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ABSTRACT

FRANCIS SUAREZ:
A METAPHYSICS FOR BODY AND SOUL

by
John L. Treloar, S.J.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the
general metaphysical doctrines of matter, form, and in-
dividuation and their application to the special problem
of the relationship of body and soul in the philosophy of
Francis Suarez. It is the general conclusion of this in-
vestigation that the metaphysics of Suarez results in
psychological dualism.

Because the works of Suarez are extensive this
thesis will limit itself to the Disputationes Metaphysicae.
This work provides the clearest outline of the problems with
Suarez' doctrine of body and soul.

The initial chapter is devoted to Suarez' treatment
of causality in general. Here Suarez follows the Aristo-
telian teaching on causality and places the discussion of
matter and form in this setting. After the context has been
established Suarez can move to the discussion of matter and
form.

In the treatment of material cause Suarez shows that

we can know by reason alone of a material cause. Suarez

 

 

 

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then specifies the nature of the cause. In this thesis the
claims that the material cause cannot be a complete sub-
stance, that it has actual being, that it can be a pure
potency only in a limited sense will be treated. It is
necessary to show the relationship of matter to quantity.
These investigations illustrate that despite the claim that
matter cannot be a complete substance of itself, Suarez does
make it an integral being.

The treatment on formal cause is parallel to
material cause. Suarez asks if there are substantial forms
in material things. He then spells out the implications of
this doctrine. He shows how forms are generated and cor-
rupted, how they are spoken of as causes, how matter and
form are mutually dependent, and how there is only one sub-
stantial form for each being. There is a desire to maintain
the form as an incomplete substance and apparent success
with respect to subhuman forms. The doctrine falls into
problems with respect to the rational soul, which can exist
independently of the body.

The chapters on matter and form show that these
causes in Suarez are more independent than was the case in
Aristotle or high scholasticism. It is necessary to con-

. front the problem of what it means to be an individual.
Suarez shows that everything that exists exists as an indi-
vidual. Then he shows that the "signed matter" of Thomas
Aquinas is unsatisfactory as the principle of individuation.

Even though matter must play a part in individuation, the

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major principle of individuation is the form. Individuation
shows the dualism of Suarezian metaphysics of matter and
form.

Body and soul are a special case of the more general
metaphysics of matter and form. Suarez encounters some very
unique problems. How is the matter of the matter-form rela-
tionship related to the human body? How can the rational
soul be the form of the body since it can exist apart from
matter? The result of the metaphysical dualism of matter
and form is a clear psychological dualism.

The treatment of cognition and of willing is care-
fully adjusted to accommodate the peculiar understanding of
body and soul. Especially noteworthy are the doctrines of
direct intellectual knowledge of the singular and of elic-
ited appetite.

Future studies must come to grips with Suarez' 23
Anima and its textual problems. Some philosopher-theologian
must examine the 23 922 g §25_Dierum. In that work Suarez
functions as a theologian, and it is necessary for someone
familiar with scholastic theology and philosophy to analyze
the work. Historians of phiIOSOphy must attend to the in-
fluence Suarez has had on figures of modern philosophy such

as Descartes and Leibniz.

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FRANCIS SUAREZ:
A METAPHYSICS FOR BODY AND SOUL
by-

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John L: Treloar, S.J.

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Philosophy

1976

Copyright by
JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J.
1976

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Upon completion of a study such as the present one,
an author realizes his debt to the many people who have
aided him. I would like to thank Professor Harold T. Walsh
for his constant encouragement and unfailing scholarship in
the direction of this dissertation and throughout my studies
at Michigan State University. In addition I greatly appre-
ciate the suggestions and help offered on the early drafts
by the members of my dissertation committee--Professor Rhoda
H. Kotzin, Professor Charles J. McCracken, and Professor
Lewis K. Zerby.

Professor William J. Callaghan, Chairman of the
Department of Philosophy has been an invaluable friend and

a scholarly inspiration throughout my doctoral program.

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TABLE OF C ONTENTS

CHAPTER
I 0 INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O C O O O O O

The Purpose of this Study. . . . .
Context of the Disputationes . . .
Influence of Duns Scotus on Suarez
The Discussion of Causality in
General in Suarez. . . . . .
Divisions of the Following Study .

II. SUAREZ' TEACHING ON MATTER . . . . .

The Existence of Prime Matter. . .

The Being and Essence of Prime Matter.

Matter as Pure Potency . . . . . .
The Causality of Prime Matter. . .

Matter and the Accident of Quantity.

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . .

III. SUAREZ' TEACHING ON FORM . . . . . .
The Existence of Substantial Form.

The Being and Essence of Substantial

The Mutual Dependence of Matter and Form

Form.
The Causality of Substantial Form. . . .

The Unicity of Substantial Form. . . . .

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . .

IV. INDIVIDUATION. . . . . . . . . . . .
The Nature of Individuality. . .

Signed Matter as the Principle of In-

dividuation in Material Substances .

Substantial Form as the Principle of

Ind1v1duation. . O O O O O O O O O 0

Existence of a Singular Thing as the

Principle of Individuation . . . . .

Principles of Individuation for All
Created Things . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

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25
36
59
68

75
83

86

107
120
128

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154
155
172
196
203

208
218

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CHAPTER

v. BODY AND SOUL O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O 0

Special Characteristics of the Human Soul.

The Human Soul is Like Other Forms . .
The Human Soul is Different from
Other Forms. . . . . . . .

Separated Souls and Internal Composition

within the Soul. . . . . . . . . . .
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Human Soul and the Problem of Unity.

The Divisions of Unity . . . . . . . .

Being and Unity. . . . .

Per Se Being, Pg; Se Unity and Human
Composition. . . .

Per Accidens Being, Per Accidens Unity
and Human Composition. . . . . . . .

 

conCIusion O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUALISM OF BODY AND SOUL

Knowing in a Dualistic Context . . . . .
Willing in a Dualistic Context . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VII. CONCLUSION AND POSSIBILITIES FOR

FURTHER STUDY 0 C O O O O O O O O O O O 0

Summary of the Present Study . . . .

Possibilities for Further Study in Suarez.
Possibilities for Further Study Concerning

Suarez' Relationship to Other Thinkers
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY. O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

221

223
223

229

2A1
2L6

2&8

2&8
250

252
256
265

270
273

302
323

327

327
333

339
3&5

3A7

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of This Study

The intention of this investigation is to inquire
into the general metaphysical doctrines of matter, form, and
individuation and their application to the special problem
of the relationship of body and soul in the philosophy of
Francis Suarez. It will be the general conclusion of this
study that the metaphysics of Suarez results in a dualism of
body and soul, if not in intent, at least in fact.

Because the works of Suarez are so extensive
(twenty-eight volumes in the Vives edition)1 it will be
necessary to limit this present study to a single work of
Suarez, the Disputationes Metaphysicae.2 This treatise is

Suarez' own definitive position on metaphysics and

 

1Francis Suarez, era Omnia, Ed. Charles Breton, 26
vols. (Paris: Ludovicus ves, I856-1877 and 2 vols of in-
dices, 1878). This collection of Suarez' works is the
standard edition of the complete works.

2Francis Suarez, Dis utaciones Metafisicas, Ed. and
trans. Sergio Rabade Romeo et al, 7 vols. (Madrid:

Biblioteca Hispanics de Filosofia, 1960).

This edition of the Disputationes is the one used in
the present study. Basically this is a translation of
Suarez' major philosophical work into Spanish. The transla-
tors and editors, however, have provided the complete Latin
text at the foot of each page and have corrected the Vives
edition where necessary to coincide with the manuscript.

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consequently is actually the central work that would have to
be consulted in any metaphysical inquiry such as the present
one. The work is long and extremely erudite but the lan-

guage is clear and direct and hence the Disputationes serve

 

as an excellent source of Suarezian thought.
There are at least two other works of Suarez that
would be likely candidates for a study similar to the pres-

ent one. Suarez' early work the De Anima3

would appear to
be the obvious source to go if one were to embark on a dis-
cussion of body and soul in the thought of Suarez. The text
of this work, however, is in very poor condition. There are
several historical accidents to account for this. As has
been noted, the 23 Agimg was an early work and never pub-
lished by Suarez himself. It is solidly medieval in tradi-
tion in the fact that it is a commentary on Aristotle's 93
Egg §ggl. The first historical accident that influenced the
quality of this text is that Suarez was in the process of
revising the work for publication at the time of his death
in 1617. What was eventually published was Chapters 1 to 12
of Book I which had been revised by Suarez; and the re-
mainder of the work was from the early period. In itself
this would not be terribly disruptive, but the second his-
torical accident makes use of the 22_Agimg_particularly dif-

ficult. Suarez' friend and literary executor Baltasar

Alvarez, in preparing the treatise for publication,

 

3The De Anima is found in Volume III of the Vives
edition of the Opera Omnia.

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apparently did extensive editing of the yet to be revised
text in order to make it coincide with the teachings of
Book I, Chapters 1 to 12. What has resulted is a hybrid
text and it is very difficult to sort out what belongs to
Alvarez and what to Suarez.“

The second work that could provide some information
on the metaphysics of Suarez is the 2g Opere Sex Dierum.5
Once again, this work was published posthumously by Alvarez
in 1621. The nature of the problems here are somewhat dif-
ferent from those of the 22,521ma. Since the De Opere Sex
Dierum is meant to be a commentary on the first part of the
Summg Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas, this immediately imposes
two limitations on it from a philosophical point of view.
1. Suarez is commenting on someone else's work and his own
position is less apparent than in the Disputationes. 2. The
Qg.nggg,§ x Dierum is more strictly theological than philo-
sophical, consequently there must be a constant sorting out
of theological positions from philosophical ones.

Given the problems, then, with the De Agimg and the
Qg_gpg£g’§gx_Dierum it has been decided to limit this pres-
ent study to the Disputationes Metaphysicae as the major

philosophical contribution of Francis Suarez.

Prior to inaugurating the discussion of matter,

 

“Cf. Joaquin Carreras y Artau, "Notas sobre el texto
del trato 'De Anima' de Francisco Suarez," Pensamiento, 15

1959): 293-307-

5The Qg O ere Sex Dierum is also found in Volume III
Vives edition of t 9 Opera Omnia.

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form, individuation, and body and soul in the Di5putationes

 

there are several preliminary matters to be taken care of.
These topics will form the subject matter of the remainder
of this introductory chapter. The Disputationes must be put
into an historical context both with respect to Suarez' own
life and their significance in the history of philosophy.
Then, as preparatory to the material in Chapters II to VI it
will be necessary to explain briefly the same doctrines of
matter, form, and individuation as they occur in Duns
Scotus. In addition, one must look at the Scotist version
of the form of corporeity which Suarez rejects as superflu-
ous. Thirdly, the concerns of this present study occur in a
very large work and it is necessary to orient the reader to
the fact that matter and form are treated in the context of
causality. Finally, at the end of this introduction a gen-

eral outline of the remainder of the study will be provided.

Context of the Disputationes

Francis Suarez was born at Granada in 15h8 and at
the age of sixteen he entered the Society of Jesus. After
his initial training in the Society he began his profes-
sional career by teaching philosOphy at Segovia. It is from
this period that the original 22 Agima comes. Later in his
career he lectured in theology rather than philosophy and
the schools at which he taught are spread across Spain and
Italy. When he was forty-nine years old he published the
Disputationes figtgphysicae at Salamanca. His other major
work, the Qg_Le ibus, was published in 1612. At the time of

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5
his death in 1617, he was working on a revision of the 93
M which was eventually published by Alvarez in 1621
together with the _l_)_e_ Opere Sex Dierum.6
Perhaps more important for present purposes than the
bare chronological data of Suarez' literary production is
the intellectual context in which the Disputationes was com-
posed. Since Suarez stands at the crossroads between the
medieval period and the modern period, there are conflicting
Opinions among the critics about his work. Some feel that
Suarez' purpose in writing the Disputationes was typically
medieval. As substantiation for this position they cite
Suarez' own preface to the work in which he points out that
the fundamental notions of metaphysics are necessary for any
one who wants to understand theology. These same critics
also note that Suarez' method is also medieval in that he
first states the opposing Opinions of his predecessors be-
fore giving his solution to a point.7 On the other hand
there is a distinctively modern tone to the Disputationes

a180. Suarez provides an elaborate discussion of philo—

sOphical problems in separation from theology and the order

\

6For a brief and concise biography of Suarez the
feeder is referred to Frederick Copleston, A Histo of fl};-
xosophy, 8 vols. (New York: Image Books, 1§62-6’73, V31. 3,
pt- - 2: 173-75. Other biographies which treat Suarez' life
1 more detail are Joseph M. Fichter, Man of

n Spain: Suarez
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 19h5'T-an'd' . e

Sclorrailef’ Francois Suarez de _l_e_1 Compagnie 519. Jesus, 2 vols.

Paris: . Cetfiielleux, I911) .

7Armand Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York:
Random House, 1962), 357.

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6

and themes of these problems are certainly modern.
Copleston acknowledges that this freer style of philoSOph-
ical writing is due to the influence of renaissance human-
ism, and it is this humanism that allows Suarez to break
through the former tradition of commenting on Aristotle and
allows him to compose the Disputationes as he does.8
Joseph Fichter, one of Suarez' more laudatory biog-

raphers, claims that the Lisputationes came at a time when

 

they were needed. Since there was beginning to be an influx

of strictly philosophical thought and since there was great
Stress and strain in theological quarrels, the Disputationes
Often served all parties as a basic treatment of very com-
Plex issues. The tradition of scholasticism had it that the
metaphysics of Aristotle should be taught. Suarez dissolved
the trappings this tradition had accumulated over the cen-
1'3\11:~ies and to do this he took the doctrine of Aristotle as a
"}1<>le and then rearranged the text and plan in a more
orderly fashion.9 In a word, one can look at the Diaputa-
L-iones as an attempt to revitalize a science that had fallen
on hard times.

Finally, it would be well to point out something of

the purpose of the Disputationes as Suarez himself
\

8COpleston, _A_ Histog 9_f_'_ Philosophy, Vol. 3, pt. 2:

163.61..

9Fichter, Man 2; S ain, 189-90. The reader is also
I‘Oferred to Suarez‘-own reworking of Aristotle. At the be-
inning of the Dis utationes Metaphysicae Suarez provides an
Index Locupletissimus“ giving the places where he treats
the usual Aristotelian topics in metaphysics.

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understood it. Astrain observes that Suarez, from the ex-
perience of his teaching, realized that many of his students
were deficient in philosophy. He saw that in order to un-
derstand theology they needed extensive instruction in meta-
physics. Suarez was in the process of publishing a series
of theological works at this time, but interrupted his pub-
lication schedule to compose and prepare the Disputationes
for publication. This was to be a solid treatise on meta-
Physics that would serve as a foundation for sacred science.
The result of this endeavor is the work now known as the
Pisputationes musicae.

This brief investigation, then, of the context of
the Disputationes serves to point out that the work is one
of Suarez' mature efforts as opposed to the Q_e_ m. In
addition it is important to note that Suarez is very much a
man of two traditions. His method and purpose are medi-
eVeluhe uses disputation format,10 and views metaphysics
as an ancillary science to theology. But, the rearrangement
Of philosophical topics and the questions being asked have a

mt><iern trend to them.

Influence of Duns Scotus on Suarez
In the previous section it was noted that Suarez is

velry much a man of a tradition. One figure that plays an
\

10It should be noted that Thomas Aquinas in his
Shauna Theolo iae used the disputation format. In that work
of IThomas t e ormat is absolutely invariable. Suarez' use
°f the disputation format is much freer than what one finds
in the earlier scholastics. Astrain is cited by Fichter in
Egg 9;; s ain, 187.

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important role in the formation of Suarez' own metaphysical
position is John Duns Scotus (1265 or 1266 - 1308). Suarez
takes over some of Duns Scotus' positions almost intact
(e.g., the separate being and essence of matter) and rejects

others (e.g., the doctrine of the plurality of forms). It

is this picking and choosing of Scotist positions together
With the desire to return to a more pristine Aristotelian or
Thomist philosophy that eventually results in the implied
dualism of the Disputationes Metaphysicae. This present
Section is meant to be a brief survey of the Scotist posi-
tions on the topics of concern in the body of this study.11
A major issue throughout the medieval period was the
Status and condition of prime matter. Scotus pulls away
fPom the tradition when he states that we must postulate a
Inatter really existent which is ontologically prior to every
fOrin and which is the prime stuff out of which the universe
13 made. This matter is not and cannot be co-eternal with
God but is created; since its very being is the farthest re-
l“fitted from self-existence; and it would be a limitation on
God's actuality if it were co-eternal with Him. Such limi-
t:Qtflon is clearly impossible. In Scotus matter must enter
11The the composition of all created things and becomes the

badge of creaturehood. What is important about matter for
\

11For comprehensive treatments of the Scotist osi-
ti«ans summarized n this study the reader should consu t the
t‘Ollowing: Efrem Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Princi-
files 93: _I_{_i_s_ Philosophg, Trans. and ed. Bernardi'ne Bonansea
ashington . .. e Catholic University of America
PI‘ess, 1961‘ and C. R. S. Harris, Duns Scotus, 2 vols. (New
York: The Humanities Press, 1959).

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9
this study is that in Scotus matter has an existence of its
own apart from its combination with form. It does not actu-
ally exist in a free state but still is a real metaphysical
Induciple with an actuality of its own. Were this not so it
mnfld not enter into the composition of anything as a con-
stituent principle. As Harris notes, this notion of matter
is far removed from the Aristotelian doctrine followed by
Thomas Aquinas.12 Suarez is especially influenced by the
«Scotist theory of matter and the idea that matter has an
existence of its own is an important aspect of Scotist phi-
losophy assumed by Suarez.
The second doctrine of Duns Scotus that influences
Suarez is the theory of form. Suarez in this instance, how-
ever, is more critical of Duns Scotus than he is in the case
of matter. As is standard in scholastic philosophy the cor-
Jrelative of matter is form. Together these principles con-
stitute the concrete substances of the real world. Like the
'“li13ter, the form has a reality of its own but exists only in
a combined state with the matter. The form is considered by
Sc=<::tus to be the determining principle by which a thing is
geherically and specifically characterized. Up to this
pOint Soctus and Suarez are in agreement with respect to the
nature of the form.13
There is now, however, a radical break between the
'EEEEnkers. Scotus, in order to account for the various

12

 

Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. 2: 77-78.
13Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. 2: 88-89.

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10
levels of being (e.g., inanimate, plant, animal, human),
xmsits the position that there can be a plurality of sub-
stantial forms within one and the same concrete being.
Suarez, on the other hand, returns to the Thomist position
that there is only one form united to matter. Scotus saw
the doctrine of unity of form as dangerous to theology;
Suarez saw hopeless philosophical complication with the doc-
trine of plurality of forms. In his own phiIOSOphy Suarez
Spends great effort in rejecting the doctrine. Scotus feels
that in all living beings one must postulate a plurality of
Substantial principles. The form by which an animal has a
bOdy is not the same as the form by which it lives, nor is
13he form by which it lives identical with the form by which
33¢, is sentient. Scotus reasons that the body is composed of
3111<>rganic matter, but the animal is something more than a
bOrly. It is a living body and the properties of living and
dead matter are widely different. The form which gives the
a1111:1111 its living being, the soul, differs from the form of
the body as body. Each of these forms has a determinate
character. In addition, Scotus reasons that at death soul
and body are parted, but the body remains behind, and it is
the same body as before death. This is Duns Scotus' famous
dOctrine on the form of corporeity.“ He does not feel that
t'l'le plurality of forms militates against the unity of the
composite of matter and form. Rather, the act of being of

the whole contains the acts of being of all the parts. This

\

lhflarris, Duns Scotus, Vol. 2: 107-08.

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11
means there is a plurality of partial actualities. The
unity of the whole is derived from one form, namely that
form which makes the whole composite to be what it 13.15
Suarez sees that this doctrine of plurality of forms de-
stroys the very meaning of "substantial form" and rejects
it completely.
In addition to the theories of matter and form,
Suarez is influenced heavily by the Scotist teaching on in-
dividuation. In each individual, according to Duns Scotus,
there are two entities or realities which are formally dis-
tiinct-u-the universal and the particular. The universal ele-
ment, the essence or nature, is common to all individuals of
tShe same species. The haecceity constitutes the individual
as a singular being. Each of these realities has a unity of
its own independent of the knowing mind. The universal ele-
ment has a unity which is less than the numerical unity of
the singular being. But, this poses a problem concerning
which entity constitutes the individual. It is neither mat-
ter as such, nor the form as such, nor the composite as
8“ch, but the ultimate real being of all three. Matter,
£011: and composite can all be conceived as universal. One
must distinguish, therefore, between the nature of these
elements, and this individuality. The individual concrete
t'hzing is not made up of form and matter simply but of this

Ina‘tter and this form. The haecceity does not add a

\

15Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. 2: 105-106. Cf. also
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qualitative difference to the individual but accrues only as

16

the matter and the form are concretized. When one turns
to the Suarezian position on individuation he sees the same
concern that it be this matter and this form that individ-

uate; the difference is that the thisness of matter and form

 

in Suarez tends to be a qualitative determination. In a
word, Suarez' position here is not as carefully nuanced as
Duns Scotus'.

Given this metaphysical background Duns Scotus must
face the problem of the unity of the human being. In the
human being there is a double combination of two matters and
two forms (physical matter/form of corporeity and spiritual
matter/spiritual form). Man in this situation is an onto-

logical peculiarity which cannot be accounted for strictly.
That is, man has a unique location in the metaphysical
s‘Ctheme of things as the meeting place of the physical and
the spiritual. He is half brute and half angel. Without
further explanation Duns Scotus simply asserts that the in-
tellectual soul is the substantial form of an already com-
I><>eite being-with which it forms an essential union more
De:l:~fect and more intimate than any other in the physical
universe.” Suarez denies, as has already been seen, all
Versions of plurality of forms; he also denies any talk of

a12>:iritua1 matter. In the instance of the unity of the human

\

16Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. 2: 9h-96.

17Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. 2: 250-51.

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13

being he will have to rework the doctrine completely since

Duns Scotus' approach is so unacceptable. Suarez' own posi-
tion is much closer to traditional Aristotelian or Thomistic
philosophy. The question that arises of course is whether
or not he can accept Duns Scotus' metaphysics of matter,
form, and individuation without also accepting this result
in psychology.

One final Scotist position that Suarez accepts, and
that will be of major concern at the end of this study, is
the doctrine that the intellect has direct knowledge of the
singular. In Thomism this psychological problem of intel-
lectual knowledge of the singular was resolved by showing
that the intellect has only indirect (reflex) knowledge of
the singular. This position of Thomism developed out of the
desire to maintain a strict understanding of the nature of
the various powers (senses had knowledge of the singular,
the intellect had knowledge of the universal). Duns Scotus,
however, blurs this distinction when he states that the
thing existing here and now in its concrete being is known
directly not only by the senses but also by the intellect
‘Vhich grasps it by an intuitive knowledge. The basis of
this claim is that intuitive knowledge is distinct from ab-
stractive knowledge which always prescinds from the object
known. That is, if one considers the origin of knowledge it
always begins from the intuition of the concrete thing. The
product of this first encounter of intellect and thing is
the idea of the individual thing. This idea is quite proper

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tn the thing as it stands before me and it is through this

idea that the intellect has the first graSp of what it wants

to know. But, as soon as the intellect tries to find out

exactly what the individual thing is (i.e., provide a def-
inition of the individual) it has recourse to abstractive
knowledge because it is incapable of grasping haecceity.
TTurough this initial idea the intellect knows the object
orily in a confused manner; it is only after a definition
has been provided that the intellect knows the object dis-
tinctly. This intuitive knowledge of the singular is an
ixritial and confused kind of knowledge but it is no less im-
portant than the abstractive knowledge. For the human in-
tellect it is the necessary starting point of knowledge. In
a word, it is like a spiritual sense by which the intellect
Perceives the reality that affects the physical senses.18

In Chapter VI it will be necessary to look at

Suarez' own version of this doctrine of the direct intellec-
‘vual knowledge of the singular. The reason why this topic
is of such interest is that one of Suarez' main proofs for
the unity of the human being rests on the unity of operation
mhanifested by a human being. That is, there must be a con-
1:inuity between the operations of sense powers and intellec-

tual powers. Suarez' own position of the direct knowledge

<>f the singular depends heavily on Scotus but cannot make

‘

18Bettoni, Duns Scotus: His Philoso h , 122-23.
(221.5 {gso Copleston, _K History 9_f_ Fix-{10301251, Vol. 2, pt. 2:

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15
use of the same explanations of the process since he has
done away with the plurality of forms. In a word such a
plurality of forms allows Duns Scotus to have a unique form
that can know the singular directly.
It has not been the purpose of this treatment of
Duns Scotus to give anything like a complete exposition of
his philosophy. Rather, the concern has been to show those
areas of Scotistic philosophy that have either influenced
Suarez or to show those areas of Scotistic philosophy that
have been rejected by him. Suarez himself does not react to
these various positions uncritically but they do influence
his overall approach. It can be seen from even the brief
review presented here that Duns Scotus' philosophy is a
great deal more complicated than Aristotle's or Thomas
Acluinas'. Suarez has a tendency to return to the simpler
philosophies of Thomism and Aristotelianism but brings to
his thought some of the more complex Scotism. This attempt
to return to simplicity using the more intricate apparatus
results in a philosophy manifesting serious inherent incon-

sistencies .19

 

19Some work has been done on the relationship of
Suarez and Scotus and the reader is referred to P. Mignes,
"Suarez und Duns Scotus," Philosophiches Jahrbuch, 32
(1919): BBL-1+0 and Eleutherius Elorduy, "Duns Scoti influxus
in Francisci Suarez doctrinam," Acta Congressus Scotistici
Internationales, Oxford and Edinburgh, Sept.TI-I7, WEE and
one : -37,

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16

The Discussion of Causality
in General in Suarez

One final topic to be treated by way of introduction
to this study is Suarez' treatment of causality in general.
In the analysis of causality one can see Suarez' intent to
Place himself in the Aristotelian tradition. Even here,
however, there are adjustments being made to the metaphysi-
cal doctrines as they have developed since Aristotle. Since
Suarez treats the theories of matter and form in the context
of causality, it is the purpose of this section to provide a
setting for the materials found in Chapters II and III of
the present study. Suarez' analysis of the general doctrine
of causality occurs in Disputation XII; the concern in this
disputation is to show the number and kinds of causes and
the mutual distinctions of one cause from another.

Suarez points out at the very beginning of his
treatment that he is concerned to validate the celebrated
division of causality as proposed by Aristotle in Book V of
the Metaphysics and Book II of the Physics. But, he is not
willing to accept this theory of causality simply because
Aristotle proposed it. Suarez asks whether all kinds of
causality are included in this division and how are the

causes distinguished from each other},0

 

20Celebris est illa divisio causes in quatuor
causarum genera, scilicet, materialis, formalis, efficientis,
et finalis quam tradit Arist., V Metaph., c. 2 et lib. II
Phys” c. 3 et sequent., cuius divisionis expositio omnino
Pendet ex singulorum membrorum exacts intelligentia, quam in
toto hoc tractatu late prosequemur; et ideo nunc in communi
solum preponemus ea quae circa hanc divisionem dubitari

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17
Whether or not there are four kinds of causes is

established by eXperience. Suppose Suarez says, that some-

thing new occurs in nature. This supposition has foundation
in experience because of the perpetual alteration, genera-
tion and corruption of things. If, therefore, something new
happens, it is necessary that there be something else by
Vhich this new thing happens. Nothing is able to cause it-
self. This process whereby something new occurs on account
of another is called efficient causality. An efficient
cause either produces its effect from nothing or from some
other thing which is presupposed for its action. One cannot
33? that the efficient cause produces from nothing generally
Speaking, for experience shows that an artist cannot make a
statue except from wood or bronze. Or, alternatively, fire
cannot heat something unless something previous is presup-
Posed which is capable of heat, nor is one even able to make
a fire except from wood or a similar material. That subject
which is presupposed for the action of an efficient cause is
called the material cause. It is necessary that the effi-

cient cause introduce something new; otherwise there would

 

possunt et ea breviter expendiemus. Primum est an omnia
illa membra vere ac proprie sub divisio contineantur.
Secundum an inter se distinguantur et opponantur. Tertium
an sufficienter comprehendant totum divisum. Quartum an
Proxime et immediate causa in illa membra dividatur, vel
possit aliqua divisio media excogitari. Quintum an illa
divisio sit infima seu stoma, an possint singula membra in
alia dividi. Sextum, an sit univoca vel analoga. Disp.
Meta. XII, Sect. 3, par. 1.

All references to the Dis utationes will appear in
this manner. Unless otherwise noted the text used is the
modern Romeo edition.

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18

be no new thing; but if there is no new thing, then, the

original hypothesis has been violated. This new thing as it

is introduced is called the form. Moreover, since causes

act not by chance but on account of the purpose of the
agent, as is clear with respect especially to human actions,
it is necessary to allow for an end on account of which the
efficient cause operates. From eXperience, then, one can

discover the four causes of Aristotle--efficient, material,

formal , and final . 21

21Ad primum dubitationem dicendum est omnia illa
vere ac proprie rationem causae participare; et ideo merito
cause!!! in illa quatuor membra dividi. Haec assertio,
praeter communem omnium consensum post Aristotelem, sic
Probatur. Nam quod illa quatuor in rebus seu effectibus
Quos experimur inveniantur, facile declarari potest
SUPPOHendo aliquid novum in rerum natura fieri; quod est tam
evidens ex perpetua rerum vicissitudine, alteratione,
Eeneratione, ac corruptione ut illud argumentis probare
sul’eI'Vacaneum sit. Si ergo fit aliquid de novo, necessaria
est aliqua alia res a qua fiat, quia non potest idem facere
seipsam, et hanc vocamus efficientem causam. Quae vel
Producit suum effectum ex nihilo vel ex aliqua re quam ad
suam actionem praesupponat; primum non potest in universum
d101, nam experimento constat neque artificem facere statuam
nisi ex ligno aut aere, neque ignem calefacere nisi aliquid
ei supponatur quod calorem suscipiat, neque efficere
ignem nisi ex ligno, stupa aut alia re simili. Immo hic
nodus agendi tam est prOprius naturalium causarum, ut
philosophi qui ad illas tantum attenderunt inde sumpserint
axioma illud: E5 nihilo nihil £12. Illud ergo subiectum
quod ad actionem efficientis causae supponitur, materialem
causam vocamus. Necesse est autem ut causa efficiens tale
subiectum aliquan rem introducat; alias nihil novum
efficeret contra positam hypothesim. Illud ergo vocamus
forlam, qualiscumque illa sit, de quo postea videbimus.
Tandem, cum causae per agentes non temere et casu agant, ut
ipso rerun experimento constat, et praocipue in actionibus
humanis, ut res sit extra controversiam, necesse est ut
Praeter illa tria detur etiam finis propter quem causa
efficions operatur. Reperiuntur ergo haec quatuor membra in
rebus, sive omnia illa in singulis effectibus inveniantur,
sive non, hoc enim postea inquirendum nam ad praesens sat

est quod in rerum universitate inveniantur. Disp. Meta.
XII, Sect. 3, par. 2.

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19
The major concern of this study will be with the
material and formal causes. The experiential proof just
given for the existence of the four causes places the dis-
cussion of matter and form in a definite context. This same
Proof also gives the initial definition of matter and form.
F'Or Suarez the matter is that subject which is presupposed
r0r the action of an efficient cause; the form is the new
thing which is introduced into the pre-existing subject.
These two definitions become the foundations upon which
Suarez builds his doctrine of prime matter and substantial
form. For the most part these doctrines as they appear in
the Mutation; are nothing more than a careful and exten-
sive elaboration of the definitions of material and formal
causes.
In the immediately succeeding paragraph Suarez ex-
panda on the basic meanings of material and formal cause
the BXistence of which has been shown from experience. In
the OXplanation of material cause he shows that his approach
coincides with Aristotle's definition of matter as id 93; 93:3
M fit aliguid (that from which something new occurs
when another is introduced into it). The preposition 9; is
meant to signify that matter is distinguished from the other
causes, and insito signifies that matter is not a mere lack
of being but also declares that there is a proper influence
by which matter shows itself to be the universal subject.

From matter, then, arises the existence of the total

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composite.22 The explanation of formal cause follows a

similar pattern to that of material cause. The form is fre-

quently defined as the act which constitutes the composite
being, or alternatively, the causa intrinseca guae dat esse
£_e_i_ (the intrinsic cause which gives existence to the
thing). That is, the matter is the foundation of the being
Q1? a thing; the form completes the being of the thing.

These two are the constituting principles of natural things
and as such are properly speaking causes of things.23

Two things to be noted even in this early discussion

of material and formal causes are that Suarez implies in his
definition of material cause some sort of separate existence
for the matter or subject, and he also refers to these two
causes as internal causes. It has already been shown that
Suarez picked up the separate existence of matter from Duns

Scotus; and even though he is using the Aristotelian

 

22. . . materia enim ab Aristotele definitur esse 1g
3; no insito Qt ali uid. Ubi per particulam ex cum
propr etete sumptum dgstinguitur materia ab aliis causis;
per particulam autem insito separatur a privatione et
declaratur pro rius influxus, quo materia et in universum
subiectum exhiget se, ut ex so consurgat esse totius. Disp.
Metae XII, SOCt. 3, par. 30

23Similiter for-a seipsam exhibet ut illa tamquam
ectu compositum constituatur; immo frequenter definiri solet
for-a, quod sit causa intrinseca uae g9; esse rei; materia
enim est quasi inchoatio quaedam ve fundamentux-n—i'psius
esse, forms vero illud consummat et complet; propter quod
ratio ggidditatis appellatur ab Aristotele citatis locis.
WI aec numerantur inter principia intrinseca rei
naturalis, vel potius illa duo tantum sunt principia
constituentia rem naturalem; sunt autem principia per se,
cum sint maxime necessaria et essentialia, et dant esse eo
Iodo quo explicatum est; sunt ergo propriae causae. Disp.
Meta. III, Sect. 3, par. 3.

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definition Suarez is positing a very different view of mat-

ter from Aristotle. The talk of matter and form as internal

causes is opposed to the notion that the efficient and final

causes are external to the being in question. Internal

causes are constitutive of the being, external causes influ-

ence but do not compose the being. What is important here

is the first sign of a separation of cause into four really
distinct and mutually exclusive metaphysical principles.
Once this is accomplished it is very difficult to maintain
an interrelationship among causes as the initial proof from
experience used to establish the four causes.

Suarez becomes explicit about the mutual distinction
of the causes when he says, that one can talk about a dis-
tinction of the causes with respect to understanding or a
distinction of the causes as they occur in the real being.

There certainly is no problem with distinguishing these

causes in our understanding. Distinction in understanding

has been shown already with respect to the proof from ex-
perience. But, in regard to distinction in real being

Suarez proves that there are different effects in reality

and hence different causes. The influence of matter in a

real thing is as a potency, the form, however, is an act.
The influence of efficient cause is through action or real

change; the end changes only metaphorically.“ Once again,

2“Ex his facile est expedire punctum secundum de
distinctione harum causarum. Potest autem esse sermo de

distinctions formaliter ac praecise in ratione causae vel de
distinctions quasi materiali seu reali in esse entis. Prior
distinctio est quae ad praesens spectat, quam certum est

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22
the interest here is with the material and formal causes.
By making the causes mutually distinct Suarez, as will be
seen, must rework the meaning of act and potency in such a
way that they are mutually distinct in reality but also de-

pendent on one another so that one cannot exist without the

other. The problem, here, is maintaining the unity of be-

ing. Suarez has only very limited success with this part of
his project because it is always necessary in his meta-

Physics that the material and formal cause with respect to
One and the same composite be really distinguished.25 He is

unable to show the mutual dependence.

Primo ex Aristotelis

inter haec membra reperiri.
eStimonio, quia alias esset vitiosa divisio. Secundo

ratione, quia cuasa, ut cause in actu, formaliter
c>nstituitur per actualem influxum in effectum; sed in

<2
quatuor illis membris sunt influxus diversarum rationum;
Probatur minor, quia influxus causae materialis et

serge.

i Qrmalis est intrinsecus per internam compositionem,

Q hfluxus autem causae efficientis et finalis est extrin-
Q cus. Rursus influxus materiae est per modum potentiae,

Influxus item efficientis est

brmae autem per modum actus.
Qr actionem seu mutationem realem; influxus autem finis est

:9

h.

Q gr mutationem intentionalem aut metaphoricam; sunt ergo

3‘ nes has causalitatis formaliter distinctae; constituunt
Unde etiam

itur causas in actu formaliter distinctas.
tiones seu virtutes causandi harum causarum distinctae

nt, nam materia causat quatenus est passiva potentia;
ficiens vero quatenus habet potentiam activam in aliud;

k

\

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\ §rma vero quatenus vim habet actuandi per seipsam; finis

\ \men quaentus bonus est, st or bonitatem habet vim

:I\ :IJiciendi effectum, quae omn a in sequentibus exponentur

§§tium neque hic occurrit specialis difficultas circa hanc
‘rtem. Disp. Meta. XII, Sect. 3, par. 9.

\ 258emper tamen necesse est ut formalis et

xfiterialis causa respectu eiusdem compositi distinguantur

§ Qaliter vel ex nature rei. Disp. Meta. XII, Sect. 3,
fir. 12.

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23
Divisions of the Following Study

In the materials that follow it will be seen that the

major concern is metaphysical. What is the status of human

unity in a hylomorphic theory such as the one proposed by
The problem breaks down into three rather clearly

Suarez?
Initially one must look at the

defined areas of concern.
general teaching on matter and on form (Chapters II and

Then one must ask by way of transition for an expla-

III).
Only after the gen-

nation of individuation (Chapter IV).

eral metaphysical doctrine has been expounded can one ask
about individual cases of unity. The unity of the human be-
ing is a problem in scholastic philosophy both with respect
to structure and operation. It is requisite for consistency
or the Suarezian system that he be able to explain the human

b eing as a unified structure of matter and form (Chapter V).
Finally, there must be a coordination of rational and phys-
i <2a1 operations if there is to be genuine unity. Or, the

material and spiritual must be able to interact with each
Q. ther (Chapter VI). In general conclusion (Chapter VII) to
h 1‘ais study one will find’a summary of the findings and some
\Nggestion of the impact Suarez has had on modern philos-
\ bhy. In the movement from general metaphysics to its ap-

hication to a specific problem--the unity of the human be-
\ %--and in the movement to accommodate both Thomistic-
\ :tdstotelianism and Scotism, Suarez cannot maintain a

§ ‘snuine unity either of being in general or in the human

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CHAPTER II

SUAREZ' TEACHING ON MATTER

Suarez' intention in the Disputationes Metaphysicae

is to establish a metaphysical position that will serve as a

foundation for all of the philosophical disciplines and will
It is with this basic

also be in accord with theology.
Suarezian desire in view that the early chapters of this

Present study concern themselves mainly with metaphysics
For, it is only after one has a

I‘a‘t‘J'zer than psychology .

general metaphysics that he can answer the more specialized
The prior metaphysics assumed

ci‘lllestion of body and soul.
r03: the understanding of body and soul is found in the doc-

t’ 1‘ines of matter, form and individuation.
It is the intention of this chapter to investigate

He sees five distinct problems

harez' teaching on matter.
V
l'Eich must be dealt with in respect to matter. First, it

§ 1There are only two secondary source studies on
N \aarez' doctrine of matter: John F. McCormick, S.J.,
§uarez on Matter and Form," Proceedin s of the Jesuit Ed_u-
Qtional Association (Chicago: Eoona Unfier—s'i'ty Press,
3 , pp. 2- . Leon MahieuilFrancois Suarez:1 a;
‘fiiloso hie et les ra orts u e e a avec sa them 0 e
esc-Tee—,'-de Erouwer RE 50., I951), Chapter V.
QCormick's article is largely a precis of the material

hot ar 5:
b
u Vund in Disputations XIII and XV and fails to realize some
§l the significance of the restructuring which occurs in
\Jarez. Mahieu is interested mainly in the relationship of
arez' theology and philosophy and gives an exposition of
e philosophy only insofar as it illuminates the theology.

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25

must be established that prime matter exists. Secondly,

a description of the being and essence of prime matter must

begupvided. Thirdly, one must examine matter as pure po-

tency. Fourthly, the causality of prime matter must be out-

lined.

matter to the accident, quantity.
through his own reasoning, one observes that this doctrine

And, fifthly, one must examine the relationship of
By following Suarez

Of matter is really quite different from the Aristotelian

and traditional scholastic conceptions of matter.

The Existence of Prime Matter

Following the practice of Aristotle, Suarez ini-

tially analyzes the meaning of the words "prime matter" in
0rd er to resolve at the outset all terminological difficul-

‘t;31~¢as. One usual division of matter is into ex gua (from

Incl 2Praetermitto disputationem in communi de causa
iEl1teriali ut abstrahit a causa susbstantiae vel accidentis,
quoniam potissima ratio huius causae cernitur in materia
13b rims; et, 81 in illa declaretur, facile erit reliqua cum
Q beportione intelligere. Neque timenda est aliquorum
;:.:‘I‘E=nsura, qui existimant tractationem de materia prima nullo
.532“=>do ad metaphysicum pertinere, sed ad solum physicum; iam
(:3. 3‘311m in superioribus, praesertim in prooemiali disputatione,
“E3claratum est multis titulis negotium hoc ad metaphysicum
:lEDectare. Quoniam licet physicus sub propria et speciali
‘iEstione agat de materia ut est principium generationis

ii'ssturalis, et ut est causa vel pars entis naturalis, nihil-
considerando communem rationem causae

inus metaphysicus
iius proprium est, necessaria agitIde
tem

terialis, quod il
j:It'ima causa illius generis, quae est materia prima.

ens de essentia substantiae, necessaria tractat de
teria, quatenus est pars essentiae, ut infra videbimus,
¥:Iractando de substantia materiali. Hoc ergo loco sub hac
“=:nsideratione de materia tractamus. Et quia ratio causandi
ilntelligi non potest non intellecta entitate materiae,
“E: jlavestigabimus prius an sit materia, deinde qualis sit
1t:;_llntitas et essentia eius, postea de proprietatibus, ac
Saandem de causalitate eius. Disp. Meta., XIII, Intro.

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26
vflnch), in gu§_(into which), and circa quam (concerning
Iflflch). This division can be explained in a variety of ways.
One can talk about materia egg qua either with respect to the
composite or with respect to the form which is educed from
that matter. That is, a composite is made up of matter and
formu here one is speaking of the principles from which a
taming is made. Alternatively, with respect to the form it-
self it is educed _i_'_rg_m_ the matter. In a word, the matter
has certain dispositions for a given form and the form is
PUlled out of the matter, so to speak. The eduction of the
form from the matter applies only to forms below the human
level. The human form, however, because of its special na-
t"III-e is not educed from matter but rather is "introduced"
into the matter. There is a union here rather than an educ-
tion. This is the application of the term materia in .911.-
F inany, the notion of materia 2132;: 9.1.1331. applies to the
matter upon which an agent operates. Although Suarez him-
:Es"‘E¥lf does not use the example here the Aristotelian paradigm

2. if? sculptor and marble is most apt. That is, the marble be-

§\Qmes the materia circa guam the sculptor operates.3 In

3Quoniam materia prima duo includit, oportet ante

”Q.

Minis exponere significationem vocis quoad utramque partem.
~§ teria ergo dividi solet in materiam ex qua, in qua, et
§~ Circa quam. Quae divisio variis modis explicari potest;
\§‘imo, ut non sit divisio rerum seu materiarum, sed

\ Vspectuum ac officiorum eiusdem materiae. Eadem enim

v§ Qteria dicitur 93g ua, vel respectu compositi, quod ex illa
§Vnstat, vel respectu formae quae ex illa educitur. Unde
k :riori respectu corpus hominis est materia ex qua, non tamen
§Vsteriori consideratione, quia forma hominis non educitur
Na potentia materiae. Unde respectu talis formae dicetur
hfiteria in qua introducitur forma; ita ut illud in €113 dicat

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27
light of the ultimate purpose of this study, to prove that
Suarez has a dualistic philosophy of body and soul, it is an
interesting point that even in the earliest section on an

understanding of the term "matter" he has felt a need to
make allowances for the special nature of the human soul.

Unsatisfied with the usual scholastic diviSion of

matter as given above, Suarez next distinguishes matter into

"metaphysical" and ”physical.” This distinction is impor-

tant in that metaphysical matter is considered by Suarez to

be matter only through analogy. That is, it is not real

matter at all; it is matter only in some sort of extended

Use of the term. It is physical matter with which Suarez

is concerned. This physical matter is the matter which is

a principle of being and is properly and simply the matter

aPprOpriate to the present discussion.“ This difficult

gfi; abstracts sumi, ut includat habitudinem ad formam ut
aerentem materiae. Respectu vero agentis dicitur eadem
t‘1-a1*.eria circa quam agens operatur. quta hanc ergo inter-
b betationem terminorum nullum membrum ex dictis a praesenti
excluditur; agimus enim de materia secundum

§ Qnsideratione
Q, vel prout in suo conceptu adaequato omnes illas habitu-

3 fines includit; an vero illae pertineant ad varies causali-
Aliter

§Qtea et ex nature rei distinctas, postea videbimus.
‘Kmi solet materia circa quam, prout distinguitur a materia

3.42::qua et in qua secundum realem unionem et inhaerentiam, et
21c ro rie dicit respectum ad agens actione immanenti, et
a iud est quam obiectum circa quod tale agens ver-

§

;\ :nn

\ w‘atur. Quae significatio materiae metaphorica est, et nihil

\ 1! praesens refert, uia illa ut sic non exercet causali-

\ iatem materialem, so vel efficientem vel finalem, ut supra

§ vetigimus non est ergo hic sermo de materia obiectiva, sed
e subiectiva. Disp. Meta., XIII, Sect. 1, par. 1.

k h. . . dividi solet materia in metaphysicam et
\ lysicam: metaphysics eat genus respectu differentiae; illa
ro appellatio solum est per analogiam et proportionem ad

ve
Nteriam physicam, quae est proprie et simpliciter materia
Q qua hic agimua; de metaphysica vero, praeter ea quae

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28
distinction points out that Suarez views the matter of
material cause not simply as something that serves as a
metaphysical explanatory principle but also, and especially,
as a real physical foundation for all tangible objects.

The final distinction Suarez makes with respect to
the use of the term "matter" is that between ”prime matter”
and ”second matter." It is here that he gives the overrid-
ing understanding of matter. That matter is called "prime"

Which does not presuppose a prior subject; here he quotes
Aristotle's definition of prime matter from the first book
of the Ph sics, ”. . . £32112 subiectum ex lug _f_'_i_t_._ aliquid"
(the first subject from which anything occurs). The whole
c3<=0c2trine on matter in Suarez is worked out on the basis of
the implications of this basic definition of prime matter.

Suarez contrasts the understanding of prime matter

with that of second matter. Simply put, second matter pre-
a‘aqaposes a prior subject. Then, he lists the various opin-
3‘ Qua on the nature of second matter. Some call the substan-
h ial composite second matter; that is, the composite made up
Q it matter and form. This composite becomes the matter with
‘spect to accidents. Some call matter which is disposed in
\\ certain way to accept some form or accident second 'matter.5

§l fiximus supra agentes de unitste universali, addemus aliqua
Nfisp. XV sect..ult., agentes de forms metaphysics. Disp.
‘ta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. 2.

k 5Prima vere dici potest materia et per negationem
§ iioris, et per respectum ad secundsm; quia ergo materia
§ Elcit rstionem subiecti, ills dicetur prima quae nullum
Q :t-ius subiectum supponit; at its Aristoteles, I Phys., c. 9,
innivit materiam esse primum subiectum _e_x_ 922 fig

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29
But, the important thing to note here is that Suarez is in-
sisting that there is a radical difference between prime
matter, which is the ultimate first subject, and second mat-
ter, which is conditioned in some way either as part of an

already constituted composite or as a disposition for a form

or accident .

In summary, then, there are three sets of terms one
must distinguish in a discussion on matter. First the divi-
Sion of g; 9113, _i_n g_u_a_, and giggle 91.1.9.1“. indicates the rela-
tionship of the matter to the form or the agent. Second,
tShe distinction of metaphysical and physical points out that
real tangible matter is the primary understanding of the
ten ”matter." Third, the distinction between prime and

3 econd matter specifies that there must be a radical first

& Hbject .

After Suarez enumerates the various uses of the term

hatter" he then turns to the question of whether or not

there is such a thing as prime matter. In the analysis of

§\§ne existence of prime matter he provides several arguments

§ hi uid. Materia autem secunda dicetur quae prius subiectum
NVppon t. Atque its multi vocant sustantisle compositum
\ iteriam secundam respectu sccidentium, quia its est subiec-
Nim sccidentium, ut ex priori subiecto constet; et simili
\ Qtione qui plures formas substantiales in eodem supposito
\ Vimittunt, compositum, verbi gratis, ex materia et forms
§ Qrporeitatis vacant materiam secundam respectu animae.
\iepe etiam vocatur materia secunda materia disposits seu
\ :ffecta dispositionibus accidentalibus, non quia compositum
§Jsum ex materia et sccidentibus sit subiectum in quo reci-
\ :itur forms sed solum quia receptio talium dispositionum
§ ltecedit ordine naturse et constituit materiam proxime
§ epscem talis formae, unde preprie vocatur talis materia
§ :roxima . . . Omnis itsque materia secunda supponit primam
X‘ sddit aliquam formam vel diapositionem. Disp. Meta.
IIII, Sect. 1, par. 3.

 

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30
to prove that there really is such a thing as prime matter.
First, there is a necessity for a first subject in any
change. Secondly, there is a necessity for prime matter
from the fact that things constantly are generated and cor-
rupted among themselves. Thirdly, there must be a resolu-
tion to one first subject. It is now appropriate to turn to
each of these claims and examine Suarez' proofs for them.
With respect to the claim that there must be a first
subject in any change and hence there must be a prime matter,
that is, concerning the first subject of change of form and
abstract from the question of kind of subject or kind of
for. which is received into the subject, it is as evident
t31‘1at there is prime matter as it is evident that there are
changes in things from one form to another. In a word,
e‘rery change presupposes a subject and this is known from
prerience (". . . et experimento constat"). Either that
aIslbject presupposes another or not. If it does not presup-
h‘Qse another then it is the "first subject" and this is what
1 a understood by "prime matter." If it does presuppose an-
Q ‘her subject then one can ask about that further subject.
:E ‘l’. is evident, however, that one cannot proceed to an in-
:fi :inity of subjects. It is necessary that there be some
§rst subject or ”prime matter."6 Here is the initial

% 6Atque hinc constat, si in communi et quasi
\Vormaliter loquamur de materia prima, id est, de prime

mbiecto mutationum vel formarum, abstrshendo a quaestione
§Wale sit tale subiectum qualisve forms quae in eo
\ «ecipitur, sic tam evidens esse dari materiam primam quam
§ at evidens dari in rebus mutationes ad vsriss formas, quia
Inni mutationi aliquod subiectum supponitur, ut supra

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example of Suarez' insistence that prime matter is a first

subject. He understands it as radically first; that is,

tmere must be some thing which stands prior to every spe-
cflfic determination. This is the task of prime matter--to
be radically the first subject.
The existence of matter is also inferred from the
continual alteration of things; the argument here is really
a variation on the previous one. The existence of prime
matter is proved principally from the fact that things are
generable and corruptible in such a way that one is gener-
ated from the corruption of another. But, in order for this
t30 occur it is necessary that it happen in some common sub-
Ject which remains in every change. This subject is the
l’ebtason why there is a capacity for mutual transformations.

find, it is this subject that is called prime matter.7 The

 

33>1Ptabatum est et experimento constat. Igitur vel illud
ElIllaiectum supponit aliud vel non; 31 non supponit, illud est
IDIPdLmum et habetur intentum. Si vero supponit aliud, quaeram
£3 1110; est autem evidens non posse procedi in infinitum;
E31‘550 necessario sistendum est in aliquo primo subiecto seu
13eria prima. .Minor propositio ultimo sssumpts
€3mnonstratur ab Aristotele de omnibus causis in lib. II; est
‘3iirmen quodammodo evidentior in causa materiali, quae est
3L131Brinsecum totius compositi fundamentum; non potest autem
ititellectupercipi compositum per se stans, cuius una pars
It‘3L1tstur in alis et alis rursus in alis quin tandem sistatur
15“) aliqua quae caeteris substet. Cum ergo omne naturals
§i<>lmpositum its per se sit ut secundum se totum non pendeat
:j‘la. genere causae materialis ab aliquo subiecto quod extra
Ibasum sit, necesse est ut intrs se habeat aliquod subiectum
cl‘lxbd sit primum respectu omnium aliarum entitatem ex quibus
c=<>rxstat et'in subiecto sunt. Sic igitur evidens est dari
1ggfiiteriam primam seu subiectum primum in rebus naturalibus.
jLeap. Meta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. h.

7Secundo principaliter probatur, nam est evidens res
generabiles et corruptibiles its transmutari ut aliae ex
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32
way in which this argument differs from the previous one is
in the fact that Suarez is taking into account not only
change from one kind of thing to another but also the fact
that generable and corruptible things alter between various
kinds of forms such as would occur in a series of changes
from plant, to animal, to human, to inorganic, and back to
plant.8 In the first argument Suarez was concerned only with
the foundation for any change; here he is concerned with the
foundation for successive changes. This serial ordering of
Changes also demands a common first subject, prime matter.
The final argument that there must be a prime matter
18 based on the notion that there cannot be an infinity of
Subjects but rather there must be some first subject. In
light of the previous discussions of change, Suarez con-
c31!.1des that this matter is the first cause in its order and
in this sense is to be called prime matter. This can be
8110w!) to be so because one cannot proceed to infinity in

Proximate and remote subjects. It is necessary that some

\

r1Geesse est ut in aliquo communi subiecto convenient quod

in omnibus ipsis maneat, ratione cuius sint capaces illius
tuse transmutationia; ergo illud subiectum est primum,

‘1‘- que adeo prima materialis causa huiusmodi rerum. Disp.

Meta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. 5.

8Potestque hoc 1 sum declarari inductione facts in
‘1 :iquibus transmutationi us; cum animal, verbi gratis, alitur
93: cibo, vel aliquid cibi manet in fine nutritionis et
cc>lIiungitur substantiae viventi vel omnino destruitur cibus
totum quod in 1110 est per actionem viventis. Si nihil
cibi manet superflua est tots actio viventis, nihilque ex
t:3i-‘lao iuvari potest ut inde vel crescat vel confortetur, quia
93: so quod perit in cibo nihil confertatur vel crescit. Si
Vfiro aliquid cibi manet, illud esse non potest nisi communis
InQteris vel subiectum. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. 8.

 

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33

subject not be subjected nor even be composed of parts which
are themselves subjects. For, every composite is able to be
resolved into more simple parts. iHence,:if prime matter were
composed in any way it would not be a genuinely first sub-
ject. Suarez here is very careful to point out that in this
argument he is not appealing to the impossibility of an in-
finite regress of substantial forms in a composite being.
Even though it is evident that there cannot be such a regress
of forms, with respect to the potency that could receive
such an infinitude there still must be some ultimate subject.
It is this ultimate subject that is called prime matter.

Not only from the simplicity but from the commonness
of this subject is it the case that there must be a prime
matter. Since all kinds of lower things (i.e., things below
the rational soul) are mutually interchangeable immediately
or at least mediately, it is necessary that that subject
which is presupposed by these interchanges be ”first" in
every understanding. If this first subject came from an-
other prior subject or constant matter it also would be mu-
tually generable and so would not be a common subject, but
only that which remains after the dissolution. Or, it would
not be mutually generable and so every corporeal being would
not be mutually generable into every other corporeal being.
But, the opposite was presupposed at the outset of the dis-

cussion.9

 

9Superest probanda secunda consequentia principalis
rationis, qua inferebamus hanc materiam esse primam causam
in suo ordine eoque sensu verissime appellsri primam

 

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This final argument contains two parts: that there
cannot be an infinity of subjects ordered in terms of prox-
imateness and remoteness because the ultimate subject cannot
subject anything else. And this ultimate subject must be
common in the sense that it must be capable of accepting any
form.

The final and decisive argument for the existence of
prime matter, according to Suarez, is the fact that there is
not only accidental change but also substantial change.

That there is such a change is sufficiently evident from ex-
perience not only in inanimate elements and aggregates but

much more in living things, in animals, and in ourselves

 

materiam; hoc autem nullo evidentiori modo ostendi potest
(quidquid aliqui velint) quam supra tacto, scilicet, quia
non potest procedi in infinitum in subiectis proximis st
remotis seu in subiectis st subiectatis (ut its dicam), sed
sistendum necessario est in sliquo subiecto quod non
subiectetur, neque etiam componatur ex parte quae in
subiecto sit, quia omne tale compositum resolvi tandem
potest in simplicis, in quibus aliquod esse oportet quod
omnino in subiecto non sit. quue supponit hic discursus
quod in formis substantialibus eiusdem compositi non sit
processus in infinitum; nam, etsi hoc etiam evidens sit
tamen, si per impossibile fingerentur infinitae formae in
eodem composite, ex parte potentiae recipientis eas neces-
sario sistendum erit in sliquo subiecto simplici quod non
sit in subiecto; quia tots collectio talium formarum est in
aliquo subiecto; ergo illud est simplex, ut magis statim
demonstrabimus; hoc ergo vocsmus materiam primam. Praeter
hoc autem potest etiam illa consequentia probsri ex
communitate huius subiecti; cum enim omnis haec inferiora
mutuo transmutentur immediate vel saltem mediate, ut dictum
est, necesse est ut subiectum illud quod his trans-
mmtstionibus supponitur, sit primum in ratione subiecti seu
,materias; nam s esset sx alio priori subiecto vel materia
constans, vel illud esset etiam transmutabile, st sic non
esset commune subiectum omnium transmutationum, sed illud
quod maneret post resolutionem eius; vel non esset trans-
mutsbile, et sic non omne corporeum ens esset transmutsbile
in quodlibet aliud, cuius oppositum supponebsmus; sed de hoc
latius sections tertia. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. 10.

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35

when we are generated and when we die. On account of this
fact Suarez sees a necessity for a substantial form distinct
from the accidents. If there is such a form then there must
be prime matter which is the subject of this kind of form
and with it composes one whole substance. That subject is
the material cause of substance.10 Suarez delays the dis-
cussion of whether or not there are substantial forms until
Disputation IV. 80, here the argument for prime matter is
decisive only on the condition that there are also substan-
tial forms. One might look at the matter as a simple mgggs

ponens argument:

If there are substantial forms, then
there is prime matter
(This is Suarez' present claim).

There are substantial forms
(This is proved in Disputation XV).

Therefore: There is prime matter.

 

loAd concludendum ergo dari materiam primam, qualem
Aristoteles posuit, restabat probandum transmutationem horum
corporum inferiorum quam experimur, non solum esse
accidentalem, sed etiam substantialem. Hoc autem praeter
experientiam, quae per se videtur satis evidens, non solum
in elementis et in mixtis inanimatis, sed multo magis in
viventibus, animalibus et in nobis ipsis cum generamur et
morimur, paraeter hanc (inquam) experientiam ratione
probandum est ex necessitate formarum substantialium ab
accidentibus distinctarum; nam si dantur hae formae, necesse
est dari materiam primam quae sit subiectum earum et cum
eis componat unam; substantiam integram, quod est esse
causam materialem substantiae. Dari autem formas sub-
stantiales, probandum est infra, disp. XV, et ideo nunc
supponatur et tantum ex ea hypothesi demonstratum habeatur
dari veram ac propriam materiam primam in his rebus quae
generentur et corrumpuntur; est enim consecutio evidens et
omni carens difficultate; antecedens vero dicto loco
probandum est. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. 12.

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36

It is evident at this point that Suarez is using the
analysis of change as the foundation for the claim that
there is indeed such a thing as prime matter. He employs
Aristotle's basic insight that there are different kinds of
change and that in each of these kinds there must be a sub-
ject of change as well as a principle which changes. There
cannot be an infinity of such subjects and, consequently,
there must be a ”first” subject, a "prime” matter. It will
become increasingly evident in the course of this chapter
that the notion of matter as the subject of change is the
basic notion of the Suarezian doctrine of matter. This no-
’tion influences especially the analysis of the being and
essence of matter and the properties of matter. It should
be also noted here that the emphasis of Suarez on matter as
a first subject of change is the source of some serious
problems with respect to the unity of a composite being.
These problems become more evident as Suarez develops the

implications of his theory of matter.

The Being and Essence of Prime Matter
Granted that the material cause is the first sub-
ject of change, Suarez immediately turns to a specification
of what this matter might be. He is concerned initially
with the unity of this first subject, and so asks whether
there are one or many material causes. He opts for the
choice that there is a single material cause. Now, given

this choice, he must refute two contrary Opinions--l. that

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37
there is a plurality but still finite number of material

causes, and 2. that there is an infinite number of material
causes.

with respect to the notion that there are an infi-
nite number of material causes, Suarez accepts Aristotle's
argumentation against this opinion. The opponents here are
the atomists (i.e., Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus,
Metrodorus, and Anaxagoras).11 Suarez claims that these
philosophers simply did not understand the nature of a true
material cause which is a physical potency for receiving
some act. The ”atoms” of these philosophers are not in po-
tency to receiving some physical form. Rather, the way in
which they are described makes each atom a composite being
in itself and consequently the being of natural things is
nothing more than a gathering together of these parts into
an accidental unity. In this sense, then, there would be no
genuine substantial generation or corruption but only vari-
ous gatherings of atoms.

According to Suarez this is an absurd opinion, for
these philosophers must understand that there is an infinite
number of these atoms either in each natural being or in the
universe taken as a whole. The first understanding is ab-
surd, for it is not possible that there be an infinite num-

ber of atoms to compose any body unless the body itself

 

11It is evident here that Suarez has a much more ex-
tensive use of the term ”atomist" than is customary in con-
temporary philosophical discourse. He includes as atomists
anyone who accepts an infinity of primary metaphysical prin-
ciples.

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38
increase to an infinite magnitude. If atoms are not taken
as indivisible mathematically but rather physically, then
they have some single magnitude in which they are all equal,
or at least there is some smallest atom and all others are
greater than this one. Therefore, in this way, infinite
atoms make up an infinite magnitude in act. But, this is
absurd. If, on the other hand, atoms are indivisible mathe-
matically (i.e., are more points), they are not able to make
up any magnitude whatsoever unless there is empty space be-
tween them. This intervening space, however, will have to
be divisible andaof some magnitude. From this one can only
conclude that infinite atoms which can never touch are al-
ways so distant from each other as to make an infinitely
large body occupying or including an infinite space, partly
empty and partly full of atoms. But, there are no infinite
bodies.

If one considers the opposite opinion, that there
are an infinite number of atoms in the universe, this also
leads to absurdities. Here Suarez does nothing more than
summarize Aristotle's argument from the Physics and 22
Qgglg, If there is an infinite number of atoms in the uni-
verse it is evident that the whole realm of finite genera-
tion and corruption cannot terminate at the sphere of the

moon,12 but this, then, attributes to the heavens a

 

12Even though Suarez is writing at the end of the
sixteenth century, he accepts the more traditional Ptolemaic
‘universe together with the Aristotelian explanation of the
fact that the only change that takes place beyond the sphere
of the moon is that of local motion.

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39
composition of atoms. To extend the number of these to
infinity is not possible philosophically because neither
experience nor reason dictate such a solution. What is at
issue here is the traditional notion that there is no gen-
eration or corruption beyond the sphere of the moon. The
position that there are an infinite number of atoms in the
universe would allow for such generation and corruption.
According to Suarez neither experience nor reason can accept

this.13

 

13. . . hi philosophi [I.e., Leucippus, Democritus,
Epicurus,.Metrodorus, Anaxagora§7 imprimis non cognoverunt
veram materialem causam quae sit potentia physice receptive
alicuiue actus; nam illae atomi non aunt in potentia ad
recipiendam aliquam formam physicam, nec possunt dici
materia totius compositi, nisi eo modo quo partes integrales
dicuntur materia totius et lapides ac ligna materia domus.
Unde ulterius fit, ut iuxta illum philosophandi modum,
formae naturalium entium quasi artificiales tantum sint,
nimirum figurae quaedam consurgentes ex vario situ et ordine
atomorum. Atque ita nulla erit vera substantialis generatio
et corruptio sed tantum varia coordinatio aut deordinatio
.tomm O O O O

Illud etiam est absurdum in his omnibus philosophis,
quad infinitam multitudinem ponant horum corpusculorum; nam
vel intelligunt in singulis entibus naturalibus esse
infinitam multitudinem harum atomorum vel solum in toto
universe, in singulis vero corporibus aut partibus eius esse
finitam multitudinem. Priori sensu est prosus absurda; non
enim possent infinitae atomi componere aliquod corpus quin
illud excreseret in infinitam magnitudinem; nam si atomi non
fingantur indivisibiles mathematics sed physice, habebunt
singulae aliquam magnitudinem in qua vel omnes erunt
aequales, quia nulla est inaequalitatis ratio, vel saltem
assignari poterit minima atomus cui aliae sint vel aequales
vel maiores; ergo ex huiusmodi atomis infinitis necessaria
componetur magnitudo actu infinite. Si vero atomi sint
indivisibiles mathematice, non possunt magnitudinem
componere, nisi interponatur spatium inane, quod s atium
erit divisibile et alicuius magnitudinis; ex quo s militer
concluditur infinitae atomos sic inter se distantes
necessaria efficere infinitam corpus, occupans seu includens
infinitam spatium, partim inane, partim repletum
atomis. . . .

Posteriori autem sensu est etiam illa sententia

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Once the opinion concerning an infinitude of atoms
is rejected as absurd, Suarez next turns his attention to
the hypothesis that there are a finite number of such atoms
or elements. This is an opinion, Suarez interprets, such as
is held by Empedocles, who maintains that the four elements--
earth, air, fire, and water-~are the four first material
causes. It is from these four causes that all mixtures
arise, but these four elements themselves have no prior
cause or material principle. But it is established that air
is changed into fire and water into earth and vice versa.
For this kind of change, the elements are not able to be ma-
terial principles, but rather there must be some subject
common to all of them. And so, here he concludes that these
elements are not first material causes of mixtures because
in the elements themselves there is a prior subject which
remains and is informed by the forms of the elements them-

selves; and this pluralistic opinion is false.1“

 

improbabilis . . . scripsit Arist., III Phys., et I de
Caelo. Deinde evidens est totam sphaeram rerum generabilium
et corruptibilium esse finitam cum ad sphaeram lunae
terminetur; attribuere autem etiam caelis compositionem ex
atomis illosque extendere in infinitum non potest esse
philosophicum, quia neque experientia neque ratio nos ducit
ad ita existimandum. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 2, pars. 3-5.

l“Secunda sententia ponit etiam plura principia, seu
plures primas causae materiales, rerum generabilium in
numero tamen finito. Ita sensit Empedocles, qui quatuor
elementa, ignem, aerem, aquam et terram, dixit esse quatuor
primes causae materiales ex quibus mixta generentur, ipsa
vero non habere priorem causam aut principium materials.
Verumtamen haec sententia falsa est et evidenter refutari
potest; nam imprimis, quamvis attigerit compositionem seu
generationem mixti ex elementis, non tamen consideravit
transmutationem elementorum inter sese, cum tamen constet et

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#1

Having eliminated both possibilities for a mul-
tiplicity of material causes, Suarez next declares that
there must be a single material cause. And, this has been
sufficiently proven by eliminating the opinions of the
pluralists and the atomists. It has been shown that from
common and mutual interchange of sublunary things that
there is one common matter. This is the case both because
contrary principles from which generation and corruptione
arise ought to have the same subject and because that sub-
ject is of itself indifferent to any form of corruptible
things. Therefore, it does not require of itself any dis-
tinction or multiplication. And, from the other side,
every form of generable thing of whatever kind is able to
be introduced into any part of this matter. It is a sign
of this matter that of itself it is one and is sufficient
in its genus for causing every effect which needs a ma-

terial cause. If other causes in other genera are

 

aerem converti in ignem et aquam in terram et e converso.
Huiuamodi autem transmutationis non possunt elements esse
principia materialis, sed aliquod subiectum commune omnibus
illis. Quod si forte existimavit Empedocles elements non
transmutari substantialiter, ideoque non constare materia
et substantiali forms, sed esse quaedam entis omnino
simplicia, accidentibus subiecta, contra hoc imprimis
ostendemus inferius non minus esse certum dari formas
substantiales elementorum quam aliorum entium naturalium et
consequenter vere ac substantialiter inter se transmutari.
Deinde licet id admitteremus, nullum esset fundamentum ad
multiplicandas materias sou prima subiecta substantialis,
sed dicendum potius esset in omnibus elementis esse idem
substantiale subiectum, quod diversis accidentibus affectum,
distinctum appellatur elementum. Cumque illud etiam
subiectum sit principium materiale mixtorum, fit ut reipsa
et substantialiter tantum sit una prima causa materialis
omnium rerum. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 2, par. 6.

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#2

necessary, then the material cause operates along with
them.15

Once it has been established that there is a single
material cause, Suarez sees the further problem of whether
or not this material cause is a total substance or a simple
body. Once again, he goes to the ancient philosophers to
illustrate this position; and here the monists are the spe-
cial object of concern. What seems to be common to all of
these thinkers is that they thought nothing truly new could
occur, that is, they did not acknowledge substantial forms,
nor substantial generation nor substantial corruption. It
was felt that every change which we experience consisted
simply in various modes of existence of the one common mat-

ter. From this some moved to the notion that they should

not speak of a material cause of all things but a single

 

15Dicendum ergo est primam materiam seu materialem
causam omnium rerum sublunarium esse tantum unam. Quae est
communis sententia omnium philosophorum quos in sequentibus
referemus. Et sufficienter probatur ratione nunc facta
contra Empedoclem et posteriori discursu facto sectione
praecedenti. Ubi ex communi et mutua transmutatione rerum
sublunarium ostendimus dari communem materiam; illa enim
ratio aeque probat primum subiectum quod sub his omnibus
transmutationibus manet esse unum tantum. Tum quia
contraria principia ex quibus fiunt generationes et
corruptiones, versari debent circa idem. Tum etiam quia
illud subiectum est ex se indifferens ad quascumque formas
rerum corruptibilium et dispositiones earum; non ergo
requirit in se distinctionem seu multiplicationem, immo non
est unde illam habeat. Et e converse omnis forma rei
generabilis cuiuscumque speciei potest introduci in quam-
cumque partem huius mater as si commode disponatur; ergo
signum est materiam hanc secundum se esse unam et eiusdem
rationis et sufficientem in suo genere ad causandos omnes
effectus qui in his.rebus possunt materialiter causari, si
aliae causae in aliis generibus necessariae applicentur seu
concurrent. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 2, par. 8.

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h3
being of all things, not in number, but in substance and
essence. If things are not changed substantially and do not
differ because of substantial forms but only because of ac-
cidents or modes of existence, there is, then, no material
cause of substance. Rather there is only a simple substance
which is not essentially different from one thing to an-
16

other. Suarez, however, does not want to accept only ac-
cidental change, as we have already seen.

There is also a "modern" Opinion which arises with
thinkers such as Avicenna, Scotus, and Henry of Ghent.

These people place in prime matter a form of corporeity

 

léAntiqui philosophi (ut Aristoteles et alii
auctores praecedenti sectione citati referunt) qui unum
tantum materiale principium naturalium rerum posuerunt, fere
omnes putarunt esse aliquam substantiam integram seu corpus
simplex, quale Averroes existimat esse caeleste corpus. De
illo autem corpora seu materiali cause fuit inter eos
multiplex o inio. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, par. 1.

