THE CONFLICTS III AGRICULTURAL POLICY MAKING Mfumnmudm. HICHIBIN STATE UNIVERSITY Jerry 8. Water: 1965 «Mal-ho, .- LIBRA T. ' Michigan Suw- .,_ University { L; '5. .9 This is to certify that the thesis entitled The Conflicts in Agricultural Policy Making I presented by :Jerry B. WaterS‘ has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for PhD degree in Political Science ‘1 ” ’ QiW/Mw Major professor Date October 18, 1965 0-169 ."\L' :Iiif" v'l‘ TEE; CLi‘fi‘LI-CTS I?! ACitICULrUnf-l. FLILIJY [.ifaKIPIG Coo; ‘5 {3‘ by Jerry e. ..3ters Probably no domestic public rolicy in the cost—world war II period has been subjected to such extensive and sustained debate as has the agricultural price sur-port and production control program. Few policies have fallen so short of the rromise originally envisioned by its authors, yet, despite numerous efforts to change it, few policies have been more immune to significant alteration. A central concern of this stuly is the develog‘r;.ent of a fuller understanding of the dominating forces in this phase of nublic rolicy mking. The findings of existing professional analyses are necessary to such an understanding, but they do not provide a sufficient exrrlanation. A necessary steo toward a more adequate exclamation is the recognition that the over-arching goal of agricultural policy is the promotion and preservation of the family farm. Analytically focusing on the family farm goal, this study incor- porates the standard explanatory factors while accounting for the important fact that the vitality of the goal is sustained by more than calCulations 0f economic interest and political aggrandizement. A major component of this goal is a set of beliefs that constitute the family farm creed. tie- cause of the persuasiveness of this creed, family farming has long been ascribed a unique role in the life of the American nation. The family farm creed and policy goal constitute valuable tools in explaining the rationale of the demands made by the farm interests, and help to explain Jerry h. Waters the lack of serious challenge to the dominance of the farm interests in the writing of farm legislation despite the skyrocketing cost of the farm subsidy. When the agricultural policy makers undertook the writing of new legislation in 1947~49, they were confronted with a barrage of advice from agricultural economists urging the abandonment of the existing nro— gran. The experts asserted that the perpetuation of the existing policy wand create several major economic evils while solving none of agricul- ‘hHe'stuoblems. Congress declined to follow these recommendations partly tmcause the experts‘ advice was so weighted with moral principle and so lkfit in dOCumentation that much of it was justifiably discounted. In fact, the economists' estimates and predictions had the effect of strength- mfing the disposition among participants to renew the existing policy. fidter 1953 the policy makers were caught up in an exduisite dilemma created byzadeterioration in farm incomes and a spectacular upsurge in the cost of the muxflus purchase program. Although these conditions were satisfactory torw one, the participants divided over the question of what policy Course flmuld be followed; the policy making process has been stalemated for the past decade. Several factors have contributed to this stalemate, but this stmhrconcludes that two have been of principal importance. First, parti- chents have held widely divergent beliefs concerning the technical nature oftheifirm problem and the consequences of alternative policy approaches. iblfljcal analysts have paid scant attention to these disagreements because, duets the great volume of expert studies of the farm problem, most have Jerry b. waters assumed that the informational base available to the policy makers was fully adequate. A conclusion of this study is that, despite this massive study, the farm problem has been one of the era's least understood econ- cmdc problems. The informational base has been so limited and uncertain that many divergent positions have been edually defensible. A second major factor in the stalemate has been an intense con- flict in values among the participants, arising out of the liberal and conservative agrarian traditions. both traditions support the family farm goal, but differ in emphasis as to the most valaable characteristics of flmfily farming. Recent conditions have broUght increasingly bitter conflict. Data for this study have been drawn from extensive surveys of mngressional cosmittee hearings and floor debates, the public press, the Hterature of agricultural economics, opinion polls, platforms and fixategies of farm groups, writings of political leaders, and correspond- encevdth key participants, plus an analysis of a wide range of secondary anuces. A considerable portion of this study is devoted to an analysis ofthe origin and development of the family farm creed. A historical anahmis of parity pricing was also necessary. COPY? ight by JERRY B. WATERS 1966 THE CONFLICTS IN AGRICULTURAL POLICY MAKING By Jerry 8. Waters A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1965 ACKNOWLEIXSMENTS The writer of a doctoral thesis is indebted to such a long list of persons that only a fractional portion can be acknowledged. This writer is particularly indebted to: Robert H. Horwitz, thesis committee chairman, whose inspirational teaching guided the author into the politi- cal science discipline, and whose encouragement and long hours of criti- cal supervision was most responsible for bringing this study to fruition; Dale E. Hathaway, whose incisive commentaries on agricultural economics and policy stimulated the author's interest in this subject, and whose subsequent advice has been invaluable; Charles R. Adrian for his aid during all phases of the study; Joseph E. Schlesinger for his balanced advice during the planning stage; Mrs. Helyn Marshall for her editing help and superior typing skills. Most of all, the author is indebted to his wife and children who, with patience and understanding, Suffered innumerable inconveniences as the author carried a full-time teaching load while writing the thesis "on the side." Whatever strengths this thesis may possess are due to the efforts of these and other persons we have been unable to mention; whatever shortcomings it reflects and what- ever errors it may contain are entirely those of the author. A note of appreciation is also due the Farm Foundation of Chicago which provided the author with a fellowship during the summer of 1964. ii f3 1'. ‘ u. ‘ 1 v ' a .1 C '. ‘nl . - u .r o u.. D . e .l. a A I O 4 J ) h " \ . U ‘I n TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOwI-EmMms OOOOOOCOOOUOOOOOOOOOCOOCOOQOOOOOC0.0.0.0.....0... Chapter I. IMRODUGION 00.0.0000...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOQIIOOOOOOO. BaCkground OOCICOOOOOOOQOCOOOOOOOOIOO‘IOOOIOOOOOUOCOOIOO ReVieW Of the Literature CO....0...COCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO Statement of Analytical Propositions .................. Scope and procedure O...0....OOOOOOOOOQOOO0.0.00.0.0... II. ORIGINsmTHE FAMILY FARM CREED .00....00000000000000000 IntrOdUCtion cocococo.000.000.0-oooooeeooooooo-oOoooooo The European Tradition ooooooooooooocccoooooooococooooo The American Tradition 0000000coco.ooooooocoooooooooooo III. NINETEENTH CENTURY AGRARIAN POLICIES .................... Agrarian VS. IndUSttialism 0.00000.0000IOOOOOOOOOOOOOQQ Triumph of Agrarian Land Policy ....................... progreSSiV. Farming 000000000000Oeooooooo-oooocoooooooo 1N3 FROM POPULISM TO THE COUNTRY LIFE MOVEMENT .............. POPUIism 0....OOOOOOOCOOOOOODOICOOO0......OOCQC0.00.... The watuShed 0..O...OOOCOOOODOOOOOO...90.00.000.000... Roosevelt and Country Life Movement ................... Summary coco.oooeooooooooocoooooooooooooo-eoooooooooooo V0 TWO DECADES OF DEPRESSION no.cocooooocooooooeoooooooooooe DepreSSion on the Family Farm concave-coo00.00.000.000. BaCk to th. Land 00000000000000.0000...cocooooogooo.... Summary coco-o.ooooocoooecon...coo-0.000000000000009... VI. AGRICULTURAL POLITICS AND FOLICIES’ 1900’1945 00009.00... The New Agrarian Strategy and Program ooooooooooooooooo The FirSt TWO Decades 00000000000000.0000coo-0000.090co Th. Twenties coo-coco.oooocoooooococo-00000000000000... Th” N," Deal o...0000.00.00...0.000.000.0000.0000...... pIQIUde to the postwar periOd ooooooooooooooooooooogggg iii Page ii 12 35 49 51 51 57 63 87 87 92 102 105 105 109 115 130 132 132 148 156 159 159 168 172 183 195 I a I - O . _ D C A. O n .V H. *‘ v 1 u .. .I A- I - 'n. l \ . . O - .' I u" ' N . 's ‘ a 0 ~ I 'd . A O Chapter VII. THE TRADITION COMINUED 0.0.0.0.000...OOOIOOOOOOOOOIOOCOO. Th. IWdiate pOStwar Years 00000ecocooooocoooocooooooco Dialogue Of the Fifties eoeecooooooeooeooocoo-oonooooeo Abatement and RetrenChment 0000000000000000000000000000. VIII. VALUE COWLICIS AND THE STALEWTE .00000000000000000000000 The His-labeled Family Farm Controversy ................ Conflicting Agrarian Traditions ........................ conflict in perspective COOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.000.00.000... 1x. ECONOMISTS AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY X. ECWWIC FACTS AND POLICY MKING OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0...... Imediate Postwar Years .0...O...OOOCCOOOOOCOOOOOOODOOCO The Eisenhower-Benson Years ............................ The 1960's OCOOOOOOOOCIOOOOOOIOOOOOOOOOOOOOIO0.000...... Temporary Policy for a Permanent Problem ............... XI. THE CHALLEWE CF EFFICIENCY 00.000000000000-ooooooooeooeoo Technological Revolution and Policy Making ............. pOIiCies at Cross purpose 0......OIOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO. XII. THE PUBLIC AND THE FARMER 00000000000000.00000000000000... The Spectre of an Urban Revolt ......................... Urban TOlerance .OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO..00....OI...009...... XIII. SUWMRY AND CDNCLUSIONS ooocoo-coo0.0000000000000000coo... SELECTED BIBLICBRAPHY 0.090000000000000.sconce-co0.000000000000000 APPENDIX IOOOOOOOCIOOOOOOO00.000.00.000.a.0.000000000000000000009. iv Page 203 203 212 228 236 236 247 259 266 297 299 321 350 365 368 371 383 392 392 400 417 434 472 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION "Farm policy has long been a serious source of discouragement to those who believe that, with thought and effort, public problems, however intractable, can be made to yield, however 1 gradually, to solution." John K. Galbraith Background __________ Shortly after the end of World War 11, there arose in Washington XXX lnFarm Policy: The Current position," igurnal of Farm Economics, “1 (May, 1955), 292, Sixties 21% "18932199, for example, during the late fifties and early " carrie ' ' ' ture under the heading of SCMkml Con'tfinmost of its stories on agricul “~ I . . . n,” I. , It, 1- 9". . ' . . 1m 3 u r 7v I ‘Q \ ' I o .A ‘ c 1 v a. t \l ‘l the capacity of the democratic system to solve tough public problems, and the position of Secretary of Agriculture has become one of the most controversial and personally uncomfortable of cabinet posts.4 Through- out most of this period farm income has remained low. While the debate has continued the economic difficulties of agriculture have persisted. Thus after almost two decades, the debate has not been resolved nor the farm problem solved. In attempting to describe the meaning of the farm policy debate which ”goes on and on" the editor of the Kansas City Star recently sug- gested that "the public will be pardoned if it becomes completely con- fused."5 It is certainly the case that the observer who seeks to explain this situation is confronted with a set of events and circumstances which, on the surface at least, would seem to defy many of the traditional notions 3Note the opening Galbraith quote. The Washington correSpondent for the New Republic put it more directly by describing the persistent farm Problem and the perennial struggle over farm legislation as "a kind of breakdown of democracy," June 8: 1959» P 2' It was in the latter fifties that public criticism reached its peak, a point we will later discuss in detail. 4John K. Galbraith once noted that "among the many mysteries which surround the government of the United States there is none more impene- trable than why anyone should want to be Secretary of Agriculture." "Why be Secretary of Agriculture?" Harper's, July, 1953, p. 82. One observer recently noted that "Orville Freeman holds the most unenviable big job in government. His predecessor, Republican Ezra Taft Benson, left the office so disspirited that he embraced the tenets of the John Birch Society." Charles 0. Gridley, "Farm Bills are Next Hurdle in Path of LBJ's Program," Wichita Ea 1e, May 29, 1965. Being Secretary of Agriculture may have some compensations. Mr. Freeman recently demonstrated an ability to soothe a faged quartet of Bengal tigers at the Brookfield Zoo in Chicago. Comment- lng on the feat Mr. Freeman said: "I have been living in a lions' den for over four years, so it seemed fairly routine to put my arm in the tigers' den." Newsweek, July 12, 1965, p. 52. 5"Farm Ideas Clash over Same coals." August 26, 1962, p. 155. 1‘ ’4', vi ‘ f h I . ..t‘l .'. .- 0 0'0... OI _ _ . l . " . '."~v c ., ' I. about politics and policy making. For example, deepite the fact that farmers have become an ever smaller minority and despite the fact that agricultural political community has become increasingly divided against itself, government subsidies to agriculture have risen sharply. While the government has poured billions of dollars into agriculture, farm income has remained depressed, and one has to search widely to find any- one who is happy with the "farm program,‘ including the recipients them- selves. Let us look at these characteristics in greater detail. From 1960 to 1965 the nation's farm population dropped by 2.5 million. Should this rate of attrition continue all of the country's farmers would have moved to the city within 25 years. Impossible? Probably. But if there are to be more than a mere handful of peOple on the farms 25 years from now the present rate of out-migration will have to be sharply reduced. In 1940 the farm population stood at 30.5 million, where it had been roughly stabilized since the turn of the cen- tury- By 1950 it had fallen to 23 million, by 1955 to 19 million, by 1960 to 15.6 million, and by 1965 to just under 12 million, a decline of almost 50 percent in the short span of 15 years.6 In 1940 farmers accounted for 23.2 percent of the total population, in 1965 only 6.8 Percent. The decline in the number of farms has also been precipitous, from 6.1 million in 1940 to 3.7 million in 1959.7 —___ 6U. 8. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1964, 85th annual edition, po 610; Kansas Cit)! Star, June 20:“— 1965, p. 5D. Figures prior to 1959 are revised to approximate the new 1959 definition of farm population- 7Stati§tica1 Abstract, 1964, p. 611. a .u H“. n...» .. ' I n . . ha. . .6.“ | b ' O n I u . r . _ _ _ A d. 1 0 It 0 a J .. ., r V , , _ N. o r p ‘ r .\ w .IA , . , . . l x I a r . e .11 . i _ . r . . A. J r t.‘ u/ , . d . «a p u . . A . .15 _\ ii, a J A . _ ' ‘\. C . .. \u. I > O 1 O )1 .rI. crL in a .i u \o‘ . r 1 a 0 v vi .I C o v O . VI r .7 J a a _ a . P n x \. . ‘V . r . J . I . r ‘7 IJ (I, Q , J t, r ‘ A :1» air r r e . i ’7 ‘~ .‘J rl r - J «J Q r . A .\ v a ,4» .u. r. .\ C . _ D . . ., . >/. . . . . P a , J _ . u .. . u r l a f r . o . . O .s . O . v '1 o 1., J Contrasting dramatically with the decline in farm population, various services and subsidies to agriculture have risen sharply during the past two decades. Taking note of this, Congressman Griffin of Michigan, during a debate on farm legislation in 1962, with tongue in cheek, moved that the number of employees in the U. S. Department of Agriculture could at no time exceed the number of farmers in the country.8 Congressman Griffin was calling attention to the interesting phenomena that between 1955 and 1962 while the farm population had decreased by 22 percent, the number of Department of Agriculture employees had increased by 30 percent.9 More interesting than the Department‘s employment figures are its eXpenditures. Net budget expenditures of the Depart- ment rose from $1.8 billion in 1945 to $2.9 billion in 1950, to $4.6 in 1955, to $5.4 in 1960 and to an all-time record of $7.9 billion in fiscal 1964, an increase of 340 percent.10 Throughout much of the postwar period Department of Agriculture expenditures have been the third largest item in the federal budget, exceeded only by spending for defense and the servicing of the national debt. Certainly not all the expenditures of the 8U. 8. Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2nd 5955., 1962, CVIII, 565. 9There were 85,503 employees in 1955 and 110,511 in 1962. Statis- tical Abstract, 1964, p. 406. This was somewhat above the previous high point of 106,217 employees reached in 1937. Wayne D. Rasmussen and Gladys 1.. Baker, "The Department is Built." After a Hundred Years, The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1962, U. S. Department of Agriculture (Washington: U. S. Govermnent Printing Office, 1962, p. 12). The number of employees had dropped off considerably after 1937 before beginning to rise around 1955. 10Net Budget Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1926-1966, Office of Budget and Finance, U. S. Department of Agriculture, May 4, 1965. 9 -~—- 1" o . O . - it , . t ' . L , I I 7 1 - J» ‘ a J i A . . 9 a " r A I F a 1 ’ L . . - I . , - . O s" ‘ i ’ . J '- - , s O ~ ,e l , a ,— O ' _ -.- ..e - ,1" e V, , .,_ -1, _. - - e c. a c . o ‘ ' ‘ _ .v v v v ' "‘ v r ' - . C -V . _ g 0 I ‘ r ' 7 ’ 3 . . o D .. r , v ‘- . O 9 I . \ _ ‘ a ‘ . . t c i - ' _ o .J , A- J i — o . Q .. } ate-s..- . r- -7 ‘ _ , .. uk. .7 .---‘ o -- -\ y't ‘__, ._ -- v I 4 A Department can be treated as subsidies to farmers. However, the Stat t a Abstract puts the cost of "subsidy programs" for agriculture from 1959 through 1964 at $20.7 billion.11 The Department's Office of Budget and Finance listed the cost of "programs predominantly for the benefot of the farmer" from 1952 through 1958 at 514.4 hiiiion.12 In 1959, for example, if each of the nation's 3.7 million farms had shared equally in the $3.9 billion Spent on "programs predominantly for the benefit of farmers” this would have meant an average subsidy of about $1,000. There are endless ways and means 9f counting or discounting the size and significance of the various services and subsidies to agriculture. But in whatever way the benefits are measured, and however the costs are computed, and to whomever they are assigned, it is quite clear that while the number of farmers has been falling, government expenditures in support of agriculture have been soaring Upward at an even faster rate. Considering the extent of the services and subsidies to agri- culture, one might well expect to see farmers, farm pressure groups, and farm-state congressmen acting and speaking in unison, thereby maxi- mizing the political influence of this ever smaller minority. Such, however, is not the case. Although the agricultural political community has never spoken with a single, united voice, it has seldom Spoken with 50 many conflicting voices as it does today. Increasingly during the Postwar period the farm interest has divided into bickering and hostile ——_.¥ 11p. 3940 1QBudget Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1952-1959: Office Of Budget and Finance, U. S. Department of Agriculture. March 21: 1960- . v e H , O. , J \ . a I p e or I i ‘ , ,, o . u a e O . ‘ a . a \ s O A g . _ . a C. _ .. . . . . _ _ a . r — . . _ . _ A I J .. h I _ . i . a e _ I» . 'x camps. This poses the seemingly paradoxical situation of an increasing volume of farm subsidies in juxtaposition to a growing political division within an ever shrinking minority. Another interesting feature of the postwar era is the fact that the experts almost universally have vigorously and persistently condemned As one observer noted: "It is hard the price support and control policy. to find well reasoned defenses of American agricultural policy because economists are almost always on the other side." Few public problems have been more widely studied by the eXperts than the price and income problem of agriculture. Few public policies have been more universally condemned by them. The experts vociferously urged Congress not to renew the program in 1948-49. And ever since, in the name of the national in- terest, the long-range interest of farmers, and for the sake of sound, rational public policy, they have been demanding that it be dismantled. The economists are not the only ones unhappy with the price and control program. Although they would probably be a great deal more unhappy without it, many farmers feel uncomfortable with it. Drive into a rural Midwest town on a Saturday evening and ask the nearest group of conversing farmers what they think of the "farm program" and their reply Will be prompt because they probably have been talking about it anyway. Among other things, one will learn, probably to one's surprise, that the farm program is not something that the government has done :25; the farmer, but something that "they"--a nebulous and nefarious group of politicians and bureaucrats--have done to the farmer. 13Rendigs F915, Challenge to the American Economy: An Introduction to Economics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1961), p. 106. One will have thus encountered the farmers' characteristic tendency for overstatement (the weather is always said to be worse than it really is) on the one hand and the tendency for understatement (the crops are never said to be as good as they really are) on the other. Cme will also have been confronted with the manifestation of a dilemma which most farmers and their Spokesmen are caught up in. Inherently they dislike Big Government, but they need its protective hand in order to survive. Yet once the hand is offered it is often rationalized as an :hmtrument of a plot to subvert them. Read the literature of the largest farm pressure group, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and cum will find Big Government not infrequently described as agriculture's mosthngerous enemy. Louis Bromfield Spoke for himself and many of his fellow farmers when he wrote that: The average farmer...hates the intervention of the federal government and the domination of the dusty, inhuman waffle- bottom bureaucrats in Washington.... The tragedy is that in bad times he is forced to compromise these beliefs in order to save his economic bacon, Egg it i§_thgfl that the 'socialist' planners step in and use every trick they can to take him over.15 One of the important reasons for the sharp divisions and bitter finmtration that has characterized so much of the postwar policy debate isthat the farm income problem has seemed to be relatively invulnerable Ubsignificant improvement. For example, from 1952 through 1959 the gownhment Spent a total of $18.3 billion on programs "predominantly for M ' 14No observer can understand farm politics unless he appreciates thusphenomenon, few political participants can succeed unless they explo it it. 15"How the Farmer Thinks," The Atlantic Monthly, June, 1952: 9.64. Italics mine. ‘ul One will have thus encountered the farmers' characteristic tendency for overstatement (the weather is always said to be worse than it really is) on the one hand and the tendency for understatement (the crops are never said to be as good as they really are) on the other. One will also have been confronted with the manifestation of a dilemma which most farmers and their Spokesmen are caught up in. Inherently they dislike Big Government, but they need its protective hand in order to survive. Yet once the hand is offered it is often rationalized as an instrument of a plot to subvert them. Read the literature of the largest farm pressure group, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and one will find Big Government not infrequently described as agriculture's most dangerous enemy. Louis Bromfield spoke for himself and many of his fellow farmers when he wrote that: The average farmer...hates the intervention of the federal government and the domination of the dusty, inhuman waffle- bottom bureaucrats in Washington.... The tragedy is that in bad times he is forced to compromise these beliefs in order to save his economic bacon, 33d 13 13 tth that the 'socialist' planners step in and use every trick they can to take him over.15 One of the important reasons for the sharp divisions and bitter frustration that has characterized so much of the postwar policy debate is that the farm income problem has seemed to be relatively invulnerable to significant improvement. For example, from 1952 through 1959 the government Spent a total of $18.3 billion on programs "predominantly for ____ . l4No observer can understand farm POlitiCS ““1955 he appreciates this phenomenon, few political participants can succeed unless they explOit it. 15"How the Farmer Thinks," The Atlantic Monthly, June, 1952: in 64. Italics mine. the benefit of the farmer," but total net income to agriculture, which stood at a Korean war high of $16.5 billion in 1951, dropped steadily 6 to a low of $11.8 billion in 1959.1 In vivid contrast to the chroni- cally low farm income, incomes to nonfarm persons have risen sharply.17 Thus "the incomes of farm families were lower relative to the rest of the population in 1961 than at any time since the last days of the great depression."1 Although some of the Specifics are different, the contemporary economic problems of agriculture are not unique to the postwar period. Since at least the early 1920's, American agriculture has been plagued with the twin problem of surplus production19 and low income. During the 1930's the policy of price supports and production control evolved as the goverrment's major weapon for dealing with this problem. In the early months of World War II the basic policy, which had been crystal- lized in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, was amended by sub- stantially raising the support levels and expanding the list of com- modities covered. k 16U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Food Costs-- Farm Prices, Committee Print, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, p. 24. From the low of 1959 net income to agriculture has stabilized at around $12-13 billion. 17ihid., p. 25. 18Kennard 0, Stephens, "We Have Not Yet Learned," After a Hundred [93192.9 PP- 505‘90 19We use John D. Black's rather general but useful definition of a surplus as "a volume of production continuing so large over a period that the producers of it have to sell at prices that will not allow them to operate with their accustomed profits, income and scale of liv- infih" Class notes from a lecture on agricultural policy by Black. \/ "nvl With the wartime provisions due to eXpire at the end of 1948, gxflicy makers were confronted with the choice of writing new legislation (u'allowing the automatic reinstitution of the permanent provisions of the 1938 law. Since the closing days of the War professional economists fwd been urging that not only should the wartime provisions be allowed to expire but that the whole price support and production control system beefither abandoned or completely restructured. Partly because of this dunus of expert criticism and partly because of the booming prosperity then being enjoyed by farmers, most sideline observers anticipated that major changes in the depression-inspired policy would be forthcoming. The first postwar legislation, the Agricultural Act of 1948, did inovide for the eventual phasing out of the rigid 90 percent of parity smxmrts that had been adopted in 1942, but the general structure of the 1938rnogram was retained. Indeed, although providing for a system of fhmible supports, the minimum and maximum support levels were substan- tially higher than those established in 1938. In 1949, the Truman Admin- imJation called for a wholesale revision of the government's price and annrol policy via the so-called Brennan Plan. Congress rejected Brennan's schameand enacted the Agriculture Act of 1949. This law differed from thel948 Act, which it replaced, by slightly narrowing the flexible wawrt range and further delaying the transition from the rigid to the flexible scale. In 1954 the Eisenhower Administration asked Congress to enact lqfislation which, generally Speaking, called for the institution of a Prmflam along the lines provided by the 1949 Act, the provisions of which hadrmt yet been put into effect because of the advent of the Korean '1 1.. u 7 O a, . . “a 0". on A. ’ ‘1» 0: so i 'F v 0.7 ‘ o . l' Ct ~e .. N. . ~_l . -‘s., a I.“ C '5. II ' v‘ ‘ tfi‘ I I I IO conflict. Except for somewhat delaying the transitional period, the Agricultural Act of 1954 was about what the Administration had asked for. However, as the costs of maintaining the program began to sky- rocket, because of mounting surpluses, the Administration began to call for ever lower support levels. By 1959 President Eisenhower proposed the abandonment of the historic parity price support system. Congress steadfastly refused to meet these requests. In 1961 and 1962 the Kennedy Administration, mindful of the growing discontent with the existing farm program from virtually all quarters, called for the enactment of a program which maintained high parity supports with the added provision of a highly restrictive and mandatory system of production controls--a program which was dubbed the "supply-management" approach. Congress initially resisted and then, in 1962, relented by approving a supply-management program for wheat, the commodity most chronically in surplus. But the rejection of this plan by farmers in the wheat referendum in the Spring of 1963 effectively killed the supply-management approach and left the price and control program about where it was a decade earlier, with the exception of the limited introduction, in 1964, of a direct-payments support system. President Johnson, following the pattern of his predecessors, has issued a call for "a fundamental examination of the entire agricultural policy of the United States."20 The lack of substantial change in the price and control policy has been a signal feature of postwar agricultural policy making. Few m:i'lor changes have occurred despite the fact that three successive M 20"Farm Message," New York Times, February 5, 1965, p. 16. , o . . K “' v 0 .' C u . , . g . . q, A- . In. I 11 Administrations, aiming in sharply divergent directions, sought to substantially alter the policy, and despite the fact that the existing policy has been universally and persistently condemned by the experts. The durability of the policy is all the more phenomenal in view of the fact that at least since the mid-1950's it has neither functioned as those who have voted to retain it intended, nor has it achieved the results they had anticipated. All of those engaged in the agricultural policy making process have felt uncomfortable with the high cost of oper— ating the program during the past decade. And while those who have sup- ported it have been convinced that the farm income problem would have been far worse without it, they have at the same time been continually disappointed at the lack of solid improvement in the farm income situ- ation. As one long-time observer, critic, and policy participant appropri- ately noted in 1960: "Virtually no one endorses or supports this program in its present form, and the farmers generally evince extreme dissatis- faction with it." but as Mr. Davis added, "it has been highly resistant even to minor improvements and politically invulnerable to drastic re- vision."21 That judgment would be no less true in 1964. Moreover, the maintenance of this extremely expensive program is particularly significant considering the sharp decline, both relative and absolute, of the farm sector in postwar American society. There are, then, many seemingly contradictory and incongruous features of post-World War II agricultural politics and policy. To say M.— 21Joseph S. Davis, "The Executive and Farm Policy," Annals of LELAmerican Academy of Political and Social Science, COCXXXI (September, 1960 , 94. rt . a o I p. A l ... be ,q u 9... IO. .. . ‘1 iv.- I‘ " ' r .o .v . ' ' .i "s. 's . u l‘. . . . _' 12 as much, however, is not to say that postwar agricultural policy making is unexplainable. We believe that it can be explained, and that is the central task of this study. Such a study does not, of course, start from scratch. There exists a considerable body of valuable information about postwar agricultural policy making. While we believe that the existing information is inadequate, it is by no means insignificant, and a full knowledge of this body of information is the necessary be- ginning point of this study. Review of the Literature The contemporary professional literature on agricultural politics and policy is not particularly characterized by an abundance of solid, in-depth analyses. Although a considerable amount has been written in this area an extremely high proportion of the literature is polemical rather than descriptive; it is more concerned with explaining what is wrong with a particular policy and why and how it should be changed than describing why it has taken the shape that it has. In addition there is a deficiency of comprehensive analyses capable of putting the entire Postwar period into proper historical perspective while providing analyti- cal continuity. In reviewing the literature one is also impressed, not only with its partial coverage, but also with its inconsistent and some- times plainly contradictory character. However, there is some existing literature which, either directly or indirectly, deals competently, if partially, with the question of why the postwar price and control policy has taken the course and shape that it has. Any attempt to develop a broader understanding must start with . ‘ I u r . ‘ o l ‘ , > x . , - o , . i r C r . . f L. , . 7 l ’ .7/ A\ ’ \f . ‘ w l ‘\ - . C ‘Lw o J I . I ' Q J . ‘ » ' .‘ . . e a ' s . t l 1 r ‘ ‘ - o , , E .. . , . x.- O ‘ ‘ I v'~. J _ I 7 g . A - 4 u. ‘ , l ’l ’ ' 'flp ,' I H “‘ I w - _ J , - . . a ‘ I T‘ | I. .\ ' b \ 1 e , ., \J - ~ - , . 'r . .. . I ' . . . v I . . g ,A 7 . - '3 A l v I . V ‘ J '0.- . Phi-l . ... ‘o. ' U . . K‘- . ‘I vs . I -. 0'. ‘ . . . . _ F 3 . r) l A 7" l J y: I,' s l u . . . h K] . ‘ . o ". a u . . ‘ . ' i l . J A l , , ) ' »- i .A l‘. W _ .. ' T l . - ‘ 7 ’\ ‘l A fi‘ ‘ f ' ~. ' l ‘ ), LJ . , >1 . ‘ ', .. u .- ’ l . ' t A‘ ‘ J tJ _ / g A A . ‘ I u . . y l r , V \ ‘ ° . . f, \l , .- . , . ‘ . -. ’ . , . ‘ T 1 . v . . . . I ‘ . u . I ' x ' v .' 7| I ‘ .' ,' l _/ , . _ , i l 0 u . . ' ‘ t ' W r < ' w. J - | i l \_' i , . - i '1 I .‘“\ . I . v ‘ , . -1 W 4‘.” x ‘l l , I . l. l . , . 2 , . . _ ) T J , ‘ Q *‘ 7 ‘ :-‘ C n , x . \ ,. P ‘ . , . r - 1 r»\ ~. r ‘\ J a. , J ' E 1 \J - j r. . ll \ l I ”f. v‘ I e \ ‘ n v- , \ . , l ' ‘ , c) J __ , _ .1 V , ‘ .I‘ 13 a survey of the general answers suggested by that literature. The answers, uddch are generally not integrated, stress the potent political power of farmers, the conflict of commodity interests within agriculture, and an occasional reference to an uninformed and indifferent urban public. These must be considered systematically. Reduced to its simplest form, one of the most commonly emphasized reasons for the maintenance of a high price support policy throughout the pmstwar period has been that low "price supports have become symbolic of IHXJe government action to help farmers. And 'rigid‘ or high price mxxwrts have become symbolic of generous aid to agriculture."22 As this ifigh support policy has cost the taxpayers several billion dollars a year tins implies that the American farmer exerts a considerable political in- fluence. Indeed, in the eyes of many observers the political power of fanmxs has assumed almost legendary proportions. The editor of Harper's, JdumFischer, expressed a common notion when he referred to the country's twanfillion commercial farmers23 as "the most powerful vested interest in the American economy."24 The maintenance of the high price support policy along with such snograms as special credit facilities, soil conservation payments, tax —.___ 22Lauren Soth, Farm Trouble (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). pp. 19-20. 23Mr. Fischer was referring to those farmers who have a gross amuml sales of at least $2,500. They produce the bulk of the total farm ouunn. The other farmers (2.7 million in 1954) are the small, part-time, amiresidential farmers who produce comparatively little in the way of Cmmbdities and even less in the way of political pressure. 24"Country Slickers Take Us Again," Har er's, December, 1955, P» 220 it ) /‘ C ..‘ g R) a I _, . i l a '\ -1 J i - . I . l . . , ,. 7 r 7. r7 l . Ail . I l J i J l 5‘ V I \,1‘ } J l is ° f {'17, i Q a .L .l‘ . \J , l -\ , J I" 3 L A ‘ ~71 . l . .1 i‘ + O e—a. ,L- l ‘ L ,1 I 'I ' 1‘ r L ‘ " T J "a J . 4 I. . , . ,c . . . . __ V . r , I VJ " J v » '- I\ ~ >./ - / ~ ( 1 . \J F / f; . , f L, V , 2 7 ¥r L . L a.) , ‘ \_. J v n 5 _7p w J l, 3 _, H .J, ' .t "‘0 l L l - A 3 . l' ., 3 \_ A :n 31‘ a ._. J a l «l t . v ,x' I - x. \ a »' .L ‘vwo r . J , . A ‘ z in. D‘- .c, I‘IO I l4 privileges for farm co-ops, REA, extension education, marketing advice, clearly indicate that farmers have done quite well in terms of government largess. Charles Hardin presented a common view when he said that "govern- ment has gone further in promoting, supporting, and regulating agriculture than any other sector of the political economy."25 Because of the diffi- cult problem of evaluation and comparative measurement of services and subsidies to any given sector, such a sweeping judgment should be accepted with caution. Still, by whatever measurement, the legislative record sug- gests a considerable political leverage on the part of the American farmer. Thus this question presents itself: "If farm families scarcely represent 8 percent of the population, how is it that they exercise such dominance in legislative policy on agriculture?"26 Standard answers to this ques- tion emphasize the significance of the farm vote, rural overrepresentation in Congress, and the effectiveness of the farm pressure groups. Mr. Fischer attributed the political influence of farmers to the fact that the political parties view them as constituting the largest “27 As the Southern and Northeastern "single block of detachable votes. farm vote can hardly be considered "detachable“ and because Western farmers are too few and far between, it is the Midwest farm vote which has been treated as the most significant. Political analysts have focused 25"The Politics of Agriculture in the United States," Journal of 5am Economics, xxxn (November, 1950), 571. 263°5eph R. Monsen, Jr., and Mark w. Cannon, The Makers of Public P01icy: American Power Groups and Their Ideologies (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 100. 27Har er's, December, 1955, p. 22. I. A—‘CV I. w . a o J o F v ~ - 4 . ..~--<-.--.— h , u . \_ ‘. . I 9,... ‘ -_ ,p ' r 15 considerable attention on this vote because of the belief that it has the capacity, deSpite its relatively small size,28 for tipping the electoral balance scales, and thus has not only determined the fate of many Senators and Representatives but supposedly has "decided many a Presidential contest" as well.z It has been generally argued that the Midwest farm vote plays such a critical role because of a high correlation between the direction of that vote and the course of agricultural policy. The relation between "farm policy and the midwest farm vote" is one of the three "most cited examples of issue that are presumed to have a decisive effect on the 30 vote of particular groups." The relationship is strong because the ,x d farm vote is considered to be the prime example of ”pocketbook" voting. As the farmer's pocketbook is invariably Subjected to periodic pinches, this makes his vote highly volatile?) A- H. Holcombe had assigned to this block of votes a pivotal role ”he” Presidential campaign strategy was aimed at putting together winning k 28h] 1954 there were 1.7 million Midwestern farm "operators" 25 Years and older. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of AgriCUNUI‘e: 1292’ V01: 11: p. 124. During the decade of the fifties this probably meant a Potential farm vote of 3 to 3.5 million. 29Carroll Kilpatrick, "What Happened to the Farm Bloc?" Har er's. November, 1957, p. 570 30Thomas V. Gilpatrick, "Price Support Policy and the Midwest Earm Vote," Midwest Journal of Political Science, In (November, 1959)’ J19: The other examples cited by Gilpatrick are: u. 5. policy toward Israel on the Jewish vote in New York City and the Atlantic Seaboard, and racial Policy on the northern Negro vote. W“ 31An9u5 Cameell, et al., The American Voter (New York: .lohn" iley 3 Sons, Inc., 1960), Chapter 15, "Agrarian Political Behavwr. 321101- exam - p 1'tics Parties. 80L ple see 1bid.; V. 0. KEY: 0 1 ' _ r. pressure Gm” 5 (4th ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1958): PP- 581 82’ 16 sectional combinations. He concluded, however, that this would be diminished with the shift in political strategy aimed at attracting the urban middle class vote.“ However, he argued that in 1948 the "grain-growing and stock-raising interests still held the balance of power...."34 Although subsequent analysis has suggested that the shift- ing Midwest farm vote may not have been the major factor in Truman's victory, many politicians, journalists, and political scientists thought that it was. The interpretations of Truman's victory acted to strengthen I‘ the beliefs as to the political significance of the Midwest farm vote.‘35 The Democratic congressional victories in the Midwest in 1956 and 1958 did little to challenge these beliefs.06 Thus, despite their ever smaller absolute and relative numbers, Midwest farmers are still considered "a big enough 91‘0Up in many districts to swing elections from one candidate Leo” EPstein, "Size and Place and the Division of the Two-Party Vote in Wisconsin," Western Political Quarterly, IX (March, 1956), pp. 138-50; Louis H. Bean, "The Farmer in the Voting Booth," The New Republic (February 29: 1960), pp. 9-10; Don F. Hadwiger, "Political Aspects of Changes in Farm Labor Force," Labor Mobility and Population in Agricul- L‘iri: Iowa State University Center of Agricultural Adjustment (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1961), pp. 50-72: Angus Campbell et alo: IDS fimirican Voter (New York: John Wiley 8. Sons, Inc., 1960), Chapter XV, Agrarian Political Behavior." 33The Middle Classes'in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard univerSitY Press, 1940). 34% More Perfect Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), P0 1170 h' 35F” a review of how the 1948 election was interpreted and for 1s own dissenting argument see Charles M. Hardin, "Farm Price Policy and :he l:arm Vote," Journan Farm Economics, XXXVII (November, 1955), pp. 01-24. ~— 3 194a bggngressional Quarterly Almanac, x11, 1956, pp. 804-10; x1v, 2 pp- 714-15, 737-38, 810. 17 37 to another" and are credited as being a major "bargaining power" in presidential electionsf8 Certainly it is true that the farm vote has been an histori- cally potent factor in American politics. It remains a force to be reckoned with today. Still, in attempting to explain why government subsidies have continued to rise, while the relative and absolute size of the farm population has declined, one notes a tendency on the part of some analysts to give to the farm vote a significance which must be questioned. Hadwiger, for example, argues that in terms of presidential politics, farmers have become more powerful by becoming an ever smaller minorityf9 The common strategy of presidential parties to play to minorities, at least during campaigns, is well known. But there are limits on how far this type of analysis can be carried. As evidence of his argument Hadwiger cites the fact that 1960 was the first time that a presidential candidate (Nixon) proclaimed that the farm issue was the 40 most important in the campaign. The significance of this is highly 4 questionable. 1 His major evidence, however, is that "the farm vote since 1948 has been extremely volatile.‘ That farmers have been somewhat 37Monsen and Cannon, p. 100- 38Hadwiger, Labor Mobilityo-oa P- 67- 39Labor Mobility..., pp. 67-72. Also see "Discussion: Trends in the Political Position of the American Farmer," Goals and Values in Agri- gyltural Policy, Iowa State University Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1961) where he argues that one of the four major trends in agricultural politics is "the increased Mgr. of the farm vote." (p. 236) Italics mine. 40Labor Mobility..., p. 68. 4lBecause of a conjunction of several factors quite unrelated to any calculation that the farm vote had somehow become more critically A . 18 more volatile in their political choices than other voting groups seems to be fairly well confirmed.42 But the really critical question here is whether or not this vote has been ME volatile than previously. Hadwiger presents no comparative evidence nor do the sources he cites. The erratic farm belt swings in the 1890's, the 1920's and the 1930's suggest that if anything, the farm vote has been comparatively stable during this period. Going beyond the question of whether the postwar farm vote is more or less volatile is the deeper question of precisely what impact the vote has had on the behavior of the political parties, individual politicians, and the policy process. The analyses of farmer voting patterns during this period certainly reveals periodic discontent. Yet exactly what the farmers were trying to communicate when they marked their ballots is extremely difficult to determine. Hardin has shown that upon close analysis the meaning of the farm vote in 1948 and 1954 with respect to price support policy is vague:13 Gilpatrick, in his comparative analysis of the fortunes of Midwest con- gressional candidates with divergent views on price policy, also found important both candidates proclaimed the farm issue to be the most important domestic issue. Despite these declarations there have been few previous peacetime campaigns in which the farm issue received less sustained atten- tion from the presidential candidates. Moreover, both candidates, in promising to do something about the farm problem were speaking as much 120 the nonfarm public as to the farmer. We might also note that the farm issue was hardly mentioned in 1964 and ask if this means that the farm vote had lost its power during that four-year period? For a fuller dis- cussion of the 1960 campaign, see ChaPter X: 42Angus Campbell and his associates believe that "since 1948 the two-party vote division among farmers outside the South has fluctuated more sharply than it has within any of the major occupation groupings." Mgrican Voter, p. 402. 43Journal of Farm Economics, xxxvn. . . 19 little clear relationship between the candidates' positions on price policy and farm vote patterns; "price support policy showed no notice- able differential effects in rural voting in Iowa and Illinois."44 But while the analysts have some doubts concerning what the farm vote has really meant with respect to price policy, they have had no doubt concerning what meaning the politicians have assigned to the farm vote. In this respect the 1948 vote has been considered the most crucial, and vir- tually all analysts have agreed with Hardin's conclusion that that elec- tion had a profound effect on "practicing politicians and especially congresmnen," and as a consequence considerably changed the whole course Cd postwar price policy.45 Thus in this critically formative period (bngress was impelled to adopt a high price support policy rather than Eilow sUpport policy. Subsequent elections, particularly the congres- shnml elections of 1954, 1956 and 1958, have been analyzed as having a rehfiorcing effect on congressional support for high guaranteed prices. A study of the actual political and economic conditions of 1947, 1948£NKi1949 casts considerable doubt on this view that the 1948 election, bland of itself, had this supposedly profound effect. There is consider- abheevidence to suggest that the price policy would likely not have been nmchcfifferent regardless of who won in 1948.46 Some of the same doubts calte raised about the supposed impact of subsequent elections. In any evmu:one can readily accept Hardin‘s admission that he had not "proved" M 44Midwest Journal of Political Science, 111, 332. 45Journal of Farm Economics, XXXVII, 610. 46See our discussion of the 1948 election in Chapter X. 5 o o ‘I .o. " s. u u ._I .D, I . '1‘ I u v V v u" ‘ '.a ‘. I . 't' i l.’ I ..‘ l s" A u' i '. Q a t n .‘u . . . , i a t \ a ‘ I \ l a 20 his argument that the politicians reacted to the elections of 1948 and 1954 in the manner that he ascribes to them.47 As much as anything else, the standard interpretations of the impact of the farm vote on price policy may reveal the analyst's bias toward the existing price policy. Because they believe that policy to be a bad policy, they have been inclined to conclude that Congress would not have adopted it except for the particular interpretation that the politicians placed on the farm vote. Thus, analysts like Hardin, re- flecting the common view that high price supports have been "bad for the economics of farm policy," have tried to show the politicians that they have been needlessly sensitive on this issue.48 Similarly, Gilpatrick advises the political parties that with respect to price policy they "have more room for maneuver than they think possible without great risk of political loss or gain."49 Most accounts of farm political power also emphasize the advantage that rural interests enjoy in Congress. Traditionally the Senate was cited as a prime example of rural overrepresentation. With the widespread 50 urbanization which has affected all states, this argument is now seldom used, especially as it has become customary to use the urbanization factor “Journal of Farm Economics, )O(XVII, p. 618. 481bid., p. 619. 49Midwest Journal of Political Science, III, 334. . 50In 1960 farmers constituted 20 percent or more of the population in only 5 states: They were Iowa, 24.0%; N. Dakota, 32.3%: S. Dakota, 30.26; Nebraska, 21.9%: Mississippi, 24.9%. U. S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book: 1962, p. 2. 4. 1 a 1 1 - .0 I .a I v I . .. I .. y u, . .. .7 .. ... , I . . I. .. y. ..u a. .n . H. ... ..- Hoe . ,h 1 .. .. . . q . . . a O . l . . . i » r . l v . c. u 4 . J .— . . . . _ . . , o a y . . _ i . . i . _ . . . a . . . _ . _. . 7 , s w . , o . , , . . c v . a t . . -0 I i . . . _ O . _ . 7 r o i . 1 . w . g i I 0 0 ~ _ ,. . . . r . g .7. . Q . . o , . 0c . . . . . u; u . I . , , . O u» w I. . , . r O i O p O O a u . A u o . o . . _ , s O , . O. I p. . O H O a o . . . r . . . .. I O . . I\ O . , v _ . o H _ . _ o H . . o . o x . k . . . . O C u, a . 21 in explaining why the Senate is "more big-city in orientation"51 than the House. Overrepresentation of the rural community in the House is apparent. The protracted failure of the states to reapportion their legislatures has meant that rural representatives have exerted a considerable influence in congressional districting, resulting in a disproportionate number of rural congressmen. Compounding this numerical advantage is the fact that rural districts tend to be one-party districts which send their Represen- tatives back to Washington year after year where, because of their senior- ity, they vauire a general expertise and commanding positions in the committee system and are therefore able to yield a disproportionate poli- tical power.52 Thus the general conclusion is that "the main results of the politics of districting are to reduce the number of competitive seats in the House and to overrepresent the rural areas."53 Unquestionably the farm sector enjoys a certain advantage in the House. However, this factor of overrepresentation must be kept in proper perspective. In much of the literature this notion has been greatly overworked and often misused. For example, the Congressional Quarterly Almagag classified 203, or 46 percent, of the congressional districts of 51Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, The American Political Process (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 410. 52For one of the more detailed accounts of the rural overrepres- entation, see Gordon E. Baker, Rural versus Urban Political Power (Garden City, New York: Double~day 8. Company, Inc., 1955). 53James MacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltson, Government by the People (5th ed., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963 ’ p. 397. PI 6., y i h) N 54 the 88th Congress as "rural." Considering that by census definition the rural population constituted only 30 percent of the national total, the discrepancy in representation seems large. But the "rural" classifi- cation used by the Almanac left much to be desired as it included "many medium-sized cities" under 50,000.55 A more meaningful classification was used in 1956. Defining "rural" districts as those being at least two-thirds rural (census definition), or one-half to two-thirds rural with no city of 35,000 or more, it was concluded that a redistricting based strictly on population would decrease the "rural" districts by 56 10 and increase the urban and metropolitan districts by 14. Although this is not insignificant it seems unlikely that there have been many farm policy issues, either in the negotiating stage or the voting stage, where this margin would have made a critical difference. 0f greater significance is the fact the concept of "rural" can no longer be equated with the farm, as was once the case, and as many observers still seem prone to do. In 1920 farmers constituted 60 percent of the census definition of rural (farms and towns under 2,500). In 1950, howeVer, farmers constituted only 42 percent of the rural population, and in 1960 farmers made up only 25 percent of the rural segment of soci- e"-Y. While it is undoubtedly the case that gerrymandering by state legislatures has continued to magnify the farmer interest in Congress, u -———-—— 54klx, 1963, 1170. 55Ibld., p. 1172. , . . l x. l . ' g . . \ , , , r \ - JV ‘ . . , < r‘ ' VK ‘ 1 , . , a ,- ' .1 ‘ , . . . l , . . a , r ‘ 1 J / . . _ . ‘a , 1 , ‘ . O . J l j .2 V / a ' /‘\ ,9 . A L o . la ' r __ .A . t r p 7 , J a A. ;“ ,L l . a , 1 1 . I J r . 1. 7 "\ a i , . . a O . . .4 . 1 1 n g ‘. x x 1. _v '\ ‘- \ '- ,s " 4 x . u M 6) unquestionably, however, the farmers' advantage has dwindled throughout the postwar period.57 Ross B. Talbot echoed another common theme concerning farm political power when he stated: The imposing and powerful private farm interest groups have been an influence in Congressional politics since the early 1920's. Considering the relatively small, albeit stable, number of commercial farms (2,063,778 farms producing over $2,500 gross in farm products, according to the 1959 census), it would seem correct to state that farmers are the most effectively organized of all groups of the American society.b8 Ahflwugh much of the literature implicitly or explicitly evokes this image the justification is too often no more penetrating than the bit 59 of deductive logic engaged in by Mr. Talbot. Without in any way implying that farm pressure groups are ineffective, several factors amnn.farmers, their pressure groups, and their congressional repre- sentative need to be kept in mind. First, there are no serious studies which show that farmers en- nmsse are exceptionally active in politically oriented farm organizations. The Survey Research Center reports that a majority of the farmers do not bekug to such organizations and moreover "of those who do belong, the inxmtion willing to indicate ‘a great deal of interest' in the —___ 57Adrian and Press also point out that the "common belief that agneat many national legislators are farmers is erroneous," and that itis not the farm but "the small town and its viewpoint that leaves itsnmrk on the legislative process." p. 410. 58"Farm Legislation in the 86th Congress," Journal of Farm W, x1111 (August, 1961), 590. Italics mine. 59Actually there has been surprisinle little detailed analysis offarm pressure group activity in the postwar period. The literature that does exist is very general. ..o ‘1' o 1.. . n . uh - 0 .v n . .. . . . a. .c. ... .. .. I I 1. , r . . .a _ . .| OK O . . I v. . . ,1. . ... . 1 L. pub . N... 1.4 .e. r u. . . ‘\l y . . . . x ‘ 1. .. of. o . L, z 1 , a L .lr 1.; J .r . r, . A. l n . I . , . . r J A r r u . a. r . Ix. .1 i . . . .1; . h \I _ . _ . . \I; ‘J v ) r 4 . . .1 r I, l l o F . J . r r O s i _ 2 FIL .1 — 1 I, — 1 C l o l , , _ l I 6 l ,5 a I) x u _ V . 4, a 4 OK 4 . r . . r 0., . 24 60 organization is small." In addition, no one has documented that the farm organizations can "deliver" the vote of their membership. Cer- tainly Hardin's observations about the power of the farm organizations seem to be well taken: "Indirectly farm organizations may help bring out the vote.... But formal organizations seemingly cannot change their members votes...[and thei£7 effectiveness on farm price policies 61 is often exaggerated." Any description of the relationship between the farm organizations mkicongressional legislation must also take account of the disunity among these groups. The notion that the farmers are the "most effectively or- ganized" group would seem to suggest a considerable cooperative harmony among the various farm organizations. Considering the sharp decline in thernmmer of farmers, one might expect to see such unity so that they muyn maximize their power. But such is not the case.()‘2 The farm groups have never worked in perfect harmony. As V. O. Key,Jr., notes, they "seldom unite for legislative purposes...and .63 gmuually urge upon Congress conflicting programs.’ However, it is thecmse that from the middle 1920's through the middle 1940's the farm gunmm, with the young and ascendant American Farm Bureau Federation in thexmnguard, united as they never had before around the goal of erecting a system of parity price supports. But increasingly in the postwar period, W 60The American Voter, p. 414. 61"Farm Political Power and the U. 8. Government Crisis,“ Jmuwml 9f Farm Ecgnomics, XL (December, 1958), 1651. ‘ 62A fact that Talbot himself has noted. See, e.g., "The Changing POlndral Position of Agriculture," Journal of Farm Economics, XLV (May, 1903), pp. 318-331, esp. pp. 325‘260 63Politics, Parties1 and Pressure Grougéj 5th ed., Po 40- /‘ I. iv. ‘. . e ‘I o~ '\ I I ~ ~ '1.- 'I 'C . '\ . I ‘- 's . t“ 1 .‘ ~ 1 .. i u | s f 25 the farm groups have sharply divided on this very issue, with the same Farm Bureau leading the effort to dismantle the program that it had formerly done so much to erect. Conflict between the Farm Bureau and its chief rival, the National Farmers Union, over price and control policy became apparent in the late 1940's, and by the mid-1950's they were engaging in open combat. by the early 1960's name-calling between the organizations' presidents, Charles B. Shuman, of the Bureau, and James G. Patton of the Union, had reached the point that Shuman had begun to refer Patton's attacks to his lawyers for possible libel action.64 The rivalry between these two giants is the most dramatic, but other divisions exist and, by the latter part of the fifties, the com- munity of farm groups was not inappr0priately described as "a collection of conflicting interests milling about Washington with more zeal than purpose.“J5 As Harold B. Cooley, Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, ruefully noted in 1964: "There is great disharmony among farmers as to public policies relating to their well-being."66 Also it needs to be kept in mind that properly Speaking, there has been no meaningful "farm bloc“ operating in Congress in the postwar 64Ovid A. Martin, "A Concerted Attack on Farm Bureau," Kansas Cit Star, 1964. 65"Wanted: A New Farm Program," America, July 11, 1959, p. 506. For similar views by other political reporters see, William Blair, "Farm Bloc Now Split in Many Factions," New York Times, June 14, 1959, Po 75; Kilpatrick, Harper's, November, l957, pp. 56-59. 56Food Costs-Food Prices: Po X- .,5 ~ ‘ . .. .7 - . . I. . .~‘ 0 6 a M yll l v n n I.» Dh- - 1‘- ' III a . I ‘ ..— . .. ... t. .. n ~ ~ . n , v x . t. .I v . a v . \ o r u . ‘ . . . i ., . .. . b . . I r a I . t . . v — . o l . . V l J. v ) t a .4 ‘1 O (U D r u l C I z . t. A x .r‘ r \ r . v.11. r . O . o r Q I A . , rt _ L r )x t . » x . o 4 u 5’ Y . . — . o. . . r . r, 1 z o . , n'. m . A p L .d o r t. I . r of; . . A . ) . _ O» l . H . _ . . . y . .. L p w h . J . 1 I . _ A .rl , . In . . I . .1} I \. O L. A 4 v r ‘J a. 1 J , r n r 'r , Z .1 , 1 rl J . t 4 .. _ A L 1 1 I. N). , I \ I .\ \IV p o... t . . V I . u/ , , . n, It. I. . J .t t, o J i L l , P1 . L l . . _ _ V \ VJ I Cf L A 1 t), . p I A \ ) A , r . . .J 1 I A H I t 1 . i . ‘x n. O x J .. IA 1 r. 3 . l l '. r I. t , 1 ~ period. The highly touted farm bloc--a bi-partisan group of farm-state Senators and Representatives-~came into existence in the early 1920's largely at the suggestion of the farm groups (particularly the Farm Bureau). Certainly the effectiveness of the farm groups in pressing their demand was greatly enhanced by the existence of this formally organized group of friendly congressmen. As a formal organization the kfloc was fairly short lived. Apparently an informal grouping continued to function for some time, but several analysts have declared that it was extinct as a viable coalition prior to the beginning of the postwar periodf’7 'The increasingly partisan character of congressional voting (Nifarm legislation since 1948 confirms this view.68 Thus when Repre- sentative H. Carl Anderson (Rep., Minnesota) observed in 1957, after taking part in a series of highly partisan debates and votes on a farm bill,tfiwt he had witnessed the "burial of the remains of the farm knoc,"69 it is probably the case that there weren't many remains to be buried. The demise of the "farm bloc" is but one of the manifestations ofthe contemporary disarray within the agricultural political community. 67Wesley McCune, The Farm Bloc (New York: Doubleday Doran, 1943), rh 44; Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society, (Englewood CIUWS, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 178. Senator Dirksen Chumed in 1944 that "there is no farm bloc unanimity in the Congress. Ttis everybody thinking for himself." Fortune, "The Farm Bureau," June, 1944, pp. 177, 188. 68Hardin, Journal of Farm Economics, XXXVII, 602-610; Hadwiger, (RBIs and Values..., pp. 233-35; J. Roland Pennock, "Party and Constitu- umy hinstwar Agricultural Price-Support Legislation," Journal of Politics, XVIII (May, 1956), 167-210. 69Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XIII: 1957, 6370 r. “1|— '\ v‘ ..‘- In this reSpect there is a rather curious anomaly that pervades much of the popular and professional literature. First, there is the stereotyped picture of Alnerican farmers wielding almost omnipotent political force in the writing of the farm legislation and, as a result, securing from govern- ment 3 range of services and subsidies virtually unparallelled by any other gIOUp in society. This implies that the lack of significant change in the price and control program is due to the fact that, through the exercise of raw political force, farm interests have been able to maintain this ex- tremely expensive program against the general interest of the tax-paying and food-consuming public. But even the most cursory survey of the politics surrounding this policy shows that the really significant battles have not been between farmer and nonfarmer, but within the farm political community. Of late, however, some analysts have pointed to conflicts within agriculture as a factor in explaining the course of recent price and con- trol policy. Explanations of the conflict within agriculture stress the fact that agriculture is composed of an "endless variety of farms and many different kinds of and classes of farmers" having different and sometimes competing interests. As applied to the price and control policy, it is the differences in commodity-based interests that are given primary atten- tion; "the interests of a specialized wheat farmer in Kansas who is in- terested in high wheat prices is far different from those of a New York dairy farmer who wants to buy cheap feeds." The price and control policy is not general in nature, but is Written and administered along individual commodity lines. This means -—-_.__ 7OGilbert C. Fite, "The Changing Political Role of the Farmer," Q—E‘Ient History, X (August, 1956), 84. ‘ao . 1", that the drafting of legislation lends itself to a piecemeal, commodity- by-commodity approach. This has a potentially paralyzing effect, par- ticularly if broad, integrating political forces fail to maintain an ascendant position. Just this type of a situation seems to have developed. Over the past several decades, agriculture has become increasingly specialized. This means that the individual farmer's economic well-being depends primarily upon the profits realized from one or two commodities. This invariably affects his views on agricultural policy. One direct manifestation of this development has been the increased activity of farm pressure groups organized on a commodity basis, for example, such organi- zations as the National Wheat Growers Association, the American National Cattlemen‘s Association, and the National Wool Growers Federation. A similar orientation has been developing at the congressional level since greater agricultural specialization has meant that one or two commodities oftentimes constitute the major source of agricultural income for a given geographical region. In addition, because of the manner in which the price and control program is administered, there is a strong tendency for many administrators in the Department of Agriculture to identify with the producers of a given commodity. These administrators may develop an interlocking relationship with the commodity organizations and certain congressmen. One result of this is that the Secretary of Agri- Culture may be hampered in his efforts to propose and administer broad, general farm policy.71 M 71For an excellent general analysis of how this commodity-by- commodity approach pervades all levels of the policy making process, see Dale E. Hathaway, Government and Agriculture: Public Policy in a Democratic Scalety (New York: The Macmillan Company: 1963): PP- 183—238- ... - .. that the drafting of legislation lends itself to a piecemeal, commodity- by-commodity approach. This has a potentially paralyzing effect, par- ticularly if broad, integrating political forces fail to maintain an ascendant position. Just this type of a situation seems to have developed. Over the past several decades, agriculture has become increasingly specialized. This means that the individual farmer‘s economic well-being depends primarily upon the profits realized from one or two commodities. This invariably affects his views on agricultural policy. One direct manifestation of this development has been the increased activity of farm pressure groups organized on a commodity basis, for example, such organi- zations as the National Wheat Growers Association, the American National Cattlemen's Association, and the National Wool Growers Federation. A similar orientation has been developing at the congressional level since greater agricultural specialization has meant that one or two commodities oftentimes constitute the major source of agricultural income for a given geographical region. In addition, because of the manner in which the price and control program is administered, there is a strong tendency for many administrators in the Department of Agriculture to identify with the producers of a given commodity. These administrators may develop an interlocking relationship with the commodity organizations and certain congressmen. One result of this is that the Secretary of Agri- colture may be hampered in his efforts to prepose and administer broad, general farm policy;71 —_¥ 71For an excellent general analysis of how this commodity-by- Commodity approach pervades all levels of the policy making process, see Dale E. Hathaway, Government and Agriculture: Public Policy in a Democratic 52.2% (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), pp. 183-238. .‘A lt4_ "Q . "t, I. i. .av 29 In juxtaposition to the rise of the more narrowly focused com~ modity interests there has been a weakening of the chief political forces which could serve as a coordinating and integrating factor, i.e., the demise of the farm bloc and the sharp rupture among the general farm organizations. Several observers have looked forward to the development of a more programatic, disciplined approach by the political parties as a force capable of providing the centralized leadership necessary for the development of general, integrated farm legislation. In this respect the tendency toward a somewhat more partisan behavior in congressional voting has been judged a favorable sign. However, these voting patterns can be highly deceiving,7:2 and no one seriously argues that party interest has become the controlling factor in farm legislation. In the absence of the older accommodating forces and with party influence only nascent the small, rather narrowly focused agricultural committees in Congress have played a crucial role.73 But the membership of these committees reflect a rather even balance of commodity interests?4 This type of arrangement is not conducive to positive, unified action. Commenting on this, Dale E. Hathaway concludes that the "organization 72The partisan voting patterns can be deceiving as the party ngraphical distribution tends to reflect commodity distribution. Thus, what may appear to be party regularity may actually be a reflection of constituency interests. See "The Political Impasse in Farm Support Legislation," Yale Law Journal, X (April, 1962), 962-64. 73Ross B. Talbot, "Farm Legislation in the 86th Congress," Journal of Farm Economics, XLIII (August, 1961), 582—605. 741bid., and Charles 0. Jones, "Representation in Congress; the Case of the House Agriculture Committee," American Political Science m. U! (June, 1961), 358-67. o...“ I. 1‘ ¥. 7 .g ,- \ I ,. a A , - .a—~ 7 A . ’ F f 0 .... -7---“ . . O . ./ 4 ~ . 1 . p t. -- P I "x .7 r“‘ I J 7‘ ,—--- V ’- .0 0 do», 0 A . v, .0 ,--- and Operation of the congressional committees dealing with agriculture are now such as to virtually preclude general farm legislation."75 The bmmct result that this commodity-by-commodity orientation in virtually all phases of the policy process has had on legislation is summed up by one study as follows: This proliferation of interests within agriculture has created a stalemate on farm_policy. Congressional procedures are such that a concerted minority interest can usually block action distasteful to it through various obstructive tactics, if the interest has sufficient access to strategic points in the legislative process. Many farm interests have access through the agriculture committees, without whose approval no farm bill is likely to be adopted. The proliferation of interests has meant that there are now many groups, each trying to ob- struct the others' programs. The sum of all these obstruc- tionist tactics has been impasse. An appreciation of the importance of this commodity-interest factor is essential, but it is by no means sufficient for understanding wbyagricultural price and control policy has taken the course that it has. First, the development of commodity oriented interest does not, initself, necessarily lead to increased conflict. Some of the commo- <fities are competitive to be sure, and this is likely to lead to con- flhn.between the political forces representing those commodities in termscfi public policy. Still, in most cases, no such conflict exists. hireading the studies which have stressed this commodity-interest con- flhn, one notes a tendency for the analyst to go from the observation Ofpmtential economic conflict between commodities to the conclusion that an actual political conflict exists. ¥ 75Government and Agriculture, p. 197. ‘ 79Yale Law Review, X, 969-70. Although overstating the case thiSisione of the best accounts of the commodity-interests conflicts. '.,I i.., However, one clear-cut result of these developments is that the agricultural political community speaks through increasingly separate voices. This has made the writing and enactment of farm legislation more difficult and has created a situation in which even rather minor conflict can contribute to wholesale stalemate. This raises the important question as to why broader, integrating and unifying forces have been unable to gain a more dominant position. Congressional leaders have certainly been keenly aware of the need for the development of such harmonizing forces.77 We will suggest that the factors which have divided the agricultural political community and stalemated the policy making process transcend the conflicts, real and fancied, of differing economic commodity interests. All those who attempt to describe agricultural policy making stress the dominance of the farm political interests in the writing of farm leg- islation. The fact that the farm interests enjoy this commanding position is usually explained by pointing to the various facets of farmer political power discussed above. This emphasis on the formidable power of the farm political community has contributed to a popular image of farm interests riding roughshod over the political representatives of nonfarm interests Who dare to try to intervene or protest. However, as has been pointed out, the great farm policy battles in the postwar period have occurred within the farm political community rather than between the farm and non- farm comunit ies. —-—_ 77See 8.9., U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Family Farms, The Famil Farm, Committee Print, 84th Congo: August 1: 1956: P- 23, 811d 599g Costs-~Farm Prices, p. x. r1 t'l. ‘. Q. . 32 If nothing else is clear about agricultural policy in the recent years one feature stands out in sharp, bold relief-~it has cost the tax- payers billions and billions of dollars. This fact, particularly when viewed against the background of the disarray among the farm interests, forces the question of why there has been no serious challenge from the nonfarm political community. The possibility of such a challenge has been a source of worry to more than a few farm political leaders. Over the long course of the postwar debates on price and control policy, farm spokesmen have, on occasion, openly expressed their fear that the taxpaying, food-consuming urban public would one day rise up in wrathful protest against the farm program. By the late 1950's and early 1960's the urban press and urban congressmen were indeed exhibiting signs of discontent. But no major revolt materialized. This lack of a major and concerted protest from the urban political community suggests itself as another factor in ex- plaining why the agricultural price and control program has been sub- jected to so little change. The professional and popular literature has devoted little direct attention to the question of why no major urban challenge has developed. There is, however, a common implication that urban political leaders so respect, or fear, the power of the farm interests that they judge such a challenge to be futile. Those few analysts who have directly addressed themselves to explaining this lack of urban protest have stressed as their general theme that the urban voter is basically too uninformed and un- concerned about farm policy to provide the basis for such a revolt. On this score, Samuel Lubell suggests that "support for farm legislation in I. H. np‘ 0" I... A v.‘ WA A... I I. ‘ . It.‘ "I. .,l Ir I. ‘ . Q I ." I n_ ‘._ O ‘v 33 the past has rested largely on ignorance and confusion among urban 78 dwellers as to what the farm problem is all about.“ He also points out that through the "complicated juggling of formulas of support prices, acreage bases and more or less controls...the writing of farm legislation has become a conspiracy against public understanding.... Sometimes even members of Congress are fooled by the country slickers on the agriculture 7 committees." 9 Unquestionably the urban public is not fully conscious of the complexity of the farm program and the magnitude of the farm subsidy. Contemporary studies of public opinion and voter behavior have forceably dispelled the image of the highly informed, carefully calculating citi- zen.80 However, lack of detailed knowledge does not preclude the forma- tion of general impressions, and on this score there is evidence that the urban voter has a fairly strong image of the farmer receiving highly favorable treatment from the government.81 But even if one attributes the maximum significance to ignorance and indifference, the question arises as to why this is the case. The opinion and voting studies prove that voters are often uninformed on any given issue, but they do not prove that voters are immune to an informing ——___ 78"America's Newest Minority." Farm P011” Forum, XVII! ”0° 3’ 1964-65, 220 791b1go, p. 24. 80899, 9.9., Bernard H. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1954, and Campbell 0‘2 81., The American Voter, and the other voting studies that have been produced by the Survey Research Center. 81For a presentation of such evidence see Chapter XII. II ..-——. h' r h1- ‘ \ \_. x J ‘1 L.1 J ’u—ncpu.._. ._n~-. I. .. ---. I) ... 1'.- 34 debate of political issues. Thus one must ask why urban political representatives and opinion leaders haven’t made a greater effort to "enlighten" their constituents. Hadwiger suggests that any such effort in regard to the farm issue would be doomed to failure. He cites as evidence the fact that Secretary of Agriculture Benson's "effort to alert consumers and taxpayers against high farm price supports" and the ”scattering“ of hostile editorial commentary in the national press in the latter 1950's and early 1960's produced "no rebellion." Hadwiger concludes: "The reason that urban voters did not react, according to voter studies, is that it is very difficult to draw voter attention to issues which have not directly affected their status or their pocketbooks."82 Whatever Hadwiger meant by "status," his thesis that the farm price policy issue can't be presented to the voter in pocketbook terms is highly suspect. In fact, despite the basically complex nature of the program, it can, for the purpose of unsophisticated public political de- bate, be reduced to two very simple and readily understood pocketbook aspects. First, unlike many of the indirect subsidies to business and labor, the costs of Operating the support program are very visible. The mUlti-billion dollar expenditure of the Commodity Credit Corporation and related agencies stand out in bold type and make potentially excellent camPaign fodder for any politician or opinion leader who wants to use them. Second, it is a fairly easy matter to develop a readily grasped u v——.— 82"Farmer and Consumer in an Urban Age," Farm P011” Forum, XVII, N00 3, 1964-65, p0 34' , O V. . 1' . V V ... ' as. . . > ~_. A»). ) L C . ;-- t . k . . , L . , . . " c _ _ i ‘ 7, c A J i N L n J \l A . A ‘ r- A- . I ‘ 4 ‘4 i .. ». I 7 . . . r ' r' C .. v ' .- F , i ‘ J ‘ L~ J L , e: _ _ ._I f p- , ‘ . .« "\ p v , ~ - .HV 0 . ‘ O o~ ‘ r, l ". y L . a . _._ 4 n 7' i o ' .: . u , e - r I - A . , 3 J-t 4 J 4' Pl . ' f v ‘ s/ D F l l J 4 .. ‘ . ) v I -..z‘ _ ' A . .A ' I c ‘ I fl" L o _ \ ‘ L ~- 1 , ~ __ . , , . . ‘ . O , 1 _ - \ - 0 . . . e D ’ D ‘ s \ ' .L , ‘ \ l _ ~, . 4 ‘ . )- . ‘ r r I v \. ’ A h ‘ ‘. v“: e . o ° \ » ‘ J o « . ‘ ‘ o - - . r \ ‘I . Q , i l m * 7 v v , r , , t . '. . ._. , i f 7 . . I r ’ i ,. . . — . ‘ A v a V y I i I l ‘ L, w 1 - y a .. V ;. W. e . r n, . . a I u . o , r , 'v _ b- - _ l _,. L r... - ‘ I M “v v . t . . ‘ ‘II I ‘- , ' l l O ‘ ' l . , \ I -’ s. . A. i . A. ‘ h.‘ .7 ‘ ' t 7 I.” fi’ ~“”’"--- -.-.- , -.. ’O'O’v' -—-.. - -- 7-7 » 9#-_-,.,‘_.. r<<-v* - ' 'I “’ .- I I o y" - 1 l ‘ '1 ’ ' ' A 1 a _ * _ . f. in O l C ‘I c argument to the effect that high price supports mean high food prices.83 Vthever may be the weaknesses in Hadwiger's reasoning, he correctly observes that the Benson effort to "alert" the urban public backfired amithe only.rebellion that occurred was in the "major farm areas, where the Secretary's popularity dropped to near zero."84 Although we would argue that the urban public is not as un- informed and as indifferent as some analysts suggest, there is no ques- tion but that this state has been a factor in the lack of a vigorous anti-farm revolt. However, of greater importance is the fact that this state is a manifestation of other more fundamental factors. Statement of Analytical Propositions The initial concern of this study is the analysis of the price support and production control policy in the post-World War II period amithe political process which generated it. It must be emphasized that the lack of major change in this policy is a signal feature of tmstwar agricultural policy making, and it is one of the truly interest- itlilaSpects of the contemporary American political scene. More specifi- cally,‘this study attempts to understand why the political debates and 83in actual fact the relationship between price support levels amiretail food prices is not at all simple° A substantial argument cmutm made that the price support program 0f the Past 20 years has mfiLresulted in higher consumer prices than would otherwise have been the case. But such a counter argument is complex and difficult to ex- plahwirxterms that can be readily grasped bY the PUbliC: particularly tithe face of ever higher marketing ¢°$t5 “h1Ch have PUShed retail prices steadily upward. 84Farm Policy Forum, XVII, p. 34. be L) up- \ n n».- u a, . a v n O. . I '1 9 . n‘ (I e! , . I 9‘ ob. ensuing struggles surrounding that policy have taken this course and shape. The preceding section has identified the major themes of the unfiemporary literature which deals with this question in one way or another. An analysis of this literature is essential to any attempt to explain contemporary agricultural politics and policy making, and it provides some of the parts of the answers to the questions with which this study is concerned. It is our contention, however, that while the results of these analyses provide a partial explanation, they cm not constitute a sufficient explanation either individually or col- lectively. The contemporary literature is inadequate, not because its ex- ;flanations are intrinsically wrong, but because too much is left un- mqflained. Because the standard analyses have been restricted to an incessively narrow range of explanatory factors, too much dependence ins been placed on the factors that have been used. In the preceding review, therefore, several questions were raised and some qualifications wereixmroduced to establish this over-worked character of the standard eXphnmtions. This review was not intended to suggest that the contem— mnary literature is insignificant, but only that it is inadequate. One of the major reasons for the inadequacy of the existing lihuature is the general failure of these analysts to properly account for the significant and meaningful effect that a strong ideological com- mfimmnt to the family farm creed,85 and the family farm goal it sustains, k —_ 85See Chapter II for a listing of other terms that have been used 'u3describe at least some of the beliefs and values that we have assigned to this concept. (J i! ' , . I I . W I ‘ t ~‘ x 7 ¥; . J ’ , n . . . l . 1 l . . J A , , , , . ' r ' 1. '. V i a i . , , - . A 7 7‘ 7 a _ 1 * l - . , 3 l .' L J — O r a t .4 7 r . .n. V I ‘ .' A , . L , . Q Q l j V , I 7) ‘ J , . C . r I'\ , x , a ,‘ _} r r 7 u . I . A p . . - , x \ ‘ A r _ x I A J A ‘ l I -‘ A ' ‘ A I J l x . ‘1 I I 1 , . - O . t . . ,\ \ ,} J 9 .J . . ‘ ~ V ‘. ‘ ' l " . r 7 I , -L J. J i i) > r- t- 'u.n U‘v. I“ v.- °e.‘ - b "l .I, I In: . O, .' 5. _. u. ‘ y in. g Om .5 ‘\ I 37 has had on the behavior of the participants of the public policy making process. The first proposition of this study is, therefore, that in order to understand the agricultural policy making process in general, and the price and control policy in particular, it is essential to realize that there is a fundamental relationship between the family farm creed and the behavior of the relevant policy making participants. In order to achieve the objectives of this study it is necessary to trace the origins and the development of the family farm creed, how its meaning has changed over time, and how its persuasive existence has affected the agricultural policy making process.86 Few socio-economic institutions in American society have been held in greater public esteem than the family farm. This has been true be- cause of the population's confidence in the political, social, and economic characteristics and capacities of this institution. The family farm has been seen as an institution which fosters a rather impressive range of human virtues such as: simplicity, piousness, honesty, patriotism, devotion to family, respect of property, respect for nature, democratic spirit and civic responsibility, political and social individualism, and Political and social stability. The institution's prestige has been en- hanced by widely held belief that many of these virtues could not be realized through non-family farm agricultural institutions. The more vigorous adherents of the family farm creed believe that urban-industrial -___ 3659. Appendix for a fuller statement about the research effort of this aspect of the study. ' x \ . ,~ ‘ l ,7) » , ' r ' ' «H :1 L t." w I J ' L ) l .A. J T . ‘ \ I , J I, . 7 L O L \ . x v V i ’ ‘ I \ J y 9 ¥ ‘\ o \_ o I ‘ v t , h r ) L / ) J l 3 . n J ‘ t l J a 'i . . K W n ‘. ,- ‘ . , . p... b‘tl .I W I PI\. CO.» .e.‘ De, ...: , .- 37 has had an the behavior of the participants of the public policy making process. The first proposition of this study is, therefore, that in order to understand the agricultural policy making process in general, and the price and control policy in particular, it is essential to realize that there is a fundamental relationship between the family farm creed and the behavior of the relevant policy making participants. In order to achieve the objectives of this study it is necessary to trace the origins and the development of the family farm creed, how its meaning has changed over time, and how its persuasive existence has affected the agricultural policy making process.86 Few socio-economic institutions in American society have been held in greater public esteem than the family farm. This has been true be- cause of the population's confidence in the political, social, and economic characteristics and capacities of this institution. The family farm has been seen as an institution which fosters a rather impressive range of human virtues such as: simplicity, piousness, honesty, patriotism, devotion to family, respect of property, respect for nature, democratic spirit and civic responsibility, political and social individualism, and Political and social stability. The institution's prestige has been en- hanced by widely held belief that many of these virtues could not be realized through non-family farm agricultural institutions. The more vigorous adherents of the family farm creed believe that urban-industrial “— fl..— 86See Appendix for a fuller statement about the research effort of this aspect of the study. rw ~- 4 ..a .- Te ,\ 1 3 O\ «1.. . r l 1 . v. mu - a» , 3 . .L 3i . 2c \ x I. ’ a . w. . . e \v r ~ .‘ W.» i \ a a In P, er“ --fi~ communities are not only incapable of adequately fostering these character- istics among their inhabitants but also are likely to promote their very antithesis. It is also commonly believed that the family farm is, or can be made to be, an economically efficient unit of agricultural production, and that a prosperous family farm agriculture is a vital component of rational prosperity because general economic depression is "farm led and farm fed." Many have also argued that the population of the cities must be physically replenished and morally renewed by the export of youth from the family farms of the countryside. These and other beliefsa7 have helped to make the promotion and pueservation of the family the over-arching goal of American agricultural pmlicy, from the early days of the Republic to the present period. Every myicultural policy has not explicitly identified the promotion and preservation of the family farm as its goal. We contend, however, that lxmause of the persuasiveness of the family farm creed all major agri- culhual policies have been at least implicitly assumed to be contribut- ing to this over-arching goal, and that no significant policy has been amxned which was knowingly intended to retard or restrict the family fanncm to promote non-family farm units in agriculture. It must be emphasized that all those who have supported the fimdly farm goal have not done so because of a commitment to all these M 87At various historical periods there have been certain beliefs Whhuihave acted to strengthen the importance assigned to the family fanm. For example, during the nineteenth century the beliefs that the family farm was a necessary vehicle for the settlement of the West and tmn;the settling of the West by family farmers acted as a social and euummic safety valve were significant components of the creed. . .,, l ,._ ‘ 4 u e-_ o .l. ‘ . ' e ‘- . e- ., '. e 'u. a '. I . ‘- c 's e , '\_ '. e e . , u a s... l'. . ‘p. . 4‘ -,' u e. ‘u '\ ‘- .,‘ (I) \0 beliefs. One individual might support the family farm goal primarily tmcause he wishes to see the promotion of economic efficiency. Another individual might SUpport the goal primarily out of a desire to promote family solidary. Indeed, this is one of the major reasons for the influ- ence and staying power of the family farm goal; it has been able to attract the support of many diverse ideologies and interests. It would be an extreme and indefensible position to say that the sole determinant of the behavior of the participants in the agricultural policy making process has been an ideological commitment,thus ignoring emnmmdc self-interest and calculations of political aggrandizement. These policy makers are ordinary men operating under all the pressures mmidemands of the political environment. When a farm pressure group leader petitions Congress for legislation to "protect the family farmer," he may sincerely believe that a prosperous family farm agriculture is \dtal to the economic and moral well-being of the nation as a whole, but oftmitfis most immediate concern is to secure legislation that will put cbllars in the pockets of the members of his organization. Similarly, mmm congressmen can and do Speak of protecting the family farm for very pmactical political reasonss A member of Congress is asked by many different groups to represent their interest in the Halls of Congress. Family farmers of Montana have asked me to support legislation in their interest, both individually and through several organi- zations-~Farmers Union, Orange, and Wheat Growers being the most vocal. Their membership is made up predominantly of owners and operators of family-type farms. These QIOUps helped me to get elected in the House of Representatives in 1952 and to the Senate in 1960.88' 88Senator Lee Metcalf (Dem., Montana), letter to author, August 8, 1964. Italics mine. « . ... i. . I- 1 q ..~ .a . I u. a If. . W. T, .. en . .h‘ I a . I a I A a s I. u o. . v .i. ,. . . . a. . n. .- ... [a e. .A . - u .e .. i\ A. .. ... .t .. A1 .., . , D . r v r I I 4 Ir f r». . a . J , , a , L . A . a . ., r . I v A . . ’ 4 I, C 5 O , . . , e a . . . I , l u . a ~ J . . A p T l n i _ i \ . A J . u v 0 4 . _ . y , o i , r I 4 O . a v I 4 . . . . , — I y . k . a y . O n . 4 I . a v . 4 . , . . e . u I . a 40 At the same time the political environment allows and indeed fosters, ideological commitments which go beyond but do not replace cal- culations of narrow self-interest. One of the reasons why this behavior determinant is often ignored by analysts is that family farm oriented policies are necessarily economic policies. but the family farm cannot be protected by decree. 'The economic well-being of the family farm is an integral part of the way of life that it sustains and economic secur- ity is necessary for its survival. Thus the demands for economic policies to serve the over-arching family farm goal can be and are sustained by tuoader conceptions of what constitutes a good society: This system of family farming in America rejected the feudal systems of older nations and established the free enterprise economic foundation on which this nation has flourished.... America cannot now afford to allow the sub- stitution of a hired hand industrial type of agriculture for the independent farm family on the land.... The nation's policies must be shaped to perpetuate the family as the dominant Operating unit in agriculture....89 The family farm creed and policy goal permeate the entire agri- cultural policy-making process. This is significant in terms of the mxfiwar price support and production control policy in two reSpects. First, it is the contention of this study that by the late 1930's the parhqrprice program had come to be viewed by most of the participants asthe principal instrument in the over-arching goal of promoting and pueserving family farm. This view was equally dominant in the late 1%Mfs and thus was a powerful determinant in shaping the legislative pmttern that emerged from that period, a pattern that has persisted ever since. ___.__ ' 89Representative Harold D. Cooley (Dem., North Carolina), Chairman oftmuse Agriculture Committee, letter to author, July 20, 1964. .I‘ 0.. We- ' b “e e,‘ u 41 Increasingly since the early 1950's, disagreement has developed among the policy making participants as to the role and place of the twice and control program in the family farm goal. This disagreement became a bitter, stalemate; deepite concerted efforts to change the program, few significant changes have occurred. But what did change, and change dramatically, was the cost of financing the program. That this extremely expensive program has been nmintained suggests that the farm community, even though sharply divided against itself and dwindling in size, exerts a formidable political pmwer. Of this there is no doubt. But this is political power in a more basic sense than that term generally implies. We propose that the lack of a major and concerted effort on the part of the urban political community to force a change in the price axicontrol program is not simply the product of a resigned reSpect for the raw political force of this ever smaller minority nor of a gmmual ignorance and indifference on the part of the urban public. We unnend that another factor which must be considered here, is the sym- pathetic support given to the traditional family farm policy goal by manytuban voters and urban political and opinion leaders and their accmflance of the price and control program as a legitimate means for achieving that goal. Certainly mid-twentieth century urban America does not fully HMHace the family farm creed as articulated by the agrarians. However, Wacm contend that some of the sentiments of the creed are accepted. Indeed, there has been enough support for the family farm goal to make thisaasignificant factor in the failure of a maSSlve urban revolt to materialize. a " r... Vi , w~. 