THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIO-ECONGMIC FACTORS
0N PARTY VOTE IN THE ITALIAN GENERAL
ELECTION OF JUNE 7, 1953

Thai: for th. Dayton 0% Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Sfeighfon Arthur Watts, Jr.
I960

 

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled
Tr: I:7TL"T.’CTE CF SOCIO-BCOfTCITI'C FACTORS Cf?
FLETY VCTS I: T313 TAIIAIT GZITETJLL ELECT CIT

CF JUSE 7, 195
presented bg

STEIGHTCH A; THU? T-IATTS, JR.

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

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Science
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THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIc—Ecomnc FACTORS ON
PARTY VOTE IN THE ITALIAN GENERAL ELECTION
OF JUNE 7, 1953

By

STEIGHTON ARTHUR WATTS, JR.

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the School for Advanced Graduate Studies of
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

Approved: #:FA L, jgémmjy/(N __

1960

 

ABSTRACT

This study presents a statistical analysis of the
Italian General Election of June 7, 1953. It was thought
that Italian voters were motivated by certain socio-economic
factors to support or oppose particular political parties.
Imfije it was impossible to measure the validity of this
belief by interviewing individual voters, it was possible
to accomplish much the same result by utilizing aggregate
data from the 1951 Italian census.

This was accomplished by statistically correlating
socio-economic variables, (e.g., age, occupation, education)
with the vote of each of the principal Italian parties.
Using the correlation coefficients thus derived, the influ-
ence of each variable was analyzed and evaluated.

The present study begins with a summary of political
events that took place between l9h5 and the election of 1953.
There is then a description of the campaign preceding that
election, followed by a party-by-party discussion of the
electoral returns. This discussion is in terms of the
orthodox explanations of party support, i.e., international
relations, legislative enactments, land refbrm, etc. Be-
ginning with Chapter IV, the present study turns to the

socio-economic analysis of the election.

The first variable deals with the extent of unem~
Ifloyment (or the level of employment). Employment is a
umjor problem in Italy, and it was anticipated that this
factor would have a profbund and extensive impact on party
vote. However, the correlations indicate that this is.not
the case; the amount of influence is slight.

The second major variable investigated, occupation,
is much more productive. Four occupational categories are
selected-~agriculture, industry, service and public admin-
istration; the variable is further subdivided into agri-
cultural and non-agricultural independents. It is feund
that occupation is an important factor in the electoral
prospects of almost all parties (i.e., a difference between
provinces in the percentage of the population engaged in
a particular occupational category means a difference in
party vote). I

The next socio-economic factor analyzed is educa-
tion. The educational level in Italy is discussed and
found to be comparatively low; 89% of the population has no
more than an elementary education, if that, and many per-
sons are illiterate. It is found that the educational level
of‘a province has a very considerable impact on the vote
of'the parties in that province. This makes possible some
interesting speculations on the political effect of raising

that educational level.

The next analysis deals with the influence of eco-
nomic status on vote, using per capita income, home owner-
ship and the number of persons per room as indicators. It
is discovered that economic status is very dependent upon
education and occupation and that its influence on vote is
secondary to that of those two factors.

The final major variable investigated is age. This
unquestionably is one of the most important factors analyzed,
and the age structure of an Italian province is found to
influence greatly the vote in that province. It is also
found that some preconceptions about the radical character
and tendencies of Italian youth need to be revised.

In addition to indicating the influence of these
socio-economic factors on party vote, the correlation
tables presented show that voter motivation and party support
vary widely between the two northern and the two southern
geographical regions. iMost of the major parties have their
support based on distinctly different types of appeal in
these two areas. This fact indicates that generalizations
tantalian electoral results must be preceded, or qualified,
by a statement as to the geographical region under discussion.

In summation, the present study provides an analysis
of the statistical correlations between party vote and
selected socio-economic variables for the Italian General
Election of 1953. The results of this study indicate that
this method of investigation provides considerable insight
into the electoral appeal of the various parties and, by

implication, the motivation of Italian voters.

THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS ON
PARTY VOTE IN THE ITALIAN GENERAL ELECTION
OF JUNE 7, 1953

By

STEIGHTON ARTHUR WATTS, JR.

A THESIS

Submitted to the School for Advanced Graduate Studies of
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1960

(2" ”1‘5
:. )J
L477 0/6‘

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the following persons who
aided in the development and writing of this study.

First, Dr. Joseph G. LaPalombara who proposed the
study and whose criticisms and suggestions, based on his
expert knowledge of Italy and Italian politics, contributed
greatly to the final product.

Particular thanks is also due to the Bureau of Social
and Political Research of Michigan State University for con-
tributions of time and money. Without the aid of Dr.

Frank A. Pinner, Henry Cooke and, especially, Francis Sim,
the statistical portion of this thesis could not have been
attempted.

I also wish to express my appreciation to ‘Michigan
State University for the very generous use of the computer,
MISTIC, and its operators.

Finally, and most important, thanks must go to my
wife, Lee, for without her there would have been nothesis.
Editor, constructive critic, typist, proofreader, errand-
girl and often the only source of moral support and encour-
agement, her contributions were absolutely essential. There-
fore, this thesis is dedicated to her as a small token) of

my gratitude and appreciation.

ii

 

ACWOWLEDMENTS O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0
LIST or TABLES
INTRODUCTION ‘

Chapter

II.
III.
Iv.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ITALIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1943-1953

THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN OF 1953 . . . . .
RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1953 .

EMPLOYMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OCCUPATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EDUCATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ECONOMIC STATUS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AGE, MARITAL STATUS AND URBAN RESIDENCE .

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

iii

0 O O O O O O 0'. O O O O O O O O

Page
ii
iv

13

76
110
1&2
178
215
2U
271
302
33k

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page
1. Significance Levels of Correlations (By

Geographical Regions) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2. Subdivisions of Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

20

3o Referendum on the RGPUbliC o o o o o o o o o o

h. Election of the Constituent Assembly, June 2,
l9h6. (Percentage voting, percentage of votes
that were valid and percentage of valid votes
received by each party) . . . . . . . . . . 30

5. Election of the Constituent Assembly, Votes
Received and Seats Won . . . . . . . . . . . 32

6. General Election of April 18, 1948, Votes Re-
ceived and Seats WOn o o o o o 0'. o o o o o 57

7. General Election of April 18, l9h8 (Percentage
voting, percentage of votes that were valid and

percentage of valid votes received by each
partY)o o o o o o o o o o o o o a o 6 o o o o

8. Comparison of 1946 and 19h8 Electoral Figures,
The Christian Demdcrats and the Left . . . . 61

58

90 PrOVin01al EleCtion Of 1951-1952 e o o o a o o 73

10. General Election of June 7, 1953, Votes Received
and Seats Received 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o 111

11. Comparison of l9h8 and 1953 Electoral Results . 113

12. General Election of June 7 1953 (Percentage
voting, percentage of valid votes received by

eaCh partY) o o o o o o o o o o o o o o ... o 115

13. Senate Election of 1953. Percentage of Vote and .
Seats won (With Changes from 1948) . . . . . 124

1h. Correlations Between Party Vote and Percent
VOting o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 134

iv

Table
15.
16.
17.

18.

19.

20.

21.
22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.
30.

Page

Correlations Between Party Vote and Valid Vote . 137
Italian unemployment, 1946-1952 e ‘o o o o o o o 11;}
Employment Level of the Total Population and of I
the.Male Population .,. . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percent-
age of the Population That is Employed . . . . 168
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percent-
age of the Male Population That is Employed . 171
Percentage of the Working Force Engaged in Each
Of Four occupational Categories 0 o o a 0'. c 185
Percentage of Employment in Various Fields . . . 187
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percent-
age of the Population Engaged in Agriculture . 192
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percent-
age of the Population Engaged in Industry . . 196
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percent-
age of the Population Engaged in Service
Occupations 0.000000000000000 200
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of the Population Engaged in Public Administra-
tion.....................201
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of Agricultural Workers That Are Independent . 207
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of Non-agricultural Workers That Are Inde-
pendent oooooooooooooooooooZlO
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of Non—agricultural Independents That Are Pro-
fessionals or Administrators . . . . . . . . . 212
Percentage Figures on Education and Literacy . . 222
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of the Population With No School Degree . . . 227

Table
31.

32.
33.
3a.
35.
3o.
37.

38.
39.

40.
41.
42.
A3.
4h.

45.

A6.

#7.

Page

Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of the Population With Elementary Degrees . . 231
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of the Population With Intermediate Degrees . 233
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of the Population With High School Degrees . 233
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of the Population With University Degrees . . 234
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of the Population That Is Illiterate . . . . 237
Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage

of Illiterates That Are Male 237 _

O O I O O O O I

Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage

of Literates That are Male 238

247

Income and Related Economic Statistics

Distribution of Population and Income by Geo-

graphical Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

Correlations Between Party Vote and Per Capita

Income 254

ooooooooooooooooooo
Correlations Between Per Capita Income and Edu-

cation Level 257

Correlations Between Per Capita Income and

Occupational Categories . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Correlations Between Educational Level and

Occupational Category . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

Correlations Between Party Vote and Average

Number of Persons Per Room . . . . . . . . . 262

Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percent-
age of the Population Living in Their Own

HomeSOOOOO00000000000000.

266

Correlations Between Party Vote and Civilization

Index.00000000000000.0000

269

Age, Marital Status and Urban Residence (By
Percentage of the Total Papulation) . . . . .

vi

273

Table

48.
L9.
50.
51.
52.

53-
5h-

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

63.

Page

Correlations Between Party Vote and Age Categories

in the North 0 L o o e e o o o e e e e e e e e 278

Correlations Between Party Vote and Age Categories
in the Center 0 e e o e e e e e e e e e e e 0

Correlations Between Party Vote and Age Categories
in thQ SOUth a o o o e o e o e e e e o e o e o

280

281

Correlations Between Party Vote and Age Categories

in the ISland3,e e e e o e e e e o e e e e e e 282

Correlations Between Party Vote and Age Categories
in Italy 0 o o e e e o e e e e o e e e e e o 0

Correlations Between D.C. Vote and Age Categories 286

284

Correlations Between P.S.D.I. Vote and Age Cate-

gories or. e o o e e e o e e e e o e e o o e e 286
Correlations Between P.L.I. Vote and Age Cate-
gorles e e e o e o e e o e e e e e e e e o e e. 286
Correlations Between P.R.I. Vote and Age Cate-
gories O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 287
Correlations Between P.C.I. Vote and Age Cate-
. 287

gories e o e e e e o o e e e e e e 9 e e e 0

Correlations Between P.S.I. Vote and Age Cate-
gorles o e o e e e e e e a e e o e o o e e e o 287

Correlations Between P.N.M. Vote and Age Cate-
gories e o e e o e e o e o e e e e e e e o ole 288

Correlations Between M.S.I. Vote and Age Cate-

gories e e e e e o e e e e e e e e e e e e e 0

Party Preferences of Youth in 1958 and Actual 1s\
Results of the General Election of 1958 . . . ,290

288

Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of the Population Living in Cities and Towns . 297

Correlations Between Party Vote and the Percentage
of the Population that is Unmarried, Widowed or

Divorced e e e e o e e e o e e o o e e e e e o 298

Correlations Between the Vote of the Christian
Democrats and the Vote of Other Parties . . . 304

vii

Table Page

65. Correlations Between the Vote of the Social Demo-
crats and the Vote of Other Parties . . . . . . 30h

66. Correlations Between the Vote of the Liberals and
the VOte Of Other Parties 0 e e e e o e e e e e 305

6?. Correlations Between the Vote of the Republicans
and the VOte Of Other Parties 0'. e e o e e e o 305

68. Correlations Between the Vote of the Communists
and the Vote of Other Parties . . . . . . . . . 306

69. Correlations Between the Vote of the Communists
and the Vote of Other Parties . . . . . . . . . 306

70. Correlations Between the Vote of the.Monarchists
and the VOte Of Other Parties 0 e e e e e e e e 307

71. Correlations Between the Vote of the M.S.I. and
' the Vote Of Other Parties 0 e o e o e e e e e e 307

viii

INTRODUCTION

In the study of democratic politics one of the most
fascinating questions asked after an election always has
been, "Why did the people vote the way they did?" A second
and equally fascinating query is, "Can motivation be iso-
lated so as to explain the past vote and predict future
results?" In the United States the problem of understanding
voter motivation has been studied for many years; methods
have ranged from an intuitional approach based upon un-
systematic observation of past elections to the much more
scientific sampling surveys of recent years. The result
of this study has been the formulation of political axioms
(e.g. a Catholic cannot become President) and the isolation
of a multiplicity of vote-influencing variables (e.g. re-
ligion, age, sex, education, economic status, etc.).

Much of the research in this area has been devoted
to proving or disproving the axioms and to determining the
relative effect of the many variables. The most-used method
of study has been the interview-questionnaire approach. This
approach involves questioning voters to determine their
attitudes and motivations, then aggregating and analyzing
the data received to understand or predict the vote. A

second method begins with the aggregate data, and by

-1-

-2-
statistical means determines the relationship between
specific variables and the distribution of the vote. The
xnesent study involves the application of this second method
to the Italian General Election of June, 1953.

This electoral analysis was based upon the selection
and evaluation of variables, principally socio—economic (e.g.
age, per capita income, education, occupation, marital
status), that might logically be expected to influence in-
dividual voters. .Each of these variables was then mathe-
matically correlated, nationally and regionally, with the
percentage of the valid vote received by each party that
won seats in the election. The chief source of statistical
information on the variables was the report of the Italian
census of 1951.1 This report gives the total number of
persons in each province that fit into certain categories,
e.g. the number engaged in agriculture, the total of those
who were under twenty-one, etc. These raw figures were
converted into percentages, thus obtaining the proportion
of the provincial population in each category. Each of
these categories was assumed to be an independent variable
tdth.which the dependent variable, size of vote, was related.

To discover if, in fact, these socio-economic variables did

fit—VV—“w m

lRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica,

IX Censimento Generals Della Po olazione.LA Novembre 1951
lRoma: Soc. Abete, l9h5).

 

 

 

Q.

(I.

m.

 

-3-
influence the vote of the Italian electorate, the provincial
percentages derived from the census materials were fed into
a.computer,.MISTIC, along with the official election returns.
This computer, using Pearsonian correlations, emitted figures
that indicated, in statistical terms, the actual relation-
ship between the dependent and the independent variables.

In succeeding chapters these figures are presented in tables
along with interpretations of'their meaning.

The figures reproduced in these charts depict the
independent variable-party vote relationship, and represent
the coefficient of correlation, usually designated g. This
2 provides a measure of’the strength and direction of the
relationship. In the charts, all figures will be preceded
by a plus (+) or minus (-) sign, indicating a positive or
negative correlation. Taking agricultural employment as an
example of a variable, a positive correlation for a party
would indicate that as the percentage of persons engaged
in agriculture gets larger, that party's probability of
increasing its vote also rises. Conversely, a negative
correlation indicates that an increase in the variable in-
hibits the party's chances. Thus, the sign gives the
direction of the influence; at the same time, the accompany-
ing figure indicates the extent of the relationship.

At what point this correlation figure becomes mean-
ingful is open to question. It is quite obvious that a

.40 correlation is lower than .90, but these figures mean

-b-
nothing by themselves. Some estimation of their strength
can be made by computing the coefficient of determination,

cn'gg. This r2 indicates what part of the total variation

is explained or accounted for by g.

This means that a .AO correlation explains only .16
or 16% of the variation and any prediction based upon such
a figure would be very questionable. On the other hand, a
g;of .90 accounts for 81% of the variation and indicates a
very strong relationship between whatever variables are
being discussed. The present study, as is the usual pro-
cedure, uses_§ rather than 2? since direction is important.
(In computing g? the sign, of course, is lost since, for
example, -.h0 x -.a0 = +.l6.) The coefficient of determina-
tion should be kept in mind, however, when consulting the
correlation tables.

While 2? indicates the part of the total variation
that is explained by 2, it does not give any measure of the
significance of the correlation figures. A test of signifi-
cance is of particular importance in the present study be-
cause the number of provinces is not the same in each of

the four geographical regions, i.e., there are 40 provinces

in the North,2 20 in both the Center and South, and only

 

2However, in computing the correlations and in test-
ing significance, a total of 39 provinces were used for the
Nbrth. Trieste was omitted because its political parties
differed from those in the rest of Italy. This difference
made it impossible to combine the political figures for
Trieste with those of the other provinces.

 

II

-5-
12 in the Islands (a total of 92 for Italy). Since statis-
tically the correlation coefficients become less significant
as the number of items (e.g., provinces) decreases, the
level of significance would vary among the geographical
regions, even those with the same coefficient.

The test of significance used here is the "Student's
t" test, the calculation of which indicates the likelihood

that the correlation between variables is the result of

 

chance. Using the formula t = §——3N" 2_ (N equals Number),
VI - r2
the significance levels were computed for the four geo-

graphical regions.3 The result is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS OF CORRELATIONS
(BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGION)

 

 

 

W _-—W
Level of
Significance Center-
(Per cent) North South Islands Italy
10 .27 .39 .50 .17
5 .32 .45 .57 .21
2% .36 .51 .64 .24
l .42 .57 .71 .27

M __ _ I

In this table four levels of significance are given

along with the correlation coefficients that achieve each

n-‘__

.— __.— *—

 

3For a brief discussion of "Student’s t" test, see M.
{. Moroney, fleets from Figures (3rd ed. rev.; Harmondsworth
ongland: Penguin Books Ltd., 1956). pp. 311-312. For "t"
distribution table see Alexander McFarlane Mood, Introduction

to the Theory of Statistics (New York: McGrawbHill Book Company
InCo, 95 , p. £5750

 

-6...
level. For example, a correlation coefficient of .42 or
above in the North would be at the 1% significance level
and, consequently, would be very significant; i.e., such
a correlation coefficient could occur by chance only once
in one-hundred times. (It should be observed that the small
number of provinces in the Islands means that correlation
coefficients in that region must be considerably higher
than those of the other regions to achieve the same signifi-
cance.) With this test of significance and the meaning of
ggand‘gz in mind, the correlation tables in subsequent chap-
ters will be more meaningful.

’ One other warning should be given. No claim is made
that relationships shown between party vote and the various
factors is causal. This type of analysis is known as ecologi-
93; correlation, and mathematicians take great pains to indi—
cate that a high correlation of this type does not necessar-
ily indicate that one factor causes the other.4 For example,

a high correlation between Christian Democratic vote and

 

hSee, for example, Robinson, W. 3., "Ecological
Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," American
Sociolo ical Review, 15 (1950). PP- 351-3573 MenzeI, Herbert,
"Comment on Robinson's 'Ecological Correlations and the Be-
havior of Individuals.'" American Sociological Review, 15
(1950), p. 67h; Goodman, Leo, "Some'Klternatives to Ecolo i-
cal Correlation," American Journal of Sociolo , 65 (1959?,
13» 610-625; Goodman, Eeo A., "EcoIogicaI Regression and
the Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological Review,
13 (1953). PP. 663-66A.

-7-

provinces in which women outnumber men would not necessarily
mean that women vote for the Christian Democrats-«it could
be that the men, being in the minority, have a tendency to
vote as a bloc for a party that women dislike. While this
may seem far-fetched, it none-the-less presents a possible
explanation.

One of the advantages of the interview-questionnaire
approach is that it permits direct identification of in-
dividual characteristics or motivations that lead to a choice
of a particular party. Using the statistical correlation
method means that identification of the characteristics or
motivations must be inferred from aggregate data. However,
the inability to show causality does not mitigate seriously
against the usefulness of the method of study. Correlations
still can serve as indications of the positive or negative
influence of specific variables on party vote. Referring
again to the example given above concerning Christian Demo-
crats, it would be necessary to do a field study involving
individual interviews to bring out the precise character
of the Christian Democratic vote. However, if a high
correlation should appear between Christian Democratic vote
and a female majority, the "why" is not necessary to secure
a certain measure of understanding and predictability. While
an analysis of one election is obviously not sufficient
to make effective predictions, it clearly presents a de-

parture point for analyzing future elections. That is all

-3-
that is hoped for from the present study.

One further point that must be explained is the
terminology which is applied, on the tables and in the dis-
cussion, to the subdivisions of Italy. The country is
divided into four sections, the North, Center, South and
Islands (the latter two grouped together into the Mezzogiorno).
These geographical areas represent actual physical, cultural
and economic subdivisions. In succeeding chapters the
efficacy and naturalness of the geographical breaks become
increasingly evident. However, these are not political
subdivisions. Legally, the country is divided into Regions
and provinces (which are further subdivided into communes).5
A list of the geographical areas, Regions and provinces is
presented in Table 2.6

The correlation tables (which are presented in
Chapters III through IX) are based upon the geographical
areas and the nation as a whole. For all of Italy the
statistical data on specific variables fer each province
were correlated with the percentage of the vote received

by each party in the General Election of 1953. The provinces

 

5In the text when reference is made to the Region,
the term will always be capitalized. This will distinguish
It from the geographical region or area which will be in
ower case.

. 6Italian electoral statistics are reported by electoral
districts, Regions and provinces. Census data is reported
by Regions and provinces.

-9-

were then divided into four groups by geographical region,
and again correlations between statistical data and party
vote were computed. While the provinces within the geo-
graphical regions are not homogeneous, these regions present
a practical and meaningful unit for research.

In summation, the present study is a statistical
analysis of the party vote in the General Election of June,
1953, using the geographical areas of Italy as a basis for
evaluation. Before turning to this analysis, however, it
is necessary to give a brief account of the Italian political
scene since World war II. It is hoped that this historical
preface, presented in Chapters I through III, will make the
voter motivation discussed in succeeding chapters more com-

prehensible.

Geographical
Areas

North

-10-
TABLE 2

SUBDIVISIONS OF ITALY

W

Region

Piemonte

Valle d'Aosta
Lombardia

Trentino-Alto Adige

Veneto

Friuli-Venezia Giulia

Trieste

Liguria

Province

Alessandria
Asti

Cuneo
Novara
Torino
Vercelli

Bergamo
Bresoia
Como
Cremona
Mantova
Milano
Pavia
Sondrio
Varese

Bolzano
Trento

Belluno
Padova
Rovigo
Treviso
Venezia
Verona
Vicenza

Gorizia
Udine

Genova
Imperia
La Spezia
Savona

-11-
TABLE 2 (Continued)

 

 

Geographical
Areas Region Province

 

Emilia-Romagna Bologna
Ferrara
Forli
Modena
Parma
Piacenza
Ravenna
Reggie nell'Emilia

Center Toscana Arezzo
Firenza
Grosseto
Livorno
Lucca
Massa-Carrara
Pisa
Pistoia
Siena

Umbria Perugia
Terni

Marche Ancona
Ascoli Piceno
Macerata
Pesaro e Urbino

Lazio Frosinone
Latina
Rieti
Roma
Viterbo

South Abruzzi e Molise Campobasso
Chietl
L'Aquila
Pescara
Teramo

Campania AVGllinO
Benevento

Caserta
Napoli
Salerno

-12-
TABLE 2 (Continued)

Geographical
Areas Region Province

Puglia Vari
Brindisi

Foggia
Lecce
Taranto

Basilicata Matera
Potenza

Calabria Catanzaro
Cosenza

Reggio di Calabria

Islands Sicilia Agrigento
Caltanissetta

Catania
Enna
Messina
Palermo
Ragusa
Siracusa
Trapani

Sardegna Cagliari
Nuoro

Sassari

 

CHAPTER I
ITALIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1943-1953

In the comparatively few years between 1943 and the
Cbmeral Election of 1953, Italy had a referendum on the re-
tention of the Monarchy, a Constitutent Assembly that drew
up the present Constitution, General Elections in 19A6 and
l9h8, administrative elections in 1950 and 1951, plus a
succession of Cabinets that saw almost all parties cooper-
ating in the Government at one time or another. Each of
these events ultimately contributed to the party platforms
and strategy in 1953. Consequently, the present chapter
is devoted to a summarization of important facts that are
essential to an understanding of the General Election of

1953 and its outcome.

The Immediate Post-war Period

At the close of World War II, Italy found itself
in an unusual position; it had fought on both sides and
ended up on the winning side. This position was the result
of'a peculiar set of circumstances. On July 2A. l9h3, the
Fascist Grand Council asked for Mussolini's'resignation;
that resignation was tendered and accepted the following
day. The deposed leader was arrested immediately, and King

-13-

-14-
Emanuel III appointed Marshall Pietro Badoglio as head of
the Government. Badoglio initiated negotiations with the
Allies and signed an armistice on September 8, 19h3. Italy
was designated as a co-belligerent against Germany. Actually,
this designation and the armistice meant little since
mussolini, after rescue by the Germans, ruled most of
Northern Italy. At the time of the signing, the King and
his Government controlled only a comparatively small section
of'Southern Italy around his temporary capital of Brindisi.
As the Allies pushed north, the capital was moved to Salerno
in 1944 and back to Rome in June of the same year.
Resistance in the North to the German forces and to
Mussolini's Government was organized under local groups
which called themselves Committees of National Liberation,
or C.N.L.'s. Five political parties comprised these groups: the Com-
munists, the Socialists, the Action party, the Christian
Democrats and the Liberals. In the south, the C.N.L.'s also
existed, but only for political activities; the five parties
above were joined by the Labor Democrats.1 The northern
committees became the focal point of anti-Fascist activity
and were more and more important as the Allied troops pushed
forward at the end of the war. These partisan forces took
over many towns in northern Italy and held them until the

Allies arrived. The Allied command negotiated with these

1Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuildin of Ital (London:
Royal Institute of International Af airs, ,55 , p. 9.

-15-

groups, particularly the Milan committee, and made a bipar~
tite agreement (in December, 1944) with the central commit-
tee of the C.N.L.'s, the Comitato della Liberazione Nazio-
nale perznglta Italia (C.L.N.A.I.).

Under this agreement, the C.L.N.A.I. undertook to
establish and maintain cooperation with all active
elements in the Resistance movement, even if they did
not belong to the committee. . . . The Committee also
promised to do its best, on enemy withdrawal, to main-
tain law and order, to safeguard the economic resources
of the territory against sabotage, and to hand over to
Allied Military Government, immediately on its estab-
lishment, all the authority and powers of local govern-
ment which it had previously assumed.

(The Italian Government recognized the C.L.N.A.I. as its

own representative in northern Italy shortly thereafter.3)
Thus the northern C.N.L.'s were able to exercise de facto
control over much of an area that was in a chaotic condition
following surrender.

The C.N.L.'s of the South were just as vehemently
anti-Fascist, but were in an area where the fighting was
over; consequently, the member parties did not act as par-
tisan forces. These parties, however, gave only lukewarm
support to the officially recognized Government of King
Victor Emmanuel and Premier Badoglio. Widespread criticism
of the Anglo-American support of the monarchy arose almost

immediately after the armistice because of the King’s ac-

ceptance of Fascism for so long. In April, l9hh, however,

A‘__-

2c. a. s. Harris, Alliedgflilitary Administration of
£2311 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), p. 776.

3Ibid., p. 293.

~16-

the Communists, generators of much of the criticism, reversed
their position and their leader, Palmiro Togliatti, joined
the cabinet. Count Carlo Sforza, also anti-monarchist,
joined the Government at the same time.4 The question of
the monarchy was laid aside by agreement, and the King re-
moved himself from governmental activity. This was the sit-
ution in June, 1944, when the capital was returned to Rome.

In Rome, however, the anti-Fascist parties refused
to work with Marshall Badoglio, and a new Government was
fermed under Ivanoe Bonomi, the president of the C.N.L. of
Rome. Bonomi's cabinet included representatives of all six
parties at first, but the Socialist and Action parties with-
drew in late November, causing a collapse of the Government.
Vfith.Communist and Christian Democrat support, Bonomi formed
a new cabinet in December with a four party coalition. The
{nincipal problem in this period was the question of future
C.N.L. power. The parties of the Left, i.e., the Communist,
Socialist and Action parties, felt that the C.L.N.A.I. should
choose the government and that the C.N.L.'s should retain
the legislative, executive and judicial powers they were
exercising. The Liberals, the Christian Democrats and the
labor Democrats strongly favored the disbanding of the

C.N.L.'s after the war was finished.5

ABuelW. Patch, "Italian Election," in Richard M.
Boeckel, ed., Editorial Research Re orts l 8 (Washington,
ILC.: EditoriaI Research Reports, §§L§). V01. 1. p. 221-

sGrindrod, o . cit., pp. 10-11.

-17-

Bonomi's third Government was also short-lived, fal-
ling when Togliatti withdrew Communist support in June, 19A5.
The selection of a new Premier was extremely difficult; the
Christian Democrats rejected the Socialist-Communist candi-
date, Pietro Nenni, and the other parties refused Alcide de
Gasperi (the Foreign Secretary and head of the Christian
Democrats). Renewed unity of the six parties was finally
achieved with a compromise choice, Ferruccio Parri of the
Action party. This agreement ended a real threat of civil
war in Italy.6 All parties now committed themselves
to the early holding of a constitutional convention. Still
to be agreed upon were the composition and selection of the
constituent assembly and the question of retaining the mon-
archy or substituting a republic.

Before these decisions could be made, another govern-
nmntal change took place. The Liberal party, followed by
the Christian Democrats, left the cabinet in November be-
cause of Communist influence on Parri.7 The six-party coali-
tion reformed under the leadership of Alcide de Gasperi who
took office on December 10, l9h5. He was to continue as
Premier until 1953. In March, the Government decided that
a referendum should be held in June, l9t6 (following local

-——-_-_

6Harris, op. cit., pp. 251-252.

7Ibid., p. 362. Parri subsequently became the
leader of the Unita Po olare, a splinter left-wing group,
in the election of 1953.

-13-
elections in March and April), to determine the fate of the
monarchy. At the same time, the election for representatives

to the Constituent Assembly would be held.

Referendum, June 2, l9h6

Actually the disposition of the monarchy may have
been determined in April of 1946, when the congress of the
Christian Democratic party voted in favor of a Republic.8
This vote, combined with the anti-monarchist policies of
the Communists and Socialists, made the institution of a
republic almost a certainty. In an effort to defeat the
opposition, King Emmanuel, three weeks before the vote,
abdicated the throne in favor of his son, Umberto. He pre-
sumably hOped that any stigma attached to himself because
of his cooperation with the Fascists would not be transferred
to his son. However, the new King, commander-in-chief of
the Italian forces in the attack on France in 1940, was con-
sidered little better than his father by left-wing parties.9
It is impossible to say whether a "purer" successor than
Umberto could have altered the eventual vote, but Emmanuel's
strategy failed. The issue was decided in favor of a re-

public, 12,717,923 to 10,719,284, 3 percentage of SA.3. As

h _. ..

8Patch, op. cit., p. 230.

9 . .
W. Hilton-Youn— The Italian Left (London: Long-
mans, Green and Co., 1859), Pp- 165-157-

-19-

can be seen from Table 3, an overwhelming vote for a re-
public in the more populous North overcame a very large
majority for the King in the southern provinces.

A violent outcry arose from the monarchist supporters
when the result of the election was announced somewhat pre-
cipitously before the final tabulations were made. The
official results showed little change, however. The monar-
chists still dissented, claiming that all challenged and
invalid votes should be counted for the King since those
ballots were largely from the illiterate peasants, particu-
larly of the South, who were overwhelmingly for the monarchy.
This claim was disregarded, and, as can be seen from the
figures on valid votes in Table 3, the percentage of ballots
thrown out in the monarchist South actually was little
different from that in the rest of the country. The result
of the election never has been accepted by large numbers
of the population, however, as indicated by continued support
for monarchist parties in subsequent elections. Neverthe-
less, King Umberto acknowledged the desires of the majority

by abdicating (on June 13, l9h6) and leaving the country.

Italian Parties, 19h6
In the concurrent elections for the Constituent
Assembly, eight major parties or lists of parties contested
f9? 556 seats. These were the Christian Democrats, the

Socialists, the Communists, the National Democratic Union

-20-
TABLE 3
REFERENDUM ON THE REPUBLIC3

 

 

Voting; Percentage
Percentage Percentage Pro-
Region Voting Valid Republic

Piemonte 9001+ 93 00 57.1
Liguria 85.6 95.6 69.0
Lombardia 91.2 9A.2 64.1
Venezia Tridentina 91.0 94.9 85.0
Veneto 91.1 91.6 59.3
Emilia 920 5 91‘41 77.0
Toscana 91.5 93.5 71.6
Marche 91.7 93.9 70.1
Umbria 91.2 9308 7109
Lazio 8t.2 96.0 h8.6
Abruzzi e Molise 88.1 9A.l 43.1
Campania 86.0 9h.h 23.5
Puglia 90.1 95.4 32.7
Basilicata 88.7 93.0 40.6
Calabria 85.6 9A.? 39.7
Sicilia 85.5 9A.l 35.3
Sardegna 85.9 92.7 39.1
NORTH 90.8 93.5 6h.8
CENTER 88.9 9A.h 63.5
SOUTH 87.5 94.6 32.6
ISLANDS 85.6 93.8 36.0
ITALIA 89.1 93.9 54.3

 

aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Sta-

tistics Annuario Statistico ItalianoI 12g5~g8, Serie V,
Vol. I (Roma: Istituto PoIigrafico del o Stato, 19A9),

PP- ISA-155.

 

 

'a
p

 

-21-

(composed of the Liberals and Labor Democrats), the gggg
Qualungue, the Republicans, the National Liberation Bloc
(monarchist) and the Action party. A few words should be
said about each of these.

The Christian Democratic party (D.C.), headed by
Alcide de Gasperi,is the successor to the Catholic Partito
Popglare (or Popular party) of pre-Mussolini days. The
Popular party was feunded in 1919 and existed until 1926
when it was disbanded fer opposing Mussolini. As the war
drew to a close, many of the leaders of the defunct Popular
party, including Alcide de Gasperi, formed a new Catholic
party, the Eggpito Democrazia Cristiana, which then parti-
cipated in the C.N.L.

The Christian Democratic party is a combination of
groups that range all over the political spectrum, bound
together by religious faith. This central belief in the
Catholic faith was virtually all that was known of the party
in 1946. The party pledged valid reforms where needed, but
vdth safeguards for the freedom of individuals. State in-
tervention in the industrial field would vary from outright
nationalization through joint public-private control to
simple governmental control, but about seventyvfive percent

of industry was to remain in private hands.10 The general

m

 

loMario Einaudi and Francois Gogueli Christian

Democrac in Ital and France (Notre Dame, ndiana: Uni—
versity of Notre Bame Press, 1952). p- 37.

-22-
trend of the party's pronouncements placed it in the center,
considerably to the right of the Communists and Socialists.

The Communist party, or P.C.I. (Eggpito Commggggga
Italiano), came into existence in 1921 after a split in the
Socialist party. The party leader was (and is) Palmiro
Togliatti.11 The P.C.I. was suppressed during the Fascist
period, and Togliatti exiled himself to Moscow until 194A
when he returned to resume command. The party was known for
its anti-Fascist stand, and its exemplary action during the
partisan period gained many friends throughout the country.
Its policies normally reflected the Moscow party line. The
P.C.I., like all Communist parties, is very pragmatic;
this was indicated in 19A6 by a statement that it had ”abso-
lute respect for the religious faith of the Italian people."12
This was an earth-shaking announcement for a Marxist party
and caught the secular parties off guard. This position on
religion enabled the P.C.I. to compete effectively with the
Christian Democrats before the election and to participate
in the Government until 1947.

The Socialist party (ngtito Sociglista Italiano di
Unite Proletaria or P.S.I.U.P.), like the Communist, had

been suppressed during the Fascist period. Its leaders were

*-

llTogliatti actually became the party leader after
defeating the Bordiga faction (the extreme left-wing of the
party) in 1926-1927.

12As quoted in Einaudi and Goguel, op. ci ., p. 33.

-23-

imprisoned or exiled; the most important of these leaders,
Pietro Nenni and Guiseppe Saragat, spent the intervening
time in Paris. This party also was strongly anti-Fascist
and was very active in the fighting against the mussolini
regime. In this struggle, however, it lacked the organiza-
tion and experience of the Communist party with which it
worked very closely.13 The P.S.I.U.P. was definitely anti-
clerical, but managed to cooperate with the Government during
the early years after the war. The party was shortly to
split on the question of continued cooperation with the
Government or joining 'ith the Communists in Opposition.

The Action party (Partito d'Azione) grew up in the

 

period of fighting and died soon thereafter. While little

was known of its strength, the party "stood so high in

popular estimation and popular hopes that its leader [Ferruccio
Parri] was able to command the confidence of the leaders

of the traditional parties."14 Its program, ennunciated

during the Badoglio governmental period, called for a re-
public, regional decentralization, elimination of monopolies,
some nationalization, taxation of inherited wealth, agrarian
reforms, freedom of worship, reforms of education and the

development of the South.15 These points were all adepted

__

W- ‘u-C‘.‘

13Grindrod, o . cit., p. 16.
1h

 

Hilton—Young, op. cit., p. 181.

15 ,
Grindrod, op. c1t., p. 16.

-24-
by the parties having mass support, and the Action party soon
disappeared. Largely a party of ideas and intellectuals,

it was ill suited to compete.

The Liberal party (Partito Liberale Italiano) can
trace its history back to the nineteenth century and the uni-
fication of Italy. In the post world war I period the party,
led by its most conservative wing, cooperated with the Fas—
cist regime. Not all the party leaders agreed with this
strategy, however, and some moved into opposition. Among
these were Luigi Einaudi and Benedetto Croce. These two
men led the Liberal party in the post Werld War II period.

Furthest to the right of the parties of the C.N.L.,
the Liberals were anti-clerical but close to the Christian
Democrats on most secular issues. However, this party was,
like the D.C., composed of heterogeneous groups; its follow-
ers ranged from progressive liberals to right-wing conserva-
tives. The P.L.I., consequently, was divided on many crucial

16

issues, and the party ultimately lost much of its more

progressive northern membership. After l9t6 most of its
strength was centered in the South and in Piedmont.
The sixth party of the C.N.L. was a small southern

group, the Democratic Labor party (Partito Democrazia del

u

1 For example, the party was divided on the question
of'the Monarchy. Croce suggested the abdication of both Vic-
tor Emmanuel and Umberto in favor of Umberto's six-year old
son. Other members favored the Republic. gpgg., p. 18.

 

 

.Io

-25-

Léyggg) of Ivanoe Bonomi. When Bonomi was no longer a power
in Italian politics, the party died. It had no policy to
distinguish it from the mass parties, and, like the Action
party, could not compete effectively for votes. The Demo-
cratic Labor party joined with the Liberals in an allied

list in 1946, but received little support.

The two principal parties in 1946 having no connec-
tion with the C.N.L. were the Republican and flpmo Qualunque.
The Partito Repubblicano Italiggg (P.R.I.) is one of the old-
est Italian parties, dating back to Guiseppe Mazzini in the
middle of the nineteenth century. Predominantly a middle
class party, it stresses republicanism and anti-clericalism.
P.R.I. support is strongest in Romagna, Tuscany and the area
raking up the former papal states. Its position has changed
little since l9h6, although it is divided by two factions,
one looking to modernizing the party and the other still ad-
hering to Nazzini. (The party secretary and leader, Randolfo
Pacciardi, spoke in 19h8 of Mazzini's writings as the Bible
of the party.l7) The party gained some followers by the de-
cline of the Action party, but remains as a minor factor
in Italian politics.

The Uomo Qualungue, or Common Man, party came into

existence in l9h5, under the leadership of Guglielmo

___—-

17John Clarke Adams, "Italy," in Walter Galenson, ed.,
Com.arative Labor.Movements (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952),
pp" [*7 'h710

 

 

~26-
Giannini. It has no particular program and existed only to
satisfy those voters with no interest in the anti-Fascist
parties. The party had definite neo-Fascist tendencies, but
these were played down in the election. (There was, of
course, no Fascist or even frankly neo-Fascist party in the
election.) The Uomo Qualungue campaign in essence was a
complaint against parties and politics. It was well financed
and even had its own daily paper, Bonsenso, but it quickly
lost support to the Center and Right after the election.

A final group, the National Liberation Bloc (Blocco
Nazionale della Libertfi) or B.N.L., campaigned almost ex-
clusively on the principle of retaining the monarchy.

All of these parties entered the election of 19A6
with the purpose of electing delegates to the Constituent
Assembly and, thus, place themselves in a position to make
an imprint on the forthcoming constituion. Nonetheless,
the voters were given very little insight into the differ-
ences among the parties. All parties agreed that Fascism
and the concentration of dictatorial power in the hands of
a small group were to be avoided. The anti-Fascist parties
differed on nationalization and methods of implementing
Policy, but were in accord on most other issues.

All wanted administrative decentralisation and regional
autonomy, development of the neglected South, reforms
in banking and taxation, in social assistance, and in
education, and an extension of the co-operative princi-

ple in industry and agriculture. Industrial reforms
were to include an end of monopolies, and the introduction

-27-
of workers' representation on factory councils; in
agriculture, landless peasants were to become small-
22%ngi8on land acquired by breaking up the big es-

Of the parties that were not to the extreme right,
the Republican party was the only one which advocated that
the state take a lesser role in the economic life of the
country. It alone stood for what is called free enterprise
in the United States, i.e., industry, business and agricul-
ture being left alone to work out their own difficulties.
All other parties, as said above, differed only on the pro-
per extent of governmental interference.19

The electorate that was to choose among these parties
was unique in two ways: (1) women were allowed to vote
for the first time,20 (2) 1953 was the first election in
which anything approaching a majority of the populace was
to participate. Previously, the largest percentage of the
adult population eligible to vote in Italy was 29.0% in

1924. From 1870 until 1913, less than 9.5% of the population

 

fl.-

8Grindrod, o . cit., p. 20.

9Mario Einaudi, "Political Change in France and
Italy," gmerican Political Science Review, XL (19h6), 911.

20This presumably was an aid to the Christian Demo-
crats since women were assumed to be more inclined to vote
fbr a Catholic party than were men. For evidence to support
this belief, see, for example, Pierpaolo Luzzatto Fegiz, Il
Volto Sconosciuto dell'Italia (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffre,-—'
5 3 Pp. 4h ’1) 7, 1+ g 5 p 519 and 5200

-23-
was eligible to vote.21 The election of 1953 was also the
first in which voting was mandatory. Actually, there was
considerable debate on whether required voting should be in-
stituted, and the resulting compromise removed most of the
Ilegal penalties for failure to vote. The Center parties
felt that mandatory participation would be to their advantage
since their potential voters were less disciplined and
enthusiastic than those of the Left. The Communists recog-
nized that they could troop their voters to the polls gg
maggg and consequently opposed enforced voting. The com-
promise electoral law made voting mandatory, but the only
sanction was the publication of the names of non-voters.
This was a very real penalty, however, for the identifica-
tion papers of non-voters were stamped when next presented.
Harassing limitations then went into effect; i.e., emigra-
tion became impossible, government jobs could not be ob-
tained, it became difficult to secure licenses, etc. Con-
Sequently, very few eligible voters did not participate.
Election of the Constituent Assembly ~
and Formation of the Government
The election took place on June 2, and the result

in terms of percentage of vote by region is indicated in

__l

21These and all other electoral statistics, unless
Otherwise noted, are from Repubblica Italiana, Istituto .
Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano (Roma.
POligrafico dello Stato, t — 55 , V0 umes AL- #8,
19W. 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953. 1951., 1955.

 

 

 

-29-

Table 4. As can be seen, the D.C. party, with 35.2% of the
popular vote, far outdistanced the 20.7% of the second place
Socialists and 19.0% of the third place Communists. The
total vote of each party and the composition of the Con-
stituent Assembly is indicated in Table 5.

The geographical distribution of the vote indicates
something of the degree of nationwide support each party
received. The D.C. was the only party which had its strength
fairly evenly spread over all four geographic sections. All
others had only one or two areas in which their support was
centered. For example, the two major opposing parties,
the P.S.I.U.P. and the P.C.I. had their greatest backing
in the North and Center and fell off distinctly in the
South. (This is particularly noticeable with the P.C.I.)
Their support obviously was least in the most underdeveloped
sections and greatest in those areas which had made the
biggest strides in the postwar period. (A qualification
should be entered that these are aggregate statistics and
do not show provincial strengths and weaknesses.)

The minor parties showed similar variations in
support. The U.D.N. parties (principally the Liberals)
were confined largely to the South and to the Islands, as
was the Uomo Qualunque. The Republicans were concentrated
in the central area with far lower and fairly even strength
elsewhere. The B.N.L. showed the same type of distribution

with its locus of strength in the South where monarchist

TABLE 4
CONSTITUENT

mLY, JUNE 2, 191.63

I.

A333

ELECTION OF THE

percentage of valid

)

 

es that were valid and

votes received by each party

 

(Percentage voting, percentage of vot

l

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-30-

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Sardegna

TABLE 4-Continued

 

 

 

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ITALIA

 

Annuario Statistico Italiano

ica,

Istituto Poligrafico dell: Stato,

Istituto Centrale di Statist

(Roma

aRepubblica Italiana,
, Serie V, Vol. 1

-~

10 l-.8

-32-
TABLE 5

ELECTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
VOTES RECEIVED AND SEATS woma

M

 

 

Percent
Seats Seats
Party Voce Won Won
Christian Democrat 8,082,A86 207 37.1
Socialist b,765,665 115 20.7
Communist 4,358,2h3 10A 18.7
National Democratic Union 1,560,037 #1 7.A
Uomo Qualunque 1,210,021 30 5.h
Republican 1,003,086 23 4.1
National Freedom Bloc 636,330 16 2.9
Action 33h,877 7 1.3
Other Lists 1,0Ah,935 13 2.3
22,952,890 556 99.9

 

aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica,
Annuario Statistico Italiano, lfigg-QS, Serie V Vol. I
Roma: stituto o igrafico dello Stato, 1949 , pp. 150,
152-153. Percentage of seats won calculated from the above
source.
feelings were strongest. The Action party was equally in-
effective everywhere; this election marked its end as a force
in Italian politics.

The Constituent Assembly met for the first time on
June 25, 19h6, and chose Guiseppe Saragat as its president.
Enrico de Nicola was elected to serve as head of state until
the Constitution could be written and put into effect. De

Nicola then called upon Alcide de Gasperi to form a

-33-

Government. De Gasperi and his Christian Democrats formed

a coalition with the Socialists, Communists and Republicans.
However, internal problems plaguing the Socialists prevented
this Government from remaining intact for more than six
months.

