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
PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: AN
ANALYSIS OF LEFT WING DHKP/C AND RELIGIOUSLY
MOTIVATED TURKISH HEZBOLLAH TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS

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Bilal Sevinc

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**PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF LEFT
WING DHKP/C AND RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED TURKISH HEZBOLLAH
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS**

By

Bilal Sevinc

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ABSTRACT

PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF LEFT WING DHKP/C AND RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED TURKISH HEZBOLLAH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

By

Bilal Sevinc

Although terrorism is a significant social and political phenomenon, research on terrorism lacks methodological and empirical sophistication. Challenges in the availability of data and collection issues result in information gaps on terrorism related topics. This study focuses on two ideologically distinct terrorist organizations active in Turkey, the religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah and left wing DHKP/C, and investigates why and how individuals come to decisions to join these terrorist groups. In order to explicate these issues, this research examines terrorist group members' individual attributes and background characteristics, factors that help them learn about terrorist groups, and motivational factors that influence them to participate in terrorist organizations. This research also seeks to reveal similarities and differences between the members of two ideologically different terrorist organizations.

This study relies on both quantitative and qualitative content analyses methods, and analyzes 302 documents seized by Turkish Security forces from Turkish Hezbollah (186) and DHKP/C (116) terrorist organizations' cells. Quantitative analyses revealed statistically significant differences between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations' participants in terms of background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors, and confirm the importance of approaching different types of terrorist organizations as distinct entities in terms of the development of policies

and strategies to prevent participation. Qualitative analysis focused on motivational factors and revealed insights into the various, and sometimes multiple, overlapping factors, that promoted the involvement of sample members in their respective organizations.

This study makes an important contribution to the understanding of terrorist actors and organizational activities, and presents numerous implications for security organizations, policy makers, and scholars. It also identifies several of the major gaps in terrorism studies and provides practical and theoretical insight for future research on similar and related topics in terrorism studies.

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**Dedicated to my wife Hanife, my sons Celal and Suha, and my daughter Julide,
diligent and heroic members of Turkish National Police, and
victims of terrorism across the world...**

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a global problem that impacts all sectors of society: government, economic, security, and social. Although many countries have been afflicted by terrorism for decades, international recognition of the importance of the terrorism phenomenon increased after attacks against the United States in 2001. These attacks confirmed the power of terrorism in the international arena, and proved that the transnational dimension of today's terrorism necessitates international cooperation to address the issue.

As a global problem, terrorism threatens the peace and security systems of developed and developing countries. Many terrorist groups have clandestine structures and strong connections in different countries that facilitate their activities by supplying them with financial aid, weapons, intelligence, new members, and materials. Today, military and political leaders believe that terrorists may attempt to use chemical and biological weapons, exponentially increasing the potential levels of casualties, as well as social, physical and economic damages. The growing number of religiously motivated groups that use more lethal tactics, the increasing availability of chemical and biological materials, the globalization of terrorism, and evidence about the intentions and capabilities of terrorist organizations are some of the factors that point out potentiality in the use of these more deadly weapons (Cronin, 2003).

In some countries, the daily lives of numerous individuals involve or are dominated by terrorist organizations and activities. Regardless of the political ideology of the group or the political context of its violent activities, the operations of terrorist groups are an area of particular concern for law enforcement and policy makers. Executing acts

of terrorism requires sophisticated organizational activities, such as planning, training, financing, and recruiting. Almost all these topics require in depth scientific inquiry. Participation in terrorist groups is of particular concern. It is impossible to create adequate policies and strategies that will prevent individuals' participation in terrorist organizations without sufficient empirical understanding. A better understanding of participation in terrorist organizations has important policy and law enforcement implications. Research might reveal background risk factors that facilitate participation, such as personal attributes, experiences, or different motivations for involvement in terrorist organizations. Practically, knowledge of these factors might help to structure the design of intervention programs, to create adequate policies, and to assist security forces in identifying individuals targeted by terrorist groups for potential participation in their activities.

Terrorism is a significant social and political phenomenon, but research on terrorism lacks methodological and empirical sophistication. A strong body of empirical knowledge is growing, but many important questions have not been addressed, and significant problems still remain. Terrorism is difficult to examine for several major reasons: most of the studies are not adequate in terms of scientific inquiry, it is difficult to collect data from the population of terrorists because of the dangers of the field and secrecy concerns of terrorists, and secrecy and data-sharing policies of governments, intelligence, military, and law enforcement organizations. As a result, many researchers note that terrorism appears to be an area in which operational knowledge is based on very little research (Sageman, 2004; Crenshaw, 2003; Schmid & Jongman, 1988).

This study investigates how individual terrorists come to their decisions to join terrorist groups, and thus speaks directly to why and how an individual becomes a terrorist. In order to understand these issues more completely, this study examines the individuals' background characteristics, factors that help them learn about specific terrorist groups, and motivational factors related to their decision-making to join them. The primary data for this research were generated from documents seized from two active terrorist organizations in Turkey, the Turkish Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist group, and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), a Marxist-Leninist terrorist group.

In order to understand the similarities and differences of participation in these ideologically distinct groups, the documents captured from terrorist cells during police operations were examined. Terrorist leaders use these documents as a part of the recruitment process for potential members, making them very valuable in terms of insight into the organization. These documents are unique, since they are in the original handwriting of the potential terrorists themselves. Consequently, these hand-written internal documents should provide more reliable information about terrorist perceptions and motivations than many other terrorism data sources used in contemporary research on terrorism. Qualitative and quantitative content analyses methods were used to analyze these documents.

1. Participation in Terrorist Organizations (Statement of Problem)

Terrorism is a broad term that describes the acts of a variety of groups, which conduct violent activities all over the world in the name of revolution, liberation, nationalism, or holy war, and that want to create an unsecure environment (Howell, 2003;

Jenkins, 2003). As a method to gain political concessions and attention, terrorism has been used as a tactic by extremist and ideological groups to attack symbolic targets. These groups espouse a variety of different political ideologies, including left wing, right wing and religiously motivated ideals. Marxist-Leninist ideology has influenced many leftist groups in different countries. Their basic targets have been imperialist powers, capitalist systems, and existing governments - all seen as obstacles for establishing a state ruled under the Marxist- Leninist or Maoist ideology. The Red Army Faction in Germany, Red Brigade in Italy, Direct Action in France, the Fighting Communist Cell in Belgium, and DHKP/C in Turkey are a few examples of extreme left ideological groups (Wilkinson, 2003).

Since 1990, religiously motivated terrorists have appeared to be the biggest threat with their increasing numbers and more violent tactics across the world (Hoffman, 2006; Rabasa et al., 2006). Religiously motivated groups accounted for only three percent of all identified terrorist groups in 1980, but represented 43 percent in 1995¹ (Cronin, 2003). Religiously motivated terrorist groups also appear to be the most lethal (Hoffman, 1999, 2006). Despite decreases in the number of terrorist activities overall in the last decade, lethality per terrorist attack has increased. An apocalyptic belief system generally justifies mass casualty tactics. The September 11 attacks, the murder of 29 Muslims in Abraham's tomb, the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, and recent bombings in Istanbul and Madrid are examples of religiously motivated political violence (Cronin, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2003; Rapoport, 2004).

¹ While the number of religiously motivated groups was 2 out of 64 in 1980, there were 25 out of 58 in 1995 (Cronin, 2003).

There are no geographic constraints for the modern terrorist operations, as the activities of al-Qaeda demonstrate. In addition to killing innocent men, women, and children to achieve their ends, terrorists regardless of ideology may sacrifice themselves to die or martyr to honor their beliefs (Pape, 2005; Rabasa et al., 2006).

The main focus of this research is participation in terrorist groups. Identifying and recruiting new members is a critical issue for most terrorist organizations. New members increase the power of terrorist organizations against governments, keep terrorist groups dynamic, and increase the motivation and morale of others in the organization. New members are indispensable to publicize the ideology and carry out organizational activities. Decisions to participate in terrorist groups and terrorist acts warrant detailed analysis, but despite the obvious importance of these issues, there is little research on the participation process in terrorist groups.

This research investigates how terrorists come to decisions to join terrorist groups, and thus bears directly on why individuals, particularly those in this sample, choose to become a terrorist. In order to try to explicate these issues, this research examines terrorist group members' individual attributes and characteristics (background characteristics), factors that help them learn about terrorist groups, and motivational factors related to their decision-making during initial periods of the process of becoming a member of a terrorist organization. These particular factors are important for several reasons. First, they lie at the root of the participation process. Second, they directly or indirectly influence individuals who are making decisions about whether to join terrorist groups. Third, the success of recruitment strategies and tactics of terrorist groups (i.e.

ideological training, practical training, and establishing special friendship groups) depend on these initial factors.

Specifically, this research seeks to reveal the similarities and differences between the members of two ideologically different terrorist organizations, the Turkish Hezbollah and the DHKP/C, in terms of background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors that lead them to join these groups. There are a variety of issues relevant to participation in terrorist groups, such as utilization of group dynamics by establishing a special group for the potential member, theoretical (ideological) and practical training of persons, and ensuring him/her to involve in illegal activities, but these issues are beyond the scope of this study.

(1) Methodological challenges of research on terrorism

Flawed methodologies, unclear conceptions, superficial treatments of the subject matter, superficial reviews of the literature, making no distinction among different types of terrorism, lack of conceptual clarity, lack of generalizability, and inappropriate data to test articulated models are among the basic problems of much terrorism research (Ross, 1993).

Although terrorism is a very important phenomenon, there is not enough empirical research on this topic and there are still a lot of unanswered questions in the field. The main reason is that terrorism is not easy to study primarily because of difficulties and limitations in access to central actors and data about them. In this regard, dangers of field research involving contact with terrorists, difficulties in finding large enough samples, unwilling and uncooperative subject populations, and barriers in receiving permission from the government agencies and entities in possession of data are

some of the obstacles for collection of official and self report data. Additionally, it is very difficult to obtain official data from governmental organizations because of secrecy issues (Friedland, 1992; Silke, 2001, 2004a).

As well as data related inadequacies, there are also researcher based problems that negatively impact the quality of empirical studies in the field. Neutrality and objectivity are usually rare in the field because of the emotional side of the subject. Further, a significant amount of material is produced by researchers with no long-term interest in making a substantial contribution to the field. For example, in the 1990s, over 80 percent of articles were written by one-timer researchers (Silke, 2001, 2004a). These issues directly affect the quality of research in the area through the proliferation of low standard, low quality, and repetitive studies (Silke, 2001, 2004a). Schmid and Jongman (1988), who criticize available research on terrorism, contend that the writings of terrorism are impressionistic, superficial and pretentious, and have generalizability problems. More than 80 percent of the literature is not research based, but mostly narrative, condemnatory and prescriptive. Terrorism is one of few areas in which so much is written on the basis of a very limited amount of empirical research. Similarly, Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2006), who examined 14,006 terrorism related articles² published between 1971 and 2003, in which 4,458 were peer-reviewed, found that just three percent of the peer reviewed articles were empirical in nature. The remaining studies were either thought pieces (96%) that involved discussion of an issue theoretically, or case studies (1%) that examined a specific issue having historical perspective (Gordon, 2004).

² Approximately 54 percent of these articles were published in 2001 and 2002 right after the September 11 events.

The use of statistics in terrorism research is infrequent. Among the other social science fields, terrorism is the one in which statistics is the least used (Gordon, 2004). On this matter, Silke (2001) notes that “terrorism articles rarely incorporate statistics and when they do they are nearly five times more likely to be just descriptive statistics” (p. 10, 12). Crenshaw (2003) concludes “the absence of significant studies of relevant cross-national factors is an obstacle to identification of propitious circumstances for terrorism. There are a number of quantitative analyses of collective violence, assassination, civil strife, and crime but none of these phenomena is identical to a campaign of terrorism” (p. 93), and there is little internal agreement among these studies.

The lack of empirical approach in the field has directly influenced the creation and application of effective policies and strategies by policy makers and security forces. In other words, the fight against terrorism has not been supported by academic research, so there is not much science-based information at the foundation of existing and ongoing counter terrorism strategies and policies. As a result, responses by states to terrorism have been reactive, rather than proactive. Reactive methods that aim at finding and killing terrorists might be effective in the short term. However, in the strategic long term, the proactive perspective calls for eliminating underlying root causes of terrorism phenomenon (Elnur, 2003; Sandole, 2005); this requires having a more scientific approach to understanding different aspects of the terrorism phenomenon.

(2) Research on participation in terrorist organizations

Although there are many terrorism related topics that await scientific inquiry such as strategy, ideology, structure, counterterrorism, or force multipliers, the focus of this research is on participation in terrorist groups. The study of participation in terrorist

organizations is very important because it is impossible to create adequate policies and strategies that will destroy the roots of terrorism without understanding why people join terrorist groups and what kind of factors affect their decisions to join. Simply, a greater numbers of participants in terrorist organizations will likely increase the number of terrorist incidents. Terrorist groups always need new members to operate and to grow. Accordingly, in order to stop terrorism, it is vitally important to focus on the root factors that influence individuals to come to the decision that they must join these violent structures.

Despite the centrality of the decision to participate in terrorist group to the sustainability of terrorist activities, there has not been much research on this topic. Among terrorism-related topics, participation is one of the least studied; consequently, there are significant gaps and uncertainties in the knowledge. Some studies have examined participation on a superficial level, whereby participation is one of many foci.

Stern (2003) interviewed religiously motivated terrorist groups' members, examining the grievances that give rise to terrorism under the name of holy war. Although her main focus was not on participation, she identified and discussed some factors and motivators that facilitated participation. Sageman (2004) drew a general picture of Global Salafi Jihad using data collected from public sources, examining demographic characteristics of individuals who joined the Salafi Jihad, the different factors that motivate them to join, as well as the methods that terrorist groups use for recruitment. Smith's (1994) research featured participation in his discussion of characteristics and profiling of left and right wing terrorists, based on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) records of 173 American left and right wing terrorist groups

members in the 1980s. Similarly, Teymur (2004) descriptively examined the background characteristics of left wing DHKP/C terrorist groups active in Turkey. His study analyzed documents captured from terrorists to examine the effects of background characteristics on recruitment. A government study conducted in Turkey involved surveying left wing terrorist prisoners on their background characteristics without having specific concerns about the participation issue (Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003).

The best examples in the terrorism literature do not provide a sufficient knowledge base for understanding the participation process. None of the studies mentioned above contain detailed examination of participation, and more specifically, they do not give information about root factors that facilitate individuals' participation in terrorist groups. Their approach to participation is limited to providing information about background and demographic characteristics, but little information is provided on motivational factors. They are largely descriptive and did not analyze data using advanced statistical methods.

These and other studies of terrorism present methodological problems, especially with respect to data sources. Terrorism research relies heavily on open source data, and open sources are not always objective or correct in their presentation of the facts about terrorism (Friedland, 1992). Data gathering has not been systematic; the same primary sources have been used repeatedly (Horgan, 2004; Merari, 1991; Sageman, 2004), and some sources are of questionable value. Media-generated data are filtered by governments and corporations, and may not verify or validate the accuracy of presented information. Further, there is the possibility of bias, from unknown and unseen sources, since the media is not always neutral (Schulze, 2004; Silke, 2001).

Few researchers were able to employ interview or/and observation methods.

These methods, however, pose several challenges, particularly to generalizability due to small sample sizes and non-random sampling. Most of the terrorism-related interviews are conducted with governmental officials, not with actual terrorists (Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2001). Obtaining direct access to terrorist does not insure accurate information. Hudson (1999) concludes that terrorists are most likely to be reluctant to reveal secrets of their group, because, most probably terrorists would not trust the researcher. Interviewer bias, cultural understanding, and linguistic or interpretation differences might also affect the validity and reliability of the research results.

Like open source, interview, and observation based data, official data present shortcomings to gaining an accurate picture of participation in terrorist groups. Offense definition, measurement error, accuracy, and record-keeping procedures may all present validity problems for official data. "Official statements of the terrorists" might vary depending on the officials taking the statement, or the policies and strategies of different departments. Of course, many observed crimes are not reported to the police, and some reported crime is not recorded by the police. "Official" terrorism data suffers from the same "dark figure" problem as do official traditional crime data. These limitations can produce data that are incomplete, out of date, and incomprehensible (Hagan, 2005; Maxfield & Babbie, 2006; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991; Schwarz, 1999; Senese, 1997).

2. Significance of the Study

In the light of these and many other problems that inhibit scientific studies on terrorism and participation in terrorist groups, this study examines participation in two different terrorist groups active in Turkey in order to fill a significant gap in the scientific

literature. This study examines and compares two ideologically different terrorist organizations using original data. Additionally, both quantitative and qualitative analysis methods are used to increase the validity of the research findings.

The spread of several domestic and international terrorist groups throughout the world has been coupled with high rate of participation in terrorist groups. Despite this fact, the field of terrorism lacks comprehensive and systematic studies that examine factors leading to participation in terrorist groups. On the other hand, most of the studies combine a large number of terrorist groups into one analysis that results in ambiguous and conflicting findings (Crenshaw, 1992). In fact, terrorism is not a homogenous topic to study, and there are many variations among organizations in terms of their recruitment methods, characteristics, and motivations (Silke, 2004a). Participation related studies require analyzing terrorist organizations separately rather than seeing them as a single ideological or organizational entity that all share similar characteristics. Stern (2003) notes that “unless we understand the appeal of participating in extremist groups and the seduction of finding one’s identity in opposition to Other, we will not get far in our attempts to stop terrorism” (p. 283). Put simply, terrorist groups are different from each other in terms of size, purpose, characteristics, cause, participation process, and motivation. Despite these differences, the variety of terrorist activities and social contexts for those activities have not been examined adequately (Garrison, 2004). Revealing differences or similarities is also important for developing adequate strategies and policies.

The documents analyzed to answer the research questions for this study are likely to be more valuable than other sources of data that have been utilized in prior terrorism

research. The documents are unique in terms of their contents because they are original hand-written documents written by terrorists for the terrorist organizations in which they want to participate. They were written as part of the terrorist groups' recruitment process and thus do not contain any influence of security forces or researchers. Therefore, they benefit from being directly from the source and do not present validity and reliability problems that are likely in self report data, official data, interview data, or open source data. These documents might be considered as terrorist organizations' data banks of recruits. Since it is very difficult to find these kinds of original documents, they are important sources of information for advancing knowledge in the terrorism field.

This study contributes to the body of knowledge in terrorism in terms of original data and comparison of dimensions of participation in two terrorist organizations by approaching two different terrorist organizations as two separate entities. Accordingly, examination of these factors in both a leftist and religiously motivated terrorist group in Turkey improves understanding of various factors that facilitate participation in terrorist groups in Turkey.

Furthermore, terrorism studies lack theories regarding terrorism, and several proposed hypotheses need to be tested and confirmed or rejected (Ferracuti, 1982; Schmid & Jongman, 1988). The findings of this proposed study might also contribute to theoretical advancement in the terrorism field. Moreover, the findings may be of help to law enforcement and lawmakers, in terms of providing information to be used in developing more effective strategies and policies against terrorist formations.

Although this research will examine terrorist organizations that are active only in Turkey, findings may be generalizable to other terrorist organizations with similar

ideological situations and motivations in other countries. That is, the ideology and objectives of the Turkish Hezbollah are likely not very different from those of other religiously motivated Islamic extremists³ across the world. Thus, it might be expected to find some common grounds in the motivations of individuals who join these kinds of groups. Similarly, several leftist groups active across the world are inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology, including members of DHKP/C terrorist organization. Therefore, motivations of these individuals are likely to be similar with those in the DHKP/C terrorist organization. This study could also provide an adequate baseline for similar studies on terrorist groups in Turkey and in other countries.

3. Organization of the Study

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter Two describes the history and characteristics of terrorism in Turkey with a specific focus on Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist groups. Chapter Three explores theoretical and policy literature related to participation in terrorist organizations. Chapter Four details the methods, techniques, and analyses involved in preparing, coding, and interpretation of the data. Chapter Five features major quantitative findings of this exploratory research in terms of background characteristics of individual participants in DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations as well as learning-related factors and motivational factors that influence them to join these two ideologically distinct terrorist organizations. Chapter Six presents a review and extensive structured qualitative analytic discussion of the content of the documents and facilitates a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. Finally, Chapter Seven reviews the major findings from the research, attempts to link the

³ As Hoffman (2006, p. 239) notes, religiously motivated terrorist groups' "sole preoccupation [is] serving God through the fulfillment of their divinely ordained mission." They see members of other religions as infidels or sinners, and aim at purifying the world (Stern, 2003).

results with different theories explaining deviant or criminal (terrorist) behavior, discusses the potential policy implications of the research, identifies the limitations of the study, and presents some suggestions for future research in the area of motivation and participation in terrorist organizations.

CHAPTER TWO

LEFTIST AND RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN TURKEY

This chapter begins with a detailed discussion on the conceptualization of terrorism and the limitations inherent in the lack of a unified definition of terrorism. It then describes the basic characteristics of left wing/revolutionary terrorism and religiously motivated terrorism as an introduction to the historical context of terrorism in Turkey. The chapter concludes with an extensive description of contemporary terrorism in Turkey and details the evolution and activities of the Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C.

1. Conceptualizations and Definitions of Terrorism

The terrorism literature features extensive discussions on the definition of terrorism and presents varying conceptualizations of the term. Despite the recent proliferation of interest in terrorism, there is not yet conceptual clarity or disciplinary unity in the definition of *terrorism*. Governments, national and international organizations, including the FBI, United Nations (UN), and European Union (EU), individual researchers, policymakers, experts, and security specialists tend to define terrorism according to their own contextual interpretations and experiences (Crenshaw, 1992; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2006; Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Smith, 1994; White, 2006). For instance, while many definitions stress the “political” aspect of the term⁴ (Enders & Sandler, 2006; Hoffman, 1998, 2006; Laqueur, 1987; Turk, 1982), some

⁴ According to Hoffman (2006, p. 2) terrorism is “fundamentally and inherently political” violence in pursuit of political change. Turk (1982) defines terrorism as “an ideology or strategy justifying terrorism defined as lethal or nonlethal violence intended to deter political opposition by maximizing fear, specifically by random targeting” (p. 119). Laqueur (1987) indicates that terrorism includes unlawful use of force against innocent people to have political change.

definitions also include targets⁵ (Gibbs, 1989) and social motives⁶ (Enders & Sandler, 2006) of terrorists, and terrorism's psychological effects⁷ (Crenshaw, 1983; Weinberg & Eubank, 2004). These discussions, however, have not yet led to conceptual clarity and unity on the subject (Smith, 1994).

In one ambitious attempt to compile and synthesize the contents of diverse definitions of terrorism, Schmid and Jongman (1988) identified 109 different definitions of terrorism, and counted the frequency of definitional elements, finding twenty-two (22) elements common to the 109 definitions. The most frequent definitional elements were "violence /force (83.5%), political (65%), fear, terror emphasized (51%), threat (47%), effects and reactions (41.5%), victim-target differentiation (37.5%) purposive, planned, systematic, organized action (32%), method of combat, strategy, tactic (30.5%), extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints (30%)..." (p. 5-6). However, the authors' themselves believed that the compiled list did not contain all the elements necessary for a good definition. Sauter and Carafano (2005) synthesized the definitions of terrorism and found that many of them contained following elements "conducted by sub-national groups; targeted at random noncombatant victims; directed at one set of victims in part to create fear among a larger audience; aimed at coercing governments or populations; planned to get publicity; motivated by political, ideological, or religious beliefs; based on criminal actions" (p. 66). Martin (2006) summarizes the

⁵ Gibbs (1989) defines terrorism as an "illegal violence or threatened violence directed against human or nonhuman objects..." (p. 330). Gibbs points out that not only human beings but also nonhuman objects might be the target of the terrorism.

⁶ As well as political motive Enders and Sandler (2006) include a social motive in their definition, "Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups in order to obtain political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims" (p. 3).

⁷ Some legal and academic definitions posit that terrorism is a sort of violence that is carried out to have psychological effects on individuals and societies (Crenshaw, 1983; Weinberg & Eubank, 2004).

common features of the definition of terrorism as “the use of illegal force, sub-national actors, unconventional methods, political motives, attacks against soft civilian and passive military targets, acts aimed at purposefully affecting an audience” (p. 47). There are further significant definitional diversities in the concepts of *terrorist*⁸, *terrorist group*⁹, and *terrorist activities*¹⁰.

Definitional differences can create confusion in research as well as counter-terrorism activities. The lack of a common definition prevents uniform data collection, reducing the availability of reliable findings and rendering scientific studies on terrorism

⁸ Payne (2000) defines a terrorist as “an individual or group who uses acts of violence and intimidation desired social, political, or religious outcome”. She stresses that in the American society, a terrorist has a broader definition. That is, an individual or a group that uses violent tactics against the domestic and foreign policies of the US might be considered as terrorist. The US Department of Defense (2001, p. 544) describes a terrorist as “an individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives.”

⁹ The U.S. Department of Defense defines a terrorist group in the course of defining terrorism, as “any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized” to carry out the acts described above in the definition of terrorist is called as terrorist group by the US Department of Defense.

The EU defines a terrorist group as “a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences” (Official Journal of the European Communities, 2002).

¹⁰ *Terrorist activities* range from legal or acceptable type of actions, such as oral protests, petitions, or demonstrations, to illegal but mostly tolerated activities such as illegal demonstrations, vandalism, seizure of property, and violent and unacceptable forms of acts such as sabotage, assassination, kidnapping, bombing, murder, mass murders or use of WMD (Ferracuti, 1982).

The FBI's (2001) definition of terrorism related activities include three important concepts; a terrorist incident, a suspected terrorist incident, and a terrorism prevention. A terrorist incident is carried out to meet political and social objectives through a violent act or an act which is dangerous for human life, against the laws, or coercive for government and civilians. A suspected terrorist incident refers to a potential act of terrorism that the responsible individual or terrorist groups are not known at that time. Terrorism prevention denotes a successfully interdicted violent act which is planned by a known terrorist group or an individual.

The EU provides a list of offenses that are considered as terrorist offenses. Some of these offenses are: attacks upon person's life and physical integrity, kidnapping, hostage taking, extensive destruction to a government or public facility, seizure of aircraft, ships or other transportation means, manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons including nuclear, biological and chemical, release of dangerous substance, disrupting the fundamental natural sources. In order to label these offenses as terrorist offenses they should be committed with the aim of “seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization” (Official Journal of the European Communities, 2002).

questionable and ambiguous (Silke, 2004a). A common definition also appears to be very important in terms of ensuring effectiveness of the national and international legislation and punishments, implementing successful international cooperation, stopping state sponsorship of terrorism, receiving public support for anti-terror activities, and improving public relations (Sezgin, 2007). Today, there are some attempts to ensure common grounds between the states in the fight against terrorism, but it is not mature enough to put these shared perspectives into daily practices. For instance, despite similarities in the definition of terrorism used by UK¹¹ and the US¹², the lists of terrorist organizations proscribed by these two countries create the potential for confusion, impediments to collaborative international responses to the problem, and may promote tolerance or support for terrorism in different countries. For example, thirteen (13) different terrorist organizations are included in both the US and UK list of terrorist organizations, however, 15 terrorist organizations on the US list do not appear on the UK list, and 8 terrorist organizations identified by the UK were not proscribed by the US. This means that some of these organizations may operate, raise funds, conduct activities and even recruit new members freely in the country where they were not listed as terrorists while being pursued by or in another allied country. Silke (2004a) rightly asserts that disagreement

¹¹ UK Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as "The use of serious violence against persons or property, or the threat to use such violence to intimidate or coerce a government, the public, or any section of the public for political, religious, or ideological ends" (Silke, 2004a).

¹² Terrorism is defined by the FBI as "...the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." The FBI further classifies the definition of terrorism as domestic and international terrorism depending on the origin of terrorists, location of their bases and objectives of the terrorist organization (The FBI, 2001). The US Department of Defense use the definition of "The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological" (The US Department of Defense, 2001, p. 544). Utilizing The United States Code's definition of terrorism, The US State Department defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (Hoffman, 2006).

between two close allies indicates significant challenges in how the problem might be addressed by diverse regimes. Besides, there is a significant variation in the definitions within the US government itself¹³.

Recognizing the ongoing debate on defining terrorism and given this study's focus on Turkish terrorist organizations, this research will rely on the definition established by the Turkish Anti-terrorism Law. Article # 1 of the Turkish Anti-terrorism Law (1991, 2006) defines terrorism as;

“...any kind of act carried out by one or more persons belonging to an organization by means of force and violence, using the methods of pressure, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic defined in its Constitution and its political, legal, social, secular and economic regime; impairing undividable integrity of the State with its territory and nation; endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic; weakening or destroying or overtaking the State's authority; demolishing the fundamental rights and freedoms, and damaging the national and international security, public order or general health of the State.”

The Second Article in the Turkish Anti-terrorism Law defines a terrorist as a **person** who takes part in an organization that is formed for committing the crimes **mentioned** in the first article. There is no distinction between a person who commits the **aforementioned** crime(s) alone or with other members of a terrorist group, or who does **not** commit any crimes at all, but is a member of a terrorist group. The same article **specifies** that even if a person is not a member of a terrorist group, if that person commits **abovementioned** crimes on behalf of a terrorist group, he or she is considered a terrorist.

The remainder of this chapter explores the ideological (political) underpinnings of **the** two major terrorist groups in Turkey, the left wing DHKP/C and religiously

¹³ For instance, one component of the US State Department's definition is the premeditated nature of terrorism; this element does not exist in the FBI's definition. The FBI's definition considers the psychological dimension of terrorism which is not addressed in the US State Department's definition. While the US State Department's definition identifies noncombatants as the targets of terrorism, the FBI's definition included broader categories, such as governments, the civilian population and even properties.

motivated Turkish Hezbollah, and details the evolution of terrorism in modern Turkey as well as the development of these two organizations.

2. Left Wing/Revolutionary Terrorism and Ideology

Left wing terrorism aims at establishing a new system by destroying the existing one. That is, leftist ideology seeks reforms or revolutions considering that existing systems are corrupt and unjust. Martin (2006) separates leftist ideology as “fringe left” and “far left.” The fringe left ideology is the extreme interpretation of the Marxist ideology. It advocates the use of violent methods as a legitimate option against an oppressive system, class, or government. Fringe groups believe that they are the representatives of the poor and lower class. This belief mechanism gives them justification for violent acts. On the other hand, for the far left, Marxism is a way to promote class or ethno-nationalist rights. Unlike the fringe left, they do not see political violence as the only option. They take part in the democratic process. Communist parties and their activities could be considered in this context (Martin, 2006). Marxist-Leninist ideology has inspired many left wing terrorist groups.

Marxism is a school of critical thought, founded by Karl Marx who argued that series of historical conflicts and revolutions impacted the human progress and social evolution. In Marx’s view, in each era the working class is exposed to unequal treatment by the ruling class. The ruling class exploits the working class’s labor and maintains the political and economic status-quo. However, Marx theorized that the working class could resist dominance by the ruling class through revolution. The challenge of the working class resulted in socioeconomic synthesis and formation of new relationships with the means of production. It was a kind of confrontation of working class against the capitalist

system. Marx's theory was based on establishment of "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the communist society. The theory proposed to build a just and egalitarian social order. These ideas were very attractive for many left-wing groups all over the world. Terrorist organizations have utilized Marxism based socialism that has revolutionary characteristics. Lenin, Mao, and Castro are some well-known revolutionary leaders who adopted Marxism (Martin, 2006).

While Marx offered that destruction of Capitalism was based on scientific law, Lenin suggested that Capitalism's collapse would be made certain through a well organized and disciplined organization, such as a Communist party, that would lead the working class to the victory. Lenin believed that political will of the people would change the system. Within this context, Mao applied a strategy named "people's war." It included indoctrinating the army, winning over the people, hitting-running and fighting forever. With this strategy in mind, Mao's Red Army used guerilla tactics. They were also careful to win people's support considering that achievement of the people's war would entail the contribution and involvement of civilians. Mao linked his military strategy to his political strategy and contributed to the concept of "political will." According to this strategy, terrorism, or violent political activity, was an acceptable tactic. The combination of ideology, political indoctrination, guerilla tactics, psychological warfare, and people's support made the people's war an effective strategy. Adopted by leftist revolutionaries across the world, they have sought people's support against capitalist systems using terrorist tactics (Martin, 2006).

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(1) Characteristics and justifications of revolutionary/left wing terrorism

Anarchism and Marxism form a philosophical base for the revolutionary/left wing terrorism. In order to reach their goal of destroying the existing capitalist system and establishing a communist system through armed conflict, they resort to unconventional war. Terrorism is seen as an effective tactic to disrupt the existing government. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, the Shining Path in Peru, the Montoneros in Argentina, the Red Brigade in Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Ireland, and the DHKP/C in Turkey are examples of left wing terrorist organizations.

The process that leads to the revolution includes several steps, initiated by a particular group that perceives that existing system or government is unfair. In order to overcome this unfairness and to have meaningful social dissent, revolution is considered the only strategy. To initiate revolution, they point out the weaknesses and contradictions of the political system. The next step is to motivate and politicize the masses for revolution: “popular discontent, the alienation of elites, and a pervasive crisis are the central ingredients for bringing a society to the brink of revolution Martin (2006, p. 93).”

Extremism is the main characteristic of many left wing terrorist groups.

Extremism contains offensive and violent beliefs. Extreme egalitarianism, extreme hatred of capitalism and extreme opposition to militarism are basic characteristics of the extreme left. However, extremism exhibits characteristics of terrorism when the violent thoughts are put into practice (Hoffman, 2006; Smith, 1994). Their targets are generally those who are blamed for economic exploitation, political repression, or being representative of the Capitalist system. Left wing groups are more selective than religiously motivated groups

in their targets: they take care not to alienate potential sympathizers and supporters.

Through their violent activities, they aim to bring attention to their political cause. Armed propaganda is very important for a left wing group since they believe it leads to armed support and then civil war, which will ultimately lead to the victory (Hoffman, 2006).

Organizational ideology is the main source of justification behind violent activities. Terrorists believe that they serve an honorable cause, so that violence is acceptable and unavoidable. Opponents of their movements are considered enemies. In the Brazilian revolutionary Marighella's *Mini Manual of the Urban Guerilla*, he indicated that terrorism is an inevitable method against a ruthless enemy. Marighella saw the dictators as shameful individuals and advocated terrorism as a method against the dictators as an honorable act (Martin, 2006).

Revolutionary left wing terrorist groups believe that they are at war against an oppressive government or system. They think that in this war, they are the representatives of the poor who are the victims to unfair and unjust practices. This belief structure helps them see the violence as a legitimate option.

3. Religiously Motivated Terrorism and Ideology

Despite two thousand years of history, including the Zealots, Thugs, and Assassins, it was not until the 1980s that religiously motivated terrorism appeared as a global threat. Hoffman (2006) marks the year of 1968 as the advent of modern international terrorism, and indicates that there was no religiously motivated terrorist group among the eleven identifiable international terrorist groups that were active in 1968. After the Iranian revolution in 1979, the number of international religiously motivated groups began to increase. Even so, in 1980, there were only two international

religiously motivated groups out of 64 active groups. By 1994, this number was 16 out of 49, and 26 out of 56 in 1995. In 2004, 52 (46%) terrorist groups were classified as religiously motivated groups (Hoffman, 2006).

There are several factors that have promoted the rise of religiously motivated terrorism, including the revolution in Iran in 1979, recent developments in the Middle East, and activities of al-Qaeda. Islamist extremists' activities have increased especially in the last ten years. Since the 1980s, religiously motivated terrorism included the elements of all major religions, smaller sects, and cults as well. The sarin nerve gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo on the Tokyo subway in 1995, bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Tanzania by al-Qaeda in 1998, the bombing of Oklahoma City federal office building in 1995, the assassination of Israeli prime minister by a Jewish extremist in 1995, the murder of 18 tourists in Egypt by Islamic extremist in 1996, the September 11 attacks in the U.S. by al-Qaeda, and recent bombings in Istanbul, London, and Spain are just some of the examples of religious extremism (Hoffman, 2006).

When compared with the religiously motivated terrorism in the past, today religiously motivated terrorism has gained global characteristics that impact many countries and the daily lives of individuals across the world, especially with respect to Islamic extremists' activities which are on the rise. Cell based networks, leaderless resistance groups, more lethal and indiscriminate attacks, possibility of the use of biological and chemical weapons, and global networks typify the contemporary religiously motivated terrorism. In this new era, al-Qaeda has been the leading terrorist group. Al-Qaeda attracts new members from all over the world. Many terrorist organizations have been inspired by the tactics and ideology of al-Qaeda. The media have

been an effective tool to publicize the terrorists' propaganda, and new technologies (i.e. internet) have facilitated the activities of terrorist groups globally. Easy access to information has helped individuals (and potential members) learn about the terrorists' ideology (Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2006, Scheuer, 2004). These developments have helped terrorists find new members that are vitally important for the long-term survival of terrorist groups.

Although religiously motivated groups committed six percent of all terrorist incidents between 1986 and 2004, these acts caused thirty percent of the total number of fatalities. Al-Qaeda has the biggest role in these numbers. Although al-Qaeda committed only 0.1 percent of all terrorist incidents, it was responsible for almost 19 percent of total fatalities (Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2006, Scheuer, 2004).

(1) Characteristics and justifications of religiously motivated terrorism

Religion may appear as a primary or secondary motive of a terrorist organization depending on the cultural and political contexts. Accordingly, misinterpretation of the basic tenets of religion is the primary motive behind the activities of terrorists. Main religious rules are changed and filled with plenty of violent images in order to justify destruction or self-destruction which is the central part of the logic behind religion-based terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Martin, 2006). Islamic extremists in the Middle East, Hindu extremists in India, and Christian extremists (i.e. anti-abortionists) in the U.S. are some of the examples of this profile. Religion as a secondary motive might appear under the scope of other movements such as nationalism or revolutionary resistance. In such conditions, religious affiliation is important in terms of providing them with ethnic or

rational identity. For example, religion has a secondary role in Northern Ireland among Catholic and Protestant terrorists (Martin, 2006).

Terrorism in the name of religion or God has been predominant in today's world. Major religions including Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and Hinduism and smaller religions and cults have extremist adherents who have involved in terrorism. Martin (2006, p. 183) defines religiously motivated terrorism as "a type of political violence that is motivated by an absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned –and commanded- the application of terrorists violence for the greater glory of the faith." Religiously motivated terrorists believe that indiscriminant violent activities would be forgiven and even rewarded by God in the afterlife since they were carried out in the name of God. Moreover, God is always together with them because they are carrying out a sacred mission. They also believe that they are defending their religion from the attacks of non-believers. They aim at spreading their beliefs across the world. Religiously motivated terrorism includes unquestioned faith (Martin, 2006). Stern (2003) concludes that a common motivation behind participation in different groups is to cleanse the world of impurities to create a better state. These types of groups think that they fight for a more Perfect world and their fight will result in purification of injustice and cruelty. They also strongly believe that they are responding to a spiritual calling.

Religious extremists see themselves as outsiders of the existing system who seek fundamental changes. This perception makes them more destructive and deadly. All religiously motivated groups regardless of religion transform their political ideologies into religious imperative. Thus, as Hoffman (2006, p. 112) concludes "[T]he killing of

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those described as “infidels” by the Shi’s, “dogs” by the Jews, or “children of Satan” by the Christian Patriots becomes a sacramental act.”

There are also some common elements that almost all religiously motivated groups regardless of religion use to justify their violent tactics such as “religious precepts, the sense of alienation, the existence of a terrorist movement in which the activists are the constituents, and a preoccupation with the elimination of a broadly defined category of enemies” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 97). Although left wing terrorist groups are relatively selective in their violent tactics, religiously motivated groups have been involved in more indiscriminate violent acts against not only declared enemies but also those who have not shared their ideological perspective.

4. The History of Terrorism in Turkey

An understanding of terrorism in Turkey requires familiarity with basic historical developments there. The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the major power in several geographic areas including Europe, Asia, and Africa for more than 600 years. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, led multiple reforms to establish Western social, economic, technological, and democratic standards in Turkey. These reforms included abolishment of the sultanate and the Caliphate, establishment of the secular state, adoption of a new alphabet, adaptation of new laws, and suffrage for women. Since its establishment, Turkey has faced several internal and external threats such as religious fundamentalism, ethnic separatism, a risk of the Soviet attack, and political impacts of ideological changes in the Soviet Union. In the mid 1920s, there were numerous challenges to the reforms, especially by religious fundamentalists and separatists. As a response to this resistance,

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harsh methods were used, and a special court known as the Independence Court was established to judge the opponents. In 1931, the People's Party, the only political party, adopted a program that has included the fundamental tenets of modern Turkey: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism. In the Cold War era, Turkey experienced economic growth; democratic values were on rise until the first military coup in 1960, which was followed by military coups in 1971 and 1980 (Sozen, 2006). The last two coups resulted from security problems that emerged because of prevalent terrorist events. However, military coups were not a remedy to terrorism; terrorist incidents increased right after the military coups.

Terrorism in Turkey goes back to the 1950s when the multiparty political system emerged, illegal demonstrations of university students and workers appeared, and security forces used some excessive force to control social unrest. In 1959, the killing of a university student by security forces during an illegal demonstration fostered illegal formations and caused more illegal demonstrations (Caglar, 2006). In 1960, Turkey experienced its first military coup. Afterwards, Turkey entered a new phase named as Pluralistic democracy. Radical left groups with socialist ideologies created political instability in Turkey during this time. After 1960, internal migration and urbanization increased rapidly due to huge industrialization, and the Turkish economy grew very quickly during the 1970s. However, economic growth could not be stabilized, and economic indicators started to go down. Economic instability resulted in huge unemployment, and generated deadly and violent demonstrations by workers and students. During this period radical right and left wing movements started to emerge. The process of industrialization created suitable conditions for Turkish socialist working

groups to seek more rights and economic benefits. Global political trends influenced the Turkish left and Turkish political life as well. The new constitution adapted in 1961 was the most democratic constitution in Turkey's history, and that created conditions tolerant of the activities of socialist ideologies, the dream of some extremist leftist groups since the Russian revolution. The Constitution listed and guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right of collective bargaining and strikes. However, these democratic rights were misused and transformed into illegal activities that took Turkey to threshold of major security crises (Bal & Laciner, 2001; Caglar, 2006; Rodoplu, Arnold & the Ersoy, 2003; Sozen, 2006).

In the 1960s when democratization processes were speeded up, the Turkish Labor Party (TLP) was established with socialist ideology. TLP participated in several elections but could not get more than three percent of the votes (Criss, 2002, p.477). In the election of 1969, TLP won fewer votes than 1965. Elections in 1969 were a turning point for most of the followers of the TLP. As a consequence of its failed election campaigns, TLP thought that there was no hope for meaningful change within formal democratic processes. To TLP, the only way for socio-economic progress was the non-capitalist path. They adapted the Proletarian Revolutionists policies and began an armed struggle (Bal & Laciner, 2001).

Youth organizations especially preferred to use these illegal methods. Ideological leaders of several left wing groups established during this era, influenced by the thoughts of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Castro and Che Guevara, believed the quickest way to change the system was to terrorize the society. As a result, government's power was weakened, and Turkey experienced another military intervention in 1971 (Bal & Laciner,

2001). Similar to TLP, many terrorist groups across the world such as IRA, ETA, and Tupamoros have replaced their legal efforts with violent tactics. When the groups could not manage their desired political aims using legal methods, they began to use illegal ways to carry out their objectives (Crenshaw, 2003; Jenkins, 2003; Schmid, 2004).

In the 1970s, Turkey experienced important changes in its democratic, social and economic systems. The rise of extremists at left and right wings of the political spectrum caused huge terrorist activities that continued until the military coup in 1980. Acts of violence and terrorism resulted in armed assaults, sabotage, kidnappings, bank robberies, destruction of workplaces, and bombings. Just before the 1980 military coup, forty-nine left wing terrorist groups had emerged (Bal & Laciner, 2001). Between the years of 1978 and 1982, there were over 40,000 terrorist incidents in Turkey, resulting in an average of 28 deaths per day (Rodoplu, Arnold & Ersoy, 2003).

During this same period, Armenian terrorism had a significant impact on the Turkish nation. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, an Armenian terrorist organization, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), posed big dangers for Turkish Diplomats in foreign missions. This organization promoted awareness of the alleged "Armenian genocide" of the Ottoman Empire, and worked to further the cause of Armenian independence. With a Marxist-Leninist ideology, ASALA allied with other international terrorist groups with similar leanings, including the Irish Republican Army, Italian Red Brigades, and the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (PKK-Kongra-Gel, or PKK). Most of the attacks of ASALA targeted Turkish diplomats or Turkish interests in the Middle East and Europe especially between 1975 and 1985. The

establishment of independent Armenia after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended Armenian terrorism (MIPT, n.d.; Orttung, 2006):

The 1980s were important in terms of the development of separatist terrorism in Turkey. The PKK terrorist organization was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978 with a separatist ideology. PKK initiated terrorist attacks in the mid-1980s that peaked in the mid-1990s. PKK has played an active role in violent activities in Turkey, especially in the Eastern and Southeastern parts. Its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in 1999 and sentenced to life imprisonment. His imprisonment, however, has not stopped the PKK's activities. The organization still targets security forces, civilians, and public properties (Sozen, 2006).

In addition to separatist terrorism represented by PKK and left wing terrorism, religiously motivated terrorism has also influenced the security of the Turkish nation. Religiously motivated terrorist groups emerged in the 1990s to exploit the religious values by identifying them with violent activities. The basic goal of these religious-terrorists is to establish a religion-based state to replace the existing secular and Constitutional one.

Terrorist attacks carried out by separatist, left and religiously motivated groups continue today in Turkey. Most incidents are carried out by the PKK, although the occurrence of terrorist incidents is not as intensive as in the 1990s. Before 1980, almost 5,000 youth died because of left and right ideological conflict. After 1980, almost 30,000 people died, mostly due to the violent acts of separatist and then left wing and religiously motivated terrorist groups. Studies on the economic aspects of terrorism in Turkey revealed that the approximate cost of terrorism to Turkey has been over 100 billion

dollars (Bal & Laciner, 2001). Turkey's long history of fighting against terrorism has made it one of the most experienced countries of the world in dealing with political violence. Orttung (2006) confirms that Turkey is one of the most experienced countries in fighting terrorism and that its experience might be beneficial to the US which has made the fight against terrorism its top national security priority.

There have been significant changes in the political climate in Turkey. In the 1990s, Turkey faced tremendous problems, such as financial crisis, political instability and an increase in terrorist activities that led to high inflation, irrational economic programs, unsuccessful coalition governments, constantly changing international situation, and deadly activities of the separatist movements and other ideological groups. In 2003, after twelve years of coalition governments, a one-party government period has emerged that appears to be successful in managing economic and democratic reforms. Renewed commitments of the one-party government to join the European Union (EU) has resulted in numerous reforms that led to the EU Council's decision to start accession negotiations in 2005 (Sozen, 2006): "the EU decision was historic since it marked a first step towards the consensus of civilizations, bringing a Muslim country into the pre-dominantly Christian organization (Sozen, 2006, p. 135)." These and similar developments in the political history of Turkey have several implications in the formation and activities of terrorist groups in Turkey. For instance, left wing and religiously motivated terrorist groups do not want Turkey to be close to Western countries, because while left wing groups see Western countries as source of capitalism, religiously motivated groups would prefer Turkey emulate Islamic countries rather than Christianity-dominated countries. Similarly, separatist groups would try to manipulate the process to

gain more support from the other countries. With these historic developments in mind, there seems to be a reciprocal relationship between terrorism and political developments in Turkey. That is, some political developments have given rise to terrorism and terrorist groups, and terrorist activities have had considerable influence on political decisions.

5. Contemporary Terrorism in Turkey

In Turkey, three factors must come together in order to be able name a group as a terrorist group: ideology, organization, and terrorist activity (i.e., political violence). Organizational philosophy and ideology are among the core elements for long-term operations of a terrorist organization. If there is no strong ideological belief system, then there is no strong tie among terrorists. Secondly, there must be an organization that consists of at least 2 persons. The final and most important component is the 'violence'. When a group of people with terrorist ideology commits a violent act/s, all the elements necessary to identify (and respond to) a group as terrorist are present.

There are four main terrorist formations in Turkey: religiously motivated/right wing terrorist groups that aim at establishing a state ruled by Sharia; left wing terrorist groups that target setting up a new state which has a Marxist-Leninist or Maoist ideology; separatist terrorist groups that want to divide the territory of Turkey to establish a new State; and lastly the extension of international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. Ideologies of separatist, left or right wing terrorist organizations are not native but imported. While leftist and separatist terrorist groups have tried to adapt the ideas of Mao, Lenin, Tito, or Marx, religiously motivated terrorist groups have been influenced from the ideas of putatively religious writers such as Ali Korani, Ali Şeriati, Hasan-el Benna (Turkish National Police [TNP], 2006).


