

THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
ON PARTY VOTE IN THE ITALIAN GENERAL
ELECTION OF JUNE 7, 1953

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
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Steighton Arthur Watts, Jr.
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
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OF JUNE 7, 1953

presented by

STEIGHTON ARTHUR WATTS, JR.

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
AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the School for Advanced Graduate Studies of
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ABSTRACT

This study presents a statistical analysis of the Italian General Election of June 7, 1953. It was thought that Italian voters were motivated by certain socio-economic factors to support or oppose particular political parties. While it was impossible to measure the validity of this belief by interviewing individual voters, it was possible to accomplish much the same result by utilizing aggregate data from the 1951 Italian census.

This was accomplished by statistically correlating socio-economic variables (e.g., age, occupation, education) with the vote of each of the principal Italian parties. Using the correlation coefficients thus derived, the influence of each variable was analyzed and evaluated.

The present study begins with a summary of political events that took place between 1945 and the election of 1953. There is then a description of the campaign preceding that election, followed by a party-by-party discussion of the electoral returns. This discussion is in terms of the orthodox explanations of party support, i.e., international relations, legislative enactments, land reform, etc. Beginning with Chapter IV, the present study turns to the socio-economic analysis of the election.

The first variable deals with the extent of unemployment (or the level of employment). Employment is a major problem in Italy, and it was anticipated that this factor would have a profound and extensive impact on party vote. However, the correlations indicate that this is not the case; the amount of influence is slight.

The second major variable investigated, occupation, is much more productive. Four occupational categories are selected--agriculture, industry, service and public administration; the variable is further subdivided into agricultural and non-agricultural independents. It is found that occupation is an important factor in the electoral prospects of almost all parties (i.e., a difference between provinces in the percentage of the population engaged in a particular occupational category means a difference in party vote).

The next socio-economic factor analyzed is education. The educational level in Italy is discussed and found to be comparatively low; 89% of the population has no more than an elementary education, if that, and many persons are illiterate. It is found that the educational level of a province has a very considerable impact on the vote of the parties in that province. This makes possible some interesting speculations on the political effect of raising that educational level.

The next analysis deals with the influence of economic status on vote, using per capita income, home ownership and the number of persons per room as indicators. It is discovered that economic status is very dependent upon education and occupation and that its influence on vote is secondary to that of those two factors.

The final major variable investigated is age. This unquestionably is one of the most important factors analyzed, and the age structure of an Italian province is found to influence greatly the vote in that province. It is also found that some preconceptions about the radical character and tendencies of Italian youth need to be revised.

In addition to indicating the influence of these socio-economic factors on party vote, the correlation tables presented show that voter motivation and party support vary widely between the two northern and the two southern geographical regions. Most of the major parties have their support based on distinctly different types of appeal in these two areas. This fact indicates that generalizations on Italian electoral results must be preceded, or qualified, by a statement as to the geographical region under discussion.

In summation, the present study provides an analysis of the statistical correlations between party vote and selected socio-economic variables for the Italian General Election of 1953. The results of this study indicate that this method of investigation provides considerable insight into the electoral appeal of the various parties and, by implication, the motivation of Italian voters.

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INTRODUCTION

In the study of democratic politics one of the most fascinating questions asked after an election always has been, "Why did the people vote the way they did?" A second and equally fascinating query is, "Can motivation be isolated so as to explain the past vote and predict future results?" In the United States the problem of understanding voter motivation has been studied for many years; methods have ranged from an intuitional approach based upon unsystematic observation of past elections to the much more scientific sampling surveys of recent years. The result of this study has been the formulation of political axioms (e.g. a Catholic cannot become President) and the isolation of a multiplicity of vote-influencing variables (e.g. religion, age, sex, education, economic status, etc.).

Much of the research in this area has been devoted to proving or disproving the axioms and to determining the relative effect of the many variables. The most-used method of study has been the interview-questionnaire approach. This approach involves questioning voters to determine their attitudes and motivations, then aggregating and analyzing the data received to understand or predict the vote. A second method begins with the aggregate data, and by

statistical means determines the relationship between specific variables and the distribution of the vote. The present study involves the application of this second method to the Italian General Election of June, 1953.

This electoral analysis was based upon the selection and evaluation of variables, principally socio-economic (e.g. age, per capita income, education, occupation, marital status), that might logically be expected to influence individual voters. Each of these variables was then mathematically correlated, nationally and regionally, with the percentage of the valid vote received by each party that won seats in the election. The chief source of statistical information on the variables was the report of the Italian census of 1951.¹ This report gives the total number of persons in each province that fit into certain categories, e.g. the number engaged in agriculture, the total of those who were under twenty-one, etc. These raw figures were converted into percentages, thus obtaining the proportion of the provincial population in each category. Each of these categories was assumed to be an independent variable with which the dependent variable, size of vote, was related. To discover if, in fact, these socio-economic variables did

¹Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, IX Censimento Generale Della Popolazione, 4 Novembre 1951 (Roma: Soc. Abete, 1946).

influence the vote of the Italian electorate, the provincial percentages derived from the census materials were fed into a computer, MISTIC, along with the official election returns. This computer, using Pearsonian correlations, emitted figures that indicated, in statistical terms, the actual relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. In succeeding chapters these figures are presented in tables along with interpretations of their meaning.

The figures reproduced in these charts depict the independent variable-party vote relationship, and represent the coefficient of correlation, usually designated r . This r provides a measure of the strength and direction of the relationship. In the charts, all figures will be preceded by a plus (+) or minus (-) sign, indicating a positive or negative correlation. Taking agricultural employment as an example of a variable, a positive correlation for a party would indicate that as the percentage of persons engaged in agriculture gets larger, that party's probability of increasing its vote also rises. Conversely, a negative correlation indicates that an increase in the variable inhibits the party's chances. Thus, the sign gives the direction of the influence; at the same time, the accompanying figure indicates the extent of the relationship.

At what point this correlation figure becomes meaningful is open to question. It is quite obvious that a .40 correlation is lower than .90, but these figures mean

nothing by themselves. Some estimation of their strength can be made by computing the coefficient of determination, or r^2 . This r^2 indicates what part of the total variation is explained or accounted for by r .

This means that a .40 correlation explains only .16 or 16% of the variation and any prediction based upon such a figure would be very questionable. On the other hand, a r of .90 accounts for 81% of the variation and indicates a very strong relationship between whatever variables are being discussed. The present study, as is the usual procedure, uses r rather than r^2 since direction is important. (In computing r^2 the sign, of course, is lost since, for example, $-.40 \times -.40 = +.16$.) The coefficient of determination should be kept in mind, however, when consulting the correlation tables.

While r^2 indicates the part of the total variation that is explained by r , it does not give any measure of the significance of the correlation figures. A test of significance is of particular importance in the present study because the number of provinces is not the same in each of the four geographical regions, i.e., there are 40 provinces in the North,² 20 in both the Center and South, and only

²However, in computing the correlations and in testing significance, a total of 39 provinces were used for the North. Trieste was omitted because its political parties differed from those in the rest of Italy. This difference made it impossible to combine the political figures for Trieste with those of the other provinces.

12 in the Islands (a total of 92 for Italy). Since statistically the correlation coefficients become less significant as the number of items (e.g., provinces) decreases, the level of significance would vary among the geographical regions, even those with the same coefficient.

The test of significance used here is the "Student's t" test, the calculation of which indicates the likelihood that the correlation between variables is the result of chance. Using the formula $t = \frac{r \sqrt{N - 2}}{\sqrt{1 - r^2}}$ (N equals Number), the significance levels were computed for the four geographical regions.³ The result is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1
SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS OF CORRELATIONS
(BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGION)

Level of Significance (Per cent)	North	Center- South	Islands	Italy
10	.27	.39	.50	.17
5	.32	.45	.57	.21
2½	.36	.51	.64	.24
1	.42	.57	.71	.27

In this table four levels of significance are given along with the correlation coefficients that achieve each

³For a brief discussion of "Student's t" test, see M. J. Moroney, Facts from Figures (3rd ed. rev.; Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1956), pp. 311-312. For "t" distribution table see Alexander McFarlane Mood, Introduction to the Theory of Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1950), p. 475.

level. For example, a correlation coefficient of .42 or above in the North would be at the 1% significance level and, consequently, would be very significant; i.e., such a correlation coefficient could occur by chance only once in one-hundred times. (It should be observed that the small number of provinces in the Islands means that correlation coefficients in that region must be considerably higher than those of the other regions to achieve the same significance.) With this test of significance and the meaning of r and r^2 in mind, the correlation tables in subsequent chapters will be more meaningful.

One other warning should be given. No claim is made that relationships shown between party vote and the various factors is causal. This type of analysis is known as ecological correlation, and mathematicians take great pains to indicate that a high correlation of this type does not necessarily indicate that one factor causes the other.⁴ For example, a high correlation between Christian Democratic vote and

⁴See, for example, Robinson, W. S., "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological Review, 15 (1950), pp. 351-357; Menzel, Herbert, "Comment on Robinson's 'Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals.'" American Sociological Review, 15 (1950), p. 674; Goodman, Leo, "Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation," American Journal of Sociology, 65 (1959), pp. 610-625; Goodman, Leo A., "Ecological Regression and the Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological Review, 18 (1953), pp. 663-664.

provinces in which women outnumber men would not necessarily mean that women vote for the Christian Democrats--it could be that the men, being in the minority, have a tendency to vote as a bloc for a party that women dislike. While this may seem far-fetched, it none-the-less presents a possible explanation.

One of the advantages of the interview-questionnaire approach is that it permits direct identification of individual characteristics or motivations that lead to a choice of a particular party. Using the statistical correlation method means that identification of the characteristics or motivations must be inferred from aggregate data. However, the inability to show causality does not mitigate seriously against the usefulness of the method of study. Correlations still can serve as indications of the positive or negative influence of specific variables on party vote. Referring again to the example given above concerning Christian Democrats, it would be necessary to do a field study involving individual interviews to bring out the precise character of the Christian Democratic vote. However, if a high correlation should appear between Christian Democratic vote and a female majority, the "why" is not necessary to secure a certain measure of understanding and predictability. While an analysis of one election is obviously not sufficient to make effective predictions, it clearly presents a departure point for analyzing future elections. That is all

that is hoped for from the present study.

One further point that must be explained is the terminology which is applied, on the tables and in the discussion, to the subdivisions of Italy. The country is divided into four sections, the North, Center, South and Islands (the latter two grouped together into the Mezzogiorno). These geographical areas represent actual physical, cultural and economic subdivisions. In succeeding chapters the efficacy and naturalness of the geographical breaks become increasingly evident. However, these are not political subdivisions. Legally, the country is divided into Regions and provinces (which are further subdivided into communes).⁵ A list of the geographical areas, Regions and provinces is presented in Table 2.⁶

The correlation tables (which are presented in Chapters III through IX) are based upon the geographical areas and the nation as a whole. For all of Italy the statistical data on specific variables for each province were correlated with the percentage of the vote received by each party in the General Election of 1953. The provinces

⁵In the text when reference is made to the Region, the term will always be capitalized. This will distinguish it from the geographical region or area which will be in lower case.

⁶Italian electoral statistics are reported by electoral districts, Regions and provinces. Census data is reported by Regions and provinces.

were then divided into four groups by geographical region, and again correlations between statistical data and party vote were computed. While the provinces within the geographical regions are not homogeneous, these regions present a practical and meaningful unit for research.

In summation, the present study is a statistical analysis of the party vote in the General Election of June, 1953, using the geographical areas of Italy as a basis for evaluation. Before turning to this analysis, however, it is necessary to give a brief account of the Italian political scene since World War II. It is hoped that this historical preface, presented in Chapters I through III, will make the voter motivation discussed in succeeding chapters more comprehensible.

TABLE 2

SUBDIVISIONS OF ITALY

Geographical Areas	Region	Province
North	Piemonte	Alessandria
		Asti
		Cuneo
		Novara
		Torino
		Vercelli
	Valle d'Aosta	
	Lombardia	Bergamo
		Brescia
		Como
		Cremona
		Mantova
		Milano
		Pavia
		Sondrio
		Varese
	Trentino-Alto Adige	Bolzano
		Trento
	Veneto	Belluno
		Padova
		Rovigo
		Treviso
		Venezia
		Verona
		Vicenza
	Friuli-Venezia Giulia	Gorizia
		Udine
	Trieste	
	Liguria	Genova
		Imperia
		La Spezia
		Savona

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Geographical Areas	Region	Province
Center	Emilia-Romagna	Bologna Ferrara Forli Modena Parma Piacenza Ravenna Reggio nell'Emilia
	Toscana	Arezzo Firenze Grosseto Livorno Lucca Massa-Carrara Pisa Pistoia Siena
	Umbria	Perugia Terni
	Marche	Ancona Ascoli Piceno Macerata Pesaro e Urbino
	Lazio	Frosinone Latina Rieti Roma Viterbo
South	Abruzzi e Molise	Campobasso Chieti L'Aquila Pescara Teramo
	Campania	Avellino Benevento Caserta Napoli Salerno

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Geographical Areas	Region	Province
	Puglia	Vari Brindisi Foggia Lecce Taranto
	Basilicata	Matera Potenza
	Calabria	Catanzaro Cosenza Reggio di Calabria
Islands	Sicilia	Agrigento Caltanissetta Catania Enna Messina Palermo Ragusa Siracusa Trapani
	Sardegna	Cagliari Nuoro Sassari

CHAPTER I

ITALIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1943-1953

In the comparatively few years between 1943 and the General Election of 1953, Italy had a referendum on the retention of the Monarchy, a Constituent Assembly that drew up the present Constitution, General Elections in 1946 and 1948, administrative elections in 1950 and 1951, plus a succession of Cabinets that saw almost all parties cooperating in the Government at one time or another. Each of these events ultimately contributed to the party platforms and strategy in 1953. Consequently, the present chapter is devoted to a summarization of important facts that are essential to an understanding of the General Election of 1953 and its outcome.

The Immediate Post-War Period

At the close of World War II, Italy found itself in an unusual position; it had fought on both sides and ended up on the winning side. This position was the result of a peculiar set of circumstances. On July 24, 1943, the Fascist Grand Council asked for Mussolini's resignation; that resignation was tendered and accepted the following day. The deposed leader was arrested immediately, and King

Emanuel III appointed Marshall Pietro Badoglio as head of the Government. Badoglio initiated negotiations with the Allies and signed an armistice on September 8, 1943. Italy was designated as a co-belligerent against Germany. Actually, this designation and the armistice meant little since Mussolini, after rescue by the Germans, ruled most of Northern Italy. At the time of the signing, the King and his Government controlled only a comparatively small section of Southern Italy around his temporary capital of Brindisi. As the Allies pushed north, the capital was moved to Salerno in 1944 and back to Rome in June of the same year.

Resistance in the North to the German forces and to Mussolini's Government was organized under local groups which called themselves Committees of National Liberation, or C.N.L.'s. Five political parties comprised these groups: the Communists, the Socialists, the Action party, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals. In the south, the C.N.L.'s also existed, but only for political activities; the five parties above were joined by the Labor Democrats.¹ The northern committees became the focal point of anti-Fascist activity and were more and more important as the Allied troops pushed forward at the end of the war. These partisan forces took over many towns in northern Italy and held them until the Allies arrived. The Allied command negotiated with these

¹Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955), p. 9.

groups, particularly the Milan committee, and made a bipartite agreement (in December, 1944) with the central committee of the C.N.L.'s, the Comitato della Liberazione Nazionale per l'Alta Italia (C.L.N.A.I.).

Under this agreement, the C.L.N.A.I. undertook to establish and maintain cooperation with all active elements in the Resistance movement, even if they did not belong to the committee. . . . The Committee also promised to do its best, on enemy withdrawal, to maintain law and order, to safeguard the economic resources of the territory against sabotage, and to hand over to Allied Military Government, immediately on its establishment, all the authority and powers of local government which it had previously assumed.²

(The Italian Government recognized the C.L.N.A.I. as its own representative in northern Italy shortly thereafter.³) Thus the northern C.N.L.'s were able to exercise de facto control over much of an area that was in a chaotic condition following surrender.

The C.N.L.'s of the South were just as vehemently anti-Fascist, but were in an area where the fighting was over; consequently, the member parties did not act as partisan forces. These parties, however, gave only lukewarm support to the officially recognized Government of King Victor Emmanuel and Premier Badoglio. Widespread criticism of the Anglo-American support of the monarchy arose almost immediately after the armistice because of the King's acceptance of Fascism for so long. In April, 1944, however,

²C. R. S. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), p. 776.

³Ibid., p. 293.

[illegible]

the Communists, generators of much of the criticism, reversed their position and their leader, Palmiro Togliatti, joined the cabinet. Count Carlo Sforza, also anti-monarchist, joined the Government at the same time.⁴ The question of the monarchy was laid aside by agreement, and the King removed himself from governmental activity. This was the situation in June, 1944, when the capital was returned to Rome.

In Rome, however, the anti-Fascist parties refused to work with Marshall Badoglio, and a new Government was formed under Ivanoe Bonomi, the president of the C.N.L. of Rome. Bonomi's cabinet included representatives of all six parties at first, but the Socialist and Action parties withdrew in late November, causing a collapse of the Government. With Communist and Christian Democrat support, Bonomi formed a new cabinet in December with a four party coalition. The principal problem in this period was the question of future C.N.L. power. The parties of the Left, i.e., the Communist, Socialist and Action parties, felt that the C.L.N.A.I. should choose the government and that the C.N.L.'s should retain the legislative, executive and judicial powers they were exercising. The Liberals, the Christian Democrats and the Labor Democrats strongly favored the disbanding of the C.N.L.'s after the war was finished.⁵

⁴Buel W. Patch, "Italian Election," in Richard M. Boeckel, ed., Editorial Research Reports, 1948 (Washington, D.C.: Editorial Research Reports, 1948), Vol. 1, p. 221.

⁵Grindrod, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

Bonomi's third Government was also short-lived, falling when Togliatti withdrew Communist support in June, 1945. The selection of a new Premier was extremely difficult; the Christian Democrats rejected the Socialist-Communist candidate, Pietro Nenni, and the other parties refused Alcide de Gasperi (the Foreign Secretary and head of the Christian Democrats). Renewed unity of the six parties was finally achieved with a compromise choice, Ferruccio Parri of the Action party. This agreement ended a real threat of civil war in Italy.⁶ All parties now committed themselves to the early holding of a constitutional convention. Still to be agreed upon were the composition and selection of the constituent assembly and the question of retaining the monarchy or substituting a republic.

Before these decisions could be made, another governmental change took place. The Liberal party, followed by the Christian Democrats, left the cabinet in November because of Communist influence on Parri.⁷ The six-party coalition reformed under the leadership of Alcide de Gasperi who took office on December 10, 1945. He was to continue as Premier until 1953. In March, the Government decided that a referendum should be held in June, 1946 (following local

⁶Harris, op. cit., pp. 251-252.

⁷Ibid., p. 362. Parri subsequently became the leader of the Unità Popolare, a splinter left-wing group, in the election of 1953.

elections in March and April), to determine the fate of the monarchy. At the same time, the election for representatives to the Constituent Assembly would be held.

Referendum, June 2, 1946

Actually the disposition of the monarchy may have been determined in April of 1946, when the congress of the Christian Democratic party voted in favor of a Republic.⁸ This vote, combined with the anti-monarchist policies of the Communists and Socialists, made the institution of a republic almost a certainty. In an effort to defeat the opposition, King Emmanuel, three weeks before the vote, abdicated the throne in favor of his son, Umberto. He presumably hoped that any stigma attached to himself because of his cooperation with the Fascists would not be transferred to his son. However, the new King, commander-in-chief of the Italian forces in the attack on France in 1940, was considered little better than his father by left-wing parties.⁹ It is impossible to say whether a "purer" successor than Umberto could have altered the eventual vote, but Emmanuel's strategy failed. The issue was decided in favor of a republic, 12,717,923 to 10,719,284, a percentage of 54.3. As

⁸Patch, op. cit., p. 230.

⁹W. Hilton-Young, The Italian Left (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1949), pp. 166-167.

can be seen from Table 3, an overwhelming vote for a republic in the more populous North overcame a very large majority for the King in the southern provinces.

A violent outcry arose from the monarchist supporters when the result of the election was announced somewhat precipitously before the final tabulations were made. The official results showed little change, however. The monarchists still dissented, claiming that all challenged and invalid votes should be counted for the King since those ballots were largely from the illiterate peasants, particularly of the South, who were overwhelmingly for the monarchy. This claim was disregarded, and, as can be seen from the figures on valid votes in Table 3, the percentage of ballots thrown out in the monarchist South actually was little different from that in the rest of the country. The result of the election never has been accepted by large numbers of the population, however, as indicated by continued support for monarchist parties in subsequent elections. Nevertheless, King Umberto acknowledged the desires of the majority by abdicating (on June 13, 1946) and leaving the country.

Italian Parties, 1946

In the concurrent elections for the Constituent Assembly, eight major parties or lists of parties contested for 556 seats. These were the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the Communists, the National Democratic Union

TABLE 3
REFERENDUM ON THE REPUBLIC^a

Region	Percentage Voting	Voting; Percentage Valid	Percentage Pro- Republic
Piemonte	90.4	93.0	57.1
Liguria	85.6	95.6	69.0
Lombardia	91.2	94.2	64.1
Venezia Tridentina	91.0	94.9	85.0
Veneto	91.1	91.6	59.3
Emilia	92.5	94.1	77.0
Toscana	91.5	93.5	71.6
Marche	91.7	93.9	70.1
Umbria	91.2	93.8	71.9
Lazio	84.2	96.0	48.6
Abruzzi e Molise	88.1	94.1	43.1
Campania	86.0	94.4	23.5
Puglia	90.1	95.4	32.7
Basilicata	88.7	93.0	40.6
Calabria	85.6	94.7	39.7
Sicilia	85.5	94.1	35.3
Sardegna	85.9	92.7	39.1
NORTH	90.8	93.5	64.8
CENTER	88.9	94.4	63.5
SOUTH	87.5	94.6	32.6
ISLANDS	85.6	93.8	36.0
ITALIA	89.1	93.9	54.3

^aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1944-48, Serie V, Vol. I (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949), pp. 154-155.

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(composed of the Liberals and Labor Democrats), the Uomo Qualunque, the Republicans, the National Liberation Bloc (monarchist) and the Action party. A few words should be said about each of these.

The Christian Democratic party (D.C.), headed by Alcide de Gasperi, is the successor to the Catholic Partito Popolare (or Popular party) of pre-Mussolini days. The Popular party was founded in 1919 and existed until 1926 when it was disbanded for opposing Mussolini. As the war drew to a close, many of the leaders of the defunct Popular party, including Alcide de Gasperi, formed a new Catholic party, the Partito Democrazia Cristiana, which then participated in the C.N.L.

The Christian Democratic party is a combination of groups that range all over the political spectrum, bound together by religious faith. This central belief in the Catholic faith was virtually all that was known of the party in 1946. The party pledged valid reforms where needed, but with safeguards for the freedom of individuals. State intervention in the industrial field would vary from outright nationalization through joint public-private control to simple governmental control, but about seventy-five percent of industry was to remain in private hands.¹⁰ The general

¹⁰ Mario Einaudi and Francois Goguel, Christian Democracy in Italy and France (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952), p. 37.

[illegible]

trend of the party's pronouncements placed it in the center, considerably to the right of the Communists and Socialists.

The Communist party, or P.C.I. (Partito Comunista Italiano), came into existence in 1921 after a split in the Socialist party. The party leader was (and is) Palmiro Togliatti.¹¹ The P.C.I. was suppressed during the Fascist period, and Togliatti exiled himself to Moscow until 1944 when he returned to resume command. The party was known for its anti-Fascist stand, and its exemplary action during the partisan period gained many friends throughout the country. Its policies normally reflected the Moscow party line. The P.C.I., like all Communist parties, is very pragmatic; this was indicated in 1946 by a statement that it had "absolute respect for the religious faith of the Italian people."¹² This was an earth-shaking announcement for a Marxist party and caught the secular parties off guard. This position on religion enabled the P.C.I. to compete effectively with the Christian Democrats before the election and to participate in the Government until 1947.

The Socialist party (Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria or P.S.I.U.P.), like the Communist, had been suppressed during the Fascist period. Its leaders were

¹¹Togliatti actually became the party leader after defeating the Bordiga faction (the extreme left-wing of the party) in 1926-1927.

¹²As quoted in Einaudi and Goguel, op. cit., p. 33.

imprisoned or exiled; the most important of these leaders, Pietro Nenni and Guiseppe Saragat, spent the intervening time in Paris. This party also was strongly anti-Fascist and was very active in the fighting against the Mussolini regime. In this struggle, however, it lacked the organization and experience of the Communist party with which it worked very closely.¹³ The P.S.I.U.P. was definitely anti-clerical, but managed to cooperate with the Government during the early years after the war. The party was shortly to split on the question of continued cooperation with the Government or joining with the Communists in opposition.

The Action party (Partito d'Azione) grew up in the period of fighting and died soon thereafter. While little was known of its strength, the party "stood so high in popular estimation and popular hopes that its leader [Ferruccio Parri] was able to command the confidence of the leaders of the traditional parties."¹⁴ Its program, enunciated during the Badoglio governmental period, called for a republic, regional decentralization, elimination of monopolies, some nationalization, taxation of inherited wealth, agrarian reforms, freedom of worship, reforms of education and the development of the South.¹⁵ These points were all adopted

¹³Grindrod, op. cit., p. 16.

¹⁴Hilton-Young, op. cit., p. 181.

¹⁵Grindrod, op. cit., p. 16.

by the parties having mass support, and the Action party soon disappeared. Largely a party of ideas and intellectuals, it was ill suited to compete.

The Liberal party (Partito Liberale Italiano) can trace its history back to the nineteenth century and the unification of Italy. In the post World War I period the party, led by its most conservative wing, cooperated with the Fascist regime. Not all the party leaders agreed with this strategy, however, and some moved into opposition. Among these were Luigi Einaudi and Benedetto Croce. These two men led the Liberal party in the post World War II period.

Furthest to the right of the parties of the C.N.L., the Liberals were anti-clerical but close to the Christian Democrats on most secular issues. However, this party was, like the D.C., composed of heterogeneous groups; its followers ranged from progressive liberals to right-wing conservatives. The P.L.I., consequently, was divided on many crucial issues,¹⁶ and the party ultimately lost much of its more progressive northern membership. After 1946 most of its strength was centered in the South and in Piedmont.

The sixth party of the C.N.L. was a small southern group, the Democratic Labor party (Partito Democrazia del

¹⁶For example, the party was divided on the question of the Monarchy. Croce suggested the abdication of both Victor Emmanuel and Umberto in favor of Umberto's six-year old son. Other members favored the Republic. Ibid., p. 18.

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Lavoro) of Ivanoe Bonomi. When Bonomi was no longer a power in Italian politics, the party died. It had no policy to distinguish it from the mass parties, and, like the Action party, could not compete effectively for votes. The Democratic Labor party joined with the Liberals in an allied list in 1946, but received little support.

The two principal parties in 1946 having no connection with the C.N.L. were the Republican and Uomo Qualunque. The Partito Repubblicano Italiano (P.R.I.) is one of the oldest Italian parties, dating back to Guiseppe Mazzini in the middle of the nineteenth century. Predominantly a middle class party, it stresses republicanism and anti-clericalism. P.R.I. support is strongest in Romagna, Tuscany and the area making up the former papal states. Its position has changed little since 1946, although it is divided by two factions, one looking to modernizing the party and the other still adhering to Mazzini. (The party secretary and leader, Randolfo Pacciardi, spoke in 1948 of Mazzini's writings as the Bible of the party.¹⁷) The party gained some followers by the decline of the Action party, but remains as a minor factor in Italian politics.

The Uomo Qualunque, or Common Man, party came into existence in 1945, under the leadership of Guglielmo

¹⁷John Clarke Adams, "Italy," in Walter Galenson, ed., Comparative Labor Movements (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), pp. 470-471.

[illegible]

Giannini. It has no particular program and existed only to satisfy those voters with no interest in the anti-Fascist parties. The party had definite neo-Fascist tendencies, but these were played down in the election. (There was, of course, no Fascist or even frankly neo-Fascist party in the election.) The Uomo Qualunque campaign in essence was a complaint against parties and politics. It was well financed and even had its own daily paper, Bonsenso, but it quickly lost support to the Center and Right after the election.

A final group, the National Liberation Bloc (Blocco Nazionale della Libertà) or B.N.L., campaigned almost exclusively on the principle of retaining the monarchy.

All of these parties entered the election of 1946 with the purpose of electing delegates to the Constituent Assembly and, thus, place themselves in a position to make an imprint on the forthcoming constitution. Nonetheless, the voters were given very little insight into the differences among the parties. All parties agreed that Fascism and the concentration of dictatorial power in the hands of a small group were to be avoided. The anti-Fascist parties differed on nationalization and methods of implementing policy, but were in accord on most other issues.

All wanted administrative decentralisation and regional autonomy, development of the neglected South, reforms in banking and taxation, in social assistance, and in education, and an extension of the co-operative principle in industry and agriculture. Industrial reforms were to include an end of monopolies, and the introduction

of workers' representation on factory councils; in agriculture, landless peasants were to become small-holders on land acquired by breaking up the big estates.¹⁸

Of the parties that were not to the extreme right, the Republican party was the only one which advocated that the state take a lesser role in the economic life of the country. It alone stood for what is called free enterprise in the United States, i.e., industry, business and agriculture being left alone to work out their own difficulties. All other parties, as said above, differed only on the proper extent of governmental interference.¹⁹

The electorate that was to choose among these parties was unique in two ways: (1) women were allowed to vote for the first time,²⁰ (2) 1953 was the first election in which anything approaching a majority of the populace was to participate. Previously, the largest percentage of the adult population eligible to vote in Italy was 29.0% in 1924. From 1870 until 1913, less than 9.5% of the population

¹⁸ Grindrod, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁹ Mario Einaudi, "Political Change in France and Italy," American Political Science Review, XL (1946), 911.

²⁰ This presumably was an aid to the Christian Democrats since women were assumed to be more inclined to vote for a Catholic party than were men. For evidence to support this belief, see, for example, Pierpaolo Luzzatto Fegiz, Il Volto Sconosciuto dell'Italia (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffrè, 1956), pp. 446-447, 462, 518, 519 and 520.

was eligible to vote.²¹ The election of 1953 was also the first in which voting was mandatory. Actually, there was considerable debate on whether required voting should be instituted, and the resulting compromise removed most of the legal penalties for failure to vote. The Center parties felt that mandatory participation would be to their advantage since their potential voters were less disciplined and enthusiastic than those of the Left. The Communists recognized that they could troop their voters to the polls en masse and consequently opposed enforced voting. The compromise electoral law made voting mandatory, but the only sanction was the publication of the names of non-voters. This was a very real penalty, however, for the identification papers of non-voters were stamped when next presented. Harassing limitations then went into effect; i.e., emigration became impossible, government jobs could not be obtained, it became difficult to secure licenses, etc. Consequently, very few eligible voters did not participate.

Election of the Constituent Assembly
and Formation of the Government

The election took place on June 2, and the result in terms of percentage of vote by region is indicated in

²¹These and all other electoral statistics, unless otherwise noted, are from Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano (Roma: Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949-1955), Volumes 1944-1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955.

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Table 4. As can be seen, the D.C. party, with 35.2% of the popular vote, far outdistanced the 20.7% of the second place Socialists and 19.0% of the third place Communists. The total vote of each party and the composition of the Constituent Assembly is indicated in Table 5.

The geographical distribution of the vote indicates something of the degree of nationwide support each party received. The D.C. was the only party which had its strength fairly evenly spread over all four geographic sections. All others had only one or two areas in which their support was centered. For example, the two major opposing parties, the P.S.I.U.P. and the P.C.I. had their greatest backing in the North and Center and fell off distinctly in the South. (This is particularly noticeable with the P.C.I.) Their support obviously was least in the most underdeveloped sections and greatest in those areas which had made the biggest strides in the postwar period. (A qualification should be entered that these are aggregate statistics and do not show provincial strengths and weaknesses.)

The minor parties showed similar variations in support. The U.D.N. parties (principally the Liberals) were confined largely to the South and to the Islands, as was the Uomo Qualunque. The Republicans were concentrated in the central area with far lower and fairly even strength elsewhere. The B.N.L. showed the same type of distribution with its locus of strength in the South where monarchist

TABLE 4

ELECTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, JUNE 2, 1946^a

(Percentage voting, percentage of votes that were valid and percentage of valid votes received by each party)

Region	Voting	Valid	D.C.	P.S.I.-U.P.	P.C.I.	U.D.M.	U.C.	P.R.I.	B.N.L.	A.P.	Other
Piemonte	90.4	94.0	35.2	27.9	20.8	5.5	2.2	0.6	0.9	1.9	5.0
Liguria	85.6	96.5	32.5	25.9	29.4	4.2	2.7	4.0	0.8	0.9	0.6
Lombardia	91.2	94.3	38.5	30.5	20.1	3.1	2.5	1.5	1.8	1.0	1.0
Venezia Tridentina	91.0	94.8	57.4	27.7	8.1	1.9	.	4.9	.	.	.
Veneto	91.1	93.0	49.1	27.6	13.9	2.4	1.9	1.7	0.8	2.2	0.7
Emilia	92.5	95.4	23.3	28.0	37.7	1.7	2.5	5.7	.	0.8	0.3
Toscana	91.5	94.5	28.2	21.9	33.6	2.3	4.2	5.6	1.1	1.6	1.4
Marche	91.7	92.3	30.6	18.8	21.8	3.0	5.3	16.4	.	2.7	1.4
Umbria	91.2	92.3	25.7	22.8	27.9	1.8	4.5	11.4	1.2	1.5	3.2
Lazio	84.2	92.0	33.0	10.8	14.1	7.0	7.0	14.8	6.2	1.3	5.8
Abruzzi e Molise	88.1	89.7	42.4	12.1	10.1	9.6	7.1	7.0	1.0	3.1	7.5
Campania	86.0	85.8	34.0	6.9	7.4	21.0	11.4	2.4	6.4	1.8	8.8
Puglia	90.1	89.4	32.9	10.8	14.7	10.4	10.4	2.6	9.5	0.5	8.3
Basilicata	88.7	89.4	31.2	16.3	13.0	22.9	8.6	3.0	.	.	5.1
Calabria	85.6	88.9	34.3	11.1	12.1	12.8	7.9	4.1	11.0	2.4	4.3
Sicilia	85.5	89.4	33.6	12.2	7.9	13.5	9.7	4.2	4.2	1.4	13.2
Sardegna	85.9	92.7	41.1	8.9	12.5	6.3	12.4	.	.	.	18.8

TABLE 4--Continued

Region	Voting	Valid Vote	D.C.	P.S.I.U.P.	P.C.I.	U.D.N.	U.C.	P.R.I.	B.N.L.	A.P.	Other
NORTH	90.8	94.4	37.3	28.5	22.4	3.2	2.3	2.4	1.0	1.4	1.5
CENTER	88.9	33.1	29.9	17.8	24.6	4.0	5.3	11.0	2.7	1.6	3.1
SOUTH	87.5	88.1	35.1	10.0	10.9	15.0	9.7	3.5	6.8	1.6	7.3
ISLANDS	85.6	90.1	35.2	11.5	8.9	12.0	10.3	3.3	3.3	1.1	14.4
ITALIA	89.1	92.3	35.2	20.7	19.2	6.8	5.3	4.4	2.8	1.3	4.3

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^aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1944-48, Serie V, Vol. 1 (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949), pp. 151-153.

