

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ABSTRACT

FRANCIS SUAREZ:
A METAPHYSICS FOR BODY AND SOUL

by

John L. Treloar, S.J.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the general metaphysical doctrines of matter, form, and individuation and their application to the special problem of the relationship of body and soul in the philosophy of Francis Suarez. It is the general conclusion of this investigation that the metaphysics of Suarez results in psychological dualism.

Because the works of Suarez are extensive this thesis will limit itself to the Disputationes Metaphysicae. This work provides the clearest outline of the problems with Suarez' doctrine of body and soul.

The initial chapter is devoted to Suarez' treatment of causality in general. Here Suarez follows the Aristotelian teaching on causality and places the discussion of matter and form in this setting. After the context has been established Suarez can move to the discussion of matter and form.

In the treatment of material cause Suarez shows that we can know by reason alone of a material cause. Suarez

then specifies the nature of the cause. In this thesis the claims that the material cause cannot be a complete substance, that it has actual being, that it can be a pure potency only in a limited sense will be treated. It is necessary to show the relationship of matter to quantity. These investigations illustrate that despite the claim that matter cannot be a complete substance of itself, Suarez does make it an integral being.

The treatment on formal cause is parallel to material cause. Suarez asks if there are substantial forms in material things. He then spells out the implications of this doctrine. He shows how forms are generated and corrupted, how they are spoken of as causes, how matter and form are mutually dependent, and how there is only one substantial form for each being. There is a desire to maintain the form as an incomplete substance and apparent success with respect to subhuman forms. The doctrine falls into problems with respect to the rational soul, which can exist independently of the body.

The chapters on matter and form show that these causes in Suarez are more independent than was the case in Aristotle or high scholasticism. It is necessary to confront the problem of what it means to be an individual. Suarez shows that everything that exists exists as an individual. Then he shows that the "signed matter" of Thomas Aquinas is unsatisfactory as the principle of individuation. Even though matter must play a part in individuation, the

major principle of individuation is the form. Individuation shows the dualism of Suarezian metaphysics of matter and form.

Body and soul are a special case of the more general metaphysics of matter and form. Suarez encounters some very unique problems. How is the matter of the matter-form relationship related to the human body? How can the rational soul be the form of the body since it can exist apart from matter? The result of the metaphysical dualism of matter and form is a clear psychological dualism.

The treatment of cognition and of willing is carefully adjusted to accommodate the peculiar understanding of body and soul. Especially noteworthy are the doctrines of direct intellectual knowledge of the singular and of elicited appetite.

Future studies must come to grips with Suarez' De Anima and its textual problems. Some philosopher-theologian must examine the De Opere Sex Dierum. In that work Suarez functions as a theologian, and it is necessary for someone familiar with scholastic theology and philosophy to analyze the work. Historians of philosophy must attend to the influence Suarez has had on figures of modern philosophy such as Descartes and Leibniz.

FRANCIS SUAREZ:

A METAPHYSICS FOR BODY AND SOUL

by

John L. Treloar, S.J.

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
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In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Philosophy

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1976

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

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

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

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of This Study

The intention of this investigation is to inquire into the general metaphysical doctrines of matter, form, and individuation and their application to the special problem of the relationship of body and soul in the philosophy of Francis Suarez. It will be the general conclusion of this study that the metaphysics of Suarez results in a dualism of body and soul, if not in intent, at least in fact.

Because the works of Suarez are so extensive (twenty-eight volumes in the Vives edition)[1] it will be necessary to limit this present study to a single work of Suarez, the Disputationes Metaphysicae.[2] This treatise is Suarez' own definitive position on metaphysics and

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[1]Francis Suarez, Opera Omnia, Ed. Charles Breton, 26 vols. (Paris: Ludovicus Vives, 1856-1877 and 2 vols of indices, 1878). This collection of Suarez' works is the standard edition of the complete works.

[2]Francis Suarez, Disputaciones Metafisicas, Ed. and trans. Sergio Rabade Romeo et al, 7 vols. (Madrid: Biblioteca Hispanica de Filosofia, 1960).

This edition of the Disputationes is the one used in the present study. Basically this is a translation of Suarez' major philosophical work into Spanish. The translators and editors, however, have provided the complete Latin text at the foot of each page and have corrected the Vives edition where necessary to coincide with the manuscript.



consequently is actually the central work that would have to be consulted in any metaphysical inquiry such as the present one. The work is long and extremely erudite but the language is clear and direct and hence the Disputationes serve as an excellent source of Suarezian thought.

There are at least two other works of Suarez that would be likely candidates for a study similar to the present one. Suarez' early work the De Anima[3] would appear to be the obvious source to go if one were to embark on a discussion of body and soul in the thought of Suarez. The text of this work, however, is in very poor condition. There are several historical accidents to account for this. As has been noted, the De Anima was an early work and never published by Suarez himself. It is solidly medieval in tradition in the fact that it is a commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul. The first historical accident that influenced the quality of this text is that Suarez was in the process of revising the work for publication at the time of his death in 1617. What was eventually published was Chapters 1 to 12 of Book I which had been revised by Suarez; and the remainder of the work was from the early period. In itself this would not be terribly disruptive, but the second historical accident makes use of the De Anima particularly difficult. Suarez' friend and literary executor Baltasar Alvarez, in preparing the treatise for publication,

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[3]The De Anima is found in Volume III of the Vives edition of the Opera Omnia.



apparently did extensive editing of the yet to be revised text in order to make it coincide with the teachings of Book I, Chapters 1 to 12. What has resulted is a hybrid text and it is very difficult to sort out what belongs to Alvarez and what to Suarez.[4]

The second work that could provide some information on the metaphysics of Suarez is the De Opere Sex Dierum.[5] Once again, this work was published posthumously by Alvarez in 1621. The nature of the problems here are somewhat different from those of the De Anima. Since the De Opere Sex Dierum is meant to be a commentary on the first part of the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas, this immediately imposes two limitations on it from a philosophical point of view. 1. Suarez is commenting on someone else's work and his own position is less apparent than in the Disputationes. 2. The De Opere Sex Dierum is more strictly theological than philosophical, consequently there must be a constant sorting out of theological positions from philosophical ones.

Given the problems, then, with the De Anima and the De Opere Sex Dierum it has been decided to limit this present study to the Disputationes Metaphysicae as the major philosophical contribution of Francis Suarez.

Prior to inaugurating the discussion of matter,

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[4]Cf. Joaquin Carreras y Artau, "Notas sobre el texto del trato 'De Anima' de Francisco Suarez," Pensamiento, 15 1959): 293-307.

[5]The De Opere Sex Dierum is also found in Volume III Vives edition of the Opera Omnia.

form, individuation, and body and soul in the Disputationes there are several preliminary matters to be taken care of. These topics will form the subject matter of the remainder of this introductory chapter. The Disputationes must be put into an historical context both with respect to Suarez' own life and their significance in the history of philosophy. Then, as preparatory to the material in Chapters II to VI it will be necessary to explain briefly the same doctrines of matter, form, and individuation as they occur in Duns Scotus. In addition, one must look at the Scotist version of the form of corporeity which Suarez rejects as superfluous. Thirdly, the concerns of this present study occur in a very large work and it is necessary to orient the reader to the fact that matter and form are treated in the context of causality. Finally, at the end of this introduction a general outline of the remainder of the study will be provided.

Context of the Disputationes

Francis Suarez was born at Granada in 1548 and at the age of sixteen he entered the Society of Jesus. After his initial training in the Society he began his professional career by teaching philosophy at Segovia. It is from this period that the original De Anima comes. Later in his career he lectured in theology rather than philosophy and the schools at which he taught are spread across Spain and Italy. When he was forty-nine years old he published the Disputationes Metaphysicae at Salamanca. His other major work, the De Legibus, was published in 1612. At the time of

his death in 1617, he was working on a revision of the De Anima which was eventually published by Alvarez in 1621 together with the De Opere Sex Dierum.[6]

Perhaps more important for present purposes than the bare chronological data of Suarez' literary production is the intellectual context in which the Disputationes was composed. Since Suarez stands at the crossroads between the medieval period and the modern period, there are conflicting opinions among the critics about his work. Some feel that Suarez' purpose in writing the Disputationes was typically medieval. As substantiation for this position they cite Suarez' own preface to the work in which he points out that the fundamental notions of metaphysics are necessary for any one who wants to understand theology. These same critics also note that Suarez' method is also medieval in that he first states the opposing opinions of his predecessors before giving his solution to a point.[7] On the other hand there is a distinctively modern tone to the Disputationes also. Suarez provides an elaborate discussion of philosophical problems in separation from theology and the order

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[6]For a brief and concise biography of Suarez the reader is referred to Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 8 vols. (New York: Image Books, 1962-67), Vol. 3, pt. 2: 173-75. Other biographies which treat Suarez' life in more detail are Joseph M. Fichter, Man of Spain: Suarez (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940) and R. de Scorraile, Francois Suarez de la Compagnie de Jesus, 2 vols. (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1911).

[7]Armand Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), 357.



and themes of these problems are certainly modern. Copleston acknowledges that this freer style of philosophical writing is due to the influence of renaissance humanism, and it is this humanism that allows Suarez to break through the former tradition of commenting on Aristotle and allows him to compose the Disputationes as he does.[8]

Joseph Fichter, one of Suarez' more laudatory biographers, claims that the Disputationes came at a time when they were needed. Since there was beginning to be an influx of strictly philosophical thought and since there was great stress and strain in theological quarrels, the Disputationes often served all parties as a basic treatment of very complex issues. The tradition of scholasticism had it that the metaphysics of Aristotle should be taught. Suarez dissolved the trappings this tradition had accumulated over the centuries and to do this he took the doctrine of Aristotle as a whole and then rearranged the text and plan in a more orderly fashion.[9] In a word, one can look at the Disputationes as an attempt to revitalize a science that had fallen on hard times.

Finally, it would be well to point out something of the purpose of the Disputationes as Suarez himself

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[8]Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 3, pt. 2: 163-64.

[9]Fichter, Man of Spain, 189-90. The reader is also referred to Suarez' own reworking of Aristotle. At the beginning of the Disputationes Metaphysicae Suarez provides an "Index Locupletissimus" giving the places where he treats the usual Aristotelian topics in metaphysics.



understood it. Astrain observes that Suarez, from the experience of his teaching, realized that many of his students were deficient in philosophy. He saw that in order to understand theology they needed extensive instruction in metaphysics. Suarez was in the process of publishing a series of theological works at this time, but interrupted his publication schedule to compose and prepare the Disputationes for publication. This was to be a solid treatise on metaphysics that would serve as a foundation for sacred science. The result of this endeavor is the work now known as the Disputationes Metaphysicae.

This brief investigation, then, of the context of the Disputationes serves to point out that the work is one of Suarez' mature efforts as opposed to the De Anima. In addition it is important to note that Suarez is very much a man of two traditions. His method and purpose are medieval--he uses disputation format,[10] and views metaphysics as an ancillary science to theology. But, the rearrangement of philosophical topics and the questions being asked have a modern trend to them.

Influence of Duns Scotus on Suarez

In the previous section it was noted that Suarez is very much a man of a tradition. One figure that plays an

[10]It should be noted that Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae used the disputation format. In that work of Thomas the format is absolutely invariable. Suarez' use of the disputation format is much freer than what one finds in the earlier scholastics. Astrain is cited by Fichter in Man of Spain, 187.

important role in the formation of Suarez' own metaphysical position is John Duns Scotus (1265 or 1266 - 1308). Suarez takes over some of Duns Scotus' positions almost intact (e.g., the separate being and essence of matter) and rejects others (e.g., the doctrine of the plurality of forms). It is this picking and choosing of Scotist positions together with the desire to return to a more pristine Aristotelian or Thomist philosophy that eventually results in the implied dualism of the Disputationes Metaphysicae. This present section is meant to be a brief survey of the Scotist positions on the topics of concern in the body of this study.[11]

A major issue throughout the medieval period was the status and condition of prime matter. Scotus pulls away from the tradition when he states that we must postulate a matter really existent which is ontologically prior to every form and which is the prime stuff out of which the universe is made. This matter is not and cannot be co-eternal with God but is created; since its very being is the farthest removed from self-existence; and it would be a limitation on God's actuality if it were co-eternal with Him. Such limitation is clearly impossible. In Scotus matter must enter into the composition of all created things and becomes the badge of creaturehood. What is important about matter for

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[11]For comprehensive treatments of the Scotist positions summarized in this study the reader should consult the following: Efrem Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy, Trans. and ed. Bernardine Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1961) and C. R. S. Harris, Duns Scotus, 2 vols. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1959).



this study is that in Scotus matter has an existence of its own apart from its combination with form. It does not actually exist in a free state but still is a real metaphysical principle with an actuality of its own. Were this not so it could not enter into the composition of anything as a constituent principle. As Harris notes, this notion of matter is far removed from the Aristotelian doctrine followed by Thomas Aquinas.[12] Suarez is especially influenced by the Scotist theory of matter and the idea that matter has an existence of its own is an important aspect of Scotist philosophy assumed by Suarez.

The second doctrine of Duns Scotus that influences Suarez is the theory of form. Suarez in this instance, however, is more critical of Duns Scotus than he is in the case of matter. As is standard in scholastic philosophy the correlative of matter is form. Together these principles constitute the concrete substances of the real world. Like the matter, the form has a reality of its own but exists only in a combined state with the matter. The form is considered by Scotus to be the determining principle by which a thing is generically and specifically characterized. Up to this point Soctus and Suarez are in agreement with respect to the nature of the form.[13]

There is now, however, a radical break between the thinkers. Scotus, in order to account for the various

[12]Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. 2: 77-78.

[13]Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. 2: 88-89.



levels of being (e.g., inanimate, plant, animal, human), posits the position that there can be a plurality of substantial forms within one and the same concrete being. Suarez, on the other hand, returns to the Thomist position that there is only one form united to matter. Scotus saw the doctrine of unity of form as dangerous to theology; Suarez saw hopeless philosophical complication with the doctrine of plurality of forms. In his own philosophy Suarez spends great effort in rejecting the doctrine. Scotus feels that in all living beings one must postulate a plurality of substantial principles. The form by which an animal has a body is not the same as the form by which it lives, nor is the form by which it lives identical with the form by which it is sentient. Scotus reasons that the body is composed of inorganic matter, but the animal is something more than a body. It is a living body and the properties of living and dead matter are widely different. The form which gives the animal its living being, the soul, differs from the form of the body as body. Each of these forms has a determinate character. In addition, Scotus reasons that at death soul and body are parted, but the body remains behind, and it is the same body as before death. This is Duns Scotus' famous doctrine on the form of corporeity.[14] He does not feel that the plurality of forms militates against the unity of the composite of matter and form. Rather, the act of being of the whole contains the acts of being of all the parts. This

[14]Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. 2: 107-08.

means there is a plurality of partial actualities. The unity of the whole is derived from one form, namely that form which makes the whole composite to be what it is.[15] Suarez sees that this doctrine of plurality of forms destroys the very meaning of "substantial form" and rejects it completely.

In addition to the theories of matter and form, Suarez is influenced heavily by the Scotist teaching on individuation. In each individual, according to Duns Scotus, there are two entities or realities which are formally distinct--the universal and the particular. The universal element, the essence or nature, is common to all individuals of the same species. The haecceity constitutes the individual as a singular being. Each of these realities has a unity of its own independent of the knowing mind. The universal element has a unity which is less than the numerical unity of the singular being. But, this poses a problem concerning which entity constitutes the individual. It is neither matter as such, nor the form as such, nor the composite as such, but the ultimate real being of all three. Matter, form and composite can all be conceived as universal. One must distinguish, therefore, between the nature of these elements, and this individuality. The individual concrete thing is not made up of form and matter simply but of <u>this</u> matter and <u>this</u> form. The haecceity does not add a

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[15]Harris, <u>Duns Scotus</u>, Vol. 2: 105-106. Cf. also 108-11.

qualitative difference to the individual but accrues only as the matter and the form are concretized.[16] When one turns to the Suarezian position on individuation he sees the same concern that it be this matter and this form that individuate; the difference is that the thisness of matter and form in Suarez tends to be a qualitative determination. In a word, Suarez' position here is not as carefully nuanced as Duns Scotus'.

Given this metaphysical background Duns Scotus must face the problem of the unity of the human being. In the human being there is a double combination of two matters and two forms (physical matter/form of corporeity and spiritual matter/spiritual form). Man in this situation is an ontological peculiarity which cannot be accounted for strictly. That is, man has a unique location in the metaphysical scheme of things as the meeting place of the physical and the spiritual. He is half brute and half angel. Without further explanation Duns Scotus simply asserts that the intellectual soul is the substantial form of an already composite being with which it forms an essential union more perfect and more intimate than any other in the physical universe.[17] Suarez denies, as has already been seen, all versions of plurality of forms; he also denies any talk of spiritual matter. In the instance of the unity of the human

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[16]Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. 2: 94-96.

[17]Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. 2: 250-51.

being he will have to rework the doctrine completely since Duns Scotus' approach is so unacceptable. Suarez' own position is much closer to traditional Aristotelian or Thomistic philosophy. The question that arises of course is whether or not he can accept Duns Scotus' metaphysics of matter, form, and individuation without also accepting this result in psychology.

One final Scotist position that Suarez accepts, and that will be of major concern at the end of this study, is the doctrine that the intellect has direct knowledge of the singular. In Thomism this psychological problem of intellectual knowledge of the singular was resolved by showing that the intellect has only indirect (reflex) knowledge of the singular. This position of Thomism developed out of the desire to maintain a strict understanding of the nature of the various powers (senses had knowledge of the singular, the intellect had knowledge of the universal). Duns Scotus, however, blurs this distinction when he states that the thing existing here and now in its concrete being is known directly not only by the senses but also by the intellect which grasps it by an intuitive knowledge. The basis of this claim is that intuitive knowledge is distinct from abstractive knowledge which always prescinds from the object known. That is, if one considers the origin of knowledge it always begins from the intuition of the concrete thing. The product of this first encounter of intellect and thing is the idea of the individual thing. This idea is quite proper

to the thing as it stands before me and it is through this idea that the intellect has the first grasp of what it wants to know. But, as soon as the intellect tries to find out exactly what the individual thing is (i.e., provide a definition of the individual) it has recourse to abstractive knowledge because it is incapable of grasping haecceity. Through this initial idea the intellect knows the object only in a confused manner; it is only after a definition has been provided that the intellect knows the object distinctly. This intuitive knowledge of the singular is an initial and confused kind of knowledge but it is no less important than the abstractive knowledge. For the human intellect it is the necessary starting point of knowledge. In a word, it is like a spiritual sense by which the intellect perceives the reality that affects the physical senses.[18]

In Chapter VI it will be necessary to look at Suarez' own version of this doctrine of the direct intellectual knowledge of the singular. The reason why this topic is of such interest is that one of Suarez' main proofs for the unity of the human being rests on the unity of operation manifested by a human being. That is, there must be a continuity between the operations of sense powers and intellectual powers. Suarez' own position of the direct knowledge of the singular depends heavily on Scotus but cannot make

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[18]Bettoni, Duns Scotus: His Philosophy, 122-23. Cf. also Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 2, pt. 2: 215-16.



use of the same explanations of the process since he has done away with the plurality of forms. In a word such a plurality of forms allows Duns Scotus to have a unique form that can know the singular directly.

It has not been the purpose of this treatment of Duns Scotus to give anything like a complete exposition of his philosophy. Rather, the concern has been to show those areas of Scotistic philosophy that have either influenced Suarez or to show those areas of Scotistic philosophy that have been rejected by him. Suarez himself does not react to these various positions uncritically but they do influence his overall approach. It can be seen from even the brief review presented here that Duns Scotus' philosophy is a great deal more complicated than Aristotle's or Thomas Aquinas'. Suarez has a tendency to return to the simpler philosophies of Thomism and Aristotelianism but brings to his thought some of the more complex Scotism. This attempt to return to simplicity using the more intricate apparatus results in a philosophy manifesting serious inherent inconsistencies.[19]

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[19]Some work has been done on the relationship of Suarez and Scotus and the reader is referred to P. Mignes, "Suarez und Duns Scotus," Philosophiches Jahrbuch, 32 (1919): 334-40 and Eleutherius Elorduy, "Duns Scoti influxus in Francisci Suarez doctrinam," Acta Congressus Scotistici Internationales, Oxford and Edinburgh, Sept. 11-17, 1966 and Rome 1968: 307-37.



The Discussion of Causality in General in Suarez

One final topic to be treated by way of introduction to this study is Suarez' treatment of causality in general. In the analysis of causality one can see Suarez' intent to place himself in the Aristotelian tradition. Even here, however, there are adjustments being made to the metaphysical doctrines as they have developed since Aristotle. Since Suarez treats the theories of matter and form in the context of causality, it is the purpose of this section to provide a setting for the materials found in Chapters II and III of the present study. Suarez' analysis of the general doctrine of causality occurs in Disputation XII; the concern in this disputation is to show the number and kinds of causes and the mutual distinctions of one cause from another.

Suarez points out at the very beginning of his treatment that he is concerned to validate the celebrated division of causality as proposed by Aristotle in Book V of the Metaphysics and Book II of the Physics. But, he is not willing to accept this theory of causality simply because Aristotle proposed it. Suarez asks whether all kinds of causality are included in this division and how are the causes distinguished from each other.[20]

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[20]Celebris est illa divisio causae in quatuor causarum genera, scilicet, materialis, formalis, efficientis, et finalis, quam tradit Arist., V Metaph., c. 2, et lib. II Phys., c. 3 et sequent., cuius divisionis expositio omnino pendet ex singulorum membrorum exacta intelligentia, quam in toto hoc tractatu late prosequemur; et ideo nunc in communi solum proponemus ea quae circa hanc divisionem dubitari



Whether or not there are four kinds of causes is established by experience. Suppose Suarez says, that something new occurs in nature. This supposition has foundation in experience because of the perpetual alteration, generation and corruption of things. If, therefore, something new happens, it is necessary that there be something else by which this new thing happens. Nothing is able to cause itself. This process whereby something new occurs on account of another is called efficient causality. An efficient cause either produces its effect from nothing or from some other thing which is presupposed for its action. One cannot say that the efficient cause produces from nothing generally speaking, for experience shows that an artist cannot make a statue except from wood or bronze. Or, alternatively, fire cannot heat something unless something previous is presupposed which is capable of heat, nor is one even able to make a fire except from wood or a similar material. That subject which is presupposed for the action of an efficient cause is called the material cause. It is necessary that the efficient cause introduce something new; otherwise there would

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possunt et ea breviter expendiemus. Primum est an omnia illa membra vere ac proprie sub divisio contineantur. Secundum an inter se distinguantur et opponantur. Tertium an sufficienter comprehendant totum divisum. Quartum an proxime et immediate causa in illa membra dividatur, vel possit aliqua divisio media excogitari. Quintum an illa divisio sit infima seu atoma, an possint singula membra in alia dividi. Sextum, an sit univoca vel analoga. Disp. Meta. XII, Sect. 3, par. 1.

All references to the Disputationes will appear in this manner. Unless otherwise noted the text used is the modern Romeo edition.

be no new thing; but if there is no new thing, then, the original hypothesis has been violated. This new thing as it is introduced is called the form. Moreover, since causes act not by chance but on account of the purpose of the agent, as is clear with respect especially to human actions, it is necessary to allow for an end on account of which the efficient cause operates. From experience, then, one can discover the four causes of Aristotle--efficient, material, formal, and final.[21]

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[21]Ad primum dubitationem dicendum est omnia illa vere ac proprie rationem causae participare; et ideo merito causam in illa quatuor membra dividi. Haec assertio, praeter communem omnium consensum post Aristotelem, sic probatur. Nam quod illa quatuor in rebus seu effectibus quos experimur inveniantur, facile declarari potest supponendo aliquid novum in rerum natura fieri; quod est tam evidens ex perpetua rerum vicissitudine, alteratione, generatione, ac corruptione ut illud argumentis probare supervacaneum sit. Si ergo fit aliquid de novo, necessaria est aliqua alia res a qua fiat, quia non potest idem facere seipsam, et hanc vocamus efficientem causam. Quae vel producit suum effectum ex nihilo vel ex aliqua re quam ad suam actionem praesupponat; primum non potest in universum dici, nam experimento constat neque artificem facere statuam nisi ex ligno aut aere, neque ignem calefacere nisi aliquid ei supponatur quod calorem suscipiat, neque efficere ignem nisi ex ligno, stupa aut alia re simili. Immo hic modus agendi tam est proprius naturalium causarum, ut philosophi qui ad illas tantum attenderunt inde sumpserint axioma illud: Ex nihilo nihil fit. Illud ergo subiectum quod ad actionem efficientis causae supponitur, materialem causam vocamus. Necesse est autem ut causa efficiens tale subiectum aliquam rem introducat; alias nihil novum efficeret contra positam hypothesim. Illud ergo vocamus formam, qualiscumque illa sit, de quo postea videbimus. Tandem, cum causae per agentes non temere et casu agant, ut ipso rerum experimento constat, et praecipue in actionibus humanis, ut res sit extra controversiam, necesse est ut praeter illa tria detur etiam finis propter quem causa efficiens operatur. Reperiuntur ergo haec quatuor membra in rebus, sive omnia illa in singulis effectibus inveniantur, sive non, hoc enim postea inquirendum nam ad praesens sat est quod in rerum universitate inveniantur. Disp. Meta. XII, Sect. 3, par. 2.

The major concern of this study will be with the material and formal causes. The experiential proof just given for the existence of the four causes places the discussion of matter and form in a definite context. This same proof also gives the initial definition of matter and form. For Suarez the matter is that subject which is presupposed for the action of an efficient cause; the form is the new thing which is introduced into the pre-existing subject. These two definitions become the foundations upon which Suarez builds his doctrine of prime matter and substantial form. For the most part these doctrines as they appear in the Disputationes are nothing more than a careful and extensive elaboration of the definitions of material and formal causes.

In the immediately succeeding paragraph Suarez expands on the basic meanings of material and formal cause the existence of which has been shown from experience. In the explanation of material cause he shows that his approach coincides with Aristotle's definition of matter as id ex quo insito fit aliquid (that from which something new occurs when another is introduced into it). The preposition ex is meant to signify that matter is distinguished from the other causes, and insito signifies that matter is not a mere lack of being but also declares that there is a proper influence by which matter shows itself to be the universal subject. From matter, then, arises the existence of the total

composite.[22] The explanation of formal cause follows a similar pattern to that of material cause. The form is frequently defined as the act which constitutes the composite being, or alternatively, the causa intrinseca quae dat esse rei (the intrinsic cause which gives existence to the thing). That is, the matter is the foundation of the being of a thing; the form completes the being of the thing. These two are the constituting principles of natural things and as such are properly speaking causes of things.[23]

Two things to be noted even in this early discussion of material and formal causes are that Suarez implies in his definition of material cause some sort of separate existence for the matter or subject, and he also refers to these two causes as internal causes. It has already been shown that Suarez picked up the separate existence of matter from Duns Scotus; and even though he is using the Aristotelian

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[22]. . . materia enim ab Aristotele definitur esse id ex quo insito fit aliquid. Ubi per particulam ex cum proprietate sumptum distinguitur materia ab aliis causis; per particulam autem insito separatur a privatione et declaratur proprius influxus, quo materia et in universum subiectum exhibet se, ut ex eo consurgat esse totius. Disp. Meta. XII, Sect. 3, par. 3.

[23]Similiter forma seipsam exhibet ut illa tamquam actu compositum constituatur; immo frequenter definiri solet forma, quod sit causa intrinseca quae dat esse rei; materia enim est quasi inchoatio quaedam vel fundamentum ipsius esse, forma vero illud consummat et complet; propter quod ratio quidditatis appellatur ab Aristotele citatis locis. Item haec numerantur inter principia intrinseca rei naturalis, vel potius illa duo tantum sunt principia constituentia rem naturalem; sunt autem principia per se, cum sint maxime necessaria et essentialia, et dant esse eo modo quo explicatum est; sunt ergo propriae causae. Disp. Meta. XII, Sect. 3, par. 3.

definition Suarez is positing a very different view of matter from Aristotle. The talk of matter and form as internal causes is opposed to the notion that the efficient and final causes are external to the being in question. Internal causes are constitutive of the being, external causes influence but do not compose the being. What is important here is the first sign of a separation of cause into four really distinct and mutually exclusive metaphysical principles. Once this is accomplished it is very difficult to maintain an interrelationship among causes as the initial proof from experience used to establish the four causes.

Suarez becomes explicit about the mutual distinction of the causes when he says, that one can talk about a distinction of the causes with respect to understanding or a distinction of the causes as they occur in the real being. There certainly is no problem with distinguishing these causes in our understanding. Distinction in understanding has been shown already with respect to the proof from experience. But, in regard to distinction in real being Suarez proves that there are different effects in reality and hence different causes. The influence of matter in a real thing is as a potency, the form, however, is an act. The influence of efficient cause is through action or real change; the end changes only metaphorically.[24] Once again,

[24]Ex his facile est expedire punctum secundum de distinctione harum causarum. Potest autem esse sermo de distinctione formaliter ac praecise in ratione causae vel de distinctione quasi materiali seu reali in esse entis. Prior distinctio est quae ad praesens spectat, quam certum est

the interest here is with the material and formal causes. By making the causes mutually distinct Suarez, as will be seen, must rework the meaning of act and potency in such a way that they are mutually distinct in reality but also dependent on one another so that one cannot exist without the other. The problem, here, is maintaining the unity of being. Suarez has only very limited success with this part of his project because it is always necessary in his metaphysics that the material and formal cause with respect to one and the same composite be really distinguished.[25] He is unable to show the mutual dependence.

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inter haec membra reperiri. Primo ex Aristotelis testimonio, quia alias esset vitiosa divisio. Secundo ratione, quia cuasa, ut causa in actu, formaliter constituitur per actualem influxum in effectum; sed in quatuor illis membris sunt influxus diversarum rationum; ergo. Probatur minor, quia influxus causae materialis et formalis est intrinsecus per internam compositionem, influxus autem causae efficientis et finalis est extrinsecus. Rursus influxus materiae est per modum potentiae, forma autem per modum actus. Influxus item efficientis est per actionem seu mutationem realem; influxus autem finis est per mutationem intentionalem aut metaphoricam; sunt ergo omnes hae causalitatis formaliter distinctae; constituunt igitur causas in actu formaliter distinctas. Unde etiam relationes seu virtutes causandi harum causarum distinctae sunt, nam materia causat quatenus est passiva potentia; efficiens vero quatenus habet potentiam activam in aliud; forma vero quatenus vim habet actuandi per seipsam; finis demum quaentus bonus est, et per bonitatem habet vim pelliciendi effectum, quae omnia in sequentibus exponentur latius, neque hic occurrit specialis difficultas circa hanc partem. Disp. Meta. XII, Sect. 3, par. 9.

[25]Semper tamen necesse est ut formalis et materialis causa respectu eiusdem compositi distinguantur realiter vel ex natura rei. Disp. Meta. XII, Sect. 3, par. 12.

Divisions of the Following Study

In the materials that follow it will be seen that the major concern is metaphysical. What is the status of human unity in a hylomorphic theory such as the one proposed by Suarez? The problem breaks down into three rather clearly defined areas of concern. Initially one must look at the general teaching on matter and on form (Chapters II and III). Then one must ask by way of transition for an explanation of individuation (Chapter IV). Only after the general metaphysical doctrine has been expounded can one ask about individual cases of unity. The unity of the human being is a problem in scholastic philosophy both with respect to structure and operation. It is requisite for consistency of the Suarezian system that he be able to explain the human being as a unified structure of matter and form (Chapter V). Finally, there must be a coordination of rational and physical operations if there is to be genuine unity. Or, the material and spiritual must be able to interact with each other (Chapter VI). In general conclusion (Chapter VII) to this study one will find a summary of the findings and some suggestion of the impact Suarez has had on modern philosophy. In the movement from general metaphysics to its application to a specific problem--the unity of the human being--and in the movement to accommodate both Thomistic-Aristotelianism and Scotism, Suarez cannot maintain a genuine unity either of being in general or in the human being.



CHAPTER II

SUAREZ' TEACHING ON MATTER

Suarez' intention in the Disputationes Metaphysicae is to establish a metaphysical position that will serve as a foundation for all of the philosophical disciplines and will also be in accord with theology. It is with this basic Suarezian desire in view that the early chapters of this present study concern themselves mainly with metaphysics rather than psychology. For, it is only after one has a general metaphysics that he can answer the more specialized question of body and soul. The prior metaphysics assumed for the understanding of body and soul is found in the doctrines of matter, form and individuation.

It is the intention of this chapter to investigate Suarez' teaching on matter.[1] He sees five distinct problems which must be dealt with in respect to matter. First, it

[1]There are only two secondary source studies on Suarez' doctrine of matter: John F. McCormick, S.J., "Suarez on Matter and Form," Proceedings of the Jesuit Educational Association (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1931), pp. 162-171. Leon Mahieu, Francois Suarez: sa philosophie et les rapports qu'elle a avec sa theologie (Paris: Desclee, de Brouwer & Co., 1921), Chapter V. McCormick's article is largely a precis of the material found in Disputations XIII and XV and fails to realize some of the significance of the restructuring which occurs in Suarez. Mahieu is interested mainly in the relationship of Suarez' theology and philosophy and gives an exposition of the philosophy only insofar as it illuminates the theology.

must be established that prime matter exists. Secondly, a description of the being and essence of prime matter must be provided. Thirdly, one must examine matter as pure potency. Fourthly, the causality of prime matter must be outlined. And, fifthly, one must examine the relationship of matter to the accident, quantity.[2] By following Suarez through his own reasoning, one observes that this doctrine of matter is really quite different from the Aristotelian and traditional scholastic conceptions of matter.

The Existence of Prime Matter

Following the practice of Aristotle, Suarez initially analyzes the meaning of the words "prime matter" in order to resolve at the outset all terminological difficulties. One usual division of matter is into ex qua (from

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[2]Praetermitto disputationem in communi de causa materiali ut abstrahit a causa susbstantiae vel accidentis, quoniam potissima ratio huius causae cernitur in materia prima; et, si in illa declaretur, facile erit reliqua cum proportione intelligere. Neque timenda est aliquorum censura, qui existimant tractationem de materia prima nullo modo ad metaphysicum pertinere, sed ad solum physicum; iam enim in superioribus, praesertim in prooemiali disputatione, declaratum est multis titulis negotium hoc ad metaphysicum spectare. Quoniam licet physicus sub propria et speciali ratione agat de materia ut est principium generationis naturalis, et ut est causa vel pars entis naturalis, nihilominus metaphysicus, considerando communem rationem causae materialis, quod illius proprium est, necessario agit de prima causa illius generis, quae est materia prima. Item ens de essentia substantiae, necessario tractat de materia, quatenus est pars essentiae, ut infra videbimus, tractando de substantia materiali. Hoc ergo loco sub hac consideratione de materia tractamus. Et quia ratio causandi intelligi non potest non intellecta entitate materiae, investigabimus prius an sit materia, deinde qualis sit entitas et essentia eius, postea de proprietatibus, ac tandem de causalitate eius. Disp. Meta., XIII, Intro.



which), in qua (into which), and circa quam (concerning which). This division can be explained in a variety of ways. One can talk about materia ex qua either with respect to the composite or with respect to the form which is educed from that matter. That is, a composite is made up of matter and form; here one is speaking of the principles from which a thing is made. Alternatively, with respect to the form itself it is educed from the matter. In a word, the matter has certain dispositions for a given form and the form is pulled out of the matter, so to speak. The eduction of the form from the matter applies only to forms below the human level. The human form, however, because of its special nature is not educed from matter but rather is "introduced" into the matter. There is a union here rather than an eduction. This is the application of the term materia in qua. Finally, the notion of materia circa quam applies to the matter upon which an agent operates. Although Suarez himself does not use the example here the Aristotelian paradigm of sculptor and marble is most apt. That is, the marble becomes the materia circa quam the sculptor operates.[3] In

[3]Quoniam materia prima duo includit, oportet ante omnia exponere significationem vocis quoad utramque partem. Materia ergo dividi solet in materiam ex qua, in qua, et circa quam. Quae divisio variis modis explicari potest; primo, ut non sit divisio rerum seu materiarum, sed respectuum ac officiorum eiusdem materiae. Eadem enim materia dicitur ex qua, vel respectu compositi, quod ex illa constat, vel respectu formae quae ex illa educitur. Unde priori respectu corpus hominis est materia ex qua, non tamen posteriori consideratione, quia forma hominis non educitur ex potentia materiae. Unde respectu talis formae dicetur materia in qua introducitur forma; ita ut illud in qua dicat respectum unionis, non eductionis. Potest etiam illud in

light of the ultimate purpose of this study, to prove that Suarez has a dualistic philosophy of body and soul, it is an interesting point that even in the earliest section on an understanding of the term "matter" he has felt a need to make allowances for the special nature of the human soul.

Unsatisfied with the usual scholastic division of matter as given above, Suarez next distinguishes matter into "metaphysical" and "physical." This distinction is important in that metaphysical matter is considered by Suarez to be matter only through analogy. That is, it is not real matter at all; it is matter only in some sort of extended use of the term. It is physical matter with which Suarez is concerned. This physical matter is the matter which is a principle of being and is properly and simply the matter appropriate to the present discussion.[4] This difficult

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qua abstracte sumi, ut includat habitudinem ad formam ut inhaerentem materiae. Respectu vero agentis dicitur eadem materia circa quam agens operatur. Iuxta hanc ergo interpretationem terminorum nullum membrum ex dictis a praesenti consideratione excluditur; agimus enim de materia secundum se, vel prout in suo conceptu adaequato omnes illas habitudines includit; an vero illae pertineant ad varias causalitates et ex natura rei distinctas, postea videbimus. Aliter sumi solet materia circa quam, prout distinguitur a materia ex qua et in qua secundum realem unionem et inhaerentiam, et sic proprie dicit respectum ad agens actione immanenti, et nihil aliud est quam obiectum circa quod tale agens versatur. Quae significatio materiae metaphorica est, et nihil ad praesens refert, quia illa ut sic non exercet causalitatem materialem, sed vel efficientem vel finalem, ut supra tetigimus non est ergo hic sermo de materia obiectiva, sed de subiectiva. Disp. Meta., XIII, Sect. 1, par. 1.

[4]. . . dividi solet materia in metaphysicam et physicam: metaphysica est genus respectu differentiae; illa vero appellatio solum est per analogiam et proportionem ad materiam physicam, quae est proprie et simpliciter materia de qua hic agimus; de metaphysica vero, praeter ea quae

distinction points out that Suarez views the matter of material cause not simply as something that serves as a metaphysical explanatory principle but also, and especially, as a real physical foundation for all tangible objects.

The final distinction Suarez makes with respect to the use of the term "matter" is that between "prime matter" and "second matter." It is here that he gives the overriding understanding of matter. That matter is called "prime" which does not presuppose a prior subject; here he quotes Aristotle's definition of prime matter from the first book of the Physics, ". . . primum subiectum ex quo fit aliquid" (the first subject from which anything occurs). The whole doctrine on matter in Suarez is worked out on the basis of the implications of this basic definition of prime matter.

Suarez contrasts the understanding of prime matter with that of second matter. Simply put, second matter presupposes a prior subject. Then, he lists the various opinions on the nature of second matter. Some call the substantial composite second matter; that is, the composite made up of matter and form. This composite becomes the matter with respect to accidents. Some call matter which is disposed in a certain way to accept some form or accident second matter.[5]

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diximus supra agentes de unitate universali, addemus aliqua disp. XV, sect. ult., agentes de forma metaphysica. Disp. eta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. 2.

[5]Prima vero dici potest materia et per negationem rioris, et per respectum ad secundam; quia ergo materia icit rationem subiecti, illa dicetur prima quae nullum rius subiectum supponit; et ita Aristoteles, I Phys., c. 9, efinivit materiam esse primum subiectum ex quo fit

But, the important thing to note here is that Suarez is insisting that there is a radical difference between prime matter, which is the ultimate first subject, and second matter, which is conditioned in some way either as part of an already constituted composite or as a disposition for a form or accident.

In summary, then, there are three sets of terms one must distinguish in a discussion on matter. First the division of ex qua, in qua, and circa quam indicates the relationship of the matter to the form or the agent. Second, the distinction of metaphysical and physical points out that real tangible matter is the primary understanding of the term "matter." Third, the distinction between prime and second matter specifies that there must be a radical first subject.

After Suarez enumerates the various uses of the term "matter" he then turns to the question of whether or not there is such a thing as prime matter. In the analysis of the existence of prime matter he provides several arguments

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liquid. Materia autem secunda dicetur quae prius subiectum upponit. Atque ita multi vocant sustantiale compositum ateriam secundam respectu accidentium, quia ita est subiectum accidentium, ut ex priori subiecto constet; et simili atione qui plures formas substantiales in eodem supposito dmittunt, compositum, verbi gratia, ex materia et forma orporeitatis vocant materiam secundam respectu animae. aepe etiam vocatur materia secunda materia disposita seu ffecta dispositionibus accidentalibus, non quia compositum psum ex materia et accidentibus sit subiectum in quo recitur forma sed solum quia receptio talium dispositionum ntecedit ordine naturae et constituit materiam proxime apacem talis formae, unde proprie vocatur talis materia roxima . . . Omnis itaque materia secunda supponit primam t addit aliquam formam vel dispositionem. Disp. Meta. III, Sect. 1, par. 3.

to prove that there really is such a thing as prime matter. First, there is a necessity for a first subject in any change. Secondly, there is a necessity for prime matter from the fact that things constantly are generated and corrupted among themselves. Thirdly, there must be a resolution to one first subject. It is now appropriate to turn to each of these claims and examine Suarez' proofs for them.

With respect to the claim that there must be a first subject in any change and hence there must be a prime matter, that is, concerning the first subject of change of form and abstract from the question of kind of subject or kind of form which is received into the subject, it is as evident that there is prime matter as it is evident that there are changes in things from one form to another. In a word, every change presupposes a subject and this is known from experience (". . . et experimento constat"). Either that subject presupposes another or not. If it does not presuppose another then it is the "first subject" and this is what is understood by "prime matter." If it does presuppose another subject then one can ask about that further subject. It is evident, however, that one cannot proceed to an infinity of subjects. It is necessary that there be some first subject or "prime matter."[6] Here is the initial

[6]Atque hinc constat, si in communi et quasi formaliter loquamur de materia prima, id est, de primo subiecto mutationum vel formarum, abstrahendo a quaestione quale sit tale subiectum qualisve forma quae in eo recipitur, sic tam evidens esse dari materiam primam quam est evidens dari in rebus mutationes ad varias formas, quia omni mutationi aliquod subiectum supponitur, ut supra



example of Suarez' insistence that prime matter is a first subject. He understands it as radically first; that is, there must be some thing which stands prior to every specific determination. This is the task of prime matter--to be radically the first subject.

The existence of matter is also inferred from the continual alteration of things; the argument here is really a variation on the previous one. The existence of prime matter is proved principally from the fact that things are generable and corruptible in such a way that one is generated from the corruption of another. But, in order for this to occur it is necessary that it happen in some common subject which remains in every change. This subject is the reason why there is a capacity for mutual transformations. And, it is this subject that is called prime matter.[7] The

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probatum est et experimento constat. Igitur vel illud subiectum supponit aliud vel non; si non supponit, illud est primum et habetur intentum. Si vero supponit aliud, quaeram de illo; est autem evidens non posse procedi in infinitum; ergo necessario sistendum est in aliquo primo subiecto seu materia prima. Minor propositio ultimo assumpta demonstratur ab Aristotele de omnibus causis in lib. II; est tamen quodammodo evidentior in causa materiali, quae est intrinsecum totius compositi fundamentum; non potest autem intellectu percipi compositum per se stans, cuius una pars nitatur in alia et alia rursus in alia quin tandem sistatur in aliqua quae caeteris substet. Cum ergo omne naturale compositum ita per se sit ut secundum se totum non pendeat in genere causae materialis ab aliquo subiecto quod extra ipsum sit, necesse est ut intra se habeat aliquod subiectum quod sit primum respectu omnium aliarum entitatem ex quibus constat et in subiecto sunt. Sic igitur evidens est dari materiam primam seu subiectum primum in rebus naturalibus. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. 4.

[7]Secundo principaliter probatur, nam est evidens res generabiles et corruptibiles ita transmutari ut aliae ex aliis vicissim ac mutuo generentur saltem mediate; ergo

way in which this argument differs from the previous one is in the fact that Suarez is taking into account not only change from one kind of thing to another but also the fact that generable and corruptible things alter between various kinds of forms such as would occur in a series of changes from plant, to animal, to human, to inorganic, and back to plant.[8] In the first argument Suarez was concerned only with the foundation for any change; here he is concerned with the foundation for successive changes. This serial ordering of changes also demands a common first subject, prime matter.

The final argument that there must be a prime matter is based on the notion that there cannot be an infinity of subjects but rather there must be some first subject. In light of the previous discussions of change, Suarez concludes that this matter is the first cause in its order and in this sense is to be called prime matter. This can be shown to be so because one cannot proceed to infinity in proximate and remote subjects. It is necessary that some

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necesse est ut in aliquo communi subiecto conveniant quod in omnibus ipsis maneat, ratione cuius sint capaces illius mutuae transmutationis; ergo illud subiectum est primum, atque adeo prima materialis causa huiusmodi rerum. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. 5.

[8]Potestque hoc ipsum declarari inductione facta in aliquibus transmutationibus; cum animal, verbi gratia, alitur ex cibo, vel aliquid cibi manet in fine nutritionis et coniungitur substantiae viventi vel omnino destruitur cibus et totum quod in illo est per actionem viventis. Si nihil cibi manet, superflua est tota actio viventis, nihilque ex cibo iuvari potest ut inde vel crescat vel confortetur, quia ex eo quod perit in cibo nihil confortatur vel crescit. Si vero aliquid cibi manet, illud esse non potest nisi communis materia vel subiectum. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. 8.

subject not be subjected nor even be composed of parts which are themselves subjects. For, every composite is able to be resolved into more simple parts. Hence, if prime matter were composed in any way it would not be a genuinely first subject. Suarez here is very careful to point out that in this argument he is not appealing to the impossibility of an infinite regress of substantial forms in a composite being. Even though it is evident that there cannot be such a regress of forms, with respect to the potency that could receive such an infinitude there still must be some ultimate subject. It is this ultimate subject that is called prime matter.

Not only from the simplicity but from the commonness of this subject is it the case that there must be a prime matter. Since all kinds of lower things (i.e., things below the rational soul) are mutually interchangeable immediately or at least mediately, it is necessary that that subject which is presupposed by these interchanges be "first" in every understanding. If this first subject came from another prior subject or constant matter it also would be mutually generable and so would not be a common subject, but only that which remains after the dissolution. Or, it would not be mutually generable and so every corporeal being would not be mutually generable into every other corporeal being. But, the opposite was presupposed at the outset of the discussion.[9]

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[9]Superest probanda secunda consequentia principalis rationis, qua inferebamus hanc materiam esse primam causam in suo ordine eoque sensu verissime appellari primam

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This final argument contains two parts: that there cannot be an infinity of subjects ordered in terms of proximateness and remoteness because the ultimate subject cannot subject anything else. And this ultimate subject must be common in the sense that it must be capable of accepting any form.

The final and decisive argument for the existence of prime matter, according to Suarez, is the fact that there is not only accidental change but also substantial change. That there is such a change is sufficiently evident from experience not only in inanimate elements and aggregates but much more in living things, in animals, and in ourselves

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materiam; hoc autem nullo evidentiori modo ostendi potest (quidquid aliqui velint) quam supra tacto, scilicet, quia non potest procedi in infinitum in subiectis proximis et remotis seu in subiectis et subiectatis (ut ita dicam), sed sistendum necessario est in aliquo subiecto quod non subiectetur, neque etiam componatur ex parte quae in subiecto sit, quia omne tale compositum resolvi tandem potest in simplicia, in quibus aliquod esse oportet quod omnino in subiecto non sit. Neque supponit hic discursus quod in formis substantialibus eiusdem compositi non sit processus in infinitum; nam, etsi hoc etiam evidens sit tamen, si per impossibile fingerentur infinitae formae in eodem composito, ex parte potentiae recipientis eas necessario sistendum erit in aliquo subiecto simplici quod non sit in subiecto; quia tota collectio talium formarum est in aliquo subiecto; ergo illud est simplex, ut magis statim demonstrabimus; hoc ergo vocamus materiam primam. Praeter hoc autem potest etiam illa consequentia probari ex communitate huius subiecti; cum enim omnia haec inferiora mutuo transmutentur immediate vel saltem mediate, ut dictum est, necesse est ut subiectum illud quod his transmutationibus supponitur, sit primum in ratione subiecti seu materiae; nam si esset ex alio priori subiecto vel materia constans, vel illud esset etiam transmutabile, et sic non esset commune subiectum omnium transmutationum, sed illud quod maneret post resolutionem eius; vel non esset transmutabile, et sic non omne corporeum ens esset transmutabile in quodlibet aliud, cuius oppositum supponebamus; sed de hoc latius sectione tertia. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. 10.



when we are generated and when we die. On account of this fact Suarez sees a necessity for a substantial form distinct from the accidents. If there is such a form then there must be prime matter which is the subject of this kind of form and with it composes one whole substance. That subject is the material cause of substance.[10] Suarez delays the discussion of whether or not there are substantial forms until Disputation XV. So, here the argument for prime matter is decisive only on the condition that there are also substantial forms. One might look at the matter as a simple modus ponens argument:

> If there are substantial forms, then there is prime matter
> (This is Suarez' present claim).
>
> There are substantial forms
> (This is proved in Disputation XV).
>
> Therefore: There is prime matter.

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[10] Ad concludendum ergo dari materiam primam, qualem Aristoteles posuit, restabat probandum transmutationem horum corporum inferiorum quam experimur, non solum esse accidentalem, sed etiam substantialem. Hoc autem praeter experientiam, quae per se videtur satis evidens, non solum in elementis et in mixtis inanimatis, sed multo magis in viventibus, animalibus et in nobis ipsis cum generamur et morimur, paraeter hanc (inquam) experientiam ratione probandum est ex necessitate formarum substantialium ab accidentibus distinctarum; nam si dantur hae formae, necesse est dari materiam primam quae sit subiectum earum et cum eis componat unam substantiam integram, quod est esse causam materialem substantiae. Dari autem formas substantiales, probandum est infra, disp. XV, et ideo nunc supponatur et tantum ex ea hypothesi demonstratum habeatur dari veram ac propriam materiam primam in his rebus quae generantur et corrumpuntur; est enim consecutio evidens et omni carens difficultate; antecedens vero dicto loco probandum est. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 1, par. 12.

It is evident at this point that Suarez is using the analysis of change as the foundation for the claim that there is indeed such a thing as prime matter. He employs Aristotle's basic insight that there are different kinds of change and that in each of these kinds there must be a subject of change as well as a principle which changes. There cannot be an infinity of such subjects and, consequently, there must be a "first" subject, a "prime" matter. It will become increasingly evident in the course of this chapter that the notion of matter as the subject of change is the basic notion of the Suarezian doctrine of matter. This notion influences especially the analysis of the being and essence of matter and the properties of matter. It should be also noted here that the emphasis of Suarez on matter as a first subject of change is the source of some serious problems with respect to the unity of a composite being. These problems become more evident as Suarez develops the implications of his theory of matter.

The Being and Essence of Prime Matter

Granted that the material cause is the first subject of change, Suarez immediately turns to a specification of what this matter might be. He is concerned initially with the unity of this first subject, and so asks whether there are one or many material causes. He opts for the choice that there is a single material cause. Now, given this choice, he must refute two contrary opinions--1. that



there is a plurality but still finite number of material causes, and 2. that there is an infinite number of material causes.

With respect to the notion that there are an infinite number of material causes, Suarez accepts Aristotle's argumentation against this opinion. The opponents here are the atomists (i.e., Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Anaxagoras).[11] Suarez claims that these philosophers simply did not understand the nature of a true material cause which is a physical potency for receiving some act. The "atoms" of these philosophers are not in potency to receiving some physical form. Rather, the way in which they are described makes each atom a composite being in itself and consequently the being of natural things is nothing more than a gathering together of these parts into an accidental unity. In this sense, then, there would be no genuine substantial generation or corruption but only various gatherings of atoms.

According to Suarez this is an absurd opinion, for these philosophers must understand that there is an infinite number of these atoms either in each natural being or in the universe taken as a whole. The first understanding is absurd, for it is not possible that there be an infinite number of atoms to compose any body unless the body itself

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[11]It is evident here that Suarez has a much more extensive use of the term "atomist" than is customary in contemporary philosophical discourse. He includes as atomists anyone who accepts an infinity of primary metaphysical principles.



increase to an infinite magnitude. If atoms are not taken as indivisible mathematically but rather physically, then they have some single magnitude in which they are all equal, or at least there is some smallest atom and all others are greater than this one. Therefore, in this way, infinite atoms make up an infinite magnitude in act. But, this is absurd. If, on the other hand, atoms are indivisible mathematically (i.e., are mere points), they are not able to make up any magnitude whatsoever unless there is empty space between them. This intervening space, however, will have to be divisible and of some magnitude. From this one can only conclude that infinite atoms which can never touch are always so distant from each other as to make an infinitely large body occupying or including an infinite space, partly empty and partly full of atoms. But, there are no infinite bodies.

If one considers the opposite opinion, that there are an infinite number of atoms in the universe, this also leads to absurdities. Here Suarez does nothing more than summarize Aristotle's argument from the Physics and De Caelo. If there is an infinite number of atoms in the universe it is evident that the whole realm of finite generation and corruption cannot terminate at the sphere of the moon,[12] but this, then, attributes to the heavens a

[12]Even though Suarez is writing at the end of the sixteenth century, he accepts the more traditional Ptolemaic universe together with the Aristotelian explanation of the fact that the only change that takes place beyond the sphere of the moon is that of local motion.

composition of atoms. To extend the number of these to infinity is not possible philosophically because neither experience nor reason dictate such a solution. What is at issue here is the traditional notion that there is no generation or corruption beyond the sphere of the moon. The position that there are an infinite number of atoms in the universe would allow for such generation and corruption. According to Suarez neither experience nor reason can accept this.[13]

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[13]. . . hi philosophi [i.e., Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Metrodorus, Anaxagoras] imprimis non cognoverunt veram materialem causam quae sit potentia physice receptiva alicuius actus; nam illae atomi non sunt in potentia ad recipiendam aliquam formam physicam, nec possunt dici materia totius compositi, nisi eo modo quo partes integrales dicuntur materia totius et lapides ac ligna materia domus. Unde ulterius fit, ut iuxta illum philosophandi modum, formae naturalium entium quasi artificiales tantum sint, nimirum figurae quaedam consurgentes ex vario situ et ordine atomorum. Atque ita nulla erit vera substantialis generatio et corruptio sed tantum varia coordinatio aut deordinatio atomorum. . . .

Illud etiam est absurdum in his omnibus philosophis, quod infinitam multitudinem ponant horum corpusculorum; nam vel intelligunt in singulis entibus naturalibus esse infinitam multitudinem harum atomorum vel solum in toto universo, in singulis vero corporibus aut partibus eius esse finitam multitudinem. Priori sensu est prosus absurda; non enim possent infinitae atomi componere aliquod corpus quin illud excreseret in infinitam magnitudinem; nam si atomi non fingantur indivisibiles mathematice sed physice, habebunt singulae aliquam magnitudinem in qua vel omnes erunt aequales, quia nulla est inaequalitatis ratio, vel saltem assignari poterit minima atomus cui aliae sint vel aequales vel maiores; ergo ex huiusmodi atomis infinitis necessario componetur magnitudo actu infinita. Si vero atomi sint indivisibiles mathematice, non possunt magnitudinem componere, nisi interponatur spatium inane, quod spatium erit divisibile et alicuius magnitudinis; ex quo similiter concluditur infinitas atomos sic inter se distantes necessario efficere infinitam corpus, occupans seu includens infinitam spatium, partim inane, partim repletum atomis. . . .

Posteriori autem sensu est etiam illa sententia

Once the opinion concerning an infinitude of atoms is rejected as absurd, Suarez next turns his attention to the hypothesis that there are a finite number of such atoms or elements. This is an opinion, Suarez interprets, such as is held by Empedocles, who maintains that the four elements--earth, air, fire, and water--are the four first material causes. It is from these four causes that all mixtures arise, but these four elements themselves have no prior cause or material principle. But it is established that air is changed into fire and water into earth and vice versa. For this kind of change, the elements are not able to be material principles, but rather there must be some subject common to all of them. And so, here he concludes that these elements are not first material causes of mixtures because in the elements themselves there is a prior subject which remains and is informed by the forms of the elements themselves; and this pluralistic opinion is false.[14]

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improbabilis . . . scripsit Arist., III Phys., et I de Caelo. Deinde evidens est totam sphaeram rerum generabilium et corruptibilium esse finitam cum ad sphaeram lunae terminetur; attribuere autem etiam caelis compositionem ex atomis illosque extendere in infinitum non potest esse philosophicum, quia neque experientia neque ratio nos ducit ad ita existimandum. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 2, pars. 3-5.

[14]Secunda sententia ponit etiam plura principia, seu plures primas causas materiales, rerum generabilium in numero tamen finito. Ita sensit Empedocles, qui quatuor elementa, ignem, aerem, aquam et terram, dixit esse quatuor primas causas materiales ex quibus mixta generantur, ipsa vero non habere priorem causam aut principium materiale. Verumtamen haec sententia falsa est et evidenter refutari potest; nam imprimis, quamvis attigerit compositionem seu generationem mixti ex elementis, non tamen consideravit transmutationem elementorum inter sese, cum tamen constet et



Having eliminated both possibilities for a multiplicity of material causes, Suarez next declares that there must be a single material cause. And, this has been sufficiently proven by eliminating the opinions of the pluralists and the atomists. It has been shown that from common and mutual interchange of sublunary things that there is one common matter. This is the case both because contrary principles from which generation and corruptions arise ought to have the same subject and because that subject is of itself indifferent to any form of corruptible things. Therefore, it does not require of itself any distinction or multiplication. And, from the other side, every form of generable thing of whatever kind is able to be introduced into any part of this matter. It is a sign of this matter that of itself it is one and is sufficient in its genus for causing every effect which needs a material cause. If other causes in other genera are

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aerem converti in ignem et aquam in terram et e converso. Huiusmodi autem transmutationis non possunt elementa esse principia materialia, sed aliquod subiectum commune omnibus illis. Quod si forte existimavit Empedocles elementa non transmutari substantialiter, ideoque non constare materia et substantiali forma, sed esse quaedam entia omnino simplicia, accidentibus subiecta, contra hoc imprimis ostendemus inferius non minus esse certum dari formas substantiales elementorum quam aliorum entium naturalium et consequenter vere ac substantialiter inter se transmutari. Deinde, licet id admitteremus, nullum esset fundamentum ad multiplicandas materias seu prima subiecta substantialia, sed dicendum potius esset in omnibus elementis esse idem substantiale subiectum, quod diversis accidentibus affectum, distinctum appellatur elementum. Cumque illud etiam subiectum sit principium materiale mixtorum, fit ut reipsa et substantialiter tantum sit una prima causa materialis omnium rerum. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 2, par. 6.

necessary, then the material cause operates along with them.[15]

Once it has been established that there is a single material cause, Suarez sees the further problem of whether or not this material cause is a total substance or a simple body. Once again, he goes to the ancient philosophers to illustrate this position; and here the monists are the special object of concern. What seems to be common to all of these thinkers is that they thought nothing truly new could occur, that is, they did not acknowledge substantial forms, nor substantial generation nor substantial corruption. It was felt that every change which we experience consisted simply in various modes of existence of the one common matter. From this some moved to the notion that they should not speak of a material cause of all things but a single

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[15]Dicendum ergo est primam materiam seu materialem causam omnium rerum sublunarium esse tantum unam. Quae est communis sententia omnium philosophorum quos in sequentibus referemus. Et sufficienter probatur ratione nunc facta contra Empedoclem et posteriori discursu facto sectione praecedenti. Ubi ex communi et mutua transmutatione rerum sublunarium ostendimus dari communem materiam; illa enim ratio aeque probat primum subiectum quod sub his omnibus transmutationibus manet esse unum tantum. Tum quia contraria principia ex quibus fiunt generationes et corruptiones, versari debent circa idem. Tum etiam quia illud subiectum est ex se indifferens ad quascumque formas rerum corruptibilium et dispositiones earum; non ergo requirit in se distinctionem seu multiplicationem, immo non est unde illam habeat. Et e converso omnis forma rei generabilis cuiuscumque speciei potest introduci in quamcumque partem huius materiae si commode disponatur; ergo signum est materiam hanc secundum se esse unam et eiusdem rationis et sufficientem in suo genere ad causandos omnes effectus qui in his rebus possunt materialiter causari, si aliae causae in aliis generibus necessariae applicentur seu concurrant. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 2, par. 8.

being of all things, not in number, but in substance and essence. If things are not changed substantially and do not differ because of substantial forms but only because of accidents or modes of existence, there is, then, no material cause of substance. Rather there is only a simple substance which is not essentially different from one thing to another.[16] Suarez, however, does not want to accept only accidental change, as we have already seen.

There is also a "modern" opinion which arises with thinkers such as Avicenna, Scotus, and Henry of Ghent. These people place in prime matter a form of corporeity

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[16]Antiqui philosophi (ut Aristoteles et alii auctores praecedenti sectione citati referunt) qui unum tantum materiale principium naturalium rerum posuerunt, fere omnes putarunt esse aliquam substantiam integram seu corpus simplex, quale Averroes existimat esse caeleste corpus. De illo autem corpore seu materiali causa fuit inter eos multiplex opinio. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, par. 1.

Prolixum esset ac superfluum propria motiva horum omnium philosophorum referre, eo quod et incerta sint et nullam prae se ferant probabilitatem aut verisimilitudinem, ut ex dicendis obiter constabit. Illud vero commune omnibus fuisse videtur quod nihil de novo simpliciter fieri putarunt, quoniam ex nihilo nihil fieri potest; ideoque nec substantiales formas agnovisse videntur, nec generationem, corruptionemve substantialem. Immo multi eorum indicant nullas esse accidentales formas quae vera entia sint, quia non intelligebant aliquam veram rem posse de novo fieri, sed omnem mutationem quam experimur, putabant consistere in variis modis se habendi illius rei quam putabant esse communem materiam. Ex quo aliqui eo ulterius progressi sunt, ut non dicerent causam materialem omnium entium esse unum, sed omnia entia esse unum, non numero, sed substantia et essentia; qui, licet rem falsam et improbabilem dicerent, consequenter tamen loquebantur, si de solis corporibus generalibus agebant. Nam, si haec non transmutantur substantialiter, nec differunt per substantiales formas, sed per accidentia aut diversos modos se habendi, revera nulla datur materialis causa substantiae, sed datur tantum substantia simplex quae non est alia et alia essentialiter, sed una aliter et aliter se habens sub diversis accidentibus. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, par. 3.

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co-equal with matter and inseparable from it. This form of corporeity is thought to be separate from essential and physical composition and matter remains the common subject of every change. The universal cause of every generation, corruption, and body is a body absolutely through the removal of every form but "corporeity."[17] Suarez takes this position on the form of corporeity seriously because it in effect makes prime matter a simple being or a total substance. In the Resolutio Questionis he analyzes very carefully the impossibility of matter being an integral being and in the process rejects the "modern" position.[18]

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[17]Potest tamen hoc loco referri alia opinio, quam multi ex modernis philosophis secuti sunt, ponentes in materia prima formam corporeitatis illi coaevum et ab illa inseparabilem. Nam, licet respectu talis formae materialis causa eius sit simplex, id est absque essentiali et physica compositione, tamen illud commune subiectum quod sub omni transmutatione manet, et est universalis causa materialis omnis generationis et omnis formae substantialis quae per eductionem fit et omnis compositi quod generatur illud (inquam) subiectum iuxta praedictam opinionem non est simplex sed essentialiter compositum et corpus aliquod, non mixtum, neque etiam aliquod ex elementis, neque medium inter illa per eorum participationem, sed absolute corpus per praecisionem omnium inferiorum formarum. [i.e., Avicenna, Scotus, Henry of Ghent] . . . Henricus . . . in solo homine illam admittendam censet propter indivisibilitatem animae rationalis. Unde hi duo auctores [Avicenna, Henry of Ghent] non ponunt hanc formam inseparabilem a materia, neque ut per se necessarium ad primam causalitatem materialem subiecti generationis, sed propter alias speciales causas; et ideo eorum opinio ad praesentem locum non spectat. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, par. 5.