Terrorist organizations in Turkey generally have a pyramid type organizational structure. This type of structure is considered most appropriate since it ensures higher level of secrecy and discipline. On the top of the pyramid, there is a leader and first level commanders. At the bottom, there are passive supporters who comprise the largest part of the organization. After the command level, there is an active cadre responsible for carrying out the organizational mission. Active supporters who follow the active cadre keep the terrorists in the field through logistical support including shelter, food, and new members. These structural characteristics are consistent with White's (2003) description of general terrorist structures.

Cells are indispensable units for all terrorist organizations to ensure secrecy and dynamism. Each cell consists of a small number of individuals (usually 4-5 people) under the command of the cell leader. Cell members know only the members in their respective cells. They do not have connections with or to other cells. Some groups have a structure similar to "leaderless network" or "leaderless resistance." It is called as "self appearance", or "self generating" (kendinden zuhur) in Turkey and consists of individuals who establish a "front" (cell-subdivision) in order to perform terrorist activities. They usually learn about a group through ideological documents (i.e. writings, messages, articles and books of terrorist leaders or organizational magazines). These persons who establish new fronts make their own decisions and carry out terrorist activities without informing the leadership cadre. The responsibility of the successful terrorist operations belongs to the organization, but if there is a failure, the responsibility belongs to the persons that carry out the failed act. Terrorist organizations also have their own judicial mechanisms that are used when there are disciplinary matters or betrayal of their

members. These mechanisms are called “People’s Courts” by left wing groups, and “Sharia Courts” by religiously motivated groups. Betrayal is one of the biggest crimes, and requires the death penalty (Caglar, 2006).

Since 1984, the Turkish people have experienced deadly terrorist attacks with varying casualty rates each year. Immediately after the PKK initiated armed attacks in 1984; there was a dramatic increase in the number of terrorist incidents. Figure 1 shows the numbers of terrorist incidents (56,693), including violent armed and non-violent propaganda activities in Turkey between the years of 1984-2004. During this period, police captured more than 159,000¹⁴ people with connections to terrorist activities.

Figure 1. Terrorist incidents in Turkey (1984-2004)




Source: TNP, 2006

Terrorist incidents peaked in 1993 with 6,956 different cases, followed by a persistent decline in the following years. In 1999, Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, was captured and so his supporters carried out several small or serious terrorist activities that led to a slight increase again. Although the PKK has the largest role in

¹⁴ This number includes those who were captured but released by the court, captured and convicted, and recidivists.

these numbers, left wing and religiously motivated groups' contribution to these numbers cannot be ignored.

Figure 2. Terrorist incidents and arrested terrorists in Turkey (1984-2004)




Source: TNP, 2006.

Figure 2 presents the number of terrorist incidents, and terrorists arrested by security forces between 1984 and 2004. In almost every year, the number of arrested terrorists exceeds the number of incidents. This appears to reinforce the importance of the group and group activities of terrorists. That is, terrorists commit crimes in a group; this dynamic generates the arrest of more than one terrorist for the same incident. Group dynamics motivate them to act together. The large number of arrested persons also shows that terrorist organizations do not have a problem of recruiting members. As long as terrorist organizations have members, they can continue to commit terrorist incidents to reach their goals.

Between the years of 1984 and 2004, 12,415 citizens and government officials including police, soldiers and temporary village guards were killed and 24,996 were wounded by different terrorist groups (see Figure 3). The numbers of murdered and

wounded citizens' are similar to the total number of government officials; an indicator that terrorists do not discriminate between the security forces and civilians in Turkey.

Figure 3. Total casualty of citizens, officials, and terrorists in Turkey (1984-2004)




Source: TNP, 2006.

During the same period, the number of dead or wounded terrorists from all groups totaled 22,105, with 20,661 killed and 1,444 wounded. The number of the terrorist captured alive (159,175) without injury far exceeds the number of dead and wounded (see Figure 3).

Figure 4 distinguishes the total number of incidents and casualties caused by religiously motivated and left wing terrorist groups in Turkey between 1994 and 2006. Left wing groups committed more terrorist crimes than religiously motivated groups; the total number of terrorist incidents was 6,202 for left wing groups and 1,433 for religiously motivated groups. While left wing groups targeted security forces, seen as servants of the existing system, religiously motivated groups selected civilian targets deemed as enemies of their religious ideology. Religiously motivated groups killed or wounded 78 security forces; left-wing groups killed or wounded 577.

Figure 4. Violent activities of religiously motivated and left wing terrorist groups and counter-terrorism (1994-2006)



Source: TNP, 2006.

Conversely, total civilian casualties caused by religiously motivated groups were 1,409; for left-wing groups, civilian casualties totaled 236. The number of arrested left wing terrorists (20,395) exceeds the arrests of religiously motivated terrorists (13,672). The number of left wing terrorists captured dead or wounded is almost 15 times higher than religiously motivated terrorists (see Figure 4). This fact could be attributed to religiously motivated groups not targeting security forces as primary target and their refraining from armed conflict with the security forces unless necessary. On the other hand, left wing groups see security forces as representatives of oppressive government and direct attacks against them; a strategy which might result in more death in both sides. The following discussion will detail the basic characteristics of religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah and left wing DHKP/C terrorist groups to further illuminate the ideological, tactical, and characteristic differences between the two groups that are the focus of this study.

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(1) Turkish Hezbollah

The major objective of the religiously motivated/right wing terrorist organizations active in Turkey is to replace the secular Republic with a theocratic state ruled by Sharia. Like many other Islamic extremists across the world with deviant and radical ideologies, religiously motivated terrorist groups in Turkey, including Turkish Hezbollah, were established after the Iranian Revolution. They adapted three core strategies: proclamation (message), congregation, and jihad. "Proclamation" might best be defined as the promotion of the ideology, including convincing individuals to practice an Islamic way of life and be governed by Islamic ruling mechanisms. Once they have gained enough supporters, in the second stage, they aim at establishing congregations/communities that internalize the requirements of the first step. The last step, jihad, implies several activities including armed struggle to establish the system that they seek (Sozen, 2006). Given that many of them, including Turkish Hezbollah, have started armed attacks, it can be concluded that they see themselves in the stage of "jihad." Religiously motivated groups in Turkey use violent tactics, however, compared to left wing and separatist groups, their casualty rate is lower. These organizations have the potential and capacity to increase their deadly activities. To increase the effectiveness of their activities, religiously motivated groups exploit various themes that are listed by Yurdakul (2006) as: US Policies in the Islamic countries, Turkish governmental policies (e.g. bans on headscarves), Israel's occupation of Palestine, English and Israeli policies, and conflicts in Chechnya.

The most active religiously motivated groups are Turkish Hezbollah, Islamic Action Organization (IHO), Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front (IBDA-C), Islamic

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Congregation Union (ICB), Vasat, and Hizb-ut Tahrir. The Turkish Hezbollah, nevertheless, is the most violent. It was founded in the 1980's in southeastern Turkey. It aims at destroying the constitutional system in order to establish a theocratic state ruled by Sharia. Like other religiously motivated groups in Turkey, Turkish Hezbollah has adopted the three stage strategy: proclamation (propaganda), congregation, and jihad (holy war). In this context, Turkish Hezbollah aims at teaching its ideology, assembling an organization that is based on its teachings, and declaring war on the "enemy". Observation and data confirm that each of the strategic steps was pursued by Turkish Hezbollah.

Turkish Hezbollah is active in eastern and mostly southeastern Anatolia, and has usually conducted its illegal activities in Diyarbakir, Van, Batman, and Mardin, although they commit illegal acts throughout the country. Bookstores owned by members and supporters have been strategic locations to meet, to discuss ideologies, and to make organizational propaganda. Due to ideological and leadership disputes, Turkish Hezbollah divided into two factions in early 1990s: the Ilimciler (scientists) and the Menzirciler (rangers). While the former was led by Huseyin Velioglu, and held its meetings at the Ilim Bookstore, the latter's leader was Fidan Gungor and they met at the Menzil bookstore. One of the biggest conflicts between two groups was the tactic to be used in order to reach the goals of the organization. Whereas the Ilimciler sought violent methods such as armed struggle, the Menzirciler believed that it was too early to start armed attacks. This dispute between two factions resulted in the deaths of 100 members from both sides in 1993 and 1994. Fidan Gungor, the leader of the Menzirciler, was assassinated by the Ilimciler in 1994. This event escalated the conflict between the

groups; however, the conflict was of short duration. The Ilımciler gained the control, and became responsible for almost all terrorist activities of Turkish Hezbollah in not only the east and southeastern parts of Turkey, but also the western parts (particularly in Istanbul). On January 17th, 2000, as a result of extensive police operations, the leader of Ilımciler, Hüseyin Velioglu, was captured dead and more than 1,350 members were arrested. Databases and information were seized from the houses of leaders and members (Aras & Bacik, 2002; Ozeren & Voorde, 2006; Sozen, 2006). These raids divulged that they were responsible for several kidnappings. They had tortured the kidnapped persons and videotaped their suffering before burying them alive (Orttung, 2006).

The similarity of the names of Lebanon Hezbollah and Turkish Hezbollah requires clarification about differences between these two groups. Despite the similarity in names, there is no connection between the groups. The Lebanese Hezbollah is based on Shia ideology and was established to struggle against Israeli occupation of Lebanon's territories, and it includes both secular and religious members with nationalist objectives (Pape, 2005). In addition to eradicating Israeli influence, Lebanese Hezbollah seeks to eliminate Western influence in Lebanon and across the Middle East. Lebanese Hezbollah is an international organization, active in Europe, North and South American, and Africa. It has become an umbrella organization for some other terrorist groups such as Hamas. Lebanese Hezbollah is a major part of political, educational, social, and economic life in Lebanon, particularly for Shiites. Its main tactics are car bombing, kidnapping, hijacking, and its main targets are Israel and Western Countries. Suicide terrorism is one of their main violent tactics; in fact, Lebanese Hezbollah initiated suicide attacks in the modern history (Ozeren & Voorde, 2006; Pape, 2005).

On the other hand, Turkish Hezbollah's core purpose is to establish a government ruled by religious ideology in Turkey. Turkish Hezbollah comprise of mostly Sunni members, marking significant ideological differences with its Lebanese namesake. The activities and violence of the Turkish Hezbollah are limited within Turkey's borders, and there is no strong evidence to confirm Turkish Hezbollah's connection with other terrorist groups. Turkish Hezbollah carries out its activities very secretly and so, it does not engage in any social activities in daily life that will reveal its identity. Further, Turkish Hezbollah has not yet used suicide attacks as a tactic (Ozeren & Voorde, 2006).

Ideology, goals and structure of Turkish Hezbollah

The basic ideology of Turkish Hezbollah is to fight against the evil that rejects the rule of the God. In this manner, the world is divided between the forces of Good and Evil. To members, Turkish Hezbollah represents the good; all others who do not believe in their goals are evil, including other Islamic movements. Regarding this issue, Stern (2003) emphasizes that "This is the way religious terrorists view the world. Their commitment to a religious idea or a religious group leads them to dehumanize their adversaries to a degree that they become capable of murder. They start out with the intention to purify the world of some evil, but end up committing evil acts" (p. xxviii). Turkish Hezbollah aims at establishing a new state by destroying Turkey's secular regime. Once the new state is established, it would apply the Sharia rules inspired by Iran.

Turkish Hezbollah has a pyramid type organizational structure. On the top of the hierarchy there is a leader. The Top Committee (Sura) comes right after the leader. The Top Committee controls political and military wings of Turkish Hezbollah and makes

important decisions. Then, there are regional commanders and under the regional commanders there are city commanders. Turkish Hezbollah has two main structures in the cities: military and political wings. While the military wing is responsible for conducting armed operations, the political wing carries out organizational propaganda and recruits new members. The military wing has some sub-structures, including assassination groups, interrogation groups, threat groups, and attack groups. The political wing assigns some of its members as coordinators of villages, schools, mosques, and streets to carry out propaganda and recruit new members (Ozeren & Voorde, 2006; TNP, 2006).

Turkish Hezbollah activities and tactics

Turkish Hezbollah has thus far committed arsons, kidnappings, and murders, using Molotov cocktails, guns and bombs. In January 2001, one year after the capture of its leader, Turkish Hezbollah assassinated the Police Chief of Diyarbakır, a province in the eastern part of Turkey, along with five police officers. It has also been responsible for several other assassinations and disappearances of individuals, including government figures, businessmen, journalists, security forces and PKK members as well (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006).

Table 1. Casualties caused by Turkish Hezbollah (1994-2006)

	Dead	(%)	Wounded	(%)	Total	(%)
Citizens	243	(91.7)	287	(85.4)	530	(88.2)
Government agents	22	(8.3)	49	(14.6)	71	(11.8)
Total	265		336		601	

Source: TNP (2006)

Between the years of 1994 and 2006, the organization killed 243 civilians and 22 government agents, and wounded 287 civilians and 49 government agents (see Table 1). It appears that civilians believed to be a threat to their ideology are the primary targets of

violence by Turkish Hezbollah; these civilians include secular academicians and journalists, feminists, and even religious Muslims who did not support its goals. When endangered or confronted by security forces, they did not hesitate to kill and wound them.

Interestingly, although Turkish Hezbollah members were trained in Iraq and Syria together with PKK members, Turkish Hezbollah soon focused its attacks on the PKK, blaming it for anti-Muslim activities (MIPT, n.d.). According to Turkish Hezbollah, PKK was killing Muslims and collaborating with Armenians. The main reason that Turkish Hezbollah picked the PKK as an enemy was to establish its (sole) authority in the southeast part of Turkey where those two different ideological terrorist groups operate. Although not a religiously motivated group, PKK established the Kurdish Prayer Leaders Association to get popular sympathy in east and southeast regions where the majority of the people are religious. This PKK strategy contradicted and conflicted with the goals and policies of Turkish Hezbollah, which was also seeking more support and trying to recruit in the region. As a result of the conflict between two groups, more than 500 terrorists died between the years of 1992 and 1995 (Ozeren & Voorde, 2006).

Turkish Hezbollah's situation greatly changed after the threat of the PKK diminished in 1999. Security forces intensified operations against Hezbollah and many members were arrested. The lack of the PKK as a serious adversary caused Turkish Hezbollah to change its focus; in the mid-1990s it began to target secular academicians and journalists, feminists and religious Muslims who did not support its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Turkey. After operations that resulted in death of its leader in 2000, many members escaped to Iran and Iraq (MIPT, n.d).

Turkish Hezbollah is suspected of bombings of synagogues and British targets in Istanbul in 2003 that resulted in 62 deaths and over 650 injuries, one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Turkish terrorism history (MIPT, n.d.; Ortung, 2006). Although there is a popular belief that there is a link between Al-Qaeda and Turkish Hezbollah, there is no strong evidence that supports this idea.

Table 2. Activities of Turkish Hezbollah and counter-terrorism (1994-2006)

	Incident	Arrested (10,720)		Dead	Wounded
		<u>Convicted</u>	<u>Released</u>		
Turkish Hezbollah	523	4,983	5,737	22	5

Source: TNP, 2006.

According to official statistics, Turkish Hezbollah carried out 523 terrorist incidents between 1994 and 2006. In the operations conducted against Turkish Hezbollah by Turkish authorities, 22 terrorists were killed and 10,720 terrorists were captured alive. Almost half of them (4,983) remain imprisoned while the remainder has been released (see Table 2) (TNP, 2006).

(2) DHKP/C

The main goal of the left wing terrorist organizations in Turkey is to establish a new state based on Marxist ideology. In the 1970s when the left wing groups emerged, the strongest support was from student organizations. In order to politicize the masses and to prepare armed pioneers, left wing groups adapted the following general strategies (Terrorist Organizations in Turkey, 2002): find and train new members in rural and urban areas, followed by the selection of candidates for active cadres; politicize people through psychological warfare (propaganda); initiate armed propaganda and constitute a proletarian party for resistance and conflict; and, create economic, social, and political crises to establish recruitment of villagers and workers. With civil war among the basic

goals, the sovereignty of the proletarian party can be ensured and a socialist regime established to rule the country. The most active left wing groups in Turkey are DHKP-C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front), the Turkish Revolutionary Communist Communists Union (TİKB), the Turkish Communist Party-Marxist-Leninist (TKP-ML), the Turkish Communist Labor Party-Leninist (TKEP-L), and the Marxist- Leninist Communist Party (MLKP), (TNP, 2006).

DHKP/C is an internationally recognized terrorist organization, included on both the EU's and USA's terrorist organizations list. DHKP/C goes back to 1978; at that time, its original name was Devrimci Sol or Dev-Sol which means Revolutionary Way. In 1994, it adapted the name of DHKP/C. Dev-Sol was a faction of Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front (THKP/C). Initially, THKP/C was a national political organization; however because of its failures in the political arena it turned to terrorism as an only way to carry out its goals. THKP/C gave birth to Dev-Sol which is, today, known as DHKP/C (Katagiri, 2002). The name of DHKP/C includes two concepts: party and front. While the concept of "party" stands for political activities of the group, the "front" represents the group's terrorist activities (The US Department of State [USDOS], 2005).

DHKP/C's primary targets have been security and military personnel and assets. Further, it has advocated a resistance against the West. Up to the late 1980s, DHKP/C intensified its terrorist activities. Between 1981 and 1983, successful operations of security forces resulted in the arrests of many members and a decrease in terrorist activities (Katagiri, 2002; MIPT, n.d.). In 1989, DHKP/C carried out simultaneous attacks against Turkish and American economic assets in Ankara. Beginning in 1990, it intensified terrorist activities against foreigners, especially against Western countries'

interests and personnel, including US and Britain (Katagiri, 2002). Apart from armed attacks, hunger strikes became one of the organization's methods to draw national and international community attention to their members in prisons. In 1989, the leader and the founder of DHKP/C, Dursun Karatas, escaped from the prison and escaped abroad.

Usurpation and robberies, aid campaigns, grants and subscriptions, incomes of the publications, proceeds from musical concerts, drug trafficking, and donations from European sympathizers are the general and main financial sources of leftist groups. Illegal activities include manifesto distribution, placard hanging, illegal demonstration, sabotage, arson, armed incursion, road blocking, ambush, armed propaganda, armed attacks on security forces and police vehicles, solicitation of donations, burglary, and robbery. All members in all left wing terrorist groups are exposed to political, military, disciplinary, and psychological training before being allowed active participation in group activities (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006; TNP, 2006).

The group has opposed U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Its socialist ideology asserts that U.S.-led imperialism attempts to dominate the world. Believing Turkey to be a puppet of imperialist powers, it aims to demolish Western influence in Turkey through violent activities (MIPT, n.d).

Ideology, goals, and structure of DHKP/C

DHKP/C has a Marxist-Leninist ideology, aiming to establish a state with leftist ideology imported from communist Soviets. In its website, DHKP/C indicates that the primary objective of the struggle is to destroy oligarchy, imperialism and the fascist state system and to establish Revolutionary People Party in power. The following list constitutes pre-determined enemies of the group: all imperialist powers, their military,

economic and political bases and their consulates; persons, businessmen, traders, and land owners who cooperate with present system; ministers, bureaucrats and all persons who represent the political party in power; military personnel, police, intelligence officers, and village guards; all political parties which try to prevent DHKP/C and operate within an oligarchic system; and, all state offices and private organizations that are used to suppress DHKP/C by serving the oligarchic and imperialist system (DHKC, 1995).

The group has a pyramid type organizational structure, led by Dursun Karatas. On top, there is a Central Committee and under this committee, three formations: Party Mass Structure, Regional Committee, and Front Structure. Sub-groups of Party Mass Structure are regional, provincial, district, and street level committees. The Regional Committee includes military, legal, and political authorities. The front structure has regional commandship and provincial committees (TNP, 2006).

DHKP/C activities and tactics

Generally DHKP/C operates in urban areas, but recently they have also initiated some terrorist activities in rural areas (Cline, 2004). They usually prefer big cities, such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana, to launch attacks at their targets. In Ankara in 1989, the group carried out bomb attacks on the Turkish American Businessmen's Association, the Economic Development Foundation, and the Metal Employees Union. They also claimed responsibility for assassinating a former deputy director of the Turkish National Intelligence Agency in Istanbul in 1990, and the murder of two U.S. Defense Department contractors in 1991. In the same year, the group shot and injured a U.S. Air Force officer in Izmir and murdered a British businessman in Istanbul. In 1992, the group launched a rocket attack on the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. The group bombed more than

twenty US and NATO military, commercial, and cultural facilities. In 1996, they killed a Turkish businessman and his two employees. An attempted attack on the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul with light anti-tank weapons was prevented by the police (USDOS, 2005; The Foundation for the Defense and Democracies [FDD], n.d.).

Table 3. Casualties caused by DHKP/C (1995-2006)

	Dead	(%)	Wounded	(%)	Total	(%)
Citizens	23	(45.1)	89	(27.8)	112	(30.2)
Government agents	28	(54.9)	231	(72.2)	259	(69.8)
Total	51		320		371	

Source: TNP (2006)

Between the years of 1995 and 2006, DHKP-C terrorist organization killed 23 civilians and 28 government agents, and wounded 89 civilians and 231 government agents (see Table 3). DHKP/C killed and wounded 259 security forces, more than 2.5 times the rate of civilian casualties (112). This supports the belief that DHKP/C's main target is the government and governmental forces, the biggest obstacles to its goal of establishing a communist system. However, they do not hesitate to attack civilians or generate collateral civilian casualties when considered necessary.

Suicide bombing has become their preferred method to destroy targets. They launched their first suicide attack in January 2001, and then another in September of that year (FDD, n.d.). Beginning in late 2001, they began to use explosive devices against Turkish and the U.S. targets. Just before the NATO summit in June 2004, they managed to explode a bus resulting in the four deaths (USDOS, 2005). On July 1, 2005, one of the suicide bombers of DHKP/C attempted to carry out an attack at the building of Ministry of Justice, most likely targeting the Minister, although this attack was unsuccessful. He was killed in the process of police intervention (CNN Turk, 2005). This incident is described on the group's web site (DHKC, 2005):

On July 1 we stood at the door of one of the centers where the oppressors have taken countless decisions to carry out massacres. We armed ourselves with bombs to demand a reckoning for the 119 people of ours that they murdered in opening their F-Type prisons and continuing their policy of prison isolation.

On July 1 our fighter Eyup Beyaz carried out a sacrificial action against the Justice Ministry. For some reason not known to us, the explosion did not occur. Our comrade was murdered by the death squads of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government which are charged with the task of protecting its torturing, murdering, thieving and pro-American ministers.

In December 1996, DHKP/C and PKK signed a protocol to perform joint operations against their mutual enemy - “oligarchy in Turkey”, but were unsuccessful in this endeavor because of lack of member support (Terrorist Organizations in Turkey, 2002; DHKC, 1998). Most members of the organization, including the leader Dursun Karatas, live in four European countries-Italy, Germany, Belgium, and Holland (BBC News, 2004). After Karatas’s prison escape and emigration in 1989, the group founded its headquarters in Germany (ICT, 2000). The group raises funds in Western Europe (IACSP, 2001) and is believed to have training facilities and offices in Western Europe, Lebanon and Syria (ICT, 2000; USDOS, 2005).

Since the European Union listed DHKP/C in the European terrorist organizations list, some European countries have become aware of the danger in their own countries. In April 2004, after long-term preparations of security forces and intelligence services, five countries, including Turkey, Italy, Holland, Germany, and Belgium, carried out joint and simultaneous operations against DHKP/C’s safe houses and bases. These operations detained 53 group members (Gunec, Gun, & Kaya, 2004).

Table 4. Activities of DHKP/C and counter-terrorism (1995-2006)

	Incident	Arrested	Dead	Wounded
DHKP/C	2,503	8,410	186	108


Source: TNP, 2006.

According to official reports, DHKP/C carried out 2,503 terrorist incidents between 1995 and 2006. In the operations conducted against DHKP-C, 186 terrorists were killed and 8,410 terrorists were captured alive (see Table 4). DHKP/C terrorist organization remains a serious threat to the security of Turkey.

(3) Comparison between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah

Comparing the combined data of all religiously motivated and left wing groups (see Figure 4) with the data of Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C (see Figure 5 and 6) reveals similar patterns in terrorists arrested, terrorist casualties, and security forces and civilians casualties, differing primarily by the number of arrests. That is, while the number of arrested terrorists in all left wing groups is higher than all religiously motivated terrorists, data on Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C reveals that there are more arrested terrorists in Turkish Hezbollah than DHKP/C.

Figure 5. Terrorist incidents conducted by DHKP & Turkish Hezbollah and counter- terrorism (1994-2006)¹⁵




Source: TNP, 2006.

Over the same period of time (1994-2006), DHKP/C committed almost five times more terrorist incidents. When compared to Turkish Hezbollah, DHKP/C members are more likely to be killed or wounded by security forces during armed conflict or because

¹⁵ Terrorist incidents conducted by DHKP/C and counter-terrorism activities cover the years between 1995 and 2006.

of their own mistakes (i.e. premature explosive detonation); 22 Turkish Hezbollah members were killed and five (5) wounded, while these numbers are 186 and 108 respectively for DHKP/C.

Figure 6. Casualties caused by DHKP/C & Turkish Hezbollah (1994-2006)¹⁶



Source: TNP, 2006.

While Turkish Hezbollah's main target is civilians, DHKP/C mostly targets security forces. Turkish Hezbollah scored 530 civilian casualties (dead and wounded) between 1994 and 2006, almost five (5) times the casualty rate caused by DHKP/C (112) between 1995 and 2006. Conversely, during the same time period, DHKP/C was responsible for 259 security force casualties; almost 4 times higher than Turkish Hezbollah sourced security-force casualties (71) (see Figure 6).

This preliminary examination confirms that while DHKP/C directs its attacks towards security forces, Turkish Hezbollah usually selects civilians as its target. Despite the different rates of incidents executed and members arrested, killed, or wounded, neither organization has difficulty in finding members who will be used in their murder missions. The number of arrested and killed members of terrorists in each year between

¹⁶ Casualties caused by DHKP/C cover the years between 1995 and 2006.

1994 and 2006 far exceed the incidents executed. This seems to indicate the recruitment of a huge number of individuals to deploy in different terrorist missions. With these findings in mind, the next chapter will examine literature and theoretical approaches to identify specific factors that lead individuals to participate in terrorist groups.

Accordingly, this theoretical and literature review will be structured to answer this study's main research questions: What are the background characteristics of terrorists from different ideological perspectives? How do potential recruits learn about terrorist groups? What types of factors motivate them to pursue and join groups with violent political ideologies?

CHAPTER THREE

PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Finding new members is a critical issue for all terrorist organizations: all terrorist organizations need new members in order to remain active. New members increase the morale and motivation of the other members of terrorist groups, make the terrorist organization strong against the government, keep the group dynamic, facilitate the organization's activities, and help publicize the organization's ideology.

A better understanding of terrorist participation has important policy and investigation implications. An empirical understanding of why individuals decide to participate in terrorist organizations is essential to create adequate policies and strategies to prevent the development and strengthening of terrorist groups. However, participation in terrorist organizations is one of the least studied areas, making the question of 'why does a person become a terrorist?' difficult to answer.

This chapter will examine the existing research literature regarding individual's participation in violent terrorist groups, and the various theoretical approaches that might clarify understanding of this process. Accordingly, this chapter consists of three sections: *the first section* includes examination of empirical studies on participation in terrorist groups. *The second section* discusses the literature in terms of individuals' participation in terrorist groups; these topics include "background characteristics", "learning related factors", "motivational factors", and "participation in suicide missions". In order to understand why people join terrorist groups, it is crucial to know "who these persons are" and "what kind of background characteristics they have." It is also necessary to know

how they become aware of terrorist groups. In other words, from what kinds of sources they learn about terrorist groups. A detailed understanding of the participation process also entails having information on the root motivations that promote their decisions to join terrorist groups. Finally, in order to have a more complete view, we also need to examine participants of suicide missions by answering the questions of “Who becomes a suicide bomber?” and “Why does he/she become a suicide bomber/terrorist?” *The third section* will focus on theoretical approaches that might help explain the participation process outlined above.

1. Research on Participation in Terrorist Groups

Studies that examine participation in terrorist groups are mostly limited to information on background characteristics of individuals joining terrorist organizations. However, information on how individuals learn about terrorist groups and the kinds of factors that motivate them are not well understood or represented in the research. In this section, several of the major studies of participation in terrorist groups are identified. The following sections then reviewed the key findings from this research.

Participation in a terrorist group is a process rather than a single decision (Sageman, 2004). In other words, individuals do not become terrorists overnight (Horgan, 2003b). There are several factors that prepare individuals to come to a decision to participate in a terrorist group. According to Martin (2006, p. 77), factors that lead to participation in terrorist groups and volunteering to commit violent acts are “(1) Logical choice and political strategy, (2) Collective rationality, (3) Lack of opportunity for political participation, (4) Dissatisfaction within an elite.” To Martin, individual level causes of terrorism might have rational, psychological, and cultural origins. From the

rationalist perspective, an individual makes a cost benefit analysis. Psychological motivation includes dissatisfaction with one's life and accomplishments. An individual's culturally-based motivation relates to his (or her) perception of others that contains the idea of us versus them.

In the terrorism literature, there are no studies that focus exclusively on participation in terrorist groups. Sageman (2004) examined the global Salafi jihad, as represented by al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups across the world. His data were culled from public sources as he did not have direct access to terrorists or governmental reports, and included in his analysis, terrorists for whom sufficient background information was available. Sageman details the reasons for individuals' participation in terrorist groups and involvement in terrorism under three main topics: social background (background characteristics), psychological make-up (motivation), and particular situation at the time of recruitment by concentrating on terrorists' specific characteristics, patterns of joining the jihad, and participant behaviors. Similarly, Stern's (2003) interviews of members of religiously motivated terrorist groups examined grievances that promote terrorism in the name of holy war. Although her main focus is not on participation, she identifies and discusses factors and motivators that facilitate participation.

Weinberg and Eubank (1987) examined the Italian left and right wing terrorist organizations' members in the 1970s, emphasizing 1977 as the turning point in Italy because of the changing characteristics of both left and right wing (Neo-Fascist) terrorist groups and their terrorist activities. After 1977, terrorist groups succeeded in recruiting significant numbers of people, and consequently, the number of terrorist incidents

increased. While the right wing groups were more effective before 1977, revolutionary communist groups rose to ascendancy afterwards. Using analysis of two nation-wide newspapers and court records, the authors tried to answer the question of whether there were background differences (gender, birth place, occupation, family relations, pre-terrorist political involvement, and age) between individuals involved in terrorist activities before and after 1977 by examining the biographical information of 2,512 individuals arrested or for whom arrest warrants were issued between 1970 and 1984. Smith (1994) focused on American left and right wing terrorist groups in the 1980s by examining records of 173 American terrorists that came to the attention of the FBI. Focusing on background characteristics and profiles of individual participants in left and right wing terrorist groups, he concluded that the findings about the left wing groups were consistent with the literature, but that right wing extremists differed significantly.

There are several studies conducted on Turkish terrorist organizations. Teymur (2004) descriptively examined the background characteristics of 74 members of left wing DHKP/C terrorist organization. For his study, he analyzed documents captured from terrorists to examine the effects of background characteristics on recruitment. Another study that surveyed prisoners focused on background characteristics of 1,077 Turkish left wing terrorists without having specific concerns about the participation issue (Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003). Ozender (1998) also surveyed PKK prisoners in 1994 and 1995 at the direction of the Turkish National Security Council in order to examine social and cultural characteristics of terrorists. This study examined 1,003 terrorists, including 451 prisoners who utilized the Amnesty Law that offered reduced punishments or pardons for cooperation with the law enforcement, and 552 prisoners who did not cooperate.

Cantekin's (2006) research also focused on the PKK; he collected data from official statements of 97 PKK terrorists who were captured or surrendered. This study was intended to create a general profile of terrorists, and generate ideas about the reasons for participation and desistence. Caglar (2006) focused on Turkish religiously motivated groups by interviewing six senior police officers and using open sources (i.e. newspaper archives) to generate his data.

The most comprehensive research to date about suicide terrorism is by Pape (2005) who examined all the suicide attacks (315 incidents) across the world between 1980 and 2003. He attempted to figure out the strategic logic behind the suicide terrorism, and his analysis included discussion on why individuals become suicide terrorists.

Examination of these studies revealed that there has been relatively little scholarly attention paid to understanding the factors that are relevant to participation in terrorist organizations. Together, these studies do not constitute a solid knowledge base for understanding the participation process. With the limitations of each of these studies in mind, the next part examines factors deemed relevant to participation in terrorist groups. These factors will be examined under the sub-topics of 'background characteristics', 'motivational factors', 'learning related factors', and 'participation in suicide missions.' Findings of abovementioned empirical studies and other terrorism literature will be used to structure a broader discussion.

2. Factors Affecting Participation in Terrorist Organizations

Some research indicates that psychological factors such as madness (i.e., insanity) and paranoia are important characteristics of individuals who become terrorists. They

assert that terrorists are mentally ill and that illness motivates them towards participation in terrorist groups. In this view, terrorism is not an intentional or decisive act, but one promoted by psychological forces behind it (Corrado, 1981; Post, 1990). Laqueur (2001) explains that all paranoids are not terrorists, but all terrorists are paranoid. They are paranoid of being victimized by hostile forces, and may also possess different levels of delusion and persecution mania. If these claims are true, then the answer to the question of “Why does a person become a terrorist?” is simple; individuals become terrorists because they are mad and paranoid. However, no comprehensive empirical research on the psychological conditions of terrorists has been conducted to substantiate this claim (Sageman, 2004). In fact, the empirical validity of these claims is difficult to assess since there is no way to test them directly as motivations may be deeply hidden in the unconscious. What we know about terrorists’ psychology is much less than what we do not know (Akers, 2000; Ferracuti, 1982; Merari, 1990).

A majority of researchers believe that terrorists are neither psychotic nor abnormal; they are normal persons (Borum, 2004; Crenshaw, 1981; Hudson, 1999; Lyons & Harbinson, 1986 cited in Horgan, 2003a; McCormick 2003; Silke, 2004a). Most of them appear to have above the average intelligence level and also have sophisticated ethical and moral development (Merari, 1990). Sageman’s (2004) examination of 61 terrorists’ childhoods revealed that only four of them had conduct disorders. Others had normal childhoods with no criminal record. He concludes that mental illness as an explanation for terrorism is not supported in his research.

There is no single terrorist personality (Duyvesteyn, 2004; Hudson, 1999). A factor which effectively influences one person may not be relevant to another,

particularly because people who join terrorist groups come from different cultures, religions, nationalities, and social structures. As Stern (2003, p. 283) indicates “the same variables (political, religious, social, or all of the above) that seem to have caused one person to become a terrorist might cause another to become a saint.” The following discussion elaborates upon the factors that are thought relevant to participation in terrorist groups.

(1) Background characteristics

To understand why an individual becomes a terrorist, it is necessary to find out who becomes a terrorist and what that person’s background characteristics are. Analysis of background characteristic is likely to give a detailed picture of individuals who participate in terrorist groups.

Different terrorist groups such as left, right, separatist, or religiously motivated have different ideological perspectives, and it is likely that different ideologies would attract different kinds of people. Accordingly, background characteristics may play a role in individuals’ selection of terrorist organization in which they will participate (Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). A single background characteristic alone might not be directly responsible for an individual’s becoming a terrorist, although the combination of several factors, such as learned factors and various motivational factors, might result in an individual’s decision to join a terrorist organization. Background characteristics of terrorists to be considered in this discussion are: age, gender, education, social-economic status, occupation, marital status, and geographic location.

Age: Age is a significant biological factor that is associated with participation in terrorist organizations, although there is some variation in the literature in terms of

terrorists' ages. The literature usually claims that individuals who join terrorist groups are young, usually between the ages of 15 and 25; this range is stable across the cultures and religions (Silke, 2003). Turk (1982) reinforces that two important predictors of the process of moving from resentment to using terrorist tactics and ideology are social class and youthfulness. Ibrahim's (1982, cited in Sageman, 2004) findings on two different Egyptian terrorist groups also support this claim. Some studies of terrorism in Turkey also revealed that majority of the left wing (65%), right wing (72.5%), and separatist (54%) terrorist groups' members were between the ages of 14 and 25 (Alkan, 2002; Alkan & Citak, 2006). One study of left wing Turkish terrorist prisoners found terrorists to be older, with about one quarter (24.4%) between 18 and 26, and slightly over one-third (33.3%) between 26 and 31 years old (Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003). Cantekin's (2006) study found that the three quarters (75%) percentage of PKK members were between the ages of 15-25, almost 20 percent higher than found in Alkan's (2002) research. Further, Cantekin's data indicated that 83.5 percent were under the age of 25.

Other studies contradict the assumption that terrorists are usually between 14 and 25. Weinberg and Eubank's (1987) research found that terrorists were younger; out of 2,512 individuals in their sample, almost half (46%) were younger than 11 years old, and further, that left wing terrorists were younger than right wing terrorists. Conversely, others argue that terrorism is not a youth movement (Sageman, 2004; Smith, 1994). Smith's (1994, p. xii) examination of American right and left wing groups found that terrorists are "thirty-something" activists with an average age of 35 at indictment for left wing groups and 39 for right wing groups. These average ages are considerably older than the findings of previous studies across the world. This finding demonstrates that

there may be a significant difference between the age distribution of the right and left wing groups in America with the average age of the right wing terrorists higher than left wing groups. Sageman's (2004) findings are analogous to Smith's (1994); he found that the average age at the time of participation was slightly above twenty-five.

To summarize, studies of different terrorist groups in different geographic locations in different years revealed inconsistent results. However, taking all the research into account, it can be inferred that overall, terrorists' ages tend to range between 11 and 39, and when compared with right wing groups, participants in left wing organizations appear to be somewhat younger.

Gender: Like age, gender is one of the most important biological predictors of participation in terrorist groups (Silke, 2003). Almost all terrorist groups across the world are male dominated, with men comprising around 80 percent of group members for many terrorist organizations (Merari, 1990). Recently however, women appear to be interested in joining terrorist activities, especially in religiously motivated extremist groups. Female participation in terrorism in the form of suicide bombers in the Middle East, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya is indicative of this trend. Local and regional conflicts are regarded as one of the basic reasons for this apparent trend (Oliverio & Lauderdale, 2005).

Females are likely to be introduced into terrorism by male counterparts. Female terrorists generally do not have as much power position as males (Galvin, 1983).

Women's roles, however, may change depending on the terrorist organizations in which they serve. The Tupamaros, a Latin American terrorist organization, used female terrorists to collect intelligence, to serve as nurses and to maintain safe-houses.

Depending on the commitment to the cause and level of the motivation, women terrorists

may be treated more professionally (Hudson, 1999). Females also have participated in suicide missions for different ideological groups regardless of ideological orientation. Galvin (1983) indicates that women's roles are usually based on their sexuality.

In terms of recruitment of women as terrorists, left wing terrorist groups appear to be more likely to recruit females than religiously motivated groups. One third (33%) of Teymur's (2004) sample examining the left wing DHKP/C was female terrorists. In Smith's (1994) study, the number of females was less than males in both left and right wing groups in America. But, the percentage of females in left wing groups (27%) was substantially more than the percentage of women in right wing groups (7%). Weinberg and Eubank's (1987) sample was male (82%) dominated, too, but they found a significant increase in the number of females after 1977. The general gender profile seems similar for separatist groups: 11 percent of Cantekin's (2006) sample, and approximately 8 percent of Ozonder's sample (cited in Cantekin, 2006) was comprised of female terrorists. Although female participation in terrorist organizations is on the rise, terrorist organizations regardless of type and ideology continue to be male dominated.

Education: "Education level" is a widely discussed factor to explain possible participation in terrorist organizations. Lack of adequate education has been viewed as a root cause of terrorism as well. Uneducated persons may be likely to join terrorist groups because they are more susceptible to influence by terrorist propaganda, and they might be more easily brainwashed than more educated persons. However, research on terrorists' level of education contradicts this popular misconception.

Sageman's (2004) findings refute the common idea that terrorism is a result of lack of education. His research on global Salafi jihad members revealed that of the 132

terrorists on whom he was able to gather data about education level, 22 (17%) had less than high school degree, 16 (12%) graduated from high school, 38 (29%) had some type of college education, 44 (33%) finished the college, 7 (5%) had a master's degree, and 5 (4%) had doctoral degrees. In other word, 83 percent finished a high school or higher education, and a majority (over 60%) attended some college. Sageman (2004) emphasized that his sample of terrorists were more educated than the average person across the world. Their university studies ranged from religion to science, engineering, computer science, and social science. Likewise, Kreuger and Maleckova (2003) examined the background characteristics of 129 Hezbollah (Lebanese) members and found that 47 percent of the Hezbollah members attended secondary school, compared to only 38 percent of the general population of Lebanon, indicating a positive relationship between education and likelihood of becoming a Hezbollah member. Ibrahim's examination of Egyptian terrorist groups (1982 cited in Sageman, 2004), and Post, Sprinzak and Denny's (2003) study on 35 incarcerated Middle-Eastern terrorists revealed similar findings, that terrorists were educated people.

Research on left wing groups shows comparable results. In the late 1970s, the German Federal Ministry of Domestic Affairs examined 227 arrested left-wing terrorists, and found that terrorists had above average educational levels and many of them attended university (Sageman, 2004). These findings are supported for the majority of Italian right and left wing terrorist groups (Weinberg & Eubank, 1987) as well as Turkish left wing groups (Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003), whose participants generally had at least a high school education.

Explaining why educated persons become terrorists elicits discrepancies between the researchers. One perspective contends that universities or other professional schools have become one of the primary sources of encountering and learning about terrorist groups. These institutions create an appropriate environment for religious, revolutionary, or other groups that try to find new members (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003; Russell & Miller, 1978). Kreuger and Maleckova (2003) assert that educated people with affluent backgrounds are more likely to engage in political activities for several reasons: political engagement using violent methods requires very low level of expertise and effort; these terrorists are educated and wealthy enough to direct their attentions to these kinds of activities rather than basic survival and economic concerns; and, the opportunity cost in terms of participation is lower for affluent people compared to impoverished persons which makes it easier for affluent people to become more closely committed to the objectives of the terrorist organizations.

Other studies, on the other hand, refute that terrorists are educated people. Smith's (1994) examination of American domestic terrorist groups revealed that rightist groups were not well educated, and there was a substantial variation in education level between right and left wing groups: over half of the leftist groups were college or university graduates, while only 12 percent of the right wing terrorists had a college degree. Cantekin's (2006) study on the separatist PKK group revealed that 80 percent had a middle school or lower level education while just 20 percent of the sample had completed high school, and only 2 had completed a university degree. Similarly, in Ozonder's (1997, cited in Cantekin, 2006) research, the majority of the PKK terrorists graduated only from primary school (47, 2%).

Findings from the research challenge the common belief that terrorists are uneducated individuals, however, given that some studies found that terrorists are not well educated, it is still difficult to propose a relationship between terrorism and educational level that is generalizable to different geographical, ideological, or cultural contexts.

Socio-economic status and poverty: The terrorism literature habitually indicates that underprivileged individuals are likely to be targeted by terrorist organizations for recruitment, although the research includes some controversial findings. Turk (1982) attempts to explain why people who have lower and higher socio-economic status might engage in terrorism. To Turk, lower-class socialization reflects experiences of material and cultural deprivation. Utilizing these negative life conditions, terrorist organizations may promise equal life standards to individuals with lower socio-economic status. Contrary to lower-class socialization, higher-class socialization reflects privileges and successful experiences, making upper-class members more likely to take decisive action, challenge authorities openly when they are not happy with policies or arrangements, and even to view terrorism as an indicator of their decisiveness and political commitment. In this context, young persons and politically inexperienced persons are more likely to join illegal political movements (Turk, 1982). Using a similar approach, Crenshaw (1981) contends that elites of a society, usually small in number and unhappy with social or economic contexts, may initiate terrorist activities on behalf of a wider constituency. They, however, may not ask for the approval and support of the constituency. These movements usually emerge when mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide. Many revolutionary movements demonstrate this approach.

Stern (2003) notes that the role of poverty as a risk factor for terrorist participation is controversial. Nevertheless, she seems to support idea that there is a correlation between poverty and participation in terrorist groups. “The September 11 bombers were mostly drawn from Saudi Arabia’s elite does not prove that poverty and terrorism are uncorrelated. Several studies have shown that states most susceptible to ethno-religious conflict are those that are poorer, unstable, and have a history of violence and conflict” (p. 284). She presents a compelling argument that in different parts of the world, rebellions occurred during periods of economic stagnations; in poor countries it is easy to convince poor people to join terrorist group by offering them economic benefits; and in some organizations militants’ families are given monetary support. Likewise, Laqueur (1977) indicates that terrorism is more likely to appear in areas where people have grievances, such as poverty, inequality, lack of political participation and injustice.

There are examples that show how terrorist groups make use of the poor economic conditions of individuals. In Indonesia, after the 1997-1998 crises, the economic downturn and lack of adequate job opportunities increased participation in extremist groups that offer employment (Stern, 2003). Lower socio-economic status characterizes Turkish left wing groups. Seventy-two percent of all terrorists indicated that they have lower level socio-economic status. Only one in four (26 percent) indicated middle socio-economic class origins. The rate of upper class individuals was just 2 percent (Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003). For suicide missions, some terrorist groups provide the families of recruited youth with financial support; this may motivate poor youths to join terrorist groups or/and launch suicide attacks (Pape, 2005).

Not all studies support the claim that terrorist groups attract lower socio-economic status individuals. In fact, many groups do not have uniform socio-economic characteristics. While some of these studies found that terrorists are from middle or upper social class (Sageman, 2004), some others revealed that terrorists are from middle or lower social class (Ibrahim, 1982 cited in Sageman, 2004; Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003). A study on Italian terrorist groups found that the socio-economic status of terrorists varies depending on in which type of ideological groups they serve. Italian right wing group members were from the middle class; left wing groups' original social status was lower than the right wing groups' members (Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). Sageman (2004) divided his sample into three categories according to socio-economic status of terrorists' families: upper, middle, and lower class. For the 102 people (out of 172) for whom he was able to gather data on socio-economic status, 18 (17%) were upper, 56 (56%) were middle, and 28 (27%) were lower class individuals. Seventy-three percent of all individuals represented were from the middle or upper classes. He concluded that members of global Salafi jihad come from relatively rich and better educated families than the average population. Analogous with Sageman's findings, a study of German left wing terrorist groups revealed that terrorists generally come from upper-middle class (Sageman, 2004). A study that examined the background characteristics of 129 Hezbollah members and compared it with the general population of Lebanon found that the poverty rate of Hezbollah members was 28 percent, compared to 33 percent of the general population. These findings suggested a negative relationship between poverty rate and participation in Hezbollah (Kreuger & Maleckova, 2003). In conclusion, the connection between poverty and terrorism is indirect, complicated and weak (Kreuger & Maleckova,

2003). Like education and age, research suggests that there may be variation across types of terrorist organizations.

Occupation: Sageman (2004) notes that terrorists are popularly known as people who do not have decent employment. By contrast, his study revealed that of the 134 terrorists, 101 had some kind of occupation; he classified the remainder (33 terrorists) as unskilled. More specifically, 44 out of 101 were professionals, such as physicians, architects, preachers and teachers. Others were police, military, mechanics, and small businessmen, etc. He contended that involvement in terrorist activities was the result of rising, not lowered expectations: having no employment or occupation did not appear to be a significant factor in participation in terrorist groups. Despite their occupational advantages, Sageman reported that the subjects of his study preferred being terrorists. Similarly, Hudson (1999) concluded that terrorist groups had recently been recruiting experts in different occupational fields, such as communications, computer programming, engineering, finance, and the sciences. For example, Al-Qaeda recruits highly skilled professionals from engineering, medicine, chemistry, physics, computer programming, communications, and so forth.

In contrast to Sageman's study, other research supports the claim that terrorists do not have decent employment. Cantekin (2006) found that 35.1 percent of PKK members were unemployed, while others worked at low paying jobs, such as construction (22.7%) or as owners of small shops like auto-repair or tailoring (22.7%). This group also contained students (15.5%). Similarly, Ozonder's (1998) study found that almost 36 percent of PKK members did not have any employment before joining the group.