42 We have spoken of the stalemate in the agricultural policy making process. It is now necessary to explicitly indicate what we mean by the concept, and to identify those factors which have generated this situ- ation. Other analysts, as has been noted, have attributed the lack of nmjor change in the price and control policy to a stalemated stand-off among the farm interests. However, we assign to this notion of stale- nmte a broader meaning than has generally been intended by other analysts. h1thl$ study, we use the concept of stalemate to describe a situation where there has been wideSpread discontent with the policy at question among virtually all participants in the struggle. The degree of this discontent has been such that virtually all participants have been re- ceptive, even desirous, of change. Still, no significant change has emerged because of a failure to deve10p a working consensus as to what form any such change should take. The actual legislative result of a situation of this type can, in one sense, be described as one of default rather than of intent. This notion of a stalemate can be applied to the period from around the close of the Korean conflict through 1964. As compared to thisgnuiod the legislative results of the late forties were not the puoduct of a stalemate in the sense we have defined it. To be sure, the legislation that emerged then was not what the experts had been urging, mn'what most observers had been expecting, nor what the Truman adminis- tration after 1948 asked for, but the widespread discontent among the cmmuessional participants, the farmers, and the farm pressure group RMders that has become a distinguishing characteristic of the past decade did not then exist. .r; -- _ k .‘q. l n ‘ . . '4‘ ' 'A. ‘ r . V . ‘ .,_> ‘ . ; ‘-“ I ., 4 . ' ' . l .' . .. o h ‘ A. v , "' n . ~ . . 'r‘ . ‘0 t M ‘v, .‘ ~ 1.. § “ I n .‘D‘_ . . . . t . o a 4 v N. I \ n u.- ' . u . . S ,» l .v .‘. ‘ . H. "I J 'T .t P. .‘ I . , I . ‘i . - . J n t ' . ' ~ . .A K 1 ‘. .V..‘ n , . .‘. 43 The discontent of the past decade was a product of the growing recognition of and the disappointment over the fact that the historic program which had once been hailed as the greatest achievement in agri- cultural policy making in the twentieth century was simply not function- ing as originally intended nor achieving the results so hopefully antici- pated. 'This discontent was largely the result of three factors: the unexpectedly high cost of maintaining the program; the perennial failure of the conventional acreage controls to hold production in line; and the chronic persistence of the farm income problem. There are a number of possible alternatives in dealing with such situations, but practically Speaking, the participants have grappled wiUItwo basic policy choices: (1) lowering or eliminating the parity price supports to bring about an adjustment in production and thus re- lieve the government of a costly burden and remove the need for controls over the farmer, or (2) maintaining price supports at relatively high level but instituting the tight mandatory production control that would assure an adjustment of supply to effective demand and thus eliminate thermwd for government purchases of surplus stocks. A decision to pursue eflfiwr alternative inevitably is influenced by both the participants' value mmmdtments and his perpeption of the economic consequences of each alter- native. Political analysts who have pointed to the stalemated stand-off Emmng the farm interests have largely ignored the conflicts in value com- thments and disagreements over technical aSpects of the economics of agri- mflture as contributing factors in this stalemate. For example, a recent I>I it 44 detailed and serious attempt to explain the stalemate in price and control policy typically placed virtually its entire emphasis on examina- tion of the conflict among commodity-based economic interest within agriculture. It relegated to one qualified sentence and a footnote the notion that conflicts springing from commitments to values which transcend simple calculations of "maximum economic advantage" could be a contributing factor in the stalemate.90 We propose, however, that a clash of value commitments among the participants in the policy making process has been a significant factor in the stalemate of the past decade. By and large this value conflict has not been between those who believe in the family farm creed and those whose value commitments make them indifferent or hostile to this creed. Rather the basic conflict has occurred among those who histori- cally have been, and who are still, by and large, committed to the family farm goal. Support of the family farm goal has never been conditional upon the acceptance of a tight, closed, logically coherent ideological con- sUnmtion. In fact, advocates of the family farm goal have articulated dhuugent opinions about what the most valuable characteristics of the meJy farm institution are and about what means should be taken to pro- mote and protect it. Within the agricultural political community which has supported thezhmfily farm goal, there has been two somewhat different ideological —_ 90Yale_Lew Journal, X, 955. .4 u.- 0,, -¢. .. u“, v . . a .< . . I.. n . | x . . u q \ ~. ._ ‘ \ - ,. J _.’n 1 45 traditions; liberal agrarianism and conservative agrarianism.91 Tensions have always existed between these two traditions. Conditions during the past decade have been such that these tensions have crystallized into open conflict. These two ideological orientations roughly parallel the traditional liberal-conservative division in American politics of the past 40 years, but the agrarian outlook which permeates each of them acts to set them apart from the liberal and conservative orientations in other political circles. This value conflict has been apparent in presidential, congressionaL and pressure group politics. It consists of differences in viewpoints con- cerning what constitutes the most valuable characteristics of the family farm and what is the proper role of government relative to the economy and to the individual. The conflict has been most sharply focused around the issue of production control. Another proposition of this study is that another, although gmuually unacknowledged, factor significantly affecting the course of Fmstwar price and control policy making has been the existence of funda- mmflel and widespread differences in belief concerning the general and ckuailed nature of the farm problem and the economic consequences of alternative public policy approaches to that problem. An extended reading of the congressional hearings and floor de- lxmes reveals that many of the participants throughout the postwar period lmveempressed sharp disagreement and many others have indicated agonizing mxmrtainty concerning the answers to such basic questions as: Do farmers .h—‘_ 91See Chapters VIII and X for a fuller discussion of these two traditions. P. out n. 46 increase, maintain, or decrease their production in the face of falling price? What would be the level of free market prices if parity price supports were removed? Would a typical farmer's total net income be severely affected, mildly affected, or scarcely affected if artificial crops were removed from the relatively few commodities that are pro- tected? What type of controls can be expected to effectively bring supply into adjustment with demand? Do price supports and production controls inhibit or promote efficiency in agriculture? What is the rwture of the demand for farm products? What are the prospects of this demand? Analysts of farm politics and policy generally have assumed that technically objective answers have existed to these technical questions. Operating on this assumption analysts have thus ignored or discounted the disagreements and uncertainties eXpressed by the participants. This assumption has profoundly affected the standard interpretations of the agricultural policy making process. We contend, however, that the technical information that has bemiavailable to the participants has not been of the quantity, quality, amiclarity generally assumed by observers. We contend that throughout mostcd'the postwar period, the claims of the professional economists rmtwithstanding, the technical information has not been such as to pre- vmfi;reasonable disputes as to the precise nature and causes of economic {noblems of agriculture and the consequences of alternative policies aimed atnmeting those problems, however defined. The character of the available technical information has affected tMacourse of price and control policy in two ways. First, the overall / U an. I‘ ;. V, a "a, ' . N.- .~.. ., '1 I. ~ ‘- ‘- 1 n ‘ - u “. c ' ' i . '- . . . o I K .b o -\ v.. ‘1 '\" , ’u l"\. ‘. .- -_ ‘. I ~- ’ n i s ..\ i A. .' . 'a,,‘. ~ . . . ‘ . ‘o 'I .V ‘ . a .u t :- u 47 quantity and quality of the information available during the formative period of 1947-49 did little to dissuade, and in fact, tended to rein- force the widespread inclination among congressmen and pressure group leaders to renew the price and control policy of the 1930's. The argu- ments used by the economists aimed at demonstrating the unworkability of the program and the dangers attendant to its continued application werezwfiected by most of the other participants, not because of "politi- cal expediency"--as the economists and many observers so judged--but because the arguments were simply unconvincing to most of the partici- pants whatever their ideological persuasion or political motivation. Second, taken as a whole, the theoretical and statistical data available to the participants during the decade following the Korean conflict was such that it had the effect of magnifying the already intense conflicts within the agricultural policy making process. In the face of persistent price and income problems, chronic overproduction, and the extremely high and unexpected cost of executing the price support tmogram, massive efforts by two different administrations were made to tweak out of the policy pattern established in 1947-49. We contend, therefore, that a major reason why no breakthrough ocmured was that there was sharp disagreement and uncertainty among thepmrticipants concerning the answers to such technical questions as Hm listed above. The technical information available was such that it éfllowed participants to advance conflicting answers and be quite justified hiclaiming that this particular answer was just as defensible as any other answer. This has changed somewhat during the last few years, but thetechnical information available to, and acceptable by the PartiCipantS, A”. W ‘u. ‘ no u ’\ l ‘1. ‘4' ‘v H A-‘ ' .' - ’. . a '. ' Vs . . .\ ‘» s 48 is still such that it allows considerable dispute concerning the answers to these technical questions and directly encourages temporization in the formulation of policy. Finally, we posit that any attempt to describe and explain the pmstwar era of agricultural policy making is necessarily inadequate unless it accounts for the impact of the Spectacular upsurge in agri- cultural productivity that has come to be called the technological revo- lution. The existence of the technological revolution and the reaction of the participants to it have been significant factors in causing the debates and the price and control policy to take the shape that they have. The perennial failure to anticipate the accelerating force of the revohfljon and the failure of the economists to develop and agree upon a theoretical model capable of adequately explaining the meaning of the revolution for family farm agriculture under differing economic and public pmlicy conditions have continually upset expectations and has doomed all the contending policy plans. These failures are a prime manifestation of the inadequacy of technical information cited above. However, the exist- cflme of the technical revolution is by no means the sole reason for the inammnmcies of this informational basis. For this and other reasons thatechnological revolution needs to be discussed on a somewhat separate basis. For example, the technological revolution has not only rendered MHicy planning nearly infeeble, its existence has acted to generate new benef and value conflicts within the agricultural political community. Hume tensions have begun to emerge as the possibility has begun to present fiselftjmt the continued advance of the revolution and the survival of the L} 4" ‘ a V ‘ Q .' A O . q . .H I "- t .’ ‘I .~ I A 4 h I \ ‘h . | . u“ . a 'v ‘:‘, o I. ' . 49 family farm are not necessarily compatible. The recognition of such a possibility forces the consideration of steps to control or retard the revolution. But this challenges deeply ingrained beliefs about the positive role that technology has played in the past survival of the family farm, and the widely held belief that equates the advance of efficiency with "progress." Because of the weaknesses in the quantity and quality of the technical information available to the participants, recognition of this condition has been possible only in recent years. Because the answers are still not complete and because the alternatives forced by such a prospect are so agonizingly difficult most participants, to date, have not fully accepted and acted upon this tension between the continued mhmnce of the technological revolution and the survival of the family farm. However, there is little question but that the revolution, and the possible consequences that it presents, have affected the decision nmking process by subtly encouraging the participants to temporize, to gun off to tomorrow-~until more of the evidence is in--the job of acting on the alternatives presented. This type of situation has contributed, amicontinues to contribute, to the drift in agricultural policy making. Scope and Procedure A statement of scope and procedure including the definition of keyterms, theoretical statements, and the description of the research gnogram appears in Appendix A. However, it is necessary to note briefly tmretfimt while our initial concern is the postwar World War II period, Eiconsiderable portion of this study is devoted to the period prior to ps- > J l . r , r a . , s \V} o . x ‘ _ \ . Ox . ), . a 3, ‘Ah . \ , 7 L . p a e . . 50 the 1940's. This historical deveIOpment constitutes a major portion of this study for two principal reasons. First, unless placed in the proper ffistorical perspective, the contemporary agricultural policy making process is quite incomprehensible. To adequately understand the course of postwar price and control policy and the behavior of the policy making participants one must have a firm grasp of the relevant historical antecedents. The lack of such a perSpective leads to distortions and misrepresentations of the skflfificant explanatory factors. Second, due to the paucity of the existing literature, it is quite impossible to deal with the family farm creed in a meaningful way without a serious and detailed treatment of its origin and development. Therefore, this portion of the study is a valuable historical contribution in itself, as well as a necessity in providing the puoper context for the postwar period. Moreover, this portion is not Simply a chronological description, but rather a serious study of the pmlicy making process, and should be read as such. 4. ; I o u . u u,- .I CHAPTER I I CHIUINS OF THE FAMILY FARM CAEED "The small land holders are the most precious part of a state." Thomas Jefferson1 "No other group is more fundamental to our national life than our farm families." Dwight D. Eisenhower Introduction Few socio-economic institutions have traditionally enjoyed a tfigher place in the general public esteem than the family farm. Politi- cians have reached heights of oratorical splendor in praising it, poets have eXperienced shivers of ecstacy in describing it, historians have seen America in it, industrialists have deferred to it, city people pine for it, few care or dare to criticize it. "Horn a farmer and you stand in contumacy to the platforms of all known parties, to the devout faith of all known statesmen, and to God."3 Much of this praise can be chalked up to political sloganeering, tkm excesses of literary romanticism, and inevitable nostalgia. But 1Jefferson to James Madison, October 28, 1785, The Papers of Ihgmas Jefferson, VIII, ed., Julian P. Boyd, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 591. 2"Farm Message," New York Times, January 10, 1956, p. 16. SH. L. Mencken, "The Husbandman," rejudices (New York: Alfred A. {Ympf Inc., 1924), p. 44. Raymond Moley recently paraphrased Menken: Scratch the skin of a family farmer and the hot blood of a score or two goggressmen and senators will flow cop10U81yo" W: April 10! 1961. 0 . 51 ’\ .71. 'J I. /I r) {‘8 ’V \J) . . - v u I . «- «I ... v,‘ s... . ‘IO. - v I." . 52 after all the chaff is sifted away a substantial body of grain remains. The residue of grain consists of a collection of beliefs about the characteristics and capacities of the institution of the family farm and the way of life that it sustains. Some of these beliefs concern valuable social and political characteristics that are thought to be fostered among those who are a product of the family farm. Some have to do with various economic and historical functions of the family farm. Some of these beliefs date from classical antiquity, some are of twen- tieth century vintage. Some are inconsistent, and not all stem from the same ideological strain. Whatever the case, they constitute an important and enduring part of the American political heritage. Various terms such as the "Jeffersonian myth," "agricultural I. H fundamentalism, agrarian idealism," "agrarian myth,” and the "freehold concept" have been used to designate at least some of these beliefs. We choose to use another term—~the family farm creed. We do so not out of someinge simply to be different, but because none of the other terms are fully adequate or appropriate to the purposes and scope of this study. The American version of the family farm creed in its most fully ckweloped form is primarily the product of eighteenth and nineteenth century agrarianism, or what we might call the Jeffersonian-Populistic agrarianideology.4 This ideology saw the world in terms of the country rather than the city, in terms of agriculture rather than industry, Awe use ideology to mean simply a politically consequential Indief system which has determinate spokesman and leaders and a politi- fiflly consequential following; see Alan P. Grimes and Robert H. Horwitz, Modern Political Ideologies (New York: Oxford University Press. 1959). p’ xiii. '47. .§» 5‘. ‘oo . 0.. F». 5‘ 53 finance and commerce. It was pre-industrial in origin and remained anti- industrial in commitment. Nourished by backwoodsman-independence and reinforced by philOSOphical theories of natural rights and social com- pacts, it trusted no governments except those which were popularly con- trolled, and the best popular governments were those which governed least. It was born "along the Appalachian watershed"5 in the early part of the eighteenth century, more or less fully formulated and activated by Jefferson's leadership at the turn of the century, re- inforced by the Jacksonian era, and sustained throughout the rest of therfirmteenth century by the promise and reality of the Western frontier. In the words of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. it stood for "simplicity vs. ostentation; frugality vs. extravagance; rectitude vs. laxity; nmderation vs. luxury; country vs. city; virtuous farmer or mechanic vs. depraved capitalist or demoralized day laborer; plain homely government vs. sumptuous complicated government; economy vs. debt; strict construc- tion vs. loose construction; State rights vs. huge federal power; de- centralization vs. concentration; democracy vs. aristocracy; purity vs. corruption."6 The family farmer is the central figure and prime hero of this ideology. But the family farm creed is not synonomous with the agrarian ideology. The family farm creed demands only a family farm agriculture. .kfifersonian-Populistic agrarianism demanded much more; it demanded an emsentially agricultural society. Twentieth century agrarian ideology, —___ 5V. L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, I (New York; lhmcourt, Brace R World, A Harvest Book, 1954; first published in 1927), p. 1330 6The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little. Brown 3 C0-: 1950). Po 512- 5/. at least since the failure of third-party agrarian efforts in the early part of the 1920's, differs strikingly from its nineteenth century pre- decessor. It differs radically in style and technique, and,having recognized reality,has negotiated a working peace with the urban- ixmustrial world. But,like its predecessor,it too is concerned with the whole range of public policy. However, our prime concern here is with agricultural policy. We are not concerned Specifically with the develop- ment, influence, and fate of American agrarianism in general, but only as it bears on the family farm creed and agricultural policy. Just as the family farm creed is more narrow and less restrictive than the ideology which brought it to full bloom, important components of the creed have traditionally been accepted by groups and ideologies out- side the agrarian circle. It is precisely because of this wide ranging and diverse support that the family farm has enjoyed such a long—enduring, privileged status. It was suggested in Chapter I that one cannot understand American agrhufltural politics and policy without an appreciation of the family farm creed. We contend that because of the persuasive existence of the family farm creed, the over-arching goal of American agricultural policy tms historically been the promotion and preservation of the family farm. Throughout much of the history of American agricultural policy the family farm goal has been an implicit one. Ever since the triumph of Jefferson- ifln-type land policy assured that agriculture would be organized primarily around the family sized unit,Americans have simply equated agriculture thifamily farm agriculture. Policies intended to promote or protect muiculture in general have been implicitly seen as promoting or a. L6. .y- L . I \ ' .w ‘. ’u IV \ ‘v u u I 55 protecting the family farm in particular. Explicit identification of the family farm goal is not common until the 1930's and 1940‘s.7 It is to be emphasized that we have used the term "over-arching." There have been and are, many specific goals of American agricultural policy such as stable prices, parity income, better housing, improved health, better education, cheaper and more adequate credit, bargaining emuflity for farmers, etcetera. The realization of these goals, however, has been seen, we submit, as contributing to or, at least, not detracting from the promotion and preservation of the family farm. Thus among those who have determined the course of American agricultural policy there has been a consensus that the promotion and preservation of the family farm r,» gggflt___b_ the ultimate goal of agricultural policies. A major task of this study is to identify the beliefs that traditionally have attended the family farm, to describe how the family farm came to be enthroned as the over-arching goal of American agricul- ‘Unal policy, and to explain the relationship between this goal and the resulting agricultural policies. It is no concern of this study to pass jmxmwnt on the question of whether or not the promotion and preservation offemily farm should have enjoyed such a high status as a goal of agri- culhual policy or whether it should continue to enjoy this status. thither are we concerned with whether or not the image of the family farm tms correSponded to the reality of the family farm except insofar as recog- rution of possible disparity between the two has affected the beliefs about ‘Uuafamily farm and had consequences for agricultural policy. _.___ 7See Chapter V for a fuller discussion of this point. . A ‘7 t \4 > a ' ) L . l - .\ I c O L - r- l O l u A I J ,l‘ I ; , , ) _ \ .r I >) I s L pf fl J to . J A _l --’ . J . ,_ .- s, 1 I « 7' > ' A ‘ . 0 ~ . J \ , \r l .. d J ' r :v 3 - ' A A _ _ A 7 , .L . o ,- ' a . J . "\ , A J v T x A j - . . A A T a II. r.‘. n 6,. v P--. u . O"‘ . n1 A. ‘- v ' _ 'N_ I‘. ' k “h I ‘, ' I“ x I '9 '. .,~ \ I“ . ‘.- 56 Although the general meaning of the terms family farm and family farmer dates to the eighteenth century, the actual useage of these terms is pretty well limited to the twentieth century. Because the family farm dominated American agriculture throughout most of its history, simply the terms farm and farmer, unadorned by the adjective, family, have been most commonly used. During the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century, however, to distinguish the small-scale, independent farmer from his European counterpart or from the American estate and plantation farmers and their tenant laborers, the terms "yeoman," "fee- simple" farmer, or "freehold" farmer were also often used. As we will note later, the adjective, family, comes into more general useage during the period between the two World Wars. While the terms have varied, the general meaning has been rather constant. Generally Speaking the family farm has been defined as a farm operated by and for a family--a family enterprise. It is large enough to puovide reasonably full employment for the family, but not so large as to require the employment of large quantities of outside labor. Proponents fave preferred that the farm be owned by the family or that the tenure arrangement be such that the family makes most of the managerial decisions. Ahm, it has generally been the case that to be designated as a family farm, the unit--whether it be the nearly self-sufficient operation of the euflneenth and early nineteenth century, or the highly commercialized (weration of the twentieth century--must be capable of providing the flmuly with that degree of material comfort which American society, scanding to various historical periods, has considered to be minimal for a "decent" life. \ .«uJ _,, p u l l A . a u on. 57 The European Tradition Although the family farm creed as developed on the American scene has its own distinguishing characteristics, many of the beliefs which attend it are neither new nor peculiarly American. The praise of farming and farmers has a long and persuasive history in Western thought. Sorokin et a1. find extensive expression of it in the writings of major philOSOphers, scholars, and poets from Hesiod to Rousseau.8 W. E. Heitland, in his extensive survey of Greco—Rcman agriculture, finds frequent reference to it.9 Paul H. Johnstone documents the praise of auuiculture from the greats of the Greco—Roman period through the various agricultural enthusiasts and romanticists of eighteenth century Europe.10 Edward Townsend Booth writes of men of letters who identified with the ununry from Hesiod to Melville.ll The praise of farming and the farmer probably is as old as the (biden Age legend of Greek mythology.12 Some of the first literary 8Pitirim A. Sorokin, Carle C. Zimmerman, and Charles J. Galpin, AlSystematic Source Book in Rural Sociology, I (Minneapolis: The Uni- wnsity of Minnesota Press, 1930), l—l4o. 9Agricola (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921). 10"In Praise of Husbandry," Agricultural History, XI (April, 1937), 80-95; ”Turnips and Romanticism," ibid., XII (July, 1938), 224-35; "The fhual Socrates," Journal of the History of Ideas. V (April, 1944), 151- 175. 11God Made the Country (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946). Also seelhdght Durling, Georgic Tradition in English Poetry (Columbia Uni- wusity studies in English and Comparative Literature, No. 121: Columbia Uniwusity Press, 1931), pp. 43-107; and Clark Emery, "The Poet and the Fflough," Agricultural History, XVI (January, 1942), 9-15. 12Arthur 0. Lovejoy and George 3035: Primitivism BDd Rélated Ideas ; _§Lfintiquity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), and Johnstone, { flgficultural History, XII. ' ’v I. A. ‘ V. 4,.“ 58 expressions of it are found in the writings of Hesiod. And in Greek literature, it probably reaches its fullest expression in The Economist by XenOphon.13 Surveying the major Creek thinkers Sorokin et al. found that they "view the farmer class favorably, as being the foundation of social order and stability, a law-abiding, hard-working, vigorous, healthy, moral, patriotic, religious, sturdy, brace, and old-fashioned group. Farm life is regarded as the best school for physical training, for the developing of the best soldiers, and for producing honest and industrious citizens."14 In the writings of Cicero, Varro, Virgil, Columella and the elder Pliny of the "praise of agriculture assumes a definitely conventionalized form."15 Agriculture is described as the only essential employment and the basis of all prosperity. Farmers are seen as simple, honest, patri- otic, manly, generally virtuous citizens.16 Cicero tersely and cleanly stated the essentials of this view when he declared that "of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, rmne more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming a free— man." 13Sorokin et al., pp. 36-38. 14Ibia., p. 25. 15Johnstone, Agricultural History, XI, 80. 161bid., and Agricultural History, XII, 225. 17De Officiis, I, XLII, Loeb Translation, p. 155, quoted in A. Whitney Griswold, Farming and Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952; first published by Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948), p. 19‘200 .Io . r i e , . . X .1, r .p. J .r x. O i ‘ _ 4 . , . 1» rl \ . J I. . i I 2 V . ‘\ \n, r l O l I 4 ' I K _ l t A a \J J 4 D, e .. W O r 0 f 3.. O r\ U _ _ . . x e r . r . . w :. . h,‘ A V L n. D\ o o 59 During the Middle Ages there was a dearth of agricultural liter- ature.18 However, with the Renaissance a modern literature of agri- culture began to develop and by the beginning of the eighteenth century a massive renewal was under way.19 By 1750 the "vogue" for agriculture had become a "veritable craze" in England.20 As one historian notes, "agriculture was not content with gaining a literature of its own; it might almost be thought of as setting out to conquer the literature of 2 England." 1 The same trend was apparent on the Continent,causing /' Voltaire to remark that all but laborers are reading about farming.22 The craze for agriculture was not simply literary. It now be- came fashionable to live in the country, to at least make a show of being a farmer. King George III operated a model farm at Windsor, contributed to Arthur Young's Annals and apparently enjoyed being called "Farmer George."zv The nobility were active in organizing agricultural societies, sponsoring sheepshearing and plowing contests and experimenting with new techniques of husbandry. "Bourgeoisie, nobility, and royalty ran a higher and higher fever from this furor 24 hortensis...." Arthur Young said of the third quarter of the 18As Booth notes, "there could be no sentimental or merely fashionable rural life at a time when everyone was in dead earnest a farmer, soldier or monastic." p. xvii. 19Johnstone, Agricultural History, XI, 86. 20Johnstone, ibid., x11, 232. 21M. s. B. Gras, A History of Agriculture in Europe and America, (2md ed., New York: F. s. Crofts s 00., 1940), p. 227. 22Ib1a., p. 217. 23Johnstone, Agricultural History: XII: 233° 24Booth, p. xxiii. r——4 V'l In "I 01* 9., >\ '. I‘- 60 eighteenth century, "perhaps we might, without any great impropriety, call farming the reigning taste of the present times."25 Not only did the literature of agriculture increase greatly in volume, but, more importantly, it "gained the patronage of the upper strata of society that decided matters of taste and fashion, thus disposing them to look with sympathy on farming and rural life." Johnstone con— cludes that the "agricultural enthusiasm was without a doubt one of the singular features of the eighteenth century."20 Taken as a whole, this literature touched on all aspects of agriculture ranging from Jethro Tull's reports on his technical eXperi- nmnts to the economic theories of the Physiocrats. Much ot it was wholly practical and did much to encourage the development of scientific and commercialized farming. However, an integral part of almost all this literature was the conventionalized praise of agriculture and farm life. hithis the writers borrowed directly from the Classical tradition. "The only major change from the Classic praise of husbandry was the in- r. clusion of Christian legend and dicta to reinforce pagan authority."‘47 This literature idealized all country life and praised the landed nobleman and milk maid alike. But throughout there was one particular object of praise, one dominant hero--the small and virtuous ywmmn farmer. In this praise of the small farmer many inconsistencies were apparent. The disparity between his interests and the interests of M 26A icultural Histor , XII, p. 233. 27IbIdo, p. 226. 4‘. I‘ . p e n“ ‘.u 0" 61 those who eulogized him were often considerable, particularly in England where writers could expound at length on the virtues of the small farmer while at the same time being vigorous advocates of scientific experi- mentation, the use of more capital, and the enclosure movement, all of which were acting to push the small farmer off the land. Likewise in France the Physiocrats sought economic reforms which primarily benefited the large estate farmers at the expense of the peasant whom they praised. But after all the inconsistencies are taken account of and the many patent absurdities acknowledged there can be little doubt but that this agricultural enthusiasm of the eighteenth century did much to etch into the European mind and European politics the image of the small, honest, unpretentious, pious and patriotic farmer, the bed—rock of the social and political structure, an image that matured in the nineteenth century and survived on into the twentieth. We are not interested in tracing through the influence and fate of the agrarian tradition in Europe beyond the latter part of the eight- eenth century. We might briefly note, however, that in almost all the European countries the family farmer has enjoyed a unique and many ways privileged position. Most of them "have put a premium on family farming and the agrarian way of life," particularly in France which has outdone auuy other country, it would seem, in making "a fetish of the small peasant farm."28 England is something of an exception. With the repeal ofthe Corn Laws in 1846, Englishmen had come "to think of their agri- see Smith, eSp. pp. 246-90. . l I O I 1 7 A . . - r . C: J . V’ O , I [I W \. 4 A \. M) C i4 P c 1 i . . n! » , ‘ Q . 0 w o . f w . l a , . . c , \ ' v I 1 _ r ' Y' I . » \r L 7 ' f' . A r ' V r' r- r .’ v , y f 1 . [ - «A . A 1 x ,‘ V ' e 1_ v 'r A A ‘ 1 ~ I . l . . i _ y. - . - \ l {I , . I A e i _ h A. . , I .‘ , . A d ' x , ...u. '4 .n. iv. I. . ovy; 'T h n . . -, 1 a Ir. - - . 'i n 85 caught up with the infectious idea of progress and expansion which the West so dramatically represented. The social prejudices and political fears of the Western farmer began to fade and the conservatives began to see and appreciate the farmer in some of the ways that the agrarians had always depicted him, particularly in his property-mindedness and his middle class characteristics. By the 1860's and 1870's the homesteader had become, as Holcombe notes, "the veritable symbol of true Americanism.... This pioneer re- garded as an individual, was the average man. Regarded as the unit of class, he stood for the supremacy of the middle class."86 In the writings of Frederick Jackson Turner the nineteenth century's popular beliefs about the significance of the West are elevated to the level of historiography. When he stated in his famous paper, "The Sig- nificance of the Frontier in American History," that "the existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American mfitlement westward, explain American development"87 and when he later re-affirmed that: American democracy was born of no theorist's dream; it was not carried in the Sarah Constant to Virginia, nor in the Mayflower to Plymouth. It came out of the American forest, and it gained new strength each time it touched a new frontier. 35For discussions of how the Eastern conservatives adjusted to the spirit and reality of the West see, ibid. Also see Arthur N. lkflcombe, The Middle Classes in American Politics (Cambridge, Harvard (Adversity Press, 1940), pp. 182-84, and Robbins, Our Landed Heritage, pp. 108, 1770 86The Middle Class in American Politics, pp. 192-93. 87The Frontier in American Histozx. P. 1. 1‘ [I /\ ’- ‘ v r... tAl .1 ‘-. IQ - ~ 1" l. ‘ a .g P y . ~‘\ 86 Not the Constitution, but free land and an abundance of natural resources open to a fit people, made the democratic type of society in America. he surprised many historians, but few citizens for he was expressing ideas 89 that already were in the air." The Turner thesis dominated American historiography for the first four decades of the twentieth century and helped serve to remind Americans that this country was made by the farmer and his associates who settled the West.90 Balbido, p0 2930 89James C. Malin, "Space and History: Reflections on the Closed- Space Doctrine of Turner and Mackinder and the Challenge of Those Ideas tw'the Air Age," Agricultural History, XVII (April, 1944), 67. For a fuller discussion of this point see Smith, pp. 291-305. Smith states that “Jefferson's agrarian ideal proves to be virtually identical with the frontier democracy that Turner believed he had discovered in the weSto" p. 298. 90For discussion of the contemporary status of the Turner thesis say Gressley, Agricultural History, XXXII, 227-249, and The Turner fflgwis Concerning the Role of the Frontier in American History, ed. Charge Rogers Taylor ("Problems in American Civilization" revised mfition; Boston: D. C. Heath, 1956). (‘ I. CHAPTER III NINETEENTH CENTURY AGRARIAN POLICIES "We propose the Public Lands of the States and of the United States shall be free to actual settlers, and to actual settlers only...."1 Agrarianism vs. Industrialism The Jeffersonian dream of a society dominated by family farmers, complimented by independent mechanics, and a small-scale industry, and the minimal institutions of commerce and finance needed to support an advanced and progressive agricultural economy, was doomed to failure even before it was fully crystallized. America was born into the main stream of already powerful currents which were carry- ing the Western world inexorably toward industrialization and urban- ization. That American industrialism got such an early start and on such solid foundations, that it grew with a thoroughgoing vigor hardly matched even in England is due to a multitude of factors, some of which we will briefly note. Undoubtedly, Jefferson, as Parrington notes, "failed to measure the thrust of economic determinism that drives every people 1"Equal Rights to Land," The Working Men's Advocate (New York), March 16, 1844, full text reprinted in Fred A. Shannon, American §2£m££§_flgggmg%t§ (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., an Anvil Original, 1957 , pp. 132-134. O... P» I I1 ‘I I" III all I“ Q 1. A t J r I . \./ 4 ..C P w e . .. a p ,- at v u o _ . . C 3 , _ r . H . n F _ A . J . . OK , a. u I. . n u e ./ . II a . .— O I; r . . . r . . J r U u _ r , Os . s ,u , . D . A . P «0.) . , D O o - , s i n s . r A .w a . . o A . T I l a C . s K v . . . r A . I . . . l. A . l . J. o . A ; . O , n, A I F , P A . . l. . _ A I, .\ d n n Ox A; . as . O r P. . . 01! c .. .T P y r “A - A . f. . - Tl‘xl 4“. 88 to go through with industrial revolution once it is begun."2 But even if Jefferson and his followers had better gauged the gathering force of industrialism, the likelihood that it could have been effectively contained is remote. Thomas Jefferson was our third president, not our first. Agrarianism assumed the reins of the new government after it had been moulded by two Federalist administrations3 working within the frame- work of a friendly constitution, and aided by the genius of Alexander Hamilton, who conceived and shepherded into enactment the public poli- cies which laid the foundations on which the new industrialism and its hand-maidens, finance and commerce, were to thrive. Thus from the very onset agrarianism was forced into a defensive posture. It is this de- fensive posture plus a strong laissez faire orientation which accounts for a great deal of the essentially negative character of pre-Civil War agrarianism; resist the encroachment of State's rights by the federal government, separate government from finance, cut spending, lower taxes, abandon the national banking system, keep hands off-- laissez faire, laisse passer. 2Main Currents in American Ibougbt, I, 354. 3Washington had a strong agricultural orientation and in 1788 he wrote Jefferson, "1 perfectly agree with you that...the introduction of anything which will divert our attention from agriculture must be extremely prejudiced if not ruinous to us." But as Herbert Ayar sug- gests: "Jefferson's agrarianism was bound up with theories of equality, and the rights of man; Washington's agrarianism was more that of a feudal landlord, or the owner of a Roman Latifungium.” The People's MES! PP. 23: 280 4Richard Hofstadter, ”Parrington and the Jefferson Tradition,” Jnurnal 2f the Hi§t£¥ 9f IQQBS, II (mtOba, 1941), 400, and Earle Do Ross, "Agricultural Backgrounds and Attitudes of American Presidentsg" W. XII (October 1934), 40. i o ’\ , A ‘ . v ' O - l "t A M » _A r“ _ I - h - ' . ' [w L J [V . 0 fl , Q ~ . , . fl n O J n l _ 7 . . . . K " u A L ‘ , , o J , ' Y n P 9 . ‘ Q r /\ O , e ’ . ‘ ‘ ' a , . - ' I , L A - J - :- J O f‘ A O o l C“ J a . ' L C‘ '. A r“ , J - f‘ l A , . . y 4 . I A h L ‘ F J A O . ' r\ A J A x A S , I . A: ‘ r f r . . ‘ ‘ c . ‘A _J , - A A o i A m h ‘ 4 L Jr A P I“ f‘ o - N f‘. F} J ‘ f ‘ . f‘ A ‘ .1 A I - A J ’ A i I . A c Q ~> : O ‘J s . ’ r‘ J 0 \1 .r‘ L'_ . 1.. .4.- “ . ya 9-- .8- Q I ’ n i 1 ~ 0 ; -8.V_3'—--.. ..fl'on-ar 89 But even this essentially negative program could conceivably be translated into more positive results had the character of Jefferson been different. In the conduct of his office Jefferson was a political pragmatist not a doctrinaire, revolutionary agrarian. When he became President he did not set about to dismantle the hated Hamiltonian programs. Writing to Du Pont de Nemours in 1802 he eXplained: We can pay off his debt in 15 years but we can never get rid of his financial system. It mortifies me to be strengthened by principles which I deem radically vicious, but this vice is entailed on us by a just err. What is practicable must often control what is pure theory, and the habits of the governed determine in great degree what is practicable.5 The end result of Jefferson's disinclination to dismantle the Hamiltonian program, as Herbert Agar bitterly notes, was "that democratic, egali- tarian principles suitable to the rural world of Jefferson's dream were grafted on to a greedy Hamiltonian capitalism..."6 Jefferson had believed that America by eXporting raw materials and importing the finished products from Europe could do without in- dustry. But the Napoleonic Wars and the struggle between France and England for world supremacy destroyed that hope. No longer could America depend on commercial trade for manufactured necessities. Thus even Jefferson came to concede that "we must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturalist."7 It was for Jefferson a reluctant 5January 18, 1802, quoted in Griswold, Farming and Democracy, P. 32. See pp. 31~35 of Griswold for a fuller discussion of this point. 6The People's Choice, p. 55. T 7Letter to Benjamin Austin, January 9, 1916, The Writings of h mas Jeffers n, VI, ed., H. A. Washington, (Washington: Taylor & Maury, 18545, 522. '§ ‘ ‘A. .3":d .ux . a ‘ u. NJ a . N rev th fi a\ . add u\ . I r. . 4 a. .Hv «A; .W W >1 : - M... .- .. All ,0 b h t «It Alum oft. ,i a . . l . J . A V . o w , J, H r a _ A m . , n n . - h ‘ a w _ n , F V . P O . D F u , A . , a . ‘ A u A L . a I . , a f i A . A < a, a c . . ..l i _ . r o I. \ r , A . r. r ‘A‘ A n J 4 J J m , p n _ . , . . A , a a, , _ J o n . _ n t . o «J o a v o . v ., . A r u L A l , n i a F . A . . . . f A o a \ul. 0‘ 9O concession. It was a concession forced by the train of world events over which we had no control: But who in 1785 could foresee the rapid depravity which was to render the close of that century the disgrace of the history of man? Who could have imagined that the two most distinguished in the rank of nations, for science and civilization, would have suddenly de- scended from the honorable eminence, and setting at defiance all those moral laws established by the Author of nature between nation and nation, as between man and man, would cover earth and sea with robberies and piracies, merely because strong enough to do it with temporal im- punity; and under this disbandment of nations from social order, we should have been despoiled of a thousand ships, and have thousands of our citizens reduced to Algerine slavery. This concession to the manufacturing interests was not only a forced one, but a limited and temporary one. By 1819, with the threat of foreign domination removed, he again vigorously attacked the pro- tectionist policy that four years ago he had seemed to endorse.9 "The farthest he would go was to approve a balanced, self-sufficient economy in which he eXpected agriculture to occupy the most important position."10 By the time Andrew Jackson became president he could destroy the hated National Bank, but he could not dismantle the blossoming 8Ibid., Italics mine. Also see Jefferson's letter to Jane Batiste Say, March 2, 1815, Ibid., pp. 430-431. 9Peterson, The Jefferson Image in the American Mind, p. 24-26. A150 see, Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1, 436-446, and Political Science Quarterly, LV, 98-121. 1061‘ iSWOld, p. 350 r‘ c x o . O o . I" ’- 9 E . a . K O f‘ , A o J o . ‘ F f A l I "_\ A , . o r‘ 1 - O' U A ’ - ‘ _ a o \ w . o t f\ .. ,\ N , 7- 4* 1 \ r‘ ’ lo, 91 factories nor depopulate the growing cities. In fact the Jacksonian economic legislation with its laisse faire dogma and war on economic privilege unintentionally, by unleashing the forces of free com- petition at a time when protection was no longer necessary, "promoted the very ends it was intended to defeat."11 Capitalistic industrial- ism was assured a benevolent climate and unlimited growth. Indeed, a stroke of ultimate historical irony occurred when after the Civil War the laisse faire and property rights emphasis of Jeffersonian- Jacksonian agrarianism "was linked with Spencerian laissez faire philosophy and the Supreme Court invoked the Declaration of Independence to put property rights beyond the reach of the people's sovereignty." The Jeffersonian heritage entered into capitalistic ideology.12 In discussing Jefferson's concession to domestic manufacturing, Merrill Peterson notes the dilemma with which Jefferson and, indeed, America was confronted: “Whether he meant to embrace the spirit and substance of an industrial society or merely the household-handicraft- mill manufacturing complex of advanced agricultural societies was the question at the heart of his, and America‘s dilemma."13 This struggle between the "agrarian spirit on the one hand and the cosmopolitan " 14 spirit on the other represents an enduring inner conflict in the A 11Schlesinger, The Age of Jackson, p. 338. l2Peterson, p. 81. lslbido. p. 250 14J0hn H. Bunzel, "The General Ideology of American Small Business,” PoliticalgScience Quarterly. LXX (March, 1955), 90. ;\ 3% r’\ .\ n 92 American mind. But in a very real sense this conflict never resulted in a face-to-face, show-down fight. A good part of the explanation for this is to be found in the reality of the West. Because of its existence America found it possible to follow both destinies at the same time. Thus while the industrial empire was growing in the East, the agrarians could concentrate on enacting land statutes through which they could build a family farm, agricultural empire in the West. Triumph of Agrarian Land Policy15 Jeffersonian-Jacksonian agrarianism failed to restrict the spirit and reality of industrialization and urbanization. But if agrarianism is viewed from its more limited goa1--that of assuring that the economic and social structure of American agriculture would be based on the family farm--then it must be judged a considerable 15For the following discussion of land policies we have relied heavily on the following works: Benjamin Horace Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924); Roy M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1936 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962); Raynor G. Wellington, The Political and Sectional Influences of the Public Lands, 1828-1842 (River- side Press, 19145; Amelia Clewley Ford, Colonial Precedents of Our National Land System as it Existed in 1800 (Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, No. 352, "History Series,“"\7o1. II, No. 2, July 1910); Percy Wells Bidwell and John I. Falconer, History of Agriculture in the Northern United States, 1620-1860 (Washington: The Carnegie Insti- tution of Washington, 1925;, passim; Shosuke Sato, "History of the Land Question in the United States," Municipal Government and Land Tenure, IV (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 1886): George M. Stephenson, The Political History of the Public Lands, 1840-1862 (Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1917); Marion Clawson, Uncle Sam's Acres (New York: Dodd, Mead 8.Co., 1951), Chapters 11 and III; Everett 5, Edwards, "American Agriculture--The First 300 Years," Farmers in 3 Chang- ing worig, The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940 (Washington, u. s. Govt. Printing Office, 1940), pp. 171-276: Paul W. Gates, The Farmer‘s Age; Agriculture, 1815-1860 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), PP- 51-98; Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier; Agriculture, 1860-1897 (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1945), pp. 51-75. O . . ‘\ I A f" A . r d 0 '”‘~ —- n i . . \ a s , 1 I C s I 1 - t K‘ ‘ ‘ a '\ A _ . , p o P‘ . , I‘ ’\ A v A f“ L f‘ ' L . . O n a x u s. f. 9 - . g I, 2 ‘\ - v C O n o C ,- f‘ h ,7, I‘\ ‘r‘ A .\ F I: A O . Q ‘ F: ,r U y n I O , C (I ’§ (0 1‘ 'I’“ *1 ID ‘i H L‘AJ L 1 93 success. The agrarian spirit, with its anti-aristocratic dogma and its pro-family farm theme, kindled the land hunger passions and then provided the rationale and the political muscle needed to translate the Everyman dream of an 80-acre or quarter-section freehold into reality. The Revolution provided a strategic opportunity for the blossoming of agrarianism as a respectable political force. Between the outbreak of hostilities in 1775 and the inauguration of Washington, agrarians dominated many of the state legislatures. They issued paper money at unprecedented rates, extended suffrage, disestablished the Church in four states, and frightened the conservatives half out of their wits: Their creed is, that the property of the United States has been protected from the confiscation of Britain by the joint exertions of all, and therefore ought to be the common property of all.... This provision has alarmed every man of principle and property in New England.16 Capitalizing on their new found strength, the agrarians quickly acted to strike down all the remaining vestiges of feudalism which constituted a threat to a freehold, family farm agriculture. Following Jefferson's lead in Virginia, all but two States had abolished entail by 1786 and all had eliminated primogeniture by 1791337 16General Knox in a letter to George Washington, October, 1786, (nmted in Agar, People's Choice, p. xix. 17Entail was the practice by which title to land was settled Permanently on a person and his heirs and could not be sold. Prime- geniture was the exclusive right of inheritance of the first-born. 94 Quitrents18 were outlawed by all the States.19 These measures weakened the legal underpinnings of the aristocratic manorial system of the Middle States. Thus the overall position of the family farm, which was already dominant throughout much of the settled regions, was greatly strengthened. These were highly significant actions. But of much greater importance was the question of the future growth of the family farm system. As the reality of the vastness of the interior beyond the Alleghenies began to be recognized, the agrarians saw an unequaled opportunity to create an empire of family farmers. The family farm creed became a keystone in the strategy of westward expansion of which the opening of the Northwest territory to freehold settlement and Jefferson's purchase of the Louisiana Territory were the initial and most important steps. The "financial and commercial Federalists on the seaboard opposed the purchase (of the Louisiana Territory) on the 18Quitrents were an annual fee levied by the large estate owners on the small farmers who had purchased land from them, the payment of the levy being one of the conditions of the sale. They were levied throughout the middle and southern colonies, but were most common in hbw York and Pennsylvania, where the manorial system was most firmly rooted. 19Although they were early declared to be illegal, a form of quitrents persisted for some time in the Hudson Valley where the man- orial system was most firmly entrenched. Alexander Hamilton contributed to maintenance of the system in New York by helping his brother-in-law, Stephen van Rensseleer III, perfect a legal contract that temporarily got around the State's anti-quitrent laws. For a masterful account of the landholders‘ efforts to preserve the system and the eventual triumph of the small farmers in destroying it, see Henry Christman, Tin HQEUS and Calic - An E is de in the Emer ence f American Dem crac New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1945;. 06a 1 new ., “Iv «no PA tot 14 e - TI, , e i. _ O L A . V 1. - J A 7, AW! rL. as. aw ) . n n ,r » O .L I c n 7‘. I\ L I; V ,\J . L A a .-1 .L I _ s k Ix A l n J .L P pl‘ TL. lilo .. . A I -.L ,\_ 0» V I 4 ~,i L ,1 ,,, nix. AL . u . .. , x... . k s 1 3 at .L I r n n n n l J J . h ,L fL 95 ground that it would soon enable the agricultural interests of the South and West to dominate the country."20 But in this battle the agrarians were triumphant. As to the disposal of the public domain, once vauired, agrarianism again ultimately triumphed. The land laws were not, of course, wholly inspired and written by agrarians. But taken in total they reflect the triumph the agrarian goal of settlement of the public domain by family farmers. The agrarians wanted easy entry to the public lands and their transferral by fee-simple ownership in family-sized tracts at nominal cost, or better yet, free gratis. Jefferson in 1776, reflecting the agrarian stand, argued that the public lands should be offered free of charge and in small tracts. Indeed by selling the land to the settlers "you will disgust them, and cause an avulsion for them from the common union."21 And, indeed, the principle of free land--either in the form 0f outright gifts in both large and small tracts, or through unenforced qUitrents--was firmly grounded in colonial history.22 But agrarian dreams and colonial precedent were not enough. For the most part, the great land debates did not center around a direct contest between small-scale versus large-$031e 89r1001ture in its various forms. The agrarians, however, were confronted with a —_ . 20Charles A. Beard, The Economic Basis of Politics and Related Writin 5: Compiled by WilliamfiBeard (New York: Vintage Books, Random ”0”“: 1957). p. 182. 21Letter to Edward Pendleton, August 13, 1776: EQEEEE V: 492° 2ZFOI‘d. Colonial Precedents..., p. 95. ,‘M' e an» 0 b .. Mil r\.h . 6w .Pe .JII a .F.. «\V f :1. o r». r... NV. hU l O.» E 0 cl. FLA .r n i r L 1 n. Os. w L . w ., h as 4 J _ . 1. 1. - _ 1 s I r 1 y 1‘ A W i. . 1 $11 I o \ 1’ r h w 1 . 1 u . . _ 1 C _ . r . . . 1. I a s “I In L W o o r . 1 A r 4 L x. A. 1 J x M l . l T 1 1 I 1 1. y . \. O . _ P e . , 1 .V a 0 ¢ 0 .x . x K 1. p r 1 l .1 L 1 {J , . .r r n 1 - 1 . . . . s . 1 P. 1 . 0 1 _ or... n 1 c a \d .11 a. T J . L . 11., p a. l _ . 1 A n e 1 . x P, A 91 t , . n r . » IiIL ."\ .11. m y ’1. l‘. n 1 «.u 1': ‘1‘ 5 FL c 16 a V .X\ . in d \ . § v TIA fl . A V A4 NJ A) out, ”a flu tie it - a .1. H is.“ 9" .6 t 9 h 141 ‘111 O t ':V '9 d b a I- t 5‘. no I J — l A l r t . a 1 J 1 t ._ _ _ 1 ms 3 , _ . r L . n \ y, . 1 r r . . C C F 1 a. . o J r I It m _ .1 . _ . k . r ~ D A 1” 1,1 A I . P . NI} .1 . 1 . F 1 -1 1 L 1 D 1 u 1 1 _ ex C P 1 . . a . . J . P c . 1. L . .\ 1 e . a 1 . .1 1 . . Wu x _ l v J 1 v _ u 1 . 1 c .14; x . I u y l a to J 0‘ J . e h m o , V 1. P 1 1 P. A / .s o 1 A . . o by 1. Is A 1 O _ . 4 v o c L «Its 1, (L F a... P . 1. ‘1 .J A . r . 1 C r s I . s 1 A. Q A . A g 4 t e e . 1 A _ n o m 1 . 1 1 1 .1 _ l L i . w n .A n 1 A. . ‘J n . h a xiv ' . . as l J l 1 . C 1 J 3 : n n y 96 powerful opposition which stood for a conservative land policy; a policy which restricted the westward expansion of agriculture in general and which could promote a nonfamily farm agriculture, if not by specific design then by default. The pressures for a conservative land policy rested on the desperate need of revenue for the Treasury, the needs of a nascent industrialism, and the demands of powerful estate owners of the Middle States for measures to protect the value of their vast holdings, and the general fear among Eastern conserva- tives of the radicalism of the frontier farmer. Jefferson and his followers wanted the debt retired as soon as possible. They abhored the cost of servicing it and saw it as a tool that Federalism could use to strengthen the ties between government and business. Reluctant to raise taxes and firmly committed to a low tariff policy, no immediate and concentrated campaign was launched to institute a free-land policy. Rather efforts were concentrated toward reducing the sale price, reducing the size of tracts to be sold, and the securing of preemption legislation. The first major law dealing with the disposal of the public domain was the Ordinance of 1785, which opened up the Northwest terri- tory for settlement. The Ordinance adopted the very important prin- °1P10 of allodial tenure; that is, land was to P355 in fee simple from Government to first purchaser. But aside from this it was as much Federalist as agrarian in its details. The land was to be sold in lots of 640 acres to the highest bidder with a minimum price of $1.00 an acre and the purchaser to pay the cost of surveying. The first land law enacted by the new federal government was the Land Act ('\ ”‘0 1‘ A in [A l i i I _ f‘ ,F. P l. i J I van F\ L) 1“ f 'g‘ l of .. ‘. 1.16.: .3"! _ , V'l “" , u I... . " ‘M . I. ;" e . ‘1». l v 97 of 1796. Again, this law had only limited appeal for the small farmer. The land was to be sold in lots of 5,760 and 640 acres at a minimum price of $2.00 an acre. In the Harrison Land Act of 1800 the minimum sized tract was reduced to 320 acres. And although the price was maintained at the minimum level of $2.00 per acre, a credit plan was introduced which re- quired a down payment of only one fourth the purchase price, the rest to be paid over a four year period. The Land Act of 1804 reduced the size of the tract to 160 acres and the price to $1.64 an acre while retaining the credit provisions of the Act of 1800. Thus with $65 for a down payment an individual could get enough land to start farming. In 1820, due to difficulties encountered in the credit program, all credit provisions were abolished. However, the minimum sized tract was reduced to 80 acres and the minimum price to $1.25 an acre. In 1832 the minimum sized tract was reduced to 40 acres. The agrarian's long standing demand for the right of pre- 23 emption legislation was partially fulfilled in the temporary and limited preemption acts of 1830, 1838 and 1840, and completely ful- filled in the Preemption Act of 1841. The Graduation Act of 1854 pro- \dded for a reduction in the minimum price in proportion to the length oftdme it had been on the market, the lowest graduated price being twelve and one-half cents an acre. -__. 23The right of preemption is the legal right to settle on public LNklwithout prior purchase with the guarantee that when the government 1{it“eady to offer the land for sale the preemptor has the exclusive Isat to buy the land at the minimum price. In effect, the preemption ““5 legalized the fairly widespread practice of "squatting." Under the FROVieions of the 1841 act the maximum amount of land that the settler ”“19 preempt was set at 160 acres. :1. w- _,_. P‘a v“—_ -- . -V r . r O. r—.- , . l O C , . , : \. , , . i i I - . " I i. .1 .. ,. .r-.-...--_o I A \l e F a \ O f x ‘\ \— .-fiv- ‘- ’r L _ o r I x l e r u .—o*'* . w v “ () I 'Q.’ 0-.- i‘. C I "\ ‘ . b“ . a“ I l \ .i a - .. e .- H: ‘P. 1| c ‘e . . I" .I'I‘l. ,. 98 A concerted drive for completely free land got under way in the 1840's. As free land became identified with free soil the South was able to temporarily delay the enactment of a homestead bill. However, with the endorsement of the Republican party and Lincoln's election in 1860, the agrarian dream of free land became a reality in the Homestead Act of 1862. By 1862 the homestead idea had almost universal support out- side the South. Labor saw it as a corrective of low wages, anti-slavery forces supported it, and the Republican Party saw in it the seeds of an electoral triumph. As a result, once the Homestead Act was consumated, it was roundly eulogized. Horace Greeley's tribute is not atypical: We may congratulate the country on the consummation of one of the most beneficient and vital reforms ever attempted in any age or clime--a reform calculated to diminish sensibly the number of paupers and idlers and increase the proportion of working, independent, self- subsisting farmers in land evermore. Its blessings will be felt more and more widely for the next twenty years.... The clouds that have darkened our National prospects are breaking away, and the sunshine of Peace, Prosperity and Progress will ere long irradiate the land. Let us rejoice in and gather strength from the prospect.24 The land policies of the nineteenth century are not the only amasure of the common man's insatiable hunger for land, clothed in and nughtily reinforced by the appealing ideals of the family farm creed. The power of the land hunger and the persuasiveness of the family farm creed are also seen in the conquest, both in imagination and in reality, k 24New York Dailerribune, lay 7, 1862, quoted in Roy Marvin Robbins, "Horace Greeley: Land Reform and Unemployment, 1837-1862," Micultural History, VII (January, 1933), 41. .0 1" FKU 0“ t: f Pa. 5." 5') u‘l‘ TI. . did 1 l. --.w- fix 99 of the Great Plaibs. When the Homestead Act was passed the line of settlement stood roughly at the 96th meridian in Eastern Kansas and Nebraska. To the west lay a vast treeless and semiearid prairie 400 to 500 miles in width stretching north and south along the eastern base of the Rocky Mountains.25 Traditionally this area had been viewed as a desert. This image dates from the travels of Coronado who transversed the region in his search for the fabled city of Quivira. Zebulon M. Pike, returning from his famous eXpedition in 1810, thought that the region would be- come in "time as celebrated as the sandy deserts of Africa."26 Most certainly it was here that the western eXpansion of the American people would be arrested and they would "leave the prairies incapable of cul- tivation to the wandering and uncivilized aborigines of the country."27 This view was confirmed by the Stephen H. Long expedition of 1819- 1820: In regard to this extensive section of country, I do not hesitate in giving the opinion, that it is almost wholly unfit for cultivation, and of course uninhabitable by a people de- pending upon agriculture for their subsistence.2 25The Great Plains most generously defined applies to most of the region from the Mississippi River west to the Pacific coastal area. The heart of the Great Plains, often called the High Plains, is the strip from the 96th or 98th meridian west to the Rocky Mountains. In this region you have a conjunction of those characteristics-~leve1, treeless tOpography, and sub-humid climate--most normally associated with the popular image of the Great Plains. For an outstanding description of this region and its history, and for an interpretation of how it af- fected the people who settled it, see Walter Prescott Webb's classic, gh£_§£22£_£lgig§, This work was first published in 1931. We use the Grosset‘s Universal Library" edition: New York; Grosset 8 Dunlap, n.d. 5 26Elliott Coves, The Ex editi ns f Zebulon Montgomery Pike. 11, 23: 525. quoted in Webb, pp. IE5. 271pm. , p. 156. 23Early Western Travels, v01. XVII, p. 147 (Arthur H. Clark cm), qu°ted 1n ibid., p. 156. e l I- 5 , r" I A A n l n ,. r. 1"}. v r ’\ V . Q ‘ C s- " L . r . g . . fl. :1 ' l r"; 1 C '3 J i. A J T: as f‘. ‘ .' , L r\ 11 _‘ JO h—‘e at () -+‘ "9 100 With the upsurge of migration to the Pacific Coast in the 1830's the tales of hardships suffered by the travelers added to the popular image of area as an inhospitable desert. This was also the official view. From at least 1820 to as late as 1858 most government maps labeled the region as the "Great American Desert." The image of this area as a desert prevailed throughout most of the first half.of the nineteenth century. But the fee-simple empire of the agrarian dream was not to be limited by the 20-inch rainfall line. The image of the area began to change in the 1840's. By the 1870's, as settlers moved up the valleys of the Platt and Kansas rivers, the image of the area in the American mind had been transformed from that of a desert to a veritable garden.29 Prompted by "scientific” reports of such men as Ferdinand Hayden, of the federal government's Geological and Geographical Survey of the Territories, it came to be widely accepted as fact that "rain followed the plow"; that as the farmer applied his sweat and plow to breaking the buffalo grass sod, the heavens would respond. Charles Dana Wilber, an amateur scientist and speculative town builder, ex- plained it this way: ... in this miracle of progress, the plow was the avant courier--the unerring prophet--the procuring cause. Not by any magic or enchantment, not by incantations or offer- ings, but, instead, in the sweat of his face, toiling with his hands, man can persuade the heavens to yield their treasures of dew ang rain upon the land he has chosen for his dwelling place. 0 f 29See Smith, Virgin Land, pp. 201-213, for an excellent account 0 this mental transformation. Nebr 3OCharles Dana Wilber, The Great Valle s and Prairies f ibidaSk; agglthe N thwest (Omaha, Nebraska, 18815, p. 69, quoted in “..., . . .\ .\ n\.‘ V. |. OK I\. MI“ .81 iv" "\ g; '3 101 If the heavens did not in fact respond, then deep-bored wells and wind mills and various irrigation schemes would solve the water problem-«hopefully.31 What had formerly been seen as region suitable only for nomadic horsemen was now seen as a home for the happy and prosperous farmer. Samuel Aughey, Professor of Natural Sciences at the newly created University of Nebraska, saw the future of the Nebraska prairies in typical agrarian terms: What then may we legitimately eXpect of the people in Nebraska in the future? We have a right to expect that our school system will reach the highest possible stage of advancement--that the great mass of the people will become remarkable for their intellectual brightness and quickness. Along with this natural development and synchronizing with it, there will be developed a healthy, vigorous and beautiful race of men and women. Art culture will then receive the attention which it deserved. Music, painting, and sculpture will be cherished and cultivated for their own sake. The marvelous richness of our soils will give a true and lasting basis for prosperity and wealth. For be it remembered that agriculture in all its branches, endures the tests of time better than any other industry. it is also the best school of virtue for a nation. Happy the children that are trained to industry 9“ a farm. More men and women of high character and en- dowments come from the farm than from any other station. It is nearest to the heart of nature and nature's God.32 The Great Plains is not a desert. But neither is it a garden as many a broken homesteader could testify,and as the Dust Bowl of the 1930's so forceably demonstrated. Had cooler heads prevailed, much of the Great Plains probably would not have been opened to the small farmer, but reserved for great cattle ranches and hacienda farms. h 31For a detailed account of both the fanciful and practical Efforts to solve the water problem, see Webb, pp. 319-375. 32Sketches. of the Physical Geography and Geology of Nebraska. p. 155: quoted in Smith, pp. 212-213. Italics mine. LO 1: info: 3m ‘ a 'x .5 Ix 102 But the power of the dream was too great. The Great Plains was opened to the l60-acre homesteader. And although he suffered greatly in its inhospitable climate, he gradually adopted, out of the pressure of necessity, the dry-land farming practices that made a family farm agriculture in the region not only a possibility but a reality. Progressive Farming In his address at Monticello on the 2015t anniversary of Jefferson's birth, Secretary of Agriculture Claude R. Wickard did not stop with crediting Jefferson as the "father of the idea of the family- sized farm": Jefferson attained international fame as an agricultural scientist. To Jefferson, the science of agriculture was not only a matter of never-ending interest, but it was a means of making farm people more efficient and independent.... Because of his accomplishments in scientific agriculture and his development of procedures for exchanging scientific in- formation, we may regard him as the founder of agricultural research and our modern agricultural extension service. Jefferson was a firm believer in the establishment of higher educational institutions for the application of the sciences ‘to agriculture.... Thus it can be said that he was the founder of the land-grant college idea.33 Again Wickard was not too far wrong. Jefferson was indeed greatly interested in improving the efficiency and productivity of farming, a goal to which, through his own inventive and scientific mind, 34 he was able to make several significant contributions. * 33Agricultural History. XIX (July, 1945), 179-180. Italics mine. F 34For Jefferson as a practicing farmer see: Thomas Jefferson’s Egrm k with C mmentar an Re evant Extracts fr m Other Writings. ed., A’win Morris Betts IPrinceton: Princeton University Press, 1953); Henry . Wallace, "Thomas Jefferson's Farm Book: A Review Essay " A ricultural W. XXVIII (October, 1954), 133-38; August c. Miller: "337T.” erson EdwzgdsgricUIturalist," ibid., XVI (January, 1942), 65-78; and Everett E. Cult v Washint n Jeffers n Linc 1n and A riculture, Bureau of A911- ural conomics, . S. Department of Agriculture (November, 1937). mt E1133." 0» tn VIII Rd A p \r ~8- F. ‘ ADM 1" J 'F: m’: (“A I - I“A‘- - I‘l‘ .\ 103 In this respect Jefferson and other early agrarian leaders were very much a part of the Age of Reason; they firmly believed in reason and progress. They believed that the practice of farming not only could but should be made more efficient and productive. Thus the agrarian spirit in America has always exhibited two strains, one stressing the virtues of farming as a way of life, one stressing the "idea of pro- gress and scientific improvement" of agriculture as a productive endeavor.35 From the early years of the Republic, agricultural societies, agricultural fairs, and agricultural journals hammered home the theme of improvement in farming practices.36 Throughout the nineteenth century, "editors, educators, politicians and self appointed farm spokesmen never tired of reminding each other and the public that im- provement was the motto of the age, that agricultural progress was both necessary and inevitable.37 This commanding dream of progress also fit well with the effort to promote a family farm agriculture. If the individual farmer was given the means and the know-how for improving his PrOdUCtiO” he would not only be better off economically,.but would be better fortified against Would-be competitors. * 35Paul H. Johnstone, "Old Ideals Versus New Ideas in Farm Life," §é£mers in a Changing World, The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940: U° 5° Department of Agriculture, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1940), p. 116. 36599 121$.» 95p. pp. 112-116, 124-128, 132-134, and Demaree, The American A icultural Press esp. pp. 23-231. 37Vel‘non Carstenson, “The Genesis of an Agricultural EXperiment Station." Agricultural History, XXXIV (January. 1960): 14- f‘\ (x I) I" (‘ it a; U uh. 1‘1 . ..11 Y' .J.S "‘ 104 This concern over the improvement of the technology of farming is manifested in three major pieces of national legislation in the nineteenth century: the creation of United States Department of Agri- culture in 1862, the creation of the Land-Grant College system by the Morrill Act of 1862, and the creation of the agricultural experiment stations as auxillaries to the Land-Grant schools by the Hatch Act of 1887.38 By these measures nineteenth century America committed itself not simply to the goal of a family farm agriculture, but to a family farm agriculture constantly improving in productiveness. 38For a selected survey of the history and development of sci- entific and educational institutions see, in addition to relevant references cited above, the following: T. Swann Harding, Two Blades of Grass: A History of Scientific Development in the U. S. Department of Agriculture, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947); Arthur P. Chew, The Response of Government to Agriculture, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 19371; A. C. True, A History of Agricultural Education in the United States: 1785:1925, U. S. Department of Agri- culture, Misc. Publication No. 36,_(Washington: U. S. Government Print- ing Office, 1929); H. C. Knoblauch 2; 31., State Agricultural Experiment Stations; A History of Research Policy and Procedure, Miscellaneous Publications No. 904, U. S. Department of Agriculture (Washington: U. Sm Government Printing Office, 1962); Earle D. Ross, Democracy's College; The Land Grant Movement in the Formative Stggg, (Ames: The Iowa State College Press, 19427, and John Y. Simon, "The Politics of the Morrill Act," Agricultural History, >o ‘7 ,1 ‘- )\ w\ c r‘ 4.) - I -1 - a, i e La) .1 E ‘L . l .4 t -A lnwvi _ e 1 I ‘ ‘ i . J " s i» o, 1.1, '1 1 In fl qi- 1' 0:) -~-« , " . N . r74 ) ~10 l . l . - . . A 1‘ ‘ — - ‘ h ‘V‘24 1 ~. I) \r‘ J 4" V, 5 " ». 7 i A .L T . 01:) — [1 is 1 , 4.1.) A ~* - I ’. . - - - v "‘ ‘ — A -- ---<-.- -‘ I o-.-‘ .. o ‘ "- I ( . . O 0...: 'f' .... A p . O L 126 During the early years the farmer's independence was also considered to derive from another source, from his relative self- sufficiency. His ability to produce many of his basic necessities strengthened his independence from others. American farmers, of course, were never self-sufficient in any complete sense. They never lived in a paradise in which they were not in need of money with which to buy household items, farming equipment, land, and to pay taxes. The Virginia-Maryland tobacco growers' revolt in the 1600's, Shay's Rebellion in the 1780's, and the Whiskey Rebellion in the 1790's are dramatic testimony to the fact that farmers were never completely immune from the price and money economy. In his Notes on Virginia Jefferson had stated that farmers, fortunately, were largely immune from the "casualties and caprice of customers." But Jefferson did not believe that American farmers were or should be wholly self- sufficient. His vision of American agriculture was not that of a subsistence agriculture. His interest in progressive agriculture and his efforts to secure foreign markets for American farm produce are demonstration of this. But on the other hand, the contrast between the farmer of, say, 1800 and 1900 is clear. The former, while never wholly self- sufficient, wasn't nearly as sensitive to the money and market economy as the latter. His welfare was not as deeply touched by the conditions of his sales and purchases. Thus this semi-self-sufficiency strength- ened the image of the farmer's independence and his isolation from the "demoralizing"effect of materialistic acquisitiveness. Much of the /\ i .. E . i r a l n , . A I i g . _ L ‘.\ h ‘V IL x}. i k I e O I \ A l .. P e y I/ \ ”w w‘u J mu .1... arr n». I'll .Jr‘f" f“ . .Dl‘i .\ ~ A .. ) i# V} O. A W.. ... .19 L .T \ip _ “J Q q a J .Wl: .[l I» )1 c |.. x .1 O n - 127 virtue of farming was attributed to the fact that it was primarily a way of life and only incidentally a way of business. The transition from the state of semi-self—sufficiency to a comercialized agriculture was pretty well completed by the turn of the century. The Agrarian Revolt testifies to the farmers' awareness of how completely their welfare was tied to the money and market economy.60 Although occasional references are made in the twentieth century to the independence that the farmer derives from his ability to produce his own food, for all practical purposes the independence of the farmer is seen as being derived simply from the fact that as a property owner he is his own boss, and thus "not taking orders from or being obligated to ask for even the slightest change of hours or services as a matter of personal favor.“61 Recognizing the commercialized nature of twentieth century agriculture, increasing emphasis was placed on farming as a way of business. The country-life people, for example, while cautioning against too much emphasis being placed on "money hunger" at the ex- pense of the noneremunerative aspects of farm life, acknowledged that "the business of agriculture must be made to yield a reasonable return" if the full potential of rural America was to be realized.62 60Taylor, The Farmers' Movement..., p. 10. 61Eugene Davenport, E. R. Easton and L. L. Bernard, "The Fundamental Values of Farm Life," Chapter II, Farm Income and Farm 5313, ed. Dwight Sanderson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927) , p. 230 62R§22rtooe, Pp. 147, 240 (j ro- r“ 1‘ I“ ' ' hf aJ J ' . L . _ r‘ Ln , i ' f - ‘ VA d .J P .A p 1. ’ ,_ _ \l 1 nu. _ 7 t... r—fin r"\ J ~. ' 5 “ r‘ f‘ (‘ x“ . - 1 L ~- ,~‘ ' ’)r J , V- M‘ . M“ C V I. ‘ l I 3 1 n ( n l (1‘ 4" , w c r . '3 ,. r. i.‘ r 1 , LhL F - f L . 0 Lip”, L n. A .e-VI c ', I R f I. in ’1 -I h; L 4x ‘w fix) 1 ‘ ,— , :v .3 r" “3 c. f. i ‘ *.i‘,_ f‘. iri d ch Q L be -- L VJ J n n -. L[ i, ,1 s . ‘L- J 1 in _ ' i, I q)— . r ‘. u' r\ v; ; JI’L n ' 37* i. 'l A J I VP:- E O Q... I“ 4 - Q)- L o ’ r‘. . . Q _/‘t I O (L 4 ’ Q~.a J - m .I [E I w‘l f“ J n J r J r ' 9 ‘_ .. \IV A i-H. 128 By the early part of the twentieth century the tenet that farming must first be a way of business that is profitable before the benefits of farming as a way of life can be realized was rather fully accepted. There is one aspect of the emerging family farm creed of the early twentieth century that is probably given at least more pointed reference than in the nineteenth century. This has to do with the farm family itself. The solidarity, wholesomeness and fecundity of the farm family had been stressed in the nineteenth century, to be sure. But with the rapid growth of the city the contrast between the farm family and the urban family became sharper. By the turn of the century there was a growing awareneSS of the increasing differential between farm and city in such indicators as divorce rates, abandoned homes, time spent together as a family unit, and the number of children per family. Also there was a concern for the effect upon the character of children brought up in congested cities lacking in both opportuni- ties for play and work and isolated by concrete and glass from the beautifying and supposedly instructive qualities of nature. It was argued that the ”farmer lives closer in touch with his family than does almost any other businessman.” No "place in the World equals the farm home for the rearing of children and for the opportunity of giving them the association with natural growing things ...and a place to play." No "place in the world is so good for the training of both boy and girl in habits of work and responsibility." The farm family is a "closely compact institution" which fosters the values of ”discipline and responsibility." Marriage "survives longer" \J Wu , n eel; \ J fix I. ole .4 b O l n .l , \ r; I n p a 1 \ . f i .> 3 3 L ,, A» FJ We , ..L A s .), . J m, n, ) Qt .4 . . . ,J n s l \ J y. iJ. nail V e i) i n .F . 9‘ c h .\ a h . . , f L ... L . . [L A. u y i ‘ I I J P . _ i a u . y a . g , a o u . x m V v n _ L , . n . n J or. n b . A. e , n I . Iv I . a. a _ . P ._ a D‘I‘ 129 in the country than in the city.63 It was also widely believed that because of the lower birth rates in the city the nation would have to rely primarily on the farm family for continued population growth. The Dean of the School of Agriculture of the University of California argued that "eventually society will probably, for its own protection, reserve the use of all agricultural lands" for only those persons who intend to "raise there- on a successful family."64 As we noted above, the relative weight of agriculture in the overall economy was rapidly being diminished. However, this apparently had little effect on the traditional belief that agriculture was the fundamental industry and that all other sectors of the economy were vitally tied to it. "It is generally recognized that the proSperity of this great fundamental industry is...essential to the success and prosperity of all other industries."65 In 1922 Eugene Meyer, Jr., managing director of the War Finance Corporation and later governor of the Federal Reserve Board.stated: The fact that agriculture is the keystone of the Ameri- can economic and business structure has been more advertised during the past five years...than at any time in the history 63Davenport, Easton and Bernard, in Farm Income..., pp. 23-34. Davenport was Dean of Agriculture at the University of Illinois, Easton was editor of the American Agriculturalist, Bernard was a sociologist from the University of Chicago. 64Thomas Forsyth Hunt, Eermanent Agriculture and Social Welfare, Senate Doc. No. 239, 64th Cong., lst Sess., 1916, p. 6. 65E. A. Goldenweiser and Leon E. Truesdell, Farm Tenancy in the United States, U. S. Bureau of Census, Census Monographs IV (Washington: U. 3. Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 9. f\ a...‘ r“.- n 8”M: 130 of the country.... The farmer is the most essential cog in the driving wheel of the American business machine...ag£iculture furnishes the basis and the substance of American prosperity. Summary During the twilight years of the nineteenth century and the morning years of the twentieth century the family farm creed under- went several modifications. First, the old Jeffersonian tenet that the nation could remain virtuous and democratic only so long as the farmer class was dominant was laid to rest. But even if farmers were now a minority it was argued that they still played a necessary and fundamental role in preserving the health of the nation. The economic vitality of the nation still depended on the prosperity of agriculture, the basic industry. But more importantly the farmer class was of fundamental importance in a social and political sense. The property-owning, family farmer was the major source spring of such vital characteristics as independence, honesty, simplicity, integrity, loyalty, frugality, stability, fecundity, etcetera. The city rested on the foundation stones of the country. Whatever remained of the image of the farmer as a self- sufficient producer was discarded early in the twentieth century. Recognizing the wholly commercialized nature of agriculture, it was now a firmly established principle that before the distinctive potential of farming as a way of life could be realized, farming as a way of busi- ness first had to be profitable. Also as demographers raised doubts about the ability of cities to reproduce themselves and as sociologists 66Quoted in Joseph s. Davis, On Agicultural Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1939), p. 24. Italics mine. - C _ V r. ) L 1 o o e K‘\ } L 4 C J ,- r o K‘ J A A- I "1 A _ V‘ ‘ . a ‘J I ,3 ‘ A \o’ P . _. Fa (a . . ‘ 3 O A A. A . n i ) n J A, _ A 1 a . "\ x) ,, )- ' f\ v J n c) h a l. .5 t e I 'f‘. i, .L . . n /l r‘ k. (I '. " "A ‘ i . o o e o r r .- ' 1 I , r . . V J . 7 (I n l , . N (A' A r ' ' rfi" ' "\ _ u i _ Q ' la 0 e ' ,s ,r , J L _(K J — fig r I . V A h» r\ ) V r In ‘ L’ .. l - i F,,_. > r‘. ‘ n ;. 1") "r1 0-1 131 documented the malaise of many urban families there was increased reference to and emphasis on such farm family characteristics as fecundity and solidarity. Without question the image of the family farmer of the early twentieth century did not stand as tall in the public mind as his eighteenth and nineteenth century counterpart. Then he possessed the heroic stature of a nation builder. With the frontier closed and the ascendancy of city and factory the farmer could no longer play such a heroic role. But the farmer's new role was only somewhat less impos- ing. For many, the farmer who had built the nation was now seen as the main hope for preserving it. Although different in several respects, the family farm creed as it was articulated in the early twentieth century was still strongly fundamentalistig; the social, economic and political health of the nation was still thought to be closely tied to the well-being of the family farm community. Many agrarians in the post-World War II period still hold to a version of the family farm creed basically the same as that which we have articulated in this chapter. However, as we will note in the following chapter, the size and receptivity of the nonfarm public willing to accept this fundamentalistic version had been sharply reduced by the end of the 1930's. {x J 1“ P Phi . ..U» (1L CHAPTER V W0 DECADES OF DEPRESSION ”The American dream of the family-size farm, owned by the family which operates it, has be- come more and more remote...when fully half the total farm population no longer can feel secure, when millions of our people have lost their roots in the soil, action to provide security is imperative, and will generally be approved." Franklin D. Roosevelt1 Depression and the FamilygFarm In 1926 Henry A. Wallace, later to be the New Deal's Secretary of Agriculture and a dominating influence in agricultural policy dur- ing the 1930's, eXpressed his concern over population trends which already showed a potentially dangerous imbalance between farm and city. Worse yet, in his view, it was conceivable that at some time in the distant a full three quarters of the people might live in cities. He doubted that this would actually ever come about but the very Possi- bility was unsettling for he did not think a nation could "long endure" such conditions. He took little comfort from the fact that "the inborn qualities of the city child are probably fully as good as the inherent qualities of the farm child" or that "the ability of the City child to do clerical labor is superior to that of the farm child." For it was —..._ 1From his letter to Congress transmitting the "Report of the President's Committee on Farm Tenancy,“ February 16, 1937, printed in Farm Tenancy (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1937), pp. 25, 260 132 .A [x y) 11 1 II! :I\ uIL xiv ‘ L o I'lL. . ..\ r t . 1‘. f\f'\ i l\ l\ 133 the environment which determined the quality of the citizenry. Just as he respected the environment of the farm, he feared that of the city: "Can the great masses of people crowded together in cities as Chicago and New York be trusted to make the decisions, which they must make, in a civilization of this sort?"2 Obviously he did not think so. Shortly after becoming Secretary of Agriculture, he said: "When former civilizations have fallen there is a strong reason for believing that they fell because they could not achieve the necessary balance be- tween city and country."3 The notion of a proper balance involved more than a statistical population ratio, it involved the entire economic, political and social structure and it was the core of his ”agricultural philosophy."4 Mr. Wallace was echoing the concern that had been articulated by the originators of the country-life movement, and which troubled agrarian sympathizers throughout the first half of the twentieth century. During the two twenty-odd years between the world wars a dramatic new dimension was added to this concern-~agricultural depres- sion. The post-World War I break in farm prices was sharp and catas- trophic, and American farmers suffered depression conditions as severe as any in their history. While the nonfarm economy bounced back to a booming prosperity, the recovery in agriculture was partial and selective. And then just as things were beginning to look up the _‘ 2"Standards of Economic Efficiency in Agriculture and Their Com- patibility with Social Welfare,” Farm Inc me and Farm Life, ed., Dwight Sanderson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19277: P- 121- 3Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959): P: 35' 41bido, p. 350 11. ‘ tn i V 'x , F r. 3 I- n a. J Irv 5‘ P - A J r A s . n )J n A h J _ 3 4 a A . L ‘ Dr N or A w 1. fl . . - f . l or or» 'f‘ 3 .3 n I 4 I‘ll oalo . 3 m J, 7%. L, ,v ‘ . a n .1... orl . :Ii 4 L. A r A, It a c, , n .. h. _ ll P;J a ’\ p. uh. «cw “My. \ _ I) _ n h ‘ . P n O r» .e n [to e u A) h h ,, I .s w H r J l x . oil A . ’ \ v. n O\ w H ‘1 b l O i . V i 11. _ , . Dr. J l n H A I II it) v.0l A. F L ‘J l . r 3 A; . < - , D t . o J n n rd n o P . n A h J ”\ \J .\ I. 134 Great Depression struck, and nowhere was the blow more severe than in agriculture. The depressed condition which settled over agriculture during the 1920's and 1930's sparked a revival of agrarian political activity which had atrOphied somewhat during the Golden Age of farm prosperity in the first two decades of the century.5 The adverse economic con- ditions and the agrarian protest forced the public to take notice, in the words of President Harding, of the state of this "oldest and most elemental of industries" to which ”every other activity is inti- mately and largely dependent upon.“6 That non-farmer, Bernard M. Baruch, reminded the readers of the Atlantic Monthly that agriculture is the greatest and fundamentally most important of our American industries. The cities are but the branches of the tree of national life, the roots of which go deeply into the land. We all flourish or decline with the farmer.... Hence, to embitter and impoverish the farmer is to dry up and contaminate the vital sources of the nation. Of the agrarian protest, Baruch counseled that basically all the farmers were asking was "that they be placed on an equal footing with buyers of their products and with other industries" and that they were "right in demanding this."8 Many of Baruch's colleagues were not so sanguine. The more militant forms of Western agrarian insurgency struck fear into the hearts of many Eastern conservatives who saw in 5See Chapter VI. 6Report of the NationaliAqriculturangonference (Washington: Us 80 cbvernment Printing Office, 1922), p. 70 7"Some Aspects of the Farmers Problems," July, 1921, pp. 111-112. 81big., p. 112. '\ . . , . T . a r r L , l) U 1‘ y r . T A _ _ ‘ u . . r O . . _ , . ~ _ x l... P 4 w 0. O... I g a . x . L o; O» 1;, A. o a . o l . ‘ C .i - J J . . _ ‘1 . 3 . , f v _ V ~ ’5 .41.\ II. 0 FL v‘r’v --O—'-.-.-'---‘ M’.-v. rv'"-¢ ,—-—r-_ - 7—..‘7- , “-.., ‘b . a... ‘1. 135 such movements the growth of "Bolshevism, Red doctrines and Socialism." Even the launching of the relatively conservative Farm Bloc sent some editors of the metropolitan press into a "perfect panic" over what they judged to be a "revolutionary movement reaching into the seat of government and menacing the heart of the nation." But as the agrarian protest persisted and as evidence of economic distress continued to accumulate, the Eastern ”establishment" was forced to give agriculture greater attention. And although such things as the farmer-backed McNary-Haugen price fixing scheme were rejected as too radical, there was a general and sympathetic recogni- tion that the farmers needed help. Big business took a particular interest and some of the most thorough economic studies of agriculture during the 1920's were produced by businessmen groups.10 Running through these studies and in editorial comment of much of the business press was the theme that business prOSperity could not be maintained 11 Thus businessmen had a "direct 12 unless farmers were prosperous. self-interest" in the restoration of agricultural prosperity. 9Arthur Capper, The Agricultural Bloc (New York: Harcourt, Brace 8' COO, 1922), ppo 3, 4o lOSee e.g., The Agricultural;groblem in the United States (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1926) and Thefianditign 91 Agriculture in the United States and Measures for its Improvement, a Report by the Business Men's Commission on Agriculture (published by the National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., New York, and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington, D. C., 1927). llBoth the 1926 and 1927 Industrial Conference Board studies of agriculture accept the economic fundamentalism theme. For an additional sampling of this belief by business, see: Charles D. Bohannan, "Agricul- ture is the Foundation of Manufacturers and Commerce,” Manufacturers Rec d, August 19, 1932, pp. 33-37, and "Can Business Prospects Continue Much Conger if the Farm Situation Fails to Improve?" H222£222_2£_flill Street, May 21, 1927, pp. llO-lll+. 12The Agricultural Pr blem..., p. 2. n l _r~ - , f i" " "‘ ~ . . .. ' ".A . n "n J I" _ . f‘ f‘ A 3' ‘~ 0 "‘ "l I‘ r n n F \ . L n , N o F _ n J . v . n ‘f‘ H r .4 A. - ‘ » — - of A m- ._ '. - J» J J g- \4 .. h. - i _‘ n ‘ 13 f‘ L (l l A .1 ~ I .. a - c .L - n " a ,_ 'i . ’ -; A - r- a .- " n" D IAJ" ‘ 3 L . l.. t- i nnn ” .-.. ,~'» - -‘ Na . :1- - .;.':a_‘- i- .1...: -H-"1 _,- I a [3}: O ..l 3 " ”... "a.“ J l I‘ _ J l" "u ‘V‘L V -I r; _ v, A; v“ ’I L - A) ' ‘4‘" A C n _ n3 _ ’n _ -E f. F» ‘ ’ d . WK . - I" v" - I“ '03 ’H i.) or 1, r, t ; gigglj “,4, L.Lw codiq " “Us "' '» ZJ L-z' ‘ ., hi. or is»: a 1:43;” aasifll! L. ll” an L _M_ oi , L m .n j- - Mi; f ”Q’Lgfnl-Ilea A _AA~ "___ >-','.'_ ”M 53’1" efli'na'x-L :-:n. can ) :ni iri. find 1', s .15 xi?! "irritl" a .5 I: .1; x.-‘l)£ 1'03 "4563} salsa. borin'i' wit n3 41,001 it lbiilniip -ui .. mu :9 i .)