulated between the council, the governor of the district, and the office of the Grand Vizier suggests an official acceptance of the efficacy of the preventative measures. The effort to control contagion relied on spatial separation of the diseased migrant and the healthy city dweller and required imposing a boundary on migrant mobility.

Barozzi and the *Meclis-i Vala* focused on the immediate benefits of quarantine; contagion fears also contributed to the effort to rapidly transfer migrants from urban centers and into provincial areas for temporary or permanent settlement. American missionary Henry Lennep commented on the group of Circassian migrants waiting for transport from Samsun and described the exhaustive efforts of the governor attempting to move the immigrants:

> The Pasha was doing all that lay in his power to scatter these poor exiles in every direction. Shiploads of them were sent to other ports. All the muleteers who came on business into town were seized by his police agents, and compelled to carry Circassians and their effects into the interior…so great was the Pasha's anxiety to dispose of them as soon as possible, that he engaged every means of transportation at high prices, and paid cash down.[40]

[39] Ibid.
[40] Henry John Van Lennep, *Travels in Little-Known Parts of Asia Minor*, vol. 1. (London: John Murray: 1870), 47.

According to Lennep, the governor's haste arose from the difficulties of maintaining the "filthy" and diseased migrants. The city's infrastructure was pressed to the limit by the crisis, with little transportation, business at a standstill, and bread increasingly difficult to find.[41]

The cramped conditions of temporary housing in Samsun did not facilitate the convalescence of the migrants. Nevertheless, enforcing migrants' removal from Samsun did not decisively improve their situation. The journey within the empire could be just as devastating as the journey to it. The effort to move individuals perpetuated refugee sickness through exposing the travelers to difficult conditions on the road, which intensified health problems, contributed to logistical difficulties, and required ongoing surveillance and treatment by state officials. For example, in another episode from 1864, the majority of migrants in transit from the coastal city of Amasya inland to Harput and Sivas fell gravely ill with infectious disease. Due to excessive hunger and sickness, some of the travelers could barely continue their journey. As there was no doctor in the area, those who were sick had to be loaded on carts and transferred for care to Samsun. This taxed the already overwhelmed port town and required the shuffling of personnel, including the transfer of another pharmacist to the city.[42]

In the migrations of the 1860s, migrants huddled in groups on the outskirts of port cities such as Trabzon and Samsun, and had little chance to recuperate prior to relocation. Likewise during the mass migrations from the Balkans after the 1877-1878 war, railroad stations in Shumen and Varna were inundated with potential passengers, and hundreds of thousands found their way to mosques, hospitals, and temporary holding areas in Istanbul.[43] Migrants' weakened condition contributed to ongoing sickness, difficulty traveling, and trouble adjusting once Ottoman officials determined where they would be settled. Removing migrants quickly to

[41] Ibid., 44-47.
[42] BOA.A.MKT.MHM 312.41, 21 Rebiyülevvel 1281/ 24 August 1864.
[43] İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu Türk Göçleri*, 46-49.

temporary or permanent locations remained the best solution, whether or not the decision to move migrants was undertaken exclusively in refugees' interest.

Climatic Complications

Foreign actors and international opinion influenced Ottoman policies, while Ottoman concerns with order and health contributed to decisions to move migrants within the empire. Environmental factors also affected the logistics of migrant arrival and settlement. Despite compelling reasons for efficient settlement, climate and weather conditions created complications and delays in migrants' original voyages and their journeys within the Ottoman Empire. Seasonal conditions determined the timing of settlement and influenced officials' decisions to postpone migrants in provisional housing or to move them more quickly to their ultimate destination.

In the 1860s, the majority of migrants travelled over water to the Ottoman Empire's Black Sea coast. The difficulties of winter travelling delayed migrant departure from the Crimean Peninsula in 1856, but by the early 1860s Russian officials' eagerness to expel Caucasians contributed to the decision to move the migrants during the winter.[44] The sea was notoriously difficult to navigate during the winter; sailors faced frequent storms and fog.[45] Russian, Ottoman, and British vessels assisted in transporting migrants, but individuals eager to depart from encampments on the northern Black Sea coast also crowded onto smaller, poorer-quality vessels, which often sank during winter voyages.[46]

[44] Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*, 87-88.
[45] Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 17.
[46] Great Britain, *Papers Respecting the Settlement of Circassian Emigrants in Turkey.* London: Harrison and Son, 1864, No. 3.

Seasonal changes also affected the feasibility of overland routes into Eastern Anatolia and the ability of Ottoman officials to transport migrants from coastal towns. Randal Roberts, an observer of the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman war, noted the condition of the roads throughout the empire. Both winter and summer thaws prevented travel on low-quality roads. According to Roberts, of the three roads from Erzurum to Trabzon, only one was passable during the summer due to snowmelt.[47] Roberts described the Black Sea region as "rugged mountainous ranges, crossed by difficult and sometimes impassable roads; rocky valleys, intersected by huge marshes and rivers, which are impossible to cross at certain seasons of the year."[48] In Tokat, a district due south of Samsun, the roads were passable during summer but were nearly impossible to traverse during the rainy season and winter, while in the area near Batum, snow melt caused road flooding throughout the district.[49] The poor quality of the roads affected the rate and timing at which migrants could be transferred from Black Sea ports to settlement locations, but British Consul Bulwer in Samsun saw in one problem the solution to the other, suggesting that migrants could be employed in constructing another road from Trabzon to Erzurum.[50]

Seasonal changes created complicating and delaying factors for migrant settlement, but Ottoman officials also recognized the danger winter posed to new arrivals. The Immigrant Commission attempted to mitigate these problems through determining settlement locations prior to migrant arrival and improving circumstances in temporary housing. This effort was delineated in instructions sent by the settlement minister of Rumelia in 1860.[51] Likewise, in the fall of 1864, the governor of Gallipoli and Biga described two areas available for rapid settlement. These two areas would be able to accommodate about 1,000 migrants each, and so every effort would be

[47] Randal Roberts, *Asia Minor and the Caucasus* (Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1877), 25.
[48] Ibid., 35.
[49] Ibid., 37; 57.
[50] *Papers Respecting the Settlement of Circassian Emigrants in Turkey*, No. 7.
[51] Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri*, 128-129.

made to prepare prior to migrant arrival.[52] Environmental factors also contributed to migrant suffering in camps and other temporary locations. Migrants housed in tents or other makeshift structures faced extreme hardship during winter months. The onset of winter required reevaluation of the logistics of caring for the temporary population. Though the timing of winter was predictable, the certainty of transportation was less so. A group of 1,200 Circassian migrants were stranded near Trabzon when their boat never arrived. Given the weather conditions, it was not possible to send them to their proposed permanent locations in Kostence (Constanta, Dobruca) until the start of spring. Since the migrants were only scheduled to stay in the area temporarily, they had previously received tents for housing. With the change in weather, officials endeavored to improve the Circassians' circumstances through relocating the migrants temporarily to several khans, coffeehouses, and similar buildings in a nearby town. The large group would be cared for over the winter months through state and private coordination in providing migrants with housing, food, and an area for religious cleansing.[53]

Temporary arrangements could drag on for months and even years, straining both migrant and local populations.[54] In the winter of 1859-1860, around forty-five Kabartay migrants who had settled temporarily with compatriots in Amasya were scheduled to be sent inland to Sivas, as state officials determined there was not enough land available for them in Amasya. Despite having stayed as guests among the locals for at least four to five months, they would remain in Amasya until early spring, when conditions would permit their transfer. Until their move to Sivas, the migrants' provisions would continue to be dispensed through the Amasya

[52] BOA.A.MHM.MKT 316.95, 5 C 1281/5 November 1864.
[53] BOA.A.MKT.MHM 324.3, 29 Şaban 1281/27 January 1865.
[54] BOA.A.MKT.MHM 231.60, 11 Safer 1278/18 August 1861; MVL 532.44, 15 Muharrem 1284/19 May 1867; BOA.MVL 540.135, 21 Rebiyülevvel 1284/23 July 1867; BOA.MVL 542.30, 3 Rebiyülahir 1284/4 August 1867; BOA.MVL 546.96, 11 Cemaziyülahır 1284/10 October 1867; BOA.MVL 559.12, 6 Zilkade 1284/29 February 1868; BOA.DH.MKT 1340.21, 5 Recep 1300/13 February 1883; BOA.DH.MKT 1463.114, 29 Safer 1305/16 November 1887; BOA.DH.MKT 1508.31, 2 Ramazan 1305/13 May 1888.

administration.[55] In a similar case from 1879, over a thousand migrants from Eastern Rumelia were stranded in Burgaz (contemporary Bulgaria) by the onset of winter. Officials attempted to commandeer grain supplies for the migrants from nearby Edirne. Given that city's own grain shortage, administrators could only procure two months worth of hardtack.[56]

Delayed settlement contributed to the migrants' tenuous conditions and strained local resources as communities accommodated the newcomers. This issue persisted beyond migrants' initial points of entry. Immigrant settlement occurred in multiple stages from port cities to inland areas, and migrants continued to rely on local hosts until they were fully established. Migrant's transition to self-sufficiency was also dependent on settlement timing. Weather factors determined whether migrants' homes could be built, while settling them after sowing or harvest time extended the amount of time they needed to receive state and local assistance.[57] Migrants facing difficult winters and insufficient food supply ate their state-issued farming seed, delaying their ability to plant crops the following season.[58] Most planting would be completed during the winter and before the arrival of spring, and thus migrants settled after the winter cold and the spring flooding would wait nearly a year to harvest their own produce. This was the case for a community of Batumi Migrants in Şile, a Black Sea town near Istanbul. The migrants arrived in Şile after the beginning of the harvest season in 1889 and petitioned the Interior Ministry for extra food and grain. As it was winter, it would be eight months before they could expect to harvest crops. The petitioners vividly described the "violence of their hunger" and the likelihood

[55] *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* Vol. I. (Istanbul: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2012), 292-3.
[56] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Muhacirin Ayniyat Defteri, 6-7. 6 Muharrem 1297/ 20 December 1879.
[57] BOA.DH.MHC 4.71, 18 Muharrem 1303/27 October 1885.
[58] Easting planting seeds was a typical response to famine in nineteenth century Anatolia. See Özge Ertem, "Eating the Last Seed: Famine, Empire, Survival and Order in Ottoman Anatolia in the Late Nineteenth Century" (PhD Diss., European University Institute, 2012), 44-46.

that they would "perish beneath the weight of the snow."[59] The petitioners asserted the locals would be unable to provide for them throughout the winter. The central state honored the migrants' request for one bushel of corn per person per month (a total of 344 bushels) and organized shipments from Istanbul since there was no extra grain stored in the district.[60]

Environmental factors influenced migrants' interactions with Ottoman aid and settlement plans beyond appeals for provisions. For example, migrant resistance could contribute to the difficulties of seasonal delays. In 1879, a large group refused to travel beyond the town of Merzifon in the district of Amasya. As the weather turned, officials decided the migrants would have to winter in the area. While the migrants waited, a group of their leaders travelled to Istanbul seeking permission to settle elsewhere. In the absence of their leaders, the remaining migrants became "disobedient," (*serkeş*) and unruly in the town's markets. Officials requested the speedy return of the group's leaders. Since the migrants refused to travel further, the Immigrant Commission decided to place the group in the nearby district of Çorum prior to the spring. Despite the fractiousness of the community, the approaching winter posed too large a threat to the migrants' wellbeing to insist they follow the previous plan. In response to the situation the Immigrant Commission made a clear statement regarding its priorities, noting that it was essential to protect the newcomers from the areas' winter conditions and important to settle the migrants as soon as possible.[61] Thus, migrant desires and threat of winter combined to trump both officials' initial settlement agenda and concerns about migrant behavior.

Examples from Samsun and the surrounding Black Sea region highlight the initial ramifications of migrant disease and prevailing tactics in battling epidemics in the early stages of

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[59] BOA.I.DH 1173.91704, 18 February 1890. *"...şiddet-i cev' ve ihtiyaçtan hiç bir tarafa müracaat imkanı bulunmadığı cihetle bu hallin devamı bil-ahire evlad ve 'iyallarımız iyle beraber cümlemizin şiddet-i cev' ve kesret-i şitaya tahammül edemeyerek karlar altında helak ve telef olmaklığımız derkar eduğuna nazaran."*
[60] Ibid.
[61] *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* v. II, no: 83. Original date: 19 December, 1888.

migration and settlement. Foreigners and international opinion directly and indirectly influenced Ottoman tactics of quarantine and removal. Fears of contagion led to both restricted movement and enforced evacuations of urban space. Environmental factors complicated efforts to transfer and establish newcomers.

Unsettling Environments

In 1890, a group of 170 households of Caucasian migrants fled thirty miles from their designated settlement area in a Mediterranean seaside village to the nearby city of Antalya. Though the migrants had been on location for only one year, they cited the seacoast and "a lack of accord with the weather" as pretext for their relocation.[62] The runaways were quite selective in their evaluation of other possible settlement locations, as they rejected the various places they were shown for resettlement. Instead, the migrants demanded to be placed near compatriots in the province of Konya. Though this group presented a significant irritation to state officials, the Interior Ministry decided to resolve the issue through compromise rather than punishment. The migrants were allowed to relocate to Konya, and though their group was scattered, they were promised land with water and meadows.[63]

Which specific elements of the Mediterranean coastal climate the migrants rejected is unclear. Though Antalya now serves as a popular vacation destination, and perhaps the only reason anyone would flee this "Turkish Riviera" is the summer's influx of tourists, the effort on the part of the migrants to transfer to Konya likely reflected both difficulty adjusting to the arid climate and the desire to reunite with those from whom they were separated. Antalya's average temperatures in summer months reach above ninety degrees Fahrenheit. Like other parts of the

[62] BOA.BEO 138.10299, 23 Cemaziyülahır 1310/12 January 1893. "*Kafkasya muhacirlerinin sakin oldukları mezkur mahaller sahil-i bahirde bulunması ve havasının mezaclerine adem-i tevafuku vesileler ile...*"
[63] Ibid.

Eastern Mediterranean, the region is characterized by low rainfall, with five to seven dry months per year.[64] On the one hand, the prospect of lowland settlement may have presented a vast difference to migrants arriving from one of the many climatic zones within the Caucasus. On the other, if the migrants were searching solely for respite from Antalya's heat, Konya's semi-arid climate, with its similarly hot, dry summers, may not have offered much of an improvement.[65] State officials' efforts to entice the migrants through settlement in valley locations with water highlight migrants' ecological concerns. Still, given migrants' emphasis on reunification, the physical landscape was not the only standard through which they evaluated their settlement.

Success in settling large groups of refuges in the Ottoman Empire was tied to the geographical and ecological landscapes into which they were placed. Nevertheless, existing narratives of Ottoman migration overlook this crucial component of immigrant integration. Historians of colonialism have recognized the importance of highlighting ecological factors in evaluating the creation of new homes in frontier zones. For example, Thomas Barret notes in his survey of Cossack settlement in the North Caucasus:

> …the environment emerges from the background and plays a leading role in the history of frontiers, where settlers try to construct new communities in unfamiliar ecological contexts. How settlers are transformed by and how they transform their landscapes are integral parts of their struggles and opportunities.[66]

Ottoman immigrant settlement and frontier colonization were similar processes.[67] As with other periods of large migration into different and demanding surroundings, newcomers frequently died in part due to environmental difficulties presented by new climates. Weather events and

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[64] A.E. Harding, J. Palutikof, J., and T. Holt. (2009), "The Climate System," in *The Physical Geography of the Mediterranean*, ed. J. C. Woodward (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009), 72.
[65] Sam White, "Ecology, Climate, and Crisis in the Ottoman Near East" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2008), 150-153.
[66] Thomas Barrett, *At the Edge of Empire: The Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier, 1700-1860* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 57.
[67] Migrants were settled as colonizers both in borderlands and along 'internal frontiers.' See Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonun," 17; Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*," 85; Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, 104; 108-9.

ecological issues played a complicating role in planning for their maintenance on location, and settlement environments were frequently deadly. Immigrants settled in malarial areas, particularly those who lacked the knowledge and resources to seek refuge in elevated locations during the summer, could lose more than half of their communities to the disease in just a few years.[68] As the case of migrants feeling from Antalya suggests, environmental issues created unanticipated settlement outcomes and generated an arena of negotiation between state and migrant. Examining the role of ecological factors brings to light contested outcomes of migrant settlement and emphasizes migrants' criteria for their new homes.

The case from Antalya highlights official tolerance of negotiation. At a moment when state administrators were attempting to curb unanticipated movement both within and out of the empire, why were they willing to undermine their initial settlement efforts and allow large-scale relocations?[69] Other scholars have shown the ongoing importance of large-scale mobility within the Ottoman Empire throughout this era of settlement, but few have examined how environmental factors and rhetoric played a role in compelling migrants' ongoing movement.[70] While contagion fears functioned to limit migrant movement by restricting them to particular neighborhoods or preventing their entry into public spaces, sometimes treatment required ongoing mobility, particularly when officials interpreted poor migrant health as the outcome of insalubrious locales. Environmental constraints played a key role in the success of migrant settlement strategies, and sickness contributed both to the restricting of migrant movement and its official acceptance.

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[68] Gratien, "The Mountains are Ours," 185. Gratien writes that transhumance was an essential response to malaria prior to the widespread use of quinine. Local pastoralists forced to settle near Adana had similar levels of mortality comparable to that of the migrants (p. 185-186).

[69] Ottoman sources frequently estimate five individuals per migrant household. With this multiplier, the group from Antalya was comprised of roughly 850 individuals.

[70] Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*; Klein, *The Margins of Empire*.