TABLE 5

ELECTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
VOTES RECEIVED AND SEATS WON^a

Party	Vote	Seats Won	Percent Seats Won
Christian Democrat	8,082,486	207	37.1
Socialist	4,765,665	115	20.7
Communist	4,358,243	104	18.7
National Democratic Union	1,560,037	41	7.4
Uomo Qualunque	1,210,021	30	5.4
Republican	1,003,086	23	4.1
National Freedom Bloc	636,330	16	2.9
Action	334,877	7	1.3
Other Lists	1,044,935	13	2.3
	<u>22,952,890</u>	<u>556</u>	<u>99.9</u>

^aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1944-48, Serie V, Vol. I (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949), pp. 150, 152-153. Percentage of seats won calculated from the above source.

feelings were strongest. The Action party was equally ineffective everywhere; this election marked its end as a force in Italian politics.

The Constituent Assembly met for the first time on June 25, 1946, and chose Giuseppe Saragat as its president. Enrico de Nicola was elected to serve as head of state until the Constitution could be written and put into effect. De Nicola then called upon Alcide de Gasperi to form a

Government. De Gasperi and his Christian Democrats formed a coalition with the Socialists, Communists and Republicans. However, internal problems plaguing the Socialists prevented this Government from remaining intact for more than six months.

The Socialist party's internal dissension was the result of a controversy concerning Socialist-Communist relations. The two parties had signed a "Unity of Action" pact in 1934 in Paris, but the right-wing of the Socialists (under Saragat) became restive under the close cooperation after the war. Nevertheless, a new "Unity of Action" pact was signed on October 25, 1946. This pact went even further than the first, and provided for coordination of and joint decisions on party activities.²² Nenni, the party head, desired extremely close relations, just short of fusion of the two parties, and obtained this in the pact. Saragat felt that while Togliatti and Nenni "were taking part with fair orthodoxy in democratic politics . . . they both showed a disquieting reluctance from proclaiming their faith in the basic principles of democracy."²³ The immediate cause of open dispute, however, was the problem of international relations. Saragat favored cooperation with the United States with the subsequent influx of money. He was willing to

²²Grindrod, op. cit., p. 48.

²³Hilton-Young, op. cit., p. 190.

accept a slower reformation of society to gain this aid. Nenni was not. Basically, this was a question of choosing between Moscow and the West. The dispute came to a head in January, 1947, when the National Congress of the Socialist party convened in Rome. After several meetings Saragat left the Congress to form a new organization, the Italian Workers' Socialist party, (P.S.L.I.), carrying with him a large bloc of the party.²⁴ Both Saragat and Nenni subsequently left the Government.

De Gasperi immediately resigned and formed a new Government composed of several parties, including the Socialists and the Communists (but without either Nenni or Togliatti). This widely-based Government then ratified the peace treaty that officially brought the war to a close. This accomplished, De Gasperi again resigned (following a general strike in May, 1947) to form a more stable Government without either the Socialists or Communists. The new Government was composed principally of Christian Democrats but was joined by the P.S.L.I. and the Republicans the following December.

Thus Italy had a stable Government but still was without a legislative body. The Constituent Assembly elected in 1946 had only two functions, to frame the Constitution and to help draft the peace treaty. Since it did not pass

²⁴Ibid., pp. 192-193.

laws, the Ministry was obligated to legislate by decree. (The "Provisional Head of the State," De Nicola, promulgated these laws.²⁵) Elections to select members of the first regular legislature were set for 1948.

The Italian Constitution

Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly was preparing the constitution for the new Italian Republic under which those elections would be held. No party had a majority so no group was in a position to push through a document which completely reflected its views. The Constitution finally produced was, as a result, a mass of compromises that completely satisfied no group and that left much detail to be filled in by succeeding governments. Various sub-committees of a Committee of Seventy-five actually drafted the document which was submitted to the entire assembly at the end of January, 1947. Almost a year of article-by-article discussion and changes resulted in final acceptance on December 22, 1947, 453 to 62; the new Constitution went into effect on January 1, 1948.

While it would be of little value here to make a point by point analysis of the Constitution and the specific powers granted to various officers and institutions, a general description might be useful. Such a description will give

²⁵Ibid., p. 187.

some understanding of the Italian constitutional system, but more important, it will indicate the positions taken by the various parties and will point out certain institutional arrangements and provisions which became campaign material in 1953.

The document opens with a section on fundamental principles, including a bill of rights (Articles 2-4) and a statement that Italy repudiates the use of war as a means of solving international problems (Article 11). Much of this section is concerned with social and economic matters, undoubtedly reflecting views of the leftist parties and the liberal wing of the D.C. Most articles are non-specific and depend to a very great extent for their implementation on the party in power. Examples of this type of provision are the following:

Article 37 -- The law establishes the minimum age for paid labor.

Article 38 -- Every citizen unable to work and deprived of the means necessary to live has the right to support and to social assistance.

Article 40 -- The right to strike is exercised within the sphere of the laws which regulate it.

Article 42 -- Private property is recognized and guaranteed by law, which determines the methods of its acquisition and enjoyment and the limitations designed to assure its social functioning and render it accessible to all.

Obviously, anything or nothing can be made of such general provisions.

Part Two of the Constitution is concerned with items more common to such documents, the institutions of the Republic. A bicameral legislature was created, but there was considerable debate regarding its structure and powers. Both the Christian Democrats and the Communists announced prior to the election that they would accept a two-house legislature. However, the Communists would agree to two houses only if both were popularly elected.²⁶ The Christian Democrats favored the representation of major economic categories (agriculture, industry, trade, professions, etc.) in the upper house, with popular representation prevailing in the lower chamber.²⁷ The first compromise resulted in two houses equal in power with the Chamber of Deputies elected directly (Article 56) and the Senate composed of life-time members and members elected on a regional basis (Article 51). These chambers would exercise the legislative power of the Republic and would select the President and approve the Government. The Christian Democrats worked to grant the President more power than he received, but they did succeed in including an article endowing him with the right to dissolve the two chambers or either of them at his discretion (Article 88). Similarly, the power granted to the Premier is less than desired

²⁶Einaudi, op. cit., pp. 908-909.

²⁷Einaudi and Goguel, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

by the Christian Democrats, but he is given considerably more protection against votes of no confidence than was his counterpart in France under the Fourth Republic (Article 94). In general, the D.C. party was more inclined to set up a stronger executive and a more subservient legislature than were the parties of the Left.

A potentially important part of the Constitution is Article 117, where the Region is established as a unit of local government. These Regions were to have their own legislative bodies and the power to handle many local problems. This particular program was sponsored in the Constituent Assembly by the Republicans with the lukewarm support of the Christian Democrats. The Communists, Socialists and Liberals opposed it but were defeated. However, the program was never implemented in any general way over the nation despite its inclusion in the Constitution.²⁸ Much of the power granted to the Regions is also granted to the central Government by Articles 124-127.

Another potentially important innovation was the provision for a Constitutional Court (Articles 134-139).

²⁸It should be noted that the parties of the Left have favored the granting of power to the Regions since 1948. The explanation of this is very simple; these parties have not been able to achieve control of the national government, but have received great support in certain Regions, e.g. Sardegnna. The Christian Democrats have strongly opposed Regional power since the Center parties have controlled the central government.

This body was to have the power to declare laws unconstitutional, but, although sponsored by the Christian Democrats, it was not set up by the time of the 1953 elections.

One point of profound importance to the embryonic republic was the relationship between the Catholic Church and the state. On February 11, 1929, Mussolini and the Church signed the Lateran Treaty or Pact. This treaty, among other things, accepted the statement of an earlier law (the Statute of the Kingdom of Sardinia) "by which the Catholic Apostolic and Roman religion is the sole religion of the State."²⁹ Other religions were free but lacked the predominant position of the Catholic faith. The Christian Democrats fought valiantly for a clause of the new Constitution that would recognize the Lateran Treaties as effective in post-Fascist Italy. Faced with unified opposition from the lay parties, the cause would have been lost except for approval by the most vehement of anti-church parties, the Communist. Presumably that party hoped, by this strategem, to win Catholic vote and to prevent concerted anti-Communist action by the Church in the 1948 election. Thus, with P.C.I. assistance, the Christian Democrats were able to push through this extremely controversial measure. The result was Article 7 of the new Constitution:

²⁹ "Italy," Encyclopedia Britannica, 1955 ed., Vol. XII, p. 812.

The state and the Catholic Church are, each in its own order, independent and sovereign.

Their relationships are regulated by the Lateran Pacts. Modifications of the pacts, which have been accepted by the two parties, do not require the procedure of constitutional amendment.³⁰

This agreement gives certain religious controls to the Italian Republic. For example, all bishops must take an oath of loyalty to the state and must be Italian-speaking subjects. Most aspects of the agreements, however, work to the advantage of the Church. Among the many provisions are the following: priests are exempted from military duty; religious training is permitted in public primary and secondary schools (with the Bishop approving teachers and texts); acts against the Pope by writing, speaking or acting will be treated as violations of law, as if directed at the head of the state; non-political organizations of the Church may operate freely.

This last point is of particular importance because it permits the functioning of the Catholic Action (this organization will be discussed below). Under the Lateran Pacts no Catholic priest may belong to any political party,

³⁰The rights of other religions are protected by Article 8:

All religious confessions are equally free before the law.

Religious confessions other than the Catholic have the right to organize according to their own statutes, in so far as they do not conflict with the Italian juridical order.

Their relationships with the state are regulated by law on the basis of agreements with the appropriate representatives.

nor may he actively work for such a group. Catholic Action (under Luigi Gedda's leadership in the period studied) avoided this prohibition by remaining formally non-political and apart from the Christian Democrats. While the D.C. party is endorsed by the Church, it is not officially a church organization.

The 1948 Electoral Campaign

With the problem of developing a Constitution out of the way, the parties turned to the rapidly approaching election of April 18, 1948. This was to be the first regular election of the Italian Republic, and the party (or parties) gaining control would be in an excellent position to determine much of the future development of the nation. In addition, the election took on tremendous international overtones as the struggle between the Soviet Union and the western countries increased in intensity. This combination of circumstances made the 1948 election a item of world-wide interest and caused extraordinary pressures to be put on the Italian people to vote in the "proper" way.

The electoral law under which this election was held was drawn up by a Consultative Assembly which served as an interim parliament. (This body was composed of 429 members nominated by the Government from lists prepared by the various political parties.³¹) The law, passed March 10,

³¹Grindrod, op. cit., p. 22.

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1946, provided for thirty-one electoral colleges or districts in which elections would be by proportional representation and party lists.

The parties and lists contending for the 273 Senate and 574 Chamber seats numbered seven: The D.C.; a popular front list of the P.C.I. and the P.S.I. called the Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Libertà, la Pace, il Lavoro (F.D.P.); a list composed of the P.S.L.I. and other dissidents who left the P.S.I. when the F.D.P. was formed, designated the Unità Socialista (U.S.); the Blocco Nazionale (the principal party of which was the P.L.I.); a list composed of the Monarchists (Partito Nazionale Monarchico or P.N.M.) and the Democratic Alliance (Alleanza Democratica Nazionale del Lavoro or A.D.N.L.); the Republicans (P.R.I.); and a new group of neo-Fascists, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (M.S.I.). Of these parties and lists, the D.C., Unità Socialista, Blocco Nazionale and the P.R.I. represented the Center and presented something of a united front against the Left (F.D.P.) and the Right (P.N.M., A.D.N.L. and M.S.I.). The Action party had completely disintegrated and the Uomo Qualunque, while participating in the election, had lost most of its supporters (neo-Fascists to the M.S.I., right-wing liberals to the P.L.I. and moderates to the other Center parties).

The election of 1948 was fought almost exclusively on international issues, with only the most limited attention paid to admittedly serious domestic problems. The parties,

in general, limited their pledges on internal matters to the same programs put forth in 1946. Again the only real distinction among the major parties concerned methods and extent of governmental activity (i.e., nationalization). The Monarchists, of course, put great emphasis on the return of the King and (what was to them) the inconclusiveness of the 1946 referendum.

The international future of Italy was, nevertheless, the only real campaign issue. The West greatly feared that the large vote polled by the Communists in the election of 1946 (4,358,243 votes) could presage a leftist swing that would put Italy in the camp of the Soviet Union. The P.S.I.U.P. (4,765,655 votes) and the P.C.I. together totaled over one million more votes than the D.C. in 1946. The joining of these parties in the F.D.P. (even with the Unità Socialista dividing the socialist vote) raised the spectre of a defeat for the Center.

Realizing the potentialities of the situation, the Soviet Union attempted to woo the Italian vote by announcing in February the renewal of its efforts to secure for Italy the trusteeship over the colonies lost by Italy after the war. The P.C.I. played up this pro-Italian attitude of the U.S.S.R. while at the same time emphasizing the growing strength of the Soviet Union. There was considerable fear in Italy and in the West that a win for the P.C.I. would

mean a repeat of the coup in Czechoslovakia.³² Even a narrow victory for the Center would cause concern since the P.C.I. openly threatened civil war if not accorded recognition in terms of cabinet posts. It was reported that Luigi Longo, Deputy Security General of the P.C.I., controlled a secret militia, the Garibaldi Brigades, of over 75,000 men, all well armed and ready for action.³³

We are following a line of democratic action, but we shall not allow ourselves to be caught unawares by any provocation or by any reactionary plan. We have behind us the experience of the partisan war. Tens of thousands of youths and men who have had this experience have learnt to defend the liberty: and independence of the Fatherland by force of arms and, if a situation were to arise, as often happens in the

³²The situation in Italy was sufficiently similar to that in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, to cause very serious concern. The May 26, 1946, election in Czechoslovakia showed that the Communist Party was the largest single party although it still represented a minority (2.7 million votes out of seven million). A Communist headed a coalition government which included a communist Minister of the Interior. This Minister, in early 1948, replaced all non-communist police with party members; in protest, eleven non-communist ministers resigned on February 20, 1948. Communist police reserves and regular party members were mobilized and took control of the country. On February 25, a new government was formed with only Communist Party representation. This coup followed the trend in most of Eastern Europe --the Communist party went from minority participation to coalition government with Communist leadership to domination. In Italy it appeared that a F.D.P. victory would be only a step away from Communist control; even a narrow Center victory might force inclusion of Communists in crucial ministries. The danger was brought home to Italians since the coup occurred only slightly over one month prior to the election.

³³Patch, op. cit., p. 216.

course of democratic revolutions, in which freedom had to be defended or reconquered by force of arms, they would not fail to do their duty once again towards democracy and towards their Fatherland.³⁴

The use of the general strike for political reasons in the period between 1946 and 1948 further led moderate forces to expect the worst unless the F.D.P. were soundly beaten.

In an apparent effort to prepare for violent action by the Communist revolutionaries, the United States sent reinforcements of marines to the Mediterranean area in early January--a move protested in vain by the left wing. While the United States insisted that this deployment of armed forces had nothing to with the Italian (or Greek) situation, observers felt that the move was clearly politically motivated. The Italian Government (in February) announced plans to increase the police force by an additional 20,000 members and also issued a decree outlawing all private military groups.³⁵ The following month the Government stated that 30,000 men had been added to the public security forces.³⁶ By these means Italy attempted to eliminate, as far as possible, the threat of civil war.

Spurred by the attempted bribery by the Soviet Union and the more or less outright threats of the P.C.I., the

³⁴As quoted in Hilton-Young, op. cit., p. 198.

³⁵New York Times, February 5, 1948, 4:4; February 6, 1948, 17:1.

³⁶New York Times, March 17, 1948, 3:6.

Western powers and moderate forces within Italy conducted an all-out battle to defeat the Left. The most immediate effort by the West was an announcement on March 20, concerning Trieste:

The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France have . . . decided to recommend the return of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italian sovereignty as the best solution to meet the democratic aspirations of the people and make possible the reestablishment of peace and stability in the area.³⁷

The maintaining of Trieste as a free territory had been included in the peace treaty, but the United States, France and Britain now proposed restoring Italian control over the entire area. The "immediate effect was to enhance the prestige of the Government parties as the upholders of the Western alignment for which they stood. The Communists, on the other hand, were by this time identified with the Soviet line of strict adherence to the letter of the peace treaty."³⁸ Special editions of the newspapers were issued hailing the decision and the principle of treaty revision; the announcement was received with rejoicing throughout Italy.

Even in the most secure strongholds of leftist strength it was noticeable that the F.D.P. had lost support. An indication of this occurred in Milan where ten truckloads of young Communists assembled and began demonstrating against

³⁷New York Times, March 21, 1948, 1:6-7.

³⁸Grindrod, op. cit., p. 56.

the West. They were received with such hostility that they were forced to retreat to their trucks in order to escape the violent reaction. This was the first such occurrence in northern Italy since the war. Pro-Western demonstrations abounded in such Communist dominated areas as Florence, Milan, Naples, Gorizia, Monfalcone and Trieste itself.³⁹

A more concrete effort made by the United States in the struggle was the continued influx of economic aid under the Marshall Plan. One writer, at least, felt that the Marshall Plan aid was critical to Christian Democratic hopes and said, "Without the Plan there would have been no alternative to the setting up of a dictatorship to carry the country through a period of economic readjustment and of even lower standards of living. The only party in a position to do that would have been the Communist Party."⁴⁰ The extent and great value of this aid was emphasized by the Center parties throughout the election.

The United States, however, was not content to sit back and hope for the unsolicited gratitude of the Italian voters. On March 15, the State Department let it be known that there would be no future aid to Italy if a Communist-dominated government were returned. Despite definite statements

³⁹ New York Times, March 21, 1948, 3:1; March 22, 1948, 1:8; March 23, 1948, 3:1.

⁴⁰ Einaudi and Goguel, op. cit., p. 53.

to this effect on several occasions, Unità and Avanti (the P.C.I. and P.S.I. newspapers) erroneously quoted officials of the United States (and representatives of United States labor unions) as saying that aid would continue regardless of the outcome of the election.⁴¹ To counteract these falsehoods and to make the position of the United States clear, Secretary of State Marshall, on March 19, reiterated the fact that all aid would cease, and further remarked:

Since the association is entirely voluntary, the people of any nation have the right to change their mind and, in effect, withdraw. If they choose to vote into power a Government in which the dominant political force would be a party whose hostility to this program has been frequently, publicly and emphatically proclaimed, this could only be considered as evidence of the desire of that country to dissociate itself from the program. This Government would have to conclude that Italy had removed itself from the benefits of the European Recovery Program.⁴²

Ignoring the evident clarity of Marshall's statement, the F.D.P. attempted to mitigate its effectiveness by first stigmatizing it as blackmail (which it was) and then by stating that the American people would, in any case, rise up and prevent such action.⁴³

⁴¹ New York Times, March 18, 1948, 9:1. The F.D.P. attempted to get support from the British Labour party and from the C.I.O. and A.F. of L. of the United States. The Labour Party explicitly repudiated the F.D.P.; James B. Carey, Secretary-Treasurer of the C.I.O., and William Green, President of the A.F. of L., announced that their organizations felt that aid should cease if the F.D.P. achieved power. New York Times, March 27, 1948, 3:8; March 31, 1948, 11:1.

⁴² As quoted in New York Times, March 20, 1948, 4:5.

⁴³ New York Times, March 21, 1948, 4:5.

Other attempts by the United States to intervene in the election were just as obvious and probably as effective in convincing the Italian voters that their own best future lay in an Italy tied securely to the West. On March 16, President Truman transferred twenty-nine merchant ships to Italian ownership; fourteen of these had been seized during the war and fifteen were Liberty ships to replace merchantmen that had been lost or were worn out. Also in March, it was announced that the United States was about to pay \$4,300,000 owed to Italian prisoners-of-war for labor done in the United States, and that this was just the first installment on the total to be paid. Italy was to have met these claims under the peace treaty. To put pressure on in another way in emigration-conscious Italy, the Justice Department reminded Italians that persons joining the Communist party could never enter the United States. In the same month, a letter-writing campaign was inaugurated under which persons having relatives and friends in Italy were urged to write and exhort them to help defeat the Communists. Within a few days air mail to Italy doubled in volume. The Voice of America was active (three broadcasts per day) with dire warnings of the doleful fate in store for countries that turn Communist, stressing the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia as an example to be heeded.⁴⁴

⁴⁴These events reported in New York Times, March 17, 1948, 3:4-5, March 23, 1948, 2:2; April 3, 1948, 5:1.

Another activity by the Western powers (primarily the United States) was an indication that they would support the granting of United Nations trusteeship over the ex-colonies to Italy (as suggested by the Soviet Union). Britain and then France and the United States demanded Italy's admission to the United Nations, thus gaining much pro-Western support in Italian newspapers.⁴⁵ When the efforts of the Catholic Church to fight communism were handicapped by lack of funds, appeals were made to the Western nations; private citizens and church organizations poured money into the coffers to continue the battle.⁴⁶ Thus, the Governments and citizens of the Western powers saw fit to attempt in every way possible to influence the Italian voters. This undoubtedly was the most external interference in a democratic election that has occurred in any country.

While these external pressures and inducements were of great impact in the final accounting, the influence of the Catholic Church was probably just as decisive. The Church was not particularly prominent in the election of 1946, but the increased pressures brought by the threat of a leftist victory made a more active role mandatory in 1948. The thought of the Vatican City surrounded by a Communist Italy

⁴⁵New York Times, March 23, 1948, 6:1-2; March 24, 1948, 12:4.

⁴⁶New York Times, March 22, 1948, 4:1; April 12, 1948, 4:3-4.

was sufficient to convince the Pope that a victory for the Center, more specifically the Christian Democrats, was crucial. The importance of this decision can easily be demonstrated by the fact that 98% of all Italians are at least nominally Catholic and, presumably, somewhat under the influence of the Church. While it certainly was true that extensive portions of the population were strongly anti-clerical and would resent interference by the Church in lay matters, the Vatican hoped that any losses incurred would be far outweighed by gains from the faithful. The position of the Church might be determinate for doubtful voters who were Catholic.

While it is hard to pinpoint the beginning of the campaign by the Church, it can be said that pronouncements by Pope Pius XII in January and February, 1948, set the stage and instructed the clergy in its proper role. The clergy began advising the Italian voters to be sure to vote (this in line with the belief that a higher vote aided the Center) and to vote only for those who could be trusted to guarantee religious freedom and interests. As the Pope said in March, "Everybody must vote according to the dictates of his conscience. Now it is evident that the voice of one's conscience urges every sincere Catholic to give his vote to those candidates or electoral lists that offer truly sufficient guarantees" of religious freedom.⁴⁷ These general instructions

⁴⁷As quoted in New York Times, March 11, 1948, 10:4.

from the Church went on to indicate in a definite manner that the Popular Democratic Front could not be trusted to give such guarantees. This political position was handed down from pulpits in every Catholic Church in Italy, and was buttressed by threats of excommunication of those joining the Left. As an example of the more militant activities of the clergy, the Archbishop of Milan issued a pastoral letter instructing the priests of his diocese to refuse absolution to "Communists or members of other movements contrary to the Catholic religion."⁴⁸ This was followed by other Archbishops in various parts of Italy.

This type of action was only a part of the struggle of the Church against the F.D.P. A more direct attack was made by the "non-political" Catholic Action. According to the Vatican, this organization had a membership of 4,500,000; it definitely was a potent force for the Christian Democrats.⁴⁹ The Catholic Action went into the election with tremendous vigor and built up a vast electoral machine for mobilizing the anti-Communist vote. It worked assiduously, saying that "all must be reminded and persuaded that every abstention is a desertion."⁵⁰ Pressure was concentrated on women on the theory that they were more attached to their religion

⁴⁸New York Times, February 24, 1948, 3:2.

⁴⁹New York Times, February 13, 1948, 10:2.

⁵⁰As quoted in New York Times, February 23, 1948, 7:2.

than were the men. To accomplish all this, the Catholic Action set up a new organization, the National Civic Committee; this body subsequently put committees in almost every city, town, village and hamlet in the country. These groups (each including a priest), operating in an effort to counteract the Communist cells, attempted to canvass all streets and all voters. Of Italy's 27,000 parishes, 24,000 had committees of this type.

Considering the potency of the appeal and the size of the organization, the Communist reaction to the anti-F.D.P. propaganda was extremely mild. This presumably was the result of a fear of further alienating potential voters who were Catholic. Anti-clerical comments became more vitriolic as the election date approached and the effectiveness of the Church attack became more apparent. (All through the election, however, the F.D.P. did attempt to exploit the traditional anti-clericalism of parts of the Italian population, particularly labor.) The Vatican defense against charges that it violated the Constitution and the Lateran Treaties was that "this is not political activity, since it is limited to defense of its own religious interests, which are recognized by the Italian State itself, and that by doing so it does not violate the concordat with Italy which bars political activity by the clergy."⁵¹ In addition,

⁵¹New York Times, February 13, 1948, 10:2.

the Catholic Action, the civic committees and the clergy were instructed to stick to religious issues and stay clear of social and political problems. This undoubtedly was a distinction without a difference except for the legal position of the Church.

A further indication of the importance that the Vatican attached to the election was the following instruction to all clergy: "All those who have the right to vote--of any rank, age or sex--without exception and therefore even if they have embraced a particular religious mode of living, are strictly and deeply duty-bound to make use of that right."⁵² This admonition specifically included nuns, including those living a completely secluded life; it assured approximately 125,000 votes for the Christian Democrats from the Catholic Church alone.

Thus, the Christian Democrats and their allies went into the election with very potent backing from within and without the country. Their entire campaign was fought on the principle that aid from the United States was absolutely essential and that a tie with the West was mandatory if Italy was to avoid the fate of Czechoslovakia. Internally they pledged agrarian reforms and accepted the premise that labor was to share in the management of industrial and agricultural

⁵² New York Times, February 25, 1948, 10:2.

enterprises.⁵³ The slogan "Every vote for Togliatti is a vote for Stalin," was the hallmark of this campaign.

The F.D.P. countered by attacking the opposition and criticizing the external interference (while ignoring the aid that the P.C.I. received from the Soviet Union). As the campaign progressed, the fears of a Communist coup d'état and the realization of the need for foreign aid caused considerable defection from the Left. To allay the fear of communism, the F.D.P. played down the hammer and sickle; pictures of Garibaldi appeared on posters in place of Stalin.⁵⁴ (This, of course, was in an effort to minimize the connection between the P.C.I. and the U.S.S.R.) Probably the most effective propaganda device used by the Communists, however, was aimed at the peasants of the South. P.C.I. members went into the country with maps of the local areas, pointing out to each peasant the specific plot of land he would receive if the F.D.P. were successful. The more general F.D.P. campaign was characterized by a slogan answering that of the Christian Democrats, "Every vote for De Gasperi is a vote for Truman." Thus, as said before, the campaign was fought largely without specific internal issues, and, as one observer said, "no party is bothering much to outline a political program to the voters. Instead, most of the time, money and

⁵³New York Times, March 14, 1948, IV, 3:5.

⁵⁴New York Times, April 12, 1948, 4:6.

paper is being employed to vilify opponents."⁵⁵

The General Election of 1948

The election was held on Sunday, April 18. The Catholic Church again cooperated in getting out the vote by granting a special dispensation to hold mass an hour early; at the same time it reminded the voters that "God sees you even in the voting booth." The resulting vote was everything the Church and Christian Democrats could have reasonably desired or hoped for, a smashing victory with an absolute majority in seats.

As Table 7 shows, the get-out-the-vote campaign resulted in over a 92% turnout. Almost 50% of the votes were for the D.C.--62% for the Christian Democrats, P.S.L.I., Liberals and Republicans in combination. It is interesting to note that the D.C. again received almost the same percentage of vote in each of the four regions while the F.D.P. fell off considerably in the two southern areas. The popular vote was even more indicative of the tremendous victory of the Christian Democrats; the vote of the F.D.P. parties fell off from a 1946 total of 9,124,008 to 8,137,047 in 1948, while the D.C. vote of 12,712,562 represented an increase of 4,530,076 (See Table 7). The distribution of seats in the election are shown in Table 6:

⁵⁵New York Times, April 12, 1948, 4:5.

TABLE 6

GENERAL ELECTION OF APRIL 18, 1948
VOTES RECEIVED AND SEATS WON^a

Party	Votes	Seats	Percent Seats Won
D.C.	12,708,263	305	53.1
F.D.P.	8,137,468	183	31.9
U.S.	1,856,287	33	5.8
B.N.	1,004,032	19	3.3
P.M.-A.D.N.L.	728,981	14	2.4
P.R.I.	651,394	9	1.5
M.S.I.	527,039	6	1.0
Others	599,357	5	1.0
	26,212,821	574	100.0

^aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1944-48, Serie V, Vol. I (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949), pp. 156, 158-159. Percentage of seats won calculated from the above source.

Thus, out of 574 seats, the Christian Democratic Party, by itself, had seventeen more than an absolute majority--with its allies it had 366, or a majority of 78. This, of course, was almost unprecedented in continental European legislatures. The Senate was elected at the same time for a six-year term. The D.C. party achieved a majority there also, 149 of 344 elected seats. However, 107 Senators "by right"

TABLE 7

GENERAL ELECTION OF APRIL 18, 1948^a

(Percentage voting, percentage of votes that were valid and percentage of valid votes received by each party)

Region	Voting ^{as}	Valid Votes	D. C.	U. S.	S. M.	P. R. I.	F. D. P.	P. N. M. L.	M. S. I.	Other
Piemonte	93.0	98.1	47.9	11.5	2.7	0.4	32.0	0.7	0.8	4.1
Lombardia	94.0	98.4	52.5	9.5	1.1	0.9	33.3	0.7	1.0	1.0
Trentino-Alto Adige	93.4	98.1	50.4	7.9	1.4	. .	9.6	. .	. .	30.7
Veneto	93.8	98.1	60.5	13.1	1.7	0.8	24.0	0.6	1.2	1.1
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	91.3	97.6	57.0	13.7	2.3	1.0	22.3	0.6	1.3	1.8
Liguria	91.1	98.6	45.9	9.8	1.1	2.5	39.1	0.9	0.8	1.1
Emilia-Romagna	95.3	98.1	33.0	9.0	0.8	4.7	51.2	0.2	0.7	0.3
Toscana	95.1	97.3	39.0	5.7	1.1	3.7	48.1	0.4	1.1	1.0
Umbria	93.4	97.2	36.5	5.3	1.3	6.1	47.1	0.5	2.4	0.7
Marche	94.2	97.9	46.7	6.2	1.4	9.0	34.2	0.5	1.2	0.9
Lazio	89.9	98.6	51.8	4.1	2.6	6.4	27.3	2.2	4.4	1.3
Abruzzi e Molise	90.8	97.8	54.3	4.8	7.4	3.4	23.5	2.7	2.7	1.3
Campania	88.0	98.5	50.4	2.9	7.9	1.1	18.8	12.5	3.9	2.5
Puglia	93.5	97.8	48.6	3.5	11.2	0.8	26.6	5.4	2.5	1.3
Basilicata	91.8	96.1	48.4	8.3	7.8	1.0	25.6	5.4	2.4	0.8
Calabria	88.2	97.1	48.8	2.1	8.1	3.3	29.5	1.5	5.4	1.4
Sicilia	88.0	97.4	47.9	4.9	7.9	3.0	20.9	8.9	3.2	3.4
Sardegna	89.8	98.0	51.2	3.7	8.7	0.6	20.3	1.6	2.8	11.1

TABLE 7--Continued

Region	Voting	Valid Voting	D.C.	U.S.	B.M.	P.R.I.	F.D.P.	P.N.M.L.	M.S.I.	Other
NORTH	93.6	98.2	49.3	10.1	1.5	1.6	33.7	0.5	0.9	2.6
CENTER	93.0	97.8	44.5	5.2	1.7	5.7	38.4	1.0	2.4	1.1
SOUTH	90.1	97.8	50.2	3.5	8.7	1.7	22.7	6.9	3.5	1.8
ISLANDS	88.4	97.6	48.6	4.7	8.0	2.5	20.7	7.3	3.1	1.5
ITALIA	92.1	98.0	48.5	7.1	3.8	2.5	31.0	2.8	2.0	2.3

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^aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1944-48, Vol. I (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949), pp. 157-159.

prevented an absolute majority.⁵⁶

Although this victory certainly must be recognized as a sweeping approbation of the Christian Democrats, the defeat of the Left was not as decisive as the figures above would indicate. The loss of votes by the F.D.P. referred to represents the P.C.I. and P.S.I. vote alone; when the Unità Socialista vote is added in, to make the figure truly comparable, the total is 9,993,334, or a rise of 869,326. While this increase does not approach that of the Christian Democrats, it does indicate that the combined Socialist-Communist vote of Italy really had gone up by a comparatively slight amount.

Applying the same reasoning to the percentage of vote achieved, it can be seen that the Unità Socialista and F.D.P. vote represented 38.1% of the national total, against a figure of 39.7% for the P.S.I.U.P. and P.C.I. in 1946. This represented a total loss of only 1.6%, thus revealing that the 13.3% rise of the Christian Democrats was not at the expense of the Socialists and Communists. This is further shown by Table 8.

⁵⁶Senators "by-right" were not elected; they "qualified by virtue of past services to the State, and included post-war ex-Premiers and ex-Presidents of the Chamber, and Deputies who had been imprisoned for more than five years under Fascism . . ." Grindrod, op. cit., p. 56. Of the 107 such Senators, 45 were of the Left and 5 of the Right. Only 18 were Christian Democrats.

TABLE 8

COMPARISON OF 1946 AND 1948 ELECTORAL FIGURES
THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND THE LEFT^a

Area	1946		1948	
	D.C.	P.C.I.+ P.S.I.U.P.	D.C.	U.S.+ F.D.P.
North	37.3	50.9	49.3 (+12.0)	43.8 (-7.1)
Center	29.9	42.4	44.5 (+14.6)	43.6 (+1.2)
South	35.0	20.9	50.3 (+15.2)	27.2 (+6.3)
Islands	35.2	20.4	48.6 (+15.2)	25.4 (+5.0)
Italy	35.2	39.7	48.5 (+13.3)	38.1 (-1.6)

^aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1944-48, Serie V, Vol. 1 (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949), pp. 152-153, 158-159.

The combined Socialist-Communist vote declined in only one area and rose significantly where it previously was lowest, the underdeveloped South and Islands. (The 1.6% national drop may well have represented losses from the right wing of the Saragat Unità Socialista to the D.C.) Since the Unità Socialista joined the Christian Democrats in a coalition in the Government, the anti-Government forces actually did decrease as much as Table 7 indicates; however, the number of Italians who voted Left certainly had not been materially decreased by the extreme Church-Western power pressure of 1948.

Obviously, if the Christian Democrat increase did not come from the major leftist parties, it had to come from the minor parties of the Center and Right. A comparison of the 1946 and 1948 electoral results shows that almost without exception the small parties had lost support. The Republican and Liberal vote was cut almost in half in each of the geographical subdivisions. These parties suffered even more disastrously in terms of seats--the Liberals dropping from 41 to 19 and the Republicans from 23 to 9. The Monarchist list was the only group to avoid this catastrophe. It fell off 50% or more in the North and Center and only held its own in the South. However, the Monarchists maintained their national total of 2.8% by doubling their percentage in the Islands. Nonetheless, the list lost two seats.