( Y 3’ b“ 3 or”; b“ (”A91 c-Of‘I {Disn' ::) misino') isifiauhnl isnoiJ’sW 1° (3.. in: d on; pet m. mi: of swimsoi ' s_m9E§V21ng ail In} on: (d deiiduq) swtiuoiipfi no nor $31”!!th a 'nJM aasnieufi 3m yd 301““ to 156.60 9d: bns also! wok! ..onI ,binofl eonszuino'l Leiliaubnl 15“ I , «(TSQI ..3 .CJ' ,nnrgnidasw ,estsia beiinU ed: in 80 bnoa sansreinQ lsi'rreubnl VS 9i has 6991 ed: {1303“ i alliances” ed: :qeoos 1M; I'm ‘1 Th! 00! tm Ill '11 136 But more than a belief in agricultural economic fundamentalism was involved. As the prestigious National Industrial Conference Board put it: Farming is more than an industry. The significance of agriculture in the life of the nation is far deeper than this. It touches something vital and fundamental in the national existence. It involves the national security, the racial character, the economic welfare and the social progress of our people.... The farm in the past has been the main source of our free and self-reliant national type and a radical change in this respect may have an important influence upon American society in the future.13 The Businessmen's Commission on Agriculture stated that farmers in "the course of their pursuit of a living and a private profit are the cus- todians of the basis of the national life.' Thus, far-sighted national agricultural policies were necessary to "provide for the national secur- ity, promote a well-rounded prosperity, and secure social and political stability."14 This is not to say that the big business community accepted the family farm creed lock-stock-and-barrel. But certainly their liter- ature of that period did little to challenge the creed and in fact it echoed many of its basic tenets.15 The farmer‘s celebrated individu- alism fit well, in theory at least, with the business community's own set of values. Most important was the fact that the farmer was a prop- erty owner. From the time of Hamilton and Adams businessmen have admired nothing quite so much as the stability and character of the propertied, h 13Ibid., pp. v, 3-4. 14The Condition of Agriculture..., p. 20. lSJohn Philip Gleason, "The Attitude of the Business Community Toward Agriculture During the McNary-Haugen Period," Agricultural History, xxx11 (April, 1958), pp. 127-38. , y ‘ ‘: - r k .. g _ J a J , r - 7 , , on .- 4- " “ ‘ . J . ' I J " l o a " ‘ ‘ ~ ' '- ‘ ~ ‘ . a r l I u. "" ‘ J . , 1 J" u ‘ .. i .:r. f I .. I - Q I a 1 v 1,] .1 41 c .. .J J r , .. ' “I _, .. 1 Q 3 1V - I u i 5 r onus- ‘- J ‘. ‘ ‘.. ...) _ J 4 - A l’ ,_ 1.. 3.)- I 3 V . ‘. . ’ son. k ‘ ‘ r I - ‘ , ) 4 I . .- f ‘ - I a is .L as. u a ‘ " " LJ \- ' , ‘4 . g _ I ' a - - a ‘ ‘ ' _ . . o L- .I ~ 3' ' h , . c g -* '_ - I r . . O 2.1 .EJjLODF vulNmeoo aarE3U\ g’x sii 191: ._2 J1 Ion ai Bill -19lii I’sdi YitiErisn J': .fclir - a~—fioo;-—flsu[ heel; 315’ Yijsl .11 332% mi uns bust 2:71.. gursilmio it; air: air boixsq 35‘“ 1° 911136 ~ubivibni laisilisiso a'uuni sdl' fusions: oiard eat 30 vnsm ”on” “W0 3'Yfinummoo aaeniem on: riiiw .Jasa! J‘s vicar” ni .[Isw iii mus ~qozc s asw 191x115“: 9d: 3m: Joel on: em Jnsnoqri $20M .eeuiev 1° ’9‘ ”flats wad meeeniaud emsbA has noiiimsh to anti: an: moat‘i .Isnlflim . fimm 913 to ”bend: bns viiiidsta ed: as down 08 911052.83” 1.2 137 and feared nothing quite so much as the radicalism of the propertyless. At a time when an ever larger proportion of the population was without property, businessmen were not anxious to see a widespread dissolution of family owned farms nor their economic impoverishment. For it was under such conditions that farmers would most likely be led astray by self-seeking radicals and begin to act like "wild jackasses"l6 rather than the conservative and responsible individualist, which their call- ing, if adequately rewarded, was supposed to make them.17 Family Farm Threatened The economic ills plaguing the agricultural sector took on added significance as it came to be recognized that the institution of the family farm was in jeopardy. Increasingly after the middle 1920's and through most of the 1930's there was a growing consciousness that the traditional family farm structure was threatened. These prospects were viewed by most-~both within and outside the agricultural political com- munity-~with considerable alarm. Prompted by the depressed conditions of the agricultural economy in contrast to the industrial prosperity, there was growing concern that American farmers were sinking into something called peasantry. As the agricultural depression persisted the references to an American peasantry increased. The trend toward increased tenantry was probably included in 16Dale Kramer, The Wild Jackasses (New York: Hastings House, 1956). p. l. Kramer is not referring to this specific period, but to the general tendency of conservative Americans to view revolting farmers' in this vein. 17The National Industrial Conference Board study of 1926, for ex- ample, emphasizes the connection between economic distress and radical action by the otherwise conservative and individualistic farmer, pp. 4-5. th fa an «Fe VI 138 this vision of peasantry, but the term as used by many was more en- compassing. Basically it meant that through prolonged poverty the farmer, whether tenant or owner-operator, would become so demoralized and servile that he would no longer manifest the unique characteristics on which the nation was supposedly so dependent. President Coolidge suggested that if "we permit our farming population to fall to the level of a mere agricultural peasantry, they will carry down with them the general social and economic level."18 Frank O. Lowden, one—time reform-governor of Illinois reflected with unease on the prospects: History discloses but two types of farmers--what we may call the peasant type and the yeoman type.... Up to the present time our farmers have been composed largely of the yeoman type-~independent self-respecting, demanding education for their children and social equality with all other classes. In the past, the farms have largely fur- nished leadership for industry, for commerce, for the learned professions, and for government in the United States...shall we permit our farm population gradually to descend to the lowly status of peasant, content if they but wring a meager living from the $011719 The popular historian, William E. Dodd, after surveying the shoddy rural landscape of ”empty and delapidated houses and shabby fences and eroding fields", regretfully concluded in 1928 that the 20 farmer was already well "on the way to peasantry". Again in 1930 18Quoted in Marcy Campbell, Rural Life at the Crossroads (Boston: The Athenaum Press, 1927), p. 20. 19"Do We Want Peasants or Yeomen?" Wallace's Farmer, November 2, 1929, p. 6. 20"Shall Our Farmers Become Peasants?" The Century Magazine, CXVI (May, 1928), p. 430 ,r ,. (\ Q 0 I r,- s \ C {a 1 non. he C63 Co? 3?; p‘- (C \‘ 139 he argued that the farmer had been "reduced to the verge of peasantry." Somewhat in the same vein the historian, Louis M. Hacker, argued in 1933 that the American economy had reached the stage where the tensions between monopoly capitalism and commercial agriculture were irrecon- cilable. To save industrial capitalism there was a pressing need for low foodstuff and raw material prices. To save agriculture these prices had to be high. A choice had to be made. "And because there can be no question of the inevitable nature of the choice, American commercial agriculture is doomed." President Roosevelt ”and his well wishers" cannot save the farmer. He has become "a peasant bound to the soil." Clairvoyance is not "required to foretell that the future of the American farmer is the characteristic one of all peasants for Whom, in our system of society, there is no hope."22 One of the alternatives pointed to by Dodd was that "great wheat and cotton growers" might organize "great farm corporations" and thus be able to control markets and make their peace with monopoly capitalism.23 It was in just such a possibility that many saw another dangerous threat to the family farm. There was a great deal of dis- cussion during the 1920's and particularly during the 1930's "concern- ., 24 ing the passing of the family farm and the coming of the corporation. The term, corporation, was often used loosely to symbolize any form of w 21"]‘he Long Trail to Farm Relief,“ New Yggk Times Magazine, AUQUSt 31, 1930, p. 200 28 3 22The Farmer is Doomed (John Day Company, Inc., 1933), pp. 31, , 1. 23New York Times Magazine, pp. 20-21. 24L015 Bernard Schmidt, “Whether Agrarian Economy in the United States,” §ggial Forces, XV (December, 1936), 196. la: "\ 9V WT; «’\f‘ 17‘. IE U fig- 3 r v r A A. a . , J A n I A . n O A I T. A A w , A m *l' .4.- n .\ T! 1 ‘iv l O\ 140 large-scale unit regardless of whether it was legally incorporated. Other terms such as "factory farms" were used to designate this threat to the family farm. Despite "the hue and cry with regard to corporation and large- scale farming" this type of unit did not increase significantly.25 But even the appearance of a few such units as the 95,000-acre Campbell wheat farm in Montana was enough to cause considerable alarm. The state legislatures in Kansas and North Dakota enacted laws outlawing farm corporations and several other Midwestern states seriously con- sidered legislation.26 Thus the alarm was not so much a product of the actual increase in the number of corporate, or larger than family farm units, as a reaction to what many saw as the potential for growth of this type of unit. The depressed conditions made quite plausible the belief that American agriculture might be on the verge of a wholesale reorganiza- tion. The high levels of farm-mortgage debt and farm foreclosures was threatening thousands of small owner-operators. From 1929 to 1933 the rate of forced sales of farms because of foreclosure of mortgages, bankruptcies and delinquent taxes, increased by 177 percent, from 19.5 to 54.1 per 1,000 farms.27 During the five-year period between 1930 25Wilson Gee, American Farm Policy (New York: W- W. Norton & COO, 1934), p0 1370 26When the anti-corporation law was passed in Kansas in 1931, there were 20 incorporated units in the state. Business Week, May 27, 1931’ pp. 20-22. 27U. 5. Bureau of the Census, Hist rica Stati tic f the United States; 1789-1945, Washington, D. C., 1949, p. 95. ,’\ I). _. .AFQ... . ./ o a . a o o h . . A v i r... 141 and 1934 three quarters of a million farms changed ownership through foreclosure and bankruptcy sales.28 Even as late as 1938 in such hard hit states as North Dakota, 70 percent of all farms were listed as tax-delinquent and 75 percent were mortgaged.29 With thousands of farmers losing their farms and thousands more teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, the status of the owner- operator farmer was indeed precarious. Thus the threat of large- scale farming was not simply a figment of the imagination. As it turned out, however, the depression brought on a reorganization not so much in the direction of giant enterprises consolidated from bank- rupt family farms but in the direction of tenancy. The rise of tenancy had been a concern since the turn of the century. The Commission on Country Life and other studies documented the trend in great detail.30 However, despite considerable concern,these studies saw no permanent threat to the owner-operator ideal. But by the middle 1930's the story was different. 28Farm Tenancy, p. 44. 29Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West: 1900-1939 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951), p. 513. 3OSee, e.g., Benjamin H. Hibbard, ”Farm Tenancy in the United States," The Annals of the American Academy of Political andySocial Science, XL (March, 1912), 29-39; W. J. Spillman and E. A. Godenweiser, "Farm Tenantry in the United States,“ U. S. Department of Agriculture Yearbook, 1916 (Washington: U. 8. Government Printing Office, 1916):— pp. 321-46: William Bennet Bizzel, Farm Tenantry in the United States (Experiment Station, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, College Station, Texas, 1921), and E. A. Goldenweiser and Leon E. Truesdell, Farm Tenancy in the United States, U. 8. Bureau of Census, ionsus Monographs,WIV (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 924 . LU , t o L PH ‘1 i ‘ I - flu (N .lrlm N ‘1- 5 «av i. 51- um. 142 A special committee appointed by President Roosevelt in 1936 to study the tenancy problem turned in what to many were truly alarming figures. The committee reported that not only was tenancy at an all time high, but increasing rapidly. 0f the nation's 6,812,350 farmers, 2,865,155, or 42 percent, were found to be tenants. Another 10 per- cent of the farmers were only part owners.3l Thus less than half of the nation's farmers held title to all the land they operated. More- over, because of heavy debt load the security of these full owners was highly tenuous. The committee reported that in many states "it is estimated that the equity of operating farmers in their lands is little more than one fifth."32 The committee concluded that the present trend in tenancy was a problem of major magnitude. Unless massive ef- forts were taken to correct it the majority of American farmers seemed destined to permanent tenancy. Reaction to the Threat In the face of these threats the conviction was widely eXpressed that the traditional family farm structure of agriculture should be pre- served if at all possible. A few prominent businessmen such as Robert S. Brookings, founder of the Brookings Institution, and Henry Ford ar- gued that agriculture should become corporatized and industrialized.33 But as our discussion of the attitudes of big business above indicates, 31Farm Tenancy, p. 20. 32Ibige , p. 30 33J0hn D. Black, Agricultural Reform in the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1929), pp. 369-70. m lvl. F“ D\ .\ 143 this view was not widely held. The editor of Business Week preferred the "road of permanent subsidy" rather than the prospect of continued poverty in agriculture and the rise of a permanent "tenant class": That is, we may tax the city dweller to maintain a decent standard of living on the farm. There can be no economic defense of subsidizing uneconomic produc— tion. It is social and political; there we may find strong justification. It might well seem important to us to preserve in our country the one large class of property owners, the greatest body of entrepreneurs, the one stable and rooted element.... It is hard to visualize an America of the future should the stream dry up that feeds us leaders in every walk of life.34 Herbert Heaton informed an English professional audience that "all American townsmen will agree that, no matter what the cost may be, the American farmer must not be allowed to sink to the level of a 'peasan '."35 The editor of the New Republic looked with dismay at the prospects of'Tactory farms" because: 531. There are characteristics of our traditional country life at its best which contribute what looks like an indispensable element to the national culture. The independent farmer with a small domain of his own, with a chance to exercise his in- genuity, patience and industry in the never ending game with nature, with a wholesome environment and a job that demands a judicious combination of brain and muscle, enjoys a way of life that, whatever may be its economic hardships, still retains precious values which have been lost to the majority of employees of large scale industry. It is the disappear- ance of this well rounded exercise of the faculties which makes so much of our machine culture shallow and fibrile, unsatisfactory to its participants, and fruitless of enduring achievement. Perhaps independence on the land is doomed by the machine age, as with the old-fashioned handicraft in industry, but somehow, one looks with horror on the possibility 34"Three Farm Roads,” February 15, 1933. p- 32- 35"The American Farmer," glitical Quarterly. V (Cbtober, 1934) - . _ 7 o (W. - J - K» J 7 I" ‘ ~ ’\ l u ' '_ . a b .4 . Am } - C o ' f~ P l. - . O I, F -, . O I. ,5 A . A I - (“r ' o ' V I O ‘n . f . e h ‘ _ rs . /\ P r .5 _ fl - r f‘ _> e 0 ~ ‘ - p > . . Ih r“ i a 0 O O t V ‘ . I“ - P . , f'\ O L l O ' ‘f\ ,1 _ ‘ e 0 J L I“ I I" 5 _ ' . r' - j _ . . x f" ,. 4 l - V I ' V 4 l ‘ . 1 E . ) ‘ ‘ . “ r“ f‘ V‘ J l r‘ , , , - . - V V‘ I \ .e I , r, r‘ _ A . . A F / O A ". n .p A \— t ' U ‘ , , hr ‘ l J . _‘ ' ’ n I.\ J _L ‘ V - .'\ ’ ' h J J . l l u i . . .... ’ ‘ i ' r~ F . ‘ . I . I (r n ‘ ‘1 ‘ > ‘7 l o I - , _ , c . - r , o I I“ P P — A ‘ \. I . . . Q A ,- ‘ A f‘ . A . P I‘ P ' ’ - . K . I . O n N r. L V \ I s.— o ‘, . . ' ' A , x " A f.‘ - 1 F O a \ r I ' . v + . c l r I A . . a .. P D . — A, . . r r‘ 1 _ ._ _ J . 7 O L . . ‘ A I t. ’. A 4 Q A l . . i A o —' ‘ . . . 7 V‘ —— A I P . ' r\ w . . A F " ’7 h n A ‘ ‘ . . ... -. . . — l ‘ A. J7 A “ J o I o 9 I , _ a - - e. t . \ - ’ . ~ f « ' " l j l , l ’ 4» O - 4- - V l 7 c ., - - I» I \ — 1 . . . vJ ro- Li -#fl-IIIIIIIIIIIII::______________:__+__——F 144 of a great factory for farms, operated in a routine fashion by mere wage-earners, who are dependent for their sustenance-~as, indeed the entire population would be--on the intelligence and favor of absentee land monopolists.30 President Roosevelt's committee on farm tenancy-—a prestigious group of editors, college presidents, church leaders, governors, farm organization leaders, and Department of Agriculture officials--put it this way: Sturdy rural institutions beget self-reliance and independence of judgment. Sickly rural institutions beget dependency and incapacity to bear the responsi- bilities of citizenship. Over wide areas the vitality of American rural life is daily being sapped by systems of land tenure that waste human and natural resources alike. Vigorous and sustained action is required for re- storing the impaired resources on whose conservation continuance of the democratic process in this country to no small extent depends.37 The depressed conditions in agriculture and the possible threat to the security of the traditional family farm structure had two other noteworthy results. As we noted in Chapter II the general meaning of the term, family farm, dates to the eighteenth century. However, it was not until the 1920's and 1930's that the term came into general usage. Since the abolition of such feudal practices as primogeniture, entail, and quitrents and the enactment of land policies aimed at disposing the vast public domain in small and inexpensive tracts, the dominance of the family unit had been fairly well secured. 36”Shall We Have Factory Farms," August 31, 1927, p. 32. 37Farm Tenancy, p. 20. U L L/ f\ II the In: 145 So dominant was this type of unit, in fact, that throughout most of the nineteenth century Americans, with the exception of the ante—bellum South, simply equated agriculture with a family farm agriculture, farmers with family farmers. This simple equation continued to be held by most on into the early years of the twentieth century. Thus the observation by the German, Sigmund Von Frauendorfer, that "every- body who uses the term 'farmer' thinks almost automatically of the operator ofyg family farm" was basically correct.38 However, at about the time Frauendorfer recorded his observa- tions, the trend was developing to add to the noun, farmer, the adjec- tive, family. Apparently by the middle to latter 1930's it had become a standard term in the vocabulary of agriculture. The adoption of the term was undoubtedly a reaction of the growing awareness that the con- tinued dominance of this traditional institution was no longer assured, that there were alternatives to it. The adjective, family, was used to more clearly distinguish that unit from its possible competitors. The perceived threat to the family farm had another related effect. Whether or not the family farm could adjust to its changing environment would depend primarily on the programs developed by the federal government. From the early days of the Republic the promotion and preservation of the family had been the over-arching goal of American agricultural policy. Generally speaking, because of the simple equation noted above, this goal had been only implicitly identified. But now ‘ 38"American Farmers and European Peasantry," Journal of Farm W. XI (October, 1929), 634. b 5 9X 9” fa: U nu M n. «his c a nun r a)“ no 4 \ n s o . t r Ar ‘ , L A . r 0 r O \ g n m P i ..I :0! ail A“ “xv film ‘x‘ r A O I f e I r . t l e a . as . I; v). . l / n . ,l r , I r s, u c h . . V _ . _ . l u. u ,_ _ ~ ‘ 4 . . C 146 conditions had rendered the equation obsolete. Because of this there was an increasingly apparent tendency during the latter 1930's and early 1940's to explicitly identify the family farm goal.39 The Bankhead~Jones Farm Tenancy Act of 1937 established an extensive government loan program for the purpose of aiding "persons "40 The Farm Security to vauire, repair or improve family-size farms. Administration which administered extensive farm rehabilitation pro- grams had "one central purpose--fostering property ownership by family-type farmers and thereby preserving and strengthening the ' according to traditionally American family-type of farm operation,’ its chief, C. B. Baldwin.41 In 1939 the administrators of the Agri- cultural Adjustment programs noted that "the agricultural adjustment acts" had done a great deal to "protect small farmers from the com- petition of large-scale farm operation."42 A special committee appointed by Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R. Wickard, to assess the goals and programs of the U. S. Depart- ment of Agriculture reported that: 39Griswold takes note of this tendency toward more explicit identification in his book, Farming and Democracy, p. 143. However, he does not eXplain why the trend occurred. 40Reprinted in Paul V. Maris, "this land is mine?; From Tenancy to Family Farm Ownership, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Monograph No. 8 (Washington: U. 5. Government Printing Office, 1950) Appendix B, p. 360. 4louoted in Griswold, Farming and Democracy, p. 165. 42Agricultural Adjustment: 1938-39; A Report on the Activities Carried on by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, U. S. DepaifL ment of Agriculture (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 4. f\ D lF‘ 1: 1 .‘II 2 m .m. m ts r 0 t n i. _ e I y . J - l . O t l . s , \ r n u I r . , 1. .L f 4 I . O y . J r J 4 a I $ $ Ad A t - n » w n . . r c .‘l ,Hi ‘1 _ a ,, Ix r . .. O a _ - , O . a . , o — > 4 . . J u w n n H . .. i J a .. r ,J . . H A .,, . A . o t k . . _ 0,. 0 O O o n r. .\ 147 The U. S. Department of Agriculture believes that the welfare of agriculture and of the Nation will be promoted by an agricultural land tenure pattern characterized by efficient family-size owner-operated farms, and one of the continuing major objectives of the Department will be the establishment and maintenance of such farms as the pre- dominating operating farm unit in the United States. The Department will attempt to prevent large farms from becoming so large as to drive out family farming, and it will at the same time, do what it can to help make small farms large enough to provide each farm family with a reasonably adequate minimum level of living.43 Subsequently, the Department took a whole series of actions aimed at assuring that the Department's many programs were administered with this acknowledged goal in mind. These actions, reported Mordecai Ezekiel, would "strengthen the position of the family-sized farm, maintain a larger number of farm families in independent position with moderate incomes and help resist the pressures toward the develop- ment of employer and wage-earning classes in farming."44 An interbureau committee of the Department of Agriculture studying the effects of technology on the farm, recommended a series of programs to "encourage and maintain the family-size farm."45 Al- though it did not elaborate, the committee suggested that larger than family-size units that were not being used "effectively" might be sub- divided into family-size units. Another interbureau committee, looking ahead to the end of the War, stated "that the scales of public policy 43Quoted in Mordecai Ezekiel, "The Shift in Agricultural Policies Toward Human Welfare,” urnal f Farm Ec mic , XXIV (May, 1942), 471. 441bide , pe 473e 45Technglogy on the Farm, U. S. Department of Agriculture (Washington: U. 5. Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 88-93. r”- e 1 ' o J. . -" . . A- Q _.. I J , 1’ l L e I I“ . 1 .L n , fl - - ' P, 1 "' I‘ ; ¥ ‘ . . - f. b — M I" - 1 e ‘N n _ -’ ‘ /\ F‘ g u . . . ‘ n J I s I . A k I e A ‘ J , e . r A . f. -" O - I a. - U \ x I. I. am‘ the d6: the $6 - H.4- 11.3 should be tipped in favor of family farms."46 In 1941 the Agricultural Extension Service subcommittee of the Association of Land-Grant Col- leges and Universities, after noting that the Extension service had always had ”the objective to maintain and preserve the family farm" and that as the growth of "large-scale operations" was now threatening the "American way of life,’ urged that the Extension service re- dedicate itself to a program "To Maintain and Preserve for America, the Family Farm.”47 Back to the Land It was during the depth of the Great Depression that the status of the family farm seemed most precarious. But the Depression affected not simply the agricultural community, but every economic and social sector of the nation. The whole capitalistic system, it seemed, had been brought to its knees. And the great cities became scenes of un- paralleled economic distress and social chaos. One of the more im- mediate effects of the Great Depression was the revival in the minds of many of all the old doubts and fears of urban-industrial society. In the most extreme cases this led to a conviction that America's only hope lay in the abandonment of the city and a return to the land. For agrarians the great crash was seen simply as the result of the folly which had allowed far too great an imbalance to develop 46What Post-War Policies for Agriculture? Report of the U. S. Department of Agriculture Interbureau and Regional Committee on Post- War Programs, Bureau of Agricultural Economics (Washington: U. 5. Government Printing Office, January, 1944), p. 6. 47Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, Proceed- ings of the 55th Annual Convention, Chicago, Illinois, November lO-l2, 1941, p. 1980 f1 ‘1‘ “ The of 1' SI 391 a1 l-\ #1.! P. A Q . . C . . x . r or J « n O, R m i .. +\ n J ‘x g A t r . A . _ r . ' 149 between city and country, and the Great Depression acted to renew their faith in the family farm creed. But also many outside the agrarian circle turned toward the country out of disillusionment with the city. The artist, Grant Wood, saw not only the end of the city's domination of literature and the arts, but the re-affirmation to rural values and rural life: The Great Depression has taught us many things, and not the least of them is self-reliance. It has thrown down the Tower of Babel erected in the years of false prosperity; it has sent men and women back to the land; it has caused us to rediscover some of the old frontier virtues.4 In a similar vein the historian Charles A. Beard noted that during the 1920's considerable "countenance was given to the idea that agriculture was destined to drop in pecuniary and cultural importance and that urban industry was bound to rise indefinitely, if not forever." But with the failure of domestic and foreign markets to absorb eXpanded industrial production, "the idea of endless urbanization fades." Thus "the course of events has forced a reconsideration of the place of agriculture in the United States...it is likely that the landward trend in American thought and practice will take on increasingly the character of an unavoidable necessity."49 The Great Depression did in fact send "men and women back to the land" in both a literal and literary sense. During the early part of the decade, the de-population of the countryside, which had first 43"Revolt Against the City,” Rural America, XV (February, 1937) 4. Italics mine. 49"Preface” to M. L. Wilson, Democracy Has Roots (New York: Carrick & Evans, Inc., 1939), pp. 9-10. Italics mine. ..._.__ . a ", \J 150 become noticeable during the twenties, was reversed. Thousands of unemployed or disillusioned city people returned to the farms from whence they had come, took up abandoned farms, or established sub- sistence plots around the fringes of the great cities. One observer saw in this the ”greatest retreat in all of the war-time or peace- time history of the United States.... People...are bolting from our cities in a veritable land-rush."50 The city-to-farm migration wasn't that extensive, but taken in conjunction with a reduced rate of farm to city migration, total farm population did increase. The 1935 agricultural census showed the largest farm population ever, a 5 percent increase over 1930. Many observers saw in this trend, if properly controlled, a solution--even tbs solution--to the economic and social woes of the time. In 1933 Willard Tilden Davis described the extent of the back- to-the-land proposals: Among the divers proposals for remedying our ills none bobs up more persistently than the back-to-the- land theory. For the last three years in particular our magazines have pictured the utopian results of settling idle men on the fat, fair and abundant lands of our country. It becomes almost a cult.5 William Randolph Hearst's New York American urged in a standing head- line each morning, "Get Back to the Land." Bernard Macfadden's flew Xerk Graphic and Liberty Magagine incessantly preached the back-to- the-land theme.52 50Donald Wilhelm, "American Return to the Soil," Review of Reviews, May, 1933, p. 31. 51”How Far Back to the Land?" New Re ublic, August 9, 1933, p. 336. 52Russell Lord and Paul H. Johnstone, eds., Aygiace on Earth: A Critical Appraisal of Subsistence Hmsteads: U- 5' Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics (Washington: U0 S. Government Printing Office. 1942): P: 12° 14 l 0‘15 91. tel $18 the . -Ml m A .1 u i L n C y . \ J v I V l l I. t A, . A. p U “ > x x . n f \ j r . a l ,1, / n C _ L . .-...--,, Q . .--. 151 On the popular literature front, the widespread tendency initiated by such writers as Hamlin Garland and Joseph Kirkland to depict the farm as a place to escape from began to die out. In- creasingly after 1929 the farm became ”something to escape tg_rather than I£2fl-“ By the middle of the forties the parade of how-grim-is- life-down-on—the-farm books had been reduced to a few pickets." How- to-do-it books promising security and happiness to the city dweller who would but buy a small farm were a phenomenal success during the middle thirties.53 Those who supported the back-to-the land movement ranged from city planners, who saw it as a way of shortening already extended breadlines, to neo-Thoreauists. Franklin Roosevelt was "somewhat infected by it,” and ”even such hard-boiled characters like Hugh Johnson, Harry Hopkins, and Bernard Baruch viewed variations of the idea with approval."54 Some saw in it simply a way of tackling the unemployment prob- lem. A great number, however, saw much more than this; they saw an opportunity to return to the sound and safe values of rural life. This theme was argued by such groups as the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, the rural-life sections of many Protestant denominations,55 53Clayton s. Ellsworth, "Ceres and the American Man of Letters, since 1929,” Aggicultural History, XXIV (October, 1954): PP- 177, 181. 54Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, 11, 367, 364. 55For a sampling of church views see, Rev. John LaFarge ("The Catholic Point of View") and Mark A. Dawbar ("The Protestant Point of View"), “Religion and Agriculture," _y;§1_5m3;1§g, XVI (September, 1938). The most comprehensive statement of the position of the Catholic Church is to be found in Manifesto on Rural Life, National Catholic Rural Life Conference (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1939). I- 7/ I l . (x A “\ f . .L fl , 1" . . _ ‘ ‘J ‘1“ . m a J \, . J a A A‘ 4 a e o , f‘ o o o o ‘ ** o — \ - ‘1 t c I’ xx 4 I“ l f‘ a ’ V; L a , O . - . - l A L L ' o _ .L . J t r“ " ' n r n \— / - . ' h o r- I“ . <- i I l — . l . ,4— r 7 Ar . i ,V . A I g I“ ‘ . , ; p ' ‘ - . -v- a: .- .... . A \J g . ‘ .‘ ’ - ‘ .l . _ 7 ' ’ ‘- - — ...”... ,. ~ . _" "\ ,x I ‘ ‘ ‘ . O n. c v r‘ . I“ J . a I O . I. ’ ‘ m T / ‘3 A (x M A - O _ . I (I I. H- m 151 On the popular literature front, the widespread tendency initiated by such writers as Hamlin Garland and Joseph Kirkland to depict the farm as a place to escape from began to die out. In- creasingly after 1929 the farm became "something to escape £2 rather than $593,” By the middle of the forties the parade of how-grim-is- life-down-on-the-farm books had been reduced to a few pickets." How- to-do-it books promising security and happiness to the city dweller who would but buy a small farm were a phenomenal success during the middle thirties.53 Those who supported the back-to-the land movement ranged from city planners, who saw it as a way of shortening already extended breadlines, to neo-Thoreauists. Franklin Roosevelt was ”somewhat infected by it,” and “even such hard-boiled characters like Hugh Johnson, Harry Hopkins, and Bernard Baruch viewed variations of the idea with approval."54 Some saw in it simply a way of tackling the unemployment prob- lem. A great number, however, saw much more than this; they saw an opportunity to return to the sound and safe values of rural life. This theme was argued by such groups as the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, the rural-life sections of many Protestant denominations,55 53Clayton S. Ellsworth, "Ceres and the American Man of Letters, since 1929," Agricultural Hist , XXIV (October, 1954): PP- 177, 181. 54Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, 11, 367, 364. 55For a sampling of church views see, Rev. John LaFarge ("The Catholic Point of View") and Mark A. Dawbar (”The Protestant Point of View"), "Religion and Agriculture." Ruralcémerlsa: XVI (SQPtGMber; l938)o The most comprehensive statement of the P051t10“ 0f the Catholic ChUICh 1, to be found in Manifesto on Rural Life, National Catholic Rural Life Conference (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company. 1939). fl F. v _ of. i L. ,J n 7| I». Q L [J J P / mat an: ",/\ (‘f‘ \L 3?“. 1}?) II N). .e OK cry. rL A J D\ [L «a» r} »| )- 7|}; .l .. n s). U r n a n . c or. n. .V b n . . v f n n - - .l _ . o. as I \ IA _[| D J n. ,\ _ , rL n. l l u . Q A y. o w. J C r N r:; o A 2 k) - L J r n L “J A t n w. . .L I» Ir a rl ‘ fl I. , '1‘ e )I x I n . . o i «J _ m n . c»; a A I, O T~ n V — V or. 152 the Ralph Borsodi Homestead Movement, the Southern Regionalism school of Howard Odum at the University of North Carolina, the English Distri- butists school of Hilaire Belloc, and a group called the Southern Agrarians.56 All these groups advocated a retreat from the rootless materialism of the city and a return to the stability, independence, and simple virtues of the country. Probably the most distinguished of the back-to-the-landers, and a group which developed a rather comprehensive rationale for the movement, was the group known as the Southern Agrarians. Formation of the group dates to the publication in 1930 of I'll Take_My Stand 57' ' many of them associated with Vander- written by "Twelve Southerners,' bilt University in Nashville. Several like John Crowe Ranson, Allen Tate, Robert Penn Warren, and Donald Davidson were, and still are, prominent and influential men in American letters. Specifically they sought to defend "a Southern way of life against what may be called the American or prevailing way." But be- cause of the way they defined the two ways of life it was, properly speaking, a defense of "Agrarian versus Industrial" society.58 56Merril D. Peterson, The Jefferson Image in the American Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 364; Lord and Johnstone, pp. l4, 17. 57(New York: Harper & Brothers). Our references are to Harper's Torchbook edition published in 1962. The original "Twelve" were: John Crowe Ransom, Donald Davidson, Frank Lawrence Quisley, John Gould Fletcher, Lyle H. Lenier, Allen Tate, Herman Clarence Nixon, Andrew Nelson Lytle, Robert Penn Warren, John Donald Wade, Henry Blue Kline, Stark Young, and Virginia Rock- 58"A Statement of Principles," Ipig-. Po xix. the "\ 598 N CH”..- MIWJ fl: .HH (.0 Rum h a .1 hl. ‘1. n P r L . c r .. _ i n A A . 1 1 . . iv A r c .H \J A, , a n m n r . A l \ 1 F‘ n . i L ; l . P. ‘2 \J D \ Mn. 3 M. .I a . o o u f, F v t .r‘ .. r. n . n , t L , . u n) rIJ \ or T : . .I a 3. LL .1 o L (L .. J r I; a . 1 (L J . A t e . ll. . fl -. . .W I P r rIJ A J Lu ,. . n J . l , L ..t o g . n 7 1 IL ‘\~ rt . \ F , . a . . l . . c J _ . ’t. \ . . f. x t h _, 3 t 0 T J c O A . r ._ w . . n .. a . I _ T . Ox 1 153 Attracted by the siren-call of industrialism (or progress), man, argued the Southern Agrarians, had become addicted to seeking material gain. So frantic and frenzied had beCome the struggle for the material pos- sessions of modernism that man ignored his own spiritual welfare and moral obligation to society. His aesthetic impulse had been lost and his religion abandoned. The answer to the theory of industrialism was the "theory of agrarianism." Agrarianism postulated that "the culture of the soil is the best and most sensitive of vocations, and therefore it should have the economic preference and enlist the maximum number of workers."5 Moreover, the agrarian economy envisioned by the group was of a special type: "Agrarianism means old-fashioned farming; or the combination of a subsistence farming of the first place with a money farming in the second place."60 This emphasis on subsistence farming (self-sufficient farming) was common to most of the other back-to-the-land supporters as well. The gap between the programs advocated by the back-to-the- land supporters and the programs actually enacted by the federal government was notable. In 1933 a Subsistence Homestead Division was established. The law establishing the program called for the creation of subsistence homestead communities which would aid in "the redistri- bution of the overbalance of population in industrial centers."61 59Ib1do, p0 XXch 6OJohn Crowe Ransom, "Happy Farmer,“ The American Review, I (October , 1933) , 52a. 61Quoted in Lord and Johnstone, p. 38. (“IL :.4\ (‘) (4' (F '7'1 154 M. L. Wilson, the Division's first director, saw in the homestead program the possibility of "laying the basis for a new type of civilization in America."62 But with only the $25 million which Congress initially allotted the Homestead Division, no "new civiliza- tion” was going to be built. By the end of the first year, 25 re- settlement communities had been established. By 1937, 122 projects were either under construction or completed. The law called for the resettlement of the economically desti- tute from the cities. As actually administered, however, the program was aimed primarily at resettling landless farmers. In 1935 the programs of the Homestead Division were joined with the Rural Rehabilitation Division under a new agency, the Resettlement Administration. In 1937 this agency was absorbed by the Farm Security Administration, an agency with considerable financial and technical resources. By this time the entire emphasis was on resettling and rehabilitating the rural poor--former farm owners, tenants, sharecroppers, etc.--not the urban poor. Also, by the end of the decade the idea of subsistence farming had been replaced by the goal of trying to establish the farming oper- ations of the resettled farmers on a commercial basis. Thus in terms of tangible results the various back-to-the-land programs of the federal government did not bring about any significant out-migration from the cities. The back-to-the-land movement, however, did tend to add strength to the more limited goal of re-establishing 62Quoted in Schlesinger, p. 364. la .3 L an th __L f‘ As 6? H14 .wl: . . t t 4L. ... . e>‘A l A4 . t1. 1 n vfl 0.. a F. e _ a ‘ rJ . .r. n r. . r . l r u ( A l c . or n _ . J a l. c 4 4 1 it; I (a A .IIIH u, ’1 . a r l c d.) s A Ix h \ 1 FL ‘\ el, To / c J v } TL 1. . 1 «Id 1 J 3 , r .L x r L “U . J P .1 l . P .\ 3 a I i . _ . . I4 . pd - l. 0 w «J — A l 2. _ r) V n. «FL o v. . l J l n . cl .. O I J A C} L 1 . L L I. C 3 II' RU. hul 3". 155 landless farmers on farms of their own. And for this program financial and Congressional support was not lacking. The back-to-the-land movement of the 1930's is significant in that it again demonstrated the persistent and widespread tendency in American thought to look to the country as a source of strength, stabil- ity, and virtue. But the gap between the programs advocated by the back-to-the-landers and the actions taken is even more significant. As critics of modern urban-industrial society, the Southern Agrarians and allied groups had something worthwhile to say. Because they criti- cized contemporary society by long respected standards they had a size- able audience. But in their proposed solutions--either in the extreme form which called for a wholesale movement back to the land, or in their more limited proposal of self-sufficiency for those already on the land-~they did not have a viable or acceptable program to offer that audience.63 The Southern Agrarians had proclaimed that: If a community, or a section, or a race, or an age, is groaning under industrialism, and well aware that it is an evil dispensation, it must find the way to throw it off. To think that this cannot be done is pusillanimous. And if the whole community, section, race, or age thinks it cannot be done, then it has simply éost its political genius and doomed itself to impotence. 4 But while a great number of Americans could agree with many of the charges against urban-industrial society only the most disillusioned 63The Southern Agrarians later made an effort to become better versed in ”economics and sociology" and their proposals became more Practical; see, 0090, We Jo caSh’ The Mind Qf the South (New York: Vintage Books, 1960; first published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1941), p. 3930 641'}; Take My Stand, p. xxx. [/1 J y C j: o J x " CA J ' a r J LA‘ \ f‘y . O i ,3' "I 7, LL . 3;.- lI pd v‘n . 1n / . ,. \L ‘ E Q.\/ I- ,. Q . J- . 1 t .5 #1 C) t A an e a l. i. ,jf‘ (I l. ,J in A j V; 2‘“ - a "J ([1)‘ 7 .V «J (\L ‘ ", l: ’ n a A H T»! V I V .Lv A I" J; C ' f‘ J 3. C i . n1 e \ l 7L“, )J‘ ,1 l.- _ O .’ {- L anf "a " I» Os; 1ft 1'. 3* .F\ J) o—(‘J p Ah AJ 17 [I .1 7A A J»- l I ran JV L \ )r.L A} Mi J c l e s l. f‘. f“ a f‘fi ,. J A- ..3 0 C. O _,‘ ‘ p l.‘ L _ l: K‘ J: C . x. n ,0 ’51 LA \ I r 7‘. .L V ’\ O- \J h‘" r L (‘1 o I L' I" C) n f‘. 156 could agree that the cities should or COUld be depopulated and the country decommercialized. Ultimately the Southern Agrarians came to recognize this also. As John Crowe Ransom later said of that period, "modern man cannot long play innocent without feeling very foolish." What most could agree with, however, was the proposition that the security of those already on the land should be protected so as to assure an economically and socially viable family-farm Community. Ultimately the back-to-the-land movement, in all its various manifesta- tions, helped to dramatize this need. And it is in this that the chief practical contribution of the movement is to be seen. Summary The economic conditions during the decades between the two World wars helped to give many of the tenents of the family farm creed increased currency. For a time during the height of the Great Depres- sion there were many of those in the city who out did the agrarians in a litany of pure Jeffersonian praise of the farm. But the depression had another more lasting effect. While the chaos of the 1930's caused some to temporarily look toward the country, the ultimate effect of the Great Depression was to finally force the recognition that America of the twentieth century was something quite different than America of the nineteenth century. As one historian notes, "Americans at long 65Newsweek, January 27, 1964, p. 80. m w. ....w -m -...b. .1. - . . A a) P, . v _ .1 . r . . A x V N .. 3 . A ... . P n 3 b, . i - 3 ‘ s I r N. n n . n 1 lJ _ - . L c A . A: t n l l. P O . J L P _ . n A. .... _ V x «is l .1 o J til . u 3 n2 . n . n if“. ‘m’ (x {\ '__F- Ox 157 last began seriously to recognize that urbanization and mechanization had brought a new America into being."66 As the meaning of the "new America" came to be appreciated it was inevitable that more and more people would come to recognize that the general welfare of the nation depended primarily upon the vitality of the city, not the country as the family farm creed has so long proclaimed. Many Americans, particularly those directly in- volved in the agricultural policy making process, continued to hold to the fundamentalistic version of the family farm creed. But, without doubt, the size and receptivity of the audience for this version was being sharply reduced. It is not insignificant that President Roosevelt in his letter appointing the Committee on Farm Tenancy, although iden- tifying the tenancy problem as a grave "challenge to national action"67 did not go on to say, as his cousin, Theodore, had said earlier, that the one great lesson "taught by history is that the permanent greatness of any state must ultimately depend more upon the character of the country population than upon anything else."68 However, F. D. R. did say that policies to preserve the family farm structure would be "generally approved."69 Thus while the currents of change eroded away at the fundamentalistic belief that the family farm was the backbone of the nation, it in no sense brought with it a demand for a reorganization of agriculture. In fact, in reaction to 66Kno1es, The New United States, p. 394. 67Farm Tenancy. p. 25. 68Re rt of the untr Life Commission, p. 43. 69£2£5Lllurureu. p. 26. yes . .—-—. o J x I V e o .' rx l. A . A ~_/ _| I v . r _, \4 .l . . I ,. U I .3. . . 1 ‘ I _/ V 4- ‘ g. 4— ~ 5 ' ' ,. 1 3 .e a O . ‘7 ‘4 . J _ . . l' I , 7 I . ‘r . 1 I A . j (,1 ~1 _ , r I r ‘ ~ . V V L\ 1 .1 I o L o I‘r r ’ .‘e - . .' 7.) J ‘ ALT , _ V. , we - o ‘r- ‘ +‘ .. 1" ‘ I _ ‘ L 1' s) ‘.e. I / . .1 J ’ r r r‘ ‘ ’3 f 1 J _ ¥ ) . . J 7‘ I W I: ’ M J g 3‘. 7 g 1 e C ‘ . J l C 1 e, r t i A J . . ov‘ v“ ..- v .w:.-r.->- ¢-.—. ~-.— . .- .— - ' 'c 0-0- -\.-u ~.--‘-'—-- .-- .-.»._ - p | _l L Q I . . --.-.--- w-- ea“..- -. __,_ ‘ -.- u A‘ F I .4 ' ' C J . r f. . -v.\.-..- . -— ‘\ . . ' ' J - 4 ~’ . 4 I _- c -- " H “7- ‘- .-.." -‘ - ‘0’. ou-—.— 1 r. _ ‘ L . ' C - - 158 the perceived threat to the security of the family farm, the traditional dedication to the over-arching policy goal of promoting and preserving that institution renewed-~a renewal that was approved by most of the urban political community.‘70 Urban America had not become indifferent to the plight of the family farmer, as D. W. Brogan noted: The decline of the agricultural interest is, to the American, horridly unnatural.... Against the relega- tion of agriculture to a comparatively minor place in the national life, not only farmers, but millions of Americans with no direct economic interest involved, will fight bitterly; for the United States, which the farms made, is not ungrateful. John Bull is no more a literal representation of the average Englishman than Marianne is of the average Frenchwoman, but Uncle Sam, the shrewd farmer reading his paper in the country-store, represents a not very distant past and is still to many minds the typical American; for even though there are fewer and fewer of him, he is not a pattern laid up in heaven or in the dead past, but one dominant only yes- terday.71 70For example, on the specific problem of tenancy, 1936 Gallup Poll reported that 83 percent of the people favored government programs that would enable tenants to buy farms. Hadley Cantril, ed., Public Siénion: 1935-1946 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19515, p. 5. 71"The Rise and Decline of the American Agricultural Interest," The Economic History Review, V (April, 1935): 22-23- Italics mine. f. I‘- k) l .1 , F a a—_. \ .. \ ~i ..' » .4 , I 4 I I . .... t , _ ’ 1 r. , . t r p ' r so - ‘o l A; . \J ; 7 .r . a _ . ‘V f' > Q .a i .2 . v . . . r x ‘ i , . , a) e w A .. , . J ‘ . . V e at ~- I ’ ‘ I A a; . _ 4.. c r 1 ‘ y , ‘ y; u 1» . r . ‘ l A J - _ ‘ f I ; . I. L. ,1 . ‘ . ) A - _ .- - I I .L- r / u 7 -. L l # — o .. J h“- . a I 7 7 ' . ‘afi.~ —- .— - .-.v .-.- "' . 4 K ..P ) I -, 1 J ‘ _ r g - _ __ .5 m . ‘ f r J ‘ _ a I A ‘ . e r. o \J A ,,-_- ,...—‘ r“- 'v' - ”7 ' , . ' - o ‘ ' ’3 - l a s , . ‘ . O k. / . ,, - CHAPTER VI AGRICULTURAL POLITICS AND POLICIES, 1900-1945 Oh r - "1 he Demand Equality for Agriculture The New Agrarian Strategy and Program Throughout most of the last three decades of the nineteenth century American farmers had suffered from low prices. Around 1900 farm prices began to rise, climaxed by the historic highs of World War I. Despite the fact that rising costs of production kept farm incomes somewhat below nonfarm incomes during most of this period, American farmers enjoyed one of their highest levels of pr05perity in this so-called Golden Age of American agriculture. In the summer of 1919 farm prices reached their all-time high and then began a dizzying downward spiral. By the spring of 1921 "American agriculture found itself in a more unfavorable position than it had experienced at any time in the memory of men then living, or Possibly at any time since the nation's beginning."2 By the middle of 1921 the nonfarm economy had turned the corner and was headed toward almost a decade of unprecedented prosperity. But for 3911001ture ”0 such immediate recovery was forthcoming. American farmers were to ‘ 1The headline above an editorial in the Bureau Farmer, Janua‘rYD 1930’ Po 4. 2Murray R. Benedict, Farm P'licies f the United States: 1790- 950 (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 19535, p. 172. 159 (I y—a .Ln 2 >/ I n , F‘ 3 I ‘1 I, s. r E J x. L’ ,s (fix) v . .~ suf dec C’) I.) 160 suffer only occasionally relieved economic hardship for the next two decades. Compared to the fervor of agrarian protest during the last thirty years of the nineteenth century it sometimes seems that farmers virtually retired from the political arena during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The fact that four major farm organizations3 came into being during that period belies such a blanket judgment. But there is no questioning the fact that there was something of a lull in agrarian political action during the morning years of the twentieth century. But this was dramatically changed by the postwar crash. As Bernard Baruch noted in 1921, the "whole rural world is in a ferment of unrest, and there is an unparalleled volume and intensity of determined, if not angry, protest; and an ominous swarming of occupational conferences, interest grouPings, political movements, and propaganda."4 SO dramatic was the increase in farmer lobbying activity in Congress that the House Committee on Banking and Currency launched an investigation to catalogue and describe the organizational structure of the new crop of national organizations.5 With the exception of the very considerable unity achieved under the banner of McNary-Haugenism during the last half of the twenties * 3The American Society of Equity, The National Farmers Union, The Nonpartisan League, and the American Farm Bureau Federation. 4“ antic M nth . JU1y, 1921, p. 111. 5James H. Shideler, Farm Crisis: 1919-1923 (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1957), p. 152. th fa (W CE 1r 3 r“. 1" :1. ..i, f‘ 161 there was great disagreement among the numerous and clamorous farm organizations as to specifically what should be done to relieve the farmers' economic distress. But if they could not agree on specifi- cally what should be done about their problems they could agree that, in good part, the difficulties that farmers suffered "arose from the subjUgation of agriculture to the hegemony of the industrial state."6 They also agreed as to what would be the consequences for the nation if the economic ills of farmers weren't cured. Most agreed with the editor of Wallace's Farmer in his belief that cities were the "cancers of civilization" and that the "slower the growth of such cities as Chicago and New York, the longer lived will be the United States."7 Most agreed with Senator Arthur Capper's declaration that “national prosperity is dependent primarily upon agricultural prosperity and that unless [Ehosg7 who live upon the farms prosper the Nation cannot have a continued growth and develop- ment," and his belief that the "American farm is the nursery of a genuine freeborn citizenship which is the strength of the Republic."8 Many be- lieved with George N. Peek that "Red doctrine thrives in industrialism, but fails in a community of land owners."9 And they united under the declaration by the Minnesota Council of Agriculture: "The people of the United States are facing today the greatest issue in American history 10 since the Civil War, the emancipation of agriculture.” ' 68aloutos and Hicks, Agricultural Discontent..., p. 540. 7Wallace's Farmer, July 9, 1926, p. 7. 8The Agricultural 8196: PP- 3: 4° 9Egua]ity for Agriculture (Molina, Illinois, Molina Plow Company, 1922) , pa 8. 10Minnesota Farm Bureau News, August 1, 1926, quoted in Saloutos and Hicks, p. 395. Cor C\ so. a Th «3 c h a» s» . a. . A r . . a n 3 «I y» .1. _ i v \ , _ . .1 p n I 1 IV , 19 56 iii 162 How was the emancipation to be achieved? The industrial, financial and commercial interests with their controlled markets and controlled government had been scored by the revolting farmers during the last part of the nineteenth century as the root cause of the farmers' distress and the nation's malady. In an effort to secure a solution to their's and the nation's problems they created a new politi- cal party through which they could directly challenge the enemy. Through the Populist Party they sought to wrest government from the hands of the industrial "conspiracy" and to return it to the "people." A fairly sizeable contingent of the revolting farmers of the 1920's, represented by the more liberal elements of such organizations as the Farmers' Union, the American Society of Equity and the Nonparti- san League, urged the revival of the third-party strategy. scoring some successes in State and congressional elections in 1922 under various farmer and farmer-labor banners, many looked forward with con- siderable hope to the Robert LaFollette campaign for the Presidency on the Progressive ticket in 1924. Although LaFollette collected the largest third-party vote in history he failed to amass the large farmer Injorities that he had expected and which were absolutely necessary for any kind of success.11 Another segment of the revolting farmers was spearheaded by the newly born and relatively conservative American Farm Bureau Federation. From its inception the Farm Bureau rejected the extremes of agrarian radicalism. Emphasizing nonpartisan pressure group activity and Working -—____ llIbig., pp. 342-371. l 3 j 1‘. f y C I ' 7, h l _ . v ‘ ' * v ' ,1, 1 L »- ,‘\r ' Va -1 } . , J r\ a . . ‘l . 7 ' n , 1 7 k. - < , , A 7 r\ 3 C v . P i ' 7 1» c. - a r . k I" ,L‘ - r . f‘ F 1 . . ‘1 7 b x F ‘ A ~ J »—r ILL‘ ‘ - T ‘ n I O , 1 - . . . [... F‘ x. ; s. I n r: J ’N l O .7 A _ n , V P; 1. ..-4 - f‘ _. 1 L L )- , . x , $ in . -r‘ .J A 1 .. , a. 0 1 n - r' is, .1» ‘ . A ~‘ J n l 4 " .r“ j., #K‘. _ ,_, , ~ A a 1 .\ [ _ 1 h r r’ _ A _, J i Q‘ 1 ’ - Al 14 ‘ ..P'J‘ I J ‘ J A- e . . I r r A. r,- ‘ { ,_/ ‘vwo ‘ ‘ I P: 3»- 1. A. — 4 " a. 1. , r )_ ‘ ' ‘ ’ v, 4L1 s A n. r J, o . _ - - - ' : “(‘1 4 —- A r r l 1 Am» ~J , i . a L. ‘ fio ) '\ ,\ O A y . J A O ,t ,— r f" r ’ f. . h ', J h . . b D n t . (K \ 6 \i P I f\ ’ J . V . l, ‘ F‘ ._ x l "\ ' o ,— , f . f‘ F\ .1 ‘ v - . 1 f" O ; _; , J- U I V‘ "s n \. a f" V, ,. an: 169 Nonpartisan League actively and successfully sought, at least in North Dakota, farmer-legislation, but this was limited to the state level. Despite this fact, important pieces of federal legislation were 18 But enacted. The final revisions to Homestead Laws were completed. more significant, reflecting the changed conditions of the twentieth century, were a series of laws aimed at promoting the economic and social welfare of the farmer. Most of the ideas for this new legislation came not from farmers and their organizational leaders, but from certain social and political leaders, not directly involved in agriculture, but deeply concerned with maintaining a viable and stable community of family farmers. The country-life movement, which had been catapulted into national attention by Theodore Roosevelt's appointment of the Country Life Commission in 1908, was a seminal source of ideas and helped to generate general sup- port for translating those ideas into policies. Legislation intended to place the farmer on a more equal social and economic footing included the establishment of parcel post in 1912, the Rural Post Roads Act in 1916, the beginnings of what eventually came to be a vast federally-backed farm credit system in the Federal Farm Loan Act and the United States Warehouse Act of 1916, and the first at- tempt to regulate institutions handling agricultural products in the Cotton Futurers Act of 1914. 18The Kincaid Act of 1904, the Forest Homestead Act of 1906, the EnlargaiHomestead Act of 1909, and the Three-year Homestead Act of 1919. W85 0\ If A l _ . . L ...L \ \ f s} y r. O . r'; '- .J . i FL. exte all; flu; a e n 1 3 sq A, a ,e x L. .\ Ix ) . _ r L L tr... Sta‘ k n o' , J Id r r , A n .+ VI A . l n Ix IF r L A Q a n _ l .x ,l n _ i - _ . L .7 r I! J T , I; A A L n A It . I; J n m «I _ c A. a n . l ’ l ., n r J r . A a. p n n _ r A l. u I, . A . “J. fill ‘e .IL do orA JP 170 Probably the most significant piece of legislation of the period was the Smith-Lever Act of 1941 which created the system of agricultural extension education. This Act must rank along with the Morrill Act as one of this country's most important and far-reaching pieces of social legislation. The Extension Service, which it created, soon became "far and away the largest single adult education enterprise in the United States."19 Although it was intended to promote the welfare of farmers, there was little support for it at the time among practicing farmers who ridiculed the notion that a college educated 'expert' could tell them anything about farming. Nor was it vigorously supported by the farm organizations.2O Somewhat in the same vein was the Smith-Hughes Vocational Act of l9lJ;which supplied federal aid to schools providing vocational agricultural education. This program had much stronger support from farmers than the Smith-Lever Act,for farmers had long felt that the high schools had tended to educate their youth away from the farm. These two acts were logical applications of that long and important tradition in American agricultural policy, the promotion of progressive farming. This interest in progressive farming was heightened during the early years of the twentieth century as it was seen as an 1m- portant means to strengthening the economic and social status of the 19Russe11 Lord, The Agrarian Revival (New York: George Grady Press, 1939), p. 7. 2OBenedict, p. 153, and Saloutos and Hicks, pp. 127-29. Q Q l h P l \_. fami educ Cul {EEG eta of 'fi r+ __,_ l—\ (1." r-‘ ...- 171 family farm community. Interest in scientific research and farmer education was also increased by fears on the part of many policy makers that with the physical expansion of agriculture brought to a standstill, population might soon begin to outstrip farm production.21 These two concerns are reflected not only in the enactment of the extension and vocational education programs but also in the rapid expansion of the U. S. Department of Agriculture. Personnel strength of the Department increased from 2,444 in 1897 to 13,858 in 1912 and 20,742 by 1926. The Department's budget was 30 times larger in 1920 than in 1890.22 During this period the efforts to strengthen progressive agri- culture took on a new dimension. The Department of Agriculture, aug- mented by the beginnings of the professional discipline of agricultural economics in the Land-Grant Colleges, began to do work in the economics of agriculture.23 This approach aimed at assisting the farmer in management of his enterprise and in the marketing of his products. Under the leadership of D. F. Houston, Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of Agriculture, the farm management and marketing divisions were created in the Department, and the whole economics-of-agriculture approach was greatly accelerated under the secretaryship of Henry C. Wallace during the early 1920's. In 1922 the Department's various efforts in this 21Shideler, p. 4, and Saloutos and Hicks, pp. 27-28. 22Wayne D. Rasmussen and Gladys L. Baker, "The Department is Built,” After a Hundred Years, The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1962 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 9-12. 23Shideler, 7, 125-130, and James C. Malin, "Mobility and History; Reflections on the Agricultural Policies of the United States in Relation to a Mechanized World,“ ggicultural History, XVII (October, 1943), esp. pp. 180-184. r‘ J LVN f'\ f‘ x _ A A O x If‘ . f‘ -l C r l (N v L A 4 "W A \4 .. . O ‘f\ l 'r a > . A I it ,, l A ‘V n ' I i l L . — C )h 0 _ Q Q 4.) ~. an) Q-sol‘ area m Econom s'u‘era stat 10 in a9: equals 611 fa not a g) the Cent. 172 area were centralized under a new agency, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Through the Purnell Act of 1925, Congress allocated con- siderable funds for economic research in state agricultural experiment stations. The Twenties The post-World War I break in farm prices was of the sharpest in agricultural history. The all-commodity price index (1909-1910 equals 100) fell from 211 in 1920 to 124 in 1921. Cash receipts from all farm products drOpped from $14.6 billion in 1919 to $8.1 billion in 1921.24 Adding salt to the raw wounds of the farmers' distress, was the fact that the prices on the items that the farmer bought re- mained high and stable. The purchasing power of the farmers' dollar, thus, fell from an index value of 105 in 1919 to 69 in 1921 (1909-1914 equals 100).25 With prices low and costs remaining high,net income to farm operators plummeted from $9.8 billion in 1919 to $3.8 billion in 1921.26 With sharply lower net incomes,many farmers found they could not meet payments on debts incurred in their wartime expansion efforts. Between 1919 and 1923 farm bankruptcy rate increased by almost 700 per- cent.27 With farm leaders widely split over specifically what was needed to restore agricultural prosperity, demands for action were many and __._..__ 24Historicaljtatistics of the United States: 1789-1945, p. 99. 25The Condition of Agriculture in the United States.... p. 45. 26Historical statistics, p. 99. 27The Agricultural Problem in the United States. p. 63. (I \J dive ible fern to : ac; aim and 173 diverse. However at least four lines of emphasis were discern- ible. Mesmerized by the visions of such men as Aaron Sapiro, many farmers and farm leaders saw in cooperative organization the solution to most of their woes. The more optimistic thought that farmers could vauire sufficient monopolistic market power to control prices. Others aimed at the more limited goal of bringing about more orderly marketing and reducing marketing costs. Although primarily a do-it-yourself type of program, certain government legislation was needed to strengthen the movement. Several laws were passed by Congress ranging from the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 (the Magna Carta of the cooperative move- ment) to the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929. The years between 1920 and 1929 represent the heyday of cooperative development in the United States. Another line of attack was to procure more adequate, federally— backed credit for farmers and several important pieces of legislation were enacted between 1920 and 1923. The third line of attack was that of securing greater regulation over industries handling and processing agricultural goods. The Packers' and Stockyards Act and the Futures Trading Act of 1921 were the major legislative results of these demands. The number of farmer-orientated laws enacted during the first four years of the 1920's testify to the effectiveness of farmer political action--particularly that of the Farm Bureau, clearly the most effective . \_ \ x; L w 1 . r o , r ‘ ~ ) . x} { 1 V .J . b l i ,\ a ‘ J 4 V \ ‘ .' V l ' 3 o 5‘ »\ L A ' e) T , fl L e . ) 1 U _ 1 '1 J i N . t e L - L 1 F . J 1 4‘ k _ h 1 J 1 I’ . l r f' .( ‘- I L p1 1 A _ ,0. _ i 1 - l I e ,. 1 ‘ 1 ‘, , i L ‘ J l J L D . J l . ... . 1‘ - L- I f‘ ' '3 1 - ‘ J l -' _, \J J A o W Y I A . . I J v ' A V I l ) 3, l J J i J A r J __ I j l ‘ i 4 f‘ F \‘ — _, ‘X 9 p | ) 1 ‘ e j - O / \. farce whit? this the The what was de: ....J (’9' 1 C3 (I) - - -_ 1‘2 5+. (f) ‘. .. '9- H -‘ (‘9‘ ’1‘} 174 farmer pressure group of the period, and the Farm Bloc28 in Congress, which the Bureau helped to create and through which it worked. But this legislative program also testifies to the lack of imagination on the part of farmers and their representatives both in and out of Congress. The relief demands put forward by the regular farm leaders represented an uncoordinated collection of "insufficient reform programs" most of which had been floating around for 15 or 20 years.29 By 1923, although prices had recovered somewhat, agriculture was still in bad shape, but farm leaders, with most of their original demands already enacted, seemed to be at a loss as to what further measures should be taken. This ideological vacuum was soon filled by the develOpment of a plan to guarantee "fair exchange" (parity) prices for agricultural commodities.30 28The Farm Bloc was a semi-formal, bipartisan group of farm-State Senators and Representatives. It was organized in the early summer spring of 1921 when it became apparent that the Harding Administration was not going to come up with a program satisfactory to the major farm organiza- tions and Midwestern and Southern Congressmen. When the "regular" Repub- licans tried to adjourn Congress on July 5, 1921 the Farm Bloc was able to block the move and hold Congress in session long enough to pass the Packers and Stockyards Act, the Futures Traders Act, and two amendments to the Farm Loan Act. The first organizational meeting of the Farm Bloc was held in the office of Gray Silver, the Farm Bureau's lobbyist, and the Bureau worked closely with the Bloc throughout its existence. By the end of 1923, most of the legislation demanded by the Bloc had been enacted and the Bloc, as a formal organization, had pretty well dis- appeared. A loose and informal non-partisan coalition of farm-State Congressmen continued to function throughout the 1920's and 1930's. For more detailed accounts of the Farm Bloc see Senator Arthur Capper's, The Agricultural Blo ; Wesley McCune, The Farm Bloc (Garden City, New York?— Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1943); Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 19541 Eéggim; Shideler, assim, and Saloutos and Hicks, pp. 321-41. 29$hideler, pp. 154, 2870 30The term parity does not become widely used until the 1930's, but “fair exchange" and "parity" involve essentially the same concept. O \ ) v A \ c u .4 F - \4) ‘\ k r. r I. 1 L J ,A » A— 5/ fi , _- . . o u > ) ( ref {I v 7‘ J J -J— A -1 r . -, l L A L o 1 K a j r c . ‘ IJ ’ ' ' A J C l l J ’ - » V4 p q \ J - 7 ‘1 ‘ \J L O A ; ._/ ' 1 a I ' l J 1 ‘ J / — .. L I I n A l . ’ ‘ O I _. i \ ' 1 I A o , , . .4 J . . J L ‘9 \ _ J J J. I i . ‘ ‘ r t o J ' r ‘ - \ .L i 3 J 7 J P P 7 1 ) 7 ‘ ' ~ J J . , ,3 , i n. ‘ > . I (L r (a - 7 ‘ w > A - o 71:) . \ I‘ |'\' k f ‘ v y L ‘ l D D . i n A} n J— } » NV . . - . [r r ,. , ‘ r ) \‘ .V f) I ‘ L V ‘ l .3 g I 1 ,1 L\ - ’ . - . ’ \ I . 3 I 1; 5 v F _ , l ’ Q 7 I r » . ' W I‘ i L i i .L ‘ . HF ‘ 1. ‘ g ’ - - . . ‘ . 7 , . ‘ t I , l ‘7) 5 1 l L 1 1 ’ ‘ C . - r . ‘ I l 7 7’ ’ I 1 » 3 7 , J J I - 1 ,\ J J i g f J 3 \F) _ k ‘ 'J j :3" , ‘ “ ' ‘ -:> i e 5 L l 3 ' . g H C v U ‘1‘“ - O _ p f . J _g_ — L ‘ .‘ A t . J. N 7 'r \ ° — ) ' I. ‘ 4 A - i I) 7‘ L‘ I ‘ -1 / 1| .1 J. J- , ‘ . . ‘ r h . F I 7 j r 7 l "‘ 1. l. e , e : J - J ;_ Q . C ' .1 ‘ L r 1.- _q o t . Q 1 6—1. h. l 175 Increasingly since 1920 farmers had become impressed by the disparity between the prices of the goods they sold and the prices of the goods they had to buy. As Department of Agriculture economists began to publish price index and purchasing power figures, interest in price ratio was heightened.31 If a more equal ratio could be achieved then surely the farmers' economic distress would be greatly lessened. But how could this be achieved? It had been hoped that farmer cooper- atives would be able to cut marketing costs and possibly to raise prices, thus narrowing the gap. Tighter controls over servicing industries had been seen as a way to reduce the level of prices paid out. Such activi- ties were helping but not nearly as much as had initially been hoped for. Something else was needed. In 1922 George N. Peek, president of Moline Plow Company, came up with a solution that he thought would secure true Equality for Agri- culture.32 For the next two decades Peek was to devote most of his energies to the farm problem. His interest in agriculture stemmed not simply from the fact that "you can't sell plows to busted farmers." Peek was "an agrarian at heart,"33 who believed that the "essence of our political genius flows from a land-owning agricultural community."34 Poek's solution was to have the government intervene in the market to assure a "fair exchange" between the prices the farmer re- ceived and the prices he had to pay out. The "fair exchange value is the 3lshideler, pp. 197-201. 32This was the title of Peek's publication in which he, in collaboration with Hugh 8. Johnson, outlined his scheme for securing "fair exchange" prices for farmers. 33Fite, George N. Peek..., p. 43. 34Peek, Equality..., p. 80 worth 0 Therefs the ger time wr is excl price time. of par ccnsi: were 1 narxe cover major domes by tt set' mam F,” V" Ie~ 176 worth of a thing in terms of those things for which it is exchanged. Therefore, some ratio between the price of wheat, for instance, and the general price index, gives a price for wheat at any particular time which eXpresses its worth in terms of those things for which it is exchanged."35 That is, by tieing the price of wheat to some general price index a bushel of wheat would have the same purchasing power over time. Because Peek was also an economic nationalist,he tied the idea of parity pricing to the tariff, to "make the tariff effective." As considerable quantities of the major American agricultural products were exported their prices were significantly influenced by the world market. But world market prices during the 1920's were not adequate to cover the American farmers' cost of production. Peek argued that the major reason for these high costs of production was the fact that the domestic producers of the goods the farmer had to buy were protected by the tariff wall. Thus tariffs on agricultural products should be set to reflect the difference in domestic and foreign costs of produc- tion, and then the government, operating behind the tariff wall, could intervene in the market to raise domestic farm prices above the world market levels. This would be accomplished by the creation of a government corporation which would buy up large quantities of agricultural commodi- ties. The commodities so purchased by the government--which would represent the surplus beyond effective domestic demand--would then be 351bido, p. 160 ‘ La 3 .o I o l ’ E 'N o A . n . a I a , , a ‘ L J. . r I t ‘4 s ' A .‘ . ) J \J A T x c I ‘ . u a, ‘ . w j 1 , A . . u I I l 1 \_4 7 4 , «.1 p is , . - ‘ F . a y" . . "x i - t) e - ‘1 , - i J - . - . r \/ the to £5) 177 sold on the world market for whatever price could be obtained. The difference between the price that the government had to pay for the commodities and the price that it received for them on the world market would be made up by an "equalization fee“ assessed against the producers themselves. Since the eXport surplus was only part of the total pro- duction of most commodities, the equalization fee would be small rela- tive to the price gains. Partly because of the simplicity of the idea, partly because of the eloquence and dedication of the plan‘s creator, and partly because no one else had a better scheme, most of the farm organizations began to back the plan by 1924 and 1925. The scheme was first introduced in Congress in 1924 via the McNary-Haugen bill, and throughout the rest of the decade a majority of the farm organizations rallied around the flag of McNary-Haugenism. Majority support in Congress had been mustered by 1927. But once through Congress McNary-Haugenism ran afoul of the steadfast opposition of President Coolidge. Coolidge vetoed McNary-Haugen bills in 1927 and in 1928. But the idea of government intervention to main- tain price levels had been deeply burned into the farmer's mind and would not easily be forgotten. Public policies are a response to a perceived problem. Belief as to the causes of the program and beliefs as to how these causes can and should be treated determine the shape of the resultant policies. How was the agricultural problem of the 1920's diagnosed? The earliest attempts to explain the crash in farm prices stressed that it was a temporary problem that would be solved by the natural workings of the r , J C . “u " ”I i a 1 .._\ . . 7 N i i A . ‘ I a . 7 1 i , i , .— ’\ — \.. . ‘ r _ A ‘ V . . . . .A- , - o .. , 1 —~ r / 3 v ‘7 4 ' | . . _ r A , _ V x.) J ‘ " ' ’3 L ‘1 u 1 . Yr ' r- ’ ’ > J «J \) rfi (I (J \ I . . \ I n ‘ ‘ r . ) l o . - r x, . N I , L , * fi ‘ ‘ ‘i 5 g 4 v ‘. w i i I _ J ' ‘\ L ‘ \/ ,. _. H’ A ' I .— L V, J ' ’- _._ I s , . J - r 7 ° W . 7 , , 7 r‘r ‘ dd. ‘ '3 ' ‘9 - .+ - fix) -' - . r. I tJ.,,L — I r , J " I u , )- l J’ .‘3 0-1 0-0. 1' m m o- -4. 178 economic cycle.36 Particularly when business began to recover in 1921 it was eXpected that agricultural recovery would soon follow. Most professional economists voiced this "temporary" view throughout most of the decade.37 The Republican Administrations also continued to predict that agriculture's return to "normalcy" was just around the corner. 38 There was a price recovery from the lows of 1921. But at no time was there a genuine recovery of farm prosperity.39 The underlying 36The first major analysis of the crash of farm prices developed this view. The study was the product of joint endeavor by the Senate and House Agricultural committees: U. 8. Congress, House, The Agricultural Crisis and its Causes, Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural In uir , Report No. 408, 67th Cong., lst Sess., October 15, 1921. 37For example, see the January, 1925 issue (Vol. CXVII) of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, which was devoted entirely to the farm problem. The overall tone of the pro- fessional articles is highly Optimistic. Greatly playing up the price revival of 1924, they generally concluded that full prosperity for agri- culture was almost at hand. It is interesting to compare this issue with the March, 1929 (Vol. CXLII) issue of Annals, which also was devoted to the farm-problem, with many of the same contributors that appeared in the 1925 issue. By 1929 the earlier Optimism was largely gone. John D. Black in his book, Agricultural Reform in the United States described the attitudes of the economists this way: "The thought that comes to one most forcibly after reviewing these efforts at farm relief is the be- latedness of some of them. The Association of Land Grant Colleges should have set a committee at work in 1921 in place of 1927. The same is true for the United States Chamber of Commerce. The fact is that these people eXpected agriculture fully to recover in a few years. They did not ap- preciate the enormity of the catastrOphe or the permanence of some of the changes." p. 74. 38The all-commodity price index for farm products dropped from 215 in 1919 to 124 in 1921. A recovery to 156 had been made by 1925. However, it dropped to 146 in 1926 and to 142 in 1927. In 1929 it stood at 149. (Base: l9lO-l9l4 = 100.) Historical Statistics, p. 99. 39For example, the number of bankruptcy cases filed by farmers increased by large percentages in every consecutive year from 1920 to 1925, after which they dropped slightly. Even so there were about four times as many cases in 1929 as in 1921. Also, the value of farms per acre decreased in every consecutive year from 1920 through 1929, thus counter- acting, to a large extent, the sporadic increases in farm income. 1222-. pp. 111, 95. . r rlJ ‘J . F i. 1) nu , .r|‘ J 3. Tr}. - ..4 _|.L .IJ r. .3 a (I; i (J . pIJ I ‘1 .I, / ,e ,‘ . , .fi x r); or .1 1 .l} 1.1 r J F.~ .. . _ . o .i . L r CC" ”\ ste fix .1, f . )r — . q . I. r) . . .1, ,1 r . A .r{ r . . . . o. . J , . 1 t . J J x r . . I” C . 0 .rl a) i [I r c . v .1 0. \il . . .I. file ll ‘1 .1) or& \I , '1 Tire \ . L nu .. .L) A. ..J. r.. . . L ..lL . i \ r. A J P. '\ ‘. r u (I. l 1H P. . .I) I/ II ..l‘ . FL I _ O i o _ P . h T1 u \ 1 Vi TL 1 1 . . Ii r «:4 vi .J. . j . FL n. n L. \. 1T1 4.. I or. n _ y p . A x «i. .r Ir . ,IV L Or I; y A. .\ i 4 ) , .11 nri v I n , w, . 1 J . , I. ..IIIL . \L l i ll .s l 2 u. x .J n[ a .1. l I. , 0V1. HI]. . I _ .. . , V .I. ...u T .rL . x . .1.» ‘u If. 4 rt. 0 a. _\J g ‘ .i 14 — i. u e .vl +H. I W, 3. i . «9 OK 179 problem was that farmers were producing too much. Between 1914 and 1919, farmers had greatly expanded their output to meet wartime demand. With that demand drastically reduced they were caught with a surplus of commodities that could be sold only at prices too low to adequately cover costs of production. Agricultural production was relatively stable throughout the 1920's at a level about 15 percent above that of 1919-1921.40 Total production was not substantially reduced because 6 million producers operating independently could not, on their own, make the production decisions that would have resulted in a substantial cut back. These facts (the fact of the overproduction and the fact of the farmers' inability to cut back the production) were not widely appreciated. The Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, for example, declared flatly that the break in farm prices was not a result of overproduction?1 The National Industrial Conference Board study of 1927 recognized over- production as a factor but ranked it well down on their list of im- portant causes.42 By the latter part of the decade the surplus problem had become a prominent "theme of agricultural discussion,"43 but as late as 1932, a special committee of the Land-Grant College Association dis- counted increased agricultural production as a cause of the farmers' 4OBenedict, p. 277. 41The Agricultural Crisis and its Causes, pp. 84-88. 42The Condition of Agriculture..., pp. 137-138. 438ernhard Ostrolenk, The Surplus Farmer (New York and London; Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1932), p. xiii. Compare, for example, the contributions by W. J. Spillman--one of the top economists of the period--in the 1925 Annals and the 1929 Annals (see footnote 37 above). In 1925 he stated that, with the exception of wheat, the major commodities I II‘ are 19|\ r\\ [t - 1 - r. a» .3 .3 .3 ,9. .. aw. W vi. nu m L1. W. _ i. l ‘ — A r L — I , . .. ., . . . .1 L . \ u . I _ I , _ p. I pp . - . .w v o _ _ . r l n l . ~ \ l I r )0 ' U 4 / . J . r. V .J 1 . p . u u _ r 0 v A 1 . L I _ L A ..l . .. c . x .4 J Wu . . . _ r . ..J 3 ,V 1 D. or! ‘u x _ .11 w a, J J . .e i \.n W3 PU NIH. 14 bra Q...‘ 11‘. 4 J . L .\ . .. 4 , _ / o , ... . _ _ _ . _ .. J g — _ IL , > _. A . x. \. been N 1. Vlfd OK \. _. 180 price problems.44 There were, of course, those who did recognize that farmers were producing too much for their own good. A committee of the National Agricultural Conference expressed the view that the farmer "prices that will was producing more than he could expect to sell for maintain a reasonable standard of living."45 Secretary of Agriculture, Henry C. Wallace, in 1922, criticized those who "contend that there is no such thing as overproduction."46 But even where a surplus problem was identified it was not fully appreciated. Wallace, for example, reflecting the views of the economic and demographic experts of his own staff,47 judged the overproduction to be strictly temporary and argued that in the near future the "problem will be to increase food production."48 Several of the farm organization leaders agreed that there was a temporary surplus problem. The scattered efforts to organize producer were in "balance." In 1929, however, he states: "It is now possible to state the problem more clearly than at that time...we are producing a surplus of each of the five major crops--cotton, corn, wheat, oats, and hay." p. 210. 44Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, Report on the Agricultural Situation, by the Special Committee, submitted at the 46th annual convention, Washington, November 14-16, 1932, p. 6. 45U. S. Congress, House, Report of the National Agricultural Con- ference, Document No. 195, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., March, 1922, pp. 137-38. 46"Report of the Secretary," Yearbook of Agriculture 1922, U. s. Department of Agriculture (Washington: U. 8. Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 40 47Shideler, p. 293. 48HA National Agricultural Program," Annals, CXVII (January, 1925), p. 127. 181 co-ops for the purpose of limiting production, and McNary-Haugenism which started with at least an implicit assumption of surplus production are testimony to this. But their proposed solutions reflect the general lack of understanding as to how to cope with it. The cooperative en- thusiasts had to learn through disappointing trial and error that pro- duction could not be controlled through voluntary action. The McNary- Haugenites were more realistic in the sense that they recognized the need for government intervention if a stable price level were to be achieved. But their scheme was faulted in that they saw the world market as a bottomless pit in which to dump the domestic surplus thus making domestic production control unnecessary. In all, as one historian notes, farmer demands of the 1920's reflected the hazy analysis by the "experts" of the causes of the farm problem. "Absence of data upon which to base policies and the lack of preliminary thinking on the causes of the farm problem" did not prevent farmers from demanding relief; however, because of the inadequacy of the diagnosis these demands were, on the whole, impetuous and short-sighted panaceas directed more at symptoms than at causes.4 One observer in criticizing the Harding and Coolidge Administra- tions charged that they hadn't the "faintest conception" of what had happened, that the "earthquake in the basic structure of commodity prices 50 was to them unknown." But as the foregoing suggests, Harding and —____ 49$hideler, p. 294. 50A. B. Genung, The Agricultural Depression Following World War I and its Political Consequences: An Account of the Deflation Episode, 1921-1934 (Ithaca, New York: Northeast Farm Foundation. 19541. p- 11. analys ChdFC! the C! have aFPrO belie that high] same State 182 Coolidge were not alone in their misunderstanding. Given the state of technical knowledge about the farm problem their opposition to more direct government intervention was not, as some critics have since argued, the result of blind obstinance bred of uncompromising ad- herence to economic orthodoxy. In 1921 President Harding had stressed that "in the last analysis, legislation can do little more than give the farmer the 51 "Cooperative action" was also chance to organize and help himself." the Coolidge Administration's "chief answer to whatever problem may have arisen in the recent affairs of agriculture."52 Likewise, President Hoover saw in farmer-cooperative organization the only sound approach to the farm problem. Cooperative action fit well with their belief in "self help" rather than direct government aid. Not unaware that the economic power of business derived in large part from its highly organized structure it was natural for them to expect that the same thing could be done in agriculture, particularly in view of the state of the technical knowledge then existing as to the causes and possible remedies of the farm problem. This emphasis on cooperative legislation culminated in the Hoover-backed Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929. The Federal Farm Board, created by the Act, had two major functions. First, it was to make federal loans intended to foster a vast complex of farmer-owned 51Report of the National Agricultural Conference (Washington: U. 5. Government Printing Office, 1922). Po 7- 52New Republic, December 23, 1925, p. 125. I ..L 183 cooperative marketing associations. Second, if subsidized, through federal loans, a series of stabilization corporations, whose function was to stabilize farm prices through storage and withholding operations. Thus, ironically, the government became involved in efforts, however feeble, at fixing prices and there launched "a federally subsidized farm which up to that time had been unparalleled in relief annals."5 With the dramatic decline in farm prices beginning in 1929, the Board was primarily concerned with the stabilization function, but its efforts were ineffectual. The glut on the market was too great to be successfully handled by storage,and withholding measures and the pleas by the Board to farmers to voluntarily reduce their production naturally went unheeded. The New Deal Shortly after "Black Monday," which ushered in the Great Depression, farm prices began another downward Spiral which was to prove even greater than the break in prices following World War I. The all- commodity price index fell from 149 in 1929 to 68 in 1932. Prices paid out by farmers also dropped but not nearly as rapidly or as deeply,thus the ratio between prices paid and prices received by farmers slid from 89 to 55 (1910-1914 equals 100). Net income to agriculture dropped from the already depressed level of $6.7 billion in 1929 to $2.2 billion in 1932.54 Farmers found this new down turn intolerable. In January 1933, Edward A. O'Neal, the president of the Farm Bureau, warned the Senate ____ —____.._ 53Sa10utos and Hicks, p. 404. 54Historical Statistics, p. 99. v. A I , ’1 ~ 1 I U _ a J \ . . . . . . . x ‘ _ _ . . . . I r 3 . ‘ - - e . r . . , ’ J . . , t . l , , V t J» o ‘ ' s, I J . , 4 \ _ n . \ ' 4 i ‘ i ’ ‘ .. -. s O i , i , 7, e L J» i . . 7 O I ' ‘ - — , ' .L g . . .. l . ' ‘ r . . ‘- , A \ - _ A- . g , .A )— ~ "N .1 , ‘ , , 4 . l x . | I x . \ . _» 184 Agricultural Conndttee: "Unless something is done for the American farmer we will have a revolution in the countryside within less than twelve months."55 "Good Lord: This is a Revolution. New action was imperative, and with the inauguration of the New Deal such action was forthcoming. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was the first major agricultural legislation. As many of the other New Deal programs, it broke new ground. And although it had a legal life of only three years, it gave official birth to a set of ideas and principles which have been, for better or for worse, a dominating influence in American agricultural policy ever since. The word "adjustment" in the title of the Act is indicative of the views of its authors as to the nature of the farm problem and its remedies. By 1933 the existence of a surplus in farm production could no longer be ignored. Although the necessity of surplus control was now given official sanction none of the framers of the Act saw the surplus problem as a permanent one. They believed that after a short period of "adjustment," agricultural production would be brought into line with demand. This is also evident in the language of the Act it- self, which in Section 13 empowered the President, after consulting with ~— 55Quoted in Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, II: P- 27- 56This remark is attributed to a Russian visitor upon seeing hundreds of U. S. D. A. employees busily producing and mailing out thousands of checks to American farmers in the fall of 1933 as a part of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration's cash-benefit program. Fite, George N. Peek..., p. 254. I) . . t. . . , t - O a ) o J v a , . . F F _‘u . 1‘ l V 4 i r . n I t . \ J . . . I m- 4 J 7 .L A / L O \J/ C \ - V. I .‘ E 0 e O I O .. L . e . u r J D - - . O A A t J v )- . 185 the Secretary of Agriculture, to terminate the price support and pro- duction control provisions once it had been determined "that the national economic emergency in relation to agriculture has been ended." The Triple-A was intended as a gigantic step toward achieving equality for agriculture. It was to achieve this by "re—establishing prices to farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of articles in the base period...August 1909~July 1914." The Act did not call for an immediate restoration of prices to a level of full (100 percent) parity, but this was the ultimate goal. The attainment of higher parity levels was to be achieved primarily through adjustments in production. As production was brought more in line with effective demand, open-market prices would rise. Several techniques could be used to adjust production. In 1933 the controversial and short-lived, plow-up campaign for cotton and tobacco and the pig-sow slaughter program were used. "Marketing agreements" between producers, processors and distributors were also to be encouraged. The primary emphasis, however, was on the voluntary acreage reduction program. The government was empowered to enter into a contract with individual farmers to reduce their acreage of the surplus commodities. In return for reducing their acreage farmers were to receive cash benefits or 57Acreage reduction was made mandatory in the case of cotton and tobacco through the Cotton Control Act and the Tobacco Control Act of 1934. x_,. iv \J A? T ‘1 1‘ "\ r-- i”. fie J. 186 rental payments.58 The payments were financed by an excise tax levied on the first processor of commodities destined for domestic consumption, the amount of the tax to be the difference between the open market price and the parity price. With the anticipated rise in open market prices the tax would be reduced and eventually eliminated. The technical ideas for the Triple-A came from outside the circle of regular farm leaders, primarily from a small group of bright young economists who were to play a major creative and administrative 59 role in the agricultural programs of the 1930's. This was, in a sense, 59These benefit payments were to be made to those c00perating farmers who were engaged in the production of the so-called "basic" com- modities. Initially this list included wheat, cotton, corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, milk and its products. These were commodities of sufficient importance that increased prices would have significant effects through- out the agricultural economy. Also they were the ones most in surplus and therefore logical candidates for control. In 1934 the "basic" list was eXpanded to include cattle, sugar beets, sugar cane, peanuts, rye, flax, barley, and grain sorghums. 59In regard to the origin of technical ideas which were incor- porated into the AAA and as to the politics surrounding its enactment, we have relied on the following works: Saloutos and Hicks, pp. 452-57; Bene- dict, 276-401: Schlesinger, pp. 27-84; Edwin G. Nourse, Joseph S. Davis and John D. Black, Three Years of the Agricultural Adjustment Administra- tigg (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1937), eSp. pp. 1-ll4; Dean Albertson, Roosevelt's Farmer (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 65-104; Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley 8 Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953), pp. 66-83; George N. Peek, Why Quit Our Own (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1936), pp. 55-91; Gilbert C. Fite, "The United States De- Partment of Agriculture as an Instrument of Public Policy: The McNary- Haugen Episode and the Triple-A," Journal of Farm Economics, XLII (December, 1960), 1084-1093; Bushrod w. Allin, "The u. s. Department of Agriculture as an Instrument of Public Policy," ibid., 1094-1103; Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek..., passim; Chester C. Davis, "The Development of Agricultural Policy Since the End of the World War," Farmers in a Chang- ing World, The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 312-26; Christiana McFadyen Campbell, The Farm §&5233_gflg_thg_flgw_gggl (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962); 6:'fi, Kile The Farm Bureau Through Three Decades (Baltimore: The Waverly Press, 19485: PP. 197-246, and Clifford V. Gregory, "The American Farm Bureau Fed— eration and the AAA," The Annals of the American Academ of Political and Social Science, CLXXIX (May, 1953) 152-SB. Most of these sources also deal with the 1936 and 1938 price legislation. ' .~ ’- \ ‘ .‘ . J - c c . ,r ., . ._ . ..l {a '- ‘ . 1 r 3 l .4 . .- t. .4 JDII .J - z .10 4.1. -14; ~A—J I .. 1' .. l J - . . . . . _ il- AJ .-. . all ”a I _ 11 -J OI _ l A .33 ~ — o L.. i I . :—. I '. ' .. s... .. . J .. J ‘ _ l ' " a j: ' .‘J ... .I '3 J. —..I[ I.- .. A- ]. - _ ...; I‘JJ ... ' ' z. r i ‘ ’1 I; J. [i .3 1.: I 1.1. ‘31- -- 1| 1. , JL ... ~ r — ,. f ) . o’l l ‘ I 3 l - c l t J l . d- 2" 1 r )1 - . ‘ - i1. ‘4' .. , (.2. .. Q .1 . a. z _ - .L J. _ A- - ~ I ‘ l 0 - c 'J J .J -3 | - D 3? L.- 2 ’ "t -c l I - -. 3*» ‘ t 1 A -' g D g I e - ‘ l ,1 _‘ : L . a 4 .. ‘ ’ 11- "] ‘ i - 0’31? .. 4 l V‘ -n .1 ‘ :-. I ' 2:3 ~_;- I ~ 1 3 : .' ‘ ' ‘ a“ J 3. . . - 1. ' \r‘ . r ‘ I r n , . . J , E . . NJ .. . a 4 ' . ,.. . . or, A- g Q- _ 1" ., 1 _ .. -~ a 0-3 I - t .J r ‘ . ' ~ I 1 I ‘ H . ~ 5 I .A- 1 4 4 ~ (I C ' ‘_ :‘ Z , l - ' t 3 l ‘ - ’L . _ - s 1' - ‘ , ..2. . . : - . {l ' 1.; - e 0 _.‘J ,_ «q ‘ .L 1 .Il . ‘ . 1.1 t C - ‘ " _ ‘ - - -. _ -.-- .. .. .... .- . --. _ -' “ ~ ‘ - - 3 e , . .‘ H in l 3 ' l :- 1 x ' ' _ r . - ’ 1 I r _ t I 3. I e ’ , —-£" ' .... ._ '_ g :- C I L“ c Q - I A r n . ' a‘ “' ‘ Q ‘ “ I ‘ 131.. I '3.) 3 ..-J .... /‘_-____U., .- 1 ' ' - A ' ‘ J I 1' 'L . Q ...; o 1. .4 '1 ' c _ .. ... . ' . , . .1 J .l e 1 , ‘_ _[ 'L _ . !‘ . 2'" I 2‘ - " " Ar. \ ... . - . J 1 DE 1 J -1 11" .L .‘ '1 ‘1. 1:. ..JA- - ' " J; I I I - - . a ‘ I 3' .3: _ , s . . --[ ll ._ ‘ L ~ H I ‘ . 1 ‘ .. ‘- n n . Q [_ . .LI':' :1 I;_ _ ‘\ _ .‘J I . ' . , , _r ' I ' ' Lt’i.-. :OI'. 2'- . J1. 'l.3l" 3 -1 J.'v1* a, r ‘ ,J, J: L {11 . ." . “3', Q... . i . t 1. - ..nqz‘uf. - n; 3“", ‘ _. ....-..-- a r . n _ 4.»- -... Q; .1 . _ l J‘J J; Dig I' J, ‘ ‘, . IUS’YKl‘JV , , -‘ - ' ' - ‘ " ' r “ -— - o ' . , . - 4‘ V _' ‘ .— . J r I ‘ Q“ - v1114 . \ -J- Ll; .II- I J'_."—--.’“ ” ' '1} ‘ .j,:’,[5f'..’&l misi adT [Lax 3‘5 gr:vser. (~z .-. w . * ’ J) .5 “$691 .330).le a:\:iiil it: Elsi-view iii”; 1 lei) ‘~_-_ L’W ‘ a ("an .rnfl en: b“; no val-1 XIXJUO 0‘19 1 I. laminae“ mm 889: bns ace: 9 1 1 . 187 the Golden Age for agricultural economists insofar as their influence on agricultural policy is concerned. During most of the 1920's this youthful discipline had generated little more than some price index figures, some outlook charts, and some farm management studies. Their contribution to policy formation 60 In the 1930's it was different. They not only had was negligible. ideas but also the ear of an Administration which, because of its dominant influence in agricultural policy, could translate those ideas into action.61 The techniques for supporting prices can be traced to Peek's "fair exchange" scheme but their more immediate origin was in the "domestic allotment plan." The domestic allotment plan was first formulated in general terms by W. J. Spillman in 1927, and developed in greater detail by John D. Black in 1928 and 1929. Black stated the plan's objective as follows: 60Chester C. Davis says of the agricultural economists during the 1920's: "Agricultural colleges and economists were as a whole in- different to the problem. During the early years their leadership was negative and their attitude scoffing." Farmers in a Changing World, P. 34. Also see Fite, Journal of Farm Economics, XLII, 1085-1091, and Shideler, passim. 