Resettlement

After the state identified particular areas as threatening to migrant health and livelihood, how did it respond? Ottoman officials shuffled doctors through the empire to address sickness within provincial locations lacking doctors, pharmacists, and health infrastructure. Many migrants responded to insalubrious situations through fleeing their settlement locations, hoping either to return to their homelands or to find more promising terrain elsewhere in the empire. While the state took action against this illegal, migrant-initiated movement, when migrants suffered from persistent illness and seasonal repetitions of health problems, officials did see transfer as a viable option. Aside from attempting treatment plans on location, migrants were also given leave to seek temporary treatment elsewhere.[71]

The Council of State issued directions in 1870 allowing for migrant relocation in cases of environmental insalubrity, and state officials embraced permanent transfer in response to migrant sickness.[72] For example, several communities of migrants from Batum and Artvin who had settled in the Western Black Sea district of Şile after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War faced ongoing exposure to "various fevers and maladies" in the late 1880s. According to a doctor dispatched to the area, low-quality housing and a diet consisting solely of state-allocated corn and wheat exacerbated the migrants' condition, and subsequently they were unable to farm.[73] The doctor advised that two different villages be relocated to a more medically suitable neighborhood with better weather, "in accordance with the principles of hygiene," even if the migrants did not see the need to relocate. The area itself was deemed unhealthy, and the district head (*kaymakam*) was tasked with determining another location for the migrants to settle. Since

[71] BOA.DH.MKT 1698.78, 22 Cemaziyülahır 1307/13 February 1890.
[72] BOA.I.MMS 38.1590, 16 Şevval 1286/20 January 1870.
[73] BOA.DH.MKT 1558.35, 21 Safer 1306/2 June 1869; BOA.DH.MKT 1585.91, 17 Cemaziyülevvel 1306/19 January 1889.

it was medically unacceptable to leave them in their current locations, the commission decided to break up the community into groups of one to two families and scatter them throughout existing non-migrant villages.[74]

Likewise, in November of 1905, the Migrant Commission responded to a petition sent on behalf of Chechen migrants in Ras al-Ayn, a town located along the contemporary Syrian-Turkish border. The petitioner argued that the migrants had suffered an excessive number of deaths and illnesses due to the harmful quality of air and water in the region. While nearly two thousand households of migrants had been settled in the area, a commission investigation revealed that only two hundred of these were left due to the sulfur emitted from a nearby spring. The official from the interior ministry mourned the fact that the flaws of the settlement location had caused loss of life. Given that it was "absolutely not permissible to leave the migrants there in that condition," the commission and provincial governor permitted the transfer of the migrants to El'izze, the location the settlers had designated in their original petition.[75]

Environmental Quality

As migrants' experiences in Ras al-Ayn reveal, once land was found for the newcomers and they were transported to their new settlement locations, environmental factors continued to structure migrants' experience of their new homes. Despite an officially optimistic view on land availability, migrants were often placed in difficult circumstances characterized by low-quality land and challenging climates. Both migrants and the Ottoman state recognized environmental problems in potential settlement areas. Directives emphasized the importance of a salubrious

[74] BOA.DH.MKT 1773.56, 6 Rabiulevvel1308/20 Ekim 1890; BOA.DH.MKT 1764.90, 10 Safer 1308/25 October 1890; BOA.DH.MKT 1770.116, 29 Safer 1308/14 October 1890.
[75] BOA.DH.MKT, 1778.59, 22 Rebiyülevvel 1308/5 November 1890. *"bu hal ile orada bırakılmaları dahi kat'a caiz olamayacağı..."*

climate for settlement. Officials evaluated the suitability of potential settlement areas in environmental terms prior to migrant arrival and attempted to select "appropriate" (*münasib*) and "suitable" (*elverişli*) land for migrant relocation.[76]

The effort to settle migrants in suitable areas was undermined by the gap between available lands and cultivable land. Ostensibly available lands were often of poorer quality or located in lowland plains.[77] Provincial officials attempted to stem the flow of migrants into their districts through emphasizing the poor quality of available land there. For example, the district of Bolu, particularly the area around the town of Düzce, remained a locus of settlement throughout the 1860s and 1870s; however, even in 1860 the District Council worried about the availability of land. An official inquiry into where to place two hundred Crimean migrants ultimately determined that no appropriate land remained. The council emphasized that the people of Düzce had already accommodated enough migrants, and it was impossible to settle the migrants near the seaside, given the rocky and hilly coastline.[78]

Lack of land contributed to decisions to place migrants in low-lying, swampy areas. Individuals in the Black Sea region avoided exposure to malaria through traditional patterns of mobility. They pastured at higher altitudes during the summer and returned to the milder weather of the lowlands during winter months. Overcoming the environmental shortcomings of the lowland swamps through building and maintaining proper drainage was an intensive and multiple year process. When migrants were moved as agricultural settlers into the lowlands, they

[76] Saydam,169. See also BOA.Y.PRK.DH 2/93, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* v.1 (no:28), 1889.
[77] As I discuss in chapter two, frequently "empty land" was not actually available for migrant settlement, as it was under usufruct by peasants or nomadic groups. Terzibaşoğlu points to the inundation of migrants after the 1877-1878 war and the outcomes of the 1858 Ottoman Land Law in explaining the increase in land disputes and the new terms under which they were waged in the nineteenth century. According to Terzibaşoğlu, at issue was the very way in which use (*tasarruf*) was defined and used to legitimize ownership. See Yucel Terzibaşoğlu, "Land-disputes and ethno-politics," 153-180.
[78] BOA.A.MKT.NZD 324.65, 29 Safer 1277/16 September 1860.

could not avoid exposure to malaria, which plagued Anatolia from July to October.[79] There are many cases of migrants falling sick after settlement in both temporary and permanent locations, particularly after exposure to swamps and wetlands. Officials recognized wetlands as dangerous areas, and doctors treating migrant communities noted swamps and lakeshore environments in determining sources of disease.[80] Migrants also recognized the source of difficulties, asking to be relocated from overly swampy areas.[81]

Flooding was a source of malaria, but it also threatened the construction of new neighborhoods. For example, the administrator of the district of Izmit planned to use newly reclaimed swampland for migrant housing. Unfortunately, the new levee system failed its first major test. During the time of year locals referred to as "peach flower season" (*şeftali çiçeği mevsimi*), presumably early spring, melting snow caused the river to overflow. Extensive rains and the coincidence of several weather events combined to make 1864 the worst year of flooding in memory. The river destroyed the levees and flooded the plain. The flooding delayed migrant settlement in the district and the completion of migrant homes.[82]

Because migrants were to be settled as agriculturalists, other factors beyond swamps and flooding contributed to rendering areas impracticable for settlement. In describing flawed settlement areas, migrants frequently emphasized their allotments were not well intended for farming, leaving their communities few options for subsistence. In a petition submitted in Canık, a migrant leader and his cohort of ten families complained that the group faced hardship (*duçar-i müzayaka*) because their settlement location was neither suitable for farming nor large enough to raise animals. He asked to be resettled with his brother in Düzce, and offered to forgo financial

[79] Lennep, *Travels in Little Known Parts of Asia Minor*, 41-42.
[80] BOA.DH.MKT 1016.26, 13 Şaban 1323/13 October 1905.
[81] BOA.MVL 527.75, 14 Muharrem 1284/18 May 1867.
[82] BOA.MVL 672.4, 25 Zilkade 1280/2 May 1864.

assistance during the move. Despite his pragmatic offer, his bid for relocation to Düzce was unsuccessful due to land shortages. The *Meclis-i Vala* noted the benefits of family reunification, but it concluded that removing the migrants from Canık would undermine the settlement project in that district. Furthermore, the court determined there was no suitable situation or productive land available for the group in the entire district of Bolu, much less within Düzce. Though the migrants did not succeed in transferring to Bolu, they were offered resettlement in another location within Canık.[83]

Migrants' petitions focused on issues of both quality and size. A group of ten families noted that the land surrounding their village near Ankara, was too small and stony for successful agriculture.[84] Migrants referenced lack of available farmland to frame requests for more assistance from the state.[85] Rather than exclusively a problem of the first years of settlement, migrants' critique of their locations could occur years into the settlement process.[86]

Requesting Relocation

Attention to environmental factors and physical landscapes is useful in considering an essential question in migration studies: why do people decide to move? Muslim migrants' settlement in the Ottoman Empire was a multi-staged process. Even after officials established migrants in new homes, newcomers could request resettlement or attempt to return to their former homes outside the empire. Though environmental unsuitability appears to be an unyielding constraint necessitating departure, migrant decisions to vacate settlement areas were

[83] BOA.MVL 503.64, 17 Rebiyülahir 1283/29 August 1866. "*…muhacirinin zevi al-erhamıyla kavuşturulması talimat iktizasından isede…yerden kaldırılması tekarrür iskanı ihlal edeceği cihetle...muhacir iskanına elverişli hali ve münaseb mahalle kalmamış olduğu*."
[84] BOA.MVL 511.40, 22 Cemaziyülahır 1283/1 November 1866.
[85] BOA.I.ŞD 93.5555, 18 Teşrinievvel 1304/30 October 1888.
[86] BOA.MVL 528.130, 21 Safer 1284/24 June 1867.

complex choices. Migrants' petitions for transfer within the Ottoman Empire offer a source to consider processes of adaptation, migrants' own settlement goals, and migrants' effective negotiation with the state on issues of settlement.

Migrants offered a variety of reasons when requesting transfers, complaining that settlement areas were not suitable for farming based on swampiness, stoniness, low-quality soil prone to flooding, insufficient allotment, or incapacity for agricultural productivity.[87] Alongside these complaints regarding quality of settlement locations, multiple petitions from the early 1860s explicitly cite acclimation as migrants' main concern, relying on the phrase "*mahallenin ab ve havasıyla imtizac edememek*" or "being unable to adapt to an area's climate." This phrase, like many found in the petitions, was not exclusive to the migrants. State officials used the same language to request their own transfers, and even the Immigrant Commission occasionally employed the phrase as a useful excuse to justify relocating troublemakers.[88] Though migrants rely on the recurring rhetorical device, the petitions reveal ways in which migrants engaged with the state in a discussion of settlement criteria. The petitions provide insight into migrant desires because criticism of current locations was accompanied by specific resettlement requests. Just as much as migrants hoped to be removed from a particular location, they petitioned in hopes of being placed in a particular elsewhere.

In criticizing their current location, petition writers emphasized those components they saw as most important to their community's wellbeing, such as economic viability. For example, three Crimean Tatar leaders hoping to relocate 465 individuals from Bursa cited several reasons

[87] BOA.MVL 527.75, 14 Muharrem 1284/18 May 1867; *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kafkas Göçleri* v. II, no: 93. (6 August 1893); BOA.MVL 511.40, 22 Cemaziyülahır 1283/1 November 1866; BOA.MVL 503.64, 17 Rebiyülahir 1283/29 August 1866; BOA.DH.MKT 332.24, 17 Recep 1312/18 January 1895.
[88] Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonu," 182. Cuthell suggests the Immigrant Commission employed the excuse of "failure to adapt" to justify the removal of Nogay leaders Berakey Bey and his brother Haci Timur from Izmit to Samsun, who had been petitioning for permission to return to Crimea.

to support their plea. Aside from inability to adapt to the climate, they noted the difficulties caused by their wide dispersal in various districts and towns, which had undermined their ability to find "tranquility" (*asayış*) in their settlement locations and exacerbated their ongoing economic need by rendering it difficult to subsist.[89] This sort of economic complaint could be tied directly to the insalubrity of settlement areas. For example, another pair of Tatar leaders traveled from Manisa to Istanbul to request the relocation of thirty-two families to either Erzurum or Uzunyayla. They expanded on their lack of accord with the environment, emphasizing the economic difficulties directly related to the insalubrity of the climate. Women and children were struck ill by sickness and fevers, and no one retained the capacity to complete daily work, as "at the moment of beginning any labor they would be struck again with sickness." The migrants concluded these factors rendered it impossible for them to sustain themselves in that area.[90]

The authors of these petitions, after noting the deficiencies of the areas they had been placed, highlighted the benefits of resettlement. Appeals for transfer covered long and short distances and offered explanation for why the area of requested resettlement was superior. For example, a petitioner from Kaza-i Erbaa in the central Black Sea region requested permission to relocate to an area only ten minutes away. After describing the hardships the community faced in their current location, such as the insufficiency of the housing in the area, the poor quality of the land, and its tendency to cause illness, the petitioner noted the advantages of the lands surrounding a nearby abandoned granary. The new location would be better given its elevated

[89] BOA.DH.MKT 1.3, 13 Ramazan 1277/25 March 1861.
[90] BOA.A.MKT.UM 9.510, 21 Rebiyülahir 1278/26 October 1861. *"...birisi salah bulsa bir işe mübaşeret edecek olduğu sırada der'akab yine hasta olarak hasıl bu beldede bizim bir veçhile temekkyun ve ta'ayyush etmekliğimiz mümkün olmayıp..."*

location and flowing water, while the wood from the abandoned granary would facilitate the construction of new homes.[91]

While those requesting short movements likely found new areas through reconnaissance work or information from locals, longer requests for movement relied on migrant networks or previous experiences passing through or being housed temporarily during the arrival and settlement process. It is unclear how migrants in Manisa were apprised of the climate in Erzurum, but other individuals' emphasis on reunification pinpoints fellow migrants as a source of information. A group of eighty-three migrants petitioning from Izmir supports this. They were originally settled in Manisa in a larger group of 120 families. However, because the group faced great difficulty and failed to acclimate to the environment, nearly one hundred families fled to Varna. The remaining group noted that they too faced these hardships, and just as importantly, sought reunification with their companions and relatives. They had travelled from Manisa but were detained in Izmir.[92]

Migrants employed environmental evaluation of their settlement areas, but their critiques reflected complex responses to their new homes. Migrants' reference to acclimation was particularly effective because it encompassed both physical and psychological reactions to settlement locations. Environmental factors and migrants' responses to them speak to the question of why individuals move, or in this case, why they attempt to return home or seek alternative settlement solutions. Although migrants articulated concerns in environmental terms, to read this as solely a result of ecological differences between their new locations and their homelands is to overlook the multifaceted ways in which people connect to places.

[91] BOA.A.MKT.NZD 429.92, 6 Muharrem 1279/4 July 1862.
[92] BOA.A.MKT.UM 504.65, 8 Rebiyülahir 1278/8 October 1861.

In the aforementioned petition asking for relocation from Manisa to Erzurum, migrants specifically noted that their troubles arose in large part because the land was too different from their homelands. Given that Uzunyayla and Erzurum were similar to the climate they were familiar with in Crimea, they thought it likely that they would easily adjust to that setting.[93] The various origins of many migrants remain obscured within state sources, and even when ethnic or topographical markers (e.g. Caucasian, Circassian, Tatar, Chechen; Crimea, Caucasus, Dagestan, Thrace) reveal a general point of origin, the climatic and economic variations within those areas makes it difficult to pinpoint the ecological milieu from which migrants hailed. Despite the difficulty in reconstructing migrants' ecological backgrounds, considering the role that difference played in shaping their responses to settlement locations is useful.

Historians and anthropologists have uncovered evidence suggesting Ottoman migrants sought settlement locations similar to their homelands to facilitate their economic transition and to maintain affective ties to their previous communities.[94] Migrants faced environmentally difficult and frequently deadly settlement processes, but reading petitions only in those terms overlooks the complexity of migrant reactions to new areas and relationships between place and migration decisions.[95] In their petitions, migrants sought not only to recreate the physical conditions of their homelands but also to reconnect social ties. This is suggested in the petition of a certain Haci Mehmet, who complained about Düzce's environment and emphasized his desire

[93] BOA.A.MKT.UM 9.510, 21 Rebiyülahir 1278/26 October 1861. Gratien notes that while the Immigrant Commission recognized elevated mountain pastures like Uzunyayla as more salubrious locations to place migrants, the pastures were also "precious" places used by local communities seeking seasonal respite from malarial valleys. Immigrant settlement in Uzunyayla led to conflict with the Afşar tribe in 1861. Gratien, "The Mountains are Ours," 90-91.

[94] Environmental imagery and attachment to various landscapes persists in the oral traditions of descendants of migrant communities. See Williams, "A Homeland Lost," 185-193, and Chatty, *Displacement and Dispossession*, 110.

[95] For a discussion of the importance of place and its affective ties in migration decisions, see Angel Pascual-de-Sans, "Sense of Place and Migration Histories: Idiotopy and Idiotope," *Area* 36.4 (2004): 348-357. For a discussion on the physical landscape as one component alongside social, emotional, and intellectual landscapes in a broader process of becoming "rooted," see Derek Spooner, "Reflections on the Place of Larkin," *Area* 2 (2000): 209-216.

to relocate his family to Varna for resettlement with his tribe.[96] Despite being validated by the Immigrant Commission, his underlying environmental claim is likely not based solely on climatic factors. Throughout the decade, Düzce and its environs remained a location where other Circassians requested to settle in their own attempts at community reunification, to the extent that state officials eventually had to deny such requests based on a lack of available land.[97] Requests for long-distance relocation such as Haci Mehmet's suggest an inverse relationship between environmental hardship and the distance migrants wanted to travel for resettlement, and are indicative of the multiple factors contributing to migrants' adjustment to new situations characterized (for some) by different physical landscapes and economic activities, restrictions on mobility, and ruptured communities.

The complexity of migrants' responses to the environment as encapsulated in their discussion of acclimation are likewise essential in recognizing that environmental critique was a rhetorical tool used in negotiating with Ottoman state. The employment of this rhetorical phrase does not preclude the reality of environmental problems faced by many migrants. Still, its ambiguity and repetition does allow for strategic complexity in both the petitions and the state's response to them. Regardless of the level of hardship faced by migrants, state officials tended to agree that environmental factors did play a detrimental role in settlement situations. Nevertheless, migrants' resettlement choices were not always honored even in cases where the difficulties of their situation were confirmed through state investigation. For example, while the Immigrant Commission agreed with the logic of moving migrants in Kaza-ı Erbaa to a nearby site, those who requested relocation from Izmir to Uzunyayla found their petition rejected.

[96] BOA.MVL 1074.77, 21 Şaban 1284/18 December 1867.
[97] BOA.DH.MKT 1310.36, 21 Şevval 1286/24 January 1870; BOA.A.MKT.NZD 324.65, 29 Safer 1277/16 September 1860; BOA.MVL 511.40, 22 Cemaziyülahır 1283/1 November 1866; BOA.MVL 503.64, 17 Rebiyülahir 1283/29 August 1866.

Likewise, the Manisa-based migrants waylaid in Izmir were not allowed to continue to Varna to join their countrymen, as this was evaluated as an attempt to facilitate return to Crimea, something the Ottoman state actively attempted to prevent.[98] Rather than Varna, and instead of returning to the hardship of Manisa, the eighty-three migrants were settled in an appropriate area within Izmir. The migrants' requests were only partially successful because officials likewise employed a hierarchy of settlement criteria and goals. The most frequently cited issue in attempting to resettle migrants was a lack of "suitable" or "productive" situations and lack of land available (*muhacir iskanına elverişli hali ve münaseb mahalle kalmamış olduğu*). When migrants' full requests could not be honored, the best alternative was to resettle migrants in ostensibly better circumstances within the same province.[99]

While many of the petitions I have cited were submitted in the 1860s, environmental evaluations remained important in later settlement efforts. In citing their lack of acclimation, the migrants moving from Antalya to Konya described in the introduction to this section were drawing on a preexisting rhetorical device and relying on an effective tool for negotiating with the state over the terms of settlement. Most petitions became tangled in provincial bureaucracy and never reached the central state. Migrants were only occasionally successful in their efforts to be moved to specific areas. Nevertheless, sending such petitions yielded the possibility of marginal or even radical improvement in migrants' circumstances.

Territorial Claims

Migrants were not the only group to recognize health as a powerful rhetoric for articulating spatial claims. A surprisingly well-documented case from Sarıyer, an Istanbul

[98] After 1877-1878 war, settlement in border areas would also be restricted in official agreement with Russia and enforced in terms of Treaty of Berlin.
[99] BOA.MVL 503.64, 17 Rebiyülahir 1283/29 August 1866.

suburb, reveals how health could be a tool for populations with competing claims over the proper use of land. The complex case reveals interactions between migrants, locals, and different bureaucratic entities within the Ottoman state. Migrants arrived in Sarıyer roughly ten years prior to the dispute, which began in 1888. While the immigrants are never described with ethnic or geographic markers, the fact that they had been settled the decade prior strongly suggests they arrived with others fleeing the Balkans during and after the 1877-1878 Russian-Ottoman war. Their placement so close to Istanbul indicates it is likely they fled from Rumelia, though it is possible they arrived from the Caucasus via the Black Sea. It may be that the migrants took some initiative in selecting this location for resettlement, as the language in the documents vacillates between designating them as squatters and noting that the Immigrant Commission "settled" them in Sarıyer.

Whether or not the migrants had initially been squatters, over the years they gained legitimate status, as indicated by their negotiations with the state. In 1888, the migrants renewed a request to build a school after a previous rejection. The migrants' difficulty arose from the construction of their community on top of an abandoned graveyard. Existing documents suggest the Immigrant Commission facilitated the migrants' settlement on "empty land" in the neighborhood prior to realizing the existence of the cemetery.[100]

While the migrants hoped to improve and solidify their community through constructing the school, Reşid Pasha, one of the long-term residents of the area, petitioned to remove the migrant presence from the neighborhood entirely. He argued it was inappropriate for migrants to build over a cemetery. In response to this petition, the Sultan determined that the migrant homes should be destroyed and permission for the school denied.[101] However, a few months earlier, the

[100] BOA.DH.MKT 772.40, 11 Recep 1321/3 October 1903.
[101] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi - Şura-yı Devlet Evrakı (BOA.ŞD) 750.14, 17 Muharrem 1306/23 September 1888.