Pro ixum esset ac superfluum propria motiva horum
omnium philosophorum referre, eo quod et incerta sint et
nullam prae se ferent probabilitatem aut verisimilitudinem,
ut ex dicendis obiter constabit. Illud vero commune omnibus
fuisse videtur quod nihil de novo simpliciter fieri puta-
runt, quoniam.ex nihilo nihil fieri potest; ideoque nec sub-
stantiales formas agnovisse videntur, nec generationem, cor-
ruptionemve substantialem. Immo multi eorum indicant nullas
esse accidentales formas quae vere entia sint, quia non
intelligebant aliquam veram rem posse de novo fieri, sed
omnem mutationem quam experimur, putabant consistere in
variis modis se habendi illius rei quam putabant esse
communem materiam. Ex quo aliqui eo ulterius progressi
sunt, ut non dicerent causam materialem omnium entium esse
unum, sed omnis entie esse unua, non numero, sed substantia
et essentia; qui, licet rem falsam et improbabilem dicerent,
consequenter tamen loquebantur, si de solis corporibus
generalibus agebant. Nam, 31 haec non transmutentur
substantialiter, nec differunt per substantiales formas, sed
per accidentia aut diversos modos se habendi, revere nulla
datur materialis causa substantiae, sed datur tantum
substantia simplex quae non est alia et alia essentialiter,
sed una aliter et aliter se habens sub diversis
accidentibus. Disp..Mete. XIII, Sect. 3, par. 3.

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co-equal with matter and inseparable from it. This form of
corporeity is thought to be separate from essential and
physical composition and matter remains the common subject
of every change. The universal cause of every generation,
corruption, and body is a body absolutely through the re-
moval of every form but "corporeity.”17 Suarez takes this
position on the form of corporeity seriously because it in
effect makes prime matter a simple being or a total sub-
stance. In the Resolutio Qgestionis he analyzes very care-

fully the impossibility of matter being an integral being

and in the process rejects the "modern" position.18

17Potest tamen hoc loco referri alia opinio, quam
multi ex modernis philosophis secuti sunt, ponentes in
materia rima formam corporeitatis illi coaevum et ab illa
insepara ilem. Nam, licet respectu talis formae materialis
cause eius sit simplex, id est absque essentiali et physice
compositione, tamen illud commune subiectum quod sub omni
transmutatione manet, et est universalis causa materialis
omnis generationis et omnis formae substantialis quae per
eductionem fit at omnis compositi quod generatur illud
(inquam) subiectum iuxta praedictam opinionem non est
simplex sed essentialiter compositum et corpus aliquod, non
mixtum, neque etiam aliquod ex elementis neque medium inter
illa per eorum participationem, sed absolute corpus per
praecisionem omnium inferiorum formarum. [I.e., Avicenna,
Scotus, Henry of Ghen§7 . . . Henricus . . . in solo homine
illam admittendam censet propter indivisibilitatem animae
rationalis. Unde hi duo auctores [Zvicenna, Henry of Ghen§7
non ponunt hanc formam inseparabilem a materia, neque ut per
se necessarium ad primam causalitatem materialem subiecti
generationis, sed propter alias speciales causes; et ideo
eorum opinio ad praesentel locum non spectat. Disp. Meta.
XIII, Sect. 3, par. 5.

18The actual rejection of this "modern position"
occurs in paragraphs 21 and 22 of Section 3, Disputation
XIII. The text of these paragraphs is as follows:

Tertia ratio sumitur ex differentia inter
essentialem compositionem physicam ac metaphysicam, quas
velle in hoc aequiparare causa est erroris, cum altera in
rebus, alters in conceptibus existat. Argumentor igitur,
nam si dari potest forma physice quae solum conferat gradum

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Suarez' doctrine on the unicity of prime matter can
be summarized in a series of conclusions. 1. The material
cause in its own order is not universal and first if it is

composed from sensible bodies or elements which bring about

 

genericum, ergo quot sunt gradus generici et specifici
substantiarum materialium, tot erunt multiplicandae formae
substantiales reeliter distinctae; consequens est falsum;
ergo. Sequels probatur a paritate rationis; quae enim ratio
afferri potest ob quam quidam gradus genericus datur per
propriam formam reeliter distinctam et non alii? Maxime
quod iuxta sententiam quam impugnamus, non solum in rebus
quae videntur elevari ad altiorem gradum corporum ut sunt
viventia, sed etiam in infimis et inanimatis corporibus
distinguitur forma dens esse corporis a forma dante esse
ignis aut lapidis vel eliud simile; quae contractio est cum
minima diversitate quae esse potest inter aliquod genus et
differentiam substantialem; si ergo illa sufficit ad realem
distinctionem formarum, quaelibet sufficit; unde non
defuerunt philosophi qui consequens illud admitterent; est
tamen non solum falsum, sed etiam ridiculum. Primo, quia
constat evidenter inductione superius facte, ad abstrahendos
conceptus generis, differentiae, et speciei, non esse
necessariam illam distinctionem realem formarum, ut patet in
angelis et accidentibus. Secundo, quia sequitur multi-
plicandae esse in homine tres animae, quae est sententia
omnino false ut ex scientia de anima suppono. Immo plures
etiam multiplicandae erunt nam in gradu sentiendi potest
aliqua convenientia essentialis abstrahi inter hominem et
aliqua animalia perfects quae non sit communis omnibus ani-
malibus, et in ratione intelligendi potest abstrahi ratio
generics communis homini et angelis quae per propriam dif-
ferentiam ad hominem contrahatur. Unde ulterius sequitur
innumeras formas reeliter distinctes esse asserendas in sin-
gulis compositis, quia differentiae genericae et specificee
possunt variis modis multiplicari iuxta varies convenientias
et differentiae quae facile possunt in rebus considerari et
secundum eas possunt varii conceptus communes vel particu-
lares abstrah . Est ergo magnus error in metaphysics et
philosophia, propter modum nostrum concipiendi confusum vel
distinctum, ex quo saepe oritur generum et differentiarum
multiplicatio, reales ac physicas formas distinguere . . .
Quod tandem confirmatur, quia impossible est dari
formam substantialem dantem specificum gradum substantiae
quae non det etiam illum gradum genericum et effectum
formalem quem dare fingitur forma corporeitatis distincte;
ergo et superflua et impossibilis est talis forma. Conse-
quentia est evidens, quia idem essentiale praedicatum
idemque effectus formalis non potest eidem rei convenire
per dues formas reeliter distinctas. Antecedens vero
probatur, quia non potest dari forma substantialis quae

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complete and whole substance. 3. The material cause of gen-
erable things is not a composite substance made up of a sub-
stantial potency and some incomplete and quasi-generic sub-
stantial form.19 From these three conclusions Suarez infers
that the first material cause of material substances is not
some total being, nor any composite of matter and form.
And, positively, that some ingenerable and incorruptible
body is not to be presupposed in the generation of sub-
stances. The first subject is prime matter.

'Uith respect to Suarez' first conclusion, that the
material cause in its own order is not universal and first
if it is composed from sensible bodies or elements which
bring about contrary qualities, it has already been shown

that atoms and a series of finite elements are inadequate

conferat specificum gradum, quae essentialiter non includat
communes ac genericum rationem formae substantialis infor-
mantis materiam; sed haec praecise ratio sufficit ad consti-
tuendam formam corporeitatis; ergo forma corporeitatis non
est specialis forma sed est quaelibet forma substantialis
considerate secundum communem rationem formae substantialis
informantis. Minor probatur (reliqua enim clara sunt), nam
ex hoc praecise quod aliqua substantia intelligatur com-
posite ex materia et forma substentiali essentialiter est
substantia corporea seu corpus de praedicamento substantiae;
nam ex vi talis compositionis et est essentialiter distincta
a substantia incorporea et est capax quantitatis seu trinae
dimensionis, in quo consistit ratio substantiae corporeae.
Unde forma corporeitatis ut sic non dicit nec requirit quod
ipsa corporea sit seu extensa sed solum quod informet
materiam ratione cuius compositum inde resultans sit capax
trinae dimensionis; nulla est ergo necessaria aut possibilis
forma media quae det esse genericum corporis, sed quaelibet
forma substantialis ex vi suae genericae rationis illud
confert. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, pars. 21-22.

19I.e., forma corporeitatis.

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explanations of the material cause. On the positive side,
though, the material cause must not be changed nor depart
in a transformation; this is what in effect elemental the-
ories do. And, since generation occurs between contraries,
it is necessary that the common subject of generation should
have none of the contraries naturally innate to itself be-
cause it would not then be able to accept contraries as
necessary. In a word, the material cause ought to be in-
different to every form, since it is common to all forms.20

Suarez' second conclusion, that prime matter is not
a whole being, also rejects atomism and the finite elements

position. When one says that material cause is not a total

being, this can be taken in two ways. First, matter itself

 

20Dicendum igitur est primo causam materialem in suo
ordine universalem et primam non esse aliquod ex
sensibilibus corporibus seu elementis quae contrariis
qualitatibus afficiuntur . . . nam si haec elements et omnia
corpora sensibilia invicem transmutentur substantialiter
nullum eorum potest esse primum subiectum transmutationis;
nan primum subiectum, quod est prima causa materialis quam
inquirimus, non transmutatur nec recedit a sua substantia;
alioqui resolveretur in aliud prius subiectum et ita ipsum
non esset primum. Praeterea, cum generatio fiat inter
contraria necesse est ut commune generationis subiectum
nullum habeat contrariorum sibi naturaliter innatum; alioqui
vel nunquam erit capax alterius contrarii vel corrumpetur
per abiectionem eius, quod sibi est connaturale, sicut
destruitur elementum ablata qualitate sibi necessaria. Cum
ergo singula elementa sint affecta propriis qualitatibus
habentibus contrarium, nullum eorum esse potest aptum
generationis subiectum; ergo neque esse potest prima causa
materialis entium naturalium.

Atque hinc consurgit tertia ratio, quia non est cur
haec causalitas potius attribuatur uni elemento quam aliis,
neque etiam est cur magis repugnet omnibus simul quam alicui
eorum; sed ostensum est non posse omnibus convenire; ergo
nulli vere attribuitur. . . . Prima vero materialis causa
Cum sit communis omnibus, ex ea debet esse indifferens ad
Omnia. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, pars. 6-7.

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is the substance of all generable things alone and these
things differ by reason of the distinct accidents. This
position is to be rejected because things differ not only
accidentally but substantially; things change not only ac-
cidentally but substantially. The other manner in which one
can conceive of matter as a whole substance is in terms of a
capacity for receiving further substantial forms.21 This
understanding also is improbable. Either matter is a com-
plete substance totally simple or it would be composed from
some substantial potency and act. The latter is not pos-
sible because, 1. matter is not already a total composite
but rather a potency-~a potency according to which it has
been established that there is a first material cause;
2. there is no indication or sensible sign of an intervening
form between pure matter and other forms which are intro-
duced through generation. This leads to a realization that
such a form would be totally superfluous, because there is
no physical effect on account of which it is necessary. It
must also be noted that it is impossible to join two such
forms in the same potency or matter, for it is plainly im-
possible that two specific forms at one and the same time be
joined together for actuating the same substantial potency.
Either those two forms would immediately actuate the matter
or one would be the act of the composite (i.e., a composite
composed of the first form and the potency). The first

cannot be held because a prior form would not necessarily

 

21E.g., forma corporeitatis.

 

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be presupposed for a later one nor would the composite from
matter and such a form be a proximate potency and material
cause of subsequent forms. Neither can the second be held
because a substantial form which helps constitute an inte-
gral and complete substance has the intelligibility of the
ultimate act in the understanding of substantial and essen-
tial act. Finally, and most generally, it is not possible
that one and the same substance, essentially and pg; s2, be
constituted in two ultimate species. It is through some
form that things are constituted in a species. Therefore
two forms are not able to be joined in the same matter. In
a word, the substantial form gives existence simply and es-
sentially, while the accidental form gives existence in a
certain way. From all of this Suarez reasons that it is im-
possible that the subject which is a material cause of gen-
erable things and of substantial generation could be a com-
plete substance and be constituted a complete being without

a proper and specific form.22

22Dico secundo: materia prima non est aliquod
corpus seu substantia complete at integra in essentia et
specie substantiae. Duobus modis intelligi potest materiam
esse huiusmodi substantiam. Primo, ut ispa sola sit
substantia omnium rerum generabilium solumque formetur
distinctis accidentibus eorum; et in hoc sensu probanda est
assertio ex ea quod res naturales non tantum differunt
accidentibus sed etiam substantia et essentia. . . .

Alio ergo modo posset quis fingere materiam esse
substantiam integram et completam in aliqua specie substan-
tiae et nihilominus esse aptam ad recipiendas ulteriores
formas substantiales et componendas cum eis varias substan-
tias et essentias materialium rerun. Et hic etiam sensus
improbabilis esset; aut enim materia esset complete substan-
tio omnino simplex aut esset composita ex aliqua potentia et
actu substantiali; hoc posterius dici non potest, primo,
quia iam non totum illud compositum, sed potentia ex qua

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50

It is now necessary to turn to Suarez' third con-
clusion, that the material cause of generable things is
not a composite substance made up of a substantial potency
and some sort of incomplete form. The first reason this
cannot be the case is that there is no indication in na-
ture for such an inseparable and coequal form, for one
can find no effect of such a form. The second reason is
that a form of this type is incompatible in matter with
subsequent forms. This is commonly proved by the maxim
that from.two beings in act there does not result an ungm
pg; £2, The first substantial form constitutes a being

in act absolutely and simply because it gives existence

 

constat esset prima causa materialis. . . . Sed contra hoc
obiicitur secundo, quia sine ullo fundamento fingitur tale
compositum; nullum enim est indicium aut sensibile signum
illius formae interiectae inter puram materiam et alias
formas quae per generationem inducuntur. . . . Unde fit
tertio ut sit omnino superflua, quia nullus est physicus
effectus propter quem sit necessaria, quia non propter
efficiendum, cum non habeat ullam qualitatem per quam
efficiat; aliunde unicuique qualitati sufficiat proprie
forma, cui est connaturalis. Neque etiam propter reci-
piendum; nam ad hoc sufficit illa potentia quae tali formae
substare dicitur; cur enim non poterit etiam illa immediate
subiici forma quae per generationem inducitur? Et propter
eamdem causam non est necessaria talis forma ad conservandam
illam potentiam suius actus esse dicitur, quia ad hoc etiam
satis est forma quae per generationem inducitur. Igitur
superflua at sine fundamento fingitur talis forma.

Quarto accedit impossibilitas coniungendi duas
illas formas in eadem potentia seu materia; nam licet in
quaestione.sit an forma quasi generics et specifics possint
simul actuare materiam, quod paulo inferius attingemus,
tamen quod duae formas specificae simul coniungantur ad
actuandam eamdem potentiam substantialem plane est
impossibile naturaliter et in hoc fere omnes auctores
conveniunt. Disp. Mata. XIII, Sect. 3, para. 9-12.

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51

simply. Therefore no supervening form is able to consti-
tute a being as an 333m per g; and simply.23

The result of this set of conclusions is that the
first material cause cannot be any type of integral sub-
stance--neither a body nor any composite of matter and form.
And, the generation of substances is not to be presupposed
through a kind of subject in which generation is received
into some ingenerable and incorruptible body; rather gen-
eration takes place only with prime matter.2h

Up to this point the doctrine of Suarez on the sta-
tus of prime matter is fairly straightforward scholastic
doctrine in that he has followed out the implications of
prime matter as the first subject of substantial change. In
the course of his argument he has rejected atomism, monism,
and the varieties of pluralism. Indeed, he seems to have
established that matter is simply a principle of being and
not a being itself. But, the next move seems to take all of
this away, for he will hold that prime matter has a limited
kind of being in itself. With his usual thoroughness he be-

gins the discussion in section four of Disputation XIII with

 

23Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, pars. 13-16.

2"Relinquitur ergo ex omnibus dictis primam causam
materialem substantiarum generabilium non esse aliquam
substantiam integram, neque ullum corpus aut compositum ex
materia et forma; ac proinde ad substantiarum generationem
non supponi per modum subiecti in quo generatio recipiatur
aliquod corpus ingenerabile et incorruptibile, sed solum
materiam primam, solam (inquam) quoad substantiam; nam quoad
accidentia quid dicendum sit, postea videbimus. Disp. Meta.
XIII, Sect. 3, par. 23. ~

 

 

 

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52
a review of the various positions held with respect to the
being of prime matter.25
As Suarez begins to give his own solution to this

problem he feels that he must distinguish very carefully be-
tween entitas essentiae (being of essence) and entitas exis-
tentiae (being of existence). For Suarez there cannot be a
being of essence without a being of existence and vice versa.
Only real beings or principles of being exist; essences or
principles of being taken in the abstract do not exist. Any
distinction between essence and existence is merely for the
sake of analysis. When one asks whether matter has exist-
ence of itself and not on account of some form this denial
can be understood in two ways-~initially, that it does not
possess a form intrinsically and is not informed by an act;
in this position existence is given to matter only through
the intrinsic informing capacity of the form; secondly, and
in opposition to the first position matter does not have its
existence on account of the form or on account of the dispo-

sition to the form or dependency upon it.26 That is, it

 

25Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. L, pars. 1-7.

26Ut quaestioni respondeamus seclusa omni ambi-
guitate terminorum, distinguamus questionem de entitate es-
sentiae et de entitate existentiae; nam est valde controver-
sum quomodo haec duo distinguantur in creaturis et ideo
certior est resolutio de una quam de alters. Rursus, cum
inquiritur an materia habeat ex se entitatem et non a forma,
dupliciter intelligi potest illa negatio; uno modo, quod non
habeat a forma intrinseca seu ut ab actu informante et dante
esse materiae per suam intrinsecam informationem; alio modo,
quod nulls ratione habeat suum esse per formam.seu per
habitudinem ad formam aut per dependentiam ab illa. Disp.
Meta. XIII, Sect. k, par. 8.

 

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53
does not depend on the form at all for its existence.

There are two sets of terms to be cleared up prior
to explanation of Suarez' position on the being and exist-
ence of prime matter. He wants to distinguish between the
being of essence and the being of existence. This distinc-
tion is essential for an understanding of his position on
the being and essence of prime matter and Suarez himself
does not explain the meaning of these terms very well.
Since only real essences exist, the being of essence refers
to those really existing beings as one finds them in the
concrete reality around himself. This term is meant to set
off the concrete particulars from the universals which are
taken by Suarez to have no real concrete existence. That
is, the term "being of essence" carries with it a rejection
of Platonism. Within an actually constituted being, how-
ever, there are co-principles which compose the being.
These co-principles, if the being is to be a real being,
must manifest a being of existence. That is, they are not
merely mental fictions or constructs on the one hand, nor
are they, on the other hand, complete essences. Taken in
themselves they are real (i.e., they exist) but they exist
in conjunction with the other co-principles to make up an
actual essence. The co-principles, then, manifest a being
of existence.

The second set of terms to be elaborated is that of
act and potency. Since later in this chapter there will be

an extensive analysis of matter as pure potency it will be

5h
necessary to defer the complete discussion of potency to
that point. Suffice it to say for the present that a po-
tency is the complementary principle to an act. That is,
in a composed being one always finds the two principles to-
gether (e.g., matter [potency7 and form [§c§7). One gets a
good understanding of the nature of the relationship between
act and potency when Suarez gives his own explanation of
what it means for a thing to be an act.

The name "act" can be taken either in an absolute or
in a relational sense. Sometimes a thing is called an act
because it actuates something in the manner in which the
form is the act of matter. Suarez calls this the relational
use of ”act" because here the act is the act of another.
Sometimes, however, an act is called such because it is a
reality in itself and has no relationship to potency (e.g.,
the way in which God is called an act). This is an act ab-
solutely considered. "Act" taken relationally can be sub-
distinguished also; an act actuating another is physical and
formal such as a real existent form. The second meaning is
"act” taken as a metaphysical act; this usage applies to a
series of logical distinctions such as act of an essence
used to indicate a difference, or act of existence used to
indicate existence as existence, or act of subsistence used
to indicate a certain mode of subsistence. Since the con-
cern here is with real beings and principles of being, the
second half of this subdistinction is irrelevant to the

present study. In the first half, however, Suarez is

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55

claiming that there are physical acts and they are co-prin-
ciples of being with physical potencies. A similar subdis-
tinction takes place with respect to "act absolutely speak-
ing." One can speak of act in this way either simply or in
a limited way. Absolutely speaking "act" taken simply means
that the act is able to exist on its own and does not inform
any potency. Absolutely speaking "act" taken in a limited

way means a being which has some actuality but this actual-

ity is incomplete and imperfect.27

27Ut autem solvantur difficultates tactae superiori
sectione, et explicetur modus loquendi philosophorum, et
omnis ambiguitas terminorum auferatur, adverto nomen actus
multipliciter sumi posse; nam interdum absolute, interdum
respective dicitur; aliquando enim dicitur actus, quia
actuat aliquid, quomodo forma est actus materiae. Et hunc
voco actum respectivum, quia est actus alterius. Aliquando
vero dicitur actus quia in se est actuale quid et non
potentiale, quamvis nihil aliud actuet quo modo Deus dicitur
actus, et hunc voco actum absolute dictum. Rursus uterque
istorum actuum subdistingui potest; nam actus actuans alius
est physicus et formalis, ut est forma physice; alius vero
est actus metaphysicus, qui est multiplex; alius enim est
actus essentiae, ut differentia; alius existentiae ut
existentia, at addi etiam potest actus seu modus subsisten-
tiae. Actus vero absolute dictus, alius est actus sim-
pliciter, alius secundum quid. Prior est ille actus, qui
in genere entis simpliciter seu substantiae its est
completus, ut nec constituatur per actum physicum a se
distinctum, neque per illam actuetur, aut illo indigeat ad
existendum. Val aliter explicari potest, illud ens dici
actum simpliciter quod ex vi suae actualitatis solius
includit perfectionem formalem, quam alia entia composite
habere solent per substantialem actum informantem. Unde,
licet huiusmodi actus absolutus, non sit actus actuans, vel
informans, dici tamen potest esse actus formalis eminenti
modo, id est per se habens complementum illud perfectionis
quod per actum informantem conferri solet his entibus, quae
per compositionem complentur. Actus autem secundum quid
dicetur ens illud quod habet aliquam actualitatem in
quantum actu est extra nihil; illam tamen habet incompletam
et imperfectam, quia non est ita sufficiens quin indigeat
alio actu, tum ut compleatur in ratione entis simpliciter,
tum etiam ut existat. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5, par. 8.

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Given this understanding of terms, Suarez can now
set forth his position on the being of prime matter. Suarez
places himself between the extremes mentioned above. He
says that prime matter of itself and not intrinsically from
the form has its own actual being, although it does not have
it unless there is also an intrinsic aptitude for a form.
Suarez is speaking in this assertion of the actual being of
existence, the actual being of the matter in concrete and
not merely in the abstract.28 In this sense and with re-
spect to the actual being of matter he does not see how any-
one is able to have a different Opinion from his own. Mat-
ter, having been created by God, and existing in the com-
posite has some real existence or otherwise it would not be
a real being. The existence of matter is not constituted
intrinsically in its being by means of the form. Therefore
in itself it has its own kind of being.29 This move is cru-
cial because even though Suarez, as we have seen earlier,
does not want to accept the doctrine that matter is an in-

tegral being, he now seems forced to give it a type of

 

28Thomas Aquinas was the most celebrated of the
medieval scholastics to separate by a real distinction the
act of existing from the essence. Suarez here is trying to
show that he is talking about real matter as opposed to mat-
ter taken in the abstract. Suarez will hold that this real
matter must have a being of its own. This position simply
would not make sense in the Thomistic system which demands
a separate act of existence for the being to be real. Once
there is an act of existence there is also a complete es-
sence; matter can have being only in terms of the total sub-
stance in Thomas Aquinas.

29Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. h, pars. 9-10.

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57
existence proper to itself because otherwise it would be a
nothing. In a word, he both wants matter not to exist with-
out a form and to be able to have a being of its own.

He attempts to get around the apparent contradiction
in this position by positing a kind of transcendental apti-
tude of matter for form and by showing that matter cannot
have its own being without this aptitude. This is true be-
cause matter is essentially a potency, and every potency has
an intrinsic aptitude for its act. The proper act of matter
is the form. Therefore, matter has its proper existence of
itself with an aptitude for the form. This aptitude is not
of itself originally to this or that form but to form abso-
lutely and consequently to any form whatever. And, there-
fore, although forms are varied in matter, the essential ap-
titude or intelligibility of matter is not varied. This can
be taken as a clear argument that matter does not have a be-
ing merely in virtue of the informing action of the form.30

This last argument gives matter a very definite be-

ing apart from the form. But, Suarez gets even more

30Quod vero materia non habet suammet entitatem

essentiae sine transcendentali habitudine ad formam, proba-
tur quia essentialiter est potentia, ut infra ostendetur, et
patet ex definitions Aristotelis dicentis materiam esse
rimum subiectum, etc.; omnis autem potentia dicit intrinse-
cam Eabitudinem ad suum actum; preprius autem actus materiae
est forma; habet ergo materia suam propriam essentiam per
seipsam cum habitudine ad formam. Haec autem habitudo non
est per se prime ad hanc vel illam formam sed ad formam
absolute, et consequenter ad quamcumque formam generabilem,
seu quae per generationem uniri possit, et ideo quamvis in
materia varientur formae, non variatur essentialis ratio vel
habitudo materiae. Quad etiam est clarum argumentum
materiam non habere entitatem essentiae ab informatione
formas. Disp..Meta. XIII, Sect. h, par. 11.

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58
explicit when he says that prime matter has being in itself
and also has being through a dependence upon the form. He
spends a great deal of time in Disputation XV outlining the
nature of this dependence and it is best, as Suarez does, to
defer that discussion until the treatment on form. Briefly,
here, though, the foundation of this position is that the
being of existence adds nothing or no real mode over and
above the being of essence. From this, however, it follows
that matter, just as it has being actually distinct from the
form, has its proper being of existence which it retains
under any form whatever.

The confirmation of this is that matter retains the
same actual being even though forms are generated and cor-
rupted one after another. Therefore it also has existence
in which it is constituted an actual being. Secondly, mat-
ter is presupposed as the subject of the generation of the
form and it is not altogether a nothing, otherwise there
would be generation from nothing. Matter is, therefore, a
created thing, an actual being, and existent, because crea-
tion is not complete unless there is actual being and exist-
ence. The final confirmation is that the existence of a
thing is of such a kind that an essence is always actual.
For just as real essences of corporeal substances are com-
posed from partial existents of matter and form, so also
total existence of the same substance is composed from par-
tial existents of matter and form. This follows from the

principle that existence and actual essence are not

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59

distinguished in fact but in reason. Matter, therefore, is
not an actual integral being distinct from form, but in its
own being it includes a proper partial existence in fact,
distinct from the partial existence of the form.31

In summary, Suarez is holding the position that the
principle of being called prime matter cannot be an integral
or whole being of itself. But, matter does possess in some
sense its own existence apart from the form. This departs
significantly from the Aristotelian tradition in scholastic
philosophy. Here he gives prime matter more independence
than he should if he wants to have a hylomorphic metaphysics
which has a true substantial unity. On the other hand, he
himself does not see how he can deny being to prime matter,
at least in some limited sense, without turning it into an
absolute nothing. The failure to reconcile this difficulty

is one of the major steps in creating the dualism of fact

despite the intention of unity.

Matter as Pure Potency
In treating the questions of the being and essence
of prime matter it was necessary to discuss the unity of
prime matter as opposed to multiple first subjects. Sec-
ondly, it has been shown that matter has no existence as an
integral being either as a body or as something informed by
some sort of form other than a substantial form. And,

thirdly, it has been shown that matter is nonetheless a type

 

31Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. h, pars. 13-17.

 

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60
of partial being. When Suarez turns to the properties of
matter, he is concerned mainly with the claim that prime
matter is pure potency and the manner in which this term
should be understood.

His position on this subject is that matter as pure
potency does not exclude every act. Matter is not called
pure potency with respect to every metaphysical act simply
because it does not include any metaphysical act whatever.
Here Suarez makes a truly outstanding statement for a scho-
lastic philosOpher; for he holds that matter in its own
nature has some perfection and transcendental goodness.32
The reason given for this is that the composite of matter
and form is a more perfect existence than form alone; there-
fore, matter has some perfection which it adds to the com-
posite. And, this is desirable and appropriate to matter
not only as a medium of perfection but in itself. By reason
of its perfection matter is appropriate to this form or this
composite. Therefore, matter of its very nature has some
proper perfection. Perfection, however, cannot be under-

stood without at least some transcendental actuality.33

 

32. . . nam materia nature sua aliquam perfectionem
et bonitatem transcendentalem habet et etiam docuit D. Thom.,
III Cont. Gent., c. 20. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5, par. 9.

33Certum est enim compositum ex materia et forma
perfectius quid esse quam sit sola forma; ergo aliquid
perfectionis habet materia, quam addit composito. Item ipsa
materia est appetibilis et conveniens non tantum ut medium
sed per se, quia ratione suae perfectionis est conveniens
huic formas vel composito; ergo habet materia ex natura sua
aliquam propriam perfectionem; sed non potest intelligi
perfectio sine actualitate aliqua, saltem transcendentali.
Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5, par. 9.

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This transcendental actuality is the type of being that is
proper to matter taken in itself (this actuality has been
examined in the previous section of this study). That is,
matter has a proper act of existence but this is only a par-
tial and proportionate act of subsistence. In a word, mat-
ter exists but does not subsist--exist independently}!+ The
general conclusion of this argumentation is that prime mat-
ter is not pure potency in the sense that it excludes every
metaphysical actuating act.

Suarez will go on to Specify the nature of the act
admitted by prime matter but it is well to pause here and
reflect on the significance of the redefinition of "pure
potency." Despite the earlier protestations with respect
to the incompleteness of prime matter and the necessity of
a substantial form which brings being, Suarez by allowing
prime matter to have some sort of act in itself and of its
very nature has made the integrity of prime matter more com-
plete than he really can allow if he is going to hold on to
a genuine hylomorphic metaphysics.

The progressive individualizing of prime matter be—
comes more evident in the succeeding paragraphs of Disputa-
tion XIII, Section 5 when he takes up the tOpics of which
act matter allows, in what way matter is pure potency, and
in what way ”to be a potency” and ”to be in potency” differ

from each other.

 

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62

With respect to the act allowed by matter, Suarez
holds that matter is not such a pure potency that it lacks
every entitative act at least in a qualified sense. This
understanding of matter comes from the intelligibility of
"first subject," for in a first subject there is a necessity
for a £22; passive potency. Or rather, what is essentially
the same, a necessity for a passive potency. Real passive
potency cannot be understood without entitative actuality.
For how can something be understood as really receptive of
something else unless it is a something itself735 Essen-
tially there must be some act allowed by matter.

When Suarez turns to the analysis of the way in
which matter is pure potency he must do a considerable re-
working of the notion of "pure potency." Matter is said to
be pure potency in respect to an act absolutely and simply
called and in respect to an informing or actuating act. It

is acknowledged by Suarez that matter is not by itself an

 

35. . . materia non est ita pura potentia quin sit
aliquis actus entitativus secundum quid. Haec assertio
satis declarata est et probata ex dictus circa opinionem
Scoti. Et ex ratione primi subiecti sufficienter col-
ligitur; nam in primo subiecto necessaria est realis
potentia passiva vel potius ipsummet essentialiter est
potentia passiva; non potest autem intelligi potentia
passiva realis sine aliqua actualitate entitativa. Qualiter
enim potest intelligi quod aliquid sit vere reeliter
receptivum alterius, nisi in se aliquid sit? Unde recte
Commentator, III de Caelo com. 29, ait omnem poten-
tialitatem passivam in aliqua actualitate fundari. Et D.
Thomas, I, q. #5, a. 1, ad 1 ait materiam non dici ens in
potentia, eo modo quo dicitur esse in potentia ens possibile
ex sola non repugnantia terminorum; supponit ergo esse
aliquod ens actu fundans realem potentiam passivam vel quod
potius sit realis potentia passiva in genere substantiae.
Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5, par. 10.

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63
actuating or informing act as is clear from the notion of
first subject. In its intrinsic and essential conception
it does not include the notion of a physical informing act.
It has been shown to be a simple being which also includes
the intelligibility of first subject. Likewise matter is
the kind of being that of itself is not sufficient for ex-
istence without the perfecting and actuating substantial
act. Therefore, of its own it includes no formal act either
formally or eminently and therefore is not an act absolutely
and simply called. But, whatever is of being in prime mat-
ter is totally for exercising the duty of receptive potency
for a substantial form. From these things, then, matter is
a pure potency in the genus of substance only and is best
explained as such.

Since matter is a simple being and a totally recep-
tive potency it is best called a pure potency. But, that

word "pure" does not exclude being and actuality in the
limited way that is necessary for understanding 332;,299
£2551. Pure does exclude, however, every duty beyond pas-
sive potency and especially the understanding of completely

in act. It excludes every formal act both properly inform-

ing ones and perfect and complete ones.36

36. . . materia dicitur esse pura potentia respectu
actus informantis seu actuantis et respectu actus absolute
et simpliciter dicti. Declaratur, nam imprimis materia non
est actus actuans, neque informans, ut per se constat ex
ratione primi subiecti. Deinde in suo intrinseco conceptu
et essentiali non includit actum physicus informantem;
ostendimus enim esse entiatem simplicem, quod etiam ex
ratione primi subiecti colligitur. Praeterea materia talis
est entitas ut per as sole sufficiens non sit ad existendum

 

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Finally one must consider the phrases "to be in po-
tency" and "to be a potency." According to Suarez the lack
of rigor in the use of these phrases has led to confusion.
The notion that matter is a potency is true and has a legit-
imate meaning as has been seen in the previous exposition.
But, "to be in potency" is at a minimum an ambiguous phrase.
To be in pure potency rigorously taken signifies a privation
of actual existence. Here, "to be in potency" says that the
potency has no act but nevertheless is able to be. But,
this cannot be said of matter after it has been created. It
can be granted that it is almost nothing but not that it is
nothing. And from the opposite viewpoint one can also dis-
tinguish ”to be in act" and "to be an act." It is true to
say that matter is in act because this signifies nothing
other than that matter exists and is among the things of

nature. And this is true just as it is true that matter is

 

sine substantiali actu ipsam perficiente et actuante, unde
ex vi suae praecisae entitatis nullum formalem actum
includit formaliter aut eminenter et ideo non est actus
absolute simpliciter. Denique, quidquid est entitatis in
materia prima, totum est ad exercendum munus potentiae
receptivae formae substantialis; ad hoc enim ex primario ac
per se institute et ideo, ut supra dicebamus, in sua
essentiali ratione includit transcendentalem habitudinem ad
formam. Ex his ergo constat merito dici puram potentiam in
genere substantiae optimeque praedicto modo explicari; nam
cum materia sit entitas simplex et tota ipsa sit potentia
receptiva, optime appellatur pura potentia. Sicut autem
dici solet dictionem exclusivam non excludere concomitan-
tiam, ita illa dictio pura non excludit entitatem et
actualitatem secundum quid necessarium ad rationem potentiae
realis, sed excludit imprimis omne aliud munus praeterquam
potentiae passivae, et deinde excludit rationem actus
completi, seu simpliciter et absolute dicti, et (quod in
idem redit) excludit omnem actum formalem, tam proprie
informantem quam simpliciter constituentem actum perfectum
et completum. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5, par. 11.

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65

created, receives a form, and makes up a composite--all of
which include the notion of existence. But, to say that
matter is an act is ambiguous to say the least. Absolutely
taken this seems to be an actuating act or an act simply
understood. This cannot be admitted. But we have seen that
there is a sense in which matter is an imperfect entitative
act.37

From these three proofs, then, one can see that
Suarez has a much different notion of matter as pure potency
than is traditionally held by Aristotle and other scholas-
tics. Suarez does not want to go the route of Scotus and
allow to matter some sort of form of corporeity, but neither
can he reconcile the notion of matter as an absolutely pure
potency with a matter that does not have some sort of actu-

ality. One issue here is the attempt to give matter some

 

37Est autem propter usum verborum considerandum
aliud in rigore significari cum dicitur materia pura
potentia, aliud si dicatur esse in pure potentia. Primum
enim simpliciter verum est et habet legitimum sensum
expositum; secundum vero, ut minimum, est ambiguum; nam esse
in pure potentia in rigore significat privationem actualis
existentiae; unde solum dicitur de eo quod actu nihil est,
esse tamen potest, quod dici non potest de materia postquam
create vel concreata est. Nam, licet sit prOpre nihil, non
tamen nihil, sed vera res ut supra cum Augustino dicebamus.
Et simili modo distinguere possumus has locutiones esse in
actu vel esse actum; materiam enim esse in actu simpliciter
verum est, quia Hoc nihil aliud significat quam materiam
esse in rerum natura et existere, quod verum est; sicut est
verum materiam esse creatam; recipere formam et componere
compositum quae omnia includunt existere; materiam vero esse
actum, ut minimum est ambiguum; nam absolute significare
videtur esse actum actuantem aut certe esse actum sim-
pliciter; et ideo absolute id admittendum non est, sed cum
aliquo addito diminuente, scilicet, esse actum entitativum
imperfectum et secundum quid. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5,
par. 12.

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66

being of its own without turning it into an integral being.
And then, an additional issue is the accepted and revered
term of "pure potency." How is he to eXplain matter as pure
potency if matter has actual being? He resorts to some sub-
tle distinctions to get around this dilemma but perhaps has
already conceded too much by allowing matter to have its
own being.

A corollary to the issue of matter as pure potency
arises in the question of our knowledge of matter. From a
slightly different angle Suarez implies the need for matter
to have its own actuality when he Speaks of the kind of con-
cept we are able to form concerning matter. It is a fact
that people do form some sort of proper concept of prime
matter, this concept is admittedly not altogether distinct
and is in some sense partly negative and partly confused.
Suarez asserts this on the basis of the definition given by
Aristotle stating that prime matter is the first subject.
This description does explain some objective concept of
matter. But, in the definition "subject" is confused and
common (as opposed to distinct and specific). The defini-
tion adds "first" as a limitation, but "first" is a nega-
tion of any prior subject. So, Aristotle's definition of

matter is lacking in distinctness and is partly negative.38

38. . . dicendum est pervenire quidem nos in aliquem
proprium conceptum materiae primae; non tamen omnino
distinctum et prout in se est sed negativum partim, partim
confusum. Tota haec assertio constat ex definitione
materiae tradita ab Aristotele, scilicet esse primum
subiectum, etc.; nam per illam descriptionem aliquem con-
ceptum Obiectivum explicamus; ille autem est proprius

 

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The same thing happens when one describes the nature
of matter as "pure potency." The understanding of "potency"
is confused and common and "pure" is a negation of every
composing or constituting form. The reason for this is that
we scarcely know simple being by proper concepts unless they
are joined to some sort of negation which is the more fre-
quent manner of declaring the nature of matter through the
lack of form or of complete actuality.39

Next, Suarez defends his own approach when he says
that his own description of matter as an incomplete sub-
stance receptive of substantial form seems to be a com-
pletely positive one. But the word, "incomplete" indicates
negation. This leads him to say that one can never describe
matter unless he uses negations. Suarez employs an analog-
ical argument to prove the point. Just as it seems to be
dark when we do not see light, so when we understand what it
is to be informed we know matter in some way. We know that
the informing is not the same as the matter and we remove

something, so we might think of matter alone. This,

 

materiae; sicut et ipsa definitio. In ea vero definitione
subiectum quid confusum est et commune; additur vero quod
Sit primum ut ad materiam limitetur: primum autem
negationem importat prioris subiecti. Sp. Meta. XIII,
Sect. 6, par. h.

 

39Perinde est quod communiter naturam materiae
declaramus per rationem puree potentiae, nam ratio potentiae
confusa est et communis; at vero dictio urae negationem
dicit omnis formae componentis vel const tuentis ipsam
materiam. Ratio vero est quia nos vix cognosicimus
simplicia propriis conceptibus nisi adiungendo aliquam
negationem, quare hic est frequentior modus declarandi
naturam materiae per carentiam formae et completae
actualitatis, etc. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 6, par. 4.

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68
however, does not appear from the fact that matter has no
being at all but from the fact that it has it as simple and
potential lying under substantial and accidental forms. It
is not able to be investigated or conceived by us in any

#0

other manner.

The Causality of Prime Matter

Suarez up to this point has shown that prime matter
exists, that it has its own being as a Simple and incomplete
entity and that it is a pure potency only in a restricted
sense. He now asks in what the causality of prime matter
consists. It is at this point that the reader of the Dispu-
tationes Metaphysicae gets a preliminary explanation of the
relationship of matter and form. The explanation is pre-
liminary because Suarez has not yet treated formal cause.
The more definitive analysis will come in Disputation XV;
this present discussion in Disputation XIII shows once again
that the separation of matter and form is really more com-
plete than Suarez is willing to admit and that he realizes
this by demanding that there be nothing intervening between
the matter and the form.

There are four items to be distinguished with re-

spect to the causality of matter: the generation of a

 

A0. . . videmur declarare naturam materiae per
conceptus pure positives, ut si dicamus esse substantiam
incompletum receptivam formae substantialis; sed quod
dicitur incomplete negationem importat. Ac denique nunquam
materiae naturam eclaramms nisi adiungamus negationem
omnis actus formalis constituentis ipsam. Disp. Meta. XIII,
Sect. 6, par. A.

 

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69
composite, the union with the form, the being of the form,
and the composite itself.

With respect to the generation Suarez thinks that
this is caused by the matter itself through its own causal-
ity. There is no other thing or mode of existence added to
the matter apart from the generation itself inhering in the
matter. Again, he uses analogy comparing the generation by
matter to an efficient cause situation. Just as action is
by an agent, not through another action but directly, and
has the intelligibility of action only as an emanation from
the agent itself, so the action is the very causality of the
agent itself. In the same manner eduction or passive gen-
eration, insofar as it is essentially dependent upon a sub-
ject, and through itself is necessarily joined to the sub-
ject, is necessarily joined to the subject and is caused
naturally by the subject and not through another causality.
This is especially proven from the fact that the causality
of matter is best understood with respect to generation only
in this way-~Nothing else is necessary; therefore it is
superfluous to posit something else, some "generation.”1

A second argument with reapect to generation states

that the same thing is shown from accidental changes and

 

A1As has been rather evident throughout this chapter

Suarez is wary of any position that seems to be Scotist in
tendency. This whole section on the causality of matter is
very much concerned that there not be some third principle
interposed between the matter and the form. Suarez sees
that the forma cogporeitatis is just such a principle and
for that reason especia y t is unacceptable in a descrip-
tion of matter.

 

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unions. When wood burns the burning occurs in some subject
and from some subject. But, there are not two changes
taking place in that subject, one of which is the passive
burning itself and the other of which is some manner by
which such a subject causes burning. It is superfluous to
multiply changes. The burning itself is such that it in-
trinsically demands a disposition of actual union and de-
pendence upon a subject in the genus of material cause. The
change itself is caused by the subject, and causes the sub-
ject itself. It is united to the subject and the subject
remains united to it. The same situation is the case in the
material causality of substantial generation.

A third argument comes more generally from the
nature of causality itself, because both through the same
cause and through the manner by which an effect is caused
does the cause bring about its effect. Causation itself as
such essentially includes a double aptitude--l. for causing
as a principle and 2. for an effect as a term. Therefore
causation signifies both the causing and the caused. Gen-
eration, which is intrinsically and essentially dependent
upon matter, is itself caused by matter and dependent upon
matter, is itself caused by matter and no other mode or
thing is necessary in order that matter be named part of
the cause of generation.

Fourthly, and finally, for matter to cause genera-
tion nothing else is needed other than it sustain the gen-

eration as a subject. It sustains generation immediately in

 

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71
being and through its own being. Any other mode is irrele-
vant to this causality, nor is it able to provide anything
to this sustaining action.“2

The second problem to be considered with respect to

 

hZCgusalitas materiae respectu generationis, est
1 samet generatio.--Verumtamen haec sententia partim false
vi etur, partim dubia. Quod ut declarem et meam sententiam
aperiam, distinguo illa quatuor, quae supra dixi causari ex
materia, generationem, unionem formas, entitatem formae, et
compositum ipsum. Quoad generationem ergo existimo per
seipsam causari a materia, nulla alia re vel modo addito
materiae praeter ipsam generationem illi inhaerentem; atque
adeo causalitatem ipsius generationis a materia, nihil aliud
esse quam ipsammet generationem, ut est eductio ex materia.
Sicut enim actio est ab agente, non per aliam actionem, sed
per seipsam, et habet rationem actionis, ut est ipsa
emanatio a causa agents, et ut sic est ipsa causalitas
agentis, ut infra dicam, ita eductio, sen passiva generatio,
quatenus essentialiter pendet a subiecto, et per seipsam
necessario illi coniungitur, ab illo causatur materialiter
non per aliam causalitatem sed per seipsam. Hoc imprimis
probatur ex ipsamet rei declarations; nam hoc modo optime
intelligitur causalitas materiae circa generationem, et
nihil aliud est necessarium; ergo superfluum est aliquid
aliud fingere. Secundo, id declaratur ex accidentalibus
mutationibus et unionibus; quando enim ligno calefit,
calefactio fit in tali subiecto et ex subiecto; non fiunt
autem tune duae mutationes in illo subiecto, una quae sit
ipsa calefactio passiva; alia, quae sit modus aliquis, quo
tale subiectum causat materialiter calefactionem, illive
unitur; superfluum enim est has multiplicare mutationes, nam
hoc ipso quod calefactio talis est, ut intrinseca dicat
habitudinem actualis unionis et dependentiae a tali subiecto
in genere causae materialis, et ipsa causatur a subiecto et
subiectum causat ipsam, et ipsa unitur subiecto, et
subiectum manet illi unitum; superfluum ergo est aliam
mutationem in subiecto addere; idem ergo est in causalitate
materiali substantialis generationis. Unde confirmatur
tertio, quia per idem, seu per eumdem modum quo effectus
causatur, causa causat, quia causatio ipsa ut sic duplicem
illam habitudinem essentialiter includit, ad causam ut ad
principium, et ad effectum ut ad terminum, et ideo utrumque
denominat, alterum causam alterum causatum; sed generatio,
hoc ipso quod intrinseca et essentialiter est pendens a
materia, per seipsam causatur ab illa; ergo ab eodem, ut est
ex materia, denominetur materia causans illam; ergo nulla
alia res aut modus necessarius est, ut materia denominetur
actu causans generationem. Immo neque intelligi potest

:11 :ausalitj
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72
the causality of matter is the union of matter and form.“3
Suarez claims here that the union of the form to the matter
is caused by the matter itself and the union depends upon
the matter. The material just treated on generation is the
beginning for an explanation of this union. In that argu-
ment Suarez wanted the generation to be caused by the matter
itself; now he adds that the union is not caused by some
causality distinct from the union but by the union of matter
and form itself. This can be easily demonstrated from the
things said about generation, for there is a proportionate
understanding here. The union of form with matter in itself
is a joining to matter in the way appropriate to matter.
The union is caused by the matter itself, not by a separate
act of joining. When matter causes that union it is one and
the same as the causality by which an effect (the joining)
is said to be caused and the cause (the matter) to cause.
This is perfectly clear because the union of matter and form
is not possible without the concurrence of matter. There is
also an a-priori reason in that this union in itself depends

essentially both on the form and on the matter; the union is

 

quomodo materia per alium modum causet generationem. Quod
quarto declaratur nam materiam causare generationem, nihil
aliud est quam sustentare illam ut subiectum; sustentat
autem illam immediate in entitate, et per entitatem suam,
hoc ipso quod generatio in ipsa fit; ergo omnis alius modus
est impertinens ad hanc causalitatem; nec conferre quidquam
potest ad hanc sustentationem. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 9,
par. 5.

haThe concern here is with the general notion of
union. The union of body and soul presents special problems
and these will be treated in Chapter V, "Body and Soul."

 

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73

an actual binding of these two and there is no need for an-
other intervening link or mode by which the union is joined
to matter and form. This approach has already been con-
firmed by the reasons given with respect to generation.““

The third item to be distinguished in regard to the
causality of matter is the being of the form. Suarez feels
that it is inappropriate to treat this topic at this point

since he has not yet discussed the nature of the form

 

hhSuperest dicendum de causalitate materiae in facto
esse, ad quam explicandum incipiendum est a causalitate
'unionis formas cum materia; nam etiam hanc diximus causari a
.materia; nunc vero addimus non causari per aliquam causali-
tatem distinctam a tali unione, sed per ipsammet. Quod
facile=demonstrari potest ex dictis de ipsa generations; est
enim.eadem proportionalis ratio. Quod Sic ostendo: nam
etiam haec unio formas cum.materia per seipsam est coniuncta
materiae eo modo quo esse potest; ergo per seipsam est
pendens a materia eo modo quo pendere potest; ergo per
seipsam1causatur; eatenus enim causatur quatenus pendet;
ergo e converso, materia causat illam unionem per ipsammet;
nam, ut dixi, eadem est causalitas, a qua et effectus
denominetur causari et causa causare. Omnes consequentiae
probatae aunt in superioribus; antecedens vero patet primo
a posteriori quia impossibile est illam unionem conservari
sine concursu materiae seu quin sit in materia eo modo quo
esse potest; ergo signum.est per seipsam immediate ac
essentialiter’pendere a mater a; nam, Si penderet mediante
aliquo modo ex nature rei distincto, posset Deus auferendo
modum illum conservare unionem illam sine materia; hac enim
ratione potest conservare formam, ut infra dicam. Ante-
cedens patet quia non potest unio manere quin actu uniat;
non potest autem actu unire quin coniungat extrema et
utrmunque attingat eo modo quo potest et debet. Et haec
est ratio a priori propter quam illa unio per seipsam pendet
essentialiter’tum.a forma tum a materia, a singulis in suo
genere, quia est veluti actuale vinculum illarum et non
indiget alio interiecto vinculo aut modo quo ipsas attingat
seu illis.coniungatur, ne procedatur in infinitum. Tandem
confirmatur ratione supra facta, quia hoc sufficit ad hanc
oausalitatem.et sine illo poni non potest ac illo posito
et praeciso ommi alio modo sufficienter intelligitur talis
causalitas materiae; ergo omne aliud est fictum et sine
fundamento, neque in hoc est ulla difficultats, praeter
statinlattingendum. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 9, par. 9.

 

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itself. The general conclusion, of course, will be much
like the conclusions we have already seen with respect to
generation and union. That is, the being of the form cannot
be such as to bring about any intervening thing or mode that
would stand between the matter and the form.“5

Suarez finally turns to the causality of matter with
reapect to the composite itself. The conclusion here is
similar to the conclusions of the other three aSpects of
matteris causality. In the formation of the composite
nothing is added outside of the matter and the form. There
is no other causality of the composite except the causality
between the matter and the form. That is, once again, there
is no medium.between the matter and the form which would be
some separate mode of composition. In real things nothing
intervenes between matter and form.“6

The discussion on the causality of matter illus-

trates two very significant things about Suarez' approach to

the hylomorphic theory. He is sensitive to the fact that

 

“SSuarez concerns himself with the being of the form
in Disputation XV. In light of this later treatment this
study will also defer the discussion of the being of the
form until the general topic of form is treated in Chapter

III.

héEx his ulterius concluditur, causalitatem materiae
circa compositum, nihil omnino addere ipsi materiae praeter
unionem formas atque ita non esse aliam causalitatem
compositi, nisi ipsamet causalitatem formas vel unionis
solaunque addere respectu compositi, quod materia, media
unione seipsam exhibet ad componendum intrinseca compositum;
unde ipsa entitate materiae magis intime ingreditur
causalitatem compositi quam formas vel unionis; in re tamen
nihil aliud intervenit nisi entitas materiae et unio seu
causalitas formae. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 9, par. 15.

utter and f

 

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75
matter and form in their own order are in some sense radi-
cally elemental principles of being and that they are imme-
diately related to one another. There can be no intervening
thing or mode between these two whether we call it genera-
tion, union, being of the form, or the composite. These
notions are merely variant expressions of the relation of
matter and form. Secondly, one sees Suarez in something of
a difficulty and problem with respect to an adequate expres-
sion of the basic relationship. He has given matter its own
being and it would appear that there should be some separate
principle which would relate matter to form, but the genera-
tion, union, and composite are not separate things Joining
these two basic principles. If this were the case there
would be an infinite regress of principles. He is forced to
think of matter and form in terms of mutual dependence. The
structure of matter and form, each with their own being,
however, prohibits the kind of mutual dependence he needs.
That is, the co-principles of being are really beings them-

selves and the mutual dependence becomes very tenuous.“7

Matter and the Accident of Quantity
Up to this point the concern of this study with re-

spect to matter has been to examine matter as the radical

 

57The dependence of the matter on the form is
treated extensively in Dis utation XV. In order to Spell
out this dependence in ful one must also have Suarez' doc-
trine on form. Near the end of the chapter on form this
study will spell out the nature of the dependence that
guarez sees is necessary for his metaphysics of matter and
orm.

 

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76
first subject. It has been noted that the fact that Suarez
gives matter its own being individualizes matter in such a
way that matter comes very close to being an integral as op-
posed to an incomplete being. In Disputation XIV Suarez
treats the problem of the material cause of accidents. What
is of special interest for this present analysis is the re-
lationship Suarez draws between the accident of quantity and
prime matter. The reason why this is important is Suarez'
treatment of individuation is closely tied up with this
topic."8 This treatment also shows rather conclusively the
tendency to convert matter into a quasi-integral being.

As is his custom in these disputations Suarez begins
the discussion of the relationship of matter and quantity by
listing various Opinions on the topic. There are two posi-
tions with respect to this problem. The first one says that
matter of itself does not have sufficient being for causing
any accident but only after a prior conjunction with sub-
stantial form, so that a composite results which is able to

receive accidents."’9 The second position affirms that

A8The general metaphysical doctrine of individuation
will be treated in Chapter IV of this present study.

L9This opinion is perhaps the most weighty with re-
spect to the relation between matter and quantity. Suarez
in Disputation XIV, Sect. 3, par. 6 lists a great number of
philosophers and theologians who have held this opinion.

Sunt ergo in hac re duae oppositae sententiae valde
communes. Prima est dicentium materiam per se non habere
entitatem sufficientem ad causandum materialiter aliquod
accidens, sed indigere prius coniunctione ad formam
substantialem, ut ex utraque resultet compositum quod gossit
accidentia recipere. Haec est epinio D. Thom. I, q. 7 ,

a. 6 et q. unic. de Spiritualib. creatur., a. 3, ad 18; et
Alberti, in Summa de homine II, p., q. An nutritio fiat ex

"'1.

 

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77
quantity is in matter. This second position is the one
accepted by Suarez.

Once he has listed the various sources for the posi-
tion that accidents are received only in a composite, Suarez
examdnes the many reasons for holding the position; he sim-
ply lists a series of conclusions the proponents of this
position give for their stance. First, matter is pure po-
tency and does not have existence unless that existence is
brought by the form. Therefore, of itself, it is powerless
to sustain accidents unless it is Joined to the form and re-

ceives existence from it. Secondly, matter is potency to

 

simili, a. 1; Durand., In I dist. 8, II p., q. t; Capreol.,
In II, dist. 13, q. l, conc us. 2 et 3, et dist. 18, q. 1,
conclus. 6' Caiet., de Ente et essent., c. 7, q. 16;
Soncin., VIII Metaph., q. 7, et 15, 17 et 18; Ferr., IV
cont. Gent. c. 81, q. 2 et 3; Soto, I Phys., q. 7;
Astudill., I de Generat. Tribuiturque Aristoteli, quia I de
Generat., text. 23, dixit generationem fieri ex materia,
nullo sensibili manente; ex quo loco et ex his quae
Aristoteles subdit, text 2h, sumunt omnes huius sententiae
auctores in transmutatione substantiali nullum accidens
‘manero in materia prima. Quod si ita fit, ob id utique
evenit, quod materia non sufficiat sustentare accidentia,
sed solum compositum; et ideo pereunt corrupto composite,
quod nulla ratione fieri posset, si materiae primae
inhaerent. Secundo hoc confirmat, quod Aristoteles, I
Phys., text. 81 et 82, ait materiam primam respicere per se
prime substantialem formam. Tertio, lib V, text 8, et

lib I de Gen., text. 2h, differentiam constituit inter
generationem et alterationem vel augmentationem quod
subiectum generationis est sola materia, quam dicit esse
materiam simpliciter, alterationis vero et augmentationis
subiectum dicit esse substantiam integram, quam vocat
materiam secundum quid. Quarto, VII Metaph., text. 8, ait
materiam non esse quid neque quantum, neque quale, neque
aliquid huiusmodi. Quinta, VII Metaph., text 1., et x1
Metaph., text 1.3, ait substantiam esse priorem natura
accidents. Sexto in Praedicam. e. de Substantia, dicit
destructis primis substantiis, impossibile esse aliquid
remanere; primae autem substantiae sunt substantiae
intergrae simplices aut compositae.

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78
every act of whatever order. Therefore, substantial form is
its first act, and matter is per s3 ordered to this act.
Accidents, on the other hand, are secondary acts following
upon that first one. Thirdly, if any accident were in prime
matter it would be quantity but quantity is not in prime
matter. Therefore, no accident is in prime matter. The
minor premise of this third argument is proved by the fact
that quantity is a property of corporeal substance neces-
sarily going along with it. But, it is not able to be a
property following upon matter alone, but upon the form.
Therefore, quantity is not able to be received in matter as
such but only as informed by the form, that is, in the com-
posite. Fourthly, quantity and all corporeal accidents must
be received in the total composite. It is acceptable for
one accident to be received into another (i.e., be mediated
by another), as is obvious with corporeal quality (e.g.,
color) and quantity (size, shape, etc.) and between quali-
ties themselves (e.g., color and heat). But, the potency
for receiving an accident is only to this or that determina-
tion, the potency, however, of matter is for receiving a

form.50

50Rationes pro hac sententia adducuntur plures.
Prima quia materia est pure potentia ita ut neque esse
habeat nisi illud mendicet a forma; ergo ex so est impotens
ad sustentanda accidentia, nisi prius saltem natura
coniungatur formas et ab illa esse recipiat. . . . Secunda
ratio, qua D. Thomas utitur, quia materia est potentia ad
omnes actus ordine quodam; ergo respicit substantialem
formam ut primum actum suum, ad quem per se prime ordinatur;
accidentia vere, ut actus secundarios consequentes primum.

Terto ratio est, nam si quod accidens esset in
materia prima, maxime quantitas; sed haec non; ergo. Maior

 

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79

Despite all of this argumentation against quantity
being in matter, Suarez prefers the second opinion, that
quantity is in matter. This Opinion holds that prime matter
by means of the force of its own being is a sufficient
material cause of the form of accidents which are proper-
tiened to it--first and immediately such an accident is
quantity and mediately the rest of the corporeal accidents.
Now, Suarez realizes that this opinion is net in accord with
the scholastic tradition he has Just finished discussing and
begins his defense of the position by citing a list of texts
from Aristotle which appear to substantiate this present

opinion.51 He also brings in Plato's doctrine on matter as

 

recepta est ab omnibus, et constat ex dictis in principio.
Minor probatur, quia quantitas est proprietas substantiae
corporeae necessaria concomitans illam; non potest autem
esse proprietas consequens materiam ut sic, sed formam; ergo
non potest recipi in materia secundum se, sed ut informata
forma, seu in composite . . .

Quarta ratio sit, quia non repugnet quantitatem et
accidentia omnia corporalia recipi in tote composite
mediante forma; et hec est magis censentaneum naturis rerum;
ergo. Maior declaratur, quia non repugnet unum accidens
recipi in substantia mediante alio, ut constat de qualitate
corporea et de quantitate, et inter qualitates ipsas
reperitur interdum hic erde, ut patebit sectione sequenti;
ergo multo magis reperiri potest inter substantialem actum,
et accidentalem. Miner vere probatur, quia potentia ad
recipiendum accidens est tantum secundum quid; potentia
autem materiae ad recipiendam formam substantialem est
potentia simpliciter; ergo est maxime censentaneum naturis
rerum, ut haec potentia materiae prius reducatur in actum
simpliciter, qui solum relinquat potentiam secundum quid, et
ille mediante recipiat accidentia quibus compositum actuetur
quoad potentiam secundum quid quae in ille manet. Disp.
Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, pars. 7-9.

51Et huic sententiae favet Aristoteles multis in
lecis, nam VII Metaph., text. 8 significat quantitatem
prime inesse materiae° et in III Phys. sentit quantitatem
esse proprietatem ipsius materiae; et lib II de Generat.,

 

 

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80

it is found in the Timaeus that matter is called "the great"
and "the small" which indicates that matter does of itself
have quantity, being indifferent, nevertheless, to any one
definite greatness or smallness. This set of texts from
Aristotle and the analysis from the Timaeus leads Suarez to
an important conclusion in the relationship of matter to
quantity. The reasons for this present position are partly
metaphysical and partly physical, and it is from both sides
that the discussion ought to be carried on. Suarez points
out that the metaphysical reasons seem to prove from the
part of matter that there is in it a sufficient foundation
of being that it could sustain accidents. The physical rea-
sons alse show it to be more appropriate for matter to sus-
tain quantity because of the sensible effects we experience.

That quantity is in matter is appropriate because
matter has actual being, with its own existence and even a
partial subsistence. Therefore, from this angle it has suf-

ficient being to sustain some accident. This must .be true

 

text. 6 sentit dispositiones ad formas substantiales, et
alterationem quae ad eas fit proxime versari circa materiam;
et lib. I de Generat., et lib. II, text. 27 ait accidentia
in quibus res genita convenit cum eerrupta manere eadem.
Potest etiam in hanc sententia Plate adduci, qui in Timaeo
materiam magnum et parvum appellavit, quod ex se quantitatem
habeat, in i erentem tamen ad magnitudinem vel parvitatem.
Rationes pro hac sententia partim metaphysicae sunt, partim
physicas; ex utrisque tamen integer discursus cenflari
debet; nam rationes metaphysicae prebare videntur non
repugnare ex parte materiae, seu esse in ea sufficiens
fundamentum entitatis ut sustentet materialiter accidentia;
physicas autem rationes ostendunt id esse magis censentaneum
tam fini seu muneri ad quod materia institute est quam
sensibilibus effectibus quos experimur. Disp. Meta. XIV,

Sect. 3, par. 11.

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81

because that which subsists in itself, even though as some
partial being, is able to support accidents proportionate
to itself.52 It could be said perhaps that matter depends
upon the form in its very existence. But, this does not re-
fute the present position, because that dependence of matter
on form is not as a true and proper cause of the matter it-
self. Rather, it is a condition naturally necessary for
matter to be preserved in existence. This manner of depend-
ence which is extrinsic to the being of matter is not able
to obstruct the being of matter in itself, nor the fact that
this being is sufficient for supporting accidents in the

genus of material cause.53 One can grant that matter

52Prime igitur probatur hanc causalitatem posse

convenire materiae, quia materia habet propriam entitatem
actualem cum sua proprie existentia, ut supra dictum est, et
prepriam etiam subsistentiam partialem, ut infra ostendetur;
erte ex hac parte habet sufficientem entitatem ut sustentet
aliquod accidens. Patet consequentia, quia quod in se sub-
sistit, licet aliequi partialis entitas sit, potest susten-
tare accidentia sibi proportionate, ut paulo antea de anima
rationali dicebamus. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 12.

53Dicetur fertasse materiam dependere in sue esse a
form, et ex hac parte esse inferioris cenditienis quam sit
anima rationalis comparata ad materiam. Sed hoc non obstat,
etiamsi illam dependentiam admittamus, quam nonnulli negant;
quia illa dependentia materiae a’ forma non est ut a vere et
prepria causa ipsius materiae, sed ut a conditions quadem
naturaliter necessaria ut materia conservetur in esse;
huiusmodi autem genus dependentiae, quod est extrinsecum
entitati materiae, id est superveniens illi et non intrin-
sece compenens illam, nihil ebstare potest queminus entitas
materiae secundum se sit sufficiens ad sustentanda acciden-
tia in genere causae materialis, dependentia enim unius
causae ab alia extrinseca in sue esse nihil impedit queminus
ipsa in sue genere sit sufficiens ad causandum effectum
proportionatum. Estque ad hominem optimum et valde accom-
modatum exemplum; nam substantiale compositum pendet a suis
naturalibus dispositionibus, nam, illis ablatis, dis-
solvitur; et tamen hec non ebstat quin ipsum compositum
secundum se sit materialis causa ali'orum accidentium. Disp.
Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 12.

 

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82

depends upon the form and is able to be a material cause of
the form, and is still able to be the material cause of
quantity. This is clear because there seems to be a greater
opposition between dependence upon the form and ability to
be a material cause of the form than there is between de-
pendence on the form and matter as the material cause of
quantity.“

From all of this the position that quantity is in
matter is confirmed. Prime matter has in itself a suffi-
cient existence and subsistence by which it might support
material substantial forms. Therefore, it also supports er
materially causes quantity. If matter can support a sub-
stantial form, it would be necessary that it subsist and
exist and be an actual being. Also, Just as matter is said
to depend on form so also it is able to be said to depend
upon quantity. Therefore Just as there is nothing wrong
with saying matter supports the form, so there is nothing
wrong with saying that it supports quantity. Just as matter
cannot be conserved without form so neither can it be con-

served without quantity.55

5“Immo, qued magis est, etiam ipsarum dispesitionum
est materialis causa ipsum compositum, licet alias ab eis
pendeat; quid ergo mirum qued materia, quamvis pendeat a
forma, pessit esse materialis causa accidentium? Accedit
qued licet materia pendeat a forma, potest esse causa mate-
rialis eiusdem formas; ergo quamvis pendeat a forma,
poterit esse causa materialis quantitatis. Patet consequen-
tia quia maior videtur esse repugnantia inter illas duas
habitudines dependentiae et causalitatis respectu eiusdem,
quam respectu diversorum. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 12.

55Ex quo tandem reboratur ratio facta; nam materia
prima habet in se sufficientem existentem et subsistentem,
qua in se sustineat formas substantiales materiales; ergo

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83

This argument for the second position, given by
Suarez, gives matter a significance that it did not have in
earlier scholasticism. Since matter is in some sense an
entity, it can accept accidents proportionate to its being
Just as the composite substance accepts accidents. The
problem here is that this violates the maxim that matter is
not an integral being. The parallels between dependence of
matter and form, and matter supporting form and quantity do
not hold up as Suarez wants them to unless one turns matter
into some sort of substance in its own right. This is
exactly what Suarez has wanted to avoid but in fact has

allowed to happen.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined the Suarezian doctrine on
matter with the aim of showing that despite his best inten-
tions Suarez is unable to avoid a substantializing tendency
with respect to matter. He sees clearly that if one makes
matter a substance in its own right one has the problems of

the monists, or of the atemists, or of the pluralists.

 

etiam ut sustentet seu materialiter causet quantitatem.
Probatur consequentia, tum quia non minus, immo plus esse
videtur sustentare formam substantialem; neque ad id est
minus necessaria subsistentia et existentia vel actualis
entitas; tum etiam quia sicut materia dicitur pendere a
forma, ita potest dici pendere a quantitate; ergo sicut hec
non obstat queminus materia sustentet formam, ita etiam non
ebstabit queminus sustentet quantitatem. Consequentia tenet
a paritate rationis; et antecedens probatur, quia, sicut non
potest materia conservari sine forma, its use sine quan-
titate, adeo ut etiam in ordine ad potentiam Dei abselutam
facilius intelligi valeat materia sine forma, quam sine
quantitate, ut inferius ostendam. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect.

3, par. 13.

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Consequently, he opts for the position that matter is a par-
tial, incomplete being with an existence of its own. This
move is clearly outside of his tradition and is the result
of a desire to avoid a form of corporeity as one finds in
Scotus. 0n the other hand, granting matter its own being
demands that there be considerable reworking of traditional
doctrines.

He examines the teaching that matter is pure potency
and sees that a blanket acceptance here denies being to mat-
ter and so he restructures this teaching on pure potency to
allow both for real existence of matter and a qualified un-
derstanding of pure potency. This qualified understanding
holds that matter is pure potency only with respect to the
fact that it can accept any substantial form. It is not
pure potency in the radical sense of being "a nothing."

The second place where the new teaching on the being
of matter forces a rethinking is the notion of our knowledge
of matter. Suarez, as has been seen, sets up criteria for
how one knows matter. It is possible to know matter because
matter has a being of its own. Whereas in Aristotle and in
earlier scholasticism matter was never knewable, Suarez
allows a derivative kind of knowledge of matter.

Thirdly, the analysis of the causality of prime mat-
ter once again takes into account the being of matter and
there is much more allowance for an active role for matter
than has been the case in the past.

A decisive shift takes place in Suarez' doctrine on

 

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85
matter when he allows matter to have the accident, quantity,
apart from the presence of the form. There are many impli-
cations to this position, but the one of most immediate con-
cern is that matter heretofore could not accept accidents.
Only complete substances could accept accidents. Once
again, Suarez appeals to the partial existence of matter as
the eXplanation for this capacity of matter.

Each of these shifts in the doctrine on matter has
been noted at some length in the body of this chapter. It
is well here to reflect on the significance of these moves
in their totality. What has happened by allowing matter its
own existence is that, despite his desires to the contrary,
Suarez has opened the door to a dualism in his metaphysical
theory. He reJects the Empedoclean type of element theory
but in fact seems to have reduced the hylomorphic theory to
a two element theory of matter and form. His additional re-
workings of the doctrine of material cause seem merely to
harden the position rather than alleviate the problems in
granting matter its own being.

Suarez himself is not unaware of the difficulties
he has created for his position and in the exposition on

formal cause attempts to preserve the hylomorphic theory.

 

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CHAPTER III
SUAREZ' TEACHING ON FORM

As a parallel to the analysis of material cause,
Suarez, in Disputation XV, turns to the treatment of the
formal cause, or substantial form. He views the analysis
here as comparable to the treatment of matter.1 Initially
he asks whether there are such things as forms. Then, as
with matter, he inquires what constitutes the being and
essence of the form and what is the causality of the form.
But, additionally, with respect to form he must detail the
mutual dependence of matter and form. Finally, Suarez is
concerned with the unicity of the substantial form in a

composite being.

 

1Queniam causa materialis et formalis mutuam
habitudinem inter se dicunt, idee eadem methodo qua de
materia disseruimus, dicemus prius de forma substantiali, et
postea de accidentali, nam quae de forma in communi
desiderari poterant, vel tacta sunt in disputations de
causis in communi, vel explicabuntur distinctius in singulis
membris, quae in illa ratione communi solum analogice
conveniunt. Tractando autem de substantiali forma,
complebimus ea quae de materia prima in hunc locum
remisimus, propter intrinsecam connexionem inter ipsam et
formam. Supponendam est autem hic non esse sermonem de
forma extrinseca, quam exemplarum vocant, de qua infra
dicemus, quia ut sic magis habet rationem efficientis quam
formas. Neque etiam de forma separata, ut solet natura
angelica, aut immaterialis nominari, non propter
causalitatem sed propter actualitatem seu pulchritudinem;
sed agimus de sola forma informante seu recepta in materia,
quia illa est quae propriam et specialiem habet rationem
causae. Disp. Meta. XV, Intro.

86

 

  

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87

As with the treatment of matter a surface reading of
Suarez seems to indicate that his understanding of form is a
rather standard scholastic doctrine. Some analysis of the
teaching on form, however, reveals that there is an original
approach here, for the form is viewed as an incomplete being
with its own partial existence. This opinion becomes espe-
cially crucial in respect to the rational soul. Suarez,
when dealing with form, subdivides this co—principle of be-
ing into subhuman forms and the rational soul. This problem
of "kinds" did not and could not arise with respect to mat-
ter as the radically first subject. It does arise in regard
to form and becomes a central problem of the intelligibility

of this metaphysical principle.2

The Existence of Substantial Form
Since the teaching on form is to be a parallel dis-

cussion to that of matter, Suarez begins by asking whether

 

ZThis chapter will set forth only the general doc-
trine on form. The problem of the rational soul and its
difference from the material form will be treated in Chapter
V, "Body and Soul."

The secondary source materials on Suarez' doctrine
of form are somewhat limited, as was the case with those of
matter. Once again the reader is referred to McCormick,
"Suarez on Matter and Form" and Mahieu, Francois Suarez,
Chapter V. These two authors provide brief treatments of
the material contained in this chapter but once again the
brevity fails to indicate something of the real uniqueness
of the doctrine. A more recent study of the treatment on
form occurs in David M. Knight, S.J., "Suarez's Approach to
Substantial Form," The Modern Schoolman 39 (1961-62):
219-39. This article according to the author is a set of
observations comparing Suarez' ideas on substantial form
with those of Thomas Aquinas. Knight shows that there are
great differences in the two doctrines and attempts to
enumerate these differences in a brief space.