61Wallace had Roosevelt's strong backing and under his driving leadership the Department of Agriculture was the major creative force in agricultural policy at least through 1937. As Fite states: "Once the new administration was in power, Wallace did not sit around wait- ing to be called by Congressional committees merely to give advice on measures drawn by legislators or the national farm organizations.... Backed by the President, and drawing support from masses of farmers, the Department had at last become a major determiner and administrator of broad public policy." Journal of Farm Economics, XLII, 1092-1093. 'J . 7 o a . l ‘ o . r , r 7‘ J - xi“ 0 . . ’ 7 J ) I . \ . O . . . s ,, J . _ l \ ‘ ’ . V j .. J _. . .. .. .3 , A . \ . ~ 1 ‘ _ ' I ,, . . 1 . . _ 1 I 188 The essential principle of the domestic allotment plan is paying producers a free-trade price plus the tariff duty for the part of their crop which is consumed in the United States and this price without the tariff duty for the part of it that is exported, this to be arranged by a system of allot- ments to individual producers of rights to sell the domestic part of the crop in the domestic market.02 The next major revision to the plan came from M. L. Wilson. Black had developed the scheme whereby every farmer would be alloted a Specified acreage representing his share of the domestic market. The farmer would receive price benefits on the yield from this allotment, production from acreage in excess of the allotment would sell at world market prices. Wilson modified this by suggesting that farmers should be given cash benefits as an inducement to take acres in excess of their allotment out of production, or shifting them to non-surplus crops. The final details of the Triple-A were worked out in a series of meetings called by F. D. R.'s agricultural advisors early in 1933. The major farm organization leaders were involved in these meetings, 63 but apparently their contribution was fairly negligible. This situation prompted George N. Peek to say that this "was not a farmers' measure."64 The major contribution of the farm organizations came in their efforts to marshal Congressional support for the measure. 62Agricu1tural Reform..., p. 271. For a full description of the plan see pp. 271-301. 63The comparatively negligible role of the farm organizations in the drafting of the first AAA is attested to by all the works cited in the footnote above on the "origins of the AAA." The main exception is the Gregory account which gives the farm organizations, particularly the Farm Bureau, a more important role. 94Why_Quit Our Own, p. 71. 189 The Triple-A was in many ways a striking success as an emergency measure. The cash benefit payments put deSperately needed money into the hands of hard-pressed farmers. The control programs did much to hold production in line with effective demand, helping to generate a partial recovery in farm prices. On January 6, 1936, however, this historic Act met the same fate suffered by Some other New Deal programs-- death at the hands of the Supreme Court. The Court's decision cut the heart out of the Triple-A by declaring the processing taxes and the acreage-reduction contracts unconstitutional. Within a scant seven weeks a replacement-~the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act--was signed into law. Building on the grow- ing interest in soil conservation, generated by the wideSpread fallout from the Dust Bowl, farmers were to be paid for switching from "soil depleting" crops to "soil conserving" crops. As the "soil depleting" crops were the cash crops which were most in surplus this was not simply a conservation program but a production control program as well. The conservation payments, to be financed by the Treasury, would provide farmers with a source of direct aid. Almost immediately work was begun on a new bill. The result was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Farm-state Congressmen and the farm organizations were much more active in shaping the AAA of 1938. The New Republic noted the change in Administration tactics: "Executive officials...in the past...have come to Congress with the bills outlined to the last detail, and have asked for prompt passage without substantial alternatives, as a necessary part of an emergency program. This was called executive usurpation or even dictatorship. L) f. 190 So this time the Department of Agriculture has put the problem up to Congress, merely offering to enlighten the committees with information or suggestions. In general, however, Mr. Wallace's views are known. He wants to create an 'ever-normal granary' [an enlarged Commodity Credit Corporatiofi7 a la Joseph of the Old Testament."65 Of the farm organiza- tions, the Farm Bureau played the major role in mustering support for the bill.66 Almost all the programs of the 1936 Act were retained. This included, with minor changes, the acreage allotment program which dated to the AAA of 1933. An important new provision was the establishment of marketing quotas which could be used in conjunction with the acreage allotments. The major change of emphasis in the new Act was the en- largement of the functions of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). In its inception in 1933 the CCC was intended as a mechanism for stabil- izing seasonal fluctuation in prices. Under the 1938 Act it became the primary mechanism for raising and maintaining farm prices above free market levels. Although the goal of both the 1933 and 1936 laws had been that of restoring farm prices to a higher parity ratio the government had not been committed to guaranteeing the farmer a Specific parity price. The AAA of 1938, however, committed the government to supporting prices of "basic“ commodities on a flexible basis ranging from a minimum of 52 percent to a maximum of 75 percent of parity. Prices were to be ‘— 95"The Program for Agriculture," December, 1937, p. 89. 66McConnell, p. 78. I" I‘ 191 supported at these specified levels through a system of nonrecourse loans to farmers by the CCC. Through the nonrecourse loans, farmers who had planted within their acreage allotment coudd, in effect, sell their commodities to the government at any time the Open market price was lower than the Specified parity price. The appeal of parity pricing and the ability of the farm organizations and farm-State Congressmen to capitalize on it is clearly reflected in the AAA of 1938 and in the later amendments to it. In 1941 the flexible provision was changed to a rigid support level pegged at 85 percent of parity for all "basic" commodities. The Steagall Amendment, also in 1941, extended the 85 percent support level to a long list of non-basic commodities. And in 1942 the mandatory support level was raised to 90 percent of parity for both the "basic" and the "Steagall" commodities. Ergdit and Rehabilitation When Roosevelt came to powen agriculture was on the verge of wholesale bankruptcy. The total outstanding farm-mortgage debt was actually less in 1933 than at any time since 192167 but the precipitous decline in prices that had occurred since 1929 made it impossible for thousands of farmers to meet their mortgage payments. Foreclosure sales skyrocketed. In the Midwest, farmers were organizing to physically __ 67Historical Statistics, p. 111. J O r. y x I I y. 1 ,— (\ ~—,. 1‘ 1 . 7‘ 'v," 192 block these eviction sales.b Price supports were not enough. There was a desperate need for credit. The credit and rehabilitation programs enacted during the New Deal probably did a great deal to preserve the family farm structure of agriculture. The Farm Credit Act of 1933 consolidated all rural credit agencies69 under the Farm Credit Administration. The FCA through its various operations undertook a massive refinancing of farm mortgages and the extension of new credit under highly favorable terms. By 1940 a full 40 percent of the farm indebtedness was fed- erally backed. This timely injection of credit saved thousands of family farmers. The FCA was not equipped nor intended to handle the more dis- astrous cases which the Depression produced in multitude. Highly Specialized credit was needed for the dispossessed farmer and the small tenant. Moreover, these individuals needed help in getting re- located. After once being resettled they needed advice and assistance in adopting those farming practices which would put their operations on a sound economic basis. In other words, specialized rehabilitation programs were needed. In responding to these needs the New Deal made some of its greatest innovations. The rehabilitation program was launched on a small scale by the creation of the Subsistence Homestead Division in 1933. Originally 68Farmers were most successful in breaking up eviction sales in areas of Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, and South Dakota where the Farmers' Holiday movement was the strongest. Saloutos and Hicks, pp. 435-51. 69The Federal Land Banks, the Intermediate Credit Banks, Federal Production Credit Corporation, and the Federal Bank for Cooperatives. \g I rl 193 intended to resettle some of the labor surplus of the cities its major contribution was in the resettlement of the rural dispossessed. A Rural Rehabilitation Division was also created in 1933. In 1935 both Divisions were absorbed by the considerably larger Resettlement Adminis- tration. In 1937 the Secretary of Agriculture set up the Farm Security Administration, which in addition to absorbing the Resettlement Admin- istration was given the responsibility of administering the Bankhead- Jones Farm Tenancy Act. In addition to its loan and grant program the FSA, in line with the practices of the earlier rehabilitation programs, carried on an important educational program. The clients were given technical assistance concerning farming practices, aiding in setting up coopera- tives, and even provided with medical care in some instances. These rural rehabilitation programs were largely Administration- inspired programs. And with the exception of the tenant-purchase pro- gram as provided by the Bankhead-Jones Act, support for these programs came from humanitarian and reform groups outside regular farm organiza- tion circles. Of the major organizations only the Farmers Union actively supported the FSA. Indeed, by the early 1940's several of the farm organizations, led by the Farm Bureau, were mounting a major assault on the FSA. Both the Resettlement Administration and the Farm Security Ad- ministration had been created by Executive action. Thus part of the attack simply reflected an effort by Congress to re-assert its authority. Part of it was due to the growing conservativism fed by returning pros- perity. Another major factor was that the Farm Bureau came to see ; Ir‘ . I . . . . 1 t ; ... p , . a n ‘J . 0 J r . fix 1 » o . . . . . 4 1 U U . o L k . 1 . , / D 1. . . .1, 3 . . .v u I t 1 x. , I e . . . , . e . C _ . 1 . 1 a J r w. '1 r 0 g 3 u I ., 1 t .0. L , O . O 3 1 . A $ . . t 1 ll» . 2 , . . V l . i) l , p . or‘. . . t .. .3 1;) A . . A .. . o . .. . . , . . . . 0. .IL 6 V 0’. 0 ll“ 3 . . J ‘1 I .u‘ n , e L, . \ .1 I l .1 A 1A . . , . r» t. . l O 1 J , I u 1 4' . . . . . . e . , . . . .. I. o / \ a o v \ r , - 1 a c \‘4 1‘ l. I . . . . I l J k ,.1 q . . n y . _ ,, ., , . J . ._ . (J u . . . . t H , ll . l , . 1 , J l . 7|. , » s I l. , I. r1. 3 , .3 r . 1 . . . .» . . t z , 1 r _ . I, a). e ., 194 the FSA as a serious threat to its influence over the Department of Agriculture. Ironically, however, the FSA came in for its most searing criticism because some of its activities raised "a flicker of doubt as to the future of the family farm."70 The overwhelming efforts of the FSA, of course, were aimed precisely at promoting and preserving the family farm. And in terms of final results, the FSA did much to strengthen the family farm structure at the lower end of the economic scale. But so dedicated was the FSA and its predecessors to preserving the "native values of rural life"71 that some of its administrators and backers were willing to experiment with various forms of tenure and organization. Some felt that the fee-simple ownership of land by the small operator in a highly mechanized world was possibly more of a liability than an asset. As a consequence a few projects were estab- lished which departed from the traditional fee-simple, family farm unit. One such type of project was the cooperative corporation farm. Another experiment was the leasing of government owned land to families on a 99-year basis. These experiments were 'intended as a means of com- bining the advantages of highly mechanized agriculture with those of 72 the small holdings" and to "obviate the difficulties of capital accumu- 73 lation incidental to fee-simple ownership." But to skeptical 7OGriswold, Farminggand Democragy, p. 166. 71McConnell, p. 112. 72BenediCt , p0 3630 73Griswold, p. 169. II on 195 congressmen and hostile farm organization leaders this looked like Red collectivism. After numerous investigations Congress decreed in 1946 that these experiments be abandoned and the full resources of the FSA be concentrated on increasing "the trend of ownership of family- sized farms."74 The FSA was then reorganized as a new agency, minus its cooperative corporations and 99-year lease projects, and renamed the Farmers Home Administration.75 Prelude to the Postwar Period Whatever the ultimate significance of the credit and re- habilitation programs it was in parity price supports that most farmers and their Spokesmen came to see the salvation of agriculture, and it was toward this end that their greatest organized political efforts were directed. As one historian of the period noted, after reviewing the position of the farm organizations on the credit and rehabilitation programs: "The most significant fact, however, was that the important agricultural organizations did not seem greatly concerned 7 with any problem other than that of prices." 6 74Ibid., p. 173 75For the life and death of the rural rehabilitation programs, particularly as administered by the FSA, see: Griswold, pp. 160-78; McConnell, pp. 84-126; Albertson, pp. 333-57; Benedict, pp. 324-27, 357-64; Joseph Eaton, Explaining Tomorrow's Agriculture (New York: Harper 3 Brothers, 19435} Paul v. Maris, "this land is mine" From Tenancy to Familygfarm Ownership, Agriculture Monograph No. 8, U. S. Department of Agriculture (Washington: U. 8. Government Printing Office, 1950), and Russell Lord and Paul H. Johnstone, A Place on Earth, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture (Washington: U. 8. Government Printing Office, 1942). 76McConnell, pp. 84-85. 196 Parity prices meant equality and equality was synonymous with justice. Parity prices, guaranteed by the government, were the great equalizer between organized business and industry and unorganized, atomized family farm agriculture. Give the farmers a "just" price in the market place and through their own initiative, hard work and per- serverance they would Survive and prOSper. The passion for parity prices originated in the earthquake that violently disturbed price relationships in the early twenties. It was kindled by the visionary zeal of George N. Peek, and became a unifying force among the farm interests in the latter twenties via McNary- Haugenism. During the thirties Ed O'Neal, president of the powerful American Farm Bureau Federation, became "a leading apostle of parity."77 When he described the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as "The Dawn of a New Day in Agriculture"78 he Spoke for most of the agricultural political community. There are several reasons why farmers and their Spokesmen had come to put so much emphasis on prices. First of all, the commercial farmer had always associated his well being, at any given time, not simply with the quantity of goods he produced, but with the prices he received for those goods. But the farmer wasn't simply interested in higher prices per se, but a more 'equitable' ratio between the prices he received and the prices he paid out. 77Campbell, p. 1880 78The title of a radio Speech delivered shortly after the AAA was signed into law, Kile, p. 202. OK 197 Certainly the idea of parity prices had a compelling logic and a tremendous political appeal. What Could be more fair and more just than to achieve and maintain an equality between the prices the farmer received and the prices he paid. This apparently eminent fairness of parity pricing was, thus, a great political asset. Here was something that everybody could be for and few could be against. Another political asset of parity pricing was its simplicity and directness. The achievement of higher parity prices was highly adaptable to organized political efforts. Concentration on this specific issue could yield direct and immediate results that could be realized through more diverse and complicated programs only over a long period of time. In this respect a Conversation that Ed O‘Neal told of having with Samuel Gompers is revealing: 'Sam. you have had great success in organizing labor to work for its own interests. I am starting out to help farmers as you have helped labor. Haven’t you some good advice to give me?' 'I surely have,’ said Sam. 'The American Feder- ation of Labor is interested in much more than wages for its members. But it does not stress these other things. We pick out one thing, simple, that everybody can under- stand, wages, and fight hard to raise them. You must do the same.’ 'I suppose then,‘ O'Neal asked, 'that you would say that higher prices for the farmer is what the Farm79 Bureau should fight for.‘ 'I surely would,‘ said Sam. All these factors combined to make parity prices the almost all-consuming passion in agricultural political circles. In 1943 I 0 O 8 John D. Black wrote a book titled Parity, Parity, Parity. O In describ- ing how he chose the title Black said that his inspiration came from a poem by Alfred Tennyson: V. 79Quoted in John D. Black "Agriculture in the Nation's Economy,“ The American Economic Review, XLVI (March, 1956), 42. 80(Cambridge: The Harvard University Press, 1942). . J .L o _ 1 '\ ‘ . I C I 1 C I‘ 1‘ ‘ O s u n L. l o ‘ _ L r‘. O O L f .. l o l 9 1 v “1 'L A. l (J . r J-J j » 1 , x i .r./ .L l _ C ' J» ‘.l . h 0‘ .3)- F ,, .1 - , J . I V l L I I ,1. . , o 3) 1. / e, C \- n . b J 3 IN - D ., 198 The poem is about an old Northumberland farmer on his deathbed whose mind is still in the grip of the hard struggle he had waged over the years to get together and protect a little 'property,’ To his dazed mind, the fading-out cantering hoof beats of his favorite horse seem to say over and over again: 'Proputty, proputty, proputty--that's what 1' ears 'em saay.’ If today almost any leader of a farm organization, or a con- gressional Spokesman for the same, were to be seized with apoplexy in the midst of his grandest peroration, the beat to which his heartblood would be throbbing through his flooded brain would have some such measure 1 as: 'Parity,gparity,rparity-~that‘s what the farmers need.‘ The elevation of parity as the supreme symbol of equality for agriculture guaranteed that when policy makers once again turned their attention toward agricultural policy in 1947 and 1948 they would not be anxious to dismantle the price supporting structure that had been erected in the 1930's. Therefore, it will be useful to review the main outline of that structure and to briefly identify the major factors that caused the structure to take the shape that it did. As we noted above, the mechanics of the original AAA were determined primarily by a small group of economists, Henry A. Wallace, and other members of the Roosevelt "brain trust." This group accepted, in principle, the notion of the desirability of restoring a better re- lationship between prices paid by farmers and prices received by them. The Triple-A of 1933 sought to achieve higher but unspecified parity prices by "adjusting" production to bring it more in line with effective demand thus pushing open market prices of farm commodities Upward. Production was to be reduced primarily through the inducement of cash payments, calculated on a parity formula, to farmers who agreed to reduce their acreage. The relative success of this earlier effort h‘ 81121§°: PP- 2—3. Italics mine. \J 199 assured the program‘s popularity. After the 1936 Supreme Court decision, it was quite natural for the policy makers to turn toward the Commodity Credit Corporation as the primary price supporting instrument. Also by this time the overwhelming popularity of parity price supports among farmers, farm organization leaders and farm-state congressmen helped to assure that the AAA of 1938 would commit the government to supporting prices as at pre-specified levels. By giving to the CCC the responsibility of directly supporting prices, at specified levels a subtle but highly important shift in emphasis had occurred. Formerly the aim had been to bring about those adjustments in production which would result in raising open market prices to higher, but unSpecified levels. Now the objective of the production adjustment program was, in effect, to raise open market prices to those specified parity levels at which the CCC was to offer its nonrecourse loans. Several complicating factors are involved here. The first is the fact that price supports are much more popular, among those directly affected, than production controls. Political support, therefore, is more easily rallied around the former than the latter. In effect what had happened was that the position of the carrot and the stick had been reversed. The effects of this reversal are obvious. Although this situation inevitably would generate Complications these would not be insurmountable if the adjustment program(5) really was successful, over the long-run, in controlling production at a level that would yield open market prices reasonably close to the specified SUpport level. If the control program was unsuccessful then CompliCa- tions in the form of large and expensive CCC stocks would arise. It is, ~- _-—-———— 0 r‘ ' o l v )7 s . ‘./ . , A J v . . . v I O ‘ v. , l ' ‘ H J 9 ._ l . . . . ‘\ . ‘— r ') l J I 4 . , v L t ‘ ‘ H J- x l , r . . D D V i . . . \ . 0 . t ‘ C O . . . . O . ‘ V 4 I. . . , ’ I . . . _ \J’ . ‘4 T 7 s . ‘ 4 I- v I , i A ‘ I ‘ o n _ _ I i (W I O ,. J. V . . — ‘ \ A ‘ I _ J A V \ ‘ - r ‘ A ‘ l ‘ J L o L . A A ‘ O \ . A J . V n . . 'L J - A. . , ~ _ ' A . A r t '1 _ ‘L ‘ ‘ - . y ‘ ‘L A ' I . R V . . ,. * 5 . A» . — . ' U » J- . ’ ’ . ’ \ ‘ F . r, ,J . . r - 4- ‘ )— l . ‘ , I ~ A . ‘. I r J ) 2 ‘ l 4- , . r o . . . c o . t . x x. . o C a . , w a \ ... 3 2P - . ..- c. E t . e V 7 t u ‘ J- O . 200 of course, precisely this general failure of the production Control programs that have generated many of the problems facing farmers and agricultural policy makers in the post-World War II period. The introduction of the acreage reduction program in 1933 is testimony that a sufficient number of policy making participants had finally come to recognize that farmers were producing too much for their own good. But few saw this as a permanent problem.82 Policy planners looked forward with considerable confidence to the restoration of foreign and domestic demand, and quite unaware of the ultimate sig- nificance of the production-increasing technologies which were just beginning to trickle into agriculture, they had good reason to believe that acreage reductions would act to restore a better relationship be- tween supply and demand. The acreage control program, aided by widespread drought con- ditions did act to bring about and maintain a more equitable relationship 82in their review of the first Agricultural Adjustment Admin- istration, Nourse, Davis, and Black have this to say: "Many of those who drafted this bill, who were also chiefly responsible later for giving the Adjustment Act the character which it eventually assumed, conceived production control legislation as marking a permanent change in the federal government's assertion of powers and assumption of acti- vities with reference to agriculture. This view likewise was accepted by many members of both House and Senate. But it seemed tactically wise to emphasize the acuteness of the emergency as a means of overcoming existing opposition to production control and to have the emergency character of the act borne out by drafting it in temporary terms." Ibree Years of the AAA, p..19. This is probably true. But the need for permanent control was not based on the assumption that an un- restricted agriculture would, year in and year out, produce a surplus. Rather it was based on the assumption that periodically a surplus problem would arise thus making it desirable to have permanent legislation on the books to deal with the problem whenever it arose. A close reading of the review itself, with the possible exception of some of Black's views, certainly suggests this. oil. ,\ 0 .V . r, .A l . 0 l . l r . i o a , .._ s x, . o is . , l V4 {It ,. J J . o . . . . . . o v t . . J a ,- . .‘ ‘._ , ‘4 u 7 all. ._ P» ._ ). .FL . c . . r I .. W, « 0" p ,o _ ., .. I .- \ err ( . 1 \4 , O . , _ . D» 201 83 between sUpply and demand during the life of the first Triple-A. Thus even though the controls were generally viewed as being effective in controlling production only over a short-term period84 the con- comittant view that the maladjustment was only temporary gave broad support for their being written into the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Aside from the question of the effectiveness of this type of mechanism in dealing with surplus Conditions that are large and chronic rather than small and temporary is the matter of the reaction of the individual farmer to those Controls. The basic problem is that farmers do not like to be bothered by governmental red tape. Furthermore, they are particularly sensitive about any interference with their freedom of decision making as to the operation of their farm enterprise. But the traditional Control programs have involved both red tape and interference in some abundance. The farmer has been caught on the horns of the di- lemma. He wants parity prices, but he doesn't want controls applied to him as an individual. Therefore, he will generally demand the former but be inclined to evade the latter if at all possible. Nourse et al., in their review of the first Triple-A, summarize this problem as follows: While the farmer accepts a rather crude adjustment formulae in the first year, he immediately begins to accumulate irrita- tions over particular terms which hamper his action or operate to his disadvantage as compared With neighboring producers or with other regions. Many farmers also develop considerable finesse at so operating under a control program as to reap maximum advantages with minimum Compliance. Experience may 83Benedict, p. 313, and Nourse et al., pp. 115-50. 84Ib1do , p0 1500 «d 1 r g r n 7 r «1.4, J t J _ .J 1 u . u .11. x O o L . I . . . . v V . l t , . , _ . _ . . . , 4 p . . 4 p o , Ox . _ _ . . r- C 0 . _ .J t . r . n 4 .. u , 1 s A I! _. C. . N, I. n p. r e . . VJ A); v . \J a . ' J J t n. . . , a W... . r Ox . c. \ t v V A , . r J J r u . 51 v n v . \IJ . _ 7 . . a . H ac . O . . ll. . 1, . 1 M . a , J . . r , L . , . o . , ,J C , .. O I r1; 202 permit refinement of the procedures so as to Correct major inequities and to reduce the opportunities for evasion, but this may simply change the Character or location of the friction rather than removing it. Moreover, modifica- tions of the formulae or the introduction of added safe- guards tend to increase the number and complexity of forms to be filled out, data to be supplied and records to be kept. 'Red tape' is anathema to all farmers and, to the large proportion of them whose schooling has been exgremely limited, it erects a great barrier to participation. 5 But the precedent had been set. The apparent initial Success of the control program plus the view that Controls would be needed only during temporary emergencies anyway added strength to that precedent. Thus the post-World War II period inherited from the 1930's a (l) commitment to parity price supports, (2) the use of the Commodity Credit Corporation to achieve those prices, and (3) a production Control program based primarily on acreage restrictions. 851b1a., pp. 148-49. r4 l‘ CHAPTER VII THE TRADITION CONTINUED "The protection of the family system of agriculture has guided all my activ- ity in the development of general agri- cultural policy." Harold D. Cooley1 The Immediate Postwar Years In 1947, three years before becoming president of Yale University, A. Whitney Griswold wrote a little book "about an idea"--the idea "that farming as a family enterprise is the 'backbone of democracy'."2 The bulk of the book was directed toward explicating this idea, which he called the "Jeffersonian ideal," as it had existed in England, France and the United States, and describing how it had influenced agricultural policy making, particularly in this Country. It is obvious, however, that his primary purpose was not simply to outline the history of the Jeffersonian ideal. Griswold was writing at a time when American policy makers were beginning to address themselves to the writing of new agricultural legis- lation. He believed that the decisions made during this period would likely have a critical effect on the whole course of postwar policy. He believed that a major change in the direction and content of that 1Letter to author, July 20, 1964. Mr. Cooley has chaired the Powerful House Committee on Agriculture since 1954. 2Farming and Democracy, p. vii: The book was first published by Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948. It was reissued by Yale University Press in 1952, with a second printing in 1963. References are to the 1963 edition. 203 204. policy was needed,and he hoped to contribute to the general re- evaluation which would be a necessary prelude to such a change. His contribution was to be a clearing of the air, so to speak, about the notions surrounding the family farm. He saw the Jeffersonian ideal not simply as a major influence in American public policy, but as a bad influence. Thus his ultimate goal was not simply to describe the Jeffersonian ideal but to debunk its validity. Griswold did not engage in a philosophical analysis of the Jeffersonian ideal. His comparative analysis of England and France and his references to the fact that his country was still a democracy even though the family farmer class was then only a small minority suggests that he did not think such an analysis was necessary. What- ever the original relevance of Jefferson's arguments the march of his- tory had rendered the ideal into a myth. And "if democracy is to sur- vive we must believe in it, not as myth but as reality."3 Griswold argued that in the past, farmers and their political spokesmen had used the JefferSOnian ideal to strengthen their demands for "protection against the impact of the industrial revolution on agriculture, preferring to make the best of their own §£é£2§.9!9 rather than to participate in any other way in the economic progress of the nation as a whole."4 He feared that they would Continue to appeal to the backbone-of-democracy proposition in an effort to maintain a status quo in agriculture and that if they were successful in shaping agricultural .— 3Ibido, p. 4. 41bid., p. a. 205 policy toward that end,grave consequences for the American nation and for democracy as a whole would surely follow: At the moment we are dedicated to a goal that promises equal opportunity to everybody-~full production and employ- ment in a free society-~the highest possible efficiency in utilizing our economic resources within a political framework that preserves the highest possible degree of individual in- itiative, self-discipline, and self-improvement. We have declared these latter factors to be commensurate with economic efficiency. If farmers are to realize the full measure of either, it is more than likely that many will have to give up farming for employment in other industries. In the final analysis, much more is at stake in our attainment of that goal than the welfare of our farmers or of any other par- ticular group-~as much, conceivably, as the peace of the world and the future of democracy as a political system.5 One of the reasons for Griswold's deep concern can be traced to the fact that he considerably misread the contemporary status and meaning of what he called the JefferSOnian ideal, which is the rough equivalent of what we have called the family farm creed. First, al- though it is certainly the case that American agrarians had sought pro- tection from those forces of industrialism which placed the family farmer at a distinct relative disadvantage, the efforts to block industrial growth died with the Populists. Moreover, with only a few exceptions, proponents of the family farm had never Sought to block the advance of economic efficiency in agriculture. In fact, most agrarians had long believed that one of the necessary means for protecting the family farm from its competitors was to assure its continued efficiency. The American family farm creed has never justified a static, peasant agriculture. Second, Griswold was attacking essentially the pure Jeffersonian, fundamentalistic, version of the family farm creed. Moreover, he believed 5331;” p. viii. Italics mine. ‘C I Alt 0 MIN“ rll\ Illv. 5, , r . . l r .\ o a O .l . . is . A w, . . L a. . .l l 0,. ,u J l , ., r, 1. a . . G c .1 r . 5 _ i . u . . . ., I . .4 , .1 . p i . . ... ., ... I o \ e . ‘4. . r , . i t , 1 O A , , . r 4 A n l; i A It i i . II\ is ., , IK I D D u _ p r z u c v Q~ . . a ., , r . is . V x. l, C ‘ . , . J . it c , i . p I x i h . , ,x _ J r I .i, , rid . O . . , ., A. . ... z . , ii. » . 1‘ \ ..JL . . dc T ru J r\ Irkmi , i i . . .l. w» i . \l,, A, o . v 7.1 V4 ,. I r . ex ) r O ‘ I \ .i Q . F 4. it . . _ 0 0s .1 . _w J , v .N r o r o x . . _ . — O 0 . u . . . _ x p _ _ O 206 that the proposition that the preservation of American democracy was directly dependent upon the survival of the family farm was growing in currency rather than diminishing: "For the past ten years, this proposition has been receiving steadily increasing attention in the formulation and conduct of our national agricultural policy." As we noted in previous chapters the actual trend was in the other direction. To be sure professions such as the following, by Representative Stephen Pace (Dem., Georgia), indicate that at the time Griswold was writing there were still participants in the agricultural policy making process who held to this fundamentalistic version: A lot of reasons have been given for the rise and fall of Rome, but my own study Convinces me that Rome fell because everybody went to town, and I am afraid the same thing is going to happen here.7 But in comparing 1947 with 1927 or 1907 one finds fewer such professions even among dedicated defenders of the family farm,and certainly the num- ber of persons outside the immediate agricultural community willing to accept this view had been sharply reduced. Griswold apparently was de- ceived, in part, by the trend toward more explicit identification of the family farm policy goal which we discussed in Chapter V. Despite these and other weaknesses8 the Griswold analysis quite properly pointed to the influence of the family farm creed in American agricultural policy. We have posited that because of the existence of -*_ this creed, in its various versions, the promotion and preservation of 61bido, p. 80 7U. 8., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Hearings, Long-Range Agricultural_Policy, Part 3, 80th Cong., lst Sess., 1947, Po 422. 8See Appendix A of this studY- ; A , ) . i x, V . r O t l, . r ./ , . C . Dc . o A . a . .) . 1k Q..\ i z ... n W. . . r L i. , .x ,. 0.; ’\ ~_-. 207 the family farm has been the over-arching goal of American agricultural policy. This was true in 1947; we believe that it is basically true in 1965. We turn now to a discussion of the status of the family farm creed and policy goal which it sustains during the post-world War II period. Griswold had said that the family farm probablY could be saved, but as he asked, "The question is, do we want to?"9 The vast majority of the participants of the agricultural policy making process would have answered with an emphatic yes: We do not know how many participants read the Griswold analysis, but we do know that a great many read another study about farming which was published at about the same time as Griswold's book. In 1946 the Senate Small Business Committee released a study conducted by the Sociologist, Walter Goldschmidt, which compared the social, economic and political Characteristics of two California communities--the towns of Dinuba (7,404 population) and Arvin (6,236) and their surrounding farm areas.lo Dinuba was in an area of family type farms, and Arvin was in an area dominated by large, industrialized farms. Goldschmidt found that Dinuba ranked considerably above Arvin in all the standard indexes of community life such as standard of living, educational, religious and recreational facilities, civic organizations, independent business enterprises, participation in local government, etcetera. 9Farming... , p. 2140 IOU, 3., Congress, Senate, Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business, Small Business and Community; Study in Central Malley of California on Effects of Scale of Farm Operations. Committee Print No. 13, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946. See Goldschmidt's book, As ng Sow (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1947) for a more detailed analysis. S i}! or CL | )fiU 5 Hum vol. p. L , . l , \ o ._ 1 . r . . (L r o, d . . r a. ‘11. . v . Pt 1 is r: w 3 O\ \Jyl \) C fl, flr/ Ox Ix 208 This study reinforced the beliefs of those who argued that the system of family farming was the most superior and desirable way of organizing agriculture. Because it showed the impact of the two divergent systems of farming on the character of town communities the study was of interest to many participants of public policy making not directly concerned with agriculture. It was of particular interest to those concerned with the status of small business in general. The Goldschmidt study became, and remains, a much used reference for congressmen and other policy making participants attempting to strengthen their praise of the family farm system and their condemna- tion of large scale, industrialized farming. We have been impressed with the frequency with which policy makers, particularly congressmen, have referred to this study during the postwar period and therefore believe that it is useful to list here a summary of its major findings 1. The small-farm community supported 62 separate business establishments, to but 35 in the large-farm community; this is a ratio in favor of the small-farm community of nearly 2310 2. The volume of retail trade in the small-farm community during the l2-month period analyzed was $4,383,000, as against only $2,535,000 in the large-farm community. Retail trade in the small—farm community was greater by 61 percent. 3. The expenditure for household supplies and building equipment was over three times as great in the small-farm community as it was in the large-farm community. 4. The small farm supports in the local community a larger number of people per dollar volume of agricultural pro- duction than an area devoted to large-scale enterprises, a difference in its favor of about 20 percent. 5. Notwithstanding their greater numbers, people in the small- farm community have a better average standard of living than those living in the community of large-scale farms. . . . 1 ‘ A . v , \ A o J i . o . , . ,\ P ‘ \ ‘ < ' \ I ‘ I .1 ’ A j l ' f . 3 ‘ ‘ J a i ,1 . _ H4 - V r I A» J ’ J . J » , " L ~ I __/ cl .V J l "‘ A ‘ ’ ’ , a J 1 7 J , . V ‘ t z ’ ‘ ~ , . I A _' 4‘ ' . \ _ .- J _ J \J 1 . , . _ . ‘ 7 ‘ ('70 _‘ o l ‘ _i _ E v _, J _’ ‘ L "L - _ 7 ‘ _ ‘4 { . : 71 l _ 4 f A L A r ‘ . I ‘ ... f , I A u‘ r b L . A} L \ , ‘7) 5’ ‘ ‘ ‘ k.) r J.‘ J) 4- A \J O . v c / .1 I i ; ‘- » J n \ . o) J J- , J, \ V.)- v.1. r‘. ,- n J n - 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. ll. l2. l3. I4. 15. 209 Over one half the breadwinners in the small-farm Community are independently employed businessmen, persons in white collar employments, or farmers; in the large-farm community the proportion is less than one fifth. Less than one third of the breadwinners in the small- farm community are agricultural wage laborers (char- acteristically landless, and with low and insecure income) while the proportion of persons in this posi- tion reaches the astonishing figure of nearly two thirds of all persons gainfully employed in the large- farm community. Physical facilities for community living--paved streets, sidewalks, garbage disposal, sewage diSposal, and other public services--are far greater in the small—farm Com- munity; indeed in the industrial farm community some of these facilities are entirely wanting. Schools are more plentiful and offer broader services in the small-farm community, which is provided with four elementary schools and one high school; the large—farm community has but a single elementary school. The small-farm community is provided with three parks for recreation; the large-farm community has a single playground loaned by a Corporation. The small-farm town has more than twice the number of organizations for civic improvement and social recrea- tion than its large-farm counterpart. Provision for public recreation centers, Boy Scout trooos, and similar facilities for enriching the lives of the inhabitants is proportioned in the two communities in the same general way, favoring the small farm community. The small-farm community supports two newspapers, each with many times the news Space carried in the single paper of the industrialized farm community. Churches bear the ratio 2:1 between the communities, with the greater number of churches and churchgoers in the small-farm community. Facilities for making decisions on community welfare through local popular elections are available to people in the small-farm community; in the large-farm community such decisions are in the hands of officials of the county. .1 a c c c f! o . an,» . i, J 1 o , > i r. . my fin» J a o . _ . A, ~I‘ v 2 » . 0 o l _ l l i , . . . i . , i . . . f , a A . A . i n , a p _ . . . _ i, i . . a, r .l. _ 1 i i , m : . . .iJ \ i m / i . J , , .4 «IV . . O l O , - i o a . . v. n )4 . . . i. r . , . 9.. . . . i . L l, . o x , J i . , o I . _ _\ 4 4‘ At \ r J . d i \ 1 O I c - I v v . i . . , 1‘, \.. Pi . A . \l . ; \ . D ..IA \‘l ...i a L 210 The fact that much of California's fruit and vegetable farming had been taken over by large, industrialized units was already well known. The question was whether or not this type of unit was threaten- ing to replace family farming in other areas of American agriculture, 3 question which the Goldschmidt study did not deal with. During congressional committee hearings on agricultural policy in 1947 several congressmen, in their questioning of witnesses, indicated that they were concerned about whether family farms in the Midwest could successfully compete with large, highly mechanized units.11 James G. Patton, presi- dent of the Farmers Union, pointed with considerable alarm to the general trend of increasing farm size.12 Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. Brennan, in presenting to Congress the plan that came to bear his name, warned of the "steady increase in the number of large-scale, industrial- ized type of farming units."13 However, there seemed to be a general Consensus at the time that the type of large-scale units in California were not easily adaptable to most other farming areas. And the general position of the family farm seemed quite secure at that time. War induced prosperity and the Operation of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act had acted to reduce the farm tenancy rate from 42 percent in 1935 to 32 percent by 1945.14 uSee e.g., U. 5. Congress, House, Hearings, Long-Range Agri- Syltural Policy, Part 3, 80th Cong., lst Sess., 1947. 12Ibid., Part 2, pp. 146-48. 13D. 8., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Hearings, Efifleral Farm Program LTestimonyyof Secretary of Agriculture Brannagl, Part 2, Blst Cong., lst Sess., 1949, p. 143. 14Farm Tenancy, p. 20, Historical Statistics of the United States; leonial Times to 1957, p. 278. Q o o u i . . 7| L .l a , l I i 1 J r i b . l I 2 1.. 1 _ a . J / ' ‘- O ) h ’ J O _) _ l 1 J a J l 4 i . u , 04.4 . A-_ . -li . , o v _ O ) I 1 \J O . 5' ,I b s o o ., c r‘ 1 J r, ! 1 ~ ~ ‘ n J» . ‘ V L p I . ‘ ,5 . , D I , - .L . .l > ‘7 e - \ .. L ‘ ‘ 4L , \J . , “J J J " it N .. I O O , J" ‘ ~ a N J 1 . . , - . L Q ° ‘. 9 I ' J ‘ . 4L . ,l J _/ o. C 211 The total farm mortgage debt was at least a third lower in 1945 than in 1935.lb Farm incomes had been steadily rising throughout the decade and were at all-time highs.lb Against this generally favorable background most participants apparently did not find the few statistics marshalled by Brennan to be unduly alarming. This undoubtedly was a factor in the rejection of the Brennan Plan; the majority of the participants did not believe that conditions in family farm agriculture warranted the rather dramatic shift in agricultural policy that Brannan proposed. But although the general position of the family farm seemed quite secure in the immediate postwar years, the memory of the 1920's and 1930's was still vivid. Economic conditions then had forced the realization that there were serious alternatives to the family farm. As we noted, one of the results of this realization was the increased tendency to explicitly affirm the family farm goal. This trend was continued into the early postwar years. Department of Agriculture study committees exploring the field of postwar agricultural policies argued that whatever new legislation 15Ibia., p. 270. 16Per capita net income of farm persons was $855 in 1947-49, up about 200 percent from 1935-39. Although per capita income of farm persons was only 60 percent of the net income of nonfarm Persons, this was a considerable improvement over 1935-39, when the per capita income of farm persons was only 40 percent of non- farm persons. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Food Costs--Farm Prices, Committee Print, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, p. 27. ‘ s . T. . A 7 C \-v" ~—/ ‘ C \ ‘ h ‘ i u . _ l 4 1 . . - . , V‘ I . 7 V c i. i 1 ‘ . ‘ . 1 r 4 . l ) \1’ I r I ‘ \ . i , c‘ I Y L i . L J D ’ J- ‘ 't { j _ i _ - a.) . ' i O o c Q . 0 ‘ J i . " ' \_l 4. A 1 J J _ T J 4‘ e a J .1 . .4 - 9 - _ J , . J — -. o / J1 212 17 was enacted it should favor the family farm. The House Special Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning, in its report on agriculture, stated that postwar policies should seek to protect the family farm.18 President Truman's "Economic Report" to Congress, in 1947, declared that the "long-range agricultural policy of the Government should be aimed at preserving the family-sized farm."19 The platform adopted by the Republicans in 1948 pledged the party to support legis- lation which would provide "encouragement of the family-size farm." The Democratic platform pledged the party to efforts "to preserve the family-size farm."2O Secretary of Agriculture, Charles F. Brennan, declared that the "common denominator" of the far-ranging programs of the Department of Agriculture was that of serving the "American family farmer" and he instituted a review to assure the Department‘s r. programs were being administered with this objective in mind.Z Dialogue of the Fifties These pledges to protect the family farm were made against a background in which the position of the family farm seemed relatively 17See, e.g., What Post-War Policies for Agriculture, Report of the Interbureau and Regional Committees on Post-War Programs, 1944, p. 5, and Farm Qpportunities in the United States, Interbureau Committee on Postwar Agricultural Problems, 1945, p. 110. 18U. 8., Congress, House, Postwar Agricultural Policies, Tenth Report, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946. 19The Economic Report of the President, January 8m 1947, text in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 111, 1947, p. 155. 20T8Xt in ibid., IV, 1948, p. 540 21U. S. Department of Agriculture, Report of the Secretary, 1951, p. 35. ~— SEC wa. of rt. 1. Ox 4 rL 1—1 3 213 secure. There was a growing awareness, however, that American agriculture was entering a new period of change as suggested by the increasing rate of migration from the farm and the correSponding increase in farm size. From our surveys of the press and of congressional floor debates and committee hearings we found that the concern over those trends began in the late 1940's, greatly intensified around 1954, and reached a peak between 1956 and 1958. After 1959 and 1960 there was a considerable reduction in the alarmist commentary about the threat to the family farms. From about 1948 on, representatives of the National Catholic Rural Life Conference Spoke with increasing concern about the exodus from the farm.22 In 1949 Governor Thomas E. Dewey, after citing some statistics on the out-migration of farm youth, told the Syracuse Chamber of Commerce that unless agriculture could be made attractive enough to hold the "able young men on the farm" the family farm was likely to be 23 'corporate agriculture." In 1953, J. H. Carmical, an replaced by a agricultural reporter for the New York Times, matter of factly declared that "the traditional family farm type is disappearing rapidly and is being replaced by large—scale and highly mechanized projects."24 Carmical's assessment was a gross exaggeration of the actual trends in agriculture, but it was not without some basis in fact. 22New York Times, August 31, 1949, p. 25; October 16, 1950, P- 16; August 28, 1951, p. 21; October 22, 1951, p. 20. 23Ibid., September 8, 1949, p. 36. 24Ibid., November 15, 1953, Part 111, p. 1. tw tn Is . A.\V Nb ‘ t 0 L , . L a r- . ., l n . llr ‘ . l . v w w x v i x u r . r r L a y s _ i v . 1 _ n I I / nflfi J 1 v , v ‘ A , a v I L _ . , \r CK \ . _ ) a t . o — a g , an] . . a , Q o u 1 _ l\ , _ I J J, 1L , . s . . L 1 IL L .g E , l r , J . 74 L .1 urll . J r a , 1 , , J . _ , . r a J r , a _ . 3, v a . L J I 1 . px . . . . I g _ . A J . .l L , -. . . J . J _ x . T .t e i a _ C o l Ad ./ J o mu . . u . \l r . l . _ ) _ 4 , L A, v V p M v — . i . , , . . f A , , i. x z s , l . . v , a Q , J t r .— J . , ,. . o. . a _ J C d a . 1 . , i . A. Q . fl . ... l w ” r L O ., J r fr 0 J IJ F \ I x s. v , J is. v ., . w , i 0 TL L . a P» .( j e m . - l . 7 vi. . .- A 4 i I . ,\ \ . C 0 { r 2 o u 0 O. — J . . I. x y . o O.\ v l e . . . r _ I} ; J 4 \ . J O L I. A w ‘ J o . , 4 l f 4 L . , “JV e ' _ r J. J a . o s O . y . z. . vvl. ml) . r 4 JV ,1 f o r l J A c 4| 1, i V / I I) _ «J J .i , a r . .l J J l s), i at z . y l I \ 1 H ‘ — , w . . . , I 1 . _ w e 0‘ 3. IA « J , o a w . I ‘ , Cl C L r e, 214 From about 1954 the concern over the security of the family farm became more widespread. This intensification was prompted by two sets of conditions. First, an accumulation of evidence (particularly the Agricultural Census of 1954) which clearly showed that the decline in farm population and farm numbers, which had first become noticeable in mid-forties, was not only continuing, but rapidly accelerating.25 Second, with the end of the Korean conflict a deterioration in the farm price and income situation set in and persisted throughout the rest of the decade.26 Cne of the first persons in Congress to call attention to possible danger that these trends foretold for family farm agriculture was Repre- sentative Wright Patman (Dem., Texas). In a series of Speeches from the House floor in 1954 Congressman Patman discussed the family farm and its present problems in great detail. In his August 4 speech he marshalled an array of statistics to document the "rapid" and "undesirable trend toward big farms."Z7 He noted that in 1920, 23.1 percent of the farm land in this country was controlled by farm units of 1,000 acres and Up 25From 1910 to 1940 the farm population had been fairly stable at about 30 million and the number of farms at around 6.5 million. The 1950 census showed a population of 25 million. The 1954 census of agri- culture showed a drop to 21.9 million. The number of farms had fallen from 6.4 million in 1940 to 5.6 million in 1950 and to 5.2 million in 1954; U. 8. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United §iatesz 1956, 85th annual edition, p. 617; Historical Statistics of the finite States: Colonial Times to 1957, p. 278. 26See Chapters I and XI for data on the farm income and price situation. 27U. 3. Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, C, 3357-13362. Also see his Speeches of June 23 and August 3, pp. 8775- 8784, 13175-13177. wt. an A a e 1 _ u . 1 s :4 1. O . c l a _ O ‘1; 4, t . I... . . .\ 1 a . y ... Lu 1 .. 1 . .l, a 1 ”,1. 4 . , x 1 1 . o..|_ 1|4, . , In; I/ 1. . .11 a , O _ I — L 1. l .r F . o i) e \L r _ 1 V v v. t t. .. ¢ . 1 J ,J » ‘1‘ ... 4 r \v m \vq l r . p _ .o r 1 _ (L is / ,J r m _ — w J 11 ,1 Li 1.. J l . . n _ . 1 w I i L r _ — o 3 1 . r l . . . 1 2 .f. 215 whereas in 1950, 42.6 percent of the land was in farms of 1,000 acres and larger. Although noting that changes in farm size was not in and of itself a sufficient measure of what was happening to the family type Operation he expressed great concern about the overall decline in farm numbers and farm population. From about this time on, virtually every floor debate on agri- cultural policy produced a flood of statistics intended to bolster the particular Representative's or Senator's contention that the family farm pattern was facing grave challenge. One of the most persistent chronic- lers of the threat to the family farm was Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota. For example, in a 1956 Senate floor Speech he noted that be- tween 1949 and 1954 the number of farms had declined by nine percent in Wisconsin, eight percent in Minnesota, six percent in South Dakota and Montana, and five percent in North Dakota. He also cited a study showing that an increasing number of farms were in the hands of farmers 55 years of age and over and agreed with the study's conclusion that if these economic conditions were not improved "most of the land" of the retiring farmers would "go to the biggest operators to make them still bigger, thereby further weakening the position of family farms."28 In the fall of 1956 the Subcommittee on Family Farms to the House Committee on Agriculture produced a report which declared that there was '5 deterioration of the economic structure of the family farm, already manifest in the disappearance of thousands of small family operated farm units."Z9 28U. 8., Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2nd 8955., 1956, CII, Part 3, 3580. 29U. 8., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Family Farms, The Family Eéims Committee Report, 84th Cong., August 1, 1956, p. 2. o n l o A 1 b ’ i Q o ‘ J - 5 ' 1 1 . 1 \1 1 , ‘ w 1‘ - I ‘ ¥ . ' 7‘ ‘ l A J \J I 1 ,1 ‘ .1 r x 1 . 1 . . f . b u 1 Jen l ' o I 1 -7 i | x.) J r ‘ J ‘ VJ . 7 I I 3 ‘ s ‘ ' } l , ... . g )- ‘ ‘ - p 1 C ' ' 1 c ’ 1 r U . ' , J .x I l i , k) 1 1 t o g .L 1 1 1 I n C . 1‘ ~ N . , V J - , ‘ . v V l. . ' . J. r . 1 J O 4 . .x . ’ v . . . . ' ’ ' L . - o c ' ‘ u I Q 7 1 1 . c - . _ I fi‘ I 4 C 1 . / Q , p 1 J 1 216 Discussion of the threat to the family farm was not limited to congressional debates. In 1955 Representative Patman stated, "when I first Spoke of this alarming situation [Tthe disastrous rate at which we are destroying our family farmsL7 I feared that I might not be heard, but the public reaction to what I said then has been overwhelming. Labor groups, churches, and farm organizations are concerning themselves most seriously with the condition that has stricken our farm economy."30 The House Subcommittee on Family Farms, which conducted ex- tensive grass roots hearings across the country in 1955, 1956, and 1957 heard witness after witness testify about the disappearance of the small family farmer. These testimonies ranged from a church lay leader's observation that the "erosion of the family farmer was affecting the church organizations to such an extent that realignments must be made in order to keep some congregations alive,"31 to the report of an in- dependent telephone Operator detailing the decline in the number of farms to be serviced,"32 to the Minnesota farmer's reference to the dozens of farm families in his county who "had to have a sale and they are now in the iron mines, in the Twin Cities doing whatever they can." Several private research grOUps also concurred in the belief that the small family farmer was facing possible extinction. A study by the Conference on Economic Progress reported in 1955 that "...more and more __ 30U. 5., Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1$t 59550: 1955: CI, 2443. . 31 U. 8., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Family Farms, Hear- 1398, Family Farm Program, 85th Cong., lst Sess., November, 1957, p. 6. 32Ibid., p. 110. 33Ibid., p. 102. .4; I III 35 .0 ..I. e (T. C s . . ,\ F1. . J . . a 1 , x . 1 , e , o O .x . rl 1 . 1 l 1 O a .. 1 1 . . . 1 . x 1‘1 . . O . . 11 . O 1 O. P 4 . 1 . p. .\ O . IL . . . . or. 1 x, 1 r v . . . 1 . c o . , . 1 I . 1 . J Rx 1 . 1 . 1 . _ , 1 . , o u a. 1 1 , 1 . O O \ 1 . 1 1 , .\ 1 r O 1 . . I1 . v. /_ C . a . . A111 . o 1 . . 1 1 . 1 ; f 1 D J I 1 1 ,1 c \ 1 r L 1 1 .. . 1 1. . * 1 1. L n . I.» 1 . . . 1 1 . o . 1 I 1 v. . F. , _ . . . 1 1 . . , 1 . . 111 . 1 r 1 1 O a 1 . . . 1. . . ml. . O . 1 1 . n\ 1 0 e. . 1» J . . . 1 1 x 1 . . L 1 \I o a 1 . 1 . . . a . . . 2 . 1 I 11, 1 1 O _ u. . s , O A «1‘1 14 _ .r. 1 1 _ . n 1 P. ‘\ — n.» . . 1 1 C . u 11 O I . 1 217 acreage and production are being concentrated in large holdings; the family farm is decreasing in relative importance; and more farm families are slipping below the adequate family farm and joining the large body of submerged farmers and farm workers who are doomed to underproduction and poverty."34 A study by the CEP in 1958 declared that the "farm depression is Speeding up the dominance of giant farms, or ‘factories in the field.' It is squeezing out the family type farm." The study estimated that farms of 50 acres or less made up 4 percent of the total farm acreage in 1945 but only 2 percent in 1958. Farms in the 50 to 500 acre range dropped from 45 to 38 percent of the total acreage, while farms of over 500 acres accounted for 60 percent of the national acreage in 1958 as compared to only 51 percent in 1945. The Agricul- ture Committee on National Policy, of the National Planning Association declared in 1957 that, "we are now witnessing a steady concentration of land and capital resources. At the same time, many families are struggling on farms too small to give them an adequate living.... Current trends indicate that the basic issues of family farm policy must be faced with- out delay."36 In 1956 the National Catholic Rural Life Conference noted that "very large farms, often of the kind called 'factories in the fields', are appearing in an increasing number. These farms, obviously are not h ‘ 34Full Pr05perity for Agriculture: Goals for Farm PoliQY, Washington, D. C., 1955, p. 810 35Toward a New Farm Program, Washington, D. C., 1958, p. 12. 35Family Farming, National Planning Association, Planning Pamphlet, No. 99, July, 1957, Washington, D. C., pp. iV, viii. ' ‘ ‘Vfl'1 w r‘ filming . J . . - 1 ,. 7 L 1 econo: , 1 1» »— f r n ‘ ¥ . O 1 t 0 1-1 , ) a \ . . ‘ 7’ I , U Q I C 1‘ , h M l ' . 7v a 1’ 1L 1 l C \ . 1 y I . 7 J 1 1. . f I J L ‘ . l . . a L - J J \ i A . . 1 . 1 fi ‘ E I . o o u .- ; l - A ~ \ 1 , . : A O . e ° — ' e - 1. - . O . . t . ' v 7 D - I ‘- . . O . 1 I. f C d O O a n i k 1 218 "1 “\. family enterprises.”7 The Reverand Louis J. Miller, Director of the NCRLC of South Dakota, in 1959 declared thatuthere are forces in the economy today that pose a real threat, yes, have already wrought their damage to family-unit farming...for example, in California...275 units, vertically integrated with feed companies are producing 90 percent of that State's need for beef.... There you have it--a type of agriculture r. foreign to our concept we derived from Jefferson." C55 commentator, Eric Severeid, reflected a widely held view in a broadcast in 1956: Beneath the surface of policy quarrels over stopgap measures, a profound change is coming over agricultural life in the country. It may be progress, it may just be inevitable, but it does have its tragic aSpects, and it is happening with remarkable rapidity. An American way of life as old as our deepest traditions is pass- ing away. The source Spring of much of our moral outlook, our conceptions of individualism, our politics, our folklore is drying up. The small family-sized farm and farm-family life are vanish- ing, as fast as the Indian villages vanishedoa century ago. And America is never going to be quite the same."9 As will be noted later, not all the agricultural policy making participants believed that the family farm pattern as a whole was in serious trouble. But regardless of how the particular policy maker in- terpreted the trends in agriculture there was a widespread renewal of testimonies to the virtues of family farming,and concommitant expressions to the effect that agricultural policy should be aimed at preserving that system. _ 37A_Erogram for the Family Farm, National Catholic Rural Life Conference,-l956, p. 9. 381n testimony before a legislative committee of the South Dakota State Legislature, January 29, 1959, cited in the Congressional Record, by Representative George McGovern, February 18, 1959, p. A1216. H 39"The Vanishing Family Farm," text in the Re orter, February 9, 1956, p. 6. W5) {‘ ‘ . C _ ' ' ' ant ‘ ‘ - . O C -' O O O - A , . l . a — \ ) I] . 1 1 . ‘ . i 4 .1 A - l + . ‘ . o v ’ I ‘ \7 . 1) I 1 1 x . . 1 0 V l I I . A . I , 1 \ W ‘ ,1 1 ‘ . o l 1 71 fl , , 1 ’ o 1 a J , 1 . ( 1 . ‘ v . 1 _ \ )1 x ‘ ._ .. r -1 1 . . 1 . A- , . . , 1 - 1 1 C. 4 . . , . .‘ . . 3 1 . O 1 1‘ J . . 1 . 1 \ 1 4 . 1 . . o r . 1 . . . . . . \l L e L ‘. ‘ I \ o 0 f . 1 1 1 1 ,1 . _ 7 ‘ ' 1 1 x- . 1 -1 . ’ - . t \ ‘ - ’ ‘ r 1.. . C ‘I . J ‘J r 4- -x r . . . _ . \ ‘ - i C 1 ‘ .— .1 ‘ . 219 In his "Farm Message" to Congress in 1956, President Eisenhower declared: "In America, agriculture is more than an industry; it is a way of life. Throughout our history, the family farm has given strength and vitality to our entire social order. We must keep it healthy and 40 vigorous." Shortly after assuming his office tzra Taft Benson spoke of the necessity of keeping the family farm "strong and secure" as it is "one of the bulwarks of American democracy." The family farm plays an important role in democracy because "it is from the family farms of the United States that the vast majority of the Nation's leaders have come. We look to our farm people not only for leaders, but for the ideals that 41 - . . sustain them." In his book, Freedom to farm, published during the last year in office, he voiced the opinion that: We have always had a feeling that there is something basically sound about having a good portion of our people on the land. Country living produces better people. The country is a good place to rear a family. It is a good place to teach the basic virtues that helped to build this nation. Young people on a farm learn how to work, how to be thrifty and how to do things with their hands. It has given millions of us the finest prepara- tion for life.... The family farm is a heritage we will not allow to perish, come what may.4z This fresh articulation of the family farm creed was extremely voluminous. In addition to the above we have selected for more detailed attention a sampling of statements which we believe are generally 40Text in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XII, 1956, 52. 41Speech at Mineral Springs, South Carolina, September, 1953, quoted in Marshall Harris and Joseph Ackerman, Town and Country Churches and Family Farming (New York: Department of Town and Country Churches, National Council of Churches, 1956), p. viii. 42(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 100-: 1960): PP- 109: 194. Italics mine. TV, 1 . I . 1 3 . . vJ . 1 _ r J O . .1, f > 1 7 ‘ . . ' ~ . C O O '. * , I . ‘ « O 1‘ _ V. g 1 . - . 1 1 ‘ . . L ’ ‘ f .4 1|- A 7 l I Q A ‘ ‘ ) 5 s v J _ e. a . ‘ l . . 1 _ _l ' l I‘ - ’ —‘ J i . . ‘ V . H J . . ‘ I 7 L ‘ ,1 fl 1 ‘ .1 I n H )— 7 V 7 ' "i I ‘ v 4 J 1 J _‘ , . I ’ I A l A . A A . _ I , 4 _ ‘7 I; \ l I ‘ I »- . 1 ‘ . - I 7 . ‘ I - ’ ._. n . u C ‘ A I . 1 1 P A \‘ J J " o v . L 7 ‘ I ’ . ) . . o , k k \ . "x 3 ° ~" i a 0 220 representative of firmly held pro-family-farm attitudes among contemporary agricultural policy makers.43 As we noted, Representative Wright Patman was one of the first in Congress to call attention to the potential dangers confronting the family farm. Accompanying his analysis of economic trends was a discussion of the family farm as a social institu- tion and a historical review of America's attitudes and policies toward it.44 It was a reasoned and deliberate statement and one which was given considerable attention both in and outside of Congress. ‘ir. Patman starts by observing that virtually "every member of this body has referred to small, independent business, and to the family farm, with high praise at some time in his political career." He is concerned lest this high praise become only a platitude and seeks to demonstrate again why "in all reality, they [family farm§7 are essential to our democratic society which must be preserved, not as a quaint but inefficient relic of the past, nor as a nostalgic whim, but because family farms are one of the finest and most valuable institutions in our democracy." The family farm as a training ground for solid, re- sPonsible wholesome citizenship is unexcelled. Protecting the family farm is necessary not only to preserve upon the land a healthy citizenry but also to maintain a source Spring of fresh and healthy blood for the cities: ; 43For a discussion of the status of the family farm creed out- Side the agricultural political community see Chapter X11- 44U. 8. Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954’ C’ 8775-8784. . A .i ‘ L J _ l V I _ a‘ 1 I _4 ‘ . A ) rt 1 s O s, l 1 J , 1 l 1, .1 I ~ 71‘ , . I 15 a . o‘- u . . t O . ‘ r A- 1 o . . . . , . . 7“ . ' _ t. , f. , 1, i . _ > .1.) » I ‘ ’ ‘ ‘ ) _ 1._ , t v-1 ‘0 l . . r . ' I . ,. )1 - k l. 4 U ‘1 n . - I l ‘._L U ’— PL 1/ 1‘ . ‘ i , . l. I i o . ~ , . fl . . - e -- ‘ J -.,,-_/.1 1 , . ‘ 1 V l . . . t . L 1 , l . . v 1 . . . 1 1 A V » . I I o ’ ' 7 . v 221 On the well-managed family farm, the father, mother, sons, and daughters are partners in a family enterprise. All share in the successes--and sometimes the failures-—that are experienced. The youths have their projects. Their time is full. They grow to adulthood with far fewer of the unhappy incidents that too often mar the lives of young men and women who find no place for themselves in early 1ife--nothing to do--in a busy city world. A million young men and women come to the cities from rural America each year. They come with the love of freedom, the wholesome background and the fine traits of character which are a bulwark to our democracy. They are the most important export of agriculture. They are a priceless contribution to our Nation, sturdy, self-reliant young people well trained to carry forward a decent, socially reSponsible, democratic society. To bolster his claims about the importance of the family farm he cites "recent congressional hearings on juvenile delinquency," which showed that while there was "some juvenile delinquency in rural areas, it was far less prevalent than in the cities. And a high percentage of it in the rural areas was where there were undesirable types of tenancy or commercialized farming, with its accompanying work gangs and rural slums. There is little where family type farming is the predominant pattern." He quotes extensively from the publications growing out of the Senate Small Business Committee study of the two California communities c: . . in 1945 and 1946.4” He also points to the close connection between the "social and armed revolutions" around the world and the problem of land tenure; "Without any exceptions that I know, there is involved in the baCkground of each such serious situation land monopoly, insecurity 0f tenure on the land, inequitable distribution of land or a closely related PIOblem. H — 45See footnote No. 10 above. /. . O u 1 u 4 A» a 1 . l x n 4 1 a .,. \ . 1 .5 1 l , V I I. . , ‘,' 3 A . . . L \ . » . 0 g .- 1e 7 x. l 1 '~/ I J b ' .. . .-. -.. -- 222 After reviewing the history of U. S. land policy and the positions taken by political leaders from Jefferson to Franklin Roosevelt and ex- tracting generously from political party platforms from 1868 to the present, Mr. Patman asserts that "but except for minor, temporary deviations, our policies have been geared to the maintenance of the family-type agriculture." Thus, not unexpectedly, Mr. Patman concludes: In my Opinion, the promotion of family-type agriculture is as important in America today as it was in the era of settle- ment. A century ago that pattern was being developed. Today the policy matters which confront us are more how to preserve it. We must see that the pattern which has been established and is now predominant remains so, that it is not destroyed abruptly or by small degrees. And in March, 1955, after reviewing the "overwhelming" public response to his 1954 Speeches, his convictions seemed to have grown even firmer and he evoked the haunting echo of fallen empires character- istic of the more fundamentalistic eXpressions of the family farm creed: We cannot go on destroying our independent family farmers and hope to remain a strong Nation. History teaches us that. Every upheaval and political dissolution in recorded history has proceeded from the amalgamation of land and natural re- sources in a few hands, and the denial of those blessings to their rightful owners, the people. We can no more escape this fact than we can escape the law of gravitation.... History furnishes us with no example by which we may console or lull ourselves in the thought that political upheaval and time of trouble does not inevitably follow the dissolution of a family farm society.4b During the last half of the 1950's probably no other individual spoke more frequently about the threat to the family farm and few Spoke with greater passion about the need of saving that institution than Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. Mr. Humphrey believes that the institution should be preserved because "the family farm pattern of agriculture is * 46U. 8., Congressional Record, 84th Cong., lst Sess., 1955, CI, 2443. I, r+ 223 the basis of agricultural progress and good community life; it builds in farm family members attitudes of self—reliance, social responsibility, individual initiative, tolerance, and self-government...the attitudes that make for a sound democracy and the human qualities that have done so much to make this a nation great."47 He is interested in protecting the family farm not simply because farming itself "is a good way of life, but because the family farm is an important cog of a broader socio-economic community which he highly prices--the community of small towns, little churches and independent businessmen. After asking his Senate colleagues if they knew what was "going to happen to the country if the number of family-Size farms con- tinues to diminish" he gave this answer: It will mean that the small towns...will be finished. It will mean a greater concentration of population in metro- politan centers, with all the problems which come with metropolitan living. It will mean that the little church one sees on the crossroad will be just a shell of a build- ing, with no congregation. It will mean that the local government institutionS--the small township governments that have been so important to the whole eXperience of democracy--will be obsolete and will no longer form an institution of government. The Senator's concern for the fate of the non-metropolitan community is well expressed by Theodore H. White in reporting his impression of Humphrey during the Wisconsin primary in 1960: We passed a shopping center; and he hated it, and the facts tumbled out--only the big firms, the Sears Roebucks and the Montgomery Wards and the Piggly-Wigglys could lease Space in these big new shopping centers; the little merchant was being Squeezed out, as his father had been Squeezed out. The 47mg” 85th Cong., lst Sess., 1957, our, 380. 48%., 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, cn, 3581. , ,- f . a C, 'C l I‘ , . p I I 1 a. .0. .r 224 government ought to take care of the little merchant by a federal guarantee of small commercial leases. He talked of the farmers, and how the young ones were leaving the farm to go into the big cities to work on wages--and it was as if he coddled and cosseted every dark farmstead he passed that night. To Humphrey, it was a nation of little peoplea of individual individuals, and he their only tribune. Although Humphrey has on occasion pointed to the fall of Rome with a warning finger, his construction of the family farm creed generally is devoid of the fundamentalistic, doomsday pronouncements that one still hears from many Southern spokesmen. In this and also in his emphasis on the family farm as both a symbol and as an important cog in the non- metropolitan community, Humphrey's views are typical of a great number of Midwestern political spokesmen. This is a general concern for the community of "individual individuals", as White puts it, not simply for the family farmer, but because the family farm is such an important com- ponent of that community and because it has the added asset of sustaining a rural way of life which is unique, the system of family farming is all the more prized. And as Humphrey and many others came to believe that the family farmer was in serious trouble, the greater was the resolve to secure public policies that would protect him, or to block the adoption of policies that might weaken his already tenuous position. A reflection of the growing concern over the status of the family farmer was the action by the House Committee on Agriculture in creating the Subcommittee on Family Farms in 1955. The Specific duty assigned the Subcommittee by Harold D. Cooley, chairman of the parent committee, was ‘E w 49The Making_of the President, 1960 (New York: Atheneum House, Inc., Giant Cardinal edition, 1961), p. 104. \ ,— . y t 'T) 225 "to make a special study of the ways and means to protect, foster, and promote the family farm as the continuing dominant unit in American agriculture...."50 The committee's membership was politically and geographically representative and we have found its first full statement to be quite representative in its articulation of the contemporary family farm creed in that it reflects a merging of the various strains of the contemporary agrarian outlook. The report after noting that there had been a "deterioration of the economic structure of the family farm," declared that the "fundamental question" facing the "American people" was "whether the Nation can afford to risk the consequences of a decadence of the basic rural system.”51 Not unexpectedly the committee answered its question in the negative. In the committee's efforts to justify its call for the preservation of the family farm two related themes are discernible. Cn the one hand, the family farm and the type of rural community it supports is "indiSpensable as a source of Spiritual, social, and political vitality in a growing nation." r ...this subcommittee by its intimate studies is persuaded that, beyond all other notice and regard, the agricultural order in the family unit pattern must be considered es- pecially for the Spiritual, social, and political vitality it has contributed to our civilization. A lessening of this vitality already is manifest in the shapes of an alarming growth in juvenile delinquency in urban areas, of crime, of the disappearance of many rural 50rhe Family Farm, p. 2. 511b1d. 52Ibid., p. 23. l I O . . . .1 ) D I r" 7 d . 2 a. . c , . . J. J O . . 1 ‘ 1L , J . . 7 A a J 11 . a a t, A 1 . 7 A .‘ . » ‘ h . l 4 4 O u . . ‘ . ‘ ‘ J . . A l 1; , A Q . I , . J o a . \ . O . . . » . \ . . 1 . g . . V ‘ \ ‘ . r l f . . 1 . ‘ 1 ‘ A - ¢ ‘ . , .. ~ 4 , e - . . .14. 226 churches, of decaying little towns, or neglect of community loyalties and pride, and perhaps a lack in many places of the full satisfggtion of a free trade in friendship and common purpose.J‘ On the other hand, the preservation of the family farm is necessary be- cause of its key role in the free enterprise system: "This subcommittee impresses particularly upon all thoughtful persons the place of the family farm in the free-enterprise system.... The free-enterprise system grew out of an early dream of a nation sustained by and for devout, 54 free, independent, and home owning farmers." This subcommittee is convinced that by the proportion the Nation permits a lessening of the number of opportunities for venture into individual enterprises--for one to own his own farm or his own business--then by an even larger measure will the free enterprise system be weakened. Free enterprise is the spirit of the frontier. The frontier must be kept open for men to venture into, and_to achieve independence in individual and family enterprises.55 The committee obviously believed that the loss of the family farmer would be a national loss, but it makes no doomsday prediction that such an event will destroy the Nation. The family farm should be preserved because in this institution and the overall rural community it supports,the committee saw a long list of positive values which, the committee believed, were lacking in any alternative to the family farm unit: "This subconmdttee concludes that...there are no values for the Nation in substituting a hired labor agriculture for the independent farm."EDO —_— V O 1 ‘ ‘ Cuflfi v“ u”. 7 7 L I l C . 7 I 1 . i J , > 1- 1 A e l t , 5 5 l 1 1 J 7 V l 1 1 J J 1 1 O I O O . ) ~ 5 n . ’ 7 u' ,. . , 7 I 7 ~ ) , V D 7 I l . V - x- K. ‘ o b 7 x’ -- : I , g 1 _ . . g , . ‘u \ , .4» C ‘ C 1 . 1 . L \. . w l 1 D p O ' O . _ O O o - ‘ . . l o O . ' . . u I 0 . I The concommitant of this renewed articulation of the family farm creed was a reaffirmation of the family farm policy goal. The Subcommittee on Family Farms put it this way: This subcommittee concludes that the Nation's farm program must begin with the family farng that the program should not promote the 'factory in the field' type of farming; that specific emphasis must be placed upon the develOpment of our smaller farms into adequate units with resources sufficient for economic produc- tion; and that the rights of tenants as well as those of landowning farmers must be protected.b’ The President informed Congress in 1950 that "we must keep it [the family farm7 healthy and vigorous," and that "efforts toward that 58 goal have been unremitting." Secretary of Agriculture benson in a Speech before the American Farm Economics Association in 1957 listed the major goals of agricultural policy which he had adhered to and which he thought ought to be followed in the future. The first was that "we seek an agriculture which is prOSperous, expanding and free." Secondly, "we seek to maintain a family-type agriculture, operated by free and self-reliant men and women.59 The Agricultural Act of 1961 declared it to be "the policy of Congress to...encourage, promote, and strengthen 60 The national advisory committee to this form of farm enterprise." the Rural Areas Development agency warned, in 1962, of any change that would "direct agricultural policy away from the historic and traditional family farm concept."01 John A. Baker, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture h 57Ibid., p. 23. 58"Farm Message." 59Journal of Farm Economics, xxxrx, 1068. 60U. s. Statutes at Large, LXXV, 294. 61Report and Recommendations of Family_Farm Subcommittee, U. S. Department of Agriculture, (mimeo) December 0-7, 1962, p. l. 8.13 IL.‘ H4 ”U14 P. v . n; th In 228 and Chairman of the Rural Areas Development board declared that "the guiding principle" in the agency's overall economic development programs was to "preserve, encourage, promote, and strengthen the family farm pattern of agriculture in the United States."0 In 1962, Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman, declared the official policy of the Department as "to encourage, preserve, and streng- then the family farm." He asked that the various programs of the Farmers Home Administration, Soil Conservation Service, and the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service be conducted and coordinated in such a manner as to assure the realization of this over-arching goal.63 Abatement and Retrenchment After attending the annual National Farm Institute at Des Moines, Iowa in 1963, Roderick Turnbull, long-time agricultural reporter for the Kansas City Star, was impressed by how different was the general atmOSphere of the 1963 institute compared with those of the 1950's. During the 1950's there were almost always highly emotional discussions about "saving the family farm" and maintaining the farm population on the land. He found little of this in 1953.()4 Turnbull had pointed to a significant feature of the farm policy debates in the 1960's; one hears far fewer claims that the family farm 62Chairman's Instruction No. 62-6 (Revised) April 4, 1963, U. S. Department of Agriculture, text in U. 8., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Family Farms, Hearings, the Family Farm, 88th Cong., lst Sess., 1963, p. 4. 63Secretary's Memorandum No. 1504, "Coordination of Services to Family Farms," July 2, 1962, U. S. Department of Agriculture, text in ibid., p. 30 64"Ca1mer Atmosphere for Farm Debate," February 24, 1963, p. 13E. '\ 229 is about to be engulfed and, as a consequence, fewer professions of the family farm creed. There are several reasons for this. For one thing the downward trend in farm prices and incomes which began in the early 1950's and persisted throughout most of the decade was stabilized in 1960 and 1961 and has since been somewhat improved. Another reason has to do with the fact that since 1961 the Democrats have controlled the Executive branch as well as the Congress. After 1954 the Democrats had not been adverse to using the "threat to the family farm" as a poli- tical club against the Eisenhower Administration thus adding extra fuel to the debates about the plight of the family farm.65 But most important is the fact that there seems to have developed a fairly broad consensus that the overall family farm pattern remains intact and barring a major economic reversal its dominant position in agriculture will continue. As Turnbull reported, "most people now recognize...that the family farm is here to stay, but it will be larger than formerly."66 In testimony before the Subcommittee on Family Farms in 1963, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman presented an array of statistics to show the past and present dominance of the family farm. Freeman con- cluded: "The discussion over whether the family farm or the large-scale corporate farm will win the battle for survival as the dominant form of agricultural production ignores the facts as they exist today. Instead of wasting away, the family farm is a growing dynamic force in agricul- tural production."67 k 65See Chapter VIII for a fuller discussion of this point. 66Kansas CitxlStar, p. 13E. 67Hearings,The Family Farm, 1963, p. 139. ——4 . O 1 1| . l O l ‘ 4 7 x J ‘ l 1 » Q 1 . :1 11 A . . 1 l l \4 l I O O . O 1) . , 1 J L . 1 1L \ l I ‘ A 1 - C A l 7 X 1 J 1 , . 1. . t . VJ A I o 7 r L “ #7 1 )- ) x A I 7 l , .VV 7 ) gt a .1 ~ 1 l J J 1 f . v- “ \ ‘ .1‘ 71...] I v » .L 1/ r - ‘- _, 1 _ A L ’ J. 2 z _ t. ..L :1 ‘ . k .9 . _ v 1.4 - 7 7 ' J a . . x - u 1 K t . . . .1 a ’ 7 . . - ' 230 For almost half a century farm population and farm numbers had remained fairly stable. A decline in the number of farms and farmers first became noticeable in the early 1940's. The Agricultural Censuses of 1949 and 1954 fully confirmed that these trends were not only per- sisting but gaining momentum. It was the growing awareness of these trends plus the deterioration in farm prices and incomes, and also the belief on the part of many participants that the Eisenhower Adminis- tration wasn't sufficiently dedicated to the family farm goal that gen- erated the great family farm dialogue of the 1950's. But the trend toward fewer farms and farmers hasn't stopped. From 1954 to 1963 the farm population declined by almost 30 percent.68 During the same period the number of farms decreased from 4.7 million to 3.5 million.69 How is it then that one can report a consensus to the effect that "the family farm is here to stay?" In addition to the somewhat improved income situation, two principal factors are involved. First, by the late 1950's and lQoO's a much clearer picture had been deveIOped as to the significance of the gross census data relative to the family farm pattern. One of the results of the great hue and cry about the disappearing family farm was the initiation of a fairly large number of technical studies by experts in the Department of Agriculture and the Land—Grant colleges aimed at pinpointing, classifying and ex- plaining the changes in farm statistics. The general conclusion of 68U. 5. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract, 1964, 85th annual edition, p. 610. 69U. S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Information, Fact .BQOk 0f U. S. AgriCUlture, January, 1965, p. 50 f. . , 4 ‘ J 0 1 4 ‘ 7 \1 . - O J C A- w ,. ‘ ‘ w . 7 ‘ t l ‘ v , . . . r 1 L a . . 1 , \ x \ . C ' ‘ b .D V ' 1) A 1 i - I 1 K _ f h ‘ I ‘J J l , O A . A 1 r I . 1 J A u A ,I 1 . . I < | 1 J ‘ 1 ‘ l . g ‘ ~ )- 1 .L _ . . 1. f I .4 J I - . . . _ 7 J ‘ . ‘ _ . , 1 . . 1 1 o m - » t . \ 7‘ _ ‘ / l 4' _ 1 . I J . ‘ . ' s 1 f z ) _, ’ ' l A V J Y 9 11 7 . \ \ C O ' , 1L- -/ I U L W ‘- '~ . ... .1 x l 4/ _ . , . . Q ~ 9 4~ _/ fl .. , ,, LL) (D 231 these studies was that the trends in farm numbers and size, mirrored by gross census statistics, did not suggest, under careful analysis, any significant movement away from the basic family farm pattern. Almost invariably these studies concluded that the family farm was holding its own, and several argued that its already overwhelming dominance in agri- culture was actually increasing.70 In the develOpment and use of definitions and classifications the studies had to deal with the technically difficult and value-laden ques- tion of what constituted a genuine and meaningful family farm operation. Answers to this question varied. However, the analyses generally divided those units defined as farms by the Census Bureau into three broad cate- gories. One category consisted of the relatively small number of units that were clearly larger—than-family-size operations. Into another category were generally placed the residential, abnormal, and part-time units plus those more or less full-time operations with extremely low incomes--usually those with gross sales under $2,500. The remaining units were generally treated as legitimate family farms. The studies generally agreed that the family farm, so defined, was continuing to produce the bulk of the nation's agricultural produce. Furthermore, the studies showed that although growing in average size the number of these units was holding rather steady at around the two million level. These h 70The following is a sampling of studies which deal with the question of defining and classifying family farms and/or which analyze trends in numbers and types of farms: John 0. Black, "The Future of the Family Farm," Yale Review, XLV (Summer, 1956), 548-59; John M. Brewster and Gene WUnderlich, "Farm Size, Capital, and Tenure Requirements,” Adjustments in Ag;iculture--a National Basebook, eds., Mervin G. Smith and Carlton F. Christian (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1961), pp. 196-228; Dale E. Hathaway, "The Family Farm in a Changing Agriculture," Michigan Farm J L) .\J r ~ )1, a. I. _ .FJ til. . F _ A , \1 ‘l 1 A J '\ . t .11 e _ . i . t. . I. ... j ,. l _ pk a. .. NJ IL I g. Q TA V A M 1 ..l. I '4 I; I P. . V I I 0 232 studies found little evidence to suggest that the larger-than-family- size Operations were growing in number, the general conclusion being that the attrition in farm numbers was primarily among those units which weren't, prOperly speaking, family farms anyway. There seems little question but that these studies by pinpoint- ing and clarifying the nature of the changing farm scene acted to help allay the earlier fears by many of the participants about the threats to the basic family farm pattern of agriculture. But it should be noted that the general conclusion that the family farm was holding its own was, in part, the product of a definitional sleight of hand. While it may be true, for example, that "most of the decrease from 1954 occurred in farms of less than fifty acres"71 it is by no means clear that many of these weren't family farms in some legitimate sense. Few would quarrel with the experts for striking from the list of legitimate family farms the residential, abnormal, and most of the part-time units. But there is considerable room for debate as to how to classify the larger part—time units and the more or less full-time operations with subsistence-level Economics, No. 186, July, 1958; Jackson V. McElveen, Family Farms in §1§hagging Economy, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Re- search Service, Agricultural Information Bulletin, No. 171, March, 1957; Radoje Nikolitch, Family and Larger-Than-Family Farms: Their Relative Egsition in American Agriculture. U. S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Agricultural Economic Report No. 4, January, 1962; "Farm Size and the Family Farm," Appendix A, U. S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, Policy for Commercial Agriculture, Its Relation to Economic growth and Stability, Joint Committee Print, 85th Cong., lst Sess., 1957, pp. 757-o8; Commercial Farms by Type._§i;§;_§flg_ggggtigg, U. S. Depart- ment of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Agricultural Information Bulletin 230 revised. 1961. and M2éL_£3£Eé_£9££é£29_2x_E2£m_Eemill£§. U. 8. Census of Agriculture, 1954, Statistics by Subject, No. 4, Series, 54-3. 71Fact Book, p. 5. .1 7‘} 1 1 1’ . . i 1 m ‘ . 1 \J 1. I I J 1, 1 7 . v ‘ . x l 1. l ‘ .4 . ‘7; . l r 7 i l .1 \ . C 1 J J J i O 0 v, . 1 . I A J C V 1 1 , 1 l \ ‘ 4 1 ¥ 1 u ‘1 n ‘ '~ . - g l ‘ e h 11 A _ . r . . . , 1 \_/ , i 1. '\ I » v 1 4 A r I . r 7 ‘ ‘ , .b . ~~J ‘, ,1 a l - t l ./ 1 . L A, 7 fit. I V r ' . ' ’3 ‘4 -. i ) , a r 1, A 1 . _ i C \ 1L 1' _ ’ ‘ 4 kl, ’4 K - M. W 3 - AL 1' . 1, 1 VJ .. . 1 a a . 1 r , J ‘ 7 y ' I O " I l 1 ,. ‘ l s 1, L . I \ . 1 1 1 . ‘, _ . ‘ - J‘ ’ ' r . 1 . - . \‘ v J. I 1 «L , ‘ x l- . _ p p ‘. 4 3 \ i 1 . y 1 A n J. A .1 ~ A 7 ~1 233 incomes. Certainly the exclusion of these units made it considerably easier to talk about the stability of the then defined group of family farms. Regardless of how the farm-numbers pie is definitionally divided the unquestionable fact remains that throughout the postwar period there has been a continuing decline in the number of families earning a liveli- hood, however meager, from farming. Cne knows this simply by driving through the rural Midwest and South and counting the abandoned farm- steads. That these farms did not provide their former occupants with a tolerable standard of living does not obscure the fact that a family once lived and worked there. This is not to say that the congressional participants have been duped by the experts. No profeSsional economist has a more detailed knowledge of what has happened to farm numbers than, say, a Harold Cooley or most any long-time member of the congressional agriculture committees. Throughout most of the 1950's most of the congressional participants resisted the notion that those units which were providing only a subsistence level of living should be striken by definition from the family farm roll. But as one reads through the hearings and floor debates of the period, one notes that consciously or unconsciously, and always agonizingly as far as the more liberal agrarians were con- cerned, the majority of the participants slowly came to accept just this notion. By at least the early 1960's the majority of the partici- pants had, in effect, agreed to scratch a million—odd units which 10 or 15 years earlier would have generally been considered to be family farms, however desperate their economic status. 1 . .. 1 J O l u t 1 a V . o 1 J J v V 1. I fix 1 4r.1 l 1 _ m (J .i a _ . 1 J . .1 . x A i J 1 1/ y t) . .[ y . 1 . A 1 1 . . .. e 1 L V 31 J .\T ... . . j , l a 1 m I A _ . . 1 1 _ . 1 1 r . c .. ‘ 1 _ C v v r“ 1 l 1 - z I o f In a . . . L, 1 1 V J 1 4 . .c l v . y 1 . v _ A I . t . 0‘. 1 ii I \i4 ‘4 z 1 I .I ) A 1 1 / I J . .) 1 x t A “urn 1 y I .c 4 . )1. . A 4 J ,\ 1v. LIA ; 1 ‘1 D pf. I . 1, 1 l . A 1 3 . J _ ‘1 C .1 1 a J t 1 A y l . -P1 1 - v. A .i L .1 . , J . ., . . 1 1T . I, . L 1J 1‘ 1 a 1 L; .rll \ 1.1; l 1 1 1), :14 my 1T r u . 4 111 J \ L I a J (L I1! Cf or. «:1 .r‘ a J W .11.. .1. a.” .1 1 -[ J ‘$.J 1 3 \Id I o m I , J 11 I“ 1 1., s,\}\ . r t . l V , \J r v 1; . . . . 1r. .rl F . 1 rl . . A . orl. a) 1 1 .-w 11 xi; ‘J 234 It is probably true that the incessant theme of the technical studies as to the continued general dominance of the family farm pattern made it easier for the participants to arrive at this position; they could point to the stability of the approximately two million hard-core units with considerable satisfaction. Without question, however, there has been something of an ideological retrenchment. Initially, reacting with dismayed protest to the decline in the small, marginal farms the participants have fallen back to the defense line of the approximately two million commercial family Operations, a group which has remained fairly stable over the past two decades. This, then, constitutes the second reason for the contemporary consensus as to the relative stability of America's family farm agriculture. This retrenchment has been made reluctantly, not enthusiastically. But the mainstream of American agrarianism has always stood for pro- gressive agriculture. American agrarians have never been status-quo minded in regard to economic and technical change in agriculture. There- fore, at any given time only the more romantic defenders of the family farm have been willing to seriously consider policies aimed at freezing agriCulture into its present pattern. But concessions to economic and technological changes cannot go on indefinitely. The next major crisis in agricultural policy making will occur if and when a significant deterioration sets in among the heretofore relatively stable group of commercial family units. When . . a r 1 . 1 V ... 1 . m 11 1 . k . v. .1. O . 1 . .1 A . L u ‘4 orl J . L. .\ 1 . c O l l J 5 ‘d ‘v .r; p i 1 . i / 1 . . L1 . l ‘1 . 1 . V I1 1 , ) . J J .r ‘1 1 1 .1 ... .i. I x i . A, c 1 a J i 1 t «H 1, O L \., . ‘4 . x .1 1}. u;v rt. \ o.‘ «I . it . 1 235 this occurs participants will be forced to come to grips once again, and quite possibly for the last time, with the meaning and demands of 72 the family farm goal. 72Actually the next family-farm-crisis debate is likely to be generated not by a further decline in actual farm numbers, but by an increase in the trend toward vertically integration and contract farm- ing. There is a slowly growing awareness that these trends may con- Stitute a serious threat to the traditional family farm. For example, see the testimony by Freeman and Patton, of the National Farmers Union, before the Subcommittee on Family Farms in 1963, pp. 52-58 and 142-44. CHAPTER VIII VALUE CCNFLICTS AND THE STALEMATE "Rural people are a bulwark against all that aims at weakening and destroying our American way of life.... If the family farm disappears we will find ourselves living in a world of giant corporations. 