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PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: AN
ANALYSIS OF LEFT WING DHKPIC AND RELIGIOUSLY
MOTIVATED TURKISH HEZBOLLAH TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS

presented by
Bilal Sevinc

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PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF LEFT
WING DHKP/C AND RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED TURKISH HEZBOLLAH
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
By

Bilal Sevinc

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Criminal Justice

2008

ABSTRACT
PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF LEFT
WING DHKP/C AND RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED TURKISH HEZBOLLAH
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
By
Bilal Sevinc

Although terrorism is a significant social and political phenomenon, research on
terrorism lacks methodological and empirical sophistication. Challenges in the
availability of data and collection issues result in information gaps on terrorism related
topics. This study focuses on two ideologically distinct terrorist organizations active in
Turkey, the religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah and lefi wing DHKP/C, and
investigates why and how individuals come to decisions to join these terrorist groups. In
order to explicate these issues, this research examines terrorist group members’
individual attributes and background characteristics, factors that help them learn about
terrorist groups, and motivational factors that influence them to participate in terrorist
organizations. This research also seeks to reveal similarities and differences between the
members of two ideologically different terrorist organizations.

This study relies on both quantitative and qualitative content analyses methods,
and analyzes 302 documents seized by Turkish Security forces from Turkish Hezbollah
(186) and DHKP/C (116) terrorist organizations’ cells. Quantitative analyses revealed
statistically significant differences between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist
organizations’ participants in terms of background characteristics, learning related
factors, and motivational factors, and confirm the importance of approaching different

types of terrorist organizations as distinct entities in terms of the development of policies

and strategies to prevent participation. Qualitative analysis focused on motivational
factors and revealed insights into the various, and sometimes multiple, overlapping
factors, that promoted the involvement of sample members in their respective
organizations.

This study makes an important contribution to the understanding of terrorist
actors and organizational activities, and presents numerous implications for security
organizations, policy makers, and scholars. It also identifies several of the major gaps in
terrorism studies and provides practical and theoretical insight for future research on

similar and related topics in terrorism studies.

 

Copyright by
BILAL SEVINC
2008

Dedicated to my wife Hanife, my sons Celal and Suha, and my daughter J ulide,
diligent and heroic members of Turkish National Police, and
victims of terrorism across the world...

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This dissertation is the result of sincere support of many individuals including
faculty, family, and friends. Particular gratitude is given to Dr. Edmund F. McGarrell, my
advisor and dissertation chair, for his continued support and guidance through my
dissertation process despite his busy schedule. I would also like to thank the reminder of
my dissertation committee, Dr. Steve Chennak, Dr. David Carter and Dr. Tamer

Cavusgil, for their support, guidance, and encouragement throughout the process.
Whenever I needed they were willing to take time and answer my questions. I would like
to give special thanks to Dr. Robyn Mace for her sincere support and editorial assistance;
her feedback was invaluable in providing insight and encouragement. Dr. Mahesh Nalla,
graduate director, is another person I would like to give special thanks; he was always
supportive and never hesitated to share his experiences with me. I can not ignore the
contribution of all my other faculty members. Their classes served as a foundation for my
dissertation and they provided me inspiration and encouragement. Many thanks should
also go to Cemal Kuloglu, Deputy Director of Counter Terrorism Department/Turkish
National Police (TNP), for his support with data which was critically important for my
study,
My family was always together with me during this challenging journey. I am

tl'lal‘lleul to my wife Hanife, and my children Celal, Suha and Julide, for their patience

and unlimited support.
I would also like to thank all the members of TNP, and my TNP colleagues at

Michigan State University- Nebi, Kaan, Onder, Sadik, Mustafa, Serkan, Ismail and
Kubilay- for their continuous support.

vi

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................. ix

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................. xi
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1

1. Participation in Terrorist Organizations (Statement of Problem) ............... 3

(1) Methodological challenges of research on terrorism ....................... 6

(2) Research on participation in terrorist organizations ....................... 8

2. Significance of the Study ............................................................ 11

3. Organization of the Study ............................................................ 14
CHAPTER 2

LEFTIST AND RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN TURKEY.... .. 16

1. Conceptualizations and Definitions of Terrorism ................................ 16

2. Left Wing/Revolutionary Terrorism and Ideology ............................... 21

(1) Characteristics and justifications of revolutionary/left wing terrorism... 23

3. Religiously Motivated Terrorism and Ideology ................................... 24

(1) Characteristics and justifications of religiously motivated terrorism ..... 26

4. The History of Terrorism in Turkey ............................................... 28

5. Contemporary Terrorism in Turkey ............................................... 34

(1) Turkish Hezbollah .............................................................. 40

(2) DHKP-C ......................................................................... 46

(3) Comparison between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah ................... 52
CHAPTER 3

PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: LITERATURE

AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES ................................................. 55

1. Research on Participation in Terrorist Groups ................................... 56

2. Factors Affecting Participation in Terrorist Organizations ..................... 59

(1) Background characteristics .................................................... 61

(2) Learning related factors ........................................................ 75

(3) Motivational factors ............................................................ 87

(4) Participation in suicide missions .............................................. 98

3 - Theoretical Approaches ............................................................. 104

4. Conclusion and Research Questions ............................................... 130
CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY .......................................................................... 137

1 - Terrorist Documents ................................................................. 138

2- Sample ................................................................................. 140

(1) Selection of terrorist groups ................................................... 140

vii

(2) Convenience sampling of the documents .................................... 143

3. Data Analysis ........................................................................ I45

(1) Basic characteristics of quantitative and qualitative research ............. 146

(2) Quantitative data analysis ...................................................... 149

Dependent variable ........................................................... 149

Independent variables ........................................................ 150

Statistical methods ........................................................... 158

(3) Qualitative analysis ............................................................ 161

4. Reliability and Validity .............................................................. 165

5. Conclusion ............................................................................. 166
CHAPTER 5

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES AND FINDINGS ................................................ 168

1. Descriptive Findings and Bivariate Statistics .................................... 168

(1) Background characteristics of terrorists .................................... 171

(2) Other background characteristics ........................................................... 175

(3) Learning related factors ......................................................................... 180

(4) Motivational factors ............................................................................... 184

(5) Gender issues ......................................................................................... 189

2. Relationship between Background Characteristics and Motivational

Factors .......................................................................................................... 192

3. Logistic Regression Analyses ........................................................................ 195
CHAPTER 6

THE PATH TO MEMBERSHIP (QUALITATIVE ANALYSES) ......................... 206

1. Ideological/Political Closeness... 207

2. Negative Life Events. 212

3. Tactics/Propaganda of TerrOristsm ................................................................... 223

4. Need to Belong to a Group ............................................................................ 233

5. Environmental Factors ................................................................................... 237

6. Other Motivational Factors ............................................................................ 242
CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................... 247

l . Summary ofResearch Findings 247
2. Theoretical Implications 260

3 - Policy Implications ....................................................................................... 273

4- Limitations ..................................................................................................... 278

5 . Future Research ................... -. ......................................................................... 280

6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 282

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................ 284
viii

 

Table 1.

Table 2.

Table 3.

Table 4.

Table 5.

LIST OF TABLES

Casualties caused by Turkish Hezbollah (1994-2006) ............................ 44
Activities of Turkish Hezbollah and counter-terrorism (1994-2006) ...... 46
Casualties caused by DHKP/C (1995-2006) ........................................... 50
Activities of DHKP/C and counter-terrorism (1995-2006) ..................... 51

Religiously motivated (1994-2006) and left wing terrorist groups
(1995-2006) and terrorist incidents, arrested terrorists, and casualties 141

Table 6. Descriptive statistics for overall sample .................................................. 170
Table 7. Background characteristics, by terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs.
Turkish Hezbollah) .................................................................................. 172
Table 8. Other background characteristics, by terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs.
Turkish Hezbollah) ................................................................................. 176
Table 9. Learning related factors, by terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish
Hezbollah) ................................................................................................ 181
Table 9.1. Classification of kinship, by terrorist groups ......................................... 181
Table 9.2. Propaganda means, by terrorist groups .................................................. 182
Table 10. Motivational factors, by terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish
Hezbollah) .............................................................................................. 185
Table 10.1.Type of negative life events, by terrorist groups ................................... 187
Table 11. Selected background characteristics, by gender ..................................... 189
Table 12. Learning related, and motivational variables, by gender ....................... 191
Table 13. Bivariate odds ratios between selected background characteristics
and each motivational factors ................................................................. 194
Table 14. Logistic regression analysis of background characteristics and
participation in terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah) ........ 197
ix

Table 15.

Table 16.

Table 17.

Table 18.

Table 19.

Table 20.

Table 21.

Logistic regression analysis of learning related variables and
participation in terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah) ........ 200

Logistic regression analysis of motivational factors and participation

in terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah) ............................ 201
Logistic regression models for all independent variables and participation

in terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah) ............................ 203
Summary of research findings: Background characteristics .................. 250
Summary of research findings: Learning related factors ....................... 252
Summary of research findings: Motivational factors ............................ 254
Summary of research findings: Gender issues ...................................... 257

x

Figure 1.
Figure 2.

‘ Figure 3.

Figure 4.

Figure 5.

Figure 6.

LIST OF FIGURES

Terrorist incidents in Turkey (1984-2004) .............................................. 36
Terrorist incidents and arrested terrorists in Turkey (1984-2004) ........... 37

Total casualty of citizens, officials, and terrorists in Turkey
(1984-2004) ............................................................................................. 38

Violent activities of religiously motivated and left wing terrorist groups
and counter-terrorism (1994-2006) ......................................................... 39

Terrorist incidents conducted by DHKP & Turkish Hezbollah and
counter- terrorism (1994-2006) .............................................................. 52

Casualties caused by DHKP/C & Turkish Hezbollah (1994-2006) ........ 53

xi

 

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is a global problem that impacts all sectors of society: government,
economic, security, and social. Although many countries have been afflicted by terrorism
for decades, international recognition of the importance of the terrorism phenomenon
increased after attacks against the United States in 2001. These attacks confirmed the
power of terrorism in the international arena, and proved that the transnational dimension
of today’s terrorism necessitates international cooperation to address the issue.

As a global problem, terrorism threatens the peace and security systems of
developed and developing countries. Many terrorist groups have clandestine structures
and strong connections in different countries that facilitate their activities by supplying

them with financial aid, weapons, intelligence, new members, and materials. Today,
military and political leaders believe that terrorists may attempt to use chemical and
biological weapons, exponentially increasing the potential levels of casualties, as well as
SOCial, physical and economic damages. The growing number of religiously motivated
groups that use more lethal tactics, the increasing availability of chemical and biological
l'rlalerials, the globalization of terrorism, and evidence about the intentions and
capabilities of terrorist organizations are some of the factors that point out potentiality in
the use of these more deadly weapons (Cronin, 2003).
In some countries, the daily lives of numerous individuals involve or are
dQIninated by terrorist organizations and activities. Regardless of the political ideology of
111% group or the political context of its violent activities, the operations of terrorist groups

1‘: e an area of particular concern for law enforcement and policy makers. Executing acts

of terrorism requires sophisticated organizational activities, such as planning, training,
financing, and recruiting. Almost all these topics require in depth scientific inquiry.
Participation in terrorist groups is of particular concern. It is impossible to create
adequate policies and strategies that will prevent individuals’ participation in terrorist
organizations without sufficient empirical understanding. A better understanding of
participation in terrorist organizations has important policy and law enforcement
implications. Research might reveal background risk factors that facilitate participation,
such as personal attributes, experiences, or different motivations for involvement in
terrorist organizations. Practically, knowledge of these factors might help to structure the
design of intervention programs, to create adequate policies, and to assist security forces
in identifying individuals targeted by terrorist groups for potential participation in their
activities.
Terrorism is a significant social and political phenomenon, but research on
teI‘Lrorism lacks methodological and empirical sophistication. A strong body of empirical
knowledge is growing, but many important questions have not been addressed, and
Significant problems still remain. Terrorism is difficult to examine for several major
reasons: most of the studies are not adequate in terms of scientific inquiry, it is difficult to
c0 llect data from the population of terrorists because of the dangers of the field and
3‘3 crecy concerns of terrorists, and secrecy and data-sharing policies of governments,
intelligence, military, and law enforcement organizations. As a result, many researchers
t1Qte that terrorism appears to be an area in which operational knowledge is based on very

1i‘Irtle research (Sageman, 2004; Crenshaw, 2003; Schmid & Jongman, 1988).

 

This study investigates how individual terrorists come to their decisions to join
terrorist groups, and thus speaks directly to why and how an individual becomes a
terrorist. In order to understand these issues more completely, this study examines the
individuals’ background characteristics, factors that help them learn about specific

terrorist groups, and motivational factors related to their decision-making to join them.
The primary data for this research were generated from documents seized from two
active terrorist organizations in Turkey, the Turkish Hezbollah, a religiously motivated

terrorist group, and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), a

Marxist-Leninist terrorist group.
In order to understand the similarities and differences of participation in these

ideologically distinct groups, the documents captured from terrorist cells during police
oPerations were examined. Terrorist leaders use these documents as a part of the
recruitment process for potential members, making them very valuable in terms of insight
into the organization. These documents are unique, since they are’in the original
ha11dvvriting of the potential terrorists themselves. Consequently, these hand-written
intel'rial documents should provide more reliable information about terrorist perceptions
and motivations than many other terrorism data sources used in contemporary research on

t . . . . .
erronsm. Qualitative and quantitative content analyses methods were used to analyze

theSe documents.
1. Participation in Terrorist Organizations (Statement of Problem)

Terrorism is a broad term that describes the acts of a variety of groups, which

orlduct Violent activ1ties all over the world In the name of revolution, liberation,

nationalism, or holy war, and that want to create an unsecure environment (Howell, 2003;

Jenkins, 2003). As a method to gain political concessions and attention, terrorism has

been used as a tactic by extremist and ideological groups to attack symbolic targets.

These groups espouse a variety of different political ideologies, including left wing, right
wing and religiously motivated ideals. Marxist-Leninist ideology has influenced many
leftist groups in different countries. Their basic targets have been imperialist powers,
capitalist systems, and existing governments - all seen as obstacles for establishing a state
ruled under the Marxist- Leninist or Maoist ideology. The Red Army Faction in
Germany, Red Brigade in Italy, Direct Action in France, the Fighting Communist Cell in

Belgium, and DHKP/C in Turkey are a few examples of extreme left ideological groups

(Wilkinson, 2003).
Since 1990, religiously motivated terrorists have appeared to be the biggest threat

“’ith their increasing numbers and more violent tactics across the world (Hoffman, 2006;
Rabasa et al., 2006). Religiously motivated groups accounted for only three percent of all
identified terrorist groups in 1980, but represented 43 percent in 1995l (Cronin, 2003).
Religiously motivated terrorist groups also appear to be the most lethal (Hoffman, 1999,
2006). Despite decreases in the number of terrorist activities overall in the last decade,
letllality per terrorist attack has increased. An apocalyptic belief system generally
jl'lstifies mass casualty tactics. The September 11 attacks, the murder of 29 Muslims in
Abraham’s tomb, the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, and recent bombings

In IStanbul and Madrid are examples of religiously motivated political violence (Cronin,

2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2003; Rapoport, 2004).

 

\
1 While the number of religiously motivated groups was 2 out of 64 in 1980, there were 25 out of 58 in

‘99s (Cronin, 2003).

There are no geographic constraints for the modern terrorist operations, as the
activities of al-Qaeda demonstrate. In addition to killing innocent men, women, and

children to achieve their ends, terrorists regardless of ideology may sacrifice themselves

to die or martyr to honor their beliefs (Pape, 2005; Rabasa et al., 2006).

The main focus of this research is participation in terrorist groups. Identifying and
recruiting new members is a critical issue for most terrorist organizations. New members
increase the power of terrorist organizations against governments, keep terrorist groups
dynamic, and increase the motivation and morale of others in the organization. New
members are indispensable to publicize the ideology and carry out organizational
activities. Decisions to participate in terrorist groups and terrorist acts warrant detailed

analysis, but despite the obvious importance of these issues, there is little research on the

Participation process in terrorist groups.

This research investigates how terrorists come to decisions to join terrorist groups,
and thus bears directly on why individuals, particularly those in this sample, choose to
beCOme a terrorist. In order to try to explicate these issues, this research examines
terrol‘ist group members’ individual attributes and characteristics (background
ch"Sll‘iolcteristicsx factors that help them learn about terrorist groups, and motivational
fact01‘s related to their decision-making during initial periods of the process of becoming
a Illetuber of a terrorist organization. These particular factors are important for several

reaSOHS. First, they lie at the root of the participation process. Second, they directly or
inclil‘ectly influence individuals who are making decisions about whether to join terrorist

g1‘011138. Third, the success of recruitment strategies and tactics of terrorist groups (i.e.

ideological training, practical training, and establishing special friendship groups) depend
on these initial factors.

Specifically, this research seeks to reveal the similarities and differences between
the members of two ideologically different terrorist organizations, the Turkish Hezbollah
and the DHKP/C, in terms of background characteristics, learning related factors, and
motivational factors that lead them to join these groups. There are a variety of issues
relevant to participation in terrorist groups, such as utilization of group dynamics by
establishing a special group for the potential member, theoretical (ideological) and
practical training of persons, and ensuring him/her to involve in illegal activities, but
these issues are beyond the scope of this study.

(1) Methodological challenges of research on terrorism

Flawed methodologies, unclear conceptions, superficial treatments of the subject
matter, superficial reviews of the literature, making no distinction among different types
of terrorism, lack of conceptual clarity, lack of generalizability, and inappropriate data to
test articulated models are among the basic problems of much terrorism research (Ross,
1 993 )

Although terrorism is a very important phenomenon, there is not enough
empirical research on this topic and there are still a lot of unanswered questions in the
field. The main reason is that terrorism is not easy to study primarily because of

difficulties and limitations in access to central actors and data about them. In this regard,
dangers of field research involving contact with terrorists, difficulties in finding large
e110Ugh samples, unwilling and uncooperative subject populations, and barriers in

eceiving permission from the government agencies and entities in possession of data are

some of the obstacles for collection of official and self report data. Additionally, it is very

difficult to obtain official data from governmental organizations because of secrecy

issues (Friedland, 1992; Silke, 2001, 2004a).

As well as data related inadequacies, there are also researcher based problems that
negatively impact the quality of empirical studies in the field. Neutrality and objectivity
are usually rare in the field because of the emotional side of the subject. Further, a
significant amount of material is produced by researchers with no long-term interest in
making a substantial contribution to the field. For example, in the 19905, over 80 percent
0f articles were written by one-timer researchers (Silke, 2001 , 2004a). These issues
directly affect the quality of research in the area through the proliferation of low standard,
low quality, and repetitive studies (Silke, 2001, 2004a). Schmid and Jongman (1988),
Who criticize available research on terrorism, contend that the writings of terrorism are
impressionistic, superficial and pretentious, and have generalizability problems. More
than 80 percent of the literature is not research based, but mostly narrative, condemnatory
and prescriptive. Terrorism is one of few areas in which so much is written on the basis
of a Very limited amount of empirical research. Similarly, Lum, Kennedy and Sherley
(2006), who examined 14,006 terrorism related articles2 published between 1971 and
2003 , in which 4,458 were peer-reviewed, found that just three percent of the peer
reViewed articles were empirical in nature. The remaining studies were either thought

pleCES (96%) that involved discussion of an issue theoretically, or case studies (1%) that

e)iatt‘riined a specific issue having historical perspective (Gordon, 2004).

\
2 Approximately 54 percent of these articles were published in 200 'l and 2002 right after the

 

September 11 events.

The use of statistics in terrorism research is infrequent. Among the other social
science fields, terrorism is the one in which statistics is the least used (Gordon, 2004). On
this matter, Silke (2001) notes that “terrorism articles rarely incorporate statistics and
when they do they are nearly five times more likely to be just descriptive statistics” (p.
10, 1 2). Crenshaw (2003) concludes “the absence of significant studies of relevant cross-
national factors is an obstacle to identification of propitious circumstances for terrorism.
There are a number of quantitative analyses of collective violence, assassination, civil

strife, and crime but none of these phenomena is identical to a campaign of terrorism” (p.

93), and there is little internal agreement among these studies.

The lack of empirical approach in the field has directly influenced the creation
and application of effective policies and strategies by policy makers and security forces.
In Other words, the fight against terrorism has not been supported by academic research,
80 there is not much science-based information at the foundation of existing and ongoing
Counter terrorism strategies and policies. As a result, responses by states to terrorism have
been reactive, rather than proactive. Reactive methods that aim at finding and killing
telTorists might be effective in the short term. However, in the strategic long term, the
p rOactive perspective calls for eliminating underlying root causes of terrorism
phenomenon (Elnur, 2003; Sandole, 2005); this requires having a more scientific

approach to understanding different aspects of the terrorism phenomenon.
(2) Research on participation in terrorist organizations
Although there are many terrorism related topics that await scientific inquiry such
as Shategy, ideology, structure, counterterrorism, or force multipliers, the focus of this

research is on participation in terrorist groups. The study of participation in terrorist

organizations is very important because it is impossible to create adequate policies and

strategies that will destroy the roots of terrorism without understanding why people join

terrorist groups and what kind of factors affect their decisions to join. Simply, a greater
numbers of participants in terrorist organizations will likely increase the number of
terrorist incidents. Terrorist groups always need new members to operate and to grow.

Accordingly, in order to stop terrorism, it is vitally important to focus on the root factors

that influence individuals to come to the decision that they must join these violent

structures.

Despite the centrality of the decision to participate in terrorist group to the
sustainability of terrorist activities, there has not been much research on this topic.
Arnong terrorism-related topics, participation is one of the least studied; consequently,
there are significant gaps and uncertainties in the knowledge. Some studies have
eXamined participation on a superficial level, whereby participation is one of many foci.

Stern (2003) interviewed religiously motivated terrorist groups’ members,
e’{Euurining the grievances that give rise to terrorism under the name of holy war.

Although her main focus was not on participation, she identified and discussed some

factors and motivators that facilitated participation. Sageman (2004) drew a general

I)ie‘fmre of Global Salafi Jihad using data collected from public sources, examining

Clet1flographic characteristics of individuals who joined the Salafi Jihad, the different

fTeletors that motivate them to ' ° 11 th th (1 h ' f
jom, as we as e me 0 st at terrorist groups use or
recl‘uitrnent. Smith’s (1994) research featured participation is his discussion of
Q11Eiracteristics and profiling of left and right wing terrorists, based on the Federal Bureau

Qf Investigation (FBI) records of 173 American left and right wing terrorist groups

members in the 1980s. Similarly, Teymur (2004) descriptively examined the background
characteristics of left wing DHKP/C terrorist groups active in Turkey. His study
analyzed documents captured from terrorists to examine the effects of background
characteristics on recruitment. A government study conducted in Turkey involved
surveying left wing terrorist prisoners on their background characteristics without having
specific concerns about the participation issue (Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003).

The best examples in the terrorism literature do not provide a sufficient
knowledge base for understanding the participation process. None of the studies
mentioned above contain detailed examination of participation, and more specifically,
they do not give information about root factors that facilitate individuals’ participation in
terrorist groups. Their approach to participation is limited to providing information about
background and demographic characteristics, but little information is provided on

mOtivational factors. They are largely descriptive and did not analyze data using

advanced statistical methods.
These and other studies of terrorism present methodological problems, especially

with respect to data sources. Terrorism research relies heavily on open source data, and
Open sources are not always objective or correct in their presentation of the facts about
tel5‘1‘Qrism (Friedland, 1992). Data gathering has not been systematic; the same primary
SOLIrces have been used repeatedly (Horgan, 2004; Merari, 1991; Sageman, 2004), and
301:» sources are of questionable value. Media-generated data are filtered by
gQ\rernments and corporations, and may not verify or validate the accuracy of presented
information. Further, there is the possibility of bias, from unknown and unseen sources,

Since the media is not always neutral (Schulze, 2004; Silke, 2001).

10

F ew researchers were able to employ interview or/and observation methods.
These methods, however, pose several challenges, particularly to generalizability due to
small sample sizes and non-random sampling. Most of the terrorism-related interviews
are conducted with governmental officials, not with actual terrorists (Schmid and
Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2001). Obtaining direct access to terrorist does not insure accurate
information. Hudson (1999) concludes that terrorists are most likely to be reluctant to
reveal secrets of their group, because, most probably terrorists would not trust the
researcher. Interviewer bias, cultural understanding, and linguistic or interpretation

difl'erences might also affect the validity and reliability of the research results.

Like open source, interview, and observation based data, official data present

Shortcomings to gaining an accurate picture of participation in terrorist groups. Offense
definitibn, measurement error, accuracy, and record-keeping procedures may all present
Validity problems for official data. “Official statements of the terrorists” might vary
depending on the officials taking the statement, or the policies and strategies of different
departments. Of course, many observed crimes are not reported to the police, and some
reported crime is not recorded by the police. “Official” terrorism data suffers from the
Same “dark figure” problem as do official traditional crime data. These limitations can
Pro duce data that are incomplete, out of date, and incomprehensible (Hagan, 2005;

I\’Ia>~rfield & Babbie, 2006; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991; Schwarz, 1999; Senese, 1997).
2. Significance of the Study

In the light of these and many other problems that inhibit scientific studies on
e1‘l‘orism and participation in terrorist groups, this study examines participation in two

different terrorist groups active in Turkey in order to fill a significant gap in the scientific

11

literature. This study examines and compares two ideologically different terrorist
organizations using original data. Additionally, both quantitative and qualitative analysis

methods are used to increase the validity of the research findings.

The spread of several domestic and international terrorist groups throughout the
world has been coupled with high rate of participation in terrorist groups. Despite this
fact, the field of terrorism lacks comprehensive and systematic studies that examine
factors leading to participation in terrorist groups. On the other hand, most of the studies
combine a large number of terrorist groups into one analysis that results in ambiguous
and conflicting findings (Crenshaw, 1992). In fact, terrorism is not a homogenous topic to
Study, and there are many variations among organizations in terms of their recruitment
methods, characteristics, and motivations (Silke, 2004a). Participation related studies
I'equire analyzing terrorist organizations separately rather than seeing them as a single
ideological or organizational entity that all share similar characteristics. Stern (2003)

notes that “unless we understand the appeal of participating in extremist groups and the
Sechnction of finding one’s identity in opposition to Other, we will not get far in our
at'ielnpts to stop terrorism” (p. 283). Put simply, terrorist groups are different from each
other in terms of size, purpose, characteristics, cause, participation process, and
rIlQ'ljvation. Despite these differences, the variety of terrorist activities and social contexts
for those activities have not been examined adequately (Garrison, 2004). Revealing

d1 t\t‘erences or similarities is also important for developing adequate strategies and

DQlicies.
The documents analyzed to answer the research questions for this study are likely

‘9 be more valuable than other sources of data that have been utilized in prior terrorism

12

research. The documents are unique in terms of their contents because they are original
hand-written documents written by terrorists for the terrorist organizations in which they
want to participate. They were written as part of the terrorist groups’ recruitment process
and thus do not contain any influence of security forces or researchers. Therefore, they
benefit from being directly from the source and do not present validity and reliability
problems that are likely in self report data, official data, interview data, or open source
data. These documents might be considered as terrorist organizations’ data banks of
recruits. Since it is very difficult to find these kinds of original documents, they are
important sources of information for advancing knowledge in the terrorism field.

This study contributes to the body of knowledge in terrorism in terms of original
data and comparison of dimensions of participation in two terrorist organizations by
approaching two different terrorist organizations as two separate entities. Accordingly,
examination of these factors in both a lefiist and religiously motivated terrorist group in

Turkey improves understanding of various factors that facilitate participation in terrorist

gr Ollps in Turkey.
Furthermore, terrorism studies lack theories regarding terrorism, and several

proImsed hypotheses need to be tested and confirmed or rejected (Ferracuti, 1982;

S cI‘Lmid & Jongman, 1988). The findings of this proposed study might also contribute to
t‘11eoretical advancement in the terrorism field. Moreover, the findings may be of help to
law enforcement and lawmakers, in terms of providing information to be used in

dQVeloping more effective strategies and policies against terrorist formations.

Although this research will examine terrorist organizations that are active only in

Turkey, findings may be generalizable to other terrorist organizations with similar

13

ideological situations and motivations in other countries. That is, the ideology and
objectives of the Turkish Hezbollah are likely not very different from those of other
religiously motivated Islamic extremists3 across the world. Thus, it might be expected to
find some common grounds in the motivations of individuals who join these kinds of
groups. Similarly, several leftist groups active across the world are inspired by Marxist-
Leninist ideology, including members of DHKP/C terrorist organization. Therefore,
motivations of these individuals are likely to be similar with those in the DHKP/C

terrorist organization. This study could also provide an adequate baseline for similar

studies on terrorist groups in Turkey and in other countries.

3. Organization of the Study
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter Two describes the
history and characteristics of terrorism in Turkey with a specific focus on Turkish
Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist groups. Chapter Three explores theoretical and policy
literature related to participation in terrorist organizations. Chapter Four details the
Inetlrods, techniques, and analyses involved in preparing, coding, and interpretation of the
data. Chapter Five features major quantitative findings of this exploratory research in
terrhs of background characteristics of individual participants in DHKP/C and Turkish
ITIQZbollah terrorist organizations as well as learning-related factors and motivational
factors that influence them to join these two ideologically distinct terrorist organizations.
Q1‘«lapter Six presents a review and extensive structured qualitative analytic discussion of
file content of the documents and facilitates a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.

F il'lally, Chapter Seven reviews the major findings from the research, attempts to link the

 

\
3 As Hoffman (2006, p. 239) notes, religiously motivated terrorist groups’ “sole preoccupation [is]

Se1Ving God through the fulfillment of their divinely ordained mission.” They see members of other
eligions as infidels or sinners, and aim at purifying the world (Stern, 2003).

14

results with different theories explaining deviant or criminal (terrorist) behavior,
discusses the potential policy implications of the research, identifies the limitations of the
study, and presents some suggestions for future research in the area of motivation and

participation in terrorist organizations.

15

 

 

CHAPTER TWO
LEFT IST AND RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN TURKEY
This chapter begins with a detailed discussion on the conceptualization of
terrorism and the limitations inherent in the lack of a unified definition of terrorism. It
then describes the basic characteristics of left wing/revolutionary terrorism and
religiously motivated terrorism as an introduction to the historical context of terrorism in
Turkey. The chapter concludes with an extensive description of contemporary terrorism
in Turkey and details the evolution and activities of the Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C.
1. Conceptualizations and Definitions of Terrorism
The terrorism literature features extensive discussions on the definition of
terrorism and presents varying conceptualizations of the term. Despite the recent
proliferation of interest in terrorism, there is not yet conceptual clarity or disciplinary
unity in the definition of terrorism. Governments, national and international
or ganizations, including the FBI, United Nations (UN), and European Union (EU),
individual researchers, policymakers, experts, and security specialists tend to define
terrorism according to their own contextual interpretations and experiences (Crenshaw,
l 992; Hoffinan, 2006; Martin, 2006; Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Smith, 1994; White,
200 6). For instance, while many definitions stress the “political” aspect of the term4

Clléllders & Sandler, 2006; Hoffman, 1998, 2006; Laqueur, 1987; Turk, 1982), some

 

\
4 According to Hoffman (2006, p. 2) terrorism is “fundamentally and inherently political” violence in

Dul‘Suit of political change. Turk (1982) defines terrorism as “an ideology or strategy justifying terror-
ed as lethal or nonlethal violence intended to deter political opposition by maximizing far, specifically

3' random targeting” (p. 119). Laqueur (1987) indicates that terrorism includes unlawful use of force

ainst innocent people to have political change.

16

 

definitions also include targets5 (Gibbs, 1989) and social motives6 (Enders & Sandler,
2006) of terrorists, and terrorism’s psychological effects7 (Crenshaw, 1983; Weinberg &
Eubank, 2004). These discussions, however, have not yet led to conceptual clarity and
unity on the subject (Smith, 1994).
In one ambitious attempt to compile and synthesize the contents of diverse
definitions of terrorism, Schmid and Jongman (1988) identified 109 different definitions
of terrorism, and counted the frequency of definitional elements, finding twenty-two (22)
elements common to the 109 definitions. The most frequent definitional elements were
“violence /force (83.5%), political (65%), fear, terror emphasized (51%), threat (47%),
effects and reactions (41.5%), victim-target differentiation (37.5%) purposive, planned,
systematic, organized action (32%), method of combat, strategy, tactic (30.5%), extra-
nonnality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints (30%)...” (p. 5-
6)- However, the authors’ themselves believed that the compiled list did not contain all
the elements necessary for a good definition. Sauter and Carafano (2005) synthesized the
definitions of terrorism and found that many of them contained following elements
“Conducted by sub-national groups; targeted at random noncombatant victims; directed at
one set of victims in part to create fear among a larger audience; aimed at coercing
go\Iemments or populations; planned to get publicity; motivated by political, ideological,

or religious beliefs; based on criminal actions” (p. 66). Martin (2006) summarizes the
\

5 Gibbs (1989) defines terrorism as an “illegal violence or threatened violence directed against human
‘honhuman objects...” (p. 330). Gibbs points out that not only human beings but also nonhuman objects
mlght be the target of the terrorism.

R 6 As well as political motive Enders and Sandler (2006) include a social motive in their definition,
errorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups in order to
9btain political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the

I‘llmediate victims” (p. 3).

7 Some legal and academic definitions posit that terrorism is a sort of violence that is carried out to
ave psychological effects on individuals and societies (Crenshaw, 1983; Weinberg & Eubank, 2004).

Or

17

common features of the definition of terrorism as “the use of illegal force, sub-national
actors, unconventional methods, political motives, attacks against soft civilian and
passive military targets, acts aimed at purposefully affecting an audience” (p. 47). There

are further significant definitional diversities in the concepts of terrorist", terrorist

groupg, and terrorist activities”.
Definitional differences can create confusion in research as well as counter-

terrorism activities. The lack of a common definition prevents uniform data collection,

reducing the availability of reliable findings and rendering scientific studies on terrorism

8 Payne (2000) defines a terrorist as “an individual or group who uses acts of violence and intimidation
desired social, political, or religious outcome”. She stresses that in the American society, a terrorist has a

broader definition. That is, an individual or a group that uses violent tactics against the domestic and
foreign policies of the US might be considered as terrorist. The US Department of Defense (2001, p. 544)

describes a terrorist as “an individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in

pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives.”
The US. Department of Defense defines a terrorist group in the course of defining terrorism, as “any

9
number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized” to carry out the
acts described above in the definition of terrorist is called as terrorist group by the US Department of

Defense.
The EU defines a terrorist group as “a structured group of more than two persons, established over a
Period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences” (Official Journal of the European

Communities, 2002).

1 Terrorist activities range from legal or acceptable type of actions, such as oral protests, petitions, or
demonstrations, to illegal but mostly tolerated activities such as illegal demonstrations, vandalism, seizure
0 property, and violent and unacceptable forms of acts such as sabotage, assassination, kidnapping,

ombing, murder, mass murders or use of WMD (Ferracuti, 1982).
in ‘ The F Bl’s (2001) definition of terrorism related activities include three important concepts; a terrorist
c ldent, a suspected terrorist incident, and a terrorism prevention. A terrorist incident is carried out to meet
:3: l itical and social objectives through a violent act or an act which is dangerous for human life, against the
te s, or coercive for government and civilians. A suspected terrorist incident refers to a potential act of
D t‘l‘orism that the responsible individual or terrorist groups are not known at that time. Terrorism
— reVention denotes a successfully interdicted violent act which is planned by a known terrorist group or an
“‘q iVidual.
a The EU provides a list of offenses that are considered as terrorist offenses. Some of these offenses are:
ttalcks upon person’s life and physical integrity, kidnapping, hostage taking, extensive destruction to a
gQ‘Iemment or public facility, seizure of aircraft, ships or other transportation means, manufacture,
DQSsession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons including nuclear, biological and chemical,
§lease of dangerous substance, disrupting the fimdamental natural sources. In order to label these offenses
terrorist offenses they should be committed with the aim of “seriously intimidating a population; or
unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any
ElCt; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social
structures of a country or an international organization” (Official Journal of the European Communities,

2002).

18

 

questionable and ambiguous (Silke, 2004a). A common definition also appears to be very
important in terms of ensuring effectiveness of the national and international legislation
and punishments, implementing successful international cooperation, stopping state
sponsorship of terrorism, receiving public support for anti-terror activities, and improving
public relations (Sezgin, 2007). Today, there are some attempts to ensure common
grounds between the states in the fight against terrorism, but it is not mature enough to
put these shared perspectives into daily practices. For instance, despite similarities in the
definition of terrorism used by UK11 and the US”, the lists of terrorist organizations
proscribed by these two countries create the potential for confusion, impediments to
collaborative international responses to the problem, and may promote tolerance or
support for terrorism in different countries. For example, thirteen (13) different terrorist
organizations are included in both the US and UK list of terrorist organizations, however,
1 5 terrorist organizations on the US list do not appear on the UK list, and 8 terrorist
organizations identified by the UK were not proscribed by the US. This means that some
of these organizations may operate, raise funds, conduct activities and even recruit new
members freely in the country where they were not listed as terrorists while being

P‘Jrsued by or in another allied country. Silke (2004a) rightly asserts that disagreement
\

11 UK Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as “The use of serious violence against persons or
petty, or the threat to use such violence to intimidate or coerce a government, the public, or any section
the public for political, religious, or ideological ends” (Silke, 2004a).

Terrorism is defined by the FBI as “...the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or
rty to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
(I erance of political or social objectives.” The FBI further classifies the definition of terrorism as
Q1liestic and international terrorism depending on the origin of terrorists, location of their bases and
jectives of the terrorist organization (The FBI, 2001). The US Department of Defense use the definition
“The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to '
QQerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious,
Q1‘ ideological” (The US Department of Defense, 2001, p. 544). Utilizing The United States Code’s
definition of terrorism, The US State Department defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated
Yiolence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually
Il'itended to influence an audience” (Hoffman, 2006).

131-0
0 f

Drope

19

“*

 

between two close allies indicates significant challenges in how the problem might be
addressed by diverse regimes. Besides, there is a significant variation in the definitions
within the US government itselfl3 .

Recognizing the ongoing debate on defining terrorism and given this study’s
focus on Turkish terrorist organizations, this research will rely on the definition
established by the Turkish Anti-terrorism Law. Article # 1 of the Turkish Anti-terrorism

Law (1991, 2006) defines terrorism as;

“. . .any kind of act carried out by one or more persons belonging to an
organization by means of force and violence, using the methods of pressure,
terror, intimidation, oppression or threat with the aim of changing the
characteristics of the Republic defined in its Constitution and its political, legal,
social, secular and economic regime; impairing undividable integrity of the
State with its territory and nation; endangering the existence of the Turkish
State and Republic; weakening or destroying or overtaking the State’s authority;
demolishing the fundamental rights and freedoms, and damaging the national
and international security, public order or general health of the State.”

The Second Article in the Turkish Anti-terrorism Law defines a terrorist as a
Person who takes part in an organization that is formed for committing the crimes
mentioned in the first article. There is no distinction between a person who commits the

aforementioned crime(s) alone or with other members of a terrorist group, or who does
not commit any crimes at all, but is a member of a terrorist group. The same article
Sla’ecifies that even if a person is not a member of a terrorist group, if that person commits
abovementioned crimes on behalf of a terrorist group, he or she is considered a terrorist.

The remainder of this chapter explores the ideological (political) underpinnings of

me two major terrorist groups in Turkey, the lefi wing DHKP/C and religiously

\

'3 For instance, one component of the US State Department’s definition is the premeditated nature of
tel‘rorism; this element does not exist in the FBI ’5 definition. The FBI’s definition considers the
psychological dimension of terrorism which is not addressed in the US State Department’s definition.
'Ie the US State Department’s definition identifies noncombatants as the targets of terrorism, the FBI’s
definition included broader categories, such as governments, the civilian population and even properties.

20

‘_______—

 

motivated Turkish Hezbollah, and details the evolution of terrorism in modern Turkey as
well as the development of these two organizations.
2. Left Wing/Revolutionary Terrorism and Ideology
Left wing terrorism aims at establishing a new system by destroying the existing
one. That is, leftist ideology seeks reforms or revolutions considering that existing
systems are corrupt and unjust. Martin (2006) separates lefiist ideology as “fringe left”
and “far left.” The fringe left ideology is the extreme interpretation of the Marxist
ideology. It advocates the use of violent methods as a legitimate Option against an
oppressive system, class, or government. Fringe groups believe that they are the
representatives of the poor and lower class. This belief mechanism gives them
justification for violent acts. On the other hand, for the far left, Marxism is a way to
promote class or ethno-nationalist rights. Unlike the fringe left, they do not see political
violence as the only option. They take part in the democratic process. Communist parties
and their activities could be considered in this context (Martin, 2006). Marxist-Leninist
ideology has inspired many left wing terrorist groups.
Marxism is a school of critical thought, founded by Karl Marx who argued that
Sel‘ies of historical conflicts and revolutions impacted the human progress and social
e\t'olution. In Marx’s view, in each era the working class is exposed to unequal treatment
by the ruling class. The ruling class exploits the working class’s labor and maintains the
DQlitical and economic status-quo. However, Marx theorized that the working class could
1“ésist dominance by the ruling class through revolution. The challenge of the working
Qlass resulted in socioeconomic synthesis and formation of new relationships with the

‘heans of production. It was a kind of confrontation of working class against the capitalist

21

system. Marx’s theory was based on establishment of “dictatorship of the proletariat” in
the communist society. The theory proposed to build a just and egalitarian social order.
These ideas were very attractive for many left-wing groups all over the world. Terrorist
organizations have utilized Marxism based socialism that has revolutionary
characteristics. Lenin, Mao, and Castro are some well-known revolutionary leaders who
adopted Marxism (Martin, 2006).
While Marx offered that destruction of Capitalism was based on scientific law,
Lenin suggested that Capitalism’s collapse would be made certain through a well
organized and disciplined organization, such as a Communist party, that would lead the
working class to the victory. Lenin believed that political will of the people would change
the system. Within this context, Mao applied a strategy named “people’s war.” It
included indoctrinating the army, winning over the people, hitting-running and fighting
forever. With this strategy in mind, Mao’s Red Army used guerilla tactics. They were
also careful to win people’s support considering that achievement of the people’s war
Would entail the contribution and involvement of civilians. Mao linked his military
Strategy to his political strategy and contributed to the concept of “political will.”
According to this strategy, terrorism, or violent political activity, was an acceptable
taQtic. The combination of ideology, political indoctrination, guerilla tactics,
p8Blchological warfare, and people’s support made the people’s war an effective strategy.
Adopted by leftist revolutionaries across the world, they have sought people’s support

against capitalist systems using terrorist tactics (Martin, 2006).

22

*1

J“
”V‘-

(1) Characteristics and justifications of revolutionary/left wing terrorism

Anarchism and Marxism form a philosophical base for the revolutionary/left wing
terrorism. In order to reach their goal of destroying the existing capitalist system and
establishing a communist system through armed conflict, they resort to unconventional
war. Terrorism is seen as an effective tactic to disrupt the existing government. The
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, the Shining Path in Peru, the Montoneros in
Argentina, the Red Brigade in Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Provisional
Irish Republican Army in Ireland, and the DHKP/C in Turkey are examples of left wing
terrorist organizations.

The process that leads to the revolution includes several steps, initiated by a
particular group that perceives that existing system or government is unfair. In order to
overcome this unfairness and to have meaningfiil social dissent, revolution is considered

the only strategy. To initiate revolution, they point out the weaknesses and contradictions
of the political system. The next step is to motivate and politicize the masses for
revolution: “popular discontent, the alienation of elites, and a pervasive crisis are the
CeIltral ingredients for bringing a society to the brink of revolution Martin (2006, p. 93).”
Extremism is the main characteristic of many left wing terrorist groups.
Extremism contains offensive and violent beliefs. Extreme egalitarianism, extreme hatred
of capitalism and extreme opposition to militarism are basic characteristics of the extreme
left. However, extremism exhibits characteristics of terrorism when the violent thoughts
ale put into practice (Hoffman, 2006; Smith, 1994). Their targets are generally those who
are blamed for economic exploitation, political repression, or being representative of the

Capitalist system. Left wing groups are more selective than religiously motivated groups

23

in their targets: they take care not to alienate potential sympathizers and supporters.
Through their violent activities, they aim to bring attention to their political cause. Armed
propaganda is very important for a left wing group since they believe it leads to armed
support and then civil war, which will ultimately lead to the victory (Hoffman, 2006).
Organizational ideology is the main source of justification behind violent
activities. Terrorists believe that they serve an honorable cause, so that violence is
acceptable and unavoidable. Opponents of their movements are considered enemies. In
the Brazilian revolutionary Marighella’s Mini Manual of the Urban Guerilla, he indicated
that terrorism is an inevitable method against a ruthless enemy. Marighella saw the
dictators as shameful individuals and advocated terrorism as a method against the
dictators as an honorable act (Martin, 2006).
Revolutionary left wing terrorist groups believe that they are at war against an
oppressive government or system. They think that in this war, they are the representatives
of the poor who are the victims to unfair and unjust practices. This belief structure helps
them see the violence as a legitimate option.
3. Religiously Motivated Terrorism and Ideology
Despite two thousand years of history, including the Zealots, Thugs, and
Assassins, it was not until the 19803 that religiously motivated terrorism appeared as a
global threat. Hoffman (2006) marks the year of 1968 as the advent of modern
international terrorism, and indicates that there was no religiously motivated terrorist
group among the eleven identifiable international terrorist groups that were active in
1968. After the Iranian revolution in 1979, the number of international religiously

motivated groups began to increase. Even so, in 1980, there were only two international

24

religiously motivated groups out of 64 active groups. By 1994, this number was 16 out of
49, and 26 out of 56 in 1995. In 2004, 52 (46%) terrorist groups were classified as
religiously motivated groups (Hoffman, 2006).

There are several factors that have promoted the rise of religiously motivated
terrorism, including the revolution in Iran in 1979, recent developments in the Middle
East, and activities of al-Qaeda. Islarnist extremists’ activities have increased especially
in the last ten years. Since the 19803, religiously motivated terrorism included the
elements of all major religions, smaller sects, and cults as well. The sarin nerve gas attack
by Aum Shinrikyo on the Tokyo subway in 1995, bombings of the US. embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya, and Tanzania by al-Qaeda in 1998, the bombing of Oklahoma City
federal office building in 1995, the assassination of Israeli prime minister by a Jewish
extremist in 1995, the murder of 18 tourists in Egypt by Islamic extremist in 1996, the
September 11 attacks in the US. by al-Qaeda, and recent bombings in Istanbul, London,

and Spain are just some of the examples of religious extremism (Hoffman, 2006).

When compared with the religiously motivated terrorism in the past, today

r oligiously motivated terrorism has gained global characteristics that impact many

c'Duntries and the daily lives of individuals across the world, especially with respect to

I Slamic extremists’ activities which are on the rise. Cell based networks, leaderless

1Tesistance groups, more lethal and indiscriminate attacks, possibility of the use of
biological and chemical weapons, and global networks typify the contemporary

l”eligiously motivated terrorism. In this new era, al-Qaeda has been the leading terrorist
group. Al-Qaeda attracts new members from all over the world. Many terrorist

organizations have been inspired by the tactics and ideology of al-Qaeda. The media have

25

been an effective tool to publicize the terrorists’ propaganda, and new technologies (i.e.
intemet) have facilitated the activities of terrorist groups globally. Easy access to
information has helped individuals (and potential members) learn about the terrorists’
ideology (Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2006, Scheuer, 2004). These developments have
helped terrorists find new members that are vitally important for the long-term survival of
terrorist groups.

Although religiously motivated groups committed six percent of all terrorist
incidents between 1986 and 2004, these acts caused thirty percent of the total number of
fatalities. Al—Qaeda has the biggest role in these numbers. Although al-Qaeda committed
only 0.1 percent of all terrorist incidents, it was responsible for almost 19 percent of total

fatalities (Hoffinan, 2006; Martin, 2006, Scheuer, 2004).
(1) Characteristics and justifications of religiously motivated terrorism
Religion may appear as a primary or secondary motive of a terrorist organization
depending on the cultural and political contexts. Accordingly, misinterpretation of the
basic tenets of religion is the primary motive behind the activities of terrorists. Main
religious rules are changed and filled with plenty of violent images in order to justify
destruction or self-destruction which is the central part of the logic behind religion-based
teI‘rorism (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Martin, 2006). Islamic extremists in the Middle East,
I‘Iindu extremists in India, and Christian extremists (i.e. anti-abortionists) in the US. are
Some of the examples of this profile. Religion as a secondary motive might appear under
the scope of other movements such as nationalism or revolutionary resistance. In such

Conditions, religious affiliation is important in terms of providing them with ethnic or

26

rational identity. For example, religion has a secondary role in Northern Ireland among
Catholic and Protestant terrorists (Martin, 2006).
Terrorism in the name of religion or God has been predominant in today’s world.
Major religions including Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and Hinduism and smaller
religions and cults have extremist adherents who have involved in terrorism. Martin
(2006, p. 183) defines religiously motivated terrorism as “a type of political violence that
is motivated by an absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned —and
commanded- the application of terrorists violence for the greater glory of the faith.”
Religiously motivated terrorists believe that indiscriminant violent activities would be
forgiven and even rewarded by God in the afterlife since they were carried out in the
name of God. Moreover, God is always together with them because they are carrying out
a sacred mission. They also believe that they are defending their religion from the attacks
of non-believers. They aim at spreading their beliefs across the world. Religiously
motivated terrorism includes unquestioned faith (Martin, 2006). Stern (2003) concludes
tl'lat a common motivation behind participation in different groups is to cleanse the world
of impurities to create a better state. These types of groups think that they fight for a more
perfect world and their fight will result in purification of injustice and cruelty. They also
Strongly believe that they are responding to a spiritual calling.
Religious extremists see themselves as outsiders of the existing system who seek
filndamental changes. This perception makes them more destructive and deadly. All
religiously motivated groups regardless of religion transform their political ideologies

into religious imperative. Thus, as Hoffman (2006, p. 112) concludes “[T]he killing of

27

My
‘5‘5.

7‘:
'n

«In
Lab

Jul

It;

~74

those described as “infidels” by the Shi’s, “dogs” by the Jews, or “children of Satan” by
the Christian Patriots becomes a sacramental act.”

There are also some common elements that almost all religiously motivated
groups regardless of religion use to justify their violent tactics such as “religious precepts,
the sense of alienation, the existence of a terrorist movement in which the activists are the
constituents, and a preoccupation with the elimination of a broadly defined category of
enemies” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 97). Although left wing terrorist groups are relatively
selective in their violent tactics, religiously motivated groups have been involved in more
indiscriminate violent acts against not only declared enemies but also those who have not
shared their ideological perspective.

4. The History of Terrorism in Turkey
An understanding of terrorism in Turkey requires familiarity with basic historical
developments there. The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 after the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire, the major power in several geographic areas including Europe,
Asia, and Africa for more than 600 years. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the
Republic of Turkey, led multiple reforms to establish Western social, economic,
technological, and democratic standards in Turkey. These reforms included abolishment
of the sultanate and the Caliphate, establishment of the secular state, adoption of a new
alphabet, adaptation of new laws, and suffrage for women. Since its establishment,
Thrkey has faced several internal and external threats such as religious fundamentalism,
ethnic separatism, a risk of the Soviet attack, and political impacts of ideological changes
in the Soviet Union. In the mid 19205, there were numerous challenges to the reforms,

especially by religious fundamentalists and separatists. As a response to this resistance,

28

H .

0:

n-r ‘

l\.\I

if]

harsh methods were used, and a special court known as the Independence Court was
established to judge the opponents. In 1931, the People’s Party, the only political party,
adopted a program that has included the fundamental tenets of modern Turkey:
republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism. In the Cold
War era, Turkey experienced economic growth; democratic values were on rise until the
first military coup in 1960, which was followed by military coups in 1971 and 1980
(Sozen, 2006). The last two coups resulted from security problems that emerged because
of prevalent terrorist events. However, military coups were not a remedy to terrorism;
terrorist incidents increased right after the military coups.