 

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88

there are such things as substantial forms, but an answer
to this question requires an initial distinction of termi-
nology. A customary division of form is into "physical" and
"metaphysical." The physical form is the true and real
form. It is called "physical" either because it constitutes
the nature of the things or because it is investigated in
terms of physical change. But a consideration of form is
not outside the domain of metaphysics as the science of be-
ing as being, because an understanding of form is common and
abstract and because the form is necessary for the constitu-
tion of an essence.3 For an understanding of "metaphysical
form" it is necessary to turn to Section 11 of Disputation
XV where Suarez states that a metaphysical form is a way of
expressing a composition parallel to the physical composi-
tion of matter and form (i.e., physical matter + physical
form) but only imitates that composition. The composition
from matter and form is the original composition and every
other composition is analogous to this one.

By providing two examples Suarez hopes to show the
analogous and metaphorical use of the term "metaphysical

3Rursus vere dividi solet forms in physicam et
Inetaphysicam: prior est, quae veram et rea em causalitatem
formas exercet, et idee de illa principalius dicendum est.
Quanwis enim physica forma dicatur, vel quia naturam rei
principaliter constituit, vel quia per motum physicum
principalius investigatur priusque in scientia physica
consideratur, non tamen est extra metaphysicam
considerationem, tum quia ratio formas communis est et
abstracts, tum etiam quia forma constituit essentiam, tum
«denique uia est una ex praecipuis causis. Quid autem per
metaphys cam formam sign ficetur et quomodo hanc rationem

causae participet, in fine huius diSputationis subiiciemus.
Disp. Meta. XV, Intro.

 

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89
form." In a being composed of integral parts, for example,
a material being, one part is always considered to be the
form, the other to be the matter. This is clear in aggre-
gates, as in a building the form of the roof is a form of
the building. It is also clear in pg£_§g unitiss, as in man
the head is the form of the other integral parts. From
these examples the "metaphysical form" can be understood to
describe in general an essentially constituted being in
which one finds a relationship of parts similar to the re-
lationship of one part as receptive and the other as deter-
minativs. This metaphysical form does not exercise the
causality proper to physical form but rather points out an
arbitrary relationship in an already totally constituted
being.3 The importance of this distinction is that Suarez,

 

“In guavis compositions aliquid gt materia, gt
aliguid up forma.--Quoniam distinctioiformae in physicam st
metap ysicam valde communis est, et quae hactenus diximus in
physicam formam conveniunt, videtur metaphysici negotii esse
nonnulla etiam de metaphysics forma dicere, quae, suppesitis
quae diximus, breviter poterunt expediri, quia haec solum
per analogiam st quasi metaphoram quamdam forma nominatur.
Est igitur advertendum ex dictis in superioribus, praeter
compositionem physicam ex materia st forma, esse aliam quae
illam imitatur; ex se tamen abstrahit a vera materia, st
idee metaphysics nominatur. Est autem haec duplex, quantum
ad praesens spectat, altsra ex natura st supposito, altera
ex genere st differentia; omitto eam quae est ex esse st
essentia, quia obscurior est et, quantum ad praesens attinst,
non intervenit in sa specialis aliqua ratio formas, ut ex
dicendis constabit. Deinde est considerandum in omni
compositions, ut ex multis unum consurgere intelligatur,
aliquid semper considerari ut materiam st aliquid ut formam,
tum quia compositio ex materiam st forma est prima compo-
sitio realis et maxime propria ac per se, et idee per
quamdam analogiam ad illam omnis alia compositio declaratur;
tum etiam quia materia est quid informs st imperfectum et
inchoatio quaedam et quasi fundamentum naturas; forma vere
est quasi pulchritudo et perfectio ac consummatio naturae;

 

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90
in the treatment of formal cause, is concerned with the
actual real form not the "metaphysical form;" just as he
was concerned with the actual real matter, not the "meta-
physical matter, so here, he is concerned with the actual

real form not the ”metaphysical form."

 

in omni autem compositione est aliquid quasi potentiale,
quod est fundamentum et inchoatio rei, et aliquid quod est
terminus vel consummatio rei, et ideo semper aliquid
consideratur ut materia et aliquid ut forma. Quod adeo
verum est ut etiam in compositione ex partibus integrantibus,
quae maxime materialis esse videtur, semper una pars
consideretur ut materia et altera ut forma, quod clarius
apparebit in rebus heterogeneis, ut in homine caput est
veluti forma aliarum partium; et in artificialibus tectum,
verbi gratia, est quasi forma aedificii; iuxta quam
analogiam distinguunt etiam tehologi materiae et formas
sacramentorum. Et in rebus homogeneis, ubi inter partes non
potest distingui illa diversa habitudo propter earum
similitudinem ut uniformitatem, omnes partes dicuntur esse
materia totius, compositum autem comparari ut forma ad
singulas partes. In quibus omnibus non intercedit specialis
causalitas, sed sola unio cum analogia et proportione ad
materiam et formam.

Ex his ergo intelligitur formam metaphysicam in
genere vocari quae in compositione metaphysica constituit
essentialiter rem ipsam, vel complet aut actuet essentiam
rei; nec potest aliter describi haec forma its in communi
sumpta. Est autem discrimen inter duas compositiones
metaphysicae supra dictas, quod rior, scilicet, ex natura
et supposito est compositio rei in creaturis loquimur), id
est, ex 113 quae in re ipsa aliquo modo actu distinguuntur,
ut sunt natura et subsistentia, de quibus diffuse infra
tractabimus; posterior vero est compositio rationis, quia
eius extrema in re non distinguuntur actu, sed ratione
tantum, ut in superioribus visum est. Est etiam alia
differentia, quod in priori compositione unum extremum est
tota essentia rei, aliud vero non spectat intrinseca ad
essentiam, sed est terminus aut modus essentiae; in alia
vero compositione utrumque extremum est essentiale et
neutrum dicit totem essentiam rei expliciter seu actualiter,
licet confuse totam illam includere possit. Unde fit ut
prior dici etiam soleat forma totalis, realis ac
propriissime metaphysica; posterior vero magis est forma
secundum rationem, et ideo non tantum metaphysics, sed etiam
logica appellari potest.

Forms metaphysica est tota rei essentia.-~Dicendum
est ergo primo-Tormam propriEmetaphysicam, quae est forma

 

 

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91

Having shown his concern that he treat the physical
form as opposed to the metaphysical form, Suarez now asks
whether there are substantial forms in material things.
There are reasons for doubting their existence. Substantial
forms are not able to be known by direct experience, nor are
they necessary for every action and difference which we do
experience. Fire, for example, is sufficiently understood
if one is able to conceive of a certain substance having

heat joined with dryness. That is, fire can be explained by

 

totius, nihil aliud esse quam totem rei substantialis
essentiam, quam etiam integram naturam rei appellamus, quae
non dicitur forma eo quod specialiter exerceat propriam
causalitatem formee, sed quis rem essentialiter constituit
per seipsam. Declaro et probo singula; nam in homine, verbi
gratis, haec forms totius dicitur esse humanitas quae cum ex
materia et forma hominis constet, totem essentiam hominis
dicit; id enim quod homo addit humanitati non est de
essentia hominis, ut infra dicemus tractando de subsistentia
et in mysterio Incernationis breviter patet; nam in Christo
est tota essentia hominis, quamvis non sit humane
subsistentia create. Praeterea, haec forma totius non
tantum in rebus materielibus, sed etiam in spiritualibus
reperitur; immo non solum in rebus creatis, sed etiam in Dec
ipso a nobis consideratur; concipimus enim Deitatem ut
formam essentialiter constitutentem Deum et quodlibet
suppositum divinum, quatenus hic Deus est; quamquam illi sit
proprium in re ipsa non distingui ab eo cuius essentia est;
in quo deficit ab ea ratione formee quam essentia habet in
rebus creatis, quia ille non pertinet ad perfectionem
simpliciter, sed imperfectionem includit; ergo haec forms in
rebus immaterialibus nihil aliud esse potest quam earum
essentia. In materialibus autem differt haec forma totius a
forma physica et partiali, ut constat ex communi usu harum
vocum, et ex ipsa distinctione formee physicas a meta-
physics; non differt autem nisi quia forma totius dicit
totem naturam compositam ex materia et forma, forma autem
physica solum dicit partem formalem; ergo haec forma meta-
physics etiam in his rebus dicit totem essentiam earum.
Quae ut infra ostendemus in disputatione de substantia
materiali, etiam materia est de essentia huius substantiae,
at its nature composite ex materia et forma est tota
essentia eius; atque its patet prima pars conclusionis.
Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. ll, pars. 1—3.

 

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92
referring only to accidental qualities. This would be suf-
ficient to explain every action of fire which one experi-
ences and to distinguish fire from other things. Therefore,
substantial forms should not be introduced without reason.
In a word, some have held that they perform no useful
function.

A second argument against substantial form states
that there is an opposition when the form is taken both as
enforming and substantial. Either the thing is subsistent
and need not be sustained by a subject or it is not sub-
sistent and needs to be sustained. If it need not be sus-
tained, then it is not an enforming form because it is re-
pugnant for that which is subsistent to be received into
another. If it is sustained by a subject, then, it is a
form inhering in the subject and therefore is an accidental
form. This means that there is no such principle as a
substantial form.

The third argument against substantial forms states
that if there are such forms one cannot understand the man-
ner in which interchanges and generations of things occur
unless something is made from nothing. But, something can-

not be made from nothing according to natural principles.5

 

5Ratio dubitandi est primo quia formee substantiales
nullo experimento cognosci possunt, nec sunt necessariae ad
omnes sctiones et differentiae rerum quas experimur; ergo
non sunt sine cause introducendae. Antecedens patet, quia
ignis, verbi gratis, sufficienter intelligitur in suo esse
constitutus, si concipiamus quamdam substantiam habentem
perfectum et summum calorem cum siccitate coniunctum, etiam
si substantia his accidentibus subiecta sit simplex; et hoc

 

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93

Despite these three arguments against substantial
form, Suarez himself holds the position that there are
substantial forms. All natural or corporeal things are
constituted by a substantial form in addition to the
matter. This form is an intrinsic principle and the
formal cause of these things. Suarez feels that he is
in the mainstream of the Aristotelian tradition by main-
taining this position and, after citing innumerable places
where Aristotle explains substantial form, Suarez makes

the further claim that Plato in the Timaeus was actually

 

etiam satis est ad omnem actionem ignis quam experimur et ad
distinctionem inter ignem et aquam et ad transmutationem
unius in aliud, quae in hoc videtur consistere quod illa
substantia a summo frigore transit in summum calorem, et e
converso. Hoc ergo satis est ad constitutionem,
distinctionem et actionem elementorum; idem ergo
proportionaliter sufficiat ad mixtorum compositionem, haec
enim ex elementorum mixtione procreantur.

Secundo involvi videtur repugnantia cum dicitur
forma informans et substantialis; nam vel est res subsistens
et nullo indigens subiecto sustentante vel illo indiget: si
primum habeat, non potest esse forma informans, quia
repugnet id quod subsistens est in alio recipi. Si secundum
habeat, est forma inhaerens; ergo accidentalis; non datur
ergo substantialis forma.

Tertio, quia positis substantialibus formis, non
potest intelligi quo modo fiant rerum transmutationes et
generationes nisi aliquid ex nihilo fiat, quod esse non
potest iuxta naturalia principia. Sequels patet, quia vel
forma substantialis praeexistit generationi, aut aliquid
eius, vel nihil. Primum dici non potest, alias infinitae
formee praeexisterent in materia, et reipsa nihil de novo
fieret, sed appareret. Neque etiam potest dici secundum,
tum quia in eadem parte materiae non potest esse aliquid
formas quin sit tota forma, cum indivisibilis sit; tum etiam
quia, etiamsi pars formee praesit et pars inducenda sit,
haec pars fiet ex nihilo; non enim potest ex priori parte
fieri; restat ergo ut dicatur tertium, quod tamen repugnet
et excedit vim naturalium agentium. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect.
1, pars o 1-3 0

 

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94
the founder of this opinion in the theory of participation
of the Forms.6
Suarez' own proof for the existence of a substantial
form is quite different from that of either Plato or Aris-
totle. Rather then start with the lower levels of being and
show that these lower levels have a substantial form and

then move to man as also having such a form, Suarez starts

 

6Dicendum vero est, omnes res naturales seu
corporeae constare forma substantiali (praeter materiam),
tamquam principio intrinseco et causa formali. Haec est
sententia Aristotelis innumeris in locis, qui saepe
reprehendit veteres philosophos quod, fere praetermissa
substantiali forms, omnem inquisitionem circa materiam
adhibuerint, et constat ex toto lib. I Phys., et lib. II, c.
l, ubi formam perfectionem naturam dicit esse, quam
materiam. Idem habet lib. 1 de Partibus animalium, c. 1, et
VII Metaph., c. A, et lib. XII, c. 2, ubi vocat formam hog
ali uid, quia complet substantiam, quae est hoc aliquid; et
{Eidem parsesertim lib. VII Metaph., vocat formam guod quid
est; et rationem reddit quia ipsa est quae constituit et
distinguit rerum essentias. Praeterea, lib. II de Anima, c.
l, distinguit substantiam in materiam, formam et compositum,
et formam vocat 31'7615 x0 0W de quo nomine multa erudite
scribit Fonseca, lib. I Metaph., in fine; communiter tamen
docent scriptores vocem entelechiae generaliorem esse et
plura comprehendere quam substantialem formam; significat
enim proprie perfectionem seu actum perficientem rem. Per
entonomasiam vero attribui solet formee substantiali quod
sit preecipuus actus et maxime perfectio rei substantialis.
Aliis etiam nominibus solet ab Aristotele forma
substantialis nominari, quae inferius, explicando eius
causalitatem adnotabimus. Non tamen fuit Aristoteles huius
veritatis inventor, nam ante eum substantialem formam
agnovit Plato, ut constet ex Timaeo ubi formas appellat vere
existentium simulchra, id est, idearum participationes, cum
tamen ipse non ponat ideas nisi substantiarum. Et ante
Platonem nonnulli e phiIOSOphis creduntur substantiales
formas attigisse, ut constat ex Aristotele I de Partibus
anima1., c. 1, et aliis locis supra citatis. Iam vero est
hoc dogma its receptum in phiIOSOphia, ut sine magna
ignorantia id negari non pessit; estque ita consentaneum
veritati fidei christianae, ut eius certitudo non parum inde
augeatur; quare placet huius veritatis probationem a quodam
principio fide certo, et lumine naturali evidente inchoare.
Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 5.

 

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95

with the human level of being and proves that since there
are human substantial forms there must be a substantial form
for all natural things. This is a truly unique move on
Suarez' part. His reasoning is that the rational soul is a
substance and not an accident and this is obvious because of
itself the soul can exist separately from the body. Since
it is immortal, it is therefore subsistent of itself (i.e.,
exist on its own), and independent of the subject (matter).
Therefore, it is not an accident but a substance. But, that
same soul is truly the form of the body as faith and the
natural light teach. It cannot be simply an aiding sub-
stance nor can it move the body extrinsically. The reasons
for this are that as an aiding substance or extrinsic mover
it could not vivify the body nor would the composite be a
man. Man, therefore, is composed of a body (matter) and
rational soul (form). Therefore, this soul is a substantial
form for the name "substantial form" stands for nothing
other than a certain partial substance which is able to be
united to matter, so that with it, it composes an integral
substance and a 22; §g_unity of such and such a kind (i.e.,

man).7

 

 

7Prima igitur ratio sit, nam homo constat forma
substantiali, ut intrinseca causa; ergo et res omnes
naturales. Antecedens probatur, nam anima rationalis
substantia est et non accidens, ut patet, quia per se manet
separata a corpore, cum sit immortalis; est ergo per se
subsistens et independens a subiecto; non est ergo accidens,
sed substantia. Rursus illa anima est vera forma corporis,
ut docet fides et est etiam lumine naturali: Non enim
potest esse substantia assistens aut extrinsece movens
corpus, alias non vivificaret illud, neque ex praesentia et

 

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96

It is well to stop and reflect on this method of
procedure for there are certain elements in this argument
that will be very important for the relationship of body and
soul-~1. the rational soul remains separate from the body,
it is immortal, subsistent, and independent of matter;

2. the definition of the form as a partial substance is
parallel to the description of matter as a partial sub-
stance; 3. the necessity that they compose together a pg;
s2 unity is familiar from the previous treatment of matter.
But, how is any unification possible given the properties
of the human form listed above? It is precisely at the
rational soul that Suarez' theory of hylomorphism breaks
down. And yet, he uses the rational soul to prove that
there are substantial forms in general.

Suarez states that since it is established that man
has a substantial form, all natural things are constituted
in a like manner with substantial forms. The first conse—
quence here is proved by the fact that in the composition of
man from matter and substantial form there are in all natu-
ral things a certain substantial subject appropriate of its

very nature to be informed by some substantial act. Such a

coniunctione eius essentialiter penderent opera vitae: nec
denique esset ipse homo qui intelligeret, sed, quaedam alia
substantia illi assistens. Constat ergo homo corpore ut
materia, et anima rationali ut forma; est ergo haec anima
substantialis forma; nam, ut infra declarabimus, nomine
substantialis formas nihil aliud significatur, quam
substantia quaedam partialis, quae ita potest uniri materiae
ut cum illa componat substantiam integram ac per se unam,
qualis est homo. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 6.

 

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subject taken by itself is imperfect and incomplete in the
genus of substance. Therefore, there is always need for it
to be united to some substantial act. This subject (matter)
is preper not only to man but is required in all other
natural things. Moreover, it is presupposed both for the
generation of man and for his nutrition and remains after
his corruption. Therefore all natural things which are set
up by that subject are constituted also by an actuating sub-
stantial form which perfects that subject.8 The reasoning
here is that since one needs a substantial form to explain
the generation, nutrition, and corruption of man (the high-
est level of natural being), one also needs a substantial
form to eXplain generation, nutrition and corruption of all
natural things. Suarez moves from the special case of com-
position in man to the general doctrine of composition in
all natural things.

The next step in the argument for substantial form
is to show that there are a number of faculties and acci-
dents proper to man and that these faculties and accidents

cannot be present in the subject (prime matter) without some

 

8Hominis ergo compositio ex materia et forma
substantiali ostendit esse in rebus naturalibus quoddam
subiectum substantiale natura sua aptum, ut informetur actu
aliquo substantiali; ergo tale subiectum imperfectum et
incompletum est in genere substantiae; petit ergo semper
esse sub aliquo actu substantiali. Hoc autem subiectum non
est proprium hominis, sed in aliis etiam rebus naturalibus
reperitur, ut per se notum est; unde et ad generationem
hominis supponitur, et ad nutritionem, at post eius
corruptionem manet; ergo res omnes naturales, quae illo
subiecto seu materia constant, constant etiam substantiali
forma actuante, et perficiente subiectum illud. Disp. Meta.
XV, Sect. 1, par. 7.

 

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98

prior actuating form.9 Since an aggregation of faculties
or accidents is not sufficient for the constitution of any
complete natural being, a form which precedes these facul-
ties and accidents is required, and this form is the foun-
tain of all actions and natural movements. In the form all
the variety of accidents and potencies has its roots and a
certain unity.10

The third step in the argument for substantial form
follows the same pattern as the other two. The substantial
generation and corruption of man does not consist in acqui-
sition or loss of some accident, but in a union or disunion
of a rational soul which substantially informs a human body.

One should understand the generation and corruption of other

natural beings in the same way. This can be seen from

 

91t has been shown in the previous chapter that
quantity is in matter. This accident, according to Suarez'
teaching there, seems to be present in the matter independ-
ently of an actuating substantial form since it is of such
a nature that it applies more properly to matter than to
form. But, if Suarez holds this position with respect to
quantity he seems to contradict himself in this general
statement regarding the necessity for all accidents to have
some prior form.

loPraeterea, ex eadem hominis compositione
colligitur, aggregationem plurium facultatem vel formarum
accidentalium in simplici subiecto substantiali non satis
esse ad constitutionem rei naturalia; nam in homine sunt
illae facultates, et formee accidentales, plures fortasse ac
perfectiores quam in aliis naturalibus rebus, et tamen non
sufficiunt ad constitutionem alicuius naturalia entis
completi, sed praeterea requiritur forma quae veluti praesit
omnibus illis facultatibus et accidentibus, et sit fons
omnium actionum et naturalium motuum talis entis, et in qua
tota illa varietas accidentium et potentiarum radicem et
quamdam unitatem habeat; ergo eadem ratione in reliquis
entibus naturalibus necessaria est aliqua forma
substantialis distincta ab accidentibus, et intimior ac
perfectior illis. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 7.

 

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99

experience: the only difference in generation and corrup-
tion between man and other natural things lies in the per-
fection and subsistence of the human form.11

What Suarez is attempting to accomplish here is to
prove from the case of man that since there is need for a
substantial form, all other natural things must have such
a form. He has argued from the nature of the substantial
subject, from the need for faculties and accidents to inhere
in a complete being, and from the nature of generation and
corruption. One discovers these things in man; therefore
this same situation exists in all natural beings.

Following upon these initial arguments, Suarez pro-
vides a more general proof for the existence of substantial
forms. From the accidents and operations of natural beings,

one can see that there must be a substantial form. For ex-

ample, if water is heated and then the source of heat is

 

lTertio eodem exemplo constat generationem et
corruptionem hominis substantialem non consistere in
acquisitione vel amissione aliquorum accidentium, sed in
unione vel disiunctione animae rationalis substantialiter
informantis corpus humanum, ad quam praeparant accidentia
quaedam, quibus sublatis, anima recedit et homo corrumpitur;
ergo eodem modo intelligendum est fieri corruptionem et
generationem aliorum entium naturalium. Nam, quantum
experientia colligi potest, idem modus est generationis et
corruptionis in aliis rebus qui est in homine, excepta
differentia in perfectione et subsistentia formas humanae,
quam ex modo generationis et corruptionis non colligeremus,
nisi aliunde nobis nota esset. Et propterea dicitur
Ecclesiast., 3: Unus interitus est hominis, gt iumentorum
gt aegua utriusgue conditio, sicut moritur homo, ita gt illa
moruntur, etc. Denique omnia indicia et signa
substantialis compositionis, quae in homine cogitari possunt
sunt in aliis entibus naturalibus, et praesertim in
animantibus, ut ex sequente ratione constabit. Disp. Meta.
XV, Sect. 1, par. 7.

 

 

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removed, the water of itself returns to its former coolness.
This is a sign that in the water there is some intrinsic
principle which keeps the water cool unless there is an ex-
trinsic agent. This intrinsic principle is the substantial
form. The proof for this is that if that reduction in heat
were from the outside it would not be pg; s3 and necessary,
but rather from accident or occurring on account of an ex-
ternal agent. If one were to enumerate every principle ex-
trinsic to the form there would be none by which that action
of returning to coolness is able to occur. There is only
air surrounding the water and naturally it is not as cool as
the water, nor is it usual that it is equally as hot as the

water itself.12 Suarez,_here, is arguing from the notion

 

12Secunda ergo ratio principalis sumitur ex variis
indiciis ortis ex accidentibus et operationibus entium
naturalium, quae indicant latere sub illis formam substan-
tialem. Primum cernitur etiam in elementis; nam si aqua,
verbi gratis, calefiat, et postea removeatur agens, ab
intrinseco reducitur ad pristinam frigiditatem, ut ex-
perimento constat; ergo signum est esse in aqua aliquod
intimius principium, a quo iterum manat intensio frigoris,
sublatis extrinsecis impedimentis; illud autem principium
non potest esse nisi forma substantialis; ergo. Prima con-
sequentia probatur, quia nullum potest esse extrinsecum
principium illius reductionis, tum quia, si illa reductio
esset ab extrinseco, non esset per se ac necessaria, sed ex
accidents, prout extrinsecum agens casu occurreret; tum
etiam quia, discurrendo per omnia principia extrinseca, quae
communiter occurrunt, nullum est a quo possit illa actio
provenire, quia proxime solum occurrere solet aer circum-
stans, qui vel naturaliter non est tam frigidus sicut aqua,
vel ex accidente relinqui solet aeque calidus ac ipsa aqua;
unde ipse etiam se reducit ad pristinum statum quantum
potest; remote vero solum interveniunt causae caelestes et
universales, quae ex se non sunt determinatae ad huiusmodi
actionem, ut notum est.

Variae talis reductionis causae refelluntur.--
Secundum vero antecedens, scilicet, nullam aliam causam
intrinsecam illius actionis excogitari posse praeter ipsam
aquae formam probatur, nam quaenam erit illa? Dicunt aliqui
in quibusdam partibus aquae semper manere intensum frigus,

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101
that even in the elements there is a natural state to which
they return once the action of an external agent has ceased.
This return to a natural state demands that there be a sub-
stantial form.
Despite the antiquated physics, the point here is
that even in inanimate things such as the elements substan-

tial corruption is distinct from mere alteration. Suarez

wants the inanimate example to stand so that he may make a
universal induction about the existence of the substantial

forms;13 for their existence is even more evident in animate

et ab illis partibus alias quae calefactae fuerunt, frige-
fieri qued probabile censet Caietan., I, q. 5A, a. 3; et
tribuitur Averroi, II de Anima, com. 1. Sed hoc frivolum
eat at contra experientiam; sensu enim percipimus totam
aquam infusam vasi alicui, esse valde calidam, quacumque ex
parte attingatur; si autem essent aliquae partes adeo frigi-
dae, vel perciperentur sensu vel saltem temperarent in
aliqua parte aquae caloris sensum; neutram autem fit. Est
etiam contra rationem physicam, nam tota aqua secundum omnes
suas partes est uniformiter difformiter applicata igni
naturaliter agenti; ergo secundum omnes partes eodem modo
patitur uniformiter; quid enim est quod posset, vel actionem
illam impedire, vel ita interrumpere ut in quibusdam parti-
bus fieret et non in aliis? Item, vel illae partes quae
frigus retinere dicuntur, possunt calefierei, vel non; 31
non, ergo neque corrumpi poterunt; si vero possunt calefieri,
ergo si tota aqua est sufficienter applicata igni, etiam
illae calefient, vel certe dari potest status in quo illa
potentia reducatur in actum at 1110 posito, adhuc illa aqua
reducetur ad pristinam frigitatem remote agente contrario,
dummodo ad corruptionem aguae preventum non sit. Disp.
Meta. IV, Sect.1, para. -9.

13Atque hinc sumi potest aliud indicium, quod est
confirmatio praecedentis, nan fere evidenti experimento
constat etiam in his rebus inanimatis aut elementis cor-
rumptionen substantialem esse distinctam ab alterations;
loquor in specie de inanimatis, ut a fortiori sit inductio
universalis; quonian in rebus animatis est res evidentior,
ut patebit. Experimus itsque, alterationem, ut, verbi
gratis, calefactionem aquae aut ferri, interdum esse adeo
vehementem ut intensissimus calor in eis sentiatur, et
nihilominus si actio contrarii agentis cesset, res illae
manent vel integrae vel fere integrae in substantia sua, et

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102

things, as has been shown in the initial arguments. Suarez

argued from the need for a form in man to a need for a form

in all natural things. Then, reversing the argument he ar-

gued from the need for a form in the elements to a need for

a form in all things, basing this argument on the difference
between alteration and corruption. He feels that these two

inductions have adequately proved the existence of substan-

tial form.

All of the previous arguments have been a-posteriori
in that they start with the effects of substantial form and
reason to the existence of the form as the cause of these
effects. Suarez now offers an a-priori possibility argument
based on the proper causes of the substantial form. There
are three such causes-~material, efficient, and final. The
substantial form does not have a formal cause since it is

itself a form.

 

facile etiam ad accidentalem statum revertuntur; interdum
vero adeo procedit alteratio ut omnimoda transmutatio rei
fiat, ita ut quamvis removeatur agens, nunquam possit passum
illud ad pristinum statum redire, neque priores actiones aut
similia accidentia recuperare; interdum etiam in viliorem
substantiam sensibilem, ut cineres, scoriam, etc., mutatur;
nonnumquam vero omnino consumitur insensibiliter, quia in
aliud corpus subtilflmsem insensibile transformatur; ergo
signum evidens est alterationem interdum esse puram et
manere intra latitudinem mutationis accidentalis, interdum
vero habere coniunctam maiorem rei mutationem. Haec autem
non potest esse alia nisi quia ipsum substantiale compositum
dissolvitur, recedente forma substantiali; dantur ergo
substantiales formae. Probatur ultima subsumptio, quia si
tota substantia rei semper maneret aeque- integra,
quantumcumque procederet alteratio, ipsa de se semper
haberet eamdem habitudinem ad accidentia; ergo vel semper
post quamcumque alterationem maneret quieta sub quibuscumque
accidentibus, quantum esset ex se et remoto contrario
agente, vel certe remotis eisdem agentibus semper rediret ad
eadem accidentia. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 12.

 

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103

One is able to suppose that there is no contradic-

tion in the fact that such a kind of being or incomplete

substance as form be given in nature. There is likewise no

contradiction in the fact that there be given in nature sub-

stantial acts of a highest order which are subsistent and

not.informing, as the angels are. There may also be sub-

stantial acts of a middle order, which may be at one and the

scans time both subsistent and informing, as the rational

soul. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the fact that
there be acts of allower order, which are simply informing

and not subsistent, as animals, plants, and inanimate ob-

Jects. Such an act can be contradictory only either because
jfitv is an "act" or because it is "substantial" or, because it

is contradictory for the two (i.e., "substantial" and "act")

t>€i joined in the same thing. But none of these positions

can be stated with probability.

tradiction in stating that there is a substantial form on
For the proof that there is no

Therefore, there is no con-

the basis of formal cause.
<3<3ntradiction here Suarez, in his explanation, appeals to ar-

‘gfiuments similar to those that have already been seen in the

Q~posteriori section of his proof for the existence of sub-

=sitantial form. What is new and a-priori here is that rather

‘tihan an argument from induction he is appealing to the lack
1h

:EELf contradiction in the very notion of "substantial form."

1"Et confirmatur haec ratio, nam videmus quaedam
iStccidentia esse ita inseparabilia ab aliquibus subiectis, ut
‘Eli illa auferantur, vel nimium diminuantur, omnimoda
‘ ransmutatio fiat in subiectis, ita ut non possint per
ntrinsecam vim ad pristinum statum redire; ergo illa

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The existence of substantial form can also be demon-

strated a-priori on the basis of material and efficient

cause. Since matter is a potency in the substantial order,

it contains in its kind of being as a receptive potency

every act proportioned to itself in its own genus; hence the
substantial form has a sufficient cause for existence. A
similar understanding arises from efficient cause. If one

speaks of the first cause there can be no lack in its abil-
ity to bring about any and every actuating form. If, how-

ever, one speaks of a proximate cause one should take into
If such

account what is able to be an effect of the form.

an effect is necessary for the constitution of natural
things and if created causes lack this power, then one turns

to the causality of the first cause, so that it may
15

Supplement the power of the proximate cause.

inseparabilitas provenit ex connexione talium accidentium
Quod non potest

cum aliquo principio interno talium rerum.
38s materia prima seu illud primum subiectum quod manet sub

l"1111 transmutatione, quia respectu illius nullum est

ccidens inseparabile ex his quae possunt per alterationem
Neque etiam illud principium potest

Qquiri vel amitti.
Sse aliquod accidens, si sit sermo de primo et radicali

e
lDI‘incipio; nam licet unum accidens sit inseparabile
ius, ut raritas respectu caloris, vel albedo

l‘espectu alter

bespectu talis temperamenti primarum qualitatum, illud tamen

temperamentum est inseparabile ab alia priori forma naturae
nae relicta; sistendum ergo necessario est in aliqua forma
uae sit prima respectu accidentium inseparabilium; illa

Qrgo est forma substantialis et non accidentalis, cum

Qonstituat propriam essentiam cui proprietas accidentales

Qonnaturaliter et inseparabiliter sunt. Disp. Meta. XV,

iiiect. 1, par. 13.
15Atque hinc concluditur facile ratio ex materiali
‘:=ausa desumpta; nam, cum materia sit substantialis potentia,
‘==ontinet in suo genere et in potentia receptive omnem actum
*Stibi proportionatum; ergo est potens ad causandum illum in
‘EKuo genere, si aliunde* non repugnat; ergo ex hac parte

 

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105
Finally, the existence of the substantial form can

be shown in terms of the end (final cause) of the form.

That end is to constitute and complete the essence of
natural beings. If the substantial form did not so consti-
tute or complete there would be nothing whole or perfect
about corporeal beings, nor would there be the known multi-
tude and variety of species. The substantial form, then, is
absolutely necessary for this end. Since matter is the most
imperfect being, it is not able of itself to constitute the

integral essence of each and every thing and hence needs the

form.16

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habet substantialis forma materialis sufficientem causam ut
9880 posit. Rursus concluditur ratio ex causa efficienti;
ham si sit sermo de prima causa, non potest illi deesse
Virtue qua efficere potuerit in universe formas sub-
8t‘oantiales actuantes materiam, vel dependenter vel inde-
pendenter ab illa, iuxta varies gradus et perfectiones
t‘valium formarum, supposita non repugnantia earum; ergo cum
t‘ales formee sint necessariae in rerum natura, effectae sunt
huiusmodi causa. Si autem sit sermo de causa proxima,
I3<>atea videndum est quaenam intercedere possit respectu
uhiuscuiusque formee. Nunc sufficiat dicere non posse talem
Canaan: deesse, si talis effectus ad rerum naturalium
§°hstitutionem est necessarius; unde si causis creatis
Iiterdum haec virtue deficiat, ad causalitatem primae causae
lbectat ut munus etiam causae proximae suppleat, quod, per
§Q loquendo, solum facit in anima rationali quantum ad
§I‘fectionem eius; aliis enim formis, ex modo quo fiunt, non
x‘qugnat fieri ab agentibus creatis, cum fiant cum concursu
til-uteri“, ut statim explicabimus. An vero in talibus
gentibua sit sufficiens virtus, dicemus tractando de causa
‘fficiente. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 17.

16Igitur praecipua ratio sumenda est ex fine formae
§‘ubstantialis, qui est constituere at complere essentiam
‘ntis naturalis, qui finis seu effectus est absolute
necessarius in rerun natura; alioqui nihil esset in rebus
Qorporeis in sue substantiali natura completum et perfectum;
heque esset multitudo et varietas specierum substantialium,
1 n qua maxime consistit huius universi corporei mirabilis
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106
This a-priori argument, then, for the existence of
substantial form centers on two main thoughts-~l. the sub-
stantial form is itself the formal cause of the being and
there is no other formal cause either needed or possible;

2. one can point to and demonstrate the material, efficient

and final causes of the substantial form.

In providing both an a-posteriori and an a-priori
argument for the existence of substantial form Suarez feels
that he has answered all the objections against the exist-
ence of these forms. He has shown that forms can be dis-
covered indirectly from experience. He has shown that they

are necessary for every action and operation of the being,

and that form can inform matter in such a way so as to be
genuinely substantial. By the a-priori argument he has

s11(an that the substantial form does explain how inter-

°\hanges take place by an appeal to the general doctrine of

he1::essaria substantialis forma, quia cum materia sit valde

ulperfectum ens, non potest in illa sola consistere integra

niuscuiusque rei essentia. Deinde, quia materia quatenus
est primum subiectum est una et eadem in omnibus rebus
l"aturalibus; ergo non potest in sola illa consistere earum
e'éisentia, aliequi omnia essent unius essentiae solumque
a(tcidentaliter different, quod repugnet amplitudini et
pulchritudini totius universi, quae ex specierum varietate
'Paxime consurgit. Quod significari videtur Genes., 1, in
11113 verbis: Facientem semen iuxta nus suum vel,
%:undum speciem suam. Et saepe I‘it file repetitio, iuxta
Bsgecies suas, et in genere suo, tandem concluditur: Viaet
‘ eus cuncta guae T's-cerat, et erant valde bona, quia nimirum
t-<>tus univers complete bonitas ex illa varietate consurgit.

11am etiam variae rerum virtutes et Operationes et mutuae
generationes et corruptiones satis ostendunt, ut declaratum
est. Aliquid ergo praeter materiam est ipsi addendum quo
eE'osentia uniuscuiusque rei compleatur; cum autem materia sit

Otentia, id quod ei additur ad complendam essentiam erit
a<2tus, quia potentia dicit essentialem ordinem ad actum.
I)3).sp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 18.

 

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107

cause. The arguments here are meant to be conclusive for

the existence of the form, but as has been seen, the

a-posteriori quasi-inductive part of the proof has some real
difficulties in that it proceeds from the most difficult
case, the rational woul, to a general doctrine. The
a-priori argument is valid if the general doctrine on causes
holds up. Since, however, the material and efficient cause
of the form seem to depend on some experience of a first
subject and of an agent constituting a being the argument

cannot be considered to be fully a-priori.

The Being and Essence of Substantial Form

As with the discussion on matter, Suarez, once he
has asserted the existence of substantial form next turns
to the question of the being and essence of the form. The
problem is formulated in terms of the manner in which the
substantial form is able to come into being in matter and
front: matter.

It is assumed by Suarez that the substantial form is
a thing distinct from matter. But, then, that form is
either something before generation or it is nothing. If it
is something it was a substantial form before it was joined
to this matter. But, this is impossible, because there
would be no substantial generation and because there could
then be opposing forms in the matter. On the other hand, if
6‘18 says that substantial form is nothing before it comes to

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108

This position is contradictory. Moreover, it does not help
to say that the form does not come into existence but only
the composite, for then the composite would come from the
matter alone and this is clearly impossible.

Suarez, here, feels the problem is more by way of
terminology and ways of speaking about reality than in re-
ality itself. In reality the form previously was not and
afterwards is; therefore it has been made. And, in a like
manner, the composite does not occur unless it has been made
01' matter and form, but it is not made except from already

BRisting beings. When the total being is corrupted the form

17

Ceases to be and passes into nothingness. The treatment

°f the being and essence of the form, then, must somehow
tfike into account the coming into being and the passing out

\

3 17Ratio dubitandi tacta est in praecedenti
In:01.:ione; na- forna substantialis est res distincta a
v tteria; vel ergo illa res est aliquid ante generationem,
91 nihil; si est aliquid ergo est forma substantialis
ent-aquam fiat; nan 111a res est indivisibilis et
raaentialiter est forma substantialis; non ergo potest illa
1‘ 3 esse aliquid ante generationem quin sit substantialis
30m; hoc autem est impossibile, tum quia alias nulla esset
iubstantialis generatio; tum etiam quia alias essent simul
ph materia formae repugnantes. Si vero eligatur altera
r‘r‘s, nimirum formam ante generationem nihil esse, sequitur
Eol‘mam ex nihilo fieri quod repugnat philosophorum axiomati:
l,‘\3( nihilo nihil fit. Nec satisfacit qui responderit formam
“1:11 fieri, sea compositum; compositum autem fieri ex
( teria et ideo nihil esse quod ex nihilo fiat; hoc
1I'lquall) non satisfacit, quia magis consistit in verbis at
Q do loquendi quam in re: nam forma revera antea non erat
rt postea est; ergo facta est. Item, quia compositum non
Q1“: nisi quatenus ex materia et forma componitur; non autem
QQMponitur nisi ex entibus factis. Item, quia, cum totum
hQI‘runmitur, forma vere desinit esse transitque in nihilum;
tam quae antea erat aliquid, postea est nihil; ergo cum
sot-um incipit esse, forma etiam fit. Disp. Meta. XV,
ect. 2, par. 1.

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109
of being of the form and yet retain the notion that the form
is distinct from the matter.

In the resolution of this problem Suarez begins with
the special case of the coming into being and passing out of
being of the rational soul. He feels that if he can prove
his case with the rational soul he can prove it with respect
to all other forms. At this point in the present study we

are interested in the general doctrine of form so it is ne-
cessary to reserve the discussion of the rational soul to
that. chapter devoted to body and soul. Suarez, however,
does make a sharp distinction between substantial forms
"hi ch are spiritual, subsistent, and independent of matter,
but still have the capacity to inform matter (i.e., the ra-
tional soul) and substantial forms which are united to mat-
ter and depend upon it in existence and in coming to be
(1 oe., forms of plants, animals, and inanimate objects).
That is, these latter forms cannot exist apart from matter
and are only found in conjunction with matter. When a sub-

stantial change takes place on the subhuman level the form

c 6ease to exist .18

With respect to the subhuman forms Suarez feels that

wet first delimit the meaning of the axiom "From nothing,

53 18This discussion is based on the early distinction
“Earez makes with the discussion of matter, as matter in
1.. ich, matter from which, and matter about which. The
"gader is referred back to the early sections of Chapter II,
Qruarez' Doctrine of Matter" for a more complete treatment
1? this distinction of terminology. The reader is also re-
werred to Disputation XV, Section 2, Paragraph 10 for the
day in which Suarez makes use of this distinction in the
e‘felopment of his doctrine on form.

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110
nothing comes." If one accepts this axiom universally with
respect to every cause and every effect then contradictions
do indeed arise. The outstanding examples of problems which
arise with respect to this axiom come in treatments of the
rational soul and of prime matter. Both the rational soul
and prime matter require a direct creation. It is precisely
the meaning of creation that something does come from noth-
ing. Hence both the rational soul and prime matter violate
the metaphysical axiom, "From nothing, nothing comes."
Understood in a limited sense, however, with respect to the
Power of a finite natural agent, the axiom can be held as
t'51'1-lo.19 With this in mind, then, Suarez is able to maintain
that no substantial form (the human soul excepted) arises
properly from nothing, but rather is educed from the potency
or an already pro-existing matter. In this sense there is
“Of-hing against the axiom, "From nothing, nothing comes."
"To come from nothing” can mean two things-~1. to
com. into being absolutely and simply and 2. that a given

°rfcct comes from nothing. The first of these two meanings

\

u nguocirca principium illud, _e_x_ nihilo nihil fit,
rhiverse intellectum de omni cause at de omni effectu,
§§lsum est et contra rationem naturalem, ut hoc ipso exemplo
phimae rationalis ostenditur, et exemplo etiam materiae
grime, ut supra tactum est, et plura in sequentibus
hrferemus. Intellectum autem de virtute agentis finiti et
Qaturalis, verum est. Unde quoad hanc formam, concedendum
33‘: non ease in proximis agentibus naturalibus virtutem ad
irficiendam illam, sed proximum agens disponere materiam,
intelligentiam vero separatam efficere formam, non quidem
antelligentiam creatam, ut putavit Avicenna, nec ideam
separatam at extra Deum existentem, sed Deum ipsum, quem
rolum esse effectorem rerun omnium quae per creationem
iunt, infra ostendemus. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 11.

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applies to subsistent things, because for them to come into

being is to have complete being. On the basis of this mean-

ing, the material substantial form does not come from noth-

ing because it does not properly come into being absolutely
and simply. The first meaning of "to come into being" is to
be taken, then, as coming into being without anything being
presupposed. And from this understanding natural things
while they do become something new do not come from nothing,
because they come from a presupposed matter. With respect
to the second and wider meaning, that a given effect is from
nothing, "to become" does not deny that a form as now con-
S1Toituted did not exist before. That is, "to come from noth-
ing" does not deny the aptitude of a material cause for com-
pOSing that which becomes. From this one can rightly con-
clude that material substantial forms do not come from
not‘ohing, rather they come from matter, which in its own
level of being aids both the existence and becoming of such
forms. These forms are not able to exist unless joined to
matater by which they are sustained in being, and they are
not able to come into being unless they are sustained by
the matter. This is the proper and m}; _s__e_ difference be-
tween causing from nothing and causing from something. It
is for this reason that the first meaning but not the second
or "to come from nothing" surpasses the finite power of

natural agents to bring about material forms.20
\

(i 20Secundo, de omnibus aliis formis substantialibus
Dicendum est non fieri proprie ex nihilo, sed ex potentia
haeiacentis materiae educi; ideoque in effectione harum

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One can see here Suarez' beginning attempt to out-
line in exact terms the meaning of the phrase "a subhuman
form is educed from matter." He wants very much to keep a

unity in the being and so he makes the coming into being of

 

formarum nihil fieri contra illud axioma: _e_x_ nihilo nihil
fit, 81 recte intelligatur. Haec assertio sumi—tur ex
Iristot., I Phys., per totam et lib. VII Metaph., et ex
aliis auctoribus, quos statim referam. Et declaratur bre-
viter; nam fieri ex nihilo duo dicit; unum est fieri abso-
lute et simpliciter; aliud est quod talis effectio sit ex
nihilo. Primum proprie dicitur de re subsistenti, quia eius
est fieri cuius est esse; id autem proprie est quod sub-
sistit et habet esse; nam quod alteri adiacet, potius est
quo aliud est. Ex hac ergo parte, formee substantiales
mater-isles non fiunt ex nihilo, quia proprie non fiunt.
Atque hanc rationem reddit D. Thomas, I, q. 1.5, a. 8 et q.
90, a. 2 et ex dicendis magis explicabitur. Sumendo ergo
ipsum fieri in hac proprietate et rigore, sic fieri ex
nihilo est fieri secundum se totum, id est nulla sui parte
Praesupposita ex qua fiat. Et hac ratione res naturales dum
de novo fiunt,non fiunt ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex praesup-
POSita materia ex qua componuntur, et ita non fiunt secundum
Se totae, sed secundum aliquid sui. Formae autem harum
rerun), quanvis revera totam suam entitatem de novo acci-
Piant, quam antea non habebant, quia vero ipsae non fiunt,
Ut dictum est, ideo neque ex nihilo fiunt. Attamen, quia
atiori modo sumendo verbum illud fieri negari non potest
quin forma facta sit eo modo quo nunc est et antea non erat,
“13 etiam probat ratio dubitandi posita in principio sec-
t'fi-Onis, ideo addendum est, sumpto fieri in hac amplitudine,
fieri ex nihilo non tantum negare Habitudinem materialis
causae intrinsece componentis id quod fit, sed etiam habi-
tudinem causae materialis per se causantis et sustentantis
Oman quae fit, seu confit. Diximus enim insuperioribus
li‘atoeriam et esse causam compositi et formee dependentia ab
118; ut res ergo dicatur ex nihilo fieri, uterque modus
gauSaIitatis negari debet, et eodem sensu accipiendum est
llud axioms, ut sit verum: ex nihilo nihil fit, scilicet
virtute agentis naturalis et‘finiti nihil—fieri nisi ex
Eraesupposito subiecto per se concurrente et ad compositum
Et ad formam, si utrumque suo modo ab eodem agente fiat.
m his ergo recte concluditur formas substantiales
iateriales non fieri ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex materia, quae
tn suo genere per se concurrit et influit ad esse et fieri
malium formarum, quia sicut esse non possunt nisi affixae
nit"eriae a qua sustententur in esse, ita nec fieri possunt
t 3 earom effectio et penetratio in eadem materia sustente-
e?” Et haec est propria et per se differentia inter
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113
the form dependent upon the existence of the matter. He now
spells out what is meant by "eduction from matter." The
first meaning is that subhuman forms are not created. The
second meaning is that the subhuman form comes into being
with a dependence upon matter both in existence and becoming.
When one says that these forms do not come from
nothing one means they are not created. For creation means
”to come from nothing." However, subhuman forms are con-
tained in the potency of matter and come into being through
the action of an agent outside the matter. That is, prior
to the generation the form was contained in potency both in
the matter and in the cause. Afterwards, the form is in the
matter in act and apart from the cause. And so, from the
eXiStence of the potentiality of matter, in which the forms

Were contained, they are educed into act on the strength of

g1 agent working upon that matter.21

OSthdemus, prior modus efficiendi superat vim finitam
naturalium agentium non vero posterior. Disp. Meta. XV,
Seet. 2, par. 13.

21Ex his etiam constat proprie de his formis dici
“on creari, sed educi de potentia materiae, et quid sit
fig; _d__e_ potentia materiae; in quo eXplicando multi
a Grant, tum in I Phys., tum in VII Metaph. Sed utrumque
ireviter declaravit D. Thomas I, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2. Nam cum
llae formee non fiant ex nihilo, non creantur, quia creari
list fieri ex nihilo. Cum autem illae formae in potentia
z,Literiae contineantur, et per actionem agentis quasi extra
lam potentiam fiant, non quod extra materiam existant
giusque potentiam non actuent et illi adhaereant, sed quod,
um antea tantum continerentur in potentia et in causa,
fiOStea sunt actu at extra causam, et ita ex esse potentiali
eateriae, in qua continebantur, in actum educuntur virtute
rgentis concurrente eadem materia. Dices: ergo eadem
iatione dicentur res educi de potentia agentis, quia etiam
1: ea continebantur virtute et potestate, et ex hoc esse
Potentia educuntur in actum per actionem ipsius

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ficult to accept; for Suarez, as we have seen, does not want

to make matter an integral being and yet here the matter
somehow contains all forms which can be "pulled out" of the
matter by the operation of the appropriate agency. One of
two things happens here. Either the matter becomes an in-
tegral being, or substantial form is a mere shaping of the
matter brought about by the agent and hence is not substan-
tial at all, but merely accidental.

A further explanation of the phrase, "Eduction from
matter" means a material form comes into being with a de-
Pendence upon matter both in existence and in becoming
attempts to show a slightly different understanding. In one
Sense this new usage differs from the preceding one only in
Words. For, matter contains in its potency a force for
Causing on its own level of being, therefore, the form is
drawn out of, comes into being out of, the potency of the
matflier in which it is contained. This is nothing other than
to come into act in the matter. But, there is another ex-
planation of this phrase--for a form to be educed from mat-

ter is for it to come into being by the same action by which
\

:gentis. Respondetur absolute negando sequelam, quia illa

merba in omni proprietate significant habitudinem causae
aterialis et non efficientis. Itaque, tam efficiens quam

:atGria potest dici continere effectum, diverso tamen modo;

Sam agens continet eminenter seu virtualiter, materia vero
olum in potentia receptive seu passiva; cum ergo dicitur

horma educi de potentia materiae, peculiariter denotatur
aec habitudo materialis causae; agens vero proprie dicitur

D11" virtutem suam educere effectum de potentia in actum.

SP. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 11..

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115
the composite is made from a preceding matter. That is, it
is not the form itself which is produced, but the composite.
This can be shown inductively because eduction consists in
this, that the action or change is peg: §_e_ and essentially
dependent upon the matter, but through this same action the
form comes into being and is united to the matter at the
same time. Therefore, through one and the same action first
the composite comes into being, and a form of such and such
a kind is simultaneously produced and comes into act from
the potency of matter. Therefore the origin of a form from

the potency of matter is best described through the action

Of eduction . 22

L

22Aliter etiam explicari solet quid sit educi formam
‘36 potentia materiae, nimirum, quod sit fieri in materia cum
d°Pendentia ab illa in esse et fieri, quod convenit omnibus
formis substantialibus, excepta rationali. Quae explicatio
30118 verbis differt a praecedenti; nam (ut supra dicebam)
materiam continere in potentia sua, causalitatem seu vim
caufiandi importat ex parte materiae in suo genere; formam
ergo trahi aut fieri extra potentiam materiae in qua
continetur, nihil aliud est quam fieri actu in materia,
°°ncurrente materia ipsa in suo genere per potentiam suam ad
eri et esse talis formee; sed hoc ipsum est fieri formam
cum dependentia materiae in fieri et in esse; solumque est
dj-Versus modus explicandi per habitudinem effectus ad
xausam, vel e contrario per habitudinem causae ad effectum.
118 item explicatio occurrit, quae, licet rem diversam a
praecedentibus non contineat, tamen eam magis declarat et
:Pta est ad nonnullas difficultates insurgentes explicandas.
a°rmam ergo educi de potentia materiae est fieri eadem
i:‘itione qua fit compositum ex materia praecedenti quae per
dilam actionem non fit; quam expositionem videtur intendisse
n V1.13 Thomas cum dixit formam non creari, sed educi, quia
Von est ipsa quae per se producitur, sed compositum, forma
c 1‘0 comproducitur ex praeiacente materia. Et inductione
p°n8tat ita fieri in omnibus formis quae educuntur ex
hotentia materiae. Ratio vero reddi potest, quia eductio in
°° consistit quod sit actio vel mutatio per se et
ntialiter pendens a materia; per hanc autem actionem
l forma fit et unitur materiae; ideoque per eamdem fit

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116
The notion of eduction from matter tells one much

about the being of a form. "Eduction" implies that the com-
ing into being of a form is not on account of creation. This
is a negative understanding. Positively, "eduction from the
potency of matter" means that the matter undergoes some ac-
tion and that the resulting form is dependent upon this ac-
tion. The emphasis in this second understanding is on the

action that brings about the form which somehow is present

in the matter already and needs only to be drawn out.

It would seem at this point, that the subhuman form
is so dependent on the matter that it can exist and have an
essence only in terms of the matter. But, Suarez wants it
to be a true co-principle of being. He concludes that from
the things he has said about the existence of the substan-
tial form and the way in which material form comes into be-
ing its status as formal cause is also easy to understand.
He gives a definition of form which parallels that of mat-
t.P-—The form is a simple and incomplete substance of a cer-

t‘in kind which as the act of matter constitutes with it the

*BSane of a composed substance.23

\_

Per se primo compositum et comproducitur talis forma, fitque
2:2“ extra potentiam materiae ergo eductio form" d,

D entis materiae cptime per illam actionem declaratur.
1313. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 15.

6 23Ex dictis de existentia formee substantialis, et
‘ Dodo quo fit, facile intelligi potest quid ipsa sit et

3““! modus causandi habeat; utrumque autem hac brevi
as(triptione comprehendere possumus: forma _e_s__t_ substantia

W simplex et incomplete, guae 93; actus materiae cum _e__a_

Stitu t essent—{am substantiae compositi-57 We
add°§7 Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 5, par. 1.

 

 

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117
He then goes on to analyze the various elements of

this description. "Substance" is to be taken in the same

manner as when Aristotle distinguishes substance into mat-

ter, form, and composite.21’ It is through this distinction

that the substantial form is separated from accidents which

are not substances. The form, on the basis of this descrip-

tion, is also able to be distinguished from substantial
mod es; the modes are not properly substantial beings as is

the form under which understanding it is called a sub-

stance.”

The form is "simple" and "incomplete." It is simple

in that it is separate from any composed substance. And it

is incomplete in that it is different from the separated

substances, for the separated substances do not exercise

formal cause but only a certain efficiency wherefore they
26

are not substantial forms but complete beings.

—_

2“In qua descriptione substantia ponitur loco
generis, eo modo quo a Philosopho distinguitur in materiam,
f0I‘Tllam et compositum. Et per eam particulam distinguitur
haec forma ab accidentalibus, quae substantiae non sunt;
distingui etiam potest a modis substantialibus; nam licet hi
ad Praedicamentum substantiae revocentur, non tamen sunt
s“lbs-mantles in ea proprietati; unde neque ab Aristotele in
ea Partitions enumerantur, quia non sunt proprie entitates
subL’etantiales, ut est forma, quae hac ratione substantia

d Citur. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 5, par. 1.

hi 2SSuarez makes much use of the doctrine of modes in
d 8 metaphysics. The easiest and simplest treatment of this
°°°trine occurs in Frederick Copleston, _A Histor of Philos-
§Lh1, 8 vols. (New York: Doubleday Image 00 3, 1552-67),

’ Pt. 2: 189-91.

26
Additur vero simplex _e_t_ incompleta ut per priorem
pa”Ciculam a composita su stantia separetur, per posteriorem

v
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118
The remaining part of the definition distinguishes
the form from the matter which also is a simple and incom-
plete substance. The matter is a simple and incomplete sub-
stance as a potency; the form is the primary act of that
potency. This leads to the notion that the substantial form
is "the act of a physical body." This definition is able to
be accommodated to form in general if one understands by the
name of "act" the substantial act. But, one is able by
"physical body" to understand either the matter itself in so
far as it is the other part of the natural composite or one
is also able to understand by "physical body" the natural

being itself made up of matter and form.27 It has already

k

formee assistentes, ut illae quae movent corpora caelestia,
quae revera non exercent munus causae formalis, sed
Efficientiam aliquam; quare non sunt formee substantiales

Front nunc de illis loquimur. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 5,
par. 1,

27Reliqua pars definitionis distinguit formam a

materia, quae etiam est substantia simplex et incompleta,

amen ut potenia; forma vero ut primarius actus illius
Potentiae. Et ideo Arist., II de Anima, definivit animam
achum corporis Lhysici, etc. Quae definitio potest facile
Wmam in communi accommodari, si nomine actus
subStantialem actum intelligamus, ut intelligi debet, et
solum dicemus formam esse actum corporis physici, reliquam
gartem auferendo quae animam secernit a formis inanimatorum.

°Ssumus autem per corpus physicum intelligere, vel materiam

Psam, quatenus est altera pars compositi naturalis, quae,
“'5 forma informetur, semper supponitur ordine naturae in suo
genere causae quantitate et aliquibus proximis
aispositionibus affects, et ea ratione corpus physicum
appellari potest. Vel etiam possumus per corpus physicum
c 3 ipsum naturale intelligere quod ex materia et forma
1i’nt’mat, cuius actus dicitur forma tanquam constituens
v1 11d; quomodo etiam Aristoteles definivit esse actum
W seu 932 vivimus. Utramque igitur habitudinem in
s eta parte nostrae descriptionis explicuimus; nam forma
mubstantialis ita est substantia incompleta ut sit actus

a eriae, actus (inquam) vel actu informans vel natura sua

 

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119
been shown in the chapter on matter that Suarez in respect
to hylomorphic theory is concerned to understand "physical
body” as the prime matter. But, in so far as he allows mat-
ter its own being and essence often understands "physical
body" as some sort of integral being, all contrary protesta-

tio ns notwithstanding .

The discussion on the being and essence of substan-
tial forms works from a given--that there are substantial
forms-and is concerned mainly with how the substantial form
does come to be without violating the axiom that something
comes from nothing. Suarez, in explaining that axiom, has
had to make special provision for the rational soul because
this kind of form can come to be only by direct creation.
The major concern in this section, however, has been with
the subhuman forms. These forms do not come into being

Stri ctly speaking from nothing but rather are educed from

¥

institutus ad informandam materiam, nam verba (ut aiunt) in
Clefinitionibus dicunt aptitudinem, at its comprehenditur
al'lima rationalis etiamsi a corpore separata sit. Et hinc
conaequenter habet ut cum materia componat essentiam entis
gaturalis, quod est substantia composita; et ideo Arist., II
1378., c. 3, ait formam esse essentiae seu quidditatis
rfitionem id est, quae compositi natural—is essentiam complet
9‘3 a5 aliis essentialiter ac quidditative eam distinguit.
Atque hinc explicata etiam est causalitas formee;
“a“! quia forma essentialiter est actus, ideo includit
r“‘d‘insece habitudinem transcendentalem ad id cuius est
“Ctug, et ad actuationem quam in illud exercet; ideoque vix
EOtest ratio formas, nisi er habitudinem ad eius
causalitatem, declarari. n qua possumus quatuor illa
°nSiderare quae in omni causa spectamus, scilicet, formale
grinoipium causandi, conditionem necessarium ad causandum,
si‘lsationem ipsam et effectum qui causatur, quae omnia
s gillatim explicanda sunt, sicut in materia fecimus, licet
Drppositis quae ibi diximus, brevius hic expediri possint.
SP. Meta. XV, Sect. 5, pars. 2-3.

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120

the potency of matter. The description of how forms come to

exist led Suarez to a general definition of the form as a
simple and incomplete substance of a certain kind which is
the act of the matter and with it constitutes the essence of
a composite being. The explanation of each part of this

definition resulted in a parallel to the basic description

of matter. Suarez, then, once he has achieved his purpose

in describing the coming into existence of the form, views
the form as the exact counterpart to the matter. In this

sense, the form is distinct from the matter and even though
educed from the matter has a being and essence of its own

Once it is in existence.

The Causality of the Substantial Form

When one turns to the problem of the causality of
the substantial form there are two main problems with which
t<3 be concerned--how the union of the form to the matter is
the very causality of the form; what is the effect of the
formal cause. Suarez attempts to give a discussion of the
causality of the form parallel to the discussion of the
causality of the matter, making only the necessary adjust-
mehts appropriate to the topic. Once again, the problem of
Some third principle arises and Suarez uses every argument
he can think of to maintain that nothing intervenes between

the matter and the form.28 And so, the union cannot be a
\

28. . . de causalitate actuali ipsius formae,

quiclnam sit, not est facile ad explicandum; tamen ex his
quae dicta sunt de materia, procedere proportionate possumus

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121
third principle intervening, nor can the effect of the for-
mal cause be something separate from the matter and the
form.

In regard, first, to the union of the form to the
nutter Suarez says that this causality is able to be nothing
other than the actual union of form to the matter. This
causality of form is proved by an exhaustive enumeration of
possibilities. The form does not cause the matter, it does
not cause form (either itself or another), nor does it cause
the composite. In the section on the being and essence of
tformlit has already been shown how the form comes into being

and how one form cannot cause itself or another form. The
same situation arises with respect to matter. Since matter
has a being and essence of its own, it is not caused by the
IVDIHm. The composite is the ultimate effect of the causality
le' the form; it is not the causality itself. Besides, the
cOmposite includes the being of matter and form, and the
<3Eillsality of the form strictly so called is not able to in-
clude the being of both co-principles. Having posited the
union as the causality of the form, Suarez states that the

\

6“: id declarandum. Et imprimis certum videtur huiusmodi
:::*iiasalitatem aliquid esse in rerum natura distinctum ex
aa‘tura rei ab entitate formee. Probatur, quia sicut agere
Jrfl-n.quid est in rerum natura, ita et informare, quia vere est
,Eg‘éliliter ac physice causare. Rursus illud, quidquid est,
.I?S313 in re ipsa separabile a forma; nam in anima rationali de
‘I>£i<=t° separatur et in qualibet forma substantiali separari
mosset per potentiam Dei absolutam; nam potest extra
E§€l13eriam conservari, sicut conservata est quantitas; est
enim eadem vel maior ratio; ergo distinguitur ex natura rei
‘3 illa. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 6, par. 6.

 

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122

form necessarily exercises this causality. If, however, one

posits the loss of union then it is impossible for the form

to exercise its causality as a co-principle of being and it

disintegrates. This is a sign that the form's very causal-

ity consists in the union with matter.

The reasoning behind this position is that if form

is united to matter it necessarily communicates itself to

the matter through its own being. That is, the form does

not bring about something like itself but communicates to

the matter its own perfection and being, and, in this manner

actuates the matter. From this the substantial composite

nature necessarily arises as a per s3 unity.

sality and the total effect of the form consists in this;
and if the union is lost the form is not able to perdure.

Such talk, of course, points up the difference be-

t“Ween the union which is called the causality of the form

and the action which is efficient causality. Action is the

‘3iilasality of the agent as agent which remains completely

(>Ilt:side of the effect. Union, on the other hand, is the

<=€ilasality of the form so that by the form's own mediation

3“: supplies itself to the matter or to the composite, for

:j“3 is an intrinsic cause causing through itself. In this

Serise one can say that the causality of the form includes

the very being of the form, or that this causality is the
-335235311t881f not absolutely considered but as united.29
29Deinde dicendum est hanc causalitatem nihil aliud

Eisisse posse praeter actualem unionem formae ad materiam.
1’<>batur primo a sufficienti enumeratione, quia neque est

The total cau-

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123
Once again Suarez is forced at this point to modify
his position on the causality of the form with reSpect to
the rational soul, for the union of the rational soul with

the body is much different from that of the subhuman form

with the matter. In the case of the rational soul there is

pure union without any inherence in the matter or dependence

of the form on the matter. This is simply because of the

materia, neque forma, neque compositum; ergo est dicta unio;
nam praeter haec nihil aliud excogitari potest; et
antecedens quoad omnes partes est per se evidens. Nam de
forma iam probatum est; et eadem ratio a fortiori probat de
materia; compositum autem est ultimus effectus huius
causalitatis, ut statim dicetur; non est ergo causatio ipsa.
Item compositum includit entitatem materiae et formae;
causalitas autem formae praecise sumpta non potest haec

omnia includere. Praeterea, posita unione et praeciso
quocumque alio, praeter ea quae dicta sunt, forma necessario
exercet suam causalitatem; positis autem omnibus aliis et
ablata unione, impossibile est formam exercere suam
causalitatem; ergo signum est in unione consistere talem
causalitatem. Maior patet, quia si forma unitur materiae,
necessario communicat illi seipsam per seipsam, id est, non
efficiendo aliam similem sed suammet perfectionem et
entitatem illi communicando et hoc modo illam actuando. Et
inde etiam necessario consurgit substantialis natura
composita per se una; sed in hoc consistit tota causalitas
formee totusque effectus eius, qui, ablata unione, permanere
non potest, ut per se notum est; ergo. Unde in hoc est
rlotanda differentia inter unionem, quam diximus esse
causalitatem formae, et actionem, quam postea dicemus esse
CHausalitatem efficientis, quod actio ita est causalitas
agentis ut agens, quatenus agens est, omnino maneat extra
effectum; quia licet per actionem communicet se, non tamen
Seipsam per seipsam dando effectui, sed similem aliquam
erl‘titatem ei conferendo; unio vero ita est causalitas formee
“13 ea mediante seipsam praebeat vel materiae vel composito;
efirt.enim causa intrinseca per seipsam causans. Quo sensu
(jitzi etiam posset causalitatem formae complecti in se
erl‘titatem formee, seu hanc causalitatem esse ipsam formam,
“on absolute sumptum, sed unitam. Sed in hoc loquendi modo
confunditur causa cum causalitate et ratio causandi quasi in
a<3tu primo cum causatione, quae est quasi actus secundus, et

1deo formalius et magis praecise dicitur haec causalitas in

ipsa unione consistere. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 6, par. 7.

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special nature of the rational soul. In subhuman forms,

however, the union is at one and the same time a dependence

and also a quasi-inherence of the form in the matter. The

causality of the rational soul is not of concern here; but
with respect to the causality of the subhuman form one can
say that these forms cause that union with matter and the
union depends upon them.30 One can see in this discussion
that Suarez is concerned to protect the uniqueness of the

rational soul and to establish the mutual dependence of

3OSed occurrit difficultas, nam haec unio duplici
modo contingit in diversis formis substantialibus. In
quibusdam enim est pura unio, id est, sine inhaesione vel
dependentia formae, ut in animabus rationalibus; in aliis
vero est unio quae simul est dependentia et quasi inhaesio
formee in materia. Prior ergo unio non potest esse
causalitas formalis rationalis animae, quia est ab ea
effective; causalitas autem effective longe diversa est a
formali. Antecedens patet, quia hoc ipso quod anima creatur
a Deo in corpore disposito, statim ipsa quasi naturali
impetu sese unit materiae efficiendo unionem; nam, cum anima
naturaliter sit propensa ad illam unionem et habeat
applicatum proprium subiectum perfectibile ab ipsa, non est
cur'non possit ipsa quasi naturali pondere sese corpori
COpulare, ut sensit Henric., Quodl. XI, q. 1h; et Aureol.,
Spud Capreol., In IV, dist. 1.3, q. 2; et probabile existimat
ibi.Richard., a. 3, q. 2. Posterior item unio non potest
eease causalitas formalis respectu aliarum formarum, quia
illae formee per ipsam unionem causantur a materia et ah ea
Pendent in suo esse; ergo non possunt eaedem formae esse
cBallsae eiusdem unionis; ergo non potest unio esse causalitas
l'11-11i.usmodi formee; causalitas enim est ab ea causa cuius est
causalitas, sicut actio est ab agente, et ideo supponit esse
tHills causae. Nec potest intelligi quod eadem res seu modus
sit ratio seu quasi via, ut causetur forma et per quam
causet forma. Et confirmatur, nam supra, disp. XII, sect.
:1. dicebamus formam non posse esse causam formalem
generationis, quia per generationem fit at educitur de non
eS’ose ad esse; ergo eadem ratione non potest esse causa
Lu"liionis et consequenter neque unio potest esse causalitas
eins. Patet consequentia, tum a paritate rationis, tum
e“etiam quia ipsa generatio videtur esse idem quod unio, cum
Cli(:tum sit has formas eadem actione fieri et uniri. Disp.

Meta. XV, Sect. 6, par. 8.

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125

subhuman forms on the matter. He must protect the unique-

ness of the rational soul because it is an immaterial form

and hence proper adjustments must be made when one talks

about that type of form and its causality. Since he wants

to preserve a true unity in natural beings the causality of
subhuman forms explained as union preserves both the hylo-

morphic theory and the unity of the being.
When one talks of the causality of the form one must
also face the question of the effect which occurs because of

this causality. There are two effects to be considered--the

composite and the matter.
The composite is the primary effect of the form, for
from it the integral being is intrinsically and essentially

constituted, and from the form the composite has its spe-
61es. The form completes the essential nature and intelli-

gibility of the composite. If the matter is a cause of the

composite, much more so is the form which brings about the

existence of the composite. Therefore the composite is the

effect of the form, for the composite depends especially on
11:. But one must not think that the proper causality of the
I'<>:rm is to constitute the composite. Rather as we have

seen, the causality is the union; the composite is the ef-

fect of the union. That is, matter is informed by the form

and the composite comes from both--is the effect of both.
The second effect of the causality of the form is
matter which is not by the nature of things distinct from

t:1’1e composite. By matter as informed, one does not

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understand only matter in terms of some sort of extrinsic
denomination, but rather a denomination by which the intel-
lect is able to unite matter to form as the agreement or
aptitude of the matter to form. By "informed matter," one
understands matter as affected by form. Informed matter in-
cludes, therefore, the notions of matter itself, form and
union. But "composite" also includes these three and noth-
ing else. These notions of matter, form, and union are not
in fact distinct. Therefore, there are not two effects but

only one which is conceived in different manners.31

 

31Duo tantum effectus sunt qui formae attribui
possunt, scilicet, compositum et materia; nam de generations
vel unitione iam dictum est non posse esse proprie effectum
eius. De unione vero ipsa in facto esse, constat ex dictis
non posse dici proprie effectum, nisi foratasse eo modo quo
actio dicitur effectus agentis, quatenus ab 1110 est,
quamvis proprius dicatur via ad effectum.

Explicatur prior effectus formae

Primarius effectus formae compositum est.--Quoad
compositum ergo satis Elarum est ex dictis illud esse
Proprium ac primarium effectum formae; nam ex illa '
intrinseca et essentialiter constat, et ab illa habet
Speciem et (ut ita dicam) pulchritudinem suam; nam ipsa
Conmdet essentialem naturam et rationem eius, ut ex
‘Aristotelis definitione supra tradita constat. Item materia
eSteausa compositi, ut supra ostensum est; ergo multo magis
15‘Orma, quia magis confert ad esse compositi; ergo e converso
1Psum compositum est effectus formae, nam in suo esse ab
111a maxime pendet.

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r‘GSpicit materiam, et per illam compositum; ergo compositum
“on est primarius effectus formee, sed materia ut actuata
Sen ut informata; ex quo effectu consequitur compositum ut

Osterior effectus. Respondeo his vocibus non explicari
dues causalitates ut duos effectus formae, sed unum dumtaxat
Sub diversis habitudinibus. Unica est enim unio formae ad
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127
This treatment of the effect of the causality of

form is very confusing unless one realizes that Suarez is
responding once again to a philosophic axiom-~"One cause,
one effect." He seems to violate that axiom when he says
that the causality of form produces two effects--the com-
posite and the matter. He has shown that this discussion of
two effects is really just a way of talking about the cau-
sality of the form, and that in reality the form has only
one effect. One distinguishes the effect in different ways
depending upon the emphasis he wants to give to the discus-
sion. At times it is appropriate to talk of the effect as
the composite and at times it is proper to talk of the ef-
fect as the informed matter. The usage is determined by
context and language not by any real causal situation in
which one would find one cause with two effects.