The Socialist party's internal dissension was the
result of a controversy concerning Socialist-Communist re-
lations. The two parties had signed a "Unity of Action"
pact in 1934 in Paris, but the right-wing of the Socialists
(under Saragat) became restive under the close cooperation
after the war. Nevertheless, a new "Unity of Action" pact
was signed on October 25, 19t6. This pact went even further
than the first, and provided for coordination of and joint
decisions on party activities.22 Nenni, the party head,
desired extremely close relations, just short of fusion of
the two parties, and obtained this in the pact. Saragat
felt that while Togliatti and Nenni "were taking part with
fair orthodoxy in democratic politics . . . they both showed
a disquieting reluctance from proclaiming their faith in
the basic principles of democracy."23 The immediate cause
of’Open dispute, however, was the problem of international
relations. Saragat favored cooperation with the United States

with the subsequent influx of money. He was willing to

“h.

22
23

Grindrod, o . cit., p. 48.

Hilton-Young, op. cit., p. 190.

-34-
accept a slower refermation of society to gain this aid.
Nenni was not. Basically, this was a question of choosing
between Moscow and the west. The dispute came to a head in
January, 19h7, when the National Congress of the Socialist
party convened in Rome. After several meetings Saragat left
the Congress to ferm a new organization, the Italian werkers'
Socialist party, (P.S.L.I.), carrying with him a large bloc
of the party.24 Both Saragat and Nenni subsequently left
the Government.

De Gasperi immediately resigned and formed a new
Government composed of several parties, including the Socialists
and the Communists (but without either Nenni or Togliatti).
This widely-based Government then ratified the peace treaty
that officially brought the war to a close. This accomplished,
De Gasperi again resigned (following a general strike in May,
1947) to form a more stable Government without either the
Socialists or Communists. The new Government was composed
principally of Christian Democrats but was joined by the
P.S.L.I. and the Republicans the following December.

Thus Italy had a stable Government but still was
without a legislative body. The Constituent Assembly elected
in 19h6 had only two functions, to frame the Constitution

and to help draft the peace treaty. Since it did not pass

A.

2
thid., pp. 192-193.

-35-

laws, the Ministry was obligated to legislate by decree. (The
"Provisional Head of the State," De Nicola, promulgated these
laws.25) Elections to select members of the first regular

legislature were set for 19h8.

The Italian Constitution

Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly was preparing
the constitution for the new Italian Republic under which
those elections would be held. No party had a majority so
no group was in a position to push through a document which
completely reflected its views. The Constitution finally pro-
duced was, as a result, a mass of compromises that completely
satisfied no group and that left much detail to be filled in
by succeeding governments. Various sub-committees of a
Committee of Seventy-five actually drafted the document which
was submitted to the entire assembly at the end of January,
1947. Almost a year of article-by-article discussion and
changes resulted in final acceptance on December 22, 19h7,

453 to 62; the new Constitution went into effect on January
1, 1958.

While it would be of little value here to make a
point by point analysis of the Constitution and the specific
powers granted to various officers and institutions, a general
description might be useful. Such a description will give

m

25Ibid., p. 187.

-36...

some understanding of the Italian constitutional system, but
more important, it will indicate the positions taken by the
various parties and will point out certain institutional
arrangements and provisions which became campaign material
in 1953.

The document opens with a section on fundamental
principles, including a bill of rights (Articles Z-h) and
a statement that Italy repudiates the use of war as a means
of solving international problems (Article 11). Much of
this section is concerned with social and economic matters,
undoubtedly reflecting views of the leftist parties and the
liberal wing of the D.C. Most articles are non-specific and
depend to a very great extent for their implementation on
the party in power. Examples of this type of provision are

the following:

Article 37 ~- The law establishes the minimum age for
paid labor.

Article 38 -- Every citizen unable to work and deprived
of the means necessary to live has the
right to support and to social assistance.

Article LO -- The right to strike is exercised within
the sphere of the laws which regulate it.

Article 42 -- Private property is recognized and guar-

anteed by law, which determines the methods
of its acquisition and enjoyment and the
limitations designed to assure its social
funtioning and render it accessible to all.

Obviously, anything or nothing can be made of such general

provisions.

-37-

Part Two of the Constitution is concerned with items
more common to such documents, the institutions of the Re-
public. A bicameral legislature was created, but there was
considerable debate regarding its structure and powers. Both
the Christian Democrats and the Communists announced prior
to the election that they would accept a two-house legis-
lature. However, the Communists would agree to two houses
only if both were popularly elected.26 The Christian Demo-
crats favored the representation of major economic categories
(agriculture, industry, trade, professions, etc.) in the
upper house, with popular representation prevailing in the
lower chamber.27 The first compromise resulted in two houses
equal in power with the Chamber of Deputies elected directly
(Article 56) and the Senate composed of life-time members
and members elected on a regional basis (Article 51). These
chambers would exercise the legislative power of theRepublic
and would select the President and approve the Government.
The Christian Democrats worked to grant the President more
power than he received, but they did succeed in including an
article endowing him with the right to dissolve the two cham-
bers or either of them at his discretion (Article 88). Simi-

larly, the power granted to the Premier is less than desired

—_

26Einaudi, 02. cit., pp. 908-909.

2
7Einaudi and Goguel, o . cit., pp. t5-h6.

-38...

by the Christian Democrats, but he is given considerably more
protection against votes of no confidence than was his coun-
terpart in France under the Fourth Republic (Article 9A).
In general, the D.C. party was more inclined to set up a
stronger executive and a more subservient legislature than
were the parties of the Left.

A potentially important part of the Constitution is
Article 117, where the Region is established as a unit of
local government. These Regions were to have their own legis-
lative bodies and the power to handle many local problems.
This particular program was sponsored in the Constituent
Assembly by the Republicans with the lukewarm support of the
Christian Democrats. The Communists, Socialists and Liberals
opposed it but were defeated. However, the program was never
implemented in any general way over the nation despite its
inclusion in the Constitution.28 Much of the power granted
to the Regions is also granted to the central Government by
Articles 124-127.

Another potentially important innovation was the

provision for a Constitutional Court (Articles 13t-139).

28It should be noted that the parties of the Left
have favored the granting of power to the Regions since 1948.
The explanation of this is very simple; these parties have
not been able to achieve control of the national government,
but have received great support in certain Regions, e.g.
Sardegna. The Christian Democrats have strongly opposed
Regional power since the Center parties have controlled the
central government.

-39-
This body was to have the power to declare laws unconstitu-
tional, but, although sponsored by the Christian Democrats,
it was not set up by the time of the 1953 elections.

One point of profound importance to the embryonic
republic was the relationship between the Catholic Church
and the state. On February 11, 1929, Mussolini and the
Church signed the Lateran Treaty or Pact. This treaty, among
other things, accepted the statement of an earlier law (the
Statute of the Kingdom of Sardinia) "by which the Catholic
Apostolic and Roman religion is the sole religion of the
State."29 Other religions were free but lacked the predomi-
nant position of the Catholic faith. The Christian Democrats
fought valiantly for a clause of the new Constitution that
would recognize the Lateran Treaties as effective in post-
Fascist Italy. Faced with unified opposition from the lay
parties, the cause would have been lost except for approval
by the most vehement of anti-church parties, the Communist.
Presumably that party hoped, by this strategem, to win
Catholic vote and to prevent concerted anti-Communist action
by the Church in the 1948 election. Thus, with P.C.I.
assistance, the Christian Democrats were able to push through
this extremely controversial measure. The result was Article
7 of the new Constitution:

-—.

29
"Italy," Encyclopedia Britannica, 1955 ed., Vol.
XII, p. 812.

-40-
The state and the Catholic Church are, each in its
own order, independent and sovereign.
Their relationships are regulated by the Lateran
Pacts. ‘Modifications of the pacts, which have been ac-
cepted by the two parties, do not require the procedure
of constitutional amendment.
This agreement gives certain religious controls to
the Italian Republic. For example, all bishops must take
an oath of loyalty to the state and must be Italian-speaking
subjects. Most aspects of the agreements, however, work to
the advantage of the Church. Among the many provisions are
the following: priests are exempted from military duty;
religious training is permitted in public primary and secondary
schools (with the BishOp approving teachers and texts); acts
against the Pope by writing, speaking or acting will be
treated as violations of law, as if directed at the head of
the state; non-political organizations of the Church may
operate freely.
This last point is of particular importance because
it permits the functioning of the Catholic Action (this

organization will be discussed below). Under the Lateran

Pacts no Catholic priest may belong to any political party,

 

30

Article 8:

All religious confessions are equally free before
the law.

Religious confessions other than the Catholic have
the right to organize according to their own statutes, in so
far as they do not conflict with the Italian juridical order.

Their relationships with the state are regulated by
law on the basis of agreements with the apprOpriate repre-
sentatives.

The rights of other religions are protected by

-41-

nor may he actively work for such a group. Catholic Action
(under Luigi Gedda's leadership in the period studied) avoided
this prohibition by remaining formally non-political and

apart from the Christian Democrats. While the D.C. party is
endorsed by the Church, it is not officially a church organi-

zation.

The 1948 Electoral Campaign

With the problem of developing a Constitution out of
the way, the parties turned to the rapidly approaching elec-
tion of April 18, 19h8. This was to be the first regular
election of the Italian Republic, and the party (or parties)
gaining control would be in an excellent position to deter-
mine much of the future development of the nation. In ad~
dition, the election took on tremendous international over-
tones as the struggle between the Soviet Union and the
western countries increased in intensity. This combination
of circumstances made the l9t8 election a item of world-wide
interest and caused extraordinary pressures to be put on the
Italian people to vote in the "proper" way.

The electoral law under which this election was
held was drawn up by a Consultative Assembly which served
as an interim parliament. (This body was composed of 429
members nominated by the Government from lists prepared by

the various political parties.3l) The law, passed March 10,

A

*—

31Grindrod, op. cit., p. 22.

 

‘ I

 

Cl!

5"

-42-
l9d$ provided for thirty-one electoral colleges or districts
in which elections would be by proportional representation
and party lists.

The parties and lists contending fer the 273 Senate
and 57h Chamber seats numbered seven: The 0.0.; a popular
front list of the P.C.I. and the P.S.I. called the Egggpg
Democratico Populare pgr la Liberta, la Pace, i1 Lavoro
(F.D.P.); a list composed of the P.S.L.I. and other dissidents
who left the P.S.I. when the F.D.P. was formed, designated
the Unita Socialists (11.3.); the Blocco Nazionale (the prin-
cipal party of which was the P.L.I.); a list composed of the
anarchists (Partito Nagionale Monarghico or P.N.M.) and the
Democratic Alliance (Alleanza Democratgca Nazionale del Lavoro
or A.D.N.L.); the Republicans (P.R.I.); and a new group of
nee-Fascists, the Movimento Socials Italiagg (M.S.I.). Of
these parties and lists, the D.C., Unite Socialist , B19239

Nazionale and the P.R.I. represented the Center and presented

 

something of a united front against the Left (F.D.P.) and
the Right (P.N.M., A.D.N.L. and M58.I.). The Action party
had completely disintegrated and the Uomo Qualungue, while
participating in the election, had lost most of its supporters
(neo-Fascists to the M;S.I., right-wing liberals to the
P.L.I. and moderates to the other Center parties).

The election of 1948 was fought almost exclusively
(nlinternational issues, with only the most limited attention

paid to admittedly serious domestic problems. The parties,

-43-
in general, limited their pledges on internal matters to the
same programs put forth in 1946. Again the only real dis-
tinction among the major parties concerned methods and extent
of governmental activity (i.e., nationalization). The Mon-
archists, of course, put great emphasis 0p the return of the
King and (what was to them) the inconclusiveness of the 1946
referendum.

The international fUture of Italy was, nevertheless,
the only real campaign issue. The West greatly feared that
the large vote polled by the Communists in the election of
1946 (4,358,243 votes) could presage a leftist swing that
would put Italy in the camp of the Soviet Union. The P.S.I.U.P.
(4,765,655 votes) and the P.C.I. together totaled over one
million more votes than the D.C. in 1946. The joining of
these parties in the F.D.P. (even with the Unite Socialispa
dividing the socialist vote) raised the spectre of a defeat
for the Center.

Realizing the potentialities of the situation, the
Soviet Union attempted to woo the Italian vote by announcing
in February the renewal of its efforts to secure for Italy
the trusteeship over the colonies lost by Italy after the
war. The P.C.I. played up this pro-Italian attitude of the
U.S.S.R. while at the same time emphasizing the growing
strength of the Soviet Union. There was considerable fear

in Italy and in the West that a win for the P.C.I. would

 

-44-

mean a repeat of the pppp in Czechoslovakia.32 Even a narrow
victory for the Center would cause concern since the P.C.I.
openly threatened civil war if not accorded recognition in
terms of cabinet posts. It was reported that Luigi Longo,
Deputy Security General of the P.C.I., controlled a secret
militia, the Garibaldi Brigades, of over 75,000 men, all

well armed and ready for action.33

We are following a line of democratic action, but

we shall not allow ourselves to be caught unawares

by any provocation or by any reactionary plan. We
have behind us the eXperience of the partisan war.
Tens of thousands of youths and men who have had this
experience have learnt to defend the liberty: and
independence of the Fatherland by force of arms and,
if a situation were to arise, as often happens in the

“AA-A __.

32The situation in Italy was sufficiently similar to
that in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, to cause very ser-
ious concern. The May 26, 1946, election in Czechoslovakia
showed that the Communist Party was the largest single party
although it still re resented a minority (2.7 million votes
out of seven million . A Communist headed a coalition
government which included a communist Minister of the In-
terior. This Minister, in early 1948, replaced all non-
communist police with party members; in protest, eleven
non-communist ministers resigned on February 20, 1948. Com-
munist police reserves and regular party members were mobil-
ized and took control of the country. On February 25, a new
government was formed with only Communist Party representa-
tion. This coup followed the trend in most of Eastern EurOpe
--the Communist party went from minority participation to
coalition government with Communist leadership to domination.
In Italy it appeared that a F.D.P. victory would be only a
step away from Communist control; even a narrow Center vic-
tory might force inclusion of Communists in crucial minis-
teries. The danger was brought home to Italians since the
cou occurred only slightly over one month prior to the
e ection.

33Patch, op. cit., p. 216.

-45-

course of democratic revolutions, in which freedom
had to be defended or reconquered by force of arms,

they would not fail to do their duty once again towards
democracy and towards their Fatherland.3h

The use of the general strike for political reasons in the

period between 1946 and 1948 further led moderate forces to

expect the worst unless the F.D.P. were soundly beaten.

In an apparent effort to prepare for violent action

by the Communist revolutionaries, the United States sent
reinforcements of marines to the Mediterranean area in early

January-~a move protested in vain by the left wing. While

the United States insisted that this deployment of armed
ferces had nothing to with the Italian (or Greek) situation,
observers felt that the move was clearly politcally motivated.
The Italian Government (in February) announced plans to in-
crease the police force by an additional 20,000 members and
also issued a decree outlawing all private military group-5.35
The following month the Government stated that 30,000 men

had been added to the public security forces.36 By these

unans Italy attempted to eliminate, as far as possible, the

threat of civil war.

Spurred by the attempted bribery by the Soviet Union
and the more or less outright threats of the P.C.I., the

u

3hAs quoted in Hilton-Young, op. pip., p. 198.

35New York Timeg, February 5, 1948, 4:4; February 6,
1948, 17:1.

36New York Times, March 17, 1948, 3:6.

 

cub

-46-
western powers and moderate forces within Italy conducted

an all-out battle to defeat the Left. The most immediate

effort by the West was an announcement on March 20, concern-
ing Trieste:

The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom
and France have . . . decided to recommend the return
of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italian sovereignty
as the best solution to meet the democratic aspirations

of the people and make possible the reestablishment of
peace and stability in the area.37

The maintaining of Trieste as a free territory had been in-
cluded in the peace treaty, but the United States, France

and Britain now proposed restoring Italian control over the
entire area. The "immediate effect was to enhance the

prestige of the Government parties as the upholders of the

western alignment for which they stood. The Communists, on

the other hand, were by this time identified with the Soviet
line of strict adherence to the letter ofthe peace treaty."38
Special editions of the newspapers were issued hailing the
decision and the principle of treaty revision; the announce-
ment was received with rejoicing throughout Italy.

Even in the most secure strongholds of leftist
strength it was noticeable that the F.D.P. had lost support.
An indication of this occurred in.Milan where ten truckloads

0f young Communists assembled and began demonstrating against

m

37New York Times, March 21, 1948, 1:6-7.

38Grindrod, op. cit., p. 56.

~.~

-g7-

the West. They were received with such hostility that they

were forced to retreat to their trucks in order to escape

the violent reaction. This was the first such occurance in

northern Italy since the war. Pro—Western demonstrations

abounded in such Communist dominated areas as Florence,
Milan, Naples, Gorizia, Monfalcone and Trieste itself.39

A more concrete effort made by the United States in

the struggle was the continued influx of economic aid under

the Marshall Plan. One writer, at least, felt that the

Marshall Plan aid was critical to Christian Democratic hopes
and said, "Without the Plan there would have been no alter-
native to the setting up of a dictatorship to carry the

country through a period of economic readjustment and of

even lower standards of living. The only party in a position

to do that would have been the Communist Party."‘*0 The ex-
tent and great value of this aid was emphasized by the Center

parties throughout the election.

The United States, however, was not content to sit

back and hope for the unsolicited gratitude of the Italian

voters. On March 15, the State Department let it be known

that there would be no future aid to Italy if a Communist-

dominated government were returned. Despite definite statements

____

9New York Times, March 21, 1948, 3:1; March 22, 1948,
1:8; March 23,—1948, 3:1.

Einaudi and Goguel, op. cip., p. 53.

-48-
to this effect on several occasions, gplpé and Ayppp; (the
P.C.I. and P.S.I. newspapers) erroneously quoted officials
of the United States (and representatives of United States
labor unions) as saying that aid would continue regardless
of the outcome of the election.’+1 To counteract these false-
hoods and to make the position of the United States clear,
Secretary of State Marshall, on March 19, reiterated the
fact that all aid would cease, and further remarked:

Since the association is entirely voluntary, the people
of any nation have the right to change their mind and,
in effect, withdraw. If they choose to vote into power
a Government in which the dominant political force would
be a party whose hostility to this program has been fre-
quently, publicly and emphatically proclaimed, this
could only be considered as evidence of the desire of
that country to dissociate itself from the program. This
Government would have to conclude that Italy had re-
moved it 31f from the benefits of the European Recovery
Program.

Ignoring the evident clarity of Marshall's statement, the
F.D.P. attempted to mitigate its effectiveness by first
stigmatizing it as blackmail (which it was) and then by
stating that the American peeple would, in any case, rise

up and prevent such action.‘’3

hlflgngork Times, March 18, 1948, 9:1. The F.D.P.
attempted to get support from the British Labour party and from
the 0.1.0. and A.F. of L. of the United States. The Labour
Party explicitly repudiated the F.D.P.; James B. Carey, Sec-
retary-Treasurer of the 0.1.0., and William Green, President
of the A.F. of L., announced that their organizations felt
that aid should cease if the F.D.P. achieved power. New York
Times, March 27, 1948, 3:8; March 31, 1948, 11:1.

1P2As. quoted in New York Times, March 20, 1948, 4:5.
43

 

New_York Times, March 21, 1948, 4:5.

 

-49- .

Other attempts by the United States to intervene in
the election were just as obvious and probably as effective
in convincing the Italian voters that their own best future
lay in an Italy tied securely to the west. On March 16,
President Truman transferred twenty—nine merchant ships to
Italian ownership; feurteen of these had been seized during
the war and fifteen were Liberty ships to replace merchantmen
that had been lost or were worn out. Also in March, it was
announced that the United States was about to pay $4,300,000
owed to Italian prisoners-of—war for labor done in the United
States, and that this was just the first installment on the
total to be paid. Italy was to have met these claims under
the peace treaty. To put pressure on in another way in
emigration-conscious Italy, the Justice Department reminded
Italians that persons joining the Communist party could
never enter the United States. In the same month, a letter-
writing campaign was inaugrated under which persons having
relatives and friends in Italy were urged to write and exhort
them to help defeat the Communists. Within a few days air
mail to Italy doubled in volume. The Voice of America was
active (three broadcasts per day) with dire warnings of the
doleful fate in store fer countries that turn Communist,
stressing the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia as an example to

be heeded.hh

hhThese events reported in New York Times, March 17,
1948, 3:4-5, March 23, 1948, 2:2; April 3, 1943. 531.

-50-

Another activity by the Western powers (primarily the
United States) was an indication that they would support the
granting of United Nations trusteeship over the ex-colonies
to Italy (as suggested by the Soviet Union). Britain and
then France and the United States demanded Italy's admission
to the United Nations, thus gaining much pro-Western support
in Italian newspapers.“5 When the efforts of the Catholic
Church to fight communism were handicapped by lack of funds,
appeals were made to the Western nations; private citizens
and church organizations poured money into the coffers to
continue the battle.A6 Thus, the Governments and citizens
of the Western powers saw fit to attempt in every way possi-
ble to influence the Italian voters. This undoubtedly was
the most external interference in a democratic election that
has occurred in any country.

While these external pressures and inducements were
of great impact in the final accounting, the influence of
the Catholic Church was probably just as decisive. The Church
was not particularly prominent in the election of 1946, but
the increased pressures brought by the threat of a leftist
victory made a more active role mandatory in 1948. The

thought of the Vatican City surrounded by a Communist Italy

 

“SNew York Times, March 23, 1948, 6:1-2; March 24,
1948, 12:4.

4 3 héNew York Times, March 22: 1948» “:13 April 12’ 1948'
2 ’Lo

-51-
was sufficient to convince the Pope that a victory for the
Center, more specifically the Christian Democrats, was
crucial. The importance of this decision can easily be de-
monstrated by the fact that 98% of all Italians are at least
nominally Catholic and, presumably, somewhat under the in-
fluence of the Church. While it certainly was true that
extensive portions of the population were strongly anti-
clerical and would resent interference by the Church in lay
matters, the Vatican hoped that any losses incurred would
be far outweighed by gains from the faithful. The position
of the Church might be determinate for doubtful voters who
were Catholic.

While it is hard to pinpoint the beginning of the
campaign by the Church, it can be said that pronouncements
by Pope Pius XII in January and February, 1948, set the stage
and instructed the clergy in its proper role. The clergy
began advising the Italian voters to be sure to vote (this
in line with the belief that a higher vote aided the Center)
and to vote only for those who could be trusted to guarantee
religious freedom and interests. As the Pope said in March,
"Everybody must vote according to the dictates of his con-
science. Now it is evident that the voice of one's conscience
urges every sincere Catholic to give his vote to those
candidates or electoral lists that offer truly sufficient
guarantees" of religious freedom.47 These general instructions

g 47

‘—

As quoted in New York Times, March 11, 1948, 10:4.

-52-
from the Church went on to indicate in a definite manner
that the Popular Democratic Front could not be trusted to
give such guarantees. This political position was handed
down from pulpits in every Catholic Church in Italy, and
was buttressed by threats of excommunication of those join-
ing the Left. As an example of the more militant activities
of the clergy, the Archbishop of Milan issued a pastoral
letter instructing the priests of his diocese to refuse
absolution to "Communists or members of other movements con-

trary to the Catholic religion."£*8

This was followed by
other Archbishops in various parts of Italy. 7

This type of action was only a part of the struggle
of the Church against the F.D.P. A more direct attack was
made by the "non~political" Catholic Action. According to
the Vatican, this organization had a membership of 4,500,000;
it definitely was a potent force for the Christian Democrats.’+9
The Catholic Action went into the election with tremendous
vigor and built up a vast electoral machine for mobilizing
the anti-Communist vote. It worked assiduously, saying that
"all must be reminded and persuaded that every abstention

50

is a desertion." Pressure was concentrated on women on

the theory that they were more attached to their religion

“—_

48New York Times, February 24,11948, 3:2.
thew York Times, February 13, 1948, 10:2.

7 50.15 quoted in New York Timgs, February 23, 1948,
:2.

-53-
than were the men. To accomplish all this, the Catholic
Action set up a new organization, the National Civic Committee;
this body subsequently put committees hialmost every city,
town, village and hamlet in the country. These groups (each
including a priest), operating in an effort to counteract
the Communist cells, attempted to canvass all streets and
all voters. 0f Italy's 27,000 parishes, 24,000 had com-
mittees of this type.

Considering the potency of the appeal and the size
of the organization, the Communist reaction to the anti-
F.D.P. propaganda was extremely mild. This presumably was
the result of a fear of further alienating potential voters
who were Catholic. Anti-clerical comments became more
vitriolic as the election date approached and the effective-
ness of the Church attack became more apparent. (All through
the election, however, the F.D.P. did attempt to exploit ‘
the traditional anti-clericalism of parts of the Italian
population, particularly labor.) The Vatican defense against
charges that it violated the Constitution and the Lateran
Treaties was that "this is not political activity, since
it is limited to defense of its own religious interests,
which are recognized by the Italian State itself, and that
by doing so it does not violate the concordat with Italy

which bars political activity by the clergy."51 In addition,

—-

._v

a

51Mew_¥9rk Times, February 13, l9h8, 10:2.

 

nu.

-54-
the Catholic Action, the civic committees and the clergy were
instructed to stick to religious issues and stay clear of
social and political problems. This undoubtedly was a
distinction without a difference except for the legal position
of the Church.

A further indication of the importance that the Vatican
attached to the election was the following instruction to
all clergy: "All those who have the right to vote-~of any
rank, age or sex-~without exception and therefore even if
they have embraced a particular religious mode of living,
are strictly and deeply duty-bound to make use of that right."52
This admonition specifically included nuns, including those
living a completely secluded life; it assured approximately
125,000 votes for the Christian Democrats from the Catholic
Church alone.

Thus, the Christian Democrats and their allies went
into the election with very potent backing from within and
without the country. Their entire campaign was fought on
the principle that aid from the United States was absolutely
essential and that a tie with the West was mandatory if Italy
was to avoid the fate of Czechoslovakia. Internally they
pledged agrarian reforms and accepted the premise that labor

was to share in the management of industrial and agricultural

*—

Szflgw York Times, February 25, 1948, 10:2.

n n

 

he

 

-

~55- '
enterprises.53 The slogan "Every vote for Togliatti is a
vote for Stalin," was the hallmark of this campaign.

The F.D.P. countered by attacking the opposition and
criticizing the external interference (while ignoring the aid
that the P.C.I. received from the Soviet Union). As the
campaign progressed, the fears of a Communist coup d'état
and the realization of the need for fereign aid caused con-
siderable defection from the Left. To allay the fear of
communism, the F.D.P. played down the hammer and sickle;
pictures of Garibaldi appeared on posters in place of Stalin.54
(This, of course, was in an effort to minimize the connection
between the P.C.I. and the U.S.S.R.) Probably the most
effective prOpaganda device used by the Communists, however,
was aimed at the peasants of’the South. P.C.I. members went
into the country with maps of the local areas, pointing out
to each peasant the specific plot of land he would receive
if the F.D.P. were successful. The more general F.D.P.
campaign was characterized by a slogan answering that of the
Christian Democrats, "Every vote for De Gasperi is a vote
fer Truman." Thus, as said before, the campaign was fought
largely without specific internal issues, and, as one observer
said, "no party is bothering much to outline a political pro-

gram to the voters. Instead, most of the time, money and

M

53New York Times, March 11., 191.8, Iv, 3:5.
Sgflewilork Timgg, April 12, 1948, #:6.

-56-

paper is being employed to vilify opponents."55

The General Election of 1948

The election was held on Sunday, April 18. The
Catholic Church again cooperated in getting out the vote by
granting a special dispensation to hold mass an hour early;
at the same time it reminded the voters that "God sees you
even in the voting booth." The resulting vote was everything
the Church and Christian Democrats could have reasonably
desired or hoped for, a smashing victory with an absolute
majority in seats.

As Table 7 shows, the get-out-the-vote campaign
resulted in over a 92% turnout. Almost 50% of the votes
were for the D.C.-~62% for the Christian Democrats, P.S.L.I.,
Liberals and Republicans in combination. It is interesting
to note that the D.C. again received almost the same per-
centage of vote in each of the four regions while the F.D.P.
fell off considerably in the two southern areas. The popular
vote was even more indicative of the tremendous victory of
the Christian Democrats; the vote of the F.D.P. parties
fell off from a 1946 total of 9,124,008 to 8,137,047 in 1948,
while the D.C. vote of 12,712,562 represented an increase
of 4,530,076 (See Table 7). The distribution of seats

in the election are shown in Table 6:

55New York Times, April 12, 1948, 4:5.

-57-
TABLE 6

GENERAL ELECTION OF APRIL 18, 1948
VOTES RECEIVED AND SEATS woNa

 

 

 

 

Percent
Seats
Party Votes Seats won
D.C. 12,708,263 305 53.1
F.D.P. 8,137,468 183 31.9
U.S. 1,856,287 > 33 5.8
B.N. 1,004,032 19 3.3
P.M.-A.D.N.L. 728,981 14 2.4
P.R.I. 651,394 9 1.5
M.S.I. 527,039 6 1.0
Others 599.357 5 1.0
26,212,821 574 100.0

aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica,
Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1944-48, Serie V, Vol. I

(fioma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949), pp. 156,

7 158-159. Percentage of seats won calculated from the above
source.

Thus, out of 57A seats, the Christian Democratic Party, by

itself, had seventeen more than an absolute majority-~with

its allies it had 366, or a majority of 78. This, of course,

was almost unprecedented in continental European legislatures.

The Senate was elected at the same time for a six-year term.

The D.C. party achieved a majority there also, 11,9 of

344 elected seats. 'However, 107 Senators "by right"

TABLE 7
HAL ELECTION OF APRIL 18, 1948a

GENE

(Percentage voting, percentage of votes that were valid and percentage of valid
votes received by each party)

 

 

Jeane

'I'S'N

'T'N'G’V
‘°H'N'd

'd'G'd

OS.“

’O'G

sedoA
FIIPA

Sutqu

egion

R

 

~58-

HONu—imr-IM
éHOl—lr-‘IHO

COO 0NM©3P~
O O Q 0 O O
C'r-J. OHHOO

('~[\ 0\O\OO\N
O O
CO 90000

OMOOC'DHN

N MO\-<;NO\r-4
ram NNmm

.jC\ 0100 mt:

O O O O O
OO OOHN-g

{\HJNMH‘CO
o o o o o c o

C‘Jr—{r-IHNHC

‘J\u\c\r-4[\‘OOO
O O O O O O
P‘IC\(\O«‘LO\C\
H Hr-i

Friuli-Venezia Giulia

Liguria
Emilia-Romagna

Trentino-Alto Adige

Lombardia
Veneto

Piemonte

050m
0 o
HOOr—i

Hims‘r
r—INHJ

l—rmmN
O O 0 O
OOON

HHNM

CON-«f5
«*JMN

(\r-IO d
O O
mxo O\\O

Omnoo

O O O O
O\\0\Or—1
mom-3W

(“.02 O\\O

o o o o
555%
0000

H-‘I’NO

mom-$0
O\O\C\OO

Toscana
Umbria
Narche
Lazio

mmmmq
o o c o o
HNHOH

Nomad-S?
o
NMNNW

FWKTJW
NNmmr-i
0—1

““0300“
o c o o o
mcoomfh
NHNNN

#HCOO 0’)

mHOHm

+O\C\2’COr-:

b¢\ru\a:
we

Abruzzi e Molise

Campania

Puglia
Basilicata

Calabria

(3\(\
o
(‘rm

O\l\

010

core

Sicilia
Sardegna

 

 

oowpmflumum owbmncca

. \JOH .ommum oaaoe eowmmanHom endpapmH
mowomapmpm we oamnpcmo oompaomH .mcmwampH moHans 0mm

 

"esomv H .Ho> .meuae a «oceaampH

 

 

 

m.N Oom mom Ooam m.N mom Hob momd Comm Hom® <HA<BH
3 mm 2 Ram ate one a; was 88 see @2242
moa m.m $.o h.mm boa m.w mom N.Om m.m© Hoom mBDOm
H.H dom O.H d.mm mom B.H New m.¢d moh© Como mmezm
@.N 0.0 m.o homm ©.H m.H H.0H m.®d N.w® o.m® memoz
nu ma even an .a (Me n“ no man NW
A.» o o o o o o o o O Q 0
U; ab UN nu Md N. S 0 1.7L 3.
8 o o c o o o o o ILL. .1.
J T. "Mm“ .d .l u D. u

o o o o 0 OJ Qd

mi. :owmom

 

 

 

 

 

 

UmSCflmeOtsh mqm<9

 

-60..

prevented an absolute majority.56

Although this victory certainly must be recognized
as a sweeping approbation of the Christian Democrats, the
defeat of the Left was not as decisive as the figures above
would indicate. The loss of votes by the F.D.P. referred
to represents the P.C.I. and P.S.I. vote alone; when the
UhitérSocialista vote is added in, to make the figure truly
comparable, the total is 9,993.33h, or a rise of 869,326.
While this increase does not approach that of the Christian
Democrats, it does indicate that the combined Socialist—
Communist vote of Italy really had gone up by a comparatively
slight amount.

Applying the same reasoning to the percentage of
vote achieved, it can be seen that the Unita Socialista
and F.D.P. vote represented 38.1% of the national total.
against a figure of 39.7% for the P.S.I.U.P. and P.C.I.
in 1946. This represented a total loss of only 1.6%, thus
revealing that the 13.3% rise of the Christian Democrats
was not at the expense of the Socialists and Communists.

This is further shown by Table 8.

—_

56Senators "by-right" were not elected; they "quali-
fied by virtue of past services to the State, and included
Post-war ex-Premiers and ex-Presidents of the Chamber, and
Deputies who had been imprisoned for more than five years
under Fascism . . ." Grindrod, op. cit., p. 56. 0f the
107 such Senators, 45 were of the aft and 5 of the Right.
Only 18 were Christian Democrats.

 

-51-
TABLE 8

COMPARISON OF 1946 AND 1948 ELECTORAL FIGURES
THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND THE LEFTa

 

 

P.C.I.+ U.S.+
Area D.C. P.S.I.U.P. D.C. F.D.P.
North 37.3 50.9 49.3 (+12.0) 43.8 (~7.l)
Center 29.9 42.4 44.5 (+14.6) 43.6 (+1.2)
South 35.0 20.9 50.3 (+15.2) 27.2 (+6.3)
Islands 35.2 20.4 48.6 (+15.2) 25.4 (+5.0)
Italy 35.2 _ 39.7 48.5 (+13.3) 38.1 (-l.6)

 

aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica,

Annuario Statistico Italiano l -'8, Serie V, Vol. 1 (Roma:
Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1649), pp. 152-153, 158-

159.

The combined Socialist-Communist vote declined in
only one area and rose significantly where it previously
was lowest, the underdeveloped South and Islands. (The
1.6% national drop may well have represented losses from
the right wing of the Saragat Unite Socialists to the D.C.)
Since the Unite Socialista joined the Christian Democrats
in a coalition in the Government, the anti-Government forces
'actually did decrease as much as Table 7 indicates; however,
the number of Italians who voted Left certainly had not

been materially decreased by the extreme Church-western

power pressure of 1948.

-62-

Obviously, if the Christian Democrat increase did
not come from the major leftist parties, it had to come from
the minor parties of the Center and Right. A comparison of
the 1946 and 1948 electoral results shows that almost with-
out exception the small parties had lost support. The
Republican and Liberal vote was out almost in half in each
of the geographical subdivisions. These parties suffered
even more disastrously in terms of seats-~the Liberals
dropping from 41 to 19 and the Republicans from 23 to 9.

The Monarchist list was the only group to avoid this catas-
trophe. It fell off 50% or more in the North and Center

and only held its own in the South. However, the Monarchists
maintained their national total of 2.8% by doubling their
percentage in the Islands. Nonetheless, the list lost two
seats.

The only other party of note in the 1948 election
was the M.S.I., the nee-Fascist party that developed as
the Uomo Qualungue declined. Prior to the election this
party was not expected to develop much strength, but its
showing in all areas but the North made it a force to be
considered in the future. After an underground Fascist
military organization, the "Fascist Revolutionary Action,"
had been uncovered in the summer of 1947, a law was passed
which banned political parties showing sympathy with
Fascism. Nonetheless, the M.S.I. was a frankly Fascist

movement; its meetings were marked by the Fascist clenched

__ M—d'w —. a»..- .-._~. M“.

-63..

fist salute and by cheering at the mention of'Mussolini's
nams.57 Aside from reactionary support, however, this
movement probably won a considerable number of votes from
non-Fascists by its violent denunciations of communism. Com-
munism was to be stamped out by "fire and sword" rather
than by the moderate parliamentary practices of the Chris-
tian Democrats.” The growth of this party from nothing
to 527,039 votes caused considerable concern in the next
few years, particularly because of its strength among the
youth of the country'.59

Turning again to the D.C., it was clear that the
party had won a great victory. The size of the majority
granted the Christian Democrats was largely the result of
very unusual circumstances--the struggle of the west versus
the East, or, as it was pictured, that of good against evil.
The result was the fermation of extremely heterogeneous
backing for the Christian Democrats with equally diverse
elements making up the party representation. This party

was actually much nearer to those of the United States than

_

57Tony, Gibson, "Italy Since the War," The Ye rbook
of World Affairs 1 0 (London: Stevens & Sons Limited,

5 p p. 5.

58v1ttorio Ivella, "New Italy Faces Old Problems:
Party Rule in the Democratic State," Forei Affairs XXVIII

9Riccardo Bauer, "The Drama of Italian Ybuth "

Nineteenth Century and Atter, CXLVI (July-December, 1349),

 

 

-64-

to those of England, France and Italy: it represented almost
every point of the political spectrum from left to right.
This was the natural result of the identification of the
D.C. as the only proper party for a Catholic or pro-western
voter to support.

The party was divided into feur wings, each of
which had its own ideas of the proper policies to be put
into effect. The center group was led by Attilio Piccioni,
Mario Scelba and the party leader, De Gasperi. This was
the largest faction, and it controlled the actions and
policies of the D.C. party. To the right was an amorphous
group including large landowners, industrialists and some
monarchists. This group was not monolithic and itself was
divided between those who looked fondly backward to the
monarchist or Fascist days (mostly inthe South, including
landholders who opposed the social program) and those merely
concerned with individualism and the spread of government
in the economic sphere. This was the conservative wing
that saw the D.C. party as a bulwark against communism.6O
0n the left there were two factions, one more pro-clerical
than the other. Giovanni Gronchi, one of the founders of
the D.C. party, was the leader of the less clerically in-
clined group. He was very interested in swinging the

Christian Democrats to the left and into closer contact with

60Einaudi and Goguel, o . cit., p. 68.

 

-65..

the Socialists. Gronchi stressed the revolutionary social
and economic role of the party and the need of economic
democracy. This wing exhibited only lukewarm interest in
the Atlantic Pact, but was clearly not anti-Western.61

The fourth group was known as the academic left,
and was headed by such men as Giuseppe Dossetti, Amintore
Fanfani and Georgia La Pira. This group was pro-Church and
would have preferred seeing the economic and political life
of the country controlled by the state in a manner approach-
ing the corporate state ofmussolini.62

Despite the obvious problems that this factionalism
brought when the party achieved power, such diversity of
internal policies undoubtedly explained in part the fairly
equal vote received by the Christian Democrats over the
country. Referring again to Table A, it can be seen that
in three of the four geographical regions the party vote
was evenly balanced. The party splintering may have helped
because anyone could find a compatible group within the
Christian Democrats. A person with_anti-clerical feelings
that normally would force him into a lay party was faced
with the East-west dichotomy, the danger of a dispersed
vote among anti-Communist parties. He could vote D.C. with

the hope that the anti-clerical wings might win out. A

—_‘

61Ibid., p. 70.

621bid.

 

 

-66..

leftist-thinking laborer of the North whose normal inclina-
tion would be to vote Socialist could hear Gronchi praising
the Socialists and socialism and criticizing the bourgeoisie
(as he did at the first party congress in 194663) and feel
that a vote fer the Christian Democrats would not be betray-
ing his principles. At the same time, an owner of large
estates in the South could find a wing of the party that
espoused views that favored retaining old property rights;
he could then vote Christian Democrat himself rather than
fer a party of the Right.

Thus, each of the elements of society could find a
"party" to support within the D.C. party. As the Democrats
and Republicans of the United States appeal to all elements
by having factions and regional differences (and by having
innocuous platforms), the Christian Democrats appealed to
all Italian voters. After the election, however, the
Christian Democrats were faced with the same problem which
besets parties of the United States-~how to get such diverse
elements to work together? The D.C. had been given a strong
mandate to rule for five years; that it was able to do so
without splitting was due almost entirely to its leader,

De Gasperi .

m

63Ibido, pp. 31'320

-57-

Formation of the Government

While De Gasperi could have set up a government
composed solely of members of his own party, he preferred
a coalition with representation accorded to the minor parties
of the Center. His cabinet thus contained eleven members
of the Christian Democrats, three from the P.S.L.I. (includ-
ing Saragat), two Republicans (with the party head, Pacciardi
as Defense Minister and Carlo Sforza as Minister of Foreign
Affairs), two Liberals and two independents. By this action
De Gasperi greatly increased his majority in the Chamber
while at the same time securing non-Catholic support for
the Government. This idea of avoiding a revival of the
Church-versus-secular parties was one of the key points of
De Gasperi's hope to develop true democracy in Italy. He
felt that the D.C. should keep away from concrete, fbrmal
ties with the Church while retaining its support. At the
same time, it was of fundamental importance to keep relation-
ships with the secular parties on a friendly and cooperating
basis.6’+ He was not able to keep this coalition in opera-
tion for the next five years, however, for the Liberal Party
left the Government in January, 1950. and the Saragat
Socialists pulled out in April, 1951. These two parties,
however, continued to support the Government in the legis-

latm‘e o

M

6“Gavindrod, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

-68-

The first Government after the election went into
office at the end of May, l9h8. Almost immediately it was
faced with a situation that easily could have resulted in
the civil war or coup d'état feared prior to the voting.
The occasion for the violent outbreak was the attempted
assasination of Pietro Togliatti in July. A general strike
went into effect within twenty-four hours all over Italy;
workers, particularly in the North, took over factories,
attacked police stations and communication centers and
smashed the party offices of the Right and Center parties.
Fortunately, the police and security forces were prepared
fer such an outbreak, and in the face of determined opposition,
the General Confederation of Labor called off the strike.“
This was the end of the most violent effort of the Communists
to take over the country.

With this threat disposed of, the new Government
was immediately in a position to put into effect its con-
ceptions of the proper policy for Italy. At least, this
would have appeared to be the case. Unfbrtunately, the
Christian Democrats came face to face with a fact that
has hindered legislative action in many countries-~a party
with a minimal majority will find its factions making con-
cessions to each other to present a solid front, while a

party with no effective competition may find unity almost

A

65Gibson, op. cit., pp. 168-169.

~69-
impossible to achieve. The Christian Democratic majority
put it in the latter hategory. The party found itself
divided on many serious issues, and something of the immo-
bilisme that plagued the legislature of France resulted
(although never to the same extent).

One of the principal devisive factors that appeared
almost immediately was De Gasperi's policy of cooperation
with the lay parties. The right and left wings of the
party refused to agree. These factions preferred a Govern-
ment composed entirely of Christian Democrats, or, at least,
Christian Democratic domination of all major ministries.

On this issue, De Gasperi won out, of course, but the re-
lationship between the D.C. party and the other Center

parties was not aided by this internal division. In addition,
these parties at times seemed to be unwilling partners in

the coalition, and the two that finally withdrew did so
principally because they felt that little was being gained

and perhaps much lost (particularly by the P.S.L.I.) by
participating in the Government.

Regardless of the internal divisions within his
own party and the frequently unenthusiastic support of the
Center allies, De Gasperi was faced with the job of actually
creating the substance of the new Italian Republic. Un-
employment was very serious; housing was inadequate; the
land reform pledged in the election was unimplemented; the

Constitution was only the bare bones of government. Added

-70-
to these and many other problems was the active opposition
of the P.C.I. in the legislature; this took the form or
obstruction by parliamentary means where possible and violence
when not. In the light of all this, the advances of the De
Gasperi program for Italy were amazing; but voters are not
inclined to weigh advances against difficulties-~results
are all that count.

In the field of foreign relations, the Government
immediately began solidifying Italy's position as a Western
ally. (marshall Plan aid continued to flow into the economy -
of the country, and, in 1949, despite the vehement protests
of the P.C.I., Italy entered N.A.T.O. A customs union pact
with France ultimately was to provide free access to the
French labor market for Italian workers. The Council of
Europe was set up in 19h9 with Italian membership, as was
the Coal and Steel Community in 1951. While the Government
was not able to secure Unitethations membership for Italy,
it did succeed in obtaining trusteeship over Somaliland‘
for a ten-year period--thus recapturing some Italian prestige.
Closer to home, some agreements were made with Yugoslavia
which permitted the reopening of the frontier. In the
international field Italy had made great progress.

In domestic matters, however, progress was much
slower. The legislature had first to pass laws filling in
the flesh of the skeleton Constitution which the Constituent

Assembly had produced. The unemployment plaguing the nation

-71..

required drastic action, but studies had to be made to
evaluate possible courses of action. The problem of the

South was ever—present and demanded immediate attention.

Provincial Election, 1951-1952

In each of these domestic problems and in many
others, the D.C. party factions contended with one another
while, at the same time, attempting to ferce programs through
the legislature in the face of Communist obstructions. Pro-
gress seemingly was being made, and certainly the Italian
economy was improving dramatically, if spottily. The
Christian Democrats had no particular reason to fear that
the populace was growing discontented with the regime until
they were stunned by the provincial elections of 1951 (prin-
cipally in Northern Italy).

In Italy these provincial or administrative elections
are not considered to be "by-elections." They are not feught
on national issues and do not necessarily indicate which
parties will be successful in subsequent general elections.
However, the results of the 1951 administrative elections
were enough to cause the Christian Democrats to fear the
future. In those elections the D.C. took a tremendous
beating, e.g., the vote in Veneto dropped from 60.5% to
h9.8%, from 45.9% to 37.0% in Piemonte. While the Left
only maintained its position or increased slightly;the pre-
eminent position of the Christian Democrats was clearly
threatened. .