Terrorism in Turkey goes back to the 19503 when the multiparty political system
emerged, illegal demonstrations of university students and workers appeared, and
security forces used some excessive force to control social unrest. In 1959, the killing of
a university student by security forces during an illegal demonstration fostered illegal

formations and caused more illegal demonstrations (Caglar, 2006). In 1960, Turkey
eXperienced its first military coup. Afterwards, Turkey entered a new phase named as
pluralistic democracy. Radical left groups with socialist ideologies created political
instability in Turkey during this time. Afier 1960, internal migration and urbanization
iIlcreased rapidly due to huge industrialization, and the Turkish economy grew very
qln'ckly during the 19708. However, economic grth could not be stabilized, and
e(:onomic indicators started to go down. Economic instability resulted in huge
unemployment, and generated deadly and violent demonstrations by workers and
Students. During this period radical right and left wing movements started to emerge. The

process of industrialization created suitable conditions for Turkish socialist working

29

groups to seek more rights and economic benefits. Global political trends influenced the
Turkish left and Turkish political life as well. The new constitution adapted in 1961 was
the most democratic constitution in Turkey’s history, and that created conditions tolerant
of the activities of socialist ideologies, the dream of some extremist leftist groups since
the Russian revolution. The Constitution listed and guaranteed fundamental rights and
freedoms, including the right of collective bargaining and strikes. However, these
democratic rights were misused and transformed into illegal activities that took Turkey to
threshold of major security crises (Bal & Laciner, 2001; Caglar, 2006; RodOplu, Arnold
& the Ersoy, 2003; Sozen, 2006).
In the 1960s when democratization processes were speeded up, the Turkish Labor
Party (TLP) was established with socialist ideology. TLP participated in several elections
but could not get more than three percent of the votes (Criss, 2002, p.477). In the election
of 1969, TLP won fewer votes than 1965. Elections in 1969 were a turning point for most
of the followers of the TLP. As a consequence of its failed election campaigns, TLP
thought that there was no hope for meaningful change within formal democratic
processes. To TLP, the only way for socio-economic progress was the non-capitalist path.
They adapted the Proletarian Revolutionists policies and began an armed struggle (Bal &
Laciner, 2001).
Youth organizations especially preferred to use these illegal methods. Ideological
1eaders of several left wing groups established during this era, influenced by the thoughts
0f Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Castro and Che Guevara, believed the quickest way
10 change the system was to terrorize the society. As a result, govemment’s power was

weakened, and Turkey experienced another military intervention in 1971 (Bal & Laciner,

30

2001). Similar to TLP, many terrorist groups across the world such as IRA, ETA, and
Tuparnoros have replaced their legal efforts with violent tactics. When the groups could
not manage their desired political aims using legal methods, they began to use illegal
ways to carry out their objectives (Crenshaw, 2003; Jenkins, 2003; Schmid, 2004).

In the 197OS, Turkey experienced important changes in its democratic, social and
economic systems. The rise of extremists at left and right wings of the political spectrum
caused huge terrorist activities that continued until the military coup in 1980. Acts of
violence and terrorism resulted in armed assaults, sabotage, kidnappings, bank robberies,
destruction of workplaces, and bombings. Just before the 1980 military coup, forty—nine
lefi wing terrorist, groups had emerged (Bal & Laciner, 2001). Between the years of 1978
and 1982, there were over 40,000 terrorist incidents in Turkey, resulting in an average of

28 deaths per day (Rodoplu, Arnold & Ersoy, 2003).

During this same period, Armenian terrorism had a significant impact on the
Turkish nation. Throughout the 19705 and 19803, an Armenian terrorist organization, the
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), posed big dangers for

kaish Diplomats in foreign missions. This organization promoted awareness of the
alleged “Armenian genocide” of the Ottoman Empire, and worked to further the cause of
Armenian independence. With a Marxist—Leninist ideology, ASALA allied with other
iIlltemational terrorist groups with similar leanings, including the Irish Republican Army,
Italian Red Brigades, and the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (PKK-
Kongra-Gel, or PKK). Most of the attacks of ASALA targeted Turkish diplomats or

Turkish interests in the Middle East and Europe especially between 1975 and 1985. The

31

 

establishment of independent Armenia after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended
Armenian terrorism (MIPT, n.d.; Orttung, 2006):

The 19805 were important in terms of the development of separatist terrorism in
Turkey. The PKK terrorist organization was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978 with a
separatist ideology. PKK initiated terrorist attacks in the mid-19805 that peaked in the
mid-19905. PKK has played an active role in violent activities in Turkey, especially in the
Eastern and Southeastern parts. Its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in 1999 and
sentenced to life imprisonment. His imprisonment, however, has not stopped the PKK’s

activities. The organization still targets security forces, civilians, and public properties

(Sozen, 2006).

In addition to separatist terrorism represented by PK and left wing terrorism,
religiously motivated terrorism has also influenced the security of the Turkish nation.
Religiously motivated terrorist groups emerged in the 19905 to exploit the religious
Values by identifying them with violent activities. The basic goal of these religious-

terrorists is to establish a religion-based state to replace the existing secular and

Constitutional one.

Terrorist attacks carried out by separatist, left and religiously motivated groups
Qontinue today in Turkey. Most incidents are carried out by the PKK, although the
Occurrence of terrorist incidents is not as intensive as in the 19905. Before 1980, almost
5,000 youth died because of left and right ideological conflict. After 1980, almost 30,000
people died, mostly due to the violent acts of separatist and then left wing and religiously
motivated terrorist groups. Studies on the economic aspects of terrorism in Turkey

revealed that the approximate cost of terrorism to Turkey has been over 100 billion

32

 

dollars (Bal & Laciner, 2001). Turkey’s long history of fighting against terrorism has
made it one of the most experienced countries of the world in dealing with political
violence. Orttung (2006) confirms that Turkey is one of the most experienced countries in
fighting terrorism and that its experience might be beneficial to the US which has made
the fight against terrorism its top national security priority.

There have been significant changes in the political climate in Turkey. In the

1 9905, Turkey faced tremendous problems, such as financial crisis, political instability
and an increase in terrorist activities that led to high inflation, irrational economic
programs, unsuccessful coalition governments, constantly changing international
Situation, and deadly activities of the separatist movements and other ideological groups.
In 2003, after twelve years of coalition governments, a one-party government period has
emerged that appears to be successful in managing economic and democratic reforms.
Renewed commitments of the one-party government to join the European Union (EU)
has resulted in numerous reforms that led to the EU Council’s decision to start accession
negotiations in 2005 (Sozen, 2006): “the EU decision was historic since it marked a first
Step towards the consensus of civilizations, bringing a Muslim country into the pre-
dominantly Christian organization (Sozen, 2006, p. 135).” These and similar
developments in the political history of Turkey have several implications in the formation
and activities of terrorist groups in Turkey. For instance, left wing and religiously

motivated terrorist groups do not want Turkey to be close to Western countries, because

While lefi wing groups see Western countries as source of capitalism, religiously
motivated groups would prefer Turkey emulate Islamic countries rather than Christianity-

dominated countries. Similarly, separatist groups would try to manipulate the process to

33

 

gain more support from the other countries. With these historic developments in mind,
there seems to be a reciprocal relationship between terrorism and political developments
in Turkey. That is, some political developments have given rise to terrorism and terrorist
groups, and terrorist activities have had considerable influence on political decisions.
5. Contemporary Terrorism in Turkey
In Turkey, three factors must come together in order to be able name a group as a
terrorist group: ideology, organization, and terrorist activity (i.e., political violence).
Organizational philosophy and ideology are among the core elements for long-term
operations of a terrorist organization. If there is no strong ideological belief system, then
there is no strong tie among terrorists. Secondly, there must be an organization that
Consists of at least 2 persons. The final and most important component is the ‘violence’.
When a group of people with terrorist ideology commits a violent act/s, all the elements
necessary to identify (and respond to) a group as terrorist are present.
There are four main terrorist formations in Turkey: religiously motivated/right

Wing terrorist groups that aim at establishing a state ruled by Sharia; left wing terrorist
groups that target setting up a new state which has a Marxist-Leninist or Maoist ideology;
Separatist terrorist groups that want to divide the territory of Turkey to establish a new
State; and lastly the extension of international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda.
Ideologies of separatist, left or right wing terrorist organizations are not native but

iniported. While leftist and separatist terrorist groups have tried to adapt the ideas of

Mao, Lenin, Tito, or Marx, religiously motivated terrorist groups have been influenced

from the ideas of putatively religious writers such as Ali Korani, Ali Seriati, Hasan-el

Benna (Turkish National Police [TNP], 2006).

34

 

Terrorist organizations in Turkey generally have a pyramid type organizational
structure. This type of structure is considered most appropriate since it ensures higher
level of secrecy and discipline. On the top of the pyramid, there is a leader and first level
commanders. At the bottom, there are passive supporters who comprise the largest part of
the organization. After the command level, there is an active cadre responsible for
carrying out the organizational mission. Active supporters who follow the active cadre

keep the terrorists in the field through logistical support including shelter, food, and new

members. These structural characteristics are consistent with White’s (2003) description
0f general terrorist structures.

Cells are indispensable units for all terrorist organizations to ensure secrecy and
dynamism. Each cell consists of a small number of individuals (usually 4-5 people) under
the command of the cell leader. Cell members know only the members in their respective
Cells. They do not have connections with or to other cells. Some groups have a structure
Similar to “leaderless network” or “leaderless resistance.” It is called as “self
appearance”, or “self generating” (kendinden zuhur) in Turkey and consists of individuals
Who establish a “front” (cell-subdivision) in order to perform terrorist activities. They
usually learn about a group through ideological documents (i.e. writings, messages,
articles and books of terrorist leaders or organizational magazines). These persons who
establish new fronts make their own decisions and carry out terrorist activities without

informing the leadership cadre. The responsibility of the successful terrorist operations
belongs to the organization, but if there is a failure, the responsibility belongs to the
persons that carry out the failed act. Terrorist organizations also have their own judicial

mechanisms that are used when there are disciplinary matters or betrayal of their

35

members. These mechanisms are called “People’s Courts” by left wing groups, and
“Sharia Courts” by religiously motivated groups. Betrayal is one of the biggest crimes,
and requires the death penalty (Caglar, 2006).
Since 1984, the Turkish people have experienced deadly terrorist attacks with

varying casualty rates each year. Immediately after the PKK initiated armed attacks in
1 984; there was a dramatic increase in the number of terrorist incidents. Figure 1 shows
the numbers of terrorist incidents (56,693), including violent armed and non-violent
propaganda activities in Turkey between the years of 1984-2004. During this period,

police captured more than 159,00014 people with connections to terrorist activities.

Figure 1. Terrorist incidents in Turkey (1984-2004)

7000- 6965 5595

6000. 567
5000‘ 4445 4561 4424
4000.
. 3242
3000. 2742 .
1969
2000- . 1673 1515

. 1380
000 77

1984198519861987198819891991199119921993199419951996199719981999 2000 20012002 2003 2004

  

1611

  

 

 

 

 

 

Source: TNP, 2006
Terrorist incidents peaked in 1993 with 6,956 different cases, followed by a

persistent decline in the following years. In 1999, Abdullah OCALAN, the leader of the
PKK, was captured and so his supporters carried out several small or serious terrorist

activities that led to a slight increase again. Although the PKK has the largest role in

 

M This number includes those who were captured but released by the court, captured and convicted,

and recidivists.

36

these numbers, left wing and religiously motivated groups’ contribution to these numbers

cannot be ignored.

Figure 2. Terrorist incidents and arrested terrorists in Turkey (1984-2004)

 

 

18000 - -- .. _ -- ._....___ _.._-______.,____ _ _, _____fi,,l
16000 477---— ‘

14000 _W__ F ,_
12000 , -

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

r I I I
ID 8‘ Q a) N 0') ID
0) O) O) O) O) O) O)
‘- F ‘- ‘- ‘- ‘— 1- F 1- 1- 1-

1

 

1_ _ INCIBENTS +ARRESTED TERRORISst

k..______J

 

 

Source: TNP, 2006.

Figure 2 presents the number of terrorist incidents, and terrorists arrested by
Security forces between 1984 and 2004. In almost every year, the number of arrested
terrorists exceeds the number of incidents. This appears to reinforce the importance of the
group and group activities of terrorists. That is, terrorists commit crimes in a group; this
dynamic generates the arrest of more than one terrorist for the same incident. Group
dynamics motivate them to act together. The large number of arrested persons also shows
that terrorist organizations do not have a problem of recruiting members. As long as

terrorist organizations have members, they can continue to commit terrorist incidents to
reach their goals.

Between the years of 1984 and 2004, 12,415 citizens and government officials

including police, soldiers and temporary village guards were killed and 24,996 were

wounded by different terrorist groups (see Figure 3). The numbers of murdered and

37

 

 

wounded citizens’ are similar to the total number of government officials; an indictor that

terrorists do not discriminate between the security forces and civilians in Turkey.

Figure 3. Total casualty of citizens, officials, and terrorists in Turkey (1984-2004)

2% -
2am s
15“” q 12415
10000 4 l
m 4
0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

>. 1‘ “o '0: "’ '0 h
8 e 1,9 w: "’ wig E are 0'5
N (_J ‘00 '08 'o_ o 13.. U...
a 3‘" 8‘: EN 53 5% = 52 55

0 a

g 332'} 305 00 g“; 005 9 0'5 131:
— fl
:2 g .331" 33 Efi 8 oo

"‘ 5: .

x 8, 8 85., Q "3

Source: TNP, 2006.

_ During the same period, the number of dead or wounded terrorists from all groups
totaled 22,105, with 20,661 killed and 1,444 wounded. The number of the terrorist
Captured alive (159,175) without injury far exceeds the number of dead and wounded (see
Figure 3).

Figure 4 distinguishes the total number of incidents and casualties caused by
religiously motivated and left wing terrorist groups in Turkey between 1994 and 2006.
Left wing groups committed more terrorist crimes than religiously motivated groups; the
total number of terrorist incidents was 6,202 for left wing groups and 1,433 for

religiously motivated groups. While left wing groups targeted security forces, seen as
servants of the existing system, religiously motivated groups selected civilian targets
deemed as enemies of their religious ideology. Religiously motivated groups killed or

wounded 78 security forces; left-wing groups killed or wounded 577.

38

 

 

Figure 4. Violent activities of religiously motivated and left wing terrorist groups

and counter-terrorism (1994-2006)

'—

 

 

i

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Y—

 

 

0 . . .
Incidents Killed or wounded Killed or womded Aneshd amiss Dead or wounded
secuily hoes civilians mists

l. Religiously motirated :3 Left wing 1:1 ..

 

Source: TNP, 2006.

Conversely, total civilian casualties caused by religiously motivated groups were
1 ,409; for left-wing groups, civilian casualties totaled 236. The number of arrested left
Wing terrorists (20,395) exceeds the arrests of religiously motivated terrorists (13,672).
The number of left wing terrorists captured dead or wounded is almost 15 times higher
than religiously motivated terrorists (see Figure 4). This fact could be attributed to
religiously motivated groups not targeting security forces as primary target and their
refraining from armed conflict with the security forces unless necessary. On the other
1'land, left wing groups see security forces as representatives of oppressive government
and direct attacks against them; a strategy which might result in more death in both sides
The following discussion will detail the basic characteristics of religiously motivated
Turkish Hezbollah and left wing DHKP/C terrorist groups to further illuminate the

ideological, tactical, and characteristic differences between the two groups that are the

focus of this study.

39

'0'.

4...

~\

5...

'rr.
.2.“

w.

ark

CO

11‘

 

(1) Turkish Hezbollah
The major objective of the religiously motivated/right wing terrorist organizations
active in Turkey is to replace the secular Republic with a theocratic state ruled by Sharia.
Like many other Islamic extremists across the world with deviant and radical ideologies,
religiously motivated terrorist groups in Turkey, including Turkish Hezbollah, were
established after the Iranian Revolution. They adapted three core strategies: proclamation
(message), congregation, and jihad. “Proclamation” might best be defined as the
promotion of the ideology, including convincing individuals to practice an Islamic way of
life and be governed by Islamic ruling mechanisms. Once they have gained enough
supporters, in the second stage, they aim at establishing congregations/communities that
internalize the requirements of the first step. The last step, jihad, implies several activities
including armed struggle to establish the system that they seek (Sozen, 2006). Given that
many of them, including Turkish Hezbollah, have started armed attacks, it can be
concluded that they see themselves in the stage of “jihad.” Religiously motivated groups
in Turkey use violent tactics, however, compared to left wing and separatist groups, their
casualty rate is lower. These organizations have the potential and capacity to increase
their deadly activities. To increase the effectiveness of their activities, religiously

rtlotivated groups exploit various themes that are listed by Yurdakul (2006) as: US

‘ policies in the Islamic countries, Turkish governmental policies (e. g. bans on

1Tleadscarves), Israel’s occupation of Palestine, English and Israeli policies, and conflicts

in Chechnya.

The most active religiously motivated groups are Turkish Hezbollah, Islamic

Action Organization (IHO), Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front (IBDA-C), Islamic

40

Congregation Union (ICB), Vasat, and Hizb-ut Tahrir. The Turkish Hezbollah,
nevertheless, is the most violent. It was founded in the 1980’s in southeastern Turkey. It
aims at destroying the constitutional system in order to establish a theocratic state ruled
by Sharia. Like other religiously motivated groups in Turkey, Turkish Hezbollah has
adopted the three stage strategy: proclamation (propaganda), congregation, and jihad
(holy war). In this context, Turkish Hezbollah aims at teaching its ideology, assembling
an organization that is based on its teachings, and declaring war on the “enemy”.
I 1 Observation and data confirm that each of the strategic steps was pursued by Turkish
Hezbollah.

Turkish Hezbollah is active in eastern and mostly southeastern Anatolia, and has

usually conducted its illegal activities in Diyarbakir, Van, Batman, and Mardin, although

 

they commit illegal acts throughout the country. Bookstores owned by members and

supporters have been strategic locations to meet, to discuss ideologies, and to make

organizational propaganda. Due to ideological and leadership disputes, Turkish

Hezbollah divided into two factions in early 19905: the Ilimciler (scientists) and the

Menzilciler (rangers). While the former was led by Huseyin Velioglu, and held its
IIleetings at the Ilim Bookstore, the latter’s leader was Fidan Gungor and they met at the
1\/Ienzil bookstore. One of the biggest conflicts between two groups was the tactic to be
used in order to reach the goals of the organization. Whereas the Ilimciler sought violent

ITlethods such as armed struggle, the Menzilciler believed that it was too early to start

 

armed attacks. This dispute between two factions resulted in the deaths of 100 members
from both sides in 1993 and 1994. Fidan Gungor, the leader of the Menzilciler, was

assassinated by the Ilimciler in 1994. This event escalated the conflict between the

41

groups; however, the conflict was of short duration. The Ilimciler gained the control, and
became responsible for almost all terrorist activities of Turkish Hezbollah in not only the
east and southeastern parts of Turkey, but also the western parts (particularly in Istanbul).
On January 17‘“, 2000, as a result of extensive police operations, the leader of Ilimciler,
Huseyin Velioglu, was captured dead and more than 1,350 members were arrested.
Databases and information were seized from the houses of leaders and members (Aras &
Bacik, 2002; Ozeren & Voorde, 2006; Sozen, 2006). These raids divulged that they were

j responsible for several kidnappings. They had tortured the kidnapped persons and

videotaped their suffering before burying them alive (Orttung, 2006).

The similarity of the names of Lebanon Hezbollah and Turkish Hezbollah

requires clarification about differences between these two groups. Despite the similarity

 

in names, there is no connection between the groups. The Lebanese Hezbollah is based
on Shia ideology and was established to struggle against Israeli occupation of Lebanon’s
territories, and it includes both secular and religious members with nationalist objectives
(Pape, 2005). In addition to eradicating Israeli influence, Lebanese Hezbollah seeks to
eliminate Western influence in Lebanon and across the Middle East. Lebanese Hezbollah
is an international organization, active in Europe, North and South American, and Africa.
It has become an umbrella organization for some other terrorist groups such as Hamas.
Iwebanese Hezbollah is a major part of political, educational, social, and economic life in
Lebanon, particularly for Shiites. Its main tactics are car bombing, kidnapping, hijacking,
and its main targets are Israel and Western Countries. Suicide terrorism is one of their
main violent tactics; in fact, Lebanese Hezbollah initiated suicide attacks in the modern

history (Ozeren & Voorde, 2006; Pape, 2005).

42

On the other hand, Turkish Hezbollah’s core purpose is to establish a government
ruled by religious ideology in Turkey. Turkish Hezbollah comprise of mostly Sunni
members, marking significant ideological differences with its Lebanese namesake. The
activities and violence of the Turkish Hezbollah are limited within Turkey’s borders, and
there is no strong evidence to confirm Turkish Hezbollah’s connection with other terrorist
groups. Turkish Hezbollah carries out its activities very secretly and so, it does not
engage in any social activities in daily life that will reveal its identity. Further, Turkish
Hezbollah has not yet used suicide attacks as a tactic (Ozeren & Voorde, 2006).

Ideology, goals and structure of Turkish Hezbollah

The basic ideology of Turkish Hezbollah is to fight against the evil that rejects the
rule of the God. In this manner, the world is divided between the forces of Good and Evil.
To members, Turkish Hezbollah represents the good; all others who do not believe in
their goals are evil, including other Islamic movements. Regarding this issue, Stern
(2003) emphasizes that “This is the way religious terrorists view the world. Their
commitment to a religious idea or a religious group leads them to dehumanize their

adversaries to a degree that they become capable of murder. They start out with the
intention to purify the world of some evil, but end up committing evil acts” (p. xxviii).
Turkish Hezbollah aims at establishing a new state by destroying Turkey’s secular
regime. Once the new state is established, it would apply the Sharia rules inspired by
Iran.

Turkish Hezbollah has a pyramid type organizational structure. On the top of the
hierarchy there is a leader. The Top Committee (Sura) comes right after the leader. The

Top Committee controls political and military wings of Turkish Hezbollah and makes

43

important decisions. Then, there are regional commanders and under the regional
commanders there are city commanders. Turkish Hezbollah has two main structures in
the cities: military and political wings. While the military wing is responsible for
conducting armed operations, the political wing carries out organizational propaganda
and recruits new members. The military wing has some sub-structures, including
assassination groups, interrogation groups, threat groups, and attack groups. The political
wing assigns some of its members as coordinators of villages, schools, mosques, and
, streets to carry out propaganda and recnrit new members (Ozeren & Voorde, 2006; TNP,
2006)
Turkish Hezbollah activities and tactics
Turkish Hezbollah has thus far committed arsons, kidnappings, and murders,

using Molotov cocktails, guns and bombs. In January 2001, one year after the capture of

 

the its leader, Turkish Hezbollah assassinated the Police Chief of Diyarbakrr, a province
in the eastern part of Turkey, along with five police officers. It has also been responsible
for several other assassinations and disappearances of individuals, including government
figures, businessmen, journalists, security forces and PK members as well (Ozeren &
Cinoglu, 2006).

Table 1. Casualties caused by Turkish Hezbollah (1994-2006)
Dead (%) Wounded (%) Total (%)

 

Citizens 243 (91.7) 287 (85.4) 530 (88.2)
Government agents 22 (8.3) 49 (14.6) 71 (11.8)
Total 265 336 601

 

Source: TNP (2006)

Between the years of 1994 and 2006, the organization killed 243 civilians and 22
government agents, and wounded 287 civilians and 49 government agents (see Table 1).

It appears that civilians believed to be a threat to their ideology are the primary targets of

44

 

violence by Turkish Hezbollah; these civilians include secular academicians and
journalists, feminists, and even religious Muslims who did not support its goals. When
endangered or confronted by security forces, they did not hesitate to kill and wound them.

Interestingly, although Turkish Hezbollah members were trained in Iraq and Syria

together with PKK members, Turkish Hezbollah soon focused its attacks on the PKK,
blaming it for anti-Muslim activities (MIPT, n.d.). According to Turkish Hezbollah, PKK
was killing Muslims and collaborating with Armenians. The main reason that Turkish
Hezbollah picked the PKK as an enemy was to establish its (sole) authority in the
southeast part of Turkey where those two different ideological terrorist groups operate.
Although not a religiously motivated group, PKK established the Kurdish Prayer Leaders
Association to get popular sympathy in east and southeast regions where the majority of
the people are religious. This PKK strategy contradicted and conflicted with the goals and
policies of Turkish Hezbollah, which was also seeking more support and trying to recruit
in the region. As a result of the conflict between two groups, more than 500 terrorists
died between the years of 1992 and 1995 (Ozeren & Voorde, 2006).

Turkish Hezbollah’s situation greatly changed after the threat of the PKK
diminished in 1999. Security forces intensified operations against Hezbollah and many
members were arrested. The lack of the PKK as a serious adversary caused Turkish
Hezbollah to change its focus; in the mid-19905 it began to target secular academicians
and journalists, feminists and religious Muslims who did not support its goal of
establishing an Islamic state in Turkey. After operations that resulted in death of its

leader in 2000, many members escaped to Iran and Iraq (MIPT, n.d).

45

 

Turkish Hezbollah is suspected of bombings of synagogues and British targets in
Istanbul in 2003 that resulted in 62 deaths and over 650 injuries, one of the deadliest
terrorist attacks in Turkish terrorism history (MIPT, n.d.; Orttung, 2006). Although there
is a popular belief that there is a link between Al-Qaeda and Turkish Hezbollah, there is

no strong evidence that supports this idea.

Table 2. Activities of Turkish Hezbollah and counter-terrorism (1994-2006)

Incident Arrested (1 0,7 20) Dead Wounded

Convicted Released
Turkish Hezbollah 523 4,983 5,737 22

5
Source: TNP, 2006.

According to official statistics, Turkish Hezbollah carried out 523 terrorist
incidents between 1994 and 2006. In the operations conducted against Turkish Hezbollah

by Turkish authorities, 22 terrorists were killed and 10,720 terrorists were captured alive.

Almost half of them (4,983) remain imprisoned while the remainder has been released

(see Table 2) (TNP, 2006).

(2) DHKP/C

The main goal of the left wing terrorist organizations in Turkey is to establish a
new state based on Marxist ideology. In the 19705 when the left wing groups emerged,
the strongest support was from student organizations. In order to politicize the masses
and to prepare armed pioneers, left wing groups adapted the following general strategies
(Terrorist Organizations in Turkey, 2002): find and train new members in rural and urban
areas, followed by the selection of candidates for active cadres; politicize people through
psychological warfare (propaganda); initiate armed propaganda and constitute a
proletarian party for resistance and conflict; and, create economic, social, and political

crises to establish recruitment of villagers and workers. With civil war among the basic

46

goals, the sovereignty of the proletarian party can be ensured and a socialist regime
established to rule the country. The most active left wing groups in Turkey are DHKP-C
(Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front), the Turkish Revolutionary Communist
Communists Union (TIKB), the Turkish Communist Party-Marxist-Leninist (TKP-ML),
the Turkish Communist Labor Party-Leninist (TKEP-L), and the Marxist- Leninist
Communist Party (MLKP), (TNP, 2006).

DHKP/C is an internationally recognized terrorist organization, included on both
the EU’s and USA’s terrorist organizations list. DHKP/C goes back to 1978; at that time,
its original name was Devrimci Sol or Dev-Sol which means Revolutionary Way. In
1994, it adapted the name of DHKP/C. Dev-Sol was a faction of Turkish People's
Liberation Party-Front (THKP/C). Initially, THKP/C was a national political
organization; however because of its failures in the political arena it turned to terrorism as
an only way to carry out its goals. THKP/C gave birth to Dev-Sol which is, today, known
as DHKP/C (Katagiri, 2002). The name of DHKP/C includes two concepts: party and
front. While the concept of “party” stands for political activities of the group, the “front”
represents the group’s terrorist activities (The US Department of Sate [USDOS], 2005).

DHKP/C’s primary targets have been security and military personnel and assets.
Further, it has advocated a resistance against the West. Up to the late 19805, DHKP/C
intensified its terrorist activities. Between 1981 and 1983, successful operations of
security forces resulted in the arrests of many members and a decrease in terrorist
activities (Katagiri, 2002; MIPT, n.d.). In 1989, DHKP/C carried out simultaneous
attacks against Turkish and American economic assets in Ankara. Beginning in 1990, it

intensified terrorist activities against foreigners, especially against Western countries’

47

interests and personnel, including US and Britain (Katagiri, 2002). Apart from armed
attacks, hunger strikes became one of the organization’s methods to draw national and
international community attention to their members in prisons. In 1989, the leader and the
founder of DHKP/C, Dursun Karatas, escaped from the prison and escaped abroad.

Usurpation and robberies, aid campaigns, grants and subscriptions, incomes of the
publications, proceeds from musical concerts, drug trafficking, and donations from
European sympathizers are the general and main financial sources of leftist groups.
Illegal activities include manifesto distribution, placard hanging, illegal demonstration,
sabotage, arson, armed incursion, road blocking, ambush, armed propaganda, armed
attacks on security forces and police vehicles, solicitation of donations, burglary, and
robbery. All members in all left wing terrorist groups are exposed to political, military,
disciplinary, and psychological training before being allowed active participation in
group activities (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006; TNP, 2006).

The group has opposed US. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Its
socialist ideology asserts that U.S.-led imperialism attempts to dominate the world.
Believing Turkey to be a puppet of imperialist powers, it aims to demolish Western
influence in Turkey through violent activities (MIPT, n.d).

Ideology, goals, and structure of DHKP/C

DHKP/C has a Marxist-Leninist ideology, aiming to establish a state with leftist
ideology imported from communist Soviets. In its website, DHKP/C indicates that the
primary objective of the struggle is to destroy oligarchy, imperialism and the fascist state
system and to establish Revolutionary People Party in power. The following list

constitutes pre-determined enemies of the group: all imperialist powers, their military,

48

economic and political bases and their consulates; persons, businessmen, traders, and
land owners who cooperate with present system; ministers, bureaucrats and all persons
who represent the political party in power; military personnel, police, intelligence
officers, and village guards; all political parties which try to prevent DHKP/C and operate
within an oligarchic system; and, all state offices and private organizations that are used
to suppress DHKP/C by serving the oligarchic and imperialist system (DHKC, 1995).

The group has a pyramid type organizational structure, led by Dursun Karatas. On
top, there is a Central Committee and under this committee, three formations: Party Mass
Structure, Regional Committee, and Front Structure. Sub-groups of Party Mass Structure
are regional, provincial, district, and street level committees. The Regional Committee
includes military, legal, and political authorities. The front structure has regional
commandership and provincial committees (TNP, 2006).

DHKP/C activities and tactics

Generally DHKP/C operates in urban areas, but recently they have also initiated
some terrorist activities in rural areas (Cline, 2004). They usually prefer big cities, such
as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana, to launch attacks at their targets. In Ankara in
1989, the group carried out bomb attacks on the Turkish American Businessmen's
Association, the Economic Development Foundation, and the Metal Employees Union.
They also claimed responsibility for assassinating a former deputy director of the Turkish
National Intelligence Agency in Istanbul in 1990, and the murder of two US. Defense
Department contractors in 1991. In the same year, the group shot and injured a US. Air
Force officer in Izmir and murdered a British businessman in Istanbul. In 1992, the group

launched a rocket attack on the US. Consulate in Istanbul. The group bombed more than

49

twenty US and NATO military, corrnnercial, and cultural facilities. In 1996, they killed a
Turkish businessman and his two employees. An attempted attack on the US. Consulate
in Istanbul with light anti-tank weapons was prevented by the police (USDOS, 2005; The
Foundation for the Defense and Democracies [FDD], n.d.).

Table 3. Casualties caused by DHKP/C (1995-2006)
Dead (%) Wounded (%) Total (%)

 

 

Citizens 23 (45.1) 89 (27.8) 1 12 (30.2)
Government agents 28 (54.9) 231 (72.2) 259 (69.8)
Total 51 320 371

 

Source: TNP (2006)

Between the years of 1995 and 2006, DHKP-C terrorist organization killed 23
civilians and 28 government agents, and wounded 89 civilians and 231 government
agents (see Table 3). DHKP/C killed and wounded 259 security forces, more than 2.5
times the rate of civilian casualties (112). This supports the belief that DHKP/C’s main
target is the government and governmental forces, the biggest obstacles to its goal of
establishing a communist system. However, they do not hesitate to attack civilians or
generate collateral civilian casualties when considered necessary.

Suicide bombing has become their preferred method to destroy targets. They
launched their first suicide attack in January 2001, and then another in September of that
year (FDD, n.d.). Beginning in late 2001, they began to use explosive devices against
Turkish and the US. targets. Just before the NATO summit in June 2004, they managed
to explode a bus resulting in the four deaths (U SDOS, 2005). On July 1, 2005, one of the
suicide bombers of DHKP/C attempted to carry out an attack at the building of Ministry
of Justice, most likely targeting the Minister, although this attack was unsuccessful. He
was killed in the process of police intervention (CNN Turk, 2005). This incident is

described on the group’s web site (DHKC, 2005):

50

On July 1 we stood at the door of one of the centers where the oppressors
have taken countless decisions to carry out massacres. We armed ourselves with
bombs to demand a reckoning for the 119 people of ours that they murdered in
opening their F -Type prisons and continuing their policy of prison isolation.

On July 1 our fighter Eyup Beyaz canied out a sacrificial action against the
Justice Ministry. For some reason not known to us, the explosion did not occur.
Our comrade was murdered by the death squads of the AKP (Justice and
Development Party) government which are charged with the task of protecting
its torturing, murdering, thieving and pro-American ministers.

In December 1996, DHKP/C and PK signed a protocol to perform joint
operations against their mutual enemy - “oligarchy in Turkey”, but were unsuccessful in
this endeavor because of lack of member support (Terrorist Organizations in Turkey,
2002; DHKC, 1998). Most members of the organization, including the leader Dursun
Karatas, live in four European countries-Italy, Germany, Belgium, and Holland (BBC
News, 2004). After Karatas’s prison escape and emigration in 1989, the group founded its
headquarters in Germany (ICT, 2000). The group raises funds in Western Europe
(IACSP, 2001) and is believed to have training facilities and offices in Western Europe,
Lebanon and Syria (ICT, 2000; USDOS, 2005).

Since the European Union listed DHKP/C in the European terrorist organizations
list, some European countries have become aware of the danger in their own countries.
In April 2004, after long-term preparations of security forces and intelligence services,
five countries, including Turkey, Italy, Holland, Germany, and Belgium, carried out joint
and simultaneous operations against DHKP/C’s safe houses and bases. These operations

detained 53 group members (Gunec, Gun, & Kaya, 2004).

Table 4. Activities of DHKP/C and counter-terrorism (1995-2006)
Incident Arrested Dead Wounded

DHKP/C 2,503 8,410 186 108
Source: TNP, 2006.

 

 

51

According to official reports, DHKP/C carried out 2,503 terrorist incidents
between 1995 and 2006. In the operations conducted against DHKP-C, 186 terrorists
were killed and 8,410 terrorists were captured alive (see Table 4). DHKP/C terrorist
organization remains a serious threat to the security of Turkey.

(3) Comparison between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah

Comparing the combined data of all religiously motivated and left wing groups
(see Figure 4) with the data of Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C (see Figure 5 and 6)
reveals similar patterns in terrorists arrested, terrorist casualties, and security forces and
civilians casualties, differing primarily by the number of arrests. That is, while the
number of arrested terrorists in all left wing groups is higher than all religiously
motivated terrorists, data on Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C reveals that there are more
arrested terrorists in Turkish Hezbollah than DHKP/C.

Figure 5. Terrorist incidents conducted by DHKP & Turkish Hezbollah and
counter— terrorism (1994-2006)15

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

120004 _ ‘ __
1oooo4/’ ,_ __ m ___ _ _ _w
8000// _____ __.__ ,_ or
eooo//
4000M __ 250 ‘
L/
2000 2
o . - .
Terrorist incident Arrested terrorist Dead tenoriet Wounded terrorist
[arumish Hezbollah r3 DHK—PIC :

 

 

Source: TNP, 2006.
Over the same period of time (1994-2006), DHKP/C committed almost five times
more terrorist incidents. When compared to Turkish Hezbollah, DHKP/C members are

more likely to be killed or wounded by security forces during armed conflict or because

 

15 Terrorist incidents conducted by DHKP/C and counter-terrorism activities cover the years between
1995 and 2006.

52

of their own mistakes (i.e. premature explosive detonation); 22 Turkish Hezbollah
members were killed and five (5) wounded, while these numbers are 186 and 108
respectively for DHKP/C.

Figure 6. Casualties caused by DHKP/C & Turkish Hezbollah (1994-2006)l6

 

600 —
500 ~
400 ~
300 - 243
200 4
100 -
0 —
1 Kiled Clizens Killed securit/ Wounded cilizens Wounded security Total kiled or Total kiled or
broes broes wounded citizens wounded

 
   
 

23

 

 

 

 

 

secbroes

 

 

 

1 __
L l I Turkish Hezbollah a DHKP/C

7 _._,-__—_4

 

Source: TNP, 2006.

While Turkish Hezbollah’s main target is civilians, DHKP/C mostly targets
security forces. Turkish Hezbollah scored 530 civilian casualties (dead and wounded)
between 1994 and 2006, almost five (5) times the casualty rate caused by DHKP/C (112)
between 1995 and 2006. Conversely, during the same time period, DHKP/C was
responsible for 259 security force casualties; almost 4 times higher than Turkish
Hezbollah sourced security-force casualties (71) (see Figure 6).

This preliminary examination confirms that while DHKP/C directs its attacks
towards security forces, Turkish Hezbollah usually selects civilians as its target. Despite
the different rates of incidents executed and members arrested, killed, or wounded,
neither organization has difficulty in finding members who will be used in their murder

missions. The number of arrested and killed members of terrorists in each year between

 

16 Casualties caused by DHKP/C cover the years between 1995 and 2006.

53

1994 and 2006 far exceed the incidents executed. This seems to indicate the recruitment
of a huge number of individuals to deploy in different terrorist missions. With these
findings in mind, the next chapter will examine literature and theoretical approaches to
identify specific factors that lead individuals to participate in terrorist groups.
Accordingly, this theoretical and literature review will be structured to answer this
study’s main research questions: What are the background characteristics of terrorists
fi'om different ideological perspectives? How do potential recruits learn about terrorist
groups? What types of factors motivate them to pursue and join groups with violent

political ideologies?

54

CHAPTER THREE
PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: LITERATURE
AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Finding new members is a critical issue for all terrorist organizations: all terrorist
organizations need new members in order to remain active. New members increase the
morale and motivation of the other members of terrorist groups, make the terrorist
organization strong against the government, keep the group dynamic, facilitate the
organization’s activities, and help publicize the organization’s ideology.

A better understanding of terrorist participation has important policy and
investigation implications. An empirical understanding of why individuals decide to
participate in terrorist organizations is essential to create adequate policies and strategies
to prevent the development and strengthening of terrorist groups. However, participation
in terrorist organizations is one of the least studied areas, making the question of ‘why
does a person become a terrorist?’ difficult to answer.

This chapter will examine the existing research literature regarding individual’s
participation in violent terrorist groups, and the various theoretical approaches that might
clarify understanding of this process. Accordingly, this chapter consists of three sections:
the first section includes examination of empirical studies on participation in terrorist
groups. The second section discusses the literature in terms of individuals’ participation
in terrorist groups; these topics include “background characteristics”, “learning related

,9 ‘6

factors , motivational factors”, and “participation in suicide missions”. In order to
9

understand why people join terrorist groups, it is crucial to know “who these persons are’

and “what kind of background characteristics they have.” It is also necessary to know

55

how they become aware of terrorist groups. In other words, from what kinds of sources
they learn about terrorist groups. A detailed understanding of the participation process
also entails having information on the root motivations that promote their decisions to
join terrorist groups. Finally, in order to have a more complete view, we also need to
examine participants of suicide missions by answering the questions of “Who becomes a
suicide bomber?” and “Why does he/she become a suicide bomber/terrorist?” The third
section will focus on theoretical approaches that might help explain the participation
process outlined above.

1. Research on Participation in Terrorist Groups

Studies that examine participation in terrorist groups are mostly limited to
information on background characteristics of individuals joining terrorist organizations.
However, information on how individuals learn about terrorist groups and the kinds of
factors that motivate them are not well understood or represented in the research. In this
section, several of the major studies of participation in terrorist groups are identified. The
following sections then reviewed the key findings from this research.

Participation in a terrorist group is a process rather than a single decision
(Sageman, 2004). In other words, individuals do not become terrorists overnight (Horgan,
2003b). There are several factors that prepare individuals to come to a decision to
participate in a terrorist group. According to Martin (2006, p. 77), factors that lead to
participation in terrorist groups and volunteering to commit violent acts are “(1) Logical
choice and political strategy, (2) Collective rationality, (3) Lack of opportunity for
political participation, (4) Dissatisfaction within an elite.” To Martin, individual level

causes of terrorism might have rational, psychological, and cultural origins. From the

56

 

 

 

rationalist perspective, an individual makes a cost benefit analysis. Psychological
motivation includes dissatisfaction with one’s life and accomplishments. An individual’s
culturally-based motivation relates to his (or her) perception of others that contains the
idea of us versus them.

In the terrorism literature, there are no studies that focus exclusively on
participation in terrorist groups. Sageman (2004) examined the global Salafi jihad, as
represented by al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups across the world. His data were
culled from public sources as he did not have direct access to terrorists or governmental
reports, and included in his analysis, terrorists for whom sufficient background
information was available. Sagemen details the reasons for individuals’ participation in
terrorist groups and involvement in terrorism under three main topics: social background
(background characteristics), psychological make-up (motivation), and particular
situation at the time of recruitment by concentrating on terrorists’ specific characteristics,
patterns of joining the jihad, and participant behaviors. Similarly, Stem’s (2003)
interviews of members of religiously motivated terrorist. groups examined grievances that
promote terrorism in the name of holy war. Although her main focus is not on
participation, she identifies and discusses factors and motivators that facilitate
participation.

Weinberg and Eubank (1987) examined the Italian left and right wing terrorist
organizations’ members in the 19705, emphasizing 1977 as the turning point in Italy
because of the changing characteristics of both left and right wing (Neo-Fascist) terrorist
groups and their terrorist activities. After 1977, terrorist groups succeeded in recruiting

significant numbers of people, and consequently, the number of terrorist incidents

57

increased. While the right wing groups were more effective before 1977, revolutionary
communist groups rose to ascendancy afterwards. Using analysis of two nation-wide
newspapers and court records, the authors tried to answer the question of whether there
were background differences (gender, birth place, occupation, family relations, pre-
terrorist political involvement, and age) between individuals involved in terrorist
activities before and after 1977 by examining the biographical information of 2,512
individuals arrested or for whom arrest warrants were issued between 1970 and 1984.
Smith (1994) focused on American left and right wing terrorist groups in the 19805 by
examining records of 173 American terrorists that came to the attention of the FBI.
Focusing on background characteristics and profiles of individual participants in left and
right wing terrorist groups, he concluded that the findings about the left wing groups
were consistent with the literature, but that right wing extremists differed significantly.
There are several studies conducted on Turkish terrorist organizations. Teymur
(2004) descriptively examined the background characteristics of 74 members of left wing
DHKP/C terrorist organization. For his study, he analyzed documents captured from
terrorists to examine the effects of background characteristics on recruitment. Another
study that surveyed prisoners focused on background characteristics of 1,077 Turkish left
wing terrorists without having specific concems about the participation issue (Yilmaz,
Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003). Ozender (1998) also surveyed PKK prisoners in 1994 and 1995
at the direction of the Turkish National Security Council in order to examine social and
cultural characteristics of terrorists. This study examined 1,003 terrorists, including 451
prisoners who utilized the Amnesty Law that offered reduced punishments or pardons for

cooperation with the law enforcement, and 552 prisoners who did not cooperate.

58

 

 

Cantekin’s (2006) research also focused on the PKK; he collected data from official
statements of 97 PKK terrorists who were captured or surrendered. This study was
intended to create a general profile of terrorists, and generate ideas about the reasons for
participation and desistence. Caglar (2006) focused on Turkish religiously motivated
groups by interviewing six senior police officers and using open sources (i.e. newspaper
archives) to generate his data.

The most comprehensive research to date about suicide terrorism is by Pape
(2005) who examined all the suicide attacks (315 incidents) across the world between
1980 and 2003. He attempted to figure out the strategic logic behind the suicide
terrorism, and his analysis included discussion on why individuals become suicide
terrorists.

Examination of these studies revealed that there has been relatively little scholarly
attention paid to understanding the factors that are relevant to participation in terrorist
organizations. Together, these studies do not constitute a solid knowledge base for
understanding the participation process. With the limitations of each of these studies in
mind, the next part examines factors deemed relevant to participation in terrorist groups.
These factors will be examined under the sub-topics of ‘background characteristics’,
‘motivational factors’, ‘learning related factors’, and ‘participation in suicide missions.’
Findings of abovementioned empirical studies and other terrorism literature will be used
to structure a broader discussion.

2. Factors Affecting Participation in Terrorist Organizations
Some research indicates that psychological factors such as madness (i.e., insanity)

and paranoia are important characteristics of individuals who become terrorists. They

59

 

 

 

assert that terrorists are mentally ill and that illness motivates them towards participation
in terrorist groups. In this view, terrorism is not an intentional or decisive act, but one
promoted by psychological forces behind it (Corrado, 1981; Post, 1990). Laqueur (2001)
explains that all paranoids are not terrorists, but all terrorists are paranoid. They are
paranoid of being victimized by hostile forces, and may also possess different levels of
delusion and persecution mania. If these claims are true, then the answer to the question
of “Why does a person become a terrorist?” is simple; individuals become terrorists
because they are mad and paranoid. However, no comprehensive empirical research on
the psychological conditions of terrorists has been conducted to substantiate this claim
(Sageman, 2004). In fact, the empirical validity of these claims is difficult to assess since
there is no way to test them directly as motivations may be deeply hidden in the
unconscious. What we know about terrorists’ psychology is much less than what we do
not know (Akers, 2000; Ferracuti, 1982; Merari, 1990).

A majority of researchers believe that terrorists are neither psychotic nor
abnormal; they are normal persons (Borum, 2004; Crenshaw, 1981; Hudson, 1999; Lyons
& Harbinson, 1986 cited in Horgan, 2003a; McCormick 2003; Silke, 2004a). Most of
them appear to have above the average intelligence level and also have sophisticated
ethical and moral development (Merari, 1990). Sageman’s (2004) examination of 61
terrorists’ childhoods revealed that only four of them had conduct disorders. Others had
normal childhoods with no criminal record. He concludes that mental illness as an
explanation for terrorism is not supported in his research.

There is no single terrorist personality (Duyvesteyn, 2004; Hudson, 1999). A

factor which effectively influences one person may not be relevant to another,

60

particularly because people who join terrorist groups come from different cultures,
religions, nationalities, and social structures. As Stern (2003, p. 283) indicates “the same
variables (political, religious, social, or all of the above) that seem to have caused one
person to become a terrorist might cause another to become a saint.” The following
discussion elaborates upon the factors that are thought relevant to participation in terrorist
groups.

(1) Background characteristics

To understand why an individual becomes a terrorist, it is necessary to find out
who becomes a terrorist and what that person’s background characteristics are. Analysis
of background characteristic is likely to give a detailed picture of individuals who
participate in terrorist groups.

Different terrorist groups such as left, right, separatist, or religiously motivated
have different ideological perspectives, and it is likely that different ideologies would
attract different kinds of people. Accordingly, background characteristics may play a role
in individuals’ selection of terrorist organization in which they will participate (Weinberg
& Eubank, 1987). A single background characteristic alone might not be directly
responsible for an individual’s becoming a terrorist, although the combination of several
factors, such as learned factors and various motivational factors, might result in an
individual’s decision to join a terrorist organization. Background characteristics of
terrorists to be considered in this discussion are: age, gender, education, social-economic
status, occupation, marital status, and geographic location.

Age; Age is a significant biological factor that is associated with participation in

terrorist organizations, although there is some variation in the literature in terms of

61

 

 

terrorists’ ages. The literature usually claims that individuals who join terrorist groups are
young, usually between the ages of 15 and 25; this range is stable across the cultures and
religions (Silke, 2003). Turk (1982) reinforces that two important predictors of the
process of moving from resentment to using terrorist tactics and ideology are social class
and youthfulness. Ibrahim’s (1982, cited in Sageman, 2004) findings on two different
Egyptian terrorist groups also support this claim. Some studies of terrorism in Turkey
also revealed that majority of the left wing (65%), right wing (72.5%), and separatist
(54%) terrorist groups’ members were between the ages of 14 and 25 (Alkan, 2002;
Alkan & Citak, 2006). One study of left wing Turkish terrorist prisoners found terrorists
to be older, with about one quarter (24.4%) between 18 and 26, and slightly over one-
third (33.3%) between 26 and 31 years old (Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003). Cantekin’s
(2006) study found that the three quarters (75%) percentage of PKK members were
between the ages of 1525, almost 20 percent higher than found in Alkan’s (2002)
research. Further, Cantekin’s data indicated that 83.5 percent were under the age of 25.
Other studies contradict the assumption that terrorists are usually between 14 and
25. Weinberg and Eubank’s (1987) research found that terrorists were younger; out of
2,512 individuals in their sample, almost half (46%) were younger than 11 years old, and
further, that left wing terrorists were younger than right wing terrorists. Conversely,
others argue that terrorism is not a youth movement (Sageman, 2004; Smith, 1994).
Smith’s (1994, p. xii) examination of American right and left wing groups found that
terrorists are “thirty-sometlring” activists with an average age of 35 at indictment for left
wing groups and 39 for right wing groups. These average ages are considerably older

than the findings of previous studies across the world. This finding demonstrates that

62

there may be a significant difference between the age distribution of the right and left
wing groups in America with the average age of the right wing terrorists higher than left
wing groups. Sageman’s (2004) findings are analogous to Smith’s (1994); he found that
the average age at the time of participation was slightly above twenty-five.

To summarize, studies of different terrorist groups in different geographic
locations in different years revealed inconsistent results. However, taking all the research
into account, it can be inferred that overall, terrorists’ ages tend to range between 11 and
39, and when compared with right wing groups, participants in left wing organizations
appear to be somewhat younger.

Gender: Like age, gender is one of the most important biological predictors of
participation in terrorist groups (Silke, 2003). Almost all terrorist groups across the world
are male dominated, with men comprising around 80 percent of group members for many
terrorist organizations (Merari, 1990). Recently however, women appear to be interested
in joining terrorist activities, especially in religiously motivated extremist groups.

Female participation in terrorism in the form of suicide bombers in the Middle East, Sri
Lanka, and Chechnya is indicative of this trend. Local and regional conflicts are regarded
as one of the basic reasons for this apparent trend (Oliverio & Lauderdale, 2005).

Females are likely to be introduced into terrorism by male counterparts. Female
terrorists generally do not have as much power position as males (Galvin, 1983).
Women’s roles, however, may change depending on the terrorist organizations in which
they serve. The Tupamaros, a Latin American terrorist organization, used female
terrorists to collect intelligence, to serve as nurses and to maintain safe-houses.

Depending on the commitment to the cause and level of the motivation, women terrorists

63

may be treated more professionally (Hudson, 1999). Females also have participated in
suicide missions for different ideological groups regardless of ideological orientation.
Galvin (1983) indicates that women’s roles are usually based on their sexuality.

In terms of recruitment of women as terrorists, left wing terrorist groups appear to
be more likely to recruit females than religiously motivated groups. One third (33%) of
Teymur’s (2004) sample examining the left wing DHKP/C was female terrorists. In
Smith’s (1994) study, the number of females was less than males in both left and right
wing groups in America. But, the percentage of females in left wing groups (27%) was
substantially more than the percentage of women in right wing groups (7%). Weinberg
and Eubank’s (1987) sample was male (82%) dominated, too, but they found a significant
increase in the number of females after 1977. The general gender profile seems similar
for separatist groups: 11 percent of Cantekin’s (2006) sample, and approximately 8
percent of Ozonder’s sample (cited in Cantekin, 2006) was comprised of female
terrorists. Although female participation in terrorist organizations is on the rise, terrorist
organizations regardless of type and ideology continue to be male dominated.