Another study of left wing terrorist group members in Germany in the late 1970s revealed

that just 35 percent of 227 terrorist had a fulltime job (Sageman, 2004). Teymur's (2004) data indicated that more than 50 percent of all left wing terrorists (in the DHKP/C sample he studied) were unemployed with just 8 percent of them working in full time jobs. Caglar's (2006) findings on Turkish religiously motivated groups revealed that 42.5% of his sample was unemployed; the remainder were students (12%), workers (14%), public officers (5.5%), and small-scale tradesmen (26%). In Caglar's data, the occupations of terrorists' parents were small-scale tradesmen (33%), workers and public officials (29%), farmers (24%), and retirees (14%). Teymur (2004) and Caglar's (2006) research indicate considerable occupational variation between the two ideologically different groups active in Turkey. That is, religiously motivated groups (as a whole) appeared to have occupational advantages compared to the left wing DHKP/C groups. Group based differences were also observed in the US; right wing groups had lower job skills as compared to left wing group (Smith, 1994). While many leftists were professionals, such as physicians, attorneys, teachers, and social workers, a large number of right wing groups' members were unemployed or impoverished, although some were self-employed workers (Smith, 1994). Weinberg and Eubank's (1987) study demonstrated that the occupational characteristic of terrorists changed over time. Until 1977, terrorists had higher level occupational status as business managers, legal, medical, and journalism professionals, and industrialists, as well as some middle class occupations like salesmen, shopkeepers, police, and military forces. After 1977, when the number of terrorist groups and incidents increased, the quality of occupation of terrorists' decreased. These occupations included workers, white-collar clerks, and some number of criminals, ex-convicts, and prostitutes.

Occupational characteristics of terrorists appear to change depending on the era, group ideology, type, and geographical location of terrorist groups. It should be remembered that many terrorist groups may prefer students to recruit, and that it is expected that some findings may reflect terrorists as unemployed.

Marital status: It is a commonly held belief that terrorists are single persons without the social and emotional ties that accompany marriage. Some groups, including the PKK, see marriage as a biggest obstacle for the group and they aim to destroy marriage based values. The PKK declares that marriage is a betrayal of the revolutionary movement of the PKK (Ozonder, 1998). Russell and Miller's (1977) study (conducted during the 1970s) revealed that between 70 -80 percent of terrorists are unmarried. This is especially the case for left wing ideologues. Many of these groups believe that total dedication to a revolutionary cause requires no social ties (Hudson, 1999). Two different Turkish studies of left wing groups revealed similar findings. In one study, only 17 percent of the sample was married; the remainder was single (including divorced and widowed members) (Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003). In the other, only ten percent were married (Teymur, 2004). Cantekin's (2006) findings on the separatist group PKK support these findings. That is, 90 percent of PKK members were single.

Sageman's (2004) study on religious extremists (global Salafi jihad) contradicts the findings of the studies on left wing and separatist groups. He found that 73 percent (83 persons) of his sample was married. Some of those in his sample who were single were too young to be married, a student, or had economic problems.

Based on these findings, religiously motivated groups' members are more likely to be married as compared to left wing groups. However, there is not enough research

that examines detailed information about different ideological groups across the world to make broad generalizations.

Geographic location and mobility: When individuals live away from their families, they lose their social ties with close friends and family members; and they may become more open or susceptible to exposure to terrorists' propaganda. Ibrahim (1982, cited in Sageman, 2004) found that the mobility distanced his samples from their families and friends in their hometowns, especially when they moved to big university cities to pursue education. This process creates suitable conditions for terrorist groups that seek new members for recruitment. As Ibrahim (1980, p. 448) notes, "The militant Islamic groups with their emphasis on brotherhood, mutual sharing, and spiritual support become the functional equivalent of the extended family to the youngster who has left his behind."

On the other hand, sharing the same birthplace might be an important factor during the recruitment process. It may be especially important when individuals live away from their hometown/birthplace. Terrorist recruiters may use the same birthplace to easily establish friendship bonds.

Urban areas are considered advantageous places for terrorist organizations to find new members to recruit. Terrorists may easily hide themselves in crowded populations. Social events like demonstrations generally occur in urban areas that might attract individuals' attention and may help them learn about the ideology of terrorist groups. Further, when we consider that universities are mostly located in the big cities/urban areas, and terrorists choose their members among the youths especially from the universities, the importance of urban areas is magnified. Additionally, if the

unemployment rate is high in big cities, it might facilitate recruitment. It must be stressed that in larger populations and in bigger cities, the greater the possibility of terrorist activities including recruitment (Ross, 1993). Weinberg and Eubank's (1987) examination of Italian terrorists found that although terrorists were overwhelmingly born in smaller cities, as adults, they were more likely to live in the big cities. They conclude that terrorists are geographically mobile and generally chose big cities. Further, they could not find significant differences between the right and left wing terrorists in terms of size of the communities in which they lived. Teymur's (2004) findings parallel Weinberg and Eubank's (1987). Teymur (2004) found that 60 percent of terrorists who moved to another city were originally from villages or rural areas. In contrast, Ibrahim (1982, cited in Sageman, 2004) focused on the place of recruitment and found that terrorists were from rural or small towns. In Sageman's (2004) study, 115 (70%) out of 165 terrorists joined the terrorist groups in a country where they did not grow up.

In sum, even if terrorists were born in villages or rural areas, they usually are recruited in big cities where they live as adults; however, not all studies support this claim.

Number of siblings: Some studies have examined the number of terrorist's siblings, reasoning that a large number of siblings in a family might result in less parental control over the children. This, in turn, might affect individuals' participation in criminal groups. In this context, Cantekin (2006) found that 65 percent of the PKK members had six (6) or more siblings, while Teymur (2004) found the same for 36 percent of the left wing DHKP/C members.

Overall, almost all background characteristics of terrorists vary according to the geographical operational location, ideologies represented, and desired objectives. Even within the same country there are variations in the background characteristics of different terrorist groups. Among all background related variables, gender appears to have the most generalizable characteristics. That is, all the terrorist groups are male dominated, despite an increase in the participation of females in some terrorist groups.

(2) Learning related factors

The participation process includes various factors that help individuals learn about terrorist groups and their activities. The learning process eases individuals' participation. The more effective the learning factors, the easier and more quickly individuals commit to join terrorist groups. Accordingly, Horgan (2003b, p. 113) accentuates that becoming a terrorist involves a learning process, "There is undeniably a gradual learning process that appears to typify involvement in terrorism." The things people learn may include various issues such as motives, attitudes, rationalizations, and even the ways joining criminal groups and committing crime (Vito & Holmes, 1994). There might be several sources that individuals learn about terrorist groups such as friendship, kinship, prison life, propaganda through publications, the media and/or internet, and organizational activities.

Friendship: Friendship is a significant factor in the process of participation in terrorist organizations. Many findings suggest that friends facilitate the learning process and/or help their friends and acquaintances join terrorist groups (Ibrahim, 1980, 1982; Sageman, 2004; Della Porta, 1988 cited in Sageman, 2004). People, especially the young, may tend to adapt their peer's perspective since they like or respect them, or they may want to be more acceptable to them (Kiknadze, 2007). Ibrahim's (1980, 1982) study

found the influence of friendship relations on participation in two Egyptian religiously motivated terrorist organizations, The Islamic Liberation Organization (ILO) and The Jamaat al-Muslimin (MG). Sageman (2004) points out that despite lack of strong religious beliefs of some al-Qaeda members, they learned through friendship about the religiously motivated terrorist group (al-Qaeda) that they joined. Solidification of friendship relations precedes formal induction into the terrorist organization (Sageman, 2004). Due to strong relations between friends, as in the example of global Salafi jihad members, sometimes prospective terrorists volunteer to join the terrorist group before receiving an invitation from the terrorist organization's members. Sageman's (2004) research revealed that 150 out of the 172 terrorists he examined had preexisting social bonds before formally joining the global jihad. Similarly, TNP officers' interviews with detained al-Qaeda terrorists who organized suicide bombing attacks in Istanbul in November 3 against the Israeli and Western targets (two synagogues, an HSBC bank, and the British Consulate) revealed that they joined terrorist organizations through family and friendship networks. To a large extent, these findings demonstrate that preexisting friendships and family bonds were effective mechanisms in terms of learning about and joining terrorist groups (McGarrell, Freilich & Chermak, 2007).

Della Porta (1988, cited in Sageman, 2004) examined 1,200 Italian left wing terrorists using court records: he found that seventy percent of his sample had at least one friend who was already a member of a terrorist organization. Thus, friendship appears to be a significant factor in terms of learning about Italian left wing terrorist groups and their activities. Similarly, Cantekin (2006) identified friendship as the biggest factor in terms of imposing PKK's ideology. That is, those who mention PKK

propaganda activities as a factor in their participation mostly emphasized on the influence of friends (67.3%) as a source of propaganda. Della Porta (1988, cited in Sageman, 2004) notes:

“Decisions to join underground organizations were taken by clusters or cliques of people connected to each other by joint involvements in more than one activity. For example, quite frequently new recruits were next-door neighbors who worked in the same department of a big factory; school friends who used to spend their vacations together; cousins who belonged to the same voluntary association” (p. 132).

Kinship: Family members and/or relatives who are members of terrorist organizations have significant effects on learning about the activities and ideologies of a terrorist group and becoming a member of it. There are many couples, brothers, and sisters who belong to the same terrorist organizations, reinforcing the learning process through interaction between the close family members (Ibrahim, 1980, 1982; Sageman, 2004; Della Porta, 1988 cited in Sageman, 2004). Almost all the research revealed that kinship was a significant factor for participation in terrorist groups, including Wasmund’s (1986, cited in Sageman, 2004) examination of the German Red Army Faction (RAF), Della Porta’s (1988, cited in Sageman, 2004) and Weinberg and Eubank’s (1987) studies on Italian terrorist groups, Ibrahim’s (1980, 1982) research on Egyptian religiously motivated terrorist groups, Post, Sprinzak and Denny’s (2003) research on religiously motivated and secular groups, Teymur’s (2004) study on a Turkish left wing group, and Cantekin’s (2006) study on separatist PKK.

According to Post, Sprinzak and Denny (2003), politically active families socialize their children to the movement at early ages. Twenty percent of religiously motivated group members and 30 percent of secular group members emphasized that the main factor that influenced their participation in their respective terrorist organizations

was their families. Some of the terrorists who did not have any family members in the groups stated that their younger brothers followed them and joined the same group, so their participation set an example for their brothers. In the event that a family member, such as father or elder brother, was already in a terrorist group, it was most likely that persons would join the same organization. In only a few instances did individuals not follow the same path as their family members; in these cases, individuals selected more radical groups to join. Teymur's (2004) findings are analogous: he found that family members of almost half his sample had been arrested at least one time because of their terrorist activities. Being a member of a family in which some members were/are terrorists was likely to help individuals learn about terrorism and terrorist groups. As an example of the influence of family members on participation in terrorist groups, Silke (2003) provides the life story of Gerry Adams, the leader of the republican political party Sinn Fein. Adams explains that his basic motivation was his family's background. His father and uncle were members of the IRA. While his father was in the IRA, he was shot and wounded by the Royal Ulster Constabulary. His uncle was involved in a bombing campaign in Britain. Gerry stressed that being a member of the IRA was a kind of carrying out a family tradition.

Sageman (2004) found that 14 percent of his sample learned and joined terrorist groups through kinship connections. For instance, the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks included brothers of two different families (al-Hazmi and al-Shehri) and three cousins (Hamza, Ahmed and Ahmed al-Haznawi). Additionally, marriage is another means to learn about and become involved in terrorist activities through spouse or/and spouse's relatives. Sageman (2004) notes that some of the individuals converted to Islam

upon marriage to Muslim women and became the supporter or active members of global Salafi jihad. Kinship has a significant effect on the participation in left wing groups, as well as religiously motivated groups. In Weinberg and Eubank's (1987) research, 13 percent of all terrorists had family connections in their respective terrorist groups; the researchers also observed a greater prevalence of married couples, and believed this is a result of husbands' encouragement of their wives. In Della Porta's (1988, cited in Sageman, 2004) study, 298 out of 1,200 left wing terrorists (Italian Red Brigades) had at least one relative (spouse, brother, sister) in the terrorist organization who shared similar beliefs. Therefore, for Italian left wing groups, participation in terrorist groups is more likely when it occurs through kinship ties. Cantekin's (2006) analysis of the PKK revealed that 5.4 percent of terrorists that joined the group as result of the organizational propaganda exposed to their families or relatives to propaganda. Fields (1979, cited in Horgan, 2003a) studied terrorism in Northern Ireland and found familial influence on persons who decided to become terrorists.

Contrary to the aforementioned finding, some researchers emphasize that although nationalist or separatist terrorists are loyal to their parents, anarchic and left wing ideological groups are disloyal to their parent's generation. In fact, anarchist groups think that they are striking at their parents using terrorism, and attack outside enemies to help them heal their inner wounds (Hudson, 1999; Sageman, 2004). Nevertheless, existing research confirms the influence of kinship factors in participation in terrorist groups, regardless of the ideology and objective of terrorist groups.

Prison life: In the criminological literature, prisons are seen as colleges of crime because in prison individuals learn how to commit and how to rationalize crime (Vito &

Holmes, 1994). Likewise, individuals in prison have opportunities to learn more about terrorist groups, usually through activities of terrorist organizations. Therefore, prisons are the places where terrorist groups find potential members to recruit. Apparently, prisons function to consolidate the individual, group and organizational identity; as a result, individuals may become more committed to the cause after their incarceration. Prison recruitment is not a new phenomenon. Several terrorist groups such as the White Supremacy movement in America, the Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) in Italy, and the IRA in Ireland have utilized prisons to recruit new members (Smith, 1994).

Sageman (2004) divided his sample (172 persons) into four clusters, the central staff (32 persons), the Southeast Asian Cluster (21 persons), the Maghreb (53 persons), and the core Arab cluster (66 persons). He found that 15 out of 26 (58%) members of the central staff had been imprisoned prior to joining terrorist groups.¹⁷ Similarly, Post, Sprinzak and Denny (2003) found that almost 77 percent of the religiously motivated group members and 54 percent of secular group members indicated that their commitment to the cause of terrorist groups increased while in the prison. Additionally, 84 percent of religiously motivated group and 65 percent of secular group members reported that they would serve the group after their release from the prison.

Propaganda through publications, the media, and/or internet: Propaganda is an effective tool for terrorists to communicate a specific message to a target audience. Propaganda can inform, educate, recruit, draw attention, publicize the cause, get public support, create fear in the government, strengthen the morale of terrorists, and justify violent operations. Hoffman (2006) notes “propaganda can be a vehicle for recruitment-meant to win new converts to the cause” (p. 199). The means of terrorist propaganda are

¹⁷ He has imprisonment related data on 26 out of 32 members of the central staff.

radio, television, internet, video productions, and publications like newspapers, books, or flyers. The media, publications, and the internet have been particularly significant tools to promote organizational ideology and recruit new members; many people learn about terrorist groups and their activities through these propaganda tools.

Terrorist groups use media during the recruitment process (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006). Some terrorist groups create their own media organizations. For example, the PKK, a Turkish separatist terrorist organization, has its own television station which broadcasts in Europe. Weinberg and Eubank (1987) indicate that in Italy, the media played a significant role in terms of making individuals aware of the activities of terrorist groups. Because of media coverage, many people joined right or left wing terrorist structures. Hudson (1999) concludes that “thanks to media coverage, the methods, demands, and goals of terrorists are quickly made known to potential terrorists, who may be inspired to imitate them upon becoming stimulated by media accounts of terrorist acts” (p. 17).

With respect to the importance of organizational publications, one religiously motivated group’s leader, in Stern’s (2003) study, emphasized that once a young man subscribes to their monthly publication, it is the indicator that he is mentally prepared to actively take part in the group. Publications are not only a way to promote the group but also a way to finance the group. William Pierce “The Turner Diaries” inspired Timothy McWeigh, the bomber in the Oklahoma City bombing case. He was such a fan of the book; he even slept with a copy of this book under his pillow (Stern, 2003). KKK leader Robert Miles regularly mailed his identity related newsletter “Beyond the Bars...The Stars” to 1,500-2,000 white inmates throughout the US. These publications were a very

effective source for promoting the cause and finding new volunteers (Smith, 2004). The PKK has utilized ideological books, newspapers and magazines in the youth recruitment process in high schools and universities (Cantekin, 2006). Regarding this, the story of former PKK member Demirkiran (1996, cited in Cantekin, 2006) is very informative:

“I met the members of the PKK... They gave me a book named “Devletlerarasi Somurge Kurdistan”¹⁸ (Kurdistan, an International Colony)” by Ismail Besikci. I was strictly recommended to read and understand it. This book was followed by other books. Now, I was a member of the PKK. I believed the organization with my whole soul. I was making the propaganda of the organization at home, in the school and in my neighborhood” (p. 89).

In this context, Cantekin’s (2006) study found that 9.1 percent of the PKK members were influenced by PKK’s publications. Not only the PKK but also almost all other Turkish terrorist groups utilize the media, organizational publications, and the internet to promote their ideologies, receive support from the community, and find new members to recruit. Caglar (2006) in reference to Turkish terrorist groups indicates “distributing tapes, using mobile phones, preparing radio broadcast, hosting web sites (not all of them), publishing journals and newspapers, operating TV channels from abroad, and spraying graffiti are among the means used in dissemination of their messages and propaganda” (p. 152). He goes on to emphasize that these propaganda tools often emphasize the concepts of “honor, religion, the holy book, the nation, motherland, freedom, and national salvation in their messages to the public.” These propaganda methods have generated individuals’ feeling ideologically close to terrorist groups (Caglar, 2006).

The internet is another important tool utilized by terrorist organizations to disseminate their ideology, make propaganda, and recruit new members (Enders &

¹⁸ Beşikçi, İ. (1990). *Devletlerarası Sömürge Kurdistan: Bilim, Resmi Ideoloji, Devlet, Demokrasi ve Kürt orunu*. Istanbul; Alan Yayıncılık.

Sandler, 2006). Terrorists' websites contain a variety of information designed to influence individuals, such as videos showing the group and its members as heroes or victims of the existing system, motivational movies, articles that criticize the government and its policies, biographies or pictures of terrorists killed by security forces or during suicide missions, religious justifications for violent activities, ideological songs or poems, information about organizational publications, and information on some activities like donations and funds given to the families, widows or orphans of suicide bombers or other members died while serving the group. Interactive features of the internet facilitates terrorist recruiters' job as it creates "cyber-realm where online visitors, recruits, recruiters can participate in chatrooms for real-time communicate and idea sharing" (Woods, 2007, p. 273).

Organizational activities: Organizational activities that create awareness about terrorist groups and their activities may include public speeches, demonstrations, meetings, religious speeches/sermons, worships, and/or social movements. These may also include terrorist groups' activities in the schools, particularly in the universities and high schools, and activities through legal structures such as associations, political parties, or offices used for publishing newspapers or magazines.

Worship through religious speeches and gatherings are important propaganda means in the recruitment process of religiously motivated terrorist groups (Ibrahim, 1980, 1982; Sageman, 2004). Through worship, terrorist organizations are legitimated and terrorist activities are justified by emphasizing that what they do is God's will. Beiner (2006) notes that "Perhaps the most interesting aspect of religion as a theory of terrorism is how a devout believer could come to mix politics and religion in such a way. The

answer is in the conception of worship... Worship is part of service to God and all of humanity on behalf of God.” Ibrahim (1980, 1982) emphasized that Egyptian terrorist groups use worships to expose people to their ideology which, in turn, helps them recruit new members.

Religious sanctuaries, like mosques, have been used for brainwashing and recruitment by al-Qaeda members. Friendship groups established around mosques allow terrorists to generate propaganda to convince individuals to join the global Salafi jihad. Potential members listen carefully to preachers (that support al-Qaeda), question them, and reach some form of synthetic understanding of their new faith. “Intensification of faith and beliefs is a stage characterized by active personnel learning about the new faith... This period involves a reappraisal of life, values, beliefs, and good” (Sageman, 2004, p. 117). As a result of interactions, they gradually gain new understanding and perspective about the world and they try to see their role in it. This learning process includes intense social interactions. However, as Sageman (2004) notes, it is not expected that everybody would be responsive to religious appeals. Rather than appealing to persons who have strong religious commitments, appeals may be most effective to those in different sects who are not satisfied with these sects. “Those receptive to a religious appeal accept the notion of an active supernatural dimension” (p. 115).

Social movements can be defined as campaigns that include promotion of change or, conversely, preservation of something believed to be under threat. Social movements include mass actions and may affect many others, as was the case in the Catholic civil rights movements in Northern Ireland in the 1960s (Martin, 2006). Religiously motivated groups use different social activities. For instance, they use special days, such as an

anniversary of martyrs. Since these days are important for them, these activities give them opportunities to promote their ideologies and recruit new members among those attending ceremonies (Alkan, 2002; Beiner, 2006). Similarly, separatist and left wing groups usually use legal and illegal demonstrations to publicize their ideology, make propaganda, and thus find new members. Ciftci (1998, cited in Cantekin, 2006), a former PKK member, indicates “it was not difficult to orientate university students in direction of the PKK’s ideology since we were taking advantage of our role as students. As we experienced before, we were finding opportunities for them to conflict with the police and the system. Thus, we were radicalizing them” (p. 90). Post, Sprinzak and Denny (2003) contend that while schools and social clubs, such as youth clubs, form the social environment of secular groups, religiously motivated groups socialize in the mosque or through religious organizations (i.e. Moslem Brotherhood), and that there is also an impact from religious instruction. Apart from social environments, university or other professional schools have become primary sources in terms of experiences with the terrorist groups that they joined. Many left wing groups in Turkey promote their organizational propaganda in public cafés, school canteens, or university dormitories. In many instances, they have not had difficulty in locating individuals influenced by speeches designed to address their needs, expectations, or beliefs.

Turkish PKK members contact the families of killed or imprisoned terrorists, and usually make propaganda against the government during these contacts. They also make monetary contributions to poor families of killed or imprisoned terrorists. By doing this, they try to create an image as a benevolent and caring group. The main concern of these

visits was to ensure new participants not only from these families but also from the public (Cantekin, 2006).

Before joining a terrorist group, some individuals may be involved in political activities, often non-violent political expressions of opposition to the state (Beiner, 2006; Crenshaw, 1981). On the other hand, some terrorist organizations have legal structures, such as political parties, that struggle in the legal arena on behalf of terrorists. These legal structures attract attention of individuals who sympathize and support terrorist groups. By becoming involved in political activities, they promote the ideology of the terrorists. The more time is spent in these activities, the stronger the ties to the political companion organization. Accordingly, Della Porta's (1988, cited in Sageman, 2004) examination of the Italian Red Brigades indicates that "the strengthening of relationship ties inside the political environment increased the value attached to political involvement and encouraged people to dedicate more and more time to political activities" (p. 163). This process results in isolation from the outside world, and individuals develop a collective identity and total commitment.

Weinberg and Eubank's (1987) examination of Italian left and right wing groups and Teymur's (2004) study of the Turkish left wing group (DHKP/C) had similar conclusions. Weinberg and Eubank (1987) emphasized that it is more likely that over time terrorism expanded through individuals who had political experiences in conventional parties. Silke (2003) reiterates that many IRA members first joined the group by contacting the persons who were working in the republican political party Sinn Fein, and concludes that "approaching legal groups associated with a terrorist cause is a common and generally efficient route into a terrorist group" (p. 48).

(3) Motivational factors

In addition to background characteristics and learning related factors, the root motivations of individuals are important to a complete understanding about the participation process. Motivation could be considered as the most important factor compared to all others. Even if an individual has disadvantageous background characteristics for participation, and even if he is exposed to intensive learning process, it might not mean that he would join a terrorist group without adequate motivation. Despite the importance of motivational factors in terms of detailed and complete understanding of the participation process, Hudson (1999) emphasizes that existing studies have not been successful to sufficiently define it. Moreover, “a proper understanding of terrorist motivation continues to sit uncomfortably within psychological research on terrorist, and continues to be tackled with embarrassingly vague references” (Horgan, 2003a, p. 3). For that reason, there is not enough empirical information about the pre-participation motivations of terrorist. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to examine because of the distinctiveness of the terrorism field in terms of difficulties in conducting scientific research on terrorist psychology. There are, nevertheless, some attempts to define terrorists’ motivations before the participation. In this section, motivational factors will be examined under the topics of “need to belong to a group”, “exorbitance of governing power/s”, “ideological closeness”, “negative life events”, and “other motivational factors.”

Need to belong to a group: The need to belong to a group is an important factor in the participation process, and may create an adequate amount of motivation for joining a group. This need is met by terrorist groups that recognize an individuals’ need for

belonging. Terrorists use a series of tactics that facilitate individual's participation (Hudson, 1999). The need to belong to a group creates such a strong motivation that some individuals begin to define their social status by group acceptance (Martin, 2006). Stern (2003, p. 5) emphasizes "in some cases, the desire to be with friends turns out to be more important, over time, than the desire to achieve any particular goal. Others are attracted to the 'glamour' of belonging to a military group." In the group, an individual gains group identity, and group identity becomes more important than individual identity. Isolation from the society and perception of hostile environments may intensify commitment to a group (Crenshaw, 1981).

There are various ways that individuals' feeling of need to belong to a group develops. For instance, a young person may come together with his peers in different social environments like school, work, mosque, bars, or clubs. His association with others teaches him that there are others who think like him and who have similar viewpoints. He feels sympathy for that group, and starts to believe that he could or should be a member of that group (Hofmann, 1985). For instance, in Palestine, many people want to join groups fighting against Israel. Feelings of victimization, eviction from their family lands, and sense of despair regarding their people's destiny encourage them to merge their individual identity with the group or organizational identity. Based on his own experience in the PKK as a terrorist, Demirkiran (1998, cited in Cantekin, 2006) attributes the formation of this need to family structure of individuals that lacks love towards kids. As a result an individual might find himself in a terrorist group that meets this need. Ozer (2007) attempts to explain individuals' need to be in a group making use of the theoretical terms of strain and self efficacy. That is, under the extreme strain conditions

“people feel low self efficacy and they want to unify their low self efficacy around a group in order to get rid of their low self efficacy by the help of collective self efficacy” (p. 70).

Exorbitance of the governing power/s: Exorbitance of the governing power/s includes oppressive, humiliating, derogatory, and/or unjust actions and counter-actions of the governing power/s against people. It also includes violations of basic human rights.

Terrorists instigate government use of excessive force and force government to take excessive precautions. This excess disturbs the public. When the state starts to use the same tactics that terrorists use, terrorists receive what they want (Crenshaw, 2003; Jenkins, 2003; Schmid, 2004). Rubenstein (2003) notes that terrorists want to generate the support of neutrals and passive sympathizers by putting them in the crossfire of the state and terrorists. In this way, they promote the government to be seen as an oppressive force. Then, they initiate propaganda that includes messages for sympathizers and neutrals that oppressive government should be resisted and overthrown.

In many countries governmental oppression is a significant political problem (Laqueur, 1987). Witnessing or/and experiencing an act of injustice, excessive use of force or harsh treatment of citizens, including protestors, demonstrators, and criminals, by government might create sympathy and support for terrorist groups that stand up against the government’s cruelty (Crenshaw, 1981). Crenshaw (2003) argues “the resort to unexpected and unusual force in response to protest or reform often invites retaliation. The development of an action-reaction syndrome then establishes the structure of the conflict between the regime and its challengers” (p. 95). The more excessive force from governing powers against opposing ideas, the more group solidarity creates strong chains

to resist the ongoing system. In Germany, authoritarian responses of the police against the student rebels gave rise to more violent activities, motivated the students to believe the justness of their way, and provided others an adequate amount of motivation to join a terrorist group (Serafino, 2002). Similarly, the aggressive response of the British soldiers in the Northern Ireland resulted in alienation of the nationalist community. As Garfield (2006) observes, the actions of the state “provided the PIRA with a large pool of willing recruits who were motivated by feelings of *anger* and a desire for revenge” (p. 104). Likewise, in the 1960s and 1970s, in Italy and Greece, excessive use of force by police was identified as fascistic by the protesters, and in some cases, promoted terrorism. As a result, protestors concluded that all forms of violent reactions against these fascist powers were appropriate (Weinberg & Richardson, 2004). Silke’s (2003) example of a German terrorist named Hans-Joachim Klein draws a clearer picture concerning the impact of oppression on participation in terrorist groups. The main reason that Klein decided to become a terrorist is that he witnessed a girl being severely beaten by a policeman during a student protest. He saw this treatment by the police was unjust, and instead imagined that he could have been the one beaten by the police. He also believed that the state caused that girl to suffer, and so the state must suffer.

Weinberg and Richardson (2004) examined a number of terrorist organizations across the world that included Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, PKK in Turkey, IRA in Northern Ireland, ETA in Spain, Palestinian groups against Israel in the Middle East etc. They found that overreaction of the governmental authorities has escalated terror incidents by the abovementioned groups. Sageman’s (2004) findings also support this claim. In his data, members of the central staff (32 out of 172 individuals) of whom 63

percent were Egyptian, had been imprisoned immediately after the assassination of President Sadat before joining the global Salafi jihad movement. Upon their release from prison, they went to Afghanistan to escape government persecution.

According to the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association, people who are oppressed and humiliated by an occupier in the eyes of the world will try to find ways to cope with this oppression in order to regain self-respect and honor. Occupation and occupiers are the main source of oppression and humiliation that lead to terrorism. In the next step, oppressed people would like to draw the world's attention to their oppression, and demonstrate that they will not tolerate it. As a result, many people joined terrorist groups and used terrorism as a tactic against the oppressor. They believe that they would defend and regain their *honor* not only in their own eyes but also in the eyes of their peers. This process might explain some of the violence in the Middle- East. It appears that saving the honor is one of the reasons of why youth joined terrorist groups and became involved in terrorism (Garrison, 2004). Those who joined terrorist group might believe that as well as the honor of the group, their personal honor depends on the degree of their support to the groups fighting against oppressors (Hudson, 1999). Similarly, in Algeria in the 1950s, extraordinary measures taken by the French Army resulted in the alienation of the native Algerian Muslim community. Brutal precautions of the French Army included tortures and killing, and increased the popularity of the FLN (National Liberation Front- Front de Liberation Nationale). As a result, the FLN gained popular support, and ultimately, the French had to withdraw from Algeria (Hoffman, 2006).

Stern (2003) sees *humiliation* as one of the most important risk factors that motivate individuals to join terrorist groups. Humiliation might occur on a national or

individual level. For example, Zawahiri, one of the intellectual leaders of Al-Qaeda, has argued that Western values and power are humiliating to the Muslim community. Kerry Noble, a former member of the Christian Identity Group, explained that he joined the group because he had been forced to play on the girls' side in his elementary school physical education class and that participation in this violent and racist cult made him feel strong. This experience presents an example of individual level humiliation.

Oppressive behaviors might also be interpreted by the community as a kind of interference with individuals' rights and freedoms, and these behaviors may serve the interests of terrorist organizations. For example, in Italy, excessive amendments to laws degrading the human rights caused increased repression and aided some terror organizations in recruiting new members (Serafino, 2002). Human right violations in the Arab communities, such as maltreatment, torture, arbitrary arrests, long detention periods, deprivation of legal rights, harassment of members of opposition parties, restrictions on the media and religious practices, demonstrations, and speeches, as well as discrimination against women create adequate conditions for illegal groups to find individuals to recruit (Al-Badayneh, 2007). With respect to these kinds of practices, Sozen (2006) suggests that it is necessary to "strike a healthy balance between society and individual freedoms" (p. 132)." Otherwise, planned or unplanned, intentional or unintentional oppression and humiliation might contribute to terrorists' interests.

Referring to Kim and Smith (1993), Silke (2003) summarizes "Lying at the heart of the whole process are perceptions of personal harm, unfairness and injustice, and the anger, indignation, and hatred associated with the perceived injustice."

Ideological/political closeness: When an individual feels that he has similar perspectives, beliefs, thoughts, or viewpoints to a terrorist group, he may want to take part in that movement. Terrorist organizations are very successful at drawing a very attractive picture of the future in the minds of the people. They know how to address individuals' needs, and are very aware of the expectations of individuals. For example, separatist organizations such as PKK in Turkey or ETA in Spain promise their followers a new independent state. Left wing terrorists promise a system that eliminates capitalism; they also promote their activities stressing that they were fighting against a fascist and imperialist system (Alkan, 2002). Religiously motivated groups, on the other hand, suggest cleansing the world of impurities to create a better world or a country. They believe that their violent activities will result in purification of injustice and cruelty, and strongly believe that they are responding to a spiritual calling (Stern, 2003). As a consequence, these perspectives and promises are very attractive and convincing for many people who join these terrorist movements.

There are similarities between the above approach and the ideological appeal thesis. According to the ideological appeal thesis, people would randomly join extremist movements simply by being exposed to the ideology of that movement. If the level of exposure increases, it may lead more participation. Contrary to this idea, Sageman (2004) found that insignificant number of individuals joined the al-Qaeda as a result of the influence of its ideology. According to Sageman, the biggest problem with this thesis is that it has more individualistic perspective and ignores the effect of sectarian acts. Through examination of the childhood faiths of 117 terrorists, Sageman found that 53 terrorists (49%) were religious and the remaining 55 terrorists (51%) were secular in

childhood; 9 Christian terrorists were excluded from his analysis. To Sageman, these findings alone contradict the notion that religiously motivated terrorists are brainwashed into religious extremism beginning from childhood, given that majority of terrorists in his sample were not religious during childhood, and that becoming religious did not necessarily mean that they would become terrorists. He also found that devotion to Islamic extremism increased significantly immediately before participation in the terrorist groups. Of the 155 individuals in his samples, 154 were more devout during their participation period than their childhood. Correspondingly, a majority of detained al-Qaeda members who conducted the Istanbul bombings in 2003 stated during their interrogations that they joined terrorist groups through family or friendship ties without having ideological commitment; only one third of them appeared to be ideologically committed (McGarrell, Freilich & Chermak, 2007). Given that many terrorists have joined terrorists groups under the influence of other factors, such as friendship and kinship effects rather than ideological closeness, it might be concluded that ideological closeness alone is not enough to explain the participation process. Nevertheless, its possible influence cannot be ignored, especially with respect to left wing and separatist groups. Hence, this concept requires more inquiry by examining its impact on other terrorist groups.

Negative life events: Negative life events may include depressing occurrences such as unhappiness and dissatisfaction in life due to failures in meeting various expectations or negative life events experienced by individuals. More specifically, financial problems, discrimination for being a woman, family problems, family pressure,

dramatic life events, desperation, or fear are some of the possible negative life events that might motivate individuals to take part in a terrorist group.

If a person is disappointed with his social and economic conditions and fails to form social attachments to the world, it is likely that these conditions will encourage him to participate in illegal groups such as terrorist organizations (Martin, 2006; Sageman, 2004). Corruption, employment problems, and disillusionment with the existing system are also some of the factors that motivate individuals to join terrorist groups. According to Sageman (2004), many individuals joined the al-Qaeda terrorist organization for similar reasons. Cantekin (2006) found that family related problems (11.3%), economic problems (7.2%), and depression (6.2%) were related to participation in the PKK.

Desperation is another important concept concerning participation. Garfield's (2006) examination of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) revealed that there was a significant role of the feelings of "hopelessness, despair and betrayal (by the system)" on those who decided to participate in this group. Garfield indicates that Palestinians and many Muslims in Europe have similar feelings today: "when one has nothing, one has nothing to lose" (p. 104). Kiknadze (2007) attributes individuals' participation in terrorist groups to other negative life experiences: people who were socially ill-adapted, less successful in school, failed to achieve a career, suffered from loneliness, failed to have contact with the opposite sex, and remained outsiders ended up in terrorist groups.

In addition, *dramatic events* may motivate individuals to join terrorist groups with the feeling of revenge, resentment, or hatred. Many terrorists have personal histories that include encounters with security forces during which the individual, his friend or family

members were threatened, maltreated, or even killed. These kinds of events may cause the development of violent feelings against a perceived enemy (i.e. government or security forces). One of the key figures in the Red Army Faction (RAF), Michael Bauman, explained that he joined the RAF, because one of his friends had been killed by a police officer during a student protest. Although he had been exposed to the ideology of the RAF, up until that time, he had not felt motivated to join the RAF to perform violent activities. Nevertheless, the death of his friend motivated him to join the RAF, because he believed that his friend's death was unjust act. Similarly, Eamon Collins attributes his participation in the IRA to the maltreatment and torture by British soldiers of his father, brother, and himself (Silke, 2003).

Al-Badayne (2007) uses the concept of *fear* as a motivating factor in Arab society, explaining that fear is a central main part of Arabs' daily life; this fear includes fear of speech, fear of criticism, fear of authority, fear of regime, and fear of everything. Loyalty of the citizens to the regime is more important than everything that creates unease in the community due to excessive control over the people. Al-Badayne goes on to conclude that fear motivates people to seek external and alternative power that will defend and protect them and "restore their dignity." Thus, terrorism and terrorist groups appear to be a good alternative to challenge sources of the fear.

Further, martyrdom in the terrorist context is important. Martyrdom of a friend or close family members may motivate individuals for suicide missions or different deadly assignments. Consequently, a kind of mythology may develop around proclaimed martyrs to motivate others to actively take place in terrorist structures (Rastorp, 1996).

Other motivational factors: In addition to the aforementioned factors, there are other factors that are likely to motivate individuals to participate in terrorist groups. Stern (2003) indicates that being a member of an armed group might give individuals feelings of being strong, perhaps for the first time in their life. Fun, status, glamour, power, prestige, and even money can provide powerful incentives for joining a terror group.

In some communities, terrorist groups and their members are regarded as honorable and they are treated with great respect. The social status of those who are able to join the group might increase. Thus, expectations of high social status and more respect from the community might be a primary motivator for some individuals (Silke, 2003).

Some groups offer protection that result from participation; some terrorist groups may threaten individuals into participation. In the event of resistance to participation, the groups may threaten to kill or kill him or close family members (Cantekin, 2006; Silke, 2003). The PKK killed thousands of civilians, including children and the elderly, just because they did not support PKK activities; families who did not allow their children to join the PKK were murdered. The PKK even destroyed and burned villages where there were no volunteers to participate in the PKK. As a result, they managed to recruit many individuals even if they did not volunteer. In Cantekin's (2006) examination of the PKK, 18.6 percent of his sample joined the group due to these kinds of reasons.

Demirkıran (1996, cited in Cantekin, 2006), based on his experiences as a former PKK member, lists some other factors that motivate individuals to join in the PKK. He indicates that the majority of recruits regretted their participation even on the first day,

because they were cheated with different promises which would never be fulfilled, such as a job for each of them, a salary for each of their families, or even some high level status such as being a commander, or a manager of a district (which in fact do not exist in the mountainous regions). Further, some were promised hotel-stays in the mountains (that do not exist). Religious people were convinced that all the group's participants were Muslim who would serve on a holy mission (despite the fact that the PKK is a Marxist-Leninist group).

It is also possible that some individuals want to join terrorist groups under the influence of their environments (i.e. parents, friends, siblings, or relatives). For example, Thornberry et al. (2003) found that many youths joined gang groups because their family members or friends were already members of the gang, or/and they encouraged them to participate.

(4) Participation in suicide missions

Given the extreme nature of suicide, a comprehensive answer to the question of why individuals become terrorists also requires an answer to the questions of “who becomes suicide terrorist?” and “why do individuals become suicide terrorists.” There are different views in the literature about individuals' participation in suicide missions.

For the religiously motivated groups, martyrdom is an important motivational concept. Martyrdom is a way of escaping from life's dilemmas. Martyrdom is especially attractive for those who feel deeply alienated, confused, humiliated, or desperate. Ideology and altruism are also pertinent concepts to martyrdom. Commitments to the goals of the organization and spiritual benefits of serving a good cause can create enough incentives for many individuals. In addition, humiliation, deprivation, hopelessness, and

envy make death and paradise more appealing (Stern, 2003). The following section will review some basic individual level motivational factors for joining suicide missions.

Financial factors: Financial support may not be considered as a sufficient motivation to end one's life, but, if an individual knows that his/her family would be monetarily supported, it might contribute considerably to motivation. That is, it may not be enough for complete motivation, yet it may be part of a constellation of other motivating factors (Hassan, 2005; Ricolfi, 2005; Stern, 2003). Sponsoring organizations usually give between \$3,000 and \$5,000 to a bomber's family (Hassan, 2005). Post, Sprinzak & Denny (2003) noted "families of terrorists who were wounded, killed or captured enjoyed a great deal of economic aid and attention. And that strengthened popular support for the attacks" (p. 177).

Heroism: Heroism refers to the social construction of suicide bombers as a hero of and in the community. Copies of a martyr's audiocassette or video are distributed to the media and to local organizations as an indicator of their success and as encouragement to other young men. Graffiti on walls and songs that praise their heroism become very attractive incentives. Martyrdom is celebrated by the bomber's family and sponsoring organization with festivities. People visit the bomber's house to offer congratulations (Hassan, 2005; Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003; Stern, 2003).

Martyrdom as a career: Given the conflict between Palestine and Israel, Ricolfi (2005) notes that along with material deprivation, daily violence committed by Israelis like killings, injuries, arrests, or destroying houses can cause devastation in the emotional worlds of Palestinians. "In a society in which social life is frozen and horizons and normal careers do not exist, war and the Intifada are not just the only world but the only

real social system” (Ricolfi, 2005, p. 115). In this kind of social system, the only available careers, such as administrator, officer, policeman, political leader, militant, or volunteer, are within some political faction. Since the available careers are very limited, martyrdom, which represents the highest spiritual position, prestige, honor and eternal glory, becomes the shortest way to have a career that everybody respects (Ricolfi, 2005). Pape (2005) conducted the most detailed analysis of suicide missions to date; he found that many suicide terrorists fit the “altruistic suicide” related explanations of Durkheim (1951) in which high levels of social integration and respect for community values can lead normal individuals to commit suicide. Contrary to the belief that suicide attackers are criminally insane, losers or problematic persons, they, in fact, have no psychological or economic problems; they have strong social networks and are part of a national context. They believe that they sacrifice themselves for the sake of their nations’ or community’s good. Pape (2005, p. 173) indicates “these individuals are rarely brainwashed into accepting such missions through the heavy indoctrination associated with the recent mass suicides by religious cults, but accept the task much like a soldiers who accepts a ‘suicide mission’ in an ordinary war.”

Altruistic suicides are usually committed under the influence of social approval. Contrary to the common perception that suicide terrorists are different from the society in which they live, they are generally an integral part of that society. Martyrdom resulting from suicide attacks is justified through the idea that it is indispensable for the protection of the local community from foreign occupation. At the same time, martyrdom operations are believed necessary because of power imbalances between an occupying power and an occupied territory (Pape, 2005). Gambetta (2005) demonstrates a similar understanding:

in all suicide missions, a major, common trait is that all suicide attackers are seen as 'altruists' by themselves and often by the attacker's group members. The attackers and the group believe that by committing suicide attacks, they further the interests of their group or their cause.

On the other hand, Kalyvas and Cuenca (2005) hypothesize that political repression or economic deprivation experienced by an individual is not the reason for extreme acts such as suicide attacks, and that the main reason is the *depressing and hopeless living conditions* of the community that force individuals to extreme activities. If there is a severe repression and/or economic deprivation in the community (rather than on an individual level), it is most likely that it would lead participation in suicide attacks. Further, although individuals carry out suicide attacks, there is always an organizational structure behind them that makes and executes the plans.

Apparently, there are various reasons for becoming suicide terrorists, such as patriotism, strong convictions, nationalism, extreme pressure from peers and/or superiors, rituals of the community, revenge (in the case of Palestinians who see suicide attacks revenge for murders by Israelis), traditional codes of honor (in the case of Chechen individuals who use suicide attacks to avenge their family members), hatred of the enemy, the desire to defend of a homeland or rid holy lands of infidels, and a desire to reach the religious hereafter (Elster, 2005; Pape, 2005). Although all these explanations are possible motivational factors, we may never know the actual motivational and cognitive conditions of the suicide attackers, as it is not possible to interview those who are successful; motivations may change based on personal or cultural characteristics (Elster, 2005; Gambetta, 2005).

Tactical and strategic methods of terrorist groups that prepare individuals for suicide missions are important to mention. Becoming a suicide terrorist invokes several processes. Hassan (2005) emphasizes that selection for suicide attacks is not enough, as after selection, it requires more preparations:

“The planners keep a close eye on the volunteer’s self-discipline, noting whether he can be discreet among friends and observing his piety in the mosque. During the week before the operation, two ‘assistants’ are delegated to stay with the potential martyr at all times. They report any signs of doubt, and if the young man seems to waiver, a senior trainer will arrive to bolster his resolve...Religious lectures last from two to four hours each day. The living martyr goes on lengthy fasts. He spends much of the night praying. He pays off all his debts, and asks for forgiveness for actual or perceived offences...The young man repeatedly watches the video of himself, as well as the videos of his predecessors. These videos encourage him to confront death, not fear it.”

Background characteristics of suicide terrorists: The terrorism literature on the background characteristics of suicide terrorists contains contradictory information. One view contends that suicide terrorists are poor, socially isolated, uneducated, hopeless, without prospects, religiously fanatic, socially alienated, mentally sick persons, and additionally, that suicide terrorism is a result of paranoia which has psychological roots (Merari, 1990; Robins & Post, 1997). Stern (2003) draws a similar picture of Palestinian suicide terrorists: they are generally young, often teenagers, mentally immature, exposed to pressures to work, but can’t find a job, have no social safety net, no girlfriend or fiancée, no money to go entertainment centers, no means to enjoy life in any way, life has no meaning but pain, there is no possibility of marriage because of economic problems, and they feel that all is lost and pray all the time. The only way out is to sacrifice

himself¹⁹ by joining a suicide mission. Organizers of suicide mission can easily identify these kinds of persons and gradually start to recruit them. For instance, they may talk about rewards in the hereafter or explain to him how his family will be honored. They emphasize martyrdom, and promise economic support to his family. Before the operation they train them, 48 hours before the operation he is removed from his environment to eliminate the chance for reconsideration. Similarly Elster (2005) indicates that for the suicide missions, those who have suicidal tendencies are selected.

Contrary to these beliefs, other researchers found that suicide attackers are generally secular, employed, reasonably well educated, and ordinary members of their own community. They are not motivated by youthful impulsiveness nor do they take personal satisfaction in harming others. Further, they do not have mental problems. They are socially integrated and have expectations and capabilities of good futures. Before conducting the mission, they live as students, housewives, or bus drivers in ordinary daily life (Gambetta, 2005; Pape, 2005). Congruent with this argument, Pape (2005) notes that suicide terrorists are college educated and uneducated, married and single, men and women, isolated and socially integrated. Their ages range from 15 to 52. In other words, they are an ordinary part of the community and so cannot be placed in a different category than other normal people. Further, he asserts that poverty is a poor explanation for suicide terrorism since countries which are exposed to suicide terrorist attacks do not have the worst economic indicators in the world, and that some are middle income societies (Pape, 2005).

¹⁹ As the research indicates, terrorist members are both male and female. However, males are much more likely to be involved. For ease of presentation, the male pronoun is used throughout this dissertation.

In terms of gender, women seem as eager to volunteer and to carry out the suicide attacks as men are (Gambetta, 2005). In some groups such as the PKK, the majority of bombers assigned to suicide missions were women (Alkan, 2000). The most comprehensive findings regarding demographic characteristics of suicide bombers are found in Pape's (2005) study. In his study, 15 percent of 381 suicide bombers were female; however, this rate may change depending on terrorist organization. Of the 384 suicide bombers, 43% (166 persons) were religious, and 57% (218) were secular. According to his findings, ages of suicide bombers vary between 15 and 52 with an average age of 22.7. However, the age distribution appears to vary across terrorist groups.

3. Theoretical Approaches

Absence of an adequate theory for guiding research on terrorism related studies is a huge obstacle. This problem has limited both the value of the very small number of scientific studies that have been conducted, and the integration of the results across studies. The lack of theoretical guidance reflects the preoccupation of terrorism related studies with the problem of causation in various terrorism related topics including participation. Ferracuti (1982) emphasizes no single theory has emerged regarding terrorism, and has proposed that hypotheses in this field need more tests and confirmation. Two decades later, Tilly (2004, p. 11) similarly notes "no coherent set of cause-effect propositions can explain terrorism as a whole." Consequently, terrorism studies are heavily informed by other academic disciplines (Duyvesteyn, 2004). In view of these facts, this section will briefly examine some theoretical approaches from different fields that might be useful to explore joining in terrorist groups. In order to have more fluid theoretical understanding about participation in terrorist groups and given that

gangs have similar characteristics to terrorist organizations, particularly in terms of the participation process, gang related studies and theoretical approaches will be applied in some areas where terrorism studies remain insufficient. Terrorist groups resemble gang groups in the following ways: both use violent tactics to reach their targets; perform legitimate or illegitimate activities; have a group structure with different roles of the members; have a hierarchy, a name, and a sign; recruit youths; and are male dominated (Block & Block, 1993; Hughes, 2005; Spergel, 1984; Thornberry et al., 2003).