[18]The actual rejection of this "modern position" occurs in paragraphs 21 and 22 of Section 3, Disputation XIII. The text of these paragraphs is as follows:

Tertia ratio sumitur ex differentia inter essentialem compositionem physicam ac metaphysicam, quas velle in hoc aequiparare causa est erroris, cum altera in rebus, altera in conceptibus existat. Argumentor igitur, nam si dari potest forma physica quae solum conferat gradum

Suarez' doctrine on the unicity of prime matter can be summarized in a series of conclusions. 1. The material cause in its own order is not universal and first if it is composed from sensible bodies or elements which bring about

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genericum, ergo quot sunt gradus generici et specifici substantiarum materialium, tot erunt multiplicandae formae substantiales realiter distinctae; consequens est falsum; ergo. Sequela probatur a paritate rationis; quae enim ratio afferri potest ob quam quidam gradus genericus datur per propriam formam realiter distinctam et non alii? Maxime quod iuxta sententiam quam impugnamus, non solum in rebus quae videntur elevari ad altiorem gradum corporum ut sunt viventia, sed etiam in infimis et inanimatis corporibus distinguitur forma dans esse corporis a forma dante esse ignis aut lapidis vel aliud simile; quae contractio est cum minima diversitate quae esse potest inter aliquod genus et differentiam substantialem; si ergo illa sufficit ad realem distinctionem formarum, quaelibet sufficit; unde non defuerunt philosophi qui consequens illud admitterent; est tamen non solum falsum, sed etiam ridiculum. Primo, quia constat evidenter inductione superius facta, ad abstrahendos conceptus generis, differentiae, et speciei, non esse necessariam illam distinctionem realem formarum, ut patet in angelis et accidentibus. Secundo, quia sequitur multiplicandas esse in homine tres animas, quae est sententia omnino falsa, ut ex scientia de anima suppono. Immo plures etiam multiplicandae erunt nam in gradu sentiendi potest aliqua convenientia essentialis abstrahi inter hominem et aliqua animalia perfecta quae non sit communis omnibus animalibus, et in ratione intelligendi potest abstrahi ratio generica communis homini et angelis quae per propriam differentiam ad hominem contrahatur. Unde ulterius sequitur innumeras formas realiter distinctas esse asserendas in singulis compositis, quia differentiae genericae et specificae possunt variis modis multiplicari iuxta varias convenientias et differentias quae facile possunt in rebus considerari et secundum eas possunt varii conceptus communes vel particulares abstrahi. Est ergo magnus error in metaphysica et philosophia, propter modum nostrum concipiendi confusum vel distinctum, ex quo saepe oritur generum et differentiarum multiplicatio, reales ac physicas formas distinguere . . .

Quod tandem confirmatur, quia impossible est dari formam substantialem dantem specificum gradum substantiae quae non det etiam illum gradum genericum et effectum formalem quem dare fingitur forma corporeitatis distincta; ergo et superflua et impossibilis est talis forma. Consequentia est evidens, quia idem essentiale praedicatum idemque effectus formalis non potest eidem rei convenire per duas formas realiter distinctas. Antecedens vero probatur, quia non potest dari forma substantialis quae

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contrary qualities. 2. Prime matter is not some body or complete and whole substance. 3. The material cause of generable things is not a composite substance made up of a substantial potency and some incomplete and quasi-generic substantial form.[19] From these three conclusions Suarez infers that the first material cause of material substances is not some total being, nor any composite of matter and form. And, positively, that some ingenerable and incorruptible body is not to be presupposed in the generation of substances. The first subject is prime matter.

With respect to Suarez' first conclusion, that the material cause in its own order is not universal and first if it is composed from sensible bodies or elements which bring about contrary qualities, it has already been shown that atoms and a series of finite elements are inadequate

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conferat specificum gradum, quae essentialiter non includat communem ac genericum rationem formae substantialis informantis materiam; sed haec praecisa ratio sufficit ad constituendam formam corporeitatis; ergo forma corporeitatis non est specialis forma sed est quaelibet forma substantialis considerata secundum communem rationem formae substantialis informantis. Minor probatur (reliqua enim clara sunt), nam ex hoc praecise quod aliqua substantia intelligatur composita ex materia et forma substantiali, essentialiter est substantia corporea seu corpus de praedicamento substantiae; nam ex vi talis compositionis et est essentialiter distincta a substantia incorporea et est capax quantitatis seu trinae dimensionis, in quo consistit ratio substantiae corporeae. Unde forma corporeitatis ut sic non dicit nec requirit quod ipsa corporea sit seu extensa sed solum quod informet materiam, ratione cuius compositum inde resultans sit capax trinae dimensionis; nulla est ergo necessaria aut possibilis forma media quae det esse genericum corporis, sed quaelibet forma substantialis ex vi suae genericae rationis illud confert. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, pars. 21-22.

[19]I.e., forma corporeitatis.



explanations of the material cause. On the positive side, though, the material cause must not be changed nor depart in a transformation; this is what in effect elemental theories do. And, since generation occurs between contraries, it is necessary that the common subject of generation should have none of the contraries naturally innate to itself because it would not then be able to accept contraries as necessary. In a word, the material cause ought to be indifferent to every form, since it is common to all forms.[20]

Suarez' second conclusion, that prime matter is not a whole being, also rejects atomism and the finite elements position. When one says that material cause is not a total being, this can be taken in two ways. First, matter itself

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[20]Dicendum igitur est primo causam materialem in suo ordine universalem et primam non esse aliquod ex sensibilibus corporibus seu elementis quae contrariis qualitatibus afficiuntur . . . nam si haec elementa et omnia corpora sensibilia invicem transmutantur substantialiter nullum eorum potest esse primum subiectum transmutationis; nam primum subiectum, quod est prima causa materialis quam inquirimus, non transmutatur nec recedit a sua substantia; alioqui resolveretur in aliud prius subiectum et ita ipsum non esset primum. Praeterea, cum generatio fiat inter contraria necesse est ut commune generationis subiectum nullum habeat contrariorum sibi naturaliter innatum; alioqui vel nunquam erit capax alterius contrarii vel corrumpetur per abiectionem eius, quod sibi est connaturale, sicut destruitur elementum ablata qualitate sibi necessaria. Cum ergo singula elementa sint affecta propriis qualitatibus habentibus contrarium, nullum eorum esse potest aptum generationis subiectum; ergo neque esse potest prima causa materialis entium naturalium.

Atque hinc consurgit tertia ratio, quia non est cur haec causalitas potius attribuatur uni elemento quam aliis, neque etiam est cur magis repugnet omnibus simul quam alicui eorum; sed ostensum est non posse omnibus convenire; ergo nulli vere attribuitur. . . . Prima vero materialis causa cum sit communis omnibus, ex se debet esse indifferens ad omnia. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, pars. 6-7.

is the substance of all generable things alone and these things differ by reason of the distinct accidents. This position is to be rejected because things differ not only accidentally but substantially; things change not only accidentally but substantially. The other manner in which one can conceive of matter as a whole substance is in terms of a capacity for receiving further substantial forms.[21] This understanding also is improbable. Either matter is a complete substance totally simple or it would be composed from some substantial potency and act. The latter is not possible because, 1. matter is not already a total composite but rather a potency--a potency according to which it has been established that there is a first material cause; 2. there is no indication or sensible sign of an intervening form between pure matter and other forms which are introduced through generation. This leads to a realization that such a form would be totally superfluous, because there is no physical effect on account of which it is necessary. It must also be noted that it is impossible to join two such forms in the same potency or matter, for it is plainly impossible that two specific forms at one and the same time be joined together for actuating the same substantial potency. Either those two forms would immediately actuate the matter or one would be the act of the composite (i.e., a composite composed of the first form and the potency). The first cannot be held because a prior form would not necessarily

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[21]E.g., forma corporeitatis.



be presupposed for a later one nor would the composite from matter and such a form be a proximate potency and material cause of subsequent forms. Neither can the second be held because a substantial form which helps constitute an integral and complete substance has the intelligibility of the ultimate act in the understanding of substantial and essential act. Finally, and most generally, it is not possible that one and the same substance, essentially and per se, be constituted in two ultimate species. It is through some form that things are constituted in a species. Therefore two forms are not able to be joined in the same matter. In a word, the substantial form gives existence simply and essentially, while the accidental form gives existence in a certain way. From all of this Suarez reasons that it is impossible that the subject which is a material cause of generable things and of substantial generation could be a complete substance and be constituted a complete being without a proper and specific form.[22]

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[22]Dico secundo: materia prima non est aliquod corpus seu substantia completa et integra in essentia et specie substantiae. Duobus modis intelligi potest materiam esse huiusmodi substantiam. Primo, ut ispa sola sit substantia omnium rerum generabilium solumque formetur distinctis accidentibus eorum; et in hoc sensu probanda est assertio ex eo quod res naturales non tantum differunt accidentibus sed etiam substantia et essentia. . . .

Alio ergo modo posset quis fingere materiam esse substantiam integram et completam in aliqua specie substantiae et nihilominus esse aptam ad recipiendas ulteriores formas substantiales et componendas cum eis varias substantias et essentias materialium rerum. Et hic etiam sensus improbabilis esset; aut enim materia esset completa substantio omnino simplex aut esset composita ex aliqua potentia et actu substantiali; hoc posterius dici non potest, primo, quia iam non totum illud compositum, sed potentia ex qua

It is now necessary to turn to Suarez' third conclusion, that the material cause of generable things is not a composite substance made up of a substantial potency and some sort of incomplete form. The first reason this cannot be the case is that there is no indication in nature for such an inseparable and coequal form, for one can find no effect of such a form. The second reason is that a form of this type is incompatible in matter with subsequent forms. This is commonly proved by the maxim that from two beings in act there does not result an unum per se. The first substantial form constitutes a being in act absolutely and simply because it gives existence

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constat esset prima causa materialis. . . . Sed contra hoc obiicitur secundo, quia sine ullo fundamento fingitur tale compositum; nullum enim est indicium aut sensibile signum illius formae interiectae inter puram materiam et alias formas quae per generationem inducuntur. . . . Unde fit tertio ut sit omnino superflua, quia nullus est physicus effectus propter quem sit necessaria, quia non propter efficiendum, cum non habeat ullam qualitatem per quam efficiat; aliunde unicuique qualitati sufficiat propria forma, cui est connaturalis. Neque etiam propter recipiendum; nam ad hoc sufficit illa potentia quae tali formae substare dicitur; cur enim non poterit etiam illa immediate subiici forme quae per generationem inducitur? Et propter eamdem causam non est necessaria talis forma ad conservandam illam potentiam suius actus esse dicitur, quia ad hoc etiam satis est forma quae per generationem inducitur. Igitur superflue et sine fundamento fingitur talis forma.

Quarto accedit impossibilitas coniungendi duas illas formas in eadem potentia seu materia; nam licet in quaestione sit an forma quasi generica et specifica possint simul actuare materiam, quod paulo inferius attingemus, tamen quod duae formae specificae simul coniungantur ad actuandam eamdem potentiam substantialem plane est impossibile naturaliter et in hoc fere omnes auctores conveniunt. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, pars. 9-12.



simply. Therefore no supervening form is able to constitute a being as an unum per se and simply.[23]

The result of this set of conclusions is that the first material cause cannot be any type of integral substance--neither a body nor any composite of matter and form. And, the generation of substances is not to be presupposed through a kind of subject in which generation is received into some ingenerable and incorruptible body; rather generation takes place only with prime matter.[24]

Up to this point the doctrine of Suarez on the status of prime matter is fairly straightforward scholastic doctrine in that he has followed out the implications of prime matter as the first subject of substantial change. In the course of his argument he has rejected atomism, monism, and the varieties of pluralism. Indeed, he seems to have established that matter is simply a principle of being and not a being itself. But, the next move seems to take all of this away, for he will hold that prime matter has a limited kind of being in itself. With his usual thoroughness he begins the discussion in section four of Disputation XIII with

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[23]Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, pars. 13-16.

[24]Relinquitur ergo ex omnibus dictis primam causam materialem substantiarum generabilium non esse aliquam substantiam integram, neque ullum corpus aut compositum ex materia et forma; ac proinde ad substantiarum generationem non supponi per modum subiecti in quo generatio recipiatur aliquod corpus ingenerabile et incorruptibile, sed solum materiam primam, solam (inquam) quoad substantiam; nam quoad accidentia quid dicendum sit, postea videbimus. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 3, par. 23.



a review of the various positions held with respect to the being of prime matter.[25]

As Suarez begins to give his own solution to this problem he feels that he must distinguish very carefully between entitas essentiae (being of essence) and entitas existentiae (being of existence). For Suarez there cannot be a being of essence without a being of existence and vice versa. Only real beings or principles of being exist; essences or principles of being taken in the abstract do not exist. Any distinction between essence and existence is merely for the sake of analysis. When one asks whether matter has existence of itself and not on account of some form this denial can be understood in two ways--initially, that it does not possess a form intrinsically and is not informed by an act; in this position existence is given to matter only through the intrinsic informing capacity of the form; secondly, and in opposition to the first position matter does not have its existence on account of the form or on account of the disposition to the form or dependency upon it.[26] That is, it

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[25]Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 4, pars. 1-7.

[26]Ut quaestioni respondeamus seclusa omni ambiguitate terminorum, distinguamus questionem de entitate essentiae et de entitate existentiae; nam est valde controversum quomodo haec duo distinguantur in creaturis et ideo certior est resolutio de una quam de altera. Rursus, cum inquiritur an materia habeat ex se entitatem et non a forma, dupliciter intelligi potest illa negatio; uno modo, quod non habeat a forma intrinsece seu ut ab actu informante et dante esse materiae per suam intrinsecam informationem; alio modo, quod nulla ratione habeat suum esse per formam seu per habitudinem ad formam aut per dependentiam ab illa. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 4, par. 8.



does not depend on the form at all for its existence.

There are two sets of terms to be cleared up prior to explanation of Suarez' position on the being and existence of prime matter. He wants to distinguish between the being of essence and the being of existence. This distinction is essential for an understanding of his position on the being and essence of prime matter and Suarez himself does not explain the meaning of these terms very well. Since only real essences exist, the being of essence refers to those really existing beings as one finds them in the concrete reality around himself. This term is meant to set off the concrete particulars from the universals which are taken by Suarez to have no real concrete existence. That is, the term "being of essence" carries with it a rejection of Platonism. Within an actually constituted being, however, there are co-principles which compose the being. These co-principles, if the being is to be a real being, must manifest a being of existence. That is, they are not merely mental fictions or constructs on the one hand, nor are they, on the other hand, complete essences. Taken in themselves they are real (i.e., they exist) but they exist in conjunction with the other co-principles to make up an actual essence. The co-principles, then, manifest a being of existence.

The second set of terms to be elaborated is that of act and potency. Since later in this chapter there will be an extensive analysis of matter as pure potency it will be

necessary to defer the complete discussion of potency to that point. Suffice it to say for the present that a potency is the complementary principle to an act. That is, in a composed being one always finds the two principles together (e.g., matter /potency/ and form /act/). One gets a good understanding of the nature of the relationship between act and potency when Suarez gives his own explanation of what it means for a thing to be an act.

The name "act" can be taken either in an absolute or in a relational sense. Sometimes a thing is called an act because it actuates something in the manner in which the form is the act of matter. Suarez calls this the relational use of "act" because here the act is the act of another. Sometimes, however, an act is called such because it is a reality in itself and has no relationship to potency (e.g., the way in which God is called an act). This is an act absolutely considered. "Act" taken relationally can be subdistinguished also; an act actuating another is physical and formal such as a real existent form. The second meaning is "act" taken as a metaphysical act; this usage applies to a series of logical distinctions such as act of an essence used to indicate a difference, or act of existence used to indicate existence as existence, or act of subsistence used to indicate a certain mode of subsistence. Since the concern here is with real beings and principles of being, the second half of this subdistinction is irrelevant to the present study. In the first half, however, Suarez is

claiming that there are physical acts and they are co-principles of being with physical potencies. A similar subdistinction takes place with respect to "act absolutely speaking." One can speak of act in this way either simply or in a limited way. Absolutely speaking "act" taken simply means that the act is able to exist on its own and does not inform any potency. Absolutely speaking "act" taken in a limited way means a being which has some actuality but this actuality is incomplete and imperfect.[27]

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[27]Ut autem solvantur difficultates tactae superiori sectione, et explicetur modus loquendi philosophorum, et omnis ambiguitas terminorum auferatur, adverto nomen actus multipliciter sumi posse; nam interdum absolute, interdum respective dicitur; aliquando enim dicitur actus, quia actuat aliquid, quomodo forma est actus materiae. Et hunc voco actum respectivum, quia est actus alterius. Aliquando vero dicitur actus quia in se est actuale quid et non potentiale, quamvis nihil aliud actuet quo modo Deus dicitur actus, et hunc voco actum absolute dictum. Rursus uterque istorum actuum subdistingui potest; nam actus actuans alius est physicus et formalis, ut est forma physica; alius vero est actus metaphysicus, qui est multiplex; alius enim est actus essentiae, ut differentia; alius existentiae ut existentia, et addi etiam potest actus seu modus subsistentiae. Actus vero absolute dictus, alius est actus simpliciter, alius secundum quid. Prior est ille actus, qui in genere entis simpliciter seu substantiae ita est completus, ut nec constituatur per actum physicum a se distinctum, neque per illam actuetur, aut illo indigeat ad existendum. Vel aliter explicari potest, illud ens dici actum simpliciter quod ex vi suae actualitatis solius includit perfectionem formalem, quam alia entia composita habere solent per substantialem actum informantem. Unde, licet huiusmodi actus absolutus, non sit actus actuans, vel informans, dici tamen potest esse actus formalis eminenti modo, id est per se habens complementum illud perfectionis quod per actum informantem conferri solet his entibus, quae per compositionem complentur. Actus autem secundum quid dicetur ens illud quod habet aliquam actualitatem in quantum actu est extra nihil; illam tamen habet incompletam et imperfectam, quia non est ita sufficiens quin indigeat alio actu, tum ut compleatur in ratione entis simpliciter, tum etiam ut existat. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5, par. 8.

Given this understanding of terms, Suarez can now set forth his position on the being of prime matter. Suarez places himself between the extremes mentioned above. He says that prime matter of itself and not intrinsically from the form has its own actual being, although it does not have it unless there is also an intrinsic aptitude for a form. Suarez is speaking in this assertion of the actual being of existence, the actual being of the matter in concrete and not merely in the abstract.[28] In this sense and with respect to the actual being of matter he does not see how anyone is able to have a different opinion from his own. Matter, having been created by God, and existing in the composite has some real existence or otherwise it would not be a real being. The existence of matter is not constituted intrinsically in its being by means of the form. Therefore in itself it has its own kind of being.[29] This move is crucial because even though Suarez, as we have seen earlier, does not want to accept the doctrine that matter is an integral being, he now seems forced to give it a type of

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[28]Thomas Aquinas was the most celebrated of the medieval scholastics to separate by a real distinction the act of existing from the essence. Suarez here is trying to show that he is talking about real matter as opposed to matter taken in the abstract. Suarez will hold that this real matter must have a being of its own. This position simply would not make sense in the Thomistic system which demands a separate act of existence for the being to be real. Once there is an act of existence there is also a complete essence; matter can have being only in terms of the total substance in Thomas Aquinas.

[29]Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 4, pars. 9-10.



existence proper to itself because otherwise it would be a nothing. In a word, he both wants matter not to exist without a form and to be able to have a being of its own.

He attempts to get around the apparent contradiction in this position by positing a kind of transcendental aptitude of matter for form and by showing that matter cannot have its own being without this aptitude. This is true because matter is essentially a potency, and every potency has an intrinsic aptitude for its act. The proper act of matter is the form. Therefore, matter has its proper existence of itself with an aptitude for the form. This aptitude is not of itself originally to this or that form but to form absolutely and consequently to any form whatever. And, therefore, although forms are varied in matter, the essential aptitude or intelligibility of matter is not varied. This can be taken as a clear argument that matter does not have a being merely in virtue of the informing action of the form.[30]

This last argument gives matter a very definite being apart from the form. But, Suarez gets even more

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[30]Quod vero materia non habet suammet entitatem essentiae sine transcendentali habitudine ad formam, probatur quia essentialiter est potentia, ut infra ostendetur, et patet ex definitione Aristotelis dicentis materiam esse primum subiectum, etc.; omnis autem potentia dicit intrinsecam habitudinem ad suum actum; proprius autem actus materiae est forma; habet ergo materia suam propriam essentiam per seipsam cum habitudine ad formam. Haec autem habitudo non est per se primo ad hanc vel illam formam sed ad formam absolute, et consequenter ad quamcumque formam generabilem, seu quae per generationem uniri possit, et ideo quamvis in materia varientur formae, non variatur essentialis ratio vel habitudo materiae. Quod etiam est clarum argumentum materiam non habere entitatem essentiae ab informatione formae. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 4, par. 11.

explicit when he says that prime matter has being in itself and also has being through a dependence upon the form. He spends a great deal of time in Disputation XV outlining the nature of this dependence and it is best, as Suarez does, to defer that discussion until the treatment on form. Briefly, here, though, the foundation of this position is that the being of existence adds nothing or no real mode over and above the being of essence. From this, however, it follows that matter, just as it has being actually distinct from the form, has its proper being of existence which it retains under any form whatever.

The confirmation of this is that matter retains the same actual being even though forms are generated and corrupted one after another. Therefore it also has existence in which it is constituted an actual being. Secondly, matter is presupposed as the subject of the generation of the form and it is not altogether a nothing, otherwise there would be generation from nothing. Matter is, therefore, a created thing, an actual being, and existent, because creation is not complete unless there is actual being and existence. The final confirmation is that the existence of a thing is of such a kind that an essence is always actual. For just as real essences of corporeal substances are composed from partial existents of matter and form, so also total existence of the same substance is composed from partial existents of matter and form. This follows from the principle that existence and actual essence are not



distinguished in fact but in reason. Matter, therefore, is not an actual integral being distinct from form, but in its own being it includes a proper partial existence in fact, distinct from the partial existence of the form.[31]

In summary, Suarez is holding the position that the principle of being called prime matter cannot be an integral or whole being of itself. But, matter does possess in some sense its own existence apart from the form. This departs significantly from the Aristotelian tradition in scholastic philosophy. Here he gives prime matter more independence than he should if he wants to have a hylomorphic metaphysics which has a true substantial unity. On the other hand, he himself does not see how he can deny being to prime matter, at least in some limited sense, without turning it into an absolute nothing. The failure to reconcile this difficulty is one of the major steps in creating the dualism of fact despite the intention of unity.

Matter as Pure Potency

In treating the questions of the being and essence of prime matter it was necessary to discuss the unity of prime matter as opposed to multiple first subjects. Secondly, it has been shown that matter has no existence as an integral being either as a body or as something informed by some sort of form other than a substantial form. And, thirdly, it has been shown that matter is nonetheless a type

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[31]Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 4, pars. 13-17.



of partial being. When Suarez turns to the properties of matter, he is concerned mainly with the claim that prime matter is pure potency and the manner in which this term should be understood.

His position on this subject is that matter as pure potency does not exclude every act. Matter is not called pure potency with respect to every metaphysical act simply because it does not include any metaphysical act whatever. Here Suarez makes a truly outstanding statement for a scholastic philosopher; for he holds that matter in its own nature has some perfection and transcendental goodness.[32] The reason given for this is that the composite of matter and form is a more perfect existence than form alone; therefore, matter has some perfection which it adds to the composite. And, this is desirable and appropriate to matter not only as a medium of perfection but in itself. By reason of its perfection matter is appropriate to this form or this composite. Therefore, matter of its very nature has some proper perfection. Perfection, however, cannot be understood without at least some transcendental actuality.[33]

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[32]. . . nam materia natura sua aliquam perfectionem et bonitatem transcendentalem habet et etiam docuit D. Thom., III Cont. Gent., c. 20. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5, par. 9.

[33]Certum est enim compositum ex materia et forma perfectius quid esse quam sit sola forma; ergo aliquid perfectionis habet materia, quam addit composito. Item ipsa materia est appetibilis et conveniens non tantum ut medium sed per se, quia ratione suae perfectionis est conveniens huic formae vel composito; ergo habet materia ex natura sua aliquam propriam perfectionem; sed non potest intelligi perfectio sine actualitate aliqua, saltem transcendentali. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5, par. 9.

This transcendental actuality is the type of being that is proper to matter taken in itself (this actuality has been examined in the previous section of this study). That is, matter has a proper act of existence but this is only a partial and proportionate act of subsistence. In a word, matter exists but does not subsist--exist independently.[34] The general conclusion of this argumentation is that prime matter is not pure potency in the sense that it excludes every metaphysical actuating act.

Suarez will go on to specify the nature of the act admitted by prime matter but it is well to pause here and reflect on the significance of the redefinition of "pure potency." Despite the earlier protestations with respect to the incompleteness of prime matter and the necessity of a substantial form which brings being, Suarez by allowing prime matter to have some sort of act in itself and of its very nature has made the integrity of prime matter more complete than he really can allow if he is going to hold on to a genuine hylomorphic metaphysics.

The progressive individualizing of prime matter becomes more evident in the succeeding paragraphs of Disputation XIII, Section 5 when he takes up the topics of which act matter allows, in what way matter is pure potency, and in what way "to be a potency" and "to be in potency" differ from each other.

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[34]The notion of subsistence is treated extensively in Disputation XXXIV.

With respect to the act allowed by matter, Suarez holds that matter is not such a pure potency that it lacks every entitative act at least in a qualified sense. This understanding of matter comes from the intelligibility of "first subject," for in a first subject there is a necessity for a real passive potency. Or rather, what is essentially the same, a necessity for a passive potency. Real passive potency cannot be understood without entitative actuality. For how can something be understood as really receptive of something else unless it is a something itself?[35] Essentially there must be some act allowed by matter.

When Suarez turns to the analysis of the way in which matter is pure potency he must do a considerable reworking of the notion of "pure potency." Matter is said to be pure potency in respect to an act absolutely and simply called and in respect to an informing or actuating act. It is acknowledged by Suarez that matter is not by itself an

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[35]. . . materia non est ita pura potentia quin sit aliquis actus entitativus secundum quid. Haec assertio satis declarata est et probata ex dictus circa opinionem Scoti. Et ex ratione primi subiecti sufficienter colligitur; nam in primo subiecto necessaria est realis potentia passiva vel potius ipsummet essentialiter est potentia passiva; non potest autem intelligi potentia passiva realis sine aliqua actualitate entitativa. Qualiter enim potest intelligi quod aliquid sit vere realiter receptivum alterius, nisi in se aliquid sit? Unde recte Commentator, III de Caelo, com. 29, ait omnem potentialitatem passivam in aliqua actualitate fundari. Et D. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 1, ad 1 ait materiam non dici ens in potentia, eo modo quo dicitur esse in potentia ens possibile ex sola non repugnantia terminorum; supponit ergo esse aliquod ens actu fundans realem potentiam passivam vel quod potius sit realis potentia passiva in genere substantiae. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5, par. 10.

actuating or informing act as is clear from the notion of first subject. In its intrinsic and essential conception it does not include the notion of a physical informing act. It has been shown to be a simple being which also includes the intelligibility of first subject. Likewise matter is the kind of being that of itself is not sufficient for existence without the perfecting and actuating substantial act. Therefore, of its own it includes no formal act either formally or eminently and therefore is not an act absolutely and simply called. But, whatever is of being in prime matter is totally for exercising the duty of receptive potency for a substantial form. From these things, then, matter is a pure potency in the genus of substance only and is best explained as such.

Since matter is a simple being and a totally receptive potency it is best called a pure potency. But, that word "pure" does not exclude being and actuality in the limited way that is necessary for understanding <u>real potency</u>. Pure does exclude, however, every duty beyond passive potency and especially the understanding of completely in act. It excludes every formal act both properly informing ones and perfect and complete ones.[36]

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[36]. . . materia dicitur esse pura potentia respectu actus informantis seu actuantis et respectu actus absolute et simpliciter dicti. Declaratur, nam imprimis materia non est actus actuans, neque informans, ut per se constat ex ratione primi subiecti. Deinde in suo intrinseco conceptu et essentiali non includit actum physicum informantem; ostendimus enim esse entiatem simplicem, quod etiam ex ratione primi subiecti colligitur. Praeterea materia talis est entitas ut per se sola sufficiens non sit ad existendum



Finally one must consider the phrases "to be in potency" and "to be a potency." According to Suarez the lack of rigor in the use of these phrases has led to confusion. The notion that matter is a potency is true and has a legitimate meaning as has been seen in the previous exposition. But, "to be in potency" is at a minimum an ambiguous phrase. To be <u>in</u> pure potency rigorously taken signifies a privation of actual existence. Here, "to be in potency" says that the potency has no act but nevertheless is able to be. But, this cannot be said of matter after it has been created. It can be granted that it is almost nothing but not that it is nothing. And from the opposite viewpoint one can also distinguish "to be in act" and "to be an act." It is true to say that matter is in act because this signifies nothing other than that matter exists and is among the things of nature. And this is true just as it is true that matter is

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sine substantiali actu ipsam perficiente et actuante, unde ex vi suae praecisae entitatis nullum formalem actum includit formaliter aut eminenter et ideo non est actus absolute simpliciter. Denique, quidquid est entitatis in materia prima, totum est ad exercendum munus potentiae receptivae formae substantialis; ad hoc enim ex primario ac per se instituta et ideo, ut supra dicebamus, in sua essentiali ratione includit transcendentalem habitudinem ad formam. Ex his ergo constat merito dici puram potentiam in genere substantiae optimeque praedicto modo explicari; nam cum materia sit entitas simplex et tota ipsa sit potentia receptiva, optime appellatur pura potentia. Sicut autem dici solet dictionem exclusivam non excludere concomitantiam, ita illa dictio <u>pura</u> non excludit entitatem et actualitatem secundum quid necessarium ad rationem potentiae realis, sed excludit imprimis omne aliud munus praeterquam potentiae passivae, et deinde excludit rationem actus completi, seu simpliciter et absolute dicti, et (quod in idem redit) excludit omnem actum formalem, tam proprie informantem quam simpliciter constituentem actum perfectum et completum. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5, par. 11.



created, receives a form, and makes up a composite--all of which include the notion of existence. But, to say that matter is an act is ambiguous to say the least. Absolutely taken this seems to be an actuating act or an act simply understood. This cannot be admitted. But we have seen that there is a sense in which matter is an imperfect entitative act.[37]

From these three proofs, then, one can see that Suarez has a much different notion of matter as pure potency than is traditionally held by Aristotle and other scholastics. Suarez does not want to go the route of Scotus and allow to matter some sort of form of corporeity, but neither can he reconcile the notion of matter as an absolutely pure potency with a matter that does not have some sort of actuality. One issue here is the attempt to give matter some

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[37]Est autem propter usum verborum considerandum aliud in rigore significari cum dicitur materia pura potentia, aliud si dicatur esse in pura potentia. Primum enim simpliciter verum est et habet legitimum sensum expositum; secundum vero, ut minimum, est ambiguum; nam esse in pura potentia in rigore significat privationem actualis existentiae; unde solum dicitur de eo quod actu nihil est, esse tamen potest, quod dici non potest de materia postquam creata vel concreata est. Nam, licet sit propre nihil, non tamen nihil, sed vera res ut supra cum Augustino dicebamus. Et simili modo distinguere possumus has locutiones esse in actu vel esse actum; materiam enim esse in actu simpliciter verum est, quia hoc nihil aliud significat quam materiam esse in rerum natura et existere, quod verum est; sicut est verum materiam esse creatam; recipere formam et componere compositum quae omnia includunt existere; materiam vero esse actum, ut minimum est ambiguum; nam absolute significare videtur esse actum actuantem aut certe esse actum simpliciter; et ideo absolute id admittendum non est, sed cum aliquo addito diminuente, scilicet, esse actum entitativum imperfectum et secundum quid. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 5, par. 12.

being of its own without turning it into an integral being. And then, an additional issue is the accepted and revered term of "pure potency." How is he to explain matter as pure potency if matter has actual being? He resorts to some subtle distinctions to get around this dilemma but perhaps has already conceded too much by allowing matter to have its own being.

A corollary to the issue of matter as pure potency arises in the question of our knowledge of matter. From a slightly different angle Suarez implies the need for matter to have its own actuality when he speaks of the kind of concept we are able to form concerning matter. It is a fact that people do form some sort of proper concept of prime matter, this concept is admittedly not altogether distinct and is in some sense partly negative and partly confused. Suarez asserts this on the basis of the definition given by Aristotle stating that prime matter is the first subject. This description does explain some objective concept of matter. But, in the definition "subject" is confused and common (as opposed to distinct and specific). The definition adds "first" as a limitation, but "first" is a negation of any prior subject. So, Aristotle's definition of matter is lacking in distinctness and is partly negative.[38]

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[38] . . . dicendum est pervenire quidem nos in aliquem proprium conceptum materiae primae; non tamen omnino distinctum et prout in se est sed negativum partim, partim confusum. Tota haec assertio constat ex definitione materiae tradita ab Aristotele, scilicet esse primum subiectum, etc.; nam per illam descriptionem aliquem conceptum obiectivum explicamus; ille autem est proprius

The same thing happens when one describes the nature of matter as "pure potency." The understanding of "potency" is confused and common and "pure" is a negation of every composing or constituting form. The reason for this is that we scarcely know simple being by proper concepts unless they are joined to some sort of negation which is the more frequent manner of declaring the nature of matter through the lack of form or of complete actuality.[39]

Next, Suarez defends his own approach when he says that his own description of matter as an incomplete substance receptive of substantial form seems to be a completely positive one. But the word, "incomplete" indicates negation. This leads him to say that one can never describe matter unless he uses negations. Suarez employs an analogical argument to prove the point. Just as it seems to be dark when we do not see light, so when we understand what it is to be informed we know matter in some way. We know that the informing is not the same as the matter and we remove something, so we might think of matter alone. This,

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materiae; sicut et ipsa definitio. In ea vero definitione subiectum quid confusum est et commune; additur vero quod sit primum ut ad materiam limitetur: primum autem negationem importat prioris subiecti. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 6, par. 4.

[39]Perinde est quod communiter naturam materiae declaramus per rationem purae potentiae, nam ratio potentiae confusa est et communis; at vero dictio purae negationem dicit omnis formae componentis vel constituentis ipsam materiam. Ratio vero est quia nos vix cognosicimus simplicia propriis conceptibus nisi adiungendo aliquam negationem, quare hic est frequentior modus declarandi naturam materiae per carentiam formae et completae actualitatis, etc. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 6, par. 4.

however, does not appear from the fact that matter has no being at all but from the fact that it has it as simple and potential lying under substantial and accidental forms. It is not able to be investigated or conceived by us in any other manner.[40]

The Causality of Prime Matter

Suarez up to this point has shown that prime matter exists, that it has its own being as a simple and incomplete entity and that it is a pure potency only in a restricted sense. He now asks in what the causality of prime matter consists. It is at this point that the reader of the Disputationes Metaphysicae gets a preliminary explanation of the relationship of matter and form. The explanation is preliminary because Suarez has not yet treated formal cause. The more definitive analysis will come in Disputation XV; this present discussion in Disputation XIII shows once again that the separation of matter and form is really more complete than Suarez is willing to admit and that he realizes this by demanding that there be nothing intervening between the matter and the form.

There are four items to be distinguished with respect to the causality of matter: the generation of a

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[40] . . . videmur declarare naturam materiae per conceptus pure positivos, ut si dicamus esse substantiam incompletum receptivam formae substantialis; sed quod dicitur incompleta negationem importat. Ac denique nunquam materiae naturam declaramus nisi adiungamus negationem omnis actus formalis constituentis ipsam. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 6, par. 4.

composite, the union with the form, the being of the form, and the composite itself.

With respect to the generation Suarez thinks that this is caused by the matter itself through its own causality. There is no other thing or mode of existence added to the matter apart from the generation itself inhering in the matter. Again, he uses analogy comparing the generation by matter to an efficient cause situation. Just as action is by an agent, not through another action but directly, and has the intelligibility of action only as an emanation from the agent itself, so the action is the very causality of the agent itself. In the same manner eduction or passive generation, insofar as it is essentially dependent upon a subject, and through itself is necessarily joined to the subject, is necessarily joined to the subject and is caused naturally by the subject and not through another causality. This is especially proven from the fact that the causality of matter is best understood with respect to generation only in this way--Nothing else is necessary; therefore it is superfluous to posit something else, some "generation."[41]

A second argument with respect to generation states that the same thing is shown from accidental changes and

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[41]As has been rather evident throughout this chapter Suarez is wary of any position that seems to be Scotist in tendency. This whole section on the causality of matter is very much concerned that there not be some third principle interposed between the matter and the form. Suarez sees that the forma corporeitatis is just such a principle and for that reason especially it is unacceptable in a description of matter.



unions. When wood burns the burning occurs in some subject and from some subject. But, there are not two changes taking place in that subject, one of which is the passive burning itself and the other of which is some manner by which such a subject causes burning. It is superfluous to multiply changes. The burning itself is such that it intrinsically demands a disposition of actual union and dependence upon a subject in the genus of material cause. The change itself is caused by the subject, and causes the subject itself. It is united to the subject and the subject remains united to it. The same situation is the case in the material causality of substantial generation.

A third argument comes more generally from the nature of causality itself, because both through the same cause and through the manner by which an effect is caused does the cause bring about its effect. Causation itself as such essentially includes a double aptitude--1. for causing as a principle and 2. for an effect as a term. Therefore causation signifies both the causing and the caused. Generation, which is intrinsically and essentially dependent upon matter, is itself caused by matter and dependent upon matter, is itself caused by matter and no other mode or thing is necessary in order that matter be named part of the cause of generation.

Fourthly, and finally, for matter to cause generation nothing else is needed other than it sustain the generation as a subject. It sustains generation immediately in



being and through its own being. Any other mode is irrelevant to this causality, nor is it able to provide anything to this sustaining action.[42]

The second problem to be considered with respect to

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[42]Causalitas materiae respectu generationis, est ipsamet generatio.--Verumtamen haec sententia partim falsa videtur, partim dubia. Quod ut declarem et meam sententiam aperiam, distinguo illa quatuor, quae supra dixi causari ex materia, generationem, unionem formae, entitatem formae, et compositum ipsum. Quoad generationem ergo existimo per seipsam causari a materia, nulla alia re vel modo addito materiae praeter ipsam generationem illi inhaerentem; atque adeo causalitatem ipsius generationis a materia, nihil aliud esse quam ipsammet generationem, ut est eductio ex materia. Sicut enim actio est ab agente, non per aliam actionem, sed per seipsam, et habet rationem actionis, ut est ipsa emanatio a causa agente, et ut sic est ipsa causalitas agentis, ut infra dicam, ita eductio, seu passiva generatio, quatenus essentialiter pendet a subiecto, et per seipsam necessario illi coniungitur, ab illo causatur materialiter non per aliam causalitatem sed per seipsam. Hoc imprimis probatur ex ipsamet rei declaratione; nam hoc modo optime intelligitur causalitas materiae circa generationem, et nihil aliud est necessarium; ergo superfluum est aliquid aliud fingere. Secundo, id declaratur ex accidentalibus mutationibus et unionibus; quando enim ligno calefit, calefactio fit in tali subiecto et ex subiecto; non fiunt autem tunc duae mutationes in illo subiecto, una quae sit ipsa calefactio passiva; alia, quae sit modus aliquis, quo tale subiectum causat materialiter calefactionem, illive unitur; superfluum enim est has multiplicare mutationes, nam hoc ipso quod calefactio talis est, ut intrinsece dicat habitudinem actualis unionis et dependentiae a tali subiecto in genere causae materialis, et ipsa causatur a subiecto et subiectum causat ipsam, et ipsa unitur subiecto, et subiectum manet illi unitum; superfluum ergo est aliam mutationem in subiecto addere; idem ergo est in causalitate materiali substantialis generationis. Unde confirmatur tertio, quia per idem, seu per eumdem modum quo effectus causatur, causa causat, quia causatio ipsa ut sic duplicem illam habitudinem essentialiter includit, ad causam ut ad principium, et ad effectum ut ad terminum, et ideo utrumque denominat, alterum causam alterum causatum; sed generatio, hoc ipso quod intrinsece et essentialiter est pendens a materia, per seipsam causatur ab illa; ergo ab eodem, ut est ex materia, denominatur materia causans illam; ergo nulla alia res aut modus necessarius est, ut materia denominetur actu causans generationem. Immo neque intelligi potest



the causality of matter is the union of matter and form.[43] Suarez claims here that the union of the form to the matter is caused by the matter itself and the union depends upon the matter. The material just treated on generation is the beginning for an explanation of this union. In that argument Suarez wanted the generation to be caused by the matter itself; now he adds that the union is not caused by some causality distinct from the union but by the union of matter and form itself. This can be easily demonstrated from the things said about generation, for there is a proportionate understanding here. The union of form with matter in itself is a joining to matter in the way appropriate to matter. The union is caused by the matter itself, not by a separate act of joining. When matter causes that union it is one and the same as the causality by which an effect (the joining) is said to be caused and the cause (the matter) to cause. This is perfectly clear because the union of matter and form is not possible without the concurrence of matter. There is also an a-priori reason in that this union in itself depends essentially both on the form and on the matter; the union is

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quomodo materia per alium modum causet generationem. Quod quarto declaratur nam materiam causare generationem, nihil aliud est quam sustentare illam ut subiectum; sustentat autem illam immediate in entitate, et per entitatem suam, hoc ipso quod generatio in ipsa fit; ergo omnis alius modus est impertinens ad hanc causalitatem; nec conferre quidquam potest ad hanc sustentationem. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 9, par. 5.

[43]The concern here is with the general notion of union. The union of body and soul presents special problems and these will be treated in Chapter V, "Body and Soul."

an actual binding of these two and there is no need for another intervening link or mode by which the union is joined to matter and form. This approach has already been confirmed by the reasons given with respect to generation.[44]

The third item to be distinguished in regard to the causality of matter is the being of the form. Suarez feels that it is inappropriate to treat this topic at this point since he has not yet discussed the nature of the form

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[44]Superest dicendum de causalitate materiae in facto esse, ad quam explicandum incipiendum est a causalitate unionis formae cum materia; nam etiam hanc diximus causari a materia; nunc vero addimus non causari per aliquam causalitatem distinctam a tali unione, sed per ipsammet. Quod facile demonstrari potest ex dictis de ipsa generatione; est enim eadem proportionalis ratio. Quod sic ostendo: nam etiam haec unio formae cum materia per seipsam est coniuncta materiae eo modo quo esse potest; ergo per seipsam est pendens a materia eo modo quo pendere potest; ergo per seipsam causatur; eatenus enim causatur quatenus pendet; ergo e converso, materia causat illam unionem per ipsammet; nam, ut dixi, eadem est causalitas, a qua et effectus denominatur causari et causa causare. Omnes consequentiae probatae sunt in superioribus; antecedens vero patet primo a posteriori quia impossibile est illam unionem conservari sine concursu materiae seu quin sit in materia eo modo quo esse potest; ergo signum est per seipsam immediate ac essentialiter pendere a materia; nam, si penderet mediante aliquo modo ex natura rei distincto, posset Deus auferendo modum illum conservare unionem illam sine materia; hac enim ratione potest conservare formam, ut infra dicam. Antecedens patet quia non potest unio manere quin actu uniat; non potest autem actu unire quin coniungat extrema et utrumque attingat eo modo quo potest et debet. Et haec est ratio a priori propter quam illa unio per seipsam pendet essentialiter tum a forma tum a materia, a singulis in suo genere, quia est veluti actuale vinculum illarum et non indiget alio interiecto vinculo aut modo quo ipsas attingat seu illis coniungatur, ne procedatur in infinitum. Tandem confirmatur ratione supra facta, quia hoc sufficit ad hanc causalitatem et sine illo poni non potest ac illo posito et praeciso omni alio modo sufficienter intelligitur talis causalitas materiae; ergo omne aliud est fictum et sine fundamento, neque in hoc est ulla difficultats, praeter statim attingendum. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 9, par. 9.



itself. The general conclusion, of course, will be much like the conclusions we have already seen with respect to generation and union. That is, the being of the form cannot be such as to bring about any intervening thing or mode that would stand between the matter and the form.[45]

Suarez finally turns to the causality of matter with respect to the composite itself. The conclusion here is similar to the conclusions of the other three aspects of matter's causality. In the formation of the composite nothing is added outside of the matter and the form. There is no other causality of the composite except the causality between the matter and the form. That is, once again, there is no medium between the matter and the form which would be some separate mode of composition. In real things nothing intervenes between matter and form.[46]

The discussion on the causality of matter illustrates two very significant things about Suarez' approach to the hylomorphic theory. He is sensitive to the fact that

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[45]Suarez concerns himself with the being of the form in Disputation XV. In light of this later treatment this study will also defer the discussion of the being of the form until the general topic of form is treated in Chapter III.

[46]Ex his ulterius concluditur, causalitatem materiae circa compositum, nihil omnino addere ipsi materiae praeter unionem formae, atque ita non esse aliam causalitatem compositi, nisi ipsammet causalitatem formae vel unionis solumque addere respectu compositi, quod materia, media unione seipsam exhibet ad componendum intrinsece compositum; unde ipsa entitate materiae magis intime ingreditur causalitatem compositi quam formae vel unionis; in re tamen nihil aliud intervenit nisi entitas materiae et unio seu causalitas formae. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 9, par. 15.

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matter and form in their own order are in some sense radically elemental principles of being and that they are immediately related to one another. There can be no intervening thing or mode between these two whether we call it generation, union, being of the form, or the composite. These notions are merely variant expressions of the relation of matter and form. Secondly, one sees Suarez in something of a difficulty and problem with respect to an adequate expression of the basic relationship. He has given matter its own being and it would appear that there should be some separate principle which would relate matter to form, but the generation, union, and composite are not separate things joining these two basic principles. If this were the case there would be an infinite regress of principles. He is forced to think of matter and form in terms of mutual dependence. The structure of matter and form, each with their own being, however, prohibits the kind of mutual dependence he needs. That is, the co-principles of being are really beings themselves and the mutual dependence becomes very tenuous.[47]

Matter and the Accident of Quantity

Up to this point the concern of this study with respect to matter has been to examine matter as the radical

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[47]The dependence of the matter on the form is treated extensively in Disputation XV. In order to spell out this dependence in full one must also have Suarez' doctrine on form. Near the end of the chapter on form this study will spell out the nature of the dependence that Suarez sees is necessary for his metaphysics of matter and form.

first subject. It has been noted that the fact that Suarez gives matter its own being individualizes matter in such a way that matter comes very close to being an integral as opposed to an incomplete being. In Disputation XIV Suarez treats the problem of the material cause of accidents. What is of special interest for this present analysis is the relationship Suarez draws between the accident of quantity and prime matter. The reason why this is important is Suarez' treatment of individuation is closely tied up with this topic.[48] This treatment also shows rather conclusively the tendency to convert matter into a quasi-integral being.

As is his custom in these disputations Suarez begins the discussion of the relationship of matter and quantity by listing various opinions on the topic. There are two positions with respect to this problem. The first one says that matter of itself does not have sufficient being for causing any accident but only after a prior conjunction with substantial form, so that a composite results which is able to receive accidents.[49] The second position affirms that

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[48]The general metaphysical doctrine of individuation will be treated in Chapter IV of this present study.

[49]This opinion is perhaps the most weighty with respect to the relation between matter and quantity. Suarez in Disputation XIV, Sect. 3, par. 6 lists a great number of philosophers and theologians who have held this opinion.

Sunt ergo in hac re duae oppositae sententiae valde communes. Prima est dicentium materiam per se non habere entitatem sufficientem ad causandum materialiter aliquod accidens, sed indigere prius coniunctione ad formam substantialem, ut ex utraque resultet compositum quod possit accidentia recipere. Haec est opinio D. Thom. I, q. 76, a. 6 et q. unic. de Spiritualib. creatur., a. 3, ad 18; et Alberti, in Summa de homine II, p., q. An nutritio fiat ex

quantity is in matter. This second position is the one accepted by Suarez.

Once he has listed the various sources for the position that accidents are received only in a composite, Suarez examines the many reasons for holding the position; he simply lists a series of conclusions the proponents of this position give for their stance. First, matter is pure potency and does not have existence unless that existence is brought by the form. Therefore, of itself, it is powerless to sustain accidents unless it is joined to the form and receives existence from it. Secondly, matter is potency to

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simili, a. 1; Durand., In I, dist. 8, II p., q. 4; Capreol., In II, dist. 13, q. 1, conclus. 2 et 3, et dist. 18, q. 1, conclus. 6; Caiet., de Ente et essent., c. 7, q. 16; Soncin., VIII Metaph., q. 7, et 15, 17 et 18; Ferr., IV cont. Gent., c. 81, q. 2 et 3; Soto, I Phys., q. 7; Astudill., I de Generat. Tribuiturque Aristoteli, quia I de Generat., text. 23, dixit generationem fieri ex materia, nullo sensibili manente; ex quo loco et ex his quae Aristoteles subdit, text 24, sumunt omnes huius sententiae auctores in transmutatione substantiali nullum accidens manere in materia prima. Quod si ita fit, ob id utique evenit, quod materia non sufficiat sustentare accidentia, sed solum compositum; et ideo pereunt corrupto composito, quod nulla ratione fieri posset, si materiae primae inhaerent. Secundo hoc confirmat, quod Aristoteles, I Phys., text. 81 et 82, ait materiam primam respicere per se primo substantialem formam. Tertio, lib V, text 8, et lib I de Gen., text. 24, differentiam constituit inter generationem et alterationem vel augmentationem quod subiectum generationis est sola materia, quam dicit esse materiam simpliciter, alterationis vero et augmentationis subiectum dicit esse substantiam integram, quam vocat materiam secundum quid. Quarto, VII Metaph., text. 8, ait materiam non esse quid, neque quantum, neque quale, neque aliquid huiusmodi. Quinto, VII Metaph., text 4, et XII Metaph., text 43, ait substantiam esse priorem natura accidente. Sexto in Praedicam., c. de Substantia, dicit destructis primis substantiis, impossibile esse aliquid remanere; primae autem substantiae sunt substantiae intergrae simplices aut compositae.



every act of whatever order. Therefore, substantial form is its first act, and matter is per se ordered to this act. Accidents, on the other hand, are secondary acts following upon that first one. Thirdly, if any accident were in prime matter it would be quantity but quantity is not in prime matter. Therefore, no accident is in prime matter. The minor premise of this third argument is proved by the fact that quantity is a property of corporeal substance necessarily going along with it. But, it is not able to be a property following upon matter alone, but upon the form. Therefore, quantity is not able to be received in matter as such but only as informed by the form, that is, in the composite. Fourthly, quantity and all corporeal accidents must be received in the total composite. It is acceptable for one accident to be received into another (i.e., be mediated by another), as is obvious with corporeal quality (e.g., color) and quantity (size, shape, etc.) and between qualities themselves (e.g., color and heat). But, the potency for receiving an accident is only to this or that determination, the potency, however, of matter is for receiving a form.[50]

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[50]Rationes pro hac sententia adducuntur plures. Prima quia materia est pura potentia ita ut neque esse habeat nisi illud mendicet a forma; ergo ex se est impotens ad sustentanda accidentia, nisi prius saltem natura coniungatur formae et ab illa esse recipiat. . . . Secunda ratio, qua D. Thomas utitur, quia materia est potentia ad omnes actus ordine quodam; ergo respicit substantialem formam ut primum actum suum, ad quem per se primo ordinatur; accidentia vero, ut actus secundarios consequentes primum.

Terto ratio est, nam si quod accidens esset in materia prima, maxime quantitas; sed haec non; ergo. Maior



Despite all of this argumentation against quantity being in matter, Suarez prefers the second opinion, that quantity is in matter. This opinion holds that prime matter by means of the force of its own being is a sufficient material cause of the form of accidents which are proportioned to it--first and immediately such an accident is quantity and mediately the rest of the corporeal accidents. Now, Suarez realizes that this opinion is not in accord with the scholastic tradition he has just finished discussing and begins his defense of the position by citing a list of texts from Aristotle which appear to substantiate this present opinion.[51] He also brings in Plato's doctrine on matter as

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recepta est ab omnibus, et constat ex dictis in principio. Minor probatur, quia quantitas est proprietas substantiae corporeae necessario concomitans illam; non potest autem esse proprietas consequens materiam ut sic, sed formam; ergo non potest recipi in materia secundum se, sed ut informata forma, seu in composito . . .

Quarta ratio sit, quia non repugnat quantitatem et accidentia omnia corporalia recipi in toto composito mediante forma; et hoc est magis consentaneum naturis rerum; ergo. Maior declaratur, quia non repugnat unum accidens recipi in substantia mediante alio, ut constat de qualitate corporea et de quantitate, et inter qualitates ipsas reperitur interdum hic ordo, ut patebit sectione sequenti; ergo multo magis reperiri potest inter substantialem actum, et accidentalem. Minor vero probatur, quia potentia ad recipiendum accidens est tantum secundum quid; potentia autem materiae ad recipiendam formam substantialem est potentia simpliciter; ergo est maxime consentaneum naturis rerum, ut haec potentia materiae prius reducatur in actum simpliciter, qui solum relinquat potentiam secundum quid, et illo mediante recipiat accidentia quibus compositum actuetur quoad potentiam secundum quid quae in illo manet. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, pars. 7-9.

[51]Et huic sententiae favet Aristoteles multis in locis, nam VII Metaph., text. 8, significat quantitatem primo inesse materiae; et in III Phys. sentit quantitatem esse proprietatem ipsius materiae; et lib II de Generat.,



it is found in the Timaeus that matter is called "the great" and "the small" which indicates that matter does of itself have quantity, being indifferent, nevertheless, to any one definite greatness or smallness. This set of texts from Aristotle and the analysis from the Timaeus leads Suarez to an important conclusion in the relationship of matter to quantity. The reasons for this present position are partly metaphysical and partly physical, and it is from both sides that the discussion ought to be carried on. Suarez points out that the metaphysical reasons seem to prove from the part of matter that there is in it a sufficient foundation of being that it could sustain accidents. The physical reasons also show it to be more appropriate for matter to sustain quantity because of the sensible effects we experience.

That quantity is in matter is appropriate because matter has actual being, with its own existence and even a partial subsistence. Therefore, from this angle it has sufficient being to sustain some accident. This must be true

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text. 6, sentit dispositiones ad formas substantiales, et alterationem quae ad eas fit proxime versari circa materiam; et lib. I de Generat., et lib. II, text. 27 ait accidentia in quibus res genita convenit cum corrupta manere eadem. Potest etiam in hanc sententia Plato adduci, qui in Timaeo materiam magnum et parvum appellavit, quod ex se quantitatem habeat, indifferentem tamen ad magnitudinem vel parvitatem. Rationes pro hac sententia partim metaphysicae sunt, partim physicae; ex utrisque tamen integer discursus conflari debet; nam rationes metaphysicae probare videntur non repugnare ex parte materiae, seu esse in ea sufficiens fundamentum entitatis ut sustentet materialiter accidentia; physicae autem rationes ostendunt id esse magis consentaneum tam fini seu muneri ad quod materia instituta est quam sensibilibus effectibus quos experimur. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 11.

because that which subsists in itself, even though as some partial being, is able to support accidents proportionate to itself.[52] It could be said perhaps that matter depends upon the form in its very existence. But, this does not refute the present position, because that dependence of matter on form is not as a true and proper cause of the matter itself. Rather, it is a condition naturally necessary for matter to be preserved in existence. This manner of dependence which is extrinsic to the being of matter is not able to obstruct the being of matter in itself, nor the fact that this being is sufficient for supporting accidents in the genus of material cause.[53] One can grant that matter

[52]Primo igitur probatur hanc causalitatem posse convenire materiae, quia materia habet propriam entitatem actualem cum sua propria existentia, ut supra dictum est, et propriam etiam subsistentiam partialem, ut infra ostendetur; erto ex hac parte habet sufficientem entitatem ut sustentet aliquod accidens. Patet consequentia, quia quod in se subsistit, licet alioqui partialis entitas sit, potest sustentare accidentia sibi proportionata, ut paulo antea de anima rationali dicebamus. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 12.

[53]Dicetur fortasse materiam dependere in suo esse a forma, et ex hac parte esse inferioris conditionis quam sit anima rationalis comparata ad materiam. Sed hoc non obstat, etiamsi illam dependentiam admittamus, quam nonnulli negant; quia illa dependentia materiae a forma non est ut a vera et propria causa ipsius materiae, sed ut a conditione quadem naturaliter necessaria ut materia conservetur in esse; huiusmodi autem genus dependentiae, quod est extrinsecum entitati materiae, id est superveniens illi et non intrinsece componens illam, nihil obstare potest quominus entitas materiae secundum se sit sufficiens ad sustentanda accidentia in genere causae materialis, dependentia enim unius causae ab alia extrinseca in suo esse nihil impedit quominus ipsa in suo genere sit sufficiens ad causandum effectum proportionatum. Estque ad hominem optimum et valde accommodatum exemplum; nam substantiale compositum pendet a suis naturalibus dispositionibus, nam, illis ablatis, dissolvitur; et tamen hoc non obstat quin ipsum compositum secundum se sit materialis causa aliorum accidentium. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 12.

depends upon the form and is able to be a material cause of the form, and is still able to be the material cause of quantity. This is clear because there seems to be a greater opposition between dependence upon the form and ability to be a material cause of the form than there is between dependence on the form and matter as the material cause of quantity.[54]

From all of this the position that quantity is in matter is confirmed. Prime matter has in itself a sufficient existence and subsistence by which it might support material substantial forms. Therefore, it also supports or materially causes quantity. If matter can support a substantial form, it would be necessary that it subsist and exist and be an actual being. Also, just as matter is said to depend on form so also it is able to be said to depend upon quantity. Therefore just as there is nothing wrong with saying matter supports the form, so there is nothing wrong with saying that it supports quantity. Just as matter cannot be conserved without form so neither can it be conserved without quantity.[55]

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[54]Immo, quod magis est, etiam ipsarum dispositionum est materialis causa ipsum compositum, licet alias ab eis pendeat; quid ergo mirum quod materia, quamvis pendeat a forma, possit esse materialis causa accidentium? Accedit quod, licet materia pendeat a forma, potest esse causa materialis eiusdem formae; ergo, quamvis pendeat a forma, poterit esse causa materialis quantitatis. Patet consequentia, quia maior videtur esse repugnantia inter illas duas habitudines dependentiae et causalitatis respectu eiusdem, quam respectu diversorum. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 12.

[55]Ex quo tandem roboratur ratio facta; nam materia prima habet in se sufficientem existentem et subsistentem, qua in se sustineat formas substantiales materiales; ergo

This argument for the second position, given by Suarez, gives matter a significance that it did not have in earlier scholasticism. Since matter is in some sense an entity, it can accept accidents proportionate to its being just as the composite substance accepts accidents. The problem here is that this violates the maxim that matter is not an integral being. The parallels between dependence of matter and form, and matter supporting form and quantity do not hold up as Suarez wants them to unless one turns matter into some sort of substance in its own right. This is exactly what Suarez has wanted to avoid but in fact has allowed to happen.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the Suarezian doctrine on matter with the aim of showing that despite his best intentions Suarez is unable to avoid a substantializing tendency with respect to matter. He sees clearly that if one makes matter a substance in its own right one has the problems of the monists, or of the atomists, or of the pluralists.

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etiam ut sustentet seu materialiter causet quantitatem. Probatur consequentia, tum quia non minus, immo plus esse videtur sustentare formam substantialem; neque ad id est minus necessaria subsistentia et existentia vel actualis entitas; tum etiam quia sicut materia dicitur pendere a forma, ita potest dici pendere a quantitate; ergo sicut hoc non obstat quominus materia sustentet formam, ita etiam non obstabit quominus sustentet quantitatem. Consequentia tenet a paritate rationis; et antecedens probatur, quia, sicut non potest materia conservari sine forma, ita nec sine quantitate, adeo ut etiam in ordine ad potentiam Dei absolutam facilius intelligi valeat materia sine forma, quam sine quantitate, ut inferius ostendam. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 13.

Consequently, he opts for the position that matter is a partial, incomplete being with an existence of its own. This move is clearly outside of his tradition and is the result of a desire to avoid a form of corporeity as one finds in Scotus. On the other hand, granting matter its own being demands that there be considerable reworking of traditional doctrines.

He examines the teaching that matter is pure potency and sees that a blanket acceptance here denies being to matter and so he restructures this teaching on pure potency to allow both for real existence of matter and a qualified understanding of pure potency. This qualified understanding holds that matter is pure potency only with respect to the fact that it can accept any substantial form. It is not pure potency in the radical sense of being "a nothing."

The second place where the new teaching on the being of matter forces a rethinking is the notion of our knowledge of matter. Suarez, as has been seen, sets up criteria for how one knows matter. It is possible to know matter because matter has a being of its own. Whereas in Aristotle and in earlier scholasticism matter was never knowable, Suarez allows a derivative kind of knowledge of matter.

Thirdly, the analysis of the causality of prime matter once again takes into account the being of matter and there is much more allowance for an <u>active</u> role for matter than has been the case in the past.

A decisive shift takes place in Suarez' doctrine on

matter when he allows matter to have the accident, quantity, apart from the presence of the form. There are many implications to this position, but the one of most immediate concern is that matter heretofore could not accept accidents. Only complete substances could accept accidents. Once again, Suarez appeals to the partial existence of matter as the explanation for this capacity of matter.

Each of these shifts in the doctrine on matter has been noted at some length in the body of this chapter. It is well here to reflect on the significance of these moves in their totality. What has happened by allowing matter its own existence is that, despite his desires to the contrary, Suarez has opened the door to a dualism in his metaphysical theory. He rejects the Empedoclean type of element theory but in fact seems to have reduced the hylomorphic theory to a two element theory of matter and form. His additional reworkings of the doctrine of material cause seem merely to harden the position rather than alleviate the problems in granting matter its own being.

Suarez himself is not unaware of the difficulties he has created for his position and in the exposition on formal cause attempts to preserve the hylomorphic theory.

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CHAPTER III

SUAREZ' TEACHING ON FORM

As a parallel to the analysis of material cause, Suarez, in Disputation XV, turns to the treatment of the formal cause, or substantial form. He views the analysis here as comparable to the treatment of matter.[1] Initially he asks whether there are such things as forms. Then, as with matter, he inquires what constitutes the being and essence of the form and what is the causality of the form. But, additionally, with respect to form he must detail the mutual dependence of matter and form. Finally, Suarez is concerned with the unicity of the substantial form in a composite being.

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[1]Quoniam causa materialis et formalis mutuam habitudinem inter se dicunt, ideo eadem methodo qua de materia disseruimus, dicemus prius de forma substantiali, et postea de accidentali, nam quae de forma in communi desiderari poterant, vel tacta sunt in disputatione de causis in communi, vel explicabuntur distinctius in singulis membris, quae in illa ratione communi solum analogice conveniunt. Tractando autem de substantiali forma, complebimus ea quae de materia prima in hunc locum remisimus, propter intrinsecam connexionem inter ipsam et formam. Supponendam est autem hic non esse sermonem de forma extrinseca, quam exemplarum vocant, de qua infra dicemus, quia ut sic magis habet rationem efficientis quam formae. Neque etiam de forma separata, ut solet natura angelica, aut immaterialis nominari, non propter causalitatem sed propter actualitatem seu pulchritudinem; sed agimus de sola forma informante seu recepta in materia, quia illa est quae propriam et specialiem habet rationem causae. Disp. Meta. XV, Intro.

As with the treatment of matter a surface reading of Suarez seems to indicate that his understanding of form is a rather standard scholastic doctrine. Some analysis of the teaching on form, however, reveals that there is an original approach here, for the form is viewed as an incomplete being with its own partial existence. This opinion becomes especially crucial in respect to the rational soul. Suarez, when dealing with form, subdivides this co-principle of being into subhuman forms and the rational soul. This problem of "kinds" did not and could not arise with respect to matter as the radically first subject. It does arise in regard to form and becomes a central problem of the intelligibility of this metaphysical principle.[2]

The Existence of Substantial Form

Since the teaching on form is to be a parallel discussion to that of matter, Suarez begins by asking whether

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[2]This chapter will set forth only the general doctrine on form. The problem of the rational soul and its difference from the material form will be treated in Chapter V, "Body and Soul."

The secondary source materials on Suarez' doctrine of form are somewhat limited, as was the case with those of matter. Once again the reader is referred to McCormick, "Suarez on Matter and Form" and Mahieu, Francois Suarez, Chapter V. These two authors provide brief treatments of the material contained in this chapter but once again the brevity fails to indicate something of the real uniqueness of the doctrine. A more recent study of the treatment on form occurs in David M. Knight, S.J., "Suarez's Approach to Substantial Form," The Modern Schoolman 39 (1961-62): 219-39. This article according to the author is a set of observations comparing Suarez' ideas on substantial form with those of Thomas Aquinas. Knight shows that there are great differences in the two doctrines and attempts to enumerate these differences in a brief space.

there are such things as substantial forms, but an answer to this question requires an initial distinction of terminology. A customary division of form is into "physical" and "metaphysical." The physical form is the true and real form. It is called "physical" either because it constitutes the nature of the things or because it is investigated in terms of physical change. But a consideration of form is not outside the domain of metaphysics as the science of being as being, because an understanding of form is common and abstract and because the form is necessary for the constitution of an essence.[3] For an understanding of "metaphysical form" it is necessary to turn to Section 11 of Disputation XV where Suarez states that a metaphysical form is a way of expressing a composition parallel to the physical composition of matter and form (i.e., physical matter + physical form) but only imitates that composition. The composition from matter and form is the original composition and every other composition is analogous to this one.