Education: “Education level” is a widely discussed factor to explain possible
participation in terrorist organizations. Lack of adequate education has been viewed as a
root cause of terrorism as well. Uneducated persons may be likely to join terrorist groups
because they are more susceptible to influence by terrorist propaganda, and they might be
more easily brainwashed than more educated persons. However, research on terrorists’
level of education contradicts this popular misconception.

Sageman’s (2004) findings refute the common idea that terrorism is a result of

lack of education. His research on global Salafi jihad members revealed that of the 132

64

terrorists on whom he was able to gather data about education level, 22 (17%) had less
than high school degree, 16 (12%) graduated from high school, 38 (29%) had some type
of college education, 44 (33%) finished the college, 7 (5%) had a master’s degree, and 5
(4%) had doctoral degrees. In other word, 83 percent finished a high school or higher
education, and a majority (over 60%) attended some college. Sageman (2004)
emphasized that his sample of terrorists were more educated than the average person
across the world. Their university studies ranged from religion to science, engineering,
computer science, and social science. Likewise, Kreuger and Maleckova (2003)
examined the background characteristics of 129 Hezbollah (Lebanese) members and
found that 47 percent of the Hezbollah members attended secondary school, compared to
only 38 percent of the general population of Lebanon, indicating a positive relationship
between education and likelihood of becoming a Hezbollah member. Ibrahim’s
examination of Egyptian terrorist groups (1982 cited in Sageman, 2004), and Post,
Sprinzak and Denny’s (2003) study on 35 incarcerated Middle-Eastem terrorists revealed
similar findings, that terrorists were educated people.

Research on left wing groups shows comparable results. In the late 19705, the
German Federal Ministry of Domestic Affairs examined 227 arrested left-wing terrorists,
and found that terrorists had above average educational levels and many of them attended
university (Sageman, 2004). These findings are supported for the majority of Italian right
and left wing terrorist groups (Weinberg & Eubank, 1987) as well as Turkish left wing
groups (Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003), whose participants generally had at least a high

school education.

65

Explaining why educated persons become terrorists elicits discrepancies between
the researchers. One perspective contends that universities or other professional schools
have become one of the primary sources of encountering and learning about terrorist
groups. These institutions create an appropriate environment for religious, revolutionary,
or other groups that try to find new members (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003; Russell &
Miller, 1978). Kreuger and Maleckova (2003) assert that educated people with affluent
backgrounds are more likely to engage in political activities for several reasons: political
engagement using violent methods requires very low level of expertise and effort; these
terrorists are educated and wealthy enough to direct their attentions to these kinds of
activities rather than basic survival and economic concerns; and, the opportunity cost in
terms of participation is lower for affluent people compared to impoverished persons
which makes it easier for affluent people to become more closely committed to the
objectives of the terrorist organizations.

Other studies, on the other hand, refute that terrorists are educated people.
Smith’s (1994) examination of American domestic terrorist groups revealed that rightist
groups were not well educated, and there was a substantial variation in education level
between right and left wing groups: over half of the leftist groups were college or
university graduates, while only 12 percent of the right wing terrorists had a college
degree. Cantekin’s (2006) study on the separatist PKK group revealed that 80 percent had
a middle school or lower level education while just 20 percent of the sample had
completed high school, and only 2 had completed a university degree. Similarly, in
Ozonder’s (1997, cited in Cantekin, 2006) research, the majority of the PKK terrorists

graduated only from primary school (47, 2%).

66

Findings from the research challenge the common belief that terrorists are
uneducated individuals, however, given that some studies found that terrorists are not
well educated, it is still difficult to propose a relationship between terrorism and
educational level that is generalizable to different geographical, ideological, or cultural
contexts.

Socio-economic status and pover_ty: The terrorism literature habitually indicates
that underprivileged individuals are likely to be targeted by terrorist organizations for
recnritment, although the research includes some controversial findings. Turk (1982)
attempts to explain why people who have lower and higher socio-economic status might
engage in terrorism. To Turk, lower-class socialization reflects experiences of material
and cultural deprivation. Utilizing these negative life conditions, terrorist organizations
may promise equal life standards to individuals with lower socio-economic status.
Contrary to lower-class socialization, higher-class socialization reflects privileges and
successful experiences, making upper-class members more likely to take decisive action,
challenge authorities openly when they are not happy with policies or arrangements, and
even to view terrorism as an indicator of their decisiveness and political commitment. In
this context, young persons and politically inexperienced persons are more likely to join
illegal political movements (Turk, 1982). Using a similar approach, Crenshaw (1981)
contends that elites of a society, usually small in number and unhappy with social or
economic contexts, may initiate terrorist activities on behalf of a wider constituency.
They, however, may not ask for the approval and support of the constituency. These
movements usually emerge when mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide. Many

revolutionary movements demonstrate this approach.

67

Stern (2003) notes that the role of poverty as a risk factor for terrorist
participation is controversial. Nevertheless, she seems to support idea that there is a
correlation between poverty and participation in terrorist groups. “The September 11
bombers were mostly drawn from Saudi Arabia’s elite does not prove that poverty and
terrorism are uncorrelated. Several studies have shown that states most susceptible to
ethno-religious conflict are those that are poorer, unstable, and have a history of violence
and conflict” (p. 284). She presents a compelling argument that in different parts of the
world, rebellions occurred during periods of economic stagnations; in poor countries it is
easy to convince poor people to join terrorist group by offering them economic benefits;
and in some organizations militants’ families are given monetary support. Likewise,
Laqueur (1977) indicates that terrorism is more likely to appear in areas where people
have grievances, such as poverty, inequality, lack of political participation and injustice.

There are examples that show how terrorist groups make use of the poor
economic conditions of individuals. In Indonesia, after the 1997-1998 crises, the
economic downturn and lack of adequate job opportunities increased participation in
extremist groups that offer employment (Stern, 2003). Lower socio-economic status
characterizes Turkish left wing groups. Seventy-two percent of all terrorists indicated that
they have lower level socio-economic status. Only one in four (26 percent) indicated
middle socio-economic class origins. The rate of upper class individuals was just 2
percent (Y ilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003). For suicide missions, some terrorist groups
provide the families of recruited youth with financial support; this may motivate poor

youths to join terrorist groups or/and launch suicide attacks (Pape, 2005).

68

Not all studies support the claim that terrorist groups attract lower socio-economic
status individuals. In fact, many groups do not have uniform socio-economic
characteristics. While some of these studies found that terrorists are from middle or upper
social class (Sageman, 2004), some others revealed that terrorists are from middle or
lower social class (Ibrahim, 1982 cited in Sageman, 2004; Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi,
2003). A study on Italian terrorist groups found that the socio-economic status of
terrorists varies depending on in which type of ideological groups they serve. Italian right
wing group members were from the middle class; left wing groups’ original social status
was lower than the right wing groups’ members (Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). Sageman
(2004) divided his sample into three categories according to socio-economic status of
terrorists’ families: upper, middle, and lower class. For the 102 people (out of 172) for
whom he was able to gather data on socio-economic status, 18 (17%) were upper, 56
(56%) were middle, and 28 (27%) were lower class individuals. Seventy-three percent of
all individuals represented were from the middle or upper classes. He concluded that
members of global Salafi jihad come from relatively rich and better educated families
than the average population. Analogous with Sageman’s findings, a study of German left
wing terrorist groups revealed that terrorists generally come from upper-middle class
(Sageman, 2004). A study that examined the background characteristics of 129 Hezbollah
members and compared it with the general population of Lebanon found that the poverty
rate of Hezbollah members was 28 percent, compared to 33 percent of the general
population. These findings suggested a negative relationship between poverty rate and
participation in Hezbollah (Kreuger & Maleckova, 2003). In conclusion, the connection

between poverty and terrorism is indirect, complicated and weak (Kreuger & Maleckova,

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2003). Like education and age, research suggests that there may be variation across types
of terrorist organizations.

Occupation: Sageman (2004) notes that terrorists are popularly known as people
who do not have decent employment. By contrast, his study revealed that of the 134
terrorists, 101 had some kind of occupation; be classified the remainder (33 terrorists) as
unskilled. More specifically, 44 out of 101 were professionals, such as physicians,
architects, preachers and teachers. Others were police, military, mechanics, and small
businessmen, etc. He contended that involvement in terrorist activities was the result of
rising, not lowered expectations: having no employment or occupation did not appear to
be a significant factor in participation in terrorist groups. Despite their occupational
advantages, Sagemen reported that the subjects of his study preferred being terrorists.
Similarly, Hudson (1999) concluded that terrorist groups had recently been recruiting
experts in different occupational fields, such as communications, computer programming,
engineering, finance, and the sciences. For example, Al-Qaeda recruits highly skilled
professionals from engineering, medicine, chemistry, physics, computer programming,
communications, and so forth.

In contrast to Sageman’s study, other research supports the claim that terrorists do
not have decent employment. Cantekin (2006) found that 35.1 percent of PKK members
were unemployed, while others worked at low paying jobs, such as construction (22.7%)
or as owners of small shops like auto-repair or tailoring (22.7%). This group also
contained students (15.5%). Similarly, Ozonder’s (1998) study found that almost 36
percent of PKK members did not have any employment before joining the group.

Another study of left wing terrorist group members in Germany in the late 19705 revealed

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that just 35 percent of 227 terrorist had a firlltime job (Sageman, 2004). Teymur’s (2004)
data indicated that more than 50 percent of all left wing terrorists (in the DHKP/C sample
he studied) were unemployed with just 8 percent of them working in full time jobs.
Caglar’s (2006) findings on Turkish religiously motivated groups revealed that 42.5% of
his sample was unemployed; the remainder were students (12%), workers (14%), public
officers (5.5%), and small-scale tradesmen (26%). In Caglar’s data, the occupations of
terrorists’ parents were small-scale tradesmen (33%), workers and public officials (29%),
farmers (24%), and retirees (14%). Teymur (2004) and Caglar’s (2006) research indicate
considerable occupational variation between the two ideologically different groups active
in Turkey. That is, religiously motivated groups (as a whole) appeared to have
occupational advantages compared to the left wing DHKP/C groups. Group based
differences were also observed in the US; right wing groups had lower job skills as
compared to left wing group (Smith, 1994). While many leftists were professionals, such
as physicians, attorneys, teachers, and social workers, a large number of right wing
groups’ members were unemployed or impoverished, although some were self-employed
workers (Smith, 1994). Weinberg and Eubank’s (1987) study demonstrated that the
occupational characteristic of terrorists changed over time. Until 1977, terrorists had
higher level occupational status as business managers, legal, medical, and journalism
professionals, and industrialists, as well as some middle class occupations like salesmen,
shopkeepers, police, and military forces. After 1977, when the number of terrorist groups
and incidents increased, the quality of occupation of terrorists’ decreased. These
occupations included workers, white-collar clerks, and some number of criminals, ex-

convicts, and prostitutes.

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Occupational characteristics of terrorists appear to change depending on the era,
group ideology, type, and geographical location of terrorist groups. It should be
remembered that many terrorist groups may prefer students to recruit, and that it is
expected that some findings may reflect terrorists as unemployed.

Marital status: It is a commonly held belief that terrorists are single persons
without the social and emotional ties that accompany marriage. Some groups, including
the PKK, see marriage as a biggest obstacle for the group and they aim to destroy
marriage based values. The PKK declares that marriage is a betrayal of the revolutionary
movement of the PKK (Ozonder, 1998). Russell and Miller’s (1977) study (conducted
during the 19705) revealed that between 70 -80 percent of terrorists are unmarried. This is
especially the case for left wing ideologues. Many of these groups believe that total
dedication to a revolutionary cause requires no social ties (Hudson, 1999). Two different
Turkish studies of left wing groups revealed similar findings. In one study, only 17
percent of the sample was married; the remainder was single (including divorced and
widowed members) (Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003). In the other, only ten percent were
married (Teymur, 2004). Cantekin’s (2006) findings on the separatist group PKK support
these findings. That is, 90 percent of PKK members were single.

Sageman’s (2004) study on religious extremists (global Salafi jihad) contradicts
the findings of the studies on left wing and separatist groups. He found that 73 percent
(83 persons) of his sample was married. Some of those in his sample who were single
were too young to be married, a student, or bad economic problems.

Based on these findings, religiously motivated groups’ members are more likely

to be married as compared to left wing groups. However, there is not enough research

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that examines detailed information about different ideological groups across the world to
make broad generalizations.

Geographic location and mobility: When individuals live away from their
families, they lose their social ties with close fiiends and family members; and they may
become more open or susceptible to exposure to terrorists’ propaganda. Ibrahim (1982,
cited in Sageman, 2004) found that the mobility distanced his samples from their families
and friends in their hometowns, especially when they moved to big university cities to
pursue education. This process creates suitable conditions for terrorist groups that seek
new members for recruitment. As Ibrahim (1980, p. 448) notes, “The militant Islamic
groups with their emphasis on brotherhood, mutual sharing, and spiritual support become
the functional equivalent of the extended family to the youngster who has left his
behind.”

On the other hand, sharing the same birthplace might be an important factor
during the recruitment process. It may be especially important when individuals live
away from their hometown/birthplace. Terrorist recruiters may use the same birthplace to
easily establish friendship bonds.

Urban areas are considered advantageous places for terrorist organizations to find
new members to recruit. Terrorists may easily hide themselves in crowded populations.
Social events like demonstrations generally occur in urban areas that might attract
individuals’ attention and may help them learn about the ideology of terrorist groups.
Further, when we consider that universities are mostly located in the big cities/urban
areas, and terrorists choose their members among the youths especially from the

universities, the importance of urban areas is magnified. Additionally, if the

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unemployment rate is high in big cities, it might facilitate recruitment. It must be stressed
that in larger populations and in bigger cities, the greater the possibility of terrorist
activities including recruitment (Ross, 1993). Weinberg and Eubank’s (1987)
examination of Italian terrorists found that although terrorists were overwhelmingly born
in smaller cities, as adults, they were more likely to live in the big cities. They conclude
that terrorists are geographically mobile and generally chose big cities. Further, they
could not find significant differences between the right and left wing terrorists in terms of
size of the communities in which they lived. Teymur’s (2004) findings parallel Weinberg
and Eubank’s (1987). Teymur (2004) found that 60 percent of terrorists who moved to
another city were originally from villages or rural areas. In contrast, Ibrahim (1982, cited
in Sageman, 2004) focused on the place of recruitment and found that terrorists were
from rural or small towns. In Sageman’s (2004) study, 115 (70%) out of 165 terrorists
joined the terrorist groups in a country where they did not grow up.

In sum, even if terrorists were born in villages orlrural areas, they usually are
recruited in big cities where they live as adults; however, not all studies support this
claim.

Number of siblings: Some studies have examined the number of terrorist’s
siblings, reasoning that a large number of siblings in a family might result in less parental
control over the children. This, in turn, might affect individuals’ participation in criminal
groups. In this context, Cantekin (2006) found that 65 percent of the PKK members had
six (6) or more siblings, while Teymur (2004) found the same for 36 percent of the left

wing DHKP/C members.

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Overall, almost all background characteristics of terrorists vary according to the
geographical operational location, ideologies represented, and desired objectives. Even
within the same country there are variations in the background characteristics of different
terrorist groups. Among all background related variables, gender appears to have the
most generalizable characteristics. That is, all the terrorist groups are male dominated,
despite an increase in the participation of females in some terrorist groups.

(2) Learning related factors

The participation process includes various factors that help individuals learn about
terrorist groups and their activities. The leaming process eases individuals’ participation.
The more effective the learning factors, the easier and more quickly individuals commit
to join terrorist groups. Accordingly, Horgan (2003b, p. 113) accentuates that becoming a
terrorist involves a learning process, “There is undeniably a gradual learning process that
appears to typify involvement in terrorism.” The things people learn may include various
issues such as motives, attitudes, rationalizations, and even the ways joining criminal
groups and committing crime (Vito & Holmes, 1994). There might be several sources
that individuals learn about terrorist groups such as friendship, kinship, prison life,
propaganda through publications, the media and/or intemet, and organizational activities.

Friendship: Friendship is a significant factor in the process of participation in
terrorist organizations. Many findings suggest that fiiends facilitate the learning process
and/or help their fiiends and acquaintances join terrorist groups (Ibrahim, 1980, 1982;
Sageman, 2004; Della Porta, 1988 cited in Sageman, 2004). People, especially the young,
may tend to adapt their peer’s perspective since they like or respect them, or they may

want to be more acceptable to them (Kiknadze, 2007). Ibralrim’s (1980, 1982) study

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found the influence of friendship relations on participation in two Egyptian religiously
motivated terrorist organizations, The Islamic Liberation Organization (ILO) and The
Jamaat al-Muslimin (MG). Sageman (2004) points out that despite lack of strong
religious beliefs of some al-Qaeda members, they learned through friendship about the
religiously motivated terrorist group (al-Qaeda) that they joined. Solidification of
friendship relations precedes formal induction into the terrorist organization (Sageman,
2004). Due to strong relations between friends, as in the example of global Salafi jihad
members, sometimes prospective terrorists volunteer to join the terrorist group before
receiving an invitation from the terrorist organization’s members. Sageman’s (2004)
research revealed that 150 out of the 172 terrorists he examined had preexisting social
bonds before formally joining the global jihad. Similarly, TNP officers’ interviews with
detained al-Qaeda terrorists who organized suicide bombing attacks in Istanbul in
November 3 against the Israeli and Western targets (two synagogues, an HSBC bank, and
the British Consulate) revealed that they joined terrorist organizations through family and
friendship networks. To a large extent, these findings demonstrate that preexisting
fiiendships and family bonds were effective mechanisms in terms of learning about and
joining terrorist groups (McGarrell, Freilich & Chennak, 2007).

Della Porta (1988, cited in Sageman, 2004) examined 1,200 Italian left wing
terrorists using court records: he found that seventy percent of his sample had at least
one fiiend who was already a member of a terrorist organization. Thus, fiiendship
appears to be a significant factor in terms of learning about Italian left wing terrorist
groups and their activities. Similarly, Cantekin (2006) identified friendship as the biggest

factor in terms of imposing PKK’s ideology. That is, those who mention PK

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propaganda activities as a factor in their participation mostly emphasized on the influence
of friends (67.3%) as a source of propaganda. Della Porta (1988, cited in Sageman, 2004)
notes:
“Decisions to join underground organizations were taken by clusters or
cliques of people connected to each other by joint involvements in more than

one activity. For example, quite frequently new recruits were next-door

neighbors who worked in the same department of a big factory; school friends

who used to spend their vacations together; cousins who belonged to the same

voluntary association” (p. 132).

Kinship: Family members and/or relatives who are members of terrorist
organizations have significant effects on learning about the activities and ideologies of a
terrorist group and becoming a member of it. There are many couples, brothers, and
sisters who belong to the same terrorist organizations, reinforcing the learning process
through interaction between the close family members (Ibrahim, 1980, 1982; Sageman,
2004; Della Porta, 1988 cited in Sageman, 2004). Almost all the research revealed that
kinship was a significant factor for participation in terrorist groups, including Wasmund’s
(1986, cited in Sageman, 2004) examination of the German Red Army Faction (RAF),
Della Porta’s (1988, cited in Sageman, 2004) and Weinberg and Eubank’s (1987) studies
on Italian terrorist groups, Ibrahim’s (1980, 1982) research on Egyptian religiously
motivated terrorist groups, Post, Sprinzak and Denny’s (2003) research on religiously
motivated and secular groups, Teymur’s (2004) study on a Turkish left wing group, and
Cantekin’s (2006) study on separatist PKK.

According to Post, Sprinzak and Denny (2003), politically active families
socialize their children to the movement at early ages. Twenty percent of religiously

motivated group members and 30 percent of secular group members emphasized that the

main factor that influenced their participation in their respective terrorist organizations

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was their families. Some of the terrorists who did not have any family members in the
groups stated that their younger brothers followed them and joined the same group, so
their participation set an example for their brothers. In the event that a family member,
such as father or elder brother, was already in a terrorist group, it was most likely that
persons would join the same organization. In only a few instances did individuals not
follow the same path as their family members; in these cases, individuals selected more
radical groups to join. Teymur’s (2004) findings are analogous: he found that family
members of almost half his sample had been arrested at least one time because of their
terrorist activities. Being a member of a family in which some members were/are
terrorists was likely to help individuals learn about terrorism and terrorist groups. As an
example of the influence of family members on participation in terrorist groups, Silke
(2003) provides the life story of Gerry Adams, the leader of the republican political party
Sinn F ein. Adams explains that his basic motivation was his family’s background. His
father and uncle were members of the IRA. While his father was in the IRA, he was shot
and wounded by the Royal Ulster Constabulary. His uncle was involved in a bombing
campaign in Britain. Gerry stressed that being a member of the IRA was a kind of
carrying out a family tradition.

Sageman (2004) found that 14 percent of his sample learned and joined terrorist
groups through kinship connections. For instance, the perpetrators of the September 11
attacks included brothers of two different families (al-Hazmi and al-Shehri) and three
cousins (Hamza, Ahmed and Ahmed al-Haznawi). Additionally, marriage is another
means to learn about and become involved in terrorist activities through spouse or/and

spouse’s relatives. Sageman (2004) notes that some of the individuals converted to Islam

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upon marriage to Muslim women and became the supporter or active members of global
Salafi jihad. Kinship has a significant effect on the participation in left wing groups, as
well as religiously motivated groups. In Weinberg and Eubank’s (1987) research, 13
percent of all terrorists had family connections in their respective terrorist groups; the
researchers also observed a greater prevalence of married couples, and believed this is a
result of husbands’ encouragement of their wives. In Della Porta’s (1988, cited in
Sageman, 2004) study, 298 out of 1,200 left wing terrorists (Italian Red Brigades) had at
least one relative (spouse, brother, sister) in the terrorist organization who shared similar
beliefs. Therefore, for Italian left wing groups, participation in terrorist groups is more
likely when it occurs through kinship ties. Cantekin’s (2006) analysis of the PKK
revealed that 5.4 percent of terrorists that joined the group as result of the organizational
propaganda exposed to their families or relatives to propaganda. Fields (1979, cited in
Horgan, 2003a) studied terrorism in Northern Ireland and found familial influence on
persons who decided to become terrorists.

Contrary to the aforementioned finding, some researchers emphasize that
although nationalist or separatist terrorists are loyal to their parents, anarchic and left
wing ideological groups are disloyal to their parent’s generation. In fact, anarchist groups
think that they are striking at their parents using terrorism, and attack outside enemies to
help them heal their inner wounds (Hudson, 1999; Sageman, 2004). Nevertheless,
existing research confirms the influence of kinship factors in participation in terrorist
groups, regardless of the ideology and objective of terrorist groups.

Prison life: In the criminological literature, prisons are seen as colleges of crime

because in prison individuals learn how to commit and how to rationalize crime (Vito &

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Holmes, 1994). Likewise, individuals in prison have opportunities to learn more about
terrorist groups, usually through activities of terrorist organizations. Therefore, prisons
are the places where terrorist groups find potential members to recruit. Apparently,
prisons function to consolidate the individual, group and organizational identity; as a
result, individuals may become more committed to the cause after their incarceration.
Prison recruitment is not a new phenomenon. Several terrorist groups such as the White
Supremacy movement in America, the Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) in Italy, and the
IRA in Ireland have utilized prisons to recruit new members (Smith, 1994).

Sageman (2004) divided his sample (172 persons) into four clusters, the central
staff (32 persons), the Southeast Asian Cluster (21 persons), the Maghreb (53 persons),
and the core Arab cluster (66 persons). He found that 15 out of 26 (58%) members of the
central staff had been imprisoned prior to joining terrorist groups.17 Similarly, Post,
Sprinzak and Denny (2003) found that almost 77 percent of the religiously motivated
group members and 54 percent of secular group members indicated that their
commitment to the cause of terrorist groups increased while in the prison. Additionally,
84 percent of religiously motivated group and 65 percent of secular group members
reported that they would serve the group after their release fiom the prison.

Propaganda through publications, the media, and/or intemet: Propaganda is
an effective tool for terrorists to communicate a specific message to a target audience.
Propaganda can inform, educate, recruit, draw attention, publicize the cause, get public
support, create fear in the government, strengthen the morale of terrorists, and justify
violent operations. Hoffman (2006) notes “propaganda can be a vehicle for recruitment-

meant to win new converts to the cause” (p. 199). The means of terrorist propaganda are

 

'7 He has imprisonment related data on 26 out of 32 members of the central staff.

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radio, television, intemet, video productions, and publications like newspapers, books, or
flyers. The media, publications, and the intemet have been particularly significant tools to
promote organizational ideology and recruit new members; many people learn about
terrorist groups and their activities through these propaganda tools.

Terrorist groups use media during the recruitment process (Chennak &
Gruenewald, 2006). Some terrorist groups create their own media organizations. For
example, the PKK, a Turkish separatist terrorist organization, has its own television
station which broadcasts in Europe. Weinberg and Eubank (1987) indicate that in Italy,
the media played a significant role in terms of making individuals aware of the activities
of terrorist groups. Because of media coverage, many people joined right or left wing
terrorist structures. Hudson (1999) concludes that “thanks to media coverage, the
methods, demands, and goals of terrorists are quickly made known to potential terrorists,
who may be inspired to imitate them upon becoming stimulated by media accounts of
terrorist acts” (p. 17).

With respect to the importance of organizational publications, one religiously
motivated group’s leader, in Stem’s (2003) study, emphasized that once a young man
subscribes to their monthly publication, it is the indicator that he is mentally prepared to
actively take part in the group. Publications are not only a way to promote the group but
also a way to finance the group. William Pierce “The Turner Diaries” inspired Timothy
McWeigh, the bomber in the Oklahoma City bombing case. He was such a fan of the
book; he even slept with a copy of this book under his pillow (Stern, 2003). KKK leader
Robert Miles regularly mailed his identity related newsletter “Beyond the Bars. . .The

Stars” to 1,500-2,000 white inmates throughout the US. These publications were a very

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effective source for promoting the cause and finding new volunteers (Smith, 2004). The
PKK has utilized ideological books, newspapers and magazines in the youth recruitment
process in high schools and universities (Cantekin, 2006). Regarding this, the story of
former PKK member Demirkiran (1996, cited in Cantekin, 2006) is very informative:

“1 met the members of the PKK. . .They gave me a book named

“Devletlerarasi Somurge Kurdistan18 (Kurdistan, an International Colony)”

by Ismail Besikci. I was strictly recommended to read and understand it. This

book was followed by other books. Now, I was a member of the PKK. I

believed the organization with my whole soul. I was making the propaganda

of the organization at home, in the school and in my neighborhood” (p. 89).

In this context, Cantekin’s (2006) study found that 9.1 percent of the PKK
members were influenced by PKK’s publications. Not only the PKK but also almost all
other Turkish terrorist groups utilize the media, organizational publications, and the
intemet to promote their ideologies, receive support from the community, and find new
members to recruit. Caglar (2006) in reference to Turkish terrorist groups indicates
“distributing tapes, using mobile phones, preparing radio broadcast, hosting web sites
(not all of them), publishing journals and newspapers, operating TV channels from
abroad, and spraying graffiti are among the means used in dissemination of their
messages and propaganda” (p. 152). He goes on to emphasize that these propaganda tools
often emphasize the concepts of “honor, religion, the holy book, the nation, motherland,
freedom, and national salvation in their messages to the public.” These propaganda
methods have generated individuals’ feeling ideologically close to terrorist groups
(Caglar, 2006).

The intemet is another important tool utilized by terrorist organizations to

disseminate their ideology, make propaganda, and recruit new members (Enders &

 

18 Besikci, l. (1990). Devletlerarasz Sbmfirge Kurdistan: Bilim, Resmi Ideoloji, Devlet, Demokrasi ve
Ku'rt orunu. Istanbul; Alan Yayrncrlrk.

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Sandler, 2006). Terrorists’ websites contain a variety of information designed to
influence individuals, such as videos showing the group and its members as hero or
victims of the existing system, motivational movies, articles that criticize the government
and its policies, biographies or pictures of terrorists killed by security forces or during
suicide missions, religious justifications for violent activities, ideological songs or poems,
information about organizational publications, and information on some activities like
donations and funds given to the families, widows or orphans of suicide bombers or other
members died while serving the group. Interactive features of the intemet facilitates
terrorist recruiters’ job as it creates “cyber-realm where online visitors, recruits, recruiters
can participate in chatrooms for real-time communicate and idea sharing” (Woods, 2007,
p.273)

Organizational activities: Organizational activities that create awareness about
terrorist groups and their activities may include public speeches, demonstrations,
meetings, religious speeches/sermons, worships, and/or social movements. These may
also include terrorist groups’ activities in the schools, particularly in the universities and
high schools, and activities through legal structures such as associations, political parties,
or offices used for publishing newspapers or magazines.

Worship through religious speeches and gatherings are important propaganda
means in the recruitment process of religiously motivated terrorist groups (Ibrahim, 1980,
1982; Sageman, 2004). Through worship, terrorist organizations are legitimated and
terrorist activities are justified by emphasizing that what they do is God’s will. Beiner
(2006) notes that “Perhaps the most interesting aspect of religion as a theory of terrorism

is how a devout believer could come to mix politics and religion in such a way. The

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answer is in the conception of worship. . .Worship is part of service to God and all of
humanity on behalf of God.” Ibrahim (1980, 1982) emphasized that Egyptian terrorist
groups use worships to expose people to their ideology which, in turn, helps them recruit
new members.

Religious sanctuaries, like mosques, have been used for brainwashing and
recruitment by al-Qaeda members. Friendship groups established around mosques allow
terrorists to generate propaganda to convince individuals to join the global Salafi jihad.
Potential members listen carefully to preachers (that support al-Qaeda), question them,
and reach some form of synthetic understanding of their new faith. “Intensification of
faith and beliefs is a stage characterized by active personnel learning about the new
faith. . .This period involves a reappraisal of life, values, beliefs, and good” (Sageman,
2004, p. 117). As a result of interactions, they gradually gain new understanding and
perspective about the world and they try to see their role in it. This learning process
includes intense social interactions. However, as Sageman (2004) notes, it is not expected
that everybody would be responsive to religious appeals. Rather than appealing to
persons who have strong religious commitments, appeals may be most effective to those
in different sects who are not satisfied with these sects. “Those receptive to a religious
appeal accept the notion of an active supernatural dimension” (p. 115).

Social movements can be defrned as campaigns that include promotion of change
or, conversely, preservation of something believed to be under threat. Social movements
include mass actions and may affect many others, as was the case in the Catholic civil
rights movements in Northern Ireland in the 19605 (Martin, 2006). Religiously motivated

groups use different social activities. For instance, they use special days, such as an

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anniversary of martyrs. Since these days are important for them, these activities give
them opportunities to promote their ideologies and recruit new members among those
attending ceremonies (Alkan, 2002; Beiner, 2006). Similarly, separatist and left wing
groups usually use legal and illegal demonstrations to publicize their ideology, make
propaganda, and thus find new members. Cifici (1998, cited in Cantekin, 2006), a former
PKK member, indicates “it was not difficult to orientate university students in direction
of the PKK’s ideology since we were taking advantage of our role as students. As we
experienced before, we were finding opportunities for them to conflict with the police
and the system. Thus, we were radicalizing them” (p. 90). Post, Sprinzak and Denny
(2003) contend that while schools and social clubs, such as youth clubs, form the social
environment of secular groups, religiously motivated groups socialize in the mosque or
through religious organizations (i.e. Moslem Brotherhood), and that there is also an
impact from religious instruction. Apart from social environments, university or other
professional schools have become primary sources in terms of experiences with the
terrorist groups that they joined. Many left wing groups in Turkey promote their
organizational propaganda in public cafes, school canteens, or university dormitories. In
many instances, they have not had difficulty in locating individuals influenced by
speeches designed to address their needs, expectations, or beliefs.

Turkish PKK members contact the families of killed or imprisoned terrorists, and
usually make propaganda against the government during these contacts. They also make
monetary contributions to poor families of killed or imprisoned terrorists. By doing this,

they try to create an image as a benevolent and caring group. The main concern of these

85

visits was to ensure new participants not only from these families but also from the public
(Cantekin, 2006).

Before joining a terrorist group, some individuals may be involved in political
activities, often non-violent political expressions of opposition to the state (Beiner, 2006;
Crenshaw, 1981). On the other hand, some terrorist organizations have legal structures,
such as political parties, that struggle in the legal arena on behalf of terrorists. These legal
structures attract attention of individuals who sympathize and support terrorist groups. By
becoming involved in political activities, they promote the ideology of the terrorists. The
more time is spent in these activities, the stronger the ties to the political companion
organization. Accordingly, Della Porta’s (1988, cited in Sageman, 2004) examination of
the Italian Red Brigades indicates that “the strengthening of relationship ties inside the
political environment increased the value attached to political involvement and
encouraged people to dedicate more and more time to political activities” (p. 163). This
process results in isolation from the outside world, and individuals develop a collective
identity and total commitment.

Weinberg and Eubank’s (1987) examination of Italian left and right wing groups
and Teymur’s (2004) study of the Turkish left wing group (DHKP/C) had similar
conclusions. Weinberg and Eubank (1987) emphasized that it is more likely that over
time terrorism expanded through individuals who had political experiences in
conventional parties. Silke (2003) reiterates that many IRA members first joined the
group by contacting the persons who were working in the republican political party Sinn
Fein, and concludes that “approaching legal groups associated with a terrorist cause is a

cormnon and generally efficient route into a terrorist group” (p. 48).

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(3) Motivational factors

In addition to background characteristics and learning related factors, the root
motivations of individuals are important to a complete understanding about the
participation process. Motivation could be considered as the most important factor
compared to all others. Even if an individual has disadvantageous background
characteristics for participation, and even if he is exposed to intensive learning process, it
might not mean that he would join a terrorist group without adequate motivation. Despite
the importance of motivational factors in terms of detailed and complete understanding of
the participation process, Hudson (1999) emphasizes that existing studies have not been
successful to sufficiently define it. Moreover, “a proper understanding of terrorist
motivation continues to sit uncomfortably within psychological research on terrorist, and
continues to be tackled with embarrassingly vague references” (Horgan, 2003a, p. 3). For
that reason, there is not enough empirical information about the pre-participation
motivations of terrorist. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to examine because of the
distinctiveness of the terrorism field in terms of difficulties in conducting scientific
research on terrorist psychology. There are, nevertheless, some attempts to define
terrorists’ motivations before the participation. In this section, motivational factors will

9’

be examined under the topics of “need to belong to a group , “exorbitance of governing

power/5”, “ideological closeness”, “negative life events”, and “other motivational
factors.”
Need to belong to a group: The need to belong to a group is an important factor

in the participation process, and may create an adequate amount of motivation for joining

a group. This need is met by terrorist groups that recognize an individuals’ need for

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belonging. Terrorists use a series of tactics that facilitate individual’s participation
(Hudson, 1999). The need to belong to a group creates such a strong motivation that
some individuals begin to define their social status by group acceptance (Martin, 2006).
Stern (2003, p. 5) emphasizes “in some cases, the desire to be with friends turns out to be
more important, over time, than the desire to achieve any particular goal. Others are
attracted to the ‘glamour’ of belonging to a military group.” In the group, an individual
gains group identity, and group identity becomes more important than individual identity.
Isolation from the society and perception of hostile environments may intensify
commitment to a group (Crenshaw, 1981).

There are various ways that individuals’ feeling of need to belong to a group
develops. For instance, a young person may come together with his peers in different
social environments like school, work, mosque, bars, or clubs. His association with others
teaches him that there are others who think like him and who have similar viewpoints. He
feels sympathy for that group, and starts to believe that he could or should be a member
of that group (Hofmann, 1985). For instance, in Palestine, many people want to join
groups fighting against Israel. Feelings of victimization, eviction from their family lands,
and sense of despair regarding their people’s destiny encourage them to merge their
individual identity with the group or organizational identity. Based on his own experience
in the PKK as a terrorist, Demirkiran (1998, cited in Cantekin, 2006) attributes the
formation of this need to family structure of individuals that lacks love towards kids. As a
result an individual might find himself in a terrorist group that meets this need. Ozer
(2007) attempts to explain individuals’ need to be in a group making use of the

theoretical terms of strain and self efficacy. That is, under the extreme strain conditions

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“people feel low self efficacy and they want to unify their low self efficacy around a
group in order to get rid of their low self efficacy by the help of collective self efficacy”
(p. 70).

Exorbitance of the governing power/s: Exorbitance of the governing power/s
includes oppressive, humiliating, derogatory, and/or unjust actions and counter-actions of
the goveming power/s against people. It also includes violations of basic human rights.

Terrorists instigate government use of excessive force and force government to
take excessive precautions. This excess disturbs the public. When the state starts to use
the same tactics that terrorists use, terrorists receive what they want (Crenshaw, 2003;
Jenkins, 2003; Schmid, 2004). Rubenstein (2003) notes that terrorists want to generate
the support of neutrals and passive sympathizers by putting them in the crossfire of the
state and terrorists. In this way, they promote the government to be seen as an oppressive
force. Then, they initiate propaganda that includes messages for sympathizers and
neutrals that oppressive government should be resisted and overthrown.

In many countries governmental oppression is a significant political problem
(Laqueur, 1987). Witnessing or/and experiencing an act of injustice, excessive use of
force or harsh treatment of citizens, including protestors, demonstrators, and criminals,
by government might create sympathy and support for terrorist groups that stand up
against the govemment’s cruelty (Crenshaw, 1981). Crenshaw (2003) argues “the resort
to unexpected and unusual force in response to protest or reform often invites retaliation.
The development of an action-reaction syndrome then establishes the structure of the
conflict between the regime and its challengers” (p. 95). The more excessive force from

governing powers against opposing ideas, the more group solidarity creates strong chains

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to resist the ongoing system. In Germany, authoritarian responses of the police against
the student rebels gave rise to more violent activities, motivated the students to believe
the justness of their way, and provided others an adequate amount of motivation to join a
terrorist group (Serafino, 2002). Similarly, the aggressive response of the British soldiers
in the Northern Ireland resulted in alienation of the nationalist community. As Garfield
(2006) observes, the actions of the state “provided the PIRA with a large pool of willing
recnrits who were motivated by feelings of anger and a desire for revenge” (p. 104).
Likewise, in the 19605 and 19705, in Italy and Greece, excessive use of force by police
was identified as fascistic by the protesters, and in some cases, promoted terrorism. As a
result, protestors concluded that all forms of violent reactions against these fascist powers
were appropriate (Weinberg & Richardson, 2004). Silke’s (2003) example of a German
terrorist named Hans-Joachin Klein draws a clearer picture concerning the impact of
oppression on participation in terrorist groups. The main reason that Klein decided to
become a terrorist is that he witnessed a girl being severely beaten by a policeman during
a student protest. He saw this treatment by the police was unjust, and instead imagined
that he could have been the one beaten by the police. He also believed that the state
caused that girl to suffer, and so the state must suffer.

Weinberg and Richardson (2004) examined a number of terrorist organizations
across the world that included Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, PKK in Turkey, IRA in
Northern Ireland, ETA in Spain, Palestinian groups against Israel in the Middle East etc.
They found that overreaction of the governmental authorities has escalated terror
incidents by the abovementioned groups. Sageman’s (2004) findings also support this

claim. In his data, members of the central staff (32 out of 172 individuals) of whom 63

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percent were Egyptian, had been imprisoned immediately after the assassination of
President Sadat before joining the global Salafi jihad movement. Upon their release from
prison, they went to Afghanistan to escape government persecution.

According to the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association, people who are
oppressed and humiliated by an occupier in the eyes of the world will try to find ways to
cope with this oppression in order to regain self-respect and honor. Occupation and
occupiers are the main source of oppression and humiliation that lead to terrorism. In the
next step, oppressed people would like to draw the world’s attention to their oppression,
and demonstrate that they will not tolerate it. As a result, many people joined terrorist
groups and used terrorism as a tactic against the oppressor. They believe that they would
defend and regain their honor not only in their own eyes but also in the eyes of their
peers. This process might explain some of the violence in the Middle- East. It appears
that saving the honor is one of the reasons of why youth joined terrorist groups and
became involved in terrorism (Garrison, 2004). Those who joined terrorist group might
believe that as well as the honor of the group, their personal honor depends on the degree
of their support to the groups fighting against oppressors (Hudson, 1999). Similarly, in
Algeria in the 19505, extraordinary measures taken by the French Army resulted in the
alienation of the native Algerian Muslim community. Brutal precautions of the French
Army included tortures and killing, and increased the popularity of the F LN (National
Liberation Front- Front de Liberation Nationale). As a result, the FLN gained popular
support, and ultimately, the French had to withdraw from Algeria (Hoffinan, 2006).

Stern (2003) sees humiliation as one of the most important risk factors that

motivate individuals to join terrorist groups. Humiliation might occur on a national or

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individual level. For example, Zawahiri, one of the intellectual leaders of Al-Qaeda, has
argued that Western values and power are humiliating to the Muslim community. Kerry
Noble, a former member of the Christian Identity Group, explained that he joined the
group because he had been forced to play on the girls’ side in his elementary school
physical education class and that participation in this violent and racist cult made him feel
strong. This experience presents an example of individual level humiliation.

Oppressive behaviors might also be interpreted by the community as a kind of
interference with individuals’ rights and freedoms, and these behaviors may serve the
interests of terrorist organizations. For example, in Italy, excessive amendments to laws
degrading the human rights caused increased repression and aided some terror
organizations in recruiting new members (Serafmo, 2002). Human right violations in the
Arab communities, such as maltreatment, torture, arbitrary arrests, long detention
periods, deprivation of legal rights, harassment of members of opposition parties,
restrictions on the media and religious practices, demonstrations, and speeches, as well as
discrimination against women create adequate conditions for illegal groups to find
individuals to recruit (Al-Badayneh, 2007). With respect to these kinds of practices,
Sozen (2006) suggests that it is necessary to “strike a healthy balance between society
and individual freedoms” (p. 132).” Otherwise, planned or unplanned, intentional or
unintentional oppression and humiliation might contribute to terrorists’ interests.

Referring to Kim and Smith (1993), Silke (2003) summarizes “Lying at the heart
of the whole process are perceptions of personal harm, unfairness and injustice, and the

anger, indignation, and hatred associated with the perceived injustice.”

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Ideological/political closeness: When an individual feels that he has similar
perspectives, beliefs, thoughts, or viewpoints to a terrorist group, he may want to take
part in that movement. Terrorist organizations are very successful at drawing a very
attractive picture of the future in the minds of the people. They know how to address
individuals’ needs, and are very aware of the expectations of individuals. For example,
separatist organizations such as PKK in Turkey or ETA in Spain promise their followers
a new independent state. Left wing terrorists promise a system that eliminates capitalism;
they also promote their activities stressing that they were fighting against a fascist and
imperialist system (Alkan, 2002). Religiously motivated groups, on the other hand,
suggest cleansing the world of impurities to create a better world or a country. They
believe that their violent activities will result in purification of injustice and cruelty, and
strongly believe that they are responding to a spiritual calling (Stern, 2003). As a
consequence, these perspectives and promises are very attractive and convincing for
many people who join these terrorist movements.

There are similarities between the above approach and the ideological appeal
thesis. According to the ideological appeal thesis, people would randomly join extremist
movements simply by being exposed to the ideology of that movement. If the level of
exposure increases, it may lead more participation. Contrary to this idea, Sageman (2004)
found that insignificant number of individuals joined the al-Qaeda as a result of the
influence of its ideology. According to Sageman, the biggest problem with this thesis is
that it has more individualistic perspective and ignores the effect of sectarian acts.
Through examination of the childhood faiths of 117 terrorists, Sageman found that 53

terrorists (49%) were religious and the remaining 55 terrorists (51%) were secular in

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childhood; 9 Christian terrorists were excluded from his analysis. To Sageman, these
findings alone contradict the notion that religiously motivated terrorists are brainwashed
into religious extremism beginning from childhood, given that majority of terrorists in his
sample were not religious during childhood, and that becoming religious did not
necessarily mean that they would become terrorists. He also found that devotion to
Islamic extremism increased significantly immediately before participation in the terrorist
groups. Of the 155 individuals in his samples, 154 were more devout during their
participation period than their childhood. Correspondingly, a majority of detained al-
Qaeda members who conducted the Istanbul bombings in 2003 stated during their
interrogations that they joined terrorist groups through family or friendship ties without
having ideological commitment; only one third of them appeared to be ideologically
committed (McGarrell, Freilich & Chennak, 2007). Given that many terrorists have
joined terrorists groups under the influence of other factors, such as fiiendship and
kinship effects rather than ideological closeness, it might be concluded that ideological
closeness alone is not enough to explain the participation process. Nevertheless, its
possible influence cannot be ignored, especially with respect to left wing and separatist
groups. Hence, this concept requires more inquiry by examining its impact on other
terrorist groups.

Negative life events: Negative life events may include depressing occurrences
such as unhappiness and dissatisfaction in life due to failures in meeting various
expectations or negative life events experienced by individuals. More specifically,

financial problems, discrimination for being a woman, family problems, family pressure,

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dramatic life events, desperation, or fear are some of the possible negative life events that
might motivate individuals to take part in a terrorist group.

If a person is disappointed with his social and economic conditions and fails to
form social attachments to the world, it is likely that these conditions will encourage him
to participate in illegal groups such as terrorist organizations (Martin, 2006; Sageman,
2004). Corruption, employment problems, and disillusionment with the existing system
are also some of the factors that motivate individuals to join terrorist groups. According
to Sageman (2004), many individuals joined the al-Qaeda terrorist organization for
similar reasons. Cantekin (2006) found that farmly related problems (11.3%), economic
problems (7.2%), and depression (6.2%) were related to participation in the PKK.

Desperation is another important concept concerning participation. Garfield’s
(2006) examination of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) revealed that there
was a significant role of the feelings of “hopelessness, despair and betrayal (by the
system)” on those who decided to participate in this group. Garfield indicates that
Palestinians and many Muslims in Europe have similar feelings today: “when one has
nothing, one has nothing to lose” (p. 104). Kiknadze (2007) attributes individuals’
participation in terrorist groups to other negative life experiences: people who were
socially ill-adapted, less successful in school, failed to achieve a career, suffered from
loneliness, failed to have contact with the opposite sex, and remained outsiders ended up
in terrorist groups.

In addition, dramatic events may motivate individuals to join terrorist groups with
the feeling of revenge, resentment, or hatred. Many terrorists have personal histories that

include encounters with security forces during which the individual, his friend or family

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members were threatened, maltreated, or even killed. These kinds of events may cause
the development of violent feelings against a perceived enemy (i.e. government or
secmity forces). One of the key figures in the Red Army Faction (RAF), Michael
Baumman, explained that he joined the RAF, because one of his friends had been killed
by a police officer during a student protest. Although he had been exposed to the

ideology of the RAF, up until that time, he had not felt motivated to join the RAF to
perform violent activities. Nevertheless, the death of his fiiend motivated him to join the
RAF, because he believed that his friend’s death was unjust act. Similarly, Eamon Collins
attributes his participation in the IRA to the maltreatment and torture by British soldiers
of his father, brother, and himself (Silke, 2003).

Al-Badayneh (2007) uses the concept of fear as a motivating factor in Arab
society, explaining that fear is a central main part of Arabs’ daily life; this fear includes
fear of speech, fear of criticism, fear of authority, fear of regime, and fear of everything.
Loyalty of the citizens to the regime is more important than everything that creates
unease in the community due to excessive control over the people. Al-Badayneh goes on
to conclude that fear motivates people to seek external and alternative power that will
defend and protect them and “restore their dignity.” Thus, terrorism and terrorist groups
appear to be a good alternative to challenge sources of the fear.

Further, martyrdom in the terrorist context is important. Martyrdom of a friend or
close family members may motivate individuals for suicide missions or different deadly
assignments. Consequently, a kind of mythology may develop around proclaimed martyrs

to motivate others to actively take place in terrorist structures (Rastorp, 1996).

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Other motivational factors: In addition to the aforementioned factors, there are
other factors that are likely to motivate individuals to participate in terrorist groups.
Stern (2003) indicates that being a member of an armed group might give individuals
feelings of being strong, perhaps for the first time in their life. Fun, status, glamour,
power, prestige, and even money can provide powerful incentives for joining a terror
group.

In some communities, terrorist groups and their members are regarded as
honorable and they are treated with great respect. The social status of those who are able
to join the group might increase. Thus, expectations of high social status and more
respect from the community might be a primary motivator for some individuals (Silke,
2003)

Some groups offer protection that result from participation; some terrorist groups
may threaten individuals into participation. In the event of resistance to participation, the
groups may threaten to kill or kill him or close family members (Cantekin, 2006; Silke,
2003). The PKK killed thousands of civilians, including children and the elderly, just
because they did not support PKK activities; families who did not allow their children to
join the PKK were murdered. The PKK even destroyed and burned villages where there
were no volunteers to participate in the PKK. As a result, they managed to recruit many
individuals even if they did not volunteer. In Cantekin’s (2006) examination of the PKK,
18.6 percent of his sample joined the group due to these kinds of reasons.

Demirkrran (1996, cited in Cantekin, 2006), based on his experiences as a former
PKK member, lists some other factors that motivate individuals to join in the PKK. He

indicates that the majority of recruits regretted their participation even on the first day,

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because they were cheated with different promises which would never be fulfilled, such
as a job for each of them, a salary for each of their families, or even some high level
status such as being a commander, or a manager of a district (which in fact do not exist in
the mountainous regions). Further, some were promised hotel-stays in the mountains
(that do not exist). Religious people were convinced that all the group’s participants
were Muslim who would serve on a holy mission (despite the fact that the PKK is a
Marxist-Leninist group).

It is also possible that some individuals want to join terrorist groups under the
influence of their environments (i.e. parents, friends, siblings, or relatives). For example,
Thomberry et a1. (2003) found that many youths joined gang groups because their family
members or friends were already members of the gang, or/and they encouraged them to
participate.

(4) Participation in suicide missions

Given the extreme nature of suicide, a comprehensive answer to the question of
why individuals become terrorists also requires an answer to the questions of “who
becomes suicide terrorist?” and “why do individuals become suicide terrorists.” There are
different views in the literature about individuals’ participation in sUicide missions.

For the religiously motivated groups, martyrdom is an important motivational
concept. Martyrdom is a way of escaping from life’s dilemmas. Martyrdom is especially
attractive for those who feel deeply alienated, confused, humiliated, or desperate.
Ideology and altruism are also pertinent concepts to martyrdom. Commitments to the
goals of the organization and spiritual benefits of serving a good cause can create enough

incentives for many individuals. In addition, humiliation, deprivation, hopelessness, and

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envy make death and paradise more appealing (Stern, 2003). The following section will
review some basic individual level motivational factors for joining suicide missions.

Financial factors: Financial support may not be considered as a sufficient
motivation to end one’s life, but, if an individual knows that his/her family would be
monetarily supported, it might contribute considerably to motivation. That is, it may not
be enough for complete motivation, yet it may be part of a constellation of other
motivating factors (Hassan, 2005; Ricolfi, 2005; Stern, 2003). Sponsoring organizations
usually give between $3,000 and $5,000 to a bomber’s family (Hassan, 2005). Post,
Sprinzak & Denny (2003) noted “families of terrorists who were wounded, killed or
captured enjoyed a great deal of economic aid and attention. And that strengthened
popular support for the attacks” (p. 177).

Heroism: Heroism refers to the social construction of suicide bombers as a hero
of and in the community. Copies of a martyr’s audiocassette or video are distributed to
the media and to local organizations as an indictor of their success and as encouragement
to other young men. Graffiti on walls and songs that praise their heroism become very
attractive incentives. Martyrdom is celebrated by the bomber’s family and sponsoring
organization with festivities. People visit the bomber’s house to offer congratulations
(Hassan, 2005; Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003; Stern, 2003).

