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GREENS, SUITS, AND BUREAUCRATS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF
DYNAMIC ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN ENERGY EFFICIENT
APPLIANCE POLICY
By

Rachael Leah Shwom-Evelich

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Sociology

2008

ABSTRACT
GREENS, SUITS, AND BUREAUCRATS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF
DYNAMIC ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN ENERGY EFFICIENT
APPLIANCE POLICY
By

Rachael Leah Shwom-Evelich

In this dissertation I develop an approach to understanding dynamic
organizational relations and the processes of environmental degradation and reform. To
do this, I draw on environmental and organizational sociology to inform an empirical
study of interorganizational relationships in deﬁning and promoting energy efﬁcient
appliances in the United States (US). The dissertation follows a three paper approach
which involves a) an overall introduction to the substantive issue of appliance energy
efﬁciency in the US; b) producing three separate and stand alone articles of publishable
quality to be submitted to professional journals; and c) an overall conclusion. The three
articles are as follows: 1) a synthetic literature review identifying ﬁve lessons that
organizational sociology and environmental sociology can learn from each other to
advance our sociological understanding of organizations, energy issues, and climate
change 2) a qualitative case study of the changing relationships between business,
government and environmental and energy advocacy organizations around mandatory
appliance efﬁciency standards supporting the development of a context-dependent theory
of ecological modernization and treadmill of production theories in environmental
sociology and 3) a network analysis of public government, business and energy
efﬁciency advocate’s interorganizational relationships and its inﬂuence on subsequent

organizational behaviors in the appliance energy efficiency ﬁeld. The second and third

articles are based on extensive archival research on organizational negotiations Of public
record over deﬁning energy efﬁcient appliances in both regulatory and voluntary settings.
Finally I will provide an overall conclusion that brings together the most signiﬁcant
ﬁndings of each individual article in anticipation of a synthetic approach to the study of

organizations in environmental reform.

Copyright by
RACHAEL LEAH SHWOM-EVELICH
2008

This dissertation is dedicated to my husband, Nicholas Evelich, and daughter, Marishka
Rose Evelich, who gave me up to this project and provided the support, love, and

occasional joyful distraction that enabled me to persevere.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

If any singular personal experience can demonstrate the importance of social
networks and the resources that ﬂow through them to success, it is perhaps my ﬁve years
spent in graduate school. First, I have beneﬁtted immensely from my Committee’s
guidance. My chair, Tom Dietz, has imparted a wonderfully broad education in the
environmental social sciences by supporting my participation in numerous
interdisciplinary environmental experiences and engaging with me as I searched for my
own sociological views on environmental issues. Pragmatically, he gave thoughtﬁil
comments on drafts and sure-handed guidance in balancing the demands of academic life.
Linda Kalof provided me sound training in social science research methods and helpful
comments and encouragement. I am indebted to Ken Frank who introduced me to social
network analysis and reassuringly kept me calm and grounded in the ftmdamentals as I
encountered the methodological complexities of network analysis. Aaron McCright has
been generous with his time as he has not only provided thoughtful comments and careful
editing, but also immensely helpful discussions of theories on social movements,
environment, organizations, and power.

There have been many others that have made this work possible and enjoyable. I
owe a particular thanks to Glee Murray at the American Council for an Energy Efﬁcient
Economy and Brenda Edwards at the US. Department Of Energy for their help in
gathering archival materials for this project. George Moyer’s help with data entry and
Leslie Pearlman’s technical expertise in network analysis software were also greatly
appreciated. A generous fellowship from Michigan State University’s Environmental

Science Policy Program provided the time to develop my dissertation proposal into a full

vi

grant. As a result, this dissertation has enjoyed support from the National Science
Foundation’s Innovation, Organization, and Change Program (Grant # 0724905). A
Dissertation Completion Fellowship from the Michigan State University College of
Social Sciences was also helpful in providing uninterrupted writing time in the fall of
2008.

Equally important as the help that ﬂowed through these professional networks
was the support I have received from my ﬁ'iends and family. My mother and father
raised me to value education and have never wavered in their encouragement of my
pursuit even as it took us away from the east coast. No matter how busy or how far
away, the Renegade Sociologists (Julie, Elisha, Lori, Amy, Karijn, Jessica and Cathy)
were there to advise on how to best format a dissertation, commiserate on another
rejected paper, go for a run, and pour a good glass of wine. I owe a debt of gratitude to

those friends, Lia Farrow (via Hong Kong) and Elisha Marr, and family, particularly my

in-laws Irene and Vince, who helped take care of my daughter whenever they could. TO

my husband and my daughter, who have allowed me to retreat into the isolation of

writing and taken up all non-dissertation responsibilities, you are both the inspiration for

this work and the reason I am glad to be done.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................... x
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................. xi
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................... xii
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1
Interorganizational Relations in Energy Efﬁciency Policy ............................................. 1
Theoretical Framework: Organizational and Environmental Sociology ........................ 4
Why the Case of Appliance Energy Efﬁciency? A Historical Perspective on Energy
Efﬁciency and US. Policy on Energy and Environment ................................................ 9
Energy Policy History up to 1973: Cheap and Available ......................................... 10
The 1970’s: A Time of Change ................................................................................ 12
Organizations and the Evolution of Energy Efﬁciency Policy Post 1973 ................. 16
Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Network Approaches ...................................... 25
Dissertation Research Objectives .................................................................................. 29
CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................... 32
Strengthening Sociological Perspectives on Organizations and the Environment: Five
Lessons from Organizational and Environmental Sociology 32
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 32
No organization is an island — socially or ecologically ................................................. 35
Organizational environmental outcomes and their measurement matter ...................... 39
Corporate environmental actions vary and are context-dependent ............................... 42
Cooperation and cooptation are two sides Of the same coin ......................................... 51
The cumulative environmental impacts of organizational change are constrained by
system tendencies .......................................................................................................... 57
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 61
CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................... 63
A Context-Dependent Theory of Green Consumer Goods: Conditions of Dynamic Power
Relations in the Struggle for Energy Efficient Appliances .................................... 63
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 63
Current Limits to Understanding Environmental Degradation and Improvement ........ 65
A Context Dependent Theorization of Ecological Modernization and Treadmill of
Production ...................................................................................................................... 70
Methods ......................................................................................................................... 75
The Shifting Political Economy of US. Appliance Efficiency ..................................... 76
The Face of Treadmill of Production 1981-1986: Reaganism, Pre-Regulation, and
Resistance ...................................................................................................................... 81
The Face of Ecological Modernization 1992-2001: Pre-negotiated Standards and
Market Transformation .................................................................................................. 88
Discussion and Conclusion ............................................................................................ 94

viii

CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................... 101
Friend or Foe? Energy Efﬁciency Advocacy Organizations’ Embeddedness and

Decisions to Partner with Business .............................................................. 101
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 101
Theoretical Approach .................................................................................................. 104
Methods and Analysis ................................................................................................. 110

Network Construction .............................................................................................. 110
Independent Variable: Cohesive Subgroup Membership ....................................... 113
Independent Variable: EEAO decision to co-author a paper for summer study with
business in 1998-2000 ............................................................................................. 114
Independent Variable: EEAO demographics .......................................................... 114
Dependent Variables: EEAO decision to cO-author a paper for summer study with
business in 2006-2008 ............................................................................................. 1 15
EEAOs and the Energy Efﬁciency Field Pre-2001 ..................................................... 116
The Energy Efficiency Field 2001-2006 ..................................................................... 123
Discussion and Conclusions ........................................................................................ 129

CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 13 l
Advancing Sociological Perspectives and Research on Organizations and the
Environment ................................................................................................................ 1 3 1

APPENDIX A .................................................................................................................. 136
Full list of face-to-face meetings on the deﬁnition and promotion of energy efficient
residential appliances available on public record from 1980 to 2006. ........................ 136

APPENDIX B .................................................................................................................. 138
Organizational and Event Subgroup Memberships ..................................................... 138

LITERATURE CITED ........................................................................... 182

ix

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: 1993-2000 Cohesive Subgroup Memberships .............................................. 122
Table 3.2: 2001-2006 Cohesive Subgroup Memberships .............................................. 126
Table 3.3: 2001-2006 Cohesive Subgroup Organizational Demographics .................... 128

Table 3.4: Logistic Regression Results for Market Transformation Subgroup
Membership and Business Co-authorship ....................................................................... 129

Table 1.1: Face-tO-face meetings of available public record on appliance energy
efﬁciency 1980-2006. ...................................................................................................... 137

Table 3.5: Cohesive Subgroup Organizational and Event Membership for 1994-2000. 139

Table 3.6: Cohesive Subgroup Organizational and Event Membership for 2001-2006. 160

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 3.1: Cohesive Subgroups of Events and Organizational Sectors for 1994-2000.121

Figure 3.2: Cohesive Subgroups of Events and Organizational Sectors for 2001-2006.127

xi

ACEEE

AN OPR

CEC

DOE

EEAO

EIS

EMT

ESMO

EPCA

GDP

NAECA

NECPA

NOPR

NRDC

SERP

TNESMOs

TOP

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

American Council for an Energy Efﬁcient Economy
Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers
Advanced Notice of Public Rulemaking
California Energy Commission

Department of Energy (US)

Energy Efﬁciency Advocacy Organization
Environmental Impact Statement

Ecological modernization theory
Environmental social movement organization
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975
Gross Domestic Product

National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 and
1992

National Energy Conservation and Policy Act of 1978
Notice of Public Rulemaking

Natural Resources Defense Council

Super Efﬁcient Reﬁ'igerator Program

Transnational Environmental Social Movement
Organizations

Treadmill Of production

xii

INTRODUCTION

Interorganizational Relations in Energy Efficiency Policy

Climate change has been cited by scientists and politicians alike as one of the
most pressing problems facing society today (Alley, Bemtsen, Bindoff, Chen,
Chidthaisong, and Friedlingstein 2007; Gore 2006; Stern 2006). New cooperative
approaches between business, government, and the non-proﬁt sector are often identiﬁed
as one of the keys to meeting the complex challenges in mitigation and adaptation that
climate change currently presents (Brewer and Stern 2005). But the question of how and
when organizations from these sectors, which have Often historically been at odds with
each other, may come to work together has been relatively unexamined. What factors
inﬂuence whether non-proﬁt, business, and governmental organizations recognize mutual
interests and see ﬁt to work together? More speciﬁcally, what political, social, and
economic conditions inﬂuence the willingness to work together? And how do past
organizational interactions and inﬂuence subsequent participation in partnerships and
new cooperative approaches?

One arena of climate change mitigation where diverse interorganizational
relationships have developed is energy efﬁciency policy. Currently greenhouse gas
producing fossil fuels — coal, oil and natural gas — provide more than 85% of all energy
consumed in the United States (Energy Information Administration 2008). Reducing the
United States’ use of these fuels is one of the major pathways to mitigating its
contributions to climate change. The reduction Of energy demand through improvement

in energy efﬁciency is Often perceived as one of the most politically and economically

feasible ways to mitigate the U.S.’s contribution to climate change (Hays 2000; Pacala
and Socolow 2004). Yet, a review of energy efﬁciency history in the US. reveals that the
path to improving efﬁciency has not been particularly straightforward or smooth. My
dissertation seeks to begin to understand the complex and changing relationships between
non-proﬁt, governmental, and private business organizations around the issue of
decreasing US. energy use from a sociological perspective by focusing on organizational
relationships and the factors that inﬂuence their evolving structure and actions.
Following the initial oil embargo of 1973, a complex network of nonproﬁt energy
efficiency organizations, manufacturers of products, energy utilities, and state and federal
government agencies has formed around negotiations over the deﬁnition of energy
efﬁcient products and services and how to promote them. This organizational network
has evolved over the last 30 years to establish multiple institutional arrangements for
deﬁning energy efﬁcient products including federal and state mandatory minimum
energy efﬁciency standards along with voluntary efficiency speciﬁcations. All of these
institutional arrangements have been characterized at different points by both combative
and cooperative relationships between the three sectors, though state and federal
mandatory standard efforts have been particularly wrought with conﬂict and lawsuits. In
addition to deﬁning energy efﬁciency, many have sought to promote energy efficiency
products through a variety of interorganizational arrangements including: funding
research and development, conducting demonstrations and ﬁeld tests, providing
commercialization incentives, marketing and consumer education, grants loans and tax
incentives, voluntary programs, and bulk purchases. Lighting, appliances and buildings

have been at the center of these efforts. This study will focus on residential appliances

since the deﬁnition and promotion of efficient lighting and buildings entails a different
set of actors and institutional arrangements and deserves to be studied in their own right.

My dissertation chronicles organizational participation in public forums that
sought to deﬁne and promote energy efﬁcient residential appliances. I use this data to
identify which organizations are highly active in different venues, what organizations
they are interacting with in these actions, how this changes over time, and what are some
outcomes from this participation. I argue that although important interactions between
organizations often take place “off-the-record” these interactions are likely based on
existing network structure and often manifest publicly at some point. The resulting
network data is analyzed to help answer the following three questions in a series of three
articles:

1. What does a dialogue between environmental and organizational sociology have
to offer in improving our understanding of fundamental questions in both ﬁelds?
How can the advancement of these theories provide insights into the root causes
of and solutions for climate change?

2. What were the relationships of the non-proﬁt organizations with government and
business organizations around energy efﬁciency from 1973 to 2006? What
changes have occurred and what external factors are associated with these
changes? Do these ﬁndings support the predictions of political economic theories
of the environment in environmental sociology?

3. How does participation in events inﬂuence the subsequent network structure via
participation in subsequent events and partnerships? Does participation in events

with other organizations and inﬂuence the stance an organization takes on an

issue? Do these ﬁndings support or nullify claims of Open systems theories of

organizational sociology?

Theoretical Framework: Organizational and Environmental Sociology

In this dissertation, I locate the production and mitigation of environmental
problems in industrial and post-industrial nations as outcomes of organizational and inter-
organizational processes (Perrow 1997). The formal organization is the overwhelmingly
dominant organizing form for business, government and social movement organizations
(Presthus and Presthus 1962; Zald 2000). The capitalist political economic environment
these organizations conduct their environmental decision-making within is extensively
theorized in environmental sociology (M01 and Spaargaren 2000; Roberts and Grimes
2002; Schnaiberg 1980). However, despite a growing literature focusing on
organizations and the natural environment (Bansal and Gao 2006), little has been done to
connect these understandings of organizational behavior in political economic theories of
the environment to those in organizational sociology. I argue that a truly sociological
study of organizations and the natural environment can yield great insights into the roots
of and solutions to environmental problems.

To enable a sociological study of this area, I seek to build an integrative
understanding of organizations and networks in environmental sociology. Environmental
Sociology undertakes the problematic of why modern societies tend towards
environmental destruction (Buttel and Gijswijt 2000). It often presents broad structural
theories of how and why people, societal institutions, and organizations cause
environmental disruption (i.e. treadmill of production, world systems theories). At the

same time, work on the environmental movement and New Ecological Paradigm has

produced a robust literature on the social psychology of individual’s environmental
behaviors. While these theories of environmental sociology have provided many insights
on environmental destruction and reform, they have drawn on limited organizational level
understandings of how these processes of environmental degradation take place and the
organizational/sectoral variations in these behaviors and outcomes.

The political economic theories within environmental sociology focus explicitly
on the interactions between the organization of political and economic systems and
technology in environmental impacts and their mitigation. Allan Schnaiberg’s
(Schnaiberg 1980) breakthrough political economic analysis of environmental problems
and subsequent work on the treadmill of production is one such line of work. Schnaiberg
theorizes that the institutional arrangements under monopoly capitalism result in the
competition and concentration of capital that leads to increases in capital investment and
technological efﬁciency. These conditions result in the increasing speeds of withdrawals
Of material resources from and additions of these material resources transformed in the
form of waste to the environment. This cycle is referred to as the treadmill of production
(TOP). In addition to theorizing industrial development and its environmental impacts,
Schnaiberg and colleagues (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004; Schnaiberg 1994) have
also theorized and empirically studied the political economy of the state and social
movement efforts for slowing the treadmill.

Contradicting much of what is said by treadmill of production advocates, M01 and
Spaargaren (M01 1995; Mo] and Spaargaren 2000) argue that a reﬂexive ecological
consciousness will result in a new politics and transformation of industrial practices and

technological innovation that will beneﬁt the environment. This stream of theory has

focused more on the development of public-private partnerships and corporate voluntary
environmental actions. Much of the research that has followed has focused on the
institutional and cultural conditions under which ecological modernization proceeds, such
as strength of the environmental state and extent of public understanding of science
(Cohen 1998; Sonnenfeld and Mo] 2002). The assumptions and predicted outcomes of
ecological modernization theory have come under close scrutiny by many environmental
sociologists (Fisher and F reudenburg 2001; York and Rosa 2003).

I argue that underlying the debate between these two theoretical approaches are
differences in the understanding of power relations between the state, society, and
industry. Focusing on the organizational level of these relationships allows us to
interrogate these two theories more comprehensively. Support for this approach in
environmental sociology emerges from political sociology where multiple scholars have
utilized organizational theory and analysis successfully. State-centered theorists have
argued that theory of the state should move away from theorizing the state as monolithic
and recognize differentiation. These theorists, such as Skocpol and Amenta, see the state
as Weber did, “as a set of organizations, but with unique functions and missions.”
(Amenta 2005). Hooks (1993) utilizes organizational theory to analyze competing
theories of the state and the conditions under which they were accurate. Additionally, I
take a cue from Knoke (1990) and his political structuralist approach in viewing each
sector as populations of organizations and people carrying out these power relations daily
through activities that can be documented and analyzed as a network.

The ﬁeld Of organizational sociology is made up of several theories that attempt

to explain and predict how organizations and the people in them will behave in varying

organizational structures, cultures, and circumstances. Most recently, the Open system
perspective (Scott, Davis, and Richard 2007) views organizational actions as being
embedded in broader environments. Open systems theories include Harman and
Freeman’s (1977) organizational ecology model, Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource
dependence model, and Meyer and Rowan’s (197 7) institutional theory. Open system
theories are gaining recognition across ﬁelds in sociology for understanding the
constitution of organizational life.

Bansal and Gao (2006:463) conclude that “the new institutional analysis has been
the dominant theoretical theme among studies with a natural environment context, likely
because institutional forces have such a signiﬁcant role in environmental issues.” New
institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Powell and DiMaggio 1991) has
critiqued the classical and neoclassical models of organizations highlighting that all
organizational behavior is a product of an embedded collective rationality. This means
that organizations act by following scripts or templates for behavior provided by those
around them. This can lead to organizational isomorphism, the phenomenon of
organizations becoming increasingly homogenous in structure, beliefs, and actions. Early
new institutionalism focused on how symbolic systems, cultural scripts, and mental
models reproduce themselves and become accepted and familiar parts of our lives.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) proposed that this occurs through three types of processes:
coercive, normative, and mimetic. Critiques of the emphasis of homogeneity in
organizations asked how change and heterogeneity in organizational forms occurred. If
the theory predicted organizations will look and behave similarly what accounts for

variation and sources of change? To account for change in new institutional theory, many

organizational scholars have sought to integrate “Old” institutional theory that focuses on
the political aspects of interorganizational interactions, such as conﬂicts of interests and
cooptation (Selznick 1966). The marriage of the two theories has resulted in an
understanding of organizations as being embedded in their organizational environment
which forms a collective understanding of the range of actions they may take
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Organizations may act strategically from this situated
understanding of rational action. Campbell (2005) has proposed multiple mechanisms of
organizational change such as diffusion, translation, bricolage, and network cultivation.
The concept of organizational ﬁelds, groups of organizations engaged with the same
activity or issue, has evolved to understand organizations as engaged with multiple and
often conﬂicting institutions. Hoffman (1999)added that ﬁelds should be seen as
contested centers of debate with power dynamics, where competing interests negotiate
the interpretation of what they each consider as key issues. Research has focused on the
extent to which organizational ﬁelds were fragmented, contained multiple institutional
inﬂuences, and were thus subject to change and transformation.

Open systems organizational theories provide three important tools for thinking
about interorganizational relationships between non-proﬁts, governments and business
organizations in deﬁning and promoting energy efﬁciency. First, open systems theories
seek to explain how interorganizational relationships inﬂuence organizational behavior
and decision-making, proposing a number of mechanisms by which organizational
inﬂuence occurs. The understanding of an organizational ﬁeld being able to be organized
around an issue, such as deﬁning and promoting energy efﬁcient appliances, is

particularly useful in being able to examine cross-sectoral organizational relationships.

Second, open system thinking generated the idea that the criteria by which organizations
make decisions are Often generated by other groups and institutions outside and include
criteria such as organizational legitimacy. This recognition of external conditions is in
synch with theories of political economy in environmental sociology. Finally, open
systems theory, particularly new institutionalism, has struggled with organizational
homogeneity, heterogeneity, and transformation and has evolved to develop some
nuanced understandings of the “rational” and “irrational” aspects Of organizational
decision-making and mechanisms of change that are useful in examining the evolution of

energy and environmental issues.

Why the Case of Appliance Energy Efficiency? A Historical Perspective on Energy

Eﬂ'rciency and U.S. Policy on Energy and Environment

“Many energy techniques have reached unmistakable size and performance plateaus.
This leveling-off is not a matter of technical limits but rather of prohibitive costs and
unacceptable environmental impacts. Greater efﬁciency, reliability, and environmental

compatibility have become new engineering goals.” (Smil 1994)

A review of the history of energy efﬁciency of residential appliances in the
broader context of U.S. energy and environmental policy highlights the unique aspects of
this interorganizational ﬁeld and its usefulness for the study of organizations and climate
change. The production and consumption of energy is pervasive in its impacts on the
environment and economy. American interests in increasing energy efﬁciency can’t and

shouldn’t be examined without considering the larger context of energy resource

management in the U.S. and its relations to energy and environmental policies. The
interest in energy efﬁciency policy at any given time has been greatly determined by the
extent of perceptions of negative environmental and economic impacts of energy use.
Indeed the story leading to our current residential energy efficiency policies is, as the
quote above indicates, a story of the mounting costs and negative environmental impacts
of increasing energy supply. The ways in which broader energy policies and
environmental policies impact the supply and availability of energy inﬂuences pricing
and has a large impact on the dynamics of end user efﬁciency. Exploring all the ways
that these policies are interrelated and impact our energy use is not within the scope of
this project, but I will focus on the aspects that have most directly inﬂuenced the
development of energy efﬁciency policy and the development Of interorganizational
relationships chronicled in this dissertation. In this section I will ﬁrst brieﬂy describe the
aspects of U.S. energy policy pre-1973 that have had direct impacts on the evolution of
residential energy efﬁciency policy: the supply of cheap fossil fuel energy and the
growth of electricity production and transmission infrastructure. I will then provide a
brief organizational understanding of the energy and environmental policy changes that
occurred starting in the early 1970’s that changed the way the U.S. has managed energy

and began to shift attention towards energy efﬁciency.

Energy Policy History up to 1973: Cheap and Available
The U.S. has developed as a “fossil-fueled civilization”, moving away from wood
and waterpower and towards coal and oil, since the turn of the 20th century. Until 1973

the U.S. achieved this dominance by managing energy policy almost exclusively on the

10

economic objective of keeping energy cheap to fuel economic growth (Andrews 2006).
This Objective was reached through keeping supply growing ahead of demand. Increases
in the cheap energy supply were realized through high American productivities in coal
extraction, from 4 tons of coal per person per shiﬁ in 1900 to 10 tons per person per shift
in 1980 (Smil, 1994:171-172). The U.S. also found oil ﬁrst in Pennsylvania and
subsequently seemingly endless supplies in the southwest and west that worked in
conjunction with declining world oil prices through 1970 to make oil a key part of the
U.S. fuel mix (Smil, 1994:203). This cheap energy ﬁreled the American per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) to grow by an unprecedented 60% between 1950 and 1973
(Smil, 1994:204). In 1956 the ﬁrst commercial nuclear reactor delivered power, adding a
non-fossil fuel energy to the mix accounting for 19.3% of U.S. energy supply by 2005.
Besides cheap fossil fuel energy that could be used in producing power for homes,
the second major factor inﬂuencing residential energy use was the expansion of the
national energy infrastructure system. Hughes (Hughes 1983) has documented the
expansion of utilities from urban to national systems led to great emphasis on
economics of scale, construction of larger stations in or near cities, the development Of
high voltage links to transmit electricity from remote hydro-stations, the promotion of
mass consumption, and the interconnection of smaller system in order to improve supply.
In 1907, only 8 percent of all dwellings were using electricity; by 1932, this ﬁgure had
risen to 67 percent. By 1932 considerably more than 80 percent of urban dwellings were
electriﬁed, while only 11 percent Of farm dwellings had electrical service. The
economics of scale realized during this expansion period through the 1960s had two

implications for energy production and management. First it meant that energy

11

production lent itself to becoming monopolistic and therefore municipal utilities
disappeared while large private utilities came to control 94% of energy production and
transmission. This monopolistic tendency facilitated the involvement of state and federal
governments that regulated private utilities while also expanding their roles in producing
energy. Second it meant that there was a large potential for increasing efﬁciency of the
primary production of electricity. This allowed electricity to remain cheap even while
demand increased (Energy Information Administration 1985; Energy Information
Administration 1992).

These trends inﬂuenced energy use in residences by keeping electricity cheap and
increasingly available. The low prices provided a lack of incentive for the conservation
of energy. Though electric lighting was invented in 1882, air conditioning in 1902, and
many electric appliances (irons, vacuums, and cookers) were available in 1900, it was
only during the post-world war II era and with the growing of the middle class that
Americans could afford these technologies (Smil, 1994). Between 1945 and 1950
residential electricity consumption grew most rapidly, almost 14 percent a year. This
expansion of both electricity production and consumption continued unfettered through

most of the 1960’s (Energy Information Administration, 1985).

The 1970’s: A Time of Change

In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s major developments affect the price of fossil
fuels on the world market and the expansion of electricity production and transmission
discussed above. First, the cheap worldwide oil market began to constrict with the

formation and subsequent actions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

12

(OPEC). Second, the growing environmental movement began to raise concerns about
environmental degradation. And third, in reaction to these developments, federal and
state governments passed a number Of environmental policies and increasing regulation
of energy producers.

As institutional theorists note, change is Often prompted by external shocks
(F ligstein 1991; Jepperson 1991) and the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) oil embargo and ensuing energy crisis was that shock for energy-users
in the United States. Formed in 1960 to counter the large Oil corporations in the west,
OPEC took the step of imposing an Oil embargo against the U.S. in response the United
State’s support of Israel. At the time the U.S. was dependent on OPEC for 35% of its oil
supply. The embargo led to a ﬁvefold increase in the price of Oil.

The threat to cheap energy prompted the federal government to begin to exert
more intervention in energy markets. We saw some Of the ﬁrst interest in exercising
control over demand for electricity from President Richard Nixon. He urged the U.S. to
turn down their thermostats, offered a proposal for daylight savings time, and for
prohibiting the selling of gasoline on Sunday. However, the major focus of the reactions
to the energy crisis continued to be on the supply side. The U.S. congress reacted by
authorizing the development of a Trans-Alaskan pipeline to increase U.S. energy
production. Nixon created the Federal Energy Ofﬁce and appointed an "energy czar"
with the power to allocate oil supplies. Nixon also requested the preparation of a plan,
known as "Project Independence," to make the United States independent of imported Oil
by 1985. Under this program, higher cost imported oil was effectively subsidized by

price-controlled domestic oil, leading to an average price below the world-market level.

13

The policy produced the opposite effect of the original intent: subsidized imports, lower
domestic production, and increases in foreign production (Miller 1995).

In addition to the embargo’s impacts, the environmental movement’s successes
started to increase the costs of increasing electricity production. In response to
widespread protests to federal highway projects, the ﬁrst piece of a wave of federal
environmental legislation is passed — the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969.
This act requires any project that receives federal funding with the potential to impact the
environment to undergo a process where its environmental impacts were publicly
reviewed before the project proceeded. The deﬁnition of actions requiring the
environmental impact statement (EIS) included "major federal actions signiﬁcantly
affecting the human environment." Thus, before implementing any "major" project the
agency must consider the environmental impacts Of that action, identify unavoidable
environmental impacts and make this information available to the public in the EIS
(Andrews, 1999). This was the ﬁrst federal level policy that led to challenges to the
siting and building of new power plants. State and local regulations added to these
challenges. However, the real impact on power production plant siting would come in
the late 1970’s and early 1980’s with the powerful anti-nuclear movement that effectively
shut down the commissioning of nuclear electricity generating plants in the U.S.
(Eckstein 1997). In addition, the federal government also passed the ﬁrst regulations
around air pollution heavily regulating emissions from existing plants.

The recognition of U.S. vulnerability to foreign oil producers and increasing
prices of supply side energy fuels, along with the slowing of increases of efﬁciencies

from economies of scale and increasing difﬁculty and costs of siting new plants for

14

electricity producers, led to a national interest in empowering U.S. citizens to reduce their
demand in energy for the ﬁrst time in U.S. history. Energy efﬁciency began to even be
seen by some as the easy solution. Hays (1991 :159) writes that energy-efﬁcient
innovations came “rather easily” as they “simultaneously reduced costs and advanced
environmental objectives.” In discussing Options for mitigating climate change, Pacala
and Socolow (2004) make the case that we currently have the technologies to stabilize
increasing emissions over the next 50 years. They identify efﬁciency and conservation as
having the most potential to do this.

Indeed, the U.S. has become more energy efﬁcient enabling a “decoupling” of
economic growth and energy use where GDP has been able to grow at a faster rate than
energy use (Energy Information Administration, 1992). In addition, Mazur and Rosa
(1974) reported a decoupling of energy use from quality of life indices. However, overall
energy consumption is still increasing. Though history may ascribe this decoupling to
the clear recognition of the ﬁnancial and environmental costs and beneﬁts of energy
efﬁciency, market supply and demand for energy efﬁciency did not materialize evenly
across the economy. Academic and advocates interested in energy efﬁciency sought to
understand the reasons for these market failures. They identiﬁed multiple barriers to
market development for energy efﬁcient lighting and appliances including distortion of
energy prices by other U.S. energy policies, lack of consumer knowledge and
understanding of long-term energy costs Of purchases or behaviors, and split incentives
where one party purchases a product and another pays the operating costs (California
Energy Commission, 2005). These “market ban'iers”, as they are referred to in the energy

efficiency ﬁeld, create the need for speciﬁc policies or actions to be undertaken in order

15

to increase energy efﬁcient product availability and demand. To many, the most obvious
and expedient policy to remedy this situation was the enactment of federally mandated
minimum efﬁciency standards that would require appliances sold or buildings built to
meet certain design or energy use requirements. However, a range of actions would
eventually be taken and it is the question of how organizational sectors in society have re-
organized tO address these market barriers through the deﬁnition and promotion of energy

efﬁciency that is central to my dissertation.

Organizations and the Evolution of Energy Eﬁiciency Policy Post 1973

The most visible and well documented struggles to institutionalize energy
efﬁciency have been in efforts to inﬂuence the adoption of mandatory energy efﬁciency
standards at the federal level. Mandatory energy efﬁciency standards establish
regulations that force manufacturers to produce only products that meet certain energy
use requirements. This is opposed to voluntary approaches that identify higher efﬁciency
products and promote them, but do not require governmental action and do not legally
enact requirements for manufacturers to only produce those products. There have been
multiple factors that have affected efﬁciency advocates’ capacities to inﬂuence the
adoption Of mandatory standards at federal and state levels. In reviewing the history of
energy efﬁciency standards, I propose that there are two major sociopolitical conditions
that have inﬂuenced the tactics of those nonproﬁt organizations advocating for mandated
energy efﬁciency standards: 1) the federal administration in power and their openness to

standards; 2) state government’s Openness to adopting minimum standards.

16

Presidential administrations have had a signiﬁcant amount of inﬂuence on the
success or failure of minimum energy efﬁciency standards. Following the 1973 Oil
embargo, President Ford was the ﬁrst to consider mandatory energy efﬁciency standards,
and chose to make energy efﬁciency targets voluntary instead. The 20% voluntary
reduction target in new appliance energy use was formalized through an executive order
and then the adoption of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. The Carter
Administration, however, proposed that mandated energy efﬁciency standards should be
adopted the National Energy Conservation and Policy Act of 1978 contained a provision
for the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop new standards. The Department of
Energy began this process, but before these requirements were ﬁnalized and
implemented, the Reagan Administration took ofﬁce. The Reagan administration was
philosophically Opposed to market interventions and proposed “no standards” standards
refusing to set them until 1985 when the federal courts overturned the administration’s
policy. Standards were ﬁnally adopted in 1987 after manufacturers and energy efficiency
advocates negotiated minimum standards on a number of products and President Reagan
signed the National Appliances Energy Conservation Act (NAECA) into effect. In 1988
subsequent standards were passed on ﬂuorescent lamp ballasts and in 1992 a number of
standards for products such as lamps, electric motors, and commercial heating, cooling,
and plumbing products were passed in the Energy Policy Act (Nadel 2002). The
Department of Energy is authorized under NAECA to review and revise minimum energy
efﬁciency levels. Under the Clinton Administration it did so for residential air-
conditioning. George W. Bush’s administration then rolled back the Clinton

administration standards arguing that the DOE did not adequately weigh the costs of

17

these new standards in its analysis. A court battle ensued where the case was eventually
dropped with industry stating that it would rather put its time into preparing for the
upcoming standards than continue dealing with the uncertainty a court battle brought
(New York Times, March 18, 2004). More recently, energy efﬁciency advocates
negotiated additional national standards for products not previously covered, such as
commercial refrigeration.