Developmental and life course perspective will form a general frame for the study in which other theoretical approaches might be adapted and discussed given that life course theories look for turning points in individuals' lives, and correspondingly, making a decision to become a terrorist is a kind of turning point, and some learning related factors such as friends or parents, and motivational factors such as need to belong to a group or ideological closeness are effective in this process as they influence the flow of individuals' lives. The present review could not find any study that has tested a theory of participation in terrorist organizations. Yet, there are various theoretical approaches that are consistent with the abovementioned participation related information gleaned from the terrorism literature. Given that participation does not occur overnight and entails a process that include some learning and motivational dynamics, this study assumes that the life course approach forms a more general and broader theoretical frame for the studies on participation in terrorist groups. Once the life course approach is considered as a broader theoretical framework, it might be easy to replace and discuss other theoretical approaches within this frame.

Two main concepts comprise the analysis of life-course dynamics, trajectories and transitions. A trajectory might be defined as a pathway or line of development over the life span of the individual. School life, work life, marriage, parenthood, and criminal behaviors are some examples of trajectories, which have long-term characteristics. On the other hand, transitions are important life events such as a first job, first marriage, first baby, first friend, first membership in a group, first crime, or first imprisonment in the terrorism context. Transitions evolve over shorter time spans and are embedded within trajectories. Transitions might be age-graded or not. Events that are considered as important are the normative timing and sequencing of role transitions, for instance, a period of time between a first job after finishing a college and a first marriage. Or, within the context of terrorism literature, transitions could be the time period between the first and ongoing contacts with a friend who is a member of a terrorist group and the decision to join the terrorist group in which that friend is a member (Sampson & Laub, 1999; Thornberry et al, 2003). Quoting from Elder (1985, p. 17), Sampson and Laub (1999) define the life-course as “pathways through the age differentiated life span where age differentiation is manifested in expectations and options that impinge on decision process and the course of events that give shape to life stages, transitions, and turning points” (p.189). Apparently, focal points of the life course perspective are duration, timing, major life events, some life changes, and their influences on a human’s life. In addition, given that participation in terrorist groups occurs at younger ages, it might be concluded that the life-course approach directly relates to the universal finding of young men being particularly at risk.

Trajectories and transitions may cause turning points and changes in the life-course. Trajectories may be modified by social institutions and life events such as work, military service, marriage, school etc. New conditions and events may affect the life course so as to change its direction; so that a life course is not fully determined (Elder, 1985 cited in Sampson and Laub, 1999). In this context, Thornberry et al. (2003, p. 7) attempt to find out why some individuals join gang groups and others do not perceive gang membership as a trajectory. They indicate that the life course perspective not only includes social and psychological forces that develop in early childhood and facilitate participation in gang groups, but also contains “unfolding relationships and developmental influences.” Factors that lead to participation/membership in gang groups might also be social structural position, family relationship, neighborhood context, school, peers, or individual characteristics. In order to discover what contributes to gang membership, they focused on the variables of area characteristics (i.e. community arrest rate, neighborhood disorganization), family socio-demographic characteristics (i.e. race, ethnicity, poverty level, parent education), parent-child relations (i.e. family management style, attachment to child, family hostility), school factors (i.e. commitment to school, college aspiration, college expectation), individual characteristics (i.e. negative life events, depression, self esteem), or a combination of these factors (Thornberry et al., 2003). They selected different variables and concepts from other theories and integrated and analyzed them within the framework of life course perspective to understand better what factors are affective in the gang participation. Likewise, Sommers and Baskin (1994) focus on socio-cultural and environmental context of behavior in order to explain the relationship between gender and violent behaviors. This study revealed that

participation in criminal violence by both males and females requires consideration of neighbor, peer, and addiction factors; these patterns were consistent with other findings on gangs (Baskin & Sommers, 1993).

Various theories in different fields like criminology or sociology identify variables that might be linked to the life course perspective in the context of participation in terrorist organizations. Akers (2000) contends that "...there is some overlap in how variables from personality, learning, bonding and other theories are utilized in life-course models..." (p. 253). In this manner, the *risk factors model* of individuals' vulnerability to negative developmental outcomes is consistent with multidimensionality characteristics of the life-course approach. According to the risk factors model, there are several and overlapping risk factors in a person's background that might lead to participation in illegal structures and violent activities (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1999; Hill, Howell, Hawkins & Battin, 1999; Sameroff et al., 1993; Small & Luster, 1994). Identification of risk factors is important in terms of initiating programs for prevention of possible involvement in criminal groups and delinquent activities. Howell (1997) studied youth violence and classified the risk factors as community, family, school, peer, and individual characteristics. Studies on gang membership found that joining gang groups is a result of different risk factors from multiple developmental domains. Accordingly, using gang membership as a dependent variable, Thornberry et al. (2003) found several risk factors regarding joining gangs, such as neighborhoods with higher proportion of African Americans, poorer residents, and higher arrest rates; demographic characteristics of being African American, having less educated parents, and family income below the poverty level; inadequate parent child relations and attachment problems of families' to sons;

school problems, such as weak attachment to teacher and school, and lower parental expectations; friends who involved in delinquent acts; individual characteristics such as experiencing negative life events, and having depressive symptoms; and also prior delinquency. However, many of these risk factors were not significant for female gang participation. Among these factors, two had more influence on joining a gang: previous involvement in a delinquent activity, and experiencing higher than average level stress as a result of a negative life event (Thornberry et al., 2003). In sum, these findings reflect the multidimensionality of a life course perspective that is influenced by several risk factors.

Selection, social facilitation and enhancements models have some implications for the participation process in addition to risk factors. According to the *selection model*, violent groups select their members from among those who have delinquent tendencies and who are already delinquents. Hirschi's social control theory (Hirschi, 1969; Matsueda & Heimer, 1987; Wiatrowski, Griswold & Roberts, 1981) and Gottfredson and Hirschi's propensity theory of crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Longshore, 1998) are directly related to the selection model (Thornberry et al., 2003). Violent groups like gangs attract persons who lack self-control (which is the basic premise of general theory of crime) and who have no social control. Alternatively, a *social facilitation model* suggests that individuals become involved in criminal activities after joining violent groups. Group dynamics, group process, normative structure and the climate of a group are likely to facilitate involvement in delinquency. Thus, delinquency is a typical result of a group membership. Findings from a wide array of other research are consistent with this approach (Decker, 1996; Deschenes & Esbensen, 1999; Jansyn, 1966; Miller &

Decker, 2001; Rosenfeld, Bray & Egley, 1999). Research that supports the social facilitation model might also be considered supportive to socialization theories such as differential association or social learning theories, because criminal groups appears to be effective in terms of communicating definitions, teaching delinquency and establishing reward systems in a group structure as these theories posit (Thornberry et al., 1993). On the other hand, the *enhancement model* is a combination of the selection model and the social facilitation model. In this model, delinquent groups (i.e. gangs) select their members among the adolescents who are already delinquent; then group process and group dynamics cause individuals to engage in more delinquent behaviors. Thus, groups play a facilitator role for individuals who have already criminal records (Sarnecki, 1990; Thornberry et al., 1993, 2003). Previous studies mostly support the facilitation model while there is little support for the selection model and enhancement model (Esbensen & Huizinga, 1993; Thornberry et al., 1993, 2003).

Another theory that appears to be relevant to participation in terrorist organizations is the *theory of normative ambiguity*. This theory posits that degradation and impugnation of a party's honor by another party creates violent incentives (Horowitz & Schwartz, 1974). Pertinent to formation of gang violence, Horowitz and Schwartz (1974) explain that an individuals' belief in terms of codes of personal honor influences his reactions to perceived insults. Honor has an expressive value, and there is an explicit tendency towards momentum in situations of normative ambiguity. They further emphasize that individuals initially respond to a certain amount of provocation by impression management. However, over time, individuals may insult and then damage another party in order to respond to violation of a personal space. If they fail to do so, it

might be considered as weakness. Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1999), in their *subculture of violence* thesis make a similar point by proposing that “the adult male who does not defend his honor or his female companion will be socially emasculated” (p. 105).

Similarly, Miller (1966) states that “Gang members fight to secure and defend their honor as males; to secure and defend the reputation of their local area and the honor of their women; to show that an affront to their pride and dignity demands retaliation” (p. 110, 112). As in gang studies, honor and humiliation appear to be significant factors in terrorism studies in terms of formation of terrorist groups and participation in them. In contrast to gangs, in terms of terrorism those who degrade the honor are usually governing power/s such as security forces (see the literature part on “exorbitances of governing power/s”).

Many of the variables discussed above and in the research literature have been basic concerns of other criminological or sociological theories, too. In this context, *anomie theory* posits that although there is a strong emphasis on financial success (especially in U.S.), the emphasis on legitimate methods such as hard work and education to achieve this dream is weak; this, in turn, motivates individuals to try all methods regardless of legality or illegality. *Institutional anomie theory* contributes to anomie theory by suggesting the ineffectiveness of the major structures such as family, school, political system, and culture that are dominated by the economy (Cullen & Agnew, 1999). Similarly, but from a broader perspective, *strain theory* suggests that when individuals are prevented from achieving cultural goals such as monetary success, good job, good education, and having middle class status through legal channels, they are pressured into offending due to a strain. Thus, illegitimate channels may appear to be the

solution to reach goals (Akers, 2000; Cullen & Agnew, 1999; Title & Meier, 1990).

Given the weaknesses²⁰ of classical strain theories, Agnew created the *general strain theory* that might be seen as a social and psychological version of strain theory. General strain theory sees crime and delinquency as an adaptation to stressful conditions, and also suggests that strain results from negative relationships with others. Strain occurs when an individual is not treated by others as he or she would like to be treated (Agnew, 1992, 1999). This negative relationship might take three forms (Cullen & Agnew, 1999):

“...relations where others 1) prevent or threaten to prevent the achievement of positively valued goals (e.g., monetary success, popularity with peers), 2) remove or threaten to remove positively valued stimuli (e.g., the loss of romantic partner, the death of a parent), or 3) present or threaten to present negatively-valued stimuli (e.g., insults, physically assault, overwork)” (p. 120).

These kinds of negative experiences are likely to increase anger or frustration that might lead a crime as an option to cope with pressure and reduce strain. Although there is no research that tests general strain theory in the terrorism, studies on other crimes give considerable support to this theory (Hoffmann & Cerbone, 1999; Mazerolle, 1998; Paternoster & Mazerolle, 1994).

Anomie and strain theories might be linked to various concepts discussed in the preceding literature review. The emphasis on economic issues in anomie and institutional anomie theory might be linked to the economic conditions based explanations of participation in terrorist groups despite conflicting findings on this issue in the terrorism literature. Strain theory might be linked to not only economic explanations but also “ideological closeness” arguments. That is, left wing groups, particularly those with a

²⁰ To Agnew (1999) classical strain theories “1- are unable to explain the extensive nature of middle-class delinquency, 2- neglect goals other than monetary success/middle-class status, 3- neglect barriers to goal achievement other than social class, and 4- do not fully specify why only some strained individuals turn to delinquency” (p. 152).

Marxist ideology, are disturbed by class inequality. Originally, leftist ideology suggests that the working class is exposed to unequal treatment by ruling class, and this results in the exploitation of working class labor. Today, the capitalist system is seen as a primary source of inequality by left wing terrorist groups, and many individuals who think in a similar way want to participate in terrorist groups that struggle against this inequality as they cannot manage it using legal methods. On the other hand, compared to anomie theory, classical strain theory and its derivative, general strain theory, seem to be significantly related to the variables in terrorism literature on participation as it moves beyond solely economic strain to multiple sources. Accordingly, most of the motivational factors that lead to participation in terrorist groups might be considered sources of strain. For instance, “need to belong to a group” might be a source of strain if this positively valued goal isn’t met through legal groups and activities; “negative life events” such as loss of a friend, a family member, or a relative killed by police might create strain because of removal of positively valued stimuli. “Exorbitances of governing power” that may include degradation of honor, humiliation, or oppression might cause a strain or stress, as these behaviors present negatively valued stimuli. In turn, all these strains may motivate individuals to join terrorist groups to struggle against the (inadequate) conditions that induce strain and stress.

Unlike other theories of crime, *control theory* explains why people do not commit crimes rather than explaining why they commit crimes. Under the main assumption that everybody is likely to commit crime, regardless of individual variation in motivation, social control theory proposes that delinquency occurs when the social and cultural constraints over human behavior become weaker and less effective (Akers, 2000;

Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi, 1969; Sokol-Katz, Dunhan & Zimmerman, 1997). Using a different approach, *Reckless' containment theory* proposes that inner and outer pushes and pulls toward deviance produce delinquent behavior, unless they are counteracted by inner and outer containment. "Pushes" that lead to delinquency might be poverty, deprivation, blocked opportunities etc. "Pulls" are positive inducements toward delinquency such as delinquent subcultures, gang structure, attractiveness of delinquent group etc. Outer containments are school or parental supervision and discipline, strong group cohesion, and a consistent moral front. Inner containments are strong conscience or a good self-concept (Akers, 2000).

Similarly, Hirschi's control theory, also known as *social bonding theory*, proposes that delinquency occurs when an individual's bond to society is weakened or broken. There are four (4) types of bonding to others: *attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief* that are strongly inter-correlated. If these four (4) bonds are stronger with family, school, adult and peers, there will be more conformity and less criminality. According to Hirschi, it does not matter to whom one is attached; even attachment to delinquent peers, friends or deviant parents reduces the possibility of criminality (Hirschi, 1969, 1999). Using these characteristics of control and bonding theories, it could be claimed that terrorism literature includes both confirmatory and contradictory findings with respect to participation in terrorist groups. Once it is accepted that terrorist organizations recruit young people who leave traditional communities and move to urban centers in order to attend universities or find jobs, there appears a considerable support for both theories, since the loss of social ties and social control may facilitate participation in terrorist groups. In Turkish culture, there is an exceptional interdependency and solidarity

between family members, relatives and even within neighborhoods that ensure considerable control over individuals. These strong ties and control disappear when a person moves to a big city, especially one where he does not have acquaintances. He suffers the difficulties of being a stranger and feels desolation never experienced in his traditional environment back at home. At this point, terrorist groups who are aware of these kinds of individuals will take over the scene under different roles and covers, and promise the despondent an environment that will exclude all negative aspects of the city life (Alkan, 2002; Ylmazer, 2006). For instance, ensuring a disconnection between a person and his family is one of the most prominent strategies of the PKK for a successful recruitment. Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, sees family as the biggest obstacle in their activities (Ozonder, 1998).

On the other hand, Reckless' containment theory that suggests the concepts of "pulls" and "pushes" might also be relevant to the terrorism literature as well. While "pushes" that lead to participation might be exorbitances of governing power/s (i.e. humiliation or oppression) or negative life events (i.e. economic problems, family pressure, or discrimination), "pulls" might be the need to belong to a group, ideological closeness, organizational activities, or having family members or friends in a terrorist group. In many cases, and in opposition to these theories, kinship and friendship play facilitating roles in the participation process as many individuals learn about terrorist groups through their family members, relatives, or friend who are the members or sympathizers of terrorist organizations. Similarly, numerous studies (outside of terrorism research) present contradictory findings with respect to social bonding theory (i.e. Jensen & Brownfield, 1983; Josine, 1992; Linden & Hackler, 1973). Thus, it may be that

attachment to peers or parents leads to conformity only when peers and parents are not delinquent.

Social control theory also assumes consensus over basic norms and values. In the context of terrorism, where both left wing and religiously motivated terrorist groups espouse ideology in contrast to mainstream society, bonding to the terrorist group may actually increase terrorist participation and belief systems supportive of terrorist ideology.

Social control theory further indicates the level of supervision that children receive is important; the more supervision the less delinquency. In this regard, it is a common feature in almost all crime formations including gangs that girls' involvement in crimes and delinquent groups is less when compared to boys (Deschenes & Esbensen, 1999; Hirschi, 1969; Mawby, 1980). Similarly, terrorist groups are male dominated as are other crimes and criminal groups, so less female participation in terrorist groups might be attributable to excessive control over the girls by families as compared to boys, i.e., close supervision of girls reduces their opportunities for joining terrorist groups. Due to inhibitive and restrictive approaches towards girls, even if the families are members or supporters of terrorist groups, they may not want their daughters to join terrorist groups.

Given the literature review on participation in terrorist organizations, *social learning theory* appears to be the most germane to the issue of participation compared to other theories, as participation is a process that entails a kind of learning process. There are two important theories within the framework of social learning theory; Sutherland's *Differential Association Theory* and Akers' *Social Learning Theory* (Akers, 2000;

Burgess & Akers, 1966). Sutherland's *differential association theory* is a micro level theory with nine propositions (Sutherland & Cressey, 1999):

“1- Criminal behavior is learned, 2- Criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication, 3- The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups, 4- When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes (a) techniques of committing the crime, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes very simple; (b) the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes, 5- The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the legal codes as favorable or unfavorable, 6- A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law, 7- Differential associations may vary in frequencies, duration, priority, and intensity, 8- The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved any other learning, 9- While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values since non-criminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values” (p. 82-83).

The sixth proposition is perhaps the most important, that exposure to others' definitions that are favorable to criminal behavior is central in terms of formation of criminal behavior. The seventh proposition clarifies the former: if a person is exposed to law violating definitions more frequently, over longer time periods, more intensively and as a priority over law abiding definitions, it is probable that he/she will violate the law (Akers, 2000). In this regard, there is a direct link between terrorism literature on participation and differential association theory: individuals learn about terrorist groups before joining them. Individuals learn about terrorists and their activities from two main sources: directly from *individuals* such as parents, relatives, or friends, or/and indirectly from *external/other factors* such as prison life, organizational propaganda (through publications, the media, or internet), or/and organizational activities. As the theory posits, during the learning process individuals are exposed to others' definitions (i.e. those of

friends or family members), violent images (i.e., excessive use of force by police during demonstrations), or propaganda through media or publications that are favorable to terrorist groups' ideologies. The more frequent, the longer duration, and the more intensive exposure to the law violating definitions compared to law abiding definitions, the greater the possibility that a person will have enough incentive to take part in a terrorist group.

Akers' social learning theory is a kind of behavioral reformulation of Sutherland's differential association of crime. It is a broader version of differential association theory that integrates Sutherland's theory with differential reinforcement and other principles of behavioral acquisition, continuation, and cessation. Inclusion of concepts such as imitation, anticipated reinforcement, and self-reinforcement makes social learning theory a soft version of behaviorism (Akers, 2000). There are four main concepts in the Akers' theory; differential association, definitions, differential reinforcement, and imitation. The first concept, *differential association*, is similar to Sutherland's approach with the additions that differential association has both behavioral- interactional and normative dimensions. *Definitions* are an individual's own attitudes or meanings that are attached to given behavior. Based on rationalizations, definition of a situation, and other evaluative and moral attitudes, an act can be defined as right or wrong, good or bad, justified or unjustified, doable or undoable. In addition, interactions with family members, relatives, or friends with connections to terrorist groups as supporters or as active members might help individuals learn whether being in a terrorist group is defined as good or bad. If many of them define it as good (positive definition) or at least justified (neutralizing definition) rather than as undesirable (negative definition), it increases the possibility that

those individuals will have enough motivation to join terrorist groups. *Differential reinforcement* might be defined as a balance of anticipated or actual rewards and punishments. In other words, the possibility of committing a crime depends on the past, present, and anticipated future rewards and also punishments for their actions.²¹ While reward/positive reinforcement and avoidance of punishment/negative reinforcement strengthen a behavior, aversive stimuli/positive punishment and loss of reward/negative punishment weaken it. Apparently, there is a strong relationship between the explanation of how reinforcements strengthen a behavior and motivational factors that facilitate participation in terrorist groups. In this context, the variables of ‘need to belong to a group’ and “ideological closeness” might be considered as reward/positive reinforcement, “exorbitances of governing powers” and “negative life events” might be seen as an avoidance of punishment/negative reinforcement. For instance, for some individuals, being accepted by a group regardless of its legality or illegality, or acting in a group that has a similar ideological perspective might be a kind of reward. On the other hand, some who are unhappy with the existing political system may think that if they join a terrorist group, they might help the group topple the government and thus, they may not experience any more exorbitances and negative life events caused by the existing system (avoidance of punishment/negative reinforcement). On the other hand, reinforcing sources are usually those that control the individual’s major sources of reinforcement and punishment and expose them to behavioral models and normative definitions. Reinforcing sources might include family members, peers, schools, or religious places (i.e. mosques, churches). In addition to reasons of friendship or kinship, many individuals join terrorist groups under the influence of religious sermons given in holy

²¹ Also see “rational choice theory” which has a similar content.

places by members or leaders of terrorist groups, or receive ideological educations in schools where extremist ideologies are taught. The final concept, *imitation*, involves exhibiting the same type of behaviors after observing others' behaviors. Accordingly, observation of others' negative behaviors may result in negative behaviors (Akers, 2000; Akers, 1977 cited in Morash, 1983). The possibility of imitation is augmented if people are in close contact or if those imitated are superiors. In this manner, parents or peers who are the members or sympathizers of terrorist groups might easily be among those who are imitated (Vito & Holmes, 1994). It seems that social learning theory is complementary to other sociological theories, and it can be used to generate more comprehensive explanations of deviant behaviors (Akers, Krohn, Lanza-Kaduce & Rodasevich, 1979).

Several studies have examined gang groups' use of learning theories. Battin et al. (1998) found a significant friendship effect on adolescents' involvement in delinquency. They conclude that individuals in a gang are exposed to delinquent models, definitions, and reinforcements that lead to delinquent behaviors. Winfree et al. (1994a; 1994b) found that gang membership and delinquency could be explained by the social learning variables of attitudes (toward gangs and gang activity), social reinforcers and punishers, and differential association (Winfree et al., 1994a). Morash (1983, p. 313) found that regardless of whether the peer group is a gang, peers' delinquency is itself predictive of individual's delinquency. Regarding gender differences in violent activities, Deschenes and Esbensen (1999) found that the most plausible explanations of this gender difference in violence relates to "differences in learning and reinforcement of behaviors through the process of socialization" (p. 67-68). Another study by Esbensen and Deschenes (1998) revealed that social learning models support more than social bonding models in terms of

distinguishing between gang and non-gang members for both males and females.

Thornberry et al. (1993, 2003) connect their findings that support the facilitation model to learning theories, contending that gangs are influential at communicating definitions and teaching techniques. They further argue the importance of reward structures of gang groups. Bjerregaard and Lizotte (1995) examined the relation between gun ownership and gang membership, and noted that the gang milieu facilitates illegal activities and that there is an influence from the social learning process on illegal activities. Critics of social learning theory generally complain that it is tautological and ignores temporal sequencing of events (Akers, 2000).

Discussion of learning theories requires mention of the theory of *techniques of neutralization*. Sykes and Matza (1957) claim that neutralization techniques comprise a very important component of differential association theory's explanation of "definitions favorable to the violation of law." This theory argues that individuals with conventional values find ways to justify their actions that have been condemned by law and by society at large. Justifications come before the delinquent behaviors, and reduce the influence of social control. Neutralization is most likely to occur during the association with delinquent peers. Sykes and Matza theorize that there are five techniques of neutralization: the denial of responsibility (i.e. deviant acts occur due to forces outside of individuals such as unloving parents, bad friends and neighborhood); the denial of injury (i.e. no personal injury but just harm to property of those who can afford it); the denial of victim (i.e. wrong-doers deserve punishment, or injury caused by him is a result of a rightful retaliation or punishment); the condemnation of condemners (i.e. police is corrupt and brutal, courts are unjust, government is corrupt and oppressive); the appeal of

higher loyalties (i.e. claiming that he committed the crime not for his own good but the benefit of others like the sibling pair, the gang, or the friendship clique) (Sykes & Matza, 1957; Vito & Holmes, 1994). This theory appears to have some implications in terms of understanding how people rationalize their participation in illegal terrorist groups and commission of violent activities. For instance, there may be various justifications with respect to participation in terrorist groups such as a rationalization that existing economic and social conditions are unjust and unfair and that there is no other way to solve these problems (the denial of responsibility), a belief that the existing system is corrupt and oppressive so it must be destroyed (the condemnation of condemners), or the belief that defending the rights of an ethnic group in which one has membership entails participation in a terrorist group that fights for the rights of that ethnic group (the appeal of higher loyalties).

Unlike other theories, *interactional theory*, a kind of integrated theory, proposes that there is no unidirectional pathway to outcomes (delinquency): persons interact with other people and institutions, and as a result, this interactive process forms the behavioral outcomes. According to the interactional theory, the control, learning, and delinquency variables are reciprocally interrelated, and mutually influence and reinforce one another over the course of an individual's life. Put simply, weakening bonds to a conventional society and delinquent behaviors learned from others leads to delinquency and participation in criminal groups. Participation in criminal groups leads to learning of criminal values and techniques and weakens bonds to conventional others. Interactional theory consists of six concepts: attachment to parents, commitment to school, belief in conventional values, associations with delinquent peers, adopting delinquent values, and

engaging in delinquent behavior (Thornberry, 1987). Thornberry et al. (2003) utilized interactional theory to explain participation in gangs during the adolescent period and identified four motivational factors: 1- Presence of family members and/or friends in the gang (a kind of group relation), 2- Expectancy of protection, 3- Fun and/or action, 4- Others (i.e. felt like it, just to be in). More than half of their samples (54%) pointed out the family/friend issue, as a main factor for participation, followed by protection (19%), fun/action (15%), and others (12%).

Peer group influence, particularly the influence of delinquent peers, is one of the significant predictors of delinquency. In this context, *social network theory* seems to be one of the most appropriate approaches in terms of explaining group effect on participation (Jansyn, 1966; Thornberry et al., 2003). Network approaches also improve the value of basic theories such as social control, differential association, or Agnew's social learning theory to explain delinquent behavior. In addition, the network approach is effective in terms of facilitating the examination of structural characteristics of personal networks and their implications for the study of delinquent behavior (Krohn, 1986). It is necessary to note that group dynamics can differ depending on the ideological characteristics of terrorist groups: we may not expect the same group dynamics for different types of terrorist organizations, i.e., religiously motivated, separatist, nationalist groups, or left wing groups. Whereas nationalist or separatist groups' members usually remain in close contact with their families and relatives regardless of active or passive participation, and may even receive support from the society where they live in, left wing, anarchic, or other ideological groups generally disconnect from family members and society at large (Hudson, 1999).

Concepts of the discipline of economics such as cost and benefit might be useful to explain participation in terrorism (Nyatepe-Coo, 2004). According to *rational choice theory*, offenders calculate the cost associated with their offending decisions. Mathematically, rational choice models suggest that crime is more likely to occur if $p(\text{success}) * \text{benefits} > [1 - p(\text{success})] * \text{costs}$ (Dugan, Lafree and Piquero, 2005). Calculated anticipated benefits may range from monetary gain to political recognition. In this manner, participation in a terrorist group may be seen as a rational choice of an individual who expects some benefit(s). Crenshaw (1992) explains the connection between rational choice theory and terrorism with two terms: *preconditions* and *precipitants*. The former is related to situational factors that invoke in individuals a tendency towards terrorist organizations, the latter refers to direct causes that might be best described as the last drop of water that causes a glass to overflow.

Using a different approach, Muller and Opp (1986) contend that individuals' belief of contribution to the public good outweighs any concerns and risks. Accordingly, perceived contributions to the public might be saving the community from oppressive governmental forces; this might also influence individual reasons and expectations. If a person thinks that being in a terrorist group will meet all his psychological needs, he may disregard all possible risks associated with the membership. Crenshaw (1983, 1992), however, does not see rational choice theory as sufficient to explain the process, and accentuates the importance of psychological theories, arguing that although terrorism has a strategic value, some aspects and different levels motivations of terrorism, such as justification of violations, peer pressure, emotions of vengeance, aggression, self-perception of heroism, and a sense of superiority, can be understood through the

contributions of psychology. Participation in and the purpose of terrorism might be political, but the intent of violence through participation is psychological, and might be best explained with psychological terms or factors.

There are several psychologically based explanations of terrorism. The *frustration-aggression hypothesis* reveals that when a person is confronted with frustration, it is likely that the person will respond aggressively (Dollard et al., 1939 cited in Berkowitz, 1989). Accordingly, terrorist behaviors including participation might be a response frustration due to different political, economic, or personal factors (Hudson, 1999). The *relative deprivation hypothesis* posits that if there is a discrepancy between the real things that individuals have and imagined things that they expect to have, then it is possible to commit illegal acts to obtain imaginary things. Duyvesteyn (2004) links this approach to terrorism: “When this situation is compounded by an ideology inciting uprising and violence and the chances and opportunities arise for doing so, persons willing to engage in terrorism will” (p. 441). The *narcissistic approach* is primarily about psychology of the self. Hudson (1999) explains the formation of narcissism “...if the psychological form of the “idealized parental ego” is not neutralized by reality testing, it can produce a condition of helpless defeatism; narcissistic defeat can lead to reactions of rage and a wish to destroy the source of narcissistic injury.” In this manner, narcissistic injury of individuals, such as lack of self esteem and self-respect, can motivate people to join terrorist organizations in order to meet their psychological needs (Borum, 2004; Hudson, 1999; McCormick 2003). The empirical validity of explanations for crime by psychological theories is difficult, if not impossible, to test, since motivations are deeply hidden in the unconscious (Akers, 2000). Besides, explanations that use simple

psychological terminology do not reflect the real complexities of the terrorism phenomena (Horgan, 2003a).

Procedural justice theory and *defiance theory* might help explain why so many terrorists come from experiences of political oppression and how exorbitances of governing powers might affect individuals to join illegal structures. *Procedural justice theory* addresses citizens' perception of justice as fair or unfair, or just or unjust. If people think that sanction is fair and just, they comply with the law by confirming the legitimacy of law enforcement. Conversely, unfair and unjust sanctions do not result in compliance and decrease legitimacy (Hinds, 2007; Tyler, 1990). On the other hand, *defiance theory* integrates three theories: procedural justice theory as explained above, the theory of "reintegrative shaming" which simply suggests that while reintegrative shaming controls crime, stigmatic shaming augments it, and the sociology of "master emotions" of pride and shame that simply indicates individual differences in emotional reaction to sanctions or shaming that might vary depending on social bonding to those who apply sanctions and to society in general. According to defiance theory, procedural justice's core concepts of fairness and legitimacy play an important role for the acknowledgement of shame, a necessary component of deterrence. In other words, defiance occurs if an individual (who is weakly bonded to or alienated from the sanctioning agent or the community the agent represents) thinks that criminal sanctions are unfair, stigmatizing, and rejecting a person; thus, he would not acknowledge shame and probably would offend again. These kinds of sanction are seen as "substantively arbitrary, discriminatory, excessive, undeserved, or otherwise objectively unjust" (Sherman, 1993, p. 461). In this context, given the literature on participation, excessive

use of force, violation of basic human rights, humiliation of people by security forces, or governmental oppression which are perceived as unnecessary and unjust might cause resistance and protest against these unacknowledged practices. This may also lead to support and even participation in terrorist groups that claim to fight against these kinds of conditions. It is not necessary for a person to be the direct victim of these treatments. That is, differently in terrorism, watching or seeing others treated unfairly and unjustly may lead to similar results.

Conflict theory is similar to procedural justice to some extent. Conflict theory contends that law and the criminal justice system watch the interest of and generate benefits for the most powerful group, rather than all members of the society. The law is unfairly used by the criminal justice system to label and punish powerless persons in the society (Akers, 2000). Conflict theory further emphasizes that crime is the behavior of individuals caught up in cultural and group conflict. Weinberg and Richardson (2004) analyzed several terrorist movements across the world (i.e. Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the PKK in Turkey, IRA in Northern Ireland, ETA in Spain) using conflict theory and concluded that overreaction of the governmental authorities have escalated the terror events by abovementioned groups. They identified four conditions for the emergence of social and political conflict: 1- Parties should think that they have different identities from one other, 2- At least one of the parties must have grievances to be satisfied, 3- At least one of the party must make plan to change other party so as to reduce or eliminate the grievance, 4- Aggrieved party must believe that they are capable of making change. While it is not certain that when all these conditions are met that conflict will emerge; however, when it starts, it escalates. Similarly, Crenshaw (1981) explains that ‘the first

condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority” (p. 383). Terrorism is seen as the best alternative to adjust the situation to make things fair and equal, or to gain equal rights or a separate state. Apparently, conflict theory is useful to explain politically or ideologically motivated crimes such as political terrorism (Akers, 2000). In other words, political terrorism is a kind of reflection of conflict theory (Weinberg & Richardson, 2004). Hence, some *political theories* such as political theory of anarchism, political theory of fascism, and political theory of Marxism could be assessed under the scope of conflict theory. According to Hoffman (1998), terrorism is a ‘fundamentally and inherently’ political concept. Terrorism is about power, and the use of power to achieve political change. This perspective makes terrorism one of the core topics of political science. In the 1960s and 1970s, the general focal points of political science were leftist ideologies that usually included the ideological concepts of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, anarchism, or nihilism. However, after the 1990s religiously motivated terrorism has been one of the main concerns (Duyvesteyn, 2004).

Among the abovementioned political theories (political theories of anarchism, fascism, and Marxism), the *political theory of Marxism* will be briefly explained due to its relevance to the study topic as one of the terrorist group under the examination (DHKP/C) has Marxist-Leninist ideology. According to Marxist theory, law and the criminal justice system are controlled by the ruling capitalist elite, and serve elite self-interests. Marxist theory posits that the capitalist system motivates egoistic tendencies, encourages selfishness, and fails to promote social instincts. In this view, all crimes are a

reflection of the crime-producing system of capitalism. Likewise, some political crimes such as rebellion conducted as a part of revolutionary movement against the capitalist system can be assessed under the frame of Marxist theory. The Marxist approach has motivated many left oriented terrorist groups that seek to destroy the capitalist system and establish a state ruled by Marxist ideology. In this context, individuals who are against capitalism might find themselves in Marxist groups that target capitalism. In addition to economic issues, different modifications of Marxist theory integrate other variables such as age, gender, socialization, strain, differential opportunity, and social learning into the theory (Akers, 2000; Beiner, 2006). Akers (2000) criticizes this issue and contends that the greater the inclusion of these kinds of variables in Marxist theory, the less Marxist theories differ from non-Marxist theories. Since Marxist theories focus on the capitalist system as a source of crime, it is difficult to test this theory by examining only capitalist systems. According to Ferracuti (1982), Marxist theory is difficult to synthesize due to its long history and different interpretations. Additionally, the transfer or transformation of class consciousness to revolutionary consciousness is still historically unproven. Political theories may draw a general theoretical frame for some of the learning and motivation related variables that facilitate participation in terrorist groups. Accordingly, given the literature it might be claimed that learning related variables such as “propaganda through publications/the media” and “organizational activities”, and the motivational factors such as “ideological closeness”, “exorbitances of governing power/s”, or “negative life events” are relevant to these political theories to a considerable extent. For example, having similar perspectives with Marxist ideology (ideological closeness), oppressive practices in a capitalist system (exorbitances of

governing power), or being in the poor class in a capitalist economic system (negative life events) may end up joining in a Marxist terrorist group that fight against these unjust conditions. As to learning related variables, propaganda through different means including publications as well as organizational activities like demonstrations have important roles to promote the Marxist ideologies.

4. Conclusion and Research Questions

A person does not become a terrorist overnight; the transition is a gradual learning (Horgan, 2003a) and motivation process. There is no single or simple answer to the question of “Why does a person become a terrorist?” The range of people participating in terrorist groups is vast, and there is demonstrated variation in terms of background characteristics, motivational factors, and factors that help them learn about terrorist groups (Horgan, 2003b; Kiknadze, 2007; Silke, 2003). In other words, there is no unique motivation, background characteristic, or learning dynamics that could be used to explain the reason of why individuals participate in terrorist groups. Congruently, Horgan (2003b, p. 113) accentuates that “there are many reasons as to why someone would want to join a terrorist group, and there is strong diversity of personal motivation even within the same group.” Therefore, it is important not to develop stereotypical views of terrorists.

Terrorist groups dramatically differ from each other as well, particularly in terms of ideology (i.e. leftist, rightist, and separatist), size, resources, tactics, targets, levels of violence, recruitment methods, objectives, and locations where they act (Silke, 2003). “In short, on these and a vast range of other variables and measures, it is possible to find

major differences between groups who are labeled by someone, somewhere, as terrorists” (Silke, 2003, p. 34).

As indicated above, there are various theories that might have explanatory value for participation in terrorist organizations. It is, nevertheless, difficult to test these theories because of data-related drawbacks. Also, based on the above discussion and findings, it can be asserted that the use of the same theory to examine different ideological groups may not be workable. Variations in the ideology, background, or geographic characteristics of terrorist groups may require the application of different theories in the study of different terrorist groups. For instance, conflict theory or Marxist theory might be more appropriate for the examination of left wing groups, rather than religiously motivated or right wing groups given that left wing groups often emphasize conflict in the society utilizing traditionally Marxist terms like inequality or injustice. Even if a same theory is used to study different groups, the same concepts/constructs of that theory may not be relevant to each group. For example, given the literature, exorbitances of governing powers might be more relevant to participation in left wing groups compared to religiously motivated groups, since left wing groups usually define governmental forces as oppressive and use that strategy in order to generate motivation for participation, violence, resistance, and revolt. Referring to the lack of commonality between different types of terrorist groups, Horgan (2003a, p. 23) contends that “...formulating a theory of terrorist behavior must accommodate the heterogeneity of the phenomenon as well as the wide diversity of individual motivations that terrorist members might themselves push as explanatory factors.”

It is also important to distinguish between levels of analysis. This study is based on a micro level analysis. If macro level analysis is executed, it may be possible to reveal variations between the findings of micro and macro level analysis of terrorism.


According to the literature, at the individual level, there are uncertain, contradictory, and debatable relationships between the variables of poverty, low socio-economic status, lower educational achievement, inequality and its impacts on involvement in a terrorist group. However, in many terrorists groups, terrorists have higher level of incomes, education, or socio-economic status than the general population from which they are drawn. At a macro level analysis, poverty, education status, inequality, or political oppression are most likely to appear to have different effects. That is to say, poverty, low educational achievement, and inequality may be positively related to terrorism in many countries where terrorist groups exist.

Finally, there exists a clear need to focus upon the critical goal of understanding all aspects of terrorism, including participation in terrorist groups, taking into particular account the possible differences between different types of terrorist organizations in terms of background characteristics of terrorists, their motivations and factors that help them learn about the groups in which they participate. This study will begin by examining how background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors relate to participation in terrorist groups. These same characteristics are then used to examine whether these traits relate to participation in left wing as opposed to religiously motivated terrorist groups. To this end, given the exploratory and inductive nature of this study, I will seek answers to the following research questions:

Research questions (RQ) for quantitative analysis

RQ1: What are the background characteristics of terrorists in DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations?

RQ2: Is there a significant difference between the sample (DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah) and general population of Turkey in terms of background characteristics?




RQ3: How (from which sources) do individuals learn about Turkish Hezbollah, and DHKP/C terrorist organizations?

RQ4: What kinds of factors motivate individuals to join Turkish Hezbollah, and DHKP/C terrorist organizations?


The next research questions will explore the relationship between each variable on (selected) *background characteristics* of DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah members and *motivational factors*.

RQ5: Is there a significant relationship between each (relevant) *background characteristics* of DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah members and *motivational factors*?




The next set of questions compare the similarities and differences between Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C members in terms of background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors.


RQ6: Are *background characteristics* of terrorists significantly related to participation in DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah? What are the odds of ratios between background characteristics and joining DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah?



RQ7: Are *learning related variables* significantly related to participation in DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah? What are the odds of ratios between learning related variables and joining DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah?




RQ8: Are *motivational factors* significantly related to participation in DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah? What are the odds of ratios between root motivational factors and joining DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah?



RQ9: Does previous criminality/arrest (any connection with security forces before participation) increase odds of joining DHKP/C or/and Turkish Hezbollah?

RQ10: Does any family member's active support or sympathy to the group increase odds of joining DHKP/C or/and Turkish Hezbollah?

RQ11: Are there significant differences between male and female participants of DHKP/C in terms of background characteristics, learning related variables, and motivational factors?²²



Research questions for qualitative analysis

In addition to the quantitative analyses, the documents will also be reviewed to find detailed answers to the following research questions:

RQ1: How do negative life events motivate individuals to join terrorist organizations?

²² The data about Turkish Hezbollah do not include girls.

RQ2: How does ideological/political closeness motivate individuals to join terrorist organizations?

RQ3: How do environmental factors motivate individuals to join terrorist organizations?

RQ4: What is effect of ‘need to belong to a group’ in participation in terrorist groups?

RQ5: How do tactics/propaganda of terrorists motivate individuals to join terrorist organizations?

RQ6: What are the other factors that motivate individuals to join terrorist groups?

RQ7: What are the expectations of individuals from the terrorist groups (DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah) before joining? How do they see the terrorist groups?

RQ8: If individuals were members of other legal or illegal groups before joining DHKP/C or Turkish Hezbollah, why did they leave from these groups and choose DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah?

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the quantitative and qualitative analysis methods used to analyze the documents captured from Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist organizations' cells to answer the questions 'What are the background characteristics of Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist organizations' members?', 'From which sources do individuals learn about these terrorist groups?', 'What kinds of factors motivate them to join terrorist groups?', and 'What are the similarities and differences between Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C with regard to background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors?'

Research on terrorism presents methodological challenges, including difficulties in accessing data and flawed methodologies (Ross, 1993). These inadequacies present difficulties in the application of traditional research methods to the study of terrorism (Silke, 2004b). Merari (1991) notes "On the practical side, terrorism is a very elusive subject for research...Collecting systematic, standardized, reliable information for the purpose of comparisons is next to impossible. Moreover, the customary tools of psychological and sociological research are almost always inapplicable for studying terrorist groups and their individual members" (p. 89). However, despite methodological limitations, there is a growing body of research on terrorism.

Methods used in terrorism research represent a broad range of traditional approaches: interviews with terrorists (i.e. Stern, 2003), use of open sources (i.e. Sageman, 2004), examination of official records (i.e. Smith, 1994), surveys of prisoners (i.e. Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003) and analysis of terrorists' documents (i.e. Teymur,

2004). Most of these studies used qualitative methods. Quantitative research, which helps us see numerical relationships and patterns, is uncommon, and those which have quantitative characteristics are generally descriptive (Silke, 2004a).

This study relies on both quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods to analyze the documents captured from Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist organizations' cells. Content analysis is especially useful for creating knowledge, representation of the facts, and new explanations and insights (Krippendorff, 1980). Accordingly, the qualitative content analysis will focus on the root motivational factors that lead individuals to participation in terrorist organizations. The quantitative content analysis will be utilized to generate data for statistical analysis of differences between participants in two ideologically distinct terrorist groups in terms of background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors.

The unit of analysis of this study is the (individual) terrorist. In the analyses, no identifiers will be included in the data for the subjects of the documents to avoid identification of the documents' authors (terrorists). All methods have been approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Michigan State University.

1. Terrorist Documents

In Turkey, almost all terrorist organizations including Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C ask their potential members to submit written background information either before active participation or right after being recruited in the terrorist group. Turkish Hezbollah usually asks its potential members to write these reports after the selection and training period and before they can become active militants who take part in terrorist incidents. Likewise, DHKP/C collects detailed information about the candidates by

asking them to write reports about themselves. Unlike Turkish Hezbollah, some DHKP/C members prepare these documents after becoming an active militant.

All the documents are similar in content, and include participation related information. Since these documents are submitted either before active participation or immediately after recruitment, the documents from this period are ideal for the study of terrorist motivation and participation. These documents constitute a kind of application form, used by the leaders and authorities of the terrorist groups in the selection and recruitment process. They contain detailed and self-presented information about each individual's background characteristics, evaluation of their previous life, explanations of the reasons that motivate their participation in the terrorist group, and evaluation of their and their families' social, economic and ideological conditions. These documents are not only used as application forms and recruitment tools but also they give power to the leaders of the terrorist organizations against the members in the case of disobedience, desistence, and conflict with the ideology of the organization. Furthermore, as Teymur (2004) notes, they facilitate the internal communication of terrorist organizations. The documents in this study were captured during police operations against the terrorist cells of Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C in different parts of Turkey.

The contents of the documents suggest that individuals answered similar type of questions, because almost all information in the documents is presented in the same order. For instance, DHKP/C related documents contain information about 28 different questions such as "Where were you born?, What is your birth date?, What is your ethnicity?, What is your level of education?, How many brothers or sisters do you have?, What is your family economic situation?, What is your family's political background?,

Do you have any relatives who work in the police or army force?” Teymur (2004). Turkish Hezbollah documents contain almost the exact same type of information. The biggest difference between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah related documents is the format: Turkish Hezbollah’s documents appear in a question and answer format, although there are no apparent questions in the documents of DHKP/C. However, the order of the information in the documents suggests that DHKP/C members answered the same type of questions from a prepared list. For example, in each DHKP/C document, the answer to item number ten contains information about individuals’ job experience. Similarly, in item number four, they gave information about their education level; “I finished high school...”, or “I graduated from college” etc. By looking at answers regarding education, it is clear that terrorist organizations want to have information about potential members’ education level. The consistent presentation of content and answers allow coding the responses to each question as a variable.

2. Sample

(1) Selection of terrorist groups

There are many religiously motivated and left wing terrorist groups in Turkey. The most active religiously motivated terrorist groups are Islamic Action Organization (IHO), Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front (IBDA-C), Islamic Congregation Union (ICB), Hizb-ut Tahrir, and Turkish Hezbollah. On the other hand, Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP), Turkish Communist Party/Marxist Leninist-Conference (TKP/ML-Conference), Marxist Communist Party (MKP), and DHKP/C are the most active left wing terrorist groups. In this study, I selected one terrorist organization from each ideological group: DHKP/C as a left wing terrorist group and Turkish Hezbollah as

a religiously motivated group. These two terrorist organizations were selected for several reasons²³.

First, DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah conducted the highest number of incidents among the terrorist organizations in their respective categories. From 1995 to 2006, terrorist incidents (serious or not serious) carried out by the left wing terrorist groups are as following: DHKP/C: 2,503, TKP/ML-Conference: 665, and MLKP: 1,528. Incidents conducted by religiously motivated terrorist groups' between 1994 and 2006 are: 523 for Turkish Hezbollah, 253 for IBDA/C, 182 for ICB, 463 for Hizb-ut Tahrir, and 5 for Vasat.

Table 5. Religiously motivated (1994-2006) and left wing terrorist groups (1995-2006) and terrorist incidents, arrested terrorists, and casualties²⁴

	Incidents	Arrested terrorists	Casualty of civilians	Casualty of Security forces
<i>Left wing</i>				
DHKP/C	2503	8410	112	259
TKP/ML-Conf.	665	2529	70	112
MLKP	1528	2508	22	82
<i>Religiously motivated</i>				
Turkish Hezbollah	523	10720	530	71
IBDA/C	253	751	44	-
ICB	182	327	-	-
Hizb-ut Tahrir	463	734	-	-
Vasat	5	200	24	-

Source: TNP (2006)

Second, although it is difficult to determine the exact size of these groups, DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah are the largest in each ideological category. The number of arrested terrorists provides an indicator of the size of these terrorist organizations.

²³ The data about Turkish terrorist groups and terrorist incidents were provided by TNP.

²⁴ This table includes the most deadlier and active ones in each ideological category. Religiously motivated terrorist groups do not include the connections of international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda.

Between the years of 1995 and 2006, there were 8,410 arrested DHKP/C members compared to 2,529 for TKP/ML-Conference, and 2,508 for MLKP in the same period. Similarly, between the years of 1994 and 2006, the number of arrested Turkish Hezbollah members was 10,720 while IBDA/C has 751, ICB has 327, Hizb-ut Tahrir has 734, and Vasat has 200 members arrested. Table 5 presents these differences in incidents and arrest rates for the major terrorist groups in Turkey.

Third, these two groups have the highest civilian casualty rate when compared with others in their respective categories. Between 1995 and 2006, the numbers of civilians killed or wounded are; 112 by DHKP/C, 70 by TKP/ML-Conference, and 22 by MLKP. The numbers for religiously motivated groups cover the years between 1994 and 2006. During this period, Turkish Hezbollah killed or wounded 530 civilians, while this number is just 44 for IBDA/C, and 24 for Vasat. ICB and Hizb-ut Tahrir did not target any civilians. Further, while Turkish Hezbollah killed or wounded 71 security forces, there is no casualty of security forces caused by other local religiously motivated groups. Compared to other left wing groups, DHKP/C appears to be the most violent. Between the years of 1995 and 2006, while DHKP/C is responsible for the killing or wounding of 259 security forces, this number is 112 for TKP/ML-Conference, and 82 for MLKP.