Martyrdom as a career: Given the conflict between Palestine and Israel, Ricolfi
(2005) notes that along with material deprivation, daily violence committed by Israelis
like killings, injuries, arrests, or destroying houses can cause devastation in the emotional
worlds of Palestinians. “In a society in which social life is frozen and horizons and

normal careers do not exist, war and the Intifada are not just the only world but the only

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real social system” (Ricolfi, 2005, p. 115). In this kind of social system, the only
available careers, such as administrator, officer, policeman, political leader, militant, or
volunteer, are within some political faction. Since the available careers are very limited,
martyrdom, which represents the highest spiritual position, prestige, honor and eternal
glory, becomes the shortest way to have a career that everybody respects (Ricolfi, 2005).
Pape (2005) conducted the most detailed analysis of suicide missions to date; he found
that many suicide terrorists fit the “altruistic suicide” related explanations of Durkheim
(1951) in which high levels of social integration and respect for community values can
lead normal individuals to commit suicide. Contrary to the belief that suicide attackers
are criminally insane, losers or problematic persons, they, in fact, have no psychological
or economic problems; they have strong social networks and are part of a national
context. They believe that they sacrifice themselves for the sake of their nations’ or
community’s good. Pape (2005, p. 173) indicates “these individuals are rarely
brainwashed into accepting such missions through the heavy indoctrination associated
with the recent mass suicides by religious cults, but accept the task much like a soldiers
who accepts a ‘suicide mission’ in an ordinary war.”

Altruistic suicides are usually committed under the influence of social approval.
Contrary to the common perception that suicide terrorists are different from the society in
which they live, they are generally an integral part of that society. Martyrdom resulting
from suicide attacks is justified through the idea that it is indispensable for the protection
of the local community from foreign occupation. At the same time, martyrdom operations
are believed necessary because of power imbalances between an occupying power and an

occupied territory (Pape, 2005). Garnbetta (2005) demonstrates a similar understanding:

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in all suicide missions, a major, common trait is that all suicide attackers are seen as
‘altruists’ by themselves and often by the attacker’s group members. The attackers and
the group believe that by committing suicide attacks, they further the interests of their
group or their cause.

On the other hand, Kalyvas and Cuenca (2005) hypothesize that political
repression or economic deprivation experienced by an individual is not the reason for
extreme acts such as suicide attacks, and that the main reason is the depressing and
hopeless living conditions of the community that force individuals to extreme activities.
If there is a severe repression and/or economic deprivation in the community (rather than
on an individual level), it is most likely that it would lead participation in suicide attacks.
Further, although individuals carry out suicide attacks, there is always an organizational
structure behind them that makes and executes the plans.

Apparently, there are various reasons for becoming suicide terrorists, such as
patriotism, strong convictions, nationalism, extreme pressure from peers and/or superiors,
rituals of the community, revenge (in the case of Palestinians who see suicide attacks
revenge for murders by Israelis), traditional codes of honor (in the case of Chechen
individuals who use suicide attacks to avenge their family members), hatred of the
enemy, the desire to defend of a homeland or rid holy lands of infidels, and a desire to
reach the religious hereafter (Elster, 2005; Pape, 2005). Although all these explanations
are possible motivational factors, we may never know the actual motivational and
cognitive conditions of the suicide attackers, as it is not possible to interview those who
are successful; motivations may change based on personal or cultural characteristics

(Elster, 2005; Gambetta, 2005).

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Tactical and strategic methods of terrorist groups that prepare individuals for
suicide missions are important to mention. Becoming a suicide terrorist invokes several
processes. Hassan (2005) emphasizes that selection for suicide attacks is not enough, as
after selection, it requires more preparations:

“The planners keep a close eye on the volunteer’s self-discipline, noting
whether he can be discreet among friends and observing his piety in the
mosque. During the week before the operation, two ‘assistants’ are delegated
to stay with the potential martyr at all times. They report any signs of doubt,
and if the young man seems to waiver, a senior trainer will arrive to bolster his
resolve. . .Religious lectures last from two to four hours each day. The living
martyr goes on lengthy fasts. He spends much of the night praying. He pays
off all his debts, and asks for forgiveness for actual or perceived
offences. . .The young man repeatedly watches the video of himself, as well as
the videos of his predecessors. These videos encourage him to confront death,
not fear it.”

Bac round characteristics of suicide terrorists: The terrorism literature on the

 

background characteristics of suicide terrorists contains contradictory information. One
view contends that suicide terrorists are poor, socially isolated, uneducated, hopeless,
without prospects, religiously fanatic, socially alienated, mentally sick persons, and
additionally, that suicide terrorism is a result of paranoia which has psychological roots
(Merari, 1990; Robins & Post, 1997). Stern (2003) draws a similar picture of Palestinian
suicide terrorists: they are generally young, often teenagers, mentally immature, exposed
to pressures to work, but can’t find a job, have no social safety net, no girlfriend or
fiancee, no money to go entertainment centers, no means to enjoy life in any way, life has
no meaning but pain, there is no possibility of marriage because of economic problems,

and they feel that all is lost and pray all the time. The only way out is to sacrifice

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himself'9 by joining a suicide mission. Organizers of suicide mission can easily identify
these kinds of persons and gradually start to recruit them. For instance, they may talk
about rewards in the hereafier or explain to him how his family will be honored. They
emphasize martyrdom, and promise economic support to his family. Before the operation
they train them, 48 hours before the operation he is removed from his environment to
eliminate the chance for reconsideration. Similarly Elster (2005) indicates that for the
suicide missions, those who have suicidal tendencies are selected.

Contrary to these beliefs, other researchers found that suicide attackers are
generally secular, employed, reasonably well educated, and ordinary members of their
own community. They are not motivated by youthful impulsiveness nor do they take
personal satisfaction in banning others. Further, they do not have mental problems. They
are socially integrated and have expectations and capabilities of good futures. Before
conducting the mission, they live as students, housewives, or bus drivers in ordinary daily
life (Gambetta, 2005; Pape, 2005). Congruent with this argument, Pape (2005) notes that
suicide terrorists are college educated and uneducated, married and single, men and
women, isolated and socially integrated. Their ages range from 15 to 52. In other words,
they are an ordinary part of the community and so cannot be placed in a different
category than other normal people. Further, he asserts that poverty is a poor explanation
for suicide terrorism since countries which are exposed to suicide terrorist attacks do not
have the worst economic indicators in the world, and that some are middle income

societies (Pape, 2005).

 

‘9 As the research indicates, terrorist members are both male and female. However, males are much
more likely to be involved. For ease of presentation, the male pronoun is used throughout this dissertation.

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In terms of gender, women seem as eager to volunteer and to carry out the suicide
attacks as men are (Gambetta, 2005). In some groups such as the PKK, the majority of
bombers assigned to suicide missions were women (Alkan, 2000). The most
comprehensive findings regarding demographic characteristics of suicide bombers are
found in Pape’s (2005) study. In his study, 15 percent of 381 suicide bombers were
female; however, this rate may change depending on terrorist organization. Of the 384
suicide bombers, 43% (166 persons) were religious, and 57% (218) were secular.
According to his findings, ages of suicide bombers vary between 15 and 52 with an
average age of 22.7. However, the age distribution appears to vary across terrorist groups.

3. Theoretical Approaches

Absence of an adequate theory for guiding research on terrorism related studies is
a huge obstacle. This problem has limited both the value of the very small number of
scientific studies that have been conducted, and the integration of the results across
studies. The lack of theoretical guidance reflects the preoccupation of terrorism related
studies with the problem of causation in various terrorism related topics including
participation. Ferracuti (1982) emphasizes no single theory has emerged regarding
terrorism, and has proposed that hypotheses in this field need more tests and
confirmation. Two decades later, Tilly (2004, p. 11) similarly notes “no coherent set of
cause-effect propositions can explain terrorism as a whole.” Consequently, terrorism
studies are heavily informed by other academic disciplines (Duyvesteyn, 2004). In view
of these facts, this section will briefly examine some theoretical approaches from
different fields that might be useful to explore joining in terrorist groups. In order to have

more fluid theoretical understanding about participation in terrorist groups and given that

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gangs have similar characteristics to terrorist organizations, particularly in terms of the
participation process, gang related studies and theoretical approaches will be applied in
some areas where terrorism studies remain insufficient. Terrorist groups resemble gang
groups in the following ways: both use violent tactics to reach their targets; perform
legitimate or illegitimate activities; have a group structure with different roles of the
members; have a hierarchy, a name, and a sign; recruit youths; and are male dominated
(Block & Block, 1993; Hughes, 2005; Spergel, 1984; Thomberry et al., 2003).
Developmental and life course perspective will form a general frame for the study
in which other theoretical approaches might be adapted and discussed given that life
course theories look for turning points in individuals’ lives, and correspondingly, making
a decision to become a terrorist is a kind of turning point, and some learning related
factors such as friends or parents, and motivational factors such as need to belong to a
group or ideological closeness are effective in this process as they influence the flow of
individuals’ lives. The present review could not find any study that has tested a theory of
participation in terrorist organizations. Yet, there are various theoretical approaches that
are consistent with the abovementioned participation related information gleaned from
the terrorism literature. Given that participation does not occur overnight and entails a
process that include some learning and motivational dynamics, this study assumes that
the life course approach forms a more general and broader theoretical frame for the
studies on participation in terrorist groups. Once the life course approach is considered as
a broader theoretical framework, it might be easy to replace and discuss other theoretical

approaches within this frame.

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Two main concepts comprise the analysis of life-course dynamics, trajectories
and transitions. A trajectory might be defined as a pathway or line of development over
the life span of the individual. School life, work life, marriage, parenthood, and criminal
behaviors are some examples of trajectories, which have long—term characteristics. On the
other hand, transitions are important life events such as a first job, first marriage, first
baby, first friend, first membership in a group, first crime, or first imprisonment in the
terrorism context. Transitions evolve over shorter time spans and are embedded within
trajectories. Transitions might be age-graded or not. Events that are considered as
important are the normative timing and sequencing of role transitions, for instance, a
period of time between a first job after finishing a college and a first marriage. Or, within
the context of terrorism literature, transitions could be the time period between the first
and ongoing contacts with a friend who is a member of a terrorist group and the decision
to join the terrorist group in which that friend is a member (Sampson & Laub, 1999;
Thomberry et al, 2003). Quoting from Elder (1985, p. 17), Sampson and Laub (1999)
define the life-course as “pathways through the age differentiated life span where age
differentiation is manifested in expectations and options that impinge on decision process
and the course of events that give shape to life stages, transitions, and turning points”
(p.189). Apparently, focal points of the life course perspective are duration, timing, major
life events, some life changes, and their influences on a human’s life. In addition, given
that participation in terrorist groups occurs at younger ages, it might be concluded that
the life-course approach directly relates to the universal finding of young men being

particularly at risk.

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Trajectories and transitions may cause turning points and changes in the life-
course. Trajectories may be modified by social institutions and life events such as work,
military service, marriage, school etc. New conditions and events may affect the life
course so as to change its direction; so that a life course is not fully determined (Elder,
1985 cited in Sampson and Laub, 1999). In this context, Thomberry et a1. (2003, p. 7)
attempt to find out why some individuals join gang groups and others do not perceive
gang membership as a trajectory. They indicate that the life course perspective not only
includes social and psychological forces that develop in early childhood and facilitate
participation in gang groups, but also contains “unfolding relationships and
developmental influences.” Factors that lead to participation/membership in gang groups
might also be social structural position, family relationship, neighborhood context,
school, peers, or individual characteristics. In order to discover what contributes to gang
membership, they focused on the variables of area characteristics (i.e. community arrest
rate, neighborhood disorganization), family socio-demographic characteristics (i.e. race,
ethnicity, poverty level, parent education), parent-child relations (i.e. family management
style, attachment to child, family hostility), school factors (i.e. commitment to school,
college aspiration, college expectation), individual characteristics (i.e. negative life
events, depression, self esteem), or a combination of these factors (Thomberry et al.,
2003). They selected different variables and concepts from other theories and integrated
and analyzed them within the framework of life course perspective to understand better
what factors are affective in the gang participation. Likewise, Sommers and Baskin
(1994) focus on socio-cultural and environmental context of behavior in order to explain

the relationship between gender and violent behaviors. This study revealed that

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participation in criminal violence by both males and females requires consideration of
neighbor, peer, and addiction factors; these patterns were consistent with other findings
on gangs (Baskin & Sommers, 1993).

Various theories in different fields like criminology or sociology identify
variables that might be linked to the life course perspective in the context of participation
in terrorist organizations. Akers (2000) contends that “. . .there is some overlap in how
variables from personality, learning, bonding and other theories are utilized in life-course
models...” (p. 253). In this manner, the risk factors model of individuals’ vulnerability to
negative developmental outcomes is consistent with multidirnensionality characteristics
of the life-course approach. According to the risk factors model, there are several and
overlapping risk factors in a person’s background that might lead to participation in
illegal structures and violent activities (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1999; Hill, Howell,
Hawkins & Battin, 1999; Sameroff et al., 1993; Small & Luster, 1994). Identification of
risk factors is important in terms of initiating programs for prevention of possible
involvement in criminal groups and delinquent activities. Howell (1997) studied youth
violence and classified the risk factors as community, family, school, peer, and individual
characteristics. Studies on gang membership found that joining gang groups is a result of
different risk factors from multiple developmental domains. Accordingly, using gang
membership as a dependent variable, Thomberry et a1. (2003) found several risk factors
regarding joining gangs, such as neighborhoods with higher proportion of African
Americans, poorer residents, and higher arrest rates; demographic characteristics of being
African American, having less educated parents, and family income below the poverty

level; inadequate parent child relations and attachment problems of families’ to sons;

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school problems, such as weak attachment to teacher and school, and lower parental
expectations; friends who involved in delinquent acts; individual characteristics such as
experiencing negative life events, and having depressive symptoms; and also prior
delinquency. However, many of these risk factors were not significant for female gang
participation. Among these factors, two had more influence on joining a gang: previous
involvement in a delinquent activity, and experiencing higher than average level stress as
a result of a negative life event (Thomberry et al., 2003). In sum, these findings reflect
the multidimensionality of a life course perspective that is influenced by several risk
factors.

Selection, social facilitation and enhancements models have some implications
for the participation process in addition to risk factors. According to the selection model,
violent groups select their members from among those who have delinquent tendencies
and who are already delinquents. Hirschi’s social control theory (Hirschi, 1969;
Matsueda & Heimer, 1987; Wiatrowski, Griswold & Roberts, 1981) and Gottfredson and
Hirschi’s propensity theory of crime (Gottferedson & Hirschi, 1990; Longshore, 1998)
are directly related to the selection model (Thomberry et al., 2003). Violent groups like
gangs attract persons who lack self-control (which is the basic premise of general theory
of crime) and who have no social control. Alternatively, a social facilitation model
suggests that individuals become involved in criminal activities after joining violent
groups. Group dynamics, group process, normative structure and the climate of a group
are likely to facilitate involvement in delinquency. Thus, delinquency is a typical result of
a group membership. Findings from a wide array of other research are consistent with

this approach (Decker, 1996; Deschenes & Esbensen, 1999; Jansyn, 1966; Miller &

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Decker, 2001; Rosenfeld, Bray & Egley, 1999). Research that supports the social
facilitation model might also be considered supportive to socialization theories such as
differential association or social learning theories, because criminal groups appears to be
effective in terms of communicating definitions, teaching delinquency and establishing
reward systems in a group structure as these theories posit (Thomberry et al., 1993). On
the other hand, the enhancement model is a combination of the selection model and the
social facilitation model. In this model, delinquent groups (i.e. gangs) select their
members among the adolescents who are already delinquent; then group process and
group dynamics cause individuals to engage in more delinquent behaviors. Thus, groups
play a facilitator role for individuals who have already criminal records (Samecki, 1990;
Thomberry et al., 1993, 2003). Previous studies mostly support the facilitation model
while there is little support for the selection model and enhancement model (Esbensen &
Huizinga, 1993; Thomberry et al., 1993, 2003).

Another theory that appears to be relevant to participation in terrorist
organizations is the theory of normative ambiguity. This theory posits that degradation
and irnpugnation of a party’s honor by another party creates violent incentives (Horowitz
& Schwartz, 1974). Pertinent to formation of gang violence, Horowitz and Schwartz
(1974) explain that an individuals’ belief in terms of codes of personal honor influences
his reactions to perceived insults. Honor has an expressive value, and there is an explicit
tendency towards momentum in situations of normative ambiguity. They further
emphasize that individuals initially respond to a certain amount of provocation by
impression management. However, over time, individuals may insult and then damage

another party in order to respond to violation of a personal space. If they fail to do so, it

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might be considered as weakness. Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1999), in their subculture of
violence thesis make a similar point by proposing that “the adult male who does not
defend his honor or his female companion will be socially emasculated” (p. 105).
Similarly, Miller (1966) states that “Gang members fight to secure and defend their honor
as males; to secure and defend the reputation of their local area and the honor of their
women; to show that an affront to their pride and dignity demands retaliation” (p. 110,
112). As in gang studies, honor and humiliation appear to be significant factors in
terrorism studies in terms of formation of terrorist groups and participation in them. In
contrast to gangs, in terms of terrorism those who degrade the honor are usually
governing power/s such as security forces (see the literature part on “exorbitances of
governing power/s”).

Many of the variables discussed above and in the research literature have been
basic concerns of other criminological or sociological theories, too. In this context,
anomie theory posits that although there is a strong emphasis on financial success
(especially in US), the emphasis on legitimate methods such as hard work and education
to achieve this dream is weak; this, in turn, motivates individuals to try all methods
regardless of legality or illegality. Institutional anomie theory contributes to anomie
theory by suggesting the ineffectiveness of the major structures such as family, school,
political system, and culture that are dominated by the economy (Cullen & Agnew,
1999). Similarly, but from a broader perspective, strain theory suggests that when
individuals are prevented from achieving cultural goals such as monetary success, good
job, good education, and having middle class status through legal channels, they are

pressured into offending due to a strain. Thus, illegitimate channels may appear to be the

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solution to reach goals (Akers, 2000; Cullen & Agnew, 1999; Title & Meier, 1990).
Given the weaknesses20 of classical strain theories, Agnew created the general strain
theory that might be seen as a social and psychological version of strain theory. General
strain theory sees crime and delinquency as an adaptation to stressful conditions, and also
suggests that strain results from negative relationships with others. Strain occurs when an
individual is not treated by others as he or she would like to be treated (Agnew, 1992,
1999). This negative relationship might take three forms (Cullen & Agnew, 1999):
“...relations where others 1) prevent or threaten to prevent the achievement

of positively valued goals (e.g., monetary success, popularity with peers), 2)

remove or threaten to remove positively valued stimuli (e. g., the loss of

romantic partner, the death of a parent), or 3) present or threaten to present

negatively-valued stimuli (e.g., insults, physically assault, overwork)” (p.

120)

These kinds of negative experiences are likely to increase anger or frustration that
might lead a crime as an option to cope with pressure and reduce strain. Although there is
no research that tests general stain theory in the terrorism, studies on other crimes give
considerable support to this theory (Hoffrnann & Cerbone, 1999; Mazerolle, 1998;
Paternoster & Mazerolle, 1994).

Anomie and strain theories might be linked to various concepts discussed in the
preceding literature review. The emphasis on economic issues in anomie and institutional
anomie theory might be linked to the economic conditions based explanations of
participation in terrorist groups despite conflicting findings on this issue in the terrorism

literature. Strain theory might be linked to not only economic explanations but also

“ideological closeness” arguments. That is, left wing groups, particularly those with a

 

20 To Agnew (1999) classical strain theories “1- are unable to explain the extensive nature of middle-
class delinquency, 2- neglect goals other than monetary success/middle-class status, 3- neglect barriers to
goal achievement other than social class, and 4- do not fully specify why only some strained individuals
turn to delinquency” (p. 152).

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Marxist ideology, are disturbed by class inequality. Originally, leftist ideology suggests
that the working class is exposed to unequal treatment by ruling class, and this results in
the exploitation of working class labor. Today, the capitalist system is seen as a primary
source of inequality by left wing terrorist groups, and many individuals who think in a
similar way want to participate in terrorist groups that struggle against this inequality as
they cannot manage it using legal methods. On the other hand, compared to anomie
theory, classical strain theory and its derivative, general strain theory, seem to be
significantly related to the variables in terrorism literature on participation as it moves
beyond solely economic strain to multiple sources. Accordingly, most of the motivational
factors that lead to participation in terrorist groups might be considered sources of strain.
For instance, “need to belong to a group” might be a source of strain if this positively
valued goal isn’t met through legal groups and activities; “negative life events” such as
loss of a friend, a family member, or a relative killed by police might create strain
because of removal of positively valued stimuli. “Exorbitances of governing power” that
may include degradation of honor, humiliation, or oppression might cause a strain or
stress, as these behaviors present negatively valued stimuli. In turn, all these strains may
motivate individuals to join terrorist groups to struggle against the (inadequate)
conditions that induce strain and stress.

Unlike other theories of crime, control theory explains why people do not commit
crimes rather than explaining why they commit crimes. Under the main assumption that
everybody is likely to commit crime, regardless of individual variation in motivation,
social control theory proposes that delinquency occurs when the social and cultural

constraints over hmnan behavior become weaker and less effective (Akers, 2000;

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Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi, 1969; Sokol-Katz, Dunhan & Zimmerman, 1997).
Using a different approach, Reckless’ containment theory proposes that inner and outer
pushes and pulls toward deviance produce delinquent behavior, unless they are
counteracted by inner and outer containment. “Pushes” that lead to delinquency might be
poverty, deprivation, blocked opportunities etc. “Pulls” are positive inducements toward
delinquency such as delinquent subcultures, gang structure, attractiveness of delinquent
group etc. Outer containments are school or parental supervision and discipline, strong
group cohesion, and a consistent moral front. Inner containments are strong conscience or
a good self-concept (Akers, 2000).

Similarly, Hirschi’s control theory, also known as social bonding theory, proposes
that delinquency occurs when an individual’s bond to society is weakened or broken.
There are four (4) types of bonding to others: attachment, commitment, involvement, and
belief that are strongly inter-correlated. If these four (4) bonds are stronger with family,
school, adult and peers, there will be more conformity and less criminality. According to
Hirschi, it does not matter to whom one is attached; even attachment to delinquent peers,
friends or deviant parents reduces the possibility of criminality (Hirschi, 1969, 1999).
Using these characteristics of control and bonding theories, it could be claimed that
terrorism literature includes both confirmatory and contradictory findings with respect to
participation in terrorist groups. Once it is accepted that terrorist organizations recruit
young people who leave traditional communities and move to urban centers in order to
attend universities or find jobs, there appears a considerable support for both theories,
since the loss of social ties and social control may facilitate participation in terrorist

groups. In Turkish culture, there is an exceptional interdependency and solidarity

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between family members, relatives and even within neighborhoods that ensure
considerable control over individuals. These strong ties and control disappear when a
person moves to a big city, especially one where he does not have acquaintances. He
suffers the difficulties of being a stranger and feels desolation never experienced in his
traditional environment back at home. At this point, terrorist groups who are aware of
these kinds of individuals will take over the scene under different roles and covers, and
promise the despondent an environment that will exclude all negative aspects of the city
life (Alkan, 2002; Ylmazer, 2006). For instance, ensuring a disconnection between a
person and his family is one of the most prominent strategies of the PKK for a successful
recruitment. Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, sees family as the biggest obstacle in their
activities (Ozonder, 1998).

On the other hand, Reckless’ containment theory that suggests the concepts of
“pulls” and “pushes” might also be relevant to the terrorism literature as well. While
“pushes” that lead to participation might be exorbitances of governing power/s (i.e.
humiliation or oppression) or negative life events (i.e. economic problems, family
pressure, or discrimination), “pulls” might be the need to belong to a group, ideological
closeness, organizational activities, or having family members or friends in a terrorist
group. In many cases, and in opposition to these theories, kinship and friendship play
facilitating roles in the participation process as many individuals learn about terrorist
groups through their family members, relatives, or fiiend who are the members or
sympathizers of terrorist organizations. Similarly, numerous studies (outside of terrorism
research) present contradictory findings with respect to social bonding theory (i.e. Jensen

& Brownfield, 1983; Josine, 1992; Linden & Hackler, 1973). Thus, it may be that

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attachment to peers or parents leads to conformity only when peers and parents are not
delinquent.

Social control theory also assumes consensus over basic norms and values. In the
context of terrorism, where both left wing and religiously motivated terrorist groups
espouse ideology in contrast to mainstream society, bonding to the terrorist group may
actually increase terrorist participation and belief systems supportive of terrorist
ideology.

Social control theory further indicates the level of supervision that children
receive is important; the more supervision the less delinquency. In this regard, it is a
common feature in almost all crime formations including gangs that girls’ involvement in
crimes and delinquent groups is less when compared to boys (Deschenes & Esbensen,
1999; Hirschi, 1969; Mawby, 1980). Similarly, terrorist groups are male dominated as are
other crimes and criminal groups, so less female participation in terrorist groups might be
attributable to excessive control over the girls by families as compared to boys, i.e., close
supervision of girls reduces their opportunities for joining terrorist groups. Due to
inhibitive and restrictive approaches towards girls, even if the families are members or
supporters of terrorist groups, they may not want their daughters to join terrorist groups.

Given the literature review on participation in terrorist organizations, social
learning theory appears to be the most germane to the issue of participation compared to
other theories, as participation is a process that entails a kind of learning process. There
are two important theories within the framework of social learning theory; Sutherland’s

Differential Association Theory and Akers’ Social Learning Theory (Akers, 2000;

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Burgess & Akers, 1966). Sutherland’s differential association theory is a micro level
theory with nine propositions (Sutherland & Cressey, 1999):

“1- Criminal behavior is learned, 2- Criminal behavior is learned in
interaction with other persons in a process of communication, 3- The principal
part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal
groups, 4- When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes (a)
techniques of committing the crime, which are sometimes very complicated,
sometimes very simple; (b) the specific direction of motives, drives,
rationalizations, and attitudes, 5- The specific direction of motives and drives
is learned from definitions of the legal codes as favorable or unfavorable, 6- A
person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to
violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law, 7-
Differential associations may vary in frequencies, duration, priority, and
intensity, 8- The process of learning criminal behavior by association with
criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are
involved any other learning, 9- While criminal behavior is an expression of
general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values
since non-criminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values”
(p. 82-83).

The sixth proposition is perhaps the most important, that exposure to others’
definitions that are favorable to criminal behavior is central in terms of formation of
criminal behavior. The seventh proposition clarifies the former: if a person is exposed to
law violating definitions more frequently, over longer time periods, more intensively and
as a priority over law abiding definitions, it is probable that he/she will violate the law
(Akers, 2000). In this regard, there is a direct link between terrorism literature on
participation and differential association theory: individuals learn about terrorist groups
before joining them. Individuals learn about terrorists and their activities from two main
sources: directly from individuals such as parents, relatives, or friends, or/and indirectly
from external/other factors such as prison life, organizational propaganda (through
publications, the media, or intemet), or/and organizational activities. As the theory posits,

during the learning process individuals are exposed to others’ definitions (i.e. those of

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friends or family members), violent images (i.e., excessive use of force by police during
demonstrations), or propaganda through media or publications that are favorable to
terrorist groups’ ideologies. The more frequent, the longer duration, and the more
intensive exposure to the law violating definitions compared to law abiding definitions,
the greater the possibility that a person will have enough incentive to take part in a
terrorist group.

Akers’ social learning theory is a kind of behavioral reformulation of Sutherland’s
differential association of crime. It is a broader version of differential association theory
that integrates Sutherland’s theory with differential reinforcement and other principles of
behavioral acquisition, continuation, and cessation. Inclusion of concepts such as
imitation, anticipated reinforcement, and self-reinforcement makes social learning theory
a soft version of behaviorism (Akers, 2000). There are four main concepts in the Akers’
theory; differential association, definitions, differential reinforcement, and imitation. The
first concept, differential association, is similar to Sutherland’s approach with the
additions that differential association has both behavioral- interactional and normative
dimensions. Definitions are an individual’s own attitudes or meanings that are attached to
given behavior. Based on rationalizations, definition of a situation, and other evaluative
and moral attitudes, an act can be defined as right or wrong, good or bad, justified or
unjustified, doable or undoable. In addition, interactions with family members, relatives,
or friends with connections to terrorist groups as supporters or as active members might
help individuals learn whether being in a terrorist group is defined as good or bad. If
many of them define it as good (positive definition) or at least justified (neutralizing

definition) rather than as undesirable (negative definition), it increases the possibility that

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those individuals will have enough motivation to join terrorist groups. Differential
reinforcement might be defined as a balance of anticipated or actual rewards and
punishments. In other words, the possibility of committing a crime depends on the past,
present, and anticipated future rewards and also punishments for their actions.” While
reward/positive reinforcement and avoidance of punishment/negative reinforcement
strengthen a behavior, aversive stimuli/positive punishment and loss of reward/negative
punishment weaken it. Apparently, there is a strong relationship between the explanation
of how reinforcements strengthen a behavior and motivational factors that facilitate
participation in terrorist groups. In this context, the variables of ‘need to belong to a
group” and “ideological closeness” might be considered as reward/positive
reinforcement, “exorbitances of governing powers” and “negative life events” might be
seen as an avoidance of punishment/negative reinforcement. For instance, for some
individuals, being accepted by a group regardless of its legality or illegality, or acting in a
group that has a similar ideological perspective might be a kind of reward. On the other
hand, some who are unhappy with the existing political system may think that if they join
a terrorist group, they might help the group topple the government and thus, they may not
experience any more exorbitances and negative life events caused by the existing system
(avoidance of punishment/negative reinforcement). On the other hand, reinforcing
sources are usually those that control the individual’s major sources of reinforcement and
punishment and expose them to behavioral models and normative definitions.
Reinforcing sources might include family members, peers, schools, or religious places
(i.e. mosques, churches). In addition to reasons of fiiendship or kinship, many

individuals join terrorist groups under the influence of religious sermons given in holy

 

2' Also see “rational choice theory” which has a similar content.

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places by members or leaders of terrorist groups, or receive ideological educations in
schools where extremist ideologies are taught. The final concept, imitation, involves
exhibiting the same type of behaviors after observing others’ behaviors. Accordingly,
observation of others’ negative behaviors may result in negative behaviors (Akers, 2000;
Akers, 1977 cited in Morash, 1983). The possibility of imitation is augmented if people
are in close contact or if those imitated are superiors. In this manner, parents or peers who
are the members or sympathizers of terrorist groups might easily be among those who are
imitated (Vito & Holmes, 1994). It seems that social learning theory is complementary to
other sociological theories, and it can be used to generate more comprehensive ,
explanations of deviant behaviors (Akers, Krohn, Lanza-Kaduce & Rodasevich, 1979).
Several studies have examined gang groups’ use of learning theories. Battin et al.
(1998) found a significant friendship effect on adolescents’ involvement in delinquency.
They conclude that individuals in a gang are exposed to delinquent models, definitions,
and reinforcements that lead to delinquent behaviors. Winfree et al. (1994a; 1994b) found
that gang membership and delinquency could be explained by the social learning
variables of attitudes (toward gangs and gang activity), social reinforcers and punishers,
and differential association (Winfree et al., 1994a). Morash (1983, p. 313) found that
regardless of whether the peer group is a gang, peers’ delinquency is itself predictive of
individual’s delinquency. Regarding gender differences in violent activities, Deschenes
and Esbensen (1999) found that the most plausible explanations of this gender difference
in violence relates to “differences in learning and reinforcement of behaviors through the
process of socialization” (p. 67-68). Another study by Esbensen and Deschenes (1998)

revealed that social learning models support more than social bonding models in terms of

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distinguishing between gang and non-gang members for both males and females.
Thomberry et al. (1993, 2003) connect their findings that support the facilitation model to
learning theories, contending that gangs are influential at communicating definitions and
teaching techniques. They firrther argue the importance of reward structures of gang
groups. Bjerregaard and Lizotte (1995) examined the relation between gun ownership and
gang membership, and noted that the gang milieu facilitates illegal activities and that
there is an influence from the social learning process on illegal activities. Critics of social
learning theory generally complain that it is tautological and ignores temporal sequencing
of events (Akers, 2000).

Discussion of learning theories requires mention of the theory of techniques of
neutralization. Sykes and Matza (1957) claim that neutralization techniques comprise a
very important component of differential association theory’s explanation of "definitions
favorable to the violation of law. " This theory argues that individuals with conventional
values find ways to justify their actions that have been condemned by law and by society
at large. Justifications come before the delinquent behaviors, and reduce the influence of
social control. Neutralization is most likely to occur during the association with
delinquent peers. Sykes and Matza theorize that there are five techniques of
neutralization: the denial of responsibility (i.e. deviant acts occur due to forces outside of
individuals such as unloving parents, bad friends and neighborhood); the denial of injury
(i.e. no personal injury but just harm to property of those who can afford it); the denial of
victim (i.e. wrong-doers deserve punishment, or injury caused by him is a result of a
rightful retaliation or punishment); the condemnation of condemners (i.e. police is

corrupt and brutal, courts are unjust, government is corrupt and oppressive); the appeal of

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higher loyalties (i.e. claiming that he committed the crime not for his own good but the
benefit of others like the sibling pair, the gang, or the fiiendship clique) (Sykes & Matza,
1957; Vito & Holmes, 1994). This theory appears to have some implications in terms of
understanding how people rationalize their participation in illegal terrorist groups and

' commission of violent activities. For instance, there may be various justifications with
respect to participation in terrorist groups such as a rationalization that existing economic
and social conditions are unjust and unfair and that there is no other way to solve these
problems (the denial of responsibility), a belief that the existing system is corrupt and
oppressive so it must be destroyed (the condemnation of condemners), or the belief that
defending the rights of an ethnic group in which one has membership entails participation
in a terrorist group that fights for the rights of that ethnic group (the appeal of higher
loyalties).

Unlike other theories, interactional theory, a kind of integrated theory, proposes
that there is no unidirectional pathway to outcomes (delinquency): persons interact with
other people and institutions, and as a result, this interactive process forms the behavioral
outcomes. According to the interactional theory, the control, learning, and delinquency
variables are reciprocally interrelated, and mutually influence and reinforce one another
over the course of an individual’s life. Put simply, weakening bonds to a conventional
society and delinquent behaviors learned from others leads to delinquency and
participation in criminal groups. Participation in criminal groups leads to learning of
criminal values and techniques and weakens bonds to conventional others. Interactional
theory consists of six concepts: attachment to parents, commitment to school, belief in

conventional values, associations with delinquent peers, adopting delinquent values, and

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engaging in delinquent behavior (Thomberry, 1987). Thomberry et al. (2003) utilized
interactional theory to explain participation in gangs during the adolescent period and
identified four motivational factors: 1- Presence of family members and/or friends in the
gang (a kind of group relation), 2- Expectancy of protection, 3- Fun and/or action, 4-
Others (i.e. felt like it, just to be in). More than half of their samples (54%) pointed out
the family/friend issue, as a main factor for participation, followed by protection (19%),
fun/action (15%), and others (12%).

Peer group influence, particularly the influence of delinquent peers, is one of the
significant predictors of delinquency. In this context, social network theory seems to be
one of the most appropriate approaches in terms of explaining group effect on
participation (Jansyn, 1966; Thomberry et al., 2003). Network approaches also improve
the value of basic theories such as social control, differential association, or Agnew’s
social learning theory to explain delinquent behavior. In addition, the network approach
is effective in terms of facilitating the examination of structural characteristics of
personal networks and their implications for the study of delinquent behavior (Krohn,
1986). It is necessary to note that group dynamics can differ depending on the ideological
characteristics of terrorist groups: we may not expect the same group dynamics for
different types of terrorist organizations, i.e., religiously motivated, separatist, nationalist
groups, or left wing groups. Whereas nationalist or separatist groups’ members usually
remain in close contact with their families and relatives regardless of active or passive
participation, and may even receive support from the society where they live in, left
wing, anarchic, or other ideological groups generally disconnect from family members

and society at large (Hudson, 1999).

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Concepts of the discipline of economics such as cost and benefit might be useful
to explain participation in terrorism (N yatepe-Coo, 2004). According to rational choice
theory, offenders calculate the cost associated with their offending decisions.
Mathematically, rational choice models suggest that crime is more likely to occur if
p(success)*benefits > [1-p(success)]*costs (Dugan, Lafree and Piquero, 2005).
Calculated anticipated benefits may range from monetary gain to political recognition. In
this manner, participation in a terrorist group may be seen as a rational choice of an
individual who expects some benefit(s). Crenshaw (1992) explains the connection
between rational choice theory and terrorism with two terms: preconditions and
precipitants. The former is related to situational factors that invoke in individuals a
tendency towards terrorist organizations, the latter refers to direct causes that might be
best described as the last drop of water that causes a glass to overflow.

Using a different approach, Muller and Opp (1986) contend that individuals’
belief of contribution to the public good outweighs any concerns and risks. Accordingly,
perceived contributions to the public might be saving the community from oppressive
governmental forces; this might also influence individual reasons and expectations. If a
person thinks that being in a terrorist group will meet all his psychological needs, he may
disregard all possible risks associated with the membership. Crenshaw (1983, 1992),
however, does not see rational choice theory as sufficient to explain the process, and
accentuates the importance of psychological theories, arguing that although terrorism has
a strategic value, some aspects and different levels motivations of terrorism, such as
justification of violations, peer pressure, emotions of vengeance, aggression, self-

perception of heroism, and a sense of superiority, can be understood through the

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contributions of psychology. Participation in and the purpose of terrorism might be
political, but the intent of violence through participation is psychological, and might be
best explained with psychological terms or factors.

There are several psychologically based explanations of terrorism. The
fiustration-aggression hypothesis reveals that when a person is confronted with
frustration, it is likely that the person will respond aggressively (Dollard et al., 1939 cited
in Berkowitz, 1989). Accordingly, terrorist behaviors including participation might be a
response frustration due to different political, economic, or personal factors (Hudson,
1999). The relative deprivation hypothesis posits that if there is a discrepancy between
the real things that individuals have and imagined things that they expect to have, then it
is possible to commit illegal acts to obtain imaginary things. Duyvesteyn (2004) links this
approach to terrorism: “When this situation is compounded by an ideology inciting
uprising and violence and the chances and opportunities arise for doing so, persons
willing to engage in terrorism will” (p. 441). The narcissistic approach is primarily about
psychology of the self. Hudson (1999) explains the formation of narcissism “. . .if the
psychological form of the “idealized parental ego” is not neutralized by reality testing, it
can produce a condition of helpless defeatism; narcissistic defeat can lead to reactions of
rage and a wish to destroy the source of narcissistic injury.” In this manner, narcissistic
injury of individuals, such as lack of self esteem and self-respect, can motivate people to
join terrorist organizations in order to meet their psychological needs (Borum, 2004;
Hudson, 1999; McCormick 2003). The empirical validity of explanations for crime by
psychological theories is difficult, if not impossible, to test, since motivations are deeply

hidden in the unconscious (Akers, 2000). Besides, explanations that use simple

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psychological terminology do not reflect the real complexities of the terrorism
phenomena (Horgan, 2003a).

Procedural justice theory and defiance theory might help explain why so many
terrorists come from experiences of politiCal oppression and how exorbitances of
governing powers might affect individuals to join illegal structures. Procedural justice
theory addresses citizens’ perception of justice as fair or unfair, or just or unjust. If
people think that sanction is fair and just, they comply with the law by confirming the
legitimacy of law enforcement. Conversely, unfair and unjust sanctions do not result in
compliance and decrease legitimacy (Hinds, 2007; Tyler, 1990). On the other hand,
defiance theory integrates three theories: procedural justice theory as explained above,
the theory of “reintegrative shaming” which simply suggests that while reintegrative
shaming controls crime, stigrnatic shaming augments it, and the sociology of “master
emotions” of pride and shame that simply indicates individual differences in emotional
reaction to sanctions or shaming that might vary depending on social bonding to those
who apply sanctions and to society in general. According to defiance theory, procedural
justice’s core concepts of fairness and legitimacy play an important role for the
acknowledgement of shame, a necessary component of deterrence. In other words,
defiance occurs if an individual (who is weakly bonded to or alienated from the
sanctioning agent or the community the agent represents) thinks that criminal sanctions
are unfair, stigmatizing, and rejecting a person; thus, he would not acknowledge shame
and probably would offend again. These kinds of sanction are seen as “substantively
arbitrary, discriminatory, excessive, undeserved, or otherwise objectively unjust”

(Sherman, 1993, p. 461). In this context, given the literature on participation, excessive

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use of force, violation of basic human rights, humiliation of people by security forces, or
governmental oppression which are perceived as unnecessary and unjust might cause
resistance and protest against these unacknowledged practices. This may also lead to
support and even participation in terrorist groups that claim to fight against these kinds of
conditions. It is not necessary for a person to be the direct victim of these treatments.
That is, differently in terrorism, watching or seeing others treated unfairly and unjustly
may lead to similar results.

Conflict theory is similar to procedural justice to some extent. Conflict theory
contends that law and the criminal justice system watch the interest of and generate
benefits for the most powerful group, rather than all members of the society. The law is
unfairly used by the criminal justice system to label and punish powerless persons in the
society (Akers, 2000). Conflict theory further emphasizes that crime is the behavior of
individuals caught up in cultural and group conflict. Weinberg and Richardson (2004)
analyzed several terrorist movements across the world (i.e. Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the
PKK in Turkey, IRA in Northern Ireland, ETA in Spain) using conflict theory and
concluded that overreaction of the governmental authorities have escalated the terror
events by abovementioned groups. They identified four conditions for the emergence of
social and political conflict: 1- Parties should think that they have different identities
from one other, 2- At least one of the parties must have grievances to be satisfied, 3- At
least one of the party must make plan to change other party so as to reduce or eliminate
the grievance, 4— Aggrieved party must believe that they are capable of making change.
While it is not certain that when all these conditions are met that conflict will emerge;

however, when it starts, it escalates. Similarly, Crenshaw (1981) explains that ‘the first

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condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete
grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic
minority discriminated against by the majority” (p. 383). Terrorism is seen as the best
alternative to adjust the situation to make things fair and equal, or to gain equal rights or a
separate state. Apparently, conflict theory is useful to explain politically or ideologically
motivated crimes such as political terrorism (Akers, 2000). In other words, political
terrorism is a kind of reflection of conflict theory (Weinberg & Richardson, 2004).
Hence, some political theories such as political theory of anarchism, political theory of
fascism, and political theory of Marxism could be assessed under the scope of conflict
theory. According to Hoffinan (1998), terrorism is a ‘fundamentally and inherently’
political concept. Terrorism is about power, and the use of power to achieve political
change. This perspective makes terrorism one of the core topics of political science. In
the 19605 and 1970s, the general focal points of political science were leftist ideologies
that usually included the ideological concepts of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism,
anarchism, or nihilism. However, after the 19905 religiously motivated terrorism has been
one of the main concerns (Duyvesteyn, 2004).

Among the abovementioned political theories (political theories of anarchism,
fascism, and Marxism), the political theory of Marxism will be briefly explained due to
its relevance to the study topic as one of the terrorist group under the examination
(DHKP/C) has Marxist—Leninist ideology. According to Marxist theory, law and the
criminal justice system are controlled by the ruling capitalist elite, and serve elite self-
interests. Marxist theory posits that the capitalist system motivates egoistic tendencies,

encourages selfishness, and fails to promote social instincts. In this view, all crimes are a

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reflection of the crime-producing system of capitalism. Likewise, some political crimes
such as rebellion conducted as a part of revolutionary movement against the capitalist
system can be assessed under the frame of Marxist theory. The Marxist approach has
motivated many left oriented terrorist groups that seek to destroy the capitalist system
and establish a state ruled by Marxist ideology. In this context, individuals who are
against capitalism might find themselves in Marxist groups that target capitalism. In
addition to economic issues, different modifications of Marxist theory integrate other
variables such as age, gender, socialization, strain, differential opportunity, and social
learning into the theory (Akers, 2000; Beiner, 2006). Akers (2000) criticizes this issue
and contends that the greater the inclusion of these kinds of variables in Marxist theory,
the less Marxist theories differ from non-Marxist theories. Since Marxist theories focus
on the capitalist system as a source of crime, it is difficult to test this theory by examining
only capitalist systems. According to Ferracuti (1982), Marxist theory is difficult to
synthesize due to its long history and different interpretations. Additionally, the transfer
or transformation of class consciousness to revolutionary consciousness is still
historically unproven. Political theories may draw a general theoretical frame for some
of the learning and motivation related variables that facilitate participation in terrorist
groups. Accordingly, given the literature it might be claimed that learning related
variables such as “propaganda through publications/the media” and “organizational
activities”, and the motivational factors such as “ideological closeness”, “exorbitances of
governing power/s”, or “negative life events” are relevant to these political theories to a
considerable extent. For example, having similar perspectives with Marxist ideology

(ideological closeness), oppressive practices in a capitalist system (exorbitances of

129

governing power), or being in the poor class in a capitalist economic system (negative
life events) may end up joining in a Marxist terrorist group that fight against these unjust
conditions. As to learning related variables, propaganda through different means
including publications as well as organizational activities like demonstrations have
important roles to promote the Marxist ideologies.
4. Conclusion and Research Questions

A person does not become a terrorist overnight; the transition is a gradual learning
(Horgan, 2003 a) and motivation process. There is no single or simple answer to the
question of “Why does a person become a terrorist?” The range of people participating in
terrorist groups is vast, and there is demonstrated variation in terms of background
characteristics, motivational factors, and factors that help them learn about terrorist
groups (Horgan, 2003b; Kiknadze, 2007; Silke, 2003). In other words, there is no unique
motivation, background characteristic, or learning dynamics that could be used to explain
the reason of why individuals participate in terrorist groups. Congruently, Horgan
(2003b, p. 113) accentuates that “there are many reasons as to why someone would want
to join a terrorist group, and there is strong diversity of personal motivation even within
the same group.” Therefore, it is important not to develop stereotypical views of
terrorists.

Terrorist groups dramatically differ from each other as well, particularly in terms
of ideology (i.e. leftist, rightist, and separatist), size, resources, tactics, targets, levels of
violence, recruitment methods, objectives, and locations where they act (Silke, 2003). “In

short, on these and a vast range of other variables and measures, it is possible to find

130

’9

major differences between groups who are labeled by someone, somewhere, as terrorists
(Silke, 2003, p. 34).

As indicated above, there are various theories that might have explanatory value
for participation in terrorist organizations. It is, nevertheless, difficult to test these
theories because of data-related drawbacks. Also, based on the above discussion and
findings, it can be asserted that the use of the same theory to examine different
ideological groups may not be workable. Variations in the ideology, background, or
geographic characteristics of terrorist groups may require the application of different
theories in the study of different terrorist groups. For instance, conflict theory or Marxist
theory might be more appropriate for the examination of left wing groups, rather than
religiously motivated or right wing groups given that left wing groups often emphasize
conflict in the society utilizing traditionally Marxist terms like inequality or injustice.
Even if a same theory is used to study different groups, the same concepts/constructs of
that theory may not be relevant to each group. For example, given the literature,
exorbitances of governing powers might be more relevant to participation in left wing
groups compared to religiously motivated groups, since left wing groups usually define
governmental forces as oppressive and use that strategy in order to generate motivation
for participation, violence, resistance, and revolt. Referring to the lack of commonality
between different types of terrorist groups, Horgan (2003a, p. 23) contends that
“. . .forrnulating a theory of terrorist behavior must accommodate the heterogeneity of the
phenomenon as well as the wide diversity of individual motivations that terrorist

members might themselves push as explanatory factors.”

131

It is also important to distinguish between levels of analysis. This study is based
on a micro level analysis. If macro level analysis is executed, it may be possible to reveal
variations between the findings of micro and macro level analysis of terrorism.
According to the literature, at the individual level, there are uncertain, contradictory, and
debatable relationships between the variables of poverty, low socio-economic status,
lower educational achievement, inequality and its impacts on involvement in a terrorist
group. However, in many terrorists groups, terrorists have higher level of incomes,
education, or socio-economic status than the general population from which they are
drawn. At a macro level analysis, poverty, education status, inequality, or political
oppression are most likely to appear to have different effects. That is to say, poverty, low
educational achievement, and inequality may be positively related to terrorism in many
countries where terrorist groups exist.

Finally, there exists a clear need to focus upon the critical goal of understanding
all aspects of terrorism, including participation in terrorist groups, taking into particular
account the possible differences between different types of terrorist organizations in
terms of background characteristics of terrorists, their motivations and factors that help
them learn about the groups in which they participate. This study will begin by
examining how background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational
factors relate to participation in terrorist groups. These same characteristics are then used
to examine whether these traits relate to participation in left wing as opposed to
religiously motivated terrorist groups. To this end, given the exploratory and inductive

nature of this study, 1 will seek answers to the following research questions:

132

Research guestions (39) for quantitative analysis
RQI: What are the background characteristics of terrorists in DHKP/C and

Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations?
RQZ: Is there a significant difference between the sample (DHKP/C, and Turkish

Hezbollah) and general population of Turkey in terms of background characteristics?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Background Characteristics (p?)
DHKP/C ‘_ 0 Gender Population
0 Educatron
0 Age
Turkish 0 Marital status ‘ Population
Hezbollah ‘— 0 Job status

 

 

 

 

 

 

RQ3: How (from which sources) do individuals learn about Turkish Hezbollah,
and DHKP/C terrorist organizations?

RQ4: What kinds of factors motivate individuals to join Turkish Hezbollah, and
DHKP/C terrorist organizations?

The next research questions will explore the relationship between each variable
on (selected) background characteristics of DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah members
and motivational factors.

RQ5: Is there a significant relationship between each (relevant) background

characteristics of DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah members and motivational factors?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. Tactics/ ro a anda of terrorists
0 Marital status p p g

 

Ideological/political closeness t:

8 0 Gender . ,3

E g , Age of onset IElnvrronmleértal factors ‘3.
' ' ' ' e atrve r e events

2 5). 0 Economic condition ‘_ p? L g E

if 8 ' Education level Need to belong to a group -§

9 K

a a 0 Job status a

an -: '4:

D e

E

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Other motivational factors

 

 

 

 

133

The next set of questions compare the similarities and differences between
Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C members in terms of background characteristics,
learning related factors, and motivational factors.

RQ6: Are background characteristics of terrorists significantly related to
participation in DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah? What are the odds of ratios between

background characteristics and joining DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8 0 Age of onset DHKP/C

g g 0 Economic condition V?

E 33 0 Education level / p?

54° ’2‘ 0 Job status \ N

g g . Marital status Turkish Hezbollah
D 0 Other background characteristics

 

 

 

RQ7: Are learning related variables significantly related to participation in
DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah? What are the odds of ratios between learning related

variables and joining DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Friend/s
E
3. a - . ”...... DHKP/C
2 g Kinship 9
3’ 3 p
'3 3 Organizational activities \
,3,” \ Turkish Hezbollah
N Propaganda

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RQ8: Are motivational factors significantly related to participation in DHKP/C,
and Turkish Hezbollah? What are the odds of ratios between root motivational factors

and joining DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah?

134

 

 

Environmental factors

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

E

‘3 Ideological/political closeness DHKP/C

Q ..———->

- . . .——-———-

'3 Negative life events p?

.S \

3 Need to 1381098 10 a group N Turkish Hezbollah
g Tactics/propaganda of terrorists

Other motivational factors

 

 

 

 

 

RQ9: Does previous criminality/arrest (any connection with security forces
before participation) increase odds of joining DHKP/C or/and Turkish Hezbollah?

RQ10: Does any family member’s active support or sympathy to the group
increase odds of joining DHKP/C or/and Turkish Hezbollah?

RQII: Are there significant differences between male and female participants of
DHKP/C in terms of background characteristics, learning related variables, and

motivational factors?”

 

Background characteristics (selected)

 

 

 

, ‘- Male
Learning related variables p?

 

 

...—v? Female

DHKP/C

 

 

 

 

 

Motivational factors

 

 

 

 

 

Research guestions for Qualitative analysis

In addition to the quantitative analyses, the documents will also be reviewed to
find detailed answers to the following research questions:
RQI: How do negative life events motivate individuals to join terrorist

organizations?

 

22 The data about Turkish Hezbollah do not include girls.

135

RQ2: How does ideological/political closeness motivate individuals to join
terrorist organizations?

RQ3: How do environmental factors motivate individuals to join terrorist
organizations?

RQ4: What is effect of ‘need to belong to a group’ in participation in terrorist
groups?

RQ5: How do tactics/propaganda of terrorists motivate individuals to join terrorist
organizations?