-72-

It was the similar elections in the South, in 1952,
however, that really caused consternation in the party. In
19A8, the lowest vote received by the D.C. in this area
was t8.h% in Basilicata; in 1952, the highest vote received
was 38.h% in Calabria. Even more startling was the rise
of the Leftin an area in which it had been weakest. The
largest gain was in Sardinia which gave the P.C.I. and P.S.I.
(running separately), a total of 36.7% as against 20.3% in
1948. It was apparent that not only the absolute control
of the D.C. was in peril; the party and its allies together
would have to struggle to achieve a bare majority in the
1953 elections. This was clearly shown by the percentages
of popular votes received in 1951-1952: the Center dropped
from 61.9% in l9t8 to A9.9% in 1951-1952; the Left rose
slightly from 31.0% to 34.6%; the Right more than doubled
its vote from A.8% to ll.h%. The Christian Democrats alone
dropped from 48.5% to 35.5%, while the other Center parties
maintained their vote. (The rise of the Right will be dis-
cussed in Chapter II.)

Needless to say, the swing away from the Center,
particularly from the D.C., created a general turmoil within
the party. ‘With only a year to go before the 1953 elections,
and much less than that until the start of the campaign,
there was little time to repair the damage throughout the
country. Without a recovery that seemed impossible, the
Center parties were going to find themselves in a greatly

-73-
TABLE 9

PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS OF 1951 - 19528
W

Percent of Vote

 

Party Received
D.C. 35.5
P.S.D.I. 7.3
P.L.I. 3.8
P.R.I. 2.3
P.C.I.-P.S.I. 32.7
P.N.M. 4.5
M.S.I. 6.9
Other 7.0

O

aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica,
Annuarlo Statistico Italiano, 1953 Serie V, Vol. V (Roma:
Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1953), pp. 141-142.

weakened position after the election. Recognizing the fact
that a narrow victory would lead to a bare majority in the
legislature (with consequent stalemate and a France-like
succession of governments), the Christian Democrats decided
to introduce an artificial remedy. The party proposed a
new electoral system granting an exaggerated majority to
any party or list of parties receiving over 50.0% of the
p0pular vote across the nation. The Center list was obviously
the only one with any significant chance of achieving such
a vote. Consequently, the bonus would go to the Center
and be divided among the member parties in proportion to
their vote. The proposed law, known as the Scelba Law,

-74-
provided that a 50+% vote would entitle the list to two-
thirds of the total seats in the Chamber; this would amount
to 380 seats in the 590 seat Chamber of Deputies.

This proposal, aszmight have been predicted, met
with instant and vehement opposition from the parties to
the Left and Right. Actually, the D.C. was the only party
definitely in favor of the proposition, although the Liberals
and Republicans agreed to cooperate. It was much more
difficult to bring the Saragat Socialists into the coalition,
but this was finally achieved. The four parties, on Nov-
ember 15, 1952, reached an agreement to join in a list in
the General Elections and sponsor the proposed law.66 Agree-
ment was not unanimous within the minor parties, and the
debate in the Chamber on the new electoral law bill caused
dissident groups to leave all three of them before the
election.

The debate on the bill undoubtedly represents the
nadir of democracy in Italy as far as the legislature is
concerned. "Debate" is perhaps a misnomer for the violent
sessions that preceded passage of the bill, which finally
came after the P.S.I. and P.C.I. deputies had walked out.
Opposition of every kind, including fist fights and multiple

voting (to force recounts), was brought to bear, but the

-—_—.._ ‘

66Grindr0d, OE. Cite, p. 830

 

-75-
D.C. coalition won out (in March) in both houses of the
legislature. The struggle became so violent and the

schism between the ferces so deep that the President (at

De Gasperi's behest) dissolved the Senate and called for
reelection. (The Senate election was held at the same time,
but under the old electoral law.67) With the Scelba Law

in effect, the parties were ready for the election which

was set for June 7.

67The Senate term, under the Constitution, is for a

maximum of six years one year longer than the term of the
Chamber. Consequently, the Senate election was not necessary
until 1954. The Senate had not been included in the Scelba

law for this reason.

0

° CHAPTER II
THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN OF 1953

The Italian electoral campaign of 1953 was scarcely
the type to appeal to an observer believing in an ideal
democratic election--a rational electorate presented with
alternative policies and making a studied choice among
candidates. Citizens of other western European countries,
such as France and England, and to a lesser extent of the
United States, are accustomed to election campaigns in
which each party will issue some type of platform espousing
certain more or less definite policies. In Italy the situ-
ation was considerably different. The London Timgg commented
during the election that, "One of the most striking features
of the election campaign so far is the total absence of
party programmes of the sort familiar in British or American
elections. Slogans largely take the place of programmes."1
Another observer said after the election, "Eight thousand
candidates of the feurteen parties for the 590 seats in the
Chamber of Deputies and the 237 in the Senate had spent the

biggest campaign funds ever heard of in Italy. But not

—_

1The Times (London), May 20, 1953, 6:3.
-76-

-77-

one of them announced a specific programme."2

The Christian Democratic Campaign
In place of concrete and specific platforms, most

of the campaign was devoted to various aspects of a single
question-~was the-Government good or bad? The D.C. party
and its allies were faced with the inevitable platform of
a group in power. They had to stand on their record, defend
it against attack from the opposition and make pledges of
continued and faster progress along the same lines. The
parties to the Right and Left devoted the bulk of their
campaigning to criticism of the Government for going too
far or for not going far enough; to claims that the Govern-
ment might not be too bad but that the Right could do better
or that the Government was wrong from the beginning and the
Left could do better. Specific complaints made by all
opposition parties

. ..were its [the Government's] slowness in initiating

social reforms and in implementing the legislation re-

quired by the Constitution; its swollen bureaucracy;

its alleged tendency to plant Government supporters in

all the best jobs; its too strongly marked clerical

associations; the repressive methods of Signor Scelba's

police; and the general feeling that the vaernment was
becoming too high-handed,too "prepotente".

2
Jennv Nicholson, "Italian Election Circus," Th2
W. cm (1958). 750-751.

A JMuriel K. Grindrod, "The Italian General Election
and the Consequences," World Toda , IX (1953), 337.

-73-

The Christian Democrats had been in office with an
absolute majority of seats for five years. In the 1953
election it was asking for another five years with a majority
of 66.6% of the seats. It was faced with the crucial prob-
lem, however, of defending what to many people seemed an
indefensible attempt to grab an unearned advantage over the
opposition. Throughout the campaign the D.C. endeavored
to explain the controversial Scelba Law in a more favorable
light. The fact that the bonus would be shared on an equit-
able basis with the other members of the list was stressed.
Christian Democrat speakers protested that the law was purely
fer the purpose of ensuring a working majority for any
party that could win 50% of the pepular vote, not merely
the D.C.

One of the most unfortunate aspects of the situation
concerning the Scelba Law was its mergence in the minds of
the people with an earlier, Fascist law, the Acerbo Law.

As the Christian Democrats, particularly Guido Gonella the
Party secretary, tried to show, there was a world of differ-
ence between the two pieces of legislation. The Acerbo

Law, passed in 1923, differed principally in that it granted
two-thirds of the total seats to a party that achieved only
25% of the vote.h The explanation of such technicalities,

however, failed to convince the electorate, and the Scelba

m

thid., p. 338.

' V

-79-

Law took on something of the aspect of the albatross in the
"Ancient Mariner"--an omnipresent issue that continually
stigmatized the Christian Democrats as a party which dis-
trusted its own strength and wished to frustrate the right-
. ful punishment coming from the voters.

Despite the unquestioned importance of this issue,
it was only one of many problems facing the Government. It
seemed that almost everything that had enabled the Christian
Democrats to roll up their tremendous totals in 1948 had
changed by 1953. Perhaps the principal change was the
dispersion of the fear of a Communist victory or coup. The
P.C.I. at the time presented a visage that was all sweetness
and light; it was the defender of democracy against the
predators of the D.C. In order to approach the successes
of the past, the Christian Democrats needed to evoke in the
minds of the voters the spectre of leftist domination and
violence which would again force divergent political elements
to support the Center. In this effort they were almost
' foredoomed. The Soviet Union, with Stalin gone, was in the
midst of a peace offensive. No less a personage than Winston
Churchill indicated that times had changed and that peace
was possible. Nonetheless, much of the Christian Democratic
campaign effort was concentrated in apprising the voters of
a continued and serious threat from the Left.

Another major change in the political environment

was the settling of the major international problems. As

-30-
in 1948, the international position of Italy and its place
between the West and the East took up the majority of the
campaign. More attention was placed on domestic issues
(since the out-parties had something to attack and the in-
parties something to defend), but foreign affairs were still
dominant. Italy was now tied firmly to the West through
N.A.T.0.; Marshall Plan aid had been accepted and the money
spent to the unquestioned profit of the country. The Chris-
tian Democrats emphasized these and other benefits received
from the association, particularly the increased inter-
national prestige and recognition accorded to Italy. These
were accomplished facts, however, and the peeple were blase
about them. The 1948 election was held shortly after the
Marshall Plan was announced, and everyone could envision
potential gains for themselves; by 1953 the novelty had
worn off. There were no ships to give back; the money due
the prisoners-of-war was paid; the trusteeship question was
solved. The only really important issue left in this area
was harmful to the Christian Democrat cause--that was Trieste.
The pledge by the Western powers to support Italian
claims to the Trieste area was unquestionably one of the
biggest single factors that swung wavering votes to the
D.C. in 1948. Now five years had passed and still Italy
did not have the area, and, in fact, seemed no closer to
possession than before. While it was probably true, as De

Gasperi averred, that it was thanks only to the Western

 

-31-
Allies that the Soviet Union had not succeeded in having
the city assigned to Yugoslavia,5 the undeniable fact was
that Italy did not have it. Some disillusionment was in-
evitable.

Predominant though foreign affairs were in the cam-
paign, the domestic field also presented grave problems.
Here the Government was faced with some embarrassing attacks
on issues other than the Scelba Law. Chief of these had
to do with its failure to completely implement the structural
articles of the Constitution. Many of these articles re-
quired positive legislative action before becoming effective,
and this action was sporadic, at best. The failure to create
the Regional governments provided for is an example of this
inaCtion--only four were created, Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino-
Adige and Valle D'Aosta. Nineteen were to have been estab-
lished under Article 131 of the Constitution. The D.C.
party had been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of
this preposal during the convention, but fear of Communist
domination of Regional governments had cooled the party's)
ardor when it achieved power.6 It was nocoincidence that
each of the four Regions created had returned good majorities

for the Christian Democrats in past elections.

‘

5New'YOrk Times, May 25, 1953, 9:3.
éMario Einaudi and Francois Goguel, Christian Democrac

in France and Ital (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame ni-
versity Press, 1952), pp. 60-61.

 

-82- .

Another failure of this type concerned the Constitu-
tional Court provided for by the Constituent Assembly. The
acquisition of power made the Christian Democrats hesitant
to create a body that might conceivably block the party's
programs. After several torturous efforts to ensure D.C.
party domination of the Court, that body was simply not
legislated into existence.7 '(The Court was finally set up
in 1955 and began work in 1956, eight years after the 1948
elections, and then only after it became a political issue
in the 1953 election.) The opportunities for attacks on
the Government parties by both the Left and Right are obvious,
and certainlymilitated' against the claims of the Center
that it was the only group believing in democracy.

Turning to the positive side of the D.C. party cam-
paign (as opposed to its essentially negative defenses
against attacks on the above issues), it will be seen that
the party pledged much the same program as in 1948 and that
the Christian Democrats were more explicit in their platform
than were the other parties. In part their platfbrm com-
mitted the Christian Democrats:

. . . to "give the greatest possible impulse to private
enterprise," to "create conditions necessary to apply

a program of maximum economic development" and to inte-
grate Italian economy with international economy.

7Ib1de, pp. 63-61;.

:I

U

A...

9.5..

-33-

Unemployment and underemployment must "be elimi-
nated at all costs," . . . and fer that reason all
efforts will be concentrated on increasing production.
The purchasing power of the lira will be preserved and
every effort made to reduce indirect taxes and dis- 8
tribute burden of taxation as evenly as possible . . .

The economic program of the party had been aimed

at these same goals fer five years with some considerable
success. The economy was definitely stronger, but most of

the programs initiated were still in the formative stages

and results were not readily apparent. For example, unemploy-
ment was clearly a major problem in Italy after the war, and
the Government turned its attention to it immediately. Dispite

parliamentary studies9

and subsequent efforts at alleviating
this serious situation, unemployment was at least 800,000
higher in 1952 than in 1946; after a great drop between 1947
and 1948, the figures increased steadily every year.10 Efforts
made to combat this problem included vast public works pro-
grams in the South, endeavors aimed at providing outlets in

other countries fer excess labor, encouraging emigration,

etc.

A

8W. May 2.. 1953. 13:3-6.

9See Giorgio Ruffolo, "The Parliamentary Inquiry

into Unemployment, " Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Re-
view,“ (January-Marc, 5 e econ nqulry
into the Labour Force in Italy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
W. VII (1955), 99-108.

10Alessandro Molinari, "Unemployment Statistics in

Italy" Banc Nazionale del Lavoro arterl Review,V
(.1952) Ti”? . '

-34-

Another example of long range programming by the
Government was the effort at land refbrm, particularly in
the South. This is an area of chronic unemployment, under-
employment, over-population, poor land, extremely low yields
per acre, tenant farming, absentee ownership and many similar
and related problems. Large estates comprise most of the
ranm land of the South, with the actual farmers being
tenants living in large villages and going out to stripe of
land which they cultivate. (This is, of course, very similar
to the agricultural system of the feudal period of the Middle
Ages.) The owners generally lease their lands to sub-landlords
called abellotos, who then make as much as possible from
the peasants.11 Virtually no money is put into improving
the soil which is badly eroded and extremely poor; the
owners are satisfied with the income from their land and do
not wish to risk trying to improve the soil in an effort
to increase their profits. There is practically no mechani-
zation of the agriculture of the region, and fertilizer,
always scarce, is lacking since the war due to the loss of
cattle and the absence of factories to produce artificial

substitutes.12 The peasants are frequently abysmally poor,

—_.

——

11Mario Bandini, "Land Refbrm in Italy " Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review,lf (1952), I3.

12Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey,
"The South of Italy and the Cases Per 11 Mezzo iorno " Egg

Western Political @arterlyfVIII (1955 , 571.

—a—._..____._._. __ _.___,. HW#-_. ¥_. ,4.

-85..

and in some areas are forced to live in caves due both to
their poverty and to a lack of housing.13

The Government proposed to improve the situation in
this area, called the Mezzo iorno, by instituting land re-
form laws to split up the land and by providing money to
develop industry in the area. Laws to attain these goals
were passed by the legislature in 1950. The Silg Law and
the "Extract" Law which went into effect in that year marked
out seven areas in which land was to be expropriated: five
of these were in the area of the South, one was concerned
with the delta of the Po River and one included a vast area
south from Florence in Rome. A scale was set up to deter-
mine the amount of land an owner would lose, depending
upon the tax value of the land, the intensity with which it
was farmed, its productiveness, the condition of the tenants'
living quarters, etc.14 Land exprOpriated would then, within
three years, be sold to the peasants on extremely easy
terms over thirty years. Before the peasants received the
land, however, it was to be improved, using the labor avail-
able in the area, thus providing employment. The entire
program was to Operate over a ten-year period and involved
approximately 1,500,000 acres plus additional regional ex-
propriation in Sicily.

.—

13Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey,
"The South of Italy: Old Despair and New Hope," South

We LIV (1955). 33.
“Bandini, 0 e Cite, ppo 15-190

-86-

The entire refbrm.program was not devoted to the
land problem, however. A project of public works and re-
construction, the Q§§§g_pgp_il_flpggpgipppg_(Fund for the
South), was set up in 1950 to complement the other programs,
and was endowed with $2,048,000,000. This sum was to be
used for such things as preventing soil erosion, building
roads, refbrestation, irrigation, providing good drinking
water, and similar projects. At the same time it was to
improve tourist facilities, improve and electrify railroads
and encourage industry.15

Thus, the Government embarked on a gigantic long-
term reform and improvement program that seemed destined
to markedly raise standards in the South. For the election
of 1953, however, the accent was on the "long-term" part
of the program. Instituted in 1950, it was expected that
the period 1950-53 would see the least amount of land put
in the hands of the peasants despite expropriation from the
owners.16 Expropriation procedures had to be carried out;
then the land was to be improved befOre the peasants received
it. By the time the election came, the government had managed
to make many enemies among the land-holders but had made

practically no new friends among the peasants. Therefbre,

h

lSCarey and Carey, "The South of Italy and the
Cassa Per 11 Mezzo iorno," op. cit., 579.

16Bandini, op. cit., p. 17.

 

 

-87-

even in the area in which the(k>vernment had, perhaps, done
the meet, its achievements and intentions received little
approbation. Each party had promised great things for the
economy, particularly the South, but the Christian Democrats
and their allies were the only ones in a position to accom-
plish anything. All the other groups could criticize and
claim that they would have done better (perhaps even take
some credit for what had been done for the peasants).

Clearly, then, the Center was open to attack from
both sides. Faced with the realization of this fact, the
Center parties waged a vigorous campaign based principally
on convincing the peeple that the Communist threat was still
virulent. In this effort they (specifically the D.C.),
"were aided again by powerfhl support from the Catholic Church
and its organizations. This assistance began in April when
the Pepe addressed several hundred leaders and members of
the civic committees and strongly urged pro-Center activity.17
He later stated that all Catholics should act (and vote) ’
on the basis of "ideological considerations" and that they
should not permit themselves to be influenced by personal
criticism of parties or their own desires, even if legiti-
mate.18 (This would seem to be tacit recognition that the

. 17New’Y'ork Times, April 15, 1953, 14:4,

18W. May 25. 1953, 9:3. ‘

 

-33-
Christian Democrats had not provided everything the voters
had expected.) The Church again used the threats of excom-
munication and refusal of rites to Communists and their
supporters.

The civic committees swung into action and again
attempted to combat the Left at the grass-roots level. Their
procedure was described as follows:

In the evenings representatives of these committees
hold courses on ”how and why one must vote". At
small indoor gatherings they explain in simple lan-
guage the political program of the Christian Demo-
cratic party, warn that votes cast fer political
candidates other than the Christian Democrats would
weaken Italy's major pro-Catholic party, and expose
Communist electoral propaganda.1.

Another source of D.C. support was the United States.
_Letter-writing campaigns wensagain instituted with Francis
Cardinal Spellman and the then major of New Yerk, Mr. Impel-
litteri, asking for a flood of mail to Italy.20' This pro-
gram never seemed to reach the size of the one in l9h8. Aside
from this, attempts by United States officials to influence
Italian voters were not numerous and when made generated
considerable resentment. The most direct effort of this
type occurred on May 29, when the United States Ambassador,
Mrs. Clare Booth Luce, made a speech in.Milan containing

the statement:

”Wises. May 31. 1953, 2am.

20New York Times, May 27, 1953, 13:3: May 29. 1953.

-39-
But if--I am required in all honesty to say this--
but if--though it cannot happen-~the Italian people
should fall the unhappy.victims to the wiles of
totalitarianism totalitarianism of Right or Left,
there would followa-logically and tragically-~grave
consequences for this intimate and warm cooperation
we now enjoy.2
Another, similar, speech was made in Genoa the next day.
Government newspapers generally attempted to ignore
the speeches; only Egpglg covered them-~and then on an inside
page and omitting the threat to stop aid. Independent
papers varied but usually played them down. The Left, how-
ever, played up the external interference in Italian politics
to good advantage; the threat of aid-cessation seemed to
scare no one. The reaction to these speeches precluded
further obvious attempts by the United States to intervene
on behalf of the Government.
A major part of the campaign by the Center parties
was devoted to getting out the vote. Prior to the election
it was generally held that "the element that will influence
the outcome of the election more than any other is what
percentage of the voters go to the polls."22 This feeling
was based upon the experience of the elections of 1948 and
1951-52. In 1948, 92% of the electorate participated, with

the Center parties getting 61o9%, the Christian Democrats

 

21New'York Times, May 29, 1953, 1:5.

22Mew;§ork Times, May 24, 1953, 40:1.

-90-

h8.5%. In the administrative elections of 1951-52, the
percentage of voters dropped to 88.8%, the Center parties
receiving 49.9%, the Christian Democrats only 35.5%. With
this in mind, it was estimated that over 90% of the electorate
had to vote in 1953 for the Center to secure the 50+% needed
fer the Scelba Law to go into effect (or even to ensure a
bare majority in the legislature which could be obtained
with slightly less than 50%). "It is a generally accepted
axiom of Italian politics that stay-at-homes belong over-
whelmingly to the middle and upper classes, from which the
Center parties draw the bulk of their support."23

The Government, as in l9b8, did not rely completely
on exhortations from the Church and the parties to convince
the voters to participate. Failure to vote in the election
without justification was not made illegal, but was entered
on a record. A non-voter then feund it difficult to obtain
passports, hunting licenses, driving licenses, etc. In
addition to these penalties, another device to get voters
to the polls was a 70% discount on railway fares given to
anyone going home to vote.24 (Absentee voting was made very
easy for those who could not return home.) These incentives
were sufficient to get a higher percentage of participation

*—

23flew York Times, June 7, 1953, IV, 4E:l.

ZAEEELZQEK-IEEEEJ June 7. 1953. 24:1.

-91-

in 1953 than in l9h8. (The Church, of course, turned out
its entire clergy, its nuns and its monks, as in l9h8.)

In summation, the D.C. party program was based on
a record of steady and considerable progress in bringing
Italy from a defeated, war-torn nation to one that was fairly
prosperous and stable and that was recognized as an important
ally of the West. The Christian Democrats had initiated
vast programs to aid underdeveloped areas of the country
and had pledged to do more while maintaining a capitalist
system. They asked that the voters give them a vote of
confidence by returning them to power with their extra-
ordinary majority. As a final weapon, the D.C. party counted
on the great national and international prestige of De
Gasperi, himself, believing that many doubtful voters would
cast their ballots for him regardless of party or program,
and, by supporting him, support the party. His picture,

consequently, dominated the Christian Democrats' posters.25

_ The Minor Center
Two of the three parties that joined with the D.C.
Party, the Liberals (P.L.I.) and the Republicans (P.R.I.),
were somewhat to the right of the Christian Democrats.26

25W. May 27. 1953, 13:2.

26The exact placing of the Republicans in relation to
the Christian Democrats is very difficult to guage because of
the amorphous character of the latter party. The P.R.I., in
the period under analysis, was to the right of the left-wing
Of the D.C., and probably also to the right of De Gasperi's
center group. It, however, was clearly to the left of the
conservative elements of the Christian Democrats.

-92-

These two parties, however, were in the unenviable position
of having very little to offer the voters for their votes.
The minor parties, and most of all the exiguous Re-
publican party, needed the prospect of sharing in a
truly generous "majority premium" if they were to
face the election with any confidence at all., Yet

there was anxiety among these lest the majority pre-
mium shall by itself be so large as to procure
Christian Democracy by itself more than half of all
the seats; it would thus be in,a position to cut adrift
from and ignore its small allies in Parliament when
the election was done.27

Nonetheless, the two parties had been forced to support

the Scelba Law and had to face the opposition it caused in

the country.

Their programs, such as they were, differed from
that of the D.C. party in only one respect-~they were anti-
clerical. These parties had opposed Article 7 of the Con-
stitution that made Catholicism the state religion, and
they continued to oppose the church-state relations supported
by the Christian Democrats. The latter accepted these parties
and included them in the Government because they agreed in
a general way on basic international and non-religious
domestic policies.28 The P.L.I. and P.R.I. represented
alternatives to those voters who wished to vote for the

Center but whose anti-clerical attitude prevented a vote

“

27"Untidy Triangle in Italy," The Economist, May

16. 1953. pp. asl-asz. ‘

28Clifford A. L. Rich, "Political Trends in Italy,"
The Western Political uarterl ,VI (1953), p. 477.

-93-
for the D.C. party. De Gasperi anticipated, or haped, that
these parties, along with the Saragat Socialists, would
pull at least 15% of the vote, which, when added to his
estimate of about h0% for his own party, would permit the
list to make the Scelba Law'effective.29

The fourth party in the joint list, the Saragat
Socialist Party, was, perhaps, in the most unfertunate
position of all. In the election of 1948, the independent
Socialists campaigned under the name Unite Socialista,
composed primarily of Saragat's party, the P.S.D.I. After
the election, the P.S.L.I. participated in the Government

while the Partito Socialista Unitario separated and joined

 

the opposition, principally because of the Atlantic Pact
- and N.A.T.0. In 1951, the two parties fused into one, the
Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (P.S.DI.) or Social
Democrats. The compromise permitting this fusion resulted
in the P.S.U. group giving up opposition to the pro-western
policy and the P.L.D.I. group leaving the Government.30 The
new Social Democrats supported the Center Government, but
remained outside throughout the 1953 election.

While the P.S.D.I. was in agreement with the secular
policies of the Government, it still had as its goal a

-.__

29 bid.

3olMuriel Grindrod, The Rebuildin of Ital (London:
Institute of International Affairs, I955), pp. 72-73.

-94-

socialistic program; its membership and voters supported
it fer that reason. This position was gravely injured
shortly before the election when, after serious internal
controversy (and subsequent loss of party members in the
legislature), the P.S.D.I. came out in favor of the Scelba
Law. The result was a socialist party that was not able
to demand pure proportional representation in its election
campaigns. This, coupled with its support of the Govern-
ment's policies during the previous years, left it with
practically no issues to distinguish it from either the
D.C. party itself or the other membership of the list. Its
presence on the list, by itself, limited the P.S.D.I. to
pronouncements not too dissimilar to those of its allies
and, while it called fer a more.dynamic program of social
refbrm, it conducted what has been called a "negative,

POIicyless campaign,n31

The Right
The effective apposition to the Christian Democrats
and their allies came from two directions in 1953 rather
than from only one as in 19L8. The rightewing parties, the
P.N.M; and.M.S.I. had developed sufficiently to constitute
a real threat to the hopes of the Center. While there was

_.___
w

31Joseph G. La Palombara, "The Italian Elections and
the Problem of Representation," The American Political Science
33.1.9.3.an (1953). 695- ' .

 

 

-95-
no fear that the rightist parties might secure power fer
themselves, a flgnyork_Time§ article expressed a widely
accepted opinion that the election "may hinge on whether

the Right will take enough votes away from the Center to pre-
vent the latter from getting a majority of the votes."32

This fear was generated by the great gains made by these

two parties in the administrative elections of 195 -52. The
parties together had increased 6.6% over their 1948 figures,
and this increase, added to the smaller gains of the Left,
prevented a Center majority in 1951-52.

The M.S.I., the neo-Fascist party, was a fairly
large organization, containing card-carrying members number-
ing around 600,000, or almost one-fourth of the Communist
membership, plus a youth'organuation of about 180,000.33
Much of this membership was composed of teen-agers and men
in their thirties, with veterans of the Italian Social Re-
public (Mussolini's puppet regime in the North) as the most
esteemed members.34 The party had two principal Win83.
the left being republican and socialistic while the right
was strongly clerical and was more interested in political

rather than social problems. The right wing seemed to be

 

32New York Times, May 3. 1953, Iv, razs-o.

33npascism in Italy," The Economist, February 1a,
1953, PP. #26-4270 ‘

3§Mario Rossi "Neo-Fascism in Italy," Virginia
Quarterly Review,lXXIX (1953), 506-507.

 

-96..
dominant, and the common aim of the group was the abolition
of parties and Parliament and the institution of econOmic
class representation rather than representation of political
beliefs.35 (It should be noted that this concept of repre-
sentation is not too dissimilar to that favored by the right
wing of the D.C. party and there was, consequently, the
danger of losing Center votes to the Right.)

While the party was frankly fascistic, it claimed
its point of origin as the ”North Italian Social Republic,"
referred to above, which was set up by Mussolini in October,
1943, and which lasted until the Allied victory in 1945. It
thus professed to have nothing to do with the Fascism of
the earlier period.36 Regardless of its origins, for a
party that was organized shortly before the l9h8 election,
the M.S.I. had made significant gains. In its first election
the party pulled not quite 527,000 votes; in 1951-52 that
total soared to slightly over 1,400,000, an increase from.
2.0% to 6.h% of the vote. While still a minor party, it
posed a considerable threat to the Center coalition's hopes,
particularly in the South.~

The M.S.I. based most of its appeal for votes on

the claim that the Government had gone too far in its social

 

”mm” 1» 509-

36flFascism in Italy," The Economist, op. cit., p.
#27.

-97-
program, particularly in its‘land reform policy. In the
southern elections of 1952, it was evident that there was
considerable dissatisfaction with the advance of the program
of land refonm. The peasants could see little general pro-
gress and were "suspicious and uncertain" of future gains.
The landowners were aware of the true situation and realized
that the program meant an attack on their "traditional
privileges and position.”37 This was still a vital issue
in 1953, and the M.S.I. used it as their primary issue on
internal Italian affairs. ‘

The other principal line of attack by.M.S.I. played
upon the nationalistic feelings of the Italians. The party
was not antagonistic to the western powers, and in its July,
1952, party congress announced that it favored the Atlantic

38 (This apparently

Pact which it previously had opposed.
was in the hope of being asked into the Government.) During
the election, however (and the entire period befbre the

party congress' announcement), the policy espoused called

fer scrapping the Atlantic Pact and replacing it with bilateral
agreements.39 Party speakers emphasized the lack of an

Italian voice in western plans and built up, out of all

preportion, any evidence that seemed to show that Italy was

#—

37Grindrod, The Rebuildin of Ital , 22,_g;g., p. 76.
381bid., p. 81.

39W. June 7. 1953. IV. 1.93:5.

-93-
slighted in international affairs.‘ An example of this was
the failure of Winston Churchill to mention Italy in his
speech of May 11, 1953, on the cold war.h0

The lack of a satisfactory settlement of the Trieste
problem, despite western support for five years, was taken
as proof of Government failure. The continued close relation-
ship with and financial dependence upon the United States
was attacked. United States interference in internal affairs
was exaggerated. For example, the speech by Ambassador
Luce was exploited throughout the election (not only by the
M.S.I.), with the clear implication that Italy had become
or was becoming merely a colony or protectorate of the
United States.

During the election, the M.S.I. evoked no spectre
of black-shirted troops marching and rarely alluded to the
"good" times under.Mussolini. However, the neo-Fascists
appealed to the same emotions that had permitted the trOOps
and Hussolini to rule. They offered a high place for Italy
in the conferences of the world.

The other rightist party in the election was the
P.N.M., the Monarchist party. In an election that was based
largely on Italy's international position and relations,

the P.N.M. concentrated almost exclusively on an issue that

L

_

5 “onltaly and Its Allies," The Economist, July 4, 1953,
p. .

-99-
appeared to be dead after the referendum of July 2, l9h6.
The Monarchists called for the restoration of the monarchy
and the return of King Umberto II to the throne.

The leaders and the backers of the P.N.M. have
been categorized as mostly conservative industrialists and
large landowners who were opposed to the social reform pro-
,gram of the Government.h1 This was certainly true of the
party leader, Achille Lauro, a southern Italian himself,
who had become the owner of one of the largest merchant
fleets in the world. Lauro, the Mayor of Naples, led the
party in its 1952 successes and apparently was hoping to
show enough strength to enter a coalition with the Christian
Democrats after the election. It may have been partly be-
cause of this hope that the P.N.M. did not attack the Gov-
ernment as severely as did some other parties. Criticism
was made of both domestic and fereign policies, but it
definitely was of secondary importance.

The party concentrated almost exclusively on exploit-
ing the strong royalist feelings which it felt still existed
in Italy, particularly in the South.

Actually, the campaign by the P.N.M. consisted pri-
marily of promises bulwarked by the widespread distribution
of gifts. For example, propagandists hired by Lauro toured
the poorer districts of the South and handed out free

__

“W. June 7. 1953, 24:1.

-100-
packages of spaghetti and cans of tomato paste. Promises
ranged from the obvious political pledge to wipe out un-
employment to such things as obtaining a championship soccer
team for Naples.

Perhaps the largest single factor that aided the
Monarchist party in the election of 1953 had nothing to do
with Italy itself. That factor was the coronation of Queen
Elizabeth II in Britain. The pomp and ceremony surrounding
that event, publicized throughout the world, brought home
to many Italian voters what they might have if the P.N.M.
could be successful. As one observer put it, the "Italians'
imaginations were caught by the flood of coronation news '
and photographs appearing in their illustrated papers, re-
minding them.of ceremonies from which they now feel excluded,
and of a State institution which seemed to many of them to
represent a stability and a rallying point beyond the reach
of party'strife.“+2 This latter point must have seemed
particularly appealing to many of the uneducated voters
(particularly of the South) who feund themselves caught up
in the struggle fer party advantage.

Recognizing the potency of the P.N.M. campaign,

De Gasperi made that party his main speaking target in the
South. The point of his attack was an accusation that the

h

”Grindrod, “The Italian General Election and the
Consequences," op. cit., p. 337.

~101-
Monarchists were dividing the country, and the vote, by
bringing up an issue which was irrelevant in present-day
Italy.h3 He, along with the Vatican and the Catholic paper,
L'0sgervatore Romano,4h emphasized that any dispersion of
the vote would only hurt the Center; since the P.R.M. had

no chance to win, the vote would be wasted.

The Left

On the other extreme of opposition to the Govern-
ment were the leftist parties, the P.C.I. and the P.S.I.
These were the parties that attacked the government fer not
going far enough in social legislation and fur going too
slowly in what was done. Both played down their radical
tendencies and endeavored to appear as more or less true
contenders in a democratic election. These two parties
conducted a very rigorous campaign, using newspapers, maga-
zines, posters, public meetings and fiery speeches to attack
the Government. The principal theme was the "charge of
tampering with the basic laws and easing democracy through
the 'Swindle Law' or Legge Truffa."h5 Both parties played
up the idea that the De Gasperi Government had no real faith
in democracy and the Italian people, and continually linked

”The Times (London), June 2, 1953, 5:4.

21. 1. “New York Times, June 1.. 1953. 9:3; June 7. 1953,

“Rich. sag-22.2.10. 474.

~102-
the Acerbo Law of Mussolini with the Scelba Law.

Contrary to what might have been expected, the P.C.I.
and the P.S.I. made no attempt to make use of the provisions
of the Scelba Law providing for allied lists. This is sur-
prising since they had run together as a list in l9h8. In
the 1953 election, however, Signor Nenni decided that his
party, the P.S.I., would run alone. While it was noted during
the election that his "programme speeches contain no hint
of impatience with the Communists, or of infidelity to the
pact of union which binds the two Marxist parties,“+6 Nenni
felt that a separation on the ballot would greatly enhance
his chances of providing what he called a "socialist alterna-
tive" to the De Gasperi Government. His aim was to present
the P.S.I. as the party to which the voters could turn-~to
give the impression that it was not a case of vote Christian
Democrat or have a radical or revolutionary government re-
sult. In his final speech before the election, Nenni stated
that "the Socialist alternative represented the positive
contribution of Socialists to the reconstruction of the
greatest possible democratic and national unit.""7 How any
true alternative to Center government could be offered with-

out a coalition with the P.C.I. was never explained, but,

‘—

“é"Untidy Triangle in Italy," The Economist, op. cit.,
p. 452.

4legm'ljipppmuondon), June 6, 1953. 5:5.

-103-
as the London Iippp commented,
. . . there is no denying that the catch-phrase
"Socialist alternative" has many attractions for many
people who refuse to vote for the Democratic Socialists
now that they are allied with the Christian Democrats,
and yet are reluctant to vote Communist.h

Despite their claim that it was offering an alterna-
tive, the P.S.I. did no more than the other parties in
offering a specific program. It made the same general
attacks on the Government's domestic policy of social reform
without presenting concrete policies for improvement.

In the international sphere the Socialists were
somewhat more specific. Nenni stressed the easing in world
tensions and the claim that the Soviet Union was working
for peace. He attacked the continued buildup of armed
ferces in the west and Italy's part in that buildup. Nenni
stated that the Socialists wanted to "rid Italy of her
'onerous commitments of military alliances' and to inaugurate
a new policy of 'neutrality without isolation' that would
facilitate solution by negotiation of the East-west con-
troversies."49 He thus categorized his own party as the
party of peace and moderation and the Christian Democrats
as a co-perpetrator, along with the west, of the cold war.

The other party of the Left, the P.C.I., attempted
to conduct somewhat the same kind of campaign. The threat

43Ibid.
49New York Times, May 22, 1953. 22:1.

 

-104-
of the Soviet Union was minimized as were the radical aims
of the P.C.I. Its tactics were changed from.the use of what
were sometimes only slightly veiled threats of violence to
the more moderate presentation of itself as an attractive
symbol of opposition to those in power. The Communists
campaigned on one real issue--oppose the Government and
keep the Scelba Law out of action. The intensity of the
party's feelings on this point was evidenced throughout
the pro-election period by the P.C.I. speakers constantly
urging persons who would not vote Communist to vote for the
Menarchists (or in some cases for the independent Left).50
One observer quoted the Communist speakers as saying, "If
you cannot vote for us, vote for the Monarchists. In any
case, vote for a change."5l Those doing so, of course,
were voting against De Gasperi's Government. This campaign
strategy was aimed particularly at devout Catholics, especially
women, who would not vote Communist for fear of excommuni-
cation.

Another attempt to counter the Catholic attacks on
the Left was the bringing of suit against-Bishops and Arch-
bishops who spoke out against the P.C.I. Public prosecutors
were asked to take action. The charges were based on the

Constitutional prohibition against the clergy participating

50Rich, 0 . cit., p. 474. '

51New York Timeg, June 8, 1953, 28:5.

-105-

directly in an election or working for a party. The purpose,
of course, was to intimidate the Church officials and to
limit their political activity. The courts, contrary to
normal procedure, ruled on the cases almost immediately and
feund that the Communists had no case in "fact or law"
against the priests.52 This decision could easily have been
predicted.

The P.C.I. was, itself, in no position to hope to
win the election. The refusal of the P.S.I. to join in a
list removed any remote chance of outdistancing the Christian
Democrats and their allies. Estimates of adult Communist
party members had dropped from 2,252,000 in 1948 to 2,05l,OOO
in January, 1952.53 While party size certainly does not
reflect the size of the Communist vote in Italy, this would
seem to indicate that its strength at the polls probably
would not rise markedly. Consequently, the P.C.I. policy
of pointing out defects in the Christian Democratic program
and.urging opposition to it was probably well founded.

In accomplishing this, the P.C.I. used every means
at its disposal to discredit the Government. In the inter-
national field the Communists criticized the Government
severely fOr not settling the Trieste problem to the satis-

faction of the Italian peeple. (no positive means of

M‘

52New York Times, May 7. 1953. 13:2: May 12. 1953.
17:a; Nay I£.'I§3§7"7?37

53New York Times, April 5. 1953. Iv, tE:5-6.

 

 

-106-

settlement were suggested, however.) As indicated before,
the growing strength of the Soviet Union, so prominently
featured in l9h8 speeches, was hardly mentioned. Instead,
the party played up the peaceful intentions of the Soviet
Union and attacked the Government for the sums being spent
on rearmament. The participation of Italy in N.A.T.0. was
criticized at every turn, since cooperation with that organi-
zation would lessen the chances for peace. To further dis-
credit this participation, the P.C.I. attempted to build up
an unfavorable picture of Italy's chief ally, the United
States. The period immediately preceding the election was
particularly fruitful for this type of action. The truce
talks at Panmanjom were going on and the Communists insisted
that the entire Korean war was the result of United States
aggression. The United States was aiding the French in
their war in Indochina, which the Communists called imperial-
ism. In Europe the United States was urging the rearming
of Germany as a necessary block to the Soviet Union. These
actions of the United States in international affairs were,
coupled with two internal problems, the beginning of Senator
Joseph McCarthy's witchhunt and the trial and execution of
the Rosenbergs.

‘There is no direct evidence of the importance to
the campaign of these criticisms of the United States, but
a content analysis of the major Communist trade union publi-

cation, Lavoro, indicates that it must have been

. -107-
considerable.54 Of 1,955 mentions of the United States in
1953, 938, almost h8% were made in May, June and July, the
period preceding the election and the period afterwards when
the fermation of a government was being attempted.55 Most
potent of these attacks probably were those concerning the
Rosenbergs. The harshness of the penalty, the doubt that
they were guilty in the first place and the leaving of their
two children as orphans made excellent grounds upon which
to build a portrait of the United States as a country with
which alliance was of doubtful virtue.

On matters pertaining to Italy itself, the P.C.I.
made much the same criticisms as the other parties, particu-
larly the P.S.I. About the only positive program proposed
by the Communists included "wide-spread nationalization of
industry and electric power companies, free medical service
for the poorer classes and an upper limit of between 125
and 250 acres to the amount of land that any individual or
corporation may own."56 This is scarcely a radical program,
being less in many ways than the programs already achieved

in some western European countries with center parties in

saAlexandraHMulRolland, "The Political Behavior of
the United States as Depicted by Italian Communist Trade-
Unionism: A Content Analysis," (unpublished master's thesis,
Eggggtment of Political Science, Michigan State University,

55Ibid., p. 50.

5§Esailszk_2iass. May 3. 1953. IV, 4E:6-7.

~108—
control. Perhaps the P.C.I.hoped to gain votes at the
expense of the Government by the very innocuousness of its

program.

Minor Parties

The two remaining parties of interest in the 1953
election were the Unita Popglare and the Alleanza Democratica
Nazionale. The former was comprised of left-wing Social
Democrats and Republicans headed by Ferrucio Parri; the
latter was made up of members of the Liberal party under
Epicarmo Corbino.57 These parties were formed solely for
one reason-~opposition to the Scelba Law. The U.P. and
A.D.N. were formed on one issue, and they campaigned on
that one issue. According to the U.P., the Christian Demo-
crat party was "aiming solely at ensuring for itself in
both Houses of Parliament that fictitious exclusive majority
which it well knows it no longer commands in the country."58
This was the sum and substance of the campaign by the two
parties.

As the time of the election approached, there were
none of the fears of violence and civil war that characterized

the General Election of 1948. All parties, with the possible

-

57Grindrod, "The Italian General Election and the
Consequences," op. cit., p. 335.

58As uoted in Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy,
22a_£lE-a P- 7n.

-109-
exception of the M.S.I., professed great love fer democratic
practices and institutions and great respect for the will
of the populace. The summation of the campaigns of the "out"
parties lay in three points: the Scelba, or "Swindle," '
Law; the position of Italy in the world with emphasis on
Trieste and N.A.T.0.; and an all-pervading effort to con-
vince the electorate that it was time for a change. The
Center did what it could to rally its ferces and defend
itself.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1953
Electoral Statistics

While the election of 1953 could not be called an
unqualified catastrOphe for the Christian Democrats, it
certainly approached that point. The drop in votes in the
administrative elections of 1951-52 effectively dissipated
any over-confidence within the D.C. party, and, as a result,
its campaign was vigorous. These efforts recovered a fair
proportion of the lost support, increasing it from the 35.5%
of 1951-52 to a respectable h0s7%: this, however, still
represented a very considerable drop of 7.8% from the 1948
figure of h8.5. Strangely enough, the Center vote remained
almost exactly the same as in the administrative elections
--t9.8%, a falling off of 12.9% from 1948.

There is irony to this precise percentage. The
Center parties required 50+% to implement the much disputed
Scelba Law. Out of 27,000,000 votes cast, the Center fell
a scant 57,000 short of the number needed to obtain the
legislative premium for which it had struggled. If the new
law had gone into effect, the distribution of seats among

the major parties would have been: D.C., 306; P.S.D.I., 34;

~110-

-1ll-
P.L.I., 23; P.R.I., 12; P.C.I.. 93: P.S.I., 53; P.N.M.,
29; M.S.I., 24.1
Under the old electoral law, the number of deputies

elected by each party and the vote received were as follows:2

TABLE 10

GENERAL ELECTION OF 1953
VOTES RECEIVED AND SEATS WONa

 

 

 

 

Percent

Seats Seats

Party Vote Won Won
D.C. 10,862,073 262 44.4
P.S.D.I. 1,222,957 19 3.2
P.L.I. 815,929 14 2.h
P.R.I. _560,623 8 1.3
Center 13,h61,582 303 51.3
P.C.I. 6,120,809 143 24.2
P.S.I. 3,462,935 75 12.7
P.N.M. 1,85h,850 40 6.8
M.S.I. 1,582,15Q 22 5.2

 

aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica,

Annaurio Statistico ItalianoI 1255 Serie V, Vol. VI (Roma:
st tuto o gra ice 9 o tato, l955). pp. 121-122. Per-

centage of seats won calculated from this source.

 

lJoseph G. LaPalombara, "The Italian Elections and
the Problem of Representation," The Americag:Political Science
BEZLEE) XLVII (1953). 689. ‘ ““““‘*‘

2The totals for the P.R.I. include l22,t7a votes and

three seats won by the Partito Po olare Sudigirolese which
exists only in one electoral district.

 

~112-

The opposition of the Right and Left thus totalled
13,020,7h7 votes and obtained 187 seats. Three minor
parties, the UnitaPopolare (U.P.) and Alleanza Democratica
Nazionale (A.D.N.) and the Independent Socialists (0.8.1.),
that did not win representation rolledfup 5173193 (1.8%)
votes. This gave the non-Government parties over one-half
the vote. Of particular importance was the fact that the
U.P. and A.D.N. got 1% of the national total:* these two
parties, it will be recalled, ran solely on the issue of
opposition to the Scelba Law. Since the leaders and organi-
zers of the U.P. and A.D.N. came largely from existing Center
parties, it is fair to say that their defection cost the
Center its majority.3

Over the country the percentages received by the
various parties and the changes from 19h8 to 1953 are shown
in Table 11. Obviously, the greatest losses were suffered
by the D.C., but the proportional losses of the minor Center
parties were much more critical. These parties lost from
20% to 40% of their l9t8 strength. At the same time, the
Right advanced dramatically, although improving by only
1.3% since 1951-52. Similarly, the Left increased considerably

—_

3It is interesting to note that the Scelba Law, if
it had gone into effect, would have given the U.P. two seats
and the A.D.N. one, whereas the proportional representation
system eliminated both parties from the legislature. Hans E.
Tutsch, "Which way Italy," Swigs Review of werld Affairs,

III, No. h (July, 1953): 9-

-113-
TABLE 11
COMPARISON OF 19h8 AND 1953 ELECTORAL RESULTSa .