Data from other indicators such as captured ammunition yield similar results that left-wing DHKP/C and religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah represent the most significant threat to public safety among their respective types of terrorist organizations. Additionally, these two groups have more institutionalized structures in both legal and illegal areas through political parties, media organs, and business investments. Turkish security forces consider them as the biggest future threat when compared with other

Turkish terrorist organizations. Because of these and other significant characteristics of Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C, I selected them for the analysis

(2) Convenience sampling of the documents

This study uses convenience sampling of documents seized from these two terrorist groups. Convenience sampling is a kind of non-probability sampling method, also known as haphazard or accidental sampling (Bachman & Schutt, 2003; Statistics Canada, 2006). In contrast to probability sampling methods, items in non-probability samples within the target population do not have an equal chance of being selected. So the basic disadvantages of convenience sampling are generally similar to non-probability sampling. “Because the chance of one element being selected versus another element remains an unknown, we cannot be certain the selected sample actually represents our target population” (Bachman and Paternoster, 2004, p. 19). Therefore, researchers would have no idea about the representativeness of the samples of the population. However, especially for exploratory research, convenience sampling is an accepted method of obtaining data. Depending on the research design and sample characteristics, convenience sampling could give significant insights into the phenomenon under study. Despite sample selection bias, convenience sampling can give accurate results when the population is homogenous (Statistics Canada, 2006).

Convenience sampling is the basic sampling method for the documents used in this analysis. Given the limitations inherent in terrorism research and the distinctiveness of the samples of original handwritten terrorist documents, the advantages of the convenience sampling method outweigh the disadvantages. As mentioned above, they are very valuable sources of information because of the originality of their contents.

Specifically, when compared with official reports or self reports, the documents appear to be more reliable and free of bias since they were submitted to terrorist organizations rather than security forces or researchers.

Convenience sampling is also considered very useful when researchers do not have a population list. In this study that concentrates on participation in terrorist groups, it is impossible to define a population because, there is no list of terrorists from which to randomly select. Even if a list existed, it was unlikely to make contact with the selected samples because of confidentiality issues and several other risk factors. Official lists, for example a list of detained terrorists, are also limited because they only represent those terrorists who were actually caught (such as prisoners) (Bachman and Paternoster, 2004). With these difficulties in mind, convenience sampling, utilizing seized documents, appears to be an appropriate and necessary method to study participation in the terrorist groups.

Since the documents have strategic importance for both terror organizations and also security forces, terror organizations try to keep them in very secure places so as not to be found during the probable police operations. Therefore, security forces do not have a significant number of these documents. They are strategically important for terrorist organizations, because they reveal considerable personal information about their members. On the other hand, they are important for the security forces, because they present direct evidence in the original handwriting of terrorists, and constitute proof of terrorist group membership. The number of these kinds of documents in TNP's archives is not clear, but they are very limited in number.

Despite the difficulties in obtaining similar documents, I had access to 116 documents for DHKP/C and 186 documents for Turkish Hezbollah to analyze, making the sample size 302. DHKP/C documents were obtained from two sources. First, Teymur (2004) who conducted descriptive study about the recruitment process of DHKP/C members provided the copies of 74 documents used in his study. Teymur (2004) gathered the documents from the archives of the TNP. This study uses the original documents, rather than Teymur's (2004) data set. Since this study addresses a distinct set of research questions, analysis of the original documents is warranted. In addition to Teymur's documents, 41 additional similar documents from TNP Archives were provided by the TNP.

In addition to DHKP/C related documents, 186 more documents which belong to Turkish Hezbollah members were also obtained from the archives of the TNP with the consent of authorities of TNP-Anti-Terrorism Department. As noted above, this results in a total sample of 302 documents²⁵.

3. Data Analysis

In the quantitative part of the study, the variables pertinent to background characteristics, learning related factors and motivational factors were coded from the documents for statistical analysis. Logistic regression was used as the basic statistical method to determine which variables discriminate between Turkish Hezbollah and

²⁵ There is no way to determine that these 302 documents constitute all such documents in TNP Archives, since it is possible that there are some more documents in the individual investigation files. In practice, during investigations, security forces do not maintain these documents together in a separate folder. Each document is kept in the related individual's folder. In order to determine if there are more documents, it would be necessary to check all the terrorists' files; this is not feasible because of accessibility problems, time constraints, and the significant number of the individual terrorist's files. These 302 documents present a significant opportunity because capturing these types of documents before they are destroyed by the terrorist organizations is quite rare. Terrorist organizations will go to great lengths to prevent the seizure of such documents.

DHKP/C terrorist organizations. Further, the relationships between the variables were examined. The qualitative part of the study is based on intensive analysis of motivational factors identified in the documents. Each motivation related variable tested in the quantitative part was also examined in detail in the qualitative part of the analysis in order to present a richer and more intimate view of motivations, and to see within and between group motivational variations in the variables.

All the available documents (n=302) were included in the quantitative part of the research. Based on the thematic categories identified in the quantitative part, purposive (judgment) sampling method was used for the qualitative analysis of the documents. In this approach, some cases were sampled based on their values on the key variables.²⁶ The total number of the documents used in the qualitative analysis is around thirty percent of all the documents available for each group (approximately 55 documents for Turkish Hezbollah and 35 documents for DHKP/C).

(1) Basic characteristics of quantitative and qualitative research

Research methods can be examined under two general topics; quantitative research methods and qualitative research methods. Quantitative research presents numerical relationships and patterns, and has been relatively uncommon in the study of terrorism. Bachman and Schutt (2003) define quantitative methods as “methods such as surveys and experiments that record variation in social life in terms of categories that vary in amount. Data that are treated as quantitative are either numbers or attributes that can be ordered in terms of magnitude” (p. 19).

²⁶ In purposive sampling, each sample element/case is selected due to its exclusive value (Bachman & Schutt, 2003). Representation of patterns of complex variations might be another reason of selection of this method (Maxfield & Babbie, 2006). Cases selected for the analysis is believed to have some traits of which a researcher might want to get detailed information (Nardi, 2003). However, these specific and unique cases might be missed if random sampling is used.

In contrast to the quantitative method, qualitative methods aim at revealing the social reality that the participants exhibit. In qualitative studies, researchers focus on the participants' words and behaviors rather than prearranged categories, counts or numbers (Bachman & Schutt, 2003). Whereas quantitative methods' key features are the use of systematic measurement and statistical methods, qualitative methods do not quantify their findings through statistical methods or analysis. In this regard qualitative variables vary in kind; quantitative variables vary in amount (Marczyk, DeMatteo & Festinger, 2005).

While explanation, description, prediction and evaluation are among the basic purposes of the quantitative method, exploration is the main focus of the qualitative research. Qualitative methods, however, might be used for the purpose of description and evaluation as in the quantitative method. Whereas the goal of the quantitative method is the correct reflection of what is happening in the real world, qualitative methods seek to understand some unknowns in social processes and social settings by focusing on various perspectives of the study subjects (Bachman & Schutt, 2003; Morse & Richards, 2002). Unlike quantitative research that generally uses hypothesis testing procedures, qualitative research starts with a more global question generally known as a guiding hypothesis. However, these research questions do not constrain the researcher (Smith & Davis, 2003).

The inclusion of both quantitative and qualitative methods empowers research by combining the strengths of each approach in the same study. In other words, data collected through quantitative methods might be supported with the data collected through qualitative method or vice-a-versa. Hagan (2005) argues this issue in the context of criminal justice "an emergent, interdisciplinary, applied scientific field require for its

mature development a full array of quantitative and qualitative approaches, pure and applied research efforts, and theoretically incisive as well as methodologically sound studies and evaluations to gain academic respectability it both aspires and deserves” (p. 20). This seems to be particularly appropriate in an emerging area of study such as terrorism.

This study uses content analysis methods. Content analysis may be classified as both qualitative and quantitative, as it may feature qualitative methods and quantification of qualitative based information (Nardi, 2003). Krippendorff (1980) defines content analysis as a “research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context” (p. 21). Content analysis involves special techniques to analyze the scientific data, and it is especially useful for creating knowledge, representation of the facts, and new explanations and insights (Krippendorff, 1980). Qualitative content analysis includes many interpretive activities applied to verbal and nonverbal, written and oral, mass mediated or individual messages. Conversely, quantitative content analysis is often based on the data which are at nominal level. It also includes aggregated cases analyzed at ordinal, interval or ratio levels (Rosengren, 1981).

Documents are one of the most commonly studied materials using content analysis. Altheide (1996) indicates that “document analysis refers to an integrated and conceptually informed method, procedure, and technique, for locating, identifying, retrieving, analyzing documents for their relevance, significance, and meaning” (p. 2). Documents that are subject to content analysis may include newspapers, books, diaries, field notes, and official reports, papers, and records. Researchers play a very important and active role in the process of the transformation of documents into data. A researcher

who uses the content analysis method has to deal with some problems such as political issues, funding, retrievability and access to the data. Even if there is access, it is not always possible to find adequate numbers of documents. When documents are obtained, they help us understand different perspectives and processes of social life, several unknown facts and meaning of social activities and movements (Altheide, 1996).

This study, which used quantitative and qualitative content analyses of the documents, sought answer to four main research questions: ‘What are the background characteristics of Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist organizations’ members?’, ‘From which sources do individuals learn about these terrorist groups?’, ‘What kinds of factors motivate them to join terrorist groups?’, and ‘What are the similarities and differences between Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C members with regard to background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors?’

(2) Quantitative data analysis

This section includes examination of the quantitative approach for the documents. The coding and general parameters of each variable and quantitative statistical method are discussed below.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable (DV) is the extent of participation in DHKP/C or Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations. DV was coded as a dummy variable (0= DHKP/C, 1= Turkish Hezbollah). In addition, each of the motivational factors was used as DV in order to explore whether different background characteristics increase the odds of having different type of motivations. The main body of the study used bivariate and multivariate logistic regression and Chi-square in order to see relations between IVs and DV.

Independent variables

There are three main factors that are believed to be effective in participation in terrorist groups: background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors. Each of these factors contains several variables.

Background characteristics: In order to capture the variables relevant to background characteristics of the individuals, documents were analyzed quantitatively. Then, the variables were coded and transformed into measurable quantitative variables. Background characteristics related variables, their measurement levels, and codes are described as following:

Age of onset: Age of onset was coded as an interval/ratio variable.

Gender: Gender was dummy-coded with “female” being as the reference category (0=Female, 1=Male).

Education level: Education level was coded into two dummy variables: high school, and higher than high school (post high school). Middle school or lower education serves as the reference category.

Marital status: Marital status of terrorists was dummy-coded (0= Not married, 1= Married). Those who are married and still remains married will be coded as one, and those who are single (never married), divorced, separated (no relation anymore) and those whose spouse is dead will be coded as zero. Zero (not married) serves as the reference category.

Economic condition: In the Turkish context, many terrorists, especially those who are students or unemployed, are economically dependent on their parents. Unlike America or some European countries, even after the age of 18, Turkish parents usually

try to meet financial needs of their children until they have their own job. Moreover, many young married couples continue to live together with their parents under the same roof using the budget either earned by parents or their kids. Therefore household economic condition was used as an economic condition of terrorists and coded into two dummy variables: moderate (modest) level, and high level. Low level economic condition serves as the reference category.

Type of job: Terrorists' type of job was coded into two dummy variables as unemployed, and student. Working full time or part time serves as the reference category.

Number of siblings: Number of siblings was coded as an interval/ratio level variable. It indicates the number of siblings that a sample has.

Any family member active in the group: Presence of at least one active family member in the group was dummy-coded with "no" serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). "No" indicates that the terrorist does not have any family member who is active in the group, while one indicates that the terrorist has at least one active family member. Family members include parents or siblings.

Any family member's sympathy to the group: Presence of at least one family member who has a sympathy or passive support to the group was dummy-coded with "no" serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). "No" indicates that the terrorist does not have any family member or relative who has sympathy or passive support to the group, while one indicates that the terrorist has at least one family member who has sympathy or passive support. Family members include parents or siblings.

Any prior detention by security forces: The variable of prior detention by security forces was dummy-coded (0=No, 1=Yes). If a terrorist was not detained or arrested

before participation in the terrorist group it was coded as zero and serves as the reference category. If there is at least one prior detention it was coded as one.

Group affiliation: The group affiliation variable was coded into two dummy variables: affiliation with legal groups, and affiliation with illegal groups. No affiliation serves as the reference category.

Father's job: Father's job included the categories of unemployed, retired, farmer, worker, tradesman/self employed, government official, other jobs, and dead.

Mother's job: Mother's job included the categories of retired, farmer, tradesman/self employed, house wife, other jobs, and dead.

The initial step is a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of individuals joining these two terrorist organizations. This step is followed by the examination of relations between the variables utilizing Chi-Square. In addition, analysis of the relation between different characteristics of the sample and the general Turkish Population is among the main concerns. The next step utilizes logistic regression methods to find out the effects of these variables in participation in two different terrorist groups.

Learning related factors: Learning related factors include the variables of “friendship”, “kinship”, “propaganda through publications, the media, and/or internet”, and “organizational activities.” Each learning related variable was coded as a distinct variable. Main contents of each of these variables, elements that were considered during the coding process and codes are described as following:

Friendship: Friendship is a significant factor in the process of participation in terrorist organizations. Friends facilitate the learning process and/or help join terrorist groups (Ibrahim, 1980, 1982; Sageman, 2004; Della Porta, 1988 cited in Sageman, 2004).

In view of that the documents will be reviewed to assess the extent to which the individuals describe friends as a source from whom they learned about the terrorist group. “Friendship” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that terrorist did not learn about the group from a friend/s (or learnt from any other sources other than a friend/s), while “one” indicates that terrorist describes a friend/s as a source of learning about the terrorist group.

Kinship: As with friendship variable, kinship is an important factor in terms of participation in terrorist groups. That is, family members and/or relatives who are the active members or sympathizers of terrorist organizations might be a source of information about activities and ideologies of a terrorist group (Ibrahim, 1980, 1982; Sageman, 2004; Della Porta, 1988 cited in Sageman, 2004). In this manner, the documents will be analyzed to assess the extent to which the individuals learn about the terrorist group from a kin. “Kinship” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that terrorist did not learn about the group through kinship (or learnt through any other sources other than kinship), while “one” indicates that terrorist describes kinship as a source of learning about the terrorist group.

Propaganda through publications, the media, and/or internet: Another factor which is important in the learning process is propaganda through publications, the media, and/or internet. Terrorists use various propaganda means such as radio, television, internet, video productions, and publications like newspapers, books, or flyers. Among them, especially the media, publications like books or magazines, and internet have been significant tools to promote organizational ideology and recruit new members. Put

simply, it is expected that some individuals learn about terrorist groups in which they have participated through the media regardless of whether it is owned by terrorist groups; organizational publications such as ideological books, magazines and newspapers, and the internet that might contain ideological movies, articles or pictures that might be attractive for some people. “Propaganda through publications, the media, and/or internet” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that terrorist did not learn about the group from any of these propaganda sources (or learnt from other sources), while “one” indicates that terrorist describes propaganda through publications, the media, and/or internet as a source of learning about the terrorist group.

Organizational activities: Organizational activities will include several legal or illegal activities carried out by terrorist groups or their active or passive supporters such as public speeches, demonstrations, meetings, religious speeches/sermons, worships, and/or social movements. It may also include terrorist groups’ activities in the schools, particularly in the universities and high schools, and activities through legal structures such as associations, political parties, or offices used for publishing newspapers or magazines. “Organizational activities” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that terrorist did not learn about the group through organizational activities (or learnt from any other sources other than organizational activities), while “one” indicates that terrorist describes organizational activities as a source of learning about the terrorist group.

Similar to the background characteristics, the first step is a descriptive analysis of the learning related variables. Then, logistic regression methods will be utilized to find

out the effects of these variables in predicting participation in two different terrorist groups.

Motivational factors: In contrast to the other factors (background characteristics and learning related factors) motivational factors were analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative content analysis.

In the quantitative part, the documents were analyzed in order to capture the variables that are related to individuals' root motivation. Then, the variables were coded and transformed into measurable quantitative variables. Motivational factors include the variables of: "need to belong to a group", "exorbitances of governing power/s", "ideological closeness", "negative life events", and "other motivational factors." Each motivational factor was coded as a distinct variable. Main contents of each of these variables, elements that will be considered during the coding process, and codes are described as following;

Need to belong to a group: Individuals' need to belong to a group creates an adequate amount of motivation to take place in a group. This need is met by terrorist groups that are aware of some individuals' this need (Hudson, 1999). As Martin (2006) indicates, a need to belong to a group is a strong desire that some individuals start to define their social status by group acceptance. Accordingly, the documents are reviewed to assess the extent to which the individuals describe 'need to belong to a group' as a motivation for participation in the terrorist group. "Need to belong to a group" was dummy-coded with "zero" serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). "Zero" indicates that "need to belong to a group" is not a motivation for terrorists, while "one" indicates some indication of "need to belong to a group" as a motivation for participation.

Exorbitances of the governing power/s: Exorbitances of the governing power/s are believed to play a significant role to motivate individuals to join terrorist groups. Exorbitances of governing power/s might be in different forms. That is, it may include oppressive, humiliating, honor breaking, derogatory, and/or unjust actions and counter-actions of the governing power/s against people. It may also include violation of basic human rights (Crenshaw, 1981, 2003; Laqueur, 1987; Jenkins, 2003; Rubenstein, 2003; Schmid, 2004; Serafino, 2002; Stern, 2003). Accordingly, the documents are analyzed to assess the extent to which the individuals express ‘exorbitances of governing power/s’ as a motivation for joining terrorist group. “Exorbitances of the governing power/s” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that “exorbitances of the governing power/s” is not a motivation for terrorists, while “one” indicates some indication of “exorbitances of the governing power/s” as a motivation for participation.

Ideological/political closeness: Ideological/political closeness is another factor for some individuals to join terrorist organizations. In other words, if an individual feels that he has similar perspectives, beliefs, thoughts, or viewpoints with a terrorist group he may want to take part in that movement (Alkan, 2002). It is necessary to note that religiously motivated groups have religious ideology and left wing groups have leftist ideology (i.e. Marxist-Leninist ideology). Regardless of this distinction, the documents, however, are examined to figure out the extent to which the individuals explain ‘ideological closeness’ as a motivation for joining terrorist group. “Ideological closeness” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that ‘ideological closeness’ is not a motivation for terrorists,

while “one” indicates some indication of “ideological closeness” as a motivation for participation.

Negative life events: Negative life events might include several negative occurrences such as unhappiness and dissatisfaction in the life due to failures in meeting the various expectations. Negative life events, more specifically, might be financial problems, employment problems, discrimination as being a woman, problems in the family, family pressure, desperation, fear, or hopelessness. Further, some dramatic life events such as having a friend or family member(s) killed by security forces might create a motivation for participation in a terrorist group (Al-Badayneh, 2007; Garfield, 2006; Kiknadze, 2007; Martin, 2006; Sageman, 2004; Silke, 2003). The documents are reviewed to assess the extent to which the individuals describe these and similar negative life events as a motivation for joining terrorist group. “Negative life events” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that “negative life events” are not a motivation for terrorists, while “one” indicates some indication of “negative life events” as a motivation for participation.

Other motivational factors: There might be some other motivational factors which are not so common compared to abovementioned factors such as fun, status, glamour, power, prestige, money, protection, or force and threat (Cantekin, 2006; Silke, 2003). These kinds of factors are gathered under the variable of “other motivational factors.” “Other motivational factors” was dummy-coded with “zero” serving as the reference category (0=No, 1=Yes). “Zero” indicates that ‘other motivational factors’ are not a motivation for terrorists, while “one” indicates some indication of “other motivational factors” as a motivation for participation.

Statistical methods

Logistic regression and discriminant function analyses are useful in predicting participation in group membership. This section examines the characteristics of each, and justifies the selection of statistical techniques for this research.

Logistic Regression: Logistic regression predicts the logit of an event outcome from a set of predictors. Independent variables might be of any type (categorical or/and continuous). There are different forms of logistic regression such as multinomial, ordinary and binomial (or binary). Multinomial logistic regression is used when the dependent variable has more than two classes. If it is possible to rank multiple classes of the dependent variable, then ordinal logistic regression is a better technique than multinomial logistic regression. This study utilizes binomial logistic regression. Binomial logistic regression is a powerful technique for analysis when the outcome variable is dichotomous. Data are entered into the analysis as 0 or 1 coding for the dichotomous outcome (Garson, n.a.; Hox, 2002; Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002). The null hypothesis for the overall model of the logistic regression indicates that all betas are equal to zero. When the null hypothesis is rejected, it means that at least one beta does not equal zero in the population. In other words, logistic regression equation predicts the probability of the outcome better than the mean of the dependent variable Y. The most important mathematical term that underlies logistic regression is the logit which can be defined as the natural logarithm of an odds ratio (Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002). Maximum likelihood estimation is used to calculate the logit coefficients. Maximum likelihood estimation points out how likely it is (the odds) that the observed values of the dependent variable may be predicted from the observed values of the independents (Garson n.a.).

There are many parallels as well as differences between OLS regression and logistic regression. Some of the parallels are: logit coefficients correspond to b coefficients in the logistic regression equation, the standardized logit coefficients correspond to beta weights, and the Pseudo R^2 statistic is used to summarize the strength of the relationship. On the other hand, contrary to OLS regression which calculates changes in the dependent variable itself, logistic regression calculates changes in the log odds of the dependent variable (Garson n.a; Pampel, 2000). Logistic regression is attractive for researchers since it gives the opportunity to ignore some restrictive assumptions of OLS regression such as linearity between the dependent and the independent variables, normality of distribution, homoscedastic dependent variable for each level of the independents, and homogeneity of variance. Further, normally distributed error terms are not assumed. Logistic regression does not require interval and unbounded independent variables. Nevertheless, other assumptions of OLS regression are still valid for the logistic regression such as inclusion of all relevant variables and exclusion of all irrelevant variables in the model, assumption of error terms to be independent (independent sampling), low error in the explanatory variables, no multicollinearity, no outliers, and existence of large samples (Garson, n.a.; Pampel, 2000).

Discriminant function analysis: Discriminant function analysis has similar functions to logistic regression. It is used to see which variables discriminate between two or more groups. More generally, it classifies cases into the values of a categorical dependent variable, shows differences between and among groups, helps determine the explained variance in the dependent variable by the independents, and assesses the

relative importance of independent variables in terms of the dependent variable. The dependent variable is generally a dichotomy. For example, discriminant analysis could be used in order to observe which variables are the best predictors of individuals' choice between two different terrorist organizations. In terms of computation, it is very similar to ANOVA and MANOVA. When the means of a variable are significantly different in different groups, it shows that this variable discriminates between the groups. If multiple variables are included in an analysis to see their contribution to the discrimination between groups, then, we can mention existence of a matrix of total variance and covariance, or a matrix of pooled within-group variance and covariance. The presence of possible significant differences is determined through comparison of these two matrices using the multivariate F-Test. This procedure is similar to MANOVA. If there is two-group case, as in this study, the interpretation of the results is similar to multiple regression. In other words, the variables which have largest regression coefficients have biggest contribution to the prediction of group membership (Garson, n.a; Huberty, 1984).

Discriminant function analysis shares several assumptions of correlation, regression, ANOVA, and MANOVA. For example, proper model specification, independence of all cases, homogeneity of variances (homoscedasticity), homogeneity of covariances and correlations, true categorical dependent variables, closer group sizes of the dependent variable, variance in the dependent variables, interval level independent variable/s, randomly distributed errors, absence of perfect multicollinearity, linearity and normal distribution are basic assumptions of the discriminant analysis (Garson, n.a.).

Which one to choose: The previous discussion indicates that it is more appropriate to use logistic regression in this study because of the violation of some

fundamental assumptions of discriminant function analysis. These data are more likely to violate the assumptions of closer group sizes of the dependent variable since one of the group's size is around 50 percent more than the other (116 vs. 186). Further, there are some nominal variables in the data such as gender and marriage status. There is also a strong possibility of violation of some other basic assumptions such as homoscedasticity and normality of the distribution.

Press and Wilson (1978) emphasize that when compared with discriminate analysis, there is less possibility of violation of assumptions in the logistic regression. As well as several other assumptions, normality and linearity assumptions do not appear as a limitation in the logistic regression. It also handles both categorical and continuous variables. They conclude that especially when normality assumptions are violated, and when many of the independent variables are qualitative, logistic regression is preferable to discriminant analysis.

(3) Qualitative analysis

The qualitative analysis of the documents concentrates on motivational factors that help individuals come to a decision that they should participate in terrorist groups. Qualitative analysis is more likely to give detailed and more comprehensive information about individuals' root motivations. Otherwise, the quantitative analysis of the motivational factors will be limited with the categorization and transformation of documents into measurable quantitative variables, and testing these variables using statistical methods in order to see how these variables discriminate between two terrorist groups. Thus, reliance on just quantitative analysis is most likely to result in missing several important points in understanding key motivational issues.

The motivation of individuals before joining terrorist groups is a poorly understood topic. Given that the exploratory perspective is at the heart of qualitative methods (Bachman & Schutt, 2003; Nardi, 2003), it is expected that qualitative analysis of documents will give a richer and more intimate view of the motivations of individuals that lead them to participate in two different terrorist groups.

Based on the quantitative statistical analysis of motivational factors, cases for themes within each motivational category (need to belong to a group, negative life events, ideological/political closeness, environmental factors, tactics/propaganda of terrorists, and other motivational factors) are reviewed. The review also includes variations in motivational differences both within and between the terrorist groups. For instance, based on the literature, it can be proposed that the variable of “exorbitance of governing forces” is typically related to left wing DHKP/C, and therefore it is most likely that it falls under the second category. The quantitative analysis will be useful in order to determine whether this variable discriminates between Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C, and to see whether this finding is supported in the literature; it, however, will not give detailed information about variation in individuals’ perception, belief, or expectation. For example, negative experiences during prison confinement, security forces’ excessive use of force (i.e. during the demonstrations), witnessing a case in which people were maltreated by the police, governmental prohibitions on democratic rights (i.e. right to free speech or demonstration), or watching harsh treatments of the police or military forces against citizens on TV are some of the examples pertinent to the variable of “exorbitances of governing forces”, and all these occurrences might be the factors that motivate individuals to support and join DHKP/C. Thus, qualitative analysis appears to be

important in terms of revealing this motivational element within group differences for each variable.

It is also likely that some variables are relevant to both of the terrorist groups. Through in-depth analysis of these kinds of variables, the motivational variation and similarities within and between the two terrorist groups can be assessed. For instance, “need to belong to a group” which typically includes friendship dynamics is likely to be pertinent to both of the groups since almost all terrorist groups, regardless of their ideology make use of friendship and group dynamics (i.e., social networks) in order to pull individuals into the group.

It is, however, expected that each terrorist group would use different tactics and strategies. While Turkish Hezbollah members might establish friendship relations utilizing religious figures or behaviors such as showing himself as a person who is honest, helping others, never lies, or always respect others; left wing DHKP/C group’s members might start to build friendship relations in the high school or universities by providing potential individuals with a home, a girl friend, course notes, or different recreational pastimes. These details would not surface in the quantitative analysis, and we would not be able to understand the friendship development process that motivates individuals to be part of the group in which his friend is a member. Similarly, “negative life events” might be the main motivator for some members in both terrorist groups. Categorization of these factors under the same variable will most likely result in losing some power to explain differences in perspectives, thoughts, and beliefs both within and between the groups. For example, whereas it is possible to observe a family pressure as a factor for joining Turkish Hezbollah, economic problems might be the basic concern for

those who join DHKP/C. Attempting to measure these two different issues under one variable (negative life events) would ignore how the content of this variable differentiates between two groups.

Lastly, qualitative methods will help to explore some unknown dynamics behind the motivations of individuals. Individuals' perceptions of the group, their expectations from the terrorist group, and other possible psychological and sociological dynamics behind each motivational factor are important in the process that leads to participation. In one case, one terrorist explained that the biggest change in his life began with one of his classmates' (a Turkish Hezbollah member) positive and friendly approach to him despite the bad reputation of him because of his criminal record as a thief:

“During my childhood I was habitually committing theft, and I was always fighting with my friends. Everybody was complaining against me to my family. Upon those complaints, my elder brother was always beating me. Once again, while I was about to commit theft in my neighborhood, one of my friends of whom I knew from the secondary school saw me. However, he did not complain; conversely, he behaved me in a good manner without blaming me. Then I felt very embarrassed. Our friendship relations developed day by day. He was giving me books and I was reading all of them. As a consequence I quitted all my bad habits, and I joined to Turkish Hezbollah”

Quantitative analysis would be limited with the categorization of this explanation as a measurable variable/s of “friendly approach of individuals (terrorists)” or “friendship effect.” This example reinforces the importance of attitudes expressed by family members and others against individuals who commit crimes, especially during childhood. In this example, the terrorist was constantly berated by people in his environment and his own family, and his family members even beat him. He was unhappy with his life and he felt ostracized. This story demonstrates that Turkish Hezbollah members are very capable of understanding human psychology and shaping the behavior of their recruits. Further,

the books provided by the Turkish Hezbollah member appear to be an important factor in terms of motivational preparation. This demonstrates how an individual's life may come under the control of a terrorist organization, and underscores the necessity of qualitative analysis of these documents as appropriate and necessary approach to develop a richer view of these kinds of issues.

4. Reliability and Validity

No measure has perfect validity and reliability, especially measurement of sensitive topics, such as terrorism and participation in terrorist groups. The measurement of terrorism related issues is further complicated by the lack of agreement about the proper definition of the terrorism in the literature. This study of documents in the original handwriting of actual terrorists addresses some of those concerns. In contrast to official data and self report data, documents may be considered more objective and sincere, since terrorists directly and voluntarily wrote them to the authorities of the terrorist organization. Unlike official data, they were not prepared under the control and supervision of security forces. Nor are they like self report data which may contain biases related to misleading information by the subjects or misinterpretation by researchers. While composing them, it is unlikely that the authors (terrorists) expected police access to these reports, and so, it is likely they wrote everything that was deemed necessary to express themselves fully in order to gain entry into the group. These characteristics of the documents make the research relatively accurate, unique and reliable.

Around 10 percent of the documents for each terrorist group (11 documents for DHKP/C and 18 documents for Turkish Hezbollah) were randomly selected for reliability analysis. An inter-coder reliability analysis using the Cohen's Kappa statistic was

performed to determine consistency among coders. Kappa values for individual variables ranged from .789 to 1.0, indicating very high agreements between the coders.²⁷ For the background characteristics variables, Kappa values ranged from .789 (family sympathy) to 1.0 (gender, marital status, prior detention). Kappa values for motivational factors ranged from .791 (negative life events, environmental factors) to 1.0 (need to belong to a group), whereas for the learning variables ranged from .792 (friend/s) to 1.0 (kinship).²⁸

In this study, validity is more problematic than reliability. While measurement validity can not be divorced from larger theoretical concerns, the lack of directly related theories on terrorism is a fundamental problem. Sooner or later, it is inevitable that researchers ask what the nature of the concepts is, what they mean, and whether the operational definition faithfully represents or reflects the consensus definition, or something else. Unfortunately, it is impossible to prove the validity of the instrument solely by application of different methods. Hence, it is necessary to keep this study under close surveillance to see if they are behaving as expected. However, a general assessment of validity is possible by comparing these findings to prior variables and research, and general sociological and psycho-sociological literature on joining various kinds of groups, particularly deviant groups, violent groups, etc.

5. Conclusion

This research will make a significant contribution to the study of terrorism in terms of understanding the factors that lead to participation in terrorist groups. Terrorism

²⁷ Following labels are assigned to the corresponding ranges of Kappa values: from 0.41 to 0.60= moderate inter-coder reliability; from 0.61 to 0.80= substantial inter-coder reliability, and from 0.81 to 1.0= almost perfect inter-coder reliability (Landis & Koch, 1977).

²⁸ The inter-coders' coding on the two ratio level variables-age of onset, and number of sibling was found to be highly correlated ($r=.984$ and $r=1.0$, respectively).

is a difficult phenomenon to examine, since data limitations negatively affect potential methods used in terrorism research. The two biggest shortcomings of terrorism related studies are the availability of original data about terrorists and the scarcity of empirical studies. Perhaps most importantly, this study offers a valuable source of information for advancing knowledge in the terrorism field. The data are unique both in terms of contents and originality. The original data come from terrorists in their own (handwritten) documentation submitted to prospective terrorist organizations, apparently with their free will; this should minimize a number of biases that influence research on terrorism. These documents constitute one of the most desirable data sources used to date in the analysis of participation in terrorist organizations.

While this study also has methodological limitations, including the use of convenience sampling, the considerable strengths of the study outweigh these limitations. The use of both qualitative and quantitative methods in the analysis of the documents is likely to strengthen the research results. The sample size of 302 is sufficient and appropriate to conduct the essential and described analyses.

CHAPTER FIVE

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES and FINDINGS

This chapter presents and discusses quantitative analyses of the data on the two terrorist groups. The quantitative analyses section features major findings of this exploratory research in terms of background characteristics of individual participants in the left-wing DHKP/C and the religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations as well as learning-related factors and motivational factors that influence them to join these two ideologically distinct terrorist organizations. The quantitative analysis section presents the findings from three separate analyses. In the first, descriptive and bivariate statistics for background characteristics, learning related variables, and motivational factors are examined. This part also considers gender participation. In the second set of analyses, bivariate relationships between selected background characteristics and each motivational factor are examined to explore whether different background characteristics promote the odds of having different types of motivation for participation in a terrorist organization. In the last, multivariate logistic regression is used to investigate which variables discriminate between participation in Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist organizations.

1. Descriptive Findings and Bivariate Statistics

The descriptive statistics displayed in Table 6 show general sample characteristics derived from the following variables; gender, economic conditions, education, job status, marital status, legal and illegal group affiliations, prior detention, family member activities and sympathies toward the groups, age of onset, number of siblings, learning related factors, and motivational factors. Discussion of descriptive statistics includes brief

information about variable coding that emerged during the analysis of this exploratory data.

Group membership is the dependent variable, and is coded with DHKP/C as the reference category. Two of the independent variables are treated as continuous: age of onset and number of siblings. Participant ages range from 9 to 45 with a mean score of 19.36. The number of sibling ranges from 0 to 15 with a mean score of 6.36.

The economic condition variable is coded into two dummy variables: moderate level with a mean score of .49, and high level with a mean score of .29. Low level economic condition serves as the reference category. The education variable is coded as two dummies with middle school or lower education as the omitted category. While the mean score of high school education is .40, the mean score of post high school education is .17. The job status variable and affiliation with a group/s variable have also three categories. The job status variable is coded into two dummy variables as unemployed (mean=.09) and student (mean=.38); working full time or part time serves as the reference category. Similarly, the group affiliation variable is coded as two dummies: affiliation with legal groups with a mean score of .26, and affiliation with illegal groups with a mean score of .14. No affiliation serves as the reference category.

For the gender variable, female is the reference category. The mean score of males in the sample is .87. There is no gender variation in the Turkish Hezbollah data; with one exception, all were male. Marital status is dummy coded with not married serving as the reference category. The mean score of married persons is .24. Detention by security forces is dummy coded with no prior detention serving as the reference category; the mean score of this variable is .18.

Table 6. Descriptive statistics for overall sample (N=302)

	Mean	SD
DEPENDENT VARIABLE		
Terrorist group (Turkish Hezbollah)	.62	.487
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS		
Age of onset	19.36	4.988
Gender (Male)	.87	.336
Economic condition (Moderate)	.49	.501
Economic condition (High)	.29	.454
Education (High school)	.40	.491
Education (Post high school)	.17	.373
Job status (Unemployed)	.09	.296
Job status (Student)	.38	.487
Marital status (Married)	.24	.425
OTHER BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS		
Number of siblings	6.36	2.933
Any detention by security forces	.18	.395
Affiliation (with legal groups)	.26	.442
Affiliation (with illegal groups)	.14	.347
Any family member active in the group	.50	.501
Any family member's sympathy to the group	.63	.484
LEARNING RELATED FACTORS		
Friend/s	.34	.475
Kinship	.30	.458
Organizational activities	.57	.495
Propaganda	.14	.348
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS		
Environmental factors	.34	.474
Ideological/political closeness	.49	.501
Need to belong to a group	.11	.317
Negative life events	.28	.448
Tactics/propaganda of terrorists	.50	.501
Other factors	.17	.379

All remaining variables are dummy coded with "No" serving as the reference category. The mean score of the variable of any family member active in the group is .50, whereas the mean score of any family member's sympathy to the group is .63. Among the learning related variables, the organizational activities variable has the highest mean score (.57). It is followed by the variables of friend/s (.34), kinship (.30), and propaganda (.14). The tactics/propaganda variable with a mean score of .50 and ideological/political closeness with a mean score of .49 have the highest mean scores

among the motivational factors. The mean scores of the rest of the motivational factors are .34 for environmental factors (family, friend, and/or relative), .28 for negative life events, .11 for need to belong to a group, and .17 for all other factors.

(1) Background characteristics of terrorists

The bivariate relationships between the independent and dependent variables are presented in Table 7. Accordingly, the Table separates the data for DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations and displays the background characteristics of individuals who participated in these organizations. The table also reports whether there are statistically significant differences in the background characteristics of individuals. The sample size for each variable varies due to listwise deletion of missing values particular to each analysis.

Gender: Eighty-seven percent of the total sample is male. Men constitute over two-thirds (67.2%) of DHKP/C. Of the total number of 39 female terrorists, only one belongs to Turkish Hezbollah. These differences are statistically significant. These findings confirm much of the literature that indicates that terrorist groups are male dominated, and left-wing groups tend to have more female members compared to religiously motivated groups.

Economic condition: There are statistically significant differences between the reported economic conditions of the members of the two groups at each of the three levels measured. Turkish Hezbollah has more members with high economic status (34.2%) than DHKP/C (20.2%). DHKP/C members self-report low economic status (34.2%) more often than Turkish Hezbollah members (14.7%). Overall, the majority of group members for both Turkish Hezbollah (85.3%) and DHKP/C (65.8%) have middle-

economic status or better, which contradicts the common public belief that low-status economic conditions contribute to participation in terrorist organizations.

Table 7. Background characteristics, by terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah)

	X ² (df)	DHKP/C		Turkish Hezbollah		Total	
		n	%	n	%	N	%
Gender (N=302)	65.953(1)***						
Female		38	32.8	1	0.5	39	12.9
Male		78	67.2	185	99.5	263	87.1
Economic condition (N=298)	17.385(2)***						
Low		39	34.2	27	14.7	66	22.1
Modest		52	45.6	94	51.1	146	49.0
High		23	20.2	63	34.2	86	28.9
Education level (N=301)	38.458(2)***						
Middle school or lower		31	26.7	99	53.5	130	43.2
High school		48	41.4	73	39.5	121	40.2
Higher than high school		37	31.9	13	7.0	50	16.6
Job status (N=298)	4.007(2)						
Unemployed		16	13.8	13	7.1	29	9.7
Student		45	38.8	69	37.9	114	38.3
Working		55	47.4	100	54.9	155	52.0
Marital status (N=301)	29.174(1)***						
Not married		108	93.1	122	65.9	230	76.4
Married		8	6.9	63	34.1	71	23.6
Age of onset (N=295)							
Mean, [SD]		19.17[2.91]		19.47[5.95]		19.36[4.98]	

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Education: The education variable reflects the education level of individual members at the time of joining the group and is comprised of three categories: middle school or lower, some high school, and higher than high school. Some high school includes high school graduates, drop-outs, and current students. Higher than high school

includes college graduates, drop-outs, and currently enrolled students.²⁹ As Table 7 displays, DHKP/C members are significantly more educated than their counterparts in Turkish Hezbollah. Almost one-third (31.9%) of DHKP/C members have some college education while only seven percent of Turkish Hezbollah members have college educational experience. Similarly, over half (53.5%) of Turkish Hezbollah members only have middle school or lower level education compared to slightly more than one-quarter (26.7) of DHKP/C members. These findings indicate that DHKP/C actively recruits and targets individuals who are college students, graduates and drop-outs.

Job status: This variable reflects the participant's job status at the time of onset³⁰ and is coded into three categories: unemployed, student, and working (which includes full or part-time employment). Overall, half of the sample (52%) was employed when they participated in their respective groups. Both groups have almost the same percentage of students (38.8% for DHKP/C and 37.9% for Turkish Hezbollah) and similarities in working members (47.4% and 54.9% respectively). The participation of unemployed people in DHKP/C (13.8%) is almost double that in Turkish Hezbollah (7.1%), although the differences were not statistically significant. Contrary to discussions in the literature and popular assertions, unemployment does not appear to be an important factor in the decision to participate in a terrorist organization.

Marital status: Over three-quarters of the total sample (76.4%) were unmarried when they joined their groups. However, the marriage rate of Turkish Hezbollah

²⁹ Please note that even if sample members prepared these documents after being active members, the information on the documents refers to time of onset of participation. The education level under discussion refers specifically to the education level at the time of participation.

³⁰ Like education variable (and other variables), this variable was coded based on respondents' reports of employment status at the time of their participation. In other words, even if they had different job status when they prepared these documents, the information on this variable refers to job status at the time of participation.

members (34.1%) was almost five times greater than DHKP/C's rate (6.9%). This difference is statistically significant and supports the literature on marital status of individuals in left-wing and religiously motivated groups (see Chapter 3).

Age of onset: The average age of onset for Turkish Hezbollah members (19.36) is slightly higher than for DHKP/C members (19.17), although the range of ages for Turkish Hezbollah members, from 9 to 45, is much broader than DHKP/C members (14 to 28). Age differences are not significant, but may indicate that Turkish Hezbollah does not discriminate against or target members of certain ages. DHKP/C may be more selective in recruiting members.

As a way of understanding similarities and differences between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members and the general Turkish population, comparisons were made between the sample characteristics, and general population characteristics for those variables where census data were available. There are substantial differences between the sample (participants of DHKP/C, and Turkish Hezbollah) and general population of Turkey in terms of background characteristics³¹ (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2007). Whereas the Turkish population consists of almost same rate of males and females (50.7% and 49.3% respectively), two-thirds of DHKP/C and all the members of Turkish Hezbollah (except one) are males. The average age of onset for DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah (19.17 and 19.36, respectively) is lower than the average age of the general population (22.21). Majority of participants of the both groups were in the 14-25 age-group (97.4% for DHKP/C and 73.9% for Turkish Hezbollah) when they joined their

³¹ The statistical information on the demographic characteristics of Turkish people is based on 1990 census results in Turkey. Since the documents mostly belong to the years between 1990 and 1997, the census results of 1990 were used for comparison (see Turkish Statistical Institute [2007] for detailed statistical results).

respective groups. The rate of Turkish population that corresponds to 15-25 age-group (14-25 is not available) is 20 percent which is much lower than the percentage of terrorists' age group.

Over two-thirds (67.1%) of the Turkish people (over 14 years old) are married whereas just about one-third of Turkish Hezbollah and seven percent of DHKP/C participants are married. Turkish Hezbollah is closer to general population characteristics in terms of marital status compared to DHKP/C. Almost half of the participants in each group were working when they joined their respective groups compared to slightly lower than two-thirds of working Turkish population (over 14 years old). In general, the background characteristic of terrorist does not reflect the general Turkish population's characteristics examined above.

(2) Other background characteristics

The remaining background characteristics of individual participants in DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah are presented in Table 8. These variables include: detention by security forces prior to participation; group affiliation with legal and illegal groups before participation; any active family member in a terrorist group; any family member sympathetic to a terrorist group; number of siblings, and father's and mother's occupation. These variables are also used in the logistic regression analysis (except for father's and mother's job); different sample size for each variable is a result of missing values specific to each analysis.

Table 8. Other background characteristics, by terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah)

	X ² (df)	DHKP/C		Turkish Hezbollah		Total	
		n	%	n	%	N	%
Any detention (N=302)	1.335(1)						
No		99	85.3	149	80.1	248	82.1
Yes		17	14.7	37	19.9	54	17.9
Group affiliation (N=302)	9.709(2)**						
No affiliation		58	50.0	122	65.6	180	59.6
Affiliation with legal g.		34	29.3	46	24.7	80	26.5
Affiliation with illegal g.		24	20.7	18	9.7	42	13.9
Active family member (N=299)	16.932(1)***						
No		75	65.2	75	40.8	150	50.2
Yes		40	34.8	109	59.2	149	49.8
Family sympathy (N=299)	12.392(1)***						
No		57	49.6	54	29.3	111	37.1
Yes		58	50.4	130	70.7	188	62.9
Number of siblings (N=281)							
Mean, [SD]		4.83[2.20]		7.23[2.95]		6.36[2.93]	
Father's job (N=252)	26.657(7)***						
Unemployed		3	2.9	16	10.7	19	7.5
Retired		28	27.2	12	8.1	40	15.9
Worker		7	6.8	10	6.7	17	6.7
Government official		7	6.8	18	12.1	25	9.9
Tradesman		11	10.7	20	13.4	31	12.3
Farmer		22	21.4	19	12.8	41	16.3
Other jobs		12	11.7	27	18.1	39	15.5
Dead		13	12.6	27	18.1	40	15.9
Mother's job (N=183)	27.171(5)***						
Retired		2	2.4	4	4.0	6	3.3
Tradesman		4	4.9	1	1.0	5	2.7
Farmer		12	14.6	0	0.0	12	6.6
Housewife		56	68.3	88	87.1	144	78.7
Other jobs		5	6.1	0	0.0	5	2.7
Dead		3	3.7	8	7.9	11	6.0

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

*Any detention*³²: More than 80 percent of the total sample reported no experience with detention by security forces prior to their participation in a terrorist group. The rate

³² Both of the groups ask their members whether they were detained before being member of the group. Some individuals mention about their previous contacts with security forces; they were "yes" coded

of detention for members of Turkish Hezbollah (19.9%) is slightly higher than that for DHKP/C (14.7%); majority of the people in both of the groups do not have any criminal records before their participation.³³ These differences are not statistically significant.

Group affiliation: There are substantial and statistically significant differences between the reported group affiliations of the members of the respective groups. Overall, the majority (60%) of the sample reported no group affiliation with nearly two-thirds (65.6%) of Turkish Hezbollah members and exactly half of DHKP/C members indicating no affiliation with any groups prior to joining respective groups. While one-half (50%) of DHKP/C members reported prior group affiliations, slightly more than one-fifth (20.7%) reported prior criminal group affiliations compared to about ten percent (9.7%) for Turkish Hezbollah members. Nearly thirty percent (29.3%) of DHKP/C members reported prior legal group affiliations compared to about one-quarter (24.9%) of Turkish Hezbollah members. There are also strong contextual differences in the reported legal group membership between the two groups: DHKP/C members reported affiliations with legal organizations with ties to DHKP/C (associations, unions, media and cultural centers) while Turkish Hezbollah members usually reported affiliations with tariqat,

in the analysis. Others who do not give information about their previous criminality are considered that they do not have any crime records, and so they did not report. These individuals were “no” coded. Those who give information about their crimes after joining rather than before participation are also “no” coded since this variable seeks information about criminality before joining the group.

³³ Based on the information gleaned from the documents it is necessary to explain that although individuals did not commit any crime prior to their participation, their participation is followed by their involvement in various crimes as a strategy of terrorist groups. After preliminary ideological indoctrination through social and group activities, initiation rituals and loyalty testing, new members of these organizations are asked to commit some illegal acts which usually begin with commission of minor crimes (i.e. participation in illegal demonstrations, illegal placard hanging, and shouting slogans) followed by participation in more serious crimes (i.e. throwing Molotov cocktail, participation in bombing, and murder). Compared to Turkish Hezbollah, this strategy is more common in DHKP/C.

religious congregations, or religious political parties not associated with Turkish Hezbollah.

Active family member: About half (49.8%) of the sample reported having at least one family member actively involved in the respective terrorist organization. There are, however, statistically significant differences between two groups; nearly 60 percent of Turkish Hezbollah members reported family member participation compared to just over one-third (34.8%) for DHKP/C. While the rate is significantly lower for DHKP/C, the relatively high rate of family member participation demonstrates a potentially strong influence on sample member participation in the respective organizations.

Family sympathy: As well as active family members, a majority of the families (62.9%) include members who are sympathetic to the sample's terrorist organization. Over two-thirds (70.7%) of Turkish Hezbollah members reported at least one sympathetic family member compared to half (50.4%) of DHKP/C members. These differences between two groups are statistically significant. While having a sympathetic family member is important in terms of the possible effect on attitudes and actions of other members of the family, this would not automatically lead to sympathy or active participation in a terrorist group.

Number of siblings: In this sample, on average, Turkish Hezbollah members have more siblings (7.23) compared to DHKP/C members (4.83). Turkish Hezbollah members reported a broader range of siblings (0-15) than DHKP/C members (1-11) as well. Family size could influence participation in a number of ways. More children might effectively reduce parental control or generate situations in which children's basic needs are not met. Some terrorist groups use promises or provisions of better circumstances to

entice participants into group affiliation and participation. Alternately, parents and family members might exercise a great deal of influence over other family members; in a large family, more children might then be subjected to the influence of parents or (generally older) siblings who are sympathetic to or participants in terrorist groups.