RQ6: What are the other factors that motivate individuals to join terrorist groups?

RQ7: What are the expectations of individuals from the terrorist groups (DHKP/C
and Turkish Hezbollah) before joining? How do they see the terrorist groups?

RQ8: If individuals were members of other legal or illegal groups before joining
DHKP/C or Turkish Hezbollah, why did they leave from these groups and choose

DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah?

136

CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the quantitative and qualitative analysis methods used to
analyze the documents captured from Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist
organizations’ cells to answer the questions ‘What are the background characteristics of
Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist organizations’ members?’, ‘From which
sources do individuals learn about these terrorist groups?’, ‘What kinds of factors
motivate them to join terrorist groups?’, and ‘What are the similarities and differences
between Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C with regard to background characteristics,
learning related factors, and motivational factors?’

Research on terrorism presents methodological challenges, including difficulties
in accessing data and flawed methodologies (Ross, 1993). These inadequacies present
difficulties in the application of traditional research methods to the study of terrorism
(Silke, 2004b). Merari (1991) notes “On the practical side, terrorism is a very elusive
subject for research. . .Collecting systematic, standardized, reliable information for the
purpose of comparisons is next to impossible. Moreover, the customary tools of
psychological and sociological research are almost always inapplicable for studying
terrorist groups and their individual members” (p. 89). However, despite methodological
limitations, there is a growing body of research on terrorism.

Methods used in terrorism research represent a broad range of traditional
approaches: interviews with terrorists (i.e. Stern, 2003), use of open sources (i.e.
Sageman, 2004), examination of official records (i.e. Smith, 1994), surveys of prisoners

(i.e. Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003) and analysis of terrorists’ documents (i.e. Teymur,

137

2004). Most of these studies used qualitative methods. Quantitative research, which helps
us see numerical relationships and patterns, is uncommon, and those which have
quantitative characteristics are generally descriptive (Silke, 2004a).

This study relies on both quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods to
analyze the documents captured from Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist
organizations’ cells. Content analysis is especially useful for creating knowledge,
representation of the facts, and new explanations and insights (Krippendorff, 1980).
Accordingly, the qualitative content analysis will focus on the root motivational factors
that lead individuals to participation in terrorist organizations. The quantitative content
analysis will be utilized to generate data for statistical analysis of differences between
participants in two ideologically distinct terrorist groups in terms of background
characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors.

The unit of analysis of this study is the (individual) terrorist. In the analyses, no
identifiers will be included in the data for the subjects of the documents to avoid
identification of the documents’ authors (terrorists). All methods have been approved by
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Michigan State University.

1. Terrorist Documents

In Turkey, almost all terrorist organizations including Turkish Hezbollah and
DHKP/C ask their potential members to submit written background information either
before active participation or right after being recruited in the terrorist group. Turkish
Hezbollah usually asks its potential members to write these reports after the selection and
training period and before they can become active militants who take part in terrorist

incidents. Likewise, DHKP/C collects detailed information about the candidates by

138

asking them to write reports about themselves. Unlike Turkish Hezbollah, some DHKP/C
members prepare these documents after becoming an active militant.

All the documents are similar in content, and include participation related
information. Since these documents are submitted either before active participation or
immediately after recruitment, the documents from this period are ideal for the study of
terrorist motivation and participation. These documents constitute a kind of application
form, used by the leaders and authorities of the terrorist groups in the selection and
recruitment process. They contain detailed and self-presented information about each
individual’s background characteristics, evaluation of their previous life, explanations of
the reasons that motivate their participation in the terrorist group, and evaluation of their
and their families’ social, economic and ideological conditions. These documents are not
only used as application forms and recruitment tools but also they give power to the
leaders of the terrorist organizations against the members in the case of disobedience,
desistence, and conflict with the ideology of the organization. Furthermore, as Teymur
(2004) notes, they facilitate the internal communication of terrorist organizations. The
documents in this study were captured during police operations against the terrorist cells
of Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C in different parts of Turkey.

The contents of the documents suggest that individuals answered similar type of
questions, because almost all information in the documents is presented in the same
order. For instance, DHKP/C related documents contain information about 28 different
questions such as “Where were you bom?, What is your birth date?, What is your
ethnicity?, What is your level of education?, How many brothers or sisters do you have?,

What is your family economic situation?, What is your family’s political background?,

139

Do you have any relatives who work in the police or army force?” Teymur (2004).
Turkish Hezbollah documents contain almost the exact same type of information. The
biggest difference between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah related documents is the
format: Turkish Hezbollah’s documents appear in a question and answer format, although
there are no apparent questions in the documents of DHKP/C. However, the order of the
information in the documents suggests that DHKP/C members answered the same type of
questions from a prepared list. For example, in each DHKP/C document, the answer to
item number ten contains information about individuals’ job experience. Similarly, in
item number four, they gave information about their education level; “I finished high
school...”, or “I graduated from college” etc. By looking at answers regarding education,
it is clear that terrorist organizations want to have information about potential members’
education level. The consistent presentation of content and answers allow coding the
responses to each question as a variable.
2. Sample

(1) Selection of terrorist groups

There are many religiously motivated and left wing terrorist groups in Turkey.
The most active religiously motivated terrorist groups are Islamic Action Organization
(IHO), Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front (IBDA-C), Islamic Congregation Union
(ICB), Hizb-ut Tahrir, and Turkish Hezbollah. On the other hand, Marxist-Leninist
Communist Party (MLKP), Turkish Communist Party/Marxist Leninist-Conference
(TKP/ML-Conference), Marxist Communist Party (MKP), and DHKP/C are the most
active left wing terrorist groups. In this study, I selected one terrorist organization from

each ideological group: DHKP/C as a left wing terrorist group and Turkish Hezbollah as

140

a religiously motivated group. These two terrorist organizations were selected for several
reasons 23 .

First, DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah conducted the highest number of incidents
among the terrorist organizations in their respective categories. From 1995 to 2006,
terrorist incidents (serious or not serious) carried out by the left wing terrorist groups are
as following: DHKP/C: 2,503, TKP/ML-Conference: 665, and MLKP: 1,528. Incidents
conducted by religiously motivated terrorist groups’ between 1994 and 2006 are: 523 for
Turkish Hezbollah, 253 for IBDA/C, 182 for ICB, 463 for Hizb-ut Tahrir, and 5 for

Vasat.

Table 5. Religiously motivated (1994-2006) and left wing terrorist groups (1995-2006)
and terrorist incidents, arrested terrorists, and casualties“

Incidents Arrested Casualty of Casualty of

 

terrorists civilians Security
forces
Left wing
DHKP/C 2503 8410 112 259
TKP/ML-Conf. 665 2529 70 l 12
MLKP 1528 2508 22 82
Religiously motivated
Turkish Hezbollah 523 10720 530 71
IBDA/C 253 751 44 -
ICB 1 82 327 - -
Hizb-ut Tahrir 463 734 - -
Vasat 5 200 24 -

 

Source: TNP (2006)

Second, although it is difficult to determine the exact size of these groups,
DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah are the largest in each ideological category. The number

of arrested terrorists provides an indicator of the size of these terrorist organizations.

 

23 The data about Turkish terrorist groups and terrorist incidents were provided by TNP.

24 This table includes the most deadlier and active ones in each ideological category. Religiously

motivated terrorist groups do not include the connections of international terrorist organizations such as Al-
Qaeda.

141

Between the years of 1995 and 2006, there were 8,410 arrested DHKP/C members
compared to 2,529 for TKP/ML-Conference, and 2,508 for MLKP in the same period.
Similarly, between the years of 1994 and 2006, the number of arrested Turkish Hezbollah
members was 10,720 while IBDA/C has 751, ICB has 327, Hizb-ut Tahrir has 734, and
Vasat has 200 members arrested. Table 5 presents these differences in incidents and
arrest rates for the major terrorist groups in Turkey.

Third, these two groups have the highest civilian casualty rate when compared
with others in their respective categories. Between 1995 and 2006, the numbers of
civilians killed or wounded are; 112 by DHKP/C, 70 by TKP/ML-Conference, and 22 by
MLKP. The numbers for religiously motivated groups cover the years between 1994 and
2006. During this period, Turkish Hezbollah killed or wounded 530 civilians, while this
number is just 44 for IBDA/C, and 24 for Vasat. ICB and Hizb-ut Tahrir did not target
any civilians. Further, while Turkish Hezbollah killed or wounded 71 security forces,
there is no casualty of security forces caused by other local religiously motivated groups.
Compared to other left wing groups, DHKP/C appears to be the most violent. Between
the years of 1995 and 2006, while DHKP/C is responsible for the killing or wounding of
259 secmity forces, this number is 112 for TKP/ML-Conference, and 82 for MLKP.

Data from other indicators such as captured ammunition yield similar results that
left-wing DHKP/C and religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah represent the most
significant threat to public safety among their respective types of terrorist organizations.
Additionally, these two groups have more institutionalized structures in both legal and
illegal areas through political parties, media organs, and business investments. Turkish

security forces consider them as the biggest future threat when compared with other

142

Turkish terrorist organizations. Because of these and other significant characteristics of
Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C, I selected them for the analysis

(2) Convenience sampling of the documents

This study uses convenience sampling of documents seized from these two
terrorist groups. Convenience sampling is a kind of non-probability sampling method,
also known as haphazard or accidental sampling (Bachman & Schutt, 2003; Statistics
Canada, 2006). In contrast to probability sampling methods, items in non-probability
samples within the target population do not have an equal chance of being selected. So
the basic disadvantages of convenience sampling are generally similar to non-probability
sampling. “Because the chance of one element being selected versus another element
remains an unknown, we cannot be certain the selected sample actually represents our
target population” (Bachman and Paternoster, 2004, p. 19). Therefore, researchers would
have no idea about the representativeness of the samples of the population. However,
especially for exploratory research, convenience sampling is an accepted method of
obtaining data. Depending on the research design and sample characteristics, convenience
sampling could give significant insights into the phenomenon under study. Despite
sample selection bias, convenience sampling can give accurate results when the
population is homogenous (Statistics Canada, 2006).

Convenience sampling is the basic sampling method for the documents used in
this analysis. Given the limitations inherent in terrorism research and the distinctiveness
of the samples of original handwritten terrorist documents, the advantages of the
convenience sampling method outweigh the disadvantages. As mentioned above, they are

very valuable sources of information because of the originality of their contents.

143

Specifically, when compared with official reports or self reports, the documents appear to
be more reliable and free of bias since they were submitted to terrorist organizations
rather than security forces or researchers.

Convenience sampling is also considered very useful when researchers do not
have a population list. In this study that concentrates on participation in terrorist groups,
it is impossible to define a population because, there is no list of terrorists from which to
randomly select. Even if a list existed, it was unlikely to make contact with the selected
samples because of confidentiality issues and several other risk factors. Official lists, for
example a list of detained terrorists, are also limited because they only represent those
terrorists who were actually caught (such as prisoners) (Bachman and Paternoster, 2004).
With these difficulties in mind, convenience sampling, utilizing seized documents,
appears to be an appropriate and necessary method to study participation in the terrorist
groups.

Since the documents have strategic importance for both terror organizations and
also security forces, terror organizations try to keep them in very secure places so as not
to be found during the probable police operations. Therefore, security forces do not have
a significant number of these documents. They are strategically important for terrorist
organizations, because they reveal considerable personal information about their
members. On the other hand, they are important for the security forces, because they
present direct evidence in the original handwriting of terrorists, and constitute proof of
terrorist group membership. The number of these kinds of documents in TNP’s archives

is not clear, but they are very limited in number.

144

Despite the difficulties in obtaining similar documents, I had access to 116
documents for DHKP/C and 186 documents for Turkish Hezbollah to analyze, making
the sample size 302. DHKP/C documents were obtained from two sources. First, Teymur
(2004) who conducted descriptive study about the recruitment process of DHKP/C
members provided the copies of 74 documents used in his study. Teymur (2004) gathered
the documents from the archives of the TNP. This study uses the original documents,
rather than Teymur’s (2004) data set. Since this study addresses a distinct set of research
questions, analysis of the original documents is warranted. In addition to Teymur’s
documents, 41 additional similar documents from TNP Archives were provided by the
TNP.

In addition to DHKP/C related documents, 186 more documents which belong to
Turkish Hezbollah members were also obtained from the archives of the TNP with the
consent of authorities of TNP-Anti-Terrorism Department. As noted above, this results in
a total sample of 302 documents”.

3. Data Analysis

In the quantitative part of the study, the variables pertinent to background
characteristics, learning related factors and motivational factors were coded from the
documents for statistical analysis. Logistic regression was used as the basic statistical

method to determine which variables discriminate between Turkish Hezbollah and

 

25 There is no way to determine that these 302 documents constitute all such documents in TNP
Archives, since it is possible that there are some more documents in the individual investigation files. In
practice, during investigations, security forces do not maintain these documents together in a separate
folder. Each document is kept in the related individual’s folder. In order to determine if there are more
documents, it would be necessary to check all the terrorists’ files; this is not feasible because of
accessibility problems, time constraints, and the significant number of the individual terrorist’s files. These
302 documents present a significant opportunity because capturing these types of documents before they
are destroyed by the terrorist organizations is quite rare. Terrorist organizations will go to great lengths to
prevent the seizure of such documents.

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DHKP/C terrorist organizations. Further, the relationships between the variables were
examined. The qualitative part of the study is based on intensive analysis of motivational
factors identified in the documents. Each motivation related variable tested in the
quantitative part was also examined in detail in the qualitative part of the analysis in
order to present a richer and more intimate view of motivations, and to see within and
between group motivational variations in the variables.

All the available documents (n=3 02) were included in the quantitative part of the
research. Based on the thematic categories identified in the quantitative part, purposive
(judgment) sampling method was used for the qualitative analysis of the documents. In
this approach, some cases were sampled based on their values on the key variables.26 The
total number of the documents used in the qualitative analysis is around thirty percent of
all the documents available for each group (approximately 55 documents for Turkish
Hezbollah and 35 documents for DHKP/C).

(1) Basic characteristics of quantitative and qualitative research

Research methods can be examined under two general topics; quantitative
research methods and qualitative research methods. Quantitative research presents
numerical relationships and patterns, and has been relatively uncommon in the study of
terrorism. Bachman and Schutt (2003) define quantitative methods as “methods such as
surveys and experiments that record variation in social life in terms of categories that
vary in amount. Data that are treated as quantitative are either numbers or attributes that

can be ordered in terms of magnitude” (p. 19).

 

26 In purposive sampling, each sample element/case is selected due to its exclusive value (Bachman &
Schutt, 2003). Representation of patterns of complex variations might be another reason of selection of this
method (Maxfield & Babble, 2006). Cases selected for the analysis is believed to have some traits of which
a researcher might want to get detailed information (Nardi, 2003). However, these specific and unique
cases might be missed if random sampling is used.

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In contrast to the quantitative method, qualitative methods aim at revealing the
social reality that the participants exhibit. In qualitative studies, researchers focus on the
participants’ words and behaviors rather than prearranged categories, counts or numbers
(Bachman & Schutt, 2003). Whereas quantitative methods’ key features are the use of
systematic measurement and statistical methods, qualitative methods do not quantify their
findings through statistical methods or analysis. In this regard qualitative variables vary
in kind; quantitative variables vary in amount (Marczyk, DeMatteo & Festinger, 2005).

While explanation, description, prediction and evaluation are among the basic
purposes of the quantitative method, exploration is the main focus of the qualitative
research. Qualitative methods, however, might be used for the purpose of description and
evaluation as in the quantitative method. Whereas the goal of the quantitative method is
the correct reflection of what is happening in the real world, qualitative methods seek to
understand some unknowns in social processes and social settings by focusing on various
perspectives of the study subjects (Bachman & Schutt, 2003; Morse & Richards, 2002).
Unlike quantitative research that generally uses hypothesis testing procedures, qualitative
research starts with a more global question generally known as a guiding hypothesis.
However, these research questions do not constrain the researcher (Smith & Davis,
2003)

The inclusion of both quantitative and qualitative methods empowers research by
combining the strengths of each approach in the same study. In other words, data
collected through quantitative methods might be supported with the data collected
through qualitative method or vice-a-versa. Hagan (2005) argues this issue in the context

of criminal justice “an emergent, interdisciplinary, applied scientific field require for its

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mature development a full array of quantitative and qualitative approaches, pure and
applied research efforts, and theoretically incisive as well as methodologically sound
studies and evaluations to gain academic respectability it both aspires and deserves” (p.
20). This seems to be particularly appropriate in an emerging area of study such as
terrorism.

This study uses content analysis methods. Content analysis may be classified as
both qualitative and quantitative, as it may feature qualitative methods and quantification
of qualitative based information (N ardi, 2003). Krippendorff (1980) defines content
analysis as a “research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to
their context” (p. 21). Content analysis involves special techniques to analyze the
scientific data, and it is especially useful for creating knowledge, representation of the
facts, and new explanations and insights (Krippendorff, 1980). Qualitative content
analysis includes many interpretive activities applied to verbal and nonverbal, written and
oral, mass mediated or individual messages. Conversely, quantitative content analysis is
often based on the data which are at nominal level. It also includes aggregated cases
analyzed at ordinal, interval or ratio levels (Rosengren, 1981).

Documents are one of the most commonly studied materials using content
analysis. Altheide (1996) indicates that “document analysis refers to an integrated and
conceptually informed method, procedure, and technique, for locating, identifying,
retrieving, analyzing documents for their relevance, significance, and meaning” (p. 2).
Documents that are subject to content analysis may include newspapers, books, diaries,
field notes, and official reports, papers, and records. Researchers play a very important

and active role in the process of the transformation of documents into data. A researcher

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who uses the content analysis method has to deal with some problems such as political
issues, funding, retrievability and access to the data. Even if there is access, it is not
always possible to find adequate numbers of documents. When documents are obtained,
they help us understand different perspectives and processes of social life, several
unknown facts and meaning of social activities and movements (Altheide, 1996).

This study, which used quantitative and qualitative content analyses of the
documents, sought answer to four main research questions: ‘What are the background
characteristics of Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist organizations’ members?’,
‘From which sources do individuals learn about these terrorist groups?’, ‘What kinds of
factors motivate them to join terrorist groups?’, and ‘What are the similarities and
differences between Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C members with regard to
background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors?’

(2) Quantitative data analysis

This section includes examination of the quantitative approach for the documents.
The coding and general parameters of each variable and quantitative statistical method
are discussed below.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable (DV) is the extent of participation in DHKP/C or Turkish
Hezbollah terrorist organizations. DV was coded as a dummy variable (0= DHKP/C, 1=
Turkish Hezbollah). In addition, each of the motivational factors was used as DV in order
to explore whether different background characteristics increase the odds of having
different type of motivations. The main body of the study used bivariate and multivariate

logistic regression and Chi-square in order to see relations between IVs and DV.

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Independent variables

There are three main factors that are believed to be effective in participation in
terrorist groups: background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational
factors. Each of these factors contains several variables.

Background characteristics: In order to capture the variables relevant to
background characteristics of the individuals, documents were analyzed quantitatively.
Then, the variables were coded and transformed into measurable quantitative variables.
Background characteristics related variables, their measurement levels, and codes are
described as following:

Age of onset: Age of onset was coded as an interval/ratio variable.

Gender: Gender was dummy-coded with “female” being as the reference category
(0=Female, 1=Male).

Education level: Education level was coded into two dummy variables: high
school, and higher than high school (post high school). Middle school or lower education
serves as the reference category.

Marital status: Marital status of terrorists was dummy-coded (0= Not married, 1:
Married). Those who are married and still remains married will be coded as one, and
those who are single (never married), divorced, separated (no relation anymore) and those
whose spouse is dead will be coded as zero. Zero (not married) serves as the reference
category.

Economic condition: In the Turkish context, many terrorists, especially those who
are students or unemployed, are economically dependent on their parents. Unlike

America or some European countries, even after the age of 18, Turkish parents usually

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try to meet financial needs of their children until they have their own job. Moreover,
many young married couples continue to live together with their parents under the same
roof using the budget either earned by parents or their kids. Therefore household
economic condition was used as an economic condition of terrorists and coded into two
dummy variables: moderate (modest) level, and high level. Low level economic
condition serves as the reference category.

Type of job: Terrorists’ type of job was coded into two dummy variables as
unemployed, and student. Working full time or part time serves as the reference category.

Number of siblings: Number of siblings was coded as an interval/ratio level
variable. It indicates the number of siblings that a sample has.

Any family member active in the group: Presence of at least one active family
member in the group was dummy-coded with “no” serving as the reference category
(0=No, 1=Yes). “No” indicates that the terrorist does not have any family member who is
active in the group, while one indicates that the terrorist has at least one active family
member. Family members include parents or siblings.

Any family member’s sympathy to the group: Presence of at least one family
member who has a sympathy or passive support to the group was dummy-coded with
“no” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “No” indicates that the terrorist
does not have any family member or relative who has sympathy or passive support to the
group, while one indicates that the terrorist has at least one family member who has
sympathy or passive support. Family members include parents or siblings.

Any prior detention by security forces: The variable of prior detention by security

forces was dummy-coded (0=No, 1=Yes). If a terrorist was not detained or arrested

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before participation in the terrorist group it was coded as zero and serves as the reference
category. If there is at least one prior detention it was coded as one.

Group afliliation: The group affiliation variable was coded into two dummy
variables: affiliation with legal groups, and affiliation with illegal groups. No affiliation
serves as the reference category.

Father ’s job: Father’s job included the categories of unemployed, retired, farmer,
worker, tradesman/self employed, government official, other jobs, and dead.

Mother ’s job: Mother’s job included the categories of retired, farmer,
tradesman/self employed, house wife, other jobs, and dead.

The initial step is a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of individuals
joining these two terrorist organizations. This step is followed by the examination of
relations between the variables utilizing Chi-Square. In addition, analysis of the relation
between different characteristics of the sample and the general Turkish Population is
among the main concerns. The next step utilizes logistic regression methods to find out
the effects of these variables in participation in two different terrorist groups.

Learning related factors: Learning related factors include the variables of
“friendship”, “kinship”, “propaganda through publications, the media, and/or intemet”,
and “organizational activities.” Each learning related variable was coded as a distinct
variable. Main contents of each of these variables, elements that were considered during
the coding process and codes are described as following:

Friendship: Friendship is a significant factor in the process of participation in
terrorist organizations. Friends facilitate the learning process and/or help join terrorist

groups (Ibrahim, 1980, 1982; Sageman, 2004; Della Porta, 1988 cited in Sageman, 2004).

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In view of that the documents will be reviewed to assess the extent to which the
individuals describe friends as a source from whom they learned about the terrorist group.
“Friendship” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No,
1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that terrorist did not learn about the group from a friend/s (or
learnt from any other sources other than a friend/s), while “one” indicates that terrorist
describes a friend/s as a source of learning about the terrorist group.

Kinship: As with fiiendship variable, kinship is an important factor in terms of
participation in terrorist groups. That is, family members and/or relatives who are the
active members or sympathizers of terrorist organizations might be a source of
information about activities and ideologies of a terrorist group (Ibrahim, 1980, 1982;
Sageman, 2004; Della Porta, 1988 cited in Sageman, 2004). In this manner, the
documents will be analyzed to assess the extent to which the individuals learn about the
terrorist group from a kin. “Kinship” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the
reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that terrorist did not learn about the
group through kinship (or learnt through any other sources other than kinship), while
“one” indicates that terrorist describes kinship as a source of learning about the terrorist
group.

Propaganda through publications, the media, and/or intemet: Another factor
which is important in the learning process is propaganda through publications, the media,
and/or intemet. Terrorists use various propaganda means such as radio, television,
intemet, video productions, and publications like newspapers, books, or flyers. Among
them, especially the media, publications like books or magazines, and intemet have been

significant tools to promote organizational ideology and recruit new members. Put

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simply, it is expected that some individuals learn about terrorist groups in which they
have participated through the media regardless of whether it is owned by terrorist groups;
organizational publications such as ideological books, magazines and newspapers, and
the intemet that might contain ideological movies, articles or pictures that might be
attractive for some people. “Propaganda through publications, the media, and/or intemet”
was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero”
indicates that terrorist did not learn about the group from any of these propaganda sources
(or learnt from other sources), while “one” indicates that terrorist describes propaganda
through publications, the media, and/or intemet as a source of learning about the terrorist
group.

Organizational activities: Organizational activities will include several legal or
illegal activities carried out by terrorist groups or their active or passive supporters such
as public speeches, demonstrations, meetings, religious speeches/sermons, worships,
and/or social movements. It may also include terrorist groups’ activities in the schools,
particularly in the universities and high schools, and activities through legal structures
such as associations, political parties, or offices used for publishing newspapers or
magazines. “Organizational activities” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the
reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that terrorist did not learn about the
group through organizational activities (or learnt from any other sources other than
organizational activities), while “one” indicates that terrorist describes organizational
activities as a source of learning about the terrorist group.

Similar to the background characteristics, the first step is a descriptive analysis of

the learning related variables. Then, logistic regression methods will be utilized to find

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out the effects of these variables in predicting participation in two different terrorist
groups.

Motivational (actors: In contrast to the other factors (background characteristics
and learning related factors) motivational factors were analyzed using both quantitative
and qualitative content analysis.

In the quantitative part, the documents were analyzed in order to capture the
variables that are related to individuals’ root motivation. Then, the variables were coded
and transformed into measurable quantitative variables. Motivational factors include the

99 ‘6

variables of: “need to belong to a group , exorbitances of governing power/s”,
“ideological closeness”, “negative life events”, and “other motivational factors.” Each
motivational factor was coded as a distinct variable. Main contents of each of these
variables, elements that will be considered during the coding process, and codes are
described as following;

Need to belong to a group: Individuals’ need to belong to a group creates an
adequate amount of motivation to take place in a group. This need is met by terrorist
groups that are aware of some individuals’ this need (Hudson, 1999). As Martin (2006)
indicates, a need to belong to a group is a strong desire that some individuals start to
define their social status by group acceptance. Accordingly, the documents are reviewed
to assess the extent to which the individuals describe ‘need to belong to a group’ as a
motivation for participation in the terrorist group. “Need to belong to a group” was
dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero”

indicates that “need to belong to a group” is not a motivation for terrorists, while “one”

indicates some indication of “need to belong to a group” as a motivation for participation.

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Exorbitances of the governing power/s: Exorbitances of the governing power/s
are believed to play a significant role to motivate individuals to join terrorist groups.
Exorbitances of governing power/s might be in different forms. That is, it may include
oppressive, humiliating, honor breaking, derogatory, and/or unjust actions and counter-
actions of the governing power/s against people. It may also include violation of basic
human rights (Crenshaw, 1981, 2003; Laqueur, 1987; Jenkins, 2003; Rubenstein, 2003;
Schmid, 2004; Serafino, 2002; Stern, 2003). Accordingly, the documents are analyzed to
assess the extent to which the individuals express ‘exorbitances of governing power/s’ as
a motivation for joining terrorist group. “Exorbitances of the governing power/s” was
dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero”
indicates that “exorbitances of the governing power/s” is not a motivation for terrorists,
while “one” indicates some indication of “exorbitances of the governing power/s” as a
motivation for participation.

Ideological/political closeness: Ideological/political closeness is another factor
for some individuals to join terrorist organizations. In other words, if an individual feels
that he has similar perspectives, beliefs, thoughts, or viewpoints with a terrorist group he
may want to take part in that movement (Alkan, 2002). It is necessary to note that
religiously motivated groups have religious ideology and left wing groups have leftist
ideology (i.e. Marxist-Leninist ideology). Regardless of this distinction, the documents,
however, are examined to figure out the extent to which the individuals explain
‘ideological closeness” as a motivation for joining terrorist group. “Ideological
closeness” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No,

1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that ‘ideological closeness’ is not a motivation for terrorists,

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while “one” indicates some indication of “ideological closeness” as a motivation for
participation.

Negative life events: Negative life events might include several negative
occurrences such as unhappiness and dissatisfaction in the life due to failures in meeting
the various expectations. Negative life events, more specifically, might be financial
problems, employment problems, discrimination as being a woman, problems in the
family, family pressure, desperation, fear, or hopelessness. Further, some dramatic life
events such as having a friend or family member(s) killed by security forces might create
a motivation for participation in a terrorist group (Al-Badayneh, 2007; Garfield, 2006;
Kiknadze, 2007; Martin, 2006; Sageman, 2004; Silke, 2003). The documents are
reviewed to assess the extent to which the individuals describe these and similar negative
life events as a motivation for joining terrorist group. “Negative life events” was dummy-
coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that
“negative life events” are not a motivation for terrorists, while “one” indicates some
indication of “negative life events” as a motivation for participation.

Other motivational factors: There might be some other motivational factors which
are not so common compared to abovementioned factors such as fun, status, glamour,
power, prestige, money, protection, or force and threat (Cantekin, 2006; Silke, 2003).
These kinds of factors are gathered under the variable of “other motivational factors.”
“Other motivational factors” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference
category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that ‘other motivational factors’ are not a
motivation for terrorists, while “one” indicates some indication of “other motivational

factors” as a motivation for participation.

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Statistical methods

Logistic regression and discriminant function analyses are useful in predicting
participation in group membership. This section examines the characteristics of each,
and justifies the selection of statistical techniques for this research.

Logistic Regression: Logistic regression predicts the logit of an event outcome
from a set of predictors. Independent variables might be of any type (categorical or/and
continuous). There are different forms of logistic regression such as multinomial,
ordinary and binomial (or binary). Multinomial logistic regression is used when the
dependent variable has more than two classes. If it is possible to rank multiple classes of
the dependent variable, then ordinal logistic regression is a better technique than
multinomial logistic regression. This study utilizes binomial logistic regression. Binomial
logistic regression is a powerful technique for analysis when the outcome variable is
dichotomous. Data are entered into the analysis as 0 or 1 coding for the dichotomous
outcome (Garson, n.a.; Hox, 2002; Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002). The null hypothesis for
the overall model of the logistic regression indicates that all betas are equal to zero. When
the null hypothesis is rejected, it means that at least one beta does not equal zero in the
population. In other words, logistic regression equation predicts the probability of the
outcome better than the mean of the dependent variable Y. The most important
mathematical term that underlies logistic regression is the logit which can be defined as
the natural logarithm of an odds ratio (Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002). Maximum
likelihood estimation is used to calculate the logit coefficients. Maximum likelihood
estimation points out how likely it is (the odds) that the observed values of the dependent

variable may be predicted from the observed values of the independents (Garson n.a).

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There are many parallels as well as differences between OLS regression and
logistic regression. Some of the parallels are: logit coefficients correspond to b
coefficients in the logistic regression equation, the standardized logit coefficients
correspond to beta weights, and the Pseudo R2 statistic is used to summarize the strength
of the relationship. On the other hand, contrary to OLS regression which calculates
changes in the dependent variable itself, logistic regression calculates changes in the log
odds of the dependent variable (Garson n.a; Pampel, 2000). Logistic regression is
attractive for researchers since it gives the opportunity to ignore some restrictive
assumptions of OLS regression such as linearity between the dependent and the
independent variables, normality of distribution, homoscedastic dependent variable for
each level of the independents, and homogeneity of variance. Further, normally
distributed error terms are not assumed. Logistic regression does not require interval and
unbounded independent variables. Nevertheless, other assumptions of OLS regression are
still valid for the logistic regression such as inclusion of all relevant variables and
exclusion of all irrelevant variables in the model, assumption of error terms to be
independent (independent sampling), low error in the explanatory variables, no
multicollinearity, no outliers, and existence of large samples (Garson, n.a.; Pampel,
2000)

Discriminant function analysis: Discriminant function analysis has similar
functions to logistic regression. It is used to see which variables discriminate between
two or more groups. More generally, it classifies cases into the values of a categorical
dependent variable, shows differences between and among groups, helps determine the

explained variance in the dependent variable by the independents, and assesses the

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relative importance of independent variables in terms of the dependent variable. The
dependent variable is generally a dichotomy. For example, discriminant analysis could be
used in order to observe which variables are the best predictors of individuals’ choice
between two different terrorist organizations. In terms of computation, it is very similar
to AN OVA and MANOVA. When the means of a variable are significantly different in
different groups, it shows that this variable discriminates between the groups. If multiple
variables are included in an analysis to see their contribution to the discrimination
between groups, then, we can mention existence of a matrix of total variance and
covariance, or a matrix of pooled within-group variance and covariance. The presence of
possible significant differences is determined through comparison of these two matrices
using the multivariate F -Test. This procedure is similar to MANOVA. If there is two-
group case, as in this study, the interpretation of the results is similar to multiple
regression. In other words, the variables which have largest regression coefficients have
biggest contribution to the prediction of group membership (Garson, n.a; Huberty, 1984).
Discriminant function analysis shares several assumptions of correlation,
regression, AN OVA, and MANOVA. For example, proper model specification,
independence of all cases, homogeneity of variances (homoscedasticity), homogeneity of
covariances and correlations, true categorical dependent variables. closer group sizes of
the dependent variable, variance in the dependent variables, interval level independent
variable/s, randomly distributed errors, absence of perfect multicollinearity, linearity and
normal distribution are basic assumptions of the discriminant analysis (Garson, n.a.).
Which one to choose: The previous discussion indicates that it is more

appropriate to use logistic regression in this study because of the violation of some

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fundamental assumptions of discriminant function analysis. These data are more likely to
violate the assumptions of closer group sizes of the dependent variable since one of the
group’s size is around 50 percent more than the other (116 vs. 186). Further, there are
some nominal variables in the data such as gender and marriage status. There is also a
strong possibility of violation of some other basic assumptions such as homoscedasticity
and normality of the distribution.

Press and Wilson (1978) emphasize that when compared with discriminate
analysis, there is less possibility of violation of assumptions in the logistic regression. As
well as several other assumptions, normality and linearity assumptions do not appear as a
limitation in the logistic regression. It also handles both categorical and continuous
variables. They conclude that especially when normality assumptions are violated, and
when many of the independent variables are qualitative, logistic regression is preferable
to discriminant analysis.

(3) Qualitative analysis

The qualitative analysis of the documents concentrates on motivational factors
that help individuals come to a decision that they should participate in terrorist groups.
Qualitative analysis is more likely to give detailed and more comprehensive information
about individuals’ root motivations. Otherwise, the quantitative analysis of the
motivational factors will be limited with the categorization and transformation of
documents into measurable quantitative variables, and testing these variables using
statistical methods in order to see how these variables discriminate between two terrorist
groups. Thus, reliance on just quantitative analysis is most likely to result in missing

several important points in understanding key motivational issues.

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The motivation of individuals before joining terrorist groups is a poorly
understood topic. Given that the exploratory perspective is at the heart of qualitative
methods (Bachman & Schutt, 2003; Nardi, 2003), it is expected that qualitative analysis
of documents will give a richer and more intimate view of the motivations of individuals
that lead them to participate in two different terrorist groups.

Based on the quantitative statistical analysis of motivational factors, cases for
themes within each motivational category (need to belong to a group, negative life
events, ideological/political closeness, environmental factors, tactics/propaganda of
terrorists, and other motivational factors) are reviewed. The review also includes
variations in motivational differences both within and between the terrorist groups. For
instance, based on the literature, it can be proposed that the variable of “exorbitance of
governing forces” is typically related to left wing DHKP/C, and therefore it is most likely
that it falls under the second category. The quantitative analysis will be useful in order to
determine whether this variable discriminates between Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C,
and to see whether this finding is supported in the literature; it, however, will not give
detailed information about variation in individuals’ perception, belief, or expectation. For
example, negative experiences during prison confinement, security forces’ excessive use
of force (i.e. during the demonstrations), witnessing a case in which people were
maltreated by the police, governmental prohibitions on democratic rights (i.e. right to free
speech or demonstration), or watching harsh treatments of the police or military forces
against citizens on TV are some of the examples pertinent to the variable of “exorbitances
of governing forces”, and all these occurrences might be the factors that motivate

individuals to support and join DHKP/C. Thus, qualitative analysis appears to be

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important in terms of revealing this motivational element within group differences for
each variable.

It is also likely that some variables are relevant to both of the terrorist groups.
Through in-depth analysis of these kinds of variables, the motivational variation and
similarities within and between the two terrorist groups can be assessed. For instance,
“need to belong to a group” which typically includes friendship dynamics is likely to be
pertinent to both of the groups since almost all terrorist groups, regardless of their
ideology make use of friendship and group dynamics (i.e., social networks) in order to
pull individuals into the group.

It is, however, expected that each terrorist group would use different tactics and
strategies. While Turkish Hezbollah members might establish friendship relations
utilizing religious figures or behaviors such as showing himself as a person who is
honest, helping others, never lies, or always respect others; left wing DHKP/C group’s
members might start to build friendship relations in the high school or universities by
providing potential individuals with a home, a girl friend, course notes, or different
recreational pastimes. These details would not surface in the quantitative analysis, and we
would not be able to understand the friendship development process that motivates
individuals to be part of the group in which his friend is a member. Similarly, “negative
life events” might be the main motivator for some members in both terrorist groups.
Categorization of these factors under the same variable will most likely result in losing
some power to explain differences in perspectives, thoughts, and beliefs both within and
between the groups. For example, whereas it is possible to observe a family pressure as a

factor for joining Turkish Hezbollah, economic problems might be the basic concern for

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those who join DHKP/C. Attempting to measure these two different issues under one
variable (negative life events) would ignore how the content of this variable differentiates
between two groups.

Lastly, qualitative methods will help to explore some unknown dynamics behind
the motivations of individuals. Individuals’ perceptions of the group, their expectations
from the terrorist group, and other possible psychological and sociological dynamics
behind each motivational factor are important in the process that leads to participation. In
one case, one terrorist explained that the biggest change in his life began with one of his
classmates’ (a Turkish Hezbollah member) positive and friendly approach to him despite
the bad reputation of him because of his criminal record as a thief:

“During my childhood I was habitually committing theft, and I was always
fighting with my friends. Everybody was complaining against me to my family.
Upon those complaints, my elder brother was always beating me. Once again,
while I was about to commit theft in my neighborhood, one of my friends of
whom I knew from the secondary school saw me. However, he did not
complain; conversely, he behaved me in a good manner without blaming me.

Then I felt very embarrassed. Our fiiendship relations developed day by day. He
was giving me books and I was reading all of them. As a consequence l quitted
all my bad habits, and I joined to Turkish Hezbollah”

Quantitative analysis would be limited with the categorization of this explanation
as a measurable variable/s of “friendly approach of individuals (terrorists)” or “friendship
effect.” This example reinforces the importance of attitudes expressed by family
members and others against individuals who commit crimes, especially during childhood.
In this example, the terrorist was constantly berated by people in his environment and his
own family, and his family members even beat him. He was unhappy with his life and he

felt ostracized. This story demonstrates that Turkish Hezbollah members are very capable

of understanding human psychology and shaping the behavior of their recruits. Further,

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the books provided by the Turkish Hezbollah member appear to be an important factor in
terms of motivational preparation. This demonstrates how an individual’s life may come
under the control of a terrorist organization, and underscores the necessity of qualitative
analysis of these documents as appropriate and necessary approach-to deveIOp a richer
view of these kinds of issues.
4. Reliability and Validity

No measure has perfect validity and reliability, especially measurement of
sensitive topics, such as terrorism and participation in terrorist groups. The measurement
of terrorism related issues is further complicated by the lack of agreement about the
proper definition of the terrorism in the literature. This study of documents in the original
handwriting of actual terrorists addresses some of those concerns. In contrast to official
data and self report data, documents may be considered more objective and sincere, since
terrorists directly and voluntarily wrote them to the authorities of the terrorist
organization. Unlike official data, they were not prepared under the control and
supervision of security forces. Nor are they like self report data which may contain biases
related to misleading information by the subjects or misinterpretation by researchers.
While composing them, it is unlikely that the authors (terrorists) expected police access
to these reports, and so, it is likely they wrote everything that was deemed necessary to
express themselves fully in order to gain entry into the group. These characteristics of the
documents make the research relatively accurate, unique and reliable.

Around 10 percent of the documents for each terrorist group (11 documents for
DHKP/C and 18 documents for Turkish Hezbollah) were randomly selected for reliability

analysis. An inter-coder reliability analysis using the Cohen’s Kappa statistic was

165

performed to determine consistency among coders. Kappa values for individual variables
ranged from .789 to 1.0, indicating very high agreements between the coders.27 For the
background characteristics variables, Kappa values ranged from .789 (family sympathy)
to 1.0 (gender, marital status, prior detention). Kappa values for motivational factors
ranged from .791 (negative life events, environmental factors) to 1.0 (need to belong to a
group), whereas for the learning variables ranged from .792 (fiiend/s) to 1.0 (kinship).28

In this study, validity is more problematic than reliability. While measurement
validity can not be divorced from larger theoretical concerns, the lack of directly related
theories on terrorism is a fundamental problem. Sooner or later, it is inevitable that
researchers ask what the nature of the concepts is, what they mean, and whether the
operational defrnition faithfully represents or reflects the consensus definition, or
something else. Unfortunately, it is impossible to prove the validity of the instrument
solely by application of different methods. Hence, it is necessary to keep this study under
close surveillance to see if they are behaving as expected. However, a general assessment
of validity is possible by comparing these findings to prior variables and research, and
general sociological and psycho-sociological literature on joining various kinds of
groups, particularly deviant groups, violent groups, etc.

5. Conclusion
This research will make a significant contribution to the study of terrorism in

terms of understanding the factors that lead to participation in terrorist groups. Terrorism

 

27 Following labels are assigned to the corresponding ranges of Kappa values: from 0.41 to 0.60:
moderate inter-coder reliability; fi'om 0.61 to 0.80= substantial inter-coder reliability, and fiom 0.81 to l.0=
almost perfect inter-coder reliability (Landis & Koch, 1977).

The inter-coders’ coding on the two ratio level variables-age of onset, and number of sibling was
found to be highly correlated (r=.984 and 1:1 .0, respectively).

166

is a difficult phenomenon to examine, since data limitations negatively affect potential
methods used in terrorism research. The two biggest shortcomings of terrorism related
studies are the availability of original data about terrorists and the scarcity of empirical
studies. Perhaps most importantly, this study offers a valuable source of information for
advancing knowledge in the terrorism field. The data are unique both in terms of contents
and originality. The original data come from terrorists in their own (handwritten)
documentation submitted to prospective terrorist organizations, apparently with their free
will; this should minimize a number of biases that influence research on terrorism. These
documents constitute one of the most desirable data sources used to date in the analysis
of participation in terrorist organizations.

While this study also has methodological limitations, including the use of
convenience sampling, the considerable strengths of the study outweigh these limitations.
The use of both qualitative and quantitative methods in the analysis of the documents is
likely to strengthen the research results. The sample size of 302 is sufficient and

appropriate to conduct the essential and described analyses.

167

CHAPTER FIVE
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES and FINDINGS

This chapter presents and discusses quantitative analyses of the data on the two
terrorist groups. The quantitative analyses section features major findings of this
exploratory research in terms of background characteristics of individual participants in
the left-wing DHKP/C and the religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah terrorist
organizations as well as learning-related factors and motivational factors that influence
them to join these two ideologically distinct terrorist organizations. The quantitative
analysis section presents the findings from three separate analyses. In the first,
descriptive and bivariate statistics for background characteristics, learning related
variables, and motivational factors are examined. This part also considers gender
participation. In the second set of analyses, bivariate relationships between selected
background characteristics and each motivational factor are examined to explore whether
different background characteristics promote the odds of having different types of
motivation for participation in a terrorist organization. In the last, multivariate logistic
regression is used to investigate which variables discriminate between participation in
Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist organizations.

1. Descriptive Findings and Bivariate Statistics

The descriptive statistics displayed in Table 6 show general sample characteristics
derived from the following variables; gender, economic conditions, education, job status,
marital status, legal and illegal group affiliations, prior detention, family member
activities and sympathies toward the groups, age of onset, number of siblings, learning

related factors, and motivational factors. Discussion of descriptive statistics includes brief

168

information about variable coding that emerged during the analysis of this exploratory
data.

Group membership is the dependent variable, and is coded with DHKP/C as the
reference category. Two of the independent variables are treated as continuous: age of
onset and number of siblings. Participant ages range from 9 to 45 with a mean score of
19.36. The number of sibling ranges from 0 to 15 with a mean score of 6.36.

The economic condition variable is coded into two dummy variables: moderate
level with a mean score of .49, and high level with a mean score of .29. Low level
economic condition serves as the reference category. The education variable is coded as
two dummies with middle school or lower education as the omitted category. While the
mean score of high school education is .40, the mean score of post high school education
is .17. The job status variable and affiliation with a group/s variable have also three
categories. The job status variable is coded into two dummy variables as unemployed
(mean=.09) and student (mean=.3 8); working full time or part time serves as the
reference category. Similarly, the group affiliation variable is coded as two dummies:
affiliation with legal groups with a mean score of .26, and affiliation with illegal groups
with a mean score of .14. No affiliation serves as the reference category.

For the gender variable, female is the reference category. The mean score of
males in the sample is .87. There is no gender variation in the Turkish Hezbollah data;
with one exception, all were male. Marital status is dummy coded with not married
serving as the reference category. The mean score of married persons is .24. Detention
by security forces is dummy coded with no prior detention serving as the reference

category; the mean score of this variable is. 1 8.

169

Table 6. Descriptive statistics for overall sample (N=302)

 

 

Mean SD
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Terrorist group (Turkish Hezbollah) .62 .487
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
Age of onset 19.36 4.988
Gender (Male) .87 .336
Economic condition (Moderate) .49 .501
Economic condition (High) .29 .454
Education (High school) .40 .491
Education (Post high school) .17 .373
Job status (Unemployed) .09 .296
Job status (Student) .38 .487
Marital status (Married) .24 .425
OTHER BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
Number of siblings 6.36 2.933
Any detention by security forces .18 .395
Affiliation (with legal groups) .26 .442
Affiliation (with illegal groups) .14 .347
Any family member active in the group .50 .501
Any family member’s sympathy to the group .63 .484
LEARNING RELATED FACTORS
Friend/s .34 .475
Kinship .30 .458
Organizational activities .57 .495
Propaganda . 14 .348
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS
Environmental factors .34 .474
Ideological/political closeness .49 .501
Need to belong to a group .1 l .317
Negative life events .28 .448
Tactics/propaganda of terrorists .50 .501
Other factors .17 .379

 

All remaining variables are dummy coded with “No” serving as the reference
category. The mean score of the variable of any family member active in the group is
.50, whereas the mean score of any family member’s sympathy to the group is .63.
Among the learning related variables, the organizational activities variable has the
highest mean score (.57). It is followed by the variables of friend/s (.34), kinship (.30),
and propaganda (.14). The tactics/propaganda variable with a mean score of .50 and

ideological/political closeness with a mean score of .49 have the highest mean scores

170

among the motivational factors. The mean scores of the rest of the motivational factors
are .34 for environmental factors (family, friend, and/or relative), .28 for negative life
events, .11 for need to belong to a group, and .17 for all other factors.

(1) Background characteristics of terrorists

The bivariate relationships between the independent and dependent variables are
presented in Table 7. Accordingly, the Table separates the data for DHKP/C and Turkish
Hezbollah terrorist organizations and displays the background characteristics of
individuals who participated in these organizations. The table also reports whether there
are statistically significant differences in the background characteristics of individuals.
The sample size for each variable varies due to listwise deletion of missing values
particular to each analysis.

Gender: Eighty-seven percent of the total sample is male. Men constitute over
two-thirds (67.2%) of DHKP/C. Of the total number of 39 female terrorists, only one
belongs to Turkish Hezbollah. These differences are statistically significant. These
findings confirm much of the literature that indicates that terrorist groups are male
dominated, and left‘wing groups tend to have more female members compared to
religiously motivated groups.

Economic condition: There are statistically significant differences between the
reported economic conditions of the members of the two groups at each of the three
levels measured. Turkish Hezbollah has more members with high economic status
(34.2%) than DHKP/C (20.2%). DHKP/C members self-report low economic status
(34.2%) more often than Turkish Hezbollah members (14.7%). Overall, the majority of

group members for both Turkish Hezbollah (85.3%) and DHKP/C (65.8%) have middle-

171

economic status or better, which contradicts the common public belief that low-status

economic conditions contribute to participation in terrorist organizations.

Table 7. Background characteristics, by terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah)

 

 

 

 

 

Turkish
x2 (d!) DHKP/C Hezbollah Total
n % n % N %
Gender (N=302) 65.953(l)***
Female 38 32.8 1 0.5 39 12.9
Male 78 67.2 185 99.5 263 87.1
Economic condition 17.3 85(2)***
(N=298)
Low 39 34.2 27 14.7 66 22.1
Modest 52 45.6 94 51.1 146 49.0
High 23 20.2 63 34.2 86 28.9
Education level (N=301) 38.458(2)***
Middle school or lower 31 26.7 99 53.5 130 43.2
High school 48 41.4 73 39.5 121 40.2
Higher than high school 37 31.9 13 7.0 50 16.6
Job status (N=298) 4.007(2)
Unemployed 16 13.8 13 7.1 29 9.7
Student 45 38.8 69 37.9 114 38.3
Working 55 47.4 100 54.9 15 5 52.0
Marital status (N=301) 29.174(1)***
Not married 108 93.1 122 65.9 230 76.4
Married 8 6.9 63 34.1 71 23.6
Age of onset (N=295)
Mean, [SD] 19.17[2.91] l9.47[5.95] 19.36[4.98]

 

*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001

Education: The education variable reflects the education level of individual

members at the time of j oining the group and is comprised of three categories: middle

school or lower, some high school, and higher than high school. Some high school

includes high school graduates, drop-outs, and current students. Higher than high school

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includes college graduates, dropouts, and currently enrolled students.29 As Table 7
displays, DHKP/C members are significantly more educated than their counterparts in
Turkish Hezbollah. Almost one-third (31.9%) of DHKP/C members have some college
education while only seven percent of Turkish Hezbollah members have college
educational experience. Similarly, over half (53.5%) of Turkish Hezbollah members only
have middle school or lower level education compared to slightly more than one-quarter
(26.7) of DHKP/C members. These findings indicate that DHKP/C actively recruits and
targets individuals who are college students, graduates and drop-outs.

Job status: This variable reflects the participant’s job status at the time of onset30
and is coded into three categories: unemployed, student, and working (which includes full
or part-time employment). Overall, half of the sample (52%) was employed when they
participated in their respective groups. Both groups have almost the same percentage of
students (38.8% for DHKP/C and 37.9% for Turkish Hezbollah) and similarities in
working members (47.4% and 54.9% respectively). The participation of unemployed
people in DHKP/C (13.8%) is almost double that in Turkish Hezbollah (7.1%), although
the differences were not statistically significant. Contrary to discussions in the literature
and popular assertions, unemployment does not appear to be an important factor in the
decision to participate in a terrorist organization.

Marital status: Over three-quarters of the total sample (76.4%) were unmarried

when they joined their groups. However, the marriage rate of Turkish Hezbollah

 

29 Please note that even if sample members prepared these documents after being active members, the
information on the documents refers to time of onset of participation. The education level under discussion
refers specifically to the education level at the time of participation.

Like education variable (and other variables), this variable was coded based on respondents’ reports
of employment status at the time of their participation. In other words, even if they had differentjob status
when they prepared these documents, the information on this variable refers to job status at the time of
participation.

173

members (34.1%) was almost five times greater than DHKP/C’s rate (6.9%). This
difference is statistically significant and supports the literature on marital status of
individuals in left-wing and religiously motivated groups (see Chapter 3).

Age of onset: The average age of onset for Turkish Hezbollah members (19.36) is
slightly higher than for DHKP/C members (19.17), although the range of ages for
Turkish Hezbollah members, from 9 to 45, is much broader than DHKP/C members (14
to 28). Age differences are not significant, but may indicate that Turkish Hezbollah does
not discriminate against or target members of certain ages. DHKP/C may be more
selective in recruiting members.