Immigrant Commission and the municipal government had emphasized that such a course was untenable, citing the long-term status of the migrants in the area, underlining that the removal of the migrants would cause them increased suffering, and submitting that the migrants' construction had been in accordance with a recently passed building code. Thus, according to the commission, the municipality's standing committee should award the migrants the legal deed to the land. Nevertheless, in December of 1887, the Council of State restated the position that settlement in the cemetery was categorically illegal according to Sharia, and ruled the migrants would have to be removed immediately.[102] Furthermore, the Council alerted the Ministry of Education that it could not render permission for the erection of the new school.

A few years after this decision the local imam and *muhtar* (headman) submitted another petition complaining that the migrants had moved back into the area.[103] In the years following the original decision, migrants had filed for the deeds to the land, and their new efforts had not been completely thwarted. Rather, as the case continued to be discussed among different bureaucratic bodies, the migrants' building and repairs had merely been postponed. Despite the halting of construction of migrant buildings, migrants continued living in the area, and their community grew from fifty families to eighty-three. By June of 1892, serious problems related to the unfinished buildings had arisen in the neighborhood. Those migrants who had been unable to complete their homes lodged complaints, while the non-migrant residents raised concerns about the sanitation problems resulting from the incomplete latrines and pipes in the migrant neighborhood. The residents petitioned to have the problem addressed as it posed a threat to public health, particularly in the heat of the summer months. Though the residents may have hoped to affect the removal of migrants through their focus on public health, the Interior

[102] Ibid.
[103] BOA.DH.MKT 1814.147, 22 Recep 1308/3 March 1891.

Ministry responded to the crisis by ordering the immediate completion of the migrant buildings.[104] The immediate question of the building status had been answered, but disputes over the legality of the migrant community persisted. After the failure of their health claims, the neighborhood residents challenged the legality of the migrant structures based on building codes, arguing the buildings were too irregular and close to the road. The question remained unresolved through October of 1903 as correspondence stating and restating the problem moved between the official in charge of Istanbul's maintenance (*Şehir Emaneti*) and the Directorate of Imperial Foundations (*Evkaf-ı Hümayun Nezareti*).[105]

This case demonstrates how changing land use created jurisdictional disputes. The Immigrant Commission attempted to fashion the abandoned cemetery as empty land appropriate for migrant settlement, but encountered opposition from residents and other ministries. The case highlights the efforts of different stakeholders adapting to changing discursive and legal norms, as migrants, local residents, and officials engaged with evolving understandings of public health and urban order. The duration of the dispute demonstrates the difficulty officials faced in controlling migrant movement, even on the outskirts of the imperial capital. Rather than a simple act of determining the location for new communities, migrant settlement was a process reliant on newcomers' interactions with other groups and with the space of settlement itself.

Conclusion

> The arrival of three vessels, bringing Circassian refugees, was the cause of the excitement. These vessels were three small brigs, which had been laden with 2,700 human beings. Two thirds of these were reported to be ill, and suffering from all kinds of diseases. Death had wrought such havoc on board that only 1,400 of the 2,700 were landed, and 900 of these were more dead than alive. It was one of the saddest sights that

[104] BOA.DH.MKT 1955.106, 5 Zilkade 1309/1 June 1892.
[105] BOA.DH.MKT 772.40, 11 Recep 1321/3 October 1903.

> could be imagined to see these wretched creatures landing, after having been crowded to so cruel an excess in these small vessels for more than two months, without even standing room, packed, in fact, like sardines, with the main hatch shut on them the great part of the way. For three days previous to their arrival they had been without water.[106]

The conditions of departure and arrival of Muslim immigrants varied widely over the fifty-year period following the end of the Crimean War, but foreign observers and state officials frequently recognized episodes within these migrations as humanitarian disasters. Descriptions of tremendous loss of life and horrific conditions of temporary encampments are a painful reminder of the wide-scale suffering accompanying forced migration. Historians have emphasized these devastating outcomes to describe these migrations as "perhaps the first full-scale ethnic cleansing, or genocide, of a region in our modern era."[107] Ongoing research into migrant sickness at the border is essential in understanding the logistics of these mass movements, but evaluating migration administration requires extending the discussion of migrant health beyond state boundaries.

Focusing exclusively on experiences of arrival overlooks the ongoing importance of health and disease in migration histories. Immigrants' experiences with quarantine were key initial encounters with state officials, but health and environmental factors played a role in movement and settlement long after migrants landed in Ottoman Black Sea ports or trekked across the empire's land borders. Amidst hectic responses to unanticipated waves of refugees, related goals of establishing migrant economic viability and reducing population movement remained essential tactics in managing settlement. Health and environmental complications produced barriers to both criteria of settlement success, leaving migrants dependent on private and public aid and ultimately serving as a reason for ongoing mobility.

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[106] Article 7 – No Title, *The Albion, A Journal of News, Politics and Literature*, 8 December 1864, 42-49.
[107] Chatty. *Displacement and Dispossession*, 94.

Health and environmental factors created ongoing state-migrant contact during settlement and generated complex interactions among Ottoman officials, reforms, and migrants. Migrant requests for relocation offer insight into integration processes. As a direct connection between people and officials, petitions were essential to forging policy; migrant petitions encouraged officials to rethink settlement solutions.[108] While migrant petitions highlight a failure of original settlement plans and strategies, they also suggest a measure of success: migrant relocation requests relied on tacit recognition of the state's prerogative to determine migrant placement.[109]

[108] Nora Lafi, "Petitions and Accommodating Urban Change in the Ottoman Empire," in Elisabeth Özdalga, Sait Özervarlı, and Feryal Tansuğ, ed. *Istanbul as seen from a Distance: Centre and Provinces in the Ottoman Empire*, Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 2011, 73-82; Yuval Ben-Bassat, "In Search of Justice: Petitions Sent from Palestine to Istanbul from the 1870's Onwards," *Turcica* 41 (2009): 89-114; Ben-Bassat, "From *Şikayet* to Political Discourse and 'Public Opinion': Petitioning Practices to the King-Crane Commission," *New Middle Eastern Studies*, 4 (2014), <http://www.brismes.ac.uk/nmes/archives/1296>.

[109] For a discussion of Ottoman attempts to control movement within the migrant through an internal pass system, see Cristoph Herzog, "Migration and the State," 117-134. For a discussion of Ottoman state attempts to limit emigration through increased use of passports, see Kemal Karpat, "The Ottoman Emigration to America, 90-131.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITIES: RELIGION AND INCORPORATION

If American and European anti-immigration, and increasingly anti-Muslim immigration, lobbyists are to be believed, the entrance of a large group of foreigners is a threat to the cultural and social coherence of the state that group has entered. Though removed in time from contemporary concerns, the late-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, which hosted a population one-third of which was immigrants, is relevant to considering debates about migrants' entrance into presupposed cultural mainstreams.[1] The struggle to define and create a mainstream is not an historical anomaly but rather remains a source of forced migrations within and between contemporary states. The sheer number of newcomers in the Ottoman Empire and its pre-nation state context distance the comparison, but characteristics of the Ottoman case differentiating it from current debates about the cultural coherence of particular communities also expose the unsteady foundations and historical manufacture of corporate identities. Ottoman bureaucrats sought to facilitate migrant assimilation through increased administrative presence, infrastructural change, spatial organization, and institutions intended to promote official ideology and modify subjects' behavior. Tactics of migrant incorporation reflected both the broader concerns of the era and shifting stances on how to define and create Ottoman communities. Religious status remained an important component in how Ottoman officials imagined newcomers and encouraged their identification with the state. Ottoman assimilation policies were intended to facilitate community creation by planning settlement, incentivizing participation and registration, and extending religious and educational access.

[1] Kemal Karpat estimates immigrants comprised 30-40% of the Ottoman population by 1882. See Karpat, *The Politicization of* Islam, 184.

Far from exclusive to immigrants, the Ottoman Empire's social integration policies were targeted at the wide swath of society. In the nineteenth century, leaders and bureaucrats responded to the relative weakness of the Ottoman Empire by attempting to cultivate loyal, productive subjects. Among other administrative and legal changes, religious and educational reforms have served as useful routes to understanding late Ottoman social engineering, as "the Ottoman [educational] project yields a remarkably precise reading of the state's attempt to influence identity formation among its youth subjects."[2] To the extent that these reforms were applied to immigrant populations, officials' attempts to influence identity formation relied on the extension of government structures such as schools and administrative changes like the creation of an education ministry; however, because migrants arrived in large numbers and were placed in less populated areas, settlement goals and outcomes conditioned their experience of religious and educational reforms. In cases where settling migrants entailed creating new towns or neighborhoods, the effort to carefully design communities functioned in tandem with the creation of educational and religious institutions, a process I refer to as 'community building.' Community building was a multi-part endeavor on the part of the state; it relied upon religious categorization, design of migrant settlement, and extension of religious and educational resources. Community building was also a shared process; many migrants held stakes in the creation of these communities to gain access to state resources or achieve stability in their areas of settlement.

There are many appropriate approaches to considering how migrants and other groups change and are changed by state policies, institutions, and other entities. Frameworks such as cultural assimilation or social integration offer important questions about the lessening of social

[2] Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 25.

boundaries and reduction of barriers to full access, and insights from these perspectives inform my analysis of Ottoman policies and interactions among officials, migrants, and other subjects.[3] Despite the utility of these ideas, "community building" is useful both as an analytical concept and an organizational approach. In this chapter, the term "community" refers to several different groupings: face-to-face connections (local), vertical relationships between individuals and the sultan/Ottoman bureaucracy (empire/state), and contacts occurring across state-boundaries (trans-imperial). Though the word community suggests tangible entities, local, state, and trans-imperial communities were goals rather than things.[4] All three types of communities were subject to top-down and bottom-up efforts of creation and adjustment. As a concept, community building refers to attempts to create, connect and control trans-empire, empire-wide, and local groups and highlights the prominence of spatial organization in assimilative efforts. As an organizational approach, community building captures the interaction of ideologies, structural constraints, regimes, and repertoires.

This organizational approach is best illustrated via a model (Figure 11). In this model, interrelated *ideologies* and *constraints* directly influence local community building (e.g. restricting where migrants might be settled or influencing the characteristics of those who decide to immigrate). Ideologies and constraints condition community building tactics enacted at the local level.

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[3] Richard Alba and Victor Nee, *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 11; Till van Rahden, *Jews and Other Germans: Civil Society, Religious Diversity, and Urban Politics in Breslau, 1860-1925* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 7.

[4] I borrow this formulation from Rogers Brubaker's writings on ethnicity and groups. He argues, "Ethnicity, race, and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals—as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded, and enduring "groups" encourages us to do—but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms." Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 11.



Figure 11: Community Building Model. Ideologies, constraints, and tactics all contribute to community building outcomes. Tactics were influenced by ideologies and constraints but relied on strategies driven by officials (left) and migrants (right).

Organizing the components and outcomes of religious and educational reform in terms of community building highlights the relationship among macro-factors such as the Ottoman Empire's Islamic identity and local repertoires of structuring, locating, and financing new communities.

This chapter is organized roughly according to the community building model. I begin by highlighting international and state dynamics (ideologies and constraints) influencing the organization and realization of multi-ethnic or multi-religious communities within and among empires. In the first section, I consider the importance of religious categorization as an organizing principle in the migrants' sending and receiving environments. In the second, I discuss Ottoman officials' attempts to facilitate subjects' identification with the state through religion and educational reform. In the final three sections, I focus on local tactics both as an enterprise reflecting the state's interest in standardization and central control and as a process

reliant on migrant participation. Through examining international contexts, state policies, and local distribution of resources, I argue religious categorization and rhetoric contributed to repertoires of social organization used by officials and migrants. Religious identity offered a pathway to creating change and community, but it was not constitutive of communities themselves.

Religious Categorization and Immigrant Experience

Religion influenced mobility. As discussed in chapter one, states employed religious identity as a category to develop stable, loyal populations in frontier zones. Religious identity was also an international issue. Leaders' interests and concerns about the status of religious groups in other states became justification for invasion and provocation. Consequently, nineteenth and twentieth century treaties included provisions for minorities defined via religion.[5] Given this context, it follows that migrants' religious categorization contributed to their movement in profound ways and structured their relationships to the Russian and Ottoman empires and Balkan states. The categorization of individuals and populations in terms of religion had material outcomes for subjects in general and migrants in particular, but relying on religion as an essential explanation for individual and group behavior risks simplifying complex historical processes and overlooking local and temporal contingencies. How was migrants'

[5] The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) granted Russia the right to represent Christians in the Ottoman Empire and served as the basis for European intervention on behalf of Ottoman subject populations, while the Treaty of Berlin (1878) stipulated the protection of minority religious rights for the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro. Weitz argues the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a shift in international diplomacy from focusing on "dynastic legitimacy and state sovereignty" to populations, minority rights, and "state sovereignty rooted in national homogeneity." This shift underlay both episodes of population expulsion and the origins of human rights standards. Eric D. Weitz, "From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions," *The American Historical Review* 113.5 (2008): 1314.

religious identity important in structuring their lives and the changes faced by the states and communities through which they traversed?

Religious identity has been used to explain both the causes of migration in nineteenth century and its outcomes. Russian policies contributed to the exodus of Crimean Tatars and forced the flight of Caucasian mountaineers, but Russian observers and later historians narrated the former as an act of religious fanaticism and remained suspicious of agitation among supposed Ottoman religious emissaries in the latter. Emphasizing the role of religion in prompting emigrations allowed for the exculpation of state policies and erasure of violence faced by many of those who left. Migrations during the final decades of the nineteenth century arose from complex reasons, and migrants faced varying levels of coercion as they considered relocation. In order to overcome the narrative of Muslim fanaticism, historians have emphasized Muslim identity as an attribute that fomented persecution and alienation from the Russian state while also creating an escape route to an Islamic homeland in the Ottoman Empire.[6] Existing cross-border ties established through earlier migrations, pilgrimages, or the Circassian slave trade influenced the direction of migrant paths. Examples of return migration and the dynamic cross-border mobility exercised by some individuals support the notion that religious identity was neither the exclusive determinant of movement nor the overarching impetus for successful integration.[7]

Religion has also been employed as an essential framework in narrating immigrant incorporation into Ottoman society. In a seminal text on Ottoman demographic and population history, Karpat writes of migrants from the Caucasus, "The linguistic differences between Circassians, ethnic Turks in Anatolia, and other refugees who had settled in Anatolia were superseded by common religious and political ties as all of them were amalgamated into a single

[6] Karpat, "The Status of the Muslim under European Rule," 7-27; Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration," 79-108.
[7] See James Meyer, "Immigration, Return, and the Politics of Citizenship", 15-32.

political and cultural entity."[8] His depiction fails to note ongoing ruptures within the "Muslim-Turkish nation formed under the Ottoman aegis" and relies almost exclusively on religion to explain migrant integration. Portraying integration as a likely or automatic outcome of religious similarity overlooks the fact that neither Ottomans nor immigrants placed the same trust in shared Muslim identity to yield this result. The insufficiency of religion as an integrative factor affected the deployment of infrastructure and influenced attempts by both bureaucrats and community leaders to cultivate particular identities or behaviors. Because religious identity is not essential or static, and because it was a mobilizing and organizing tool, it is unsatisfactory to posit it as an exclusive reason for integration.

Integrative efforts of the nineteenth century contributed to the period's violent episodes. Historians analyzing the ruptures of the era have reevaluated religious identity as a category that requires contextualizing through exploring local and regional responses to changing social dynamics. Violence, rather than explained by ancient religious-ethnic divisions, arose via "the reconfiguration of political, economic, and social networks that pre-date state reform and globalization."[9] Several forces contributed to raising stakes of religious categorization, such as the intertwining of religious and national identity and developing ideals of popular sovereignty.[10] In both the Ottoman and Russian Empires, religion functioned as a means to categorize communities during an era of increasing efforts to know the population through statistical inquiry.[11] These classifications were increasingly important in distributing political power and material resources. Various players relied on those categorizations to navigate new

[8] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 75. More recently Karpat has described this process as "restructuring," rather than assimilation or integration, a correction which more directly emphasizes processes of change to which migrants contributed. Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 344.
[9] Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 6. See also Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*.
[10] See Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, for a discussion of the ways in which the spread of nationalism raised the stakes of religious conversion in local and international conflicts.
[11] Holquist, "To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate," 111-145.

circumstances, articulating identity with the practice of power in ways that both unified and divided existing and emerging communities.[12]

Migrant integration and efforts to create communities, rather than an assured process based on religious identity, occurred within a system in which categorization and identity claims had material consequences for newcomers and other Ottoman subjects. This is not to say that faith and religious identity were not important components in migrants' experiences. Religion was a potential coping factor, a point of connection to homelands and new communities, and a tactic of resistance to violence from states and other groups. Even when it was a crucial component of migrant experience, religious identity gained varying meanings when filtered through local considerations of power and resources. Concerns about migrant religious practice and education on the part of both Ottoman bureaucrats and migrant leaders were wrapped within larger assimilative projects. Religious practice, language, and institutions were points of dialogue and negotiation within groups and between migrants and officials, particularly as bureaucrats and newcomers used education and religious institutions as routes to creating communities. In considering migrants' developing role within Ottoman society, particularly when state generated documents are sources used to examine that process, it is essential to recognize the context for statements and practices of religious identity.

Envisioning Empire-Wide Communities

During the nineteenth century, alternative loyalties defined in religious, ethnic, or linguistic terms increasingly threatened the territorial cohesion of empires, fueling leaders' anxieties about the future of their states. Ottoman officials, far from immune to these

[12] The very use of identity in this way also became a route to criticizing Muslim fanaticism or emphasizing the reactionary or non-modern make-up of groups and individuals who used it. See Meyer, "Speaking Sharia to the State," 485-505, and Makdisi, *Culture of Sectarianism*.

circumstances, felt them sharply in response to the growing threat of national separatist movements, such as the one that led to Greek independence in 1832, and in the ongoing encroachment of European states acting as protector-instigators of the empire's various religious groups. Faced with internal and external pressures, reformers sought to foster identity with the sultan and the state through reorganizing sources of identification and allegiance, such as the *millet* system and nomadic tribes.[13] Legal reform was a main tactic in changing this system. This legal reform was exemplified by the dual decrees of the Tanzimat era, the Edict of Gülhane of 1839 (Hatt-ı Şerif), establishing a right to life and property for all subjects regardless of religious affiliation, and the Reform Edict of 1856 (Hatt-ı hümayun) establishing equality for all creeds in educational opportunity, access to justice, appointment to government and including an anti-defamation clause.[14] The Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869 reinforced the thrust of the Reform Edict, establishing citizenship definitions, delineating naturalization processes, and declaring legal equality for all subjects.[15] The constitution of 1876, though abrogated soon after its promulgation, established equality of representation based on an individual rather than corporate or millet system.[16] Lawmakers also attempted to settle nomads and undermine the coherence of tribal unity through changing administrative structures and land tenure systems via reforms such as the Land Law of 1858 and Provincial Reorganization in 1864.

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[13] The *millet* system was a method of social organization that devolved components of rule to the leadership and infrastructure of particular religious groups.

[14] Roderic Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," in *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 113-114.

[15] According to the law, residents were eligible for citizenship as long as they were not foreign citizens. Foreigners could acquire Ottoman citizenship following five years of residence. Campos describes the law as a response to the influx of refugees and an attempt to undermine the capitulations and protégée system. The law was not Pan-Islamic in intent, both because it established legal equality for all Ottoman citizens and because it "marked the boundary between Ottoman and non-Ottoman Muslims." Michelle U. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 62.