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percent
Party 19h8 1953 Change
D.C. £0805 £500]. "801}
P.S.D.I. 701 1&05 “2.6
P.L.I. 3.8 3.0 -O.8
P.R.I. 2.5 1.6 -0.2
Center 61.9 49.2 -11.7
P.C.I. 31.0b 22.6
P.S.I. 1202
Left 31.0 35.3 +4-3
P.N.M. 2.8 6.9 +h.l
M03010 2.0 508 +2.8
Right #98 1207 +709

 

aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica,
Annaurio Statistico ItalianoII l2gg-g8, Serie V, Vol. I (Roma:
Istituto oligrafico de 0 Stato, 1949). pp. 158—159; Annaurio
Statistico Italiano, 1225 Serie V, Vol. VI (Roma: Istituto
o igrafico de 0 Stato, l955), pp. 121-122.

bThe P.C.I. and P.S.I. ran together as the Popular
Democratic Front (F.D.P.).
over 1948, but gained only 0.7% after 1951-52. In fact,

a comparison of the aggregate percentages received by the
Center, Right and Left in 1951—52 and in 1953 shows that
practically no change had occurred—~the election campaigns
seem to have had little practical effect. However, a more

detailed breakdown of the figures reveals a somewhat different

picture.

-114-

Table 12 shows the percentage of vote received by
each party in each province, Region and geographical sub-
division of Italy. A comparison of the Regional figures
on this chart with those of Table 9 (1951-1952 elections)
indicates that the D.C. party increased its vote between
0.6% and 14.2% in every Region but one (Friuli-Venezia
Giula). There it suffered only a marginal loss of 0.8%. A
similar comparison with the 1948 figures (Table 7), however,
shows that the party dropped in everthegion, with the losses
ranging between 2.5% (Emilia-Romagna) and 14.8% (Lazio).

The greatest losses occurred in the Mezzogiorno.

The other Government parties lost ground in almost
every Region, and each received a smaller percentage of the
vote in 1953 than in either 1948 or 1951-52. The P.R.I.
probably suffered the greatest damage since it dropped to a
mere 1.6% of the papular vote and secured only five seats.
Always at its strongest in the central provinces where anti-
clerical feeling was rampant, it was here that this party
fell most drastically (e.g., in Marche it received 9.0% in
1948, 10.0% in 1951-52 and only 4.9% in 1953).

The Liberal party which usually receives its strongest
support in the South suffered great losses in this area.

In the five Regions of the South losses were ~1.9%; -4.2%;
~8.7%: ~5.4%; and -4.6%--in every case but the first (Abruzzi
e Melise) the loss was considerably over 50% of the 1948

vote. These losses, however, were tempered by slight gains

TABLE 12

GENERAL ELECTION or JUNE 2, 19533
(Percentage voting, percentage of votes that were valid and percentage of valid

votes received by each party)

Jeq

GIGS.

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PTIBA

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Province
and
Region

 

-115...
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TABLE 12-Continued

 

 

 

 

Jeane

'I'S’N

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Regionb

—116—
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C O O O O O O O O O Q
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TABLE 12-Continued

-117-

 

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MARCHE

TABLE 12-Continued

 

 

 

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-119...

 

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0.0 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.4 0.0 4.00 0.40 0.00 0000000
0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0. 40 0. 00 0:00000
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0.0 0.00 4.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0000000
m.H ¢.~H w.4 m.m m.mm m.o m.o H.H .Hd m.mm H.Nm mononmammpamo
0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.00 0.00 000000000
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~120-

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~121-

in the North and Center. (In Piemonte, for example, the
P.L.I. percentage exactly doubled, but was still only 5.4%.)

Over the entire nation, the party that suffered the
greatest proportional loss was the P.S.D.I. This party lost
strength between l9h8 and 1953 in every section of the
country and in every province-~its greatest losses occurred
in the North and the Islands and its least in the South.
Even more indicative of the Social DemOcratic collapse was
the fact that it lost strength in every Region and every
province between the administrative elections and 1953.

Needless to say, as the Center parties declined the
opposition group increased proportionately. Direct compari-
sons of the respective gains by the two major parties of
the Left are impossible since they ran as an allied list in
l9h8. However, the gains by the Left of h.3% probably can
be ascribed principally to increased Communist vote. This
seems indicated by the P.S.I. drop between 1951-52 and 1953
(i.e., the P.S.I. pulled 2,892,811 votes in 1951-52 for
13.1%; in 1953 the comparable figures were 3,462,93h, but
only 12.7%). More indicative is the location of Socialist
strength over the country. The party gained in each of the
Northern regions (with increases ranging from 0.7% to h.9%),
but made little progress in the Center, South or Islands.
In these areas gains that were made were largely cancelled
or overcome by losses. Since the greatest improvement in

the leftist vote was in the South, it seems evident that

~122-

the P.S.I. contributed little to the increase.h

0n the other hand, the vote of the P.C.I. increased
from 4,505,598 in 1951-52 to 6,120,809 in 1953: from 17.9%
to 22.6%. As Table 12 shows, the vote for the Communists
was fairly uniform over the nation, ranging from a high of
28.3% in the central area to about 21% elsewhere. This is
especially significant.in.that the P.C.I. achieved strength
in the South, previously its weakest area. Moreover, the
party's percentage increased in all but four provinces, one
in the North (Lombardia), the other three in the Center
(Umbria, Marche and Lazio). Southern gains ranged from
0.7% to 14.4%. Since the Left had already made considerable
gains in 1951-52 over 19h8, these advances looked even more
impressive. Actually, the total vote of the Left increased
steadily in the South after the l9h6 election, while declin-
ing or barely holding its own in the various northern and
central provinces. (The leftist total was off some 900,000
votes in 1953 from its figures-of l9b6 in these latter
areas.5)

Looking again at Table 12, it can be seen that the
most dramatic progress involved the parties of the Right,

the P.N.M. and the M.S.I. Both made considerable gains in

hHowever, it should be noted that the P.S.I. showed
significant gains in some Southern provinces in the General
Election of 1958.

5Muriel Grindrod, "Political Stocktaking in Italy,"
world Toda , X (l95h), 528.

-123-
all sections of Italy over their 1948 returns, but the M.S.I.
(despite an increase in its total popular vote), dropped
from 6.9% in 1951-52 to 5.8% in 1953. The P.N.M. became
the largest conservative party in Italy. The expected
popularity of the Right in the South materialized to an
extent that made the P.N.M. and M.S.I. the third and fourth
largest groups respectively in that area. The strides made
in the North and Center, however, were not anticipated.
While both parties remained minor in those sections, each
managed to more than double its percentage of votes. In
addition, each secured sufficient support to pass the P.L.I.
and P.R.I. in both areas and the P.S.D.I. in the Center.
The strength or the P.N.M. and M.S.I., however, was still
centered in the South (e.g., the P.N.M. received over 700,000
of its total vote of 1,800,000 in the two Regions of Campania
and Puglia.)6

Although not of direct interest to the present study,
the concurrent Senate election should be mentioned. In that
body, with its membership selected by the old electoral law
(a modified proportional representation system'using electoral
colleges), the Center emerged with a bare majority in seats

but a percentage of votes slightly smaller than in the

-——-

601‘ its 40 seats, the P.N.M. secured 22 in the South
and 7 in the Islands. The M.S.I. obtained 7 seats from the
South and 7 from the Islands, slightly less than one-half
of its total of 29.

.12“.
Chamber. The results, with changes from the 19L8 figures,

were as follows:
TABLE 13

SENATE ELECTION OF 1953
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE AND SEAT WONa
(WITH CHANGES FROM 1948

 

 

 

 

Change Seatsb
Party Vote From 1948 Won
Deco hoe? -703 116
P.S.D.I. #01 -001 h
P.L.I. 3.0 -20h 3
P.R.I. 0.2 “1.2 0
Center h8.7 -ll.5 . 123
P.C.I. 22.6 5h
P.S.I. 12.1 28
Left 3A.? + 3.8 82
P.N.M. 7.1 + 5.h l6
M.S.I. 6.1 + 5.& 2
Right 13.2 +10.h 25
Other 3.h 3

_.

aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica,
Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1255, Serie V, Vol. VI (Roma:
stituto oligrafico de lo Stato, 1955), p. 123.
. bThe seats listed were won by the various parties
in the election; to these must be added the seats "by right."
It will be observed that the Christian Democratic loss was
slightly smaller (1.1%) than it was in the Chamber, while
the P.S.D.I. achieved almost equal support in both houses.

The other two Center parties each lost about half its vote

-125-
(the P.R.I. being completely unrepresented). The Center
parties lost in every geographical area with one exception;
i.e., the Social Democrats registered a gain of 1.8% in the
North.

The opposition parties' distributions in the Senate
were very similar to those in the Chamber. Gains were made
in each area, the largest in the South and Islands. The
gains by the Right are particularly noteworthy for these
two parties went from an insignificant 2.4% in 1948 to 13.2%
in 1953. Over-all, however, the Senate election was not

greatly dissimilar to that of the Chamber of Deputies.

Explanation of the Results

In summation, the electoral figures reveal that
the D.C. party was by far the largest single party of Italy
despite its losses since 1948. Its allies, however, had
suffered seriously. The vote of the Left and Right went
up in all areas with the greatest gains being made in the
South where the Government seemed most vulnerable. The
question remains, why did the Center receive what amounted
to an electoral defeat? Most answers given to this question
are based on the assumption that the national problems featured
in the electoral campaigns were the determining factors.
Before offering an alternative or supplementary analysis of
the voting, it would be best to summarize briefly these

explanations.

 

-126-

MMch.of the Center loss was probably inevitable since
its parties were running on an issue that no longer caused
much concern to the Italian people-~the fear of Communist
control. De Gasperi and his allies attempted to evoke this
fear, but the obvious fact was that there was no real danger
of the P.C.I. gaining or even approaching a majority. The
sense of urgency, of dedication, that once caused hundreds
of thousands of people with diverse political beliefs to
congregate under the D.C. banner was now missing. The
Communists were relatively quiet in the period preceding
the election (except during the period of the Scelba Law
debate) and openly avowed their belief in democracy. Chur-
dfill's speech on May 11, advocating conferences with the
Soviet Union, encouraged pe0ple to believe that the crisis
was passed. The peOple did not fear the reinstitution of a
dictatorship by_the Right or Left. ‘This was, in fact, the
first election since the end of World war II in which the
Italian voters felt they could vote for the party of their
choice; even a purely protest vote could be cast. It is
impossib1e_to prove how much of the P.C.I. vote was of the
protest variety and how much was motivated by belief in
Communism, but as one writer said, "It was apparent in these
elections that the Communist party had successfully revised
its tactics and was now proving attractive as a symbol of

Opposition to those in power."7

—__

7
Roy Pryce "Parliamentar Government in Ital T d n
Parliamentary Affairs, VIII (1955 , 186. y o ay,

 

 

~127-

The change in international affairs unquestionably
contributed to the Center losses. Trieste was probably as
much responsible for the size of the Center majority in l9h8
as any other single factor. The joint declaration by the
western powers concerning this problem area drew voters
from Right and Left for nationalistic reasons. In 1953,
however, Trieste was still not Italian, and the ties with
the West which had brought so much to Italy had become, in
many minds, chains that bound the nation to the dangerous
policies of the United States.

The influence of the P.C.I. campaign against the
United States cannot be measured today, but with the great
danger seemingly ended, the inevitable minor irritations
in relations between two nations played into the hands of
the Communists. The United States had contributed generously
to the Italian economy since World war II and expected
gratitude for its efforts in the form of a continued high
vote for the favored Center parties. Much of the thankful-
ness had worn away, however, and ". . . the undoubted bene-
fits of the alliance tended, after five years of obligatory
gratitude, to be glossed over in irritation at its disad-
vantages and at the subservience it entailed."8 With many

voters becoming increasingly sensitive to this subservience,

 

——.—

8Muriel Grindrod, "The Italian General Election and
its Consequences," World Toda , IX (1953). 336 .

~128-
any effort by the United States to interfere took on the
aspect of the old "Yankee imperialism" in South and Central
America. The speeches by Ambassador Luce, which would have
been acceptable and effective in 19h8, were now seen as
bare-faced efforts to tell the Italians how to run their
own country. What had been an asset in l9h8 in securing
undecided voters became a liability in 1953.

Another type of intervention may also have rebounded
against the hopes of the D.C. party-~the program of the
Church. While the pro-Christian Democrat propaganda issued
by the Catholic Church undoubtedly prevented many members
from straying from the "proper" party, there is some ques-
tion as to whether this interference was not resented by
many Catholics, themselves. This question was posed in
Commonweal magazine, a Catholic publication; the writer went
on to say that, "the anti-clericals might have gathered
under any other political symbol which does not mix Christian-
ity with politics and is decidedly anti-Communist."9 This
could explain much of the loss by the Government lay parties.
They were besmirched by their association with a clerical
party and were unable to attract the anti-clerical vote
they needed to maintain their positions. This inability,
combined with the defection by those Catholic voters who

_

9Gunner D. Kumlien "Setback fer the Christian Demo-
crats," Commonweal, LVIII (April lO-October 2, 1953), 319.

~129-
believed that the Church should stay out of temporal affairs,
probably was enough to prevent a Center majority from being
realized. It should be noted that the P.R.I., the only
minor Center party in the Government before the election,
suffered the biggest proportional losses of all.

A further note concerning the role of the Catholic
Church in the election has to do with the Catholic Action
and its then leader, Luigi Gedda. The support of this organi-
zation was of undoubted value in the election of 19h8 and
again in 1953. Fears were expressed, however, about the
rightist tendencies of Gedda and the support he might feel
inclined to give the M.S.I. if there were danger of advances
by the Left. Gedda was reported to have a personal dislike
of political parties and so-called middle-of-the-road poli-
cies.10 He was obligated by the Church to support the
Christian Democrats, but the rightist proclivities which
caused him to support the conservative wing of the D.C.
party probably meant the loss of some votes to the Left.

In domestic affairs the Center obviously did not
convince the people that its progress had been impressive.
Actually, the advances made may well have aided the Oppo-
sition. The Government had succeeded in creating a sense

of economic and political stability in the country; this

A

lOMario Rossi, "Neo-Fascism in Italy," Vir inia -
Quarterly Review, XXVIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1952), 512-51 .

-130-
convinced many voters that they could now afford the luxury
of a non-Center vote. It certainly does not appear to be
true that the defeat was a case of the voters rising up in
righteous wrath to punish the scandal-ridden, corrupt
Christian Democrats (as the British writer, Nannette Jucker
aversll). In general, the domestic causes of the reversal
seemed to lie in the natural swing against a party in power,
coupled with that party's inability to show immediate pro-
gress in all areas. As Jane P. C. Carey said, "Poverty,
unemployment, lack of credit, slow progress in land refbrm
all combined to push the Italian people toward the more
extreme parties . "12

As indicated in Chapter II, the Government was-
attempting to solve these and other problems, but time was
needed. This was particularly evident in the program for
the South. The Communists made this area their target for
expansion and their success was mainly due to the undeniable
poverty that existed there. Their campaign tactics were
effective because they offered the peasants concrete, explicit
gains, including specified plots of land. As the semi-feudal
structure of society in the South gradually changed, the un-

educated, often illiterate, peasants were freed from the

A

11Nannette Jucker. "Italian Crisis." Waite.
XXVI (195A). 67-75-

12Jane P. C. Carey, "Italian Voters want Chan e, "

Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXIII, No. 21 (July 15, 1953

~131-
jpflimcal influence of'the land-lords, and the so-called
"clientelistico" vote began to disappear. These voters,
thinking for themselves politically for the first time, were,
‘in many cases, inclined to swing to the extremes, particu-
larly to the Left. At the same time, as indicated in Chap-
ter II, the land-lords became disenchanted with the Center
because of the embryonic land reforms, and they swung to the
Right.

Despite the admitted importance of all the above
explanations for the defeat of the Center list, the paramount
issue seems to have been the Scelba Law. In actuality, the
election took on the unintended appearance of a referendum
on this one issue and the Italian voters said no.13 The
Center heped that the violent opposition to this law by the
P.C.I. in the Chamber and Senate would renew the fears of
the populace and point up the necessity of a workable majority
in the legislature. The stalemate (broken in the Chamber
only by making the issue a vote of confidence) completely
disrupted legislative business and clearly indicated the
future of an evenly divided legislature. The voters, how-
ever, apparently accepted the awesome struggle by the Left
(and Right to a lesser extent) as an effort to prevent a
naked powerégrab by the Christian Democrats and therefore

as a good cause.

13La Palombara, op. cit., p. 690.

-132-

The effert by the D.C. party to convince the voters
that the Scelba Law could give a majority premium to any
party or list of parties was a failure; any person who knew
anything about politics in Italy realized that only one list
could possibly qualify.' Those not qualified to make this
judgement were easily persuaded to believe that the new law
and the old Acerbo Law were identical in intent and effect.

The effect of the vast number of disqualified voteslh
is harder to assess, but it is clear that the lack of edu-
cation of the voters was played upon by the parties. For
example, in the South, where the percentage of invalid
ballots was highest, the P.N.M. exploited the ignorance and
illiteracy of the electorate by suggesting that the election
actually was a referendum on the Monarchy and that a vote
fer the P.N.M. would bring back the king.15 This ignorance
was epitomized by one voter who said that he would vote for

16

the prettiest party symbol on the ballot. With over 1.3

million votes thrown out, it is easy to see that the Chris-
tian Democrat loss (of a majority) by only 57,000 could
possibly have been turned into a victory if the electorate

1“The total of invalid ballots soared from 5A0,000
in l9h8 to 1,300,000 in 1953. The percentage of votes dis-
qualified rose in every Region except Valle d’Aosta.

1SRichard Wigg, "The Italian General Elections,”
Contem rar Review, CLXXXIV, No. 2 (August, 1953), 71.

16Ibid.

-133-
had been able to understand what was occurring. (The

correlations presented below, however, seem.to disprove this
contention.) The Center parties made no attempt to challenge
the vast number of disqualifications for fear of further
antagonizing the populace which clearly was not in favor

of the electoral law.

Party Vote and Percent Voting

The twenty-seven million ballots that were cast
represented 93.7% of the eligible vote, an increase of 1.2%
over l9h8 and A.7% over 1951-52. The percentage of vote
was up over 1951-52 in every Region of the country and over
the 19A8 figures in all but two Regions (Friuli-Venezia
Giulia and Abruzzi e Molise). Contrary to the unanimous
predictions of experts prior to the election, a large turn-
out did not result in a Center victory. (The enormous
drop in votes between 19A8 and 1951-52 and the concordant
drop in Center strength seemed to indicate a definite re-
lationship.) Looking again at Table 12, however, the pre-
election predictions seem more in line with the actual
returns. The geographical area in which the D.C. party
suffered its greatest losses from the figures was the South
and Islands. The voting in these two areas was thelowest
of the entire country, falling below 90% in two regions and
getting above the national average in only one. At the

same time, the largest numbers of spoiled ballots were feund

 

 

 

-134-
in these areas. The Christian Democrats received their
highest vote in 1953 in the North which was second in per-
centage of votes cast and first in total votes of the four
geographical areas. _Consequently, it would seem logical to
assume that the increased number of ballots aided the Center
in making the considerable comeback that it did; conversely,

a lower vote would have resulted in a disastrously low Center
total. That the correlation data contradict these deductions
is shown by Table 14.
TABLE 1A
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND PERCENT VOTING

 

* ‘

{in “Cu. {,(gJ- flSMIIn.g.)

(
Islands Italy

 

Party North Center South

D.C. -050 ’ohl “03 +oh6 “029
P.S.D.I. “053 +02% ‘03 "013 +010 ‘
P.L.I. ".05 “01 -021 ‘052 “031
P.R.I. +923 “021 -062 “045 +015
P.C.I. +051 +066 +033 +069 +oh8
P.S.I. +032 +035 ‘014 +03h +052
PoNoMfi “026 “070 +032 “071 “049
M.S.I. '010 -053 “'23 -92“ -0h9

—_—

This table represents the relationship between the
percent voting and the individual party vote. A positive
figure indicates that the party totals are likely to go up
as the percentage of the electorate voting goes up. As .
can be seen clearly, only two parties have this relationship,
the P.C.I. and the P.S.I. All other parties are, in general,

 

.1...” _-

-135- .
negatively influenced by an increased vote.

It seems obvious that the axiom that a high vote
helps the Center, or more specifically the Christian Demo—
crats, was in error in 1953. ~In no region did a Center
party achieve a positive correlation of significant size.
Even in the Islands where the D.C. figure was +.A6, the
principal opposition party, the P.C.I. was more definitely
aided by-a high turnout. The explanation for this seems
evident. The P.C.I. and P.S.I. did troop their ideologically-
motivated voters to the polls as anticipated; the Catholic
Church and Christian Democrats presumably did the same
thing. However, the uncommitted voters who were forced to
participate in 1953 were inclined to vote for the Left.

The Right, with the lowest number of hard-core voters,
suffered the most as might have been expected. No single
commentator before the election, however, cast any doubt on
the efficacy of a high vote for the Center. In fact, no
writer since 1953 has questioned the benefit to the Center
of a high turnout.

'Actually, the high total vote-high Center support
axiom may not be completely wrong. Taking the electoral
totals of three post-war elections into account, it appears
that the optimum vote fer the Center is somewhere between
the 89.0% of 1951-52 and the 93.7% of 1953; if the 1953
turnout had been approximately 91-92% as in 1948, a Center
victory might well have resulted. Below that point it seems

~136-
that lukewarm pro-Center voters stay home, permitting the
more ideologically motivated leftist voters to cut the
Center percentage. Above that point, the uncommitted voters
appear; in 1953 these voters seemed to go Left. It must
be assumed that these leftist voters are not motivated
by ideological considerations (otherwise they would have
voted anyway and thus not led to a positive correlation
with a high voting percentage17). If this is the case,
they presumably can be attracted to the Center in future
elections.- (It might well be that the Scelba Law was suffic-
ient to alienate these voters in 1953).

Party Vote and Valid Votes
In any event, it appears that a simple increase in
vote will not necessarily provide a consequent increase in
Center support-~in fact, it may have the exact opposite
effect. The same situation prevails when evaluating the

influence of the percentage of valid votes on party vote.

_.‘ _

17If it can be assumed that virtually 100% of all
ideologically motivated voters fer the Left will turn out
at every election, these voters form a base which will be
unaffected by the percentage of the total electorate that
participates and by ”get-out-the-vote” campaigns. If the
P.C.I. and P.S.I. received only these votes, they obviously
could not have a positive correlation with increased turn
out-~in fact, the reverse would be true. Consequently,
the positive correlation indicates the acquisition of
votes from uncommitted or independent persons.

-137-
The exceedingly small number of votes by which the Center
failed to achieve a majority led to speculations that count-
ing the invalid votes would have made the Scelba Law operate.
Actually, it appears that counting those ballots would have ’
decreased the size of the Center percentage and possibly

would have prevented Center control of the legislature.

TABLE 15
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND VALID VOTES

 

 

a"? I
3
we

 

North Center South Islands Italy
Deco “020 “.55 . ‘oh3 +016 -018
P.S.D.I. ‘019 +019 -003 +009 +018
P.L.I. “.06 +005 -038 +018 “018
P.R.I. +021 ‘ ’QBL -012 '055 -001
P.C.I. +.25 +.57 +.A0 -.38 +.29
P.S.I. -003 +001; ‘01]. ‘01]. +018
PoNoMb -.42 “016 +008 +0A2 -028
M.S.I. +045 +oOh +000 ".25 '010

 

In the above tabkg a negative correlation, as achieved
by all Center parties in most areas, means that the higher
the percentage of votes that were valid, the lower the chances
of the party securing support. It can readily be seen that
it was the Communist vote that was favorably influenced as
the percent of valid votes rose. When it is realized that
most monitors at the poning places represented the Center
parties, this result is not surprising. It also makes the
refusal of the Center to challenge the disqualifications

-138-
seem much less altruistic. Only in the Islands does it
appear that the Christian Democrats were slightly hurt and
the Communists aided by declaring ballots invalid. Since,
for the nation as a whole, the D.C. vote was negatively re-
lated to an increasing percentage of valid votes, it is
quite likely that the Center would have found its 57,000
vote deficit materially increased had all ballots been ac-
cepted. The usefulness of this factor in explaining the

electoral result is, therefbre, extremely questionable.

Conclusion

Nonetheless, it is this type of variable, plus those
discussed above (Scelba Law, land policy, fereign policy,
the British coronation, etc.), that have been accepted as
explanations of why the Center parties failed to receive a
majority in the General Election of 1953. De Gasperi, him-
self, blamed the Monarchists and what he spoke of as the
“pettishness and selfish ambitions" of the middle class for
taking votes from the Center by campaigning on a dead issue.18
Nenni said that the returns called for a radical change in
foreign policy since that was a decisive factor in the

election.19 A New Yerk Times writer stressed a completely

18New York Times, June 11, 1953, 8:2.

19London Times, June 15, 1953, h:7.

--139--
different interpretation when commenting on the P.C.I.

vote :

The basic reason, according to Italians who have
studied the question is that Communist propaganda

is so much more skillful and efficient than that

of the anti-Communist parties that it is able to
neutralize the achievements of the De Gasperi Govern-
ment and to take credit fer any development-~social,
political or economic-~favorab1e to the working
classes. 0

 

None of these rationalizations, however, gives an

adequate explanation as to why the people voted the way
they did. Some of the actual motivation was brought out
prior to the election when Camille M. Cianfarra, New York
Times writer, had interviews with the mayors of several small
Italian villages. The consensus seemed to be that the peOple
did not really care about foreign policy and similar matters
except as these things affected them personally. One of
these mayors was quoted as saying:

Many women vote for the Christian Democratic party

because it is Catholic. The men reason a different

way. If they are unemployed and feel that the Gov-

ernment--that is the Christian Democratic party--

has done nothing for them they vote for candidates

of other parties, especially the Communists and Mon-

archists, who have been promising the? all sorts of
things during the political campalgn.

20Camille M. Cianfarra, "Why Every Third Italian
Votes Communist," New York Times Magazine, June 21, 1953.
p. A0.

21W: June 3, 1953, 16:1.

-140-

Another, more sophisticated study which was reported
by Joseph LaPalombara concerned seventy-six Italian communes
where the P.C.I. vote shifted considerably between 1948 and
1953. In every case the shifts were caused by local issues
such as sewers, schools, road maintenance, etc. As he
said, "Regardless of its national ideology, the party that
succeeded in resolving local problems was the one that bene-
fited at the polls."22

While recognition of the primacy of local issues in)
political campaigns is certainly not new, it is a factor
receiving practically no study in Italy. Generalizations
(such as the one on the relationship between the size of
vote and the Center's prospects) are common, but no detailed
analysis has been made that proports to give accurately the
dependence of individual party vote on specific variables.
The influence of such items as education, literacy, age,
unemployment, income, housing, occupations, etc. is almost
completely ignored except for certain intuitional judgements
by politicians and various "experts". In succeeding chapters
several variables, principally socio-economic, which might

logically be expected to influence individual voters as

.—

22Joseph G. LaPalombara, "A Decade of Political and
Economic Change in Italy," world Politics, IX, No. 3 (April,
1957), #29. Also reported in, "RoIitical Party Systems and
Crisis Government: French and Italian Contrasts," Midwest

Jgurnal of Political Science, II, No. 2 (May, 1958), I30-
1Ijr:—————————————————-—————- ,

—1al-
they go to the polls will be studied. It is hOped that some
understanding of each party's appeal may be achieved from

these results.

CHAPTER IV
UNEMPLOYMENT

The unemployment problem that plagues Italy has
been alluded to several times above, but no mere mention
can conceivably bring understanding of the true situation.
The total number of persons without occupation is extremely
difficult to ascertain, and figures vary from one study to
another. The two chief sources fer statistics on this
subject are reports issued by the Ministry of Labor and
the results of inquiries into the problem by committees
of the legislature. A third source, upon which Table 17
is based, is the census reports collated in 1951.

Unemployment Statistics and Characteristics
The first of these sources is based upon the number
of persons registering with the Ministry of Labor in an
effort to secure jobs. The Ministry of Labor figures on
Italian unemployment from 19A6 to 1952 are cited in Table
16. The labor force was taken as being at something under

19.1. million in 3.952.1

1All figures referred to in the text as Ministry
of Labor statistics, unless otherwise noted, are from
Alessandro Mblinari, "Unemployment Statistics in Italy,
with Special Reference to Southern ItalyiV Banca Nazionale

del Lavoro Quarterly Review, V, No. 21 ( 95 , - .
-lh2-

 

-1A3-
TABLE 16
ITALIAN UNEMPLOYMENT, 1946-1952a

 

 

Year North-Center South-Islands Italy

1946 946,183 A81,918 1,128,101
19h? 1.553.530 674.336 2.227.866
19h8 1.393.561 562.702 1.656.263
19h9 1,A09,6h9 676,201 2,085,850
1950 1,374,252 73h.978 2,109,230
1951 1.368.062 751,458 2,119,520

1952 1,t06,503 841,480 2.2h3.938

‘

 

aAlessandro Molinari, "Unemployment Statistics in
Italy, With Special Reference to Southern Italy " Banca

, Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, V, No. 21 (I9327, 78.
The legislative studies of the unemployment problem
came up with more optimistic statistics. Two of these
studies were undertaken in the period of interest: the
first in 1952, the second in 1951..2 The fermer reported
the total unemployed in Italy, in 1952, at 1,286,200, of
which 677,700 were seeking their first job. The second

inquiry attempted to correct some obvious shortcomings of

_‘

2Unless otherwise noted, statistics from the first
parliamentary investigation are from Giogio Ruffolo, "The
Parliamentary Enquiry into Unemployment," Banca Nazionale
del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VI, No. 2A (1953). 55-73. The
secon nvestigation is covered in Giorgio Ruffolo, "The
Second Enquiry into the Labour Force in Italy? Banca

Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VIII, No. 33 (1955),

 

 

 

-144-

 

 

 

TABLE 17
EMPLOIMENT LEVEL OF THE TOTAL POPULATION AND OF THE MALE
POPULATIONa

Percent of Percent of

Population Males that
that is are

Province Employed Employed

Alessandria 50.6 79.9
Asti 55.3 85.6
Cuneo 5‘}. 2 8hol§
Novara 54.5 77-0
TOPiDO 51001 7809
Vercelli 61.2 78.2
Valle d'Aosta 5h.5 81.1
Bergamo 51.0 75.2
Bresoia A6.8 7h.8
Como 540 5 770 2
Cremona 1&6. 1 7501
Mantova 50.5 80.6
Milano 5A.2 77.8
Pavia 52-7 79.0
Sondrio ' 5200 7700
Varese 56.1 76.8
Bolzano 5A.3 81.A
Trento A8.h 78.9
Belluno 51-8 77-9
Padova h9o3 77.5
Rovigo 55.3 75.8
Treviso 5h.5 80.2
Venezia 47.3 75.2
Verona [+90 2 77.6
Vicenza A8.8 7A.8
G0r121a #803 71+09
Udine 52.0 77-9
Trieste h9o8 79.1

-115- '

TABLE l7--Continued

W

_ 1- -___hu

 

Percent of . Percent of
Population . M3193 that
that is are
Province Employed Employed

Genova Ah.7 73.5
Imperia 53.0 77,9
La Spezia 43.4 72.5
Savona A6.A 75.9
Bologna 53.4 78.5
Ferrara 61.0 80.0
Forli 5009 7909
Modena 57.0 81.A
Parma 51.5 79.5
Piacenza 51.5 79.0
Ravenna 5 5o 8 82 o 0
Reggio nell'Emilia 53.7 80.7
Arezzo 5A.? 81.6
Firenza h9.2 76.9
Grosseto AA.8 78.9
Livorno A2.2 71.9
Lucca 45.3 72.3
Massa-Carrara A2.1 71.1
Pisa 11:30? 7,308
Pistoia . .
Siena 55.6 82.5
Peru ia 52.5 80.5
Tern? 46.2 78.1
Ancona 55.6 78.8
Ascoli Piceno 56.h g%.%
Macerata 60.2 81.0
Pesaro e Urbino 52.0 0
Frosinone 52.2 77.1
Latina 10.706 7703
Rieti #906 7302
Roma [+505 31'
Viterbo A9.6 -

-146-

TABLE l7--Continued

 

 

Percent of Percent of
Population Males that
that is are
Province Employed Employed

Campobasso 60.6 82.0
Chieti 52.1 80.3
L'Aquila (when 7701
Pescara 45.3 76.3
Teramo 49.4 80.6
Avellino 54.6 77.0
Benevento 57.5 79.3
Caserta 51.4 75.4
Napoli 40.0 68.7
Salerno 52.2 75.4
Vari 43.2 74.6
Brindisi 59.6 78.1
Foggia 5005 77.6
Lecce 6105 7406
Taranto 50.5 74.6
Meters 53.2 81.0
Potenza 59.6 81.5
Catanzaro 49-2 77.1
Cosenza , 50.6 77.4
Reggio di Calabria 48-7 73-9
Agrigento 41.3 77.6
Caltenissetta 40.9 77.4
Catania 41.6 75.2
Enna 15101 79.0
Messina 46.3 73.1
Palermo 38.6 73.2
Ragusa [+0010 7702
Siracusa 41.2 76.3
Trapani 40.4 76.8

-117- _
TABLE 17--Continued

 

 

 

Percent of Percent of

Population Males that
that is are

Province Employed Employed
Cagliari 43.8 75.1
Nuoro 43-3 77-5
Sassari 44.3 76.6
ITALIA 49-8 76.9

aAll figures represent percentage of the total
male population that was ten years of age or over. Calculated
from: Repubblica Italiansi Istituto Centrale di Statistics,
a

IX Censimento Generals del Pogolazione, 4 Novembre 1251,
one: oc. ete, 94 .

 

 

 

-l48-

the first (e.g., a person who did any work at all during
the week studied was listed as employed; the study was done
in September when agricultural employment was at a peak,
etc.) and came up with a figure of 1,656,000 unemployed
(3.5% of the total population; 7.8% of the 1954 working
force of 21.1 million) of which 794,000 were seeking a
first job. These were the people completely without work.
The employed part of the labor force was then divided into
two parts, isolating so-called “occasional workers" who
numbered 1,909,000.3 The resulting total indicated that
over 3.5 million persons (7.5% of the total population;
16.6% of the working force) were either completely without
work or were employed on a part-time basis.

A comparison with similar figures for the United
'States in 1954 will emphasize the full extent of the problem
in Italy. With a labor ferce of 67,139,000, the United
States had 3,671,000 out of work, for 2.2% of the total
population.“ If this 2.2% were to rise to equal the 3.5%
of Italy, the unemployment figure would be approximately

“—
v""— v“

3The term "occasional workers" is used to refer to
workers who have no regular jobs but who obtain some employ-
ment on an hourly basis. At the time of the second parlia-
mentary inquiry into unemployment, 60.6% of these persons
worked fewer than 24 hours per week and 88.2% less than 40
hours per week. Ruffolo, "The Second Enquiry into the
Labour Force in Italy," op. cit., p. 104.

 

Ibid.

-149- ‘
six million; if it went to 7.5%, the total would be a
staggering twelve million. Any unemployment figures of
this size would be taken as an unmitigated disaster in the
United States, but these percentages merely describe the
normal state of affairs in Italy. In fact,most writers
on the subject are convinced that the normal situation
was actually somewhat worse and that the statistics reported
by the Ministry of Labor, indicating that unemployment was
over two million, were probably far more accurate. Regard-
less of the precise total arrived at, however, unemployment
of this type is only one facet of the situation--it does
not include other factors such as underemployment, concealed
unemployment and what might be called the "potential" labor
force.

The first of these additional factors, underemploy-
ment, refers to the fact that in Italy several million
workers can be called "employed" only in the sense that
they have jobs part of the time. The category of "occasional"
workers set up by the second legislative inquiry included
only part of these people. In 1952, it was found that
of the 16.5 million people listed as employed, 258,600
were working less than fifteen hours per week and another
2,878,100 were working between fifteen and thirty-nine hours
per week. With the Italian working week set at forty-eight
hours, it can be seen that over three million persons were

working only part time at ”regular" jobs. These totals

-150-
still do not include an uncounted, but evidently large,
group of workers who nominally have full-time occupations_
but who actually have very little to keep them busy at
work, e.g., many civil service employees.

The second factor, concealed unemployment, is un-
doubtedly just as serious as the first and possibly includes
even more persons. This problem is largely one of the
Mezzogiorno where agriculture is the principal occupation.
Concealed unemployment refers to persons who are fully
employed in the technical sense but who are doing work
,that is extremely low in productivity; a worker's income
from such employment often is virtually indistinguishable
from that of a person who is unemployed. (This is fre-
quently true of "self-employed" farmers.) This concealed
unemployment also includes the members of large families
working on a single plot of land, where many persons do
the work of one yet all are considered gainfully employed.

The "potential" working force referred to above
is also centered in the South. This term applies to a
large proportion of the dependent population of the area.
In the Mezzogiorno the vast majority of women are engaged
in housework (a much smaller percentage is engaged in paid
employment than in the North where opportunities for women
are much more numerous). These Southern women are not
listed as unemployed but are prepared to enter the labor

market as jobs are created. Consequently, the actual

-151-
available labor ferce (and the unemployed) in the region,
is much larger than the official figures indicate.5

The tremendous importance of these last factors
can readily be pointed out by looking again at the statistics
presented by the Ministry of Labor. As can be seen, the
figures for southern Italy are much lower than those fer
the North and Center. Despite the fact that the portion
of thetxmal found in the South has increased steadily since
1948, this region, as of 1952, still made up only 37.4%
of Italian unemployment. Anyone familiar with the true
situation in southern Italy is well aware of the fact
that the.Mezzogiorno is by far the poorest section of the
country and that true unemployment (whether called under-
employment, concealed unemployment or anything else) is
higher there than elsewhere.

Several characteristics of this unemployment that
make it even more serious are not evident from the above
statistics. First is the size of the labor force in rela-
tion to the total population. Estimates of the dependent
portion of the population vary between 56% and 59% (which
is somewhat higher than the figures for most other Western

EurOpean countries).6 Italy is a country with a comparatively

_. ___

. 5Vera Lutz, "Italy's Problem: Unemployment," Swiss
Review of World Affairs, III, No. 5 (August. 1953), 7-

. 6Ruffolo, "The Second Enquiry into the Labour Force
11’) Italy." 02. Cit-o, p0 1010

~152- _

small labor ferce supporting a large population. This is
important in that it is estimated that about one-fourth of
the unemployed are heads of families with an average of
one dependent per worker in the North and two in the South.7

A second such characteristic is the fact that the
unemployment period for workers is not short, having a
mean duration of three months, twenty-one days.8 Roberto
Tremelloni, the head of the committee of inquiry that first
-inve8tigated the unemployment problem, indicates that this
duration ranges from less than fifteen days to three months
in 44.6% of the cases, three to six months in 15.6% and
from six months up in 36.7%. 0f the last group, 23.8% had
been out of work fer one year or more.9 For a person with
dependents to lose a job takes on disastrous overtones
since the situation may acquire semi-permanency and since
unemployment benefits are extremely low.

Another characteristic of the problem is that much
of the unemployment is among the younger workers, particu-

larly those seeking first jobs. It is estimated that 400,000

 

7Muriel Grindrod.The Rebuildin of Ital (London:
Royal Institute of Internet one Affa re, 55 , p. 218.

8Roberto Tremelloni, "The Parliamentary Inquiry
into Unemployment in Italy," International Labour Review,
LXVIII (July-December, 1953), 256.

Ibid.

 

-153-

young Italians have never succeeded in their job-seeking

efforts.10 In 1952, there were 856,000 persons under the
age of thirty who were unemployed; 415,000 of these were

under twenty-one.11

Having such a large proportion of the
young people in this situation must be considered extremely
grave since it presumably disassociates them from society

and the hOpe for a prosperous future under the present system.
This could leave them susceptible to radical philosophies
from the Right or Left as the unemployment of the 1920's
helped build Mussolini's army of supporters. (It appears

that increased disillusionment comes with age and results

in radical voting; see Chapter VIII.)

Finally, the qualification and training of the un-
employed militate seriously against future prospects of
gaining occupations. .Most of the laborers are unskilled
(particularly the agricultural workers), and almost none
has anything remotely resembling vocational training. Most
have very little formal education and many are illiterate.
These handicaps frequently make them inefficient employees
and also make it almost impossible for them to seek a '
different type of job. They have little but physical strength

to offer prospective employers.

_

__Y v—v—v

loHerbert SolOW, "The Biggest Capitalist in Italy,"
5.

Fortune, L, No. 1 (July, 1954)-

1
Tremelloni, 020 Cite, p0 2670

-154-

From the previous few pages it is clear that the
number of persons in Italy benefit of adequate employment is
of sufficient size to be a major concern of the Government.
The two legislative investigations into the problem, plus
several similar studies of such things as poverty and agri-
cultural problems, indicate that the central Governme t was,
in fact, cognizant of the paramount needs of the pe0ple.
Unfortunately, the Government, as of 1953, had done little
toward improving the situation. Much of this failure to
cut unemployment can be ascribed to the Italian economic
and demographic structure.

Something of the Southern situation was given earlier
when the land reform program and the ”Fund for the South"
were discussed. Peasants work on land owned by absentee-
landlords and sometimes receive only one-fifth of their
crops; in Matera thousands live in caves, and the only new

12

building since the war is a movie theatre; so many people

compete for the very few jobs available that even the ex-

tremely low wages required by law are undercut;13

agricul-
tural employment is seasonal and most laborers are fertunate
if they work six months a year. Dramatic as this situation

is in the South, the North suffers nearly as much; its

 

12Elizabeth Wiskemann, "New Italy Faces Old Prob-

lems: Poverty and Population in the South," Foreigg Affairs,
XXVIII (October, 1949-July, 1950), 86.

13Ibid., p. 87.

~155-
unemployment, however, is largely industrial.

In addition to the efforts for the South.referred
to above, the Government had, by 1953, made considerable
efferts to improve the situation for the nation as a whole.
Investment was encouraged to repair factories destroyed
during the war, and funds were made available fer moderni-
zation of existing facilities. A Government agency, the
Instituto pgr la Ricostruzione Industriale or I.R.I. (which
was set up by mussolini to have charge of nationalized and
uneconomical industries), was given control of the develop-
ment of many companies in an effort to improve the economy.
Hydroelectric facilities were constructed, railroads improved,
mines opened, etc. All these efforts seemed to sink into
the morass of Italian unemployment without appreciable

effect.

Population.Growth and Emigration
One principal reason for this seeming ineffective-

ness of the Government programs is the Italian birthrate.
The extent of the population growth perhaps can best be
indicated by a few statistics: the total population in
1936 was only slightly over forty-two million; in 1951 it
was approximately forty-seven million-~a growth of five
million in fifteen years despite war losses and
emigration. This is an 11.2% increase or a gain of 7.3

-156.-

persons per thousand.14 (Actually, these totals and per-
centages are not exceptionally large for Europe as a
whole, but Italy is probably less able to provide for
growth than any country in the West except Spain.) In
1951 alone, the natural increase in Italy was over 350,000
with the birth rate reported as 17.6 per 1,000, over ten
per thousand greater than for the 1936-51 period.15

This growth factor greatly complicates the unemploy-
ment picture because an influx of new workers enters the
labor market each year to compete fer the existing jobs.
The Temelloni committee referred to above estimated that
the period between 1953 and 1957 would see a continuation
of this growth and that approximately 300,000 persons would
reach working age yearly. Since the committee also estimated
that the new jobs available during that period would average
only 125,000 per year, a large annual deficit would result.
(Unfortunately, this estimated figure fer the natural in-
crease in the population that was of working age proved to
be conservative. For the actual statistics and the effect
of emigration on nmuial increase, see footnote 22.)

The most impressive, or perhaps the most depressing,

part of this growth is occurring in southern Italy, the

‘-

l“Nora Federici, "Some Aspects of the Italian Demo-
graphic Situation: The First Results of the 1951 Census,"

Bang; Nazionale del Lavoro anrterly Review, VI, No. 25
g o

15Lutz, op. cit., p. 7.

~157-
area which has the highest birth rate.16 In the past,
only emigration to foreign countries and migration within
Italy itself have kept the South lower than the North and
Center in total population. The projected growth in this
area will make it almost impossible for the present regional
balance to be maintained. With the vast majority of southern
workers dependent upon agriculture, which even now cannot
effectively support them, the growth will be catastrOphic.
The density of population on farm land in southern Italy
is already more than double that of Holland and higher
than that of any other Western European country.17 Con-
sequently, tremendous gains must be made in productivity
per acre and per laborer; the land reform program is
calculated to accomplish part of this. Agriculture, howb

ever, could never provide sufficient employment in this

 

16The population projections referred to are cited
in Federici, op. cit., p. 66. In the table below the "Low"
refers to the me ium predictions with migratory movement
from southern Italy included. The "High" is the medium
projections determined by natural growth and movement only.

Year , Low High
1951 \ 37-4 39.3
1961 38.8 41.3
1971 40.6 43.8
1981 42.7 46.5
1991 45-0 49-4
2001 .47.6 52.7

l7Ruffolo, "The Parliamentary Enquiry into Unemploy-

ment in Italy," op. cit., p- 71-

~158-

area of poor soils, so industrialization is essential.
Thus, the Government is faced with the necessity of increas-
ing the industrial facilities in southern Italy while, at
the same time, rectifying the industrial unemployment situ-
ation in the North.

Some hope that the population pressure may be
alleviated is offered by demographers who indicate that
the birth rate in Italy seems to be falling. Even this
faint glimmer of hope is lessened by the fact that it is
in the North and Center that the biggest drop has occurred.
In any case, a falling birth rate would not help for ten
to fifteen years since it would take that long to reach
the point where the yearly addition to the labor force
would materially decrease. Therefore, while this potential
population stabilization is interesting, it could not
bear upon the 1953 election and this study; the only perti-
nent question here is whether the governmental programs
were successful enough to favorably influence the electorate.