Father's job: There are substantial and statistically significant differences between the groups in terms of father's employment. Father's employment included an array of occupations, including government officials (i.e. teacher, policeman), tradesmen (small or large business owners), farmer, worker, and other jobs (generally lower paying and lower status jobs, such as street seller, waiter, driver, or construction worker). This category also reflected father's status as unemployed, retired, and deceased (15.9%) for the total sample. DHKP/C members reported paternal retirement (27.2%) at over three times the rate as Turkish Hezbollah members (8.1%), while Turkish Hezbollah members reported unemployed fathers (10.7%) at three times the rate as DHKP/C members (2.9%). Except for workers and tradesman category, there are substantial differences between the employment status of fathers of DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members in all the other categories, most notably farmers (21.4% vs. 12.8% respectively).

Mothers' job: Of the total sample, only 183 provided information about their mother's employment. Overall, almost eighty percent of mothers were reported as housewives, with a statistically significant difference between the overwhelming majority (87.1%) of Turkish Hezbollah mothers and just over two-thirds (68.3%) of DHKP/C mothers in that category. Other notable differences include that about 15 percent of DHKP/C mothers were employed as farmers with the remainder in other occupations while only five percent of Turkish Hezbollah mothers were reported as retired (4%) or

tradesman (1%). Turkish Hezbollah mothers were reported as deceased (7.9%) at over twice the rate for DHKP/C (3.7%).

(3) Learning related factors

As a result of the examination of the documents, four learning related variables emerged to answer the question “How did you learn about the group?”: friend/s, kinship, organizational activities, and organizational propaganda. Almost every member of the sample answered this question with short answers. If friends were the source of information about the organization, respondents usually referred to friend/s from high school, university, their neighborhood, student association, etc. If family members (kinship) were the source of information, respondents usually mentioned about the person who helped them to learn about the group, such as an uncle, father, sister, brother, etc. Kinship is subdivided into four subcategories: parent, sibling, spouse, and relative. Organizational activities included relatively rich information on the activities through which these future members learned about their respective organizations. The information given about the variable of organizational propaganda confined to specific propaganda tools and included the categories of publications, the media, and the internet. Table 9 displays the learning related factors and the respective groups, as well as indicates the variables where statistically significant differences exist between the groups.

Friend/s: Overall, more than one-third of the sample learned about the group they ultimately joined through friends with only a slight and non-statistically significant difference between DHKP/C (36%) and Turkish Hezbollah (32.8%).

Table 9. Learning related factors, by terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah) N=300)

	X^2 (df)	DHKP/C		Turkish Hezbollah		Total	
		n	%	n	%	N	%
Friend/s	.316(1)						
No		73	64.0	125	67.2	198	66.0
Yes		41	36.0	61	32.8	102	34.0
Kinship	.539(1)						
No		83	72.8	128	68.8	211	70.3
Yes		31	27.2	58	31.2	89	29.7
Organizational activities	5.375(1)*						
No		39	34.2	89	47.8	128	42.7
Yes		75	65.8	97	52.2	172	57.3
Propaganda	23.164***						
No		84	73.7	174	93.5	258	86.0
Yes		30	26.3	12	6.5	42	14.0

*p< .05 ***p< .001

Kinship: Similarly, just under a third (29.7%) of the total sample reported kinship as their initial source of information about the group they joined. Under a third (31.2%) of Turkish Hezbollah members reported learning about the organization through kinship while just over one quarter (27.2%) of DHKP/C members did; this difference is not statistically significant, although the availability of data warrants further consideration of the kinship issue by type of relation (see Table 9.1).

Table 9.1. Classification of kinship, by terrorist groups (N=89)

	DHKP/C		Turkish Hezbollah		Total	
	n	%	n	%	N	%
Parent	2	6.5	13	22.4	15	16.9
Sibling	13	41.9	23	39.7	36	40.4
Relative	15	48.4	21	36.2	36	40.4
Spouse	1	3.2	1	1.7	2	2.3
Column totals	31	100.0	58	100.0	89	100.0

Chi-square comparison is not significant

For the overall sample, siblings (40.4%) and other relatives (40.4%) are the major information source, and this is the case for each of the groups as well. However, it appears that there are two kinship categories that reflect potentially important differences between two groups. That is, while parents play a more important role for Turkish

Hezbollah members (22.4%) than for DHKP/C members (6.5%), other relatives play a more important role for DHKP/C members (48.4%) than for Turkish Hezbollah members (36.2%).

Propaganda: Of the total sample, relatively a small amount of individuals (14%) reported propaganda as their main source for learning about the terrorist group in which they participated, but comparison of the groups indicates statistically significant differences. Over one-quarter (26.3%) of DHKP/C members reported learning about that group through propaganda while less than seven percent of Turkish Hezbollah members did.

Table 9.2. Propaganda means, by terrorist groups (N=42)

	DHKP/C		Turkish Hezbollah		Total	
	n	%	n	%	N	%
Publication	28	93.3	10	83.3	38	90.5
Media	2	6.7	2	16.7	4	9.5
Column totals	30	100.0	12	100.0	42	100.0

Chi-square comparison is not significant

Table 9.2 displays a further breakdown of the sources of organizational propaganda. Publications were the most frequent means of learning about groups for both groups (93.3% for DHKP/C and 83.3% for Turkish Hezbollah) with other media being a more common for information source for Turkish Hezbollah members (16.7%) than DHKP/C members (6.7%). No one in either group reported the internet as how they learned about their organization.

Organizational activities: Over half of the sample (57.3%) indicated that they learned about their groups through its activities. Almost two-thirds (65.8%) of DHKP/C members reported this as the main source of information about the organization compared to just over half (52.2%) of Turkish Hezbollah members. This difference is

statistically significant (see Table 9). Analyses of the document also offered insight into the types of activities conducted by the group to raise awareness, promote the group, and recruit new members. For DHKP/C, these activities included:

- Activities in the legal organizations of the group such as cultural centers, associations, unions, publishing and media offices which promoted ideological discussions, films, and publications;
- Cultural and protest activities at educational institutions, in some cases involving students, teachers and outsiders. These activities included food boycotts, demonstrations against school administration and tuition, and organizing theatre, folklore, chat groups or school trips;
- Celebrations, protests and demonstrations for various reasons, for example, Turkish Labor Day, a common day to stage organized protests featuring violence to attract public and the media attention;
- Commemoration ceremonies for organizational founders or members killed by security forces;
- Information distribution, including subscription or delivery of free magazines or newspapers to cafes, restaurants, or dormitories;
- Prison visits together with potential members to introduce ideological positions and befriend prisoners through discussions of solidarity, brutality and systemic inequality.³⁴

³⁴ Although it was initially planned to use prisons as a separate learning related variable given that prisons are utilized by terrorist organizations to recruit new members, analyses of documents revealed only four cases reporting prisons and activities in prisons as a learning source. Therefore, prison variable was coded under the variable of “organizational activities” given that prison based activities of terrorists could be considered as an organizational activity.

Activities reported by Turkish Hezbollah participants are similar to those described above; however, there are some differences in terms of context and content.

Turkish Hezbollah's organizational activities included:

- Religious and ideological home-based meetings, unstructured ideological/religious talks in an informal setting;
- Ideological speeches, meetings and outreach at cafes and cafeterias, mosques, centers for religious training, and religious bookstores;
- Religious services and sermons in small villages
- Home visits to those referred by members;
- Recruiting persons with strong religious ideologies through schools.

Organizational activities have a substantial impact in terms of informing people about terrorist groups. Exposure to activities does not necessarily or automatically motivate people to join the group. While these activities may help individuals to learn about these groups, other factors may motivate them to join. Motivational factors will be considered in the subsequent section and in regression analysis.

(4) Motivational factors

Document analysis indicated a number of factors that potentially motivate individuals to join these terrorist groups, and they seem to cluster in six general categories: environmental factors (family, friend, relative, neighbor, etc.), ideological/political closeness, need to belong to a group, negative life events, tactics/propaganda of terrorists, and other factors. Some individuals reported only one of these factors as their main motivation for joining the group, while others reported more than one factor. Table 10 presents the distribution of motivational factors by group for

the 301 participants for whom this information is available. Significant and substantial group differences are evident for all the motivational factors except for need to belong to a group. A more detailed discussion of these factors will be included in the qualitative analysis later in the chapter.

Table 10. Motivational factors, by terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah) (N=301)

	X ² (df)	DHKP/C		Turkish Hezbollah		Total	
		n	%	N	%	N	%
Environmental factors	5.122(1)*						
No		67	58.3	132	71.0	199	66.1
Yes		48	41.7	54	29.0	102	33.9
Ideological/political closeness	5.884(1)*						
No		49	42.6	106	57.0	155	51.5
Yes		66	57.4	80	43.0	146	48.5
Need to belong to a group	.556(1)						
No		104	90.4	163	87.6	267	88.7
Yes		11	9.6	23	12.4	34	11.3
Negative life events	2.787(1) ^a						
No		77	67.0	141	75.8	218	72.4
Yes		38	33.0	45	24.2	83	27.6
Tactics/propaganda of terrorists	6.721(1)**						
No		46	40.0	103	55.4	149	49.5
Yes		69	60.0	83	44.6	152	50.5
Other factors	3.389(1) ^a						
No		101	87.8	148	79.6	249	82.7
Yes		14	12.2	38	20.4	52	17.3

*p< .05; ***p< .01; ^a p< .10

Environmental factors: Although this variable was originally considered under the variable of “other factors”, as a result of analysis of the documents, it was decided to use it as a separate variable given the huge number of individuals who reported environmental factors as their main motivation or one of the motivations to join the terrorist groups. The environmental factors that cause motivation for participation include

family members, neighbors, relatives, or/and friends³⁵. For example, in some cases individuals join because their friends or siblings were already members of the group, their fathers or mothers encouraged them to do so, or they were influenced from their neighbors. These kinds of the factors will be discussed in the next section.

Around one-third of the overall sample (33.9%) identified environmental factors as the cause for their motivation to participation in the organization. Nearly 42 percent of DHKP/C member reported environmental factors as their motivation as compared with 29 percent of Turkish Hezbollah members. The influence of the environmental factors seems to play a greater role in joining DHKP/C. These differences between two groups are statistically significant.

Ideological/political closeness: Almost half (48.5%) of the sample indicated ideological/political closeness as their source of motivation. Slightly over fifty-seven percent of DHKP/C members cited this reason for their motivation compared with only forty-three percent of Turkish Hezbollah members. In this sample, the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the DHKP/C appeared to have motivated more members than the religious ideologies of Turkish Hezbollah. These differences between the groups are statistically significant.

Need to belong to a group: The motivation of group membership is the weakest among the reported motivators for both groups as only eleven percent of the sample overall reported this as their motivation. The rates of those who reported this variable as their motivation are 9.6 percent for DHKP/C and 12.4 percent for Turkish Hezbollah. Differences between the groups are not statistically significant.

³⁵ It is difficult to subdivide this variable (i.e. as family, relative, neighbor, or friend) because many sample combined them on their actual answers, for example “my father and my friend were in the group”, or “everybody in my neighborhood was supporter or sympathizer of the group.”

Tactics/propaganda of terrorists: Although this variable was not initially proposed for analysis as a motivational factor, findings from the analysis strongly warranted its inclusion as a distinct variable. Over half the sample reported their motivation to join their groups stemmed from the tactics, propaganda, and/or strategies of the terrorist group and its members. Sixty percent of DHKP/C members report this as a motivating factor while only forty-five percent of Turkish Hezbollah members use this reason; this difference is statistically significant. The groups use different tactics and propaganda methods, and DHKP/C appears to be more successful at motivating potential members.

Negative life events: Over one-quarter of the total sample (27.6%) indicated that negative life events motivated their participation in a terrorist organization. There is a slight difference between two groups; one-third of DHKP/C members reported this as their motivation compared to about one-quarter of Turkish Hezbollah participants. The differences between the groups are statistically significant at $p < .10$ (Table 10).

Table 10.1.Type of negative life events, by terrorist groups (N=83)

	DHKP/C		Turkish Hezbollah		Total	
	n	%	n	%	N	%
- Dissatisfaction/unhappiness in the life	3	7.9	29	64.5	32	38.5
- Friend, family member or relative killed or arrested	5	13.2	6	13.4	11	13.3
- Discrimination, inequality against gender, group etc.	9	23.7	2	4.4	11	13.3
- Family pressure/problems	4	10.6	1	2.2	5	6.0
- Exorbitances of governing powers	5	13.2	1	2.2	6	7.2
- Others	3	7.9	4	8.9	7	8.4
- Mix (2 or more of above)	9	23.7	2	4.4	11	13.3
Column totals*	38	100.0	45	100.0	83	100.0

Chi-square comparison is significant ($p < .001$)

Although there are numerous negative life events reported by the sample, they are collapsed into seven general categories which are presented in Table 10.1, and the chi-square comparison indicates significant differences between the types of negative life events identified between the two groups. Dissatisfaction/unhappiness in life is the most significant negative life event reported by almost two-thirds (64.5%) of Turkish Hezbollah members, while it is reported by only eight percent of DHKP/C members.

DHKP/C members reported discrimination/inequality (23.7%), family pressures/problems (10.6%) and exorbitances of governing powers³⁶ (13.2%) at rates about five times greater than their counterparts in Turkish Hezbollah (4.4%, 2.2% and 2.2% respectively). Further, DHKP/C members identified two or more events (23.7%) significantly more often than Turkish Hezbollah members (4.4%).

Other factors: This variable includes various factors which are not classified under the other motivation variables such as respect, honor, revenge, fighting against another group, sincerity and friendliness of group members, adventure, the group's fame, being more radical, involvement in armed activities etc. Over 17 percent of the total sample cited one of these other factors. One fifth (20.4%) of Turkish Hezbollah members indicated other factors as their motivation compared with only twelve percent of DHKP/C members. These differences are statistically significant ($p < .10$).

³⁶ Originally, exorbitances of governing powers was expected to be a separate variable of motivations. However, this variable was collapsed into the negative life events variable due to the small number of individuals reporting this factor as their motivation. Obviously, being a victim of perceived or actual exorbitances such as oppression, humiliation, or excessive use of force can be easily imagined as a negative life event.

(5) Gender issues

Almost all studies of terrorism have found that terrorist organizations are male-dominated. However, the literature is characterized by a notable absence on the background characteristics of male and female participants. The data presents the opportunity to analyze background, learning-related, and motivational factors of male and female participants in DHKP/C; no discussion of gender differences is included for Turkish Hezbollah as there is no gender variation in that data.

Table 11. Selected background characteristics, by **gender** (DHKP/C only)

	X² (df)	Female		Male		Total	
		n	%	n	%	N	%
Economic condition (N=114)	.790						
Low		11	29.7	28	36.4	39	34.2
Modest		17	45.9	35	45.4	52	45.6
High		9	24.4	14	18.2	23	20.2
Education level (N=116)	2.475						
Middle school or lower		7	18.4	24	30.7	31	26.7
High school		19	50.0	29	37.2	48	41.4
Higher than high school		12	31.6	25	32.1	37	31.9
Job status (N=116)	12.405**						
Unemployed		11	28.9	5	6.4	16	13.8
Student		15	39.5	30	38.5	45	38.8
Working		12	31.6	43	55.1	55	47.4
Marital status (N=116)	1.160						
Not married		34	89.5	74	94.9	108	93.1
Married		4	10.5	4	5.1	8	6.9
Age of onset (N=115)							
Mean, [SD]		19.29 [3.03]		19.12 [2.87]		19.17 [2.91]	
Any detention (N=116)	3.986*						
No		36	94.7	63	80.8	99	85.3
Yes		2	5.3	15	19.2	17	14.7
Group affiliation (N=116)	3.993						
No affiliation		20	52.6	38	48.8	58	50.0
Affiliation with legal g.		14	36.9	20	25.6	34	29.3
Affiliation with illegal g.		4	10.5	20	25.6	24	20.7

*p< .05 **p< .01

There are statistically significant differences in the prior detention experiences and employment status of male and female DHKP/C members as displayed in Table 11. Females reported unemployment (28.9%) at over four times the rate as their male counterparts (6.4%), and substantially lower prior detention rates (5.3%) as compared to men (19.2%). The mean scores of age of onset for both gender are almost identical; 19.29 for females and 19.12 for males. Males' onset age ranges from 14 to 27 whereas females' onset age ranges from 14 to 28. It seems that DHKP/C does not discriminate between males and females in terms of their age.

There are no significant differences in economic status, education levels, group affiliation, marital status, and age of onset. While there aren't statistically significant differences in these variables, some differences should be mentioned. Over eighty percent of female participants report high school or higher education compared to about seventy percent of males; the rates of marriage for female participants (10.5%) are over twice that for males (5.1%). Men also seem to be much more likely to be affiliated with illegal groups (25.6%) compared to female participants (10.5%). These differences may reflect more traditional role expectations and behaviors between men and women.

In terms of learning and motivational factors, statistically significant differences between male and female participants appear only in kinship-based learning, and ideological/political closeness as a motivation (Table 12). Almost forty percent of female participants learn about the organization through kinship compared to only one-fifth (21.1%) for males. Men also report being more motivated to join DHKP/C by the closeness of ideological and political concerns (64.9%) than do women (42.1%).

Table 12. Learning related, and motivational variables, by **gender** (DHKP/C only)

	X ² (df)	Female		Male		Total	
		n	%	n	%	N	%
<i>Learning related factors (N=114)</i>							
Friend/s	.076						
No		25	65.8	48	63.2	73	64.0
Yes		13	34.2	28	36.8	41	36.0
Kinship	4.342*						
No		23	60.5	60	78.9	83	72.8
Yes		15	39.5	16	21.1	31	27.2
Organizational activities	.702						
No		15	39.5	24	31.6	39	34.2
Yes		23	60.5	52	68.4	75	65.8
Propaganda	.814						
No		30	78.9	54	71.1	84	73.7
Yes		8	21.1	22	28.9	30	26.3
<i>Motivational factors (N=115)</i>							
Environmental factors	.704						
No		20	52.6	47	61.0	67	58.3
Yes		18	47.4	30	39.0	48	41.7
Ideological/political closeness	5.423*						
No		22	57.9	27	35.1	49	42.6
Yes		16	42.1	50	64.9	66	57.4
Need to belong to a group	2.542						
No		32	84.2	72	93.5	104	90.4
Yes		6	15.8	5	6.5	11	9.6
Negative life events	2.106						
No		22	57.9	55	71.4	77	67.0
Yes		16	42.1	22	28.6	38	33.0
Tactics/propaganda of terrorists	.236						
No		14	36.8	32	41.6	46	40.0
Yes		24	63.2	45	58.4	69	60.0
Other factors	.694						
No		32	84.2	69	89.6	101	87.8
Yes		6	15.8	8	10.4	14	12.2

*p< .05

For the remaining learning and motivational factors, there are no statistically significant differences indicated by gender. However, it seems that the rates of males for the remaining learning related variables are higher than the rates of females, while the rates of females compared to males are higher for the remaining motivational factors.

2. Relationship between Background Characteristics and Motivational Factors

A more complete understanding of the motivational factors warrants the estimation of the strength of the relationship between the motivational factors, and the background characteristics of individuals joining terrorist groups. Accordingly, it is aimed to explore whether different background characteristics increase the odds of having different type of motivations, and to see how these characteristics vary by each motivational factor. Table 13 presents bivariate relationships (odds ratio) between selected background characteristics and motivational factors. Selected background characteristics used in the analyses are gender, economic condition, education level, job status, marital status, and age of onset; this table does not include gender for Turkish Hezbollah due to the previously mentioned lack of gender data for that group. Each of the motivational factors is binary coded (i.e. individuals who reported environmental factors as their motivation are coded as 1, and those who did not report environmental factors or reported any other sources other than environmental factors are coded as zero). Odds ratios of less than one (1) indicate that the background characteristic is associated with a reduced likelihood (less likely) of the motivation type examined, while odds ratios greater than one (1) indicate that the likelihood of having that motivation is increased (more likely) when that background characteristic is present. To examine whether the same background characteristics predict each type of motivational factor for DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah, analyses are separated by terrorist group. Due to the exploratory character of this analysis, a significance level of $p < .10$ is employed.

In terms of gender, males compared to females are 2.5 times more likely to join DHKP/C under the motivation of ideological/political closeness. Age is a statistically

significant ($p < .10$) factor for both groups; environmental factors are more influential on younger individuals. Older DHKP/C members are significantly more likely to report motivations by need to belong to a group ($p < .10$), and negative life events (not significant for Turkish Hezbollah).

DHKP/C members reporting moderate economic status (as compared to low economic status) are significantly less likely to have motivations of need to belong to a group ($p < .10$) and negative life events ($p < .10$). In other words, poorer people compared to people with moderate economic condition are more likely to join DHKP/C because of a need to belong to a group, and negative life events they experienced. It can be speculated that economic problems might be one of the negative life events of poorer individuals.

More educated participants in Turkish Hezbollah are significantly less likely to be influenced by environmental factors than their less educated counterparts, but are more likely to be motivated by their need to belong to a group ($p < .10$). Restated, less educated participants are more influenced by environmental factors than their more educated counterparts but more education apparently increases the motivation of need to belong to a group. This finding might be partially attributed to characteristics of adolescents in high school and adults in university that seek social support and solidarity within a group. On the other hand, DHKP/C members with more education (post high school) are significantly more likely to be motivated by tactics and propaganda of terrorist organizations. As individuals may be exposed to DHKP/C's propaganda and recruitment tactics in universities, this finding is not especially surprising.

Table 13. Bivariate odds ratios between selected background characteristics and each motivational factors

	Motivational factors					
	Environmental factors (Odds ratio)		Ideological/political closeness (Odds ratio)		Need to belong to a group (Odds ratio)	
	DHKP/C	TH	DHKP/C	TH	DHKP/C	TH
Gender (Male)	.709	-	2.546*	-	.370	-
Age of onset	.878 ^a	.947 ^a	.944	1.037	1.198 ^a	1.027
Economic con. (Moderate)	1.587	.938	.944	1.315	.213 ^a	.762
Economic con. (High)	1.102	.571	1.518	1.450	.800	.836
Education (High school)	2.066	.434*	.497	1.217	4.390	2.585 ^a
Education (Post high sch.)	.873	1.143	.625	1.721	3.636	5.841*
Job status (Unemployed)	.809	1.333	.276*	1.878	1.143	1.117
Job status (Student)	.985	1.600	.480 ^a	.710	.571	.694
Marital status (Married)	.182	.448*	1.257	1.591	3.630	1.038

*p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001; ^a p< .10

Table 13. (cont'd) .

	Motivational factors					
	Negative life events (Odds ratio)		Tactics/propaganda of terrorists (Odds ratio)		Other factors (Odds ratio)	
	DHKP/C	TH	DHKP/C	TH	DHKP/C	TH
Gender (Male)	.550	-	.820	-	.618	-
Age of onset	1.211*	.994	.987	.992	1.052	.956
Economic con. (Moderate)	.455 ^a	1.007	1.074	1.175	.559	2.027
Economic con. (High)	.540	1.293	1.364	1.322	.620	2.500
Education (High school)	.742	1.402	1.503	1.074	1.915	2.262*
Education (Post high sch.)	.670	1.114	4.402**	1.519	.824	1.018
Job status (Unemployed)	1.571	2.092	2.246	1.485	.261	1.117
Job status (Student)	.393*	.930	5.391***	.979	.182*	2.507*
Marital status (Married)	3.737 ^a	.662	1.120	.975	1.033	.913

*p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001; ^a p< .10

In terms of employment (job) status, unemployed and student DHKP/C members compared to working members are less likely to be motivated by their ideological/political closeness. Also, DHKP/C members who were students (compared to working members) are significantly more likely to be motivated by tactics and propaganda (likely though exposure to DHKP/C school-based activities mentioned above), and less likely to be motivated due to negative life events and other factors. These findings might be explained by considering that working people are concerned

with working conditions, discrimination, and other job-related concerns which are often the focus of leftist DHKP/C propaganda. For Turkish Hezbollah, students are significantly more likely (compared to working people) to be motivated by other factors.

For married individuals, Turkish Hezbollah membership is less affected by environmental factors while environmental factors are influential for single men. Married DHKP/C members are significantly more likely than their single counterparts to be motivated to join because of negative life events ($p < .10$). It might be speculated that it is especially the case for married women who have experienced some terrible events during their marriage. Some findings in qualitative analysis support this idea.

3. Logistic Regression Analyses

Logistic regression is used to examine which variables discriminate between Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C terrorist organizations. For this exploratory purpose, first, logistic regression models are estimated independently for three main sets of variables: background characteristics (including other background characteristics) (Table 14), learning related variables (Table 15), and motivational factors (Table 16). Then, background characteristics and learning related variables are entered into the model together (Table 17, Model 2). In the final model, all the variable sets (background characteristics, learning related variables, and motivational factors) are entered into the model concurrently (Table 17, Model 3). The dependent variable (terrorist groups) is dummy coded as 0 for DHKP/C and 1 for Turkish Hezbollah. Chi-square statistics of the logistic regression models indicates that all the models are highly significant ($p < .0001$).³⁷ Also, investigation of goodness of fit revealed that all the models fit the data well as

³⁷ Significant chi-square means that at least one beta in the model is nonzero (DeMaris, 1995).

Hosmer and Lemeshow statistics are non-significant ($p > .05$)³⁸ (Lottes, DeMaris, & Adler, 1996). Although pseudo- R^2 does not have same meaning as it has in an OLS regression, the values of pseudo- R^2 (Cox & Snell's pseudo- R^2) are included in all logistic regression models in order to give information about the discriminatory power of different models.³⁹ Interpretation of the results also presents information about correctly predicted cases⁴⁰ (Lottes, DeMaris, & Adler, 1996; Pampel, 2000).

Before interpreting the logistic regression results, diagnostic tests are conducted to identify potential problems of multicollinearity and outliers. In this context, independent variables inspected for multicollinearity do not indicate any serious problem as all VIF scores are lower than 10 which is the suggested critical limit in the literature⁴¹ (DeMaris, 2004; Gujarati, 2003). Diagnostic procedures also include residual analyses utilizing standardized deviance values (in the range of -3 to 3), DfBeta statistics, and Cook's D (Cook's Distance). Potential outliers that have significant influence on the model and parameter estimates are dropped, and the subsequent reduced models which fit the data better and have more discriminatory power are presented⁴² (Agresti & Finlay, 1997; Garson, n.a.; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000).

³⁸ The nonsignificant p-value indicates that the model fit the data well (Lottes, DeMaris & Adler, 1996).

³⁹ Pampel (2000) notes that these measures should be used "as only rough guides without attributing great importance..." (p. 50). Pampel also indicates that goodness of fit values that range from 0 to 1 could be helpful if they are used carefully.

⁴⁰ A perfect model correctly predicts group membership for all the cases (100%), while failed model correctly predicts for less than 50 percent of the cases. The percentage of correctly predicted cases between 50 percent and 100 percent might be considered acceptable (Pampel, 2000). It is, however, necessary to note that classification tables might be misleading (DeMaris, 2004; Garson, n.a.); "because they ignore actual predicted probabilities and instead use dichotomized predictions based on a cutoff..." (Garson, n.a.).

⁴¹ Some suggests 4 as the critical value; VIF scores in all the models are even lower than 4.

⁴² DfBeta is used to see the cases that are poorly fit the model. A large value of DfBeta means that the case has a large influence on the coefficient estimate; the critical value of DfBeta is 1.0. Cook's D is also a measure of the influence; a case is considered as influential if Cook's D is greater than 1.0. In all the Models DfBeta scores are lower than 1.0. However, some models (Models 1 and 2 in Table 9 and Models 2

Table 14. Logistic regression analysis of background characteristics and participation in terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah)

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Logistic Coef. (B)	SE	Odds Ratio (B)	Logistic Coef. (B)	SE	Odds Ratio (B)
Background characteristics						
Age of onset	.018	.047	1.018	.028	.051	1.028
Economic con. (Moderate)	.970*	.376	2.637	1.955***	.547	7.065
Economic con. (High)	1.383**	.427	3.986	1.549**	.579	4.707
Education (High school)	-.995**	.348	.370	-1.087*	.480	.337
Education (Post high school)	-3.245***	.567	.039	-3.868***	.754	.021
Job status (Unemployed)	-.120	.513	.886	-.048	.648	.953
Job status (Student)	1.158**	.435	3.185	1.695**	.568	5.445
Marital status (Married)	2.546***	.539	12.752	2.901***	.664	18.190
Other background characteristics						
Number of sibling				.449***	.092	1.567
Any detention				1.569**	.613	4.803
Affiliation (legal groups)				-1.173*	.503	.309
Affiliation (illegal groups)				-.2.049**	.607	.129
Any active family member				.666	.418	1.946
Any fam. member's sympathy				.103	.416	1.109
Constant	-.641	.977	.430	-4.119**	1.386	.016

Note: **Model 1:** $X^2 = 104.860^{****}$, $df=8$; Cox & Snell .306; **Model 2:** $X^2 = 173.320^{****}$, $df=14$; Cox & Snell .487; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; **** $p < .0001$

Table 14 presents the results of logistic regression analyses for background characteristics. The table shows which background characteristics are more related to Turkish Hezbollah compared to DHKP/C. Main background characteristic of age of onset, economic condition, education, job status, and marital status are examined in the first model while second model includes all background characteristic.⁴³ Model 1 yields a pseudo- R^2 of .306, whereas Model 2's pseudo- R^2 is .487. The higher pseudo- R^2 in the second model indicates that second model has more discriminatory power than the first

and 3 in Table 12) include few cases which have standardized deviance values out of the acceptable range of -3 to 3 and Cook's D values greater than 1. Those cases are dropped to estimate new (reduced) models; all the reduced models fit the data better with relatively more discriminatory power; so that they are retained and presented in the study (Agresti & Finlay, 1997; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000; Garson, n.a.; Long, 1997).

⁴³ Gender is not included in any logistic regression models (which predict group participation) since there is no gender variation in the Turkish Hezbollah data; in fact there is only one document written by female Turkish Hezbollah terrorist, other 185 documents belong to male terrorists.

model. Also Model 2 correctly predicts group membership for 83.1 percent of the cases while Model 1 correctly predicts 76.7 percent of the cases. Since the second model fits the data better than the first model it is retained in the following full models (Model 2 and 3 in Table 17)⁴⁴

The results for both models are quite similar. There are no significant differences between two groups in terms of age of onset. There are, however, statistically significant differences between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist groups along other main background variables. That is, compared to individuals with low economic condition, those participating in Turkish Hezbollah are significantly more likely to have moderate or high economic conditions than those joining DHKP/C. This result shows that Turkish Hezbollah participants are relatively more prosperous. Compared to people joining DHKP/C, those joining Turkish Hezbollah are significantly less likely to have high school, or post high school education (compared to middle school or lower education). In other words, participants of DHKP/C are relatively more educated. As the contingency table shows (see Table 7) the rate of individuals with post high school education in DHKP/C is over 30 percent compared with 7 percent of Turkish Hezbollah. Job status variable compares unemployed people and students with working people (full or part time job). Those who participate in Turkish Hezbollah are significantly more likely to be students at the time of participation compared to those of DHKP/C.⁴⁵ Although the variable of unemployed (as a job status) is not statistically significant, the negative sign

⁴⁴ Also, the highest VIF scores are 1.84 for the first model and 1.92 for the second model (both of them are for job status [student]), and they are much lower than the VIF score of 10 which is the indicator of high collinearity.

⁴⁵ It is, however, necessary to note that while DHKP/C usually targets students in universities and high schools, Turkish Hezbollah targets students in middle schools and high schools. Also, contrary to logistic regression result, bivariate analyses did not reveal a significant difference (see Table 2).

of the logistic coefficient indicates that DHKP/C contains relatively more unemployed people. The variable marital status has the highest significant odds ratio of 18.19 indicating that individuals who join Turkish Hezbollah are over 18 times more likely to be married compared to those joining DHKP/C. Findings on economic condition, education level, and marital status confirm the bivariate results in Table 7 which indicate statistically significant differences between two groups.

Along with main background characteristics, other background characteristics are entered in the second model (Model 2 in Table 14). DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah have similar characteristics (no statistically significant differences) in terms of having active or sympathetic family members. With the exception of these two variables logistic regression analyses indicate statistically significant differences for all other variables. Accordingly, it is significantly more likely that individuals who join Turkish Hezbollah have more siblings than those of DHKP/C; in other words, Turkish Hezbollah members come from more crowded families. These findings tend to support that Turkish Hezbollah members reflect the characteristics of the regions where they operate (Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey); in these regions families usually tend to have more children than other parts of the country. Compared to DHKP/C, Turkish Hezbollah is significantly more likely to contain individuals who were detained before participation. It is also significantly less likely that Turkish Hezbollah members have participated in legal or illegal groups before joining compared to those participating in DHKP/C. Again this may be explained by the existence of DHKP/C legal associations, unions, cultural centers, and student organizations designed to spread propaganda and to find, motivate, and recruit new members.

Table 15. Logistic regression analysis of learning related variables and participation in terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah)

	Logistic Coef. (B)	SE	Odds Ratio (B)
Friend/s	-.554 ^a	.316	.575
Kinship	-.547	.357	.579
Organizational activities	-1.142**	.335	.319
Propaganda	-1.870***	.386	.154
<i>Constant</i>	1.784***	.379	5.956

Note: $X^2 = 35.093^{***}$, $df=4$; Cox & Snell .11

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; **** $p < .0001$; ^a $p < .10$

Table 15 displays the logistic regression results for learning related variables.

Three of four learning related variables (propaganda, organizational activities, and friends) indicate statistically significant differences between two terrorist groups.

Compared to individuals joining DHKP/C, Turkish Hezbollah participants are significantly less likely to learn about their group from friend/s ($p < .10$), through organizational activities, or organizational propaganda. In other words, these variables are more influential on those who join DHKP/C. By way of explanation, DHKP/C deliberately utilizes friendship dynamics, organizational activities, and propaganda to recruit new members more frequently than Turkish Hezbollah does. In terms of learning through kinship relations, there is no significant difference between two groups. This model with a pseudo- R^2 of .110 has lower discriminatory power than the models for background characteristics and motivational factors. The model correctly predicts group membership for 68.7 percent of the cases.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ The highest VIF score is 1.68 for the kinship variable.

Table 16. Logistic regression analysis of motivational factors and participation in terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah)

	Logistic Coef. (B)	SE	Odds Ratio (B)
Environmental factors	-.996**	.298	.369
Ideological/political closeness	-1.058***	.275	.347
Need to belong to a group	.285	.427	1.330
Negative life events	-.976**	.303	.377
Tactics/propaganda of terrorists	-1.232***	.297	.292
Other factors	.206	.377	1.228
<i>Constant</i>	2.217***	.373	9.179

Note: $X^2 = 38.621$ ****, $df=6$; Cox & Snell .120

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; **** $p < .0001$

The logistic regression results for the model including motivational factors are presented in Table 16. Four of the six measures are statistically significant: environmental factors, ideological/political closeness, negative life events, and tactics/propaganda of terrorists. Compared to individuals joining DHKP/C, those participating in Turkish Hezbollah are significantly less likely to be motivated due to environmental factors, ideological/political closeness, negative life events, and tactics/propaganda of terrorists. In other words, these four motivational factors are more influential on those joining DHKP/C. The variables of need to belong to a group and other factors do not have statistically significant measures meaning that there are no significant differences between two terrorist groups for these variables. The motivational factors model yields a pseudo- R^2 of .120; discriminatory power of this model is lower than background characteristics, and higher than the learning related variables. This model correctly predicts group membership for 68.4 percent of the cases.⁴⁷ There will be detailed discussion on each motivational factor in the next section.

As a first step, background characteristics are entered in Model 1 presented in Table 17 (consistent with Table 14, Model 2). Then, learning related variables are entered

⁴⁷ The highest VIF score is 1.266 for the variable for tactics/propaganda of terrorists.

in the model (Model 2) along with all background characteristics. Finally, the variables in all three main categories (background, learning, and motivation) are entered as a full model (Model 3). The statistical results for Models 1 and 2 in Table 17 are quite similar in terms of background characteristics. That is, compared to those who join DHKP/C, participants of Turkish Hezbollah are significantly more likely to have moderate economic condition (compared to low economic condition), be a student (compared to job status of working), and be married; and also significantly less likely to have post high school education (compared to middle school or lower education). High school (as one of the categories of the education variable) and high economic condition, while significant in the background characteristics model, are not significant when learning related variables are included (Model 2). The statistical findings for other background characteristic in Model 2 are almost identical to Model 1. That is, participants of Turkish Hezbollah are significantly more likely to have more siblings and have a detention record before participation, and significantly less likely to be affiliated with illegal groups (before participation) compared to DHKP/C's participants.

In Model 2, three out of four learning related variables are statistically significant: friend/s ($p < .10$), organizational activities ($p < .10$) and learning through propaganda (i.e. publications and the media). Those who join Turkish Hezbollah are significantly less likely to learn about their respective group through friendship relations, activities of the organization, and propaganda compared to those of DHKP/C. Both models (Models 1 and 2) have almost same pseudo- R^2 (.487 and .485 respectively). The inclusion of learning related variables does not improve the discriminatory power of Model 2.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Also, percentages of correctly predicted cases in both models are almost same; 83.1% for Model 1 and 84.4% for Model 2. The highest if VIF score is 2.158 for the learning related variable of kinship.

Table 17. Logistic regression models for all independent variables and participation in terrorist groups (DHKP/C vs. Turkish Hezbollah)

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Logistic Coef. (B)	SE	Odds Ratio (B)	Logistic Coef. (B)	SE	Odds Ratio (B)	Logistic Coef. (B)	SE	Odds Ratio (B)
Background characteristics									
Age of onset	.028	.051	1.028	.013	.051	1.013	.071	.062	1.073
Economic con. (Moderate)	1.955***	.547	7.065	1.457**	.517	4.293	1.905**	.645	6.717
Economic con. (High)	1.549**	.579	4.707	.813	.576	2.256	.942	.684	2.566
Education (High school)	-1.087*	.480	.337	-.513	.470	.599	-.251	.565	.778
Education (Post high school)	-3.868***	.754	.021	-3.151***	.723	.043	-3.254**	.936	.039
Job status (Unemployed)	-.048	.648	.953	-.097	.659	.908	.848	.781	2.336
Job status (Student)	1.695**	.568	5.445	1.513**	.570	4.542	1.818*	.709	6.158
Marital status (Married)	2.901***	.664	18.190	2.595***	.621	13.402	2.739***	.752	15.467
Other background characteristics									
Number of sibling	.449***	.092	1.567	.441***	.092	1.554	.631***	.130	1.879
Any detention	1.569**	.613	4.803	1.010 ^a	.562	2.746	1.885*	.742	6.585
Affiliation (with legal groups)	-1.173*	.503	.309	-.864	.527	.421	-1.885**	.702	.152
Affiliation (with illegal groups)	-2.049**	.607	.129	-2.124***	.592	.119	-2.983***	.783	.051
Any active family member	.666	.418	1.946	.827 ^a	.455	2.286	.798	.520	2.221
Any family member's sympathy	.103	.416	1.109	.029	.420	1.030	.430	.481	1.537
Learning related variables									
Friend/s				-.929 ^a	.535	.395	-1.387*	.702	.250
Kinship				-.835	.615	.434	-1.057	.851	.348
Organizational activities				-.967 ^a	.542	.380	-2.048**	.740	.129
Propaganda				-1.848**	.616	.158	-3.341**	.970	.035
Motivational factors									
Environmental factors							-2.108**	.671	.121
Ideological/political closeness							-1.734**	.589	.177
Need to belong to a group							2.454*	.963	11.640
Negative life events							-2.003**	.654	.135
Tactics/propaganda of terrorists							-.657	.585	.518
Other factors							.593	.691	1.810
Constant				-4.119**	1.386	.016	-2.237	1.444	.107

Model 1: $X^2=173.320$ ***, df=14; Cox & Snell .487; Model 2: $X^2=173.939$ ***, df=18; Cox & Snell .485;Model 3: $X^2=208.220$ ***, df=24; Cox & Snell .550; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; ****p<.0001; ^a p<.10

The full model (Table 17 Model 3) includes all the variables in three main categories. The results are very similar to those from Model 2; almost all statistically significant variables in Model 2 remain to be statistically significant in Model 3. Therefore, interpretation of the findings is very similar to those from Model 2 (see above paragraph). The only differences are that the variable of affiliation with legal groups is statistically significant in Model 3 but not in Model 2, while the variable of active family member is not significant in Model 3 when it is statistically significant in Model 2 ($p < .10$).

In the full model, four out of six motivational factors are statistically significant meaning that there are motivational differences between two terrorist groups. Participants in Turkish Hezbollah are significantly less likely to be motivated due to environmental factors, ideological/political closeness, and negative life events compared to participants of DHKP/C. Turkish Hezbollah members are, however, significantly more likely to join under the motivation of their need to belong to a group. There is no statistically significant difference between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah in terms of being motivated by means of terrorist tactics/propaganda and other motivational factors. Model 3 yields the highest pseudo- R^2 of .550 compared to all other models; thus Model 3 fits the data better with relatively more discriminatory power.⁴⁹ Model 3 also correctly predicts group membership for 89.3 percent of the cases which is much higher than the other models.

Overall, there are statistically significant and substantive differences between two Turkish terrorist groups in terms of background characteristics, motivations, and learning

⁴⁹ Nagelkerke R square is .750 which might be used as an alternative to Cox & Snell R Square. Also, in Model 3, the highest VIF score is 2.673 for the learning related variable of kinship.

related factors. The pseudo- R^2 scores and percentages for correctly predicted cases in each model indicate that background characteristics and motivational factors have more discriminatory power. In order to further illuminate and differentiate motivations for participants in these two terrorist groups, the following section features a qualitative analysis of motivational factors that promote participation in DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PATH TO MEMBERSHIP (QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS)

The seized membership documents from DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah present an unprecedented opportunity to examine the motivations of participants in two ideologically distinct terrorist groups through the examination of their own words. This qualitative chapter presents a review and extensive structured analytic discussion of the content of the seized recruitment documents and facilitates a deeper understanding of the phenomenon and the potential to reveal previously undiscovered facts (Altheide, 1996). Qualitative analyses of the documents reveal insights into the differing and sometimes overlapping motivational factors that promoted the involvement of sample members in their respective organizations, thereby presenting a richer and more comprehensive perspective on the motivations to join terrorist groups and motivational differences for ideologically disparate groups. This section examines the six motivational factors modeled in analyses discussed earlier -ideological/political closeness, need to belong to a group, negative life events, organizational tactics and propaganda, environmental factors, and other attributed factors.

In this section, each motivational factor is analyzed and discussed separately, although it is necessary to stress that many individuals indicated various and multiple influences as motivating factors. A single person might express ideological affinity, negative life events, and the influence of his or her environment. From these documents, it is almost impossible to discern which of multiple motivational factors exerts the primary or greatest influence on decisions to participate because individuals were not asked to, nor did they, report this information in a systematic order.

1. Ideological/Political Closeness

Ideological or political closeness is one of the most important factors in an individuals' decision to participate in terrorist organizations. This factor was described by members of both groups in terms of self-identification with group values, opportunity for personal expression of political or religious ideals, meaningful social engagement, and dissatisfaction with other alternatives. As expected, however, there are some contextual, conceptual, and semantic differences between the declarations of motivations for each of the distinctive terrorist groups, including the content and orientation of social ideals and the articulation of revolutionary goals.

DHKP/C

Closeness to leftist ideology, organizational strategies and policies, potential for revolutionary social change, and best choice among alternative organizations were commonly cited by DHKP/C members as motivating their participation.

Centrality to life: Some individuals praised the group as the most important part of their lives: "I can't imagine myself away from the group; it is my reason to live", and "I can not think a life without DHKP/C." According to applicants of the group, DHKP/C is the honor and morality of the humanity; it represents honesty, rightfulness and justness; it is a new life style with its peculiar culture, and it also means love and friendship. They also saw DHKP/C as an indispensable part of their lives: "My party is my life; my duty is to dedicate all my existence to this life", and "DHKP/C is a part of my life, my future, my home, my family, and my everything..."

True path to revolution and best alternative: For some members that identified the existing state system as fascist, oligarchic, or/and imperialist, the DHKP/C's Marxist-

Leninist and revolutionary ideology were very attractive and pure. Many individuals articulated their expectations of the organization in terms of revolutionary pioneer-ism, a new society, and a symbol of resistance and freedom: "It is the only group that will carry out the revolution in Turkey." "I have become a revolutionary because I have wanted to take part in the formation of a communist society which does not accommodate exploitation. I see DHKP/C as our future, and our hope of salvation aiming at establishing a system that fight against imperialism and oligarchy."

Some individuals had connections with other leftist groups before joining DHKP/C, but finally chose to join DHKP/C because of ideological closeness with the only movement that would raise the Marxist-Leninist flag in Turkey and in the world.

Sympathy and affinity: For some, sympathy and feelings of affinity toward DHKP/C activities and members motivated participation in the group. These members simply liked the leftist ideology before joining, and when exposed to recruitment activities (i.e., friendship relations, culture center and student association activities, etc.), easily established their own involvement. "While I was at high school I was a sympathizer of revolutionary left wing groups. When I enrolled the university I met some students who were the members of a legal university organization of the DHKP/C. My relations with them motivated me to join them." Others were more proactive in finding a way to convert their ideological views into practicing terrorist actions, "I had sympathy to revolutionaries and this sympathy leaded me to make some more research about them that ended up participation in them."

Several individuals had revolutionary ideals since childhood and DHKP/C became an opportunity for them to express these ideals. "I have always had sympathy to

the revolution and socialism since my childhood, I have always believed it. Once I was told about the activities of the DHKP/C by one of my friends I accepted and joined it." Another stated, "Since my childhood I always wanted to meet revolutionary people and be together with them."

Organizational policies, strategies, and rules: In some cases, organizational policies and characteristics of DHKP/C generated attraction. Group values, principles, and rules based on equality, justness, and righteousness were motivations to some, including non-discrimination policies towards women. Leadership characteristics were also cited as a reason for joining.

Turkish Hezbollah

Turkish Hezbollah presents itself as promoting and teaching the basic tenets of Islam, although it (ab)uses religious concepts by promoting violent ideology to recruit new members. Dissatisfaction with other religious groups, search for a more religious life, religious characteristics of the group, ability to cultivate sympathy and affinity, and its standing as the best alternative promoted appreciation and participation in Turkish Hezbollah.

Best alternative: Some participants previously affiliated with other groups reported joining Turkish Hezbollah because of the group's purity and high ideals, the courage, seriousness, and consistency of leadership and members, and the dedication of the group to religious and non-state goals. "Other groups in which I had been were not natural, sincere and systematic. That's why I selected Turkish Hezbollah."

Other group's policies, ideologies, methods, and/or opinions did not meet their expectations nor represent the real Islam. One member who had been in several religious

groups, tariqats, and congregations contends that "Turkish Hezbollah's policies and strategies appeared to me very attractive. Then I thought that this is the one that I should be the member and act together." Another indicated "Although I was in a religious group I did not feel like I was one of them. When I met Turkish Hezbollah members, their ideas, life styles and activities have seemed to me more attractive; they appeared to be more realist."

Additionally, some indicated that other groups were either not radical enough or supported the State system. Further, uncertainties in the activities of the groups in which they were members promoted allegiance. "I am now sure about the future of the Islam in Turkish Hezbollah." A few Turkish Hezbollah members had been members of the Marxist-Leninist PKK, but left to join Turkish Hezbollah thinking that PKK was the enemy of Muslims and Islam (despite the fact that Turkish Hezbollah members were killings Muslims who did not support them).

Seeking a more religious life: "Turkish Hezbollah represents the way of God." Two groups of people seek a more religious life - those who are already religious and those who are not religious but want to be religious. Both types of people joined Turkish Hezbollah because they believed it represented the real Islam and the opportunity to be true believers within the group. "My life was full of impurities and I was feeling blankness. I wanted to join Turkish Hezbollah to be better person." One religious person who wanted to participate in a religious group explains that "I was in search of group that shared similar ideas with me. When I learned about Turkish Hezbollah, I just wanted to be one of them." Another wrote "I was a religious person and I was praying regularly, so I joined real Muslims to be more religious person".

For those without information about Islam and Islamic rules and teachings, Turkish Hezbollah is the only group providing information about religion. These recruits easily accepted and believed the teachings about religious rules and talks by Turkish Hezbollah members. "Turkish Hezbollah practices the real Islam and fights against the enemies of the Islam", "Turkish Hezbollah is the best means to bring real Islam into life", and "It is necessary to follow the path offered by Turkish Hezbollah."