By providing two examples Suarez hopes to show the analogous and metaphorical use of the term "metaphysical

[3]Rursus vero dividi solet forma in physicam et metaphysicam: prior est, quae veram et realem causalitatem formae exercet, et ideo de illa principalius dicendum est. Quamvis enim physica forma dicatur, vel quia naturam rei principaliter constituit, vel quia per motum physicum principalius investigatur priusque in scientia physica consideratur, non tamen est extra metaphysicam considerationem, tum quia ratio formae communis est et abstracta, tum etiam quia forma constituit essentiam, tum denique quia est una ex praecipuis causis. Quid autem per metaphysicam formam significetur et quomodo hanc rationem causae participet, in fine huius disputationis subiiciemus. Disp. Meta. XV, Intro.

form." In a being composed of integral parts, for example, a material being, one part is always considered to be the form, the other to be the matter. This is clear in aggregates, as in a building the form of the roof is a form of the building. It is also clear in per se unities, as in man the head is the form of the other integral parts. From these examples the "metaphysical form" can be understood to describe in general an essentially constituted being in which one finds a relationship of parts similar to the relationship of one part as receptive and the other as determinative. This metaphysical form does not exercise the causality proper to physical form but rather points out an arbitrary relationship in an already totally constituted being.[4] The importance of this distinction is that Suarez,

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[4]In quavis compositione aliquid ut materia, et aliquid ut forma.--Quoniam distinctio formae in physicam et metaphysicam valde communis est, et quae hactenus diximus in physicam formam conveniunt, videtur metaphysici negotii esse nonnulla etiam de metaphysica forma dicere, quae, suppositis quae diximus, breviter poterunt expediri, quia haec solum per analogiam et quasi metaphoram quamdam forma nominatur. Est igitur advertendum ex dictis in superioribus, praeter compositionem physicam ex materia et forma, esse aliam quae illam imitatur; ex se tamen abstrahit a vera materia, et ideo metaphysica nominatur. Est autem haec duplex, quantum ad praesens spectat, altera ex natura et supposito, altera ex genere et differentia; omitto eam quae est ex esse et essentia, quia obscurior est et, quantum ad praesens attinet, non intervenit in ea specialis aliqua ratio formae, ut ex dicendis constabit. Deinde est considerandum in omni compositione, ut ex multis unum consurgere intelligatur, aliquid semper considerari ut materiam et aliquid ut formam, tum quia compositio ex materiam et forma est prima compositio realis et maxime propria ac per se, et ideo per quamdam analogiam ad illam omnis alia compositio declaratur; tum etiam quia materia est quid informe et imperfectum et inchoatio quaedam et quasi fundamentum naturae; forma vero est quasi pulchritudo et perfectio ac consummatio naturae;

in the treatment of formal cause, is concerned with the actual real form not the "metaphysical form;" just as he was concerned with the actual real matter, not the "metaphysical matter, so here, he is concerned with the actual real form not the "metaphysical form."

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in omni autem compositione est aliquid quasi potentiale, quod est fundamentum et inchoatio rei, et aliquid quod est terminus vel consummatio rei, et ideo semper aliquid consideratur ut materia et aliquid ut forma. Quod adeo verum est ut etiam in compositione ex partibus integrantibus, quae maxime materialis esse videtur, semper una pars consideretur ut materia et altera ut forma, quod clarius apparebit in rebus heterogeneis, ut in homine caput est veluti forma aliarum partium; et in artificialibus tectum, verbi gratia, est quasi forma aedificii; iuxta quam analogiam distinguunt etiam tehologi materias et formas sacramentorum. Et in rebus homogeneis, ubi inter partes non potest distingui illa diversa habitudo propter earum similitudinem ut uniformitatem, omnes partes dicuntur esse materia totius, compositum autem comparari ut forma ad singulas partes. In quibus omnibus non intercedit specialis causalitas, sed sola unio cum analogia et proportione ad materiam et formam.

Ex his ergo intelligitur formam metaphysicam in genere vocari quae in compositione metaphysica constituit essentialiter rem ipsam, vel complet aut actuat essentiam rei; nec potest aliter describi haec forma ita in communi sumpta. Est autem discrimen inter duas compositiones metaphysicas supra dictas, quod prior, scilicet, ex natura et supposito est compositio rei (in creaturis loquimur), id est, ex iis quae in re ipsa aliquo modo actu distinguuntur, ut sunt natura et subsistentia, de quibus diffuse infra tractabimus; posterior vero est compositio rationis, quia eius extrema in re non distinguuntur actu, sed ratione tantum, ut in superioribus visum est. Est etiam alia differentia, quod in priori compositione unum extremum est tota essentia rei, aliud vero non spectat intrinsece ad essentiam, sed est terminus aut modus essentiae; in alia vero compositione utrumque extremum est essentiale et neutrum dicit totam essentiam rei expliciter seu actualiter, licet confuse totam illam includere possit. Unde fit ut prior dici etiam soleat forma totalis, realis ac propriissime metaphysica; posterior vero magis est forma secundum rationem, et ideo non tantum metaphysica, sed etiam logica appellari potest.

Forma metaphysica est tota rei essentia.--Dicendum est ergo primo formam proprie metaphysicam, quae est forma



Having shown his concern that he treat the physical form as opposed to the metaphysical form, Suarez now asks whether there are substantial forms in material things. There are reasons for doubting their existence. Substantial forms are not able to be known by direct experience, nor are they necessary for every action and difference which we do experience. Fire, for example, is sufficiently understood if one is able to conceive of a certain substance having heat joined with dryness. That is, fire can be explained by

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totius, nihil aliud esse quam totam rei substantialis essentiam, quam etiam integram naturam rei appellamus, quae non dicitur forma eo quod specialiter exerceat propriam causalitatem formae, sed quia rem essentialiter constituit per seipsam. Declaro et probo singula; nam in homine, verbi gratia, haec forma totius dicitur esse humanitas quae cum ex materia et forma hominis constet, totam essentiam hominis dicit; id enim quod homo addit humanitati non est de essentia hominis, ut infra dicemus tractando de subsistentia et in mysterio Incarnationis breviter patet; nam in Christo est tota essentia hominis, quamvis non sit humana subsistentia creata. Praeterea, haec forma totius non tantum in rebus materialibus, sed etiam in spiritualibus reperitur; immo non solum in rebus creatis, sed etiam in Deo ipso a nobis consideratur; concipimus enim Deitatem ut formam essentialiter constitutentem Deum et quodlibet suppositum divinum, quatenus hic Deus est; quamquam illi sit proprium in re ipsa non distingui ab eo cuius essentia est; in quo deficit ab ea ratione formae quam essentia habet in rebus creatis, quia illa non pertinet ad perfectionem simpliciter, sed imperfectionem includit; ergo haec forma in rebus immaterialibus nihil aliud esse potest quam earum essentia. In materialibus autem differt haec forma totius a forma physica et partiali, ut constat ex communi usu harum vocum, et ex ipsa distinctione formae physicae a metaphysica; non differt autem nisi quia forma totius dicit totam naturam compositam ex materia et forma, forma autem physica solum dicit partem formalem; ergo haec forma metaphysica etiam in his rebus dicit totam essentiam earum. Quia ut infra ostendemus in disputatione de substantia materiali, etiam materia est de essentia huius substantiae, et ita natura composita ex materia et forma est tota essentia eius; atque ita patet prima pars conclusionis. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 11, pars. 1-3.



referring only to accidental qualities. This would be sufficient to explain every action of fire which one experiences and to distinguish fire from other things. Therefore, substantial forms should not be introduced without reason. In a word, some have held that they perform no useful function.

A second argument against substantial form states that there is an opposition when the form is taken both as enforming and substantial. Either the thing is subsistent and need not be sustained by a subject or it is not subsistent and needs to be sustained. If it need not be sustained, then it is not an enforming form because it is repugnant for that which is subsistent to be received into another. If it is sustained by a subject, then, it is a form inhering in the subject and therefore is an accidental form. This means that there is no such principle as a substantial form.

The third argument against substantial forms states that if there are such forms one cannot understand the manner in which interchanges and generations of things occur unless something is made from nothing. But, something cannot be made from nothing according to natural principles.[5]

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[5]Ratio dubitandi est primo quia formae substantiales nullo experimento cognosci possunt, nec sunt necessariae ad omnes actiones et differentias rerum quas experimur; ergo non sunt sine causa introducendae. Antecedens patet, quia ignis, verbi gratia, sufficienter intelligitur in suo esse constitutus, si concipiamus quamdam substantiam habentem perfectum et summum calorem cum siccitate coniunctum, etiam si substantia his accidentibus subiecta sit simplex; et hoc

Despite these three arguments against substantial form, Suarez himself holds the position that there are substantial forms. All natural or corporeal things are constituted by a substantial form in addition to the matter. This form is an intrinsic principle and the formal cause of these things. Suarez feels that he is in the mainstream of the Aristotelian tradition by maintaining this position and, after citing innumerable places where Aristotle explains substantial form, Suarez makes the further claim that Plato in the Timaeus was actually

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etiam satis est ad omnem actionem ignis quam experimur et ad distinctionem inter ignem et aquam et ad transmutationem unius in aliud, quae in hoc videtur consistere quod illa substantia a summo frigore transit in summum calorem, et e converso. Hoc ergo satis est ad constitutionem, distinctionem et actionem elementorum; idem ergo proportionaliter sufficiet ad mixtorum compositionem, haec enim ex elementorum mixtione procreantur.

Secundo involvi videtur repugnantia cum dicitur forma informans et substantialis; nam vel est res subsistens et nullo indigens subiecto sustentante vel illo indiget: si primum habeat, non potest esse forma informans, quia repugnat id quod subsistens est in alio recipi. Si secundum habeat, est forma inhaerens; ergo accidentalis; non datur ergo substantialis forma.

Tertio, quia positis substantialibus formis, non potest intelligi quo modo fiant rerum transmutationes et generationes nisi aliquid ex nihilo fiat, quod esse non potest iuxta naturalia principia. Sequela patet, quia vel forma substantialis praeexistit generationi, aut aliquid eius, vel nihil. Primum dici non potest, alias infinitae formae praeexisterent in materia, et reipsa nihil de novo fieret, sed appareret. Neque etiam potest dici secundum, tum quia in eadem parte materiae non potest esse aliquid formae quin sit tota forma, cum indivisibilis sit; tum etiam quia, etiamsi pars formae praesit et pars inducenda sit, haec pars fiet ex nihilo; non enim potest ex priori parte fieri; restat ergo ut dicatur tertium, quod tamen repugnat et excedit vim naturalium agentium. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, pars. 1-3.

the founder of this opinion in the theory of participation of the Forms.[6]

Suarez' own proof for the existence of a substantial form is quite different from that of either Plato or Aristotle. Rather than start with the lower levels of being and show that these lower levels have a substantial form and then move to man as also having such a form, Suarez starts

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[6]Dicendum vero est, omnes res naturales seu corporeas constare forma substantiali (praeter materiam), tamquam principio intrinseco et causa formali. Haec est sententia Aristotelis innumeris in locis, qui saepe reprehendit veteres philosophos quod, fere praetermissa substantiali forma, omnem inquisitionem circa materiam adhibuerint, et constat ex toto lib. I Phys., et lib. II, c. 1, ubi formam perfectionem naturam dicit esse, quam materiam. Idem habet lib. 1 de Partibus animalium, c. 1, et VII Metaph., c. 4, et lib. XII, c. 2, ubi vocat formam hoc aliquid, quia complet substantiam, quae est hoc aliquid; et ibidem paraesertim lib. VII Metaph., vocat formam quod quid est; et rationem reddit quia ipsa est quae constituit et distinguit rerum essentias. Praeterea, lib. II de Anima, c. 1, distinguit substantiam in materiam, formam et compositum, et formam vocat ἐντελέχειαν de quo nomine multa erudite scribit Fonseca, lib. I Metaph., in fine; communiter tamen docent scriptores vocem entelechiae generaliorem esse et plura comprehendere quam substantialem formam; significat enim proprie perfectionem seu actum perficientem rem. Per antonomasiam vero attribui solet formae substantiali quod sit praecipuus actus et maxima perfectio rei substantialis. Aliis etiam nominibus solet ab Aristotele forma substantialis nominari, quae inferius, explicando eius causalitatem adnotabimus. Non tamen fuit Aristoteles huius veritatis inventor, nam ante eum substantialem formam agnovit Plato, ut constat ex Timaeo ubi formas appellat vere existentium simulchra, id est, idearum participationes, cum tamen ipse non ponat ideas nisi substantiarum. Et ante Platonem nonnulli e philosophis creduntur substantiales formas attigisse, ut constat ex Aristotele I de Partibus animal., c. 1, et aliis locis supra citatis. Iam vero est hoc dogma ita receptum in philosophia, ut sine magna ignorantia id negari non possit; estque ita consentaneum veritati fidei christianae, ut eius certitudo non parum inde augeatur; quare placet huius veritatis probationem a quodam principio fide certo, et lumine naturali evidente inchoare. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 5.



with the human level of being and proves that since there are human substantial forms there must be a substantial form for all natural things. This is a truly unique move on Suarez' part. His reasoning is that the rational soul is a substance and not an accident and this is obvious because of itself the soul can exist separately from the body. Since it is immortal, it is therefore subsistent of itself (i.e., exist on its own), and independent of the subject (matter). Therefore, it is not an accident but a substance. But, that same soul is truly the form of the body as faith and the natural light teach. It cannot be simply an aiding substance nor can it move the body extrinsically. The reasons for this are that as an aiding substance or extrinsic mover it could not vivify the body nor would the composite be a man. Man, therefore, is composed of a body (matter) and rational soul (form). Therefore, this soul is a substantial form for the name "substantial form" stands for nothing other than a certain partial substance which is able to be united to matter, so that with it, it composes an integral substance and a <u>per se</u> unity of such and such a kind (i.e., man).[7]

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[7]Prima igitur ratio sit, nam homo constat forma substantiali, ut intrinseca causa; ergo et res omnes naturales. Antecedens probatur, nam anima rationalis substantia est et non accidens, ut patet, quia per se manet separata a corpore, cum sit immortalis; est ergo per se subsistens et independens a subiecto; non est ergo accidens, sed substantia. Rursus illa anima est vera forma corporis, ut docet fides et est etiam lumine naturali: Non enim potest esse substantia assistens aut extrinsece movens corpus, alias non vivificaret illud, neque ex praesentia et

It is well to stop and reflect on this method of procedure for there are certain elements in this argument that will be very important for the relationship of body and soul--1. the rational soul remains separate from the body, it is immortal, subsistent, and independent of matter; 2. the definition of the form as a partial substance is parallel to the description of matter as a partial substance; 3. the necessity that they compose together a per se unity is familiar from the previous treatment of matter. But, how is any unification possible given the properties of the human form listed above? It is precisely at the rational soul that Suarez' theory of hylomorphism breaks down. And yet, he uses the rational soul to prove that there are substantial forms in general.

Suarez states that since it is established that man has a substantial form, all natural things are constituted in a like manner with substantial forms. The first consequence here is proved by the fact that in the composition of man from matter and substantial form there are in all natural things a certain substantial subject appropriate of its very nature to be informed by some substantial act. Such a

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coniunctione eius essentialiter penderent opera vitae: nec denique esset ipse homo qui intelligeret, sed, quaedam alia substantia illi assistens. Constat ergo homo corpore ut materia, et anima rationali ut forma; est ergo haec anima substantialis forma; nam, ut infra declarabimus, nomine substantialis formae nihil aliud significatur, quam substantia quaedam partialis, quae ita potest uniri materiae ut cum illa componat substantiam integram ac per se unam, qualis est homo. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 6.



subject taken by itself is imperfect and incomplete in the genus of substance. Therefore, there is always need for it to be united to some substantial act. This subject (matter) is proper not only to man but is required in all other natural things. Moreover, it is presupposed both for the generation of man and for his nutrition and remains after his corruption. Therefore all natural things which are set up by that subject are constituted also by an actuating substantial form which perfects that subject.[8] The reasoning here is that since one needs a substantial form to explain the generation, nutrition, and corruption of man (the highest level of natural being), one also needs a substantial form to explain generation, nutrition and corruption of all natural things. Suarez moves from the special case of composition in man to the general doctrine of composition in all natural things.

The next step in the argument for substantial form is to show that there are a number of faculties and accidents proper to man and that these faculties and accidents cannot be present in the subject (prime matter) without some

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[8]Hominis ergo compositio ex materia et forma substantiali ostendit esse in rebus naturalibus quoddam subiectum substantiale natura sua aptum, ut informetur actu aliquo substantiali; ergo tale subiectum imperfectum et incompletum est in genere substantiae; petit ergo semper esse sub aliquo actu substantiali. Hoc autem subiectum non est proprium hominis, sed in aliis etiam rebus naturalibus reperitur, ut per se notum est; unde et ad generationem hominis supponitur, et ad nutritionem, et post eius corruptionem manet; ergo res omnes naturales, quae illo subiecto seu materia constant, constant etiam substantiali forma actuante, et perficiente subiectum illud. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 7.

prior actuating form.[9] Since an aggregation of faculties or accidents is not sufficient for the constitution of any complete natural being, a form which precedes these faculties and accidents is required, and this form is the fountain of all actions and natural movements. In the form all the variety of accidents and potencies has its roots and a certain unity.[10]

The third step in the argument for substantial form follows the same pattern as the other two. The substantial generation and corruption of man does not consist in acquisition or loss of some accident, but in a union or disunion of a rational soul which substantially informs a human body. One should understand the generation and corruption of other natural beings in the same way. This can be seen from

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[9]It has been shown in the previous chapter that quantity is in matter. This accident, according to Suarez' teaching there, seems to be present in the matter independently of an actuating substantial form since it is of such a nature that it applies more properly to matter than to form. But, if Suarez holds this position with respect to quantity he seems to contradict himself in this general statement regarding the necessity for all accidents to have some prior form.

[10]Praeterea, ex eadem hominis compositione colligitur, aggregationem plurium facultatem vel formarum accidentalium in simplici subiecto substantiali non satis esse ad constitutionem rei naturalis; nam in homine sunt illae facultates, et formae accidentales, plures fortasse ac perfectiores quam in aliis naturalibus rebus, et tamen non sufficiunt ad constitutionem alicuius naturalis entis completi, sed praeterea requiritur forma quae veluti praesit omnibus illis facultatibus et accidentibus, et sit fons omnium actionum et naturalium motuum talis entis, et in qua tota illa varietas accidentium et potentiarum radicem et quamdam unitatem habeat; ergo eadem ratione in reliquis entibus naturalibus necessaria est aliqua forma substantialis distincta ab accidentibus, et intimior ac perfectior illis. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 7.

experience: the only difference in generation and corruption between man and other natural things lies in the perfection and subsistence of the human form.[11]

What Suarez is attempting to accomplish here is to prove from the case of man that since there is need for a substantial form, all other natural things must have such a form. He has argued from the nature of the substantial subject, from the need for faculties and accidents to inhere in a complete being, and from the nature of generation and corruption. One discovers these things in man; therefore this same situation exists in all natural beings.

Following upon these initial arguments, Suarez provides a more general proof for the existence of substantial forms. From the accidents and operations of natural beings, one can see that there must be a substantial form. For example, if water is heated and then the source of heat is

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[11]Tertio, eodem exemplo constat generationem et corruptionem hominis substantialem non consistere in acquisitione vel amissione aliquorum accidentium, sed in unione vel disiunctione animae rationalis substantialiter informantis corpus humanum, ad quam praeparant accidentia quaedam, quibus sublatis, anima recedit et homo corrumpitur; ergo eodem modo intelligendum est fieri corruptionem et generationem aliorum entium naturalium. Nam, quantum experientia colligi potest, idem modus est generationis et corruptionis in aliis rebus qui est in homine, excepta differentia in perfectione et subsistentia formae humanae, quam ex modo generationis et corruptionis non colligeremus, nisi aliunde nobis nota esset. Et propterea dicitur Ecclesiast., 3: Unus interitus est hominis, et iumentorum et aequa utriusque conditio, sicut moritur homo, ita et illa moruntur, etc. Denique omnia indicia et signa substantialis compositionis, quae in homine cogitari possunt sunt in aliis entibus naturalibus, et praesertim in animantibus, ut ex sequente ratione constabit. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 7.

removed, the water of itself returns to its former coolness. This is a sign that in the water there is some intrinsic principle which keeps the water cool unless there is an extrinsic agent. This intrinsic principle is the substantial form. The proof for this is that if that reduction in heat were from the outside it would not be per se and necessary, but rather from accident or occurring on account of an external agent. If one were to enumerate every principle extrinsic to the form there would be none by which that action of returning to coolness is able to occur. There is only air surrounding the water and naturally it is not as cool as the water, nor is it usual that it is equally as hot as the water itself.[12] Suarez, here, is arguing from the notion

[12]Secunda ergo ratio principalis sumitur ex variis indiciis ortis ex accidentibus et operationibus entium naturalium, quae indicant latere sub illis formam substantialem. Primum cernitur etiam in elementis; nam si aqua, verbi gratia, calefiat, et postea removeatur agens, ab intrinseco reducitur ad pristinam frigiditatem, ut experimento constat; ergo signum est esse in aqua aliquod intimius principium, a quo iterum manat intensio frigoris, sublatis extrinsecis impedimentis; illud autem principium non potest esse nisi forma substantialis; ergo. Prima consequentia probatur, quia nullum potest esse extrinsecum principium illius reductionis, tum quia, si illa reductio esset ab extrinseco, non esset per se ac necessaria, sed ex accidente, prout extrinsecum agens casu occurreret; tum etiam quia, discurrendo per omnia principia extrinseca, quae communiter occurrunt, nullum est a quo possit illa actio provenire, quia proxime solum occurrere solet aer circumstans, qui vel naturaliter non est tam frigidus sicut aqua, vel ex accidente relinqui solet aeque calidus ac ipsa aqua; unde ipse etiam se reducit ad pristinum statum quantum potest; remote vero solum interveniunt causae caelestes et universales, quae ex se non sunt determinatae ad huiusmodi actionem, ut notum est.

Variae talis reductionis causae refelluntur.-- Secundum vero antecedens, scilicet, nullam aliam causam intrinsecam illius actionis excogitari posse praeter ipsam aquae formam probatur, nam quaenam erit illa? Dicunt aliqui in quibusdam partibus aquae semper manere intensum frigus,

that even in the elements there is a natural state to which they return once the action of an external agent has ceased. This return to a natural state demands that there be a substantial form.

Despite the antiquated physics, the point here is that even in inanimate things such as the elements substantial corruption is distinct from mere alteration. Suarez wants the inanimate example to stand so that he may make a universal induction about the existence of the substantial forms;[13] for their existence is even more evident in animate

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et ab illis partibus alias quae calefactae fuerunt, frigefieri quod probabile censet Caietan., I, q. 54, a. 3; et tribuitur Averroi, II de Anima, com. 1. Sed hoc frivolum est et contra experientiam; sensu enim percipimus totam aquam infusam vasi alicui, esse valde calidam, quacumque ex parte attingatur; si autem essent aliquae partes adeo frigidae, vel perciperentur sensu vel saltem temperarent in aliqua parte aquae caloris sensum; neutram autem fit. Est etiam contra rationem physicam, nam tota aqua secundum omnes suas partes est uniformiter difformiter applicata igni naturaliter agenti; ergo secundum omnes partes eodem modo patitur uniformiter; quid enim est quod posset, vel actionem illam impedire, vel ita interrumpere ut in quibusdam partibus fieret et non in aliis? Item, vel illae partes quae frigus retinere dicuntur, possunt calefierei, vel non; si non, ergo neque corrumpi poterunt; si vero possunt calefieri, ergo si tota aqua est sufficienter applicata igni, etiam illae calefient, vel certe dari potest status in quo illa potentia reducatur in actum et illo posito, adhuc illa aqua reducetur ad pristinam frigitatem remoto agente contrario, dummodo ad corruptionem aquae preventum non sit. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, pars. 8-9.

[13]Atque hinc sumi potest aliud indicium, quod est confirmatio praecedentis, nam fere evidenti experimento constat etiam in his rebus inanimatis aut elementis corrumptionem substantialem esse distinctam ab alteratione; loquor in specie de inanimatis, ut a fortiori sit inductio universalis; quoniam in rebus animatis est res evidentior, ut patebit. Experimus itaque, alterationem, ut, verbi gratia, calefactionem aquae aut ferri, interdum esse adeo vehementem ut intensissimus calor in eis sentiatur, et nihilominus si actio contrarii agentis cesset, res illae manent vel integrae vel fere integrae in substantia sua, et

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things, as has been shown in the initial arguments. Suarez argued from the need for a form in man to a need for a form in all natural things. Then, reversing the argument he argued from the need for a form in the elements to a need for a form in all things, basing this argument on the difference between alteration and corruption. He feels that these two inductions have adequately proved the existence of substantial form.

All of the previous arguments have been a-posteriori in that they start with the effects of substantial form and reason to the existence of the form as the cause of these effects. Suarez now offers an a-priori possibility argument based on the proper causes of the substantial form. There are three such causes--material, efficient, and final. The substantial form does not have a formal cause since it is itself a form.

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facile etiam ad accidentalem statum revertuntur; interdum vero adeo procedit alteratio ut omnimoda transmutatio rei fiat, ita ut quamvis removeatur agens, nunquam possit passum illud ad pristinum statum redire, neque priores actiones aut similia accidentia recuperare; interdum etiam in viliorem substantiam sensibilem, ut cineres, scoriam, etc., mutatur; nonnumquam vero omnino consumitur insensibiliter, quia in aliud corpus subtilius et insensibile transformatur; ergo signum evidens est alterationem interdum esse puram et manere intra latitudinem mutationis accidentalis, interdum vero habere coniunctam maiorem rei mutationem. Haec autem non potest esse alia nisi quia ipsum substantiale compositum dissolvitur, recedente forma substantiali; dantur ergo substantiales formae. Probatur ultima subsumptio, quia si tota substantia rei semper maneret aeque integra, quantumcumque procederet alteratio, ipsa de se semper haberet eamdem habitudinem ad accidentia; ergo vel semper post quamcumque alterationem maneret quieta sub quibuscumque accidentibus, quantum esset ex se et remoto contrario agente, vel certe remotis eisdem agentibus semper rediret ad eadem accidentia. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 12.

One is able to suppose that there is no contradiction in the fact that such a kind of being or incomplete substance as form be given in nature. There is likewise no contradiction in the fact that there be given in nature substantial acts of a highest order which are subsistent and not informing, as the angels are. There may also be substantial acts of a middle order, which may be at one and the same time both subsistent and informing, as the rational soul. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the fact that there be acts of a lower order, which are simply informing and not subsistent, as animals, plants, and inanimate objects. Such an act can be contradictory only either because it is an "act" or because it is "substantial" or, because it is contradictory for the two (i.e., "substantial" and "act") be joined in the same thing. But none of these positions can be stated with probability. Therefore, there is no contradiction in stating that there is a substantial form on the basis of formal cause. For the proof that there is no contradiction here Suarez, in his explanation, appeals to arguments similar to those that have already been seen in the a-posteriori section of his proof for the existence of substantial form. What is new and a-priori here is that rather than an argument from induction he is appealing to the lack of contradiction in the very notion of "substantial form."[14]

[14]Et confirmatur haec ratio, nam videmus quaedam accidentia esse ita inseparabilia ab aliquibus subiectis, ut si illa auferantur, vel nimium diminuantur, omnimoda transmutatio fiat in subiectis, ita ut non possint per intrinsecam vim ad pristinum statum redire; ergo illa

The existence of substantial form can also be demonstrated a-priori on the basis of material and efficient cause. Since matter is a potency in the substantial order, it contains in its kind of being as a receptive potency every act proportioned to itself in its own genus; hence the substantial form has a sufficient cause for existence. A similar understanding arises from efficient cause. If one speaks of the first cause there can be no lack in its ability to bring about any and every actuating form. If, however, one speaks of a proximate cause one should take into account what is able to be an effect of the form. If such an effect is necessary for the constitution of natural things and if created causes lack this power, then one turns to the causality of the first cause, so that it may supplement the power of the proximate cause.[15]

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inseparabilitas provenit ex connexione talium accidentium cum aliquo principio interno talium rerum. Quod non potest esse materia prima seu illud primum subiectum quod manet sub omni transmutatione, quia respectu illius nullum est accidens inseparabile ex his quae possunt per alterationem acquiri vel amitti. Neque etiam illud principium potest esse aliquod accidens, si sit sermo de primo et radicali principio; nam, licet unum accidens sit inseparabile respectu alterius, ut raritas respectu caloris, vel albedo respectu talis temperamenti primarum qualitatum, illud tamen temperamentum est inseparabile ab alia priori forma naturae suae relicta; sistendum ergo necessario est in aliqua forma quae sit prima respectu accidentium inseparabilium; illa ergo est forma substantialis et non accidentalis, cum constituat propriam essentiam cui proprietas accidentales connaturaliter et inseparabiliter sunt. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 13.

[15]Atque hinc concluditur facile ratio ex materiali causa desumpta; nam, cum materia sit substantialis potentia, continet in suo genere et in potentia receptiva omnem actum sibi proportionatum; ergo est potens ad causandum illum in suo genere, si aliunde non repugnat; ergo ex hac parte

Finally, the existence of the substantial form can be shown in terms of the end (final cause) of the form. That end is to constitute and complete the essence of natural beings. If the substantial form did not so constitute or complete there would be nothing whole or perfect about corporeal beings, nor would there be the known multitude and variety of species. The substantial form, then, is absolutely necessary for this end. Since matter is the most imperfect being, it is not able of itself to constitute the integral essence of each and every thing and hence needs the form.[16]

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habet substantialis forma materialis sufficientem causam ut esse posit. Rursus concluditur ratio ex causa efficienti; nam si sit sermo de prima causa, non potest illi deesse virtus qua efficere potuerit in universo formas substantiales actuantes materiam, vel dependenter vel independenter ab illa, iuxta varios gradus et perfectiones talium formarum, supposita non repugnantia earum; ergo cum tales formae sint necessariae in rerum natura, effectae sunt ab huiusmodi causa. Si autem sit sermo de causa proxima, postea videndum est quaenam intercedere possit respectu uniuscuiusque formae. Nunc sufficiat dicere non posse talem causam deesse, si talis effectus ad rerum naturalium constitutionem est necessarius; unde si causis creatis interdum haec virtus deficiat, ad causalitatem primae causae spectat ut munus etiam causae proximae suppleat, quod, per se loquendo, solum facit in anima rationali quantum ad effectionem eius; aliis enim formis, ex modo quo fiunt, non repugnat fieri ab agentibus creatis, cum fiant cum concursu materiae, ut statim explicabimus. An vero in talibus agentibus sit sufficiens virtus, dicemus tractando de causa efficiente. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 17.

[16]Igitur praecipua ratio sumenda est ex fine formae substantialis, qui est constituere et complere essentiam entis naturalis, qui finis seu effectus est absolute necessarius in rerum natura; alioqui nihil esset in rebus corporeis in sua substantiali natura completum et perfectum; neque esset multitudo et varietas specierum substantialium, in qua maxime consistit huius universi corporei mirabilis dispositio et pulchritudo. Ad hunc ergo finem est omnino

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This a-priori argument, then, for the existence of substantial form centers on two main thoughts--1. the substantial form is itself the formal cause of the being and there is no other formal cause either needed or possible; 2. one can point to and demonstrate the material, efficient and final causes of the substantial form.

In providing both an a-posteriori and an a-priori argument for the existence of substantial form Suarez feels that he has answered all the objections against the existence of these forms. He has shown that forms can be discovered indirectly from experience. He has shown that they are necessary for every action and operation of the being, and that form can inform matter in such a way so as to be genuinely substantial. By the a-priori argument he has shown that the substantial form does explain how interchanges take place by an appeal to the general doctrine of

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necessaria substantialis forma, quia cum materia sit valde imperfectum ens, non potest in illa sola consistere integra uniuscuiusque rei essentia. Deinde, quia materia quatenus est primum subiectum est una et eadem in omnibus rebus naturalibus; ergo non potest in sola illa consistere earum essentia, alioqui omnia essent unius essentiae solumque accidentaliter different, quod repugnat amplitudini et pulchritudini totius universi, quae ex specierum varietate maxime consurgit. Quod significari videtur Genes., 1, in illis verbis: Facientem semen iuxta genus suum vel, secundum speciem suam. Et saepe fit illa repetitio, iuxta species suas, et in genere suo, tandem concluditur: Videt Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona, quia nimirum totus universi completa bonitas ex illa varietate consurgit. Quam etiam variae rerum virtutes et operationes et mutuae generationes et corruptiones satis ostendunt, ut declaratum est. Aliquid ergo praeter materiam est ipsi addendum quo essentia uniuscuiusque rei compleatur; cum autem materia sit potentia, id quod ei additur ad complendam essentiam erit actus, quia potentia dicit essentialem ordinem ad actum. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 1, par. 18.

cause. The arguments here are meant to be conclusive for the existence of the form, but as has been seen, the a-posteriori quasi-inductive part of the proof has some real difficulties in that it proceeds from the most difficult case, the rational woul, to a general doctrine. The a-priori argument is valid if the general doctrine on causes holds up. Since, however, the material and efficient cause of the form seem to depend on some experience of a first subject and of an agent constituting a being the argument cannot be considered to be fully a-priori.

The Being and Essence of Substantial Form

As with the discussion on matter, Suarez, once he has asserted the existence of substantial form next turns to the question of the being and essence of the form. The problem is formulated in terms of the manner in which the substantial form is able to come into being in matter and from matter.

It is assumed by Suarez that the substantial form is a thing distinct from matter. But, then, that form is either something before generation or it is nothing. If it is something it was a substantial form before it was joined to this matter. But, this is impossible, because there would be no substantial generation and because there could then be opposing forms in the matter. On the other hand, if one says that substantial form is nothing before it comes to exist, then it follows that something comes from nothing.

This position is contradictory. Moreover, it does not help to say that the form does not come into existence but only the composite, for then the composite would come from the matter alone and this is clearly impossible.

Suarez, here, feels the problem is more by way of terminology and ways of speaking about reality than in reality itself. In reality the form previously was not and afterwards is; therefore it has been made. And, in a like manner, the composite does not occur unless it has been made of matter and form, but it is not made except from already existing beings. When the total being is corrupted the form ceases to be and passes into nothingness.[17] The treatment of the being and essence of the form, then, must somehow take into account the coming into being and the passing out

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[17]Ratio dubitandi tacta est in praecedenti sectione; nam forma substantialis est res distincta a materia; vel ergo illa res est aliquid ante generationem, vel nihil; si est aliquid ergo est forma substantialis antequam fiat; nam illa res est indivisibilis et essentialiter est forma substantialis; non ergo potest illa res esse aliquid ante generationem quin sit substantialis forma; hoc autem est impossibile, tum quia alias nulla esset substantialis generatio; tum etiam quia alias essent simul in materia formae repugnantes. Si vero eligatur altera pars, nimirum formam ante generationem nihil esse, sequitur formam ex nihilo fieri quod repugnat philosophorum axiomati: Ex nihilo nihil fit. Nec satisfacit qui responderit formam non fieri, sed compositum; compositum autem fieri ex materia, et ideo nihil esse quod ex nihilo fiat; hoc (inquam) non satisfacit, quia magis consistit in verbis et modo loquendi quam in re: nam forma revera antea non erat et postea est; ergo facta est. Item, quia compositum non fit nisi quatenus ex materia et forma componitur; non autem componitur nisi ex entibus factis. Item, quia, cum totum corrumpitur, forma vere desinit esse transitque in nihilum; nam quae antea erat aliquid, postea est nihil; ergo cum totum incipit esse, forma etiam fit. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 1.



of being of the form and yet retain the notion that the form is distinct from the matter.

In the resolution of this problem Suarez begins with the special case of the coming into being and passing out of being of the rational soul. He feels that if he can prove his case with the rational soul he can prove it with respect to all other forms. At this point in the present study we are interested in the general doctrine of form so it is necessary to reserve the discussion of the rational soul to that chapter devoted to body and soul. Suarez, however, does make a sharp distinction between substantial forms which are spiritual, subsistent, and independent of matter, but still have the capacity to inform matter (i.e., the rational soul) and substantial forms which are united to matter and depend upon it in existence and in coming to be (i.e., forms of plants, animals, and inanimate objects). That is, these latter forms cannot exist apart from matter and are only found in conjunction with matter. When a substantial change takes place on the subhuman level the form ceases to exist.[18]

With respect to the subhuman forms Suarez feels that he must first delimit the meaning of the axiom "From nothing,

[18]This discussion is based on the early distinction Suarez makes with the discussion of matter, as matter in which, matter from which, and matter about which. The reader is referred back to the early sections of Chapter II, "Suarez' Doctrine of Matter" for a more complete treatment of this distinction of terminology. The reader is also referred to Disputation XV, Section 2, Paragraph 10 for the way in which Suarez makes use of this distinction in the development of his doctrine on form.

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nothing comes." If one accepts this axiom universally with respect to every cause and every effect then contradictions do indeed arise. The outstanding examples of problems which arise with respect to this axiom come in treatments of the rational soul and of prime matter. Both the rational soul and prime matter require a direct creation. It is precisely the meaning of creation that something does come from nothing. Hence both the rational soul and prime matter violate the metaphysical axiom, "From nothing, nothing comes." Understood in a limited sense, however, with respect to the power of a finite natural agent, the axiom can be held as true.[19] With this in mind, then, Suarez is able to maintain that no substantial form (the human soul excepted) arises properly from nothing, but rather is educed from the potency of an already pre-existing matter. In this sense there is nothing against the axiom, "From nothing, nothing comes."

"To come from nothing" can mean two things--1. to come into being absolutely and simply and 2. that a given effect comes from nothing. The first of these two meanings

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[19]Quocirca principium illud, ex nihilo nihil fit, universe intellectum de omni causa et de omni effectu, falsum est et contra rationem naturalem, ut hoc ipso exemplo animae rationalis ostenditur, et exemplo etiam materiae primae, ut supra tactum est, et plura in sequentibus afferemus. Intellectum autem de virtute agentis finiti et naturalis, verum est. Unde quoad hanc formam, concedendum est non esse in proximis agentibus naturalibus virtutem ad efficiendam illam, sed proximum agens disponere materiam, intelligentiam vero separatam efficere formam, non quidem intelligentiam creatam, ut putavit Avicenna, nec ideam separatam et extra Deum existentem, sed Deum ipsum, quem solum esse effectorem rerum omnium quae per creationem fiunt, infra ostendemus. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 11.

applies to subsistent things, because for them to come into being is to have complete being. On the basis of this meaning, the material substantial form does not come from nothing because it does not properly come into being absolutely and simply. The first meaning of "to come into being" is to be taken, then, as coming into being without anything being presupposed. And from this understanding natural things while they do become something new do not come from nothing, because they come from a presupposed matter. With respect to the second and wider meaning, that a given effect is from nothing, "to become" does not deny that a form as now constituted did not exist before. That is, "to come from nothing" does not deny the aptitude of a material cause for composing that which becomes. From this one can rightly conclude that material substantial forms do not come from nothing, rather they come from matter, which in its own level of being aids both the existence and becoming of such forms. These forms are not able to exist unless joined to matter by which they are sustained in being, and they are not able to come into being unless they are sustained by the matter. This is the proper and <u>per se</u> difference between causing from nothing and causing from something. It is for this reason that the first meaning but not the second of "to come from nothing" surpasses the finite power of natural agents to bring about material forms.[20]

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[20]Secundo, de omnibus aliis formis substantialibus dicendum est non fieri proprie ex nihilo, sed ex potentia praeiacentis materiae educi; ideoque in effectione harum

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One can see here Suarez' beginning attempt to outline in exact terms the meaning of the phrase "a subhuman form is educed from matter." He wants very much to keep a unity in the being and so he makes the coming into being of

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formarum nihil fieri contra illud axioma: ex nihilo nihil fit, si recte intelligatur. Haec assertio sumitur ex Aristot., I Phys., per totam et lib. VII Metaph., et ex aliis auctoribus, quos statim referam. Et declaratur breviter; nam fieri ex nihilo duo dicit; unum est fieri absolute et simpliciter; aliud est quod talis effectio sit ex nihilo. Primum proprie dicitur de re subsistenti, quia eius est fieri cuius est esse; id autem proprie est quod subsistit et habet esse; nam quod alteri adiacet, potius est quo aliud est. Ex hac ergo parte, formae substantiales materiales non fiunt ex nihilo, quia proprie non fiunt. Atque hanc rationem reddit D. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 8 et q. 90, a. 2 et ex dicendis magis explicabitur. Sumendo ergo ipsum fieri in hac proprietate et rigore, sic fieri ex nihilo est fieri secundum se totum, id est nulla sui parte praesupposita ex qua fiat. Et hac ratione res naturales dum de novo fiunt, non fiunt ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex praesupposita materia ex qua componuntur, et ita non fiunt secundum se totae, sed secundum aliquid sui. Formae autem harum rerum, quanvis revera totam suam entitatem de novo accipiant, quam antea non habebant, quia vero ipsae non fiunt, ut dictum est, ideo neque ex nihilo fiunt. Attamen, quia latiori modo sumendo verbum illud fieri negari non potest quin forma facta sit eo modo quo nunc est et antea non erat, ut etiam probat ratio dubitandi posita in principio sectionis, ideo addendum est, sumpto fieri in hac amplitudine, fieri ex nihilo non tantum negare habitudinem materialis causae intrinsece componentis id quod fit, sed etiam habitudinem causae materialis per se causantis et sustentantis formam quae fit, seu confit. Diximus enim insuperioribus materiam et esse causam compositi et formae dependentis ab illa; ut res ergo dicatur ex nihilo fieri, uterque modus causalitatis negari debet, et eodem sensu accipiendum est illud axioma, ut sit verum: ex nihilo nihil fit, scilicet virtute agentis naturalis et finiti nihil fieri nisi ex praesupposito subiecto per se concurrente et ad compositum et ad formam, si utrumque suo modo ab eodem agente fiat. Ex his ergo recte concluditur formas substantiales materiales non fieri ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex materia, quae in suo genere per se concurrit et influit ad esse et fieri talium formarum, quia sicut esse non possunt nisi affixae materiae a qua sustententur in esse, ita nec fieri possunt nisi earom effectio et penetratio in eadem materia sustentetur. Et haec est propria et per se differentia inter effectionem ex nihilo et ex aliquo, propter quam, ut infra

the form dependent upon the existence of the matter. He now spells out what is meant by "eduction from matter." The first meaning is that subhuman forms are not created. The second meaning is that the subhuman form comes into being with a dependence upon matter both in existence and becoming.

When one says that these forms do not come from nothing one means they are not created. For creation means "to come from nothing." However, subhuman forms are contained in the potency of matter and come into being through the action of an agent outside the matter. That is, prior to the generation the form was contained in potency both in the matter and in the cause. Afterwards, the form is in the matter in act and apart from the cause. And so, from the existence of the potentiality of matter, in which the forms were contained, they are educed into act on the strength of an agent working upon that matter.[21]

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ostendemus, prior modus efficiendi superat vim finitam naturalium agentium non vero posterior. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 13.

[21]Ex his etiam constat proprie de his formis dici non creari, sed educi de potentia materiae, et quid sit educi de potentia materiae; in quo explicando multi laborant, tum in I Phys., tum in VII Metaph. Sed utrumque breviter declaravit D. Thomas I, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2. Nam cum illae formae non fiant ex nihilo, non creantur, quia creari est fieri ex nihilo. Cum autem illae formae in potentia materiae contineantur, et per actionem agentis quasi extra illam potentiam fiant, non quod extra materiam existant eiusque potentiam non actuent et illi adhaereant, sed quod, cum antea tantum continerentur in potentia et in causa, postea sunt actu et extra causam, et ita ex esse potentiali materiae, in qua continebantur, in actum educuntur virtute agentis concurrente eadem materia. Dices: ergo eadem ratione dicentur res educi de potentia agentis, quia etiam in ea continebantur virtute et potestate, et ex hoc esse in potentia educuntur in actum per actionem ipsius

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The description of eduction given here is very difficult to accept; for Suarez, as we have seen, does not want to make matter an integral being and yet here the matter somehow contains all forms which can be "pulled out" of the matter by the operation of the appropriate agency. One of two things happens here. Either the matter becomes an integral being, or substantial form is a mere shaping of the matter brought about by the agent and hence is not substantial at all, but merely accidental.

A further explanation of the phrase, "Eduction from matter" means a material form comes into being with a dependence upon matter both in existence and in becoming attempts to show a slightly different understanding. In one sense this new usage differs from the preceding one only in words. For, matter contains in its potency a force for causing on its own level of being, therefore, the form is drawn out of, comes into being out of, the potency of the matter in which it is contained. This is nothing other than to come into act in the matter. But, there is another explanation of this phrase--for a form to be educed from matter is for it to come into being by the same action by which

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agentis. Respondetur absolute negando sequelam, quia illa verba in omni proprietate significant habitudinem causae materialis et non efficientis. Itaque, tam efficiens quam materia potest dici continere effectum, diverso tamen modo; nam agens continet eminenter seu virtualiter, materia vero solum in potentia receptiva seu passiva; cum ergo dicitur forma educi de potentia materiae, peculiariter denotatur haec habitudo materialis causae; agens vero proprie dicitur per virtutem suam educere effectum de potentia in actum. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 14.

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the composite is made from a preceding matter. That is, it is not the form itself which is produced, but the composite. This can be shown inductively because eduction consists in this, that the action or change is per se and essentially dependent upon the matter, but through this same action the form comes into being and is united to the matter at the same time. Therefore, through one and the same action first the composite comes into being, and a form of such and such a kind is simultaneously produced and comes into act from the potency of matter. Therefore the origin of a form from the potency of matter is best described through the action of eduction.[22]

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[22]Aliter etiam explicari solet quid sit educi formam de potentia materiae, nimirum, quod sit fieri in materia cum dependentia ab illa in esse et fieri, quod convenit omnibus formis substantialibus, excepta rationali. Quae explicatio solis verbis differt a praecedenti; nam (ut supra dicebam) materiam continere in potentia sua, causalitatem seu vim causandi importat ex parte materiae in suo genere; formam ergo trahi aut fieri extra potentiam materiae in qua continetur, nihil aliud est quam fieri actu in materia, concurrente materia ipsa in suo genere per potentiam suam ad fieri et esse talis formae; sed hoc ipsum est fieri formam cum dependentia materiae in fieri et in esse; solumque est diversus modus explicandi per habitudinem effectus ad causam, vel e contrario per habitudinem causae ad effectum. Alia item explicatio occurrit, quae, licet rem diversam a praecedentibus non contineat, tamen eam magis declarat et apta est ad nonnullas difficultates insurgentes explicandas. Formam ergo educi de potentia materiae est fieri eadem actione qua fit compositum ex materia praecedenti quae per illam actionem non fit; quam expositionem videtur intendisse divus Thomas cum dixit formam non creari, sed educi, quia non est ipsa quae per se producitur, sed compositum, forma vero comproducitur ex praeiacente materia. Et inductione constat ita fieri in omnibus formis quae educuntur ex potentia materiae. Ratio vero reddi potest, quia eductio in hoc consistit quod sit actio vel mutatio per se et essentialiter pendens a materia; per hanc autem actionem simul forma fit et unitur materiae; ideoque per eamdem fit

The notion of eduction from matter tells one much about the being of a form. "Eduction" implies that the coming into being of a form is not on account of creation. This is a negative understanding. Positively, "eduction from the potency of matter" means that the matter undergoes some action and that the resulting form is dependent upon this action. The emphasis in this second understanding is on the action that brings about the form which somehow is present in the matter already and needs only to be drawn out.

It would seem at this point, that the subhuman form is so dependent on the matter that it can exist and have an essence only in terms of the matter. But, Suarez wants it to be a true co-principle of being. He concludes that from the things he has said about the existence of the substantial form and the way in which material form comes into being its status as formal cause is also easy to understand. He gives a definition of form which parallels that of matter--The form is a simple and incomplete substance of a certain kind which as the act of matter constitutes with it the essence of a composed substance.[23]

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per se primo compositum et comproducitur talis forma, fitque actu extra potentiam materiae, ergo eductio formae de potentia materiae optime per illam actionem declaratur. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 15.

[23]Ex dictis de existentia formae substantialis, et de modo quo fit, facile intelligi potest quid ipsa sit et quem modum causandi habeat; utrumque autem hac brevi descriptione comprehendere possumus: <u>forma est substantia quaedam simplex et incompleta, quae ut actus materiae cum ea constituit essentiam substantiae compositae</u>. /Italics added/ Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 5, par. 1.



He then goes on to analyze the various elements of this description. "Substance" is to be taken in the same manner as when Aristotle distinguishes substance into matter, form, and composite.[24] It is through this distinction that the substantial form is separated from accidents which are not substances. The form, on the basis of this description, is also able to be distinguished from substantial modes; the modes are not properly substantial beings as is the form under which understanding it is called a substance.[25]

The form is "simple" and "incomplete." It is simple in that it is separate from any composed substance. And it is incomplete in that it is different from the separated substances, for the separated substances do not exercise formal cause but only a certain efficiency wherefore they are not substantial forms but complete beings.[26]

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[24]In qua descriptione substantia ponitur loco generis, eo modo quo a Philosopho distinguitur in materiam, formam et compositum. Et per eam particulam distinguitur haec forma ab accidentalibus, quae substantiae non sunt; distingui etiam potest a modis substantialibus; nam licet hi ad praedicamentum substantiae revocentur, non tamen sunt substantiae in ea proprietati; unde neque ab Aristotele in ea partitione enumerantur, quia non sunt proprie entitates substantiales, ut est forma, quae hac ratione substantia dicitur. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 5, par. 1.

[25]Suarez makes much use of the doctrine of modes in his metaphysics. The easiest and simplest treatment of this doctrine occurs in Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 8 vols. (New York: Doubleday Image Books, 1962-67), 3, pt. 2: 189-91.

[26]Additur vero simplex et incompleta ut per priorem particulam a composita substantia separetur, per posteriorem vero a substantiis separatis, quae interdum vocari solent

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The remaining part of the definition distinguishes the form from the matter which also is a simple and incomplete substance. The matter is a simple and incomplete substance as a potency; the form is the primary act of that potency. This leads to the notion that the substantial form is "the act of a physical body." This definition is able to be accommodated to form in general if one understands by the name of "act" the substantial act. But, one is able by "physical body" to understand either the matter itself in so far as it is the other part of the natural composite or one is also able to understand by "physical body" the natural being itself made up of matter and form.[27] It has already

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formae assistentes, ut illae quae movent corpora caelestia, quae revera non exercent munus causae formalis, sed efficientiam aliquam; quare non sunt formae substantiales prout nunc de illis loquimur. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 5, par. 1.

[27]Reliqua pars definitionis distinguit formam a materia, quae etiam est substantia simplex et incompleta, tamen ut potenia; forma vero ut primarius actus illius potentiae. Et ideo Arist., II de Anima, definivit animam actum corporis physici, etc. Quae definitio potest facile ad formam in communi accommodari, si nomine actus substantialem actum intelligamus, ut intelligi debet, et solum dicamus formam esse actum corporis physici, reliquam partem auferendo quae animam secernit a formis inanimatorum. Possumus autem per corpus physicum intelligere, vel materiam ipsam, quatenus est altera pars compositi naturalis, quae, ut forma informetur, semper supponitur ordine naturae in suo genere causae quantitate et aliquibus proximis dispositionibus affecta, et ea ratione corpus physicum appellari potest. Vel etiam possumus per corpus physicum ens ipsum naturale intelligere quod ex materia et forma constat, cuius actus dicitur forma tanquam constituens illud; quomodo etiam Aristoteles definivit esse actum viventis seu quo vivimus. Utramque igitur habitudinem in dicta parte nostrae descriptionis explicuimus; nam forma substantialis ita est substantia incompleta ut sit actus materiae, actus (inquam) vel actu informans vel natura sua



been shown in the chapter on matter that Suarez in respect to hylomorphic theory is concerned to understand "physical body" as the prime matter. But, in so far as he allows matter its own being and essence often understands "physical body" as some sort of integral being, all contrary protestations notwithstanding.

The discussion on the being and essence of substantial forms works from a given--that there are substantial forms--and is concerned mainly with how the substantial form does come to be without violating the axiom that something comes from nothing. Suarez, in explaining that axiom, has had to make special provision for the rational soul because this kind of form can come to be only by direct creation. The major concern in this section, however, has been with the subhuman forms. These forms do not come into being strictly speaking from nothing but rather are educed from

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institutus ad informandam materiam, nam verba (ut aiunt) in definitionibus dicunt aptitudinem, et ita comprehenditur anima rationalis etiamsi a corpore separata sit. Et hinc consequenter habet ut cum materia componat essentiam entis naturalis, quod est substantia composita; et ideo Arist., II Phys., c. 3, ait formam esse essentiae seu quidditatis rationem, id est, quae compositi naturalis essentiam complet et ab aliis essentialiter ac quidditative eam distinguit.

Atque hinc explicata etiam est causalitas formae; nam quia forma essentialiter est actus, ideo includit intrinsece habitudinem transcendentalem ad id cuius est actus, et ad actuationem quam in illud exercet; ideoque vix potest ratio formae, nisi per habitudinem ad eius causalitatem, declarari. In qua possumus quatuor illa considerare quae in omni causa spectamus, scilicet, formale principium causandi, conditionem necessarium ad causandum, causationem ipsam et effectum qui causatur, quae omnia sigillatim explicanda sunt, sicut in materia fecimus, licet suppositis quae ibi diximus, brevius hic expediri possint. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 5, pars. 2-3.

the potency of matter. The description of how forms come to exist led Suarez to a general definition of the form as a simple and incomplete substance of a certain kind which is the act of the matter and with it constitutes the essence of a composite being. The explanation of each part of this definition resulted in a parallel to the basic description of matter. Suarez, then, once he has achieved his purpose in describing the coming into existence of the form, views the form as the exact counterpart to the matter. In this sense, the form is distinct from the matter and even though educed from the matter has a being and essence of its own once it is in existence.

The Causality of the Substantial Form

When one turns to the problem of the causality of the substantial form there are two main problems with which to be concerned--how the union of the form to the matter is the very causality of the form; what is the effect of the formal cause. Suarez attempts to give a discussion of the causality of the form parallel to the discussion of the causality of the matter, making only the necessary adjustments appropriate to the topic. Once again, the problem of some third principle arises and Suarez uses every argument he can think of to maintain that nothing intervenes between the matter and the form.[28] And so, the union cannot be a

[28]. . . de causalitate actuali ipsius formae, quidnam sit, not est facile ad explicandum; tamen ex his quae dicta sunt de materia, procedere proportionate possumus

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third principle intervening, nor can the effect of the formal cause be something separate from the matter and the form.

In regard, first, to the union of the form to the matter Suarez says that this causality is able to be nothing other than the actual union of form to the matter. This causality of form is proved by an exhaustive enumeration of possibilities. The form does not cause the matter, it does not cause form (either itself or another), nor does it cause the composite. In the section on the being and essence of form it has already been shown how the form comes into being and how one form cannot cause itself or another form. The same situation arises with respect to matter. Since matter has a being and essence of its own, it is not caused by the form. The composite is the ultimate effect of the causality of the form; it is not the causality itself. Besides, the composite includes the being of matter and form, and the causality of the form strictly so called is not able to include the being of both co-principles. Having posited the union as the causality of the form, Suarez states that the

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ad id declarandum. Et imprimis certum videtur huiusmodi causalitatem aliquid esse in rerum natura distinctum ex natura rei ab entitate formae. Probatur, quia sicut agere aliquid est in rerum natura, ita et informare, quia vere est realiter ac physice causare. Rursus illud, quidquid est, est in re ipsa separabile a forma; nam in anima rationali de facto separatur et in qualibet forma substantiali separari posset per potentiam Dei absolutam; nam potest extra materiam conservari, sicut conservata est quantitas; est enim eadem vel maior ratio; ergo distinguitur ex natura rei ab illa. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 6, par. 6.



form necessarily exercises this causality. If, however, one posits the loss of union then it is impossible for the form to exercise its causality as a co-principle of being and it disintegrates. This is a sign that the form's very causality consists in the union with matter.

The reasoning behind this position is that if form is united to matter it necessarily communicates itself to the matter through its own being. That is, the form does not bring about something like itself but communicates to the matter its own perfection and being, and, in this manner actuates the matter. From this the substantial composite nature necessarily arises as a per se unity. The total causality and the total effect of the form consists in this; and if the union is lost the form is not able to perdure.

Such talk, of course, points up the difference between the union which is called the causality of the form and the action which is efficient causality. Action is the causality of the agent as agent which remains completely outside of the effect. Union, on the other hand, is the causality of the form so that by the form's own mediation it supplies itself to the matter or to the composite, for it is an intrinsic cause causing through itself. In this sense one can say that the causality of the form includes the very being of the form, or that this causality is the form itself not absolutely considered but as united.[29]

[29]Deinde dicendum est hanc causalitatem nihil aliud esse posse praeter actualem unionem formae ad materiam. Probatur primo a sufficienti enumeratione, quia neque est



Once again Suarez is forced at this point to modify his position on the causality of the form with respect to the rational soul, for the union of the rational soul with the body is much different from that of the subhuman form with the matter. In the case of the rational soul there is pure union without any inherence in the matter or dependence of the form on the matter. This is simply because of the

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materia, neque forma, neque compositum; ergo est dicta unio; nam praeter haec nihil aliud excogitari potest; et antecedens quoad omnes partes est per se evidens. Nam de forma iam probatum est; et eadem ratio a fortiori probat de materia; compositum autem est ultimus effectus huius causalitatis, ut statim dicetur; non est ergo causatio ipsa. Item compositum includit entitatem materiae et formae; causalitas autem formae praecise sumpta non potest haec omnia includere. Praeterea, posita unione et praeciso quocumque alio, praeter ea quae dicta sunt, forma necessario exercet suam causalitatem; positis autem omnibus aliis et ablata unione, impossibile est formam exercere suam causalitatem; ergo signum est in unione consistere talem causalitatem. Maior patet, quia si forma unitur materiae, necessario communicat illi seipsam per seipsam, id est, non efficiendo aliam similem sed suammet perfectionem et entitatem illi communicando et hoc modo illam actuando. Et inde etiam necessario consurgit substantialis natura composita per se una; sed in hoc consistit tota causalitas formae totusque effectus eius, qui, ablata unione, permanere non potest, ut per se notum est; ergo. Unde in hoc est notanda differentia inter unionem, quam diximus esse causalitatem formae, et actionem, quam postea dicemus esse causalitatem efficientis, quod actio ita est causalitas agentis ut agens, quatenus agens est, omnino maneat extra effectum; quia licet per actionem communicet se, non tamen seipsam per seipsam dando effectui, sed similem aliquam entitatem ei conferendo; unio vero ita est causalitas formae ut ea mediante seipsam praebeat vel materiae vel composito; est enim causa intrinseca per seipsam causans. Quo sensu dici etiam posset causalitatem formae complecti in se entitatem formae, seu hanc causalitatem esse ipsam formam, non absolute sumptum, sed unitam. Sed in hoc loquendi modo confunditur causa cum causalitate et ratio causandi quasi in actu primo cum causatione, quae est quasi actus secundus, et ideo formalius et magis praecise dicitur haec causalitas in ipsa unione consistere. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 6, par. 7.

special nature of the rational soul. In subhuman forms, however, the union is at one and the same time a dependence and also a quasi-inherence of the form in the matter. The causality of the rational soul is not of concern here; but with respect to the causality of the subhuman form one can say that these forms cause that union with matter and the union depends upon them.[30] One can see in this discussion that Suarez is concerned to protect the uniqueness of the rational soul and to establish the mutual dependence of

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[30]Sed occurrit difficultas, nam haec unio duplici modo contingit in diversis formis substantialibus. In quibusdam enim est pura unio, id est, sine inhaesione vel dependentia formae, ut in animabus rationalibus; in aliis vero est unio quae simul est dependentia et quasi inhaesio formae in materia. Prior ergo unio non potest esse causalitas formalis rationalis animae, quia est ab ea effective; causalitas autem effectiva longe diversa est a formali. Antecedens patet, quia hoc ipso quod anima creatur a Deo in corpore disposito, statim ipsa quasi naturali impetu sese unit materiae efficiendo unionem; nam, cum anima naturaliter sit propensa ad illam unionem et habeat applicatum proprium subiectum perfectibile ab ipsa, non est cur non possit ipsa quasi naturali pondere sese corpori copulare, ut sensit Henric., Quodl. XI, q. 14; et Aureol., apud Capreol., In IV, dist. 43, q. 2; et probabile existimat ibi Richard., a. 3, q. 2. Posterior item unio non potest esse causalitas formalis respectu aliarum formarum, quia illae formae per ipsam unionem causantur a materia et ab ea pendent in suo esse; ergo non possunt eaedem formae esse causae eiusdem unionis; ergo non potest unio esse causalitas huiusmodi formae; causalitas enim est ab ea causa cuius est causalitas, sicut actio est ab agente, et ideo supponit esse talis causae. Nec potest intelligi quod eadem res seu modus sit ratio seu quasi via, ut causetur forma et per quam causet forma. Et confirmatur, nam supra, disp. XII, sect. 1, dicebamus formam non posse esse causam formalem generationis, quia per generationem fit et educitur de non esse ad esse; ergo eadem ratione non potest esse causa unionis et consequenter neque unio potest esse causalitas eius. Patet consequentia, tum a paritate rationis, tum etiam quia ipsa generatio videtur esse idem quod unio, cum dictum sit has formas eadem actione fieri et uniri. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 6, par. 8.



subhuman forms on the matter. He must protect the uniqueness of the rational soul because it is an immaterial form and hence proper adjustments must be made when one talks about that type of form and its causality. Since he wants to preserve a true unity in natural beings the causality of subhuman forms explained as union preserves both the hylomorphic theory and the unity of the being.

When one talks of the causality of the form one must also face the question of the effect which occurs because of this causality. There are two effects to be considered--the composite and the matter.

The composite is the primary effect of the form, for from it the integral being is intrinsically and essentially constituted, and from the form the composite has its species. The form completes the essential nature and intelligibility of the composite. If the matter is a cause of the composite, much more so is the form which brings about the existence of the composite. Therefore the composite is the effect of the form, for the composite depends especially on it. But one must not think that the proper causality of the form is to constitute the composite. Rather as we have seen, the causality is the union; the composite is the effect of the union. That is, matter is informed by the form and the composite comes from both--is the effect of both.

The second effect of the causality of the form is matter which is not by the nature of things distinct from the composite. By matter as informed, one does not



understand only matter in terms of some sort of extrinsic denomination, but rather a denomination by which the intellect is able to unite matter to form as the agreement or aptitude of the matter to form. By "informed matter," one understands matter as affected by form. Informed matter includes, therefore, the notions of matter itself, form and union. But "composite" also includes these three and nothing else. These notions of matter, form, and union are not in fact distinct. Therefore, there are not two effects but only one which is conceived in different manners.[31]

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[31]Duo tantum effectus sunt qui formae attribui possunt, scilicet, compositum et materia; nam de generatione vel unitione iam dictum est non posse esse proprie effectum eius. De unione vero ipsa in facto esse, constat ex dictis non posse dici proprie effectum, nisi foratasse eo modo quo actio dicitur effectus agentis, quatenus ab illo est, quamvis proprius dicatur via ad effectum.

Explicatur prior effectus formae

Primarius effectus formae compositum est.--Quoad compositum ergo satis clarum est ex dictis illud esse proprium ac primarium effectum formae; nam ex illa intrinsece et essentialiter constat, et ab illa habet speciem et (ut ita dicam) pulchritudinem suam; nam ipsa complet essentialem naturam et rationem eius, ut ex Aristotelis definitione supra tradita constat. Item materia est causa compositi, ut supra ostensum est; ergo multo magis forma, quia magis confert ad esse compositi; ergo e converso ipsum compositum est effectus formae, nam in suo esse ab illa maxime pendet.

Unica unione et materiam et compositum causat forma.--Sed obiiciunt aliqui nam si compositum est proprius et primarius effectus formae, ergo propria causalitas formae erit constituere compositum; hoc autem verum esse non potest, quia forma prius natura actuat materiam quam compositum; nam cum essentialiter sit actus materiae, prius respicit materiam, et per illam compositum; ergo compositum non est primarius effectus formae, sed materia ut actuata seu ut informata; ex quo effectu consequitur compositum ut posterior effectus. Respondeo his vocibus non explicari duas causalitates ut duos effectus formae, sed unum dumtaxat sub diversis habitudinibus. Unica est enim unio formae ad materiam, et illa posita et praecisa omni alia re vel modo



This treatment of the effect of the causality of form is very confusing unless one realizes that Suarez is responding once again to a philosophic axiom--"One cause, one effect." He seems to violate that axiom when he says that the causality of form produces two effects--the composite and the matter. He has shown that this discussion of two effects is really just a way of talking about the causality of the form, and that in reality the form has only one effect. One distinguishes the effect in different ways depending upon the emphasis he wants to give to the discussion. At times it is appropriate to talk of the effect as the composite and at times it is proper to talk of the effect as the informed matter. The usage is determined by context and language not by any real causal situation in which one would find one cause with two effects.

The discussion of the causality of form as the union of matter and form once again emphasizes the immediate relationship of the matter and the form. As with the discussion

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reali, materia manet informata per formam, et compositum ex utraque resultat, quamvis in ipsa forma possint diversae relationes considerari respectu materiae vel compositi. Rursus materiam esse actuatam forma non est effectus ex natura rei distinctus a composito, quia per materiam ut informatam non intelligimus solam materiam cum aliqua denominatione quasi extrinseca; nam hic conceptus vel nullus est vel non est conceptus alicuius effectus realis, sed denominationis quam intellectus confingere potest ex concomitantia vel habitudine ad formam ut praesentem; sed per materiam informatam intelligimus materiam ut intrinsece affectam forma; includit ergo materia ut informata, et materiam ipsam et formam, et unionem. Sed compositum haec tria includit et nihil aliud; ergo haec non sunt in re distincta; ergo non sunt duo effectus, sed unus diversimode a nobis conceptus et declaratus. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 7, pars. 1-3.

Cf. also Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 8, pars. 7, 9, and 13.



on the causality of matter one sees that Suarez is very careful not to interpose some third principle between the matter and the form. The form brings about union; that is how form operates as a cause; and the resulting effect is the composite. The union, and composite are not additions to the matter and form. Rather they express the relationship between these two principles.