While the federal level struggled with the paralysis of shifting administrations,
states that faced more immediate energy problems acted. Many states, such as California
and New York, faced constraints in building new power generation capacity as a result of
the increasing costs and environmentalist opposition, but also faced growing demand was
attributable to growing economies, increasing populations and changes in household
energy consumption. State actions to deal with energy supply and demand issues have
provided important openings in the political opportunity structures that were often closed
at the federal level. First, state energy efﬁciency standards were essential in driving
manufacturer’s willingness to negotiate at the federal level. The California Energy
Commission had been proposed to be established in California in 1972, but had been
rejected by then Governor Ronald Reagan until the 1973 energy crisis (Rosenfeld 1999).
In 1974, California adopted the Warren-Alquist Act that established the California
Energy Commission with the authority to set appliance efﬁciency standards. The ﬁrst
standards in California went into place in 1976 and New York State followed. By 1986
six states had adopted mandate minimum efﬁciency standards on what could be sold in
the state on one or more products. This patchwork presented a problem for national

manufacturers that were seeking to maximize economies of scale, but were instead faced

18

with producing a number of products and shipping them to different states. This condition
along with the federal courts decision on the Reagan administration’s “non-standards”
standards provided the impetus for manufacturers to negotiate (N adel, 2002).

In addition to adopting minimum energy efﬁciency standards, many public
utilities commissions in states began to regulate utilities to collect “systems beneﬁts
charges.” These charges could be used to run “demand-side-management” programs that
could encourage curbing of energy use to decrease peak energy demand problems
without building new and expensive power plants. NECPA of 1978 required utilities to
Offer on-site energy audits to residential customers. This law was an acknowledgment
that saving energy could be cheaper than producing it. The additional regulatory roots of
DSM programs go back to state government involvement in the regulation of energy
utilities emerging in the early 1900’s and their role in rate setting. Energy efficiency
advocates introduced the idea of “least cost planning” where additional power plant
proposals underwent review and the cost of the additional supply was compared to the
costs to reducing demand to prevent the need for the supply. These programs began to be
implemented on a state to state basis in the early eighties and grew into the early 90’s
(Etc 1996).

To understand the process by which these sociopolitical changes have impacted
this cross-sectoral organizational ﬁeld Of energy efﬁciency I must look to organizational
perceptions and reactions to these changes. Despite the fact that opportunities to
implement minimum energy efficiency standards are often unviable politically, a wide
variety of organizations from government, the nonproﬁt and private sectors have

coalesced around the speciﬁc issue of promoting innovation and diffusion of energy

19

efﬁcient products and services. They have developed innovative approaches and have
built on multiple levels of political Opportunities, such as those at the state level (Nadel,
2002: (Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer 2006). The process by which energy efﬁcient
products are introduced into the marketplace and over time diffuse and penetrate into the
market in large numbers is known as market transformation. The strategies employed in
market transformation include ﬁmding research and development, conducting
demonstrations and ﬁeld tests, providing commercialization incentives, marketing and
consumer education, grants loans and tax incentives, voluntary efficiency speciﬁcation
programs, bulk purchases, and mandatory standards (Geller and Nadel, 1994). These
strategies are all aimed at producing changes in the markets for energy efﬁciency
products though the philosophical basis of these strategies ranges from the policy tools of
the command-and-control mandated standards to the economic tools of changing
economic incentive structures to the marketing tools of branding and advertising. These
activities have been carried out by a range of private, governmental, and nonproﬁt sector
organizations, Often in intrasectoral and cross-sectoral coordination, to support the
widespread market adoption of energy efficient appliances and building practices.
Changes in the external sociopolitical conditions can only result in changes in the
interorganizational network if they are perceived and acted upon at the organizational
level. The dynamics that have emerged in energy efﬁciency resemble Meyer and
Tarrow’s (1998:20) description of contemporary societies where contention “does not
come from movement organizations as such but from campaigns organized by parties,
interest groups, professional associations, citizens’ groups and public servants.” Social

movement organizations are Often deﬁned by their “non-institutional tactics” such as

20

protests (i.e. McAdam, 1982:25). However, energy efficiency organizations work within
institutional boundaries through activities such as inﬂuencing policy with research and
policy brieﬁngs, bringing lawsuits to force the government to establish energy efﬁciency
standards while also pursuing market based solutions. Public protests are not part of their
tactical repertoires. They are, however, all driven by the mission of improving energy
efﬁciency. They are highly professionalized employing many technical and policy
analysts. Only the few organizations that are related to environmentalism (such as
Natural Resources Defense Council and Environmental Defense) have grassroots
memberships as it has been noted that “energy efficiency” is not a “sexy” topic that the
public has broadly mobilized around; though, in small geographical locations it has been
a popular identity issue. I employ the term “energy efﬁciency nonproﬁt organizations” as
it is theoretically neutral. I will investigate the ways they are like social movement
organizations and the ways they are like interest groups. Non-proﬁt energy advocates
have cobbled together support from a range of elites with interests in energy efﬁciency.
Organizations vary in the funding sources they pursue but potential funders include
demand-side management programs run by electric utilities and others, progressive state
energy Ofﬁces, foundations such as the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Energy
Foundation, manufacturers, private for-proﬁt energy efﬁciency service providers and
consultants, the Environmental Protection Agency, and to a lesser extent the Department
of Energy.

Despite the similarities in organizational form, energy efﬁciency nonproﬁt
organizations have maintained a high level of diversity in their discourses, tactics and

partnerships undertaken in pursuing their energy efﬁciency goals. Organizations have

21

been formed at various levels of interests from national, regional, state, and local. They
all wish to promote energy efﬁciency, but the ideal policies they would like to implement
and the tactics they use to promote them are varied. Some are identiﬁed with the broader
mainstream environmental movement, such as Natural Resources Defense Council, while
others, though working towards a goal that could improve the environment, do not
organizationally identify with the environmental movement. Like many environmental
social movement organizations that are seeking to inﬂuence markets, they take the role of
both adversaries and partners with corporations and the state (Galaskiewicz and Colman
2006). Some energy efﬁciency nonproﬁt organizations target the states and federal
governments to regulate industry providing the underlying research for future efﬁciency
standards and testifying and formally commenting on rulemakings. On several occasions
lawsuits have been brought by nonproﬁts to force adoption of energy-efficiency product
standards i.e. NRDC v. Herrington (1985). Other energy efﬁciency nonproﬁt
organizations undertake more cooperative actions with states and industry such as
providing third-party certiﬁcation of energy-efﬁcient products and joint marketing
campaigns to promote efﬁcient products. And some have undertaken both combative and
cooperative actions over time, and even simultaneously.

Differentiation in energy efﬁciency nonproﬁt organizations may be a result of
differences in how they participate in and experience change processes in the
organizational ﬁeld including framing, institutional entrepreneurship, and network
cultivation. By studying the mechanisms of change at the organizational level, I seek to
understand how organizational factors inﬂuence these differences including the

organizations overall position in the ﬁeld, strong network ties such as board members and

22

funders, and an organization’s cultural and ideological orientation. For example, the
collective framing of energy efﬁciency programs under the overall frame of market
transformation is a cognitive mechanism of change that is inclusive of a range of
organizational tactics that build on diverse opportunities to inﬂuence energy efﬁciency.
From 1973 to 1987, the ﬁrst advocacy nonproﬁt organizations engaging with the struggle
over federal energy eﬂiciency standards (mainly the American Council for an Energy
Efﬁcient Economy and the Natural Resources Defense Council) saw little success on that
front. However, Natural Resources Defense Council, and more speciﬁcally David
Goldstein, senior scientist for their energy program and a former physics student of
efﬁciency pioneer Arthur Rosenfeld began to adopt more innovative approaches to
creating market supply and demand for energy efﬁcient products. In the early 1990’s,
Natural Resource Defense Council facilitated a commercialization effort for energy-
efﬁcient reﬁ'igerators, called the Super Efﬁcient Refrigerator Program. Twenty-ﬁve
utilities across the U.S. pledge $30.7 million dollars of demand-side-management
funding to Offer to the manufacturer of the most efﬁcient refrigerator that met a set of
speciﬁcations. Fourteen manufacturers submitted bids and Whirlpool won and went on to
manufacture a refrigerator from 1993 to 1998. The halting of production of the model due
to lack of sales has brought into the question whether the Super Efﬁcient Refrigerator
Program was a successful tactic, but the market based COOperative model of offering
“carrots” has been a template for action for multiple other organizations.

In 1993, the US Environmental Protection Agency created the voluntary Energy
Star labeling program in response to the 1992 Energy Policy Act. The Energy Star

initiative is a family of voluntary programs designed to increase energy efﬁciency and

23

reduce carbon emissions. EPA subsequently partnered with DOE in 1996 to promote the
Energy Star label and broaden the range Of activities it covered. Over the past few years,
Energy Star has expanded to cover 31 product categories, including residential and
commercial buildings, residential heating and cooling equipment, major appliances,
lighting, and consumer electronics. Cumulatively, by 2000 the Energy Star program had
saved an estimated 1,130 petajoules (1015 joules) of primary energy and avoided the
emission of an estimated 20.7 MIC of carbon (Webber, Brown, and Koomey 2000). The
mission of the Energy Star program is to “realize signiﬁcant reductions in emissions and
energy consumption by permanently transforming markets for energy-consuming
products” (Brown, Webber, and Koomey 2002). Demand side management programs
that saw decreases in funding under deregulation in the late 1990’s also saw a resurgence,
many Of them using Energy Star as a baseline level of energy efficiency to promote to
commercial and residential energy end-users.

There are several advantages to using the energy efﬁciency industry as a focus for my
study. First, energy efﬁciency nonproﬁt organizations are diverse in the number and
kinds Of ties they have developed with state and industry organizations. Second,
organizations in the energy efﬁciency ﬁeld have exhibited a good deal of innovation in
the tactics they have used to cooperate with and coerce state and industry actors. Third,
there are a number Of diverse interorganizational arrangements that have developed over
time that aim to deﬁne and promote energy efﬁcient products and services. Fourth, the
relatively narrow focus on the speciﬁc issue of energy efﬁciency (versus energy or
environmental policy more generally) enables me to identify a “whole-network” (Provan,

Fish and Sydow, 2007) and study a broad range of organizational interactions at a high

24

level Of detail. And lastly, the recent evolution of the interorganizational network (post
1973) provides an Opportunity to follow up on the interorganizational analysis contained
in this dissertation and conduct interviews with those who have been in the ﬁeld since the
beginning and have a historical perspective on how various external events were
perceived and the organizational decision-making processes.
Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Network Approaches

While environmental sociology predicts the environmental outcomes of societal
power relations, and open systems theories of organizations predicts the behavioral
implications of interorganizational relations, network theory provides us with an
understanding and analytic approach for examining the organizational ties underpinning
these theories. I construct a longitudinal data set of the various organizations that have
participated in debates on the deﬁnition of energy efﬁciency from 1973 to 2006 and this
data set is used to inform a network analysis. Comments, hearing transcripts, federal
records, and agenda from these events aid me in the reconstruction of events and
organizational participation in them. To construct this interorganizational data set, I
utilize afﬁliation network data constructed from archival records of organizational
participation in a broad range of events:

0 Department of Energy Minimum Standard Rulemakings for clothes washers,
dishwashers, central air-conditioners, room air conditioners, and
refrigerators/refrigerator-freezers (1980-2006)

Interorganizational interactions during the Department of Energy’s federally
regulated procedures for developing mandatory appliance minimum standards

under the National Appliance Energy Conservation Act. The documents of record

25

includel) transcripts from hearings and workshops on standards with individuals
and their organizational afﬁliation and 2) the submitted written comments on
proposed standards in response to federal register notices.

Environmental Protection Agency/ Department of Energy “Energy Star”
Speciﬁcation Development for clothes washers, dishwashers, central air-
conditioners, room air conditioners, and refrigerators/reﬁtgerator-freezers (1990-
2006)

Interorganizational interactions of record during the development of the voluntary
speciﬁcations used for the jointly run Environmental Protection Agency/ .
Department of Energy “Energy Star” labeling program. The documents of record
includel) meeting notes from Energy Star workshops and the individuals and
organizational affiliations of those who participated and 2) submitted written
comments that provide organizational stances on the development of Energy Star _
speciﬁcations.

American Council for an energy Efﬁcient Economy (ACEEE) Efﬁcient Buildings
Summer Study Conference (bi-annually 1980 to 2006)

Interorganizational interactions during a bi-annual conference organized to bring
technical and academic experts together with policy and other decision-makers to
improve efﬁciency of buildings. Documents of record include individual and
interorganizational afﬁliation for 1) registered participant of the conference 2)
sponsor of the conference and 3) co-authorship of papers and papers topics for the

conference.

26

American Council for an Energy Efﬁcient Economy (ACEEE)/Consortium for
Energy Efficiency Market Transformation Symposium (1997-2006)

Annual conference in Washington DC focused on highlighting successful ongoing
policies and practices promoting energy efﬁciency for policy makers, program
planners, irnplementers and evaluators, manufacturers and trade allies in the ﬁeld
of market transformation. This also serves as the quarterly meeting of the
Consortium of Energy Efﬁciency’s members. Documents Of record include the
individual and organizational affiliation of 1) topics and presenters on the agenda
and 2) registered attendees.

Lawsuits regarding mandatory minimum energy efﬁciency standards (1973 —
2006)

Interorganizational interactions in the judicial system regarding minimum energy
efficiency standards under NAECA. Documents of record include the
organizations bringing the lawsuit, those the lawsuit is brought against, and
ancillary organizations involved.

This data informs an understanding Of how the interorganizational network

around energy efﬁciency has evolved over time. It speciﬁcally provides me with insights
on the changes in the organizational populations that have participated in various kinds of
events (lawsuits, congressional hearings, conferences) and the circumstances of these

events. A full list of the events used in this study can be found in the Appendix A, Table

There are some traditional concerns with afﬁliation data - mainly that they may

not reﬂect actual relationships between organizations. However, I believe that such data

27

will prove useﬁil in addressing my core questions. Many of the beneﬁts of using
afﬁliation data are derived from its duality (Breiger 1974; Field, Frank, Schiller, Riegle-
Crumb, and Muller 2006). Linkages in an afﬁliation network occur between two
different kinds of social entities: actors and events. The actors in this study are the
organizations involved in deﬁning and promoting energy-efficiency. The events are the
testimonies, lawsuits, and meetings that bring these actors together regarding energy
efficiency. In a sense, these events are “where the action is” in the contestation over
energy efﬁciency]. Studying organizational affiliation networks is useful because they
reﬂect how organizational strategic choice and constraints combine to create the
formation of networks. The social constraints are determined by the events that are
offered in society whilst the meaning of these events is determined by the set of
organizations that attend it (Faust 2005). Afﬁliation networks can also be precursors to
actual organizational relationships with each other and may provide insights into how
these relationships form. The analysis of two-mode data tells you not only who is
exposed to whom (the precursor of direct organizational relationships or one mode data)
but exactly which events brought them together. I hypothesize that the introduction and
socialization of organizations (such as learning about their mission and activities and the
emergence Of tacit understandings) at these events is often an important part of the
process of forming direct organizational partnerships. Finally, afﬁliation network data

are beneﬁcial in that they are a record of historical interactions and therefore particularly

 

' The use of these events is grounded in my three years of experience in the energy efﬁciency ﬁeld and
discussions with other actors working for energy efficiency advocacy organizations. While these events
don’t capture every event that bring actors together, 1 would argue that these are the signiﬁcant
institutionalized events that occur on a regular basis.

28

useful in constructing longitudinal data sets. Such longitudinal data sets are essential for
studying causal processes in network evolution.
Dissertation Research Objectives

As discussed earlier, my dissertation will examine interorganizational relations
between business, government and non-proﬁts in environmental and energy issues
through three articles. The ﬁrst article provides an analysis of the beneﬁts of bringing
insights from organizational and environmental sociology together and their potential to
inform our understanding of climate change. This article summarizes ﬁve lessons that we
can learn from these two ﬁelds and provides grounded examples of the insights gained
ﬁ'om each lesson using the issue of climate change. The second article examines the
structure of relations between government, business and civil society organizations
around energy efﬁciency from 1973 to 2007 and the external factors that inﬂuence that
structure of relationships. Using data on the events discussed above, I propose a context-
dependent theory of green consumer products. Building on treadmill of production and
ecological modernization theory, I theorize the conditions under which the
interorganizational power relations predicted by each would prevail. I support this
approach to understanding the political economy of green consumer goods through a
qualitative case study of the variations in the historical struggles between organizations to
promote energy-efﬁcient appliances.

While the second article focuses on the external conditions of changes in the
interorganizational network, the third article focuses on how energy efﬁciency
organizational network embeddedness is related to organizational understandings of its

sociopolitical environment and whether to work with businesses. This approach provides

29

insight on the underlying dynamics of the changing networks. To investigate this I ask
whether an organization’s participation in events over time inﬂuences its subsequent
actions to partner with business. This article builds on theories of institutional change to
demonstrate how organizations make sense of changing political environments and who
it is effective to partner with to pursue its goals.

In answering these research questions, I expect the cumulative knowledge from
these chapters to make some more general contributions to the study of cross-sectoral
organizational relationships and the environment. First, through the aggregation of
organizational populations upward to analyze sectoral relationships along with the
analysis of individuals within the networks, I hope to encourage recognition of the
importance of multi-level analysis in environmental issues and the use of organizations to
develop meta-level understandings of macro-theories. Second, I intend this research to
highlight the usefulness of examining cross-sectoral interorganizational networks through
longitudinal network analysis as a means for more rigorous and systematic understanding
of interactions of organizations over time. Finally, through the use of a range Of venues,
regulatory and voluntary, state hosted and non-proﬁt hosted, I hope to highlight the
connections between these various mechanisms for deﬁning energy efﬁciency and
expand our current understanding of how we deﬁne policy networks from its narrow
focus on regulatory venues Only.

I expect this research to contribute to work on organizational network formation
and institutional change in theories of environmental sociology. In addition, I hope that it
will serve to inform future studies of formal organizations in energy and environmental

sociology and the broader environmental social sciences. Further, these results will

30

contribute to an increased understanding of the environmental, economic, political and
social contexts that inﬂuence the development and effectiveness of institutions for
sustainability (as recommended by the National Research Council, 2005:47) and
ultimately aid those nonproﬁt, business, and governmental organizations involved in

building institutions for a healthy and sustainable environment.

31

CHAPTER ONE
Strengthening Sociological Perspectives on Organizations and the Environment:

Five Lessons from Organizational and Environmental Sociology

Introduction

Organizations have been described by Perrow (1997:66) as “the most intensive
and effective environmental destroyer.” The social origins of many environmental
problems and their solutions can be located within organizational and interorganizational
processes. The organizations involved in these processes vary from informal to formal
and private to public, including businesses, government agencies, and social movement
organizations. Institutions like capitalism and the state may be the machines of
environmental degradation, and individuals may make important decisions that impact
the environment, but organizations are the cogs in the machines. Organizations bring
institutional logics into everyday practice, providing the rules and cultural contexts for
individual decisions about the environment. How individuals participate in organizations,
and how organizations interact with other organizations, structures and inﬂuences many
decisions that impact the environment.

Climate change has been cited by scientists and politicians alike as one of the
most pressing problems facing society today (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2007; Gore, 2006; Stern, 2006). At the root of climate change is the increase of
greenhouse gas emissions (carbon dioxide, methane, some industrial compounds) that
absorb infrared radiation from the sun and “trap” it in the earth’s atmosphere causing

complex climatic changes. The 25% increase of greenhouse gases that scientists have

32

observed started about 150 years ago with the large scale industrialization that also
brought the proliferation of formal organizations. Over the past twenty years
approximately 75% of human caused greenhouse gas emissions are from the burning of
fossil fuels for energy (U .8. Energy Information Administration, 2008). More than half
the energy-related emissions come ﬁom large sources such as power plants and factories.
Industrial processes (such as the production of cement, steel, and aluminum), agriculture,
other land use, and waste management are also important sources of greenhouse gas
emissions in the United States (Environmental Protection Agency 2008). The fossil fuel
basis of the U.S. economy and social system means that all organizations utilize energy in
its daily workings whether an ofﬁce or a manufacturing plant.

The recognition of the important role that formal organizations play in the
production and mitigation of environmental problems such as climate change has led to a
quickly growing multi and inter-disciplinary literature that focuses on the nexus of
organizations and the natural environment. As the environment is increasingly
recognized as a major social problem and prominent social theorists address it (Beck
1992; Luhmann 1989), the number of organizational sociologists that have undertaken
studies of environmental issues has been growing (Bansal and Gao, 2006). In addition,
business and public policy schools, where organizational sociologists are often trained
and employed, have expanded their interests and programs in the environment (Finlay
1999). There also has been an increasing amount of work in environmental sociology at
the organizational level and multiple environmental sociologists have suggested that
more work on industries and organizations would be useful (Grant and Jones 2003;

Grant, Jones, and Trautner 2004; Sonnenfeld and Mo] 2002). Considering the potential

33

for understanding how organizations contribute to environmental impacts and how the
environment and natural resource issues impact organizations, it is surprising how little
organizational and environmental sociologists studying similar issues have built on each
other’s insights. Traditionally, environmental sociology has offered well developed
theories of the macro political, economic and cultural factors inﬂuencing environmental
degradation and reform along with more micro social psychological explanations of
environmentalism. Environmental sociology has only engaged occasionally with the
inspection of meta-level understandings of the role of organizational processes in
environmental degradation and reform and the variation in these behaviors and outcomes.
In contrast, organizational theory has developed a strong body of research on why and
how organizations do what they do by theorizing both organizational and
interorganizational processes, but often fall short of accounting for the larger political
economic context of environmental issues and the extent of the material basis of
organizations.

Several reasons have been suggested for this failure to connect and integrate these
two bodies of work. In his review of environmental sociology’s potential to inform
research on business decision-making and the environment, Hoffman, an organizational
sociologist who studies environmental issues, notes the tension between the “added value
of creating distinct specialty ﬁelds (such as environmental sociology) versus remaining
engaged with wider disciplinary approaches” (Hoffman 2005:211; Hoffman and
Ventresca 2002:18). This criticism has also emerged ﬁom within environmental
sociology. Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg (2004:312) note that among environmental

sociology’s weaknesses is “its failure to build lasting bridges to sociology itself.” In

34

addition, one may note that there are few occasions that organizational sociologists and
environmental sociologists have the opportunity to interact. Butte] (2002) offers an
opposing perspective, arguing that though the cost of the struggle to build the
subdiscipline of environmental sociology was a temporary lack of engagement with other
theoretical perspectives, the increasing strength of environmental sociology has yielded a
growing number of productive engagements with broader sociological theoretical
perspectives. I argue in this paper that synthetic lessons learned from environmental and
organizational sociology could do much to advance a truly sociological perspective on
organizations and the natural environment.
No organization is an island — socially or ecologically

In early classical organizational theory, organizations are conceptualized as closed
rational systems. Weber’s theories on bureaucracy (1922) and Taylor’s scientiﬁc
management (1916) view organizations as highly formalized rational collectivities
pursuing agreed upon organizational goals. The organizational ideal was an isolated unit
that served internal objectives and had no external resource dependencies. In this way, an
organization was conceptualized as an island. An organization was separated ﬁ'om the
rest of the world with its workers carrying out only its organizational objectives set by
those at the top of the organizational hierarchy. The resources needed to carry out those
Objectives were owned by the organization, materializing within organizational
boundaries as if appearing from nowhere. Subsequent organizational theory provided
insights into just how unrealistic the ideal of the organization as an island is by
highlighting the role of employees’ personal motivations, external resource dependencies,

and external cultural pressures.

35

Despite realizing these external factors, the material and “natural resource” basis
of organizations is still relatively ignored. That is, even with the rise of an environmental
consciousness and the recognition of organizational impacts on the environment, the
impact of the natural environment on organizations is relatively unexplored. A one way
relationship where organizations impact the environment has developed rather than a
conceptualization of the mutual dependencies. Organizational theories to date have not
produced an integrative understanding of how organizations both inﬂuence and are
inﬂuenced by the natural environment. If we think of power as “the ability of an
individual or group (we shall call them A) to inﬂuence another individual or group (we
shall call them B) in a non-trivial signiﬁcant manner” (Cox, Furlong, and Page 1985:31)
this challenge to organizational theory can be thought of as the failure to ﬁrst, recognize
the power of the natural environment and second, to understand the power relationship
between organizations and the natural environment as a reciprocal relationship.
Shrivastava (1994) attributes this failure of organizational studies to a narrow deﬁnition
of organizational environment that focuses on the social environment at the cost Of the
material environment.

The raison d ’etre of environmental sociology is to bring to sociology an
understanding of systems of human-environment relations as interdependent, entailing
mutual inﬂuence, and dynamic, entailing change and stability. Asking why sociology as
a whole had previously failed to address the natural environment, its relationship with
humans, and problems of the deteriorating environment, Catton and Dunlap (1978)
posited that sociology had been operating under the Human Exemptionalist Paradigm

(HEP) - a belief that humans were unique from other species in their ability to develop

36

without limits. The assumptions of mainstream sociology about humans and their
environment were questioned with the development of environmental sociology and the
move towards the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP). NEP recognizes that humans may
adapt and mitigate, but the assumption persists that humans are ecologically
interdependent like all other species.

In arguing for the “greening” of business studies, Gladwin, Kennelly, and Krause
(1995) build on Catton and Dunlap’s work and contend that there must be a shift ﬁom the
dominant social paradigm that does not account for the environment in the survival of
social systems to one that recognizes human dependencies on the environment and
integrates this into business studies. Similarly, Rosen and Sellers (1999) advocate
eloquently for business historians to “. .. start asking explicit questions about the role of
environmental factors in industrial development and corporate evolution in different
places and times. More open-minded and empirical research will allow us to better
determine how nature actually ﬁgured into what business managers did: how managers
did or did not handle their ﬁrms' extraction and transformation Of natural resources; how
nature's openings and impositions shaped their strategies and organizational choices.”
They go on to argue that this focus can provide a corrective to overly cultural accounts Of
business history. In this way, addressing the material basis of organizations will help
bring about a re-merging of realist and constructivist approaches and provide the middle
ground perspectives on the realist-constructivist debates that have emerged in
environmental sociology to organizational studies (Kroll-Smith, Gunter, and Laska 2000;

McLaughlin 2001; Rosa 1998)

37

Humans and their organizations are part of ecosystems and no organization is an
island unto itself. Though organizations vary in the extent and character of their social
and material connectedness they all are constrained by their social and material
environment. NEP helps us to understand this by highlighting that earth has a finite level
of natural resources and waste repositories and that the biophysical environment
constrains human activity. It teaches us that organizations are not an island, and are not
only connected with the social fabric ﬁom which they emerge, but have a mutual and
dynamic connection with the natural environment. Understanding this helps us think
about how organizations are intimately involved in the production of climate change
while their daily Operations are inextricable from the climate system their activities are
inﬂuencing. Climate assumptions are so interwoven into daily practices of organizations
that the assumptions are often rendered invisible. Firms that have paid the most attention
thus far are those directly connected to natural resources. For example, many industrial
agricultural farms face shifts in geographical productivity. But less visible are all the
organizations that utilize infrastructure with built in assumptions about climate. The Pew
Center on Global Climate Change (Sussman and Freed 2008) issued a report that
chronicles these threats such as the potential for extreme weather events to disrupt site
work and impact worker health in the building and construction industry or the
susceptibility of industries that use shipping in their supply chain. A recognition of the
dual role of organizations in climate change as one that impacts climate and is impacted
by climate highlights the need for a duality in responses by organizations. Climate
change requires ﬁrms to undertake both mitigation Of their impacts to the climate system

and adaptation of the way organizations do business.

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Organizational environmental outcomes and their measurement matter

While still struggling to come to grips with the natural resource basis of
organizational life, research assessing the environmental impacts of organizations
through both material and cultural indicators has gotten more attention. In fact, in their
thorough review of management journal articles on organizations and the natural
environment, Bansal and Gao found that more studies focused on reducing environmental
impacts of organizations than organizational performance on other measures (such as
proﬁt). The measurement of organizational environmental impacts is a complex
challenge facing all who seek to integrate social and natural variables in their studies.
Bansal and Gao (2006) summarize the signiﬁcant body of work documenting the links
between organizations and the environment reporting that much of the research uses
proxies of environmental performance. Some proxies of environmental performance
utilize actual measurements of some material input or output such as toxic release reports
and organizational waste generation and waste processing activities. Other proxies of
environmental performance are reﬂections of how well an organization adheres to
society’s expectations of what it means to perform environmentally, but do not actually
attempt to measure the material outcomes. For example, an organization’s environmental
performance has been measured via the amount of environmental litigation brought
against it, the adoption of environmental management systems (such as ISO-14001), or
other beyond compliance activities. In addition, some studies of organizational
“greenness” have also been assessed by measuring the values, beliefs and attitudes of

organizational members.

39

The imperative of undertaking these measurements in organization and
environment studies is undeniable and yet we are well served by casting a critical eye to
what we are actually measuring and its place in organizational and environmental
processes. Some measures are indicators of the amount of stress being placed on the
ecosystem while others measure the actual impact of the organization on an ecosystem.
Impacts are the result of ecosystem responses to stressors and thus inherently more
complicated. In addition, choosing speciﬁc indicators of environmental impacts may
indicate improvement when environmental impacts have either been transformed in
nature (i.e. a shift from using coal to nuclear) or across space and time. Take for
example, the toxic release inventory (TRI). Grant, Bergesen, and Jones(2002) and Grant
and Jones (2003) use toxic release inventories and ﬁnd that large chemical plants emit
toxins at a higher rate than small plants, and this difference increases if the large plant is
part of a larger corporation. Freudenberg and colleagues (Fisher and Freudenburg;
Freudenburg and Nowak 2000) use these same data to support the claim that there is a
“disproportionality” between economic and environmental impacts at the level of
economic sectors, industries, and speciﬁc facilities. These works are highly respectable
in their efforts to integrate both social and natural variables. However, measures of toxic
releases only consider pollution at the point of production, not the toxins in the end
products. F urtherrnore, TRI only tracks certain chemicals that have been tested and
determined to be toxic, while there is a large number of chemicals that have not been
tested at all with some estimates assessing that only 10% of estimates have been tested.

Assessments Of organizational “greenness” using measures other than actual

environmental impacts need to be placed in context of how we understand organizational

40

decision-making and processes. Similar to the use of material measures, what is actually
being measured should be carefully speciﬁed. We may imagine that an organization that
has been involved in fewer environmental lawsuits is more environmentally responsible,
or it may just be better at hiding environmental illegalities and harms. The use of
adoption of environmental management systems or participation in voluntary green
programs to assess environmental impact is based upon assumptions that this reﬂects a
dedication to undertaking actions that actually decrease environmental impact. Whether
this is true is a question for further research. Research evaluating voluntary programs
has found that in general environmental behaviors and outcomes did not change with
participation in a voluntary program, and that in some cases the environmental
performance of ﬁrms actually decreased (deLeon and Rivera 2007; Dietz and Stern
2002). Similarly, one would theorize that possession of environmental attitudes about
business sustainability by organizational members would be reﬂected in environmental
decision-making and thus improved environmental performance. However, we know
from research on individuals that pro-environmental attitudes and beliefs do not always
translate to pro-environmental actions, often due to constraints in the choices individuals
face (Gardner and Stern 1995; Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002; Tanner 1999). All this
demonstrates the challenges of developing measures and the need to be explicit about
what is and is not being measured. The further development of organizational
environmental outcome measurements within an integrated understanding of
organizational resource processes is a worthy goal for both environmental and

organizational sociologists.

41

Developing models of greenhouse gas footprints Of organizations is thus an
important step in assessing impacts of organizational and interorganizational
characteristics and impacts. The literature from industrial ecology and material ﬂows
provides us one basis for calculating the material usage of organizations. An obvious
proxy is energy use though we must also remember that there are other greenhouse gases
in addition to carbon dioxide (such as methane). Lough (1996) provides an insightful
discussion of the amount of energy needed to maintain industrial society’s structure and
reports ﬁndings on six organizations, their organizational characteristics and energy use.
Lough’s ﬁndings conﬁrm earlier studies of energy use and organizational structure.
Organizations that were smaller, part of the private sector, and part of the service sector
were more energy-efﬁcient than their counterparts that were larger, in the public sector or
manufacturing sector.

Corporate environmental actions vary and are context-dependent

Two major theories in environmental sociology that are used to make sense of the
capitalist system’s role in environmental problems and solutions are treadmill of
production (Schnaiberg, 1984) and ecological modernization (M01 and Spaargaren,
2000). Treadmill of production (TOP) generally views capitalist organizations as
following the logics set out by the capitalist system in that it will act as an economic
rational actor maximizing proﬁt by pursing the cheapest resource extraction and waste
disposal methods that it can legally get away with (Gould and Gould 1994). Variations in
this behavior are therefore due to variations in economic conditions facing ﬁrms.
Meanwhile, ecological modernization (EMT) suggests that further development of

capitalism and the state regulation and public pressure it brings will lead to capitalist

42

organizations adopting a broader more ecological and economic perspective on decision-
making. EMT sees the ﬁrm and markets as more socially embedded, perceiving and
responding to cultural and economic cues.