1 leave you to imagine how long our present economy would last under those conditions. but the family farm will not disappear." Ezra Taft Benson1 "It's worse than in the thirties...they're driving farmers off the farms...oh, I know all the economics of it...but I just say it's 992g for this country to have family farmers, I just feel that way.... Now that Benson, he's an idiot, he has brains one degree less than a moron, and this country is going to have some bills to pay for him some day." Hubert H. Humphrey2 The His-labeled FamilygFarm Controversy In 1951 Secretary of Agriculture, Charles F. Erannan, initiated a project called the "Family Farm Policy Review." The first part of the project called for all the Department's agencies to review their programs to see that they were being administered in the interest of the family 3 . farmer. The second part of the proJeCt involved a series 0f grass-roots meetings across the country conducted by Department of Agriculture officials 1Farmers at the Crossroads (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1956), p. 4, and Freedom to Farm (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 19603, p. 198. 2From an informal conversation with newsmen during the Wisconsin primary in 1960, reported by Theodore H. White. in The Making of the Presi- gggtl 1960, p. 1030 ‘—'— 3599 Family Farm Policy Review, U. S. Department of Agriculture, June 11, 1956. "(Mimeo.l 236 n 090 . ' 1 I i L 00. A 5 1 ‘ A o... \ ' V C . A . ’ I .-. ‘ I r 1‘ . g . . O , l . I 1 . . ‘ 1. ' A V ‘ r .e 1 . i W I 1 . _ ‘ - . . ‘ r ‘ 7.7” ~ ‘- I J l 2* . a I g. _ A. Q \- fi A r ‘J I . ‘u " ;. . V . ) ‘ ‘ 1‘ 1 . ~ e 1; 1 P‘ rsl . " ‘ o 1 - . ‘ . ' V. ' ‘ ) I o .A . L 7} , L \ _1 A , l7 4’ v . . . . i‘ I _1 x ‘7’ \ r , 1 J. I J . ,. . a At ',_.‘1 . m b — ‘L l J ‘ I“ J J . ma _ .— 1 , . 1\"H . F‘ 714». " J- 1" h A I- A. ‘ J b J 1- , . . ‘ ' . -i' J j 77’ -- . . -.1- . . P A . j ’ I a _ .1 ’ .. O . 0 {a 1 J > 7“, . 1 . . . g I . . . - L - \ 7 A 1 ‘ . . O x O. 0 \1, . _‘_ ' 7 ‘ . . ‘ . ' C I 237 seeking the views of farmers, church leaders, and the farm organizations on how they thought agricultural policies could be improved to "help family farms." The American Farm Bureau Federation refused to take part in the hearings, vehemently charging that the whole thing was an "effort to de- stroy the farmers' own organizations and the right to Speak for them- selves...and to usurp powers which rightfully belong to Congress...." Although Brannan denied such intention the Farm Bureau had correctly seen the maneuver as an effort on the part of the Department to bypass the organization's national leadership. Vigorous reaction by the organi- zations leadership was therefore not unexpected. Of interest here is the fact that in its efforts to counteract the program the Farm Bureau, on several occasions, used language that was highly critical of what the Bureau claimed was the Department's concept of the family farm. In one of its News Letters the Bureau equated the Department's concept of a family farm with Webster's definition of a peasant-—"a rustic; esp., in Eur0pean countries, a tiller of the soil either as a small proprietor or as a laborer."5 After observing this ruckus stirred up over the "Review" Shirley Greene reported that the "family farm is no longer non-controverisal." Certain aspects of the highly partisan and often bitter farm policy de- to bear out bates since that time would seem, on the surface at least, Greene's observation. Since the early 1950's Farm Bureau critics have 4New York Times, June 1, 1952, p. 72. 5Quoted in Jean Begeman, "The Farm Bureau's Big Smear," New 52222Iig. October 15, 1951, p. 11. 6"The Family Farm—-New Center of Controversy," Christian Communit , March-April, 1952, p. 1. V. f. f. 1‘ frequently accused the organization's national leadership as being anti- family farm.7 Farm Bureau officials have rejected the charge out of hand by pointing to the fact that the vast majority of its membership consists of family farmers. John C. Lynn, legislative director for the Farm Bureau, after pointing out that the Bureau's 1,607,000 members "are predominantly family farm operators," described the organization's "support for the family-farm concept" for the members of the Subcommittee on Family Farms this way: The operation of farms by family units living on the land is part of the American tradition. Pride of ownership, reliance upon, and pleasure in one's own creative capacity; love of the soil and of rural life; an independent spirit; active participa- tion in community life--these are the characteristics of American farmers. They have contributed to Spirit and strength of American economy. 7As early as 1952 (New York Times, March 11, 1952, p. 20) the leadership of the National Farmers Union leveled this charge against the A.F.B.F. It has continued to do so. often being supported by several con- gressional Democrats. In 1960 the National Catholic Rural Life Conference broke its long standing official policy of neutrality among the farm organi- zations by alerting its members to "gross conflicts" between its phil- osophy and that of the A.F.B.F. The N.C.R.L.C., a dedicated partisan of the family farm, felt that among other things the A.F.B.F. was not com- mitted strongly enough in that direction. (New York Times, January 31, 1960.) For several years the A.F.B.F. has had a plank in its annual platform urging farmers to strengthen their faith in God and to partici- pate in church activities. Since 1962 it has added a statement urging "each Farm Bureau member to make every effort to make certain that actions taken by his church are within the basic concepts of our American system." J. L. Vizzard, of the N.C.R.L.C., reacted to this by stating that he thought "it almost groteSque that the Farm Bureau should have a formal statement encouraging their members to keep their churches straight...," in "Dialogue," Farm Goals in Conflict (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1963), p. 208. 8U. 5. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Family Farms, HearingsI Ib§1Family Farm, 88th Cong., lst Sess., 1963, p. 108. flak...’- \ . , ‘ J l w 2 , . I ' s a . I C ! i o I u I ‘ .. x r ’7‘ 1) V < . A ‘ . 0 O O o C y A ' . J ' . 239 But appeals to the conventionalized family farm creed by the Farm Bureau are relatively rare compared with the two other general farm organizations--the Farmers Union and the Grange--who in their annual resolutions and in their testimonies before congressional committees seldom fail to evoke the sacred image of the heroic but beleaguered family farmer.9 In fact, the national leadership has, at times, chas- tized other agricultural spokesmen for talking too much about the family farm. In 1957, Charles Shuman declared the "family farm" was being used as a "goblin...by some who advocate expansion and extension of federal government controls over all farmers." The charge that family farmers are disappearing is a "bogey man...the family farm is stronger today than ever before."10 At the political party level there have likewise been charges and countercharges as to who is and who is not the friend of the family farmer. Some Republicans have criticized Secretary of Agriculture, Freeman, as being anti-family farm.11 But mostly it has been the other way, with Democrats accusing the Republicans as being either indifferent or outright hostile in their attitude toward the family farm. Charges to this effect 9The National Farmers Union unally speaks of the family farm in only slightly updated Jeffersonian language while the Grange statements, although positive are less wordy and less fundamentalistic in tenor. Both annually assert that the family farm should be the keystone of federal agricultural policy in their statement of resolutions drafted at their national conventions. 10"The Family Farm: Fact vs. Fiction," Nation's Agriculture, February, 1957, p. 7. 11See, e.g., remarks by Representative John P. Saylor of Pennsyl- vania in U. S. Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, CVIII, p. A1337. ' I‘ 240 were hurled against the Eisenhower-Benson Administration with particular frequency and fervor. One of Adlai Stevenson's major themes in the 1956 campaign was that the Republican's attitude of "defeatism toward the farm problem" was threatening to destroy the family farm. Stevenson charged that the Eisenhower Administration was committing a "grave in- jury to the American people [becausg7 the "family farm has been the back- bone of the American society, and when the family farmer is in trouble, "12 America is in trouble. Averill Harriman claimed that Secretary of Agriculture Benson was pursuing a "calculated policy...favoring the de- veIOpment of corporate farms to replace the traditional family units."13 The charge against the Administration that it had abandoned the family farm goal was persistent and often bitter. This charge stemmed not only from the belief that the price policy advocated by Mr. Benson would be ruinous to the family farmer but also from the belief that Secretary Benson's overall administration of the Department of Agriculture constituted a reversal of "the nation's traditional policy of favoring the small farmers."14 Benson's dismissal of several long-time Farmers Home Administration hands and their replacement by men with more con- servative views on credit antagonized many.15 Suspicions were also aroused by his prOpensity to name to high administrative positions and advisory committees businessmen and conservative agricultural cooperative leaders, who one observer characterized as being men who often wanted to 12New York Times, September 9, 1956, p. 52. 13Ibid., September 6, 1956, p. 19. 14"Secretary Benson and Small Farmers," (editorial) America (September 3, 1955), p. 521. lSIbido, pp. 521'220 fi_fl 241 prove themselves "more kingly than the king--more like the popular image of the hard-boiled, no-nonsense businessmen" than the businessman him- self.16 Another constant source of irritation to farm-state congressmen from both sides of the aisle were statements by top agricultural econo- mists in the Department such as True 0. Morse, John H. Davis, Earl L. Butz, and Don Paarlberg. These men, generally reflecting the view of their profession, but showing little political acumen, frequently made public statements to the effect that there were too many farmers in the country, that the small, marginal farmer would be better off if he moved to the city. Such statements provided excellent ammunition for con- gressional sniping at the Secretary. Thus Senator Stuart Symington, in the debate over the appointment of Don Paarlberg as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture in 1957, charged that a vote for confirmation of Paarlberg was a vote "against the family-sized farm and the small towns of America which are supported by those farms."l7 A reflection of how widespread and persuasive was the belief that the Eisenhower-Benson Administration was not positively enough committed to the family farm goal was the Spate of bills introduced in both Houses by members from both sides of the aisle from 1955 through 16Charles M. Hardin, "The Republican Department of Agriculture-- A Political Interpretation," Journal of Farm Economics, XXXVI (May, 1954), 212. On businessmen in the Department also see "Facing Up to the Farm Forces," Business Week, February 14, 1953, pp. 30-1; New York Times, December 14, 1957, article by William M. Blair, p. 14. 17u, 3,, Congressional Record, 85th Cong., lst Sess., 1957, 0111, 14910. see pages 14890-14913 for the full debate. The vote on Paarlberg's confirmation was 42 yeas, 32 nays and 21 not voting. . v ' .A . 1 4 , _ / ' v . 1 . J . . 1 . ’ v j A I _ - l l c I L O A. f . r . y c I . 1 . r A .4 1 1, J 1 I ' \ ... 1 r - n o t . . c - K: , - . , . .A— t ‘4 ' . . t 1 1.. . n . n .L 11» . ‘ ~ g .5 I 41 )1 a. 7v I a e , 1 242 1958 calling upon Congress to proclaim in the form of laws or resolutions the "long standing national policy to preserve and strengthen the family- 18 Senator Karl M. Mundt (Rep., farm pattern of American agriculture." South Dakota), explained why he and fellow Republican tdward J. Thye of Minnesota introduced such bills (8.2776 in 1956 and 5.2915 in 1958) this way: At the time Senator Thye and I introduced the legislative proposal explicitly supporting the family farm pattern it was done because administration spokesmen at that time were in our opinion not placing enough emphasis on the need for maintain- ing family-type farm operations. The attacks against the Administration's conduct of farm policy were inspired for the most part by a genuine concern that it was not positively enough committed to the family farm goal. At the same time it was also clear that these attacks were, in some measure, politically inSpired. In farm circles, the charge of being anti-family farm is equivalent to being charged with opposing "Motherhood and Country." Benson's critics obviously saw the advantage of this political stratagem. The use of the anti-family farm charge as a political weapon had two effects on the debates on agricultural policy during this period. First, it led the Administration critics to oratorical excesses. The wideSpread concern over the status of the family farm was quite genuine, 18In 1955 the following bills or resolutions calling for an ex- plicit statement of the family farm goal were introduced: H. R. 2000, 2027, 2177, 2565, 3780, 5. J. Res. 20, the latter being Sponsored by Senators Humphrey, Murray, Mansfield, Kerr, Kefauver, Neely, Lehman, and Langer. Other similar bills introduced during this period were: 5.2776 and H.R. 8456 in 1956, H.R. 202 and 8. Res. 175 in 1957, and So 2915 in 1958. 19Letter to author, July 27, 1964. I. 243 but it is doubtful that many critics really believed that American agri- culture was being converted overnight into a system of "factories in the field" as was often charged. The second probable effect was that the Administration and its defenders tended to adOpt a stance that somewhat overly minimized the threat to the family farmer. This political-defense factor is shown in the position taken by Benson to the effect that because American agri- culture was almost "wholly" dominated by the family farmer it was un- necessary to talk about the family farm as such, particularly because of the political emotionalism associated with such talk merely acted to obscure the real issues: "Adding to the confusion, and delaying forthright congressional action, are those professional protagonists of the old agri- culture who make their living by propagandizing their ideas of what they think the farmer should have or what they think will appeal to the un- informed and those with special interests."20 All this suggests that the family farm concept had at least come to be used in a controversial way. But we have found little evidence to suggest that the major participants of the agricultural policy making process had Split over the fundamental question of whether the traditional family farm goal should be continued or abandoned. A consensus around the proposition that the promotion and preservation of the family farm pattern of agriculture should constitute the over-arching goal of agricultural policy prevailed in during the 1950's and continues to prevail in the 1960's. ¥ 20Freedom to Farm, p. 227. «J P 1 5 .. < > J \. s _, I J ... [IA . . I; 2 . u . f A l V 2 r l . . e r . _ 4 ‘ t. o .— V . l is x , . . I1 . . y . v .1 t t 1 . . 4 J OT a a t x. 1/ l r H l . I _ \. , x 1. 9. J . .1; . l1 7 l l. ..L r L “)1 O , \ v ‘ J g l J . J J 4 . . . . . \I k . ‘ \y ._ ,4 it. 1g . OI: _ A . , J a V .. a w .xu L. A l L_ . o . .. a» I x C )1 u _ H . i p . . fl . vii . r i 2 . (J 3 . r . c . r a . . a. l . . F 4 1 . 4 v x ‘ .VJ . . , I! I r . . l r J x J h l C .. pr . 0 e I. 2 r . . 1 o 2 .v. A v i— V , J i. J . I], my L1 . . L \ )1 4 . a - \IJ . u l :1 .1 , 0 J 'IV 1 . A . u t i \ . . l \l, . A. t i 1 4 . i 241. Among the participants, the principal exception to this would be the agricultural economists. Many of them--although seldom committing themselves publicly, straightforwardly and cogently--have come to believe that the family farm goal properly belongs to the past. Because they play the important role of expert advisors in the policy process their defec- tion is not insignificant.21 But with this qualification it is clearly the case that the majority of the other relevant participants remain dedicated to the proposition that the family farm is the most desirable form of organizing and utilizing the human and non—human resources of agriculture, and that agricultural policy should be framed with this in mind. Political campaign charges notwithstanding, the Eisenhower-Benson Administration had not abandoned the goal and it did not seek to convert American family farm agriculture into large-scale, industrialized and corporatized agriculture. In the previous Chapter we cited evidence indicating the commitment by both President Eisenhower and Secretary to the family farm goal, a commitment which they justified by appealing to the unique virtues of the family farming system. We found no evidence to suggest that these were hollow expressions, made merely to conform to the dictates of an American political tradition. In 1953 Senator Humphrey petitioned Mr. Benson to set up an advisory committee in the Department of Agriculture to make sure that the Department's programs were being admin- istered with the interests of family farm in mind. Mr. Benson rejected 21See Chapter IX for a fuller discussion of the policy role of the economists and their attitude toward the family farm. 3 245 the petition on the grounds that "all the committees had the family farm at interest" anyway and that the appointment of another special committee would constitute unneeded duplication.22 While the Senator obviously be- lieved otherwise, Benson's explanation was undoubtedly sincere. Mr. Benson did stand in contrast to his predecessor, Charles F. Brannan, whose every proposal on farm policy was prefaced and closed in the name of the family farmer. Basically, however, Secretary Benson and President Eisenhower, as well, matter of factly accepted most of the tenets of the family farm creed, although, as we will note, they gave greater emphasis to certain of its aspects than did many of their critics. That this came naturally to them increased their ire at being accused of being anti-family farm, prompting the President to dismiss the charge by "some political orators" that he was against the family farmer as mere "drivel," for the "family farm is the cornerstone of American agriculture."2 Likewise, one cannot infer from the relative paucity of appeals to the family farm creed and policy goal by the Farm Bureau that the national leadership and the organization as a whole are somehow hostile to the family farm. The following explanation by Charles B. Shuman is no mere rationalization of convenience: M 22U. 5,, Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., lst Sess., 1953, XCIX, 10259. 23New York Times, October 17, 1956, p. 1. The President's irritation over the fact that anyone could seriously believe such charges is revealed in several of his press conferences when reporters queried him about the matter. See, e.g., the text of the press conference on October 31, 1956 in ibid., September 1, 1956. , a - t , 7 . . . 9' \I 7 V . I ’ a v \ - h . - ’\ ‘l r _ . t . V O t J V . i .‘ , I l x v . . 1L , - _ . r ' » ' 1 - I; t l ‘ J , ‘4 . . '\ I . ,_ L , ' \J «I . r t i ‘ J v w - . . i ..x »~./ 1! . . — .L r . ‘I . \ . e _ . u r - a x » . ‘ , . i n. O, I s - k . g _, . n O [- 246 Our policies and statements are the policies and statements of the largest farm family organization in the United States. It would be rather ridiculous for us to repeatedly make statements to the effect that we 'believe in the farm family'. It would be equivalent to a church issuing statements saying that the church 'believed in the church' or the Chamber of Commerce 'believed in the Chamber of Commerce'. The entire purpose of our policies is to improve opportunity for farm families. No amount of pious sloganeering can help strengthen or maintain the farm family.‘4 It is a fact, as Mr. Shuman points out, that the Farm Bureau is a family farm organization. Its membership may number a few larger-than-family- size farmers, but probably no more proportionately than, say, the National Farmers Union. The overwhelming majority of the organization's members are family farmers by almost anybody's definition.25 It literally makes no sense, either in terms of ideology or simple economic interest, that such an organization would consciously promote the adoption of public policies intended to encourage the conver- sion of America's several million family farmers into a handful of giant, industrialized factories-in-the-field. The same can be said of the Eisenhower-Benson Administration and of the congressional farm-state 24Letter to author, August 28, 1964. 25This author wrote a paper in 1960 in which we stated that "the national leadership of the Farm Bureau no longer couched its policy recommendations in terms of the family farm." The paper was read and dis- cussed by several officials of the Michigan Farm Bureau and that particular passage caused a great deal of consternation on their part. As one put it: "How can an organization of 1,600,000 farm families fail to be concerned about the family farm?" (Letter from Dan E. Reed, associate legislative counsel, October 20, 1960.) The Michigan Bureau's legislative counsel took "strong exception to your statement that the A.F.B.F. does not recog- nize any particular values in the family farm and has for some time ceased to make its preservation one of the objectives of the organization. I was g2 sur rised that anyone could have seriously entertained such a concep- tion...." (Letter from Stanley M. Powell, July 5, 1960.) ‘L L . t l J v - l . K » _; . a x A A ) O ‘ x . . s a , . \ O , J . i t . A .L .1 l 1 1.; , . A 1 > \ , a.) ,1 'x 1h ' ~ K J V . J< . \ -1 ‘. . A 1, I! V ‘I l , 00' 247 Republicans, who in the 1960‘s tend to support the Farm Bureau's position on agricultural policy as the Farm Bureau supported the Eisenhower-Benson Administration in the 1950's. But whether or not the policies proposed by this group might indirectly contribute to just such a deve10pment in agriculture is quite another question. And it is over this question that the agricultural political community has divided, not over the question of whether or not the promotion and preservation of the family farm ought to remain the over-arching goal of American agricultural policy. Conflicting,Agrarian Traditions The agricultural political community has divided over several policy issues in the postwar period, but since the mid-1950's no division has been as sharp, as bitter, as enduring as the division over price sup- port and production control policy. The conflicts surrounding this policy are partly the reflection of competing commodity interests, but it goes far beyond this.26 The conflict over and beyond the commodity division consists of two related factors. First, there has been sharp disagreement among the participants as to the general and detailed nature of the economics of the farm prob- lem and the economic consequences of alternative public policy approaches to that problem. The critics of the Eisenhower-Benson Administration were convinced that the price policies it sought to enact would have been dis- astrous for the family farm. For many of the participants the maintenance of high price supports had come to be identified with protection for the 26See the Review of Literature section of Chapter I. at L . 4 t t L .( 4 . . a \ . J o u A O 1 i J . C . . 1 O . . . > u . . A. 1 s . r: J . i i [DI 248 family farm. The Administration's proposals to sharply lower those supports and/or to eventually eliminate them convinced the critics that President Eisenhower, and particularly Secretary Benson, were either totally ignorant of the economics of agriculture or purposely seeking to eliminate the family farm, or at least indifferent to its plight. The charge by Representative George McGovern (Dem., South Dakota) that Benson's demand for lower price supports was "either unadulterated nonsense or else it is a malicious and calculated plan to drive the family farmer from the land and replace him with corporation farms,"27 was simply one of the more cutting of the barrage of similar charges leveled against the Secretary. From Mr. Benson's point of view, of course, his proposals were neither nonsensical nor anti-family farm. He believed them to be pro-family farm and economically sound. In Chapter X we will discuss the conflicts in beliefs as to the economics of agriculture and the consequences of alternative policies, and how these conflicts have contributed to the stalemate in the policy making process. Here we want to deal with the second factor in the division over price and control policy, a conflict in value commitments. It will be noted that there is a considerable overlapping and that the differing sets of belief and value positions tend to be mutually reinforcing. But although they are interwoven to a certain extent they are not mirror images of each other. The nature of both the interdependence and the in- dependence of these two factors will become clearer in Chapter X. “A 27U. 5. Congressional Record, 85th Cong., lst Sess., 1957, C111, 1918. 21.9 The value conflict among the participants of the agricultural policy making process stems from two somewhat differing and enduring ideological traditions which we call liberal agrarianism and conservatism agrarianism. These two traditions have always supported the family farm goal and continue to do so. However, the differing ideological orienta- tions have resulted in differences of emphasis as to what is considered the most valuable characteristics of family farming. Likewise, there has been disagreement over the means that should be adopted to promote and protect the interests of the family farmer. The resulting groupings cannot always be neatly categorized in terms of specific individuals and organizations for the different out- looks involved are only tendencies, they are not mutually exclusive and they have much in common. But some broad generalizations can be made. During the 1920's and 1930's liberal agrarianism was represented by such spokesmen as the LaFollettes and Henry A. Wallace and by such organiza- tions as the Nonpartisan League and the National Farmers Union. Con- servative agrarianism was represented by such men as Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas and the American Farm Bureau Federation. In the post-World War II period the Farmers Union and the Farm Bureau continue to best exemplify these two traditions. Geographically, liberalism has been strongest in the South and in the Midwestern states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the Dakotas. Conservative agrarianism has been strongest in the Mid- western stages of Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas. Reflecting the increasingly urbanized character of even the South and the Midwest,there are no political figures today that can properly be categorized as agrarians in the sense of, say, a William Jennings Bryan. . 1 - t . . ‘ b ‘ - r . ‘ J t 1 i . . \ , 4 v . ' _L 4 J 1 . . 7 . r 7 J T . l > . . _ . . x . J ‘ \ . . . . , . l ' x ’ -; e , . - » 1 . . . J . . J . . J J v») 1 4 I . o .- , g 1 - «- . 1 . ‘ r N g A ' ’ , . ‘ l 14 . 1‘ \ . . . ' ‘ ‘ x. . ( ‘ I A ' 4 J ‘_, 1 _‘ I .A | a . . 7 I . x , ‘7 L -’ t; _. a j z E - . . _ . . 1 . J ‘- I J z. _ L , , o v l . r . I 7 a t . . . I r J J 1 ‘ _. t 1 , ‘ l . 7 ' o , v. V 1 . . . , 4 T‘ o 4 1 l 1 ,, , . ‘V J ‘L .4 . I k V ‘ A 4 O . ' o 1 . L l » . . l . ‘ , J 1 7 ‘1 ' a . , , _ . I ’ ~ 1 o . I . I C . ' o ' 7 \ 1 , . < t . _ 1 . - . ’ 1- I I ‘ 1 ’ > , J ’ . o - L \ I ‘ l I I o 9. \ ' I . . fl , ‘ . - A [7“ _ 1 ) ' ' « J -. ,1 _ M 250 However, among the politicians who are particularly interested in agri- cultural matters, the liberal-conservative division tends to follow the Democratic-Republican division. Of the postwar Secretaries of Agriculture, both Brannan and Benson can be properly categorized as dedicated and zeal- ous agrarians. The very considerable differences in their style and their political programs reflect the differences between the liberal and con- servative traditions at the extreme. Secretary Freeman espouses the 1 program of liberal agrarianism, but the zeal that he brings to the office is that of a dedicated political technician rather than a dedicated, from- ‘ the-heart agrarian. Almost all defenders of the family farm have seen it as an important institution of the free enterprise system. However, the liberal agrarian will generally first point to the ruralness of the institution and the unique way of living--country living--that it sustains. This will be buttressed by pointing to the family farm as an important cog in the free enterprise system. The conservative agrarian will generally reverse the emphasis, stressing that the family farm is a prime example of free enterprise at its best, made better by the fact that it is a rural in- stitution. Something of the contrast between the two traditions can be pointed out by suggesting that the liberal tradition stresses family farming as "a way of life" and the conservative tradition stresses family farming as "a way of business." However, this needs to be immediately qualified. Only the most romantic of agrarians have stressed the way-of- life theme to the exclusion of farming as a business. At the same time the conservative agrarian in stressing family farming as a way 0f business /" 251 sees that institution as something much more than an operation for making money. For as an independent, privately owned enterprise the operation of it for a profit breeds the character traits of individual initiative, self-reliance, independence, and prudent judgment and otherwise helps to develop the type of citizenship necessary to sustain a sound social and political order. The family farmer is seen as an independent, pr0perty-owning entrepreneur in the best sense of the word. The sentiment of the liberal tradition on this point is reflected by Senator Humphrey, who after stressing the need of public policies to assure the economic security of the small farmer, made the following point: A man can live on a little farm. He may not make too much money, but he can breathe fresh air. He can bring up his family under good, wholesome conditions. He can go fishing and not have to fish in a polluted stream. He can have a place for his children to work rather than loiter in the streets. Family farming has something to it besides dollars. It is a way of life.28 In pointed reference to this type of sentiment the Farm Bureau's national platform for 1953 contained the following statement: The fact that farming is a family enterprise has led some groups to misunderstand the nature of farming. If we are to maintain a prosperous, efficient and progressive agriculture, it must be recognized that farming is a business enterprise. There are, of course, many advantages to rural living, but it will be noted that rural standards of living are generally low and food prices high in countries where farming is considered only a 'way of life.'29 While spokesmen of the liberal tradition make frequent allusions to such things as that the family farmer can "go fishing in an unpolluted stream? the conservatives do so only rarely. 28U. 8. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, C11, 3581. 29Policies of the American Farm Bureau Federation. 1953, adopted at the 34th annual meeting, December, 1952, p. 45. I‘ . I J t | l 7 J .\' . a - e V ' 9 x \ A . ' Q s 1 O r11 - .» 7 1. . . . ‘ 7 . ‘ O t ,A .1 , . ‘ A O . . ‘ l . . ‘ v - . . .7 . . r a K . I . r 1 a o . ’ j v J. .4 J 1 J V . _ . 7 ' J ‘ / - I . - . ‘ n ‘ A .J -1 . — A . J7 1: , . L - . . L . J L ‘ l . « . . _‘ b J ‘ V ‘ ‘ o 1 J . ‘ . i .../J J / \ l . . . » A ’ W ) .A. , t 1 1 u! -1 7’ r .A . _ , i ' A E - . - I ' L ,v i ,1 e ' ~— 7 ' 7 1 3 ‘ J I p‘ I . 1 ». L ‘ I . .—_ 1 _ 1, i . i A ’1 k L I _, . J A r ~, | O J ‘ I J .A 1 . _ . \ - J t / J 1 . - 4 ‘ O J J ’ t r' . . O I O ‘ l ‘ ~ -. . \ - . .- - J . . 1 O . . 252 This special emphasis on the family farm as an institution of free enterprise was clearly reflected in the outlook of Ezra Taft Benson. For him, free enterprise made this country what it is today, in both its material and spiritual aspects; free enterprise has given us material abundance, moral character and the basis of our political freedom.30 The following expressions are typical: The future of agriculture and the preservation of a sound economic system depend upon a never-ending, vigorous re-emphasis of the principles, benefits and values of private competitive enterprise. No group in America is in a better position to con- tribute to this need than those who live on our farms.31 Today agriculture is not so much an important segment of our population as of our free enterprise system. It should be per- mitted to operate as such. Indeed it has a special importance because it is, essentially, small-business industryn’z In one of Senator Humphrey's numerous attacks on Secretary Benson for not doing enough to protect the family farmer the Senator pointedly declared that he was "for a government policy which would make it pos- "33 The Senator and the Secretary differed on sible for them to survive. agricultural policy issues not because one was for and the other against the family farmer, but because they disagreed in their analyses and 30Benson‘s missionary-like quality that he brought to the defense of "the American way" was strengthened by his firm belief that this nation was heavenly inspired; "It is my firm belief that the God of Heaven raised up the founding fathers and inSpired them to establish the Constitution of this land. This was ingrained in me as a youngster by my father and mother and by my church. It is a part of my religious faith. To me, this is not just another nation. It is a great and glorious society with a divine mission to perform for liberty-loving people everywhere." Farmers §t_the Crossroads, p. 4. 3lIbid., p. 4. Italics mine. 32Freedom to Farm, p. 198. Italics mine. 33U. S. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, C11, 4491. . F 1 l r I. v 4 a. ' ‘fi ‘ V we L 4 )- . h c a l I .1 )— - Q 4 1 . r .. . . . \ J 1 .5 l 1‘ r 1 , r C - ‘ v _ 4 x \ 1 ‘ - r . . . 1 o . , . J l . . .. I J O ‘ N . . .. . i v 7 ‘ ‘ V > A Q , . r k ‘ \1’ _, ' l 4 V d > . x 1 . .- 7. . _ ‘ r V. ‘ . l ‘ J ) 7 . . . i y I I _ 2 . , L . l . N i - O . .1 V L Q ‘ J_ a . c O O \ . ' ‘ n . . a . O O i, - O O . _ . - I . . . . ' r 253 understanding of the agricultural economic situation,and because they had sharply different views as to the proper role of government in society. Given the differing interpretations of the economic situation the liberal and conservative participants in agricultural policy making have divided all the more sharply over the issue of the proper role of government. The liberal agrarian tradition has always been more willing to call upon government intervention in order to protect the family farmer. In its more extreme form, such as the Nonpartisan League, it has asked for government action to socialize those industries which service the farmer in order to assure the continued health of small-unit, free enterprise in agriculture. Conservative agrarianism, on the other hand, while by no means unwilling to call for government intervention, reflects a much stronger and more consistent attachment to the doctrine of laissez faire. Whereas liberal agrarianism is likely to embrace government not only as a necessary protector but a friend as well, conservative agrarianism always regards Big Government with inherent su5picion and thus can ask for government protection only under rather dire circumstances, and even then the embrace is always cooled by cautious suspicion. The conservative fears that the very policies that the liberals promote in the name of pre- serving the family farm will actually destroy it. Too many government controls and too much government red tape will smother the independent Spirit and destroy the character of the independent entrepreneur. Thus Benson, like most dedicated agrarians, conjured up the memory of fallen emPires, but with a special twist: 254 History teaches that when individuals have given up looking after their own economic needs and transferred a large share of that responsibility to the government, both they and the govern- ment have failed. At least 20 great civilizations have disappeared. The pattern is shockingly similar. All, before their collapse, showed a decline in spiritual values, in moral stamina and in the freedom and responsibility of their citizens. They showed such symptoms as excessive taxation, bloated bureaucracy, govern- mental paternalism and generally a rather elaborate set of supports, controls and,regulations affecting prices, wages, production and consumption.‘3 These differing ideological orientations almost always generate differences in the types of policy recommendations. But while the policy positions may differ and therefore add confusion to the agricultural policy making process they need not be in direct conflict. For example, during the period between the 1920's and 1930's the liberal and conservative groupings had their own pet schemes, but this led to heated and open con- flict only on a few issues. A prime example of such liberal-conservative conflict would be the bitter dispute over the Farm Security Administration. Despite a considerable ideological diversity the agricultural political community was able to unite to effectively unite under the banner of parity price supports from the mid-1920's to the mid-1940's. The price support and production control that was erected during this period was in no small part due to this unified support. But in the post-World War II period, particularly since the mid-1950's, the agricultural political com- munity has divided in sharp conflict over this very policy. The Farm Bureau, which played such a leading role in the building of the price and 34Farmer at the Crossroads, p. 90. Like many conservatives, Benson feared that a small beginning toward government controls would eventually end up with total control. In his Speeches and writings he incessantly pointed to the Soviet Union as an example of what controlled agriculture egets. '\ 255 control program, has taken the lead in trying to dismantle it. Over the past decade such organizations as the Farmers Union, the Grange and the Wheat Growers Association along with some of the lesser groups have exhibited a considerable unity on the matter of price and control policy, but the Farm Bureau has persistently pursued a sharply divergent path. The Benson price policy proposals received as much support as they did primarily because of the backing of the Farm Bureau. And it is probably the case that the supply-management approach (endorsed by all the majur organizations mentioned above) advocated by the Kennedy Administration would have been adopted, at least on a limited scale, had it not been for the fierce opposition of the Farm Bureau. Therefore, it is of value to take a closer look at the ideological position of the Bureau. In 1947, after 16 years as president of the American Farm Bureau Federation, Edward A. O'Neal retired to his Alabama farm. O'Neal probably did as much as any other farm-group leader to popularize the idea of parity prices and his skillful direction of the Bureau helped to enact the idea into law. O'Neal was replaced by Allan B. Kline of Iowa, who served until 1954. Charles Shuman of Illinois was elected president as Kline's succes- sor. The Farm Bureau of the postwar period, particularly under the Shuman presidency, has done more than any other group to popularize the idea that farmers do not need, do not want, and should not have the protection of high, rigid parity prices. By 1958 the Farm Bureau was arguing that any Support program should be designed only to "facilitate orderly marketing rather than to guarantee unrealistic prices,’ and the only "realistic" support price was that based on "competitive conditions, supply and demand, J . , o , t 9 ’ - J o J i. l ,- r, , _ J‘ A \4 I i c . 'W ‘ F r . \ l ' .1 a fl ) (‘D ‘\ 256 A 5 and market trends."0 In 1959 it proposed that price supports should be shifted away from the historic parity concept and based on a moving aver- age of market prices in the preceding three years. Charles B. Shuman, then, was "happy" when President Eisenhower recommended this plan to Congress in 1959.30 As to the concept which the Bureau had once so vigor- ously championed, the organization's platform of 1960 had this to say: The original purpose of the parity formula was to measure statistical changes in relationships between prices farmers receive and prices they pay for a selected group of items. The parity formula has been used to determine price support levels on certain commodities--a use for which it was not originally desigged and with reSpect to which it has serious limitationsv’7 This change was certainly rather dramatic. As one observer noted: "If the U. A. W. began to advocate the 'right-to-work' or anti-union shop law, the change would be no more striking than that of the Farm Bureau ' O "38 after the Ed 0 Neal regime. This overstates the case because it glosses over the basically conservative outlook that has always been a part of the Farm Bureau stance. The Farm Bureau, from its inception as a sponsoring agency of the county agent system, has always been dominated in its membership lists 35Farm Bureau Policies for 1959, adopted at the 40th annual meet- ing of the American Farm Bureau Federation, December 11, 1958, pp. 10-11. 36Congressional_Quarterly_Almanac, XV, 1959, p. 239. 37Farm Bureau Policies for 1960, adopted at the 4lst annual meet- ing of the American Farm Bureau Federation, December 17, 1959. 38Lauren Soth reviewing Christiana Campbell's The Farm Bureau 23d the New Deal, in the Journal of Farm Economics, XLV (November, 1963), 904. 257 and particularly in its official thinking by the larger, more economically progressive family farmers.39 During the tumultuous years of the early 1920's the Bureau saw itself, and was seen by others, as a moderate alternative to the more radical farm organizations of the period.40 During the 1930's the Farm Bureau, under the leadership of Ed O'Neal, threw its mighty weight behind the New Deal programs intended to bring agricultural relief and recover , but it was cool toward schemes involving agricultural reform.41 Lauren Soth in searching for an explanation for the "intriguing" change in the Farm Bureau's national leadership's position quoted a friend's suggestion: 'What happened to the Farm Bureau is that the successors of Ed O‘Neal became fascinated with economic theory. Somebody told them about Adam Smith's market and interest rate.’42 Charles Shuman in replying to Soth did not challenge this point but argued that "historical facts in- dicate that the Farm Bureau's discovery of Adam Smith is not as recent as Soth suggests."43 Shuman, like Ezra Taft Benson, goes Adam Smith one better by evoking God's authority: "When we turn to Government to negate 390f the Farm Bureau's early membership one observer noted that they were "family farmers, though family farmers of the upper income group. They were the salt-of-the-earth type, God-fearing, self-reSpecting, hard- working, and usually contented with their lot, which was ordinarily a pros- perous one." Christiana McFadyen Campbell, The Farm Bureau and the New Deal (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 28. ‘This view that the Farm Bureau is dominated by the larger family farmers is universally accepted by contemporary analysts. Typically, Harmon Zeigler notes that "the membership and policies of the Farm Bureau indicate quite clearly that it is primarily the representative of the upper strata of the farm Pepulation." Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964). P- 186' 40Fred A. Shannon, American Farmers Movements (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 19577, p. 86. 41Campbell, The Farm Bureau.... p. 165. 42Journal of Farm Economics, XLV, p. 903. 43"Comment on Lauren Soth's Review of The Farm Bureau and the New 223;," Journal of Farm Economics, XLVI (February, 1964), 251. . ,. .41. I V 7|. \. 1;. r . .r i Fl «7:. .i .ll. J \J J . 3,. .... O 1.- oi (I; i a I). i. ‘71 z or .i ..I v . 1‘ r . k. V IL I A4 4 t 1|) , w r a -1 J g. at «J . ..L .I J a . 0 » I, x _ H. . \. . a n. q .r v.“— )v \ . p \ Orv. . O . r W .(. .7. ‘ v \ i t . r .u h . f ‘4 ‘4 .1 w .. K v I. ‘ V a ! D 3 , . - ,5, ., L» r, I/ e V . . r . . lr ‘ J , .. u ..i V L (I Q ur‘. . i. . fx In in 1 J \- 1 .. or . . w or), Ifl. ' rll .lz J 7‘ -L i. pk . a 3 l .. V ‘ x "l . x J II \a; . J I. t o n\ y ; F\. .J L .. i a) _ c . A f k i . i . , J ‘ O .1 O, l c l f _ , . .. x ‘L .3, .E . J ‘i, w . {A a or“ \. \I . . 1 If) Y I. w A f. i J O . ‘ ... . J. .... 5. . b I .— » 3, I l r ll? U A l 14 l w . J. \. o. I I 7 » nJ a I, I. \J ,— x' .I. i F1. 1 .rli I'll; If a A)» .y . T. .\ L 0‘ \1 It. )4 4 \J J . . J. i ) 4 . . .r J ._ ilv :. .r «d O. . .t i C l r l . J i ‘ l l i i it It A ‘. i L o ‘J )4 fly‘ L ll. ,v y o ri 3“ ., . \. x . J J .1; .v A. I w. i a r .J Al .1 r . i J . J ., . R. ... . 7|. 11, J 4, x, , J. . . I. or. v V i . ‘K i\ M .a .1» J x. V V J I Wt. rJ . I; I .1 X, .11. . . L pi) i _ L. 1 ,J L v ,J . I b L D... ... , Du . To 1 all . )1. c r r! ~ rl « l. t .. r.— ’b \v x x . r l A 3' L J 0’1 ... ..IL 3 \II ., 1 Q .1... N, J, . o . T... 3, ..L .N a J . J _ I} I \) c l . .J .. cl IFJL . r . . .‘ '1‘“ N J .‘ 4 I .I» Ti . .y. .. u it . \ J Q .J i _ . \ .IL p \3 rl \t l. r _ j \ A»... . I . o ”It L .. l e . . . D\ l_ T J y r . i o p» n v \ I; ._ f A). : b O ... r , \. I. + I 3 1 . :4 . ./ _ .l . i .l. A ...L L. ; .. I r r, J .J l .J. 1 0.1;, L x, .p e I) FL , Tc .. J z . i h it I ..l. l. v v . 10.. — . E _ _ . . r _ J V, 1 J T o. . . . [‘L N r e I Q 0 2 V J - l b . L rIL .l .. \J 3 . We 2 C . . , c I. .31. \ , .. . r . I. ... 1 i, \ Orin a .f I v § 1 \L. O . . ., . 3 r . J '\ . 0 A. . o J O . . o I . O , 3 .rL . Q . O . o N J J . r! O . ... . vk \J. . . I ii .i O . j } j P l. . A A J. V F I '\ Ox 253 economic truth and to avoid adjustment we are in reality rejecting God's law in favor of man's law."44 This type of dedication to the principles of competitive enter- prise leads first of all to an inherent and intense suspicion of Big Government. Reo M. Christenson after interviewing top Farm Bureau leaders reported: "Nothing struck me more forcefully, in talking to high-ranking Farm Bureau officials in 1952, than the anti-governmentalist sentiments which colored their discussions of public policies."45 This view has been intensified over the years. One Farm Bureau official described the organization's effort to block the Kennedy Administration's supply-management proposals this way: "I don't believe I am overstating our role in the crucial battle ahead when I declare that the Farm Bureau is the only organization standing between the farmer and the complete socialization of agriculture."46 Opposition to Big Government is greatly reinforced by the belief that farmers can survive the rigors of free market conditions. As Mr. Shuman put it: "There is absolutely no evidence that the family farmer is in any danger.“47 Indeed, Mr. Shuman argues that the current problems of the farmer are not the result of the workings of the free market, but of government intervention: 44Speech before the American Farm Bureau Federation's annual meeting in 1961, New York Times, December 12, 1961, p. 30. 45The Brennan Plan: Farm Politics ang:Policy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1959), p. 147. 47Letter to author, August 28, I964. v c . A \r; I . 4 L 11 or]. L ._ J l , J. o a . c . I ~ i» 4 v . F‘; .i \» E. J oi.» g r a u , .J t ._ u y p . l». o _ .. c w o. i c \J , t . . . .. 7 v v e I; . .FI. o L ,_ ..u a . . . . . L \,1 all url. . i4 1. 2 r N . ll » v/ A 1 i a I) « 4 U. I H nu . 4 J I .1) r yr r ‘ ... . O L . -( . Cull A y I . O ._ :5 .IL . A “J 0 .yi :- y «:4 ' a ’ .IuL L I .J . D. 0.,1 . o C 7L. . .‘A r‘u m c w)._ ‘1. ,1\ .IL. Fit. 9 _ f .| . .ix. 7 or? . V v . N) “a . .4. r . e I a. 259 The market-price system worked in agriculture until the last 30 years, and it will work again.... The farmer's situation today, certainly, is not as good as it has been in the past. And, again, I say that it's due primarily to the intervention of Government, which has disrupted the balance in agriculture, destroyed markets for farm products and caused farmers to pro- duce unneeded crops that have piled up in wasteful and expen- sive Government storage warehouses. The 8.5 billion dollar surplus is a principal cause of low farm prices...if we want to liquidate agriculture, that's the way to do it--fix prices and control production.48 As a result, the national leadership believes that government controls are not the saviour of the family farm but its nemesis: ...a far greater threat to the family farm than the corporation or factory type farm is government directed farming which would have many of the disadvantages of the collective system.49 There is no greater threat to the family farm than Government programs that restrict the full utilization of family and farm resources and that attempt to fix or manage resources and ration the right to produce on the basis of some historical formula.50 The enactment of the supply-management program would have reduced agriculture to "regulated, subsidized, controlled, comfortable peasantry. Conflict in Perspective The above discussion suggests the general nature of the value conflict involved in the debates over the price support and production control policy of the postwar period. It will be useful by way of summary to state the components of the conflict with more precision. 48”Regulated Peasantry," interview with Charles Shuman, U. 8. News and World Report, June 12, 1961, pp. 80-84. 4gShuman, Nation's Agriculture, February, 1957, p. 7. 50John C. Lynn, legislative director, A.F.B.F., in testimony be- fore Subcommittee on Family Farms, Hearings, The Family Farm, 1963, P0 1130 51$human, U. S. News and World Report, June 12, 1961, p. 80. 'e e ..l 1|. .I L Wu J Fl. J ) .J J L. . _ ,. ... J .{. Uriv I O 0 . 0 L . o: r ‘L i . Fl! '1 0" w . l. (we 7.. g . D, .J I; A . ,u 1.. c 1 i j g I . ‘ bx J U‘. x. O 1 - _ | O J .L I. x . .1 J or lab r l a ‘ O X 0 x) l ..K \1 Carl A » .J . . I . . a r i a L L t I, .. x _ r . . . J a, . ry. .r44 1 w .11 L .4 J J u I l I} i A s r , x O T14 r‘ . y ..x 1‘ ‘x I] H J .4 K ‘1 J pl . \L A \I 7 r . VJ, Orlp D . 1‘ . L r .r V D A fit L OP! rls. \: .K F \u. I\ 260 Following the pattern of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 the price support laws of 1948 and 1949 designated the Commodity Credit Corporation as the primary-instrument supporting prices. The CCC would maintain prices at the specified support levels by purchasing surplus commodities through the system of nonrecourse loans to farmers. A con- commitant of the price supports was a system of production controls in- volving "voluntary"52 acreage restrictions, supplemented by marketing quotas, whose function was to keep overall production in line with effec- tive demand thus maintaining the Open-market price at or near the support level. The majority of the participants believed that the control program would make it unnecessary for the CCC to purchase unduly large quantities of surplus books. However, by the mid-1950's the increasing productivity of the American farmer was negating the influence of this control system; by 1955 the support Operation was costing over $2 billion a year. This forced the general recognition that if this type of situation continued it would eventually become necessary to either sharply lower the price SUpports or to enforce much more stringent production controls. It was this prospect, complicated by the deteriorating general price and income L; 52The controls were voluntary in the sense that the farmer had to reduce his acreage only if he wanted to be eligible to participate in the price support program. This has not been a hollow choice be- cause as a sufficient number of farmers generally participated in the program open-market prices were always fairly close to the support levels. A gradual tightening up of the control program in the 1960's, however, has made this freedom of choice less meaningful. J J \ul. J . J , n e I , pg - . , 1. e . w .I or]. . J ) . . O . , . . . . . . . 5 J . c l f . . , s I v .1. \ . . i . .r. H s. . I. r J . W, . . . A H J V t” x . J .t . «v I 3., fix . r . I o I J J. J. 4 . r A . \v . . , _ l . j . . .. / . I 1L, I I i / U ,. , e . _ A . . . v C .7 . . A a l O _ .1 J, x _ . . . . J J a . — s , . 1. I — l 3 ll — .J . a J \I» a . . J ti o u x. , i r J , )4 u l t t,_ . a i J. .. . : . I .V I 1. n .l - . H \ r x . . l .J .. v r _ e L e . . J . . . J . IJ . .u z . . . . _ . . .c a \ r . r v . z . \ , . ,l Y z I . i . . . x P o A . J i. I O w o . J I 1.. .1 , r F x p I . . _ I, .. A . . I. .fl ... . V J t , J J ..g . J . v x . r a a ._ ) l , \u I . . . O J . i \ . L L, . r J - r o o — . . . a. 1 . . , .L 261 situation in agriculture, that brought ever present tensions between liberal and conservative agrarianism into direct and bitter conflict. No one in the agricultural political community is for a general policy of low prices for farmers, but some participants have been much more willing to accept lower supports than others. Those who have taken this position first of all believe that the average farmer, with other forms of indirect aid, can survive and prosper under relatively free market conditions, emphasizing the farmers capacity to shift his pro- duction efforts from one commodity to another and to change his techniques of production so as to reduce his per unit costs. Those most opposed to a significant lowering of the support levels have long been convinced that relative free market pricing would force a wholesale reorganization of agriculture, and that unsupported prices would ultimately destroy the family farmer. But the growing division among the participants in the 1950's and 1960's is the product of more than this conflict in beliefs as to the economics of agriculture. It is also the product of a sharp clash in value commitments. Just as none of the spokesmen for agriculture are for a general policy low prices as such, no one is an enthusiastic supporter of production controls. But again some of the participants are much more willing than others to accept the imposition of tighter controls. As it became clearer that tighter controls would have to be im- posed if high supports were to be maintained the conservative participants became firmer in their opposition. If the participant also believed that the farmer could survive relatively free market conditions his Opposition to production controls was all the more rigid. The most vigorous opponents A fl . . J v . . , . . s . . A c . . n . .V , c . . . J n I a .. J .r. l, . ,h. . . . , .\ f . l l l . A . J 1 ,c rx . . C L , . . , l I). J J c . a a , ), . a . r s l . . L a J v \ ... 0 l j . f . n 4 v J _ x .A x . ,.. J r 1, Ir «a. ..u o C .| v j v, x a . . . u , J . q 3 a‘ y M t 1.. '1. if. ‘ l x s) . a a V J , .J 262 to tight controls are those participants committed to a free enterprise outlook which stresses that the enterprising character of the small, property—owning entrepreneur developed this country in both its material and spiritual aSpects. The family farmer is seen as a prime example of this system which is constantly being threatened by Big Government, Big Labor, and Big Business in that order of importance. The ownership of property and the freedom and responsibility of making the decisions as to how it is to be used to produce a living for himself and his family encourages individual initiative and develops in the farmer the character traits of self-reliance and a Spirit of individualism. His economic in- dependence breeds social and political independence and a stable and prudent outlook which constitute the basis of all freedom and sound govern- ment. Therefore, government regulations which act to deprive the farmer of his entrepreneurial freedom are seen to strike at the very heart of the institution of the family farm. Those participants of the liberal agrarian tradition are far less hostile to the general notion of government intervention and are willing to accept the adoption of stringent controls, particularly if they are also convinced that such a control program is a necessary part of the overall effort to preserve the family farm. The liberal agrarians also see the family farmer as a small-scale entrepreneur and stress the virtues of the free enterprise system and the need of maintaining it. But their interpretation of free enterprise is Populist-Progressive in character. They reverse the conservative's ranking of the three basic enemies to free enterprise agriculture. Increasingly since the New Deal they have looked to Big Government for policies that would prevent small entrepreneurs o e L u V l _ . i L l I I J l; r r, .) r L. >J O . i , m 1t _ \ , . . a l .‘\h 263 from being engulfed by the giant corporations. Their willingness to accept controls is buttressed by the belief that there are many values associated with family farming which are not dependent on the complete entrepreneurial freedom of the farm operator, but which are a direct product of country living. It is impossible to neatly categorize every participant into the groupings identified above. We have been talking about the poles of the schism,and,as in most political schisms,the population diminishes as one approaches the extremes. Because none of the participants have been enthusiastically for low prices or for production controls as such, many participants have tried to stand for high prices and against production controls at the same time. Political and economic conditions during the 1950's made this type of fence-straddling quite easy. One could vote against Benson for a retention of relatively high supports without at the same time voting for tougher controls. This was made easier by the per- ennial hope that the relatively mild controls then existing would actually work, thus halting the build up of surplus stocks. By the end of the decade, with surplus stocks continuing to mount, such a fence-straddling position became more difficult to maintain and the division among the participants became more visible. Since the Democratic victory in 1960 and the Administration's decision to push for tougher, more extensive con- trols the division between the two camps has become more clear cut. The low-support, minimal controls group is populated primarily by Republicans, the conservative farm organizations in general and the American Farm Bureau Federation in particular, and the bulk of the agri- CUltural economists. From 1952 to 1960 Ezra Taft Benson was the exemplar .\ A 261. and most persuasive spokesman for this group. It is true, of course, that during this period many of the Midwestern Republican congressmen broke party lines and voted against Benson's price policy. Their voting for the retention of higher support levels was made easier by the vol- untary character of the controls then in effect. When confronted with the much tougher control measures proposed by the Kennedy Administration they abandoned their position on high prices and voted against controls. Since 1960, with the Democrats controlling the White House as well as the Congress, the national leadership of the Farm Bureau has been the primary spokesman of this group. The high-support, pro-controls camp consists primarily of Demo- crats, supported by more of the liberal farm organizations, particularly the Farmers Union, and a scattering, although growing, number of agri- cultural economists. This group has always been for high price support levels but it came to embrace mandatory and highly stringent production and marketing controls only under the prodding leadership of the Kennedy- Freeman Administration, and then only very reluctantly, and as it has turned out, only temporarily. Since the 1963 wheat referendum much of the steam has been taken out of the mandatory supply-management approach. Neither of the two camps has been strong enough to enact its pro- gram. The high-support camp, although it has not been able to retain the high, rigid support levels of World War II, has been able to block efforts to lower supports to essentially free market levels as proposed by their opponents. On the other hand, the efforts since 1961 to impose tighter control measures have been effectively blocked by the anti-control group. q . L. A :J ./ w , r x... . J A J .. .c .rn I) O , O \L , . J \i. v\ 3 . x J \x . U ., J .r. «J .JJ 1 I I, f . v.51“ / . , o. t . .. L / _ OF; J t , C A.) J, P. I\ i L J I... g L w, a l . I: .. '\ 3. l . V _ _ r .l. '5 J .\ v v w. 3 or c J . J n t . o , g '\ O u . I) » 1‘ o ) w“ ll Wx 4 A x l s F‘ . . u v 0‘. «I r .l 34 4 A), ._ . , t , (l J , on .r. - all t. t ) a A \» a } v c . w . o 3 .. L e, t. e . r , . \1/ C u. .I/ O . . A. H L. 1. . , I. ) . Ix .. a 4 l . Io J ,J i J b J. a r _ l t u . J y a. . l J x . ,. r . »u I A 1,. J .l , r w “ ..- A Q r . fir ‘ . ). FL U . ‘ l I t i _ 1. 1.. N 1. IA u c . \ L d L g . rl k . 2 J J r}; 3h. .i K), it! I c J I I or». A ”2’ . y r L , 3 r I. .. \v V .7 — , .fnl. 1‘ , \Js .. P. . i I I J, r t It i J .rlo ‘ T . J J Iv 1 . 3 . .L ! mu , .1 .L ‘J «4, «wk e l . . . ~l \I.. Dr»; . . l L .1 / a . 3, Lrl 265 The end product is a policy not warmly supported by anybody, a policy of moderate support levels and moderate production controls. It is a policy that almost no one has been happy with. It is a policy which almost everyone says must be changed. It is,in short,a stalemated policy. CHAPTER IX ECCNCMISTS AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY Our task is to supply the essential facts affecting farm policy, and to make recommendations on the basis of care- ful analysis of such facts. It is our hope that men and women on the farms and in the cities will consider these matters carefully, allowing no preconceived loyalties or animosities to becloud the issues, and strive to reach decisions which will cause Americans ten, twenty and fifty years hence to say they reasoned well and acted wisely.1 In 1948 Charles Hardin informed the readers of the fiflfiEiEifl PoliticalASCience Review that a "major redefinition of agricultural policy in the United States appears imminent. ApprOpriate committees in both houses of Congress held exhaustive hearings during 1947 on both the con- tent of agricultural policy (revision of parity, manner of price Supports, regulation of marketing, and production controls) and the manner of organ- ization of agricultural administration."2 By the time Hardin's article 0 was published it was becoming apparent that the "redefinition,' at least insofar as price supports and production controls were concerned, was going to be quite minor rather than major. This anticipation of a major 1P95twar Agricultural Policy, Report of the Committee on Postwar AgriCUItural Policy of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Univgr- sities, October 25, 1944, pp. 3, 6, 21. 2"Reflections on Agricultural Policy Formation in the United States," XLII (October, 1948), 881. 266 J»\_/ 267 change, however, reflected a view that had been held by most observers since the closing days of the war. As early as 1944, various study groups and committees in the Executive and in the Congress had begun to explore the question of post- war price and control policy. Some of the reports from these activities did indicate that major redefinitions were at least being considered. ‘ But, on the whole, the wideSpread belief among most interested observers that major changes would occur seemed to be predicated more on their con- viction that such a change should be made rather than any sound sampling of the political winds. As an editor of the New Republic put it, after citing such facts as the accumulation of cotton in CCC warehouses, there is "obvious evidence that some time soon a major shift in national farm policy will have to take place."3 The editor thought that the shift would undoubtedly be in the direction pointed to by the "widely circulated" re- port of a committee of prominent "agricultural college professors and executives" calling for a "postwar agricultural policy free from direct price-propping."4 The report referred to was the product of a special, blue-ribbon committee appointed by the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Univer- sities. Out of reSpect for the "agricultural as well as the public interest," the committee called for the rejection of "continued reliance upon expedients" and recommended the removal of "detrimental" and 3"New Farm Policy," April 16, 1945, p. 496. Italics mine. 4Ibid. . _' ' / w‘. A l . . A) ‘ ' b .1 ‘ y r. ‘ L . , . ' o l L I r c A l ‘ ' a r ‘ 4» g ‘ .1 . r w ‘ r h\ ‘Q ,1 I a t 1 l' J 4 j . 7.1 1 . a, , i. l . V. J o ' >' A . a | ‘ F I gr V J ’ 4 J a. , l O \_/ , ../ . . . i/ I ’ / l x.) _. ~- . . J 5 :- J I r I w J , l‘ I t x. . . .L . ‘r ' ’ \ g, I 1 v , ; » n C x ,1— a . , 268 "hamstringing" production controls and a return to free market pricing within three years after the cessation of hostilities.5 The Land-Grant Colleges report was one of the first of a sizeable flood of studies on postwar agriculture and agricultural policy.6 These studies, almost invariably, had three common characteristics. First, all were highly critical of the existing price support and control program; all urged major changes. There was some disagreement as to precisely what changes should be made, but they all called for the abandonment of the control program and urged that direct market price supports be either removed or so changed that they would be used only to eliminate extreme price fluctuations rather than to maintain an artificial price level above that which would be generated by the free market. A second characteristic of these studies was a bristling defense of the national interest and an often emotion-laden attack on the narrow view of the special interests; the common theme was that the special interests had flouted the general interest in getting the price and con- trol laws on the books and that if the national interest was reasserted these laws would surely be done away with. Moreover, these studies gen- erally argued that the laws in question did not really serve the "true" long-range interests of farmers, but were actually detrimental to them. 5Postwar Agricultural Policy, pp. 3, 6, 21. 6One observer noted of this period: "All in all, the nation had witnessed one of the most intensive and thoroughgoing reviews of a major legislative problem in recent decades." Reo M. Christenson, The Brannan Plan; Farm Politics and Policy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1959), p. 15. 269 A third characteristic of these studies was their emphasis that the authors were concerned only with providing the public and the policy participants with the facts needed to decide on policy alternatives whatever they may be: "It is not the function of this Committee, or any other similar group, to determine what agricultural policies shall be adopted. That is the responsibility of the nation's citizens."7 These studies left little doubt but that if the public and the participants would open-mindedly consider all the facts supplied by the experts the resulting changes in agricultural policy would be along the lines that the eXpert studies invariably recommended: It is hoped that farm people and citizens generally will be willing to accept and to follow the facts. The future of American agriculture, indeed that of the nation, will be enormously influenced by what is gone with the recom- mendations contained in this report. This flood of expert studies has continued to the present. Be- cause of the "enormous research and multifarious publications of the USDA and the state agricultural colleges, eXperiment stations, and extension services, many independent individuals and groups, and the committees of the Congress"9 it would appear that no other area of domestic public policy has been more widely studied and analyzed than agricultural policy: "In no field of domestic economic policy has the nation had the benefit 0f as much expert study and opinion as in agricultural policy." 7Postwar Agricultural Policy, p. 3. 8C. B. Hutchison, President, Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, ibid., p. 2. Joseph S. Davis "The Executive and Farm Policy," The Annals, cccxxx1 (September, 19e03, 95. 10Lauren Soth, Farm Trouble (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 8. WV J.“ ... )’ 270 This massive study of the farm problem and farm policy gave rise, very early in the postwar period, to two widely accepted proposi- tions. The sheer number of these studies served to create the impression that there had been a vast accumulation of relevant factual information. This impression was strengthened by the claim of the experts themselves that they were indeed providing policy makers with all the essential economic data. Thus there develOped the proposition that the agricultural policy makers had the benefit of a sound information base about agricul- tural problems and relevant policy alternatives. Joseph S. Davis, put it this way: "There is hardly any other area of national policy in which the information basis is so nearlyadeguate."11 Not unexpectedly, this proposition has had its greatest currency among economists. Indeed, they were its primary originator and have re- mained its principal sustainer. They have argued that, drawing on their special knowledge of the farm problem and the overall economics of agri- cultural production and consumption, they could design any number of workable policies for almost any objective the policy makers sought. Thus Earl O. Heady and Lee G. Burchinal expressed the sentiment of most of their colleagues: Economists can suggest a half dozen effective means for eliminating the farm problem, whether the criterion be one of improving the farm income, equalizing resource returns with other industries, bettering the allocation of resources between agriculture and other industries for national benefit or elim- inating surplus stocks and production. 11The Annals, cccxxxr, 95. Italics mine. 12"The concern With Goals and Values in Agriculture," Goals and Values in Agricultural Policy, Iowa State University Center for Agri- cultural and Economic Adjustment (Ames: Iowa State University Press, . F 7 I , a r , . . . y . . J v . c w, A. p o , , . . _ . . . . y . v . . o . F ,, v . P. _ L .\ y _ x C . ..\ . a v . all 0 C . . s, a e l , J or ., o , - . a p . u , O\ a , e- _ . . 0 ll . . v p \/ J (I r. ._ v I I . a 1 o «J a l . \I 7 I . s . t O , r . . r r . 1 i .\ l . . L n 4 O s t r 4 . o .L 271 This mass of expert testimony has seldom been a simple presenta- tion of the facts. It has almost always been critical of existing policy and usually pregnant with recommendations for change. Because these studies have had the lustre of being conducted by politically detached experts and because, at least during the first part of the postwar period, there was near unanimity in the direction that the changes should take, there develOped a pr0position, held by many observers and certainly by most of the economists, that policy makers could have declined to sub- stantially change existing agricultural policy only by ignoring the hard, neutral, economic data abundantly available to them. These two propositions were typically expressed by A. Whitney Griswold, addressing himself to the immediate postwar policy debates. "This is not a question of knowing what to do, but of having the will to do it. We know what to do. Our economists have told us, with remark- able unanimity and precision." Because "we know what to do” Griswold, like many other observers, was convinced that the only thing that could keep us from doing it would be the excesses of "agrarian particularism" with its "arbitrary...free-for-all among pressure groups."13 But the policy makers did not follow the advice of the economists. As Lauren Soth noted, somewhat incredulously, in 1957: "Despite all the 1961), p. 1. Whether or not the objectives to which the economists could recommend a number of alternative means are the objectives sought bY the policy makers is another question. For instance, in this example the authors haven't really posed four different criteria, but have merely stated one basic criterion in four different ways. However, the sentiment is there; they could advise on any objective named by the policy makers. 13Farming and Democracy, p. 214. Italics mine. n V , ) , . . . ‘4 J . C - , . . r . I v 7 ,7 - J ' ‘c. \. .1 ' 7 . K x , _ i. . . ; 4 O ,. . ’ . Q Q . f . . e , - 1 . - . n A , J J . _) O .1 A. A , a ’ I <) l ‘ l _ . 7 r , . T , r O ' \ 1 l , a z ‘7 I \ r . . . J ’ ' I 4 tr- , i , \ 1 C .4 1’7 ‘ 4 ' P J- c» , . g I \ . . . C , ’ ~- 77 . . O - ' x or \“ . \ o a .1. es .5 . n . . e c. o -— A” A ... 1 Jar \ 3 -” { J‘r’ I .0 r a _. avv l, J j .a o r . l u I L .I 4 .)- J ,‘ at \,' \, p 272 erudite studies of the problem of farm adjustment, deSpite...the over- whelming majority of expert Opinion among agricultural economists and independent research groups advising change in federal price supports... these programs remain essentially the same now as they were in 1945-46."14 This discrepancy between what the policy makers did and what the eXperts advised has caused considerable consternation among some ob- servers. Davis, after noting that the abundance of factual information available to the policy makers, lamented: Yet there are few areas in which the failure to grapple effec- gively with obstinate policy issues has been so serious and pro- tracted.... Thus the nation continues in the grip of a badly working, indefensible system. This extremely costly failure re- flects on all of us. Somehow the impasse must be broken.15 Lthers like Soth took comfort in the notion that "this is the way of democracy, and it is the best way."16 Because of the wideSpread acceptance of these propositions, analysts of the agricultural political scene have generally, either implicitly or explicitly, eliminated the policy makers' understanding of the economics of agriculture as a significant factor in the policy making process. As a result the range of factors which might be used to explain the course of postwar behavior has been significantly narrowed. This assumption that the policy participants knew what to do and that they really knew better than to do what they did has distorted virtually every serious attempt to describe the postwar agricultural policy making process. 14Farm Trouble, p. 19. 15The Annals, cccxxx1, 94, 95. 16Farm Trouble, p. 218. JG 3 3 '\ \j \1 J ,1... 1) . 7‘1. (J 1 fr... Li ...I J .ri. r _ .. _ J ‘pl. 4 r \l/ . . .. l r , . r , Ira \ \Iv is z 34 L 1 «I E, J, 9. )I n- ,. urlu are l. r! L l» .l Ix .r1. 3. .rl j .x. . I4 \ ‘1 1, I 1r or“ ...Qir 3 RI I: r , \ I . L J x F v n \r/ z or . p I r e i [.11 y . . \J . ,J l a {L l L, , r r x . . ... r s . . P. . o o . r‘ H v I; .\ 0 Q o '\ e s . . 273 A central purpose of this study is to secure a better under- standing of why the policy makers have so consistently ignored the recommendations of the policy area of price supports and production con- trol. Possible explanations have been suggested, at least implicitly, in previous chapters,and in Chapter X we will submit this question to direct and systematic analysis. However, as a necessary prelude to that analysis we need to take a closer look at the role of the agricultural economists in the policy making process, and secure a better understanding of their positions on agricultural policy,and to identify some of the underlying factors which have shaped their arguments. Although general economists have concerned themselves with this area,the study of the economics of agriculture and agricultural policy has been primarily the preserve of the agricultural economists. Agri- cultural economists have been participants in the policy making process in a deeper sense than simply the supplying of basic data. As Soth states: Professional agricultural economists probably have been closer to practical affairs in their field than economists specializing in any other branch of economic activity. Working in the land grant colleges, the Department of Agriculture, and the farm or- ganizations, they have been participants in policy formation since the beginning of the postwar farm troubles of the twenties...many have been key men in the writing of "farm plans," in the advisory councils of Congress, the Department of Agriculture, and the farm organizations, and in the many studies of agricultural policy by independent agencies.17 Not only have agricultural economists been important participants in the sense described above, they have also been important sources of what we know about the agricultural policy making process. Some of the more important historical surveys and contemporary commentaries on 17Ib1do, p. 18. _.‘._____._._ __ «J. at. «V v, r , I \ d» u . Ic .: l )u _ ) O J l 4 .L 1;. a r y .xnu J . 1., V . .11 P. Q I:, r .. f e 3 Fr‘.. 1, .1 a , , . Alt. . _ \V . . w; I/ I A g It I J . . a . y; A .2 .r‘ r, r , vi 3 . , A .... J J. r _ 'fl . \. or; r \/ J (If. F _ ' L l, x) ’ x. J o a. 3 .l 1. . V‘ J 4 -. . . i _ l x I» .rL .. r r . .J J 7 1 :i. \J I \J .l I l ,. J .1» i1 _ . 1... «J .l V D .l. I . . r? . 4 ), _ . c x a ,J v Q ,. J ...\ pra \ Irlg. Wu ,1“ O 274 agricultural policy making have been produced by agricultural economists. And other important observers of the politics of agriculture, men such as Charles Hardin, Lauren Soth, and Ross Talbot, have been strongly in- fluenced by them. During the early 1930's agricultural economists played important roles as both designers and advocates of the parity price support system which came into being with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. By the middle 1930's their earlier enthusiasm began to wane. By the late 1930's and early 1940's, as they saw Congress raise the supports to ever higher levels and to extend them to more and more commodities, a majority of the economists became convinced that a hydra-headed monster had been created. One of the maneuvers by the farm interests that the agricultural economists found particularly disconcerting was the successful drive to insert into the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 a provision which specified that the ceiling on agricultural products would not be less than 110 percent of parity. The Act was signed into law in January,and in February, John D. Black, one of the most prolific and respected agri- cultural economists of the period, began to write a book attacking parity pricing.18 This was a book written in anger. Black believed that the success of the ”Farm bloc" in getting its way, against vigorous Presi- dential opposition, was a self-interest power play that was simply in- tolerable. His book was one of the first full-dress attacks on parity pricing by an agricultural economist, but, as he notes, a great many of ) 18Parity, Parity, Parity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942 . c) .. r V , V 1v .l; I .— l #J, VA . .it 1 c—‘I J n“ e 1|. l» . 7» l, u C . r‘ l r ,‘J , 3 ,r .m i 3 . e r v or re r , II J J. r 3 w e 1L J "1,» ), _ r1 ll 0 v t. ., l .J\ g 0 a d [J I. I III . \ M J 2‘ 0‘ l/ x Wu ‘J PI} Y. or: ‘ . 1 J l .|/ I.I. r . trio. of nrl .1. To L . ell \ . . . O . o a. o. l J .\ r N. r _ i, N p. (I J . 11. I rI‘ IIW r’. x . u L, ,\ I. .1 ‘1 o. 3, ) 31,, J ‘l I. » .. r I\ Fl... 1,; q, ), cf. .t 1 ll a l «mu 11 A j p, l , . L w . .f, .r . WV 275 his colleagues had already come to share his views. He favorably quotes "a highly respected fellow agricultural economist" who "referred to the whole idea of parity as 'vicious,'" and adds that "defined and applied as parity has been increasingly in the last few years, not many would differ with him."19 Part of Black's effort was devoted to a tracing of the history of parity, and in this respect the book is a rather interesting exercise in the art of convenient loss of memory. Black does an injustice to his profession and to history by virtually ignoring the yeoman contributions that agricultural economists, such as himself, had made to the concept and mechanics of parity pricing. However, he is quite correct in stressing that the farm interests had come to place an emphasis on parity pricing that had never been intended by the agricultural economists. As Black frequently put it, no "self-respecting" economist agreed with the emphasis that had come to be placed on parity prices. By the middle 1940's, looking forward to the day that Congress would have to reconsider the whole price policy question, agricultural economists, acting individually and through special study committees, began to produce what came to be a plethora of studies and reports attempt- ing to demonstrate the folly of retaining the existing price support system, and laying down guidelines for what they considered to be a sound and rea- sonable approach to the economic problems of agriculture. The committee which wrote the 1944 report of Association of Land- Grant Colleges was liberally sprinkled with agricultural economists and lgIbido, pp. 4, 348-490 .v k . \ J u . t. . l . Wu ‘1] x . I W V , a .I. o l l v r o '11 r: n. ‘ QC . ,_ . .\ . a o u A orJ - rlL .E _ l ._ J 3 VI A s. .. t T} , , 4 ._ . my ) u: . r, I) oi AV (1 V J , t .l 34 (, \Ll (.J ‘1 \ r A 1 a... B 276 2 the report itself was well received by the professional community. 0 A survey of members of the American Farm Economics Association in 1946 showed that few agricultural economists endorsed the existing policy. The vast majority thought that government should get out completely or, at the most,engage in price fixing aimed at eliminating the extreme price fluctuations and/or protecting farmers from depression level con- ditions. Virtually all agreed that if there were to be price supports they should not be maintained through government purchases of surpluses. In 1945 the American Farm Economics Association sponsored an essay contest on the subject "A Price Policy for Agriculture, Consistent with Economic Progress, That Hill Promote Adequate and More Stable Income From Farming." In reporting the results the president of the Association said that among the papers submitted by "farmers and other laymen there was 1 a strong accent in favor of fixed prices,‘ while among the papers sub- mitted by professionals ”the general trend of thought was toward freer markets."dz Of the 18 essays which were awarded prizes all rejected the 20T. W. Schultz thought it the "most significant document ever issued by the association" and urged its "wide dissemination,"'Postwar Agricultural Policy: A Review of the Land-Grant Colleges Report," The igurnal of Land and Public Utility Economics, XXI (Maya 1945): 96. Murray R. Benedict identified it as "one of the most serious efforts to come to grips with...farm policy" and reported that it was "widely read and dis- cussed," Farm Policies of the United States: 1790-1950 (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 19537jwp. 409. 210f those responding to the survey, 4 percent voted to retain the present system; 19 percent thought government should get out com- Pletely; 40 percent voted for a forward pricing system to stabilize prices; 37 percent favored supports only under depression conditions. Of those favoring some kind of support only 8 percent favored government pur- chases of surpluses. “Agricultural Economists' Views on Farm Price Policy," lgurnal of Farm Economics, XXVIII (May, 1946), 604—607. 22Journal of Farm Economics, XXVII (November, 1945), p. 740. . I ‘1 , x r _ I l m J r‘ r. 3. J . , .. 0.]. AV . ‘0, \ I U I _ . x m. l. W .‘Iv . r .m 1’, O, . u l a \z r _ n v ll _ .‘V v \r; I n . A V . . L l 1 , f, u Or .7 i \} ‘ r. K . m I . ‘ u . . ., o . \ l r e V 7 11 u L, .(. a; J l 1 . W”. A. v . , . l r . J ,i J v . l [- IVA . . l ,, . u , r . I 1 I J J till 1., / l . C I A , ‘J u, .1 l —l C II x L a ,J r _ l .V , _ L. a l e v n J m . I l‘ « 277 existing program. About a third of the essayists argued for free market pricing. The others argued for a "forward pricing system."23 Those who took this view argued that whenever market prices diverged from the for- ward prices the differences should be made up by direct payments to farmers, allowing the market to seek its own level, rather than government purchases through an instrumentality such as the CCC. All were particu- larly critical of the parity concept. None suggested any form of produc- tion control.24 Despite the economists' persistent and voluminous criticism of the price support program,the legislation of 1948 and 1949 reflected little of what they had been recommending and most of what they had been condemn- ing.25 The fact that Congress chose to slightly modify rather than abandon 23Forward pricing was a term used to describe a program in which the government, after estimating current and expected supply and demand, would determine the price at which the coming year's production would ex- pect to sell in the open market. Farmers would be guaranteed this price even if open market prices fell below it. The objective would not be to SUpport prices at a level consistently above what the open market would generate, but to simply stabilize the prices received by farmers and also, by announcing them for a year in advance, to give the farmer a better basis for planning his production. 24The prize winning papers were printed in the November, 1945 issue. A good summary of the essays is to be found in William H. Nichols and D. Gale Johnson, "The Farm Price Policy Awards, 1945: A Topical Digest of the Winning Essays," Journal of Farm Economics, XXVIII (February, 1946), 267-293. 25Professional criticism of the parity formula probably produced the most significant legislative results. Most of the experts would have preferred that the parity concept be entirely abandoned, but if parity pricing was to be continued they urged a substantial modification of the formula. Their arguments were heeded in part and the old parity formula was altered to some extent, although these alterations fell short of the revisions sought by the economists. p—e. U q I z A . I , t . , . . 1 , , ‘ I ‘~ I a > r . . . a . . | ) b ‘ A 4L ‘ g ‘ J v r ’ ‘ o 1 . x l w .L ’ . . N . A ~ - . . ‘ A 4‘ T J L 1 , f ' . s l ,, » ‘ y. \W q— r' F . . , u . ‘ g | , / 2 i . I ' , / ‘ A 1 r a . l " I ) “ , . a V y r, V , , I 1. v . ‘ ‘ 7’ ‘ Q . ' ‘ J A n J h, n . 2 ‘ J . o I. . . k . v J ‘ ' in . \ v A l ‘ ‘ 3 V . , , A a 3 . . . A) , . ( , \/ ea- 7 . . . . . . F O " 1 ' J /V \’ t .. 1 . ‘ «-1 _ ; 1V1..- -r_———'—' 278 the traditional price support and production control structure was a source of great and often bitter disappointment to the economists. They looked forward to 1954 when Congress would once again have to consider the price policy issue. Symbolic of the thinking of many during that period was a report by a blue ribbon committee of thirteen economists in 1952.26 The committee members, eight of whom were former presidents of the American Farm Econ- omics Association, urged that in the interest of general economic welfare the existing program be abandoned and free market pricing be re-established. They recommended that farmers be given some protection during depressions, not in the form of price supports, but in the form of supplemental income payments. They argued that "free-market clearing prices are likely to do a better job of pulling the economy out of business depression than a program of government price supports and the production limitations which they call for."27 The conndttee argued that whatever benefits farmers had gained from government price support activities since 1929 had been temporary and mostly illusory. They contended that these programs had acted to pre- vent badly needed adjustments in agricultural production, thus breeding and perpetuating economic inefficiencies which were detrimental to the general welfare and to the long-run welfare of the farmer himself. Moreover, 26Turning the Searchlight on Farm PoliCYi A Forthright Analysis of Experience, Lessons,_Criteria,yand Recommendations (Chicago: The Farm Foundation, 1952). 271bid., p. 70. \ U c —_- ___.._..__..._-.——- ._—._ .-__._.. ._.—a..._ 279 going beyond the bounds of economics, the committee suggested that such programs created a climate in which the farmer too often turned to govern- ment, rather than being self-reliant, and in which the narrow self interest of the few was too easily secured against the general interest of the many. Although some of the economists found the language of the Farm Foundation excessively polemical, most agreed with its general position on price supports. As John K. Galbraith noted in 1954, the price support program was being "condemned by the professional students with remarkable unanimity.... In the current climate of professional attitudes approval of the present farm policy, one senses, would be not alone exceptional 28 but eccentric." The price support and production control program has been con- demned by the eXperts for a host of reasons, the following being some of the more important. (1) Price supports were seen as an inflationary force. Because inflation was a matter of considerable concern in the immediate postwar years this criticism received a great deal of attention until about the mid-1950's. (2) Price supports and the scarcity program of production controls were said to hurt consumers, particularly those in the low income brackets. (3) One of the sharpest criticisms had to do with the effect that the program would have on international trade. Virtually all the economists were convinced that the Government's efforts to move surpluses into the international market would thoroughly disrupt the world trade in farm products and would have serious economic effects on both importing and exporting nations, as well as causing serious 28"Economic Preconceptions and Farm Policy," The American Egonomic Review, XLIV (March, 1954), 41, Italics mine. L, 2 \ ¢v_ . \l . , l (V . x l, . u , . x O . o . . . L I ., l o r 4 ,J a . O I, . , 1 o I A r\ \, . i ,v . i. p. b, n; u t, A J oi } /\ I I t, r . 1. . 4 l I . f . , u Ox , l I X , e 'x. r t L , a . t\ p l , (A r . u k , . .c .u . . . . . w , . . . .I A .. ._ .x . r~ _ . .\ 280 political repercussions. (4) Quite a number of economists also warned of non—economic dangers such as loss of farmer freedom and too much central- ized government power. (5) The most important criticism by far was that the policy had a highly detrimental effect on efficiency. It was charged that the maintenance of artificial prices above the free market level would seriously impede the efficient allocation of resources within agriculture; farmers would produce too much of certain commodities and not enough of others. Even more seriously, the price and control policy would prevent the efficient allocation of resources between agriculture and the rest of the economy; Specifically, the high prices would act to keep too many labor resources (farmers) in agriculture. Aside from creating great allocative inefficiencies, many believed that the growth in technical efficiency would also be impaired.2 The economists were so opposed to price supports because they be- lieved that while free market prices would not solve all of agriculture's problems they would at least not give rise to problems such as the fore- going. The general theory of competitive, consumer-choice, economic systems assigns to free market prices an extremely important role--that of being the primary determinant of efficient resource allocation in the economy. 29The critical literature of this period is too extensive to fully index. However, in addition to those already cited we would call atten- tion to Readings on Agricultural Poligy, assembled and published under the sponsorship of the American Farm Economics Association, 0. B. Jesness, ed. (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1949). Pertinent sections of Murray R. Benedict's Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950 are also useful. The Journal of Farm Economics is, of course, the most valuable continuing source. For a limited but useful summary of the general atti- tudes through at least the mid-1950's see Galbraith's American Economic Review article cited above and his "Farm Policy: The Current Position," igurnal of Farm Economics, XXXVII (May, 1955), 292-308. ,. . . o . I v / a J . v - V . J r . r — ..l A O . - ‘ ‘ ' i l / J I . \. l I . ‘ ‘ ~ 2 ‘ ‘ A . .1 r,‘ v , _ ‘ - r i J . ' A # l x .A . 7 7’ . . J . , — ‘ ‘ i r . M o _. t ‘ m A 4 . _ ‘ . v t O ' V L. e r . J . J r J u - . I , J _ I , y ) - r . . . ‘ ‘ L ,I t ‘ ‘ / a J , ' D . . ' ‘ J t l J ) L ‘ , a g r . (I 1 I _“ \ x . , , )' _, . r , k . J . . . . . ) J . ‘2 ; j . ‘ . 7 A O s - . . ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ . ' ) ‘ , - O r 7 l , - O . I. t f i q , , , ‘ W, x. ‘ r v . y _ ‘l O ' ' fl - I \ . ‘ . I ' . , ‘ ‘ - ) ’ e i Q C . I ‘ ~ . . ‘ v . A I . . C ‘ . . . _ . _ J , 7‘ k . \ . .,_ U ' . V 4 . " .. 0 . . ‘ .r 231 Economists, then, are usually disturbed by the appearance of forces which disrupt the free interplay of prices, whether they be the forces of oligopoly and monopoly or direct government intervention in the market place. Because of economic concentrations and other factors, prices no longer fully perform the traditional role assigned to them by classical economic theory. But generally Speaking,economists of whatever specialization and of whatever professional or political coloring have urged that the mechanism of market pricing be kept as free as possible. As one recently put it: It seems appropriate that economists should seek to enhance and extend the role of price in their policy recommendations, much as judges should seek to enhance and extend the rule of law in their discussions. Justices of the Supreme Court are widely re- garded as liberal or conservative in their philosophies, just as economists are so categorized, but each justice is nevertheless guided by the law. Economists of divergent persuasion identify themselves with the goals of individual freedom and the preserva- tion of the free society. But, however, divergent their persuasions they agree upon the desirability of maintaining and improving the price system.JO Probably no other group of economists has been more vigorous in their efforts to "enhance the role of price in their policy recommendations" than have the agricultural economists. Agriculture is the last major econ- omic sector in the economy to exhibit a nearly model-perfect competitive structure. Possibly agricultural economists are influenced by a romantic attachment to it and thus particularly resent government intrusion in this area. Whatever the case, the following comment by Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman is appropriate: ‘— 30Roger w, Gray, "SomeThoughts on the Changing R019 0f Price," Journal of Farm Economics, XLVI (February, 1964), 126-27. a . . . l ‘ J 7 o ,- n \ ‘ x . ' . . f . l ‘ J \ _ r . a . . 1 , . .