The Mutual Dependence of Matter and Form

Up to this point in the present study, it has been necessary to assume that there has been a mutual dependence of matter and form. The actual explanation of that dependency has had to wait until the doctrine of matter and form itself was relatively complete. As has been seen, both in the section on the causality of matter and the causality of form, Suarez is very concerned that all of his talk of union, generation, corruption, and composition not interpose some third thing between the matter and the form. If one grants on the basis of the previous discussion that matter and form are directly related to one another and that both are incomplete partial substances, and that each needs the other for a complete being to result, then Suarez must spell out the nature of the mutual dependence the co-principles of being have for each other.

The mutual dependence of matter and form can be understood in two ways either as a proper cause of a thing or as a condition so necessary that apart from this dependence there would not be such a thing. One could say that

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matter (or form) causes the other co-principle; this is one way that the two can depend on each other. One can also say that the form (or matter) is a necessary condition for the existence of the matter (or form); this is the other way the two can depend on each other.

The first possibility for understanding this mutual dependence of matter and form is that of a necessary condition as proposed by Peter Fonseca in his Commentariorum in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros. Some accidents are necessary conditions for the conservation of a being. Although one cannot speak of these accidents as causes of that conservation, they provide the natural dispositions necessary for the conservation. For example, a material being has as one of its necessary conditions the accident of quantity; without quantity the material being could not be conserved in existence. According to Fonseca's opinion quantity is not a cause of the conservation of the being, rather it is a necessary prerequisite for that conservation.[32] The mutual dependence of matter and form is an analogous case to the dependence of a material being on the accident of quantity. That is, one depends on the other in such a way that they are necessary prerequisites for the constitution of an integral being. Certainly if such a relationship exists between a being and one of its accidents,

[32]For a more detailed discussion of the relationship of matter and quantity the reader is referred to the appropriate section in Chapter II "Suarez's Doctrine on Matter." In addition to this discussion Suarez himself treats the subject extensively in Disputations XIV and XL and XLI.

the same kind of relationship can exist between the constitutive principles of a being. This is the simplest way to understand the mutual dependence of matter and form.[33]

There is another and more difficult explanation of this mutual dependency. Since matter is simply supposed for the form in order that it be able to be educed from its potency, one can hardly understand in what manner matter is able to depend upon the form as a necessary condition. Matter comes about through true creation and is conserved

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[33]Sed explicandum superest qualis sit haec dependentia; duobus enim modis potest intelligi, scilicet, vel tanquam a propria causa vel tanquam a conditione ita necessaria ut absque illa non debeatur esse tali rei, quos duos modos dependentiae explicui late, in I tomo III partis, disp. VIII, sect. 1, et illos videtur significare Fonseca, V Metaph., c. 2, q. 3, sect. 1, dum ait intelligi posse materiam pendere a forma vel tamquam a vera causa vel tamquam a quodam concomitante; et sect. 3 videtur de eisdem facere mentionem, dum ait accidentia conservare substantiam, non a priori sed a posteriori. Dubitari ergo potest quo ex his modis pendeat materia a forma. Et quidem, quod sit tantum dependentia a posteriori et a conditione necessaria, videtur probabiliter persuaderi. Primo, quia hic modus dependentiae possibilis est; nam forma substantialis vel eius unio ad materiam, atque adeo totum compositum, pendet hoc modo ab aliquibus formis accidentalibus tamquam a dispositionibus necessariis via conservationis, ut aiunt, non quia sint propriae et directae causae talis conservationis, sed quia sunt dispositiones ita connaturales ut sint etiam necessariae; ergo maiori ratione potest materia habere talem dependentiam a forma tamquam a necessaria dispositione et primaria. Item hoc modo pendet materia a quantitate; ergo et potest pendere a forma. Deinde hic modus est sufficiens ad salvandum omnia quae dicuntur de dependentia materiae a forma, et omnes rationes factae non amplius probant. Est etiam modus facilis et clarus; nam iuxta illum facile conciliantur duae conclusiones positae. Recte etiam intelligitur quomodo vicissim pendeat forma a materia et materia a forma: una enim dicetur pendere a priori et altera a posteriori; una tamquam a vera causa, et alia ut conditione concomitante. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 8, par. 17.

Cf. Peter Fonseca, Commentariorum in Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros (Hildescheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964), V Metaph., c. 2, q. 3, sect. 1.



through some permanent action; consequently it does not depend upon the form as a true cause in its coming to be. No created cause is able to work naturally alongside of creation. That is, creation as such is not able to have any dependence upon a formal cause, because formal cause presupposes matter. Matter of generable things is truly and properly created and not concreated. That is, it is not produced by one and the same action as is the creation of a whole integral being. Therefore, with respect to this creation the form is not able to function as a true cause. The creation of matter and the introduction of the form are two distinct actions. The introductive action of the form is not able to be the true cause of the creative action by which matter comes to be. And, therefore, even less is the form, which is introduced through that action able to be the true cause of the matter.

This argument can be proven by the fact that the introduction of the form presupposes either the creation of matter or an already created matter. The "introduction of a form" speaks of a transcendental aptitude for matter already created. The creation or conservation of matter does not depend on the <u>eduction</u> of the form as a proper cause or upon that action <u>per se</u>. Therefore, much less is it able to depend upon the form as a true cause, since the form is in every level of cause posterior to the action by which it is educed from the potency of matter. From first to last matter is unable to depend upon the form as upon a cause <u>per</u>

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se, but rather as a causal concommitant condition both for disposing and actuating the matter.[34]

These two arguments may be summarized by the statement that matter depends on form and form depends on matter

[34]At vero iuxta alium modum difficile intelligitur haec mutua dependentia; nam cum materia simpliciter supponatur formae ut haec ex illius potentia educi possit, vix intelligitur quomodo a priori possit materia a forma dependere. Et explicatur amplius augeturque difficultas ex eo quod materia fit per veram creationem et per eamdem actionem permanentem conservatur; ergo non pendet in suo fieri a forma ut a vera causa, quia ad creationem nulla causa creata concurrere potest naturaliter. Respondent aliqui hoc esse verum de causa efficienti, non vero de aliis generibus causarum; nam creatura non potest esse causa efficiens creationis; potest tamen esse causa finalis, ut per se constat; et eadem ratione potest esse causa formalis, immo et materialis; nam cum creatur totum, partes concurrunt ad esse et fieri illius in genere causae materialis. Sed omissa causa finali, cuius causalitas habet peculiarem rationem, propterea quod non est per realem ac propriam motionem distinctam ab actione causae efficientis, et ideo non praerequirit reale esse in re quae talem causalitatem exercet, de causa materiali videtur concursus eius directe repugnare cum creatione, ut est propria et vera creatio; quod facile patet ex dictis supra de eductione formae de potentia materiae, et latius ostendetur infra in propria disputatione de creatione. Loquor autem de creatione, ut proprie creatio est; nam sub ratione concreationis potest habere dependentiam a causa materiali, ut supra declaratum est tractando de materia caeli, quia concreatio ut sic ordine naturae supponit creationem, et ideo potest habere dependentiam. Eadem ergo ratione creatio ut sic non potest habere dependentia a causa formali, quia causa formalis supponit materialem, licet concreatio possit habere dependentiam a forma, ut supra loco citato declaratum est. At vero materia rerum generabilium vere ac proprie creatur, et non concreatur proprie, id est non producitur per unam et eamdem actionem qua creatur totum; ergo ad creationem eius non potest forma concurrere ut vera causa.

Quod in hunc modum declaratur et confirmatur ex dictis; nam creatio huius materiae rerum generabilium et inductio formae sunt actiones distinctae, tam nunc in materiae conservatione et rerum generatione, quam in prima rerum sublunarium productione; sed actio indictiva formae non potest esse vera causa actionis creativae materiae; ergo multo minus forma quae per illam actionem inducitur potest esse vera causa creationis materiae. Minor patet, tum quia indictio formae supponit omnino creationem materiae seu

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not because one causes the other but because each is a necessary condition for the other. In light of what has already been said with respect to these two co-principles of being, namely, that they are both incomplete beings or partial substances, it is through this mutual dependence of necessary condition that one is united to the other. It must be noted here, however, that in these arguments Suarez seems to imply some sort of existence of the matter prior to the eduction of the form. There are two reasons why he must hold this prior existence. The prime matter, as first

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materiam creatam, nec intelligi potest quod formae inductio aut unio supponatur in aliquo genere causae ad creationem materiae, quia indictio formae ut sic dicit habitudinem transcendentalem ad materiam iam creatam; unde sicut relatio non potest praesupponi ad terminum in aliquo genere causae, ita neque inductio formae ad creationem materiae. Tum etiam quia alias penderet per se creatio vel conservatio materiae ab eductione formae; ergo et ab agente educente formam; atque ita agentia naturalia ut verae causae effectivae, conservarent materiam. Unde etiam fieret ut quoties forma mutatur in materia, mutaretur actio qua materia conservatur a Deo quia mutata dependentia actionis, mutatur actio, eo quod ipsa sit essentialiter dependentia, ut infra declarabimus. Consequens autem est falsum, quia materia, ut est primum subiectum generationis, est quid ingenerabile et incorruptibile, quia supponitur generationi et corruptioni; ergo eadem ratione est quid immutabile quoad actionem per quam fit et conservatur, quia supponitur facta et conservata; alioqui per quamcumque generationem entis naturalis concrearetur materia, vel ita se haberet ac si concrearetur, quia per novam actionem terminatam ad totum ipsa inciperet conservari, quod plane repgunat actioni agentis naturalis; alias eadem ratione dici posset per talem actionem comproduci semper novum materiam. Igitur creatio vel conservatio materiae non pendet ab eductione formae tamquam a propria causa vel actione per se; ergo multo minus potest pendere a forma tamquam a vera causa, cum forma sit in omni genere causae posterior actione per quam educitur de potentia materiae; ergo de primo ad ultimum, nec materia ipsa potest pendere a forma ut a causa per se, sed solum ut a causa vel conditione concomitante et bene disponente ac actuante ipsam materiam. Disp. Meta., XV, Sect. 8, pars. 18-19.

subject, must be directly created by God. The accident of quantity, as has been shown, inheres in the prime matter. Once again, the problem of the being and essence of the matter, as explained by Suarez, significantly weakens his attempt to get a unified being from matter and form.

Even though the arguments are convincing that matter and form are necessary conditions for one another, Suarez also acknowledges that there are reasons for thinking that the matter depends upon the form as upon a true cause. This argument states that the material substantial form depends upon the matter as upon a proper and per se cause in its own level of being, and from the other side the matter depends upon the form as a true cause. Otherwise the matter would not sustain the form as a subject and form would not contain the matter as an act. Just as the efficient act holds the effect in being through its causality, so the informing act, according to its own way, is able to contain its subject in being. Therefore, substantial form is joined to matter in this way.

The proof of this argument rests on the fact that the material form is more perfect and more actual than matter. Therefore matter per se depends on form more than form depends on matter. Secondly, there is no contradiction in this type of union between matter and form, as if between causes which are mutually and equally causes of each other. This is clear both because in the general teaching on cause there is no contradiction in mutual priority among the

different kinds of causes. Also, in the heavens there seems to be this mutual connection between matter and form, for there, both in coming to be and in existence, there is mutual dependence. That is, the concreation of the one *per se* depends upon the concreation of the other.[35] From this example, the third reason is able to be accepted; the matter of the heavens depends upon its own determined form, as upon a cause *per se*. Therefore the matter of all lower things will depend upon a generable form although the form is indefinite in some way. It is clear that the matter of the heavens is more perfect than sublunary matter. If it depends upon the form as a true cause, much more should the matter of lower beings.[36]

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[35]It is necessary to call to the reader's attention once again that the metaphysics of the sublunary sphere is quite different from the metaphysics of the caelestial spheres. Suarez is clearly in the Aristotelian tradition in the matter of celestial mechanics and in no way does he make reference to the revolution in astronomy that is taking place during his own lifetime.

[36]Non desunt tamen argumenta quibus suaderi videatur materiam posse dependere a forma ut a propria causa quae per informationem suam continet illam in esse. Et praesertim quia forma substantialis materialis pendet a materia ut a propria et per se causa in suo genere; ergo et e contrario materia pendet a forma tamquam a vera causa, quia, licet non sustentet illam ut subiectum, potest ut actus continere illam. Nam sicut actus effectivus tenet effectum in esse per suam causalitatem, ita actus informativus potest modo sibi proportionato continere suum subiectum in esse; ergo ita comparatur forma substantialis ad materiam. Probatur consequentia primo, quia forma materialis est perfectior et actualior quam materia; ergo magis per se pendet materia a forma quam forma a materia. Secundo, quia non repugnat huiusmodi mutuus nexus inter materiam et formam tamquam inter causas quae mutuo et vicissim sunt sibi per se causae. Quod patet tum illa generali ratione quod in diversis generibus causarum non repugnat mutua prioritas, tum etiam

At this point one seems to be at an impasse. Suarez has given two arguments for the mutual dependence as a necessary condition and an argument for dependence as a true cause. He grants that both understandings are probable and that either argument is able to be sustained from the things said, but for himself he thinks the opinion holding mutual dependence as a necessary condition seems to be the more intelligible and easier one. If these arguments are considered carefully they will be seen to supersede the argument that the form and matter are true causes.[37] The reason for concern is that Suarez is of the opinion that if matter is a true cause of form and form the true cause of matter, then absolutely speaking one cannot exist without the other. The doctrine on the rational soul militates against this, for the rational soul can exist without matter. The other

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quia in caelo videtur esse haec mutua connexio inter materiam et formam; nam et in fieri et in esse mutuo et per se pendent, ut supra dictum est, ita ut concreatio unius per se pendeat a concreatione alterius, et e converso. Ex quo exemplo potest sumi tertia ratio, quia materia caeli pendet a sua determinata forma, ut a causa per se; ergo et materia horum inferiorum pendebit eodem modo a forma generabili, licet indefinita. Patet consequentia, quia perfectior est materia caeli; ergo si illa pendet, multo magis alia. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 8, par. 20.

[37]Sunt quidem hae rationes probabiles, et ita potest utraque pers ex dictis probabiliter sustineri; mihi tamen (ut verum fatear) prior videtur intelligibilior et facilior, et si attente ponderentur rationes factae, facilius possunt posteriores dissolvi. Quod munus lectori relinquo, quia res facilis videtur, quia infra explicando quomodo causae sint sibi invicem causae, radicitus declarandum est quaenam prioritas mutua possit inter aliqua duo intercedere, et quae non possit, ex cuius intelligentia maxime pendet praesens resolutio. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 8, par. 21.

reason for concern is that the true cause formulation seems to militate against the absolute power of God, whereas the mutual dependence as necessary condition always allows for the intervention of God's power. God does create and sustain forms without matter as is the case of the rational soul and the angels. The true cause argument would seem to say he cannot do this. For these reasons, then, the relationship of matter and form is one of necessary condition this position not only allows for forms of the higher types but it also allows for the intervention of the absolute power of God.[38]

The Unicity of Substantial Form

There is one final topic to be treated with respect to the metaphysics of form. It has been in many oblique ways that Suarez is much concerned that there be nothing interposed between the matter and the form. In the chapter on matter he was concerned to show that there not be a "union," "generation," or "corruption" between the matter and the form, that matter be of itself a simple rather than a composed or integral being, and that quantity, even though in matter, in no way served to constitute matter as a whole being. In this present chapter it has also been shown at least by implication that there is a single substantial form for each being. In Section 10 of Disputation XV Suarez takes up the problem of a single substantial form. The

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[38]Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 9, pars. 2-8.

discussion first proceeds negatively by rejecting three common opinions with respect to the multiplicity of forms. 1. Some have said there is a multiplication of forms in accord with essential predication. 2. Scotus and Henry of Ghent have held the opinion that there is a form of corporeity in addition to the substantial form. 3. Others have held the opinion that there is a separate form for each grade of being in which an existent participates.[39] Suarez views this enumeration of positions to constitute the most serious arguments for multiple substantial forms, and by rejecting each opinion Suarez establishes his own position that each real existent has only one substantial form.

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[39]Explicata causalitate formae, necessarium est eius unitatem vel multitudinem in eodem effectu vel composito exponere, ut hinc simul constet an intra hoc genus causae sit aliqua subordinatio vel dependentia causarum respectu eiusdem effectus. Duobus autem modis intelligi potest in una substantia esse plures formas, scilicet, vel in diversis partibus materiae vel in eadem materia. De priori modo hic non disputamus, quia etsi in diversis partibus materiae dentur diversae formae, tamen unaquaeque earum unum tantum habet effectum proprium in sua materia. Quod si ex omnibus illis substantiis una componitur tamquam ex partibus integrantibus ipsam, necesse est ut formae illae non sint totales, sed partiales, unam totalem formam integrantes. Atque ita ea multitudo partium non impediet quominus unius effectus totalis una detur adaequata causa formalis. Et quidem si huiusmodi partiales formae sint eiusdem rationis, non est dubium quin possint in materialibus formis pro diversitate partium materiae multiplicari et uniri ad componendum unam substantiam. An vero formae diversarum rationum possint esse partiales et inter se uniri ad componendam unam substantiam, et quanta possit esse illa unio, an, scilicet, per veram continuationem mathematicam vel per minorem aliquam coniunctionem physicam, haec omnia non pertinent ad praesentem materiam, sed ad scientiam de anima; nam illa omnia potissimum quaeri solent propter partes heterogeneas viventium, et maxime propter sanguinem et alios humores existentes in animali, de quibus nonnulla attigi I tomo, III partis, disp. XV, sec. 5, 6, et 7. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 1.



With respect to the opinion that there is a multiplication of forms in accord with essential predication, Suarez feels that philosophers who hold this position do so on the basis of a misunderstanding of what it means to give an essential definition. This approach multiplies forms without foundation and without necessity. Universals are not distinguished from particulars in reality nor are genera distinguished from species in reality. When predications are multiplied it is only through abstraction and precision of our intellect. It is silly to think that these forms correspond in reality to distinct things.[40] Perhaps an example would help here. If one takes an essential definition such as, "Man is a rational animal," the present opinion would hold that the predication here is composed of two parts "rationality" and "animality," and that for each of these parts there is a distinct form. Suarez says that this type of essential definition does not indicate separate forms in reality but is rather the indication of one form the uniqueness of which one designates by the essential

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[40]Ibidem est etiam tractata et cursim impugnata opinio quae affirmat formas substantiales realiter multiplicari in composito iuxta multitudinem praedicatorum essentialium, . . . Verumtamen haec sententia antiquata iam est et ut omnino improbabilis reiecta; nam praeter rationes generales quas inferius efficiemus pro unitate formae, haec ratio convincit falsitatis illam opinionem, quod multiplicet formas sine fundamento et necessitate, nam in superioribus ostensum est universalia non distingui realiter a particularibus, nec genera ab speciebus; ergo cum haec predicata multiplicentur solum per abstractionem et praecisionem nostri intellectus, vanum est existimare illis correspondere in re formas realiter distinctas. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 4.

predication "rational animal." The distinction is one the intellect makes not a distinction of real forms of "rationality" and "animality" in one and the same being. In a word, one cannot allow usage to deceive him on the matter of number of substantial forms in a composite being.

The second opinion Suarez rejects with respect to multiplicity of forms is that of Scotus and Henry of Ghent who hold that there is a form of corporeity in certain types of composite beings.[41] Scotus thought that the form of corporeity intercedes between matter and every soul but not indeed between matter and inanimate forms. Henry of Ghent requires this form only in man. The foundation of Scotus' position seems to have been that a soul is a form transcending the general level of body and it requires a disposition and variety in the matter appropriate to organic life which other forms do not require. Therefore, a soul as such does not give being to a body but presupposes it through some form by reason of which matter is supposed capable of the necessary organization and disposition for a soul. In inanimate things, however, this necessity ceases.[42]

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[41]The doctrine of the form of corporeity was proposed to take care of the need for matter to be organized in a certain way before a soul could be joined to that matter. Scotus was the chief proponent of the doctrine. For simple but accurate treatments of Scotus' position on this matter the reader is referred to Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 2, part 2, especially Chapters XLVII and XLIX; and Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), 233 ff.

[42]. . . ad hoc caput spectat opinio Scoti et Henrici supra tacta, disp. XIII, qui ponunt etiam formam corporeitatis aut mixti ut per se necessarium inter materiam

Suarez,

effect,

substance

of Scotus

This is a very dangerous opinion, according to Suarez, for if one allows a form of corporeity one is, in effect, destroying the per se unity created by the partial substances, matter and form. Suarez begins his refutation of Scotus by showing that this doctrine contradicts two

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et formas quasdam substantiales, quamvis non eodem modo; Scotus enim putat intercedere inter materiam et omnem animam, non vero inter materiam et formas inanimatorum; Henricus vero solum in homine illam formam requirit. Fundamentum Scoti, si a priori explicetur, fuisse videtur quia anima est forma transcendens communem gradum corporis et requirit in materia dispositionem et varietatem quamdam organorum, quam aliae formae non requirunt; ergo anima ut sic non dat esse corporis sed praesupponit illud per aliam formam, ratione cuius supponitur materia capax organizationis et dispositionis necessariae ad animam; in rebus autem inanimatis cessat haec necessitas. Et confirmari hoc potest ex communi modo loquendi; dicimus enim vivens constare corpore et anima, non tamen dicimus aquam vel aerem constare ex corpore et tali forma, sed ex materia et tali forma; ergo signum est corpus, quod in viventibus dicitur esse altera pars compositi praeter materiam includere quamdam substantialem formam intermediam inter materiam et animam. De quo corpore optime intelligitur definitio illa animae: est actus corporis physici, organici, potentia vitam habentis. Nam cum illud corpus quod condistinguitur ab anima sit pars physica, non includit animam ipsam, etiam ut dantem superiorem gradum quia alias non esset ex eis compositio physica, sed metaphysica; nec etiam dicit solam materiam aut nudam, quia hoc modo communis est omnibus rebus naturalibus, aut cum accidentibus, quia haec non pertinent ad essentiam substantiae; ergo includit specialem formam substantialem distinctam ab anima. Secundo ac principaliter motus est Scotus argumento a posteriori, quia in morte animalis recedit anima et non statim introducitur nova forma; non est autem dicendum manere materiam sine forma; ergo dicendum est manere sub forma corporeitatis, quae praeerat in animali. Maior probatur, quia, si introduceretur forma, illa esset diversa pro diversitate dispositionum; videmus autem non ita esse, sed in morte hominis idem cadaver manere sive ex redundantia caloris sive frigoris moriatur. Accedit etiam saepe nullum esse agens a quo talis forma educatur. Tertio utitur Scotus argumento theologico, quod maxime movit Henricum; nam dici non potest corpus hominis mortui semper esse specie aut numero distinctum a corpore viventis; ergo necesse est fateri manere eamdem numero formam corporis sive nova forma,



principles of Aristotle--1. No substantial corruption can occur without a subsequent generation. 2. After a substantial corruption takes place there must remain a sensible composite of matter and substantial form.[43] The point Suarez is making is not so much that the Scotist doctrine contradicts Aristotle as that it destroys the relationship of matter and form. The two Arsitotelian principles simply make explicit what is embedded in a hylomorphic theory.

There are, however, other arguments against this position which make no use of the authority of Aristotle. If one holds that a part of a substance is able to be reductively under a genus and not under a species, then it is impossible for it to be under a genus unless it is in some species of that genus. Just as matter, even matter conserved by the absolute power of God, is not able not to be some ultimate kind of matter so the same situation holds

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quia variata forma, variatur individuum immo et species. Antecedens patet, quia alias non fuisset in sepulchro idem numero corpus, quod fuit in Christo vivente. Et si hostia fuisset ante Christi mortem consecrata et servata in triduo, non mansisset in ea idem corpus numero, quae videntur esse contra dicta Sanctorum. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 7.

[43]Haec vero opinio etiam multiplicat formas sine sufficienti fundamento, et impugnari potest eisdem rationibus quibus dicta disp. XIII contra Avicen. usi sumus. Et praeterea supponit Scotus in sua sententia duo quae Aristoteli repugnant. Unum est interdum fieri corruptionem substantialem sine subsequenti generatione, contra Arist., I de Gener., 3. Secundum est fieri corruptionem substantialem manente completa substantia sensibili composita ex materia et forma contra eumdem Philosophum, I de Gener., c. 4. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 8.

with respect to genus and species.[44] There is also an ad hominem argument against Scotus. If he does not think it appropriate for this body to remain, which he says is a part of substance without an ulterior form, why does he not judge it inappropriate for matter to remain without any form? Therefore, he ought not introduce the form of corporeity simply on the basis of inappropriateness.[45] One can also

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[44]. . . quia, licet pars substantiae reductive possit esse sub genere et non sub specie, tamen, si directe et proportionate illi assignentur genera et species, impossibile est esse sub genere quin sit in aliqua specie eius, sicut supra dicebamus materiam, etiam conservatam de potentia Dei absoluta sine forma, non posse non esse in aliqua ultima specie materiae. Ita ergo forma illa quae constituit illud corpus seu cadaver non potest esse sub communi genere formae substantialis quin sit in aliqua ultima specie substantialis formae; ergo compositum ex tali forma et materia erit etiam in aliqua ultima specie substantiae compositae; ergo non tantum reductive in genere corporis. Et haec ratio, ut supra dicebam, convincit etiam illud compositum non esse amplius actuabile per ulteriorem differentiam substantialem, neque per formam a qua talis differentia sumatur, et ideo non esse partem nec potentiam per se ordinatam ad ulteriorem actum substantialem, sed esse completam substantiam in actu ultimo constitutam; nulla enim substantia est ita completa in actu nisi quia habet aliquam formam substantialem constitutam in aliqua specie ultima talis formae. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 10.

[45]. . . argumentum ad hominem contra Scotum, quia, si non existimat inconveniens manere hoc corpus, quod dicit esse partem substantiae, sine ulteriori forma non est cur inconveniens iudicet materiam manere sine forma; ergo ad vitandum hoc inconveniens non debuit introducere hanc corporeitatis formam. Antecedens patet, quia, sicut materia est potentia per se ordinata ad formam, ita corpus illud est potentia per se ordinata ad animam. Et sicut materia sub illa forma corporeitatis habet aliquam actualitatem, ita per se sola habet propriam actualitatem entitativam, quae sufficit ad existendum; ergo non est cur magis pendeat entitas materiae ab illa forma corporeitatis quam ipsa forma corporeitatis ab ulteriori forma, id est, anima; si ergo forma corporeitatis potest manere sine anima, etiam materia poterit manere sine forma corporeitatis. Est ergo impertinens illa forma. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 11.

see that it follows from the opinion of Scotus that in substantial generations there would often be introduced two really distinct forms into a being. Therefore, since changes will be multiplied there will be two substantial generations constituting one substantial composite. But this is absurd.[46] Finally, on the Scotist doctrine it can occur that a body made up of a given matter and form of corporeity at one time could live a human life, and afterwards the life of an animal. If that form remains in the cadaver without disposition to human life, why would it not more appropriately remain in every situation whatever? The Scotist position on the form of corporeity limits this form to living beings without a good reason. Rather, it seems that the form of corporeity should be extended to all composites, even inanimate.[47]

Suarez now gives by way of summary a general statement against the multiplication of forms by means of the

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[46] . . . sequitur ex opinione Scoti in generatione substantiali saepe introduci duas formas realiter distinctas; cum ergo mutationes multiplicentur ex terminis, erunt duae generationes substantiales ad unum compositum substantiale constituendum. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 11.

[47] . . . accidere potest quod idem numero corpus, ex eisdem numero materia et forma constans, nunc vivat vita hominis, postea vita bruti; nam quando ex cadavere generatur vermis, non est cur mutetur forma corporeitatis; nam si illa manet in cadavere sine dispositionibus hominis, poterit melius manere sub forma cuiuscumque viventis. Immo inde videtur ulterius sequi sine causa limitari hanc formam ad sola viventia, sed ut minimum extendi debere ad omnia mixta, etiam inanimata; nam ut ipse etiam Scotus loquitur, illa est forma mixtionis consurgens ex mixtione elementorum; ergo ubicumque fuerit haec mixtio, erit in materia dispositio sufficiens ad hanc formam; erit ergo in omnibus mixtis



form of corporeity. Although the soul is a higher form than the inanimate forms and needs a special organization in the matter, there is no necessity for a form of corporeity. Of itself the soul is sufficient for immediate actuation and conservation of matter both in being and dependency. The consequence is that the composite resulting from such matter and form is capable of three dimensions which is a body of the predicament, "substance." It is sufficient for such a form to require in different parts of the matter different accidental dispositions by which the different organs are completed. Without the body, the soul, if divisible, has various parts to which the dispositions of the body respond. Or, without the body, the soul, if indivisible, contains in itself eminent and perfect being in all its variety.[48] The Scotist position, then, leads to nothing but absurdities.

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inanimatis; alioqui oportet ut Scotus declaret quaenam transmutatio facta in materia cadaveris sufficiat ad expellendam hanc formam. Nulla certe poterit rationabiliter assignari, nisi fortasse resolutio in prima simplicia elementa; nam ad omnes alias dispositiones quae consurgunt ex mixtione elementorum videtur esse indifferens talis forma, cum dicatur manere in ligno, osse et carne, etc. Quod si hoc consequens admittatur, vix poterit assignari rationabilis differentia, cur talis forma non sit in materia cum forma auri vel alterius mixti homogenei, etc. Unde si ponenda esset forma corporeitatis, magis consequenter loqueretur qui eam poneret in ominibus entitatibus naturalibus cum Avicenna quam in quibusdam, ut alii faciunt. Atque hae rationes sufficiunt etiam contra opinionem Henrici; nam quae dicta sunt de viventibus in communi applicari facile possunt ad solum hominem. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 12.

[48]Accedit rationes quibus hi auctores moti sunt ad introducendam illam formam valde debiles esse. Ad primam enim respondetur, quamvis anima sit superior forma quam formae inanimatorum et requirat in materia organizationem

The final argument Suarez feels that he must reject is the one which states that there is a multiplication of forms in accord with the grade of being a thing possesses. The argument is that there are four grades of material substances--inanimate bodies, vegetative, sensible, and rational--whatever participates in one grade has one form (inanimate bodies), whatever participates in two grades has two forms (vegetative). Animals participate in three grades and human beings in four, having three and four forms respectively.[49] The opinion need be taken seriously only at the human level and then only to the extent that there might be a necessity for two forms. The two reasons for this are

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membrorum, non propterea esse necessarium corporeitatis formam; nam per se sufficit ad actuandam immediate materiam et conservandam illam in esse seu terminandam dependentiam illius, et consequenter satis etiam est ut compositum ex tali materia et forma sit capax trinae dimensionis, quod est esse corpus de praedicamento substantiae; sufficit denique ut talis forma requirat in diversis partibus materiae diversas dispositiones accidentales, per quas diversa organa complentur, sive quia anima ipsa, si divisibilis sit, varias habet partes diversarum rationum partialium, quibus illae dispositiones respondent; sive quia, si anima sit indivisibilis, in sua eminenti et perfecta entitate totam illam varietatem virtute continet. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 13.

[49]Ultimus modus dicendi in hoc primo capite esse potest in unaquaque re tot multiplicari formas substantiales per se subordinatas, quot sunt gradus rerum naturalium et iuxta numerum graduum qui ab una et eadem substantia participantur. Sunt autem quatuor gradus substantiarum materialium, scilicet, inanimatorum corporum, vegetabilium, sensibilium et rationalium. Rursus entia naturalia quaedam participant unum solum gradum, et in eis tantum est una forma, et haec sunt corpora inanimata; vegetantia vero duos participant gradus, unde duabus formis constituuntur; animalia tribus, homines quattuor. Quam sententiam hoc modo integre declaratam non invenio, . . . Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 16.

that the rational soul is not able properly to be a vegetative or sensitive form because forms of this kind are material and corruptible. Therefore, on account of these reasons there is required in man some subhuman forms besides the soul whether one or many does not matter.[50]

Suarez finds this opinion improbable both philosophically and theologically.[51] In so far as it places multiple souls in man, and indeed in so far as it distinguishes multiple forms in the grades of being it is proven to be false if it follows that human beings genuinely have souls. All the reasons given above by which one proves that the soul is not distinguished from the form of the body (form of corporeity) prove that the addition of a new grade of being does not suffice for really distinguishing forms. Indeed, the

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[50]Solum in homine videtur inveniri peculiaris necessitas plurium animarum, saltem duarum, ob duas praecipuas causas homini proprias. Una est, quia rationalis anima est perfecte spiritualis et indivisibilis maximeque distans ab imperfectione materiae; et ideo extrema tam distantia non videntur posse immediate coniungi; est ergo necessaria aliqua forma qua mediante uniantur. Atque haec ratio peculiariter favet opinioni Henrici supra tractatae, nam anima rationalis, cum sit incorporea, non potest dare esse corporeum; ergo nec potest esse forma corporeitatis. Et eadem ratione non potest esse forma vegetativa aut sensitiva formaliter; nam huiusmodi formae sunt materiales et corruptibiles; ergo propter haec requiritur in homine aliqua forma materiales praeter animam, sive illa sit una sive multiplex. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 17.

[51]The present study is a philosophical one as is the Disputationes Metaphysicae, but it should be noted that Suarez feels that good philosophy and good theology will not contradict one another. This gives him the right, he feels, to cite theological reasons when he wants to refute an inadequate philosophical opinion. Suarez is very much in the mainstream of scholastic thinkers in that he feels philosophy is the handmaid of theology.



reasons given against the first opinion by which it has been shown that forms are not really distinguished on account of different quidditative predicates, show that such grades or differences are not forms really to be distinguished in such a substance.[52] In addition to these philosophical refutations Suarez adds a series of theological ones which are not

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[52]Immo rationes factae contra primam sententiam, quibus ostensum est non distinqui realiter formas propter diversa praedicata quidditativa inter se subordinata, idem probant, etiam si unum praedicatum addat alteri novum gradum, nam quando illi duo gradus in una et eadem re coniunguntur, unus comparatur ad alium ut differentia specifica ad genericam, et ita ex utroque una substantialis species constituitur tamquam ex universali et particulari; ergo in re non distinguuntur illi gradus seu differentiae ut coniunctae in tali specie; ergo nec formae, quae sunt principia talium graduum vel differentiarum, realiter distinguuntur in tali substantia. Quod tandem declaratur applicando cum proportione rationem supra factam, nam si in equo, verbi gratia, est anima vegetativa, necesse est ut per aliquam specificam differentiam sit contracta, nam anima vegetativa ut sic solum dicit rationem genericam, quae distinguitur per varias species, ut in arboribus et plantis est evidentissimum; non potest autem esse in equo individua et realis anima constituta sub genere animae vegetativae et non sub aliqua specie illius generis; ergo necesse est ut per aliquam specificam differentiam sit contracta et constituta. Aut ergo illa differentia continetur intra gradum ipsum vegetativum, sicut differentia specifica cuiusdam arboris, verbi gratia, piri, manet intra latitudinem gradus vegetativi; vel est ipsamet differentia elevans illam animam ad gradum sensitivum. Primum dici non potest, quia alias illa anima ut sic constitueret ultimam quamdam et infimam speciem rei vegetabilis quae non esset capax ulterioris differentiae et consequenter neque ulterioris animae; neque compararetur ille gradus ad subsequentem ut genus ad speciem, sed opponerentur tamquam duae species ultimae condistinctae; ergo necesse est dicere secundum, nimirum animam vegetativam secundum suam rationem genericam contrahi in anima equi per ipsummet gradum specificum. Ex quo aperte concluditur animam vegetativam in equo non esse re distinctam a sensitiva, quia nulla res potest distingui realiter a differentia per quam essentialiter constituitur. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 20, Cf. also par. 21.

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of concern here, but which conclude to the same opinion that there cannot be a really distinct form for each of the various grades of being.[53]

Once the groundwork has been laid, by refuting all of the contrary opinions about the multiplicity of forms, Suarez' proof that there is a single substantial form is fairly concise. From an adequate enumeration of entitative parts (i.e., matter, form, substance, and accident) one can see that there is no way for there to be in matter multiple forms essentially subordinated as act and potency. Nor, can there be an ordering and subordination of forms. Nor can there be simple agreement without any ordering among the forms. This is an exhaustive enumeration; therefore, there is no way that multiple formal causes work to bring about the same effect. Secondly, the substantial form is sufficient for constituting by itself a complete substantial supposit in some ultimate species. Therefore, not only is no additional form required but one cannot even allow it. Finally, from the proof that there are substantial forms one can draw the most powerful argument against a multiplicity. In these arguments for the existence of the form it was shown that for the perfect constitution of a natural being it is necessary that all the faculties and operations of the being be rooted in one essential principle. These faculties and operations are the natural effect of the form. The plurality of forms, therefore, is altogether alien to the

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[53]Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, pars. 22-23.

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constitution of nature.[54] Here one sees Suarez making use of all his previous work in order to preserve the distinctive relationship between the matter and the form. A plurality of forms would once again interpose something between the two co-principles of being and this would destroy the unity of the being.

Conclusion

As a summary to this chapter it is well to point out several of the significant moves Suarez has made in his treatment of formal cause. A particular type of argument based on the grades of being was used to prove both the existence of the form and the unicity of the form. The result of the discussion on the being and essence of the form concluded in a description of form which exactly parallels the description of matter. The causality of form showed how eduction from the potency of matter was not an action which is proper to efficiency but is a union which is proper to the form. Although Suarez opts for a mutual dependence of matter and form in terms of a necessary condition of one for the other, he sees that there are arguments for the fact that the matter and form do in some sense cause each other. Finally, in order to preserve the unity of the being, he denies every possible version of the opinion which holds a multiplicity of substantial forms.

In the early part of this present chapter it was

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[54]Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, pars. 61-64.

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pointed out that Suarez reasons that since humans have a substantial form, every lower being must also have a substantial form. There is certainly no attempt to say that the human form is identical with the lower forms, but Suarez is presuming in this type of argument that there are, indeed, grades of being. The doctrine of the grades of being is coin of the realm as far as scholasticism is concerned. What Suarez wants to do is take the highest grade and then prove that because the highest grade of being has a substantial form all lower grades must have this form. The approach rests on a second assumption also; that is, that all higher grades of being include everything that the lower grades include in addition to what would place them in the higher grade. In a word, humans include whatever an animal, plant or inanimate object might have plus that which makes a distinctively human form--rationality. Suarez has turned this assumption end for end and rather than prove that plants are more sophisticated than inorganic objects, and animals than plants, and men than animals, he shows that there is less sophistication in each lower grade by taking something away from the previous grade. The approach might work except for the gap which occurs between animal and man because of the nature of the rational soul. It would have been much better to prove the existence of subhuman forms (inanimate, plants, animals) and then account for the rational soul. Instead, he has had to make a jump between the immaterial human form and subhuman forms. It seems that

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this especially harms the arguments for the unity of a composite being because the human form is such a special case.[55]

In a strict discussion of subhuman forms Suarez does maintain the per se unity of the being. His parallel definition of form as an incomplete, partial substance, as the act of matter relates the two co-principles as simple beings needing each other for completion. When matter and form are joined in the composite, the causality of the form which is the union itself is not a third thing relating the original two co-principles. The same concern is expressed in the doctrine on the relation of matter and form in terms of mutual dependence in the sense that matter and form are necessary conditions one for the other and not causes of each other. The concern for per se unity is also expressed in the demand for a single form in each living being. Any more than one form destroys that unity.

From these discussions, then, Suarez does achieve the purpose of a hylomorphic theory of bringing a single being out of two co-principles. The dangerous move of granting matter its own being and essence does not look quite so destructive in light of the treatment of form. There is,

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[55]Even though it has been implied rather extensively throughout these two chapters on matter and form that the rational soul requires some very special treatment, it has been necessary to defer the consideration of the rational soul until the fifth chapter of this study. In that chapter it will be shown that Suarez' position on the rational soul makes it impossible for him to have a genuine unity in the human being.

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however, one major problem: Suarez can hold this hylomorphic doctrine and achieve per se unity in those beings which are "educed from matter" but, the rational soul is "introduced into matter;" this destroys mutual dependence on the human level. There is, indeed, a break between human and subhuman being; what Suarez holds with respect to subhuman forms often does not hold in the case of the rational soul.

This present study has deferred wherever possible any discussion of the rational soul until the chapter on body and soul. What one can say, though, even at this point, is that there is constant allowance for the uniqueness of this form and it will be necessary to ask some hard questions with respect to the unity of the human being at the appropriate time. Before body and soul can be treated directly, there is one final metaphysical problem to analyze. Individuation must necessarily play a large part in any analysis of the unity of a being. Consequently, the next chapter will investigate Suarez' analysis of this problem.

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CHAPTER IV

INDIVIDUATION

The previous chapters on matter and form have shown that these two interior causes in Suarez are more independently real than was the case in either Aristotle or the high scholasticism of the Thirteenth Century. In this present chapter it is necessary to confront directly the problem of what it means to be an individual.[1] For this material one turns to Disputation V, "De Unitate Individuali Eiusque Principio." Suarez is concerned first with the very meaning of "individuality" and "singularity" and asks whether all things which either exist or are able to exist are singular and individual. Once it is acknowledged that existence and individuality are coterminous one with the other, he faces the problem of whether individuality adds anything to the common and specific nature. The answer to this question

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[1]Suarez' doctrine on individuality has been seen by several authors for its uniqueness. Most of the articles written to date on this matter have been mainly expository of the position with little appreciation of its implications for the general metaphysical theory. The reader is referred to the following as examples of the articles on individuality and individuation: Mahieu, Francois Suarez, Chapter II. A. F. De Vos, "El aristotelismo de Suarez, y su teoria de la individuacion," Revue Filosofia 47 (1948): 755-66. Juan Rosanas, "El principio de individuacion, segun Suarez," Ciencia Fe 6 (1950): 69-86.



results in a claim that individuality is something added to the common and specific nature. This assertion leads to a discussion of the principle of individuation. Suarez first rejects the doctrine of materia quantitate signata as the sole principle of individuation and then argues that the form is also a principle of individuation.[2] The claim is that even though matter does play a part in individuation, it is not the only nor even the most important principle of individuation. At this point in Suarezian metaphysics one is able to see the clear dualism of the doctrine on matter and form.[3]

The Nature of Individuality

When Suarez begins his discussion of the unity of the individual he is concerned first and foremost with an understanding of what it means "to be an individual" or "to be a singular thing." For Suarez, to be an individual is to

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[2]The special theory of individuation is mentioned by John A. Mourant in his article, "Suarez, Francisco (1548-1617)," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1972) but the treatment here does not appreciate the significance and complexity of Suarez' approach.

[3]Tria in hac disputatione inquiremus: primum an haec unitas omnibus rebus existentibus conveniat; deinde quid in eis sit; ac denique quod principium seu radicem in singulis habeat. Et quoniam hoc ultimum non potest in rebus omnibus eadem ratione explicari, sigillatim inquiretur de substantiis materialibus, spiritualibus, et accidentibus. Disp. Meta. V, Intro.

It is well to point out at this early stage that Suarez' discussion of individuation is in terms of a much broader context than had been usual up to his time. The treatment is meant to take care of individuation on all levels of reality, not only individuation of material beings.



be any of those things which are actual beings, either those things which exist or are able to exist immediately. Realizing that the term "immediate" can prove to be a problem he explains that this word excludes all universal beings which are not able to exist as such but only in singular and individual beings.[4] This is not the appropriate place to explicate Suarez' doctrine on universals, but from what has been said one can see that he is unequivocally rejecting all versions of Platonic realism.

His proof of the assertion "that whatever exists or is able to exist, exists as an individual," follows from the fact that whatever exists has a certain and determinate

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[4]Sic ergo explicata ratione individui seu singularis entis dicendum est res omnes, quae sunt actualia entia seu quae existunt vel existere possunt immediate, esse singulares ac individuas. Dico immediate, ut excludam communes rationes entium, quae ut sic non possunt immediate existere, neque habere actualem entitatem, nisi in entitatibus singularibus et individuis, quibus sublatis impossibile est aliquid reale manere, sicut de primis substantiis dixit Aristoteles in Praedicamentis, c. de Substantia. Et ita explicata assertio est per se evidens, quam contra Platonem probat Aristoteles, I lib. Metaph., c. 6 et lib. VII, text. 26 et 27, et saepe alias. Quamquam multi existimant Aristotelem sinistre fuisse interpretatum Platonis sententiam de ideis, quod vel illas posuerit in mente divina, vel certe non reipsa, sed ratione tantum formali ab individuis separatas; sed hoc parum nostra interest, et illud iterum attingemus disputatione sequenti. Nunc probatur assertum, quia quidquid existit habet certam et determinatam entitatem; sed omnis talis entitas necessario habet adiunctum negationem; ergo et singularitatem individuamque unitatem. Minor patet, quia omnis entitas, hoc ipso quod determinata entitas est, non potest dividi a seipsa; ergo nec potest dividi in plures quae tales sint, qualis ipsa est, alioqui tota illa entitas esset in singulis, et consequenter, ut est in unua, divideretur a seipsa prout est in alia, quod manifestam involvit repugnantiam. Omnis ergo entitas, hoc ipso quod est una entitas in rerum natura, necessario est una praedicto modo, atque ideo singularis et individua. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 1, par. 4.

being. But every such being has some negation attached to it. That is, it is a this and not a that. Such a determined existence is singular and individual. As exposition for this argument Suarez examines what it means to be determinate being and states that such a being cannot be divided from itself and therefore cannot be divided into a many which would be the same as the original being.[5] Because of the absurdity to which the position of dividing a determinate being leads, Suarez concludes that every being which is a real natural being, is necessarily singular and an individual.[6] Logically speaking, this argument is unsatisfactory since it is cast in an invalid form (A is B; B is not C, therefore A is not C); the underlying concern Suarez expresses, however, is very real in that he wants to grant individuality only to actually existing beings or beings that can actually exist. The argument is against Platonic realisms in order to preserve the uniqueness of the individual and to say that only individuals exist in the concrete (i.e., qua individual).

This position has the implication that universals

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[5]This whole discussion is reminiscent of the problems Plato faced in the Parmenides. Suarez in his own time is certainly aware of the problems of the one and the many. He sees that the whole theory is full of difficulties and will accept his own version of this material in a later disputation. For a good contemporary treatment of the Suarezian doctrine on the one and the many the reader is referred to Francisco Pecorini, "Suarez's Struggle with the Problem of the One and the Many," Thomist 36 (1972): 433-71.

[6]Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 1, pars. 4-5.



are not able to exist separately from the singular beings because if a "universal man" should exist apart from Peter and Paul either that "universal man" would remain in Peter and Paul or altogether separate from them. If one were to hold the latter position "man" would already be a singular being divided off from Peter and Paul and hence not a true universal. If, however, one holds that the "universal man" is in Peter and Paul, either it is the same in both and then Peter and Paul are not two men but rather one, or it is distinct in both of them and then the "universal man" is not truly universal.[7]

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[7]Quae ratio concludit etiam de potentia absoluta intelligi non posse ut realis entitas, prout in re ipsa existit, singularis et individua non sit, quia implicat contradictionem esse entitatem et esse divisibilem in plures entitates, quae sint tales qualis ipsa est. Alioqui esse posset simul una et plures entitative seu secundum eamdem realem entitatem, quod involvit contradictionem. Et haec ratio etiam convincit universalia non posse esse a singularibus separata, quia si homo universalis existeret extra Petrum et Paulum, etc., vel ille esset etiam in Petro et Paulo vel omnino maneret separatus extra illos; si dicatur hoc posterius, iam homo ut sic esset quaedam res singularis condivisa a Petro et Paulo; falso ergo dicebatur universalis. Et praeterea sequitur nec Petrum nec Paulum esse homines, quia, ut praedicatum essentiale alicui conveniat, necesse est ut non sit separatum ab illo. Quomodo enim de illo vere dici poterit, si non sit in illo? Aut quomodo intelligi potest essentialiter constituere eum in quo non est? Si vero est in Petro et Paulo, vel est idem omnino realiter et entitative in utroque, et ita Petrus et Paulus non erunt duo homines, sed unus; vel est distinctus secundum rem et entitatem in utroque eorum, et sic ille homo universalis et separatus aut esset quidam tertius condistinctus a Petro et Paulo, et sic falso diceretur esse in illis et esse universalis, quia non esset nisi quidam singularis distinctus ab aliis, aut certe si idemmet esset in uno et in altero oporteret esse et distinctus a seipso et unus et plures realiter secundum essentiam eamdem prout in re existentem, quae sunt aperte repugnantia. Hac ergo ratione, necesse est ut omnis res prout a parte rei existit

These are rather traditional arguments for the numerical singularity of existence of the individual. Suarez rejects all Platonic interpretations of the notion of individual existence, and clearly states that only individual things exist not universals. Suarez has been very careful to avoid any doctrine of participation that would destroy the integrity of an actual existent. Rather, the thing as one finds it in experience is the individual in Suarezian philosophy. This is a statement of a fact that; next Suarez must turn to an analysis of what constitutes the unity of the individual. In a word, what does the singularity add to a common nature which can be conceived both abstractly and universally by us.[8]

There are various opinions asserting different things that are added by the property of individuality, but these opinions are often contradictory. One opinion states that at least in created things the property of individuality adds to the common nature some real mode of existence distinct from the nature of the thing but composes with that nature the numerically singular individual itself.[9] On the

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singularis et individua sit. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 1, par. 5.

[8]Ostendimus esse in rebus unitatem individuam et singularem; nunc declarare incipimus quid illa sit, quod non potest melius aliter fieri quam declarando quid addat supra communem naturam seu quae a nobis abstracte et universe concipitur. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 1.

[9]Prima sententia generaliter affirmat saltem in rebus creatis individuum addere communi naturae modum aliquem realem ex natura rei distinctum ab ipsa natura et componentem cum illa individuum ipsum . . . Fundamentum

other hand, another opinion states that the property of individuality adds nothing at all to the common nature, rather each natural being is an individual first and immediately.[10] There is a third position stating that there is a distinction between the property of individuality and the common

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huius sententiae esse potest illud fere quod (teste Aristotele) Platonem movit ad ponendas ideas universalium a singularibus abstractas, scilicet, quia scientiae et demonstrationes sunt de universalibus et non de singularibus. Item, quia definitiones essentiales et propriae dantur de universalibus et non de singularibus. Item, quia proprietates, quae per se insunt rebus, conveniunt illis, mediis universalibus naturis, ita ut verum sit dicere Petrum esse risibilem, quia homo est risibilis; sicut e contrario praedicata contingentia conveniunt communibus naturis ratione individuorum; homo enim currit, quia Petrus currit; ergo haec omnia indicant distinctionem aliquam ex natura rei inter individuum et naturam communem; sed haec distinctio esse non potest nisi quatenus individuum aliquid addit supra naturam communem, quia includit totam illam; ergo non potest distingui ab illa nisi ut aliquid addens illi. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 2.

Tertio non eodem formaliter constituitur Petrus ut Petrus et ut homo, tum quia id quo contituitur homo commune et ipsi Petro et aliis hominibus; quo autem constituitur in esse Petri est proprium eius; tum etiam quia alias non posset magis concipi homo sub conceptu communi quam Petrus . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 4.

[10]Secunda sententia extreme contraria est, individuum nihil omnino addere communi naturae quod positivum et reale sit, aut re aut ratione distinctum ab illa, sed unamquamque rem vel naturam per se esse individuam primo et immediate. . . . Fundamentum est quia nihil potest intelligi reale quod singulare non sit, ut probatum est sectione praecedenti; ergo repugnat quod res fiat singularis per additionem alicuius realis supra naturam communem. Secundo, quia nulla res fieri potest una per realem additionem alicuius positivi, ut supra ostensum est, ergo neque singularis et individua . . . Tertio, quia vel id quod additur est essentiale, vel accidentale; si essentiale, sequitur speciem dividi posse per essentiales differentias, . . . unde ulterius sequitur individua essentialiter differre, et speciem non dicere totam essentiam seu quidditatem individuorum, quod est contra Porphyr. et omnes dialeticos. Denique sequitur individua posse et debere definiri propria et adaequata definitione essentiali contra

nature, but one must distinguish between material beings and immaterial beings. In immaterial beings nothing is added to the numerically singular individual by the property of individuality beyond the common nature; in material things there is something added by this property.[11] Given the diversity of opinion concerning the meaning of the property of individuality, Suarez feels that this whole difficulty must be clarified before he can answer the question whether or not the property of individuality adds something to the common and specific nature.

There is, he says, no doubt among all these authors that the property of individuality at least adds some denial to a common nature (e.g., Peter is not Paul). This denial completes or constitutes the unity of the individual. This is known per se and especially from what has been said with respect to universals and individuals. If, however, one speaks about the numerically singular individual, in so far

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Aristot., VII Metaph., text. 53. Si vero id, quod additur, est accidentale, sequitur individuum esse ens per accidens; sequitur etiam accidens non advenire subiecto individuo sed constituere illud, quod impossibile est, quia si unum ex alio individuatur, potius accidens a subiecto, quam e converso, individuationem accipit. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 5.

[11]Tertia sententia potest distinctione uti inter res spirituales et materiales; nam in immaterialibus res singularis nihil addit supra naturam communem; in materialibus vero aliquid . . . Nam ex ibi tractandis dumendum est fundamentum huius sententiae, scilicet, quia substantiae immateriales, cum nec materiam habeant nec ad illam dicant habitudinem, nihil etiam in eis excogitari potest quod addant supra essentiam, et ideo se ipsis sunt individuae; at vero in rebus compositis additur materia signata, ex qua sumi potest aliquid quod individuum addat supra speciem. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 6.

as it is one, it adds a denial in its concept not only over and above the common nature conceived abstractly and universally, but also over and above the complete singular being conceived precisely under a positive understanding. That is, this complete being is not conceived of as one singularly and individually unless it is conceived of as incapable of division into many. The difficulty, then, is not with the denial itself, whether it appropriately applies to the understanding of this unity or not; but rather with the foundation for the denial. Since the denial does not seem to be founded on the common nature alone (for that nature is indifferent to nondivisibility), it is necessary to ask what is in the singular and individual that such a denial would be appropriate to its intelligibility.[12] Despite the technical terminology Suarez is really asking a

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[12]Primo, indubitatum est apud auctores omnes individuum addere supra naturam communem negationem aliquam formaliter complentem seu constituentem unitatem individui. Hoc per se notum est ex ratione unitatis supra explicata, adiunctis his quae sectione praecedenti notavimus circa rationem, seu quid nominis individui. Quin potius, si formaliter loquamur de individuo, quatenus tali modo unum est, negationem addit in suo conceptu formali, non solum supra naturam communem abstracte et universe conceptam, sed etiam supra totam entitatem singularem praecise conceptam sub ratione positiva, quia tota haec entitas non concipitur ut una singulariter et individuae, donec concipiatur ut incapax divisionis in plura eiusdem rationis. Difficultas ergo praesens non est de hac negatione, sive illa formaliter pertineat ad rationem huius unitatis sive non; nam de hoc etiam sunt opiniones, de quibus iam diximus praecedenti disputatione quid verius existimemus; sed est difficultas de fundamento illius negationis; nam cum non videatur posse fundari in sola communi natura, illa enim de se indifferens est et non postulat talem indivisionem in plura similia, sed in ea potius dividitur ideo inquirimus quid sit in singulari et individua, ratione cuius ei conveniat talis negatio. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 7.

very simple question here. When one says that something is a numerically singular individual, he is saying that it is this and not that. What is the foundation that allows us to make this denial?

In answer to this question Suarez draws four conclusions about the property of individuality. 1. Individuality adds something, beyond the common nature, by reason of which a being is numerically singular, and the denial of divisibility into many like things is then inappropriate to this being.[13] 2. The property of individuality as such does not add something real by means of a specific nature distinct from the common nature of the thing.[14] 3. The property of individuality adds something beyond the common nature distinct from it by reason alone.[15] 4. The property of individuality individuates the individual not only in material things but also in created immaterial substances adds something beyond the species by means of this distinction of reason.[16] In this set of statements one can see the major concern of Suarez--the property of individuality does add something to the common nature but not something real; this something is distinct from the common nature only by a distinction of reason. These four conclusions are meant to apply not only to material things but to all created things.

[13]Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 8.

[14]Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 9.

[15]Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 16.

[16]Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 21.

Now, it is important to look at Suarez' own proof for these four claims. When one says that the individual adds something real beyond the common nature, by which it is an individual, and which denies divisibility into many like things, one is stating that the common nature of itself does not postulate such a negation. But, that common nature as it exists in the thing per se and intrinsically demands such a denial. The denial itself, however, is founded on something positive which is not only a distinction of reason between the common nature and the individual but also a real distinction between the two. A specific nature in itself and in so far as it is a proximate object of the common concept of man, of lion, etc., has nothing contradictory in the notion of the communication to many. That is, when one considers a given individual in a species, say Peter, and one applies the common concept "man" to this individual no contradiction arises. The concept "man" applies to Peter, to Paul and to all other humans. In other words, one does not equivocate by using this concept of each individual. The concept of itself is spoken of as negatively indifferent to many. Through individuation, however, this negative indifference is lost and the concept becomes incapable of such division into many with respect to this individual. And so, individuation should be understood as something positive added to the common nature. For example, Peter and Paul agree in the common nature they share, but differ between themselves in their proper intelligibility. Therefore, they

add their proper intelligibility to the common nature, and these proper intelligibilities are something positive.[17]

The problem, however, with stating that individuation adds something positive to the common nature is that this statement appears to be a license for the "haecceity" as advocated by Scotus. It has been shown in the previous two chapters that Suarez is careful to avoid any addition to the basic metaphysical principles of matter and form. The second conclusion on individuality is provided to reject all versions of Scotism. When Suarez states that the individual as such does not add something real by means of a separate specific nature distinct from the nature of the thing, he means that in the individual, Peter, "humanity" as such and

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[17]Dico primo: individuum aliquid reale addit praeter naturam communem, ratione cuius tale individuum est et ei convenit illa negatio divisibilitatis in plura similia. . . . nam communis natura de se non postulat talem negationem, et tamen illi naturae, ut in re existit et facta est haec, per se et intrinsece convenit talis negatio; ergo additum est ei aliquid, ratione cuius illi adiuncta est, quia omnis negatio ab intrinseco et necessario conveniens alicui rei, fundatur in aliquo positivo, quod non potest esse rationis, sed reale, quandoquidem illa unitas et negatio ipsi rei vere et ex se convenit. Vel aliter proponi haec ratio potest, quia natura specifica secundum se et quatenus est proximum obiectum conceptus communis hominis, leonis, etc., nihil habet repugnans communicabilitati, et ideo dicitur negative indifferens ut infra videbimus; per hanc autem individuationem tollitur haec eius indifferentia et fit incapax talis divisionis, quatenus singularis effecta est; ergo necesse est ut intelligatur aliquid positivum ei esse additum, ratione cuius hoc ei repugnat. Denique Petrus et Paulus conveniunt in communi natura et differunt inter se in propriis rationibus ergo illas addunt naturae communi; sed illae positivae sunt; non enim constituuntur negationibus in ratione talis substantiae; ergo. Idem etiam concludunt argumenta quae ad confirmandam opinionem Scoti adducta sunt. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 8.

"this humanity" (or rather that which is added to "humanity" that it might become "this") are not related in such a way that "this" would be distinguished from the nature of the thing and consequently make a true composition of "this" and the common nature. If, in the individual itself that which adds individuality over and above the common nature is distinct from the nature of the thing by means of that individuality, then the very nature in the thing itself is destroyed by such an addition or individual difference. That is, on the part of the thing "the nature" and "haecceity" are two. If they are not two things at least they are two as thing and mode. Each one of these then has its own unity. This Scotist position, however, cannot be maintained, for then each nature would be an individual before there was an individual difference. And such a difference joined to that nature would then be superfluous.[18] In a

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[18]Dico secundo: individuum, ut sic, non addit aliquid ex natura rei distinctum a natura specifica, ita ut in ipso individuo Petro, verbi gratia, humanitas ut sic, et haec humanitas vel potius id quod additur humanitati ut fiat haec (quod solet vocari haecceitas vel differentia individualis), ex natura rei distinguantur et consequenter faciant veram compositionem in ipsa re. In hac assertione convenire debent omnes qui opinionem Scoti impugnant . . . Qui tamen non satis distinguunt an impugnent Scotum quoad totam sententiam, etiam quoad additionem differentiae individualis supra specificam, vel solum quoad distinctionem ex natura rei, et argumenta eorum videntur esse utrique parti communia, et ideo non sunt admodum efficacia. In eadem assertione necesse est conveniant qui negant naturam esse a parte rei universalem, . . . Quod autem unum ex alio consequatur patet, quia si in ipsis individuis id quod addit individuum supra naturam communem est distinctum ex natura rei ab illa, ergo et e converso ipsa natura in re ipsa praescindit a tali addito seu differentia individuali; atque adeo a parte rei natura et haecceitas sunt duo, si non ut

word, any addition by means of the metaphysical principle of "haecceity" destroys the genuine unity of the individual existent.

The argument against the Scotist position is extended through many succeeding paragraphs of Disputation V and all the additional objections are variations on the one just stated. Generally speaking every such real distinction ought to be between a real being and another real being or between a real being and its mode of existence. But if a distinction is real it presupposes that each being is singular and individual in itself; and, consequently, there is no real unity. If the distinction is between a being and its mode either that mode intrinsically and formally constitutes that being or it does not. If it constitutes the being it is not distinguished from the nature of the thing by that individual difference because it would be included in the nature of the thing. If, however, that mode is not understood to constitute such a being, it is necessary that it be understood to presuppose that being prior to its own being.

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duae res, saltem ut res et modus; ergo unaquaeque earum habet per se unitatem suam, quia non potest intelligi quod aliqua sint duo, nisi sint unum et unum: numerus enim supponit unitates; ergo illa natura ut praecisa a differentia individuali habet in re ipsa unitatem individualem vel universalem. Primum dici non potest, iuxta praedictam sententiam, alioqui natura esset individua ante differentiam individualem, et ita superflue talis differentia adiungeretur; ergo iuxta hanc sententiam necessario dicendum est naturam illam prout in re ipsa praescindit et ex natura rei distinguitur a differentia individuali, habere unitatem universalem quod esse impossibile intelligi potest ex dictis sectione praecedenti et latius infra ostendimus. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 9.

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But, this is impossible. In a word, the Scotist position on haecceity or individual difference leads to nothing but absurdities.[19]

What Suarez has established to this point is that something is genuinely added by individuation, but there

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[19]Atque hinc argumentor secundo, directe ostendendo non posse esse talem distinctionem in rebus quae sit vera et actualis distinctio ex natura rei intervertens omnem operationem intellectus; nam omnis talis distinctio esse debet inter reales entitates aut inter realem entitatem et modum eius. Et quidem, si sit superiori modo erit distinctio realis, quae necessario supponet unamquamque entitatem in se singularem et individuam, quod est per se notum et ita a nemine negatur, quia distinctio entitatem supponit utramque entitatem in se constitutam atque adeo unam et singularem. Si autem distinctio sit inter entitatem et modum eius, qualis hic esse dicitur, ut sit vera distinctio ex natura rei necesse est quod talis entitas praeciso modo intelligatur in reipsa habere veram entitatem realem, alioqui intelligi non posset distinctio ex natura rei inter talem modum et entitatem. Quia vel modus ille intrinsece et formaliter constituit entitatem illam vel non; si constituit, ergo non distinguitur ex natura rei ab illa, quia intrinsece et essentialiter includetur in illa, ita ut nihil concipi possit in illa entitate quod non includat illum modum; si autem modus ille non intelligitur ita intrinsece et formaliter constituere talem entitatem, necesse est ut intelligatur supponere illam in sua entitate constituam et realiter advenire illi et modificare illam, cum ponatur in re ipsa distinctus ab illa. Impossibile autem est intelligere hunc modum distinctionis inter differentiam individualem et naturam communem; ergo. Probatur minor, quia, si praeciso illo modo intelligitur natura habere entitatem suam, ergo illa entitas per seipsam, et ut est prior illo modo, debet necessario esse singularis et individua; ergo non indiget individuatione superaddita, nec potest ab illa ex natura rei distingui; sicut, si linea non posset intelligi constituta in ratione lineae absque rectitudine, non posset rectitudo concipi ut modus ex natura rei condistinctus a linea, et adveniens illi; si autem nunc concipitur modus ex natura rei distinctus, ideo est quia potest concipi linea in re ipsa existens, et constituta in ratione lineae absque tali modo. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, par. 11.

Cf. also Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, pars. 12-15 for a further and complex explication of this argument.

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cannot be a real distinction between that which is added and the common nature. He must spell out now what kind of distinction is appropriate between individuality and the common nature. He does this in his third conclusion.

Individuation adds a distinction of reason over and above the common nature. That is, both the individual and the common nature make use of the same predicament composing the individual metaphysically as if the individual difference draws together the species and constitutes the individual. Just as separation of a common nature from individual differences is only through reason, so conversely that individual difference is understood as having been added to the common nature but this addition is also only through reason. There is not in the thing any real proper addition; but in each individual whatever, there is unity of being having both understandings as "a this" and as "common nature" in itself.[20]

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[20]Dico tertio individuum addere supra naturam communem aliquid ratione distinctum ab illa, ad idem praedicamentum pertinens, et individuum componens metaphysice, tamquam differentia individualis contrahens speciem et individuum constituens. Prima pars huius assertionis sequitur ex duabus praecedentibus; nam dictum est in prima individuum addere aliquid naturae communi, et in secunda negatum est illud esse distinctum ex natura rei; ergo necessarium est ut saltem ratione distinguatur, quia, si nullo modo distingueretur, nullo modo adderetur. Nec vero inde sequitur id quod additur esse aliquid rationis; nam, sicut est aliud distingui ratione, aliud vero esse tantum rationis, fieri enim potest ut quae realia sunt sola ratione distinguantur, ita etiam id quod additur potest esse reale, sicut revera est, quamvis sola ratione distinguatur. Dices: illa additio est tantum per rationem. Respondeo: quoad rem additam nego; quoad modum additionis seu contractionis aut compositionis, concedo; nam sicut separatio naturae communis a differentiis individuis est

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Suarez' final conclusion generalizes the position stated in the previous argument. So that he will be able to use this special distinction for all created beings, he says that individuation adds something by a distinction of reason over and above the species, not only in material things but also in all created and finite immaterial substances. He is careful to point out that all this talk of individuation does not apply to the divine nature because there is no way that it can be multiplied. The concern here is with the immaterial substances. In any individual and finite immaterial substance the mind conceives this individual in so far as it conceives this being (both its essential intelligibility and its species). Therefore, the mind conceives something common and something which according to reason is added to it in order that it determine the individual to

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solum per rationem, ita e converso, quod differentia individualis intelligatur ut addita naturae communi, solum est per rationem; nam in re non est illa propria additio sed in unoquoque individuo est una entitas utramque rationem per seipsam realiter habens.