Those who have studied a number individual ﬁrms and environmental decision-
making have probably seen both theories at work. Organizational researchers and
theorists from all perspectives have undertaken a large variety of work to investigate the
sources Of the variation of corporate decision-making on the environment. There is
research that supports that the level of homogeneity and heterogeneity in environmental
corporate behavior across industries varies. Some industries have undertaken reactive
pro-environmental behaviors in a united fashion. For example, the chemical industry
responded to its deadly plant explosion in Bhopal by self-regulating through the
Responsible Care Program (Hoffman, 1999). On the other hand, some industries have
acted in unity to resist the adoption of pro-environmental behaviors. The oil industry’s
initial response to climate change was to form the Global Climate Coalition and link to
conservative think tanks to contest that climate change was a problem (McCright and
Dunlap 2000). However, the oil industry’s initial response to climate change has been
followed by a disintegration of unity as corporations took a variety of stances (Pulver
2007; van den Hove, Le Menestrel, and de Bettignies 2002). Similarly, Levy and
Rothenberg (2002) provide an account of the diversity in responsiveness to climate
change in the automobile industry.

Understanding the factors that inﬂuence organizational decision-making towards
environmental disasters or improved environmental outcomes is an essential contribution

that organizational and environmental sociology can offer to the study of humans and the

43

environment. Dietz and Henry (2008) point out that Hardin’s theory of the tragedy of the
commons, where resources are exploited by individuals to the point of collapse, is based
on the assumptions of narrow self-interest embodied in the rational actor paradigm.
Indeed, if a ﬁrm is in full adherence with the economic rational actor paradigm then it
will use and dispose of resources in the least costly ways possible, maximizing proﬁt and
most likely simultaneously maximizing harm to the environment. A central question for
the social sciences is then to assess what factors drive resource decision-making (Dietz
2005; Dietz and Henry 2008). Under what conditions do narrow self interests prevail and
when are broader societal interests accounted for? In regards to the capitalist ﬁrm, under
what contexts do ﬁrms account for the health of the environment and resources and take
action accordingly?

Dietz and Henry provide three understandings of how context matters in
environmental decision-making. First, context can be understood as how the state of one
variable is related to the state Of another variable. For example, Prakash and Potoski
(2007) propose that organizational decisions to participate in a voluntary environmental
program are dependent upon the ability to make beneﬁts of green club membership
excludable (the Olsonian dilemma) and the potential the members will shirk their
responsibility to meet club standards thus jeopardizing potential beneﬁts to all members.
The second understanding of context is “the larger landscapes of local and national
govermnent and the local, regional, and global political economies that shape actions and
responses to actions” (Dietz and Henry, 2008:13190). For example, theories of political
economy Of the environment in environmental sociology suggest that governmental

resource management decisions will favor business interests because the government is

44

dependent upon business proﬁts for a tax base (O'Connor 1973; Schnaiberg 1980). The
third understanding of context is the social relationships or network in which decision-
making is embedded. Pulver (2007) illustrates how oil companies made divergent
assessments of the market risks and opportunities related to climate change because of
the different scientiﬁc and policy networks they were embedded in, rather than rational
economic criteria.

Stern and Barley (1996: 154) similarly argue that the organizational research
community can provide a corrective to law and economics “overly rational and coercive
mechanisms” for understanding environmental issues. In organizational sociology,
theories have constantly evolved to try to provide a realistic account of how decision-
making takes place and the importance of context. Scott describes the most recent wave
of theories as an open system perspective. These theories view organizational actions as
being embedded in broader environments. Open systems theories include Harman and
Freeman’s (1977) organizational ecology model, Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource
dependence model, and Meyer and Rowan’s institutional theory (1977; DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983). At the heart of all these perspectives is the question of what motivates
organizational behavior and decision-making. One area where these theories have been
used to understand when organizations undertake actions beyond their narrowly deﬁned
interests is the study of corporate environmentalism.

A great deal of this work is engaged with explaining the development of corporate
environmentalism, when ﬁrms or industries take pro-environmental action beyond
regulatory demands. Business decisions about resource use and conservation have Often

been understood as a rational organization pursuing the deﬁned goal of proﬁt. A strong

45

case has been made that acting on environmental issues such as climate change
accomplishes the business goal of proﬁt maximization through improved reputation and
increased legitimacy, decreased government regulation, long term economic goals,
decreased risk of liability, and production cost savings among others (Aupperle, Carroll,
and Hatﬁeld 1985; Burke and Logsdon 1996; Hoffman 2006b). Lyon and Maxwell
(2004) expand this approach to utilize economic tools to model the political economy of
corporate environmentalism. Their contention is that cost reductions from eco-efﬁciency
and increases of market demand from green consumers are only modest inﬂuencers of
corporate environmental action and the real driver is the state and public policy. Using a
policy life cycle approach they demonstrate that once an issue has the potential to be
regulated the costs to ﬁrms increase with time: voluntary actions that preempt new laws
have the lowest impact on ﬁrms, trying to inﬂuence regulations has a greater impact on
ﬁrms, and deﬂecting enforcement at the end of the policy life cycle has the highest
impact on ﬁrms.

Lyon and Maxwell’s work provides insights on understanding variations across
industries but, like much of the rational system work, is limited when faced with variation
between ﬁrms that face relatively similar external pressures but exhibit variations in
environmental behaviors. To explain this variation, some organizational theorists have
adopted an approach to organizational decision-making that focuses on internal decision-
making factors. Supported by empirical research on environmental decisions in
businesses, Bansal and Roth have argued for a mixed motives theory of environmental
decision-making where organizations are seeking to fulﬁll multiple objectives (Bansal

and Roth 2000). For example, Dutton et a1. (1997) found that the perception Of how

46

important an issue is has been found to be related to how well it ﬁts with the
organizational and top leadership values and concerns rather than any “rational” strategic
imperative. Meyerson’s (2003) research on “tempered radicals” has found that some
individuals will champion social initiatives in the workplace (i.e. environmental,
afﬁrmative action, fair trade) because they are personally important to them.
Management’s receptivity to undertaking an environmental initiative is also inﬂuenced
by their personal values (Bansal 2003). These theories highlight the embeddedness of
individuals in both organizational cultures but also broader society. With the rise of
environmentalism as a popular movement, it is more and more likely that individuals will
hold these attitudes and bring them into new institutional contexts and the potential for
social movements to have impacts this way has been highlighted in Zald’s work on
“ideologically structured action” (Zald 2000).

Others have turned further outward to explain ﬁrm and industry variations in
environmental behavior. Open system theories are gaining recognition across ﬁelds in
sociology for understanding the constitution of organizational life and provide the most
insight into the context dependencies of organizational decision-making on the
environment. Both resource dependence and new institutionalism saw the social context
and organizational environment in which an organization was embedded as a key
inﬂuence in organizational behavior. Resource dependence focused on the external
factors organizations need to control to achieve their goals. It therefore theorizes
organizations as seeking power and exercising it strategically (or rationally) to gain
control of those organizational resources needed to achieve its goals and open up space

for actions that reach its organizational Objectives. New institutional theory differed in

47

focusing on the irrationalities of organizational life and focusing more on the role of
cultural norms. Organizational actions are often less a result of deliberate strategic action
than the result of people in organizations following scripts or templates for behavior
provided by those around them. This can result in what Powell and Dimaggio (1983)
refer to as organizational isomorphism where organizations tend toward similar forms
and behaviors. Many theoretical advances have been made to merge these two
perspectives towards providing an account of embedded rational organizational decision-
making where opportunities and constraints for strategic choice are embedded within the
institutional environment. Organizations may act strategically from this situated
understanding Of rational action (Clemens 1997; Greenwood and Hinings 1996).
Beamish (2001; 2002) builds on the internal sense-making processes of
organizations in perceiving and reacting to the external environment to provide an
explanation of how organizational processes can lead to non-action regarding the
prevention and management of environmental risks by undertaking a study of the
Guadalupe Dunes Oil Spill in California. Beamish focuses on the material characteristics
of the environmental crisis in this case, a “crescive crisis” where the impacts are more
insidious over long periods of time. Examples of this are an oil spill underground (such
as the Gaudalupe Dunes) or climate change. Beamish’s study focuses on how the oil
company, state and public involved interpreted whether the spill was problematic and
highlights the role that organizational routine plays in failure to recognize the risks of
environmental degradation. Oliver (2008) extends this work to how these organizational

processes in remedying one environmental risk can lead to the creation of new risks.

48

The implicit acceptance and routinization of environmental behaviors and how
these norms are transformed is taken up by new institutional theorists. Bansal and Gao
(2006:463) conclude that “the new institutional analysis has been the dominant
theoretical theme among studies with a natural environment context, likely because
institutional forces have such a signiﬁcant role in environmental issues.” While
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) characterization of organizational isomorphism suggests
that organizations become increasingly homogenous in structure, beliefs, and actions to
increase organizational legitimacy, those working in this area have also paid close
attention to the sources of heterogeneity in ﬁrm behavior and performance. Bansal and
Clelland (2004) analyzed media reports and stock prices of 100 ﬁrms over a ﬁve-year
period and found that environmentally legitimate ﬁrms had less stock market risk than
illegitimate ﬁrms. Environmental legitimacy is determined by the extent that ﬁrms
conform to stakeholders' expectations regarding environmental management. The
analysis also showed that ﬁrms with low environmental legitimacy could reduce their risk
by expressing commitment to the natural environment. Pulver (2007) argues that
differences in networks and embeddedness of oil companies led to differing
interpretations and stances on climate change. Prakash and Potoski’s (2006:41) study
organizational participation in voluntary environmental programs (termed “green clubs”)
through combining what they call rational-choice institutionalism where actors seek to
maximize their net beneﬁts with new institutionalism where “actors respond to the logic
of appropriateness choosing the course of action that seems most normatively
appropriate.” They contend that organizational decisions to participate in voluntary

environmental programs are dependent upon the design of the program. To encourage

49

participation a program must be designed so that the beneﬁts of green club membership
are excludable and the program design must minimize the risk that members will shirk
their responsibility to meet club standards thus jeopardizing potential beneﬁts to all
members.

The total body of this work suggests that the likelihood of voluntary corporate
action to protect the environment is an interaction between three conditions 1) the
external organizational environment that makes pro-environmental action necessary,
desirable, and legitimate 2) the organization’s competitive position in that environment
and 3) the internal organizational members’ ability to perceive ﬁnancial and external
pressures to act voluntarily and frame environmental action as an Opportunity for
improving organizational survival. A ﬁrm is highly unlikely to act if it 1) would actually
lose competitive advantage, 2) faces little or none external pressure from its
organizational and institutional environment and 3) has no internal champion for the
action. The stronger the presence of each one of these conditions is, the more likely
voluntary pro-environmental action is to occur.

This lesson teaches us that encouraging corporate action on climate change should
proceed with multiple approaches that provide these enabling conditions. Regulations
and market-based programs should seek to align incentives so that action maintains
market competitiveness. Programs that expose organizations to the business logic
behind climate change action and provide models for emulation of respected
organizations that have taken successful climate change actions can change the networks
organizations are embedded in and the information transmitted. These programs can also

provide internal champions with the tools they need to make the case for action.

50

Cooperation and cooptation are two sides of the same coin

Organizational studies focusing on networks, particularly in governance, have
focused on the beneﬁts of new public-private partnerships between organizations
(Huxharn 1996). The development of new cooperative actions between environmental,
governmental and corporate organizations is often offered as a pathway to increasing
sustainability pointing to the need for increased ﬂexibility and innovation to address the
complex problems Of non-point source pollution and global climate change (Berenbaum
1999; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Paralleling this reasoning, in environmental
sociology, ecological modernization theory suggests that more direct negotiations
between environmental social movement organizations and business will produce more
innovative “win-win” solutions using the market (M01 1995; Spaargaren 1997).

The enthusiasm for these approaches leaves O’Toole and Meier (2004) warning
of the dark side of interorganizational networks and “desperately seeking Selznick.”
Selznick’s (1966) treatise on the Tennessee Valley Authority brought to light the problem
of cooptation and serves as a founding literature for the future development of resource
dependence theory. He identiﬁes cooptation as when an organization absorbs new
elements into its policy-deterrnining structure to avert threats to its stability or existence.
Formal cooptation occurs when an organization faces a crisis of legitimacy and integrates
outside interests formally and publicly, while informal cooptation is where organized
forces that are in a position to enforce demands are given a role in policy determination,
but explicit recognition of this position is avoided to sustain legitimacy. Cooptation will

result in changes in the character and role of organizations.

51

Environmental sociology’s theories provide perspective on the broader political
and economic environment for these partnerships. Treadmill of production and
ecological modernization propose a role for the environmental movement, though each
varies in its understanding of environmental social movement power in relation to the
state and corporations. Buttel (2004:331) characterizes the treadmill of production
perspective as early on considering environmentalism as a “crucial force that is subject to
trivialization” while later theorizations still claimed it to be crucial but “overwhelmed by
transnational and local treadmills and undermined by commodiﬁcation.” In treadmill of
production, because of the concentration of capital within corporations, social movements
are particularly susceptible to cooptation because of their limited monetary resources.
Treadmill of production sees these interactions through the lens of resource dependence.
In ecological modernization, the environmental movement is seen as having more power
in being able to institutionalize ecological objectives through motivation of public
pressures and state regulation. Ecological modernizationists see these collaborations
through the lens of new institutional theory — organizational objectives are aligning as
corporations adopt ecological logics. Sonnenfeld (2002) poses a series of questions about
social movements and the political processes of ecological modernization including
whether social movements have: 1) moved from radical opposition to capitalism,
industrialization and bureaucratization, to greater involvement in environmental reform
efforts, 2) become more single-issue oriented, rather than remaining part of broader social
movements, 3) shifted from being “outside inﬂuences” to becoming “inside” players in
environmental transformation, 4) played an increasingly direct role in planning and

designing new production technologies, and 5) shifted from working with the state to

52

working more closely with market actors. While these questions are to assess the extent
Of the ecological modernization process, these are the same questions that are Often asked
by those who are assessing the cooptation of the environmental movement. Whether an
organization has made a reasonable compromise in cooperation to meet mutual goals or
whether it has been coopted by the partner organization is a difﬁcult judgment. In other
words, all interorganizational relationships involve cooperation and cooptation to the
extent that they all require compromise.

Though labeling speciﬁc organizational partnerships as compromise or cooptation
is perhaps a subjective and unproductive process, there are multiple opportunities to
investigate the dynamics of cooperation and cooptation and their outcomes in public-
private environmental partnerships. The productive collaboration between organizational
sociology and social movement theory is one place where scholars can build this study.
Introducing a special issue of Mobilization, Caniglia and Carmin (2005) articulate that
social movement organizations should be studied in their own right and that the clear way
to accomplish this is to link social movement theories (such as resource mobilization,
political process, and framing) to organizational theories (such as resource dependence
and new institutionalism). This conversation has produced a book (McAdam, Scott,
Davis, and Zald 2005) that highlights the similarities and differences in the theories and
points to how social movement theory can beneﬁt from organizational understandings of
processes and outcomes and how business organizations may be understood through the
lens of social movements (Berg and Zald, 1978; Morrill, Zald and Rao, 2003; Davis and

McAdam, 2000).

53

Much of the research conducted in environmental sociology on environmental
social movement organizations (ESMOs) has touched upon the impacts of
interorganizational relations. This has Often focused on the capabilities and selection of
tactics in populations of environmental organizations with a critical eye on the
institutionalization and cooptation of the movement. Mitchell (1979) led the way in
focusing on organizations in the U.S. environmental movement in his analysis of large
national organizations making up the environmental lobby. He focused on the
institutional tactics, such as litigation and lobbying, undertaken by organizations like
Natural Resources Defense Council and Sierra Club and their successful use of mail
campaigns. Brulle (2000) identiﬁes the organizational environmental movement using a
database of U.S. environmental organizations (as registered as tax-exempt organizations
with the IRS) to analyze why the U.S. environmental movement has not attained the
levels of social change seen in other nations. He concludes that organizational capacities
for social learning as needed for communicative action are limited by the organizational
characteristics found within the environmental movement: 1) competing and disparate
organizational discourses between organizations and a lack Of an turifying frame, 2)
movement organization ties to business and foundations that result in cooptation, and 3)
external ties facilitate need for centralized management, professionalization, and mass
mailings that limit democratic participation in organizations. These conclusions are
supported by Mertig, Dunlap and Morrison’s ﬁndings as well (2002). More recently
Brulle and Jenkins and colleagues have continued this focus on studying environmental
movement organizations in relation to the strength of civil society and the impacts of

foundation funding (Brulle and Jenkins 2005; Brulle and Jenkins 2006).

54

Many researchers studying populations of environmental movement organizations
have utilized approaches from organizational ecology to undertake studies of the
organizational populations of environmental movement organizations. McLaughlin and
Khawaja (2000) use organizational ecology and resource mobilization theory to explain
national population dynamics of the U.S. environmental movement. Andrews and
Edwards (2005) examine the structures of local organizations in North Carolina and how
various organizational characteristics, such as geographic scope, degree of
professionalization, and tactical repertoires are related to each other. On a more global
scale, Murphy (2005) uses organizational ecology to analyze the population of
transnational environmental movement organizations (TNESMOS) and ﬁnds that the
increasing number of coalition organizations decreases the number of foundings of new
organizations. Ties between TNESMOS are studied in relation to ties with international
governmental organizations in Caniglia’s (2001) analysis of the ﬂow of information
between these organizations, while Lewis (2000) documented the factors that impacted
TMESMO’s decisions to ﬁrnd debt-for-nature swaps in developing nations.

In addition to studies of organizational populations, there have been multiple
studies that have looked at individual cases or organizations. Pellow (2001), who works
in the political economic tradition, utilizes a comparative case study approach to update
political process theory and its relevance to environmental justice. Analyzing two cases
of movement, governmental, and corporate organizational interactions over the siting of
two toxic sites, he suggests that environmental movement organizations that recognize
the weakening of state power and strengthening of corporate power and adjust their

tactics accordingly are more likely to succeed. In their study of Friends of the Earth and

55

Greenpeace, two organizations with no corporate ties, Carmin and Balser (2002)explicitly
utilize cognitive organizational perspectives on sense-making and merge these with
Tilly’s concept of organizational repertoires Of collective actions. They ﬁnd that
experience, core values and beliefs, environmental philosophy and political ideology
work together to create organizational interpretations of the political environment and
tactical efﬁcacy.

Organizational and environmental sociology have much to contribute to
understanding the relationships between ESMOs, corporations, and the state. Resource
dependence and new institutional theory provide an understanding of how
interorganizational relationships are formed and the expected impacts of those
relationships. Environmental sociology provides us with an understanding of the
broader institutional context of the relationship between social movements, the state, and
corporations under capitalism. Future investigations should examine what kinds of
relationship between ESMOs and the state/corporations lead to cooptation. Longitudinal
studies of organizations with data on tie formations and dissolutions along with
organizational outcomes can provide insight into the organizational impacts of the
relationships. Hoffman (2006a) has begun this undertaking by examining interlocking
boards of non-proﬁt environmental organizations and environmental organization website
links to corporations and organizational activities and perceptions of these organizations.
What are the impacts of these ties and what kinds of ties between social movement
organizations and others make a difference in subsequent behavior (funding, joint efforts,

engaging in meetings together)? What kinds of ties enable an organization to reach its

56

original goals with little impact? How can ESMO’s heed Selznick’s advice (l965:v) to
“guard against organizational surrender” when making needed compromises?
The cumulative environmental impacts of organizational change are constrained by
system tendencies

Much has been written about the potential for greening capitalism (O’Connor,
1994). Allan Schnaiberg’s (1980) breakthrough political economic analysis of
environmental problems and subsequent work on the treadmill of production (TOP)
builds on the Monthly Review school of Marxism and theorizes that the institutional
arrangements under monopoly capitalism result in the competition and concentration of
capital that leads to increases in capital investment and technological efﬁciency. These
conditions result in the increasing rates of withdrawals of material resources from the
earth and additions Of these material resources transformed into waste and deposited into
the environment. This cycle is referred to as the treadmill of production. Subsequent to
TOP’s initial publication, Schnaiberg and Gould (1994) wrote a chapter that made
explicit their understanding of economic organizations. Business organizations are
assumed to have singular decision-making criteria as reﬂected in a rule-based rational
systems approach. As these business organizations are situated within capitalist
institutions these criteria are driven by capitalist logics such as proﬁt-maximization.
Under TOP theory, ﬁrms arrive at the conclusion that the best return on this accumulated
capital is the investment in more capital and technological efﬁciency. This predicts that
ﬁrms all make similar decisions regardless of the internal dynamics of the ﬁrm as natural
systems perspectives would suggest. Schnaiberg and Gould state that social, economic,

and political forces outside the ﬁrm (such as the state or social movements) may alter

57

behavior, but that all ﬁrms will resist and try to suppress these forces. As Pulver
(2007:49) summarizes “from a treadmill perspective, ﬁrm-level activities cannot change
system-level dynamics.”

In ecological modernization theory, M01 and Spaargaren argue that a reﬂexive
ecological consciousness will result in a new politics and transformation of industrial
practices and technological innovation that will beneﬁt the environment (Spaargaren,
1997). This model is rooted in an economic model of change with social implications,
deriving its basis from earlier work done by resource economists on internalizing the
externalities of markets. In this economic model, businesses face increasing costs of
resources from both increasing scarcity and increased state-irnposed costs on resource
withdrawals and resulting pollution outputs. In accounting for these increased costs of
resource use and by-products, ﬁrms respond by investing in technologies that reduce
resource use. Ecological modernization clearly emphasizes a ﬁrm’s ability to perceive
changing external conditions like environmental destruction and increasing costs of
resources and react by altering their use of resources in response. One underlying
difference between treadmill of production and ecological modernization theory is the
level agency granted to corporations and industrial sectors in being able to react to their
external environment and seek to alter it. Ecological modernization also provides for
more variation in behaviors between organizations and industries, rather than the view of
a united group of economic organizations. In addition, in ecological modernization
theory economic organizations do not necessarily resist changes from environmental

inﬂuences such as social movements and the state, and in fact, interorganizational

58

partnerships between these groups are highlighted as part of the process Of political
modernization.

As discussed in the section on corporate environmentalism, at both the corporate
and industry levels we see corporations undertaking environmental actions characterized
by ecological modernization. Pulver (2007) suggests that understanding variations in
ﬁrm environmental behavior is a necessary step of understanding eventual broader
tendencies in capitalism. Pulver employs new institutionalist models of ﬁrm behavior to
focus on bottom up organizational processes in the interpretation of contestation of what
is economically proﬁtable and environmentally desirable. This perspective on social
embeddedness and interpretation of environmental conditions provides useful
understanding on how ﬁrms come to make certain decisions. However, as we as
sociologists proceed in undertaking these organizational and sectoral studies it is
important to simultaneously understand the broader system that serves as the context Of
these actions and the material constraints to them. There are clearly a number of stances
and actions a corporation can take. However, corporate decisions are bound by the logic
of capitalism. Most obviously, we know this because any organization that alters its
organizational objectives to pursue environmental objectives at the cost of its proﬁt
objectives will cease to exist.

Perrow’s (1999) understanding of “normal accidents” in high-risk technologies is
another theory that identiﬁes how system structure can continue to produce
environmental disorganization despite individual organizational changes. Studying
systems like nuclear power facilities, chemical and petroleum reﬁneries, and aircraft

operations, Perrow “locates the risks associated with these complex technical systems in

59

organizational conﬁgurations rather than operational error.” (Beamish, 2002:46). He
identiﬁes how interactively complex systems have the potential to interact in so many
ways that it is nearly impossible for humans to calculate all the interactions and plan for
them. Tightly coupled systems compound this challenge by increasing the time
dependence of events in a system creating little slack for adjustment. The result is that,
though of low probability, high magnitude accidents are almost an inevitable and part of
the system.

Understanding the limits to greening business organizations and technological
advancements has important implications for our responses for mitigating and adapting to
climate change. Consider the case Of meeting current and future electricity needs.
“Normal accidents” in tightly coupled technological systems means that simply switching
energy sources will continue to leave us susceptible to energy and ecological disruptions.
The theory of normal accidents instead suggests that a de-centralized decoupled energy
system where small scale renewable energy technologies and efﬁciency could help us
mitigate climate change while also helping us avoid low risk high impact disasters.
Treadmill of production theory provides insights into why this kind of de-centralized
energy system is unlikely to prevail as one of the solutions to mitigating climate change.
Schnaiberg (1994) writes on the appropriate technology movement of the late 1960’s and
1970’s and its advocacy for the local development of small scale energy systems and how
the political economy of energy led to the adoption of energy policies that instead favored
large scale technologies that supported the status quo. We can witness this currently as

nuclear re-emerges as a climate change solution. The lessons of “normal accidents” and

60

the political economy of energy policy are instructive as social science research seeks to
inform our transition to decreasing fossil fuel use.

Those who attend to the limits of reform and system tendencies are often accused
of being pessimists. It is depressing to point out a switch ﬁom fossils to solar includes
the growth of the manufacturing Of solar technologies that involves increased mining and
creation of toxic by products. However, we may take inspiration from Selznick (1966).
After being charged with embracing a “pathos of pessimism” by Gouldner, Selznick
(1966:v) wrote about the obligation of research to critically assess our ability to meet
ideals:

The point Of anti-utopian criticism is not that it denigrates ideas.

Rather it asks that such ideals [sic] be given their proper place in

human affairs. Ideals are deﬁners of aspiration. They are

judgments upon us. But they are not surrogates for operative

goals. The latter have the special virtue, and suffer the peculiar

hardship, of striving to be reasonably adequate renderings of the

moral ideal while taking due account of the human condition of the

historical setting. A practical goal that does not rise to

Opportunities is unworthy; but one that ignores limitations invites

its own corruption.

To ignore the challenges to sustainability - to systematically focus narrowly on an
organization, a ﬁrm, a nation, without considering the larger context - is a disservice to
the discipline Of sociology, the public, and the environment.

Conclusion

61

The need for a truly sociological perspective on organizations and the natural
environment is critical to understanding and solving environmental problems. In this
article, I have tried to illustrate how bringing research and theory in organizational and
environmental sociology together can provide a stronger and more balanced sociological
perspective on the roots of and solutions for environmental problems. Taken together,
these subdisciplines can help sociological research on organizations and environment
toward the ideal of integrating the social/cultural and natural/material dynamics of
organizations by recognizing the material basis of organizational life and its impacts. In
addition, research on business decision-making and the natural environment united with
an understanding of its political economy provides insights into the contexts of pro-
environmental and harmful actions toward the environment. Finally, work from each
subdiscipline also provides balance on the dangers of and potentials for public-private
cooperation on environmental issues and the potential for and limits to change within
systems. I hope that this article provides an impetus for organizational and
environmental sociologists working on these issues to read each others’ work, talk at
conferences, and maybe even enjoy a meal together. There are surely more lessons to be

learned together.

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CHAPTER TWO
A Context-Dependent Theory of Green Consumer Goods: Conditions of Dynamic

Power Relations in the Struggle for Energy Efficient Appliances

Introduction

For the past decade, environmental sociologists have wrestled with making sense
of the current state of U.S. environmental politics through the use of two major
theoretical lenses: treadmill of production (TOP) theory and ecological modernization
theory (EMT). TOP theory emphasizes the structure of capitalism and its intrinsic
acceleration of resource use and misuse while EMT focuses on the potential for modern
capitalist societies to transform industrial structure and production to improve resource
use. Both perspectives have been able to point to cases that support their theoretical
argument (Pellow, Weinberg & Schnaiberg, 2000; Sonnenfeld, 2000; Scheinberg 2003).
Almost all have agreed that each theory can account for the experiences of speciﬁc
nations or industries at certain times, indicating that the underlying historical social and
economic conditions assumed in each theory make them context-dependent (Buttel and
Gijswijt 2000; M01 and Spaargaren 2000). In this article, I specify the sociopolitical
factors likely to result in the power relations underlying each theory. I then analyze the
case of U.S. state, business, and social movement efforts to deﬁne and promote
residential energy efﬁciency from 1973 to 2006. I use this case to analyze how and when
the state-business-social movement relations underlying EMT or TOP predictions have

prevailed and illustrate the potential value for this contextual approach.

63

The context dependent focus used here to explore these political economic
theories of the environment is inspired by Hooks’ (1993) political sociology approach to
investigating competing theories of the state. Heeding Merton’s (1968) call for middle
range theory, Hooks (1993:75) argued that the strong versions of theories of the state
made “a priori commitments that only the converted would endorse.” Weaker variants
relaxed the strong assumptions acknowledging limits of theories and used pieces of each
theory to explain phenomenon in an ad-hoc fashion. This allowed the weakened
theoretical formulations to account for more of the complexities of history, but also
caused them to become less theoretically distinctive. Indeed, I believe this is the very
situation that environmental sociologists face today in working to assess the political
economic forces of environmental degradation and reform. In this paper, I propose to lay
the groundwork for a theory that more fully accounts for both environmental degradation
and improvement by scoping the sociopolitical conditions of TOP and EMT.

This contextualized political economic theory of green consumer products is then
applied to examine the conditions of evolving institutional relationships among the state,
business and social movements and their outcomes around the deﬁnition and promotion
of energy efﬁcient residential appliances. The 1973 oil shock shook American’s
sensibilities about energy use. Until that point, policymakers and economists assumed
that if there was a demand by household consumers for an energy-efﬁcient appliance,
companies would respond by developing efﬁcient appliance technologies for the market.
The “invisible hand” of the market would work so that supply met the emerging demand
and there was no need for public policy actions. However, facing rising input fuel costs

and increased opposition to and regulation of siting electricity plants, electric utilities

64

managers and public policymakers realized that increasing the supply of electricity would
become more expensive, while continuing low prices through government regulation
provided no market incentive for household consumers to want efﬁcient products. One
environmentally-friendly way to meet the increasing U.S. energy needs was to improve
the efﬁciency of residential appliances. This case focuses on the societal struggle to
empower residential energy consumers to save energy and money by improving the
efﬁciency of residential appliances for consumers. I ﬁnd that a high threat of regulation
of manufacturers is a major driver of business’s willingness to cooperate with social
movement organizations. High threat of regulation occurs under conditions where the
state is open to environmental movement inﬂuence, the presence of environmental crisis,
and high levels of environmental awareness and support. The conditions that result in a
low threat of regulation are high business unity, economic crisis, and low levels of
political opportunity for environmental movement inﬂuence. Under conditions that lead
to a low threat of regulation, the power relations described by TOP prevail and business
interests dominate environmental issues. Under conditions that result in a high threat of
regulation, the power relations described by EMT prevail. Standing alone, neither can
explain the variations in the relationships among state, business and social movements
around environmental issues. However, brought together by specifying the conditions
under which each prevails, the theory can explain efforts to improve energy efﬁciency
under certain conditions.
Current Limits to Understanding Environmental Degradation and Improvement
The strong variants of EMT and TOP are broad macro-level theories of the state,

business, and social movements that explain the extent of environmental degradation or

65

improvement in modern capitalist societies. As is, these theories are difﬁcult to support,
and efforts to evaluate them have consisted mainly Of a single nation or industry leading
to problems of case selection.2 In addition, even empirical work on the same industry,
urban recycling, has led different researchers to different conclusions about the meaning
Of events and the ecological outcomes (Pellow, Weinberg & Schnaiberg, 2000;
Weinberg, Pellow & Schnaiberg, 2000; Scheinberg, 2003). Despite advocacy for more
well-constructed empirical research to shed light on this debate, work that contextualizes
these theories and views them as on-going processes in time and space continues to be
lacking (York, Rosa, and Dietz Forthcoming 2008). In this paper, I will develop a
context dependent theorization of green consumer products that integrates both theories
through a longitudinal case study of the dynamic power relations of efforts within the
U.S. to improve the efﬁciency of home appliances.

The strong variant of ecological modernization states that the Objectives Of
business, the state, and civil society align to account for both economic and ecological
values in decision-making. EMT describes this process Of one where the economy is
ecologized and ecology is economized through the modernization of production and
consumption processes (M01, 1995; Spaargaren, 1997; M01 and Spaargaren, 2000).
Environmental problems are a result of the failure of capitalism and accompanying
political institutions to modernize enough to bring about the technological solutions that
result from a merging of ecological and economic objectives. In EMT, public pressure
and market regulation are strong enough forces to lead corporate actors to incorporate

ecological rationales into their decision-making, effectively greening capitalism. As this

 

2 For an exception see
York, R., E. A. Rosa, and T. Dietz. 2003. "Footprints on the earth: The environmental consequences of
modernity." American sociological review 68:279-300.

66

process occurs, EMT predicts that businesses participate in leading this ecological
restructuring by taking pro-environmental actions beyond those required by regulation.
State agencies focus on facilitating business leadership through a shift away from
command-and-control regulation and toward more inclusive negotiated rule-makings and
ﬂexible approaches. Environmental social movement organizations adopt new tactics in
moving these goals forward by engaging in direct cooperative partnerships with
businesses (M01 1995). Intensifying relationships among these groups are indicative of
the shared logics of “greening” the economy and development of cooperative working
relationships to reach these goals.