[16] Davison, "The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire" in *Essays*, 96-111.

Aside from legal changes and administrative reorganization, reformers sought to modify the population's loyalty and behavior through the application of assimilative policies such as education and religious reform. Various nineteenth and twentieth century states and other entities relied on education to spread official histories and centrally-sanctioned ideologies among their subjects and potential adherents, and educational and religious reforms were components in broader attempts to penetrate the provinces with the administrative power of the central state. Despite the difficulty of implementing change on the Ottoman periphery, educational and religious reforms generated new realms of state-subject interaction and were complementary components in the effort to cultivate state legitimacy and increase state presence in social life. Both religious and educational reform relied on the development of new administrative entities, the creation of unified systems and standardized practice, and statistical data to inform policy. Reforms in Quran schools and the separate school system for most elementary aged children encouraged state-sanctioned religious practice and ideology while extending the state school system to the provinces, and religion played an important role in the legitimizing efforts of state officials, particularly during the Hamidian period, which witnessed greater emphasis on the Sultan's role as caliph, overt celebrations of religious charity, and the incorporation of religious leaders into the state apparatus.[17]

Throughout the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods, reformers and social critics sought an answer to the question of what might unite disparate elements of society, and how to frame the identity of the state so as to create a more viable, cohesive, and productive social body. In

[17] Historians influenced by modernization and Westernization theories classically described education reforms as emergent steps on a path toward a secular, democratic society eventually realized by reforms in modern Turkey; however, religion and Islamic morality were inherent to the justification and actualization of educational reform. Fortna emphasizes "Islam was nevertheless critical to late Ottoman education despite the state's arrogation of many of the prerogatives of the religious establishment." He notes the importance of Islam in the structure of the school day and the state's educational message. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 22.

seeking to facilitate the creation of a loyal and dependable populace, reformers emphasized different shared characteristics, contributing to ideologies such as Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Turkism. Officials relied on changes in religious and non-religious education to encourage subjects' acquiescence to the presence of state and their identification with the unifying characteristics emphasized within these ideologies. Changing contexts and ruling styles signaled commensurate shifts in the parameters and popularity of these ideologies of cohesion and state legitimization. The changing demographics of the empire were one such contextual shift. Factors contributing to increased immigration were also those that threatened the territorial integrity of the state, and the fact that by the end of the nineteenth century migrants comprised one-third of the population of the Ottoman Empire encouraged reevaluations of unifying social characteristics. The development of Ottoman policies intended to incorporate newcomers were intrinsic to Ottoman efforts to foster legitimacy and belonging among its entire population.

In order to understand the general and particular in migrant groups' experiences within the assimilating state, it is instructive to first consider the broad outline of integrative efforts and outcomes of educational and religious reforms within the late Ottoman Empire. Three basic stages demarcate educational reforms in the Ottoman Empire: the pre-Tanzimat era, the Tanzimat, and the Hamidian period. The earlier period of reform arose following Ottoman defeats in the eighteenth century and coincided with the effort to increase military, administrative and financial power and reassert the primacy of the central state over provincial *ayans*. Traditional Quranic schools were seen as highly flawed institutions. Officials worried Muslim graduates were inadequately trained in science and foreign languages to successfully participate in professional military and civil administration schools. In response, Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) initiated an effort to create and improve state-run schools and open special institutes for the study

of medicine, military engineering, and officer training.[18] This era also marked a new effort to establish central administrative control over religion in the empire. These changes were limited; nevertheless, the reign of Mahmud II contributed to the growing belief that educational reform was essential for the empire's political and economic wellbeing.[19]

The mass migrations of the nineteenth century occurred primarily during the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods, when education increasingly expanded in conceptual importance from a tool to overcome Ottoman military and economic weakness to a strategy to increase central power and create loyal, productive subjects. Tanzimat reforms were largely framed via Ottomanism, or an identification with the state based on equality among religious creeds and linguistic groups. The Tanzimat-era understanding of social change and social organization led to the establishment of the legal groundwork and administrative apparatus for reforming existing schools and establishing new state institutions throughout the empire. Reformers began to institute educational administrative entities in the 1840s, and the Ministry of Public Education was established in 1857.[20] The Education Act of 1869 signaled the attempt to centralize the educational system into a coherent network of schools.[21] Among its significant changes were making primary education compulsory, establishing a standard curriculum and educational sequence, and determining teacher training programs in the capital.[22] As a general rule, the ambitious reform efforts of the Tanzimat took time to move from rhetoric and ideology to practical implementation. Despite the grand vision of the regulation, the establishment of primary schools and local educational councils remained dependent on local funds and interest,

[18] Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2, 47-48.
[19] Somel, *Modernization of Public Education*, 16.
[20] Ibid., 8.
[21] Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 113.
[22] Education Act of 1869, fully translated in Emine Ö. Evered, *Empire and Education under the Ottomans*, 205-246.

and shortages among certified teachers meant the same individuals who taught in Quran schools prior to the law remained in their positions.[23]

Tanzimat officials coupled administrative changes with specific measures intended to support the principles of Ottomanism while addressing the shortcomings of existing schooling, particularly for Muslim children. The Reform Edict of 1856 adopted the right of every religious community to establish its own schools. This measure supported religious equality but also contributed to the major expansion of non-Muslim, private, and foreign schools throughout the empire.[24] This expansion may have been an unintended consequence, given that Tanzimat reformers employed the establishment of inter-communal schools as a tactic to inspire shared identification with the state.[25] While encouraging Ottomanism in the form of mixed secondary schools, reformers also attempted to improve Quranic schools, which remained "the essential basis of Ottoman Muslim education and socialization" and served as preparation for entrance into the *rüşdiye* (advanced primary or secondary schools) system.[26] Tanzimat reformers had limited resources; nevertheless, the Sublime Porte did allocate funds to create schools in strategically important areas, a tactic maintained in the Hamidian period. Immigrants could fall into this category, and the Sublime Porte perceived the establishment of schools for migrants as a matter of importance, allocating funds from the Refugee Commission to build immigrant schools in the 1860s.[27] Despite focused efforts directed at particular communities, the material significance of the Tanzimat period was primarily in the creation of the legal and administrative foundation activated by the Hamidian state.

[23] Somel, *Modernization of Public Education*, 84-5.
[24] Ibid, 42.
[25] Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 103.
[26] Somel, *Modernization of Public Education*, 74.
[27] Ibid, 76.

Tanzimat reformers and intellectuals embraced Ottomanism as a route to cohering a diverse society, but this process did not displace Islam as an essential component of state identity and practice. Nor did Ottomanism signify a religion-blind understanding of the population. Islam remained influential in crafting Tanzimat policy and religious practice and symbol endured as essential organizing principles and components in state legitimacy.[28] Just as historians have traditionally downplayed the religious and traditional elements of Tanzimat reform in favor of a narrative of increased Westernization and reform, they have also overstated the rupture of the Hamidian period from the Tanzimat period. Despite the abrogation of the constitution and the different ruling style of the Sultan, the Hamidian period maintained continuity with the Tanzimat in terms of increasing the presence of the central state in the provinces. Many of the differences between the periods were changes in degree instead of changes in kind, marked by increased resources for schooling and increased efforts to facilitate the legibility and loyalty of the population. In terms of inspiring the loyalty of the population through spreading unifying ideals, the state's use of Ottomanism was tempered by a more self-conscious use of Islam to connect to Muslims at home and abroad in response to the empire's position in the post-1878 world.

The Hamidian era witnessed an explosion in school construction. The execution of the Hamidian educational agenda arose with a shift in the regime's approach to social belonging and state penetration.[29] In recent years, scholars of the Hamidian period have emphasized the

[28] Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript," *Die Welt des Islams*, 34.2 (Nov. 1994): 173-203. Campos notes that discourses of liberty, equality, and Ottomanism itself also took on religious symbolism in the cultural ferment following the reinstatement of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908. Muslim liberals endorsed the constitution as a reassertion of the inherent notions of justice and equality within Islam; Muslims and non-Muslims spoke of the "holy constitution" and referred to Macedonia as a sacred birthplace of the revolution; others emphasized the importance of martyrdom and other sacrifices for the Ottoman nation. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers,* 49-51; 77-79.

[29] Historians estimate over 10,000 schools were built during Abdülhamid's roughly thirty-year reign. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 99. Estimating literacy rates in the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic is a "thorny" historical problem given the heterogeneity of written language in the empire and regional, gender, and class differences. Though there are a number of conflicting estimates, it is likely that literacy remained below ten

regime's legitimacy crisis created, addressed, and aggravated through increased penetration of the state and competition for resources and legitimacy with other states and internally fissiparous elements. This crisis arose in response to changing Ottoman notions of governance, which transferred legitimacy from religious and other traditional sources to the state's ability to modernize and facilitate the welfare of its population.[30] Given this shift, Ottoman officials relied on a variety of tools to validate the role of the sultan both within the empire and abroad, ranging from emphasis on the Sultan's role as caliph to asserting the empire's status among the era's imperial states through civilizational rhetoric directed toward provincial groups.[31] Emphasis on Islam was a way to bolster the legitimacy of the Sultan, and Hamidian legitimation projects relied on mobilization of religious symbols and the Sultan's responsibility for aid projects for Muslim groups through circumcision ceremonies for the poor or support for Muslim migrants.[32] Educational and religious reforms remained essential routes to connecting state to subjects. As in earlier periods, European military and financial success were instigating factors in educational reform, but the success of non-state educational institutions and alternatives to state power in the provinces also prompted new efforts to build schools, "civilize" provincial groups, and bureaucratize religious learning and practice. The construction of schools was a response to internal competition for students, an incorporation tactic, an attempt to increase the taxability of the population, and a legitimization endeavor complementary to the regime's use of and attempts to bureaucratize religious symbols and practice.

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percent into the 1920s. Perhaps more important than the literacy rate itself is the fact these rates were rapidly rising in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Benjamin Fortna, *Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 20-21.

[30] Evered, *Empire and Education Under the Ottomans*, 8.

[31] See Selim Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45.2 (2003): 311-342, and Ussama Makdisi "Ottoman Orientalism," *The American Historical Review* 107.3 (2002): 768-796.

[32] For discussions of Hamidian uses of religious symbolism and charity for the purposes of legitimation, see Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domain* and Nadir Özbek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset, İktidar, ve Meşrutiyet 1876-1914* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002).

The Hamidian era also witnessed a self-conscious effort to employ Muslim identity to bolster state legitimacy and subject loyalty, even as the state persisted in the bureaucratization initiated by previous regimes. Prior to the Hamidian period, changes in religious administration created routes to increased revenues for the state, new knowledge about the population, and standardization of practice.[33] The abolition of the Janissary corps during the reign of Mahmud II allowed for increased responsibilities of the Ministry of Imperial Endowments and the Şeyhülislam.[34] The creation of a Ministry for Imperial Endowments shifted the collection of revenues from endowments to the central state and established mechanisms for certifying *medrese* teachers and determining the leadership of *waqfs* and Sufi lodges.[35] Although the traditional religious establishment gained some importance through these processes of bureaucratization, its influence declined as responsibilities traditionally exercised by the ulema – e.g. components of education, health, justice, and municipal administration – became the purview of the state.[36] For example, control over Sufi practice was increased through the creation in 1866 of the Assembly of Sheiks, which allowed the ulema control over the appointment of *tekke* leaders, increasing bureaucratization and rationalization of Sufi practice.[37] Centralization and administrative organization also allowed for data collection. During the Hamidian era, this prior incorporation of Sufi sheiks into the religious establishment encouraged their participation

[33] Brian Silverstein, "Sufism and Governmentality in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 29.2 (2009): 171-185.
[34] Following the abolition of the Janissaries, the Seyhulislam was awarded the former residence of the Aga of the Janissaries. Lewis, B.. "Bāb-i Mashīkhat." *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, et al. Brill Online, 2015. Reference. Michigan State University. 26 May 2015 <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/bab-i-mashikhat-SIM_0971>.
[35] The Ministry of Imperial Endowments existed after 1812. With the abolition of the Janissaries, it took over key properties and became an independent ministry. Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire*, 69-83.
[36] Amit notes that even though they lost these traditional responsibilities, the ulema were not a unified opposition against reform. Many participated in these trends and themselves engaged in questions over the role of religion in the reforming state. Bein Amit, *Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Republic: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). See Silverstein, "Sufism and Governmentality," for how Sufi sheiks were likewise invested in the processes of reform.
[37] Silverstein, "Sufism and Governmentality," 178, 184.

in registering the mobile populations traveling through dervish lodges and surveilling guests' behavior.[38]

Reliance on sheiks or other religious practitioners to facilitate control and legibility reflects the instrumental orientation of "state pan-Islamism", the use of Islamic symbols to encourage loyalty to the state and an attachment to the Muslim community within the empire and abroad.[39] Pan-Islamism occurred alongside Ottomanism, but emphasizing Muslim identity offered a route to cultivate loyalty and overcome potentially divergent identities. For example, in attempting to undermine the development of an ethnic or linguistically based movement among Muslim Albanians, local and central state officials relied on the construction of religious schools.[40] Even though Hamidian educational policy focused on the creation and funding of secondary schools rather than directing resources toward Quranic institutions, education and religious reform complemented each other. Officials cautiously deployed Islamism and religious education in response to local conditions, as with the use of traveling ulema in the province of Syria to provide education throughout the provinces in response to local concerns about missionary schools.[41]

In an effort to incorporate disparate groups into the centralizing state, officials made concessions to leaders and communities and framed their desired changes in subjects' behaviors in terms of modernity and civilization. Tribes, which presented an economic and political threat to the center through avoiding taxation, raiding settlements, extracting payment, and offering alternative sources of allegiance, were targets of reforms intended to increase loyalty to the

[38] Can, "Connecting People," 384, 397.
[39] The designation "state pan-Islam" is used by Adeeb Khalid to distinguish policy from "public Pan-Islam", or a "new form of affective solidarity that knitted Muslim elites together around the Ottoman state." Adeeb Khalid, "Pan-Islamism in practice: the Rhetoric of Muslim Unity and its Uses," in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, ed. Elisabeth Ozdalga (Oxford: Routledge-Curzon, 2005), 201-224. See also Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 223-240.
[40] Evered, *Empire and Education*, 37-67.
[41] Ibid., 125.

state.[42] Through awarding military power to certain leaders, the Ottoman state attempted to employ some tribes in order to subdue others.[43] Alongside the creation of tribal regiments, Sultan Abdul Hamid established the Aşiret Mektebi in 1892, a school for the sons of tribal chiefs, to facilitate tribal participation in the government and cultivate loyal local representatives.[44] Attempts to incorporate tribes combined education and religious schooling with infrastructural changes based on an understanding of progress that contrasted traditional nomadism with the modernizing center.[45] The Ottoman civilizing mission could be realized through education and through building clock towers, public transportation, and other structures, which increased the visible presence of the state and generated changes in temporal, spatial, and social organization.

Social engineering policies in the late Ottoman Empire were informed by belief in the state's ability to modify behavior to increase stability, population productivity, and loyalty, but the state's capacity to do so was dependent upon administrative organization and detailed population data. Given the limited financial and personnel resources of the Ottoman state, the decision to follow through with policy was influenced by local contexts such as concerns about the loyalty and status of specific groups. Far from a tactic directed exclusively or even primarily at non-Muslim groups, the inclusionary strategies of the state focused on Muslim groups whose social structure or ethno-linguistic characteristics threatened central power and the unification of a Muslim community. Because religion remained an important organizing principle, the intertwined tools of religious and educational reform remained at the forefront of the Ottoman effort to incorporate subjects.

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[42] Rogan, "Aşiret Mektebi," 84.
[43] Devolving power to tribal leaders on the periphery was an essential tactic in increasing tribal settlement. See Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire* and Klein, *The Margins of Empire*.
[44] Rogan, "Aşiret Mektebi, 83.
[45] Deringil, "They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery," and Makdisi "Ottoman Orientalism."

Immigration policy and assimilation measures directed toward migrants reflected the continuous importance of religious categorization throughout the era as well as the self-conscious use of religious identity and increased administrative power of the Hamidian state. As discussed in chapter one, immigration policy during the Tanzimat recognized population increase as important for state welfare. Even though welcoming refugees of all creeds was a moral responsibility for the state, the state's Islamic identity influenced the importance of serving as a refuge for Muslim immigrants, and, as with earlier episodes of "demographic warfare," Muslim migrants were seen as useful settlers in border areas.[46] Despite these continuities, the shift toward Pan-Islamism during the Hamidian Era influenced immigration policy. The 1877-1878 war was an important factor in convincing some leaders that the cohesion of the Muslim populace was essential to the future of the empire, and the threat of European intervention in areas with a large proportion of Christians lent migrants an important role in increasing the Muslim percentage of the population throughout Anatolia.[47] Alongside strategic settlement, the Ottoman state developed a less liberal immigration regime, and non-Muslim migrants, particularly in large numbers, were more frequently denied entry by the Ottoman state.[48]

Increasing the percentage of the Muslim population was not a sufficient answer to the question of how to encourage social cohesion and state legitimacy. The broader belief in the ability of the state to modify individual behavior through administrative organization informed

[46] Pinson, "Demographic Warfare," and Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonu."
[47] As I mention in Chapter One, this was a well-known policy within the bureaucracy by the 1880s. For example, in the village of Gemlik, near Bursa, in 1881, officials from Hüdavendigar Province noted that the Muslim population had fallen in response to the banditry and predations of the Greek population, leaving just eight to ten impoverished families. They suggested 150 orderly, well-mannered (*terbiyeli*) migrant households should be settled in the town. In another case from Muş, in Eastern Anatolia, officials noted the primary reason for settling migrants in the area would be to equalize the distribution of Christians and Muslims, as there were currently many more of the former. "…*Muhacirin-i İslamiyenin iskanından maksad-ı aslı Muş cihetlerinde İslame nisbeten Ermeni ahalisi pek ziyade olduğundan oralarca İslam iyle Hristiyan nüfus arasında husul-u müvazenat için mümkün olabileceği ve arazi-i haliye ve mahlulanin musa'id bulunabileceği kadar muhacirin-i İslamiyenin celb ve iskanı*..." BOA.İ.DH 1185.92756, 4 Zilkade 1307/22 June 1890.
[48] Kale, "Transforming an Empire," 252-271. This topic is discussed at greater length in Chapter One.

the use of settlement policy as the first and most important component in incorporating Muslim migrants in both the Tanzimat and Hamidian eras. Directives emphasized distributing migrants in a way that would reduce the burden for existing settled groups and undermine the development of coherent communities.[49] Tanzimat-era officials attempted to quickly disperse migrants from city centers, and the Ali Suavi incident, in which refugees from the Balkans participated in an attempted coup in the early years of the Hamidian regime, encouraged the continuation of this practice. In provincial areas, officials remained concerned about large gatherings of migrants, as seen in attempts to prevent group travel to a large Circassian wedding in Düzce in 1886.[50]

Settlement policies were largely preventative measures focused on achieving rural and urban stability, but officials also engaged in reactive and proactive attempts to cultivate loyalty and encourage migrant incorporation. Within the parameters of centrally generated policies, state actors engaged with migrant communities on a case-by-case basis. Certain groups and individuals within the immigrant population could become sources of concern, and even religion itself could appear threatening to the regime when it was characterized by egalitarian rhetoric or when movements coalesced around popular figures. Kemal Karpat argues Abdulmecid and Abdülhamid II were wary of the populist nature of the Nakşbandia-Muridiyya movement, which became particularly powerful as a proto-nationalist force in the Caucasus and rural Anatolia. Officials worried that the great crowds who gathered to welcome Sheik Shamil to Istanbul on his way to Mecca in 1869 could become anti-government and sent the celebrated figure on his