This, of course, was not the case. It has been
estimated that the Government inveStment programs, as of
1953, had added approximately one-million new jobs in the
post-war period.18 While this would seem to represent con-
siderable progress, the two-million-plus total of unemploy-

ment was not reduced; the one-million new jobs barely

M

lsLUtz, Mo, p. 80

-159-

absorbed the workers that entered the market in the same
period. The unemployment caused by natural population
growth was bolstered by a tendency of workers, when possi-
ble, to switch from agriculture to industry; by the increased
number of women seeking work; and by the severe curtailment
of emigration in large numbers. It was estimated before
the 1953 election that the Government's efforts to overcome
this job deficit had cost about twenty percent of the total
national income (only ten percent of this expenditure came
from.Marshall Plan aid).19 Still the Government was criti-
cized because its program did not produce substantial gains.

The cessation of large-scale emigration referred
to above had considerable impact on the national economy.
In the pre-war period this emigration was continually high,
reaching its zenith in 1913 when 872,958 persons left the
country.20 In the inter-war period starting in 1921 the
emigration gradually slowed, averaging over 300,000 a year
at first and dropping almost to 50,000 immediately prior
to world war II. The totals never fell below 200,000 a
year until 1927, and the fall-off that occurred afterwards

was largely due to Fascist laws rather than to a desire

191bid.

20A detailed analysis of pre-war emigration is
given in Giandomencio Cosmo, "Italian Emigration Movements

up to 1940," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Qparterly Review,
VII, N030 28-2 5h 9 75’ 0

 

~160-
to remain in Italy. Even at its lowest ebb, however, annual
emigration amounted to over 111 persons per 100,000 inhabitants,
a considerable number. The majority of these emigrants came
from the depressed South and thus relieved the pressure of
population growth.

After the war the Government began to encourage
emigration, but by 1953 had really laid only the foundation
for future departures which have averaged around 150,000
per year.21 (This, of course, is still far below the
number that left every year before 1927). In the period
under discussion the Government succeeded in making emigra-
tion agreements with France, Belgium, Argentina, Switzer-
land, Great Britain, Australia and many other countries.
(Much of this travel was only in the form of seasonal migra-
tion to fill labor needs in nearby countries, but still it
provided a source of income for the unemployed.) The United
States, up to 1953, limited Italian immigration to a small
quota of something under 6,000, and consequently did not
help relieve the population pressure. (In 1953 the United
States liberalized its immigration policy when Italy was

granted a temporary quota of 60,000 under the Refugee Relief

‘

2lIt should be noted that this figure does not repre-
sent net emigration. Many emigrants subsequently become
repatriates, e.g. 30,000 in 1953. Gastone Silvano Spinetti,
(ed.), Ital Toda (Roma: The Documentation Center of
the Presidency o the Council of Ministers of the Republic
of Italy, 1955), p. 40.

 

~161~
Act. President Eisenhower recently, March, 1960, suggested
a permanent quota of approximately 20,000 per year.) None-
theless, the Italian Government had made considerable pro-
gress in encouraging emigration and finding places for the
people to go. This very fact left it open to considerable
criticism every time emigrants encountered difficulties
abroad or whenever a foreign country decided to cut down
the number of emigrants that it would accept.

Regardless of the merit of these attacks, the
advocacy of emigration by the Government had some slight
effect (in the period 1946-1953) in cutting down the size
of the working force in Italy. Unfortunately, even the
greater numbers leaving the country after 1954 amounted to
only a very small percentage of the labor supply; the basic

problem of finding jobs for several million people remained.22

Effect of Unemployment
As a result of this unemployment situation, there

is a tremendous pressure in Italian society to retain

_—

22The‘following table will give some idea of the
excess of new population over emigration; jobs must be found
for these new workers. In thousands of persons of working

age:

1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Natural Increase 320 342 371 379 380
Emigration 95 '69 100 110 140
Remainder 225 273 271 269 240

Vera C. Lutz, "Some Characteristics of Italian Economic

Development, 1950-1955," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Qparterly
Review, IX, N0. 39 (1956). 7°

 

-162~
existent jobs, regardless of their necessity. For example,
when experts from the United States recommended the grow-
ing of wheat rather than grape vines in Southern Italy .
(because the world wine market was limited), the Southerners
were indignant because the vines require more labor, and
thereforexmxe laborers.23 It was considered better to
continue producing grapes and wine for a comparably insig-
nificant market.

In another, similar case, the Government was
criticized severely in the electoral campaign of 1953 bee
cause of the swollen bureaucracy. In 1949 there were
1,089,261 civil servants (of which about two-thirds were
classified as permanenO; in.l951, this figure was 1,075,177.24
These were substantial figures, particularly for a country
as economically poor as Italy. Efforts were made to cut
the number dependent upon the Gavernment, and several laws
were proposed which would make gradual limitation mandatory.
Nothing came of these suggestions, however, because public
service was viewed in Italy as a type of social welfare
agency.25 Therefore, the Government was castigated by

the opposition for maintaining such high employment (and

_-

23Wiskemann, op. cit., p. 89.

2"Taylor Cole, "Reform of the Italian Bureaucracy,"
Public Administrapgpn Review, XIII (Autumn, 1953), 252.

25Ibid., p. 253.

 

-163-
for hiring its own supporters), but the criticisms were
nothing to what they would have been had a large percentage
of these civil servants been forced to join the ranks of
the unemployed. It was another case where the Government (mean-
ing the Center parties) could do nothing acceptable and
chose the lesser of two evils.

Much of the same situation prevailed in industry,
where many inefficient, non-productive companies were kept
in operation at a deficit so that employees would not lose
their jobs. This was particularly true with companies
that were controlled by the I.R.I. The payrolls were padded
with a great many employees who had little or nothing to
contribute to production. A Fortune magazine survey of
this problem included a revealing photograph taken at one
of these vaernment-controlled industries--a man repairing
a fence with two assistants watching him work.26 The
stultifying effect on the economy of this type of non-
productive operation is evident. An Italian industry,
in order to meet foreign competition, would have to be
efficient and produce at low cost; no industry can do this
when saddled with excess employees which it is socially,
morally and politically required to retain. In the past,
private industries which have attempted to close when faced

‘with the twin problems of competing with efficient companies

26Solow, pp. c151, p. 90.

-164-
and meeting labor demands (for higher pay or retention of
workers) have found their factories taken over by the workers.
Any reorganization or modernization of the plant which would
reduce the labor force is met with consternation, and with
the rallying of the employees to protect jealously the
vested interest they have in their jobs. In addition,'
factories which do out their payrolls must grant very high
severance pay to employees. To avoid this trap Italian
firms are loath to hire new personnel; they prefer to have
the existing employees work overtime. (Consequently, jobs
which normally would be available are lost.)

Another factor that has helped to keep the economy
of Italy at a low level and that has contributed to unemploy-
ment is the business philosophy of many manufacturers. The
estate owners of the South and these industrialists have
much in common in their perception of their own best
interests--each group wants to take as much out of the
economy with as little investment as possible. This particu-
lar philosophy is certainly not unique to Italy, but these
industrialists do not wish to increase their productionin
an effort to earn more; they are happy with a low production
rate, steady profits and no risk. The manufacturers insist
on restricting production and turning out only a few items
which they can sell at a high price. This they do in
preference to enlarging and modernizing their factories to

take advantage of mass production, low unit cost and lower

-165-
profits per item (but with much larger sales). Some Italian
companies (such as the Vespa factories) are very efficient
and use mass production techniques, but all too many continue
to operate in what amounts to a medieval tradition. Con-
sequently, they do not hire nearly so many employees as

they otherwise could.

Electoral Impact of Employment Level

All of the above factors add up to the simple con-
clusion that there is a tragic amount of unemployment in
Italy-~regardless of how the statistics are derived. Next,
an analysis must be attempted of the possible effect of
this situation on the relative strengths of the political
parties. In the campaigning discussed previously, each
of the parties evidently was of the opinion that the un-
employment issue would considerably influence the electoral
outcome. The Government went to great pains to convince
the voters that it was making all possible efforts to solve
the problem and that it was making progress. (While there
is no proof, it is quite possible that the investigating
committees chose a definition of unemployment designed
to secure a more favorable estimate of the number of persons
out of work. Certainly the time chosen was calculated to
accomplish this aim.) The Opposition parties incessantly
attempted, first, to convince the voters that the Govern-

ment would do nothing for them and, second, to beguile

 

~166-
them with the rosy promises characteristic of opposition
politicians everywhere.

To assay the impact of this admittedly dismal situ-
ation on the election, the province by province statistics
on employment levels listed by the November, 1951, national
census were analyzed.27 These reports give the total number
of persons in each province who were not employed outside
the home and who were ten years of age and over (202,700
persons under fourteen were employed in 195328). Out of
a population of 39,309,51A, the census found 19,732,234
nominally unemployed (4,395,593 males)--12,517,l93 of these
were actually engaged in caring for the home. Table 17
indicates, first, the percentage of the total population
that was employed at the time of the census, and, second,
the percentage of the male population that was employed.
The data shown on this table were correlated with the pro-

vincial vote for the various parties.

Party Vote and Employment Level
The results of this analysis seem to indicate that

the impact of low employment on electoral returns in Italy

‘_

27Census material in this and subsequent chapters
is from: Repubblica Italianai Istituto Centrale di Sta-
e

tistica, IX Consimento Genera della Po olazione
Novembre , Roma: Soc. A etc, A .

28
Tremelloni, o . cit., p. 260.

 

~167-

is overrated; on a nationwide basis there is no clear
correlation between these two factors. The only party
manifesting such relationship is the M.S.I., which has
a fairly strong negative correlatiion with the number of
employed. (A positive correlation would mean that the
higher the percentage of employment, the higher the vote
of the party; conversely, the negative correlation of the
M.S.I. means that its chances of getting a high vote drape
as employment risesJ Even here the correlation was only
-.l+7. The D.C. party does exhibit a faint positive corre-
lation with employed, as (R) the P.S.D.I. and P.L.I. The
other Government party, the P.R.I. has a negative inclina-
tion while the P.S.I. is slightly positive. The figures
are inconclusive, at best, although the general tendency
may have some significance.

Looking at the relationships by geographical regions,
a peculiar picture appears. The D.C. party has a low but
clear negative correlation in the North, a stronger and
positive correlation in the Center and then a higher and
more significant relationship (+.L9) in the South. The
correlation is still positive but smaller in the Islands.
The principal opposition party, the P.C.I. has a precisely
opposite relationship, being positive in the North and
becoming negative toward the South. The correlations for

the major parties on this issue are shown in Table 18.

~168—
TABLE 18

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF
THE POPULATION THAT IS EMPLOYED

 

 

 

Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. . -033 +037 +0£§9 +009 +005
P.S.D.I. +028 “.08 -018 +013 +028
P.L.I. +013 fols +ol+7 +olt2 +013
P.R.I. +006 “022 ”.07 -031 '028
P.C.I. +018 -019 “037 “.28 -.05
P.S.I. ’00]. +002 ‘038 -033 +Ollf
P.NOMO +014 -010 +010 +033 -009
M.S.I. ”019 -024 -013 “shit ’0‘}?

 

As can be seen, all correlations are low (in most cases,
below the level of significance). The Government parties
show no unity, with only the Christian Democrats and the
Liberals consistently positive. The relationship between
employment and P.L.I. vote is particularly noticeable in
the South and Islands. The results for other parties vary
- from area to area except for those of the M.S.I. which are
consistently negative. It is worth noting that the highest
correlations, both positive and negative, occur in the
Mezzo iorno, the area most plagued with unemployment.

While these correlation figures are not high enough
to indicate that the percentage of employed materially
affects the election, the positive or negative character-

istics are interesting. It would be expected that the

~169-
Government parties would benefit from high employment;
conversely, the opposition would be aided by high unemploy-
ment. In general, the correlation figures indicate precisely
this situation. Over the nation, three of the four Center
parties has a positive relationship with high employment:
three of the four opposition groups have a negative relation—
ship. Geographically the picture is not quite so clear.

In the North, where employment is highest, the
correlation with size of vote is low. Here the three
minor Center parties have the expected positive relation-
ship, but the D.C. is clearly negative. Obviously the
Christian Democratic vote is not based upon high employment
in this area. On the other hand, the P.C.I. figure is
positive, indicating opposition to the Government even
where conditions are best. This support is certainly not
of the protest variety. In the North the Christian Demo-
crats apparently are Opposed as a matter of principle de-
spite relatively high employment. At the same time the
P.C.I. support evidently is based on belief in Communist
precepts.

Another possibility is indicated by the positive
correlatflxm.of the minor Center in the North. All three
parties appear to have attracted support where employment
is high-~perhaps those who were motivated to reward the
Center fer high employment turned to these parties rather
than the D.C. At the same time, it should be remembered

 

-170-
that this is the area where P.C.I. support is very strong
in the labor movement. High employment probably is taken
as being the direct result of action by the communist-
dominated Italian General Confederation of Labor (C.G.I.L.).
Thus the P.C.I. is supported as a matter of principle and
as the result of gratitude.

In the other three regions the expected pattern
appears. The D.C. correlation ranges from -.33 in the
North to +.37 in the Center; the Communists from +.18
to -.l9. The spread is even larger in the Mezzogiogno.

It appears that outside the North the voters tend to reward
the Christian Democrats where the employment rate is high.
In the same areas low employment evidently causes some
protest-voting for the two leftist parties and fer the
M.S.I. It may be expected that the governmental programs
to improve economic conditions in the Mezzo iorno, if
effective, will result in higher Christian Democratic vote
in this area. The same reasoning would indicate increased
Liberal support as employment rises.

One of the most interesting bits of information
derived from the correlation figures applies to the M.S.I.
This is the only party to have a negative relationship with
high employment in each of the geographical areas. It
appears that the M.S.I. consistently attracts protest votes
and is a refhge for disgruntled persons who eeek radical
remedies from the Right. This probably is particularly

 

-l7l-
true of those without occupation who fondly recall the
‘ Mussolini period. This type of support for the M.S.I.
was anticipated and presages a decline for this party if

conditions improve.

Party Vote and Percentage of Males Who are Employed
The second set of correlation figures indicates
the relationship between party vote and the percentage of
males who are employed. Since it normally is the male
who is the wage—earner, it was expected that the effect of
vote would be more pronounced for this variable. The
higher the percent of males employed, the smaller the number
of protest votes should be. In most respects this expecta-
tion is fulfilled.
TABLE 19

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF
THE MALE POPULATION THAT IS EMPLOYED

=============================================================
Party North Center South Islands Italy

D.C. -.31 +002 +061 +038 ”.06
P.S.D.I. +025 +001} -009 -012 +020
P.L.I. +.l9 +.07 +.3l -.5h +.OA
P.R.I. +023 ‘026 +027 -0010 +009
P.C.I. +010 +010 +007 +036 +011
P.S.I. “-032 +026 ‘020 +0214! +006
P.N.Mo +036 -028 -043 '0b7 -024
MaSoI. +033 “025 ”all -022 ‘031

 

~172-

The Christian Democrats still show' a negative
relationship in the North, fall off in the Center, but
show tremendous gains in the Mezzogiorno. The +.6l
correlation in the South is particularly noteworthy. High
male employment clearly leads to support of the D.C. The
other Government parties, however, show- a peculiar re-
lationship. For example, P.L.I., after being positive in
three regions, falksto a -.5A in the Islands. Only the
P.R.I. (in the South) manages to improve itself signifi-
cantly as male employment increases. This drop by the
minor Center is partly explained by the D.C. strength: this
party receives the reward for high male employment. Again,
however, the opposite situation exists in the North. All
three minor Center parties are positive while the Christian
Democrats are negative.

A phenomenon that is much more difficult to explain
is the positive correlation for the P.C.I. in every geogra-
phical region. This runs precisely counter to the expected
result, and, with the exception of the North, is directly
opposite to the figures for employment in general. While
it is quite obvious that all P.C.I. correlations in Table
19 are so low as to be far below the level of significance
(see Table 2), the positive figure present some interesting
possibilities. It appears that increased male employment
has a very slight but positive effect on P.C.I. vote,
particularly in the Islands. This is not to say that

~173-

the employed males necessarily vote for the Communists;
possibly as the percentage of male employment increases
those still unemployed become more inclined to votefor
the Left. Another, and perhaps more plausible explanation
is that the P.C.I. vote is not adversely affected by in- A
creased male employment because the males are more inclined
to accept communism on ideological grounds. These men do
not desert the party as their economic status improves.

In summation, if the latter explanation is accepted,
the situation seems to be this: ideologically committed
men vote Left despite economic betterment; less committed
men tend to reward the party to which they ascribe the
gains, generally the Christian Democrat. (The minor Center,
especially the P.L.I., is negatively influenced by this
variable in the Islands where it would appear that only
the D.C. is accorded gratitude. The situation varies in
the other regions.) This would account for the negative
correlations for the parties of the Right which clearly
are adversely affected by a higher percentage of male
employment. This is particularly true for the Mbnarchists
who are more influenced by this variable than by general
employment levels.

A final observation has to do with the very peculiar
overall picture in the North. In that region only two
parties are negatively influenced, the Christian Democrats

and the Socialists. This is, of course, the same situation

-174-

that prevails for employment in general, and the same ex-
planations presumably apply. Of particular interest,
however, are the correlations of the.M.S.I. and P.N.M.

The P.N.M. relationship remains positive but with a

more sigrificant figure. The M.S.I.swings from --.19 to
+.33. Obviously the support of these parties in the North
is not based upon the disgruntled unemployed as appears

to be the case in the rest of Italy.

This points up a fact that the correlations figures
illustrate. It appears that there is a distinction between
the North and the three other regions when it comes to
determining vote. In the Center, South and Islands the
expected pattern is present; high employment (whether male
or general) leads to support for the D.C. and, to a lesser
extent, the minor Center. Conversely, low employment leads,
usually, to what evidently is a protest vote for the Right
or Left. Only in the North is this pattern missing. As
indicated above, it may be because of the deeper ideological
commitment of northern workers and because of a different
view as to which parties are responsibile for high employ-
ment. Possibly, also, the relatively high economic position
of northern workers since the war has made employment of
less concern; this could account for the low correlation
figures in the area (i.e., a .36 is the highest correlation
indicated). '

-l75-

Conclusion

The overall results of this analysis of the unem-
ployment-party vote relationship would seem to indicate
that there is less of a connection than might have been
expected. Writers on the Italian political situation when
discussing the cause of party loss or gain have been wont
to include unemployment as a critical variable. The only
really effective correlation that results, however, is
with the Christian Democratic vote in the South (and, to
a lesser extent, the Islands). Since the D.C. party was
clearly the ruling group in the Government, this might
well have been predicted. It is somewhat surprising, how-
ever, that the opposition forces do not show a higher,
negative correlation (i.e., increasing their vote as employ-
ment dr0ps). While there is a definite tendency in this
direction, it is very far from conclusive.

When one considers the probable political result
of such widespread unemployment if it occurred in the United
States, the lack of a clearer correlation is even more
surprising. The last time a somewhat equivalent portion
of the labor force in this country was without occupation,
the result was the overthrow of Republican party control
and brought in a generation of Democratic office holders.
Since the unemployment problem in Italy is of such scope,
it seems evident that it should have some political

effect.

-l76-

One possible explanation of this lack of influence
is that the Italians have lived with widespread unemploy-
ment fer so long that they face it with equanimity and
resignation and do not really expect the Government to
accomplish what would seem to be a miracle. Certainly this
attitude exists-~the belief that they have never received
I anything from Rome and will get nothing in the future,
regardless of which parties win. This is probably the
principal fact that caused the difference between the
reaction to widespread unemployment in Italy and the
United States. The population of the United States was
suddenly presented with an unusual situation; in Italy
there was merely the continuation of "normal" unemployment.

Another, and perhaps better, explanation of the
lack of the Italian reaction would be that the voters are
concerned with unemployment, but that this single issue
is merged with many others. (This will, of course, be
true of all variables discussed.) Coupled with this is
the fact that the correlations are based on provincial
votes, and the aggregating of the communal statistics into
provincial figures undoubtedly merges areas with divergent
unemployment levels and, at the same time, divergent party
vote. The validity of this hypothesis could only be dis-
covered by a similar analysis of the thousands of communes
of Italy. (While possible, such a study is far beyond'
the bounds of the present analysis.) Regardless of this

~177-
or other possible explanations, it is evident that unemploy-
ment has a relatively low correlation with party vote in
Italy. The directions of the correlations are interesting,
but the figures are very low, especially when compared with the
relationship between vote and other variables to be discussed

in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER V
OCCUPATION

In the preceding chapter the effect of the level
of employment on vote was discussed; the next subject will
be a similar analysis of types of employment or occupation.
It is logical to assume that the occupation of a voter
will have some influence on his political beliefs since,
if for no other reason, the party that wins may have some
considerable effect on that occupation. (This, of course,
is due to governmental participation in and influence on
business, industry and agriculture.) To discover if, in
fact, this connection between job and vote does exist, the
categories of employment used in the 1951 census were
checked for relationships with each of the principal parties.
Before detailing the results of that analysis, however,
it might be well to indicate something of the range of

economic development in Italy.

Industry
Italian industry is located primarily in the
North and Center, with comparatively little development
in the South or Islands. Italy has a full range of in-
dustrial activities--from mining raw materials through

-178-

_ ~179-
fabricating finished products. In the past, economic ex-
pansion has been severely limited by the necessity of
importing the coal needed to operate heavy industries, but
this problem has been met, in part, by the development of
excellent hydroelectric facilities and by the comparatively
recent discovery of oil and natural gas. The gas has been
particularly advantageous since it can replace much of the
imported coal. Coal is still essential in steel production,
however, and the latter is the basis of many other industries.
Italian steel has been the most expensive in Europe because
of import requirements; this has resulted in higher priced
,fabricated products. (The hope of alleviating some of
this hardship partly explains Italy's interest in the
European Coal and Steel Community.) Production of steel
has increased despite its expense; 3.5 million tons in 1952
as opposed to the 2 million per year before Wbrld war II.
Other, non-ferrous metals are also produced, with aluminum
from domestic bauxite leading the way; Mining includes
soda, potash, quartz and sulphur.

Italian fabricated products are multitudinous, in-
cluding automobiles, motor scooters: cash registers, type-
writers, roller bearings, tractors, cement, tires (from
imported rubber), electric motors, plastics, calculating
machines, etc. The textile industry has blossomed since
the war, with cotton and wool yarns of particular importance;

garment making has expanded equally fast. Wood processing,

~180-
paper making and printing have flourished. The most impor-
tant single category of production in 1951 was the mechanical
industries which accounted for the largest part of the in-
dustrial net product, 18.2%, and the largest number of
employed, 859,600.l As can be easily seen, Italy has a
widely diversified industrial economy. In developing this
economy, the country has been aided immeasurably by a
cheap labor supply which is the result of the number of
unemployed. As mentioned in the previous chapter, however,
the pressure of these unemployed has made it impossible
to reorganize the industrial part of the economy. Labor
pressure (particularly from unions) has forced manufac-
turers to maintain past levels of employment despite ob-

vious excesses.2 Another helpful and at the same time

__-

lOther principle contributors to the net production
of Italy were: textiles, lh.h%; chemicals, 10.5%; con-
struction, 8.3%; steel and non-ferrous metals, 7.1%; electric,
gas water, 6.0%; and garments, 3.8%. Food processing ac-
counted for the second largest percentage of production
with 16.7%. Bruno Foa, "The Italian Economy: Growth Factors
and Bottlenecks," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly
Review, VI, No. 27 1953 . 57.

2For example, a public agency, the F.I.M., was
established for the purpose of controlling several engineer-
ing firms with the intent of liquidating the majority which
were no longer profitable or necessary. Workers led by
the P.C.I. and the General Confederation of Labor blocked
all liquidations and forced an influx of state money to
support the firms and maintain jobs. Mario Einaudi,
Maurice Bye and Ernesto Rossi, Nationalization in France
and Ital (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Universxty Press, I955).
pp' 2 ‘2190

~181-
stultifying factor is the participation of the government
in business. This participation was extensive prior to
WOrld war II, and, because of the vast amounts Of recon-
struction and modernization needed, all parties (with some
P.R.I. reservations) agreed that it must continue. The
immense cost Of these activities could only be met by
government resources (with aid from the United States).
The Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale handled
much of this financing, particularly in the steel, ship-
building and heavy engineering industries. This resulted
in public ownership of 40% of the steel production, 80%
Of the shipyard capacity, 30% Of the electric power plants,
etc.3 Uneconomic industries and factories continued to
operate at a loss while those that were sound had to make
up the deficits incurred. (Originally I.R.I. was expected
to keep industries until they were profitable and then
return them to private operation. This worked only fer a
short time; now companies under I.R.I. stay there.) Other
state owned or controlled enterprises are Operated by

similar public organizations with about the same results.“

31bid., p. 251.

hSee Bye and Rossi Einaudi, op. cit., pp. 191—246,
and Giandomencio Cosmo, "State Participation in Business
Concerns in Italy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly
Review, VI, NO. 19 ( 95 , 2 -2 2.

~182-
Agriculture

The second major element in the Italian economy
is agriculture. Compared to most other European countries
wand the United States, agriculture takes up a dispropor-
tionately large percentage of the labor force; e.g., in
1951, Italy had h2.2%, France had 31.8% and the United
States had only 11.7% engaged in farming. Despite this
concentration on agriculture, however, Italy is not self-
sufficient in foodstuffs and is forced to import wheat
(60.5 billion lira worth in 1950), corn, other cereals,
tobacco, meat, fats and many other basic needs. The
only items grown in sufficient quantities to meet domestic
demands, and have an excess to export, are rice, olives,
olive Oil, grapes, wine, citrus fruits and hemp.

This is not to say that Italy is not a producer
of great quantities Of food crOps. Wheat is the largest
single crop--approximately eleven and one-half million
acres producing something under eight million tons. Other
grains grown are corn (mostly in the North), oats, barley
and rye. Beans, peas and lentils are produced, principally
in the South, along with citrus fruits, pears, peaches,
tomatoes, potatoes, sugar beets and tobacco. Livestock
is raised in all areas; in 1953 there were approximately
nine million head of cattle, four million hogs, two million
goats and ten million sheep in Italy. (While these totals

may sound large they actually are very low in terms of the

-183...
Italian population. For example, the 9,000,000 cattle
represent only approximately 181 head per thousand popula-
tion as compared to an equivalent figure of 531 per thou-
sand in the United States.5)

A The best farming region of the entire country is
the valley and delta of the Po River where the soil is
“excellent, the farms are relatively large and the farming
methods and equipment are modern. This is a region of
mixed farming, including dairy herds, vegetables, grains
(corn and rice), fruits and some grape vines. Wheat pro-
duction in this area averages 60 bushels per acre (120
per acre upper limit) as opposed to the national average
of 13.4. Outside this favored area, however, the climatic
conditions and physiographical structure of Italy are
starkly different. The Appenine mountains, which are the
backbone of the country, make the majority of the land
unusable except for marginal farming and grazing. (80%
of Italian land is hilly or mountainous). The soil is
poor; the seasonal rains are inadequate and often fall at
the wrong time; over-cutting has depleted (or obliterated)
forests and severe erosion is common; low flat areas are
Often marshy and malarial; etc. Elaborate terracing,

particularly in the Center, has made the most of what is

50arlo Vanzetti and Frank Meissner, "The Agrarian
Reform in Italy," Land Economics, XXIX (May, 1953), 1A3.

 

 

-18A-
available. Beautiful olive and citrus groves and vineyard
have resulted, but expansion is almost impossible. Much
of the highland area is good only fOr sheep and goat herd-
ing, but seasonal migration is required for even this
activity. The land tenure system and the poor training
of the farmers (discussed above with reference to land
reform) are merely contributing factors that make a bad
situation worse.

The result of this very poor environment (fer farm-
ing is that Italy has a net import-export deficit in food-
stuffs-~this despite the productive capacity of the PO
region. Italy is in the very unfortunate position of
having too little good land to feed its people and, at the
same time, insufficient mineral resources to emulate Great
Britain in turning to industry. Nonetheless, a better
balance Of industrial-agricultural workers would markedly
improve the situation. (This is a prime example of a vicious
circle.)

Since the beginning Of the twentieth century the
trend in Italy as in all other Western countries, has been
away from agriculture, as Table 20 indicates. This
development has been extremely slow-~an increase in indus-
trial employment Of less than 10% in fifty years is virtually
no change at all compared to other countries. Whether this
pace will be accelerated will depend almost entirely upon

Government land reform and industrial investment policies

 

 

-185-
TABLE 20

PERCENTAGE OF THE WORKING FORCE ENGAGED IN EACH
OF FOUR OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIESa

W

 

Public
Year Agriculture Industry Commerce Administration
1901 58.8 ' 26.3 4.9 5.2
1911 56.1 30.2 5.3 A.6
1921 56.2 28.6 6.0 A.2
1931 51.0 31.2 7.7 4.6
1936 48.2 31.8 8.7 5.4
1951 Al.3 36.1 lO.h 5.6

 

aIndustry includes transportation and communication;
commerce includes banking and insurance. The figures in
this table total approximately 93-94%; the remainder includes,
among other things, service occupations which made up 5.A%
of the total employment in 1951. Bruno Foa, "The Italian
Ecnomy: Growth Factors and Bottlenecks," Banca Nazionale
del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VI, No. 27 (l 53 , A .
--these, in turn, will depend partly upon which parties

are in power.

Occupational Categories
To assess the influence that the workers' Occupa-

tions have on their vote, the 1951 census figures were
again used. For convenience sake the various activities
were coalesced into four main categories: agriculture,
industry and commerce, service occupations and public
administration. The first of these includes agriculture,
hunting and fishing. The second is made up of industry,

 

 

~186-
commerce and construction. Service occupations include
transportation, credit and insurance and electric, gas and
water workers. Public admdnistration refers to public
employees. The first four columns of Table 21 indicate
the results in terms of percentage of the total population
engaged in each category by provinces. The fifth and sixth
columns indicate, respectively, the percentage of agri-
cultural and non-agricultural workers who are self-employed.
(The category "self-employed" is extended to include un-
paid family labor.) The final column represents the per-
centage of non-agricultural workers that are administrators
or professionals.

A very brief perusal of Table 21 will indicate what
has been said previously about the drOp in industrial employ-
ment in the South. (The provinces are arranged in rough
North to South order.) In only one province of the flgggg;
géggng (Napoli) does industry employ over half the labor
and in only one other (Cagliari) is the total above 40%.

It will be noted, however, that the provinces of the North
and Center vary between industry and agriculture, ranging
between approximately 67% agriculture and 84% industry.
There is little geographical difference in service occupa-
tions and public administration.

The figures on independence offer some interesting
differences, however. The percentage of independent farmers

in the North and Center is unifbrmly high (the principal

‘4

 

-137-

TABLE 21

PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYMENT IN VARIOUS FIELDSa

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no mamaowmmOHOum

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one humaneGH

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Province

1.0

49.4 4.3 6.6 89.9 .9

39-7

 

Alessandria
Valle d'Aosta

Asti
Cuneo
Novara
Torino
Vercelli

268800001

111123212

897511.263.)

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395656I+52
111231211

976e)ozviw1tbiw

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352622176
869265588

923231 591
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6 7686 76 96

6952601799

000......

33.14l436 1414.3,

891

o o o o
5 .146
5 .43

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83.9

7

0
I4
1+

67.1
75

78.2
48.9

516800950
0 O O C O O O O 0
233247906
231.45 3.14

08 aa 0
ma... nVO .16
C Comahs
gsomt .1 e
reme lvnr
auto”. .1308
BBCC MPSV

Bolzano
Trento
Belluno
Padova
Rovigo
revise

T
Venezia

Verona
Vicenza

60.0
48.7

17.6
39.8

Gorizia
Udine

58.8 17.1 21.9 75.4 13.2 3.1

2.2

Trieste

-188-
TABLE 21--Continued

 

 

mHOpmupmanwaBe. 9279 0033754 6 970995500
0 C C O C O C C O O C 6 6 O O O O C O C O
to mHmcowmmomomm 2211 2111111 1 021111121
9220 9706104 3 861674634
medowm .3590 Loner.“ O./m7.7.7..mL 8. iLMImLoneral.
a.“ ucovcoaovcH 1212 2222223 2 222121222
onspHsOHhmae. eukwflnw JMANRNJMM ,Oem MMJewMMJJM
1526 6 258 32 66
GH acouanmUmH 9798 6287765 7 886888888
soaosauuafisea JMJM MJMonum J BMppMmutm/wm
1 5 689 6 6 83 8
0353 11.41 1 1
7955 4963140 5 325191615
mofizmm . O . O 0 C 6 . C O . C C C O O C O O O .
MWOnVRc n/LT45557414 a) .Jorfidw:2574§{3
oouoeaoo omen/memo“ JMINIMMAWQW d Jewdnwcuiudnwfl
2 64 4 44 68 5 935641255
9.8 AppmzocH 6345 4233332 3 253556 462
4151 0222921 0 133071886
caspasowhmma onion7. emlelmemOnO. a” LONLLLAWMWL
412 3655446 5 625232436
a
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.. aeIMwa mwr a. .unuoai o.za.m . .1
p ween .muamaein naaoaaaan
an a nannanvms annuaennn
_%Ihs BFFMPPMR AFGLLMPPS

 

24.4 0.9

91.9

7.3

3200 300

51.8
65.4
67.8
57.7

106110
a

gia
esarO e

Peru
Terni
Ancona
Ascoli P'
gacerat
Urbino
Rieti
Viterbo

~189-

TABLE 21--Continued

 

 

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9:85

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onsuflsoapm<

Province

 

82032

7706.8
12332

87047

000.0
thnfleJ
7:0:2570

Campobasso

Chieti
L'Aquila

Pescara
Teramo

Benevento
Caserta

Avellino
Napoli

Salerno

saa

Brindisi

Fo
Le

Bari
cce
Taranto

Matera

Potenza .

1.2

27.9
26.3
27.0

7.9 9
oo o
92 0
.443 a;
.614 52
oo o
55 6
.413 7:
00 O
21) .4

26.
26.
28.5

4
5
60.6

Calabria

Catanzaro
Cosenza
Reggio di

1587
.Wn/oKUnU/hw o e e o
66969u787

.782847492

M372 57.4.“3

KidnvifiDofifieDRu

0000.0...

72 7118 32 3
2 33333333

474253383
0 e o e eA/"IMQNQOJ
3
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altmsumcra
and 6 ask?
ACCEMPRST

-190-

TABLE 21--Continued

 

a

o
5 .5 ..‘3 .2
v °~ .2: '33
8 5 3 fig 3H am
a M :s .3. .33 3::
£3 $.o m a spa s=k. nun
:3 +9“ 0 OH 0:3 8. Dior-l
o cum .4 .c: am: a a»:

*4 fig > H 0H 00 $4
:2, '2. a; 93 3:2, '23 23
Province 4: HD to Lg< H< HO am:
Cagliari 21.7 63.5 5.3 9.6 #8.1 19.6 1.0
Nuoro 7.5 22.6 2.7 7.2 58.4 30.8 0.6
Sassari 5603 2902 has 1000 5401 2708 102
ITALIA 42.2 35.3 5.4 8.5 67.5 21.5 1.7

 

aCalculated from:

Centrale d1 Statistica,

Repubblica Italiana, Istituto

Roma: Soc. A eta,

IX Censimento Generals della P029-
13210ne. & 251, h 0

Novembre l

~191-
exceptions being Cremona, Rovigo and Ferrara)--in the flgggg;
giorno the opposite is true. The southern situation is
actually worse than the percentages indicate. The inde-
pendent landholders (with the obvious exception of the
estate owners) usually have only marginal lands and very
little equipment. While better off than the tenant farmers,
these "independents", with their large families and low in-
comes, can barely survive.

The percentages indicating independence are somewhat
misleading due to the including of non-paid family workers.
While these persons are clearly not employees, their inclu-
sion does inflate the number of "independent" farmers. The
census lists 5,573,812 farm workers in this class, of which
3,001,771 may be described as family help. This, of course,
represents well over 50% of the total independents. It is
worth noting that l,8h4,37l of these helpers are male--
many presumably adults. .

While the South is much lower in percentage of inde-
pendent farm workers, the non-agricultural independents are
lowest in the North. The reason for this is relatively
simple--the large industries which hire many employees are
in the North and Center. The independent workers of the
Mezzogiorno are often the operators of one-man or one-family
"industries" which usually specialize in handicraft work.
These figures, incidently, also include unpaid family
"employeavg but these number only 40L,269 out of 2.h37.h8h

independents.

~192-

Party Vote and Agricultural Occupations
The statistics from Table 21 were compared with the
voting totals of the various parties to obtain statistical
lcorrelations. While these correlations are not high, they
do seem to indicate a definite relationship between the vote
of certain parties and the occupations of the voters.
Looking first at agricultural employment, it can
be seen that for Italy as a whole there is a definite but
fairly low negative relationship with the two major Center
parties. The two leftist parties are split, with the P.C.I.

insignificantly positive and the P.S.I. more clearly negative.

TABLE 22

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN-PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE

W fi I
_‘i_—- -—. W“.

 

 

Party North Center South ISlands Italy
D.C. “.2h +025 +050 +oh7 “.31
P.S.D.I. +00k 9.22 “005 “008 “.40
P.L.I. +000 +011} +037 ”OJ-h +021
P.R.I. +024 +011 +018 ’009 +010
P.C.I. +026 -023 “012 3'015 +008
P.S.I. “.17 +008 “017 -026 ’03“
PONOMJ +001 +009 -021 -.27 +g32
M.S.I. -031 . “006 “022 “045 +022

*_

 

Note that a positive correlation with a party here means

that as the percentage of workers employed in agriculture

goes up in a province, the chances of a higher vote for

 

-l93~
that party also go up--this, however, is not a proportional
rise. (The higher the correlation, the more likely a high
vote for the party; consequently it is evident that a
correlation in the .20 to .30 range indicates, at best, a
low probability.) Interestingly, the two rightist parties
have a low positive correlation with_agricultural employ-
ment over the nation as a whole, but are negative in most
geographical areas.

As with unemployment in Chapter IV the most sig-
nificant relationships appear when the geographical break-
down is studied. It appears, again, that there is a sub-
stantial difference in voter motivation from one region
to another. (For the majority of parties, the correlation
figures in the North have signs apposite to those in the
Mezzogiorgo. In the Center the signs show no pattern.)
With the agricultural employment variable, however, there
is probably very little significance to this division. In
the North and Center, where agricultural occupations repre-
sent only a small percentage of the total working force,
the correlation figures are very low. This indicates that
this variable has little influence on vote in these areas.
(This, of course, reduces the significance of the national
figures.) Only in the agricultural mezzogiorno are these
figures of sufficient size as to have meaning, and even
here only the Christian Democrats and M.S.I. are. obviously
affected.

 

m..- —w-—~.w#*9 - ,-.,.L_._,r -

-194-

It is the positive correlation of the D.C. party
that is most interesting. Since the Mezzogiorno was the
area at which the land reform program was aimed, it might
have been anticipated that the Christian Democrats would
show strong support where agricultural employment was the
principal occupation. However, as discussed previously,
the land program had barely been started in 1953. The'
anti-D.C. feelings engendered among landlords-(who lost
land) and peasants (who had not received it yet) were
thought to have cost that party a considerable number of
votes. There is no way of discerning whetherthe corre-
'lation between the Christian Democratic vote and agricul-
tural employment was higher in 19A8 or whether it would
have changed in 1953 had the land reform program been fur-
ther advanced. Since the party's vote drapped in the South
and Islands between the two elections, there would seem to
(be some reason for assuming so. However, the Christian
Democrats obviously were not repudiated in agricultural
regions.

In view of the concentration by the Opposition on
the agricultural workers (especially by the P.C.I.), the
negative figures for the Left and Right are noteworthy.
Actually, these figures are too low to be significant, but
they clearly show that the gains by the opposition in the ,
mezzogioggo came from non-agricultural areas. The highest.
correlation among the parties of the Left and Right is

 

 

 

_ ~ -195-
that of the M.S.I. in the Islands. (This party was particu-
larly weak in Sardegna where agriculture predominates. Quite
possibly a local party, the Partito Sardo diAgiope, attracted
potential M58.I. voters.) Even this M.S.I. figure is
relatively low, however, and, along with the negative
correlations of the other parties, is important only in
that it shows that the inroads of the opposition into the
agricultural regions of the.Mezzogiorno have been slight.
These remain strongholds of the Christian Democrats.

Party Vote and Industrial Occupations

The relationships between party vote and industrial
employment present much the same picture as did the agri-
cultural employment . variable. Here, again, there is a
considerable difference between the two northern areas and
the Mezzogiorno. It is in the North and Center that the
vast majority of industrial workers is employed. Conse-
quently, the correlations for these two regions are of
much more importance in determining the effect of industrial
employment on vote. A high negative or positive figure
in the South or Islands presumably would not add to or
detract materially from a party's total. The importance
of the correlations fer the nation is also somewhat lessened
because of the split between the major geographical areas.
Actually, only two parties, the P.S.I. and P.S.D.I., have
even fairly clear national correlations. In both cases

the relationship is clearly positive although still less
than 0 so.

 

 

~196-

TABLE 23 ,

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION ENGAGED IN INDUSTRY

Islands Italy

 

Party . North Center South

D.C. +031 “.19 -0h8 'ohh +020
P.S.D.I. +003 +042 +001 -000 +oh7
P.L.I. +006 “.33 -027 “001 “020
P.R.I. “.27 +009 ‘022 +011 ‘012
P.C.I. ‘032 +025 +001 +005 ’011
P.S.I. +023 -001 +010 +ohl§ +.l|.0
PoNflMe +001 -020 +032 +00h “035‘
M33010 _ +020 '015 +013 +oh6 “032

 

Looking at the industrial employment-party vote
geographical break-down, it can be seen that the position
of the Christian Democratic party is almost exactly the
reverse of what it was with agriculture. The relationship
is somewhat indeterminate outside the Mezzogiorno (although
clearly positive in the North), but in that area the nega-
.tive correlations indicate that the D.C. party' is better
off in provinces with low industrial employment. Since
that type of province predominates in the South and Islands,
the Christian Democratic vote does not suffer as much as- it
would if the negative relationship existed in the
North. ’

Actually, the correlation figure fer the D.C. in
the most heavily industrialized section of Italy, the
North, indicates that the party has considerable appeal in

 

 

~197-

the stronghold of the P.C.I. It should be recognized,
however, that this does not necessarily imply labor support
for the Christian Democrats. It could very well result
from a reaction by non-industrial workers to the pro-
communist labor movement.

Undoubtedly the most surprising bit of information
conveyed by the above table is the almost complete lack
of correlation between the vote of the Communist party
and the size of the industrial labor force. A small nega-
tive relationship in the North and an even lower positive
correlation in the Center are followed by insignificant '
figures for the other areas (and for the nation as a whole).
The negative correlation of the North indicates that the
P.C.I.'s chances of increasing its vote fall as the per-
centage of industrial workers rises. A comparison of the
voting figures of Table 12 with the industrial percentages
of Table 21 indicates why this is true. The highest pro-
portion of the vote received by the Communists occurred
in the Region of Emilia-Romagna. In the provinces of that
Region, the P.C.I. vote ranged between 29.3% and h2.3%;
the portion of the working ferce engaged in industrial
occupations ranged from 28.8% to Ah.7%. The northern 3
prevince with the highest proportion of workers engaged in
industry, Varese with 83.9%, gave the P.C.I. only 13.0%
of the vote (the D.C. received h6.5%).

 

-l98- -

It seems to be apparent that the political philoso-
phy of the P.C.I. in the industrial areas has either not
cenvinced the workers or else has antagonized non-workers
to the extent that the labor vote is virtually cancelled.
Whichever explanation is true (and probably each accounts
in part fer the correlations), it might be expected that
increased Communist activity and more stringent party dis-
cipline would increase this negative reaction.

The two Socialist parties, which have positive
national correlations of moderate size, each has a similar
correlation with industrial employment in a single geogra-
phical region-~the Social remocrats in the Center and the
P.S.I. in the Islands. Since the industrial employment
totals in the Islands are low, the P.S.I. could not hope
to secure many votes from that element (as the actual
Socialist vote in the Islands indicates), but the votes
itckes receive in Sicilia and Sardegna come largely from
the few industrial centers. The P.S.I. (like the P.S.D.I.)
has a positive correlation in three of the four geographical
regions, but in the North and South these figures are low.

In the area where the Socialists are negative,
the Center, the Social Democrats have their highest positive
relationship. Since industrial workers make up a compara-
tively high percentage of the working force, the P.S.D.I.
is in an advantageous position. It is interesting to .

note that a Socialist party has a positive correlation with

 

 

. ~199-
industrial labor in each of the four regions and over the
entire nation. It appears that a high percentage of in-
dustrial labor is a definite asset to the Socialists. Quite
possibly this appeal is clearer than that of the P.C.I.
because the P.S.I. and P.S.D.I. arouse less antagonism
from non-industrial workers. (This quite probably was
due, in part, to Nenni's "split" with the Communists and
his call fer a "Socialist Alternative".)

The only other party with a fairly high correlation
is the M.S.I. with a +.ao in the Islands. coupled with '
its -.A5 with agricultural employment, it is quite clear
that the neo-Fascists are considerably stronger where in-
dustrial employment is highest. Since most of the Islands
are agricultural, however, their prospects are somewhat
limited. The other rightist party, the P.N.M., is insig-
nificantly positive in the same areas as is the M.S.I.

Party Vote and Service Occupations

The third of the four occupational categories is
"service" employment (which, it will be recalled, includes
transportation, credit and insurance and electric, gas and
water workers). As the table shows, there appears to be
little relationship between party vote and the proportion
of the population engaged in this type of employment. The
only exception is the D.C. party. The Christian Democrats,
as was the case in both the agricultural and industrial

-200-
TABLE 2h

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
or THE POPULATION ENGAGED IN SERVICE OCCUPATIONS

,._ _ _- _, fl,_, ." ._.__

 

.......v _, ..-_-

South Islands Italy

 

 

Party f North Center

D.C.. ‘016 “037 ’055 '040 “019
P.S.D.I. “010 +006 +002 '008 +011
P.L.I. -007 +004 “029 +014 -014
P.R.I. +.Ol +.O7 -.26 +.lO +.02
P.C.I. +012 +031 +012 '016 +014
P.S.I. +010 "019 +023 +007 +elh
P.N.M. ' -.07 -.Ol +.2z. +.35 -.lO
M.S.I. +.28 +.21 +.o3 +.37 +.oz.