The only other party of note in the 1948 election was the M.S.I., the neo-Fascist party that developed as the Uomo Qualunque declined. Prior to the election this party was not expected to develop much strength, but its showing in all areas but the North made it a force to be considered in the future. After an underground Fascist military organization, the "Fascist Revolutionary Action," had been uncovered in the summer of 1947, a law was passed which banned political parties showing sympathy with Fascism. Nonetheless, the M.S.I. was a frankly Fascist movement; its meetings were marked by the Fascist clenched

first salute and by cheering at the mention of Mussolini's name.⁵⁷ Aside from reactionary support, however, this movement probably won a considerable number of votes from non-Fascists by its violent denunciations of communism. Communism was to be stamped out by "fire and sword" rather than by the moderate parliamentary practices of the Christian Democrats.⁵⁸ The growth of this party from nothing to 527,039 votes caused considerable concern in the next few years, particularly because of its strength among the youth of the country.⁵⁹

Turning again to the D.C., it was clear that the party had won a great victory. The size of the majority granted the Christian Democrats was largely the result of very unusual circumstances--the struggle of the West versus the East, or, as it was pictured, that of good against evil. The result was the formation of extremely heterogeneous backing for the Christian Democrats with equally diverse elements making up the party representation. This party was actually much nearer to those of the United States than

⁵⁷Tony, Gibson, "Italy Since the War," The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1950 (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1950), p. 65.

⁵⁸Vittorio Ivella, "New Italy Faces Old Problems: Party Rule in the Democratic State," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (October, 1949-July, 1950), 83.

⁵⁹Riccardo Bauer, "The Drama of Italian Youth," Nineteenth Century and After, CXLVI (July-December, 1949), 297-303.

to those of England, France and Italy; it represented almost every point of the political spectrum from left to right. This was the natural result of the identification of the D.C. as the only proper party for a Catholic or pro-Western voter to support.

The party was divided into four wings, each of which had its own ideas of the proper policies to be put into effect. The center group was led by Attilio Piccioni, Mario Scelba and the party leader, De Gasperi. This was the largest faction, and it controlled the actions and policies of the D.C. party. To the right was an amorphous group including large landowners, industrialists and some monarchists. This group was not monolithic and itself was divided between those who looked fondly backward to the Monarchist or Fascist days (mostly in the South, including landholders who opposed the social program) and those merely concerned with individualism and the spread of government in the economic sphere. This was the conservative wing that saw the D.C. party as a bulwark against communism.⁶⁰ On the left there were two factions, one more pro-clerical than the other. Giovanni Gronchi, one of the founders of the D.C. party, was the leader of the less clerically inclined group. He was very interested in swinging the Christian Democrats to the left and into closer contact with

⁶⁰Einaudi and Goguel, op. cit., p. 68.

the Socialists. Gronchi stressed the revolutionary social and economic role of the party and the need of economic democracy. This wing exhibited only lukewarm interest in the Atlantic Pact, but was clearly not anti-Western.⁶¹

The fourth group was known as the academic left, and was headed by such men as Giuseppe Dossetti, Amintore Fanfani and Giorgio La Pira. This group was pro-Church and would have preferred seeing the economic and political life of the country controlled by the state in a manner approaching the corporate state of Mussolini.⁶²

Despite the obvious problems that this factionalism brought when the party achieved power, such diversity of internal policies undoubtedly explained in part the fairly equal vote received by the Christian Democrats over the country. Referring again to Table 4, it can be seen that in three of the four geographical regions the party vote was evenly balanced. The party splintering may have helped because anyone could find a compatible group within the Christian Democrats. A person with anti-clerical feelings that normally would force him into a lay party was faced with the East-West dichotomy, the danger of a dispersed vote among anti-Communist parties. He could vote D.C. with the hope that the anti-clerical wings might win out. A

⁶¹Ibid., p. 70.

⁶²Ibid.

leftist-thinking laborer of the North whose normal inclination would be to vote Socialist could hear Gronchi praising the Socialists and socialism and criticizing the bourgeoisie (as he did at the first party congress in 1946⁶³) and feel that a vote for the Christian Democrats would not be betraying his principles. At the same time, an owner of large estates in the South could find a wing of the party that espoused views that favored retaining old property rights; he could then vote Christian Democrat himself rather than for a party of the Right.

Thus, each of the elements of society could find a "party" to support within the D.C. party. As the Democrats and Republicans of the United States appeal to all elements by having factions and regional differences (and by having innocuous platforms), the Christian Democrats appealed to all Italian voters. After the election, however, the Christian Democrats were faced with the same problem which besets parties of the United States--how to get such diverse elements to work together? The D.C. had been given a strong mandate to rule for five years; that it was able to do so without splitting was due almost entirely to its leader, De Gasperi.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 31-32.

Formation of the Government

While De Gasperi could have set up a government composed solely of members of his own party, he preferred a coalition with representation accorded to the minor parties of the Center. His cabinet thus contained eleven members of the Christian Democrats, three from the P.S.L.I. (including Saragat), two Republicans (with the party head, Pacciardi as Defense Minister and Carlo Sforza as Minister of Foreign Affairs), two Liberals and two independents. By this action De Gasperi greatly increased his majority in the Chamber while at the same time securing non-Catholic support for the Government. This idea of avoiding a revival of the Church-versus-secular parties was one of the key points of De Gasperi's hope to develop true democracy in Italy. He felt that the D.C. should keep away from concrete, formal ties with the Church while retaining its support. At the same time, it was of fundamental importance to keep relationships with the secular parties on a friendly and cooperating basis.⁶⁴ He was not able to keep this coalition in operation for the next five years, however, for the Liberal Party left the Government in January, 1950, and the Saragat Socialists pulled out in April, 1951. These two parties, however, continued to support the Government in the legislature.

⁶⁴Grindrod, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

The first Government after the election went into office at the end of May, 1948. Almost immediately it was faced with a situation that easily could have resulted in the civil war or coup d'état feared prior to the voting. The occasion for the violent outbreak was the attempted assassination of Pietro Togliatti in July. A general strike went into effect within twenty-four hours all over Italy; workers, particularly in the North, took over factories, attacked police stations and communication centers and smashed the party offices of the Right and Center parties. Fortunately, the police and security forces were prepared for such an outbreak, and in the face of determined opposition, the General Confederation of Labor called off the strike.⁶⁵ This was the end of the most violent effort of the Communists to take over the country.

With this threat disposed of, the new Government was immediately in a position to put into effect its conceptions of the proper policy for Italy. At least, this would have appeared to be the case. Unfortunately, the Christian Democrats came face to face with a fact that has hindered legislative action in many countries--a party with a minimal majority will find its factions making concessions to each other to present a solid front, while a party with no effective competition may find unity almost

⁶⁵Gibson, op. cit., pp. 168-169.

impossible to achieve. The Christian Democratic majority put it in the latter category. The party found itself divided on many serious issues, and something of the immobilisme that plagued the legislature of France resulted (although never to the same extent).

One of the principal divisive factors that appeared almost immediately was De Gasperi's policy of cooperation with the lay parties. The right and left wings of the party refused to agree. These factions preferred a Government composed entirely of Christian Democrats, or, at least, Christian Democratic domination of all major ministries. On this issue, De Gasperi won out, of course, but the relationship between the D.C. party and the other Center parties was not aided by this internal division. In addition, these parties at times seemed to be unwilling partners in the coalition, and the two that finally withdrew did so principally because they felt that little was being gained and perhaps much lost (particularly by the P.S.L.I.) by participating in the Government.

Regardless of the internal divisions within his own party and the frequently unenthusiastic support of the Center allies, De Gasperi was faced with the job of actually creating the substance of the new Italian Republic. Unemployment was very serious; housing was inadequate; the land reform pledged in the election was unimplemented; the Constitution was only the bare bones of government. Added

to these and many other problems was the active opposition of the P.C.I. in the legislature; this took the form of obstruction by parliamentary means where possible and violence when not. In the light of all this, the advances of the De Gasperi program for Italy were amazing; but voters are not inclined to weigh advances against difficulties--results are all that count.

In the field of foreign relations, the Government immediately began solidifying Italy's position as a Western ally. Marshall Plan aid continued to flow into the economy of the country, and, in 1949, despite the vehement protests of the P.C.I., Italy entered N.A.T.O. A customs union pact with France ultimately was to provide free access to the French labor market for Italian workers. The Council of Europe was set up in 1949 with Italian membership, as was the Coal and Steel Community in 1951. While the Government was not able to secure United Nations membership for Italy, it did succeed in obtaining trusteeship over Somaliland for a ten-year period--thus recapturing some Italian prestige. Closer to home, some agreements were made with Yugoslavia which permitted the reopening of the frontier. In the international field Italy had made great progress.

In domestic matters, however, progress was much slower. The legislature had first to pass laws filling in the flesh of the skeleton Constitution which the Constituent Assembly had produced. The unemployment plaguing the nation

required drastic action, but studies had to be made to evaluate possible courses of action. The problem of the South was ever-present and demanded immediate attention.

Provincial Election, 1951-1952

In each of these domestic problems and in many others, the D.C. party factions contended with one another while, at the same time, attempting to force programs through the legislature in the face of Communist obstructions. Progress seemingly was being made, and certainly the Italian economy was improving dramatically, if spottily. The Christian Democrats had no particular reason to fear that the populace was growing discontented with the regime until they were stunned by the provincial elections of 1951 (principally in Northern Italy).

In Italy these provincial or administrative elections are not considered to be "by-elections." They are not fought on national issues and do not necessarily indicate which parties will be successful in subsequent general elections. However, the results of the 1951 administrative elections were enough to cause the Christian Democrats to fear the future. In those elections the D.C. took a tremendous beating, e.g., the vote in Veneto dropped from 60.5% to 49.8%, from 45.9% to 37.0% in Piemonte. While the Left only maintained its position or increased slightly, the pre-eminent position of the Christian Democrats was clearly threatened.

It was the similar elections in the South, in 1952, however, that really caused consternation in the party. In 1948, the lowest vote received by the D.C. in this area was 48.4% in Basilicata; in 1952, the highest vote received was 38.4% in Calabria. Even more startling was the rise of the Left in an area in which it had been weakest. The largest gain was in Sardinia which gave the P.C.I. and P.S.I. (running separately), a total of 36.7% as against 20.3% in 1948. It was apparent that not only the absolute control of the D.C. was in peril; the party and its allies together would have to struggle to achieve a bare majority in the 1953 elections. This was clearly shown by the percentages of popular votes received in 1951-1952: the Center dropped from 61.9% in 1948 to 49.9% in 1951-1952; the Left rose slightly from 31.0% to 34.6%; the Right more than doubled its vote from 4.8% to 11.4%. The Christian Democrats alone dropped from 48.5% to 35.5%, while the other Center parties maintained their vote. (The rise of the Right will be discussed in Chapter II.)

Needless to say, the swing away from the Center, particularly from the D.C., created a general turmoil within the party. With only a year to go before the 1953 elections, and much less than that until the start of the campaign, there was little time to repair the damage throughout the country. Without a recovery that seemed impossible, the Center parties were going to find themselves in a greatly

TABLE 9

PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS OF 1951 - 1952^a

Party	Percent of Vote Received
D.C.	35.5
P.S.D.I.	7.3
P.L.I.	3.8
P.R.I.	2.3
P.C.I.-P.S.I.	32.7
P.N.M.	4.5
M.S.I.	6.9
Other	7.0

^a Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1953, Serie V, Vol. V (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1953), pp. 141-142.

weakened position after the election. Recognizing the fact that a narrow victory would lead to a bare majority in the legislature (with consequent stalemate and a France-like succession of governments), the Christian Democrats decided to introduce an artificial remedy. The party proposed a new electoral system granting an exaggerated majority to any party or list of parties receiving over 50.0% of the popular vote across the nation. The Center list was obviously the only one with any significant chance of achieving such a vote. Consequently, the bonus would go to the Center and be divided among the member parties in proportion to their vote. The proposed law, known as the Scelba Law,

provided that a 50+% vote would entitle the list to two-thirds of the total seats in the Chamber; this would amount to 380 seats in the 590 seat Chamber of Deputies.

This proposal, as might have been predicted, met with instant and vehement opposition from the parties to the Left and Right. Actually, the D.C. was the only party definitely in favor of the proposition, although the Liberals and Republicans agreed to cooperate. It was much more difficult to bring the Saragat Socialists into the coalition, but this was finally achieved. The four parties, on November 15, 1952, reached an agreement to join in a list in the General Elections and sponsor the proposed law.⁶⁶ Agreement was not unanimous within the minor parties, and the debate in the Chamber on the new electoral law bill caused dissident groups to leave all three of them before the election.

The debate on the bill undoubtedly represents the nadir of democracy in Italy as far as the legislature is concerned. "Debate" is perhaps a misnomer for the violent sessions that preceded passage of the bill, which finally came after the P.S.I. and P.C.I. deputies had walked out. Opposition of every kind, including fist fights and multiple voting (to force recounts), was brought to bear, but the

⁶⁶ Grindrod, op. cit., p. 83.

D.C. coalition won out (in March) in both houses of the legislature. The struggle became so violent and the schism between the forces so deep that the President (at De Gasperi's behest) dissolved the Senate and called for reelection. (The Senate election was held at the same time, but under the old electoral law.⁶⁷) With the Scelba Law in effect, the parties were ready for the election which was set for June 7.

⁶⁷The Senate term, under the Constitution, is for a maximum of six years, one year longer than the term of the Chamber. Consequently, the Senate election was not necessary until 1954. The Senate had not been included in the Scelba law for this reason.

CHAPTER II

THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN OF 1953

The Italian electoral campaign of 1953 was scarcely the type to appeal to an observer believing in an ideal democratic election--a rational electorate presented with alternative policies and making a studied choice among candidates. Citizens of other western European countries, such as France and England, and to a lesser extent of the United States, are accustomed to election campaigns in which each party will issue some type of platform espousing certain more or less definite policies. In Italy the situation was considerably different. The London Times commented during the election that, "One of the most striking features of the election campaign so far is the total absence of party programmes of the sort familiar in British or American elections. Slogans largely take the place of programmes."¹ Another observer said after the election, "Eight thousand candidates of the fourteen parties for the 590 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the 237 in the Senate had spent the biggest campaign funds ever heard of in Italy. But not

¹ The Times (London), May 20, 1953, 6:3.

one of them announced a specific programme."²

The Christian Democratic Campaign

In place of concrete and specific platforms, most of the campaign was devoted to various aspects of a single question--was the Government good or bad? The D.C. party and its allies were faced with the inevitable platform of a group in power. They had to stand on their record, defend it against attack from the opposition and make pledges of continued and faster progress along the same lines. The parties to the Right and Left devoted the bulk of their campaigning to criticism of the Government for going too far or for not going far enough; to claims that the Government might not be too bad but that the Right could do better or that the Government was wrong from the beginning and the Left could do better. Specific complaints made by all opposition parties

...were its [the Government's] slowness in initiating social reforms and in implementing the legislation required by the Constitution; its swollen bureaucracy; its alleged tendency to plant Government supporters in all the best jobs; its too strongly marked clerical associations; the repressive methods of Signor Scelba's police; and the general feeling that the Government was becoming too high-handed, too "prepotente".³

² Jenny Nicholson, "Italian Election Circus," The Spectator, CXG (1958), 750-751.

³ Muriel K. Grindrod, "The Italian General Election and the Consequences," World Today, IX (1953), 337.

The Christian Democrats had been in office with an absolute majority of seats for five years. In the 1953 election it was asking for another five years with a majority of 66.6% of the seats. It was faced with the crucial problem, however, of defending what to many people seemed an indefensible attempt to grab an unearned advantage over the opposition. Throughout the campaign the D.C. endeavored to explain the controversial Scelba Law in a more favorable light. The fact that the bonus would be shared on an equitable basis with the other members of the list was stressed. Christian Democrat speakers protested that the law was purely for the purpose of ensuring a working majority for any party that could win 50% of the popular vote, not merely the D.C.

One of the most unfortunate aspects of the situation concerning the Scelba Law was its mergence in the minds of the people with an earlier, Fascist law, the Acerbo Law. As the Christian Democrats, particularly Guido Gonella the party secretary, tried to show, there was a world of difference between the two pieces of legislation. The Acerbo Law, passed in 1923, differed principally in that it granted two-thirds of the total seats to a party that achieved only 25% of the vote.⁴ The explanation of such technicalities, however, failed to convince the electorate, and the Scelba

⁴Ibid., p. 338.

Law took on something of the aspect of the albatross in the "Ancient Mariner"--an omnipresent issue that continually stigmatized the Christian Democrats as a party which distrusted its own strength and wished to frustrate the rightful punishment coming from the voters.

Despite the unquestioned importance of this issue, it was only one of many problems facing the Government. It seemed that almost everything that had enabled the Christian Democrats to roll up their tremendous totals in 1948 had changed by 1953. Perhaps the principal change was the dispersion of the fear of a Communist victory or coup. The P.C.I. at the time presented a visage that was all sweetness and light; it was the defender of democracy against the predators of the D.C. In order to approach the successes of the past, the Christian Democrats needed to evoke in the minds of the voters the spectre of leftist domination and violence which would again force divergent political elements to support the Center. In this effort they were almost foredoomed. The Soviet Union, with Stalin gone, was in the midst of a peace offensive. No less a personage than Winston Churchill indicated that times had changed and that peace was possible. Nonetheless, much of the Christian Democratic campaign effort was concentrated in apprising the voters of a continued and serious threat from the Left.

Another major change in the political environment was the settling of the major international problems. As

in 1948, the international position of Italy and its place between the West and the East took up the majority of the campaign. More attention was placed on domestic issues (since the out-parties had something to attack and the in-parties something to defend), but foreign affairs were still dominant. Italy was now tied firmly to the West through N.A.T.O.; Marshall Plan aid had been accepted and the money spent to the unquestioned profit of the country. The Christian Democrats emphasized these and other benefits received from the association, particularly the increased international prestige and recognition accorded to Italy. These were accomplished facts, however, and the people were blasé about them. The 1948 election was held shortly after the Marshall Plan was announced, and everyone could envision potential gains for themselves; by 1953 the novelty had worn off. There were no ships to give back; the money due the prisoners-of-war was paid; the trusteeship question was solved. The only really important issue left in this area was harmful to the Christian Democrat cause--that was Trieste.

The pledge by the Western powers to support Italian claims to the Trieste area was unquestionably one of the biggest single factors that swung wavering votes to the D.C. in 1948. Now five years had passed and still Italy did not have the area, and, in fact, seemed no closer to possession than before. While it was probably true, as De Gasperi averred, that it was thanks only to the Western

Allies that the Soviet Union had not succeeded in having the city assigned to Yugoslavia,⁵ the undeniable fact was that Italy did not have it. Some disillusionment was inevitable.

Predominant though foreign affairs were in the campaign, the domestic field also presented grave problems. Here the Government was faced with some embarrassing attacks on issues other than the Scelba Law. Chief of these had to do with its failure to completely implement the structural articles of the Constitution. Many of these articles required positive legislative action before becoming effective, and this action was sporadic, at best. The failure to create the Regional governments provided for is an example of this inaction--only four were created, Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino-Adige and Valle D'Aosta. Nineteen were to have been established under Article 131 of the Constitution. The D.C. party had been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of this proposal during the convention, but fear of Communist domination of Regional governments had cooled the party's ardor when it achieved power.⁶ It was no coincidence that each of the four Regions created had returned good majorities for the Christian Democrats in past elections.

⁵New York Times, May 25, 1953, 9:3.

⁶Mario Einaudi and Francois Goguel, Christian Democracy in France and Italy (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1952), pp. 60-61.

Another failure of this type concerned the Constitutional Court provided for by the Constituent Assembly. The acquisition of power made the Christian Democrats hesitant to create a body that might conceivably block the party's programs. After several torturous efforts to ensure D.C. party domination of the Court, that body was simply not legislated into existence.⁷ (The Court was finally set up in 1955 and began work in 1956, eight years after the 1948 elections, and then only after it became a political issue in the 1953 election.) The opportunities for attacks on the Government parties by both the Left and Right are obvious, and certainly militated against the claims of the Center that it was the only group believing in democracy.

Turning to the positive side of the D.C. party campaign (as opposed to its essentially negative defenses against attacks on the above issues), it will be seen that the party pledged much the same program as in 1948 and that the Christian Democrats were more explicit in their platform than were the other parties. In part their platform committed the Christian Democrats:

. . . to "give the greatest possible impulse to private enterprise," to "create conditions necessary to apply a program of maximum economic development" and to integrate Italian economy with international economy.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 63-64.

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Unemployment and underemployment must "be eliminated at all costs," . . . and for that reason all efforts will be concentrated on increasing production. The purchasing power of the lira will be preserved and every effort made to reduce indirect taxes and distribute burden of taxation as evenly as possible . . .⁸

The economic program of the party had been aimed at these same goals for five years with some considerable success. The economy was definitely stronger, but most of the programs initiated were still in the formative stages and results were not readily apparent. For example, unemployment was clearly a major problem in Italy after the war, and the Government turned its attention to it immediately. Despite parliamentary studies⁹ and subsequent efforts at alleviating this serious situation, unemployment was at least 800,000 higher in 1952 than in 1946; after a great drop between 1947 and 1948, the figures increased steadily every year.¹⁰ Efforts made to combat this problem included vast public works programs in the South, endeavors aimed at providing outlets in other countries for excess labor, encouraging emigration, etc.

⁸New York Times, May 4, 1953, 13:3-6.

⁹See Giorgio Ruffolo, "The Parliamentary Inquiry into Unemployment," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VI (January-March, 1953), 62-73; "The Second Inquiry into the Labour Force in Italy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VII (1955), 99-108.

¹⁰Alessandro Molinari, "Unemployment Statistics in Italy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, V (1952), 78.

Another example of long range programming by the Government was the effort at land reform, particularly in the South. This is an area of chronic unemployment, under-employment, over-population, poor land, extremely low yields per acre, tenant farming, absentee ownership and many similar and related problems. Large estates comprise most of the farm land of the South, with the actual farmers being tenants living in large villages and going out to strips of land which they cultivate. (This is, of course, very similar to the agricultural system of the feudal period of the Middle Ages.) The owners generally lease their lands to sub-landlords called gabellotos, who then make as much as possible from the peasants.¹¹ Virtually no money is put into improving the soil which is badly eroded and extremely poor; the owners are satisfied with the income from their land and do not wish to risk trying to improve the soil in an effort to increase their profits. There is practically no mechanization of the agriculture of the region, and fertilizer, always scarce, is lacking since the war due to the loss of cattle and the absence of factories to produce artificial substitutes.¹² The peasants are frequently abysmally poor,

¹¹Mario Bandini, "Land Reform in Italy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, V (1952), 13.

¹²Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey, "The South of Italy and the Cassa Per Il Mezzogiorno," The Western Political Quarterly, VIII (1955), 571.

and in some areas are forced to live in caves due both to their poverty and to a lack of housing.¹³

The Government proposed to improve the situation in this area, called the Mezzogiorno, by instituting land reform laws to split up the land and by providing money to develop industry in the area. Laws to attain these goals were passed by the legislature in 1950. The Sila Law and the "Extract" Law which went into effect in that year marked out seven areas in which land was to be expropriated: five of these were in the area of the South, one was concerned with the delta of the Po River and one included a vast area south from Florence in Rome. A scale was set up to determine the amount of land an owner would lose, depending upon the tax value of the land, the intensity with which it was farmed, its productiveness, the condition of the tenants' living quarters, etc.¹⁴ Land expropriated would then, within three years, be sold to the peasants on extremely easy terms over thirty years. Before the peasants received the land, however, it was to be improved, using the labor available in the area, thus providing employment. The entire program was to operate over a ten-year period and involved approximately 1,500,000 acres plus additional regional expropriation in Sicily.

¹³Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey, "The South of Italy: Old Despair and New Hope," South Atlantic Quarterly, LIV (1955), 33.

¹⁴Bandini, op. cit., pp. 15-19.

The entire reform program was not devoted to the land problem, however. A project of public works and reconstruction, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (Fund for the South), was set up in 1950 to complement the other programs, and was endowed with \$2,048,000,000. This sum was to be used for such things as preventing soil erosion, building roads, reforestation, irrigation, providing good drinking water, and similar projects. At the same time it was to improve tourist facilities, improve and electrify railroads and encourage industry.¹⁵

Thus, the Government embarked on a gigantic long-term reform and improvement program that seemed destined to markedly raise standards in the South. For the election of 1953, however, the accent was on the "long-term" part of the program. Instituted in 1950, it was expected that the period 1950-53 would see the least amount of land put in the hands of the peasants despite expropriation from the owners.¹⁶ Expropriation procedures had to be carried out; then the land was to be improved before the peasants received it. By the time the election came, the government had managed to make many enemies among the land-holders but had made practically no new friends among the peasants. Therefore,

¹⁵Carey and Carey, "The South of Italy and the Cassa Per Il Mezzogiorno," op. cit., 579.

¹⁶Bandini, op. cit., p. 17.

even in the area in which the Government had, perhaps, done the most, its achievements and intentions received little approbation. Each party had promised great things for the economy, particularly the South, but the Christian Democrats and their allies were the only ones in a position to accomplish anything. All the other groups could criticize and claim that they would have done better (perhaps even take some credit for what had been done for the peasants).

Clearly, then, the Center was open to attack from both sides. Faced with the realization of this fact, the Center parties waged a vigorous campaign based principally on convincing the people that the Communist threat was still virulent. In this effort they (specifically the D.C.) were aided again by powerful support from the Catholic Church and its organizations. This assistance began in April when the Pope addressed several hundred leaders and members of the civic committees and strongly urged pro-Center activity.¹⁷ He later stated that all Catholics should act (and vote) on the basis of "ideological considerations" and that they should not permit themselves to be influenced by personal criticism of parties or their own desires, even if legitimate.¹⁸ (This would seem to be tacit recognition that the

¹⁷New York Times, April 15, 1953, 14:4.

¹⁸New York Times, May 25, 1953, 9:3.

Christian Democrats had not provided everything the voters had expected.) The Church again used the threats of excommunication and refusal of rites to Communists and their supporters.

The civic committees swung into action and again attempted to combat the Left at the grass-roots level. Their procedure was described as follows:

In the evenings representatives of these committees hold courses on "how and why one must vote". At small indoor gatherings they explain in simple language the political program of the Christian Democratic party, warn that votes cast for political candidates other than the Christian Democrats would weaken Italy's major pro-Catholic party, and expose Communist electoral propaganda.¹⁹

Another source of D.C. support was the United States. Letter-writing campaigns were again instituted with Francis Cardinal Spellman and the then Mayor of New York, Mr. Impelleri, asking for a flood of mail to Italy.²⁰ This program never seemed to reach the size of the one in 1948. Aside from this, attempts by United States officials to influence Italian voters were not numerous and when made generated considerable resentment. The most direct effort of this type occurred on May 29, when the United States Ambassador, Mrs. Clare Booth Luce, made a speech in Milan containing the statement:

¹⁹New York Times, May 31, 1953, 24:4.

²⁰New York Times, May 27, 1953, 13:3; May 29, 1953, 5:6.

But if--I am required in all honesty to say this--but if--though it cannot happen--the Italian people should fall the unhappy victims to the wiles of totalitarianism, totalitarianism of Right or Left, there would follow--logically and tragically--grave consequences for this intimate and warm cooperation we now enjoy.²¹

Another, similar, speech was made in Genoa the next day.

Government newspapers generally attempted to ignore the speeches; only Popolo covered them--and then on an inside page and omitting the threat to stop aid. Independent papers varied but usually played them down. The Left, however, played up the external interference in Italian politics to good advantage; the threat of aid-cessation seemed to scare no one. The reaction to these speeches precluded further obvious attempts by the United States to intervene on behalf of the Government.

A major part of the campaign by the Center parties was devoted to getting out the vote. Prior to the election it was generally held that "the element that will influence the outcome of the election more than any other is what percentage of the voters go to the polls."²² This feeling was based upon the experience of the elections of 1948 and 1951-52. In 1948, 92% of the electorate participated, with the Center parties getting 61.9%, the Christian Democrats

²¹New York Times, May 29, 1953, 1:5.

²²New York Times, May 24, 1953, 40:1.

48.5%. In the administrative elections of 1951-52, the percentage of voters dropped to 88.8%, the Center parties receiving 49.9%, the Christian Democrats only 35.5%. With this in mind, it was estimated that over 90% of the electorate had to vote in 1953 for the Center to secure the 50+% needed for the Scelba Law to go into effect (or even to ensure a bare majority in the legislature which could be obtained with slightly less than 50%). "It is a generally accepted axiom of Italian politics that stay-at-homes belong overwhelmingly to the middle and upper classes, from which the Center parties draw the bulk of their support."²³

The Government, as in 1948, did not rely completely on exhortations from the Church and the parties to convince the voters to participate. Failure to vote in the election without justification was not made illegal, but was entered on a record. A non-voter then found it difficult to obtain passports, hunting licenses, driving licenses, etc. In addition to these penalties, another device to get voters to the polls was a 70% discount on railway fares given to anyone going home to vote.²⁴ (Absentee voting was made very easy for those who could not return home.) These incentives were sufficient to get a higher percentage of participation

²³New York Times, June 7, 1953, IV, 4E:1.

²⁴New York Times, June 7, 1953, 24:1.

in 1953 than in 1948. (The Church, of course, turned out its entire clergy, its nuns and its monks, as in 1948.)

In summation, the D.C. party program was based on a record of steady and considerable progress in bringing Italy from a defeated, war-torn nation to one that was fairly prosperous and stable and that was recognized as an important ally of the West. The Christian Democrats had initiated vast programs to aid underdeveloped areas of the country and had pledged to do more while maintaining a capitalist system. They asked that the voters give them a vote of confidence by returning them to power with their extraordinary majority. As a final weapon, the D.C. party counted on the great national and international prestige of De Gasperi, himself, believing that many doubtful voters would cast their ballots for him regardless of party or program, and, by supporting him, support the party. His picture, consequently, dominated the Christian Democrats' posters.²⁵

The Minor Center

Two of the three parties that joined with the D.C. party, the Liberals (P.L.I.) and the Republicans (P.R.I.), were somewhat to the right of the Christian Democrats.²⁶

²⁵New York Times, May 27, 1953, 13:2.

²⁶The exact placing of the Republicans in relation to the Christian Democrats is very difficult to gauge because of the amorphous character of the latter party. The P.R.I., in the period under analysis, was to the right of the left-wing of the D.C., and probably also to the right of De Gasperi's center group. It, however, was clearly to the left of the conservative elements of the Christian Democrats.

These two parties, however, were in the unenviable position of having very little to offer the voters for their votes.

The minor parties, and most of all the exiguous Republican party, needed the prospect of sharing in a truly generous "majority premium" if they were to face the election with any confidence at all. Yet there was anxiety among these lest the majority premium shall by itself be so large as to procure Christian Democracy by itself more than half of all the seats; it would thus be in a position to cut adrift from and ignore its small allies in Parliament when the election was done.²⁷

Nonetheless, the two parties had been forced to support the Scelba Law and had to face the opposition it caused in the country.

Their programs, such as they were, differed from that of the D.C. party in only one respect--they were anti-clerical. These parties had opposed Article 7 of the Constitution that made Catholicism the state religion, and they continued to oppose the church-state relations supported by the Christian Democrats. The latter accepted these parties and included them in the Government because they agreed in a general way on basic international and non-religious domestic policies.²⁸ The P.L.I. and P.R.I. represented alternatives to those voters who wished to vote for the Center but whose anti-clerical attitude prevented a vote

²⁷"Untidy Triangle in Italy," The Economist, May 16, 1953, pp. 451-452.

²⁸Clifford A. L. Rich, "Political Trends in Italy," The Western Political Quarterly, VI (1953), p. 477.

for the D.C. party. De Gasperi anticipated, or hoped, that these parties, along with the Saragat Socialists, would pull at least 15% of the vote, which, when added to his estimate of about 40% for his own party, would permit the list to make the Scelba Law effective.²⁹

The fourth party in the joint list, the Saragat Socialist Party, was, perhaps, in the most unfortunate position of all. In the election of 1948, the independent Socialists campaigned under the name Unità Socialista, composed primarily of Saragat's party, the P.S.D.I. After the election, the P.S.L.I. participated in the Government while the Partito Socialista Unitario separated and joined the opposition, principally because of the Atlantic Pact and N.A.T.O. In 1951, the two parties fused into one, the Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (P.S.D.I.) or Social Democrats. The compromise permitting this fusion resulted in the P.S.U. group giving up opposition to the pro-Western policy and the P.L.D.I. group leaving the Government.³⁰ The new Social Democrats supported the Center Government, but remained outside throughout the 1953 election.

While the P.S.D.I. was in agreement with the secular policies of the Government, it still had as its goal a

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy (London: Institute of International Affairs, 1955), pp. 72-73.

socialistic program; its membership and voters supported it for that reason. This position was gravely injured shortly before the election when, after serious internal controversy (and subsequent loss of party members in the legislature), the P.S.D.I. came out in favor of the Scelba Law. The result was a socialist party that was not able to demand pure proportional representation in its election campaigns. This, coupled with its support of the Government's policies during the previous years, left it with practically no issues to distinguish it from either the D.C. party itself or the other membership of the list. Its presence on the list, by itself, limited the P.S.D.I. to pronouncements not too dissimilar to those of its allies and, while it called for a more dynamic program of social reform, it conducted what has been called a "negative, policyless campaign."³¹

The Right

The effective opposition to the Christian Democrats and their allies came from two directions in 1953 rather than from only one as in 1948. The right-wing parties, the P.N.M. and M.S.I. had developed sufficiently to constitute a real threat to the hopes of the Center. While there was

³¹Joseph G. La Palombara, "The Italian Elections and the Problem of Representation," The American Political Science Review, XLVII (1953), 695.

no fear that the rightist parties might secure power for themselves, a New York Times article expressed a widely accepted opinion that the election "may hinge on whether the Right will take enough votes away from the Center to prevent the latter from getting a majority of the votes."³² This fear was generated by the great gains made by these two parties in the administrative elections of 1951-52. The parties together had increased 6.6% over their 1948 figures, and this increase, added to the smaller gains of the Left, prevented a Center majority in 1951-52.

The M.S.I., the neo-Fascist party, was a fairly large organization, containing card-carrying members numbering around 600,000, or almost one-fourth of the Communist membership, plus a youth organization of about 180,000.³³ Much of this membership was composed of teen-agers and men in their thirties, with veterans of the Italian Social Republic (Mussolini's puppet regime in the North) as the most esteemed members.³⁴ The party had two principal wings, the left being republican and socialistic while the right was strongly clerical and was more interested in political rather than social problems. The right wing seemed to be

³²New York Times, May 3, 1953, IV, 4E:5-6.

³³"Fascism in Italy," The Economist, February 14, 1953, pp. 426-427.

³⁴Mario Rossi "Neo-Fascism in Italy," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXIX (1953), 506-507.

dominant, and the common aim of the group was the abolition of parties and Parliament and the institution of economic class representation rather than representation of political beliefs.³⁵ (It should be noted that this concept of representation is not too dissimilar to that favored by the right wing of the D.C. party and there was, consequently, the danger of losing Center votes to the Right.)