This early strong formulation of ecological modernization has come under a
number of criticisms. The most strident is the critique that the capitalist logic of proﬁt
has not been and cannot be ecologized and any appearance as such is window-dressing
(O’Connor 1994; Pellow, Schnaiber, Weinberg 2000). York and Rosa (2003) put forth a
call for empirical support for the suppositions of EMT. Speciﬁcally, they seek evidence
that l) the modernization of institutions yields real ecological improvements; 2)
superindustrialization resulting in green production and consumption is a common
occurrence; 3) overall impacts from industries and ﬁrms are being reduced and not
simply shifted geographically or from one kind of impact to another; and 4) the pace of
increases in resource efficiencies are outstripping the pace of increases in overall
production (Clark and York 2005; York 2006). This line of criticism claims that
increasing ties among business, environmental movement organizations, and the state are

not a reﬂection of converging interests, but a tool to subordinate social movement’s goals

67

to those of business’s proﬁt motive (Pellow et al., 2000). Buttel (2000) critiques EMT’s
failure to clarify and ground itself in broader sociological theories of state-society.

In response to these critiques, several tenets of the strong formulation of EMT
have been weakened. The ﬁrst is an acknowledgement that the pathway of development
toward an ecological economy and the content of modernity is contingent upon many
factors. The integration of ecological concerns is not inevitably a product of
superindustrialization, but instead a product of a political process where the pathway is
dependent on contestation among state, private ﬁrms and civil society groups. It is a
“purposive change due to political decision making and institutional restructuring” that
allows for heterogeneity in patterns of development (Perz, 2007:422). Similarly, EMT
has moved away from isomorphic assumptions about the environmental outcomes of
capitalism (Perz 2007). This weaker variant leaves space for contextualizing the power
relationships among states, ESMOs and business, but fails to take the opportunity to
specify institutional conditions, relative power relations among states, ESMOS and
business, and corresponding environmental outcomes of capitalism.

Contrary to EMT, TOP argues that there is a fundamental conﬂict between the
environment and capitalist economic production. Building on the Monthly Review
school Of Marxism, Schnaiberg (1980) theorizes that the institutional arrangements under
monopoly capitalism result in the competition and concentration of capital that leads to
increases in capital investment and technological production efﬁciencies. This increase
in productive physical capital requires even more ecosystem resources and result in the
increasing rates of withdrawals of material resources from the earth and additions of

these material resources transformed into waste and deposited into the environment. This

68

cycle is referred to as the “treadmill of production.” It generally predicts a worsening Of
the health of the environment through an accelerating treadmill and “environmental
improvement” is understood as a substantial slowing or dismantling of the treadmill.
Producers will not account for ecological harms in their decision-making unless forced to
do so because it would reduce proﬁts. The state is dependent on expanding capital
production and consumption for increasing tax revenue. Workers are dependent on it for
jobs. Any efforts to slow the treadmill of production are tempered by a belief by all actors
that some form of economic expansion is needed to meet their material needs
(Schnaiberg, 1994). In TOP, civil society and business are ﬁghting for scarce resources
and the state is a mediator that tends to favor business, but will negotiate between the two
in a “managed scarcity” approach. Increasingly close relationships among these groups
are generally viewed as a process of cooptation by business of group interests rather than
a shared logic of ecology.

TOP theory has faced its challenges over the past quarter century. Broadly, there
has been a general demise in the political and academic popularity of Marxian analyses or
critiques of capitalism in sociology. Hannigan (1995:22) argues that the whole model
relies “exclusively on the logic of the capitalist system” and a resulting economic
determinism though Buttel (1999) defends TOP against this assertion. The initial
formulation of TOP was an analysis of the U.S. political economy of resource use. The
majority of recent critiques are based on globalization and its impacts on the political
economy theorized by TOP scholars. The expansion of neoliberal capitalism globally is
theorized to have increased the power of businesses to act as they wish while diminishing

the autonomy of the state to control ﬂows of money and resources across national

69

borders. This has challenged TOP’s theorization of the nation-state as a negotiator
between business and civil society’s resource needs (Sonnenfeld and M01, 2002). In
addition, there is an emergence of transnational environmental movement organizations
seeking to counter the rise of transnational corporate power (Gould, 2004).

Treadmill theorists have accommodated these critiques in a few ways though the
thrust of their argument regarding the treadmill has remained the same. One response has
been to de-emphasize the role that monopoly capital plays in the model. Gould,
Schnaiberg, and Pellow (2004) highlight instead how the global north’s industrial
treadmill is predicated on southern natural resource pools, labor pools, markets, and
waste sinks. They also focus on the increasing ease for transnational corporations to
move production around globally. The authors argue that the reorganization of global
capital has forced localities (nations, states, etc.) to compete with others, undermining
their ability to protect the environment through political action (Gould and Schnaiberg,
1994). In addition, they recognize that the forces of the treadmill are decreasingly tied to
the U.S. state (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004). TOP advocates argue that there are
new or renewed forms of political coalitions that seek to oppose the transnational
treadmill such as new environmental-labor alliances and the anticorporate globalization
movement, but they maintain these coalitions are greatly diminished by local and global
treadmills and commodiﬁcation (Buttel 2004).

A Context Dependent Theorization of Ecological Modernization and Treadmill of
Production
One reason the debate on TOP and EMT has lingered is that, although it is clear

that each theory is not fully applicable to all cases, we may easily Observe examples of

70

each theory, particularly in recent U.S. environmental politics. A context dependent
theory seeks to identify the underlying conditions for a theory’s applicability and build on
it. In EMT and TOP, there are assumptions about the power relations among state, social
movements and business and how each sector behaves. Rather than assume power
relations are one way or another, it is better to specify the conditions under which the
power relations lead to the particular theorized environmental outcomes.

EMT asserts that in response to regulatory and societal pressures, businesses will
internalize an ecological rationality and increase their role in ecological restructuring.
The state will shift its role from command-and-control to a negotiated rulemaking agency
that serves as a facilitator for bringing together businesses and civil society to realize and
carry out ecological transformation. In this way, ecological modernization reﬂects a view
of the state as described in early pluralist accounts of the state where the state is an arena
where others compete to promote their subjective interests (Dahl 2005). Environmental
social movement organizations (ESMOs), representing civil society interests, will
increase direct negotiation with industry and the state. EMT does not have an explicit
theory of power, but its focus on institutional change can be informed by recent work by
new institutionalists in organizational sociology who recognize that changes in
organizational ﬁelds emerge from actors that by virtue of size, legitimacy or social capital
can exert power and inﬂuence change (Hoffman and Ventresca, 2002). For institutional
change to occur as EMT predicts, the state and ESMOS must have enough power to
inﬂuence business to adopt their ecological objectives into business’s objectives via
public pressure and regulation. When recast as a context dependent theory, the

relationships anticipated by EMT are likely to emerge when:

71

1) public consciousness of an issue is high increasing the societal pressures for
business to adopt an ecological rationality (Cohen, 1998);

2) the state is open to public pressure to regulate industry heightening the threat
of future regulation via increased political opportunity structure for the public
to actualize their Obj ectives via regulation (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald
1996x

3) the industry has already been regulated on the issue, and thus has developed
ways of incorporating regulatory costs which reduces further resistance
(F ineman and Clarke 1996; Parson 2003)and

4) business interests are fragmented, weakening business’s ability to oppose
regulation and pursue a single interest (Mizruchi and Bey 2005).

TOP theory provides a systematic view where all sectors of society have a stake

in the continuance of the capitalist society that they are a part of. Thus TOP predicts a
tendency to marginalize environmental factors in decision-making. TOP asserts that
business does not internalize ecological rationality and maintains the core logic of proﬁt
maximization. To maximize proﬁts ﬁrms seek to extemalize the social costs of their
economic activities. Monopoly capital, the basis Of TOP’s original formulation, is
characterized by a small number of capitalist corporations and low levels of competition.
These factors result in a united business class that provides a strong basis for opposing
regulations. Breaking with typical Marxist views of “the capitalist state” as relatively
undifferentiated (Amenta, 2005), Schnaiberg (1994) describes it as differentiated
agencies pursuing their own context-based goals as understood by “state-centered”

theorists (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). These goals, however, are highly

72

constrained by the imperative to support continued growth of business for jobs and
maintain the tax base (O’Connor, 1973; Schnaiberg, 1980). Social movement
organizations seek to reduce environmental degradation via the state, but often fail as the
state chooses to protect business interests while meeting its growth imperative. TOP
theory suggests that in economic crisis, the state is even more dependent on business and
the inﬂuence of social movement weakens. While in times of environmental crisis,
environmental social movements may increase their access to and inﬂuence in regulatory
efforts. These changes last only as long the crisis lasts and then normal TOP relations
return. When recast as a context dependent theory, the relationships anticipated by TOP
are likely to emerge when:

1) there are high levels of business unity to oppose social movement inﬂuence on
the state to force business to be responsible for environmental costs of their
activities. This condition is dependent upon either a monopolistic or
oligarchic industry structure with low competitive pressures and/or a strong
trade industry association that facilitates industry unity (Mizruchi and Bey,
2005);

2) there is low threat of regulation and little previous regulation of an industry.
This occurs particularly in times of economic crisis when state autonomy is
decreased and it becomes more dependent on business decreasing receptivity
to civil society concerns (Evans, Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985;

Schnaiberg, 1994);

73

3) in times of resource crisis and a healthy economy and state administrations are
more Open to environmental concerns. Under these conditions, states have
more autonomy from business to pursue civil society’s interest in resources.

This study focuses on the power relations among state, civil society and business

that would lead to ecological modernization or treadmill of production processes. While
the above discussion has highlighted the differences between these two theories, there are
points of likeness. For example, TOP theorizes that under certain conditions the
treadmill can be slowed temporarily. We may ask what is the difference between the
power relations predicted for slowing the treadmill of production and ecological
modernization? The key difference in original formulations of the theories is the
emphasis given to the development of direct relationships between the environmental
movement and business in ecological modemization. Original formulations of TOP
focused on increased social movement power to inﬂuence the state (Schnaiberg. 1980).
Subsequent writings on TOP suggests that if business supports a regulation or participates
in a voluntary partnership, its motive is proﬁt driven (delaying regulation could be more
costly, new regulation presents additional market regulation) whereas EMT ascribes
cooperation between business and ESMOS to a merging of ecological and economic
rationality achieved by modernization. The “true” motives of industry are difﬁcult to
assess and are not addressed in this study. Much work has been done investigating the
motivations for business action and almost all has found a range Of motives that
encompass both bottom line and ethical dimensions (Bansal and Roth, 2000). The

primary distinction I draw here is that EMT predicts direct cooperative interactions and

74

negotiations between ESMOS and business whereas TOP predicts that the state will
mediate interactions between the two.
Methods

To examine dynamic organizational relations and their contexts around appliance
efﬁciency over time I conducted archival research. The aim of my archival research was
to 1) identify organizations participating in efforts to inﬂuence the deﬁnition and
promotion of efﬁcient appliances, 2) the nature of organizational relationships in these
efforts, and 3) the broader social and political contexts of the relationships. To identify
and describe organizational interactions around appliance efﬁciency ﬁ'om 1978 to 2006, I
used Department of Energy (DOE) mandatory efﬁciency standards rulemaking dockets,
energy star negotiations, lawsuit case ﬁndings, and newspaper articles in the New York
Times. Since 1978, each time the Department of Energy has sought to develop
minimum energy efﬁciency standards it is required by law to publish in the Federal
Register an advanced notice of public rulemaking that announces they are considering
developing standards and identiﬁes dates for public hearings and written comment, a
notice of proposed rule that announces a proposed standard developed by the agency and
identiﬁes dates for public hearings and written comment, and a ﬁnal rule that announces
a ﬁnal standard and addresses the comments it received in the previous commenting
periods. Transcripts from these hearings and comments submitted from these
rulemakings are made part of a public record. In winter 2008, I electronically searched
the Federal Register (using HeinOnline) 1978 to 2006 using the key words “appliance”,
“NECPA”, “NECA” or “NAECA”. This identiﬁed all federal register announcements

regarding appliance energy efficiency. I then requested the dockets kept on each of the

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events held by Department of Energy which included transcripts and attendees if it was a
hearing and copies of comments received by DOE. DOE had misplaced dockets from
between1980 to 1988. Negotiations from 2001-2006 on the voluntary Energy Star
labeling program were retrieved from the DOE website, Environmental Protection
Agency website, and in coordinationi‘with a DOE consultant who worked on the Energy
Star meetings. I then conducted lawsuit case searches in relation to the policy and
regulations related to appliance efﬁciency to identify lawsuits that had been brought.
Lawsuit case background materials were useful in ﬁlling in the missing DOE data.
Finally, New York Times articles were searched for any articles reporting on appliance
energy efﬁciency and organization and events described were noted. Once these sources
were compiled, the organization, individual representative, position held, date comment
was made or hearing was held, and nature Of comment was then logged. Organizational
characteristics such as whether it was a business, energy efﬁciency non-proﬁt, trade
industry, utility, state or federal governmental agency was coded. To identify the broader
social and political contexts I consulted a broad range of published research on
presidential administrations and energy and environmental policy (Andrews 2006; Miller
1995; Schnaiberg 1994), public opinion on environmental issues (Dunlap 1992; Dunlap
and Scarce 1991), and energy efﬁciency advocates accounts of improving appliance
efﬁciency (Nade12002;Nadel 1997; Rosenfeld 1999).
The Shifting Political Economy of U.S. Appliance Efﬁciency

In the early 19703, the idea of an unending supply of cheap electricity was
threatened by an increasing realization of US vulnerability to foreign Oil producers and

rising prices of inputs for electric and gas utilities. In addition, energy utilities were

76

encountering technological limitations Of a centralized energy system with a slowing rate
of increases of efficiencies from economies of scale in electricity production. Finally,
energy utilities were ﬁnding it more difﬁcult and costly of to site new plants, including
nuclear power plants (Smil 1994). These conditions led to a substantial political interest
in empowering U.S. citizens to reduce their demand in energy for the ﬁrst time in U.S.
history. However, despite a wide understanding that energy-efﬁciency was an Obvious
“win-win” solution with its potential to save money and save the environment (Hayes
2000), market supply and demand for energy efﬁciency did not materialize evenly across
the economy (California Energy Commission 2005). The residential sector seemed
especially laggard. Academics and advocates interested in energy efﬁciency sought to
understand the reasons for these market failures. They identiﬁed multiple barriers to
market development for energy efﬁcient lighting and appliances including distortion of
energy prices by U.S. energy policies, lack of consumer knowledge and understanding of
long-term energy costs of purchases or behaviors, and split incentives where one party
purchases a product and another pays the operating costs (California Energy Commission
2005). These “market barriers”, as they are referred to in the energy efﬁciency ﬁeld,
create the need for speciﬁc policies or actions to be undertaken in order to increase
energy efficient product availability and demand.

One of the ﬁrst things state and federal policymakers did to address the market
barrier of lack of consumer knowledge was to develop test procedures for appliance
energy use. The intent was to provide comparable measures of appliance energy use
consumers so consumers could compare and choose. The development of these test

procedures also provided a basis for deﬁning efﬁcient appliances through voluntary

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labeling programs or eliminating the worst energy performing products through minimtun
efﬁciency standards. From the early 1970s, policymakers discussed both voluntary and
mandatory approaches discussed for deﬁning and promoting efﬁcient products in the
marketplace. States like California and New York led, while the federal government
followed.

Deﬁning a product as energy efﬁcient or not efficient is a political process that
leads to an environmental outcome. It is political because the decision is one where
various parties have a stake in the outcome and power relations are enacted to decide
“who gets what, when and how”(Laswell 1936). Higher levels of efﬁciency for an
appliance mean, all things being held constant, avoided need for energy supplies and
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and air pollutants from the avoidance of fossil
fuels extraction and combustion. The development of appliance efﬁciency speciﬁcations
has been a rocky road characterized by antagonistic relationships, lawsuits, cooperative
coalitions, broken coalitions, and administrative interventions. The U.S. national
laboratories provide exhaustive analyses of the economic and technological Options and
impacts for mandatory rulemakings of efﬁciency standards. Efﬁciency advocates and
manufacturers closely scrutinize the assumptions and meaning of what is technologically
and economically feasible inevitably comes under close scrutiny (American Council for
an Energy Efficient Economy, 1996; Association for Home Appliance Manufacturers,
1996). All sides lay claim to being experts and the national lab scientists must defend
their objectivity and ﬁndings against claims of “ineptitude and bias” (Association for
Home Appliance Manufacturers, 1996). Manufacturers of the products being deﬁned

have an interest in ensuring that they are already producing items meeting the efﬁciency

78

standard or that they can produce these products without high incremental investments.
Depending on these relative competitive advantages that manufacturers have they may
vary in support for level of efficiency being speciﬁed in a standard. Often manufacturers
producing products with the highest levels of efﬁciency are most opposed to an increase
in mandatory minimum standards as it raises the ﬂoor making it harder to differentiate
their product from others. Energy efﬁciency, consumer, and environmental advocates
have sought to set levels of efﬁciency higher ensuring maximum savings for consumers
and reductions of impacts on the environment. Meanwhile the state’s position in these
debates has varied from objective negotiator to interested party with agencies facing off
and all three branches of government intervening at various points.

In this study, I utilize archival materials from debates deﬁning energy efﬁciency
as well as data on sociopolitical conditions to explore how changes in sociopolitical and
economic conditions are correlated with changing power relations among state,
environmental social movement, and business relations. Each sector theorized is
conceptualized as a population of organizations. Though TOP and EMT theorize
capitalist political economy and the environment in terms of the state, business, and
social movements at the societal sector, recognizing that the logics of these relations are
carried out by organizations embedded within that institution enables us to carry out a
grounded analysis of the power relations among organizations. This approach also
recognizes that actors embedded in these institutions have varying levels of agency in
how they interpret and apply these logics (Burns and Dietz 1992; Clemens and Cook
1999). This approach has been utilized extensively in political sociology (Clemens 1997;

Hooks 1993; Laumann, Knoke, and Kim 1985).

79

In this study, the state is instantiated as government agencies, business as for-
proﬁt organizations and industry associations, and social movements as non-proﬁt
organizations advocating for energy efﬁciency. The extent to which the non-proﬁt
organizations involved “energy efﬁciency” debates are environmental social movement
organizations is arguable. There is-certainly some overlap with the mainstream
environmental movement. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) is highly active
in the energy efﬁciency ﬁeld with Sierra Club and others occasionally participating I
(particularly in partnership with NRDC). In addition, there are many more locally based
organizations that have their roots in the early “appropriate technology movement” of the
early 1970’s such as the Center for Neighborhood Technology of Chicago and Center for
Energy and Environment in Minneapolis. However, many organizations involved are
dedicated speciﬁcally to energy efﬁciency at the national or regional level (i.e. the
American Council for an Energy Efﬁcient Economy or the Northwest Energy Efﬁciency
Alliance). These organizations, though talking about the environmental beneﬁts of
energy efficiency, have no public membership, and employ a highly professional staff
with a focus on technical expertise.

The process of deﬁning energy efﬁcient residential appliances is a useful
empirical case for this purpose for three reasons. First, efforts to improve energy
efﬁciency have drawn attention from both EMT and TOP advocates (Schnaiberg, 1994;
Mo] and Spargaaren, 2004). Schnaiberg (1994) suggests that the politics of energy
efﬁciency that have emerged is an example of the state and business’s dedication to
upholding the capitalist treadmill. In his case study on the political economy of energy

policymaking he reminds us that two options emerged in response to the rising oil prices.

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The appropriate technology movement sought to “dismantle the treadmill and substitute a
more subsistence-like, stable, intermediate technology” (Schnaiber,l994:27; Schumacher
1973). Meanwhile, Amory Lovins put forth the less radical “soft energy pa ” that
focused on energy efficiency (Lovins and Thorndike 1978). Schnaiberg has
characterized the focus on energy efﬁciency that has prevailed as a “change in the forces
of production associated with energy transformations with little change in business-labor
class relations” as opposed to the appropriate technology movement which sought to alter
production and class relations (Schnaiberg, 1994: 28). He argues that in this way the
treadmill of production and its relations were preserved by energy efﬁciency.
Meanwhile, advances in energy efficiency through cooperative market-based approaches
used to promote it have served as a prime example of ecological modernization (Melchert
2007). The second reason I focus on the case of residential energy efﬁciency is that past
studies indicates that power relations among the sectors have inﬂuenced the development
and adoption of energy efficiency policies and multiple approaches to efﬁciency have
evolved over time (Varone and Aebischer 2001). Finally, the availability of historical
notices, transcripts from meetings, and organizational comments in negotiations available
from proceedings on mandatory and voluntary negotiations on appliance efﬁciency allow
for a detailed analysis of organizational participation and stances on these issues.
The Face of Treadmill of Production 1981-1986: Reaganism, Pre-Regulation, and
Resistance

In 1977, the energy crisis was back on the pages of the newspapers and in
people’s minds with 301 articles being run in the New York Times. During the 1973-74

OPEC embargo the New York Times had run 929 articles with “energy crisis” or a

81

related term in its headlines or ﬁrst paragraph, but this had fallen to a mere 31 articles in
1976. The general public’s support for government doing more to protect the
environment had fallen from its highs in the early 19708 but hovered around 50%
(Dunlap 1992; Dunlap and Scarce 1991). Subsequent to the ﬁrst wave of the energy
crisis, the Republican Ford administration had taken a voluntary approach issuing a
federal directive that suggested the energy efﬁciency of residential appliances attain
voluntary 20% improvement targets (subsequently formalized in the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975). In 1977, the Democratic Carter Administration came into
power and proposed mandatory energy efﬁciency standards for residential products. The
debate over making energy efficiency standards mandatory was contentious in the U.S.
Congress, generally falling along party lines. In the end, the National Energy
Conservation and Policy Act (ECPA) of 1978 was adopted with mandatory energy
efﬁciency standards. The Department Of Energy (DOE), under the Carter
administration, formulated minimum energy efﬁciency standards and was near
implementing them when a change of presidential party occurred once again (Nadel
1997)

In 1981, Ronald Reagan took over the White House and a new Republican
Administration began. Reagan called for the abolition of the DOE and saw little need for
an energy policy beyond the strategic petroleum reserve and a strong military presence in
the Middle East. His budget director, David Stockman, expressed the Reagan philosophy
as "strategic reserves and strategic forces" (Miller, 1995: 2). Consistent with the anti-
govemment intervention, free market philosophy of the administration, a notice of intent

was promptly published in the Federal Register on February 23rd to review the standards

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developed by DOE under the Carter Administration for nine appliances. The notice of
intent noted the administration’s particular concerns about the “economic justiﬁcation”
for the energy efﬁciency standards (CAS-RM-78-100 Comment 8).

The Reagan administration’s review of the standards and general anti-regulatory
stance signaled to industry a decreased probability that national appliance standards
would be enacted. In addition, the public’s concern for environmental and energy issues
diminished as support for environmental regulation dropped to new lows and the 1979
energy crisis disappeared from the newspaper pages with falling oil prices. Meanwhile,
the economy remained a focus of attention as the U.S. economy plunged into a deep
recession in 1981. Under these conditions we expect the power relations predicted by
TOP to emerge where 1) the state, with decreasing autonomy due to economic crisis,
favors business interests’ 2) civil society has little opportunity to inﬂuence the state to
protect the environment and 3) competing business and civil society interests are
mediated by the state. Inspecting newspaper articles from the New York Times and
transcripts from the regulatory hearings (Docket CAS RM-79-113, Comment #3) there is
no evidence of cooperative relationships between business and non-govemmental
organizations. The state’s interest in not regulating the market, including energy
efﬁciency, is aligned with appliance manufacturers’ interests in not being regulated.

In October of 1981, left with no other opportunity to inﬂuence the state’s adoption
of mandatory standards, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Consumers
Union of the United States ﬁled suit against DOE to compel promulgation of appliance
efﬁciency standards (NRDC, Inc. v. Edwards, Civ. No. 8102546). On April 2, 1982,

DOE published its ﬁndings on its review of the Carter administration’s proposed

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standards. DOE found that the previously proposed standards neither provided
signiﬁcant energy savings, nor were economically justiﬁed as required by Energy Policy
and Conservation Act of 1975. DOE’s ﬁndings were based on drastic revisions of what
"signiﬁcant" savings meant and re-calculations of the beneﬁts and burdens of mandatory
standards. Based on these ﬁndings, DOE proposed that no standards were justiﬁable for
any of the eight appliances that were to be covered under EPCA (47 Fed.Reg. 14,424:
1982). This came to be referred to by the energy efﬁciency advocacy community as the
“no standards standard.” As required by procedural law, DOE provided opportunity for
comment on the proposed rule.

DOE'S notice did not state when DOE would make its ﬁnal decision on appliance
efﬁciency so NRDC and Consumers Union pressed forward with their litigation to force
DOE to implement standards. DOE settled the suit by agreeing to establish efﬁciency
standards no later than October 29, 1982, unless prevented by good cause (47 F ed.Reg.
57,198, 57,200: 1982). DOE failed to meet that deadline. On December 22, 1982, DOE
published its ﬁnal rule determining that standards for kitchen ranges and ovens and for
clothes dryers would not result in signiﬁcant conservation of energy and in any event
would not be economically justiﬁed. On August 30th, 1983, DOE announced its refusal
to prescribe mandatory standards for the six remaining priority products (48 Fed.Reg.
39,376: 1983). DOE concluded that for seven of the eight appliances considered in the
December 1982 and August 1983 rules, standards would not result in signiﬁcant
conservation and would not be economically justiﬁed. For the eighth, central air
conditioners, DOE concluded that a standard would result in signiﬁcant conservation but

would not be economically justiﬁed. These ﬁnal rules ended federal consideration Of

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standards for the eight appliances and pre-empted state efﬁciency regulation of those
appliances. DOE also decided that it was not required to prepare an environmental
assessment or environmental impact statement for its "no-standard standard"
determinations.

These decisions by DOE illustrate it pursuing the objectives that met its
immediate needs for administration approval and business proﬁt in the face of economic
crisis. Its manipulation of the tests that determined the signiﬁcance of savings and costs
of energy efficiency clearly aligns its interests with the interests of targeted regulated
manufacturers at the expense of public and environmental interests in energy
conservation. In its determination of “no-standard standards” the Republican executive
branch clearly favored appliance industry interests which focused on avoiding the costs
entailed in re-tooling manufacturing plants for energy efﬁciency. The Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC), Consumers Union of the United States, Representative
Richard Ottinger (Democrat from New York), the California State Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Commission, the State of Minnesota, and the State of
New York ﬁled suit against the Department of Energy once again (NRDC v. Herrington,
768 F.2d 1355). The State of Texas Energy Ofﬁce, the Northwest Power Planning
Council, the Florida Department of Community Affairs (Energy Ofﬁce), the Oregon
Department of Energy, and the Iowa Commerce Commission provided support for the
petitioners’ claims. Various appliance manufacturers and the Association of Home
Appliance Manufacturers intervened in support of the Secretary of Energy Herrington.

The court’s ﬁndings from this lawsuit are instructive on how deﬁnitions can be

inﬂuenced by powerful organizations to ﬁt their agenda in appliance standards. DOE had

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redeﬁned what was technologically feasible to only those products currently available on
the U.S. market and would not consider any prototype technologies or technologies
currently available in foreign markets. Economic justiﬁability was limited to a 5 year
pay back from a technology’s speciﬁc energy savings even though all appliances under
consideration last between 12-23 years. The discount rate for consumer decisions was
doubled from 5% to 10%.

The lack of Opportunity for efﬁciency advocates to inﬂuence DOE is exempliﬁed
in the court’s ﬁndings that DOE had violated section 336(a)(2) of EPCA. That section
provides that in prescribing energy efﬁciency standard “the Secretary shall, by means of
conferences or other informal procedures, afford any interested party an opportunity to
question employees of the United States who have made written or oral presentations,
with respect to disputed issues of material fact. Such Opportunity shall be afforded to the
extent the Secretary determines that the questioning pursuant to such procedures is likely
to result in a more timely and effective resolution of such issues.” In a 1982 hearing,
NRDC had requested to ask questions in person and they were denied but told to submit
questions in writing. NRDC submitted six questions regarding the appliance rulemaking
and DOE replied that the questions failed to demonstrate how their questioning would
result in a more timely and effective resolution. DOE wrote back to NRDC that NRDC
needed to identify the disputed issues of fact and who they wanted to question for DOE to
reconsider. However, when NRDC submitted these materials they were again denied the
Opportunity to question DOE (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Herrington,

768 F.2d 1355 DC. Cir. 1985).

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The “no standards” standards were set aside by the courts in the NRDC v.
Herrington and rulemaking for standards ordered to start again. This ruling, along with
the state-level energy standards already in place, made national mandatory appliance
efﬁciency standards more likely. The major appliance manufacturer organizations began
negotiations in ear1y1986 with the Natural Resources Defense Council to develop
national standards. An agreement was reached in July 1986, which was subsequently
written as proposed legislation based on previously enacted state standards. This
legislation was introduced in August 1986 in both Houses of Congress (HR. 5465, S.
2781). The legislation was largely viewed by manufacturers and states as a compromise
— states gave up the right to develop their own standards providing manufacturers the
“non-patchwork” uniﬁed national market they needed and in return manufacturers
acquiesced to national standards to be updated periodically. On November 1, 1986,
despite industry support for it, President Reagan pocket vetoed the measure. He argued
that appliance efﬁciency standards were not consonant with the administration’s policy of
minimal Federal regulatory involvement in the marketplace. The next year, however,
Congress passed an essentially identical bill (S. 83, or the National Appliance Energy
Conservation Act referred to as NAECA) on March 3, and President Reagan signed it on
March 17,1987, ending the 9 year struggle to implement the ﬁrst mandatory appliance
energy efﬁciency standards.

In the years of 1980 to 1986, I ﬁnd that the case of appliance energy efﬁciency
supports my context dependent theory of TOP and the expected political outcomes. The
Reagan administration’s laissezfaire market approach along with the 1981-1982

recession that assured state dependence on business resulted in the threat of regulation

87

being low. As a result, business was not inclined to cooperate with environmental groups
and energy advocates to pursue efﬁciency goals. The lack of political opportunity to
inﬂuence the state lead to the kinds of oppositional politics described by TOP where
regional and state energy ofﬁces with energy efﬁciency advocates pursued their interests
through the courts to enforce the statutory laws and required DOE to carry out its
regulatory functions. In the end, the courts upheld their role as an independent
adjudicator of the law. This highlights the important role the judicial branch has played
in enabling environmental policies, once in place, to have real impact despite shifts in
political administration and public opinion. Although lawsuits are decried as expensive,
time-consuming, and blamed for negative and combative relations among the societal
sectors, they have often provided ESMO’s with their only opportunity to pursue their
interests when the state and business interests are dominant. With the court’s ruling,
national mandatory standards become imminent. This increased threat of regulation,
along with the growing state patchwork of appliance standards, provided the conditions
where business capitulated and agreed to negotiate with efﬁciency advocates.
The Face of Ecological Modernization 1992-2001: Pre-negotiated Standards and
Market Transformation

Once the ﬁrst mandatory standards were implemented, a transition of power
relations occurs among ESMOS, government and industry. After a low of 49.7% in 1980,
public support for environmental regulation resurged in 1990 to 69.8% of the general
public supporting increased government involvement to protect the environment (Dunlap,
1992; Dunlap and Scarce, 1991). While the ﬁrst Bush administration was a continuation

Of the Republican policies of Reagan, it was arguably not as ardent in its dedication to the

88

free market. The Bush administration also faced the reality of foreign Oil disruptions
once again with the ﬁrst Iraq War (Miller, 1995). Recognizing the problem of a
patchwork of state standards, the Bush administration did not block new national
standards that had industry support. In 1988 and 1991, motivated by states establishing
standards for products not covered by NAECA, manufacturers and efﬁciency advocates
negotiated new standards for ultimately these discussions led to passage of federal
legislation in 1988 establishing efﬁciency standards for ﬂuorescent lamp ballasts. In
1992, the Energy Policy Act expanded standards to include a variety of lamps, electric
motors, and commercial heating, cooling, and plumbing products. By 1992, the
Association for Home Appliance Manufacturers (AHAM) and its manufacturers were
negotiating standards with Natural Resources Defense Council, the American Council for
an Energy-Efﬁcient Economy (ACEEE) and a number of states (most prominently
California, Massachusetts and New York) to bring to DOE on a regular basis.

In 1993, the Democratic Clinton administration entered the White House after 12
years of Republican rule. While the Democrats willingness to regulate industry was
higher than that of the previous Republican administration, the Clinton Administration
had also adopted rhetoric consistent with the ideas of ecological modernization espousing
a willingness to provide more innovative approaches and work more cooperatively.
Miller’s (1995) analysis Of the early energy policy under the Clinton administration
documents a switch to market-based approaches as a substitute for more prescriptive
regulatory mandates. Miller points to: 1)the Clinton administration’s support of "market
transforming" strategies emphasized in Climate Change Action Plan, 2)the system of

competitive bidding for new power plants that has evolved in response to Public Utility

89

Regulatory Policies Act, 3) the emissions trading system central to the acid rain program
for coal burning power plants incorporated in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
and 4) the concept of "joint implementation," a variant of emissions trading included in
the F rarnework Convention on Climate Change. All of these programs provided
regulated industry with greater latitude in choosing the means to achieve energy and
environmental goals, while creating incentives for technological innovation. This reﬂects
a changing role of the state around energy issues as it moved to become a “market
facilitator.”