The discussion of the causality of form as the union
0f matter and form once again emphasizes the immediate rela-

tionship of the matter and the form. As with the discussion

iPeali, materia manet informata per formam, et compositum ex
‘Itraque resultat, quamvis in ipsa forma possint diversae
Pelationes considerari respectu materiae vel compositi.
1:tursus materiam esse actuatam forma non est effectus ex
natura rei distinctus a composite, quia per materiam ut
informatam non intelligimus solam materiam cum aliqua
denominatione quasi extrinseca; nam hic conceptus vel nullus
est vel non est conceptus alicuius effectus realis, sed
enominationis quam intellectus confingere potest ex
cOincomitantia vel habitudine ad formam ut praesentem; sed
per materiam informatam intelligimus materiam ut intrinsece
af.f'ectam forma; includit ergo materia ut informata, et
‘teriam ipsam et formam, et unionem. Sed compositum haec
‘3¥V1a includit et nihil aliud; ergo haec non aunt in re
dlstincta; ergo non sunt duo effectus, sed unus diversimode
Inobis conceptus et declaratus. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 7,
pars. 1-30
Cf. also Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 8, pars. 7, 9, and 13.

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128
on the causality of matter one sees that Suarez is very

careful not to interpose some third principle between the

matter and the form. The form brings about union; that is

how form operates as a cause; and the resulting effect is
the composite. The union, and composite are not additions
to the matter and form. Rather they eXpress the relation-

ship between these two principles.

The Mutual Dependence of Matter and Form
Up to this point in the present study, it has been

necessary to assume that there has been a mutual dependence

of matter and form. The actual explanation of that depend-

ency has had to wait until the doctrine of matter and form

itself was relatively complete. As has been seen, both in

the section on the causality of matter and the causality of
form, Suarez is very concerned that all of his talk of
union, generation, corruption, and composition not interpose

some third thing between the matter and the form. If one

grants on the basis of the previous discussion that matter
and form are directly related to one another and that both
are incomplete partial substances, and that each needs the
other for a complete being to result, then Suarez must spell
Olrt the nature of the mutual dependence the co-principles of
being have for each other.
The mutual dependence of matter and form can be

‘lruderstood in two ways either as a proper cause of a thing

(’1‘ as a condition so necessary that apart from this depend-

ence there would not be such a thing. One could say that

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129
matter (or form) causes the other co-principle; this is one
way that the two can depend on each other. One can also say
that the form (or matter) is a necessary condition for the
existence of the matter (or form); this is the other way the
two can depend on each other.

The first possibility for understanding this mutual
dependence of matter and form is that of a necessary condi—
1xion as proposed by Peter Fonseca in his Commentariorum in
Ixibros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros. Some
accidents are necessary conditions for the conservation of a
being. Although one cannot speak of these accidents as
causes of that conservation, they provide the natural dis-
IMDsitions necessary for the conservation. For example, a
Inaterial being has as one of its necessary conditions the
accident of quantity; without quantity the material being
could not be conserved in existence. According to Fonseca's
tapinion quantity is not a cause of the conservation of the
laeing, rather it is a necessary prerequisite for that con-
servation.32 The mutual dependence of matter and form is an
vanalogous case to the dependence of a material being on the
accident of quantity. That is, one depends on the other in
such a way that they are necessary prerequisites for the
constitution of an integral being. Certainly if such a re-

lationship exists between a being and one of its accidents,

¥

32For a more detailed discussion of the relationship
of matter and quantity the reader is referred to the appro-
Priate section in Chapter II "Suarez's Doctrine on Matter."
In addition to this discussion Suarez himself treats the
subject extensively in Disputations XIV and XL and XLI.

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130

the same kind of relationship can exist between the consti-
tutive principles of a being. This is the simplest way to
understand the mutual dependence of matter and form.33

There is another and more difficult explanation of
this mutual dependency. Since matter is simply supposed for
the form in order that it be able to be educed from its po-
tency, one can hardly understand in what manner matter is
able to depend upon the form as a necessary condition. Mat-

ter comes about through true creation and is conserved

 

33Sed explicandum superest qualis sit haec
dependentia; duobus enim modis potest intelligi, scilicet,
vel tanquam a prOpria causa vel tanquam a Conditione ita
necessaria ut absque illa non debeatur esse tali rei, quos
duos modos dependentiae explicui late, in I tomo III partis,
disp. VIII, sect. 1, et illos videtur significare Fonseca, V
Metaph., c. 2, q. 3, sect. l, dum ait intelligi posse mate-
riam pendere a forma vel tamquam a vera causa vel tamquam a
quodam concomitante; et sect. 3 videtur de eisdem facere
mentionem, dum ait accidentia conservare substantiam, non a
priori sed a posteriori. Dubitari ergo potest quo ex his
modis pendeat materia a forma. Et quidem, quod sit tantum
dependentia a posteriori et a conditione necessaria, videtur
probabiliter persuaderi. Primo, quia hic modus dependentiae
possibilis est; nam forma substantialis vel eius unio ad
materiam, atque adeo totum compositum, pendet hoc modo ab
aliquibus formis accidentalibus tamquam a dispositionibus
necessariis via conservationis, ut aiunt, non quia sint pro-
priae et directae causae talis conservationis, sed quia sunt
dispositiones ita connaturales ut sint etiam necessariae;
ergo maiori ratione potest materia habere talem dependentiam
a forma tamquam a necessaria dispositione et primaria. Item
hoc modo pendet materia a quantitate; ergo et potest pendere
a forma. Deinde hic modus est sufficiens ad salvandum omnia
quae dicuntur de dependentia materiae a forma, et omnes
rationes factae non amplius probant. Est etiam modus
facilis et clarus; nam iuxta illum facile conciliantur duae
Conclusiones positae. Recte etiam intelligitur quomodo
Vicissim pendeat forma a materia et materia a forma: una
enim dicetur pendere a priori et altera a posteriori; una
tamquam a vere causa, et alia ut conditione concomitante.
Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 8, par. 1?.

Cf. Peter Fonseca, Commentariorum in Metaphysicorum
Aristotelis Sta iritae Libros THildescheIm: Georg Olms Ver-
IagsEucEEandIung, 196a), V Metaph., c. 2, q. 3, sect. l.

 

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131
through some permanent action; consequently it does not de-
pend upon the form as a true cause in its coming to be. No
created cause is able to work naturally alongside of crea-
tion. That is, creation as such is not able to have any
dependence upon a formal cause, because formal cause pre-
supposes matter. Matter of generable things is truly and
properly created and not concreated. That is, it is not
produced by one and the same action as is the creation of a
whole integral being. Therefore, with respect to this crea-
tion the form is not able to function as a true cause. The
creation of matter and the introduction of the form are two
distinct actions. The introductive action of the form is
not able to be the true cause of the creative action by
which matter comes to be. And, therefore, even less is the
form, which is introduced through that action able to be the
true cause of the matter.

This argument can be proven by the fact that the in-
troduction of the form presupposes either the creation of
matter or an already created matter. The "introduction of a
form" speaks of a transcendental aptitude for matter already
created. The creation or conservation of matter does not
depend on the eduction of the form as a proper cause or upon
that action pg; g3. Therefore, much less is it able to de-
Pend upon the form as a true cause, since the form is in
GVery level of cause posterior to the action by which it is
educed from the potency of matter. From first to last mat-

ter is unable to depend upon the form as upon a cause per

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132
se, but rather as a causal concommitant condition both for
disposing and actuating the matter.3h
These two arguments may be summarized by the state-

ment that matter depends on form and form depends on matter

 

3“At vero iuxta alium modum difficile intelligitur
haec mutua dependentia; nam cum materia simpliciter
supponatur formas ut haec ex illius potentia educi possit,
vix intelligitur quomodo a priori possit materia a forma
dependere. Et explicatur amplius augeturque difficultas ex
eo quod materia fit per veram creationem et per eamdem
actionem permanentem conservatur; ergo non pendet in suo
fieri a forma ut a vera causa, quia ad creationem nulla
causa creata concurrere potest naturaliter. Respondent
aliqui hoc esse verum de causa efficienti, non vero de aliis
generibus causarum; nam creature non potest esse causa effi-
ciens creationis; potest tamen esse causa finalis, ut per se
constat; et eadem ratione potest esse causa formalis, immo
et materialis; nam cum creatur totum, partes concurrunt ad
esse et fieri illius in genere causae materialis. Sed
omissa causa finali, cuius causalitas habet peculiarem
rationem, propterea quod non est per realem ac propriam
motionem distinctam ab actione causae efficientis, et ideo
non praerequirit reale esse in re quae talem causalitatem
exercet, de causa materiali videtur concursus eius directe
repugnare cum creatione, ut est propria et vera creatio; quad
facile patet ex dictis supra de eductione formae de potentia
materiae, et latius ostendetur infra in propria disputatione
de creations. Loquor autem de creatione, ut proprie creatio
est; nam sub ratione concreationis potest habere dependen-
tiam a cause materiali, ut supra declaratum est tractando de
materia caeli, quia concreatio ut sic ordine naturae sup-
ponit creationem, et ideo potest habere dependentiam. Eadem
ergo ratione creatio ut sic non potest habere dependentia a
cause formali, quia causa formalis supponit materialem,
licet concreatio possit habere dependentiam a forma, ut
supra loco citato declaratum est. At vero materia rerum
generabilium vere ac proprie creatur, et non concreatur pro-
Prie, id est non producitur per unam et eamdem actionem qua
creatur totum; ergo ad creationem eius non potest forma
concurrere ut vere causa.

Quod in hunc modum declaratur et confirmatur ex
dictis; nam.creatio huius materiae rerum generabilium et
inductio formee sunt actiones distinctas, tam nunc in
Interiae conservatione et rerum generatione, quam in prima
I‘Iu'um sublunarium productione; sed actio indictiva formae
non potest esse vera causa actionis creativae materiae; ergo
multo minus forma quae per illam actionem inducitur potest
esse‘vera causa creationis materiae. Minor patet, tum quia
1ndictio formas supponit omnino creationem materiae seu

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133

not because one causes the other but because each is a ne-
cessary condition for the other. In light of what has al-
ready been said with reSpect to these two co-principles of
being, namely, that they are both incomplete beings or par-
tial substances, it is through this mutual dependence of
necessary condition that one is united to the other. It
must be noted here, however, that in these arguments Suarez
seems to imply some sort of existence of the matter prior to
the eduction of the form. There are two reasons why he must

hold this prior existence. The prime matter, as first

 

materiam creatam, nec intelligi potest quod formas inductio
aut unio supponatur in aliquo genere causae ad creationem
materiae, quia indictio formae ut sic dicit habitudinem
transcendentalem ad materiam iam creatam; unde sicut relatio
non potest praesupponi ad terminum in aliquo genere causae,
ita neque inductio formee ad creationem materiae. Tum etiam
quia alias penderet per se creatio vel conservatio materiae
ab eductione formas; ergo et ab agente educente formam;
atque ita agentia naturalia ut verae causae effectivae,
conservarent materiam. Unde etiam fieret ut quoties forma
mutatur in materia, mutaretur actio qua materia conservatur
a Deo quia mutate dependentia actionis, mutatur actio, eo
qued ipsa sit essentialiter dependentia, ut infra
declarabimus. Consequens autem est falsum, quia materia, ut
est primum subiectum generationis, est quid ingenerabile et
incorruptibile quia supponitur generationi et corruptioni;
ergo eadem ratione est quid immutabile quoad actionem per
quam fit at conservatur, quia supponitur facta et
conservata; alioqui per quamcumque generationem entis
ruturalis concrearetur materia, vel ita se haberet ac si
concrearetur, quia per novam actionem terminatam ad totum
ipsa inciperet conservari, quod plane repgunat actioni
agentis naturalis; alias eadem ratione dici posset per talem
actionem comproduci semper novum materiam. Igitur creatio
V81 conservatio materiae non pendet ab eductione formae
tamquam a prepria causa vel actione per se; ergo multo minus
POtest pendere a forma tamquam a vera causa, cum forma sit
inomni genere causae posterior actione per quam educitur de
POtentia materiae; ergo de primo ad ultimum, nec materia
iPsa potest pendere a forma ut a causa per se, sed solum ut
a cause vel conditione concomitante et bene disponente ac
{gtuante ipsam materiam. Disp. Meta., XV, Sect. 8, pars.
-19,

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subject, must be directly created by God. The accident of
quantity, as has been shown, inheres in the prime matter.
Once again, the problem of the being and essence of the mat-
ter, as explained by Suarez, significantly weakens his at-
tempt to get a unified being from matter and form.

Even though the arguments are convincing that matter
and form are necessary conditions for one another, Suarez
also acknowledges that there are reasons for thinking that
the matter depends upon the form as upon a true cause. This
argument states that the material substantial form depends
upon the matter as upon a proper and per g; cause in its own
level of being, and from the other side the matter depends
upon the form as a true cause. Otherwise the matter would
not sustain the form as a subject and form would not contain
the matter as an act. Just as the efficient act holds the
effect in being through its causality, so the informing act,
according to its own way, is able to contain its subject in
being. Therefore, substantial form is joined to matter in
this way.

The proof of this argument rests on the fact that
the material form is more perfect and more actual than mat-
ter. Therefore matter pg§_§g depends on form more than form
depends on matter. Secondly, there is no contradiction in
this type of union between matter and form, as if between
causes which are mutually and equally causes of each other.
This is clear both because in the general teaching on cause

there is no contradiction in mutual priority among the

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135
different kinds of causes. Also, in the heavens there seems
to be this mutual connection between matter and form, for
there, both in coming to be and in existence, there is
mutual dependence. That is, the concreation of the one per
§g_depends upon the concreation of the other.35 From this
example, the third reason is able to be accepted; the matter
of the heavens depends upon its own determined form, as upon
a cause per se. Therefore the matter of all lower things
will depend upon a generable form although the form is in-
definite in some way. It is clear that the matter of the
heavens is more perfect than sublunary matter. If it de-
pends upon the form as a true cause, much more should the

matter of lower beings.36

 

351t is necessary to call to the reader's attention
once again that the metaphysics of the sublunary sphere is
quite different from the metaphysics of the caelestial
spheres. Suarez is clearly in the Aristotelian tradition in
the matter of celestial mechanics and in no way does he make
reference to the revolution in astronomy that is taking
place during his own lifetime.

36Non desunt tamen argumenta quibus suaderi videatur
materiam posse dependere a forma ut a prOpria causa quae per
informationem suam continet illam in esse. Et praesertim
quia forma substantialis materialis pendet a materia ut a
propria et per se causa in suo genere; ergo et e contrario
materia pendet a forma tamquam a vera causa, quia, licet non
sustentet illam ut subiectum, potest ut actus continere
illam. Nam sicut actus effectivus tenet effectum in esse
per suam causalitatem, ita actus informativus potest modo
sibi proportionate continere suum subiectum in esse; ergo
ita comparatur forma substantialis ad materiam. Probatur
consequentia primo, quia forma materialis est perfectior et
actualior quam materia; ergo magis per se pendet materia a
forma quam forma a materia. Secundo, quia non repugnat
huiusmodi mutuus nexus inter materiam et formam tamquam
inter causas quae mutuo et vicissim sunt sibi per se causae.
Quod patet tum illa generali ratione quod in diversis
generibus causarum non repugnat mutua prioritas, tum etiam

136

At this point one seems to be at an impasse. Suarez
has given two arguments for the mutual dependence as a ne-
cessary condition and an argument for dependence as a true
cause. He grants that both understandings are probable and
that either argument is able to be sustained from the things
said, but for himself he thinks the opinion holding mutual
dependence as a necessary condition seems to be the more in-
telligible and easier one. If these arguments are consid-
ered carefully they will be seen to supersede the argument

37

that the form and matter are true causes. The reason for
concern is that Suarez is of the opinion that if matter is a
true cause of form and form the true cause of matter, then
absolutely speaking one cannot exist without the other. The
doctrine on the rational soul militates against this, for

the rational soul can exist without matter. The other

 

quia in caelo videtur esse haec mutua connexio inter
materiam et formam; nam et in fieri et in esse mutuo et per
se pendent, ut supra dictum est, ita ut concreatio unius per
se pendeat a concreatione alterius, et e converso. Ex quo
exemplo potest sumi tertia ratio, quia materia caeli pendet
a sua determinata forma, ut a causa per se; ergo et materia
horum inferiorum pendebit eodem modo a forma generabili,
licet indefinite. Patet consequentia, quia perfectior est
materia caeli; ergo si illa pendet, multo magis alia. Disp.
Meta. XV, Sect. 8, par. 20.

37Sunt quidem hae rationes probabiles, et ita potest
utraque pers ex dictis probabiliter sustineri; mihi tamen
(ut verum fatear) prior videtur intelligibilior et facilior,
et si attente ponderentur rationes factae, facilius possunt
posteriores dissolvi. Quod munus lectori relinquo, quia res
facilis videtur, quia infra explicando quomodo causae sint
sibi invicem causae, radicitus declarandum est quaenam
prioritas mutua possit inter aliqua duo intercedere, et quae
non possit, ex cuius intelligentia maxime pendet praesens
resolutio. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 8, par. 21.

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reason for concern is that the true cause formulation seems
to militate against the absolute power of God, whereas the
mutual dependence as necessary condition always allows for
the intervention of God's power. God does create and sus-
tain forms without matter as is the case of the rational
soul and the angels. The true cause argument would seem to
say he cannot do this. For these reasons, then, the rela-
tionship of matter and form is one of necessary condition
this position not only allows for forms of the higher types
but it also allows for the intervention of the absolute

power of God.38

The Unicity of Substantial Form

There is one final topic to be treated with respect
to the metaphysics of form. It has been in many oblique
ways that Suarez is much concerned that there be nothing in-
terposed between the matter and the form. In the chapter on
matter he was concerned to show that there not be a "union,"
"generation," or "corruption" between the matter and the
form, that matter be of itself a simple rather than a com-
posed or integral being, and that quantity, even though in
matter, in no way served to constitute matter as a whole be-
ing. In this present chapter it has also been shown at
least by implication that there is a single substantial form
for each being. In Section 10 of Disputation XV Suarez

takes up the problem of a single substantial form. The

A

38Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 9, pars. 2-8.

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138
discussion first proceeds negatively by rejecting three
common opinions with respect to the multiplicity of forms.
1. Some have said there is a multiplication of forms in ac-
cord with essential predication. 2. Scotus and Henry of
Ghent have held the opinion that there is a form of corpo-
reity in addition to the substantial form. 3. Others have
held the Opinion that there is a separate form for each
grade of being in which an existent participates.39 Suarez
views this enumeration of positions to constitute the most
serious arguments for multiple substantial forms, and by re-
jecting each opinion Suarez establishes his own position

that each real existent has only one substantial form.

 

39Explicata causalitate formee, necessarium est eius
unitatem vel multitudinem in eedem effectu vel composite
expenere, ut hinc simul constet an intra hec genus causae
sit aliqua subordinatie vel dependentia causarum respectu
eiusdem effectus. Duobus autem medis intelligi potest in
una substantia esse plures formas, scilicet, vel in diversis
partibus materiae vel in eadem materia. De prieri mode hie
non disputamus, uia etsi in diversis partibus materiae
dentur diversae ermae, tamen unaquaeque earum unum tantum
habet effectum preprium in sua materia. Qued 51 ex omnibus
illis substantiis una cempenitur tamquam ex partibus
integrantibus ipsam, necesse est ut fermae illae nen sint
totales, sed partiales, unam tetalem formam integrantes.
Atque ita ea multitude partium nen impediet queminus unius
effectus totalis una detur adaequata causa formalis. Et
quidem si huiusmodi partiales fermae sint eiusdem rationis,
nen est dubium quin possint in materialibus formis pro
diversitate partium materiae multiplicari et uniri ad
componendum unam substantiam. An vere formas diversarum
rationum possint esse partiales et inter se uniri ad
cempenendam unam substantiam, et quanta pessit esse illa
unie, an, scilicet per veram centinuatienem mathematicam
vel per minerem aliquam ceniunctienem physicam, haec omnia
non pertinent ad praesentem materiam, sed ad scientiam de
anima; nam illa emnia petissimum quaeri solent propter
partes heterogeneas viventium, et maxime propter sanguinem
et alios humeres existentes in animali, de quibus nonnulla
attigi I tome, III partis, disp. XV, sec. 5, 6, et 7.
DiSp..Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 1.

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With respect to the opinion that there is a multi-
plication of forms in accord with essential predication,
Suarez feels that philosophers who hold this position do so
on the basis of a misunderstanding of what it means to give
an essential definition. This approach multiplies forms
without foundation and without necessity. Universals are
not distinguished from particulars in reality nor are genera
distinguished from species in reality. When predications
are multiplied it is only through abstraction and precision
of our intellect. It is silly to think that these forms

correspond in reality to distinct things."O

Perhaps an ex-
ample would help here. If one takes an essential definition
such as, "Man is a rational animal," the present opinion
would hold that the predication here is composed of two
parts "rationality" and "animality," and that for each of
these parts there is a distinct form. Suarez says that this
type of essential definition does not indicate separate

forms in reality but is rather the indication of one form

the uniqueness of which one designates by the essential

 

holbidem est etiam tractata et cursim impugnata
epinio quae affirmat formas substantiales realiter

multiplicari in composite iuxta multitudinem praedicaterum
essentialium, . . . Verumtamen haec sententia antiquata iam
est et ut omnino improbabilis reiecta; nam praeter rationes
generales quas inferius efficiemus pro unitate formee, haec
ratio convincit falsitatis illam opinionem, qued multiplicet
formas sine fundamento et necessitate, nam in superioribus
ostensum est universalia non distingui realiter a
particularibus, nec genera ab speciebus; ergo cum haec
predicate multiplicentur solum per abstractionem et
praecisionem nostri intellectus, vanum est existimare illis
correspondere in re formas realiter distinctas. Disp. Meta.
XV, Sect. 10, per. h.

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predication "rational animal." The distinction is one the
intellect makes not a distinction of real forms of "ration-
ality" and "animality" in one and the same being. In a
word, one cannot allow usage to deceive him on the matter of
number of substantial forms in a composite being.

The second opinion Suarez rejects with respect to
multiplicity of forms is that of Scotus and Henry of Ghent
who hold that there is a form of corporeity in certain types

41 Scotus thought that the form of cor-

of composite beings.
poreity intercedes between matter and every soul but not in-
deed between matter and inanimate forms. Henry of Ghent re-
quires this form only in man. The foundation of Scotus'
position seems to have been that a soul is a form transcend-
ing the general level of body and it requires a diaposition
and variety in the matter appropriate to organic life which
other forms do not require. Therefore, a soul as such does
not give being to a body but presupposes it through some
form by reason of which matter is supposed capable of the
necessary organization and disposition for a soul. In in-

#2

animate things, however, this necessity ceases.

 

thhe doctrine of the form of corporeity was pro-
posed to take care of the need for matter to be organized in
a certain way before a soul could be joined to that matter.
Scotus was the chief proponent of the doctrine. For simple

but accurate treatments of Scotus' position on this matter
the reader is referred to Copleston, A_Histor of Philos-

o h , Vol. 2, part 2, especially Chapters XIVII and—XIIX;

an Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random
House, 1962), 233 ff.

#2. . . ad hec caput spectat epinio Scoti et Henrici
supra tacta, disp. XIII, qui ponunt etiam formam
corporeitatis aut mixti ut per se necessarium inter materiam

 

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This is a very dangerous opinion, according to
Suarez, for if one allows a form of corporeity one is, in
effect, destroying the p§§_§g_unity created by the partial
substances, matter and form. Suarez begins his refutation

of Scotus by showing that this doctrine contradicts two

 

et formas quasdam substantiales, quamvis non eodem mode;
Scotus enim putat intercedere inter materiam et omnem
animam, non vere inter materiam et formas inanimatorum;
Henricus vere solum in homine illam formam requirit. Funda-
mentum Scoti, si a priori explicetur, fuisse videtur quia
anima est forma transcendens communem gradum corporis et
requirit in materia dispositionem et varietatem quamdam
organorum, quam aliae formae non requirunt; ergo anima ut
sic non dat esse corporis sed praesupponit illud per aliam
formam, ratione cuius supponitur materia capax
erganizationis et dispositionis necessariae ad animam; in
rebus autem inanimatis cessat haec necessitas. Et
confirmari hoc potest ex communi modo loquendi; dicimus enim
vivens censtare corpore et anima, non tamen dicimus aquam
vel aerem censtare ex corpore et tali forma, sed ex materia
et tali forma; ergo signum est corpus, qued in viventibus
dicitur esse altera pars compositi praeter materiam
includere quamdam substantialem formam intermediam inter
materiam et animam. De que corpore optime intelligitur
definitio illa animae: est actus corporis physici, ‘
organici, potentia vitam habentis. Nam cum illud corpus
qued cendistinguitur ab anima sit pars physica, non includit
animam ipsam, etiam ut dantem superiorem gradum quia alias
non esset ex eis compositio physica, sed metaphysica; nec
etiam dicit solam materiam aut nudam, quia hoc modo communis
est omnibus rebus naturalibus, aut cum accidentibus, quia
haec non pertinent ad essentiam substantiae; ergo includit
specialem formam substantialem distinctam ab anima. Secundo
ac principaliter metus est Scotus argumente a posteriori,
quia in morte animalis recedit anima et non statim
introducitur nova forma; non est autem dicendum manere
materiam sine forma; ergo dicendum est manere sub forma
corporeitatis, quae praeerat in animali. Meier probatur,
quia, si introduceretur forma, illa esset diversa pro
diversitate dispesitionum; videmus autem non ita esse, sed
in morte hominis idem cadaver manere sive ex redundantia
caloris sive frigoris moriatur. Accedit etiam saepe nullum
esse agens a que talis forma educatur. Tertio utitur Scotus
argumente theologice, qued maxime movit Henricum; nam dici
non potest corpus hominis mortui semper esse specie aut
numero distinctum a corpore viventis; ergo necesse est
fateri manere eamdem numero formam corporis sive nova forma,

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142
principles of Aristotle--l. No substantial corruption can
occur without a subsequent generation. 2. After a sub-
stantial corruption takes place there must remain a sen-
sible composite of matter and substantial form.‘+3 The
point Suarez is making is not so much that the Scotist
doctrine contradicts Aristotle as that it destroys the
relationship of matter and form. The two Arsitotelian
principles simply make explicit what is embedded in a hy-
lomorphic theory.

There are, however, other arguments against this
position which make no use of the authority of Aristotle.
If one holds that a part of a substance is able to be re-
ductively under a genus and not under a species, then it
is impossible for it to be under a genus unless it is in
sgmg species of that genus. Just as matter, even matter
conserved by the absolute power of God, is not able not to

be some ultimate kind of matter so the same situation holds

 

quia variata forma, variatur individuum immo et species.
Antecedens patet, quia alias non fuisset in sepulchro idem
numero corpus, qued fuit in Christo vivente. Et si hostia
fuisset ante Christi mortem consecrata et servata in triduo,
non manSisset in ea idem corpus numero, quae videntur esse
contra dicta Sanctorum. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 7.

hBHaec vere epinio etiam multiplicet formas sine
sufficienti fundamento, et impugnari potest eisdem
rationibus quibus dicta disp. XIII contra Avicen. usi sumus.
Et praeterea supponit Scotus in sue sententia duo quae
Aristoteli repugnant. Unum est interdum fieri corruptionem
substantialem sine subsequenti generatione, contra Arist.,
I de Gener., 3. Secundum est fieri corruptionem
substantialem manente complete substantia sensibili
composita ex materia et forma contra eumdem Philesophum, I
de Gener., c. h. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 8.

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with respect to genus and species.hh There is also an ad
hominem argument against Scotus. If he does not think it
appropriate for this body to remain, which he says is a part
of substance without an ulterior form, why does he not judge
it inappropriate for matter to remain without any form?
Therefore, he ought not introduce the form of corporeity

simply on the basis of inappropriateness."5 One can also

 

3“. . . quia, licet pars substantiae reductive
possit esse sub genere et non sub Specie, tamen, si directe
et proportionate illi assignentur genera et species,
impossibile est esse sub genere quin sit in aliqua specie
eius, sicut supra dicebamus materiam, etiam censervatam de
potentia Dei absolute sine forma non posse non esse in
aliqua ultima specie materiae. Ita ergo forma illa quae
constituit illud corpus seu cadaver non potest esse sub
communi genere formee substantialis quin sit in aliqua
ultima specie substantialis formee; ergo compositum ex tali
forma et materia erit etiam in aliqua ultima specie
substantiae cempesitee; ergo non tantum reductive in genere
corporis. Et haec ratio, ut supra dicebam, convincit etiam
illud compositum non esse amplius actuabile per ulterierem
differentiam substantialem, neque per formam a que talis
differentia sumatur, et idee non esse partem nec potentiam
per se ordinatam ad ulteriorem actum substantialem, sed esse
cempletam substantiam in actu ultimo constitutam; nulla enim
substantia est ita complete in actu nisi quia habet aliquam
formam substantialem constitutam in aliqua specie ultima
talis formee. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 10.

“5. . . argumentum ad hominem contra Scotum, quia,
81 non existimat inconveniens manere hoc corpus, qued dicit
esse partem substantiae, sine ulteriori forma non est cur
inconveniens iudicet materiam manere sine forma; ergo ad
vitandum hoc incenveniens non debuit intreducere hanc
corporeitatis formam. Antecedens patet, quia, sicut materia
est potentia per se ordinate ad formam, ita corpus illud est
potentia per se ordinate ad animam. Et sicut materia sub
illa forma corporeitatis habet aliquam actualitatem, ita per
se sole habet prepriam actualitatem entitativam, quae
sufficit ed existendum; ergo non est cur magis pendeat
entitas materiae ab illa forma corporeitatis quam ipsa forma
corporeitatis ab ulteriori forma, id est, anima; si ergo
forma corporeitatis potest manere sine anima, etiam materia
poterit manere sine forma corporeitatis. Est ergo imper-
tinens illa forma. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 11.

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see that it follows from the opinion of Scotus that in sub-
stantial generations there would often be introduced two
really distinct forms into a being. Therefore, since
changes will be multiplied there will be two substantial
generations constituting one substantial composite. But
this is absurd.’+6 Finally, on the Scotist doctrine it can
occur that a body made up of a given matter and form of cor-
poreity at one time could live a human life, and afterwards
the life of an animal. If that form remains in the cadaver
without disposition to human life, why would it not more
appropriately remain in every situation whatever? The
Scotist position on the form of corporeity limits this form
to living beings without a good reason. Rather, it seems
that the form of corporeity should be extended to all
composites, even inanimate.‘+7

Suarez now gives by way of summary a general state-

ment against the multiplication of forms by means of the

 

L6. . . sequitur ex opiniene Scoti in generatione
substantiali saepe introduci dues formas realiter dis-
tinctae; cum ergo mutationes multiplicentur ex terminis,
erunt duae generationes substantiales ad unum compositum
substantiale censtituendum. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10,
par. 11.

“7. . . accidere potest qued idem numero corpus, ex
eisdem numero materia et forma constans, nunc vivat vita
hominis, postea vita bruti; nam quando ex cadavere generatur
vermis, non est cur mutetur forma corporeitatis; nam si illa
manet in cadavere sine dispositionibus hominis, poterit
melius manere sub forma cuiuscumque viventis. Immo inde
videtur ulterius sequi sine causa limitari hanc formam ad
sola viventia, sed ut minimum extendi debere ad omnia mixta,
etiam inanimate; nam ut ipse etiam Scotus loquitur, illa est
forma mixtienis consurgens ex mixtione elementorum; ergo
ubicumque fuerit haec mixtio, erit in materia dispositio
sufficiens ad hanc formam; erit ergo in omnibus mixtis

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form of corporeity. Although the soul is a higher form than

the inanimate forms and needs a special organization in the
matter, there is no necessity for a form of corporeity. Of
itself the soul is sufficient for immediate actuation and
conservation of matter both in being and dependency. The
consequence is that the composite resulting from such matter
and form is capable of three dimensions which is a body of
the predicament, "substance." It is sufficient for such a
form to require in different parts of the matter different
accidental dispositions by which the different organs are
completed. Without the body, the soul, if divisible, has
various parts to which the dispositions of the body respond.
Or, without the body, the soul, if indivisible, contains in
itself eminent and perfect being in all its variety.“8 The

Scotist position, then, leads to nothing but absurdities.

 

inanimatis; aliequi oportet ut Scotus declaret quaenam
transmutatio facta in materia cadaveris sufficiat ad expel-
lendam hanc formam. Nulla certe poterit rationabiliter
assignari, nisi fertasse reselutio in prime simplicia
elementa; nam ad omnes alias dispositiones quae consurgunt
ex mixtione elementorum videtur esse indifferens talis
forma, cum dicatur manere in ligno, esse et carne, etc.

Quod si hec consequens edmittatur, vix poterit assignari
rationebilis differentia, cur talis forma non sit in materia
cum forma auri vel alterius mixti homogenei, etc. Unde si
penenda esset forma corporeitatis, magis consequenter
loqueretur qui eam poneret in eminibus entitatibus
naturalibus cum Avicenna quam in quibusdam, ut alii faciunt.
Atque hae rationes sufficiunt etiam contra opinionem
Henrici; nam quae dicta sunt de viventibus in communi
applicari facile possunt ad solum hominem. Disp. Meta. XV,
Sect. 10, par. 12.

thccedit rationes quibus hi auctores moti sunt ad
introducendam illam formam valde debiles esse. Ad primam
enim respondetur, quamvis anima sit superior forma quam
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146

The final argument Suarez feels that he must reject
is the one which states that there is a multiplication of
forms in accord with the grade of being a thing possesses.
The argument is that there are four grades of material sub-
stances--inanimate bodies, vegetative, sensible, and ra-
tional--whatever participates in one grade has one form (in-
animate bodies), whatever participates in two grades has two
forms (vegetative). Animals participate in three grades and
human beings in four, having three and four forms respec-
tively."9 The opinion need be taken seriously only at the
human level and then only to the extent that there might be

a necessity for two forms. The two reasons for this are

 

membrorum, non propterea esse necessarium corporeitatis
formam; nam per se sufficit ad actuandam immediate materiam
et conservandam illam in esse seu terminandam dependentiam
illius, et consequenter satis etiam est ut compositum ex
tali materia et forma sit capax trinae dimensionis, qued est
esse corpus de praedicamento substantiae; sufficit denique
ut talis forma requirat in diversis partibus materiae
diversae dispositiones accidentales, per quas diversa organa
complentur, sive quia anima ipsa, si divisibilis sit, varies
habet partes diversarum rationum partialium, quibus illae
dispositiones respondent; sive quia, si anima sit
indivisibilis, in sua eminenti et perfecta entitate totam
illam varietatem virtute continet. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect.
10, par. 13.

thltimus modus dicendi in hoc prime capite esse
potest in unaqueque re tot multiplicari formas substantiales
per se subordinates, quot sunt gradus rerum naturalium et
iuxta numerum graduum qui ab una et eadem substantia
participantur. Sunt autem quatuor gradus substantiarum
materialium, scilicet, inanimatorum cor orum, vegetabilium,
sensibilium et rationalium. Rursus ent a naturalia quaedam
participant unum solum gradum, et in eis tantum est una
forma, et haec sunt corpora inanimate; vegetantia vere duos
participant gradus, unde duebus formis constituuntur;
animalia tribus, homines quattuer. Quam sententiam hoc mode
integre declaratam non invenio, . . . Disp. Meta. XV,
Sect. 10, par. 16.

 

 

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that the rational soul is not able properly to be a vege-
tative or sensitive form because forms of this kind are
material and corruptible. Therefore, on account of these

reasons there is required in man some subhuman forms be-

sides the soul whether one er many does not matter.50

Suarez finds this opinion improbable both philosoph-
ically and theologically.5l In so far as it places multiple
souls in man, and indeed in so far as it distinguishes mul-
tiple forms in the grades of being it is proven to be false
if it follows that human beings genuinely have souls. All
the reasons given above by which one proves that the soul is
not distinguished from the form of the body (form of corpo-
reity) prove that the addition of a new grade of being does

not suffice for really distinguishing forms. Indeed, the

 

soSelum in homine videtur inveniri peculiaris
necessitas plurium animarum, saltem duarum, ob dues
praecipuas causes homini proprias. Una est, quia rationalis
anime est perfects spiritualis st indivisibilis maximeque
distans ab imperfections materiae; et idee extrema tam
distantia non videntur posse immediate ceniungi; est ergo
necessaria aliqua forma qua mediante uniantur. Atque haec
ratio psculiariter favet opinioni Henrici supra tractatae,
nam anima rationalis, cum sit incorporea, non potest dare
esse corporeum; ergo nec potest esse forma corporeitatis.
Et eadem ratione non potest esse forma vegetative aut
sensitive formaliter; nam huiusmodi formas sunt materiales
et cerruptibiles; ergo propter haec requiritur in homine
aliqua forma materiales praeter animam, sive illa sit una
sive multiplex. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 17.

51The present study is a philosophical one as is the
Dis utationes Metaphysicae but it should be noted that
Suarez feeIs that good philosophy and good theology will not
contradict one another. This gives him the right, he feels,
to cite theological reasons when he wants to refute an in-
adequate philosophical epinion. Suarez is very much in the
mainstream of scholastic thinkers in that he feels philos-
ophy is the handmaid of theology.

 

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reasons given against the first opinion by which it has been
shown that forms are not really distinguished on account of
different quidditative predicates, show that such grades or
differences are not forms really to be distinguished in such
a substance.52 In addition to these philosophical refuta-

tions Suarez adds a series of theological ones which are not

 

52Immo rationes factae contra primam sententiam,
quibus ostensum est non distinqui realiter formas propter
diversa praedicata quidditativa inter se subordinate, idem
probant, etiam si unum praedicatum addat alteri novum
gradum, nem quando illi duo gradus in una st eadem re
coniunguntur, unus comparatur ad alium ut differentia
specifics ed genericam, et its ex utroque una substantialis
species constituitur tamquam ex universali st particulari;
ergo in re non distinguuntur illi gradus seu differentiae ut
coniunctae in tali specie; ergo nec formas, quae sunt
principia talium graduum vel differentiarum, realiter
distinguuntur in tali substantia. Quod tandem declaratur
applicando cum proportions rationem supra factam, nem si in
equo, verbi gratis, est anima vegetative, necesse est ut per
aliquem specificam differentiam sit contracts, nam anima
vegetative ut sic solum dicit rationem genericam, quae
distinguitur per varies species, ut in arboribus et plantis
est evidentissimum; non potest autem esse in equo individua
st realis anima constitute sub genere animae vegetativae et
non sub aliqua specie illius generis; ergo necesse est ut
per aliquam specificam differentiam sit contracts et
constitute. Aut ergo illa differentia continetur intra
gradum ipsum vegetativum, sicut differentia specifics
cuiusdem arboris, verbi gratis, piri, manet intra
latitudinem gradus vegetativi; vel est ipsamet differentia
elevans illam animam ad gradum ssnsitivum. Primum dici non
potest, quia alias illa enima ut sic constitueret ultimam
quamdam et infimam speciem rei vegetabilis quae non esset
capax ulterioris differentiae et consequenter neque
ulterioris animae; neque compararetur ille gradus ad
subsequentem ut genus ed Speciem, sed opponerentur tamquam
duae species ultimae condistinctae; ergo necesse est dicere
secundum, nimirum animam vegetativam secundum suam rationem
genericam contrahi in anima equi per ipsummet gradum
specificum. Ex que aperte concluditur animam vegetativam in
equo non esse re distinctam a sensitive, quia nulls res
potest distingui realiter a differentia per quam
essentialiter constituitur. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par.
20, Cf. also par. 21.

 

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of concern here, but which conclude to the same opinion that
there cannot be a really distinct form for each of the vari-
ous grades of being.53

Once the groundwork has been laid, by refuting all
of the contrary opinions about the multiplicity of forms,
Suarez' proof that there is a single substantial form is
fairly concise. From an adequate enumeration of entitative
parts (i.e., matter, form, substance, and accident) one can
see that there is no way for there to be in matter multiple
forms essentially subordinated as set and potency. Nor, can
there be an ordering and subordination of forms. Nor can
there be simple agreement without any ordering among the
forms. This is an exhaustive enumeration; therefore, there
is no way that multiple formal causes work to bring about
the same effect. Secondly, the substantial form is suffi-
cient for constituting by itself a complete substantial sup-
posit in some ultimate species. Therefore, not only is no
additional form required but one cannot even allow it.
Finally, from the proof that there are substantial forms one
can draw the most powerful argument against a multiplicity.
In these arguments for the existence of the form it was
shown that for the perfect constitution of a natural being
it is necessary that all the faculties and operations of the
being be rooted in one essential principle. These facul-
ties and operations are the natural effect of the form. The

plurality of forms, therefore, is altogether alien to the

 

53Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. lO, pars. 22-23.

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150
constitution of nature}!+ Here one sees Suarez making use
of all his previous work in order to preserve the distinc-
tive relationship between the matter and the form. A plu-
rality of forms would once again interpose something between
the two ce-principles of being and this would destroy the

unity of the being.

Conclusion

As a summary to this chapter it is well to point out
several of the significant moves Suarez has made in his
treatment of formal cause. A particular type of argument
based on the grades of being was used to prove both the ex-
istence of the form and the unicity of the form. The result
of the discussion on the being and essence of the form con-
cluded in a description of form which exactly parallels the
description of matter. The causality of form showed how
eduction from the potency of matter was not an action which
is proper to efficiency but is a union which is proper to
the form. Although Suarez opts for a mutual dependence of
matter and form in terms of a necessary condition of one for
the other, he sees that there are arguments for the fact
that the matter and form do in some sense cause each other.
Finally, in order to preserve the unity of the being, he de-
nies every possible version of the opinion which holds a
multiplicity of substantial forms.

In the early part of this present chapter it was

 

54Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, pars. 6l-6L.

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151
pointed out that Suarez reasons that since humans have a
substantial form, every lower being must also have a sub-
stantial form. There is certainly no attempt to say that
the human form is identical with the lower forms, but Suarez
is presuming in this type of argument that there are, in-
deed, grades of being. The doctrine of the grades of being
is coin of the realm as far as scholasticism is concerned.
What Suarez wants to do is take the highest grade and then
prove that because the highest grade of being has a substan-
tial form all lower grades must have this form. The ap-
proach rests on a second assumption also; that is, that all
higher grades of being include everything that the lower
grades include in addition to what would place them in the
higher grade. In a word, humans include whatever an animal,
plant or inanimate object might have plus that which makes a
distinctively human form-—rationality. Suarez has turned
this assumption end for end and rather than prove that
plants are more sophisticated than inorganic objects, and
animals than plants, and men than animals, he shows that
there is less sophistication in each lower grade by taking
something away from the previous grade. The approach might
work except for the gap which occurs between animal and man
because of the nature of the rational soul. It would have
been much better to prove the existence of subhuman forms
(inanimate, plants, animals) and then account for the ra-
tional soul. Instead, he has had to make a jump between the

immaterial human form and subhuman forms. It seems that

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152
this especially harms the arguments for the unity of a com-
posite being because the human form is such a special
case.55

In a strict discussion of subhuman forms Suarez does
maintain the peg gs unity of the being. His parallel defi-
nition of form as an incomplete, partial substance, as the
act of matter relates the two co-principles as simple beings
needing each other for completion. When matter and form are
joined in the composite, the causality of the form which is
the union itself is not a third thing relating the original
two co-principles. The same concern is expressed in the
doctrine on the relation of matter and form in terms of
mutual dependence in the sense that matter and form are ne-
cessary conditions one for the other and not causes of each
other. The concern for per s3 unity is also expressed in
the demand for a single form in each living being. Any more
than one form destroys that unity.

From these discussions, then, Suarez does achieve
the purpose of a hylomorphic theory of bringing a single be-
ing out of two ce-principles. The dangerous move of grant-
ing matter its own being and essence does not look quite so

destructive in light of the treatment of form. There is,

 

55Even though it has been implied rather extensively
throughout these two chapters on matter and form that the
rational soul requires some very Special treatment, it has
been necessary to defer the consideration of the rational
soul until the fifth chapter of this study. In that chapter
it will be shown that Suarez' position on the rational soul
makes it impossible for him to have a genuine unity in the
human being.

w e
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153

however, one major problem: Suarez can hold this hylomor-
phic doctrine and achieve pg; s2 unity in those beings which
are "educed from matter" but, the rational soul is "intro-
duced into matter;" this destroys mutual dependence on the
human level. There is, indeed, a break between human and
subhuman being; what Suarez holds with respect to subhuman
forms often does not hold in the case of the rational soul.

This present study has deferred wherever possible
any discussion of the rational soul until the chapter on
body and soul. What one can say, though, even at this
point, is that there is constant allowance for the unique-
ness of this form and it will be necessary to ask some hard
questions with respect to the unity of the human being at
the appropriate time. Before body and soul can be treated
directly, there is one final metaphysical problem to ana-
lyze. Individuation must necessarily play a large part in
any analysis of the unity of a being. Consequently, the
next chapter will investigate Suarez' analysis of this

problem.

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I

CHAPTER IV
INDIVIDUATION

The previous chapters on matter and form have shown
that these two interior causes in Suarez are more independ-
ently real than was the case in either Aristotle or the high
scholasticism of the Thirteenth Century. In this present
chapter it is necessary to confront directly the problem of
what it means to be an individual.1 For this material one
turns to Disputation V, "De Unitate Individuali Eiusque
Principio." Suarez is concerned first with the very meaning
of "individuality" and "singularity" and asks whether all
things which either exist or are able to exist are singular
and individual. Once it is acknowledged that existence and
individuality are coterminous one with the other, he faces
the problem of whether individuality adds anything to the

common and specific nature. The answer to this question

 

1Suarez' doctrine on individuality has been seen by
several authors for its uniqueness. Most of the articles
written to date on this matter have been mainly expository
of the position with little appreciation of its implications
for the general metaphysical theory. The reader is referred
to the following as exam les of the articles on individual-
ity and individuation: ieu, Francois Suarez, Chapter II.
A. F. De Vos, "El aristotelismo de Suarez, y su teoria de la
individuacion," Revue Filosofia A7 (l9h8): 755-66. Juan
Rosanas, "El rincip e de individuacion, segun Suarez,"
Ciencia Fe61950):69-86.

15h

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results in
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iiscussion
rejects th
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form is al
that even

it is not

individua:

i3 able to

and form .3

 

 

155
results in a claim that individuality is something added to
the common and specific nature. This assertion leads to a
discussion of the principle of individuation. Suarez first
rejects the doctrine of materia quantitate signata as the
sole principle of individuation and then argues that the
form is also a principle of individuation.2 The claim is
that even though matter does play a part in individuation,
it is not the only nor even the most important principle of
individuation. At this point in Suarezian metaphysics one
is able to see the clear dualism of the doctrine on matter

and form.3

The Nature of Individuality
When Suarez begins his discussion of the unity of
the individual he is concerned first and foremost with an
understanding of what it means "to be an individual" or "to

be a singular thing." For Suarez, to be an individual is to

 

2The special theory of individuation is mentioned by
John A. Mburent in his article, "Suarez, Francisco (15h8-
1617)," in The Enc clo edia of Philosophy (New York: Mac-
millan and rise Press I972)_Sut the treatment here does not
appreciate the significance and complexity of Suarez?
approach.

3Tris in hec disputatione inquiremus: primum an
haec unites omnibus rebus existentibus cenveniat; deinde
quid in eis sit; ac denique qued principium ssu radicem in
singulis habeat. Et quoniam hec ultimum non potest in rebus
omnibus eadem ratione explicari, sigillatim inquiretur de
substentiis materialibus, spiritualibus, et accidentibus.
Disp. Meta. V, Intro.

It is well to point out at this early stage that
Suarez' discussion of individuation is in terms of a much
broader context than had been usual up to his time. The
treatment is meant to take care of individuation on all
levels of reality, not only individuation of material beings.

he explain

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156
be any of those things which are actual beings, either those
things which exist or are able to exist immediately. Re-
alizing that the term "immediate" can prove to be a problem
he explains that this word excludes all universal beings
which are not able to exist as such but only in singular and

individual beings.h

This is not the appropriate place to
explicate Suarez' doctrine on universals, but from what has
been said one can see that he is unequivocally rejecting all
versions of Platonic realism.

His proof of the assertion "that whatever exists or

is able to exist, exists as an individual," follows from the

fact that whatever exists has a certain and determinate

 

“Sic ergo explicata ratione individui seu singularis
entis dicendum est res omnes, quae sunt actualis entia seu
quae existunt vel existere possunt immediate, esse
singulares ac individuas. Dico immediate, ut excludam
communes rationes entium, quae ut sic non possunt immediate
existere, neque habere actualem entitatem, nisi in
entitatibus singularibus et individuis, quibus sublatis
impossibile est aliquid reale manere, sicut de primis
substantiis dixit Aristoteles in Praedicamentis, c. de
Substantia. Et ita explicata assertio est per se evidens,

uam contra Platonem probat Aristoteles, I lib. Metaph., c.
et lib. VII, text. 26 et 27, et saepe alias. Quamquam
multi existimant Aristotelem sinistre fuisse interpretatum

Platonis sententiam de ideis, quod vel illas posuerit in
mente divina, vel certe non reipsa, sed ratione tantum
formali ab individuis separates; sed hoc parum nostra
interest, et illud iterum attingemus disputatione sequenti.
Nunc probatur assertum, quia guidquid existit habet certam
et determinatam entitatem; se omnis talis entitas
necessario habet adiunctum negationem; ergo et
singularitatem individuamque unitatem. Minor patet, quia
omnis entitas, hoc ipso quod determinata entitas est, non
potest dividi a seipsa; ergo nec potest dividi in plures
quae tales sint qualis ipsa est, alioqui tota illa entitas
esset in singulis, et consequenter, ut est in unua,
divideretur a seipea prout est in alia, quod manifestam
involvit repugnantiam. Omnis ergo entitas, hoc ipso quod
est una entitas in rerum natura, necessaria est una
raedicto modo, atque ideo singularis et individua. Disp.
eta. V, Sect. 1, par. h.

being. BL”
it. That :
mined exis
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157
being. But every such being has some negation attached to
it. That is, it is a this and net's that. Such a deter-
mined existence is singular and individual. As exposition
for this argument Suarez examines what it means to be de-
terminate being and states that such a being cannot be di-
vided from itself and therefore cannot be divided into a
many which would be the same as the original being.5 Be-
cause of the absurdity to which the position of dividing a
determinate being leads, Suarez concludes that every being
which is a real natural being, is necessarily singular and
an individual.6 Logically speaking, this argument is un-
satisfactory since it is cast in an invalid form (A is B;
B is not C, therefore A is not C); the underlying concern
Suarez expresses, however, is very real in that he wants to
grant individuality only to actually existing beings or be-
ings that can actually exist. The argument is against Pla-
tonic realisms in order to preserve the uniqueness of the
individual and to say that only individuals exist in the
concrete (i.e., qua individual).

This position has the implication that universals

 

5This whole discussion is reminiscent of the prob-

lems Plato faced in the Parmenides. Suarez in his own time
is certainly aware of the problems of the one and the many.
He sees that the whole theory is full of difficulties and
will accept his own version of this material in a later dis-
utation. For a good Contemporary treatment of the
uarezian doctrine on the one and the many the reader is re-
ferred to Francisco Pecorini, "Suarez's Strug 1e with the
Problem of the One and the Many,” Thomist 36 1972):

‘33-'71 o
6Disp. Meta. v, Sect. 1, pars. u-s.

are not at
because if
and Paul e
and Paul c
held the 1
being divi
universal.
is in Pete
Peter and
time: in ‘:
11"le uni...

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contradic.

 

 

158

are not able to exist separately from the singular beings
because if a "universal man" should exist apart from Peter
and Paul either that "universal man" would remain in Peter
and Paul or altogether separate from them. If one were to
hold the latter position "man" would already be a singular
being divided off from Peter and Paul and hence not a true
universal. If, however, one holds that the "universal man"
is in Peter and Paul, either it is the same in both and then
Peter and Paul are not two men but rather one, or it is dis-

tinct in both of them and then the "universal man" is not

truly universal.7

7Quae ratio concludit etiam de potentia absolute
intelligi non posse ut realis entitas, prout in re ipsa
existit, singularis et individua non sit, quia implicat
contradictionem esse entitatem et esse divisibilem in plures
entitates, quae sint tales qualis ipsa est. Alioqui esse
posset simul una et plures entitative seu secundum eamdem
realem entitatem quod involvit contradictionem. Et haec
ratio etiam convincit universalia non posse esse a
singularibus separata, quia si homo universalis existeret
extra Petrum et Paulum, etc., vel ille esset etiam in Petro
et Paulo vel omnino maneret separatus extra illos; si
dicatur hoc posterius, iam homo ut sic esset quaedam res
singularis condivisa a Petro et Paulo; falso ergo dicebatur
universalis. Et praeterea sequitur nec Petrum nec Paulum
esse homines, quia, ut praedicatum essentiale alicui
cenveniat, necesse est ut non sit separatum ab illo.
Quomodo enim de illo vere dici poterit, si non sit in 1110?
Aut quomodo intelligi potest essentialiter constituere eum
in qua non est? Si vero est in Petro et Paulo, vel est idem
omnino realiter et entitative in utroque, et ita Petrus et
Paulus non erunt duo homines, sed unus; vel est distinctus
secundum rem et entitatem in utroque eorum, et sic ille homo
universalis et separatus aut esset quidam tertius
condistinctus a Petro et Paulo, et sic falso diceretur esse
in illis at ease universalis, quia non esset nisi quidam
singularis distinctus ab aliis, aut certe si idemmet esset
in uno et in altero oporteret esse et distinctus a seipso et
unus et plures realiter secundum essentiam eamdem prout in
re existentem, quae sunt aperte repugnantia. Hac ergo
ratione, necesse est ut omnis res prout a parte rei existit

159

These are rather traditional arguments for the
numerical singularity of existence of the individual.
Suarez rejects all Platonic interpretations of the notion
of individual existence, and clearly states that only indi-
vidual things exist not universals. Suarez has been very
careful to avoid any doctrine of participation that would
destroy the integrity of an actual existent. Rather, the
thing as one finds it in experience is the individual in
Suarezian philosophy. This is a statement of g fggt_thgt;
next Suarez must turn to an analysis of what constitutes the
unity of the individual. In a word, what does the singu-
larity add to a common nature which can be conceived both
abstractly and universally by us.8

There are various opinions asserting different
things that are added by the property of individuality, but
these opinions are often contradictory. One opinion states
that at least in created things the property of individual-
ity adds to the common nature some real mode of existence
distinct from the nature of the thing but composes with that

9

nature the numerically singular individual itself. On the

 

singularis et individua sit. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 1,
par. 5.

8Ostendimus esse in rebus unitatem individuam et
singularem; nunc declarare incipimus quid illa sit, quod non
potest melius aliter fieri quam declarando quid addat supra
communem naturam seu quae a nobis abstracts et universe
concipitur. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 1.

9Prime sententia generaliter affirmat saltem in
rebus creatis individuum addere communi naturae modum
aliquem realem ex natura rei distinctum ab ipsa natura et
componentem cum illa individuum ipsum . . . Fundamentum

O
o
e
w
,.

 

I.

160
other hand, another opinion states that the property of in-
dividuality adds nothing at all to the common nature, rather
each natural being is an individual first and immediately.10
There is a third position stating that there is a distinc-

tion between the property of individuality and the common

 

huius sententiae esse potest illud fere quod (teste
Aristotele) Platonem movit ad ponendas ideas universalium a
singularibus abstractas, scilicet, quia scientiae et
demonstrationes sunt de universalibus et non de
singularibus. Item, quia definitiones essentiales et
propriae dantur de universalibus et non de singularibus.
Item, quia proprietates, quae per se insunt rebus,
conveniunt illis, mediis universalibus naturis, ita ut verum
sit dicere Petrum esse risibilem, quia homo est risibilis;
sicut e contraria praedicata contingentia conveniunt
communibus naturis ratione individuorum; homo enim currit,
quia Petrus currit; ergo haec omnia indicant distinctionem
aliquam ex natura rei inter individuum et naturam communem;
sed haec distinctio esse non potest nisi quatenus individuum
aliquid addit supra naturam communem, quia includit totam
illam; ergo non potest distingui ab illa nisi ut aliquid
addens illi. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 2.

Tertio non eodem formaliter constituitur Petrus ut
Petrus et ut homo, tum quia id quo contituitur homo commune
et ipsi Petro et aliis hominibus; quo autem constituitur in
esse Petri est proprium eius; tum etiam quia alias non
Basset magis concipi homo sub conceptu communi quam

etrus . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. A.

10Secunda sententia extreme contraria est,
individuum nihil omnino addere communi naturae quod
positivum et reale sit, aut re aut ratione distinctum ab
illa, sed unamquamque rem vel naturam per se esse individuam
prime et immediate. . . . Fundamentum est quia nihil potest
intelligi reale quod singulare non sit, ut probatum est
sectione praecedenti; ergo repugnat quod res fiat singularis
per additionem alicuius realis supra naturam communem.
Secundo, quia nulla res fieri potest una per realem
additionem alicuius positivi, ut supra ostensum est, ergo
neque singularis et individua . . . Tertio, quia vel id quod
additur est essentiale, vel accidentale; si essentiale,
sequitur speciem dividi posse per essentiales differentias,
. . . unde ulterius sequitur individua essentialiter
differre, et speciem non dicere totam essentiam seu
quidditatem individuorum, quod est contra Porphyr. et omnes
dialeticos. Denique sequitur individua posse et debere
definiri propria et adaequata definitione essentiali contra

161
nature, but one must distinguish between material beings and
immaterial beings. In immaterial beings nothing is added to
the numerically singular individual by the property of indi-
viduality beyond the common nature; in material things there

11 Given the diversity

is something added by this property.
of opinion concerning the meaning of the property of indi-
viduality, Suarez feels that this whole difficulty must be
clarified before he can answer the question whether or not
the property of individuality adds something to the common
and Specific nature.

There is, he says, no doubt among all these authors
that the property of individuality at least adds some denial
to a common nature (e.g., Peter is ngt_Paul). This denial
completes or constitutes the unity of the individual. This
is known pg; §g_and especially from what has been said with

respect to universals and individuals. If, however, one

speaks about the numerically singular individual, in so far

 

Aristot., VII Metaph., text. 53. Si vero id, quod additur,
est accidentale, sequitur individuum esse ens per accidens;
sequitur etiam accidens non advenire subiecto individuo sed
constituere illud, quod impossibile est, quia si unum ex
alio individuatur, potius accidens a subiecto, quam e
converso, individuationem accipit. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2,
par. 5.

11Tertia sententia potest distinctione uti inter res
spirituales et materiales; nam in immaterialibus res
singularis nihil addit supra naturam communem; in
materialibus vere aliquid . . . Nam ex ibi tractandis
dumendum est fundamentum huius sententiae, scilicet, quia
substantiae immateriales, cum nec materiam habeant nec ad
illam dicant habitudinem, nihil etiam in eis excogitari
potest quod addant supra essentiam, et idea as ipsis sunt
individuae; at vero in rebus compositis additur materia
signata, ex qua sumi potest aliquid quod individuum addat
supra speciem. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 6.

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162
as it is one, it adds a denial in its concept not only over
and above the common nature conceived abstractly and uni-
versally, but also over and above the complete singular be-
ing conceived precisely under a positive understanding.
That is, this complete being is not conceived of as one
singularly and individually unless it is conceived of as
incapable of division into many. The difficulty, then, is
not with the denial itself, whether it appropriately applies
to the understanding of this unity or not; but rather with
the foundation for the denial. Since the denial does not
seem to be founded on the common nature alone (for that
nature is indifferent to nondivisibility), it is necessary
to ask what is in the singular and individual that such a
denial would be apprOpriate to its intelligibility.12 De-

spite the technical terminology Suarez is really asking a

 

12Primo, indubitatum est apud auctores omnes
individuum addere supra naturam communem negationem aliquam
formaliter complentem seu constituentem unitatem individui.
Hoc per se notum est ex ratione unitatis supra explicata,
adiunctis his quae sectione praecedenti notavimus circa
rationem, seu quid nominis individui. Quin potius, si
formaliter loquamur de individua, quatenus tali modo unum
est, negationem addit in suo conceptu formali, non solum
supra naturam communem abstracte et universe conceptam, sed
etiam supra totam entitatem singularem praecise conceptam
sub ratione positiva, quia tota haec entitas non concipitur
ut una singulariter et individuae, donec concipiatur ut
incapax divisionis in plura eiusdem rationis. Difficultas
ergo praesens non est de hac negatione, sive illa formaliter
pertineat ad rationem huius unitatis sive non; nam de hoc
etiam sunt opiniones, de quibus iam diximus praecedenti
disputatione quid verius existimemus; sed est difficultas de
fundamento illius negationis; nam cum non videatur posse
fundari in sola communi natura, illa enim de se indifferens
est et non postulat talem indivisionem in plura similia, sed
in ea potius dividitur ideo inquirimus quid sit in singulari
et individua, ratione cuius ei conveniat talis negatio.
Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 7.

163
very simple question here. When one says that something is
a numerically singular individual, he is saying that it is
this and not that. What is the foundation that allows us to
make this denial?

In answer to this question Suarez draws four conclu-
sions about the property of individuality. 1. Individuality
adds something, beyond the common nature, by reason of which
a being is numerically singular, and the denial of divisi-
bility into many like things is then inappropriate to this
being.13 2. The property of individuality as such does not
add something real by means of a specific nature distinct

14

from the common nature of the thing. 3. The property of

individuality adds something beyond the common nature dis-

15 h. The property of indi-

tinct from it by reason alone.
viduality individuates the individual not only in material
things but also in created immaterial substances adds some-
thing beyond the species by means of this distinction of
reason.16 In this set of statements one can see the major
concern of Suarez-~the property of individuality does add
something to the common nature but not something real; this
something is distinct from the common nature only by a dis-
tinction of reason. These four conclusions are meant to

apply not only to material things but to all created things.

 

13D13p. Meta. v, Sect. 2, par. 8.
1“Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 9.
15Disp. Meta. v, Sect. 2
2

16Disp. Meta. v, Sect.

, par. 16.
, par. 21.

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Now, it is important to look at Suarez' own proof
for these four claims. When one says that the individual
adds something real beyond the common nature, by which it is
an individual, and which denies divisibility into many like
things, one is stating that the common nature of itself does
not postulate such a negation. But, that common nature as
it exists in the thing pg§_§g and intrinsically demands such
a denial. The denial itself, however, is founded on some-
thing positive which is not only a distinction of reason be-
tween the common nature and the individual but also a real
distinction between the two. A specific nature in itself
and in so far as it is a proximate object of the common con-
cept of man, of lion, etc., has nothing contradictory in the
notion of the communication to many. That is, when one con-
siders a given individual in a species, say Peter, and one
applies the common concept "man" to this individual no con-
tradiction arises. The concept "man" applies to Peter, to
Paul and to all other humans. In other words, one does not
equivocate by using this concept of each individual. The
concept of itself is spoken of as negatively indifferent to
many. Through individuation, however, this negative indif-
ference is lost and the concept becomes incapable of such
division into many with respect to this individual. And so,
individuation should be understood as something positive
added to the common nature. For example, Peter and Paul
agree in the common nature they share, but differ between

themselves in their proper intelligibility. Therefore, they

165
add their proper intelligibility to the common nature, and

these proper intelligibilities are something positive.17

The problem, however, with stating that individua-
tion adds something positive to the common nature is that
this statement appears to be a license for the "haecceity"
as advocated by Scotus. It has been shown in the previous
two chapters that Suarez is careful to avoid any addition to
the basic metaphysical principles of matter and form. The
second conclusion on individuality is provided to reject all
versions of Scotism. When Suarez states that the individual
as such does not add something real by means of a separate
specific nature distinct from the nature of the thing, he

means that in the individual, Peter, "humanity" as such and

 

l7Dico primo: individuum aliquid reale addit
praeter naturam communem, ratione cuius tale individuum est
et ei convenit illa negatio divisibilitatis in plura
similia. . . . nam communis natura de se non postulat talem
negationem, et tamen illi naturae, ut in re existit et facta
est haec, per se et intrinsece convenit talis negatio; ergo
additum est ei aliquid ratione cuius illi adiuncta est,
quia emnis negatio ab intrinseca et necessario conveniens
.alicui rei, fundatur in aliquo positivo, quod non potest
esse rationis, sed reale, quandoquidem illa unites et
negatio ipsi rei vere et ex se convenit. Vel aliter proponi
haec ratio potest quia natura specifics secundum se et
quatenus est proximum obiectum conceptus communis hominis,
leonis etc., nihil habet repugnans communicabilitati, et
'ideo dicitur negative indifferens ut infra videbimus; per
Ihanc autem individuationem tollitur haec eius indifferentia
at fit incapax talis divisionis quatenus singularis effecta
est; ergo necesse est ut intelligatur aliquid positivum ei
esse additum, ratione cuius hoc ei repugnat. Denique Petrus
et Paulus conveniunt in communi natura et differunt inter se
in propriis rationibus ergo illas addunt naturae communi;
sed illae positives sunt; non enim constituuntur
negationibus in ratione talis substantiae; ergo. Idem etiam
concludunt argumenta quae ad confirmandam opinionem Scoti
adducta sunt. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 8.

 

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166
"this humanity" (or rather that which is added to "humanity"
that it might become "this") are not related in such a way
that "this" would be distinguished from the nature of the
thing and consequently make a true composition of "this" and
the common nature. If, in the individual itself that which
adds individuality over and above the common nature is dis-
tinct from the nature of the thing by means of that individ-
uality, then the very nature in the thing itself is de-
stroyed by such an addition or individual difference. That
is, on the part of the thing "the nature" and "haecceity"
are two. If they are not two things at least they are two
as thing and mode. Each one of these then has its own
unity. This Scotist position, however, cannot be main-
tained, for then each nature would be an individual before
there was an individual difference. And such a difference

18

joined to that nature would then be superfluous. In a

 

18Dico secundo: individuum, ut sic, non addit
aliquid ex natura rei distinctum a natura specifics, ita ut
in ipso individuo Petro, verbi gratis, humanitas ut sic, et
haec humanitas vel potius id quod additur humanitati ut fiat
haec (qued solet vocari haecceitas vel differentia
individualis), ex natura rei distinguantur et consequenter
faciant veram compositionem in ipsa re. In hac assertione
convenire debent omnes qui opinionem Scoti impugnant . . .
Qui tamen non satis distinguunt an impugnent Scotum quoad
totam sententiam, etiam uoad additionem differentiae
individualis supra speci icam, vel solum quoad distinctionem
ex natura rei, et argumenta eorum videntur esse utrique
part1 communis, et ideo non sunt admodum efficacia. In
eadem.assertione necesse est convenient qui negant naturam
esse a parts rei universalem, . . . Quod autem unum ex alio
oonsequatur patet, quia si in ipsis individuis id quod addit
individuum supra naturam communem est distinctus ex natura
rei ab illa, ergo at e converso ipsa natura in re ipsa
jpraescindit a tali addito seu differentia individuali; atque
.adeo a parte rei natura et haecceitas sunt duo, si non ut

\R‘ ‘IA

 

167

word, any addition by means of the metaphysical principle of
"haecceity" destroys the genuine unity of the individual
existent.

The argument against the Scotist position is ex-
tended through many succeeding paragraphs of DiSputation V
and all the additional objections are variations on the one
just stated. Generally speaking every such real distinction
ought to be between a real being and another real being or
between a real being and its mode of existence. But if a
distinction is real it presupposes that each being is singu-
lar and individual in itself; and, consequently, there is no
real unity. If the distinction is between a being and its
mode either that mode intrinsically and formally constitutes
that being or it does not. If it constitutes the being it
is not distinguished from the nature of the thing by that
individual difference because it would be included in the
nature of the thing. If, however, that mode is not under-
stood to constitute such a being, it is necessary that it be

understood to presuppose that being prior to its own being.

 

duae res, saltem ut res et modus; ergo unaquaeque earum
habet per se unitatem suam, quia non potest intelligi quod
aliqua sint duo, nisi sint unum et unum: numerus enim
supponit unitates; ergo illa natura ut praecise a
differentia individuali habet in re ipsa unitatem
individualem vel universalem. Primum dici non potest, iuxta
praedictam sententiam, aliequi natura esset individua ante
differentiam individualem, et ita superflue talis
differentia adiungeretur; ergo iuxta hanc sententiam
necessario dicendum est naturam illam prout in re ipsa
praescindit et ex natura rei distinguitur a differentia
individuali, habere unitatem universalem quod esse
impossibile intelligi potest ex dictis sectione praecedenti
et latius infra ostendimus. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 9.

 

..m

d

h)

 

168
But, this is impossible. In a word, the Scotist position on
haecceity or individual difference leads to nothing but ab-
surdities.19
What Suarez has established to this point is that

something is genuinely added by individuation, but there

 

19Atque hinc argumentor secundo, directe ostendendo
non posse esse talem distinctionem in rebus quae sit vera et
actualis distinctio ex natura rei intervertens omnem
operationem intellectus; nam omnis talis distinctio esse
debet inter reales entitates aut inter realem entitatem et
modum eius. Et quidem, si sit superiori modo erit
distinctio realis, quae necessario supponet unamquamque
entitatem in se singularem et individuam, quod est per se
notum et its a nemine negatur, quia distinctio entitatem
supponit utramque entitatem in se constitutam atque adeo
unam et singularem. Si autem distinctio sit inter entitatem
et modum eius, qualis hic esse dicitur, ut sit vera
distinctio ex natura rei necesse est quod talis entitas
praeciso modo intelligatur in reipsa habere veram entitatem
realem, aliequi intelligi non posset distinctio ex natura
rei inter talem modum et entitatem. Quia vel modus ille
intrinsece et formaliter constituit entitatem illam vel non;
si constituit, ergo non distinguitur ex natura rei ab illa,
quia intrinsece et essentialiter includetur in illa, ita ut
nihil concipi possit in illa entitate quod non includat
illum modum; si autem modus ille non intelligitur ita
intrinsece et formaliter constituere talem entitatem,
necesse est ut intelligatur supponere illam in sua entitate
constituam et realiter advenire illi et modificare illam,
cum ponatur in re ipsa distinctus ab illa. Impossibile autem
est intelligere hunc modum distinctionis inter differentiam
individualem et naturam communem; ergo. Probatur minor,
quia, si praeciso illo modo intelligitur natura habere
entitatem suam, ergo illa entitas per seipsam, et ut est
prior illo modo, debet necessario esse singularis et
individua; ergo non indiget individuatione superaddita, nec
potest ab illa ex natura rei distingui; sicut, si linea non
posset intelligi constitute in ratione lineae absque
rectitudine, non posset rectitudo concipi ut modus ex natura
rei condistinctus a lines, at adveniens illi; si autem
nunc concipitur modus ex natura rei distinctus, ideo est
quia potest concipi linea in re ipsa existens, et constitute
in ratione lineae absque tali modo. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2,
ar. .
p Cf. also Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, pars. 12-15 for a
further and complex explication of this argument.

 

169
cannot be a real distinction between that which is added and
the common nature. He must spell out now what kind of dis-
tinction is appropriate between individuality and the common
nature. He does this in his third conclusion.

Individuation adds a distinction of reason over and
above the common nature. That is, both the individual and
the common nature make use of the same predicament composing
the individual metaphysically as if the individual differ-
ence draws together the species and constitutes the individ-
ual. Just as separation of a common nature from individual
differences is only through reason, so conversely that indi-
vidual difference is understood as having been added to the
common nature but this addition is also only through reason.
There is not in the thing any real proper addition; but in
each individual whatever, there is unity of being having
both understandings as "a this" and as "common nature" in

itself.20

 

20Dico tertio individuum addere supra naturam
communem aliquid ratione distinctum ab illa, ad idem
praedicamentum pertinens, et individuum componens
metaphysice, tamquam differentia individualis contrahens
speciem et individuum constituens. Prime pars huius
assertionis sequitur ex duebus praecedentibus; nam dictum
est in prima individuum addere aliquid naturae communi, et
in secunda negatum est illud esse distinctum ex natura rei;
ergo necessarium est ut saltem ratione distinguatur, quia,
si nullo modo distingueretur, nullo modo adderetur. Nec
vero inde sequitur id quod additur esse aliquid rationis;
nam, sicut est aliud distingui ratione, aliud vero esse
tantum rationis, fieri enim potest ut quae realia sunt sola
ratione distinguantur, ita etiam id quod additur potest esse
reale, sicut revera est, quamvis sola ratione distinguatur.
Dices: illa additio est tantum per rationem. Respondeo:
quoad rem additam nego; quoad modum additionis seu
contractionis aut compositionis, concedo; nam sicut
separatio naturae communis a differentiis individuis est

170

Suarez' final conclusion generalizes the position
stated in the previous argument. So that he will be able to
use this special distinction for all created beings, he says
that individuation adds something by a distinction of reason
over and above the species, not only in material things but
also in all created and finite immaterial substances. He is
careful to point out that all this talk of individuation
does not apply to the divine nature because there is no way
that it can be multiplied. The concern here is with the im-
material substances. In any individual and finite immate-
rial substance the mind conceives this individual in so far
as it conceives this being (both its essential intelligibil-
ity and its species). Therefore, the mind conceives some-
thing common and something which according to reason is

added to it in order that it determine the individual to

 

solum per rationem ita e converso, quod differentia
individualis intelligatur ut addita naturae communi, solum
est per rationem; nam in re non est illa propria additio sed
in unoquoque individuo est una entitas utramque rationem per
seipsam realiter habens.