[49] For example, an imperial command from 1879 required maintaining a ten percent threshold for migrant households in villages and towns in Aydın Province. BOA.I.MMS 60.9, 8 Rebiyülevvel 1296/2 March 1879.
[50] BOA.DH.MKT 1374.78 28 Muharrem 1304/27 October 1886/BOA.DH.MKT 1375.54, 4 Safer 1304/2 November 1886. Preparations for the wedding included special transportation for the bride from Russia in order to prevent a large gathering of Circassians in İzmid or elsewhere. After arriving in İstanbul she would be transported by sea to a port near Düzce.

way.[51] Abdülhamid embraced some members of the Nakşbandia movement while exiling those who were too popular and threatened to "polarize immigrants into opposing religious groups and delay assimilation."[52]

Aside from the subversive potential of populist religious movements, migrant groups could threaten social order through banditry or other lawless behavior. Several communities arriving from the Caucasus became implicated in banditry, including the Circassians in the 1860s and the Georgians in the 1880s. The Circassians were notorious for brigandage and for attacking settled populations in the Balkans, and the Treaty of Berlin specifically noted Armenians in the Six Provinces should be protected from Kurds and Circassians by the Ottomans. At moments when migrant groups were blamed for violence and upheaval in the countryside, the importance of improving newcomers' conditions and providing education and religious infrastructure was heightened. State officials and migrant leaders conflated settlement, education, and civilization in developing a response to violence in the countryside. In a petition from 1870, more than 300 Circassian communal leaders brought together by *mirliva* (general) Musa Pasha addressed existing problems with banditry within the Circassian community near Sivas.[53] These leaders submitted a fifteen-article code describing how illegal behavior would be dealt with within the province and described brigandage as an outcome of the problems they continued to experience during the course of settlement.[54] The leaders, through Musa Pasha's intervention, emphasized

[51] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 33-40.
[52] Ibid., 113. Karpat notes in particular the case of Şeyh Ahmet Daghestani, a Caucasian immigrant of the Khalidi-Nakşbandia order, who attracted thousands of followers while living in Sivrihisar in Central Anatolia. The *şeyh* was exiled to Ankara and then Damascus. When he was too popular even in the latter city, he was returned to Istanbul where he could be more easily observed. See Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 111-112.
[53] I discuss different aspects of this petition in Chapter Two.
[54] BOA.I.MMS 36.1481, 12 Cemazeyilevvel 1285/31 August 1868. These problems included carelessness and negligence on the part of officials and the fact that many of the newcomers, having not been settled for three to four years, were forced into banditry. "*Memurın-ı mumaileyhuma tarafından i'tina ve dikkat olunmadığından...ve muhacirinin ekserisi üç dört seneden beri henüz iskan ve tatvin olunmamayarak şurayı burayı gezip dolaşmakta oldukları cihetle...bazı'ları sirkat etmeğe mecburiyyet hasıl eylemektedir...*" Document transliterated in Georgi

settlement issues and impoverished conditions as the source of lawlessness, and introduced the code through underlining its importance in producing education and discipline by bringing robbers and outlaws under control.[55]

Musa Pasha would continue to report to the state regarding the difficult conditions of the migrants. Two years later he submitted another petition emphasizing the importance of settling migrants efficiently and fairly. To a much greater extent than his previous petition submitted with the other Circassian leaders, Musa Pasha's 1870 appeal underlined connections between civilization and education and migrant troubles. A *talimatname* issued in response to Musa Pasha's petition took up the same language, noting that migrants had engaged in banditry and other illegal activities because of corruption in land apportionment and the related failure to take proper measures to eliminate nomadism and ignorance and to produce civilizational progress.[56] While settlement policy and land distribution remained the most important component in incorporating migrant populations, this *talimat* addressed concerns about civilizational shortcomings and lack of stability through an article requiring the effort to build educational and religious institutions in migrant villages.[57] This requirement would be reiterated in subsequent decrees, maintaining religious and educational infrastructure as an important subsidiary concern in creating stable migrant communities.

Chochiev, "XIX. Yüzyılın," 436. The migrants also noted that the maın culprits were two migrants and their followers, but that the action of these few bandits were ruining the rest of the group's reputation. "*…şu iki nefer nadan ve edebsizin yüzünden Anadolu kıt'asında aslsız olarak olunan rivayet bütün bütün namusumuza halel vermiştir*." Ibid., 437.

[55] BOA.I.MMS 36.1481, Chochiev, "XIX. Yüzyılın," 432. "*Sivas vilayet-i celilesinde bulunan 'umum muhacirin meyanesinde zuhur eden sarik ve şakilerinin taht-ı mazbutiyyete alınarak te'dib ve terbiyyelerine bi-lütf-i te'ala muvaffakıyyet hasıl olunmak üzere.* "*Tedib*" and "*terbiye*" have meanings related to both education/proper upbringing and discipline/punishing.

[56] BOA.I.MMS 38.1590, 26 Zilhicce 1286/29 March 1870. "*Anadolu kıtasının sevk olunan muhacirinin iskanları hususunda arazi taksiminde vukuabulan suistimalatın eseri olmak üzere ekser mahallede zayif halleri za'il olamadığı ve meluf oldukları tavur-u bedevviyet ve cehaleti izalesiyle medeniyetçe-i terakkiyat-i tedriciyyelerinin husula mudar olacak esbab ve tedabirin henüz layikiyle tesis edememesi dahi kıta' tarik ve serket mesellu vesail gayr-ı meşru-i maişete kesret inhimak ve teşebbüslerine sebeb olduğu tahkik ve istihbar kılınmıştır.*"

[57] Ibid. "*Muhacirin karyelerinde cevami' ve mekatib inşası ve mekteplere münasib mu'allımlar tayiniyle etfalin talim ve terbiyelerine teşebbüs ettirilmesi.*"

In both the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods, religion was an important organizing principle used to both divide and unite the population. Assimilative projects were predicated on cultivating and leveraging similarities among populations and an idealized Ottoman subject. Ottoman immigration and settlement policies reflected changing approaches to the question of what those similarities would be and how to promote them in order to create coherence and loyalty within the empire. Religious and educational reform were important tools in this effort, though facilitating settlement and addressing economic difficulties were principal to the state's attempt to incorporate migrants. Muslim identity was important not because it guaranteed loyalty or assimilation but rather because it served as a potential route to influence group coherence. Encouraging sanctioned religious practice was a tactic for both bureaucrats and some migrant leaders. Ottoman officials created policies intended to unify all or some of the population in loyal identification with the regime, and legal changes such as the Education Act of 1869 and evolving assimilation directives reflect attempts to form communities at an empire-wide level. Still, the course of reform was closely tied to local politics. The extension of resources and administration created new nodes of resistance and negotiation, and limited resources contributed to the importance of cajoling and coercing individuals and groups.

Incorporation through community building was necessarily a local process predicated on the belief that planned settlement and designed localities could create specific social outcomes. As seen in the petitions of Musa Pasha and other Circassian leaders, migrants and state officials shared this belief. Thus far, my focus on empire-wide and top-down modes of organization and social change has highlighted the importance of ideologies of social organization and state identity and international constraints. The next three sections of this chapter will consider repertoires, analyzing how state officials and migrants went about facilitating the creation of

local communities through registering settlement, allocating institutions, and financing social resources. Throughout this era, officials continued to define migrants and attempt to incorporate them via their religious identity, a strategy corresponding with migrants' own concerns about the coherence of their communities. Migrant incorporation relied on newcomers' acceptance of and participation in a hierarchical relationship with provincial administrations and the central state. Religious and educational institutions played an important role in facilitating incorporation and immigrant participation because these institutions were also a route through which migrants attempted to create and recreate communities in their new homes.

Locating Communities

The process of creating or recreating migrant communities depended on settlement outcomes. Despite numerous examples of migrant difficulties in settlement areas, prolonged refugee status in the provinces, and consequences such as migrant mobility or banditry, a significant number of migrants were ultimately settled in permanent locations in Anatolia. State documents about these successful settlements reveal an ideal repeatedly obtained: groups of migrants were settled, registered, and sought recognition through official routes to conduct daily business and receive resources. The Ottoman state used three different methods to distribute and settle migrants: individually placing migrant households within existing cities and towns, settling groups of migrant families within an existing city or town to create a new neighborhood, and creating new migrant villages through settling groups on available or "empty land" (*arazi-i haliye*).[58] Naming and registering new communities created as neighborhoods within existing towns and cities or as independent villages was an important component in realizing official

[58] Fuat Dündar, "Balkan Savaşı Sonrasında Kurulmaya Çalışılan Muhacir Köyleri," *Toplumsal Tarih* 14.82 (2000): 52.

recognition and an essential first step in migrant incorporation at both the community and individual family levels.

State officials' interest in cataloging migrant villages is clear from the inclusion of registration requirements in settlement directives and in the hundreds of documents from local administrators communicating new names to multiple ministries.[59] Registering village names achieved several important outcomes. First, this process increased central control over the provinces through amassing information, particularly information about the spatial distribution of the population. Second, registration signaled a change in status for migrants and migrant communities. Though migrants remained under the purview of the migration commission even after village registration, they were also incorporated into other administrative structures. For example, following the communication of the names, the villages were entered in the population registers (*nüfus sicilleri*) and the deeds of new landowners were entered into the property registers of the Office of Imperial Registers (*defter-i hakkani nezareti*). Issuing deeds and registering villages helped to render migrant settlements more permanent, signaling an end to their guest or temporary status.[60] Registration of villages happened at different intervals after migrant settlement, and sometimes prior to the completion of the construction of migrant homes; however, in cases in which migrants had been established in the area for several years prior, registration could signal the end of migrants' tax-exempt status.[61] A reduction in migrant

[59] Many of these notifications are available in the İrade-Dahiliye collection, though similar notifications of registration occur within the Şurayı Devlet and Yıldız Palace (Specifically BOA.Y.A.HUS – Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evraki, BOA.Y.MTV – Mütenevvi Maruzat Evraki, BOA.Y.A.RES – Sadaret Resmi Maruzatı).
[60] BOA.I.DH 1003.79235, 26 Zilhicce 1303/25 September 1886; BOA.Y.A.RES 121.26 19 Zilhicce 1320/19 March 1903.
[61] BOA.I.DH 1298.33, 3 Rebiyülevvel 1310/September 1892; BOA.I.DH 1300.11, December 1892; 1372.59 24 Zilkade 1317/March 1900; BOA.I.DH 1032.81278 1304 Şaban 7/May 1887; Registering migrants was also intended to indicate when they would be eligible for military conscription. Irregularity in the registration of a village near Adapazari meant that migrants who had been settled in the area for ten to fifteen years had not yet been entered into the population registers, even though they were registered to pay taxes. BOA.I.DH 1423.16, 9 Rebiyülahir 1322/June 1904.

mobility and change in status to taxpayer was valued to the extent that even migrants who had settled locations without permission were invited into this process in order to shift them from illegal and potentially impermanent settlements to taxable entities subject to regulation.[62]



Figure 12: Location of Hamidiye. Diagram showing distance from surrounding villages to the migrant village of Hamidiye, in Hüdavendigar. BOA.I.DH 1324.39, 8 Muharrem 1313/1 July 1895.

Registration of communities and individuals facilitated data collection about the migrant population. Though earlier regulations required the enumeration of migrants at various stages in their movement through the empire, attaching increasingly detailed information about new migrant villages during registration became a trend after the migrations of 1878. The first document of this kind in the Irade-i Dahiliye collection occurred in 1882. Providing this information along with registration requests streamlined data collection and reflected both increased effort and capacity of migration commissions and provincial administrations. In the

[62] BOA.I.DH 1300.11, 14 Cemaziyülevvel 1310/4 December 1892.

years following 1878, provincial officials were expected to describe the location of the new villages and did so in various ways ranging from brief explanation of a new village's direction and distance from kaza centers to rough diagrams of the same.[63] Eventually it became relatively common to provide detailed maps showing natural features and other settlements in the area.[64] Aside from describing village location, officials sometimes noted the number of migrant households, their points of origin, and their village of settlement. Increased attention to this sort of information reflected a change in the roles of administrators as well as the qualities of particular areas of settlement. The provision of detailed information and maps was more common in areas of intensive migrant placement, such as Biga, Hüdavendigar and Ankara, where the clustering of villages allowed officials to alert the central state of the layout of an entire area and register multiple new villages and the names under which they would be known. For example, a list from Aydın registers the name of twelve new migrant villages, two of which retained their former names.[65] Another list from Ankara contains the names of 26 migrant villages, ten of which had maintained the same names,[66] and a list from Biga registers the town names and populations of the 70 villages created for 21,577 individuals.[67]

[63] BOA.I.DH1321.39, 21 Şevval 1312/17 April 1895; BOA.I.DH 1336.29, 23 Safer 1314/3 August 1896; BOA.I.DH 1336.33, 27 Safer 1314/7 August 1896; 1356.48, 27 Rabiulahir 1316/14 September 1898.
[64] BOA.I.DH 1355.54, 10 Safer 1316/30 June 1898; BOA.I.DH 1362.33 5 Zilkade 1316; 17 March 1899; BOA.I.DH 1393.25 4 Zilkade 1319/12 February 1902; BOA.I.DH 1414.20 23 Rabiulevvel 1321/19 June 1903; BOA.I.DH 1411.33 19 Rabiulahir 1321/15 July 1903; BOA.I.DH 1416.26, 9 Ramazan 1321/29 Kasim 1903; BOA.I.DH 1408.24, 24 Muharrem 1324/20 March 1906.
[65] BOA.Y.A.RES 156.69, 22 Rabiulahir 1326/24 May 1908.
[66] BOA,Y.MTV 283.46, 7 Zilhicce 1323/February 1906.
[67] BOA.I.DH 1330.45, 20 Recep 1313/January 1896.



Figure 13: Borders and Physical Geography of Orhaniye. Village near Bursa, with twenty-three Rusçuk (Ruse, Bulgaria) and Silistra migrant households. BOA.I.DH 1428.8, 23 Rebiyülahir 1322/7 July 1904.

Aside from areas of intense migrant settlement, more detailed information on migrants' spatial distribution was provided for areas of strategic importance.[68] Increasingly detailed maps and blueprints allowed officials to match each migrant household with an intended structure and plot of land, and instructions indicated drawings and maps were essential to impose regularity on new villages.[69] Policies directed toward migrants reflected officials' broader interest in defining

[68] The maps showing migrant settlement around the Ankara-Eskişehir railroad are an example of this. See Figure 9 and Figure 10 in Chapter Two.

[69] For example, a series of instructions for the newly formed High Immigrant Commission, led by Sultan Abdülhamid, indicated that drawings and plans were necessary to regularize the streets and ensure houses were not only secure but suitable, inexpensive and nice looking. BOA.Y.A.RES 90.5, 2 Recep 1315/27 November 1897. "*Muhacirin için tahsis edilecek mahallerden yapılacak karyelerin esvakı muntazam ve tesis olunacak hanelerin*

and recording locations and characteristics of the population. This mission is clear in coinciding policies for migrants and tribes, whose new settlements were registered under the same format and law as migrant villages.

Though the benefits to state power of registering villages are clear, registration relied on migrants' utilization of incentives such as receiving deeds that accompanied registration. Even the process of naming villages existed within a matrix of incentivized participation. Migrants frequently named their new communities after Ottoman sultans, and the Anatolian countryside is dotted with Hamidiyes, Aziziyes, Mecidiyes, Osmaniyes, and Orhaniyes.[70] Choosing a sultan's name was frequent and traditional rather than required, and when they did not rely on sultanic inspiration, migrants choose names based on the existing names of their settlement location, their community leaders, local officials who had been helpful during settlement, and their former villages.[71] When migrants were responsible for choosing names, the choice of sultanic names may have been both a grateful recognition of the assistance migrants received as well as a pragmatic decision, given that registration was a route to seek other resources and that village names were reported to the central administration to receive verification that these names were "suitable" (*munasib*). Selecting a suitable name and succeeding in registering their village offered a route to stability, land ownership, and community resources.[72]

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hayvan muhafazasına dahi elverişli ve ehven ve latif al-manzara olmak üzere icap eden resim ve planları Komisyonu-i Alice tanzim olunacak."

[70] Mecdiye, a significant and early planned migrant settlement in modern Bulgaria, was named by officials rather than migrants, but migrants' participation in village naming is clear from some, though by no means all, of the registration notifications in the I.Dh collection. According to Nedim İpek, during the Tanzimat era some villages took the names of Tanzimat reformers, and during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) migrant villages also took *Meşrutiyet* (Constitutionalism) or *Hurriyet*.(Independence) as well as changed existing villages names from Hamidiye to *Meşrutiyet*. Nedim İpek, "Göçmen Köylerine Dair," 340.

[71] For example, the village of Akyeri retained its name after being settled by Georgian migrant and incorporated, and the village of Hayriye was named for the *kaymakam*, Mamud Hayri Bey. BOA.I.DH 1044.82058, 6 Zilkade 1304/27 July 1887; BOA.I.DH 1230.96327, 21 Zilkade 1308/28 June 1891.

[72] Multiple migrants in a village near Izmir submitted a petition to have their neighborhood recognized and receive the official seals for a *muhtar* and imam. BOA.I.DH 1035.81483, 24 Recep 1304/18 April 1887. "*121 hane inşa olunarak bir mahalle teşkil edildiğinden bahisle mahalle-i mezkurenin Ali Bey mahallesine namiyle yad edilmesi ve*

One incentive for registering villages was the permission to establish local administration and participate in provincial politics. Administrative reorganization during the Tanzimat created more opportunities for local, elected representation in government. The *muhtar*, or headman, and local councils (*ihtiyar meclisi*) were elected and took on some of the tasks of appointed officials. Some historians have dismissed the significance of these offices, particularly the local councils. The councils were mostly advisory in nature, had intricate electoral policies, and were frequently unsuccessful in facilitating Christian representation, and so for some observers, the councils signaled the failure of the project of representative government in the late empire.[73] Others have evaluated the success of these institutions in terms of a primary goal of the era: furthering Ottoman central control over the provinces. Establishing *muhtar*s and councils at various levels of provincial administration increased governmental control through expanding the role of local administration and encouraging participation among the provincial population. For example, in his research on the Tanzimat reforms in the Danube Province, Milen Petrov argues provincial and local councils offered an important route to state participation for Bulgarian elites, encouraging their belief in the Tanzimat system and diverting potential interest in the Bulgarian national movement by recasting them as actors in the Ottoman government. Bulgarian participation in the councils affirmed the state as the "legitimate venue for addressing grievances and advancing communal goals."[74] Like Danubian Bulgarians, some migrant leaders embraced the potential for influence within Ottoman bureaucracy. As Oktay Özel's discussion of "migration politics" in Ordu suggests, the utilization of this "legitimate venue" encouraged Georgian immigrant nobility to engage in a struggle for political power in Trabzon through

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lazım gelen imam ve muhtar mühürlerinin hak muhacirin tarafından müteadid mühür ve imza iyle verilen arzuhalde istida olunmuş"; Registering villages was also a route to avoiding land disputes between migrants and other communities. See BOA.I.DH 1060.83169, 2 Muharrem 1305/20 September 1887.

[73] Petrov cites Davison, *Reform*, as a proponent of this view. Milen V. Petrov, "*Tanzimat* for the Countryside," 97.