While the party was frankly fascistic, it claimed its point of origin as the "North Italian Social Republic," referred to above, which was set up by Mussolini in October, 1943, and which lasted until the Allied victory in 1945. It thus professed to have nothing to do with the Fascism of the earlier period.³⁶ Regardless of its origins, for a party that was organized shortly before the 1948 election, the M.S.I. had made significant gains. In its first election the party pulled not quite 527,000 votes; in 1951-52 that total soared to slightly over 1,400,000, an increase from 2.0% to 6.4% of the vote. While still a minor party, it posed a considerable threat to the Center coalition's hopes, particularly in the South.

The M.S.I. based most of its appeal for votes on the claim that the Government had gone too far in its social

³⁵Ibid., p. 509.

³⁶"Fascism in Italy," The Economist, op. cit., p. 427.

program, particularly in its land reform policy. In the southern elections of 1952, it was evident that there was considerable dissatisfaction with the advance of the program of land reform. The peasants could see little general progress and were "suspicious and uncertain" of future gains. The landowners were aware of the true situation and realized that the program meant an attack on their "traditional privileges and position."³⁷ This was still a vital issue in 1953, and the M.S.I. used it as their primary issue on internal Italian affairs.

The other principal line of attack by M.S.I. played upon the nationalistic feelings of the Italians. The party was not antagonistic to the Western powers, and in its July, 1952, party congress announced that it favored the Atlantic Pact which it previously had opposed.³⁸ (This apparently was in the hope of being asked into the Government.) During the election, however (and the entire period before the party congress' announcement), the policy espoused called for scrapping the Atlantic Pact and replacing it with bilateral agreements.³⁹ Party speakers emphasized the lack of an Italian voice in Western plans and built up, out of all proportion, any evidence that seemed to show that Italy was

³⁷ Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, op. cit., p. 76.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 81.

³⁹ New York Times, June 7, 1953, IV, 4E:5.

slighted in international affairs. An example of this was the failure of Winston Churchill to mention Italy in his speech of May 11, 1953, on the cold war.⁴⁰

The lack of a satisfactory settlement of the Trieste problem, despite Western support for five years, was taken as proof of Government failure. The continued close relationship with and financial dependence upon the United States was attacked. United States interference in internal affairs was exaggerated. For example, the speech by Ambassador Luce was exploited throughout the election (not only by the M.S.I.), with the clear implication that Italy had become or was becoming merely a colony or protectorate of the United States.

During the election, the M.S.I. evoked no spectre of black-shirted troops marching and rarely alluded to the "good" times under Mussolini. However, the neo-Fascists appealed to the same emotions that had permitted the troops and Mussolini to rule. They offered a high place for Italy in the conferences of the world.

The other rightist party in the election was the P.N.M., the Monarchist party. In an election that was based largely on Italy's international position and relations, the P.N.M. concentrated almost exclusively on an issue that

⁴⁰"Italy and Its Allies," The Economist, July 4, 1953, p. 5.

appeared to be dead after the referendum of July 2, 1946. The Monarchists called for the restoration of the monarchy and the return of King Umberto II to the throne.

The leaders and the backers of the P.N.M. have been categorized as mostly conservative industrialists and large landowners who were opposed to the social reform program of the Government.⁴¹ This was certainly true of the party leader, Achille Lauro, a southern Italian himself, who had become the owner of one of the largest merchant fleets in the world. Lauro, the Mayor of Naples, led the party in its 1952 successes and apparently was hoping to show enough strength to enter a coalition with the Christian Democrats after the election. It may have been partly because of this hope that the P.N.M. did not attack the Government as severely as did some other parties. Criticism was made of both domestic and foreign policies, but it definitely was of secondary importance.

The party concentrated almost exclusively on exploiting the strong royalist feelings which it felt still existed in Italy, particularly in the South.

Actually, the campaign by the P.N.M. consisted primarily of promises bulwarked by the widespread distribution of gifts. For example, propagandists hired by Lauro toured the poorer districts of the South and handed out free

⁴¹New York Times, June 7, 1953, 24:1.

packages of spaghetti and cans of tomato paste. Promises ranged from the obvious political pledge to wipe out unemployment to such things as obtaining a championship soccer team for Naples.

Perhaps the largest single factor that aided the Monarchist party in the election of 1953 had nothing to do with Italy itself. That factor was the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in Britain. The pomp and ceremony surrounding that event, publicized throughout the world, brought home to many Italian voters what they might have if the P.N.M. could be successful. As one observer put it, the "Italians' imaginations were caught by the flood of coronation news and photographs appearing in their illustrated papers, reminding them of ceremonies from which they now feel excluded, and of a State institution which seemed to many of them to represent a stability and a rallying point beyond the reach of party strife."⁴² This latter point must have seemed particularly appealing to many of the uneducated voters (particularly of the South) who found themselves caught up in the struggle for party advantage.

Recognizing the potency of the P.N.M. campaign, De Gasperi made that party his main speaking target in the South. The point of his attack was an accusation that the

⁴²Grindrod, "The Italian General Election and the Consequences," op. cit., p. 337.

Monarchists were dividing the country, and the vote, by bringing up an issue which was irrelevant in present-day Italy.⁴³ He, along with the Vatican and the Catholic paper, L'Osservatore Romano,⁴⁴ emphasized that any dispersion of the vote would only hurt the Center; since the P.N.M. had no chance to win, the vote would be wasted.

The Left

On the other extreme of opposition to the Government were the leftist parties, the P.C.I. and the P.S.I. These were the parties that attacked the government for not going far enough in social legislation and for going too slowly in what was done. Both played down their radical tendencies and endeavored to appear as more or less true contenders in a democratic election. These two parties conducted a very rigorous campaign, using newspapers, magazines, posters, public meetings and fiery speeches to attack the Government. The principal theme was the "charge of tampering with the basic laws and burying democracy through the 'Swindle Law' or Legge Truffa."⁴⁵ Both parties played up the idea that the De Gasperi Government had no real faith in democracy and the Italian people, and continually linked

⁴³The Times (London), June 2, 1953, 5:4.

⁴⁴New York Times, June 4, 1953, 9:3; June 7, 1953, 24:4.

⁴⁵Rich, op. cit., p. 474.

the Acerbo Law of Mussolini with the Scelba Law.

Contrary to what might have been expected, the P.C.I. and the P.S.I. made no attempt to make use of the provisions of the Scelba Law providing for allied lists. This is surprising since they had run together as a list in 1948. In the 1953 election, however, Signor Nenni decided that his party, the P.S.I., would run alone. While it was noted during the election that his "programme speeches contain no hint of impatience with the Communists, or of infidelity to the pact of union which binds the two Marxist parties,"⁴⁶ Nenni felt that a separation on the ballot would greatly enhance his chances of providing what he called a "socialist alternative" to the De Gasperi Government. His aim was to present the P.S.I. as the party to which the voters could turn--to give the impression that it was not a case of vote Christian Democrat or have a radical or revolutionary government result. In his final speech before the election, Nenni stated that "the Socialist alternative represented the positive contribution of Socialists to the reconstruction of the greatest possible democratic and national unit."⁴⁷ How any true alternative to Center government could be offered without a coalition with the P.C.I. was never explained, but,

⁴⁶"Untidy Triangle in Italy," The Economist, op. cit., p. 452.

⁴⁷The Times (London), June 6, 1953, 5:5.

as the London Times commented,

. . . there is no denying that the catch-phrase "Socialist alternative" has many attractions for many people who refuse to vote for the Democratic Socialists now that they are allied with the Christian Democrats, and yet are reluctant to vote Communist.⁴⁸

Despite their claim that it was offering an alternative, the P.S.I. did no more than the other parties in offering a specific program. It made the same general attacks on the Government's domestic policy of social reform without presenting concrete policies for improvement.

In the international sphere the Socialists were somewhat more specific. Nenni stressed the easing in world tensions and the claim that the Soviet Union was working for peace. He attacked the continued buildup of armed forces in the West and Italy's part in that buildup. Nenni stated that the Socialists wanted to "rid Italy of her 'onerous commitments of military alliances' and to inaugurate a new policy of 'neutrality without isolation' that would facilitate solution by negotiation of the East-West controversies."⁴⁹ He thus categorized his own party as the party of peace and moderation and the Christian Democrats as a co-perpetrator, along with the West, of the cold war.

The other party of the Left, the P.C.I., attempted to conduct somewhat the same kind of campaign. The threat

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹New York Times, May 22, 1953, 22:1.

of the Soviet Union was minimized as were the radical aims of the P.C.I. Its tactics were changed from the use of what were sometimes only slightly veiled threats of violence to the more moderate presentation of itself as an attractive symbol of opposition to those in power. The Communists campaigned on one real issue--oppose the Government and keep the Scelba Law out of action. The intensity of the party's feelings on this point was evidenced throughout the pre-election period by the P.C.I. speakers constantly urging persons who would not vote Communist to vote for the Monarchists (or in some cases for the independent Left).⁵⁰ One observer quoted the Communist speakers as saying, "If you cannot vote for us, vote for the Monarchists. In any case, vote for a change."⁵¹ Those doing so, of course, were voting against De Gasperi's Government. This campaign strategy was aimed particularly at devout Catholics, especially women, who would not vote Communist for fear of excommunication.

Another attempt to counter the Catholic attacks on the Left was the bringing of suit against Bishops and Archbishops who spoke out against the P.C.I. Public prosecutors were asked to take action. The charges were based on the Constitutional prohibition against the clergy participating

⁵⁰Rich, op. cit., p. 474.

⁵¹New York Times, June 8, 1953, 28:5.

directly in an election or working for a party. The purpose, of course, was to intimidate the Church officials and to limit their political activity. The courts, contrary to normal procedure, ruled on the cases almost immediately and found that the Communists had no case in "fact or law" against the priests.⁵² This decision could easily have been predicted.

The P.C.I. was, itself, in no position to hope to win the election. The refusal of the P.S.I. to join in a list removed any remote chance of outdistancing the Christian Democrats and their allies. Estimates of adult Communist party members had dropped from 2,252,000 in 1948 to 2,051,000 in January, 1952.⁵³ While party size certainly does not reflect the size of the Communist vote in Italy, this would seem to indicate that its strength at the polls probably would not rise markedly. Consequently, the P.C.I. policy of pointing out defects in the Christian Democratic program and urging opposition to it was probably well founded.

In accomplishing this, the P.C.I. used every means at its disposal to discredit the Government. In the international field the Communists criticized the Government severely for not settling the Trieste problem to the satisfaction of the Italian people. (no positive means of

⁵²New York Times, May 7, 1953, 13:2; May 12, 1953, 17:4; May 14, 1953, 7:5.

⁵³New York Times, April 5, 1953, IV, 4E:5-6.

settlement were suggested, however.) As indicated before, the growing strength of the Soviet Union, so prominently featured in 1948 speeches, was hardly mentioned. Instead, the party played up the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union and attacked the Government for the sums being spent on rearmament. The participation of Italy in N.A.T.O. was criticized at every turn, since cooperation with that organization would lessen the chances for peace. To further discredit this participation, the P.C.I. attempted to build up an unfavorable picture of Italy's chief ally, the United States. The period immediately preceding the election was particularly fruitful for this type of action. The truce talks at Panmanjom were going on and the Communists insisted that the entire Korean War was the result of United States aggression. The United States was aiding the French in their war in Indochina, which the Communists called imperialism. In Europe the United States was urging the rearming of Germany as a necessary block to the Soviet Union. These actions of the United States in international affairs were coupled with two internal problems, the beginning of Senator Joseph McCarthy's witchhunt and the trial and execution of the Rosenbergs.

There is no direct evidence of the importance to the campaign of these criticisms of the United States, but a content analysis of the major Communist trade union publication, Lavoro, indicates that it must have been

considerable.⁵⁴ Of 1,955 mentions of the United States in 1953, 938, almost 48% were made in May, June and July, the period preceding the election and the period afterwards when the formation of a government was being attempted.⁵⁵ Most potent of these attacks probably were those concerning the Rosenbergs. The harshness of the penalty, the doubt that they were guilty in the first place and the leaving of their two children as orphans made excellent grounds upon which to build a portrait of the United States as a country with which alliance was of doubtful virtue.

On matters pertaining to Italy itself, the P.C.I. made much the same criticisms as the other parties, particularly the P.S.I. About the only positive program proposed by the Communists included "wide-spread nationalization of industry and electric power companies, free medical service for the poorer classes and an upper limit of between 125 and 250 acres to the amount of land that any individual or corporation may own."⁵⁶ This is scarcely a radical program, being less in many ways than the programs already achieved in some Western European countries with center parties in

⁵⁴Alexandra Ann Rolland, "The Political Behavior of the United States as Depicted by Italian Communist Trade-Unionism: A Content Analysis," (unpublished master's thesis, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, 1955).

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 50.

⁵⁶New York Times, May 3, 1953, IV, 4E:6-7.

control. Perhaps the P.C.I. hoped to gain votes at the expense of the Government by the very innocuousness of its program.

Minor Parties

The two remaining parties of interest in the 1953 election were the Unità Popolare and the Alleanza Democratica Nazionale. The former was comprised of left-wing Social Democrats and Republicans headed by Ferruccio Parri; the latter was made up of members of the Liberal party under Epicarmo Corbino.⁵⁷ These parties were formed solely for one reason--opposition to the Scelba Law. The U.P. and A.D.N. were formed on one issue, and they campaigned on that one issue. According to the U.P., the Christian Democrat party was "aiming solely at ensuring for itself in both Houses of Parliament that fictitious exclusive majority which it well knows it no longer commands in the country."⁵⁸ This was the sum and substance of the campaign by the two parties.

As the time of the election approached, there were none of the fears of violence and civil war that characterized the General Election of 1948. All parties, with the possible

⁵⁷ Grindrod, "The Italian General Election and the Consequences," op. cit., p. 335.

⁵⁸ As quoted in Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, op. cit., p. 87n.

exception of the M.S.I., professed great love for democratic practices and institutions and great respect for the will of the populace. The summation of the campaigns of the "out" parties lay in three points: the Scelba, or "Swindle," Law; the position of Italy in the world with emphasis on Trieste and N.A.T.O.; and an all-pervading effort to convince the electorate that it was time for a change. The Center did what it could to rally its forces and defend itself.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1953

Electoral Statistics

While the election of 1953 could not be called an unqualified catastrophe for the Christian Democrats, it certainly approached that point. The drop in votes in the administrative elections of 1951-52 effectively dissipated any over-confidence within the D.C. party, and, as a result, its campaign was vigorous. These efforts recovered a fair proportion of the lost support, increasing it from the 35.5% of 1951-52 to a respectable 40.7%; this, however, still represented a very considerable drop of 7.8% from the 1948 figure of 48.5. Strangely enough, the Center vote remained almost exactly the same as in the administrative elections --49.8%, a falling off of 12.9% from 1948.

There is irony to this precise percentage. The Center parties required 50+% to implement the much disputed Scelba Law. Out of 27,000,000 votes cast, the Center fell a scant 57,000 short of the number needed to obtain the legislative premium for which it had struggled. If the new law had gone into effect, the distribution of seats among the major parties would have been: D.C., 306; P.S.D.I., 34;

P.L.I., 23; P.R.I., 12; P.C.I., 93; P.S.I., 53; P.N.M., 29; M.S.I., 24.¹

Under the old electoral law, the number of deputies elected by each party and the vote received were as follows:²

TABLE 10
GENERAL ELECTION OF 1953
VOTES RECEIVED AND SEATS WON^a

Party	Vote	Seats Won	Percent Seats Won
D.C.	10,862,073	262	44.4
P.S.D.I.	1,222,957	19	3.2
P.L.I.	815,929	14	2.4
P.R.I.	<u>560,623</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>1.3</u>
Center	13,461,582	303	51.3
P.C.I.	6,120,809	143	24.2
P.S.I.	<u>3,462,934</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>12.7</u>
Left	9,583,743	218	36.9
P.N.M.	1,854,850	40	6.8
M.S.I.	<u>1,582,154</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>4.9</u>
Right	3,437,004	69	11.7

^aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1954, Serie V, Vol. VI (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1955), pp. 121-122. Percentage of seats won calculated from this source.

¹Joseph G. LaPalombara, "The Italian Elections and the Problem of Representation," The American Political Science Review, XLVII (1953), 689.

²The totals for the P.R.I. include 122,474 votes and three seats won by the Partito Popolare Sud Tirolese which exists only in one electoral district.

The opposition of the Right and Left thus totalled 13,020,747 votes and obtained 187 seats. Three minor parties, the Unità Popolare (U.P.) and Alleanza Democratica Nazionale (A.D.N.) and the Independent Socialists (U.S.I.), that did not win representation rolled up 517,193 (1.8%) votes. This gave the non-Government parties over one-half the vote. Of particular importance was the fact that the U.P. and A.D.N. got 1% of the national total: these two parties, it will be recalled, ran solely on the issue of opposition to the Scelba Law. Since the leaders and organizers of the U.P. and A.D.N. came largely from existing Center parties, it is fair to say that their defection cost the Center its majority.³

Over the country the percentages received by the various parties and the changes from 1948 to 1953 are shown in Table 11. Obviously, the greatest losses were suffered by the D.C., but the proportional losses of the minor Center parties were much more critical. These parties lost from 20% to 40% of their 1948 strength. At the same time, the Right advanced dramatically, although improving by only 1.3% since 1951-52. Similarly, the Left increased considerably

³It is interesting to note that the Scelba Law, if it had gone into effect, would have given the U.P. two seats and the A.D.N. one, whereas the proportional representation system eliminated both parties from the legislature. Hans E. Tutsch, "Which Way Italy," Swiss Review of World Affairs, III, No. 4 (July, 1953), 9.

TABLE 11

COMPARISON OF 1948 AND 1953 ELECTORAL RESULTS^a

Party	1948	1953	Percent Change
D.C.	48.5	40.1	-8.4
P.S.D.I.	7.1	4.5	-2.6
P.L.I.	3.8	3.0	-0.8
P.R.I.	<u>2.5</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>-0.9</u>
Center	61.9	49.2	-11.7
P.C.I.	31.0 ^b	22.6	
P.S.I.	<u> </u>	<u>12.7</u>	<u> </u>
Left	31.0	35.3	+4.3
P.N.M.	2.8	6.9	+4.1
M.S.I.	<u>2.0</u>	<u>5.8</u>	<u>+3.8</u>
Right	4.8	12.7	+7.9

^aRepubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1944-48, Serie V, Vol. I (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949), pp. 158-159; Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1954, Serie V, Vol. VI (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1955), pp. 121-122.

^bThe P.C.I. and P.S.I. ran together as the Popular Democratic Front (F.D.P.).

over 1948, but gained only 0.7% after 1951-52. In fact, a comparison of the aggregate percentages received by the Center, Right and Left in 1951-52 and in 1953 shows that practically no change had occurred--the election campaigns seem to have had little practical effect. However, a more detailed breakdown of the figures reveals a somewhat different picture.

Table 12 shows the percentage of vote received by each party in each province, Region and geographical subdivision of Italy. A comparison of the Regional figures on this chart with those of Table 9 (1951-1952 elections) indicates that the D.C. party increased its vote between 0.6% and 14.2% in every Region but one (Friuli-Venezia Giulia). There it suffered only a marginal loss of 0.8%. A similar comparison with the 1948 figures (Table 7), however, shows that the party dropped in every Region, with the losses ranging between 2.5% (Emilia-Romagna) and 14.8% (Lazio). The greatest losses occurred in the Mezzogiorno.

The other Government parties lost ground in almost every Region, and each received a smaller percentage of the vote in 1953 than in either 1948 or 1951-52. The P.R.I. probably suffered the greatest damage since it dropped to a mere 1.6% of the popular vote and secured only five seats. Always at its strongest in the central provinces where anti-clerical feeling was rampant, it was here that this party fell most drastically (e.g., in Marche it received 9.0% in 1948, 10.0% in 1951-52 and only 4.9% in 1953).

The Liberal party which usually receives its strongest support in the South suffered great losses in this area. In the five Regions of the South losses were -1.9%; -4.2%; -8.7%; -5.4%; and -4.6%--in every case but the first (Abruzzi e Molise) the loss was considerably over 50% of the 1948 vote. These losses, however, were tempered by slight gains

TABLE 12

GENERAL ELECTION OF JUNE 2, 1953^a

(Percentage voting, percentage of votes that were valid and percentage of valid votes received by each party)

Province and Region ^b	Vote	Valid Vote	% Valid	I. D. P.	I. I. P.	I. F. P.	I. C. P.	I. S. P.	W. N. P.	M. S. P.	Other
Alessandria	94.4	96.4	36.4	7.9	3.0	0.7	27.4	15.1	3.8	3.3	2.6
Asti	93.9	94.5	41.6	7.3	4.4	1.5	15.4	8.1	17.2	1.7	2.7
Cuneo	91.1	95.6	51.1	8.5	9.2	2.0	9.8	7.7	7.2	1.3	3.2
Novara	94.1	95.6	39.4	5.4	3.3	0.4	20.1	22.1	2.9	3.9	2.6
Torino	93.0	97.0	37.1	7.8	6.0	0.5	23.6	12.5	5.8	2.8	3.9
Vercelli	94.6	95.5	36.9	8.0	4.1	0.3	26.6	16.4	3.3	2.3	2.3
PIEMONTE	94.3	95.2	39.6	7.6	5.4	0.8	21.4	13.4	5.8	2.6	3.2
VALLE D'AOSTA	86.7	96.0	53.3	.	.	.	.	42.3	.	4.4	.
Bergamo	93.0	95.6	64.5	5.4	1.7	0.4	7.6	13.1	2.7	3.3	1.2
Brescia	94.9	96.2	54.9	4.0	1.4	0.6	15.2	16.2	2.9	4.1	0.9
Como	95.0	95.7	53.7	5.9	2.4	0.7	10.1	18.1	4.3	3.1	1.8
Cremona	96.6	95.8	44.7	4.1	2.8	0.4	20.2	22.5	1.9	2.5	0.9
Mantova	95.6	96.3	34.0	6.3	1.9	0.2	25.5	26.3	1.0	3.9	1.0
Milano	95.1	97.7	40.8	6.6	2.7	1.0	20.2	17.5	4.2	4.3	2.8
Pavia	96.0	96.1	35.6	5.8	1.9	0.8	27.6	18.3	4.8	2.8	2.3
Sondrio	86.6	92.9	59.1	5.9	1.2	0.5	8.8	13.9	6.9	2.5	1.1
Varese	95.1	96.4	46.5	6.3	2.0	0.7	13.0	22.0	3.9	3.8	1.8
LOMBARDIA	95.5	96.0	45.9	5.8	2.2	0.7	17.8	18.2	3.9	3.8	2.0
Bolzano	94.3	96.4	17.6	3.2	0.5	0.3	4.1	5.8	2.9	4.6	67.3
Trento	93.3	96.8	69.8	7.8	1.6	0.3	6.1	7.8	1.2	3.1	3.6
TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE	96.6	96.8	45.2	5.7	0.8	0.3	5.2	6.9	1.8	3.8	28.3

TABLE 12--Continued

Province and Region ^b	Vote	Valid Vote	D.C.	P.S.D.I.	P.L.I.	P.R.I.	P.C.I.	P.S.I.	P.N.M.	M.S.I.	Other
Belluno	84.4	97.4	53.7	12.3	1.8	0.6	11.6	11.4	3.2	3.8	1.4
Padova	93.5	97.0	59.7	4.0	2.3	0.4	14.3	11.1	2.8	3.3	1.1
Rovigo	95.7	96.5	37.3	5.7	2.5	0.4	29.0	18.3	1.6	2.7	2.6
Treviso	91.6	95.0	60.0	8.0	2.1	1.4	8.6	12.0	2.1	3.3	2.7
Venezia	93.6	96.7	42.5	5.0	2.2	0.6	19.7	20.8	3.0	4.4	1.7
Verona	93.3	98.6	53.5	4.7	2.9	0.3	10.9	18.2	2.9	4.3	2.3
Vicenza	93.6	96.9	62.3	4.4	6.6	0.3	9.5	9.2	2.4	3.0	2.4
VENETO	94.1	95.6	53.4	5.6	3.0	0.6	14.2	14.7	2.6	3.6	2.2
Gorizia	93.7	97.5	48.0	6.1	1.3	1.2	23.9	8.3	2.3	7.7	1.0
Udine	87.3	97.5	50.4	7.9	1.4	0.5	13.6	13.9	3.2	6.2	2.9
FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA	91.3	94.2	50.0	7.6	1.4	0.6	15.2	13.1	3.1	6.4	2.6
Genova	92.6	97.3	37.8	6.5	3.0	2.0	25.1	17.9	2.7	3.6	1.8
Imperia	91.6	96.1	47.4	9.1	1.8	1.5	18.5	10.4	3.7	5.7	1.9
La Spezia	92.4	97.8	36.1	4.2	2.1	2.5	31.6	15.2	2.2	4.2	1.9
Savona	94.3	97.9	40.1	7.4	1.8	1.4	27.5	14.7	2.5	2.7	1.9
LIGURIA	94.0	96.1	38.6	6.6	2.6	1.9	25.7	16.2	2.7	3.8	1.9
Bologna	96.0	98.2	28.5	2.8	2.4	1.0	39.7	12.2	0.9	9.0	3.4
Ferrara	96.8	96.2	22.4	7.8	2.4	0.9	38.7	20.8	0.6	3.6	2.8
Forlì	95.7	97.0	29.5	3.5	1.2	12.9	33.6	12.9	0.6	3.6	2.3
Modena	95.6	96.1	30.9	7.1	1.5	0.4	42.3	12.5	1.0	1.9	2.3
Parma	94.1	94.6	38.1	7.2	1.6	0.9	29.3	16.5	1.3	3.2	1.9
Piacenza	93.7	95.1	41.5	6.7	1.7	0.3	26.1	15.8	3.2	2.7	1.9

TABLE 12--Continued

Province and Region ^b	Vote	Valid Vote	D.C.	P.S.D.I.	P.L.I.	P.R.I.	P.C.I.	P.S.I.	P.N.M.	M.S.I.	Other
Ravenna	97.2	97.7	26.3	3.6	1.4	16.7	35.1	11.9	0.5	2.1	2.5
Reggio nell'Emilia	95.2	97.0	30.9	6.9	1.3	0.2	41.5	14.9	0.4	2.1	1.8
EMILIA-ROMAGNA	96.3	96.0	30.5	6.8	1.8	3.7	36.7	14.4	1.0	2.8	2.5
Arezzo	95.3	95.3	35.2	3.3	2.3	0.9	32.8	19.1	1.1	4.1	1.3
Firenze	96.3	97.8	34.8	4.4	2.2	0.7	36.5	15.1	0.9	3.8	1.6
Grosseto	95.5	95.1	24.8	3.8	1.9	8.9	37.3	15.2	1.2	5.9	1.0
Livorno	95.1	97.6	26.8	3.6	1.5	3.3	43.2	13.7	1.5	4.8	1.6
Lucca	92.6	93.8	51.9	2.8	1.3	3.3	17.8	11.1	3.9	5.7	2.1
Massa-Carrara	90.7	43.8	35.6	3.9	0.8	9.4	21.5	19.3	2.5	5.3	1.8
Pisa	96.5	96.7	32.4	3.2	1.3	2.1	36.1	18.1	1.0	4.4	1.4
Pistoia	95.6	96.3	35.0	6.0	1.1	0.8	37.1	13.9	0.6	4.3	1.2
Siena	96.3	97.9	25.2	3.1	1.7	0.9	48.7	14.7	1.0	3.9	0.9
TOSCANA	96.2	95.6	34.3	3.8	1.7	2.4	35.1	15.4	1.0	4.4	1.5
Perugia	94.4	95.4	32.1	2.5	1.3	2.3	27.8	23.9	1.3	6.8	2.0
Terni	95.0	97.7	26.6	2.6	1.5	5.0	29.3	23.1	1.5	8.4	2.1
UMBRIA	96.0	94.9	30.5	2.5	1.4	3.1	28.2	23.7	1.4	7.2	2.0
Ancona	95.9	96.7	37.3	4.3	1.6	8.5	23.4	18.2	0.7	3.7	2.3
Ascoli Piceno	93.6	95.5	46.4	3.4	2.9	2.4	20.4	14.2	1.7	6.7	1.9
Macerata	95.2	94.6	48.3	4.1	1.7	5.9	16.7	14.1	1.1	5.5	2.6
Pesaro e Urbino	93.8	97.9	36.1	5.1	1.5	1.9	31.2	18.8	0.6	2.9	1.8
MARCHE	95.8	95.3	41.6	4.2	1.9	4.9	23.1	16.5	1.0	4.6	2.2

TABLE 12--Continued

Province and Region ^b	Vote	Valid Vote	D. C.	P. S. D. I.	P. L. I. P.	P. R. I. P.	P. C. I. P.	P. S. I. P.	P. N. M. P.	M. S. I. P.	Other
Frosinone	91.6	94.7	46.3	3.8	2.3	2.4	18.0	6.0	11.3	7.1	2.8
Latina	91.1	96.0	38.4	2.7	1.1	4.0	21.2	9.5	10.8	9.9	2.5
Rieti	92.4	94.5	39.2	1.8	5.1	2.8	17.0	15.3	6.0	10.0	2.7
Roma	92.7	99.3	34.4	3.2	3.7	2.7	24.4	8.7	7.3	12.9	2.7
Viterbo	96.1	95.8	41.5	2.8	1.7	2.2	25.5	12.3	4.7	7.4	1.9
LAZIO	94.3	96.4	37.0	3.1	3.3	2.7	23.1	9.1	7.8	11.3	2.6
Campobasso	89.8	94.3	46.0	1.9	14.7	1.8	13.8	5.2	9.6	7.2	1.7
Chieti	90.6	96.8	43.3	4.1	3.1	3.8	17.1	8.4	12.3	8.5	1.6
L'Aquila	88.6	95.9	41.0	2.4	3.6	2.4	20.0	10.0	4.8	12.6	1.4
Pescara	89.7	96.4	39.1	2.4	1.9	1.4	26.6	12.2	7.3	7.5	1.6
Teramo	89.4	96.3	40.8	2.5	2.7	1.8	27.7	10.0	5.4	7.6	1.4
ABRUZZI E MOLISE	90.4	95.3	42.5	2.1	5.5	2.4	20.1	8.9	8.2	8.8	1.5
Avellino	88.6	95.6	40.4	3.7	1.7	1.9	20.2	4.2	21.0	5.3	1.6
Benevento	90.2	94.4	40.7	1.1	11.7	0.8	12.8	4.8	21.4	5.1	1.6
Caserta	92.0	96.5	36.3	2.9	5.6	1.1	16.2	6.5	23.4	5.9	2.1
Napoli	91.9	95.9	35.1	2.1	2.5	0.5	21.5	7.4	20.9	7.9	2.2
Salerno	91.6	94.8	34.4	4.4	3.1	1.0	18.1	7.8	23.3	6.1	1.8
CAMPANIA	92.2	94.9	36.1	2.7	3.7	0.9	19.3	6.8	21.7	6.7	2.0
Bari	93.3	96.9	37.8	1.5	1.9	0.8	23.4	10.1	17.7	5.1	1.7
Brindisi	93.8	94.9	37.8	1.5	2.6	0.4	19.5	13.9	14.3	8.2	1.8
Foggia	94.1	96.0	36.2	1.2	1.4	0.5	31.6	8.8	13.6	5.5	1.2
Lecce	93.5	93.1	44.2	1.7	5.3	1.3	15.3	4.8	16.0	9.3	1.1

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TABLE 12--Continued

Province and Region ^b	Vote	Valid Vote	D.C.	P.S.D.I.	P.L.I.	P.R.I.	P.C.I.	P.S.I.	P.N.M.	M.S.I.	Other
Taranto	92.3	97.6	36.0	1.3	1.5	0.3	28.2	8.8	12.2	9.8	1.9
PUGLIA	94.8	94.6	39.5	1.5	2.5	0.7	23.7	9.0	15.5	6.9	1.7
Matera	94.8	95.3	39.9	2.2	1.7	0.7	32.3	6.9	8.4	6.1	1.7
Potenza	90.3	94.4	41.9	4.5	2.7	0.8	23.2	6.8	11.2	7.3	1.6
BASILICATA	92.0	94.1	41.3	3.8	2.4	0.8	25.9	6.8	10.4	6.9	1.7
Catanzaro	89.5	93.2	40.7	2.6	4.3	2.6	23.2	7.3	9.2	7.8	2.3
Cosenza	88.6	93.7	44.3	2.2	2.0	1.8	22.4	10.1	7.4	7.7	2.1
Reggio di Calabria	88.0	93.9	36.6	3.2	4.2	1.9	16.5	16.7	9.9	7.7	3.3
CALABRIA	89.2	93.1	40.6	2.7	3.5	2.1	30.9	11.2	8.8	7.7	2.5
Agrigento	90.3	95.1	41.1	0.9	1.0	0.4	31.1	9.9	5.5	7.9	2.2
Caltanissetta	92.1	95.3	41.0	1.1	0.5	0.3	29.8	7.3	4.8	12.4	1.8
Catania	89.3	95.6	39.5	2.5	1.7	0.6	20.2	7.0	13.4	13.0	2.0
Enna	89.0	95.8	37.1	1.8	5.2	1.5	16.2	6.6	15.1	13.9	2.6
Messina	87.4	96.2	31.6	3.2	13.0	1.4	16.7	4.0	17.6	11.0	1.5
Palermo	88.9	95.9	37.1	1.8	5.2	1.5	16.2	6.6	15.1	13.9	2.6
Ragusa	91.5	94.7	37.8	4.5	5.0	2.5	27.4	8.2	3.9	8.7	2.0
Siracusa	90.0	96.5	32.4	4.6	6.3	0.4	25.2	8.1	10.7	10.6	1.7
Trapani	88.0	94.6	32.2	2.9	1.6	5.9	22.4	11.2	9.1	10.8	3.9
CICILIA	89.8	94.8	36.4	2.5	4.6	1.7	21.8	7.5	11.6	11.7	2.3
Cagliari	91.4	97.7	38.3	1.6	3.1	0.4	24.3	11.6	7.6	9.1	4.0
Nuoro	89.9	96.2	49.8	1.6	2.2	0.4	18.8	5.9	6.9	6.6	7.8

TABLE 12--Continued

Province and Region ^b	Vote	Valid Vote	D.C.	P.S.D.I.	P.L.I.	P.R.I.	P.C.I.	P.S.I.	P.N.M.	M.S.I.	Other
Sassari	90.0	97.5	42.4	4.0	2.6	0.6	17.3	6.5	17.0	7.7	1.9
SARDEGNA	91.7	96.4	41.7	2.3	2.8	0.5	21.2	9.1	10.1	8.2	4.2
NORTH	94.8	95.7	43.1	6.4	2.8	1.3	21.2	15.4	3.2	3.5	3.1
CENTER	95.4	96.6	36.3	3.5	2.1	3.0	28.3	14.1	3.7	7.3	3.7
SOUTH	92.1	94.4	38.6	2.4	3.6	1.2	21.2	8.4	15.4	7.3	1.9
ISLANDS	90.3	95.2	37.6	2.4	4.2	1.4	21.7	7.8	11.2	11.0	2.7
ITALIA	93.8	95.4	40.1	4.5	3.0	1.6	22.6	12.7	6.9	5.8	2.8

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^a Calculated from: Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Elezioni della Camera dei Deputati, 7 Giugno 1953, I (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1955), 53-397.

^b Regions in capitals.

in the North and Center. (In Piemonte, for example, the P.L.I. percentage exactly doubled, but was still only 5.4%.)