Secunda pars conclusionis etiam sequitur aperte ex dictis, sumiturque ex D. Thoma, I, q. 29, a. 1, ubi ait substantiam individuari per seipsam et q. 10 de Potent., a. 3, negat posse substantiam per accidens constitui; non est ergo hoc additum extra genus ipsius rei, sed in substantiis est substantia, saltem incompleta, quia in re non est nisi substantia individua. Tertia denique pars facile patet, quia hoc additum non est pars aliqua physica substantiae, quia praedicatur de individuo ut dicens totam essentiam eius, quam non dicit pars physica, et ideo non praedicatur de toto. Nec est aliquid per modum totius directe positi in praedicamento substantiae; est ergo quid incompletum per modum differentiae. Item contrahit naturam communem illamque dividit in individua, et constituit metaphysice ipsum individuum, ut per se unum in suo genere. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, pars. 16-17.

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"this." In the matter of individuality, then, there is no difference between immaterial substances and other created things.[21]

From this discussion of the unity of the individual one can see that there is a whole complex of problems with which Suarez is dealing. He wants nothing to do with an

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[21]Dico quarto: individuum non solum in rebus materialibus et accidentibus, sed etiam in substantiis immaterialibus creatis et finitis addit aliquid ratione distinctum supra speciem. Excludimus ab hac conclusione divinam naturam, quia cum illa sit essentialiter ita determinata ad hanc numero naturam, ut omnino ei repugnet secundum eam multiplicari, non potest etiam secundum rationem (si vera sit) abstrahi communis ratio deitatis a tali deitate; nam hoc ipso quod sic abstrahitur, non concipitur vera deitas, quia de vero conceptu deitatis est ut sic haec numero, et non alia; quia hoc requirit eius infinitas. Et hinc consequenter fit ut haec individua deitas nihil etiam secundum rationem addat supra conceptum verae deitatis. Unde merito reprihenditur Caietanus, eo quod I, q. 3, a. 3, et aliis locis dixerit. Deum uno modo sumi posse ut significat concretum quasi specificum naturae divinae. Nam talis conceptus vere communis repugnat verae divinitati, de cuius essentia est quod sit haec singularis natura, et ideo non magis potest verus Deus communi conceptu concipi et abstrahi ab hoc Deo quam Petrus.

Ex hac vero exceptione, quae singularis est Deoque specialiter convenit propter infinitatem eius confirmatur conclusio posita et generalis regula contraria in omnibus creaturis, etiamsi immateriales sint. Probatur, quia in qualibet substantia immateriali individua et finita, verbi gratia, Gabriele Archangelo, concipit mens et hoc individuum, quatenus concipit hanc numero entitatem, et rationem essentialem et specificam eius, quae non includit essentialiter hanc numero entitatem nec positivam repugnantiam ut communicari possit alteri individuo; ergo ibi concipit mens aliquid commune et aliquid quod secundum rationem ei additur ut ad hoc individuum determinetur; ergo quoad hoc praecise non est differentia inter substantias immateriales et alias res. Dicetur fortasse quamlibet essentiam seu speciem angelicam, essentialiter et ab intrinseco determinari ad hoc individuum, et consequenter hoc individuum nihil positivum reale, etiam ratione distinctum, addere supra ipsam speciem, sed solam negationem communicabilitatis in plura similia, quae immediate convenit tali speciei, ratione sui ipsius absque additione ulla. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 2, pars. 21-22.

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exaggerated realism of the Platonic variety and hence says that the only things that really exist are individuals, not common natures or universals. If, however, this is the case, then, when one speaks of this or that individual thing there must be added to the common nature something to make this or that individual. There is certainly a negation or denial involved--this thing is not that thing, nor is this individual thing coterminous with the common nature. But, there is also a positive interpretation of what it means to be an individual in that there is a special kind of distinction of reason between the common nature and the individual. In this positive position Suarez has denied all forms of Scotism, thus avoiding the addition of a metaphysical principle beyond the matter and form.

This section of the present study has been concerned with the problem <u>that</u> the individual is distinct from the common nature. It is necessary now to ask the question <u>how</u> individuation comes about. In the next sections of this chapter it will be shown that Suarez' doctrine on individuation puts him in the company of all other dualists, for he advocates two principles of individuation for material things.

Signed Matter as the Principle of Individuation in Material Substances

In the discussion of the principle of individuation, Suarez approaches the problem negatively and then gives his own solution to the question of individuation. The negative

argumentation is the subject of Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Disputation V. In each of these sections he attacks one or other popular opinion on the principle of individuation. In order he eliminates versions of signed matter, substantial form, and individual existence as possibilities for the principle of individuation. Having concluded the negative argument, in Section 6 he asks what the principle of individuation might be for all created substances. Here he gives a carefully nuanced position on individuation.

Prior to any arguments for or against any given principle of individuation, Suarez tries to focus the questions at issue in this metaphysical discussion. In created substances metaphysical composition is able to be considered to consist in a specific nature and individual difference. Just as that which adds the species over and above the genus, according to a metaphysical consideration, is the separating difference, so that which the individual adds over and above the species is called the contracting difference, a difference constitutive and distinctive of individuals. It is because of this latter difference that individuals of the same species differ numerically one from the other. Suarez has already shown that what the individual adds over and above the species is distinct from the species only by a distinction of reason but that there is nevertheless a real and positive being founded on a negation or lack of division on the part of the individual. Some have thought that this has been sufficient as a principle of



individuation; but this is simply a discussion of the metaphysical composition of a being which misses the point of the real principle of individuation. The sense of the question about the principle of individuation is what foundation or principle is in the thing itself so that it should have this individual difference. Metaphysical predicates (e.g., genus, species, individual difference) are taken from real constituting principles; it is these principles as intrinsic causes which will give the principle of individuation.[22]

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[22]Ut autem sensus quaestionis intelligatur, sumendum est ex dictis sectione praecedenti in huiusmodi substantiis creatis considerari posse metaphysicam compositionem, quae secundum rationem est ex natura specifica et differentia individuali; sicut enim id quod addit species supra genus, iuxta metaphysicam considerationem est differentia divisiva seu contractiva generis, et constitutiva speciei, ita id quod addit individuum supra speciem recte dicitur differentia contractiva speciei et constitutiva ac distinctiva individuorum quae vere ac proprie differre numero dicuntur; propterea enim species dicitur de pluribus differentibus numero praedicari. Item ostendimus, hoc quod addit individuum supra speciem, licet sit tantum ratione distinctum, tamen reale esse et positivum, fundans negationem, seu individisionem propriam individui, quia per sese incommunicabile est et distinctum ab aliis seu incommunicabile aliis individuis, et ideo adiunctum speciei, cum illa constituit individuum per se unum sub tali specie; nihil ergo illi deest quominus veram habeat rationem differentiae. Unde nonnulli hoc putant esse assignandum principium individuationis, et nullum aliud esse quaerendum, ut videre est in Scoto, In II, dist. 2, q. 6; et Fonseca, lib V Metaph., c. 6, sect. 1. Sed non disputatur in hoc sensu quaestio, nec de illa vere est diversitas opinionum inter eos qui de principio individuationis disputant. Sensus ergo quaestionis est, quodnam fundamentum vel principium in re ipsa habeat illa differentia individualis. Solent enim haec metaphysica praedicata sumi ex principiis realibus constituentibus rem, quomodo genus dici solet sumi a materia et differentia a forma; et determinationes substantiales interdum sumuntur a materia, ut cum homo materialis dicitur, interdum a forma, ut cum dicitur rationalis, interdum a tota natura composita, ut cum dicitur homo; ad hunc ergo modum in praesenti inquiritur quod sit

Once again, as with matter and form, Suarez makes a distinction between the "metaphysical constitution" and the "physical constitution" of a being. And, once again, in the discussion on the principle of individuation he is concerned with "that real principle" which makes an individual to be a numerically singular being.

The first opinion to be refuted is that signed matter is the principle of individuation. It is especially important that Suarez refute this position carefully because it has all the weight of the authority of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas behind it. Other than this authority Suarez can find almost no reason for holding that signed matter as usually understood is the principle of individuation.[23] The

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principium huius differentiae individualis. Ex qua declaratione constat hic non inquiri principia vel causas extrinsecas individuationis, seu potius individuorum, quales sunt causa efficiens et finalis; nam hae non aliter causant individuationem quam causando entitatem individuam, seu dando ipsum intrinsecum principium individuationis; hoc ergo est quod inquirimus. Et, licet quaestio generalis sit de omnibus substantiis creatis, quia tamen materiales sunt nobis notiores, de illis dicemus prius, et deinde facile constabit quid nos coniectari possimus de spiritualibus. Et quoniam variae sunt de hac re opiniones, quae prolixam postulant examinationem, eas sigillatim tractabimus. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 2.

[23]Est ergo celebris sententia affirmans principium individuationis esse materiam signatam. Haec est sententia D. Thomae, I, q. 3, a. 3, ad. 3 et q. 50, a. 4, III, q. 77, a. 2, et in In IV, dist. 12, q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2, et Opusc. 29, et De Ente et essentia, c. 2, ubi Caietan. prolixe hoc disputat ac defendit; et Capreol., In II, dist. 3; Soncin., VII Metaph., q. 33 et 34; Ferr., I cont. Gent., c. 21, et alii infra citandi. Et existimatur haec sententia Aristotelis; nam variis in locis distinctionem et identitatem numericam materiae primae attribuendam censet. Unde lib. V Metaph., c. 6, text. 42, dicit et esse unum numero, quorum est materia una; et lib. VII, c. 8, text. 28,



reasons for the difficulty concerning the position that signed matter is the principle of individuation are: 1. matter of itself is common not only in so far as "common" has the same understanding for many "material individuals" but also because the same matter is able to be under many different forms, many distinct species, or things differing only numerically. This is true at least in terms of successive situations; and Suarez asks how can this matter be the principle of individuation. 2. A genuine principle of individuation ought to be especially proper and in no way common

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ait formam in his carnibus atque ossibus esse Socratem et Calliam; et c. 10, text. 25: singulare (inquit) ex ultima materia, iam Socrates est; et ex hoc principio, in lib. XII, Metaph., c. 8, text. 49, concludit primam motorem non posse esse, nisi unum numero, quia est expers materiae, existimans necessarium ut quae conveniunt specie et differunt numero materiam habeant et per materiam differant. Et similiter, I de Caelo, c. 9, probat non posse esse alium mundum, quia hic mundus totam materiam rerum naturalium complectitur. Ex his ergo testimoniis apparet hanc fuisse sententiam Aristotelis, iuxta quam consequenter dicendum est (ut dicunt praedicti auctores) in substantiis immaterialibus non esse positivam individuationis principium nec propriam differentiam individualem, sed solum naturam de se incommunicabilem.

Fundamentum huius sententiae, si rationem spectemus, fere nullum invenio, quod ab Aristotelis auctoritatem non revocetur, scilicet, quia materia est principium multiplicationis et distinctionis individuorum intra eamdem speciem, ut Aristoteles testatur citatis locis; sed illud est principium individuationis quod est principium nunumerice /sic/ distinctionis; ergo. Secundo, quia illud est individuum quod est incommunicabile inferioribus similibus; sed materia est primum fundamentum huius incommunicabilitatis; nam forma, cum sit actus, de se communicabilis est, materia autem cum sit prima potentia, de se est incommunicabilis, et forma tunc limitatur et determinatur cum ad hanc materiam coarctatur. Tertio, quia individuum est primum subiectum in metaphysica coordinatione; de illo enim omnia superiora predicantur, et ipsum non de aliis ergo primum principium et fundamentum individui, ut sic, esse debet illud quod est primum subiectum inter principia physica; huiusmodi autem est materia; ergo. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, pars. 3-4.

to many individuals, neither simultaneously nor successively.[24] On account of these difficulties some authors have added to the position that matter is the principle of individuation, not as such, but "matter signed by quantity" is the sought after principle. What that phrase, "matter signed by quantity" means is so obscure that the defenders of this position can in no way agree on its significance.[25] Suarez sees three general trends in the various explanations

[24]This present point seems to be Suarez' major criticism of Aristotle's position on matter as the principle of individuation. The fact that matter can be common to many at least successively prohibits it from being a genuine principle of individuation.

One should also note that Suarez is apparently reading Aristotle anachronistically with respect to matter as the principle of individuation. It is only in scholasticism that "matter signed by quantity" becomes the principle of individuation. As can be seen from the text cited in footnote 23 above, Suarez lists texts from both Thomas and Aristotle in support of the position that "matter signed by quantity" is the principle of individuation. A careful reading of the Aristotelian texts cited does not substantiate this position.

[25]Sed videndum est, quamvis sententia haec ratione convinci non possit, an valeat convenienter defendi ac sustineri, nam hoc satis nobis erit ut saltem propter Aristotelis et D. Thomae auctoritatem illam defendamus. Et prima ratio difficultatis circa illam esse potest, quia materia de se communis est non solum quatenus eadem secundum rationem specificam communis est multis individuis materiae, sed etiam quia eadem numero materia subesse potest multis formis vel specie distinctis vel solo numero diversis, saltem successive; quomodo ergo potest materia esse principium individuationis? Nam principium individuationis debet esse maxime proprium, et nullo modo commune multis individuis, nec simul nec successive. Propter hanc difficultatem additum est in illa sententia materiam non utcumque, sed signatam quantitate, esse principium individuationis. Quid autem illa voce significetur, tam est obscurum ut in ea re explicanda defensores huius sententiae inter se mirum in modum dissideant. Quorum expositiones varias referre oportet et examinare, ut quanta sit probabilitas huius sententiae clarius apparet. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 8.

of "matter signed by quantity;" he finds each of these lines of argumentation inadequate taken in itself.

The first understanding of "signed matter" to be rejected is that this "signed matter" is nothing other than matter with quantity or matter affected by quantity. That is, from matter and quantity it is felt that the principle of individuation gives a quasi-integral being--the matter gives incommunicability and the quantity gives distinction. The reasoning here is that if matter is to be the principle of individuation something is necessary in order to distinguish this matter from that matter. This distinction cannot come from the matter itself because such a distinction ought to come about through act. The act needed here cannot be the form for one form is distinct from another because it occurs in or is received in distinct matter.[26]

Suarez says this understanding of "signed matter" is false and can be denied by the most weighty argumentation. Initially, Suarez uses a reductio argument against this understanding. Suppose quantity is not in prime matter but rather in the whole composite; then, when the substance is

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[26]Prima expositio est materiam signatam quantitate nihil aliud esse quam materiam cum quantitate seu quantitate affectam; ex his enim duobus censent hoc principium individuationis quasi integrari, ut materia det incommunicabilitatem, quantitas distinctionem, ut supra dicebamus. . . . Ratio vero esse potest quia, ut materia sit principium individuationis, aliquid necessarium est quod distinguat hanc materiam ab illa; sed hoc non est ipsa materia, quia distinctio debet fieri per actum; neque est forma, nam potius haec forma est distincta ab illa, quia in distincta materia fit et recipitur. Disp. Meta. V. Sect. 3, par. 9.

corrupted the quantity is destroyed. The generation of a new quantity is to be compared to the generation of a new substance. This would mean that first the substantial form is introduced and then quantity. The argument, then, for signed matter is destroyed, because "this form," since it is first understood to be received in this matter, is also understood to be received in matter distinct from other matter. There is no need to distinguish matter by signing with quantity. Therefore formally and intrinsically it is not made distinct by means of quantity. In other words, from matter and form taken precisely and as preceding quantity, this substantial individual results. Therefore, the individual is one not by a unity of reason, but by a real, singular and transcendental unity. Just as from the power of its being the individual is substantially per se undivided, so also it is substantially and entitatively distinct from all others. This means that it does not have its distinction by reason of quantity.[27] The relationship between

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[27]Sed haec sententia falsa est et gravibus rationibus impugnari potest. Duobus autem modis procedere possumus, primo, supponendo aliam sententiam, quam praedicti auctores tenent, quantitatem non esse in materia prima, sed in toto composito, et destrui corrupta substantia, et novam comparari ad generationem substantiae. Ex quo fit, simpliciter loquendo, prius hanc numero formam substantialem introduci in hanc materiam et consequi quantitatem. Unde conficitur argumentum, quia haec forma, cum primum intelligitur recipi in hac materia, intelligitur etiam recipi in materia distincta ab aliis; ergo formaliter et intrinsece non fit distincta per quantitatem. Item ex materia et forma praecise conceptis et ut praevenientibus quantitatem, resultat hoc individuum substantiale; ergo illud ut sic unum est, non unitate rationis; sed unitate reali et singulari ac transcendentali; ergo, sicut ex vi



matter and quantity has been seen in the chapter on matter. In his present refutation Suarez takes a position contrary to his own simply to show that there is no need to say quantity signs matter in order to have a true principle of individuation. From the very relation of this matter and this form one can get a genuine oneness of being. Two things are at work here--1. it has been shown over and over that Suarez does not want to interpose anything between the matter and the form; 2. a "signed matter" would interpose such a being between matter and form.

The argument just given, seems, however, to refute the position already stated that quantity inheres in matter.[28] Suarez now proceeds to show at some length that one can hold the position that quantity inheres in matter without being held to the position of "signed matter." Suppose, he says, that quantity inheres in prime matter and remains the same both in generation and corruption. This matter, then, not only of itself but also as affected by this quantity is able to be under different forms and, consequently, in distinct individuals. It is not able to be a principle of individuation any more than the signed matter which would interpose between matter and form. Quantity can inhere in matter without matter being the "signed matter" of the principle of individuation.

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suae entitatis substantialis est in se indivisum, ita etiam est substantialiter et entitative distinctum ab omnibus aliis; ergo non habet distinctionem per quantitatem . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 10.

[28]Cf. Chapter II of this present study.

It could be said perhaps that matter with undetermined dimensions can be under different forms and hence as such is not a principle of individuation. Matter, however, with determinate dimensions is proper to this individual and as such is the principle of individuation. But, Suarez asks, what do these indeterminate dimensions add over and above quantity? Dimensions are able to be spoken of only because they do give a definite length, width or breadth. Determined quantity only adds certain definite dimensions, and this is not sufficient to solve the problem of individuation. One and the same material, existing under a certain and determined quantity, is able to be under distinct forms (e.g., a branch at one time is green, at another dry, etc.).

Another approach is to say that quantity is undetermined when it is not affected by certain limiting dispositions as such and such a rarity or density or other qualities by which the matter is determined to this form rather than another. In this sense it can be admitted that matter affected by quantity or determined dimensions is so proximately disposed as to be of this individual that the individual is not able to be in another matter. But, the authors who hold the position of "signed matter" do not speak in this manner, and if they were to do so they would not be true to their own position.[29]

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[29]Secundo, procedere possumus in alia sententia, quod quantitas inest materiae primae et manet eadem in genito et corrupto, et tunc aliunde sumitur non minus efficax argumentum, quia non solum haec materia secundum se,

Suarez concludes his rejection of this first position on "signed matter" by stating that it does not pertain to the formal effect of quantity to distinguish entitatively one matter from another, or one part of matter from another

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sed etiam ut affecta hac quantitate, potest esse sub diversis formis, et consequenter in individuis numero distinctis; ergo non magis potest esse principium individuationis quam sola materia. Dicetur fortassse materiam cum dimensionibus interminatis esse posse sub diversis formis, et ut sic non esse principium individuationis, materiam vero cum his determinatis dimensionibus esse propriam huius individui et ut sic esse principium individuationis. Sed inquiro quid addant hae determinatae dimensiones supra quantitatem. Dimensiones enim possunt dici interminatae solum quia non dicunt certum terminum longitidinis, aut latitudinis, etc., et sic quantitas terminata solum addet certos terminos dimensionum; et hoc non satis est ad praesens, quia eadem materia hoc modo existens sub eadem certa et determinata quantitate, potest subesse distinctis formis, ut patet in eadem virga prius viridi, postea sicca et similibus. Aliter potest dici quantitas interminata illa quae non est affecta certis dispositionibus, ut tali raritate aut densitate, vel aliis qualitatibus, quibus materia ad hanc formam potius quam ad aliam determinatur. Et hoc sensu admitti potest materiam quantitate seu dimensionibus sic determinatis affectam, id est, sic proxime dispositam, ita esse propriam huius individui, ut non possit esse in alio. Verumtamen neque dicti auctores loqui possunt in hoc sensu, neque in illo esset vera eorum sententia. Primam patet, quia ipsi dicunt quantitatem ex propria ratione et effectu formali distinguere unum individuum ab alio, ergo non convenit hoc illi ratione aliarum qualitatum seu dispositionum, alioque non materia signata quantitate, sed materia quanta signata qualitatibus deberet dici principium individuationis. Secundum patet, quia alias sequitur accidentia, quibus materia disponitur ad formam, intrinsece includi in principio individuationis substantiae; consequens est falsum; ergo. Sequela patet, quia materia signata, iuxta hanc opinionem, intrinsece ac formaliter includit haec accidentia ut ipsi inhaerentia ipsamquae determinantia ad talem formam. Minor vero probatur primo, quia individuum substantiae est per se unum collocatum sub specie in praedicamento substantiae; non ergo includit intrinsece accidentia, cum tamen intrinsece includat individuationis principium. Secundo, quia ostensum est supra differentiam individualem in reipsa non esse distinctam ex natura rei a natura substantiali, atque adeo esse ipsammet substantiam



part of matter. Just as quantity presupposes matter as a subject so it presupposes the individual being which in itself is entitatively distinct from another being of similar nature. Therefore, distinct quantities presuppose distinct subjects in which they are received. And, distinct parts of quantity presuppose also distinct parts of entitatively distinct subjects.[30] A distinction which presupposes quantity in a substance is a substantial distinction. It is this entitative distinction which pertains to individuality, for through this distinction one understands the individual to be distinct from all others (either within the same species or under some common predicate). If quantity confers some distinction, it will be accidental only in the understanding of the individual and above and beyond the entitative distinction. Quantity does not therefore by its understanding pertain to the principle of individuation.[31]

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individuam; ergo principium intrinsecum eius non potest esse accidens, sed substantia. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 11.

[30]Unde etiam fit (quod est novum et sufficiens argumentum contra totam hanc sententiam) non pertinere ad effectum formalem quantitatis distinguere entitative unam materiam ab alia, vel partem materiae a parte materiae, quia sicut quantitas supponit materiam ut subiectum ita supponit individuam entitatem eius, quae per seipsam entitative distincta est ab alia entitate simili; ergo distinctae quantitates supponunt distincta subiecta in quibus recipiantur et distinctae partes quantitatis, partes etiam subiecti entitative distinctas . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 14.

[31]Distinctio, ergo, quam supponit quantitas in substantia est distinctio entitativa et substantialis: haec autem est quae per se pertinet ad unitatem individualem, de qua tractamus; nam per hanc intelligitur individuum esse

A second understanding of "signed matter" is possible but it really is no more acceptable than the previous one. Some philosophers have said that "signed matter" does not include the quantity itself intrinsically, but rather as a term of the condition of matter itself. That is, it is of the very nature of matter to be capable of quantity. But signed matter as such cannot be the complete principle of individuation. The reason for this is that matter is indifferent to any quantity whatsoever just as it is indifferent to any form whatsoever. It is determined both to a given quantity and given form through the action of a previously existing agent bringing about generation. As such, matter is capable of this quantity and not of another. And, that matter is said to be the principle of individuation. It should be noted, Suarez says, that the concern here is not only with mathematical quantity but also with real physical quantity.[32]

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distinctum ab omnibus aliis, vel sub eadem specie, si cum similibus comparetur, vel etiam sub genere, vel sub quocumque praedicato communi, si cum omnibus aliis conferatur; ergo, si aliquam distinctionem confert quantitas, illa erit per accidens ad rationem individui, et superveniens illi; non ergo ea ratione pertinebit quantitas ad principium individuationis de qua agimus . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 15.

[32]Secunda expositio est materiam signatam quantitate non includere quantitatem ipsam intrinsece, sed ut est terminum habitudinis materiae ad ipsam. Est enim materia nautra sua capax quantitatis, sed ut sic non potest esse completum principium individuationis, quia est indifferens ad quamcumque quantitatem sicut ad quamvis formam; per actionem autem agentis praeviam ad generationem determinatur ut sit capax huius quantitatis, et non alterius, et illa ut sic dicitur esse individuationis principium. Per quantitatem autem intelligimus hoc loco non solam



Along the same lines, "signed matter" can also be understood as nothing other than matter as it is ultimately disposed to this particular form as opposed to any other form. This disposition can be understood in two ways, by first understanding quantity and other dispositions to inhere and remain in matter and simply to precede the introduction of the form. As such, matter can be rightly understood to be disposed and signed for form. But, this falls into the earlier way of understanding which has already been rejected. That is, this matter includes quantity and accidents intrinsically. The second way of understanding this disposition is by supposing quantity and other dispositions not to be in matter but in the composite and since they make up the ultimate disposition they follow upon the form. In this sense it is the same for matter to be disposed as it is to have a determined order or potency to this quantity with these dispositions.[33]

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mathematicam quantitatem (ut sic dicam), sed physicam, id est physicis qualitatibus et dispositionibus affectam . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 18.

[33]Cum his etiam coniungenda est alia, quae dicit materiam signatam nihil aliud esse quam materiam ultimo dispositam ad hanc formam, quia non disponitur nisi quantitate talibus qualitatibus affecta. Haec autem sententia dupliciter affirmari potest: primo intelligendo quantitatem et alias dispositiones inhaerere et manere in materia, et simpliciter praecedere ordine naturae introductionem formae, et sic recte potest intelligi materia disposita et signata ad formam; tamen hoc modo ponere materiam signatam principium individuationis est incidere in priorem sententiam Capreoli, quia haec materia signata includit intrinsece quantitatem et accidentia, quae impossibile est includi in principio individuationis, ut ostendimus. . . . Alio ergo modo potest doceri haec sententia, supponendo quantitatem et alias dispositiones non



Suarez feels the total exposition of "signed matter" in this way is false. This is especially the case in that it presupposes that matter does not have quantity inhering in itself, which even though it may be possible is not nearly as probable as the opinion stating that quantity does inhere in matter. This exposition confuses the various orders of potency and act. A potency is related to an act of the same order. But matter is not such a potency with respect to quantity. Matter is a potency for substantial form and therefore it is necessary that it not pertain to the predicament of quantity. If the potency of matter first looks to substantial form and then to accidental form, it is first determined to this or that form and only then to this or that quantity. Therefore, it is not signed or determined to a given form because of its potency to this or that quantity.[34] In a word, before the substantial form nothing else

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inesse materiae, sed composito, et ut conficiunt ultimam dispositionem consequi formam, et in hoc sensu idem est materiam esse dispositam quod habere ordinem seu potentiam determinatam ad hanc quantitatem cum his dispositionibus; atque hoc modo coincidit hic modus loquendi cum secunda expositione adducta. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 19.

[34]Hanc ergo totam expositionem falsam esse censeo. Et imprimis in illa supponitur materiam non habere sibi inhaerentem quantitatem et dispositiones alias, quod, licet probabile sit, fortasse tamen non est aeque probabile ac contrarium. Deinde, supposita illa sententia, argumentatur Caiet., in I, nam potentia materiae ad quantitatem recipiendum est in genere quantitatis, quoniam potentia et actus sunt in eodem genere ut Aristoteles ait, X Metaph.; ergo neque illa potentia ad quantitatem potest intrinsece pertinere ad principium individuationis substantiae, alias individuum substantiae non esset per se unum: constaret enim ex rebus diversorum predicamentorum. Haec tamen ratio per se sumpta non est efficax; bene enim respondent Iavellus

is able to be understood as added to matter for what would it be or from where would it come, or what foundation would it have?[35] This second understanding of "signed matter" then is no more adequate than the earlier one.

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potentiam pertinere ad genus sui actus primarii, ad quem per se primo ordinatur, et a quo suo modo sumit speciem; materia autem non est ita potentia ad quantitatem ut per se primo ad illam ordinetur, sed ad formam substantialem, et ideo necesse non est ut a praedicamentum quantitatis pertineat. Quod autem in favorem Caietani instat Fonseca, V Metaph., c. 6, q. 4, quamvis potentia materiae simpliciter non pertineat ad quantitatem, tamen ut receptivam quantitatis ad illud praedicamentum pertinere, hoc (inquam) non urget, quia illa reduplicatio materiae, ut receptivae quantitatis, non addit potentiam realem ipsi materiae, sed solum secundum nostrum modum concipiendi et loquendi explicat illam potentiam per habitudinem ad secundarium terminum, qui est quantitas, et ideo necesse non est ut ea ratione ad praedicamentum quantitatis pertineat. Quod ergo attinet ad vim argumenti fundati in illa maxima, actus et potentia sunt in eodem genere, bona est responsio Iavelli, ut latius infra dicemus, tractando de causa materiali accidentium.

Tamen ex eadem responsione sumitur argumentum efficax contra hanc ipsam opinionem; nam si potentia materiae prius respicit substantialem formam quam quantitatem, ergo prius etiam determinatur eius potentia ad hanc formam substantialem quam ad hanc quantitatem; ergo non signatur seu determinatur ad hanc formam per potentiam ad hanc quantitatem. . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, pars. 20-21.

[35] . . . ante formam substantialem nihil aliud substantiale potest praeintelligi additum materiae; quid enim illud esset, aut a quo fieret, aut quo fundamento, aut ad quid poneretur? Neque etiam aliquid accidentale, quia nullum accidens praecedit in materia ante formam substantialem, et in omni sententia nullum accidens praecedit in materia quantitatem ipsam. Dicunt aliqui addi materiae in illo instanti quemdam modum realem et ex natura rei distinctum a materia, praevium ad introductionem formae substantialis cum sua quantitate et aliis dispositionibus, et per hunc modum sigillari materiam, et nonnulli vocant illum modum substantialem, alii accidentalem. Sed utrique gratis loquuntur, neque explicare possunt aut rationem reddere eorum, quae dicunt, quod est a vera philosophandi ratione alienum. Nam primo inquiro ad quid sit iste modus. Dicent: ut materia determinetur ad hanc formam. Contra, ipsa est indifferens ad hunc modum, et infinitos alios; per quid ergo determinatur materia ut hunc modum in illo



There is one final way of looking at "signed matter" as the principle of individuation. The emphasis here is on what it means to speak of a "principle of individuation." One can speak of such a principle in two ways--1. in itself as a principle constituting the individual and the foundation from which one takes the individual difference. In a word, by what principle is both Peter an individual and Paul an individual and what makes one different from the other;[36] 2. it can be spoken of in respect to the production or multiplication of individuals; this is to ask what the principle is on account of which individual substantial beings are multiplied. In other words, given a certain grouping of beings all of whom one calls men, by what principle can there be Peter, Paul, John, and William. That is, why one individual rather

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instanti recipiat potius quam alium? Si enim dicas determinari per alium modum, procedemus in infinitum; si vero dicas determinari per dispositiones immediate praecedentes, melius dicetur immediate determinari materiam ad formam, et ita superfluus est iste modus. Praeterquam quod argumenta, quibus statim ostendemus non posse materiam per dispositiones praecedentes determinari ad formam, eodem modo probant non posse determinari per eas ad talem modum recipiendum. Si vero tandem dicatur, materiam sine ulla determinatione praevia recipere hunc modum virtute agentis, cur non dicetur idem de forma? Sine ratione ergo vel fundamento interponitur hic modus. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 22.

Cf. also pars. 23-27.

[36]Tertia explicatio est, de principio individuationis dupliciter nos loqui posse, primo secundum se, id est, quatenus revera est principium constituens individuum ut tale est, et est radix seu fundamentum a quo sumitur individualis differentia. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 28.

than another and why one distinct from another.[37]

In the previous two sets of arguments Suarez has asserted that one cannot accept the notion of "signed matter" as a principle constituting the individual and the foundation from which one takes the individual difference.

In this third way of understanding matter as a principle of individuation Suarez opts for the second way of understanding the principle--that matter can be spoken of as the principle of individuation in respect to the production or multiplication of individuals. The proof for this second way is that matter is the origin of generation and corruption by means of which multiplication of individuals occurs. A composite from such matter in its very understanding is corruptible; and hence it happens that an individual of such a kind is not able to be conserved perpetually. So, in order that the species be conserved a multiplication of individuals is required. The source of such a multiplication is matter. And, it can be added that this source is matter

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[37] . . . Secundo loqui possumus de principio individuationis in ordine ad productionem seu multiplicationem individuorum, quod est quaerere quod sit principium et radix ob quam individua substantialia multiplicantur, vel cur potius producitur hoc individuum quam aliud, seu cur producitur distinctum a reliquis. Rursus in utraque consideratione inquiri potest id quod est principium per se et in se individuationis, vel id tantum quod in ordine ad nos est principium distinguendi unum individuum ab alio, vel quod est solum occasio talis distinctionis. Primo ergo, loquendo de principio constituente in re individuum, et a quo vere sumitur differentia individualis contractiva speciei et constitutiva individui, negat haec opinio materiam signatam quantitate esse principium individuationis, quia hoc videntur concludere discursus facti. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 28.



affected by quantity, because matter without quantity is incapable of physical alteration, of changes through various and contrary dispositions on account of which arises this variety and multiplication of individuals. It should be noted here that this capacity does not apply to matter as signed and determined to a given form or quantity but to matter taken as a real physical component.

Up to this point (i.e., opinions one and two which have already been rejected) the discussion has not been about the principle of individuation of this particular individual, but the absolute principle of individuation for members of the same species. Matter, however, is not the root of multiplication absolutely speaking taken in so far as it is determined to one form or quantity, but rather in so far as it is determinable to many.[38]

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[38]Secundo ait haec opinio materiam esse principium et radicem multiplicationis individuorum in substantiis materialibus. Probatur, quia est origo generationum et corruptionum, per quas fit individuorum multiplicatio. Item, quia compositum ex tale materia ratione illius est corruptibile, et inde habet ut non possit perpetuo conservari; et ideo, ut species conservetur requiritur individuorum multiplicatio; huius ergo multiplicationis radix est materia. Et addi etiam potest hanc radicem esse materiam affectam quantitate, quia materia absque quantitate non esset capax alterationis physicae et mutationis per varias et contrarias dispositiones, ex qua nascitur haec individuorum varietas et multiplicatio. Hoc autem munus non convenit materiae ut signatae et determinatae ad certam formam vel quantitatem, sed absolute secundum se, quia hactenus non eigmus de radice huius individui in particulari, sed absolute de radice multiplicationis individuorum in eadem specie; materia autem non est radix huius multiplicationis absolute quatenus determinata ad unam formam vel quantitatem, se potius quatenus est determinabilis ad plures. . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 29.



Once one accepts matter as the principle of individuation in this way there are other arguments possible to substantiate the opinion. This third opinion says signed matter is the principle and source (or at least the occasion) of the production of this individual distinct from the rest. This is obvious because this individual can be compared either to all other existing individuals or all other possible individuals which can be produced from the same matter by the same agent. The reason why this individual is produced distinct from the rest is that it is produced from matter that differs numerically from all other matter. It is not possible for a given single form to be in two or more totally distinct matters. These different matters are necessary that the form may differ in number.[39] This same

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[39]Tertio ait haec opinio, materiam signatam quantitate, esse principium et radicem, vel saltem occasionem productionis huius individui distincti a reliquis. Declaratur, nam potest hoc individuum comparari, vel ad reliqua individua existentia, vel ad alia possibilia, quae ex eadem materia produci possunt, etiam ab eodem agente. Priori modo sufficiens et prima ratio, cur hoc individuum producitur distinctum a reliquis, est quia ex diversa numero materia producitur, quia, cum non possit eadem numero forma esse in diversis numero materiis totalibus, hoc ipso quod materia est diversa numero, necesse est ut forma saltem sit numero diversa; unde ad hanc distinctionem non oportet dispositiones alias, vel aliam materiam signationem adiungere, quia sufficit numerica distinctio materiae secundum se, vel cum sua quantitate, quod tamen non sufficit ut haec materia sit radix distinctionis huius individui a reliquis quae non existunt, seu quae ex eadem materia facta sunt, aut fieri possunt. Unde quidam dixerunt Aristotelem non assignasse principium individuationis quo distinguatur individuum ab omnibus quae non existunt, quia haec satis per solam contradictionem distinguntur; sed assignasse solum principium distinguens praedicto modo unum individuum ab aliis existentibus, quod docuit Fonseca, lib. V, c. 6, q. 4, sect. 4; idque refert ex



approach allows one to say why one individual exists and not another. The reason for this cannot be attributed only to prime matter, since it remains the same successively in one individual after another. Rather from this subject so prepared and so disposed at this time by this agent and by this action this individual occurs distinct from all others. This applies both to the actually existing individuals and to those that can exist.[40]

Hervaeo, Quodl. V, q. 9; et Caiet., c. 2, de Ente et essent., q. 5. Addendum autem est per materiam praedicto modo consideratam non solum distingui individuum ab aliis existentibus, sed etiam a quibuscumque aliis possibilibus, etiam non existentibus, quae ex aliis materiis numero distinctis generari possunt, praesertim in his quorum formae a materia educuntur, quia valde verisimile est eamdem numero formam, non solum simul, verum nec successive posse ex diversis numero materiis educi. In individuis autem quae ex eadem numero materia generari possunt, non habet locum distinctio unius individui existentis ab alio existente, quia non possunt simul existere plura individua ex eadem numero materia constantia, et ideo talis distinctio semper est rei existentis a non existente. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 30.

[40]Quamvis autem haec oppositio contradictoria sufficiens argumentum sit distinctionis talium individuorum, tamen adhuc inverstigari potest principium et radix, cur ita distinguantur, ut uno existente, aliud non existat; seu cur potius in hac materia haec numero forma introducatur, quam alia, quae fieri posset. Causa enim huius non potest reddi ex sola materia prima, cum eadem successive sit in utroque individuo, quod etiam fortasse est verum de quantitate coaeva ipsi materiae. Adiungendae ergo sunt aliae dispositiones et circumstantiae actionis, scilicet, quod ex hoc subiecto sic preparato et disposito hoc tempore, ab hoc agente, haec actio fiat; hic enim fit ut, licet materia prima seu remota sit eadem, ex illa tamen fiat hoc individuum distinctum ab omnibus aliis quae ex illa vel facta sunt, vel fieri possunt, quia cum diversis dispositionibus et circumstantiis fit productio. . . . Hoc igitur modo materia signata et his circumstantiis affecta, est principium seu occasio talis individuationis, quia nec materia sufficit sine circumstantiis, ut dictum est, nec circumstantiae sine materia nam si haec sit diversas,



Finally, this interpretation of sensible signed matter allows one to speak of the principle of individuation as we know it. Because through this principle we know the distinction of material individuals among themselves. It is that sign by which we distinguish a posteriori one individual from another not that by which one individual is distinguished from another in itself. All talk of signed matter then is merely to help us understand individuation. Real physical individuation takes place because the real intrinsic cause of this or that being is this as opposed to that matter.[41]

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effectus etiam diversus erit. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 31.

[41]Quarto addit haec opinio materiam signatam quantitate sensibili dici principium individuationis quoad nos, quia per illud nos cognoscimus distinctionem individuorum materialium inter se. Sic D. Thomas, Opusc. 32, De Natura materiae et dimensionibus indeterminatis, c. 3, ait ex hac materia prima et hac forma fieri individuum substantiae, non tamen esse hic et nunc demonstrabile sine dimensionibus determinatis; et ideo (inquit) dicitur materia sub certis dimensionibus causa individuationis, non quod dimensiones causent individuum, cum accidens non causet suam subiectum, sed quia per dimensiones certas demonstratur individuam hic et nunc, sicut per signum proprium individui et inseparabile; et idem indicat Opusc. 29, de Principio individuationis. Unde, quando aliis locis significat D. Thomas individuum addere accidentia supra naturam specificam, ut I, q. 3, et Quodl. II, a. 4, et q. 2 de Verit., a. 6, ad 1, et aliis locis supra citatis, exponendus videtur in ordine ad cognitionem nostram. Est enim illud signum quo nos a posteriori distinguimus unum individuum ab alio, non vero id quo in se distinguitur, ut ipse D. Thomas aliis locis seu opusculis citatis explicasse videtur, et optima etiam ratione probasse, scilicet, quia accidens non causat subiectum suum; maxime cum idem D. Thomas, I, q. 29, a. 1, et q. 9. De Potentia, a. 1, ad 8, dicat substantiam individuari per seipsam, et per propria principia, accidentia vero individuari per substantiam; ergo cum aliis locis point accidentia, vel ordinem ad accidentia inter ea quae individuant substantiam, exponendus necessario est, vel



When Suarez comes to the Questionis Resolutio of this section of Disputation V, he merely says that this third explanation of signed matter, as just seen, is the more probable one of the three opinions investigated and that he is pleased with it. Acknowledging that perhaps it does not satisfactorily explain the mind of Thomas and Aristotle, he feels that it does handle the problem of concrete material individuals and the reasons for the existence of one rather than another.[42]

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quoad nostram cognitionem, vel quoad occasionem quam praebent productioni talis individui substantiae, ut declaratum est. Attribuitur autem hoc materiae, ratione quantitatis potius quam ratione qualitatum, quia etiam ipsarum qualitatum numeralis distinctio maxime nobis nota est ex quantitate; nam si duae imagines sint inter se valde similes, non aliter distinguimus illas, quam in diversis subiectis quantis eas numerando. Et in eodem sensu videtur intelligendum quantitates ipsas distingui numero ex sitibus; est enim id verum quoad nos; ideo enim illas sensibiliter distinguimus et numeramus, quia eas in diversis sitibus conspicimus; non tamen est verum secundum se; nam potius occupant quantitates diversos situs quia in se distinctae sunt; solum ergo quia quantitas natura sua hoc habet ut constituat partem extra partem in corpus extra corpus in ordine ad situm, et deest aptius principium ad distinguenda individua materialia in ordine ad nos. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 33.

[42]Haec tota opinio in se quidem probabilis est et mihi aliquando placuit; vereor tamen an iuxta illam satis explicetur mens Aristotelis et D. Thomae, tum quia, alioqui valde diminute, et cum magna aequivocatione, tradidissent nobis individuationis principium, si omisso eo quod vere et in se est principium constitutivum individui, solum nobis tradidissent vel signa a posteriori, vel occasiones distinguendi, aut producendi individua; tum maxime quia ex hoc principio videntur intulisse in separatis a materia non dari plura individua, quia non datur huiusmodi principium individuationis. Illud etiam, quod in ea sententia dicebatur de determinatione agentium ad particulares effectus et formas, ex materia cum circumstantiis actionis, multis et doctis viris difficile creditu videtur, quia, si attente res consideretur, omnia reducuntur ad circumstantiam

What, then, began as a rather severe attack on signed matter as the principle of individuation in actuality has ended up as a strong claim that matter is a genuine principle of individuation. Where Suarez differs from the positions he rejects is that he is concerned not with an absolute principle of individuation but rather with what makes this individual different from or distinct from all others in the concrete situation. The initial discussion of this

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temporis, quae videtur valde extrinseca, ut ab ea possit haec determinatio provenire. Sed de hoc ultimo puncto dicam commodius sectione sequenti. De alio vere pertinente ad mentem Aristotelis et D. Thomae, quod ad D. Thomam pertinet, constat expositionem illam fundatam esse in aliis locis et verbis eius, quae aliter conciliari non possunt. Quod vero ad Aristotelem attinet, non videtur unquam ex professo et metaphysice principium hoc investigasse et declarasse, sed solum ex sensibilibus physico more docuisse unum individuum materiale ab alio distinguere. Quod vero inde intulerunt dicit auctores, in substantiis immaterialibus non esse multiplicationem individuorum in eadem specie, hunc potest ad summum habere probabilem sensum, scilicet, non habere nos rationes et principia ad distinguendas spirituales substantias numero distinctas, quas habemus in materialibus; immo multi hoc extendunt etiam ad materiales substantias incorruptibiles, in quibus etiam non habemus tot principia ad cognoscendam vel ponendam in eis numericam distinctionem, quot habemus in substantiis corruptibilibus, de quibus maxime procedunt omnia quae dicta sunt. Denique quod Aristoteles dixit, in I de Caelo, non posse esse alium modum praeter hunc, quia in hoc est tota materia, videtur certe intellexisse, aut Deum creasse mundum ex materia, nec posse materiam ipsam creare; aut Deum agere ex necessitate naturae, et ideo non posse plus materiae creare, quam creavit; vel certe ita esse Deum determinatum in suo modo agendi, ut nullum substantiuam integram et materialem possit in tempore ex nihilo condere, ut in discursu huius operis videbimus. Itaque ex illa sententia solum ad praesens colligitur, ex mente Aristotelis, materiales substantias non multiplicari nisi ex materia. Quidquid vero sit de mente horum auctorum, constat ex hac sententia sic declarata non esse nobis traditum proprium et internum principium differentiae individualis etiam in rebus materialibus. Nam argumenta facta contra hanc sententiam aliis modis expositam, plane concludunt non posse materiam signatam esse huiusmodi principium. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 3, par. 34.

chapter on the individual, actually existing thing showed that Suarez is not concerned with abstract explanation but rather with concrete situations. The principle of individuation for this material being is this matter affected by quantity; this matter is a necessary condition for distinguishing one individual from another. It will be shown by Suarez that there are other necessary conditions for this kind of distinction. It is only when they are all taken together that one can say there is genuine individuality.

Substantial Form as the Principle of Individuation

One sees as he reads Disputation V that Suarez expends great effort in outlining exactly the way in which matter can be considered to be a principle of individuation. Once the groundwork is laid for matter as a necessary but not sufficient condition for individuation of material beings, Suarez must ask what other entitative elements are necessary for the being to be a genuine individual. If one has granted matter as a principle of individuation Suarez feels the next and most obvious question is to ask in what manner the form individuates. He is interested in the form because like matter it is an internal principle of being and some have held that the form rather than the matter is the principle of individuation.[43] Once again, Suarez must contend with the authority of Aristotle on this subject. It is

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[43]Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 4, par. 1.

Suarez' contention that Aristotle himself favored this opinion.

With respect to Aristotle's opinion on the subject, Suarez quotes from Book II, Chapter 1 of the On the Soul where Aristotle says, formam esse, quae constituat hoc aliquid (that the form is that which makes a being to be a definite thing). In other words, a principle of individuation ought to be that which intrinsically constitutes this substance and this constitution is especially appropriate to the form. The principle of individuation cannot be an accident because accidents do not constitute the substance, and especially, they do not constitute this substance. This substance must be a substantial being per se. In addition, the principle of individuation cannot be matter (Suarez claims this quote of Aristotle substantiates) because matter is not especially proper to this individual, since it can be under some other form. Using this small quotation from Aristotle, then, Suarez expands it to an argument for the form as a principle of individuation. The problem, then, is to delineate the sense in which the form may be said to individuate.[44]

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[44]Est alia principalis sententia in hac materia, principium internum individuationis esse formam substantialem. Haec solet tribui Duran., In II, dist. 3, q. 2, qui non omnino illam affirmat, ut postea dicam; eam vero videtur docuisse Averr., I de Anima, c. 7, et lib. II, in principio, et com. 7, 8, 9, et 60 et III Phys., com. 60, et lib. IV, com. 38; citatur etiam Avicen., VI Natural., part. I, dicens formam dare subiecto unitatem numericam; tenet Zimara, Theorem. 97; et Sebast., episc. Oxamen., II de Anima, c. 1. Favetque Arist., ibid., dum ait formam esse, quae constituat hoc aliquid. Et ex hoc verbo Aristotelis



There are two arguments against the form as a principle of individuation.

Some philosophers have said that the form is especially that internal principle which confers unity on a being and hence must be the principle of individuation. But, some object to this opinion because, although it rightly states that the form confers unity, it does not follow that the form itself is the only principle of individuation of the thing. And, therefore, matter will also be a principle of individuation.[45] The issue here is whether the form is the only principle of individuation. From what has been

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summendum est praecipuum fundamentum huius sententiae; nam principium individuationis esse debet id, quod intrinsece constituit hanc substantiam et est maxime proprium illius; ergo ratione primae proprietatis esse debet aliquid substantiale; nam accidentia, ut saepe dictum est, nec constituunt substantiam, neque hanc substantiam; nam haec substantia, etiam ut est haec, est ens per se et substantiale. Ratione autem alterius proprietatis, hoc principium non potest esse materia, sed forma, quia haec materia non est maxime propria huius individui, cum sub aliis formis esse possit; ergo forma est principium individuationis.

Unde argumentor secundo, quia idem est principium unitatis quod entitatis, propter quod dixit D. Thomas, quaest. unica, de Anima, a. 1, ad 2, unumquodque secundum idem habere esse et individuationem. Sed unaquaeque res prorpie habet esse a forma; ergo et unitatem individualem. Maior constat, quia unitas est passio consequens entitatem, et non addit illi nisi negationem; ergo non potest habere aliud principium positivum et reale, nisi quod est principium ipsius entitatis. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 4, pars. 1-2.

[45]Sed obiiciet aliquis contra hanc sententiam et rationem, quia quamvis recte probet formam conferre ad unitatem, non tamen quod ipsa sola sit principium individuationis; nam etiam materia est principium intrinsecum constituens rei entitatem, et ideo etiam erit principium individuationis, si non sola, saltem cum forma. . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 4, par. 3.

said already one can surmise that Suarez will reject that position.

Suarez says that it is true that the adequate intrinsic cause of the individual unity of material substance is the form and the matter as the argument concludes. But, if one compares form and matter the principal cause of unity is the form. In this sense it is especially the principle of individuation. Just as matter is necessary for intelligibility or specific unity ("man" or "mankind" is not intelligible without being constituted of matter) nonetheless absolutely speaking specific intelligibility comes from the form. The form gives the final completeness and presupposes matter only as something potential and indifferent. Therefore, the form is called a principle of individuation because it gives the ultimate substantial completeness to the individual.[46] So, then, Suarez agrees with those who raised

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[46]Respondetur ergo aliter, verum quidem esse adaequatam causam intrinsecum individualis unitatis substantiae materialis esse formam et materiam, ut argumentum concludit; tamen si haec duo inter se comparentur, praecipuam causam huius unitatis esse formam, et hoc sensu illi specialiter attribui quod sit individuationis principium. Sicut etiam materia necessaria est ad rationem seu unitatem specificam; non enim potest ratio hominis vel humanitatis ut sic sine materia constitui, et idem est de ratione generica animalis, viventis, etc.; et nihilominus absolute dicitur ratio specifica sumi a forma, quia illa dat ultimum complementum, solumque praesupponit materiam ut quid potentiale et indifferens; eadem ergo ratione illa dicetur principium individuationis, quia illa dat ultimum substantiale complementum individuo, quamvis praesupponat materiam ut potentialem de se et indifferentem propter quod dixit Aristoteles supra, et I Phys., c. 7, text. 69, formam constituere hoc aliquid. Et quoniam, ut supra dicebamus, per idem distinguitur res per quod constituitur, eadem forma quae constituit hoc aliquid,

this objection to substantial form as a principle of individuation. For he sees that there is a very real sense in which the form does give individuality. He disagrees with the objection in that it would put matter and form on an equal footing in the understanding of individuation. Rather, Suarez says, the form is the primary principle of individuation.

This, then, leads to the second objection which must be overcome if one is to accept the form as a principle of individuation. This new objection states that the form as such gives specific existence but does not give individual and numerical existence unless it is considered as this form. Therefore not form as such but rather form as this is the principle of individuation.[47] At this point, one

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distinguit illud ab aliis quoniam actus est qui distinguit, VII Metaph., c. 13, text. 49; ergo forma est quae complet rationem individui. Et hoc confirmat communis concipiendi et loquendi modus; nam si animae Petri, verbi gratia, uniatur corpus constans ex materia distincta a corpore quod prius habuit, quamvis compositum illud non sit omni ex parte idem quod antea fuit, tamen simpliciter loquendo, illud individuum dicitur idem ratione eiusdem animae; at vero e contrario, si corpori ex eadem materia constanti uniatur anima numero distincta, simpliciter non censetur idem individuum sed distinctum; ergo signum est individuationem sumi praecipue a forma. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 4, par. 4.

[47]Sed adhuc obiicitur contra hanc sententiam et rationem factam, quia, licet forma ut sic det esse specificum, tamen non dat esse individuale et numericam nisi ut est haec; ergo non forma ut sic, sed id unde ipsa forma habet ut sit haec, est individuationis principium; sed est haec ratione materiae; ergo materia potius est prima radix individuationis. Probatur minor primo, quia forma non est per seipsam haec; alioqui idem dici posset de qualibet entitate, neque oporteret quaerere aliud individuationis principium: ergo est haec per materiam, non enim potest alia radix excogitari. Secundo, quia forma habet totum suum



should note that Suarez takes it for granted that there are two principles of individuation; here, it is only a question of the priority of one over the other. In his own answer to the problem Suarez concedes that the form is not the principle of individuation of the composite in respect to its specific intelligibility and this is self-evident. But, in so far as the form is this form it is a principle of individuation. The same thing could be said of matter, because matter has a specific and common intelligibility according to which it is not sufficient for constituting an individual. If matter does constitute an individual it does so in so far as it is this matter.[48] There is a distinction operating

esse in ordine ad materiam; ergo et individuationem suam; ergo materia est principium individuationis formae et consequenter totius compositi. Tertio, quia formae multiplicantur numero, quatenus in diversis materiis recipiuntur, et ideo formae separatae non multiplicantur numero, quia non recipiuntur in materia; ergo individuantur etiam per ordinem ad materiam: ultima ergo resolutio huius individuationis fit ad materiam; est enim haec forma haec, quia in tali materia recipitur; ergo prima radix individuationis est materia. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 4, par. 5.

[48] . . . Concedo itaque formam non esse principium individuationis compositi secundum specificam rationem suam, ut est per se notum, sed in quantum est haec; sed hoc ipsum dicendum est de materia, quia etiam materia habet specificam et communem rationem, secundum quam non est sufficiens ad constituendum individuum; ergo, si constituit, id facit in quantum est haec. Quaeram ergo rursus unde habet quod sit haec. Respondent aliqui, quia Deus voluit hanc potius creare quam aliam; sed hoc extra rem est, non enim hic inquirimus extrinsecum principium individuationis, sed intrinsecum; alioqui etiam dicere quis posset hanc animam esse hanc, quia Deus voluit potius illam infundere quam aliam; vel hanc formam esse hanc, quia Deus determinavit ad illam suum concursum, ut est valde probabile, sicut dicemus sectione sequenti. Alii respondent hanc materiam esse hanc ratione huius quantitatis. Sed hoc et est falsum, et non evacuat difficultatem. Primum patet ex supra dictis, quia, cum haec



here that is evident in many places in Suarezian metaphysics. All of the talk about this matter and this form is meant to be talk about real "physical" principles of being. To talk about "matter" and "form" absolutely does nothing to solve the problem of individuals. These absolute terms are used only in that special "metaphysical" sense which has been shown in the earlier chapters of this study to be an abstract way of speaking. When one talks of the form as a principle of individuation one is talking about this form, not form taken abstractly.

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materia simpliciter supponatur huic quantitati, non potest per illam individuari. Item, quia rationes supra factae universaliter probant nihil substantiale posse individuari per accidens superadditum; nam etiam haec materia est aliquid per se unum constitutum sub specifica ratione materiae, per se illam contrahens. Immo ex natura rei non distinguuntur materia et haec materia, sicut supra ostensum est de quolibet individuo respectu rationis communis; ergo non potest haec materia intrinsece individuari per quantitatem, quae est res ab illa distincta nec per ordinem ad illam, cum potius haec quantitas dicat ordinem ad hanc materiam, quam e converso. Secundum de quantitate patet, quia de illa etiam inquiram unde sit haec, cum id non habeat ex sua specifica ratione, et cum non sit procedendum in infinitum, nec vitiosus et inutilis circulus committendus, sistendum erit in aliqua re, quae per seipsam sit haec; ergo hoc potius tribuendum est substantiae quam accidenti, cum illa sit prior magisque absoluta entitas; vel, si admittendum est duo entia incompleta per mutuam habitudinem ad invicem individuari, secundum diversa genera causarum, id potius dicendum erit de materia et forma substantiali inter se, quam cum aliquo accidente, quia magis per se connectuntur, et se invicem respiciunt. Ergo omnia argumenta facta possunt idem de materia concludere quod intendunt de forma, nam est inter eas, quoad hoc, quaedam aequalitas. Et aliunde materia solum superat formam in hoc, quod est quaedam occasio producendi formas varis et individuas, ut supra declaratum est; forma vero superat materiam in hoc, quod praecipue constituit individuum, et quod est magis propria eius, et quod materia potius est propter formam quam e converso, ut dicitur II Phys., c. 9, text 91; ergo pensatis omnibus, potissimum individuationis principium est forma. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 4, par. 6.



It is because of thisness, then, that one can say that the form alone is not the complete and adequate principle of individuation of material things. It has already been shown that matter individuates as well as form. So, these two, when one speaks concretely, are principles of individuation. The form, however, in Suarezian philosophy is the primary principle of individuation together with the matter, and is the sufficient principle needed to distinguish one being from another in the same species.

Existence of a Singular Thing as the Principle of Individuation

In the previous two sections it has been shown that Suarez takes matter and form as principles of individuation. Ultimately he accepts both rather than one or the other as principles of individuation. It has been shown in Chapters II and III that matter and form are related to each other directly and permit of no other intervening entitative principle. The union of the matter and form gives the really existing being; Suarez now asks whether or not it is this real existence which individuates.

As has been shown, Suarez is interested in the intrinsic or constitutive principles of individuation, and he is now concerned whether subsistence (i.e., independent existence) can be considered the principle of individuation. Suarez feels that everyone has considered this opinion to be false but that it must be treated because of the history of the controversies over the "act of existence." Unlike

Suarez' examination of matter and form, Suarez' explanation of existence results in a total rejection of the position that existence is a principle of individuation.

One can suppose that existence is distinct from the nature of the thing (from the essence of the individual). If one proceeds in this manner, it will be true that each thing in its intelligibility as an existent has also some intelligibility as an individual from the existence itself; but it is improbable that existence individuates. There are three reasons given by Suarez for the rejection of this opinion.

First, an essence considered only as an essence can become an individual and the individual will always be determined to a definite species. But the individual essence is not determined by means of something in itself distinct from the nature of the thing. Therefore, the individual essence is not determined by existence. As substantiation for this argument Suarez says that man of itself is common to many individuals, whether these individuals exist or not; and also even individual men (e.g., Peter and Paul) as abstracted from actual existence, as possible beings, include intrinsically in their understanding all those things by which they are distinguished one from the other. Therefore, individuation does not occur by means of actual existence, which comes to a fully constituted and individuated essence only contingently.[49]

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[49]Primo quidem quia essentia intra latitudinem essentiae manens, fit individua, et in ea contrahitur et determinatur essentia specifica; sed essentia specifica non

Second, a general argument can be given in terms of act and potency. A singular act presupposes a singular potency. Thus the potency really is presupposed by the act. This potency is one and distinct from its act not in thought but in fact. If one considers existence as an act and essence as a potency, the essence is not able to come into being so that it should have its unity on account of its act. It has been shown in the first argument that the essence is already individual and hence does not get its unity from existence.[50]

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contrahitur per aliquid ex natura rei distinctum a se, ut supra probatum est; ergo non contrahitur ad individuam essentiam per existentiam. Maior per se evidens est, tum quia homo, verbi gratia, de se communis est multis individuis, sive illa existant, sive non existant; tum etiam, quia Petrus et Paulus, ut abstrahunt ab actuali existentia, seu ut possibiles, intrinsece includunt suas rationes individuas, quibus distinguuntur; tum denique quia differentiae specificae seu essentiales conveniunt speciebus necessaria connexione, secundum quam propositiones in quibus praedicata essentialia praedicantur, dicuntur esse perpetuae veritates; ita individuo convenit sua differentia individualis. Unde tam necessario Petrus est hic homo, sicut est homo, et tam necessario Petrus collocatur sub homine, sicut homo sub animali; haec ergo contractio et subordinatio non fit per existentiam actualem, quae contingenter advenit essentiae plene constitutae et individuatae. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 5, par. 3.

[50]Secundo hic habet locum argumentum supra relatum ex Caiet., quod actus singularis supponit potentiam singularem, quod principium diximus esse verum in actu et potentia ex natura rei distinctis, quia tunc potentia realiter supponitur actui ordine naturae et est quid unum distinctum a suo actu, et unum non cogitatione, sed reipsa, et ideo fieri non potest ut formaliter et intrinsece habeat unitatem ab actu suo. Sed ita comparantur essentia et existentia iuxta praedictam opinionem; ergo essentia, eo modo quo per se habet entitatem essentiae distinctam ab existentia et aptam actuari per illam, ita etiam habet suam unitatem et individuationem. Alioqui oporteret intelligere existentiam esse actum naturae specificae et universalis, quod est satis absurdum. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 5, par. 4.

Third, in existence itself there is a common intelligibility as well as individual intelligibility. Human existence is able to be considered as common or as in Peter and Paul. Since this is the case one would be forced to inquire about existence itself--what individuates this principle of being? What makes existence a this? It cannot be the essence since according to the present opinion the essence is not individual but common to many. It cannot be an accident which individuates existence because accidents and existence are each on different levels of being. The questions cannot be answered.[51] This presupposition, then,

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[51]Tertio, quia in ipsamet existentia potest considerari communis ratio existentiae humanae, verbi gratia, et ratio huius existentiae Petri vel Pauli; ergo de ipsa existentia superest inquirendum per quid fiat haec; non enim ab essentia, cum non supponat illam individuam iuxta hanc sententiam, sed communem; neque ab aliquo accidente, ut per se notum est, satisque in superioribus probatum; a quo ergo? Si dicas seipsa fieri hanc, cur non id potiori ratione dices de essentia, cum et ordine naturae sit prior et perfectione etiam, et cum quodammodo sit magis absoluta? Nam existentia est actus huius essentiae; unde haec existentia potius erit haec quia hanc essentiam actuat; sicut in communi etiam existentia hominis et leonis differunt, quia vel consequuntur, vel respiciunt diversas essentias, supposita praedicta distinctione. Ex quo potest sumi nova confirmatio, quia sicut existentia humana in communi est extra essentiam hominis in communi, ita haec existentia Petri est extra hanc essentiam individuam Petri et sicut in Petro et Paulo sunt duae numero existentiae, ita duae numero humanitates, habentes distinctas individuas entitates essentiae. Ultimo a posteriori est argumentum, quia (supposita illa sententia) eadem individua entitas conservatur sine sua existentia, aut mutat varias existentias, ut humanitas Christi in ea opinione caret propria existentia, et tamen est individua, et habet intrinsecum individuationis principium; similiter eadem numero entitas materiae primae, prout mutat formas, dicitur mutare existentias et tamen eadem semper numero manet. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 5, par. 5.



leads to nothing but contradictions or unanswerable questions.

Perhaps one could still hold existence to be the principle of individuation by presupposing that existence is nothing other than the actual being of each thing. This presupposition is unacceptable because of the obscurity of the term "actual being of a thing." It wants to attribute to existence rather than essence the intelligibility of individuation, but according to the "actual being presupposition" existence and essence are the same. It is useless to speak of existence as individuating when one already has an individual essence.[52]

Suarez, then, rejects on both presuppositions that

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[52]Opinio igitur de existentia ab omnibus reiicitur, ut omnino falsa et improbabilis; dupliciter autem in ea procedi potest, primo supponendo existentiam esse ex natura rei distinctam ab essentia individui; secundo opinionem asserentem existentiam nihil aliud esse quam actualem entitatem uniuscuiusque rei. Hoc posteriori modo haec sententia in re conicidit cum opinione asserente unamquamque rem individuari se ipsa, nulloque alio principio individuationis indigere, praeter entitatem suam; unde in re non est haec opinio maiori reprehensione digna, quam illa de qua postea dicemus. Solum reprehendi potest quod obscuris et ambiguis terminis utatur, et quod existentiae potius quam essentiae hanc rationem individuationis tribuat, cum potius existentiae non possit hoc convenire, nisi quatenus est idem cum essentia. Si autem procedatur in priori sententia, formaliter quidem verum erit quod unaquaeque res in ratione existentis habet aliquam rationem individualem ab ipsa existentia, sicut hoc album, quantum ad formalem rationem albi constituitur per albedinem, quamvis simpliciter hoc album, quia pro subiecto accipitur, non constituatur per albedinem. Unde etiam in proposito, materialiter (ut sic dicam) loquendo de re existente, seu de hac numero essentia, improbabile est dicere individuari per existentiam qua existit, si haec est res ab ipsa distincta, vel modus ex natura rei diversus. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 5, par. 2.



existence individuates one thing from another. This rejection results from Suarez' deeper metaphysical conviction that essence and existence are not related to each other in the same way as matter and form. It is the two primary principles of being of material things that individuate. Essence and existence bear a different relationship one to another than matter and form. It is on the level of matter and form that individuation occurs because matter and form make the real substance and individuation occurs on the substantial level.