[74] Ibid., 235.

filling civilian, military and fiscal administrative roles. One goal of this administrative infiltration was migrants' influence in land distribution and administrative reorganization.[75] Özel's findings show that among other factors, the political context within areas in which migrants settled had significant outcomes during the course of settlement and confirms that migrants recognized and attempted to manipulate the political options presented by the extension of administration in the provinces.

Local administration was essential for both stability and representation. Local knowledge was an essential component in efforts to surveil migrant populations. The *muhtar*'s positions included responsibilities intended to curb unanticipated movement within the countryside, including collecting information for the issuing of travel passes and verifying travel papers for visitors, vouching for newcomers, and registering all inhabitants and informing the Defter Nazırı.[76] Migrant leaders also viewed the muhtar as a stabilizing entity in the provinces, and in Sivas they explicitly emphasized the importance of appointing a muhtar in all migrant neighborhoods and villages to prevent banditry.[77] The office served as liaison with central administration in the province, and communicated individual and community grievances to the state. The muhtar served longer terms and could ostensibly maintain closer relationships with communities than appointed officials. As elected officials, the muhtar and local council members served as important go-betweens and representatives for migrant communities, and frequently, though not always, reduced corruption in the provinces. Local councils were also a route to participate in the broader politics of the provinces, as the vetting process for candidates to the

[75] Oktay Özel, "Migration and Power Politics," 482-483. In this case, migrants clearly bought into the utility of participation in state administration, but their presence in local politics became a destabilizing force in the region, as the Georgian notables clashed with existing landowners and communities.
[76] Musa Çadırcı, "Türkiye'de Muhtarlık Teşkilatının Kurulması Üzerine bir İnceleme," *Belleten* 34.135 (1970), 413-414.
[77] BOA.I.MMS 36.1481. Cited in Chochiev, "XIX. Yüzyılın."

more central councils went through the village council.[78] Registration yielded access to religious as well as civil administration, since villages gained permission to appoint imams once they received official recognition.

Migrants' requests to register villages are not included with the registration itself, and so their role as a driving force behind registration is not clear. Nevertheless, sources from this collection indicate migrants recognized and valued the connection between registering their villages and establishing local administration to the point that they did submit registration petitions to regional offices.[79] Thus, when multiple individuals near Izmir signed a petition requesting permission to appoint a muhtar and imam in their newly named community of one hundred migrants, they might have done so with the hope that establishing these offices would facilitate their ability to articulate other claims to state administration and legitimize local religious practice.[80] Registering villages operated on the twin policies of acquiring legibility and encouraging loyalty among the provincial migrant population. Through facilitating migrants' entry into local, provincial and central administration, incorporation was a tactic that advanced migrants' ability to gain permission and funds to build community institutions.

Structuring Communities

Registering and locating migrant villages were not sufficient steps within the broader assimilationist model of the Tanzimat and Hamidian eras, nor were migrants content with just deeds for their land parcels and participation in local government. Indeed, both state officials and

[78] Petrov, "*Tanzimat* for the Countryside," 95.
[79] Migrants in Kırk Kilise requested seals for a *muhtar* after determining their village name. BOA.I.DH 1039.81719, 4 Şevval 1304/26 June 1887. Laws required villages to receive the seals for migrants and imams upon registration, and so registration notices included phrases such as "in order to appoint individuals as muhtars and members of the local council," ("*bu mahallenin muhtar ve ihtiyar zatları tayin kılnmak üzere*") and noted migrants' "right" (*hak*) to these seals. BOA.I.DH 1000.79050, 9 Zilkade 1303/9 August 1886.
[80] BOA.I.DH 1035.81483, 28 Ramazan 1304/20 June 1887.

migrants shared a concern over the construction of religious and educational institutions in new neighborhoods and villages as a component of community building. Registering villages combined knowledge-driven and engagement-driven tactics of incorporation by merging data gathering with migrant participation in local government through the *muhtar* and *meclis*. Providing educational and religious buildings for migrants likewise relied on both strategies. On the part of state officials, an interest in institutions reflected larger trends in conceiving the design of the urban fabric as a top-down route to change, although as with other components of policy, these projects occurred with participation and via complication and amendment by local communities. For migrants, access to these resources represented important routes to maintaining communal coherence and creating paths to other resources gained via education.

During the nineteenth century, state officials viewed the process of planning neighborhoods as a route to incorporation and social change for migrants and other communities. Evolving efforts to organize space in cities and elsewhere influenced attempts to design migrant settlements. Zeynep Çelik's well-known analysis of nineteenth century Istanbul describes efforts to rebuild areas of the city with fireproof materials and wider, regularized streets.[81] A series of building regulations attempted to standardize the distance of buildings from streets in Istanbul, though material changes in urban form proceeded at a much slower pace than legislative and planning efforts.[82] Whereas in Istanbul and other existing urban areas city planners waited for fires to clear communities and allow for planned projects, building new villages and cities in the provinces offered more freedom to execute plans. As Kemal Karpat has noted, the construction of Mecidiye in Dobruca in 1856 relied on a plan stipulating the width of roads, the dimensions of the market, and designating the locations and functions for other components of the urban

[81] Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul*.
[82] Murat Gül and Richard Lamb, "Mapping, Regularizing and Modernizing Ottoman Istanbul: Aspects of the Genesis of the 1839 Development Policy," *Urban History* 31.3 (2004): 435.

landscape.[83] Settling migrants and tribes created other opportunities to plan cities on previously uninhabited land, as Yasemin Avcı has described for the desert town of Beersheba in 1899.[84] In locations where building and designing were ways to facilitate rule, establish commercial centers, and increase state revenue, new buildings associated with the government, such as secondary schools, hospitals, courts and administrative offices became a part of the provincial landscape. Still, communal institutions such as mosques remained essential. The decision to build a mosque in Mecidiye and Beersheba occurred early in the planning of each city.[85]

Planned communities and plans for migrant communities became more common in the Hamidian era. Following the Balkan Wars, the Immigrant Commission published blueprints establishing what migrant settlements should look like and distributed guidelines for founding migrant settlements to the provinces.[86] An 1897 regulation in response to migrations from Crete required that newly established villages submit blueprints to the central Immigrant Commission.[87] The plans provided for the construction of migrant villages during this period generally designate space for constructing the village mosque, school, and fountain, reinforcing the policy of requiring their construction in all newly established migrant villages and the ongoing importance of migrants' Muslim identity in state-migrant interaction.[88] While maps such as the one of the Ankara-Eskisehir railroad focus on population distribution, diagrams of individual villages focus on organizing space on a local scale.

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[83] Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism," 214-216.
[84] Yasemin Avci, "The Application of the *Tanzimat* in the Desert: The Bedouins and the Creation of a New Town in Southern Palestine (1860-1914)," *Middle East Studies* 45.6 (2009), 969-983.
[85] Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism," 216. The state treasury covered all expenses for the mosque and school in Mecidiye. Avci, "Tanzimat in the Desert," 978.
[86] Dündar, "Balkan Savaşı Sonrasında Kurulmaya Çalışılan Muhacir Köyleri," 52-54.
[87] Mehmet Yılmaz, "XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti'nin Muhacirin İskan Politikası," *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi* 5: Toplum (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1996): 596.
[88] BOA.I.DH 1364.5 5 Muharrem 1317; May 1899; See also BOA.PLK.P 6502 (1901) (Figures 5 and 6 in Chapter 2).



Figure 14: Plan: Migrant Village near Pazarköy. Blocks in the center indicate migrant housing. Space on the left side of the map shows a cemetery and a square for the mosque, fountain, and school. The accompanying report devoted as much space to describing the need for and location of necessary communal spaces as it did indicating the layout of the village, road, and houses and the distribution of water. Y.MTV 205.91, 23 Teşrinievvel 1313/4 November 1897.

Policies establishing the obligation to build institutions reflected both trends in broader assimilative efforts and specific directives for the building of migrant villages. The 1869 Educational decree required that there be a primary school (*sıbyan*) in every village and district or every other village and district, while secondary schools (*rüşdiye*) were to be built in each

town with more than 500 households.[89] The directive requiring a *mescid* and *mekteb* be established in all new migrant villages was issued no later than an 1870 instruction and reiterated in subsequent directives.[90] As noted above, the initial policy arose in response to an investigation of migrant settlement and conditions in 1870, which was itself prompted by a summarized petition from a Circassian leader, Musa Pasha, who emphasized problems in settlement as contributing to the instability of migrant settlement regions. The ensuing investigation engaged in how to meet migrants' religious and civilizational needs.

Decrees issued in 1870,1878, and 1888 did not demarcate a required size of migrant communities to necessitate their entitlement to religious and educational institutions, but prior to 1870 this expectation was in place, as in 1868, a community of thirty-five migrant households in a neighborhood within Kepsut *kaza* in Karesi (Balikşehir) cited several reasons they should be eligible for a mescid and mekteb despite an existing imperial order mandating the building of a mescid and mosque in areas comprised of more than fifty households.[91] Subsequent directives dropped any language to this effect, and in 1892, Circassian migrants in Eskisehir requested a mosque for their thirty-household village without specifically acknowledging the size of their population as a deterrent to building.[92] Still, numbers were used to justify the building of these institutions, and villages with 100 or more migrant households emphasized their size in their

[89] Articles 3 and 18 from Evered's translation of the Education Act of 1869. Evered, *Empire and Education*, 210. Article 34 also stipulated that *idadiye* schools would be established in towns with populations numbering more than 1,000 households.
[90] The 1870 Talimatname is cited in Georgi Chochiev, "XIX. Yüzyılın," 421. Subsequent iterations include: BOA.I.MMS 59.2786, 2 Şevval 1295/1 August 1878; BOA.Y.PRK 2.93, 29 Zilhicce 1305/6 September 1888; BOA.Y.PRK 2.92, Article 31: "*Muhacirin-i merkumenin kâffesinin mutlaka kura-yı kadimeye veyahut müceddeden insa olunacak köylere yerleştirilmeleri lazım gelmeyip şehir ve kasaba kenar ve civarlarında hâli arazi olduğu halde oralarda muhacir iskân ve îvâ ve başlıca yapılan köylerde birer mescid ve birer mekteb inşâ kılınacaktır*."
[91] BOA.A.MKT.MHM 427.38. 9 Cemaziyülevvel 1285/24 August 1868.
[92] BEO 102.7580, 28 Rebiyülevvel 1310/18 October 1892.

requests through 1900.[93] Whether according to the requirement of the Education Act of 1869 or migrant-specific directives, policies of building religious institutions and primary schools did not immediately yield results, leading migrants to petition for permission and funds to receive these institutions.

Migrants' acknowledgement of population restrictions while requesting institutions was part of a larger trend of seeking permission and assistance in the building of schools and mosques alongside and soon after official incorporation.[94] Unfortunately, the petitions themselves are harder to find than the state response to those requests, and frequently migrants' stated interests are available only as summaries. Still, these summaries and the bureaucratic correspondence initiated by migrant petitions often reveal the basic terms through which migrants coded their entreaties. These requests reveal migrants' stake in community institutions, underline their participation in official avenues of state policy, and highlight the ways in which the success of incorporation was highly dependent on migrant communities themselves. Migrant petitioners usually made two arguments. First, they argued that the building of a mosque or school was essential and required for the community. Through scribal mediators and in interdepartmental summaries of petitions, migrants emphasized religious duties and even civilizational concerns to support their appeals. The simple request for a place to conduct obligatory prayer (*eda-yi salat*) appeared in some petitions,[95] while others emphasized both this need and their concerns about children's access to religious education.[96] For example, a petition from Süleyman bin Ibrahim in Hüdavendigar sent to the sultan emphasized migrants' prayer on

[93] BOA.I.DH 1043.82014, 26 Zilkade 1304/16 August 1887; BOA.MF.MKT 397.30 7 Muharrem 1316/28 May 1898, BOA.DH.MKT 2393.69 26 Rebiyülahir 1318/23 August 1900.
[94] BOA.I.DH 1312.51 28 Ramazan 1311/4 April 1894.
[95] BOA.I.DH 1090.85465, 6 Zilkade 1305/15 July 1888; BOA.DH.MKT 1656.95, 8 Muharrem 1307/4 September 1889; BOA.I.MMS 108.4644 16 Muharrem 1307/12 September 1889.
[96] BOA.I.EV 9.76, 19 Zilhicce 1312/13 June 1895.

Friday and religious holidays as essential to practice and relied on the image of ignorant children to underline the necessity of the institutions.[97] A community of Abaza migrants in Karesi represented by an Imam Süleyman likewise noted the need for a mescid and mekteb. The response from the Şuray-ı Devlet described the necessity of fulfilling this request to obtain religion and civilization for migrants.[98]

Aside from religious and civilizational concerns, migrants proved their savvy understanding of administrators' approaches through addressing the limitations of available institutions. Distance and environmental factors limited migrants' access to already existing mosques and schools in nearby towns. A key element in requesting the permission to build these institutions was an emphasis on the remoteness of a particular community. Remoteness may have been considered a fundamental requirement in construction, since state responses often entailed an investigation confirming the circumstances migrants described. For example, the decision to build a mosque for migrants in small villages in Eskisehir province confirmed that individuals in at least one village had to travel three to four hours to perform their prayers.[99] Migrants cited distance as a key concern, but also described ways in which winter or climatic factors compounded existing problems.[100] A frequent, and likely accurate, obstacle was the flooding of inter-village roads during the winter months or the difficulties of traveling through the swampy areas where migrants had been settled.[101]

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[97] BOA.DH.MKT 2393.69 26 Rebiyülahir 1318/23 August 1900. "*...yüz yirmi hane İvraça* (located in contemporary Bulgaria) *muhacirler iskan olunarak karye teşkil eylemiş olduğu halde henüz cami-i şerif ve mekteb yapılmamasıyla ahali salat-ul-eid ve cumaye edevat ve çocukları tahsil-i ilim ve ma'rifetten mahrum bulundukları beyanına orada bir cami-i şerif ve bir mekteb inşası istidasına dair ahali merkumadan Süleyman bin İbrahim imzasıyla huzur-i ali-i sadaret-penahiye bil-takdim tevdi buyurulan arzuhal leffen irsal kılındı.*"
[98] BOA.A.MKT.MHM 427.38, 7 Şaban 1286/23 November 1868.
[99] BOA.BEO 102.7580, 16 Rebiyülahir 1310/7 November 1892.
[100] BOA.A.MKT.MHM 427.38, 7 Şevval 1285/23 November 1868; BOA.DH.MKT 261.83, 13 Muharrem 1312/17 June 1894; BOA.DH.MKT 2009.92, 20 Rebiyülevvel 1310/12 October 1892.
[101] BOA.BEO 32.2343, 18 Zilhicce 1309/14 July 1892.

The tendency to rely on the language of religious obligation was not unique to migrants, and other communities petitioned the state in similar terms. As with many components of the Tanzimat and Hamidian era reforms, local communities were expected to contribute to or cover entirely the cost of building and maintaining new institutions.[102] Primary schools were the financial responsibility of the villages where they were found, while funds for regions of strategic interest and secondary schools were distributed by the central state with money collected via an education contribution tax on agricultural yield beginning in 1884.[103] In her work on education during the Hamidian era, Evered argues that local requests for institutions caged in religious or civilizational terms reflected both genuine religious concern and a strategic mobilization of the competitive view officials held of Muslim schools. Local actors hoped to retain taxes and other resources in their area through emphasizing the tenuous conditions of the Muslim population there, and requests issue both from a desire to keep resources close and actual concerns coded in religious terms about the course of the community.[104] Given the competitive atmosphere and concerns about the future of the Muslim religious and political community in the empire, these requests fell on sympathetic ears.

State officials viewed migrants and other subjects in terms of Muslim identity and assumed that facilitating sanctioned religious practice would yield social stability. As seen with Musa Pasha's petition, at times migrant leaders agreed with this perspective, lending their requests for institutions a particular urgency. Migrants emphasized the importance of their

[102] As noted in Chapter One, local communities were expected to house migrants and facilitate their settlement in regions where they were settled. Another example of this localizing of the cost of infrastructure is the use of local labor and money in road building and bridge building in Bulgaria under Midhat Pasa. Individual communities were often charged with building and maintaining transportation infrastructure. See Petrov, "*Tanzimat* for the Countryside," 135-139.
[103] Somel, *Modernization of Education*, 139.
[104] Evered, *Empire and Education*, 56-58.

religious identity, recognizing it as a useful route to connecting with the state.[105] Both migrants and state officials representing them could underline the newcomers' history of being forced from their lands and seeking refuge in the empire as Muslims. Official directives allowing migrant entry or addressing settlement issues emphasized the religious component to the migrations, for example noting, "all of the migrant peoples, as required by religion, left their countries and abodes and took refuge under the protective shade of the justice and mercy of the Ottoman government."[106] The fact that migrants faced oppression and moved for religious reasons required Ottoman interest. An official plan issued in 1887 began with the moral responsibility of the state, noting that honoring the immigration requests of the Muslims of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia was "regarded as a sacred duty," as for the Muslims "to remain under the rule of the Bulgarian government was not possible within the requirements of Islam."[107] Provincial officials adopted this language when forwarding migrant requests for religious and educational institutions to the center. The Vali of Hüdavendigar sent a general description of migrant conditions in Adapazari. He summarized the perspectives of the Abkaz, Circassian and Rumelian migrant leaders, noting they had likewise sought the protection of the Sultan after migrating from their homelands. Though they had been settled and received housing, they were deprived of a mosque for their prayers and a school for their children's education,

[105] For Caucasian or Crimean migrants, doing so was in line with their previous relationship to the Russian state, in which religious terms were the ways in which individuals interacted with state structure. See Meyer, "Speaking Sharia to the State."
[106] BOA.I.MMS 38.1590. "*Akvam-i muhacirinin cümlesi bir mukteza-i diyanet vatan ve mevalarını terk iyle sultanat-i seniyyenin zir-i saye-i merhamet ve adaletine iltica etmiş*."
[107] BOA.Y.A.HUS 198.69, 26 Rebiyülahir 1304/22 January 1887. "*Bulgaristan ve şarkı Rumeli ahali-i Muslimesi ötedenberi ve hususuyla bu son zamanlarda gördükleri tazyikat ve taadiyat tehemmül edemeyip sair vilayat-i şahane'ye hicretlerine müsaade buyurulmak için peyderpey arzuhaller takdim eylemekte ve mahfuziyet can ve malları temin kılınması bile Bulgarlar hükumeti altında kalmak hasb-u-islamiye mümkün olamayacağı katien beyan etmekte olduklarından ahvan-i İslamiye iktizasınca ahali-i merkumanın işbu istidalarını nazar-i dikkat ve i'tibar olmak bir vazifa-i mukaddestir.*"

leaving the people in a state of ignorance and misery.[108] Through juxtaposing the ongoing injustice of migrants' spiritual deprivation with their gratitude for the Sultan's previous religious protection, officials highlighted migrants' dependence on the Sultan's graces and his responsibility as a protector.