 

analyses, have significant correlations in the Mézzogiorno
--especially in the South. In both southern areas the
relationship is negative as it is in the North and Center.
There appears to be no logical explanation of why an increas-
ing percentage of the population engaged in service employ-
ment should lead to a decrease in D.C. support, but this

is obviously the case.
Of some interest are the relationships of the M.S.I.,

the P.S.I. and the P.C.I. with service employment. These
parties have low, positive correlations with this variable
in almost all geographical areas (the only exceptions being
the P.C.I. in the Islands and the P.S.I. in the Center). It
appears that an increase in service employment in a province

slightly enhances the possibility of a higher radical vote

in that province.

 

-201-

Party Vote and Public Administration

The final table in the vote-occupation correlation
analysis has to do with public administration. As in the
"service" table, there is no national correspondence be-
tween vote and occupation. Geographically, however, several
of the parties show very clear correlations.

As in the cases above, the Christian Democrats have
their highest relationship with this occupation in the South

TABLE 25

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION ENGAGED IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

 

 

_-:._
h:-

 

 

 

Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. ‘ “.03 ’026 “.515 -026 “.12
P.S.D.I. '021 “004 “012 +032 +001
P.L.I. ’020 +027 -031 +037 ‘elh
P.R.I. +003 +e02 -OBA ‘010 +003
P.C.I. +007 +009 +027 -055 +010
P.S.I. ‘019 -022 +017 -021 “001
P.N.Mo '01]. +0111: +008 +065 -.11
M.S.I. +.41 +.h9 +.35 +.l6 +.18

with less significant figures in the Islands and the Center.
The negative correlations in the Mezzogiornocontinue the
trend indicated by industry and service-~in every employment
category except agriculture the D.C. party clearly has a
relatively high negative correlation in this area. (This,

of course, means that as the percentage of the labor force

. ~202-
engaged in any or all non-agricultural occupations rises,
the probability of a high D.C. vote decreases.) With this
being the case, the loss of vote by that party in the
mezzogiogno is not surprising. However, most analyses of-
the southern vote have indicated that it was the non-pro-
ductiveness of the land reform law that paralyzed the
Christian Democrats-~these correlations appear to cast

some doubt on such a belief.

The negative correlation for public administration
workers, of course, does not necessarily indicate an anti-
D.C. feeling amongthose employees. This result could
perhaps be due to successful anti-Center prOpaganda by the
P.C.I. The P.C.I. continually criticized the Christian
Democrats for crowding the public service with proeCenter
personnel-~the negative correlation could well be the
result of voters being more conscious of the Communist
attack in provinces in which the percentage of workers in
public administration is highest.

Other parties which have clear correlations with
the percentage of workers engaged in public administration
are the P.C.I., the P.N.M. and the.M.S.I. The Communists
display no relationship with public employees in the nation
as a whole or in three of the four regions. In the Islands,
however, the P.C.I. has a high, negative correlation; the
highest correlation, in fact, that it has in any region on

any occupation variable. Evidently the anti-Government

e203-
propaganda on civil service employees did little for the
Communists in the Islands.

The correlation between vote and percentage of
workers in public administration is significantly positive
with only two parties-~those of the Right. The correlations
for these two parties cast some severe doubts upon the
claims of the P.C.I. that the public payroll is clogged
with pro~Center employees. It is evident that the rightist
parties draw heavily upon the bureaucracy fer support.

The P.N.M. has a very high relationship in only one area,
the Islands. (It is interesting to note that the corre-
lations, both positiie and negative, are high in the
Islands. This would seem to indicate that this variable
has more direct effect on the voting there than in any
other area.) The M.S.I., on the other hand, has signifi-
cant positive relationships in the North and Center and
only slightly lower figures in the South. The cause of
this is not clear, but it is interesting to note that the
neo-Fascist is the only group to have a positive correlation
in the two northern areas. Between them, the two rightist
parties definitely have a clear advantage where the public
administration employment vote is high. The high positive
relationship between the rightist vote and public adminis-
tration coupled with the uniformly negative correlations
of other parties, certainly indicates a conservative
bureaucracy. Whether this indicates a lack of sympathy

-204-

with democratic government is less clear. In any case,
the comparatively low percentage of the national vote
received by the P.N.Ms and the M.S.I. quite probably would
have been higher if public employees made up a

large portion of the working population in more provinces.

In analyzing the total impact of occupation on
voting, it is evident that the Christian Democratic party
is most influenced, with this influence largely limited
to the Mezzogiorno. None of the other Center parties has
any significant correlation (except for the fairly low
relationship of the P.S.D.I. with industrial workers),
and evidently their vote is influenced very little by
these variables.

It should be noted that there is a considerable
geographical difference in the influence of occupation on
vote. High correlations are rare in the two northern
regions, but are common in the Mezzogiorno. It is also
worth noting that the Christian Democrats have negative
relationships with each employment category other than
agriculture in the southern regions. It is quite probable
that there is a connection between these two facts. It
appears that the land reform program of the South and
‘Islands had convinced the agricultural workers that the
Government (in effect, the D.C. party) intended to help
despite the only slight gains up to.l953. On the other
hand, the Government had done little for other employees

 

-205-

(although the "Fund for the South" might offer future
industrial employment). Regardless of the explanation of
the vote, it is clear that the chances of a Christian Demo-
cratic victory in a southern province are materially im-
proved if a high percentage of employment is agricultural.
At the same time, a high percentage of employment in any
other category substantially decreases this probability.
This fact emfixasizes one further point; the D.C. party,

if it is to continue its dominant position in Italy, must
retain its support in agricultural areas. An effective
and far—reaching land program is evidently its best in-
surance against further losses.

.most other parties are relatively little affected
by occupation (although in the case of the P.C.I. this
lack of correlation is itself of some significance, as
discussed befbre). The only exceptions are the M.S.I.
and, to a lesser extent, the P.N.M. The correlations
for these rightist parties indicate a definite reliance
upon occupation groups that represent only a minority of
the populace. This is most clearly shown by the influence
of public administration and service employment on their
vote throughout the country. Something of the same situation
exists fer industrial occupations. The two parties have
their highest positive correlations with this variable in
the mezzogiorno where industrial workers are in the
minority. Only for agricultural employment does this

 

 

~206-

reliance upon minorities disappear (where the only signifi-
cant correlation is a -.L5 for the M.S.I. in the Islands).

One further point of interest conserning the Right
is the relationship between the P.N.M. and M.S.I. and the
Christian Democrats in the Mezzogiorno. For most occupational
classifications one or both of the rightist parties has a
correlation figure approximately equal to but always opposite
in sign to that of the D.C. It would seem that the Right
and the Christian Democrats appeal to provinces with pre-
cisely opposite employment characteristics. The correlations
between the Right and the Christian Democrats bear out this
statement; the relationship with the P.N.M. being -.A5 in
the South, and that with the M.S.I. being -.A6 in the Is-

lands 0

Party Vote and Agricultural Independence

The next two variables to be analyzed for effect
on party vote have to do with the economic independence
of agricultural and industrial workers. The correlations
between party vote and the percentage of agricultural
workers who are independent are indicated in Table 26.

Quite obviously the most indicative correlations
describe the relationship between agricultural independents
(cultivatori diretti) and the vote of the Christian Demo-

 

crats. While the figures are not high in any geographical

area, they are moderately positive everywhere. There are

-207...

TABLE 26

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS THAT ARE INDEPENDENT

 

 

Party North

 

 

Center South Islands Italy
D.C. +.Ao +.2A +.35 +.Al '+.27
P.S.D.I. +023 +029 +016 “04»6 +032
PeLoIe +olh -027 +027 '025 “.10
P.R.I. “003 “.07 +ol|v5 +005 +016}
P.C.I. “037 “003 ‘01]. “022 “008
P.S.I. “.46 +o#8 'oBh “007 +019
P.N.Mo +033 '05“ '01]. ”002 -036
M.S.I. +002 “068 “001} “.01 “oh-1
two explanations for this very favorable situation. First,

it might logically have been expected that land ownership

and economic independence would lead to a fairly conserva-

tive vote for the Christian Democrats to help ensure the

status quo.

(This, of course, is not true for estate

owners who would lose land if the Center were victorious.)

Secondly, and perhaps more directly responsible, was a

vigorous organizational drive made by the Christian Demo-

crats (specifically Ivanoe Bonomi)6 among the small inde-

pendent land owners of Italy.

This effort evidently pro-.

duced gratifying results for the D.C. party. It was une
fortunate for the Christian Democrats that agricultural

*

6Bonomi organized most of the cultivatori diretti
rm

into a massive pressure group for the

“.mhm 2:32;»

 

~208-

independents did not represent a higher proportion of all
persons engaged in agricultural occupations; the land reform
program presumably will raise this percentage for future
elections.

It might have been anticipated that the minor
Center parties would share in any success among the 2313;;
vatori diretti, but neither singly nor collectively do they
show a pattern. The only one of these parties to show a
relatively significant positive relationship is the P.R.I.
in the South-~an area in which all Center parties have
low, positive correlations. Evidently the allies of the
Christian Democrats are little influenced in their vote
by this particular variable.

This is not true of the opposition parties. Each
of these has at least one geographical region in which it
is influenced by agricultural independents. Both of
the parties of the Right are, in general, negatively
affected, with particularly significant correlations in the
Center. Only in the non-agricultural North do these parties
have positive figures. This is, perhaps, somewhat surpris-
ing since land ownership conceivably could lead to a very
conservative vote for the Right. This inclination undoubtedly
does exist among the estate owners, but these are greatly
outnumbered by the small cultivatori diretti who support
the Christian Democrats.

The leftist opposition shows the same negative

 

-209-
relationship as the Right. This, of course, was to be
expected. Actually, the P.S.I. does have a comparatively
high positive correlation in the Center and a similar, but
much lower, relationship for the nation as a whole. Why
these independents should support the Socialists in the
Center is obscure, but evidently the P.S.I. received con-
siderable support from them in that area. It is interest-
ing to note that this positive relationship is in the same
area where the rightist correlations are significantly
negative. ‘With the Dehocratic Socialists also positive
in the Center, it would seem that land ownership is likely
to lead to a socialist vote. The negative correlations
fer the P.S.I. in the North and.Mezzogiorno are much more
in line with expectations.

The Communist party has no correlations of sig-
nificance, but the negative characteristic of its relation-
ships in all areas is noteworthy. While not severely in-
hibited by a high percentage of agricultural workers being
independent, the P.C. obviously gained virtually no support
among these voters; the result reflects the failure of the
P.C.I. to organize the cultivatori diretti. As the land
reform program advances, and independents become more

numberous, the Communists may well suffer.

Party Vote and Non-Agricultural Independents
The second set of correlations applying to inde-

pendent workers refers to all non-agricultural occupations.

 

~210-
As can be seen, this table presents very few figures of
significant size, whether for the Government or for the
TABLE 27

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF NON-AGRICULTURAL WORKERS THAT ARE INDEPENDENT

“ A _fi l ‘1 I 1
_-___ _1.

 

Party . North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. "03" +039 +028 +010 -019
P.S.D.I. +004 +001} “010 +029 "031
P.L.I. +013 +o07 +040 “016 +026
P.R.I. +028 ".02 -003 +016 +008
P.C.I. +036 ‘012 “.01 +025 +015
P.S.I. “002 ‘007 ”019 -008 “032
P.N.Me +006 “.12 “007 “022 +032
M.S.I. '03“ ‘023 “04.8 “027 +016

 

opposition. It was anticipated that the Center and possibly
the Right would show positive correlations with this vari-
able because of the vested interests these independents
have in the existing society. In general, the Center
parties have this favorable relationship, but none of them
is positive in every region. The Christian Democrats and
Liberals are in the best position, but the figures for even
these two groups are so low as to have only marginal sig-
nificance. The most important piece of information con-
veyed by the correlations of the Center is that these parties
Certainly are not handicapped, and may be supported, in

areas where non-agricultural independents are numerous.

The second expectation, that the Right possibly

 

~211-
would receive support, is not borne out by the correlations.
Unquestionably many of the "big-business" proprietors do
back the M.S.I. or P.N.M., but in voting power they are
greatly outnumbered by the small independents. This has.
resulted in negative correlations for both these parties,
particularly the M.S.I., with this variable. While the
figures are generally low, the tendency is to handicap the
Right as the tendency is to aid the Center.

The correlations of the Left are all too low to
permit any substantial conclusions to be reached. All
that can be said is that the position of the P.C.I. and the
P.S.I. is similar to that of the Right, i.e., a high per- '

centage of independents in a province is a handicap.

Party Vote and Professionals and Administrators

The final variable to be discussed is the relation-
ship between party vote and the percentage of non-agricultural
independents that are professionals or administrators. For
most parties this table indicates no general pattern and
no significant correlations. For the Christian Democrats,
however, the situation is very different.

The D.C. correlations are negative in all areas
and significantly so in the Mezzogiorno. This, of course,
is a startling reversal of the trend for all non-agricultural
independents, as discussed above. These professionals and

administrators presumably had good livelihoods and had a

 

-212-
TABLE 28

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF
NON-AGRICULTURAL INDEPENDENTS THAT ARE PROFESSIONALS

 

 

, 0R ADMINISTRATORS

 

 

 

‘:_.

 

 

Party _ North‘ Center South Islands Italy
DOC. ”022 “010 ‘662 “059 “ell
P.S.D.I. -.10 +.3A +.02 +.Al +.3O
P.L.I. +003 “005 “031} +020 -011
P.R.I. -011. “.13 -030 +031 -.11
P.C.I. +.08 +.26 +.ll -.07 +.07
P.L.I. +0214» “020 - +021 -005 +020
P.N.Me +002 '016 +036 +030 -.]J+
M.S.I. +019 '00]. “.03 +051 “.12

stake in the country under Christian Democratic control.
Presumably, also, they were among the best educated voters,
but, as will be seen in the next chapter, there is a fairly
high negative correlation between education and the D.C.
party. Which is cause and which is effect cannot be shown.
It is clear, however, that the positive relationship be-
tween the Christian Democratic vote and non-agricultural
independents is due to non-professionals and those who
are not administrators. (In fact, the D.C. support among
these workers is evidently high since it overcomes the ‘
negative relationship with professionals and administrators.)
The minor Center parties have no clear correlations
with the profsasional-administrator variable (with the

possible exception of the +.bl of the P.S.D.I. in the Islands.)

 

~213-

The same statement applies to the Left. The Right-wing
parties are somewhat more dependent upon this factor,
however. The P.N.M. figures indicate a low positive relation-
ship in both regions of the Mezzo iorno, while the M.S.I.
has a significant positive relationship in the Islands.

Turning from this last variable to an overall
study of independence on vote, it is readily seen that
there is little substantial difference between agricultural
and non-agricultural independents. An increase in the
percentage of persons in this category leads, in almost
every area, to better prospects for the Christian Democrats
and, with less uniformity, for the minor-Center parties.
On the other hand, an increase in this percentage is very
likely to lessen the chances of the Right or Left. It
is only when the non-agricultural independent category is
divided and the professionals and administrators are iso-
lated that this pattern is altered. Even then, as discussed
above, it is only the Christian Democrats that are pro-
foundly affected(negatively) while the other parties are
only marginally and spottily aided.

Conclusion
In summation of the entire study of the occupational
-independent variables, it must be said that these provide
a stronger or clearer motivation fer voting than did the

employment-unemployment factor. Several things have become

 

 

~21A-
clear. Correlations, positive and negative, are generally
greater in the Mazzogiorno; this presumably means that
these variables provide a stronger motivation in that area.
Correlations are also generally higher for the Christian
Democrats than for other parties, indicating perhaps a
tendency to reward or retaliate against the D.C. The
retaliatory votes, however, may go to any of the other
parties, thus keeping correlations fairly low. Finally,
since the Christian Democrats consistently have their
positive correlations with the majority elements in most
areas (e.g., agricultural occupations in the mezzo iorno,
industrial occupations in the North) and their negative
relationships with minority categories (e.g., industrial
occupations in the Eggsogiorno, public administration
occupations, professionals and administrators) they have

a considerable advantage over the Opposition.

 

CHAPTER VI
EDUCATION

Italian Educational System

One of the fundamental requirements of a modern,
democratic state is a literate populace which will be able
to make rational choices among alternative policies and
parties. Recognizing this fact, the Italian state has
long had a free and compulsory educational system designed
to produce an educated citizenry. All children fourteen
years of age and under are required to attend school;
refresher courses are available for adults. On paper, and
legally, it appears that Italy is the possessor of a com-
plete and efficient educational organization.

Despite the legal requirements and the existence
of an extensive school system, however, over 30% of the
Italian population over six years of age has not completed
elementary school and almost 13% is illiterate; 89% has
no more than an elementary education, if that. The simple
fact is that a great many children do not attend school.
A study of elementary school attendance made in 19L9 indicates
something of the true situation. In all of Italy, only
63% of children of elementary school age were actually

-215-

 

 

~216-

enrolled in school. By geographical regions the figures
were: North, 68.A%: Center, 65.1%; South, 57.6%; and
Islands, 57.1%.1 Furthermore, fer every three children
who enter the first grade, only one enters the fifth.2 Ob-
viously, considering the attendance at the elementary .
level, subsequent and more advanced education is going
to reach only a small proportion of the children. The
result is illiteracy for a large part of the population.

The importance of this illiteracy is apparent.
When discussing the appeals for votes made by the various
political parties, several references were made to the
educational level of the electorate. Illiterate persons
could not read the campaign materials; they could not read

newspaper comments; they could not even read the few words

 

1Association fer the Industrial Development of
Southern Italy (SVIMEZ), Surve of Southern Italian Econo ,
as cited by Joseph G. LaPanmEara, "LETE-Wing Traae UnIon-
ism," The Western Political arterl , VII, No. 2 (June,
1954), 2IZ. That tfiese figures were still approximately
correct at the time of the 1953 election is indicated by
the total attendance in elementary schools: in the l9h9-5O
school year, total enrollment was 4,815,239; in the 1952-53
school year this total had dropped to A,L77,299. Since
there is no indication of a large drop in the number of
children of the proper age, it can be assumed that any

change in the percentage attending school was probably for
the worse. Istituto Centrale de Statistics %fipgg£ig
i one:

Statistico ItalianoI 12%;, Serie V Vol. VI
st tuto o gra co e o Stato, 1955), p. 62.

- 2Geor e F. Kneller, "Education in Italy " in A. H.
Moehlman and . Roucek (ed.) Com arative Educat on (New
York: The Dryden Press, 1953 , p. . .-

 

 

 

-217-

printed on the ballots. The electoral consequences were
serious. When they were told by the P.N.M. that the elec-
tion of 1953 would serve as a new referendum on the Non-
archy, these persons had no way to find the truth except
from other political parties. The details of the Scelba
Law were almost incomprehensible. In addition, and perhaps
even more important, the willingness to wait for the fruition
of a long-term program is usually dependent upon the ability
to preceive and understand current problems preventing im-
mediate gratification of needs and desires. It could be
expected, therefore, that the Government pledges of eventual
economic progress and the Center parties' philosophical
arguments against Communism would have little weight when
confronted with the enticing picture of almost instantaneous
advancement promised by the P.C.I. To discovbr the extent
to which education influenced the electoral returns is the
purpose of this chapter.

The Italian educational system has four levels:
elementary, intermediate, secondary and university. The
elementary schools legally must be attended by all children
between the ages of six and eleven. The vast majority of
these schools (35,462 out of 41,119) are public and atten-

dance is free.3 The private schools are almost all operated

 

3Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale de Statistico,
op. cit., p. 63. Figures on schools and Size of attendance
may e ound in each of the annual volumes of this series.
Further information is included in Gastone Silvano Spinetti
(ed.), Italy Today (Rome: The DocumenuniXICenter of the
Presidency of the Council of'Ministers of the Republic of
Italy, 1955). Pp. 114-120.

 

~218-
by church organizations but may receive state aid if
they apply and are qualified. As indicated before, tre-
mendous numbers of children do not attend school even at
this elementary level.

7 The second or intermediate level of education is
principally for children between ages eleven and fourteen.
Two types of training are available, the choice of alter-
natives depending upon the educational and vocational aims
of the student. The vocational training schoolsare usually
for persons with no desire (or financial resources) to
continue their education past the compulsory age of fourteen.
The other type of school provides the preparatory work re-
quired for advancement into the high school level. In the
year 1952-53, the two classifications had approximately
equal numbers of students enrolled. However, where the
total number of elementary students was over 4.5 million,
the intermediate level had only 710,000.

The third stage of training is the high school or
upper secondary level. Here the preparation is separated
into feur divisions or lypégg: classical, scientific,
teacher training and technical/vocational. Only a com-
paratively small number of the persons of the right ages
(fourteen and up) enter the high school level-~402,000 in
1952-53 as compared to the 710,000 in the intermediate
classes. The persons who do work for a high school diploma

select the division which best suits their interest and

 

 

-219-
best meets the requirements for further training. Students
in the classical lygég are eligible to enroll in any uni-
versity course; those from the scientific division can '
take any courses except jurisprudence, philosophy and
literature. Persons in the teacher training lygég are
eligible to teach in elementary schools or to attend uni-
versity courses in teacher education. .Students from.the
technical/vocational sections can enroll in certain uni-
versity schools such as economics, commerce, business, etc.
There are fifty-two institutions of higher education
(twenty-eight universities) in Italy, many of them world
famous. The number of students who go beyond high school
is comparatively small (211,000 in 1953-5h), and only one
persent of the population had university degrees when the
census was taken in 1951. Part of the reason for this low
enrollment and fer the relatively few high school graduates
lies in the rigid requirements for a secondary degree.
Those in the classical lygég are required to pass courses
in Italian, Latin, Greek, mathematics, physics, chemistry,
natural sciences, history of art, p01itical history and
economics.‘ Shmilar course work must be passed by students
in the other divisions. A state examination must be

passed before graduation, and another examination is

V

L'Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuildin of Ital (London:
Royal Institute of Internet one airs, 5 , p. 242.

 

~220-
necessary befbre entering the university. Requirements
such as these (plus a natural questioning of the utility
of some of the courses) have kept the total enrollment low.

This pedagogical system was designed to provide at
least minimal education fer the children and young adults.
However, it was not capable of lessening the startling
number of illiterate adults. These people, in many cases,
were deprived of a continuous education during their youth
because of the war; others, particularly in the.Mezzo iorno,
simply did not attend school. Those "natural" illiterates
were augmented by thousands that were once able to read
and write but whose environment caused them to revert to
illiteracy.

To decrease the number of persons who could not
read or write, the government set up what are called
"popular" schools. Three types of courses are taught: one
for illiterates, one for semi-illiterates and one designed
as a refresher course. Reading rooms were established to
encourage the use of skills learned. Every year since 1947
almost 100,000 persons have received elementary certificates
as a result of this program; 562,000 were enrolled in
1953-54.5

Educational Level in Italy

Despite the magnitude of these efforts and the

compulsory school law, the educational level is not high.

SSpinetti, o . cit., pp. 118-119.

-221-

Table 29 presents something of the situation. The first
five columns represent the extent of education by the major
levels offered. When a person completes the work required
in any level, he receives a degree certifying that fact.
The figures presented in the first column represent the
percentage of the total population of six years of age
and older that has no school degree. The other columns
give the percentage of the population that has received
the degrees indicated. The last three columns present the
illiteracy figures fer Italy: the first gives the per-
centage of the total population (six years old and up)
that is illiterate; the second the percentage of illiterates
that is male; and the third the percentage of literates
that is male.

Even the most cursory examination of this table
will indicate that the educational problem in Italy, in
one respect at least, is very similar to the problems dis-
cussed in previous chapters--the mezzogiorno is the principal
area of underdevelopment. From the North through the Islands
the percentage of persons with no school degree steadily
increases. In every province of the Mezzogiorno the per-
centage of persons without a degree is higher than the
national average (30.8%). The percentage of persons with
elementary degrees drops from over 70% in the North to 40%
and lower in the southern areas; no area of the South or

Islands equals the national average of 59.0%. The same

-222—
TABLE 29

PERCENTAGE FIGURES ON EDUCATION AND LITERACYa

 

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-223-
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-225-
TABLE 29-Continued

 

 

 

 

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Province £13 ma HQ 32:: an H H» .44:
Cagliari 50.4 42.7 3.9 2.3 0.7 23.5 43.3 52.3
Nuoro 51.3 44.7 2.0 1.5. 0.4 21.8 43.7 51.7
Sassari 46.1 47.6 3.4 2.1 0.8 19.3 42.6 51.9
ITALIA 30.8 59.0 5.9 3.2 1.0 12.9 39.6 50.0
aAll educational figures and the figures in the
"Illiterate" column represent percentages of the total
The figures

population that was six years of age and above.
under the last two headings represent, respectively, the
percentage of "llliterates that are Male" and "Literates

that are Male." Calculated from: Repubblica Italiana,
Istituto Centrale di Statistica, IX Censimento Generals della

Popglazione114 Novembre 1251, I ( oma: oc. ete, .

 

 

 

~226-

trend is present but less noticeable in the columns repre-
senting intermediate and advanced degrees.

Just as revealing are the figures on illiteracy.
This problem actually takes on the appearance of being a
southern phenomena. In no province of the North or Center
do the illiterates make up 20% or more of the population;
in the mezzogiorno there are only two provinces (both on
the Center-South border) where this proportion falls below
20%. This has been an area where education and the ability
to read have been little needed and ill-afforded luxuries
for much of the population. All too frequently those that
do secure an education do so in the classical 112§2§_and
become prestigious but superfluous lawyers and professional
men: comparatively few enter the vocationthechnical classes.
The Mezzogiorno thus has a surplus of illiterate, uneducated
peasants and, at the same time, a surplus of professionals;

both contribute heavily to the army of the unemployed.

Party Vote and Educational Level

The influence of education on voting behavior is
of particular interest in view of the very large part of
the Italian population that has had little fermal training.
A party with a high correlation between its vote and pro-
vinces with a high percentage of persons of a low educational
level would clearly have an advantage. In Table 30 it is
evident that theparties of the Right are in that enviable
position in the nation as a whole.

~227-

 

TABLE 30
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE

OF THE POPULATION WITH NO SCHOOL DEGREE

 

Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. “035 +011 +003 +054 “023
P.S.D.I. “.12 -033 +007 '060 *071
P.L.I. "oll +023 “.03 -071 +021
P.R.I. +.40 ‘017 -006 -028 +002
P.C.I. +051 -015 -008 +052 +010
P.S.I. +.20 -.19 +.08 +.42 -.50
P.N.Mo “.36 +0“ +008 “064} +061
M.S.I. -008 +017 “034} “009 +061}

 

Both the P.N.M. and M.S.I. have high correlations with
provinces with a high percentage of persons that have no
school degree. Since much of their campaign material was
aimed at getting the vote of the uneducated, it appears

that they were at least partly successful. The geographical
area figures, however, present a different picture. Neither
party has a high correlation in its favor in.the Mezzo iorno;
in fact, the large negative relationship. shown the

P.N.M. in the Islands indicates that it has comparatively
little appeal where low education predominates. The only
positive correlations that the Right obtaines are in the
Center where the educational level is higher and where pro-
vinces with a high percent of persons without degrees are

few.

 

-228-

The party most definitely hurt by extremely low
education is the P.S.D.I. Its -.71 correlation for the
nation as a whole indicates that it has little hope of
pulling votes where voterslmme no school degrees. This
indication is also given in all geographical areas, particu—
larly in the Islands. (The slight positive figure in the
South is completely insignificant.) The other Socialist
party, the P.S.I. is also hurt over the nation by low
education but does manage to show a positive correlation
in the Islands. It appears that socialism does not appeal
in areas where education. is lowest. However, where an
inclination to vote for a socialist party does exist among
those with no degree, the P.S.I. is favored over the
P.S.D.I. A person with little education who wishes to
vote Left will support the P.C.I. or P.S.I.; similarly, if
he wishes to vote for theCenter, he will support the
Christian Democrats. To understand the appeals of the
P.S.D.I. requires at least a moderate level of education.
The correlations here reinfbrce what has been the accepted
view of the P.S.D.I. supporters.

While no other parties have significant correlations
with this variable for all of Italy, several do have a
fairly high relationship in individual regions. Among
the Center parties the correlations vary greatly, as they
do with every variable discussed previously. The most

significant figure for the Christian Democrats occurs in

-229-
the Islands where a fairly high positive correlation is
indicated. Since provinces with large percentages of
uneducated predominate in that region, the Christian
Democrats presumably gains. The same is true of the
lower, negative correlations in the North-~this area has
'fewer provinces with the uneducated predominating so the
Christian Democrats loses few votes on this variable. In
general, it can be said that the Christian Democrats receive
at least moderate support where education is low.

The Liberals are little affected by the percentage
of persons with no school degree except in the Islands.
There is a very high negative correlation in that region--
since every province in the Islands has a high perCentage
of uneducated voters, it would be expected that the P.L.I.
would get few'votes in the area. This is precisely the
case, although the party vote ranges between 0.5% and 13.0%.
However, in the province in which the Liberals received
the 13.0% (Messina), the percentage of persons without any
school degree is "only“ 41.8%. While this is 11.0% above
the nationalaverage, it is the third lowest figure fer
the entire.Mezzogiorno and well below any other province
of the Islands. The last of the Center parties, the P.R.I.
shows only a moderate positive relationship in the North
and nothing of significance elsewhere--its vote evidently
is not greatly influenced by this variable.‘ As with the
P.S.D.I., these generally negative relationships with the

 

-230-
low education variable are not surprising. The attractions
of the P.L.I. and P.R.I. are more for the educated, literate
person. The result of this limited appeal is, of course,
a low vote in a country like Italy.

The Communist party has definite positive corre-
1ation figures in two widely separated regions, the North
and the Islands. In these two areas the P.C.I. obviously
has an enhanced appeal in provinces where education is
. least. It is the only party to have a positive figure of
significance in the North except for the small Republican
party. In the Islands, however, both the P.C.I. and the
D.C. (and, to a leeser extent, the P.S.I.) were pulling
their votes in similar provinces, those with the lowest
educational levels. In this area these two parties actually
have a very slight positive correlation with each other
as compared to a -.68 correlation fer the nation as a whole.
(This inter-party correlation is -.73 in the North and
-.80 in the Center. Further inter-party correlations will
be discussed in the concluding chapter.)

The second educational variable is the percentage
of the population that has an elementary school degree.

It should be noted that these first two variables account
fer almost 90% of the population-—in other words, if a
province does not have a high percentage of persons without
. any degree, it will have a high percentage of persons with

only elementary school degrees. The result of this can be

 

-231-

perceived by comparing Table 31 with Table 30.
TABLE 31

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION WITH ELEMENTARY DEGREES

 

I

 

Party North Center South‘ Islands Italy
DOC. +038 -003 +016 -032 +027
P.S.D.I. +019 +0142 -0051 +055 +072
P.L.I. +005 '052 +011 +060 -022
P.R.I. -.39 +.31 +.l8 +.30 -.03
P.C.I. -0145 +012 +006 -046 “011
P.S.I. “0110- +0412 -013 -041} +051
P.N.Mo +024 -062 “020 +050 -063
M.S.I. '017 “053 +032 -020 '069

 

FrOm the column "Italy" it can be seen that every
sign is reversed as compared to the first variable, but
that the figures for each party are almost precisely the

same. The correlation between variable one and variable

two is almost perfect, being a -.96, indicating that the
existence of one of them precludes the existence of the
other. Consequently, the parties that had high negative
correlations on the first table new are positive, and vice
versa.

The same general statement applies for the geographical

regions, with a few exceptions. For example, the M.S.I.

had no significant relationship in the Center with the first
variable, but it has a -.53 with the second; where the

P.N.M. had a moderate positive correlation in the Center,

 

 

-232-
it is now -.62. In most cases the biggest change is a
reversal of sign. For these two parties, in the Center, a
high percentage with no degree is only a marginal help; a
high percentage with elementary degrees is a definite hard-
ship.

For the entire country, it appears that the rightist
parties and the two Socialist parties are most influenced
by the percentage of persons with or without elementary
school degrees-~the former favored in places where the
populace is most uneducated and the latter best supported
where elementary training is common. Geographically, the
variables seem to have the greatest effect in the Islands.
Here the P.L.I. and M.S.I. reverse their national tendencies
and have high positive correlations indicating an affinity
for provinces with more educated people. The Center parties
other than the Christian Democrats have the same affinity
in the Islands. Outside of this area, however, the most ‘
indicative figures are for Italy as a whole rather than for
specific areas.

The situation isvery different for the next set
of correlations. ’These three variables, intermediate,
high school and university degrees, will be considered
together since, as a group, they represent only 10% of
the population and since the figures obtained are very
similar in each case. (See Tables 32, 33 and 3a).

 

-233-

TABLE 32
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF

THE POPULATION WITH INTERMEDIATE DEGREES

=============================================================

North

 

 

Party Center South 'Islands Italy
D.C. “elk '025 '057 “057 ‘006
P.S.D.I. -000 +008 -009 +039 +039
P.L.I. -002 +020 '027 +oh7 -012
P.R.I. -005 “008 -035 +00h “005
P.C.I. +003 +019 +009 -028 +003
P.S.I. “005 ‘016 +016 “010 +02h
P.N.M. +.07 -.Ol +.31 +.48 —.27
M.S.I. +041 +030 +015 +035 “020
TABLE 33

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF

THE POPULATION WITH HIGH SCHOOL DEGREES

 

 

Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. “.20 4.12 -.hh “059 -011
P.S.D.I. '002 +005 +006 +036 +003
P.L.I. “.02 +02h -018 +052 -007
P.R.I. +009 ‘006 -012 +019 +007
P.C.I. +015 +005 +001 ‘038 +008
P.S.I. -006 “012 +012 -019 +020
P.N.Mo +002 -002 +023 +05h ‘OZh
M.S.I. +03h +012 +037 +037 “011

 

~234- .
TABLE 3A

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION WITH UNIVERSITY DEGREES

 

Party North Center South Islands 'Italy
D.C. "027 “017 -046 “ohg ‘022
P.S.D.I. -008 +02h ‘001 +026 +008
P.L.I. +007 ’026 -015 +o#3 +006
P.R.I. +002 ”007 “025 I +010 “004
P.C.I. +021 +oh0 “009 -;35 +011
P.S.I. ’003 +029 +009 “027 +003
P.N.Mo +002 -055 +036 +053 +00h
M.S.I. +003 -057 +010 +old-8 +005

Perhaps the most interesting statistics are those
applying to the Christian Democrats. As with the other
parties there are no effective correlations for the entire
country, but for the Mezzogiorno the figures are moderate
It appears that the D.C. party, more than any other, is
likely to lose votes as the percentage of well-educated
citizens rises. _This could be because the better educated
people are less inclined to accept the word of the Catholic
Church in political matters, or because these people can
better perceive flaws in the Christian Democratic program.
A relatively high percentage of the university graduates
of the South and Islands is unemployed-~this could help
to explain the situation. Regardless of the reason, howb
ever, the saving feature for the D.C. party, in 1953 at
least, was the fact that provinces with a high percentage

-235-
of educated peOple were rare.

Other parties with definite correlations include
those of the Right. The P.N.M. has a positive relationship
in the Islands for both high school and university degrees,
while the M.S.I. is positive, but with a lower figure, in
the same areas. (Oddly enough, these same two parties have
high negative correlations with one variable, university
degrees, in the Center.) It is quite apparent that the
P.N.M. and M.S.I. are parties which most consistently
attract the support of the well educated people in the
Mezzogiorno. (This attraction also exists, but to a lesser
extent, in the North and Center.) In this area the land
refbrm program presumably isolated numerous persons of the
estate-owner class from the Center. In addition, high
unemployment among the well educated (caused by a lack of
suitable, i.e., prestigious, jobs) probably helped the
Right.

The rest of the major parties vary widely with refer-
ences to education past the elementary level. None of them
has correlations of significant size and none has a consistent
positive or negative relationship. As an item of interest,
it should be noted that the Unite Popglare (one of the minor
parties running exclusively on the anti-Scelba Law issue)
has very high correlations with education. This party
deliberately appealed to the intellectuals and to the
supporters of the Action party in past elections, and it

-236-
appears that what support it received came from these ele-
ments. A figure of -.7A represents the U.P.‘s relationship
with provinces with "no degree" persons predominating,
and a figure of +.7l is its correlation with provinces with
a high percentage of elementary school degrees. Correla-
tions with the other three variables, intermediate, high
school and university degrees, are +.A8, +.37 and +.16
respectively. (These figures are for the entire country.)
It seems that opposition to the Scelba Law, at least so
far as the U.P. was concerned, was greatly dependent upon

education.

Party Vote and Illiteracy

The analysis of the relationship between the per-
centage of provincial pepulation that is illiterate and
party vote produces some results very similar to those
obtained by using the education variables (see Tables
35, 36, and 37). Illiteracy is, of course, somewhat dependent
upon lack of education, but as Table 29 indicates, the
percentage of persons who are illiterate is considerably A
lower than the percentage of persons with no school degree.
This presumably is true because of persons who dropped out
of elementary school after learning to read and write or
who attended the ”p0pular" schools. Despite this dis-
crepancy in numbers, however, the nation-wide correlations

on these two variables are identical to two decimal places

 

 

 

 

-237-
TABLE 35

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION THAT IS ILLITERATE

 

 

Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. “045 +018 '000 -005 -023
P.S.D.I. 'QZh “024 +005 “.22 ‘071
PoLoIo -019 +017 -006 -021 +021
P.R.I. ‘+054 -016 “009 -002 +003
P.C.I. +.62 -.18 +.OO +.48 +.lO
P.S.I. +.20 -.lO +.O7 +.20 -.50
P.N‘M. -042 +034 +010 “0&2 +061
.MoSoIo .00# +005 “045 +030 +o63
TABLE 36

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
‘ OF ILLITERATES THAT ARE.MALE

 

 

Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. +015 “.56 ‘W38 +002 +010
P.S.DoI “.15 +010 ‘01“ -035 +016
P.L.I. +006 -026 ”0&0 ‘056 -010
P.R.I. +005 “003 '068 +017 ‘015
P.C.I. '028 +059 +050 +o3h “.10
P.S.I. -009 +034 +003 +037 -001
P.N.MQ +023 “0&2 +014 “033 ‘005
.M.S.I. -.39 -.29 -.21 +.A3 -.lO

 

‘ --.—-—'-m.-“‘——"m-. - _——.—-- H..-

-238-
TABLE 37

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF LITERATES THAT ARE MALE

 

 

 

Party North Center South .AIslands Italy
D.C. -027 +00]- +02? +043 -020
P.S.D.I. "009 -034 +017 +009 “052
P.L.I. -018 +024 +922 '001 +014
P.R.I. +020 -008 +032 -052 “.10
PoCoIo +03h -015 -024 +005 +012
P.S.I. '001 +004 -002 +001 ’026
P.NQMo “021 +039 -007 “012 +038
.MoSoIo -016 +020 “.20 “066 +028

 

fer all but one party (+.6A to +.63 fbr the MtS.I.) With

the high correlations obtained fbr the P.S.D.I., P.S.I.,
P.N.M. and M.S.I., it appears that either variable could
be used effectively to estimate the probability of a high
vote fer these parties.

(More surprising than the virtual identity of the
national figures are the drastic differences within the
geographical.regions. For example, under no school degree
the P.L.I. has a -.71 and the P.S.D.I. a -.60 correlation
in the Islands. There is no significant figure for
illiteracy fer these parties in that area. This is
particularly noteworthy in view of what was said above

about the appeal of these two parties. Logically it would

seem that literacy rather than possession of a school degree

‘ e \F— Mum—‘— ‘-

 

-239-
would be more of a determinant of vote. Evidently this is
not the case with the Social Democrats and Liberals. Actually,
in the Islands the only figures of even moderate importance
are those for the P.C.I. and the P.N.M. A

The region where illiteracy has the most effect

is the North where the Communists and Republicans are
clearly aided and the D.C. and P.N.M; hurt if the percentage
is high. In each case the correlations have the same sign
but higher figures than with the "no-degree" variable. In
this area illiteracy is relatively uncommon and most
illiterates would probably lead a marginal existence. This,
of course, could account, in part, for the positive relation-
ship with the P.C.I. and, at the same time, for the negative

correlation of the Christian Democrats.

Party Vote and Male Literacy or Illiteracy

The remaining two sets of figures were compiled
on the assumption that male literacy or illiteracy might
have a greater effect on vote than would the percentage
of the entire population that was illiterate. This is not
borne out in the nation-wide figures except fOr a fairly
high negative correlation between the vote of the P.S.I.
and the percentage of literates that is male. Other parties
have only negligible relationships with these variables.

Several parties, however, have their vote influenced sig-

nificantly in one or more geographical regions.

-240—

With reference to the percentage of illiterates
which is male, the Christian Democrats are affected
negatively in the Center, the P.L.I. in the South and Islands
and the P.R.I. in the South. These Center parties all
have their chance fer a relatively high vote improved con-
siderably if the illiterates in the province are not male.
The same generally applies to the Right. The two parties
of the Left, especially the P.C.I. in the Center and South,
have their vote total improved when male illiteracy is
high. Evidently, the percentage of male illiteracy does
influence vote more than does the incidence of illiteracy
in the general population. Although it cannot be proved, ‘
it is quite probable that a family that is headed by an
illiterate male is in a more precarious economic position
than one that is not. (As will be shown later, there is
a clear.relationship in Italy between education and income.)

A further indication of the importance of male illiteracy
(and low male education in general) 13 the following state-

ment 3

. . . the heaviest incidence of card-carrying party

membership occurs among Italy's poorest, least well
educated voters, . . . who are largely inclined, if

male, to join the Communist party and, if female, to
join the Christian Democratic party.

__L_

A L- g

6Joseph G. LaPalombara and Jerry B. watersi "Values,

Expectations and Political Predispositions of Ital an Youth "
unpublished manuscript to be published in western Political

Quarterly, February, 19 l)-

 

 

-241-

The second variable, the proportion of the literate
part of the population that is male, seems to have practically
no effect on party vote except in the Islands. In that
region the Republicans and the M}S.I. have fairly high nega-
tive correlations with this variable.

As with the no degree variable, the Unite Popolare
has a very high negative correlation, -.73, with the per-
centage of the population that is illiterate. It also has
a -.53 with the percentage of males that is illiterate.

As with the educational variables above, it appears that
the voters who supported this protest party were most
likely to understand the Scelba Law. Oddly enough, the
other protest party, the A.D.N., has no significant corre-

lations with any of these variables.

Conclusions
In summation, the effect of education and literacy
on the fertunes of the various political parties appears
to be considerable. In general, a high percentage of
illiterates and uneducated persons in a province seems to
incline that province to vote for the Left. Conversely,
the probability of a Center and, with several exceptions,

a Right vote increases as persons with moderate education

because more numerous. The word moderate should be emphasized

in this statement for education beyond the elementary level

presents a completely different picture (particularly in

 

-242-
'the South and Islands). As education goes past this basic
level, the Christian Democrats are faced with a strong
negative reaction; the effect on other parties varies
greatly from one region to another.

Of all the variables discussed to this point, in-
cluding occupations and unemployment, education and literacy
most clearly influence the vote fer individual parties. If
the correlations described here truly reflect the effect
that education has, it can be anticipated that the increased
emphasis in Italy on raising the_educational level will
eventually cut the strength of the parties of the Left
unless those parties revise their appeal. On the other
hand, this trend will not greatly aid the D.C. party unless
education stops at the elementary level. A better, more
democratic alternative, of course, would be fer the Chris-
tian Democrats to fester elementary and secondary education
fer more people. This would serve the double purpose of
educating the populace and increasing the base upon which
the D.C. party could draw. :If, at the same time, the Gov-
ernment can gradually build up the economy of the country
and provide more jobs through its redevelopment plans, it
is likely that the protest votes that the educated minority
gives the Right can be reduced.

 

CHAPTER VII

ECONOMIC STATUS

thh has been written in preceding chapters concern—
ing the unfortunate amount of unemployment, the poor land,
the tenant farming, of Italy. These factors, however, are
of importance only in that they affect the day-to—day life
of the people; they determine the standard of living-~the
housing, the food, the clothing—-that may be obtained. In
Italy this standard has long been low for the vast majoritr
of the populace. To discover precisely how serious was
the financial plight of the citizens, the Italian legis-
lature established a committee to study the situation. Its
report, entitled "Enquiry into Poverty in Italy and the
Means of Counteracting It," was publiched in June, 1953,
the month of the General Election.

Some of the resulting statistics indicate the
abysmal conditions under which millions of Italians exist.
A few examples might serve to describe the seriousness of
the situation. One investigation to discover the "food
standards" of Italian families selected meat, sugar and
wine as commodities to be checked. In this survey 869,000
families, 7.5% of the national total, are found to consume

none of these items; another 1,032,000 (8.9%) consume only

-243-

 

 

~244- .
"very small" amounts, while 1,333,000 (11.5%) use "small"
(quantities. These figures indicate that 27.9% of the total
number of families consumes from only a small amount to
nothing of what might be considered basic items.

A similar investigation of clothing uses footwear
as its criterion and finds that only 54.1% of families have
shoes which can be classified as "good" or better. A
total of 1,090,000 families have "poor" or worse footwear.
Additionally, it is found that 324,000 families live in
‘cellers, storerooms, huts and caves and that another 2.8
million families live in overcrowded conditions. A final
synthesis of the committee findings indicates that 1,357,000
families have a "wretched" standard of living, and that
another 1,345,000 has a "poor" living level. These persons
represent 23.4% of all families in Italy.

It should be emphasized that these figures are all
for families, not individuals. The percentage of the
total population that is involved would undoubtedly be
much higher than 23.4% since the most miserable conditions
exist in the Mezzogiorno where families are largest. That
the locus of this deplorable economic situation is in the
southern area is proved by the following figures; the per-
centage of families with a "wretched" standard of living
ranges from a low average of 1.5% in the North and 5.9%
in the Center to 28.3% in the South and 24.8% in the Islands.

-245-
In one southern province, Calabria, the figure is 63%.1
The state has made efforts to ameliorate the financial
plight of the people by paying unemployment compensation,
but these payments go to the wrong area. In 1951, for
example, 59.7% of all such money went to the North, 13.3%
to the Center, 20.3% to the South and only 6.8% to the
Islands.2 ,This is true because the unemployment compensa—
tion was aimed principally at industrial unemployment. The
underemployment and concealed unemployment discussed in
Chapter IV make the southern situation even worse.