Principles of Individuation for All Created Things

In the negative section of his discussion on the principle of individuation Suarez has shown that previous authors have not been able to explain adequately why there is one individual as opposed to another. It has been shown in the negative argumentation that matter and form, if they are to be accepted as principles of individuation, cannot be understood in the simplistic manner of the earlier explanations. Suarez will not allow existence to individuate in any way whatsoever.

The positive analysis of the principle of individuation occurring in Disputation V, Section 6 attempts to answer the question, "What is the principle of individuation for all created things?" The question is meant to take into account a complex reality. The major problem with the earlier philosophers' positions was that they were not

sufficiently sensitive to the complexities of the problem of individuation. Suarez now wants to explicate a principle of individuation for all created things.[53] Individual beings can be considered as simple or as composed. One simple being (matter) must be able to be distinguished from another (form or another matter). And one composed being (i.e., composed of matter and form) must be able to be distinguished from another both in number and in kind.[54]

Suarez' first concern is how one can distinguish one matter from another. That is, matter is a simple incomplete being but this matter is different from that matter. Suarez states that matter is in itself an individual; the foundation of such a unity is the being of the matter itself. This being is in the matter itself and there is nothing extrinsic added to the matter to make it an individual (e.g., as some would add on, e.g., quantity). This can be proved

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[53]One should note here that the treatment is for all created things. Suarez feels that God of his very nature is an individual and consequently the problem of multiplicity and individuation is not even appropriate when one is discussing the divinity.

[54]Ex hactenus dictis contra superiores sententias videtur quasi a sufficienti partium enumeratione relinqui omnem substantiam singularem [se ipsa seu per entitatem suam, esse singularem] neque alio indigere individuationis principio praeter suam entitatem, vel praeter principia intrinseca quibus eius entitas constat. Nam, si talis substantia physice considerata, simplex sit, ex se et sua simplici entitate est individua; si vero sit composita, verbi gratia, ex materia et forma unitis, sicut principia entitatis eius sunt materia, forma et unio earum, ita eadem in individuo sumpta sunt principia individuationis eius; illa vero, cum sint simplicia, seipsis individua erunt. . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 6, par. 1.



because matter that is under this form of wood differs in number from that which is under a form of water or of man. The matter is, therefore, in itself individual and singular. It is important to realize that the foundation of such a unity in matter is not the substantial form nor even any ordering to this or that form, because regardless of the variation of the form the matter remains the same in number.[55] The import of this position is that since matter

[55]Primo igitur a materia prima incipiendo, dicendum est illam esse in re individuam, et fundamentum talis unitatis esse entitatem eius per seipsam, prout est in re absque ullo extrinseco superaddito. Probatur, quia materia quae est sub hac forma ligni, est numero diversa ab illa quae est sub forma aquae vel hominis; est ergo in se individua et singularis. Fundamentum autem talis unitatis in ea non est forma substantialis, neque ordo ad hanc vel illam formam . . . quia variata quacumque forma substantiali, semper manet eadem numero materia, quae, licet actu sit unita huic vel illi formae, tamen ex se communem et indifferentem habitudinem dicit ad quamcumque formam quam potest recipere. Rursus, neque etiam quantitas potest esse fundamentum huius individuae unitatis materiae, ut idem probat argumentum, si verum est materiam amittere et acquirere quantitates varias prout formae substantiales variantur. Item quia iuxta eamdem opinionem materia prius natura, quam recipiat quantitatem, subest actioni agentis inducentis formam vel quantitatem; non autem subest, nisi ut individua et singularis, quia actiones sunt circa singularia. Si autem teneamus eamdem quantitatem esse materiae coaevum, potest idem argumentum accommodari, saltem in ordine ad potentiam Dei; potest enim Deus ab hac materia hanc quantitatem auferre et aliam tribuere, vel omnino sine quantiate servare; esset ergo eadem materia numero sine eadem numero quantitate; ergo non est quantitas fundamentum talis unitatis ipsi materiae, alias nullo modo posset sine illa suam unitatem reservare. Et praeterea sunt omnia argumenta communia supra facta, quod substantia non individuetur per accidens, nec per ordinem ad accidens; materia enim substantia est, licet partialis. Item quod individua substantia est ens per se. Item, quod accidens supponit subiectum suum prout est in re et consequenter singulare. Item quod differentia individualis non est in re distincta ab entitate quam constituit; unde nec potest fundari in entitate distincta. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 6, par. 2.

There are several strange notions in this passage

is a simple being it needs nothing other than itself to be an individual. It is a this of its very nature.

A similar argument occurs in the analysis of the principle of individuation for the form. A substantial form is a this intrinsically by reason of its own being, from which its individual difference is taken. No accident is able to be an intrinsic individuating principle for substantial form, because such a form, since it is this is a being per se, even though incomplete, and pertains to the predicate substance. Consequently, the form, like matter, needs no further principle of individuation. There might be a possibility, however, that matter could individuate the form; Suarez denies this outright. Matter cannot of itself be an intrinsic principle individuating any form because the matter is not an intrinsic principle of the form. In simple beings the principle of unity and the principle of being are one and the same. Unity adds nothing to the being, but only a negation that the being is this and not that. Matter is a principle of individuation for the composite because through its being it composes the composite; matter does however, compose the being of the form.[56]

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of Suarez' which are worthy of special note. What does it mean to say that matter is in itself an individual? In this context what does it mean to say that matter is incomplete? There seems to be some basic confusion over the differences and relationships between the concepts of "singularity" and "unity."

[56]Secundo dicendum est formam substantialem esse hanc intrinsece per suammet entitatem, a qua secundum ultimum gradum seu realitatem sumitur differentia individualis eius. Haec conclusio probari potest eisdem



It is fairly easy to determine Suarez' reasoning in these sections on the principle of individuation for simple beings. If he allows that there is some principle (e.g., quantity) of individuation for such a simple being as matter

rationibus proportionalibus quibus praecedens, et ex superioribus, praesertim ex his quae in prima et secunda opinione dicta sunt, facile comfirmari potest. Nam imprimis nulla accidentia possunt esse intrinseca principia individuantia formam substantialem, quia etiam talis forma, ut est haec, est ens per se, licet incompletum, et pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae, et sub specifica ratione talis formae collocatur, quamvis reductive. Item haec forma vel est simpliciter et omni ratione prior accidentibus, et origo illorum vel, si aliqua supponit in genere causae materialis, non dicit per se habitudinem ad illa, sed a summum requirit illa ut conditiones vel dispositiones necessarias ad praeparandum subiectum; ergo nullo modo potest ab accidentibus individuari. Deinde materia non potest per seipsam esse intrinsecum principium individuandi ullam formam, quia non est intrinsecum principium entitatis eius; idem autem est principium unitatis quod est principium entitatis, ut saepe dictum est, quia unitas nullam rem addit entitati, sed negationem intrinsece comitantem illam. Antecedens autem patet, quia materia est principium compositi intrinsecum, quia per suam entitatem componit entitatem formae; non est ergo intrinsecum principium eius. Respectu vero illarum formarum, quae a materia pendent in fieri et in esse, materia est causa per se in suo genere formae, non ut intrinsece componens illam, sed ut sustentans illam quod est genus quoddam causalitatis veluti extrinsecum; et hoc modo materia dici potest causa et principium individuationis talium formarum in suo genere, ex principio posito, quod causa entitatis est causa unitatis, et quia materia non causat formam, nisi singularem et individuam; ergo causando entitatem causat individuationem eius. Tamen, quia differentia individualis intrinsece praedicatur de re individua, ideo non sumitur ex causis quovis modo extrinsecis ipsius rei individuae, sed ex intrinseco principio seu entitate eius, et ideo hoc modo non potest esse materia principium intrinsecum individuationis formarum. Quod a posteriori declaratur in ordine ad divinam potentiam: potest enim haec forma substantialis conservari sine materia, et tunc sicut retinet suam differentiam individualem, ita etiam suum intrinsecum principium individuationis; ergo non est materia huiusmodi principium intrinsecum. Hoc autem manifestius est in anima rationali, in qua, sicut esse non causatur per se a materia, ita etiam neque unitas ante individuatio ut notavit D. Thomas, II cont Gent., c. 75 in solutione primae rationis, et c. 81, in principio; ergo materia non solum est principium intrinsecum



and form he is faced with an infinite regression of principles of individuation. Because matter and form are simple beings there is no way for them to be individuated by something else which is intrinsic to their constitution. In effect, Suarez is saying that this matter or this form is a <u>this</u> precisely because they have a being of their own. There is nothing further needed for individuation.

Once the problem of individuation has been solved for the simple beings, Suarez turns his attention to the composite beings. How is one composite being individuated from another both in number and in kind? The early negative argumentation gave some hint of the manner in which Suarez will proceed. It has already been shown that both matter and form individuate in the composite being. Suarez in rejecting signed matter did finally arrive at the conclusion that there is a real sense in which <u>this</u> matter individuates a composite complete being. A similar conclusion occurred with the form, i.e., <u>this</u> form also individuates a composite complete being. Although Suarez found certain versions of the theory that form individuates unacceptable, he did, however, conclude that there is a real sense in which the form does act as a principle of individuation. The early argumentation resulted then in the position that both this matter and this form are necessary conditions for

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individuationis animae verum etiam nec causa per se eius, quamvis sit veluti occasio quaedam ut, organizatio tali corpore, Deus in illo talem animam creet. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 6, par. 5.

individuation. Taken in themselves though neither is sufficient to individuate a composite being.

The positive discussion on the principle of individuation for composite being is meant to make explicit the necessary and sufficient conditions for a given composite to be an individual. Suarez' own solution to the problem is that in composite substance, in so far as it is composite, the adequate principle of individuation is this matter and this form united to each other. Of the two the main principle is the form, which alone suffices that this composite in so far as it is an individual of such a species should be one in number.[57] At this point there is really nothing new that Suarez has not already said; what he develops in this section of the argument, however, are his reasons for this position.

Suarez first answers the objection that says that it is an improper way of speaking to say this matter and this form are physical principles of individuation, for neither this form, nor this matter, nor both taken at the same time would be able to be added to the specific nature of man. Also, this matter and this form are individuals constituted

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[57] . . . dicendum est in substantia composita, ut tale compositum est, adaequatum individuationis principium esse hanc materiam et hanc formam inter se unitas, inter quae praecipuum principium est forma, quae sola sufficit ut hoc compositum, quatenus est individuum talis speciei, idem numero censeatur. Haec conclusio sequitur ex praecedentibus et ex dictis sect. 4, et est consentanea opinioni Durandi et Toleti supra tractatis, et in re non dissentiunt Scotus et Henricus nec nominales omnes . . . Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 6, par. 15.



from their own specific nature and proper principles of individuation. Therefore, they are unable to be the principles of individuation for the composite. The problem, here, Suarez says, is that the objections stray from physical intelligibility (composition of matter and form) to metaphysical composition (genus and specific nature). This matter and this form are called physical principles of individuation of this composite. There is no comparison here to a specific nature, but the only concern is the physical composite. There is no need that there be added a specific nature, nor is there any question that matter and form have their own specific nature since their very being individuates them. The objection is, therefore, fallacious and the original statement that this matter and this form individuate is true.[58] Here it can be seen, once again, that Suarez' main concern is with the real physical constitution of the being and on this level of discussion it takes this matter and this form to establish the individual.

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[58]. . . Fonseca etiam non dissentit, lib. V Metaph., q. 5, quamvis dicat impropriam esse locutionem cum dicimus hanc materiam et hanc formam esse principia individuationis physica, quia neque forma haec, neque haec materia, neque ambae simul addi possent naturae specificae hominis, ut cum ea constituant hunc hominem, et quia etiam haec materia et haec forma sunt individua, ex suis naturis specificis et propriis individuationis principiis constituta. Sed in his rationibus divertit a physica ratione ad metaphysicam compositionem; cum enim haec materia et haec forma dicuntur principia physica individuationis huius compositi, non comparantur ad specificam naturam communem, sed ad physicum compositum quod componunt; et ideo non est necesse ut addantur naturae specificae communi, sed ut componant illam componendo individuum in quo includitur. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 6, par. 15.

This position can be especially substantiated by adverting to the fact that matter and form absolutely considered are physical principles of substance, both composing and specifying it. Therefore this matter and this form will be physical principles of the individual, individuating it. And, in the same way one can conclude that neither per se, but both at the same time are the adequate principles of individuation. This composite, in order to be all together and completely one in number, requires not only this form or this matter but both at the same time; whenever either one is altered the composite does not remain the same as it was previously because some part of its being has been altered. Therefore, the matter and the form are the adequate principles of numerical unity of the whole composite. This all follows from the general principle that the principles of unity are the same as those of being. This matter and this form are the adequate intrinsic principles of the being of this composite. Therefore they are the adequate intrinsic principles of unity and individuation.[59]

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[59]Unde secundum eamdem physicam constitutionem talia principia simplicia sunt, neque habent alia quibus physice individuentur, sed seipsis individuantur, ut declaratum est. Non est ergo impropria locutio, sed vera ac propria, quia eadem sunt principia individuationis intrinseca quae sunt principia intrinseca entitatis, ut saepe dictum est, quia individuatio sequitur entitatem, ut est negatio quaedam; ut autem includit positivum est ipsamet entitas, nihilque illi addit; sed haec materia et haec forma inter se unitae sunt intrinseca principia totius entitatis compositae substantiae de qua agimus; ergo sunt etiam intrinseca principia physica individuationis. Et confirmatur, nam materia et forma absolute sumptae sunt principia physica speciei substantiae compositae et specificationis eius; ergo



Suarez' argument for the principles of individuation, then, at this stage appeals to the notions that in composite beings one is dealing with this real physical matter and this real physical form; it is the combination of the two that makes for the actual individual. Since the being is composite rather than simple, there can be some principle of individuation beyond the being of the existent that brings about the individuation. It is the peculiar combination of this matter and this form that results in the being and unity of the composite.

Simply put, in composite beings there are two principles of individuation--this matter and this form--on the physical level. Suarez does not feel that this leads to a dualism but rather results in a genuine unity. It is very difficult to see how, if one allows for two principles of individuation, Suarez can avoid a dualism. The solution Suarez would say is that matter and form are simple, incomplete beings and hence are dependent upon one another in their being. But, it has already been shown in earlier

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haec materia et haec forma erunt principia physica individui et individuationis eius. Et eodem modo concludi potest neutram per se, sed utramque simul esse hoc adaequatum principium. Quia hoc compositum, ut omnino et complete sit idem numero, requirit non solum hanc formam vel hanc materiam, sed utramque simul, et quacumque variata non manet simpliciter et omni ex parte idem compositum quod antea erat, quia aliqua ex parte variata est eius entitas; ergo materia et forma sunt adaequatum principium unitatis numericae totius compositi, ut tale est. Et confirmatur ratione facta, quia eadem sunt principia unitatis, quae entitatis; sed haec materia et haec forma sunt adaequatum principium intrinsecum huius compositae entitatis; ergo et unitatis et individuationis. Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 6, par. 15.



chapters and in this present chapter that matter and form progressively become more and more complete and more and more independent of one another. To quote the dictum that the principle of being is the principle of unity does not help on the composite level since the principle of being is twofold in a composite. It appears that Suarez is in effect dualist with respect to composite beings, despite his intentions to the contrary.[60]

Conclusion

This present chapter has shown the very great stress Suarez puts on the unity of the individual and the care with which he establishes the claim that everything that exists is an individual. In a word, things exist as individuals not as universals. This led Suarez to ask how the individuals are distinguished from each other, or what is the principle of individuation for an individual existent. The traditional answers of a separate metaphysical principle of individuation (e.g., haecceity), signed matter, form, and existence as principles of individuation were found to be either incomplete or fallacious. Suarez,

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[60]In the early part of this section of this chapter it was mentioned that Suarez attempts to give principles of individuation for all reality. This means that the one level of the hierarchy of being he has not accounted for up to this point is the separated substances or the angels. He treats the manner in which spiritual substances are individuated in Disp. Meta. V, Sect. 6, par. 18. That discussion is omitted in this present study since the main concern is with the relationship of matter and form and especially with the relationship of the rational soul and the body.

then, reworked the whole doctrine on individuation.

In the reworked treatment he is very careful to avoid confusion over real physical composition as opposed to metaphysical composition. He sees that one must account for physical individuation among both simple beings and composite beings. Some of the previous approaches gave one or other partial solution that helped to solve the problem of individuation but none completely solved it in the sense that it accounted for all the complexity of reality. In the positive argument Suarez attempted to take what was appropriate from each of the psoitions and give a general solution to the problem. The distinction, however, between simple and composite beings forced him into a dualism that was undesirable. That is, the simple being (matter or form) is an individual, but the two individuals (matter and form) also make an individual on the composite side by means of a union with one another. This composite is meant to be a unity <u>per se</u>, not merely an accidental unity.

This is a general doctrine and as such could be made to work if all forms were subhuman forms (i.e., educed from matter); but, there is a distinction of kinds of forms that must also enter in here. It has been shown already that a hierarchy of beings is taken for granted by Suarez. This means that the distinction of kinds of forms must express a different relationship between matter and form depending on the kind of form with which one is concerned. In a word, a form of stone is related to its matter in one way, plant

forms in another way, animal forms in a third way, and the human form in still another way. It is this relationship that now takes on importance as an element in individuation. Suarez does not treat the relationship of matter and form when he works out the theory of individuation. But, the kind of form and the way it is related to matter is of central importance in determining whether Suarez has a dualism or not.

CHAPTER V

BODY AND SOUL

Before treating the doctrine of body and soul directly it is important at this point to summarize the results of the previous three chapters. Those portions of this study were concerned with the metaphysical doctrines of matter, form, and individuation. It has been shown that Suarez has a tendency progressively to substantialize the two interior causes; this is especially evident in the move to grant matter a being of its own, to call both matter and form simple beings, and to allow for matter and form to be individuated simply on the basis of their status as simple incomplete beings. It has also been shown that a hierarchy of kinds of beings is taken for granted by Suarez. In order to determine the various grades of being, Suarez holds that matter must be disposed in a certain way to accept a form of one or other grade of being. The forms themselves manifest different qualities and capacities.

In the treatment of matter and form, it has been shown that Suarez is especially concerned to keep these two principles of being related directly to one another. In this concern he rejects all versions of metaphysics which would either increase the number of metaphysical principles

or which would interpose some third principle between the matter and the form. The particular targets of attack in this phase of his argument are Scotus and the Scotists.

Finally, the metaphysical treatment of individuation highlighted the fact that only individuals exist. When one asks concretely how one individual is to be distinguished from another, one must deal with two separate problems--1. What is the principle of individuation for simple beings (e.g., matter and form)?; 2. What is the principle of individuation for a composite being? Suarez, as has been seen, holds that simple, incomplete beings need no further principle of individuation, but as a matter of fact are individuals in themselves. The composed being has two principles of individuation, this matter and this form.

Up to this point the present study has set forth in the most general terms Suarez' metaphysics. He is very much concerned that one talk about real "physical" principles of being; these principles are the basis for a metaphysical doctrine that will explain being as being. But, metaphysics must have concrete application to the individual existing beings one finds in the world. In the present chapter the treatment will be concerned with a single concrete application of the metaphysical doctrine. Since one of Suarez' concerns is to maintain a unity in being, the one special test case of unity is the relationship of the rational soul to the human body. If Suarez can maintain a unity of being in this case, he can maintain it in all cases below the

human level in the hierarchy of being. Since angels and God are not composed of matter and form there certainly is no problem with their unity.[1] The unique combination of body and rational soul presents special problems because the form in this case is unique.

The discussion of this chapter will be divided into two major divisions. First, the concern will be with the "Special Characteristics of the Human Soul;" here one sees the ways in which the rational soul is like other forms and then the ways in which the rational soul differs from other forms. Secondly, the argument will face the difficulty of "The Human Soul and the Problems of Unity of the Human Being." In this section the divisions and kinds of unity as outlined in Disputation IV will be juxtaposed with the materials on matter and form and individuation. The general conclusion of this chapter will be that with respect to the composition of the human being Suarez is a dualist.

Special Characteristics of the Human Soul

The Human Soul is Like Other Forms

In Chapter III it was shown that Suarez is concerned that there be only one substantial form for a being and that there are strong arguments against the contrary position

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[1] In the case of the subhuman forms they are educed from the potency of matter. For a fuller description of the theory of eduction from matter the reader is referred to Chapter III, "Suarez' Teaching on Form," pp. 112-116. Since God and angels do not have a matter-form composition but are only forms there is no problem with their unity; they are what Suarez would call simple, complete beings.

that there are multiple forms.[2] The rational soul is the substantial form of the body and consequently there is only one soul in the body. Suarez' proof here is based on the nature of vital functions. He has a much broader interpretation of vital functions than current usage would admit; and basically his understanding of a vital function is any operation which is characteristic of living things as opposed to non-living things. Concerning vital functions one can take the position that they are simply accidental or that the soul brings them about on the essential order. Since Suarez wants a genuine relationship between soul and body vital functions cannot be simply accidental, rather there must be a genuine influence of the soul on the body and vice versa. This conclusion comes as the result of experience. For example, it could happen that the eye would have an image of an object and from that image receive a species. But, if the soul is not attentive to that species the person does not see. It does not matter if someone should object that lack of sight occurs because the imagination or common sense is distracted because the same kind of argument could be made in respect to attentiveness concerning these interior senses. The situation is that the exterior senses first sense and then the

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[2]The complete argumentation of why there can be only a single substantial form for each being is given in Chapter III in the subsection entitled "The Unicity of Substantial Form," pp. 137-150.

interior senses and the intellect cooperate in seeing.[3] Because of this unity of action Suarez feels that there is only one soul in the human being.

The problem with the present argument for the unicity of the soul is that it depends on a direct relationship of body and soul for the corporeal and intellectual

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[3]Nihilominus censeo distinctione esse utendum; nam inter has actiones quaedam sunt vitales, aliae vero minime. De prioribus dicendum videtur non solam facultatem accidentalem, sed etiam ipsam animam per substantiam suam in illas proxime in suo ordine influere. Hanc conclusionem videtur suadere experientia; nam hae actiones vitales tam intimo modo fiunt ut ab ipso primo principio vitae, quod est anima actualiter procedere videantur; unde fit ut, licet oculus praesentem habeat imaginem et ab illa recipiat speciem, si anima non attendat, non videat. Nec refert si quis dicat id provenire ex distractione imaginationis aut sensus communis, tum quia idem argumentum faciam de sensu communi et imaginatione. Quod si dicatur tunc speciem sensibilem non transcendere sensum externum, inde sumemus argumentum contra priorem evasionem. Nam si species obiecti sensibilis praesentis et immutantis sensum externum non pervenit ad sensum internum quando anima non attendit, ideo est quia species exterioris sensus non communicatur interiori sensui nisi medio actu sensus exterioris. Ex quo fit ut exterior sensus prius natura sentiat quam interior cooperetur; nam haec cooperatio videtur subsequi operationem sensus exterioris; ergo ratio cur in praedicto casu sensus exterior non sentit non provenit ex interiori sensu, sed potius ideo interior sensus non tangitur specie illius obiecti, quia sensus exterior non percipit illud. Alia ergo causa quaerenda est cur tunc sensus exterior non efficiat suum actum, quae non videtur esse alla nisi quia tunc anima non influit nec cooperatur illi. Dices rationem esse quia non cooperatur, non quidem per suam substantiam, sed per spiritus animales, qui necessarii sunt ad sensum et motum. Sed, licet verum sit hos spiritus esse necessarios, tamen hoc ipsum confirmat argumentum et experientiam adductam. Nam ad hos actus vitales requiritur non solum proxima facultas, sed concursus etiam spirituum, qui non casu illuc confluunt, sed virtute alicuius facultatis ministrantis illos spiritus ad illum actum; ergo necesse est ut sit aliquod commune principium actu utens illis duabus facultatibus, et ex naturali inclinatione vel sympathia ordinans actionem unius ad actum alterius. Disp. Meta. XVIII, Sect. 5, par. 2.

powers to interact with each other. It assumes and does not prove that there is such a relationship between the two co-principles of being. The argument is by means of example and gives no reason why the rational soul, a spiritual form, should be related to a corporeal act such as seeing. Consequently Suarez must provide a further argument that rational soul and body are related as matter and form. This argument is from experience but given the metaphysical structure he has set up, do the structure and experience coincide one with the other?

In order to get at the problem of a single soul for the human being, he appeals to another set of experiences. Basically this group of experiences centers around the co-operation or lack of cooperation between various faculties. Here, he deliberately moves from the simple sensate level to the intellectual level. Special attention is given to the human being where the operation of one faculty at times impedes the operation of another faculty. For example, if a person is investigating something carefully he often does not hear others talking. This cannot be attributed to a defect of the spirit but rather should be attributed to the attention of the intellect which impedes the operation of the sense. If each faculty had its own operation of itself there would be no reason why one should impede the operation of the other.

Once again, Suarez has a fact of experience before him, but the question to be asked again is whether, given

his metaphysical scheme, the fact and the scheme can agree with each other. Somehow the form has to be related to matter and influence it. Can an immaterial form do this to matter? When one turns to the special way in which the soul is different from material forms it will be seen that there is no way to establish the requisite relationship to explain impeding operations.

The argument of impeding operations has an opposite side also in that there must be a connection and cooperation of operations in the human. The example from experience cited here is that while the intellect understands, the will is aroused to various actions like loving, etc. The relationship of these powers is that the same soul operates in both powers. There would be no actual causality or motion and excitation if each power operated alone and without some connection in a common principle.[4]

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[4]Praeterea hoc confirmat alia experientia, qua supra probabamus esse in homine unam tantum animam, quia nimirum ex nimia attentione ad opus unius facultatis impeditur in opere alterius, ut si nimis attente aliquid homo inspiciat, non audiet loquentem; et ne id tribuatur defectui spirituum, etiam attentio intellectus impedit operationem sensus, et quo est altior et perfectior, eo plus minuit etiam phantasiae motum aut repraesentationem et (quod magis est) etiam opera nutritivae partis impedit vel suspendit. Si autem unaquaeque facultas sola per seimpsam haberet suam operationem, nulla esset ratio cur unius operatio impediret operationem alterius; nam multiplicatis virtutibus, si una ab altera non pendet, neque ambae ab uno tertio, cuius virtus, dum utrique applicatur, minuatur in singulis, nihil est cur earum operationes non possint simul multiplicari et exerceri aeque perfecte. Praeterea sumitur a contrario optimum argumentum ex connexione operationum, nam dum intellectus intelligit, voluntas excitatur ad amandum, etc.; hoc autem ideo est qui eadem anima per utramque potentiam actu operatur, nam sola veluti habitualis radicatio seu

There are several questions in this argument for the unicity of the soul that must be examined. In the argument based on the nature of vital functions Suarez establishes that there must be a single soul but not that there is a unity of the human being. It is not clear how this argument applies to the relationship of the rational soul and the body. The approach which takes the contrary operation does draw a relationship between a bodily function and an intellectual one and here one could find an argument for both the unicity of the form and the unity of the human being. On the basis of these two arguments one could hold a single

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remota dimanatio ab eadem anima non esset satis ad hanc actualem causalitatem seu motionem et excitationem, si unaquaeque operatio a sua sola potentia actualiter prodiret sine connexione in aliquo communi principio. Et inde etiam oritur dependentia inter appetitum vitae et cognitionem, ut nihil possit esse amatum nisi sit praecognitum. Ratio autem a priori sumi potest ex proprio modo operationis vitalis, quae requirit hanc intimam connexionem cum suo principali principio formali ut modo consentaneo ad naturam suam fieri possit et ut suum principium vel suppositum vitali modo efficere valeat; quantum enim experientia assequi possumus, in hoc consistit actualis vita et primaria differentia viventium a non viventibus. Et confirmatur, nam ob hanc causam censent omnes visum separatum non posse videre seu visionem elicere, neque intellectum intelligere. Contra hanc autem sententiam possunt nonulla obiici, quae prudens omitto, quia vel difficilia non sunt vel multa necessario attingunt quae ad scientiam de anima spectant. Quod vero aliquis interrogare potest, ad quid nimirum sint necessariae facultates accidentales et vitales, si forma ista etiam actu influit, ex dictis in sectione praecedenti habet sufficiens responsum. Forma enim est veluti universale principium, potentia vero necessaria est ut particulare magisque accommodatum ac proprium, ut ibi latius declaratum est. Statim etiam alias leviores obiectiones dissolvemus. Disp. Meta. XVIII, Sect. 5, par. 3.

See also Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, pars. 18-24. The materials quoted above from Disp. Meta. XVIII, Sect. 5, pars. 2-3 are a briefer treatment of what is explained at length in Disputation XV.



form but there is a most tenuous claim for unity of the human being at this point. Then, the argument from complementary operations has special problems of its own. The complementary operations stay solely on the intellectual, immaterial level (understanding and willing). Here the example takes two functions special to the rational soul which does not allow Suarez to draw the unique relationship he desires between body and soul.

The argument from unity of operation to unicity of soul and unity of being is a standard scholastic treatment. It has been shown, however, that Suarez so transforms the doctrines of matter and form and individuation that the metaphysical principles become quasi-substances in themselves. What does unity of operation mean in this new context? Considering what he has done metaphysically Suarez cannot get unity of being by appealing to unity of operations. In a word, this standard argument does not apply in the Suarezian context.

The Human Soul is Different from Other Forms

All through this study and throughout the Disputationes Metaphysicae, it has been implicit that the rational soul is a special kind of form. Indeed, it is the uniqueness of the soul that seems to be the militating factor against the unity of the human being. The relationship Suarez draws between the rational soul and the accident of quantity is a special place in which he not only has real difficulty with the unity of the human being but also in the

process shows the uniqueness of the soul. In Chapter II it was shown that quantity inheres in matter.[5] This position has significant implications for a discussion of the nature of the soul which even in the best light has only a tenuous relationship to matter.

In the first argument for quantity inhering in matter, Suarez uses the rational soul as the example of a form which has no relationship to quantity. Initially, he gives a summary of his doctrine on matter to prove that the inherence of quantity in matter is appropriate to that metaphysical principle. Matter has proper actual being with its own proper existence and even a proper partial subsistence. From this viewpoint matter has of itself sufficient being to sustain an accident such as quantity. Suarez feels that the example of man is especially appropriate to establishing the position that quantity is in matter. The soul is not related to quantity in any way, but the substantial composite depends on the natural dispositions of matter. If these dispositions are removed, the composite would be dissolved.[6] Quantity, Suarez claims, is one such disposition. What Suarez is holding here is that there are certain accidents appropriate to matter alone, certain to the form, and certain to the composite. Quantity is appropriate to matter

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[5]The general treatment of the doctrine that quantity inheres in matter occurs in Chapter II, "Suarez' Teaching on Matter," pp. 75-83.

[6]Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, pars. 6-13.

and intellectual knowledge to the rational soul. But, what accident is appropriate to the composite? Suarez gives no examples on this point.

The situation with quantity is even more serious than has been shown thus far. Suarez maintains that quantity cannot be received in any spirit. In this argument one gets a real feeling for the uniqueness of the rational soul. The relationship between soul and quantity is explained as an answer to an objection which says that perhaps it is not contradictory that a material accident should come in contact with an immaterial form by the union of the matter and the form. An immaterial form comes in contact with matter by its union with matter; why, therefore, cannot a form of this type come in contact with a material accident? Suarez' answer to this objection is most informative, for it gives a good explanation of the uniqueness of the rational soul. Quantity is united to its subject, matter, as its form and its act; therefore it is able to be united only to that thing which can give the requisite formal effect. The rational soul, however, cannot in any way give the formal effect of quantity, because it is not capable of quantitative extension even while it informs the body. In a word, Suarez insists that the rational soul is incapable of sharing either totally or partially in quantity. One cannot even say that there could be a union with quantity as that which circumscribes form; there is no union unless there is information. Information is not able to circumscribe unless

there is in the thing a capacity for the formal effect.[7] Quantity cannot be the formal effect of the rational soul.

Suarez views the relationship of the rational soul and quantity as a mediate rather than immediate one, as the objection would have it. Suarez' reasoning is that since man is composed of matter and soul, there is an immediate union between matter and quantity and this union is on the accidental level. Between the soul and quantity there is no immediate union; they are united only by means of a third principle (i.e., matter). Therefore the quantity inheres only in the matter.[8]

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[7]Dicetur fortasse non repugnare ut accidens materiale attingat sua unione immaterialem formam ut informantem materiam; nam forma immaterialis attingit sua unione ipsam materiam; cur ergo non poterit materiale accidens attingere huiusmodi formam? Item in unione Verbi incarnati videmus corpus crassum et materiale habere unionem terminatam ad supremum spirituale suppositum, quale est Verbum Dei; quid ergo mirum quod quantitas terminet unionem suam ad infimum spiritum, ut corpori unitum? Sed nihilominus hoc dici non potest, quia quantitas unitur subiecto suo ut forma et actus eius; et ideo illi tantum rei uniri potest quae est capax effectus formalis eius; anima autem rationalis nullo modo est capax effectus formalis quantitatis, quia non est capax extensionis quantitative, etiam dum informat corpus; non ergo potest ullo modo in se suscipere nec totaliter neque partialiter quantitatem; neque etiam potest unio quantitatis ad illam terminari, quia illa unio non est nisi informatio; informatio autem terminari non potest nisi ad rem capacem effectus formalis. Unde nulla est proportio in exemplis adductis, ut ex dictis constat. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 16.

[8]Et confirmari hoc ac declarari potest amplius, nam, cum in homine sint materia et anima, inter materiam et anima est immediata unio substantialis, et inter quantitatem et materiam est etiam immediata unio, licet accidentalis; inter quantitatem vero et animam nulla est immediata unio, qua inter se uniantur, sed solum per accidens uniuntur in uno tertio, scilicet materia; ergo sola materia est quae exercet munus causae materialis respectu quantitatis, quia haec



The problem here, of course, is that Suarez mixes two entitative orders; he combines the accidental order and the substantial order. This argument does two things to the substantial order of matter and form. It increases the independence of the matter from the form; or to use Suarez' own terms, it tends to integralize the matter. The other aspect of this confusion is that Suarez by not allowing the form to have an immediate relationship to quantity, has loosened one more bond between the soul and matter. If Suarez allows quantity to inhere in the matter alone he has moved to destroy the unity of the human. If he allows quantity to inhere in matter alone he integralizes the co-principles of being in such a way that there cannot be a true union but rather a gluing together of the two principles.

The position Suarez takes with respect to quantity and the relationship to the rational soul raises the further perplexing problem of the conditions of the relationship of the soul to the matter. It was shown early in Chapter II that there is need for a special term, in qua, when one speaks of the origin of the rational soul with respect to the matter. The notion of the form as "educed" from matter does not apply to the rational soul. The soul is of such a nature that it cannot be contained within the potency of the matter, nor does it occur or exist dependent upon the matter, nor does it occur on account of the same action which

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exercetur per immediatam unionem ipsarum, ut supra declaratum est. Disp. Meta. XIV, Sect. 3, par. 17.

brings about the composite. Rather, it occurs and accepts its being independently of the matter and afterward by another action is united to the matter by which the whole composite is generated.[9] This explanation of in qua has the effect of further substantializing the soul and makes the unity of the human precarious.

In Disputation XV, Section 2 Suarez tries to answer the problem of the relationship of the soul and matter. The peripatetic position, he says, is correct when it holds that some forms are spiritual, substantial, and independent of matter although they truly inform the matter. The only forms of this kind are human souls. These forms must come from nothing by means of a true creation but they do not pre-exist the body to which they are united. In addition, they are not, even though created from nothing, necessary beings, either in themselves or in their possession of being. From the aspect of the matter or the body, there is no influence either in the coming to be of the soul or in the existence of the soul, since the rational soul separated from the body must retain its own existence because of the nature of its origin. In a word, the soul does not depend

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[9]Atque hinc primo intelligitur amplius quod supra dicebamus, formam rationalem non educi de potentia materiae, quia nec continetur in potentia illius, ut extra ipsam educatur, neque fit aut existit dependenter a materia, neque fit eadem actione qua fit compositum, seu qua ipsa unitur materiae; prius enim, saltem natura, in se fit et accipit esse suum independens a materia, et postea alia actione unitur qua totum compositum generatur. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 16.



upon a sustaining subject either in its existence or in its coming to be.[10]

Suarez realizes that this Aristotelian doctrine really does separate matter and form more than should be the

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[10]Vera igitur et peripatetica sententia est inter formas substantiales quasdam esse spirituales, et substantiales et independentes a materia, quamvis eam vere informent; alias vero esse materiales itaque materiae inhaerentes ut ab ea in esse et fieri pendeant. Prioris ordinis sunt solae animae humanae (agimus enim tantum de formis informantibus), et de illis concedendum est consequens illatum in difficultate tacta, nimirum fieri ex nihilo per veram creationem, quod in proprio loco latius est ostendendum; nunc satis sit dicere id necessario consequi ex principio posito, supposito quod hae animae non praeexistunt antequam corporibus uniantur, quod certum est ex fide et ex illo principio quod sunt verae formae corporis. Immo, licet praeexisterent, non possunt nisi per creationem existere, quia non sunt entia necessaria ex se et ex sua quidditate habentia esse, ut universe demonstrabimus infra, partim in disputatione de causa efficienti, partim demonstando unum tantum esse ens increatum. Si autem rationalis anima non habet esse nisi per efficientiam alterius, et fingitur esse ante corpus, quodammodo clarius et evidentius est habere esse per creationem, quia facta est ex nihilo et absque concursu subiecti vel causae materialis. Dico autem esse quodammodo clarius, quia nunc, dum expectatur dispositio corporis ut anima fiat, videri potest non esse tam propria creatio, quia fit cum aliquali concursu materiae. Nihilominus tamen est vera creatio, quia ex parte corporis non est concursus per se et in genere causae materialis in ipsum esse vel fieri animae rationalis, sed est veluti quaedam occasio exigens creationem illius animae, sine qua occasione nec ipsi animae debetur ut fiat, nec causa eius ad illius effectionem determinaretur. Quod autem corpus seu materia non influat per se in fieri vel esse animae, constat ex eo quod anima rationalis, separata a corpore, retinet suum esse; ergo non pendet a subiecto sustentante in suo esse; ergo neque in fieri, quia tale est fieri rei quale est esse; ergo et e converso subiectum ipsum seu materia non habet per se influxum in esse aut fieri talis animae; nam haec duo correlativa sunt, vel potius idem, dependentia effectus et influxus causae.

Ex nihilo nihil fit, axioma limitandum.--Quocirca principium illud, ex nihilo nihil fit, universe intellectum de omni causa et de omni effectu, falsum est et contra rationem naturalem, ut hoc ipso exemplo animae rationalis ostenditur, et exemplo etiam materiae primae, ut supra



case if one is going to maintain a true unity in the human being. He turns to an analysis of the natural potency prime matter has for the rational soul. Some objectors would say that it is inappropriate for the rational soul to be related to prime matter as its form. This opinion is disturbing; for if matter is not in natural potency to the rational soul then the generation of man would not be natural, either on the part of the active principle (the form) or on the part of the passive principle (the matter). That is, man is only an artifact, not a natural being. The doctrine to be held at all costs is that the rational soul is the natural and proportioned act of matter, and thus matter is also the natural potency for that act. From these two occurs a certain natural being which is a per se unity. The reason, Suarez says, that there is this natural potency of matter for the rational soul, is that although this form is able to come about from God alone, nevertheless God in the act of creation works according to the manner and order of natural things. This is sufficient to show that matter has such a natural potency for the rational soul.[11]

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tactum est, et plura in sequentibus afferemus. Intellectum autem de virtute agentis finiti et naturalis, verum est. Unde quoad hanc formam concedendum est non esse in proximis agentibus naturalibus virtutem ad efficiendam illam, sed proximum agens disponere materiam, intelligentiam vero separatam efficere formam, non quidem intelligentiam creatam, ut putavit Avicenna, nec ideam separatam et extra Deum existentem, sed Deum ipsum, quem solum esse effectorem rerum omnium quae per creationem fiunt, infra ostendimus. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, pars. 10-11.

[11]Materia prima naturalis potentia est ad rationalem animam.--Dices hinc fieri materiam primam non esse in potentia naturali ad animam rationalem, quod videtur



There is, however, a problem with Suarez' reasoning here in that if the soul is of such a nature that it requires special creation, it is already outside the natural order of things. In a word, the argument from God working according to a natural order of things does not establish

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inconveniens. Sequela patet, quia omni potentiae passivae naturali correspondet potentia activa naturalis; sed nulla est potentia activa naturalis quae possit formam hanc in materia efficere; ergo neque in materia est potentia passiva naturalis ad illam. Aliqui concedunt sequelam tum propter rationem factam, tum etiam quia, si materia esset in potentia ad animam rationalem cum fit haec anima, diceretur educi de potentia materiae. Sed non placet haec sententia; nam si materia non esset in potentia naturali ad animam rationalem, generatio hominis, non esset naturalis, quia neque ex principio activo neque ex passivo esset naturalis. Item, quia materia naturaliter disponitur ultimate ad recipiendum formam rationalem et illi sic dispositae iuxta naturae ordinem debetur talis forma; est ergo in potentia naturali ad illam. Ad difficultatem ergo respondetur negando sequelam. Ad primam vero rationem respondetur naturalem potentiam primo et per se esse attendendam in ordine ad actum connaturalem et proportionatum; anima autem rationalis est actus naturalis et proportionatus materiae, et ideo etiam materia est potentia naturalis ad illum actum; unde ex utraque fit quoddam ens naturale per se unum, et materia ipsa connaturaliter conservatur sub tali actu. Quod vero attinet ad potentiam activam imprimis dari potest potentia activa naturalis ad uniendam talem actum tali potentiae, et hoc modo iam respondet potentia activa naturalis potentiae naturali passivae. Deinde, quamvis haec forma a solo Deo fieri possit, tamen Deus in ea actione operatur iuxta modum et ordinem naturis rerum debitum, et hoc satis est ut dicatur operari per modum causae naturalis et ut potentiae passivae sufficiens virtus activa respondeat. Ad alteram rationem respondetur aliud esse materiam continere formam in potentia, et aliud esse in potentia ad formam; nam primum indicat vim causandi formam, nam causa continet effectum in suo genere; secundum vero indicat solum capacitatem ad recipiendam formam. Materia ergo est in potentia naturali ad rationalem animam recipiendam, non tamen illam in potentia sua continet, cum non possit causare illam; ideoque anima rationalis non educitur ex potentia materiae, quia nihil educitur nisi unde continetur, et quia eductio indicat causalitatem materiae in forma, ut iam dicemus. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 12.



the natural potency of matter for the rational soul because it presupposes an intervention of God into that order.

Related to the problem of the natural potency of matter for the rational soul is the more general problem of the relationship of the form to a pre-existing subject. Suarez holds that all substantial forms except the soul come about from a pre-existing subject, that is are educed from the subject. These forms do not come properly from nothing but are educed from a pre-existing matter. As has been shown, however, the soul comes from nothing strictly speaking. Generally, to come from nothing is to come into being totally; that is, no part is presupposed. From this understanding natural things while they become something new do not come from nothing because they come from a presupposed matter.[12] By this reasoning Suarez feels he can attain a unity of the material being. But this reasoning does not help with the unity of the human being, and as a matter of fact positively hinders it. Creation of the soul from nothing makes it independent of the matter and despite protestations to the contrary the union of soul and body is artificial rather than natural.

Even if Suarez could hold the human being together in terms of natural potency of matter for form, or in terms of the special creation apart from a pre-existing subject,

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[12]Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 2, par. 13. For Suarez' text on this matter the reader is referred to Chapter III, note 20.

when one asks the question whether or not the soul exists before the body since it needs a special creation, then one comes upon a basic confusion in Suarez. In Disputation XXIX, Section 2, paragraph 11 Suarez sets forth the opinion that the soul does not exist before the body. He states that matter of its nature demands form and without it cannot exist unless in a very extraordinary state. This is sufficient to conclude that it is alien to the nature of matter of itself to await form from an agent. But, philosophers also teach that it is not natural for the soul to exist before the body because of its very nature it should originally be in a body although not dependent upon the body. Even granted that it is able to remain outside the body, nevertheless it is at that time in an extraordinary state. By which argument it can be concluded that the rational soul does not have necessary and eternal existence of itself.[13]

The sections on special creation and temporal priority when juxtaposed show that Suarez is confusing the order of temporal priority with the order of priority in being. It would be possible for him to hold that the rational soul

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[13]Respondeo, etiam seclusa rigorosa dependentia, hoc ipso quod materia natura sua postulat formam et sine illa esse non potest nisi in statu maxime praeternaturali (quod nemo negare potest), satis concludi esse prorsus alienum a natura materiae habere esse a se et expectare formam ab agente. Sicut in materia de anima recte docent philosophi non esse naturale animae rationali esse ante corpus, quia natura sua postulat esse in corpore, quamvis a corpore non pendeat; unde licet extra corpus manere possit, est tamen tunc in paraeternaturali statu. Quo argumento recte etiam concluditur animam rationalem non habere esse ex se necessarium et aeternum. Disp. Meta. XXIX, Sect. 2, par. 11.



does not exist temporally prior to the body and continues to exist temporally consequent to the body without giving priority of being in the way that he does. There has, however, been a priority of being granted to the soul in such doctrines as that of the special creation, that denying any relationship to quantity, and that of special faculties. It is the priority of being that is of concern in a discussion of the unity of the human being. Suarez has argued for a soul that really is very much independent of matter. This independence is especially true of the soul after it is separated from the body.[14] Even though such a soul exists independently of matter it does have some limitations in that it can no longer move other bodies but only itself. What, one may ask, allowed it to move any body in the first place? Once the soul was capable of moving a body; now it is not; this is a priority in the capacities of the soul. Suarez evidently wants to talk about the nature of the soul and its capacities not about a temporal sequence. He uses a temporal sequence metaphor which not only does not explain the metaphysical relationship of body and soul but positively confuses it.

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14. . . . postquam est separata, nullum corpus movere potest, sed seipsam tantum, ad quod etiam habet potentiam a sua voluntate distinctam, propter eamdem rationem. Disp. Meta. XXXV, Sect. 6, par. 23.



Separated Souls and Internal Composition within the Soul

If Suarez is going to be true to his own metaphysical scheme, then he must get the spiritual soul into direct relation with the body. The status of the separated soul tells one much about what the relationship of body and soul should be. For this discussion one must turn to Disputation XIII. In a context meant to show that it is not part of the intelligibility of created and complete substances (e.g., angels and God) that they have an intrinsic material cause from which they are composed along with a form, Suarez provides a long analysis of the relation of the soul to matter. He wants to show that the soul itself as separated from matter is not itself composed of a matter and form. In the process he tells the reader much about the nature of the soul itself and about its relation to matter.

Suarez begins the discussion by characterizing the separated soul as a dependent created substance which is not altogether simple in that one is able altogether to distinguish various operations of understanding, willing and self-movement. The separated soul is capable of all of these operations without any internal composition of matter and form. Some authors have held that there is such a composition within the soul, but this position is contrary to reason. These same authors understand the soul, even while it is in the body, to be composed of a matter and form. It follows, then, that the soul is not the form of the body,



because the soul itself will be a complete and integral substance. That is, it would itself have a proper matter and form. Secondly, as composed it would not be able to inform the body through its own matter, because matter is not an actuating act but a first subject of form. Neither would it be able to inform the body through its own form because one form cannot inform two matters at the same time.[15]

This position, of course, is consonant with everything Suarez says. It maintains the direct relationship of the matter and form. It avoids the addition of further metaphysical principles. It avoids an infinite regress of metaphysical principles. More importantly, however, for the present discussion is the list of operations given for the rational soul; understanding, willing, and self-movement are operations of the soul, not of the composite. Matter has its characteristics (e.g., quantity) in which the rational

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[15]Et confirmatur ac declaratur his discursus ex anima rationali separata a materia; illa enim est substantia creata dependens et non omnino simplex et potens ad intelligendum, volendum et se movendum; et horum omnium capax est sine compositione ex materia et forma. Unde auctores contrariae sententiae, coacti hoc exemplo, indicant etiam in anima reperiri hanc compositionem; verumtamen id est valde alienum non solum a principiis naturalibus, sed etiam fidei. Nam vel intelligunt animam, etiam dum est in corpore, esse compositam ex materia et forma spiritualibus; at inde sequitur animam non esse veram formam corporis, tum quia anima per se erit substantia completa et integra, utpote ex propria materia substantiali et propria forma composita; tum etiam quia non poterit informare corpus per suam materiam quia materia non est actus actuans sed primum subiectum formae; neque etiam per suam formam, quia non potest eadem forma simul informare duas materias, neque habere connaturalem et intrinsecam habitudinem transcendentalem ad illas. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 14, par. 10.



soul does not share and the soul has its operations apart from matter. Even without raising the question of a composition within the soul itself given these characteristics of each metaphysical principle the unity of composition here is very unstable because these operations of the soul are independent of the matter.

Philosophers who hold an internal composition of the soul can also understand this composition to occur immediately as when the soul is separated from the body and the soul receives some "spiritual matter" to which it is united and in which it is conserved. But, Suarez says, this position is equally false. First, the soul would not in this condition be truly separated. Second, there would be necessary a creation of a new matter in order that the soul might remain apart from the body, because this "spiritual matter" cannot exist prior to the separation of the body and the soul. Otherwise, it would be matter without a form, or something else would have to be corrupted in order that the rational soul would be able to remain apart from the body. Suarez sees all of these possibilities as absurd. But all of these absurdities do lead to further and important conclusions; namely, that it would not be necessary for a separated soul to come to a body at all; for if it already had a proper and perfect matter which it enforms (i.e., spiritual matter) why should it come to the body in the first place? The composition of spiritual matter and soul, of its very nature, would be more

incorruptible than the composition of body and soul.[16]

Even if one grants that the soul itself is not composed of matter and form, Suarez must answer the question why this soul is related to this matter. The only arguments he gives that in any way indicate the relationship of soul and matter are the ones based on the unity of operations and lack of priority of being between body and soul. The difficulties with these two arguments have been stated earlier in this chapter.

In a discussion of the difference between simple complete substances (e.g., God and angels) and simple incomplete substances (e.g., form and matter) Suarez tries to show how, in fact, the soul is a simple, incomplete substance and what the significance of this is. The rational soul, even though an incomplete substance, is able to exist on its own and to be *per se* subsistent because it is incorporeal.[17] Once

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[16]Vel intelligunt animam rationalem, statim ac separatur a corpore, recipere aliquam spiritualem materiam cui uniatur et in qua conservetur; et hoc aeque falsum est et erroneum. Nam inde fit primo, animam rationalem vere non conservari separatam. Secundo, sequitur necessarium esse creationem novae materiae ut anima possit extra corpus manere, quia illa materia non poterat antea praeesse; alias oportuisset vel esse sine forma, vel aliquid aliud corrumpi ut anima rationalis extra corpus manere posset. Quae omnia sunt absurda. Immo, praeterea sequitur non oportere ut talis anima aliquando redeat ad corpus; nam si iam habet propriam et perfectiorem materiam quam informet, cur debet illa privari ut ad corpus redeat? Maxime quia compositum illud ex tali materia et anima, natura sua incorruptibile esset. Igitur nullo modo dici potest rationalem animam constare materia et forma. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 14, par. 10.

[17]. . . anima rationalis quamvis sit incompleta substantia, quia incorporea est, potest esse per se subsistens sine materia et in sese operari ac se movere. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 14, par. 11.



again the question arises given these characteristics, why is there any relationship to matter in the first place? Suarez does not answer this question.

In this context, Suarez turns to a proof not so much that the separated soul is an incomplete substance as a proof that there are such things as simple complete substances. But, he uses the soul as something of a paradigm to give the characteristics of the complete simple substances. Just as in the soul the same thing is able to be the principle of effecting and of receiving motion so this is the case in complete substance. And just as the separated soul does not need matter for its action and movements, so also this is the case with the complete substance, for God is a complete substance without matter, and the fact that a substance is created does not of itself demand matter as a complement to the substance.[18] The concern of this present analysis is not so much with the possibility of the existence of simple complete substance but rather with the rather striking parallel Suarez draws between these

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[18]. . . ex hoc (inquam) inferimus non repugnare quod dentur completae substantiae incorporeae quae materia non constent et in se operari possint ac se movere. Et ratio huius consequentiae est quia, sicut in anima eadem res potest esse principium efficiendi et recipiendi motum et actum accidentalem, ita in illis substantiis completis. Et sicut anima separata non indiget materia ad suos actus et motus, ita nec substantia completa et incorporea indigebit illa. Et aliunde non est materia necessaria ad rationem substantiae completae ut sic, nam Deus est completa substantia sine materia; neque ex eo praecise quod substantia sit creata postulat ut complementum eius sit ex compositione materiae, ut demonstratum est; ergo. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 14, par. 11.



substances and the separated soul. Either the separated soul could have existed at all times without matter, given these parallel characteristics between simple complete substance and simple incomplete substance, or the separated soul is changed in some way when it is separated from the body. If the two kinds of substance are so parallel there is no reason for the distinction between "complete" and "incomplete," and hence the soul does not really need matter at its creation. Or, why was it in matter in the first place? If the separated soul is changed in some way when it is separated from the body, the only change that really seems to take place is that it can no longer move other bodies. This, however, does not make sense because on the one hand the soul upon separation must become a simple complete substance since it exists apart from matter; but on the other hand it has fewer operations than it did while united to the body. In a word, completion means deprivation. This does not coincide with the whole notion of a hierarchy of beings.[19]

Summary

At this point there seems to be an impasse in Suarezian psychological and metaphysical theory. It has

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[19]The whole argument on the composition of the soul of matter and form continues throughout Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 14, pars. 12 and 13. The approach in these paragraphs is mainly an attempt to show that the argument coincides with what Thomas Aquinas held on this matter. In the end then Suarez in this context seems to be arguing from authority rather than from reason.



been shown that Suarez wants to maintain a standard scholastic position that the soul is the form of the body and that this informing function sets up the relationship between the soul and the body. He attempts to do this on the foundation of the usual scholastic arguments based on the notion of a unity of operation. The soul, then, is to be like material forms in that they are the form of the matter. But, the description of the soul as a particular kind of form leads to a position which so substantializes the soul that the unity between the soul and body is doubtful at best and dualist at the worst. An examination of the special characteristics of the soul results in the constant question: "Why does the soul need the body in the first place?" Suarez does not provide an adequate answer to this question and consequently must be forced to admit to a dualism despite the constant assertion that the human being is a unity.

There are, however, various understandings of what it means to be "one." Suarez sorts out these understandings with some care. It is now necessary to turn to the treatment on unity and see if there is a possible interpretation of the notion of "unity" that would allow Suarez to hold his position on the special characteristics of the human form (rational soul) and at the same time maintain a genuine unity of the human being.

The Human Soul and the Problem of Unity

The Divisions of Unity

Suarez' basic text on unity occurs in Disputation IV. Initially, in this section of the present study, it will be necessary to spend some time detailing the various divisions of unity and then one must ask whether or not any of these understandings can apply to the human being structured in the way explained in the previous section.

In the discussion of unity Suarez takes as the basic distinction, a division of those things which are one *per se* and those things which are one *per accidens*. A *per se* unity is simply one; *per accidens* unity is one only by an extended application of the term "one." That is, there is a certain likeness to a unity *per se*. Aristotle, he says, proposes various modes of *per se* and *per accidens* unity. He begins with some examples of *per accidens* unity. One mode of *per accidens* unity is the situation in which the subject is affected by an accident (e.g., Peter is musical). That is, an accident can come or go; destruction of the accident does not destroy the subject of the accident (in the example cited Peter is still Peter whether or not he acquires or loses musical ability). Likewise two accidents inhering in the same subject constitute a *per accidens* unity (e.g., white and sweetness in sugar). That is, one accident can be joined to another because both are in the same subject. Aristotle explains *per se* unity in a like manner by various examples (i.e., examples which subdistinguish it into



different modes). Some things are one by reason of continuity (e.g., a line or water), some by reason of collection (e.g., a house and artifacts), some by reason of the fact that they have one form or by reason of the fact that they have one matter (as liquids are called one). Suarez sees that Aristotle's examples are not very helpful in setting out the meaning of unity so he initiates his own theory of unity which will not be dependent merely on examples.[20]

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[20]Variae unius divisiones.--De hac re disputat Aristoteles, V Metaph., c. 6. Est autem hoc loco necessario praemittenda, ut explicare possimus quaenam unitas sit entis passio. Distinguit ergo Aristoteles varios modos unius. Et prima divisio eius est, unum quoddam esse per accidens, aliud per se. Et merito hanc divisionem primo loco ponit, quia et videtur esse valde analoga; nam unum per se est simpliciter unum, per accidens vero tantum secundum quid, et per quamdam proportionem ad unum per se. Non explicat autem Aristoteles rationes unius per accidens et per se per proprias eorum definitiones, sed solum variis exemplis, quibus simul proponit varios modos unitatis per accidens et per se. Unum enim per accidens esse dicit subiectum accidente affectum ut Petrus musicus. Item duo accidentia eidem subiecto inhaerentia unum per accidens sunt seu constituunt, ut album dulce. Hanc vero unitatem per accidens in ordine praedicationes variis modis explicare possumus, vel per incomplexos terminos, vel per complexos, vel praedicando accidens de accidente, aut in communi, aut in singulari. Et iuxta haec distinguit Aristoteles varias rationes huius unitatis, quae magis ad dialecticas praedicationes, quam ad rem metaphysicam spectant. Similiter explicat Aristoteles unum per se variis exemplis, seu subdistinguendo illud in varios modos. Nam quaedam (inquit) sunt unum continuatione, ut linea, aqua; quaedam colligatione, ut domus et aliae quae arte fiunt; alia, ratione formae unius, ratione materiae, vel proximae, vel remotae, ut liquores (inquit) dicuntur unum. Rursus (ait) quoddam est unum numero, aliud specie, aliud genere, etc., quae ibi prosequitur. Ex quibus omnibus difficile est colligere in quo consistat ratio unius per se et per accidens; nam in membris quae posteriori in loco Aristoteles numerat, multa videntur esse unum tantum per accidens, ut domus et artificialia. Item ibidem ait plura interdum dici unum, eo quod aliquid unum aut agunt, aut patiuntur, aut habent aut ad aliquid unum sunt. Haec autem omnia videntur



Being and Unity

Because unity follows upon being, in order that something be understood as either a per se or a per accidens unity one must explain at the same time per se and per accidens being. This division of being is proper to real being and not only a distinction of reason.[21] Real being can be called per se or per accidens in a twofold way--one by reason of the being itself; the other by reason of the effect of the being. When one talks about the effect one says that it is a being per se by reason of the intention of the agent; it is a being per accidens if it comes about apart from the intention of the agent. That is, comes about on account of chance. The notion of being as an effect is not the concern here; rather, one is interested in being itself and specifically the difference between per se and per accidens being.[22]

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tantum per accidens esse unum, vel denominatione potius quam re. Rursus inter unitates quas ibi ponit, aliqua est realis, ut numerica, alia rationis tantum, ut generica et specifica; est ergo difficile hanc Aristotelis doctrinam ad certum aliquam rationem ac methodum revocare. Disp. Meta. IV, Sect. 3, par. 1.

[21]Once again one sees that Suarez is concerned to talk about real physical beings rather than about beings distinguished by reason alone. This has been a major concern throughout the Disputationes Metaphysicae and is especially true when he discusses being and unity. He is careful to point out that he is talking about real beings and about real unities. The discussion here, then, is about actualities not simply categorizations constructed by the mind to help in sorting out beings and unities.

[22]Ut ergo rem hanc declaremus, quoniam unum consequitur ens, ut intelligatur quid sit unum per se et unum per accidens, simul explicandum est quid sit ens per se



The argument, then, is that if one can find a being *per se* one can find a unity *per se*. And, if there is only *per accidens* being, then there is only *per accidens* unity. In the course of this present study there has been reference to several kinds of beings; in the order of complexity these

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et per accidens; sic enim etiam ens dividitur ab eodem Aristotele, eodem lib. V, c. 7, quae divisio propria est entis realis; nam entia rationis, sicut aequivoce tantum sunt entia, ita non nisi aequivoce has denominationes recipiunt. Ens autem reale duplici modo potest per se aut per accidens appellari, uno modo in ratione entis, alio modo in ratione effectus. Hoc posteriori modo dicitur per se id quod ex virtute et intentione agentis fit; per accidens vero dicitur id quod praeter intentionem agentis casu et fortuna evenit; de qua ait Aristoteles, VI Metaph., c. 2, esse extra scientiae considerationem, quatenus, scilicet, in singulari exercetur et per accidens, nam ut sic non habet necessitatem, sed contingentiam. At vero ipsa communis ratio causae vel effectus per accidens sub scientiam cadit; sic enim disputatur de casu et fortuna et contingentia effectuum; sed tamen ens per se et per accidens sub hac consideratione nihil ad praesens institutum pertinet.

Quale indicet Aristoteles per se unum, quale per accidens.--Priori ergo modo ens in ratione entis dicitur per se aut per accidens in ordine ad unitatem quam habet, seu ratione talis unitatis, ut, verbi gratia, quia constat una natura unius praedicamenti, aut naturis diversorum praedicamentorum; sic enim Aristoteles dict. lib. V, text., 13 et 14, entia per accidens vocat quae constant ex subiecto et accidente, vel quando multa accidentia in eodem subiecto coniunguntur; ens autem per se dicit esse quod dividitur in decem categorias. Idemque Aristoteles, VII Metaph., text. 43, et clarius lib. VIII, text. 15, et lib. II De Anima, text 7, illud significat esse ens per se unum, quod vel simplex est, vel ex potentia substantiali et proprio actu componitur. Unde e contrario per accidens erit quod neque est simplex, nec praedictam compositionem habet, sed alio imperfectiori modo ex diversis rebus constat. Ex quibus intelligere licet illud appellari in ratione entis ens per se, quod est per se unum; illud autem per accidens, quod tantum per accidens unum est. Non enim vocatur hic per se et per accidens ratione modi essendi per se vel in alio, quo modo sola substantia est ens per se, reliqua vero dici possunt per accidens, seu potius accidentalia; sed sumitur per se et per accidens in ordine ad unitatem; quae autem sit unitas per se aut per accidens in entibus, non satis declaratum est ex dictis, nec eodem modo ab omnibus



beings are--1. simple, complete beings, 2. simple incomplete beings, 3. composite beings, and 4. per accidens beings. It is Suarez' contention that the first three types are per se beings and therefore also per se unities. The fourth type is made up of two or more integral beings (i.e., beings which are per se in themselves) but joined in some way. These multiple beings make up a per accidens being and consequently only a per accidens unity. It will be necessary to look at each of these kinds of being and then ask the questions: "Which kind of being and unity does Suarez consider the human being to be?" "Which kind of being and unity is the human in fact, based on Suarez' own description of matter, form, individuation, and rational soul?"

Per Se Being, Per Se Unity, and Human Composition

In his comprehensive explanation of the understanding of being and unity per se Suarez begins by showing that the intelligibility of being per se is that a given being should have that which is required for the integral and complete essence of such a being of that kind. That is, such an essence has whatever applies to its intrinsic intelligibility or completeness. This approach to being per se needs no further proof than the explanation of the terms involved. Since, therefore, a being is said to be that which has being or essence, it will be a being per se properly and strictly

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explicatur. Disp. Meta. IV, Sect. 3, pars. 2-3.
The reader is also referred to paragraphs 15-19 of the same section of Disputation IV.

if it has one and only one essence. That essence will be most properly one which for its own kind has whatever is appropriate to its own intrinsic intelligibility. A being of this kind is properly a being *per se*. Anything that lacks this kind of unity is a being *per accidens*.[23]

Given this strict understanding of being *per se* Suarez now explains the various categories of being *per se*; he does this by using the language of unity. Beings *per se* are divided into simple and composite. This division has precedent in both Aristotle and Thomas, and Suarez follows their lead. For, he says, concerning simple being there is no difficulty since every simple being is a being and a unity *per se*. That is, a simple being is *per se* undivided and as such does not have any admixture of something extraneous to that being. Taken in this way even any accident taken in the abstract is a being *per se* and then also the soul according to the intelligibility of substance is a being *per se* although incomplete. But, composite beings are

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[23]In hac igitur re dicendum videtur, rationem entis per se in hoc consistere, quod praecise habeat ea quae ad essentiam, integritatem vel complementum talis entis in suo genere per se et intrinsece requiruntur. Hoc insinuavit Aristoteles, priori loco citato. Et ex terminis ipsis videtur clarum; haec enim communissima et simplicissima vix possunt aliter probari quam explicatis terminorum rationibus. Cum ergo ens dicatur illud quod entitatem seu essentiam habet, illud erit ens per se proprie et in rigore quod unam essentiam vel entitatem habet. Illa autem essentia seu entitas una propriissime erit, quae in suo genere habet quidquid ad eius intrinsecam rationem seu consummationem spectat; ergo illud ens, quod huiusmodi est, sub ea ratione erit proprie ac per se ens; omne autem illud, quod ab hac unitate defecerit, dicetur ens per accidens. Disp. Meta. IV, Sect. 3, par. 6.



also able to be per se beings and per se unities. In so far as a composite being is established by matter and form and this combination makes up a subsistent supposit then the composite is a being per se. Since matter and form are not complete beings in the genus of substance, but are instituted of their nature for the composition of substance, the composite resulting from these two, then, is spoken of as a per se unity. This understanding does not violate the general explanation of being given above but rather conforms to it.[24]

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[24]Potest autem hoc amplius explicari, si ens per se dividamus in simplex et compositum, quae divisio etiam de uno per se dari potest, eamque insinuavit Aristoteles, X Metaph., c. 6 dicens unum quoddam esse divisibile, aliud indivisum. Nam ut notavit D. Thomas, I, q. 6, a. 3, et q. 11, a. 1, unum per se, aliud est indivisum actu et potentia, aliud vero tantum actu; prius est ens simplex, posterius vero compositum. Igitur de simplici nulla est difficultas; omne enim simplex est ens per se ac per se unum, quia et per se indivisum est, et ut sic non habet admixtionem alicuius extranei, ut possit ens per accidens appellari, et hoc modo quodlibet accidens in abstracto sumptum ea consideratione est ens per se, et anima in ratione substantiae est ens per se licet incompletum; quatenus vero constat pluribus potentiis habitibus, vel actibus, iam declinat in ens per accidens.