Secunda pars conclusionis etiam sequitur aperte ex
dictis, sumiturque ex D. Thoma I, q. 29, a. l, ubi ait
substantiam individuari per seipsam et q. 10 de Potent., a.
3, negat posse substantiam per accidens constitui; non est
ergo hoc additum extra genus ipsius rei, sed in substantiis
est substantia, saltem incompleta quia in re non est nisi
substantia individua. Tertia denique pars facile patet,
quia hoc additum non est pars aliqua physica substantiae,
quia praedicatur de individua ut dicens totam essentiam
eius, quam non dicit pars physica, et ideo non praedicatur
de toto. Nec est aliquid per modum totius directe positi
in praedicamento substantiae; est ergo quid incompletum per
modum differentiae. Item contrahit naturam communem
illamque dividit in individua, et constituit metaphysice
ipsum individuum, ut per se unum in suo genere. Disp. Meta.
V, Sect. 2, pars. 16-17.

_ a
931115 '

at»
51.15%?)

 

171
"this." In the matter of individuality, then, there is no
difference between immaterial substances and other created
things.21
From this discussion of the unity of the individual
one can see that there is a whole complex of problems with

which Suarez is dealing. He wants nothing to do with an

 

21Dico quarto: individuum non solum in rebus
materialibus et accidentibus, sed etiam in substantiis
immaterialibus creatis et finitis addit aliquid ratione
distinctum supra speciem. Excludimus ab hec conclusione
divinam naturam, quia cum illa sit essentialiter ita
determinata ad hanc numero naturam, ut omnino ei repugnet
secundum eam multiplicari, non potest etiam secundum
rationem (si vera sit) abstrahi communis ratio deitatis a
tali deitate; nam hoc ipso quod sic abstrahitur, non
concipitur vere deitas, quia de vere conceptu deitatis est
ut sic haec numero, et non alia; quia hoc requirit eius
infinitae. Et hinc consequenter fit ut haec individua
deitas nihil etiam secundum rationem addat supra conceptum
verae deitatis. Unde merito reprihenditur Caietanus, eo
quod I, q. 3, a. 3, et aliis locis dixerit. Deum uno modo
sumi posse ut significat concretum quasi specificum naturae
divinae. Nam talis conceptus vere communis repugnat verae
divinitati, de cuius essentia est quod sit haec singularis
natura et ideo non magis potest verus Deus communi conceptu
concipi et abstrahi ab hoc Deo quam Petrus.

Ex hac vero exceptions, quae singularis est Deoque
specialiter convenit propter infinitatem eius confirmatur
conclusio posite et generalis regula contraria in omnibus
creaturis, etiamsi immateriales sint. Probatur, quia in
qualibet substantia immateriali individua at finite, verbi
,gratia, Gabriele Archangelo, concipit mens et hoc
individuum, quatenus concipit hanc numero entitatem, et
rationem essentialem et specificam eius, quae non includit
essentialiter hanc numero entitatem nec positivam
:repugnantiam ut communicari possit alteri individua; ergo
ibi concipit mens aliquid commune et aliquid quod secundum
rationem.ei additur ut ad hoc individuum determinetur; ergo
quoad hoc praecise non est differentia inter substantiae
immateriales et alias res. Dicetur fortasse quamlibet
essentiam seu speciem angelicam, essentialiter et ab
intrinsece determinari ad hoc individuum, et consequenter
hoc individuum nihil positivum reale, etiam ratione
distinctum, addere supra ipsam speciem, sed solam negationem
communicabilitatis in plura similia, quae immediate convenit
tali speciei, ratione sui ipsius absque additions ulla.
Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, para. 21-22.

.
a

.-

 

172
exaggerated realism of the Platonic variety and hence says
that the only things that really exist are individuals, not
common natures or universals. If, however, this is the
case, then, when one speaks of this or that individual thing
there must be added to the common nature something to make
this or that individual. There is certainly a negation or
denial involved-~this thing is not that thing, nor is this
individual thing coterminous with the common nature. But,
there is also a positive interpretation of what it means to
be an individual in that there is a special kind of distinc-
tion of reason between the common nature and the individual.
In this positive position Suarez has denied all forms of
Scotism, thus avoiding the addition of a metaphysical prin-
ciple beyond the matter and form.

This section of the present study has been concerned
with the problem.thgt the individual is distinct from the
comon nature. It is necessary now to ask the question 11931
individuation comes about. In the next sections of this
chapter it will be shown that Suarez' doctrine on individua-
tion puts him in the company of all other dualists, for he

advocates two principles of individuation for material

things.

Signed Matter as the Principle of Individuation
in Material Substances

In the discussion of the principle of individuation,
Suarez approaches the problem negatively and then gives his

own solution to the question of individuation. The negative

173
argumentation is the subject of Sections 3, h, and 5 of
Disputation V. In each of these sections he attacks one
or other popular opinion on the principle of individuation.
In order he eliminates versions of signed matter, substan-
tial form, and individual existence as possibilities for the
principle of individuation. Having concluded the negative
argument, in Section 6 he asks what the principle of indi—
viduation might be for all created substances. Here he
gives a carefully nuanced position on individuation.

Prior to any arguments for or against any given
principle of individuation, Suarez tries to focus the ques-
tions at issue in this metaphysical discussion. In created
substances metaphysical composition is able to be considered
to consist in a specific nature and individual difference.
Just as that which adds the species over and above the
genus, according to a metaphysical consideration, is the
separating difference, so that which the individual adds
over’and above the species is called the contracting differ-
ence, a difference constitutive and distinctive of individ-
uals. It is because of this latter difference that individ-
uals of the same species differ numerically one from the
other» Suarez has already shown that what the individual
adds over and above the species is distinct from the Species
only by a distinction of reason but that there is neverthe-
less a real and positive being founded on a negation or lack
of division on the part of the individual. Some have
thought that this has been sufficient as a principle of

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17h

individuation; but this is simply a discussion of the meta-
physical composition of a being which misses the point of
the real principle of individuation. The sense of the ques-
tion about the principle of individuation is what foundation
or principle is in the thing itself so that it should have
this individual difference. Metaphysical predicates (e.g.,
genus, species, individual difference) are taken from real
constituting principles; it is these principles as intrinsic

causes which will give the principle of individuation.22

 

22Ut autem sensus quaestionis intelligatur, sumendum
est ex dictis sectione praecedenti in huiusmodi substantiis
creatis considerari posse metaphysicam compositionem, quae
secundum rationem est ex natura specifica et differentia
individuali; sicut enim id quod addit species supra genus,
iuxta metaphysicam considerationem est differentia divisive
seu contractiva generis, et constitutive speciei, ita id
quod addit individuum supra speciem recte dicitur
differentia contractiva speciei et constitutive ac dis-
tinctiva individuorum quae vere ac proprie differre numero
dicuntur; propterea enim species dicitur de pluribus differ-
entibus numero praedicari. Item ostendimus, hoc quod addit
individuum supra speciem, licet sit tantum ratione
distinctum, tamen reale esse et positivum, fundans
negationem, seu individisionem propriam individui, quia per
sese incommunicabile est et distinctum ab aliis seu
incommunicabile aliis individuis, et ideo adiunctum speciei,
cum illa constituit individuum per se unum sub tali specie;
nihil ergo illi deest queminus veram habeat rationem
differentiae. Unde nonnulli hoc putant esse assignandum
principium individuationis, et nullum aliud esse quaerendum,
ut videre est in Scoto, In II, dist. 2, q. 6; et Fonseca,
lib V Metaph., c. 6, sect. l. Sed non disputatur in hoc
sensu quaestio, nec de illa vere est diversitas opinionum
inter eos qui de principio individuationis disputant.
Sensus ergo quaestionis est, quodnam fundamentum vel
principium in re ipsa habeat illa differentia individualis.
Solent enim haec metaphysice praedicata sumi ex principiis
realibus constituentibus rem, quomodo genus dici solet sumi
a materia et differentia a forma; et determinationes
substantiales interdum sumuntur a materia, ut cum homo
materialis dicitur, interdum a forma, ut cum dicitur
rationalis, interdum a tota natura composita, ut cum dicitur
homo; ad hunc ergo modum in praesenti inquiritur quod sit

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175
Once again, as with matter and form, Suarez makes a distinc—
tion between the "metaphysical constitution" and the "phys-
ical constitution" of a being. And, once again, in the dis-
cussion on the principle of individuation he is concerned
with "that real principle" which makes an individual to be
a numerically singular being.

The first opinion to be refuted is that signed mat-
ter is the principle of individuation. It is especially
important that Suarez refute this position carefully because
it has all the weight of the authority of Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas behind it. Other than this authority Suarez
can find almost no reason for holding that signed matter as

usually understood is the principle of individuation.23 The

 

principium huius differentiae individualis. Ex qua
declaratione constat hic non inquiri principia vel causes
extrinsecas individuationis, seu potius individuorum, quales
sunt causa efficiens et finalis; nem hae non aliter causant
individuationem quam causando entitatem individuam, seu
dando ipsum intrinsecum principium individuationis; hoc ergo
est quod inquirimus. Et, licet quaestio generalis sit de
omnibus substantiis creatis, quia tamen materiales sunt
nobis notiores, de illis dicemus prius, et deinde facile
constabit quid nos coniectari possimus de spiritualibus. Et
quoniam variae sunt de hec re opiniones, quae prolixam
postulant examinationem, eas sigillatim tractabimus. Disp.
Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 2.

23Est ergo celebris sententia affirmans principium
individuationis esse materiam signatam. Haec est sententia
D. Thomas, I q. 3, a. 3, ad. 3 at q. 50, a. h, III, q. 77,
a. 2, et in In IV diet. 12, q. l, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2, et
Opusc. 29, at De Ente et essentia, c. 2, ubi Caietan.
prolixm hoc disputat ac defendit; et Capreol., In II, dist.
,3; Soncin., VII Metaph., q. 33 et 3L; Ferr., I cont. Gent.,
c. 21, et alii infra citandi. Et existimatur haec sententia
,Aristotelis; nam variis in locis distinctionem et
identitatem numericam materiae primae attribuendam censet.
Unde lib. V Metaph., c. 6, text. £2, dicit gt esse unum
rnnnero, Quorum est materia gas; at lib. VII, c. 8, text. 28,

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176
reasons for the difficulty concerning the position that
signed matter is the principle of individuation are:
1. matter of itself is common not only in so far as "common"
has the same understanding for many "material individuals"
but also because the same matter is able to be under many
different forms, many distinct species, or things differing
only numerically. This is true at least in terms of succes-
sive situations; and Suarez asks how can this matter be the
principle of individuation. 2. A genuine principle of indi-

viduation ought to be especially proper and in no way common

 

ait formam ig_his carnibug atque ossibus esse Socratem et
Calliam; et c.—IO, text. 25: singulare (inquit) g; ultifia
materia, iam Socrates est; gt ex hoc principio, in lib. XII,
Mfitaph., c. 8, text, h97concludit primam motorem non posse
esse, nisi unum numero, guia est expers materiae, existimans
necessarium ut quae conven unt specie et differunt numero
materiam habeant et per materiam different. Et similiter, I
de Caelo, c. 9, probat non posse esse alium mundum, quia hic
mundus totam materiam rerum naturalium complectitur. Ex his
ergo testimoniis apparet hanc fuisse sententiam Aristotelis,
iuxta quam consequenter dicendum est (ut dicunt praedicti
auctores) in substantiis immaterialibus non esse positivam
individuationis principium nec propriam differentiam
individualem, sed solum naturam de se incommunicabilem.

Fundamentum huius sententiae, si rationem spectemus,
fere nullum invenio, quod ab Aristotelis auctoritatem non
revocetur, scilicet, quia materia est principium
multiplicationis et distinctionis individuorum intra eamdem
speciem, ut Aristoteles testatur citatis locis; sed illud
est princi ium individuationis quod est principium nu-
numerice sigj distinctionis; ergo. Secundo, quia illud est
individuum quod est incommunicabile inferioribus similibus;
sed materia est primum fundamentum huius incommuni-
cabilitatis; nam forma, cum sit actus, de se communicabilis
est, materia autem cum sit prima potentia, de se est
incommunicabilis, et forma tunc limitatur et determinatur
(nun ad hanc materiam coarctatur. Tertio, quia individuum
est primum subiectum in metaphysice coordinatione; de 1110
enim omnis superiors predicantur, et ipsum non de aliis ergo
primum. rincipium et fundamentum individui, ut sic, esse
debet i lud quod est primum subiectum inter principia
physica; huiusmodi autem est materia; ergo. Disp. Meta. V,
Sect. 3, pars. 3-h.

 

177
to many individuals, neither simultaneously nor succes-
sively.21+ On account of these difficulties some authors
have added to the position that matter is the principle of
individuation, not as such, but "matter signed by quantity"
is the sought after principle. What that phrase, "matter

signed by quantity" means is so obscure that the defenders

of this position can in no way agree on its significance.25

Suarez sees three general trends in the various explanations

2l‘This present point seems to be Suarez' major crit-
icism of Aristotle's position on matter as the principle of
individuation. The fact that matter can be common to many
at least successively prohibits it from being a genuine
principle of individuation.

One should also note that Suarez is apparently read-
ing Aristotle anachronistically with respect to matter as
the principle of individuation. It is only in scholasticism
that "matter signed by quantity" becomes the principle of
individuation. As can be seen from the text cited in foot-
note 23 above, Suarez lists texts from both Thomas and Aris-
totle in support of the position that "matter signed by
quantity" is the principle of individuation. A careful
reading of the Aristotelian texts cited does not substan-
tiate this position.

25Sed videndum est, quamvis sententia haec ratione
convinci non possit, an valeat convenienter defendi ac
sustineri, nem hoc satis nobis erit ut saltem propter
Aristotelis at D. Thomas auctoritatem illam defendamus. Et
‘primm.ratio difficultatis circa illam esse potest, quia
materia de se communis est non solum quatenus eadem secundum
rationem specificam communis est multis individuis materiae,
.sed etiam quia eadem numero materia subesse potest multis
forums vel specie distinctis vel solo numero diversis,
saltem successive; quomodo ergo potest materia esse
principium individuationis? Nam principium individuationis
debet esse maxime proprium, et nullo modo commune multis
individuis, nec simul nec successive. Propter hanc
difficultatem additum est in illa sententia materiam non
utcumque, sed signatam quantitate, esse principium
individuationis. Quid autem illa voce significatur, tam est
obscurum ut in ea re explicanda defensores huius sententiae
inter se mirum in modum dissideant. Quorum expositiones
'varias referre oportet et examiners, ut quanta sit
jprobabilitas huius sententiae clarius apparet. Disp. Meta.

'V, Sect. 3, par. 8.

178
of "matter signed by quantity;" he finds each of these lines
of argumentation inadequate taken in itself.

The first understanding of "signed matter" to be re-
jected is that this "signed matter" is nothing other than
matter with quantity or matter affected by quantity. That
is, from matter and quantity it is felt that the principle
of individuation gives a quasi-integral being--the matter
gives incommunicability and the quantity gives distinction.
The reasoning here is that if matter is to be the principle
of individuation something is necessary in order to distin-
guish this matter from that matter. This distinction cannot
come from the matter itself because such a distinction ought
to come about through act. The act needed here cannot be
the form for one form is distinct from another because it
occurs in or is received in distinct matter.26

Suarez says this understanding of "signed matter" is
false and can be denied by the most weighty argumentation.
Initially, Suarez uses a reductio argument against this un-
derstanding. Suppose quantity is not in prime matter but

rather in the whole composite; then, when the substance is

 

26Prime expositio est materiam signatam quantitate
nihil.aliud esse quam materiam cum quantitate seu quantitate
affectam; ex his enim duobus censent hoc principium
individuationis quasi integrari, ut materia det incommuni-
cabilitatem, quantitas distinctionem, ut supra dicebamus.
. . . Ratio vero esse potest quia, ut materia sit principium
individuationis, aliquid necessarium est quod distinguat
ihanc materiam ab illa; sed hoc non est ipsa materia, quia
distinctio debet fieri per actum; neque est forma, nem
potius haec forma est distincta ab illa, quia in distincta
.materia fit et recipitur. Disp. Meta. V. Sect. 3, par. 9.

 

 

 

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179

corrupted the quantity is destroyed. The generation of a
new quantity is to be compared to the generation of a new
substance. This would mean that first the substantial form
is introduced and then quantity. The argument, then, for
signed matter is destroyed, because "this form," since it is
first understood to be received in this matter, is also un-
derstood to be received in matter distinct from other mat-
ter. There is no need to distinguish matter by signing with
quantity. Therefore formally and intrinsically it is not
made distinct by means of quantity. In other words, from
matter and form taken precisely and as preceding quantity,
this substantial individual results. Therefore, the indi-
vidual is one not by a unity of reason, but by a real, sin-
gular and transcendental unity. Just as from the power of
its being the individual is substantially pg; §g_undivided,
so also it is substantially and entitatively distinct from
all others. This means that it does not have its distinc-

27

tion by reason of quantity. The relationship between

 

27Sed haec sententia false est et gravibus
rationibus impugnari potest. Duobus autem modis procedere
possumus, primo, supponendo aliam sententiam, quam praedicti
auctores tenant, quantitatem non esse in materia prima, sed
in toto composita, st destrui corrupta substantia, et novam
comparari ad generationem substantiae. Ex quo fit,
simpliciter loquendo, prius hanc numero formam substantialem
introduci in hanc materiam et consequi quantitatem. Unde
conficitur argumentum, quia haec forma, cum primum
intelligitur recipi in hac materia, intelligitur etiam
recipi in materia distincta ab aliis; ergo formaliter st
intrinsece non fit distincta per quantitatem. Item ex
materia et forma praecise conceptis et ut praevenientibus
quantitatem, resultet hoc individuum substantiale; ergo
illud ut sic unum est, non unitate rationis; sed unitate
reali et singulari ac transcendentali; ergo, sicut ex vi

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180

matter and quantity has been seen in the chapter on matter.
In his present refutation Suarez takes a position contrary
to his own simply to show that there is no need to say quan-
tity signs matter in order to have a true principle of indi-
viduation. From the very relation of thi§_matter and thig
form one can get a genuine oneness of being. Two things are
at work here-~1. it has been shown over and over that Suarez
does not want to interpose anything between the matter and
the form; 2. a "signed matter" would interpose such a being
between matter and form.

The argument just given, seems, however, to refute
the position already stated that quantity inheres in mat-
ter.28 Suarez now proceeds to show at some length that one
can hold the position that quantity inheres in matter with-
out being held to the position of "signed matter." Suppose,
he says, that quantity inheres in prime matter and remains
the same both in generation and corruption. This matter,
then, not only of itself but also as affected by this quan-
tity is able to be under different forms and, consequently,
in distinct individuals. It is not able to be a principle
of individuation any more than the signed matter which would
interpose between matter and form. Quantity can inhere in
matter without matter being the "signed matter" of the prin-
ciple of individuation.
suae entitatis substantialis est in se indivisum, ita etiam
est substantialiter et entitative distinctum ab omnibus

aliis; ergo non habet distinctionem per quantitatem . . .
Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 10.

280f. Chapter II of this present study.

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181

It could be said perhaps that matter with undeter-
mined dimensions can be under different forms and hence as
such is not a principle of individuation. Matter, however,
with determinate dimensions is proper to this individual and
as such is the principle of individuation. But, Suarez asks,
what do these indeterminate dimensions add over and above
quantity? Dimensions are able to be spoken of only because
they do give a definite length, width or breadth. Deter-
mined quantity only adds certain definite dimensions, and
this is not sufficient to solve the problem of individua-
tion. One and the same material, existing under a certain
and determined quantity, is able to be under distinct forms
(e.g., a branch at one time is green, at another dry, etc.).

Another approach is to say that quantity is undeter-
mined when it is not affected by certain limiting disposi-
tions as such and such a rarity or density or other quali-
ties by which the matter is determined to this form rather
than another. In this sense it can be admitted that matter
affected by quantity or determined dimensions is so proxi-
mately disposed as to be of this individual that the indi-
vidual is not able to be in another matter. But, the
authors who hold the position of "signed matter" do not
speak in this manner, and if they were to do so they would

not be true to their own position.29

 

29Secundo, procedere possumus in alia sententia,
quod quantitas inest materiae primae et manet eadem in
genito et corrupto, et tunc aliunde sumitur non minus
efficax argumentum, quia non solum haec materia secundum se,

{a

182
Suarez concludes his rejection of this first posi-
tion on "signed matter" by stating that it does not pertain
to the formal effect of quantity to distinguish entitatively

one matter from another, or one part of matter from another

 

sed etiam ut effecta hec quantitate, potest esse sub
diversis formis, et consequenter in individuis numero
distinctis; ergo non magis potest esse principium
individuationis quam sola materia. Dicetur fortassse
materiam cum dimensionibus interminatis esse posse sub
diversis formis, et ut sic non esse principium
individuationis, materiam vero cum his determinatis
dimensionibus esse propriam huius individui et ut sic esse
principium individuationis. Sed inquiro quid addant has
determinatae dimensiones supra quantitatem. Dimensiones
enim possunt dici interminatae solum quia non dicunt certum
terminum longitidinis, aut latitudinis, etc., et sic
quantitas terminate solum addet certos terminos dimensionum;
et hoc non satis est ad praesens, quia eadem materia hoc
modo existens sub eadem certa st determinata quantitate,
potest subesse distinctis formis, ut patet in eadem virga
prius viridi, postea sicca st similibus. Aliter potest dici
quantitas interminata illa quae non est effecta csrtis
dispositionibus, ut tali raritate aut densitate, vel aliis
qualitatibus quibus materia ad hanc formam potius quam ad
aliam determ natur. Et hoc sensu admitti potest materiam
quantitate seu dimensionibus sic determinatis affectam, id
est, sic proxime dispositam, ita esse propriam huius
individui, ut non possit esse in alio. Verumtamen neque
dicti auctores loqui possunt in hoc sensu, neque in 1110
esset vera eorum sententia. Primam patet, quia ipsi dicunt
quantitatem ex propria ratione st effectu formali
distinguere unum individuum ab alio, ergo non convenit hoc
illi ratione aliarum qualitatum ssu dispositionum, alioque
non materia signata quantitate, sed materia quanta signata
qualitatibus deberet dici principium individuationis.
Secundum patet, quia alias sequitur accidentia, quibus
materia disponitur ad formam, intrinsece includi in
principio individuationis substantiae; consequens est
falsum; ergo. Sequela patet, quia materia signata, iuxta
hanc opinionem, intrinsece ac formaliter includit haec
accidentia ut ipsi inhaerentia ipsamquae determinantia ad
talem formam. Minor vero probatur primo, quia individuum
substantiae est per se unum collocatum sub specie in
praedicamento substantiae; non ergo includit intrinsece
accidentia, cum tamen intrinsece includat individuationis
principium. Secundo, quia ostensum est supra differentiam
individualem in reipsa non esse distinctam ex natura rei a
nature substantiali, atque adeo esse ipsammst substantiam

183
part of matter. Just as quantity presupposes matter as a
subject so it presupposes the individual being which in it-
self is entitatively distinct from another being of similar
nature. Therefore, distinct quantities presuppose distinct
subjects in which they are received. And, distinct parts
of quantity presuppose also distinct parts of entitatively

30 A distinction which presupposes quan-

distinct subjects.
tity in a substance is a substantial distinction. It is
this entitative distinction which pertains to individuality,
for through this distinction one understands the individual
to be distinct from all others (either within the same spe-
cies or under some common predicate). If quantity confers
some distinction, it will be accidental only in the under-
standing of the individual and above and beyond the entita-
tive distinction. Quantity does not therefore by its under-

standing pertain to the principle of individuation.31

 

individuam; ergo principium intrinsecum eius non potest
esse accidens, sed substantia. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3,
par. 11.

30Unde etiam fit (quod est novum st sufficiens
.argumentum contra totam hanc sententiam) non pertinere ad
effectum formalem quantitatis distinguere entitative unam
materiam ab alia, vel partem materiae a parts materiae, quia
sicum quantitas supponit materiam ut subiectum ita supponit
individuam entitatem eius, quae per seipsam entitative
distincta est ab alia entitate simili; ergo distinctae
quantitates supponunt distincta subiecta in quibus
:recipiantur et distinctae partes quantitatis, partes etiam
subiecti entitative distinctae . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect.

3, par. 1A.

31Distinctio, ergo, quam supponit quantitas in
substantia est distinctio entitative et substantialis: haec
autem est quae per se pertinet ad unitatem individualem, de
que tractamus; nam per hanc intelligitur individuum esse

18h

A second understanding of "signed matter" is possi-
ble but it really is no more acceptable than the previous
one. Some philosophers have said that "signed matter" does
not include the quantity itself intrinsically, but rather as
a term of the condition of matter itself. That is, it is of
the very nature of matter to be capable of quantity. But
signed matter as such cannot be the complete principle of
individuation. The reason for this is that matter is indif-
ferent to any quantity whatsoever just as it is indifferent
to any form whatsoever. It is determined both to a given
quantity and given form through the action of a previously
existing agent bringing about generation. As such, matter
is capable of this quantity and not of another. And, that
matter is said to be the principle of individuation. It
should be noted, Suarez says, that the concern here is not
only with mathematical quantity but also with real physical

quantity.32

 

distinctum ab omnibus aliis, vel sub eadem specie, si cum
similibus comparetur, vel etiam sub genere, vel sub
quocumque praedicata communi, si cum omnibus aliis
conferatur; ergo, si aliquam distinctionem confert
quantitas, illa erit per accidens ad rationem individui, et
superveniens illi; non ergo ea ratione pertinebit quantitas
ad principium individuationis de que agimus . . . Disp.
.Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 15.

32Secunda expositio est materiam signatam quantitate
non includere quantitatem ipsam intrinsece, sed ut est
terminum habitudinis materiae ad ipsam. Est enim materia
nautra sue capax quantitatis, sed ut sic non potest esse
completum principium individuationis, quia est indifferens
ad quamcumque quantitatem sicut ad quamvis formam; per
actionem autem agentis praeviam ad generationem determinatur
ut sit capax huius quantitatis, et non alterius, et illa ut
sic dicitur esse individuationis principium. Per
quantitatem autem intelligimus hoc loco non solam

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185

Along the same lines, "signed matter" can also be
understood as nothing other than matter as it is ultimately
disposed to this particular form as opposed to any other
form. This disposition can be understood in two ways, by
first understanding quantity and other dispositions to in-
here and remain in matter and simply to precede the intro-
duction of the form. As such, matter can be rightly under-
stood to be disposed and signed for form. But, this falls
into the earlier way of understanding which has already been
rejected. That is, this matter includes quantity and acci-
dents intrinsically. The second way of understanding this
disposition is by supposing quantity and other dispositions
not to be in matter but in the composite and since they make
up the ultimate disposition they follow upon the form. In
this sense it is the same for matter to be disposed as it is
to have a determined order or potency to this quantity with

these dispositions.33

 

mathematicam quantitatem (ut sic dicam), sed physicam, id
est ph sicis qualitatibus et dispositionibus affectam . . .
Disp. eta. V, Sect. 3, par. 18.

33Cum his etiam coniungenda est alia, quae dicit
materiam signatam nihil aliud esse quam materiam ultimo
dispositam ad hanc formam, quia non disponitur nisi
quantitate talibus qualitatibus effecta. Haec autem
sententia dupliciter affirmari potest: primo intelligendo
quantitatem et alias dispositiones inheerere et manere in
materia, et simpliciter praecedere ordine naturae
introductionem formee, et sic recte potest intelligi materia
disposita et signata ad formam; tamen hoc modo ponere
materiam signatam principium individuationis est incidere in
priorem sententiam Capreoli, quia haec materia signata
includit intrinsece quantitatem et accidentia, quae
impossibile est includi in principio individuationis, ut
ostendimus. . . . Alio ergo modo potest doceri haec
sententia, supponendo quantitatem et alias dispositiones non

 

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186

Suarez feels the total eXposition of "signed matter"
in this way is false. This is especially the case in that
it presupposes that matter does not have quantity inhering
in itself, which even though it may be possible is not
nearly as probable as the opinion stating that quantity does
inhere in matter. This eXposition confuses the various or-
ders of potency and act. A potency is related to an act of
the same order. But matter is not such a potency with re-
spect to quantity. Matter is a potency for substantial form
and therefore it is necessary that it not pertain to the
predicament of quantity. If the potency of matter first
looks to substantial form and then to accidental form, it is
first determined to this or that form and only then to this
or that quantity. Therefore, it is not signed or determined
to a given form because of its potency to this or that quan-

tity.3“ In a word, before the substantial form nothing else

 

inesse materiae, sed composito, et ut conficiunt ultimam
dispositionem consequi formam, et in hoc sensu idem est
materiam esse dispositam quod habere ordinem seu potentiam
determinatam ad hanc quantitatem cum his dispositionibus;
atque hoc modo coincidit hic modus loquendi cum secunda
expositions adducta. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 19.

3"I-lanc ergo totam expositionem falsam esse censeo.
Et imprimis in illa supponitur materiam non habere sibi
inhaerentem quantitatem et dispositiones alias, quod, licet
probabile sit, fortasse tamen non est aeque probabile ac
contrarium. Deinde, supposita illa sententia, argumentatur
Caiet., in I, nam potentia materiae ad quantitatem
recipiendum est in genere quantitatis, quoniam potentia et
actus aunt in eodem genere ut Aristoteles ait, X Metaph.;
ergo neque illa potentia ad quantitatem potest intrinsece
pertinere ad principium individuationis substantiae, alias
individuum substantiae non esset per se unum: constaret
enim ex rebus diversorum predicamentorum. Haec tamen ratio
per se sumpta non est efficax; bene enim respondent Iavellus

‘I

187
is able to be understood as added to matter for what would
it be or from.ghg£g would it come, or what foundation would
it have?35 This second understanding of "signed matter"

then is no more adequate than the earlier one.

 

potentiam pertinere ad genus sui actus primarii, ad quem per
se primo ordinatur, et a quo suo modo sumit speciem; materia
autem non est ita potentia ad quantitatem ut per se primo ad
illam ordinatur, sed ad formam substantialem, et ideo
necesse non est ut a praedicamentum quantitatis pertineat.
Quod autem in favorem Caietani instat Fonseca, V Metaph., c.
6, q. A, quamvis potentia materiae simpliciter non pertineat
ad quantitatem, tamen ut receptivam quantitatis ad illud
praedicamentum pertinere, hoc (inquam) non urget, quia illa
reduplicatio materiae, ut receptivae quantitatis, non addit
potentiam realem ipsi materiae, sed solum secundum nostrum
modum concipiendi et loquendi explicat illam potentiam per
habitudinem ad secundarium terminum, qui est quantitas, et
ideo necesse non est ut ea ratione ad praedicamentum quanti-
tatis pertineat. Quod ergo attinet ad vim argumenti fundati
in illa maxima actus gt, otentia aunt in eodem genere, bona
est responsio aveIII, ut latius infra dicemus, tractando de
causa materiali accidentium.

Tamen ex eadem responsione sumitur argumentum
efficax contra hanc ipsam opinionem; nam si potentia
materiae prius respicit substantialem formam quam quanti-
tatem, ergo prius etiam determinatur eius potentia ad hanc
formam substantialem quam ad hanc quantitatem; ergo non
signatur seu determinatur ad hanc formam per potentiam ad
hanc quantitatem. . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, pars. 20-21.

35. . . ante formam substantialem nihil aliud
substantiale potest praeintelligi additum materiae; quid
enim illud esset, aut a quo fieret, aut quo fundamento, aut
ad quid poneretur? Ne e etiam aliquid accidentale, quia
nullum accidens praece it in materia ante formam
substantialem, et in omni sententia nullum accidens
praecedit in materia quantitatem ipsam. Dicunt aliqui addi
materiae in 1110 instanti quamdam modum realem et ex natura
rei distinctum a materia, praevium ad introductionem formee
substantialis cum sua quantitate et aliis dispositionibus,
at par hunc modum sigillari materiam, et nonnulli vocant
illum modum substantialem, alii accidentalem. Sed utrique
gratis loquuntur, neque explicare possunt aut rationem
reddere eorum, quae dicunt, quod est a vera philosophandi
ratione alienum. Nam prime inquiro ad quid sit iste modus.
Dicent: ut materia determinatur ad hanc formam. Contra,
ipsa est indifferens ad hunc modum, et infinitos alios; per
quid ergo determinatur materia ut hunc modum in illo

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188

There is one final way of looking at "signed mat-
ter" as the principle of individuation. The emphasis here
is on what it means to speak of a "principle of individ-
uation." One can speak of such a principle in two ways--
1. in itself as a principle constituting the individual

and the foundation from which one takes the individual

I..—

difference. In a word, by what principle is both Peter

an individual and Paul an individual and what makes one

36

different from the other; 2. it can be spoken of in re-

 

spect to the production or multiplication of individuals;
this is to ask what the principle is on account of which
individual substantial beings are multiplied. In other
words, given a certain grouping of beings all of whom one
calls men, by what principle can there be Peter, Paul,

John, and William. That is, why one individual rather

 

instanti recipiat potius quam alium? Si enim dicas
determinari per alium modum, procedemus in infinitum; si
vero dicas determinari per dispositiones immediate
praecedentes, melius dicetur immediate determinari materiam
ad formam, et ita superfluus est iste modus. Praeterquam
quod argumenta, quibus statim ostendemus non posse materiam
per dispositiones praecedentes determinari ad formam, eodem
modo probant non posse determinari per eas ad talem modum
recipiendum. Si vero tandem dicatur, materiam sine ulla
determinatione praevia recipere hunc modum virtute agentis,
cur non dicetur idem de forma? Sine ratione ergo vel
fundamento interponitur hic modus. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3,
par. 22.

Cf. also pars. 23-27.

36Tertia explicatio est de principio
individuationis dupliciter nos loqui posse, primo secundum
se, id est, quatenus revera est principium constituens
individuum ut tale est, et est radix seu fundamentum a quo
sumitug individualis differentia. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3,
par. 2 .

189
than another and why one distinct from another.37
In the previous two sets of arguments Suarez has
asserted that one cannot accept the notion of "signed mat-
ter" as a principle constituting the individual and the
foundation from which one takes the individual difference.
In this third way of understanding matter as a prin-
ciple of individuation Suarez opts for the second way of un-
derstanding the principle-~that matter can be spoken of as
the principle of individuation in respect to the production
or multiplication of individuals. The proof for this second
way is that matter is the origin of generation and corrup-
tion by means of which multiplication of individuals occurs.
A composite from such matter in its very understanding is
corruptible; and hence it happens that an individual of such
a kind is not able to be conserved perpetually. So, in or-
der that the species be conserved a multiplication of indi-
viduals is required. The source of such a multiplication is

matter. And, it can be added that this source is matter

 

37. . . Secundo loqui possumus de principio
individuationis in ordine ad productionem seu
:multiplicationem individuorum, quod est quaerere quod sit
principium et radix ob quam individua substantialia
.multiplicantur, vel cur potius producitur hoc individuum
quam.aliud, seu cur producitur distinctum a reliquis.
Rursus in utraque consideratione inquiri potest id quod est
principium per se et in se individuationis, vel id tantum
quod in ordine ad nos est principium distinguendi unum
individuum ab alio, vel quod est solum occasio talis
distinctionis. Primo ergo, loquendo de principia
constituente in re individuum, et a quo vere sumitur
differentia individualis contractiva speciei et constitutiva
individui, negat haec opinio materiam signatam quantitate
esse principium individuationis, quia hoc videntur
cgncludere discursus facti. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par.

2 .

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190
affected by quantity, because matter without quantity is
incapable of physical alteration, of changes through vari-
ous and contrary dispositions on account of which arises
this variety and multiplication of individuals. It should
be noted here that this capacity does not apply to matter as
signed and determined to a given form or quantity but to
matter taken as a real physical component.

Up to this point (i.e., opinions one and two which
have already been rejected) the discussion has not been
about the principle of individuation of this particular in-
dividual, but the absolute principle of individuation for
.members of the same species. Matter, however, is not the
root of multiplication absolutely speaking taken in so far
as it is determined to one form or quantity, but rather in

so far as it is determinable to many.38

 

38Secundo ait haec epinio materiam esse principium
et radicem multiplicationis individuorum in substantiis
materialibus. Probatur, quia est origo generationum et
corruptionum, per quas fit individuorum multiplicatio.
Item, quia compositum ex tale materia ratione illius est
corruptibile, et inde habet ut non possit perpetuo
conservari; et ideo ut species conservetur requiritur
individuorum multiplicatio; huius ergo multiplicationis
radix:est materia. Et addi etiam potest hanc radicem esse
materiam affectam quantitate, quia materia absque quantitate
non esset capax alterationis physicae et mutationis per
‘rarias et contrarias dispositiones, ex qua nascitur haec
individuorum varietas et multiplicatio. Hoc autem munus non
convenit materiae ut signatae et determinatae ad certam
formam vel quantitatem, sed absolute secundum se, quia
hactenus non eigmus de radice huius individui in
particulari, sed absolute de radice multiplicationis
individuorum in eadem specie; materia autem non est radix
Inxrus multiplicationis absolute quatenus determinata ad unam
formam vel quantitatem, se potius quatenus est
determinabilis ad plures. . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par.

29.

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191

Once one accepts matter as the principle of individ-
uation in this way there are other arguments possible to
substantiate the opinion. This third opinion says signed
matter is the principle and source (or at least the occa-
sion) of the production of this individual distinct from the
rest. This is obvious because this individual can be com-
pared either to all other existing individuals or all other
possible individuals which can be produced from the same
matter by the same agent. The reason why this individual is
produced distinct from the rest is that it is produced from
matter that differs numerically from all other matter. It
is not possible for a given single form to be in two or more
totally distinct matters. These different matters are ne-

39

cessary that the form may differ in number. This same

 

39Tertio ait haec opinio, materiam signatam
quantitate, esse principium et radicem, vel saltem
occasionem productionis huius individui distincti a
reliquis. Declaratur, nam potest hoc individuum comparari,
vel ad reliqua individua existentia, vel ad alia possibilis,
quae ex eadem materia produci possunt etiam ab eodem
agente. Priori modo sufficiens et prima ratio, cur hoc
individuum producitur distinctum a reliquis, est quia ex
diversa numero materia producitur, quia, cum non possit
eadem numero forma esse in diversis numero materiis
totalibus, hoc ipso quod materia est diversa numero, necesse
est ut forma saltem sit numero diversa; unde ad hanc
distinctionem non oportet dispositiones alias, vel aliam
materiam signationem adiungere, quia sufficit numerica
distinctio materiae secundum se, vel cum sua quantitate,
quod tamen non sufficit ut haec materia sit radix
distinctionis huius individui a reliquis quae non existunt,
seu quae ex eadem materia facta sunt, aut fieri possunt.
Unde quidam dixerunt Aristotelem non assignasse principium
individuationis quo distinguatur individuum ab omnibus quae
non existunt, quia haec satis per solam contradictionem
distinguntur; sed assignasse solum principium distinguens
praedicto modo unum individuum ab a 113 existentibus, quod

docuit Fonseca, lib. V, c. 6, q. L, sect. h; idque refert ex

 

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192
approach allows one to say why one individual exists and not
another. The reason for this cannot be attributed only to
prime matter, since it remains the same successively in one
individual after another. Rather from this subject so pre-
pared and so disposed at thi§_time by thi§_agent and by this
action this individual occurs distinct from all others.
This applies both to the actually existing individuals and

to those that can exist."0

 

Hervaeo, Quodl. V, q. 9; et Caiet., c. 2, de Ente et
essent., q. 5. Addendum autem est per materiam praedicto
modo consideratam non solum distingui individuum ab aliis
existentibus, sed etiam a quibuscumque aliis possibilibus,
etiam non existentibus, quae ex aliis materiis numero
distinctis generari possunt, praesertim in his quorum formae
a materia educuntur, quia valde verisimile est eamdem numero
formam, non solum simul, verum nec successive posse ex
diversis numero materiis educi. In individuis autem quae ex
eadem numero materia generari possunt, non habet locum
distinctio unius individui existentis ab alio existente,
quia non possunt simul existere plura individua ex eadem
numero materia constantia, et ideo talis distinctio semper
est r33 existentis a non existente. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3,
par. .

koQuamvis autem haec oppositio contradictoria
sufficiens argumentum sit distinctionis talium individuorum,
tamen adhuc inverstigari potest principium et radix, cur ita
distinguantur, ut uno existente, aliud non existat; seu cur
potius in hac materia haec numero forma introducatur, quam
alia, quae fieri posset. Causa enim huius non potest reddi
ex sola materia prima, cum eadem successive sit in utroque
individua, quod etiam fortasse est verum de quantitate
coaeva ipsi materiae. Adiungendae ergo sunt aliae
dispositiones et circumstantiae actionis, scilicet, quod ex
hoc subiecto sic preparato et disposito hoc tempore, ab hoc
agente, haec actio fiat; hic enim fit ut, licet materia
prima seu remote sit eadem, ex illa tamen fiat hoc
individuum distinctum ab omnibus aliis quae ex illa vel
facta sunt, vel fieri possunt, quia cum diversis disposi-
tionibus et circumstantiis fit productio. . . . Hoc igitur
modo materia signata et his circumstantiis affects, est
principium seu occasio talis individuationis, quia nec
materia sufficit sine circumstantiis, ut dictum est, nec
circumstantiae sine materia nam si haec sit diversae,

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193
Finally, this interpretation of sensible signed

matter allows one to speak of the principle of individua-
tion as we know it. Because through this principle we know
the distinction of material individuals among themselves.
It is that sign by which we distinguish a posteriori one
individual from another not that by which one individual is
distinguished from another in itself. All talk of signed
matter then is merely to help us understand individuation.
Real physical individuation takes place because the real
intrinsic cause of this or that being is this as opposed to

that matter.‘1

 

effectus etiam diversus erit. Disp..Meta. V, Sect. 3,
par. 31.

L1Quarto addit haec opinio materiam signatam quan-
titate sensibili dici principium individuationis quoad nos,
quia per illud nos cognoscimus distinctionem individuorum
materialium inter se. Sic D. Thomas, Opusc. 32, De Natura
materiae et dimensionibus indeterminatis, c. 3, ait ex hgg
materia prima 33 £33 forma fieri individuum substantiae, Egg,
tamen esse __g.et nunc demonstrabile sine dimensionibus gge
terminatis; gt Ideo (Inquit) dicitur materia sub certis
dimensionibus causa individuationis, ggg_gpgd‘aimensiones
causant individuum, gum accidens ggg_causet suam subiectum,
gggfguia g; dimensiones certas demonstratur individuam hig_
et nunc, chut er si nun ro rium‘ihdividui gt_inse ara-
bile; et Idem in cat Upusc. 2 , e Prinprio individua-
tionis. Unde, quando aliis locis significat D. Thomas in-
dividuum addere accidentia supra naturam specificam, ut I,
q. 3, et Quodl. II, a. h, at q. 2 de Verit., a. 6, ad 1, et
aliis locis supra citatis, eXponendus videtur in ordine ad
cognitionem nostram. Est enim illud signum quo nos a
posteriori distinguimus unum individuum ab alio, non vero id
quo in se distinguitur, ut ipse D. Thomas aliis locis seu
opusculis citatis explicasse videtur et optima etiam
ratione probasse, scilicet uia accidens non causat subiec-
tum suum; maxime cul.idem D. omas,I, q.—§§, a. I, at q.
§T—'Ue Potentia, a. 1, ad 8, dicat substantiam individuari
per seipsam, et per propria principia, accidentia vere
individuari per substantiam; ergo cum aliis locis point
accidentia, vel ordine- ad accidentia inter ea quae
individuant substantiam, eXponendus necessario est, vel

 

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19h

When Suarez comes to the Questionis Resolutio of
this section of Disputation V, he merely says that this
third explanation of signed matter, as just seen, is the
more probable one of the three opinions investigated and
that he is pleased with it. Acknowledging that perhaps it
does not satisfactorily explain the mind of Thomas and Aris-
totle, he feels that it does handle the problem of concrete
material individuals and the reasons for the existence of

one rather than another.h2

 

quoad nostram cognitionem, vel quoad occasionem quam
praebent productioni talis individui substantiae, ut
declaratum est. Attribuitur autem hoc materiae, ratione
quantitatis potius quam ratione qualitatum, quia etiam
ipsarum qualitatum numeralis distinctio maxime nobis nota
est ex quantitate; nam si duae imagines sint inter se valde
similes, non aliter distinguimus illas, quam in diversis
subiectis quantis eas numerando. Et in eodem sensu videtur
intelligendum quantitates ipsas distingui numero ex sitibus;
est enim id verum quoad nos; ideo enim illas sensibiliter
distinguimus et numeramus, quia eas in diversis sitibus
conspicimus; non tamen est verum secundum se; nam potius
occupant quantitates diversos situs quia in se distinctae
sunt; solum ergo quia quantitas natura sua hoc habet ut
constituat partem extra partem in corpus extra corpus in
ordine ad situm et deest aptius principium ad distinguenda
individua materialia in ordine ad nos. Disp. Meta. V, Sect.

3, par. 33.

Lzflaec tota opinio in se quidem probabilis est et
mihi aliquando placuit; vereor tamen an iuxta illam satis
explicetur mens Aristotelis et D. Thomae, tum quia, aliequi
valde diminute, et cum magna aequivocatione, tradidissent
nobis individuationis principium, si omisso eo qued vere et
in se est principium constitutivum individui, solum nobis
tradidissent vel signa a posteriori, vel occasiones
distinguendi, aut producendi individua; tum maxime quia ex
hoc principia videntur intulisse in separatis a materia non
dari plura individua, quia non datur huiusmodi principium
individuationis. Illud etiam, quod in ea sententia
dicebatur de determinations agentium ad particulares
effectus et formas, ex materia cum circumstantiis actionis,
multis et doctis viris difficile creditu videtur, quia, si
attente res consideratur, omnia reducuntur ad circumstantiam

195

What, then, began as a rather severe attack on
signed matter as the principle of individuation in actuality
has ended up as a strong claim that matter is a genuine
principle of individuation. Where Suarez differs from the
positions he rejects is that he is concerned not with an ab-
solute principle of individuation but rather with what makes
this individual different from or distinct from all others

in the concrete situation. The initial discussion of this

 

temporis, quae videtur valde extrinseca, ut ab ea possit
haec determinatio provenire. Sed de hoc ultimo puncto dicam
commodius sectione sequenti. De alio vere pertinente ad
mentem Aristotelis at D. Thomae, quod ad D. Thomam pertinet,
constat expositionem illam fundatam esse in aliis locis et
verbis eius, quae aliter conciliari non possunt. Quod vero
ad Aristotelem attinet, non videtur unquam ex professo et
metaphysice principium hoc investigasse et declarasse, sed
solum ex sensibilibus physice more docuisse unum individuum
materiale ab alio distinguere. Quod vero inde intulerunt
dicit auctores, in substantiis immaterialibus non esse
multiplicationem individuorum in eadem specie, hunc potest
ad summum habere probabilem sensum, scilicet, non habere nos
rationes et principia ad distinguendas spirituales substan-
tias numero distinctas, quas habemus in materialibus; immo
multi hoc extendunt etiam ad materiales substantias incor-
ruptibiles, in quibus etiam non habemus tot principia ad
cognoscendam vel ponendam in eis numericam distinctionem,
quot habemus in substantiis corruptibilibus, de quibus
maxime procedunt omnia quae dicta sunt. Denique quod
Aristoteles dixit, in I de Caelo, non posse esse alium modum
praeter hunc, quia in hoc est tota materia, videtur certe
intellexisse, aut Deum creasse mundum ex materia, nec posse
materiam ipsam creare; aut Deum agere ex necessitate
naturae, et ideo non posse plus materiae creare, quam
creavit; vel certe ita esse Deum determinatum.in suo modo
agendi, ut nullum substantiuam integram et materialem possit
in tempore ex nihilo condere, ut in discursu huius operis
videbimus. Itaque ex illa sententia solum ad praesens col-
ligitur, ex mente Aristotelis, materiales substantias non
multiplicari nisi ex materia. Quidquid vero sit de mente
horum auctorum, constat ex hac sententia sic declarata non
esse nobis traditum proprium et internum principium differ-
entiae individualis etiam in rebus materialibus. Nam argu-
menta facta contra hanc sententiam aliis medis expositam,
plane concludunt non posse materiam signatam esse huiusmodi
principium. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 3h.

196
chapter on the individual, actually existing thing showed
that Suarez is not concerned with abstract explanation but
rather with concrete situations. The principle of individ-
uation for thi§_material being is this matter affected by
quantity; this matter is a necessary condition for distin-
guishing one individual from another. It will be shown by
Suarez that there are other necessary conditions for this
kind of distinction. It is only when they are all taken to-
gether that one can say there is genuine individuality.
Substantial Form as the Principle
of Individuation

One sees as he reads Disputation V that Suarez ex-
pends great effort in outlining exactly the way in which
matter can be sonsidered to be a principle of individuation.
Once the groundwork is laid for matter as a necessary but
not sufficient condition for individuation of material be-
ings, Suarez must ask what other entitative elements are
necessary for the being to be a genuine individual. If one
has granted matter as a principle of individuation Suarez
feels the next and most obvious question is to ask in what
manner the form individuates. He is interested in the form
because like matter it is an internal principle of being and
some have held that the form rather than the matter is the
principle of individuation."3 Once again, Suarez must con-

tend with the authority of Aristotle on this subject. It is

 

h3nisp. Meta. v, Sect. a, par. 1.

197

Suarez' contention that Aristotle himself favored this
opinion.

With respect to Aristotle's opinion on the subject,
Suarez quotes from Book II, Chapter 1 of the Qg_the Soul
where Aristotle says, formam esse, guae constituat hoc
aliquid (that the form is that which makes a being to be a
definite thing). In other words, a principle of individu-
ation ought to be that which intrinsically constitutes this.
substance and this constitution is especially appropriate to
the form. The principle of individuation cannot be an acci-
dent because accidents do not constitute the substance, and
especially, they do not constitute thi§_substance. This
substance must be a substantial being pg; s3. In addition,
the principle of individuation cannot be matter (Suarez
claims this quote of Aristotle substantiates) because matter
is not especially proper to this individual, since it can be
under some other form. Using this small quotation from
Aristotle, then, Suarez expands it to an argument for the
form as a principle of individuation. The problem, then, is
to delineate the sense in which the form may be said to

individuate.hh

 

M‘Est alia principalis sententia in hac materia,
principium internum individuationis esse formam
substantialem. Haec solet tribui Duran., In II, dist. 3,
q. 2, qui non omnino illam affirmat, ut postea dicam; eam
vero videtur docuisse Averr. I de Anima, c. 7, et lib. II,
in principia, et com. 7, 8, 9, et 60 et III Phys., com. 60,
et ib. IV, com. 38; citatur etiam Avicen., VI Natural.,
part. I, dicens formam dare subiecto unitatem numericam;
tenet Zimara, Theorem. 97; etSebast., episc. Oxamen., II de
Anima, c. l. Favetque Arist., ibid., dum ait formam esse,
guae constituat h9§_aliguid. Et ex hoc verbo Aristotelis

 

 

ff

 

C
i.

198

There are two arguments against the form as a prin-
ciple of individuation.

Some phiIOSOphers have said that the form is espe-
cially that internal principle which confers unity on a be-
ing and hence must be the principle of individuation. But,
some object to this opinion because, although it rightly
states that the form confers unity, it does not follow that
the form itself is the only principle of individuation of
the thing. And, therefore, matter will also be a principle
of individuation.h5 The issue here is whether the form is

the only principle of individuation. From what has been

summendum est praecipuum fundamentum huius sententiae; nam
principium individuationis esse debet id, quod intrinsece
constituit hanc substantiam et est maxime proprium illius;
ergo ratione primae proprietatis esse debet aliquid
substantiale; nam accidentia, ut saepe dictum est, nec
constituunt substantiam, neque hanc substantiam; nam haec
substantia, etiam ut est haec, est ens per se et substan-
tiale. Ratione autem alterius proprietatis, hoc principium
non potest esse materia, sed forma, quia haec materia non
est maxime propria huius individui, cum sub aliis formis
esse possit; ergo forma est principium individuationis.

Unde argumentor secundo, quia idem est principium
unitatis qued entitatis, propter qued dixit D. Thomas,
quaest. unica, de Anima, a. 1, ad 2, unumguodgue secundum
idem habere esse gt individuationem. Sed unaquaeque res
prorpie Habet esse a‘forma; ergo et unitatem individualem.
Maior constat quia unitas est passio consequens entitatem,
et non addit illi nisi negationem; ergo non potest habere
aliud principium positivum et reale, nisi quod est
principium ipsius entitatis. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. L,
pars. 1-2.

‘53ed obiiciet aliquis contra hanc sententiam et
rationem, quia quamvis recte probet formam conferre ad
unitatem, non tamen quod ipsa sole sit principium
individuationis; nem etiam materia est principium
intrinsecum constituens rei entitatem, et ideo etiam erit
principium individuationis, si non sola, saltem cum forma.
. . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. a, par. 3.

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199
said already one can surmise that Suarez will reject that
position.

Suarez says that it is true that the adequate in-
trinsic cause of the individual unity of material substance
is the form and the matter as the argument concludes. But,
if one compares form and matter the principal cause of unity
is the form. In this sense it is especially the principle
of individuation. Just as matter is necessary for intelli-
gibility or specific unity ("man" or "mankind" is not intel-
ligible without being constituted of matter) nonetheless ab-
solutely speaking specific intelligibility comes from the
form. The form gives the final completeness and presupposes
matter only as something potential and indifferent. There-
fore, the form is called a principle of individuation be-
cause it gives the ultimate substantial completeness to the

individual.L6 So, then, Suarez agrees with those who raised

 

thespondetur ergo aliter, verum quidem esse
adaequatam causam intrinsecum individualis unitatis
substantiae materialis esse formam et materiam, ut
argumentum concludit; tamen si haec duo inter se
comparentur, praecipuam causam huius unitatis esse formam,
et hoc sensu illi specialiter attribui quod sit
individuationis principium. Sicut etiam materia necessaria
est ad rationem seu unitatem specificam; non enim potest
ratio hominis vel humanitatis ut sic sine materia constitui,
et idem est de ratione generics animalis, viventis, etc.; et
nihilominus absolute dicitur ratio Specifics sumi a forma,
quia illa dat ultimum complementum, solumque praesupponit
materiam ut quid potentials et indifferens; eadem ergo
ratione illa dicetur principium individuationis, quia illa
dat ultimum substantiale complementum individuo, quamvis
praesupponat materiam ut potentialem de se et indifferentem
propter quod dixit Aristoteles supra, at I Phys., c. 7,
text. 69, formam constituere hoc aliquid. Et quoniam, ut
supra dicebamus, per idem distinguitur res per quod
constituitur, eadem forma quae constituit hoc aliquid,

 

 

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200
this objection to substantial form as a principle of indi-
viduation. For he sees that there is a very real sense in
which the form does give individuality. He disagrees with
the objection in that it would put matter and form on an
equal footing in the understanding of individuation.
Rather, Suarez says, the form is the primary principle of
individuation.

This, then, leads to the second objection which must
be overcome if one is to accept the form as a principle of
individuation. This new objection states that the form as
such gives specific existence but does not give individual
and numerical existence unless it is considered as this
form. Therefore not form as such but rather form as this

is the principle of individuation."7 At this point, one

 

distinguit illud ab aliis quoniam actus est gui distinguit,
VII Metaph., c. 13, text. L9; ergo—forma est quae complet
rationem individui. Et hoc confirmat communis concipiendi
et loquendi modus; nam si animae Petri, verbi gratia,
uniatur corpus constans ex materia distincta a corpore quod
prius habuit, quamvis compositum illud non sit omni ex parte
idem quod antea fuit, tamen simpliciter loquendo, illud
individuum dicitur idem ratione eiusdem animae; at vero e
contrario, si corpori ex eadem materia constanti uniatur
anima numero distincta, simpliciter non censetur idem
individuum sed distinctum; ergo signum est individuationem
sumi praecipue a forma. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. h, par. L.

‘7Sed adhuc obiicitur contra hanc sententiam et
rationem factam, quia, licet forma ut sic det esse
specificum, tamen non dat esse individuale et numericam nisi
ut est haec; ergo non forma ut sic, sed id unde ipsa forma
habet ut sit haec, est individuationis principium; sed est
haec ratione materiae; ergo materia potius est prima radix
individuationis. Probatur minor primo, quia forma non est
per seipsam haec; alioqui idem dici posset de qualibet
entitate, neque oporteret quaerere aliud individuationis
principium: ergo est haec per materiam, non enim potest
alia radix excogitari. Secundo, quia forma habet totum suum

 

'v

kt

 

:

 

 

 

'\

*4

201

should note that Suarez takes it for granted that there are
two principles of individuation; here, it is only a question
of the priority of one over the other. In his own answer to
the problem Suarez concedes that the form is not the princi-
ple of individuation of the composite in respect to its spe-
cific intelligibility and this is self-evident. But, in so
far as the form is this form it is a principle of individua-
tion. The same thing could be said of matter, because mat-
ter has a specific and common intelligibility according to
which it is not sufficient for constituting an individual.
If matter does constitute an individual it does so in so far

4+8

as it is this matter. There is a distinction operating

 

esse in ordine ad materiam; ergo et individuationem suam;
ergo materia est principium individuationis formae et conse-
quenter totius compositi. Tertio, quia formas multiplican-
tur numero, quatenus in diversis materiis recipiuntur, et
ideo formas separatae non multiplicentur numero, quia non
recipiuntur in materia; ergo individuantur etiam per ordinem
ad materiam: ultima ergo resolutio huius individuationis
fit ad materiam; est enim haec forma haec, quia in tali
materia recipitur; ergo prima radix individuationis est
materia. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. h, par. 5.

L8. . . Concedo itsque formam non esse principium
individuationis compositi secundum specificam rationem suam,
ut est per se notum, sed in quantum est haec; sed hoc ipsum
dicendum est de materia, quia etiam materia habet specificam
et communem rationem, secundum quam non est sufficiens ad
constituendum individuum; ergo, si constituit, id facit in
quantum est haec. Quaeran ergo rursus unde habet quod sit
haec. Respondent aliqui, quia Deus voluit hanc potius creare
quam aliam; sed hoc extra rem est non enim hic inquirimus
extrinsecum principium individuationis, sed intrinsecum;
alioqui etiam dicere quis posset hanc animam esse hanc, quia
Deus voluit potius illam infundere quam aliam; vel hsnc
formam esse hanc, quia Deus determinavit ad illam suum con-
cursum, ut est valde probabile, sicut dicemus sectione
sequenti. Alii respondent hanc materiam esse hanc ratione
huius quantitatis. Sed hoc et est falsum, et non evacuat
difficultatem. Primum patet ex supra dictis, quia, cum haec

202

here that is evident in many places in Suarezian metaphys-

ics - All of the talk about t_h_i_§ matter and th_i_s_ form is
meant to be talk about real "physical" principles of being.
To talk about "matter" and "form" absolutely does nothing to
solve the problem of individuals. These absolute terms are
used only in that special "metaphysical" sense which has
been shown in the earlier chapters of this study to be an
abstract way of speaking. When one talks of the form as a
principle of individuation one is talking about EELS. form,

not form taken abstractly.

materia simpliciter supponatur huic quantitati, non potest
per :illam individuari. Item, quia rationes supra factae
universaliter probant nihil substantiale posse individuari
per accidens superadditum; nam etiam haec materia est
311 quid per se unum constitutum sub specifica ratione
materiae, per se illam contrahens. Immo ex natura rei non
dZi-St‘ainguuntur materia et haec materia, sicut supra ostensum
est, de quolibet individuo respectu rationis communis; ergo
non potest haec materia intrinsece individuari per
quantitatem, quae est res ab illa distincta nec per ordinem
ad illam, cum potius haec quantitas dicat ordinem ad hanc
materiam, quam e converso. Secundum de quantitate patet,
quia de illa etiam inquiram unde sit haec, cum id non habeat
ix Sue specifica ratione, et cum non sit procedendum in
S$~fiiriiitulln, nec vitiosus et inutilis circulus committendus,
h S‘tlendum erit in aliqua re, quae per seipsam sit haec; ergo
11° potius tribuendum est substantiae quam accidenti, cum
adla sit prior magisque absolute entitas; vel, si
admi ttendum est duo entia incompleta per mutuam habitudinem
invicem individuari, secundum diversa genera causarum, id
got-ins dicendum erit de materia et forma substantiali inter
cg’ quam cum aliquo accidente, quia magis per se
arnhectuntur, et se invicem respiciunt. Ergo omnia
ingumenta facta possunt idem de materia concludere quod
3e endunt de forma, nam est inter eas, quoad hoc, quaedam
ququalitas. Et aliunde materia solum superat formam in hoc,
inod est quaedam occasio producendi formas varis et
madividuas, ut supra declaratum est; forma vero superat
(in eriam in hoc, quod praecipue constituit individuum, et
pro est magis propria eius, et quod materia potius est
teopter formam quam e converso, ut dicitur II Phys., c. 9,
prxt 91; ergo pensatis omnibus, potissimum individuationis
incipium est forma. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 1., par. 6.

 

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203

It is because of thisness, then, that one can say
that the form alone is not the complete and adequate prin-
ciple of individuation of material things. It has already
been shown that matter individuates as well as form. So,
these two, when one speaks concretely, are principles of
individuation. The form, however, in Suarezian philosophy
is the primary principle of individuation together with the
matter, and is the sufficient principle needed to distin-
guish one being from another in the same species.

Existence of a Singular Thing as the
Principle of Individuation

In the previous two sections it has been shown that
Suarez takes matter and form as principles of individuation.
Ultimately he accepts both rather than one or the other as
principles of individuation. It has been shown in Chapters
II and III that matter and form are related to each other
directly and permit of no other intervening entitative prin-
ciple. The union of the matter and form gives the really
existing being; Suarez now asks whether or not it is this
real existence which individuates.

As has been shown, Suarez is interested in the in-
trinsic or constitutive principles of individuation, and he
is now concerned whether subsistence (i.e., independent ex-
istence) can be considered the principle of individuation.
Suarez feels that everyone has considered this opinion to be
false but that it must be treated because of the history of

the controversies over the "act of existence." Unlike

20h

Suarez' examination of matter and form, Suarez' explanation
of existence results in a total rejection of the position
that existence is a principle of individuation.

One can suppose that existence is distinct from the
nature of the thing (from the essence of the individual). If
one proceeds in this manner, it will be true that each thing
in its intelligibility as an existent has also some intelli-
gibility as an individual from the existence itself; but it
is improbable that existence individuates. There are three
reasons given by Suarez for the rejection of this opinion.

First, an essence considered only as an essence can
become an individual and the individual will always be de-
termined to a definite species. But the individual essence
is not determined by means of something in itself distinct
from the nature of the thing. Therefore, the individual es-
sence is not determined by existence. As substantiation for
this argument Suarez says that man of itself is common to
many individuals, whether these individuals exist or not;
and also even individual men (e.g., Peter and Paul) as ab-
stracted from actual existence, as possible beings, include
intrinsically in their understanding all those things by
which they are distinguished one from the other. Therefore,
individuation does not occur by means of actual existence,
which comes to a fully constituted and individuated essence

only contingently.“9

 

“9Primo quidem quia essentia intra latitudinem
essentiae manens, fit individua, et in ea contrahitur et
determinatur essentia specifica; sed essentia specifica non

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205

Second, a general argument can be given in terms of
act and potency. A singular act presupposes a singular po-
tency. Thus the potency really is presupposed by the act.
This potency is one and distinct from its act not in thought
but in fact. If one considers existence as an act and es-
sence as a potency, the essence is not able to come into be-
ing so that it should have its unity on account of its act.
It has been shown in the first argument that the essence is
alreadyindividual and hence does not get its unity from

existence.5O

 

contrahitur per aliquid ex natura rei distinctum a se, ut
supra probatum est; ergo non contrahitur ad individuam
essentiam per existentiam. Maior per se evidens est, tum
quia homo, verbi gratia, de se communis est multis
individuis, sive illa existant, sive non existant; tum
etiam, quia Petrus et Paulus, ut abstrahunt ab actuali
existentia, seu ut possibiles, intrinsece includunt suas
rationes individuae, quibus distinguuntur; tum denique quia
differentiae specificae seu essentiales conveniunt speciebus
necessaria connexione, secundum quam propositiones in quibus
praedicata essentialis praedicantur, dicuntur esse perpetuae
veritates; ita individuo convenit sua differentia
individualis. Unde tam necessario Petrus est hic homo,
sicut est homo, et tam necessaria Petrus collocatur sub
homine, sicut homo sub animali; haec ergo contractio et
subordinatio non fit per existentiam actualem, quae
contingenter advenit essentiae plene constitutae et
individuatae. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 5, par. 3.

50Secundo hic habet locum argumentum supra relatum
ex Caiet., quod actus singularis supponit potentiam
singularem, quod principium diximus esse verum in actu et
potentia ex natura rei distinctis, quia tunc potentia
realiter supponitur actui ordine naturae et est quid unum
distinctum a suo actu, et unum non cogitatione, sed reipsa,
et ideo fieri non potest ut formaliter et intrinsece habeat
unitatem ab actu suo. Sed ita comparantur essentia et
existentis iuxta praedictam opinionem; ergo essentia, eo
modo quo per se habet entitatem essentiae distinctam ab
existentis et aptam actuari per illam, ita etiam habet suam
unitatem et individuationem. Alioqui oporteret intelligere
existentiam esse actum naturae specificae et universalis,
quod est satis absurdum. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 5, par. A.

 

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206

Third, in existence itself there is a common in-
telligibility as well as individual intelligibility. Human
existence is able to be considered as common or as in Peter
and Paul. Since this is the case one would be forced to
inquire about existence itself--what individuates this prin-
ciple of being? What makes existence a tttg? It cannot be
the essence since according to the present Opinion the es-
sence is not individual but common to many. It cannot be
an accident which individuates existence because accidents
and existence are each on different levels of being. The

51

questions cannot be answered. This presupposition, then,

 

51Tertio, quia in ipsamet existentia potest
considerari communis ratio existentiae humanae, verbi

gratia, et ratio huius existentiae Petri vel Pauli; ergo de
ipsa existentia superest inquirendum per quid fiat haec; non
enim ab essentia, cum non supponet illam individuam iuxta
hanc sententiam, sed communem; neque ab aliquo accidente, ut
per se notum est, satisque in superioribus probatum; a quo
ergo? Si dicas seipsa fieri hanc, cur non id potiori
ratione dices de essentia, cum et ordine naturae sit prior
et perfectione etiam, et cum quodammodo sit magis absoluta?
Nam existentia est actus huius essentiae; unde haec
existentia potius erit haec quia hanc essentiam actuet;
sicut in communi etiam existentia hominis et leonis
differunt, quia vel consequuntur, vel respiciunt diversas
essentias, supposita praedicta distinctione. Ex quo potest
sumi nova confirmatio, quia sicut existentia humana in
communi est extra essentiam hominis in communi, ita haec
existentia Petri est extra hanc essentiam individuam Petri
et sicut in Petro et Paulo sunt duae numero existentiae, ita
duae numero humanitates habentes distinctae individuas
entitates essentiae. Ultimo a posteriori est argumentum,
quia (supposita illa sententia) eadem individua entitas
conservatur sine sua existentia, aut mutat varias
existentias, ut humanitas Christi in ea opinione caret
propria existentia, et tamen est individua, et habet
intrinsecum individuationis principium; similiter eadem
numero entitas materiae primae, prout mutat formas, dicitur
mutare existentias et tamen eadem semper numero manet.

Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 5, par. 5.

 

   

 

 

 

 

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207
leads to nothing but contradictions or unanswerable ques-
tions.

Perhaps one could still hold existence to be the
principle of individuation by presupposing that existence
is nothing other than the actual being of each thing. This
presupposition is unacceptable because of the obscurity of
the term "actual being of a thing." It wants to attribute
to existence rather than essence the intelligibility of in-
dividuation, but according to the "actual being presupposi-
tion" existence and essence are the same. It is useless to
speak of existence as individuating when one already has an
2

individual essence.5

Suarez, then, rejects on both presuppositions that

 

520pinio igitur de existentia ab omnibus reiicitur,
ut omnino false et improbabilis; dupliciter autem in ea
procedi potest, primo supponendo existentiam esse ex natura
rei distinctam ab essentia individui; secundo opinionem
asserentem existentiam nihil aliud esse quam actualem
entitatem uniuscuiusque rei. Hoc posteriori modo haec
sententia in re conicidit cum opinione asserente unamquamque
rem individuari se ipsa, nulloque alio principia indi-
viduationis indigere, praeter entitatem suam; nude in re

non est haec opinio maiori reprehensione digna, uam illa de
qua postea dicemus. Solum reprehendi potest quo obscuris
et ambiguis terminis utatur et quod existentiae potius quam
essentiae hanc rationem individuationis tribuat, cum potius
existentiae non possit hoc convenire, nisi quatenus est idem

cum essentia. Si autem procedatur in priori sententia,
formaliter quidem verum erit quod unaquaeque res in ratione
existentis habet aliquam rationem individualem ab ipsa
existentia, sicut hoc album, quantum ad formalem rationem
albi constituitur Ber albedinen, quanvis simpliciter hoc
album, quia ro su iecto accipitur, non constituatur per
albedinem. nde etiam in proposito, materialiter (ut sic
dicam) loquendo de re existente, seu de hac numero essentia,
inprobabile est dicere individuari per existentiam qua
existit, si haec est res ab ipsa distincta, vel modus ex
natura rei diversus. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 5, par. 2.

 

 

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208
existence individuates one thing from another. This rejec-
tion results from Suarez' deeper metaphysical conviction
that essence and existence are not related to each other in
the same way as matter and form. It is the two primary
principles of being of material things that individuate.
Essence and existence bear a different relationship one to
another than matter and form. It is on the level of matter
and form that individuation occurs because matter and form
make the real substance and individuation occurs on the sub-
stantial level.
Principles of Individuation
for All Created Things

In the negative section of his discussion on the
principle of individuation Suarez has shown that previous
authors have not been able to explain adequately why there
is one individual as opposed to another. It has been shown
in the negative argumentation that matter and form, if they
are to be accepted as principles of individuation, cannot be
understood in the simplistic manner of the earlier explana-
tions. Suarez will not allow existence to individuate in
any way whatsoever.

The positive analysis of the principle of individua-
tion occurring in Disputation V, Section 6 attempts to
answer the question, "What is the principle of individuation
for all created things?" The question is meant to take into
account a complex reality. The major problem with the

earlier philosophers' positions was that they were not

209
sufficiently sensitive to the complexities of the problem of
1nd ividuation. Suarez now wants to explicate a principle of
ind ividuation for all created things.53 Individual beings
can be considered as simple or as composed. One simple be-
ing (matter) must be able to be distinguished from another
(form or another matter). And one composed being (i.e.,
composed of matter and form) must be able to be distin-
gui shed from another both in number and in kind.“

Suarez' first concern is how one can distinguish one
matt er from another. That is, matter is a simple incomplete
being but this matter is different from that matter. Suarez
states that matter is in itself an individual; the founda-
tion of such a unity is the being of the matter itself.
This being is in the matter itself and there is nothing ex-
tri nsic added to the matter to make it an individual (e.g.,

as some would add on, e.g., quantity). This can be proved

‘

 

53One should note here that the treatment is for all
created things. Suarez feels that God of his very nature is
indual and consequently the problem of multiplicity
and individuation is not even appropriate when one is dis-
cussing the divinity.