Religious identity may have been an ideal idiom for conversing with the central state, but it was not necessarily a factor in reducing social boundaries between groups. Migrants requested mosques to maintain communities, and in areas where migrants were several hours distant from existing institutions, the religiosity of their claims is likely. However, in cases in which the distance migrants might have travelled to religious institutions was not as significant, migrant requests for institutions may communicate attempts to ground the identity of their neighborhood and to retain community insularity. In both urban and rural environments mosques and schools could have served as spiritual "melting pots" in areas with ethnically diverse Muslim populations, but this was not an inevitable outcome. One petition writer specifically reinforced the problem of an overflowing stream by citing existing quarrels regarding land boundaries between neighboring Circassian and Nogay village as a reason the Circassians could not be expected to attend the mosque with the Nogays.[109]

The role of schools and religious education was important enough that even migrants settled irregularly would request their provision. For example, a dispute between residents of Sarıyer, an Istanbul suburb located along the Bosporus, and a migrant community in the area revolved around the legality of migrants' settlement near or on a graveyard. The issue arose with the migrants' request to build a school, even though their previous attempt to do so had been

[108] BOA.I.DH 1043.82014, 26 Zilkade 1304/16 August 1887. "*...evlad ve 'iyallarını barındıracak surette birer hane inşa ve emr-i iskanları icra buyurulmuş isede ifa-i salat-ı mefruza için cami ve mescidleri ve atfallarına talim mesail-i diniyye için mektebleri bulunmadığından bir hal-i cehalet ve sefalet içinde kaldıklarını...*"
[109] BOA.A.MKT.MHM 427.38, 7 Şaban 1286/23 November 1868.

denied by the state.[110] The resistance to this migrant presence was articulated through a petition sent by one of the prior residents of the area, Reşid Pasha, and in response the migrants were denied permission to build the school and asked to leave the area, though the migrants remained in the area for at least five more years during the course of legal battles.[111] Despite the fact that they had moved into the area illegally, had previous requests for a school denied, and were at odds with both residents and local administration, the migrants attempted to solidify their position in the neighborhood through renewing their request.

Financing Religious Communities Near and Far

Instructions issued in 1870, 1878, and 1888 legally required the establishment of schools and religious facilities for migrants, and the delivering of seals to an imam alongside incorporation reinforced the importance of religion in creating new communities. Despite the steps taken on paper to provide religious or educational infrastructure, migrant petitions and bureaucratic responses focused on the question of how this infrastructure was to be funded, revealing a lack of uniformity or success in actualizing reform. Given the legal requirements, official response to migrant petitions rarely denied their claims of necessity, especially once migrants' assertions of distance or difficulty traveling were verified. Instead, bureaucratic correspondence focused on which entity should be responsible for covering expenses. This debate reflects the financial limitations of the Tanzimat and Hamidian state that contributed to failures in attempts to develop a standardized religious and educational infrastructure and to activate identification with a broader Ottoman subject hood. Moreover, the distribution of resources based on categorizations like migrant or Muslim reinforced the importance of that

[110] BOA.DH.MKT 772/40, 11 Recep 1321/3 October 1903.
[111] BOA.ŞD 750/14(2), 17 Muharrem 1306/23 September 1888.

identity or categorization in future interactions between the state and the community. Debates regarding funding reveal a lack of consistent administrative planning and ambiguity about the institutional responsibility for newly constructed migrant villages. Given the lack of administrative uniformity, cases of successful financing of infrastructure notionally and bureaucratically preserved migrants' outsider and group status.

Issuing migrants deeds, approving the appointment of local administration in the shape of a *muhtar* and local council, and entering families into tax registers offered a route to transfer immigrant communities from the purview of entities within migration administration to jurisdictions within a centralized and hierarchical bureaucratic system. The Immigrant Commission and its later iterations were most essential in organizing the initial stages of immigrant arrival and settlement and providing aid to newcomers. As seen earlier in this chapter, both state officials and migrant leaders viewed settlement and employment as primary factors in achieving stable migrant communities, while religious and educational institutions remained secondary concerns. The relative importance of these tasks was detailed in state directives describing migrant administration's responsibilities and organization. When included in directives, requirements to build mosques and institutions comprised only one item within a larger list focused on funding and settlement tasks. Despite the prominence of these specialized responsibilities, during its early years, a certain portion of the Commission's funds were allocated to cover the cost of schools and religious buildings, though it did not have enough money to cover all religious needs for new migrant communities.[112] By the 1880s, the Immigrant Commission was no longer responsible for structures or aid of this kind. In 1887, the migration administration explicitly noted that the building of mosques was to fall on the donations of individuals in the community and rely on migrants' labor, as these costs were not included in the

[112] Somel, *Modernization of Education*, 76.

general funds apportioned for migrants.[113] Despite avoiding direct responsibility for funding institutions, migrant administration did remain a conduit for requesting financial assistance in migrant villages. In 1902/1903, the High Muslim Immigrant Commission (*Muhacirin-i Islamiye Komisyonu-u Alisi*) requested that the treasury assist in covering wood and building materials for a migrant village that could not meet the 4,275 piaster cost for mosque and school.[114]

Emphasis on the responsibility of communities as the source of funds for infrastructure was in keeping with the era. As noted previously, officials delegated the costs of many components of the Tanzimat and Hamidian structural changes to local communities. For example, costs associated with transferring and housing migrants were apportioned to surrounding villages. As they did for the general population, regulations specified that either wealthy members from among the migrants or public-minded individuals from nearby non-migrant communities should meet the costs of mosques, schools, fountains and other community infrastructure. Alongside local capital, migrants were to provide free labor to assist in construction, and their taxes could be diverted as another resource.[115] This option worked only when migrants had become liable for taxes and their taxes were sufficient to cover the cost of infrastructure.[116] Limited funds could necessitate scaling back potential projects. Officials responding to requests for a mosque and mekteb in several Batumi migrant villages determined the accumulated revenues from two years of taxes and the use of local labor would provide the community with a sufficient structure, even though the anticipated taxes amounted to less than

[113] DH.MKT 1411.6 (1887).
[114] BOA.A.MKT.MHM 521.13, 1320/1902.
[115] BOA.BEO 32.2343, 18 Zilhicce 1309/14 July 1892.
[116] Relying on migrant taxes indicated that the community had been settled for several years without receiving the institutions to which they were entitled. The amount of time migrants were free from taxation varied throughout the period, but during the Hamidian era it was only three years, meaning administrators would have to wait at least four years for any significant amount of migrant tax to accrue. BOA.Y.PRK.KOM 1.26 (1878).

one-sixth the projected cost of the initial proposal.[117] Relying on local capital, labor, and infrastructure remained the first resort for funding.

Aside from taxes and local labor, rich migrants were able to establish at least some religious and educational institutions with their own funds. Hasan Yuksel's investigation of *vakıf* (endowment) records reveals that Caucasian migrants established 119 *vakıf* from 1880 to 1912. The first was established within three years of migrant settlement. These endowments were overwhelmingly religious rather than educational in their primary function, concentrated in Western Anatolia, and located in villages rather than cities. His data show none of the endowments were established in Eastern Turkey, which suggests wealthier Caucasians generally managed to avoid harsher settlement areas.[118] The participation of wealthy community members in the creation of *vakıf*s persisted in other migrant groups. For example, in 1892, Haci Ahmed Edendi, a migrant from Tirnova, contributed money to ensure the completion of a mosque and mekteb in his village of Selimiye in Bursa, and in 1900, after the settlement of 120 migrant households from Bulgaria in a village in Hüdavendigar, local benefactors applied for permission to contribute to the founding of a mosque and mekteb.[119] Wealthy migrants could also become impatient with the bureaucracy, as indicated by a petition sent from a migrant named Mustafa in Ertuğrul Sancak in Hüdavendigar. Mustafa requested assistance in providing village mosques, and noted that thus far the people of the area had worked to build mosques in migrant villages without ever receiving assistance from the state.[120]

[117] BOA.BEO 12.887, 5 Zilkade 1309/1 June 1892.
[118] Hasan Yüksel, "Kafkas Göçmen Vakıfları", *Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* 5: 1994, 475-90. His data show 95% of *vakif*s were religious in function, while 5% were educational.
[119] BOA.BEO 44.3254, 10 Muharrem 1310/4 August 1892. BOA.DH.MKT 2393.69, 26 Rebiyülahir 1318/23 August 1900.
[120] BOA.I.MMS 108.4644, 14 R 1307/8 December 1889.

Even as local capital remained the best option for the state, bureaucrats were willing to divert funds to assist communities in need of schools but lacking the funds themselves. Because local communities were expected to fund their own religious and educational facilities, each request for a mosque or school was treated individually. As these cases moved through the bureaucracy, migrants were maintained as special communities with particular needs and characteristics. Rather than funneling migrants successfully into an integrated Education Ministry, Ministry of Imperial Endowments, or Treasury responsible for funding and administering all components of the empire's educational policy or religious institutions, migrants, particularly those in newly built (*mecdedden*) villages, remained a distinct category.

Since bureaucratic entities were called upon to pay for structures in specific cases rather than as a general rule, requests for assistance often bounced between several ministries and the provincial administration. The route to payment remained unclear, and even precedents established in particular provinces did not translate to wider policy. Options included the Ministries of Imperial Endowments, Education, Finances, and combinations of the three.[121] Other institutions were financed via special funds within the treasury, including the Sultan's Privy Purse.[122] For example, in 1892, a mosque and school established for Circassian migrants in Tarsus were named after and funded by the Sultan's assistance.[123] Sometimes provincial administrations were unable to access central funds. Twenty-two thousand piasters required for the establishment of necessary mosques and mekteps in Edirne was not available from the provincial fund or from the state treasury. The request bounced through the Financial Ministry and the Ministry of Imperial Foundations, which eschewed responsibility for newly constructed

[121] BOA.I.DH 628.43699, 15 Cemaziyülevvel 1287/13 August 1870; BEO 20.1462, 20 Zilkade 1309/16 June 1892; BOA.BEO 658.49302 28 Muharrem 1313/ 21 July 1895.
[122] BOA.Y.MTV 230.148, 25 Safer 1320/3 June 1902.
[123] BOA.BEO 40.2969, 4 Muharem1310/29 July 1892.

migrant religious foundations. Finally, financial responsibility returned to the provincial administration.[124]

Migrants' special status arose not only from a lack of clarity in administrative instructions but also in the international agreements related to migration. In another case from Hüdavendigar, administrators noted that the directives for settling migrants dictated the necessity of providing mosques and schools in newly established migrant villages, but emphasized that this directive did not clearly delineate where the funds for these new establishments were to be found. Likewise, in the new village of Hayriye in Inegol Sancak, revenues from the areas' existing endowments were not sufficient to fund new structures, and the treasury, treasury of endowments, and Privy Purse were unable to provide the funds due to economic difficulties. Since these resources were unavailable, officials hoped to access another source: the revenues from property exchange in Macedonia following the Treaty of Berlin. The Berlin Treaty established a mixed commission responsible for determining the outcome of private and public property, and the instructions to the Ottoman representative delineated how property was to be redistributed following the Ottoman exit.[125] According to these instructions, in villages that had lost their Muslim populations to emigration, the mosques, mektebs, and other institutions related to the Islamic community were to be destroyed. After demolition, the rubble (and land) from these institutions would be sold, and the profits distributed for the establishment of similar institutions among needy communities in the Ottoman Empire. While this offered a tidy solution

[124] BOA.DH.MKT 202.15. c. 1311/1894

[125] Article 30: Musulmans or others possessing property in the territory annexed to Montenegro, and who would rather take up their residence beyond the Principality, may retain their lands, either by letting them or allowing them to be managed by third parties. No one shall be bereft of his landed property except for the public interest, on good and legal cause shown, and after previous indemnification. A Turko-Montenegrin Commission shall be appointed to regulate within three years all matters connected with the mode of transfer, management, or use on account of the Sublime Porte, of State property, religious foundations (vakauf), as well as all questions relative to the interests of private persons thereby affected. The Treaty of Berlin established a similar policy for Serbia, and allowed Ottomans to dispose of government and military property in Bulgaria and protected Muslims' property and religious foundations in Bulgaria.

for funding new migrant communities and deploying those funds for their intended religious purposes, it is unclear whether the money was ever collected and accounted for as intended, since five years had passed since the original treaty and Hüdavendigar Province was still unable to access money.[126]

Migrants were also treated as a specific case because their subject hood and loyalties were uncertain. Migrants sent requests for official recognition of their mosques and school because each was to be registered officially, and provincial officials submitted blueprints of proposed mosques and schools to the central government. A case from Elma Alaki (?), a village in Hüdavendigar Province, reveals that despite the eagerness to have the burden of establishing mosques and schools covered by locals or others, Ottoman officials were interested in controlling these financial sources and the messages individuals might hear within them. Even when funds were available within the community, not all requests were immediately welcomed, and a seemingly unusual request for permission to build a mosque in Elma Alaki raised a red flag among Ottoman bureaucrats. Yeci Bey, a Dagistani migrant living in Istanbul, sent the request. Both his distance from the location of the intended mosque and his Russian subject hood struck officials as suspicious. An inspector was dispatched to investigate Yeci Bey's situation, the duration of his Russian citizenship, and his "purpose" (*maksad*) for erecting the mosque. Further investigation revealed that Yeci Bey resided as a renter in a house in the Istanbul neighborhood of Coğaloğlu. Yeci Bey had recently hosted a wealthy Dagestani migrant from the village of Elmaalaki, who had sought medical treatment in Istanbul for roughly a month. The wealthy patient had no children, and he had attempted to establish the foundation prior to his death. Since he was unsuccessful, Yeci Bey was charged with completing the project. Yeci Bey remained a

[126] BOA.ŞD 108.3, 1 Cemaziyülevvel 1301/28 February 11884; BOA.MF.MKT 85.20, 21 Muharrem 1302/10 November 1884.

Russian subject, and he planned to travel to his homeland soon. However, once he finished selling off his former holdings, he would resolve the issue, presumably by renouncing his previous status and becoming an Ottoman subject.[127]

While the mosque building in Elma Alani (?) and its benefactor speak to local community building tactics, they also reveal the importance of regional networks and empire-wide communities. The investigator recorded detailed information about Yeci Bey, but the report reveals neither the origins nor the name of the deceased benefactor. Given this lack of information, it is difficult to know how the men became close enough for the deceased to reside with Yeci for a month and to designate Yeci executor of his wealth. The decision to appoint Yeci Bey, rather than an individual from Elma Alani, to build the mosque and control the revenues of its associated properties, indicates a class-based network rather than a village-based connection. Yeci Bey's Russian citizenship was a grave issue for Ottoman authorities concerned about the designs of an Istanbul newcomer establishing a religious institution in a migrant village. Their investigation into his status revealed he maintained property in Russia and benefitted from relative ease of movement between the two states. The relative mobility among wealthy Dagestanis would have encouraged ties between new Ottoman subjects and their relatives and countrymen who remained in the Russian Empire.[128]

If Dagistani migrants, even ones who maintained their Russian citizenship, had been in the habit of sponsoring endowments in disparate villages, surely the state would not have launched a detailed investigation of Yeci Bey. Still, the sending of money over long distance to establish and maintain religious institutions was not limited to the small village Elma Alani. The

[127] BOA.A.MKT.MHM 530.13, 29 Rebiyülahir 1324/22 June 1906.
[128] Immigrant return, ongoing movement, and existing networks between the empires has recently received scholarly attention. James Meyer reflects on these "trans-imperial" individuals and their cross-border networks in *Turks Across Empires: Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian-Ottoman Borderlands, 1856-1914.*

story of the Mir Hamza Nigari Mosque (now known as Şirvanlı Mosque) in Amasya, underlines the presence of a trans-imperial Muslim Dagistani community. Mir Hamza, born in either 1805 or 1815 in contemporary Azerbaijan, was a Naqshbandi Sufi. His religious and militant life carried him from the Caucasus to North Eastern Anatolia. He fought with the Ottomans during the 1877-1878 war, and then spent time in Erzurum, Istanbul, Amasya, and Harput.[129] When Mir Hamza died in Harput in 1886, his body was transferred to Amasya in accordance with his will and installed in a tomb attached to a mosque sharing his name. The structure was completed and functioning by 1889, but the community encountered trouble covering its costs in 1893. Mir Hamza's followers in Dagistan had raised 4,000 lira to cover the worker and student salaries of the twenty room medrese, but the Russian government prevented the passage of this money to the mosque itself. Members of Amasya's provincial council noted that due to lack of funds, the students and personnel would have to disperse and the school and mosque would be closed. Faced with the difficulty of having a well-known religious figure's mosque and tomb fall into ruin and emphasizing the important role the mosque served in the community, the provincial council and the Governor of Sivas Province requested 15,000 piasters from the Imperial Treasury to cover the institution's yearly fixed costs.[130]

[129] Tahsin Yazi, "Hamza Nigari," in *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, XI/6, 648-649; available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hamza-nigari (accessed 10 June, 2015).
[130] BOA.Y.MTV 81.88 9 Safer 1311/22 August 1893.

Figure 15: Mir Hamza Mosque and Tomb. Amasya, c. 1893.

The financial implications of funding religious and educational infrastructure reveal several tactics officials and migrants used in gaining resources and potential stability for communities. The central government's financial constraints curbed the success of standardizing the process of erecting these institutions. Once migrants had established housing and economic

viability, their dependency on the Migrant Commission should have shifted to other bureaucratic divisions. Confusion about the entity responsible for covering required community institutions ensured these institutions would not be built in areas with fewer resources and representation to the center. This confusion also maintained migrants in a realm of indeterminate jurisdiction, which reinforced their special status. Rather than being incorporated into a standardized administrative structure, the category of migrant maintained its specific resonance in material ways, reinforcing bureaucratically and among communities this important distinction. Given financial limitations, local capital and labor were essential to extending infrastructure. Migrant benefactors and others could take an active role in establishing institutions, though officials attempted to maintain control over revenue streams, land usage, and institutional design through requiring building registration, plans, and expense sheets. Community building tactics were never entirely local, both because they functioned within larger ideologies and constraints and because participants maintained connections outside their immediate vicinities. Attempts to finance new buildings not only reveal migrant participation in local community building but also highlight fault lines within intended communities and possibilities of trans-empire ethnic and religious communities.

Conclusion

Policies directed at seeming outsiders reveal interests and definitions at play in defining insiders. In a state attempting to create loyal, productive populations, the policies directed at immigrants were broadly similar to those directed toward communities that had been in the empire long-term and groups that shared characteristics with the ruling identity of the state. Officials employed these points of commonality to encourage the creation and modification of

communities. Religion was one such point of commonality. A simplistic view of religious identity and migrant incorporation uses religion as a mode of analysis rather than recognizing it as a dynamic, involved, and ongoing component in defining and creating groups. Exploring the importance of religion and related educational efforts in the Ottoman Empire reveals that though religion was important, it was not on its own the cause of migrant incorporation. As a point of commonality activated by officials and others, its use was conditioned by ideological factors and the position of the Ottoman state in terms of relative power and status as the sole Muslim power within Europe. These factors encouraged the related tactics of religion and educational reform, which influenced the distribution of resources and population, affected incorporation strategies, and established a particular vocabulary for engaging with state. Evaluating this process of resource distribution and material change reveals that religion did not necessarily yield affiliation with broader communities, nor even fully incorporate migrants as an undifferentiated component of a Muslim or Ottoman society.

Officials and migrants recognized religion as an agent of change instead of a static descriptor. This is not to suggest that individuals only engaged instrumentally with religion. Religious identity was a framework for understanding and engaging in conflicts with and among states and a potential coping mechanism, and faith and practice were essential to daily life. Nevertheless, social categories conditioned the creation and maintenance of communities and engagement with official channels. In this context, religious faith, practice, and identity were components of larger efforts to achieve stable settlement. Officials and migrants believed this stability could be created through providing institutions and organizing space. These two perspectives – that religion was a tool to facilitate community creation and that stable communities could be maintained through planning and exerting control over space – is why

looking at the material creation of religious and educational institutions is important. Creating these material changes was about situating migrants within communities, within networks, and within states and empires.