Over the entire nation, the party that suffered the greatest proportional loss was the P.S.D.I. This party lost strength between 1948 and 1953 in every section of the country and in every province--its greatest losses occurred in the North and the Islands and its least in the South. Even more indicative of the Social Democratic collapse was the fact that it lost strength in every Region and every province between the administrative elections and 1953.

Needless to say, as the Center parties declined the opposition group increased proportionately. Direct comparisons of the respective gains by the two major parties of the Left are impossible since they ran as an allied list in 1948. However, the gains by the Left of 4.3% probably can be ascribed principally to increased Communist vote. This seems indicated by the P.S.I. drop between 1951-52 and 1953 (i.e., the P.S.I. pulled 2,892,811 votes in 1951-52 for 13.1%; in 1953 the comparable figures were 3,462,934, but only 12.7%). More indicative is the location of Socialist strength over the country. The party gained in each of the Northern regions (with increases ranging from 0.7% to 4.9%), but made little progress in the Center, South or Islands. In these areas gains that were made were largely cancelled or overcome by losses. Since the greatest improvement in the leftist vote was in the South, it seems evident that

the P.S.I. contributed little to the increase.⁴

On the other hand, the vote of the P.C.I. increased from 4,505,598 in 1951-52 to 6,120,809 in 1953; from 17.9% to 22.6%. As Table 12 shows, the vote for the Communists was fairly uniform over the nation, ranging from a high of 28.3% in the central area to about 21% elsewhere. This is especially significant in that the P.C.I. achieved strength in the South, previously its weakest area. Moreover, the party's percentage increased in all but four provinces, one in the North (Lombardia), the other three in the Center (Umbria, Marche and Lazio). Southern gains ranged from 0.7% to 14.4%. Since the Left had already made considerable gains in 1951-52 over 1948, these advances looked even more impressive. Actually, the total vote of the Left increased steadily in the South after the 1946 election, while declining or barely holding its own in the various northern and central provinces. (The leftist total was off some 900,000 votes in 1953 from its figures of 1946 in these latter areas.⁵)

Looking again at Table 12, it can be seen that the most dramatic progress involved the parties of the Right, the P.N.M. and the M.S.I. Both made considerable gains in

⁴However, it should be noted that the P.S.I. showed significant gains in some Southern provinces in the General Election of 1958.

⁵Muriel Grindrod, "Political Stocktaking in Italy," World Today, X (1954), 528.

all sections of Italy over their 1948 returns, but the M.S.I. (despite an increase in its total popular vote), dropped from 6.9% in 1951-52 to 5.8% in 1953. The P.N.M. became the largest conservative party in Italy. The expected popularity of the Right in the South materialized to an extent that made the P.N.M. and M.S.I. the third and fourth largest groups respectively in that area. The strides made in the North and Center, however, were not anticipated. While both parties remained minor in those sections, each managed to more than double its percentage of votes. In addition, each secured sufficient support to pass the P.L.I. and P.R.I. in both areas and the P.S.D.I. in the Center. The strength of the P.N.M. and M.S.I., however, was still centered in the South (e.g., the P.N.M. received over 700,000 of its total vote of 1,800,000 in the two Regions of Campania and Puglia.)⁶

Although not of direct interest to the present study, the concurrent Senate election should be mentioned. In that body, with its membership selected by the old electoral law (a modified proportional representation system using electoral colleges), the Center emerged with a bare majority in seats but a percentage of votes slightly smaller than in the

⁶Of its 40 seats, the P.N.M. secured 22 in the South and 7 in the Islands. The M.S.I. obtained 7 seats from the South and 7 from the Islands, slightly less than one-half of its total of 29.

Chamber. The results, with changes from the 1948 figures, were as follows:

TABLE 13

SENATE ELECTION OF 1953
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE AND SEATS WON^a
(WITH CHANGES FROM 1948)

Party	Vote	Change From 1948	Seats ^b Won
D.C.	40.7	-7.3	116
P.S.D.I.	4.1	-0.1	4
P.L.I.	3.0	-2.4	3
P.R.I.	0.9	-1.7	0
Center	48.7	-11.5	123
P.C.I.	22.6		54
P.S.I.	12.1		28
Left	34.7	+ 3.8	82
P.N.M.	7.1	+ 5.4	16
M.S.I.	6.1	+ 5.4	9
Right	13.2	+10.4	25
Other	3.4		3

^a Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1954, Serie V, Vol. VI (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1955), p. 123.

^b The seats listed were won by the various parties in the election; to these must be added the seats "by right."

It will be observed that the Christian Democratic loss was slightly smaller (1.1%) than it was in the Chamber, while the P.S.D.I. achieved almost equal support in both houses. The other two Center parties each lost about half its vote

(the P.R.I. being completely unrepresented). The Center parties lost in every geographical area with one exception; i.e., the Social Democrats registered a gain of 1.8% in the North.

The opposition parties' distributions in the Senate were very similar to those in the Chamber. Gains were made in each area, the largest in the South and Islands. The gains by the Right are particularly noteworthy for these two parties went from an insignificant 2.4% in 1948 to 13.2% in 1953. Over-all, however, the Senate election was not greatly dissimilar to that of the Chamber of Deputies.

Explanation of the Results

In summation, the electoral figures reveal that the D.C. party was by far the largest single party of Italy despite its losses since 1948. Its allies, however, had suffered seriously. The vote of the Left and Right went up in all areas with the greatest gains being made in the South where the Government seemed most vulnerable. The question remains, why did the Center receive what amounted to an electoral defeat? Most answers given to this question are based on the assumption that the national problems featured in the electoral campaigns were the determining factors. Before offering an alternative or supplementary analysis of the voting, it would be best to summarize briefly these explanations.

Much of the Center loss was probably inevitable since its parties were running on an issue that no longer caused much concern to the Italian people--the fear of Communist control. De Gasperi and his allies attempted to evoke this fear, but the obvious fact was that there was no real danger of the P.C.I. gaining or even approaching a majority. The sense of urgency, of dedication, that once caused hundreds of thousands of people with diverse political beliefs to congregate under the D.C. banner was now missing. The Communists were relatively quiet in the period preceding the election (except during the period of the Scelba Law debate) and openly avowed their belief in democracy. Churchill's speech on May 11, advocating conferences with the Soviet Union, encouraged people to believe that the crisis was passed. The people did not fear the reinstitution of a dictatorship by the Right or Left. This was, in fact, the first election since the end of World War II in which the Italian voters felt they could vote for the party of their choice; even a purely protest vote could be cast. It is impossible to prove how much of the P.C.I. vote was of the protest variety and how much was motivated by belief in Communism, but as one writer said, "It was apparent in these elections that the Communist party had successfully revised its tactics and was now proving attractive as a symbol of opposition to those in power."⁷

⁷Roy Pryce, "Parliamentary Government in Italy Today," Parliamentary Affairs, VIII (1955), 186.

The change in international affairs unquestionably contributed to the Center losses. Trieste was probably as much responsible for the size of the Center majority in 1948 as any other single factor. The joint declaration by the Western powers concerning this problem area drew voters from Right and Left for nationalistic reasons. In 1953, however, Trieste was still not Italian, and the ties with the West which had brought so much to Italy had become, in many minds, chains that bound the nation to the dangerous policies of the United States.

The influence of the P.C.I. campaign against the United States cannot be measured today, but with the great danger seemingly ended, the inevitable minor irritations in relations between two nations played into the hands of the Communists. The United States had contributed generously to the Italian economy since World War II and expected gratitude for its efforts in the form of a continued high vote for the favored Center parties. Much of the thankfulness had worn away, however, and ". . . the undoubted benefits of the alliance tended, after five years of obligatory gratitude, to be glossed over in irritation at its disadvantages and at the subservience it entailed."⁸ With many voters becoming increasingly sensitive to this subservience,

⁸Muriel Grindrod, "The Italian General Election and its Consequences," World Today, IX (1953), 336.

any effort by the United States to interfere took on the aspect of the old "Yankee imperialism" in South and Central America. The speeches by Ambassador Luce, which would have been acceptable and effective in 1948, were now seen as bare-faced efforts to tell the Italians how to run their own country. What had been an asset in 1948 in securing undecided voters became a liability in 1953.

Another type of intervention may also have rebounded against the hopes of the D.C. party--the program of the Church. While the pro-Christian Democrat propaganda issued by the Catholic Church undoubtedly prevented many members from straying from the "proper" party, there is some question as to whether this interference was not resented by many Catholics, themselves. This question was posed in Commonweal magazine, a Catholic publication; the writer went on to say that, "the anti-clericals might have gathered under any other political symbol which does not mix Christianity with politics and is decidedly anti-Communist."⁹ This could explain much of the loss by the Government lay parties. They were besmirched by their association with a clerical party and were unable to attract the anti-clerical vote they needed to maintain their positions. This inability, combined with the defection by those Catholic voters who

⁹Gunnar D. Kumlien, "Setback for the Christian Democrats," Commonweal, LVIII (April 10-October 2, 1953), 319.

believed that the Church should stay out of temporal affairs, probably was enough to prevent a Center majority from being realized. It should be noted that the P.R.I., the only minor Center party in the Government before the election, suffered the biggest proportional losses of all.

A further note concerning the role of the Catholic Church in the election has to do with the Catholic Action and its then leader, Luigi Gedda. The support of this organization was of undoubted value in the election of 1948 and again in 1953. Fears were expressed, however, about the rightist tendencies of Gedda and the support he might feel inclined to give the M.S.I. if there were danger of advances by the Left. Gedda was reported to have a personal dislike of political parties and so-called middle-of-the-road policies.¹⁰ He was obligated by the Church to support the Christian Democrats, but the rightist proclivities which caused him to support the conservative wing of the D.C. party probably meant the loss of some votes to the Left.

In domestic affairs the Center obviously did not convince the people that its progress had been impressive. Actually, the advances made may well have aided the opposition. The Government had succeeded in creating a sense of economic and political stability in the country; this

¹⁰ Mario Rossi, "Neo-Fascism in Italy," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXVIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1952), 512-513.

convinced many voters that they could now afford the luxury of a non-Center vote. It certainly does not appear to be true that the defeat was a case of the voters rising up in righteous wrath to punish the scandal-ridden, corrupt Christian Democrats (as the British writer, Nannette Jucker avers¹¹). In general, the domestic causes of the reversal seemed to lie in the natural swing against a party in power, coupled with that party's inability to show immediate progress in all areas. As Jane P. C. Carey said, "Poverty, unemployment, lack of credit, slow progress in land reform all combined to push the Italian people toward the more extreme parties."¹²

As indicated in Chapter II, the Government was attempting to solve these and other problems, but time was needed. This was particularly evident in the program for the South. The Communists made this area their target for expansion and their success was mainly due to the undeniable poverty that existed there. Their campaign tactics were effective because they offered the peasants concrete, explicit gains, including specified plots of land. As the semi-feudal structure of society in the South gradually changed, the uneducated, often illiterate, peasants were freed from the

¹¹Nannette Jucker, "Italian Crisis," Political Affairs, XXVI (1954), 67-75.

¹²Jane P. C. Carey, "Italian Voters Want Change," Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXXII, No. 21 (July 15, 1953), 1.

political influence of the land-lords, and the so-called "clientelistico" vote began to disappear. These voters, thinking for themselves politically for the first time, were, in many cases, inclined to swing to the extremes, particularly to the Left. At the same time, as indicated in Chapter II, the land-lords became disenchanted with the Center because of the embryonic land reforms, and they swung to the Right.

Despite the admitted importance of all the above explanations for the defeat of the Center list, the paramount issue seems to have been the Scelba Law. In actuality, the election took on the unintended appearance of a referendum on this one issue and the Italian voters said no.¹³ The Center hoped that the violent opposition to this law by the P.C.I. in the Chamber and Senate would renew the fears of the populace and point up the necessity of a workable majority in the legislature. The stalemate (broken in the Chamber only by making the issue a vote of confidence) completely disrupted legislative business and clearly indicated the future of an evenly divided legislature. The voters, however, apparently accepted the awesome struggle by the Left (and Right to a lesser extent) as an effort to prevent a naked power-grab by the Christian Democrats and therefore as a good cause.

¹³La Palombara, op. cit., p. 690.

The effort by the D.C. party to convince the voters that the Scelba Law could give a majority premium to any party or list of parties was a failure; any person who knew anything about politics in Italy realized that only one list could possibly qualify. Those not qualified to make this judgement were easily persuaded to believe that the new law and the old Acerbo Law were identical in intent and effect.

The effect of the vast number of disqualified votes¹⁴ is harder to assess, but it is clear that the lack of education of the voters was played upon by the parties. For example, in the South, where the percentage of invalid ballots was highest, the P.N.M. exploited the ignorance and illiteracy of the electorate by suggesting that the election actually was a referendum on the Monarchy and that a vote for the P.N.M. would bring back the king.¹⁵ This ignorance was epitomized by one voter who said that he would vote for the prettiest party symbol on the ballot.¹⁶ With over 1.3 million votes thrown out, it is easy to see that the Christian Democrat loss (of a majority) by only 57,000 could possibly have been turned into a victory if the electorate

¹⁴The total of invalid ballots soared from 540,000 in 1948 to 1,300,000 in 1953. The percentage of votes disqualified rose in every Region except Valle d'Aosta.

¹⁵Richard Wigg, "The Italian General Elections," Contemporary Review, CLXXXIV, No. 2 (August, 1953), 71.

¹⁶Ibid.

had been able to understand what was occurring. (The correlations presented below, however, seem to disprove this contention.) The Center parties made no attempt to challenge the vast number of disqualifications for fear of further antagonizing the populace which clearly was not in favor of the electoral law.

Party Vote and Percent Voting

The twenty-seven million ballots that were cast represented 93.7% of the eligible vote, an increase of 1.2% over 1948 and 4.7% over 1951-52. The percentage of vote was up over 1951-52 in every Region of the country and over the 1948 figures in all but two Regions (Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Abruzzi e Molise). Contrary to the unanimous predictions of experts prior to the election, a large turnout did not result in a Center victory. (The enormous drop in votes between 1948 and 1951-52 and the concordant drop in Center strength seemed to indicate a definite relationship.) Looking again at Table 12, however, the pre-election predictions seem more in line with the actual returns. The geographical area in which the D.C. party suffered its greatest losses from the figures was the South and Islands. The voting in these two areas was the lowest of the entire country, falling below 90% in two regions and getting above the national average in only one. At the same time, the largest numbers of spoiled ballots were found

in these areas. The Christian Democrats received their highest vote in 1953 in the North which was second in percentage of votes cast and first in total votes of the four geographical areas. Consequently, it would seem logical to assume that the increased number of ballots aided the Center in making the considerable comeback that it did; conversely, a lower vote would have resulted in a disastrously low Center total. That the correlation data contradict these deductions is shown by Table 14.

TABLE 14
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND PERCENT VOTING

Party	North	Center	South	Islands (incl. Sicily & Sardinia)	Italy
D.C.	-.50	-.41	-.34	+.46	-.29
P.S.D.I.	-.53	+.24	-.38	-.13	+.10
P.L.I.	-.05	-.18	-.21	-.52	-.31
P.R.I.	+.23	-.21	-.62	-.45	+.15
P.C.I.	+.51	+.66	+.33	+.69	+.48
P.S.I.	+.32	+.35	-.14	+.34	+.52
P.N.M.	-.26	-.70	+.32	-.71	-.49
M.S.I.	-.10	-.53	-.23	-.24	-.49

This table represents the relationship between the percent voting and the individual party vote. A positive figure indicates that the party totals are likely to go up as the percentage of the electorate voting goes up. As can be seen clearly, only two parties have this relationship, the P.C.I. and the P.S.I. All other parties are, in general,

negatively influenced by an increased vote.

It seems obvious that the axiom that a high vote helps the Center, or more specifically the Christian Democrats, was in error in 1953. In no region did a Center party achieve a positive correlation of significant size. Even in the Islands where the D.C. figure was $+ .46$, the principal opposition party, the P.C.I. was more definitely aided by a high turnout. The explanation for this seems evident. The P.C.I. and P.S.I. did troop their ideologically-motivated voters to the polls as anticipated; the Catholic Church and Christian Democrats presumably did the same thing. However, the uncommitted voters who were forced to participate in 1953 were inclined to vote for the Left. The Right, with the lowest number of hard-core voters, suffered the most as might have been expected. No single commentator before the election, however, cast any doubt on the efficacy of a high vote for the Center. In fact, no writer since 1953 has questioned the benefit to the Center of a high turnout.

Actually, the high total vote-high Center support axiom may not be completely wrong. Taking the electoral totals of three post-war elections into account, it appears that the optimum vote for the Center is somewhere between the 89.0% of 1951-52 and the 93.7% of 1953; if the 1953 turnout had been approximately 91-92% as in 1948, a Center victory might well have resulted. Below that point it seems

that lukewarm pro-Center voters stay home, permitting the more ideologically motivated leftist voters to cut the Center percentage. Above that point, the uncommitted voters appear; in 1953 these voters seemed to go Left. It must be assumed that these leftist voters are not motivated by ideological considerations (otherwise they would have voted anyway and thus not led to a positive correlation with a high voting percentage¹⁷). If this is the case, they presumably can be attracted to the Center in future elections. (It might well be that the Scelba Law was sufficient to alienate these voters in 1953).

Party Vote and Valid Votes

In any event, it appears that a simple increase in vote will not necessarily provide a consequent increase in Center support--in fact, it may have the exact opposite effect. The same situation prevails when evaluating the influence of the percentage of valid votes on party vote.

¹⁷If it can be assumed that virtually 100% of all ideologically motivated voters for the Left will turn out at every election, these voters form a base which will be unaffected by the percentage of the total electorate that participates and by "get-out-the-vote" campaigns. If the P.C.I. and P.S.I. received only these votes, they obviously could not have a positive correlation with increased turn out--in fact, the reverse would be true. Consequently, the positive correlation indicates the acquisition of votes from uncommitted or independent persons.

The exceedingly small number of votes by which the Center failed to achieve a majority led to speculations that counting the invalid votes would have made the Scelba Law operate. Actually, it appears that counting those ballots would have decreased the size of the Center percentage and possibly would have prevented Center control of the legislature.

TABLE 15
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND VALID VOTES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.20	-.55	-.43	+.16	-.18
P.S.D.I.	-.19	+.19	-.08	+.09	+.18
P.L.I.	-.06	+.05	-.38	+.18	-.18
P.R.I.	+.21	-.34	-.12	-.55	-.01
P.C.I.	+.25	+.57	+.40	-.38	+.29
P.S.I.	-.03	+.04	-.11	-.11	+.18
P.N.M.	-.42	-.16	+.08	+.42	-.28
M.S.I.	+.45	+.04	+.00	-.25	-.10

In the above table, a negative correlation, as achieved by all Center parties in most areas, means that the higher the percentage of votes that were valid, the lower the chances of the party securing support. It can readily be seen that it was the Communist vote that was favorably influenced as the percent of valid votes rose. When it is realized that most monitors at the polling places represented the Center parties, this result is not surprising. It also makes the refusal of the Center to challenge the disqualifications

seem much less altruistic. Only in the Islands does it appear that the Christian Democrats were slightly hurt and the Communists aided by declaring ballots invalid. Since, for the nation as a whole, the D.C. vote was negatively related to an increasing percentage of valid votes, it is quite likely that the Center would have found its 57,000 vote deficit materially increased had all ballots been accepted. The usefulness of this factor in explaining the electoral result is, therefore, extremely questionable.

Conclusion

Nonetheless, it is this type of variable, plus those discussed above (Scelba Law, land policy, foreign policy, the British coronation, etc.), that have been accepted as explanations of why the Center parties failed to receive a majority in the General Election of 1953. De Gasperi, himself, blamed the Monarchists and what he spoke of as the "pettishness and selfish ambitions" of the middle class for taking votes from the Center by campaigning on a dead issue.¹⁸ Nenni said that the returns called for a radical change in foreign policy since that was a decisive factor in the election.¹⁹ A New York Times writer stressed a completely

¹⁸New York Times, June 11, 1953, 8:2.

¹⁹London Times, June 15, 1953, 4:7.

different interpretation when commenting on the P.C.I.

vote:

The basic reason, according to Italians who have studied the question, is that Communist propaganda is so much more skillful and efficient than that of the anti-Communist parties that it is able to neutralize the achievements of the De Gasperi Government and to take credit for any development--social, political or economic--favorable to the working classes.²⁰

None of these rationalizations, however, gives an adequate explanation as to why the people voted the way they did. Some of the actual motivation was brought out prior to the election when Camille M. Cianfarra, New York Times writer, had interviews with the mayors of several small Italian villages. The consensus seemed to be that the people did not really care about foreign policy and similar matters except as these things affected them personally. One of these mayors was quoted as saying:

Many women vote for the Christian Democratic party because it is Catholic. The men reason a different way. If they are unemployed and feel that the Government--that is the Christian Democratic party--has done nothing for them, they vote for candidates of other parties, especially the Communists and Monarchists, who have been promising them all sorts of things during the political campaign.²¹

²⁰Camille M. Cianfarra, "Why Every Third Italian Votes Communist," New York Times Magazine, June 21, 1953. p. 40.

²¹New York Times, June 8, 1953, 16:1.

Another, more sophisticated study which was reported by Joseph LaPalombara concerned seventy-six Italian communes where the P.C.I. vote shifted considerably between 1948 and 1953. In every case the shifts were caused by local issues such as sewers, schools, road maintenance, etc. As he said, "Regardless of its national ideology, the party that succeeded in resolving local problems was the one that benefited at the polls."²²

While recognition of the primacy of local issues in political campaigns is certainly not new, it is a factor receiving practically no study in Italy. Generalizations (such as the one on the relationship between the size of vote and the Center's prospects) are common, but no detailed analysis has been made that purports to give accurately the dependence of individual party vote on specific variables. The influence of such items as education, literacy, age, unemployment, income, housing, occupations, etc. is almost completely ignored except for certain intuitional judgements by politicians and various "experts". In succeeding chapters several variables, principally socio-economic, which might logically be expected to influence individual voters as

²²Joseph G. LaPalombara, "A Decade of Political and Economic Change in Italy," World Politics, IX, No. 3 (April, 1957), 429. Also reported in, "Political Party Systems and Crisis Government: French and Italian Contrasts," Midwest Journal of Political Science, II, No. 2 (May, 1958), 130-131.

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they go to the polls will be studied. It is hoped that some understanding of each party's appeal may be achieved from these results.

CHAPTER IV

UNEMPLOYMENT

The unemployment problem that plagues Italy has been alluded to several times above, but no mere mention can conceivably bring understanding of the true situation. The total number of persons without occupation is extremely difficult to ascertain, and figures vary from one study to another. The two chief sources for statistics on this subject are reports issued by the Ministry of Labor and the results of inquiries into the problem by committees of the legislature. A third source, upon which Table 17 is based, is the census reports collated in 1951.

Unemployment Statistics and Characteristics

The first of these sources is based upon the number of persons registering with the Ministry of Labor in an effort to secure jobs. The Ministry of Labor figures on Italian unemployment from 1946 to 1952 are cited in Table 16. The labor force was taken as being at something under 19.4 million in 1952.¹

¹All figures referred to in the text as Ministry of Labor statistics, unless otherwise noted, are from Alessandro Molinari, "Unemployment Statistics in Italy, with Special Reference to Southern Italy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, V, No. 21 (1952), 76-88.

TABLE 16

ITALIAN UNEMPLOYMENT, 1946-1952^a

Year	North-Center	South-Islands	Italy
1946	946,183	481,918	1,428,101
1947	1,553,530	674,336	2,227,866
1948	1,393,561	562,702	1,656,263
1949	1,409,649	676,201	2,085,850
1950	1,374,252	734,978	2,109,230
1951	1,368,062	751,458	2,119,520
1952	1,406,503	841,480	2,243,938

^aAlessandro Molinari, "Unemployment Statistics in Italy, With Special Reference to Southern Italy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, V, No. 21 (1952), 78.

The legislative studies of the unemployment problem came up with more optimistic statistics. Two of these studies were undertaken in the period of interest: the first in 1952, the second in 1954.² The former reported the total unemployed in Italy, in 1952, at 1,286,200, of which 677,700 were seeking their first job. The second inquiry attempted to correct some obvious shortcomings of

²Unless otherwise noted, statistics from the first parliamentary investigation are from Giorgio Ruffolo, "The Parliamentary Enquiry into Unemployment," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VI, No. 24 (1953), 62-73. The second investigation is covered in Giorgio Ruffolo, "The Second Enquiry into the Labour Force in Italy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VIII, No. 33 (1955), 99-108.

TABLE 17

EMPLOYMENT LEVEL OF THE TOTAL POPULATION AND OF THE MALE
POPULATION^a

Province	Percent of Population that is Employed	Percent of Males that are Employed
Alessandria	50.6	79.9
Asti	55.3	85.6
Cuneo	54.2	84.4
Novara	54.5	77.0
Torino	54.1	78.9
Vercelli	61.2	78.2
Valle d'Aosta	54.5	81.1
Bergamo	51.0	75.2
Brescia	46.8	74.8
Como	54.5	77.2
Cremona	46.1	75.1
Mantova	50.5	80.6
Milano	54.2	77.8
Pavia	52.7	79.0
Sondrio	52.0	77.0
Varese	56.1	76.8
Bolzano	54.3	81.4
Trento	48.4	78.9
Belluno	51.8	77.9
Padova	49.3	77.5
Rovigo	55.3	75.8
Treviso	54.5	80.2
Venezia	47.3	75.2
Verona	49.2	77.6
Vicenza	48.8	74.8
Gorizia	48.3	74.9
Udine	52.0	77.9
Trieste	49.8	79.1

TABLE 17--Continued

Province	Percent of Population that is Employed	Percent of Males that are Employed
Genova	44.7	73.5
Imperia	53.0	77.9
La Spezia	43.4	72.5
Savona	46.4	75.9
Bologna	53.4	78.5
Ferrara	61.0	80.0
Forli	50.9	79.9
Modena	57.0	81.4
Parma	51.5	79.5
Piacenza	51.5	79.0
Ravenna	55.8	82.0
Reggio nell'Emilia	53.7	80.7
Arezzo	54.7	81.6
Firenza	49.2	76.9
Grosseto	44.8	78.9
Livorno	42.2	71.9
Lucca	45.3	72.3
Massa-Carrara	42.1	71.1
Pisa	49.6	77.5
Pistoia	47.3	78.6
Siena	55.6	82.5
Perugia	52.5	80.5
Terni	46.2	78.1
Ancona	55.6	78.8
Ascoli Piceno	56.4	81.1
Macerata	60.2	82.9
Pesaro e Urbino	52.0	81.0
Frosinone	52.2	77.1
Latina	47.6	77.3
Rieti	49.6	79.0
Roma	45.5	72.2
Viterbo	49.6	81.3

TABLE 17--Continued

Province	Percent of Population that is Employed	Percent of Males that are Employed
Campobasso	60.6	82.0
Chieti	52.1	80.3
L'Aquila	44.4	77.1
Pescara	45.3	76.3
Teramo	49.4	80.6
Avellino	54.6	77.0
Benevento	57.5	79.3
Caserta	51.4	75.4
Napoli	40.0	68.7
Salerno	52.2	75.4
Vari	43.2	74.6
Brindisi	59.6	78.1
Foggia	50.5	77.6
Lecce	61.5	74.6
Taranto	50.5	74.6
Matera	53.2	81.0
Potenza	59.6	81.5
Catanzaro	49.2	77.1
Cosenza	50.6	77.4
Reggio di Calabria	48.7	73.9
Agrigento	41.3	77.6
Caltanissetta	40.9	77.4
Catania	41.6	75.2
Enna	41.1	79.0
Messina	46.3	73.1
Palermo	38.6	73.2
Ragusa	40.4	77.2
Siracusa	41.2	76.3
Trapani	40.4	76.8

TABLE 17--Continued

Province	Percent of Population that is Employed	Percent of Males that are Employed
Cagliari	43.8	75.1
Nuoro	43.3	77.5
Sassari	44.3	76.6
ITALIA	49.8	76.9

^aAll figures represent percentage of the total male population that was ten years of age or over. Calculated from: Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, IX Censimento Generale della Popolazione, 4 Novembre 1951, (Roma: Soc. Abete, 1946).

the first (e.g., a person who did any work at all during the week studied was listed as employed; the study was done in September when agricultural employment was at a peak, etc.) and came up with a figure of 1,656,000 unemployed (3.5% of the total population; 7.8% of the 1954 working force of 21.1 million) of which 794,000 were seeking a first job. These were the people completely without work. The employed part of the labor force was then divided into two parts, isolating so-called "occasional workers" who numbered 1,909,000.³ The resulting total indicated that over 3.5 million persons (7.5% of the total population; 16.6% of the working force) were either completely without work or were employed on a part-time basis.

A comparison with similar figures for the United States in 1954 will emphasize the full extent of the problem in Italy. With a labor force of 67,139,000, the United States had 3,671,000 out of work, for 2.2% of the total population.⁴ If this 2.2% were to rise to equal the 3.5% of Italy, the unemployment figure would be approximately

³The term "occasional workers" is used to refer to workers who have no regular jobs but who obtain some employment on an hourly basis. At the time of the second parliamentary inquiry into unemployment, 60.6% of these persons worked fewer than 24 hours per week and 88.2% less than 40 hours per week. Ruffolo, "The Second Enquiry into the Labour Force in Italy," op. cit., p. 104.

⁴Ibid.

six million; if it went to 7.5%, the total would be a staggering twelve million. Any unemployment figures of this size would be taken as an unmitigated disaster in the United States, but these percentages merely describe the normal state of affairs in Italy. In fact, most writers on the subject are convinced that the normal situation was actually somewhat worse and that the statistics reported by the Ministry of Labor, indicating that unemployment was over two million, were probably far more accurate. Regardless of the precise total arrived at, however, unemployment of this type is only one facet of the situation--it does not include other factors such as underemployment, concealed unemployment and what might be called the "potential" labor force.

The first of these additional factors, underemployment, refers to the fact that in Italy several million workers can be called "employed" only in the sense that they have jobs part of the time. The category of "occasional" workers set up by the second legislative inquiry included only part of these people. In 1952, it was found that of the 16.5 million people listed as employed, 258,600 were working less than fifteen hours per week and another 2,878,100 were working between fifteen and thirty-nine hours per week. With the Italian working week set at forty-eight hours, it can be seen that over three million persons were working only part time at "regular" jobs. These totals

still do not include an uncounted, but evidently large, group of workers who nominally have full-time occupations but who actually have very little to keep them busy at work, e.g., many civil service employees.

The second factor, concealed unemployment, is undoubtedly just as serious as the first and possibly includes even more persons. This problem is largely one of the Mezzogiorno where agriculture is the principal occupation. Concealed unemployment refers to persons who are fully employed in the technical sense but who are doing work that is extremely low in productivity; a worker's income from such employment often is virtually indistinguishable from that of a person who is unemployed. (This is frequently true of "self-employed" farmers.) This concealed unemployment also includes the members of large families working on a single plot of land, where many persons do the work of one yet all are considered gainfully employed.

The "potential" working force referred to above is also centered in the South. This term applies to a large proportion of the dependent population of the area. In the Mezzogiorno the vast majority of women are engaged in housework (a much smaller percentage is engaged in paid employment than in the North where opportunities for women are much more numerous). These Southern women are not listed as unemployed but are prepared to enter the labor market as jobs are created. Consequently, the actual

available labor force (and the unemployed) in the region, is much larger than the official figures indicate.⁵

The tremendous importance of these last factors can readily be pointed out by looking again at the statistics presented by the Ministry of Labor. As can be seen, the figures for southern Italy are much lower than those for the North and Center. Despite the fact that the portion of the total found in the South has increased steadily since 1948, this region, as of 1952, still made up only 37.4% of Italian unemployment. Anyone familiar with the true situation in southern Italy is well aware of the fact that the Mezzogiorno is by far the poorest section of the country and that true unemployment (whether called underemployment, concealed unemployment or anything else) is higher there than elsewhere.

Several characteristics of this unemployment that make it even more serious are not evident from the above statistics. First is the size of the labor force in relation to the total population. Estimates of the dependent portion of the population vary between 56% and 59% (which is somewhat higher than the figures for most other Western European countries).⁶ Italy is a country with a comparatively

⁵Vera Lutz, "Italy's Problem: Unemployment," Swiss Review of World Affairs, III, No. 5 (August, 1953), 7.

⁶Ruffolo, "The Second Enquiry into the Labour Force in Italy," op. cit., p. 101.

small labor force supporting a large population. This is important in that it is estimated that about one-fourth of the unemployed are heads of families with an average of one dependent per worker in the North and two in the South.⁷

A second such characteristic is the fact that the unemployment period for workers is not short, having a mean duration of three months, twenty-one days.⁸ Roberto Tremelloni, the head of the committee of inquiry that first investigated the unemployment problem, indicates that this duration ranges from less than fifteen days to three months in 44.6% of the cases, three to six months in 15.6% and from six months up in 36.7%. Of the last group, 23.8% had been out of work for one year or more.⁹ For a person with dependents to lose a job takes on disastrous overtones since the situation may acquire semi-permanency and since unemployment benefits are extremely low.

Another characteristic of the problem is that much of the unemployment is among the younger workers, particularly those seeking first jobs. It is estimated that 400,000

⁷Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955), p. 218.

⁸Roberto Tremelloni, "The Parliamentary Inquiry into Unemployment in Italy," International Labour Review, LXVIII (July-December, 1953), 266.

⁹Ibid.

young Italians have never succeeded in their job-seeking efforts.¹⁰ In 1952, there were 856,000 persons under the age of thirty who were unemployed; 415,000 of these were under twenty-one.¹¹ Having such a large proportion of the young people in this situation must be considered extremely grave since it presumably disassociates them from society and the hope for a prosperous future under the present system. This could leave them susceptible to radical philosophies from the Right or Left as the unemployment of the 1920's helped build Mussolini's army of supporters. (It appears that increased disillusionment comes with age and results in radical voting; see Chapter VIII.)

Finally, the qualification and training of the unemployed militate seriously against future prospects of gaining occupations. Most of the laborers are unskilled (particularly the agricultural workers), and almost none has anything remotely resembling vocational training. Most have very little formal education and many are illiterate. These handicaps frequently make them inefficient employees and also make it almost impossible for them to seek a different type of job. They have little but physical strength to offer prospective employers.

¹⁰Herbert Solow, "The Biggest Capitalist in Italy," Fortune, L, No. 1 (July, 1954), 85.

¹¹Tremelloni, op. cit., p. 267.

From the previous few pages it is clear that the number of persons in Italy benefit of adequate employment is of sufficient size to be a major concern of the Government. The two legislative investigations into the problem, plus several similar studies of such things as poverty and agricultural problems, indicate that the central Government was, in fact, cognizant of the paramount needs of the people. Unfortunately, the Government, as of 1953, had done little toward improving the situation. Much of this failure to cut unemployment can be ascribed to the Italian economic and demographic structure.

Something of the Southern situation was given earlier when the land reform program and the "Fund for the South" were discussed. Peasants work on land owned by absentee-landlords and sometimes receive only one-fifth of their crops; in Matera thousands live in caves, and the only new building since the war is a movie theatre;¹² so many people compete for the very few jobs available that even the extremely low wages required by law are undercut;¹³ agricultural employment is seasonal and most laborers are fortunate if they work six months a year. Dramatic as this situation is in the South, the North suffers nearly as much; its

¹²Elizabeth Wiskemann, "New Italy Faces Old Problems: Poverty and Population in the South," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (October, 1949-July, 1950), 86.