Sympathy and affinity: Feeling sympathy and affinity to Turkish Hezbollah and its religious ideology motivated many individuals to join without any specific expectations of the group. Some even had admired Turkish Hezbollah since childhood. "I have always liked the Muslims [Turkish Hezbollah members] before joining Islam [Turkish Hezbollah]⁵⁰ and I was angry with those who talks against Muslims", "I always loved Turkish Hezbollah, I was a sympathizer of it", and "I have liked the religious activities of Turkish Hezbollah since my childhood."

Religious characteristics: Turkish Hezbollah uses religious concepts and presents itself as a group that promotes Islam. Their religious activities teach and promote Islam in a way that influences people and cause them to feel closeness based on religion. "I joined because it tells heavenly facts", "The way the congregation follows is the right way, that's why I joined", and "I saw the real Islam in the group; that is why I joined in." One person

⁵⁰ A significant number of Turkish Hezbollah members call Turkish Hezbollah members "Muslims" and participation in Turkish Hezbollah as "joining Islam". These statements indicate that they see Turkish Hezbollah as the real representative of Islam; and many of them believe that they became real Muslim when they participated in the group. The main reason of these statements is that majority of these individuals are not familiar with religious topics and/or they do not practice religious rules although many of them come from a religious environment. Being in a religious environment but not practicing the religion creates concerns for many of them. Once they meet individual/s who promote the Islam they easily believe them and want to be like them. Once they joined they believe that they became Muslim and joined the Islam faith.

indicated that Turkish Hezbollah was promising his dream that Islam would rule the world, and that he believed that Turkish Hezbollah could manage to achieve this goal.

In both of the groups, a number of individuals reported their respective groups as the best organizational alternative and that sympathy and closeness to the group created motivation to join. While DHKP/C members emphasize that they felt ideological and political closeness to DHKP/C because it is the only way to revolution, and/or they are influenced from its policies, strategies and rules, Turkish Hezbollah members attributed their ideological and political closeness to the group's religious characteristics and their search of more religious life.

2. Negative Life Events

Negative life events appear to be influential on both groups' members' decisions to join; there are, however, significant contextual and conceptual differences between the reasons for the motivation. For instance, while discrimination and inequality, family pressures/problems, exorbitances of governing power or the killing of family members/friends by security forces are commonly reported motivations for DHKP/C, the same concepts are very uncommon in Turkish Hezbollah. For Turkish Hezbollah members, the most significant motivator is negative life events that are primarily based on religious issues. DHKP/C documents indicate a substantial number of individuals reported abuses of governing powers and discrimination and inequality as factors motivating their participation, but these are not the cases for Turkish Hezbollah participants.

DHKP/C

Dissatisfaction and unhappiness in the life and emotional vulnerability led some individuals to be influenced by promises of a better life under DHKP/C's ideology. The help from and interest of DHKP/C members provided reassurance and compelling incentives to join the group. One female member, placed in a foster home after the death of her father and abandonment by her mother, had recently aged out of her foster home (at 18 years old). Trying to find a job and a place to stay, she was unable to adapt to her new life and experienced many difficulties until she met DHKP/C members who befriended her. Another member reported that he became extremely distressed by everything in his life, including his living standards and the 'system'; his existential crisis sent him in search of meaning and excitement that he found with DHKP/C members.

Negative life events can be combined with the influence of environmental factors. One Turkish recruit living in France was unhappy with school, his daily life in a foreign country, and different cultural environment. His uncle, a member DHKP/C, was aware of his situation and used it to motivate him to be a member of DHKP/C:

"I was always fighting at the school. I was threatening the kids and teachers that resulted in my suspension from the school. Because of my actions, my father was always beating me that was causing me to be more aggressive...Many youth in Europe, like me, is most likely to be alienated from their culture, traditions, and language if their parents and relatives do not teach them their own traditional and cultural values. I was one of those who was disaffected from the life style in the Europe. My uncle who was aware of this situation exhibited a different approach. I was not good in Turkish; he wanted me to read the newspaper [DHKP/C's newspaper]. He was always talking about revolutionary ideology. He was taking me to ideological concerts and also some other social activities of DHKP/C. He was dealing with my all problems; he was teaching me how to act in the community and how to speak with other people. He helped me to be a part of a community. He was taking me to seminars and other ideological meetings. Friendly approach of people that I met through my uncle influenced me, and I began to feel some changes in my life and in my thoughts. I have wanted to be like other revolutionaries who fought and died for their ideals of more freedom and fraternal life..."

Killing or arrest of a friend, relative or family member by security forces during gunfire exchanges in the course of operations was among the motivating negative life events. In each reported cases, the arrested or dead persons were members of DHKP/C or other revolutionary groups. "My uncle's son, who was the member of DHKP/C, was killed by the security forces. This sad incident and the activities of revolutionaries caused me to feel more sympathy to DHKP/C."

Some reported *discrimination, inequality, and injustice in the community/in the existing system* against women, a specific group, or an ideology as negative life events. One emphasized that "I could not endure the inequities and injustices of the existing system; I could not just sit and watch this negative situation. So I joined DHKP/C to fight against this system." Similarly, another reported "I became a revolutionary because I did not like the existing relations in the system that has included immorality, injustice, and deformity." Discrimination based on social class was also a factor: "Being a member of a social class which has been discriminated for years made me more close to the left wing groups and motivated me to join DHKP/C." Oppression against Kurdish people was also cited as a source of motivation: "DHKP/C could handle the Kurdish people's problems; DHKP/C is the only advocate of brotherhood of all people."

Female participants are more gender role-oriented in their assessments and descriptions of *discrimination, inequality, and injustice*. For instance, one of the women stated that there was a discrimination against woman in all level and layers of the life. She emphasized that her only crime was to be a woman in the community. Her husband left her but her family blamed her for this event although she had no role in destroying her marriage:

"I was raised in a village...Like many other girls in our village I got married very early, while I was 16. I became a mother at 18, and divorced at 20. I experienced all difficulties and challenges in the life as a woman. The life of the women, the point of view of the society against women, and values of the community towards women were very strange, and I was not able to settle for this. I am a human being, I have my own thoughts but there was nobody who was listening to me and respecting me; because I was a woman. My husband was abandoning me but I was the one who was blamed for this although I had not done anything that will affect the unity of my family. My only crime was to be a woman. This viewpoint against women has existed in the community, in the State system, and even in the law. These negative approaches against women were negatively influencing me, and so I did not have any self-trust. I believed that I would not success anything in the life until I met some of our members [DHKP/C members]. When I met revolutionary movement I felt like I was re-born and re-started the life."

Another woman also refers to discrimination against woman in reference to her own and her mother's life, and indicates that she always hated this. When she met the group members that advocates the equal rights of all human being regardless of gender she was influenced and wanted to join them:

"I was the only daughter of my parent; my mother was very influential on me. My mother did not have enough education that would give her a job for economic independence. She was always oppressed during her life by her environment. She always motivated me to finish a university and have my own economic independence in order not to live what she experienced. Under the influence of my mother's talks, I began to hate the community that has negative standards and attitudes against women. One time I was even sexually harassed....Sometimes I hated to be a woman...My organization [DHKP/C] is very respectful to the rights of the women. I believe that it is the only power that would eradicate these negative approaches against women."

Another woman's statement echoes these concerns: "Women have always been oppressed in the history. It is the main source of the problem. I felt this in my family which has patriarchal characteristics."

Family pressure is another negative life event that seems to motivate participation in terrorist groups. Family pressure as a negative life event was most frequently reported by female participants. After dropping out of school, one participant was essentially

homebound as her mother would not allow her to leave the home since her mother was aware that she was meeting some persons whom she did not know. The situation was boring and restrictive, and she wanted to escape and be free.

Another woman indicated that her father was not respectful about her decisions regarding her professional career. The family had been living in her grandfather's house, but he forced them to leave the house and they ended up in a very small house in a poor neighborhood. Her family did not want her to be together with her friends who had different religious and ideological backgrounds.

Another woman's story includes more details:

"Until I attended university, I was under family pressure, especially from my father. I had a very boring life passed between the high school and home. I did not have any social life. I did not have a friend because my father did not want me to have...Even he planted ivy surrounding the balcony to prevent people to see us. I had to arrange my life according to his expectations and reactions. He was inconsistent in his demands from me...It was, for me, a period which was full of uncertainties, fears, indistinctness, and blues. Although I like reading, he did not want me to buy books, and even he was tearing the books to pieces when he found in my room. I did not want to argue with him with a fear that he might not send me to the school anymore. This life pushed me in new searches...Although I had a religious life I began to show interest to left ideas since my father was blackening the left. I was reading leftist books...When I passed the university entry exams my father did not want me to stay at the dormitory, so he rented a house where one of my parent would stay with me in order to ensure more control over me. In the second semester of the first year they allowed me to have a female roommate because of the high rent fees. When they believed that my roommate is trustable person they did not stay with me anymore."

In fact, her roommate was a DHKP/C member and her relations with the roommate led her to participate in the group. Initially, the roommate invited her DHKP/C member boyfriend to the home. Next, the roommate introduced her to the university-based legal association of the group. They participated in some legal and illegal protests and demonstrations together. Afterwards, they asked her to leave the home and live with

group members. Her participation grew into more serious responsibilities and duties, including organizing illegal demonstrations, couriering illegal materials, and planting a bomb in a police station. This case is an extreme example of how family pressure might promote some unacceptable behaviors. Most interestingly, she reported becoming interested in leftist ideology because her father criticized the leftists.

Abuses and exorbitances of governing powers is another negative life event category that usually included exposure to excessive use of force, humiliation, or oppression. People motivated by abuses and exorbitances of government power or agencies believe that the existing political and institutional system ignores the honor of humanity, and promotes violence and oppression of the state authorities. In one case, one member had visited her uncle, imprisoned because of his terrorist activities. During the visit, prisoners began to shout slogans and she joined the prisoners and shouted slogans. In the course of the intervention of the prison guards she was beaten, along with some prisoners. "It was my first time I was beaten by security forces"; the use of force against prisoners influenced her decision to join.

Another member indicated that his entire family sees security forces as an enemy because of the negative experience with them. He also noted that not one person among his relatives had served in the police military service because of these experiences with security forces.

Exposure to abuses or exorbitances did not have to affect a direct family member. Observing brutality against others in public or on TV was remembered as a negative life event by some, and increased their motivation toward the group. One reported watching a security forces' operation on a terrorist cell on TV in exchange of gunfire killing of

some members of the terrorist group. "I was watching TV. Suddenly, the ordinary broadcast stopped and they began to broadcast armed conflict between the security forces and revolutionaries. I thought that I found what I was looking for; revolutionaries were like hero. It was like I was fighting with the fascism. I did not believe that they [revolutionaries] were killed."

There are some *other negative life event factors* as seem to promote motivation, including poverty. One member explained that although they worked hard as a family, they were poor people, and that this suffering from poverty influenced her to join the group. Similarly, another one stressed economic problems after his father died.

Although some of the members report only a single negative life event as described above, others mention a *combination of negative events*. One member reported both exposure to official abuses and his poor economic conditions:

"I hate the Military Service because I was punished during my obligatory service to military since I hit a commander with my rifle. When I finished the military service, I returned my village and I was abominating the system, and wanted to fight against it in an organized group. Our organization [DHKP/C] was the only group that was fighting against the existing system so I sympathized it."

He also emphasizes his family's poor economic situation, "My mom has always suffered during her life and raised us in very poor conditions", and stresses that he seeks a just system. Similarly, another person, after mentioning about their poverty and economic problems, talks about inadequacies of the system by indicating that existing system was oppressive and implemented assimilation policies in order to create masses that are loyal and obedient to the system. It is also evident from the following statement that perceived inequality and discrimination between different classes and exorbitances have become motivator for some others: "Discrimination between the classes, and martyred

revolutionaries influenced me, and made me search for a organized relations for struggle."

Another member mentions abuses of government forces, especially during the military coup, pressure from her father, and the economic challenges of the family:

"In our family there were some feudal values; we were raised by being exposed to some feudal disciplinary rules. These rules were being applied through my father's authority and harshness. Since then I had reaction to this authority...In different periods of our family life we had some economic problems, especially when my elder brother got married and left the home...During the military coup we were witnessing security forces' operations to the homes of people whom we knew, and detention of people in our neighborhood. One of the most important things that influenced me was that my brother was imprisoned and one of my friends was killed by security forces."

As a result of these events, when she met the group members in the university, she was responsive to their ideological message, and began to attend and to become involved in legal and illegal activities together with DHKP/C members.

Turkish Hezbollah

For Turkish Hezbollah members, dissatisfaction and unhappiness with life constituted the largest sub-category of negative life events (64.5%, see Table 10.1). The main reported reason for unhappiness and dissatisfaction was their sinful and immoral behaviors. Although the individuals committing these socially, morally, and religiously unacceptable behaviors were not happy or satisfied to do them and wanted to desist, they could not. They believed that participation in Turkish Hezbollah would make them better persons through the practice of the basic tenets of Islam. "I was committing sins and at the same time adoring to be a religious person to keep myself away from the bad habits which are against Islamic way of life", "I was together with my peers who had bad habits; we were drinking alcohol, gambling and committing adultery. But I was not

happy with this life style and wanted to be a good person”, “I was committing theft and insulting Muslims”, “I was vagabondizing and had a feeling of nothingness”, “I had a lot of bad habits due to my friends around me”, “I have been living illiterately; I was breaking into houses, gambling and drinking alcohol. Everybody in my neighborhood was complaining against me”, and “I could not find peace in my prior life before the congregation; I was a kind of clown. I was stealing others’ goods.”

Turkish Hezbollah presents itself as a religious group that helps individuals to understand the basic rules of the Islam; this tactic is used to attract people before ideologically motivating to prepare them for radical and violent activities. One participant indicated: “I compared my life with the life standards that Turkish Hezbollah promotes. I saw that they were different...I understood that the congregation [Turkish Hezbollah] is a unique group that presents real Islamic life. Then I have joined.”

In almost every one of these situations that included negative life events, members joined Turkish Hezbollah through their siblings, parent, relatives, or friends, or a member of Turkish Hezbollah they met in cafés, schools, or mosques. They were offered a better (purer) life and were exposed to strategic propaganda through books, sermons, and home visits.

“During my childhood I was habitually committing theft, and I was always fighting with my friends. Everybody was complaining against me to my family. Upon those complaints, my elder brother was always beating me. Once again, while I was about to commit theft in my neighborhood, one of my friends of whom I knew from the secondary school saw me. However, he did not complain; conversely, he behaved me in a good manner without blaming me. Then I felt very embarrassed. Our friendship relations developed day by day. He was giving me books and I was reading all of them. As a consequence I quitted all my bad habits, and I joined to Turkish Hezbollah”

A small set of members wrote about their unhappiness and dissatisfaction as members or sympathizers of PKK prior to involvement with Turkish Hezbollah:

"While I was in a high school I was together with PKK supporters. They were advocating atheism. Although I was against atheism I tended to believe atheism while I was together with them. I got very bad friends in the PKK. I was gambling and enjoying the life together with them. Then, my uncle whom I loved a lot died; this event influenced me. Upon this bad news I went to my hometown. In my parent's home I saw a book of my brother. After reading it I began to pray and met my brothers' friends who were the Turkish Hezbollah members."

Clearly, life in PKK caused conflict with his own and family values. The death of his uncle and the exposure to religious literature through his brother became a factor that helped him to change his life.

Similarly, another PKK sympathizer unhappy with the organization chose Turkish Hezbollah as an alternative to the PKK:

"I had very bad habited friends. Some of them were PKK sympathizers. We were forcibly collecting money in front of the school from the kids. When they did not give we were hitting them, and even one of my friends stabbed one of them... While I was at elementary school I was sharing the same desk with a silent and harmless boy. My friend hit this boy; I was very angry with my friend. My life was full of bad friends and bad activities, and I had fed up them. In the high school I wanted to desert these behaviors and so I liked the Muslims who were against these kinds of behaviors."

The killing of a family member also influenced the participation of some Turkish Hezbollah members. However, unlike DHKP/C members who were killed in gunfire exchanges with security forces, these victims were killed by the PKK, a rival and enemy group of Turkish Hezbollah. Feelings of anger and revenge motivated them to join Turkish Hezbollah.

Perceived *discrimination and inequality* against Muslims in Turkey and in the world motivated one respondent to join Turkish Hezbollah. He wanted to do something to struggle with this discrimination and humiliation:

"The books I was reading were including information on how Muslims have been maltreated and tortured, how they have been martyred and how bad conditions they have had to live. It was giving me pain and sometimes I was asking myself why those who are persecuted and tortured are only Muslims and why Muslims do not come together and resist against these actions. My hate against infidels has increased day by day...One day under the influence of my hatred I decided to set on fire a bar-restaurant that sell alcoholic beverages and cause people to be drunken. I found a highly strong fire bomb and a bought some gas. I replaced it under a car parked in front of the restaurant. The bomb was found before its explosion; I, however, believe that I did what I had to."

Inequality and injustice against majority of the people in the community by very small minority (of rich people) motivated one respondent to join Turkish Hezbollah. "I have observed that the existing system was full of injustices and inequalities. There was a happy minority and this happy minority group was ruling and superior to majority of the community. So I could not endure this and decided to join Islam [Turkish Hezbollah]." It is possible that what he heard and listened to about Turkish Hezbollah was designed to support his ideas and Turkish Hezbollah was introduced as an only solution to similar problems.

Even some very simple and seemingly minor humiliating experiences might generate circumstances of vulnerability that can generate opportunities for exposure to and ultimately participation in Turkish Hezbollah. As one member explains:

"It was the beginning of the second year of the high school. One day, while I was about to sit on my chair one of the vagabond students pulled my chair away, I fell down and all other students laughed at me. I was very embarrassed. After this event I sat together with another boy whom I knew as a sympathizer of Turkish Hezbollah. He showed me a great interest. Then our friendship

relations developed and I joined the Muslims [Turkish Hezbollah] under his guidance.”

3. Tactics/Propaganda of Terrorists

Over half the sample referred to organizational propaganda and tactics by the respective groups as a source for their participation. This discussion examines the types of tactics and propaganda activities used by the groups and the differences between the group’s use of these tactics. Both groups used home and village visits to generate public awareness. The DHKP/C used publications, targeted engagement (of male potential members) by female members, legal structures and organizations, mass activities, and ceremonies. Turkish Hezbollah focused on home based chats, and activities in mosques and bookstores.

In addition to the various tactics employed, both groups’ members use respectful, sincere, and friendly approaches towards outsiders and potential members to generate positive images of the organizations. As expected, Turkish Hezbollah used religion and religious concepts to influence and recruit individuals, while DHKP/C promoted traditional leftist ideological concepts.

DHKPC

The following discussion includes the type of tactical and propaganda activities that DHKP/C carries out in different contexts to promote the group and motivate individuals to participate. As discussed in the descriptive analysis section, some of these activities were also identified by participants as a source of information (learning) about DHKP/C.

The use of publications: DHKP/C members promote and distribute the publications of the group (i.e. magazines, newspapers, or books) to the public and through schools (especially high schools and universities). The ideological content of these publications strongly emphasize the concepts of equality, justice, freedom, people's brotherhood etc.; these ideas seem particularly attractive for younger potential participants. Free subscriptions for potential members and home delivery assists in exposure and recruitment. One member stated, "My sympathy to the revolutionary movement [DHKP/C] began through revolutionary magazines while I was at high school. I was a fanatic reader of them." Similarly another reported, "Under the influence of DHKP/C's publications provided by some of our members, I felt sympathy to DHKP/C. My enlightenment through these publications and conversations with members motivated me to become a member."

The use of female members: DHKP/C uses its female members to establish friendship relations with targeted males. After normal friendship relations and ensuring some level of emotional attachment, the girl begins to promote the group through various joint activities such as visiting the group's legal organizations (e.g., associations and culture centers) and joining sponsored legal activities (e.g., protest meetings and demonstrations).

One male participant explained that he had worked in different cities where he could find employment. In one city, he met a girl who was a DHKP/C member. After dating a few times, she provided him with the magazines of DHKP/C to read. Then, she urged him to open a branch of the group's association in that city. His involvement in

different activities with her generated attachment and promoted his active role in the group to remain together with her.

Legal structures/organizations: DHKP/C is very effective in using its legal extensions (associations for students in universities and high schools), cultural centers and publication offices, and support services (for families of prisoner members) to introduce its ideology and organization to potential new members. Efforts to draw individuals to these places and activities result in the promotion of the group and revolutionary ideas. In these places, they organize ideological chats, meetings, conferences, movies, and reading groups and these activities foster discussion about the ideas, articles, and activities. A well-informed group member is usually assigned to answer possible questions during the discussions. Folklore or theatre groups are also a source of attraction for some youths, and these situations offer the opportunity to increase group solidarity and friendship relations. One member indicated:

"...Another factor that increased my motivation was the persons that I met at the X magazine's office. We were reading the newspapers and magazines and making discussions about their contents; we were singing songs and marches that had ideological content. I was taken to the musical concert of the X group [supporter of DHKP/C]. During the concert they were shouting slogans; I also accompanied the slogans as I was under their influence."

In another instance, DHKP/C members invited a popular musical group that supported DHKP/C to an association, and ensured the opportunity for potential members' to chat informally with the musical group. One attendee of that event reported: "Our conversations with the group members caused me to like the revolutionary idea and DHKP/C. I continued to attend the office [used for publishing magazine] where I met different group members. Our talks and their sincere behaviors influenced me."

Organized mass activities: DHKP/C members organized legal and illegal protests, demonstrations and public meetings to capture the attention of the general public, publicize the group's ideology and perspective, and to develop and increase the dependence and motivation of members and targeted individuals. These events also serve to attract media attention.

Potential members, especially those who attend the legal extensions, are encouraged to join and support other organized DHKP/C activities, as well as other leftist-oriented demonstrations and protest. Group psychology, including ideological chanting, combined with sometimes haphazard precautions and preparations of security forces (i.e. excessive use of force) can enhance affinity to the group. One member explained:

"While I was at the preparation class of the University I met a person who was one of the managers of the University [DHKP/C] student association. My chats with her about the association and its activities motivated me to join them. Afterward, I joined several of the group's activities as a participant and sometimes as an organizer for boycotts, protests, conferences, or forums. We, as a group, also conducted illegal demonstrations, delivered proclamations, and collected money for the mineworkers on strike. I was detained due to some of these activities."

His subsequent statements included how he became involved in more violent activities and how he became more radicalized within the group.

Home visits: Visits to potential members' houses, especially during the summer semester for students, were designed to sustain individuals' feeling of belonging, considering that family environment might draw them away from the group's ideology. In one case, one DHKP/C member was instructed by the group to "target" his cousin during the summer semester:

“My cousin is a university student and an active member of our group. He visited me in one of the summer semesters a few years ago. I was a high school student at that time. He was always talking about poverty and social justice related issues. He was also giving me our group’s magazines that I did not know at that time; he was asking me to read them. When the schools opened he was sending me letters through which he was promoting the activities of DHKP/C, and also advising me to go to the group’s office used for our publications in our city. Then, my father died, and we had economic problems...In the meantime, I passed the university entry exams, enrolled the university, and found a dormitory to stay... During that time, my cousin was arrested for being a member of DHKP/C. He began to send me letters in which he was again recommending that I read the group's magazines. Although I began to buy it; I was also being sent the magazines by mail. Probably my cousin gave my address to the group, so they began to send them to me. My cousin and the magazine were the primary reasons of my motivation.”

In addition to the tactic of home visits, this example features several other techniques to increase motivation – targeting potential members (even while the recruiter is jailed), repeated recommendations to group propaganda (magazine), and free delivery of the materials.

The use of prisons: Prison outreach and imprisoned DHKP/C’s members are also used for motivational purposes. Potential recruits are taken to the prisons to visit prisoners; prisoners talk about their experiences and make ideological speeches that usually stress the inadequacies of the existing system and the necessity of a revolution to end social injustices. In addition to prison visits, some individuals visiting their own relatives were influenced by the speeches and ideological slogans shouted by prisoners. One member recalled a childhood visit to her uncle in prison where she heard the slogans of the terrorist prisoners and wrote about how the event had influenced her, “My dreams were filled by prisons during my childhood and adolescent period. I was telling my observations and feelings to everybody when I left from the prison. I was doing a kind of propaganda of the group. My uncle was always sending me letters from the prison and

these letters created more awareness about the group as I grow up." Her experiences in the prison combined with her uncle's promotional activities through letters from the prison motivated her to join. In a few cases, members mentioned their own motivation as a result of contact with terrorist prisoners during their own incarceration.

Ceremonies: Some documents point out that DHKP/C members organize commemoration ceremonies for their founders and killed members. Potential participants are taken to these ceremonies that include propaganda speeches, slogans and marches of the group members; such a psychological environment motivated some individuals.

Village visits: Village visits and propaganda tours that featured ideological conversations also influenced member decisions to join DHKP/C.

In most cases, participants in DHKP/C were exposed multiple tactics or propaganda activities. One indicated:

"My sympathy to the group increased after reading an ideological book that contains success stories of DHKP/C members, and attending a musical concert of a music group that is known as having leftist ideology. This sympathy increased even more when I began to go to the culture center and participate in their activities...I joined protest meetings and demonstrations. Then, I was given some responsibilities such as delivering newspapers of the group, organizing protest meetings and demonstrations, and some innocent activities such as folkloric dance practices or organizing theatres in order to pull youths' attract to the center."

It is necessary to reiterate that the sympathetic approach - sincerity, friendliness and benevolence, is a common characteristic of group members during their contact with members of the public and potential recruits.

Turkish Hezbollah

Turkish Hezbollah's tactics/propaganda activities are directed toward individuals from different parts of the community, instead of the student-focus of DHKP/C's activities.

Activities in the schools: Turkish Hezbollah appears to use direct friendship relations rather than organized structures like DHKP/C. Individual members concentrate on building good relationships with the potential members, who are usually targeted within groups of identified religious persons. As the friendship develops, the Turkish Hezbollah member promotes the involvement and participation of the target in the group. In a few cases, member teachers in the schools appear to be a motivator for some students:

“One of my teachers in the high school taught a course named ‘religion and morals’ which was very influential for me. I met with him out of the school and talked on various issues including our group and its activities. Until this conversation I had a feeling of nothingness, but I overcame of this feeling and felt better after listening to my teacher.”

Home visits: Turkish Hezbollah members visit homes of the potential members on multiple occasions. In some instances, they visited individuals' families whose sons were killed by the PKK. These targets, who later became members, indicated that their anger against the PKK and Turkish Hezbollah members' close interest and concern motivated them to join.

The use of publications: Turkish Hezbollah uses publications, especially books with religious ideology, in order to create awareness and motivation. They also use religious and other occasions to expose individuals to their ideological publications. In one example, information for a class assignment and his desire to write about a religious subject resulted in his exposure to Turkish Hezbollah literature:

"While I was at high school I had a teacher whom I know as a religious person. I was thinking that he does not like me because of my opinions. One of the assignments for the course was to analyze any topic that we chose. In order to influence him I planned to prepare a paper with a religious content. I had a friend I knew to be a religious person, so I consulted him and he gave me a book. The book seemed to be very interesting. I prepared my paper and it benefited from the book; the paper seemed to be a really good job. That book influenced me a lot. After reading that book and writing my paper I felt as a Muslim. I asked my friend for similar books to read. With the help of those books I understood that all the best options were in Islam [Turkish Hezbollah]."

It is also likely that his friend knew him, his needs, his vulnerabilities, and was able to choose a book that would help with the assignment as well as appeal to his psychological state; the books was so effective that it caused him to change his whole life. In another example, both a friend and the influence of book combined to provide motivation to join Turkish Hezbollah.

Organizing tours: Social activities, including tours, are also used as tactic to promote the group. One member indicated: "The tour was very influential for me; I liked them [Turkish Hezbollah] and I wanted to be together with them."

Village visits: Villages are potential places to promote the organization and to recruit potential new members. Villagers sensitive to religious issues are predisposed to be convinced by Turkish Hezbollah members' discussions and teaching about religion and the Turkish Hezbollah. In these contexts, Turkish Hezbollah is as the savior and promoter of Islam. To exemplify:

"In my prior life before the group, I was involved in several illegal activities such as stealing villagers' sheep and adultery. I had also friends who were thieves. Turkish Hezbollah members came to our village and conducted talks on religious matters. Everybody liked their sincere and friendly behaviors. My friends, as I already mentioned, joined Turkish Hezbollah and became good people by leaving all their bad habits their behind. Like them, I too was influenced by Turkish Hezbollah. The members were really different; friendly, sincere, helpful, honest. I just wanted to be like them, too."

Apparently, his observation of Turkish Hezbollah members' behaviors, their convincing talks, his friends' participation, and participation of other villagers motivated him to join Turkish Hezbollah. Another member stated: "Turkish Hezbollah members were coming to our village and organizing chats with the villagers. After listening to them I saw that I had not had any tie to Islam although I claim to be Muslim, and at that time I decided to join Islam [Turkish Hezbollah]." Turkish Hezbollah knows the vulnerabilities of people and targets them by religious concepts and responsibilities (as well as offering redemption for past sins).

The use of public places: Turkish Hezbollah members use public places like cafés to promote the group since these places present the opportunity to find someone there that might listen and thus be influenced. The following example demonstrates a successful outcome of that method.

"I was feeling sympathy to the Muslims [Turkish Hezbollah]. One day, I, together with my friends, was sitting in a café. A person who was a friend of my friend initiated a conversation by asking us 'What is the difference between human and animal?' It was an interesting question. Then, he explained it using various examples utilizing religious concepts. His speech and explanations really influenced me. After this conversation, I just assessed my life and saw a lot of deficiency, and I decided to be a good religious person."

Later, he met a member of Turkish Hezbollah in another shop; this member promoted Turkish Hezbollah as a religious group and took him to another meeting of the group; ultimately, this second member helped him to become an active member himself. Clearly, Turkish Hezbollah members use religious teachings and structures to elicit interest and sympathy from the targets; these religious messages also help convince them to join.

Home based chats: Home-based religious chats with potential individuals in members homes also help to promote Turkish Hezbollah as the best option to join and support. "I was invited to religious gatherings in different houses that included sermons and religious chats. Thanks to God that I joined these sermons, and now I am in the congregation [Turkish Hezbollah] now."

One-to-one connections: Some Turkish Hezbollah members choose a person and dedicate a substantial amount of time to develop and advance relations with them. The group member might be a friend, relative, or neighbor. The basic aim is to earn targeted party's trust, love, and respect. During these one-to-one contacts (as is done in group based activities), they chat about religious issues and Turkish Hezbollah. One member recruited in this way recounted: "I linked to the congregation by the agency of X. He was very sincere and friendly. I should confess that his special interest in me, our chats at his home and remote places for hours were very influential on me. His chat was more delicious than honey, and his advice have influenced me some much that I will never forget them throughout my life."

Mosques: Mosques controlled by group members are also effectively used to recruit new members and promote the group. Some participants reported that sermons with ideological contents influenced some individuals who were not aware of the real aim of the group. One participant who was member of religious tariqat attended Turkish Hezbollah sponsored activities at a mosque in his neighborhood; these activities led his separation from the tariqat and participation in Turkish Hezbollah:

"Although I am not a too conscious person in terms of practicing religious belief, I have not had bad ideas and habits. I was joining Friday prayers and I was affiliated with a tariqat. When Turkish Hezbollah members began religious talks and sermons in the mosque located in my neighborhood. I

listened to their sermons and enjoyed their activities; I left the tariqat and joined them.”

In addition to the sermons, Turkish Hezbollah showed a great deal of interest and concern for him; he stated that he had never seen this level of interest from his own environment.

Bookstores: Bookstores owned by sympathizers or active members of the group were also places that raised individuals’ awareness of the group not only through the sale of ideological books but also through activities at the bookstore, such as meetings and chats. Potential members who come to the bookstore to read and to buy books with religious content are targeted for the development of relationships. In one instance, a member was recruited when he went to a religious bookstore that was lending books; during the course of getting his book, he began a conversation with Turkish Hezbollah and later became involved with the group himself.

4. Need to Belong to a Group

Some individuals are motivated by their need to belong to a group, but there are differences in the formation of this motivation within and between the groups. Understanding these differences warrants detailed examination, and reveals a divergence between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members based on political ideologies and religious preoccupations respectively.

Factors such as being bored with life or becoming radicalized are reported by participants in both groups. The primary similarity is that individuals’ need to belong to a group was met by the different terrorist organizations by their strategic approaches to recruitment as well as operations.

DHKP/C

Moving away from familiar environments with friends and relatives to a new environment where individuals do not have acquaintances may cause feelings of *isolation and ostracism*. This may especially be the case for kids who were well-integrated into their home environments and had a lot of friends in school or in their neighborhoods. One of the women in the sample verified this explanation. Her family moved to another city where she enrolled a new high school in which the students were mostly from rich families. She had difficulty in establishing friendships because they already had their own peer groups; it was difficult for her to enter into any of these groups, and she found the situation to be psychologically and sociologically disturbing. When she met members of DHKP/C that were very friendly and seemed to be very honest, sincere, and respectful, she wanted to be together with them. In this case, a new school environment created difficulty for her in establishing new friendships because of established peer groups and socio-economic status differences. The friendly approach of DHKP/C members seemed to make it an attractive group for her to join.

Loneliness is also an important factor that promoted a search for a group of persons with which to identify and interact. Another woman indicated that “I was very bored after dropping out the university education; I was feeling as if I was alone in the world.” During this period, she met some members of the group in a café; these people visited her and these visits made her happy and feel social connections. “I forgot my loneliness when I was with them.” Her social isolation and loneliness after dropping out of school was replaced by the group members’ close contact for recruitment. Other members, mostly women, also referred to loneliness as factor that motivated their decision to join DHKP/C. They all stressed that they felt happy in the group they joined.

Another group explained that they needed a group that would *share their ideology and act together* to carry out this ideology. When they learned about DHKP/C activities and beliefs, they found them to be very appealing. Clearly, in these cases, radical ideology caused a search for radical groups which ended when they discovered and joined DHKP/C. One member stated "I was in search of a group that would meet my ideological needs and expectations." Another explained in more detail:

"I was reading philosophical and ideological books after I finished high school. Through these books I learned about Marxist-Leninist theory that influenced me a lot; I internalized it. For long time I was in search of people with whom I would be able to share my ideas. As a result of this search I learned about our movement [DHKP/C]. Their approach to Marxist-Leninist ideology, their revolutionary characteristics, and their heroism influenced me. Especially after the death fast in 1996, I felt as a real member of DHKP/C."

One member indicated the impact of a combination of several factors, loneliness, ostracism, boredom with life, being unpopular, and the need to belong to a group increased motivations to join DHKP/C.

"My elder brother and elder sister were active members of DHKP/C. They were involving in several legal and illegal activities to promote DHKP/C; they organized meetings and chats in the association, hanging placards, and delivering proclamations. Although I wanted to be like them I was always ostracized, and even I was despised. I was upset; I really wanted to be part of that group, so I needed to prove myself. I was working hard and only one or two days a week I was able to come home. My life was very boring and monotonous. Sometimes I was going to the group's association, but anybody was not interested in me. Although I was able to carry out some of the activities that my elders did, I was not allowed in others and I was always ostracized. I wanted my elder brother and sister to involve me into their group but they did not believe that I was serious. In fact, I just wanted to be among them."

Turkish Hezbollah

Sinful behaviors and a wish to get out of this lifestyle directed some individuals to a search of a religious group that could help them control their behavior and help them to

live them *have a more acceptable and sin-free life*. For some, Turkish Hezbollah was a good option, in part due to the influence of the tactics and propaganda of the group members.

“Because of my sins I committed I was feeling that I was moving away from a religious life. I was like an ice cube, and I was about to melt down under the sun. I would be a sinful person in the presence of God. If you throw that ice cube into a pool it gains a value; in order to be part of that pool and serve the God slavishly I joined the Congregation.”

Some participants of Turkish Hezbollah emphasized *tedium and monotony* of their lives, and sought a group or friends that would make their lives better. “Before I joined I was very bored in my life since I had nobody that would show concern to me. I was alone, and I was feeling like something was missing in my heart.” This same person added that Turkish Hezbollah members got in touch with him and gave him some ideological books. These contacts resulted in his joining the group. Both the monotony of his life and his desire to have caring relationships with others motivated him to join Turkish Hezbollah. The desire for caring relationships was also indicated by another participant who stressed that he needed a friendship environment that would show him respect, concern, and interest. He found an answer to these concerns in Turkish Hezbollah, and stated “I did not see this kind of interest even from my family environment. The close attention and sincere interest of Turkish Hezbollah motivated me to join them.”

Another group of people joined Turkish Hezbollah in order to be able to *carry out their radicalized ideas*. They wanted to fight against infidels and unbelievers, and to do so they needed a radical group. One indicated “Since my childhood I was dreaming of participating in a radical religious congregation to fight against the infidels together with

them." Prior radicalization motivated another group of participants as well; while members of legal religious groups, they sought belonging to a group which was more radical and extreme. The only female member of Turkish Hezbollah in the sample explained: "I was affiliated with different religious group but they did not meet my expectations, and I was not sharing the same thoughts with them... I was seeking radicalism." Another indicated that "I like Lebanon Hezbollah. I was looking for a group like Lebanon Hezbollah, which is sincere and systematic. I have been in different groups including religious groups but they did not satisfy me. They were so simple, and did not have a program. They were not promising a future."

Others had relatively innocent desires and expectations about the group in which they wanted to be involved: they just wanted to be in a religious group that would teach them some tenets of the religion. Their searches ended with Turkish Hezbollah which promotes itself as a group that helps individuals learn and practice religion.

5. Environmental Factors

Environmental factors involve motivation influenced or derived from people in intimate and familiar environments, often family or friends who are members and/or sympathizers of the terrorist groups. The documents revealed that there were within and between group differences in the formation of this motivation as described below. For both groups, it is difficult to quantitatively classify or definitively state the role of specific environmental factors because of the influence of multiple environmental factors on the same person.

DHKP/C

Participants of DHKP/C refer different persons and context as a source of their motivation. In many cases, they attributed their motivations to several environmental factors rather than one. A combination of family members and relatives in the group, the prevailing ideologies in their neighborhood or villages, and strong friendships with group members seemed to be common.

Parent/sibling/relatives: “I was raised in a family environment that has revolutionary ideas...” Parents, siblings, and/or relatives who were members or sympathizers of DHKP/C or other revolutionary movements exerted some influence over future members. “My elder brother was in DHKP/C and I wanted to be like him”, and “My father felt affinity to revolutionaries, and sometimes met with them. Therefore, he was known in his neighborhood as a communist and anarchist. Everybody in my family is leftist, and they never thought to be rightist.” Some members in the sample also had family members in the prisons because of their terrorist activities. A few mentioned family members who were killed by security forces during operations. As well as being influenced, some of them were directly introduced to the group by their parents or elder siblings. Another one noted her family’s logistical support to the group. She contends that her parent was giving logistical support to DHKP/C by allowing group members to stay and hide at their home. Her parents’ relation with the group influenced her and she wanted to join them.

Friends: Close friends, especially in the school context (usually university and high school) were often cited as a source of influence and motivation. “In the university, I had friends who were revolutionaries.” Friends discussed revolutionary movements,

talked about political issues, read DHKP/C's magazine and newspaper together. DHKP/C asks its members to visits friends who might become involved in the group.

"I support leftist ideology. One of my friends whom I have known for long years visited me at my home and explained me that he was a member of DHKP/C, and invited me to operate together with him. I told him that I would think about it, and then, since I had a leftist ideology, I accepted his offer."

Neighborhood: Some members mentioned being raised in a neighborhood where revolutionary and leftist ideas and activities were common. In several different cases members explained that their neighbors provided them with DHKP/C's magazines, newspapers, ideological books, and/or music cassettes. They also reported having ideological talks with their neighbors. These discussions and ideological materials motivated their decisions to participate in the organization.

Village/town: In addition to neighborhoods, the political orientation of villages and towns seemed important in terms of environmental motivators. One member noted that the village where he grew up included people with revolutionary ideologies, and that many of them have struggled against the existing system by joining revolutionary movements. These factors influenced his decision to join.

Some of those who identified family members as an environmental source of motivation also mentioned about some negative events or bad experiences of family members. These cases demonstrate that the family environment combined with bad events were a necessary condition for stronger motivation. One member stated that many people in his family had been victims of the oppressive fascist system and this oppression made them enemies of the state. Therefore, the family was very sympathetic to leftist groups that targeted the existing regime. Another stressed that her revolutionary friends

in the university talked frequently about injustices of the existing system against women and poor people.

Turkish Hezbollah

While DHKP/C participants' environment is mostly comprised of people (parent, sibling, neighborhood, relative) who are supporter or sympathizer of DHKP/C or other illegal revolutionary groups, Turkish Hezbollah members' environment mostly include religious people and influences not affiliated with other illegal religious groups or Turkish Hezbollah.

Parent/sibling: Simply having a very religious family environment motivated many individuals to join Turkish Hezbollah because they believed or were made to believe through propaganda that they were participating in a religious group that promoted religion and fought against all demonic and sinful things. One indicated that "The reason why I selected Turkish Hezbollah is that my parents are religious persons; they have always taught us to be honest and lawful, and do rightful things; they kept us away from evil things. Therefore, God helped me find Turkish Hezbollah." This member believed that he would find all the values he learned from his parent in Turkish Hezbollah. As discussed previously, Turkish Hezbollah uses basic and commonly acceptable religious concepts and values (i.e. honesty, rightfulness) in order to influence individuals.

Another group that referred their parents and siblings as their source of motivation indicated that their family's membership in (especially fathers and elder brothers) or sympathy toward Turkish Hezbollah influenced their own decisions to join. A father's membership in the group led to many family members' participation. As well as fathers,

brothers also caused motivation, "My elder brother's recommendations about living a religious life, and information provided by him about the movement [Turkish Hezbollah] which promotes Islam helped me become more conscious, and I wanted to do something for Islam." In some cases, similarity of family members' religious beliefs with Turkish Hezbollah's religious ideology created affinity for Turkish Hezbollah. "I was raised in a family whose religious belief was very close to Turkish Hezbollah's ideology." Also, in a few instances, wives who were members or sympathizers motivated their husband's decision to join.

Some were forced by their parents and/or siblings to join; "I was under the strict control of my father who was the member of Turkish Hezbollah; he wanted me to join the activities of Turkish Hezbollah."

Familial environments and activities created awareness about the group. One participant indicated that group members were gathering in his parent's house for religious chats. He was listening to them and wanted to join Turkish Hezbollah.

Behavioral changes of family members through participation in Turkish Hezbollah caused others in the same family to join Turkish Hezbollah.

"My elder brother was a very sinful person. After his participation in Turkish Hezbollah his behaviors and attitudes positively changed; he was praying, he was respectful to our family members, and he was very patient in each negative events. Secrecy in his behaviors was very admiring. I was influenced from him, and wanted to be part of the group that caused these changes."

Relatives: Close relatives' active membership in or sympathy for Turkish Hezbollah also motivated their decisions to participate. "My uncle invited me to join Turkish Hezbollah and I could not reject him."

Friends: Friendship ties were also an important motivating factor for some participants. Friends from school who supported Turkish Hezbollah became models for them to imitate, and friends from daily life generated motivation through the standard promotional activities. "My friend who was the member of the group was frequently inviting me to his house. He and his mother were promoting the group by making religious conversations. While I was at military service, they were sending me letters and postcards with religious contents..."

Village: Turkish Hezbollah conducts promotional activities in villages where villagers may be less educated and easier to convince for participation than in larger, more sophisticated towns. In the villages where everybody knows each other and there are social pressures for conformity, people are apt to be influenced from each other. "When I saw that all of my friends participated in this congregation, I also decided to join Turkish Hezbollah as they did."

6. Other Motivational Factors

The remaining motivational factors not covered under the previously discussed categories are classified as other factors. Although the statements made by individuals in the recruitment documents are not rich in content, the concept and ideas are important in terms understanding the existence and constitution of other possible factors that motivated participation in terrorist organizations.

The factors that are not classified in the five (5) primary categories of motivations include respect, harmony between group members, revenge, and desire for involvement in violent activities. Compared to DHKP/C, Turkish Hezbollah participants' documents included more diverse other factors and are relatively rich in their content.

DHKP/C

Despite the lack of detailed discussion in the documents, some of the reported reasons for participation in DHKP/C include contribution to *the brotherhood of the Turkish people, discipline within the group, dedication to revolution, and harmony among the group members*. Other members indicated that *respect* played a role in their motivation, both in terms of respectful and helpful behaviors of the group's members as well as respect in the group that women would not normally receive in the community. "One of the biggest factors that pulled me into the revolutionary movement was the respect that is showed to women in the movement."

One member cited a desire for *revenge* from representatives of the existing [political and social] system. Another expressed a desire to be involved in *assassinations of political figures* he identified as enemies of the people: "I would like to involve in some punishment activities. I want to serve as a warrior; I want to be guerilla. I am ready to do whatever the party charges me to do. I can not wait anymore in such a system without doing nothing."

Finally, one participant noted that he initially joined for *adventure and excitement*, but was later influenced by the behaviors and ideals of the DHKP/C members whom he met.

Turkish Hezbollah

The rate of other factors as a motivator for Turkish Hezbollah members is almost three (3) times that of those given by DHKP/C members. The range of other factors is more varied and extensive for members of this group.

Revenge and Protection: Revenge was a substantial motivation for a few members of Turkish Hezbollah, especially those whose family members had been killed by the PKK. "After my brother was martyred, my trust for Turkish Hezbollah strengthened, and I felt rancor and hatred against the blasphemous and unbelievers [the PKK]." The regional struggle between the groups also motivated members. "I liked Turkish Hezbollah particularly because they were against cruelty and violence of the PKK."

One participant learned that PKK was planning to bomb his house, and consequently decided to join Turkish Hezbollah. An expectation of protection and defense motivated him to take part in the group that was fighting against the organization that was threatening him.

Dissatisfaction with the existing group: Some members of Turkish Hezbollah had been active supporters or sympathizers of the PKK; however, after they came to believe that the PKK was an enemy of Islam and promoted leftist ideals, some of them left PKK and joined Turkish Hezbollah.

Armed struggle and the desire to commit a suicide attack: Other members reported more radical and extreme expectations and desires. One explained that he joined because he wanted to be involved in armed struggle and to commit a suicide attack. He left other religious groups because they did not have extreme activities, and joined Turkish Hezbollah hoping that he would be assigned to these kinds of duties. Another wrote about his radicalization through joining Turkish Hezbollah, while others indicated that they wanted to participate in war and jihad to make Islam more powerful.

Using weapons: One person who liked weapons thought he would find opportunity to use weapons and to join armed activities through his membership. "I like weapons. I heard members of Turkish Hezbollah talking about weapons and going to the mountains for armed activities; these were satisfactory for me to join."

Organizational characteristics: One member wanted to join a well-organized religious group, and saw this opportunity in Turkish Hezbollah. Another member reported that the *strength of the group* was a motivating factor for him. "Turkish Hezbollah started to be very strong and I wanted to be in it." Others saw Turkish Hezbollah as an *objective, serious, consistent and courageous* group compared to the groups in which they had previously been members.

Solidarity and fraternity: Solidarity and fraternity between Turkish Hezbollah members have been influential for some others. *The sincerity, maturity, friendly approach and/or humble attitudes* of the Turkish Hezbollah members motivated some to join.

Youth effect: One individual reported that he saw youths in the group and wanted to be among them. Another noted that all the Muslims he saw in the mosque were old people. He thought that they did not promote Islam, and he wanted to join Turkish Hezbollah since he felt that younger people would be more likely to promote Islam.

Receiving respect: The need for respect influenced several members that did not receive respect within their immediate environments. One stated "The Muslims [Turkish Hezbollah members] were respecting me; other people have never respected me." In addition to respect from Turkish Hezbollah members, receiving respect from a family member who did not respect before provided motivation for another:

“While I was at the Middle school, Turkish Hezbollah showed an interest in my elder brother that led his participation in the group. Before joining Turkish Hezbollah, my elder brother had bad habits never wanted me near him while he was together with his friends since I was embarrassing to him with my old clothes. However, after entering Islam [Turkish Hezbollah], my elder brother’s attitudes have changed; he became a very good person, and asked me to be together with him wherever he was. My elder brother introduced me to his friends in the group. I liked them since they showed me respect and behaved in a friendly way that I had not seen from anyone before.”

Fear of death: Turkish Hezbollah promises paradise in the other world to its members. One member who had had a heart attack indicated that he was very close to death, and as a result of members close interest in him and his fear of death and punishment in the other world motivated him to join Turkish Hezbollah. Another who cited several motivating factors also listed the fear of death: "I was influenced from the mature and respectful behavior of the congregation’s members in the school...When I had a surgical operation in the hospital, I felt the death very close to me. These things influenced me to join Turkish Hezbollah."