As a way of understanding similarities and differences between DHKP/C and
Turkish Hezbollah members and the general Turkish population, comparisons were made
between the sample characteristics, and general population characteristics for those
variables where census data were available. There are substantial differences between the
sample (participants of DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah) and general population of
Turkey in terms of background characteristics31 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2007).
Whereas the Turkish population consists of almost same rate of males and females
(50.7% and 49.3% respectively), two-thirds of DHKP/C and all the members of Turkish
Hezbollah (except one) are males. The average age of onset for DHKP/C and Turkish
Hezbollah (19.17 and 19.36, respectively) is lower than the average age of the general
population (22.21). Majority of participants of the both groups were in the 14-25 age-

group (97.4% for DHKP/C and 73.9% for Turkish Hezbollah) when they joined their

 

31 The statistical information on the demographic characteristics of Turkish people is based on 1990
census results in Turkey. Since the documents mostly belong to the years between 1990 and 1997, the
census results of 1990 were used for comparison (see Turkish Statistical Institute [2007] for detailed
statistical results).

174

respective groups. The rate of Turkish population that corresponds to 15-25 age-group
(14-25 is not available) is 20 percent which is much lower than the percentage of
terrorists’ age group.

Over two-thirds (67.1%) of the Turkish people (over 14 years old) are married
whereas just about one-third of Turkish Hezbollah and seven percent of DHKP/C
participants are married. Turkish Hezbollah is closer to general population characteristics
in terms of marital status compared to DHKP/C. Almost half of the participants in each
group were working when they joined their respective groups compared to slightly lower
than two-thirds of working Turkish population (over 14 years old). In general, the
background characteristic of terrorist does not reflect the general Turkish population’s
characteristics examined above.

(2) Other background characteristics

The remaining background characteristics of individual participants in DHKP/C
and Turkish Hezbollah are presented in Table 8. These variables include: detention by
security forces prior to participation; group affiliation with legal and illegal groups before
participation; any active family member in a terrorist group; any family member
sympathetic to a terrorist group; number of siblings, and father’s and mother’s
occupation. These variables are also used in the logistic regression analysis (except for
father’s and mother’s job); different sample size for each variable is a result of missing

values specific to each analysis.

175

Table 8. Other background characteristics, by terrorist grog (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah)

 

 

 

 

Turkish
x2 ((11) DHKP/C Hezbollah Total
n % n "/o N %
Any detention (N=302) 1.335(1)
No 99 85.3 149 80.1 248 82.1
Yes 17 14.7 37 19.9 54 17.9
Group affiliation (N=302) 9.709(2)“
No affiliation 58 50.0 122 65.6 180 59.6
Affiliation with legal g. 34 29.3 46 24.7 80 26.5
Affiliation with illegal g. 24 20.7 18 9.7 42 13.9
Active family member 16.932(1)***
(N=299)
No 75 65.2 75 40.8 150 50.2
Yes 40 34.8 109 59.2 149 49.8
Family sympathy (N=299) 12.392(1)***
No 57 49.6 54 29.3 111 37.1
Yes 58 50.4 130 70.7 188 62.9
Number of siblings (N=281)
Mean, [SD] 4.83[2.20] 7.23[2.95] 6.36[2.93]
Father’s job (N=252) 26.65 7(7)***
Unemployed 3 2.9 16 10.7 19 7.5
Retired 28 27.2 12 8.1 40 15 .9
Worker 7 6.8 10 6.7 17 6.7
Government official 7 6.8 18 12.1 25 9.9
Tradesman 1 1 10.7 20 13.4 31 12.3
Farmer 22 21.4 19 12.8 41 16.3
Otherjobs 12 11.7 27 18.1 39 15.5
Dead 13 12.6 27 18.1 40 15.9
Mother’s job (N=183) 27.171(5)***
Retired 2 2.4 4 4.0 6 3.3
Tradesman 4 4.9 l l .0 5 2.7
Farmer 12 14.6 0 0.0 12 6.6
Housewife 56 68.3 88 87.1 144 78.7
Other jobs 5 6.1 0 0.0 5 2.7
Dead 3 3.7 8 7.9 1 1 6.0

 

*p< .05 "p< .01 ***p< .001

Any detention”: More than 80 percent of the total sample reported no experience

with detention by security forces prior to their participation in a terrorist group. The rate

 

32 Both of the groups ask their members whether they were detained before being member of the

group. Some individuals mention about their previous contacts with security forces; they were “yes” coded

176

of detention for members of Turkish Hezbollah (19.9%) is slightly higher than that for
DHKP/C (14.7%); majority of the people in both of the groups do not have any criminal
records before their participation.33 These differences are not statistically significant.

Group afliliation: There are substantial and statistically significant differences
between the reported group affiliations of the members of the respective groups. Overall,
the majority (60%) of the sample reported no group affiliation with nearly two-thirds
(65.6%) of Turkish Hezbollah members and exactly half of DHKP/C members indicating
no affiliation with any groups prior to joining respective groups. While one-half (50%) of
DHKP/C members reported prior group affiliations, slightly more than one-fifth (20.7%)
reported prior criminal group affiliations compared to about ten percent (9.7%) for
Turkish Hezbollah members. Nearly thirty percent (29.3%) of DHKP/C members
reported prior legal group affiliations compared to about one-quarter (24.9%) of Turkish
Hezbollah members. There are also strong contextual differences in the reported legal
group membership between the two groups: DHKP/C members reported affiliations with
legal organizations with ties to DHKP/C (associations, unions, media and cultural

centers) while Turkish Hezbollah members usually reported affiliations with tariqat,

 

in the analysis. Others who do not give information about their previous criminality are considered that
they do not have any crime records, and so they did not report. These individuals were “no” coded. Those
who give information about their crimes after joining rather than before participation are also “no” coded
since this variable seeks information about criminality before joining the group.

Based on the information gleaned from the documents it is necessary to explain that although
individuals did not commit any crime prior to their participation, their participation is followed by their
involvement in various crimes as a strategy of terrorist groups. After preliminary ideological indoctrination
through social and group activities, initiation rituals and loyalty testing, new members of these
organizations are asked to commit some illegal acts which usually begin with commission of minor crimes
(i.e. participation in illegal demonstrations, illegal placard hanging, and shouting slogans) followed by
participation in more serious crimes (i.e. throwing Molotov cocktail, participation in bombing, and
murder). Compared to Turkish Hezbollah, this strategy is more common in DHKP/C.

177

religious congregations, or religious political parties not associated with Turkish
Hezbollah.

Active family member: About half (49.8%) of the sample reported having at least
one family member actively involved in the respective terrorist organization. There are,
however, statistically significant differences between two groups; nearly 60 percent of
Turkish Hezbollah members reported family member participation compared to just over
one-third (34.8%) for DHKP/C. While the rate is significantly lower for DHKP/C, the
relatively high rate of family member participation demonstrates a potentially strong
influence on sample member participation in the respective organizations.

Family sympathy: As well as active family members, a majority of the families
(62.9%) include members who are sympathetic to the sample’s terrorist organization.
Over two-thirds (70.7%) of Turkish Hezbollah members reported at least one sympathetic
family member compared to half (50.4%) of DHKP/C members. These differences
between two groups are statistically significant. While having a sympathetic family
member is important in terms of the possible effect on attitudes and actions of other
members of the family, this would not automatically lead to sympathy or active
participation in a terrorist group.

Number of siblings: In this sample, on average, Turkish Hezbollah members have
more siblings (7.23) compared to DHKP/C members (4.83). Turkish Hezbollah members
reported a broader range of siblings (0-15) than DHKP/C members (1-11) as well.
Family size could influence participation in a number of ways. More children might
effectively reduce parental control or generate situations in which children’s basic needs

are not met. Some terrorist groups use promises or provisions of better circumstances to

178

entice participants into group affiliation and participation. Altemately, parents and
family members might exercise a great deal of influence over other family members; in a
large family, more children might then be subjected to the influence of parents or
(generally older) siblings who are sympathetic to or participants in terrorist groups.

Father ’s job: There are substantial and statistically significant differences
between the groups in terms of father’s employment. Father’s employment included an
array of occupations, including government officials (i.e. teacher, policeman), tradesmen
(small or large business owners), farmer, worker, and other jobs (generally lower paying
and lower status jobs, such as street seller, waiter, driver, or construction worker). This
category also reflected father’s status as unemployed, retired, and deceased (15.9%) for
the total sample. DHKP/C members reported paternal retirement (27.2%) at over three
times the rate as Turkish Hezbollah members (8.1%), while Turkish Hezbollah members
reported unemployed fathers (10.7%) at three times the rate as DHKP/C members
(2.9%). Except for workers and tradesman category, there are substantial differences
between the employment status of fathers of DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members in
all the other categories, most notably farmers (21.4% vs. 12.8% respectively).

Mothers ’ job: Of the total sample, only 183 provided information about their
mother’s employment. Overall, almost eighty percent of mothers were reported as
housewives, with a statistically significant difference between the overwhelming majority
(87.1%) of Turkish Hezbollah mothers and just over two-thirds (68.3%) of DHKP/C
mothers in that category. Other notable differences include that about 15 percent of
DHKP/C mothers were employed as farmers with the remainder in other occupations

while only five percent of Turkish Hezbollah mothers were reported as retired (4%) or

179

tradesman (1%). Turkish Hezbollah mothers were reported as deceased (7.9%) at over
twice the rate for DHKP/C (3.7%).

(3) Learning related factors

As a result of the examination of the documents, four learning related variables
emerged to answer the question “How did you learn about the group?”: friend/s, kinship,
organizational activities, and organizational propaganda. Almost every member of the
sample answered this question with short answers. If friends were the source of
information about the organization, respondents usually referred to friend/s from high
school, university, their neighborhood, student association, etc. If family members
(kinship) were the source of information, respondents usually mentioned about the person
who helped them to learn about the group, such as an uncle, father, sister, brother, etc.
Kinship is subdivided into four subcategories: parent, sibling, spouse, and relative.
Organizational activities included relatively rich information on the activities through
which these future members learned about their respective organizations. The
information given about the variable of organizational propaganda confined to specific
propaganda tools and included the categories of publications, the media, and the intemet.
Table 9 displays the learning related factors and the respective groups, as well as
indicates the variables where statistically significant differences exist between the groups.

Friend/s: Overall, more than one-third of the sample learned about the group they
ultimately joined through friends with only a slight and non-statistically significant

difference between DHKP/C (36%) and Turkish Hezbollah (32.8%).

180

Table 9. Learning related factors, by terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah) N=300)

 

 

Turkish
x2 (d1) DHKP/C Hezbollah Total
n % n % N %
Friend/s .3 16(1)
No 73 64.0 125 67.2 198 66.0
Yes 41 36.0 61 32.8 102 34.0
Kinship .5 39(1)
No 83 72.8 128 68.8 211 70.3
Yes 31 27.2 58 31.2 89 29.7
Organizational activities 5.3 75( l )*
No 39 34.2 89 47.8 128 42.7
Yes 75 65.8 97 52.2 172 57.3
Propaganda 23. 1 64* "' *
No 84 73.7 174 93.5 258 86.0
Yes 30 26.3 12 6.5 42 14.0

 

*p< .05 ***p< .001

Kinship: Similarly, just under a third (29.7%) of the total sample reported kinship

as their initial source of information about the group they joined. Under a third (31.2%)

of Turkish Hezbollah members reported learning about the organization through kinship

while just over one quarter (27.2%) of DHKP/C members did; this difference is not

statistically significant, although the availability of data warrants further consideration of

the kinship issue by type of relation (see Table 9.1).

Table 9.1. Classification of kinship, by terrorist groups (N=89)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Turkish

DHKP/C Hezbollah Total

n % n % N %
Parent 2 6.5 13 22.4 15 16.9
Sibling 13 41.9 23 39.7 36 40.4
Relative 15 48.4 21 36.2 36 40.4
Spouse 1 3 .2 1 1.7 2 2.3
Column totals 31 100.0 58 100.0 89 100.0

 

Chi-square comparison is not significant

For the overall sample, siblings (40.4%) and other relatives (40.4%) are the major

information source, and this is the case for each of the groups as well. However, it

appears that there are two kinship categories that reflect potentially important differences

between two groups. That is, while parents play a more important role for Turkish

181

Hezbollah members (22.4%) than for DHKP/C members (6.5%), other relatives play a
more important role for DHKP/C members (48.4%) than for Turkish Hezbollah members
(36.2%).

Propaganda: Of the total sample, relatively a small amount of individuals (14%)
reported propaganda as their main source for learning about the terrorist group in which
they participated, but comparison of the groups indicates statistically significant
differences. Over one-quarter (26.3%) of DHKP/C members reported learning about that

group through propaganda while less than seven percent of Turkish Hezbollah members

 

 

 

did.
Table 9.2. Propaganda means, by terrorist groups (N=42)
Turkish
DHKP/C Hezbollah Total
n % n % N %
Publication 28 93.3 10 83.3 38 90.5
Media 2 6.7 2 16.7 4 9.5

 

Column totals 30 100.0 12 100.0 42 100.0
Chi-square comparison is not significant

 

Table 9.2 displays a further breakdown of the sources of organizational
propaganda. Publications were the most frequent means of learning about groups for
both groups (93.3% for DHKP/C and 83.3% for Turkish Hezbollah) with other media
being a more common for information source for Turkish Hezbollah members (16.7%)
than DHKP/C members (6.7%). No one in either group reported the intemet as how they
learned about their organization.

Organizational activities: Over half of the sample (57.3%) indicated that they
learned about their groups through its activities. Almost two-thirds (65.8%) of DHKP/C
members reported this as the main source of information about the organization

compared to just over half (52.2%) of Turkish Hezbollah members. This difference is

182

statistically significant (see Table 9). Analyses of the document also offered insight into
the types of activities conducted by the group to raise awareness, promote the group, and
recruit new members. For DHKP/C, these activities included:

- Activities in the legal organizations of the group such as cultural centers,
associations, unions, publishing and media offices which promoted ideological
discussions, films, and publications;

- Cultural and protest activities at educational institutions, in some cases involving
students, teachers and outsiders. These activities included food boycotts, demonstrations
against school administration and tuition, and organizing theatre, folklore, chat groups or
school trips;

~ Celebrations, protests and demonstrations for various reasons, for example,
Turkish Labor Day, a common day to stage organized protests featuring violence to
attract public and the media attention;

- Commemoration ceremonies for organizational founders or members killed by
security forces;

- Information distribution, including subscription or delivery of free magazines or
newspapers to cafes, restaurants, or dormitories;

- Prison visits together with potential members to introduce ideological positions
and befriend prisoners through discussions of solidarity, brutality and systemic

inequality.34

 

34 Although it was initially planned to use prisons as a separate learning related variable given that
prisons are utilized by terrorist organizations to recruit new members, analyses of documents revealed only
four cases reporting prisons and activities in prisons as a learning source. Therefore, prison variable was
coded under the variable of “organizational activities” given that prison based activities of terrorists could
be considered as an organizational activity.

183

Activities reported by Turkish Hezbollah participants are similar to those
described above; however, there are some differences in terms of context and content.
Turkish Hezbollah’s organizational activities included:

- Religious and ideological home-based meetings, unstructured
ideological/religious talks in an informal setting;

- Ideological speeches, meetings and outreach at cafes and cafeterias, mosques,
centers for religious training, and religious bookstores;

- Religious services and sermons in small villages

- Home visits to those referred by members;

- Recruiting persons with strong religious ideologies through schools.

Organizational activities have a substantial impact in terms of informing people
about terrorist groups. Exposure to activities does not necessarily or automatically
motivate people to join the group. While these activities may help individuals to learn
about these groups, other factors may motivate them to join. Motivational factors will be
considered in the subsequent section and in regression analysis.

(4) Motivational factors

Document analysis indicated a number of factors that potentially motivate
individuals to join these terrorist groups, and they seem to cluster in six general
categories: environmental factors (family, friend, relative, neighbor, etc.),
ideological/political closeness, need to belong to a group, negative life events,
tactics/propaganda of terrorists, and other factors. Some individuals reported only one of
these factors as their main motivation for joining the group, while others reported more

than one factor. Table 10 presents the distribution of motivational factors by group for

184

the 301 participants for whom this information is available. Significant and substantial
group differences are evident for all the motivational factors except for need to belong to
a group. A more detailed discussion of these factors will be included in the qualitative

analysis later in the chapter.

Table 10. Motivational factors, by terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah) (N=301)

 

 

 

 

Turkish
x2 (d1) DHKP/C Hezbollah Total
n % N % N %
Environmental factors 5. 122(1)*
No 67 58.3 132 71.0 199 66.1
Yes 48 41.7 54 29.0 102 33.9
Ideological/political closeness 5 . 884( l)*
No 49 42.6 106 57.0 155 51.5
Yes 66 57.4 80 43.0 146 48.5
Need to belong to a group .556(1)
No 104 90.4 163 87.6 267 88.7
Yes 11 9.6 23 12.4 34 11.3
Negative life events 2.787(1) a
No 77 67.0 141 75.8 218 72.4
Yes 38 33.0 45 24.2 83 27.6
Tactics/propaganda of
terrorists 6.721(1)"
No 46 40.0 103 55.4 149 49.5
Yes 69 60.0 83 44.6 152 50.5
Other factors 3.389(1) "
No 101 87.8 148 79.6 249 82.7
Yes 14 12.2 38 20.4 52 17.3

 

*p< .05; **“p< .01; ' p< .10

Environmental factors: Although this variable was originally considered under
the variable of “other factors”, as a result of analysis of the documents, it was decided to
use it as a separate variable given the huge number of individuals who reported
enviromnental factors as their main motivation or one of the motivations to join the

terrorist groups. The environmental factors that cause motivation for participation include

185

family members, neighbors, relatives, or/and friends”. For example, in some cases
individuals join because their friends or siblings were already members of the group, their
fathers or mothers encouraged them to do so, or they were influenced from their
neighbors. These kinds of the factors will be discussed in the next section.

Around one-third of the overall sample (33.9%) identified environmental factors
as the cause for their motivation to participation in the organization. Nearly 42 percent of
DHKP/C member reported environmental factors as their motivation as compared with
29 percent of Turkish Hezbollah members. The influence of the environmental factors
seems to play a greater role in joining DHKP/C. These differences between two groups
are statistically significant.

Ideological/political closeness: Almost half (48.5%) of the sample indicated
ideological/political closeness as their source of motivation. Slightly over fifty-seven
percent of DHKP/C members cited this reason for their motivation compared with only
forty-three percent of Turkish Hezbollah members. In this sample, the Marxist-Leninist
ideology of the DHKP/C appeared to have motivated more members than the religious
ideologies of Turkish Hezbollah. These differences between the groups are statistically
significant.

Need to belong to a group: The motivation of group membership is the weakest
among the reported motivators for both groups as only eleven percent of the sample
overall reported this as their motivation. The rates of those who reported this variable as
their motivation are 9.6 percent for DHKP/C and 12.4 percent for Turkish Hezbollah.

Differences between the groups are not statistically significant.

 

35 It is difficult to subdivide this variable (i.e. as family, relative, neighbor, or friend) because many
sample combined them on their actual answers, for example “my father and my friend were in the group”,
or “everybody in my neighborhood was supporter or sympathizer of the group.”

186

T actics/propaganda of terrorists: Although this variable was not initially
proposed for analysis as a motivational factor, findings from the analysis strongly
warranted its inclusion as a distinct variable. Over half the sample reported their
motivation to join their groups stemmed from the tactics, propaganda, and/or strategies of
the terrorist group and its members. Sixty percent of DHKP/C members report this as a
motivating factor while only forty-five percent of Turkish Hezbollah members use this
reason; this difference is statistically significant. The groups use different tactics and
propaganda methods, and DHKP/C appears to be more successful at motivating potential
members.

Negative life events: Over one-quarter of the total sample (27.6%) indicated that
negative life events motivated their participation in a terrorist organization. There is a
slight difference between two groups; one-third of DHKP/C members reported this as
their motivation compared to about one-quarter of Turkish Hezbollah participants. The

differences between the groups are statistically significant at p<.10 (Table 10).

Table 10. 1 .Tmof negative life events, by terrorist groups (N=fi)
Turkish
DHKP/C Hezbollah Total
n % n % N %

 

 

 

 

 

- Dissatisfaction/unhappiness

 

in the life 3 7.9 29 64.5 32 38.5
- Friend, family member or

relative killed or arrested 5 13.2 6 13.4 11 13.3
- Discrimination, inequality

against gender, group etc. 9 23.7 2 4.4 1 1 13.3
- Family pressure/problems 4 10.6 1 2.2 5 6.0
- Exorbitances of governing

powers 5 13.2 1 2.2 6 7.2
- Others 3 7.9 4 8.9 7 8.4
- Mix (2 or more of aboveL 9 23.7 2 4.4 1 1 13.3
Column totals* 38 100.0 45 100.0 83 100.0

 

Chi-square comparison is significant (p< .001)

187

Although there are numerous negative life events reported by the sample, they are
collapsed into seven general categories which are presented in Table 10.1, and the chi-
square comparison indicates significant differences between the types of negative life
events identified between the two groups. Dissatisfaction/unhappiness in life is the most
significant negative life event reported by almost two-thirds (64.5%) of Turkish
Hezbollah members, while it is reported by only eight percent of DHKP/C members.

DHKP/C members reported discrimination/inequality (23.7%), family
pressures/problems (10.6%) and exorbitances of governing powers‘”5 (13.2%) at rates
about five times greater than their counterparts in Turkish Hezbollah (4.4%, 2.2% and
2.2% respectively). Further, DHKP/C members identified two or more events (23.7%)
significantly more often than Turkish Hezbollah members (4.4%).

Other factors: This variable includes various factors which are not classified
under the other motivation variables such as respect, honor, revenge, fighting against
another group, sincerity and friendliness of group members, adventure, the group’s fame,
being more radical, involvement in armed activities etc. Over 17 percent of the total
sample cited one of these other factors. One fifth (20.4%) of Turkish Hezbollah members
indicated other factors as their motivation compared with only twelve percent of

DHKP/C members. These differences are statistically significant (p<.10).

 

36 Originally, exorbitances of governing powers was expected to be a separate variable of motivations.
However, this variable was collapsed into the negative life events variable due to the small number of
individuals reporting this factor as their motivation. Obviously, being a victim of perceived or actual
exorbitances such as oppression, humiliation, or excessive use of force can be easily imagined as a negative
life event.

188

(5) Gender issues

Almost all studies of terrorism have found that terrorist organizations are male-

dominated. However, the literature is characterized by a notable absence on the

background characteristics of male and female participants. The data presents the

opportunity to analyze background, learning-related, and motivational factors of male and

female participants in DHKP/C; no discussion of gender differences is included for

Turkish Hezbollah as there is no gender variation in that data.

Table 11. Selected background characteristics, by gender (DHKP/C only)

 

 

 

 

 

Female Male Total

x2 (d1) 11 % n % N %
Economic condition (N=ll4) '790
Low 11 29.7 28 36.4 39 34.2
Modest 17 45.9 35 45.4 52 45.6
High 9 24.4 14 18.2 23 20.2
Education level (N=116) 2.475
Middle school or lower 7 18.4 24 30.7 31 26.7
High school 19 50.0 29 37.2 48 41.4
Higher than high school 12 31.6 25 32.1 37 31.9
Job status (N=116) 12.405"
Unemployed 1 1 28.9 5 6.4 16 13.8
Student 15 39.5 30 38.5 45 38.8
Working 12 31.6 43 55.1 55 47.4
Marital status (N=116) 1.160
Not married 34 89.5 74 94.9 108 93.1
Married 4 10.5 4 5.1 8 6.9
Age of onset (N=115)
Mean, [SD] 19.29 [3.03] 19.12 [2.87] 19.17 [2.91]
Any detention (N=116) 3986*
No 36 94.7 63 80.8 99 85.3
Yes 2 5.3 15 19.2 17 14.7
Group affiliation (N=116) 3.993
No affiliation 20 52.6 38 48.8 58 50.0
Affiliation with legal g. 14 36.9 20 25.6 34 29.3
Affiliation with illegal g. 4 10.5 20 25.6 24 20.7

 

*p< .05 **p< .01

189

There are statistically significant differences in the prior detention experiences
and employment status of male and female DHKP/C members as displayed in Table 11.
Females reported unemployment (28.9%) at over four times the rate as their male
counterparts (6.4%), and substantially lower prior detention rates (5.3%) as compared to
men (19.2%). The mean scores of age of onset for both gender are almost identical;
19.29 for females and 19.12 for males. Males’ onset age ranges from 14 to 27 whereas
females’ onset age ranges from 14 to 28. It seems that DHKP/C does not discriminate
between males and females in terms of their age.

There are no significant differences in economic status, education levels, group
affiliation, marital status, and age of onset. While there aren’t statistically significant
differences in these variables, some differences should be mentioned. Over eighty percent
of female participants report high school or higher education compared to about seventy
percent of males; the rates of marriage for female participants (10.5%) are over twice that
for males (5.1%). Men also seem to be much more likely to be affiliated with illegal
groups (25.6%) compared to female participants (10.5%). These differences may reflect
more traditional role expectations and behaviors between men and women.

In terms of learning and motivational factors, statistically significant differences
between male and female participants appear only in kinship-based learning, and
ideological/political closeness as a motivation (Table 12). Almost forty percent of female
participants learn about the organization through kinship compared to only one-fifth
(21.1%) for males. Men also report being more motivated to join DHKP/C by the

closeness of ideological and political concerns (64.9%) than do women (42.1%).

190

Table 12. Learning related, and motivational variables, by gender (DHKP/C only)

 

 

 

 

 

Female Male Total

x2 (or) n % n % N %
Learning related factors (N=114)
Friend/s .076
No 25 65.8 48 63.2 73 64.0
Yes 13 34.2 28 36.8 41 36.0
Kinship 4.342*
No 23 60.5 60 78.9 83 72.8
Yes 15 39.5 16 21.1 31 27.2
Organizational activities .702
No ' 15 39.5 24 31.6 39 34.2
Yes 23 60.5 52 68.4 75 65.8
Propaganda .8 1 4
No 30 78.9 54 71.1 84 73.7
Yes 8 21.1 22 28.9 30 26.3
Motivational factors (N=115)
Environmental factors .704
No 20 52.6 47 61.0 67 58.3
Yes 18 47.4 30 39.0 48 41.7
Ideological/political closeness 5.423“
No 22 57.9 27 35.1 49 42.6
Yes 16 42.1 50 64.9 66 57.4
Need to belong to a group 2.542
No 32 84.2 72 93 .5 104 90.4
Yes 6 15.8 5 6.5 1 1 9.6
Negative life events 2.106
No 22 57.9 55 71.4 77 67.0
Yes 16 42.1 22 28.6 38 33.0
Tactics/propaganda of
terrorists .236
No 14 36.8 32 41.6 46 40.0
Yes 24 63.2 45 58.4 69 60.0
Other factors .694
No 32 84.2 69 89.6 101 87.8
Yes 6 15.8 8 10.4 14 12.2
*p< .05

For the remaining learning and motivational factors, there are no statistically

significant differences indicated by gender. However, it seems that the rates of males for

the remaining learning related variables are higher than the rates of females, while the

rates of females compared to males are higher for the remaining motivational factors.

191

2. Relationship between Background Characteristics and Motivational Factors

A more complete understanding of the motivational factors warrants the
estimation of the strength of the relationship between the motivational factors, and the
background characteristics of individuals joining terrorist groups. Accordingly, it is
aimed to explore whether different background characteristics increase the odds of
having different type of motivations, and to see how these characteristics vary by each
motivational factor. Table 13 presents bivariate relationships (odds ratio) between
selected background characteristics and motivational factors. Selected background
characteristics used in the analyses are gender, economic condition, education level, job
status, marital status, and age of onset; this table does not include gender for Turkish
Hezbollah due to the previously mentioned lack of gender data for that group. Each of the
motivational factors is binary coded (i.e. individuals who reported environmental factors
as their motivation are coded as 1, and those who did not report enviromnental factors or
reported any other sources other than environmental factors are coded as zero). Odds
ratios of less than one (1) indicate that the background characteristic is associated with a
reduced likelihood (less likely) of the motivation type examined, while odds ratios
greater than one (1) indicate that the likelihood of having that motivation is increased
(more likely) when that background characteristic is present. To examine whether the
same background characteristics predict each type of motivational factor for DHKP/C
and Turkish Hezbollah, analyses are separated by terrorist group. Due to the exploratory
character of this analysis, a significance level of p < .10 is employed.

In terms of gender, males compared to females are 2.5 times more likely to join

DHKP/C under the motivation of ideological/political closeness. Age is a statistically

192

significant (p<.10) factor for both groups; environmental factors are more influential on
younger individuals. Older DHKP/C members are significantly more likely to report
motivations by need to belong to a group (p<.10), and negative life events (not significant
for Turkish Hezbollah).

DHKP/C members reporting moderate economic status (as compared to low
economic status) are significantly less likely to have motivations of need to belong to a
group (p<.10) and negative life events (p<.10). In other words, poorer people compared
to people with moderate economic condition are more likely to join DHKP/C because of
a need to belong to a group, and negative life events they experienced. It can be
speculated that economic problems might be one of the negative life events of poorer
individuals.

More educated participants in Turkish Hezbollah are significantly less likely to be
influenced by environmental factors than their less educated counterparts, but are more
likely to be motivated by their need to belong to a group (p<.10). Restated, less educated
participants are more influenced by environmental factors than their more educated
counterparts but more education apparently increases the motivation of need to belong to
a group. This finding might be partially attributed to characteristics of adolescents in high
school and adults in university that seek social support and solidarity within a group. On
the other hand, DHKP/C members with more education (post high school) are
significantly more likely to be motivated by tactics and propaganda of terrorist
organizations. As individuals may be exposed to DHKP/C’s propaganda and recruitment

tactics in universities, this finding is not especially surprising.

193

Table 13. Bivariate odds ratios between selected background characteristics and each
motivational factors

Motivational factors

 

 

 

 

Environmental ldeological/politi- Need to belong
factors cal closeness to a group
(Odds ratio) (Odds ratio) (Odds ratio)
DHKP/C TH DHKP/C TH DHKP/C TH
Gender (Male) .709 - 2.546* - .370 -
Age of onset .878 a .947 a .944 1.037 1.198 a 1.027
Economic con. (Moderate) 1.587 .938 .944 1.315 .213 a .762
Economic con. (High) 1.102 .571 1.518 1.450 .800 .836
Education (High school) 2.066 .434* .497 1.217 4.390 2.585 3
Education (Post high sch.) .873 1.143 .625 1.721 3.636 5841*
Job status (Unemployed) .809 1.333 .276* 1.878 1.143 1.1 17
Job status (Student) .985 1.600 .480 a .710 .571 .694
Marital status (Married) .182 .448* 1.257 1.591 3.630 1.038

 

*p<.05; "p<.01; **"'p<,001; ‘p< .10

Table 13. (cont’d) .

 

Motivational factors

 

 

 

 

 

Negative life Tactics/propagan Other factors
events da of terrorists (Odds ratio)
(Odds ratio) (Odds ratio)
DHKP/C TH DHKP/C TH DHKP/C TH
Gender (Male) .550 - .820 - .618 -
Age of onset 1.211* .994 .987 .992 1.052 .956
Economic con. (Moderate) .455 a 1.007 1.074 1.175 .559 2.027
Economic con. (High) .540 1.293 1.364 1.322 .620 2.500
Education (High school) .742 1.402 1.503 1.074 1.915 2262*
Education (Post high sch.) .670 1.1 14 4.402" 1.519 .824 1.018
Job status (Unemployed) 1.571 2.092 2.246 1.485 .261 1.1 17
Job status (Student) .393“ .930 5.391 *** .979 .182* 2.507*
Marital status (Married) 3.737 a .662 1.120 .975 1.033 .913

 

*p<.05; **p<.01; *"'"'p<.001; 'p<.10
In terms of employment (job) status, unemployed and student DHKP/C members
compared to working members are less likely to be motivated by their
ideological/political closeness. Also, DHKP/C members who were students (compared to
working members) are significantly more likely to be motivated by tactics and
propaganda (likely though exposure to DHKP/C school-based activities mentioned
above), and less likely to be motivated due to negative life events and other factors.

These findings might be explained by considering that working people are concerned

194

with working conditions, discrimination, and other job-related concerns which are often
the focus of leftist DHKP/C propaganda. For Turkish Hezbollah, students are
significantly more likely (compared to working people) to be motivated by other factors.

For married individuals, Turkish Hezbollah membership is less affected by
environmental factors while environmental factors are influential for single men.
Married DHKP/C members are significantly more likely than their single counterparts to
be motivated to join because of negative life events (p<.10). It might be speculated that it
is especially the case for married women who have experienced some terrible events
during their marriage. Some findings in qualitative analysis support this idea.

3. Logistic Regression Analyses

Logistic regression is used to examine which variables discriminate between
Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist organizations. For this exploratory purpose,
first, logistic regression models are estimated independently for three main sets of
variables: background characteristics (including other background characteristics) (Table
14), learning related variables (Table 15), and motivational factors (Table 16). Then,
background characteristics and learning related variables are entered into the model
together (Table 17, Model 2). In the final model, all the variable sets (background
characteristics, learning related variables, and motivational factors) are entered into the
model concurrently (Table 17, Model 3). The dependent variable (terrorist groups) is
dummy coded as 0 for DHKP/C and 1 for Turkish Hezbollah. Chi-square statistics of the
logistic regression models indicates that all the models are highly significant (p<.0001).37

Also, investigation of goodness of fit revealed that all the models fit the data well as

 

37 Significant chi-square means that at least one beta in the model is nonzero (DeMaris, 1995).

195

Hosmer and Lemeshow statistics are non-significant (p >.05)3’8 (Lottes, DeMaris, &
Adler, 1996). Although pseudo-R2 does not have same meaning as it has in an OLS
regression, the values of pseudo-R2 (Cox & Snell’s pseudo-R2) are included in all logistic
regression models in order to give information about the discriminatory power of
different models.39 Interpretation of the results also presents information about correctly
predicted cases40 (Lottes, DeMaris, & Adler, 1996; Pampel, 2000).

Before interpreting the logistic regression results, diagnostic tests are conducted
to identify potential problems of multicollinearity and outliers. In this context,
independent variables inspected for multicollinearity do not indicate any serious problem
as all VIF scores are lower than 10 which is the suggested critical limit in the literature41
(DeMaris, 2004; Gujarati, 2003). Diagnostic procedures also include residual analyses
utilizing standardized deviance values (in the range of -3 to 3), DfBeta statistics, and
Cook’s D (Cook’s Distance). Potential outliers that have significant influence on the
model and parameter estimates are dropped, and the subsequent reduced models which fit
the data better and have more discriminatory power are presented42 (Agresti & Finlay,

1997; Garson, n.a.; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000).

 

38 The nonsignificant p-value indicates that the model fit the data well (Lottes, DeMaris & Adler;
1996 .
J9 Pampel (2000) notes that these measures should be used “as only rough guides without attributing
great importance...” (p. 50). Pampel also indicates that goodness of fit values that range fiom 0 to 1 could
be helpful if they are used carefully.

4 A perfect model correctly predicts group membership for all the cases (100%), while failed model
correctly predicts for less than 50 percent of the cases. The percentage of correctly predicted cases between
50 percent and 100 percent might be considered acceptable (Pampel, 2000). It is, however, necessary to
note that classification tables might be misleading (DeMaris, 2004; Garson, n.a.); “because they ignore
actual predicted probabilities and instead use dichotomized predictions based on a cutoff...” (Garson, n.a.).

Some suggests 4 as the critical value; VlF scores in all the models are even lower than 4.

2 DfBeta is used to see the cases that are poorly fit the model. A large value of DfBeta means that the
case has a large influence on the coefficient estimate; the critical value of DfBeta is 1.0. Cook’s D is also a
measure of the influence; a case is considered as influential if Cook’s D is greater than 1.0. In all the
Models DfBeta scores are lower than 1.0. However, some models (Models 1 and 2 in Table 9 and Models 2

196

Table 14. Logistic regression analysis of background characteristics and participation

in terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah)

 

 

 

 

Model 1 Model 2
Logistic Odds Logistic Odds
Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio
(B) SE (B) (B) SE (B)
Background characteristics
Age of onset .018 .047 1.018 .028 .051 1.028
Economic con. (Moderate) .970" .376 2.637 1955*" .547 7.065
Economic con. (High) 1.383" .427 3.986 1.549" .579 4.707
Education (High school) -.995** .348 .370 -1.087* .480 .337
Education (Post high school) -3.245*** .567 .039 -3.868*** .754 .021

Job status (Unemployed) -.120 .513 .886 -.048 .648 .953
Job status (Student) 1.158" .435 3.185 1.695M .568 5.445
Marital status (Married) 2546*" .539 12.752 2.901 *** .664 18.190

Other background characteristics

.449*** .092 1.567
1.569" .613 4.803
-l.l73* .503 .309

Number of sibling
Any detention
Affiliation (legal groups)

Affiliation (illegal groups) -.2.049** .607 .129
Any active family member .666 .418 1.946
Any fam. member’s sympathy .103 .416 1.109

Constant -.641 .977 .430 --4.1 19'” 1.386 .016

 

Note: Model 1: x2= 104.860*"'", df=8; Cox & Snell .306; Model 2: x2= 173.320****, df=l4; Cox
& Snell .487; *p< .05; **p< .01; *"p< .001; ***"‘p< .0001

Table 14 presents the results of logistic regression analyses for background
characteristics. The table shows which background ”characteristics are more related to
Turkish Hezbollah compared to DHKP/C. Main background characteristic of age of
onset, economic condition, education, job status, and marital status are examined in the
first model while second model includes all background characteristic.43 Model 1 yields a
pseudo-R2 of .306, whereas Model 2’s pseudo-R2 is .487. The higher pseudo-R2 in the

second model indicates that second model has more discriminatory power than the first

 

and 3 in Table 12) include few cases which have standardized deviance values out of the acceptable range
of -3 to 3 and Cook’s D values greater than 1. Those cases are dropped to estimate new (reduced) models;
all the reduced models fit the data better with relatively more discriminatory power; so that they are
retained and presented in the study (Agresti & Finlay, 1997; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000; Garson, n.a.;
Lon , 1997).

Gender is not included in any logistic regression models (which predict group participation) since
there is no gender variation in the Turkish Hezbollah data; in fact there is only one document written by
female Turkish Hezbollah terrorist, other 185 documents belong to male terrorists.

197

model. Also Model 2 correctly predicts group membership for 83.1 percent of the cases
while Model 1 correctly predicts 76.7 percent of the cases. Since the second model fits
the data better than the first model it is retained in the following full models (Model 2 and
3 in Table 17)44

The results for both models are quite similar. There are no significant differences
between two groups in terms of age of onset. There are, however, statistically significant
differences between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist groups along other main
background variables. That is, compared to individuals with low economic condition,
those participating in Turkish Hezbollah are significantly more likely to have moderate or
high economic conditions than those joining DHKP/C. This result shows that Turkish
Hezbollah participants are relatively more prosperous. Compared to people joining
DHKP/C, those joining Turkish Hezbollah are significantly less likely to have high
school, or post high school education (compared to middle school or lower education). In
other words, participants of DHKP/C are relatively more educated. As the contingency
table shows (see Table 7) the rate of individuals with post high school education in
DHKP/C is over 30 percent compared with 7 percent of Turkish Hezbollah. Job status
variable compares unemployed people and students with working people (full or part
time job). Those who participate in Turkish Hezbollah are significantly more likely to be
students at the time of participation compared to those of DHKP/C.45 Although the

variable of unemployed (as a job status) is not statistically significant, the negative sign

 

44 Also, the highest VIF scores are 1.84 for the first model and 1.92 for the second model (both of
them are for job status [student]), and they are much lower than the VIF score of 10 which is the indicator
of high collinearity.

5 It is, however, necessary to note that while DHKP/C usually targets students in universities and high
schools, Turkish Hezbollah targets students in middle schools and high schools. Also, contrary to logistic
regression result, bivariate analyses did not reveal a significant difference (see Table 2).

198

of the logistic coefficient indicates that DHKP/C contains relatively more unemployed
people. The variable marital status has the highest significant odds ratio of 18.19
indicating that individuals who join Turkish Hezbollah are over 18 times more likely to
be married compared to those joining DHKP/C. Findings on economic condition,
education level, and marital status confirm the bivariate results in Table 7 which indicate
statistically significant differences between two groups.

Along with main background characteristics, other background characteristics are
entered in the second model (Model 2 in Table 14). DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah
have similar characteristics (no statistically significant differences) in terms of having
active or sympathetic family members. With the exception of these two variables logistic
regression analyses indicate statistically significant differences for all other variables.
Accordingly, it is significantly more likely that individuals who join Turkish Hezbollah
have more siblings than those of DHKP/C; in other words, Turkish Hezbollah members
come from more crowded families. These findings tend to support that Turkish Hezbollah
members reflect the characteristics of the regions where they operate (Eastern and
Southeastern regions of Turkey); in these regions families usually tend to have more
children than other parts of the country. Compared to DHKP/C, Turkish Hezbollah is
significantly more likely to contain individuals who were detained before participation. It
is also significantly less likely that Turkish Hezbollah members have participated in legal
or illegal groups before joining compared to those participating in DHKP/C. Again this
may be explained by the existence of DHKP/C legal associations, unions, cultural
centers, and student organizations designed to spread propaganda and to find, motivate,

and recruit new members.

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Table 15. Logistic regression analysis of learning related variables and
participation in terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah)

 

 

Logistic Odds
Coef. SE Ratio
(B) (B)

Friend/s -.554a .316 .575
Kinship -.547 .357 .579
Organizational activities -1 .142** .335 .319
Propaganda -1.870*** .386 .154
Constant 1.784*** .379 5.956

 

Note: x7: 35.093****, df=4; Cox & Snell .11
*p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001; ****p< .0001; ' p< .10

Table 15 displays the logistic regression results for learning related variables.
Three of four learning related variables (propaganda, organizational activities, and
friends) indicate statistically significant differences between two terrorist groups.
Compared to individuals joining DHKP/C, Turkish Hezbollah participants are
significantly less likely to learn about their group from friend/s (p< .10), through
organizational activities, or organizational propaganda. In other words, these variables
are more influential on those who join DHKP/C. By way of explanation, DHKP/C
deliberately utilizes friendship dynamics, organizational activities, and propaganda to
recruit new members more frequently than Turkish Hezbollah does. In terms of learning
through kinship relations, there is no significant difference between two groups. This
model with a pseudo-R2 of .110 has lower discriminatory power than the models for
background characteristics and motivational factors. The model correctly predicts group

membership for 68.7 percent of the cases.“5

 

46 The highest VIF score is 1.68 for the kinship variable.

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Table 16. Logistic regression analysis of motivational factors and participation
in terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah)

 

Logistic Odds

Coef. (B) SE Ratio (BL
Environmental factors -.996** .298 .369
Ideological/political closeness -1.058*** .275 .347
Need to belong to a group .285 .427 1.330
Negative life events -.976** .303 .377
Tactics/propaganda of terrorists -l .232*** .297 .292
Other factors .206 .3 77 1.228
Constant 2.217*** .373 9.179

 

Note: x2= 38.621****, df=6; Cox & Snell .120
*p< .05; **p< .01; "*p< .001; ****p< .0001

The logistic regression results for the model including motivational factors are
presented in Table 16. Four of the six measures are statistically significant:
environmental factors, ideological/political closeness, negative life events, and
tactics/propaganda of terrorists. Compared to individuals joining DHKP/C, those
participating in Turkish Hezbollah are significantly less likely to be motivated due to
environmental factors, ideological/political closeness, negative life events, and
tactics/propaganda of terrorists. In other words, these four motivational factors are more
influential on those joining DHKP/C. The variables of need to belong to a group and
other factors do not have statistically significant measures meaning that there are no
significant differences between two terrorist groups for these variables. The motivational
factors model yields a pseudo-R2 of .120; discriminatory power of this model is lower
than background characteristics, and higher than the learning related variables. This
model correctly predicts group membership for 68.4 percent of the cases.47 There will be
detailed discussion on each motivational factor in the next section.

As a first step, background characteristics are entered in Model 1 presented in

Table 17 (consistent with Table 14, Model 2). Than, learning related variables are entered

 

47 The highest VIF score is 1.266 for the variable for tactics/propaganda of terrorists.

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in the model (Model 2) along with all background characteristics. Finally, the variables in
all three main categories (background, learning, and motivation) are entered as a full
model (Model 3). The statistical results for Models 1 and 2 in Table 17 are quite similar
in terms of background characteristics. That is, compared to those who join DHKP/C,
participants of Turkish Hezbollah are significantly more likely to have moderate
economic condition (compared to low economic condition), be a student (compared to
job status of working), and be married; and also significantly less likely to have post high
school education (compared to middle school or lower education). High school (as one of
the categories of the education variable) and high economic condition, while significant
in the background characteristics model, are not significant when learning related
variables are included (Model 2). The statistical frndings for other background
characteristic in Model 2 are almost identical to Model 1. That is, participants of Turkish
Hezbollah are significantly more likely to have more siblings and have a detention record
before participation, and significantly less likely to be affiliated with illegal groups
(before participation) compared to DHKP/C’s participants.

In Model 2, three out of four learning related variables are statistically significant:
friend/s (p<.10), organizational activities (p<.10) and learning through propaganda (i.e.
publications and the media). Those who join Turkish Hezbollah are significantly less
likely to learn about their respective group through friendship relations, activities of the
organization, and propaganda compared to those of DHKP/C. Both models (Models 1
and 2) have almost same pseudo-R2 (.487 and 485 respectively). The inclusion of learning

related variables does not improve the discriminatory power of Model 2.48

 

48 Also, percentages of correctly predicted cases in both models are almost same; 83.1% for Model I
and 84.4% for Model 2. The highest if VIF score is 2.158 for the learning related variable of kinship.

202

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The full model (Table 17 Model 3) includes all the variables in three main
categories. The results are very similar to those from Model 2; almost all statistically
significant variables in Model 2 remain to be statistically significant in Model 3.
Therefore, interpretation of the findings is very similar to those from Model 2 (see above
paragraph). The only differences are that the variable of affiliation with legal groups is
statistically significant in Model 3 but not in Model 2, while the variable of active family
member is not significant in Model 3 when it is statistically significant in Model 2 (p<
.10).

In the full model, four out of six motivational factors are statistically significant
meaning that there are motivational differences between two terrorist groups. Participants
in Turkish Hezbollah are significantly less likely to be motivated due to environmental
factors, ideological/political closeness, and negative life events compared to participants
of DHKP/C. Turkish Hezbollah members are, however, significantly more likely to join
under the motivation of their need to belong to a group. There is no statistically
significant difference between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah in terms of being
motivated by means of terrorist tactics/propaganda and other motivational factors. Model
3 yields the highest pseudo-R2 of .550 compared to all other models; thus Model 3 fits the
data better with relatively more discriminatory power.49 Model 3 also correctly predicts
group membership for 89.3 percent of the cases which is much higher than the other
models.

Overall, there are statistically significant and substantive differences between two

Turkish terrorist groups in terms of background characteristics, motivations, and learning

 

49 Nagelkerke R square is .750 which might be used as an alternative to Cox & Snell R Square. Also,
in Model 3, the highest VIF score is 2.673 for the learning related variable of kinship.

204

related factors. The pseudo-R2 scores and percentages for correctly predicted cases in
each model indicate that background characteristics and motivational factors have more
discriminatory power. In order to further illuminate and differentiate motivations for
participants in these two terrorist groups, the following section features a qualitative
analysis of motivational factors that promote participation in DHKP/C and Turkish

Hezbollah.

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CHAPTER SIX
THE PATH TO MEMBERSHIP (QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS)

The seized membership documents from DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah present
an unprecedented opportunity to examine the motivations of participants in two
ideologically distinct terrorist groups through the examination of their own words. This
qualitative chapter presents a review and extensive structured analytic discussion of the
content of the seized recruitment documents and facilitates a deeper understanding of the
phenomenon and the potential to reveal previously undiscovered facts (Altheide, 1996).
Qualitative analyses of the documents reveal insights into the differing and sometimes
overlapping motivational factors that promoted the involvement of sample members in
their respective organizations, thereby presenting a richer and more comprehensive
perspective on the motivations to join terrorist groups and motivational differences for
ideologically disparate groups. This section examines the six motivational factors
modeled in analyses discussed earlier -ideological/political closeness, need to belong to a
group, negative life events, organizational tactics and propaganda, environmental factors,
and other attributed factors.

In this section, each motivational factor is analyzed and discussed separately,
although it is necessary to stress that many individuals indicated various and multiple
influences as motivating factors. A single person might express ideological affinity,
negative life events, and the influence of his or her environment. From these documents,
it is almost impossible to discern which of multiple motivational factors exerts the
primary or greatest influence on decisions to participate because individuals were not

asked to, nor did they, report this information in a systematic order.

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l. Ideological/Political Closeness

Ideological or political closeness is one of the most important factors in an
individuals’ decision to participate in terrorist organizations. This factor was described by
members of both groups in terms of self-identification with group values, opportunity for
personal expression of political or religious ideals, meaningful social engagement, and
dissatisfaction with other alternatives. As expected, however, there are some contextual,
conceptual, and semantic differences between the declarations of motivations for each of
the distinctive terrorist groups, including the content and orientation of social ideals and
the articulation of revolutionary goals.

DHKP/C

Closeness to leftist ideology, organizational strategies and policies, potential for
revolutionary social change, and best choice among alternative organizations were
commonly cited by DHKP/C members as motivating their participation.

C entrality to life: Some individuals praised the group as the most important part
of their lives: “I can't imagine myself away from the group; it is my reason to live", and
“I can not think a life without DHKP/C.” According to applicants of the group, DHKP/C
is the honor and morality of the humanity; it represents honesty, rightfulness and justness;
it is a new life style with its peculiar culture, and it also means love and friendship. They
also saw DHKP/C as an indispensible part of their lives: "My party is my life; my duty is
to dedicate all my existence to this life", and “DHKP/C is a part of my life, my future, my
home, my family, and my everything...”

True path to revolution and best alternative: For some members that identified

the existing state system as fascist, oligarchic, or/and imperialist, the DHKP/C’s Marxist-

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Leninist and revolutionary ideology were very attractive and pure. Many individuals
articulated their. expectations of the organization in terms of revolutionary pioneer-ism, a
new society, and a symbol of resistance and freedom: "It is the only group that will carry
out the revolution in Turkey." “1 have become a revolutionary because I have wanted to
take part in the formation of a communist society which does not accommodate
exploitation. I see DHKP/C as our future, and our hope of salvation aiming at
establishing a system that fight against imperialism and oligarchy."

Some individuals had connections with other leftist groups before joining
DHKP/C, but finally chose to join DHKP/C because of ideological closeness with the
only movement that would raise the Marxist-Leninist flag in Turkey and in the world.

Sympathy and affinity: For some, sympathy and feelings of affinity toward
DHKP/C activities and members motivated participation in the group. These members
simply liked the leftist ideology before joining, and when exposed to recruitment
activities (i.e., friendship relations, culture center and student association activities, etc.),
easily established their own involvement. "While I was at high school I was a
sympathizer of revolutionary left wing groups. When I enrolled the university I met some
students who were the members of a legal university organization of the DHKP/C. My
relations with them motivated me to join them." Others were more proactive in finding a
way to convert their ideological views into practicing terrorist actions, "I had sympathy to
revolutionaries and this sympathy leaded me to make some more research about them
that ended up participation in them."

Several individuals had revolutionary ideals since childhood and DHKP/C

became an opportunity for them to express these ideals. "I have always had sympathy to

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the revolution and socialism since my childhood, I have always believed it. Once I was
told about the activities of the DHKP/C by one of my friends I accepted and joined it."
Another stated, "Since my childhood I always wanted to meet revolutionary people and
be together with them.”

Organizational policies, strategies, and rules: In some cases, organizational
policies and characteristics of DHKP/C generated attraction. Group values, principles,
and rules based on equality, justness, and righteousness were motivations to some,
including non-discrimination policies towards women. Leadership characteristics were
also cited as a reason for joining.

Turkish Hezbollah

Turkish Hezbollah presents itself as promoting and teaching the basic tenets of
Islam, although it (ab)uses religious concepts by promoting violent ideology to recruit
new members. Dissatisfaction with other religious groups, search for a more religious
life, religious characteristics of the group, ability to cultivate sympathy and affinity, and
its standing as the best alternative promoted appreciation and participation in Turkish
Hezbollah.