¹³Ibid., p. 87.

unemployment, however, is largely industrial.

In addition to the efforts for the South referred to above, the Government had, by 1953, made considerable efforts to improve the situation for the nation as a whole. Investment was encouraged to repair factories destroyed during the war, and funds were made available for modernization of existing facilities. A Government agency, the Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale or I.R.I. (which was set up by Mussolini to have charge of nationalized and uneconomical industries), was given control of the development of many companies in an effort to improve the economy. Hydroelectric facilities were constructed, railroads improved, mines opened, etc. All these efforts seemed to sink into the morass of Italian unemployment without appreciable effect.

Population Growth and Emigration

One principal reason for this seeming ineffectiveness of the Government programs is the Italian birthrate. The extent of the population growth perhaps can best be indicated by a few statistics: the total population in 1936 was only slightly over forty-two million; in 1951 it was approximately forty-seven million--a growth of five million in fifteen years despite war losses and emigration. This is an 11.2% increase or a gain of 7.3

persons per thousand.¹⁴ (Actually, these totals and percentages are not exceptionally large for Europe as a whole, but Italy is probably less able to provide for growth than any country in the West except Spain.) In 1951 alone, the natural increase in Italy was over 350,000 with the birth rate reported as 17.6 per 1,000, over ten per thousand greater than for the 1936-51 period.¹⁵

This growth factor greatly complicates the unemployment picture because an influx of new workers enters the labor market each year to compete for the existing jobs. The Temelloni committee referred to above estimated that the period between 1953 and 1957 would see a continuation of this growth and that approximately 300,000 persons would reach working age yearly. Since the committee also estimated that the new jobs available during that period would average only 125,000 per year, a large annual deficit would result. (Unfortunately, this estimated figure for the natural increase in the population that was of working age proved to be conservative. For the actual statistics and the effect of emigration on natural increase, see footnote 22.)

The most impressive, or perhaps the most depressing, part of this growth is occurring in southern Italy, the

¹⁴Nora Federici, "Some Aspects of the Italian Demographic Situation: The First Results of the 1951 Census," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VI, No. 25 (1953), 108.

¹⁵Lutz, op. cit., p. 7.

area which has the highest birth rate.¹⁶ In the past, only emigration to foreign countries and migration within Italy itself have kept the South lower than the North and Center in total population. The projected growth in this area will make it almost impossible for the present regional balance to be maintained. With the vast majority of southern workers dependent upon agriculture, which even now cannot effectively support them, the growth will be catastrophic. The density of population on farm land in southern Italy is already more than double that of Holland and higher than that of any other Western European country.¹⁷ Consequently, tremendous gains must be made in productivity per acre and per laborer; the land reform program is calculated to accomplish part of this. Agriculture, however, could never provide sufficient employment in this

¹⁶The population projections referred to are cited in Federici, op. cit., p. 66. In the table below the "Low" refers to the medium predictions with migratory movement from southern Italy included. The "High" is the medium projections determined by natural growth and movement only.

Year	Low	High
1951	37.4	39.3
1961	38.8	41.3
1971	40.6	43.8
1981	42.7	46.5
1991	45.0	49.4
2001	47.6	52.7

¹⁷Ruffolo, "The Parliamentary Enquiry into Unemployment in Italy," op. cit., p. 71.

area of poor soils, so industrialization is essential. Thus, the Government is faced with the necessity of increasing the industrial facilities in southern Italy while, at the same time, rectifying the industrial unemployment situation in the North.

Some hope that the population pressure may be alleviated is offered by demographers who indicate that the birth rate in Italy seems to be falling. Even this faint glimmer of hope is lessened by the fact that it is in the North and Center that the biggest drop has occurred. In any case, a falling birth rate would not help for ten to fifteen years since it would take that long to reach the point where the yearly addition to the labor force would materially decrease. Therefore, while this potential population stabilization is interesting, it could not bear upon the 1953 election and this study; the only pertinent question here is whether the governmental programs were successful enough to favorably influence the electorate.

This, of course, was not the case. It has been estimated that the Government investment programs, as of 1953, had added approximately one-million new jobs in the post-war period.¹⁸ While this would seem to represent considerable progress, the two-million-plus total of unemployment was not reduced; the one-million new jobs barely

¹⁸Lutz, op. cit., p. 8.

absorbed the workers that entered the market in the same period. The unemployment caused by natural population growth was bolstered by a tendency of workers, when possible, to switch from agriculture to industry; by the increased number of women seeking work; and by the severe curtailment of emigration in large numbers. It was estimated before the 1953 election that the Government's efforts to overcome this job deficit had cost about twenty percent of the total national income (only ten percent of this expenditure came from Marshall Plan aid).¹⁹ Still the Government was criticized because its program did not produce substantial gains.

The cessation of large-scale emigration referred to above had considerable impact on the national economy. In the pre-war period this emigration was continually high, reaching its zenith in 1913 when 872,958 persons left the country.²⁰ In the inter-war period starting in 1921 the emigration gradually slowed, averaging over 300,000 a year at first and dropping almost to 50,000 immediately prior to World War II. The totals never fell below 200,000 a year until 1927, and the fall-off that occurred afterwards was largely due to Fascist laws rather than to a desire

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰A detailed analysis of pre-war emigration is given in Giandomercio Cosmo, "Italian Emigration Movements up to 1940," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VII, Nos. 28-29 (1954), 75-86.

to remain in Italy. Even at its lowest ebb, however, annual emigration amounted to over 111 persons per 100,000 inhabitants, a considerable number. The majority of these emigrants came from the depressed South and thus relieved the pressure of population growth.

After the war the Government began to encourage emigration, but by 1953 had really laid only the foundation for future departures which have averaged around 150,000 per year.²¹ (This, of course, is still far below the number that left every year before 1927). In the period under discussion the Government succeeded in making emigration agreements with France, Belgium, Argentina, Switzerland, Great Britain, Australia and many other countries. (Much of this travel was only in the form of seasonal migration to fill labor needs in nearby countries, but still it provided a source of income for the unemployed.) The United States, up to 1953, limited Italian immigration to a small quota of something under 6,000, and consequently did not help relieve the population pressure. (In 1953 the United States liberalized its immigration policy when Italy was granted a temporary quota of 60,000 under the Refugee Relief

²¹It should be noted that this figure does not represent net emigration. Many emigrants subsequently become repatriates, e.g. 30,000 in 1953. Gastone Silvano Spinetti, (ed.), Italy Today (Roma: The Documentation Center of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Italy, 1955), p. 40.

Act. President Eisenhower recently, March, 1960, suggested a permanent quota of approximately 20,000 per year.) Nonetheless, the Italian Government had made considerable progress in encouraging emigration and finding places for the people to go. This very fact left it open to considerable criticism every time emigrants encountered difficulties abroad or whenever a foreign country decided to cut down the number of emigrants that it would accept.

Regardless of the merit of these attacks, the advocacy of emigration by the Government had some slight effect (in the period 1946-1953) in cutting down the size of the working force in Italy. Unfortunately, even the greater numbers leaving the country after 1954 amounted to only a very small percentage of the labor supply; the basic problem of finding jobs for several million people remained.²²

Effect of Unemployment

As a result of this unemployment situation, there is a tremendous pressure in Italian society to retain

²²The following table will give some idea of the excess of new population over emigration; jobs must be found for these new workers. In thousands of persons of working age:

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Natural Increase	320	342	371	379	380
Emigration	95	69	100	110	140
Remainder	225	273	271	269	240

Vera C. Lutz, "Some Characteristics of Italian Economic Development, 1950-1955," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, IX, No. 39 (1956), 167.

existent jobs, regardless of their necessity. For example, when experts from the United States recommended the growing of wheat rather than grape vines in Southern Italy (because the world wine market was limited), the Southerners were indignant because the vines require more labor, and therefore more laborers.²³ It was considered better to continue producing grapes and wine for a comparably insignificant market.

In another, similar case, the Government was criticized severely in the electoral campaign of 1953 because of the swollen bureaucracy. In 1949 there were 1,089,261 civil servants (of which about two-thirds were classified as permanent); in 1951, this figure was 1,075,177.²⁴ These were substantial figures, particularly for a country as economically poor as Italy. Efforts were made to cut the number dependent upon the Government, and several laws were proposed which would make gradual limitation mandatory. Nothing came of these suggestions, however, because public service was viewed in Italy as a type of social welfare agency.²⁵ Therefore, the Government was castigated by the opposition for maintaining such high employment (and

²³Wiskemann, op. cit., p. 89.

²⁴Taylor Cole, "Reform of the Italian Bureaucracy," Public Administration Review, XIII (Autumn, 1953), 252.

²⁵Ibid., p. 253.

for hiring its own supporters), but the criticisms were nothing to what they would have been had a large percentage of these civil servants been forced to join the ranks of the unemployed. It was another case where the Government (meaning the Center parties) could do nothing acceptable and chose the lesser of two evils.

Much of the same situation prevailed in industry, where many inefficient, non-productive companies were kept in operation at a deficit so that employees would not lose their jobs. This was particularly true with companies that were controlled by the I.R.I. The payrolls were padded with a great many employees who had little or nothing to contribute to production. A Fortune magazine survey of this problem included a revealing photograph taken at one of these Government-controlled industries--a man repairing a fence with two assistants watching him work.²⁶ The stultifying effect on the economy of this type of non-productive operation is evident. An Italian industry, in order to meet foreign competition, would have to be efficient and produce at low cost; no industry can do this when saddled with excess employees which it is socially, morally and politically required to retain. In the past, private industries which have attempted to close when faced with the twin problems of competing with efficient companies

²⁶Solow, op. cit., p. 90.

and meeting labor demands (for higher pay or retention of workers) have found their factories taken over by the workers. Any reorganization or modernization of the plant which would reduce the labor force is met with consternation, and with the rallying of the employees to protect jealously the vested interest they have in their jobs. In addition, factories which do cut their payrolls must grant very high severance pay to employees. To avoid this trap Italian firms are loath to hire new personnel; they prefer to have the existing employees work overtime. (Consequently, jobs which normally would be available are lost.)

Another factor that has helped to keep the economy of Italy at a low level and that has contributed to unemployment is the business philosophy of many manufacturers. The estate owners of the South and these industrialists have much in common in their perception of their own best interests--each group wants to take as much out of the economy with as little investment as possible. This particular philosophy is certainly not unique to Italy, but these industrialists do not wish to increase their production in an effort to earn more; they are happy with a low production rate, steady profits and no risk. The manufacturers insist on restricting production and turning out only a few items which they can sell at a high price. This they do in preference to enlarging and modernizing their factories to take advantage of mass production, low unit cost and lower

profits per item (but with much larger sales). Some Italian companies (such as the Vespa factories) are very efficient and use mass production techniques, but all too many continue to operate in what amounts to a medieval tradition. Consequently, they do not hire nearly so many employees as they otherwise could.

Electoral Impact of Employment Level

All of the above factors add up to the simple conclusion that there is a tragic amount of unemployment in Italy--regardless of how the statistics are derived. Next, an analysis must be attempted of the possible effect of this situation on the relative strengths of the political parties. In the campaigning discussed previously, each of the parties evidently was of the opinion that the unemployment issue would considerably influence the electoral outcome. The Government went to great pains to convince the voters that it was making all possible efforts to solve the problem and that it was making progress. (While there is no proof, it is quite possible that the investigating committees chose a definition of unemployment designed to secure a more favorable estimate of the number of persons out of work. Certainly the time chosen was calculated to accomplish this aim.) The opposition parties incessantly attempted, first, to convince the voters that the Government would do nothing for them and, second, to beguile

them with the rosy promises characteristic of opposition politicians everywhere.

To assay the impact of this admittedly dismal situation on the election, the province by province statistics on employment levels listed by the November, 1951, national census were analyzed.²⁷ These reports give the total number of persons in each province who were not employed outside the home and who were ten years of age and over (202,700 persons under fourteen were employed in 1953²⁸). Out of a population of 39,309,514, the census found 19,732,234 nominally unemployed (4,395,593 males)--12,517,193 of these were actually engaged in caring for the home. Table 17 indicates, first, the percentage of the total population that was employed at the time of the census, and, second, the percentage of the male population that was employed. The data shown on this table were correlated with the provincial vote for the various parties.

Party Vote and Employment Level

The results of this analysis seem to indicate that the impact of low employment on electoral returns in Italy

²⁷Census material in this and subsequent chapters is from: Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, IX Consimento Generale della Popolazione. 4 Novembre 1951, I (Roma: Soc. Abete, 1946).

²⁸Tremelloni, op. cit., p. 260.

is overrated; on a nationwide basis there is no clear correlation between these two factors. The only party manifesting such relationship is the M.S.I., which has a fairly strong negative correlation with the number of employed. (A positive correlation would mean that the higher the percentage of employment, the higher the vote of the party; conversely, the negative correlation of the M.S.I. means that its chances of getting a high vote drops as employment rises.) Even here the correlation was only $-.47$. The D.C. party does exhibit a faint positive correlation with employed, as do the P.S.D.I. and P.L.I. The other Government party, the P.R.I. has a negative inclination while the P.S.I. is slightly positive. The figures are inconclusive, at best, although the general tendency may have some significance.

Looking at the relationships by geographical regions, a peculiar picture appears. The D.C. party has a low but clear negative correlation in the North, a stronger and positive correlation in the Center and then a higher and more significant relationship ($+.49$) in the South. The correlation is still positive but smaller in the Islands. The principal opposition party, the P.C.I. has a precisely opposite relationship, being positive in the North and becoming negative toward the South. The correlations for the major parties on this issue are shown in Table 18.

TABLE 18

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF
THE POPULATION THAT IS EMPLOYED

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.33	+.37	+.49	+.09	+.05
P.S.D.I.	+.28	-.08	-.18	+.13	+.28
P.L.I.	+.13	+.15	+.47	+.42	+.13
P.R.I.	+.06	-.22	-.07	-.31	-.28
P.C.I.	+.18	-.19	-.37	-.28	-.05
P.S.I.	-.01	+.02	-.38	-.33	+.14
P.N.M.	+.14	-.10	+.10	+.33	-.09
M.S.I.	-.19	-.24	-.13	-.44	-.47

As can be seen, all correlations are low (in most cases, below the level of significance). The Government parties show no unity, with only the Christian Democrats and the Liberals consistently positive. The relationship between employment and P.L.I. vote is particularly noticeable in the South and Islands. The results for other parties vary from area to area except for those of the M.S.I. which are consistently negative. It is worth noting that the highest correlations, both positive and negative, occur in the Mezzogiorno, the area most plagued with unemployment.

While these correlation figures are not high enough to indicate that the percentage of employed materially affects the election, the positive or negative characteristics are interesting. It would be expected that the

Government parties would benefit from high employment; conversely, the opposition would be aided by high unemployment. In general, the correlation figures indicate precisely this situation. Over the nation, three of the four Center parties has a positive relationship with high employment: three of the four opposition groups have a negative relationship. Geographically the picture is not quite so clear.

In the North, where employment is highest, the correlation with size of vote is low. Here the three minor Center parties have the expected positive relationship, but the D.C. is clearly negative. Obviously the Christian Democratic vote is not based upon high employment in this area. On the other hand, the P.C.I. figure is positive, indicating opposition to the Government even where conditions are best. This support is certainly not of the protest variety. In the North the Christian Democrats apparently are opposed as a matter of principle despite relatively high employment. At the same time the P.C.I. support evidently is based on belief in Communist precepts.

Another possibility is indicated by the positive correlations of the minor Center in the North. All three parties appear to have attracted support where employment is high--perhaps those who were motivated to reward the Center for high employment turned to these parties rather than the D.C. At the same time, it should be remembered

that this is the area where P.C.I. support is very strong in the labor movement. High employment probably is taken as being the direct result of action by the communist-dominated Italian General Confederation of Labor (C.G.I.L.). Thus the P.C.I. is supported as a matter of principle and as the result of gratitude.

In the other three regions the expected pattern appears. The D.C. correlation ranges from $-.33$ in the North to $+.37$ in the Center; the Communists from $+.18$ to $-.19$. The spread is even larger in the Mezzogiorno. It appears that outside the North the voters tend to reward the Christian Democrats where the employment rate is high. In the same areas low employment evidently causes some protest voting for the two leftist parties and for the M.S.I. It may be expected that the governmental programs to improve economic conditions in the Mezzogiorno, if effective, will result in higher Christian Democratic vote in this area. The same reasoning would indicate increased Liberal support as employment rises.

One of the most interesting bits of information derived from the correlation figures applies to the M.S.I. This is the only party to have a negative relationship with high employment in each of the geographical areas. It appears that the M.S.I. consistently attracts protest votes and is a refuge for disgruntled persons who seek radical remedies from the Right. This probably is particularly

true of those without occupation who fondly recall the Mussolini period. This type of support for the M.S.I. was anticipated and presages a decline for this party if conditions improve.

Party Vote and Percentage of Males Who are Employed

The second set of correlation figures indicates the relationship between party vote and the percentage of males who are employed. Since it normally is the male who is the wage-earner, it was expected that the effect of vote would be more pronounced for this variable. The higher the percent of males employed, the smaller the number of protest votes should be. In most respects this expectation is fulfilled.

TABLE 19

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THE MALE POPULATION THAT IS EMPLOYED

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.31	+.02	+.61	+.38	-.06
P.S.D.I.	+.25	+.04	-.09	-.12	+.20
P.L.I.	+.19	+.07	+.31	-.54	+.04
P.R.I.	+.23	-.26	+.27	-.04	+.09
P.C.I.	+.10	+.10	+.07	+.36	+.11
P.S.I.	-.32	+.26	-.20	+.24	+.06
P.N.M.	+.36	-.28	-.43	-.47	-.24
M.S.I.	+.33	-.25	-.11	-.22	-.31

The Christian Democrats still show a negative relationship in the North, fall off in the Center, but show tremendous gains in the Mezzogiorno. The $+0.61$ correlation in the South is particularly noteworthy. High male employment clearly leads to support of the D.C. The other Government parties, however, show a peculiar relationship. For example, P.L.I., after being positive in three regions, falls to a -0.54 in the Islands. Only the P.R.I. (in the South) manages to improve itself significantly as male employment increases. This drop by the minor Center is partly explained by the D.C. strength: this party receives the reward for high male employment. Again, however, the opposite situation exists in the North. All three minor Center parties are positive while the Christian Democrats are negative.

A phenomenon that is much more difficult to explain is the positive correlation for the P.C.I. in every geographical region. This runs precisely counter to the expected result, and, with the exception of the North, is directly opposite to the figures for employment in general. While it is quite obvious that all P.C.I. correlations in Table 19 are so low as to be far below the level of significance (see Table 2), the positive figure presents some interesting possibilities. It appears that increased male employment has a very slight but positive effect on P.C.I. vote, particularly in the Islands. This is not to say that

the employed males necessarily vote for the Communists; possibly as the percentage of male employment increases those still unemployed become more inclined to vote for the Left. Another, and perhaps more plausible explanation is that the P.C.I. vote is not adversely affected by increased male employment because the males are more inclined to accept communism on ideological grounds. These men do not desert the party as their economic status improves.

In summation, if the latter explanation is accepted, the situation seems to be this: ideologically committed men vote Left despite economic betterment; less committed men tend to reward the party to which they ascribe the gains, generally the Christian Democrat. (The minor Center, especially the P.L.I., is negatively influenced by this variable in the Islands where it would appear that only the D.C. is accorded gratitude. The situation varies in the other regions.) This would account for the negative correlations for the parties of the Right which clearly are adversely affected by a higher percentage of male employment. This is particularly true for the Monarchists who are more influenced by this variable than by general employment levels.

A final observation has to do with the very peculiar overall picture in the North. In that region only two parties are negatively influenced, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. This is, of course, the same situation

that prevails for employment in general, and the same explanations presumably apply. Of particular interest, however, are the correlations of the M.S.I. and P.N.M. The P.N.M. relationship remains positive but with a more significant figure. The M.S.I. swings from $-.19$ to $+.33$. Obviously the support of these parties in the North is not based upon the disgruntled unemployed as appears to be the case in the rest of Italy.

This points up a fact that the correlations figures illustrate. It appears that there is a distinction between the North and the three other regions when it comes to determining vote. In the Center, South and Islands the expected pattern is present; high employment (whether male or general) leads to support for the D.C. and, to a lesser extent, the minor Center. Conversely, low employment leads, usually, to what evidently is a protest vote for the Right or Left. Only in the North is this pattern missing. As indicated above, it may be because of the deeper ideological commitment of northern workers and because of a different view as to which parties are responsible for high employment. Possibly, also, the relatively high economic position of northern workers since the war has made employment of less concern; this could account for the low correlation figures in the area (i.e., a $.36$ is the highest correlation indicated).

Conclusion

The overall results of this analysis of the unemployment-party vote relationship would seem to indicate that there is less of a connection than might have been expected. Writers on the Italian political situation when discussing the cause of party loss or gain have been wont to include unemployment as a critical variable. The only really effective correlation that results, however, is with the Christian Democratic vote in the South (and, to a lesser extent, the Islands). Since the D.C. party was clearly the ruling group in the Government, this might well have been predicted. It is somewhat surprising, however, that the opposition forces do not show a higher, negative correlation (i.e., increasing their vote as employment drops). While there is a definite tendency in this direction, it is very far from conclusive.

When one considers the probable political result of such widespread unemployment if it occurred in the United States, the lack of a clearer correlation is even more surprising. The last time a somewhat equivalent portion of the labor force in this country was without occupation, the result was the overthrow of Republican party control and brought in a generation of Democratic office holders. Since the unemployment problem in Italy is of such scope, it seems evident that it should have some political effect.

One possible explanation of this lack of influence is that the Italians have lived with widespread unemployment for so long that they face it with equanimity and resignation and do not really expect the Government to accomplish what would seem to be a miracle. Certainly this attitude exists--the belief that they have never received anything from Rome and will get nothing in the future, regardless of which parties win. This is probably the principal fact that caused the difference between the reaction to widespread unemployment in Italy and the United States. The population of the United States was suddenly presented with an unusual situation; in Italy there was merely the continuation of "normal" unemployment.

Another, and perhaps better, explanation of the lack of the Italian reaction would be that the voters are concerned with unemployment, but that this single issue is merged with many others. (This will, of course, be true of all variables discussed.) Coupled with this is the fact that the correlations are based on provincial votes, and the aggregating of the communal statistics into provincial figures undoubtedly merges areas with divergent unemployment levels and, at the same time, divergent party vote. The validity of this hypothesis could only be discovered by a similar analysis of the thousands of communes of Italy. (While possible, such a study is far beyond the bounds of the present analysis.) Regardless of this

or other possible explanations, it is evident that unemployment has a relatively low correlation with party vote in Italy. The directions of the correlations are interesting, but the figures are very low, especially when compared with the relationship between vote and other variables to be discussed in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER V

OCCUPATION

In the preceding chapter the effect of the level of employment on vote was discussed; the next subject will be a similar analysis of types of employment or occupation. It is logical to assume that the occupation of a voter will have some influence on his political beliefs since, if for no other reason, the party that wins may have some considerable effect on that occupation. (This, of course, is due to governmental participation in and influence on business, industry and agriculture.) To discover if, in fact, this connection between job and vote does exist, the categories of employment used in the 1951 census were checked for relationships with each of the principal parties. Before detailing the results of that analysis, however, it might be well to indicate something of the range of economic development in Italy.

Industry

Italian industry is located primarily in the North and Center, with comparatively little development in the South or Islands. Italy has a full range of industrial activities--from mining raw materials through

fabricating finished products. In the past, economic expansion has been severely limited by the necessity of importing the coal needed to operate heavy industries, but this problem has been met, in part, by the development of excellent hydroelectric facilities and by the comparatively recent discovery of oil and natural gas. The gas has been particularly advantageous since it can replace much of the imported coal. Coal is still essential in steel production, however, and the latter is the basis of many other industries. Italian steel has been the most expensive in Europe because of import requirements; this has resulted in higher priced fabricated products. (The hope of alleviating some of this hardship partly explains Italy's interest in the European Coal and Steel Community.) Production of steel has increased despite its expense; 3.5 million tons in 1952 as opposed to the 2 million per year before World War II. Other, non-ferrous metals are also produced, with aluminum from domestic bauxite leading the way. Mining includes soda, potash, quartz and sulphur.

Italian fabricated products are multitudinous, including automobiles, motor scooters, cash registers, typewriters, roller bearings, tractors, cement, tires (from imported rubber), electric motors, plastics, calculating machines, etc. The textile industry has blossomed since the war, with cotton and wool yarns of particular importance; garment making has expanded equally fast. Wood processing,

paper making and printing have flourished. The most important single category of production in 1951 was the mechanical industries which accounted for the largest part of the industrial net product, 18.2%, and the largest number of employed, 859,600.¹ As can be easily seen, Italy has a widely diversified industrial economy. In developing this economy, the country has been aided immeasurably by a cheap labor supply which is the result of the number of unemployed. As mentioned in the previous chapter, however, the pressure of these unemployed has made it impossible to reorganize the industrial part of the economy. Labor pressure (particularly from unions) has forced manufacturers to maintain past levels of employment despite obvious excesses.² Another helpful and at the same time

¹Other principle contributors to the net production of Italy were: textiles, 14.4%; chemicals, 10.5%; construction, 8.3%; steel and non-ferrous metals, 7.1%; electric, gas water, 6.0%; and garments, 3.8%. Food processing accounted for the second largest percentage of production with 16.7%. Bruno Foa, "The Italian Economy: Growth Factors and Bottlenecks," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VI, No. 27 (1953), 257.

²For example, a public agency, the F.I.M., was established for the purpose of controlling several engineering firms with the intent of liquidating the majority which were no longer profitable or necessary. Workers led by the P.C.I. and the General Confederation of Labor blocked all liquidations and forced an influx of state money to support the firms and maintain jobs. Mario Einaudi, Maurice Bye and Ernesto Rossi, Nationalization in France and Italy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 218-219.

stultifying factor is the participation of the government in business. This participation was extensive prior to World War II, and, because of the vast amounts of reconstruction and modernization needed, all parties (with some P.R.I. reservations) agreed that it must continue. The immense cost of these activities could only be met by government resources (with aid from the United States). The Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale handled much of this financing, particularly in the steel, shipbuilding and heavy engineering industries. This resulted in public ownership of 40% of the steel production, 80% of the shipyard capacity, 30% of the electric power plants, etc.³ Uneconomic industries and factories continued to operate at a loss while those that were sound had to make up the deficits incurred. (Originally I.R.I. was expected to keep industries until they were profitable and then return them to private operation. This worked only for a short time; now companies under I.R.I. stay there.) Other state owned or controlled enterprises are operated by similar public organizations with about the same results.⁴

³Ibid., p. 251.

⁴See Bye and Rossi Einaudi, op. cit., pp. 191-246, and Giandomencio Cosmo, "State Participation in Business Concerns in Italy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VI, No. 19 (1951), 202-212.

Agriculture

The second major element in the Italian economy is agriculture. Compared to most other European countries and the United States, agriculture takes up a disproportionately large percentage of the labor force; e.g., in 1951, Italy had 42.2%, France had 31.8% and the United States had only 11.7% engaged in farming. Despite this concentration on agriculture, however, Italy is not self-sufficient in foodstuffs and is forced to import wheat (60.5 billion lira worth in 1950), corn, other cereals, tobacco, meat, fats and many other basic needs. The only items grown in sufficient quantities to meet domestic demands, and have an excess to export, are rice, olives, olive oil, grapes, wine, citrus fruits and hemp.

This is not to say that Italy is not a producer of great quantities of food crops. Wheat is the largest single crop--approximately eleven and one-half million acres producing something under eight million tons. Other grains grown are corn (mostly in the North), oats, barley and rye. Beans, peas and lentils are produced, principally in the South, along with citrus fruits, pears, peaches, tomatoes, potatoes, sugar beets and tobacco. Livestock is raised in all areas; in 1953 there were approximately nine million head of cattle, four million hogs, two million goats and ten million sheep in Italy. (While these totals may sound large they actually are very low in terms of the

Italian population. For example, the 9,000,000 cattle represent only approximately 181 head per thousand population as compared to an equivalent figure of 531 per thousand in the United States.⁵⁾

The best farming region of the entire country is the valley and delta of the Po River where the soil is excellent, the farms are relatively large and the farming methods and equipment are modern. This is a region of mixed farming, including dairy herds, vegetables, grains (corn and rice), fruits and some grape vines. Wheat production in this area averages 60 bushels per acre (120 per acre upper limit) as opposed to the national average of 13.4. Outside this favored area, however, the climatic conditions and physiographical structure of Italy are starkly different. The Appenine mountains, which are the backbone of the country, make the majority of the land unusable except for marginal farming and grazing. (80% of Italian land is hilly or mountainous). The soil is poor; the seasonal rains are inadequate and often fall at the wrong time; over-cutting has depleted (or obliterated) forests and severe erosion is common; low flat areas are often marshy and malarial; etc. Elaborate terracing, particularly in the Center, has made the most of what is

⁵Carlo Vanzetti and Frank Meissner, "The Agrarian Reform in Italy," Land Economics, XXIX (May, 1953), 143.

available. Beautiful olive and citrus groves and vineyard have resulted, but expansion is almost impossible. Much of the highland area is good only for sheep and goat herding, but seasonal migration is required for even this activity. The land tenure system and the poor training of the farmers (discussed above with reference to land reform) are merely contributing factors that make a bad situation worse.

The result of this very poor environment (for farming) is that Italy has a net import-export deficit in food-stuffs--this despite the productive capacity of the Po region. Italy is in the very unfortunate position of having too little good land to feed its people and, at the same time, insufficient mineral resources to emulate Great Britain in turning to industry. Nonetheless, a better balance of industrial-agricultural workers would markedly improve the situation. (This is a prime example of a vicious circle.)

Since the beginning of the twentieth century the trend in Italy as in all other Western countries, has been away from agriculture, as Table 20 indicates. This development has been extremely slow--an increase in industrial employment of less than 10% in fifty years is virtually no change at all compared to other countries. Whether this pace will be accelerated will depend almost entirely upon Government land reform and industrial investment policies

TABLE 20

PERCENTAGE OF THE WORKING FORCE ENGAGED IN EACH
OF FOUR OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES^a

Year	Agriculture	Industry	Commerce	Public Administration
1901	58.8	26.3	4.9	5.2
1911	56.1	30.2	5.3	4.6
1921	56.2	28.6	6.0	4.2
1931	51.0	31.2	7.7	4.6
1936	48.2	31.8	8.7	5.4
1951	41.3	36.1	10.4	5.6

^aIndustry includes transportation and communication; commerce includes banking and insurance. The figures in this table total approximately 93-94%; the remainder includes, among other things, service occupations which made up 5.4% of the total employment in 1951. Bruno Foa, "The Italian Economy: Growth Factors and Bottlenecks," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VI, No. 27 (1953), 248.

--these, in turn, will depend partly upon which parties are in power.

Occupational Categories

To assess the influence that the workers' occupations have on their vote, the 1951 census figures were again used. For convenience sake the various activities were coalesced into four main categories: agriculture, industry and commerce, service occupations and public administration. The first of these includes agriculture, hunting and fishing. The second is made up of industry,

commerce and construction. Service occupations include transportation, credit and insurance and electric, gas and water workers. Public administration refers to public employees. The first four columns of Table 21 indicate the results in terms of percentage of the total population engaged in each category by provinces. The fifth and sixth columns indicate, respectively, the percentage of agricultural and non-agricultural workers who are self-employed. (The category "self-employed" is extended to include unpaid family labor.) The final column represents the percentage of non-agricultural workers that are administrators or professionals.

A very brief perusal of Table 21 will indicate what has been said previously about the drop in industrial employment in the South. (The provinces are arranged in rough North to South order.) In only one province of the Mezzogiorno (Napoli) does industry employ over half the labor and in only one other (Cagliari) is the total above 40%. It will be noted, however, that the provinces of the North and Center vary between industry and agriculture, ranging between approximately 67% agriculture and 84% industry. There is little geographical difference in service occupations and public administration.