Findings presented in this chapter address the research questions which require qualitative analyses of the documents. The following chapter is going to provide discussion about the results of quantitative and qualitative analyses so as to link findings to the literature and various theoretical approaches. The discussion will be followed by the limitations and implications of the study and suggestions for the future research.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DISCUSSION

The main purpose of this study is to determine similarities and differences between the members of DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations in terms of individual members' background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors as reflected in documents that these participants provided to their respective organizations. The study specifically examined the motivational factors that promote participants to decide to join terrorist groups, and therefore, offers direct insight into why these individual became a terrorist in these particular organizations. Three hundred and two documents (116 for DHKP/C and 186 for Turkish Hezbollah) seized in the course of security force operations were reviewed, coded, and analyzed based on the unit of analysis of the individual terrorist. Quantitative analyses included chi-square and logistic regression analyses while the qualitative aspect of the research involved extensive analysis of the focal motivational factors described in the terrorists' own words in the documents.

This chapter reviews the major findings from the research, attempts to link the results with different theories explaining deviant or criminal (terrorist) behavior, discusses the potential policy implications of the research, identifies the limitations of the study, and presents some suggestions for future research in the area of motivation and participation in terrorist organizations.

1. Summary of Research Findings

Bivariate statistics revealed significant differences in the background characteristics of individuals joining DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah. The background

characteristics vary significantly between the two groups in terms of gender, economic status, education level, marital status, and also, group affiliation, active family member, family sympathy, number of siblings, father and mother's jobs. While men constitute over two-thirds of DHKP/C, there is no gender variation within Turkish Hezbollah. Reinforcing prior studies, both groups are male dominated although the left-wing group has a reasonable proportion of female members (i.e. Smith 1994; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987).

Overall, the majority members of both groups report middle or higher economic status. Turkish Hezbollah members have better economic status than those of DHKP/C; this difference is statistically significant. This finding challenges the common and apparently inaccurate belief that economic problems promote individual participation in terrorist organizations.

DHKP/C participants are significantly more educated than Turkish Hezbollah participants. Almost one-third of DHKP/C members have some college education compared with only seven percent of Turkish Hezbollah members. This finding supports the literature regarding educational backgrounds of left wing groups (i.e. Weinberg & Eubank, 1987; Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003). In this sample, over half of Turkish Hezbollah members have only middle school or lower education; this finding contradicts the most notable research finding on another Islamic extremist group (Sageman, 2004); in Sageman's sample, 83 percent of participants had finished high school and a majority (over 60%) attended some college. This finding suggests variation in the educational background across religiously motivated terrorist organizations.

There are no significant job status differences between the two groups, although they are comprised of almost the same percentage of students and working members. However, the participation of the unemployed in DHKP/C is almost double the rate for Turkish Hezbollah (13.8% and 7.1%, respectively). In contrast to much of the literature (i.e. Caglar, 2006) and popular (mis) conceptions, unemployment does not appear to be an important factor in the decision to participate in a terrorist organization.

The marriage rate of Turkish Hezbollah members is almost five times greater than DHKP/C's rate (34.1% and 6.9%, respectively). Like other extremist Islamic religious groups (i.e. Sageman, 2004) Turkish Hezbollah appear to value marriage contrary to many leftist groups that see marriage as an obstacle in to recruiting new revolutionaries (i.e. Cantekin 2006; Hudson, 1999; Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003).

The range of onset participation ages for Turkish Hezbollah (9 to 45) is much broader than DHKP/C (14 to 28), although the average age of onset is very close for both groups (19.36 and 19.17, respectively). In other words, Turkish Hezbollah does not appear to restrict recruitment to certain ages, whereas DHKP/C seems to target those in the 14-25 age range as almost all members (97.4%) joined at these ages. Prior studies conducted on Turkish terrorist groups found that terrorists regardless of ideology are usually between the ages of 14-25 or 15-25⁵¹ (Alkan, 2002; Alkan & Citak, 2006; Cantekin, 2006). This study reinforces those findings as the majority of the participants of both terrorist groups are in the 14-25 age-group. Almost three quarters (73.9%) of Turkish Hezbollah joined between ages 14-25.

⁵¹ In almost all studies this age group reflects the ages at the time of data collection (i.e. interview); it does not reflect the age of onset.

Table 18. Summary of research findings: Background characteristics

Variables	Key findings
Gender	- Significant differences between groups - Both groups are male dominated - DHKP/C has a reasonable proportion of female members - No gender variation in TH
Economic condition	- Significant differences between groups - Majority of the people in both groups have modest economic status - TH has more members with high economic status than DHKP - DHKP/C has more members with low economic status than TH
Education	- Significant differences between groups - DHKP/C members are more educated than TH members
Job status	- No significant differences between groups - Unemployed people in DHKP/C is almost double that in TH
Marital status	- Significant differences between groups - The marriage rate of TH members is five times greater than of DHKP/C
Age of onset	- Average age of onset is very close (19.36 for TH, 19.17 for DHKP/C) - Range of ages for TH (9 to 45) is broader than DHKP/C (14 to 28)
Group affiliation	- Significant differences between groups - DHKP/C has more members with prior illegal group affiliation than TH
Number of siblings	- Significant differences between groups - On average, TH members have more siblings (7.23) than DHKP/C members (4.83)
Any (prior) detention	- No significant differences between groups - Majority in both of the groups do not have any prior detention before participation
Active family member	- Significant differences between groups - TH members reported family member participation more than DHKP/C members do.
Family sympathy	- Significant differences between groups - More TH members reported at least one sympathetic family member compared to DHKP/C
Father's job	- Significant differences between groups - DHKP/C members have more retired, and farmer fathers; TH has more unemployed, government official, and deceased fathers
Mother's job	- Significant differences between groups - Overall, 80% of mothers are housewife (TH has more than DHKP/C)

Bivariate statistics of all other background characteristics revealed significant differences between two groups. The only non-significant variable was “any (prior) detention”. The majority of the participants in each group (80.1% for Turkish Hezbollah and 85.3% for DHKP/C) reported no prior experiences with detention by security forces in advance of their participation. DHKP/C had significantly more members with prior

illegal group affiliation than Turkish Hezbollah (20.7% vs. 9.7%). In terms of affiliation with legal groups, DHKP/C participants usually reported the legal organizations with ties to DHKP/C (i.e. associations, culture centers), while Turkish Hezbollah members usually reported affiliations with religious organizations (i.e., tariqat, religious congregations or political parties) that were not associated with Turkish Hezbollah. DHKP/C has more members with prior illegal group affiliation than Turkish Hezbollah (20.7% vs. 9.7%).

Both of the groups' members reported a considerable number of family members that were active in or sympathetic to the sample's terrorist organization. Nevertheless, there were statistically significant differences between two groups. Around 60 percent of Turkish Hezbollah members reported family member participation compared with about one-third of DHKP/C. Similarly, over two-thirds of Turkish Hezbollah members reported having at least one family member sympathetic to the cause compared to only about half of DHKP/C members. Turkish Hezbollah members reported significantly more siblings (7.23) than DHKP/C members (4.83). Family size might influence participation in a number of ways. More children might diminish parental control or/and the parents' ability to meet the basic needs of their children. Terrorist organizations utilize such situations by promising or providing better conditions to meet these needs; this might result in affinity to or participation in a particular terrorist group. It is also possible that in a large family, more children might be influenced by parents or siblings who are sympathetic to or participants in terrorist groups.

Examination of the documents revealed four information sources regarding how the participant learned about the terrorist organization in which they participated (learning sources): friend/s, kinship, organizational activities, and organizational

propaganda (Table 19). These variables were derived from answers to “How did you learn about the group?”: Bivariate analyses revealed significant differences between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah for only two of these learning-related variables: propaganda, and organizational activities. *Organizational activities* were the most frequently reported means of learning about the groups. Almost two-thirds of DHKP/C members and just over half of Turkish Hezbollah members reported these activities as their main source of information about the organization they joined. While organizational activities are important in terms of informing people about the groups, exposure to these activities does not automatically insure motivation or incentive for people to join these types of groups. Compared to other sources of information, a relatively a small number of individuals (14%) reported *propaganda* as their main source for learning about the group in which they participated. Over one-quarter of DHKP/C members reported propaganda compared to less than seven percent of Turkish Hezbollah members. Publications were the most frequently reported propaganda source for both groups followed by the media.

Table 19. Summary of research findings: Learning related factors

Variables	Key findings
Friend/s	• No significant differences between groups • Around one-third of the sample in each group learned about the group they joined through friends
Kinship	• No significant differences between groups • Slightly less than a third of the sample in each group learned about the group they joined through kinship • Parents for TH, and relatives for DHKP/C play more important roles.
Organizational activities	• Significant differences between groups • More DHKP/C members referred organizational activities as a learning source about the group than TH members (65.8% vs. 52.2%)
Propaganda	• Significant differences between groups • More DHKP/C members referred propaganda as a leaning source about the group than TH members (26.3% vs. 6.5%) • Publications are the most frequent learning source for both groups

There were no significant differences between two groups for the variables of friend/s and kinship. However, almost one-third of the sample in each terrorist group learned about the group they ultimately joined through *a friend or friends*. Just under a third of Turkish Hezbollah members reported learning about the organization through *kinship* while just over one quarter of DHKP/C members did. Within the kinship categories (parent, sibling, relative, and spouse), parents played a more important role for Turkish Hezbollah members while relatives (outside the nuclear family) played a more important role for DHKP/C members.

Motivation is a necessary condition for participation in a terrorist organization. Despite the importance of motivational factors in the participation process, existing studies have not successfully or satisfactorily defined what constitutes motivation (Hudson, 1999; Horgan, 2003a). As a result of the document analysis, six motivational factors were identified: environmental factors (family, friend, relative, neighbor, etc.), ideological/political closeness, need to belong to a group, negative life events, tactics/propaganda of terrorists, and other factors. Bivariate analyses revealed statistically significant differences between two groups for all of the motivational factors except for the *need to belong to a group*.

Need to belong to a group was the weakest among the reported motivators for each groups with the overall percentage of 11.3. Members of each group also reported a variety of factors contributing to the need to belong to a group, such as being bored or becoming radicalized as reasons that they wished to join their respective groups. DHKP/C members reported isolation and ostracism, loneliness, the need to share

ideology and act together. In contrast, Turkish Hezbollah members reported the desire to have a more acceptable and sin-free life (especially for those who identified themselves as sinful, but wanted to reform), tedium and monotony in their lives, and participation in a religious group to learn tenets of the religion. All of these diverse factors contributed to the need to join a group, and motivated participants to join their respective organizations.

Table 20. Summary of research findings: Motivational factors

Variables	Key findings
Environmental factors	• Significant differences between groups • More DHKP/C members reported environmental factors than TH members (41.7% vs. 29%)
Ideological political closeness	• Significant differences between groups • More DHKP/C members reported ideological/political closeness than TH members (57.4% vs. 43%)
Need to belong to a group	• No significant differences between groups • The weakest among the reported motivators for both groups (9.6% for DHKP/C, 12.4% for TH)
Negative life events	• Significant differences between groups • More DHKP/C members reported negative life events than TH members (33% vs. 24.2%) • Dissatisfaction/unhappiness in life is the most significant negative life event for TH • Discrimination/inequality, family pressures/problems, and exorbitances of governing powers are the most significant negative life event for DHKP/C
Tactics/propaganda of terrorists	• Significant differences between groups • More DHKP/C members reported tactics/propaganda of terrorists than TH members (60% vs. 44.6%)
Other factors	• Significant differences between groups • More TH members reported tactics/propaganda of terrorists than DHKP/C members (20.4% vs. 12.2%)

The influence of *environmental factors* is exercised through people in intimate and familiar environments such as friends, family members (parents, siblings), relatives, and/or neighbors that are sympathizers or members of the terrorist groups. In these environments, the political orientation of participants' home villages and towns seemed an important contributor to environmental motivators. These factors exerted more

influence on DHKP/C members (41.7%) than members of Turkish Hezbollah (29%). In many instances, document analyses revealed the influence of multiple environmental factors on the same individual. Consequently, environmental factors could not be quantitatively classified.

Ideologically, the Marxist-Leninist focus of DHKP/C motivated more members than the religious ideology of Turkish Hezbollah. Well over half (57.4%) of DHKP/C members reported *ideological/political closeness* as a reason of their motivation compared with only 43 percent of Turkish Hezbollah members. It appeared that there were some contextual, conceptual, and semantic differences between the declarations of motivations for members in each of the distinctive terrorist groups. DHKP/C members generally cited affinity to leftist ideology, organizational strategies and policies, the potential for revolutionary social change, and DHKP/C as the best choice among alternative organizations. Turkish Hezbollah members' affinity was attributed to dissatisfaction with other religious groups, the search for a more religious life, the religious characteristics of the group, and the group's ability to cultivate sympathy and affinity, as well as its standing as the best alternative.

The *tactics and propaganda* of the organization was the most frequently cited motivational factor (50.5%). More DHKP/C members (60%) report this motivation than Turkish Hezbollah members (44.6%). The documents revealed differences between the groups' use of tactics and propaganda. Both groups used home and village visits to promote the group and engender public awareness. DHKP/C used publications, female members (to target potential male members), organized mass activities, legal structures/organization (i.e. associations, culture centers), commemoration ceremonies,

and prison visits. The Turkish Hezbollah focused on religiously based activities, including home based chats and activities in mosques and bookstores.

Negative life events were reported as motivating factors for about one third of DHKP/C members compared to about one-quarter of Turkish Hezbollah participants ($p < .10$). Dissatisfaction/unhappiness with life was the most significant negative life event reported by Turkish Hezbollah participants (64.5%), while discrimination/inequality, family pressures/problems, exorbitances of governing powers, and the death of family members/friends by security forces were the most significant negative life events reported by DHKP/C participants. Although the killing of family members/friends was a substantial negative life event for several Turkish Hezbollah participants, unlike the DHKP/C members, the murderers of Turkish Hezbollah relations and friends was another terrorist organization, the PKK, rather than security forces.

Other factors not classified in the previous motivation categories were also reported in the documents. One fifth of Turkish Hezbollah members indicated other motivating factors compared with only twelve percent of DHKP/C members. Turkish Hezbollah participant documents included a more diverse listing of other factors than DHKP/C documents. Turkish Hezbollah members' reports included; revenge, protection, armed struggle, desire to commit a suicide attack, using weapons, strength of the group, solidarity and fraternity, receiving respect, fear of death, sincerity, maturity, and friendly approach of the members. DHKP/C members reported discipline within the group, harmony among the group members, the desire to be involved in assassinations of political figures, and adventure and excitement.

Table 21. Summary of research findings: Gender issues

Backgrounds	Key findings
Economic condition	• No significant differences
Education	• No significant differences
Job status	• Significant differences between male and female participants • Females are significantly more likely to be unemployed
Marital status	• No significant differences; however, females are more likely to be married
Age of onset	• Average age of onset is almost identical (19.29 for females, 19.12 for males) • Almost same age range: 14 to 28 for females, 14 to 27 for males
Any detention	• Significant differences between male and female participants • Females have significantly lower prior detention rates
Group affiliation	• No significant differences; however, males are more likely to be affiliated with illegal groups
Learning related variables	Key findings
Friend/s	• No significant differences
Kinship	• Significant differences between male and female participants • Females are more likely to learn through kinship
Organizational activities	• No significant differences
Propaganda	• No significant differences
Motivational factors	Key findings
Environmental factors	• No significant differences
Ideological political closeness	• Significant differences between male and female participants • Males are more likely to be motivated by this factor
Need to belong to a group	• No significant differences
Negative life events	• No significant differences
Tactics/propaganda of terrorists	• No significant differences
Other factors	• No significant differences

In terms of gender, bivariate analyses revealed only two statistically significant differences in terms of background characteristics: prior detention experiences and employment status. Women in DHKP/C, as compared to men, were more likely to be unemployed and less likely to have prior detention prior to their participation. The average age of onset was almost identical for genders, 19.29 for females and 19.12 for males. And while not statistically significant, men appeared to be more likely to be affiliated with illegal groups (25.6%) than women (10.5%). This finding supports other research on the role of gender in criminal groups/activities. There were statistically

significant differences between females and males regarding kinship as a learning source (39.5% and 21.1%, respectively) and ideological/political closeness as a motivation (42.1% and 64.9%, respectively).

A review of the bivariate logistic regression results for the relationship between selected background characteristics and each motivational factor follows. Men were more likely to join DHKP/C than women under the motivation of ideological/political closeness; the gender related bivariate analysis (Table 12) also supports this finding. Environmental factors were more influential on younger individuals than older participants for both groups. Older DHKP/C members are significantly more likely to indicate motivations by need to belong to a group and negative life events. For members of Turkish Hezbollah, environmental factors are more influential on less educated participants than their more educated counterparts. However, it appears that more education increases the motivation of need to belong to a group. This finding might be attributed to characteristics of individuals in high school and university who seek group affiliation. DHKP/C members with university education are significantly more likely to be motivated by the tactics and propaganda of terrorist organizations. This finding is unsurprising given that DHKP/C conducts extensive activities in universities to generate recruits.

Married Turkish Hezbollah members were less likely to be influenced by their environments than single male members. Conversely, married DHKP/C members (compared to singles) were significantly more likely to be motivated by negative life events. The document analysis and bivariate analyses suggested that this is especially the case for unhappily married female DHKP/C members.

Logistic regression was used to investigate which variables (background, learning, and motivational) discriminated between participation in Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C. The Logistic regression model for background characteristics (see Table 14) revealed statistically significant differences between two groups for almost all variables. Participants of Turkish Hezbollah were significantly more likely to be married, students, and have moderate or high economic conditions, but less likely to have high school, or post high school education than DHKP/C participants. Further, it was significantly more likely that Turkish Hezbollah members had more siblings and prior detention records than DHKP/C members, but were less likely to be affiliated with legal or illegal groups.

The logistic regression model for learning related variables (see Table 15) revealed statistically significant differences for three out of four learning variables: propaganda, organizational activities, and friends. DHKP/C participants were significantly more likely to learn through these information sources than Turkish Hezbollah participants. There is no significant difference between two groups in terms of learning through kinship.

The logistic regression model for motivational factors (see Table 16) revealed statistically significant differences between the groups for four motivational factors: environmental factors, ideological/political closeness, negative life events, and tactics/propaganda of terrorists. DHKP/C members were more likely to report being motivated by each of these factors than Turkish Hezbollah participants. There were no significant differences between the two groups in terms of motivations related to the need to belong to a group or the other factors category.

The model that included background characteristics and learning related variables was almost identical to the full model. In the full model, the findings on background characteristics almost mirrored those in the background characteristics (only) model except for high school education and high economic condition, which were not significant in the full model. Likewise, findings regarding learning related variables were the same for both the learning related (only) model and in the full model (see Table 17).

There were slight changes in terms of motivational factors between the motivational factor (only) model and the full model. Turkish Hezbollah participants were significantly less likely to be motivated due to environmental factors, ideological/political closeness, and negative life events, and more likely be motivated by their need to belong to a group than DHKP/C participants. There was no statistically significant difference between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah in terms of being motivated by tactics and propaganda or other motivational factors.

Overall, there are substantial and statistically significant differences between these two distinctive terrorist groups within Turkey in terms back ground characteristics, learning sources about the groups, and factors that motivate individuals to join DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah.

2. Theoretical Implications

The study of terrorism lacks adequate theories to guide research on motivation to participate in terrorist organizations (Ferrucati, 1982; Duyvesteyn, 2004). Theory based studies of terrorism are profoundly informed by other academic disciplines. The

following discussion will link selected findings of this research to different theoretical explanations for aspects of participation in terrorist organizations.⁵²

Various findings of this research are consistent with *developmental and life course perspectives*. Participation in a terrorist organization involves a process that includes some specific background formations, learning dynamics, and motivations. During this process, individuals are exposed to information about the terrorist group through various sources such as family, friend, relative, organizational activities and propaganda as well as influenced by different factors (i.e. negative life events, environmental factors) that contribute to the motivation to join the terrorist group. The consequent decision to join is arguably a turning point that changes the direction and flow of an individuals' life.

Two main concepts comprise the analysis of life-course dynamics: trajectories and transitions. *Trajectories* are pathways such as schooling (where individuals meet terrorist groups' members) or marriage (with a member of terrorist group), and *transitions* are important life events, such as initiation into a (terrorist) group, friendships (with members of a terrorist group), illegal activities (with terrorists), or imprisonment (due to illegal activities with terrorist groups). Each of these types of trajectories and transitions were influential in many of the cases examined for this research. Many of the findings are consistent with Thornberry et al.'s (2003) seminal study of gang participation in which the authors contend that the life course perspective not only includes social and psychological forces that develop in early childhood and facilitate participation in gang groups, but also contains "unfolding relationships and

⁵² This discussion will not include detailed definition or explanation of the theories' basic premises or propositions since they were already discussed in the chapter three.

developmental influences (p. 7).” They also note that factors that lead to participation/membership in gang groups might be social structural positions, family relationships, neighborhood contexts, schools, peers, or individual characteristics; almost all of these identified factors emerged as significant in this research. Moreover, given that overwhelming majority of the group members in this sample (97.4% for DHKP/C and 73.9% for Turkish Hezbollah) joined their respective groups between the ages of 14-25, it is reasonable to conclude that the life-course approach directly relates to the universal criminological finding that young men are particularly at risk for deviance and criminality.

The majority of the study’s results also support the *risk factors model* which emphasizes individuals’ vulnerability to negative developmental outcomes, while contending that various overlapping risk factors in a person’s background might lead to participation in illegal activities (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1999; Hill, Howell, Hawkins & Battin, 1999; Sameroff et al., 1993; Small & Luster, 1994; Thornberry et al., 2003). Risk factors identified in this research include multiple environmental factors: intimate and familiar environments with friend and family sympathizers or members; neighborhoods, villages, or towns where ideologically appealing (revolutionary/leftist or religious) ideas and activities are common; schools where leftist or religious groups carry out recruitment activities; peer groups affiliated with terrorist groups; and individual characteristics and experiences such as negative life events and the need to belong to a group as well as lesser parental control (perhaps due to family size).

That majority of the people in both of the groups (85.3% for DHKP/C and 80.1% for Turkish Hezbollah) reported no prior detention before participation and that

documents explain how individual members were radicalized after they joined, it can be inferred that these findings mostly support the *social facilitation model* (rather than selection, and enhancement models) which posits that individuals become involved in criminal/terrorist activities after joining violent/terrorist groups. Group dynamics and normative structures of the terrorist groups appear to facilitate involvement in delinquency. This aspect of this research also supports socialization theories of *differential association or social learning* given that terrorist groups are apparently quite effective in terms of communicating definitions, teaching organizational ideology, strategy, and terrorist activities ranging from minor property to violent crimes, and establishing reward systems.

There is little support in this research for anomie, institutional anomie and economic strain theories, because the participants from neither group emphasized financial issues as a significant factor in their participations (Akers, 2000; Cullen & Agnew, 1999; Title & Meier, 1990). In fact, the majority of group members in Turkish Hezbollah (85.3%) and DHKP/C (65.8%) reported middle or better economic status and only about fourteen percent of DHKP/C members and seven percent of Turkish Hezbollah participants reported unemployment. Additionally, qualitative analyses revealed only a few individuals stressed economic problems. Therefore, in this research, anomie was not an important factor in the decision to participate in a terrorist organization.

There is, however, considerable support for general strain theory which looks beyond solely economic strain to multiple sources; sees crime as an adaptation to stressful conditions, and suggests that strain results from negative relationships with

others (Agnew, 1992, 1999; see Chapter 3 for detailed explanation). In this context, most of the motivational factors revealed in the document analyses might be considered as sources of strain. For instance, around ten percent of the participants in each group cited the need to belong to a group which included the reasons of being bored, isolation and ostracism, loneliness, and having a more acceptable and sin-free life (for Turkish Hezbollah participants). These factors could be understood as sources of strain since positively valued goals were not being met through legal groups and activities. About one-third of DHKP/C and one-quarter of Turkish Hezbollah participants reported negative life events as their motivational factor. The death of a family member or friends by security forces (usually for DHKP/C) or rival terrorist groups (for Turkish Hezbollah), or social and cultural restrictions on women that prevented their freedom to conduct their life activities in the desired manner seem to generate strain due to removal of positively valued stimuli. Abuses and exorbitances by governing powers, discrimination and inequality are other reported motivational factors that could be conceptualized as strain or stress, since these behaviors presented negatively valued stimuli. Consequently, these strains seem to have motivated some individuals to participate in both groups to address the inadequate conditions that caused strain and stress.

A major finding of this research seems to contradict the basic premise of *control theories*, especially Hirschi's *social bonding theory*, which posits that it does not matter to whom one is attached; even attachment to delinquent peers, friends or deviant parents reduces the possibility of criminality. In this research, nearly 60 percent of Turkish Hezbollah and 35 percent of DHKP members reported family member participation in the respective groups; over two-thirds of Turkish Hezbollah and half of DHKP/C members

reported at least one sympathetic family member; and nearly 42 percent of DHKP/C 29 percent of Turkish Hezbollah members reported environmental factors as their motivation. These findings suggest that attachment to peers or parents affiliated with terrorist groups might promote participation in terrorist groups as well as criminality. In other words, attachment to peers or parents might lead to non-criminal conformity only when peers and parents are not affiliated with terrorist groups. Presumably the members of these groups believe that their activities and organizations are fighting against oppression and for social justice and that illegal tactics may be necessary and justified for victory; crime in this context is tangential rather than instrumental, and Hirschi's theoretical may not be applicable to the "crime" of terrorism. This is particularly relevant in the context of terrorism that are based on conflicting values as opposed to control theory's assumption of consensus over norms and values.

However, some findings from this research seem to support some premises of social control theory. Some of the documents suggested that the loss of social ties and social control seemed to facilitate participation in terrorist groups. The documents revealed that terrorist groups, especially the left wing group, targeted and recruited young people who left traditional communities and moved to urban centers in order to attend universities or find jobs⁵³ (see page 114-115 for detailed discussion on this issue). Furthermore, social control theory suggests that supervision is important in terms of (prevention of) involvement in delinquency. A lower rate of participation by women in

⁵³ One DHKP/C woman explicates this pressure: "...When I passed the university entry exams my father did not want me to stay at the dormitory, so he rented a house where one of my parents would stay with me in order to ensure more control over me. In the second semester of the first year, they allowed me to have a female roommate because of the high rent. When they believed that my roommate was a trustworthy person, they did not stay with me anymore." Her roommate was a DHKP/C member. After her parents left, her roommate's recruitment strategies and tactics led her to participate in the group.

terrorist groups might be attributable to more extensive social control exercised over the Turkish girls by their families as compared to boys. In some instances, parents affiliated with terrorist groups did not want their daughters to be involved in terrorist activities while they did not interfere with their sons' participation. Perhaps contradictorily, several female DHKP/C participants cited excessive familial pressure and control as a motivation to join (to escape that pressure).

Reckless' containment theory regarding “pushes” and “pulls” on behaviors receives support from many of the findings of this study (Akers, 2000). As described in this research, “pushes” that lead to participation are negative life events (i.e. discrimination and inequality, family pressures/problems, exorbitances of governing powers, or the killing of family members/friends by security forces) and some reasons promoting the need to belong to a group (i.e., being bored, isolation and ostracism, loneliness). “Pulls” could easily be construed as other reasons for needing to belong to a group (i.e. desire to be radicalized in/with a group, need to share ideology and act together [for both groups], as well as the wish to lead a more acceptable and sin-free life [for Turkish Hezbollah]); ideological/political closeness; some of the activities of the group; environmental factors such as having a friend or a family member in the group, or other factors such as involving in armed activities.

Participation is a process that involves learning. As discussed in the quantitative aspects of the research analysis, individuals learn about the groups they joined through various sources such as friend, kin, organizational propaganda and/or organizational activities. Even with enough motivation to be a radical or extremist, without information about a suitable group that would meet his/her needs and expectancies, there is no way

that a potential participant would be able join. Learning dynamics are important at the early phases of the participation process, they become much more effective and influential once individuals become involved in legal or illegal activities with terrorist group recruiters or other members.⁵⁴

Some of the findings can be firmly linked to *Sutherland's Differential Association Theory*, particularly the sixth and seventh propositions (regarding others' definitions favorable to criminal behavior, and that frequent exposure over longer periods to law violating behaviors generates priority over law abiding orientations) (Akers, 2000; Sutherland & Cressey, 1999). Since DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members reported learning about their respective groups from their friends, through kinship, terrorist activities and terrorist propaganda, their exposure to these sources and groups influenced their behaviors. Based on the statements found in the documents, it can be inferred that those with active or sympathetic family members, relatives, or friends were exposed to the favorable definitions more frequently, intensively, and over longer periods.

Some findings directly related to *Akers' learning theory*. His "definitions" concept might explain the influence of families, friends, relatives as well as organizational propaganda and activities on an individuals' perception and decision regarding the morality of being a terrorist, i.e., as good (positive definition), at least justified (neutralizing definition), or undesirable (negative definition). Akers' concept of "Differential reinforcement" also offers insight into some of the findings.⁵⁵ Motivations

⁵⁴ This is not the main research topic of this study. This study focuses on early phases of the participation/radicalization process. Advanced levels of the radicalization process might involve learning dynamics as suggested in Sutherland's differential association theory is an excellent focus for additional research on the decision to join and actively participate in terrorist organizations.

⁵⁵ Differential reinforcement might be defined as a balance of anticipated or actual rewards and punishments (Akers, 2000). Rational choice theory has a similar content. Participation in a terrorist group

by “need to belong to a group” and “ideological/political closeness” could be classified under reward/positive reinforcements while motivations by “negative life events” (e.g., exorbitances of governing powers, inequality, discrimination, and family pressure) could be classified under avoidance of punishment/negative reinforcement. For example, joining DHKP/C represented a kind of reward for some individuals because they had felt an affinity for DHKP/C since childhood; they had dreamed of become a member. Similarly, feeling alone, ostracized, and bored and joining either DHKP/C or Turkish Hezbollah presented a type of reward since participation relieved them of these negative factors. Conversely, in terms of avoidance of punishment/negative reinforcements, others thought that if they joined DHKP/C, they would not experience (or avoid) any inequality, discrimination, or exorbitances, and they have the opportunity to destroy an existing oppressive system. Many Turkish Hezbollah members thought they would no longer be unhappy or dissatisfied with the life after they joined. For both of the groups, environmental factors, ideological/political affinity, terrorists’ tactics and propaganda worked as reinforcing sources. Aker’s final concept, *imitation*, easily describes the potential influence of all these factors in terms of family members or friends, terrorist groups’ members and propaganda, through schools, mosques, legal organizations, villages, or neighborhoods (Akers, 2000).

Social network theory contributes to the explanation of group effect on participation (Jansyn, 1966; Thornberry et al., 2003). Both of the groups exploit group dynamics to motivate and induce individuals into participation. DHKP/C uses female

may be seen as a rational choice of an individual who expects some benefits. In this study, some of the expected benefits are meeting the need to belong to a group, and relieving some negative life events such as family pressure, discrimination, (especially for DHKP/C members) or unhappiness and dissatisfaction with the life (especially for Turkish Hezbollah members).

members to establish friendship relations with targeted males; legal structures/organizations to establish affinity between members and targeted individuals through ideological chats, meetings, conferences, movies, and reading groups; folklore or theatre groups to attract youth to activities; and ceremonies and mass activities to attract and ensure the participation of potential members to create affinity with the group.

Turkish Hezbollah uses friendship relations in the schools, organized tours for group and potential members, organized home based chats with potential and group members. Both groups are usually acutely aware of individuals who need to belong to a group, and they cultivate these people carefully by meeting the individuals' needs with attention, information, and affection from group members. For both organizations, peers and friends are indispensable factors for the formation of motivation through various group activities that present opportunities for potential members and group members to interact in a variety of settings.

Given that many individuals, especially DHKP/C participants, explain that they joined because of inequalities, injustices, and discrimination in the system, exorbitances of governing power, or the killing of their friends/family members (which to them is not acceptable), these findings might be linked to both *procedural justice theory* and *defiance theory* which basically focuses on individuals' perception of justice (see Chapter 3 for detailed discussion). Findings from this research might also be linked to *conflict theory's* propositions related to equality or fairness. In terms of conflict theory, terrorism may be construed as the best alternative to address or to adjust an undesirable or oppressive situation to make things fair and equal, or to gain equal rights or a separate state (Akers, 2000). DHKP/C aims at establishing a new system based on Marxist-Leninist ideology,

the basic platform of its policies, and a major draw to participants in the organization. In terms of ideological/political closeness and negative life events (i.e. inequality, injustice, and discrimination), the motivations and justifications of individual participants can be directly linked to Marxist theory.

The findings of this research suggest that the decision-making process and participation in these distinct groups relates to philosophical and social orientations. DHKP/C members are more politically oriented and tend to express a cosmopolitan worldview while Turkish Hezbollah is based more on a traditional (conservative) cultural orientation. Generally, DHKP/C members are more educated, have greater group affiliations (legal and illegal), have greater exposure to (DHKP/C) organizational activities, and appear to be more influenced by political orientation, negative life experiences, and environmental factors. Based on these finding it might be speculated that DHKP/C members generally have broader life experiences and use a broader perspective than Turkish Hezbollah members to contextualize these experiences into their own lives. In contrast, Turkish Hezbollah members seem relatively conscribed by environmental and cultural factors often characterized by religious orientation. Turkish Hezbollah members value marriage, have large families and strong family ties, and see religion as a path to happiness; participation in Turkish Hezbollah supports and reinforces the achievement of these goals. The internal or individualistic focus of Turkish Hezbollah in terms of individual self-improvement and benefit (to redeem past sins, to be a good person, for revenge against PKK) is a marked contrast to DHKP/C members who are collectively oriented towards larger social issues (equality, ending discrimination, systemic change).

The findings link this research to numerous theoretical explanations for various aspects of the decision to participate in a terrorist organization. Unfortunately, this study was not designed or able to test all of the potentially applicable theories, but provides the following discussion for consideration of research questions and hypotheses for future research. Many findings for both groups offer support for developmental and life course perspectives in that participating individuals identified different trajectories and transitions in their own lives that were influential in terms of their own participation in their respective terrorist groups. A variety of overlapping risk factors in their individual backgrounds appears to have facilitated their participation in their respective groups.

Numerous motivational factors considered in this research might be conceptually linked to the pushes and pulls explanation of Reckless' Containment Theory. Learning theories also deserve further consideration in studies of motivation and participation in terrorist organizations as there is a strong learning and transmission component to many of the motivational factors discussed in this research. Social network theory offers potentially promising insights into the explanation of group effect on participation. This research found little support for anomie, institutional anomie and economic strain theories, since financial issues did not seem to be a significant factor for participation in either group. Nevertheless, general strain theory which looks beyond solely economic strain and considers crime as an adaptation to stressful circumstances receives considerable support when motivational factors are conceptualized as sources of strain. Also, contrary to social bonding theory, attachment to peers or parents affiliated with terrorist groups seems to promote participation in terrorist groups.

In addition to the theoretical commonalities in motivation to participate in the ideologically distinct terrorist organizations DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah, there are some differences in terms of the applicability of theoretical explanations of the participation of one group compared to the other. Given that the majority of participants in both groups reported no prior illegal activities or detention experiences, some support is indicated by findings for both groups for the social facilitation model. However, given that the percentage of Turkish Hezbollah members (19.9%) who have prior detention is bigger than DHKP members (14.7%) it could be speculated that social facilitation is more applicable to DHKP/C (motivation to participation through group activities as opposed to prior detention experiences) while selection model is more applicable to Turkish Hezbollah (influence of prior detention experiences). Further, since DHKP/C participants place more emphasis on exorbitances of governing powers, killing of their friends and family members by security forces, inequalities, injustice, and discrimination originating within the state system, it appears that conflict, procedural justice, and defiance theories are more applicable to the involvement and participation of DHKP/C members than to those in Turkish Hezbollah.

A lower rate of participation by women might be attributable to more extensive social control over girls compared to boys. However, given that one-third of DHKP/C participants are women and there is only one woman Turkish Hezbollah participant, control theories appear more effective in explaining Turkish Hezbollah membership. The majority of Turkish Hezbollah members reported family members active or sympathetic to the group which values strong family ties and traditional roles, characterized by strict

religious edicts governing proper behavior and the social control (and consequent behavioral control) of women may explain the lack of participation by women.

3. Policy Implications

The results of the research have numerous implications for security organizations, policy makers, and scholars of terrorism and political violence by expanding the knowledge base regarding the background characteristics, learning sources, and motivational factors that have been presumed to affect individuals' decision to join terrorist organizations. The data reflect the time period in which individuals decided to participate in terrorist groups, and the data is derived directly from these participants own writing about their background, motivations, and sources of information about the organizations they ultimately joined.

All terrorist organizations need new members to survive. New members keep the terrorist groups active in the field, support and build the group dynamic, and increase the morale and motivation of the other members. Participation by new members strengthens organizational opposition to the government (and in some cases, other groups), and helps to publicize and spread the organizational ideology. Therefore, one of the core strategies of governments and security organizations should be to discourage or to prevent new participants from joining terrorist groups. While the implementation of this strategy requires a better understanding of 'Why does a person become a terrorist?' and "What kind of factors encourage joining a terrorist groups?", the lack of information on this specific aspect of terrorism makes it difficult to find adequate solutions to affect behavior changes on the individual level.

One of the most important findings relates to the significant differences in background characteristics, motivational factors, and learning related sources between participants in the two ideologically distinct groups. These differences are in gender, economic conditions, education levels, marital status, prior group affiliations, family participation and family sympathy, number of siblings, organizational activities and propaganda, environmental factors, ideological/political closeness, negative life events, tactics/propaganda of terrorists, and other factors. These differences have strong implications for the formation of policies and prevention strategies necessary to approach different terrorist organizations as distinct entities with very different individual member and organizational attributes (and motivations). For example, almost one-third of DHKP/C members have some college education compared over half of Turkish Hezbollah members who have only middle school or lower education. Since Turkish Hezbollah members generally have less formal education, targeted programs at the elementary or middle school level might be effective in deferring or preventing the participation of potential members. DHKP/C clearly targets high school and university students (over 73% of their members reported high school or higher level education at the time of participation), so addressing the recruitment of this leftist organization at these educational institutions would seem to be an effective use of resources.

School and university based-interventions could take a variety of forms: training of teachers about terrorist activities and recruiting tactics in schools; educating students in school⁵⁶ through courses, speakers, brochures, conferences, radio or TV programs; identifying students targeted by groups (and providing information about the potential

⁵⁶ The Turkish Counter Terrorism Department has developed a variety of school-based programs, especially for students in the universities and high schools.

consequences of organizational participation as well as support services that family awareness of the problem and participation in the programs, particularly for those families not affiliated with terrorist groups). Further, given that DHKP/C uses legal organizations like student associations or clubs, particularly in universities, the universities must exercise more control and supervision over these activities and the places in which they occur. Students moving from rural areas and small towns to big cities for education need housing, and this need creates an excellent opportunity for terrorist groups to identify potentially isolated and stressed individuals to recruit by offering accommodations for free or at very affordable prices. Expansion of university housing and dormitories for students could help to remove this potential avenue of access to potential recruits. While many of these precautions might have been put into practice, it is important to ensure the effectiveness of these practices and policies through rigorous examination and evaluation of the programs.

A significant number participants in both groups reported family members (parent or sibling) active in or sympathetic to their respective groups. Similarly, the analyses of environmental factors revealed the significant influence of family, siblings, friends, and relatives on the formation of motivation to join. Despite the importance of the “family factor” as a facilitator for participation, this issue appears to be unaddressed in policies and strategies designed to prevent participation in terrorism. While some programs aim to gain support of families whose kids are in terrorists groups in order to promote desistence (see Yilmaz, Alkan & Kolbasi, 2003), these programs do not to consider the converse possibility of family support, i.e., that some families allow and support their kids joining terrorist groups and/or involve in terrorist activities. These family and environmental

factors should be taken into consideration in the policy making process, perhaps through a specific focus on families (parent and siblings) with past affiliations to terrorist groups that might be risk factors for other family members.

Almost two thirds of Turkish Hezbollah participants reported dissatisfaction or unhappiness with the life, and thought that involvement with religious practices would increase their satisfaction and happiness. However, they were not informed or sophisticated enough to know whether the religious ideology and activities provided to them was historically or morally right or wrong. A significant number of people reported “entered to Islam” through participation in Turkish Hezbollah and equated their participation in the organization as becoming Muslim, even calling Turkish Hezbollah members Muslims (not Turkish Hezbollah members). The innocent and attractive religious concepts (such as honesty, benevolence, morality, sin-free life, or heaven), the respectful approach and sincere, friendly behaviors used to recruit new members easily convinces religious illiterates that Turkish Hezbollah members are true Muslims, represent Islam, and have and offer divine insight. The basic lack of knowledge about Islam and its tenets is used very effectively by Turkish Hezbollah. Given that members of Turkish Hezbollah control many mosques in the areas where they are active, the potential level of threat multiplies. For these reasons, it seems imperative to provide correct information about the religion and religious rules, especially within the regions where Turkish Hezbollah operates. This might be achieved through officially appointed and designated personnel such as Imams, and an increase in the number of them in the regions where Turkish Hezbollah is active. Imams with formal education from state-sponsored religious schools could be used to help distinguish authentic tenets of Islam

from radical and extremist interpretations used by Turkish Hezbollah and similar extremist groups. Such an approach would further necessitate both government and community activism (from religious leaders and practicing Muslims) in terms of informing the public about the existence of such distinctions, doctrinal and practical differences between the philosophies, and the potential negative consequences (spiritually and civically) of adherence to fundamentalist interpretations. The lack of adequate numbers of government assigned Imams in the mosques might make the misrepresentation of Islam by Turkish Hezbollah quite simple, as people have no few alternatives to seek spiritual growth and learn about Islam.

It is imperative for law enforcement officers to operate within the limits of the law, given that a significant number of DHKP/C members reported the exorbitances of government powers as a source of their motivation. Terrorist groups join mass protest and demonstrations against government agencies, and they ensure participation of potential members in these activities, some of which are organized by the groups themselves. At these events, the groups often want security forces to use excessive force, and they will perform outrageous and extreme criminal acts to incite security force with the goal of exposing attendees to oppressive and illegitimate government forces. First hand evidence of government excess seems to be a convincing motivation for some potential members. Awareness of this provocative tactic can help security force commanders and officers to avoid unnecessary clashes with demonstrators and minimize this source of facilitated motivation.

For some members of both of the groups, being bored is a reason of their search of a group. If there are no places or social activities that people, especially youths, could

spend their spare time they might be searching excitement through illegitimate ways such as involving in illegal groups. Therefore, it is important to establish social places for the public such as sport centers, amusement parks, theatres, and libraries. In many part of Turkey, especially in the regions where Turkish Hezbollah is more active, there are not adequate amount of these places.

4. Limitations

This study makes important contributions to the understanding of many aspects of motivation for participation in terrorist organizations, but has several limitations. This study focuses on participants in two specific terrorist organizations in Turkey, left-wing DHKP/C and religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah. Despite the two ideological extremes they represent, these organizations may not be typical or representative of other separatist or terrorist groups in Turkey or elsewhere around the world. Continued studies on these types of internal terrorist organization documents have the potential to contribute to a much broader understanding of participation in different and different types of terrorist organizations. However, access to these types of documents is exceptionally limited: when they exist, they are restricted first within the organizations themselves, and if seized, then restricted, often by confidentiality and strategic security concerns, within official government records.

The findings of this study are based on information gleaned from seized documents, and data for quantitative analysis and qualitative discussions were limited to that information which existed in the documents. Since the main criterion to use a variable was its potential comparability across groups, important variables in Turkish

Hezbollah documents might not exist in DHKP/C documents so they could not be used as a basis for comparison.

The data for this research is drawn directly from the reported statements of participants from their documents, and there is no way to gauge the accuracy of the information provided. However, since the documents were written as applications to the respective terrorist groups, it seems that they are likely to reflect honestly presented information about the participants and their thoughts.

With only three hundred two documents available for analysis, the sample size is somewhat small. Considering the difficulties in terms of availability and access to first-hand descriptive accounts of motivations to participate in terrorist organizations, this sample size, while perhaps not representative, is sufficiently large to identify key differences and themes in terms of the two groups, as well as to lay the groundwork for future studies of this type (as data becomes available). Another potential weakness of the research related to the sample involves the convenience sampling represented by the seized documents. Compared to random or probability-based sampling methods, convenience sampling has many limitations. However, it is almost impossible and totally unrealistic to expect to apply random sampling methods to studies of terrorist actors because of secretive characteristics of these organizations and the criminal status of those involved with them. Further, it would be impossible to define a sampling frame (population) as there are no readily available lists of terrorists from which to randomly select participants. For the qualitative aspect of this research, purposive (judgment) sampling method was used: cases were selected based solely on the value and richness of

information contained since not all available documents included rich and detailed information.

This research is largely exploratory, as the terrorism literature does not offer adequate theoretical articulation to easily guide research on terrorism or provide an adequate baseline for comparison. Most prior studies on participation have been limited to descriptive information from a limited number of actors, and did not include variable, coding, advanced statistical analyses, or detailed qualitative discussion.

Findings regarding motivational factors might be generalized to other terrorist groups in each ideological category within Turkey and perhaps the rest of world. However, generalizability might be limited given that different groups in different countries might attract different persons with different characteristics. Characteristics of region, countries, and the ongoing social and cultural conditions in places where terrorist groups operate would seem to generate some variation in the background characteristics, learning factors, and even motivations of participants in terrorist organizations. For instance, the contrast between the present findings and those of Sageman (2004) on global Salafi jihad suggests such variation.

5. Future Research

Although this study provides a strong foundation for similar research, it raises several additional questions. First, to determine whether study findings for DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah are generalizable to other left wing and religiously motivated groups, the study needs to be replicated for other types of terrorist groups (including right wing, separatist and ethnic terrorist groups) in Turkey and in a variety of countries and contexts. Second, even though this study gives some idea about family effect on

participation, future research should focus specifically on more detailed and richer information on the characteristics of family participation in terrorist groups and family effects on an individual's participation. Similar studies might also be conducted at the neighborhood level to determine risk factor for participation. Third, gender differences within and between the groups might be examined in more detailed. The lack of gender variation in Turkish Hezbollah prevented examining the role of women in various types of terrorist organizations.

Fourth, despite various associated difficulties, longitudinal studies and interviews and questionnaires might be fruitfully used to fully understand participation process. Fifth, this study focuses on initial periods related to participation, although participation leads to various tactics of terrorist groups to radicalize individuals and solidify their identification with group. Examination of more advanced levels of the participation process would generate a better understanding about entire process and dynamic of becoming and being a terrorist. This would also provide an opportunity for extending the life course perspective. Findings of the study suggest that most members were not recruited because of their desire for violence. Future research could distinguish between desisters and persisters. Sixth, the findings suggest that DHKP/C participants are more political and collectivist in orientation and motivation as demonstrated by their more expansive (i.e., externally oriented) and cosmopolitan world view. In contrast, Turkish Hezbollah participants seem to be individualistic in terms of their religious, traditional and cultural orientations and motivations. The reasons for these apparent differences between these two terrorist groups deserve fuller consideration and exploration in future research. Finally, there is a need for more research that focuses on the dynamics at the

time of participation. Almost all the literature reflects findings at the time when the data collected, but not at the time of participation. For example, information about education levels or job status reflects the respondent's education or job status at the time of interview; but not the actual education level or job status at the time of onset. This distinction is crucial: a person might be an engineer during the interview but when he joined a group ten years earlier, he might have been a lonely and isolated student in the university, ripe for targeting by an organization which could appeal to or exploit his background or intellectual and social orientation through exposure to people, information, and activities that could promote his choice to join a terrorist organization..

6. Conclusion

This study explored similarities and differences between the members of two ideologically different terrorist organizations: Turkish Hezbollah and DHKP/C. Quantitative analyses of the documents revealed statistically significant differences between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations' participants in terms of background characteristics, learning related factors, and motivational factors that led them to participate in terrorist organizations. These significant differences reveal the importance of approaching different terrorist organizations as distinct entities during the formation of policies and strategies to prevent participation. The qualitative part analyzed six motivational factors identified from seized document analyses, and revealed insights into the various and sometimes overlapping factors that promoted the involvement of sample members in their respective organizations.

The research and its findings make an important contribution to the understanding of terrorist actors and organizational activities, and present numerous implications for

security organizations, policy makers, and scholars. The unprecedented use of documentary data, the quantitative and qualitative analytic examination of participation onset, and the statistical significance of many motivational, learning, and background characteristics variables in this research address several of the major gaps in terrorism studies, and provide practical and theoretical insight for future research on similar and related topics.

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