In the meantime, environmental and energy groups identiﬁed and built new
relationships with an unexpected “big business” — electric power utilities. Utilities are in
the business Of selling energy — so why the interest in efﬁciency? Some electric utility
companies facing strict regulations and public opposition to the building of new power
plants and/or transmission infrastructure still needed to meet the increasing energy
demands of industry and the public. Often these utilities have challenges meeting the
highest times Of public electricity use (called peak demand), which occur on the hottest
days when customers all run air-conditioners at the same time. Utilities serving the
metropolitan areas of California and the densely populated northeast corridor from
Boston to New York City are the most affected by the problem of peak demand.
Reduction in appliance energy use was a relatively inexpensive way to avoid expensive
power plant construction for utilities. State regulators had been supporting this approach
by using efﬁciency as part of the least cost planning process for utilities. In fact, many
states collected a small surcharge on energy use called a systems beneﬁt charge that was

dedicated to run energy efﬁciency programs to decrease demands. Mandatory energy

90

efﬁciency standards are essentially a way for electric utilities to shift costs from their
industry to the appliance industry.

Recognizing these overlapping interests in energy efﬁciency, lead to innovations
in industry and environmental movement partnerships that are characteristic of ecological
modernization in the appliance efﬁciency ﬁeld. For example, the 1993 Clinton/Gore U.S.
Climate Change Action Plan cites the 1990 Super Efﬁcient Refrigerator Program (SERP)
as an example of a favored approach that emphasizes ESMO-industry cooperative efforts
that have a minimal role for government (Gore 1993). The idea of SERP was born in
1990 during discussions between Paciﬁc Gas & Electric (PG&E), the nation’s largest
investor-owned utility, and NRDC on how utilities could best leverage their money to
gain the most energy saving. PG&E, ACEEE, and NRDCE proceeded to organize SERP
with twenty-four utilities from a range of states to pool $30 million to award the
manufacturer that could build the most efﬁcient CF C-free refrigerator at the lowest cost.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provided a minimal amount of money and
had limited involvement. SERP went on to be incorporated as the Consortium for Energy
Efﬁciency which develops voluntary speciﬁcation for appliances for utilities running
conservation programs.

Indeed these kinds of approaches became encompassed in an approach commonly
referred to as “market transformation.” Market transformation is a “process whereby
energy-efﬁciency innovations are introduced into the marketplace and over time
penetrate a large portion of the eligible market.” (Geller and Nadel 1994). The strategies
are targeted at increasing technology diffusion and include research and development,

demonstration and ﬁeld tests, commercialization incentives, marketing and consumer

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education, grants, loans, and tax incentives, voluntary commitments, bulk purchases,
building codes and appliance standards (Geller and Nadel, 1994). In 1997, the American
Council for an Energy Efﬁcient Economy instituted an annual “Market Transformation”
Symposium in Washington, DC.

This is an example of an evolution of partnerships between utilities and other
industries on the one hand and environmentalists on the other that allow for mutually
beneﬁcial outcomes, as opposed to litigation and regulatory confrontations that produce
winners and losers. However, these approaches only work with the Options to litigate and
regulate still in play to encourage compromise and the search for common ground. An
instructive example of this occurred in 1994 when there was a change in control Of
Congress and Newt Gingrich led renewed efforts to dismantle DOE and reduce
regulation.

In the 90’s efforts were underway to revise the ﬁrst set of standards put into place
in 1986. The revision of mandatory standards by DOE involves conducting analyses,
proposing standard levels, soliciting public comments, and then issuing ﬁnal standards.
While this type of process sometimes works successfully, this process has often lead to
bitter ﬁghts among competing interests and resulted in a standard that several parties
were dissatisﬁed with. An alternative to this type Of formal standard-setting process is for
manufacturers, consumers, ESMOS, and government agencies to work together to
negotiate on standard levels. This has often been done with limited government
involvement where parties then bring the “pre-negotiated” standard to DOE to adopt.

On November 11, 1994, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Association of

Home Appliance Manufacturers and American Council for an Energy Efﬁcient

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Economy, along with the New York State Energy Ofﬁce, the California Energy
Commission, Paciﬁc Gas & Electric, and Southern California Edison, presented joint
comments to the U.S. Department of Energy describing a two-year negotiation process
and a pre-negotiated standard for refrigerators, refrigerator-freezers, and freezers. All
parties above expressed that rulemaking procedures, even informal rulemakings such as
those conducted under NAECA, tend to cause participants to take relatively rigid,
adversarial, and ideological positions. The manufacturers, advocates, and utilities that
had participated in the negotiation process expressed hope that the informal pre-
negotiations would facilitate the candid sharing of information and development of more
innovative approaches. For manufacturers, the pre-negotiation of standards provided
certainty about the products they would need to produce in the future. Negotiating the
standards before the formal DOE rulemaking also provided manufacturers extra lead time
to re-tool for the new standards and to coordinate this re-tooling with CFC phase-outs.
Non-industry participants were motivated to participate by improved access to
manufacturer’s technical and economic information. This enabled them to make more
informed judgments as to the economic feasibility of different levels of energy efﬁciency
along avoiding the costs of participating in prolonged rulemakings.

All parties to the negotiations urged the DOE to act quickly to enable
manufacturers to prepare for the upcoming implementation. However, the Republicans
had captured Congress. In 1995, allegedly at the prompting of AHAM (National
Association of State Energy Ofﬁces, 1995), a proposal for a moratorium on new
appliance efficiency standards was inserted into the Interior and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act for Fiscal 1996. On July 20‘“, 1995 DOE published the Notice of

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Proposed Rule that, for the most part, adopted the jointly proposed pre-negotiated
standards as its proposed levels. In a letter dated August 11, 1995, AHAM requested a
postponement of the hearings and written comment deadline because of the legislative
proposals before Congress to withhold appropriations for DOE appliance standards
making, which would delay the adoption of the standards. In a hearing on October 25,
1995, AHAM made oral comments backing away from the pre-negotiated standards by
taking a “no standing” on the proposed rule as the legislation had been passed by the U.S.
House Of Representatives and Senate. Whirlpool, an AHAM member, broke with the
trade industry by voicing disapproval of AHAM’s silence on the issue and continued
support for the joint proposal and DOE’s proposed rule. Whirlpool acknowledged it had
a good competitive position in relation to the standard with plenty of products that met
the standard on the market, but also cited that it felt it had an “ethical obligation” to stand
by the standards it had agreed to (Whirlpool, 1995). ACEEE and NRDC also continued
their support with the proviso that if DOE re-opened the rulemaking the compromises
they agreed to in the pre-negotiation phase would have to be revisited. On August 12,
1996 the U.S. Doe published a second Notice of Proposed Rule that re-opened
negotiations for new refrigerator/freezer standards. In the end, the pro-negotiated
standards that had been negotiated since 1992 became effective in 2001.
Discussion and Conclusion

This study illustrates that recognizing the broader sociopolitical conditions that
alter societal power relations provides insight into when TOP or EMT theories are
applicable. By using this context-sensitive approach, it is clear that TOP theory is

instructive in explaining power relations among state, business and civil society during

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the early Reagan years of ﬁrst trying to regulate energy efﬁciency in residential
appliances. However, EMT proved similarly useful for explaining more cooperative
direct business-ESMO efforts to improve energy efficiency of appliances during the
Clinton presidency. In contrast to the Reagan years where the state strongly favored
business interests, during the Clinton years there was a purposeﬁrl effort by business to
directly engage with local and state government and environmental movement
organizations with limited federal involvement. In addition, the Clinton government
developed as a market facilitator, rather than command-and-control regulator, through
such programs as the voluntary labeling programs meant to foster less mandatory
regulation and more cooperative efforts to bring efﬁcient appliances to market in
adherence with EMT. This study highlights the sensitivity of these two theories to the
strength Of the state and unity of the capitalist class and the state’s likelihood to pass
regulations on behalf of public interests that are at odds with business interests.

There are a couple of characteristics that make the case of appliance energy
efﬁciency unique and may limit its generalizability in studying power relations of TOP
and EMT. Appliance efﬁciency standards deal with the product made by industry rather
than the process of production (though the design of the product can be considered part of
the production process). Thus the targeted change is to get manufacturers to produce an
energy efficient product for consumers, not to make their production practices more
efﬁcient, which is the primary focus of theories of ecological modernization of
production and treadmill of production. There is some evidence that corporations
approach these two types of decisions separately, weighing different factors. A good

example can be found in the automobile industry. Ford Motor Company arguably has

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greater resource production efﬁciencies than other manufacturers, but the automobile
ﬂeet it produces has lower average miles per gallon than other car manufacturers (Levy
and Rothenberg, 2002). These differences are likely due to differences in corporate
assessment of proﬁt potentials. Ford perceives an opportunity to make proﬁt by reducing
resource input expenses while perceiving that there is not a proﬁt opportunity in
producing more fuel efﬁcient cars. Both TOP and EMT focus on production processes
not on consumption efﬁciency. The theories are calibrated at the level of states and
industries, while the case study is more micro in focus. Since TOP theorizes that changes
in the production process that conserve resources take the proﬁts from the increased
efﬁciencies and make additional investments in business that speeds up withdrawals from
the environment, it does not predict the environmental impacts of decisions about what
products to produce.

This leads us to the second unique characteristic of the case of residential energy
efficient appliances, which is that it is a case where the economic signals are muted thus
signiﬁcantly reducing the market mechanism that is at the heart of EMT. EMT argues
that rising prices for resources that come about through the internalization of
environmental costs will lead to increased efﬁciencies of resource use in the production
process. In this case, residential consumers have electricity prices that are kept relatively
low via regulation, dampening the consumer demand for energy efficient products. In
addition, for renters, there is a split incentive because building owners pay the ﬁrst costs
of the appliances, but the renter will pay the electricity bill. Because of this, historically
manufacturers do not perceive a proﬁtable consumer market for energy efﬁcient

products. This has begun to change and show greater amounts of variation, particularly

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as energy-efﬁcient products have come under the broader heading of popular “green”
products. However, in this case, there is a failure to internalize the ecological
externalities in the production of electricity. This trickles down to the production of
energy using products (Norberg-Bohm 2000).

The uniqueness of this case indicates that the contexts of business-state-civil
society power relations could be further contextualized toward a theory of “green”
consumer products. There has been a great deal written about the power of markets to
bring about changes in the environmental impacts and human safety of products, but the
political economy of consumer products and market failures must be understood. In
effect, the contextualized theories of EMT and TOP power relations offered could apply
to any case where there is a conﬂict between multiple users’ interests and producer’s
interests in a product. If market signals are clear and the economic is ecologized and the
ecology is economized, then production processes will automatically become more
resource efﬁcient and end-users will demand more efﬁcient, green, safe products (Mol,
1995; Spaargaren, 1997; Mo] and Spaargaren, 2000) and we are left with only assessing
whether the outcome is an environmentally signiﬁcant improvement (EMT) or
environmentally insigniﬁcant improvement (TOP). However, market failures are
commonplace in environmental problems and the context dependent theory I propose is
focused on the predicted power relations in EMT and TOP that determine what ecology
gets economized and what economy gets ecologized and how that happens. That is —
what is internalized and extemalized is a result of the exercise of power.

In addition to the theoretical insights this research has some important

implications for U.S. policy efforts to address climate change. Currently greenhouse gas

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producing fossil fuels - coal, oil and natural gas — provide more than 85% of all energy
consumed in the United States (U .S. Department of Energy, 2008). Reducing the United
States’ use of these fuels is one of the major pathways to mitigating its contributions to
climate change. Since this study is focused on the political economy of a consumer
product, it makes a contribution to understanding the political economic context of
consumer choices to reduce their energy consumption and Carbon footprint. Although
there is a strong body of social science research on energy consumption and behavior
(Stern and Gardener, 2008), this study aligns with one aspect of the treadmill model in
that it focuses more on economic structure and political power as the context for
consumer decisions (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg, 2004). That is, while much of the
research focuses on why consumers choose an efﬁcient or inefﬁcient appliance, this
research highlights the political and economic reasons for why they have the choices they
have. The widespread availability of affordable energy efﬁcient products is an essential
condition of empowering U.S. citizens to reduce their climate change impact. If Reagan
had not been elected, it is arguable that the standards developed under the Carter
administration would have been implemented and consmners would have been making
choices across a very different range of efﬁcient appliances in 1983 than the ones they
had to choose from under Reagan.

This study also informs us about some of the challenges for policies intended to
make energy efﬁcient products more available. Energy efﬁciency is often pointed to as
the most economically feasible way to reduce energy demand — the “low hanging fruit” in
addressing climate change (Pacala and Socolow, 2004; Hays, 2000). Yet, a review of

energy efficiency history in the U.S. reveals that the path to improving efﬁciency has not

98

been particularly straightforward or smooth. Even when there are technologies on the
shelf for making energy using products more efﬁcient, both regulatory and non-
regulatory approaches require a strong commitment of resources from the state, ESMOS
and industry. All policies to reform the U.S.’s contribution to climate change are
challenging, but the perception that improving technological energy-efﬁciency is an
easily negotiated “win-win” policy is misleading if history predicts the future.

The second insight this study provides is on the signiﬁcant role of regulation in
the development of efforts characterized by ecological modernization. While many
nations have moved ahead with binding greenhouse gas reduction goals, the U.S. climate
change policy has consistently rejected any mandatory climate change policies. It instead
has focused on the voluntary market approaches described in ecological modernization.
Some in industry, facing climate change regulations at the state level (a lawsuit currently
underway between California and the Environmental Protection Agency) and
international level, have surmised regulation is imminent and have taken a proactive
stance of requesting the U.S. adopt a climate regulatory regime. However, the Bush
Global Climate Change Policy Book of 2002, after setting voluntary emission reduction
levels, states “If, in 2012, we ﬁnd that we are not on track toward meeting our goal, and
sound science justiﬁes further policy action, the United States will respond with
additional measures that may include a broad, market-based program as well as
additional incentives and voluntary measures designed to accelerate technology
development and deployment”(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 2002).
An understanding of the conditions that encourage dedication of resources by industry

towards an issue in cooperation with ESMOS and the state suggests that a purely

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voluntary approach without regulation or the threat Of regulation is unlikely to lead to

action on climate change.

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CHAPTER THREE
Friend or Foe? Energy Efﬁciency Advocacy Organizations’ Embeddedness and

Decisions to Partner with Business

Introduction

The tactics environmental social movement organizations use to pursue the
protection of environmental resources in the interest of the public is theorized to be an
important determinant of ecological integrity (Brulle, 2000; Schnaiberg, 1980). Theories
of environmental degradation and improvement in environmental sociology all provide
an important role for environmental social movement organizations (referred to as
environmental organizations from here on). Treadmill of production theory proposes that
a strong environmental movement provides the major counter-force to business’s
expanding demand for resources by pressuring the state to regulate industry’s use of
resources and disposal of waste (Schnaiberg, 1980; Gould and Schnaiberg, 1994). In
ecological modernization theory, environmental organizations are theorized to play an
important role in cooperatively engaging directly with businesses to pursue
environmental solutions through negotiated regulations and market-based approaches
(Mol, 1995). In the U.S., many environmental organizations have undertaken these
cooperative approaches with industry, many have continued to pursue industry change
through governmental regulation and enforcement, and many have done both. Changes
in the state’s willingness to adopt regulatory approaches, the nature of environmental
problems, increased politicization of consumerism, and the structure of industry have all

been theorized to explain the evolution of market approaches to addressing

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environmental problems (Cohen 2006; Jaffee 2007; Konefal 2007; Pellow 2001). In this
paper, I explore the organizational level factors that explain differences between
environmental organization’s tactical decisions in who to engage with in pursuing their
environmental goals.

To explore this question, I utilize the case of U.S. energy, consumer, and
environmental advocacy organizations (EEAOs) that seek to inﬂuence the energy
efﬁciency of appliances and their decisions to partner with business to pursue these goals.
Residential energy use has negative impacts on the environment because the production
of electricity requires the extraction and combustion of fossil fuels, such as petroleum and
coal, and these processes contribute signiﬁcantly to water pollution, air pollution, and
climate change. Since the 19705, there has been a concerted effort by energy efﬁciency
advocacy organizations (EEAOs) to improve the efﬁciency of home appliances.
Organizations advocating for energy efﬁciency have included environmental
organizations, along with advocates for consumer rights, low-income residential energy
users, and energy conservation. EEAOs’ efforts to improve appliance efﬁciency have
focused on: 1) regulatory approaches by lobbying the state for mandatory standards 2)
consumer-based approaches through voluntary product labeling and consumer education
efforts and 3) market-based approaches to work with businesses and consumers to create
supply and demand for efﬁcient appliances.

EEAOs must make assessments of tactics for pursuing their goals. They must
consider how cooperating with and/or ﬁghting against businesses may increase or
decrease their effectiveness in reaching their goals. They may perceive the decision to

work with business in a way consistent with treadmill Of production theorists - fraught

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with risks to organizational independence. Or they may view it in a way consistent with
ecological modernization theorists — an opportunity to pursue mutually beneﬁcial
objectives. In this study, I seek to shed some light on the organizational dynamics of
institutional change by understanding how an EEAO’s immediate social environment and
interactions inﬂuences subsequent decisions regarding these tactical decisions about
partnering. To do this, I ﬁrst develop a theoretical understanding of Situated strategic
organizational action that builds on integrative theories of political and organizational
institutional theory. I then conduct a longitudinal network analysis Of ESMO
participation in face-to-face appliance energy efficiency events from 2001-2006. Using a
clustering algorithm, I identify cohesive subgroups of organizations and events that
constitute an organization’s immediate environment. Logistic regression analysis is used
to analyze the relationship between the organization’s immediate organizational
environment and subsequent EEAO decisions of whether to co-author a paper with a
business organization. An EEAO’s decision to co-author a paper with a business is
considered signiﬁcant for several reasons. EEAO’s are not like academic organizations
where submitting papers for conferences is an automatic expectation and co-authorship
between academics is relatively free of organizational afﬁliations. Instead, the decision
to cO-author a paper is a dedication of staff resources and time to writing a paper that the
EEAO will not have sole decision-making authority on its content. In addition, the co-
authorship of a paper between an EEAO and a business is a public declaration of
historical record Of a working partnership between the two organizations. In addition,

while the co-authorship of a paper is not always indicative of a deeper relationship, many

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co-authored papers written for the conference report on “lessons learned” from on-going
joint efforts to improve energy efﬁciency.
Theoretical Approach

Since the late 1970’s, organizational sociology has paid an increasing amount of
attention to the impact of interorganizational relations on organizational actions. In
particular, new institutional theory has had increasing power in explaining the social
organization of life over the past three decades (Scott and Davis, 2007). New
institutionalism has been an especially popular theoretical frame for studying natural
environment issues because of the importance of institutional forces on organizational
environmental decision-making (Bansal and Gao, 2006:463; Ventresca and Hoffman,
2005). In addition, there have been many synergies identiﬁed between new institutional
theory and social movement theory seeking to understand the organizational basis of
movement strength, ideology and tactics (Davis and McAdam, 2005; Campbell, 2005).

New institutional theory focuses on how the organizational ﬁeld an organization
is embedded within inﬂuences organizational form and actions. Scott (1995:56)
describes an organizational ﬁeld as “a community of organizations that partakes Of a
common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully
with one another than with actors outside the ﬁeld.” Organizational ﬁelds have
commonly been understood and studied as interorganizational networks (Powell and
DiMaggio 1991; Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith 2005). Hoffman (1999:351)
argues that ﬁelds are actually formed “around issues that bring together various ﬁeld
constituents with disparate purposes.” While initial work on organizational ﬁelds in new

institutionalism focused on the homogenizing effects of ﬁelds (DiMaggio and Powell,

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1983), much subsequent work has focused on how organizational ﬁelds can lead to
diverse organizational responses and change (Baum and Oliver 1991; Brint and Karabel
1991; Fligstein 1991; Greenwood and Hinings 1996).

In this paper, I utilize work from those who have theorized diversity and change
in organizations by combining new institutional theory’s emphasis on the importance of
cultural scripts and logics of the organizational environment with “old”
institutionalisms’s emphasis on agentic political action (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996;
Clemens, 1997). The social world consists of multiple heterogeneous institutions and
each institution has its own rules or logics that guide what is appropriate behavior
(Clemens, 1997). An organization and its members all come to an organizational ﬁeld
with past social experiences and these “logics of appropriateness” compete for meaning
and legitimacy in an organizational ﬁeld. An organization’s speciﬁc social location
within the ﬁeld makes certain logics more appropriate or likely to be enacted than others
(Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott 2002). An organization’s social location is determined by
its interactions with other organizations and the context of these interactions. An
EEAO’s decision to pursue a cooperative action with a business means that an
organization has determined that the action is an appropriate way to pursue its goals. An
organization that abstains from cooperative behavior or pursues other tactics, such as
bringing a lawsuit, is guided by alternative logics. The uneven adoption of various logics
results in change and heterogeneity in an organizational ﬁeld.

There are two important aspects to this theoretical perspective that I advance
through my study: 1) relations are uneven within organizational ﬁelds resulting in uneven

adoption of competing logics and 2) these logics guide subsequent actions that

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reconﬁgures the organizational ﬁeld. To account for the uneven adoption of logics, we
must understand that there is an unequal distribution of power and inﬂuence (Brint and
Karabel, 1991). Scott’s (1995:56) delineation of an organizational ﬁeld as those who
interact “more frequently and fatefully with one another than those outside the ﬁeld” is
useﬁrl. However, it is important to recognize that there are variations in the frequency
and signiﬁcance of interactions between organizations within a ﬁeld. Organizations not
only interact to different extents (frequency), but the organizations involved and kind of
resources (money, information) that are exchanged in those interactions inﬂuences how
signiﬁcant they are. A powerful organization, by nature of its size, legitimacy or social
capital, may have disproportionate inﬂuence on what comes to be seen as the appropriate
organizational form or action to take in a ﬁeld. The recognition of varying abilities of
organizations to inﬂuence an organizational ﬁeld must be complemented by the
recognition of varying agentic potential of organizations to resist inﬂuence and adopt
alternative logics. Organizations can undertake a constrained range of strategic actions,
such as the formation of organizational alliances that can lead to changes in
organizational relations and ﬁeld conﬁguration. The reconﬁguration of the organizational
ﬁeld results in the alteration of corresponding institutions through political negotiations
that reﬂect the interests of the newly formed ﬁeld (Oliver, 1991).

In this paper I utilize Hoffman’s (1999:351) deﬁnition of an organizational ﬁeld
being organized around an issue, the deﬁnition and promotion of appliance energy
efﬁciency, to analyze organizational relations among business, government and EEAOs.
I identify the energy efﬁcient appliance organizational ﬁeld as a bounded

interorganizational network formed by organizations that participated in face-to-face

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information-sharing conferences, negotiations on voluntary energy efﬁcient appliance
labeling, and negotiations on mandatory energy efﬁcient appliance labeling. The
network used in this study is constructed using archival data on organizational
participation in face-to-face rulemakings, workshops, and conferences. The use of events
to identify actors who have co-participated makes it a special kind of network called an
afﬁliation or two-mode network. A two-mode network has information on both actors
(the organizations) and the events that bring them together. In this afﬁliation network, we
can observe l) ties between organizations through co-participation in events 2) ties
between organizations and the events they participate in and 3) ties between events via
organizational participation in multiple events (Faust, 2005). Two-mode data is beneﬁcial
as it forces us to think of how events that embody certain logics of appropriateness for
inﬂuencing energy efﬁciency appliances bring organizations together and how
organizations link these events together.

Breiger (1974) points out that the duality of the data in afﬁliation networks
allows one to analyze the relationships between an actor and its social grouping.
Theoretically, an organization chooses to participate in an event based on shared logic(s),
organizational afﬁnities, or the ascribed status of the other organizational members
participating in the event. At the same time, an organization’s pattern of participation in
events inﬂuences its own points of references and organizational character. Studying
organizational afﬁliation networks is useful because they reﬂect how organizational
strategic choice and constraints combine to create the formation of networks. The social
constraints are determined by the events that are offered in society whilst the meaning of

these events is determined by the set of organizations that attend it. If nobody attends an

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event, there is no social meaning. So in this sense, the dual examination of organization
and events allows me to consider the interplay between agency and structure (Faust,
2005)

Since organizations are choosing which events to attend, afﬁliation networks can
be thought of as the pre-cursors to actual organizational relationships with each other and
may provide insights into how these relationships form. The analysis Of two-mode data
tells you not only who is exposed to whom (the precursor of direct organizational
relationships or one mode data) but exactly which events brought them together. I
hypothesize that the introduction and socialization of organizations (such as learning
about each other’s activities and the emergence of tacit understandings or logics) at these
events is often an important part of the process of forming direct organizational
partnerships. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how partnerships form in the absence of such
events.

The events organizations participate in are speciﬁed in this study as an arena
where organizations seek to inﬂuence the deﬁnition of the energy efﬁciency of residential
appliances (speciﬁcally room air-conditioners, refrigerators/refrigerator-ﬁ'eezers, clothes
washers, and dishwashers). The events are either part Of l) mandatory energy efﬁciency
standard rulemakings 2) voluntary energy efficiency label negotiations or 3) energy
efﬁciency conferences that take place to inform the development of new voluntary or
mandatory approaches. I understand organizational choices to participate in an event to
be a decision to dedicate limited organizational resources of staff time and/or money and
to be a reﬂection of an organization’s: l) perceived importance of the event in the

deﬁning and promoting appliance efﬁciency 2) acceptance of the legitimacy of the

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event’s logic and purpose and 3) willingness of the organization to interact with the other
organizations that attend/organize the event.

Identiﬁcation of cohesive non-overlapping subgroups in this network and the
events they are meeting at recognizes that relationships and resources within an
organizational ﬁeld are textured. Campbell (2005) suggests that diffusion is one
mechanism through which organizational ﬁelds can change. The amount organizations
interact and the events they interact within determines their exposure to certain logics and
the inﬂuence those logics hold over organizational actions. The content of the event
exposes organizations in attendance to speciﬁc logics as well. I theorize that
organizational and event subgroups are social locations within the organizational ﬁeld
where certain logics of appropriateness for who it is acceptable to partner with are
developed and reinforced and that subgroup memberships will inﬂuence subsequent
decisions to partner. To test this theory, I utilize a network inﬂuence model where
organizational subgroup membership from 2001 to 2006 predicts subsequent decisions to
co-author a paper with business for the ﬁeld’s leading conference on energy efﬁciency in

2006 and 2008. This can be formalized as:

Yit = PiWii’Yi’t-IW Yit-l +eit

Yit represents the decision of energy efﬁciency advocacy organization i to cO-author with
a business at time t (2006,2008).

WYi’t—l indicates the relation between energy efficiency advocacy organization i and the
subgroup it belongs to (i’) at time t-l (2001-2006)

int-l represents the decisions of energy efﬁciency advocacy organization i to co-author

with a business previous to H (1998, 2000)

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eit is the error term where errors are assumed normal with mean zero and variance (02).
Methods and Analysis
Network Construction

The study sought to construct a whole organizational network and was bound
using an event-based approach (Marsden 2005). Events were identiﬁed by using
archived information to identify organizations that had participated in face-to-face public
activities of record that sought to inﬂuence the deﬁnition and promotion of residential
energy-efﬁcient appliances. Whole organizational networks are useful for “illuminating
the structure of collective action” (Powell et al. 2005:1133). The activities were
identiﬁed by the author, who previously worked in the ﬁeld of appliance energy
efﬁciency for three years, and through consultation with key leaders in non-proﬁt and
government agencies that work on appliance energy efficiency. They are limited to
events that are of public record and that seek to inﬂuence the deﬁnition and promotion of
an energy efficient appliance. Three classes of events were identiﬁed that organizations
attended: 1) hearings for mandatory energy efﬁciency standards rulemakings 2)
negotiations over voluntary energy efﬁciency speciﬁcations and 3) conferences seeking
to inform the debates over appliance energy efﬁciency.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is the agency charged with developing
and implementing mandatory energy efficiency standards as enacted by the 1978
National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA). For each rulemaking DOE is
required to release an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANOPR) that alerts
stakeholders to its intention to make a standard and identify questions of interest for

public input, a notice of proposed rule (NOPR) that puts for the agency’s proposed

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standard and questions of interest for public input, and a ﬁnal rule with the opportturity
for stakeholder input. Each notice provides a time period for written public comments
and attendance at public hearings (except for ﬁnal rules). DOE is required to keep a
docket with all those who submitted public comments during the commenting period and
transcripts from the hearings with attendees and their organizational afﬁliation.
Unfortunately, some materials from early dockets (1978 to 1993) were missing calling
into question their entirety, but dockets from 1994 and on are fairly complete. From
1993 to 2000, I identify 7 DOE rulemaking hearings and 2 DOE rulemaking hearings
from 2001 to 2006.

In 1992, the Energy Policy Act directed the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to implement a program to identify and designate particularly energy
efﬁcient products and in 1993 the Energy Star program launched its ﬁrst labeled
products. In 1996, EPA and DOE became joint partners in Energy Star and the ﬁrst
voluntary speciﬁcations for refrigerators, room air conditioners, clothes washers and
dishwashers were introduced (Webber, Brown and Koomey, 2000). From 2002 to 2006,
the energy efficiency levels to be qualiﬁed as Energy Star were updated for multiple
residential appliances and four face-to-face stakeholder workshops took place.

In addition to these two government hosted sets of events, I utilized historic
attendance at two sets of conferences that have sought to share information to, inﬂuence
the deﬁnition of energy efﬁciency. The ﬁrst, the American Council for an Energy
Efﬁcient Economy’s (ACEEE) Summer Study on Energy Efﬁcient Buildings, was
initiated in1980 and has brought together a diverse group of professionals from around

the world to discuss the technological basis for and practical implementation of

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improving energy use in building with a consistent focus on appliance efﬁciency. This
conference was organized initially by academics and professionals who felt that energy
efﬁciency policy was not being well informed by scientiﬁc information. The second set
of conferences is the Market Transformation Symposium, hosted jointly ACEEE and the
Consortium for Energy Efﬁciency (CEE). Held in Washington DC. since 1997, this
conference focuses mainly on market-based approaches to deﬁning and promoting
efﬁciency. This conference simultaneously serves as the Consortium for Energy
Efﬁciency’s only public quarterly meeting for its members who develop voluntary
appliance efﬁciency speciﬁcations to promote in their demand-side management
programs. Attendees list were retrieved for all years of each of these sets of conferences
resulting in the identiﬁcation of 7 summer study conferences (4 from 1994-2000, and 3
from 2001-2006), and 10 market transformation symposium conferences (3 from 1994-
2000, and 6 from 2000-2006).