The figures on independence offer some interesting differences, however. The percentage of independent farmers in the North and Center is uniformly high (the principal

TABLE 21

PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYMENT IN VARIOUS FIELDS^a

Province	Agriculture	Industry and Commerce	Service	Public Administration	Independent in Agriculture	Independent in Other Fields	Professionals or Administrators
Alessandria	44.0	42.6	5.8	7.6	85.1	24.3	1.8
Asti	63.1	27.7	3.4	5.8	96.0	33.0	1.4
Cuneo	59.4	30.9	3.1	6.6	91.3	31.9	1.2
Novara	24.0	63.9	5.4	6.8	77.3	16.9	1.6
Torino	16.8	69.0	5.8	8.4	92.0	17.6	2.2
Vercelli	30.5	61.2	3.2	5.1	55.7	17.7	1.6
Valle d'Aosta	39.7	49.4	4.3	6.6	89.9	14.9	1.0
Bergamo	22.4	67.1	3.6	6.9	83.2	13.8	1.2
Brescia	33.1	55.8	3.9	7.2	65.6	19.9	1.6
Como	13.6	75.6	4.5	6.3	92.3	15.7	1.8
Cremona	42.8	44.9	4.2	8.2	26.9	26.5	1.8
Mantova	54.0	36.1	3.6	6.3	62.9	35.4	2.0
Milano	7.0	78.2	6.9	7.1	52.4	16.3	3.0
Pavia	39.9	48.9	4.7	6.5	51.1	24.6	2.0
Sondrio	40.5	44.7	4.9	9.9	87.5	15.3	1.0
Varese	6.0	83.9	3.9	6.1	86.4	12.5	2.1
Bolzano	42.6	41.4	5.6	10.5	70.4	20.3	1.9
Trento	40.1	45.0	4.9	10.0	89.5	20.4	1.4
Belluno	33.5	55.0	4.3	7.2	84.4	18.5	1.2
Padova	44.6	44.0	3.8	7.6	76.5	24.3	1.9
Rovigo	59.7	32.2	2.9	5.1	37.4	30.3	1.1
Treviso	49.6	41.0	3.3	6.0	93.2	20.5	1.1
Venezia	35.3	46.0	8.1	10.5	76.9	17.9	1.5
Verona	44.5	42.0	5.8	7.8	71.9	24.7	1.6
Vicenza	34.9	54.6	3.4	7.0	85.3	19.5	1.4
Gorizia	17.6	60.0	5.2	17.1	84.0	15.3	1.4
Udine	39.8	48.7	3.9	7.6	88.9	17.0	1.1
Trieste	2.2	58.8	17.1	21.9	75.4	13.2	3.1

TABLE 21--Continued

Province	Agriculture	Industry and Commerce	Service	Public Administration	Independent in Agriculture	Independent in Other Fields	Professionals or Administrators
Genova	9.4	62.2	16.7	11.7	91.5	15.9	2.9
Imperia	45.1	37.8	6.9	10.2	75.6	29.2	2.2
La Spezia	19.5	46.8	9.5	24.1	92.7	15.2	1.7
Savona	27.1	54.2	8.5	10.3	86.0	21.0	1.9
Bologna	38.0	44.7	7.4	9.9	66.1	20.9	2.0
Ferrara	64.2	27.6	4.9	5.2	27.6	26.7	1.0
Forli	53.2	34.4	4.6	7.8	82.6	27.0	1.3
Modena	56.2	34.4	3.3	6.1	75.8	27.6	1.3
Parma	48.9	37.6	5.1	8.4	78.1	27.1	1.7
Piacenza	49.2	36.6	4.4	9.9	67.9	24.0	1.5
Ravenna	60.1	28.8	4.0	7.1	57.9	31.4	1.4
Reggio nell' Emilia	55.0	35.1	3.5	6.3	79.6	28.3	1.6
Arezzo	61.1	29.3	3.3	6.3	89.1	25.8	0.9
Firenza	29.3	53.8	7.2	9.7	89.2	22.6	2.7
Grosseto	51.3	35.2	5.5	8.0	63.1	24.1	1.0
Livorno	21.0	56.0	10.1	13.0	82.8	16.6	1.9
Lucca	31.7	54.5	5.9	7.8	87.6	21.7	1.9
Massa-Carrara	26.1	61.3	5.1	10.3	89.8	19.4	1.5
Pisa	44.8	42.2	4.6	8.4	86.7	23.6	1.5
Pistoia	37.8	65.0	5.1	7.6	86.3	26.3	2.0
Siena	63.6	25.7	3.5	7.2	87.0	27.4	1.0
Perugia	59.9	29.2	3.5	7.4	89.2	22.4	0.8
Terni	45.5	40.8	5.1	8.6	88.6	17.8	1.0
Ancona	51.8	35.0	5.3	7.8	95.2	22.4	1.3
Ascoli Piceno	65.4	25.6	2.8	6.2	95.4	31.0	1.1
Macerata	67.8	23.6	2.2	6.4	94.8	30.4	0.9
Pesaro e Urbino	57.7	32.0	3.0	7.3	91.9	24.4	0.9
Frosinone	64.0	28.1	2.6	5.3	85.5	22.1	0.6
Latina	59.4	29.6	4.0	7.0	66.0	24.7	0.9
Rieti	66.8	22.8	3.2	7.2	79.2	26.7	0.5
Roma	14.9	50.6	10.4	24.0	57.4	14.9	2.7
Viterbo	62.9	25.3	4.0	7.9	71.7	31.8	0.9

TABLE 21--Continued

Province	Agriculture	Industry and Commerce	Service	Public Administration	Independent in Agriculture	Independent in Other Fields	Professionals or Administrators
Campobasso	75.8	17.8	1.9	4.5	86.3	35.8	0.7
Chieti	64.7	27.2	2.5	5.2	92.1	27.2	1.0
L'Aquila	58.0	30.0	4.0	81.	77.6	25.8	1.1
Pescara	51.4	36.5	4.8	7.3	85.2	25.2	1.6
Teramo	63.7	28.2	2.4	5.7	88.0	30.5	0.9
Avellino	70.6	22.0	2.5	4.9	78.1	32.0	1.0
Benevento	76.2	16.9	2.2	4.7	77.0	34.4	0.8
Caserta	60.0	30.0	3.3	6.7	57.3	27.0	1.1
Napoli	20.4	55.5	11.4	12.8	65.2	21.2	2.5
Salerno	57.0	33.2	3.8	5.9	69.7	26.3	1.4
Bari	60.8	35.2	6.0	8.0	39.1	27.0	1.8
Brindisi	70.0	21.3	2.8	5.9	32.1	30.9	1.0
Foggia	66.9	23.7	4.0	5.4	46.6	33.4	1.1
Lecce	56.7	36.4	2.2	4.7	31.2	20.6	1.0
Taranto	55.2	25.8	3.6	15.3	36.7	22.6	1.2
Matera	69.0	23.3	2.4	5.3	56.6	30.2	0.9
Potenza	74.5	18.9	2.4	4.2	69.6	34.8	0.7
Catanzaro	64.1	26.9	3.4	5.6	49.7	27.9	0.8
Cosenza	65.2	26.1	3.3	5.4	52.9	26.3	0.8
Reggio di Calabria	60.6	28.5	4.7	6.2	30.9	27.0	1.2
Agrigento	61.4	27.5	4.7	6.4	45.5	33.1	1.2
Caltanissetta	56.7	32.8	3.8	6.7	56.7	26.0	1.2
Catania	46.4	37.9	7.2	9.5	30.6	29.9	2.3
Enna	59.2	31.3	2.8	6.7	64.4	25.4	1.1
Messina	53.5	31.5	5.4	9.6	41.5	26.2	1.6
Palermo	42.3	38.9	7.7	11.1	48.5	27.7	1.9
Ragusa	54.3	33.8	4.4	7.5	40.9	31.1	1.7
Siracusa	53.8	32.5	4.9	8.8	35.2	31.8	1.7
Trapani	53.3	33.8	5.2	7.7	50.4	30.1	1.7

TABLE 21--Continued

Province	Agriculture	Industry and Commerce	Service	Public Administration	Independent in Agriculture	Independent in Other Fields	Professionals or Administrators
Cagliari	41.7	43.5	5.3	9.6	48.1	19.6	1.0
Nuoro	67.5	22.6	2.7	7.2	58.4	30.8	0.6
Sassari	56.3	29.2	4.5	10.0	54.1	27.8	1.2
ITALIA	42.2	35.3	5.4	8.5	67.5	21.5	1.7

^aCalculated from: Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, IX Censimento Generale della Popolazione, 4 Novembre 1951, I (Roma: Soc. Abete, 1946).

exceptions being Cremona, Rovigo and Ferrara)--in the Mezzogiorno the opposite is true. The southern situation is actually worse than the percentages indicate. The independent landholders (with the obvious exception of the estate owners) usually have only marginal lands and very little equipment. While better off than the tenant farmers, these "independents", with their large families and low incomes, can barely survive.

The percentages indicating independence are somewhat misleading due to the including of non-paid family workers. While these persons are clearly not employees, their inclusion does inflate the number of "independent" farmers. The census lists 5,573,812 farm workers in this class, of which 3,001,771 may be described as family help. This, of course, represents well over 50% of the total independents. It is worth noting that 1,844,371 of these helpers are male--many presumably adults.

While the South is much lower in percentage of independent farm workers, the non-agricultural independents are lowest in the North. The reason for this is relatively simple--the large industries which hire many employees are in the North and Center. The independent workers of the Mezzogiorno are often the operators of one-man or one-family "industries" which usually specialize in handicraft work. These figures, incidently, also include unpaid family "employees", but these number only 404,269 out of 2,437,484 independents.

Party Vote and Agricultural Occupations

The statistics from Table 21 were compared with the voting totals of the various parties to obtain statistical correlations. While these correlations are not high, they do seem to indicate a definite relationship between the vote of certain parties and the occupations of the voters.

Looking first at agricultural employment, it can be seen that for Italy as a whole there is a definite but fairly low negative relationship with the two major Center parties. The two leftist parties are split, with the P.C.I. insignificantly positive and the P.S.I. more clearly negative.

TABLE 22

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.24	+.25	+.50	+.47	-.31
P.S.D.I.	+.04	-.22	-.05	-.08	-.40
P.L.I.	+.00	+.14	+.37	-.14	+.21
P.R.I.	+.24	+.11	+.18	-.09	+.10
P.C.I.	+.26	-.23	-.12	-.15	+.08
P.S.I.	-.17	+.08	-.17	-.26	-.34
P.N.M.	+.01	+.09	-.21	-.27	+.32
M.S.I.	-.31	-.06	-.22	-.45	+.22

Note that a positive correlation with a party here means that as the percentage of workers employed in agriculture goes up in a province, the chances of a higher vote for

that party also go up--this, however, is not a proportional rise. (The higher the correlation, the more likely a high vote for the party; consequently it is evident that a correlation in the .20 to .30 range indicates, at best, a low probability.) Interestingly, the two rightist parties have a low positive correlation with agricultural employment over the nation as a whole, but are negative in most geographical areas.

As with unemployment in Chapter IV the most significant relationships appear when the geographical breakdown is studied. It appears, again, that there is a substantial difference in voter motivation from one region to another. (For the majority of parties, the correlation figures in the North have signs opposite to those in the Mezzogiorno. In the Center the signs show no pattern.) With the agricultural employment variable, however, there is probably very little significance to this division. In the North and Center, where agricultural occupations represent only a small percentage of the total working force, the correlation figures are very low. This indicates that this variable has little influence on vote in these areas. (This, of course, reduces the significance of the national figures.) Only in the agricultural Mezzogiorno are these figures of sufficient size as to have meaning, and even here only the Christian Democrats and M.S.I. are obviously affected.

It is the positive correlation of the D.C. party that is most interesting. Since the Mezzogiorno was the area at which the land reform program was aimed, it might have been anticipated that the Christian Democrats would show strong support where agricultural employment was the principal occupation. However, as discussed previously, the land program had barely been started in 1953. The anti-D.C. feelings engendered among landlords (who lost land) and peasants (who had not received it yet) were thought to have cost that party a considerable number of votes. There is no way of discerning whether the correlation between the Christian Democratic vote and agricultural employment was higher in 1948 or whether it would have changed in 1953 had the land reform program been further advanced. Since the party's vote dropped in the South and Islands between the two elections, there would seem to be some reason for assuming so. However, the Christian Democrats obviously were not repudiated in agricultural regions.

In view of the concentration by the opposition on the agricultural workers (especially by the P.C.I.), the negative figures for the Left and Right are noteworthy. Actually, these figures are too low to be significant, but they clearly show that the gains by the opposition in the Mezzogiorno came from non-agricultural areas. The highest correlation among the parties of the Left and Right is

that of the M.S.I. in the Islands. (This party was particularly weak in Sardegna where agriculture predominates. Quite possibly a local party, the Partito Sardo di Azione, attracted potential M.S.I. voters.) Even this M.S.I. figure is relatively low, however, and, along with the negative correlations of the other parties, is important only in that it shows that the inroads of the opposition into the agricultural regions of the Mezzogiorno have been slight. These remain strongholds of the Christian Democrats.

Party Vote and Industrial Occupations

The relationships between party vote and industrial employment present much the same picture as did the agricultural employment variable. Here, again, there is a considerable difference between the two northern areas and the Mezzogiorno. It is in the North and Center that the vast majority of industrial workers is employed. Consequently, the correlations for these two regions are of much more importance in determining the effect of industrial employment on vote. A high negative or positive figure in the South or Islands presumably would not add to or detract materially from a party's total. The importance of the correlations for the nation is also somewhat lessened because of the split between the major geographical areas. Actually, only two parties, the P.S.I. and P.S.D.I., have even fairly clear national correlations. In both cases the relationship is clearly positive although still less than .50.

TABLE 23

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION ENGAGED IN INDUSTRY

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.31	-.19	-.48	-.44	+.20
P.S.D.I.	+.03	+.42	+.01	-.00	+.47
P.L.I.	+.06	-.33	-.27	-.01	-.20
P.R.I.	-.27	+.09	-.22	+.11	-.12
P.C.I.	-.32	+.25	+.01	+.05	-.11
P.S.I.	+.23	-.01	+.10	+.44	+.40
P.N.M.	+.01	-.20	+.32	+.04	-.35
M.S.I.	+.20	-.15	+.13	+.46	-.32

Looking at the industrial employment-party vote geographical break-down, it can be seen that the position of the Christian Democratic party is almost exactly the reverse of what it was with agriculture. The relationship is somewhat indeterminate outside the Mezzogiorno (although clearly positive in the North), but in that area the negative correlations indicate that the D.C. party is better off in provinces with low industrial employment. Since that type of province predominates in the South and Islands, the Christian Democratic vote does not suffer as much as it would if the negative relationship existed in the North.

Actually, the correlation figure for the D.C. in the most heavily industrialized section of Italy, the North, indicates that the party has considerable appeal in

the stronghold of the P.C.I. It should be recognized, however, that this does not necessarily imply labor support for the Christian Democrats. It could very well result from a reaction by non-industrial workers to the pro-communist labor movement.

Undoubtedly the most surprising bit of information conveyed by the above table is the almost complete lack of correlation between the vote of the Communist party and the size of the industrial labor force. A small negative relationship in the North and an even lower positive correlation in the Center are followed by insignificant figures for the other areas (and for the nation as a whole). The negative correlation of the North indicates that the P.C.I.'s chances of increasing its vote fall as the percentage of industrial workers rises. A comparison of the voting figures of Table 12 with the industrial percentages of Table 21 indicates why this is true. The highest proportion of the vote received by the Communists occurred in the Region of Emilia-Romagna. In the provinces of that Region, the P.C.I. vote ranged between 29.3% and 42.3%; the portion of the working force engaged in industrial occupations ranged from 28.8% to 44.7%. The northern province with the highest proportion of workers engaged in industry, Varese with 83.9%, gave the P.C.I. only 13.0% of the vote (the D.C. received 46.5%).

It seems to be apparent that the political philosophy of the P.C.I. in the industrial areas has either not convinced the workers or else has antagonized non-workers to the extent that the labor vote is virtually cancelled. Whichever explanation is true (and probably each accounts in part for the correlations), it might be expected that increased Communist activity and more stringent party discipline would increase this negative reaction.

The two Socialist parties, which have positive national correlations of moderate size, each has a similar correlation with industrial employment in a single geographical region--the Social Democrats in the Center and the P.S.I. in the Islands. Since the industrial employment totals in the Islands are low, the P.S.I. could not hope to secure many votes from that element (as the actual Socialist vote in the Islands indicates), but the votes it does receive in Sicilia and Sardegna come largely from the few industrial centers. The P.S.I. (like the P.S.D.I.) has a positive correlation in three of the four geographical regions, but in the North and South these figures are low.

In the area where the Socialists are negative, the Center, the Social Democrats have their highest positive relationship. Since industrial workers make up a comparatively high percentage of the working force, the P.S.D.I. is in an advantageous position. It is interesting to note that a Socialist party has a positive correlation with

industrial labor in each of the four regions and over the entire nation. It appears that a high percentage of industrial labor is a definite asset to the Socialists. Quite possibly this appeal is clearer than that of the P.C.I. because the P.S.I. and P.S.D.I. arouse less antagonism from non-industrial workers. (This quite probably was due, in part, to Nenni's "split" with the Communists and his call for a "Socialist Alternative".)

The only other party with a fairly high correlation is the M.S.I. with a $+.46$ in the Islands. Coupled with its $-.45$ with agricultural employment, it is quite clear that the neo-Fascists are considerably stronger where industrial employment is highest. Since most of the Islands are agricultural, however, their prospects are somewhat limited. The other rightist party, the P.N.M., is insignificantly positive in the same areas as is the M.S.I.

Party Vote and Service Occupations

The third of the four occupational categories is "service" employment (which, it will be recalled, includes transportation, credit and insurance and electric, gas and water workers). As the table shows, there appears to be little relationship between party vote and the proportion of the population engaged in this type of employment. The only exception is the D.C. party. The Christian Democrats, as was the case in both the agricultural and industrial

TABLE 24

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION ENGAGED IN SERVICE OCCUPATIONS

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.16	-.37	-.55	-.40	-.19
P.S.D.I.	-.10	+.06	+.02	-.08	+.11
P.L.I.	-.07	+.04	-.29	+.14	-.14
P.R.I.	+.01	+.07	-.26	+.10	+.02
P.C.I.	+.12	+.31	+.12	-.16	+.14
P.S.I.	+.10	-.19	+.23	+.07	+.14
P.N.M.	-.07	-.01	+.24	+.35	-.10
M.S.I.	+.28	+.21	+.03	+.37	+.04

analyses, have significant correlations in the Mezzogiorno --especially in the South. In both southern areas the relationship is negative as it is in the North and Center. There appears to be no logical explanation of why an increasing percentage of the population engaged in service employment should lead to a decrease in D.C. support, but this is obviously the case.

Of some interest are the relationships of the M.S.I., the P.S.I. and the P.C.I. with service employment. These parties have low, positive correlations with this variable in almost all geographical areas (the only exceptions being the P.C.I. in the Islands and the P.S.I. in the Center). It appears that an increase in service employment in a province slightly enhances the possibility of a higher radical vote in that province.

Party Vote and Public Administration

The final table in the vote-occupation correlation analysis has to do with public administration. As in the "service" table, there is no national correspondence between vote and occupation. Geographically, however, several of the parties show very clear correlations.

As in the cases above, the Christian Democrats have their highest relationship with this occupation in the South

TABLE 25

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION ENGAGED IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.03	-.26	-.54	-.26	-.12
P.S.D.I.	-.21	-.04	-.12	+.32	+.01
P.L.I.	-.20	+.27	-.31	+.37	-.14
P.R.I.	+.03	+.02	-.34	-.10	+.03
P.C.I.	+.07	+.09	+.27	-.55	+.10
P.S.I.	-.19	-.22	+.17	-.21	-.01
P.N.M.	-.11	+.14	+.08	+.65	-.11
M.S.I.	+.41	+.49	+.35	+.16	+.18

with less significant figures in the Islands and the Center. The negative correlations in the Mezzogiorno continue the trend indicated by industry and service--in every employment category except agriculture the D.C. party clearly has a relatively high negative correlation in this area. (This, of course, means that as the percentage of the labor force

engaged in any or all non-agricultural occupations rises, the probability of a high D.C. vote decreases.) With this being the case, the loss of vote by that party in the Mezzogiorno is not surprising. However, most analyses of the southern vote have indicated that it was the non-productiveness of the land reform law that paralyzed the Christian Democrats--these correlations appear to cast some doubt on such a belief.

The negative correlation for public administration workers, of course, does not necessarily indicate an anti-D.C. feeling among those employees. This result could perhaps be due to successful anti-Center propaganda by the P.C.I. The P.C.I. continually criticized the Christian Democrats for crowding the public service with pro-Center personnel--the negative correlation could well be the result of voters being more conscious of the Communist attack in provinces in which the percentage of workers in public administration is highest.

Other parties which have clear correlations with the percentage of workers engaged in public administration are the P.C.I., the P.N.M. and the M.S.I. The Communists display no relationship with public employees in the nation as a whole or in three of the four regions. In the Islands, however, the P.C.I. has a high, negative correlation; the highest correlation, in fact, that it has in any region on any occupation variable. Evidently the anti-Government

propaganda on civil service employees did little for the Communists in the Islands.

The correlation between vote and percentage of workers in public administration is significantly positive with only two parties--those of the Right. The correlations for these two parties cast some severe doubts upon the claims of the P.C.I. that the public payroll is clogged with pro-Center employees. It is evident that the rightist parties draw heavily upon the bureaucracy for support. The P.N.M. has a very high relationship in only one area, the Islands. (It is interesting to note that the correlations, both positive and negative, are high in the Islands. This would seem to indicate that this variable has more direct effect on the voting there than in any other area.) The M.S.I., on the other hand, has significant positive relationships in the North and Center and only slightly lower figures in the South. The cause of this is not clear, but it is interesting to note that the neo-Fascist is the only group to have a positive correlation in the two northern areas. Between them, the two rightist parties definitely have a clear advantage where the public administration employment vote is high. The high positive relationship between the rightist vote and public administration coupled with the uniformly negative correlations of other parties, certainly indicates a conservative bureaucracy. Whether this indicates a lack of sympathy

with democratic government is less clear. In any case, the comparatively low percentage of the national vote received by the P.N.M. and the M.S.I. quite probably would have been higher if public employees made up a large portion of the working population in more provinces.

In analyzing the total impact of occupation on voting, it is evident that the Christian Democratic party is most influenced, with this influence largely limited to the Mezzogiorno. None of the other Center parties has any significant correlation (except for the fairly low relationship of the P.S.D.I. with industrial workers), and evidently their vote is influenced very little by these variables.

It should be noted that there is a considerable geographical difference in the influence of occupation on vote. High correlations are rare in the two northern regions, but are common in the Mezzogiorno. It is also worth noting that the Christian Democrats have negative relationships with each employment category other than agriculture in the southern regions. It is quite probable that there is a connection between these two facts. It appears that the land reform program of the South and Islands had convinced the agricultural workers that the Government (in effect, the D.C. party) intended to help despite the only slight gains up to 1953. On the other hand, the Government had done little for other employees

(although the "Fund for the South" might offer future industrial employment). Regardless of the explanation of the vote, it is clear that the chances of a Christian Democratic victory in a southern province are materially improved if a high percentage of employment is agricultural. At the same time, a high percentage of employment in any other category substantially decreases this probability. This fact emphasizes one further point; the D.C. party, if it is to continue its dominant position in Italy, must retain its support in agricultural areas. An effective and far-reaching land program is evidently its best insurance against further losses.

Most other parties are relatively little affected by occupation (although in the case of the P.C.I. this lack of correlation is itself of some significance, as discussed before). The only exceptions are the M.S.I. and, to a lesser extent, the P.N.M. The correlations for these rightist parties indicate a definite reliance upon occupation groups that represent only a minority of the populace. This is most clearly shown by the influence of public administration and service employment on their vote throughout the country. Something of the same situation exists for industrial occupations. The two parties have their highest positive correlations with this variable in the Mezzogiorno where industrial workers are in the minority. Only for agricultural employment does this

reliance upon minorities disappear (where the only significant correlation is a $-.45$ for the M.S.I. in the Islands).

One further point of interest concerning the Right is the relationship between the P.N.M. and M.S.I. and the Christian Democrats in the Mezzogiorno. For most occupational classifications one or both of the rightist parties has a correlation figure approximately equal to but always opposite in sign to that of the D.C. It would seem that the Right and the Christian Democrats appeal to provinces with precisely opposite employment characteristics. The correlations between the Right and the Christian Democrats bear out this statement; the relationship with the P.N.M. being $-.45$ in the South, and that with the M.S.I. being $-.46$ in the Islands.

Party Vote and Agricultural Independence

The next two variables to be analyzed for effect on party vote have to do with the economic independence of agricultural and industrial workers. The correlations between party vote and the percentage of agricultural workers who are independent are indicated in Table 26.

Quite obviously the most indicative correlations describe the relationship between agricultural independents (cultivatori diretti) and the vote of the Christian Democrats. While the figures are not high in any geographical area, they are moderately positive everywhere. There are

TABLE 26

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS THAT ARE INDEPENDENT

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.40	+.24	+.35	+.41	+.27
P.S.D.I.	+.23	+.29	+.16	-.46	+.32
P.L.I.	+.14	-.27	+.27	-.25	-.10
P.R.I.	-.03	-.07	+.45	+.05	+.14
P.C.I.	-.37	-.03	-.11	-.22	-.08
P.S.I.	-.46	+.48	-.34	-.07	+.19
P.N.M.	+.33	-.54	-.11	-.02	-.36
M.S.I.	+.02	-.68	-.04	-.01	-.41

two explanations for this very favorable situation. First, it might logically have been expected that land ownership and economic independence would lead to a fairly conservative vote for the Christian Democrats to help ensure the status quo. (This, of course, is not true for estate owners who would lose land if the Center were victorious.) Secondly, and perhaps more directly responsible, was a vigorous organizational drive made by the Christian Democrats (specifically Ivanoe Bonomi)⁶ among the small independent land owners of Italy. This effort evidently produced gratifying results for the D.C. party. It was unfortunate for the Christian Democrats that agricultural

⁶Bonomi organized most of the cultivatori diretti into a massive pressure group for the D.C.

independents did not represent a higher proportion of all persons engaged in agricultural occupations; the land reform program presumably will raise this percentage for future elections.

It might have been anticipated that the minor Center parties would share in any success among the cultivatori diretti, but neither singly nor collectively do they show a pattern. The only one of these parties to show a relatively significant positive relationship is the P.R.I. in the South--an area in which all Center parties have low, positive correlations. Evidently the allies of the Christian Democrats are little influenced in their vote by this particular variable.

This is not true of the opposition parties. Each of these has at least one geographical region in which it is influenced by agricultural independents. Both of the parties of the Right are, in general, negatively affected, with particularly significant correlations in the Center. Only in the non-agricultural North do these parties have positive figures. This is, perhaps, somewhat surprising since land ownership conceivably could lead to a very conservative vote for the Right. This inclination undoubtedly does exist among the estate owners, but these are greatly outnumbered by the small cultivatori diretti who support the Christian Democrats.

The leftist opposition shows the same negative

relationship as the Right. This, of course, was to be expected. Actually, the P.S.I. does have a comparatively high positive correlation in the Center and a similar, but much lower, relationship for the nation as a whole. Why these independents should support the Socialists in the Center is obscure, but evidently the P.S.I. received considerable support from them in that area. It is interesting to note that this positive relationship is in the same area where the rightist correlations are significantly negative. With the Democratic Socialists also positive in the Center, it would seem that land ownership is likely to lead to a socialist vote. The negative correlations for the P.S.I. in the North and Mezzogiorno are much more in line with expectations.

The Communist party has no correlations of significance, but the negative characteristic of its relationships in all areas is noteworthy. While not severely inhibited by a high percentage of agricultural workers being independent, the P.C. obviously gained virtually no support among these voters; the result reflects the failure of the P.C.I. to organize the cultivatori diretti. As the land reform program advances, and independents become more numerous, the Communists may well suffer.

Party Vote and Non-Agricultural Independents

The second set of correlations applying to independent workers refers to all non-agricultural occupations.

As can be seen, this table presents very few figures of significant size, whether for the Government or for the

TABLE 27

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF NON-AGRICULTURAL WORKERS THAT ARE INDEPENDENT

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.34	+.39	+.28	+.10	-.19
P.S.D.I.	+.04	+.04	-.10	+.29	-.31
P.L.I.	+.13	+.07	+.40	-.16	+.26
P.R.I.	+.28	-.02	-.03	+.16	+.08
P.C.I.	+.36	-.12	-.01	+.25	+.15
P.S.I.	-.02	-.07	-.19	-.08	-.32
P.N.M.	+.06	-.12	-.07	-.22	+.32
M.S.I.	-.34	-.23	-.48	-.27	+.16

opposition. It was anticipated that the Center and possibly the Right would show positive correlations with this variable because of the vested interests these independents have in the existing society. In general, the Center parties have this favorable relationship, but none of them is positive in every region. The Christian Democrats and Liberals are in the best position, but the figures for even these two groups are so low as to have only marginal significance. The most important piece of information conveyed by the correlations of the Center is that these parties certainly are not handicapped, and may be supported, in areas where non-agricultural independents are numerous.

The second expectation, that the Right possibly

would receive support, is not borne out by the correlations. Unquestionably many of the "big-business" proprietors do back the M.S.I. or P.N.M., but in voting power they are greatly outnumbered by the small independents. This has resulted in negative correlations for both these parties, particularly the M.S.I., with this variable. While the figures are generally low, the tendency is to handicap the Right as the tendency is to aid the Center.

The correlations of the Left are all too low to permit any substantial conclusions to be reached. All that can be said is that the position of the P.C.I. and the P.S.I. is similar to that of the Right, i.e., a high percentage of independents in a province is a handicap.

Party Vote and Professionals and Administrators

The final variable to be discussed is the relationship between party vote and the percentage of non-agricultural independents that are professionals or administrators. For most parties this table indicates no general pattern and no significant correlations. For the Christian Democrats, however, the situation is very different.

The D.C. correlations are negative in all areas and significantly so in the Mezzogiorno. This, of course, is a startling reversal of the trend for all non-agricultural independents, as discussed above. These professionals and administrators presumably had good livelihoods and had a

TABLE 28

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF
NON-AGRICULTURAL INDEPENDENTS THAT ARE PROFESSIONALS
OR ADMINISTRATORS

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.22	-.10	-.62	-.59	-.11
P.S.D.I.	-.10	+.34	+.02	+.41	+.30
P.L.I.	+.03	-.05	-.34	+.20	-.11
P.R.I.	-.11	-.13	-.30	+.31	-.11
P.C.I.	+.08	+.26	+.11	-.07	+.07
P.L.I.	+.24	-.20	+.21	-.05	+.20
P.N.M.	+.02	-.16	+.36	+.30	-.14
M.S.I.	+.19	-.01	-.03	+.51	-.12

stake in the country under Christian Democratic control. Presumably, also, they were among the best educated voters, but, as will be seen in the next chapter, there is a fairly high negative correlation between education and the D.C. party. Which is cause and which is effect cannot be shown. It is clear, however, that the positive relationship between the Christian Democratic vote and non-agricultural independents is due to non-professionals and those who are not administrators. (In fact, the D.C. support among these workers is evidently high since it overcomes the negative relationship with professionals and administrators.)

The minor Center parties have no clear correlations with the professional-administrator variable (with the possible exception of the +.41 of the P.S.D.I. in the Islands.)

The same statement applies to the Left. The Right-wing parties are somewhat more dependent upon this factor, however. The P.N.M. figures indicate a low positive relationship in both regions of the Mezzogiorno, while the M.S.I. has a significant positive relationship in the Islands.

Turning from this last variable to an overall study of independence on vote, it is readily seen that there is little substantial difference between agricultural and non-agricultural independents. An increase in the percentage of persons in this category leads, in almost every area, to better prospects for the Christian Democrats and, with less uniformity, for the minor-Center parties. On the other hand, an increase in this percentage is very likely to lessen the chances of the Right or Left. It is only when the non-agricultural independent category is divided and the professionals and administrators are isolated that this pattern is altered. Even then, as discussed above, it is only the Christian Democrats that are profoundly affected (negatively) while the other parties are only marginally and spottily aided.

Conclusion

In summation of the entire study of the occupational-independent variables, it must be said that these provide a stronger or clearer motivation for voting than did the employment-unemployment factor. Several things have become

clear. Correlations, positive and negative, are generally greater in the Mezzogiorno; this presumably means that these variables provide a stronger motivation in that area. Correlations are also generally higher for the Christian Democrats than for other parties, indicating perhaps a tendency to reward or retaliate against the D.C. The retaliatory votes, however, may go to any of the other parties, thus keeping correlations fairly low. Finally, since the Christian Democrats consistently have their positive correlations with the majority elements in most areas (e.g., agricultural occupations in the Mezzogiorno, industrial occupations in the North) and their negative relationships with minority categories (e.g., industrial occupations in the Mezzogiorno, public administration occupations, professionals and administrators) they have a considerable advantage over the opposition.

CHAPTER VI

EDUCATION

Italian Educational System

One of the fundamental requirements of a modern, democratic state is a literate populace which will be able to make rational choices among alternative policies and parties. Recognizing this fact, the Italian state has long had a free and compulsory educational system designed to produce an educated citizenry. All children fourteen years of age and under are required to attend school; refresher courses are available for adults. On paper, and legally, it appears that Italy is the possessor of a complete and efficient educational organization.

Despite the legal requirements and the existence of an extensive school system, however, over 30% of the Italian population over six years of age has not completed elementary school and almost 13% is illiterate; 89% has no more than an elementary education, if that. The simple fact is that a great many children do not attend school. A study of elementary school attendance made in 1949 indicates something of the true situation. In all of Italy, only 63% of children of elementary school age were actually

enrolled in school. By geographical regions the figures were: North, 68.4%; Center, 65.1%; South, 57.6%; and Islands, 57.1%.¹ Furthermore, for every three children who enter the first grade, only one enters the fifth.² Obviously, considering the attendance at the elementary level, subsequent and more advanced education is going to reach only a small proportion of the children. The result is illiteracy for a large part of the population.

The importance of this illiteracy is apparent. When discussing the appeals for votes made by the various political parties, several references were made to the educational level of the electorate. Illiterate persons could not read the campaign materials; they could not read newspaper comments; they could not even read the few words

¹ Association for the Industrial Development of Southern Italy (SVIMEZ), Survey of Southern Italian Economy, as cited by Joseph G. LaPalombara, "Left-Wing Trade Unionism," The Western Political Quarterly, VII, No. 2 (June, 1954), 214. That these figures were still approximately correct at the time of the 1953 election is indicated by the total attendance in elementary schools: in the 1949-50 school year, total enrollment was 4,815,239; in the 1952-53 school year this total had dropped to 4,477,299. Since there is no indication of a large drop in the number of children of the proper age, it can be assumed that any change in the percentage attending school was probably for the worse. Istituto Centrale de Statistica, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1955, Serie V, Vol. VII (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1955), p. 62.

² George F. Kneller, "Education in Italy," in A. H. Moehlman and J. Roucek (ed.) Comparative Education (New York: The Dryden Press, 1953), p. 270.

printed on the ballots. The electoral consequences were serious. When they were told by the P.N.M. that the election of 1953 would serve as a new referendum on the Monarchy, these persons had no way to find the truth except from other political parties. The details of the Scelba Law were almost incomprehensible. In addition, and perhaps even more important, the willingness to wait for the fruition of a long-term program is usually dependent upon the ability to perceive and understand current problems preventing immediate gratification of needs and desires. It could be expected, therefore, that the Government pledges of eventual economic progress and the Center parties' philosophical arguments against Communism would have little weight when confronted with the enticing picture of almost instantaneous advancement promised by the P.C.I. To discover the extent to which education influenced the electoral returns is the purpose of this chapter.

The Italian educational system has four levels: elementary, intermediate, secondary and university. The elementary schools legally must be attended by all children between the ages of six and eleven. The vast majority of these schools (35,462 out of 41,119) are public and attendance is free.³ The private schools are almost all operated

³Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale de Statistico, op. cit., p. 63. Figures on schools and size of attendance may be found in each of the annual volumes of this series. Further information is included in Gastone Silvano Spinetti (ed.), Italy Today (Rome: The Documentation Center of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Italy, 1955), pp. 114-120.

by church organizations but may receive state aid if they apply and are qualified. As indicated before, tremendous numbers of children do not attend school even at this elementary level.

The second or intermediate level of education is principally for children between ages eleven and fourteen. Two types of training are available, the choice of alternatives depending upon the educational and vocational aims of the student. The vocational training schools are usually for persons with no desire (or financial resources) to continue their education past the compulsory age of fourteen. The other type of school provides the preparatory work required for advancement into the high school level. In the year 1952-53, the two classifications had approximately equal numbers of students enrolled. However, where the total number of elementary students was over 4.5 million, the intermediate level had only 710,000.

The third stage of training is the high school or upper secondary level. Here the preparation is separated into four divisions or lycées: classical, scientific, teacher training and technical/vocational. Only a comparatively small number of the persons of the right ages (fourteen and up) enter the high school level--402,000 in 1952-53 as compared to the 710,000 in the intermediate classes. The persons who do work for a high school diploma select the division which best suits their interest and

best meets the requirements for further training. Students in the classical lycée are eligible to enroll in any university course; those from the scientific division can take any courses except jurisprudence, philosophy and literature. Persons in the teacher training lycée are eligible to teach in elementary schools or to attend university courses in teacher education. Students from the technical/vocational sections can enroll in certain university schools such as economics, commerce, business, etc.

There are fifty-two institutions of higher education (twenty-eight universities) in Italy, many of them world famous. The number of students who go beyond high school is comparatively small (211,000 in 1953-54), and only one percent of the population had university degrees when the census was taken in 1951. Part of the reason for this low enrollment and for the relatively few high school graduates lies in the rigid requirements for a secondary degree. Those in the classical lycée are required to pass courses in Italian, Latin, Greek, mathematics, physics, chemistry, natural sciences, history of art, political history and economics.⁴ Similar course work must be passed by students in the other divisions. A state examination must be passed before graduation, and another examination is

⁴Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955), p. 242.

necessary before entering the university. Requirements such as these (plus a natural questioning of the utility of some of the courses) have kept the total enrollment low.

This pedagogical system was designed to provide at least minimal education for the children and young adults. However, it was not capable of lessening the startling number of illiterate adults. These people, in many cases, were deprived of a continuous education during their youth because of the war; others, particularly in the Mezzogiorno, simply did not attend school. Those "natural" illiterates were augmented by thousands that were once able to read and write but whose environment caused them to revert to illiteracy.