De ente autem composito certum imprimis est posse vere ac proprie esse ens per se ac unum per se, ut omnes philosophi docent de natura substantiali; quatenus materia et forma constat, et de supposito quatenus ex natura et subsistentia suo modo componitur. Cum enim neque materia neque forma per se sint entia completa et integra in suo genere, sed ad illud componendum natura sua institutae sint, merito illud quod ex eis proxime componitur, essentia et natura per se una dicitur et est. Atque eadem ratione, quia illa essentia non habet intrinsecum complementum in suo genere, nisi per se sit intrinsece et substantialiter terminata, ideo illa etiam cum sua subsistentia ens per se unum constituit. Igitur haec unitas per se in hoc consistit, quod resultat ex rebus constituentibus completum ens in aliquo genere, intercedente unione eorum inter se, ad tale ens constituendum accommodata, quae in compositione



There is a new and added note here in that previous philosophers when speaking of simple being were referring only to simple, complete beings (i.e., God and at most angels). The category of simple, incomplete beings is new and it is this category that is the source of Suarez' troubles.

Given this general understanding of being and unity per se, it is now necessary to ask which kind of being Suarez considers the human to be? The effort Suarez expends to show the soul as the form of the body gives the reader a clear indication that the human is a composite being per se. In the early sections of this chapter it was shown that the soul does have similarities with other forms of the natural order and based on these similarities Suarez does have justification for saying the human being is a composite being per se. But the investigation of the special characteristics of the soul gave the soul qualities which integralized that metaphysical principle. When one considers the integral nature of the soul together with a doctrine such as the separate existence of matter one realizes that a genuine being per se is impossible. On his own reasoning, then,

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unius naturae est per modum actus et potentiae substantialis; in compositione vero unius personae, est per modum naturae integrae et termini eius. Atque haec ratio accommodari etiam potest ad entia ut composita ex genere et differentia per se contrahente illud intra proximum praedicamentum; nam etiam genus et differentia comparantur ut potentia et actus per se ordinata ad constituendum unum in suo genere completum et integrum, quamquam haec compositio magis est rationalis quam realis et ideo minus impedire potest realem ac per se unitatem entis. Disp. Meta. IV, Sect. 3, pars. 7-8.

Suarez cannot consistently hold that the human is a being per se and hence neither is the human a unity per se even though that is the position that he would like to hold.

The problem arises in Suarez' understanding of simple being as complete or incomplete. There is an equivocation on the term "simple." If something is simple it must be complete. If something is incomplete its completion would then remove the simplicity because there are then parts to the being. In a word, God is a simple complete being for Suarez and is a being per se. The matter and the human soul need each other for completion and hence cannot be truly simple beings. The basic problem, then, in stating that a being is a composite being per se is that a simple incomplete being does not make sense on the general metaphysical level; and when one applies it to the human soul with all of its special characteristics, it certainly is an erroneous concept, since, as has been shown, the soul really gathers to itself all the characteristics of the simple complete being.

Per Accidens Being, Per Accidens Unity and Human Composition

The remaining category of being and unity that must be examined is being per accidens. Suarez' approach is parallel to the approach used in the discussion of being per se; he begins by giving a description of being per accidens. Everything which is made up of distinct things without the physical or real union between them is strictly speaking a

being *per accidens* and not a being *per se*. This description is proved because such a being is not able to meet the intelligibility of a being *per se* according to the previous explanation--being *per accidens* does not have one real essence but at least two real essences. The notion of "real essence" can be taken as something simple or as a real union arising out of many; in the being *per accidens* neither of these situations apply. Finally, every being which is one in such a way that it is established from distinct things of which one is a complete being in some genus and through adjunction to another being is brought to a different genus, this being is strictly speaking a unity *per accidens*. The important notion here is that if a being is complete anything joined to it makes the combination a being *per accidens* rather than a being *per se*.[25]

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[25]Ex his quae dicta sunt de ente et uno per se, colligere licet quid sit dicendum de ente et uno per accidens, quod ab illo distinguitur; nam imprimis omne id, quod ex rebus distinctis constat absque physica et reali unione earum inter se, est in rigore ens per accidens et non per se. Probatur, tum ex dictis, quia in tali ente non potest reperiri ratio entis per se a nobis explicata; tum etiam quia illud unum non potest habere unam realem essentiam; non enim potest intelligi una essentia, nisi vel quia simplex sit, vel quia per realem unionem plurium consurgat; in praedicto autem casu neutrum horum reperitur. Deinde omnes ens quod ita est unum ut constet ex rebus distinctis, quarum altera in aliquo genere completum ens sit et per adiunctionem alterius perfectione diversi generis efficiatur, tale etiam ens in rigore est unum per accidens, quia non convenit illi ratio entis per se a nobis explicata, nec potest in tali ente una vera essentia reperiri. Item quia, hoc ipso quod unum ens in suo genere est completum et integrum, quod ei adiungitur, accidentaliter advenit, et ideo unum per accidens cum illo componere dicitur; atque hac ratione vere dicitur id quod constat ex rebus diversorum praedicamentorum et ex natura rei diversis, unum per



From this kind of description of being per accidens one realizes that there are a variety of existences involved in one and the same being. That is, the being per accidens is a being only on account of an aggregation in which many integral and complete per se beings are gathered together without any union and without any order. This kind of per accidens being is seen especially in a pile of grain or of stones. There is another kind of per accidens being made up of integral beings not having among themselves a genuine union but merely a joining of the beings. These beings would be armies, states, a house, and similar kinds of artifactual things. In this kind of being the only variety possible is that of more or less physical union among the beings from which the artifact is constructed. In this sense then a tree to which a branch of another species has been grafted is more one than a house and a house more one than an army, but they are all per accidens beings. The point here is that there is some kind of aggregation among various beings per se.[26]

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accidens esse. Quin potius, etiam in rebus eiusdem praedicamenti id verum habet, si sint diversi generis vel speciei, et una accidat alteri in sua ratione et specie iam completa, et hoc modo ex potentia et habitu, vel actu, fit unum per accidens, et similiter vas argenteum deauratum est ens per accidens et sic de caeteris. Disp. Meta. IV, Sect. 3, par. 13.

[26]Secundo ex dictis colligitur in ente uno per accidens esse varietatem, et in ea esse magis vel minus. Quoddam enim est ens omnino per aggregationem, in quo multa entia per se integra et perfecta, sine ulla unione et sine ullo ordine congeruntur, et hoc videtur esse maxime per

Now it is possible to turn to the question asked earlier: "Which kind of being is the human in fact, based on Suarez' own understanding of matter, form, individuation, and the human soul?" It has already been shown that Suarez thinks the human being is a being per se and consequently a unity per se. It has also been shown why this position is untenable given Suarez' metaphysical scheme. All through this present study there have been hints that Suarez has a

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accidens, quia omni ex parte opponitur enti per se proprie sumpto, et huiusmodi est acervus tritici aut lapidum. Aliud vero est ens per accidens, constans quidem ex integris entibus per se, non habentibus inter se physicam unionem, habentibus autem inter se aliquem ordinem, ut est exercitus, respublica, domus et alia similia artificialia, in quibus tanta potest esse varietas tantaque differentia secundum magis et minus, quanta potest esse maior vel minor unio inter entia per se, ex quibus constat; et hoc modo videtur magis una arbor, cui ramus alterius speciei est insitus, quam domus, et domus magis quam exercitus; et sic de aliis. Et in hoc ordine collocandi sunt liquores mixti, ex simplicibus imperfecte alteratis compositi, ut vinum lymphatum, oximel, etc. Quo etiam fit ut, licet haec simpliciter et absolute sint entia per accidens, tamen respective, id est comparatione illius entis quod est unum per meram aggregationem, soleant haec interdum vocari entia per se. Nam, quia media participant aliquid de extremis comparatione illorum solent diversis nominibus appellari; huiusmodi autem entia conveniunt aliquo modo cum entibus per se, quatenus in aliqua forma vel habitudine uniuntur, et ideo ita aliquando nominantur. Quomodo videtur locutus Aristoteles in citato loco V Metaph. Tamen hac consideratione et comparatione ens compositum ex substantia et accidente sibi inhaerente, multo magis videtur posse vocari ens per se; hoc enim est tertium genus entium per accidens quod magis videtur recedere ab illo primo et infimo ente per aggregationem, magisque accedere ad unum per se, quia, et ea quibus constat, non distinguuntur supposito, sicut in aliis, et habent inter se maiorem physicam unionem, et unum revera est in potentia ad aliud, quamvis accidentali, et alterum natura sua est ordinatum ad aliud, et in unione ad illud habet suam perfectionem connaturalem, in quibus omnibus huiusmodi ens imitatur illud quod est proprie ac per se unum; quamvis simpliciter absolute unum per accidens sit. Disp. Meta. IV, Sect. 3, par. 14.

being per accidens in his matter-form scheme and this is especially true in the test case of the human being.

In Disputation XIII, Section 4, paragraph 5 Suarez gives a description of the relationship of matter and form which if taken seriously makes all beings composed of matter and form to be per accidens beings. In this passage he states that matter is a being really separable from any given determinate form. This is sufficient that it be in itself a thing distinct from the form. These two principles are not distinguished only modally, for a substantial form is not merely a mode of being but a real thing having proper being. And, at times this form can be conserved separate from matter. For example, the rational soul is able to be conserved separate from matter. This leads Suarez to state that matter is distinguished from form as one thing from another. This is confirmed for the composition of a substance from matter and form is real and physical; substantial composition is not composition between a thing and a mode. Therefore there is composition from two real things. Finally, since matter exists perpetually and before the form it is evident that it is distinguished from the form, but this presupposes that the form is not only some mode but a true act and a proper being. This is certain since it is a more perfect being than the matter.[27] On even the metaphysical level, then, the union of matter and form seems to

[27]Ultima pars etiam est clara, quia materia est entitas realiter separabilis a qualibet forma particulari determinata, quod satis est ut a forma sit in re ipsa

result in a being per accidens rather than a being per se.

An additional argument for the contention that Suarez is a dualist even in the general metaphysical doctrine is to refer back to the discussion on individuation of the matter and the form.[28] This discussion showed that Suarez does treat matter and form as realities which have to be distinguished from one another and from other matters and other forms. This kind of individuation would not be necessary if Suarez did not in some sense substantialize the two metaphysical principles. But this substantializing tendency results in the inability to get a genuinely composite unity of matter and form.

When one turns to Suarez' own treatment of the union of the body and the soul, one realizes rather quickly that Suarez' metaphysical doctrine makes this union something of a major problem. Given the general metaphysics on matter,

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distincta; non distinguuntur autem solum modaliter; nam forma substantialis non est modus, sed res vera habens propriam entitatem; unde interdum naturaliter etiam conservari potest separata a materia, ut anima rationalis, et per potentiam absolutam quaelibet forma potest separata conservari. Distinguitur ergo materia a forma tanquam res a re. Et confirmatur; nam compositio substantiae ex materia et forma est realis et physica et non ex re et modo; ergo ex duabus rebus. Denique cum materia sit perpetua, et ante formam, evidens est distingui realiter a forma, supponendo formam non esse tantum aliquem modum sed verum actum, et propriam entitatem, quod etiam est certum cum sit res perfectior quam materia de quo infra latius dicetur. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 4, par. 5. [Italics added]

[28]For a more complete discussion of the problem of individuation the reader is referred to Chapter IV of this study. The subsection of that chapter entitled, "Principles of Individuation for All Created Things" is especially noteworthy in this context.

form, and individuation and the special characteristics of the soul, Suarez is forced to say that the union of the rational soul with matter is unique and has essentially different understanding from the union of matter with material forms. One can call this union a substantial adherence. This is the causality by which matter is related to such a form.[29] The problem here though is that the adherence of the soul and body, given what has been shown about the general metaphysics and the special character of the soul, looks very much like the per accidens unity which occurs when a branch from one tree is engrafted to another and a different tree.

At this point the weight of evidence is that Suarez is a dualist in his approach to the unity of the human being. One of the bases of the argument for this dualism has been the contention that the soul and body are so different one from the other in Suarezian philosophy that there is no

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[29]Permanens causalitas materiae in formam materialem est unio.--Qualis sit rationalis animae cum materia nexus. Hinc ulterius addo causalitatem materiae in ipsam formam (quando forma talis est ut a materia causetur et pendeat) non esse aliud a propria unione talis formae cum materia quatenus ipsamet unio materialiter causatur a materia et mediante illa forma ipsa pendet etiam a materia. Dixi non esse aliud a propria unione talis formae quia non quaelibet unio sufficit ad hanc causalitatem; anima enim rationalis habet propriam unionem cum materia, quae unio etiam causatur materialiter a materia et tamen ipsa anima non causatur; non ergo quaelibet unio est causalitas ipsiusmet formae sed illa quae est per eductionem formae. Ex quo obiter intelligimus unionem animae rationalis cum materia esse singularem et diversae rationis essentialis ab omni unione materialis formae, quam substantialem inhaesionem appellare possumus et hanc dicimus esse causalitatem per quam materia causat talem formam. Disp. Meta. XIII, Sect. 9, par. 10.



way to unite the two in a genuine unity per se. In Disputation XV, Section 10, paragraph 25 he attempts to answer this objection to his theory. He states that even if it is granted that the soul is indivisible and spiritual, it can be united immediately to the matter because it is essentially the act of the matter. It is of no concern that in the perfection of being there is such a great distance between the matter and the rational soul. Union is not attendant upon distance or nearness in perfection of being but rather depends upon proportion and appropriateness in respect of act and potency. This proportion is sufficiently found between the matter and the soul, perhaps even a greater and more perfect proportion than in other things. Suarez offers a traditional proof that the soul is the form of the body as an argument; this traditional proof is based on unity of operations. In order that the rational soul be the true form of the body, it is necessary for the soul to be a principle not only of intellection but also of operations which are exercised through the body. This would be especially true of the sensitive operations which are actions most closely related to understanding.[30]

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[30]Nec rationes in contrarium factae difficilem habent solutionem. Ad primam enim negatur minor, nam, licet anima sit indivisibilis et spiritualis, potest immediate uniri materiae, quia essentialiter est actus eius. Non enim refert quod in perfectione entis multum inter se distent materia et anima rationalis, nam ad unionem non est attendenda distantia vel propinquitas in perfectione entitatis, sed in proportione et convenientia in mutuo respectu actus et potentiae, quae proportio sufficiens reperitur inter materiam et animam; immo fortasse maior et



Suarez' argument for the unity of body and soul founded on the unity of operations is unsuccessful, because in other places as has been shown he shows the complete and total lack of relationship between matter and a spiritual form. He cannot achieve unity by simply invoking the unity-of-operations formula given his total metaphysics. On the basis of the earlier discoveries, then, Suarez does not get around the difficulty of the distance of matter and rational soul. As a matter of fact it is precisely this distance which militates against the unity per se that he wants to establish in the human being.

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perfectior quam inter materiam et quamcumque aliam formam. Alioqui etiamsi fingatur materia iam informata quacumque forma vel anima extensa et materiali, adhuc erit anima improportionata ut uniatur illi; quia quod ad extensionem attinet, tam extensa est illa forma sicut materia; ergo si inde oriebatur imporportio, non tollitur, immo augetur aliunde. Primo quia cum illa anima sensitiva sit actus substantialis et specificus, ut probatum est, magis distat ab anima rationali quoad proportionem requisitam ad unionem quam anima et materia, et ita potius impedit quam iuvat ad unionem. Secundo, quia si intercederet anima sensitiva, intellectiva esset purum principium intelligendi; purum autem intelligendi principium non est aptum ad informandum corpus, ut latius ostendemus infra, tractando de intelligentiis separatis. Ut ergo rationalis anima sit vera forma corporis, oportet ut ipsamet sit principium non tantum intellectionum, sed etiam operationum quae exercentur per corpus; ergo maxime operationum sensitivarum, quae sunt actionibus intelligendi propinquiores. Quod adeo necessarium est ut dubitaverint nonnulli an ipsamet anima quatenus intellectiva informet corpus. Non vero est quod dubitaverint, nam rationalis anima essentialiter est forma corporis secundum se totam et secundum omnes gradus, qui, licet a nobis ratione praescindantur, in re tamen idem in anima sunt. Unde licet ex essentia huius anima non dimanent potentiae intellectivae quae in corpore recipiantur, tamen eaedemmet potentiae sensitivae, immo et vegetativae, manant cum singulari quadam perfectione propria rationalis animae et proportionata ad ministrandum actionibus mentis. Et hoc etiam est argumentum eamdem esse animam sensitivam cum rationali in homine. Disp. Meta. XV, Sect. 10, par. 25.



Conclusion

The groundwork for the contention that Suarez is a dualist in his rational psychology is laid by a careful investigation of his theories of matter, form, and individuation. Then, when one asks about the special case of the relationship of the rational soul to the body, one sees that the very structure of Suarezian metaphysics prohibits a true unity in the human being. Metaphysically speaking, to give matter its own existence, to allow quantity to inhere in matter, and to permit matter of itself to be individuated, treats this principle in such a way that it becomes an integral being in its own right. The same substantializing tendency takes place with respect to the form. The form has its own being, its own accidental qualities, and its own individuation. Suarez wants matter and form to be co-principles of being on the substantial level. The matter is to be the potency and the form the act; together these two compose a real physical substance. Since he continues to think in the potency/act terms he feels that in his metaphysics he has achieved a real unity <u>per se</u> between matter and form. The tendency to make complete substances out of these co-principles, however, militates against this type of unity.

Perhaps the most obvious place to see the implications of the general metaphysical position is in the relationship of the body and the rational soul. The body, being the same as all other material beings has no special characteristics except that it is matter disposed in such a way as

to receive a rational soul. The soul, however, bears characteristics which are similar to other forms, and since it is a rational soul it has characteristics specific to itself. This soul, like all other forms is directly related to the matter; there can be no intervening metaphysical principles such as the form of haecceity or the form of corporeity. There is only one substantial form for each human being. But, the rational soul also has very special characteristics and it is these special characteristics that prohibit a true unity in the human being. Suarez shows that the spiritual form has no relationship to quantity and that quantity inheres in matter only. This means that the soul cannot be educed from the potency of matter but must be introduced into the matter. And then, the introduction means that there must be a special creation of the soul. This total lack of relationship to matter has the implication that the soul can subsist on its own and in fact does so subsist upon separation from the body. Some have asked whether this subsistence on its own indicates that the soul itself is composed of matter and form. As could be expected Suarez rejects this position, since once again it would add an unneeded metaphysical principle to the being. Consequently, the soul is very far removed from the matter in its level of being. As a matter of fact, the soul and matter are at two poles and the question naturally arises, how can two such different beings ever be united to form a genuine unity?

One cannot solve the problem of the unity of the human being without examining Suarez' general doctrine of the breakdown of beings in respect to their unity into *per se* and *per accidens* unity. Then, the *per se* unity has two further divisions, "simple" and "composite." In an attempt to discover the type of unity appropriate to the human being it is necessary to ask what kind of unity would be considered appropriate for the human and then to ask what kind of unity in fact is the case for the human. From Suarez' own description of unity and being *per se*, it can be seen that he wants the human being to be a composite unity *per se*. But from his own description of unity and being *per accidens*, and from the description of the human soul one can easily see that the unity of the human being is in fact a *per accidens* unity. Finally, one can examine the disparity of the soul and matter as metaphysical principles. Suarez feels that this disparity enhances rather than hinders the unity of the human being. He tries to show that there is a proportion between the soul and the matter, but as has been shown in the discussion of the special characteristics every possible spot one can turn to establish this proportion breaks down under examination.

The basic flaw in the whole scheme of Suarezian metaphysics is the desire to grant matter its own being. In itself this looks like a fairly innocent move, but it gets a metaphysical scheme into operation that has disastrous results when one comes to the discussion of the unity of the

human being. In summary, if one allows matter its own being, then it has certain accidents which are appropriate to it alone (e.g., quantity); and finally the separation from the form becomes more complete. If, as Suarez does, one does not want to add an extra metaphysical principle, then one is forced to talk about matter and form as partial or incomplete simple beings. It is here that, as one begins to apply the general metaphysics to concrete cases, one discovers the error of spatializing and temporalizing the matter and the form. In the case of the human being, disparity of matter and form is so great that the only unity possible is per accidens unity. To talk of partial and incomplete principles of being does absolutely no good if one gives these partial and incomplete principles all the characteristics of integral and complete beings as Suarez does in the case of the human being.

Suarez does make allowance in his further teaching on the human being for the dualism of body and soul. In the following chapter it will be necessary to investigate the implications of his dualism. By examining the problems of knowledge and will one can see that the Suarezian explanation of these two operations substantiates the contention of dualism rather than alleviating it. In the present chapter, the emphasis was on the impossibility for a true unity in the human being based on the origin of the matter and the soul. Now, the concern turns to the operations of the human. Based on an examination of

these operations, one can see that Suarez does not even need the unity he claims for the human composite.

CHAPTER VI

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUALISM OF BODY AND SOUL

The general conclusion of the previous chapter was that Suarez has a dualism of fact if not of intent in his theory of the composition of the human being. This dualism has severe implications for the theory of the operations of the human being.

In Aristotelian scholasticism there are two parallel but complementary systems of operation. On the one hand, there is the knowledge system composed of the exterior senses, the interior senses and the intellect. On the other hand, there is the system of appetites or tendencies composed of the sense appetites and the will. The two systems are parallel to each other but also are meant to operate in conjunction with each other.[1] For the purpose of this present study they provide an excellent opportunity to examine the possibilities of genuine interaction between body and soul. If Suarez, in explaining these two systems, can

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[1]For representative presentations of the doctrine on operative potencies the reader is referred to Aristotle, On the Soul and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, qq 75-89. A modern treatment in the Thomistic tradition of the doctrine of operative potencies can be found in George P. Klubertanz, The Philosophy of Human Nature (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953).



show that soul and body are interactive then, despite the dualistic tendency of the metaphysics, the union of body and soul results in one being, not two.

It should be obvious that this present chapter cannot be a complete analysis of knowledge and appetition. An exhaustive treatment would be the domain of rational psychology. The concern in this chapter is metaphysical; the discussion will show that the traditional problems of scholasticism concerning how immaterial beings (human souls) know material objects and immaterial beings (human souls) affect material objects become especially crucial in Suarez. One of his chief arguments for unity has been that there is a unity of operation in the human being. He must show what this means given the special nature of the soul/body relationship.

The materials on cognition are spread throughout the Disputationes and when one separates them from the more general metaphysical discussion, one realizes that the Suarezian treatment of human knowledge is quite different from its Thomistic predecessors. The chief variation of note is that there is direct intellectual knowledge of the singular.[2] The reasons for holding this position are multiple and they will be detailed in the next section of this present chapter. It is sufficient at this point to note

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[2]As was noted in the Introduction Suarez is following Scotus on this point. For the Thomistic position on knowledge of the singular the reader is referred to Summa Theologiae, I, q. 84.

that it is by direct intellectual knowledge of the singular that Suarez hopes to achieve a unity of operation in knowledge, a continuity of operation between sense and intellect.

The basic treatment of appetition occurs in Disputation XIX in the context of a discussion of efficient causality. This discussion is most appropriate for the present study. Since the interest is in how a human being's will act results in a given physical action, Suarez has a means to establish a genuine unity of operation. One can see Suarez making some very clear adjustments in the notion of appetition to accommodate his peculiar understanding of the body and soul. A noteworthy idea introduced at this point is the notion of elicited appetite which Suarez feels will solve the unity of operation problem in the appetitive system. The section entitled "Willing in a Dualistic Context" will examine Suarez on the unity of appetitive operation.

At this point one can see that, given the interpretation Suarez has of the basic principles of being, there must be an appropriately adjusted understanding of the human operations of knowing and appetition if they are to be at all intelligible. It is essential that humans know concrete singulars and affect concrete material beings. The dualism of itself does not allow one to bridge the gap between material and spiritual and so knowledge and appetition are examined in the light of this problem.

Knowing in a Dualistic Context

In the case of human knowledge, given the dualistic structure of the human being, Suarez wants to provide some continuity between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. As one investigates the doctrine on human knowing in the Disputationes Metaphysicae one comes to a realization that Suarez wants to hold a rather traditional position on the problem of how the human being knows. But, the question arises whether or not he maintains the integrity of the traditional scholastic structure of external senses, internal senses, and intellect as a unified system given the dualistic composition of the human being. Since Suarez is not doing rational psychology in the Disputationes, but rather metaphysics the topic of human knowledge arises only peripherally.[3] There is, however, enough information on this topic to see that Suarez' treatment of the nature of human knowledge does not take into account the dualism of the human being. And if, as in knowledge of the singular, it does allow for dualism then there is no need for a per se unity such as Suarez advocates.

In order to see the structure of human knowledge as it occurs in the Disputationes one must first examine Suarez' position on the nature of sensation. Then Suarez poses a rather unique version of the meaning of experience,

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[3]Suarez gives a much fuller treatment of the nature and implications of human knowledge in his treatise De Anima.

maintaining that experience is proper only to humans. On the side of the intellect Suarez gives a lengthy treatment of the knowledge of universals and in this same treatment indicates that the intellect has direct knowledge of the singular. By these varied and disparate treatments Suarez hopes to show that there is a genuine unity of operation with respect to knowledge in the human being.

Other than a passing comment here and there in the Disputationes, the only section in which Suarez treats sensation to any great extent occurs in Disputation I, Section 6, paragraphs 10 to 12. This examination of sense knowledge is in the context of the question whether or not man naturally pursues the sicence of metaphysics. Suarez explains the doctrine of Aristotle concerning the relation of sight and the other senses as naturally tending to this science. Aristotle, he says, maintains that of all the senses sight is the most fully adapted to doing metaphysics. From this Aristotle infers that the love of science is greater and more natural to sight than to any of the other senses.[4] The significance of these assertions is that in respect to a concrete activity, the tendency toward science, Suarez has an opportunity to draw comparisons among the various

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[4]Praeterea discursus Aristotelis ex dilectione sensuum, et praesertim visus desumptus, optimus est ad idem confirmandum. Duo autem sumit Aristoteles in eo discursu: primum est, quod in dilectione sensuum visum anteponimus; secundum est causam huius esse, quia ad scientiam maxime deservit. Ex quibus infert tertium, scilicet amorem scientiae esse maiorem magisque naturalem, quam ipsius visus aliorumque sensuum. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 10.



external senses. A detailed comparison is relegated to psychology; here Suarez is interested only in the relationship of the senses to science. Even in this context, however, one must remember that the whole comparison can and does take place solely in terms of bodily operations. Whether one sense tends more toward science than another does not bridge the gap between body and soul. Or, more bluntly, the sense of sight is the best physical instrument for metaphysical speculation but it is still a bodily operation.

Suarez analyzes Aristotle's proposition that of all the senses sight tends most fully toward metaphysics by drawing a comparison between sight and touch. Touch can be found in living things apart from the sense of sight but the sense of sight cannot be found without the sense of touch. The reason for this is that touch is the first of all the senses and the foundation for the others. In a word, if touch is destroyed, sight is not able to remain, because life cannot be conserved without touch. Therefore, in so far as sight as a higher sense implies touch in some manner sight will tend more to science than touch alone would. In addition, to the extent that loss of touch implies loss of vision, touch is more elementary than vision. A person would choose to conserve touch over sight if at the loss of touch, sight were necessarily lost.[5] What is important here

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[5]Quae consecutio videtur per se evidens et fundata in eo principio: Propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis. Prima autem propositio assumpta imprimis intelligenda est cum praecisione, ut recte fiat comparatio;



is the fact that Suarez is appropriating from Aristotle the general notion that the senses are somehow interrelated and dependent upon each other. This view is in complete accord with a general theory of the hierarchy of being. That is, the more complex the organism the more senses it has and the more complex these senses will be. Sense knowledge as such, though, is considered to be a material operation and needs nothing more than an appropriate kind of subhuman form in order to function. Consequently, at this level there is no question even for a need for continuity between the various kinds of knowledge.

In the next comparison, between sight and hearing, however, Suarez is concerned with the acquisition of science more directly. Aristotle points out a double tendency in the senses--one arises for the sake of usefulness, the other comes about for the sake of knowledge. The notion of the usefulness of the senses is self-evident, for under this conception one can comprehend every convenience of body

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tactus enim inveniri potest sine visu, non vero e contrario, quia tactus est omnium sensuum primus, aliorumque fundamentum. Unde destructo tactu, non potest naturaliter visus manere quia nec vita sine tactu conservatur, III de Anim., c. 12, et lib. XIII de Sensu et sens., c. 1. Quatenus ergo visus quodammodo includit tactum, appetibilior erit visus quam solum tactus; et in contrario sensu quatenus amissio tactus includit amissionem visus, et non e converso, praefertur tactus visui, quia potius eliget homo conservationem tactus quam visus, si ad amissionem tactus visus necessario amittendus est. Haec vero comparatio sic intellecta nullius momenti est, quia non comparantur singuli sensus inter se, sed duo ad unum qui in eis includitur; est ergo comparatio praecise facienda in eo quod singuli per se conferunt. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 10.



pertaining either to its conservation or pleasure, or other operations proper to human life. The tendency toward knowledge, however, is appropriate to man, and in sensation sight takes precedence over the other senses. This assertion is established by experience in that we give priority to the operation of sight over all other senses. But an a-priori reason can also be given for this priority. There are two ways to acquire science, either by teaching or by discovery. In the acquisition by teaching hearing is the most useful of the senses; this is evident because words are signs of concepts and hearing alone perceives words. Although hearing does not perceive the meaning but rather the mind perceives the meaning, it is sufficient that there is a proper organ by which such a sign is mediated to the mind. This, however, is only an accidental acquisition of science, for it supposes another person who speaks about the nature of things. This teacher's function is to supply for the imperfection or negligence of the man who has learned the science originally by discovery. Even in learning science by teaching, hearing has a minimal function since many things are learned also by the written word and the use of sight is more important here than hearing.[6] Finally, the manner of

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[6]Deinde est observandum Aristotelem hic duplicem amorem sensuum indicare. Unus est ob utilitatem; alter vero propter cognitionem. Prior est per se notissimus, et sub utilitate comprehendi potest omnis commoditas corporis, pertinens vel ad conservationem eius, vel ad delectationem, vel ad alias operationes humanae vitae. Posterior amor est maxime proprius hominis, et in ordine ad hunc amorem praecipue comparatur hic visus cum aliis sensibus, eisque

doing science by discovery depends more heavily on the senses of sight and touch than on any of the other senses and this is so obvious that it does not need proof.[7]

In all of this discussion of the manner in which the senses function in the acquisition of science the point that is of special concern in this present study is how Suarez treats vocal expression and written expression. In these

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praefertur. Quod experimento probat Aristoteles, quia nihil (inquit) acturi ipsum visum aliis anteponimus. Rationem autem a priori, et quae ad rem praesentem maxime spectat, reddit in altera propositione. Circa quam est tertio notandum, duos esse modos acquiriendi scientiam, scilicet disciplinam, et inventionem. Ad priorem modum utilissimus est auditus, ut per se constat, quia voces sunt signa conceptuum; solus autem auditus voces percipit, et quamvis ipse non percipiat earum significationem, sed mens, satis est quod sit organum proprium, quo mediante tale signum ad mentem pervenit. Hic tamen excessus et est per accidens, et minimus. Per accidens quidem, quia modus acquirendi scientiam per disciplinam est quasi per accidens; nam et supponit alium, loquendo secundum naturas rerum, et solum est ad suppledam imperfectionem vel negligentiam hominum in vacando scientiis inveniendis. Minimum autem excessum appello, quia etiam visus plurimum deservit ad disciplinam: nam etiam scripturae sunt signa conceptuum, et illae percipiuntur visu: unde multo plura videntur addisci lectione, quae visu fit, quam auditione. Est tamen discrimen, quod tota fere utilitas scripturae potest etiam auditu percipi, non tamen e converso; ea enim energia, vis ac claritas, quae est in voce ad exprimendos proprios conceptus, non potest scriptura sola aut visu suppleri; unde legimus nonnullos carentes visu fuisse doctissimos, partim auditis solis scriptis aliorum, partim etiam explicationibus seu doctrinis viva voce sibi propositis; quod vero aliquis omnino surdus evaserit doctissimus, me legisse non memini, et vix id fieri posse existimo. Non igitur comparantur hic ab Aristotele hi sensus quoad hoc munus, sed quoad modum acquirendi scientiam per inventionem. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 11.

[7]In quo dubium non est quin visus et tactus, tam auditum quam alios sensus superent, quod addeo notum est, ut non egeat probatione; solum de comparatione visus et tactus inter se, breviter dicendum superest. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 11.



instances he has said that the sense does not perceive the meaning of the word; rather, the intellect perceives the meaning. What is presupposed here is a continuity of operation between the intellect and the senses. He feels that by his doctrine of the soul as the form of the body this continuity of operation follows. But, it is also necessary to note that he uses continuity of operation to prove that the soul is the form of the body. In fairness to Suarez it is necessary to point out that the issue here is the acquisition of science not the unity of operation. He must, however, answer the problem of how unity of operation takes place, and the only spot where such an attempt is made is in the notion that the soul is the form of the body. It has been shown earlier, however, that Suarez' metaphysical structure does not allow for true unity of operation or composition.

Unity of operation is also presumed in the further treatment of sight and touch as sources of science by discovery. In the acquisition of science by discovery in one way touch surpasses sight, because touch is a more universal sense on the part of the knowing subject (i.e., it is spread throughout the body). But sight of itself and as an instrument of science surpasses touch in many other ways. First, sight is superior to touch in the breadth of its object for it perceives many more differences (e.g., motions, actions, figure, etc.) than the other senses. In a word, sight is the most complex of the senses. Secondly, it perceives more



rapidly than all the other senses and extends itself to the most distant things. The reason for this is that it completes its operation by a more immaterial operation than the sense of touch which depends on material contact. Third, it impresses its phantasms more firmly than the other senses, and this is known by experience. Visual phantasms inhere in the memory more firmly and recur more easily than other types of phantasms. Fourth, sight gives more certitude than the other senses. That is, because it is the most sophisticated of those senses it gives more knowledge than any animal sense (e.g., the eyesight of an eagle may be very acute but is still only an animal sense) and more knowledge than any other human sense (e.g., touch is less sophisticated than sight). The reason for this is that sight is more immaterial and perceives its object more acutely than the lower senses. For these reasons, then, sight is more useful for the sciences than other senses.[8]

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[8]Est igitur advertendum quarto, aliud esse loqui de signo (ut ita dicam) melioris facultatis, maiorisque aptitudinis ad scientiam acquirendam, aliud de aptiori instrumento inveniendae scientiae; tactus enim priori ratione visum superat, quia tactus est universalis sensus ex parte subiecti, nam est per totum corpus diffusus, et est signum optimae et temperatae complexionis, unde est illud: Molles carnes aptae sunt ingenio de quo latius in II de Anima, text. 24. At visus per se, et ut instrumentum ad scientiam, multis modis tactum superat. Primo in latitudine obiecti; plures enim differentias percipit, ut hic dixit Aristoteles, et circa coelestia et terrestria vagatur, et rerum motus, actiones, et figuras perspicacius cognoscit, quam ullus alius sensus; sunt autem haec veluti prima signa et indicia quibus ad res cognoscendas utimur. Secundo, citius quam alii sensus percipit, cum tamen ad res distantissimas etiam sese extendat, et causa est quod puriori et immaterialiori modo, et absque alteratione materiali operationem suam perficit. Tertio, vehementius



Once again, Suarez presumes that there is a continuity between the knowledge acquired from the senses and science, knowledge which is properly intellectual. Suarez is appropriating Aristotle's doctrine on knowledge to himself, but in Aristotle the soul as the form of the body means something quite different from the way in which Suarez understands the soul as the form of the body. Aristotle's approach in On the Soul, Book II, Chapter 1, is to show that the soul is the form of the body in the sense that the matter and form are genuine co-principles of being. There is

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imprimit phantasiae quae percipit, quod experimento constat; nam tenacius inhaerent memoriae, et facilius postea occurrunt. Causa autem esse videtur, quod eius operatio sicut spiritualior est, ita maiori vi anima et conatu, et cooperatione etiam maiori ipsius phantasiae fit. Quarto, experimentum visus certius esse videtur experimento tactus, per se loquendo; etsi enim Aristoteles, lib I de Histor. animal., c. 15, dicat tactum in homine esse exquisitissimum, ibi tamen non comparat sensus hominis inter se, et respectu ipsius hominis, sed cum sensibus aliorum animalium; et hoc modo ait hominem superare alia animalia in tactu et gustu, cum tamen in aliis sensibus superetur a multis, saltem in multis conditionibus sentiendi, ut ab aquila in perspicacia et fortitudine visus; non tamen ait tactum hominis superare visum in certitudine. Quin potius, sect. 31, Problem. q. 18, inquit tactum aemulari visum. Itaque quilibet horum sensuum habet suam certitudinem in ordine ad proprium adaequatum obiectum; interdum vero deficit circa communia sensibilia ex insufficienti applicatione; et fortasse quia visus eminus sentit et non tactus, ideo facilius contingit obiectum visus indebite applicari, ac visum decipi; si tamen caetera sint paria quoad applicationem obiecti et dispositionem potentiae, non magis accidit deceptio in visu quam in tactu. Et aliunde visus ob suam immaterialitatem percipit acutius obiectum, et ex hac parte certior est; ideoque frequentius adhiberi solet ad certitudinem de rebus sensibilibus accipiendam. His ergo de causis visus est simpliciter utilior ad scientias, eamque ob rem naturaliter magis diligitur; signum ergo est, ut Aristoteles concludit, quod et ipsa scientia naturaliter ab homine diligitur. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 12.

an immaterial aspect to man in Aristotle but this never forces its way into the basic metaphysical structure so as to destroy the structure.[9] Suarez, however, allows the immaterial aspect to dominate the structure of humanity.[10] This means that he cannot simply transfer Aristotle's doctrine on the continuity of knowledge into his own system without doing violence to Aristotle.

Suarez is aware of these problems of continuity of operation in knowledge and attempts to answer them in his discussion of "experience." Once again he follows Aristotle's discussion of experience maintaining that experience properly so called is peculiar to man.

According to Aristotle in Book I, Chapter 1 of the Metaphysics experience comes from the nature of memory; for many memories of the same thing bring about the force of a single experience. This understanding of experience gives Aristotle an opportunity to ask whether or not experience applies to the sense alone or also to the intellect. The first thing Aristotle teaches is that experience does not concern the universal but the singular. The fact that experience is of the singular can be seen especially in medicine in which many single occurrences of a disease lead one

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[9]To see that this is the case the reader is referred to the discussion of the agent intellect as it occurs in Aristotle's On the Soul.

[10]It was precisely this willingness to allow the immaterial aspect to dominate the structure of the human being that led to structural dualism. This topic was discussed at length in Chapter V of the present study.

to a knowledge that a patient has a given disease. The relation of experience to the singular is also shown in the use one makes of experience in performing practical actions; such actions are always concerned with the singular in opposition to art or science both of which may also be concerned with the universal. Suarez does not expand on this contention but the significance is that persons can learn how to perform certain actions in a given circumstance such as stepping aside from the path of an oncoming car; but this type of action comes only from memory of several past experiences. It is not, strictly speaking, universal in nature. Given this understanding both Aristotle and Suarez maintain that the separation of universal from the singular does not pertain to experience. Rather, experience is simply a firm and prompt judgment concerning the singular.[11]

In both cases either of direct experience or of

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[11]Tertio igitur ait in hominibus generari experientiam ex memoria: Nam multae (inquit) eiusdem rei recordationes unius experientiae vim perficiunt. Quo loco afferebat se occasio declarandi fuse quid experientia sit et an ad sensum pertineat, vel ad intellectum; item sitne habitus iudicativus, an apprehensivus, et quomodo gignatur, vel ad quid inclinet. Sed quia haec magis perinent ad scientiam de anima et obiter tantum hic ab Aristotele attinguntur, breviter advertendum est Aristotelem hic plane docere experientiam non versari circa universale sed circa singulare, sic enim ait compertum haberi Calliae hoc morbo laboranti hoc profuisse, itemque Socrati atque eodem modo pluribus singulatim, experientia esse, profuisse autem iis omnibus qui certo morbo laborent, id iam artis esse; et infra probat utiliorem esse ad actiones experientiam, quam solam scientiam vel artem, quia actiones circa singularia versantur. Non ergo pertinet ad experimentum collectio universalis ex singularibus; multoque minus assensus universalis, sed solum firmum promptumque iudicium circa singularia. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 23.



vicarious experience, Suarez points out that it is not sufficient simply to undergo the same effect on multiple occasions. Even animals do this. But, they cannot properly be said to have experience. Animals have only a simple memory of those singulars perceived by the senses. For perfect experience of the kind proper to man a comparison of the singulars among themselves is required. The repeated occurrence of these singulars is not sufficient to establish experience, but rather the ability to compare and recognize similitude is the constituting factor of experience. As a person senses more and more singulars of a given type he acquires a habit of judging that a certain effect comes from a given cause. This habit requires nothing more than memory of the singulars and experience is not therefore properly of the universal but of the singular.[12]

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[12]Potest enim experientia late sumpta dici de quacumque perceptione unius singularis, quomodo dici potest quis esse expertus vinum inebriare, etiamsi semel tantum id passus sit, vel in alio viderit; quia vero, ut Hippocrates dixit, experimentum fallax est, proprie non accipitur pro unius tantum singularis cognitione, sed plurium singularium ut dixit Aristoteles. Immo nec satis est ad propriam experientiam et perfectam, saepius eumdem effectum experiri; hoc enim etiam bruta animalia possunt, de quibus Aristoteles dixit parum experientiae participare, quia solum habent simplicem memoriam eorum singularium quae sensu perceperunt; sed ad perfectam experientiam ulterius requiritur collatio quaedam eorumdem singularium inter se, quae propria est hominis, et ideo dixit Aristoteles ex memoria fieri homini experientiam, quia multae eiusdem rei recorationes experientiam perficiunt. Eiusdem rei, dicit, non individuae et singularis, ita ut ad experientiam sufficiat saepius recordari unius et eiusdem singularis effectus sensu percepti; haec enim repetitio efficiet promptiorem memoriam talis effectus, non vero experientiam. Intelligit ergo eiusdem secundum similitudinem et convenientiam circumstantiarum; et ad hoc requiritur collatio singularium per recordationem, scilicet, quod tale medicamentum



One can see the completely sense-oriented understanding of experience when Suarez turns to the deceitful nature of experience. Although there does seem to be a certain type of certitude arising from sense knowledge, the certitude is less than that required for science. Experience, as has been shown, is not of the universal, but rather of the singular. Science is of the universal simply. This is especially the case when science takes into account singulars which do not fall under experience. The mere collection and comparison of singulars does not suffice to generate science which must be genuinely universal knowledge.[13]

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profuit. Petro laboranti hoc morbo, et Paulo similiter; nam si non sit similitudo sufficiens, saepe videbitur esse experientia, et revera non erit. Unde provenit ut saepe sit experimentum fallax. Hoc igitur modo propria est hominis experientia quae licet sensu inchoetur, mente tamen et ratione perficitur, ut declaratum est. Unde non consistit in notitia apprehensiva, sed in iudicativa, ex qua generatur habilitas quaedam, qua homo promptus redditur ad iudicandum hunc effectum solere a tali causa prodire, quae habilitas fortasse nihil aliud est quam memoria talium effectuum singularium, non utcumque, sed ut inter se collati sunt, et similes inventi, et cum eis circumstantiis ab eadem seu simili causa manasse dignoscuntur. Atque haec nunc pro huius loci opportunitate de experientia sufficiant. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 23.

[13]Quod tamen difficile est, quia humanum experimentum est fallax, ut ex Hippocrate dixi, et quamvis demus interdum esse certum certitudine sensus, illa tamen certitudo minor videtur quam ea quae ad scientiam requiritur; maxime quia experimentum non est universale, seu de omnibus omnino singularibus, scientia autem est universalis simpliciter, et complectitur ea etiam singularia quae sub experientiam non ceciderunt. Et quamvis interdum liceat ex his quae experimur idem colligere de singularibus quae sub experientiam non ceciderunt, haec tamen collectio videtur valde infima, et ad summum sufficiet ad scientiam quia, non vero propter quid. Rursus occurebat hic difficultas, an propositio illa Aristotelis artem ab experientia generari, indefinita tantum sit, ut sonat, an vero sumenda sit ut doctrinalis et universalis, ita ut



Two things must be noted here: experience for Suarez is completely sensate in nature and hence properly applies only to bodily operations; and the fact that it is not infallible means that it cannot properly be the source of universal knowledge.

The discussion on experience, which could have provided a way of showing the continuity in knowledge, remains on the sensate level since it applies only to singulars as a group of repeated sense occurrences. Suarez here manifests the problem that faces most scholastic philosophers; the process by which sense knowledge becomes strictly universal and immaterial must be expressed in terms of a continuity of knowledge. To establish this continuity, however, is impossible when one makes the strict dichotomies as Suarez does between the body and the soul. By tracing a given piece of knowledge from the primary sense occurrence through experience to genuinely universal science one should be able to see this continuity, but there is an essential break in continuity between experience and universal knowledge. It is at this point that one also sees Suarez' position on knowledge as dualistic. That is, experience is sensitive (bodily); universal science is intellectual (spiritual). The problem is how to bridge the gap between the two kinds of knowledge.

Suarez is aware of the difficulty he faces in

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nunquam contingat scientiam aut artem in nobis aliter generari. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 25.

respect to the gap between particular and universal knowledge. First, one must solve the problem of whether the universal occurs through abstraction or through intellectual comparison of objects. This is a question of the way in which one comes to universal knowledge. Secondly, Suarez notes that everyone holds that the object of the intellect is being. This is a question of what the intellect knows most properly. Thirdly, one must solve the problem of the difference of the agent and possible intellects. This question has to do with the interior structure of the intellect as a knowing power.[14] Here Suarez is merely trying to sort out the various aspects of intellectual knowledge. When he turns to the question of the way the universal is produced he makes use of these distinctions to describe the three possible answers to the production of the genuine universal as opposed to an experience.

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[14]Haec questio sub aliis verbis tractari solet in principio dialecticae, scilicet, an universale fiat per abstractionem vel per comparationem intellectus. Tractari etiam solet, ac magis proprie in III de Anima, explicando obiectum intellectus, quod universale esse dicitur. Quoniam vero dictum a nobis est unitatem universalem per opus intellectus resultare, praetermittere non possumus quin declaremus quod et quale sit hoc opus intellectus. Oportet autem breviter distinguere duplicem intellectum, agentem et possibilem; illius munus est efficere species intelligibiles; huius operari et intelligere per illas; habet autem duplicem operationem (praetermissis aliis quae ad praesens institutum non spectant): una vocatur directa, qua directe tendit in rem quam species intelligibilis repraesentat et ad quam dicit intellectum per se ac simpliciter. Alia vocatur reflexa, qua intellectus revolvitur supra priorem cognitionem vel supra obiectum eius secundum eas conditiones vel denominationes quas ex cognitione accipit. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, par. 1.

In response to the difference between the agent and possible intellects, Suarez holds that the function of the agent intellect is to bring about the intelligible species; the function of the possible intellect is to understand by means of the intelligible species. The possible intellect has a double operation--direct: by which it tends toward the thing which the intelligible species represents and which is called understanding simply and per se; reflex: by which the intellect considers a prior knowledge either the object, or the conditions, or meanings which it receives from the knowledge.

In response to the problem of the object of intellectual knowledge Suarez offers no further comment since there is universal agreement that being is the proper object of the intellect.

The major problem to be dealt with is the way in which the universal is produced in the intellect. Briefly, the three positions on the production of the universal are:

1. That the universal occurs through the operation of the agent intellect which takes place prior to every operation of the possible intellect. This operation consists in the production of the intelligible species representing a specific nature which has been abstracted from all individuality. This is spoken of as abstraction of a common nature accomplished by the power of the agent intellect.[15]

[15]Tres igitur in hac re possunt esse opiniones: prima est universale fieri per operationem intellectus agentis quae antecedit omnem operationem intellectus

2. The universal does not come from the agent intellect but rather from the possible intellect through a direct operation of the agent intellect by which the possible intellect knows a common nature according to its precise formal intelligibility and essence. In this operation the possible intellect considers nothing of the lower intelligibilities nor of individuals. Rather, the consideration is solely upon the essence which is common. This position ought necessarily to teach that the possible intellect directly knows the singular, even material things. In this opinion the agent intellect does not abstract the universal from the singular but only abstracts the intelligible species from phantasms which are directly known. What is being

possibilis, et consistit in productione speciei intelligibilis repraesentantis naturam praecisam et abstractam ab omnibus individuis, quae proinde dici solet abstractio naturae communis facta virtute intellectus agentis. Ita significat D. Thomas, I, q. 85, a. 1, in corpore, et ad 4, et a. 3, ad 4, VII Metaph., lect. 13, de Ente et essent., c. 4; et Com., II De Anima, comm. 10, dicens intellectum moveri ad ultimam perfectionem a rebus universalibus, scilicet, repraesentatis in speciebus intelligibilibus . . . Quae sententia supponit imprimis intellectum possibilem directe et ex vi speciei quam recipit ab intellectu agente, non cognoscere singularia materialia sed tantum naturas communes. Ex quo infert speciem productam ab intellectu agente tantum repraesentare directe naturam communem praecisam ab omnibus individuis et consequenter esse universalem in repraesentando. Ex quo tandem fit naturam sic repraesentatam, obiective et denominatione extrinseca fieri universalem per huiusmodi abstractionem; nam si contractione fit singularis et individua, abstractione fiet universalis et communis. Et confirmatur, quia universale est obiectum intellectus agentis et possibilis, illius ut potentiae activae, huius ut passivae seu receptivae; ergo fit per actionem intellectus agentis, antecedit vero operationem intellectus possibilis; nam de ratione potentiae activae est ut faciat obiectum suum, potentia vero passiva supponit illud; ab eo enim pati solet. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, par. 2.



said is that it separates the species from its material conditions.[16]

3. The universal comes about through a comparative knowledge by which the possible intellect, after it apprehends the nature abstractly, compares that nature with the individuals in which the nature exists and understands it as a nature which is appropriately applied to the many singulars and is predicated of them. In this third opinion a

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[16]Secunda opinio est universale non fieri ab intellectu agente, sed a possibili per operationem directam qua cognoscit naturam communem secundum suam praecisam rationem formalem et essentiam, nihil de inferioribus rationibus vel de individuis considerando, neque etiam formaliter et quasi in actu signato considerando communitatem ipsius naturae sed solum essentiam, quae communis est. Hanc sententiam quoad priorem partem negantem in qua differt a praecedente, necessario docere debent qui tenent intellectum possibilem cognoscere directe singularia, etiam materialia. Nam iuxta illam opinionem consequenter dicendum est intellectum agentem, per se loquendo, efficere speciem singularem, non solum in essendo sed etiam in repraesentando rem individuam et singularem; quia non posset eam intellectus primo et directe cognoscere, nisi reciperet speciem proprie et in particulari repraesentantem illam. Quo fit ut iuxta hanc sententiam intellectus agens non abstrahat universale a singularibus solumque dicatur abstrahere speciem intelligibilem a phantasmate quia separat illam a conditionibus materiae, quantum ad esse reale illius, non vero quantum ad obiectum quod repraesentat: producit enim speciem spiritualem et immaterialem in entitate sua, repraesentantem eamdem numero rem individuam quam repraesentat phantasma; non enim repugnat materiale individuum per immaterialem formam seu qualitatem intentionaliter repraesentari. Et in universalitate generis potest hoc confirmari in omni sententia, quia, licet demus intellectum agentem abstrahere illo modo naturam specificam ab individuis, non tamen necesse est quod abstrahat naturam genericam ab speciebus; quia certum est intellectum possibilem posse directe et immediate ferri ad cognoscendam specificam naturam, et intellectum agentem posse efficere speciem intelligibilem quae in repraesentatione sua non abstrahat a differentia specifica, quidquid sit de individuali; ergo tunc non fiet universale quod est genus, per abstractionem intellectus agentis. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, par. 3.

nature actually existing in singulars has universality only remotely speaking, because universality, strictly speaking, is not a positive quality or common to many (as if one thing existing in many), neither is it a negative quality (as if something proper to no singular thing). Rather, the universality is a certain likeness of many things among themselves which provides the occasion and foundation of universality. The point of this position is that universality is not something having true existence, but is only a being or relation of reason. This implies that it has objective existence only in the intellect; it only occurs when there is an act of the intellect, and this means there is a universality only through comparative knowledge.[17]

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[17]Tertia sententia est universale fieri per notitiam comparativam qua intellectus possibilis, postquam naturam praecise et abstracte apprehendit, confert illam sic conceptam cum rebus in quibus existit et intelligit illam ut unum quid aptum ut sit in multis inferioribus et de illis praedicetur. Itaque iuxta sententiam hanc, natura in singularibus existens universalitatem habet solum in potentia remota, quia non est communis vel positive, tamquam aliquid vere unum existens in multis vel etiam negative, tamquam aliquid nulli rei singulari proprium. Sed est tantum in illa quaedam similitudo et convenientia plurium rerum inter se quae praebet occasionem et fundamentum remotum universalitati. Natura vero abstracte cognita dici potest universalis in potentia proxima, quia iam est communis negative, quia concipitur secundum se et non ut propria alicuius individui; nondum tamen censetur esse actu universalis, quia nondum concipitur ut habens aptitudinem et relationem ad multa in quibus sit, quam relationem accipit per notitiam comparativam, et ideo per illam dicitur ultimo constitui universale in actu. Quod ulterius probatur, quia universalitas non est res aliqua habens veram existentiam, sed est tantum ens seu relatio rationis; ergo tantum habet esse obiective in intellectu; ergo tantum est quando actu fit ab intellectu, nam tunc solum est obiective in intellectu; ergo tantum est per notitiam comparativam, quia per eam solam fit seu excogitatur ab intellectu. Confirmatur, nam universale ut universale relativum est, ut

Given these three possible opinions on the production of the universal Suarez now feels he must make a choice among them in order to show the relationship of the intellect to the universal and to the singular. He rejects the first opinion and combines the other two as a resolution to the problem. Suarez accepts a version of intellectual knowledge which allows at one and the same time both knowledge of the universal and direct knowledge of the singular. If the intellect can know the singular directly then there is no need for sense knowledge as a unique operation and the dualism is confirmed on the very basis of unity of operation which, as has been shown in Chapter V, was Suarez' strongest argument leading to a structural unity of the human being.

In his rejection of the first opinion Suarez states that the opinion is probably only on the supposition that the agent intellect does not produce a species representing the individual. This supposition, however, is to be rejected because the agent intellect never impresses a species representing only a difference but rather impresses a

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patet, tum ex eius definitione; per suum enim correlativum definitur, scilicet: Est unum in multis et de multis; tum ex suis speciebus, ut sunt genus, species differentia, etc.; haec enim relative dicuntur, ut constat et definitionibus a Porphyrio datis in praedicabilibus; relativa autem sunt simul natura et cognitione; ergo universale in actu non est eo modo quo esse potest, scilicet, obiective in intellectu, donec eius correlativum eodem modo sit; non potest autem esse illo modo donec unum ad alterum conferatur, quod fit solum per dictam comparativam notitiam; ergo. Et huic opinioni favet D. Thomas, qui ubique docet relationis rationis tantum esse in apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri, ut I, q. 28, a. 1, in corp, et ad 4 . . . Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, par. 5.

specific nature. Just as the phantasm does not represent something in the individual through the manner of a form but through the manner of the whole individual, so the agent intellect produces a species representing the total specific nature of the individual not merely a difference. The agent intellect is not free in its action but naturally impresses a species only on the basis of the definite phantasm presented to it. Neither is the intellect constructed so that it would be able to conceive a nature at one time in one way and then conceive it afterwards in another way.[18] The

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[18]Inter has sententias, prima est quidem probabilis ex suppositione illius sententiae, quod intellectus agens non producit species repraesentantes individua, et adhuc ea supposita, non procedit generaliter de omni universali sed ad summum de specifico et de solo illo formaliter loquendo, ut ratio quaedam supra facta probat. Et amplius declarari potest, quia imprimis certum est intellectum agentem nunquam imprimere speciem repraesentantem solam differentiam, ut differentia est, sed totam specificam naturam. Quia, sicut phantasma non repraesentat in individuo aliquid per modum formae sed per modum totius individui ita intellectus agens producit speciem repraesentatem totam naturam specificam individui per modum totius nec potest praescindere seu immutare actionem istam ut tunc producat unam speciem repraesentantem differentiam per modum formae, deinde producat aliam repraesentantem totam naturam specificam per modum totius; quia neque est liber in agendo, sed naturaliter imprimit speciem quantum potest, supposito tali phantasmate; neque est cognoscitivus ut nunc possit uno modo naturam concipere, postea alio. Unde in proprio et accidente, quamvis demus efficere species repraesentantes illa in communi abstrahendo ab individuis, tamen unumquodque eorum ex vi talis speciei intelligibilis solum repraesentatur ut quid commune multis individuis in ea ratione similibus. Et idem suo modo est in gradu generico, si forte aliquando ob imbecillitatem phantasmatis producatur species intelligibilis repraesentans praecise illum gradum; nam, sicut phantasma tunc repraesentat solum hoc animal, verbi gratia, ita species intelligibilis ab illo sumpta repraesentabit gradum animalis solum ut abstractum et praecisum a similibus individuis. Et hac ratione dicimus, etiam supposita illa sententia, per hanc abstractionem intellectus agentis, per se non abstrahi naturam



substance of Suarez' objection here is the manner of presentation of the intelligible species; this presentation does not take place as the first opinion would have it. The intelligible species is presented as a whole not simply as a group of abstracted differences. This means that the intellect must in some sense know the individual.

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specificam. Obiicies hunc discursum fieri posse de abstractione facta per conceptionem intellectus possibilis praesertim quoad universale proprii et accidentis. Respondeo non esse parem rationem, ut patebit ex his quae sectione sequenti dicemus.

Addo ergo ulterius, si proprie ac vere intelligatur ratio et natura speciei intelligibilis, satis improprie dici per hanc abstractionem fieri naturam universalem, quia iuxta veram sententiam, species impressa neque est formalis imago neque ullo modo formaliter repraesentat, sed effective quatenus est veluti semen seu instrumentum obiecti ad efficiendam formalem repraesentationem intentionalem, quae fit per conceptum mentis. Unde natura non dicitur esse proprie obiective repraesentata in specie impressa nisi valde remote et mediate, quatenus illa species est effectiva actus, cui natura illa obiicitur. Ac denique etsi demus universale aliquo modo fieri per abstractionem intellectus agentis, id solum erit in habitu seu in actu primo; ex quo fit, multo magis ac perfectius fieri per actum secundum proportionatum illi actui primo, ut supra argumentabar. Omitto primam illam sententiam procedere ex falsa hypothesi; simpliciter enim veirus est, speciem impressam ab intellectu agente non abstrahere a repraesentatione eiusdem individui repraesentati in phantasmate sed solum a materialitate reali et entitativa ipsius phantasmatis sine qua esse potest repraesentatio eiusdem individui, quantumvis materialis; hanc enim non repugnat esse aut fieri per formam seu qualitatem aut entitatem spiritualem, ut in angelis et in Deo ipso patet. Quod si non repugnat, nulla potest afferri physica ratio ob quam non possit talis forma vel species ab intellectu agente fieri; sine ratione autem id negandum non est, cum hoc sit magis consentaneum et variis experimentis et naturali ordini cognoscendi et fini et activitati naturali ipsius intellectus agentis, qui ad hoc datur ut media actione spirituali intellectum possibilem redat similem repraesentationi phantasmatis, quantum potest, quod latius hic persequi et probare, alienum esset a praesenti instituto. Iuxta hanc vero sententiam constat abstractionem universalis nullo modo fieri ex necessitate ab intellectu agente, immo et fortasse nullo modo fieri posse; nam, si intellectus agens semel ponitur productivus specierum rerum

Having rejected the first opinion, Suarez now works out his own position on the production of the universal and the knowledge of the singular. He begins by pointing out that the universal can be conceived by us in two ways--1. as something absolute in its being which is able to be the foundation of a certain relationship. In this interpretation the universal would be like a Platonic form. 2. As a being of reason pointing to an order among actually existing beings. The first way leads to a kind of universal substance as if "man" the universal were subsisting separate from every contraction of that universal. The people who think of the universal as something real, consider the relationship between the universal and the individual as minimal. Either there is not a sufficient distinction between the individual and the nature to bring about a real relation or the nature itself does not have sufficient being for founding the relation, since it would not have singular being as such. One cannot, then, simply accept the universal as something absolute in its being.[19] This leads to the

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singularium, verisimile est nunquam posse producere species repraesentantes naturas abstractas a singularibus; sed de hoc latius suo loco. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, pars. 6-7.

[19]Omissa ergo prima sententia, ut de aliis duabus iudicemus advertendum est universale dupliciter posse a nobis concipi vel denominari. Primo, ut quid absolutum secundum esse, quod potest relationem aliquam fundare. Secundo, ut relativum secundum esse dicens ordinem ad inferiora. Primo modo intelligeretur substantia universalis, si esset homo a parte rei subsistens separatus ab omni contractione, iuxta platonicam opinionem; neque esset universalis propter relationem realem secundum esse ad inferiora, sed propter unitatem suam cum intrinseca et substantiali aptitudine ad existendum in multis. Ad quem



rejection of the second opinion of the way universals are produced, for the Platonic interpretation of universality is unacceptable. What Suarez does want to hold onto from this opinion, however, is the notion that the intelligible species is presented as a whole to the possible intellect. That is, abstraction does not mean the intellect knows only the universal but also the singular.

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fere modum dicebant doctores citati sectione praecedenti naturam in statu potentiali, quem habere fingitur ante existentiam in individuis, habere universalitatem quamdam quae non consistit in relatione secundum esse sed in proprietate quadam absoluta naturae habentis talem unitatem et communitatem; hoc solet vocari ab aliquibus universale ante rem; quod si esset, absolutum esset; tamen revera nullum est. Immo, et qui ponunt universale actu in ipsis individuis realiter existens, quod vocant universale in re, non ponunt universalitatem eius in relatione. Nam putant universalitatem esse realem, relationem autem minime, quia vel inter naturam et individua non est sufficiens distinctio in re ad relationem realem; vel natura, ut praescindit ab individuis, non habet sufficientem entitatem ad fundandam relationem realem, cum non habeat ut sic entitatem singularem in qua posit talis relatio fundari. Ponunt ergo universalitatem hanc in proprietate absoluta, quae est unitas quaedam et communitas talis naturae. Haec ergo exempla, quamvis vera non sint, declarant tamen conceptum universalis ut sic non esse conceptum rei relative secundum esse, sed rei absolutae habentis modum talem essendi, in quo habeat indifferentiam et aptitudinem essendi in multis. Nec refert quod haec aptitudo videatur per modum respectus explicari. Nam sicut in potentia reali intelligimus respectum transcendentalem et secundum dici, priorem respectu praedicamentali secundum esse et inclusum in re absoluta, ita in praesenti possumus concipere hanc aptitudinem rei universalis ut absolutam quidem in se, licet explicetur per modum respectus transcendentalis. Et hinc fit ulterius ut haec aptitudo, quia concipitur ad modum potentiae habentis saltem transcendentalem ordinem ad ea quibus potest se communicare, possit etiam intelligi ut fundamentum sufficiens ad relationem vel habitudinem ad ea quibus potest re communicare quae habitudo concipitur ut quaedam relatio secundum esse, et dici etiam potest universalitas quaedam, cum sit habitudo unius ad multa in quibus esse potest vel de quibus potest praedicari. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, par. 8.



At this point Suarez turns to the third opinion on the way universals are produced to show that production of the universal comes through a comparison of various intelligible species. This fits with the conception of the universal as a being of reason. In other words, the universal is something relative in its being, simply pointing to an order among singulars. The universal is of reason and occurs through a certain action of the mind. The intellect knows the whole intelligible species and by a certain comparison among these species comes to a knowledge of the universal.[20]

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[20]Universale igitur priori modo conceptum fit per directam operationem intellectus, quae praecise et abstracte concipit naturam communem absque differentiis contrahentibus; quod satis probant rationes factae in secunda opinione. Et confirmari potest evertendo fundamentum opinionis tertiae; quia non est de ratione universalis relatio aliqua secundum esse; ergo, quamvis in natura sic abstracta non intelligatur aliqua relatio secundum esse ad inferiora, potest intelligi actu universalis. Patet consequentia, quia si illa relatio non est necessaria, nihil aliud deesse potest, quia ibi est natura communis et ad modum subsistentis abstracte ab individuis. Unde ita se habet in eo statu per intellectum, sicut se haberet realiter, si a parte rei subsisteret extra individua; sed tunc esset realiter universalis; ergo et nunc est intellectualiter universalis, ut sic dicam. Tandem in natura sic concepta est nova unitas rationis quia habet unum conceptum obiectivum indivisibilem in plures similes; habet etiam communitatem seu aptitudinem ut insit multis et de iis praedicetur; ergo nihil illi deest ad rationem universalis.