The complete list of all organizations attending any of these events was then
entered in a column and all events were entered across the top row to create an actor-
event matrix. Where an organization attended an event, the number of organizational
representatives attending was entered. All organizations were also coded with an
organizational type using organizational listings (guidestar.org) or the organizational
homepage on the internet. Organizational types identiﬁed were: 1) academic 2) federal
government 3) international 4) national laboratory 5) non-proﬁt energy efficiency
advocacy 6) local, state, and regional government 7) regulated manufacturers 8) for-proﬁt
third party organizations (consultants) and 9) energy utilities. Associations of

organizations were categorized in the organizational type that they represented. For

112

example, the Air-Conditioning and Reﬁigeration Institute, a trade association of air-
conditioning and refrigerator manufacturers, was coded as a regulated manufacturer.
Independent Variable: Cohesive Subgroup Membership

To identify organizational subgroups within the afﬁliation data I utilized the
recent adaptation of Frank’s (1995) clustering technique for identifying positions in two-
mode data (Field, Frank, Schiller, Riegle-Crumb, Muller, 2006; Frank, Muller, Schiller,
and Riegle-Crumb, 2008). Drawing on an extension of p* social network models to
afﬁliation networks (Skvoretz and Faust 1999), the algorithm maximizes the increase in
odds that an actor participates in an event within the same cluster versus participating in
an event outside the cluster. When applied to the energy efﬁciency organizational ﬁeld,
the actors are energy efﬁciency advocacy organizations, the events are in-person
meetings on deﬁning appliance energy efﬁciency, and the identiﬁed clusters are local
positions in which event attendance is concentrated. The beneﬁts of the Kliqueﬁnder
algorithm are that it does not require the a priori assignment of connectedness criteria or
number of groups required by other subgroup identiﬁers. It instead seeds groups based
on strong connections and then moves organizations from group to group until it can not
maximize the designated odds further. Kliqueﬁnder was run for 2-mode data for the span
of years from 1994-2000 and 2001-2006. From 1994 to 2000, a total of 37 EEAOs were
included in the cohesive subgroups and 59 EEAOs were identiﬁed from 2001-2006.
Organizations that were not included in the Kliqueﬁnder subgroups, but only had one tie
to an event were added back in to the subgroup that the event they attended was included
in. The year spans were designated based on research that found that changes in political

administrations inﬂuence the organizational relations between business and energy

113

efﬁciency advocates around energy efﬁciency appliance policy. The identiﬁed
subgroups and organizational type groupings from each of these era’s networks was
drawn in Netme 2-mode graphic representation.
Independent Variable: EEAO decision to co-author a paper for summer study with
business in 1 998-2000

Summer study conference proceedings from 1998 and 2000 are used to identify
EEAOs that had cO-authored a paper. The types Of organizations they coauthored with are
then coded into the nine organizational types described above. A binary variable was set
up to code for if the EEAO had cO-authored with a utility or regulated manufacturer
during this time period. This variable was used to control for previous EEAO decisions
to co-author a paper in summer study with a business before exposure to events in their
subgroup.
Independent Variable: EEAO demographics

Once all EEAOs in the subgroups were identiﬁed, organizational demographics
were collected using a database of non-proﬁt organizations (guidestar.org). The available
revenues of the organization for each year from 2001 to 2006 derived from their I-99 tax
form was recorded as an indicator of organizational size and resources. The average
revenues of the organization was ﬁgured along with changes in revenue between 2001
and 2006. I hypothesize that organizations with fewer resources might be more likely to
partner with a business organization out of need. The founding year of the organization
was recorded and subtracted from 2006 to ﬁnd the age of the organization. Age is used
as an indicator of legitimacy (Hannah and Freeman 2004). Legitimacy could be

important in either direction. Younger organizations may see partnering with business as

114

a way to gain legitimacy within institutional circles and in the eyes of speciﬁc ﬁrnders.
Older, or more legitimate organizations, may be more able to partner with business
without threatening their legitimacy within the energy efﬁciency advocacy community.
Finally, organizational mission was derived from the mission statement provided either in
the guidestar.org database or through reviewing the organizational web-page. Mission
was coded as either environmental, energy, or consumer issues. Almost all organizations
identify all three as motivations for improving energy efﬁciency, but the primary reason
for the existence of the organization was used to determine the coding of the
organizational mission. For example, Natural Resources Defense Council is an
environmental group that works on energy issues and was coded as “environmental”
whereas ACEEE is found solely as an energy efﬁciency group and was coded as
“energy."
Dependent Variables: EEAO decision to co-author a paper for summer study with
business in 2006-2008

To assess the inﬂuence of organizational event attendance and group membership,
I use co-authorship between an energy efﬁciency advocacy organization and a business
organization (regulated manufacturer or energy utilities). The ACEEE summer study
(also one Of the face-to-face events) publishes approximately 300-400 co-authored papers
on energy efﬁciency every other year when it takes place. The conference began in 1980
with a small group of academics and national lab researchers presenting research ﬁndings
to a select group of policymakers. The event has grown to be an industry-wide event for
a wide range of organizations involved in energy efﬁciency to write up more applied

research on the results of their efforts to promote efﬁciency. Organizational co-

115

authorship is often not only two organizations exploring an idea together, but a reﬂection
Of a project that has already occurred.
EEAOs and the Energy Efficiency Field Pre-2001: The Birth of Competing Logics

Organizations to help people save energy have been around since the mid-
twentieth century, ﬁnding its roots in the appropriate technology movement. One of the
ﬁrst, if not the ﬁrst, was the Volunteers in Technical Assistance founded in 1959 by a
group of scientists and engineers to help “low-income communities use more locally
available and appropriate resources to meet their own needs for economic and social
development” (Purcell, 2001). The appropriate technology movement, rooted in 1960’s
counter-culture, embodied the idea that redistributive social justice goals could be
reached by selectively using technology (Schnaiberg 1994; Purcell, 2001; Schumacher,
1970). When the 1973 oil crisis began, the number of these organizations began to grow
at a rapid pace as the ﬁrst larger concerted effort to conserve energy began to get popular
support from local, state and federal governments (Purcell, 2001). Appropriate
technology began its institutionalization with the establishment of Califomia’s Ofﬁce of
Appropriate Technology in 1976 that “sought to assist low-income groups and cultural
minorities through the development Of human-scale technologies and ways Of thinking
which promotes wise use of resources, more harmonious connections with the natural
world, and smaller more workable government and social institutions” (Purcell,
2001:307-308).

Starting in the late 1970’s, relatively separate from the appropriate technology
movement, organizations and institutional mechanisms for inﬂuencing appliance energy

efficiency emerge in dynamic mutual dependence. In 1975, the Energy Policy

116

Conservation Act established voluntary targets for appliance efficiency that were changed
to mandatory standards in 1978. The American Council for an Energy Efﬁcient
Economy (ACEEE) was subsequently founded in 1979 by a group of academic and
national lab energy efﬁciency researchers who had been working with limited success to
inform mandatory standards at the state and federal level (Rosenfeld, 2000). In the
original document drafted to recruit support for ACEEE, the nine-person founding
committee, expressed the feeling that their individual voices needed to be expressed
collectively through an organization to provide a counter-balance to the organized
interests in supply-side solutions to One of the ﬁrst tasks the founding committee
identiﬁed was to “devise a way to disseminate this information [potential savings ﬁ'om
energy efficiency] broadly, to legislators at the federal, state, and local levels, and to
technical and non-technical citizens throughout the country” (ACEEE, 1979:2). In 1980,
to ﬁrlﬁll this goal, the ﬁrst ACEEE study on energy efﬁciency was held in 1980 and has
continued to be held bi-annually with participating growing and diversifying over the ﬁrst
decade. The beliefs underlying the founding of ACEEE and establishment of summer
study can be characterized as a technocratic approach. Brulle (2000:235-237) writes that
technocratic environmental reform organizations emphasize the role scientists have to
play in the identiﬁcation of problems and formation of solutions. The technocratic logic
produces a hierarchy of technical knowledge and seeks to empower scientists. This is in
contrast to earlier organizations in the appropriate technology movement that focused
more on local direct engagement with the public to empower disadvantaged communities.
In addition to inﬂuencing appliance efﬁciency through the provision of technical

information for deﬁnitions, the passage of federal regulations (EPCA of 1978) provided

117

the opportunity for EEAOs to use legal tactics. Natural Resources Defense Council was
founded in 1970 by a group Of lawyers, ﬁnding its origins in the logic that inﬂuencing the
state’s development and enforcement of regulations through lawsuits was an effective
tactic for protecting the environment. Building on its experiences in forcing the state to
act on environmental regulations, NRDC brought the ﬁrst set of lawsuits to force the
Department of Energy under the Reagan administration to implement the appliance
efﬁciency standards required by law. NRDC has continued to bring lawsuits (2001-
2006) in regards to appliance energy efficiency Often jointly with state attorney general’s
offices and consumer rights groups.

In the early 1990’s, another approach for deﬁning and promoting energy
efﬁciency by the state was born when the 1992 Energy Policy Act mandated that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) develop a program to help American’s save
energy and mitigate climate change. The Energy Star (ES) program was built upon ideas
of social marketing and focused speciﬁcally on inﬂuencing consumer demand for
efﬁcient appliances. Although the Federal Trade Commission had been labeling
appliances energy use for over a decade, Energy Star typically identiﬁes that top 20% of
energy performers of a product category on the market and labels it with a recognizable
Energy Star seal. The ﬁrst round of these voluntary standards was made with no formal
input by stakeholders, instead relying mostly on agency assessments Of the markets and
product availability and inforrna] consultation with stakeholders. This process changed in
2001 when DOE issued a voluntary speciﬁcation for Energy Star windows in October
2001 that was highly protested by members Of the industry (McNary 2008). Lawsuits

were threatened, and DOE had to start its analysis for the voluntary standard over in

118

spring of 2002, effectively delaying the implementation of the voluntary labeling
program until fall of 2005. To avoid another instance of this, EPA and DOE
implemented a more formalized and transparent public input process for the deciding
what appliances would qualify for the Energy Star label.

Following the trend towards market-based approaches, EEAOs also began to
investigate how they could encourage manufacturers to produce more efﬁcient appliances
in ways other than command-and-control regulation. In the mid-1980’s David Goldstein,
a physics graduate student of Arthur Rosenfeld (an ACEEE founder), joined the Natural
Resources Defense Council’s (NRDC) energy program (Breckenridge, 2002). In the
early 1990’s Goldstein pioneered the “golden carrot” approach to promoting energy
efﬁciency. The approach focused on cooperative market-based approaches for promoting
the development and sale of energy-efﬁcient appliances through working with
manufacturers and consumers. Regulatory mandatory standards were viewed as a way to
“lock in” market shifts. The logic reﬂected in this approach is very characteristic of the
cooperative business-environmental movement relations predicted by ecological
modernization. In 1991, NRDC facilitated 24 utilities to pool their money to award a
prize to the manufacturer that produced a marketable energy-efﬁcient refrigerator. This
project resulted in the creation of the Consortium for Energy Efﬁciency that seeks to
facilitate utility support of energy-efﬁciency. Goldstein has also founded the Institute for
Market Transformation (a small think-tank) and is president of the board of the New
Buildings Institute. In 1997 ACEEE held the ﬁrst market transformation symposium as a
way to highlight the successes of the approach to improving energy efficiency and

facilitate the spread of the approach.

119

The cohesive subgroups identiﬁed through organizational attendance of events
from 1994 to 2000 provide a picture of an organizational ﬁeld in ﬂux as the groupings of
events and organizations are difﬁcult to interpret (Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1, Full
organizational membership lists can be found in Appendix B). This could be attributed
to the emergence of the Market Transformation Symposium in 1997. In group 1, all
summer study conferences are linked together through the organizations that attend them.
All academic organizations and the national labs (dominantly Lawrence Berkeley
National Lab) are isolated from the rest of the organizational ﬁeld besides their
interactions with others through summer study. Groups 2 through 6 are made up of
regulatory DOE hearings on mandatory standards and Market Transformation
Symposiums. No particular pattern Of event groupings emerges from these linkages, but
Figure 3.] identiﬁes the organizational sectors that tie these events together. Lines
between organizational sectors and subgroups indicate their attendance at those events
and their role in linking events. The width of the line indicates the strength of their tie to
the event as measured by the number of attendees sent to the event by organizations.
Analysis of Figure 3.] reveals the central role that energy efﬁciency advocates, utilities,
and regional government play in linking all types of events. Further analysis of
individual organization’s connectedness to other organizations and events reveals that
representatives of the state of California (California Public Utility Commission and
California Energy Commission), NRDC, and ACEEE emerge as particularly central
organizations that tie these conferences and rulemakings together. Another group that

has strong links with both the summer study and market transformation conferences is

120

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Table 3.1: 1993-2000 Cohesive Subgroup Memberships

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1993éitggiuogesrve Events Organizational Membership
1994 ACEEE Summer Study 11 academic organizations
1996 ACEEE Summer Study 4 federal government agencies
1998 ACEEE Summer Study 36 international organizations
2000 ACEEE Summer Study 5 national labs
1 16 local, state and regional
government
1 regulated manufacturer
64 for-proﬁt third party
22 power utilities
25 energy efficiency advocates
1999 ACEEE/CEE Market 1 federal government
Transformation Symposium 2 international organizations
2000 ACEEE/CEE Market 6 local, state and regional
2 Transformation Symposium government
2 regulated manufacturers
25 for-proﬁt third party
12 power utilities
10 energy efﬁciency advocates
1997 ACEEE/GEE Market 1 international organizations
Transformation Symposium 3 local, state and regional
3 government
3 for-proﬁt third party
7 power utilities
2 energy efﬁciency advocates
January 1995 DOE Central Air- 1 regulated manufacturer
Conditioning/Refrigerator 2 for-proﬁt third party
Rulemaking
June 1998 DOE Central Air-
4 Conditioning/Refrigerator
Rulemaking
November 2000 DOE Central Air-
Conditioning/Refrigerator
RulemakinL
December 1999 DOE Central Air- 1 federal government agency
Conditioning/Refrigerator 3 energy efﬁciency advocates
Rulemaking 2 local, state and regional
5 government
19 regulated manufacturers
13 for-proﬁt third party
6 power utilities
January 1994 Central air- 3 regulated manufacturers
conditioning/refrigerator rulemaking
February 1994 clothes washer
rulemaking
6 September 1997 Central air-

 

conditioning rulemaking
November 1998 dishwasher
rulemaking

March 1998 ACEEE/GEE Market
Transformation Symposium

 

 

122

 

for-proﬁt consultants. As state and federal governments have cut their ﬁrll-time
employees, consultants have played an increasingly important part in providing the
technical expertise for assessing technologies, developing program designs, and
implementing energy efﬁciency programs. In addition utilities utilize consultants to a
large extent to implement their demand-side management programs.

The Energy Efficiency Field 2001-2006: Organizational and Event Subgroups,
Logics of Appropriateness, and Coauthorship Outcomes

In examining the development of organizations and mechanisms for deﬁning
appliance efﬁciency prior to 2001, I identify four competing logics that guide the
existence of these mechanisms and the events through which they are implemented: 1)
the technocratic logic of the ACEEE summer study conferences 2) the regulatory logic
ofDOE mandatory standard rulemakings 3) the consumer-based logic of EPA Energy
Star negotiations and 4) the market transformation logic of the ACEEE/CEE market
transformation symposiums.

Each logic entails certain beliefs about who to work with or against in pursuing
energy efﬁciency goals. The technocratic logic emphasizes the role of technical
knowledge in deﬁning appliance efﬁciency and emphasizes the importance of scientists
and researchers. The regulatory logic emphasizes the role of regulations and emphasizes
the importance of the state as mediator between the interests of EEAOs and business.
Under a regulatory logic, business and EEAO interests are Often set up as counter to each
other. Moving away from the regulatory approach, the consumer-based logic suggests
that EEAO’s should work with the state and business to educate consumers. Finally, the

logic of market transformation highlights the opportunity to partner with business to

123

develop and promote efﬁcient products. These contradictory logics that guide
partnering actions co-exist in the appliance energy efﬁciency organizational ﬁeld.
Organizations experience these contradictions as they participate in multiple kinds of
events.

To review, my theoretical understanding Of organizational choices to participate
in an event to be a decision to dedicate limited organizational resources of staff time
and/or money and to be a reﬂection of an organization’s: 1) perceived importance of the
event in the deﬁning and promoting appliance efﬁciency 2) acceptance of the legitimacy
of the event’s logic and purpose and 3) willingness of the organization to interact with the
other organizations that attend/organize the event. EEAO’s decisions to dedicate what
are the often scarce resources of staff, money, and time should not be trivialized.
Participation of EEAOs in these events is guided by a corresponding logic of
appropriateness that reﬂects EEAO’s understandings of appropriate and effective actions
for inﬂuencing the deﬁnition and promotion of energy efﬁciency residential appliances.

The logics described above are reproduced and reinforced through organizational
participation in different types of events. For example, organizations participating in
regulatory events are enacting the regulatory logic in their decision to attend the event.
Once at the event, the purpose and content of events along with exposure to other
organizations that are adhering to the regulatory logic reinforces that participation in
regulatory events is an effective way to inﬂuence appliance efﬁciency. Similarly,
organizations attending the market transformation symposium with others who subscribe

to the market transformation approach will strengthen their belief that the cooperative

124

market-based approaches emphasized in market transformation are appropriate and
effective approaches tO improving appliance efﬁciency.

Between the years of 2001 to 2006, four cohesive subgroups Of events and
organizations emerge that reﬂect these logics. Each subgroup identiﬁes a group Of
organizations that are brought together by a group of events. The subgroups found in
this time period unite events of the same type. All EPA Energy Star voluntary label
negotiations are in group 1, DOE regulatory rule-makings are in group 2, all
ACEEE/GEE market transformation symposiurns are in group 3, and all ACEEE Summer
studies are in group 4 (Table 3.2, Full organizational membership lists from the cluster
analysis can be found in Appendix B). The organizational membership of these cohesive
subgroups identiﬁes organizations that have stronger tendencies to attend certain kinds of
events than others. Organizations still attend other kinds of events as well as illustrated
in Figure 5.2. where, as with the earlier set of years examined, energy efﬁciency
advocates, utilities, and for-proﬁt consultants emerge at the center of the network linking
all four types of events together.

EEAOs are clustered mainly in two cohesive subgroups: 1) ACEEE summer
study and 2) ACEEE/CEE market transformation symposium. I hypothesize that
attendance at these two events predicts logics of appropriateness for partnering.
Speciﬁcally I predict that organizations belonging to the market transformation group are
more likely to enact a logic of market transformation and partner with businesses. To test
this, I use organizational joint co-authorship Of papers for the ACEEE Summer study
conference. The cohesive subgroups emerging from 2001-2006 contain 59 EEAOs. The

cohesive subgroup’s organizational member’s annual revenues, organizational focus

125

Table 3.2: 2001-2006 Cohesive Subgroup Memberships

 

2001-2006 Cohesive

 

 

 

 

 

Subgroups Events Organizational Membership
July 2002 Reﬁ'igerator/Freezer 2 energy efﬁciency advocacy organizations
Energy Star Workshop 7 regulated manufacturers
October 2004 Central Air- 4 for-proﬁt third party organizations
1 Conditioner Energy Star Workshop 3 utility organizations
August 2004 Clothes washer Energy
Star Workshop
July 2005 Dishwasher Energy Star
Workshop
March 2001 DOE Central air- 3 federal government agencies
conditioning Rulemaking 4 energy efﬁciency advocacy
October 2001 DOE Central air- organizations
2 conditioner Rulemaking 1 local, state and regional government
18 regulated manufacturers
5 for-proﬁt third party organizations
6 power utilities
2002 ACEEE Summer Study 13 academic organizations
2004 ACEEE Summer Study 4 federal government agency
2006 ACEEE Summer Study 28 international organizations
4 national labs
3 27 energy efﬁciency advocacy
organizations
13 local, state and regional government
98 for-proﬁt third party organizations
25 power utilities
2001 ACEEE/CEE Market 1 federal government agency
Transformation Symposium 25 energy efﬁciency advocacy
2002 ACEEE/CEE Market organizations
Transformation Symposium 8 local, state and regional government
2003 ACEEE/CEE Market 4 regulated manufacturers
4 Transformation Symposium 25 for-proﬁt third party organizations
2004 ACEEE/GEE Market 15 power utilites
Transformation Symposium
2005 ACEEE/CEE Market
Transformation Symposium
2006 ACEEE/GEE Market

 

Transformation Symposium

 

 

and age can be found in Table 3.3. Independent samples t-test reveal that there is no

signiﬁcant difference in the organizational revenues and age of organizations in the

Independent samples t-test reveal that there is no signiﬁcant difference in the

organizational revenues and age of organizations in the market transformation and

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Table 3.3: 2001-2006 Cohesive Subgroup Organizational Demographics

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Average Annual Revenues . Age (as of
from 2001-200 6 Organizational Focus 2003)
Cohesive 6.5 8.5-2.5 52.5-10 >510 C E . E < 5 >5
Subroups mill. mill. mill. mill. °“" “"'°° ""3" yrs. yrs.
Consumer-
Market 0 2 0 0 1 l 0 l 1
MT 1 10 1 1 4 2 5 19 9 l7
Reﬂetory 0 l l l 2 1 0 1 2
Technocratic 5 9 9 5 4 13 11 12 16
Total
Number 6 22 21 10 9 20 30 23 36

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

technocratic subgroups. In addition to revenues and age, organizations were coded for
whether their primary mission focus of environment (identifying them as an
environmental social movement organization), low-income or consumer issues, or
energy. Although almost all groups referenced all three issues as a reason to advocate for
energy efﬁciency, the primary reason for the organization’s existence was coded.
Independent sample t-tests do reveal signiﬁcant differences of organizational mission
focus (p=.014, S.E.=.240) between the market transformation and technocratic subgroup
with more energy groups in the market transformation group.

In the years 1998 and 2000, a total of six EEAOs co-authored a paper for ACEEE
summer study with either a utility company or a regulated manufacturer. In 2006 and
2008 this number had climbed to 16 EEAOs. Membership in the market transformation
group also is a signiﬁcant predictor of co-authorship with a regulated manufacturer or
utility (p=.045, S.E.=.79) when controlling for an energy mission and previous co-
authorship with business. Neither organizational revenues nor age was found to be
signiﬁcant predictors of organizational decisions to cO-author with business and were

therefore dropped from the model. The odds of a member of the market transformation

128

logic group co-authoring a paper with a business are increased by approximately four

than those not a member of the market transformation group.

Table 3.4: Logistic Regression Results for Market Transformation Subgroup
Membership and Business Co-authorship

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Variable Sigpit'lcance S.E. B Exp (B)
90-00 Co-authorship .0] 1* .99 2.52 10.08
Environ’l Mission .20]
Consumer Mission .085 .10 -1.8 .166
Enﬂy Mission .502 1.21 .81 .445
MT Logic .045* .79 1.60 4.95

 

 

 

 

 

Discussion and Conclusions

In this paper, I have sought to link the development of new events and
organizations to the development and adoptions of new logics in an organizational ﬁeld
and subsequent organizational decisions to partner. The use of two-mode network
analysis to identify cohesive subgroups of organizations and the events to bring them
together advances our theoretical understanding of organizational ﬁelds by illuminating
the texture of organization relations through identiﬁcation of organizations that interact
frequently in certain contexts. Through this more in-depth understanding of the
organizational ﬁeld, I am able to identify how uneven event and organizational exposure
can lead to uneven adoption of certain logics of appropriateness for partnering and
variation in subsequent partnering choices. I am able to illustrate that within the
organizational ﬁeld of appliance energy efﬁciency, organizations with a high level of
embeddedness in market transformation events from 2001 to 2006 are more likely to co-
author with businesses than those that are not.

This paper does have limitations. I have not been able to control for all factors
and although knowing co-authorship for the 1998 and 2000 years helps control for some

firings, it can be argued that factors in ﬂux between the two time periods have inﬂuenced

129

 

organizational co-authorship. A particular concern would be a shift in funding
opportunities between 2000 and 2006. For example, if governmental agencies slashed
funding, EEAOs may be more likely to seek business funding and consequently more
likely to co-author. However, if this were the case, it does not explain why EEAOs in
the two subgroups would experience funding changes differently.

In addition tO providing insights on organizational and institutional change, this
study can inform environmental sociological theories that deal with environmental social
movements organizations and businesses relations. While political economic theories of
the environment in environmental sociology identify the social and political factors that
may inﬂuence social movement-business power relations, social movement organizations
must interpret these changes and interpret appropriate actions in response. The case of
energy efﬁcient appliances identiﬁes how one subgroup Of EEAOs has come to
understand business organizations as appropriate and effective partners for pursuing their
energy efﬁciency goals. The establishment of events that reproduce this logic, both in the
organizations that participate in it (4 regulated manufacturers are part of the subgroup in
contrast to the technocratic logic subgroup) and the content Of the event program, are one
way that organizational ﬁelds are transformed and new institutional logics for action are
enacted. This provides insight into how organizational ﬁelds formed around certain

issues undergoes the process Of ecological modernization.

130

CONCLUSION
Advancing Sociological Perspectives and Research on Organizations and the

Environment

The formal organization is the dominant organizing form for economic and social
activities in modern society. These organizational activities are central in society’s
production of environmental problems and its ability to mitigate and adapt in reaction to
these problems. Environmental sociologists may be tempted to relegate the study of
formal organizations to business schools, and business schools may be tempted to
relegate the study of environmental problems to natural scientists, but not taking the
relationships between formal organizations and the natural environment seriously in
sociology is a disservice to sociology and hmnan and ecological health.

This dissertation was an attempt to provide an initial example of the kind of
productive sociological work that can be done at the intersection of organizational and
environmental sociology. To reach my standards of an exemplary sociological piece of
work at this intersection, it would incorporate all the lessons that I identify in my ﬁrst
article on strengthening sociological perspectives on organizations and the natural
environment. Ideally, my ﬁrst article suggests that my dissertation should demonstrate a
more holistic approach to understanding 1) organizations as a product of their social and
material environments 2) organizational impacts on the material environment 3) ﬁrm
environmental behavior and its political economic context 4) cooperation and cooptation
and 5) system constraints on organizational change. Unfortunately, in this dissertation I
have not met all of these ideals of what a sociological study of organizations and the

environment could truly accomplish, I hope that my contribution to understanding how

131

political economic theories of the environment and institutional theories of change are
related can provide an example to build on for myself and others.

Beginning my substantive look at the appliance energy efﬁciency ﬁeld, my
second article examined the structure of relations between government, business and civil
society organizations around energy efficiency from 1973 to 2007 and the external
factors that inﬂuence that structure of relationships. I illustrated that recognizing the
broader sociopolitical conditions that alter societal power relations provides insight into
when TOP or EMT theories are applicable. This article’s ﬁndings emphasized support
for the importance of the state and the threat of regulation in determining relations
between business, environmental, and government organizations. Employing a theory of
the context dependent, I demonstrated that TOP theory is instructive in explaining power
relations among state, business and civil society during the early Reagan years of ﬁrst
trying to regulate energy efficiency in residential appliances. However, EMT proved
similarly useful for explaining more cooperative direct business-ESMO efforts to
improve energy efﬁciency of appliances during the Clinton presidency.

In my third article, I focused on the organizational processes underlying the
emergence of cooperative business-social movement relations characterized by ecological
modernization. This article highlighted how the changes in sociopolitical conditions
discussed in the previous article led to organizational innovation and the creation of new
events to inﬂuence energy efﬁciency. Organizational participation in these events created
distinct organizational communities within the organizational ﬁeld that led to the
diffusion and adoption of new logics on who was an appropriate partner for pursing

efﬁciency. In this article, I am able to demonstrate that energy efﬁciency advocacy

132

organizations embedded in the market transformation community from 2001 to 2006
were four times more likely to co-author a paper with a business organization than those
not embedded in that community. Through this lens we get a slice of how in an
organizational ﬁeld where energy efﬁciency advocates battled with industry during the
Reagan years (as predicted in TOP), some organizations adopted more cooperative
approaches with industry to pursue their goals (as predicted in EMT).

The major contribution my substantive study of the energy efﬁcient appliance
ﬁeld makes is an advance in linking political economic theories Of the environment from
environmental sociology to institutional change theories in organizational sociology. By
identifying the organizational ﬁeld as organized around a speciﬁc topic I am able to track
business, governmental, and energy efﬁciency organization’s involvement in the issue
and interaction with each other over time. A broader analysis of the sociopolitical
conditions suggests that the presidential administration via openness to social movement
attempts to regulate and the subsequent threat of regulation to businesses, inﬂuences
changes in the relations between societal sectors. These changes in the sociopolitical
environment result in changes in the effectiveness of various movement tactics for
inﬂuencing energy efﬁciency. Four types of events for inﬂuencing energy efﬁciency
reﬂect the development of competing logics of appropriateness for inﬂuencing efﬁciency
and partnering: 1) technocratic where EEAOS work with researchers and scientists to
produce and disseminate technical knowledge to policymakers and the public 2)
consumer-based where EEAOs work with consumer groups 3) regulatory where EEAOs
work via the state development of regulation and 4) market transformation where EEAOS

work with industry on market-based approaches. This results in contradictory logics for

133

guiding action for partnering within the organizational ﬁeld. Organizational interactions
through events over time that reinforce certain logics results in the formation Of
organizational subgroups. In this study, I demonstrate organizations belonging to the
market transformation subgroup are more likely to cO-author with a business organization
providing insight into how the process of ecological modernization occurs at the
organizational ﬁeld level.

There is much to be done to improve our understanding beyond what I begin here.
To create institutions that encourage positive environmental action, we must understand
how contexts inﬂuence actions (Dietz, Ostrum, and Stern, 2004; Dietz and Henry, 2008).
Further studies may continue what was begun in this research in the linking of macro and
meso-level, a major challenge in the environmental social science (York, Rosa, and
Dietz, forthcoming). Network analysis is a powerful tool for understanding the contexts
of action by linking levels. Data limitations for this study made whole network measures
difﬁcult, but in the future with other sets of data, more could be said about the relations
between societal sectors at the macro-level (Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007). Analysis of
these societal sectoral networks can then be examined at the organizational level analysis.
If data includes the people attending these events, analysis of individuals, their attendance
at events, and their organizational affiliations over time could even be used to gain
insight on the connection between the organizational and individual level. Developing
these understandings can help develop new institutions for preserving the environment
and aid those nonproﬁt, business, and governmental organizations involved in building

institutions for a healthy and sustainable environment.

134

APPENDICES

135

APPENDIX A

Full list of face-to-face meetings on the definition and promotion of energy efficient
residential appliances available on public record from 1980 to 2006.

136

Table 1.1: Face-to-face meetings of available public record on appliance energy

 

 

efficiency 1980-2006.
DATE HOST TITLE
July 1980 U.S. DOE ACEEE Summer Study Conference

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

August 1980 ACEEE DOE Appliance Standard Rulemaking Hearig
August 1982 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study Conference
ILugust 1984 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study Conference
Argust 1986 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study Conference
Augugt 1988 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study Conference
January 1989 DOE DOE Appliance Standard RulemakingHearing
August 1990 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study Conference
August 1992 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study Conference
Central Air-Conditioning/Refrigerator-Freezer
January 1994 US DOE Standard Rulemaking Hearing
January 1994 U.S. DOE Clothes Washer Appliance Rulemaking HearinL
August 1994 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study Conference
Central Air-Conditioning/ Refrigerator-Freezer
January 1995 US DOE Standard Rulemaking Hearing
August 1996 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study Conference
March 1997 ACEEE/CEE Market Transformation Symposium
September 1997 U.S. DOE gzrggzlgAIr-Condltlomng Test Procedure Revrsron
March 1998 ACEEE/GEE Market Transformation Symposium
Central Air-Conditioning/ Refrigerator-Freezer
June 1998 U'S' DOE Standard Rulemaking Hearing
August 1998 ACEEE Summer Study
November 1998 U.S. DOE Dishwasher Test-Procedure Revision Hearing
March 1999 ACEEE/CEE Market Transformation Symposium
Central Air-Conditioning / Refrigerator-Freezer
December 1999 U.S. DOE Standard Rulemaking
March 2000 ACEEE/CEE Market Transformation Symposium
November 2000 U.S. DOE Central Arr-Condltlomng / Refrrgerator- Freezer
Standard Rulemakﬂ
August 2000 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study Conference
March 2001 U. S. D OE Central Arr-Condltlonlng Test Procedure Revrslon
Rulemakﬂ
March 2001 ACEEE/GEE Market Transformation Symposium
Central Air-Conditioning / Refrigerator-Freezer
October 2001 U.S. DOE Standard Rulemaking
March 2002 ACEEE/CEE Market Transformation Symposium
U.S. EPA /U.S. .
July 2002 DOE Refrigerator-Freezer Energy Star Workshop
August 2002 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study Conference
March 2003 ACEEE/GEE Market Transformation Symposium
March 2004 ACEEE/CEE Market Transformation Symposium
U.S. EPA! U.S.
August 2004 DOE Clothes Washer Energy Star Workshop
August 2004 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study Conference
U.S. EPA/ U.S. . . .
October 2004 DOE Central Arr-Conditioner Energy Star Workshop
March 2005 ACEEE/CEE Market Transformation Symposium
July 2005 U.S. EPA/U.S. DOE Dish Washer Energy Star Workshop
March 2006 ACEEE/CEE Market Transformation Symposium
August 2006 ACEEE ACEEE Summer Study

 

137

 

APPENDIX B

Organizational and Event Subgroup Memberships

138

Table 3.5: Cohesive Subgroup Organizational and Event Membership for 1994-
2000.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ORGANIZATIONAL

ORGANIZATION TYPE SUBGROUP
BuildingPerformance Institute, Inc. (BPI) energy efﬁciency advocates 1
California Urban Water Conservation Council energy efﬁciency advocates 1
Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers
(AHAM) regulated manufacturer 1
BSH Home Appliances regulated manufacturer 1
Electrolux Inc. regulated manufacturer 1
Fisher & Paykel regulated manufacturer 1
General Electric Consumer Products muted manufacturer 1
Mamg Corporation Egrlated manufacturer 1
Whirlpool Corporation Egulated manufacturer 1
Air Conditioning Contractors of America
(ACCA) third party consultant 1
National Energy Management Institute
(N EMI) third party consultant 1
Procter & Gamble third party consultant 1
Sears, Roebuck & Company third party consultant 1
Alliant Enﬂy Corporation utility 1
Austin Water Utility utility 1
MidAmerican EnergyCompany utility l
2002/7/18 ESRRFWS Energy Star Workshop 1
2004/10/6 ESCACWS Energy Star Workshop 1
2004/8/15 ESCWWS Energy Star Workshop 1
2005/7/13 ESDWWS EnegyStar Workshop 1
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) federaljovemment 2
National Institutes of Standards and
Technology (N IST) federal government 2
American Association of Retired Persons,
Consumer Issues energy efficiency advocates 2
Appliance Standards Awareness Project
(ASAP) enegy efﬁciency advocates 2
Center for Enﬂy & Environment energy efficiency advocates 2
Consumer Federation of America energy_efﬁciency advocates 2
Northwest Power PlanninLCouncil enﬂy efﬁciency advocates 2
City of Austin regional government 2
Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Institute
(AR1)- now Air Conditioning, Heating and
Reﬁ'igeration (AHRI) regulated manufacturer 2
Allied Signal, Inc. re lated manufacturer 2
Armstrong Air Conditioning, Inc. regulated manufacturer 2
Bard ManufacturiggCo. regulated manufacturer 2

 

139

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)
Carrier Corporation/United Technologies regulated manufacturer 2
Copeland Corporation regulated manufacturer 2
ECR International, Inc. re ulated manufacturer 2
Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association,
InﬂGAMA) rgggted manufacturer 2
Goodman Manufacturing Company, LP.
(Amana) regulated manufacturer 2
Hydrotherrn Corporation, A Mestek Inc.
Company regﬂted manufacturer 2
International Comfort Products Corporation regulated manufacturer 2
Lennox International Inc. rggulated manufacturer 2
Modine Manufacturing Company regulated manufacturer 2
Nordyne Co. regulated manufacturer 2
Rheem Manufacturing Company regyirted manufacturer 2
Trane Company/American Standard regulated manufacturer 2
Unico System regulated manufacturer 2
York International Corporation regulated manufacturer 2
Energy Design Update third party consultant 2
GPU Service Co. third party consultant 2
Intertek Testing Services third party consultant 2
Systematic Mange_ment Services, Inc. third party consultant 2
Wiley, Rein, & Fieldirg third party consultant 2
Baltimore Gas & Electric utility 2
Edison Electric Institute (EEI) utility 2
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) utility 2
National Rural Electric Cooperative
Association utility 2
Pepco Holdings, Inc. utility 2
Virginia Power utility 2
2001/10/2CACRMWS DOE Rulemaking He% 2
2001/3/29CACTPWS DOE Rulemaking-harm 2
Brooks Energy& Sustainability Laboratory academic 3
California Lighting Techno—logy Center academic 3
California State University academic 3
Cameg Mellon University academic 3
Oberlin Coljge academic 3
Portland State University academic 3
Princeton University academic 3
Purdue University academic 3
Texas A&M University academic 3
University of California academic 3

 

 

 

 

140

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

University of Colorado academic

University of Washin on academic

Washinglon State University academic

National Aeronautics and Space Center

(NASA) federal government 3
U.S. Cmss federalgovemment 3
U.S. Department of EngggUS. DOEL federal government 3
U.S. Department of Housing & Urban

Development (HUD) federal gpvemment 3
Australian Greenhouse Ofﬁce international 3
BRANZ Ltd. international 3
Center for Energy Efﬁciency - EnEffect international 3
Central European University international 3
Central Research Institute of Electric Power

Industry (CRIEPI) international 3
Central Research Institute of Electric Power

Industry (CRIEPI), Japan international 3
Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden international 3
China Ceritifcation Center for Energy

Conservation Product (CECP) international 3
China National Institute of Standardization international 3
Danish Building Research Institute international 3
Danish Energy Management A/S international 3
Enegy Efﬁcient Strategies, Australia international 3
Enova SF international 3
European Commission Directorate international 3
EVO international 3
Hydro Quebec international 3
Jyunkankyo Research Institute, Tokyo international 3
Linkopinggniversity international 3
Manitoba Hydro international 3
Minisgy of Construction, China international 3
National Research Council Canada international 3
Natural Resources Canada international 3
NOVEM international 3
Osaka Gas international 3
Osaka University international 3
Regulatory Authority for Electricity & Gas,

Italy international 3
United Nations international 3
University of Toronto international 3
Lawrence Berkeley National Laborato

(LBNL) ‘ national lab 3

 

 

 

I41

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

National Renewable Energy Laboratory

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(NREL) national lab 3
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) national lab 3
Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory

QNNL) national lab 3
Academy for Educational Development (AED) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Academy for Educational Development (AED) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Advanced Energy Corporation energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Advanced Energy Corporation energy efficiency advocate 3
Affordable Comfort, Inc. (AC1) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Affordable Comfort, Inc. (AC1) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Association for Energy Affordability, Inc.