-‘ ‘4 7 , J i n ‘ ‘ r ' u ‘ ) o ' l v ‘ l ' r - I r \ J x r . I , Q \ a r , r r, ‘4 . _ . , . J O J u ' v p. .4 ' o . . . r o J o u ) r A A , , . ' \ .1 l A . t . t r l o i . . h _ F ' ‘ I . m ‘ 7 L . ‘ v V l s) , s l a . .L, A -‘ I '. ' v . A. l ) ‘ ,. ,1 282 I have chided some of my economist friends, both in and out of government, for being up—to-date, pragmatic, and reasonable in regard to general economics, but when they come to an agri- cultural problem, they get out their dog-eared copy of Adam smith.J This, of course, does not mean that the profession is dominated by laisse-faire economists. To be sure, many are as close to this end of the Spectrum as a modern day economist can be, but most crowd the middle of the road with a fair sprinkling running along the left side. But whether liberal or conservative, most prefer free market pricing although they may disagree greatly about the proper relationship between government and agriculture in other areas. Closely related to the economists' natural professional aversion to direct government price supports is their natural distaste for produc- tion controls. H. S. Houthakker possibly puts it a little strongly, but he expresses a common sentiment: "Supply management is the negation of everything that economics stands for; namely greater output of saleable products, efficient allocation of resources, and recognition of inter- dependence.'82 In recent years the list of dissenters from these views on prices and production restriction has grown somewhat. Chief among this group are the agriculture economists who have figured prominently in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Along with their disillusionment with government price supporting activities,a great number of economists also experienced a considerable 31Speech before the American Farm Economics Association, "Agri- culture at the Crossroads," Journal of Farm Economics, XLIV (December, 1962). 1161. 32"Discussion: Principles of Economic Policy, Consistent and In- consistent: Economics of our Present Farm Price Support Policy," Journal gi_Farm Economics, XLV (May, 1963), 353. Italics mine. I . 4 . A . p . \ . p J o . V - _ . . . . _ , . _ O . _ . A, .c . .J A O J , . . . . . ' . > . . t ,, . 4 . , . . . ; 1| . J . . 7 J \ _ I , . , , . . .\ . , O f a g or J ) . . , .1 I o . ., , a . 1 . o . a r J . ,1 l N . 7 , o 283 disillusionment with the political process which had generated these policies. In their initial discussions of postwar policy, economists usually went to great pains to caution against narrow self-interest, blinding the participants to the needs of the general welfare. Typi- cally, O. B. Jesness warned of the dangers of taking the demands of farm pressure groups "too seriously," although he counseled that in a democracy the "remedy is enlightenment rather than elimination."33 As Congress failed to heed their recommendations many economists became more caustic in their criticism of self-seeking interest groups, leaders and politicians." Earl Butz, head of the department of agricultural economics at Purdue University, spoke to many sympathetic ears when he said that the stand by many congressmen for high price SUpports "reflects not nearly so much their genuine concern for the long-term welfare of 34 American agriculture as their desire to control Congress." The authors of the Farm Foundation report in discussing the various grOUps involved in the policy process had this to say under the pointed heading of "The Statesmen and Politicians": While many Senators and Representatives, many state legis- lators, and many in executive and administrative posts studiously and conscientiously try to weigh agricultural policies on the scales of sound national interest, we discern also a tendency in the last thirty years for agricultural policy to be regarded by some farm state politicians as opportunities to serve special interests.35 33"Postwar Agricultural Policy-~Pressure vs. General Welfare," lgurnal of Farm Economics, XXVIII (February, 1946), 8. 34"Politics of Agriculture," Proceedings, National Agricultural §£§dit Conference, Chicago, 1953, p. BK. ‘— 355631‘Ch113ht... , p. 610 l J 1 , _ , . _ .111 . 4 a a \J . 1 1 l, 4 , . r a . C . \l .1 . J I ,1 J u 1 _ . _ ,\ t . . . . . nu , 1.. . 1 t, \ Aw I . , ‘1\ p l 1, _ J . , x , .r , 1. o _ I . 1 I" If: . . , V J . A, , O . t, a . r a 4 o\ .1 D\ A n «J , r 7 , 'L .~ . Ill ex 0 . l1 _ o J V . 1 r l . I. V ~\ C . w l L . , . w). 5 . 1 ‘ . 284 By the latter part of the 1950's one notices an abatement in at least the tone of the economists' criticism of the price support and production control program and the political process which generated it. The acidity of their critical commentary had been reduced, in part, be- cause of the growing recognition that the policy was not having the calamitous results so long predicted, and also by the almost simultaneous recognition that the elimination of price supports would have a much more damaging impact on the farm economy than they had earlier anticipated. This probably was instrumental in bringing about a calmer tempered approach in their commentary on the political process noticeable after the mid-1950's. Also at times one notes an air of resignation of the type adOpted by a disappointed but understanding parent toward his errant child. Another type of resignation to be noted is that effected by some economists who, as one observer put it, after witnessing "several successive defeats" come "to decide that trying to inject some economics into United States farm policy is a hopeless task, probably not worth accomplishing."36 Whatever the explanation, one now finds less rancor and fewer patronizing remarks about special interests and national general welfare in the critical commentary by economists. For example, the par- ticipants of an agricultural policy conference in 1961 explored various aspects of the political process with notably little indulgence in righteous . . 37 indignation and "good guys versus bad guys" language. ‘— 36Dale E. Hathaway, Government and Agriculture, p. 399. 37Goals and Values in Agriculturaerolicy, Iowa State University Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment (Ames: Iowa State Univer- sity Press, 1961). J . k .. e , k / . r o v _ A ’ I. I 1) _ . a . I r J . . l1. . . r , x . 3 , A r . l A s . l J i F a P . a . O J ’ 1 q p 1, v C a , . a x. H 1 .V V n l 0 J \ 1. OK \ . a ‘14 J 1, d . J, l , J 11 , l J. l r . . x, I A .A 1x 4 a J z .rlfl I. _ . . I i 4 ) r}. t . . J a q r _ J I I! J . 12 .71. , “1.. I J . . . . . r ~ C o . . A . r .H , . _ r , . r V C D .\ 1., \ . 1 . . . , . l . . r s \, l _ . . u . l — a I , . .1; . . ex A ’ . . 1 -1 l I , x , . '\ . I . _ . , , 0 . u 4 r 1, 285 One of the factors that has strengthened the credibility of the criticisms by economists is the myth, popular with many economists and observers, that the role of economics and economists in policy making is essentially a technical and a neutral one. Technical data itself, of course, is neutral, but the impact of technical economic data on policy is greatly affected by the type of data gathered and the manner in which it is presented. In short, while data may be neutral, those who gather and present the "hard facts" seldom are. The value commit- ment of the analyst is particularly critical in the definition and de- lineation of the problem(s) toward which policy is to be directed. If the problem is fully defined by the political process then the role of the expert in detailing the specifics of that problem can be more nearly neutral. But increasingly in today's complex society the eXpert plays an important role in defining the problem. And every definition of a public problem by its very nature necessarily involves a value reference. A neutrally defined public problem is a contradiction in terms. Economists do, of course, in part, play a purely technical role. But they are not mere technicians. They have strong value commitments and these commitments affect their behavior both in their definitions of public problems and in their discussions of alternative means of deal- ing with the problem. Their dedication to the discipline of economics assures this. Economic theory from Smith to Keynes is shot through with value judgments. Because some of these important values are hidden in the foundation assumptions, some economists are prone to forget that the theoretical models through which they view the world are colored: g‘ c-) f. /‘~.2 It is strange, indeed, how tenaciously many economists believe sincerely and innocently that the concept of free competitive mar- ket is devoid of any value judgment, is beyond good or evil like the laws of nature, and that it represents, therefore, the only objectively true standard with which economic reality should be compared. From this pseudo-scientific position they plunge, with a somersault unnoticed by most of them, into the moral-political value judgment that the free-market mechanism is really best for what people want and any deviation from it is bad for them-~even though people don't know it.‘38 It is fortunate that economists are not mere intellectual tech- nicians, for such minds are the instrumentalities of the Brave New Worlds. To see the economists' participation in the policy process as purely technical and neutral is, therefore, unfair to the economists themselves, to the other policy makers and to the observer of the policy process, highly misleading. It is far beyond the reach of this study to identify in detail the various value orientations of economists. However, we want to deal with two common attitudes which we believe significantly affect the be- havior of the economists and, as a result, the agricultural policy making process itself. These have to do with the economists' attitude toward efficiency and their attitudes toward the family farm creed and the family farm policy goal. Economists are first of all experts on efficiency, but they are much more than this, they are advocates of efficiency. As Earl Butz stated, "the economist seeks to increase efficiency of resource utiliza- n: ' o 9 U9 0 O 0 0 tion and to maXimize returns." Economists periodically remind themselves 38Rainer Schickele, Agricultural Policy: Farm Programs and National Eflliiifi (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954), p. 37. l_ 39"Agricultural Economists in the Political Environment of Policy Making," Journal of Farm Economics, XXXVII (May, 1953), 190. ' ' J l . - 5 , \ , _ o * ‘ . . J a n — c ‘ ’ V 1 . ‘ . ' ’ . u. 4 a a ' I ‘ ‘ ’ ‘- 5 ii \ I J _ _ . 7 . e " 7,, 1 ‘ I , , . _ . ' . . ‘1 l )« A L ‘ ' V . 1 n , ' ’ L \ ‘ Q l J ’7 1 ' K > V . ‘ 4 7 ‘-‘ a ‘ t . F . . A - .. 7 ’ l ‘ 4 \‘ A J 7 ‘il ' C v. I L - _ - - » r 1 ' " I '- J .J V ‘7‘ \ .( . ‘ A O ' A ‘ \ 4 ’ f I ‘ 1. ‘ , , ~ . - , . A - ’ ... .4 ‘ ‘ ' ll ... - J _ . . ' . F J 7 . ‘ , . ‘1 L . V I . ) ~ I r - V J ' a J I ‘ I ‘1 - ‘ ‘ ’ .1. 1 Q ’ r 1 . ° - 1 ’ l, ’ A. ' . _ I I ’ ‘ ‘ , 1 $ ,3 1 / , . . I k , . J a - _ e x 1 _ — e o _- ’ I - r ,A . . I J ' k v , \ . _ , . O .. I \ ' o - ‘ . . 1 _ O 1' . o ' I - C ~ r - O o ’ . J a s . O n ‘ , > 1 . . . . i‘ , »’ r J I ‘ I u ‘ J 7 R r_ . e f 1. O . a l 7 ’ _ . v A . c . J V —. J I ‘ V ‘ k 1‘ J J v. ' L s , l . ‘ C , . 3 J - 2 1 l ) . u, x -1 k ..I 1 . I X . 4 * _ ‘ I ' K - ‘ \ V V , . . a , J ’ , .— \ , ~ .c ‘ A‘ ~‘ 7 ‘ x . I 1 . J n J " u ’ I V n ‘ - \ . J ‘ r , - c . . . _ J. . . . - . 7 ‘ \ . I u v -‘ I I 0 ‘ I F . v C ‘ . \ . J‘ \ r , .“ . :- " ~‘ I ‘ . g ,, , 287 that efficiency should not be allowed to become an all consuming end. But for most, efficiency is inevitably seen as good, inefficiency as bad. This attitude toward efficiency has dominated their descriptions of the "agricultural problem," greatly affected their criticisms of agricultural policies, and conditioned their recommendations for change. Thus, al- though economists have argued that they are, or should be, prepared to advise on whatever course of action the policy makers choose,the course that they expect the policy makers to pursue is always clear: We, as agricultural economists, should have technical competence to discover and explain the consequences of given economic actions so that farmers and those who shape our economic institutions or formulate our economic policies may have a sound basis for choosing their course of action. That course should be one which promotes troductive and distributive efficiency and at the same time con- serves other values, such as individual freedom, which our people hold to be coordinate with, or even superior to, sheer productive efficiency. Economists and educators should not be special pleaders for any group or any cause other than economic efficiency and national welfare.4O During the 1930's several of the economists actively advising and participating in the making of agricultural policy exhibited a willing- ness to make concessions on the matter of efficiency--our general wealth was great enough we didn't have to be thoroughly efficient in all things. Agricultural economists such as M. 1. Wilson, John D. Black, Chester Davis, and Mordecai Ezekiel, who contributed much to the formula- tion and administration of agricultural programs of the 1930's, held this View.41 However, a few prominent economists, such as Joseph DaV1s, were 4OSearchlight, p. 62. 41For a sampling of the views of these economists see: Black, flgricultural Reform, pp. 59-60; M. L. Wilson, 0. E. baker and Ralph . Borsodi, Agriculture in Modern Lifg_(New York: Harper & Brothers Publish- ers, 19393, pp. 244-45; Mordecai Ezekiel, "The Shift in Agricultural I. 288 unwilling to make any such concessions.42 The young agricultural econ- omist, T. W. Schultz, probably best reflected the general attitude at that time when he stated: The broad socio-political end which American agriculture pre- sumably is striving to attain, namely that of maintenance and strengthening the family type farm is an end which permits society on the production side to use its resources most efficiently. It should be pointed out, however, that the productive accomplish- ments of American farmers is such that we might well afford, under normal peace time conditions, at least, to give up some_productive efficiency if necessary in order to attain the end, the family type farm."43 Such expressions were made against the background of vast under- employment of resources in almost all sectors of the economy, thus render- ing the goal of allocative efficiency somewhat superfluous. Also, at that time, there seemed to be little question but that the family farm was as technically efficient as any other type of production unit. In the post- war period the achievement of a fully employed economy has become a much more meaningful goal, thus elevating the importance of allocative effic- iency. One of the reasons why economists came to be so Opposed to the price support program as it evolved during the 1940's was the belief that it would prevent the achievement of maximum allocative efficiency by freez- ing agricultural production patterns and particularly by acting to keep too Policies Toward Human Welfare," Journal of Farm Economics, XXIV (May, 1942), 463-76: Chester C. Davis, "How Does the Economic Status of Agri- culture or the Economic Relation of Agriculture to Other Industries and Commerce Affect Possible Standards of Living of Farmers," Farm Income and Farm Life, Dwight Sanderson, ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927;, pp. 101-107. 42"Observation on Agricultural Policy," Journal of Farm éseeemiss. XIX (November, 1937), 861-77. 43"Discussion: Schisms in Agricultural Policy," Journal of Farm Eseeemissa XXIV (May. 1942), 513. r3 . ‘ ’ l J . V, r a, . - a ’ I ' - ', , ... a s , a w V . . ’ ' .1— fl . . > , J ~ . ’ , ' I (a , - » JV . y I c t \ U ' o , - l . _ J - ‘ _/ \.4 I _ ‘ . i 1.. ‘ J ‘ J . - . . i . . A J ~ ' _ l J - 4 , . . . - , . I - - 7 . ‘ . . - ‘ r . , . ' A r ' _ r ~ 7 ¥ J . . r . _, V 7 I .. .. V ~ Q ’ ' I , z 3 J y. , Av .1 ' J . l , I . hi . r 4 . ' I f ’ J. , A , ) 1.1 - , r ’ . 7 J Q“, a , - _ , A e. , a . J r c a . , J J c I ’ ‘1 t. . \ c a .\ 1 V I -.J,, O r . . a — n n. f' ’3 .,J- Li . u .‘ L. _ y I s. . .fl .\J_\'- 4 . . - . ' a ' 289 many labor resources in agriculture. Because the program would supposedly perpetuate too many small and unproductive family units in agriculture this would prevent advances in technical efficiency as well. Partly as a result of this, economists in the postwar period have been far less willing to make concessions on the matter of efficiency, despite the fact that we are a far richer nation and despite the fact that American agriculture has consistently recorded Spectacular gains in productivity. Thus the same T. w. Schultz who formerly thought agriculture was productive enough to justify keeping more farmers on the land than the dictates of efficiency might demand became, in the postwar period, the foremost chronicler of the so-called "' 44 inefficiency" in agriculture, and one of the most vigorous advocates of increasing the rate of out- migration from the farm via his proposal for a national policy of "home- . 4 steads in reverse." 5 The iconoclastic John K. Galbraith once twitted fellow economists for their excessive harping on the inefficiencies supposedly generated by the existing policies. However, his questions were raised not for the purpose of challenging his colleagues concern for efficiency, but because the existence of inefficiency had not been satisfactorily demonstrated. If inefficiency could be proved there would be no debate: "If inefficiency can be demonstrated, it is pro-tanto intolerable. There is no degrees of 44"How Efficient is American Agriculture?" Journal of Farm E2222migg, XXIX (August, 1947), 644-58. 45See e.g., "Homesteads in Reverse,” Farm Policy Forum, VIII (Spring, 1956), 12-15. . . ‘ ‘ 7 J J . I ‘ I I r, 77L ,7 g , O . . . r , a . , _, l ) H, i , . . w _ . , J ' ‘ . , u ‘ g I ) J I . ‘l . > I V .y . , v 4 l 9 . . F‘ ' ‘ J ~ v ‘ I ‘ A \4 p“ I \ . . - l , ' F l . - . . l .— I . ‘ ‘ , L a 4 J . . s I c I 4' . A . .... . . ' 1‘ . . l ‘ . - . , . a , . . r t . , . 4 - I . . ~ i ) a \l x > , . . < I I o I ,i . , . ‘ I r 1 - a v r y ‘ . 7 I . 4' a. 1 J , l o l ‘ , J .A V ~ .— p . x I. :“ 290 damage; a death sentence on the policy that produces it follows auto- "46 . m. . matically. A few economists, such as Willard Cochrane, have raised some challenging questions about the typical attitudes toward efficiency. Others, like Dale E. Hathaway, have stressed the need for maintaining a proper perspective: However rich, we cannot as a nation afford to do without economic change and progress in our agriculture. Because we are rich we can- not afford, in a political democracy, to ignore the very high cost that this change and progress forces farm people to bear. This means that we must continue to have progress and change in agriculture and that we must, if for no other reason than equity, have public policies to make these changes tolerable to farm people.47 To note that economists are greatly concerned with efficiency is not to speak disparagingly of the economists' intellectual commitment. Indeed, precisely because of that commitment it would be unjust to demand a different perSpective. What is demanded, however, is that the nature of that perspective be recognized, particularly by those who would describe the policy making process and the behavior of those who participate in it. Another common attitude that has affected the position of agri- cultural economists,viz.policy and policy makers,is their view of the family farm. Disillusionment over the politics of price policy convinced many agricultural economists that one of the important barriers to rational policy decisions was an excessive romanticism toward the family farm and/or persistent demagogic appeals to that tradition. Many have concluded that the continual "fuss" about "saving the family farm" has been a major cause —.— of the politician's persistent refusal to abandon the old and supposedly 46Amer1can Economic Review, XLIV, 48. 47Government and Agriculture, p. 399. .\ 291 inefficiency-breeding price support system. As a result many have come to exhibit a considerable hostility toward the creed and, at times, the family farm itself. Generally speaking, this hostility toward the family farm creed and goal has not been Openly and forcefully eXpressed. Those agricultural economists who have become convinced that the family farm creed is a factor in the policy process recognize just what a sacred cow the family farm is, and as a whole they are not in a very good position to Openly attack sacred cows. Most agricultural economists are in the employment of land-grant institutions or the United States Department of Agriculture. These in- stitutions o . \ l , i - V l . ‘ / ‘ .. J . , . . A ’ e, L O )' , , .- t . '1 ' ' , . e ' a V . r . ‘ V v v e ‘ P J ' \/ ‘ D 7 . . . . ‘ ' , , . - _ | . A ,0 \ .r , . 2 \ E ' a a , - . u 3 , . . . . - , r 3 ~ I . ‘ , C . r _ , , h} ’7 L ‘ a 0 . \I‘ - , . —— I" .. ....__.___.- at»;- 293 Agricultural economists, in their journal articles and text books, frequently attempt to identify the goals of agricultural policy, goals that they think other policy participants operate by and/or goals that they personally think should be followed. Significantly it is on fairly rare occasions that the promotion and preservation of the family farm appears in these sets of goals.52 A classic example of this type of glaring omission is an article by D. Gale Johnson, one of the more prominent agricultural economists.53 The purpose of the article is to identify and evaluate "all" the arguments that have been used "that might in any meaningful way distinguish agriculture from the other sectors of the economy and thus might serve as a basis for a different relation be- tween government and agriculture than prevails elsewhere."54 If this were to be a discussion of "all" the arguments that have been used to justify special treatment for agriculture one would expect that the family farm creed would at least receive a mention. But no, the only aspect of the creed that he touches on is the familiar tenet that all depressions are farm led and farm fed. There are several possible explanations for this tendency to ignore the family farm goal. One is that some agricultural economists, although 52There are exceptions to this, of course. For two examples see: Rainer Schickele, Agricultural Policy, Chapters XIX and XX and Dale E. Hathaway, Government and Agriculture, Part I. Schickele not only identi- fies the family farm goal but also endorses it. 53“Government and Agriculture: Is Agriculture a Special Case?" igurnal of Law ang;Economics, I (October, 1958), 122-136. 54Ibid., p. 136. 1" L4 ’l J .1 I D 294- aware that the family farm creed is much discussed by political partici- pants, chalk this up to mere political sloganeering and thus of no sig- nificant consequence. In other instances this behavior may be predicated on the assumption that if the "bogey man" is studiously ignored long enough it may go away someday. In still other instances this behavior 55 is probably the result of ivory-tower isolation. This is not to say that 3;; agricultural economists reject the family farm goal, but among those who have been dominant in the pro— fession in the postwar period there have been few exceptions. One notable exception is Willard w. Cochrane, former Chief Economic Advisor to Secre- tary of Agriculture Orville Freeman and intellectual father of "supply- management" approach to agriculture's income and surplus problem. In his book Farm Prices: Myth and Reality he makes his position clear: ...there is one institution I value particularly, one that is currently undergoing rapid change and may be in danger, like the whooping crane, of passing out of existence. It is the family farm-—the family farm as it flourished from the Alleghenys to the High Plains and north to the Ohio River. It provided a way of life as well as a way of business and to me it provided a good way of life. Now it provides primarily a way of business, and in years to come it may not provide even that in an owner-operator sense.... But what I want to say here is that I think our country will be losing something vital if it loses the institution of the owner-operator family farm.56 55Of late, agricultural economists seem to have shown a somewhat greater awareness of the influence of the family farm creed and have taken a somewhat more balanced view of it in the sense that it can be discussed without it being labeled and dismissed as corn-fed, political sloganeering and mawkish sentimentalizing. For example, see pertinent articles from the following three volumes of the Iowa State University Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment. Problems and Policies of American Agriculture, 1959; Egals and Valuesgin Agricultural Policy, 1961; Farm Goals in Conflict, 1963. The latter volume is the most valuable. “_ 56(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 131. -. - I ‘ .l - . ' i l t. x. . . , . ‘ ‘ I a A \ e . r . ._.. . . r . J - 7 . . ‘ . t . 1 J“ ,v \ 4 . . — \ A. _. I o 4 . I ‘ 1 . , I , .- Q 4- ‘ f' O ’ i ' . ...“; . A . ‘ J A l J o, ,I ., , i. J ‘ u 4., . A4. -‘ \l 4 7 s. i , ,-. _. . ’ N’ H‘ J fir ' A H .1 L ti, - . . I ‘ -i t ) & x, l g .. . 'r . . .‘ V ‘ A J- - x, 4 7' .- . ~ ' » .- . l, ‘ . . , W 7 ‘ x I . J \‘a . 4 ‘ . . . ‘ I A J ; w ¥ Y' e , ‘ ‘ ‘ l 1 , Q I | Q q ‘ e . _ r. ... A l 6 ‘ J .L _. V y o 7 -‘ .- ' R, r , L, . . m . _ I ”A 7 - ’ /’ J Is; A; > . l ‘ '_ ‘ 00-. , y. , ~ . 7 , V _ i - _‘ l ‘J' . . , A I .4 ‘ C J ‘ - \ o i l V ‘- '- o ‘ J \ . . O ‘ ‘7 .fi . ‘ . r , _ u i d ' A ~ I _ F - ’ . ‘ O I . L . — \ k v e' n h , ' O .4 ‘ 7 I r > _ 7' ‘ , r . ' ‘ ‘ . ' \ I x J , _ I f o , J J ,1 ) 295 With few exceptions, then, agricultural economists view the family farm simply as an economic production unit not essentially different than any other economic unit. Therefore, they would not de- fend the institution should it fail to remain as efficient as alternative production units. That most have not, as yet, urged its elimination is largely due to the fact that family farms--at least the larger ones-- have proven to be as efficient as alternative units.57 But in clear contradistinction to most of the other participants of the agricultural ‘ policy making process economists, as a whole, are not committed to the traditional family farm goal. They may support such goals as higher and more stable farm income, etcetera, but most cannot commit themselves to the policy goal of protecting and preserving the institution of the family farm as such. The ignoring of the family farm creed and this non-sharing of the family farm goal has affected the economists' role as critics, advisors, and active participants in the policy process. The lack of commitment to the family farm in conjunction with their commitment to efficiency has been reflected in their analysis of the farm problem. In their discussion and vieWpoints about the farm problem no proposition 1 has been more persistently advanced and more universally accepted than the proposition that one of the best ways to solve the farm income problem is to Speed up the out-migration from the farm. Acting on this proposi- tion, economists have urged the adoption of policies specifically aimed 57Among general economists there is probably more of a tendency to argue for a corporate, large-scale type agriculture. 5999 909-: William H. Peterson, The Great Farm Problem (Chicago: Henry Regenery Company, 1959), esp. p. 213. I . - . ‘ e r . ’ . . ' w 1 ._1 , e , . 7 ’7 A 7 l , r J A I o . q 7 . . . ' I » . . . , A ‘L J 7 _ . l \ , , l o . , . ‘ ' ¥ . . ‘ ' P \ ’ ’ - . ‘ ‘ a _ - 3 A ' ' ’ ’ ) _ . . , _ . . . J ' ( I ‘ F . ‘ _ ,7 1‘ . J . . ‘ l _ _ _ \ . . y »_ I 7 ' ) i ‘ ' A J - » . . g x) . ' r ' ) l ‘ 7’ ‘ x . ' A4 ) u- l . E . I‘\ 1 \ . . v‘ 0 ‘ L '- b ‘ ‘ 5 v - > z m A L . 7 ‘ b I v ‘ ‘y ’ a J _ . .. J a . . ‘ C N ’ o .L I _ J x \ x.) J I ‘ J . s . r ' ‘ 1 J V ~ 0 1 n Y I) ‘ ~ I ‘ L . b , l ‘ AJ ’ , . .-x \ ‘l ’ Q .. . . . K L y 7. 7. \2 i m . ,. t 7 \ v ._ ‘ \ . . _ . ‘ . . . W ‘ J )— . ‘ . c - , J . _ . _ . . _ ‘L A \ , n V. r > ' L . . \ J» 1. . . I I . - f ‘ l ‘ ‘ r, ) B . , . - , J ' l v V ‘4 - ‘ ‘ ‘ x ‘ 1 . . . . _ ‘ I —‘ I r . 1‘, .L . * — u . a g . I l » ~ . . . _ ’ ' 7 I ‘ J " ~ -. .J _ , , z ’ . .7 - ,. ...». 7. ,_, , _ n ' , ’ ‘ . . fl ‘ ’ r ‘ \ ~ ' J J.» 296 at increasing the exodus rate and have condemned those programs, which they have believed to constitute barriers to rapid out-migration. This attitude has acted to create a tension between the agri- cultural economists and those participants committed to the preservation of the family farm. Congressional participants and others have not taken the position that there should be 39 out-migration, but they have, gen- erally, resented proposals specifically aimed at moving people off the farm. This difference in sentiment is well expressed by Representative Charles Hoerven's (Rep., Iowa) reply to the Land-Grant College Association's policy proposals which had stressed the need for greater out-migration: "I say you should make agriculture so attractive to the young men on the farm that he is willing to stay there."58 Periodically this tension has erupted into openly hostile exchanges. Quite likely it is the case that these tensions have hindered the effective flow of communications between the groups. It would be grossly unjust to demand of economists that they endorse a policy goal which they do not believe sound. Still, the agri- cultural economists have been less than honest with themselves and with the other participants when they proclaim themselves ready to advise on any goal(s) generated by the political process. Economists have not, by and large, taken seriously the over-arching family farm goal and then pur- Posely sought to do research and to devise policy recommendations aimed at facilitating the realization of that goal. #7 58U. 8. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Hearings, Long- Bénge Agricultural Poligy, Part 3, 80th Cong., lst Sess., 1947, p. 415.77. Mr. Noble Clark, who presented the Association's recommendations, was quizzed sharply by other committee members on this point, see pp. 392-423. CHAPTER X ECONCMIC FACTS AND POLICY MAKING "Government policy can be no better than the information that underlies it." "In summary, economic projections in an economy as complex as ours is a complex business." Dale E. Hathaway1 Few public economic problems in the postwar period have been subjected to more extensive expert analysis and commentary than the farm problem; few domestic policies enacted by Congress have been subjected to more intensive and sustained criticism by the experts than the agricultural price support and production control program. This situation has given rise to two widely held propositions: (l) the informational base concerning the economics of the farm problem and the consequences of alternative approaches to its solution has been fully adequate; (2) policy makers could have declined to abandon or to substantially change the price and control policy only by consciously or unconsciously ignoring the significance of the abundant economic data available to them. Observers of the agricultural policy making process have, therefore, generally assumed that the price and control policy has been an unsound and ill-considered economic policy. A recent commentary 1"The Implications of Changes in the Economy for Work in Agri- cultural Economics," Journal of Farm Economics, XLIV (December, 1962): 1245, and U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Hearings, CED Pro ram, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p- 43. 297 298 on price policy indicated the persuasiveness of this attitude by suggest- ing that it wasn't necessary to describe that was wrong with the policy because its ills are such common knowledge: "Since there has been full discussion of the disadvantages of the programs in both popular and scholarly publications, little would be gained by further detailing here the standard outrages and the commonplace enormities. The difficult question is: given the undesirability of the present situation, what can, in fact be done about it?"2 As a part of our effort to secure a better understanding of agricultural policy making, we will subject these propositions to detailed analysis. This analysis must be placed in the broad context of the prin- cipal highlights of postwar price support and production control policy making. This discussion is organized around three time periods. The first period is the immediate postwar years, from 1947, when the con- gressional agricultural committees first began to hold hearings on long- range policy, through 1952. The debates and legislation of this period established a pattern that has characterized most of the entire postwar era. The second period encompasses the years of the Eisenhower Administra- tion. It was during this period that the Commodity Credit Corporation was forced to vauire ever larger quantities of surplus stocks, thus sharply increasing the cost of the price support program. As a result the Admin- instration sought to drastically revise the price policy. But this also was a period of lower farm prices and lower farm income. Against this 2"The Political Impasse in Farm Support Legislation," Yale Law w. LXXI (April, 19oz), 953. m 299 background, the agricultural political battles entered their most bitter and partisan phase. The third period is from the election of 1960 to 1964. The presidential campaign of 1960 suggested that whichever candidate was elected, another major effort would be made to substan- tially alter the price and control policy. This effort came in the Kennedy Administration's supply-management proposal. But, like other previous attempts at change, it failed and by 1964 the price and control policy was only slightly different from that legislated in 1948 and 1949. Although the following discussion is organized around these three time periods, it will be necessary at several points to extend the discussion of a particular issue beyond the delineated time period. Immediate Postwar Years In 1947 the agriculture committees in Congress began to hold hearings in preparation for the writing of replacement legislation for the price support laws due to expire on December 31, 1948. These laws provided for mandatory, rigid supports at 90 percent of parity for the SO-called basic commodities--corn, cotton, peanuts, rice, tobacco, and wheat. Also supported at 90 percent of parity were a number of non-basic commodities (the so-called Steagall commoditieS)--h09$: 9995, certain types of chickens, turkeys, milk, butterfat, dry peas, dry edible beans, soy- beans, flaxseed and peanuts for oil, potatoes, sweet potatoes and Ameri- can-Egyptian cotton. The first postwar legislation, the Agricultural Act of 1948, dr0pped the mandatory supports on the Steagall commodities; henceforth they were to be supported at the discretion of the Secretary of Agricul- ture. Mandatory supports were retained for the basic commodities on a A . 7 r . I . I . _ 7 J l . A i O r 1 J I ‘. O f L. . . ' I - I r 7 . 1 2 g . F‘ o - , 1 ; . I I I I ° . . 7 4 , . . . . ‘ J ‘ 1 O o . _, I ‘ I g .1 1 . . . ' I r I O . I I ' ,1 5 . F ” “ II I . 5 I‘ I \,( . - J o J - 1 a .- . '. _ I L , s . ~ , . . . J . , _ ‘ f I ‘7 v L 0 n A . l. . . . | 1 : 1 \ . .- ' . ('N D ..x . ‘ I V I i ‘ k ~ . J , ..' 9 s o i o ‘ ‘ P p I l I . I _ J J - P - ‘ I , I \. . I x r‘ ) I . . ‘ v. C- . ‘ 2 ‘ -' 1 A , ' .' 7 , . ‘ x r ’ )— J 2 r ‘ N J ‘ n C t . _. ’ I p L 2 e l r . . - _, I A ) . ‘ J _. ,1 - 7 V. , v I 4 _ I I . .1 3 O . . . . I 1 F - v ’ — J , ll . \ _ I F l I / I ’ q ‘I I 7 ' E . . I - I- I _ l J V‘ ’ . x 1 o . . \ ) I f‘ 3 I ‘l ‘1 l ‘ .a r 300 flexible basis ranging from 00 to 90 percent of parity; however, the flexible provision was not to go into effect until January 1, 1950. before the 1948 Act could go into effect the Agricultural Act of 1949 was enacted. This Act narrowed the flexible range to 75 to 90 per- cent of parity, but again the flexible provision was postponed and was not to be applied until January, 1951. Tobacco was to be supported permanently at 90 percent of parity. In addition to the basic commodities, tung nuts, honey, and potatoes were to be supported at 60-90 percent of parity, and milk products at 75-90 percent. A new parity formula was developed which had the effect of slightly lowering the dollar-and-cent support levels, but this new formula was not to go into effect until 1954. The general provisions of the pre-war voluntary production control system were renewed. To be sure, the rigid, mandatory 90 percent of parity support levels, which had been adOpted early in the 1940's as an inducement to encourage farm production, had been abandoned, but the basic provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 had been retained. In fact, the support levels had been considerably raised; supports under the 1938 Act were to range from 52-75 percent of parity. In an effort to explain why the policy makers choose to adopt a course of action so contrary to the abundant advice of the experts, we must identify some of the more important factors which acted to shape their outlook and behavior during this critical and formative period. J O , . , i D o . I l i I i l . . ' L .. o I V I A . o . , - ‘1 l , . ‘ A- I J ‘1 J i O . ‘ A. \ . V l .0 .l , ’ . , . v .) . ~ 3 . i f a Q ' 1 . r A 5 . A ~ A . O O ' ' 1 f ‘ J , ,) . . l J O . .1 . . ‘ . . . .. ’ »« 301 Political Popularity The first major factor was the immense popularity of parity price supports among farmers, their spokesmen and their political representa- tives. There were some differences in opinion concerning support levels and methods but virtually all agreed that prices should be supported. Traditionally prices have had the same sacred status among farmers and their political leaders that wages have had among workers, union leaders and labor-oriented politicians. Agriculture, as well as labor, had sought "fringe benefits," but prices still assigned a central role and a Special status concerning the economic welfare of the farmer. We have detailed the major reasons for this in Chapter VI; however, we need to take note of one other important factor. The price support program, inherited from the 1930's, was par- ticularly attractive because it was seen as a form of significant aid, but without the appearances of a direct and open subsidy to farmers. Supposedly the storage and control program would sustain the prescribed price level in the open market most of the time without major cost to the government. Thus the farmer could enjoy the benefits of guaranteed prices while avoiding the stigma of being on the "dole." These and other features combined to salve the consciences of farmers and farm leaders whose general ideological orientation taught them to place considerable faith in the natural justness of the free enterprise market system and to distrust massive and open government subsidies, in principle at least. The supports interfered with the market but did not destroy it. In short, the program was a way of "having your cake and eating it too." 302 This attitude helps explain the opposition to the Brannan Plan. Several factors were involved, but one of the most objected to provisions of the Brannan Plan was the proposed system of making up the difference between the support price and the open market price by direct cash pay- ments to farmers. Economists, while not generally endorsing the Brannan Plan, had also argued that if there were to be price subsidies, a system of direct cash payments would be far better than the traditional system. But most farm organizations and many farm-state congressmen have vigor- ously opposed this approach.3 It has been adopted on a limited basis in the 1960's primarily as the result of "last-resort" resignation rather than enthusiastic commitment. When Ed O‘Neil, president of the American Farm Bureau Federation, referred, in 1947, to the price support program as ”the finest agricul- tural program the world has ever seen," he spoke for many of his colleagues both in and out of Congress.4 Agricultural interests had fought the good fight in winning this "finest" of programs. The memories of the long, frustrating and often bitter struggle and the sweet taste of victory was still very much in the minds of farm leaders and congressmen during the formative postwar years. They would not readily abandon the fruits of that victory. Parity supports meant more than guaranteed dollar-and-cent 3A limited but useful discussion of some of the value conflicts involved in these two positions is found in Charles M. Hardin, "The Bureau of Agricultural Economics Under Fire: A Study in Valuation Conflicts," Journal of Farm Economics, XXVIII (August, 1946), eSp. pp. 635-638. 4U. 8. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Agri- CUIture and Forestry, Hearings, Long;8ange AgriEUltural Policy, Part I, 80th Cong., ISt $855., 1947, p. 39. r‘ 303 prices, they had come to mean equality and justice. The following ex- change conveys something of the meaning of parity pricing to the agri- cultural interests: Angus McDonald (National Farmers Union): We have here in our viewpoint a principle. We feel that parity by definition means equality, equality of income for American farmers, that is, as a whole, with the rest of the population-~something making for purchasing equality.... Sen. Elmer Thomas (Chairman, Sen. Agriculture Committee): It is not a fact that the concept of parity is to give the farmer, or to see that the farmer gets enough money for the things he pro- duces to put him in an economic level with other groups of our people? McDonald: Yes, sir. Thomas: Then 100 percent of parity would be equality, and 100 percent would be justice.... That is my interpretation. McDonal : That is mine, sir. Thomas: If there are any different views, I would be so glad to have them stated in the record. (None of Senator Thomas' fellow committeemen suggested a different view.) Most farm leaders were willing to consider revisions to the existing program. Before they would consider abandoning the program, or shifting to a quite different form, say, that envisioned in the Brannan Plan, only if they could be convinced that supports weren't really needed, or that the existing system was unworkable, or that it was causing sub- stantial evils, say, in the form of gross economic inefficiencies, or some combination thereof. Most economists were arguing that, in fact, the existing program wasn‘t needed, that its perpetuation would cause a long list of economic evils, and that the program, as designed, probably 50. 8. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings, Farm Price-Support Policy. 315t Cong., lst 5955'» 1949: P- 49- I . h --v. .. . I I J . ~ _ ’ . . a ' . . .000 ' I . ° ' ' / -m. .. . 7 ‘ - . , , . _ L . . - . ..a.-.‘l l 0.0. C . - a '>" . . 1-, . . . . 7 . . . r . I ‘ O , l 0 . . . - \ ~ L ‘ . r t b ‘ . .A— \ \ F. u . ‘ . I O ‘ V ti I .. . . . . . v )- . ' a ¥ e ' . ‘ . f. \ l I . t , 3 , ‘ "-- .-. ... -- ---.-.” _. .-,l.-. __ ,-.. ... -__ -. 0 - . . ' I " _. - ‘_ _ . i _- . . ‘ ’ .. A . .~ 0 ~ ’ ° 2 .. .. . ~ , -~..-A. 304, would prove unworkable. These arguments need to be carefully ana- lyzed. Economics and Price Supports By far the most important question during this period was whether or not farmers really needed the protection of guaranteed prices, considering current and anticipated economic conditions. The economists differed sharply with the majority of the other participants on this question. 0. B. Jesness, former president of the American Farm Economics Association, observed in 1946, that "by and large, the market has not performed too badly in arriving at prices which have been servicable as guides to production and at the same time have done fairly effectively the job of moving supplies into consumption and export."6 Free market prices may have done a fair job of allocating production and consumption, but farm leaders, looking back to the 1920's and 1930's,knew that they hadn't done a good job of providing the individual family farmer with an income which would assure his survival. Thus most participants needed to be convinced that conditions were such that open market prices would remain at a reasonable level into the foreseeable future before they would have been willing to consider abandoning supports, or even sig- nificantly lowering the parity levels of the existing program. The economists, however, scarcely dealt in concrete price esti- mates. Most of their arguments consisted of broad generalizations ¥ E”Postwar Agricultural Policy--Pressure vs. General Welfare," leurnal of Farm Economics, XXVIII (February, 1946), 5. —q‘__ 305 stressing fundamental principles of economics. Congress was not in- different to "principles" but it was also interested in specifics, as the following exchange between Congressman Poage and the economist T. w. Schultz suggests: Poage: Doctor, are you in favor of allowing support prices to drop below 75 percent of parity? Schultz: Let me say that it is not the figure; it is the principle; and it seems to me that you have to spell the principle out in Congress. Poaoe: Doctor, it is the figure that buys clothes and beans and the bacon for the farm; it is not the principle-- it is the dollars and cents that the farmers get.... John D. black perceptively noted this tension in his review of the Land-Grant College Association‘s policy recommendations on postwar agricultural policy: As a whole the policy outlined is definitely progressive and the Committee is to be commended highly upon the result of its labors. 1f the reviewer were a congressman he could vote for legislation that would implement it just as it is. He would suggest some amendments, to be sure, but if they were defeated, as probably they would be, he would still vote for it as it is, and he would be as happy about it as an economist has any right to expect to be. The difficulty is thit too many other congressmen wouldn't--at least, not if they understood that they were voting for, within five years after the war, lO-or lZ-cent cotton, $10 hogs, 75-cent wheat, and the like."8 insofar as economists did think about future price levels, there was little indication that they anticipated a major break. Economists 7U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Hearin s, Long-Range Agricultural Poligy, Part 5, 80th Cong., lst 8855., 1947, p.tb0. 8"Land-Grant College Post-War Agricultural Policy," Journal 9i Farm Economics, XXVII (February, 1945), 170. Italics mine. 03.. 306 testifying before the congressional agricultural committees during 1947 and 1948 predicted no such occurrence. Pointing to strong foreign de- mand and stressing the growth potentials of domestic demand they generally painted a rosy picture of the future. Carl C. Farrington, Department of Agriculture economist, argued that due to underconsumption agriculture had suffered greatly during the 1930's, but now with strong world demand and full employment at home "we are faced with shortage rather than surplus."9 Although John D. Black had suggested in 1945 that a return to free market pricing might eventually result in sharply lower prices his 1948 testimony before the House agriculture committee stressed far different themes: "The most important revision needed now--and needed urgently and immediately-- grows out of the food-shortage situation. Next year and probably for two or three more, we must plan in this country for all—out, or nearly all-out agricultural production."10 Economists anticipated a slump, with the tapering off of war- induced demand, but there was no hint that they expected this to be of great magnitude. Fairly typical of the essentially Optimistic attitude that prevailed up until the middle of the 1950's was the Farm Foundation report of 1952. The thirteen top economists went to great effort to show that the price support program of the 1930's was a response to 9U. S. Congress, Joint Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Agri- Culture and Forestry and House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings, Long- Range Agricultural Policy, 80th Cong., lst Sess., 1947, p. 151. 10U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Hearings, Leas-Range Agricultural Poligy, Part 14, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, p' 15580 ‘-_/ 307 emergency conditions, conditions which were not likely to be repeated again in the foreseeable future: In marked contrast to the weak economic position and the depressed conditions out of which our present farm legislation emerged, it appears that the outlook for American agriculture during the next five or ten years, and probably longer, is basically strong.... he do not see the likelihood of a similar conjunction of adverse factors affecting the agricultural in- dustry in the near future.11 Anticipating a growing and stable world market for farm products and a fully employed and expanding domestic economy,their view of the future was rosy. In contrast to the Optimism of the economists, the most cursory reading of the committee hearings and floor debates of the period re- veals a wideSpread fear among congressmen and farm organization leaders that a major economic slump might be just around the corner. Concern over the possibilities of a general major economic downturn was by no means peculiar to the farm sector, as the debates preceding the enact- ment of the Full Employment Act clearly indicated. But probably in no area of postwar policy did the memory of the slump after World War I and the Great Depression of the 1930's affect the behavior of the participants as much as in the making of agricultural policy. The following testimonial is typical: I saw farmers threatened with the loss of their property, some of them were already faced with a sheriff's sale. From that day on I have concerned myself with some of these problems. I saw it with my own eyes...I will not be a party to under- mining our price structure in a time of crisis when we have a surplus of wheat and corn, a surplus of cotton, and a Surplus of dairy products.12 llsearchlight, pp. 44, 47. 128enator Edward Thye (Rep., Minnesota), U. 8. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings,_General Farm Program, Part 2, 3rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, p. 132. p i r“ ‘ ,- I . ~ \ L - , . H ‘ A .1 O I , A F \ I D . 4 1 l ' n I \ . . r # ‘ . 4L... 1‘ 308 This fear of an agricultural depression colored the thinking of the farm-state congressmen and farm organization leaders. Most of the economists did not believe the fear was justified and thought that the other participants were allowing this fear to become an unreasonable obsession. T. W. Schultz admonished: "We believe that far too much stress is being placed in developing agricultural policy designed to cope with a great depression of the 1931-33 variety.13 But to have con- vinced the other participants that they were needlessly concerned, the economists would have had to demonstrate that the whole demand-supply structure, in both its domestic and international aSpects, had been so significantly altered as to render the possibilities of a depression virtually nonexistent. No such demonstration was made. Their arguments were characterized by sweeping generalizations and shot through with assumptions about foreign and domestic demand which, while tenable, were by no means beyond serious questioning. This general concern about the possibilities of a depression also revealed another basic difference between the economists and con- gressional participants. The economists fully agreed that provisions should be made to provide farmers with income protection in the event that a major depression should occur. But they were also of one voice in arguing that if a severe farm slump were to be prevented the only sound and sure way to accomplish this was through the adoption of other public policies aimed at maintaining full employment in the domestic economy and stable world markets. 13U. 8. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Hearings, Long- flange Agricultural Policy, 80th Cong., lst Sess., 1947, p. 667. 309 Given the recent enactment of the Full Employment Act, the growing confidence in the capacity of the government to act on the principles of Keynesian economics, and the clear evidence that the United States was not going to withdraw from world affairs as it did after First world War, the economists believed that a major depression not only could be prevented but most likely would be. But many of those responsible for writing farm legislation had little understanding or confidence in Keynesian economics at this stage, and many had real doubts about the capacity of the United States to stabilize world markets. Therefore they were naturally reluctant to trust the maintenance of farm prices and incomes to these conditional prospects. Intimately involved in this general concern over the possibilities of a postwar depression were the beliefs, held by many participants, as to the critical influence of the agricultural sector in the overall economy. One of the most venerable and widely used arguments for special treatment of agriculture is that of economic fundamentalism. By mid- twentieth century the older argument that agriculture determines the whole character of the national economy, both in prosperity and in adversity, had pretty well disappeared. What remained was the widely held belief that depressions in agriculture can and are likely to trigger depressions in the non-agricultural sector of the economy. The following are typical expressions of this view: Secretary_of figriculture,_Char1es F. Brennan: Most de- pressions have been farm-led and farm-fed....I don't mean to say that declines in farm prices are the sole cause of depressions, but they certainly contribute C A O ' _ I O "1 ' l . o r. . '7 A I . ._ ‘I l L ) ~ . t x .‘ ‘ . O V 1 ‘ r l C r Lo... l 310 greatly and would do so more now than in the past be- cause agriculture has become a bigger customer of in— dustry.14 James G. Patton, President, National Farmers Union: It seems to me of the greatest importance that Secretary brannan's statement here be repeated again and again.... The seeds of the great 1929-34 crash and depression were sown in the years l9l9-21...the only difference between then and what we now face is a matter of timing.15 Kenneth Kendrick, President, National Association of Wheat Growers: The history of this Nation has taught us that when agriculture is sick for a very long period of time, every other segment of our economy soon becomes ill...I believe it is a fact that agriculture has always been in the lead in periods of great prosperity; and conversely, agriculture has always been in the lead when we enter into recessions or depressions. Senator Johnston, Democrat, South Carolina: Mr. Chairman, I think we all agree with that statement:17fi This belief, of course, has had its most vigorous advocates among farm-state congressmen and farm leaders. Whether or not it has been widely believed outside farm circles that a farm depression would necessarily trigger an economy-wide depression is questionable. But certainly the belief that a farm depression might well have this effect seems to have had enough currency to garner additional support outside farm circles for policies aimed at preventing a major agricultural down- turn.18 14U. S. Congress, Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, flggrings, General Farm Program, Part 2, Blst Cong., lst Sess., 1949, p. 140. 15Ibid., Part 3, p. 363. 16U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, fl§§I1ngs, General Farm Program, Part 2, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, p. 10200 17Ibid. IBSee our discussion of labor leaders and urban congressmen in Chapter XII. CH. 4 _ c, L . . t . . z . ,. . o w r . T . xv ,. .. e s A J . k 4 c . e A ,3 . .I , , 1 , , a z . C . . . x ‘3. :1. 2 t . , , , i 1 7 .. a. . , , \ j . a } y . l \J ,t . l ., l r . I | 4 1 V a l . _ r, t l c. l , \ x J i. A x O I a . L J \J. J , u \ . .w r J J . . J a L . , w I . r , . O . n .— . , i. , . r a , 4 J . a J u i I O O . s O O l 1L. _ . on n. . v, I . . t I l J A at. ‘ , _ Ix . '\ . C r! .V , O a... . \a I P. r _ IL A. r. I I F fl. . l L C . o » .u. . ,t . . l J .. _. J 1;, C r ., l r O p\ , O Q or 311 Of the various arguments used to justify Special treatment for agriculture, few have seemed to irritate the economists more than this argument of economic fundamentalism. Despite the fact that economists have generally tended to dismiss the argument out of hand, they have marshalled surprisingly little empirical evidence capable of discredit- ing it. One of the first direct attacks on the proposition was contained in an essay by Joseph S. Davis. The Davis essay presented no empirical data, but by connecting seVeral broad generalizations it left the distinct impression that those who continued to argue that national depressions originated in the agricultural sector were either ignorant of economics or political demagogues,and probably both. The Davis essay became a standard reference on this subject and apparently typified the sentiment of most economists.19 The continued currency of the proposition continued to dismay economists. Thus in 1945 the economist, William H. Nichols, noted with dismay that: Underlying...current agricultural legislation is much irrational but politically-powerful folklore... Not only is agriculture considered so basic as to be the keystone to the over-all national welfare, but certain farm products have been singled out as basic, however differently current consumer demands might decree.ZO 19The article "Agricultural Fundamentalism," first appeared in Economics, Sociology and the Modern World, Norman E. Himes, ed. (Cam- bridge: harvard University Press, 1935). It next appeared as Chapter II in Davis' book, Cn Agricultural Poligy (Stanford: Ford Research Insti- tute, Stanford University, 19397. It was reprinted as the lead article in the American Farm Economics Association's volume, Readings on Agri- ggltural Policy in 1949. We have observed many references to this article which sought to discredit the social fundamentalism of the family farm creed as well as the economic argument. 20Nilliam H. Nichols, "A Price Policy for Agriculture, Consistent With Economic Progress, that Will Promote Ade U8 e and More Sta le Income from Farming," Journal of Farm Economics, XXV I November, 1945 , 757. This was the first place paper in the AFEA's contest on price policy. "I . - u ‘ , )— a) ' . . , O ' - 4 I c, g L a g l ‘ , . r a 0 c , . A l A . O A ‘ u _ . ‘ ‘ _~ w J , , l , l , r. v . I ~ 7 . _ r i' , ' I. A » r r , - \ . J '\ \ 1 br ’ i ; .L .‘ ‘ O - ‘ - r \ o J r A , . ‘ . ' \ 1 L L . y . x a w l \ J . l" . . . , ‘ l ‘ . ~ r . . Economists were dismayed, not simply because they believed that the proposition was erroneous, but because in acting upon it Congress was likely to be too concerned about the development of policies aimed at protecting agricultural prices and income, whereas the proper approach, they believed, was to develop programs aimed at strengthening the over- all economy and thus indirectly, agriculture. But despite an essen- tially sound theoretical argument economists had very little hard evidence that they could point to that would discredit the contention that general depressions result from farm depressions. It was not until 1957 that a solid empirical study of the re- lationships between the farm and nonfarm sector was made. Dale E. Hathaway, effectively documented that given the nature of our highly complex, industrialized modern economy the really critical factor was the effect of the nonfarm business cycle upon agriculture rather than the effect of agriculture on the nonfarm economy. Even so, Hathaway did not prove that an agricultural depression was incapable of causing a serious downturn in the nonfarm sector. His conclusions on this point were quite cautious: It is not possible to conclude from this analysis that the agricultural sector of the economy has been or will prove to be a serious threat to the stability of the United States economy. Cf equal importance, however, is the suggestion that neither is it possible to conclude that the agricultural sector has not or might not be an inherent source of instability. Thus, it would seem that agriculture deserves the continuing attention of economic researchers and policy makers who bearzthe responsi- bility of continued economic growth and stability. 21"Agriculture and the Business Cycle," U. S. Congress, Senate, Joint Economic Committee, Policy for Commercial Agriculture; Its Relation to Economic Growth and Stability, Joint Committee Print, 85th Cong., lst 89550, 1957, p. 64. - h. 11 ’\ In the same vein, Hathaway had this to say in 1903: To what extent is this belief justified? Will declines in farm income result in a reduction in nonfarm income? Answers to these questions are not readily available. Therefore, we must depend upon theoretical reasoning, marshalling whatever facts are available to support it.‘4 Without question, the more extreme interpretations of the fundamental role of agriculture ignore much of the reality of our modern economy. But like those who err in unqualifiedly accepting as fact the proposition that depressions are "farm led and farm fed" the economists have too often erred in unqualifiedly rejecting this proposi- tion as mere politically inspired folk lore. Whatever may be the real facts in the matter this ancient and influential belief still persists: If the farmers do not remain in business the rest of us will die on the vine.ZJ The bounty of the earth is the foundation of our economy. Progress in every aSpect of our nation's life depends upon the abundant harvest of our farm lands.‘4 by 1955 and 1956 the agricultural price support program was being widely criticized because it wasn't working as originally intended. What was the status of this argument in the immediate postwar period? If congressmen in 1947-49 could have looked 10 years into the future and seen the size of the government owned surpluses, and the mag- nitude of the drain on the federal treasury that these surpluses entailed they most likely would have enacted substantially different price 22Government and Agriculture, p. 158. 23Senator Allen S. Ellender, U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, ReariUQS. Agriculture ACt Of 1991: Part II: 87th Cong., lst Sess., 1961, p. 958. 24President Lyndon B. Johnson, "Farm Message," New York Times, February 5, 1965, p. 16. "— legislation. Because we have experienced these surpluses for almost a decade now many observers have come to see them as an inevitable part of the price support program and thereforetrstmpnyto the folly of the congressional policy makers. But it is necessary to stress that this situation was not envisioned by most policy makers in 1947-49 or even in 1954, and that this failure was not due to the fact that the partici- pants were blinded by considerations of political expediency. There simply was not a sufficient quantity of hard evidence available at that time to suggest that this situation would develop. It is true that some relatively minor surpluses had been accumu- lated but these had been temporary. It is also true that some economists had been arguing that the existing price support program might eventually lead to the aCCumulation of costly surpluses. But again their arguments were based more on principle than on empirical fact. Indeed, when pressed on the matter, economists tended to agree that a flexible support system, on the order of that provided by the 1949 law, would not require the accumulation of undue quantities of surplus stocks.25 Economists, no less than the other participants, were quite unaware of the production- increasing significance of the nascent technological revolution in agri- culture. when the AAA of 1938 was enacted it was not the expectation of its supporters that the CCC would have to vauire unduly large stocks of surplus commodities. Stocks did begin to accumulate, but were soon 95399, e.g., T. W. Schultz' testimony before the House Agri- CUltural Committee (footnote No. 7 above), p. 681. . r ‘7 . ' A i ' y y ‘ I A A I , . , 7 . , - . .A ‘ A ) A u ' . _) . x ‘ . J r l \ o g . ‘ t a ,\ A . ’ c3 , , . ' V , , . , . - l c , a ’ A « . A , , O A . J o , A I t ' A a I J n , . , r - - b l I 7‘ . I , _ ‘ . , l A - \ ~ \ A ' erased by war-induced demand. by the early 1950's significant accumula- tions were beginning to occur. However, as late as 1954 the long-term record of the CCC was such that many congressmen found it difficult to believe that the program, even with support levels at 90 percent, was inherently unsound and not workable as originally intended. In 1954 the Eisenhower Aiministration, in seeking support for its flexible support proposal, went to considerable effort to dramatize the accumulation of stocks then beginning to appear, and to point to the dangers of perpetuating the rigid support levels then in effect. This touched off a long, complicated, and often acrimonious debate between the Department of Agriculture and various members of the congressional agricultural conndttees.zo This exchange produced a flood of statistics and tables relating to the past 20 years with participants making such diverse claims as that the support program had cost the government $16 billion, to the claim that it hadn't cost a penny and that the govern- ment had actually made a profit on the operation.27 The significant aspect of the debate was that it revealed that a great number of the congressional participants were operating on the be- lief that the program, as operated in the past, was highly successful, not only in that it had greatly helped farmers, but that it did so 26See relevant sections of U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings, Agricultural Outlook and the Presi- dent's Farm Program, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, and Hearings, General Farm Program, Part I, same committee. 27'The debate at points became extremely confusing, prompting Senator Karl Mundt (Rep., South Dakota) to compare the various statisti- cal tables to a ”Chinese puzzle,” and to express the hope that those persons responsible for compiling them would "set them UP in a language I can understand.” Ibid., p. 93. 1 316 at relatively insignificant cost to the government. Thus Senator Thye expressed great "shock” at the talk about the "burdensome" cost of the program.2 There was disagreement between Department officials and Congressional spokesmen as to what the true costs had been, but even if the highest cost estimates were used they represented an "excellent investment," as Senator George Aiken (Rep., Vermont) put it, considering the benefits gained.?9 Economists have long condemned the price support and control policy for creating or, at least, perpetuating inefficiencies in agri- culture. Seemingly, this charge has been ignored by many of the other participants. In fact, several congressional participants and some farm organization leaders have been highly critical of those using the in- efficiency argument. From time to time, congressmen have been critical of economists in this respect. Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, drew considerable fire from his critics because of his rather frequently used argument that continued high price supports were per- petuating inefficiencies in agriculture. But so persuasive is the re- spect for efficiency, variously defined, in the American ethic there are few participants anywhere in the policy making processes who are immune to charges that such-and-such a policy breeds inefficiency. Agriculture is no exception. Therefore the claim that the price support and produc- tion control programs breed inefficiency is not one that would be dis- . . . 3 mlssed by the participants because of sheer 1nd1fference. ZBIbido, p. 740 291bia., p. 73. 30399 Chapter XI for a more detailed discussion of the general attitudes about efficiency. However, there is not too much evidence to indicate that many of the participants have been substantially influenced by this criticism of the program. most participants have long believed that American agri- culture is highly efficient. As one economist ruefully noted in 1947, 1 1L) "the belief is widely held that farming in the United States has no peer. Moreover, they are most likely to think in terms of productive efficiency, a notion which at times may mean nothing more than simply abundance. The spectacular increase in farm production during World War II was a source of great satisfaction to agriculturalists and taken as a positive sign of the efficiency of the American farmer. As production has continued to surge upward, despite the fact that there are fewer and fewer farmers, and despite valiant efforts to control it, the majority of the participants have found it difficult to believe that agriculture was inefficient. The economists have tended to deal more with allocative effici- ency.32 but the lines of communication between them and the other par- ticipants haven't been too good on this issue. The economist will cite low returns to labor in agriculture as a sign of allocative inefficiency, and will argue that the price and control program has perpetuated this condition by encouraging too many marginal farmers to stay in agriculture. But most farm-state politicians and farm leaders are likely to see the 31T. W. Schultz, "How Efficient is American Agriculture," Journal gf_Farm Economics, XXIX (August, 1947), 645. Schultz was one of the first to attempt to empirically demonstrate the allocative inefficiencies in American agriculture. He and his students, such as D. Gale Johnson, have done as much as any other economists to dramatize the idea that agriculture Was not nearly as efficient as it could be or ought to be. 32See Chapter XI for definition and fuller discussion. problem quite differently; let us continue the supports, thus protecting all farmers, and at the same time devise programs which help the marginal farmer become a larger producer and thus an earner of higher incomes. uuestions of meanings and goals aside, the basic reason why the inefficiency charge has been relatively ineffective is that it has been little documented. This lack of solid and understandable documenta- tion in juxtaposition to the extremely visible growth in the productive- ness of agriculture has rendered this charge quite superfluous in the eyes of most participants. The Election of 1948 Any account of the immediate postwar years must deal with the election of 1948. Virtually all political analysts have agreed that this election had a profound effect on the course of agricultural policy making. "Farmers get the big credit for the Truman victory," headlined flr\ a the US News g world Report's account of the 1948 election. J This was the typical explanation of Truman's unexpected victory. This widely accepted interpretation was based on the fact that while Truman lost New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, and Michigan which Roosevelt had carried in 1944, he gained Ohio, Iowa, and Wisconsin and held Illinois. There was a shift among farmers to Truman,34 but 33November 19, 1948, p. 19. 34For one of the better accounts of why the shift in the farm vote see Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday 8 Company, Inc., 1951), Chapter VIII, "Battle for the Farm Vote." 319 subsequent analysis has suggested that the major reason for his victory was his large gains in the towns and cities of the Midwest.35 However, at the time,many politicians and most observers thought that the farm vote had been decisive. Because of this, it has been common to treat the election as a decisive factor in determining the course of postwar price policy. Those observers who have been opposed to the course that price policy took, are most prone to this view. Thus Murray R. benedict observed that prior to the election "it was confidently expected that the farm program would be modified in the general direction of more reliance on price in the O\ 3 market as a guide to kinds and amounts of production." Several things need to be noted in order to put the 1948 elec- tion in its proper perspective. First of all, the Agricultural Act of 1948 made clear that Congress did pg; intend to move toward free market pricing. It did provide for a flexible range of supports, but these were considerably higher than the supports of the AAA of 1938 that would have gone into effect in the absence of new legislation in 1948. Second, although the 1949 Act narrowed the flexible range and covered a few more commodities it differed from the 1948 Act only in degree, not in kind. Third, the background of the enactment of the 1948 Act is important. The permanent provision of the Act was the Aiken bill which 35Charles M. Hardin, "Farm Price Policy and the Farm Vote," lgurnal of Farm Economics, XXXVII (November, 1955), 601-624. 36Farm Policies of the United States, p. 478. Charles M. Hardin, whose analyses have figured prominently in the interpretation of postwar agricultural politics also takes this line. For example, see article cited in the footnote above. passed the Senate with a fair margin over strong Southern opposition. But in the House the story was different. The House Agriculture Com— mittee, chaired by Clifford Hope (Hep., Kansas) was unable to agree on a permanent bill. It reported out a bill, authored by Hope, extending the wartime supports for a year and a half. This bill was passed by the House. The conference committee had great difficulty in agreeing on a compromise. Agreement was reached only after Representative Murray (Rep., Wisconsin) resigned and was replaced by Representative Gillie (Rep., Indiana). The compromise was simply the co-joining of the two bills. House leaders of both parties clearly indicated that they did not see the Aiken bill as a permanent piece of legislation and "vowed to reconsider the matter again in 1949."37 Fourth, although Truman attacked the Republicans for being anti-farmer, pointing to failure of the "do-nothing 80th Congress to provide for adequate CCC storage facilities as an example,3 8he did not attack the price SUpport provisions of the 1948 Act. The platforms of both parties indicated they favored a flexible system. The actions of Midwestern Democrats and Republicans in the House and Southerners in the Senate in 1948 meant that whichever party won the White House and control of Congress the whole issue of supports was going to be reOpened in 1949. Almost any incident would have greatly strength- ened the high support groups. That incident came in the form of a down- turn in farm prices. After reaching a peak in 1947 farm prices and in- comes began to sag in 1948, a trend which continued until 1950. Given 37Congressiona1 anrterly Almanac, IV, 1948, 56. 38For the details of this issue see Oliver P. Williams, "The Commodity Credit Corporation and the 1948 Presidential Election," Mid- west Journal of Political Science, I (August, 1957), 111-24. the mood of farm leaders in Congress it would seem that this may well have been the really decisive factor, not the Truman victory, in pro- ducing the Agricultural Act of 1949. phat the Truman victory did, unquestionably, however, was to pave the way for the Administration‘s endorsement of the Brennan Plan. The tisenhower—benson Years The Agricultural Act of 1949 established a system of flexible supports and a new parity formula. With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Congress postponed the implementation of these provisions until January 1, 1955. Thus, in 1954 policy makers once again turned their attention to the agriCultural price support program. Under different economic and political conditions the agricultural policy battle entered a new phase. The price support program of 1900 was virtually that of 1954, but during the interim there occurred one of the most far-flung, in- tensive, and bitter debates in the history of American agricultural policy. by the end of the decade the agricultural community was practic- ing political fratricida frustrated critics were wondering if responsible, democratic policy making hadn't floundered on the rocks of political ex- pediency, and some policy makers themselves were calling for a "Moses"39 to lead them out of the wilderness of frustrating stalemate and brooding sense of failure. 39The "Moses" statement was made by Senator Allen Ellender, Chairman of the Senate Agricultural Committee, during a committee session with Ezra Taft Benson: "It looks as though we need 3 Moses in this field." [153, March 2, 1949, p. 10. Ellender obviously did not see Benson as the Moses. Ellender later applied it to Freeman: "I hope (x) K. In the 1952 campaign Mr. Eisenhower had promised to get farmers 100 percent of parity in the market place, although he did not Spell out how this was to be achieved. Soon after his Administration took over it became apparent that this was not to be accomplished through full parity price guarantees. Shortly after being sworn in as Secretary of Agri- culture, Ezra Taft benson made it known that he personally favored a return to free, or nearly free, market pricing. However, the popularity of the traditional CCC-backed price support program was so great at that time that the only real question was what should be the level of the supports. Thus the new Administration's proposals closely paralleled the provisions of the 1949 Act, which had never been implemented. In his defense of the Administration's program, Mr. Henson argued that the existing program simply was not working: "Our mounting surpluses and our need for additional funds both argue that the rigid price support system is not functioning properly. The fact that we have been unable to maintain prices of most of the six basic commodities ...at 90 percent of parity--even with Government loans at that level--is 4 also eloquent testimony on this point." 0 we have a Moses in the person of the man we now have before us who has been nominated for the post of Secretary of Agriculture." U. 8. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings, Hon. Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, 87th Cong., lst Sess., January 13, 1901, p. 1. Although Ellender was probably somewhat overly pleased by the sound of the phrase it does convey something of the sentiment held by many of the policy makers during this period. 40U. 8. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, figarings, Agricultural Outlook and the President's Farm Program, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., January, 1954, p. 6. g: h) (,1 When Mr. Eenson appeared before Congress in 1958 to defend the Administration's proposal that supports on the basic commodities and dairy products be lowered to 60—90 percent of parity, one of his major arguments again was the prohibitive costs currently being in- curred. Although committee members again quarreled with some of his computations there was now no questioning the basic fact that the operation of the price support program was proving to be extremely ex- pensive. Eenson testified that the "realized cost of programs pri- marily for stabilization of farm prices and incomes" had risen from $329.4 million in 1953 to $964.3 in 1954, and then had jumped to $1,349.9 billion in 1955, $1,936.1 billion in 1956, and to $3,225.4 billion in 1957.41 Against this background of mounting surpluses and deepening drains on the Federal Treasury the Administration began to swing back toward the position expressed by benson in 1953, that of essentially free market pricing. Finally in 1959, with the CCC holdings swollen to $2.4 billion in corn, $891 million in cotton, $706 million in grain sorghums, and a staggering $3.1 billion in wheat,42 President Eisenhower proposed the complete abandonment of the historic parity support system. Instead, he called for prices to be Supported at 75-90 percent (the exact level to be set by the Secretary) of a three-year moving average of Open market prices. If Congress didn't want this, his proposed alternative was to give the Secretary discretionary power to set price supports anywhere from 0-90 percent of parity. 41U. S. Congress Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings, Farm Program, Part I, '5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 42. 42U. 8. Agricultural Policy in the Postwar Years; 1945—1963 (Washington, Congressional Quarterly Service, 1963), p. 43. II rt The Administration's price policy proposals, from the first in 1954 to the last in 1959,43 met vigorous opposition in Congress. In the late and generally prosperous forties Congress had embraced the principle of flexible pricing. But as prices began to soften after 1952, resistance to lowering the support levels began to harden. Whereas the Administration pointed to the skyrocketing costs of the sup- port program its opponents, although not unmindful of these costs, pointed to the worsening economic conditions in agriculture and argued that a sig- nificant lowering of prices under such conditions would be disastrous. That agriculture was in economic difficulty there could be no doubt. Farm prices fell 12 percent from 1947-49 to 1959 while produc- tion expenses increased by 45 percent.44 Total net farm income had stood at $16.3 billion in 1951, but by 1954 it had dropped to $12.7 billion, and by 1956 it hit a low of $11.6 billion.45 In 1951—52, farm workers, including owner-operators, received a return of $0.90 an hour for their labor as compared with $1.63 for manufacturing employees. In 1959, returns to labor on farms was $0.75 an hour compared to the $2.22 received per hour by workers in manufacturing.46 431m 1960 President Eisenhower did not make any Specific pro- posals and, in effect, told Congress, "I've done all I can, let's see what you can do." He did, however, indicate his preference for the program he had recommended in 1959. 44U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic Policies for Agriculture in the 1960's, Joint Committee Print, 86th Cong., 2nd 39550, 1900, p. 70 ‘ 45U. 5. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Price §gpport and Production Adjustment Activities, House Report No. 2219, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960, p. 48. 46Economic Policies for Agriculture..., P- 3- I‘ (1) (‘0 U‘ Policy makers were caught in an exquisite dilemma. The down— ward pressure on open market prices was a powerful argument for main- taining or increasing the government's support levels. But, on the other hand, the obvious failure of acreage controls to hold back pro- duction thus giving rise to skyrocketing SUpport costs created pressures in the opposite direction. which way to turn? The Administration turned toward lower supports. On this issue it had the backing of Republican congressmen outside the Midwest, the American Farm bureau Federation and the bulk of the professional econo- mists. Opposing the Administration was the majority of congressional Democrats, a number of Midwest Republicans, and the National Farmers Union and most of the time the Grange. Neither group was powerful enough to achieve its goal, but each was strong enough to stalemate the other. To counter the Administration's 1954 proposal the high-support bloc sought to freeze the guarantees on basic commodities at the 90 per- cent level through 1955. The resulting compromise was a Sliding scale of 82 1/2 percent of parity through 1955, with a 75-90 percent range thereafter, as the Administration had asked for. In 1955 the House passed a bill aimed at restoring Supports to the 90 percent level. Early in 1956 the Senate supported the House bill, but the President immediately vetoed it. However, to secure passage of its Soil Bank Plan the Administration had to accept a restoration of mandatory sup- ports for small grains at 76 percent of parity and a one year freeze on transitional parity. In 1958 President Eisenhower proposed that supports for basics and dairy products be lowered to a sliding scale of 60-90 C.) 0\ percent of parity. Congress countered by voting to freeze supports at the 1957 level. And again the Presidential veto was wielded. The compromise Agricultural Act of 1958 provided for a lowering of the support levels for corn, upland cotton and rice from 75 to 65 percent of parity, but with the stipulation that all production limits on corn be removed and no further cutbacks in rice and cotton acreage allot- ments be made. In 1959 the Administration proposed the abandonment of parity pricing system. This was rejected by a large majority in Congress. Congress then passed high-support wheat and tobacco bills, which the Presi- dent vetoed. In 1960 Mr. Eisenhower made no Specific proposals. Nany pr0posals were advanced in Congress, but only a tobacco bill and a dairy bill were passed: the former provided for somewhat lower supports, the latter for somewhat higher. Thus as the new decade began the agricul- tural price support and production control program stood about where it had in 1954; production had been made more complex and a little more restrictive, but basically they were the same "voluntary" type, and price supports, desuite periodic juggling, were not substantially different. many factors acted to determine the Shape of this bitter and stalemated battle. An extremely important factor, but one which has not been generally recognized or properly accounted for, was a sharp and paralyzing conflict in technical beliefs. This conflict took the form of genuine differences of opinion as to the nature of the economic prob- lems plaguing agriculture, and the consequences of alternative policies to be aimed at relieving these problems. In short, the participants were wrestling with a series of technical questions to which there was no cor- reSponding series of technically objective answers. The impact that this I L 327 had on the behavior of the participants has been largely ignored because nest political analysts have too often accepted, with little or no ques- tioning, the proposition that there were technically objective answers available to the questions that the participants had to deal with. The Aiministration's Case The basic starting point of the bisenhower-penson position on price policy, as we have seen, was the reference to the growing piles of surplus stocks. They, and the others in the low-support bloc, stressed that the maintenance of high level supports would act to en- courage farmers to continue to expand their production which, because of war-induced demand and past price guarantees, was already too great for the market to bear. Because of their general ideological orienta- tion they found these rising costs inherently distasteful. Moreover, they were fearful that others, particularly urban politicians, would find the costs intolerable and rise in revolt against the entire farm program.4 They saw two alternatives. Cne was to lower the supports to the point that large government purchases would not be necessary. The other was to tighten up production controls with the intended purpose of cutting production to the point that Open market prices would rise to the support levels, thus taking the pressure off the CCC granaries. The move toward highly restrictive controls was not attractive. Io politician could be insensitive to the fact that controls were not F 47See Chapter x11. "8 \y‘. popular with farmers. NoreOVer, most Republicans and leaders of the conservative farm organizations found controls to be ideologically repugnant.48 Finally, many like Hr. Benson doubted whether production could actually be cut through the application of traditional controls: "Ln this overall question of acreage reduction, I am by no means con~ vinced that such controls as we can invoke under existing law will 49 actually accomplish the production cutbacks which have been envisioned." The production control route was made all the more unattractive because of the belief that all but the smallest and most inefficient farmer could survive a controlled transition period and then prosper under essentially free market pricing. Mr. Benson had complete faith in the capacity of the family farm to adapt to changing conditions: I don't believe that there is any danger to our farms in this country, if we keep our farmers relatively free--I don't think there is any danger of them moving to the great corporation type or Government cooperative-type farm. I think the family-type farm can meet any competition. I think it is the backbone of American agriculture now, has been and always will be.50 The family farm has always been in danger in our changing economy. But it has always adapted to the changing conditions that faCed it.... Always the family farm has stood the test, and it remains today the overwhelmingly dominapt form of organi- zation of agricultural production in our land.J 4839e Chapter VIII for a detailed discussion of this group's attitude toward production controls. 49Senate, hearings, Agricultural Outlook:.., 1954, p. 8. As production continued to mount throughout the decade, Mr. Benson's doubts changed to conviction. 50U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, figgrings, Farm Program, 85th Cong., lst Sess., 1957, p. 14. SISpeech before the American Farm Economics Association, August, 1957, igurnal of Farm Economics, xxxrx (December, 1957), 1071. 5 O o ' v o o - . I L - , o o v, L _ , J. _ A o . r . \ I o . ’ . I I... ‘ ’ a . J o 4, . f _ ’ . . . . "I. ‘ A . I I , . . ‘ O I o I O . .. ' . I ' I ~ A ‘ I 0 ‘n t I L r I Cne of the factors in the Administration's conviction that the family farm could survive free marketing pricing, and which strengthened the preference for the low-support approach,was the firm belief that just as higher prices generated greater production, lower prices would induce farmers to cut back their production schedules. Mr. benson's response to arguments advanced by the Administration's critics that farmers would not cut back production in the face of lower prices was always categorically firm: "The fact is that farmers adjust their pro- duction logically with respect to price. They endeavor to increase production when price rises and to decrease production when it falls." The conviction that this approach would not have disastrous effects was undergirded by the belief that the surplus capacity existed in only a few cocmodities: The nation's agriCultural problem is not one of general over- production: consumer demand continues at or near record high levels: the average prices of farm products that lack direct price-support have been as high in recent years as those of price-supported products. The problem is rather one of un- balanced production, resulting in Specific surpluses whgch are unavoidable under the present rigid price supports. 0 because of this, it was argued that farmers could shift from the surplus commodities to other commodity areas thus maintaining their overall production and protecting their total income position. 5’QCu‘enate, Hearings,_0eneral Farm Program, Part I, 1954, p. 118. 53Fresident Eisenhower, ”Farm Message," New York Times, January 12, 1954, p. 8. The Administration never changed significantly on this point. See, for example, interview with Secretary Benson in Qslso News a World Report, February 6, 1959, p. 182. 330 In addition, it was believed that as prices fell consumers would buy more of the commodity in question. This increase in con- sumption could be counted on to prevent prices and incomes from falling to disastrous levels. The basic position of the Administration was effectively summarized in the following questioning of Department of Agriculture officials by Senator Karl Mundt: Senator Mungt: I would like to ask Mr. Loos and Mr. Morse derstanding that the premise on if I am Correct in my un which you propose this new farm program rests primarily on 2 different pillars, 1 being the theory that you can help stop the production of crop surpluses by a sliding price formula so that when prices on a given product tend to fall, the production of the product will also fall.... The second pillar is that as the price received by the producer falls the price paid by the consumer also falls so that he consumes more of it and by those two tactics you hope to keep the surpluses in control, is that right? Mr. worse: Yesé you would return to balanced consumption and production. The Cpposition's Cage Those who resisted the Administration's efforts to significantly vels tended to agree with their protagonists that lower the support 19 ited to few basic commodities the surplus capacity in agriculture was lim 55 and that this disequilibrium was temporary. As they were also fearful 54Senate, fiearings,6eneral Farm Program, Part I, 1954, p. 114. them ever specifically talked about the surplus as being permanent and industry-wide, a survey of their arguments suggests that many of them intuitively graSped that the surplus Capacity in agriculture was more widespread and durable than was gen- erally recognized at the time. 55However, although few 0f F‘ s s NV . . A (i fi. .1, ‘1 , x A . J r» J U , fl, .. _ . J .\\4 , s .I V \‘ ..wA . L . J 0 AV \, I. t. _ _ o 0‘ mt , , n, . 1 ,lu r , _ o y . p, ( .4 u i. , . i .r Twi— . m l . r. r p r . 0" r. J s. ll., 0 . tr , . I r r . ”we , ..l . .1 r. C . . I r . or . _ pr 1, O 5 J a. l[| . n; _ _ . J k , y .. r f . r. . , _ . 4 . . l _ ~r. y . . l _ . i _ " l, , , W4 fl} . no , y . o . _ ‘I. . . Q . a _ l. I ,‘ _ , i ,. nu 'R r x . . , r A ) I _ x . . . 1., v t ‘ s _ . a , «J .V J . that the burgeoning CCC stocks might eventually endanger the whole price support system, they agreed on the necessity of restoring a balance between supply and effective demand. Thus the two QIOUps generally agreed on the necessity and the possibility of achieving a But beyond this point they "balanced consumption and production.” parted company. Cne of the points on which they disagreed was the matter of production controls. Although all farmers and agricultural spokesmen would have much preferred a situation of unregulated production.the Democratic Congressional delegation was generally not as hostile to controls as were their counterparts in Congress and in the Administration. This was due in part to a more liberal ideology. This greater tolerance of controls was also encouraged by a greater faith in possibility of curtailing production through the traditional restrictions. This be- lief was particularly strong among the Southern Democrats who, by their dominance of the agricultural conmittees in both houses, exerted power- ful influence in shaping the Democratic Party's position on farm policy. The Southerners had considerable faith in the control system because of the relative success of such programs in cotton and tobacco. As Senator Allen Ellender, Chairman of the Senate Agricultural and Forestry Com- mittee put it: We have been able in the past, with reference to cotton, and I believe we can do it under the law as it is now written, to produce just the amount we need for supply and demand, almost the same as you have done for tobacco. I believe that it is possible to do it and I honestly believe that the same thing can be done wgth corn and with wheat. I don't think there is any doubt about it.5 568enate, Hearings, General Farm Program, Part I, 1954, p. 120. Italics mine. "\ LxJ , 4. is , t »t r 3 i . i . '7: fix I r, .4 . r . r r r «I, . i l , u 0 , I. e r .« ., 332 This confidence in the controls system was considerably weakened by the latter part of the decade as surpluses in wheat, corn and feed grains continued to mount. This was an important factor in causing many congressmen to move away from their formerly firm stand on high, rigid supports that they had taken in 1954 and 1955. But even so, the high support bloc saw the traditional control system as a much more meaningful alternative than did the free market advocates. They, therefore, saw in acreage restrictions a genuine possibility through which production could at least be held in line until such time that demand effectively caught up with supply, thus achieving the long sought equilibrium. Those who opposed the Administration's price policy proposals, however, did so not primarily because of their more positive attitude toward controls, but because they were convinced that the effort to reestablish an equilibrium between Supply and demand through lower prices was simply not a meaningful alternative. Those who resisted the move toward significantly lower supports justified their position by first pointing to fact that throughout most of the 1954—60 period the farmers' income position had either stagnated or was deteriorating and that any action which would have the effect of even temporarily mak- ing a bad situation worse was indefensible. The high support group rejected the lower prices route as a meaningful alternative because they did not believe that farmers would reSpond to lower prices by cutting production. In fact, many argued that in the face of falling prices farmers would increase rather than decrease 0x . i L Ix as. l r i I . a , . o , .1 x, l p V y. . . L r 3.. r t; a . 