\r ShEx hactenus dictis contra superiores sententias
01d etur quasi a sufficienti partium enumeratione relinqui
smnem substantiam si ularem [s'e ipsa seu per entitatem
“8'11, esse singularem neque alio indigere individuationis
Erincipio praeter suam entitatem, vel praeter principia
sntt‘inseca quibus eius entitas constat. Nam, si talis
3‘fi‘fbstantia physice considerata, simplex sit, ex se et sua
Vamplici entitate est individua; si vero sit composita,
enrbi gratia, ex materia et forma unitis sicut principia
intitatis eius sunt materia, forma et un o earum, ita eadem
11 individuo sumpta sunt principia individuationis eius;
la vero, cum sint simplicia, seipsis individua erunt. . .

D1313. Meta. V, Sect. 6, par. 1.

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210
because matter that is under this form of wood differs in
number from that which is under a form of water or of man.
The matter is, therefore, in itself individual and singular.
It is important to realize that the foundation of such a
unity in matter is not the substantial form nor even any
ordering to this or that form, because regardless of the
variation of the form the matter remains the same in

numb or.” The import of this position is that since matter

55Primo igitur a materia prima incipiendo, dicendum

est illam ease in re individuam, et fundamentum talis unita-
tis esse entitatem eius per seipsam, prout est in re absque
ullo extrinseco superaddito. Probatur, quia materia quae
881: sub hac forma ligni, est numero diversa ab illa quae est
311b forma aquae vel hominis; est ergo in se individua et
sil'lgularis. Fundamentum autem talis unitatis in ea non est
forma substantialis, neque ordo ad hanc vel illam formam

° - . quia variata quacumque forma substantiali, semper
manet eadem numero materia, quae, licet actu sit unita huic
vel illi formee, tamen ex se communem et indifferentem

aI=>1tudi1aem dicit ad quamcumque formam quam potest recipere.

Ursus, neque etiam quantitas potest esse fundamentum huius
1nd ividuae unitatis materiae, ut idem probat argumentum, si
Vern); est materiam amittere et acquirere quantitates variae
I>IPC>Iat formae substantiales varientur. Item quia iuxta
Band em opinionem materia prius natura, quam recipiat quan-
‘31 tatem, subest'actioni agentis inducentis formam vel quan-
‘31 tatem; non autem subest, nisi ut individua et singularis,
quia actiones sunt circa singularia. Si autem teneamus
eamdem quantitatem esse materiae coaevum, potest idem argu-
l"Orltum accommodari, saltem in ordine ad potentiam Dei;
pot, est enim Deus ab hac materia hanc quantitatem auferre et
“liam tribuere, vel omnino sine quantiate servare; esset
:I‘go eadem materia numero sine eadem numero quantitate; ergo
a3“ est quantitas fundamentum talis unitatis ipsi materiae,
E 1&3 nullo modo posset sine illa suam unitatem reservare.
at Praeterea sunt omnia argumenta communia supra facta, quod
aabstentia non individuetur per accidens, use per ordinem
It. accidens; materia enim substantia est, licet artialis.
a en, quod individua substantia est ens per se. tem, quod
q:iciidens supponit subiectum suum prout est in re ct conse-
esehter singulare. Item quod differentia individualis non
pot in re distincta ab entitate quam constituit; unde nec
S.test fundari in entitate distincta. Disp. Meta. V,

ct. 6, par. 2.

There are several strange notions in this passage

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211
is a simple being it needs nothing other than itself to be
an individual. It is a this of its very nature.

A similar argument occurs in the analysis of the
principle of individuation for the form. A substantial form
is a this intrinsically by reason of its own being, from
which its individual difference is taken. No accident is
able to be an intrinsic individuating principle for substan-
tial form, because such a form, since it is this is a being
fl: g3, even though incomplete, and pertains to the predi-
Cate substance. Consequently, the form, like matter, needs
no further principle of individuation. There might be a
possibility, however, that matter could individuate the
I‘<>r‘ln; Suarez denies this outright. Matter cannot of itself
be an intrinsic principle individuating any form because the
matter is not an intrinsic principle of the form. In simple
beings the principle of unity and the principle of being are
one and the same. Unity adds nothing to the being, but only
a negation that the being is this and not that. Matter is
a principle of individuation for the composite because
through its being it composes the composite; matter does

waver, compose the being of the form.56

935‘ Suarez' which are worthy of special note. What does it

InGan to say that matter is in itself an individual? In this

gontext what does it mean to say that matter is incomplete?
here seems to be some basic confusion over the differences

and relationships between the concepts of "singularity" and
1Amity."

h 56Secundo dicendum est formam substantialem esse
anc intrinsece per suammet entitatem, a qua secundum

ultimum gradum seu realitatem sumitur differentia

individualis eius. Haec conclusio probari potest eisdem

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212
It is fairly easy to determine Suarez' reasoning in
these sections on the principle of individuation for simple
beings. If he allows that there is some principle (e.g.,

quantity) of individuation for such a simple being as matter

rationibus proportionalibus quibus praecedens, et ex
SUperioribus, praesertim ex his quae in prima et secunda
opinione dicta sunt, facile comfirmari potest. Nam imprimis
nulls accidentia possunt esse intrinseca principia indivi-
duantia formam substantialem, quia etiam talis forma, ut est
haec, est ens per se, licet incompletum, et pertinet ad
pra edicamentum substantiae, et sub specifica ratione talis
formee collocatur, quamvis reductive. Item haec forma vel
est, simpliciter et omni ratione prior accidentibus, et origo
11lc>rum vel, si aliqua supponit in genere causae materialis,
“on dicit per se habitudinem ad illa, sed a summum requirit
111a ut conditiones vel dispositiones necessariae ad praepa-
r‘ndum subiectum; ergo nullo modo potest ab accidentibus in-
<jividuari. Deinde materia non potest per seipsam esse in-
;rinsecun principium individuandi ullam formam, quia non est
ntrinsecum principium entitatis eius; idem autem est prin-
gipium unitatis quod est principium entitatis, ut saepe
tictum est, quia unitas nullam rem addit entitati, sed nega-
ionem intrinsece comitantem illam. Antecedens autem patet,
guia materia est principium compositi intrinsecum, quia per
than entitatem componit entitatem formas; non est ergo in-
t‘Ilnsecum principium eius. Respectu vero illarum formarum,
ghee a materia pendent in fieri et in esse, materia est
ause: per se in suo genere formee, non ut intrinsece com-
I>°liens illam, sed ut sustentans illam quod est genus quoddam
Qausalitatis veluti extrinsecum; et hoc modo materia dici
Eotest causa et principium individuationis talium formarum
‘1 suo genere, ex principia posito, quod causa entitatis est
causa unitatis, et quia materia non causat formam, nisi sin-
gularem et individuam; ergo causando entitatem causat indi-
tiduationem eius. Tamen, quia differentia individualis in-
I‘insece praedicatur de re individua, ideo non sumitur ex
fiausis quovis modo extrinsecis ipsius rei individuae, sed ex
htrinseco principia seu entitate eius, et ideo hoc modo non
gotest esse materia principium intrinsecum individuationis
Qrmarum. Quod a posteriori declaratur in ordine ad divinam
potentiam: potest enim haec forma substantialis conservari
$1!“ materia, et tune sicut retinet suam differentiam indi-
1dua1en, ita etiam suum intrinsecum principium indivi-
clllationis; ergo non est materia huiusmodi principium intrin-
chm. Hoe autem manifestius est in anima rationali, in
qua, sicut esse non causatur per se a materia, ita etiam
eque unites ante individuatio ut notavit D. Thomas, II
cont Gent., c. 75 in solutione primae rationis, et c. 81, in
principia; ergo materia non solum est principium intrinsecum

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213

and form he is faced with an infinite regression of princi-
p1 es of individuation. Because matter and form are simple
beings there is no way for them to be individuated by some-
thing else which is intrinsic to their constitution. In
effect, Suarez is saying that this matter or this form is a
this precisely because they have a being of their own.
There is nothing further needed for individuation.

Once the problem of individuation has been solved
for the simple beings, Suarez turns his attention to the
composite beings. How is one composite being individuated
from another both in number and in kind? The early nega-
tive argumentation gave some hint of the manner in which
Suarez will proceed. It has already been shown that both
matter and form individuate in the composite being. Suarez
in rejecting signed matter did finally arrive at the conclu-
8icon that there is a real sense in which this matter indi-
viduates a composite complete being. A similar conclusion
Occurred with the form, i.e., this form also individuates a
Composite complete being. Although Suarez found certain
Versions of the theory that form individuates unacceptable,
he did, however, conclude that there is a real sense in
which the form does act as a principle of individuation.
The early argumentation resulted then in the position that

both this matter and this form are necessary conditions for

\

individuationis animae verum etiam nec causa per se eius,
quamvis sit veluti occasio quaedam ut, organizatio tali

gorpore, Deus in 1110 talem animam creet. Disp. Meta. V.
Get. 6, par. 5.

21h
individuation. Taken in themselves though neither is suffi-
cient to individuate a composite being.

The positive discussion on the principle of individ-
uation for composite being is meant to make explicit the
necessary and sufficient conditions for a given composite to
be an individual. Suarez' own solution to the problem is
that in composite substance, in so far as it is composite,
the adequate principle of individuation is this matter and
this form united to each other. Of the two the main prin-
ciple is the form, which alone suffices that this composite
in so far as it is an individual of such a species should be

57

one in number. At this point there is really nothing new

that Suarez has not already said; what he develops in this
section of the argument, however, are his reasons for this
position.

Suarez first answers the objection that says that it
is an improper way of speaking to say this matter and this
form are physical principles of individuation, for neither
tahis form, nor this matter, nor both taken at the same time
Would be able to be added to the specific nature of man.

Also, this matter and this form are individuals constituted

\

57. . . dicendum est in substantia composita, ut
t'ale compositum est, adaequatum individuationis principium
eSse hanc materiam et hanc formam inter se unitas, inter
quae praecipuum principium est forma, quae sola sufficit ut

0:: compositum, quatenus est individuum talis speciei, idem
n\llfnero censeatur. Haec conclusio sequitur ex praecedentibus
gt ex dictis sect. 1., et est consentanea opinioni Durandi et

0 eti supra tractatis, et in re non dissentiunt Scotus et

Hel'lricus nec nominales omnes . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 6,
Par. 15.

215

from their own specific nature and proper principles of in-
dividuation. Therefore, they are unable to be the princi-
pl es of individuation for the composite. The problem, here,
Suarez says, is that the objections stray from physical in-
telligibility (composition of matter and form) to metaphys-
ical composition (genus and specific nature). This matter
and this form are called physical principles of individua-
tion of this composite. There is no comparison here to a
specific nature, but the only concern is the physical com-
posite. There is no need that there be added a specific
nature, nor is there any question that matter and form have
their own specific nature since their very being individu-
ates them. The objection is, therefore, fallacious and the

Original statement that this matter and this form individu-
58

ate is true. Here it can be seen, once again, that

Suarez' main concern is with the real physical constitution
of the being and on this level of discussion it takes this

Inatter and this form to establish the individual.

¥

58. . . Fonseca etiam non dissentit, lib. V Metaph.,

q - 5, quamvis dicat impropriam esse locutionem cum dicimus
anc materiam et hanc formam esse principia individuationis
Physics, quia neque forma haec, neque haec materia, neque
alllbae simul addi possent naturae specificae hominis, ut cum
ea constituent hunc hominem, et quia etiam haec materia et
haec forma sunt individua, ex suis naturis specificis et
PPOpriis individuationis principiis constitute. Sed in his
rat ionibus divertit a physica ratione ad metaphysicam
compositionem; cum enim haec materia et haec forma dicuntur
pri ncipia physica individuationis huius compositi, non
consparantur ad specificam naturam communem, sed ad physicum
compositum quod componunt; et ideo non est necesse ut
addantur naturae specificae communi, sed ut componant illam
gomponendo individuum in quo includitur. Disp. Meta. V,

act. 6, par. 15.

216
This position can be especially substantiated by

adverting to the fact that matter and form absolutely con-
sidered are physical principles of substance, both composing
and specifying it. Therefore this matter and this form will
be physical principles of the individual, individuating it.
And, in the same way one can conclude that neither pg; _s_e_,
but both at the same time are the adequate principles of in-
dividuation. This composite, in order to be all together
and completely one in number, requires not only this form or
this matter but both at the same time; whenever either one
is altered the composite does not remain the same as it was
Previously because some part of its being has been altered.
Therefore, the matter and the form are the adequate princi-
Ples of numerical unity of the whole composite. This all
follows from the general principle that the principles of
unity are the same as those of being. This matter and this
for; are the adequate intrinsic principles of the being of
this composite. Therefore they are the adequate intrinsic
Principles 0f unity and individuation.”

__

59Unde secundum eamdem physicam constitutionem talia

Principia simplicia sunt, neque habent alia quibus physice
1nd ividuentur, sed seipsis individuantur, ut declaratum est.
on est ergo impropria locutio, sed vera ac propria, quia
98d em sunt principia individuationis intrinseca quae sunt
pri ncipia intrinseca entitatis, ut saepe dictum est, quia
1nd ividuatio sequitur entitatem, ut est negatio quaedam; ut
ant em includit positivum est ipsamet entitas, nihilque

1 li addit; sed haec materia et haec forma inter se unitae
sunt intrinseca principia totius entitatis composites
substantiae de qua agimus; ergo sunt etiam intrinseca

pri ncipia physica individuationis. Et confirmatur, nam
mat; eria et forma absolute sumptae sunt principia physica
sF‘Qciei substantiae compositae et specificationis eius; ergo

 

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217
Suarez' argument for the principles of individua-

tion, then, at this stage appeals to the notions that in
composite beings one is dealing with this real physical mat-
ter and this real physical form; it is the combination of
the two that makes for the actual individual. Since the be-
ing is composite rather than simple, there can be some prin-
ciple of individuation beyond the being of the existent that
brings about the individuation. It is the peculiar combina-
tion of this matter and this form that results in the being
and unity of the composite.

Simply put, in composite beings there are two prin-
¢1p1es of individuation--this matter and this form-~on the
Phy’sical level. Suarez does not feel that this leads to a
c"1812mm but rather results in a genuine unity. It is very
difficult to see how, if one allows for two principles of
ind ividuation, Suarez can avoid a dualism. The solution
Snarez would say is that matter and form are simple, incom-
P1 eta beings and hence are dependent upon one another in

their being. But, it has already been shown in earlier

‘

 

haec materia et haec forma erunt principia physica individui
et, individuationis eius. Et eodem modo concludi potest
he“tram per se, sed utramque simul esse hoc adaequatum

principium. Quia hoc compositum, ut omnino et complete sit
idem numero, requirit non solum hanc formam vel hanc
In“ter-iam, sed utramque simul, et quacumque variata non manet
31mPliciter et omni ex parte idem compositum quod antea
erat , quia aliqua ex parte variata est eius entitas; ergo
materia et forma sunt adaequatum principium unitatis
mmlericae totius compositi, ut tale est. Et confirmatur
rat'itbne facta, quia eadem sunt principia unitatis, quae
em"itatis; sed haec materia et haec forma sunt adaequatum
firincipium intrinsecum huius compositae entitatis; ergo et
nit‘oatis et individuationis. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 6, par. 15.

 

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218

chapters and in this present chapter that matter and form

progressively become more and more complete and more and

more independent of one another. To quote the dictum that

the principle of being is the principle of unity does not

help on the composite level since the principle of being

is twofold in a composite. It appears that Suarez is in

effect dualist with respect to composite beings, despite
his intentions to the contrary.60

Conclusion
This present chapter has shown the very great
stress Suarez puts on the unity of the individual and the

care with which he establishes the claim that everything

that exists is an individual. In a word, things exist as

individuals not as universals. This led Suarez to ask how

the individuals are distinguished from each other, or what

is the principle of individuation for an individual exist-

ent . The traditional answers of a separate metaphysical

Principle of individuation (e.g., haecceity), signed mat-

ter, form, and existence as principles of individuation

Were found to be either incomplete or fallacious. Suarez,

 

1 601n the early part of this section of this chapter
't ‘Vaas mentioned that Suarez attempts to give principles of

individuation for all reality. This means that the one
tgvel °f the hierarchy of being he has not accounted for up

H t"l‘lis point is the separated substances or the angels.
vidtlreats the manner in which Spiritual substances are indi-
u

Eated in DiSP- Meta. V: Sect. 6, par. 18. That discus-
3:0: is omitted in this present study since the main concern

Hi ith the relationship of matter and form and especially
th the relationship of the rational soul and the body.

219
then, reworked the whole doctrine on individuation.

In the reworked treatment he is very careful to
avoid confusion over real physical composition as opposed
to metaphysical composition. He sees that one must account
£231? physical individuation among both simple beings and
composite beings. Some of the previous approaches gave one
or other partial solution that helped to solve the problem
of individuation but none completely solved it in the sense
that it accounted for all the complexity of reality. In the
positive argument Suarez attempted to take what was appro-
Priate from each of the psoitions and give a general solu-
tion to the problem. The distinction, however, between sim-
ple and composite beings forced him into a dualism that was
and eairable. That is, the simple being (matter or form) is
‘1'! individual, but the two individuals (matter and form)
8130 make an individual on the composite side by means of a
union with one another. This composite is meant to be a
unity m _s_g, not merely an accidental unity.

This is a general doctrine and as such could be made
to work if all forms were subhuman forms (i.e., educed from

matter); but, there is a distinction of kinds of forms that
must also enter in here. It has been shown already that a
bier‘archy of beings is taken for granted by Suarez. This
“loans that the distinction of kinds of forms must express
a di fferent relationship between matter and form depending
°n the kind of form with which one is concerned. In a word,

a form of stone is related to its matter in one way, plant

 

220

forms in another way, animal forms in a third way, and the

human form in still another way. It is this relationship

that now takes on importance as an element in individuation.

Suarez does not treat the relationship of matter and form

when he works out the theory of individuation. But, the

kind of form and the way it is related to matter is of cen-

tral importance in determining whether Suarez has a dualism

or not .

CHAPTER V
BODY AND SOUL

Before treating the doctrine of body and soul di-
rectly it is important at this point to summarize the re-
sults of the previous three chapters. Those portions of
this study were concerned with the metaphysical doctrines
Of matter, form, and individuation. It has been shown that
Suarez has a tendency progressively to substantialize the
two interior causes; this is especially evident in the move
to grant matter a being of its own, to call both matter and
form simple beings, and to allow for matter and form to be
individuated simply on the basis of their status as simple
incomplete beings. It has also been shown that a hierarchy
°f kinds of beings is taken for granted by Suarez. In order
to determine the various grades of being, Suarez holds that
mat‘eter must be disposed in a certain way to accept a form of
one or other grade of being. The forms themselves manifest
diff‘erent qualities and capacities.

In the treatment of matter and form, it has been
she’wm that Suarez is especially concerned to keep these two
pril'11::iples of being related directly to one another. In
this concern he rejects all versions of metaphysics which
would either increase the number of metaphysical principles

221

222
or which would interpose some third principle between the
matter and the form. The particular targets of attack in
this phase of his argument are Scotus and the Scotists.

Finally, the metaphysical treatment of individuation

highlighted the fact that only individuals exist. When one
asks concretely how one individual is to be distinguished
from another, one must deal with two separate problems--

1. What is the principle of individuation for simple beings
(e .g., matter and form)?; 2. What is the principle of indi-
Vi duation for a composite being? Suarez, as has been seen,
h01ds that simple, incomplete beings need no further princi-
PLe of individuation, but as a matter of fact are individ-
Ha Is in themselves. The composed being has two principles
of individuation, this matter and 21.1.1.9: form.

Up to this point the present study has set forth in
the most general terms Suarez' metaphysics. He is very much
Concerned that one talk about real "physical" principles of
being; these principles are the basis for a metaphysical
doctrine that will explain being as being. But, metaphysics
"“4815 have concrete application to the individual existing
beings One finds in the world. In the present chapter the
tr‘98“!!th will be concerned with a single concrete applica-
tion 0f the metaphysical doctrine. Since one of Suarez'
concerns is to maintain a unity in being, the one special
teat c’asm of unity is the relationship of the rational soul
to the human body. If Suarez can maintain a unity of being

i
n this case, he can maintain it in all cases below the

223
human level in the hierarchy of being. Since angels and God
are not composed of matter and form there certainly is no
problem with their unity.1 The unique combination of body

and rational soul presents special problems because the form

in this case is unique.
The discussion of this chapter will be divided into

two major divisions. First, the concern will be with the

"Special Characteristics of the Human Soul;" here one sees
the ways in which the rational soul is like other forms and
then the ways in which the rational soul differs from other
forms. Secondly, the argument will face the difficulty of
"The Human Soul and the Problems of Unity cf the Human
Being." In this section the divisions and kinds of unity
as outlined in Disputation IV will be juxtaposed with the
materials on matter and form and individuation. The general
COnclusion of this chapter will be that with respect to the

c<>mposition of the human being Suarez is a dualist.

Special Characteristics of the Human Soul

2&9 Human Soul is Like Other Forms

In Chapter III it was shown that Suarez is concerned
that there be only one substantial form for a being and that

there are strong arguments against the contrary position

 

 

 

\‘x

fr 1In the case of the subhuman forms they are educed
them the potency of matter. For a fuller description of the
Che”? of eduction from matter the reader is referred to
gpter III, "Suarez' Teaching on Form," pp. 112-116. Since
onl and angels do not have a matter-form composition but are
”he: fOrms there is no problem with their unity; they are
Slzuarez would call simple, complete beings.

 

 

r; 7“

. A

221+

 

that there are multiple forms.2 The rational soul is the
substantial form of the body and consequently there is
only one soul in the body. Suarez' proof here is based on
the nature of vital functions. He has a much broader in-
terpretation of vital functions than current usage would
admit; and basically his understanding of a vital function
is any operation which is characteristic of living things
as opposed to non-living things. Concerning vital func-

tions one can take the position that they are simply acci-

 

dental or that the soul brings them about on the essential
order. Since Suarez wants a genuine relationship between
Soul and body vital functions cannot be simply accidental,
I'ather there must be a genuine influence of the soul on
tJ‘me body and vice versa. This conclusion comes as the re-
sL‘llt of experience. For example, it could happen that the
eye would have an image of an object and from that image
I‘eceive a species. But, if the soul is not attentive to
that Species the person does not see. It does not matter
if someone should object that lack of sight occurs because
the imagination or common sense is distracted because the
Same kind of argument could be made in respect to atten-
tiveness concerning these interior senses. The situation
is that the exterior senses first sense and then the

\

a i 2The complete argumentation of why there can be only
II; $310 substantial form for each being is given in Chapter
F n the subsection entitled "The Unicity of Substantial

°m» " pp. 137-150.

225
3

 

interior senses and the intellect cooperate in seeing.
Because of this unity of action Suarez feels that there is
only one soul in the human being.

The problem with the present argument for the

of the soul is that it depends on a direct rela-

[I
D

unicity
tionship of body and soul for the corporeal and intellectual

3Nihilominus censeo distinctione esse utendum; nam
inter has actiones quaedam sunt vitales, aliae vero minima.
De prioribus dicendum videtur non solam facultatem
accidentalem, sed etiam ipsam animam per substantiam suam in
illas proxime in suo ordine influere. Hanc conclusionem
videtur suadere experientia; nam hae actiones vitales tam
intimo modo fiunt ut ab ipso primo principio vitae, quod est
anima actualiter procedere videantur; unde fit ut, licet
Oculus praesentem habeat imaginem et ab illa recipiat
sEDeciem, si anima non attendat, non videat. Nec refert si
quia dicat id provenire ex distractions imaginationis aut
sensus communis, tum quia idem argumentum faciam de sensu
communi et imaginations. Quod si dicatur tunc speciem
sensibilem non transcendere sensum externum, inde sumemus
aI‘gumentum contra priorem evasionem. Nam si species obiecti
sensibilis praesentis et immutantis sensum externum non
Pervenit ad sensum internum quando anima non attendit, ideo
:81; 91118 species exterioris sensus non communicatur
Eil'l‘tericuri sensui nisi medio actu sensus exterioris. Ex quo
cit ut exterior sensus prius natura sentiat quam interior
3°°Peretur; nam haec cooperatio videtur subsequi operationem
e‘anus oxterioris; ergo ratio our in praedicto casu sensus
Xterior non sentit non provenit ex interiori sensu, sed
9° tins ideo interior sensus non tangitur specie illius
c iecti, quia sensus exterior non percipit illud. Alia ergo
sausa quaerenda est cur tunc sensus exterior non efficiat
nu“ ac“Sum, quae non videtur esse alla nisi quia tunc anima
no“ inf'luit nec cooperatur illi. Dices rationem esse quia
3°“ °°°Peratur, non quidem per suam substantiam, sed per
Spiritus animales, qui necessarii sunt ad sensum et motum.
had: licet verum sit hos epiritus esse necessarios, tamen
“0° ipsum confirmat argumentum et experientiam adductam.
ram ad hos actus vitales requiritur non solum proxime
cac‘gtas, sed concursus etiam spirituum, qui non casu illuc
1:31 “lint, sed virtute alicuius facultatis ministrantis
ali‘” 8piritus ad illum actum; ergo necesse est ut sit
a 3‘1““! commune principium actu utens illis duabus
01-531 t"atibus, et ex naturali inclinatione vel sympathia
lel’l‘ans actionem unius ad actum alterius. Disp. Meta.
: Sect. 5, par. 2.

 

226
powers to interact with each other. It assumes and does not
prove that there is such a relationship between the two co-
principles of being. The argument is by means of example
and gives no reason why the rational soul, a spiritual form,
should be related to a corporeal act such as seeing. Conse-
quently Suarez must provide a further argument that rational
soul and body are related as matter and form. This argument
is from experience but given the metaphysical structure he
has set up, do the structure and experience coincide one
With the other?

In order to get at the problem of a single soul for
the human being, he appeals to another set of experiences.
Basically this group of experiences centers around the co-
op eration or lack of cooperation between various faculties.
Here, he deliberately moves from the simple sensate level to
the intellectual level. Special attention is given to the

human being where the operation of one faculty at times im-
Pedes the operation of another faculty. For example, if a
person is investigating something carefully he often does
not hear others talking. This cannot be attributed to a de-
feet Of the spirit but rather should be attributed to the
att“ti-0n of the intellect which impedes the Operation of
the sel'lse. If each faculty had its own operation of itself
the“ would be no reason why one should impede the operation
or the other.

Once again, Suarez has a fact of eXperience before

him, but the question to be asked again is whether, given

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227

his metaphysical scheme, the fact and the scheme can agree
with each other. Somehow the form has to be related to mat-
ter and influence it. Can an immaterial form do this to
matter? When one turns to the special way in which the soul
is different from material forms it will be seen that there
is no way to establish the requisite relationship to explain
impeding operations.

The argument of impeding operations has an opposite

side also in that there must be a connection and cooperation

 

of operations in the human. The example from eXperience . t.
Cited here is that while the intellect understands, the will
is aroused to various actions like loving, etc. The rela-
tionship of these powers is that the same soul operates in
b<>th powers. There would be no actual causality or motion
and excitation if each power operated alone and without some

connection in a common principle.“
\

“Praeterea hoc confirmat alia experientia, qua supra
grobabamus esse in homine unam tantum animam, quia nimirum
03‘: nimia attentione ad opus unius facultatis impeditur in

pare alterius, ut si nimis attente aliquid homo inspiciat,
eOn audiet loquentem; et ne id tribuatur defectui spirituum,

tiam attentio intellectus impedit operationem sensus, et
Que 93‘? altior et perfectior, eo plus minuit etiam
Shantasiae motum aut repraesentationem et (quod magis est)
atiam opera nutritivae partis impedit vel suspendit. Si
outem unaquaeque facultas sola per seimpsam haberet suam
c>15>91‘3t'a1’l.<3nem, nulla esset ratio cur unius operatio impediret
agerationem alterius; nam multiplicatis virtutibus, si una
v1 ahielr-a non pendet, neque ambae ab uno tertio, cuius
e ”“3. dum utrique applicatur, minuatur in singulis, nihil
eit cur earum operationes non possint simul multiplicari et
0 :{cel‘i aeque perfects. Praeterea sumitur a contrario
1:15 !{“1111 argumentum ex connexione operationum, nam dum

o e lectus intelligit, voluntas excitatur ad amandum, etc.;
ac: autem ideo est qui eadem anima per utramque potentiam

u °Deratur, nam sola veluti habitualis radicatio seu

228
There are several questions in this argument for the
unicity of the soul that must be examined. In the argument
based on the nature of vital functions Suarez establishes
that there must be a single soul but not that there is a
unity of the human being. It is not clear how this argument

applies to the relationship of the rational soul and the

..__.:H
l

body. The approach which takes the contrary operation does
draw a relationship between a bodily function and an intel-

lectual one and here one could find an argument for both the

 

unicity of the form and the unity of the human being. On

the basis of these two arguments one could hold a single

‘

remote dimanatio ab eadem anima non esset satis ad hanc
actualem causalitatem seu motionem et excitationem, si
uIiaquaeque operatio a sua sola potentia actualiter prodiret
Sine connexione in aliquo communi principio. Et inde etiam
oritur dependentia inter appetitum vitae et cognitionem, ut
nihil possit esse amatum nisi sit praecognitum. Ratio autem
a Priori sumi potest ex proprio modo operationis vitalis,
Caliae requirit hanc intimam connexionem cum suo principali
t”Irina-1321.0 formali ut modo consentaneo ad naturam suam fieri
e088“? et ut suum principium vel suppositum vitali modo
i:E‘flcere valeat; quantum enim eXperientia assequi possumus,
vh hoc consistit actualis vita et primaria differentia
Giventium a non viventibus. Et confirmatur, nam ob hanc
vausam censent omnes visum separatum non posse videre seu
hisionem elicere, neque intellectum intelligere. Contra
cane autem sententiam possunt nonulla obiici, quae prudens
albi-“'0. quia vel difficilia non sunt vel multa necessario
a§:tingunt quae ad scientiam de anima spectant. Quod vero
1‘ 191113 interrogare potest, ad quid nimirum sint necessariae
aacmlltates accidentales et vitales, si forma ista etiam
actu influit, ex dictis in sectione praecedenti habet
pufficiens responsum. Forma enim est veluti universale
rincipium, potentia vero necessaria est ut particulare
e Bisque accommodatum ac proprium, ut ibi latius declaratum
D§t° statim etiam alias leviores obiectiones dissolvemus.
1313- Meta. XVIII, Sect. 5, par. 3.
See also Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, pars. 18-24. The

pailigrials quoted above from Disp. Meta. XVIII, Sect. 5,
lengthz-B are a briefer treatment of what is explained at

in DiSputation XV.

229
form but there is a most tenuous claim for unity of the

Then, the argument from comple-
The

human being at this point.

mentary operations has special problems of its own.

complementary operations stay solely on the intellectual,

immaterial level (understanding and willing). Here the ex-

ample takes two functions special to the rational soul which r-

does not allow Suarez to draw the unique relationship he de- 5

sires between body and soul.
The argument from unity of operation to unicity of

 

soul and unity of being is a standard scholastic treatment. . _
I t has been shown, however, that Suarez so transforms the
doctrines of matter and form and individuation that the

metaphysical principles become quasi-substances in them-

selves. What does unity of operation mean in this new con-

text? Considering what he has done metaphysically Suarez

cannot get unity of being by appealing to unity of opera-

t3=l<>m=h In a word, this standard argument does not apply in

the Suarezian context.
ma Human Soul is Different from Other Forms
All through this study and throughout the Disputa-

W Metaphysicae, it has been implicit that the rational
Soul is a special kind of form. Indeed, it is the unique-

ness of the soul that seems to be the militating factor

aglitlnst the unity of the human being. The relationship

Suarez draws between the rational soul and the accident of
quantity is a special place in which he not only has real
difil‘ficulty with the unity of the human being but also in the

 

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230
process shows the uniqueness of the soul. In Chapter II it

was shown that quantity inheres in matter.5

This position
has significant implications for a discussion of the nature
of the soul which even in the best light has only a tenuous
relationship to matter.

In the first argument for quantity inhering in mat-
ter, Suarez uses the rational soul as the example of a form
which has no relationship to quantity. Initially, he gives
a summary of his doctrine on matter to prove that the in-
herence of quantity in matter is apprOpriate to that meta-
physical principle. Matter has proper actual being with its
own proper existence and even a proper partial subsistence.
From this viewpoint matter has of itself sufficient being to
sustain an accident such as quantity. Suarez feels that the
example of man is especially appropriate to establishing the
position that quantity is in matter. .The soul is not re-
lated to quantity in any way, but the substantial composite
depends on the natural dispositions of matter. If these
dispositions are removed, the composite would be dissolved.6
Quantity, Suarez claims, is one such disposition. What
Suarez is holding here is that there are certain accidents

appropriate to matter alone, certain to the form, and cer-

tain to the composite. Quantity is appropriate to matter

 

5The general treatment of the doctrine that quantity
inheres in matter occurs in Chapter II, "Suarez' Teaching on
Matter, '1 pp. 75-83 0

6Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, pars. 6-13.

231
and intellectual knowledge to the rational soul. But, what
accident is appropriate to the composite? Suarez gives no
examples on this point.

The situation with quantity is even more serious
than has been shown thus far. Suarez maintains that quan-
tity cannot be received in any spirit. In this argument one
gets a real feeling for the uniqueness of the rational soul.
The relationship between soul and quantity is explained as
an answer to an objection which says that perhaps it is not
contradictory that a material accident should come in con-
tact with an immaterial form by the union of the matter and
the form. An immaterial form comes in contact with matter
by its union with matter; why, therefore, cannot a form of
this type come in contact with a material accident? Suarez'
answer to this objection is most informative, for it gives a
good explanation of the uniqueness of the rational soul.
Quantity is united to its subject, matter, as its form and
its act; therefore it is able to be united only to that
thing which can give the requisite formal effect. The ra-
tional soul, however, cannot in any way give the formal ef-
fect of quantity, because it is not capable of quantitative
extension even while it informs the body. In a word, Suarez
insists that the rational soul is incapable of sharing
either totally or partially in quantity. One cannot even
say that there could be a union with quantity as that which
circumscribes form; there is no union unless there is in-

formation. Information is not able to circumscribe unless

 

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232
there is in the thing a capacity for the formal effect.7
Quantity cannot be the formal effect of the rational soul.
Suarez views the relationship of the rational soul
and quantity as a mediate rather than immediate one, as the
objection would have it. Suarez' reasoning is that since
man is composed of matter and soul, there is an immediate
union between matter and quantity and this union is on the
accidental level. Between the soul and quantity there is no
immediate union; they are united only by means of a third
principle (i.e., matter). Therefore the quantity inheres

only in the matter.8

 

7Dicetur fortasse non repugnare ut accidens
materiale attingat sua unione immaterialem formam ut
informantem materiam; nam forma immaterialis attingit sua
unione ipsam materiam; cur ergo non poterit materiale
accidens attingere huiusmodi formam? Item in unione Verbi
incarnati videmus corpus crassum et materiale habere unionem
terminatam ad supremum spirituale suppositum, quale est
Verbum Dei; quid ergo mirum quod quantitas terminet unionem
suam ad infimum spiritum, ut corpori unitum? Sed
nihilominus hoc dici non potest, quia quantitas unitur
subiecto suo ut forma et actus eius; et ideo illi tantum rei
uniri potest quae est capax effectus formalis eius; anima
autem rationalis nullo modo est capax effectus formalis
quantitatis, quia non est capax extensionis quantitative,
etiam dum informat corpus; non ergo potest ullo modo in se
suscipere nec totaliter neque partialiter quantitatem; neque
etiam potest unio quantitatis ad illam terminari, quia illa
unio non est nisi informatio; informatio autem terminari non
potest nisi ad rem capacem effectus formalis. Unde nulla
est proportio in exemplis adductis, ut ex dictis constat.
Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 16.

8Et confirmari hoc ac declarari potest amplius, nam,
cum in homine sint materia et anima, inter materiam et anima
est immediata unio substantialis, et inter quantitatem et
materiam est etiam immediata unio, licet accidentalis; inter
quantitatem vero et animam nulla est immediata unio, qua
inter se uniantur, sed solum per accidens uniuntur in uno
tertio, scilicet materia; ergo sola materia est quae exercet
munus causae materialis respectu quantitatis, quia haec

 

 

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233

The problem here, of course, is that Suarez mixes
two entitative orders; he combines the accidental order and
the substantial order. This argument does two things to the
substantial order of matter and form. It increases the in-
dependence of the matter from the form; or to use Suarez'
own terms, it tends to integralize the matter. The other
aspect of this confusion is that Suarez by not allowing the
form to have an immediate relationship to quantity, has
loosened one more bond between the soul and matter. If
Suarez allows quantity to inhere in the matter alone he has
moved to destroy the unity of the human. If he allows quan-
tity to inhere in matter alone he integralizes the co-prin-
ciples of being in such a way that there cannot be a true
union but rather a gluing together of the two principles.

The position Suarez takes with respect to quantity
and the relationship to the rational soul raises the further
perplexing problem of the conditions of the relationship of
the soul to the matter. It was shown early in Chapter II
that there is need for a special term, 12.922: when one
speaks of the origin of the rational soul with respect to
the matter. The notion of the form as "educed" from matter
does not apply to the rational soul. The soul is of such a
nature that it cannot be contained within the potency of the
matter, nor does it occur or exist dependent upon the mat-

ter, nor does it occur on account of the same action which

exercetur per immediatam unionem ipsarum, ut supra
declaratum est. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 17.

23h
brings about the composite. Rather, it occurs and accepts
its being independently of the matter and afterward by an-
other action is united to the matter by which the whole com-

posite is generated.9

This explanation of ig_gug has the
effect of further substantializing the soul and makes the
unity of the human precarious.

In Disputation XV, Section 2 Suarez tries to answer
the problem of the relationship of the soul and matter. The
peripatetic position, he says, is correct when it holds that
some forms are spiritual, substantial, and independent of
matter although they truly inform the matter. The only
forms of this kind are human souls. These forms must come
from nothing by means of a true creation but they do not
pre-exist the body to which they are united. In addition,
they are not, even though created from nothing, necessary
beings, either in themselves or in their possession of be-
ing. From the aspect of the matter or the body, there is no
influence either in the coming to be of the soul or in the
existence of the soul, since the rational soul separated

from the body must retain its own existence because of the

nature of its origin. In a word, the soul does not depend

 

9Atque hinc primo intelligitur amplius quod supra
dicebamus, formam rationalem non educi de potentia materiae,
quia nec continetur in potentia illius, ut extra ipsam
educatur, neque fit aut existit dependenter a materia, neque
fit eadem actione qua fit compositum, seu qua ipsa unitur
materiae; prius enim, saltem natura, in se fit at accipit
esse suum independens a materia, et postea alia actione
unitur qua totum compositum generatur. Disp. Meta. XV,
Sect. 2, par. 16.

I:

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UV

235
upon a sustaining subject either in its existence or in its
coming to be.10
Suarez realizes that this Aristotelian doctrine

really does separate matter and form more than should be the

 

10Vera igitur et peripatetica sententia est inter
formas substantiales quasdam esse spirituales, et
substantiales et independentes a materia, quamvis eam vere
informant; alias vero esse materiales itaque materiae
inhaerentes ut ab ea in esse et fieri pendeant. Prioris
ordinis aunt solae animae humanae (agimus enim tantum de
formis informantibus), et de illis concedendum est
consequens illatum in difficultate tacta, nimirum fieri ex
nihilo per veram creationem, quod in proprio loco latius est
ostendendum; nunc satis sit dicere id necessaria consequi ex
principio posito, supposito quod has animae non praeexistunt
antequam corporibus uniantur, quod certum est ex fide et ex
1110 principia quod sunt verae formas corporis. Immo, licet
praeexisterent, non possunt nisi per creationem existere,
quia non sunt entia necessaria ex se et ex sua quidditate
habentia esse, ut universe demonstrabimus infra, partim in
disputatione de causa efficienti, partim demonstando unum
tantum esse ens increatum. Si autem rationalis anima non
habet esse nisi per efficientiam alterius, et fingitur esse
ante corpus, quodammodo clarius et evidentius est habere
esse per creationem, quia facta est ex nihilo et absque
concursu subiecti vel causae materialis. Dico autem esse
quodammodo clarius, quia nunc, dum expectatur dispositio
corporis ut anima fiat, videri potest non esse tam propria
creatio, quia fit cum aliquali concursu materiae.
Nihilominus tamen est vera creatio, quia ex parte corporis
nOn est concursus per so at in genere causae materialis in
ipsum esse vel fieri animae rationalis, sed est veluti
quaedam occasio exigens creationem illius animae, sine qua
occasions nec ipsi animae debetur ut fiat, nec causa eius ad
illius effectionem determinaretur. Quod autem corpus seu
materia non influat per se in fieri vel esse animae, constat
ex eo quod anima rationalis, separata a corpore, retinet
suum esse; ergo non pendet a subiecto sustentante in suo
esse; ergo neque in fieri, quia tale est fieri rei quale
est esse; ergo et a converso subiectum ipsum seu materia non
habet per se influxum in esse aut fieri talis animae; nam
haec duo correlativa aunt, vel potius idem, dependentia
effectus et influxus causae.

fix nihilo nihil fit, axioms limitandum.--Quocirca
principium Illud, g; nIhIIE'nIFTT—fit, universe intellectum
de omni causa et de omni effectu, falsum est et contra
rationem naturalem, ut hoc ipso exemplo animae rationalis
ostenditur, et exemplo etiam materiae primae, ut supra

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236
case if one is going to maintain a true unity in the human
being. He turns to an analysis of the natural potency prime
matter has for the rational soul. Some objectors would say
that it is inappropriate for the rational soul to be related
to prime matter as its form. This opinion is disturbing;
for if matter is not in natural potency to the rational soul
then the generation of man would not be natural, either on
the part of the active principle (the form) or on the part
of the passive principle (the matter). That is, man is only
an artifact, not a natural being. The doctrine to be held
at all costs is that the rational soul is the natural and
proportioned act of matter, and thus matter is also the na-
tural potency for that act. From these two occurs a certain
natural being which is a peg §g_unity. The reason, Suarez
says, that there is this natural potency of matter for the
rational soul, is that although this form is able to come
about from God alone, nevertheless God in the act of crea-
tion works according to the manner and order of natural
things. This is sufficient to show that matter has such a

natural potency for the rational soul.11

 

tactum est, et plura in sequentibus afferemus. Intellectum
autem de virtute agentis finiti et naturalis, verum est.
Unde quoad hanc formam concedendum est non esse in proximis
agentibus naturalibus virtutem ad efficiendam illam, sed
proximum agens disponere materiam, intelligentiam vero
separatam efficere formam, non quidem intelligentiam
creatam ut putavit Avicenna, nec ideam separatam et extra
Deum existentem, sed Deum ipsum, quem solum esse effectorem
rerum omnium quae per creationem fiunt, infra ostendimus.
Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, pars. 10-11.

11Materia rima naturalis potentia est 3g rationalem
animam.--Dices Einc fieri materiam primam non esse in
potentia naturali ad animam rationalem, quod videtur

 

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237
There is, however, a problem with Suarez' reasoning
here in that if the soul is of such a nature that it re-
quires special creation, it is already outside the natural
order of things. In a word, the argument from God working

according to a natural order of things does not establish

 

inconveniens. Sequela patet, quia omni potentiae passivae
naturali correspondet potentia active naturalis; sed nulle
est potentia active naturalis quae possit formam henc in
materia efficere; ergo neque in materia est potentia passiva
naturalis ad illam. Aliqui concedunt sequelam tum propter
rationem factam, tum etiam quia, si materia esset in
potentia ad animam rationalem cum fit haec anima, diceretur
educi de potentia materiae. Sed non placet haec sententia;
nem si materia non esset in potentia naturali ad animam
rationalem, generatio hominis, non esset naturalis, quia
neque ex principio activo neque ex passivo esset naturalis.
Item, quia materia naturaliter disponitur ultimate ad
recipiendum formam rationalem et illi sic dispositae iuxta
naturae ordinem debetur talis forma; est ergo in potentia
naturali ad illam. Ad difficultatem ergo respondetur
negando sequelam. Ad primam vero rationem respondetur
naturales potentiam primo et per se esse attendendam in
ordine ad actum connaturalem et proportionatum; anima autem
rationalis est actus naturalis et proportionatus materiae,
et ideo etiam materia est potentia naturalis ad illum actum;
unde ex utraque fit quoddam ens naturals per se unum, et
materia ipsa connaturaliter conservatur sub tali actu. Quod
vero attinet ad potentiam activam imprimis dari potest
potentia activa naturalis ad uniendam talem actum tali
potentiae, et hoc modo iam respondet potentia active
naturalis potentiae naturali passivae. Deinde, quamvis haec
forma a solo Deo fieri possit, tamen Deus in ea actione
operatur iuxta modum et ordinem naturis rerum debitum, et
hoc satis est ut dicatur operari per modum causae naturalis
ettnspotentiae passivae sufficiens virtus activa respondeat.
Ad alteram rationem respondetur aliud esse materiam
continere formam in potentia, et aliud esse in potentia ad
formam; nem primam indicat vim causandi formam, nem causa
continet effectum in suo genere; secundum vero indicat solum
capacitatem ad recipiendam formam. Materia ergo est in
potentia naturali ad rationalem animam recipiendam non
tamen illam in potentia sua continet, cum non poss t causare
illam; ideoque anima rationalis non educitur ex potentia
materiae quia nihil educitur nisi unde continetur, et quia
eductio indicat causalitatem materiae in forma, ut iam
dicemus. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 12.

238

the natural potency of matter for the rational soul because
it presupposes an intervention of God into that order.

Related to the problem of the natural potency of
matter for the rational soul is the more general problem
of the relationship of the form to a pre-existing subject.
Suarez holds that all substantial forms except the soul come
about from a pre-existing subject, that is are educed from
the subject. These forms do not come properly from nothing
but are educed from a pre-existing matter. As has been
shown, however, the soul comes from nothing strictly speak-
ing. Generally, to come from nothing is to come into being
totally; that is, no part is presupposed. From this under-
standing natural things while they become something new do
not come from nothing because they come from a presupposed
matter.12 By this reasoning Suarez feels he can attain a
unity of the material being. But this reasoning does not
help with the unity of the human being, and as a matter of
fact positively hinders it. Creation of the soul from
nothing makes it independent of the matter and deepite pro-
testations to the contrary the union of soul and body is
artificial rather than natural.

Even if Suarez could hold the human being together
in terms of natural potency of matter for form, or in terms

of the special creation apart from a pre-existing subject,

 

12Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 13. For Suarez'
text on this matter the reader is referred to Chapter III,
note 20.

 

v

239

when one asks the question whether or not the soul exists
before the body since it needs a special creation, then one
comes upon a basic confusion in Suarez. In Disputation
XXIX, Section 2, paragraph 11 Suarez sets forth the opinion
that the soul does not exist before the body. He states
that matter of its nature demands form and without it cannot
exist unless in a very extraordinary state. This is suffi-
cient to conclude that it is alien to the nature of matter
of itself to await form from an agent. But, philosophers
also teach that it is not natural for the soul to exist be-
fore the body because of its very nature it should origi-
nally be in a body although not dependent upon the body.
Even granted that it is able to remain outside the body,
nevertheless it is at that time in an extraordinary state.
By which argument it can be concluded that the rational soul
does not have necessary and eternal existence of itself.13

The sections on special creation and temporal prior-
ity when juxtaposed show that Suarez is confusing the order
of temporal priority with the order of priority in being.
It would be possible for him to hold that the rational soul

 

13Respondeo, etiam seclusa rigorosa dependentia, hoc
ipso quod materia natura sue postulat formam et sine ille
esse non potest nisi in statu maxime praeternaturali (quod
nemo negare potest), satis concludi esse prorsus alienum a
nature materiae habere esse a se et expectare formam ab
agente. Sicut in materia de anima recte docent philosophi
non esse naturals animae rationali esse ante corpus, quia
natura sua postulat ease in corpore, quamvis a corpore non
pendeat; unde licet extra corpus manere possit, est tamen
tune in paraeternaturali statu. Quo argumenta recte etiam
concluditur animam rationalem non habere esse ex se
necessarium et aeternum. Disp. Meta. XXIX, Sect. 2, par.
11.

2&0
does not exist temporally prior to the body and continues to
exist temporally consequent to the body without giving pri-
ority of being in the way that he does. There has, however,
been a priority of being granted to the soul in such doc-
trines as that of the special creation, that denying any re-
lationship to quantity, and that of special faculties. It
is the priority of being that is of concern in a discussion
of the unity of the human being. Suarez has argued for a
soul that really is very much independent of matter. This
independence is especially true of the soul after it is
separated from the body.1k Even though such a soul exists
independently of matter it does have some limitations in
that it can no longer move other bodies but only itself.
What, one may ask, allowed it to move any body in the first
place? Once the soul was capable of moving a body; now it
is not; this is a priority in the capacities of the soul.
Suarez evidently wants to talk about the nature of the soul
and its capacities not about a temporal sequence. He uses a
temporal sequence metaphor which not only does not explain
the metaphysical relationship of body and soul but posi-
tively confuses it.

 

11‘. . . postquam est separata, nullum corpus movers
potest sed seipsam tantum, ad quod etiam habet potentiam a
sua vo untate distinctam, propter eamdem rationem. Disp.
Meta. XXXV, Sect. 6, par. 23.

e

(,‘V ' 1

241

Separated Souls and Internal
Composition within the Soul

If Suarez is going to be true to his own metaphys-
ical scheme, then he must get the spiritual soul into direct
relation with the body. The status of the separated soul
tells one much about what the relationship of body and soul
should be. For this discussion one must turn to Disputation
XIII. In a context meant to show that it is not part of the
intelligibility of created and complete substances (e.g.,
angels and God) that they have an intrinsic material cause
from which they are composed along with a form, Suarez pro-
vides a long analysis of the relation of the soul to matter.
He wants to show that the soul itself as separated from mat-
ter is not itself composed of a matter and form. In the
process he tells the reader much about the nature of the
soul itself and about its relation to matter.

Suarez begins the discussion by characterizing the
separated soul as a dependent created substance which is not
altogether simple in that one is able altogether to distin-
guish various operations of understanding, willing and self-
movement. The separated soul is capable of all of these
operations without any internal composition of matter and
form. Some authors have held that there is such a composi-
tion within the soul, but this position is contrary to rea-
son. These same authors understand the soul, even while it
is in the body, to be composed of a matter and form. It

follows, then, that the soul is not the form of the body,

e :5

 

 

 

 

2h2
because the soul itself will be a complete and integral sub-

stance. That is, it would itself have a proper matter and
form. Secondly, as composed it would not be able to inform
the body through its own matter, because matter is not an
actuating act but a first subject of form. Neither would it
be able to inform the body through its own form because one
form cannot inform two matters at the same time.15
This position, of course, is consonant with every-
thing Suerez says. It maintains the direct relationship of
the matter and form. It avoids the addition of further
metaphysical principles. It avoids an infinite regress of
metaphysical principles. More importantly, however, for the
present discussion is the list of operations given for the
rational soul; understanding, willing, and self-movement are

operations of the soul, not of the composite. Matter has

its characteristics (e.g., quantity) in which the rational

 

15Et confirmatur ac declaratur his discursus ex
anima rationali separata a materia; illa enim est substantia
creata dependens et non omnino simplex et potens ad in-
telligendum, volendum et se movendum; et horum omnium
capax est sine compositione ex materia et forma. Unde
auctores contrarias sententiae, coacti hoc exemplo, indicant
etiam in anima reperiri henc compositionem; verumtamen id
est valde alienum non solum a principiis naturalibus, sed
etiam fidei. Nam vel intelligunt animam, etiam dum est in
corpore, esse compositam ex materia et forma spiritualibus;
at inde sequitur animam non esse veram formam corporis, tum
quia anima per se erit substantia complete at integra,
utpote ex propria materia substantiali et propria forma
composita; tum etiam quia non poterit informare corpus per
suam materiam quia materia non est actus actuans sed primum
subiectum formee; neque etiam per suam formam, quia non
potest eadem forma simul informare dues materias, neque
habere connaturalem et intrinsecam habitudinem transcen-
dentalem ad illas. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. lb, par. 10.

2h3
soul does not share and the soul has its operations apart
from matter. Even without raising the question of a com-
position within the soul itself given these characteristics
of each metaphysical principle the unity of composition
here is very unstable because these operations of the soul
are independent of the matter.

Philosophers who hold an internal composition of
the soul can also understand this composition to occur
immediately as when the soul is separated from the body
and the soul receives some "spiritual matter" to which it
is united and in which it is conserved. But, Suarez says,
this position is equally false. First, the soul would not
in this condition be truly separated. Second, there would
be necessary a creation of a new matter in order that the
soul might remain apart from the body, because this "spir-
itual matter” cannot exist prior to the separation of the
body and the soul. Otherwise, it would be matter without
a form, or something else would have to be corrupted in
order that the rational soul would be able to remain apart
from the body. Suarez sees all of these possibilities as
absurd. But all of these absurdities do lead to further
and important conclusions; namely, that it would not be
necessary for a separated soul to come to a body at all;
for if it already had a proper and perfect matter which
it enforms (i.e., spiritual matter) why should it come
to the body in the first place? The composition of spir-

itual matter and soul, of its very nature, would be more

 

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2th
incorruptible than the composition of body and soul.16

Even if one grants that the soul itself is not com-
posed of matter and form, Suarez must answer the question
why this soul is related to this matter. The only arguments
he gives that in any way indicate the relationship of soul
and matter are the ones based on the unity of operations and
lack of priority of being between body and soul. The diffi-
culties with these two arguments have been stated earlier in
this chapter.

In a discussion of the difference between simple com-
plete substances (e.g., God and angels) and simple incomplete
substances (e.g., form and matter) Suarez tries to show how,
in fact, the soul is a simple, incomplete substance and what
the significance of this is. The rational soul, even though

an incomplete substance, is able to exist on its own and to

be per g2 subsistent because it is incorporeal.17 Once

 

16Vel intelligunt animam rationalem, statim ac
separatur a corpore, recipere aliquam spiritualem materiam
cui uniatur et in qua conservetur; et hoc aeque falsum est
et erroneum. Nam inde fit primo, animam rationalem vere non
conservari separatam. Secundo, sequitur necessarium esse
creationem novae materiae ut anima possit extra corpus
manere, quia illa materia non poterat antea praeesse; alias
oportuisset vel esse sine forma, vel aliquid aliud corrumpi
ut anima rationalis extra corpus manere posset. Quae omnia
sunt absurda. Immo, praeterea sequitur non oportere ut talis
anima aliquando redeet ad corpus; nam si iam habet propriam
et perfectiorem materiam quam informet, cur debet illa
privari ut ad corpus redeet? Maxime quia compositum illud
ex tali materia et anima, natura sue incorruptibile esset.
Igitur nullo modo dici potest rationalem animam constare
materia et forma. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. lb, par. 10.

17. . . anima rationalis quamvis sit incompleta
substantia, quia incorporea est, potest esse per se
subsistens sine materia et in sese operari ac se movere.
Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 1h, par. 11.

245

again the question arises given these characteristics, why
is there any relationship to matter in the first place?
Suarez does not answer this question.

In this context, Suarez turns to a proof not so much
that the separated soul is an incomplete substance as a
proof that there are such things as simple complete sub-
stances. But, he uses the soul as something of a paradigm
to give the characteristics of the complete simple sub-
stances. Just as in the soul the same thing is able to be
the principle of effecting and of receiving motion so this
is the case in complete substance. And just as the sepa-
rated soul does not need matter for its action and move-
ments, so also this is the case with the complete substance,
for God is a complete substance without matter, and the fact
that a substance is created does not of itself demand matter
as a complement to the substance.18 The concern of this
present analysis is not so much with the possibility of the
existence of simple complete substance but rather with the

rather striking parallel Suarez draws between these

 

18. . . ex hoc (inquam) inferimus non repugnare
quod dentur completae substantiae incorporeae quae materia
non constant at in se operari possint ac se movere. Et
ratio huius consequentiae est quia, sicut in anima eadem res
potest esse principium efficiendi et recipiendi motum et
actum accidentalem, its in illis substantiis completis. Et
sicut anima separata non indiget materia ad suos actus et
motus, ita nec substantia complete et incorporea indigebit
illa. Et aliunde non est materia necessaria ad rationem
substantiae completae ut sic, nem Deus est complete
substantia sine materia; neque ex eo praecise quod
substantia sit create postulat ut complementum eius sit ex
compositione materiae, ut demonstratum est; ergo. Disp.
Meta. XV, Sect. lb, par. 11.

 

 

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2A6
substances and the separated soul. Either the separated
soul could have existed at all times without matter, given
these parallel characteristics between simple complete sub-
stance and simple incomplete substance, or the separated
soul is changed in some way when it is separated from the
body. If the two kinds of substance are so parallel there
is no reason for the distinction between ”complete" and "in-
complete," and hence the soul does not really need matter at
its creation. Or, why was it in matter in the first place?
If the separated soul is changed in some way when it is
separated from the body, the only change that really seems
to take place is that it can no longer move other bodies.
This, however, does not make sense because on the one hand
the soul upon separation must become a simple complete sub-
stance since it exists apart from matter; but on the other
hand it has fewer operations than it did while united to the
body. In a word, completion means deprivation. This does
not coincide with the whole notion of a hierarchy of

beings.19

Summagy
At this point there seems to be an impasse in

Suarezian psychological and metaphysical theory. It has

 

19The whole argument on the composition of the soul
of matter and form continues throughout Disp. Meta. XV,
Sect. 1h, pars. 12 and 13. The approach in these paragraphs
is mainly an attempt to show that the argument coincides
with what Thomas Aquinas held on this matter. In the end
then Suarez in this context seems to be arguing from author-
ity rather than from reason.

(I

a-

2A7
been shown that Suarez wants to maintain a standard scholas-
tic position that the soul is the form of the body and that
this informing function sets up the relationship between the
soul and the body. He attempts to do this on the foundation
of the usual scholastic arguments based on the notion of a
unity of operation. The soul, then, is to be like material
forms in that they are the form of the matter. But, the
description of the soul as a particular kind of form leads
to a position which so substantializes the soul that the
unity between the soul and body is doubtful at best and
dualist at the worst. An examination of the special charac-
teristics of the soul results in the constant question:
"Why does the soul need the body in the first place?"
Suarez does not provide an adequate answer to this question
and consequently must be forced to admit to a dualism de-
spite the constant assertion that the human being is a
unity.

There are, however, various understandings of what
it means to be "one." Suarez sorts out these understandings
with some care. It is now necessary to turn to the treat-
ment on unity and see if there is a possible interpretation
of the notion of "unity" that would allow Suarez to hold his
position on the special characteristics of the human form
(rational soul) and at the same time maintain a genuine

unity of the human being.

248
The Human Soul and the Problem of Unity
The Divisions of Unity

 

Suarez' basic text on unity occurs in Disputation
IV. Initially, in this section of the present study, it
will be necessary to spend some time detailing the various
divisions of unity and then one must ask whether or not any
of these understandings can apply to the human being struc-
tured in the way eXplained in the previous section.

In the discussion of unity Suarez takes as the basic
distinction, a division of those things which are one 223 §2
and those things which are one per accidens. A pg; s2 unity
is simply one; pg; accidens unity is one only by an extended
application of the term "one." That is, there is a certain
likeness to a unity pg; s2. Aristotle, he says, proposes
various modes of pgg_§g and per accidens unity. He begins
with some examples of per accidens unity. ‘One mode of 233_
accidens unity is the situation in which the subject is af-
fected by an accident (e.g., Peter is musical). That is, an
accident can come or go; destruction of the accident does
not destroy the subject of the accident (in the example
cited Peter is still Peter whether or not he acquires or
loses musical ability). Likewise two accidents inhering in
the same subject constitute a pg; accidens unity (e.g.,
white and sweetness in sugar). That is, one accident can be
joined to another because both are in the same subject.
Aristotle explains pg; s2 unity in a like manner by various

examples (i.e., examples which subdistinguish it into

 

 

 

 

2L9

different modes). Some things are one by reason of continu-
ity (e.g., a line or water), some by reason of collection
(e.g., a house and artifacts), some by reason of the fact
that they have one form or by reason of the fact that they
have one matter (as liquids are called one). Suarez sees
that Aristotle's examples are not very helpful in setting
out the meaning of unity so he initiates his own theory of

unity which will not be dependent merely on examples.20

 

20Variae unius divisiong§.--De hac re disputat
Aristoteles, V Metaph., c. 6. Est autem hoc loco neces-
sario praemittenda, ut explicare possimus quaenam unites sit
entis passio. Distinguit ergo Aristoteles varios modos
unius. Et prima divisio eius est, unum quoddam esse per
accidens, aliud per se. Et merito henc divisionem primo
loco ponit, quia et videtur esse valde analoga; nam unum per
se est simpliciter unum, per accidens vero tantum secundum
quid, et per quamdam proportionem ad unum per se. Non
explicat autem Aristoteles rationes unius per accidens et
per as per proprias eorum definitiones, sed solum variis
exemplis, quibus simul proponit varios modos unitatis per
accidens et per se. Unum enim per accidens esse dicit
subiectum accidente effectum ut Petrus musicus. Item duo
accidentia eidem subiecto inhaerentia unum per accidens sunt
sen constituunt, ut album dulce. Hanc vero unitatem per
accidens in ordine praedicationes variis modis explicare
possumus, vel per incomplexos terminos, vel per complexos,
vel praedicando accidens de accidente, aut in communi, aut
in singulari. Et iuxta haec distinguit Aristoteles varies
rationes huius unitatis, quae magis ad dielecticas
praedicationes, quam ad rem metaphysicam spectant.
Similiter explicat Aristoteles unum per se variis exemplis,
seu subdistinguendo illud in varios modos. Nam quaedam
(inquit) sunt unum continuatione, ut linea, aqua; quaedam
colligatione, ut domus et aliae quae arte fiunt; alie,
ratione formee unius, ratione materiae, vel proximae, vel
remotes, ut liquores (inquit) dicuntur unum. Rursus (ait)
quoddam est unum numero aliud specie, aliud genere, etc.,
quae ibi prosequitur. Ex quibus omnibus difficile est
colligere in quo consistat ratio unius per se et per ac-
cidens; nam in membris quae posteriori in loco Aristoteles
numerat, multa videntur esse unum tantum per accidens, ut
domus et artificialia. Item ibidem ait plura interdum dici
unum, §g|guod aliquid unum eut agunt, aut patiuntur, £32
HaEent gut gg_aliquid unum sunt. Haec autem omnis videntur

 

250
Being_and Unity
Because unity follows upon being, in order that
something be understood as either a pg£.§g or a per accidens
unity one must explain at the same time pg; s3 and pg;
ggcidens being. This division of being is proper to real
21 Real being

being and not only a distinction of reason.

can be called per §g_or per accidens in a twofold way--one

 

 

by reason of the being itself; the other by reason of the
effect of the being. When one talks about the effect one
says that it is a being pgg_§g_by reason of the intention of
the agent; it is a being pgg_accidens if it comes about
apart from the intention of the agent. That is, comes about
on account of chance. The notion of being as an effect is
not the concern here; rather, one is interested in being it-
self and specifically the difference between pgg_§g and pg;

accidens being.22

 

tantum per accidens esse unum, vel denominatione potius quam
re. Rursus inter unitates quas ibi ponit, aliqua est

realis ut numerica, alia rationis tantum, ut generics et
specifica; est ergo difficile hanc Aristotelis doctrinam ad
certum aliquam rationem ac methodum revocare. Diap. Meta.
IV, Sect. 3, par. 1.

21Once again one sees that Suarez is concerned to
talk about real physical beings rather than about beings
distinguished by reason alone. This has been a major con-
cern throughout the Disputationes Metaphysicae and is espe-
cially true when he discusses being and unity. He is care-
ful to point out that he is talking about real beings and
about real unities. The discussion here, then, is about
actualities not simply categorizations constructed by the
mind to help in sorting out beings and unities.

22Ut ergo rem henc declaramus, quoniam unum
consequitur ens, ut intelligatur quid sit unum per se et
unum per accidens, simul explicandum est quid sit ens per se

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251
The argument, then, is that if one can find a being
pg; s2 one can find a unity pg; se. And, if there is only
per accidens being, then there is only per accidens unity.
In the course of this present study there has been reference

to several kinds of beings; in the order of complexity these

 

et per accidens; sic enim etiam ens dividitur ab eodem
Aristotele, eodem lib. V, c. 7, quae divisio propria est
entis realis; nam entia rationis, sicut aequivoce tantum
sunt entia, ita non nisi aequivoce has denominationes
recipiunt. Ens autem reale duplici modo potest per se aut
per accidens appellari, uno modo in ratione entis, alio modo
in ratione effectus. Hoc posteriori modo dicitur per se id
quod ex virtute et intentions agentis fit; per accidens vero
dicitur id quod praeter intentionem agentis casu et fortune
evenit; de que ait Aristoteles, VI Metaph., c. 2, esse extra
scientiae considerationem, quatenus, scilicet, in singulari
exercetur et per accidens, nam ut sic non habet neces-
sitaten, sed contingentiam. At vero ipsa communis ratio
causae vel effectus per accidens sub scientiam cadit; sic
enim disputatur de casu et fortune et contingentia effec-
tuum; sed tamen ens per se et per accidens sub hec con-
sideratione nihil ad praesens institutum pertinet.

ale indicet Aristoteles per s3 unum, uals pg;
accidens.-- riori ergo modo ensiin ratione entis citur per
se aut per accidens in ordine ad unitatem quam habet, seu
ratione talis unitatis, ut, verbi gratia, quia constat una
natura unius praedicamenti, aut naturis diversorum
praedicanentorum; sic enim Aristoteles dict. lib. V, text.,
13 et la, entia per accidens vocat quae constant ex subiecto
et accidente, vel quando multa accidentia in eodem subiecto
coniunguntur; ens autem per se dicit esse quod dividitur in
decen categories. Idenque Aristoteles, VII Metaph., text.
#3, et clarius lib. VIII, text. 15, et lib. II De Anima,
text 7, illud significat esse ens per se unum, quod vel
simplex est, vel ex potentia substantiali et proprio actu
componitur. Unde e contraria per accidens erit quod neque
est simplex, nec praedictam compositionem habet, sed alio
imperfectiori modo ex diversis rebus constat. Ex quibus
intelligere licet illud appellari in ratione entis ens per
se, qued est per se unum; illud autem per accidens, quod
tantum per accidens unum est. Non enim vocatur hic per se
et per accidens ratione modi essendi per se vel in alio, quo
modo sola substantia est ens er se, reliqua vero dici
possunt per accidens, seu pot us accidentalis; sed sumitur
per se et per accidens in ordine ad unitatem; quae autem sit
unites per se aut per accidens in entibus, non satis
declaratum est ex dictis, nec eodem modo ab omnibus

 

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252
beings are-~l. simple, complete beings, 2. simple incomplete

beings, 3. composite beings, and A. per accidens beings. It

 

is Suarez' contention that the first three types are pg£_§g.
beings and therefore also pg; fig unities. The fourth type
is made up of two or more integral beings (i.e., beings
which are pg; §g_in themselves) but joined in some way.

These multiple beings make up a per accidens being and con-

 

sequently only a per accidens unity. It will be necessary
to look at each of these kinds of being and then ask the
questions: "Which kind of being and unity does Suarez con-
sider the human being to be?" "Which kind of being and
unity is the human in fact, based on Suarez' own description
of matter, form, individuation, and rational soul?"

Per §g_Being, Per S2 Unity,
and Human Composition

 

In his comprehensive explanation of the understand-
ing of being and unity pg; s2 Suarez begins by showing that
the intelligibility of being p§§_§g is that a given being
should have that which is required for the integral and com-
plete essence of such a being of that kind. That is, such
an essence has whatever applies to its intrinsic intelligi-
bility or completeness. This approach to being pg; s2 needs
no further proof than the explanation of the terms involved.
Since, therefore, a being is said to be that which has being

or essence, it will be a being per g3 properly and strictly

explicetur. Disp. Meta. IV, Sect. 3, pars. 2-3.
The reader is also referred to paragraphs 15-19 of
the same section of Disputation IV.

253
if it has one and only one essence. That essence will be
most properly one which for its own kind has whatever is ap-
propriate to its own intrinsic intelligibility. A being of
this kind is properly a being pg; s2. Anything that lacks
this kind of unity is a being per accidens.23

 

Given this strict understanding of being pg; s2
Suarez now explains the various categories of being per se;
he does this by using the language of unity. Beings pg; s3
are divided into simple and composite. This division has
precedent in both Aristotle and Thomas, and Suarez follows
their lead. For, he says, concerning simple being there is
no difficulty since every siMple being is a being and a
unity pg; 23. That is, a simple being is pg; §g_undivided
and as such does not have any admixture of something ex-
traneous to that being. Taken in this way even any accident
taken in the abstract is a being pgg_gg_and then also the
soul according to the intelligibility of substance is a be-

ing per 92 although incomplete. But, composite beings are

23In hac igitur re dicendum videtur, rationem entis
per se in hoc cons stere, quod praecise habeat ea quae ad
essentiam, integritatem vel complementum talis entis in suo
genere per so at intrinsece requiruntur. Hoc insinuavit
Aristoteles, priori loco citato. Et ex terninis ipsis
videtur clarus; haec enim comaunissiaa et simplicissima vix
possunt aliter probari quam explicatis terminorum rationibus.
Cum ergo ens dicatur illud quod entitatem seu essentiam
habet, illud erit ens per as pro rie et in rigore quod unan
essentiam vel entitatem habet. lla autem essentia seu
entitas una propriissime erit, quae in suo genere habet
quidquid ad eius intrinsecam rationem seu consummationem
spectat; ergo illud ens, quod huiusmodi est, sub ea ratione
erit proprie ac per se ens; omne autem illud, quod ab hac
unitate defecerit, dicetur ens per accidens. DiSp. Meta.
IV, Sect. 3, par. 6.

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25h
also able to be peg s2 beings and pg§_§g unities. In so far
as a composite being is established by matter and form and
this combination makes up a subsistent supposit then the
composite is a being pg;_§g. Since matter and form are not
complete beings in the genus of substance, but are insti-
tuted of their nature for the composition of substance, the
composite resulting from these two, then, is spoken of as a
peg s2 unity. This understanding does not violate the gen-
eral explanation of being given above but rather conforms

to it.2h

 

2“Potest autem hoc amplius eXplicari, si ens per se
dividamus in simplex et compositum, quae divisio etiam de
uno per se dari potest, eamque insinuavit Aristoteles, X
Metaph., c. 6 dicens unum quoddam esse divisibile, aliud
indivisum. Nam ut notavit D. Thomas, I, q. 6, a. 3, et q.
11, a. l, unum per se, aliud est indivisum actu et potentia,
aliud vero tantum actu; prius est ens simplex, posterius
vero compositum. Igitur de simplici nulla est difficultas;
omne enim simplex est ens per se ac per se unum, quia et per
se indivisum est, et ut sic non habet admixtionem alicuius
extranei, ut possit ens per accidens appellari, et hoc modo
quodlibet accidens in abstracto sumptum ea consideratione
est ens per se, et anima in ratione substantiae est ens per
se licet incompletum; quatenus vero constat pluribus
potentiis habitibus, vel actibus, iam declinat in ens per
accidens.

De ente autem composito certum imprimis est posse
vere ac proprie esse ens per se ac unum per se, ut omnes
philosophi docent de natura substantiali; quatenus materia
et forma constat, et de supposito quatenus ex natura et
subsistentia suo modo componitur. Cum enim neque materia
neque forma per se sint entia complete at integra in suo
genere, sed ad illud componendum natura sua institutes sint,
merito illud quod ex eis proxime componitur, essentia at
nature per se una dicitur et est. Atque eadem ratione, quia
illa essentia non habet intrinsecum complementum in suo
genere, nisi per se sit intrinsece et substantialiter
terminate, ideo illa etiam cum sua subsistentia ens per se
unum constituit. Igitur haec unites per se in hoc
consistit, quod resultet ex rebus constituentibus completum
ens in aliquo genere, intercedente unione eorum inter se, ad
tale ens constituendum accommodate, quae in compositione

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255

There is a new and added note here in that previous
philosophers when speaking of simple being were referring
only to simple, complete beings (i.e., God and at most
angels). The category of simple, incomplete beings is new
and it is this category that is the source of Suarez'
troubles.