(AEA) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Association for Energy Affordability, Inc.

(AEA) energy efﬁciency advocate
BuildingCodes Assistance Project (BCAP) energy efficiency advocate

California Climate Action Registry energy efﬁciency advocate

California Home Energy Efﬁciency Rating

S stem energy efficiency advocate 3
California Institute for Energy Efﬁciency

LCIEE) energy efﬁciency advocate

Center for Neighborhood Technology (CNT) energy efﬁciency advocate

Clean Air - Cool Planet energy efﬁciency advocate
Collaborative Labelling and Appliance

Standards Program (CLASP) energy efﬁcielgy advocate 3
Community Enhancement Services energy efficiency advocate 3
Ecology Action energy efficiency advocate 3
Efﬁcient Windows Collaborative energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Electric Solar Utility Network (ElectricSUN) energy efficiency advocate 3
Electricity Innovation Institute energy efficiency advocate 3
Energy Center of Wisconsin (ECW) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Enﬂy Conservation Finance Institute (ECFI) energy efficiency advocate 3
Energy Foundation energy efﬁciengy advocate 3
EnergyTrust of Oregon (ETO) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Florida Solar Energy Center energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Global Environment & Technology

Foundation energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Institute for Market Transformation energy efﬁciency advocate 3

 

International Energy Agency (IEA)

 

energy efﬁciency advocate

 

International Institute for Energy Conservation
(IIEC)

enemy efﬁciency advocate

 

Iowa Energy Center

energy efﬁciency advocate

 

Lighting Research Center, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute QsRC)

energy efﬁciency advocate

 

 

Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA)

 

energLefﬁciency advocate

 

 

142

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDQ energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use
Management (N ESCAUM) entﬂy efﬁciency advocate 3
Northwest Power & Conservation Council erﬂgy efﬁciency advocate 3
Paciﬁc Institute enigy efﬁciency advocate 3
Pew Charitable Trusts energy efficiency advocate 3
Portland Energy Conservation, Inc. (PECI) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Eulatoq Assistance Project (RAP) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Residential Energy Services Network
(RESNET) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Sierra Club energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Southern Alliance for Clean Buggy enmefﬁciency advocate
Southwest Energy Efﬁciency Partnerships
(SWEEP) energmﬁciency advocate 3
U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) regional government 3
California Energy Commission (CEC) regionemmem 3
California Public Utility Commission regional government 3
City of Boulder regional Qvemment 3
City of Lompoc regional government 3
City of San Francisco regional government 3
City of Santa Monica regional government 3
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities regional government 3
Ohio Ofﬁce of Consumers' Council regional government 3
Oregon Office of Energy regional government 3
Vermont Department of Public Service regionaljovemment 3
Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) regional government 3
Wisconsin Energy Bureau regional government 3
Alternative Energy Systems Consulting, Inc. third party consultant 3
Appliance Recycling Centers of America, Inc.
(ARCA) third party consultant 3
Architectural Energy Co. (ABC) third party consultant 3
Amp third party consultant 3
ASW Engineering third party consultant 3
Better Buildings Interactive third party consultant 3
Bevilacqua-Knight, Inc. third party consultant 3
Building Science Corporation third party consultant 3
Cardinal 10 third party consultant 3
CH2M Hill third party consultant 3
CMC Eﬂgy Services third party consultant 3
Consol, Inc. third party consultant 3
Davis Energy Group, Inc. third party consultant 3

 

143

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Demand Research third party consultant 3
Dethman & Associates third party consultant 3
Dunlap & Browder, Inc. third party consultant 3
Dunsky Energy Consulting third party consultant 3
DuPont third party consultant 3
Duro-Last Rooﬁng Inc. third party consultant 3
ECONorthwest third party consultant 3
Boos Consulting, Inc. third party consultant 3
Ecotope, Inc. third party consultant 3
Eley Associates third party consultant 3
Erﬂgy & Resource Solutions, Inc. third party consultant 3
Energy Conservatory third partyconsultant 3
Energy Market Innovations, Inc. third party consultant 3
Energy Solutions Unltd. third party consultant 3
EnVinta Corp. third party consultant 3
Equipoise Consulting, Inc. third party consultant 3
E-SOURCE/Platts third party consultant 3
Etc. Group, Inc. third party consultant 3
Franklin Energy Services, Inc. third party consultant 3
Freeman & Associates, LLC third party consultant 3
Freeman, Sullivan & Co. third party consultant 3
Frontier Associates third party consultant 3
Geltz Communications third party consultant 3
GeoPraxis, Inc. third party consultant 3
Gruenreich Resource Advocate third party consultant 3
H. Gil Peach & Associates LLC third party consultant 3
Heschong Mahone Group, Inc. third party consultant 3
HMW International, Inc. third party consultant 3
Home Building Technology Services third party consultant 3
Home Energy Magazine third party consultant 3
IBACOS, Inc. third party consultant 3
Ice Energy LLC third party consultant 3
Innovologie, LLC thirdJarty consultant 3
Invensys third party consultant 3
Itron, Inc. third party consultant 3
KEMA, Inc. third party consultant 3
KEMA-XENERGY, Inc. third party consultant 3
KJ Consultiﬂ third party consultant 3
kW Engineering third party consultant 3
Loisos & Ubbelohde Associates third party consultant 3

 

 

 

144

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

‘ﬂgdal & Associates third pagyconsultant 3
MOjan MarketingPartners, LLC third party consultant 3
Nagigant Consultinﬁlnc. third party consultant 3
Nexant, Inc. third party consultant 3
North American Insulation Manufacturers
Association (NAIMA) thirgpany consultant 3
North American Technician Excellence
(NATE) third party consultant 3
Optimal Energy, Inc. third party consultant 3
Orion Energy Systems, Ltd. third paLty consultant 3
Owens Corning third party consultant 3
PA ConsultigGroup, Inc. third party consultant 3
Performance Systems Development, Inc. third party consultant 3
Peter Benenson Consulting third party consultant 3
Peter Schwartz & Associates third party consultant 3
Potomac Resources, Inc. third party consultant 3
Prahl & Associates third party consultant 3
Proctor Engineering Group, Ltd. third party consultant 3
Quantec, LLC third party consultant 3
Quantum Consulting, Inc. third party consultant 3

Michal Economic Research, Inc. third party consultant 3
Research Into Action, Inc. third party consultant 3
Rita Norton & Associates, LLC third party consultant 3
RLW Analytics, Inc. third party consultant 3
Robert Mowris & Associates third party consultant 3
SBW Consulting, Inc. third party consultant 3
Schiller Associates third party consultant 3
Science Applications International Co. (SAIC) third party consultant 3
She] Feldman Management Consultants
(SFMC)) third party consultant 3
Sheltersource, Inc. third party consultant 3
Skumatz Economic Research Associates, Inc. third party consultant 3
Steven Winter Associates, Inc. third party consultant 3
Strategic Energy Technologies, Inc. third party consultant 3
Summit Blue Consulting LLC third party consultant 3
Sustainable Energy Partnerships third party consultant 3
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. thirdgrarty consultant 3
TecMRKT Works LLC third party consultant 3
TIAX, LLC third party consultant 3
TRC Eneggy Services third party consultant 3
Truveon Co. third party consultant 3
Valley Energy Efﬁciency Co. third party consultant 3

 

145

 

Table 3.5Lcont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Vermont Enegy Investment Co. (VEIC) third party consultant 3
Vistron Corp. third party consultant 3
Weidt Group third party consultant 3
Wirtshafter Associates, Inc. third pary consultant 3
Xenergy, Inc. third party consultant 3
Yinsight third party consultant 3
AQUILA utility 3
British Columbia Gas Utility Ltd. utility 3
British Columbia Hydro utility 3
Community Energy Cooperative utility 3
Enbridge Gas Distribution utility 3
EW utility 3
_Et_l_gene Water & Electric Board utility 3
Nevada Power Company utility 3
Northwest Natural Gas Company utility 3
Oncor Energy utility 3
Paciﬁc Gas & Electric Company utility 3
Portland General Electric Company utility 3
ﬂget Sound Energy (PSE) utility 3
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
(SMUD) utility 3
Salt River Project (SRP) utility 3
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (SDG&E) utility 3
Seattle City Light utility 3
Sierra Paciﬁc Power Company utility 3
Southern California Edison Company (SCE) utility 3
Southern California Gas Company utility 3
Tacoma Power utility 3
TXU Electric Company utility 3
We Energies utility 3
Western Massachusetts Electric Co.
(WMECO) utility 3
Xcel Energy, Inc. utility 3
2002 SS Summer Study Conference 3
2004 SS Summer Study Conference 3
2006 SS Summer Study Conference 3
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(U SEPA) federal government
Alliance to Save Energy energy efﬁciency advocate
American Council for an Energy Efﬁcient
Economy (ACEEE) enegy efﬁciency advocate 4
Consortium for Energy Efficiency, Inc. (CEE) enegy efﬁciency advocate 4

 

146

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Economic Opportunity Research Institute energyefﬁciency advocate 4
Efficiency Vermont energy efficiency advocate 4
Energy and Environmental Building

Association (EEBA) energy efficiency advocate 4
EnergLCoordinatingAgency of PA, Inc. energLefﬁciency advocate 4
Energy Federation, Inc. energy efficiency advocate 4
Marketing Science Institute energLefﬁciency advocate 4
Midwest Energy_Efﬁciency Alliance (MEEA) energy efﬁciency advocate 4
National Albanian American Council energyefﬁciency advocate 4
National Center for Energy Management and

Buildiﬂ Technologies (NCEMBT) enggyefﬁciency advocate 4
National EnggLFoundation enﬁy efficiency advocate 4
Natural Resources Council of Maine energy efﬁciency advocate 4
New Buildingsilnstitute, Inc. (NBI) energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Northeast Energy Efﬁciency Council energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships, Inc.

(N EEP) energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Northeast Midwest Institute energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Northeast Power PlanningCouncil energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Northwest Energy Efﬁciency Alliance (N EBA) energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Northwest Energy Efficiency Council energy efficiency advocate 4
Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Technical Development Corporation enﬂy efficiency advocate 4
Vermont Energy Investment Corporation energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Wisconsin Energy Conservation Corporation/

Focus on Energy energy efﬁciency advocate 4
District of Columbia Public Service

Commission regionaljovemment 4
Idaho Public Utilities Commission regionaljovernment 4
Maine Public Utilities Commission regional government 4
Maryland Energy Administration regionalglvemment 4
Massachusetts Division of Enegy Resources regional gpvemment 4
New York State Energy Research &

Development Authority (NYSERDA) regional government 4
Ohio Department of Development regioﬂgovemment 4
Ohio Ofﬁce of Energy Efﬁciency regional government 4
Effikal International, Inc. re lated manufacturer 4
Flowserve Corp. Mad manufacturer 4
Good Earth Lighting regulated manufacturer 4
Honeywell, Inc. regulated manufacturer 4

 

147

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Applied Proactive Technologh Inc. (APT) third party consultant 4
Aspen Systems Co. third party consultant 4
Cadmus Group, Inc. third party consultant 4
Conservation Services Group, Inc. (CSG) third party consultant 4
Copper Develgpment Association Inc. third party consultant 4
D & R International Ltd. third party consultant 4
EAM Associates, Inc. third party consultant 4
ERG International, Inc. third party consultant 4
GDS Associates, Inc. third party consultant 4
ﬂggman Inc. third party consultant 4
Hydraulic Institute third party consultant 4
ICF Consulting, Inc. third party consultant 4
I'I‘T Industrial Products Corp. third party consultant 4
LDL Consulting third party consultant 4
Lockheed Martin Aspen Systems third party consultant 4
Magrann Associates third party consultant 4
Marketing Drive Worldwide third party consultant 4
MCN third party consultant 4
National Association of Energy Service
Companies (NAESCO) third party consultant 4
National Electrical Manufacturers Association
(NEMA) third party consultant 4
Nexus 13%, Inc. third party consultant 4
North American Retail Dealers Association
(NARDA) third party consultant 4
Northeast by Northwest third party consultant 4
Opinion Dynamics Corporation third party consultant 4
Paciﬁc Energy Associates, Inc. third party consultant 4
PR third party consultant 4
Resource Planning Group third party consultant 4
Schlegel & Associates third party consultant 4
SENTECH, Inc. third party consultant 4
Servidyne Systems, LLC third party consultant 4
TraynorKirk and Co. third party consultant 4
Wisconsin Energy Conservation
Corp.(WECC) third party consultant 4
Austin Energy utility 4
Center Point Enegy utility 4
Conectiv Power Delivery utility 4
Georgia Power Co. utility 4
Jersey Central Power & Light utility 4
Keyspan Energy Corp. utility 4

 

148

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) utility 4
National Grid USA utility 4
New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc. utility 4
Northeast Utilities utility 4
NSTAR Electric & Gas utility 4
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
(PSE&G) utility 4
South Jersey Gas Company utility 4
United Illuminatig Co. utility 4
Vermont Gas Systems, Inc. utility 4
Market Transformation
2001MT Symposium 4
Market Transformation
2002MT Symposium 4
Market Transformation
2003MT Symposium 4
Market Transformation
2004MT Symposium 4
Market Transformation
ZOOSMT Symposium 4
Market Transformation
2006MT Symposium 4
American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS) academic No Group
City University of New York (CUNY) academic No Group
Cornell University academic No Group
Daylighting Lab academic No Group
George Mason University academic No Group
Green Mountain College academic No Group
Hong-Ik University academic No Group
Howard University academic No Group
Kansas State University academic No Grog
Michign State University academic No Grog:
National Center for Atmospheric Research
(NCAR) academic No Group
Oregon Renewable Energy Center academic No Group
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute academic No Group
Umea University academic No Group
University of Alaska academic No Group
University of Delaware academic No Group
University of Idaho academic No Grgp

 

149

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

150

 

University of Illinois academic No Group
University of Maryland academic No Group
University of Michigan academic No Group
University of Nevada academic No Group
University of North Carolina academic No Group
Vermont Law School academic No Group
U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) federal government No Group
U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA) federal government No Group
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) federal ggernment No Group
U.S. General Services Administration federal government No GrouL
Agencia Nacional de Energyia Electrica

(ANEEL) international No Group
Beijing Association of Sustainable

Development international No Group
Beijing Electric Light Sources Research

Institute international No Group
Beijing Energy Efﬁciency Center international No Group
Berliner Energieagentur Ltd. international No Group
Big Switch Projects international No Group
Butwal Power Company P. Ltd. international No Group
Carbon Trust international No Group
Centre for Renewable Energy Systems

Technology international No Group
Cete de Lyon international No Group
CFL Harmonisation Initiative international No Group
China Sustainable Energy Program international No Group
Commergy Ltd. international No Group
Danish Electricity Saving Trust Fund international No Group
Danish Energy AgencL international No Group
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs aka

Senternovem international No Group
E.V.A. the Austrian Energy Agency international No Group
Ecole des Mines de Paris international No Group
Econoler International international No Group
Efﬁciency NB international No Group
Eletrobras/Procel international No Group
Energy Efﬁciency and Conservation Authority international No Group
Energy Research Institute, China international No Group
Exergy Australia Pty Ltd international No Group
Golden Power Manufacturing, Ltd. international No Group
Government of Canada international No Group
Housing & Building Research Center (HBRC),

Egypt international No Group

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IEI international No GYM
IFZ - Inter-University Research Center international No Group
IIEU international No Group
Industrial Technology Research Institute
(ITRI) international No Group
Institut fur Engrgie und Umweltforschung international No Group
Institute of Local Government Studies (AKF) international No Group
Instituto de lnvestiggiones Electricas international No Group
Joint Research Centre of the European
Communities international No Group
Kerma, Inc. international No Group
Korea Gas Co.. international No Group
Korea Institute of Energy Research (KIER) international No Group
Kyushu University, Japan international No Group
LivingWise international No Group
Mexican Energy Saving National Commission
CONAE international No Group
Mid Sweden University international No Group
National Development & Reform
Commission, China international No Group
NCC Nordic Construction Company international No Group
Ontario Power Technologies international No Group
PROCEL/Eletrobras international No Group
Royal Nepal Academy of Science and
Technology (RONAST) international No Group
Saskatchewan Research Council international No Group
Shanghai Energy Conservation Supervision
Center international No Group
Shanghai HousigDevelopment Bureau international No Group
Sietten Finnmark AS international No Group
State Economic & Trade Commission international No Group
Surya Roshni international No Group
Technical University of Denmark international No Group
Terasen Gas international No Group
Tokyo University intemational No Grog
Trilogy Holdings, Ltd. international No Group
U.K. Market Transformation Program international No Group
_Uganda Christian University Mukono international No Group
University of British Columbia international No Group
University of Kassel international No Group
University of New South Wales international No Group
University of Twente international No Group
University of Waterloo international No Group

 

151

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Victoria University of Wellington international No Group
Brookhaven National Laboratory national lab No Group
Idaho National Engineering & Environment

Laboratory national lab No Group
Electric Solar Utility Network (ElectricSUN) energy efficiency advocate No Group
Environmental & Energy Study Institute

(EESI) academic No Group
eProcurement Project energy efficiency advocate No Group
Focus on Energy energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
Four Winds Resource and Conservation Area energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
International Council for Local Environmental

Initiatives (ICLEI) energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
Kentucky Pollution Prevention Center energy efficiency advocate No Group
National Commission on Energy Policy energLefﬁciency advocate No Group
Northeast Premium Efficiency Motor Initiative enegyefﬁciency advocate No Group
PATH energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
Vermont Campus Energy Group energy efficiency advocate No Group
Virginia Housing& Environment Network energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
WestEd energy efﬁciency advocate No Gropp
Arkansas State Energy Ofﬁce regional government No Group
Avondale regional grvemment No Group
California Department of General

Administration regional government No Group
Champlain Valley Ofﬁce of Economic

Opportunity (CVOEO) regional government No Group
City of Berkeley regional government No Group
City of Oakland regional government No Group
City of Palo Alto regional government No Group
City of Pleasanton regional government No Group
City of San Jose regional government No Group
City of Seattle regionngovemment No Group
City of Springﬁeld Egional government No Group
Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority regional government No Group
Idaho Department of Resources reﬂmalgpvernment No Group
Indiana Consumer Advocate Ofﬁce regional government No Group
Inland Empire Utilities Agency regional government No Group
Iowa Department of Justice, Ofﬁce of

Consumer Advocate regional government No Group
Kentucky Ofﬁce of Energy Policy regional government No Group
Louisville Metro Air Pollution Control District remnalgwemment No Group
Maine State Planning Ofﬁce regional government No Group
Massachusetts Board of Building Regulations

and Standards regional government No Group

 

 

 

152

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Missouri Buggy Center regional grvernment No Group
Moorhead Public Service Department Egional gpvemment No Group
National Association of State Energy Ofﬁces

ASEO) regional government No Group
New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission Mal government No Group
North Carolina Department of Commerce regional government No Group
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin rgional government No Group
San Diego County Water Authority regipnaIﬂ/emment No Group
San Diego Regional Energy Ofﬁce regional government No Group
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission re ional government No Group
Seattle Public Utilities regional ﬁvernment No Group
Snohomish County Public Utilities
Commission regional government No Group
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) regionaigovernment No Group
Utah Enggy Ofﬁce regional government No Group
A.O. Smith Co. regﬂed manufacturer No Group
Absocold regulated manufacturer No Group
Advanced Conservation Technologies, Inc.
(ACT) Metlund Systems regulated manufacturer No Group
Amana Refrigeration Inc. regrlated manufacturer No Group
American Fluorescent regulated manufacturer No Group
Climate Master regulated manufacturer No Group
Emerson Motor Co regulated manufacturer No Group
Flanders Electric of IL regulated manufacturer No Group
Goulds Pumps - ITT Industries regulated manufacturer No Group
Haier regulated manufacturer No Group
Marcelo regulated manufacturer No Group
Marvel Industries regulated manufacturer No Group
Microfridge regulated manufacturer No Group
Miele regulated manufacturer No Group
National Comfort Products regulated manufacturer No Group
Philips Lighting Co. Egulated manufacturer No Group
Samsung Air Conditioners regulated manufacturer No Group
Space Pak regulated manufacturer No Group
Staber Industries regulated manufacturer No Group
Sun Frost regulated manufacturer No Group
U-Line Corporation regulated manufacturer No Group
Ultra 8 International / Ariston Appliances Egulated manufacturer No Group
United Technologies Research Center ggulated manufacturer No Group
W. C. Wood Company Limited regulated manufacturer No Group
ADM Associates, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Aeroseal third party consultant No Group

 

153

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Afterimagg + Sgace third party consultant No Group
Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration

News third party consultant No Group
Alewife Energy & Environment third party consultant No Group
All Star Construction third party consultant No Group
American Gas Association (AGA) third party consultant No Group
American Lighting Association (ALA) third party consultant No Group
American Synergy Co. third party consultant No Group
Applied EnergLResearch Group third party consultant No Group
Applied Engineering ManaLment third party consultant No Group
AJplch Flow Technolgy third party consultant No Group
Applied Innovations Research third party consultant No Group
Applied Resources Group thirdparty consultant No Group
Arthur D. Little, Inc.(ADL) third party consultant No Group
Association of Energy Service Professionals

(AESPL third party consultant No Group
ATOFINA Chemicals, Inc. thirdparty consultant No Group
Ayala Land Inc/Ayala Property Mgt. Corp. third party consultant No Group
Bayview Technology Group third party consultant No Group
BeckleLSingleton, Cntd. third party consultant No Group
Benya Lighting Design third party consultant No Group
Berkeley Solar Group third party consultant No Group
Bozell Kamstra third party consultant No Group
Braebum Systems third party consultant No Group
Bramante Energy, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Brand Source - AVB third party consultant No Group
Buderus Hydronic Systems third party consultant No Group
Business & Energy Services third party consultant No Group
Calyx Investments third party consultant No Group
Caneta Research, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Cannon Technologies third party consultant No Group
Chitwood Energy Management third party consultant No Group
Chong Partners Architecture third party consultant No Group
Chris Robertson & Associates, LLC third party consultant No Group
CLEAResult Consulting, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Climate Energy, LLC third party consultant No Group
Comfort Diagnostics & Solutions third party consultant No Group
Competitive Resources, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Concurrent Technologies Corp. third party consultant No Group
Consumer Powerline third party consultant No Group
Costco third party consultant No Group

 

154

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CS&M Marketing third party consultant No Group
CT C third party consultant No Group
Curtiss-mht EMD third party consultant No Group
Dawnbreaker third party consultant No er
Design AVEnues third party consultant No Group
Eastern Research Group third party consultant No Group
Ed Malemezian Consulting Inc. third party consultant No Group
Electrical Apparatus Service Association third party consultant No Group
Electronic Industries Alliance third party consultant No Group
Elemental Enterprises third party consultant No Group
Elf Atochem North America, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Enercomp, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Energetics, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Energy & Environmental Management
Magazine third party consultant No Group
Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Energy Economics, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Energy Market & Policy Analysis, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Energy Saving Products, Ltd. third party consultant No Group
Enemet Co. third party consultant No Group

_Erlgineered Web Information Systems third party consultant No Group
Envenergy third party consultant No Group
Environmental Interface, Ltd. third party consultant No Group
Esherick Homsey Dodge & Davis third party consultant No Group
ETW Inc. third party consultant No Group
F. Smothers & Associates third party consultant No Group
First Tracks Consulting Service, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Florida Home Energy & Resources

_nganization (HERO) third party consultant No Group
Flowcare Eﬂineering Inc. third party consultant No Grog)
Frito-Lay third party consultant No Group
GH Consultig, LLC third party consultant No Group
Global Energy Options third party consultant No Group
Global Ermy Partners, LLC third party consultant No Group
Green Homes America third party consultant No Group
Green Order third party consultant No Group
Grimason Associates, LLC third party consultant No Group
Gunnar Hovstadius Consulting, LLC. third party consultant No Group
Habart & Associates Consultingﬂ. third party consultant No Group
Halton Company third party consultant No Group
Harris Design Inc. third party consultant No Group

 

155

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hatch Consultiﬁ third party consultant No Group
HEC, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Hill and Knowlton third party consultant No Group
Hoffman Corporation third party consultant No Group
Hoffman LLCNertegy third party consultant No Group
Hoffman York third party consultant No Group
Home Depot third party consultant No Group
Home Excellence, Inc. third party consultant No Group
HPAC Engineering third party consultant No Group
lcynene Co. third party consultant No Group
Innovest Strategﬂalue Advisors third party consultant No Group
INSIGHT third partyconsultant No Group
Insights Unlimited third party consultant No Group
Igtegrated DeﬂgpAssociates, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Interbrand third party consultant No Group
J. Ottrnan Consulting third party consultant No Group
Jaco Environmental third party consultant No Group
Jim Perich-Anderson ConsultinL third party consultant No Grog
John Manville third party consultant No Group
KAT Consulting third party consultant No Group
KER] third party consultant No Group
Koeller & Company third party consultant No Group
Lambert Engineering, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Les Tumidaj & Associates third party consultant No Group
Levy Associates third party consultant No Group
Lighting Wizards third party consultant No Group
LumenX, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Lutron Electronics Co., Inc. third party consultant No Group
MaxLite third party consultant No Group
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and

Popeo, P.C third party consultant No Group
Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. third party consultant No Group
MSI Consulting third pagy consultant No Group
Mullen Advertising third party consultant No Group
National Association of Home Builders

(N AHB) third party consultant No Group
National Association of Plumbing Heating

Cooling Contractors (N AHPCC) third party consultant No Group
Nationwide TV & Appliance third pary consultant No Group
Natural Gas Supply Association third party consultant No Group
North Atlantic Energy Advisors third party consultant No Group
Northern Power Systems third party consultant No Group

 

156

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OBAcorp third party consultant No Grog)
ON Semiconductor third party consultant No Group
PAH Associates third party consultant No Group
Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) third party consultant No Grgp
Peregrine Energy Group third party consultant No Group
PlumbLng Manufacturers Institute third party consultant No Group
Polyisocyanurate Insulation Manufacturers

Association (PIMA) third party consultant No Group
PositivEnergL third party consultant No Group
Power Efﬁciency Corporation third party consultant No Group
Power Integrations third party consultant No Group
Predicate Energy, LLC third party consultant No Group
Primen third party consultant No Group
Public Solutions third party consultant No Group
Pumps & Systems Magazine third party consultant No Group
PWP, Inc. third party consultant No Group
R. M. Shoemaker Construction third party consultant No Group
R.L. Martin & Associates, Inc. third party consultant No Group
RAND Corporation third party consultant No Group
Real Estate Technologies Group third party consultant No Group
RealWinWin, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Resource Engineering Group, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Richardson & Associates third pagty consultant No Group
Ridge & Associates third party consultant No Group
Rockwell Automation third party consultant No Group
Rockwood International AS third party consultant No Group
Ruhnke Consulting, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Sanyo third party consultant No Group
Sawtooth RM Woodcraft third party consultant No Group
Schott Applied Power Corp third party consultant No Group
SHADE Consulting, LLC third party consultant No Group
Shockman Consulting third party consultant No Group
Sieben EnergyAssociates third party consultant No Group
Mark International third party consultant No Group
Smart Systems International third party consultant No Group
Solar Alternatives third party consultant No Cry
Southwall Technologies third party consultant No Grog)
Stellar Processes, Inc. third pargy consultant No Group
Sunoptics Prismatic Skylights third party consultant No Group
Superior Coils third party consultant No Group
Sustainable Earth Enterprises third party consultant No Group

 

 

 

157

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Synertech Systems Corporation third party consultant No Group
Systel-USA third party consultant No Group
Takagi Industrial Co., Inc. third party consultant No Group
Take Note Company third party consultant No Group
Technical Consumer Products (TCP), Inc. third party consultant No Group
Technology Prospects, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Therrnalex, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Thomsjo Services third party consultant No Group
Two GatewayCenter third party consultant No Group
U.S. Combined Heat & Power Association third party consultant No Group
Unleash Inc. third party consultant No Group
USAA Realty third party consultant No Group
Veazey, Parrott, Durkin & Shoulders third party consultant No Group
Venstar, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Veriﬁed TM, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Watt Stopper, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Weatherwise USA Inc. third party consultant No Group
West Hill Energy & Computing, Inc. third party consultant No OHM
Westlab third party consultant No Group
White-Rodgers third party consultant No Group
ZGF Partnership third party consultant No Group
American Electric Power Service Corp. utility No Group
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies utility No Group
Atlantic City Electric Company utility No Group
Aton Teknikkonsult AB utility No Group
Baldor Electric Company utility No Group
Bay State Gas utility No Group
Berkshire Gas Company utility No Group
Blacksburg, Christiansburg, VPI Water

Authority utility No Group
Central Vermont Public Service Comration utility No Group
Cinergy Co. utility No Group
Colorado Springs Utilities utility No Group
Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. utility No Group
Commonwealth Edison Company utility No Grog)
Exelon Corporation utility No Group
Florida Power Corporation utility No Group
Gaz Metropolitain utility No Group
Great River Energy utility No Group
Idaho Power Company utility No Group
Madison Gas & Electric Company utility No Group

 

 

 

158

 

Table 3.5 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Narrpggnsett Electric utiliﬁ No Group
Reliant Enegy HL&P utility No Group
Sempra Energy Utilities utility No Group
Silicon ValleJLPower-City of Santa Clara utility No Group
Southern Company Services, Inc. utility No Group
Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency

(SMMPA) utility No Gropp
Tacoma City Light utility No Group
Union Gas Limited utility No Group
Utilicorp United Inc. utility No Group

 

159

 

Table 3.6: Cohesive Subgroup Organizational and Event Membership for 2001-
2006.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ORGANIZATIONAL

ORGANIZATION TYPE SUBGROUP
Building Performance Institute, Inc. (BPI) eIEgy efﬁciency advocates 1
California Urban Water Conservation Council energy efﬁciency advocates 1
Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers
(AHAM) regulated manufacturer 1
BSH Home Appliances ﬂated manufacturer 1
Electrolux Inc. Wed manufacturer 1
Fisher & Paykel rgglated manufacturer 1
General Electric Consumer Products regplated manufacturer 1
Maytag Corporation regulated manufacturer I
Whirlpool Corporation lpgulated manufacturer 1
Air Conditioning Contractors of America third party consultant I
National Energy Management Institute third party consultant 1
Procter & Gamble third party consultant 1
Sears, Roebuck & Company third party consultant 1
Alliant Energy Corporation utility 1
Austin Water Utility utility I
MidAmerican Energy Company utility 1
2002/7/18 ESRRFWS Energy Star Workshop 1
2004/10/6 ESCACWS Enegy Star Workshop 1
2004/8/15 ESCWWS Energy Star Workshop 1
2005/7/13 ESDWWS Enﬂy Star Workshop 1
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(F ERC) federaljovernment 2
National Institutes of Standards and
Technolﬂy (N 1ST) federal government 2
American Association of Retired Persons,
Consumer Issues energy efﬁciency advocate 2
Appliance Standards Awareness Project
(ASAP) eggy efﬁciency advocate 2
Center for Energy & Environment enggy efﬁciency advocate 2
Consumer Federation of America energy efﬁciency advocate 2
Northwest Power PlanningCouncil energy efﬁciency advocate 2
City of Austin regional goyemment 2
Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Institute
(ARI) Egulated manufacturer 2
Allied Siﬂal, Inc. regulated manufacturer 2
ArmstrongyAir Conditionirg Inc. regulated manufacturer 2
Bard ManufacttLing Co. rﬂrted manufacturer 2
Carrier Corporation/United Technologips regLated manufacturer 2