'x 1 . . s 0 . J 4 . .4 I 4 . i . A . , , . y a i . J V . s . r . y a), y l. . u . Fl. 1 4 . s A” _ J I 7 . , J l . L . A , F . ex I ... I yr . . O _ , 4 r v u g , 4 , _ i . . A l ,1 . , a l s ‘ ~ i ‘ ,i r r :4 . «V/ L. V. . «I,» F H, \4 A l r g _ . ,.. l f. j , . . . . / . O ..J I T L . . l _ a J \ 5|. , . ., 333 production. They pointed to the production records of the early 1920's and 1930's as proof of this reverse relationship between price and supply. The continued rise in production in the face of falling price levels through the 1950's did nothing to change their mind: Harolng. Cooley (Chairman, House Committee on Agriculture responding to Mr. Benson): I do not believe that the facts and figures and statistics in your Department will support your philOSOphy and your reasoning that lower prices bring about lower production.... When you say to him the farme57 you are going to lower the price of his commodity, you are going to increase the volume of it, naturally. The Benson critics did not take the extreme position that if prices were turned loose an equilibrium level would never be reached. They did genuinely fear, however, that before a balance would be achieved the family farm structure of agriculture would be severely if not irrecoverably damaged. Many believed that such an approach would result in the elimination of great many more than a few marginal far- mers: "In the meantime you would break an awful lot of farmers in getting the production down, would you not? You would break an awful lot of producers."58 The Farmers Union took a more dramatic position, but one that was rather widely supported: This 'free market' approach using 'full flexibility' as the national policy would take a long time to reach a solution. It would do so only through untold financial distress, personal suffering and reduced technological advance. By then farming might well be (I) concentrated on a few hundred thousand factories-in-the-field; (2) conducted by virtually integrated 57U. 5. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Hearin s, 9222£1l_£2£fl_££22£éfla 85th Cong., lst Sess., 1957, p. 32. 58Senator Milton R. Young (Rep., North Dakota), Senate, Hearin s Genera Farm Pro am, Part I, 1954, p. 121. . fl ' O - 4 a . ' r , , k A - ‘ » - . ' V - l I _ i r . . ~ ,A . r . - . ' __ . ’ ' «- .....— .»— ¢ — , ~ ‘ . F ' o .. _ I J .L . J . ‘ - . . - J a , . r e n I a c , ‘ .v I ~ I 1 ‘ ‘ a a. I] I I ‘ . ’ A - ’ .7 ~’ \. .4 x . , u ' e A ‘P , ~ . , . . - I I. ‘ ‘-&.—A / § - J z, '\ . A , . 7‘ ‘ - _ _ ; ‘ ix — J. ‘ , . . . , ‘ A > l ,- » . - Q 1“ Q - . a . ’ .l- " K W . - ¥ 7. . 1 . l ‘ .1 5 N c . ,., - . a I ‘ . ‘ I f p r \ ' 7 - Q J 4 . o . r _ \ _ . , V - r . l * A - I , l . v t , . ‘ r _ ‘ J l J ’ - 7 . - a r , . ’ I o A l ‘ A V . v I . ' q l 7 ’- V ‘ I - A ' ’ r. v V , ‘ A h . ‘ — J I r ’ f , ‘ _ H ‘ v \ ' . - . , )l ‘ - n - fl ' M j I " _ - - 1. ¢ ‘ J~ , / ‘4 \ 4' ’ 7 ,_- -r- , - -,.. ,-._...-.-..-..- t - . . _ --.... --- . - _- . . -- ..-.-.. -, rur‘ __-'_ ~ ...--.,.,,, ‘- \ ‘ ,, , .- ' fl) ‘ . t . . J p , _ . ‘ g I / \ 7r t _, ,_ , i t . I r v. , . ‘ ‘ j . “ ...a o . . . ‘ x I - r it. I . C c e \ ‘ v . r‘.r 4-4 M» nonfarmers; (2) performed by poverty stricken peasants on eroded rupfdown farms; or (4) a mixed pattern of all three of these.39 Unquestionably the maintenance of high price supports had come to be identified by many participants with protection for the family farm. Senator humphrey, after reviewing trends in farm costs, invest- ment, and income against the background of the Benson proposals to lower price supports, asserted: Therefore, if prices are not kept at a fairly high level, there is no chance in the world for the farmer to survive... any drop in farm prices and farm income can have disastrous consequences.... There can be no question about that.60 Many persons outside the halls of Congress also held this view. For example, the editor of a Georgia newspaper stated: "Few people who are even remotely familiar with the farm picture doubt that the proposed reduction in price supports would just about finish up small farmers in Georgia and the nation.”1 even Carl Saanerg felt constrained to inform the editor and readers of the New Republic that "the only effect that lower farm prices will have is the doom of the family type farm."62 The Administration obviously did not believe that its policy recommendations would "break" more than the most marginal farmers, but many of its critics either firmly believed that such would be the case or that the risk was simply too great to take: sgpolicyfifor Commercial Agriculture, p. 463. 60U. S. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, CII, 3580. 61naycross Journal-Herald, January 22, 1958, cited in the Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, CIV, A1050. 62"Letter-to-the-editor," AUQUSt 9: 19549 P- 3- 0... o r , i l x‘ I wish you [Bensog7 were right. You would have no trouble selling me on flexible supports if I thought lowering supports would really do the business...I wish I could believe flexible supports would measurably reduce production without breaking an awful lot of people.Lu All things considered, they simply did not believe that the Administra- tion's proposals constituted a technically feasible solution to the problems at hand. Technical duestions at Issue Two basic sets of related questions of fact have been in- extricably involved in the postwar price policy debates. First, what is the relationship between price and supply? Specifically, will a de- clining price situation bring about a cutback in production? If so, what is the precise ratio; how large a drop in price is required to bring about a given decline in production? Are the ratios between prices and production such and are the production alternatives available to farmers such that agriculture can absorb the lower prices and make the necessary adjustments without a major re-organization of the basic family farm structure of agriculture? Second, what is the extent of the disequilibrium between agricultural supply and demand? 15 the surplus capacity limited to only a few of the basic commodities or is virtually the entire agricultural plant producing beyond the level of effective demand? Is the surplus capacity of agriculture temporary or is it more or less permanent in nature? Is the surplus, whether temporary or permanent, large or is the margin of excessive production over effective demand relatively small? GgSenator Young, Senate, Hearings, General Farm Program, Part I, 1954, p. 122. /’ $30 Agricultural policy participants, particularly in regard to the first set of questions, have either sharply disagreed as to what constituted the "right" answers or have been so uncertain as to what the answers were that they have been plagued with indecision. Disagreement and uncertainty as to what constituted the right answers has affected the course of price and control policy throughout the postwar period, but these factors were probably never more critical than during the 1954-CO period. Prior to 1954 the context within which these questions were discussed was sharply different. War-induced de- mand kept open market prices high, CCC granaries empty, and farm in- comes booming. Thus the questions were not as pressing, the stakes were not as high. In the 1960's the farm income picture has stabilized and improved somewhat, and the political line-up in Washington has changed. Also during the past five or six years there has been a significant increase in the quantity and quality of empirical and theoretical data pertaining to these questions. These questions and their answers were particularly critical to the 1954-60 period because the traditional price policy was, for the first time, placed under tremendous pressure; the general farm price structure was weak and government Operating costs were skyrocketing. Thus the question of to "change or not to change" took on a pressing and iwmediate significance. Also, the disagreement over questions of fact was magnified by-—but was by no means a mere reflection of--the diff- erences in the political color of the White House and the Capitol. How was it possible that the participants could be sharply divided and/or uncertain about these technical questions? Surely the (A b) \1 answers were to be found in the mountains of studies and testimonies on the farm problem which had been growing at geometric rates since the closing days of world War II. hasn't it the case as most econo- mists, either implicitly or explicitly,claimed that they could supply the participants, if they would but listen with open minds, with all the information they needed to rationally decide on any number of policy alternatives? Price and supply.--A1though full agreement as to precisely how responsive supply was to prices was lacking, the majority of the econo- mists endorsel the general role assigned to prices by the Administration. Ur probably to put it more properly, the Administration endorsed the role assigned to prices by the economists. The general economic theory of rational, competitive economic systems assigns to market price the role of allocating productive resources in accordance with consumer choice; that is, of adjusting supply to consumer demand. Although there have been a few recent exceptions, economists have shown little dis- position to treat agriculture as unique and therefore exempt from this general law: There is no more than a minute grain of truth, if any, in such fundamentalistic assertions by some members of the pro- fession as that due to physical, biological, and organizational circumstances, agriculture is unable to adjust supply to demand, and that it reacts perversely to prices.... Agriculture is a system of private, overwhelmingly family-operated enterprises, which in its 2 million commercial units behaves so remarkably businesslike that it gears production in accordance with the effective demand. 64Karl Brandt, "Guidelines for a Constructive Revision of Agricultural Policy in the Coming Decade," Journal of Farm Economics, XLIII (February, 1961), s, 7. ’\ \J ”'8 mu Otherwise the vigorous criticism by most economists of price support policies, which persistently maintain agricultural prices above free market levels, would make little Sense. Most of the economists also agreed that once the temporary allocations were corrected farmers could survive and prosper under free market pricing: iowever, if freedom of choice to work either in agriculture or out of it can be achieved and maintained, real incomes to farmers should not long remain far out of balance with real incomes in comparable nonfarm occupations.... Thus, although some thought him a little Optimistic, the basic principles eXpressed by b. J. working was generally endorsed by the profession in 1957. Adlressing the question of how effective are prices and incomes in bringing about adjustments within agriculture he stated: A brief answer to this question is that they are Very effec- tive. Indeed, given any situation as to the knowledge of the arts of production and as to the available re50urces, consider- ations of price and income are of dominant importance in deter- mining how much of each couewdity commercial farmers will attempt to produce. Similarly, changes in prices and incomes, or in prospects for them, are of primary importance in causing com- mercial farmers to decide to make adjustments in their output. This is bound to be the case where we have intelligent farmers and each individual is free to make his own decisions as to what he should pIOJUCe.°° Testifying before the same congressional committee, John A. Baker, of the National Farmers Union, argued that the individual farmer would be motivated to maintain and, in fact, to try to increase his production 053 atement by the Committee on Agricultural Policy of the Twentieth Century Fund, printed in Nurray R. Benedict, Can We Solve the Eérm Problem (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), p. 492. The committee was composed of 12 nationally prominent economists. 66?olicyfor Commercial Agricwlture-oo: PP- 430: 433- r‘ r. 1 . \.. \4 in the face of falling prices. The end result would be that, over the short and intermediate term, total production would be maintained or increased rather than decreased in a declining price situation. As {roof that lower prices would not cut production baker cited historical and contemporary statistics. For example: From 19:9 to 193; total farm output did not droo even though prices dropped ty so percent and national farm net income dropped by c7 percent. From 1951 to 1956, prices received by farmers dropped 22 rercent, natiOnal net incone by 38 percent, per farm net income by 23 percent; yet total output increased by 7 per- centob7 baker conceded that over the long run the rate of increase in farm production would be cut and an equilibrium between supply and demand achieved. but he argued that in the process the family farm structure would be destroyed. The baker testimony quite faithfully reflected the arguments used by most of the participants who opposed the Administration's pro- 68 posed price policies. but it is significant for another reason. C71bid., p. 404. These and similar statistics were cited over and over by the Administration's critics. Without sophisticated tools of analysis, those statistics could be used to prove about any possible position on this question. For example, in a 1954 discussion of a set of tables supplied by the USDA, Senator Young proclaimed: "This morning I got figures from the Department of Agriculture which I think totally diSprove any argument that flexible supports would take care of the sur- plus." Mr. Kline of the Farm Bureau, however, had a different view of what these sane tables revealed: "I think you can categorically state that production in agriculture does respond to price in exactly the op- posite direction you [genator Young7 are suggesting." Senate, Qgpgral Fara Program, Part I, p. 208. bBalthough rather passionate, the Baker testimony could not be dismissed as simply "group interest propaganda" lacking in "objective presentation of facts and ideas," as one reviewer of the Hearings put it. Marion Clawson, "Policy for Commercial Agriculture Re-examined: A Review Article," Journal of Farm Economics, XL (August, 1958), 560. l . I . | ‘ - ‘ l , i is ' I . N . i . t ‘7 U C I I I In pointing to the historical statistics on production and price, Eaker said: Cfficial historical figures do not necessarily prove this conclusion that falling prices and income will not reduce farm output. but any who would try to prove the op- posite that falling prices will reduce output would be re- quired satisfactorily to explain them away.°9 And on the general question of price, income, and SUpply he asserted: we in Farmers Union have made an extended and diligent search through libraries and by personal interview, without success, to uncover currently applicable scientific research results bearing on the question of the short- and long-run price or income elasticity of total farm production or supply. As far as we have been able to determine there are no published results of sound scientific, statistical and economic research of current significance that indicates any connection or re- lationship between market prices or farm income and the volume of farm production or farm marketing.7O whether or not intended, Kr. baker was in effect saying, here is what I believe will happen and why it will happen, and before I will consider changing my mind somebody is going to have to come up with more solid explanations than has been the case to date. Concerning the dearth of "research of current significance” Mr. daker overstated the case. Several papers presented at the same hearings dealt meaningfully with some of the questions he raised and there had been other earlier studies. but while overstating it he had nevertheless touched on a very significant point. The implied challenge he had issued really hadn't been effectively met. As soon as one begins to probe the professional literature of the period one is struck by a curious anomaly. 0n the one hand, the oQPolicy for Commercial Agriculture, p. 462. 7OIbido, p0 4030 (a. In H literature exudes implicit faith in the general role of free market pricing. out on the other hand, when confronted with the Specific questions of the precise effect of free pricing in agriculture the literature is vague, inconclusive and not infrequently contradictory. Most of the literature, since the end of the war and through most of the 1954-c0 period, dealing with general role of agricultural prices was devoted to expounding the theme that rising prices get higher production, and that the maintenance of artificial prices above free market levels generates a series of problems, such as helping to per- petuate surplus production, creating and maintaining inefficient resource allocation, and disrupting foreign trade. And all this without solving the farm income problem. The data and theoretical arguments presented in this literature were valuable to the participants to be sure. but of more pressing sig- nificance were the questions as to precisely what problems a move away from artificial pricing would solve and what problems would this create? Cn this the economists were not particularly helpful. Most of their studies were concerned with arguing the evils of high, artificial pric- ing; while they condemned the existing Supports they implicitly or ex- plicitly judged free market prices to be good. but they did so without documenting why and how free market prices would be useful for achieving what the agricultural policy making participants wanted to accomplish. As the economic problems of agriculture continued to worsen, and as the debate in Washington concerning what to do about them continued its stalemate course, economists inevitably had to address themselves more Specifically to the nature of agricultural supply function. Moving from 'L; ~ generalities to specifics most admitted that their knowledge of the supply curve was not very deep or firm. For example, Don Paarlberg, a top economic advisor to Mr. uenson and vigorous advocate of freer pricing, stated: "admittedly we do not know as much as we should about supply responses in agriculture."71 John A. Schnittker put it this way: "The profession is not blessed with many firm conclusions in supply analysis. The question of whether there is less agreement in the field of individual commodities than in respect to aggregate agricultural output appears to be unanswered at this time."72 Although lacking firm understanding as to why, there was con- siderable agreement that the supply curve was rather inelastic. Marion Clawson, reviewing the testimony of "nation's leading agricultural economists" before the Joint Economic Committee in 1957, reported that ”there was general agreement that the supply function for agriculture is highly inelastic."7; by the latter part of the decade there was a growing awareness that the curve was more inelastic on the downward side of price than on the upward side. In short, one finds a paradoxical situation. On the general question of whether or not production responds to price changes either 71”Shortcomings in Current Explanations Of National Farm Surpluses," Journal of Farm Economics, XXXVIII (December, 1956), 1710. 7”The Response of Wheat Production to Prices with Emphasis on Technological Change," Journal of Farm Economics, XL (December, 1958), 1087. 73Journal of Farm Economics, XL, 553- .343 on the upward or downward side, the answer was a loud and an emphatic yes. but on the specific question of how much change, the answer is a quiet, probably not much. Traditional economic theory postulates that, other things equal, rational economic producers will reSpond logically to price changes. However, many of the participants of the price policy process have argued, either implicitly or explicitly, that in some sense agriculture is unique and therefore exempt from this theoretically postulated behavior. Much of the confusion and bitterness of the postwar price policy debates can be attributed to the fact that economists have not been able to adequately explain farmer behavior, either individual or aggregate, during periods of falling prices. Economists had dealt with the question of why agriculture "seems" to behave somewhat differently from other in- dustries, but the theoretical explanations of the landmark studies, prior to mid-1950's, were obviously inadequate. Since the mid-1950's the explanation of the supply function has been greatly extended. Several economists have been involved, but the work of two individuals stand out. Willard w. Cochrane's brilliant analysis of the role of technology as a shifter of the supply curve has had a profound effect on attitudes toward agricultural supply both 74Two major studies were: John D. Black and John K. Galbraith, "Maintenance of Agricultural Production During Depression: The Explana_ tions Reviewed," Journal of Eolitical Econozny, XLVI (June, 1938), 305- 23; D. Gale Johnson, "The Nature of the Supply Function for Agriculture Products," American Economics Review, XL (September, 1950), 539-64. For a terse but good survey of past attempts to explain the supply function see Glenn L. Johnson, ”Supply Function—-Some Facts and Notions," Agricul- tural Adiustment roblems in a Growing Economy, eds. Earl C. Heady et al., (.anes: Iowa btate University Press, 195d), eSp. pp. 74- 7a. This article also sets forth Johnson' 5 own landmark contribution. . v t r . m a , . v , \ ¥ Q , , . r 7 \ l . ,., 3 t t I .’ . t ‘ . I f 0 x , . O , . o . ‘ . I O i 7. . O ' - , e n ‘ 7., a ‘ A r- ' g \I— ~‘ 1 ~ , ..» . r . - ‘ A o c .1 2 ‘ ,7 N, 7‘ V . o - ' , o _- \.. ‘ ' x] A P , V g. ' ' I y J ) r l 1‘ o r ' ‘ x J a A . j ‘ —. 344 within and outside the profession.75 The fixed assets theory developed by Glenn L. Johnson is also of landmark proportions, and may well prove to constitute the final link in the chain of explaining agricultural 76 production behavior. These and other related works are only now being integrated, and much disagreement still exists, but certainly economists are in a much better position today than at any time in the past in regard to their ability to explain the SUpply response in agriculture. Dale E. Hathaway, whose own work has contributed significantly to understanding the whys 77 and wherefores of agricultural production, makes one of the best inte- grated statements of the efforts to explain the disequilibrium in agri- 75 culture. he identifies five key characteristics of agriculture and their significance in regard to agricultural production: Several characteristics of the agricultural industry now have been discussed. They are: (l) a highly inelastic demand for products: (4) a low income elasticity for products; (3) rapid rates of technological change which increase the physical productivity of certain inputs; (4) a competitive structure; and (5) a high degree of asset fixity which reduces resource mobility from the industry. No one of these characteristics is unique to agriculture, nor would any one of them alone suffice to explain the large and extended disequilibrium in agriculture. The co kiration of characteristics does appear 75Cochrane's fullest and most complete statement is to be found in his book, Farm Prices, Myth and Reality (Ninneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 19bd), esp. Chapter V, “The Agricultural Treadmill." 70Johnson's writings are scattered, but the core of his theory is to be found in his article cited in footnote No. 74 above. 77See, e.g., "Agriculture and the Business Cycle," Policy for fifiliculture, pp. 51-76, and "Agriculture in an Unstable Economy He- visited," Journal of Farm Economics, XLI (may, 1959), 180-85. 7aGovernment and Agriculture, Chapters IV and X. to be unique to agriculture, and the combination will explain a large and persistent disequilibrium...Zunless at least some of these characteristics are substantially altereg7 total output will not contract ani may even expand, desgite falling product prices and low earnings on fixed assets.]9 Opponents of free market pricing had long argued that agriculture was somehow unique and, therefore, production would not reSpond to price changes in accordance with traditional economic theory. As the above statement by Hathaway suggests, these laymen, although they weren't able to present a sophisticated theoretical justification, were basically correct. In short, many laymen, arguing from common sense observation, were right on this issue long before the economists. Somewhat the same situation has existed in reSpect to the question of just how far prices would fall if government guarantees were to be re- moved. Price and income_projections.--One of the truly amazing features of the studies, critiques, and hearing which had grown in massive pro- fusion since the inauguration of the postwar price policy, is the almost complete absence, prior to about 19cc, of competent, generally creditable estimates and projections of agricultural price and income under varying price and control policies. Information of this type was certainly crucial to the decisions that participants had to make about price policy. Thus the subject was endlessly and heatedly debated. But, for the most part, these debates dealt in broad generalities and emotional polemics. The National Farmers Union and the Grain Terminal Association, a Union c00perative, made 79£§ii., Pp. 126, 128. Italics mine. L‘ 5- 346 attempts to deal with Specifics but their studies lacked sophistication and independence. The fact that UbDA econopists produced little in this area is partly attributable to the Eisenhower Administration's increas— ingly strong covmdtment to free market pricing, and its general faith that prices and incomes would hold up reasonably well under such con- ditions. Land—Grant economists did not show initiative in this area partly because, where they Were concerned about price policy, their energies tended to be focused more on describing the effects of high price supports rather than the effects of low support or free market prices. Another reason for the dearth of solid information in this area was that economists simply hadn't developed the sophisticated technical tools necessary for detailed and creditable price estimates. Such work requires highly refined detailed knowledge of demand and supply schedules, massive and accessible basic data, and highly refined theoretical tools. Until the latter part of the 1950's these conditions were rather lacking. An imgortant consequence of this paucity of creditable information was that a participant could take any number of positions on the possible effects of various price policy proposals and sincerely and properly claim that his supporting evidence was as good as the evidence used to back quite different claims. Given the state of knowledge about the economics of agricultural production and demand, a neutral and objective observer would have been forced to conclude that both the Administration's position that the effects of moving the price props toward the free market level would not be unduly disruptive, and the position taken by the Admin- istration's critics that such a move would have calamatous resultS, were L47 equally plausible. It also meant that the paralyzing uncertainty which plagued many of the participants not c mmitted to either position was quite justified. In this sort of partial information-vacuum, bitter disagreement and confusing uncertainty abounded, and political and value differences were considerably magnifiel. This is not to say that had better infor- mation been available there would have been no technical or political conflicts. In the area of public policy technical knowledge can seldom be that persuasive. but surely the debates would have been different. This is demonstrated by noting the effect of the publication, between 1959 and 19o}, of several competent and detailed price and income pro- jection studies. In 195‘ a group of Iowa State University economists concluded that haj it not been for the price support program total net farm in- Cone would have been a whopping 3? percent lower during the previous five years than it actually had been.30 Shortly after the Eisenhower Administration proposed the abanionment of the parity price support system, Senator Ellender, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, requested stadies, involving the Senate Committee's staff, halter Wilcox of the Library of Congress, department of Agriculture economists, and a committee of the Land-Grant Colleges, aimed at pro- jecting farm price, income, and output over the 1960-65 period under a program of "orderl " transition to free market pricing and no production Y 80.‘Iallace's Farmer, December 19, 1959- I l I) CD A controls.bl Two other important stulies on this subject were published in lvcl. T The results of these studies was sobering. It was estimated that by l9ob corn and wheat would be selling at less than a dollar a bushel, cattle at about fifteen cents and hogs at ten cents. Total net income to agriculture would be down as much as 40 percent. Net cash receipts of a typical Corn-belt farmer would be off 37 percent. Net cash receipts to the average commercial wheat producer would be down 60 percent! Koreover, hathaway estimated that under such conditions the value of physical assets in agriculture would be reduced "by some sue to 380 billion."d3 because rising land values have been one of the strong points in the agricultural economy such a devaluation would have dis- astrous impact. my 1938 and 19:9 the growing frustration with the government's farm program had caused an increasing number of individuals and gIOUps (for example, the tisenhower Administration and its major farm ally, the American farm bureau Federation) to call for an abrupt return to the free 81The studies by the USDA and the Land-Grant Colleges' Committee along with Senator cllender's requesting letters are in U. 8. Congress, Senate, Farm Price and Income Projections 1900-(5, Under Conditions Aprrox- inating Free Troluction anl harketinggof Agricultural Commodities, Report from the U. S. Department of Agriculture and a Statement from the Land Grant Colleges Ida-1 Advisory Committee, Senate Document No. 77, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960. The wilcox study is in Economic Policies for Agriculture in the chO's, "Agriculture's Income and Adjustment Problem," Ppo 1‘1". 8?“, A. Cromarty, "Free Market Price Projections Based on a Formal Econometric Model," Journal of Farm Economics, XLIII (May, 1961), 365-78; Arnold Paulsen and Don Kaldor, Whethods, Assumptions and Results of Free Market Frojections for Livestock and Feed :conomy," ibid., pp. 357-64. 3$Covernment and Agriculture: P° 243' 3‘49 market. The refrain "get government out of agriculture" grew in volume and shrillness. However, the publication of the above studies soon acted to take much of the wind out of this movement. This did not mean that all abandoned the idea of ever restoring free market pricing. But it did mean that virtually no one any longer supported such a return without a fairly long and effectively controlled transition, and without the use of other devices such as massive (and expensive) land retirement programs:4 aimed at cushioning the blow that most now recognized would be extremely severe if price guarantees were to be withdrawn. The surplus.--The above studies reflect the fact that by the latter part of the 1950's the economists had come to recognize that the surplus capacity in agriculture was large and characteristic of virtually the entire agriCultural plant, rather than small and limited to the few supported commodities, as has been assumed for so long. The view of a relatively small, limited, and temporary surplus had been held by most of the other participants as well. Ironically, on this technical question where consensus was greatest, all were basically wrong. but the consensus on this point did not promote agreement, it acted to sharpen the conflict. belief that the surplus was temporary and limited was a foundation stone in the Eisenhower Administration's posi- tion that a lowering of the support toward free market levels would effec- tively correct the surplus problem without hardship to farmers; farmers COUld shift their production to other commodities and maintain their 64The Farm Bureau, for example, still talks about a return to the free market, but after the publication of these studies it retreated from its position of an abrupt withdrawal that it had taken in 1958 and 1959. Furthermore, it has come to place ever greater importance on a massive land retirement program. The Bureau has been reluctant to put a price tag on such a program, but it would involve several billion dollars annually. 350 income position. The Administration's opponents seeing the surplus as limited and temrorary were renewed in their belief that an equilibrium could be restored by holding production in line with traditional control rethods until demand caught up with supply. because the Surplus is large and not limited to only a few commodities, a removal of price guarantees would generate a wholesale price decline not limited to those commodities that have been protected. Thus farmers would be unable to protect their income position by changing their production patterns as the Administration assumed. The Administra- tion's Opponents were confident that the lowering of supports would not solve the surplus problem and were convinced that such an approach would have disastrous effects. This is not because they graSped the true sig- nificance of the nature of the surplus problem. But, although they may not have had an adequate explanation they were closer to being right on the ultimate effects of free, or nearly free, market pricing than any of the other participants, as the recent studies have since demonstrated. The IQuO's If farno other reason than it has become customary to do so, political observers in 1960 reported that "regardless of which party wins the Presidency, a new farm program seems certain to evolve." 5 There was, of course, good evidence to support such a prediction. The growing dissatisfaction with the existing farm program and the swelling demand for a break in the frustrating stalemate of the post-Korea years forced each party to pledge to try to achieve a breakthrough in agricultural k \ 85.1. H. Carmical, New York Times, July 17, 1960. policy. Richard Nixon declared the farm dilemma to be the "toughest and biggest problem confronting America today."86 Senator Kennedy stated that "no domestic issue in this election is more important than the farm . ”87 issue. The position of both candidates was clearly influenced by the growing recognition that there were no quick, easy, or cheap solutions. Nixon, although going to great effort to dissociate himself from Mr. Benson, emphasized the traditional Republican "free enterprise" theme, calling for a continuation of moderate supports and controls for the transitional period after which controls would be lifted and government would intervene in the market only to stabilize free market prices. To make this possible, however, the surplus problem would have to be licked, and to do this he called for a massive land retirement program, which his supporters estimated would cost about a billion dollars a year above the current programs.88 Senator Kennedy, following traditional Democratic line, emphasized high parity prices, and particularly the achievement of parity income for family farmers. Also, leaning on past tradition, he stressed production control, but he broke new ground by making it the heart of his program. The supply-management approach, about which Mr. Kennedy general- ized during the campaign, became the centerpiece of the new Administra- tion's approach to the farm problem. The traditional acreage restrictions aC'Speech in Ninot, North Dakota, June 21. 87Speech in Des Moines, Iowa, August 22. 88New York Times, September 259 1960: P- 105- (4,) J1 \) were to be largely supplanted by units-of-production controls. Each farmer would be assigned Specific l'bushel, bales, barrels" allotments in addition to, or in place of, the old acreage allotments. Moreover, and this was the most novel and most controversial part, the controls were to be made mandatory for all farmers, enforced by fines and penalties. Under the traditional acreage and quota system the farmer always had the option of not participating in the control program. No such option would exist under the Administration's proposed programs. The intellectual father of the supply-management program was willard w. Cochrane, an agricultural economist from the University of Ninnesota. Cochrane had been Governor Orville Freeman's farm expert, he was a Kennedy advisor during the 19eo campaign, and after the in- auguration was named director of agricultural economics in the Depart- ment of Agriculture. Not since 1933, when several agricultural econo- mists were major architects in the construction of the New Deal's first farm program, have the ideas of an economist been so critical in the develOpment of new policy proposals.8 Two factors explain Cochrane's critical role. First, because of the growing frustrations with old programs, policy makers were highly receptive to new ideas. Many were desperately hoping for a "Moses” in the form of an idea or a person to give agricultural policy a new sense 89Although the general supply—management approach was almost solely Cochrane's he was assisted by other economists in the development of Specific policy proposals. Most notable was John A. Schnittker, of Kansas State University, who went to Washington as Cochrane's second lieutenant, then replaced him as the Secretary's chief economic advisor in 1964 when Cochrane returned to academic life. He was named under- secretary of agriculture in April, 1965. 353 of direction. Second, Cochrane was virtually the only economist in the postwar era to offer a proposal of substance which broke from the hack- neyed nostrums of free market pricing, compensatory payments, Speeding up the out-migration of farmers, etc., that his colleagues had been offering up year after year. Actually Cochrane's major contribution was not the supply- management proposal itself, for the idea of tight effective controls had been tossed around for some time. Rather his contribution was in his new approach to the analysis of the agricultural problem.91 His landmark book, Farm Prices, Myth and Reality, published in 1958, challenged tra- ditional economic theory shibboleths about SUpply reSponses to price, and constructed an analytical framework which dramatically focused atten- tion on one of the most important features of postwar American agriculture, the technological revolution. The dogma that Cochrane challenged was the belief that agriculture was capable, given some temporary emergency assistance, of adjusting to an equilibrium--the "Myth of an Automatically Adjusting Agriculture" as he dubbed it.92 In reality, he argued, under free market pricing, agricultural production could be brought into equilib- rium with demand only after a wholesale reorganization of agriculture had goHis general proposal is set out in Chapter VIII of his book, Farm Prices, and in "Some Reflections Upon Supply Control," Journal of rare economics, XLI (November, 1959), 697—710. 9lAs Cochrane emphasized there was no necessary connection between his economic analysis and his policy proposal. but given his value com- mitments and his belief that the nonfarm public was approaching the end of his willingness to pay for the costly farm programs, the preposal followed quite logically. 92Farm Prices, p. 10. 354 occurred, including the virtual elimination of the family farm. Cochrane argued that the disequilibrium in agriculture was chronic, not temporary; aggregate agricultural production is always ex- panding, and eXpanding faster than aggregate demand. Agricultural output constantly expands since, due to the competitive structure of agriculture (several million small-unit family farms), the individual farmer is a price taker. The individual farmer knows he can't influence the price he gets, so he tries to protect or increase his income by adopting new technology to lower his per unit cost. But these new technologies also increase output and, as other farmers inevitably adopt the same techniques, total output increases. This increase in the face of an inelastic demand, forces prices down to where the temporary gains are wiped out. Caught in a price-cost squeeze, the farmer again seeks to lower his cost and again the results are the same: The average farmer is on a treadmill with reSpect to tech- nological advanCe. In the quest for increased returns, or the minimization of losses, which the average farmer hopes to achieve through the adOption of some new technology, he runs faster and faster on the treadmill. but by running faster he does not reach the goal of increased returns; the treadmill simply turns over faster. As the treadmill speeds up, it grinds out more and more farm products for consumers.93 The treadmill keeps turning and turning because a constant flow of new technologies is virtually assured by the work of agricultural scientists in the land-grant colleges, governmental research agencies . . . 94 and in private enterprise. 93Ibid., p. 96. 94Any work which challenges traditional dogma inevitably attracts controversy. Jochrane's work was no exception. His economic analysis, of course, is open to criticism. He probably imputes too much of the , a ._ -l \ _ < l ‘ ll. . (‘ v D - - l , 7 x _. . . I — . A l C I V l . O l C 7 \ O . . J - v- - V - . a r T — ~ '4 l t ‘ ‘ v ' . A J» r, x r F ' . _ ,, l I ’ , p . 1 l .t , .4 c7 - " I r A . a fl . _ _'\7 , x O - O 3 Q o r . J I r . I‘ Cochrane's picture of a totally inelastic supply Curve constantly shifting to the right faster than the totally inelastic demand curve showed that constant downward pressure on farm prices should be expected. This meant that free market pricing would be disastrous, and that the traditional support and control programs would continue to be extremely expensive, an expense which he thought the public would not much longer be Willing to bear. Thus he saw two alternatives: biven the general situation in agriculture described by the theory of the treadmill, and the decision by all of society to dichntinue or reduce materially the treasury ccst of price and inco e support in agriculture, corxercial farmers are confronted with an inescapable choice; they can either choke off the rate of aggregate outrut expansion through widespread losses and business failire unler the free market approach, or bridle the rate of expansion by the wide spread acceptance and use of production and marketing controls. These are the alternatives, unless all society is willing to continue to underwrite the treasury costs of {rice and incone support in agriculture.95 increased output in recent decades to technology. He correctly observes that farmers will continue to acquire new technologies in the face of falling prices but fails to give an adequate explanation as to why they do so. The theories of Glen L. Johnson, deve10ped almost simultaneously, help to fill the gap at this point. For a fairly balanced criticism of Cochrane's economic analysis and his proposed control program see Hathaway, vaernnent anl_}nricultwre, Charters IV and X11, nassim. A great deal of the criticism of Cochrane by his fellow economists has been purely on value grounds. Although identified with the "new" economists he didn't really fit the mold of either the contemporary left or the right in economics. what made him different was his value orientation, which was basically that of a liberal, somewhat romantic, agrarian. He unabashedly eXpressed his comritment to the family farm goal, for he thought it a valuable social institution which should be saved if at all possible (pp. 129-31). More significantly, he committed near heresy by saying that while he was not opposed to technological advance he did not want it to occur at a "more rapid rate" (p. 132), and once referred to the technological explosion as a "monster" requiring a "new dimension in agricultural policy" (p. 159). For such sentiments he was branded, by one reviewer, as being against "pro- gress" and as standing "against the trend of the last several hundred years, the thing that differentiates man from the animals and plants, and in my Opinion the survival of the United States as we know it." George brinegar, JOJrnal of Farm Economics, XL (August, 1958), 768-709- 9: J1 \. Farm Frices, p. 176- 350 The new Administration saw the supply-management approach as a means to "raise farmer income and preserve the smaller farmers while .9b reducing government surpluses.‘ As originally envisioned by the Admin- istration, virtually all commodities would be brought under the strict control system. however, the new system was not to be imposed immediately. In 1901 President Kennedy asked for legal authority to set up the control system on a conmodity by commodity basis after producers in each group had approved by referendum. The proposed program would then be submitted to Congress for endorsement or veto. This first Administration proposal was killed in the congressional agricultural committees. In 1962 the Adminis- tration dropped the farmer-committee approach and asked for authority to impose tight controls on dairy products, feed grains, and wheat. Congress rejected the dairy and feed grain proposals but accepted one for wheat. The Administration's pr0posals had the support of the National Farmers Union, the Orange, and most of the commodity organizers. But Opposition was intense from the start. The American Farm Bureau Federation and the livestock associations were adamantly opposed. Most Republicans were also. Part of the opposition was derived from factors of pure economic self interest. The Midwestern livestock-feed grain regions were opposed because the pr0posed program would limit the amount of feed that COUld be locally produced and fed and would raise feeding costs. Some Southerners were skeptical of the dairy and feed-grain provisions because of the recent eXpansion by Southern farmers into those areas. Many urban Democrats were opposed, at least initially, fearing higher food prices.97 9LU, 5, Agricultural Policy in the Postwar Years, pp. 48-49. 97Hearly all the urban Democrats who voted against the 1961 pro- Posal supported the Administration in 1962, ibid., p. 52. The traditional rivalry between Congress and the Executive also was involved. This was particularly important in the l9ol proposal which would have sharply limited Congress' role in policy formation and given to the Secretary of Agriculture the dominating role. This was also a factor in the Farm bureau's opposition. Its influence would have been substantially diluted under such a system. But the over-riding reason for the opposition was ideological. Because of their value orientation virtually all Republicans and a good number of conservative Democrats were opposed to such a wholesale expan- sion of the Federal government's power to control personal and economic freedom. The Republican National Committee branded the proposals as ,_ "socialist Icihilosophy.”d The president of the Farm bureau saw it as "regulated peasantry."99 General Eisenhower indicated that he would "rather go to jail" than comply with the controls. The Administration persisted in its efforts. In 1962, with CCC costs breaking new records, Congress approved a tight control pro- gram for wheat, where the surplus was the greatest. The program was subject to approval in a referendum of wheat growers in the spring of 1903. Farmer approval of the program would have likely paved the way for extension of similar controls to other areas. The stakes were high and the [re-election campaign intense. The Administration with the vast resources of the Department of Agriculture and most of the affected farm ‘— galbijo ’ p. 51. 99o. 5. News a World Report. June 21. 1961. p- 80- . . , ~ .A 4 . .. .. U _ A o .. a . .. , r a . , q , , < .r. .n a L, r l .a , I ., . . A“ 1, . .., .l . . . i .f. j _ I O r , I, . c A311,, , a I . , . ~ i . . . e II has . .1 4 . _ . _ a J 1 ..r, . . 3 r J, . v A K it ,1 I. I; It _ 4 ‘ 338 organizations asked the farmers to vote ”yes." The Farm Bureau in a massive campaign called for a rejection. with a two-thirds majority needed to approve the program the Small, 48 percent "yes" vote represented a major defeat for the Adminis- tration and effectively killed, at least for the immediate future, the rigid-control approach. Roderick Turnbull after reviewing the pro— ceedings of annual conventions of Midwestern farm organizations in the fall of 1903 noted that the principal effect of the wheat vote is that all organizations apparently now admit that farm programs to be accepted by farmers must be voluntary in nature.... This doesn‘t mean they [farm organization§7all believe in the voluntary approach. They just accept it as a fact of life, for the time being at least."100 Willard Cochrane, who had seen his brain-child hacked to pieces in Congress and finally thrown out the window by the wheat farmers, ruefully concluded that "farmers will not accept collective, mandatory control programs that have the purpose of reducing program costs; but they are happy with a voluntary type program, where they are free to choose the option of re- 101 ducing production if it is to their personal advantage." The wheat farmers in voting "no," voted their hearts more than their pocketbooks. Under the law, the rejection of the rigid controls and high supports was to result in prices sopported at 50 percent of parity with the old controls retained. The financial differences were Considerable, as a Western Kansas banker says he tried to point out, but without success: "I tried to get them to take a piece of paper and figure —‘ lCO"Frograms Must be Voluntary," Kansas City Star, November 24, 19o3. 101Kansas City Star, February 14, 1965, p. 56. ,. . ‘ [ Ir , \J .» I ,, ' — ../ , "b '. \ J . _ . r r r t 9 ‘ . ' r' F I\> . l i v _- . y' ‘ . . '\ . \ J . l ‘ r p I ' J D O O C ,J ~ r 7 r r v . ‘— I a ‘ N . I ' ~ , I . r A . _ 1H J _ l .J V t . \~ 4 \— ‘ r , ,. ' F r r— w l ‘ \_ r ‘ q k v ‘ t H J ~J , \ . A ~ — _‘ if " r v r . s , ‘ l V J ’ L \J ‘4 , ‘l _ . i . .J J‘ u ‘ _ . l t, A Q .» I ‘ ‘ —. . -. 4 r v “ A\ , J - . u . _ r ‘ .- A T 1 , a g - r O V. ' l. 7 ¢ l ,r . ¥ , ‘J u , , .L \ A . 2 J P J _1 s ’4) UT \0 out what a no vote would mean, but they didn't want to do that. They 102 hollered about losing their freedom." This has to be qualified to the extent that many farmers, as Walter C. Fierce, president of the Kansas Farm bureau observed,103 be- lieved that Congress would step in with intermediate legislation rather than allowing supports to fall to the 50 percent of parity level.104 In effect, the farmers "struck a blow for freedom on May 21, but not "105 complete freedom. As the result of the wheat referendum, the Administration's hope of a breakthrough in policy was thwarted, just as all such efforts-- whatever their direction--to break out of the traditional pattern had been stymied since 1949. However, a minor but significant change was achieved in 1964 when Congress passed wheat legislation setting up a combination two-price plan (a 90 percent of parity support for allotment- wheat designated for domestic use and a lower support for export wheat), and compensatory payments. The compensatory payments were in the form of cash certificates paid for by the wheat processors. Actually programs such as this have been preposed in various forms ever since the late w 103"aheat Farmers' Revolt," U. 8. News 8 World Report, June 3, 19o2, p. 42. 1C3Kansas City Star, June 9, l9o3, p. 9E. 104Samuel Lubell thinks that this was a major factor in the vote. Farmers were "bargaining;” they eXpected new legislation with moderate controls and fairly high supports. "Press Release," May 24, 1963, supplied by Nr. Lubell. 1053. 5. News a World Report, p. 41. For a statistical inter- Pretation of the vote see Lynn M. Daft, "The l9o3 Wheat Referendum," lgurnal of Farm Economics, XLVI (August, 1964), 588-599. /. L -. “l C’ . ' \ W V 3- - l A. o . g I a / o A—J s 1" O «’3 SoO 1920's. However, they have now become enacted into law. And, although still limited in coverage, they nay be extended to other commodities. The price and control policy debates since 1961 have occurred against a somewhat different background and have differed in several important respects from the 1954—o0 debates. The fact that the Democrats have controlled both the Hh te House and the Congress has given the de- bates a firmer sense of direction, if not actual accomplishments. The fact that the farm income situation has been stabilized and improved slightly has eliminated some of the crisis atmOSphere that affected the previous period. There also seems to have been a subtle but significant change in the attitude on the part of many participants toward the problem at hand. hhen the post-Korea debates began the leading Spokesmen for each of the major opposing camps were quite confident that they had the right answers. By the end of the decade that confidence had been partially shattered: 'I admit I don't know what should be done' says a don't-quote- me CC? wheat—state Senator. Vermont's George Aiken, ranking Re- publican on the Cowmittee and longtime farm policy specialist, shakes his head in confessed bewilderment. Louisiana's Allen Ellender, agricultural committee chairman, mutters, 'I wish I knew.'109 As a result congressional policy makers entered the new decade with a certain humility and a heightened receptiveness to new policy proposals} 106”stumpea Experts," Tine, Narch 2, 1959, p. 10. 107This sense of discouragement was wideSpread among farmers also. Samuel Lubell reported that in 1959, for the first time since 1950, he found "that a sizeable majority of farmers confessed they thought there might be no solution at all to the farm problem." He reported that in sharp contrast to the past "not a single farmer could offer even a crack- Fot solution to the surplus problem." "Press Release," August 4, 1959, supplied by Mr. Lubell. '\ y’ 3s1 More importantly, by 19c] enough empirical and theoretical evidence had been accumulated that most participants were forced to come to grips with the fact that virtually the entire agricultural plant was producing in surplus and that this surplus was large. Recognition of this fact had considerable impact on the behavior of the participants and on the course of the policy process. For example, no longer could participants seriously quarrel over whether or not the surplus problem could be solved safely through a return to the appealing simplicity of the free market. The growing consensus among economists that a removal of price props would have calamitous effects eliminated this technical- belief conflict which had so plagued the policy process during the pre- vious eight years. The growing recognition of the extent of the problem made it possible for the supply-management approach to be seriously advanced. but the accumulation of technical data, on which the supply-management program was predicated, did not, of course, assure its enactment. Al- though most of the participants had come to agree that the surplus was large they did not agree on what to do about it. The supply-management proposal generated a deep seated and intense value conflict. It is this conflict which has been the dominating feature of the farm debates in the sixties. It does seem apparent, however, that this greater understanding of the surplus problem has been a contributing factor to the new direction in price policy that has begun to emerge since the wheat referendum. The deepening awareness of the complexity of the farm illness also seems to have had a quieting effect on the interested nonfarm public. By the end of the decade public criticism of the stalemate between the j J Aiministration and the Congress, and the failure to "solve the farm problem had climbed to a fever pitch. Despairing comments such as the following were not uncommon: The price support program is like Prohibition. It isn't working. It is unfair and terribly expensive. But our government doesn't deal with the problem. It is a kind r) of breakiown of inmocracy.10° This is not pretty. It inmlies that U. 8. politics, perhaps democracy itself, isn‘t equal to the obvious demands of a technological age.... The repute of our folifical system is at stake.1C9 To a large extent this crescendo of criticism was predicted on the rather widely held assumption that if the policy makers Would just rise above narrow ;olitical interest a solution could be easily fashioned. Lut despite the fact that no l'solution” has been found, despite the fact that the stalemate persists, despite the fact that net budget expenditures of the USDA have recently averaged about $7 billion a year, up about a; billion from the 19s4-ao period, we find little of the type of criticism that characterized a considerable portion of the urban press during the last half of the fifties. beveral factors are involved. First, in terms of legislative accomplishments, Crville Freeman hasn‘t been much more effective than Ezra Taft Benson, but he has been an infinitely better public relations man. where censon talked about agriculture as the country's No. l prob- lem, Freeman has talked about agriculture as the country's No. 1 "success story." Secondly, the whole American political climate has changed enough to shift some of the attention away from agriculture. Editors 103"Third Largest Expense," New Republic, June 8, 1959, p. 2. Italics mine. 199"Farmers and the Space Age budget," £212: January 27: 1958, Co 25. Italics mine. have found that such matters as the New Frontier, the Cubas and the Viet Nams, and the Negro revolution were more in need of their solemn advice than matters agricultural. But probably of greater importance was the recognition that while the old programs didn't solve the farm problem their dissolution would have had an intolerable impact on agriculture. by 1961 no one could seriously argue, as the Eisenhower Administration had taken to arguing during its last days, that the old programs were helping only the rela- tively few very large farmers. This, plus the recognition that there is no quick and simple solution to the problems plaguing agriculture, has had a sobering effect. For example, in 1900 the U. 8. News 3 horld Renort, in telling the "real story of the perennial farm problem," concluded that "there is much more to it than politics.“110 Roughly translated, the writer was admitting that there is more to this thing than self-seeking liberal politicians trying to curry favor with the voters by trying to enlarge the powers of Big Government. In short, by that time, much of the public could agree with Mr. Nixon that the farm problem "requires the most creative and imaginative thinking the nation can produce,"111 while sympathizing with him for not having any of the "creative" ideas he was calling for. Another effect of the accumulation of "new knowledge, which seemed to reach something of a climax during the period roughly from 11(3"Cne Problem that has both Parties Stumped," August 1, 1960, p. 79. 1llspeech at Minot, South Dakota. 3L4 1957 to 19oz, was to dull the cutting edge of the econOmists' criticism. Not only has there been a slackening in the nonfarm public criticism, but the criticisms by economists have also been muted; the former fact is undoubtedly, to a certain extent, the product of the latter. The slackening in the criticism by the economists may be due to a greater political sorhistication on their part, or to the type of wearied resignation suggested earlier. but most importantly, it is due to the almost simultaneous recognition that (1) an abrupt removal of the price props would generate more problems than it solved, and (2) that the traditional programs had not, in fact, created the great problems that the economists had so long predicted they would. According to the solemn warnings of the late 1940's and early 1950's, Congress' myoyic persistence in retaining the old program should have produced, by lQLO, an American agriculture characterized by vast allocative inefficiencies, stagnated technology, and populated by mil- lions of farmers who otherwise would have long since moved to the city, where they would have found a better life and by their leaving made it better for those remaining in agriculture. In addition, world trade Would have been thoroughly diSIUpted during the interim. Alas, none of these things came to pass. In no other sector of the American economy has the growth rate in productive efficiency been more rapid. between 1920 and 19c0 there was a net migration of 7.2 million people from the farm, and total farm population drOpped by more than 30 percent. It is difficult to imagine how the rate of migration could have been faster. If the program had seriously hindered resource Ebb adjustment within agriculture no one seemed to be able to document it. If world trade in farm products had been adversely affected it hardly seemed noticeable. hathaway was one of the first to Specifically point out that 112 the program could not be found guilty of all the old charges. Lihers followed suit, many of whom had been around long enough to have taken I". d part in drafting the prosecution's original set of Specifications. This is not to say that the economists now recommend the continuation of the old program. They do not, because by and large they do not see it as effectively dealing with the problems of agriculture. But they have recognized that the old program did not create the problems they thought that it would. And, furthermore, they have accepted the fact the problem of low farm income would have been much worse in the absence of the pro- gr (3177 o Temforary iolicy for a Permanent Problem Recognition that the surplus was large and extensive killed demands for an abrupt return to the free market and generated a series of proposed approaches--from supply-management on the one hand to massive land retirement on the other. however, except for the increased use of *— 112"United States Farm Policy: An Appraisal," Journal of Farm E22222i22a XLI (Nay, 1959), 180-85. 11giaee for example, George E. Brandow, "In Search of Principles of Farm Policy," Journal of Farm Economics, XLIV (December, 1902), 1145-55; D. Gale Johnson, "efficiency and Welfare Implications of United States Agriculture;" halter w. WilcoX. "The Rationality of United States Agricultural Policies;" John A. Schnittker, "Discussion," Journal of {firm Economics, XLV (May, 1963), 331-358. 30C) diversionary payments and price support certificates,the political pro- cess has generated no fundamental changes in policy tx> deal with the income problem of commercial agriculture, even though that problem con- tinues to exist and the cost of the old program remains high. Unable to decide on a long-range, permanent program the partici- pants have continued to renew the old program on a "temporary" basis. President Johnson has called for a "fundamental examination of the entire agricoltural policy" aimed at the development of permanent legislation.114 but it is unlikely that new permanent programs will soon emerge. Until the substantial majority of participants recognize that the problem is a per- manent one, the possibility of a permanent program is remote. Throughout the postwar period the agricultural policy process has producei makeshift legislation, in part, because the participants thought they were dealing with a temporary problem. The general recog- nition that the surplus problem is large did not bring a general recog- nition that it was permanent. Cochrane recognized that it was. Some congressmen and National farmers Union leaders seem to have accepted this. but Cochrane is simply wrong when he says: "We know what the problem is in American Agriculture and we know what different courses of action will do in the way of coning with that problem. What we lack at the political level is the courage to take the action that is known and is required."11J He has lived with his own view that the disequilib- rium is permanent long enough to see that View as orthodox, and makes the 114"F'3rm hkessage’" fig}; York Tires, Fe'bruary 5, 1963, 331-2580 .—— 11bletter to author, September ?9, 1964. 3o7 rather natural mistake of aSsuming that all others also accept it as orthodox. but this is not the case. Most farm organizations, particu- larly the farm bureau, and probably most congressional participants still see the surplus as essentially tem:orary. while the list of economists who support this view is growing, it does not number a majority. Hathaway argues that "only a minority have accepted the view that it [the disequilibrium7 is inherent in the economic structure of agriculture in the market economy."116 The differences that divide the agriculture political community will continue to result in "temporary” legislation until a consensus is develOped based on recognition that the technological revolution and the family farm structure of agriculture makes surplus production permanent rather than temporary. Until this view is accepted as ortho- doxy by the majority of the economists, chances for consensus are slim. Even when the consensus develops, there is no guarantee that participants "solution." But underlying the differences will agree on a permanent that Currently divide the agricultural community there is a commonality of basic political values and economic interests which would suggest that, with such an understanding, agreement is more likely than continued division. One other factor could force unified action--refusal of the nonfarm public to continue to pay for the "temporary" programs. This pIOSpect has been a nagging fear among the Agricultural interests for some time. The possibilities of such a revolt are discussed in Chapter XII. * 11bGovernment and Agriculture, p. 246. L a . ‘ a I V v 91' .. r , r .. . , -r l . . \ .(i r, \l a k , s . . a v, o I u r , O l A V (I . r .r . O l . l O r O C r I . la a a l i u. _ a . l . . , s . ..V 3 i l . n | _ r x . . .. n V l.. .V . _ , . ..\I. b , . J L i . . , v , a a . L r I , . P , l . .(J. . .. . . fiv a. _ .. l. ,l, c '14 x . I» l 0‘ . y l , F 4 l A.” l V \1 r.“ J ' , . . s _ , . «a, . . l .1: I\ r l a ; .. .\ .rlr . , . ‘_ _ . Ale t . . t a. r l , _ . _ I . I a I :4 l» . I a s , F , V , 1 . , a f _ , Ill . , . .+ _ . ; , . run . . n ,L y A; I _. Ir‘ . \iu . , .1. -I .x. i A .s. .. h D x. _ r . u u c u i . e l k L . _ , l i y «1. l . a A , . A t l r . or c l . _ . Li . A, U . I l . . > x . J J . t t e O l r , I r fig w , ti .1. . . . .K F , s r ‘11 . .r‘ . - . b y a O V V \ , p , . . . .r t 1!... i , I I u . a . \ . A _ . a .,l . L 7‘ 4 4 ,J . l . c r I. . \ . O z , V a . . . . a r o t -, l , A _ . r . _ r, U n a a L 'L . . tr 4 i r l , r r . I . . i y l J .. , . . ., . A r . - . a . r, . .l- . w . l . i. av . l, . . F . . t . x), r e ‘ x 15 _ i , V; _ r» . . c . .v?. i ll . ... v , i t. . Hi. , .r, . . y e i . 1 .., > _ 4 o p l D Si \ J ‘ .. c . a . . . I 7 . I . . . x; . \ i l . l r . z e o A , i4 _ O EflfifTrfi XI TEE ChALLLNGE > . . . .7 g , . J h H I pi , in, .I re . . . i I ..i _ A t, , I . a We . r , v. , ..r . Fl . ~ .\ a V . 4 0 e A l . x n , H , ll .1 .1 i. U I . c A.\ V a O . . . _ . A. O o a . r A. . 7" a. no. t O» .\ o . o E . I . _ ,. I O O I\ O O . 370 fertilizers, pesticides, livestock feed additives, improved cropping and feeding techniques, weed killers,improved crop varieties, and a host of other new efficiency increasing techniques. Improved crop varieties alone have accounted for about 12 percent of increase in wheat yields and about 20 percent of the increase in corn yields over the past 30 year%? because of the technological revolution, production has been grow- ing faster than the demand for agricultural products. Because the pub- lic's demand for farm produce is virtually inelastic (the individual consumes very little more even though his income may be up and/or farm prices may be down), the unbalanced growth between production and popula- tion has created a constant downward pressure on farm prices since the early 19bO's--down 18 percent from 1947-49 to 1963.11 but whereas the prices the farmer receives have declined, the prices of items he buys for general living and production requirements have risen, thus catching him in a painful price-cost squeeze. With a heavy commitment of productive resources that cannot be shifted to other uses the farmer has tried to protect his income position by adopting more cost-reducing technologies "as long as the family continues to farm."12 but this inevitably results in greater total production and, thus, continued downward pressure on 1::'John A. Schnittker, "The Response of Wheat Production to Prices with Emghasis on Technological Change," Journal of Farm Economics: XL (December, 1958), 1096, and Zvi Criliches, "Research Costs and Social Returns; hybrid Corn and Related Innovations," The Journal of Political Economy, LXVI (October, 1953): 4Z1. 11Farm Ccsts--Parm Prices, p. 5. 19Economic Policies for Agriculture in the l9b0's, p. 5. 371 prices. As a result returns to agricultural resources have remained low and net incomes to farm families have been stagnated. For thousands of farm families, the priceecost scissors have cut too deeply and they have migrated to the city. The land they leave is consolidated into larger units making more efficient production possible, increasing total production even more. In most forms of economic production the producer materially benefits from efficiency gains. However, in agriculture, because of the market structure, most of the benefits are lost in the form of lower prices. The consumer, not the farmer, is the greatest beneficiary. Thus is presented a great paradox; the farmer is penalized by his increased efficiency. His capacity to produce in great abundance is the cause of his scarcity of income. This spectacular increase in efficiency has constituted a great challenge to the participants of the agricultural policy making process, and postwar agricultural policy has been dramatically affected by it. Technological Revolution and Polignyaking The myriad of statistical studies which now document the spectacu- lar upsurge in agricultural productivity during the past two decades can be deceiving. The observer can become so engrossed that he fails to note that, generally speaking, the recognition of the efficiency revolution has been 21 post facto rather than prescient. Participants in the late forties and early fifties were aware that agricultural productivity was increasing, but none, including the economists, anticipated the extent to which it would continue to grow. In 1952, thirteen nationally prominent economists judged that the develOpment and adoption of "improved farming techniques" had just about reached its peak. while they expected "certain progress both in equipment and farming methods" they saw no future increase in productivity comparable to the past twenty years.13 In 1954-55 a group of ”scientists and economists met to appraise yield possibilities for each major crop in 197'." by 19c3 actual yields for most crops had already surpassed the projected yields for 1975.14 As the economist Don Paarlberg noted, "The productivity of American agriculture continues to amaze most of '15 us....' The chronic failure to anticipate the upsurge in agricultural productivity continually upset the expectations of those policy makers who personally hoped that the traditional control program would hold pro— duction in line and relieve the pressure on the CCC warehouses. But the reality of the revolution guaranteed that the program would not achieve the results that had originally been intended. Simply limiting acres would not limit production. Take the example of wheat. During the 1930's wheat acreage and production climbed steadily, hitting a prewar peak of around 80 million acres planted and almost a billion bushels harvested in 1938. The growing production in conjunction with other factors forced prices down.10 The A 13Turning the Searchlight on Farm POIiEXa PP- 46-47- 14Fact book..., pp. 25-56. 15"Shortcomings in Current Explanations of National Farm Sur- pluses," Journal of Farm Economics, XXXVIII (December, 1956), 1768. Italics mine. loHistcrical Statistics of the United State§i Colonial Times to lvd7, p. 290, and Farm Costs-~Farm Prices, P- 28° a“ groiuction control provision of the Agricultaral Adjustment Act of 1938 established a bi million acre national allotment for 1939 through 1941. ?rimarily tecadse ~f this, seeded acreage was reduced by 18 million acres each year. aith yields increasing only slightly, total production was . fill-HA o o 17 ' cut by nearly z»u million bushels each year. The reduced production contributei significantly to a rise in prices, and the incomes of wheat farmers were considerably improved. The recent record is quite different. flith controls removed and under the stimulus of high war-induced prices farmers were again planting around 80 million acres of wheat by the early 1950's and producing somewhat over one billion bushels. Controls were imposeJ again in 1954, with a basic national allotment of 55 million acres in effect since 1955. Again, as in the period 1939 to 1941, wheat acreage has been correspondingly reluced. but in sharp contrast to the elrlier period, tctal production has not been cut. Although acreage has been slashed by arcupj f0 percent from 1951-55, total production since ';/ q _ ,. ~ 18 o o . lass has ayerigtd about 14 percent pore. Acreage yields, which during 1331-25 had been only slightly greater than in the previous ten years, . ,n . ,, . Q 19 Jurped su percent in IUDL-CC and another 7 percent in 1961-6o. Thus the planners were Confouniel and the CJC was forced to purchase millions of bushels of wheat. 17John A. Schnittker, hheat Problems and Programs in the United gal 393;-1ggm, Research bulletin 733, North Central Regional Publi- cati n 115 (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1960), p. 15. ’a i ( fl r+ r9 labtatistical abstract, 1964, po 650. 191:11. W I‘ wheat is but one example of what has happened across the board. ay continually underestimating the thrust of the revolution in productiv- ity, the calculations of participants have inevitably missed the mark. The high support tlock overestimated the potential for curtailing pro- duction via traditional controls. The low support group block under- estimated the extent to which the inexorable upward thrust of total production would force down farm prices and incomes. This underestimation of the growing flood of agri0ultural produc- tivity goes a long way toward explaining why farm income has been con- sistently lower than expected, and why costs of efforts to bolster sagging farm income have been much higher than intended. Participants have been trapped between rising production on the one hand and falling prices on the other. About all they have been able to do is to hold on to the old program; a program which solves neither problem to anyone's satisfaction, but a program which will seemingly have to do as a stop-gap measure until a fundamental change occurs somewhere, somehow. The challenge of the technological revolution goes deeper than simply past and present failure to adequately measure it. Its existence has created a great challenge to the participants in regard to what they can or should do about it. Agricultural policy makers, knowingly or un- knowingly, have been caught Up in a great dilemma, a dilemma which cannot be easily resolved, but which if not, will surely guarantee that agricultural Policy will continue to drift in the foreseeable future much as it has in the past. To understand the nature of this dilemma it is necessary to dis- cuss the meaning of efficiency and the general attitudes toward it. - A44 (J i \1 Q1 The word efficiency is used in various ways. however defined, it is highly valued both as a means and as an end. Allocative efficiency (also called economic efficiency) concerns the utilization of scarce resources in such a way that, given the state of technology and resources available, the greatest total production is achieved. This is measured by the economic returns to employed resources. Peak allocative efficiency is achieved when returns to comparable resources are the same regardless where they are employed in the economy. Productive efficiency (also called technical efficiency) states the ratio between inputs and output in the production cycle. The productive efficiency of an individual, a firm, an industry, a nation can be said to be increasing if the growth of outputs is more rapid than the growth of inputs. while not ignoring the latter, economists tend to be more concerned with the former. The public at large treats efficiency primarily in the latter sense, which it gen- erally translates as technological advance. "Americans prize technologi- cal adVance highly, expect it, and demand it in all segments of the econ- m‘."20 Apparently Americans often value technology in and of itself. lore generally it is valued because of its contribution to economic prog- Eoth allocative and productive efficiency are intimately tied up With the idea of economic atuniance and high standards of living. Efficient allocation assures the greatest possible abundance from given r980urces ‘— f 4 I n ' i - ~"Willard w. Cochrane, farm 3r1ces,fifiyth and Reality, pp. 105-106. Also see Robin M. williams, Americ:n Society: A Sociological Interpreta- 1on (flew York: Alfred C. Knopf, Inc., 1951), Chapter XI, and almost any standard dissertation on American values. 370 and techniques. Growth in productive efficiency assures ever greater abundance. Expanding economic abundance may be valued as an end or as a veins, but whatever the case it is closely associated with the notion of "progress." Nowhere has the conCern with economic abundance been stronger than in Anerica. The economic wealth available to Everyman in the form of relatively cheap but productive land was seen by the eighteenth and nineteenth century American as one of the primary characteristics which nude the New norld infinitely tetter than the Old World. This economic base helped to make the American 3 free man,and his desire for social and political equality a reality. by the latter part of the nineteenth century the American economy was characterized by glaring inequality in wealth. Reacting to these inequalities many Americans, particularly the political left, became concerned with the redistribution of wealth, not simply the production of more wealth. hit with the cataclysm of the 1930's even this changed. The Great Derression stalled the production processes and generated social chaos and economic deprivation. To revitalize the production process be— came an all important goal. Redistribution of inc0me via welfare programs Could be helpful and was demanded, but the over-riding concern became that of increasing production. Increased economic production became a panacea for all 1115: To increase production was to ameliorate unemployment, agricul- tural insecurity, the threat of bankruptcy to the small business- man, the risk of investors, the financial troubles of the states and the cities, even the wretched overcrowding which results when people cannot afford to own or rent their own homes and must double up. Scarcely a single social problem was left .\ 377 untouched. And within a few years after Keynes the level of production became the critical factor in war mobilization.... here was perhaps the nearest thing to alchemy that had ever been seen in the field of politics. Increased_production solved,_or seemed to solve, nearly all of the social problems of the day.:1 In the post-world war II era the dedication to the goal of increased production has been complete. A constantly expanding economy is supposed to solve economic insecurity and eliminate deprivation, but also to mitigate such things as racial discontent as well. Across the political spectrum politicians stress the need for achieving the fastest possible economic growth rate. Indeed, economic growth has become a central issue in the cold war. he have accepted Khruschev's challenge, confident that the Soviets can never "bury" us but, rather, that the flood of economic goods that they seek to generate will bury the Communist ideology itself. And most believe that through the stimulation of the production processes of the roor nations, Coamunist dreams of eXpansion will be stymied. farmers and farm rolicy participants have been a part of the general tradition placing a high value on abundant production, on the achievement of ever higher standards of living. This emphasis in eighteenth and nineteenth century agrarianism was dealt with in Chapter 11. Albert S. Goss, former master of the National Grange, expresses a typical contemporary view: He believe in an economy of abundance. Especially do we believe in an abundance of food and fiber, man's chief necessities. Every step of progress that civilization . 21John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Societl (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, College Edition, 1938): PP. 188'189° Italics mine. .J. T . I _ ,x. I i r! . a . p , v . 0 Ir. ¢ 7 A . J ., Ar r is n n J, .t r a . _, o L l. . \ , ,., \J . t A _ w .1 v ; . .. r ~J 1 r _, n . l . w T O p it; )v , , r ). . i \ . \,,,_ , .c C . t .i J .fL i r. J. J , 3 t, t J at, ii. i . vL , t T; J. W]; J u . I.\~ \. . f 4 .r4 0 7 r :, \., r V. I r x r .l .l 378 has made has been marked with increased consumption of goods and serviCes, and, unless we_§roduce these goods and services in abundanceJ we stop_progress.44 This production-mindedness is further reinforced by a belief--held less strongly today than in the past-~that producing to the utmost of one's capacity is morally right, not to do so is morally wrong. This attitude stems, in part, from what one observer has called the "work-Imperative," which derived from Puritan thought and influence.2 The pr0ponents of the family farm have also placed a high value on efficiency because they have seen it as an important instrument for pro- moting and preserving the family farm. As long as the family farm could be kept as efficient as non-family units, then its survival, if not as— sured, was at least greatly enhanced. It became a widely and persuasively accepted view that one of the best ways to "improve the condition of the farmer was by the simple process of teaching him 'efficiency'--how to grow two blades of grass where but one grew beforei"24 The "make-all-farms- efficient approach" today emphasizes not only the use of new technologies I) but the proper combination of resources and their management.‘5 22U. 8. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings, long-Range AgriCultural POIiCX BNj Program. 80th Cong., lst Sess., 1947, p. o7. Italics mine. 23John M. brewster, ”Technological Advance and the Future of the Family Farm," Journal of farm Economics, XL (December, 1958), 1596-1613; "Society Values and Goals in hespect to Agriculture," Goals and Values in Agricultural Policy, Iowa State University Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1961): PP. 114-37. Also see Arthur M. Schlesinger, "what Then is the American, This New Man," American Historical Review, XLVIII (January, 1943), for a description of what he calls the ”work habit," about which he says, "probably no legacy from our farmer forebears has entered more deeply into the national PSYChology." p. 222. ~ 24Henr C. Taylor, "The New Farm Economics," Journal of Farm _§pnomics, XI July, 19:9), 362. 25Cochrane, Farm lrices, pp. 141-46. ’ . . . i . V e ./ n [L J 4 s r . _ . r ,1 w n . C O . L P . «be . ol 0 O O / vlL F .ri , A!“ 9. NJ. ‘1 . e 4 o r A,» ,. . ... r _ c . o, i l . ., . A n. .. , O . x . r: . or 4 F I} L ... l. r 1, .. .rl. . I , l P, v ‘ ,IL .1 , w y .. . .C figs 1; c :4 0 ‘e / all. s . _ . J P. . . . . .l I x .7 J .r; Fr. ‘ l. 1 / no .. r . c ‘4‘ x. . A F. l \ r Jr~ r z e A a o. . J . 3 l 4 F r o . a a. r \L . w . y C , r. F 3 . a. O :1 379 In his book, Farmers at the Crossroads, Ezra Taft benson raised the distinctly loaded question, "Chould Efficiency be Outlawed’Pw"O his answer, of course, was in the negative. he implied, however, that high government price supports and production controls did just that. Echo- ing the charge long useJ by economists, he argued that the program froze production patterns and tragped too many resources in agriculture and prevented "desirable adjustments to changing technology and shifting demands. This nearly always means less efficient utilization of re- 27 sources than would occur under a system with less government control." Ur. benson and Er. Eisenhower used this argument rather frequently in justifying their demands for lower and more flexible price supports. This sparked an erratic and sometimes heated dialogue among the partici- pants as to the importance and pr0per value to be placed on efficiency in policy determinations. This exchange was closely tied up with the charges and counter charges as to who was or was not defending the family farm as described in Chapter VIII. Although the oratorical excess is obvious, the general theme expressed by Senator hubert Humphrey is fairly typical of the response by Administration critics: we can look through the bid Testament and the New Testament, the Sermon on the hount, and the Ten Commandments; we can look through every book of holy Scripture, or the writings of Thomas Aquinas or John Locke, we can go back to the writings of bocrates and Cicero, and come down through the Declaration of Independence, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the Constitution of the United States, but we will never find the word "efficiency." That word has been made 'holier than thou' by the Republican National Committee. “rt-I‘D o 40 o 4’Itid., pp. 40, 41. Kr. President, I have never defended the family farm on the basis that it can produce a commooity at less cost than a big oreration.... he do not seek efficiency as our main goal. we seek the good life: we seek a sound social structure and a good social order.?8 Lut just as the cfarge that the Eisenhower Administration was anti-family farm was basically grounlless, so was the Administration's charge that the opponents of its program were anti-efficiency without any real tasis in fact. As in the family farm exchange, the efficiency exchange brought out differences of emphasis within the agricultural political Community rather than fundamental disagreements. The criterion of efficiency tends to loom larger in the minds of the conservative agrarians, who see the family firm primarily as an institution of free enterprise, than among the literal agrarians who see the family farm first as a rural social institution and only secondly as a unit of free enter- prise. This difference of emrhasis is not totally inconsequential. It has contributed to the divisions within agriculture. But the conflict is not a fundamental one. for example, from the debates of the 1950's one might have expected to hear less about efficiency in agriculture under Democratic Alministrations in the l9oO's. Suchfns not been the case. from the beginning the Kennedy-Freeman Administration endeavored to build a more favorable image of American agriculture-~an image which it believed was badly tarnished during the benson tenure. Reversing the Benson charges that much of the farm program was breeding inefficiency, the new Adminis- tration emphasized the marvelous efficiency 0f agriculture. The farmer A leU. 8 Congressional Record, C11, 1956, 3581. $61 “9 was pictured as the "unheralded hero of the American economy." Agri- 30 culture was repeatedly described as America's “No. 1 success story," tecause, in the Words of Fresident Kenneiy9" as a provider of food and fiter, American agriculture is a highly successful and highly efficient industry. In no other country and at no other time in the history of our own farm econohy, have So many geoyle been so well provided with such abundance and variety at such low cost":1 This emphasis on the efficiency of the family farmer was a part of a public relations effort to improve his image and, thus, did not refresent an obsessive concern with efficiency as such. but as a public relations theme it was well chosen, for virtually all relevant partici- pants are for Lgth the family farm and efficiency. While it may be true that Senator Humphrey "never defended the family farm [simpli7 on the basis it cin produce a commodity at less cost than a big operation," most defenlers of the family farm have pointed with pride to the fact that the institution could produce a commodity as cheaply. Moreover, most participants, to dite at least, have generally assumed that the preservation of the family farm is closely linked with its capacity to remain a reason- ably efficient economic institution. orville Freeman noted: r'r . ‘)Tew York Times, Narch 2c, 1961, p. 49. 3CFor an elaboration of this theme by Freeman see U. 8. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearin 5, ton. Crville L. Free“in1,SpCI€tarY Cf Agriculture—Designate, 57th Cong., lst Sess., January lb, l9ol, p. 13. alfresident John F. Kennedy, ”Farm hessage," March 16, 1961. ” A . - a \ ‘- I believe the finily farm system is worth preserving Le- cause it has social worth as well as economic value. out if we are realistic, we must recognize that the family farm will continue only if it is an efficient producer of agricultural prouucts in terms of cirrent scientific, technological, and nanagenent rractices." . 4— That the family farm must pass the test of efficiency is not a staniarl created by the preSent principal of the Department of Agriculture nor pecaliar to him. he may stite it a little more openly and forcefully than many chapricns of the family farm care to do, but it is a test that generally has been acce;ted by all except the more romantic agrarians. froronents of the family firm have stood by the efficiency test because they have always helieveJ--and most still do—-that it would pass the test. Cne of the key tenets of the family farm creed is that, while the family erm may need some assistance from government, it is just as efficient or more efficient than any other type of farm unit and that it Will remain so. Typical of this belief is the judgment of the House Sub- committee on Family Farms: This is not to manifest or intimate, however, that this rural order can he maintained solely for the values heretofore sup- plied. The hard test now is in the growing competition within agriculture dae suhstantially to technical evolution. It is the judgment of this subcommittee that the family system of far ing, in adequate production units, can continue £2 he he host efficient, the most economic, and the most satisfy- ing operation in a prosperous agriculture. ” Indeed, the family farm has been declared efficient by law; the preamble of the Agricultural Act of 1901 declares it to be "the policy of Congress JtU. 3. Congress, house, Subcommittee on Family Farms, The Family Firm, 85th Cong., lst Sess., 19o3, p. 141. fl 3cU. S. Congress, house, Subcommittee on Family Farms, The Famil_ firm 84th Cong., Committee Report, August 1, 1956, p. 23. to...recognize the importance of the family farm as an efficient unit '34 \— of production." Policies it Crc s Purpose (3') The persuasiveness of the belief in efficiency as an end and as a means for assisting the family farmer is demonstrated by the con- tinued emphasis on research efforts to develop ever more production- increasing technologies and educational programs to assure these new technologies are alopted by farmers. As Lauren Soth noted in 1957, "all officialdom and the major farm organizations are alike...on this point. The Farm bureau, the Grange and the Farmers Union all are in favor of increased appropriations for farm research...Secretary benson asks for bigger funds for research in farm production at the same time he asks for a soil bank program to cut output. He complains that the high price supports passed by Congress provide incentives which work against the acreage limitation programs. out he seems not to see that new technology f— v has the same effect."JJ That assessment applies equally today. Reflecting this widespread support, postwar Administrations have asked for increasingly larger research budgets, and the Congress has generously reSponded. From 1953 through 1960 the net budget expenditures of the Agricultural Research Service, the Department of Agriculture's . v0 , .—\ a o o o . chief research agency, grew from adl million to $175 million, an in- crease of 115 percent. Since 1960 ARS's eXpenditures have increased r 34U. S. Statutes at Large, LXXV (Washington: U. 8. Government Printing Cffice, 1961), 294. EbFarm Trouble, p. 136. assesearch is also carried on by such agencies as the Agricultural ’4 v . . '— . o ' 9 o verketing Service, rorest SerVice, Farmers Cooperative SerVice, and Foreign Agricultural Service. I” . \27 00 percent, to $i78 million (est.) for fiscal 1905. About 20 percent of the AmS budget ayrropriations are transferred to the State agricultural experiment stations as grants—in-aid. The States generally match this A.- i . od with about m;.50 for each Sl received from the federal government, thus considerably expanding the total of public expenditures for agricultural a» .( research.” Thus you have the unusual situation of the government increasing- ly concerned, since the Korean Jar, with trying to get farmers to curtail their production on the one hand and on the other hand pouring more and core money into {rograns which, by ultimately contributing to the increased productivity of agriculture, make such control efforts all the more diffi- cult and expensive and, to date, largely futile. Through the institutions of the Department of Agriculture, the Land-Crant Colleges, and the Experiment Stations we have created in this country an enormously large and enormously effective apparatus for sci- entific reseirch in agricultural production. Through the institutions of the Extension Service and the vocational education program the farmer has been informed of the technologies resulting from these research efforts and encouraged, even cajoled, into adopting them. 37Budget Exrenfiitures, Fiscal Yeirs 1952-1959, Office of budget and Finance, United States uepartnent of Agriculture, harch 21, 1960; Budget Eigenditures, Fiscal Years 1957 through th4, and Estimated 1955 and lQCo, office of cudget and Finance, United States Department of Agriculture, Karch 9, 19oz. hot all the AhS exgenditures can be charged to research as the agency administers several non-research programs. he do not have precise figures, but the increase in expenditures for actual research have generally paralled the UQWJId trend in the overall budget of the ARS. The trend is alSo evident in the other agencies which engage in research. cdggestions gqj Answers on Agriculturil Research, Agriculture In- formation rulletin ho. aid, Agricultural nesearch Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture (hashington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1900), p. 4. . 