Given this general understanding of being and unity
pg; s3, it is now necessary to ask which kind of being
Suarez considers the human to be? The effort Suarez expands
to show the soul as the form of the body gives the reader a
clear indication that the human is a composite being pgg_§g.
In the early sections of this chapter it was shown that the
soul does have similarities with other forms of the natural
order and based on these similarities Suarez does have jus-
tification for saying the human being is a composite being
pg; g3. But the investigation of the special characteris—
tics of the soul gave the soul qualities which integralized
that metaphysical principle. When one considers the inte-
gral nature of the soul together with a doctrine such as the
separate existence of matter one realizes that a genuine be-

ing per 32 is impossible. On his own reasoning, then,

 

unius naturae est per modum actus et potentiae
substantialis; in compositione vero unius personae, est per
modum naturae integrae et termini eius. Atque haec ratio
accommodari etiam potest ad entia ut composita ex genere et
differentia per se contrahente illud intra proximum
praedicamentum; nam etiam genus et differentia comparantur
ut potentia et actus per se ordinata ad constituendum unum
in suo genere completum et integrum, quamquam haec
compositio magis est rationalis quam realis et ideo minus
impedire potest realem ac per se unitatem entis. Disp.
Meta. IV, Sect. 3, pars. 7-8.

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256
Suarez cannot consistently hold that the human is a being
pg; gg and hence neither is the human a unity pg; gg even
though that is the position that he would like to hold.

The problem arises in Suarez' understanding of sim-
ple being as complete or incomplete. There is an equivoca-
tion on the term "simple." If something is simple it must
be complete. If something is incomplete its completion
would then remove the simplicity because there are then
parts to the being. In a word, God is a simple complete be-
ing for Suarez and is a being pg; gg. The matter and the
human soul need each other for completion and hence cannot
be truly simple beings. The basic problem, then, in stating
that a being is a composite being pg; gg is that a simple
incomplete being does not make sense on the general meta-
physical level, and when one applies it to the human soul
with all of its special characteristics, it certainly is an
erroneous concept, since, as has been shown, the soul really
gathers to itself all the characteristics of the simple com-
plete being.

Per Accidens Being, Per Accidens
Unity and Human Composition

 

The remaining category of being and unity that must
be examined is being pg; accidens. Suarez' approach is
parallel to the approach used in the discussion of being pg;
pg; he begins by giving a description of being pg; accidens.
Everything which is made up of distinct things without the

physical or real union between them is strictly speaking a

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257
being per accidens and not a being pg; gg. This description
is proved because such a being is not able to meet the in-
telligibility of a being pg; gg according to the previous
explanation--being per accidens does not have one real es-
sence but at least two real essences. The notion of "real
essence" can be taken as something simple or as a real union

arising out of many; in the being per accidens neither of

 

these situations apply. Finally, every being which is one
in such a way that it is established from distinct things of
which one is a complete being in some genus and through ad-
junction to another being is brought to a different genus,
this being is strictly speaking a unity per accidens. The
important notion here is that if a being is complete any-
thing Joined to it makes the combination a being pg;

accidens rather than a being per gg.25

 

25Ex his quae dicta sunt de ente et uno per se,
colligere licet quid sit dicendum de ente et uno per
accidens, quod ab illo distinguitur; nam imprimis omne id,
quod ex rebus distinctis constat absque physica et reali
unione earum inter se, est in rigore ens per accidens et non
per se. Probatur, tum ex dictis, quia in tali ente non
potest reperiri ratio entis per se a nobis eXplicata; tum
etiam quia illud unum non potest habere unam realem
essentiam; non enim potest intelligi una essentia, nisi vel
quia simplex sit, vel quia per realem unionem plurium

consurgat; in praedicto autem casu neutrum horum reperitur.
Deinde omnes ens quod ita est unum ut constet ex rebus
distinctis, quarum altera in aliquo genere completum ens sit
at per adiunctionem alterius perfectione diversi generis
efficiatur, tale etiam ens in rigore est unum per accidens,
quia non convenit illi ratio entis per se a nobis explicata,
nec potest in tali ente una vere essentia reperiri. Item
quia, hoc ipso quod unum ens in suo genere est completum et
integrum, quod ei adiungitur, accidentaliter advenit, et
ideo unum per accidens cum illo componere dicitur; atque hac
ratione vere dicitur id quod constat ex rebus diversorum
praedicamentorum et ex natura rei diversis, unum per

 

 

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258

From this kind of description of being per accidens

 

one realizes that there are a variety of existences involved

in one and the same being. That is, the being per accidens

 

is a being only on account of an aggregation in which many
integral and complete pg; gg beings are gathered together
without any union and without any order. This kind of pg;
adgidens being is seen especially in a pile of grain or of
stones. There is another kind of per accidens being made up
of integral beings not having among themselves a genuine
union but merely a joining of the beings. These beings
would be armies, states, a house, and similar kinds of arti-
factual things. In this kind of being the only variety pos-
sible is that of more or less physical union among the be-
ings from which the artifact is constructed. In this sense
then a tree to which a branch of another species has been
grafted is more one than a house and a house more one than
an army, but they are all pg; accidens beings. The point
here is that there is some kind of aggregation among various

beings pg;fl_s_g.26

 

accidens esse. Quin potius, etiam in rebus eiusdem
praedicanenti id verum habet, si sint diversi generis vel
speciei, et una accidat alteri in sua ratione et specie iam
complete, at has modo ex potentia et habitu, vel actu, fit
unum per accidens, et similiter vas argenteum deauratum est
ens per accidens et sic de caeteris. Disp. Meta. IV, Sect.

3, par. 13.

26Secundo ex dictis colligitur in ente uno per
accidens esse varietatem, et in ea esse magis vel minus.
Quoddaa enim est ens omnino per aggregationem, in quo multa
entia per se integra et perfecta, sine ulla unione et sine
ullo ordine congeruntur, et hoc videtur esse maxime per

259
Now it is possible to turn to the question asked
earlier: "Which kind of being is the human in fact, based
on Suarez' own understanding of matter, form, individuation,
and the human soul?" It has already been shown that Suarez
thinks the human being is a being pgg_§g and consequently a
unity pg; s3. It has also been shown why this position is
untenable given Suarez' metaphysical scheme. All through

this present study there have been hints that Suarez has a

 

accidens, quia omni ex parte opponitur enti per se proprie
sumpto, et huiusmodi est acervus tritici aut lapidum. Aliud
vero est ens per accidens, constans quidem ex integris
entibus per se, non habentibus inter se physicam unionem,
habentibus autem inter se aliquem ordinem, ut est exercitus,
respublica, domus et alia similia artificialia, in quibus
tanta potest esse varietas tantaque differentia secundum
magis et minus, quanta potest esse maior vel minor unio
inter entia per se, ex quibus constat; et hoc modo videtur
magis una arbor, cui ramus alterius speciei est insitus,
quam domus, et domus magis quam exercitus; et sic de aliis.
Et in hoc ordine collocandi sunt liquores mixti, ex
simplicibus imperfecte alteratis compositi, ut vinum
lymphatum, oximel, etc. Quo etiam fit ut, licet haec
simpliciter et absolute sint entia per accidens, tamen
respective, id est comparatione illius entis quod est unum
per meram aggregationem, soleant haec interdum vocari entia
per se. Nam, quia media participant aliquid de extremis
comparatione illorum solent diversis nominibus appellari;
huiusmodi autem entia conveniunt aliquo modo cum entibus per
se, quatenus in aliqua forma vel habitudine uniuntur, et
ideo ita aliquando nominantur. Quomodo videtur locutus
Aristoteles in citato loco V Metaph. Tamen hac considera-
tione et comparatione ens compositum ex substantia et
accidente sibi inhaerente, multo magis videtur posse

vocari ens per se; hoc enim est tertium genus entium per
accidens qued magis videtur recedere ab illo primo et
infimo ente per aggregationem, magisque accedere ad unum per
se, quia, et ea quibus constat, non distinguuntur supposito,
sicut in aliis, et habent inter se maiorem physicam unionem,
et unum revera est in potentia ad aliud, quamvis acci-
dentali, et alterum natura sua est ordinatum ad aliud, et
in unione ad illud habet suam perfectionem connaturalem,

in quibus omnibus huiusmodi ens imitatur illud quod est
proprie ac per se unum; quamvis simpliciter absolute unum
per accidens sit. Disp. Meta. IV, Sect. 3, par. 1h.

1‘

260
being per accidens in his matter-form scheme and this is es-
pecially true in the test case of the human being.
In Disputation XIII, Section A, paragraph 5 Suarez
gives a description of the relationship of matter and form
which if taken seriously makes all beings composed of matter

and form to be per accidens beings. In this passage he

 

states that matter is a being really separable from any
given determinate form. This is sufficient that it be in
itself a thing distinct from the form. These two principles
are not distinguished only modally, for a substantial form
is not merely a mode of being but a real thing having proper
being. And, at times this form can be conserved separate
from matter. For example, the rational soul is able to be
conserved separate from matter. This leads Suarez to state

that matter is distinguished from form as one thing from

 

another. This is confirmed for the composition of a sub-
stance from matter and form is real and physical; substan-
tial composition is not composition between a thing and a
mode. Therefore there is composition from two real things.
Finally, since matter exists perpetually and before the form
it is evident that it is distinguished from the form, but
this presupposes that the form is not only some mode but a
true act and a proper being. This is certain since it is a
more perfect being than the matter.27 On even the meta-

physical level, then, the union of matter and form seems to

 

27Ultima pars etiam est clara, quia materia est
entitas realiter separabilis a qualibet forma particulari
determinata, quod satis est ut a forma sit in re ipsa

 

 

 

 

261

result in a being per accidens rather than a being per g3.

 

An additional argument for the contention that
Suarez is a dualist even in the general metaphysical doc-
trine is to refer back to the discussion on individuation

28 This discussion showed that

of the matter and the form.
Suarez does treat matter and form as realities which have to
be distinguished from one another and from other matters and
other forms. This kind of individuation would not be neces-
sary if Suarez did not in some sense substantialize the two
metaphysical principles. But this substantializing tendency
results in the inability to get a genuinely composite.unity
of matter and form.

When one turns to Suarez' own treatment of the union
of the body and the soul, one realizes rather quickly that

Suarez' metaphysical doctrine makes this union something of

a major problem. Given the general metaphysics on matter,

 

distincta; non distinguuntur autem solum modaliter; nam
forma substantialis non est modus, sed res vera habens
propriam entitatem; unde interdum naturaliter etiam
conservari potest separate a materia, ut anima rationalis,
et per potentiam absolutam quaelibet forma potest separata
conservari. Distinguitur ergo materia g_forma tanquam res g
3;. Et confirmatur; nam compositio substantiae ex materia
et forma est realis et physica et non ex re et modo; ergo ex
duabus rebus. Denique cum materia sit perpetua, et ante
formam, evidens est distingui realiter a forma, supponendo
formam non esse tantum aliquem modum sed verum actum, et
propriam entitatem, quod etiam est certum cum sit res
perfectior quam materia de quo infra latius dicetur. Disp.
Meta. XIII, Sect. h, par. 5. [Italics added]

28For a more complete discussion of the problem of
individuation the reader is referred to Chapter IV of this
study. The subsection of that chapter entitled, "Principles
of Individuation for All Created Things" is especially note-
worthy in this context.

262
form, and individuation and the special characteristics of
the soul, Suarez is forced to say that the union of the ra-
tional soul with matter is unique and has essentially dif-
ferent understanding from the union of matter with material
forms. One can call this union a substantial adherence.
This is the causality by which matter is related to such a
form.29 The problem here though is that the adherence of
the soul and body, given what has been shown about the gen-
eral metaphysics and the special character of the soul,
looks very much like the per accidens unity which occurs
when a branch from one tree is engrafted to another and a
different tree.

At this point the weight of evidence is that Suarez
is a dualist in his approach to the unity of the human be-
ing. One of the bases of the argument for this dualism has
been the contention that the soul and body are so different

one from the other in Suarezian philosophy that there is no

 

29Permanens causalitas materiae in formam materialem
est unio.--9ualis sit rationalis animae cum materia nexus.
Hinc ulterius addo causalitatem materiae in ipsam formam
(quando forma talis est ut a materia causetur et pendeat)
non esse aliud a propria unione talis formas cum materia
quatenus ipsamet unio materialiter causatur a materia et
mediante illa forma ipsa pendet etiam a materia. Dixi non
esse aliud a propria unione talis formae quia non quaelibet
unio sufficit ad hanc causalitatem; anima enim rationalis
habet propriam unionem cum materia, quae unio etiam causatur
materialiter a materia et tamen ipsa anima non causatur; non
ergo quaelibet unio est causalitas ipsiusmet formee sed illa
quae est per eductionem formee. Ex quo obiter intelligimus
unionem animae rationalis cum materia esse singularem et
diversae rationis essentialis ab omni unione materialis
formae, quam substantialem inhaesionem appellare possumus
et hanc dicimus esse causalitatem per quam materia causat
talem formam. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 9, par. 10.

 

 

263
way to unite the two in a genuine unity pg§_§g. In Disputa-
tion XV, Section 10, paragraph 25 he attempts to answer this
objection to his theory. He states that even if it is
granted that the soul is indivisible and spiritual, it can
be united immediately to the matter because it is essen-
tially the act of the matter. It is of no concern that in
the perfection of being there is such a great distance be-
tween the matter and the rational soul. Union is not at-
tendant upon distance or nearness in perfection of being but
rather depends upon proportion and appropriateness in re-
spect of act and potency. This proportion is sufficiently
found between the matter and the soul, perhaps even a
greater and more perfect proportion than in other things.
Suarez offers a traditional proof that the soul is the form
of the body as an argument; this traditional proof is based
on unity of operations. In order that the rational soul be
the true form of the body, it is necessary for the soul to
be a principle not only of intellection but also of opera-
tions which are exercised through the body. This would be
especially true of the sensitive operations which are ac-

tions most closely related to understanding.30

 

30Nec rationes in contrarium factae difficilem
habent solutionem. Ad primam enim negatur minor, nam, licet
anima sit indivisibilis et Spiritualis, potest immediate
uniri materiae, quia essentialiter-est actus eius. Non enim
refert quod in perfectione entis multum inter se distent
materia et anima rationalis, nam ad unionem non est
attendenda distantia vel propinquitas in perfectione
entitatis, sed in proportions at convenientia in mutuo
respectu actus et potentiae, quae proportio sufficiens
reperitur inter materiam et animam; immo fortasse maior et

261+
Suarez' argument for the unity of body and soul

founded on the unity of operations is unsuccessful, because
in other places as has been shown he shows the complete and
total lack of relationship between matter and a spiritual
form. He cannot achieve unity by simply invoking the unity-
of-operetions formula given his total metaphysics. On the
basis of the earlier discoveries, then, Suarez does not get
around the difficulty of the distance of matter and rational
soul. As a matter of fact it is precisely this distance
which militates against the unity pgg_§§_that he wants to

establish in the human being.

 

perfectior quam inter materiam et quamcumque aliam formam.
Alioqui etiamsi fingatur materia iam informata quacumque
forma vel anime extensa et materiali, adhuc erit anima
improportionata ut uniatur illi; quia quod ad extensionem
attinet, tam extensa est illa forma sicut materia; ergo si
inde oriebatur imporportio, non tollitur, immo augetur
aliunde. Primo quia cum ille enima sensitive sit actus
substantialis et Specificus, ut probatum est, magis distat
ab enima rationali quoad proportionem requisitam ad unionem
quam anima et materia, et ita potius impedit quam iuvat ad
unionem. Secundo, quia si intercederet anima sensitive,
intellectiva esset purum principium intelligendi; purum
autem intelligendi principium non est aptum ad informandum
corpus, ut latius ostendemus infra, tractando de intelli-
gentiis separatis. Ut ergo rationalis anima sit vere

forma corporis, oportet ut ipsamet sit principium non tantum
intellectionum, sed etiam operationum quae exercentur per
corpus; ergo maxime operationum sensitivarum, quae sunt
actionibus intelligendi propinquiores. Quod adeo neces-
sarium est ut dubitaverint nonnulli an ipsamet anima
quatenus intellectiva informet corpus. Non vero est quod
dubitaverint, nem rationalis anime essentialiter est forma
corporis secundum se totam et secundum omnes gradus, qui,
licet a nobis ratione praescindantur, in re tamen idem in
anima sunt. Unde licet ex essentia huius anima non
dimanent potentiae intellectivae quae in corpore reci-
piantur, tamen eeedemmet potentiae sensitivae, immo et
vegetativae, manent cum singulari quadem perfectione proprie
rationalis animae et proportionate ad ministrandum
actionibus mentis. Et hoc etiam est argumentum eamdem esse
animam sensitivam cum rationali in homine. Disp. Meta.

XV, Sect. 10, par. 25.

 

In my:

 

265
Conclusion

The groundwork for the contention that Suarez is a
dualist in his rational psychology is laid by a careful
investigation of his theories of matter, form, and individ-
uation. Then, when one asks about the special case of the
relationship of the rational soul to the body, one sees that
the very structure of Suarezian metaphysics prohibits a true
unity in the human being. Metaphysically speaking, to give
matter its own existence, to allow quantity to inhere in
matter, and to permit matter of itself to be individuated,
treats this principle in such a way that it becomes an in-
tegral being in its own right. The same substantializing
tendency takes place with respect to the form. The form has
its own being, its own accidental qualities, and its own in-
dividuation. Suarez wants matter and form to be co-princi-
ples of being on the substantial level. The matter is to be
the potency and the form the act; together these two compose
a real physical substance. Since he continues to think in
the potency/act terms he feels that in his metaphysics he
has achieved a real unity pg§_§g between matter and form.
The tendency to make complete substances out of these co-
principles, however, militates against this type of unity.

Perhaps the most obvious place to see the implica-
tions of the general metaphysical position is in the rela-
tionship of the body and the rational soul. The body, being
the same as all other material beings has no special charac-

teristics except that it is matter disposed in such a way as

 

 

 

   

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266
to receive a rational soul. The soul, however, bears char-
acteristics which are similar to other forms, and since it
is a rational soul it has characteristics specific to it-
self. This soul, like all other forms is directly related
to the matter; there can be no intervening metaphysical
principles such as the form of haecceity or the form of cor-
poreity. There is only one substantial form for each human
being. But, the rational soul also has very special charac-
teristics and it is these special characteristics that pro-
hibit a true unity in the human being. Suarez shows that
the spiritual form has no relationship to quantity and that
quantity inheres in matter only. This means that the soul
cannot be educed from the potency of matter but must be in-
troduced into the matter. And then, the introduction means
that there must be a special creation of the soul. This
total lack of relationship to matter has the implication
that the soul can subsist on its own and in fact does so
subsist upon separation from the body. Some have asked
whether this subsistence on its own indicates that the soul
itself is composed of matter and form. As could be expected
Suarez rejects this position, since once again it would add
an unneeded metaphysical principle to the being. Conse-
quently, the soul is very far removed from the matter in its
level of being. As a matter of fact, the soul and matter
are at two poles and the question naturally arises, how can
two such different beings ever be united to form a genuine

unity?

 

 

 

 

.
.ru-
.
o

267

One cannot solve the problem of the unity of the
human being without examining Suarez' general doctrine of
the breakdown of beings in reSpect to their unity into pg;
gg and per accidens unity. Then, the pg; gg unity has two
further divisions, "simple" and "composite." In an attempt
to discover the type of unity appropriate to the human being
it is necessary to ask what kind of unity would be consid-
ered appropriate for the human and then to ask what kind of
unity in fact is the case for the human. From Suarez' own
description of unity and being pg; gg, it can be seen that
he wants the human being to be a composite unity pg;_gg.
But from his own description of unity and being pg;
accidens, and from the description of the human soul one
can easily see that the unity of the human being is in fact

a pgr accidens unity. Finally, one can examine the dispar-

 

ity of the soul and matter as metaphysical principles.
Suarez feels that this disparity enhances rather than hin-
ders the unity of the human being. He tries to show that

' there is a proportion between the soul and the matter, but
as has been shown in the discussion of the special charac-
teristics every possible spot one can turn to establish this
proportion breaks down under examination.

The basic flaw in the whole scheme of Suarezian
metaphysics is the desire to grant matter its own being. In
itself this looks like a fairly innocent move, but it gets a
metaphysical scheme into operation that has disastrous re-

sults when one comes to the discussion of the unity of the

 

 

 

 

268
human being. In summary, if one allows matter its own
being, then it has certain accidents which are appropriate
to it alone (e.g., quantity); and finally the separation
from the form becomes more complete. If, as Suarez does,
one does not want to add an extra metaphysical principle,
then one is forced to talk about matter and form as per-
tial or incomplete simple beings. It is here that, as one
begins to apply the general metaphysics to concrete cases,
one discovers the error of Spatializing and temporalizing
the matter and the form. In the case of the human being,
disparity of matter and form is so great that the only
unity possible is pg; accidens unity. To talk of partial
and incomplete principles of being does absolutely no good
if one gives these partial and incomplete principles all
the characteristics of integral and complete beings as
Suarez does in the case of the human being.

Suarez does make allowance in his further teaching
on the human being for the dualism of body and soul. In
the following chapter it will be necessary to investigate
the implications of his dualism. By examining the prob-
lems of knowledge and will one can see that the Suarezian
explanation of these two operations substantiates the
contention of dualism rather than alleviating it. In the
present chapter, the emphasis was on the impossibility
for a true unity in the human being based on the origin
of the matter and the soul. Now, the concern turns to

the Operations of the human. Based on an examination of

J
I

 

 

 

 

 

269
these operations, one can see that Suarez does not even

need the unity he claims for the human composite.

CHAPTER VI

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUALISM
OF BODY AND SOUL

The general conclusion of the previous chapter was
that Suarez has a dualism of fact if not of intent in his
theory of the composition of the human being. This dualism
has severe implications for the theory of the operations of
the human being.

In Aristotelian scholasticism there are two parallel
but complementary systems of operation. On the one hand,
there is the knowledge system composed of the exterior
senses, the interior senses and the intellect. On the other
hand, there is the system of appetites or tendencies com-
posed of the sense appetites and the will. The two systems
are parallel to each other but also are meant to operate in
conjunction with each other.1 For the purpose of this
present study they provide an excellent opportunity to ex-
amine the possibilities of genuine interaction between body

and soul. If Suarez, in explaining these two systems, can

 

1For representative presentations of the doctrine on
operative potencies the reader is referred to Aristotle, On
the Soul and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, qq 75-897
A modern treatment in the Thomistic tradition of the doc-
trine of operative potencies can be found in George P.
Klubertanz, The Philosophy 9; Human Nature (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953).

270

 

 

 

f 3

 

Anal.“

 

 

271
show that soul and body are interactive then, despite the
dualistic tendency of the metaphysics, the union of body and
soul results in one being, not two.

It should be obvious that this present chapter can-
not be a complete analysis of knowledge and appetition. An
exhaustive treatment would be the domain of rational psy-
chology. The concern in this chapter is metaphysical; the
discussion will show that the traditional problems of scho-
lasticism concerning how immaterial beings (human souls)
know materiel objects and immaterial beings (human souls)
affect materiel objects become especially crucial in Suarez.
One of his chief arguments for unity has been that there is
a unity of operation in the human being. He must show what
this means given the special nature of the soul/body rela-
tionship.

The materials on cognition are spread throughout the
Disputationes and when one separates them from the more
general metaphysical discussion, one realizes that the
Suarezian treatment of human knowledge is quite different
from its Thomistic predecessors. The chief variation of
note is that there is direct intellectual knowledge of the
singular.2 The reasons for holding this position are multi-
ple and they will be detailed in the next section of this

present chapter. It is sufficient at this point to note

 

2A8 was noted in the Introduction Suarez is follow-
ing Scotus on this point. For the Thomistic position on
knowledge of the singular the reader is referred to Summa
Theologiae, I, q. 8h.

272

that it is by direct intellectual knowledge of the singular
that Suarez hopes to achieve a unity of operation in knowl-
edge, e continuity of operation between sense and intellect.

The basic treatment of appetition occurs in Disputa-
tion XIX in the context of a discussion of efficient causal-
ity. This discussion is most appropriate for the present
study. Since the interest is in how a human being's will
act results in a given physical action, Suarez has a means
to establish a genuine unity of operation. One can see
Suarez making some very clear adjustments in the notion of
appetition to accommodate his peculiar understanding of the
body and soul. A noteworthy idee introduced at this point
is the notion of elicited appetite which Suarez feels will
solve the unity of operation problem in the appetitive sys-
tem. The section entitled "Willing in a Dualistic Context"
will examine Suarez on the unity of appetitive operation.
. At this point one can see that, given the interpre-
tation Suarez has of the basic principles of being, there
must be an appropriately adjusted understanding of the human
operations of knowing and appetition if they are to be at
all intelligible. It is essential that humans know concrete
singulare and affect concrete material beings. The dualism
of itself does not allow one to bridge the gap between ma-
terial and spiritual and so knowledge and appetition are

examined in the light of this problem.

 

 

273
Knowing in a Dualistic Context

In the case of human knowledge, given the dualistic
structure of the human being, Suarez wants to provide some
continuity between sense knowledge and intellectual knowl-
edge. As one investigates the doctrine on human knowing in
the Disputationes Metaphysicae one comes to a realization
that Suarez wants to hold a rather traditional position on
the problem of how the human being knows. But, the question
arises whether or not he maintains the integrity of the tra-
ditional scholastic structure of external senses, internal
senses, and intellect as a unified system given the dual-
istic composition of the human being. Since Suarez is not
doing rational psychology in the Disputationes, but rather
metaphysics the topic of human knowledge arises only periph-
erally.3 There is, however, enough information on this
topic to see that Suarez' treatment of the nature of human
knowledge does not take into account the dualism of the
human being. And if, as in knowledge of the singular, it
does allow for dualism then there is no need for a pg; gg
unity such as Suarez advocates.

In order to see the structure of human knowledge as
it occurs in the Disputationes one must first examine
Suarez' position on the nature of sensation. Then Suarez
poses a rather unique version of the meaning of experience,

3Suarez gives a much fuller treatment of the nature
and implications of human knowledge in his treatise Qg
Anima.

 

 

 

 

27h

maintaining that experience is proper only to humans. On
the side of the intellect Suarez gives a lengthy treatment
of the knowledge of universals and in this same treatment
indicates that the intellect has direct knowledge of the
singular. By these varied and disparate treatments Suarez
hopes to show that there is a genuine unity of operation
with respect to knowledge in the human being.

Other than a passing comment here and there in the
Disputationes, the only section in which Suarez treats sen-
sation to any great extent occurs in Disputation I, Section
6, paragraphs 10 to 12. This examination of sense knowledge
is in the context of the question whether or not men natu-
rally pursues the sicence of metaphysics. Suarez eXpleins
the doctrine of Aristotle concerning the relation of sight
and the other senses as naturally tending to this science.
Aristotle, he says, maintains that of all the senses sight
is the most fully adapted to doing metaphysics. From this
Aristotle infers that the love of science is greater and
more natural to sight than to any of the other senses.‘+ The
significance of these assertions is that in respect to a
concrete activity, the tendency toward science, Suarez has

an opportunity to draw comparisons among the various

 

“Praeterea discursus Aristotelis ex dilectione
sensuum, et praesertim visus desumptus, optimus est ed idem
confirmandum. Duo autem sumit Aristoteles in eo discursu:
primum est, quod in dilectione sensuum visum anteponimus;
secundum est causam huius esse, quia ad scientiam maxime
deservit. Ex quibus infert tertium, scilicet emorem
scientiae esse maiorem magisque neturalem, quam ipsius visus
aliorumque sensuum. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 10.

275
external senses. A detailed comparison is relegated to psy-
chology; here Suarez is interested only in the relationship
of the senses to science. Even in this context, however,
one must remember that the whole comparison can and does
take place solely in terms of bodily operations. Whether
one sense tends more toward science than another does not
bridge the gap between body and soul. Or, more bluntly, the
sense of sight is the best physical instrument for metaphys-
ical speculation but it is still a bodily operation.

Suarez analyzes Aristotle's proposition that of all
the senses sight tends most fully toward metaphysics by
drawing a comparison between sight and touch. Touch can be
found in living things apart from the sense of sight but the
sense of sight cannot be found without the sense of touch.
The reason for this is that touch is the first of all the
senses and the foundation for the others. In a word, if
touch is destroyed, sight is not able to remain, because
life cannot be conserved without touch. Therefore, in so
far as sight as a higher sense implies touch in some manner
sight will tend more to science than touch alone would. In
addition, to the extent that loss of touch implies loss of
vision, touch is more elementary than vision. A person
would choose to conserve touch over eight if at the loss of

5

touch, sight were necessarily lost. What is important here

 

SQuae consecutio videtur per se evidens et fundeta
in eo principio: Propter uod gpumguodgue tale, g; illud
me is. Prime autem propos t o assumpta imprimis
inte ligenda est cum praecisione, ut recte fiat comparatio;

 

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276
is the fact that Suarez is appropriating from Aristotle the
general notion that the senses are somehow interrelated and
dependent upon each other. This view is in complete accord
with a general theory of the hierarchy of being. That is,
the more complex the organism the more senses it has and the
more complex these senses will be. Sense knowledge as such,
though, is considered to be a material operation and needs
nothing more than an appropriate kind of subhuman form in
order to function. Consequently, at this level there is no
question even for a need for continuity between the various
kinds of knowledge.

In the next comparison, between sight and hearing,
however, Suarez is concerned with the acquisition of science
more directly. Aristotle points out a double tendency in
the senses--one arises for the sake of usefulness, the other
comes about for the sake of knowledge. The notion of the
usefulness of the senses is self-evident, for under this

conception one can comprehend every convenience of body

 

tactus enim inveniri potest sine visu, non vero e contrario,
quia tectus est omnium sensuum primus, aliorumque
fundamentum. Unde destructo tactu, non potest naturaliter
visus manere quia nec vita sine tactu conservatur, III de
Anim., c. 12, et lib. XIII de Sensu et sens., c. l.

Quatenus ergo visus quodammodo includit tectum, appetibilior
erit visus quam solum tectus; et in contrario sensu quatenus
emissio tectus includit amissionem visus, et non e converso,
preefertur tectus visui, quia potius eliget homo
conservationem tectus quam visus, 31 ad amissionem tectus
visus necessario amittendus est. Haec vero comparatio sic
intellecta nullius momenti est, quia non comparantur singuli
sensus inter se, sed duo ad unum qui in eis includitur; est
ergo comparatio praecise facienda in eo quod singuli per se
conferunt. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 10.

 

..

 

277
pertaining either to its conservation or pleasure, or other
operations proper to human life. The tendency toward knowl-
edge, however, is appropriate to man, and in sensation sight
takes precedence over the other senses. This assertion is
established by eXperience in that we give priority to the
operation of sight over all other senses. But an a-priori
reason can also be given for this priority. There are two
ways to acquire science, either by teaching or by discovery.
In the acquisition by teaching hearing is the most useful of
the senses; this is evident because words are signs of con-
cepts and hearing alone perceives words. Although hearing
does not perceive the meaning but rather the mind perceives
the meaning, it is sufficient that there is a proper organ
by which such a sign is mediated to the mind. This, how-
ever, is only an accidental acquisition of science, for it
supposes another person who speaks about the nature of
things. This teacher's function is to supply for the imper-
fection or negligence of the man who has learned the science
originally by discovery. Even in learning science by teach-
ing, hearing has a minimal function since many things are
learned also by the written word and the use of sight is

6

more important here than hearing. Finally, the manner of

 

6Deinde est observandum Aristotelem hic duplicem
emorem sensuum indicare. Unus est ob utilitatem; alter vero
propter cognitionem. Prior est per se notissimus, et sub
utilitate comprehendi potest omnis commoditas corporis,
pertinens vel ed conservationem eius, vel ad delectationem,
vel ad alias operationes humanae vitae. Posterior amor est
maxime proprius hominis, et in ordine ad hunc emorem
praecipue comparatur hic visus cum aliis sensibus, eisque

278
doing science by discovery depends more heavily on the
senses of sight and touch than on any of the other senses
and this is so obvious that it does not need proof.7
In all of this discussion of the manner in which the
senses function in the acquisition of science the point that
is of special concern in this present study is how Suarez

treats vocal expression and written expression. In these

 

preefertur. Quod experimento probat Aristoteles, quia nihil
(inquit) acturi ipsum visum aliis anteponimus. Rationem
autem a priori, et quae ad rem praesentem maxime spectat,
reddit in altera propositione. Circa quam est tertio
notandum, duos esse modos acquiriendi scientiam, scilicet
disciplinam, et inventionem. Ad priorem modum utilissimus
est auditus, ut per se constat, quia voces sunt signa
conceptuum; solus autem auditus voces percipit, et quamvis
ipse non percipiet earum significationem, sed mens, satis
est quod sit organum proprium, quo mediante tale signum ed
mentem pervenit. Hic tamen excessus et est per accidens, et
minimus. Per accidens quidem, quia modus acquirendi
scientiam per disciplinam est quasi per accidens; nam et
supponit alium, loquendo secundum natures rerum, et solum
est ad suppledam imperfectionem vel negligentiam hominum in
vacando scientiis inveniendis. Minimum autem excessum
appello, quia etiam visus plurimum deservit ad disciplinam:
nem etiam scripturae sunt signa conceptuum, et illae
percipiuntur visu: unde multo plura videntur addisci
lectione, quae visu fit, quam auditions. Est tamen dis-
crimen, quod tota fere utilitas scripturae potest etiam
auditu percipi, non tamen e converso; ea enim energia, vis
ac claritas, quae est in voce ad exprimendos proprios
conceptus, non potest scripture sola aut visu suppleri; unde
legimus nonnullos carentes visu fuisse doctissimos, partim
auditis solis scriptis aliorum, partim etiam eXplicationibus
seu doctrinis viva voce sibi propositis; quod vero aliquis
omnino surdus evaserit doctissimus, me legisse non memini,
et vix id fieri posse existimo. Non igitur comparantur hic
ab Aristotele hi sensus quoad hoc munus, sed quoad modum
acquirendi scientiam per inventionem. DiSp. Meta. I, Sect.
6, par. 11.

7In quo dubium non est quin visus et tectus, tam
auditum quam alios sensus superent, quod addeo notum est, ut
non egeat probatione; solum de comparatione visus et tectus
inter se, breviter dicendum superest. Disp. Meta. I, Sect.
6, par. 11.

279
instances he has said that the sense does not perceive the
meaning of the word; rather, the intellect perceives the
meaning. What is presupposed here is a continuity of opera-
tion between the intellect and the senses. He feels that by
his doctrine of the soul as the form of the body this con-
tinuity of operation follows. But, it is also necessary to
note that he uses continuity of operation to prove that the
soul is the form of the body. In fairness to Suarez it is
necessary to point out that the issue here is the acquisi-
tion of science not the unity of operation. He must, how-
ever, answer the problem of how unity of operation takes
place, and the only spot where such an attempt is made is in
the notion that the soul is the form of the body. It has
been shown earlier, however, that Suarez' metaphysical
structure does not allow for true unity of operation or com-
position.

Unity of operation is also presumed in the further
treatment of sight and touch as sources of science by dis-
covery. In the acquisition of science by discovery in one
way touch surpasses sight, because touch is a more universal
sense on the part of the knowing subject (i.e., it is spread
throughout the body). But sight of itself and as an instru—
ment of science surpasses touch in many other ways. First,
sight is superior to touch in the breadth of its object for
it perceives many more differences (e.g., motions, actions,
figure, etc.) than the other senses. In a word, sight is

the most complex of the senses. Secondly, it perceives more

t. .

u
\l.
‘ s\
o
. v ‘1
u
C .
u
_ ‘
u ...
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I

 

280
rapidly than all the other senses and extends itself to the
most distant things. The reason for this is that it com-
pletes its operation by a more immaterial operation than the
sense of touch which depends on material contact. Third, it
impresses its phantasms more firmly than the other senses,
and this is known by experience. Visual phantasms inhere in
the memory more firmly and recur more easily than other
types of phantasms. Fourth, sight gives more certitude than
the other senses. That is, because it is the most sophisti-
cated of those senses it gives more knowledge than any ani-
mal sense (e.g., the eyesight of an eagle may be very acute
but is still only an animal sense) and more knowledge than
any other human sense (e.g., touch is less 30phisticated
than sight). The reason for this is that sight is more im-
material and perceives its object more acutely than the

lower senses. For these reasons, then, sight is more useful

for the sciences than other senses.8

8Est igitur advertendum quarto, aliud esse loqui de
signo (ut ita dicam) melioris facultatis, maiorisque
aptitudinis ad scientiam acquirendam, aliud de aptiori
instrumento inveniendae scientiae; tectus enim priori
ratione visum superat, quia tectus est universalis sensus ex
parte subiecti, nam est per totum corpus diffusus, et est
signum optimae et temperatae complexionis, unde est illud:
Mblles carnes aptae sunt ipgenio de quo latius in II de
Anima, text. 2A. At vIsus per se, et ut instrumentum ad
scientiam, multis medis tactum superat. Primo in latitudine
obiecti; plures enim differentiae percipit, ut hic dixit
Aristoteles, et circa coelestia et terrestria vagatur, et
rerum motus, actiones, et figures perspicacius cognoscit,
quam ullus alius sensus; sunt autem haec veluti prima signa
et indicia quibus ad res cognoscendas utimur. Secundo,
citius quam alii sensus percipit, cum tamen ad res
distantissimas etiam sese extendat, et causa est quod
puriori et immaterialiori modo, et absque alteratione
materiali operationem suam perficit. Tertio, vehementius

 

 

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281

Once again, Suarez presumes that there is a continu-
ity between the knowledge acquired from the senses and sci-
ence, knowledge which is properly intellectual. Suarez is
appropriating Aristotle's doctrine on knowledge to himself,
but in Aristotle the soul as the form of the body means
something quite different from the way in which Suarez un-
derstands the soul as the form of the body. Aristotle's ap-
proach in Q; the Soul, Book II, Chapter 1, is to show that

 

the soul is the form of the body in the sense that the mat-

ter and form are genuine co-principles of being. There is

 

imprimit phantasiae quae percipit, quod experimento constat;
nam tenacius inhaerent memoriae, et facilius postea
occurrunt. Cause autem esse videtur, quod eius operatio
sicut spiritualior est, ita maiori vi anima et conatu, et
cooperatione etiam maiori ipsius phantasiae fit. Querto,
experimentum visus certius esse videtur experimento tectus,
per se loquendo; etsi enim Aristoteles, lib I de Histor.
animal., c. 15, dicat tactum in homine esse exquisitissimum,
ibi tamen non comparat sensus hominis inter se et reapectu
ipsius hominis, sed cum sensibus aliorum animalium; et hoc
modo ait hominem superare alia animalia in tactu et gustu,
cum tamen in aliis sensibus superetur a multis, saltem in
multis conditionibus sentiendi, ut ab aquila in perSpicacia
et fortitudine visus; non tamen ait tactum hominis superare
visum in certitudine. Quin potius, sect. 31, Problem.

q. 18, inquit tactum aemulari visum. Itaque quilibet horum
sensuum habet suam certitudinem in ordine ad proprium
adaequatum obiectum; interdum vero deficit circa communia
sensibilia ex insufficienti applicatione; et fortasse quia
visus eminus sentit et non tectus, ideo facilius contingit
obiectum visus indebite applicari, ac visum decipi; si tamen
caetera sint paria quoad applicationem obiecti et
dispositionem potentiae, non magis accidit deceptio in visu
quam in tactu. Et aliunde visus ob suam immaterialitatem
percipit acutius obiectum, et ex hec parte certior est;
ideoque frequentius adhiberi solet ad certitudinem de rebus
sensibilibus accipiendam. His ergo de causis visus est
simpliciter utilior ad scientiae, eamque ob rem naturaliter
magis diligitur; signum ergo est, ut Aristoteles concludit,
quod et ipsa scientia naturaliter ab homine diligitur.
Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 12.

 

282

an immaterial aspect to man in Aristotle but this never
forces its way into the basic metaphysical structure so as
to destroy the structure.9 Suarez, however, allows the im-
material aspect to dominate the structure of humanity.10
This means that he cannot simply transfer Aristotle's doc-
trine on the continuity of knowledge into his own system
without doing violence to Aristotle.

Suarez is aware of these problems of continuity of
operation in knowledge and attempts to answer them in his
discussion of "experience." Once again he follows Aris-
totle's discussion of experience maintaining that experience
properly so called is peculiar to man.

According to Aristotle in Book I, Chapter 1 of the
Metaphysics experience comes from the nature of memory; for
many memories of the same thing bring about the force of a
single eXperience. This understanding of experience gives
Aristotle an opportunity to ask whether or not experience
applies to the sense alone or also to the intellect. The
first thing Aristotle teaches is that eXperience does not
concern the universal but the singular. The fact that ex-
perience is of the singular can be seen especially in medi-

cine in which many single occurrences of a disease lead one

 

9To see that this is the case the reader is re-
ferred to the discussion of the agent intellect as it occurs
in Aristotle's 9g the Soul.

10It was precisely this willingness to allow the im-
material aspect to dominate the structure of the human being
that led to structural dualism. This topic was discussed at
length in Chapter V of the present study.

283
to a knowledge that a patient has a given disease. The re-
lation of experience to the singular is also shown in the
use one makes of experience in performing practical actions;
such actions are always concerned with the singular in oppo-
sition to art or science both of which may also be concerned
with the universal. Suarez does not expand on this conten-
tion but the significance is that persons can learn how to
perform certain actions in a given circumstance such as
stepping aside from the path of an oncoming car; but this
type of action comes only from memory of several past ex-
periences. It is not, strictly speaking, universal in na-
ture. Given this understanding both Aristotle and Suarez
maintain that the separation of universal from the singular
does not pertain to experience. Rather, experience is sim-
ll

ply a firm and prompt judgment concerning the singular.

In both cases either of direct experience or of

 

11Tertio igitur ait in hominibus generari
experientiam ex memoria: Nam multae (inquit) eiusdem rei
recordationes unius experientiae vim pgrficiunt. Quo loco
afferébat se occasio declarandi fuse quid experientia sit et
an ad sensum pertineat, vel ad intellectum; item sitne
habitus iudicativus, an apprehensivus, et quomodo gignatur,
vel ad quid inclinet. Sed quia haec magis perinent ad
scientiam de anima et obiter tantum hic ab Aristotele
attinguntur, breviter advertendum est Aristotelem hic plane
docere experientiam non versari circa universale sed circa
singulare, sic enim ait compertum haberi Calliae hoc morbo
laboranti hoc profuisse, itemgue Socrati atque eodem modo
pluribus singulatim, experientia esse, profuisse autemfiiig
omnibus gui certo morbo—laborent, id iam artis esse; et
infra probat utiliorem esse ad actiones experientiam, quam
solam scientiam vel artem, quia actiones circa singularia
versantur. Non ergo pertinet ad eXperimentum collectio
universalis ex singularibus; multoque minus assensus
universalis, sed solum firmum promptumque iudicium circa
singularia. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 23.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

28h
vicarious eXperience, Suarez points out that it is not suf-
ficient simply to undergo the same effect on multiple occa-
sions. Even animals do this. But, they cannot properly be
said to have experience. Animals have only a simple memory
of those singulars perceived by the senses. For perfect ex-
perience of the kind proper to men a comparison of the sin-
gulars among themselves is required. The repeated occur-
rence of these singulars is not sufficient to establish ex-
perience, but rather the ability to compare and recognize
similitude is the constituting factor of experience. As a
person senses more and more singulars of a given type he ac-
quires a habit of judging that a certain effect comes from a
given cause. This habit requires nothing more than memory
of the singulars and eXperience is not therefore properly of

the universal but of the singular.12

 

12Potest enim experientia late sumpta dici de
quacumque perceptione unius singularis, quomodo dici potest
quis esse eXpertus vinum inebriare, etiamsi semel tantum id
passus sit, vel in alio viderit; quia vero, ut Hippocrates
dixit, experimentum fallax est, proprie non accipitur pro
unius tantum singularis cognitione, sed plurium singularium
ut dixit Aristoteles. Immo nec satis est ad prOpriam
experientiam et perfectam, saepius eumdem effectum eXperiri;
hoc enim etiam brute animalia possunt, de quibus Aristoteles
dixit parum experientiae participare, quia solum habent
simplicem memoriam eorum singularium quae sensu perceperunt;
sed ad perfectam experientiam ulterius requiritur collatio
quaedam eorumdem singularium inter se, quae propria est
hominis, et ideo dixit Aristoteles ex memoria fieri homini
experientiam, quia multae eiusdem rei recorationes
experientiam perficiunt. Eiusdem rei, dicit non individuae
et singularis, ita ut ad experientiam sufficiat saepius
recordari unius et eiusdem singularis effectus sensu
percepti; haec enim repetitio efficiet promptiorem memoriam
talis effectus, non vero experientiam. Intelligit ergo
eiusdem secundum similitudinem et convenientiam
circumstantiarum; et ad hoc requiritur collatio singularium
per recordationem, scilicet, quod tale medicamentum

285

One can see the completely sense-oriented under-
standing of eXperience when Suarez turns to the deceitful
nature of eXperience. Although there does seem to be a cer-
tain type of certitude arising from sense knowledge, the
certitude is less than that required for science. Experi-
ence, as has been shown, is not of the universal, but rather
of the singular. Science is of the universal simply. This
is especially the case when science takes into account sin—
gulars which do not fall under experience. The mere collec-
tion and comparison of singulars does not suffice to gen-

erate science which must be genuinely universal knowledge.13

 

profuit. Petro laboranti hoc morbo, et Paulo similiter; nam
si non sit similitudo sufficiens, saepe videbitur esse
experientia, et revera non erit. Unde provenit ut saepe sit
experimentum fellax. Hoc igitur modo proprie est hominis
eXperientia quae licet sensu inchoetur, mente tamen et
ratione perficitur, ut declaratum est. Unde non consistit
in notitia apprehensive, sed in iudicativa, ex que generatur
habilitas quaedam, qua homo promptus redditur ad iudicandum
hunc effectum solere a tali causa prodire, quae habilitas
fortasse nihil aliud est quam memoria talium effectuum
singularium, non utcumque, sed ut inter se collati sunt, et
similes inventi, et cum eis circumstantiis ab eadem seu
simili causa manasse dignoscuntur. Atque haec nunc pro
huius loci opportunitate de experientia sufficient. Disp.
Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 23.

l3Quod tamen difficile est, quia humanum
experimentum est fallax, ut ex Hippocrate dixi, et quamvis
demus interdum esse certum certitudine sensus, illa tamen
certitudo minor videtur quam ea quae ad scientiam
requiritur; maxime quia experimentum non est universale, seu
de omnibus omnino singularibus, scientia autem est
universalis simpliciter, et complectitur ea etiam singularia
quae sub eXperientiam non ceciderunt. Et quamvis interdum
liceet ex his quae eXperimur idem colligere de singularibus
quae sub experientiam non ceciderunt, haec tamen collectio
videtur valde infima, et ad summum sufficiat ad scientiam
quia, non vero propter quid. Rursus occurebat hic
difficultas, an propositio illa Aristotelis artem ab
experientia generari, indefinite tantum sit, ut sonat, an
vero sumenda sit ut doctrinalis et universalis, ita ut

 

 

 

 

 

286
Two things must be noted here: experience for Suarez is
completely sensate in nature and hence properly applies only
to bodily operations; and the fact that it is not infallible
means that it cannot properly be the source of universal
knowledge.

The discussion on experience, which could have pro-
vided a way of showing the continuity in knowledge, remains
on the sensate level since it applies only to singulars as a
group of repeated sense occurrences. Suarez here manifests
the problem that faces most scholastic philosophers; the
process by which sense knowledge becomes strictly universal
and immaterial must be expressed in terms of a continuity of
knowledge. To establish this continuity, however, is impos-
sible when one makes the strict dichotomies as Suarez does
between the body and the soul. By tracing a given piece of
knowledge from the primary sense occurrence through eXperi-
ence to genuinely universal science one should be able to
see this continuity, but there is an essential break in con-
tinuity between eXperience and universal knowledge. It is
at this point that one also sees Suarez' position on knowl-
edge as dualistic. That is, eXperience is sensitive
(bodily); universal science is intellectual (Spiritual).

The problem is how to bridge the gap between the two kinds
of knowledge.

Suarez is aware of the difficulty he faces in

 

nunquam contingat scientiam aut artem in nobis aliter
generari. DiSp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 25.

.n 'Irna.

 

287

respect to the gap between particular and universal knowl-
edge. First, one must solve the problem of whether the uni-
versal occurs through abstraction or through intellectual
comparison of objects. This is a question of the way in
which one comes to universal knowledge. Secondly, Suarez
notes that everyone holds that the object of the intellect
is being. This is a question of what the intellect knows
most properly. Thirdly, one must solve the problem of the
difference of the agent and possible intellects. This ques-
tion has to do with the interior structure of the intellect
as a knowing power.1h Here Suarez is merely trying to sort
out the various aspects of intellectual knowledge. When he
turns to the question of the way the universal is produced
he makes use of these distinctions to describe the three
possible answers to the production of the genuine universal

as opposed to an experience.

 

l“Haec questio sub aliis verbis tractari solet in
principio dialecticae, scilicet, an universale fiat per
abstractionem vel per comparationem intellectus. Tractari
etiam solet, ac magis proprie in III de Anima, explicando
obiectum intellectus, quod universale esse dicitur. Quoniam
vero dictum a nobis est unitatem universalem per opus
intellectus resultare, praetermittere non possumus quin
declaremus quod et quale sit hoc opus intellectus. Oportet
autem breviter distinguere duplicem intellectum, agentem et
possibilem; illius munus est efficere species intelli-
gibiles; huius operari et intelligere per illas; habet
autem duplicem operationem (praetermissis aliis quae ad
praesens institutum non spectant): una vocatur directe,
qua directe tendit in rem quam species intelligibilis
repraesentet et ed quam dicit intellectum per se ac simpli-
citer. Alia vocatur reflexa, qua intellectus revolvitur
supra priorem cognitionem vel supra obiectum eius secundum
eas conditiones vel denominationes quas ex cognitione
accipit. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, par. 1.

288

In response to the difference between the agent and
possible intellects, Suarez holds that the function of the
agent intellect is to bring about the intelligible species;
the function of the possible intellect is to understand by
means of the intelligible species. The possible intellect
has a double operation--direct: by which it tends toward
the thing which the intelligible species represents and
which is called understanding simply and pg;_gg; reflex:
by which the intellect considers a prior knowledge either
the object, or the conditions, or meanings which it receives
from the knowledge.

In response to the problem of the object of intel-
lectual knowledge Suarez offers no further comment since
there is universal agreement that being is the proper object
of the intellect.

The major problem to be dealt with is the way in
which the universal is produced in the intellect. Briefly,
the three positions on the production of the universal are:

1. That the universal occurs through the operation
of the agent intellect which takes place prior to every
operation of the possible intellect. This operation con-
sists in the production of the intelligible species repre-
senting a specific nature which has been abstracted from all
individuality. This is spoken of as abstraction of a common

nature accomplished by the power of the agent intellect.15

 

15Tres igitur in hec re possunt esse opiniones:
prima est universale fieri per operationem intellectus
agentis quae antecedit omnem operationem intellectus

 

 

-"lj

 

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r
u
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289

2. The universal does not come from the agent intel-
lect but rather from the possible intellect through a direct
operation of the agent intellect by which the possible in-
tellect knows a common nature according to its precise for-
mal intelligibility and essence. In this operation the pos-
sible intellect considers nothing of the lower intelligibil-
ities nor of individuals. Rather, the consideration is
solely upon the essence which is common. This position
ought necessarily to teach that the possible intellect di-
rectly knows the singular, even material things. In this
opinion the agent intellect does not abstract the universal
from the singular but only abstracts the intelligible spe-

cies from phantasms which are directly known. What is being

 

possibilis et consistit in productione speciei
intelligibilis repraesentantis naturam praecisam et
abstractam ab omnibus individuis, quae proinde dici solet
abstractio naturae communis facta virtute intellectus
agentis. Ita significat D. Thomas I, q. 85, a. 1, in
corpore, et ed A, et a. 3, ed A, VII Metaph., lect. 13, de
Ente et essent., c. A: et Com., II De Anima, comm. lO,
dicens intellectum moveri gg‘ultimem perfectionem g rebus
universalibus, scilicet, repraesentatis in speciebus
InteIIigIBIIibus . . . Quae sententia supponit imprimis
intellectum possibilem directe et ex vi speciei quam recipit
ab intellectu agente, non cognoscere singularia materialia
sed tantum natures communes. Ex quo infert speciem
productam ab intellectu agente tantum repraesentare directe
naturam communem praecisam ab omnibus individuis et
consequenter esse universalem in repraesentando. Ex quo
tandem fit naturam sic repraesentatam, obiective et
denominatione extrinseca fieri universalem per huiusmodi
abstractionem; nam si contractione fit singularis et
individua, abstractione fiet universalis et communis. Et
confirmatur, quia universale est obiectum intellectus
agentis et possibilis, illius ut potentiae activae, huius
ut passivae seu receptivae; ergo fit per actionem intel-
lectus agentis, antecedit vero operationem intellectus
possibilis; nem de ratione potentiae activae est ut faciat
obiectum suum, potentia vero passive supponit illud; ab eo
enim pati solet. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, par. 2.

 

 

 

 

r"

 

A
..lr.

 

290
said is that it separates the Species from its material
conditions.16
3. The universal comes about through a comparative
knowledge by which the possible intellect, after it appre-
hends the nature abstractly, compares that nature with the
individuals in which the nature exists and understands it

as a nature which is appropriately applied to the many sin-

gulars and is predicated of them. In this third opinion a

 

16Secunda opinio est universale non fieri ab
intellectu agente, sed a possibili per operationem directam
qua cognoscit naturam communem secundum suam praecisam
rationem formalem et essentiam, nihil de inferioribus
rationibus vel de individuis considerando, neque etiam
formaliter et quasi in actu signato considerando
communitatem ipsius naturae sed solum essentiam, quae
communis est. Hanc sententiam quoad priorem partem negantem
in qua differt a praecedente, necessario docere debent qui
tenent intellectum possibilem cognoscere directe singularia,
etiam materialia. Nam iuxta illam opinionem consequenter
dicendum est intellectum agentem, per se loquendo, efficere
speciem singularem, non solum in essendo sed etiam in
repraesentando rem individuam et singularem; quia non posset
eam intellectus primo et directe cognoscere, nisi reciperet
speciem proprie et in particulari repraesentantem illam.
Quo fit ut iuxta henc sententiam intellectus agens non
abstrahat universale a singularibus solumque dicatur
abstrahere speciem intelligibilem a phantasmate quia separat
illam e conditionibus materiae, quantum ad esse reale
illius, non vero quantum ed obiectum quod repraesentat:
producit enim speciem spiritualem et immaterialem in
entitate sua, repraesentantem eamdem numero rem individuam
quam repraesentat phantasma; non enim repugnat materiale
individuum per immaterialem formam seu qualitatem
intentionaliter repraesentari. Et in universalitate generis
potest hoc confirmari in omni sententia, quia, licet demus
intellectum agentem abstrahere illo modo naturam specificam
ab individuis, non tamen necesse est quod abstrahat naturam
genericam ab speciebus; quia certum est intellectum
possibilem posse directe et immediate ferri ad cognoscendam
specificam naturam, et intellectum agentem posse efficere
speciem intelligibilem quae in repraesentatione sua non
abstrahat a differentia specifica, quidquid sit de
individuali; ergo tunc non fiet universale quod est genus,
per abstractionem intellectus agentis. Disp. Meta. VI,
Sect. 6, par. 3.

 

 

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291

nature actually existing in singulars has universality only
remotely Speaking, because universality, strictly speaking,
is not a positive quality or common to many (as if one thing
existing in many), neither is it a negative quality (as if
something proper to no Singular thing). Rather, the uni-
versality is a certain likeness of many things among them-
selves which provides the occasion and foundation of uni-
versality. The point of this position is that universality
is not something having true existence, but is only a being
or relation of reason. This implies that it has objective
existence only in the intellect; it only occurs when there
is an act of the intellect, and this means there is a uni-

versality only through comparative knowledge.17

 

l7Tertia sententia est universale fieri per notitiam
comparetivam qua intellectus possibilis, postquam naturam
praecise et abstracte apprehendit, confert illam Sic
conceptam cum rebus in quibus existit et intelligit illam ut
unum quid aptum ut Sit in multis inferioribus et de illis
praedicetur. Itaque iuxta sententiam henc, nature in
singularibus existens universalitatem habet solum in
potentia remote, quia non est communis vel positive, tamquam
aliquid vere unum existens in multis vel etiam negative,
tamquam aliquid nulli rei singulari proprium. Sed est
tantum in illa quaedam similitudo et convenientia plurium
rerum inter se quae praebet occasionem et fundamentum
remotum universalitati. Nature vero abstracte cognita dici
potest universalis in potentia proxime, quia iam est
communis negative, quia concipitur secundum se et non ut
propria alicuius individui; nondum tamen censetur esse actu
universalis, quia nondum concipitur ut habens aptitudinem et
relationem ad multa in quibus sit, quam relationem accipit
per notitiam comparetivam, et ideo per illam dicitur ultimo
constitui universale in actu. Quod ulterius probatur, quia
universalitas non est res aliqua habens veram existentiam,
sed est tantum ens seu relatio rationis; ergo tantum habet
esse obiective in intellectu; ergo tantum est quando actu
fit ab intellectu, nam tunc solum est obiective in intel-
lectu; ergo tantum est per notitiam comparetivam, quia per
eam solam fit seu excogitatur ab intellectu. Confir-
metur, nem universale ut universale relativum est, ut

292

Given these three possible opinions on the produc-
tion of the universal Suarez now feels he must make a choice
among them in order to Show the relationship of the intel-
lect to the universal and to the singular. He rejects the
first opinion and combines the other two as a resolution to
the problem. Suarez accepts a version of intellectual
knowledge which allows at one and the same time both knowl-
edge of the universal and direct knowledge of the singular.
If the intellect can know the singular directly then there
is no need for sense knowledge as a unique operation and the
dualism is confirmed on the very basis of unity of operation
which, as has been shown in Chapter V, was Suarez' strongest
argument leading to a structural unity of the human being.

In his rejection of the first opinion Suarez states
that the opinion is probably only on the supposition that
the agent intellect does not produce a species representing
the individual. This supposition, however, is to be re-
jected because the agent intellect never impresses a species

representing only a difference but rather impresses a

 

patet, tum ex eius definitione; per suum enim correlativum
definitur, scilicet: .ggp_unum.;;_multis g; gg multis; tum
ex suis Speciebus, ut sunt genus, species differentia, etc.;
haec enim relative dicuntur, ut constat et definitionibus a
Porphyrio detis in praedicabilibus; relative autem sunt
simul nature at cognitione; ergo universale in actu non est
eo modo quo esse potest, scilicet, obiective in intellectu,
donec eius correlativum eodem modo Sit; non potest autem
esse illo modo donec unum ad alterum conferatur, quod fit
solum per dictam comparetivam notitiam; ergo. Et huic
opinioni favet D. Thomas, qui ubique docet relationis
rationis tantum esse in apprehensione rationis conferentis
unum alteri, ut I, q. 28, a. l, in corp, et ad a . . .
DiSp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, par. 5.

 

 

n
, ,

 

 

 

 

 

 

293

Specific nature. Just as the phantasm does not represent
something in the individual through the manner of a form but
through the manner of the whole individual, so the agent in-
tellect produces a Species representing the total specific
nature of the individual not merely a difference. The agent
intellect is not free in its action but naturally impresses
a species only on the basis of the definite phantasm pre-
sented to it. Neither is the intellect constructed so that
it would be able to conceive a nature at one time in one way

18

and then conceive it afterwards in another way. The

 

18Inter has sententias, prima est quidem probabilis
ex suppositione illius sententiae, quod intellectus agens
non producit species repraesentantes individua, et adhuc ea
supposita, non procedit generaliter de omni universali sed
ad summum de specifico et de solo illo formaliter loquendo,
ut ratio quaedam supra facta probat. Et amplius declarari
potest, quia imprimis certum est intellectum agentem nunquam
imprimere speciem repraesentantem solam differentiam, ut
differentia est, sed totam specificam naturam. Quia, sicut
phantasma non repraesentat in individuo aliquid per modum
formee sed per modum totius individui ita intellectus agens
producit speciem repraesentatem totam naturam specificam
individui per modum totius nec potest praescindere seu
immutare actionem istam ut tunc producat unam speciem
repraesentantem differentiam per modum formee, deinde
producat aliam repraesentantem totam naturam specificam per
modum totius; quia neque est liber in agendo, sed
naturaliter imprimit speciem quantum potest, supposito tali
phantasmate; neque est cognoscitivus ut nunc possit uno modo
naturam concipere, postea alio. Unde in proprio et acci-
dente, quamvis demus efficere species repraesentantes illa
in communi abstrahendo ab individuis, tamen unumquodque
eorum ex vi talis Speciei intelligibilis solum
repraesentatur ut quid commune multis individuis in ea
ratione similibus. Et idem suo modo est in gradu generico,
si forte aliquando ob imbecillitatem phantasmatis pro-
ducatur species intelligibilis repraesentans praecise illum
gradum; nem, sicut phantasma tunc repraesentat solum hoc
animal, verbi gratia, ita species intelligibilis ab illo
sumpta repraesentabit gradum animalis solum ut abstractum
et praecisum a similibus individuis. Et hac ratione
dicimus, etiam supposita illa sententia, per hanc abstrac-
tionem intellectus agentis, per se non abstrahi naturam

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29h
substance of Suarez' objection here is the manner of presen-
tation of the intelligible species; this presentation does
not take place as the first opinion would have it. The in-
telligible species is presented as a whole not simply as a
group of abstracted differences. This means that the intel-

lect must in some sense know the individual.

 

specificam. Obiicies hunc discursum fieri posse de
abstractione facta per conceptionem intellectus possibilis
praesertim quoad universale proprii et accidentis.
Respondeo non esse parem rationem, ut patebit ex his quae
sectione sequenti dicemus.

Addo ergo ulterius, si proprie ac vere intelligatur
ratio et natura speciei intelligibilis, satis improprie dici
per hanc abstractionem fieri naturam universalem, quia iuxta
veram sententiam, species impressa neque est formalis imago
neque ullo modo formaliter repraesentat, sed effective
quatenus est veluti semen seu instrumentum obiecti ad
efficiendam formalem repraesentationem intentionalem, quae
fit per conceptum mentis. Unde natura non dicitur esse
proprie obiective repraesentata in specie impressa nisi
valde remote et mediate, quatenus illa species est effectiva
actus, cui natura illa obiicitur. Ac denique etsi demus
universale aliquo modo fieri per abstractionem intellectus
agentis, id solum erit in habitu seu in actu primo; ex quo
fit, multo magis ac perfectius fieri per actum secundum
proportionatum illi actui primo, ut supra argumentabar.
Omitto primam illam sententiam procedere ex falsa hypothesi;
simpliciter enim veirus est, Speciem impressam ab intellectu
agente non abstrahere a repraesentatione eiusdem individui
repraesentati in phantasmate sed solum a materialitate reali
et entitativa ipsius phantasmatis sine qua esse potest
repraesentatio eiusdem individui, quantumvis materialis;
hanc enim non repugnat esse aut fieri per formam seu
qualitatem aut entitatem spiritualem, ut in angelis et in
Deo ipso patet. Quod 31 non repugnat, nulla potest afferri
physica ratio ob quam non possit talis forma vel species ab
intellectu agente fieri; sine ratione autem id negandum non
est, cum hoc sit magis consentaneum et variis experimentis
et naturali ordini cognoscendi et fini et activitati
naturali ipsius intellectus agentis, qui ad hoc datur ut
media actione spirituali intellectum possibilem redat
similem repraesentationi phantasmatis, quantum potest, quod
latius hic persequi et probare, alienum esset a praesenti
instituto. quta hanc vero sententiam constat abstractionem
universalis nullo modo fieri ex necessitate ab intellectu
agente, immo et fortasse nullo modo fieri posse; nam, si
intellectus agens semel ponitur productivus specierum rerum

295

Having rejected the first opinion, Suarez now works
out his own position on the production of the universal and
the knowledge of the singular. He begins by pointing out
that the universal can be conceived by us in two ways-~l. as
something absolute in its being which is able to be the
foundation of a certain relationship. In this interpreta-
tion the universal would be like a Platonic form. 2. As a
being of reason pointing to an order among actually existing
beings. The first way leads to a kind of universal sub-
stance as if “man" the universal were subsisting separate
from every contraction of that universal. The people who
think of the universal as something real, consider the rela-
tionship between the universal and the individual as mini-
mal. Either there is not a sufficient distinction between
the individual and the nature to bring about a real relation
or the nature itself does not have sufficient being for
founding the relation, since it would not have singular be-
ing as such. One cannot, then, simply accept the universal

as something absolute in its being.19 This leads to the

 

singularium, verisimile est nunquam posse producere species
repraesentantes naturas abstractas a singularibus; sed de
hoc latius suo loco. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, pars. 6-7.

19Omissa ergo prima sententia, ut de aliis duabus
iudicemus advertendum est universale dupliciter posse a
nobis concipi vel denominari. Primo, ut quid absolutum
secundum esse, quod potest relationem aliquam fundare.
Secundo, ut relativum secundum esse dicens ordinem ad
inferiora. Primo modo intelligeretur substantia
universalis, si esset homo a parte rei subsistens separatus
ab omni contractione, iuxta platonicam opinionem; neque
esset universalis propter relationem realem secundum esse ad
inferiora, sed propter unitatem suam cum intrinseca et
substantiali aptitudine ad existendum in multis. Ad quem

 

 

 

 

‘

296
rejection of the second opinion of the way universals are
produced, for the Platonic interpretation of universality is
unacceptable. What Suarez does want to hold onto from this
opinion, however, is the notion that the intelligible spe-
cies is presented as a whole to the possible intellect.
That is, abstraction does not mean the intellect knows only

the universal but also the singular.

 

fere modum dicebant doctores citati sectione praecedenti
naturam in statu potentiali, quem habere fingitur ante
existentiam in individuis, habere universalitatem quamdam
quae non consistit in relatione secundum esse sed in
proprietate quadam absoluta naturae habentis talem unitatem
et communitatem; hoc solet vocari ab aliquibus universale
ante rem; quod si esset, absolutum esset; tamen revera
nullum est. Immo, et qui ponunt universale actu in ipsis
individuis realiter existens, quod vocant universale in re,
non ponunt universalitatem eius in relatione. Nam putant
universalitatem esse realem, relationem autem minime, quia
vel inter naturam et individua non est sufficiens distinctio
in re ad relationem realem; vel natura, ut praescindit ab
individuis, non habet sufficientem entitatem ad fundandam
relationem realem, cum non habeat ut sic entitatem
singularem in qua posit talis relatio fundari. Ponunt ergo
universalitatem hanc in proprietate absoluta, quae est
unitas quaedam et communitas talis naturae. Haec ergo
exempla, quamvis vera non sint, declarant tamen conceptum
universalis ut sic non esse conceptum rei relative secundum
esse, sed rei absolutae habentis modum talem essendi, in
quo habeat indifferentiam et aptitudinem essendi in multis.
Nec refert quod haec aptitudo videatur per modum respectus
explicari. Nam sicut in potentia reali intelligimus
respectum transcendentalem et secundum dici, priorem
reSpectu praedicamentali secundum esse et inclusum in re
absoluta, ita in praesenti possumus concipere hanc
aptitudinem rei universalis ut absolutam quidem in se, licet
explicetur per modum respectus transcendentalis. Et hinc
fit ulterius ut haec aptitudo, quia concipitur ad modum
potentiae habentis saltem transcendentalem ordinem ad ea
quibus potest se communicare, possit etiam intelligi ut
fundamentum sufficiens ad relationem vel habitudinem ad ea
quibus potest re communicare quae habitudo concipitur ut
quaedam relatio secundum esse, et dici etiam potest
universalitas quaedam, cum sit habitudo unius ad multa in
quibus esse potest vel de quibus potest praedicari. Disp.
Meta. VI, Sect. 6, par. 8.

 

'3

 

 

 

 

297

At this point Suarez turns to the third opinion on
the way universals are produced to show that production of
the universal comes through a comparison of various intelli-
gible species. This fits with the conception of the univer-
sal as a being of reason. In other words, the universal is
something relative in its being, simply pointing to an order
among singulars. The universal is of reason and occurs
through a certain action of the mind. The intellect knows
the whole intelligible species and by a certain comparison

among these species comes to a knowledge of the universal.20

 

20Universale igitur priori modo conceptum fit per
directam operationem intellectus, quae praecise et abstracte
concipit naturam communem absque differentiis contra-
hentibus; quod satis probant rationes factae in secunda
opinione. Et confirmari potest evertendo fundamentum
Opinionis tertiae; quia non est de ratione universalis
relatio aliqua secundum esse; ergo, quamvis in natura sic
abstracta non intelligatur aliqua relatio secundum esse ad
inferiora, potest intelligi actu universalis. Patet con-
sequentia, quia si illa relatio non est necessaria, nihil
aliud deesse potest, quia ibi est natura communis et ad
modum subsistentia abstracte ab individuis. Unde ita se
habet in eo statu per intellectum, sicut se haberet reali-
ter, 31 a parte rei subsisteret extra individua; sed tunc
esset realiter universalis; ergo et nunc est intellec-
tualiter universalis, ut sic dicam. Tandem in natura sic
concepta est nova unitas rationis quia habet unum conceptum
obiectivum indivisibilem in plures similes; habet etiam
communitatem seu aptitudinem ut insit multis et de iis
praedicetur; ergo nihil illi deest ad rationem universalis.

At vero loquendo de relatione universalitatis prout
a nobis concipitur ad modum relationis secundum esse, haec
non potest resultare per solam abstractionem sed eo modo quo
est, fit per comparationem, quia, ut suppono haec relatio
non est realis sed rationis; ergo non est in natura ipsa dum
absolute et abstracte cogitatur, quia ex vi illius actionis,
illa non refertur per intellectum quia intellectus nondum
comparat illam ad sua inferiora, neque etiam refertur
realiter; ergo nondum est talis relatio. Et hoc satis etiam
probant rationes adductae in tertia sententia. Quocirca, si
illae duae opiniones unum affirment et aliud non excludant,
non sunt inter se contrariae neque unius rationes contra
aliam procedunt. Quia nihil obstat quod eidem naturae

298

Suarez now explains the way in which this comparison
takes place. There are two possible manners for comparison.
First, a common nature can be abstracted by means of cutting
away the nature from a single being of a given kind. This
can take place apart from any comparison either of the
higher concept to some lower ones or of the comparison of
lower ones among themselves: for example, when I cut away
from Peter alone all of his individual properties and rest
only on a consideration of human nature. Some would say
this is not genuine universal knowledge because there is
only one individual involved. It is, however, Suarez main-
tains true universal knowledge in that the abstraction takes
place from a direct knowledge of a total intelligible spe-
cies. The universal knowledge here is limited, however, in
that it does not suffice for a realization of the superior-
ity of the universal over the individual. Secondly, the

common nature can be abstracted by means of a comparison of

 

possit per intellectum convenire duplex ratio
universalitatis, absoluta, scilicet, at respective, et quod
illae per diversas operationes intellectus fabricentur, et
quod una, scilicet, quae absoluta est, sit proximum
fundamentum alterius, scilicet, relativae. Neque etiam
repugnat aliquid convenire naturae per intellectum et esse
per modum absoluti, quando illud huiusmodi est ut solum per
extrinsecam denominationem conveniat; sic enim naturam esse
abstractam seu universaliter conceptam non addit naturae
nisi esse quoddam conveniens illi per extrinsecam
denominationem; quod esse obiectivam appellatur. Sicut esse
visum vel esse cognitum non est aliquod esse reale additum
rebus, nec formaliter consistit in relatione rationis, sed
in denominatione proveniente ab actu videndi vel
cognoscendi, super quam potest intellectus fabricare
relationem rationis, si unum cum altero conferat; ita ergo
est in praesenti. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, pars. 9-10.