The community building model I used in this chapter was useful in connecting interrelated factors on the local, state, and trans-imperial levels and in emphasizing how spatial organization was an inherent component of migrant integration efforts. Organizing local community building in terms of ideologies, constraints, and tactics offers a holistic approach to considering how state ideology, affected by international conditions, can be filtered through local circumstances and stakeholders. Making these connections also reveals how assimilation, while frequently associated with minority or migrant communities, was a broader process engaging all components of societies during an era of state-building. Community building has a metaphorical aspect, but it is a material process regardless of whether it takes place in international, state, or local arenas. Creating new communities was a practice tied to spatial organization and infrastructure; considerations of migrant incorporation in the Ottoman Empire should engage with this question of space, organization, and territory even in considering assimilative efforts like extending mosques and schools. Doing so assists in shifting understandings of incorporation explained by categories like religion to exploring how those categories themselves are activated to create and modify social groups.

CONCLUSION

In the six decades following the Crimean war, more than three million migrants arrived in Anatolia. Alongside this movement of Muslims into the Ottoman Empire, Christian populations increasingly moved or were forced from their homes. A century of constant warfare, the maneuverings of the Russian Empire and other European Powers in light of the Eastern Question, the development of nationalist movements agitating for independence, and forced migration itself were essential in transforming the heterogeneous empire into the nation-states that followed it. These same factors encouraged reforms within the empire. Leaders sought to address the empire's economic, military, and political limitations by consolidating the power of the central state, and reform increased the bureaucratic presence of the state in the lives of its subjects. These changes were essential to the institutional and infrastructural framework of the nation-states that emerged from the empire.

In this dissertation, I have evaluated Ottoman migration administration from 1856 to 1908, focusing particularly on the aftermaths of two episodes of mass migration within this period, that of Crimean Tatars and Circassians in in the early 1860s, and the flight of Muslims from the Balkans and Caucasus following the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman War. I analyzed attempts to organize migrant placement and incorporation through the lens of governmentality. In terms of sources, I relied on policy directives, official reports, and plans for migrant villages to evaluate Ottoman migration and settlement regimes. Officials' concerns about the productivity and welfare of the population contributed to their attempts to coordinate movement, use migrants as tools in state security and economic development, and collect information about the newcomers. Where possible, I enhanced my evaluation of state policy by analyzing immigrant

petitions. Ottoman officials mediated the vocabulary, phrasing, structure, and availability of petitions and petition summaries. Their responses to immigrant petitions provide further insight into how obstacles or articulations of failure contributed to changes in migration and settlement policy.

Applying governmentality, as with any framework, requires adapting it to the circumstances of a particular historical case. Some historians have dismissed the utility of analyzing changing Ottoman governance by emphasizing the limited implementation of reform.[1] In many cases, migration and settlement policies were aspirational rather than actualized. Financial, infrastructural, and personnel restraints meant that the expansion of migration administration required participation on the part of subjects, and individuals and groups were able to mobilize emerging governmental techniques to assert their own goals. Local interests, foreign observers, and the climate itself were factors in the articulation and enactment of migration and settlement regimes. Nevertheless, migration administration offers an important lens to analyze officials' concerns with population welfare and the techniques they developed to encourage subjects' productivity and identification with the state. Though not all efforts to manage migration were actualized, attempts to know the population, control mobility, and distribute resources contributed to the increased presence of the central state in the lives of its subjects. I described Ottoman efforts to regulate mobility and arrange space in four chapters.

In Chapter One, I analyzed the population politics, institutional history, and organizing principles of migration administration following the creation of the Immigrant Commission in 1860. The creation of the commission signaled a shift from localized responses to immigration to the attempt to manage migration on an empire-wide scale. After analyzing state directives, I argued migration administration increased the institutional presence of the state through a

[1] Blumi, *Ottoman Refugees*.

network of provincial and central offices. Likewise, the act of provisioning migrants signaled the presence of the state in provincial life through requiring local populations to cover expenditures and housing for newcomers. The effort to organize immigration and settlement established tiers of migrant assistance, splitting the migrant community into categories based on age, sex, and occupation. The Immigrant Commission thus signaled a new conception of population within the empire, the development of institutions intended to assess migration as a component in organizing the population, and the attempt to understand migrants as legible objects. Budgetary constraints limited the extent to which migration administration could function as an independent and continual component of the Ottoman bureaucracy and the effectiveness with which it could apply those organizational initiatives. Despite the institutional instability of the Immigrant Commission, its organizational structure and founding directives provide a lens to consider administrators' responsibilities and goals.

In Chapter Two, I analyzed the development of grids of specification used to locate migrants in imperial space. I argued that immigrant settlement contributed to the larger project of land reform, which was intended to increase taxation and security through rendering the population more legible. I analyzed factors contributing to the emergence of migrant classifications and suggested the development of categorizations reflected migrant needs and local concerns as well as state interests in agricultural productivity and economic development. The category of "empty land" became a powerful tool in settling migrants. By describing land as empty and placing migrants within it, officials were able to remove alternate claims to access particular spaces. In this way, migrants and others were positioned within legible sites. Organizing migrants at the level of the village or home was intended to incorporate newcomers as productive rural subjects. While officials increased their capacity to arrange placement, I

found some evidence of ways in which migrants and others participated in the process of settlement: local officials collected the data necessary to "know" the territory and the population; non-migrants attempted to register land prior to migrant arrival; and migrants and others contested claims to land.

In Chapter Three, I evaluated migrant health and environment as factors influencing immigrant arrival and settlement experiences. I considered how health regimes were important in controlling movement and enacting specific ideas about order on urban and rural spaces. I also highlighted factors influencing those regimes that were external to state institutions. These external factors included environmental and climactic characteristics and international politics. Health and disease were factors conditioning migrant mobility, and health and environmental discourses became important components of migrant, official, and non-migrant groups' use of space. Environment and climate affected migrants' reactions to settlement spaces. Newcomers could seek resettlement by framing requests in terms of environmental challenges, though doing so ceded to the state the right to determine their movement.

In the final chapter, I employed the concept of "community building" to analyze religion as a factor in migrant incorporation. During the nineteenth century, state assimilative efforts included extending the infrastructure of modern, state-run schools throughout the empire. I examined how migrants participated in registering their villages, requesting religious and educational infrastructure, and contributing monetary resources for the establishment of mosques and schools. I argued that religion, though it remained an important route in categorizing and managing the population, did not exclusively forward the creation of an undifferentiated Muslim or Turkish community. Migrants were treated as distinct groups, maintained trans-imperial

connections, and found in religion a way to maintain particular communities vis-à-vis other migrant or non-migrant groups.

Historians have described an essential change emerging from the large-scale migrations as one of assimilation and restructuring, emphasizing that the state was successful in "Turkifying" migrants.[2] As ongoing episodes of tension among religious and ethnic minorities within Turkey reveal, the supposed homogeneity of the Turkish Republic has functioned as an often-violent goal rather than a political reality. Rather than Turkification, I have considered how and why officials attempted to make migrants legible subjects. More research is necessary to evaluate assimilative policies encouraged migrants to articulate an emerging identification with the state, a topic which could further enrich historian's assessment of the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods. To the extent that my work addressed migrant incorporation, I suggest that there is evidence of a merging of interests and vocabularies among various actors within changing ideologies of the nature of state and society. Officials and other Ottoman subjects contested, complicated, and engaged with new realms of state-society interaction brought about by migrant settlement. The ways in which Ottomans grappled with new types of power indicates that the boundaries between state and society are more permeable than their oppositional positioning might suggest. As other historians have begun to show, changes in Ottoman governance were filtered through and refracted from existing and emerging social hierarchies.[3]

There are other essential components immigrants' experiences that did not find their way into this dissertation. Several historians have offered important methods for asserting Ottoman immigrants' agency and influence. Studies narrower in scale bring individual migrant experiences to life and narrate the local effects of migrants' incorporation into district life and

[2] Cuthell, "Muhacirin Komisyonu," 17.
[3] For discussions of how individuals in the provinces activated the rhetoric of Ottoman reform to access affect local politics, see Petrov, "Tanzimat for the Countryside," and Saraçoğlu, "Letters from Vidin."

politics, while global analyses insert migrants and the Ottoman Empire itself into historiographical debates on the development and spread of finance capitalism.[4] Further research will reveal how categories of age, class, origin, and sex indicated in administrative directives influenced newcomers' experiences within the Ottoman Empire. I stressed themes of migrant settlement, health, and education because they were associated with major reforms of the period; there are other promising routes to linking migration to the developing central state. Historians have connected migrant settlement to the empire's agricultural development, but to what extent were officials successful in distributing animals and tools? Likewise, Muslim migrants were viewed as potential military conscripts. Did the influx of migrants affect military reform?[5] Migrant leaders and officials linked criminality and banditry to improper settlement and lack of work. To what extent did migrants contribute to unrest in the countryside or contribute to the development of national separatism in the Balkans? To what extent did the influx of migrants influence institutions such as prisons?[6]

A deeper analysis of gender would further highlight characteristics of Ottoman governmentality and better assess migrant experience. Three promising routes to incorporating gender as a point of analysis are direct engagement with women's voices via petitions, closer analysis of gendered distribution of aid, and evaluation of the slave trade. More directly addressing gender would illuminate new sources and provide another way to analyze those I did access. Though petitions from migrant women are fewer in number than those written by migrant men, women's voices and concerns emerge in requests for housing and educational opportunities

[4] See Özel, "Migration and Power Politics," and Blumi, *Ottoman Refugees*.
[5] Khaled Fahmy's work on the Egyptian army shows its affect as a disciplinary institution that contributed to transformations among soliders, conscripts, and peasants. See Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt* (New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2002).
[6] Kent Schull has recently argued that the creation of modern prisons was connected to Ottoman state construction. Kent Schull, *Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire*.

for their children. Beyond incorporating women's concerns into the body of the dissertation, a deeper reading of aid and employment policies, such as those of the Turkish Compassionate Fund, would bring to light gendered views of work and humanitarianism promoted and shared by European and Ottoman observers.[7] The topic of slavery would likewise enrich my perspective on the international dimensions of migrant issues. Despite the banning of the slave trade within the Ottoman Empire in the mid-nineteenth century, slaveholding persisted. Female slaves were central in questions of Ottoman sovereignty and the social order within the Tanzimat era and beyond.[8] Furthermore, the enslavement of Circassian women became a component of emerging Circassian ethnic consciousness in the twentieth century.[9] Enslavement of women is a factor in patterns of forced migrations within the region and worldwide.

This dissertation places migration and migration administration at the forefront of historical change in the late Ottoman Empire. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries bore witness to the slow contraction and ultimate demise of the Ottoman Empire, which left in its wake a cluster of newly formed states. Forced migrations emerged throughout the period as symptoms of, complications to, and catalysts in the formation of nation-states and their imperial predecessors. Migration regimes function within broader attempts to intervene in the lives of

[7] Keith Watenpaugh's analysis of the League of Nations response to the Armenian Genocide offers a useful framework for analyzing the intersection of gender and foreign aid. Keith Watenpaugh, "The League of Nations' Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920-1927," *The American Historical Review* 115.5 (2010): 1315-1339.

[8] Madeline C. Zilfi, *Women and slavery in the late Ottoman Empire: The Design of Difference* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Circassians in particular were famous in the Ottoman Empire and European representations of the harem. Especially during nineteenth century abolition movements, Westerners frequently coupled their titillating commentary of the alluring Oriental woman with abhorrence to the idea that parents sold their young children into slavery. During the Circassion-Russian Wars in the 1860s, newspaper articles published in the United States and Great Britain celebrated the independent spirit of the noble Circassian mountaineers while wondering at their ability to enslave their daughters. See, for example, "The War in Circassia." *The Charleston Mercury* 27, February 1862, 4.

[9] Setenay Nil Doğan, "From National Humiliation to Difference: The Image of the Circassian Beauty in the Discourses of Circassian Diaspora Nationalism," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 42 (Spring 2010): 77-102. Elmas Zeynep Arslan, "Circassian Organizations in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1923" (Master's Thesis. Boğaziçi University 2008). Mehmet Fetgerey Şuenu, *Osmanlı Alem-i İçtimaisinde Çerkes Kadınları: Çerkeslik, Türklük* (İstanbul: Zafaret Matbaası, 1914).

citizens and subjects and facilitate identification with the state. A history of migration administration and changing migration regimes provides a lens to discern broader patterns of how state powers are formulated and executed via relationships with those on the margins.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: FIGURE 2 DATA AND METHOD



Figure 16: Methodology for Figure 2. Referenced tables below.

Table 5: Register: Immigrant Population. Ottoman population register from 1861 showing a total of 255,414 migrants and their settlement provinces. Over 60% of migrants were in the European provinces (Danube and Rumelia). The Anatolian provinces of Sivas, Adana, Konya and Hüdavendigar received the greatest number of migrants. The total number of migrants (255,414) is slightly higher than that provided by historians for the same time frame. This total is included in Table 6.[10]

Location	Population	Households	Percentage of Migrant Population
Danube Coast	142,852	34,344	56%
Rumelia (European Provinces)			
Edirne	10,289	2,445	
Selanik	4,421	768	
Total Rumelia	14,710	3,213	6%
Anatolia			
Hüdavendigar (Bursa)	15,173	2,882	
Aydın	4,837	1,079	
Ankara	9,342	1,282	
Kastamonu	4,375	798	
Konya	17,173	3,520	
Sivas	20,731	2,411	
Erzurum	3,975	1,062	
Trabzon	58	7	
Adana	19,918	1,769	
Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid	741		
Damascus	33	10	
Total Anatolia	97,852	15,255	38%
Total (all three locations)	255,414	52,812	

[10] BOA.I.DH 486.32799, 19 Safer 1278/26 August 1861.

Table 6: Estimates of Immigrant Numbers. I compiled varying estimates of migrations from multiple secondary sources to determine rough approximations for each period. Determining exact aggregates for migrant numbers proved impossible for this era. Migrants arriving over land borders were not systematically counted. Other factors, such as double counting as migrants moved from port city to port city and return and circular migrations likewise present obstacles to establishing aggregate arrivals or to tabulating how many refugees lived through their first year. In general the estimates listed in this table are based on piecemeal consular reports and various Russian and Ottoman state documents, such as the one cited in Table 5.

Date	Number of Migrants (Origin)	Source (Page Number)
1854-1860	141,667	Eren (66)
1855-1862	210,000-230,000	Pinson (55)
1856-1862	100,000 (Caucasus)	Pinson (99)
1856-1863	311,333	Saydam (91)
1858-1866	470,000 (Caucasus)	Pinson(122)
1859-1879	1,500,000 (Caucasus)	Karpat (69)
1860	130,000-140,000	Pinson (55)
1860-1861	255,414	BOA I.DH 486.32799
1860-1862	252,067	Pinson (67)
1860-1862	200,000	Pinson (55)
1860-1862	227,361	Eren (66)
1862-1865	300,000-400,000	Pinson (99)
1863-1864	320,000-330,000 (Caucasus)	Pinson (122)
1863-1864	283,000	Saydam (91)
1864-1864	657,068	Karpat (68)
1864-1864	595,000	Karpat (67)
1864-1865	87,000	Saydam (91)
1867	16,000*	Saydam (89)
1872-1874	1,200-1,600*	Saydam (90)
1877-1879	515,000 (Rumelia)	McCarthy (90)
1877-1879	70,000 (Caucasus)	McCarthy (339)
1877-1879	1,230,000	Ipek (41)
1881-1914	500,000 (Caucasus)	Karpat (67-70)
1883	200,000*	Ipek (150)
1886	7,500*	Ipek (150)
1886-1887	13,305	Ipek (152)
1891-1892	22,220	Ipek (152)
1893-1902	72,524	Karpat (75)
1893-1902	72,000 (Bulgaria)	Kocacik (141)
1895	4,000*	Karpat (70)
1897-1898	5,829	Ipek (153)

Table 6 (cont'd)

1899-1900	395,353	Karpat (70)
1908-1913	440,000	Ipek (154)
1912-1920	413,922	McCarthy (161)
1923-1980	500,000	Ipek (154)

* Original number provided in households. I used a multiplier of 4 to render overall population.

Table 7: Generated Estimates by Year. The aim of Figure 2 was to visualize changes in migration administration alongside numbers of arriving refugees, and the data has several flaws. Y values were based on estimates from contradicting secondary sources. In order to plot dates as ranges, I averaged sums for the period in question and used that figure as a y value for each year. Migration was not uniform within years much less across them. Gaps in the line represent years for which I had no available data (NA), though immigration certainly continued during these years.

Date	Estimate
1855	20,000
1856	20,000
1857	20,000
1858	20,000
1859	20,000
1860	83,000
1861	83,000
1862	83,000
1863	200,000
1864	500,000
1865	90,000
1866	6,000
1867	16,000
1868-1872	NA
1872	500
1873	500
1874	500
1875-1876	NA
1877	302,500
1878	302,500
1879	302,500
1880-1882	NA
1883	75,000
1884	75,000

Table 7 (cont'd)

1885	NA
1886	10,000
1887	10,000
1888-1890	NA
1891	11,000
1892	11,000
1893	7,000
1894	7,000
1895	7,000
1896	7,000
1897	7,000
1898	7,000
1899	200,000
1900	200,000
1901	7,000
1902	7,000
1903	7,000
1904-1907	NA
1908	73,000
1909	73,000
1910	73,000
1911	73,000
1912	73,000
1913	73,000
1914	60,000
1915	60,000
1916	60,000
1917	60,000
1918	60,000
1919	60,000
1920	60,000

Table 8: Migrant Institutions and Their Characteristics, 1860-1920. Information represented in Figure 2.

Date	Name	Status
1860-1865	Muhacirin Komisyonu	State Institution, independent
1866-1875	Muhacirin Idaresi	Tied to Supreme Council, other functions attached to Police and Justice Ministries
1875-1878	No formal, independent institution	Functions attached to Police Ministry
1878-1894	Idare-i Umumiyye-i Muhacirin Komisyonu	State Institution, independent
1877-1878	Iane-i Muhacirin Encumeni/Muhacirine Muavenet Cemiyeti	Attached to Yıldız Palace administration
1877- ?	Muhacirin-i Iane Komisyonu	Attached to Şehremaneti
1878-1879	International Committee for Migrant Assistance	Non-governmental organization
1878-1890s	Turkish Compassionate Fund	Non-governmental organization. Refugee relief work during 1878-1879, extant as employment agency/business through 1890s
1897- ?	Muhacirin Komisyonu-i Alisi (becomes Muhacirin-i Islamiye Komisyonu in 1905)	State Institution, independent - headed by Sultan Abdülhamid II
1911	Trablusgarp ve Bingazi Mültecilerine Mahsus Komisyon	Emergency Commission
1911-Present	Ottoman/Turkish Red Crescent	Non-governmental organization (with close ties to state)
1914-1922	Iskan-ı Aşairin ve Muhacirin Muduriyeti (changes status during War of Independence)	Attached to Interior and then subsumed into Sihhat ve Ictimai Muavenet Vekaleti

APPENDIX B: SAMPLE REGISTER



Figure 17: Example Register of Migrant Types, Danube Province. I.MMS 133.5690.

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- Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi

İradeler
- İrade Dahiliye
- İrade Evkaf
- İrade Meclis-i Mahsus
- İrade Melis-i Vala
- İrade Şura-yı Devlet

Meclis-i Vala Evrakı

Muhacirin Ayniyat Defteri

Plan-Proje-Kroki

Sadaret
- Sadaret Mektubi Mühimme Kalemi Evraki
- Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Nezaret ve Devair Evrakı
- Sadaret Mektubi Umum Vilayet Evrakı

Şura-yı Devlet Evrakı

Yıldız Palace
- Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evraki
- Yıldız Sadaret Resmi Maruzatı
- Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evraki
- Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Komisyanlar Maruzatı
- Yıldız Perakende Dahiliye Nezareti Maruzatı
- Yıldız Perakende Şura-yı Devlet Maruzatı
- Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Umumi
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