 

160

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

Copeland Corporation

regulated manufacturer

 

ECR International, Inc.

rpgulated manufacturer

 

Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association

regulated manufacturer

 

Goodman Manufacturing Company, LP.

regulated manufacturer

 

Hydrotherm Corporation, A Mestek Inc.

regulated manufacturer

 

International Comfort Products Corporation

regulated manufacturer

 

Lennox International Inc.

regulated manufacturer

 

Modine Manufacturirg Company

regulated manufacturer

 

Nordyne Co.

regulated manufacturer

 

Rheem Manufacturing Company

regulated manufacturer

 

Trane Company/American Standard

regulated manufacturer

 

Unico System

regulated manufacturer

 

York International Corporation

regulated manufacturer

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Energy Design Update third party consultant

GPU Service Co. third party consultant

Intertek Testiﬂ Services third party consultant

Systematic Mggement Services, Inc. third party consultant

Wiley, Rein, & Fieldirg third party consultant

Baltimore Gas & Electric utility

Edison Electric Institute (EEI) utility

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) utility

National Rural Electric Cooperative

Association utility 2
Pepco Holdings, Inc. utility 2
Virﬂia Power utility 2
2001/lO/2CACRMWS DOE Rulemakingl-Iearin 2
2001/3/29CACTPWS DOE RulemakingHearEg 2
Brooks Ermy & Sustainability Laboratory academic 3
California Lighting Techrmgy Center academic 3
California State University academic 3
Cwnpgie Mellon University academic 3
Oberlin College academic 3
Portland State University academic 3
Princeton University academic 3
Purdue University academic 3
Texas A&M University academic 3
University of California academic 3
University of Colorado academic 3
University of Washington academic 3
WasMon State Universitg academic 3

 

 

161

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

National Aeronautics and Space Center

federal government

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

U.S. Congrgess federal government

U.S. Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) federﬂovemment

U.S. Department of Housing & Urban

Development (HUD) federalgovemment 3
Australian Greenhouse Ofﬁce international 3
BRANZ Ltd. international 3
Center for Energy Efficiency - EnEffect international 3
Central European University international 3
Central Research Institute of Electric Power

Industry (CRIEPI) international 3
Central Research Institute of Electric Power

Industry (CRIEPI), Japan international 3
Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden international 3
China Ceritifcation Center for Energy

Conservation Product (CECP) international 3
China National Institute of Standardization international 3
Danish Building Research Institute international 3
Danish Energy Management A/S international 3
Energy Efficient Strategies, Australia international 3
Enova SF international 3
European Commission Directorate international 3
EVO international 3
Hydro Quebec international 3
Jyunkankyo Research Institute, Tokyo international 3
LinkopingUniversity international 3
Manitoba Hydro international 3
Ministry of Construction, China international 3
National Research Council Canada international 3
Natural Resources Canada international 3
NOVEM international 3
Osaka Gas international 3
Osaka University international 3
Regulatory Authority for Electricity & Gas,

Italy international 3
United Nations international 3
University of Toronto international

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

(LBNL) national lab 3
National Renewable Energy Laboratory

(National Renewable Enﬂy Laboratory) national lab 3
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) national lab 3
Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory national lab 3
Academy for Educational Development (AED) energy efﬁciency advocate 3

 

 

 

162

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Academy for Educational Development (AED) engggefﬁciency advocate 3
Advanced EnergyCorporation energy efficiency advocate 3
Advanced Eneygy Corporation energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Affordable Comfort, Inc. (ACI) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Association for Energy Affordability, Inc.
(AEA) energy efficiency advocate
Building Codes Assistance Project (BCAP) energy efﬁciency advocate
California Climate Action Registry energy efﬁciency advocate
California Home Energy Efficiency Rating
System energy efﬁciency advocate 3
California Institute for Energy Efﬁciency

CIEE) energy efﬁciency advocate
Center for Neighborhood Technology (CNT) enﬂy efﬁciencgadvocate
Clean Air - Cool Planet energy efﬁciency advocate
Collaborative Labelling and Appliance
Standards Program (CLASP) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Community Enhancement Services energy efficiency advocate 3
Ecology Action energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Efficient Windows Collaborative energLefﬁciency advocate 3
Electric Solar Utility Network (ElectricSUN) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Electricity Innovation Institute energy efﬁciengy advocate 3
Energy Center of Wisconsin (ECW) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Energy Conservation Finance Institute (ECFI) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Energy Foundation energy efficiency advocate 3
Energy Trust of Oregon (ETO) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Florida Solar Energy Center energy efﬁciency advocate 3
Global Environment & Technology
Foundation energy efficiency advocate
Institute for Market Transformation energy efﬁciency advocate
International Energy Agency (IEA) energy efﬁciency advocate
International Institute for Energy Conservation
(IIEC) energy efﬁciency advocate 3
International Institute for Energy Conservation
(IIEC) energyefﬁciency advocate 3
Iowa Energy Center energy efﬁciency advocate 3

 

Lighting Research Center, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute (LRC)

energy efficiency advocate

 

Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA)

energy efﬁciency advocate

 

Natural Resources Defense Council (N RDC)

energy efﬁciency advocate

 

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use
Management (N ESCAUM)

energy efﬁciency advocate

 

Northwest Power & Conservation Council

energy efﬁciency advocate

 

 

Paciﬁc Institute

 

energy efﬁciency advocate

 

 

163

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

Pew Charitable Trusts

enegy efﬁciency advocate

 

Portland Enﬂy Conservation, Inc. (PECI)

energyefﬁciency advocate

 

Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP)

engerggefﬁciency advocate

 

Residential Energy Services Network

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(RESNET) energLefﬁciency advocate 3
Sierra Club energLefﬁciency advocate 3
Southern Alliance for Clean Energy enjgy efficiency advocate 3
Southwest Energy Efﬁciency Partnerships

(SWEEP) enggy efficiency advocate 3
U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) energmfﬁciency advocate 3
U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) energy efficiency advocate 3
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) regional government 3
California Energy Commission (CEC) regional government 3
California Public Utility Commission regional government 3
City of Boulder Egional government 3
City of Lompoc regional government 3
City of San Francisco regional government 3
City of Santa Monica regional government 3
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities regional gvemment 3
Ohio Ofﬁce of Consumers' Council regional government 3
Oregon Office of Energy regional government 3
Vermont Department of Public Service rpgﬁonal government 3
Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) regional government 3
Wisconsin Energy Bureau gional ggv'emment 3
Alternative Energy Systems Consultinﬂc. third party consultant 3
Appliance Recycling Centers of America, Inc.

(ARCA) third party consultant 3
Architectural Eneﬁy Co. (ABC) third party consultant 3
Amp third party consultant 3
ASW Engineering third party consultant 3
Better Buildings Interactive third party consultant 3
Bevilacqua-Knight, Inc. third party consultant 3
Building Science Corporation third party consultant 3
Cardinal IG third party consultant 3
CH2M Hill third party consultant 3
CMC Energy Services third party consultant 3
Consol, Inc. third party consultant 3
Davis Energy Group, Inc. third party consultant 3
Demand Research third party consultant 3
Dethman & Associates third party consultant 3
Dunlap & Browder, Inc. third party consultant 3
Dunsky Energy Consulting third party consultant 3

 

 

 

164

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DuPont third party consultant 3
Duro-Last Rooﬁng, Inc. third party consultant 3
ECONorthwest third party consultant 3
Ecos Consultiﬂl Inc. thirdJarty consultant 3
Ecotope, Inc. third party consultant 3
Eley Associates third party consultant 3
Energy & Resource Solutions, Inc. third party consultant 3
Energy Conservatory third party consultant 3
Energy Market Innovations, Inc. third party consultant 3
Ermy Solutions Unltd. third party consultant 3
EnVinta Corp. third party consultant 3
Equipoise Consulting, Inc. third party consultant 3
E-SOURCE/Platts third party consultant 3
Etc. Group, Inc. third party consultant 3
Franklin Energy Services, Inc. third party consultant 3
Freeman & Associates, LLC third party consultant 3
Freeman, Sullivan & Co. thirdJartyconsultant 3
Frontier Associates third party consultant 3
Geltz Communications third party consultant 3
GeoPraxis, Inc. third party consultant 3
Gruenreich Resource Advocates third party consultant 3
H. Gil Peach & Associates LLC third party consultant 3
Heschong Mahone Group, Inc. third party consultant 3
HMW International, Inc. third party consultant 3
Home Building Technology Services third party consultant 3
Home Energy Magazine third party consultant 3
IBACOS, Inc. third party consultant 3
Ice Energy LLC third party consultant 3
Innovologie, LLC third party consultant 3
Invensys third partyconsultant 3
Itron, Inc. third party consultant 3
KEMA, Inc. third party consultant 3
KEMA-XENERGY, Inc. third party consultant 3
KJ Consulting third party consultant 3
kW Engineering third party consultant 3
Loisos & Ubbelohde Associates third party consultant 3
Megdal & Associates third party consultant 3
Morﬂ Marketing Partners, LLC third party consultant 3
Navigant Consulting, Inc. third party consultant 3

 

 

 

I65

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nexant, Inc. third party consultant 3
North American Insulation Manufacturers
Association (NAIMA) third party consultant 3
North American Technician Excellence third party consultant 3
Optimal Energy, Inc. third party consultant 3
Orion Energy Systems, Ltd. third party consultant 3
Owens CorLing third party consultant 3
PA ConsultigngGroup, Inc. third party consultant 3
Performance Systems Development, Inc. third party consultant 3
Peter Benenson Consulting third parjy consultant 3
Peter Schwartz & Associates third party consultant 3
Potomac Resources, Inc. third party consultant 3
Prahl & Associates third party consultant 3
Proctor Engineering Group, Ltd. third party consultant 3
Quantec, LLC third party consultant 3
Quantum Consulting, Inc. third party consultant 3
Michal Economic Research, Inc. third party consultant 3
Research Into Action, Inc. third party consultant 3
Rita Norton & Associates, LLC third party consultant 3
RLW Analytics, Inc. third party consultant 3
Robert Mowris & Associates third party consultant 3
SBW Consulting, Inc. third party consultant 3
Schiller Associates third party consultant 3
Science Applications International Co. (SAICy third party consultant 3
She] Feldman Management Consultants third party consultant 3
Sheltersource, Inc. third party consultant 3
Skumatz Economic Research Associates, Inc. third party consultant 3
Steven Winter Associates, Inc. third party consultant 3
Strategic Energy Technoltgjes, Inc. third party consultant 3
Summit Blue ConsultiniILC third party consultant 3
Sustainable Energy Partnerships third party consultant 3
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. third party consultant 3
TecMRKT Works LLC third party consultant 3
TIAX, LLC third party consultant 3
TRC Enegy Services third party consultant 3
Truveon Co. thirgparty consultant 3
Valley Energy Efﬁciency Co. third party consultant 3
Vermont Energy Investment Co. (VEIC) third party consultant 3
Vistron Corp. third papty consultant 3
Weidt Group third party consultant 3
Wirtshafter Associates, Inc. third party consultant 3

 

166

 

Table 3.6 (cont’dL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Xenergy, Inc. third party consultant 3
Yinsight thiﬂartyconsultant 3
AQUILA utility 3
British Columbia Gas Utility Ltd. utility 3
British Columbia Hydro utility 3
Community Energy Cooperative utility 3
Enbridge Gas Distribution utility 3
Entergy utility 3
Egene Water & Electric Board utility 3
Nevada Power Company utility 3
Northwest Natural Gas Company utility 3
Oncor Energy utility 3
Paciﬁc Gas & Electric Company utility 3
Portland General Electric Company utility 3
m Sound Energy LPSE) utility 3
Sacramento Municipal Utility District utility 3
Salt River Project (SRP) utility 3
San Dieg) Gas & Electric Co. (SDG&E) utility 3
Seattle City Light utility 3
Sierra Paciﬁc Power Company utility 3
Southern California Edison Company (SCE) utiliy 3
Southern California Gas Company utility 3
Tacoma Power utility 3
TXU Electric Company utility 3
We Energies utility 3
Western Massachusetts Electric Co. utility 3
Xcel Energy, Inc. utility 3
2002 SS Summer Study Conference 3
2004 SS Summer StudyConference 3
2006 SS Summer Study Conference 3

 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

 

 

 

 

 

(U SEPA) federaljovemment 4
Alliance to Save Energy energy efﬁciency advocate 4
American Council for an Energy Efficient

Economy (ACEEE) energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Consortium for Energy Efﬁciency, Inc. (CEE) energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Economic Opportunity Research Institute energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Efﬁciency Vermont energy efﬁciency advocate 4

 

Energy and Environmental Building
Association (EEBA)

energy efﬁciency advocate

 

 

Energy Coordinating Agency of PA, Inc.

 

 

energy efﬁciency advocate

 

 

167

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Energy Federation, Inc. Iggy efﬁciency advocate 4
Marketing Science Institute energmfﬁciency advocate 4
Midwest Energy Efficiency Alliance (MEEA) energy efﬁciency advocate 4
National Albanian American Council energy efﬁciency advocate 4
National Center for Energy Management and

Building Technologies (NCEMBT) energy efﬁciency advocate 4
National Ermy Foundation energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Natural Resources Council of Maine eggy efﬁciency advocate 4
New Buildings Institute, Inc. (N BI) enggy efﬁciency advocate 4
Northeast Energy Efficiency Council eﬂgy efﬁciency advocate 4
Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships, Inc. energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Northeast Midwest Institute energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Northeast Power Planning Council energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Northwest EnegyEtﬁciency Alliance (N EEA) energyefﬁciency advocate 4
Northwest Energy Efﬁciency Council energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) energy efficiency advocate 4
Technical Development Corporation energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Vermont Energy Investment Corporation energy efﬁciency advocate 4
Wisconsin Energy Conservation Corporation/

Focus on Energy energy efﬁciency advocate 4
District of Columbia Public Service

Commission regional government 4
Idaho Public Utilities Commission re ional government 4
Maine Public Utilities Commission rgional @vemment 4
Maryland Enggy Administration regional government 4
Massachusetts Division of Energy Resources regional government 4
New York State Energy Research &

Development Authority (N YSERDA) regional @vemment 4
Ohio Department of Development regional government 4
Ohio Ofﬁce of Energy Efficiency Legional ggvemment 4
Efﬁkal International, Inc. regulated manufacturer 4
F lowserve Corp. Eulated manufacturer ‘ 4
Good Earth Lighiipg re lated manufacturer 4
Honeywell, Inc. re lated manufacturer 4
Applied Proactive Technology, Inc. (APT) third party consultant 4
Aspen Systems Co. third party consultant 4
Cadmus Group, Inc. third party consultant 4
Conservation Services Group, Inc. (CSG) third party consultant 4
Copper Development Association Inc. third party consultant 4
D & R International Ltd. third party consultant 4
EAM Associates, Inc. third party consultant 4
ERG International, Inc. third party consultant 4

 

 

 

168

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GDS Associates, Inc. third party consultant 4
_Hpggman Inc. third party consultant 4
Hydraulic Institute third party consultant 4
ICF Consultingglnc. third party consultant 4
ITT Industrial Products Corp. third party consultant 4
LDL Consulting third party consultant 4
Lockheed Martin Aspen Systems third party consultant 4
Magrann Associates third party consultant 4
Marlﬂg Drive Worldwide third party consultant 4
MCN third party consultant 4
National Association of Energy Service
Companies (NAESCO) third party consultant 4
National Electrical Manufacturers Association
(N EMA) third party consultant 4
Nexus Energglnc. third party consultant 4
North American Retail Dealers Association
(NARDA) third party consultant 4
Northeast by Northwest third party consultant 4
Opinion Dynamics Corporation third party consultant 4
Paciﬁc EnergLAssociates, Inc. third party consultant 4
PRR third party consultant 4
Resource Planning Group third party consultant 4
Schleil& Associates third party consultant 4
SENTECH, Inc. third party consultant 4
Servidyne Systems, LLC third party consultant 4
TraynorKirk and Co. third party consultant 4
Wisconsin Energy Conservation third party consultant 4
Austin Energy utility 4
Center Point Energy utility 4
Conectiv Power Delivery utility 4
Georgia Power Co. utility 4
Jersey Central Power & Lim utility 4
Keyspan Energy Corp. utility 4
Lonﬂland Power Authority (LIPA) utility 4
National Grid USA utility 4
New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc. utility 4
Northeast Utilities utility 4
NSTAR Electric & Gas utility 4
Public Service Electric & Gas Company utility 4
South Jersey Gas Company utility 4
United Illuminatiﬁ Co. utility 4
Vermont Gas Systems, Inc. utility 4

 

169

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Market Transformation
2001MT Symposium 4
Market Transformation
2002MT Symposium 4
Market Transformation
2003MT Symposium 4
Market Transformation
2004MT Symposium 4
Market Transformation
2005MT Symposium 4
Market Transformation
2006MT Symposium 4
American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS) academic No Group
City University of New York (CUNY) academic No Group
Cornell University academic No Group
Daylighting Lab academic No Group
GeorggMason University academic No Group
Green Mountain College academic No Group
Hong-Ik University academic No Group
Howard University academic No Group
Kansas State University academic No Group
Michigan State University academic No Group
National Center for Atmospheric Research
(N CAR) academic No Group
Oregon Renewable Energy Center academic No Group
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute academic No Group
Umea University academic No Group
University of Alaska academic No Group
University of Delaware academic No Group
University of Idaho academic No Group
University of Illinois academic No Group
University of Maryland academic No Group
University of Michigan academic No Group
University of Nevada academic No Group
University of North Carolina academic No Group
Vermont Law School academic No Group
U.S.Agency for International Development federal government No Group
U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA) federal government No Group
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) federa_lgovemment No Group
U.S. General Services Administration federal wemment No Grog)
_Agencia Nacional de Enlﬂyia Electrica international No Group
Beijing Association of Sustainable
Development international No Group

 

170

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

Beijing Electric Light Sources Research

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Institute international No Group
Beﬁing Enegy Efficiency Center international No Group
Berliner Energie_agentur Ltd. international No Group

_Big Switch Projects international No Group
Butwal Power Company P. Ltd. international No Group
Carbon Trust international No Group
Centre for Renewable Energy Systems
Technology international No Group
Cete de Lyon international No Group
CFL Harmonisation Initiative international No Group
China Sustainable Energy Wm international No Group
Commergy Ltd. international No Group
Danish Electricity Saving Trust Fund international No Group
Danish Energy Agency international No Group
Dutch Ministg of Economic Affairs international No Group
E.V.A. the Austrian Energy Agency international No Group
Ecole des Mines de Paris international No Group
Econoler International international No Group
Efﬁciency NB international No Group
Eletrobras/Procel international No Group
Energy Efﬁciency and Conservation Authority international No Group
Energy Research Institute, China international No Group
Exergy Australia Pty Ltd international No Group
Golden Power Manufacturingind. international No Group
Government of Canada international No Group
Housing & Building Research Center (HBRC),

_Egypt international No Group
[E] international No Group
IFZ - Inter-University Research Center international No Group
IIEU international No Groug
Industrial Technology Research Institute
(ITRI) international No Group
Institut fur Energie und Umweltforschung international No Group
Institute of Local Government Studies (AKFL international No Group
Instituto de Investigaciones Electricas international No Group
Joint Research Centre of the European
Communities international No Group
Kerma, Inc. international No Group
Korea Gas Co.. international No Group
Korea Institute of Energy Research (KIER) international No Group
Kyushu University, Japan international No Group
LivingWise international No Group

 

17]

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

Mexican Energy Saving National Commission

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONAE international No Group
Mid Sweden University international No Group
National Development & Reform
Commission, China international No Group
NCC Nordic Construction Company international No Group
Ontario Power Technologies international No Group
PROCEL/Eletrobras international No Group
Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Tech. international No Group
Saskatchewan Research Council international No Group
Shanghai Energy Conservation Supervision
Center international No Group
Shanghai HousigngDevelopment Bureau international No Group
Sietten Finnmark AS international No Group
State Economic & Trade Commission international No Group
Surya Roshni international No Group
Technical University of Denmark international No Group
Terasen Gas international No Group
Tokyo University international No Group
Trilogy Holdings, Ltd. international No Group
UK. Market Transformation Program international No Group
_Uganda Christian University Mukono international No Group
University of British Columbia international No Group
University of Kassel international No Group
University of New South Wales international No Group
University of Twente international No Group
University of Waterloo international No Group
Victoria University of Wellington international No Group
Brookhaven National Laboratory national lab No Group
Idaho National Engineering & Environment
Laboratory national lab No Group
Electric Solar Utility Network (ElectricSUN) energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
Environmental & Energy Study Institute academic No Group
eProcurement Project ﬂgy efficiency advocate No Group
Focus on Energy energgefﬁciency advocate No Group
Four Winds Resource and Conservation Area energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
International Council for Local Environmental
Initiatives (ICLEI) energy efﬁciency advocate No Grog)
Kentucky Pollution Prevention Center energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
National Commission on EnegLPolicy energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
Northeast Premium Efﬁciency Motor Initiative energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
PATH energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
Vermont Campus Energy Group em efﬁciency advocate No Group

 

172

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Virgﬂ Housiﬁ& Environment Network enﬁy efﬁciency advocate No Group
WestEd energy efﬁciency advocate No Group
Arkansas State Enegy Office regional government No Group
Avondale regional government No Group
California Department of General

Administration lpgionaljovemment No Group
Champlain Valley Ofﬁce of Economic

Opportunity (CVOEO) regional government No Group
City of Berkeley rggional government No Group
City of Oakland regional government No Group
City of Palo Alto regional government No Group
City of Pleasanton regional government No Group
City of San Jose rpgional government No Group
City of Seattle regional government No Group
City of Springﬁeld regionﬁovemment No Group
Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority regional government No Group
Idaho Department of Resources Egional government No Group
Indiana Consumer Advocate Ofﬁce regional government No Group
Inland Empire Utilities Agency regional government No Group
Iowa Department of Justice, Ofﬁce of

Consumer Advocate regional government No Group
Kentucky Ofﬁce of Energy Policy regional government No Group
Louisville Metro Air Pollution Control District regional government No Group
Maine State Planning Ofﬁce regional government No Group
Massachusetts Board of Building£gulations regional government No Group
Missouri Energy Center re ional government No Group
Moorhead Public Service Department Eional government No Group
National Association of State Energy Ofﬁces regional government No Group
New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission re ional government No Group
North Carolina Department of Commerce regional government No Group
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin regional government No Group
San Dieg) County Water Authority regional government No Group
San Diego Regional Energy Office regional government No Group
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission regional government No Group
Seattle Public Utilities pegional government No Group
Snohomish County Public Utilities

Commission Egional government No Grog)
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) regional government No Group
Utah Energy Ofﬁce rggional government No Group
A.O. Smith Co. reﬂlaIed manufacturer No Group
Absocold rpgulated manufacturer No Group
Advanced Conservation Technologies, Inc.

(ACT) Metlund Systems regulated manufacturer No Group

 

173

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Amana Refrigeration Inc. regulated manufacturer No Group
American Fluorescent Egulated manufacturer No Group
Climate Master regulated manufacturer No Group
Emerson Motor Co regulated manufacturer No Group
Flanders Electric of IL regulated manufacturer No Group
Goulds Pumps - ITT Industries regylated manufacturer No Group
Haier Egulated manufacturer No Group
Marcelo regulated manufacturer No Group
Marvel Industries regulated manufacturer No Group
Microfridge regulated manufacturer No Group
Miele regulated manufacturer No Group
National Comfort Products regrlated manufacturer No Group
Philips Lighting Co. regulated manufacturer No Group
Samsung Air Conditioners re lated manufacturer No Group
Space Pak regulated manufacturer No Group
Staber Industries regulated manufacturer No Group
Sun Frost regulated manufacturer No Group
U-Line Corporation regulated manufacturer No Group
Ultra 8 International / Ariston Appliances rewed manufacturer No Group
United Technologies Research Center regulated manufacturer No Group
W. C. Wood Company Limited regulated manufacturer No Group
ADM Associates, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Aeroseal third party consultant No Group
Afterimage + Space third party consultant No Group
Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration

News third party consultant No Group
Alewife EnergL& Environment third party consultant No Group
All Star Construction third party consultant No Group
American Gas Association (AGA) third party consultant No Group
American Lighting Association (ALA) third party consultant No Group
American Synergy Co. third party consultant No Group
Applied Energy Research Group third pagI consultant No Group
Applied Engineering Management third pargl consultant No Group
Applied Flow Technology third party consultant No Group
Applied Innovations Research third party consultant No Group
Applied Resources Group third paptyconsultant No Group
Arthur D. Little, Inc.(ADL) third party consultant No Group
Association of Energy Service Professionals

(AESP) third party consultant No Group
ATOF INA Chemicals, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Ayala Land Inc/Ayala Property Mgt. Corp. third party consultant No Group

 

174

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Benya Lighting Design third party consultant No Group
Berkeley Solar Group third party consultant No Group
Bozell Kamstra third party consultant No Group
Braebum Systems third party consultant No Group
Bramante Energy, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Brand Source - AVB third party consultant No Group
Buderus Hydronic Systems third party consultant No Group
Business & Energy Services third party consultant No Group
Calyx Investments third party consultant No Group
Caneta Research, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Cannon Technologies third party consultant No Group
Chitwood Energy Manament third party consultant No Group
Chog Partners Architecture third party consultant No Group
Chris Robertson & Associates, LLC third party consultant No Group
CLEAResult Consultin , Inc. third pary consultant No Group
Climate Energy, LLC third party consultant No Group
Comfort Diagnostics & Solutions third party consultant No Group
Competitive Resources, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Concurrent Technologies Corp. third party consultant No Group
Consumer Powerline third party consultant No Group
Costco third party consultant No Group
CS&M Marketing third party consultant No Group
CT C third party consultant No Group
Curtiss-Wright EMD third party consultant No Grog)
Dawnbreaker third party consultant No Group
Design AVEnues third party consultant No Group
Eastern Research Group third party consultant No Group
Ed Malemezian Consulting, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Electrical Apparatus Service Association third party consultant No Group
Electronic Industries Alliance third party consultant No Group
Elemental Enterprises third party consultant No Group
Elf Atochem North America, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Enercomp, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Energetics, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Energy & Environmental Management

ngazine third party consultant No Group
Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc. third papty consultant No Group
Energy Economics, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Eneggy Market & Policy Analysis, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Energy Saving Products, Ltd. third party consultant No Group

 

 

 

I75

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Envenergy third party consultant No Group
Environmental Interface, Ltd. third party consultant No Group
Esherick Homsey Dodge & Davis third party consultant No Grog;
ETW Inc. third party consultant No Group
F. Smothers & Associates third party consultant No Group
First Tracks Consultlg Service, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Florida Home Energy & Resources

_O_rganization (HEROL third party consultant No Group
Flowcare Eﬂineering Inc. third party consultant NO Group
Frito-Lay third party consultant No Group
GH Consulting, LLC third parg consultant No Group
Global Energy Options third party consultant No Group
Global Energy Partners, LLC third party consultant No Group
Green Homes America third party consultant No Group
Green Order third party consultant No Group
Grimason Associates, LLC third party consultant No Group
Gunnar Hovstadius Consumg, L.L.C. third party consultant No Group
Habart & Associates Consulting Inc. third party consultant No Group
Halton Company third party consultant No Group
Harris Design Inc. third party consultant No Group
Hatch Consulting third party consultant No Group
HEC, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Hill and Knowlton third party consultant No Group
Hoffman Corporation third party consultant No Group
Hoffman LLCNertegy third party consultant No Group
Hoffman York third party consultant No Group
Home Depot third party consultant No Group
Home Excellence, Inc. third party consultant No Group
HPAC Engineering third party consultant No Group
lcynene Co. third party consultant No Group
Innovest Strategic Value Advisors third party consultant No Group
INSIGHT third party consultant No Group
Insights Unlimited third party consultant No Group
Integrated Design Associates, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Interbrand third party consultant No Group
J. Ottman Consulting third party consultant No Group
Jaco Environmental third party consultant No Group
Jim Perich-Anderson Consulting third party consultant No Group
John Manville third party consultant No Group
KAT Consultii third party consultant No Group
KER] third party consultant No Group

 

176

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lambert Engﬂeeringlnc. third party consultant No Group
Les Tumidaj & Associates third party consultant No Group
Levy Associates third party consultant No Group
Lighting Wizards third party consultant No Group
LumenX, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Lutron Electronics Co., Inc. third party consultant No Group
MaxLite third party consultant No Group
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and

Popeo, P.C third party consultant No Group
Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. third party consultant No Group
MSI Consulting third party consultant No Group
Mullen Advertising third party consultant No Group
National Association of Home Builders

(N AI-IB) third party consultant No Group
National Association of Plumbing Heating

Cooling Contractors (N AHPCC) third party consultant No Group
Nationwide TV & Appliance third party consultant No Group
Natural Gas Supply Association third party consultant No Group
North Atlantic Energy Advisors third party consultant No Group
Northern Power Systems third party consultant No Group
OBAcorp third party consultant No Group
ON Semiconductor third party consultant No Group
PAH Associates third party consultant No Group
Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) third party consultant No Group
Peregrine Energy Group third party consultant No Group
Plumbirg Manufacturers Institute third party consultant No Group
Polyisocyanurate Insulation Manufacturers

Association Q’IMA) third party consultant No Group
PositivEnergy third party consultant No Group
Power Efﬁciency Corporation third party consultant No Group
Power Integrations third party consultant No Group
Predicate Energy, LLC third party consultant No Group
Primen third party consultant No Group
Public Solutions third party consultant No Grog:
Pumps & Systems Magazine third party consultant No Group
PWP, Inc. third party consultant No Group
R. M. Shoemaker Construction third party consultant No Group
R.L. Martin & Associates, Inc. third party consultant No Group
RAND Corporation third party consultant No Group
Real Estate Technologies Group third party consultant No Group
RealWinWin, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Resource Engineering Group, Inc. third party consultant No Group

 

I77

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ridge & Associates third party consultant No Group
Rockwell Automation third party consultant No Group
Rockwood International AS third party consultant No Group
Ruhnke ConsultinLInc. third party consultant No Group
Sanyo third party consultant No Group
Sawtooth Ridge Woodcraft third party consultant No Group
Schott Applied Power Corp third party consultant NO Group
SHADE Consulting, LLC third party consultant No Group
Shockman Consulting third party consultant No Group
Sieben Energy Associates third party consultant No Grorm
Skymark International third party consultant No Group
Smart Systems International third party consultant No Group
Solar Alternatives third party consultant No Group
Southwall Technoloﬁs third party consultant No Group
Stellar Processes, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Sunoptics Prismatic Skylights third party consultant No Group
Superior Coils third party consultant No Group
Sustainable Earth Enterprises third party consultant No Group
Synertech Systems Corporation third party consultant No Group
Systel-USA third party consultant No Group
Takagi Industrial Co., Inc. third party consultant No Group
Take Note Company third party consultant No Group
Technical Consumer Products (TCP), Inc. third party consultant No Group
Technology Prospects, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Therrnalex, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Thomsjo Services third party consultant No Group
Two Gateway Center third party consultant NO Group
U.S. Combined Heat & Power Association third party consultant No Group
Unleash Inc. third party consultant No Group
USAA Realty third paprtyconsultant No Group
Veazey, Parrott, Durkin & Shoulders third party consultant No Group
Venstar, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Veriﬁed TM, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Watt Stopper, Inc. third pargl consultant No Group
Weatherwise USA Inc. third party consultant No Group
West Hill Energy & Computing, Inc. third party consultant No Group
Westlab third party consultant No Group
White-Rodgers third party consultant No Group
ZGF Partnership third party consultant No Group

 

178

 

Table 3.6 (cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Atlantic City Electric Company utility No Group
Aton Teknikkonsult AB utility No Group
Baldor Electric Company utility No Group
Bay State Gas utility No Group
Berkshire Gas Company utility No Group
Blacksburg, Christiansburg VPI Water Auth. utility No Group
Central Vermont Public Service Corporation utility No Group
Cinergy Co. utility No Group
Colorado Springs Utilities utility No Group
Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. utility No Group
Commonwealth Edison Company utility No Group
Exelon Corporation utility No Group
Florida Power Corporation utility No Group
Gaz Metropolitain utility No Group
Great River Energy utility No Group
Idaho Power Company utility No Group
Madison Gas & Electric Company utility No Group
Narrpgansett Electric utility No Group
Reliant Energy HL&P utility No Group
Sempra Energy Utilities utility No Group
Silicon Valley Power-City of Santa Clara utility No Group
Southern Company Services, Inc. utility No Group
Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency utility No Group
Tacoma City Light utility No Group
Union Gas Limited utility No Group
Utilicorp United Inc. utility No Group

 

 

 

179

 

LITERATURE CITED

180

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