Best alternative: Some participants previously affiliated with other groups
reported joining Turkish Hezbollah because of the group’s purity and high ideals, the
courage, seriousness, and consistency of leadership and members, and the dedication of
the group to religious and non-state goals. “Other groups in which I had been were not
natural, sincere and systematic. That's why I selected Turkish Hezbollah."

Other group’s policies, ideologies, methods, and/or opinions did not meet their

expectations nor represent the real Islam. One member who had been in several religious

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groups, tariqats, and congregations contends that “Turkish Hezbollah’s policies and
strategies appeared to me very attractive. Then I thought that this is the one that I should
be the member and act together." Another indicated "Although I was in a religious group
I did not feel like I was one of them. When I met Turkish Hezbollah members, their
ideas, life styles and activities have seemed to me more attractive; they appeared to be
more realist."

Additionally, some indicated that other groups were either not radical enough or
supported the State system. Further, uncertainties in the activities of the groups in which
they were members promoted allegiance. "I am now sure about the firture of the Islam in
Turkish Hezbollah." A few Turkish Hezbollah members had been members of the
Marxist-Leninist PKK, but left to join Turkish Hezbollah thinking that PKK was the
enemy of Muslims and Islam (despite the fact that Turkish Hezbollah members were
killings Muslims who did not support them).

Seeking a more religious life: “Turkish Hezbollah represents the way of God.”
Two groups of people seek a more religious life - those who are already religious and
those who are not religious but want to be religious. Both types of people joined Turkish
Hezbollah because they believed it represented the real Islam and the opportunity to be
true believers within the group. "My life was full of impurities and I was feeling
blankness. I wanted to join Turkish Hezbollah to be better person." One religious person
who wanted to participate in a religious group explains that “I was in search of group that
shared similar ideas with me. When I learned about Turkish Hezbollah, I just wanted to
be one of them.” Another wrote “I was a religious person and I was praying regularly, so

I joined real Muslims to be more religious person”.

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For those without information about Islam and Islamic rules and teachings,
Turkish Hezbollah is the only group providing information about religion. These recruits
easily accepted and believed the teachings about religious rules and talks by Turkish
Hezbollah members. “Turkish Hezbollah practices the real Islam and fights against the
enemies of the Islam”, “Turkish Hezbollah is the best means to bring real Islam into life”,
and “It is necessary to follow the path offered by Turkish Hezbollah.”

Sympathy and aflinity: Feeling sympathy and affinity to Turkish Hezbollah and its
religious ideology motivated many individuals to join without any specific expectations
of the group. Some even had admired Turkish Hezbollah since childhood. "I have always
liked the Muslims [Turkish Hezbollah members] before joining Islam [Turkish
Hezbollah]50 and I was angry with those who talks against Muslims", "I always loved
Turkish Hezbollah, I was a sympathizer of it", and “I have liked the religious activities of
Turkish Hezbollah since my childhood.”

Religious characteristics: Turkish Hezbollah uses religious concepts and presents
itself as a group that promotes Islam. Their religious activities teach and promote Islam in
a way that influences people and cause them to feel closeness based on religion. "I joined
because it tells heavenly facts”, "The way the congregation follows is the right way, that's

why I joined", and "I saw the real Islam in the group; that is why I joined in." One person

 

50 A significant number of Turkish Hezbollah members call Turkish Hezbollah members “Muslims”
and participation in Turkish Hezbollah as “joining Islam”. These statements indicate that they see Turkish
Hezbollah as the real representative of Islam; and many of them believe that they became real Muslim
when they participated in the group. The main reason of these statements is that majority of these
individuals are not familiar with religious topics and/or they do not practice religious rules although many
of them come from a religious environment. Being in a religious environment but not practicing the
religion creates concerns for many of them. Once they meet individual/s who promote the Islam they easily
believe them and want to be like them. Once they joined they believe that they became Muslim and joined
the Islam faith.

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indicated that Turkish Hezbollah was promising his dream that Islam would rule the
world, and that he believed that Turkish Hezbollah could manage to achieve this goal.

In both of the groups, a number of individuals reported their respective groups as
the best organizational alternative and that sympathy and closeness to the group created
motivation to join. While DHKP/C members emphasize that they felt ideological and
political closeness to DHKP/C because it is the only way to revolution, and/or they are
influenced from its policies, strategies and rules, Turkish Hezbollah members attributed
their ideological and political closeness to the group’s religious characteristics and their
search of more religious life.

2. Negative Life Events

Negative life events appear to be influential on both groups’ members’ decisions
to join; there are, however, significant contextual and conceptual differences between the
reasons for the motivation. For instance, while discrimination and inequality, family
pressures/problems, exorbitances of goveming power or the killing of family
members/friends by security forces are commonly reported motivations for DHKP/C, the
same concepts are very uncommon in Turkish Hezbollah. For Turkish Hezbollah
members, the most significant motivator is negative life events that are primarily based
on religious issues. DHKP/C documents indicate a substantial number of individuals
reported abuses of governing powers and discrimination and inequality as factors
motivating their participation, but these are not the cases for Turkish Hezbollah
participants.

DHKP/C

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Dissatisfaction and unhappiness in the life and emotional vulnerability led some
individuals to be influenced by promises of a better life under DHKP/C’s ideology. The
help from and interest of DHKP/C members provided reassurance and compelling
incentives to join the group. One female member, placed in a foster home after the death
of her father and abandonment by her mother, had recently aged out of her foster home
(at 18 years old). Trying to find a job and a place to stay, she was unable to adapt to her
new life and experienced many difficulties until she met DHKP/C members who
befriended her. Another member reported that he became extremely distressed by
everything in his life, including his living standards and the ‘system’; his existential crisis
sent him in search of meaning and excitement that he found with DHKP/C members.

Negative life events can be combined with the influence of environmental factors.
One Turkish recruit living in France was unhappy with school, his daily life in a foreign
country, and different cultural environment. His uncle, a member DHKP/C, was aware of
his situation and used it to motivate him to be a member of DHKP/C:

“I was always fighting at the school. I was threatening the kids and
teachers that resulted in my suspension from the school. Because of my
actions, my father was always beating me that was causing me to be more
aggressive...Many youth in Europe, like me, is most likely to be alienated
from their culture, traditions, and language if their parents and relatives do not
teach them their own traditional and cultural values. I was one of those who
was disaffected from the life style in the Europe. My uncle who was aware of
this situation exhibited a different approach. I was not good in Turkish; he
wanted me to read the newspaper [DHKP/C’s newspaper]. He was always
talking about revolutionary ideology. He was taking me to ideological
concerts and also some other social activities of DHKP/C. He was dealing
with my all problems; he was teaching me how to act in the community and
how to speak with other people. He helped me to be a part of a community.
He was taking me to seminars and other ideological meetings. Friendly
approach of people that I met through my uncle influenced me, and I began to
feel some changes in my life and in my thoughts. I have wanted to be like
other revolutionaries who fought and died for their ideals of more freedom
and fraternal life..."

213

Killing or arrest of a fi'iend, relative or family member by security forces during
gunfire exchanges in the course of operations was among the motivating negative life
events. In each reported cases, the arrested or dead persons were members of DHKP/C or
other revolutionary groups. "My uncle's son, who was the member of DHKP/C, was
killed by the security forces. This sad incident and the activities of revolutionaries caused
me to feel more sympathy to DHKP/C."

Some reported discrimination, inequality, and injustice in the community/in the
existing system against women, a specific group, or an ideology as negative life events.
One emphasized that “I could not endure the inequities and injustices of the existing
system; I could not just sit and watch this negative situation. So I joined DHKP/C to fight
against this system.” Similarly, another reported "I became a revolutionary because I did
not like the existing relations in the system that has included immorality, injustice, and
deformity." Discrimination based on social class was also a factor: “Being a member of a
social class which has been discriminated for years made me more close to the left wing
groups and motivated me to join DHKP/C." Oppression against Kurdish people was also
cited as a source of motivation: “DHKP/C could handle the Kurdish people's problems;
DHKP/C is the only advocate of brotherhood of all people."

Female participants are more gender role-oriented in their assessments and
descriptions of discrimination, inequality, and injustice. For instance, one of the women
stated that there was a discrimination against woman in all level and layers of the life.
She emphasized that her only crime was to be a woman in the community. Her husband
left her but her family blamed her for this event although she had no role in destroying

her marriage:

214

"I was raised in a village...Like many other girls in our village I got
married very early, while I was 16. I became a mother at 18, and divorced at
20. I experienced all difficulties and challenges in the life as a woman. The
life of the women, the point of view of the society against women, and values
of the community towards women were very strange, and I was not able to
settle for this. I am a human being, I have my own thoughts but there was
nobody who was listening to me and respecting me; because I was a woman.
My husband was abandoning me but I was the one who was blamed for this
although I had not done anything that will affect the unity of my family. My
only crime was to be a woman. This viewpoint against women has existed in
the community, in the State system, and even in the law. These negative
approaches against women were negatively influencing me, and so I did not
have any self-trust. I believed that I would not success anything in the life
until I met some of our members [DHKP/C members]. When I met
revolutionary movement I felt like I was re-bom and re-started the life.”

Another woman also refers to discrimination against woman in reference to her
own and her mother’s life, and indicates that she always hated this. When she met the
group members that advocates the equal rights of all human being regardless of gender
she was influenced and wanted to join them:

“I was the only daughter of my parent; my mother was very influential on
me. My mother did not have enough education that would give her a job for
economic independence. She was always oppressed during her life by her
environment. She always motivated me to finish a university and have my
own economic independence in order not to live what she experienced. Under
the influence of my mother’s talks, I began to hate the community that has
negative standards and attitudes against women. One time I was even sexually
harassed....Sometimes I hated to be a woman...My organization [DHKP/C] is
very respectful to the rights of the women. I believe that it is the only power
that would eradicate these negative approaches against women.”

Another woman’s statement echoes these concerns: “Women have always been
oppressed in the history. It is the main source of the problem. I felt this in my family
which has patriarchal characteristics."

Family pressure is another negative life event that seems to motivate participation

in terrorist groups. Family pressure as a negative life event was most frequently reported

by female participants. After dropping out of school, one participant was essentially

215

homebound as her mother would not allow her to leave the home since her mother was
aware that she was meeting some persons whom she did not know. The situation was
boring and restrictive, and she wanted to escape and be free.

Another woman indicated that her father was not respectful about her decisions
regarding her professional career. The family had been living in her grandfather's house,
but he forced them to leave the house and they ended up in a very small house in a poor
neighborhood. Her family did not want her to be together with her friends who had
different religious and ideological backgrounds.

Another woman’s story includes more details:

“Until I attended university, I was under family pressure, especially from
my father. I had a very boring life passed between the high school and home. I
did not have any social life. I did not have a friend because my father did not
want me to have...Even he planted ivy surrounding the balcony to prevent
people to see us. I had to arrange my life according to his expectations and
reactions. He was inconsistent in his demands from me...It was, for me, a
period which was full of uncertainties, fears, indistinctness, and blues.
Although I like reading, he did not want me to buy books, and even he was
tearing the books to pieces when he found in my room. I did not want to argue
with him with a fear that he might not send me to the school anymore. This
life pushed me in new searches...Although I had a religious life I began to
show interest to left ideas since my father was blackening the left. I was
reading leftist books...When I passed the university entry exams my father did
not want me to stay at the dormitory, so he rented a house where one of my
parent would stay with me in order to ensure more control over me. In the
second semester of the first year they allowed me to have a female roommate
because of the high rent fees. When they believed that my roommate is
trustable person they did not stay with me anymore."

In fact, her roommate was a DHKP/C member and her relations with the
roommate led her to participate in the group. Initially, the roommate invited her DHKP/C
member boyfriend to the home. Next, the roommate introduced her to the university-
based legal association of the group. They participated in some legal and illegal protests

and demonstrations together. Afterwards, they asked her to leave the home and live with

216

group members. Her participation grew into more serious responsibilities and duties,
including organizing illegal demonstrations, couriering illegal materials, and planting a
bomb in a police station. This case is an extreme example of how family pressure might
promote some unacceptable behaviors. Most interestingly, she reported becoming
interested in leftist ideology because her father criticized the leftists.

Abuses and exorbitances of governing powers is another negative life event
category that usually included exposure to excessive use of force, humiliation, or
oppression. People motivated by abuses and exorbitances of government power or
agencies believe that the existing political and institutional system ignores the honor of
humanity, and promotes violence and oppression of the state authorities. In one case, one
member had visited her uncle, imprisoned because of his terrorist activities. During the
visit, prisoners began to shout slogans and she joined the prisoners and shouted slogans.
In the course of the intervention of the prison guards she was beaten, along with some
prisoners. "It was my first time I was beaten by security forces"; the use of force against
prisoners influenced her decision to join.

Another member indicated that his entire family sees security forces as an enemy
because of the negative experience with them. He also noted that not one person among
his relatives had served in the police military service because of these experiences with
security forces.

Exposure to abuses or exorbitances did not have to affect a direct family member.
Observing brutality against others in public or on TV was remembered as a negative life
event by some, and increased their motivation toward the group. One reported watching

a security forces’ operation on a terrorist cell on TV in exchange of gunfire killing of

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some members of the terrorist group. "I was watching TV. Suddenly, the ordinary
broadcast stopped and they began to broadcast armed conflict between the security forces
and revolutionaries. I thought that I found what I was looking for; revolutionaries were
like hero. It was like I was fighting with the fascism. I did not believe that they
[revolutionaries] were killed."

There are some other negative life event factors as seem to promote motivation,
including poverty. One member explained that although they worked hard as a family,
they were poor people, and that this suffering from poverty influenced her to join the
group. Similarly, another one stressed economic problems after his father died.

Although some of the members report only a single negative life event as
described above, others mention a combination of negative events. One member reported
both exposure to official abuses and his poor economic conditions:

"I hate the Military Service because I was punished during my obligatory
service to military since I hit a commander with my rifle. When I finished the
military service, I returned my village and I was abominating the system, and
wanted to fight against it in an organized group. Our organization [DHKP/C]
was the only group that was fighting against the existing system so I
sympathized it."

He also emphasizes his family’s poor economic situation, “My mom has always
suffered during her life and raised us in very poor conditions", and stresses that he seeks a
just system. Similarly, another person, after mentioning about their poverty and economic
problems, talks about inadequacies of the system by indicating that existing system was
oppressive and implemented assimilation policies in order to create masses that are loyal
and obedient to the system. It is also evident from the following statement that perceived

inequality and discrimination between different classes and exorbitances have become

motivator for some others: "Discrimination between the classes, and martyred

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revolutionaries influenced me, and made me search for a organized relations for
struggle."

Another member mentions abuses of government forces, especially during the
military coup, pressure from her father, and the economic challenges of the family:

“In our family there were some feudal values; we were raised by being
exposed to some feudal disciplinary rules. These rules were being applied
through my father's authority and harshness. Since then I had reaction to this
authority...In different periods of our family life we had some economic
problems, especially when my elder brother got married and left the
home...During the military coup we were witnessing security forces'
operations to the homes of people whom we knew, and detention of people in
our neighborhood. One of the most important things that influenced me was
that my brother was imprisoned and one of my friends was killed by security
forces.”

As a result of these events, when she met the group members in the university,
she was responsive to their ideological message, and began to attend and to become
involved in legal and illegal activities together with DHKP/C members.

Turkish Hezbollah

For Turkish Hezbollah members, dissatisfaction and unhappiness with life
constituted the largest sub-category of negative life events (64.5%, see Table 10.1). The
main reported reason for unhappiness and dissatisfaction was their sinful and immoral
behaviors. Although the individuals committing these socially, morally, and religiously
unacceptable behaviors were not happy or satisfied to do them and wanted to desist, they
could not. They believed that participation in Turkish Hezbollah would make them better
persons through the practice of the basic tenets of Islam. “I was committing sins and at
the same time adoring to be a religious person to keep myself away from the bad habits

which are against Islamic way of life”, “I was together with my peers who had bad

habits; we were drinking alcohol, gambling and committing adultery. But I was not

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happy with this life style and wanted to be a good person”, “I was committing theft and
insulting Muslims”, "I was vagabondizing and had a feeling of nothingness”, “I had a lot
of bad habits due to my friends around me”, “I have been living illiterately; I was
breaking into houses, gambling and drinking alcohol. Everybody in my neighborhood
was complaining against me”, and “I could not find peace in my prior life before the
congregation; I was a kind of clown. I was stealing others’ goods."

Turkish Hezbollah presents itself as a religious group that helps individuals to
understand the basic rules of the Islam; this tactic is used to attract people before
ideologically motivating to prepare them for radical and violent activities. One participant
indicated: "1 compared my life with the life standards that Turkish Hezbollah promotes. I
saw that they were different...I understood that the congregation [Turkish Hezbollah] is a
unique group that presents real Islamic life. Then I have joined."

In almost every one of these situations that included negative life events,
members joined Turkish Hezbollah through their siblings, parent, relatives, or fiiends, or
a member of Turkish Hezbollah they met in cafe’s, schools, or mosques. They were
offered a better (purer) life and were exposed to strategic propaganda through books,
sermons, and home visits.

“During my childhood I was habitually committing theft, and I was always
fighting with my friends. Everybody was complaining against me to my

family. Upon those complaints, my elder brother was always beating me.

Once again, while I was about to commit theft in my neighborhood, one of my

friends of whom I knew from the secondary school saw me. However, he did

not complain; conversely, he behaved me in a good manner without blaming

me. Then I felt very embarrassed. Our friendship relations developed day by

day. He was giving me books and I was reading all of them. As a consequence
I quitted all my bad habits, and I joined to Turkish Hezbollah”

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A small set of members wrote about their unhappiness and dissatisfaction as
members or sympathizers of PKK prior to involvement with Turkish Hezbollah:

"While I was in a high school I was together with PKK supporters. They
were advocating atheism. Although I was against atheism I tended to believe
atheism while I was together with them. I got very bad friends in the PKK. I
was gambling and enjoying the life together with them. Then, my uncle whom
I loved a lot died; this event influenced me. Upon this bad news I went to my
hometown. In my parent's home I saw a book of my brother. After reading it I
began to pray and met my brothers' friends who were the Turkish Hezbollah
members."

Clearly, life in PKK caused conflict with his own and family values. The death of
his uncle and the exposure to religious literature through his brother became a factor that
helped him to change his life.

Similarly, another PKK sympathizer unhappy with the organization chose Turkish
Hezbollah as an alternative to the PK:

“1 had very bad habited fiiends. Some of them were PKK sympathizers.

We were forcibly collecting money in front of the school from the kids. When

they did not give we were hitting them, and even one of my fiiends stabbed

one of them...While I was at elementary school I was sharing the same desk

with a silent and harmless boy. My friend hit this boy; I was very angry with

my friend. My life was full of bad fiiends and bad activities, and I had fed up

them. In the high school I wanted to desert these behaviors and so I liked the

Muslims who were against these kinds of behaviors."

The killing of a family member also influenced the participation of some Turkish
Hezbollah members. However, unlike DHKP/C members who were killed in gunfire
exchanges with security forces, these victims were killed by the PKK, a rival and enemy

group of Turkish Hezbollah. Feelings of anger and revenge motivated them to join

Turkish Hezbollah.

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Perceived discrimination and inequality against Muslims in Turkey and in the
world motivated one respondent to join Turkish Hezbollah. He wanted to do something to
struggle with this discrimination and humiliation:

"The books I was reading were including information on how Muslims

have been maltreated and tortured, how they have been martyred and how bad

conditions they have had to live. It was giving me pain and sometimes I was

asking myself why those who are persecuted and tortured are only Muslims

and why Muslims do not come together and resist against these actions. My

hate against infidels has increased day by day...One day under the influence of

my hatred I decided to set on fire a bar-restaurant that sell alcoholic beverages

and cause people to be drunken. I found a highly strong fire bomb and a

bought some gas. I replaced it under a car parked in front of the restaurant.

The bomb was found before its explosion; I, however, believe that I did what I

had to.”

Inequality and injustice against majority of the people in the community by very
small minority (of rich people) motivated one respondent to join Turkish Hezbollah. "I
have observed that the existing system was full of injustices and inequalities. There was a
happy minority and this happy minority group was ruling and superior to majority of the
community. So I could not endure this and decided to join Islam [Turkish Hezbollah]." It
is possible that what he heard and listened to about Turkish Hezbollah was designed to
support his ideas and Turkish Hezbollah was introduced as an only solution to similar
problems.

Even some very simple and seemingly minor humiliating experiences might
generate circumstances of vulnerability that can generate opportunities for exposure to
and ultimately participation in Turkish Hezbollah. As one member explains:

“It was the beginning of the second year of the high school. One day, while
I was about the sit on my chair one of the vagabond students pulled my chair
away, I fell down and all other students laughed at me. I was very embarrassed.

After this event I sat together with another boy whom I knew as a sympathizer
of Turkish Hezbollah. He showed me a great interest. Then our friendship

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relations developed and I joined the Muslims [Turkish Hezbollah] under his
guidance.”
3. Tactics/Propaganda of Terrorists

Over half the sample referred to organizational propaganda and tactics by the
respective groups as a source for their participation. This discussion examines the types
of tactics and propaganda activities used by the groups and the differences between the
group’s use of these tactics. Both groups used home and village visits to generate public
awareness. The DHKP/C used publications, targeted engagement (of male potential
members) by female members, legal structures and organizations, mass activities, and
ceremonies. Turkish Hezbollah focused on home based chats, and activities in mosques
and bookstores.

In addition to the various tactics employed, both groups’ members use respectful,
sincere, and friendly approaches towards outsiders and potential members to generate
positive images of the organizations. As expected, Turkish Hezbollah used religion and
religious concepts to influence and recruit individuals, while DHKP/C promoted
traditional leftist ideological concepts.

DHKPC

The following discussion includes the type of tactical and propaganda activities
that DHKP/C carries out in different contexts to promote the group and motivate
individuals to participate. As discussed in the descriptive analysis section, some of these
activities were also identified by participants as a source of information (learning) about

DHKP/C.

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The use of publications: DHKP/C members promote and distribute the
publications of the group (i.e. magazines, newspapers, or books) to the public and
through schools (especially high schools and universities). The ideological content of
these publications strongly emphasize the concepts of equality, justice, freedom, people’s
brotherhood etc.; these ideas seem particularly attractive for younger potential
participants. Free subscriptions for potential members and home delivery assists in
exposure and recruitment. One member stated, “My sympathy to the revolutionary
movement [DHKP/C] began through revolutionary magazines while I was at high school.
I was a fanatic reader of them." Similarly another reported, "Under the influence of
DHKP/C’s publications provided by some of our members, I felt sympathy to DHKP/C.
My enlightenment through these publications and conversations with members motivated
me to become a member.”

The use of female members: DHKP/C uses its female members to establish
fiiendship relations with targeted males. After normal fiiendship relations and ensuring
some level of emotional attachment, the girl begins to promote the group through various
joint activities such as visiting the group’s legal organizations (e.g., associations and
culture centers) and joining sponsored legal activities (e. g., protest meetings and
demonstrations).

One male participant explained that he had worked in different cities where he
could find employment. In one city, he met a girl who was a DHKP/C member. After
dating a few times, she provided him with the magazines of DHKP/C to read. Then, she

urged him to open a branch of the group’s association in that city. His involvement in

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different activities with her generated attachment and promoted his active role in the
group to remain together with her.

Legal structures/organizations: DHKP/C is very effective in using its legal
extensions (associations for students in universities and high schools), cultural centers
and publication offices, and support services (for families of prisoner members) to
introduce its ideology and organization to potential new members. Efforts to draw
individuals to these places and activities result in the promotion of the group and
revolutionary ideas. In these places, they organize ideological chats, meetings,
conferences, movies, and reading groups and these activities foster discussion about the
ideas, articles, and activities. A well-informed group member is usually assigned to
answer possible questions during the discussions. Folklore or theatre groups are also a
source of attraction for some youths, and these situations offer the opportunity to increase
group solidarity and friendship relations. One member indicated:

"...Another factor that increased my motivation was the persons that I met
at the X magazine's office. We were reading the newspapers and magazines

and making discussions about their contents; we were singing songs and

marches that had ideological content. I was taken to the musical concert of the

X group [supporter of DHKP/C]. During the concert they were shouting

slogans; I also accompanied the slogans as I was under their influence."

In another instance, DHKP/C members invited a popular musical group that
supported DHKP/C to an association, and ensured the opportunity for potential members’
to chat informally with the musical group. One attendee of that event reported: “Our
conversations with the group members caused me to like the revolutionary idea and

DHKP/C. I continued to attend the office [used for publishing magazine] where I met

different group members. Our talks and their sincere behaviors influenced me.”

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Organized mass activities: DHKP/C members organized legal and illegal protests,
demonstrations and public meetings to capture the attention of the general public,
publicize the group’s ideology and perspective, and to develop and increase the
dependence and motivation of members and targeted individuals. These events also
serve to attract media attention.

Potential members, especially those who attend the legal extensions, are
encouraged to join and support other organized DHKP/C activities, as well as other
leftist-oriented demonstrations and protest. Group psychology, including ideological
chanting, combined with sometimes haphazard precautions and preparations of security
forces (i.e. excessive use of force) can enhance affinity to the group. One member
explained:

"While I was at the preparation class of the University I met a person who
was one of the managers of the University [DHKP/C] student association. My
chats with her about the association and its activities motivated me to join
them. Afterward, I joined several of the group’s activities as a participant and
sometimes as an organizer for boycotts, protests, conferences, or forums. We,
as a group, also conducted illegal demonstrations, delivered proclamations,
and collected money for the mineworkers on strike. I was detained due to
some of these activities."

His subsequent statements included how he became involved in more violent
activities and how he became more radicalized within the group.

Home visits: Visits to potential members’ houses, especially during the summer
semester for students, were designed to sustain individuals’ feeling of belonging,
considering that family environment might draw them away from the group’s ideology.

In one case, one DHKP/C member was instructed by the group to “target” his cousin

during the summer semester:

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“My cousin is a university student and an active member of our group. He
visited me in one of the summer semesters a few years ago. I was a high

school student at that time. He was always talking about poverty and social

justice related issues. He was also giving me our group’s magazines that I did

not know at that time; he was asking me to read them. When the schools

opened he was sending me letters through which he was promoting the

activities of DHKP/C, and also advising me to go to the group’s office used

for our publications in our city. Then, my father died, and we had economic

problems...In the meantime, I passed the university entry exams, enrolled the

university, and found a dormitory to stay... During that time, my cousin was
arrested for being a member of DHKP/C. He began to send me letters in

which he was again recommending that I read the group's magazines.

Although I began to buy it; I was also being sent the magazines by mail.

Probably my cousin gave my address to the group, so they began to send them

to me. My cousin and the magazine were the primary reasons of my

motivation.”

In addition to the tactic of home visits, this example features several other
techniques to increase motivation — targeting potential members (even while the recruiter
is jailed), repeated recommendations to group propaganda (magazine), and free delivery
of the materials.

The use of prisons: Prison outreach and imprisoned DHKP/C’s members are also
used for motivational purposes. Potential recruits are taken to the prisons to visit
prisoners; prisoners talk about their experiences and make ideological speeches that
usually stress the inadequacies of the existing system and the necessity of a revolution to
end social injustices. In addition to prison visits, some individuals visiting their own
relatives were influenced by the speeches and ideological slogans shouted by prisoners.
One member recalled a childhood visit to her uncle in prison where she heard the slogans
of the terrorist prisoners and wrote about how the event had influenced her, "My dreams
were filled by prisons during my childhood and adolescent period. I was telling my

observations and feelings to everybody when I left from the prison. I was doing a kind of

propaganda of the group. My uncle was always sending me letters from the prison and

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these letters created more awareness about the group as I grow up." Her experiences in
the prison combined with her uncle’s promotional activities through letters from the
prison motivated her to join. In a few cases, members mentioned their own motivation as
a result of contact with terrorist prisoners during their own incarceration.

Ceremonies: Some documents point out that DHKP/C members organize
commemoration ceremonies for their founders and killed members. Potential participants
are taken to these ceremonies that include propaganda speeches, slogans and marches of
the group members; such a psychological environment motivated some individuals.

Village visits: Village visits and propaganda tours that featured ideological
conversations also influenced member decisions to join DHKP/C.

In most cases, participants in DHKP/C were exposed multiple tactics or
propaganda activities. One indicated:

“My sympathy to the group increased after reading an ideological book

that contains success stories of DHKP/C members, and attending a musical

concert of a music group that is known as having leftist ideology. This

sympathy increased even more when I began to go to the culture center and

participate in their activities...I joined protest meetings and demonstrations.

Then, I was given some responsibilities such as delivering newspapers of the

group, organizing protest meetings and demonstrations, and some innocent

activities such as folkloric dance practices or organizing theatres in order to

pull youths’ attract to the center.”

It is necessary to reiterate that the sympathetic approach - sincerity, friendliness
and benevolence, is a common characteristic of group members during their contact with

members of the public and potential recruits.

Turkish Hezbollah

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Turkish Hezbollah’s tactics/propaganda activities are directed toward individuals
from different parts of the community, instead of the student-focus of DHKP/C’s
activities.

Activities in the schools: Turkish Hezbollah appears to use direct fiiendship
relations rather than organized structures like DHKP/C. Individual members concentrate
on building good relationships with the potential members, who are usually targeted
within groups of identified religious persons. As the fiiendship develops, the Turkish
Hezbollah member promotes the involvement and participation of the target in the group.
In a few cases, member teachers in the schools appear to be a motivator for some
students:

“One of my teachers in the high school taught a course named ‘religion

and morals’ which was very influential for me. I met with him out of the

school and talked on various issues including our group and its activities.

Until this conversation I had a feeling of nothingness, but I overcame of this

feeling and felt better after listening to my teacher.”

Home visits: Turkish Hezbollah members visit homes of the potential members on
multiple occasions. In some instances, they visited individuals’ families whose sons were
killed by the PKK. These targets, who later became members, indicated that their anger
against the PK and Turkish Hezbollah members’ close interest and concern motivated
them to join.

The use of publications: Turkish Hezbollah uses publications, especially books
with religious ideology, in order to create awareness and motivation. They also use
religious and other occasions to expose individuals to their ideological publications. In

one example, information for a class assignment and his desire to write about a religious

subject resulted in his exposure to Turkish Hezbollah literature:

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"While I was at high school I had a teacher whom I know as a religious
person. I was thinking that he does not like me because of my opinions. One
of the assignments for the course was to analyze any topic that we chose. In
order to influence him I planned to prepare a paper with a religious content. I
had a friend I knew to be a religious person, so I consulted him and he gave
me a book. The book seemed to be very interesting. I prepared my paper and
it benefited from the book; the paper seemed to be a really good job. That
book influenced me a lot. After reading that book and writing my paper I felt
as a Muslim. I asked my friend for similar books to read. With the help of
those books I understood that all the best options were in Islam [Turkish
Hezbollah]."

It is also likely that his friend knew him, his needs, his vulnerabilities, and was
able to choose a book that would help with the assignment as well as appeal to his
psychological state; the books was so effective that it caused him to change his whole
life. In another example, both a friend and the influence of book combined to provide
motivation to join Turkish Hezbollah.

Organizing tours: Social activities, including tours, are also used as tactic to
promote the group. One member indicated: “The tour was very influential for me; I liked
them [Turkish Hezbollah] and I wanted to be together with them.”

Village visits: Villages are potential places to promote the organization and to
recruit potential new members. Villagers sensitive to religious issues are predisposed to
be convinced by Turkish Hezbollah members’ discussions and teaching about religion
and the Turkish Hezbollah. In these contexts, Turkish Hezbollah is as the savior and
promoter of Islam. To exemplify:

“In my prior life before the group, I was involved in several illegal
activities such as stealing villagers’ sheep and adultery. I had also fiiends who
were thieves. Turkish Hezbollah members came to our village and conducted
talks on religious matters. Everybody liked their sincere and fiiendly
behaviors. My friends, as I already mentioned, joined Turkish Hezbollah and
became good people by leaving all their bad habits their behind. Like them, I

too was influenced by Turkish Hezbollah. The members were really different;
friendly, sincere, helpful, honest. I just wanted to be like them, too.”

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Apparently, his observation of Turkish Hezbollah members’ behaviors, their
convincing talks, his friends’ participation, and participation of other villagers motivated
him to join Turkish Hezbollah. Another member stated: "Turkish Hezbollah members
were coming to our village and organizing chats with the villagers. After listening to
them I saw that I had not had any tie to Islam although I claim to be Muslim, and at that
time I decided to join Islam [Turkish Hezbollah]." Turkish Hezbollah knows the
vulnerabilities of people and targets them by religious concepts and responsibilities (as
well as offering redemption for past sins).

The use of public places: Turkish Hezbollah members use public places like
cafés to promote the group since these places present the opportunity to find someone
there that might listen and thus be influenced. The following example demonstrates a
successful outcome of that method.

“I was feeling sympathy to the Muslims [Turkish Hezbollah]. One day, I,
together with my friends, was sitting in a café. A person who was a fiend of
my fiiend initiated a conversation by asking us 'What is the difference
between human and animal?‘ It was an interesting question. Then, he
explained it using various examples utilizing religious concepts. His speech
and explanations really influenced me. After this conversation, I just assessed
my life and saw a lot of deficiency, and I decided to be a good religious
person."

Later, he met a member of Turkish Hezbollah in another shop; this member
promoted Turkish Hezbollah as a religious group and took him to another meeting of the
group; ultimately, this second member helped him to become an active member himself.
Clearly, Turkish Hezbollah members use religious teachings and structures to elicit

interest and sympathy from the targets; these religious messages also help convince them

to join.

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Home based chats: Home-based religious chats with potential individuals in
members homes also help to promote Turkish Hezbollah as the best option to join and
support. "I was invited to religious gatherings in different houses that included sermons
and religious chats. Thanks to God that I joined these sermons, and now I am in the
congregation [Turkish Hezbollah] now."

One-to-one connections: Some Turkish Hezbollah members choose a person and
dedicate a substantial amount of time to develop and advance relations with them. The
group member might be a fiiend, relative, or neighbor. The basic aim is to earn targeted
party’s trust, love, and respect. During these one-to-one contacts (as is done in group
based activities), they chat about religious issues and Turkish Hezbollah. One member
recruited in this way recounted: "I linked to the congregation by the agency of X. He was
very sincere and friendly. I should confess that his special interest in me, our chats at his
home and remote places for hours were very influential on me. His chat was more
delicious than honey, and his advice have influenced me some much that I will never
forget them throughout my life."

Mosques: Mosques controlled by group members are also effectively used to
recruit new members and promote the group. Some participants reported that sermons
with ideological contents influenced some individuals who were not aware of the real aim
of the group. One participant who was member of religious tariqat attended Turkish
Hezbollah sponsored activities at a mosque in his neighborhood; these activities led his
separation from the tariqat and participation in Turkish Hezbollah:

“Although I am not a too conscious person in terms of practicing religious

belief, I have not had bad ideas and habits. I was joining Friday prayers and I

was affiliated with a tariqat. When Turkish Hezbollah members began
religious talks and sermons in the mosque located in my neighborhood. I

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listened to their sermons and enjoyed their activities; I left the tariqat and
joined them.”

In addition to the sermons, Turkish Hezbollah showed a great deal of interest and
concern for him; he stated that he had never seen this level of interest from his own
environment.

Bookstores: Bookstores owned by sympathizers or active members of the group
were also places that raised individuals’ awareness of the group not only through the sale
of ideological books but also through activities at the bookstore, such as meetings and
chats. Potential members who come to the bookstore to read and to buy books with
religious content are targeted for the development of relationships. In one instance, a
member was recruited when he went to a religious bookstore that was lending books;
during the course of getting his book, he began a conversation with Turkish Hezbollah
and later became involved with the group himself.

4. Need to Belong to a Group

Some individuals are motivated by their need to belong to a group, but there are
differences in the formation of this motivation within and between the groups.
Understanding these differences warrants detailed examination, and reveals a divergence
between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members based on political ideologies and
religious preoccupations respectively.

Factors such as being bored with life or becoming radicalized are reported by
participants in both groups. The primary similarity is that individuals’ need to belong to
a group was met by the different terrorist organizations by their strategic approaches to
recruitment as well as operations.

DHKP/C

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Moving away from familiar environments with friends and relatives to a new
environment where individuals do not have acquaintances may cause feelings of isolation
and ostracism. This may especially be the case for kids who were well-integrated into
their home environments and had a lot of friends in school or in their neighborhoods. One
of the women in the sample verified this explanation. Her family moved to another city
where she enrolled a new high school in which the students were mostly from rich
families. She had difficulty in establishing friendships because they already had their own
peer groups; it was difficult for her to enter into any of these groups, and she found the
situation to be psychologically and sociologically disturbing. When she met members of
DHKP/C that were very friendly and seemed to be very honest, sincere, and respectful,
she wanted to be together with them. In this case, a new school environment created
difficulty for her in establishing new fiiendships because of established peer groups and
socio-economic status differences. The fiiendly approach of DHKP/C members seemed
to make it an attractive group for her to join.

Loneliness is also an important factor that promoted a search for a group of
persons with which to identify and interact. Another woman indicated that “I was very
bored after dropping out the university education; I was feeling as if I was alone in the
world.” During this period, she met some members of the group in a café; these people
visited her and these visits made her happy and feel social connections. “I forgot my
loneliness when I was with them.” Her social isolation and loneliness after dropping out
of school was replaced by the group members’ close contact for recruitment. Other
members, mostly women, also referred to loneliness as factor that motivated their

decision to join DHKP/C. They all stressed that they felt happy in the group they joined.

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Another group explained that they needed a group that would share their ideology
and act together to carry out this ideology. When they learned about DHKP/C activities
and beliefs, they found them to be very appealing. Clearly, in these cases, radical
ideology caused a search for radical groups which ended when they discovered and
joined DHKP/C. One member stated “I was in search of a group that would meet my
ideological needs and expectations.” Another explained in more detail:

“I was reading philosophical and ideological books after I finished high
school. Through these books I learned about Marxist-Leninist theory that
influenced me a lot; I internalized it. For long time I was in search of people
with whom I would be able to share my ideas. As a result of this search I
learned about our movement [DHKP/C]. Their approach to Marxist-Leninist
ideology, their revolutionary characteristics, and their heroism influenced me.
Especially after the death fast in 1996, I felt as a real member of DHKP/C."

One member indicated the impact of a combination of several factors, loneliness,
ostracism, boredom with life, being unpopular, and the need to belong to a group
increased motivations to join DHKP/C.

“My elder brother and elder sister were active members of DHKP/C. They
were involving in several legal and illegal activities to promote DHKP/C; they
organized meetings and chats in the association, hanging placards, and
delivering proclamations. Although I wanted to be like them I was always
ostracized, and even I was despised. I was upset; I really wanted to be part of
that group, so I needed to prove myself. I was working hard and only one or
two days a week I was able to come home. My life was very boring and
monotonous. Sometimes I was going to the group's association, but anybody
was not interested in me. Although I was able to carry out some of the
activities that my elders did, I was not allowed in others and I was always
ostracized. I wanted my elder brother and sister to involve me into their group
but they did not believe that I was serious. In fact, I just wanted to be among
them."

Turkish Hezbollah
Sinful behaviors and a wish to get out of this lifestyle directed some individuals to

a search of a religious group that could help them control their behavior and help them to

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live them have a more acceptable and sin-free life. For some, Turkish Hezbollah was a
good option, in part due to the influence of the tactics and propaganda of the group
members.
“Because of my sins I committed I was feeling that I was moving away

from a religious life. I was like an ice cube, and I was about to melt down

under the sun. I would be a sinful person in the presence of God. If you throw

that ice cube into a pool it gains a value; in order to be part of that pool and

serve the God slavishly I joined the Congregation."

Some participants of Turkish Hezbollah emphasized tedium and monotony of
their lives, and sought a group or friends that would make their lives better. "Before I
joined I was very bored in my life since I had nobody that would show concern to me. I
was alone, and I was feeling like something was missing in my heart." This same person
added that Turkish Hezbollah members got in touch with him and gave him some
ideological books. These contacts resulted in his joining the group. Both the monotony of
his life and his desire to have caring relationships with others motivated him to join
Turkish Hezbollah. The desire for caring relationships was also indicated by another
participant who stressed that he needed a friendship environment that would show him
respect, concern, and interest. He found an answer to these concerns in Turkish
Hezbollah, and stated “I did not see this kind of interest even from my family
environment. The close attention and sincere interest of Turkish Hezbollah motivated me
to join them.”

Another group of people joined Turkish Hezbollah in order to be able to carry out
their radicalized ideas. They wanted to fight against infidels and unbelievers, and to do

so they needed a radical group. One indicated “Since my childhood I was dreaming of

participating in a radical religious congregation to fight against the infidels together with

236

them." Prior radicalization motivated another group of participants as well; while
members of legal religious groups, they sought belonging to a group which was more
radical and extreme. The only female member of Turkish Hezbollah in the sample
explained: “I was affiliated with different religious group but they did not meet my
expectations, and I was not sharing the same thoughts with them... I was seeking
radicalism." Another indicated that “I like Lebanon Hezbollah. I was looking for a group
like Lebanon Hezbollah, which is sincere and systematic. I have been in different groups
including religious groups but they did not satisfy me. They were so simple, and did not
have a program. They were not promising a future."

Others had relatively innocent desires and expectations about the group in which
they wanted to be involved: they just wanted to be in a religious group that would teach
them some tenets of the religion. Their searches ended with Turkish Hezbollah which
promotes itself as a group that helps individuals learn and practice religion.

5. Environmental Factors

Environmental factors involve motivation influenced or derived from people in
intimate and familiar environments, often family or friends who are members and/or
sythhizers of the terrorist groups. The documents revealed that there were within and
between group differences in the formation of this motivation as described below. For
both groups, it is difficult to quantitatively classify or definitively state the role of
specific environmental factors because of the influence of multiple environmental factors
on the same person.

DHKP/ C

237

Participants of DHKP/C refer different persons and context as a source of their
motivation. In many cases, they attributed their motivations to several environmental
factors rather than one. A combination of family members and relatives in the group, the
prevailing ideologies in their neighborhood or villages, and strong friendships with group
members seemed to be common.

Parent/sibling/relatives: “I was raised in a family environment that has
revolutionary ideas...” Parents, siblings, and/or relatives who were members or
sympathizers of DHKP/C or other revolutionary movements exerted some influence over
future members. “My elder brother was in DHKP/C and I wanted to be like him”, and
“My father felt affinity to revolutionaries, and sometimes met with them. Therefore, he
was known in his neighborhood as a communist and anarchist. Everybody in my family
is leftist, and they never thought to be rightist." Some members in the sample also had
family members in the prisons because of their terrorist activities. A few mentioned
family members who were killed by security forces during operations. As well as being
influenced, some of them were directly introduced to the group by their parents or elder
siblings. Another one noted her family’s logistical support to the group. She contends that
her parent was giving logistical support to DHKP/C by allowing group members to stay
and hide at their home. Her parents’ relation with the group influenced her and she
wanted to join them.

Friends: Close friends, especially in the school context (usually university and
high school) were often cited as a source of influence and motivation. “In the university,

I had friends who were revolutionaries.” Friends discussed revolutionary movements,

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talked about political issues, read DHKP/C’s magazine and newspaper together. DHKP/C
asks its members to visits friends who might become involved in the group.
"I support leftist ideology. One of my fiiends whom I have known for

long years visited me at my home and explained me that he was a member of

DHKP/C, and invited me to operate together with him. I told him that I would

think about it, and then, since I had a leftist ideology, I accepted his offer. "

Neighborhood: Some members mentioned being raised in a neighborhood where
revolutionary and leftist ideas and activities were common. In several different cases
members explained that their neighbors provided them with DHKP/C’s magazines,
newspapers, ideological books, and/or music cassettes. They also reported having
ideological talks with their neighbors. These discussions and ideological materials
motivated their decisions to participate in the organization.

Village/town: In addition to neighborhoods, the political orientation of villages
and towns seemed important in terms of environmental motivators. One member noted
that the village where he grew up included people with revolutionary ideologies, and that
many of them have struggled against the existing system by joining revolutionary
movements. These factors influenced his decision to join.

Some of those who identified family members as an environmental source of
motivation also mentioned about some negative events or bad experiences of family
members. These cases demonstrate that the family environment combined with bad
events were a necessary condition for stronger motivation. One member stated that many
people in his family had been victims of the oppressive fascist system and this oppression

made them enemies of the state. Therefore, the family was very sympathetic to leftist

groups that targeted the existing regime. Another stressed that her revolutionary friends

239

in the university talked frequently about injustices of the existing system against women
and poor people.

Turkish Hezbollah

While DHKP/C participants’ environment is mostly comprised of people (parent,
sibling, neighborhood, relative) who are supporter or sympathizer of DHKP/C or other
illegal revolutionary groups, Turkish Hezbollah members’ environment mostly include
religious people and influences not affiliated with other illegal religious groups or
Turkish Hezbollah.

Parent/sibling: Simply having a very religious family environment motivated
many individuals to join Turkish Hezbollah because they believed or were made to
believe through propaganda that they were participating in a religious group that
promoted religion and fought against all demonic and sinful things. One indicated that
“The reason why I selected Turkish Hezbollah is that my parents are religious persons;
they have always taught us to be honest and lawful, and do rightful things; they kept us
away from evil things. Therefore, God helped me find Turkish Hezbollah.” This member
believed that he would find all the values he learned from his parent in Turkish
Hezbollah. As discussed previously, Turkish Hezbollah uses basic and commonly
acceptable religious concepts and values (i.e. honesty, rightfulness) in order to influence
individuals.

Another group that referred their parents and siblings as their source of motivation
indicated that their family’s membership in (especially fathers and elder brothers) or
sympathy toward Turkish Hezbollah influenced their own decisions to join. A father’s

membership in the group led to many family members’ participation. As well as fathers,

240

brothers also caused motivation, "My elder brother’s recommendations about living a
religious life, and information provided by him about the movement [Turkish Hezbollah]
which promotes Islam helped me become more conscious, and I wanted to do something
for Islam." In some cases, similarity of family members’ religious beliefs with Turkish
Hezbollah’s religious ideology created affinity for Turkish Hezbollah. “I was raised in a
family whose religious belief was very close to Turkish HeZbollah’s ideology.” Also, in a
few instances, wives who were members or sympathizers motivated their husband’s
decision to join.

Some were forced by their parents and/or siblings to join; “1 was under the strict
control of my father who was the member of Turkish Hezbollah; he wanted me to join the
activities of Turkish Hezbollah.”

Familial environments and activities created awareness about the group. One
participant indicated that group members were gathering in his parent's house for
religious chats. He was listening to them and wanted to join Turkish Hezbollah.

Behavioral changes of family members through participation in Turkish
Hezbollah caused others in the same family to join Turkish Hezbollah.

“My elder brother was a very sinful person. After his participation in

Turkish Hezbollah his behaviors and attitudes positively changed; he was

praying, he was respectful to our family members, and he was very patient in

each negative events. Secrecy in his behaviors was very admiring. I was
influenced from him, and wanted to be part of the group that caused these
changes.”

Relatives: Close relatives’ active membership in or sympathy for Turkish

Hezbollah also motivated their decisions to participate. “My uncle invited me to join

Turkish Hezbollah and I could not reject him.”

241

Friends: Friendship ties were also an important motivating factor for some
participants. Friends from school who supported Turkish Hezbollah became models for
them to imitate, and fiiends from daily life generated motivation through the standard
promotional activities. "My fiiend who was the member of the group was frequently
inviting me to his house. He and his mother were promoting the group by making
religious conversations. While I was at military service, they were sending me letters and
postcards with religious contents..."

Village: Turkish Hezbollah conducts promotional activities in villages where
villagers may be less educated and easier to convince for participation than in larger,
more sophisticated towns. In the villages where everybody knows each other and there
are social pressures for conformity, people are apt to be influenced from each other.
"When I saw that all of my fiiends participated in this congregation, I also decided to join
Turkish Hezbollah as they did.”

6. Other Motivational Factors

The remaining motivational factors not covered under the previously discussed
categories are classified as other factors. Although the statements made by individuals in
the recruitment documents are not rich in content, the concept and ideas are important in
terms understanding the existence and constitution of other possible factors that
motivated participation in terrorist organizations.

The factors that are not classified in the five (5) primary categories of motivations
include respect, harmony between group members, revenge, and desire for involvement
in violent activities. Compared to DHKP/C, Turkish Hezbollah participants’ documents

included more diverse other factors and are relatively rich in their content.

242

DHKP/C

Despite the lack of detailed discussion in the documents, some of the reported
reasons for participation in DHKP/C include contribution to the brotherhood of the
Turkish people, discipline within the group, dedication to revolution, and harmony
among the group members. Other members indicated that respect played a role in their
motivation, both in terms of respectful and helpful behaviors of the group’s members as
well as respect in the group that women would not normally receive in the community.
"One of the biggest factors that pulled me into the revolutionary movement was the
respect that is showed to women in the movement."

One member cited a desire for revenge from representatives of the existing
[political and social] system. Another expressed a desire to be involved in assassinations
of political figures he identified as enemies of the people: "I would like to involve in
some punishment activities. I want to serve as a warrior; I want to be guerilla. I am ready
to do whatever the party charges me to do. I can not wait anymore in such a system
without doing nothing."

Finally, one participant noted that he initially joined for adventure and
excitement, but was later influenced by the behaviors and ideals of the DHKP/C members
whom he met.

Turkish Hezbollah

The rate of other factors as a motivator for Turkish Hezbollah members is almost
three (3) times that of those given by DHKP/C members. The range of other factors is

more varied and extensive for members of this group.

243

Revenge and Protection: Revenge was a substantial motivation for a few
members of Turkish Hezbollah, especially those whose family members had been killed
by the PKK. "After my brother was martyred, my trust for Turkish Hezbollah
strengthened, and I felt rancor and hatred against the blasphemous and unbelievers [the
PKK]." The regional struggle between the groups also motivated members. “I liked
Turkish Hezbollah particularly because they were against cruelty and violence of the
PKK.”

One participant learned that PKK was planning to bomb his house, and
consequently decided to join Turkish Hezbollah. An expectation of protection and
defense motivated him to take part in the group that was fighting against the organization
that was threatening him.

Dissatisfaction with the existing group: Some members of Turkish Hezbollah had
been active supporters or sympathizers of the PKK; however, after they came to believe
that the PKK was an enemy of Islam and promoted leftist ideals, some of them left PKK
and joined Turkish Hezbollah.

Armed struggle and the desire to commit a suicide attack: Other members
reported more radical and extreme expectations and desires. One explained that he joined
because he wanted to be involved in armed struggle and to commit a suicide attack. He
left other religious groups because they did not have extreme activities, and joined
Turkish Hezbollah hoping that he would be assigned to these kinds of duties. Another
wrote about his radicalization through joining Turkish Hezbollah, while others indicated

that they wanted to participate in war and jihad to make Islam more powerful.

244

Using weapons: One person who liked weapons thought he would find
opportunity to use weapons and to join armed activities through his membership. "I like
weapons. I heard members of Turkish Hezbollah talking about weapons and going to the
mountains for armed activities; these were satisfactory for me to join.”

Organizational characteristics: One member wanted to join a well-organized
religious group, and saw this opportunity in Turkish Hezbollah. Another member
reported that the strength of the group was a motivating factor for him. “Turkish
Hezbollah started to be very strong and I wanted to be in it.” Others saw Turkish
Hezbollah as an objective, serious, consistent and courageous group compared to the
groups in which they had previously been members.

Solidarity and fraternity: Solidarity and fraternity between Turkish Hezbollah
members have been influential for some others. The sincerity, maturity, fiiendly
approach and/or humble attitudes of the Turkish Hezbollah members motivated some to
join.

Youth eflect: One individual reported that he saw youths in the group and wanted
to be among them. Another noted that all the Muslims he saw in the mosque were old
people. He thought that they did not promote Islam, and he wanted to join Turkish
Hezbollah since he felt that younger people would be more likely to promote Islam.