 

”on;

299

singulars or similar kinds of beings among themselves, as
when comparing Peter and Paul a person knows they are alike
in their human nature. This comparison demands the initial
type of cutting away described above for it SUpposes that
such a nature can be known of both singulars. But this
second means of comparison presupposes such a nature as
separated from singular individuals. This comparison only
adds a knowledge of the similarity of many lower beings in
an abstract nature. This comparison as such does not per-
tain to the constitution of the universals themselves as
real beings but to the consideration of a certain relation

existing among many particulars.21

 

21Sed adhuc superest circa has opiniones eXplicandum
qualis sit haec cognitio praecisiva vel comparativa, per
quam fit universale utroque modo dictum. Variis enim modis
potest universalis natura praescindi vel comparari. Primo
enim abstrahi potest natura communis per puram praecisionem
naturae ab uno inferiori absque ulla compartione vel supe-
rioris conceptus ad aliquem inferiorem vel ipsorum infe-
riorum inter se, ut quando a solo Petro simpliciter praes-
cindo individuantes proprietates et sisto in humanae naturae
consideratione. Et per hanc notitiam pure praecisivam
putant aliqui nullum universale fieri. Verius tamen est per
eam etiam fieri universale absolutum, iuxta ea quae de
secunda opinione diximus. Nam hoc etiam probant rationes
factae; quamquam haec notitia non sufficiat ad cognoscendam
in natura sic concepta universalitatem seu superioritatem
quam habet, ut iam dicam.

Secundo abstrahi potest natura communis per compara-
tionem singularium seu inferiorum inter se, ut quando con—
ferendo Petrum cum Paulo cognosco eos esse inter se similes
in natura humana. Quae comparatio supponit priorem praeci-
sionem, nam supponit de utroque singulari cognosici esse
talis naturae; unde supponit conceptum talis naturae ut
praescinditur a singulis individuis. Unde per hanc compar-
tionem solum additur cognitio convenientiae et similitudinis
plurium inferiorum in tali abstracte ac praecisa natura.
Haec autem comparatio ulterius potest subdistingui, quatenus
per eam considerari potest vel sola habitudo particularium
inter se ut inter se habent habitudinem similium, et haec
comparatio ut sic non pertinet ad constitutionem universalis

 

 

 

'5.”

 

 

 

 

300

After the intellect apprehends that Peter and Paul
are alike in their being as men, it considers the predicate
"man" to apply to both Peter and Paul as something common to
singulars. In this comparison rests the totality of the in-
telligibility of "man," for through this operation there
arises in the mind the capacity for seeing one common thing
in many individuals.22

Once Suarez allows the intellect to have direct
knowledge of the singular the hope for achieving a unity of
operation in knowledge is lost. In rejecting the first po-
sition on the production of the universal he blurs the dis-
‘tinction between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge.
The blurring of itself is not terribly dangerous but what
Suarez does with it destroys any hope of unity of operation

for the human being. The senses produce phantasms which of

their very nature are singular and material; this is the

 

sed ad considerationem cuiusdem relationis mutuae inter ipsa
particularia. Vel quatenus per eam consideratur habitudo
naturae communis ad particularia in quibus existit. Disp.
Meta. VI, Sect. 6, pars. 11-12.

22Postquam enim intellectus apprehendit Petrum et
Paulum esse similes in esse hominis, rursus considerat hoc
praedicatum homo habere se ad Petrum et Paulum ut quid
commune ad particularia; et in hac comparatione videtur
consummari ratio universalis, etiam respectivi; per eam
enim consurgit in mente, vel potius in re menti obiecta,
habitudo rationis unius rei communis ad plura. Ultra vero
intelligi potest alia notitia magis reflexa, quam intel-
lectus facit cognoscendo guisi in actu signato naturam sic
abstractam et cum suis in erioribus collatam, inde habere
denominationes generis, speciei et similes, hasque
denominationes esse rationis, non rei. Haec autem cognitio
iam non est fabricatio universalitatis, sed est quaedam
eius contemplatio magis formalis et eXpressa. Disp. Meta.
VI, Sect. 6, par. 12.

L‘-‘-J

 

 

 

 

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301
unique contribution of the senses. The intellect produces
the intelligible species which in Suarez is also singular
but immaterial. He gives no explanation of how one gets
from phantasm to intelligible species. It is only on the
level of intelligible species that the necessary comparison
takes place in order that the intellect can produce a uni-
versal; the intelligible species is of itself singular.
What has happened here is that Suarez has destroyed the
unique contribution of the senses to human knowledge. The
intelligible species have to be produced from some sort of
direct knowledge which is non-sensate in its origin. If it
is sensate in origin the intelligible Species is nothing
more than a phantasm and Suarez clearly thinks of it as
superior to a mere phantasm.

The result of this investigation into the operation
of knowing is that Suarez cannot establish genuine unity of
Operation between the soul and the body. His analysis of
sense knowledge although incomplete in the Disputationes, is
concerned only with the relationship of the senses to each
other and with detailing the hierarchy of the senses. The
senses know only the singular material things. The intel-
lect in traditional scholastic philosophy, especially
Thomism, does not know the singular directly but only the
universal. The Thomistic position would by these means
attempt to derive a continuity in knowledge. Suarez as has
been seen rejects this position in favor of a direct intel-

lectual knowledge of the singular. But, if the intellect

 

 

 

302
can directly know the singular then there is no need for
the contribution of the body (i.e., sense knowledge) and

the unity of operation in the knowing system is destroyed.

Suarez' attitude toward knowledge, then is dualistic and
only enhances the dualism of body and soul. It does not

destroy it.

Willing in a Dualistic Context

In the previous sections of this chapter it has been
shown that Suarez cannot establish a continuity between
sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. The consequence
of this was to destroy the argument from unity of operation
as a means of establishing the peg §g_unity of man. A simi-
lar situation occurs with respect to the appetitive system
in the human being.23 In Chapter V it was noted that once
the soul is separated from the body it can no longer move
other bodies. The question arose at that point, what allows
the soul to move any body at all? That is, it is easy
enough to see that if the soul is united to its body by sub-
stantial union it can move other bodies using its own as an

intermediary. It is precisely the substantial union of body

 

23As with knowledge the system of appetites is con-
ceived of as a series of operative potencies or capacities
to accomplish certain operations. The system of appetites,
however, is not as complex as the system of knowledge. As
with knowledge there are two levels of appetition of concern
here. The sense appetites which are further divided into
concupiscible and the irascible are material powers. The
rational appetite or the will is an immaterial power.

3..

 

 

 

303

and soul, however, that is the problem.2[+ Put very di-
rectly, what allows an immaterial principle to move a ma-
terial principle? Once again a continuity between the two
principles must be established.

Unlike the treatment of the cognitive system, in
which the terminology is endowed with a generally accepted
meaning, the terms used in the treatment of appetite are
somewhat special to Suarez. It is necessary first to detail
the vocabulary to be used; this will give a clue as to where
the continuity if any in the appetitive system lies. The
question of different kinds of appetites arises initially in
Disputation I, Section 6, paragraphs 3 to 5. In this sec-
tion Suarez explains what Aristotle means in Book 1, Chapter

I of the Metaphysics by the phrase, "All men by nature de-

 

sire to know." It is an analysis of the term "desire" that
prompts the discussion of appetite. Implied in the analysis
is the opinion that "desiring" or "tending" is the domain of
a system of operations separate from but parallel to the
cognitive system.

Initially, when one talks of "having an appetite" or
of "desiring" one can presuppose the common distinction be-
tween "innate appetites" and "elicited appetites." The "in-
nate appetites" are only improperly and metaphorically
called appetites. The reason for this is that they are

nothing other than the natural propensity each thing has

 

Zth. Chapter V for a further explanation of the
problem with the soul moving any body whatsoever.

30h

toward something good. In a passive power this is the
natural capacity of the power to be able to accomplish its
purpose. One can say, for example, that a person has an
innate appetite to see. In active powers, however, the in-
nate appetite is the natural faculty for acting. That is,
a living being has a natural faculty for nourishment. The
important thing here is that in innate appetites, the appe-
tite does not add anything beyond the very nature of the be-
ing in question. In a word, an "innate appetite" is nothing
more than the tendency a thing has to operate in a certain
way because it is a definite kind of thing.25

The "elicited appetite" is properly speaking an ap-
petite, because it tends to the good precisely as good.
This appetite tends by means of a proper act as opposed to
an "automatic act" as in the innate appetite. There are two

aspects to the elicited appetite-~the faculty and the appe-

tition itself. With respect to appetitive faculties there

 

2SCirca quod imprimis sensum Aristotelis exponere
oportet, deinde propositionis veritatem. Tres ergo termini
in illa propositione declarandi sunt; prior est appetere vel
desiderare. Circa quem supponenda est primo vulgaris
distinctio duplicis appetitus innati et elicitivi. Prior
imprOprie ac metaphorice dictus est appetitus; proprie vero
nihil aliud est quam naturalis propensio quam unaquaeque res
habet in aliquod bounum, quae inclinatio in potentiis
passivis nihil aliud est quam naturalis capacitas et
proportio cum sua perfectione, in activis vero est ipsa
naturalis facultas agendi. Itaque in his ominibus appetitus
non addit aliquid ultra ipsam rei naturam, vel proximam
facultatem, ratione cuius convenit rei talis appetitus.
Neque in hoc appetitu distingui potest actus primus et
secundus, quia hoc modo appetere non est agere aliquid, sed
solum habere innatam talem propensionem, qualem habet
gravitas ad centrum, etiamsi nihil agat. Disp. Meta. I,
Sect. 6, par. 3.

 

 

305

are two of them, sense appetite and rational appetite (i.e.,
the will). If one considers these two faculties in them-
selves there is one understanding in which they too may be
called innate because they are given with a nature and have
a natural tendency to their object and to their act. But
these faculties are to be distinguished from the type of in-
nate appetite spoken of earlier since sense appetites and
will tend to the good formally and in so far as it is good.
The second aspect of elicited appetite is the act of appeti-
tion. This is nothing other than the operation of the elic-
ited appetite, which loves or desires a good. This appetite
is never innate in human beings. That is, neither on the
sensate nor on the rational level does a human being tend by
an innate capacity to the good as good.26

This set of definitions helps to locate where the

continuity between appetites must be placed. One cannot

find the requisite continuity in the innate appetites

 

 

26Appetitus elicitivus est proprie appetitus quia
fertur in bonum ut bonum, illudque per proprium actum potest
appetere. Unde duo sunt in hoc appetitu (loquimur in
creaturis): unum est facultas appetendi, aliud appetitio
ipsa. Primum retinuit iam nomen appetitus, qui in
sensitivum et rationalem dividitur; et hic appetitus ut sic,
etiam est innatus, si generatim de innato loquamur, quia cum
ipsa natura datus est, et habet naturalem propensionem ad
suum obiectum et ad suum actum. Quia vero ita est innatus
ut sit etiam elicitivus actualis appetitionis, qua tendit in
bonum formaliter, et quatenus bonum est, atque ita sit
propiissime appetitus, ideo condistinguitur ab appetitu pure
innato et metaphorico; sic enim prior divisio accipienda
est. Secundum, id est, actus appetendi, qui proprie dicitur
appetitio, vel appetitus elicitus, nihil aliud est quam
actus elicitus ab appetitu eliciente, quod amat vel
desiderat bonum; et hic appetitus nunquam est innatus saltem
in nobis, de quibus in praesenti agimus; interdum vero est
naturalis, ut inferius ex professo magis declarabo. Disp.
Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 3.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

306
because they are quasi-automatic and are taken care of
solely on the physical level. If Suarez is going to have
a continuity of the appetitive system he must find it in the
elicited appetites prOperly called, that is in the act of
appetition by which a person actively pursues the good. For
example, the good of physical health is sought by a person
and issues in the positive physical action of consuming only
nutritious foods. What must occur in this case is an action
of the will as seeking a general good and then the particu-
lar action of eating only good foods. The emphasis here is
on the process from tendency to a general good to a precise
physical action. This, of course, in the scholastic ap-
proach, implies an underlying power or capacity. Therefore,
the will which is the faculty of the general good must be
continuous with the sense appetites which tend toward par-
ticular goods. But the will is a rational, immaterial power
and the sense appetites are physical powers.

Lest one think that the elicited appetite is somehow
beyond the nature of the human, Suarez next details the
various ways in which appetite can be considered "natural"
but not "innate." An appetite can be called natural simply
because it has been given by nature, but the effect of such
an appetite is not caused through a proper action of the
person himself. That is, the effect is given rather than
determined by the person. For example, there is a natural
appetite of the eye to see; it is not determined by an act

of the person's will what the function of the eye is to be.

 

l
.3

 

 

307
In this way every innate appetite is natural. Sometimes,
however, an appetite is called "natural" when it occurs
necessarily from an intrinsic tendency of the nature. Al-
though absolutely speaking and in itself this appetite is
not given by the nature but occurs on account of elicited
appetite strictly so called. This occurs as natural in
people when they are hungry or thirsty and lack food or
drink. The result is an elicited appetite (i.e., an act of
appetition) of searching for food; this kind of appetition
is natural to man, and the sense appetites are the proper
faculties of this tending. The will, however, in its act
is a different case because while it is a natural appetite
in man it is not always natural because it is also free.
The situation can be explained by the ability of the will
to delay the acquisition of an immediate good for a more
significant good at a later date. Finally, sometimes
"natural" is opposed to "violent;" this means only that the
natural is in accord with nature while violent means in dis-

harmony with the nature of the being.27 The importance of

 

27Alter igitur terminus eXponendus erat naturaliter;
appetitus enim naturalis multipliciter dicitur; interdum
enim naturale dicitur, quod ab ipsa natura datum est, neque
est effectum per propriam ipsius hominis, verbi gratia,
actionem seu effectionem. Et hoc modo omnis appetitus
innatus naturalis est, et ipse etiam appetitus elicitivus;
non tamen appetitus seu actus elicitus, ut ex data
terminorum expositione satis constat. Aliquando vero
dicitur naturale, quod necessario fit ex intrinseca
propensione naturae, etiamsi absolute et in se non sit a
nature datum, sed ab appetente factum; et hoc modo est
homini naturalis appetitus qui est fames aut sitis, quando
deficit cibus aut potus; qua ratione appetitus elicitus
naturalis esse potest, et in appetitu sensitivo ex se semper

 

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308

this discussion of natural appetite is the fact that Suarez
feels that all appetites are "natural" to the human being up
to and including some aspects of willing. With the elicited
appetite of the will (i.e., the act of the will), however,
there are times because of its freedom when it chooses be-
yond a natural propensity. What this means to do is set the
will beyond the sense appetites in some of its acts.

Having outlined the differences between innate and
elicited appetite, and having detailed the meaning of "nat-
ural" when speaking of appetite, Suarez now turns to the
type of necessity proper to appetition. One can speak of
necessity in two ways--with respect to the exercise of the
appetite and with reSpect to the specification of the appe-
tite. Necessity with respect to the exercise of the appe-
tite occurs when an appetite elicits or exercises the act of
appetition on account of some definite need. This kind of

necessity is found in the sense appetites, but cannot be

 

talis est; in voluntate vero licet interdum talis appetitus
sit naturalis, non tamen semper, quia libera est. Omitto
interdum sumi naturale ut a supernaturali distinguitur, quo
sensu apud naturales philosophos, seu procedendo ex solo
lumine naturae, ut nunc loquimur, omnis appetitus naturalis
est, nam supernaturalis appetendi modus, qui per gratiam
fit, non potest naturali ratione investigari. Aliquando
etiam sumitur naturale ut violento opponitur, ut est
frequens in philosophia. Atque his etiam duobus modis
appetitus elicitus, etiam si liber sit, naturalis tamen esse
potest, ut per se constat. Immo interdum dicitur naturalis
appetitus elicitus, hoc ipso quod est naturae consentaneus,
et opponitur ei, quod est praeternaturale tamquam naturae
dissonum, etiam si violentum non sit; quo modo appetitus
virtutis naturalis est, vitii autem minime. Quo tandem fit
ut multo magis naturalis dicatur appetitus ille ad quem ipsa
naturae propensio necessitatem infert; et ideo appetitus
necessarius, tanetsi elicitus, naturalis merito vocari
potest. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. A.

 

IF H‘IA.‘ ;

We

 

 

a?!

309

found in the rational appetite in this life, but only in

the life of the blessed. The reason is that sense appetites
deal with particular goods; the will may deal with an abso-
lute good. One does not, however, find an absolute good in
the present life. With respect to specification, one finds
that the will does not exercise its act of appetition from
necessity; but if it should exercise its act in this way, it
would do so necessarily. Such an act is called necessary
with respect to specification not with respect to exercise.

Lack of necessity of specification, then, is a distinguish-

 

ing mark of the will. The sense appetites are necessitated
both in exercise and in specification. The will is neces-
sitated only once its act is specified freely.

At this point the sense appetites and the will ap-
pear to be very distinct powers with almost no relationship
to each other than the fact that both are appetites. In
order to establish a continuity Suarez must show that these
appetites are elicited, natural and necessitated in the same
way. But to do this either turns the will into a sophisti-
cated sense appetite or spiritualizes the sense appetites in
such a way that they are superfluous in the sense that the
will could accomplish their job by itself.28

Just as universal knowledge is a distinguishing

 

28A similar situation occurs with respect to the in-
tellect/sense relationship on the cognitive side. That is,
the intellect's ability to know the singular directly obvi-
ates any real need for the unique contribution of the
senses.

310
characteristic of a spiritual substance, so only a rational
agent is capable of freedom. It is Suarez' contention that
everything lacking reason also lacks freedom by reason of
imperfection in being. The contrary is also true, that
every rational or intellectual agent is also a free agent.
This is shown by the fact that human beings are free agents,
if one is willing to grant that they are the lowest grade of
intellectual substances. Therefore, one can say that every

29

created agent which has an intellect also has freedom.

 

29In tertia et quarta ratione dubitandi, sect. 2
propositis, petitur ut distinctius declaremus quaenam sint
causae creatae quae in agendo non subduntur necessitati, et
per quam facultatem hoc dominium habeant. Et quidem de
causis principalibus seu operantibus ut quod, facilius est
resolutio ex dictis; ostendimus enim res omnes ratione
carentes carere etiam libertate ob imperfectionem suam. Quo
fit ut e contrario omnia agentia rationalia seu
intellectualia sint etiam agentia libera; nam illa negatio
usus rationis est sufficiens et adaequata ratio carentiae
libertatis; ergo opposita affirmatio est etiam adaequata
ratio oppositae affirmationis. Et confirmatur; nam ostensum
est in particulari hominem esse agens liberum, licet in
gradu intellectuali sit infimum omnium; ergo a fortiori
dicendum est omnia agentia creata quae intellectum habent
habere etiam libertatem. Quod iterum de intelligentiis
creatis in particulari dicemus infra de eis disputantes.
Neque contra hoc obstat argumentum sumptum ex motibus aut
influentiis caelorum. Nam quod attinet ad intelligentias
motrices caelorum, etsi in aliis rebus liberae sint, possunt
in movendis caelis necesSitate aliqua duci, vel ex motione
et imperio superioris agentis vel ex fine praeconcepto, quem
immutabiliter diligunt atque intendunt. Quod vero ad
influentiam caelorum attinet, dicendum est illam non extendi
directe ac per se ad res spirituales et immateriales, tum
quia solum influunt per physicam motum, cuius res
spiritualis incapax est, tum etiam quia res spiritualis est
ordinis superioris, et ideo in eam directe agere non potest
res materiales. Animi autem hominum in se immateriales sunt
et libertatem habent quatenus immateriales sunt et per imma-
terialem potentiam operantur, et ideo influentia caelorum
non potest libertatis usum hominibus impedire, etiamsi
indirecte medio corpore et affectibus eius possit illos in
alterutram partem magis aut minus inclinare, quam

 

 

311
This is a type of argument which is quite common in scholas-
ticism. One goes from the attributes of the lower grade to
higher grades of being. The present concern is how to prove
that man is free.

Suarez, in Disputation XIX, Section 2, gives two
proofs that human beings are free. He tells the reader that
it is evident by natural reason and by experience that
humans do not act from necessity in many of their acts, but
rather from their own will and from freedom. This conclu-
sion, he says, is proven first from the common consensus of

philosophers.3O More importantly, however, he offers a

 

inclinationem potest homo sua libertate superare et astris
dominari.

Spiritualis substantia liberae actionis radicale
principium.--Ex quo ulterius constat principium principale
quo liberae actionis semper esse substantiam aliqum seu
substantialem formam spiritualem. Probatur quia huiusmodi
principium vel est anima rationalis vel aliqua superior
substantia; sed anima rationalis est immaterialis, et multo
magis omnis superior substantia: ergo. Et confirmatur, nam
omnis forma materialis, quatenus talis est, operatur absque
intelligentia et ratione, et ideo operatur modo mere
naturali; ergo forma quae est principium liberae actionis
esse debet spiritualis. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 5, pars.
1-2.

 

 

30This is an argument from authority and conse-
quently is very weak philosophically. Suarez' text follows:

Secundo dicendum est omnes causas quae operantur
absque usus rationis, quatenus tales sunt, operari cum
praedicta necessitate. Hoc sumitur ex Aristotele, lib. IX
Metaph., c. 2, ubi hoc discrimen constituit inter potentias
rationales et irrationales, quod potentiae irrationales sunt
determinatae ad unum, rationales vero sunt indifferentes ad
opposita. Quid vero intelligat per potentias rationales, et
an omnibus conveniat ille operandi modus, infra videbimus;
nunc solum asserimus factultates omnes quae rationis usu
omnino carent naturali necessitate suas operationes
exercere. Quod etiam inductione confirmare potest; ita enim
experimento constat in omnibus rerum gradibus usque ad bruta
animalia. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 1, par. 12.

 

 

312

proof from experience. We realize that it is in our power
to do something or to omit something. In order to decide we
use reason, argumentation and consultation so that we may be
inclined to one or the other action. There is, therefore,
an election of choice posed to us. This power of delibera-
tion and consultation would be superfluous if people did not
have freedom. For, it happens that the usual manner of
governing human actions is through counsel, laws, precepts,
exhortations, threats of punishment, and admonitions. All
of these would be useless if man were necessitated by nature
and did not operate freely.31

These arguments lead Suarez to the general proposi-

tion that a spiritual substance is the radical principle of

a free act. A spiritual substance must either be a rational

 

31Solum posset de appetitu sensitivo hominis
dubitari, cui aliqui tribuunt nescio quod libertatis
vestigium. Immo sunt qui id extendant ad appetitum
brutorum, ut inferius iterum attingemus. Sed in ea re, quae
in theologia latius disputatur, veritas est, si quod est
participium libertatis in appetitu sensitivo hominis, in
tantum esse in quantum est participium rationis in
cogitativa hominis. Quod si in hac non est vera
ratiocinatio, ut revera non est, neque in illo per se sumpto
est vera libertas quae excludat necessitatem operandi
positis omnibus requisitis. Et ita hoc exemplo potius
confirmatur et quasi consummatur inductio facta. Ratio
autem eius est quia adaequate radix libertatis est usus
rationis ut infra videbimus, et ideo carentia usus rationis
est etiam adaequate causa carentiae libertatis, et
consequenter necessitatis in operando. Quod si intrinsecam
et quasi positivam radicem huius modi operandi inquiramus,
nulla est alia nisi ipsa natura talium rerum vel facultatem,
quae ex natura sua habent hanc determinationem in modo
operandi, eo quod non sint adeo perfectae ut participare
possint dominium suarum operationum. Item quia
indifferentia in operando intrinsece et adaequate oritur ex
amplitudine rationalis facultatis ut infra declarabimus;
sicut autem affirmatio est causa affirmationis, ita negatio
negationis. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 1, par. 13.

 

313
soul or some higher substance (e.g., an angel or God).
Since the rational soul is immaterial any higher substance
can be assumed to be immaterial and free. This is proven
from the fact that every material form in so far as it is
material operates apart from intelligence and reason.
That is, it operates in a merely natural manner (i.e.,
all of its operations are determined). A form which is
going to be a principle of free action ought to be spir-
itual.32

Suarez, as has been seen over and over in this

 

study, places a gap between the spiritual and the material
in such a way that there is no means to bridge the two.
In this instance to maintain freedom on the human level,
he places it in the rational soul, a spiritual substance.
But, there is no eXplanation how this freely choosing
Spiritual substance influences a material body. This
material body is governed by completely determined opera-
tions.33
Holding onto the dictum that the proximate princi-
ple of a free act is some power of a spiritual substance
in so far as it is spiritual or intellectual, Suarez adds
that in the human soul which has multiple faculties many

of them are material because they are not appropriate to

the soul as intellectual (i.e., senses, nutritive faculty

 

32Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 5, par. 2. Cf. footnote 29
of this chapter for the Suarezian text.

33Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 1, par. 12.

31h
).3h

and sense appetites This is an amazing assertion. How

can a spiritual substance have material faculties? The

dualism makes its presence felt at this point. There is no

way given the uniqueness of the human soul as seen in Chap-

ter V, that Suarez can consistently make this statement. He

made the practical implications of the dualism less severe :—
in the system of knowledge by allowing direct knowledge of
the singular by the intellectual power, but he did not talk

about a spiritual substance having material faculties. 0n

the appetitive side, though, he is talking about a spiritual

 

power influencing a material principle and the only way this
can work is if all human powers belong to the soul, even the
material ones. But, then there is no need for a personal
body, or organs, or any other union with matter.

Suarez feels he can solve this problem of how the
act of the will issues in physical action. He does this by
distinguishing within the soul two kinds of acts-~elicited
and commanded. An elicited act of the will is the will's
actual initiating of an action; the emphasis is on the be-
ginning of the action. A commanded act of the will is the
will's ability to act as an agent, the emphasis is on the

efficient causality. An elicited act is closest to the

 

3I‘Tertio, hinc etiam constat principium proximum
actionis liberae esse potentiam aliquam substantiae
spiritualis quatenus spiritualis seu intellectualis est.
Quod addo propter animam humanam, quae, licet plures habeat
facultates, multae tamen earum materiales sunt, quia non
conveniunt illi quatenus intellectualis est et ideo non sunt
principium proximum liberae actionis. Disp. Meta. XIX,
Sect. 5, par. 3.

 

Ia. .r.

25..

a .m—

 

 

315
prer'which brings about efficient action. The commanded
act is removed from the power. That is, the will has the
ability to set itself into motion and can also set the lower
powers into motion by means of commanded acts.35 In human
beings the operation would function as follows: the will
elicits an act (e.g., move your hand from the heat!); this
act is relayed by means of a commanded act to the sense ap-
petite which brings about the required physical action
(e.g., the actual moving of the hand from the heat). This
scheme would work except for two problems--1. the spiritual
substance cannot have genuinely material powers even though
Suarez says it is possible, and 2, even if one grant that
it could have such powers the problem still remains concern-

ing how these powers are related to the body.

 

3SSolum est animadvertendum dupliciter actionem
aliquam denominari liberam, scilicet, ut actum elicitum seu
proxime in ordine ad potentiam efficientem actionem, quomodo
ipsum velle liberum est, vel ut actum imperatum seu remote
in ordine ad potentiam moventem seu applicantem inferiorem
facultatem ad agendum, quomodo ambulare est liberum. Cum
ergo agimus proximo principio actionis liberae, intel-
ligendum est de actione proprie libera in ordine ad suum
immediatum principium, et hoc modo dicimus principium
proximum actionis liberae esse facultatem spiritualem; nam
principium proximum actionis quae solum imperative libera
est interdum esse potest facultas materialis ut est potentia
motiva secundum locum residens in membris corporis, quia
illa esse potest subordinate superiori substantiae
spirituali, in qua est propria vis dominativa in suum actum
et mediante illo in inferiorem potentiam et actionem eius.
Unde etiam dici potest quod, licet actio imperative libera,
physice et secundum suum entitatem proxime fiat ab alia
potentia, denominationem autem libertatis non habet nisi a
superiori potentia medio actu eius; illa ergo potentia quae
principium proximum est actus per se ac immediate liberi
spiritualis esse debet at per se spectans ad intellectualem
gradum, quatenus talis est. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 5,
par. 3.

 

 

316

It is well at this point to look at the appetitive
faculties themselves. Beginning with the sense appetites
Suarez asks whether these powers act necessarily or freely
in the human being. It has already been shown that the root
of freedom is the use of reason and that in so far as a be-
ing lacks reason it also lacks freedom and consequently is r*'
necessitated in its Operations. If the sense appetites are

to be even minimally free in their operation they must some-

how participate in reason. Suarez shows that the only way

 

these appetites could share in reason is through a relation-

36

ship with the cogitative sense interpreted as a rational
faculty. But, it cannot be the case that the cogitative
sense is rational in any way. This means that the sense ap-
petites are necessitated in man. This necessity, Suarez
claims, arises not only out of the intrinsic nature of the
faculty itself (i.e., as a non rational power) but also from
the fact that the sense appetites cannot of themselves alter
other natural causes by means of their operations. Rather,

it is the will which through the power of command can con-

trol the natural causes.37 In essence this means that the

 

36There are four interior senses in scholastic phi-
losophy. The highest and most sophisticated of these is the
estimative sense. In animals this sense takes care of what
one would call instinct. In man this sense is called the
cogitative sense and is sometimes thought of as a quasi-
rational power that takes care of the particular needs of
the human being as opposed to the universal knowledge pro-
vided by the intellect. Suarez denies any rational capacity
to the cogitative sense.

37Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 1, pars. l3-1h.

 

 

 

 

317
sense appetites are separate powers from the rational powers
and this is as it should be. Or, if one talks of necessity
one must say that these powers are necessitated both in exe-
cution and specification. That is, they have particular Ob-
jects and always operate in a determinate way. But, since
they are necessitated, they are material powers and follow
the laws Of matter. Once again the problem of the relation-
ship of matter and spirit arises; or in the present context
how does the power of command as an act of the will influ-
ence the body? The only solution seems to be a type of
Platonism in which the soul is the mover of the body.
Suarez, however, does not want this solution as has been
shown time and again.

The rational faculty of will, Suarez maintains is
free. The ultimate eXplanation for this freedom lies in the
fact that it is related to the use of reason, but a descrip-
tion of the faculty itself yields two other facts. The will
is an active power and from its own internal structure has
the capacity to exercise or suspend its own action. Then,
this power while it is exercising its act, can be so dis-
posed and proximately prepared for a work, that it can

either act or not act.38 In order to understand the will as

 

38Ut ergo difficultatibus propositis satisfaciamus,
retinenda imprimis et explicanda est illa descriptio
facultatis liberae, in qua duo postulantur. Unum est quOd
illa sit potentia activa, ex se et ex sua interna facultate
habens vim ad exercendum et suspendenduam actionem suam.
Aliud est quod illa facultas, dum exercet actum, ita sit
disposita et proxime (ut ita dicam) preparata ad Opus ut,
positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, possit agere et non
agere. DiSp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 4, par. 8.

 

 

 

 

318

an active faculty one must turn once again to the notion Of
"elicited appetite." The elicited appetite is self-acti-

vating and not dependent on the presence of a proper Object
tO operate. That is, as an elicited appetite the will can
go out and seek its object whereas a passive power such as

sight must depend on the actual previous presence of its Ob- rm.
ject in order to operate. This is very important because it
is the notion of the will as an active power that permits it
to initiate activity both in itself and in the body, and it

is this ability which is another basis of freedom.

 

-—— -_‘_« A—
v I

In such a free potency one can separate the faculty
into two parts. The one part is for willing or exercising
its act; the other part is for denying or suspending action.
The latter part, even though in itself it manifests a cer-
tain perfection, nevertheless in its use the act Of such a
faculty is exercised only through denial or lack. But,
there is a genuinely positive aspect to denial in that this
kind of appetition must be exercised by a positive act Of
denial. For example, in love either direction or change to
another Object would be most difficult without a positive
act. Simple suspension Of the will would not work in this

39

C886.

 

39Unde, claritatis gratia, possumus in potentia
libera duas potentias praescindere, seu quasi duas partes
unius potentiae. Unus est ad volendum seu exercendum actum;
alia ad nolendum seu suspendendam actionem. Haec enim
posterior pars huius potestatis, licet in se positiva
quaedam perfectio sit, tamen in usu per solam negationem seu
carentiam actus talis facultatis exerceri potest, si de
absoluta eius potestate loquamur, ut sumitur ex S. Thoma,
I-II, q. 6, a. 3, et aliis theologis ibi, quia non velle ut

'1'“H

 

 

 

 

319

The positive aspect Of denial or lack gives Suarez

 

an Opportunity to eXplain the indifference of the will. In-
difference is precisely freedom with respect to the exercise
of the will. That is, the will is indifferent in its exer-
cise to an act or to avoiding an act. Since this free fac-
ulty is so perfect and spiritual it is able to reflect upon .ii.
itself and on its motions. This means that as Often as it

is not able to exercise some act freely, it can through an-

other positive act desire not to exercise the first act. In

this way there never is liberty with respect to exercise

I .
1

without some liberty of specification. As often as the will
is able freely not to love it is able also to elicit some
act according to its own intelligibility and species which
is repugnant to love and in this the will is in some indif-
ference with respect to the specification of act.

This double aspect of the will as an active power
shows that the will even in its denial of an action works
positively both in exercise and specification of an action.

The disposition of the will, or proximate prepara-

tion, for acting or not acting outlines not only the

 

sic, potest esse liberum, non velle autem praecise sumptum
non includit actum, sed carentiam actus, quae si sit cum
perfecta advertentia rationis et plena potestate volendi,
libera erit. Dico autem si de absoluta potestae loquamur,
quia moraliter seu ordinarie huiusmodi carentia
appetitionis non exercetur absque positivo actu qui sit vel
nolitio qua refutatur obiectum propositum aut alius actus
circa illud, verbi gratia, amor vel intentio eius, vel sit
conversio ad aliud obiectum repugnans aut diversum, ut
experientia satis constat; quia difficillimum esset,
existente perfecta et practica advertentia rationis, omnem
actum voluntatis suspendere. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. A,
par. 8.

"i’ “-

 

 

320
intelligibility of a free faculty but also the conditions
necessary for a free act. Two things are said to be re-
quired for such an act--the prerequisites of the act (i.e.,
what is necessary prior to the act) and the essential or in-
trinsic components Of the act itself. With respect to the
prerequisites one can say that the will must be so disposed
that it can either act or not act. This does not mean that
the will is merely incapable of acting but positively has
the power of not acting. An example of contrast is helpful
here. When the will lacks some act on account of some de-
fect in knowledge, that lack is not from the power Of not
acting (as would be the case in a truly free act) but rather
from impotency of action. Lack of action, then because Of
defect of knowledge is not free. In a word, the will must
be so disposed that a genuine choice to act or not act is

40

possible. When one turns to the intrinsic components of

 

LOIn secunda parte sententiae propositae declaratur
non solum ratio facultatis liberae, sed etiam id quod
necessarium est ad usum libertatis seu actus liberi; hoc
enim totum comprehendit praedicta definitio libertatis, et
merito, quia tota difficultas libertatis et utilitas eius in
ipso usu et exercitio libertatis posita est. Est autem
considerandum dupliciter posse dici aliquid requiri ad
actum: uno modo, tamquam praerequistum ad actionem; alio
modo, tamquam intrinsece vel essentialiter inclusum in ipsa
actione. Illud prius dici solet praerequisitum antecedenter
vel ex parte actus primi, sive illud sit proprium principium
actionis sive conditio praerequisita ad illum quocumque modo
vel in quovis genere causae. Hoc autem posterius dici
potest requisitum concomitanter seu in ipso actu secundo,
quia non distinguitur ab ipsa actione libera, quae est actus
secundus facultatis liberae. Cum ergo dicitur liberum esse
quod, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest agere et
non agere, intelligendum est de praerequisitis antecedenter
et in actu primo, non de aliis. Et hoc ipsum insinuatur in
praedicata sententia cum dicitur debere facultatem liberam
ita esse dispositam et proxime preparatam ad opus ut cum ea

 

4- Mu

 

 

 

321
the act itself, he finds that they are nothing more than the
necessary elements that the power might be determined for-
mally so that it is constituted in operation. These compo-
nents are positive in that they include appropriate knowl-
edge, ability tO act or not act, and the power to initiate

#1

an action.

 

dispositione possit agere et non agere; in illa enim
preparatione includuntur omnia illa praerequisita in actu
primo ad operandum.

Et quidem quod ad usum liberum sit necessarium cum
illis omnibus dictam indifferentiam et quasi duplicem
potestatem integram manere, facile ostendi potest. Primo,
quia alias cessatio, verbi gratia, ab opere non esset ex
intrinseca vi et facultate, sed ex defectu alicuius bu
conditionis requisitae; hoc autem nil confert ad libertatem,
nulla est enim naturalis potentia tam necessario agens quae
non possit interdum non agere ex defectu conditionis
requisitae, ut approximationis passi vel alterius similis.
Immo, si quis recte perpendat, illud non est posse non
agere, sed est potius impotentia agendi seu non posse agere
cum tali defectu; libertatis autem indifferentia non
fundatur in impotentia agendi, sed in potentia non agendi.
Unde quando ipsamet voluntas caret aliquo actu propter
naturalem inadvertentiam rationis, illa carentia actus non
est ex potentia non agendi sed ex impotentia sic operandi
seu volendi, et ideo talis carentia non potest esse libera.
Ut ergo facultas liberum usum habeat, necesse est ut,
positis omnibus conditionibus praerequisitis antecedenter
seu in actu primo ex interna vi et facultate sua possit
agere et non agere. Cum autem dicimus ex interna vi et
facultate (ut obiectionibus occurramus) non excludimus
divinum concursum vel maius auxilium necessarium pro actuum
qualitate, sed it theologis relinquimus. Disp. Meta. XIX,
Sect. A, pars. 10-11.

thuod autem dicta definitio intelligenda non sit de
requisitis concomitanter, probatur, quia haec, ut diximus,
includuntur in ipsa actione; nam sicut actio est requisita
ad agendum, ita quidquid in actione includitur potest dici
requisitum. Est autem actio requisita ut id quo formaliter
determinatur potentia et constitutitur actu agens, et ideo
non potest includi in his conditionibus cum quibus potentia
debet esse indifferens ad agendum et non agendum, quia
involvitur manifesta repugnantia; ergo neque etiam includi
debet in illis requisitis totum id quod est de intrinseca
ratione actionis seu in illa essentialiter includitur; nam
eadem est de illis omnibus ratio, quae de ipsa

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Tina»

 

322
This discussion of sense appetite and will results
in a parallel conclusion to that Of knowledge. That is, the
will as a Spiritual faculty has no way of initiating gen-
uinely physical action. Suarez hopes to allow for this by

making the distinction between an elicited act and a command

but the difference between spiritual and material still in-
tervenes even at the level of command. Suarez does not give
an eXplanation of how command issues in physical action;
only that it does so. As a matter of fact it cannot do this
given the metaphysical composition of the human being.

But, the fact remains that people do as a matter of
fact freely initiate activity and suspend action, or even
deliberately fail to act. In order to account for this the
will is construed as an active power with enough positive
knowledge to initiate activity on its own. What in effect
happens here is that any real function of the sense appe-
tites is obviated. That is, since the will is active there
is no real need for the sense appetites because it would
seem that the will can seek particular goods as well as the
good in general. There is no real need for the command and
the way Suarez describes the will would indicate that the
elicited act of the will is sufficient to accomplish any
action appropriate to a human being.

Finally, the contrast between the will as a free

 

actione. Atque haec interpretatio illius definitionis
colligitur ex communi sententia theologorum, In I, dist. 38
et 39, et In II, dist. 2h, et ex doctrine Anselmi, quam
statim eXplicabimus. DiSp. Meta. XIX, Sect. A, par. 12.

323
power and the sense appetites as determined powers makes use
of traditional Aristotelian and scholastic terms but these
notions are not really integrated into the whole system of
appetition as described by Suarez. Rather, the important
notions in Suarez are the differences between innate and
elicited appetites and the various understandings Of appe-
tite as "natural." What one sees here is an attempt on
Suarez' part to rework the notion of appetition in terms of
elicitation in such a way that the distinction between sense
appetite and will becomes minimal. By this blurring of ap-
petition in the idea that both are elicited appetites Suarez
hopes on the appetitive level to achieve a unity of opera-
tion between the various kinds of appetite. What he does
not account for, though, even in all the talk Of elicited
appetite is that the will is Spiritual and the sense appe-
tites are material and must interact one with the other. In
a word, the traditional division of appetition does not work
to preserve the unity of man. The notion of elicited appe-
tite does not preserve this unity either since it reduces
all of the appetitive system to willing with no real need
for sense appetites, and then the problem arises of the

will's relationship to the body.

Conclusion
The burden of this chapter has been to examine the
two great systems Of operative potencies in Suarez' treat-

ment of the human being. The concern has been to attempt to

 

324
solve the problem of the unity of operation between a spir-
itual soul and a body. If Suarez could actually prove this
unity of operation in either one of the two systems, then
the human being would be a genuinely unified composite be-
ing. The attempts Suarez makes, however, result in two un-
desirable consequences--l. there is a simplification Of
powers accomplished at the price of denying the uniqueness
of the powers; 2. the soul becomes a very Platonic entity in
that it moves the body around rather than being genuinely
united to the body as its form.

When one looks at the simplification of powers that
takes place on the level Of knowledge one sees that Suarez
allows for direct intellectual knowledge Of the singular.
This direct knowledge of the singular had been in earlier
Thomism and Aristotelianism the unique contribution of the
senses. As a unique contribution it was a necessary pre-
requisite to get any systematic knowledge initiated at all.
Since, in Suarez the intellect can know the singular there
is no real need for sense knowledge at all.

The same type Of simplification takes place with
respect to appetition. Suarez, in the notion that the will
and sense appetites are both elicited appetites both as act
and as faculties blurs the distinction between the two and
obviates any real need for sense appetition. There is no
reason, given what has been seen with respect to appetition,
why one needs a separate set of sense appetites, the will in

its own act can provide for the eventualities formerly taken

 

 

 

 

325
care of by sense appetition. That is, the will can seek
general goods, but it can also seek particular goods pre-
cisely as goods.

Suarez has achieved unity of operation at a great
price. He has so Spiritualized the sense powers that they
no longer seem to be material powers in the usual sense of
the word. That is, a material power needs an organ and a
physical Operation. Suarez' senses and sense appetites seem
to operate independently of these material limitations.

This leads to the second undesirable conclusion--
that the soul in Suarez becomes a very Platonic entity.

When one speaks of the soul as basically Platonic, he must
realize that this is not Suarez' intention at all. Rather
Suarez wants a genuine hylomorphism. The effect, however,
of the unique characteristics of the soull’2 and of the
blurring of the various operations of the human being as
has been seen in this chapter is to create a soul which is
very much independent of matter.

Suarez himself, realizes that he has problems with
the unity Of the human being. By the time he gets to a dis-
cussion of the various powers of the soul the disparity be-
tween the body and the soul is so great that there is no way
to achieve unity of operation as a proof of unity of being.
Suarez has two basic choices. Either he can rest content

with the dualism and attempt to eXplain how a spiritual and

 

hZFor a detailed analysis of this point the reader
is referred to Chapter V of this present study.

 

326

a material principle work together, or he can combine what
had formerly been considered to be a unique series of Opera-
tions into a type of unified operation and maintain unity on
that level. He is not content to accept the dualism, and
so, consequently, he combines the unique operations of sense
knowledge and intellectual knowledge or sense appetite and
will. This only results in a spiritualism which intensifies
the dualism rather than alleviates it.

One final caution is necessary at this point; Suarez

is making no pretenses in the Disputationes Metaphysicae to

 

be doing a complete rational psychology. The comments he
does make on the tOpics of knowledge and appetition are
usually by way of example or of explanation of other points.
This means that one can in no way accept the theory of

operations as it appears in the Disputationes as definitive.

 

Rather, this theory of knowledge and appetition points up
the necessity for a serious investigation of Suarezian psy-

chology in the 2g Anima and the Qg_0pere Sex Dierum. The

 

concern here has been to show that within the Disputationes
there is an inconsistent picture on the unity of operation
and that this is the result of a predetermined dualism in

the composition of the human being, a composition which is

based on a dualistic metaphysics.

 

 

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION AND POSSIBILITIES
FOR FURTHER STUDY

Summary of the Present Study

The aim and purpose of this study has been to in-
vestigate the Suarezian hylomorphic theory of matter and
form and its concrete application in the analysis of the
structure and operations of the human being. The doctrines
Of matter and form are treated extensively in Disputations
XIII and XV; the applications Of these doctrines to the
problem of the relationship of body and soul is found
throughout the Disputationes Metaphysicae. This situation
results in a caution to be taken account of: Suarez is do-
ing metaphysics in the Disputationes and not psychology.
This means that, even though the references to the structure
and Operations of man are multiple, there is no pretense on
Suarez' part to present a fully developed theory of human
nature in the Disputationes. The significance of the pres-
ent study is twofold, then: 1. Suarez gives an extensive
analysis of matter and form and individuation resulting in
a metaphysical dualism deSpite the intention to present a
unified being as the result of metaphysical analysis. 2. He

uses arguments based on the composition of the human being

327

328
to buttress the metaphysical position; but, being insensi-
tive to some Of the implications of his own metaphysical
positions, destroys the unity of the human being both in
structure and operation.

In the analysis of matter Suarez shows that prime
matter exists and that it has a being and essence of its
own. Once again, it is necessary to emphasize the impor-
tance of this attitude toward prime matter. Suarez is try-
ing to mediate between positions holding that matter is an
integral being and positions maintaining that matter is
"pure potency" in such a way that it has no characteristics
whatsoever and becomes a pure nothing. In Chapter II there
was a survey of all Of these Opinions and an exposition of
Suarez' own position on the problem of the being and essence
of prime matter. Suarez' mediated position is that matter
as a co-principle of being is itself a partial, incomplete
being. The implications Of this stance were seen to have an
impact on the causality Of matter and the relationship of
matter to the accident of quantity. With reSpect to the
causality of matter Suarez holds that matter and form must
be directly related to each other--that there can be no in-
tervening third principle such as a form of corporeity. The
attempt to give being and essence to matter, however, de-
stroyed the relationship Of mutual dependence necessary to
maintain a unified being. One final move Suarez makes in
the process Of integralizing matter occurs in the discussion

he presents Of the relationship of matter to the accident Of

 

.K-

 

 

 

 

329
quantity. In this presentation Suarez concludes that quan-
tity inheres in the matter rather than in the form. This is
completely alien to the teaching of Aristotle and the
earlier scholastics such as Aquinas; in these thinkers acci-
dents inhere only in complete substances. The general con-
clusion, then, with respect to matter is that, despite the
care Suarez uses in denying that matter is an integral be-
ing, the net effect of his own analysis is to create a mat-
ter that is very much a total being.

Suarez' procedure in the analysis Of form is paral-
lel to his treatment of matter. Initially, he is concerned
to show that there are such things as substantial forms;
then he attempts to describe their nature. As has been
shown in Chapter III the proof for the existence of form is
unique. Suarez uses the human soul as the test case that
there are substantial forms. Rather than the cumulative ap-
proach of starting with lower levels of beings and ascending
to the higher levels and showing on the way how each level
differs from the previous one, Suarez proves that because
human beings have forms lower and higher levels of being
must also have or be forms. He argues at this point that
the soul is a substance and not an accident because it is
immaterial and can remain separate from the body. But, it
is also related to the body substantially. The soul becomes
the substantial form, in this interpretation, of the body.
Substantial form, also is a certain partial substance which

can be united to matter. The problem though is that Suarez

. 1L.“ I

 

 

330
proceeded from a substantial form that could exist on its
own to a claim that all beings have or are forms. He does
not want to say that forms of lower beings can exist apart
from matter, but he has used as his test case the one form
that can do so. The major problem with form is taken care
of, Suarez feels, when he has established that there are
forms. The treatment of the causality of form has the im-
port Of showing that matter and form are directly related
to one another and that there can be no possibility Of a
third intervening principle of being to establish this re-
lationship. Finally, Suarez is concerned to show that there
is a single form rather than multiple ones in a being. Once
again, the result of Suarez' analysis was to integralize a
co-principle of being; this has disastrous effects on his
hylomorphic theory.

As a transition between the strictly metaphysical
doctrines of matter and form and the concrete application of
these doctrines to the unity of body and soul, it was neces-
sary to investigate Suarez' own notion Of what it means to
be an individual. Suarez is very concerned about the unity
Of the individual because of some of the implications of his
own hylomorphic theory. He rejects the common positions
that signed matter or the form are principles of individua-
tion. The solution settled on by Suarez is that there are
two principles of individuation in composite being--thi§
matter and this form. The final result is that the hylo-

morphic theory becomes dualistic in the very talk Of unity

 

 

 

 

331
and individuation.

Given the context of this metaphysics when one asks
about the unity of the human being he automatically faces a
dualistic situation. Suarez, as has been seen in Chapter V,
very much wants the human being to be a unity of structure.
He goes to great lengths to prove that the soul is the form
Of the body and that the soul is like other forms in some
sense. But, in the same discussions of the soul he endows
this co-principle of being with such unique characteristics
(e.g., immortality, immateriality) that the already present
dualism becomes so exaggerated that there is no possible way
for him to claim that there is a structural unity in the
human being.

One argument for the unity of human nature offered
by Suarez that had to be considered separately was the argu-
ment from unity of operation. This argument proceeds on the
assumption that there is a continuity of Operation between
physical and rational potencies. Suarez, following his
Aristotelian predecessors, views the operational structure
of the human in terms of a cognitive system and an appeti-
tive system. What he must establish for the unity of opera-
tion on the cognitive side is that there is a continuity be-
tween sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. On the
appetitive side he must establish a similar continuity be-
tween sense appetites and the will. In Chapter VI of this
present study these arguments were examined with the rather

amazing conclusion that unity of operation in Suarez avoids

 

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332

the issue of continuity in both cognitive and appetitive
systems. The two systems are reworked in such a way that
Suarez obviates the need for any real interrelationship be-
tween sense levels and rational levels. By maintaining a
position that the intellect has direct knowledge of the sin-
gular and only forms the universal by a comparison of multi-
ple individuals he destroys the unique contribution of sen-
sation to a knowing situation. 0n the appetitive side his
doctrine on elicited appetite downplays the interaction of
the sense level and the rational level in such a way that
ultimately the will is able to make particular choices in
addition to choosing the good in general. The result of
these operational investigations was to see that Suarez does
in fact have a unity of operation; but this is not between
body and soul. Rather the unity of operation occurs within
the soul itself. For the purposes of this study the general
conclusion is that the operational analysis provided by
Suarez enhances rather than destroys the dualistic tenden-
cies of his theory.

Although Suarez is concerned to maintain a doctrine
Of metaphysical unity, he cannot consistently do so given
the manner in which he works out the doctrine of matter and
form. The results of the theory do not become Obvious until
one looks at the special case of the human being-~composed
of matter and a spiritual form with physical and rational

operations.

I"

 

 

333

Possibilities for Further Study in Suarez

It is the fate of any study of a great thinker that
it raises more problems than it solves. In the present case
this is especially true and one must admit that as complex
as this present exposition of Suarezian doctrine has been it
merely scratches the surface Of the metaphysical problems in
the Disputationes. In terms of subject areas that must
still be investigated a fruitful source of study would be
the doctrine of subsistence as it occurs in Disputation

XXXIV. This notion of subsistence is important for a com-

 

plete understanding Of Suarez' metaphysics, for here he
tells what it means for a thing to exist on its own. In
light of the problems with matter and form as partial, in-
complete beings shown earlier in this work, Suarez either

is not aware that he must adjust his doctrine of subsistence
or if he is aware then partial, incomplete beings do subsist
and the dualism is conclusive. Now, subsistence was not
treated here because in the special test case of the human
being it is very clear that one Of the co-principles, the
human form, can and does subsist (i.e., exist on its own).
The general doctrine of subsistence in Suarez must eventu-
ally be investigated.1

As one moves away from the Disputationes

 

1The doctrine on subsistence has not been ignored in
the literature on Suarez. The studies so far presented,
however, are short and of a merely provisional nature. The
reader is referred to, Copleston, A History of Philosophy,
Vol. III, pt. 2, 189-90; and Mahieu, Francois Suarez,
2h9‘2 A e

 

33h
Metaphysicae themselves Suarez provides a vast fund of
scholarly possibilities. Some of his works that are of
Special concern to the scholar and which are related to

this present t0pic are the 23 Anima, the 22 Opere Sex

 

Dierum, and the Qg,Legibus.

2

The 23 Anima is of special concern in light of what

has been discovered here. It has been shown that Suarez
wanted to maintain a rather traditional Aristotelian psy-
chology while reworking the understanding of some central
metaphysical notions. One must ask whether the psychology
as it appears in the 23 Amiga is consistent with the meta-
physics or whether it is merely a commentary on the 9g the
Soul of Aristotle. In order to answer the problem several
initial steps must be taken that are related to the adequacy
of the traditional text of Suarez' ge,ggiga.3 Initially,
the text must be established. It has been shown rather con-
clusively by Joaquin Carreras y Artau that the Vives version
of the leégima has been edited rather extensively (probably
by Baltasar Alvarez); it is also known that Suarez himself
was in the process of revising this work at the time of his
death in 1617. Consequently what a modern reader has is
Chapters 1 to 12 of Book I as revised text and the remainder

of the work as something from Suarez' early days. And all

 

20f. Suarez, Opera Omnia, III: h67-801.

3In this matter the reader is referred to Joaquin
Carreras y Artau, "Notas sobre el texto del tratado 'De
Anima' de Francisco Suarez," Pensamiento, 15 (1959):
293 -307 o

 

 

 

 

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335
of this is in an edited form. There is great need for a
critical edition of Suarez' Qg_gnima. The manuscript is
available and must be edited in such a way as to preserve
Suarez' own thought and not the predilections of the editor
as seems to be the case with Alvarez' version if one is to
take Carreras y Artau seriously.

In addition to the textual problems of the £2.5nima
one must also look at the doctrinal problems. These are the
same areas that were of concern in Chapters V and VI of this
work. That is, how does Suarez in the Qg_Agima express the
structural relationship of body and soul? How are the oper-
ations of knowledge and appetite related to the structure?
And, is there a way to achieve genuine unity of the human
being and yet remain consistent with the doctrine of the

Disputationes Metaphysicae?

 

The second work which needs to be taken into account
in the study of Suarez is the Qg_gpg£g Sex Dierum.“ Like
the 22.52333 this work was published posthumously in 1621
and edited by Alvarez. Consequently, one can assume that
there are something of the same textual problems in this
work as there are in the Q§_Agig§. What is of major concern
here, however, in the Qg_gpg§g Sex Dierum is that it is a
convenient place to get an explicit statement of Suarez'
theory of the hierarchy of being. In this present study the

doctrine of levels of being has been taken pretty much for

 

“or. Suarez, Opera Omnia, III: 1-hh7.

 

 

 

 

336
granted. That is, even a cursory glance at Suarez shows
that he is using such a foundation to talk about generic and
specific differences of beings. He does not, however, say

much about the levels of beings in the Disputationes. In

 

the 2§_ng 3 Sex Dierum, Suarez' concern is with the whole
of creation. He Spells out in this context the various
levels of being beginning with God and ending with prime
matter.

It should be obvious that any doctrine of levels of
being implies in a hylomorphic context that there is a dif-
ferent relationship between matter and form on the various
levels. This, of course, means that the problem of unity
must be solved for each genuinely distinctive level of be-
ing. There will be some instances in which it will be
fairly easy to see a genuine unity of being, but there will
be others where unity of being is very difficult to estab-
lish. God would be an example of an easy case in which one
can establish unity; man is an example of a hard case one
must face.

Finally, within the works of Suarez himself there is
a wealth of opportunity to study the relationship of the
findings of the present analysis to the 2g,Legibus.5 This
work is without a doubt the most generally known of Suarez'
texts and has had an impact on theories of international

law. In this work Suarez' establishes the foundations of

 

5cr. Suarez, Opera Omnia, v and VI.

 

 

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337

law in the will rather than in the intellect. He is here in
the long tradition of the voluntarists represented by
Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and Duns Scotus. The present
study has spent some time on the will theory of Suarez as it
appears in an abstract metaphysical context. It has been
assumed by historians of philOSOphy such as Maurer, that
Suarez' theory of law is continuous with his fundamental
metaphysics.6 But, if what has been said earlier about the
will is correct, and if Suarez is at least unwittingly a
dualist in his metaphysical and psychological doctrine, then
it will be necessary to investigate what impact these dis-
coveries have on the theory of the will as it appears in the
2g Legibus. But, more importantly one must inquire whether
or not one can hold the theory of law as stated if the dual-
ism is present. In a word, one must ask if Suarez' will
theory is consistent and if any shift must take place be-
cause of the dualism. A shift of which Suarez himself would
be unaware since he does feel he has achieved unity in his
doctrine of being and in human nature.

One final problem within Suarezian studies that is
given special significance by an examination such as the one
presented in this work is whether or not Suarez is an eclec-

7

tic. Some authors such as Frederick Copleston want to

 

6Maurer, Medieval Philosoghy, 370-71.

7Copleston's position on the charge of Suarez' ec-
lecticism is as follows:

That Suarez possessed an analytic mind would hardly
I think, be denied. But it has been maintained that he
lacked the power of synthesis. He became immersed in a

 

 

 

 

 

338
minimize the charge of eclecticism against Suarez but if
there is one general result produced by the present work it
is that Suarez does pick and choose from other authors and
at times does not synthesize these various positions. It is
certainly foolish to level a general charge of eclecticism
against a thinker but one must always be open to the possi-
bility that in individual areas of his thought the thinker
might well be an eclectic. This study will necessarily re-
quire careful analysis both of Suarez' own text and of the
supposed sources of his thought. It is a fact that simply
cannot be contested that Suarez was familiar with the great

authors of the Christian tradition in philosophy and

 

succession of problems, it is sometimes said, and he gave
such a careful consideration to the manifold ways in which
these problems had been treated and solved in history that
he was unable to see the wood for the trees. Moreover his
great erudition inclined him to eclecticism. He borrowed a
view here and an Opinion there, and the result was a patch-
work rather than a system. His critics would not, I think,
suggest that he was a superficial eclectic, since it needs
no very close acquaintance with his writings to see that he
is very far from being superficial; but they do suggest that
he was an eclectic in a sense which is incompatible with
possessing the gift of synthesis.

. . . And in the first place one can ask in what
sense Suarez was an eclectic . . .

That Suarez was an eclectic in some sense seems to
me undeniable. He had an extremely extensive knowledge of
former philOSOphers, even if, as is only to be expected, he
was sometimes mistaken in his assertions or interpretations.
And he could hardly possess this knowledge without being in-
fluenced by the opinions of the philosophers he studied.

But this does not mean he accepted other people's opinions
in an uncritical manner . . . MOreover, if Suarez was an ec-
lectic so was Aquinas. The latter did not simply accept
Aristotelianism in its entirety; if he had done so, he would
have occupied a far less important position in the develop-
ment of medieval philosophy and would have shown himself to
be devoid of any spirit of philOSOphical criticism. A
History of Philosophy, Vol. III, pt. 2: 196- 97.

I

 

 

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339

theology; he quotes and summarizes these authors extensively
in the Disputationes.' It is also a fact that he does use in
his own system notions developed by these authors and per-
haps the best example here is the use he makes of the Sco-
tist ideas of the being of matter and individuation. Suarez
also rejects notions of his predecessors such as the concept

of forma corporeitatis. The issue of eclecticism then re-

 

solves itself to one of whether the pieces of other systems

 

that he chooses fit together into a unified whole. This

study has shown one instance where the pieces do not meet

and have disastrous results for a doctrine of unity in psy-
chology. The same thing must be done for other sets of doc-
trines prOposed by Suarez. In short, there is no easy an-
swer to the problem of eclecticism in Suarez, rather one
must work out the doctrines piecemeal and this provides an
almost untold wealth of possibilities for further study.

Possibilities for Further Study Concerning

Suarez' Relationship to Other Thinkers

It is always a provocative question to inquire which
thinkers influenced a man such as Suarez. And, it is no
less interesting to ask which thinkers Suarez himself influ-
enced. With respect to the first question and in the con-
text of this work one can try to draw out the relationships
between Duns Scotus and Suarez. With reSpect to the second
question two modern philosophers especially who appear to
have known of and to have been influenced by Suarez are

Descartes and Leibniz.

 

 

 

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31.0

In the introductory chapter there was a brief survey
of the Scotistic doctrines which Suarez either adopts, modi-
fies, or rejects. It should be obvious to any reader that
this introductory material is not a sufficient answer to the
question of the relationship between Suarez and Scotus. As
with Suarez the textual difficulties in Scotus abound. How-
ever, the problem is compounded in Scotus for many of the
works thought to be by Scotus have been shown to be inau-
thentic or the texts have been shown to be corrupt.
Copleston in his initial chapter on Scotus in A_History of

Philosophy summarizes these problems very well and shows
8

 

what must be done to get a genuine text of Scotus.
What is important in terms of Suarez is for someone
to establish which of Duns Scotus' texts Suarez himself was
familiar with and which version of the text. Only after
this has been done can one ask whether Suarez' version of
Scotism is genuine Scotism or whether what Suarez thinks is
the position of Duns Scotus is really some hybrid of Sco-
tistic doctrines. It is entirely possible that the
Suarezian version of individuation, for example, is only a
caricature of the Scotist understanding because of texts
available to Suarez. Suarez himself is very interested to
remain within a tradition in the Disputationes and studies

such as these which would show how Suarez remains part of a

 

8Copleston, A_History 9; Philosophy, vol. II, pt.
2: 199-2090

 

 

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3h1
heritage or departs from it would be extremely fruitful for
late medieval and renaissance scholarship.

If one uses Suarez as a point of departure one can
also inquire how this thinker of the late Sixteenth and
early Seventeenth Centuries influenced those who followed
him. Most critics of Suarez acknowledge that one of the
outstanding aspects of Suarez' impact on thought was that he
was the first to propound a systematic metaphysics at a time
when people were content to produce commentaries on Aris—
totle. Indeed, Suarez himself did a fair amount of comment-
ing for this seems to have been the original purpose of the

_Q_e_ Anima and the pa Ogre Sex Dierum.9 In this attempt to

 

write a metaphysics authors such as Ferrater MOra would put
Suarez among the modern philosophers not because he was in-
fluenced by modern or pre-modern philosophy, not because he
was highly interested in modern science, but because he was
trying to answer questions stated by the modern philos-
ophers.10
That Suarez had an influence on classical modern
philosophy is a generally acknowledged fact but authors who
make this claim are often unwilling to spell out exactly

what this influence has been. One approach such as that

used by Maurer is to point out that Descartes was introduced

 

9The 22 Anima was originally a commentary on Aris-
totle's 92 the Soul. The Qg_Qp§re Sex Dierum was a commen-
tary of Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, Part I.

 

 

10Jose Ferrater Mora, "Suarez and Modern Philos-
ophy," Journal Qf_the History of Ideas, 1h (1953): 531-32.

 

 

p .._

 

 

 

342
to Suarez at La Fleche and later acquired knowledge of the

Disputationes. Then Maurer points out that Leibniz could

 

read Suarez as easily as most people read novels. This way
of approaching the relation of Suarez and subsequent think-
ers is a mere cataloguing of isolated comments by the modern
philosophers and really tells one very little about the in-
fluence Suarez had on them. As a whole this approach is
quite unsatisfactory.ll A second approach to the problem of
the relationship of Suarez and modern thought is to ask spe-
cific questions about obvious doctrines in men such as
Descartes and Leibniz (e.g., soul-body dualism in Descartes
and unity in Leibniz) and then see whether there is any re-
lationship between what one finds in the modern text and in
Suarez.

With respect to the soul-body dualism of Descartes,
one has a generally accepted doctrine that can be estab-

lished from the text of the Meditations on First Philosophy.

 

 

 

11Maurer approachs the relationship of Suarez and
modern philosophers as follows:

Suarez is significant in the history of philosophy
as the main channel by which scholasticism came to be known
by modern classical philosophers. Descartes was introduced
to him by his Jesuit professors of philosophy at La Fleche,
and later he acquired a firsthand knowledge of Suarez' most
important philosophical work, the Disputationes
Metaphysicae. Leibniz boasted that he could read Suarez as
easily as most people read novels. Schopenhauer shows a
good acquaintance with the Disputationes, which he valued as
"a true compendium of scholasticiém" and "an authentic com-
pendium of the whole scholastic wisdom." Christian Wolff's
Ontologia, which Kant considered to be the finest treatise
in metaphysics is highly indebted to Suarez. To Wolff,
Suarez was the metaphysician "who among the scholastics pon-
dered metaphysical realities with particular penetration,"
and he identified Suarez' teachin with that of St. Thomas
himself. Medieval Philosophy, 35 ~57.

 

 

 

3A3
It would be an entirely legitimate question to ask whether
or not the dualism of Descartes had any antecedents in pre-
vious thought. This present study has been at pains to
point out the dualistic tendency of Suarez and it would ap-
pear that one could spell out a definite relationship be-
tween Suarez and Descartes on this matter of dualism. It is
entirely possible that Descartes saw the inherent dualism of
the Suarezian system and, rather than disguising it in his
own approach, advocated it openly. Suarez' proofs for unity
and Descartes' proof for dualism of mind and body are cer-

tainly different from one another but, from what has been
shown in the first six chapters of this work the question of
Cartesian dualism and its relationship to Suarezian meta-
physics can no longer be ignored.

The job of drawing out the relationship between
Descartes and Suarez is especially complicated by the care
with which Descartes concealed his sources. Some such as
Ferrater Mora would give up on the attempt to relate Des-
cartes to his predecessors.12 Others would go too far in
terms of seeing Descartes as really doing nothing but col-

lating previous material.13

In fact, the truth seems to re-
side in a middle position, but this means scholars must take

one Cartesian position at a time and try to establish the

 

8 12Ferrater MOra, "Suarez and MOdern Philosophy,"
52 "'29.

13One serious attempt to trace out the sources of
Cartesian philosophy is Etienne Gilson, Etudes sur la role
de la ensee medievale dans la formation du systeme—
cartesfen (Paris: I. Vr in ,1551).

 

 

 

   

34L

source of that position. Because of the results of this
study it would be good to give Suarez a much greater empha-
sis in Cartesian studies than has been the case previously.

The problem of showing the relationship of Suarez to
Leibniz is much easier to solve than that of Descartes. In-
deed, Gottfried Martin has made a tentative advance in this
direction in his book, Leibniz: Logic and Metaphysics. The
chapter that is of special concern is the treatment of unity
in Leibniz' metaphysics. In this chapter Martin points out
that Leibniz was educated in the tradition of Aristotle and
the scholastics. This education, it is safe to assume, was
not only from manuals but from the original works them-
selves. Since Leibniz is more open about his sources than
Descartes, and since Leibniz is more concerned to preserve
the continuity of the great complex of philosophical thought
one may safely ask for monographs which spell out the rela-
tionship of Leibniz to his sources-~in this case the rela-
tionship to Suarez.lh

Martin is at great pains to show how Leibniz pre-
served the scholastic notion of unity in his own work. He
summarizes Leibniz' train of thought by explaining that me-
dieval philosophy develops the notion that unity is not an
accident. Martin then points out that Thomas Aquinas was

the first to work out a consistent doctrine on this subject.

The notion that unity is not an accident is reworded to say

 

1“Gottfried Martin, Leibniz: Logic and Metaphysics,
Trans. K. J. Northcott and P. G. Lucas'TManchester: Man-
chester University Press, l96h), 182.

 

"'

 

 

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3h5

that "unity follows being." In the chapter on individuation
it was shown that Suarez made extensive use of this princi-
ple. It would be an interesting study to spell out what
Leibniz acquired from the tradition as a whole with respect
to unity and what he acquired from individual authors such
as Thomas Aquinas or Suarez.15

What has just been said with respect to the influ-
ence Suarez has had on modern philosophers should not be
construed as a claim that these men were merely copying
Suarez or the scholastic tradition. There is something de-
cidedly modern about philosophy since Descartes. Historians
of philosophy, however, have been too eager to generalize
the break between the medieval tradition and modern philos-

ophy. A study of relationships among thinkers helps to

alleviate any oversimplification that might occur.

Conclusion
This concluding chapter has provided a general sum-

mary of the findings of this study. Then, the question
arose whether or not there were possibilities for further
study both in Suarez himself and Suarez' relationship to
other thinkers. There are multiple opportunities for fur-
ther investigation in both Suarezian and relational works.
Several cautions and methods of procedure were suggested for
these further investigations and what is most important in

each instance is careful investigation of the text of each

 

15Martin, Leibniz, 120-23.

1'-

 

 

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31.6
author. For, it is only by this means that over-hasty gen-
eralization can be avoided.

Some of the results of this present study have been
startling and have gone contrary to what Suarez himself
claims he is doing. One cannot make excuses for the incon-
sistencies that arise with respect to unity as a result of
the hylomorphic theory, but one can see the very real at—
tempt on Suarez' part to consider all the possible solutions
to a problem, to choose the one he feels fits with his meta-
physics, and then to live with the consequences. Given this
honesty on his part it is more difficult to accept the dual-
ism of being. The dualism of being leads to a dualism of
body and soul, and above all Suarez had desired that the

human being be a unified entity.

 

»'~|

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Suarez, Francis. Disputationes Metafisicas. Edited and
translated by Sergio—Rabade'Romeo, et 31. 7 vols.
Biblioteca Hispanica de Filosofia, 1960.

' . .113 . Audi.”

 

. Opera Omnia. Edited by Charles Breton. 26 vols.
’Paris: Ludovicus Vives, 1856-1877 and 2 vols. of
indices, 1878.

 

 

 

Bibliographies

de Aldana, J. A. "El IV Centenario de nacimiento de P.
Francisco Suarez: Bibliographia." Archive
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Iturrioz Jesus. "Bibliografia suareciana." Pensamiento h
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McCormick, John F. "A Suarezian Bibliography." Proceedings
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Riedl, C. C. "A Suarez Bibliography." Jesuit Thinkers gf
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Books

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Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Edited with an
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3&7

I. \l.JllI:l\ IJio ,s

 

(t I
z
n . fix! 0
f
l . I r. .
v v r
e v
a e f I
_ . .
.’ v o l a a .
v 0 fl
._ . p.\ . _. a . . . .. e.
F . - a. .
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. I A c s.
. . y
. .
. v I I
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i e . u o f . . .
z u . , i e o
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x u .
.F .n e 1
4 .
_. .1. . y . .. .
O . I .
v
y . . . . . .n v
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1 . c . 9. .
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l I rte .. .
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a o o
\ l l
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~ A
i
a . o
i t .
. u , o
. a
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O o o
I -
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348

Bettoni, Efrem. Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles 9; His
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Copleston, Frederick. A Histor of Philosophy. 8 vols.
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Cubells, Salvador Castellote. Die Anthropplogie Des Suarez.
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Fichter, Joseph M. Man Lf S ain: Suarez. New York: The E—
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Fonseca, Peter. Commentariorum in Metaphysicorum Aris-
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Gilson, Etienne. Etudes sur la role Le la pensee medievale
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Vrin,_1951

 

"‘5'. 9 '.I -

Harris, C. R. S. Duns Scotus. 2 vols. New York: The
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Klubertanz, George P. The Philosophny Human Nature. New
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Mahieu, Leon. Francois Suarez: sa philosophie et les
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Maurer, Armand A. Medieval Philosophy. New York: Random
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Scoraille, R. de. Francois Suarez de la Compagnie Le Jesus.
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755-7 0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3A9

Dictionnaire g3 theologie catholique. S. v. "Suarez: Vie
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Elorduy, Eleutherius. "Duns Scoti influxus in Francisci
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Encyclopedia 9:,Bhilosophy. S. v. "Suarez, Francisco
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Knight, David M., S.J. "Suarez's Approach to Substantial
Form." The Modern Schoolman 39 (1961-62): 219-239.

 

Mahowald G. "Suarez' De Anima." The New Scholasticism
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McCormick, John F., S.J. "Suarez on Matter and Form."

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Mignes, P. "Suarez und Duns Scotus." Philosophices
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Mora, Jose Ferrater. "Suarez and Modern Philoso hy."
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Pecorini, Francisco. "Suarez's Struggle with the Problem of
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Rosanas, Juan. "El principio de individuacion, segun
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I thnll