' Despite the fact that millions live in the miser»
able condition just described, it is possible to make a
great deal of money in Italy. Almost one million persons
have their food consumption listed as plentiful or very
plentiful and the footwear of 38% is "very good". 1,274,000

are classified as having a "high" standard of living. many
’ industrialists, aided by cheap labor, are very rich men;
many estate owners continue to have high incomes from their
farms. Since taxation was seventy-five percent indirect

(at the time of the 1953 election) these high income groups

*

3‘The figures cited above from the report of the leg-
islative committee investigating poverty are from Giorgio
Ruffolo "The Parliamentary Enquiry into Poverty," B ca
8-33 (1954).

Nazionale del Lavoro arterl Review, VII, Nos. 2
‘7ZJffi7"""‘"““‘Jmi“"‘JL“"“' .

201na Papa, "Compulsory Unemployment Insurance in

Italy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro anrterly Review, V, No.
23 (1952 . 23 .

-246-
were favored at the expense of the rest of the pepulation.3
These conditions create, or perpetuate, a disparity between
economic classes that is wide and distinct in Italy. It
would be logical to assume that the existence of this upper
class would make the "wretched" living conditions described
above seem even worse.

To discover what influence, if any, the economic
level of the voter has on the electoral returns of 1953,
four variables were selected. The first of these, and the
most obvious,is per capita income. The others are based
upon the reasonable assumption that the housing facilities
of the population are roughly indicative of economic status.
These variables, persons per room, percent of residents
living in their own homes and an artificial "civilization"
index, will be discussed below.

As can be seen on Table 38, per capita income in
Italy averaged 180,272 lire in 1953, ranging between 74,986
and 398,111. These raw numbers would appear to represent
a considerable amount of money until it is recalled that
one United States dollar is equal to approximately 625
lire. This means that the average per capita income was
$288.43 per year. Low as this figure is, it is the range
that makes the situation really unfbrtunate. There is no

 

3Clifford A. L. Rich, "The Permanent Crisis of
Italian Democracy." W XIV {1952), 672.

~247-

 

 

 

TABLE 38
INCOME AND RELATED ECONOMIC STATISTICSa

n m

s tn: .3

a. 32:5
$2 555s 3%
° ° 8 a '88
“° Eighoo <vIa
Province ,2 .5 a. a. 5 m o H
Alessandria 209,302 49.2 49.1
Asti 181,010 63.9 45.9
Cuneo 192,041} 5805 3809
Novara 281,518 43.0 51.8
Torino 341,253 33.1 59.5
Vercelli 346,055 41.2 49.7
Valle d'Aosta 354,455 53.2 45.7
Bergamo 188,607 33.8 52.8
Brescia 186,100 38.2 48.3
Como 236,219 3 .8 57.9
Cremona 199,197 24.8 43.0
Mantova 190,811 27.0 35.5

Milano 398,111 1609 60
PaVia ’ 256,706 3700 4505
Sondrio 204,552 73-3 53-4
Varese - 299,222 34.9 60.2
Bolzano 242,962 48.7 66.2
Trento 199,107 64.9 66.9
Belluno 191,167 71.8 31.8
Padova 158,683 40.5 41.2
Rovigo 143,179 38.3 28.1

Treviso 141,525 44.9 39.

Venezia 211,605 27.1 57.
Verona 184,102 39.0 45.5
Vicenza l7£fplb9 zP909 [+506
Gorizia 228,676 36.9 55.7
Udine 154,694 60.2 43.6
d 19.0 74.5

Trieste

-248-

TABLE 38--Continued

 

I
_I

 

:1 8

s end .a

in oeaég .9

H 8 «3

(DU-U 28 figs: :3!
08 on: mos-cm u—lx
O U) 00) Q) H0
no ssh autos >11
Province as 8 8. 8282 as
Genova 307, 913 0.9 25.5 82.4
_Imperia 309, 804 0.8 48.5 63.3
La SpGZia V 17h, 371 101 3507 6701
Savona 27k, ,683 009 350k 7101
Bologna 221,179 1.1 20.9 62.8
Ferrara 200, 756 1.4 25.4 39.7
Forli 152, 022 1.3 36.1 45.0
Modena 181,143 1.2 28.0 46.2

Parma 215,939 1.1 30.7 47.
Piacenza 217, 550 1.1 35.5 #3.?
Ravenna 203, 696 1.2 34.8 32.3
Reggio nell'Emilia 172, 535 1.2 31.6 32.1
Arezzo 126, 501 1.1 32.3 48.1
Firenza 228, 849 1.0 24.8 73.8
Grosseto 205, 778 1.2 38.0 41.9
Livorno 236, 378 1.2 22.8 69.7
Lucca 154,195 0.9 ' 43.7 54.4
Massa-Carrara 160, 832 1.2 47.8 45.8
Pisa 183: 757 1.0 28.8 55.3
Pistoia 168, 705 0.9 37.7 61.5
Siena 193,147 1.0 25.1 62.1
Perugia 130, 881 1.1 37.0 45.5
Terni 192,172 103 3706 A901
Ancona 161, 387 1.1 30.6 60.2
Ascoli Piceno 128,101 1.2 36.9 44.4
.Macerata 137: 054 1.1 35oh h7-h
Pesaro e Urbino 114,015 1.2 37.0 40.9
Frosinone 103, 957 1.5 64.3 23.6
Latina 121, 578 1.7 56.8 42.0
Rieti 127. 329 1.3 65.9 35.9
Roma 245,530 1.4 26.6 76.6
Viterbo 151, 287 1.3 46.6 51.5

 

 

:1 8
3 “62% 33
.4 m
0. +>m a
3% §§58 3%
ac: k34h08 hHU
”Mm as was as
C be 1 6 .
03331 33° 183316 6 .2' 3
L'Aquila 99,012 65.4 4
Pescara 22,477 48.5
Teramo 101,084 47.2
Avellino 75,913 55.9
Benevento 86,679 60.6
Caserta 74,986 48.1
33161710 97; 888 460 9
Bari 112,111 32.9
Brindisi 113.928 44.4
Foggia 119,593 39.6
Lecce 78,031 51.5
Taranto 92,604 36.8
Matera 126,994 51.0
Potenza 80,007 58.4
Catanzaro 91,841 57.9
Cosenza 86,286 53.5
Reggio di Calabria 78,741 57.2
Agrigento 82 699 61.1
Caltenissetta 93:525 54.9
Catania 103,826 40.
Enna 95,479 64.0
Messina 119,221 48.8
Palermo _116,951 39.
Siracusa 141,157 53.3
Trapani 136,096 56-3

H

 

-251-
TABLE 38--Continued

 

 

; a

a «H... .2

4.2 mag 43

vi a w

% 23 23: .3
03 om moan raw
- .8 a. 22mg 23
Province 0 c: o o o o c: o H s:
mH mg mmam cna
Cagliari 139,934 1.2 61.3 39.5
Nuoro 101,634 1.3 80.11 32.8
Sassari 93,317 1.6 54.2 48.4
ITALIA 180,279 1.3 40.1 44.3

 

aPer capita income figres are from: Guglielmo
Tagliacarne, "Calcolo del Reddito del Settore'Privato e della
Pubblica Amministrazione nelle Provincie Risparmio Bancario e
Postale," Moneta e Credito, (second quarter, 1954), 187-189.
Other statistics were calculated from: Repubblica Italiana
Istituto Centrale di Statistica, IX Censimento Generale de a

Pogglazione, 4 Novembre 1251, I (Roma: 30c. ASete, 1946).

bIncome expressed in lire.

cIndexderived by averaging {rovincial figures for
homes having electricity, inside toi ets and internal

running water.

dData not available.

-252-
province in the Mezzogiorno that had a per capita income
of 150,0002nre, and the vast majority had figures under
100,000. A disproportionate share of the personal income
of the nation is in the North and, to a much lesser extent,

in the Center, as Table 39 shows.

TABLE 39

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND INCOME
BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONa

 

 

Region Population Income
North 101402 5906
Center 18.3 19.3
30111311 2503 1307
Islands 12.3 97.4

 

aFigures are for 1954. Guglielmo
Tagliacarne, "Italy's Net National Product
by Regions," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro

Quarterly RevM217.

Obviously the two southern areas are receiving
only slightly over one-half of the income that their popu-
lation merits. With per capita income ranging between $119
and $240, with the majority nearer the lower extreme, these
regions are on a par with some of the most underdeveloped

countries in the world.h Incomes such as these would make

_

hltaly is ranked with such countries as Poland,
Spain, Cuba, Chile, Japan Hungary and Puerto Rico since
its per capita income falls in the $150-$450 range. Many

-253-
a "wretched" standard of living inevitable-~particu1arly
since these averages include the incomes of multi-millionaires
such as Achille Laure.

It would not have been surprising if economic con-
ditions such as these had produced serious reactions against
the parties in power in the form of anti—Government votes
in low income areas. Logically, the expectations would have
been that provinces with a high per capita income would
support the Center. Persons in those provinces presumably
had profited under the predominantly Christian Democratic
(3overnment, had the most to lose if a change were made and,
consequently, had little reason to support the opposition.
If they were to decide on a non-Center vote, the Right was
the obvious choice over the radical Left. As Table 40
indicates, however, these expectations were not fulfilled.

In every gebgraphical region and for the entire
nation, the Christian Democratic vote is negatively influ-
enced as provincial per capita income rises. In the Center
and South the figures are high enough to indicate that
income is a serious inhibiting factor. Obviously, it is
the low income, or "wretched", province that aids the D.C.
party. The other Center parties vary widely, all being

negative in the South and positive in most other areas. Only

.—
_fi—

Erovinces of the mezzo iorno, however, are in the $150

93 750 lire) or Iess range which puts them on a par with
Costa Rica, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, India, Greece, Jordan,
and Yugoslavia.

 

____-_--—— __—-— —‘ '— - _._,_».- .i— - -~‘ $4-". . r- -» ----- L—

 

-254-
TABLE 40
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND PER CAPITA INCOME

 

Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. “020 -059 . “029 '062 “003
P.S.D.I. ~ +019 +008 “030 +041 +062
P.L.I. +015 +001 ".32 +03h "016
P.R.I. “.13 +006 “.26 +038 “003
P.C.I. +.02 +.58 +.59 -.06 +.09
P.S.I. +.18 -.02 +.27 +.38 +.48
PONOMJ +013 -028 “021 +003 ' -052
M.S.I. +009 +005 '005 +905 “.50

in the Islands do their correlations even approach the
point of being significant. Nationally, the Social Demo-
crats are alone in having a high positive relationship with
income.

The opposition to the Right is in much the same
position as the minor-Center. Geographically, the P.N.M.
and MsS.I. have no significant correlations. Nationally,
however, a definite negative relationship is indicated by
the .52 and .50 figures they achieved. Evidently, the
Right is also hurt as per capita income rises in a province.

For the Left, however, a different picture is pre-
sented. The P.S.I. has low positive figures in three of
the feur regions and a similar but moderate relationship
for Italy as a whole. (Interestingly, the two socialist
parties again appeal to the same type of province nationally.

-255-
It will be recalled that this was the case with education

and literacy.) The Communist party is affected geographi—
cally, with definite positive correlations in the Center

and South. In these two areas the picture is presented of
increased P.C.I. vote as income rises.

For the Center, Right and Left the results are
precisely the opposite of what might have been anticipated.
The question that immediately arises is, how can these
unexpected correlations be explained? Obviously, no definitive
answer can be given here, but one possible interpretation
lies in the aggregate character of the statistics used. In
Italy it unfortunately is the case that a rise‘in per capita
income does not necessarily indicate a rise in income for
the average person (or voter). It is perhaps more likely
that a high per capita rate merely represents a widening
of the gap between the highest and the lowest, i.e., the
average person has the same income but the upper bracket
person is higher. It is worth noting that in the North,
where the variation in income is probably least, there is
no correlation of even slight significance. It is the other
areas where the income variable influences vote. Quite
possibly the peculiar correlation figures in these areas
are accounted for, in part, by the fact that the voters in
high per capita income provinces are more aware of the
discrepancy between their own incomes and those of persons

in the upper brackets. The positive vote fer the Left

4 -256-- ,

could well represent a protest against the uneven distribu-
tion of wealth. In low income areas the variation is not
so great and, therefbre, not such an influential factor.

Another possible explanation of the correlations
between vote and per capita income has to do with the '
relationship between income and two variables discussed
previously, education and occupation. It is generally
accepted that education increases earnings; this is gra-
phically shown for Italy by comparing these two variables.
Between per capita income and the “no degree" part of the
population there is a -.80 correlation, indicating that
the lack of at least an elementary education almost pre-
cludes a high income. For each of the other educational
levels discussed in Chapter VI, there is a positive corre-
lation; +.7O with elementary degrees, +.8l with intermediate
degrees, +.69 with high school degrees and +.43 with uni-
versity degrees. Obviously there is a very close relation-
ship between education and income, with only the acquisition
of a univerSity degree having doubtful economic advantage.

The relationship between per capita income and
occupation is almost as definite. Provinces where agri-
cultural employment predominates have a -.73 correlation
with income. Each of the other major categories is positive:
+.73 fer industry and commerce, +.45 for service and +.25
for public administration. (While the correlation figures
are not high fer the latter two variables, the probability

-257-

of increased income is markedly lower than_that of industry

and commerce.)
A final relationship of interest is that between

education and occupations. (Tables 41, 42 and 43 give the

relationships among income, occupation and education.)
TABLE #1

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PER CAPITA INCOME AND
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

 

 

 

 

North Center South Islands Italy

No Degree «.42 -.61 -.40 -.43 -.80

Elementary -.05 +.24 +.32 +.22 +.70

Intermediate +.78 +.77 +.39 +.53 +.81

High School +.72 +.64 +.3l +.44 +.69

univerSity +.73 +045 +030 +025 +oh3
TABLE 42

CORRELATIONS BBT‘EEN PER CAPITA INCOME AND
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY

 

 

 

North Center South Islands Italy

Agriculture -.62 -.75 -.34 -.55 -.73

Industry +.62 +.58 +.34 +.55 +.73

Service +.40 +.86 +.4l +.33 +.45
Public Admin-

istriation +.02 +.70 +.24 +.42 +.25

 

-258-

 

 

 

TABLE 43
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND OCCUPATIONAL
CATEGORY
Agri- , Public
culture Industry Service Administration
No Degree +.66 -.7o -.27 -.25
Elementary “051 ' +059 +011 +011
Intermediate -083 +072 +068 +059
High School -.73 +.58 +.75 +.65
University ‘ -.51 +.4l +.69 +.32

 

Quite obviously occupation is greatly affected by
education. The reverse is also true, particularly fer
agricultural provinces where school attendance is severely
limited when children begin helping on the farms at a
very early age. (In addition, persons in agricultural
regions have a tendency to leave agriculture when they be—
come educated.) Neither variable, education or occupation,:is
completely independent of the other.

Actually, this interdependence of these variables
with each other and with per capita income is what is
important here. The income correlations, which seemed to
run counter to the logical pattern, become more under-
standable when the impact of these other factors is con-
sidered. The Christian Democrats are supported in agri-
cultural provinces and where education is low. (These
coincide in most cases.) Since these two variables lead
to low income, it logically follows that high incomes and

D.C. vote will have a negative correlation.

-259-

Similarly, the Right is supported in provinces
where service and public administration occupations are
numerous and.where there is a high educational level. I
Whereas high education tends to lead to high income,‘
service and public administration occupations are not
particularly remunerative. The result is the inconclusive
correlations in the geographical regions of Italy. However,
the high negative relationship between the rightist vote
and per capita income over the entire nation seems to indi-
cate that occupation may be a greater determinant of vote
than education fer the P.N.M. and M.S.I. For the Left
the picture is not clear, although the generally positive
correlations with industrial occupations and higher per
capita income probably overweigh a tendency toward a nega-
tive relationship with increased education.

While it is evident that no variable is either
completely dependent or independent, it is likely that per
capita income is more dependent than either education or
occupation. This appears to be the case because each of
the other variables generally fits the pattern expected of
Italy. Income runs counter to the anticipated course but
can be explained in terms of the other two. If this is
the case, per capita income can be used to understand vote
only as an adjunct, 5nd qualifying factor, to education

and occupation.

. -260-

Per capita income, however, is the only variable
available that can be used in an effort to discover a
specifically economic basis fer vote. Consequently, it is
necessary to turn to variables that reflect the economic
position of the voter in an indirect manner. The first
two of these to be discussed have to do with housing--
persons per room and home ownership.

Housing has been one of the biggest problems facing
the Italian Government-~both before and after world war II.
This problem.was the result of the natural population in-
crease and the destruction or damaging of 5.6 million rooms
(the unit used in Italian statistics) during the war. In
1945 it was estimated that 854,000 persons were homeless
and that another 3.5 million were liVing in rooms too
badly damaged to be considered habitable.5 By 1953, 4.4
million rooms had been repaired and another 775,000 rooms
constructed with Government assistance and about three
million rooms had been built privately.6 (How many homes
these rooms represent is not reported.) Obviously this

construction had done little more than replace rooms de-

stroyed or damaged and had not begun to meet new demands.

‘— A.._ ‘

SMuriel Grindrod, The R buildin of Ital (London:
Royal Institute of InternationaI Affairs, I955), p. 212.
6Gastone Silvano Spinetti, (ed.), Ital Toda (Roma:

The Documentation Center of the Presidency o t e ouncil
of Ministers of the Republic of Italy, 1955), PP. 60-61.

 

~261-

{Much of the housing was substandard by any rating
system. People were crowded, often with more than one
family in asingle house. Large families, particularly in
the mezzo io 0, were forced to live in one or two rooms.
In addition, when the census was taken in_late 1951: 876,903
persons were living in 252,980 "habitations" such as caves,
huts, cellars, warehouses, shops, offices, etc.7 This situ-
ation was particularly bad in Matera where entire families
and their livestock lived in caves without electricity,
running water, sanitary facilities or any other modern
amenities. Some families had lived in these caves for
generations.

The immediate problem is to discover how much the
voter's housing situation influences his vote. The first
variable to be analyzed is the average number of persons
per room in the various provinces-~a measure of the extent
of crowding. As is indicated by Table 38, the range of
variation is not high over the country, the low being .8
per room and the high being 2.5 (average 1.37), but as is
usual, the worst conditions exist in the Mezzogigggo.8

7For Italy the number of families in a habitation
averaged 1.07. The average fer huts and caves was 1.13.
Nora Federici, "Some Aspects of the Italian Demographic
Situation: the First Results of the 1951 Census," B ca
(1%31, 114.

Nazionale del Lavoro anrterly Review,fiYI, No. 25

. 8The Italian average was 1.3 persons per room accord-
ing to the census of 1951. Equivalant averages were 1.1 for
France, .78 for the United Kingdom and .67 for the United
States. Spinetti, o cit., p. 60.

-262-_
Only one province in either the South or Islands has fewer
people per room than the national average; only five pro-
vinces in the other two regions have a higher total than
the national average. It is primarily in the southern ’
areas that two or more families share a house, and it is
in these areas that families are largest.

Since this crowding is essentially due to low in-
come, it might well be anticipated that the correlations
fer the persons per room variable would be very similar
to those fer income.

TABLE 44

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND AVERAGE NUMBER
OF PERSONS PER ROOM

 

 

Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. +.02 +.06 -.1.o +.os -.le
P.S.D.I. '04? -036 ‘011 “.23 “060
P.L.I. ‘027 +025 “0&1 “024 +007
P.R.I. +.12 +016 '059 -036 “all
P.C.I. +.ll -.41 +.56 +.41 +.Ol
P.S.I. +021 ’ -339 “002 -015 “0&8
PaNoMfi 'ohé ‘ ‘+080 +olh “012 +060
:MOSOI. +007 +069 ‘033 +ohh +054

(Opposite signs would be expected since persons per room

goes up as income goes down.) With respect to the national

figures, this is precisely the case. Where the P.S.D.I.

receives its best support in areas with high incomes, it

is equally weakened when crowding is extensive.

Exactly

~263+
the same statement applies to the P.C.I. The parties of
the Right are strongly supported when persons per room is
high and income is low. Other parties have no significant
correlations with either variable.

When the country is divided into geographical
regions, however, a completely different picture is pre-
sented. Several parties which manifest clear dependence
upon the persons per room variable have no such relationship.
with income. The P.N.M. and.M.S.I. are prime examples of
this. Neither party evidences any relationship between
its vote and income in the Center, but both have very high
persons per room correlations in that area. The Monarchists,
with their +.80, apparently receive their votes in this
region almost exclusively in provinces with extensive
crowding; the +.69 of the.M.S.I. is only slightly less
conclusive. Since there are fewer provinces in this region
with crowded conditions, these parties gain comparatively
little from this positive relationship.

Another considerable change that occurs has to
do with the Christian Democrats. This party has signifi-
cant negative correlations with income in the Center and
Islands, but no such figures result with persons per room.
This latter variable obviously has no influence over the
D.C. vote in the Center and Islands. An even more peculiar
circumstance is revealed in the South fer the Christian

Democrats and the other three Center parties. All four

. ~264-

parties have very slight negative relationships with income,
indicating strength where income is low. At the same.
time, these four parties show negative correlations with
person per room, indicating support where crowding is
least. The P.C.I. is in exactly the same position; it has .
a high positive correlation with both variables in the
South.

It appears that the persons per room variable is
related to per capita income when the nation is taken as
a unit, but geographically the relationship breaks down.
This is,perhaps, due to the dependence of income upon edu-
cation and occupation while crowding is more independent-
(being affected by factors such as availability of housing
and, perhaps most important, the consciousness of being
crowded). The result is that, regardless of income, the
D.C. and other Center parties are opposed in crowded
provinces of the South. At the same time, crowded con-
ditions in the same area lead to a Communist vote, again
regardless of income. It would take a province by province
survey to determine if this explanation is accurate. It
does appear, however, that from the standpoint of the Center
parties, reduction of crowding is desirable for more than
humanitarian reasons.

The second housing variable is home ownership.
As Table 38 indicates, this is one factor which shows the
Mezzogiorno ahead of the two northern areas-~only four

-265-

provinces of the South and one of the Islands fall below
the national average. The unfbrtunate fact of the matter,
however, is that many of the southerners live in their own
homes, but those homes are overcrowded and, all too often,
virtually uninhabitable. The industrial workers of the
. North and Center live in rented houses and apartments;
farmers in these areas usually have comparatively good
accommodations. In the United States home ownership is
taken as a sign of financial stability and good income;
in Italy home ownership is highest in the area where income
is least and.economic prospects are bleakest. Nonetheless,
the correlations resulting from analyzing the relationship
between party vote and the percent of residents living in
their own homes are precisely what might have been expected
--home ownership leads to a vote fer the Government or the
Right and opposition to the radical Left. (It should be
remembered, however, that these figures are for aggregates
of voters, not individuals.)

Over the nation as a whole only the Left has what
might be termed significant correlations. Both the P.C.I.
and the P.S.I. have their votenegatively influenced,
i.e., as home ownership goes up in a province, their vote
goes down. Geographically, the same relationship is shown,
for both parties in the North and for the Communists in
the Center and South (the P.S.I. is negative in the latter
two areas also, but the figures lack significance). The

-266-
TABLE #5

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION LIVING IN THEIR OWN HOMES

 

Party , North Center South ‘ . Islands Italy
D.C. +.47 +.47 +.69 +.53 +.36
P.S.D.I. +oh3 -031 +018 “.14 ”013
P.L.I. +.13 +.25 +.51 -.23 +.30
P.R.I. -008 +012 +062 -003 “006
PoCoIo- “058 “067 “.43 +021 “049
P.S.I. ‘053 “031 ‘015 +016 ‘05#
VP.N.M. +047 +071 “037 ’055 ‘+037
MQSQIO “017 +031

+042 +019 'oéh

leftist parties have very slight positive correlations in
the Islands, but is is doubtful if they are meaningful.

The party with the most unifbrm relationship is the
D.C. In each area this party has a definite positive
correlation, indicating that provinces with a high percentage
of home ownership, regardless of their location, are likely
to vote Christian Democrat. (This is particularly true
in the South where the cultivatori diretti strongly support
the D.C.) For the Center parties as a group, the South
is the region where this variable most influences voting.
All have positive correlations, with only the P.S.D.I.
not having a significant relationship. However, only the
D.C. party is positively affected in each geographical

region..

~267~

0f the rightist parties, the Monarchist vote is
more influenced than that of the M.S.I. The P.N.M. has a
high positive correlation in the Center and lower but still
positive figures in the North and for the nation as a whole.
The M;S.I. has moderate positive correlations in the Center
and for all of Italy. Both, however, have significant
negative figures in the Islands where the Left has its very
low positive correlations. _

One conclusion can be made about the influence of'home.
ownership on vote--except fer the Christian Democrats,
the geographical region must be known before any prediction
can be made. It is obvious that home ownership is one
factor which decidedly raises the possibility of a pro-D.C.
vote. The minor-Center parties appear to be next in line
with the Right as third choice (except for the Central
area). Home ownership clearly inhibits the chances of
the Left.

The final variable to be discussed in connection
with the Italian standard of living is a combination of
three factors-~electricity, running water and interior
bathrooms. The percentages of houses having these features
in the various provinces have been combined into a single
variable somewhat euphemistically called a "civilization“
indext It is not contended that these three items singly
or collectivelyinfluence the vote--it is, for example,

highly unlikely that a person will vote for or against a

-268-
political party merely because his house is or is not wired
for electricity. It was thought, however, that the lack
of features such as these could conceivably cause a citizen
to feel underprivileged or, in fact, indicate that he was
underprivileged. The range of variation with these three
factors was such as to lend credence to such a contention.

The percent of homes wired fer electricity, for
example, varied between 97.6% (Como) and 48.k% (Teramo).

The national average was 70.8%, with the highest percentages
in the North. Houses with internal running water ranged
from.7?.0% (Genova) down to 9.6% (Laces), the national
average being 35.1%. Here there was little geographical
variation. Interior bathrooms existed in 77.0% of the
homes in one province (Genova) and in only 12.1% of the
homes in another (Rovigo). The national average was 26.9%,
but surprisingly the South and Islands were better equipped
than the North.

Rather than attempting to analyze each of these
variables, which probably was insignificant alone, the index
was created by averaging all three together. The resulting
figures are meaningless in themselves, but they do indicate
how the provinces relate to each other. Correlations were
then computed between this index.and the vote of the various
parties.

As can be seen from.Table L6, high correlations

between vote and this variable are not numerous-~none, in

~269-

 

 

 

TABLE #6
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE CIVILIZATION
INDEX
Party North Center South Islands Italy.
D.C. +001 -038 -052 ”.37 ”.11
P.S.D.I. -.12 +.23 -.2o +.IB +.12
P.L.I. -008 “.07 -033 +00h “.19
P.R.I. "017 “elk “0&2 -006 ‘009
PoCoIo “015 +05“ ' +03h +006 +01“
P.S.I. ”009 ”005 +008 ”.06 +012
P.N.M; +007 '036' +018 +019 “022
M.S.I. +031. “010 +013 +003

+o5h
fact, fer the whole of Italy. However, several interesting
figures are indicated in the geographical regions. For
example, it appears that the D.C. party is faced with
difficulty in regions in which the index figures are high,
i.e., areas where conditions are best. The negative corre-
lations in the Center and the Mezzogiorno indicate this
fact. At the same time, the Communists have positive
figures in the same areas, showing an improvement in vote
potential as "civilization" services are extended. The
only other figure of significance is the +.59 correlation
fer the M33.I. in the Islands, a region where provinces
with high index.numbers are few.

It is apparent that the civilization index is not
a particularly productive variable to relate to party vote.

In essence it bears out a fact that has become evident in

-270-
past chapters--the Christian Democrats are not dependent
upon the existence of good conditions. In fact, as the
income and educational variables showed, this party is most
likely to achieve a high vote in the poorer provinces. 0n
the other hand, it is just as clear that the Communists (and
to a limited extent, the P.S.I.) are far from dependent
'upon depressed areas fer their vote.

Actually, the economic, or standard of living,
variables discussed in this chapter have all (with the
exception of home ownership) indicated about the same thing
as the civilization index. UnfOrtunately, they contribute
very little to an understanding of influence on vote. It
must be said that fer Italy economic motivation fer voting
is comparatively slight or is the result of interrelatiOn
with other variables.

CHAPTER VII
AGE, MARITAL STATUS AND URBAN RESIDENCE

In the preceding chapters the variables discussed
werelargely grouped around a single focal point such as
education or unemployment. This is not the case with the
‘1ast set of factors to be analyzed. The only mutual rela-
tionship here is that each night logically be expected to
influence voting behavior. These last variables are age,

marital status, and urbanization.

Age

The electoral impact of the first of these, age,
has been the cause of'much speculation. For example, it
has been generally accepted that the youth of Italy is
radical. Disillusioned with the present society in Italy,
youth has been thought to have turned to the extreme Right
or Left. It has been pointed out by various writers that
the M.S.I. attracts young people by its appeals to the
glorious past and by its rampant nationalism. At the same
time, other young people presumably have turned to the
Left, particularly the P.C.I., as the savior of their

COImtpry.

~271-

-272-

Other assumptions were made concerning the impact
of age on vote, but all (including the influence of youth)
were based almost exclusively on personal opinions and
observations without scientific basis. To discover, by
more systematic means, the actual relationship between age
and provincial vote, each of the seven age categories of
the 1951 census was correlated with the vote of each
political party. I

Befbre turning to the results of that analysis, it
might be well to look at the distribution of age groupings
over the country. It is obvious from Table 47 that the
mezzogiorno contains (at least as of 1953) the youngest
part of the Italian population. The vast majority of
provinces in that area have over h0% of their population
under the age of 21, the highest figure being 46%; only
one province, Pescara, falls below the national average.
It is also evident that there is little geographical vari-
ation in the percentage of the population in the 21 through
34 range. Above 35, the figures fer the Mezzogiorno fall
well below the national average. Clearly a party that has
a high positive correlation with the under 21 category is
well off in the southern areas (and less successfhl in the
North and Center). In view of the assumed affinity of
youth for the radical parties, this presumably hurts the

Center parties.

TABLE 47
AGE, MARITAL STATUS AND URBAN RESIDENCEa

(By Percentage of the Total Population)

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-277-

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in these tables do not indicate that if a party has a

-27 8..

The figures presented

positive or negative correlation with an age category that

persons of that age vote for or against that party. This

is obviously not true of those under 21. A positive corre-

lation with a particular age grouping merely means that

as the percentage of the population that is in that grouping
goes up, the chances of the party receiving votes also goes

up.

In the first region, the North, it appears that

age was not an especially potent factor in the 1953 election.1

 

TABLE 48 _
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES
IN THE NORTH

W

Under 65-
Party 21 21-2h 25-3h 35-4L Over
D.C. +037 +023 -038 -032 “.114-
PoSoDoIo ”.31; ’030 ‘019 +008 +ol+1
P.L.I. -020 #018 ”0&5 +029 ‘ +031
P.R.I. “008 ‘ +001; +020 +003 +011
P.C.I. -.37 —.12 +.55 +.35 +.13
P.S.I. ‘007 ’009 +003 +006 -005
P.N.Mo -028 ’02“ ’059 +003 +.hl}
M.S.I. -001 “006 +ol¥2 +008 “018

 

1The age categories have been combined into tables by
geographical regions to better present the impact of age on

the vote of each party.

will be included below, pp. 286-287.

Individual tables for each party

-279-
Most parties have insignificant correlations with each age
grouping, with only the Communists and.Monarchists showing
any high figures. The most interesting part of the table
probably is the direction of the signs fer all parties; in
almost every case there is a distinct point where the sign
reverses. For the Christian Democrats, for example, the
figures are positive below age 25 and negative above. The
P.S.D.I. and P.L.I. have almost precisely opposite relation-
ships, being negative in the lower categories through the
25-3h grouping and positive thereafter. (The P.R.I. figures
are so low with all ages as to be almost completely without
significance, indicating that age is not a major factor in
determining its vote.) The opposition parties, Right and
Left, show much the same trend, having slightly negative
correlations where persons under 25 make up a relatively
high percentage of the population. (The M.S.I., of course,
has its most significant correlation in the 25-3h range,
a -.59) Despite the trends shown in this table, however,
the low figures greatly limit the usefulness of age as a
voting predictor in the North.

A similar tendency for each party to have positive
correlations with either the younger or older portions of
the population is manifested in the Center. Here, however,
the higher figures add a great deal to the significance of
the age variable. With several parties age appears to be

crUCialo

~280-
TABLE 49

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES
IN THE CENTER

 

 

Under 65-
21 21-2t 25-34 35-ha hs-sa 55-6A Over
D.C. +040 +.36 +067 ‘052 ”033 “035 -009
P.S.D.I. -027 ’026 ‘013 - +035 +033 +025 +015
P.L.I. +019 +009 -006 ' “.16 -016 “.10 -009
PoRoIo +.02 +033 +020 ‘001 -015 “021 ;031
P.C.I. -062 “063 +oh1 +068 +062 +063 +oh#
P.S.I. “035 “0010 +oz|rl +023 +01“ +029 ”022
P.N.Mo +.77 +041 ‘03} ’069 ‘062 ”.69 “.56
MoSoIo +053 +036 +012 “.37 ‘0“? ‘05“ “055
Of the Center parties, only the D.C. has clear
correlations. As in the North, the Christian Democrats

receive their strongest support in provinces with a high
percentage of young peeple, but fall off even more definitely
after age 25. The party's appeal in areas where a high per-
centage of the population is ZS-AS is particularly low.' In
this respect the Christian Democrats are in exactly the same
position as the parties of the Right. Both of these groups
expecially the P.N.M., appeal most strongly in provinces with
a high percentage of the populace under 21. In the provinces
where the percentage of persons over 35 is high, these
parties (again with emphasis on the.Monarchists) have very
little chance of succeeding. While strong support for
the M.S.I. might have been expected in "young" provinces,

the support for the P.N.M. in such areas is very surprising.

~281-

It was thought that this party would appeal to those with
fend memories of a monarchist past, not to a new generation.
The Center is the only area in which this pro-Right correla-
tion with the under-25 grouping is so definite. I

As can be seen, the Left parties have a relationship
with age which is opposite to that of the Right and Center.
The Communists, in particular, have little chance of success
in provinCes with high percentages of persons under 25. This
party has moderate strength with the 25-34 grouping but is
strongest in provinces with older populations. It appears.
that, in the Center, being young does not lead to a radical

vote for the Left.

 

 

 

TABLE 50
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES
IN THE SOUTH
Under 65-
Party 21 21-24 25-34 35-hh AS-SA 55-6A Over
D.C. -.2h +038 "008 +036 +026 +ooh +0“?
P.S.D.I. ‘002 +oh8 +016 ‘01? ’000 -011 “elk
P.L.I. “.02 +015 ".15 +ol§5 +039 +015 +032
P.R.I. -.33 +.28 +.l3 +.26 +.23 +.1A +.53
P.C.I. +018 “028 “.02 “028 ‘015 -031 “.27
P.S.I. “.22 ‘ohz +018 +011} “027 +019 +023
P.N.Mo +935 +006 “.15 -033 “010 “.08 ‘0‘06
M.S.I. "'037 +003 +057 +021... +001; +059 +039

 

In the South there is no evident relationship shown

between vote and age, whether in terms of clear correlations

-282-

or general trends. The only exceptions to this statement

are the positive figures applying to the MtS.I. in the 25-3A

55-6A groupings. Apparently the age of the voters in the

South has little to dO‘Wlth their choice of parties.
The other region of the Mezzogiorno presents a

completely different situation, however. In the Islands,

at least for the Center parties, clear and definite re-

lationships can be drawn between vote and age.

TABLE 51

' CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND'AGE CATEGORIES
‘ IN THE ISLANDS'

_A‘

 

 

Under * 65‘
Party 21 21-24 25-34 35-A4 AS-Sh 55-65 Over
D.C. +054 +022 '073 “084 '03k -030 -011
P.S.D.I. -.65 -.58 +.AA +.AO +.21 +.78 +.7l
P.L.I. ”023 “025 +053 +ol+2 +008 +040 +027
P.R.I. -. 3 -.13 +.A5 +.53 +.68 +.Al +.5A
AP.C.I. +.13 +.25 +.07 +.08 -.22 -.24 -.21
P.S.Ip +015 -024 -025 +009 “002 ’020 “.13
P.N.M. -.18 -.19 +.21 +.21 +.26 +.l7 +.03
MeS.I. -.03 +.43 +.58 +.38 +.07 -.23 -.A5

 

where the percentage of persons under 25 is high.

The Christian Democrats, again, have strong support

However,

a high proportion of persons in any of the 25 and above

categories is likely to lead to a decline in Christian

Democratic vote.

Where the percentage of the population

in the 25-3A or 35-44 brackets is high, this decline is

~283-

almost certain. (Note that fer these two groupings the
level of significance is better than 1%.) On the other'
hand, the correlations of the minor-Center parties are
diametrically opposed; their support is weakest where that
of the D.C. is strongest. A young population militates
strongly against a P.S.D.I., P.R.I. or P.L.I. vote. The'
P.L.I. is best supported where there is a high percentage
of persons in the 25-34 or the over-65 range; the P.R.I.

is strongest when the age is 35-44; the P.S.D.I. when persons
6 55 and up are numerous. All of these parties, however,
have positive relationships above the age of 25. Since
the Islands have (with the exception of the South) the
highest percentage of persons under 21 of any region of
Italy, the D.C. clearly has the advantage over the other
Center parties.

Among the opposition parties, only the M.S.I. evi-
dences a clear relationship with any specific age category,
a +.58 correlation with the 25-3A grouping. Mbst of the
other figures fer the M.S.I. and all those fer the other
parties are insignificant.

For Italy as a whole, the general tendency of the
parties to have positive relationships with either the
population below or above the age of 25 and negative cor-
relations with the other is continued. Of the eight parties
analyzed, seven show this distribution, the only exception
being the P.R.I. which has no correlations of value.

 

-28h-

 

 

 

. TABLE 52 .
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES
IN ITALY
Under 65-
Party 21 21-2h 25-3h 35-hh AS-SA 55-6h Overf
DOC. +013 6 +010 .'038 ‘009 ”00‘; '009 -002
P.S.D.I. -.63 -.52 +.O7 +.59 +.65 +.6O +.52
P.L.I. +.12 +.12 ‘ -.29 -.ll -.10 -.08 +.03
P.R.I. -.13 +.07 +.31 +.lO -.02 +.O6 +.08
P.C.I. -.27 , -.39 +.t9 +.25 +.16 +.23 +.1t
P.S.I. -052 -039 +037 +053 +oh8 +ollv8 +029
PONOMO +057 +043 -0158 -063 ‘052 “050 ”035
M.S.I. +05z +039 “001+ “.53 “057 “051 “ell-o

 

Among the Government parties, only the P.S.D.I.
has truly significant relationships indicated. The sizes
of the figures and their uniformity with all age groupings
would seem.to mean that this is an especially important
factor in the Social Democratic vote over the nation. This
party has its best chances of success in those provinces
without high percentages of the population under the age
of 25. Precisely the same situation applies to both parties
of the Left (particularly the P.S.I.), but with somewhat
smaller correlation figures. .

The only parties with substantial positive relation-
ships with the under-25 segment of the pepulation are the
P.N.M. and M.S.I. Thus, over the entire country, as in the

Center (and, with the exception of the youngest group, the

-285...

Islands), the vote of the Right depends upon "youthful"
provinces. These provinces support the appeals for monarchy
and faSCism. Areas where older persons predominate vote
Left or fer one of the minor—Center parties (specifically
the P.S.D.I., which might also be considered leftist). To
a certain extent, this type of support for the.M.S.I. is
directly in line with the pre-election estimates of'neo-
Fascist strength among the young people of the country.

In addition to the suggestions of the importance
of a high percentage of youth in a province to the vote
of the Right, certain characteristics of the appeal of other
Italian parties are shown by these correlations. To make
the impact of age on vote more clear, the correlations for
each party were rearranged in individual tables presented
on the next pages.

Looking first at the D.C. table, it can be seen
that in every region and in the nation as‘a whole this
party has a fairly low but definite positive relationship-
with the two lowest age categories and negative correlations
with all others. (The only exception to this is the belowe
21 grouping in the South. However, in that area virtually
every party has correlations which run counter to their
national pattern.) Since the Italian population is
relatively young (as compared to the rest ochurope), this
would appear to put the Christian Democrats in an advantage—.

ous position.

-286-

TABLE 53 .
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN D.C. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

 

 

Age North Center South Islands Italy
Under 21 ' +.37 +.Ao -.2A +.5A +.13
Zl-Zh +023 +036 +038 +022 +010
25-3“ '038 -067 '008 “073 “038
35-h4 -.32 -.52 +.36 -.8A -.09
h5~5h “026 -033 +026 -03# -00h
55'6h ’025 -035 +00“ “.30 -.09
65-0ver ’olh ‘0 +oh7 “.11 “002

TABLE 54

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.S.D.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

v—v— ‘7

 

 

 

Age North Center South Islands Italy
Under 21 ..3h “.27 -002 “.65 ”.63
21-2h ‘030 “.26 ' +oh8 “058 “.52
25‘3k “019 -013 +016 +ohb +007
35‘16'4 +008 +035 "017 +040 +059
“S“SA +029 +033 “.00 +021 +065
SS-Oh +.29 +.25 -.ll +.78 +.65
65~Over +0145]. +015 “011} +071 +052

TABLE 55

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.L.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

 

I _—

 

Age North Center South Islands Italy
Under 21 “.20 +019 “002 -0h3 +012
21‘2# “118 +009 +015 '025 +.12
25*3L -.#5 -006 ‘015 +053 -029
35-hh ‘ +029 -016 +045 +042 '011
h5“54 +029 “.16 +039 +008 “010
55-6h +.33 -.10 +.15 +.h0 -.08
65-Over +.31 -.09 +.32 +.27 +.03

_—

-287-
TABLE 56

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.R.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

 

 

 

Age North Center South Islands Italy
Under 21 +008 +002 -033 ”063 “.13
Zl-ZA +.OA +.33 . +.28 -.l3 +.O7
25-34 +.20 +.20 +.13 +.AS +.31
35‘hh +003 "001 +026 +053 +010
AS-SA -.13 -.15 +.23 +.68 -.02
55—6t _ +.03 -.21 +.1A +.A8 +.06
65‘0V3r +011 -031 +053 +054 +008

TABLE 57

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.C.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

 

 

 

Age ' North Center South Islands‘ Italy
Under 21 -037 “062 +018 I +013 ‘02?
21-24 “.12 -063 “028 +025 -039
25-34 +055 +041 -902 +007 +.h9
35-44 +035 +068 -028 +008 +025
hS‘Sh +016 +062 “015 '022 +016
55-6A +.25 +.63 -.31 -.2A +.23
65-Over +013 +ouh “.27 “.21 +01“

TABLE 58

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.S.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

 

Age ,. North Center South Islands Italy
Under 21 “.07 ‘0 5 -022 +015 '0 2
21'24 -. -.OA -.h2 '02“ -039
25-3h +.03 +.hl +.18 -.25 +037
35‘1“!» +006 +023 +011? +009 +053
AS-SA +.13 +.1A -.27 -.02 +.h8
55’64 +007 +029 +019 -020 +.h8
65-Over'| -005 “022 +023 "013 *029’

 

~288-
TABLE 59
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.N.M. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

 

 

Age North Center_ South , Islands Italy
Under 21 fii-028 +077 F? +035 -018 A_w—+os7
‘21*2# ‘024 +ohl +006 “019 +oh3
25-34 -059 ‘033 *015 +021 '048
BS‘AA +003 “069 “033 7+021 '063
h5“5h ' +037 “062 -010 +026 “.52
55-64 +036 -069 -008 +017 “050
65'0ver +04# -056 “046 +003 -035

TABLE 60

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MeS.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

 

 

Age North Center South Islands Italy
Under 21 ”001 +053 ’037 -003 6 +052
Zl-ZA -.06 +.36 +.03 +oh3 +.39
25’3b +042 +012 +057 +058 ‘00“
35-h4 +.O8 -.37 +.24 +.38 --53
hS’Sh ‘ooh "Oh? +00h +.07 ‘05?
55’6h -007 -054 +059 "023 ".51
65-0ver -.18 , -.55 +.39 -.A5 -.A0

 

Interestingly enough, the chief rival of the D.C.
party, the P.C.I., shows exactly the opposite tendency in
two regions and over the country. Only in the Islandscha
the Communists appeal in areas where young people make up
a relatively high percentage of the population (and even
there the figures are insignificant). The other Leftist,
party, the P.S.I., has) only one, very low, positive relation-
ship with a young group-«the below 21 category in the

-289-
Islands. This is interesting, of course, because of the
anticipated radical behavior of the younger elements of
the society. Quite obviously, this expected result did
not materialize. Explanations of this situation must be
hypothetical; e.g., in provinces with a high number of
families with young children (thus lowering the average
'age and increaSing the total under 21) the parents might
vote fer the Center or Right to ensure economic security
(because they cannot afford to support radical parties); or
perhaps more logically, a radical youth element might cause.
a reaction in favor of’the Center or Right by the older
portion of the population. .

While these conjectures may have a degree of validity,
there is considerable evidence that a simpler explanation--
that youth is not so radical as previously thought-~is more
correct. A recent study of Italian young people has shown
them to be a somewhat conservative group who value security
over risky, but potentially remunerative undertakings. When,
fer example, young Italians were queried concerning employ-
ment, 44.1% evidenced a preference fer employment by a state
agency; only 29.4% would choose a private firm (26.5%

either had no preference or made no response).2 Despite

2Joseph G. LaPalombara and Jerry B. waters, "Values,
Expectations and Political Predispositions of ItalianYouth,“
Unpublished manuscript (to be published in the western

Political Quarterly, February, 1961).

-290-
the fact that upward mobility and high salaries were more
likely with private employment, the "security of employment
in the public bureaucracy, the social insurance benefits
available to bureaucrats, and the promise of pension bene-
fits on retirement,"3 seemed more attractive.