Receiving respect: The need for respect influenced several members that did not
receive respect within their immediate environments. One stated “The Muslims [Turkish
Hezbollah members] were respecting me; other people have never respected me." In
addition to respect from Turkish Hezbollah members, receiving respect from a family

member who did not respect before provided motivation for another:

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“While I was at the Middle school, Turkish Hezbollah showed an interest
in my elder brother that led his participation in the group. Before joining
Turkish Hezbollah, my elder brother had bad habits never wanted me near
him while he was together with his friends since I was embarrassing to him
with my old clothes. However, after entering Islam [Turkish Hezbollah], my
elder brother’s attitudes have changed; he became a very good person, and
asked me to be together with him wherever he was. My elder brother
introduced me to his friends in the group. I liked them since they showed me
respect and behaved in a friendly way that I had not seen from anyone
before."

Fear of death: Turkish Hezbollah promises paradise in the other world to its
members. One member who had had a heart attack indicated that he was very close to
death, and as a result of members close interest in him and his fear of death and
punishment in the other world motivated him to join Turkish Hezbollah. Another who
cited several motivating factors also listed the fear of death: "I was influenced from the
mature and respectful behavior of the congregation’s members in the school...When I had
a surgical operation in the hospital, I felt the death very close to me. These things
influenced me to join Turkish Hezbollah."

Findings presented in this chapter address the research questions which require
qualitative analyses of the documents. The following chapter is going to provide
discussion about the results of quantitative and qualitative analyses so as to link findings

to the literature and various theoretical approaches. The discussion will be followed by

the limitations and implications of the study and suggestions for the future research.

246

CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCUSSION

The main purpose of this study is to determine similarities and differences
between the members of DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations in terms
of individual members’ background characteristics, learning related factors, and
motivational factors as reflected in documents that these participants provided to their
respective organizations. The study specifically examined the motivational factors that
promote participants to decide to join terrorist groups, and therefore, offers direct insight
into why these individual became a terrorist in these particular organizations. Three
hundred and two documents (116 for DHKP/C and 186 for Turkish Hezbollah) seized in
the course of security force operations were reviewed, coded, and analyzed based on the
unit of analysis of the individual terrorist. Quantitative analyses included chi-square and
logistic regression analyses while the qualitative aspect of the research involved
extensive analysis of the focal motivational factors described in the terrorists’ own words
in the documents.

This chapter reviews the major findings from the research, attempts to link the
results with different theories explaining deviant or criminal (terrorist) behavior,
discusses the potential policy implications of the research, identifies the limitations of the
study, and presents some suggestions for future research in the area of motivation and
participation in terrorist organizations.

1. Summary of Research Findings
Bivariate statistics revealed significant differences in the background

characteristics of individuals joining DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah. The background

247

characteristics vary significantly between the two groups in terms of gender, economic
status, education level, marital status, and also, group affiliation, active family member,
family sympathy, number of siblings, father and mother’s jobs. While men constitute
over two-thirds of DHKP/C, there is no gender variation within Turkish Hezbollah.
Reinforcing prior studies, both groups are male dominated although the left-wing group
has a reasonable proportion of female members (i.e. Smith 1994; Weinberg & Eubank,
1987)

Overall, the majority members of both groups report middle or higher economic
status. Turkish Hezbollah members have better economic status than those of DHKP/C;
this difference is statistically significant. This finding challenges the common and
apparently inaccurate belief that economic problems promote individual participation in
terrorist organizations.

DHKP/C participants are significantly more educated than Turkish Hezbollah
participants. Almost one-third of DHKP/C members have some college education
compared with only seven percent of Turkish Hezbollah members. This finding supports
the literature regarding educational backgrounds of left wing groups (i.e. Weinberg &
Eubank, 1987; Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003). In this sample, over half of Turkish
Hezbollah members have only middle school or lower education; this finding contradicts
the most notable research finding on another Islamic extremist group (Sageman, 2004); in
Sageman’s sample, 83 percent of participants had finished high school and a majority
(over 60%) attended some college. This finding suggests variation in the educational

background across religiously motivated terrorist organizations.

248

There are no significant job status differences between the two groups, although
they are comprised of almost the same percentage of students and working members.
However, the participation of the unemployed in DHKP/C is almost double the rate for
Turkish Hezbollah (13.8% and 7.1%, respectively). In contrast to much of the literature
(i.e. Caglar, 2006) and popular (mis) conceptions, unemployment does not appear to be
an important factor in the decision to participate in a terrorist organization.

The marriage rate of Turkish Hezbollah members is almost five times greater than
DHKP/C’s rate (34.1% and 6.9%, respectively). Like other extremist Islamic religious
groups (i.e. Sageman, 2004) Turkish Hezbollah appear to value marriage contrary to
many leftist groups that see marriage as an obstacle in to recruiting new revolutionaries
(i.e. Cantekin 2006; Hudson, 1999; Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003).

The range of onset participation ages for Turkish Hezbollah (9 to 45) is much
broader than DHKP/C (14 to 28), although the average age of onset is very close for both
groups (19.36 and 19.17, respectively). In other words, Turkish Hezbollah does not
appear to restrict recruitment to certain ages, whereas DHKP/C seems to target those in
the 14-25 age range as almost all members (97.4%) joined at these ages. Prior studies
conducted on Turkish terrorist groups found that terrorists regardless of ideology are
usually between the ages of 14-25 or 15-2551 (Alkan, 2002; Alkan & Citak, 2006;
Cantekin, 2006). This study reinforces those findings as the majority of the participants
of both terrorist groups are in the 14-25 age-group. Almost three quarters (73.9%) of

Turkish Hezbollah joined between ages 14-25.

 

51 In almost all studies this age group reflects the ages at the time of data collection (i.e. interview); it
does not reflect the age of onset.

249

Table 18. Summary of research findings: Background characteristics

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Variables Key findings
0 Significant differences between groups
Gender 0 Both groups are male dominated
o DHKP/C has a reasonable proportion of female members
0 No gender variation in TH
0 Significant differences between groups
Economic o Majority of the people in both groups have modest economic status
condition 0 TH has more members with high economic status than DHKP
o DHKP/C has more members with low economic status than TH
Education 0 Significant differences between groups
0 DHKP/C members are more educated than TH members
Job status 0 No significant differences between groups
0 Unemployed people in DHKP/C is almost double that in TH
. 0 Significant differences between groups
Marital status 0 The marriage rate of TH members is five times greater than of DHKP/C
Age of onset 0 Average age of onset is very close (19.36 for TH, 19.17 for DHKP/C)
0 Range of ages for TH (9 to 45) is broader than DHKP/C (14 to 28)
. . 0 Si nificant differences between on 5
Group affiliation o DHKP/C has more members witfirprilbr illegal group affiliation than TH
Number of 0 Significant differences between groups .
siblings o On average, TH members have more srblrngs (7.23) than DHKP/C
members (4.83)
Any (prior) 0 No significant differences between groups . .
detention '0 Majority in both of the groups do not have any prior detention before
partrcrpatron
. . 0 Significant differences between groups
33;?me 0 TH members reported family member participation more than DHKP/C
members do.
0 Significant differences between groups
Family sympathy o More TH members reported at least one sympathetic family member
compared to DHKP/C
0 Significant differences between groups
Father’s job 0 DHKP/C members have more retired, and farmer fathers; TH has more
unemployed, government official, and deceased fathers
Mother’sjob 0 Significant differences between groups
0 Overall, 80% of mothers are housewife (TH has more than DHKP/C)

 

 

Bivariate statistics of all other background characteristics revealed significant
differences between two groups. The only non-significant variable was “any (prior)
detention”. The majority of the participants in each group (80.1% for Turkish Hezbollah
and 85.3% for DHKP/C) reported no prior experiences with detention by security forces

in advance of their participation. DHKP/C had significantly more members with prior

250

illegal group affiliation than Turkish Hezbollah (20.7% vs. 9.7%). In terms of affiliation
with legal groups, DHKP/C participants usually reported the legal organizations with ties
to DHKP/C (i.e. associations, culture centers), while Turkish Hezbollah members usually
reported affiliations with religious organizations (i.e., tariqat, religious congregations or
political parties) that were not associated with Turkish Hezbollah. DHKP/C has more
members with prior illegal group affiliation than Turkish Hezbollah (20.7% vs. 9.7%).

Both of the groups’ members reported a considerable number of family members
that were active in or sympathetic to the sample’s terrorist organization. Nevertheless,
there were statistically significant differences between two groups. Around 60 percent of
Turkish Hezbollah members reported family member participation compared with about
one-third of DHKP/C. Similarly, over two-thirds of Turkish Hezbollah members reported
having at least one family member sympathetic to the cause compared to only about half
of DHKP/C members. Turkish Hezbollah members reported significantly more siblings
(7.23) than DHKP/C members (4.83). Family size might influence participation in a
number of ways. More children might diminish parental control or/and the parents’
ability to meet the basic needs of their children. Terrorist organizations utilize such
situations by promising or providing better conditions to meet these needs; this might
result in affinity to or participation in a particular terrorist group. It is also possible that in
a large family, more children might be influenced by parents or siblings who are
sympathetic to or participants in terrorist groups.

Examination of the documents revealed four information sources regarding how
the participant learned about the terrorist organization in which they participated

(learning sources): friend/s, kinship, organizational activities, and organizational

251

propaganda (Table 19). These variables were derived from answers to “How did you
learn about the group?”: Bivariate analyses revealed significant differences between
DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah for only two of these learning-related variables:
propaganda, and organizational activities. Organizational activities were the most
frequently reported means of learning about the groups. Almost two-thirds of DHKP/C
members and just over half of Turkish Hezbollah members reported these activities as
their main source of information about the organization they joined. While organizational
activities are important in terms of informing people about the groups, exposure to these
activities does not automatically insure motivation or incentive for people to join these
types of groups. Compared to other sources of information, a relatively a small number
of individuals (14%) reported propaganda as their main source for learning about the
group in which they participated. Over one-quarter of DHKP/C members reported
propaganda compared to less than seven percent of Turkish Hezbollah members.
Publications were the most frequently reported propaganda source for both groups

followed by the media.

Table 19. Summary of research findings: Learning related factors

 

 

Variables Key findings
0 No significant differences between groups
F riend/s 0 Around one-third of the sample in each group learned about the group
theyjoined through friends

 

o No significant differences between groups
0 Slightly less than a third of the sample in each group learned about the

 

 

KmShlp group they joined through kinship
0 Parents for TH, and relatives for DHKP/C play more important roles.
Organizational 0 Significant differences between groups
activities 0 More DHKP/C members referred organizational activities as a learning
source about the groupthan TH members (65.8% vs. 52.2%)
0 Significant differences between groups
Propaganda o More DHKP/C members referred propaganda as a leaning source about

the group than TH members (26.3% vs. 6.5%)
0 Publications are the most frequent learning source for both groups

 

 

 

 

252

There were no significant differences between two groups for the variables of
fiiend/s and kinship. However, almost one-third of the sample in each terrorist group
learned about the group they ultimately joined through a fiiend or fiiends. Just under a
third of Turkish Hezbollah members reported learning about the organization through
kinship while just over one quarter of DHKP/C members did. Within the kinship
categories (parent, sibling, relative, and spouse), parents played a more important role for
Turkish Hezbollah members while relatives (outside the nuclear family) played a more
important role for DHKP/C members.

Motivation is a necessary condition for participation in a terrorist organization.
Despite the importance of motivational factors in the participation process, existing
studies have not successfully or satisfactorily defined what constitutes motivation
(Hudson, 1999; Horgan, 2003a). As a result of the document analysis, six motivational
factors were identified: environmental factors (family, fiiend, relative, neighbor, etc.),
ideological/political closeness, need to belong to a group, negative life events,
tactics/propaganda of terrorists, and other factors. Bivariate analyses revealed statistically
significant differences between two groups for all of the motivational factors except for
the need to belong to a group.

Need to belong to a group was the weakest among the reported motivators for
each groups with the overall percentage of 11.3. Members of each group also reported a
variety of factors contributing to the need to belong to a group, such as being bored or
becoming radicalized as reasons that they wished to join their respective groups.

DHKP/C members reported isolation and ostracism, loneliness, the need to share

253

ideology and act together. In contrast, Turkish Hezbollah members reported the desire to

have a more acceptable and sin-free life (especially for those who identified themselves

as sinful, but wanted to reform), tedium and monotony in their lives, and participation in

a religious group to learn tenets of the religion. All of these diverse factors contributed to

the need to join a group, and motivated participants to join their respective organizations.

Table 20. Summary of research findings: Motivational factors

 

 

 

political closeness

Variables Key findings
. 0 Significant differences between groups
gtzér‘znmental More DHKP/C members reported environmental factors than TH
members (41.7% vs. 29%)
Ideological 0 Significant differences between groups

0 More DHKP/C members reported ideological/political closeness than TH

members (57.4% vs. 43%)

 

Need to belong to a
group

0 No significant differences between groups
0 The weakest among the reported motivators for both groups (9.6% for

DHKP/C, 12.4% for TH)

 

Negative life
events

0 Significant differences between groups
0 More DHKP/C members reported negative life events than TH members

(33% vs. 24.2%)

Dissatisfaction/unhappiness in life is the most significant negative life
event for TH

Discrimination/inequality, family pressures/problems, and exorbitances

of governing powers are the most significant negative life event for
DHKP/C

 

Tactics/propaganda
of terrorists

- Significant differences between groups
0 More DHKP/C members reported tactics/propaganda of terrorists than

TH members (60% vs. 44.6%)

 

Other factors

 

 

0 Significant differences between groups
0 More TH members reported tactics/propaganda of terrorists than

DHKP/C members (20.4% vs. 12.2%)

 

The influence of environmental factors is exercised through people in intimate

and familiar environments such as friends, family members (parents, siblings), relatives,

and/or neighbors that are sympathizers or members of the terrorist groups. In these

environments, the political orientation of participants’ home villages and towns seemed

an important contributor to environmental motivators. These factors exerted more

254

 

influence on DHKP/C members (41.7%) than members of Turkish Hezbollah (29%). In
many instances, document analyses revealed the influence of multiple environmental
factors on the same individual. Consequently, environmental factors could not be
quantitatively classified.

Ideologically, the Marxist-Leninist focus of DHKP/C motivated more members
than the religious ideology of Turkish Hezbollah. Well over half (57.4%) of DHKP/C
members reported ideological/political closeness as a reason of their motivation
compared with only 43 percent of Turkish Hezbollah members. It appeared that there
were some contextual, conceptual, and semantic differences between the declarations of
motivations for members in each of the distinctive terrorist groups. DHKP/C members
generally cited affinity to leftist ideology, organizational strategies and policies, the
potential for revolutionary social change, and DHKP/C as the best choice among
alternative organizations. Turkish Hezbollah members’ affinity was attributed to
dissatisfaction with other religious groups, the search for a more religious life, the
religious characteristics of the group, and the group’s ability to cultivate sympathy and
affinity, as well as its standing as the best alternative.

The tactics and propaganda of the organization was the most frequently cited
motivational factor (50.5%). More DHKP/C members (60%) report this motivation than
Turkish Hezbollah members (44.6%). The documents revealed differences between the
groups’ use of tactics and propaganda. Both groups used home and village visits to
promote the group and engender public awareness. DHKP/C used publications, female
members (to target potential male members), organized mass activities, legal

structures/organization (i.e. associations, culture centers), commemoration ceremonies,

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and prison visits. The Turkish Hezbollah focused on religiously based activities,
including home based chats and activities in mosques and bookstores.

Negative life events were reported as motivating factors for about one third of
DHKP/C members compared to about one-quarter of Turkish Hezbollah participants
(p<.10). Dissatisfaction/unhappiness with life was the most significant negative life event
reported by Turkish Hezbollah participants (64.5%), while discrimination/inequality,
family pressures/problems, exorbitances of governing powers, and the death of family
members/fiiends by security forces were the most significant negative life events
reported by DHKP/C participants. Although the killing of family members/ friends was a
substantial negative life event for several Turkish Hezbollah participants, unlike the
DHKP/C members, the murderers of Turkish Hezbollah relations and friends was another
terrorist organization, the PKK, rather than security forces.

Other factors not classified in the previous motivation categories were also
reported in the documents. One fifth of Turkish Hezbollah members indicated other
motivating factors compared with only twelve percent of DHKP/C members. Turkish
Hezbollah participant documents included a more diverse listing of other factors than
DHKP/C documents. Turkish Hezbollah members’ reports included; revenge, protection,
armed struggle, desire to commit a suicide attack, using weapons, strength of the group,
solidarity and fraternity, receiving respect, fear of death, sincerity, maturity, and friendly
approach of the members. DHKP/C members reported discipline within the group,
harmony among the group members, the desire to be involved in assassinations of

political figures, and adventure and excitement.

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Table 21. Summary of research findings: Gender issues

 

Backgrounds

Key findings

 

Economic condition

No significant differences

 

Education

No significant differences

 

Job status

0 Significant differences between male and female participants
0 Females are significantly more likely to be unemployed

 

Marital status

0 No significant differences; however, females are more likely to be

married

 

Age of onset

Average age of onset is almost identical (19.29 for females, 19.12
for males)

 

 

0 Almost same age range: 14 to 28 for females, 14 to 27 for males
Any detention 0 Significant differences between male and female participants

0 Females have significantly lower prior detention rates
Group affiliation 0 No significant differences; however, males are more likely to be

affiliated with illegfigroups

 

 

Learning related variables

Key findings

 

Friend/s

No significant differences

 

Kinship

0 Significant differences between male and female participants
0 Females are more likely to learn through kinship

 

Organizational activities

No significant differences

 

Propaganda

No significant differences

 

Motivational factors

Key findings

 

Environmental factors

No significant differences

 

Ideological political
closeness

0 Significant differences between male and female participants
0 Males are more likely to be motivated by this factor

 

 

 

 

 

 

Need to belong to a group 0 No significant differences
Negative life events 0 No significant differences
Tactics/propaganda of o No significant differences
terrorists

Other factors 0 No significant differences

 

In terms of gender, bivariate analyses revealed only two statistically significant

differences in terms of background characteristics: prior detention experiences and

employment status. Women in DHKP/C, as compared to men, were more likely to be

unemployed and less likely to have prior detention prior to their participation. The

average age of onset was almost identical for genders, 19.29 for females and 19.12 for

males. And while not statistically significant, men appeared to be more likely to be

affiliated with illegal groups (25.6%) than women (10.5%). This finding supports other

research on the role of gender in criminal groups/activities. There were statistically

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significant differences between females and males regarding kinship as a learning source
(39.5% and 21.1%, respectively) and ideological/political closeness as a motivation
(42.1% and 64.9%, respectively).

A review of the bivariate logistic regression results for the relationship between
selected background characteristics and each motivational factor follows. Men were more
likely to join DHKP/C than women under the motivation of ideological/political
closeness; the gender related bivariate analysis (Table 12) also supports this finding.
Environmental factors were more influential on younger individuals than older
participants for both groups. Older DHKP/C members are significantly more likely to
indicate motivations by need to belong to a group and negative life events. For members
of Turkish Hezbollah, environmental factors are more influential on less educated
participants than their more educated counterparts. However, it appears that more
education increases the motivation of need to belong to a group. This finding might be
attributed to characteristics of individuals in high school and university who seek group
affiliation. DHKP/C members with university education are significantly more likely to
be motivated by the tactics and propaganda of terrorist organizations. This finding is
unsurprising given that DHKP/C conducts extensive activities in universities to generate
recruits.

Married Turkish Hezbollah members were less likely to be influenced by their
environments than single male members. Conversely, married DHKP/C members
(compared to singles) were significantly more likely to be motivated by negative life
events. The document analysis and bivariate analyses suggested that this is especially the

case for unhappily married female DHKP/C members.

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Logistic regression was used to investigate which variables (background,
learning, and motivational) discriminated between participation in Turkish Hezbollah and
DHKP/C. The Logistic regression model for background characteristics (see Table 14)
revealed statistically significant differences between two groups for almost all variables.
Participants of Turkish Hezbollah were significantly more likely to be married, students,
and have moderate or high economic conditions, but less likely to have high school, or
post high school education than DHKP/C participants. Further, it was significantly more
likely that Turkish Hezbollah members had more siblings and prior detention records
than DHKP/C members, but were less likely to be affiliated with legal or illegal groups.

The logistic regression model for learning related variables (see Table 15)
revealed statistically significant differences for three out of four learning variables:
propaganda, organizational activities, and friends. DHKP/C participants were
significantly more likely to learn through these information sources than Turkish
Hezbollah participants. There is no significant difference between two groups in terms of
learning through kinship.

The logistic regression model for motivational factors (see Table 16) revealed
statistically significant differences between the groups for four motivational factors:
environmental factors, ideological/political closeness, negative life events, and
tactics/propaganda of terrorists. DHKP/C members were more likely to report being
motivated by each of these factors than Turkish Hezbollah participants. There were no
significant differences between the two groups in terms of motivations related to the need

to belong to a group or the other factors category.

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The model that included background characteristics and learning related variables
was almost identical to the full model. In the full model, the findings on background
characteristics almost mirrored those in the background characteristics (only) model
except for high school education and high economic condition, which were not
significant in the full model. Likewise, findings regarding learning related variables were
the same for both the learning related (only) model and in the full model (see Table 17).

There were slight changes in terms of motivational factors between the
motivational factor (only) model and the full model. Turkish Hezbollah participants were
significantly less likely to be motivated due to environmental factors, ideological/political
closeness, and negative life events, and more likely be motivated by their need to belong
to a group than DHKP/C participants. There was no statistically significant difference
between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah in terms of being motivated by tactics and
propaganda or other motivational factors.

Overall, there are substantial and statistically significant differences between
these two distinctive terrorist groups within Turkey in terms back ground characteristics,
learning sources about the groups, and factors that motivate individuals to join DHKP/C
and Turkish Hezbollah.

2. Theoretical Implications

The study of terrorism lacks adequate theories to guide research on motivation to

participate in terrorist organizations (Ferrucati, 1982; Duyvesteyn, 2004). Theory based

studies of terrorism are profoundly informed by other academic disciplines. The

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following discussion will link selected findings of this research to different theoretical
explanations for aspects of participation in terrorist organizations.52

Various findings of this research are consistent with developmental and life
course perspectives. Participation in a terrorist organization involves a process that
includes some specific background formations, learning dynamics, and motivations.
During this process, individuals are exposed to information about the terrorist group
through various sources such as family, friend, relative, organizational activities and
propaganda as well as influenced by different factors (i.e. negative life events, Y
environmental factors) that contribute to the motivation to join the terrorist group. The
consequent decision to join is arguably a turning point that changes the direction and flow
of an individuals’ life.

Two main concepts comprise the analysis of life-course dynamics: trajectories
and transitions. Trajectories are pathways such as schooling (where individuals meet
terrorist groups’ members) or marriage (with a member of terrorist group), and
transitions are important life events, such as initiation into a (terrorist) group, friendships
(with members of a terrorist group), illegal activities (with terrorists), or imprisonment
(due to illegal activities with terrorist groups). Each of these types of trajectories and
transitions were influential in many of the cases examined for this research. Many of the
findings are consistent with Thomberry et al.’s (2003) seminal study of gang
participation in which the authors contend that the life course perspective not only
includes social and psychological forces that develop in early childhood and facilitate

participation in gang groups, but also contains “unfolding relationships and

 

52 This discussion will not include detailed definition or explanation of the theories’ basic premises or
propositions since they were already discussed in the chapter three.

261

developmental influences (p. 7).” They also note that factors that lead to
participation/membership in gang groups might be social structural positions, family
relationships, neighborhood contexts, schools, peers, or individual'characteristics; ahnost
all of these identified factors emerged as significant in this research. Moreover, given that
overwhelming majority of the group members in this sample (97.4% for DHKP/C and
73.9% for Turkish Hezbollah) joined their respective groups between the ages of 14-25, it
is reasonable to conclude that the life-course approach directly relates to the universal
criminological finding that young men are particularly at risk for deviance and
criminality.

The majority of the study’s results also support the risk factors model which
emphasizes individuals’ vulnerability to negative developmental outcomes, while
contending that various overlapping risk factors in a person’s background might lead to
participation in illegal activities (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1999; Hill, Howell, Hawkins &
Battin, 1999; Sameroff et al., 1993; Small & Luster, 1994; Thomberry et al., 2003). Risk
factors identified in this research include multiple environmental factors: intimate and
familiar environments with friend and family sympathizers or members; neighborhoods,
villages, or towns where ideologically appealing (revolutionary/leftist or religious) ideas
and activities are common; schools where leftist or religious groups carry out recruitment
activities; peer groups affiliated with terrorist groups; and individual characteristics and
experiences such as negative life events and the need to belong to a group as well as
lesser parental control (perhaps due to family size).

That majority of the people in both of the groups (85.3% for DHKP/C and 80.1%

for Turkish Hezbollah) reported no prior detention before participation and that

262

documents explain how individual members were radicalized after they joined, it can be
inferred that these findings mostly support the social facilitation model (rather than
selection, and enhancement models) which posits that individuals become involved in
criminal/terrorist activities after joining violent/terrorist groups. Group dynamics and
normative structures of the terrorist groups appear to facilitate involvement in
delinquency. This aspect of this research also supports socialization theories of
diflkrential association or social learning given that terrorist groups are apparently quite
effective in terms of communicating definitions, teaching organizational ideology,
strategy, and terrorist activities ranging from minor property to violent crimes, and
establishing reward systems.

There is little support in this research for anomie, institutional anomie and
economic strain theories, because the participants fiom neither group emphasized
financial issues as a significant factor in their participations (Akers, 2000; Cullen &
Agnew, 1999; Title & Meier, 1990). In fact, the majority of group members in Turkish
Hezbollah (85.3%) and DHKP/C (65.8%) reported middle or better economic status and
only about fourteen percent of DHKP/C members and seven percent of Turkish
Hezbollah participants reported unemployment. Additionally, qualitative analyses
revealed only a few individuals stressed economic problems. Therefore, in this research,
anomie was not an important factor in the decision to participate in a terrorist
organization.

There is, however, considerable support for general strain theory which looks
beyond solely economic strain to multiple sources; sees crime as an adaptation to

stressful conditions, and suggests that strain results from negative relationships with

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others (Agnew, 1992, 1999; see Chapter 3 for detailed explanation). In this context, most
of the motivational factors revealed in the document analyses might be considered as
sources of strain. For instance, around ten percent of the participants in each group cited
the need to belong to a group which included the reasons of being bored, isolation and
ostracism, loneliness, and having a more acceptable and sin-fiee life (for Turkish
Hezbollah participants). These factors could be understood as sources of strain since
positively valued goals were not being met through legal groups and activities. About
one-third of DHKP/C and one-quarter of Turkish Hezbollah participants reported
negative life events as their motivational factor. The death of a family member or friends
by security forces (usually for DHKP/C) or rival terrorist groups (for Turkish Hezbollah),
or social and cultural restrictions on women that prevented their freedom to conduct their
life activities in the desired manner seem to generate strain due to removal of positively
valued stimuli. Abuses and exorbitances by governing powers, discrimination and
inequality are other reported motivational factors that could be conceptualized as strain or
stress, since these behaviors presented negatively valued stimuli. Consequently, these
strains seem to have motivated some individuals to participate in both groups to address
the inadequate conditions that caused strain and stress.

A major finding of this research seems to contradict the basic premise of control
theories, especially Hirschi’s social bonding theory, which posits that it does not matter
to whom one is attached; even attachment to delinquent peers, friends or deviant parents
reduces the possibility of criminality. In this research, nearly 60 percent of Turkish
Hezbollah and 35 percent of DHKP members reported family member participation in the

respective groups; over two-thirds of Turkish Hezbollah and half of DHKP/C members

264

reported at least one sympathetic family member; and nearly 42 percent of DHKP/C 29
percent of Turkish Hezbollah members reported environmental factors as their
motivation. These findings suggest that attachment to peers or parents affiliated with
terrorist groups might promote participation in terrorist groups as well as criminality. In
other words, attachment to peers or parents might lead to non-criminal conformity only
when peers and parents are not affiliated with terrorist groups. Presumably the members
of these groups believe that their activities and organizations are fighting against
oppression and for social justice and that illegal tactics may be necessary and justified for
victory; crime in this context is tangential rather than instrumental, and Hirschi’s
theoretical may not be applicable to the “crime” of terrorism. This is particularly relevant
in the context of terrorism that are based on conflicting values as opposed to control
theory’s assumption of consensus over norms and values.

However, some findings from this research seem to support some premises of
social control theory. Some of the documents suggested that the loss of social ties and
social control seemed to facilitate participation in terrorist groups. The documents
revealed that terrorist groups, especially the left wing group, targeted and recruited young
people who left traditional communities and moved to urban centers in order to attend
universities or find jobs53 (see page 114-115 for detailed discussion on this issue).
Furthermore, social control theory suggests that supervision is important in terms of

(prevention of) involvement in delinquency. A lower rate of participation by women in

 

53 One DHKP/C woman explicates this pressure: “...When I passed the university entry exams my
father did not want me to stay at the dormitory, so he rented a house where one of my parents would stay
with me in order to ensure more control over me. In the second semester of the first year, they allowed me
to have a female roommate because of the high rent. When they believed that my roommate was a
trustworthy person, they did not stay with me anymore." Her roommate was a DHKP/C member. After her
parents left, her roommate’s recruitment strategies and tactics led her to participate in the group.

265

terrorist groups might be attributable to more extensive social control exercised over the
Turkish girls by their families as compared to boys. In some instances, parents affiliated
with terrorist groups did not want their daughters to be involved in terrorist activities
while they did not interfere with their sons’ participation. Perhaps contradictorily, several
female DHKP/C participants cited excessive familial pressure and control as a motivation
to join (to escape that pressure).

Reckless’ containment theory regarding “pushes” and “pulls” on behaviors
receives support from many of the findings of this study (Akers, 2000). As described in
this research, “pushes” that lead to participation are negative life events (i.e.
discrimination and inequality, family pressures/problems, exorbitances of governing
powers, or the killing of family members/fiiends by security forces) and some reasons
promoting the need to belong to a group (i.e., being bored, isolation and ostracism,
loneliness). “Pulls” could easily be construed as other reasons for needing to belong to a
group (i.e. desire to be radicalized in/with a group, need to share ideology and act
together [for both groups], as well as the wish to lead a more acceptable and sin-free life
[for Turkish Hezbollah]); ideological/political closeness; some of the activities of the
group; environmental factors such as having a friend or a family member in the group, or
other factors such as involving in armed activities.

Participation is a process that involves learning. As discussed in the quantitative
aspects of the research analysis, individuals learn about the groups they joined through
various sources such as fiiend, kin, organizational propaganda and/or organizational
activities. Even with enough motivation to be a radical or extremist, without information

about a suitable group that would meet his/her needs and expectancies, there is no way

266

that a potential participant would be able join. Learning dynamics are important at the
early phases of the participation process, they become much more effective and
influential once individuals become involved in legal or illegal activities with terrorist
group recruiters or other members.54

Some of the findings can be firmly linked to Sutherland ’s Differential Association
Theory, particularly the sixth and seventh propositions (regarding others’ definitions
favorable to criminal behavior, and that frequent exposure over longer periods to law
violating behaviors generates priority over law abiding orientations) (Akers, 2000;
Sutherland & Cressey, 1999). Since DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members reported
learning about their respective groups from their fiiends, through kinship, terrorist
activities and terrorist propaganda, their exposure to these sources and groups influenced
their behaviors. Based on the statements found in the documents, it can be inferred that
those with active or sympathetic family members, relatives, or friends were exposed to
the favorable definitions more frequently, intensively, and over longer periods.

Some findings directly related to Akers ’ learning theory. His “definitions”
concept might explain the influence of families, friends, relatives as well as
organizational propaganda and activities on an individuals’ perception and decision
regarding the morality of being a terrorist, i.e., as good (positive definition), at least
justified (neutralizing definition), or undesirable (negative definition). Akers’ concept of

“Differential reinforcement” also offers insight into some of the findings.55 Motivations

 

54 This is not the main research topic of this study. This study focuses on early phases of the
participation/radicalization process. Advanced levels of the radicalization process might involve learning
dynamics as suggested in Sutherland’s differential association theory is an excellent focus for additional
research on the decision to join and actively participate in terrorist organizations.

55 Differential reinforcement might be defined as a balance of anticipated or actual rewards and
punishments (Akers, 2000). Rational choice theory has a similar content. Participation in a terrorist group

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by “need to belong to a group” and “ideological/political closeness” could be classified
under reward/positive reinforcements while motivations by “negative life events” (e.g.,
exorbitances of governing powers, inequality, discrimination, and family pressure) could
be classified under avoidance of punishment/negative reinforcement. For example,
joining DHKP/C represented a kind of reward for some individuals because they had felt
an affinity for DHKP/C since childhood; they had dreamed of become a member.
Similarly, feeling alone, ostracized, and bored and joining either DHKP/C or Turkish
Hezbollah presented a type of reward since participation relieved them of these negative
factors. Conversely, in terms of avoidance of punishment/negative reinforcements, others
thought that if they joined DHKP/C, they would not experience (or avoid) any inequality,
discrimination, or exorbitances, and they have the opportunity to destroy an existing
oppressive system. Many Turkish Hezbollah members thought they would no longer be
unhappy or dissatisfied with the life after they joined. For both of the groups,
environmental factors, ideological/political affinity, terrorists’ tactics and propaganda
worked as reinforcing sources. Aker’s final concept, imitation, easily describes the
potential influence of all these factors in terms [of family members or fiiends, terrorist
groups’ members and propaganda, through schools, mosques, legal organizations,
villages, or neighborhoods (Akers, 2000).

Social network theory contributes to the explanation of group effect on
participation (Jansyn, 1966; Thomberry et al., 2003). Both of the groups exploit group

dynamics to motivate and induce individuals into participation. DHKP/C uses female

 

may be seen as a rational choice of an individual who expects some benefits. In this study, some of the
expected benefits are meeting the need to belong to a group, and relieving some negative life events such as
family pressure, discrimination, (especially for DHKP/C members) or unhappiness and dissatisfaction with
the life (especially for Turkish Hezbollah members).

268

members to establish friendship relations with targeted males; legal
structures/organizations to establish affinity between members and targeted individuals
through ideological chats, meetings, conferences, movies, and reading groups; folklore or
theatre groups to attract youth to activities; and ceremonies and mass activities to attract
and ensure the participation of potential members to create affinity with the group.
Turkish Hezbollah uses fiiendship relations in the schools, organized tours for group and
potential members, organized home based chats with potential and group members. Both
groups are usually acutely aware of individuals who need to belong to a group, and they
cultivate these people carefully by meeting the individuals’ needs with attention,
information, and affection fi'om group members. For both organizations, peers and
fiiends are indispensable factors for the formation of motivation through various group
activities that present opportunities for potential members and group members to interact
in a variety of settings.

Given that many individuals, especially DHKP/C participants, explain that they
joined because of inequalities, injustices, and discrimination in the system, exorbitances
of governing power, or the killing of their friends/family members (which to them is not
acceptable), these findings might be linked to both procedural justice theory and defiance
theory which basically focuses on individuals’ perception of justice (see Chapter 3 for
detailed discussion). Findings from this research might also be linked to conflict theory’s
propositions related to equality or fairness. In terms of conflict theory, terrorism may be
construed as the best alternative to address or to adjust an undesirable or oppressive
situation to make things fair and equal, or to gain equal rights or a separate state (Akers,

2000). DHKP/C aims at establishing a new system based on Marxist-Leninist ideology,

269

the basic platform of its policies, and a major draw to participants in the organization. In
terms of ideological/political closeness and negative life events (i.e. inequality, injustice,
and discrimination), the motivations and justifications of individual participants can be
directly linked to Marxist theory.

The findings of this research suggest that the decision-making process and
participation in these distinct groups relates to philosophical and social orientations.
DHKP/C members are more politically oriented and tend to express a cosmopolitan
worldview while Turkish Hezbollah is based more on a traditional (conservative) cultural
orientation. Generally, DHKP/C members are more educated, have greater group
affiliations (legal and illegal), have greater exposure to (DHKP/C) organizational
activities, and appear to be more influenced by political orientation, negative life
experiences, and environmental factors. Based on these finding it might be speculated
that DHKP/C members generally have broader life experiences and use a broader
perspective than Turkish Hezbollah members to contextualize these experiences into their
own lives. In contrast, Turkish Hezbollah members seem relatively conscribed by
environmental and cultural factors often characterized by religious orientation. Turkish
Hezbollah members value marriage, have large families and strong family ties, and see
religion as a path to happiness; participation in Turkish Hezbollah supports and reinforces
the achievement of these goals. The internal or individualistic focus of Turkish
Hezbollah in terms of individual self-improvement and benefit (to redeem past sins, to be
a good person, for revenge against PKK) is a marked contrast to DHKP/C members who
are collectively oriented towards larger social issues (equality, ending discrimination,

systemic change).

270

The findings link this research to numerous theoretical explanations for various
aspects of the decision to participate in a terrorist organization. Unfortunately, this study
was not designed or able to test all of the potentially applicable theories, but provides the
following discussion for consideration of research questions and hypotheses for future
research. Many findings for both groups offer support for developmental and life course
perspectives in that participating individuals identified different trajectories and
transitions in their own lives that were influential in terms of their own participation in
their respective terrorist groups. A variety of overlapping risk factors in their individual
backgrounds appears to have facilitated their participation in their respective groups.

Numerous motivational factors considered in this research might be conceptually
linked to the pushes and pulls explanation of Reckless’ Containment Theory. Learning
theories also deserve further consideration in studies of motivation and participation in
terrorist organizations as there is a strong learning and transmission component to many
of the motivational factors discussed in this research. Social network theory offers
potentially promising insights into the explanation of group effect on participation. This
research found little support for anomie, institutional anomie and economic strain
theories, since financial issues did not seem to be a significant factor for participation in
either group. Nevertheless, general strain theory which looks beyond solely economic
strain and considers crime as an adaptation to stressful circumstances receives
considerable support when motivational factors are conceptualized as sources of strain.
Also, contrary to social bonding theory, attachment to peers or parents affiliated with

terrorist groups seems to promote participation in terrorist groups.

271

In addition to the theoretical commonalities in motivation to participate in the
ideologically distinct terrorist organizations DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah, there are
some differences in terms of the applicability of theoretical explanations of the
participation of one group compared to the other. Given that the majority of participants
in both groups reported no prior illegal activities or detention experiences, some support
is indicated by findings for both groups for the social facilitation model. However, given
that the percentage of Turkish Hezbollah members (19.9%) who have prior detention is
bigger than DHKP members (14.7%) it could be speculated that social facilitation is more
applicable to DHKP/C (motivation to participation through group activities as opposed to
prior detention experiences) while selection model is more applicable to Turkish
Hezbollah (influence of prior detention experiences). Further, since DHKP/C participants
place more emphasis on exorbitances of governing powers, killing of their friends and
family members by security forces, inequalities, injustice, and discrimination originating
within the state system, it appears that conflict, procedural justice, and defiance theories
are more applicable to the involvement and participation of DHKP/C members than to
those in Turkish Hezbollah.

A lower rate of participation by women might be attributable to more extensive
social control over girls compared to boys. However, given that one-third of DHKP/C
participants are women and there is only one woman Turkish Hezbollah participant,
control theories appear more effective in explaining Turkish Hezbollah membership. The
majority of Turkish Hezbollah members reported family members active or sympathetic

to the group which values strong family ties and traditional roles, characterized by strict

272

religious edicts governing proper behavior and the social control (and consequent
behavioral control) of women may explain the lack of participation by women.
3. Policy Implications

The results of the research have numerous implications for security organizations,
policy makers, and scholars of terrorism and political violence by expanding the
knowledge base regarding the background characteristics, learning sources, and
motivational factors that have been presumed to affect individuals’ decision to join
terrorist organizations. The data reflect the time period in which individuals decided to
participate in terrorist groups, and the data is derived directly from these participants own
writing about their background, motivations, and sources of information about the
organizations they ultimately joined.

All terrorist organizations need new members to survive. New members keep the
terrorist groups active in the field, support and build the group dynamic, and increase the
morale and motivation of the other members. Participation by new members strengthens
organizational opposition to the government (and in some cases, other groups), and helps
to publicize and spread the organizational ideology. Therefore, one of the core strategies
of governments and security organizations should be to discourage or to prevent new
participants from joining terrorist groups. While the implementation of this strategy
requires a better understanding of ‘Why does a person become a terrorist?’ and “What
kind of factors encourage joining a terrorist groups?”, the lack of information on this
specific aspect of terrorism makes it difficult to find adequate solutions to affect behavior

changes on the individual level.

273

One of the most important findings relates to the significant differences in
background characteristics, motivational factors, and learning related sources between
participants in the two ideologically distinct groups. These differences are in gender,
economic conditions, education levels, marital status, prior group affiliations, family
participation and family sympathy, number of siblings, organizational activities and
propaganda, environmental factors, ideological/political closeness, negative life events,
tactics/propaganda of terrorists, and other factors. These differences have strong
implications for the formation of policies and prevention strategies necessary to approach
different terrorist organizations as distinct entities with very different individual member
and organizational attributes (and motivations). For example, almost one-third of
DHKP/C members have some college education compared over half of Turkish
Hezbollah members who have only middle school or lower education. Since Turkish
Hezbollah members generally have less formal education, targeted programs at the
elementary or middle school level might be effective in deferring or preventing the
participation of potential members. DHKP/C clearly targets high school and university
students (over 73% of their members reported high school or higher level education at the
time of participation), so addressing the recruitment of this leftist organization at these
educational institutions would seem to be an effective use of resources.

School and university based-interventions could take a variety of forms: training
of teachers about terrorist activities and recruiting tactics in schools; educating students in

156

schoo through courses, speakers, brochures, conferences, radio or TV programs;

identifying students targeted by groups (and providing information about the potential

 

56 The Turkish Counter Terrorism Department has developed a variety of school-based programs,
especially for students in the universities and high schools.

274

consequences of organizational participation as well as support services that family
awareness of the problem and participation in the programs, particularly for those
families not affiliated with terrorist groups). Further, given that DHKP/C uses legal
organizations like student associations or clubs, particularly in universities, the
universities must exercise more control and supervision over these activities and the
places in which they occur. Students moving from rural areas and small towns to big
cities for education need housing, and this need creates an excellent opportunity for
terrorist groups to identify potentially isolated and stressed individuals to recruit by
offering accommodations for free or at very affordable prices. Expansion of university
housing and dormitories for students could help to remove this potential avenue of access
to potential recruits. While many of these precautions might have been put into practice,
it is important to ensure the effectiveness of these practices and policies through rigorous
examination and evaluation of the programs.

A significant number participants in both groups reported family members (parent
or sibling) active in or sympathetic to their respective groups. Similarly, the analyses of
environmental factors revealed the significant influence of family, siblings, friends, and
relatives on the formation of motivation to join. Despite the importance of the “family
factor” as a facilitator for participation, this issue appears to be unaddressed in policies
and strategies designed to prevent participation in terrorism. While some programs aim to
gain support of families whose kids are in terrorists groups in order to promote desistence
(see Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003), these programs do not to consider the converse
possibility of family support, i.e., that some families allow and support their kids joining

terrorist groups and/or involve in terrorist activities. These family and environmental

275

factors should be taken into consideration in the policy making process, perhaps through
a specific focus on families (parent and siblings) with past affiliations to terrorist groups
that might be risk factors for other family members.

Almost two thirds of Turkish Hezbollah participants reported dissatisfaction or
unhappiness with the life, and thought that involvement with religious practices would
increase their satisfaction and happiness. However, they were not informed or
sophisticated enough to know whether the religious ideology and activities provided to
them was historically or morally right or wrong. A significant number of people reported
“entered to Islam” through participation in Turkish Hezbollah and equated their
participation in the organization as becoming Muslim, even calling Turkish Hezbollah
members Muslims (not Turkish Hezbollah members). The innocent and attractive
religious concepts (such as honesty, benevolence, morality, sin-free life, or heaven), the
respectful approach and sincere, friendly behaviors used to recruit new members easily
convinces religious illiterates that Turkish Hezbollah members are true Muslims,
represent Islam, and have and offer divine insight. The basic lack of knowledge about
Islam and its tenets is used very effectively by Turkish Hezbollah. Given that members
of Turkish Hezbollah control many mosques in the areas where they are active, the
potential level of threat multiplies. For these reasons, it seems imperative to provide
correct information about the religion and religious rules, especially within the regions
where Turkish Hezbollah operates. This might be achieved through officially appointed
and designated personnel such as Imams, and an increase in the number of them in the
regions where Turkish Hezbollah is active. Irnarns with formal education from state-

sponsored religious schools could be used to help distinguish authentic tenets of Islam

276

from radical and extremist interpretations used by Turkish Hezbollah and similar
extremist groups. Such an approach would firrther necessitate both government and
community activism (from religious leaders and practicing Muslims) in terms of
informing the public about the existence of such distinctions, doctrinal and practical
differences between the philosophies, and the potential negative consequences (spiritually
and civically) of adherence to fundamentalist interpretations. The lack of adequate
numbers of government assigned Imams in the mosques might make the
misrepresentation of Islam by Turkish Hezbollah quite simple, as people have no few
alternatives to seek spiritual growth and learn about Islam.

It is imperative for law enforcement officers to operate within the limits of the
law, given that a significant number of DHKP/C members reported the exorbitances of
government powers as a source of their motivation. Terrorist groups join mass protest and
demonstrations against government agencies, and they ensure participation of potential
members in these activities, some of which are organized by the groups themselves. At
these events, the groups often want security forces to use excessive force, and they will
perform outrageous and extreme criminal acts to incite security force with the goal of
exposing attendees to oppressive and illegitimate government forces. Firsthand evidence
of government excess seems to be a convincing motivation for some potential members.
Awareness of this provocative tactic can help security force commanders and officers to
avoid unnecessary clashes with demonstrators and minimize this source of facilitated
motivation.

For some members of both of the groups, being bored is a reason of their search

of a group. If there are no places or social activities that people, especially youths, could

277

spend their spare time they might be searching excitement through illegitimate ways such
as involving in illegal groups. Therefore, it is important to establish social places for the
public such as sport centers, amusement parks, theatres, and libraries. In many part of
Turkey, especially in the regions where Turkish Hezbollah is more active, there are not
adequate amount of these places.
4. Limitations

This study makes important contributions to the understanding of many aspects of
motivation for participation in terrorist organizations, but has several limitations. This
study focuses on participants in two specific terrorist organizations in Turkey, left-wing
DHKP/C and religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah. Despite the two ideological
extremes they represent, these organizations may not be typical or representative of other
separatist or terrorist groups in Turkey or elsewhere around the world. Continued studies
on these types of internal terrorist organization documents have the potential to contribute
to a much broader understanding of participation in different and different types of
terrorist organizations. However, access to these types of documents is exceptionally
limited: when they exist, they are restricted first within the organizations themselves, and
if seized, then restricted, often by confidentiality and strategic security concerns, within
official government records.

The findings of this study are based on information gleaned from seized
documents, and data for quantitative analysis and qualitative discussions were limited to
that information which existed in the documents. Since the main criterion to use a

variable was its potential comparability across groups, important variables in Turkish

278

Hezbollah documents might not exist in DHKP/C documents so they could not be used as
a basis for comparison.

The data for this research is drawn directly from the reported statements of
participants from their documents, and there is no way to gauge the accuracy of the
information provided. However, since the documents were written as applications to the
respective terrorist groups, it seems that they are likely to reflect honestly presented
information about the participants and their thoughts.

With only three hundred two documents available for analysis, the sample size is
somewhat small. Considering the difficulties in terms of availability and access to first-
hand descriptive accounts of motivations to participate in terrorist organizations, this
sample size, while perhaps not representative, is sufficiently large to identify key
differences and themes in terms of the two groups, as well as to lay the groundwork for
future studies of this type (as data becomes available). Another potential weakness of the
research related to the sample involves the convenience sampling represented by the
seized documents. Compared to random or probability-based sampling methods,
convenience sampling has many limitations. However, it is almost impossible and totally
unrealistic to expect to apply random sampling methods to studies of terrorist actors
because of secretive characteristics of these organizations and the criminal status of those
involved with them. Further, it would be impossible to define a sampling frame
(population) as there are no readily available lists of terrorists from which to randomly
select participants. For the qualitative aspect of this research, purposive (judgment)

sampling method was used: cases were selected based solely on the value and richness of

279

information contained since not all available documents included rich and detailed

information.

This research is largely exploratory, as the terrorism literature does not offer
adequate theoretical articulation to easily guide research on terrorism or provide an
adequate baseline for comparison. Most prior studies on participation have been limited
to descriptive information from a limited number of actors, and did not include variable,
coding, advanced statistical analyses, or detailed qualitative discussion.

Findings regarding motivational factors might be generalized to other terrorist
groups in each ideological category within Turkey and perhaps the rest of world.
However, generalizability might be limited given that different groups in different
countries might attract different persons with different characteristics. Characteristics of
region, countries, and the ongoing social and cultural conditions in places where terrorist
groups operate would seem to generate some variation in the background characteristics,
learning factors, and even motivations of participants in terrorist organizations. For
instance, the contrast between the present findings and those of Sageman (2004) on
global Salafi jihad suggests such variation.

5. Future Research

Although this study provides a strong foundation for similar research, it raises
several additional questions. First, to determine whether study findings for DHKP/C and
Turkish Hezbollah are generalizable to other left wing and religiously motivated groups,
the study needs to be replicated for other types of terrorist groups (including right wing,
separatist and ethnic terrorist groups) in Turkey and in a variety of countries and

contexts. Second, even though this study gives some idea about family effect on

280

participation, future research should focus specifically on more detailed and richer
information on the characteristics of family participation in terrorist groups and family
effects on an individual’s participation. Similar studies might also be conducted at the
neighborhood level to determine risk factor for participation. Third, gender differences
within and between the groups might be examined in more detailed. The lack of gender
variation in Turkish Hezbollah prevented examining the role of women in various types
of terrorist organizations.

Fourth, despite various associated difficulties, longitudinal studies and interviews
and questionnaires might be fruitfully used to firlly understand participation process.
Fifth, this study focuses on initial periods related to participation, although participation
leads to various tactics of terrorist groups to radicalize individuals and solidify their
identification with group. Examination of more advanced levels of the participation
process would generate a better understanding about entire process and dynamic of
becoming and being a terrorist. This would also provide an opportunity for extending the
life course perspective. Findings of the study suggest that most members were not
recruited because of their desire for violence. Future research could distinguish between
desisters and persisters. Sixth, the findings suggest that DHKP/C participants are more
political and collectivist in orientation and motivation as demonstrated by their more
expansive (i.e., externally oriented) and cosmopolitan world view. In contrast, Turkish
Hezbollah participants seem to be individualistic in terms of their religious, traditional
and cultural orientations and motivations. The reasons for these apparent differences
between these two terrorist groups deserve firller consideration and exploration in future

research. Finally, there is a need for more research that focuses on the dynamics at the

281

time of participation. Almost all the literature reflects findings at the time when the data
collected, but not at the time of participation. For example, information about education
levels or job status reflects the respondent’s education or job status at the time of
interview; but not the actual education level or job status at the time of onset. This
distinction is crucial: a person might be an engineer during the interview but when he
joined a group ten years earlier, he might have been a lonely and isolated student in the
university, ripe for targeting by an organization which could appeal to or exploit his
background or intellectual and social orientation through exposure to people, information,
and activities that could promote his choice to join a terrorist organization.
6. Conclusion

This study explored similarities and differences between the members of two
ideologically different terrorist organizations: Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C.
Quantitative analyses of the documents revealed statistically significant differences
between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations’ participants in terms of
background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors that led
them to participate in terrorist organizations. These significant differences reveal the
importance of approaching different terrorist organizations as distinct entities during the
formation of policies and strategies to prevent participation. The qualitative part
analyzed six motivational factors identified from seized document analyses, and revealed
insights into the various and sometimes overlapping factors that promoted the
involvement of sample members in their respective organizations.

The research and its findings make an important contribution to the understanding

of terrorist actors and organizational activities, and present numerous implications for

282

security organizations, policy makers, and scholars. The unprecedented use of
documentary data, the quantitative and qualitative analytic examination of participation
onset, and the statistical significance of many motivational, learning, and background
characteristics variables in this research address several of the major gaps in terrorism
studies, and provide practical and theoretical insight for future research on similar and

related topics.

283

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