39It also needs to be emphasized that not all the activity which 15 described as "agricultural research has the ultimate effect of I. In their ince tion these institutions were intended to ”serve the interests of the family farmer.”40 denerally speaking they have done so. without question the services of these institutions helped to strengthen the position of the finily farmer against his potential com— petitors. Youaver, in recent years 3 great ruralcx has arisen. An ever more trcgressive family firm agricultire is an eyer more productive agri- calture. but the single greatest problem of family farm agriculture,as a wholeiin recent years is not that it has been inefficient, but, in a very real sense, that it has been too efficient. from this increased efficiency has come the urSurge in total agricultural production. because this upsurge in production has out- stripped effective demand, there has been a more or less constant down- ward pressure on farm prices and incomes. what was originally intended as subsidy to farmers has increasingly become a subsidy to consumers in the form of cheap food ani fiber. A subsidy which once served to strengthen the family far or now has become his stalking horse. The family farmer may WEll be buried beneath the growing avalanche of the commodities that the government has taught him to produce so effectively. The basic tension between the efforts of the government to deal with the surplus problem--an effort which is intimately tied to the increasing productivity. It is probably the case that non-production increasing research has taken a somewhat larger share than formerly. but again the basic trend is clear. More money and effort than ever be- fore is being spent on research projects which will ultimately lead to greater production. 40Jayne D. Rasmussen and Gladys L. baker, "The Department is duilt," After a Hucdred Years, The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1962 (Wash- ington: U. S. bovernment Printing Office, 1902), p. 7. I . s... CJIJ fanily-farm policy goal-~anj the increasing expenditures and efforts aimed at increasing the productive efficiency of agriculture has not been totally unrecognized. As early as 1927 henry A. Wallace suggested that it "would seem wise to take something of a breathing spell...in 41 effcrts along the lines of increasing agricultural efficiency.... hexford G. Tugwell pinpointed the dilemma in 1936: All this has been done by Government aid--for research, for experiment, for education, and for extension work. No effort of the like sort eVer got its results quicker or was more difficult to handle once the results arrived. For by it we have jeopardized the traditional family farm which is the only form of agricul- tural organization with which we feel secure. He went on to point out that this illustrates the dilemma which progress--or perhaps I should say change-~always creates. It begins as one thing and ends up as quite another, creating problems of adjustment--usually unforeseen, and therefore difficult. host of the difficulty lies in the fact that our minds have not been prepared to . . . 4* recognize new facts and the necessity of new accommodations. Z he urged a major reassessment of the overall agricultural research pro- gram to take account of these "new facts." Almost three decades later the "new facts" have not been gen- erally recognized and the "new accommodations" have not been made. In the postwar period only a few scattered voices have raised questions about the rationale of continued increases in publicly subsidized agricultural research and education at a time when the albatross of 41”Standards of Economic Efficiency in Agriculture and Their Compatibility with Social Welfare," Farm Income and Farm Life, Dwight Sanderson, ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 121. 42"Down to Earth," Current history, XLIV (July, 1936), 36. 337 surplus production has grown heavier and heavier around the neck of the farmer. Lne such voice was raised by Willard a. Cochrane. In an article published in 1959 Cochrane noted: The tine has Cone, I believe, to realistically appraise and analyze the allocation of research and educational resources among different sectors of the economy. Certainly economists who earn their keep fussing over resource allocation problems should be receptive to the study of another allocation problem. And cer- tainly there is [rira facie evilence of too heavy a concentration of new kflOWlngu-CICJting resources in agriculture; the chronic surplus is not at "unduly high" farm prices and the constancy of conventional resources Committed to agricultural production pro- vides such eviience. daticnal behavior in the field of agricul- tural policy suggests that Careful consideration be given to a withdrawal of éfiifi research and educational resources from agri- culture and their transference to other activities. This is not a case of turning the clock back. Nor is it a case of being against progress. iut it is a recognition that there Egg pg too many new knowledge-creating resources allocated to a particular sector of the economy-—an allocation of new knowledge-creating resources that causes that sector to grow too fast relative to the exnansion in den nd for the_products of that sector.“3 Not unexpectedly Cochrane found little SUpport but considerable . . . . . 4' . cr1t1crsm among his professional colleagues. 4 Nor were his proposals received any more warmly after he became an economic advisor to Secre- tary of Agriculture, Crville Freeman. Cochrane described the reception given his prorosals this way: .9 Further Reflections on Supply Control," Journal of Farm ’2" _ 4V bou Econonics, XLI (hovember, 1959), 713- 4“For conments addressed Openly or implicitly to the questions raised by Cochrane see: T. W. Schultz, "thy Continue to Add to the Excess Capacity of Agriculture Through Research," The University of Chicago Lffice of Agricultural Economics, Research Paper No. 6107, May 15, 1961, Prepared for the white house Agricultural Panel on Science and Tech- nology, hay 24, 19s] (mimeo); T. w. Schultz, "A Policy to Redistribute Looses from Economic Progress," Journal of Farm Economics, XLIII (August, "Public Purpose in Agricultural Research 1901), ssa-ss; tarl c. heady, and Education," ibid., pp. cos-a1, and Dale E. Hathaway, Government and flgriculture, pp. 311-12. .A . . . . , . h , ‘J V} l O n‘ t ‘ . H ‘1 I _‘ . . r , r‘ ’\ ‘ l l ' L . - y‘ 4 fl . \ 1 (J r W In my role as Economic Advisor to Secretary Freeman I often suggested that we were spending too much on research and develop- ment in the production phases of agriculture. but I have to say to you that those ideas were never well received by anyone in the Department of Agriculture. There is a strong belief on the part of almost all Apericans that research is good and more research is even better, and to suggest that we do less research apd develoLWent work in the Agricultural De;artment is to_profess a lick of faith in Logern_Lro3ress. Thus it is fair to say that I never got anywhere with the politicians or the bureau- crats or the Special interest groups with the idea that we should perhaps slow down or even reduce our research effort in agricul- ture. And since there is a limit to how many lost causes that an advisor can advocate regardless of how rational such causes may Le, I eventually stopped trying to influence the inflow of re- search in develOpment resources in agriculture."5 efficiency is a relative thing. The Cochrane proposals were in no way a suggestion that we pursue a policy of inefficiency. A reduc- tion and redirection of publicly supported research would be intended only to slow down the rate of productivity growth in agriculture. There are, of course, additional policy innovations that could be taken to stem the tide of production-increasing technologies into agriculture. out to date, none have been seriously advanced, and if advanced they would not likely be warmly received. The failure of the agricultural policy makers to seriously come to grips with the paradoxical and immensely complicated problem of agri- cultural productivity is partly the result of the fact that economists 45Letter to author, September 29, 1964. Italics mine. 461m recent years there has been a great increase in basic and applied agricultural research by private industry. Thus even if all public research were to be halted we would still be assured of a con- siderable flow of new technologies. because of the continuing expansion of privately financed research the justification for continual increases in public research seems all the more questionable. >441 389 haVe only recently been able to measure its full force, and to explain the possible consequences for family farm agriculture. This failure is also the product of the persuasive belief that to tamper with efficiency is to tamper with progress, and the equally persuasive belief that the promotion of more efficient family farming is one of the test ways to assure its survival. Correcting the drift in agricultural policy depends to a large extent upon a fundamental re-thinking of these notions. but such a re- appraisal Will not come easily. And without some rather dramatic develop- ment, such as a sharp downturn in the farm economy or a revolt among city voters, such a reappraisal is not likely to occur in the near future. President Johnson noted in his "Farm Nessage" in 1905 that "the farm program will be necessary as long as advance in agricultural tech- nology continues to outpace the growth of population at home and at markets abroad." Implicit in this statement is a notion widely held among the policy making participants. It is the notion that the problem of excessive agricultural production is a tough but temporary problem. It is the notion that the technological revolution has just about Spent its force and will soon taper off. Each year these beliefs are shown up as mere euphemisms, but each year they are renewed. Given the present policy conditions, the flood of technology will Continue, the surplus capacity of agriculture will persist, and the policy planners will continue to be confounded. We might cite one example to illustrate this. In 1957 John A. Schnittker, specialist on wheat problems and wheat legislation, and later a principal economic __ 47PTew York Tires, February 5, 1965, p. 16. 590 advisor in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, noted that, while the deveIOpment of improved wheat varieties had contributed greatly to the increase in wheat yields in the past, "varietal improvement” would not likely be a najor source of yield increases in the foresee- 48 . . . . . . able future. at about that time agricultural screntists at Kansas State University, where Schnittker was employed at the time, began work on the development of a hybrid wheat. Kansas State scientists announced in 19t5 that the hybrid wheat, which "promises increases of 20 to 30 percent in yield,” will be ready fcr "field use within three to five , years." and, as the director of the experiment station noted, "hybrid . . . , . 49 Wheat 15 certain to be adopted by all progressive wheat farmers." Aaxing poetic on one of his faVorite subjects, the Spoofing of the notion of perverse surply function in agriculture, Don Paarlberg once observed that: A negatively sloped supply curve would be a kind of sorcerer's apprentice who keeps fetching water until everything is engulfed. Cr it would be like the magic will that was commanded to grind out salt and did so, the cornand to stop having been lost, until in tine it turned the sea itself to salt. These concepts belong in our poetry and in our folklore, not in the councils where . I O L serious matters of farm policy are being resolved.”0 whether or not there actually does exist a perverse SUpply function Within the confines of the economists' theoretical definitions we do but what is abundantly clear is that agricultural production not know. has teen increasing for the past fifteen years in the face of sagging prices. Discounting the end of the technological IQVUIUtiOW as a pipe k 9? .. . 4d c Ina] of Farm economics, XL, 1096. "vjy, 1965, p. l. (in: .r . ,i r: ' ' - "r * -/ -nr-~ itatc cniver8_ii,lru~?ek’ “* a.) 3"“! C’O‘Icurrfij] Cf Fifi“, ECOQOTTlCS, XXXVIII, 17.110 V I}: 0 1 dream, and assuming no radicxl chznge in policy, production will con- tinue to increase. This may well result in the family farm stnicture of American agricalture being engalfei. If that should happen it will he salt in the aoaths cf the policy makers who initially gave the conmand that initiited the revolution, but then lost the ability to iSsue the Ccixini that coalj Control it. Chhhicn XII "There is the sociologically unprcvahle but instinctively American feeling that the little town and the ccuntrysije are the source of civic energy for the nation."1 The bgectre of an Hrtan Revolt In 1947 Lenatcr George Aiken, chairman of the Senate agriculture committee, in urging the adoption of a flexible price SUpport program, argued that 'if we Continue the high level of 90 percent support the time will not be far distant when the American people will rise up and \ - . . . "2 say they wrll no longer have any farm price support programs whatsoever. In 1954 Ezra Taft uenson, making his first appeal to Congress to shift away from the high, rigid price support system to a lower and flexible program, pcintelly asked: "At what point will the 140 million Americans who do not live on farns rise up...and demand not revision but outright '2 an" elimination of all direct aid to agriculture: During his tenure Nr. benson rather frequently pointed to the spectre of an urban revolt against the high costs of the federal price support program. 1"Smalltcwn, U. b. A., Newsweek, July 8, 1963, p. 20. 3Coggressional Quarterly Almanac, IV, 1948, 57. ¢U. 5, Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, rifigsergricultjril Lutlook and the Fresident's Farm Program, 83rd Klongo’ grid £06550, 19:4, p0 5’ ( 0 \O {\J As surpluses piled up, and as the Congress consistently refused to give the Republican Administration the type of program it wanted, both Eisenhower and :enson increasingly sought to call attention to the cost of the price support programs and its heavy burden on the tax- payer. For exauple, when President Eisenhower asked Congress in 1959 to abandon the traditional parity price support system he went to such pains to dramatize the expensiveness of the current programs that he consider- ably exaggerated actual costs.4 Moreover, he declared that most of the billions expended had gone to only a ”relatively few large producers." The rising cost of the farm subsidy, and the Administration's tactics inevitably encouraged critical comment. John Fischer was one of the first major elitors to attack the farm program. His editorial, "Country Clickers Take us Again," was probably the most slashing attack of the period.5 It received extra attention because due to a snafu on the part of a Department of Agriculture staffer, Harper's received and printed a letter over the signature of Ezra Taft Benson stating that the 6 Secretary had read the article and found it to be "excellent." by the 4For example, he cited the gross budgetary outlays for the oper- ations of the Commodity Credit Corporation rather than net costs. During the previous years the CdC had recovered an average of about 50 percent of its original outlay through surplus disposal. President Eisenhower estimated the cost of the price support program for 1959 at $4.3 billion. This was indeed approximately the actual gross outlay but after disposal operations the net cost was 3;.7 billion. C J'rf-‘art‘er's, December, 1958, pp. 21-24. 6The publication of this letter produced another in a series of outbursts from Democratic congressional leaders demanding Benson's resig- nation. Nr. benson was ultimately able to convince his critics that neither he nor his assistant who wrote the letter had actually read the Fischer editorial (New York Times, January 28, 29, 30, and 31). However, the affair is rather symbolic of the Secretary's frequent public relations Fratfalls. latter part of the decade the firm program was coming in for increasingly heavy criticism Ly several of the national newsmagazines and metropolitan I newsparers. Three months after Fresiient Eisenhower's 1959 "Farm Message,’ Life magazine putlishei its most inflanmatory editorial criticism and issued a call for a Voter's revolt: You can prove the cynics wrong. In this country, the voter is king. when he swuawks loui enough, Congress listens-~even more so in a political year. So start sauawking loud and long enough to put an end, for good anl all, to this incredible Farm Ccanlal that is getting worse every year.7 Symbolizing this diSContent, Representative Edward P. doland (Dem. Kissichusetts laced in the Conxres:ional Record with s'm athetic ! P J l P introluctory remarks, an article by hoscoe Drunnond, which contained the following prophesy: fihat is going to harpen, if the farm bloc doesn't join with the rest of Congress to halt the hrankensteinian monster of mounting surpllses, aggravated by price supports which pile up bigger surpluses, is that as sure as a hangover follows a lost weekend, there will he a nasrive_§olitical revolt by the voting fir-in d CU-ls.) I er. The voting hehavior of Representative Boland and many of his big—city colleagues over the past half dozen years does, indeed, indicate that there has been a hardening in the attitude of urban representatives toward the farm legislation, particularly those schemes that threaten to have the effect of raising both food prices and tax requirements. 7"A Tax Cut You Can Aid," April 20’ 1959’ p. 39' 8"Anti-farm Revolt; Rebellion Unless Workable Program is Found," h"hington Post, March 25, 1929, entered in the Congressional Record, JV ‘— (L’ "‘r r f lady, CV, SQ7J. 9See Congressional guarterly Almanac, XIII, 1957, 637-38; XV: 1959, 241; XVI, lvtO, 32 ; XVII, 1901, 354. ,. .. \t‘gg Secretary of Agriculture, Lrville Freeman, in attempting to drum up Support for his supply—management approach, took note of this trend by declaring that "there is an increasing disenchantment, particularly among CongreSsmen from urban areas, with costly firm programs that continue to build up surpluses. If we drift along the way we have been, we will end up with a revolt in Congress and have no farm program at 10 all." but the fact that proposed farm legislation was being more care- fully scrutinized by urban congressmen does not mean that they were preparing a major anti—farm revolt, nor was there much evidence to in- dicate that their constituents were demanding such a revolt. At about the time Roscoe Drummond was predicting that the "lost weekend" was about over, and the editor of Life magazine was trying to encourage the sober- ing up process, George Callup was asking a national cross section of voters if they thought there was "anything for which the Government should be spending less money than it is at present?” About 50 percent of the respondents identified areas in which they thought the government shoald be Spending less money but only four percent suggested that farm subsidies should be cut.11 A Gallup poll conducted in January, 1959 asked a national sample the following: "If the time should come when the government income cannot pay for all the things in the budget, would you favor cutting back on certain things, or increasing taxes?" Not un- eXpectedly, about three fourths of the sample favored "cutting back" 10uew York Times, February 6. 1962. po 14- r llconducted Larch, 1959. Tabulation provided by the Roper Public bpinion Research Center. rather than increasing taxes, but of these only six percent pointed A . . . . . lz to "farm subsidies" as an area in which such a out should be effected. by and large the public opinion polls of the past two decades, that we have Surveyed, fail to reveal any significant, Spontaneously l3 eXpressed hostility to the federal farm program. This view is sup- ported by the independent pollster, Samuel Lubell, who reports that while he has found a certain 'potential for indignation...there is no evidence of a real taxpayer's revolt against farm legislation."14 There was no "massive revolt" in 1947, nor in 1954, nor in 1959, nor in 1902. Considering the sharp increase in federal tax monies spent in the name of the farmer in juxtaposition to the relative and absolute decline of the farm comhunity the failure of the long predicted revolt to materialize is one of the more interesting features of the postwar American rolitical scene. It is all the more significant considering the stalemated bickering among the farm interests and the continuing failure of the farm program to "solve" the farm problem. lagondJCted January, 1939. Tabulation provided by Roper. IJThe seirch of public opinion polls involved the following steps. For the period prior to 1947 we used Hadley Cantrill's Public Opinion: 1925-1945 (irinceton: Princeton University Press, 1951)- FOP the period 1&47 through 1950 we searched the issues of Public Opinion QUEITGIlY- These two sources reproduced most of the published, national-sample sur- veys taken from 1935 through 1950. For the period since 1950 we con- sulted the hoper Public opinion Research Center. As their files are not complete and as we were not able to personally do the library search we cannot claim to have a complete compilation 0f pertinent PUbliC opinion data for this period. however, we believe that our public opinion data is fairly representative. 14"The Impact of Changing PUbliC Opinion on Farm Policy," A911- Cdltural Policy_Review, III (January, 1963), 16- ()A“ \O Q As noted in Chapter I, the lack of a concerted campaign against the firm program has been attributed by several observers to a general ignorance anJ indifference on the part of the urban voter. Undoubtedly it is the case that much of the urban public is not fully conscious of the magnitule of the farm subsidy. however, there is data that suggest that the public has a fairly strong image of the farmer receiving con- siderable favors from the government. A Gallup poll in 1950 asked peOple \ to indicate which of the major socio-economic gIOUps they thought re- ceived the "best treatment from our Government?" Thirty-eight percent of the respondents naneJ farmers, 23 percent named labor, 14 percent selected business, 8 percent designated the white-collar groups and 18 percent had no opinion.15 At that time, the costs of the various farm programs were relatively small Compared to the costs of the past 8 to 10 years. And as George Gallup reports, by 19cc such terms as "surplus," "soil bank," and "subsidy" had become "household words in many quarters.%6 Those commentators who have stressed the urban voter's ignorance and indifference implicitly assume that if the urban voter were better informed a revolt would likely occur. This raises two basic questions. why haven't urban politicians and other opinion leaders done more to , inform and arouse their constituents, and if such a campaign were con— ducted would it generate a mass protest? g liaiteported in F?_lt‘ll.C Qinion Quarterly (Spring, 1951), p. 172. A similar question was asked in 1949 and produced essentially the same results, see ibid., (Winter, 1949-50), p. 724. léfrom a Gallup article with a release date of January 3, 1960, supplied by the American Institute of Public Opinion. < r ,\ r . (.1 t) 398 while farm-state congressmen have been very liberal in their voting on farm legislation they have been notoriously conservative in their voting on city-orientated legislation. Rural congressmen and farm pressure group leaders have been highly vocal in arguing that this country can't afford to spend more money on such projects as urban transit and slum clearance and have vigorously stated the case against such things as minimum wage laws and repeal of Taft-Hartley's right-to- work clause. why, then, haven't big-city congressmen and labor leaders reciprocated in kind? Part of the answer is to be found in the politics of national political parties. The majority of the big-city congress- men are Democrats, and ever since the New Deal the national Democratic party has stood four-square behind federal aid to farmers. but the Democratic party is not disciplined monolith. It is most unlikely that big-city congressmen would continue to follow the national party's line if they thought that such a strategy would serious- ly endanger their own political position. They apparently have not found the issue of farm subsidies to be a critical one with their constituents. This is partly because leaders of organized labor have not taken an anti—farm subsiiy position. This is noteworthy considering the massive fact--unknown to no one, least of all labor leaders-~that most of organ- ized agriculture is one of organized labor's most implacable foes. Be- cause of its ideological commitment organized labor is not Opposed to government subsidies as such. This, plus the perennial h0pe that at some future date labor and agriculture might join forces, and also labor's tie with the Democratic party, partly explain the unions' position on farm 1egiSIation. Eut the explanation is partial. The criticism in the urban tress during the late fifties has been noted. However, this was sporadic and temporary, hardly a massive campaign. It is also significant that the editorial criticism was not directed against the iiea of firm sutsidies as such, but against sub- sijies that supposedly weren't neefed. For example, the bitterness of Fischer's criticisn was obviously related to his ill-informed belief that farvers wore enjoying great prosperity: "The ordinary Iowa farmer ...has a rinimum of two new cars and they are usually brand new Buicks or Clisrobiles or Cadillacs."l7 Arguments by the Eisenhower Administra- tion to the effect that farmers could get along without price Sprorts, and that most of the ;rice subsidies Went only to the large farmers anyway were cited by several editors as evidence the price support program was an unheelei extense. The {ress criticism of that period was partly due to the fact that hr. henson wls fairly successful in casting the battle over farm price suyports into a "good guys versus bad guys" drama. benson quite sincerely saw himself in the role of honest, dedicated, and unsullied statesran who desired nothing wore fervently tth to take agriculture out of golitics."1L3 This sincerely instired strategy had its effect. Even the editors of the Tea Yor? Ti es chcumhei: h 17This bit of infornition was originally reported by Harrison Salisbury, a fi=w York Tives regorter, after a quick trip through the Iowa countryside. flow York Times, July :4, 1955, IV, ;. 6. Mr. Fischer did not aCknowlejge a Lillace's far er and Homesteid survey, reported in the n gazine's September 2, ldvb issue, showing that the average 399 of low: farmer cars was 5.4 years and that 72.3 percent of these were Fords, Chevrolets, and Flyrcuths. loin hr. Lengon's first book, Farmers at the 3;os:r dos, Kr. barlisle targeron makes the following Observation in his prefatory note: u. ,. . ' . “hen :reSLJent-clect Lisenhower offered :zra Taft benson the post of £100 The critics of tenson are memters' of a group "who having male political Careers of rosing as "friends of the farmer," titterly reSent the efforts of Kr. benson to take the farm problem out of rolitics....19 l ' ' frown Tolerance whatever the causes of the elitoriil attacks during this period, they seerei to have stirrei few city Voters to protest. This fact taken in conjwnction with the past disinclination of urban congressmen to mount a concerted anti-firm campaign inlicates that the food-consuming, tax- paying, nonfarm public has shown considerable tolerance toward the Ameri- can farmer and the passive government programs that have been enacted in his name. Chat is the basis of this tolerance? he believe that part of f g the answer was pointel to by a writer in the labor magazine, New Leader. After noting the enormous cost of farm subsidies to the taxpayer and to the consumer, Kr. Scott observed: "It seems strange that a nation sub- jected to inflationary pressures and heavy tax burdens should behave in this masochistic way." He suggested that a major reason for this be- havior is that traditionally "the farmer has enjoyed a highly reSpected Secretary of Agriculture in HoVember, l952, he demurred, explaining that he was a clergyman and doubted whether he could engage in politics, where exf-ediency is often the rule. hr. Eisenhower replied that the American people had given him a mandate to restore their faith in the integrity of the United States governnent and surely that was a Spiritual job. From that tine on, frank and honest dealings were to mark the relationship of the Department of Agriculture and the American farmer." p. v. 1 "Mr. Lenson and His Critics," editorial, December 7, 1957, p. 20, ZCdoger haney Scott, "how to Solve the Farm Problem," December 19: 19cc, p. 8. O {lace in society.... It is, therefore, not with equanimity that society anticipates the possibility of wiJeSpread poverty among farmers. They have society's sympathy." That the farmer should have urtan society's sympathy may appear a hit raraioxical consiiering that the feeling is not mutual. It also appears contraiictory considering that the individual farmer is often seen by his city cousin as a "hick" and a “hayseed,” and that farm life in the concrete is commonly viewed as physically too demanding and de- meaning and socially stultifyingi‘1 In any rating of Social status the farmer always ranks far down on the list, and the urban parent who ad- vises his child to take up farming as an occupation is rare indeed. however, the image of the farmer and country life in the 2g;- lective atstract is a rather different thing. At the collective level a significant portion of the urban public accepts, with various degrees of sympathy, many of the stock beliefs of the family farm creed. This is partly due to the fact that America was born on the farm, and to the eighteenth and nineteenth century belief that the farmer "built the nation." America long since moved to the city, but for many individuals this was only a physical move, not a spiritual one. Well into the twen- tieth century, as has been noted in Chapters IV and V, many outside the immediate agricultural community continued to hold to the belief that the nation still depended on the farmer for its moral virtue, its political democracy, and its economic prosperity. k . ZlDue to the considerable "urbanization" of the countryside, the image of the hick farmer and culturally deprived farm life is probably 1955 Wilespread tojay than at any time in the past. .... I} '3 h.) by the 1949's most urban Americans had come to recognize that the continued vitality of the nation was more dependent upon the urban~ industrial Comrunity than upon the firm Connunity. In the postwar era this recognition has been broadened anj deepened. Still, the venerable tradition of assigning to the farm anJ the farmer a special and unioue status in the life of the nation arrears to possess considerable vitality. Certainly that tradition has weakened during the past two decades, but the weakening process has been slow. As the editor of the New York Times noted, sorewhat ruefully, in 195s, "the farver image is as old as Ameri- can life.... Car traditions as well as some of our practical arrangements and ievices, incluiing the fine art of gerrymandering, reflect the popular belief, or the bill to believe, that the farmer is more virtuous than the I!;}' rest of us. This trajition is nourished ty the propensity of childhood recol- lections to conveniently weed out the unpleasant aspects of youthful days on the farm, or in the small town, magnifying the most blissful. It con- tinues to draw sustenance from the nagging and half-serious fear that "home fell” because her "family farrs" were displaced by the latifundia. Southern political orators are not the only ones to rredict a Roman fate for modern Anerica should the family farm be wiped out. The urban and urbane Alsop brothers have also pointed to the lessons of history: The decay of home quite certainly began when the hardy farm citizen, whose valor made Home great, ceased to be able to main- tain themselves and their families by farming their small holdings. In hardly more than a generation, over great areas of Italy, the family sized farms were swept away. They made way for vast, “(Janaary :9, 1936, IV, p. 8. .... ..z. "N (.3 Consolijated, slave—crerated, absentee—capitalist holdings which were the eluivalent in those days of what we now call industrial- izej farms. The sane Social change, whenever it has come over any great nation of the past, has invariatly marked a beginning of an ending. All around night he the evidence of the nost hectic prosperity, excert on the little farms. but when the little farms went, it was as though the nation's healthy roots in native soil were stricken and withered; and in the end the nation was stricken, too. The wirnings of history need to be remembered, at the moment, for the rather simple reason that there would be no really grave Axerican firfl’TIOLlem if it were not for the plight of the family— sizei farms.“ ’1 when “right Fatman had finished his 1934 syeeci detailing the threats to the family farm, hepresentative tarratt U'hara, of Chicago's :nd Congressional district, was the first to rise and pay tribute to the discourse, proclaiming that it was "perhaps the most timely address made in the 82rd Congress.";5 be endorsed Patnan's thesis that "every great nation of the past has fallen when land fell into possession of the few," and notel that "the growth of tremendously large agricultural corpora- tions and the diminishing number of independent farmers must raise in every thoughtful mind grave fears of what may be in the future unless the trend is halted."zU O'Hara also appealed to another tenet of the family farm creed when he declared: "City people are now acutely aware 27 that recessions are farm led and farm fed." zSJOSeph and Stewart Alsop, ”Gloomy Parallel to the Farm Ailment," flashington Post, March 11, 1956, p. E 5. lésee Chapter VIII. 25U. 8. Congressional Record, 82rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, C, 8781. 404 For the literal, urban Democrat considerable justification for farm subsidies can he found in this latter argument. There was con- siderable concern that the sig in farm income during the 1950's might Spark an econony-wije recession. This concern is clearly evident, for exannle, in the How Feruhlic's persistent editorial opposition to the "O ‘ J l 0 O 1 0 hisenhower-henscn farm prorosals. This concern over the possibilities of a farm-induced recession also has been a factor in organized labor's position of farm sutsidies. As a 1955 CIU resolution stated: "There can he no lasting security for industrial workers if the farm families of :9 the Nation are insecure.‘ Another reason for the broad-based support for subsidies to trctect the family farm stems from the fact that the family farm is a prise example of small business enterprise and thus its fate is of con- cern to all those who seek to protect small business in general. As the Senate committee studying the problems of small business noted: The family farm is the classic example of the American small- business enterprise....Lhoreove§7 not only does the small farm itself constitute small business, it supports flourishing small C077.” 81‘Cia 1 t-UsinesS. an; we find this theme represented in the words of James Roosevelt in his testimony before the House Agricultural Committee on behalf of a "Q,“ . h o l ' - . ‘UQQE, e.g., "has a Depression begun here?" January 25, 1954. Reuther in U. 8. Congress, house, Committee 2931ted by halter Price Surnorts for basic Commodities 84th FL , on Agriculture, hearinQS, f‘ . , _ , . u0n9., lst Sess., 1v;;, p. ¢/oo aCu, 3, Congress, Senate, Special Committee to Study Problems of enericsn $3311 Euginesg, small business and Cohmunity; Study in Central Eilley of California on Effect of bcale of farm Lperetions, Committee Print No. 1;, 73th Cong., ind Sess., December zS, 1940, pp. 1, 5. k) farm till he hll introiuced with George thover.: iwCiUSG I an a heater cf the Small fusiness Committee, I am tremendously interested in seeing, as I am sure hr. hill his aISo been, thit the sare thing is happening in agriculture that has hirzenej in industry and being a tremendous believer in indivilual entergrise, and in the right of the small individual fellow to h‘ve his ngortunity in the ecoHOKy I think that this till will “u a long way to storping the concentration and restoring \ vigor to the s all independent 0 orator who, I think, is the hack- Lone of car Nation, both economically as well as politically.‘31 In the postwar period, the Church has teen one of the most vocal an; positive forces oatsile the agricultural ptlitical community acting to keen the fi ily farm creed alive and to re-affirn the {rotection of the flLll/ firm as the overarching goal of agricultural policy. The most active an! the rol ingortance of the farmer to the nation's well-being. The co nittee for Lconovic Sevelothent (CCC), which has prob- atly rresented the rost coy;etent stufies of the farm problem in the preSent rerioi,h!c ,,gc no such glqifis. The CED has never Specifically called for the eli in tion of the fimily farm. Indeed, as at least one S?CK6$TJW for the to; Sill, the approach we reConLeni holds out the 59 greatest hgge f.r the f:~il; fart." hut generally 5 eaking,neither the CL; nor other voices of Lig unsiness have teen raised to proclaim the neceSsity of saving the fimily fl n. This is partly due to the con- viction that the basic family f.rm pattern is not threatened. The develoo- tent of a xrliatic threat to this pattern might act to bring forth _— Lb 7T413nificent Decline of J. S. Farming," Egrtggg, June, 1955, p.180. 33”how Can You Keen 'em Lff the Farm," June, 1956: P0 192- ‘Vx.ngig City Star, Angust Lo, 19oz, p. 16 E. ('7 .- _. . . y A I l r . ‘ t 7 . , , . . , , . . k k. 7 A , . l I ‘ I'M J ‘ - c I ’ l i O ‘ r g . I . r .‘ r , . l o , o L _ _\ l a V - ,. ‘ u 1’ O I ~ . , \ A .. O ’ - I r F g . , F _ . r r ‘ defeniers from the Ijfihb of rig husiness, hit they would likely be few in Gunter. to enhat sy~holic cf the general urtan puhlic's attitude toward the rural WoIIJ in the post“ r period is the record of the so—called hack-to-the-land movement. At the close of the wir there was wide5pread concern that in the shift to a peace time economy millions of persons woull be thrown out of work. This prosyect broUght forth numerous pre- dictions, reuiniscent of the 1920's, that the unemployed would flock to the countrysiie, prongting Congressman Steghen Face to express the fear that "they are going to use the firm as a Juhping ground for the unem- "od ,. _ , ployel. the harm KUI81U eChoed this concern by 901ng on record in its 194; F1 tforx against "any attemot to use the farm as a dumping ground . "b1 for the unemployei. The discus ion of the hack-to-the-land movement, which anpeared ”to i. he Just arouni the Corner,” was also promote} by what the currently en- ;loyej were talking of icing. As early as 1944 the New york Times was reforting on what it thought to re a significant trend among city resi- dents moving to the country, and was giving advice on how these urbanites (.0 . . . 6 . nght best enjoy the benefits of country liv1ng. Secretary of Agriculture I‘r'co - .. o . . b'u. 3. Congress, house, Committee on Agriculture, Hearings, Long- “ioje Agricultural }olicy, Part 3, 80th Cong., lst Sess., 1947, p. 421. Clkesolutions Alofted at 25th Annual Convention of the American Farm Egreau Peder tiow, peceuter, 174C, p. 97. (3308 J. King, "back-to—the-iand Movements," Rural Sociology, X (march, 1944), p. 71. C3beotemoer 18, 1944, p. 18; September 24, 1944; IV, p. 10; hovemher 7, 1945, p. 23° October 28, 1946, p. ?6. 9 Cliuie nickard felt it necessary to warn the city resident that he had ’ ' . 9 0 o C'4 Lest thinx twice before actuxlly yurcnasing a farm. when a 1940 Fortune rutlic opinion poll asked a national sample "if there were nothing to keep you from living whereVer you wanted to, in what kind of location woulj you choose to live,” SC percent of those persons Cirrently livin, in cities of over 1(O,CDO said that they would 'ob rather live in a "small town" or out in the "country.' That many of these individuals were at least giving passing thought to making such a . . . . . . oo move is indicated ty the brisk sales of how-to-do-it books on farming. The sociologist, Paul H. iandis, reported that "one of the interesting finiings" of a survey of Spokane defense workers was "the common desire to seek security on a small piece of land after the war." Another sociol- ogist revortel that surveys of soldiers showed that many reflected this same desire--"they want a small farm and, what they believe, is indepen- L7 , ‘ - - " h' h ' th' k dence." In 1949 a ballup {01] question-- In general W 1C 00 YOU 1“ is hahpier tolay, the man who lives on the farm or the man who lives in ' . the city?"--produced these results:d ”4"'ack to the Land?" Countr1,39011975”’ GCtOber’ 1944’ p. 114' L; ', o r 'r' ,‘ . ' r . ‘V‘.. . . ‘f “Jr er Luxelease date, Agril, l/4o, re orted 1” ES 11C C inion *U t 1y, (Suvrer, 194o), F’ 2L9. "fires and the American Men of Letters CLC a‘t . i. E sworth l-/ on ll a 1950), 178. Since 19.9," Agricultural History, XXIJ (CCtOber: C7cuoted in King, T- 71‘ Q resorted in Eyblic Crinion “duelease date, June 24, 194;, Lifirtcrlz (Fall, 1949), p. 543. .Ji Yin on the f*rr Lin in the city Eon't know Rational total L?” gla 14o Tirrers 73 ls l" nesizents of towns unier l”, a" t5 l3 l4 1n,ncn to lac,inn e; LO lo 1 “,5““ to 3““,Cnn 7“ 13 1s S‘"‘:(‘,’5""1 in} (,Vcr UL l9 1c- The same roll rerortei that :3 percent of the nation's nonfarm outlic hai, at one time or another, "thoUght they would like to live on a farm." As it turned out, however, there was no significant number of "unhappy" Americans actually willing or ahle to abandon the prosrerous cities. The haCK-to-the-land movenent was costly talk. There was, of course, during this period the teginning of an exodus from the core cities, tut it never out as fir as the country--it petered out in the Suhurbs. The dream of a place in the Country, however, has not ceased to tantalize nsny city dwellers in their hore harried moments, but few have either the will or the means to act on it. but afterall, it is only a dream anl dreams aren't sucrose} to come true. A significant tortion of Averic1's urban leadership and general PJblic share in a trajition that assigns to the farm and the farmer a soecial and uninue status. This is a {roluct of an overall view of the rural worli, anj the fiCt that this view may not square with hard reality is entirely heside the point. LGCJUSQ of this View, the urban public has been eytremely tolerant while its tax monies have heen appropriated by farm representatives in the name of protecting the family farm and the rural community which it supports. The reservoir of tolerance is not as deep as it was forty, twenty, or even ten years ago. Still it has proven ueep enough to accept $3 and $6 billion Department of Agriculture Budgets, and there is little evidence to suggest that this will change suddenly. Illlllll ChAPTzd XIII .... EJIJPQfaizn‘f All) CLTICI ULIU'JS Frobacly no domestic public policy in the post—world har II period has been subjected to such extensive and sustained debate as has the fed- eral governnent's agricultural price support and production control policy. Despite numerous and concerted efforts to change it, few economic policies have been more ixnune to significant alteration. The debate got under way during the closing days of the war, and from the Very beginning policy makers were confronted with a barrage of advice from professional farm experts-—ranging from Land—Grant College presidents to individual agricultural economists--urging the abandonment of the parity pricing system. The great volume and unanimity of these extert analyses constituted a massive assault on a public policy probably unequaled in recent history except for the great outpouring of critical commentary which greeted the enactment of the Smooth-Hawley Tariff Act in 1932. In view of the vigorous unanimity with which the professional farm experts were criticizing the existing policy, and because of the war-induced farm prosperity, there was widespread expectation among political analysts that Congress would atandon or substantially alter the depression-inspired and war-modified policY- 417 , ..X 1...; J) however, Compress dij not follow the recowmendations of the pro- fessional farm exterts. Although some of the wartime price guarantees were allowed to expire, the farm legislation of 1945 and 1949 conmitted the governuent to regulating farm prices and production on a substan- tially larger scale than had the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. After the Korean conflict the debate over agricultural price and control policy was renewed. It was continued to the (resent. There have been numerous avengments to the rolicy but few major changes. The agricultural price and control {olicy of l9c4 was not substantially different from what it was in 1947-49. uhile the hasic {olicy has changed little, the cost of implement- ing it has changed greatly. by the mid-1959's the cost of the price SUp— port and related programs was averagirg from $2 to $4 billion annually. Noreover, ex enditures for other agricultural programs were also increas- ing rapidly. from 1923 to 19o? the net butget expenditures of the U. S. Department of AdriCulture averaged about 25 percent of all federal govern rest eypenditures for "civil" functions. The massiveness of the farm subsily takes on adJed significance in view of the relative and absolute decline of the farm sector. Farmers constituted 13.3 percent of the total pepulation in 1950, but only 6.8 PGICent in 19o4. During the same period agriculture's contribution to the national income declined from 7.2 percent to 3-9 percent. This suggests that farmers are a formidable force in Aperican EOIitics, and, indeed, the political power of farmers is widely celebrated in the professional and pOpular literature. Contemporary analyses empha- size three factors as accounting for the political power of the American <1») flrver. first, the far" vote is described as {laying an important rivotal role id tresiiential anl Congressional elections. Thus, despite the fact that the farm vote is srall and decreasing, the farmer is assiiu— ously Courto! Ly :resijentiil parties an: iniividual congressmen. Another factor stressed i; iralysts is the effectiveness of farm {ressure grours in nihin; their do injs on Congress. Thiri, most analysts point out that congressionzl or: oization and representation is Eschewed towart the far: 0" cciiusity. This rlgpifit the chtI of the farm vote anj generally in- crelses the weight cf the firm interests in the writing of agricultural legisl.tion. lhe formifiarle rclitical power of the fsrners takes on an adied dirension in the Cortergorary liter: ure as HOLt analysts have assumed that the {rice SUrtort an} proiuction control policy has been against the national interest anj the lOflg—r}099 interests of farmers as well. The perjetuati01 of the rolicy has often been oescrihed, either implicitly or explicitly, as the result of narrow short-run economic self interest on the part of farmers an: {olitical exoediency on the part of politicians. As a result there has teen a general image of the farm interests wield— ing raw political force anl riding roughshod over nonfarm interests to maintain a costly anl basically unsound economic policy. Thus there is a ccfiton inplication that the great political struggles over agricultural Price and control policy have been tetween farm and nonfarm political in- terests. In actual fact, however, the great battles of the postwar period have not been between farm anj city, but among the individuals and groups - r . a u 7 I. 0 . '3 A ‘ .-\ ‘ 4 . , ,_\ o l , \/ . ,L _ _ s , J A « o , 7 -' . , . , . of the farm political connlnity. Increasingly in the postwar period the agricultural yolitical Cc ¢dnity has divided against itself. The recent conflicts agodg farm interests have been as hitter as any in history. 3oncerning the rrice and control yolicy these conflicts have resulted in stalemate} policy raring process since the mid-fifties, a situation that few in the agriCultsral Community find to their liking. host political analysts who haVe analyze} these conflicts trace them to competing econ- owic interests, refl'ctinl generally different Commodity groupings. Consiiering the enormity of the farm saksidy, the decline of the farm sector, ani the sharp divisions among the farm interests the fact that the nonfarm {olitical Conswnity has not made a Concerted effort to exercise greater control over farm legislation is particularly significant. Those analysts who have adlressed themselves to explaining the lack of a rajor urban revolt against the farm program have pointed to ignorance, agathy, and iniifferenCe on the {art of the urban political community towarl farm prohlecs anl policies as primary factors. In much of the literature there is also the implication, at least, that the lack of an urban revolt is due to the resigned respect that nonfarm political leaders have for the entrenched rower of the farm interests. All the flotors enumerated above are certainly a necessary part of any attempt to describe and explain the making of agricultural price and control policy in the postwar period. However, we found that neither injividually nor collectively do they provide a sufficient explanation. Lne of the major reasons for the inadequacy of the existing literature stuns from its general failure to adequately account for the fact that the over-arching goal of virtually all agricultural policy has been the promotion and preservation of the family farm. An analytical unity within which the behavior of the policy making girticipants can re describei and explained is achieved by focusing on this goal. Farm Voters and meniers of farm pressure groups are over- whelmingly family farners. Lf alied significance is the fact that the vitality ani persuasiveness of the family farm policy goal is sustained by more than calculations of single economic self interest and political agaranjize ent. An extremely inrortant ingredient of this policy goal is an adherence to that Set of beliefs termed the family farm creed. This creed echraCes the social, economic, anJ political characteristics of the family farm. cecause of the existence of these persuasive be- liefs, the farm and the farmer have long been ascribed a unique role in the life of the American nation. The family f.rm creel helps to make understandable the underlying rationale of the den nls sale by the farm interests, as well as the fer- vor with which tfese denanls are pressed. out the significance of the farily fxrm creed uni policy goal goes far beyond their impact on the behavior of those participants directly responsible for the formulation of agriCultural ;olicy. The family farm creed-—or, more properly, certain aspects of it--has long been accepted by a significant portion of the non- farm political and Opinion leadership of this country. While there has been substantial gositive Sugport for the family farm goal, there has never been a significant demand from the nonfarm public or its leadership that agricultural policy should be aimed at fostering a different form 0f agricultural organization. For these reasons there has been a broad acceptance of the pro- motion and preservation of the family farm 35 the legitimate, over-arching goal of national agricultural policy. As a result probably no other socio—economic group in America has had as free a hand in the writing of legislation directly affecting its own welfare as have the farmers and their political representatives. Throughout the nineteenth century, agrarians sought to promote family farming through the enactment of land laws which gave land hungry settlers easy access to the vast public domain. These land laws, culmin- ating in the Homestead Act of 1862 and its later amendments, assured the settlement of the great American interior by family farmers. Liberal land policies early assured the family farm a dominating position in American agriculture, but easy access to land was not enough to guarantee the preservation of the family farm system. From 1862 through the 1920's Congress enacted a series of laws which brought into being a vast system of agricultural research and education unparalleled anywhere in the world. A primary objective of these institutions and programs was to make family farming as efficient as possible, thus assur- ing the growing nation an abundance of food and fiber, and, at the same thne, strengthening the economic position of the family farm relative to its potential competitors. The commercialization of agriculture and the development of monopoly capitalism during the last half of the nineteenth century gen- erated new problems for family farm agriculture. Farmers needed more than cheap land and technical advice from the Department of Agriculture and the county agents on the efficient production and marketing of farm products. New programs ranging from rural free delivery to federal farm 1- ,~ q;3 Credit were enacted, but the agricultural depression of the 1920's and 1930‘s dramatized the economic plight of Anerican farmers, and forcej the realization that the entire system of family farming faced possible co]- lapse. Family farmers had first experienced major economic difficulty during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Under the influence of rising prices, farmers enjoyed consiieratle prosperity during the first two iecaies of the twentieth century. howeVer, since that time commercial fimily farm agriculture has eXperienced an almost Continuous price and income prosle , relieved only Ly wartime conditions. Although several fictors have contributed, the fundamental cause of the farm price and income prorlem is surplus production. Farmers have persistently produced more than they could sell at prices that yield a return to their resources and sustain a standard of living roughly com- parable to nonfarm sectors. The several million family farmers have no control over prices, thus they can only react to prices set by the purely competitive market in which they sell. Farmers tend to react rather quickly to rising prices Ly eXpanJing their production. but cutbacks in agricultural pro- duction are made very slowly when prices decline, particularly when such a decline affects most of the major commodities. The major effect of a general price decline seems to be merely to halt or at least slow down the eXpansion in production. While the growth in agricultural production is slowed or halted, a growing population and other factors can act to increase demand and thus may lead eventually to better prices. In the meantime the farmers have suffered considerably. /‘ ,‘ y 1 r, is lhe problems of the farmer are compounded by the fact that while he sells in a turely comyetitive market, te ordinarily buys in a re— stricted aarket. This reans that there is generally little relationship tetween the fluctuations in the {rices he receives and the price he has to pay. During periods of general price increases, such as those induced by war, the farmer usually enjoys a relative alvantage. Yet this advan- tage is likely to he of short duration. then the demand situation changes the produCers of the products the farzer has to buy are able to rapidly aijust their proiuction to that jenanl, thus maintaining prices. The farmer, being unable to adjust his production, will receive sharply lower prices. As a result, he is caught in a price-cost scissors. it was such a {rice-Cost saueeze that underlay the agrarian revolt of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. There was little or no recognition at the time that the major cause of the farmers' diffi- culty was overproduction. home/er, many recognized that part of their economic difficulty stemmel from the ability of nonfarm industries to Control prices. Therefore farmers adopted a political program calling for government to break up anl/or to regulate the market power that had Leen acduirel by industrial capitalism and thus restore competitive con- ditions throughout the economy. Following the failure of agrarian populism to destroy the market power of industrial capitalism, the idea began to develop that agricul— ture itself needed market power to control its prices. 'Nany thought that this could be achieved through the organization of farmer cooperatives. however, the inability of farmer cooperatives to redress price imbalances 4_5 became clear luring the earthduike in price relationships that occurred after norli air I, and firm leaders began to look to governmental author- ity as a means of achieving ewuality of market power. host of the agricultural political community had Come to believe, by the late lQIT's and early 1933's, that the major solution to problems of ateriCin agricultire was to he found in parity pricing guaranteed by the government. This system {rouisel price equality, without undue overt Sahsiiization, anl it seeged eminently fair to nost farmers. All that was heing asked was that a degree of control be afforded over agricul- tiral prices to mitch the control which husiness and iniastry exercised over tieir grices, as well as the control that unions hal achieved over n:ges. Lcrecver, the {rogram HTS iesirnei to cyerate at little net cost to the 3QV9I’78"1. “hen the first TAIlLY {rice lam wzs enacted, it was declared to constitute a "n~u 11am" for agriculture. After this parity pricing "ran wls goilfiei ani extendei through the legislation of the late lkifi's uni e-rly lkafl's, it his hailed as the "finest farm program in the worli." “hen the agricultural golicy making particinants undertook the writing of new farm legislation in 1947-49, agricultural economists 11363 them to restore free nirket pricing in agriculture. The economists firgnel that, Ly and large, free market pricing had worked well in the past anJ that it would do so again. In contrast, they argued, the per- ?etuation of the price sufport and proluction control policy would create a fcrmillble list of economic evils; allocative inefficiencies would arise, grodactive efficiency woull he retardel, American Consumers would Suffer, and wtrll tra«e in agricu tural products woalJ to thoroughly 4isragtei. Loreover, these evils were totally unnecessary because the future {IU£}BCiS for the firm econocy were so iright that farmers lijn't nee: the ;rote;tion of grice s; ;crts. The arginents of the eco o ist were heavily laden with moral yrinciples ani tiecretical generalizations tut were light on empirical gn,o f :t. Those r rtici ants who re~enierea the 1936's and 19c, a vigor- ously dissente! from the view that free narket pricing had Worked well *h C n 5. H y! H tn H ) f; It gist. The un:ocirented arguments concerning the inefficiercies in agricglture were not nearly as i pressive to most par- ticiyants as the great wzrti e rrcductiveness of American farmers. If there wzs a need for SJ sijiziag low incone consuners, farm leaders thought this coal} in} shouli be achieved through some other means than low grices to firzers. The argawcnts that farmers didn't need price grotection were fased on highly Conjitional assumptions about future foreign chi Jorestic demanl. nith full knowledge of the great crash in farm prices thzt followed norlj car I, many participants judged these assixptions to te too tenuois. As a result, during the critical an} forfiitive gerioi of the postwar era, the majority of the participants ieciiel to renew, with certain codifications, the price and control pol- icy they hal inherited from the ore-war period. Kost gclitical analysts were convinced that the policy makers hide this iecision in the face of an overwhelming abundance of economic fact anl theory which clearly demonstrated the folly of their action. In actual fact, however, despite the great outpouring of critical commentary, the quantity of reliitle enrirical data supplied by the economists was surgrisingly slight, and their theoretical arguments were open to reasonatle questioning. Discounting the ideological content of the argureots LivenCed by ecoromists, the decisions of the policy makers were a naturil and IOQIC}] reflection of the reliatle economic information tten available. The Korean conflict further stimulated the farm econony, but by 1953-34 a general rrice and inco e decline had set in which persisted throughout the deCide. In the face of this price decline--and despite the application of controls--agricultural production continued to exnand. Ly 195% the {rice sniport progrim was costing several billion dollars, while governient storage facilities were overflowing. The long-cherished {rice and control program was not working in the intended fJCLIOD, nor was it achieving the horefully anticipated results. iolicy makers were ciught up in an exduiSite dilemma created ty the deterioration in the farm income situation and the mounting cost of the sirolus {urchase and lishosal program. Although these conditions were satisfactory to no one, the participants divided sharply and bitterly over the question of what policy course should be followed. 'Ihe hisenhcwer Administration, supported by the American Farm LUIBJJ Federation, took the rosition that war-induced demand and high rrice sugpgrt levels had acted to create a surplus in only a few major commodities. Since the existing control program was failing to ade- quately curtail production, and since the Administration was ideologically ocposed to the adortion of more rigid control measures, they argued that a low price tolicy should he pursue} to bring atout the needed adjustment between sirply ani do and. In 1939 the Administration pr0posed that the historic parity grice program he ahanioned entirely. because they be- lievel that the surplus was limited to a few conrodities and because they believed that farmers Would readily respond to lower prices by shifting to the production of those commodities not thought to exist in erplus glantities, they argued that all but the marginal farmers coull survive the adjustment and then prosrer under essentially free market pricing. The general thesis of the Administration's position corres oniej closely with the arguments that be) long been advanced by most economists. The Adwinistration's approach was vigorously opposed by many of the farm organizations and a nijority of congressmen. The Administra- tion's erronents argued that fir ers Would not readily cut production in the face of lower yrices. Therefore, the needed adjustment between supply and denanj woull be achieved only after an extended period of disastrously low prices. while they generally agreed with the Administration that the sirplus Was limitei to a few coxnodities and essentially temporary in nature, urlike becretlry henson, they believed that the existing control progrim, with a few modifications, would act to keep production down at least to the extent that eventually an expanding demand would catch up with production and thus restore an equilibrium. crowing diSsatisfaction with the existing policy assured that with the election of a new Alministration in 1960 renewed efforts would be made to LIan out of the stalemated policy pattern. The Kennedy Aixinistrition proposed the siggly-manAgement a:proach with its manditory ani highly restrictive trollotion control scheme. The proyosal was op- pose) Ly all hat the staunchest of the Adninistration's suhporters. A majority in Congress was finally ousterej to a prove the adoition of the control rronra: for wheat. but in the 19o? wheat referendum farmers, refusing to believe thit the only alternatives were depression-level yrioes or iron c115 in; re;res.ive Controls, rejected the trogran and hillef the swjrly-xuhigepent aggroach. As a conseduence the price r+ . V L. (,1 51:9crt anj rrozwztion control progr m was left about where it was a 'lEe Litter conflicts an} the stile ate} rolicy of the past decade age a groglct of severil factors. Co getifig economic cor: dity interests, ii has teen hotel, have Lwefl significant. elt prohakly no other factor hgs so greltl/ affectei the policy raking process of the past decade as hvs the sharp conflict in reliefs Concerning the nature of agricultural grojuotion «r! Junlfld ani iiffering views about the conseguehces of alternative policy lgyrosches. The sharp disagreehents, noted above, were no mere {oliticul ration liZJtions. These heliefs were sincerely 1nd fervently held. Th1; such divergent beliefs were prevalent may be drjUTERLS ayyeired eéuilly defensible. thcerVors hive often noted that probably more has been said and written giout the farm problem than any other domestic economic problem. This is true. L;t what most onservers have failed to recognize is that for All this figsaive study, the farm problem has been one of the least I" “‘t, understood do estic economic problems of the postwar period. Contrary to wiiely held assum:tions,the information base for agricultural policy miking has been ihafeluate. In recent years, however, there has been an improvement in the quality of the informational base. A much inproved theoretical understand- ing of the nature of the agricultural supply function has been develooed, and new etpirical studies have forced the realization that the surplus is not limited to a few commodities, but is characteristic of virtually the entire agricultural output. The publication of a series of price and inco e projection studies ketween 19oo and 19o1 revealed what many partici- pants had helieved all along but had been unable to document; viz. that an abrupt return to free market pricing would have disastrous consequences throughout agriculture. The sharp oisugreehent Concerning the nature of the farm problem and the consequences of alternative policies have magnified the value conflicts anong the participants, further increasing the divisions within the agricultural political cormunity. There have always been tensions tetween the literal and conservative agrarian traditions. Both traditions have c .J ‘4 iven support to the farily farm goal, and they continue to do so. however, the differing ideological orientations have resulted in differ- ences of emphasis as to what are the most valuable characteristics of the family farmer. Also they have often differed over the means that should be 33o;ted to prounte and protect the interests of the family farmer. Con- ditions since the early 1950's have been such as to bring these differences into direct and increasingly bitter conflict. This value conflict has been 421 nost intense in regar! to the issue of governaent controls over the individual fatter. At the inception of this study we hyrothesized that one of the grincinal reasons for the continuing stalemate in price support and production control {olicy was due to the treakdown in the consensus around the family farm goal. Subsequent investigation proved this not to be the CaSe. It is true that some of the participants in the agricul- tural policy making {rocess, such as the agricultural economists, no longer give positive surport to the family farm goal. Still, a working consensus remains. The fierce conflicts which have divided the agricul- tural rolicy makers 30 not reflect a challenge to the family farm goal, but, rather, they are a meaere of the sharp disagreement among the par- ticinants as to how that goal can and should be realized. The rarity (rice sugport and production control program has not createi any of the evils that had teen so universally predicted by the econorists. tn the other hint it has not live} up to the original bright rrotise envisioned Ly its authors. because of this, concerted efforts have teen aide to change the direction of agricultural policy, but no hijor reorientztion has been achieved. Assuming a continued consensus around the family farm goal, what are the rrospects thit a unity in agricultural policy making can be achieved and, if achieved, can the participants then come up with a frogram(s) capable of assuring the preservation of the family farm? They are not good, for the American agricultural policy making process has fallen into an intellectual and political dilemma, incapable of reCogniz— ing and responding to the meaning of the accumulating evidence concerning '\ '2 ./ ~./ J I i t4 4 u, l " a . ‘J l '. r“ \J , O p a x v f z A the natzre an! permanence of the deen economic ills that beset family firW agricultzre. In res;onse to the failure of the old price control grogram, the agricultiral leidershiy has responded not with new policy iieis, tut with oli SlOgans done Up in new rihions. Ln tie rclitical right the national leziership of the powerful fi"eri;in kzrn .ureii ieieration has assure: an ileological Commitment that tlin s itself to the meining of the new evidence. It continues to offer the s:-e cli trogri.s in; la Olrces with increasing vehenence the tru- gtsils of others. ZoreoVer, in its fieniCitei Cimgiign to save agriculture fret "scci:liz:tion an: Collectivization” the oureau has taken increasingly to itt c ivo existing :3: frojosei :olicies for their high cost to the tax- ;aytr :nl tra food cons; or. if continued, such attacks by the "nation's largest 31;. or;tr.izltiof; Csn only help to discredit the entire farm ;rojr2 , an! the hard ifircld itself will find it difficult to justify its own jet sche e for J malti-iillion follir lint retirement rrogram. The ;Ull:1cil left has keen more reshonsive to recent developments in eCononic theory tut its {refused golicy Solutions have acted only to in- crease the bitterness cf the ideological division in agriculture. The con- tinuing Joterioration of family farm agriculture has confirmed, in large part, the ewrlier l1©7h€$i€$ of the hational farmers Union. But while its mgrfiifids of ingending jifiaptcr have increased in fervor, it has proposed no new trogrlm c; file tf rallying support beyond its staunch band of Sliporters, on the farms and in Congress. Ltwn the rolitiCal center of the agriCultural policy making orocess {lode the L:;n e, old, tired, and confused. The political center is also ' Eb§8l2tei ty :any of the leSuor firm organizations and a great many fir -stete CufiareS: on of toth pirties. lheir willifijHESe to see the "goo! ‘15 the iii" in trogu51ls frog the left uhi tfe right ste 5 too often not so finch fro: their ijeolcgical flexihility as free their own fuzzy unferstinzing of the fxrn trotlefi an} their lack of ideas as to how r—A- Thios.hout :ost of the rostnlr gerioi anr cultural yolicy mskinn has teen affo:tei r" tie telief that the farm slrclus was temporary and li;ite£ to only a few Co foflllUS. cince tout 19t? a rijority cf the J H (4 H. 0 'd l (9 s thc recognise} that the surglus c gacity characterized virtu;lly all of Agriculture. The fiUJinS of some economists now suggest that Jflicr rrerent Conuiiions the sirclus is a gerranent characteristic of family fir: agriculture. Until a mejority of the participants come to eccert this View no xzjor chicge in the agricultural policy making process is lixely. uwt even if this View CoLCS to he wiiely accepted there is no assirance thit the golicy stale :te will te troken or that the problems of family for: wgricultire nil] he solved. Tie new evi:ence inkes it {ossihle to meqsure the nature of the eConofiic ills whiCh {laqle fumily farm agriculture with more precision. At the sine ti.e this evijence renJers the possible rolicy choices all the tore difflCllt. This is so Lecause the new evidence raises the question of whether or Pot the finily firm is compatible with the modern economic ifii socill forces which are re-shiying this nation's life. It is quite likely thlt agricultnri] policy will continue to be an after-the-fact resignge to these forces, and, thus, ultimately the farm problem, as now defined, will be "SQIVQJ" ty the disappearance of Averican family farming. SL1 ECTLD beLIUejit-QFHY SELECTiD BIBLIOGRAPHY giglenatoryNote The following bibliography consists of those sources cited in the text plus a select number of other sources which we found par- tiCUlarly useful. This listing does not include all the sources con- sulted, nor is it intended as a complete bibliography of the subject matter. An important source of data for this study was the public hearings of the House Committee on Agriculture and Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry for the period 1947 through 1963, and the hearings of the House Subcommittee on Family Farms for the period 1955 through 1963. Due to the vast number of separate documents in- volved we have not made an individual listing here. The listing under 2923; includes, in addition to the standard categories, those Government and University publications which have a designated author(s),and also booklets by various pressure groups, research foundations, religious organizations and other private organi- zations. Under the heading of Articles and Periodicals we have listed only those articles appearing in professional journals and books. The listing under General Press is limited to non-professional publications. It includes, in addition to the articles cited in the text, a small representative sample from the hundreds of other articles that we con- sulted. Only editorials and signed articles are listed. Some of the articles are by professional economists, historians, and political scientists, but most of them are by political journalists and editors. 425 {N (‘\ '\ Books Ackerman, Joseph, and Harris, Marshall. Family Farm Policy. Proceedings of a Conference on Family Farm Policy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947. Adrian, Charles, and Press, Charles. The American Political Process. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1905. Agar, Herbert. The People's Choice. Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1933. Albertson, Dean. Roosevelt's Farmer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. An Adagtive Program for Agriculture. A statement on national policy by the research and policy committee of the Committee for Economic Development. July, 1962. Andrews, Stanley. The Farmer's Dilemma. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961. A Program for the Family Farm. National Catholic Rural Life Conference, 1956 (pamphlet). Bailey, Liberty Hyde. The Country-Life Movement in the United States. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1911. Baker, Gladys. The Countyngent. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939. Baker, Gordon E. Rural versus Urban Political Power. Garden City, New York: Doubleday 8.Company, Inc., 1955. Beard, Charles A. The Economic Basis of Politics and Related Writings. Compiled and annotated by William Beard. New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 1957. Benedict, Murray R. Can We Solve the Farm Problem? New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1955. __o . Farm Policies of the United States,:1790-l950. The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953. Benson, Ezra Taft. Farmers at the Crossroads. New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1956. . Freedom to Farm. Garden City, New York: Doubleday 8 Company, Inc., 1960. (I f\ A. O s f“ . -— DV'A _( P . r“ Q r .. .- - , . \. 'I .3. . J , 1' f \ _l . .. l 1 . ‘1 A. .. .. . . i - . . . 1 (x f . i ,, . r Bidwell, Percy Wells, and Falconer, John I. History of Agriculture in the Northern United States, 1620-1800. Washington: The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1925. Bizzell, William Bennet. Farm Tenantry in the United States. Experiment Station, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, College Station, Texas, 1921. Black, John D. Agricultural Reform in the United States. New York: McGraw-Hill book Company, Inc., 19z9. . Parity, Parity, Parity. Cambridge: The Harvard University Press, 1954. Blaisdell, Donald C. Government andAgriculture: The Growth of Federal Farm Aid. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940. Boorstin, Daniel J. The Lost World of Thomastefferson. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1948. 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Congress, Senate. Farm Price and Income Projections 1960-65. Under Conditions Approximating Free Production and Marketing of_Agricultural Commodities. Report from the U. 5. Depart- ment of Agriculture and a Statement from the Land Grant Colleges IRM-l Advisory Committee, Senate Document No. 77, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960. . Joint Economic Committee. Economic Policies for Agriculture in the 1960's, Joint Committee Print, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960. . Joint Economic Committee. Policy for Commercial Agriculture: Its Relation to Economic Growth and Stability, Joint Committee Print, 85th Cong., lst Sess., 1957. . Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business. Small Business and Community: Study in Central Valleyyof California on Effects of Scale of Farm Operations. Committee Print NO. 13, 79th Cong., 2nd 5955., 1946. u. s. Comressional Recorg. Vols. xux-c1x (1953-1963). U. S. Department of Agriculture. Agricultural Adjustment: 1938-39: A Report of the Activities Carried on by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. 1939. . Family Farm Policy. Review. Provisional Report and Tentative Recommendations of the Department of Agriculture's Family Farm Policy Review Subcommittee. June 11, 1951. (mimeo). 7‘ I. (‘U «1 l A ,_,- - ,. I I“ . O . O . _ A O U. S. Department of Agriculture. Farm Opportunities in the United States. Interbureau Committee on Postwar Agricultural Problems, Washington, D. C., 1945. ”Report of the Secretary," Yearbook of Agriculture: 19:20 ~ . "Report of the Secretary," Yearbook of the U. S. Depart”eflt of Agriculturezgl9lo. . Report of the Secretary_of Agriculture: 1945. washington, D. C., 1940. . Technology on the Farm. 1940. . What Post-War Policies for Agriculture? Report of U. S. Department of Agriculture Interbureau and Regional Committee on Post-mar Programs, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, January, 1944. U. S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service. Questions and Answers on Agricultural Research. Agri- culture Information Bulletin No. 224, 1960. U. S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Budget and Finance. budget Exgenditures, Fiscal Yearsyl952:l959. March 21, 1960. . Budget Egpenditures, Fiscal Years 1957 through 1964, and Estimated 1905 BHd 1966. MarCh 9, 19650 . Net Budget EXpenditures,_Fisca1 Yearsg1926-1966, May 4, 19050 U. S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Information. Fact Book of U, S, Agriggltgrg. Washington, D. C., January, 1965. Letter§ Cochrane, Willard W. Director of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1961-1964. September 29, 1964. Cooley, Harold D. U. 3. Representative, Democrat, North Carolina. Chairman, Committee on Agriculture, July 20, 1964. Ellender, Allen J. U. 8. Senator, Democrat, Louisiana, Chairman, Agriculture Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. July 23, 1964. r. r. I‘ - O O C p . Q 1 O O o I .L V J t ' . . ’\ _ ’N I .. ‘J i , . c ’x I h ,_ o \ r~ f) r - , r~ ', V \ . J o _ . p I r . I41 I r +- H. ,_ U 1" 3? a: L. l 0 fl 0 f\ awe-or o- _.c—-.......— -» .. I .1 .hi. .1 ' -.....— .—.a-: V“- -.. ...- *U ‘ . . . -——~—— —-Q‘ _ . . . -.‘-~-o-o..».—‘ 7 O O h A no 1 o I . l - l 9 O . . O Q, . o \ ,., V . V ,. r - «r7 b . o 4 LL Q .271 McCanna, Henry A. Executive Director, Department of Town and Country Churches, National Council of Churches of Christ. Metcalf, Lee. U. 8. Senator, Democrat, Montana. August 8, 1964. Mundt, Karl E. U. S. Senator, Republican, South Dakota. July 22, 1964. O'Rourke, Edward W. Executive Director, National Catholic Rural Life Conference. Powell, Stanley. Legislative Counsel, Michigan Farm Bureau, July 5, 1960 and July 19, 1960. Reed, Dan E. Associate Legislative Counsel, Michigan Farm Bureau. October, 1960. Shuman, Charles B. President, American Farm Bureau Federation. August 28 and September 24, 1964. ther Sources We requested and obtained from the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Farmers Union, and the National Grange a complete set of their respective Resolutions adopted at their annual national conventions from 1946 through 1963. The Roper Public Opinion Research Center, at Williams College, provided us with a listing of the public opinion polls in its library dealing with public attitudes toward farmers, farming and the farm program for the period 1950 through 1964. From this listing we obtained the tabulated results of fifteen of the most pertinent polls. Mr. Samuel Lubell supplied us, on a loan basis, press release copies of all the polls that he had taken of Midwest farmers from 1956 through 1963. I‘D 4‘ I. )’ rx' .lr -" L. r .../1‘1 l . f L f“ : ;I.LJ‘IA |1(‘ r‘.L.;£;.'.‘.L'.-.:1': F‘s-.Lklgl'tfii 31.? B:F1?IITIC.~ Full knowleqqe cf the available literature on agricultural politics anJ policy making is essential to any understanding of the {rice Support and production control policy making process. However, Lec.use professional and political analysts have relied Upon an in- sufficient list of excl nltory factors, description and explanation of the political rrccess uhich has generated the agricultural price and control le,islation since World War 11 is inadequate and often misleading. he ielieve there are ftnu‘ principal reasons why the agriCUltural policy hiking {recess has not been adequately described and explained. First, analysts have generally failed to properly account for the influ- ential role that the family farm creed and the family farm policy goal have played in all agricultural policy making. Seconj, political analysts have shown little awareness of the fact that due to an inadequate informational base the policy making par- ticipants have diszgreed sharply in their perception concerning the actual characteristics of agricultural supply an] demand functions and other economic characteristics of the farm problem and the possible con- sequences of alternative policy approaches. These belief conflicts, which have flowel inevitably from the inadequacy of the economic infor- mational base, have been a powerful determinate in shaping the course of aSricultural policy making in the postwar period. 473 (1ft, Thiri, in concentrating on the conflicts generated by competing can olity interests, analysts have too often ignored the intense value conflicts among the policy making participants--conflicts which trans- Cend Lit do not supersede the commcdity conflicts. A fourth factor which helps to explain the inadequacy of the contemporary literature is that most analyses have been lacking in historical perspective. Angus Cl piell and associates have pointed out the nee} of historical gerSpective in the analysis of contemporary poli- tical events. The following passage ayplies to the matter of party iden- tification a ong voters: Thus prior party attachments form the great watershed for putlic reaction to current political events. With the examina- tion of this phenomenon in Section 111 it was natural to ask what coniitions leai to the formation of partisan allegiances igitially...such a tracing leads with surprising (italics mine) fre,uency to events lying years or even generations behind us, such rerote circumstances as a ravaged Georgia plantation or a job for a tewiliered uoston immigrant. It is such roots of current choice that rrovije a strange commentary on the view of the devocratic process as a periodic re-evaluation of contemporary events. hence we have stressed in building our metaphor of the causal funnel, the irportance of a 'political' core running back- war} in time, which more often than not provides the clearest explanation of Current behavior. Rot all political scientists would find it "surprising" that a significant pirt of the explanation of contemporary political behavior is to te found in historical antecedents. Unquestionably, however, many rolitical analysts have forgotten history, so to Speak. In no area of political study is the need of relevant historical context more important than in the study of the policy making processes. Public policies grow over ti e, they do not syring forth fully matured. Just as we cannot 1The fi"erican [oter (New York: John Wiley 3 Sons, Inc., 1960), p. :9:. .l \J .‘i A pi , . W‘. s . 4 r ”u . a O . .1 ..I i. t . , “J. .rIA O . . O ., A . L o . .l. s _ . rs Ag of. rv ; , \ . re nu J, \J r ,t . t p a 4 , A _ V .L r ; .1, _ v \ l 1 ya Av . ”J t 1 . . .. .A out» 4 .x n; s , A 1 cm , . .P \4 f .1 he i . . i a )v V . . . a . u/ i 1 -1 J \l 1 O .J . , l , a!» . a t, _ 1 _ . . u . a ti. .h ) x I, A f . w x 7 r x a / J j . I ‘. 4 . o a _ . .F ., _ l a “I! J , n I. J .x. , \ -1 hore to ajeguatel/ understand in individual without knowing something of his chilihotd, we cannot ilequately understani a given policy and the :clitics surrouniing it without knowing souething of its formative growth. In this study, therefore, we have concentrated on identifying the relevant reliefs and values of the policy makihg participants and ex- rliining how these affect their Lehavior in the policy making process. In allition, we have {liced considerable emyhasis on develoying a pr0per historical Context necessary to the understanding of the contemporary scene. A definition of Key analytical terms and a trief statement of the {olitical process incorporating these concepts follow: ieliefs are ideas as to what are the facts (in the Sense of what has been, is, and is likely to he) of the subject universe. They may Le held with varying degrees of Certainty and mjy or may not be con- sistent. They Tc] he absolutely or conlitionally right or wrong. what- ver the CiSU,ihUy go to make up the individual's conception of the re lities cf the ervironzent in which he lives and which he may wish to exert influence over. Leliefs may yertain to strictly factual conditions, such as the Lelief that declining farm prices will act to bring about a reduction in groduction. tr, beliefs may pertain to situations involving value Concegts, Such as the belief that individualism is promoted by the institution of the family firm. ‘;Vloes are ideas as to what is good or bad, desirable or un- desirable. Every inlividual holds a complex set of values. The set of values held by an individual will reflect a degree of hierarchial ranking, but the relative importance of any nlmoer of values is often only vaguely conceived by the individual. Some values may be competitive and some may . J . r n s . .x . L W,» e ; . 4 r r, , r it A” . [A a . F or; . .r1. 7 _ .. .L l. yr; D. |\, r , . F ._ , ,_ r 7, .,v , . no .t. l . , , $ . ._ . P O.» or , ¢ b'J A ,, NV 1 fl s Ii. r 3 i . Vt . . l .} _\ ,.i r . . I’ll. .. r , s l. . x . t, l , g ' e, Z . O l x . .l :1 0 ,e . q .. I ’ _ a s , p .V 3, ol, r J . x, /_ \vv , V _ \ , urIL r! » 0\ it is C _ . . 4 . c a .l a. l 1 r. .,, L l n l . .r. «a u .r 1!. 1:1 .II. \J IrlA - VA l) .r. All , x .. .l ‘J . a ..s F. . Fl \ . . s r. e ; J n. :12 . vi . . 7 ./ eff 1 _ _. y. ‘ or‘L .l. . I , _ Vin I ?. -(A N). ax “J actually Conflict with each other. thatever the case they are the things that man atteugts to strive for or to avoid. Futlic ;olicies are government programs of action generated by the political process an intenled to maximize the achievement of some 9011(8), widtfiarniy be exrlicitly or imrlicitly stated. Pulicz 40715 are state ents of those conditions which it is be- lieved ought to grevril. lhese conditions ought to prevail because it is believed that by creating, or maintaining these conditions, a value I or series of VilJtS will be naximizel. A goal is not simply the product of values sought, rather it is a product of an interaction of values and teliefs. A value may be highly regardei but may not lead to an effort to estatlich a goal through which thlt value might be realized because it may te relieve! that the realities of the environment are such that the achieve- nent of that value is impossible, or it may be believed that the conditions necessary to realize that value may be such as to impinge upon the realiza- tion of another value of egudl or greater importance. geliefs, values, and goals may be usefully separated for analyti- cal purposes; however, caution is needed. deliefs, for example, are not simply the product of the facts available to the observer, but are a product of the facts he chooses to digest and the interpretation he gives l those facts. The facts he digests and the interpretation he gives them 'J. s influenced to a Very considerable extent by the observer's values. Also, values, of course, are influenced by beliefs. In actual practice, the indiviiual rarely consciously separates these three concepts. In regard to potlic policies the political process must generate two decisions, the goal to be sought, and the means of achieving that goal. l , _ . . s. . , , , . | r . ‘w , \' - . - . ,. v ' ‘ F ‘l , h; u r . . , ‘ . ., y r I e - ' _ l J’ x . . - A / - 1, Q - r r A o — > 1 V P u - ,_\ , v ‘ y . , D A , Q . O - ~ r r 4 ‘ V’ L . a . . . . / ' , I l _, - xx . r r ‘ O L * p _ A . . ‘ t I g t 4 \ I ' A I . , , , V t , , . - ’ ' r ”W ‘ ' A . ‘4 A l A The beliefs an: values of the participants of the yrocess are vital in roth decisions. The interaction between the beliefs and comronents values occurs at tho lavels. First, the particinant (defined either 2 or a srecific Group) must, by making some n ..J (A 1 I" O HO "'3 '—I U H. J H. < *J L- C.) attu rt to corral te his reliefs and vilues, decile what he thinks ~.q] in» 4:3 . ,.- 2f :~f°~ - . thzt . «1 c a 4 th ".(v , ., L ,t. ...e .r-D L 19 Ilt‘Vlng t-h (JUL: 0 VEoOflu, Jere éwr ie an inter ction Lbiheun the relevant (articipants in an effort to dgtgrfifie “hat in f1ct will be the policy--its goal and the means of ictievinj it. ihis is, of course, a two-way process in which the beliefs an‘ vllaes of the furticihahts influence the shase of the interaction in} which the interaction acts to influence the beliefs and values of the iniiviigal {articirirt. As the tarticirant rarely holds his beliefs L -i“l values with alsolute certainty and Clarity and as no two participants A holi eractly the tire reliefs in} values, there will always be political . 5 . - conflict as to the goal to te Souyht and the means of achieving that goal. Fwtlic 'olicies are created or miintainel only if there is sufficient accohmojzticn to geser:te a decision. as hotel, a consiieruble portion of this study is devoted to an historical analysis of the family farm Creed and the relevant political an! econonic anteceients to the contemforary price support and production heavily ca secondary Sources, Particularly the works of Chester b. bisinqer, :uUI h. Johnstone, henry Nash Smith, Richard hofstadter, 4Lee Bibliogrifhy for full citations. Ii ' ,. ' ,. ° , (‘.:..' \;~ ..3 7--u'\.' '4 ‘4~‘+ ',- lie 1 .io r1.te ,orti-ns cf saith s .1Ig.n 3:.l, LbfLLJJhCI s .. P f . . ‘ a . a l. .I ' . r. . 7‘ "I ‘5 = r‘ 1" “ ' l“ "'y " ' M ' 3 tr 2.1.: H,.:nd urishol: s T ulti.g a". »« tcr o! a.e the host Villltle incluse of their grezter courrehensiveneSs and teCNuse they identify acne of tie general relationshirs between the creed and agricultural policy hiking. However, only the briswoll work deals with the creed in the twentieth century, anl it is lisited to the tre-Jorld her 11 period. but the most serious liritation of these works is the authors' attitude tow Ij the Creed: they argue that the conditions which give rise to the Creei an} which gave it A Certain sense of legitimacy have long since oiszjgeare23 therefore tie creed itself :houll be exercised from the Lnerlaln leiLlCl] scene. Specifl:.lly they argue that as the creed arose jflIlfig in er; when f; ily firming was to a large extent self- sufficiert fir in:, the commercialization of agriculture in the last hllf cf the nineteenth Century has renlarel it quite neiningless. This bfiddtitb, then, that Continued a heals to the family farm creed in the twentieth cs t:ry are nothing more than calcalated aypeals to a popular tr iition for tie stle purpose of bolstering demands for public policies aimej at grotecting the eCononic interests of an agriculture that no longer eXLihits any of the inalities assigned to farming by the family farm creed. In short, they argue that continuel references to the creed are wholly iIUlljafljiC in nature. lheSe analysts err in their interpretation that the originators of the Anerican family farm creed thought that the major virtues of fanily firming stenmei primarily from its economic self~sufficiency. They also err in not recognizing that the creed could change over time and move away from its earlier funlamentalistic thesis without losing its rolitic l vitalit, :nl legitimacy. Therefore, one of the rurroses of our histori::l inaIVSis is to Correct these Cot on distortions in the int er; rot .lt ions of the f wily {.31‘72‘. creed. Lur ruaekgsis of IIAB‘fIWllY fir"1CLthhj in the twentieflli century riur to the seconj w:r is wrawn, to a large extent, from rriwary sources. 'V he have concentrsted on an :nalysis cf the country life movement, which uTgflg other this s, revitilizei the creed an} re-defined it in accord with exictinj Coniitiohr. Po; the reriofl Ietween the wars we have drlwn fro? extensive survey of the Public press anj from the writings of lead- ing colitical fiiures uni social anilysts of the pericj. “e have been rxrticulzrly sorce;nei with reisurinn the imr ct that the agricultural Jerrcflflsion of tin: l};i':. Hui l37fi's ha ltfla‘the creed. 'ite a-ta for our :nilysis of the :ost-Jorlo war II period has been cr.wn from 1 Variety of :reas. A nijcr source has been the extensive herrinns on rrice ind control policy conaucted hy the house Cosmittee on Agriculture, the Senate Conrittee on agriculture and Forestry and the genersl hc rings cf the house Suhconmittee on Family Farms, as well as areciwl stuzies condicted or Sgonsorel ty these committees. These hear- ings yiell a wealth of data on almost every aspect of the postwar period with which we are conCernel. iecause rostWJI agricultural policy making has been so dramatically affectel hy the quality of the analytical models and empirical data avail- uhle to the rolicy makers regariing the nature of the micro and macro aCIlCJltJIJl sq ply and demanj functions and other economic characteristics of agriculture, it was necessary to conduct an exhaustive survey of the literature of rrofessional agricultural eConomists. our former training in agricultural eCcno ics rcth at the unierarajuate and grajuate level was most val» tie in this resrect. “e usei the following guiies in our survey of the public press erinq the rostw.r yericn: Agricuftxr l Ian ex, CongressionAI Record F .4f13irs fluiie, Yew York Tires Infex, and deaners Guiee. p ’4' C) injex, Futlic oginion data WIS obtainei from seVeral sources. For the period lu47 to 135] we reliel on the iuilic cginion Quarterly. The no er Public trinion neseirch Center provided us with a Consilerable volume of oginion 1.13 for the years since 1950. hr. Samuel Lubell proviled us with tress release cories of all his published newspaner columns deal- ing with farmer orinion. The American Institute of Public Urinion also SUppliei us with some valuable tabulations. The three major farm organizations--Farm bureau, Grange, Farmers Union-~5u7rliei us with complete sets of their reSpective platforms for the ye.rs 1047 through laud. CorreSpcndence with farm organization leaders, church lelders, and seVoral Congressmen prominent in the agricul- tural policy making rroCess provided a great deal of valuable data. r 13'r-‘H‘;PAP.51ATEUN H lllllulllll. : 3 1293 03 VERSHV UBRAF‘PS 1‘7 13 9 0 8