Facts such as these are sufficient to cast consider-
able doubt on any claim about a radical youth. The same
study, also, provided what appears to be the evidence that
completely belies any such contention. Table 61 indicates
the distribution of responses when young people were asked
to indicate the party which they considered most worthy of
support. These are scarcely the replies expected of a
radical youth; actually, the Center percentage was greater
than that it achieved in any election after 1948 until 1958.
. If it is recognized that Italian youth, as a group,
is not radically inclined, the correlationsbetween party
vote and the below-25 age categories are what could be logi-
cally expected, i.e., positive correlations for the Christian
Democrats and negative relationships with the Left. This
would reasonably lead to the deduction that the D.C. party
‘is due to continually increase its vote as the present-day
youth replaces the older, more radical voters. Conversely,

the futures of the P.C.I. and P.S.I. would seem to be bleak.

 

~291-
TABLE 61

PARTY PREFERENCES OF YOUTH IN 1958 AND
ACTUAL RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 19583

 

A;

 

 

Youth cg; 1958

Party Preference Election

D.C. 39.2% 42.3%
P.S.D.I. 700 A06
P.L.I. 308 395
P.R.I. (and FOR.) 101 105
Center 51.1 51.8
P.C.I. 5.6 22.7
P.S.I. 10.2 15.}
Left 1508 3700
P.N.Mo (and PoMoPo) 308 409
M.S.I. 2.2 &08
Right 9.0 907
Other responses 24.1 1.5

 

aIn this table, P.R. refers to the Radical Party:
P.N.P. refers to the Popular Monarchist Party. Joseph G.
LaPalombara and Jerry B. Waters, "Values, Expectations and
Political Predispositions of Italian Youth," Unpublished

manuscript (to be published in the Western Political Quarterly

February, 1961).

Unfortunately for the D.C. party, this reasoning
does not fit the facts. It appears from the correlations
on the previous pages that youth in Italy has been inclined
toward the Center, at least since the 1951 Census and the
1953 election. Since the youth of 1953 was five years older
in 1958, a tremendous victory for the D.C. in the election
of the latter year would be expected; the actual gain was

only 2.2%. It definitely appears that the youth did not stay

with the D.C.

-292-

. This points up the importance of the sudden switch
from positive to negative at the 25-34 age category (and
from negative to positive fer the Left at the same point).
The explanation probably lies in the increasing disillusion-
ment that all too frequently faces Italian youth as it matures.
The thousands of young men that have never obtained their
first jobs are only one indication of the causes of this
disillusionment. It was suggested earlier (Chapter IV)
that disassociation from society and a swing to the radical
parties might well result from the economic status, and
future, of these men. The correlation figures in the present
chapter seem to confirm the thought that this is occurring.
The Italian youth study referred to above comes to a very
similar conclusion when noting that membership in the P.C.I.
comes several years gftgg voting age is attained, the result
of "long-term dissatisfaction with one's personal economic
condition, growing lack of confidence in the promise of
socio-economic betterment, and the development of strong
negative expectations regarding the future."“

The conclusion that these facts leads to is that
the D.C. party, if it is to retain its preeminent position
in Italian politics, must improve economic conditions to
the point that it can hold the allegiance of the new gen-
eration. If this can be accomplished, andthe positive-

 

Ibid.

:‘rg'ipr . 7;; ,.—;.z. t; ‘ ...:." H;.

-293-
negative swing at age 25 eliminated, the vote of the Left
should steadily decline.

An interesting element that complicates the picture
is the relationship between age and the minor-Center. As
the preceding tables show, these parties, the P.R.I., P.L.I.
and particularly the P.S.D.I., have generally negative
correlations with the younger age groupings. The switch
from negative to positive occurs at approximately thesame
place as with the Left, at age 25. This fact leads to the
conjecture that the disillusionment of youth does not
necessarily lead to a radical vote; the minor parties of the
Center may be the beneficiaries. (These votes would, perhaps,
represent a non-radical protest.) The failure of the Left
to improve its position between 1953 and 1958 lends credence
to this thought. However, the importance of this point is
mitigated by the comparatively low total vote (whether pro-
test or not) of the minor-Center, and by the fact that these
parties also failed to markedly increase their support
between 1953 and 1958. In addition, if the minor-Center
does secure any respectable portion of its vote from these
discouraged persons who pass the age of 25, these parties
will also suffer if the Christian Democrats succeed in
improving conditions.

The final two parties to be discussed are the P.N.M..
and.M.S.I. These parties present a very peculiar relation—

ship with age, neither confirming nor denying the validity

-294-
of the belief that the former is supported by older voters
and the latter by youth. -Nationally, each party has fairly
significant positive correlations with the below-25 age
category and equally significant negative relationships with
every age grouping over 25. Geographically, however, this
pattern is continued only in the Center. In that region
each party, particularly the P.N.M., has a high positive
correlation with the under-21 category, a lesser but still
positive figure for the Zl-Zh grouping, and significant
negative correlations with all other ages. (The T.N.M. has
the same relationship in the South, but the figures are too
low to have significance.) In the other geographical areas
the general tendency is for the relationship to be negative
below 25 and positive above. However, the correlations
are too mixed to establish a real pattern.

The result of this analysis is to throw consider-
able doubt upon the assumed source of rightist support. For
the P.N.M., it is certainly evident that a high percentage
of persons over 25 in a province does not materially enhance
the chances of this party in that province. Only in the'
North and Islands do the 25-plus age categories show even
low positive correlations. In the Center and for Italy as
a whole the relationship is significantly toward support in
"young" provinces.

At the same time, the source of M.S.I. support in

three of the four geographical regions is in provinces

-295-

where a high percentage of persons in the 25-4h age range;
a high proportion in the Zl-Zh group is slightly helpful.
Only for the nation as a whole and the Center does the
M.S.I. have strong support in "youthful" provinces. Thus,
for both parties of the Right there is considerable variation
in the effect of age on vote. Before any generalizations
or predictions could be made, the geographical region would
have to be known.

The overall influence of age on vote is difficult
to assess. 'Certainly there are many very definite and
significant correlations. Certainly, also, previous
assumptions about age and party support should be revised.
In any case, age is clearly one of the variables which must
be considered when voting analyses and predictions are being
made. It should be recognized, however, that age is not
independent of other variables. Families are largest among
agricultural workers and probably among those with the
least education, two factors whichpreviously have indicated
support fer the D.C. and Opposition to the Left. This may
at least partly explain the positive correlations of the
Christian Democrats in provinces with a high percentage of
the population under the age of 25. That age is more than
the mere reflection of other variables is shown, however,
by the fairly consistent relationship of the major parties,
including the D.C., in most regions of the country. Age

certainly is an important variable.

-296- q .

The same statement cannot be made for the next
variable, the percent of persons in a province that lives
in cities or towns, those living in concentrations of five
or fewer families, and those living in the country. For
purposes of the present investigation, the first category
is contrasted against the latter two to gauge the influence
of urbanisation on vote. As Table 47 shows, there is a
wide range in the percentage of persons residing in cities
and towns (a low of h0.9%, a high of 97.2%), and, conse-
quently, it was expected that this influence might be con-
siderable.5 However, as Table 62 shows, the correlations
are generally insigificant.

f It is only in the Islands that this variable appears
to have materially affected the vote (and even there the
correlations are not quite at the.5% level of significance).
In that region each of the Center parties has its vote in-
fluenced, positively for the D.C. and negatively for all
others. A look at Table 10 will show that the Christian

5It should be noted that the term "urbanization"
as used here does not have the connotation commonly ascribed
to that term in the United States. In Italy, urbanization
does not necessarily imply industry or commerce; it fre~
quently (particularly in the Mezzogiorno) means simply that
great numbers of families live in a concentrated area. Farm
workers (especially the sharecroppers and agricultural
laborers) live in these urban areas and travel to the farms
every day. These concentrations frequently achieve con-
siderable size, but still are composed of essentially rural
citizens. The urbanization variable is of use here in-that
it indicates the political effect of living in concentrations
of five or more families.

~297-
TABLE 62

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE

OF THE POPULATION LIVING IN CITIES AND TOWNS

 

I

 

:_:

 

North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. +016 “.24 “031 +050 (+002
P.S.Do +013 '021 “.10 ‘05“ “.22
POLOIO ‘0 +016 “.08 -0A1 +013
P.R.I. ‘022 +020 ‘045 -.Sh .-023
P.C.I. ”026 +008 +010 +008 “.18
P.S.I. +014 “022 -009 +007 -033
P.N.M. +.lh +.l6 +.20 -.20 +.h2
M.S.I. +.32 +.h0 +.13 +.12 +.h7

 

Democrats are) quite fortunate in this relationship; the f
Islands have the highest urbanization rate of any geographie
cal area, the lowest percentage being 81.3%. The other
Center parties, of course, are at a considerable dis-
advantage.

The only other correlations of interest are those
of the Right, principally those of the.M.S.I. The neo-
Fascists achieve low to moderate positive figures in all
regions and for the nation, while the Monarchists have a
negative relationship only in the Islands. However, it is
the consistency rather than the size of the correlations that
makes this interesting. The explanation probably lies in
the appeal of these parties, particularly the M.S.I., to
voters with higher education and to those engaged in service

and public administration occupations. These factors

. ~298-
presumably lead to a predisposition fbr city residence.

Despite these few correlations, it is evident that
the percent of persons living in cities and towns has little
effect on voting behavior in the provinces. This variable
adds little to an understanding of party support in Italy.

If the correlations with the above variable are
surprising in their lack of significance, those with the
next variable are equally surprising because they are sig-
nificant. This factor, the percent of persons in a province
that is unmarried, widowed or divorced, provides some of'
the highest correlation figures obtained in the present study.

TABLE 63

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION THAT IS UNMARRIED, WIDOWED OR

\

 

 

DIVORCED
Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. +059 +079 “’th +066 +057
P.S.D.I. “008 “008 +03h '035 +013
P.L.I. “.12 -031} -013 ’017 -000
P.R.I. -018 '005 ‘022 '026 ‘028
P.C.I. -¢7O -071} ‘029 -036 -06“
P.S.I. ‘0‘}? -035 +0.09 u'el8 “029
P.N.M. -.05 +.32 +.h6 +.lh +.15
M.S.I. “003 +032 +003 -0159 '002

As can be seen on the above table, only two parties
have clear relationships with this variable, the D.C. and

P.C.I. The Christian Democrats are affected more than any

-299- .
other group, having high positive correlations.over the
nation and in every region except the South. The Communists
have equally high negative correlations in the North and
Center and for Italy as a whole and smaller figures in the
South and Islands. For each party a high percentage of
unmarried, widowed or divorced persons in a province appears
to be a vital factor in determining vote.‘

Other parties, while not having high correlation
figures, do present a pattern that indicates some relation-
ship between their vote and this variable. Each of the minor-
Center parties has low but negative correlations, the P.L.I.
and P.R.I. in every region and for the nation as a whole and
the P.S.D.I. in the North, Center and Islands. The P.S.I.
is negative everywhere but in the South. The patterns fer
the parties of the Right are not so definite. The P.N.M.
is generally positive while the.M.S.I. has as its highest
correlation, a -.A9 in the Islands. The influence of this
variable cannot be denied; explaining that influence,
however, is not so easy as recognizing it.

On the surface it does not appear that there is a
logical way to account for a high percentage of unmarried,
widowed or divorced persons in a province indicating support
for the D.C. to the virtual exclusion of all other parties
I (unless it could be postulated that married persons are
more painfully aware of the limitations of the existent social

system and, consequently, support the Opposition.) The

-300-

only explanation that seems to fit the facts lies in the
composition of the variable itself. Of the 15,142,013
persons (men 16 and over, women 14 and over) who were un-
married, widowed or divorced in Italy in 1951, only
2,990,795 fit into the two latter categories. In other
words, 12,151,218 had never been married. Since it is quite
likely the vast majority of these unmarried persons were
under the age of 25, it appears that the governing factor
may have been age.

A comparison of the marital status table with the
age correlations lends support to this hypothesis. The
' D.C. has a positive correlation with both age categories
below 25 except in the South (where it is positive with the
.21-2h group). With marital status it is positive everywhere
but the South. The P.C.I. is negatively related to the
lower two age groupings in the North and Center with insig-
nificant positive figures in the South and Islands. With
marital status the Communists have very high negative corre-
lations in the North and South and relatively insignificant.
negative figures in the Mezzogiorno. The M.S.I., the only
party without a clear pattern with marital status has a
wide regional variation with age. A juxtaposition of the
age and marital status charts shows a very definite dependency
of the latter on the former.

If this explanation of the influence of marital

status is accepted, it becomes obvious that the only

-301-
variable of real importance discussed in this chapter is
age. Urbanization has little, if any, influence and is
probably dependent on other variables; marital status is
dependent on age.. It definitely appears, however, that age
is a very important factor in the Italian political scene,
and it must be taken into account if the vote received
by each party is to be understood. ‘Age Joins education and

occupation as a crucial variable.

 

 

. _,__ ,_‘,_-___._

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

After completing the variable by variable analysis
in the preceding chapter, it is now possible to present a
picture of the socio-economic factors that provide optimum
conditions for each political party. For several of the
parties this picture is clear and lucid; fer others the
correlations are so low or contradictory that the party
appeal is not intelligible in terms of the variables examined.
Before giving this resume of the factors that contribute
to individual party success, however, there is one more
group of relationships to discuss-~those between the
parties themselves.

While inter-party relationships are not of direct
concern in a study of social and economic factors, it
was thought that some further understanding of the Italian
political party system might be obtained from such a dis-
cussion. As Tables 64-71 illustrate, however, very little
infbrmation of value is found.

There are numerous correlations of significant size
but only rarely is any pattern shown. Nest correlations

probably are fertuitous and the result of regional factors

-3 02...

-303-
unrelated to the impact of one party upon another. The few
patterns that do appear indicate negative relationships,
i.e., as one party's vote goes up, another's goes down. The
only two parties with a consistently positive relationship
are the P.S.I. and P.C.I. (and here the correlations are
only of moderate size). This merely indicates that both
parties tend to be successful in the same provinces. A
perusal of Table 12 will show that it is unusual for either
the P.C.I. or P.S.I. to be markedly successful when the
other has little support.

A second relationship that is interesting is that
between the D.C. and the Left. As Table 64 shows, the

. Christian Democratic vote is severely affected in a negative

manner by increased vote for the P.C.I. and, to a much less
significant extent, the P.S.I. This points out what appears
to be a polarization of vote between the two major parties
of the Left and the major party of the Center. These three
parties, between them, receive over 70% of the total vote
cast in Italian elections and, as a result, a change in

the vote of either the Left or the D.C. almost necessarily
causes a change in the support for the other. In addition,
certain Regions of Italy are inclined to vote Left in every
election (e.g., Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria) and others
are inclined to vote fer the D.C. (e.g., Valle d'Aosta,
Veneto, Udine and much of the South). The D.C.-P.C.I.-P.S.I.

correlations in Table 6A merely reflect this inclination and

-304-
TABLE 6h

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATS AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

 

 

 

 

Party North Center 'South Islands Italy
P.S.D.I. +020 “001 ‘022 'ehB +024
P.L.I. +elh +elh +043 -057 +005
P.R.I. ‘031 -007 +051]» “0&9 “e29
P.C.I. “e73 -080 -027 +005 “.68
P.S.I. ‘021 “0&6 -033 -014 -015
PeNeMfi +017 +037 “0&6 ”.32 “003
MoSeIe 9005 +012 +022 ’eh6 “017
TABLE 65
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE SOCIAL
DEMOCRATS AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES
Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. +020 ”.01 -022 ‘OLB +02“
P.L.I. +017 “037 “043 +042 -015
P.R.I. -.30 +.03 +.18 +.24 -.lS
PeCeIe '010 +027 +001 “013 “.09
P.S.I. 4010 '00“ +009 -01h +033
P.N.M. “.26 “037 +OOI+ +021} "'0 1
M.S.I. -006 -059 +el# -019 “020

 

 

-305-
TABLE 66

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE LIBERALS
AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

 

 

 

Party North Center South 0 Islands Italy
D.C. +.14 ’+.14 +.h3 -.57 +.05
P.S.D.I. +017 -037 ‘eh3 +042 -015
P.R.I. “.12 ‘022 +01]. +00]. “012
P.C.I. “.17 “028 ”067 "ehh +031)
P.S.I. -014 -025 “038 -OSA ‘03?
P.N.M. +.A2 +.30 -.12 +.5h +.h2
MaSeIe -031 +054 “ell +015 +017
TABLE 67

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE REPULICANS
AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

 

 

 

 

 

Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. -0 l '007 +054 “049 -029
P.S.D.I. “.30 +003 +018 +024 “015
P.L.I. -012 '022 +011 +001 ‘012

e o a +0 0 -029 ”030 '009 +020
gege%e 'eié _ +018 +003 +03A +008

0 o o “.17 '00? -037 -003 “.19
N.g.¥. -.11 +.03 +.33 +.ll -.01

 

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE COMMUNISTS

-306-

TABLE 68

AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

North

 

 

Party Center South Islands Italy
DOC. “e73 "080 “027 +005 “068
P.S.D.I. -.10 +027 +e01 “013 ”009
PeLeIe -017 -028 “067 “044 +031
P.R.I. +030 “.29 ”030 ’009 +020
P.S.I. +.25 +.27 +.18 +.58 +.27
P.NOMJ “053 ‘03? “.52 ‘085 -033
M.S.I. -e#8 +.03‘ -005 -023 ’007
TABLE 69

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE SOCIALISTS
AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

 

Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. -021 ”0&6 ”033 “elk ”015
P.S.D.I. “.10 “.0“ +009 “014 +033
P.R.I. -016 +018 +003 +03h +008
P.C.I. +.25 +.27 +.18 +.58 +.27
P.N.M. “026 -071 -.h2 ‘056 -065
M38010 “006 ”037 +026 '020 “0&6

-307-

TABLE 70

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE MONARCHISTS
AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Party North Center South Islands Italy
D.C. +017 +037 “046 -032 -003

P.S.D.I. -026 -037 +001;- 43214. -041

P.L.I. +042 +030 -012 +051+ +olf2

P.R.I. '017 “‘00? -037 ”003 ‘019

P.C.I. "053 -037 “0&2 ".85 “033

P.S.I. -026 -071 -.l+2 “.56 “065

M.S.I. -026 +070 -0514» +036 +eh3

TABLE 71
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE M.S.I.
AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

Party North. Center South Islands Italy
D.C. -005 +012 +022 ”ell-6 “017
P.S.D.I. -006 “059 +01“, ”019 -060
P.L.I. '03]. +051} ‘01]. +015 +017
P.R.I. -.ll +.03 +.13 +.ll +.Ol
P.C.I. -.h8 +.03 ‘005 -023 '90?
P.S.I. ”006 “e37 +026 -020 "ellr6
P.N.M. “.26 +070 -051} +036

+oh3

 

 

-303-
the polarization referred to above.

No such patterned relationships are revealed fer
the other parties. All Center parties have negative or in-
significant relationships with the Left and mixed correla-
tions with the Right. As Table 70 and 71 show, the rightist
figures are definitely negative with the Left and are mixed
with the Center. These relationships of the minor parties
do not seem to be of particular importance, and, in fact,
the usefulness of the inter-party correlations as a whole,
to the present study is doubtful. These relationships
cannot be included in the list of variables affecting party.
vote since presumably it is these other variables that cause
the inter-party correlations to be what they are.1
I With this last series of relationships disposed of,
a summary can now be made of the impact on each party of
the variables discussed in earlier chapters. Since the in-
fluence of the party vote-variable relationships has been
discussed previously, the party "portraits" presented below
do not go into detail. -The only exceptions to this are
the descriptions of the two largest parties, the D.C. and
the P.C.I.

 

- lHowever,it must be recognized that the interparty
relationships may actually affect the vote, e.g., strong
P.C.I. support in a province may well cause a reaction in
favor of the D.C. among independent voters. '

-309-

Christian Democrats

As indicated in a previous chapter, the Christian
Democrats are not dependent fer votes upon areas where
economic conditions are best (at least as of 1953). In
fact, it is in provinces with low education and low income
that support is greatest. The preeminent position of the
D.C. party in agricultural areas, which are economically
the poorest parts of Italy, is a further indication of this
fact. It is when income goes up, when education passes the
elementary level, that the Christian Democrats are in trouble.
Actually, these facts are not surprising since they are in
line with the D.C. support in previous elections.

However, there are some indications that the per-
petuation of low economic and educational levels is not in
the interests of the D.C. party. The correlations in pre-
ceding chapters indicate that the Christian Democratic
vote is likely to be highest in areas where the poorest
conditions exist. For example, Table 22 shows a clear
positive relationship between the D.C. and agricultural
provinces (which are, of course, the poorest provinces),
but the decline of the Christian Democratic vote in these
areas between l9h8 and 1953 makesit probable that the
correlations would have been even more definite in the
fermer election. Further evidence of this point is the
fact that the D.C. party suffered its greatest losses and

-310-'
the Left made its greatest gains in the agricultural
tigzzogiogo. However, in provinces where the embryonic

land referm program had been implemented, the general trend
of leftist gains was halted.2

There are other indications that improved economic
conditions are imperative fer the Christian Democrats if
the support of the non-Center parties is to be cut. The
LaPalombara-waters study referred to in Chapter VIII gives
evidence that youth is inclined to support the Christian
Democrats. The age-party vote correlations reported in
the same chapter indicate that "youthful" provinces(i.e.,
those with a high prOportion of the p0pulation in the under-
21 and 21-2h age groupings) are likely to favor the D.C.
party. As the percentage of the population in the over-25
categories grows, however, the election prospects of the
Christian Democrats decrease.

The evidence (as discussed in Chapter VIII). seems
to show'that the advent of maturity and experience with
the economic facts of life cause a change in the political
outlook of those who make up the youthful part of the pOpu-
lation. The disillusionment that sets in as this maturity
comes is a serious blow to the D.C.; if support (at the

 

‘r'

‘ 2Francesco Compagna and Vittorio de Caprariis,
Geogfiafia delle Elezioni Italiane dal l 6 a1 1 (Bologna:
1 M inc, 51+ , PP. 53-5 0

 

. -31l- ,

level.indicated fer the younger age groups) had continued
past-the age of 25, the Christian Democrats almost undoubtedly
would have won their majority in 1953.3

In addition,there is a very grave question as to
how long the support fer the D.C. (as indicated by the youth
study) even among the youth can continue unless the job
market is expanded. It is quite possible that the age of
disillusionment will drop and the radical youth thought to
exist in Italy will actually appear if more jobs do not
become available. If this should occur, negative rather
thanpositive correlations might result. with the below-25
groups (indicating a loss of support in provinces with a
youthful age structure). This would be particularly damag-
ing since the Christian Democrats already have moderate to
low negative correlations with every category of ages from
25-65 in every geographical area but the South. It seems
logical to say that the D.C. must retain the support of
provinces with a youthful age structure if it is to continue
as the leading party of Italy; at the same time, it must
increase its appeal to provinces with older populations if
it is to cut the opposition's strength.

 

3There is no evidence (or logic) to suggest that
this switch occurs at or about the age of 25; it may well
occur before or after that age-~or never. The a e of 25,
however, is the lower end of the first category 25-3h)
that shows a negative relation to D.C. vote.

-312-

The only apparent way to accomplish this is by
improving economic conditions. D.C. support is now centered
in the poorer areas (particularly the mezzogiorno), but this
support presumably exists despite poor conditions rather
than because of them. By improving the economy, the D.C.
party could expect to hold on to these votes and, at the
same time, out down the number ofprotest votes going to
the opposition. Maturing youth quite probably would retain
its allegiance to the Christian Democrats if the future
looked promising.

It is also probable that improved economic conditions
would help cut the antipathy of the educated to the Chris-
tian Democrats. It was anticipated that education would
work to the detriment of the D.C. party, and this expectation
materialized. As Chapter VI indicates, any education past
the elementary degree clearly inhibits the D.C. vote.
People with comparatively advanced education are in the
best position to perceive the flaws in the present economic
structure and,at the same time, are most likely to resent
a lack of opportunities fer themselves.h While there
certainly are other reasons why these educated peeple do

not support the Christian Democrats (e.g., dislike of a

#This is particularly the case in the Mezzo iorno.
See Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuildin of Ital (Lanaon:
Eggal Institute of InternationaI AfTairs, I555), pp. 198-

-313-
Catholic party), economic conditions undoubtedly play a
major role when protest votes are cast.

Thus, while the Christian Democratic correlations
indicate a reliance on provinces where depressed circum-
stances are the rule, future success may depend upon improved
economic standards. The party cannot expect to cut the
opposition's strength, or perhaps even hold its own, unless
improvements are made. For the present (at least as of
1953), the Christian Democratic situation is as follows.
The most important variables are age, occupation and edu-
cation. The D.C. support is at its strongest in a province
that has a high percentage of its population under the age
of twenty-one (or twentybfive), engaged in agricultural
employment and owning, at most, an elementary school de-
gree. Favorable conditions which are secondary include high
percentages of employment and home ownership. Provinces
where unmarried persons make up a large prOportion of the
pOpulation are also likely to support the D.C.

The principal inhibiting factors in a province are
a high percentage of persons engaged in public administra-
tion or service occupations and a high percentage of pro-
fessionals and administrators. (These, of course, are in
addition to education past the elementary level and age
past twenty-five.) Secondary variables that hurt the D.C.
are high per capita income and a large proportion of male
illiterates.

 

~31h-
In summation, it appears that the Christian Demo-
cratic vote is more influenced by socio-economic factors
than that of any other party. If the social and economic
structure of an Italian province is known in advance, the
D.C. success or failure in that province might well be pre-
dicted.

Communists

When discussing the Christian Democrats it was
pointed out that that party's strength is not located in
the most advanced provinces. A far more surprising bit of
infermation is that the P.C.I. does not necessarily depend
upon poor economic conditions for its votes.

The general view of Communist support has always
been that that party has its greatest appeal in depressed
areas. This belief, in fact, was the basis of the Truman
Doctrine and Marshall Plan aid after World war II. Since
that time, however, this belief in the vulnerability of
communism to improved economic standards has lessened.5
The correlations discussed in previous chapters indicate
that this lessening of belief has some basis in fact. For
example, the P.C.I. correlation with per capita income shows

that the party's chances of success go up as income rises.

L.-

5Gabriel A. Almond, The A sale of Communism
(Princeton, N.Y.: Princeton University Press, I954), p. 286.

 

-315-
The same relationship exists with education-~generally
positive with provinces with a high percentage of the popu-
lation owning high school or more advanced degrees. In
addition, the party has a generally positive relationship
with non-agricultural independents, a group that cannot be
considered underprivileged.

Another difference from the prevailing view of
P.C.I. support is the lack of a positive correlation with
youth and the existence of such correlations with older
groups. As has been indicated several times befbre, the
youth of Italy was assumed to be radically inclined, either
from dissatisfaction with its future prospects6 or through
the attractiveness of radical philosophies.7 Certainly
the Communists enroll some youth into its organizations,
but the correlations show that the P.C.I. electoral appeal
does not come from provinces with a "young5 structure.
This, coupled with the economic variables discussed above,
indicates that changes are due in the generally held image
of the Communist voter.

However, indications also exist that the P.C.I.

does have considerable attractiveness for those persons who

_ A;

6Grindr0d, 0 e Cite, p0 2230

7Riccardo Bauer, "The Drama of Italian YOuth "

Ningteegth Centggy and After, CXLVI (July-December, l9h9),
PP. 7“ 30 ‘

-316-
are in unhappy circumstances. Negative correlations with
persons per room, home ownership and high employment levels
are evidence of this appeal. Even more indicative, however,
are the data given above when discussing the Christian
Democrats. Communist advancement in the South and Islands
was greatest where conditions were worst and where the land
referm program was not yet in effect; as said before,
that advancement was halted in the few areas in which land
had been distributed.

This points up a fact that has become increasingly
apparent as the correlation tables were analyzed—-there are
considerable and seemingly crucial socio-economic and
electoral variations between geographical regions. This
.variation is particularly noticeable between the two northern
areas and the Mezzogiorno. The result is that a party can
easily have two sorts of appeal, depending upon the area
of the country.

While this is true to a greater or lesser extent
for all parties, it is especially evident fer the P.C.I.

In the poorest regions, where the people expect little from
the Center parties, the Communists have their traditional
appeal to the depressed portions of the population--those
who are crowded, those who own their own poor homes (often
caves), those who are unemployed. In Italy, however, it
appears that these peeple may not be ideologically committed

and that concrete improvements in the economy may win their

votes for the Center.

-317-

In the better areas, where income is high, where
education and literacy are high, the P.C.I. still pulls
votes, but probably from ideological motivation rather than
from a protest against the Center. The Communists are still
very strong among industrial workers (although their corre-
lations with industrial provinces are not high for the
reasons discussed in Chapter V above); as said befbre, these
workers have not deserted the P.C.I. as their economic
position has improved.

Consequently, the positive correlations between the
P.C.I. and variables that contradict each other can be ex-
plained by this dual appeal. It is likely that the first
type of appeal can be cut drastically if economic conditions
(particularly in the poorer areas) improve. The latter,
ideological, appeal, however, cannot be overcome easily or
in the forseeable future. In any case, it is necessary to
know the location of the province as well as its socio-
economic chracteristics befbre predictions of Communist
strength can be attempted. '

These geographical differences, of course, influ-
ence the vote of other parties as well as the P.C.I. and
make generalizations on vote-variable correlations dangerous.
This should be remembered when reading the short summaries

that fellow.

-318-

Social Democrats

The Democratic SocialiSts have their best opportun-
ities in provinces which have high per capita income, where
the percentage of the population over the age of twenty-
five is high and where persons with at least an elementary
degree predominate. Industrial provinces with a high
percentage of professionals and administrators are favor-
able. In addition, chances fOr a strong P.S.D.I. showing
are slightly increased if there are high percentages of
employment and home ownership.

This party is weak in agricultural provinces (al-
though a high percentage of agricultural independents is
favorable). Other inhibiting factors include high persons
per room and urbanization rates. The P.S.D.I. also has
less probability of securing a substantial vote in a pro-
vince if persons under twenty-five and with no school
degree make up a large proportion of the population. As
would be expected from the negative relationship with the
no school degree variable, the party is hurt by illiteracy
and particularly by male illiteracy.

It was expected that the Social Democratic vote
would be favorably affected by increased education, and
the correlations confirm this belief. This party is hurt
more than any other if the educational level in a province

is low. The negative correlations with the under-25 age

‘ - . . —, . ~h ~ . #5” .— .~ A
, v _ . .._..— .- . - . .fi — *.—- Mud #.
_._.. . ,. , _ ,- .m..‘-..._._.____.- .- . “'

-319-
categories is also not particularly surprising since the
P.S.D.I.‘s rather limited appeal was not expected to be to
this group. (It is interesting to note, however, that the
LaPalombara-waters study found youth favoring this party
at a considerably higher rate than did the general electorate
in 1958.)

Liberals

The Liberals have comparatively few positive corre-
lations, fewer, in fact, than any party except the Republi-
cans. They are most successful in agricultural provinces,
particularly where employment is high. The P.L.I. has few
relationships with age but tends to be better off with ages
of twenty-five and up. Provinces with a high percentage of
home ownership, and those where a high proportion of the
papulation has at least an elementary degree are also favor-
able. These correlations fit the picture that was generally
held of Liberal support. The most conservative of the Center
parties, the P.L.I.'s slight appeal is to the older, edu-
cated part of the population which can see a reason for
supporting such a minority party.

The Liberals are weakest in industrial provinces
and in those where urbanization is high. They also have
negative relationships with the lowest educational level,
the no degree group. This negative relationship is repeated
fer male illiteracy (but not for illiteracy in general).

 

-320-
Consequently, the Liberals could expect little support in
provinces where low education prevailed. In addition,
the P.L.I. vote is slightly limited in provinces where un-
married persons make up a considerable prOportion of the
pOpulation. (This, quite probably, is due to the negative
tendency toward "young" provinces.) It is obvious that
these many negative factors severely limit the electoral
prospects of the Liberals. It must be recognized, however,
that the P.L.I. is a very minor party with very little
support over the nation. The reasons fer supporting it are
fewb-the most important of which may be tradition. Con-
sequently, its negative correlations may very well be the
natural result of a general lack of support rather than

the effect of socio-economic factors.

Republicans

Actually, the same reasoning applies to the last
Center party, the P.R.I. This is also a very small party,
and its electoral support is minute. Its appeal is so small
that it is doubtful if socio-economic factors play any
significant role in securing support; as with the Liberals,
its following is probably based largely on tradition and
remembrance of the past. In any case, the Republicans,
as indicated above, have the fewest positive relationships
of any party. Actually, the only factor that favors the
P.R.I. is a high percentage of the population over the age

 

-321-

.of twenty-one. (This, of course, includes most of the popu-
lation, but the negative relationships with many other
variables cancel this advantage.) The Republican chances
are also slightly enhanced by agricultural independence

and home ownership. They are also aided in the North by
high percentages of illiterate and no degree persons, but
have little relationship with education in other areas.

The Republican's chances are severely limited in
provinces where the persons per room and urbanization rates
are high and where a large percentage of the populace is
under twenty-one and unmarried. In addition, this is one
of the few parties for which the civilization index shows
pa relationship-~negative in this case. It is obvious that
if the P.L.I. has few provinces that can approach the

optimum, the P.R.I. has even fewer.

Socialists
The ideal province for the Socialists is primarily
.industrial and has a high per capita income. A large
proportion of "no degree" persons and male illiterates in
the population is advantageous to a limited extent. (How-
ever, as the income and occupation correlations with educa-
tion show, no single province in Italy is likely to have
all these attributes, i.e., a province with a high per-
centage of persons without degrees is unlikely to be in-
dustrial or to have a high per capita income.) A high

-322-

percentage of persons over twenty-five also inclines a pro-
vince to be favorable to the P.S.I.

The Socialist chances are lessened if the province
is predominently agricultural. Other limiting factors in-
clude a high persons per room rate along with high percentages
of home ownership, unmarried persons and persons under twenty-
five.

The P.S.I. is similar to the P.C.I. in that it
appeals to two types of provinces; those with industry,
high income, a low persons per room rate and an older popu-
lation (all attributes, more often, of the North and Center),
and those with low education, youth, unmarried persons and
home ownership (which generally are attributes of the South
and Islands). The negative relationship with agricultural
employment presumably limits the gains made in the latter
type of province and accounts, in part, for the comparatively

low Socialist vote in the South.

Monarchists
The factors that make a province ideal for the
Monarchists fit together in a logical pattern. A relatively
high percentage of the population engaged in service and
public administration occupations is favorable, particularly
if professionals and administrators are numerous. These
occupations lead naturally to high urbanization and persons

per room rates. A high proportion of the population in the

-323-
unmarried and under twenty-one categories is also advanta-
geous. There is a slight tendency to be aided by home
ownership in the North and Center, but this factor is
damaging in the South and Islands.

Other limiting factors include high per capita
income and high percentages of elementary degrees and persons
over twenty-five. The relationships with these variables
are mixed or very slight and the picture is not clear.

With age, fer example, the trend is negative above twenty-
five, but significant positive correlations do exist. With
education, the relationship is clearly negative with ele-
mentary degrees but mixed above and below that level. The
impact of these variables is difficult to measure, but

the limiting effect would appear to be marginal.

The most surprising of the Monarchist correlations
are the ones related to age. It was expected that the P.NJW.
would have its strongest appeal to older persons who remem-
bered the King-~there should have been little appeal in
provinces with a youthful age structure. It should be
remembered, however, that the older voters in these."youth-
ful" provinces may have been the cause of the positive
correlations, i.e., they may have tended to vote as a bloc
for the P.N.M., perhaps even as a reaction to the youthful-
ness of the province.

A second explanation, that also partly accounts for

the largely mixed correlations of the P.N.M., is that that

_ ~32e-

party received many votes from Catholics in protest against
the Christian Democrats. It will be recalled that the P.C.I.
urged dissatisfied Catholics to support the Monarchists if
their religion prevented a Communist vote. These votes,

if at all numerous, would greatly distort the socio-economic
correlations of the P.N.M. The extent to which this actually
occurred, unfertunately, cannot be measured, but it seems ‘

likely that the correlations would be clearer if the protest
votes of this type could be isolated from the P.N.M. figures.

Neo-Fascists

The M.S.I.. has almost the same favorable factors
as the Monarchists, but are negative with mere variables.

As with the P.N.M., the M.S.I. is at its best in provinces
where service and public administration employment make up
a relatively large proportion of the working force. A
high percentage of professionals and administrators is
slightly favorable. In addition, high persons per room
and urbanization rates are advantageous.

There is no clear picture of the age and education
factors which most favor the M.S.I. The relationship with
age is mixed with the below-21 category, favorable with the
21-2A grouping and generally negative above. The M.S.I.
has a negative relationship with elementary degrees, but
with the other education variables only a trend is eviden --

a tendency to be negative with "no degree" and positive

. ~325-
with intermediate and above.

‘Other negative factors include high per capita
income, unmarried status and a high percentage of agricul-
tural independents. There is a slight tendency to be hurt
by high employment. It is quite obvious that the M.S.I.
vote is more inhibited than aided by the socio-economic
factors discussed in this study. (This presumably held
down its vote in 1953 and accounts, in part at least, fer
the slight drop in MQS.I. support in l958--from 5.8% to
4.8%, as shown in Chapter VIII.)

In general, these correlations were expected. For
example, the bureaucracy is known to favor the.M.S.I. to
a considerable extent, particularly in the South. In that
area the civil service is largely staffed by disgruntled
persons who are educated for prefessions but who cannot
find jobs. These positive correlations with public admin-
istration and "advanced" education are logical. The only
correlations that are not what might have been expected are
those relating to age. A

Most writers on the subject assume that.M.S.I.
support is basically among the youth.8 The correlations
in the present work and the LaPalombara-waters youth study

cast some doubt on this belief. The latter study indicates

 

8Ibid.,;Mario Rossi, "Nee-Fascism in Italy,"

’ Virginia Quarterly Review, XXIX, No. A (1953), pp. 506-507.

~326-
that youth supports this party in approximately the same
degree as does the general pOpulation. The correlations
show, at most, a tendency fer the expected pattern to develop.
Certainly there is no clear evidence to prove that M.S.I. A
support basically comes from "youthful" provinces. (This,
of course, does not necessarily indicate that young voters

do not vote fer the neo-Fascists.)

Overall Variable Impact

The above summaries (and the earlier discussions).
show that the influence of socio-economic factors on party
vote varies widely, depending principally upon the party
being discussed. This variation is in the number of factors
influencing the vote and the intenSity of that influence.1
Certain of the variables discussed, however, are much more
productive than others. Some produce surprises in the
impact they have on the electoral results; others produce
equally great surprises in their lack of impact. Perhaps
a final summary of the important variables would be illumina-
ting.

The unemployment variable was expected to provide
considerable insight into voter motivation, particularly
as it pertains to the Christian Democrats. As Table 18
shows, however,virtually no significant correlations re-
sult from this analysis. It appears that the level of

employment has little actual effect on electoral outcome.

-327-

The occupation of the voter, however, seems to have
considerable impact. Almost all parties have definite
correlations with one or more of the occupational categories.
_In general, these correlations were expected (e.g., positive
correlations between the vote of the Right and service and
publicadministration occupations). The most surprising
finding related to this variable has to do with the two
major parties, the D.C. and P.C.I., in the North. In that
region the Christian Democrats have a positive relation-
ship with industry and negative correlations with agricul-
ture. The Communists have precisely the apposite relation-
ships. The P.C.I. finds its greatest support in agricul-
tural provinces such as Emilia-Romagna while the D.C. party
pulls votes where manufacturing is heavy (although not
necessarily from the actual workers themselves.).

The next major variable discussed was education.
This turned out to be one of the most important subjects
analyzed. It appears that when a high preportion of the
population of a province has a moderate (i.e., elementary)
education, that provinceis inclined to vote fer the Center.
Less education (and illiteracy) inclines a province toward
the Left; more education brings on a mixed relationship.
Actually, the correlations on education indicate that the
efforts being made to cut illiteracy and provide at least
an elementary education fer most Italians could eventually

result in greater support fer the Center.

~328-

The feurth major category of variables has to do
with economic status, the principal factor being per capita
income. As Table A0 shows, correlations between income and
party vote are quite definite, particularly for the D.C.
and P.C.I. The peculiar fact is that they indicate that
the Communist vote is likely to rise as income goes up;
conversely, the Christian Democratic vote rises as income
drops. Further analysis seems to indicate, however, that
per capita income is clearly a dependent variable and that
the correlations actually indicate the impact of education
and occupation rather than income (i.e., income depends
upon education and occupation). The suprising result is
that income per se can largely be discounted in assessing
the effect of socio-economic factors on the election.

The final major variable is age, a variable that
joins education and occupation as the most important sub—
jects analyzed. Perhaps the most interesting fact revealed
by the age-party vote tables is that almost every party has
a specific age category at which its relationship switches
from positive to negative (or vice versa). At one end of
the age scale the party is supported; at the other it is
not. The most surprising fact revealed by these tables has
to do with the lack of radical feeling among the youth and
has been discussed several times before. Sufficient to say
here that the age structure of a province plays a major role

in determining the relative success of a political party.

-329-
There are two other findings of importance which

come out of the present study; first, the influence of a
high vote on the prospects of the Christian Democrats and,
second, the major difference that appears between the two
northern areas and the Mezzogiorno.

A The first of these was discussed in Chapter III.
Political writers before the 1953 election were unanimous
in their belief that the higher the vote the better the
chances of the D.C. (and the other Center parties). How»
ever, the correlation tables show that in 1953 the Christian
Democrats had a negative relationship with a high vote and,
thus, feund their percentage declining as the total vote
rose. Conversely, the Opposition was favorably affected by
a greater turnout.

The conclusion to be reached from.this is that

there is, fer the D.C. party, an Optimum point between the
very low total vote of 1951-52 and the very high vote
of 1953. Below that point the more regimented (or dedicated)
supporters of the Left and Right easily outnumber those
of the Christian Democrats. Above that point a new element
enters that appears to be uncommitted and, perhaps, inclined
to cast protest votes (e.g., against the Scelba Law). The
optimum point would seem to be somewhere around the voter
turnout of 19A8. The simple statement that the D.C. party's
vote goes up as the turnout gets larger definitely needs

to be revised.

~330-

The second finding of this type has to do with the
tremendous differences in voting motivation between the
(Mezzogiorno and the North-Center. For almost every variable
analyzed there is a clear line of distinction between the
two areas, almost as if two different countries are being
discussed.

In actuality, of course, this concept of two differ-
ent countries is not far from the truth. Even the most
‘cursory examination of the major variable tables (i.e.,
Tables 17, 21, 29, 38 and 47) cannot help but indicate
that the differences between the areas are basic and that
similar voter motivation is not be expected. In every
economic aspect the Mezzogiorno is poorer; in every social
variable, it is different. Thenatural result is that all
the major parties (and to a lesser extent the minor ones)
have what amounts to two types of appeal (as discussed above
with the P.C.I.). This variation in appeal, of course,
puts a premium on parties that can stand fer diverse pro-
grams, depending upon the geographical region. For example,
the separate wings of the Christian Democratic party (as
discussed in Chapter II) undoubtedly aid in securing nation-
‘wide support by saying just what the voters in each area
wish to hear. (Of course, the Catholic Church also helps
the D.C. party pull votes in all areas.) Certainly the
ability of the P.C.I. to adjust its stand to circumstances

and location is a considerable advantage.~ This varying

-331-
motivation in voting may also partly explain the failure
-of most of the minor parties to achieve uniform support
.over the country--they frequently have a comparatively
rigid philosOphy that is not adaptable to regional differ-
ences.

The meaning, for the present study, of these
geographical variations is that generalizations on voter
motivation are likely to apply to only one-half of the
country. At the same time, these variations practically
negate the usefulness of the correlations based on Italy as
a whole. Saying, fer example, that a party has a positive
Inational correlation with a variable means little if the
equivalent correlations fer the South and Islands are nega-
tive. Thus, the geographical region must be known before

an accurate statement can be made about voter motivation.

Conclusion

With the party "portraits" and the general impact
of socio-economic variables summarized, it is now possible
to make a final comment on the usefulness of the study and
the correlation method of approach. The above summaries
and the analyses in the preceding chapters indicate that
knowing the socio-economic environment that exists in a
province will tell a great deal about the probable electoral
outcome in that province. While age, occupation and edu-

cation undoubtedly provide the clearest insight into and

-332-
give the most understanding of Italian politics, almost
all the variables discussed contribute to the final
picture.

It appears that correlational analysis of elections
is very efficacious fer Italy and that further studies of
this type would contribute greatly to an understanding of
that country's politics. While, as has been pointed out
before, the positive and negative correlations between
party vote and the individual factors do not show causation,
this matters little in assessing the value of this approach
to interpreting Italian elections. It is enough to be able
to say that socio-economic factors act as indicators of
probable vote. That age, education and occupation are the
variables that actually cause the vote to be distributed
as itis cannot be proved, but if, in a province, the average
age, the percentage of persons in each educational category
and the proportion of the population in various occupational
groupings are known, the potential of each party in the
following election can be estimated with a reasonable degree
of accuracy.

Of perhaps greater importance than predictability,
the electoral results can be analyzed after an election
to determine precisely tflwa elements of the population for
which the various parties did or did not have appeal. A
prime example of data to be derived from such an analysis

is the relationship between Christian Democratic vote and

-333-

age; the cOncentration of support in "young" provinces and
the sudden adverse swing at the 25-3h age category is cer-
tainly crucial information fer the D.C. The value of this
type of knowledge to a party, particularly in its efforts
to retain its supporters while seeking converts, is obvious.
No other system of analysis (with the exception of time
consuming and expensive surveys) can present this informa-
tion as clearly and succinctly as statistical correlations.

Thus, for Italy, at least, the evidence seems to
be that socio-economic factors provide a considerable amount
of voter motivation in elections and that correlational
analysis of electoral returns can give a good picture of
the particular variables that influence the vote of each
party. Since the present study covers only the one election,
1953, there is some question as to the permanency of the,
relationships discovered; no answer to this question can be
found unless similar analyses are made of other censuses
and other elections. For the present, however, it is clear
that the correlatiOns described in preceding chapters give
considerable insight into the electoral process in Italy
and provide information that was never available before.
Certainly the relationships discussed must be studied if
voter motivation in Italy is to be understood. They do not
provide a complete picture in themselves, but the picture

is not complete without them.

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Rolland, Alexandra Ann. "The Political Behavior of the
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