At vero loquendo de relatione universalitatis prout a nobis concipitur ad modum relationis secundum esse, haec non potest resultare per solam abstractionem sed eo modo quo est, fit per comparationem, quia, ut suppono haec relatio non est realis sed rationis; ergo non est in natura ipsa dum absolute et abstracte cogitatur, quia ex vi illius actionis, illa non refertur per intellectum quia intellectus nondum comparat illam ad sua inferiora, neque etiam refertur realiter; ergo nondum est talis relatio. Et hoc satis etiam probant rationes adductae in tertia sententia. Quocirca, si illae duae opiniones unum affirment et aliud non excludant, non sunt inter se contrariae neque unius rationes contra aliam procedunt. Quia nihil obstat quod eidem naturae



Suarez now explains the way in which this comparison takes place. There are two possible manners for comparison. First, a common nature can be abstracted by means of cutting away the nature from a single being of a given kind. This can take place apart from any comparison either of the higher concept to some lower ones or of the comparison of lower ones among themselves: for example, when I cut away from Peter alone all of his individual properties and rest only on a consideration of human nature. Some would say this is not genuine universal knowledge because there is only one individual involved. It is, however, Suarez maintains true universal knowledge in that the abstraction takes place from a direct knowledge of a total intelligible species. The universal knowledge here is limited, however, in that it does not suffice for a realization of the superiority of the universal over the individual. Secondly, the common nature can be abstracted by means of a comparison of

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possit per intellectum convenire duplex ratio universalitatis, absoluta, scilicet, et respectiva, et quod illae per diversas operationes intellectus fabricentur, et quod una, scilicet, quae absoluta est, sit proximum fundamentum alterius, scilicet, relativae. Neque etiam repugnat aliquid convenire naturae per intellectum et esse per modum absoluti, quando illud huiusmodi est ut solum per extrinsecam denominationem conveniat; sic enim naturam esse abstractam seu universaliter conceptam non addit naturae nisi esse quoddam conveniens illi per extrinsecam denominationem; quod esse obiectivam appellatur. Sicut esse visum vel esse cognitum non est aliquod esse reale additum rebus, nec formaliter consistit in relatione rationis, sed in denominatione proveniente ab actu videndi vel cognoscendi, super quam potest intellectus fabricare relationem rationis, si unum cum altero conferat; ita ergo est in praesenti. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, pars. 9-10.



singulars or similar kinds of beings among themselves, as when comparing Peter and Paul a person knows they are alike in their human nature. This comparison demands the initial type of cutting away described above for it supposes that such a nature can be known of both singulars. But this second means of comparison presupposes such a nature as separated from singular individuals. This comparison only adds a knowledge of the similarity of many lower beings in an abstract nature. This comparison as such does not pertain to the constitution of the universals themselves as real beings but to the consideration of a certain relation existing among many particulars.[21]

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[21]Sed adhuc superest circa has opiniones explicandum qualis sit haec cognitio praecisiva vel comparativa, per quam fit universale utroque modo dictum. Variis enim modis potest universalis natura praescindi vel comparari. Primo enim abstrahi potest natura communis per puram praecisionem naturae ab uno inferiori absque ulla compartione vel superioris conceptus ad aliquem inferiorem vel ipsorum inferiorum inter se, ut quando a solo Petro simpliciter praescindo individuantes proprietates et sisto in humanae naturae consideratione. Et per hanc notitiam pure praecisivam putant aliqui nullum universale fieri. Verius tamen est per eam etiam fieri universale absolutum, iuxta ea quae de secunda opinione diximus. Nam hoc etiam probant rationes factae; quamquam haec notitia non sufficiat ad cognoscendam in natura sic concepta universalitatem seu superioritatem quam habet, ut iam dicam.

Secundo abstrahi potest natura communis per comparationem singularium seu inferiorum inter se, ut quando conferendo Petrum cum Paulo cognosco eos esse inter se similes in natura humana. Quae comparatio supponit priorem praecisionem, nam supponit de utroque singulari cognosici esse talis naturae; unde supponit conceptum talis naturae ut praescinditur a singulis individuis. Unde per hanc compartionem solum additur cognitio convenientiae et similitudinis plurium inferiorum in tali abstracta ac praecisa natura. Haec autem comparatio ulterius potest subdistingui, quatenus per eam considerari potest vel sola habitudo particularium inter se ut inter se habent habitudinem similium, et haec comparatio ut sic non pertinet ad constitutionem universalis



After the intellect apprehends that Peter and Paul are alike in their being as men, it considers the predicate "man" to apply to both Peter and Paul as something common to singulars. In this comparison rests the totality of the intelligibility of "man," for through this operation there arises in the mind the capacity for seeing one common thing in many individuals.[22]

Once Suarez allows the intellect to have direct knowledge of the singular the hope for achieving a unity of operation in knowledge is lost. In rejecting the first position on the production of the universal he blurs the distinction between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. The blurring of itself is not terribly dangerous but what Suarez does with it destroys any hope of unity of operation for the human being. The senses produce phantasms which of their very nature are singular and material; this is the

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sed ad considerationem cuiusdam relationis mutuae inter ipsa particularia. Vel quatenus per eam consideratur habitudo naturae communis ad particularia in quibus existit. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, pars. 11-12.

[22]Postquam enim intellectus apprehendit Petrum et Paulum esse similes in esse hominis, rursus considerat hoc praedicatum homo habere se ad Petrum et Paulum ut quid commune ad particularia; et in hac comparatione videtur consummari ratio universalis, etiam respectivi; per eam enim consurgit in mente, vel potius in re menti obiecta, habitudo rationis unius rei communis ad plura. Ultra vero intelligi potest alia notitia magis reflexa, quam intellectus facit cognoscendo quisi in actu signato naturam sic abstractam et cum suis inferioribus collatam, inde habere denominationes generis, speciei et similes, hasque denominationes esse rationis, non rei. Haec autem cognitio iam non est fabricatio universalitatis, sed est quaedam eius contemplatio magis formalis et expressa. Disp. Meta. VI, Sect. 6, par. 12.



unique contribution of the senses. The intellect produces the intelligible species which in Suarez is also singular but immaterial. He gives no explanation of how one gets from phantasm to intelligible species. It is only on the level of intelligible species that the necessary comparison takes place in order that the intellect can produce a universal; the intelligible species is of itself singular. What has happened here is that Suarez has destroyed the unique contribution of the senses to human knowledge. The intelligible species have to be produced from some sort of direct knowledge which is non-sensate in its origin. If it is sensate in origin the intelligible species is nothing more than a phantasm and Suarez clearly thinks of it as superior to a mere phantasm.

The result of this investigation into the operation of knowing is that Suarez cannot establish genuine unity of operation between the soul and the body. His analysis of sense knowledge although incomplete in the Disputationes, is concerned only with the relationship of the senses to each other and with detailing the hierarchy of the senses. The senses know only the singular material things. The intellect in traditional scholastic philosophy, especially Thomism, does not know the singular directly but only the universal. The Thomistic position would by these means attempt to derive a continuity in knowledge. Suarez as has been seen rejects this position in favor of a direct intellectual knowledge of the singular. But, if the intellect

can directly know the singular then there is no need for the contribution of the body (i.e., sense knowledge) and the unity of operation in the knowing system is destroyed. Suarez' attitude toward knowledge, then is dualistic and only enhances the dualism of body and soul. It does not destroy it.

Willing in a Dualistic Context

In the previous sections of this chapter it has been shown that Suarez cannot establish a continuity between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. The consequence of this was to destroy the argument from unity of operation as a means of establishing the per se unity of man. A similar situation occurs with respect to the appetitive system in the human being.[23] In Chapter V it was noted that once the soul is separated from the body it can no longer move other bodies. The question arose at that point, what allows the soul to move any body at all? That is, it is easy enough to see that if the soul is united to its body by substantial union it can move other bodies using its own as an intermediary. It is precisely the substantial union of body

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[23]As with knowledge the system of appetites is conceived of as a series of operative potencies or capacities to accomplish certain operations. The system of appetites, however, is not as complex as the system of knowledge. As with knowledge there are two levels of appetition of concern here. The sense appetites which are further divided into concupiscible and the irascible are material powers. The rational appetite or the will is an immaterial power.

and soul, however, that is the problem.[24] Put very directly, what allows an immaterial principle to move a material principle? Once again a continuity between the two principles must be established.

Unlike the treatment of the cognitive system, in which the terminology is endowed with a generally accepted meaning, the terms used in the treatment of appetite are somewhat special to Suarez. It is necessary first to detail the vocabulary to be used; this will give a clue as to where the continuity if any in the appetitive system lies. The question of different kinds of appetites arises initially in Disputation I, Section 6, paragraphs 3 to 5. In this section Suarez explains what Aristotle means in Book 1, Chapter I of the Metaphysics by the phrase, "All men by nature desire to know." It is an analysis of the term "desire" that prompts the discussion of appetite. Implied in the analysis is the opinion that "desiring" or "tending" is the domain of a system of operations separate from but parallel to the cognitive system.

Initially, when one talks of "having an appetite" or of "desiring" one can presuppose the common distinction between "innate appetites" and "elicited appetites." The "innate appetites" are only improperly and metaphorically called appetites. The reason for this is that they are nothing other than the natural propensity each thing has

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[24]Cf. Chapter V for a further explanation of the problem with the soul moving any body whatsoever.

toward something good. In a passive power this is the natural capacity of the power to be able to accomplish its purpose. One can say, for example, that a person has an innate appetite to see. In active powers, however, the innate appetite is the natural faculty for acting. That is, a living being has a natural faculty for nourishment. The important thing here is that in innate appetites, the appetite does not add anything beyond the very nature of the being in question. In a word, an "innate appetite" is nothing more than the tendency a thing has to operate in a certain way because it is a definite kind of thing.[25]

The "elicited appetite" is properly speaking an appetite, because it tends to the good precisely as good. This appetite tends by means of a proper act as opposed to an "automatic act" as in the innate appetite. There are two aspects to the elicited appetite--the faculty and the appetition itself. With respect to appetitive faculties there

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[25]Circa quod imprimis sensum Aristotelis exponere oportet, deinde propositionis veritatem. Tres ergo termini in illa propositione declarandi sunt; prior est appetere vel desiderare. Circa quem supponenda est primo vulgaris distinctio duplicis appetitus innati et elicitivi. Prior improprie ac metaphorice dictus est appetitus; proprie vero nihil aliud est quam naturalis propensio quam unaquaeque res habet in aliquod bounum, quae inclinatio in potentiis passivis nihil aliud est quam naturalis capacitas et proportio cum sua perfectione, in activis vero est ipsa naturalis facultas agendi. Itaque in his ominibus appetitus non addit aliquid ultra ipsam rei naturam, vel proximam facultatem, ratione cuius convenit rei talis appetitus. Neque in hoc appetitu distingui potest actus primus et secundus, quia hoc modo appetere non est agere aliquid, sed solum habere innatam talem propensionem, qualem habet gravitas ad centrum, etiamsi nihil agat. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 3.

are two of them, sense appetite and rational appetite (i.e., the will). If one considers these two faculties in themselves there is one understanding in which they too may be called innate because they are given with a nature and have a natural tendency to their object and to their act. But these faculties are to be distinguished from the type of innate appetite spoken of earlier since sense appetites and will tend to the good formally and in so far as it is good. The second aspect of elicited appetite is the act of appetition. This is nothing other than the operation of the elicited appetite, which loves or desires a good. This appetite is never innate in human beings. That is, neither on the sensate nor on the rational level does a human being tend by an innate capacity to the good as good.[26]

This set of definitions helps to locate where the continuity between appetites must be placed. One cannot find the requisite continuity in the innate appetites

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[26]Appetitus elicitivus est proprie appetitus quia fertur in bonum ut bonum, illudque per proprium actum potest appetere. Unde duo sunt in hoc appetitu (loquimur in creaturis): unum est facultas appetendi, aliud appetitio ipsa. Primum retinuit iam nomen appetitus, qui in sensitivum et rationalem dividitur; et hic appetitus ut sic, etiam est innatus, si generatim de innato loquamur, quia cum ipsa natura datus est, et habet naturalem propensionem ad suum obiectum et ad suum actum. Quia vero ita est innatus ut sit etiam elicitivus actualis appetitionis, qua tendit in bonum formaliter, et quatenus bonum est, atque ita sit propiissime appetitus, ideo condistinguitur ab appetitu pure innato et metaphorico; sic enim prior divisio accipienda est. Secundum, id est, actus appetendi, qui proprie dicitur appetitio, vel appetitus elicitus, nihil aliud est quam actus elicitus ab appetitu eliciente, quod amat vel desiderat bonum; et hic appetitus nunquam est innatus saltem in nobis, de quibus in praesenti agimus; interdum vero est naturalis, ut inferius ex professo magis declarabo. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 3.

because they are quasi-automatic and are taken care of solely on the physical level. If Suarez is going to have a continuity of the appetitive system he must find it in the elicited appetites properly called, that is in the act of appetition by which a person actively pursues the good. For example, the good of physical health is sought by a person and issues in the positive physical action of consuming only nutritious foods. What must occur in this case is an action of the will as seeking a general good and then the particular action of eating only good foods. The emphasis here is on the process from tendency to a general good to a precise physical action. This, of course, in the scholastic approach, implies an underlying power or capacity. Therefore, the will which is the faculty of the general good must be continuous with the sense appetites which tend toward particular goods. But the will is a rational, immaterial power and the sense appetites are physical powers.

Lest one think that the elicited appetite is somehow beyond the nature of the human, Suarez next details the various ways in which appetite can be considered "natural" but not "innate." An appetite can be called natural simply because it has been given by nature, but the effect of such an appetite is not caused through a proper action of the person himself. That is, the effect is given rather than determined by the person. For example, there is a natural appetite of the eye to see; it is not determined by an act of the person's will what the function of the eye is to be.

In this way every innate appetite is natural. Sometimes, however, an appetite is called "natural" when it occurs necessarily from an intrinsic tendency of the nature. Although absolutely speaking and in itself this appetite is not given by the nature but occurs on account of elicited appetite strictly so called. This occurs as natural in people when they are hungry or thirsty and lack food or drink. The result is an elicited appetite (i.e., an act of appetition) of searching for food; this kind of appetition is natural to man, and the sense appetites are the proper faculties of this tending. The will, however, in its act is a different case because while it is a natural appetite in man it is not always natural because it is also free. The situation can be explained by the ability of the will to delay the acquisition of an immediate good for a more significant good at a later date. Finally, sometimes "natural" is opposed to "violent;" this means only that the natural is in accord with nature while violent means in disharmony with the nature of the being.[27] The importance of

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[27]Alter igitur terminus exponendus erat naturaliter; appetitus enim naturalis multipliciter dicitur; interdum enim naturale dicitur, quod ab ipsa natura datum est, neque est effectum per propriam ipsius hominis, verbi gratia, actionem seu effectionem. Et hoc modo omnis appetitus innatus naturalis est, et ipse etiam appetitus elicitivus; non tamen appetitus seu actus elicitus, ut ex data terminorum expositione satis constat. Aliquando vero dicitur naturale, quod necessario fit ex intrinseca propensione naturae, etiamsi absolute et in se non sit a natura datum, sed ab appetente factum; et hoc modo est homini naturalis appetitus qui est fames aut sitis, quando deficit cibus aut potus; qua ratione appetitus elicitus naturalis esse potest, et in appetitu sensitivo ex se semper

this discussion of natural appetite is the fact that Suarez feels that all appetites are "natural" to the human being up to and including some aspects of willing. With the elicited appetite of the will (i.e., the act of the will), however, there are times because of its freedom when it chooses beyond a natural propensity. What this means to do is set the will beyond the sense appetites in some of its acts.

Having outlined the differences between innate and elicited appetite, and having detailed the meaning of "natural" when speaking of appetite, Suarez now turns to the type of necessity proper to appetition. One can speak of necessity in two ways--with respect to the exercise of the appetite and with respect to the specification of the appetite. Necessity with respect to the exercise of the appetite occurs when an appetite elicits or exercises the act of appetition on account of some definite need. This kind of necessity is found in the sense appetites, but cannot be

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talis est; in voluntate vero licet interdum talis appetitus sit naturalis, non tamen semper, quia libera est. Omitto interdum sumi naturale ut a supernaturali distinguitur, quo sensu apud naturales philosophos, seu procedendo ex solo lumine naturae, ut nunc loquimur, omnis appetitus naturalis est, nam supernaturalis appetendi modus, qui per gratiam fit, non potest naturali ratione investigari. Aliquando etiam sumitur naturale ut violento opponitur, ut est frequens in philosophia. Atque his etiam duobus modis appetitus elicitus, etiam si liber sit, naturalis tamen esse potest, ut per se constat. Immo interdum dicitur naturalis appetitus elicitus, hoc ipso quod est naturae consentaneus, et opponitur ei, quod est praeternaturale tamquam naturae dissonum, etiam si violentum non sit; quo modo appetitus virtutis naturalis est, vitii autem minime. Quo tandem fit ut multo magis naturalis dicatur appetitus ille ad quem ipsa naturae propensio necessitatem infert; et ideo appetitus necessarius, tanetsi elicitus, naturalis merito vocari potest. Disp. Meta. I, Sect. 6, par. 4.



found in the rational appetite in this life, but only in the life of the blessed. The reason is that sense appetites deal with particular goods; the will may deal with an absolute good. One does not, however, find an absolute good in the present life. With respect to specification, one finds that the will does not exercise its act of appetition from necessity; but if it should exercise its act in this way, it would do so necessarily. Such an act is called necessary with respect to specification not with respect to exercise. Lack of necessity of specification, then, is a distinguishing mark of the will. The sense appetites are necessitated both in exercise and in specification. The will is necessitated only once its act is specified freely.

At this point the sense appetites and the will appear to be very distinct powers with almost no relationship to each other than the fact that both are appetites. In order to establish a continuity Suarez must show that these appetites are elicited, natural and necessitated in the same way. But to do this either turns the will into a sophisticated sense appetite or spiritualizes the sense appetites in such a way that they are superfluous in the sense that the will could accomplish their job by itself.[28]

Just as universal knowledge is a distinguishing

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[28]A similar situation occurs with respect to the intellect/sense relationship on the cognitive side. That is, the intellect's ability to know the singular directly obviates any real need for the unique contribution of the senses.

characteristic of a spiritual substance, so only a rational agent is capable of freedom. It is Suarez' contention that everything lacking reason also lacks freedom by reason of imperfection in being. The contrary is also true, that every rational or intellectual agent is also a free agent. This is shown by the fact that human beings are free agents, if one is willing to grant that they are the lowest grade of intellectual substances. Therefore, one can say that every created agent which has an intellect also has freedom.[29]

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[29]In tertia et quarta ratione dubitandi, sect. 2 propositis, petitur ut distinctius declaremus quaenam sint causae creatae quae in agendo non subduntur necessitati, et per quam facultatem hoc dominium habeant. Et quidem de causis principalibus seu operantibus ut quod, facilius est resolutio ex dictis; ostendimus enim res omnes ratione carentes carere etiam libertate ob imperfectionem suam. Quo fit ut e contrario omnia agentia rationalia seu intellectualia sint etiam agentia libera; nam illa negatio usus rationis est sufficiens et adaequata ratio carentiae libertatis; ergo opposita affirmatio est etiam adaequata ratio oppositae affirmationis. Et confirmatur; nam ostensum est in particulari hominem esse agens liberum, licet in gradu intellectuali sit infimum omnium; ergo a fortiori dicendum est omnia agentia creata quae intellectum habent habere etiam libertatem. Quod iterum de intelligentiis creatis in particulari dicemus infra de eis disputantes. Neque contra hoc obstat argumentum sumptum ex motibus aut influentiis caelorum. Nam quod attinet ad intelligentias motrices caelorum, etsi in aliis rebus liberae sint, possunt in movendis caelis necessitate aliqua duci, vel ex motione et imperio superioris agentis vel ex fine praeconcepto, quem immutabiliter diligunt atque intendunt. Quod vero ad influentiam caelorum attinet, dicendum est illam non extendi directe ac per se ad res spirituales et immateriales, tum quia solum influunt per physicam motum, cuius res spiritualis incapax est, tum etiam quia res spiritualis est ordinis superioris, et ideo in eam directe agere non potest res materiales. Animi autem hominum in se immateriales sunt et libertatem habent quatenus immateriales sunt et per immaterialem potentiam operantur, et ideo influentia caelorum non potest libertatis usum hominibus impedire, etiamsi indirecte medio corpore et affectibus eius possit illos in alterutram partem magis aut minus inclinare, quam

This is a type of argument which is quite common in scholasticism. One goes from the attributes of the lower grade to higher grades of being. The present concern is how to prove that man is free.

Suarez, in Disputation XIX, Section 2, gives two proofs that human beings are free. He tells the reader that it is evident by natural reason and by experience that humans do not act from necessity in many of their acts, but rather from their own will and from freedom. This conclusion, he says, is proven first from the common consensus of philosophers.[30] More importantly, however, he offers a

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inclinationem potest homo sua libertate superare et astris dominari.

Spiritualis substantia liberae actionis radicale principium.--Ex quo ulterius constat principium principale quo liberae actionis semper esse substantiam aliqum seu substantialem formam spiritualem. Probatur quia huiusmodi principium vel est anima rationalis vel aliqua superior substantia; sed anima rationalis est immaterialis, et multo magis omnis superior substantia: ergo. Et confirmatur, nam omnis forma materialis, quatenus talis est, operatur absque intelligentia et ratione, et ideo operatur modo mere naturali; ergo forma quae est principium liberae actionis esse debet spiritualis. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 5, pars. 1-2.

[30]This is an argument from authority and consequently is very weak philosophically. Suarez' text follows:

Secundo dicendum est omnes causas quae operantur absque usus rationis, quatenus tales sunt, operari cum praedicta necessitate. Hoc sumitur ex Aristotele, lib. IX Metaph., c. 2, ubi hoc discrimen constituit inter potentias rationales et irrationales, quod potentiae irrationales sunt determinatae ad unum, rationales vero sunt indifferentes ad opposita. Quid vero intelligat per potentias rationales, et an omnibus conveniat ille operandi modus, infra videbimus; nunc solum asserimus factultates omnes quae rationis usu omnino carent naturali necessitate suas operationes exercere. Quod etiam inductione confirmare potest; ita enim experimento constat in omnibus rerum gradibus usque ad bruta animalia. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 1, par. 12.



proof from experience. We realize that it is in our power to do something or to omit something. In order to decide we use reason, argumentation and consultation so that we may be inclined to one or the other action. There is, therefore, an election of choice posed to us. This power of deliberation and consultation would be superfluous if people did not have freedom. For, it happens that the usual manner of governing human actions is through counsel, laws, precepts, exhortations, threats of punishment, and admonitions. All of these would be useless if man were necessitated by nature and did not operate freely.[31]

These arguments lead Suarez to the general proposition that a spiritual substance is the radical principle of a free act. A spiritual substance must either be a rational

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[31]Solum posset de appetitu sensitivo hominis dubitari, cui aliqui tribuunt nescio quod libertatis vestigium. Immo sunt qui id extendant ad appetitum brutorum, ut inferius iterum attingemus. Sed in ea re, quae in theologia latius disputatur, veritas est, si quod est participium libertatis in appetitu sensitivo hominis, in tantum esse in quantum est participium rationis in cogitativa hominis. Quod si in hac non est vera ratiocinatio, ut revera non est, neque in illo per se sumpto est vera libertas quae excludat necessitatem operandi positis omnibus requisitis. Et ita hoc exemplo potius confirmatur et quasi consummatur inductio facta. Ratio autem eius est quia adaequata radix libertatis est usus rationis ut infra videbimus, et ideo carentia usus rationis est etiam adaequata causa carentiae libertatis, et consequenter necessitatis in operando. Quod si intrinsecam et quasi positivam radicem huius modi operandi inquiramus, nulla est alia nisi ipsa natura talium rerum vel facultatem, quae ex natura sua habent hanc determinationem in modo operandi, eo quod non sint adeo perfectae ut participare possint dominium suarum operationum. Item quia indifferentia in operando intrinsece et adaequate oritur ex amplitudine rationalis facultatis ut infra declarabimus; sicut autem affirmatio est causa affirmationis, ita negatio negationis. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 1, par. 13.

soul or some higher substance (e.g., an angel or God). Since the rational soul is immaterial any higher substance can be assumed to be immaterial and free. This is proven from the fact that every material form in so far as it is material operates apart from intelligence and reason. That is, it operates in a merely natural manner (i.e., all of its operations are determined). A form which is going to be a principle of free action ought to be spiritual.[32]

Suarez, as has been seen over and over in this study, places a gap between the spiritual and the material in such a way that there is no means to bridge the two. In this instance to maintain freedom on the human level, he places it in the rational soul, a spiritual substance. But, there is no explanation how this freely choosing spiritual substance influences a material body. This material body is governed by completely determined operations.[33]

Holding onto the dictum that the proximate principle of a free act is some power of a spiritual substance in so far as it is spiritual or intellectual, Suarez adds that in the human soul which has multiple faculties many of them are material because they are not appropriate to the soul as intellectual (i.e., senses, nutritive faculty

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[32]Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 5, par. 2. Cf. footnote 29 of this chapter for the Suarezian text.

[33]Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 1, par. 12.

and sense appetites).[34] This is an amazing assertion. How can a spiritual substance have material faculties? The dualism makes its presence felt at this point. There is no way given the uniqueness of the human soul as seen in Chapter V, that Suarez can consistently make this statement. He made the practical implications of the dualism less severe in the system of knowledge by allowing direct knowledge of the singular by the intellectual power, but he did not talk about a spiritual substance having material faculties. On the appetitive side, though, he is talking about a spiritual power influencing a material principle and the only way this can work is if all human powers belong to the soul, even the material ones. But, then there is no need for a personal body, or organs, or any other union with matter.

Suarez feels he can solve this problem of how the act of the will issues in physical action. He does this by distinguishing within the soul two kinds of acts--elicited and commanded. An elicited act of the will is the will's actual initiating of an action; the emphasis is on the beginning of the action. A commanded act of the will is the will's ability to act as an agent, the emphasis is on the efficient causality. An elicited act is closest to the

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[34]Tertio, hinc etiam constat principium proximum actionis liberae esse potentiam aliquam substantiae spiritualis quatenus spiritualis seu intellectualis est. Quod addo propter animam humanam, quae, licet plures habeat facultates, multae tamen earum materiales sunt, quia non conveniunt illi quatenus intellectualis est et ideo non sunt principium proximum liberae actionis. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 5, par. 3.

power which brings about efficient action. The commanded act is removed from the power. That is, the will has the ability to set itself into motion and can also set the lower powers into motion by means of commanded acts.[35] In human beings the operation would function as follows: the will elicits an act (e.g., move your hand from the heat!); this act is relayed by means of a commanded act to the sense appetite which brings about the required physical action (e.g., the actual moving of the hand from the heat). This scheme would work except for two problems--1. the spiritual substance cannot have genuinely material powers even though Suarez says it is possible, and 2, even if one grant that it could have such powers the problem still remains concerning how these powers are related to the body.

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[35]Solum est animadvertendum dupliciter actionem aliquam denominari liberam, scilicet, ut actum elicitum seu proxime in ordine ad potentiam efficientem actionem, quomodo ipsum velle liberum est, vel ut actum imperatum seu remote in ordine ad potentiam moventem seu applicantem inferiorem facultatem ad agendum, quomodo ambulare est liberum. Cum ergo agimus proximo principio actionis liberae, intelligendum est de actione proprie libera in ordine ad suum immediatum principium, et hoc modo dicimus principium proximum actionis liberae esse facultatem spiritualem; nam principium proximum actionis quae solum imperative libera est interdum esse potest facultas materialis ut est potentia motiva secundum locum residens in membris corporis, quia illa esse potest subordinata superiori substantiae spirituali, in qua est propria vis dominativa in suum actum et mediante illo in inferiorem potentiam et actionem eius. Unde etiam dici potest quod, licet actio imperative libera, physice et secundum suum entitatem proxime fiat ab alia potentia, denominationem autem libertatis non habet nisi a superiori potentia medio actu eius; illa ergo potentia quae principium proximum est actus per se ac immediate liberi spiritualis esse debet at per se spectans ad intellectualem gradum, quatenus talis est. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 5, par. 3.



It is well at this point to look at the appetitive faculties themselves. Beginning with the sense appetites Suarez asks whether these powers act necessarily or freely in the human being. It has already been shown that the root of freedom is the use of reason and that in so far as a being lacks reason it also lacks freedom and consequently is necessitated in its operations. If the sense appetites are to be even minimally free in their operation they must somehow participate in reason. Suarez shows that the only way these appetites could share in reason is through a relationship with the cogitative sense[36] interpreted as a rational faculty. But, it cannot be the case that the cogitative sense is rational in any way. This means that the sense appetites are necessitated in man. This necessity, Suarez claims, arises not only out of the intrinsic nature of the faculty itself (i.e., as a non rational power) but also from the fact that the sense appetites cannot of themselves alter other natural causes by means of their operations. Rather, it is the will which through the power of command can control the natural causes.[37] In essence this means that the

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[36]There are four interior senses in scholastic philosophy. The highest and most sophisticated of these is the estimative sense. In animals this sense takes care of what one would call instinct. In man this sense is called the cogitative sense and is sometimes thought of as a quasi-rational power that takes care of the particular needs of the human being as opposed to the universal knowledge provided by the intellect. Suarez denies any rational capacity to the cogitative sense.

[37]Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 1, pars. 13-14.

sense appetites are separate powers from the rational powers and this is as it should be. Or, if one talks of necessity one must say that these powers are necessitated both in execution and specification. That is, they have particular objects and always operate in a determinate way. But, since they are necessitated, they are material powers and follow the laws of matter. Once again the problem of the relationship of matter and spirit arises; or in the present context how does the power of command as an act of the will influence the body? The only solution seems to be a type of Platonism in which the soul is the mover of the body. Suarez, however, does not want this solution as has been shown time and again.

The rational faculty of will, Suarez maintains is free. The ultimate explanation for this freedom lies in the fact that it is related to the use of reason, but a description of the faculty itself yields two other facts. The will is an active power and from its own internal structure has the capacity to exercise or suspend its own action. Then, this power while it is exercising its act, can be so disposed and proximately prepared for a work, that it can either act or not act.[38] In order to understand the will as

[38]Ut ergo difficultatibus propositis satisfaciamus, retinenda imprimis et explicanda est illa descriptio facultatis liberae, in qua duo postulantur. Unum est quod illa sit potentia activa, ex se et ex sua interna facultate habens vim ad exercendum et suspendenduam actionem suam. Aliud est quod illa facultas, dum exercet actum, ita sit disposita et proxime (ut ita dicam) preparata ad opus ut, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, possit agere et non agere. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 4, par. 8.



an active faculty one must turn once again to the notion of "elicited appetite." The elicited appetite is self-activating and not dependent on the presence of a proper object to operate. That is, as an elicited appetite the will can go out and seek its object whereas a passive power such as sight must depend on the actual previous presence of its object in order to operate. This is very important because it is the notion of the will as an active power that permits it to initiate activity both in itself and in the body, and it is this ability which is another basis of freedom.

In such a free potency one can separate the faculty into two parts. The one part is for willing or exercising its act; the other part is for denying or suspending action. The latter part, even though in itself it manifests a certain perfection, nevertheless in its use the act of such a faculty is exercised only through denial or lack. But, there is a genuinely positive aspect to denial in that this kind of appetition must be exercised by a positive act of denial. For example, in love either direction or change to another object would be most difficult without a positive act. Simple suspension of the will would not work in this case.[39]

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[39]Unde, claritatis gratia, possumus in potentia libera duas potentias praescindere, seu quasi duas partes unius potentiae. Unus est ad volendum seu exercendum actum; alia ad nolendum seu suspendendam actionem. Haec enim posterior pars huius potestatis, licet in se positiva quaedam perfectio sit, tamen in usu per solam negationem seu carentiam actus talis facultatis exerceri potest, si de absoluta eius potestate loquamur, ut sumitur ex S. Thoma, I-II, q. 6, a. 3, et aliis theologis ibi, quia non velle ut

The positive aspect of denial or lack gives Suarez an opportunity to explain the indifference of the will. Indifference is precisely freedom with respect to the exercise of the will. That is, the will is indifferent in its exercise to an act or to avoiding an act. Since this free faculty is so perfect and spiritual it is able to reflect upon itself and on its motions. This means that as often as it is not able to exercise some act freely, it can through another positive act desire not to exercise the first act. In this way there never is liberty with respect to exercise without some liberty of specification. As often as the will is able freely not to love it is able also to elicit some act according to its own intelligibility and species which is repugnant to love and in this the will is in some indifference with respect to the specification of act.

This double aspect of the will as an active power shows that the will even in its denial of an action works positively both in exercise and specification of an action.

The disposition of the will, or proximate preparation, for acting or not acting outlines not only the

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sic, potest esse liberum, non velle autem praecise sumptum non includit actum, sed carentiam actus, quae si sit cum perfecta advertentia rationis et plena potestate volendi, libera erit. Dico autem si de absoluta potestae loquamur, quia moraliter seu ordinarie huiusmodi carentia appetitionis non exercetur absque positivo actu qui sit vel nolitio qua refutatur obiectum propositum aut alius actus circa illud, verbi gratia, amor vel intentio eius, vel sit conversio ad aliud obiectum repugnans aut diversum, ut experientia satis constat; quia difficillimum esset, existente perfecta et practica advertentia rationis, omnem actum voluntatis suspendere. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 4, par. 8.

intelligibility of a free faculty but also the conditions necessary for a free act. Two things are said to be required for such an act--the prerequisites of the act (i.e., what is necessary prior to the act) and the essential or intrinsic components of the act itself. With respect to the prerequisites one can say that the will must be so disposed that it can either act or not act. This does not mean that the will is merely incapable of acting but positively has the power of not acting. An example of contrast is helpful here. When the will lacks some act on account of some defect in knowledge, that lack is not from the power of not acting (as would be the case in a truly free act) but rather from impotency of action. Lack of action, then because of defect of knowledge is not free. In a word, the will must be so disposed that a genuine choice to act or not act is possible.[40] When one turns to the intrinsic components of

[40]In secunda parte sententiae propositae declaratur non solum ratio facultatis liberae, sed etiam id quod necessarium est ad usum libertatis seu actus liberi; hoc enim totum comprehendit praedicta definitio libertatis, et merito, quia tota difficultas libertatis et utilitas eius in ipso usu et exercitio libertatis posita est. Est autem considerandum dupliciter posse dici aliquid requiri ad actum: uno modo, tamquam praerequistum ad actionem; alio modo, tamquam intrinsece vel essentialiter inclusum in ipsa actione. Illud prius dici solet praerequisitum antecedenter vel ex parte actus primi, sive illud sit proprium principium actionis sive conditio praerequisita ad illum quocumque modo vel in quovis genere causae. Hoc autem posterius dici potest requisitum concomitanter seu in ipso actu secundo, quia non distinguitur ab ipsa actione libera, quae est actus secundus facultatis liberae. Cum ergo dicitur liberum esse quod, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest agere et non agere, intelligendum est de praerequisitis antecedenter et in actu primo, non de aliis. Et hoc ipsum insinuatur in praedicata sententia cum dicitur debere facultatem liberam ita esse dispositam et proxime preparatam ad opus ut cum ea

the act itself, he finds that they are nothing more than the necessary elements that the power might be determined formally so that it is constituted in operation. These components are positive in that they include appropriate knowledge, ability to act or not act, and the power to initiate an action.[41]

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dispositione possit agere et non agere; in illa enim preparatione includuntur omnia illa praerequisita in actu primo ad operandum.

Et quidem quod ad usum liberum sit necessarium cum illis omnibus dictam indifferentiam et quasi duplicem potestatem integram manere, facile ostendi potest. Primo, quia alias cessatio, verbi gratia, ab opere non esset ex intrinseca vi et facultate, sed ex defectu alicuius conditionis requisitae; hoc autem nil confert ad libertatem, nulla est enim naturalis potentia tam necessario agens quae non possit interdum non agere ex defectu conditionis requisitae, ut approximationis passi vel alterius similis. Immo, si quis recte perpendat, illud non est posse non agere, sed est potius impotentia agendi seu non posse agere cum tali defectu; libertatis autem indifferentia non fundatur in impotentia agendi, sed in potentia non agendi. Unde quando ipsamet voluntas caret aliquo actu propter naturalem inadvertentiam rationis, illa carentia actus non est ex potentia non agendi sed ex impotentia sic operandi seu volendi, et ideo talis carentia non potest esse libera. Ut ergo facultas liberum usum habeat, necesse est ut, positis omnibus conditionibus praerequisitis antecedenter seu in actu primo ex interna vi et facultate sua possit agere et non agere. Cum autem dicimus ex interna vi et facultate (ut obiectionibus occurramus) non excludimus divinum concursum vel maius auxilium necessarium pro actuum qualitate, sed it theologis relinquimus. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 4, pars. 10-11.

[41]Quod autem dicta definitio intelligenda non sit de requisitis concomitanter, probatur, quia haec, ut diximus, includuntur in ipsa actione; nam sicut actio est requisita ad agendum, ita quidquid in actione includitur potest dici requisitum. Est autem actio requisita ut id quo formaliter determinatur potentia et constitutitur actu agens, et ideo non potest includi in his conditionibus cum quibus potentia debet esse indifferens ad agendum et non agendum, quia involvitur manifesta repugnantia; ergo neque etiam includi debet in illis requisitis totum id quod est de intrinseca ratione actionis seu in illa essentialiter includitur; nam eadem est de illis omnibus ratio, quae de ipsa

This discussion of sense appetite and will results in a parallel conclusion to that of knowledge. That is, the will as a spiritual faculty has no way of initiating genuinely physical action. Suarez hopes to allow for this by making the distinction between an elicited act and a command but the difference between spiritual and material still intervenes even at the level of command. Suarez does not give an explanation of how command issues in physical action; only that it does so. As a matter of fact it cannot do this given the metaphysical composition of the human being.

But, the fact remains that people do as a matter of fact freely initiate activity and suspend action, or even deliberately fail to act. In order to account for this the will is construed as an active power with enough positive knowledge to initiate activity on its own. What in effect happens here is that any real function of the sense appetites is obviated. That is, since the will is active there is no real need for the sense appetites because it would seem that the will can seek particular goods as well as the good in general. There is no real need for the command and the way Suarez describes the will would indicate that the elicited act of the will is sufficient to accomplish any action appropriate to a human being.

Finally, the contrast between the will as a free

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actione. Atque haec interpretatio illius definitionis colligitur ex communi sententia theologorum, In I, dist. 38 et 39, et In II, dist. 24, et ex doctrine Anselmi, quam statim explicabimus. Disp. Meta. XIX, Sect. 4, par. 12.

power and the sense appetites as determined powers makes use of traditional Aristotelian and scholastic terms but these notions are not really integrated into the whole system of appetition as described by Suarez. Rather, the important notions in Suarez are the differences between innate and elicited appetites and the various understandings of appetite as "natural." What one sees here is an attempt on Suarez' part to rework the notion of appetition in terms of elicitation in such a way that the distinction between sense appetite and will becomes minimal. By this blurring of appetition in the idea that both are elicited appetites Suarez hopes on the appetitive level to achieve a unity of operation between the various kinds of appetite. What he does not account for, though, even in all the talk of elicited appetite is that the will is spiritual and the sense appetites are material and must interact one with the other. In a word, the traditional division of appetition does not work to preserve the unity of man. The notion of elicited appetite does not preserve this unity either since it reduces all of the appetitive system to willing with no real need for sense appetites, and then the problem arises of the will's relationship to the body.

Conclusion

The burden of this chapter has been to examine the two great systems of operative potencies in Suarez' treatment of the human being. The concern has been to attempt to

solve the problem of the unity of operation between a spiritual soul and a body. If Suarez could actually prove this unity of operation in either one of the two systems, then the human being would be a genuinely unified composite being. The attempts Suarez makes, however, result in two undesirable consequences--1. there is a simplification of powers accomplished at the price of denying the uniqueness of the powers; 2. the soul becomes a very Platonic entity in that it moves the body around rather than being genuinely united to the body as its form.

When one looks at the simplification of powers that takes place on the level of knowledge one sees that Suarez allows for direct intellectual knowledge of the singular. This direct knowledge of the singular had been in earlier Thomism and Aristotelianism the unique contribution of the senses. As a unique contribution it was a necessary prerequisite to get any systematic knowledge initiated at all. Since, in Suarez the intellect can know the singular there is no real need for sense knowledge at all.

The same type of simplification takes place with respect to appetition. Suarez, in the notion that the will and sense appetites are both elicited appetites both as act and as faculties blurs the distinction between the two and obviates any real need for sense appetition. There is no reason, given what has been seen with respect to appetition, why one needs a separate set of sense appetites, the will in its own act can provide for the eventualities formerly taken

care of by sense appetition. That is, the will can seek general goods, but it can also seek particular goods precisely as goods.

Suarez has achieved unity of operation at a great price. He has so spiritualized the sense powers that they no longer seem to be material powers in the usual sense of the word. That is, a material power needs an organ and a physical operation. Suarez' senses and sense appetites seem to operate independently of these material limitations.

This leads to the second undesirable conclusion--that the soul in Suarez becomes a very Platonic entity. When one speaks of the soul as basically Platonic, he must realize that this is not Suarez' intention at all. Rather Suarez wants a genuine hylomorphism. The effect, however, of the unique characteristics of the soul[42] and of the blurring of the various operations of the human being as has been seen in this chapter is to create a soul which is very much independent of matter.

Suarez himself, realizes that he has problems with the unity of the human being. By the time he gets to a discussion of the various powers of the soul the disparity between the body and the soul is so great that there is no way to achieve unity of operation as a proof of unity of being. Suarez has two basic choices. Either he can rest content with the dualism and attempt to explain how a spiritual and

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[42]For a detailed analysis of this point the reader is referred to Chapter V of this present study.

a material principle work together, or he can combine what had formerly been considered to be a unique series of operations into a type of unified operation and maintain unity on that level. He is not content to accept the dualism, and so, consequently, he combines the unique operations of sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge or sense appetite and will. This only results in a spiritualism which intensifies the dualism rather than alleviates it.

One final caution is necessary at this point; Suarez is making no pretenses in the Disputationes Metaphysicae to be doing a complete rational psychology. The comments he does make on the topics of knowledge and appetition are usually by way of example or of explanation of other points. This means that one can in no way accept the theory of operations as it appears in the Disputationes as definitive. Rather, this theory of knowledge and appetition points up the necessity for a serious investigation of Suarezian psychology in the De Anima and the De Opere Sex Dierum. The concern here has been to show that within the Disputationes there is an inconsistent picture on the unity of operation and that this is the result of a predetermined dualism in the composition of the human being, a composition which is based on a dualistic metaphysics.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION AND POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER STUDY

Summary of the Present Study

The aim and purpose of this study has been to investigate the Suarezian hylomorphic theory of matter and form and its concrete application in the analysis of the structure and operations of the human being. The doctrines of matter and form are treated extensively in Disputations XIII and XV; the applications of these doctrines to the problem of the relationship of body and soul is found throughout the Disputationes Metaphysicae. This situation results in a caution to be taken account of: Suarez is doing metaphysics in the Disputationes and not psychology. This means that, even though the references to the structure and operations of man are multiple, there is no pretense on Suarez' part to present a fully developed theory of human nature in the Disputationes. The significance of the present study is twofold, then: 1. Suarez gives an extensive analysis of matter and form and individuation resulting in a metaphysical dualism despite the intention to present a unified being as the result of metaphysical analysis. 2. He uses arguments based on the composition of the human being



to buttress the metaphysical position; but, being insensitive to some of the implications of his own metaphysical positions, destroys the unity of the human being both in structure and operation.

In the analysis of matter Suarez shows that prime matter exists and that it has a being and essence of its own. Once again, it is necessary to emphasize the importance of this attitude toward prime matter. Suarez is trying to mediate between positions holding that matter is an integral being and positions maintaining that matter is "pure potency" in such a way that it has no characteristics whatsoever and becomes a pure nothing. In Chapter II there was a survey of all of these opinions and an exposition of Suarez' own position on the problem of the being and essence of prime matter. Suarez' mediated position is that matter as a co-principle of being is itself a partial, incomplete being. The implications of this stance were seen to have an impact on the causality of matter and the relationship of matter to the accident of quantity. With respect to the causality of matter Suarez holds that matter and form must be directly related to each other--that there can be no intervening third principle such as a form of corporeity. The attempt to give being and essence to matter, however, destroyed the relationship of mutual dependence necessary to maintain a unified being. One final move Suarez makes in the process of integralizing matter occurs in the discussion he presents of the relationship of matter to the accident of

quantity. In this presentation Suarez concludes that quantity inheres in the matter rather than in the form. This is completely alien to the teaching of Aristotle and the earlier scholastics such as Aquinas; in these thinkers accidents inhere only in complete substances. The general conclusion, then, with respect to matter is that, despite the care Suarez uses in denying that matter is an integral being, the net effect of his own analysis is to create a matter that is very much a total being.

Suarez' procedure in the analysis of form is parallel to his treatment of matter. Initially, he is concerned to show that there are such things as substantial forms; then he attempts to describe their nature. As has been shown in Chapter III the proof for the existence of form is unique. Suarez uses the human soul as the test case that there are substantial forms. Rather than the cumulative approach of starting with lower levels of beings and ascending to the higher levels and showing on the way how each level differs from the previous one, Suarez proves that because human beings have forms lower and higher levels of being must also have or be forms. He argues at this point that the soul is a substance and not an accident because it is immaterial and can remain separate from the body. But, it is also related to the body substantially. The soul becomes the substantial form, in this interpretation, of the body. Substantial form, also is a certain partial substance which can be united to matter. The problem though is that Suarez



proceeded from a substantial form that could exist on its own to a claim that all beings have or are forms. He does not want to say that forms of lower beings can exist apart from matter, but he has used as his test case the one form that can do so. The major problem with form is taken care of, Suarez feels, when he has established that there are forms. The treatment of the causality of form has the import of showing that matter and form are directly related to one another and that there can be no possibility of a third intervening principle of being to establish this relationship. Finally, Suarez is concerned to show that there is a single form rather than multiple ones in a being. Once again, the result of Suarez' analysis was to integralize a co-principle of being; this has disastrous effects on his hylomorphic theory.

As a transition between the strictly metaphysical doctrines of matter and form and the concrete application of these doctrines to the unity of body and soul, it was necessary to investigate Suarez' own notion of what it means to be an individual. Suarez is very concerned about the unity of the individual because of some of the implications of his own hylomorphic theory. He rejects the common positions that signed matter or the form are principles of individuation. The solution settled on by Suarez is that there are two principles of individuation in composite being--<u>this</u> matter and <u>this</u> form. The final result is that the hylomorphic theory becomes dualistic in the very talk of unity

and individuation.

Given the context of this metaphysics when one asks about the unity of the human being he automatically faces a dualistic situation. Suarez, as has been seen in Chapter V, very much wants the human being to be a unity of structure. He goes to great lengths to prove that the soul is the form of the body and that the soul is like other forms in some sense. But, in the same discussions of the soul he endows this co-principle of being with such unique characteristics (e.g., immortality, immateriality) that the already present dualism becomes so exaggerated that there is no possible way for him to claim that there is a structural unity in the human being.

One argument for the unity of human nature offered by Suarez that had to be considered separately was the argument from unity of operation. This argument proceeds on the assumption that there is a continuity of operation between physical and rational potencies. Suarez, following his Aristotelian predecessors, views the operational structure of the human in terms of a cognitive system and an appetitive system. What he must establish for the unity of operation on the cognitive side is that there is a continuity between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. On the appetitive side he must establish a similar continuity between sense appetites and the will. In Chapter VI of this present study these arguments were examined with the rather amazing conclusion that unity of operation in Suarez avoids

the issue of continuity in both cognitive and appetitive systems. The two systems are reworked in such a way that Suarez obviates the need for any real interrelationship between sense levels and rational levels. By maintaining a position that the intellect has direct knowledge of the singular and only forms the universal by a comparison of multiple individuals he destroys the unique contribution of sensation to a knowing situation. On the appetitive side his doctrine on elicited appetite downplays the interaction of the sense level and the rational level in such a way that ultimately the will is able to make particular choices in addition to choosing the good in general. The result of these operational investigations was to see that Suarez does in fact have a unity of operation; but this is not between body and soul. Rather the unity of operation occurs within the soul itself. For the purposes of this study the general conclusion is that the operational analysis provided by Suarez enhances rather than destroys the dualistic tendencies of his theory.

Although Suarez is concerned to maintain a doctrine of metaphysical unity, he cannot consistently do so given the manner in which he works out the doctrine of matter and form. The results of the theory do not become obvious until one looks at the special case of the human being--composed of matter and a spiritual form with physical and rational operations.

Possibilities for Further Study in Suarez

It is the fate of any study of a great thinker that it raises more problems than it solves. In the present case this is especially true and one must admit that as complex as this present exposition of Suarezian doctrine has been it merely scratches the surface of the metaphysical problems in the Disputationes. In terms of subject areas that must still be investigated a fruitful source of study would be the doctrine of subsistence as it occurs in Disputation XXXIV. This notion of subsistence is important for a complete understanding of Suarez' metaphysics, for here he tells what it means for a thing to exist on its own. In light of the problems with matter and form as partial, incomplete beings shown earlier in this work, Suarez either is not aware that he must adjust his doctrine of subsistence or if he is aware then partial, incomplete beings do subsist and the dualism is conclusive. Now, subsistence was not treated here because in the special test case of the human being it is very clear that one of the co-principles, the human form, can and does subsist (i.e., exist on its own). The general doctrine of subsistence in Suarez must eventually be investigated.[1]

As one moves away from the Disputationes

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[1]The doctrine on subsistence has not been ignored in the literature on Suarez. The studies so far presented, however, are short and of a merely provisional nature. The reader is referred to, Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. III, pt. 2, 189-90; and Mahieu, Francois Suarez, 249-264.

Metaphysicae themselves Suarez provides a vast fund of scholarly possibilities. Some of his works that are of special concern to the scholar and which are related to this present topic are the De Anima, the De Opere Sex Dierum, and the De Legibus.

The De Anima[2] is of special concern in light of what has been discovered here. It has been shown that Suarez wanted to maintain a rather traditional Aristotelian psychology while reworking the understanding of some central metaphysical notions. One must ask whether the psychology as it appears in the De Anima is consistent with the metaphysics or whether it is merely a commentary on the On the Soul of Aristotle. In order to answer the problem several initial steps must be taken that are related to the adequacy of the traditional text of Suarez' De Anima.[3] Initially, the text must be established. It has been shown rather conclusively by Joaquin Carreras y Artau that the Vives version of the De Anima has been edited rather extensively (probably by Baltasar Alvarez); it is also known that Suarez himself was in the process of revising this work at the time of his death in 1617. Consequently what a modern reader has is Chapters 1 to 12 of Book I as revised text and the remainder of the work as something from Suarez' early days. And all

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[2]Cf. Suarez, Opera Omnia, III: 467-801.

[3]In this matter the reader is referred to Joaquin Carreras y Artau, "Notas sobre el texto del tratado 'De Anima' de Francisco Suarez," Pensamiento, 15 (1959): 293-307.

of this is in an edited form. There is great need for a critical edition of Suarez' De Anima. The manuscript is available and must be edited in such a way as to preserve Suarez' own thought and not the predilections of the editor as seems to be the case with Alvarez' version if one is to take Carreras y Artau seriously.

In addition to the textual problems of the De Anima one must also look at the doctrinal problems. These are the same areas that were of concern in Chapters V and VI of this work. That is, how does Suarez in the De Anima express the structural relationship of body and soul? How are the operations of knowledge and appetite related to the structure? And, is there a way to achieve genuine unity of the human being and yet remain consistent with the doctrine of the Disputationes Metaphysicae?

The second work which needs to be taken into account in the study of Suarez is the De Opere Sex Dierum.[4] Like the De Anima this work was published posthumously in 1621 and edited by Alvarez. Consequently, one can assume that there are something of the same textual problems in this work as there are in the De Anima. What is of major concern here, however, in the De Opere Sex Dierum is that it is a convenient place to get an explicit statement of Suarez' theory of the hierarchy of being. In this present study the doctrine of levels of being has been taken pretty much for

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[4]Cf. Suarez, Opera Omnia, III: 1-447.

granted. That is, even a cursory glance at Suarez shows that he is using such a foundation to talk about generic and specific differences of beings. He does not, however, say much about the levels of beings in the Disputationes. In the De Opere Sex Dierum, Suarez' concern is with the whole of creation. He spells out in this context the various levels of being beginning with God and ending with prime matter.

It should be obvious that any doctrine of levels of being implies in a hylomorphic context that there is a different relationship between matter and form on the various levels. This, of course, means that the problem of unity must be solved for each genuinely distinctive level of being. There will be some instances in which it will be fairly easy to see a genuine unity of being, but there will be others where unity of being is very difficult to establish. God would be an example of an easy case in which one can establish unity; man is an example of a hard case one must face.

Finally, within the works of Suarez himself there is a wealth of opportunity to study the relationship of the findings of the present analysis to the De Legibus.[5] This work is without a doubt the most generally known of Suarez' texts and has had an impact on theories of international law. In this work Suarez' establishes the foundations of

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[5]Cf. Suarez, Opera Omnia, V and VI.

law in the will rather than in the intellect. He is here in the long tradition of the voluntarists represented by Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and Duns Scotus. The present study has spent some time on the will theory of Suarez as it appears in an abstract metaphysical context. It has been assumed by historians of philosophy such as Maurer, that Suarez' theory of law is continuous with his fundamental metaphysics.[6] But, if what has been said earlier about the will is correct, and if Suarez is at least unwittingly a dualist in his metaphysical and psychological doctrine, then it will be necessary to investigate what impact these discoveries have on the theory of the will as it appears in the De Legibus. But, more importantly one must inquire whether or not one can hold the theory of law as stated if the dualism is present. In a word, one must ask if Suarez' will theory is consistent and if any shift must take place because of the dualism. A shift of which Suarez himself would be unaware since he does feel he has achieved unity in his doctrine of being and in human nature.

One final problem within Suarezian studies that is given special significance by an examination such as the one presented in this work is whether or not Suarez is an eclectic. Some authors such as Frederick Copleston[7] want to

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[6]Maurer, Medieval Philosophy, 370-71.

[7]Copleston's position on the charge of Suarez' eclecticism is as follows:

That Suarez possessed an analytic mind would hardly I think, be denied. But it has been maintained that he lacked the power of synthesis. He became immersed in a



minimize the charge of eclecticism against Suarez but if there is one general result produced by the present work it is that Suarez does pick and choose from other authors and at times does not synthesize these various positions. It is certainly foolish to level a general charge of eclecticism against a thinker but one must always be open to the possibility that in individual areas of his thought the thinker might well be an eclectic. This study will necessarily require careful analysis both of Suarez' own text and of the supposed sources of his thought. It is a fact that simply cannot be contested that Suarez was familiar with the great authors of the Christian tradition in philosophy and

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succession of problems, it is sometimes said, and he gave such a careful consideration to the manifold ways in which these problems had been treated and solved in history that he was unable to see the wood for the trees. Moreover his great erudition inclined him to eclecticism. He borrowed a view here and an opinion there, and the result was a patchwork rather than a system. His critics would not, I think, suggest that he was a superficial eclectic, since it needs no very close acquaintance with his writings to see that he is very far from being superficial; but they do suggest that he was an eclectic in a sense which is incompatible with possessing the gift of synthesis.

. . . And in the first place one can ask in what sense Suarez was an eclectic . . .

That Suarez was an eclectic in some sense seems to me undeniable. He had an extremely extensive knowledge of former philosophers, even if, as is only to be expected, he was sometimes mistaken in his assertions or interpretations. And he could hardly possess this knowledge without being influenced by the opinions of the philosophers he studied. But this does not mean he accepted other people's opinions in an uncritical manner . . . Moreover, if Suarez was an eclectic so was Aquinas. The latter did not simply accept Aristotelianism in its entirety; if he had done so, he would have occupied a far less important position in the development of medieval philosophy and would have shown himself to be devoid of any spirit of philosophical criticism. A History of Philosophy, Vol. III, pt. 2: 196-97.



theology; he quotes and summarizes these authors extensively in the Disputationes. It is also a fact that he does use in his own system notions developed by these authors and perhaps the best example here is the use he makes of the Scotist ideas of the being of matter and individuation. Suarez also rejects notions of his predecessors such as the concept of forma corporeitatis. The issue of eclecticism then resolves itself to one of whether the pieces of other systems that he chooses fit together into a unified whole. This study has shown one instance where the pieces do not meet and have disastrous results for a doctrine of unity in psychology. The same thing must be done for other sets of doctrines proposed by Suarez. In short, there is no easy answer to the problem of eclecticism in Suarez, rather one must work out the doctrines piecemeal and this provides an almost untold wealth of possibilities for further study.

Possibilities for Further Study Concerning Suarez' Relationship to Other Thinkers

It is always a provocative question to inquire which thinkers influenced a man such as Suarez. And, it is no less interesting to ask which thinkers Suarez himself influenced. With respect to the first question and in the context of this work one can try to draw out the relationships between Duns Scotus and Suarez. With respect to the second question two modern philosophers especially who appear to have known of and to have been influenced by Suarez are Descartes and Leibniz.

In the introductory chapter there was a brief survey of the Scotistic doctrines which Suarez either adopts, modifies, or rejects. It should be obvious to any reader that this introductory material is not a sufficient answer to the question of the relationship between Suarez and Scotus. As with Suarez the textual difficulties in Scotus abound. However, the problem is compounded in Scotus for many of the works thought to be by Scotus have been shown to be inauthentic or the texts have been shown to be corrupt. Copleston in his initial chapter on Scotus in A History of Philosophy summarizes these problems very well and shows what must be done to get a genuine text of Scotus.[8]

What is important in terms of Suarez is for someone to establish which of Duns Scotus' texts Suarez himself was familiar with and which version of the text. Only after this has been done can one ask whether Suarez' version of Scotism is genuine Scotism or whether what Suarez thinks is the position of Duns Scotus is really some hybrid of Scotistic doctrines. It is entirely possible that the Suarezian version of individuation, for example, is only a caricature of the Scotist understanding because of texts available to Suarez. Suarez himself is very interested to remain within a tradition in the Disputationes and studies such as these which would show how Suarez remains part of a

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[8]Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. II, pt. 2: 199-209.

heritage or departs from it would be extremely fruitful for late medieval and renaissance scholarship.

If one uses Suarez as a point of departure one can also inquire how this thinker of the late Sixteenth and early Seventeenth Centuries influenced those who followed him. Most critics of Suarez acknowledge that one of the outstanding aspects of Suarez' impact on thought was that he was the first to propound a systematic metaphysics at a time when people were content to produce commentaries on Aristotle. Indeed, Suarez himself did a fair amount of commenting for this seems to have been the original purpose of the De Anima and the De Opere Sex Dierum.[9] In this attempt to write a metaphysics authors such as Ferrater Mora would put Suarez among the modern philosophers not because he was influenced by modern or pre-modern philosophy, not because he was highly interested in modern science, but because he was trying to answer questions stated by the modern philosophers.[10]

That Suarez had an influence on classical modern philosophy is a generally acknowledged fact but authors who make this claim are often unwilling to spell out exactly what this influence has been. One approach such as that used by Maurer is to point out that Descartes was introduced

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[9]The De Anima was originally a commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul. The De Opere Sex Dierum was a commentary of Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, Part I.

[10]Jose Ferrater Mora, "Suarez and Modern Philosophy," Journal of the History of Ideas, 14 (1953): 531-32.

to Suarez at La Fleche and later acquired knowledge of the Disputationes. Then Maurer points out that Leibniz could read Suarez as easily as most people read novels. This way of approaching the relation of Suarez and subsequent thinkers is a mere cataloguing of isolated comments by the modern philosophers and really tells one very little about the influence Suarez had on them. As a whole this approach is quite unsatisfactory.[11] A second approach to the problem of the relationship of Suarez and modern thought is to ask specific questions about obvious doctrines in men such as Descartes and Leibniz (e.g., soul-body dualism in Descartes and unity in Leibniz) and then see whether there is any relationship between what one finds in the modern text and in Suarez.

With respect to the soul-body dualism of Descartes, one has a generally accepted doctrine that can be established from the text of the Meditations on First Philosophy.

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[11]Maurer approachs the relationship of Suarez and modern philosophers as follows:

Suarez is significant in the history of philosophy as the main channel by which scholasticism came to be known by modern classical philosophers. Descartes was introduced to him by his Jesuit professors of philosophy at La Fleche, and later he acquired a firsthand knowledge of Suarez' most important philosophical work, the Disputationes Metaphysicae. Leibniz boasted that he could read Suarez as easily as most people read novels. Schopenhauer shows a good acquaintance with the Disputationes, which he valued as "a true compendium of scholasticism" and "an authentic compendium of the whole scholastic wisdom." Christian Wolff's Ontologia, which Kant considered to be the finest treatise in metaphysics is highly indebted to Suarez. To Wolff, Suarez was the metaphysician "who among the scholastics pondered metaphysical realities with particular penetration," and he identified Suarez' teaching with that of St. Thomas himself. Medieval Philosophy, 356-57.

It would be an entirely legitimate question to ask whether or not the dualism of Descartes had any antecedents in previous thought. This present study has been at pains to point out the dualistic tendency of Suarez and it would appear that one could spell out a definite relationship between Suarez and Descartes on this matter of dualism. It is entirely possible that Descartes saw the inherent dualism of the Suarezian system and, rather than disguising it in his own approach, advocated it openly. Suarez' proofs for unity and Descartes' proof for dualism of mind and body are certainly different from one another but, from what has been shown in the first six chapters of this work the question of Cartesian dualism and its relationship to Suarezian metaphysics can no longer be ignored.

The job of drawing out the relationship between Descartes and Suarez is especially complicated by the care with which Descartes concealed his sources. Some such as Ferrater Mora would give up on the attempt to relate Descartes to his predecessors.[12] Others would go too far in terms of seeing Descartes as really doing nothing but collating previous material.[13] In fact, the truth seems to reside in a middle position, but this means scholars must take one Cartesian position at a time and try to establish the

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[12]Ferrater Mora, "Suarez and Modern Philosophy," 528-29.

[13]One serious attempt to trace out the sources of Cartesian philosophy is Etienne Gilson, Etudes sur la role de la pensee medievale dans la formation du systeme cartesien (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951).

source of that position. Because of the results of this study it would be good to give Suarez a much greater emphasis in Cartesian studies than has been the case previously.

The problem of showing the relationship of Suarez to Leibniz is much easier to solve than that of Descartes. Indeed, Gottfried Martin has made a tentative advance in this direction in his book, Leibniz: Logic and Metaphysics. The chapter that is of special concern is the treatment of unity in Leibniz' metaphysics. In this chapter Martin points out that Leibniz was educated in the tradition of Aristotle and the scholastics. This education, it is safe to assume, was not only from manuals but from the original works themselves. Since Leibniz is more open about his sources than Descartes, and since Leibniz is more concerned to preserve the continuity of the great complex of philosophical thought one may safely ask for monographs which spell out the relationship of Leibniz to his sources--in this case the relationship to Suarez.[14]

Martin is at great pains to show how Leibniz preserved the scholastic notion of unity in his own work. He summarizes Leibniz' train of thought by explaining that medieval philosophy develops the notion that unity is not an accident. Martin then points out that Thomas Aquinas was the first to work out a consistent doctrine on this subject. The notion that unity is not an accident is reworded to say

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[14]Gottfried Martin, Leibniz: Logic and Metaphysics, Trans. K. J. Northcott and P. G. Lucas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), 182.

that "unity follows being." In the chapter on individuation it was shown that Suarez made extensive use of this principle. It would be an interesting study to spell out what Leibniz acquired from the tradition as a whole with respect to unity and what he acquired from individual authors such as Thomas Aquinas or Suarez.[15]

What has just been said with respect to the influence Suarez has had on modern philosophers should not be construed as a claim that these men were merely copying Suarez or the scholastic tradition. There is something decidedly modern about philosophy since Descartes. Historians of philosophy, however, have been too eager to generalize the break between the medieval tradition and modern philosophy. A study of relationships among thinkers helps to alleviate any oversimplification that might occur.

Conclusion

This concluding chapter has provided a general summary of the findings of this study. Then, the question arose whether or not there were possibilities for further study both in Suarez himself and Suarez' relationship to other thinkers. There are multiple opportunities for further investigation in both Suarezian and relational works. Several cautions and methods of procedure were suggested for these further investigations and what is most important in each instance is careful investigation of the text of each

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[15]Martin, Leibniz, 120-23.

author. For, it is only by this means that over-hasty generalization can be avoided.

Some of the results of this present study have been startling and have gone contrary to what Suarez himself claims he is doing. One cannot make excuses for the inconsistencies that arise with respect to unity as a result of the hylomorphic theory, but one can see the very real attempt on Suarez' part to consider all the possible solutions to a problem, to choose the one he feels fits with his metaphysics, and then to live with the consequences. Given this honesty on his part it is more difficult to accept the dualism of being. The dualism of being leads to a dualism of body and soul, and above all Suarez had desired that the human being be a unified entity.

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

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

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