To decrease the number of persons who could not read or write, the government set up what are called "popular" schools. Three types of courses are taught: one for illiterates, one for semi-illiterates and one designed as a refresher course. Reading rooms were established to encourage the use of skills learned. Every year since 1947 almost 100,000 persons have received elementary certificates as a result of this program; 562,000 were enrolled in 1953-54.⁵

Educational Level in Italy

Despite the magnitude of these efforts and the compulsory school law, the educational level is not high.

⁵Spinetti, op. cit., pp. 118-119.

Table 29 presents something of the situation. The first five columns represent the extent of education by the major levels offered. When a person completes the work required in any level, he receives a degree certifying that fact. The figures presented in the first column represent the percentage of the total population of six years of age and older that has no school degree. The other columns give the percentage of the population that has received the degrees indicated. The last three columns present the illiteracy figures for Italy: the first gives the percentage of the total population (six years old and up) that is illiterate; the second the percentage of illiterates that is male; and the third the percentage of literates that is male.

Even the most cursory examination of this table will indicate that the educational problem in Italy, in one respect at least, is very similar to the problems discussed in previous chapters--the Mezzogiorno is the principal area of underdevelopment. From the North through the Islands the percentage of persons with no school degree steadily increases. In every province of the Mezzogiorno the percentage of persons without a degree is higher than the national average (30.8%). The percentage of persons with elementary degrees drops from over 70% in the North to 40% and lower in the southern areas; no area of the South or Islands equals the national average of 59.0%. The same

TABLE 29

PERCENTAGE FIGURES ON EDUCATION AND LITERACY^a

Province	No School Degree	Elementary Degree	Intermediate Degree	High School Degree	University Degree	Illiterate	Illiterates that are Male	Literates that are Male
Alessandria	16.6	72.7	6.2	3.7	0.8	3.6	44.5	49.0
Asti	15.0	76.8	4.8	3.7	0.7	2.7	46.6	49.6
Cuneo	15.5	77.7	3.7	2.6	0.6	3.0	50.9	49.7
Novara	12.1	76.9	7.0	3.3	0.8	2.5	39.8	47.8
Torino	12.5	70.4	11.2	4.4	1.5	1.8	39.8	47.7
Vercelli	15.7	74.1	6.4	3.1	0.7	3.4	39.8	47.4
Valle d'Aosta	16.2	75.3	5.2	2.7	0.6	2.6	44.0	50.3
Bergamo	14.1	77.8	5.1	2.5	0.6	2.1	49.9	48.7
Brescia	15.4	77.0	4.6	2.4	0.6	2.7	52.0	49.1
Como	11.1	77.8	7.4	3.0	0.7	1.8	43.5	48.0
Cremona	17.1	73.8	5.4	3.0	0.7	4.1	49.9	49.3
Mantova	19.9	72.8	4.3	2.4	0.6	5.4	42.0	50.1
Milano	12.6	67.7	12.9	5.2	1.7	2.3	44.5	47.8
Pavia	16.1	73.2	6.3	3.5	0.8	3.9	44.9	49.1
Sondrio	12.3	79.3	5.0	2.8	0.6	2.1	46.8	48.8
Varese	11.4	75.5	8.8	3.5	0.8	1.7	42.0	47.3
Bolzano	11.1	77.0	7.7	3.3	0.9	1.2	47.8	49.4
Trento	8.4	81.5	6.0	3.4	0.8	0.7	49.0	48.7
Belluno	19.3	74.2	3.7	2.3	0.5	3.1	39.0	49.4
Padova	25.1	67.1	4.5	2.6	0.8	6.9	41.7	49.6
Rovigo	33.8	61.1	2.9	1.8	0.4	11.8	35.3	51.2
Treviso	20.6	72.6	3.9	2.3	0.5	5.4	40.3	49.5
Venezia	28.2	61.7	6.3	2.9	0.9	8.8	41.0	49.9
Verona	18.4	73.1	5.1	2.8	0.7	4.7	39.9	49.5
Vicenza	18.9	74.0	4.2	2.4	0.6	3.8	38.7	48.9
Gorizia	10.8	70.8	12.5	5.0	0.9	2.9	37.9	47.9
Udine	19.0	73.6	4.3	2.5	0.5	5.0	29.9	50.1
Trieste	8.7	59.9	21.7	7.8	1.9	2.4	29.5	46.7

TABLE 29--Continued

Province	No School Degree	Elementary Degree	Intermediate Degree	High School Degree	University Degree	Illiterate	Illiterates that are Male	Literates that are Male
Genova	20.9	60.0	11.2	6.1	1.7	3.6	42.7	47.8
Imperia	20.0	65.3	9.1	4.5	1.2	4.4	37.1	48.7
La Spezia	20.7	66.7	8.0	3.7	0.9	6.9	31.8	49.9
Savona	18.4	68.5	8.2	3.8	1.1	3.9	44.6	48.8
Bologna	18.9	68.3	7.4	4.0	1.4	5.7	40.5	49.0
Ferrara	30.5	62.9	3.8	2.2	0.6	12.0	39.8	50.8
Forli	29.6	61.6	5.0	3.1	0.7	12.9	42.7	50.4
Modena	20.8	71.3	4.6	2.5	0.8	6.7	40.6	50.3
Parma	21.1	91.5	5.1	3.1	0.7	6.2	43.5	49.7
Piacenza	20.3	72.1	5.2	3.3	0.7	5.9	51.7	49.5
Ravenna	27.5	63.3	5.0	3.4	0.8	11.2	45.2	49.8
Reggio nell' Emilia	19.4	73.0	4.3	2.7	0.7	6.2	38.1	50.6
Arezzo	34.8	58.3	3.9	2.4	0.6	15.6	36.3	52.8
Firenze	26.0	61.6	7.2	3.9	1.4	9.4	37.9	49.0
Grosseto	35.5	58.6	3.4	2.0	0.6	13.7	43.5	52.1
Livorno	26.1	62.5	6.9	3.5	1.0	8.1	35.6	50.4
Lucca	23.4	67.9	4.7	3.1	0.8	7.6	36.1	48.5
Massa-Carrara	25.1	66.7	4.6	2.9	0.7	10.1	34.0	50.6
Pisa	29.1	61.9	5.2	2.9	0.9	11.4	33.9	51.1
Pistoia	26.1	66.0	4.7	2.6	0.6	9.7	36.5	50.3
Siena	36.0	56.1	4.3	2.7	0.8	17.4	37.4	52.5
Perugia	32.7	59.9	3.9	2.8	0.8	14.5	37.6	51.9
Terni	30.2	61.1	5.1	3.0	0.7	13.4	35.1	52.3
Ancona	24.4	66.0	5.4	3.4	0.9	10.2	32.3	50.2
Ascoli Piceno	37.5	55.4	3.7	2.8	0.7	18.1	30.3	52.3
Macerata	30.7	62.1	3.7	2.8	0.8	14.3	29.9	51.5
Pesaro e Urbino	31.0	61.8	3.7	2.9	0.7	13.9	40.3	51.3
Frosinone	43.3	51.8	2.8	1.7	0.5	22.4	27.5	54.9
Latina	40.0	53.8	3.6	2.1	0.5	16.7	35.1	52.9
Rieti	37.9	56.3	3.1	2.8	0.5	16.1	33.8	53.7
Roma	21.4	56.2	12.1	7.1	0.5	5.9	32.4	49.1
Viterbo	36.4	57.8	3.0	2.3	0.5	11.4	37.8	52.3

TABLE 29--Continued

Province	No School Degree	Elementary Degree	Intermediate Degree	High School Degree	University Degree	Illiterate	Illiterates that are Male	Literates that are Male
Campobasso	45.1	49.8	2.6	2.0	0.6	20.7	32.6	52.4
Chieti	43.7	50.9	3.0	2.1	0.6	22.8	28.9	53.1
L'Aquila	34.4	58.6	3.7	2.6	0.8	11.9	31.6	51.1
Pescara	41.0	50.6	4.6	3.1	0.8	18.9	32.2	52.5
Teramo	44.6	49.9	2.8	2.2	0.5	22.6	33.2	53.4
Avellino	50.0	44.4	2.8	2.2	0.6	25.4	31.1	54.7
Benevento	49.8	45.4	2.7	2.0	0.6	26.8	30.5	54.8
Caserta	50.3	43.0	3.6	2.4	0.7	26.3	36.2	52.6
Napoli	43.0	44.4	7.1	4.0	1.5	20.0	40.6	49.7
Salerno	49.9	43.2	3.7	2.4	0.8	25.0	36.7	52.6
Bari	45.4	46.2	4.7	2.6	1.0	22.9	45.5	49.8
Brindisi	54.0	40.4	3.2	1.7	0.6	28.4	37.6	53.4
Foggia	47.8	46.1	3.3	2.1	0.6	24.8	41.5	51.7
Lecce	49.8	43.8	3.4	2.2	0.8	24.3	39.7	51.9
Taranto	46.2	44.9	4.7	2.3	0.7	22.4	39.6	52.1
Matera	50.2	45.1	2.4	1.8	0.6	28.9	43.8	52.4
Potenza	53.3	42.2	2.3	1.7	0.5	29.2	39.0	53.2
Catanzaro	60.8	34.1	2.5	1.9	0.6	32.8	35.6	54.3
Cosenza	58.5	36.2	2.7	2.0	0.6	31.1	36.6	53.3
Reggio di Calabria	56.9	36.5	3.3	2.4	0.8	31.6	34.7	54.2
Agrigento	53.6	41.5	2.6	1.9	0.7	28.3	49.6	49.8
Caltanissetta	51.7	43.3	2.6	1.5	0.6	27.7	49.0	50.3
Catania	49.1	41.6	4.6	3.4	1.3	26.0	46.4	49.1
Enna	52.5	42.7	2.3	1.8	0.6	31.6	50.9	49.5
Messina	41.8	49.3	4.5	3.3	1.2	21.5	37.8	50.4
Palermo	46.4	43.9	5.0	3.3	1.5	20.7	49.1	48.5
Ragusa	48.8	44.3	3.5	2.4	0.9	28.4	46.4	49.9
Siracusa	48.0	44.2	4.2	2.6	0.9	24.7	46.9	50.7
Trapani	47.3	46.1	3.3	2.5	0.8	23.3	48.2	48.8

TABLE 29-Continued

Province	No School Degree	Elementary Degree	Intermediate Degree	High School Degree	University Degree	Illiterate	Illiterates that are Male	Literates that are Male
Cagliari	50.4	42.7	3.9	2.3	0.7	23.5	43.3	52.3
Nuoro	51.3	44.7	2.0	1.5	0.4	21.8	43.7	51.7
Sassari	46.1	47.6	3.4	2.1	0.8	19.3	42.6	51.9
ITALIA	30.8	59.0	5.9	3.2	1.0	12.9	39.6	50.0

^a All educational figures and the figures in the "Illiterate" column represent percentages of the total population that was six years of age and above. The figures under the last two headings represent, respectively, the percentage of "Illiterates that are Male" and "Literates that are Male." Calculated from: Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, IX Censimento Generale della Popolazione, 4 Novembre 1951, I (Roma: Soc. Abete, 1946).

trend is present but less noticeable in the columns representing intermediate and advanced degrees.

Just as revealing are the figures on illiteracy. This problem actually takes on the appearance of being a southern phenomena. In no province of the North or Center do the illiterates make up 20% or more of the population; in the Mezzogiorno there are only two provinces (both on the Center-South border) where this proportion falls below 20%. This has been an area where education and the ability to read have been little needed and ill-afforded luxuries for much of the population. All too frequently those that do secure an education do so in the classical lycées and become prestigious but superfluous lawyers and professional men; comparatively few enter the vocational/technical classes. The Mezzogiorno thus has a surplus of illiterate, uneducated peasants and, at the same time, a surplus of professionals; both contribute heavily to the army of the unemployed.

Party Vote and Educational Level

The influence of education on voting behavior is of particular interest in view of the very large part of the Italian population that has had little formal training. A party with a high correlation between its vote and provinces with a high percentage of persons of a low educational level would clearly have an advantage. In Table 30 it is evident that the parties of the Right are in that enviable position in the nation as a whole.

TABLE 30

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION WITH NO SCHOOL DEGREE

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.35	+.11	+.03	+.54	-.23
P.S.D.I.	-.12	-.33	+.07	-.60	-.71
P.L.I.	-.11	+.23	-.03	-.71	+.21
P.R.I.	+.40	-.17	-.06	-.28	+.02
P.C.I.	+.51	-.15	-.08	+.52	+.10
P.S.I.	+.20	-.19	+.08	+.42	-.50
P.N.M.	-.36	+.44	+.08	-.64	+.61
M.S.I.	-.08	+.17	-.34	-.09	+.64

Both the P.N.M. and M.S.I. have high correlations with provinces with a high percentage of persons that have no school degree. Since much of their campaign material was aimed at getting the vote of the uneducated, it appears that they were at least partly successful. The geographical area figures, however, present a different picture. Neither party has a high correlation in its favor in the Mezzogiorno; in fact, the large negative relationship shown the P.N.M. in the Islands indicates that it has comparatively little appeal where low education predominates. The only positive correlations that the Right obtains are in the Center where the educational level is higher and where provinces with a high percent of persons without degrees are few.

The party most definitely hurt by extremely low education is the P.S.D.I. Its $-.71$ correlation for the nation as a whole indicates that it has little hope of pulling votes where voters have no school degrees. This indication is also given in all geographical areas, particularly in the Islands. (The slight positive figure in the South is completely insignificant.) The other Socialist party, the P.S.I. is also hurt over the nation by low education but does manage to show a positive correlation in the Islands. It appears that socialism does not appeal in areas where education is lowest. However, where an inclination to vote for a socialist party does exist among those with no degree, the P.S.I. is favored over the P.S.D.I. A person with little education who wishes to vote Left will support the P.C.I. or P.S.I.; similarly, if he wishes to vote for the Center, he will support the Christian Democrats. To understand the appeals of the P.S.D.I. requires at least a moderate level of education. The correlations here reinforce what has been the accepted view of the P.S.D.I. supporters.

While no other parties have significant correlations with this variable for all of Italy, several do have a fairly high relationship in individual regions. Among the Center parties the correlations vary greatly, as they do with every variable discussed previously. The most significant figure for the Christian Democrats occurs in

the Islands where a fairly high positive correlation is indicated. Since provinces with large percentages of uneducated predominate in that region, the Christian Democrats presumably gains. The same is true of the lower, negative correlations in the North--this area has fewer provinces with the uneducated predominating so the Christian Democrats loses few votes on this variable. In general, it can be said that the Christian Democrats receive at least moderate support where education is low.

The Liberals are little affected by the percentage of persons with no school degree except in the Islands. There is a very high negative correlation in that region--since every province in the Islands has a high percentage of uneducated voters, it would be expected that the P.L.I. would get few votes in the area. This is precisely the case, although the party vote ranges between 0.5% and 13.0%. However, in the province in which the Liberals received the 13.0% (Messina), the percentage of persons without any school degree is "only" 41.8%. While this is 11.0% above the national average, it is the third lowest figure for the entire Mezzogiorno and well below any other province of the Islands. The last of the Center parties, the P.R.I. shows only a moderate positive relationship in the North and nothing of significance elsewhere--its vote evidently is not greatly influenced by this variable. As with the P.S.D.I., these generally negative relationships with the

low education variable are not surprising. The attractions of the P.L.I. and P.R.I. are more for the educated, literate person. The result of this limited appeal is, of course, a low vote in a country like Italy.

The Communist party has definite positive correlation figures in two widely separated regions, the North and the Islands. In these two areas the P.C.I. obviously has an enhanced appeal in provinces where education is least. It is the only party to have a positive figure of significance in the North except for the small Republican party. In the Islands, however, both the P.C.I. and the D.C. (and, to a lesser extent, the P.S.I.) were pulling their votes in similar provinces, those with the lowest educational levels. In this area these two parties actually have a very slight positive correlation with each other as compared to a $-.68$ correlation for the nation as a whole. (This inter-party correlation is $-.73$ in the North and $-.80$ in the Center. Further inter-party correlations will be discussed in the concluding chapter.)

The second educational variable is the percentage of the population that has an elementary school degree. It should be noted that these first two variables account for almost 90% of the population--in other words, if a province does not have a high percentage of persons without any degree, it will have a high percentage of persons with only elementary school degrees. The result of this can be

perceived by comparing Table 31 with Table 30.

TABLE 31

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION WITH ELEMENTARY DEGREES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.38	-.03	+.16	-.32	+.27
P.S.D.I.	+.19	+.42	-.05	+.55	+.72
P.L.I.	+.05	-.52	+.11	+.60	-.22
P.R.I.	-.39	+.31	+.18	+.30	-.03
P.C.I.	-.45	+.12	+.06	-.46	-.11
P.S.I.	-.14	+.42	-.13	-.44	+.51
P.N.M.	+.24	-.62	-.20	+.50	-.63
M.S.I.	-.17	-.53	+.32	-.20	-.69

From the column "Italy" it can be seen that every sign is reversed as compared to the first variable, but that the figures for each party are almost precisely the same. The correlation between variable one and variable two is almost perfect, being a $-.96$, indicating that the existence of one of them precludes the existence of the other. Consequently, the parties that had high negative correlations on the first table now are positive, and vice versa.

The same general statement applies for the geographical regions, with a few exceptions. For example, the M.S.I. had no significant relationship in the Center with the first variable, but it has a $-.53$ with the second; where the P.N.M. had a moderate positive correlation in the Center,

it is now $-.62$. In most cases the biggest change is a reversal of sign. For these two parties, in the Center, a high percentage with no degree is only a marginal help; a high percentage with elementary degrees is a definite hardship.

For the entire country, it appears that the rightist parties and the two Socialist parties are most influenced by the percentage of persons with or without elementary school degrees--the former favored in places where the populace is most uneducated and the latter best supported where elementary training is common. Geographically, the variables seem to have the greatest effect in the Islands. Here the P.L.I. and M.S.I. reverse their national tendencies and have high positive correlations indicating an affinity for provinces with more educated people. The Center parties other than the Christian Democrats have the same affinity in the Islands. Outside of this area, however, the most indicative figures are for Italy as a whole rather than for specific areas.

The situation is very different for the next set of correlations. These three variables, intermediate, high school and university degrees, will be considered together since, as a group, they represent only 10% of the population and since the figures obtained are very similar in each case. (See Tables 32, 33 and 34).

TABLE 32

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF
THE POPULATION WITH INTERMEDIATE DEGREES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.14	-.25	-.57	-.57	-.06
P.S.D.I.	-.00	+.08	-.09	+.39	+.39
P.L.I.	-.02	+.20	-.27	+.47	-.12
P.R.I.	-.05	-.08	-.35	+.04	-.05
P.C.I.	+.03	+.19	+.09	-.28	+.03
P.S.I.	-.05	-.16	+.16	-.10	+.24
P.N.M.	+.07	-.01	+.31	+.48	-.27
M.S.I.	+.41	+.30	+.15	+.35	-.20

TABLE 33

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF
THE POPULATION WITH HIGH SCHOOL DEGREES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.20	-.12	-.44	-.59	-.11
P.S.D.I.	-.02	+.05	+.06	+.36	+.03
P.L.I.	-.02	+.24	-.18	+.52	-.07
P.R.I.	+.09	-.06	-.12	+.19	+.07
P.C.I.	+.15	+.05	+.01	-.38	+.08
P.S.I.	-.06	-.12	+.12	-.19	+.20
P.N.M.	+.02	-.02	+.23	+.54	-.24
M.S.I.	+.34	+.12	+.37	+.37	-.11

TABLE 34

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION WITH UNIVERSITY DEGREES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.27	-.17	-.46	-.49	-.22
P.S.D.I.	-.08	+.24	-.01	+.26	+.08
P.L.I.	+.07	-.26	-.15	+.43	+.06
P.R.I.	+.02	-.07	-.25	+.10	-.04
P.C.I.	+.21	+.40	-.09	-.35	+.11
P.S.I.	-.03	+.29	+.09	-.27	+.03
P.N.M.	+.02	-.55	+.36	+.53	+.04
M.S.I.	+.03	-.57	+.10	+.48	+.05

Perhaps the most interesting statistics are those applying to the Christian Democrats. As with the other parties there are no effective correlations for the entire country, but for the Mezzogiorno the figures are moderate. It appears that the D.C. party, more than any other, is likely to lose votes as the percentage of well-educated citizens rises. This could be because the better educated people are less inclined to accept the word of the Catholic Church in political matters, or because these people can better perceive flaws in the Christian Democratic program. A relatively high percentage of the university graduates of the South and Islands is unemployed--this could help to explain the situation. Regardless of the reason, however, the saving feature for the D.C. party, in 1953 at least, was the fact that provinces with a high percentage

of educated people were rare.

Other parties with definite correlations include those of the Right. The P.N.M. has a positive relationship in the Islands for both high school and university degrees, while the M.S.I. is positive, but with a lower figure, in the same areas. (Oddly enough, these same two parties have high negative correlations with one variable, university degrees, in the Center.) It is quite apparent that the P.N.M. and M.S.I. are parties which most consistently attract the support of the well educated people in the Mezzogiorno. (This attraction also exists, but to a lesser extent, in the North and Center.) In this area the land reform program presumably isolated numerous persons of the estate-owner class from the Center. In addition, high unemployment among the well educated (caused by a lack of suitable, i.e., prestigious, jobs) probably helped the Right.

The rest of the major parties vary widely with references to education past the elementary level. None of them has correlations of significant size and none has a consistent positive or negative relationship. As an item of interest, it should be noted that the Unità Popolare (one of the minor parties running exclusively on the anti-Scelba Law issue) has very high correlations with education. This party deliberately appealed to the intellectuals and to the supporters of the Action party in past elections, and it

appears that what support it received came from these elements. A figure of $-.74$ represents the U.P.'s relationship with provinces with "no degree" persons predominating, and a figure of $+.71$ is its correlation with provinces with a high percentage of elementary school degrees. Correlations with the other three variables, intermediate, high school and university degrees, are $+.48$, $+.37$ and $+.16$ respectively. (These figures are for the entire country.) It seems that opposition to the Scelba Law, at least so far as the U.P. was concerned, was greatly dependent upon education.

Party Vote and Illiteracy

The analysis of the relationship between the percentage of provincial population that is illiterate and party vote produces some results very similar to those obtained by using the education variables (see Tables 35, 36, and 37). Illiteracy is, of course, somewhat dependent upon lack of education, but as Table 29 indicates, the percentage of persons who are illiterate is considerably lower than the percentage of persons with no school degree. This presumably is true because of persons who dropped out of elementary school after learning to read and write or who attended the "popular" schools. Despite this discrepancy in numbers, however, the nation-wide correlations on these two variables are identical to two decimal places

TABLE 35

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION THAT IS ILLITERATE

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.45	+.18	-.00	-.05	-.23
P.S.D.I.	-.24	-.24	+.05	-.22	-.71
P.L.I.	-.19	+.17	-.06	-.21	+.21
P.R.I.	+.54	-.16	-.09	-.02	+.03
P.C.I.	+.62	-.18	+.00	+.48	+.10
P.S.I.	+.20	-.10	+.07	+.20	-.50
P.N.M.	-.42	+.34	+.10	-.42	+.61
M.S.I.	-.04	+.05	-.45	+.30	+.63

TABLE 36

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF ILLITERATES THAT ARE MALE

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.15	-.56	-.38	+.02	+.10
P.S.D.I.	-.15	+.10	-.14	-.35	+.16
P.L.I.	+.06	-.26	-.40	-.56	-.10
P.R.I.	+.05	-.03	-.68	+.17	-.15
P.C.I.	-.28	+.59	+.50	+.34	-.10
P.S.I.	-.09	+.34	+.03	+.37	-.01
P.N.M.	+.23	-.42	+.14	-.33	-.05
M.S.I.	-.39	-.29	-.21	+.43	-.10

TABLE 37

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF LITERATES THAT ARE MALE

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.27	+.01	+.27	+.43	-.20
P.S.D.I.	-.09	-.34	+.17	+.09	-.52
P.L.I.	-.18	+.24	+.22	-.01	+.14
P.R.I.	+.20	-.08	+.32	-.52	-.10
P.C.I.	+.34	-.15	-.24	+.05	+.12
P.S.I.	-.01	+.04	-.02	+.01	-.26
P.N.M.	-.21	+.39	-.07	-.12	+.38
M.S.I.	-.16	+.20	-.20	-.66	+.28

for all but one party (+.64 to +.63 for the M.S.I.) With the high correlations obtained for the P.S.D.I., P.S.I., P.N.M. and M.S.I., it appears that either variable could be used effectively to estimate the probability of a high vote for these parties.

More surprising than the virtual identity of the national figures are the drastic differences within the geographical regions. For example, under no school degree the P.L.I. has a -.71 and the P.S.D.I. a -.60 correlation in the Islands. There is no significant figure for illiteracy for these parties in that area. This is particularly noteworthy in view of what was said above about the appeal of these two parties. Logically it would seem that literacy rather than possession of a school degree

would be more of a determinant of vote. Evidently this is not the case with the Social Democrats and Liberals. Actually, in the Islands the only figures of even moderate importance are those for the P.C.I. and the P.N.M.

The region where illiteracy has the most effect is the North where the Communists and Republicans are clearly aided and the D.C. and P.N.M. hurt if the percentage is high. In each case the correlations have the same sign but higher figures than with the "no-degree" variable. In this area illiteracy is relatively uncommon and most illiterates would probably lead a marginal existence. This, of course, could account, in part, for the positive relationship with the P.C.I. and, at the same time, for the negative correlation of the Christian Democrats.

Party Vote and Male Literacy or Illiteracy

The remaining two sets of figures were compiled on the assumption that male literacy or illiteracy might have a greater effect on vote than would the percentage of the entire population that was illiterate. This is not borne out in the nation-wide figures except for a fairly high negative correlation between the vote of the P.S.I. and the percentage of literates that is male. Other parties have only negligible relationships with these variables. Several parties, however, have their vote influenced significantly in one or more geographical regions.

With reference to the percentage of illiterates which is male, the Christian Democrats are affected negatively in the Center, the P.L.I. in the South and Islands and the P.R.I. in the South. These Center parties all have their chance for a relatively high vote improved considerably if the illiterates in the province are not male. The same generally applies to the Right. The two parties of the Left, especially the P.C.I. in the Center and South, have their vote total improved when male illiteracy is high. Evidently, the percentage of male illiteracy does influence vote more than does the incidence of illiteracy in the general population. Although it cannot be proved, it is quite probable that a family that is headed by an illiterate male is in a more precarious economic position than one that is not. (As will be shown later, there is a clear relationship in Italy between education and income.) A further indication of the importance of male illiteracy (and low male education in general) is the following statement:

. . . the heaviest incidence of card-carrying party membership occurs among Italy's poorest, least well educated voters, . . . who are largely inclined, if male, to join the Communist party and, if female, to join the Christian Democratic party.⁶

⁶ Joseph G. LaPalombara and Jerry B. Waters, "Values, Expectations and Political Predispositions of Italian Youth," unpublished manuscript (to be published in Western Political Quarterly, February, 1961).

The second variable, the proportion of the literate part of the population that is male, seems to have practically no effect on party vote except in the Islands. In that region the Republicans and the M.S.I. have fairly high negative correlations with this variable.

As with the no degree variable, the Unità Popolare has a very high negative correlation, $-.73$, with the percentage of the population that is illiterate. It also has a $-.53$ with the percentage of males that is illiterate. As with the educational variables above, it appears that the voters who supported this protest party were most likely to understand the Scelba Law. Oddly enough, the other protest party, the A.D.N., has no significant correlations with any of these variables.

Conclusions

In summation, the effect of education and literacy on the fortunes of the various political parties appears to be considerable. In general, a high percentage of illiterates and uneducated persons in a province seems to incline that province to vote for the Left. Conversely, the probability of a Center and, with several exceptions, a Right vote increases as persons with moderate education become more numerous. The word moderate should be emphasized in this statement for education beyond the elementary level presents a completely different picture (particularly in

the South and Islands). As education goes past this basic level, the Christian Democrats are faced with a strong negative reaction; the effect on other parties varies greatly from one region to another.

Of all the variables discussed to this point, including occupations and unemployment, education and literacy most clearly influence the vote for individual parties. If the correlations described here truly reflect the effect that education has, it can be anticipated that the increased emphasis in Italy on raising the educational level will eventually cut the strength of the parties of the Left unless those parties revise their appeal. On the other hand, this trend will not greatly aid the D.C. party unless education stops at the elementary level. A better, more democratic alternative, of course, would be for the Christian Democrats to foster elementary and secondary education for more people. This would serve the double purpose of educating the populace and increasing the base upon which the D.C. party could draw. If, at the same time, the Government can gradually build up the economy of the country and provide more jobs through its redevelopment plans, it is likely that the protest votes that the educated minority gives the Right can be reduced.

CHAPTER VII

ECONOMIC STATUS

Much has been written in preceding chapters concerning the unfortunate amount of unemployment, the poor land, the tenant farming, of Italy. These factors, however, are of importance only in that they affect the day-to-day life of the people; they determine the standard of living--the housing, the food, the clothing--that may be obtained. In Italy this standard has long been low for the vast majority of the populace. To discover precisely how serious was the financial plight of the citizens, the Italian legislature established a committee to study the situation. Its report, entitled "Enquiry into Poverty in Italy and the Means of Counteracting It," was published in June, 1953, the month of the General Election.

Some of the resulting statistics indicate the abysmal conditions under which millions of Italians exist. A few examples might serve to describe the seriousness of the situation. One investigation to discover the "food standards" of Italian families selected meat, sugar and wine as commodities to be checked. In this survey 869,000 families, 7.5% of the national total, are found to consume none of these items; another 1,032,000 (8.9%) consume only

"very small" amounts, while 1,333,000 (11.5%) use "small" quantities. These figures indicate that 27.9% of the total number of families consumes from only a small amount to nothing of what might be considered basic items.

A similar investigation of clothing uses footwear as its criterion and finds that only 54.1% of families have shoes which can be classified as "good" or better. A total of 1,090,000 families have "poor" or worse footwear. Additionally, it is found that 324,000 families live in cellars, storerooms, huts and caves and that another 2.8 million families live in overcrowded conditions. A final synthesis of the committee findings indicates that 1,357,000 families have a "wretched" standard of living, and that another 1,345,000 has a "poor" living level. These persons represent 23.4% of all families in Italy.

It should be emphasized that these figures are all for families, not individuals. The percentage of the total population that is involved would undoubtedly be much higher than 23.4% since the most miserable conditions exist in the Mezzogiorno where families are largest. That the locus of this deplorable economic situation is in the southern area is proved by the following figures; the percentage of families with a "wretched" standard of living ranges from a low average of 1.5% in the North and 5.9% in the Center to 28.3% in the South and 24.8% in the Islands.

In one southern province, Calabria, the figure is 63%.¹ The state has made efforts to ameliorate the financial plight of the people by paying unemployment compensation, but these payments go to the wrong area. In 1951, for example, 59.7% of all such money went to the North, 13.3% to the Center, 20.3% to the South and only 6.8% to the Islands.² This is true because the unemployment compensation was aimed principally at industrial unemployment. The underemployment and concealed unemployment discussed in Chapter IV make the southern situation even worse.

Despite the fact that millions live in the miserable condition just described, it is possible to make a great deal of money in Italy. Almost one million persons have their food consumption listed as plentiful or very plentiful and the footwear of 38% is "very good". 1,274,000 are classified as having a "high" standard of living. Many industrialists, aided by cheap labor, are very rich men; many estate owners continue to have high incomes from their farms. Since taxation was seventy-five percent indirect (at the time of the 1953 election) these high income groups

¹The figures cited above from the report of the legislative committee investigating poverty are from Giorgio Ruffolo, "The Parliamentary Enquiry into Poverty," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VII, Nos. 28-29 (1954), 52-57.

²Gina Papa, "Compulsory Unemployment Insurance in Italy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, V, No. 23 (1952), 230.

were favored at the expense of the rest of the population.³ These conditions create, or perpetuate, a disparity between economic classes that is wide and distinct in Italy. It would be logical to assume that the existence of this upper class would make the "wretched" living conditions described above seem even worse.

To discover what influence, if any, the economic level of the voter has on the electoral returns of 1953, four variables were selected. The first of these, and the most obvious, is per capita income. The others are based upon the reasonable assumption that the housing facilities of the population are roughly indicative of economic status. These variables, persons per room, percent of residents living in their own homes and an artificial "civilization" index, will be discussed below.

As can be seen on Table 38, per capita income in Italy averaged 180,272 lire in 1953, ranging between 74,986 and 398,111. These raw numbers would appear to represent a considerable amount of money until it is recalled that one United States dollar is equal to approximately 625 lire. This means that the average per capita income was \$288.43 per year. Low as this figure is, it is the range that makes the situation really unfortunate. There is no

³Clifford A. L. Rich, "The Permanent Crisis of Italian Democracy," Journal of Politics, XIV (1952), 672.

TABLE 38

INCOME AND RELATED ECONOMIC STATISTICS^a

Province	Per Capita Income ^b	Persons per Room	Percent of Persons Liv- ing in Own Homes	Civilization Index ^c
Alessandria	209,302	0.9	49.2	49.1
Asti	181,010	0.8	63.9	45.9
Cuneo	192,044	1.0	58.5	38.9
Novara	281,518	1.0	43.0	51.8
Torino	341,253	1.0	33.1	59.5
Vercelli	346,055	0.9	41.2	49.7
Valle d'Aosta	354,455	1.1	53.2	45.7
Bergamo	188,607	1.3	33.8	52.8
Brescia	186,100	1.3	34.2	48.3
Como	236,219	1.1	36.8	57.9
Cremona	199,197	1.1	24.8	43.0
Mantova	190,811	1.2	27.0	35.5
Milano	398,111	1.3	16.9	66.6
Pavia	256,706	1.0	37.0	45.5
Sondrio	204,552	1.2	73.3	53.4
Varese	299,222	1.1	34.9	60.2
Bolzano	242,962	1.1	48.7	66.2
Trento	199,107	1.1	64.9	66.9
Belluno	191,167	0.9	71.8	31.8
Padova	158,683	1.3	40.5	41.2
Rovigo	143,179	1.4	38.3	28.1
Treviso	141,525	1.2	44.9	39.4
Venezia	211,605	1.4	27.1	57.6
Verona	184,102	1.1	39.0	45.5
Vicenza	174,149	1.2	49.9	45.6
Gorizia	228,676	1.2	36.9	55.7
Udine	154,694	1.1	60.2	43.6
Trieste	. . . ^d	1.1	19.0	74.5

TABLE 38--Continued

Province	Per Capita Income	Persons per Room	Percent of Persons Liv- ing in Own Homes	Civilization Index
Genova	307,913	0.9	25.5	82.4
Imperia	309,804	0.8	48.5	63.3
La Spezia	174,371	1.1	35.7	67.1
Savona	274,683	0.9	35.4	71.1
Bologna	221,179	1.1	20.9	62.8
Ferrara	200,756	1.4	25.4	39.7
Forli	152,022	1.3	36.1	45.0
Modena	181,143	1.2	28.0	46.4
Parma	215,939	1.1	30.7	47.6
Piacenza	217,550	1.1	35.5	43.7
Ravenna	203,696	1.2	34.8	32.3
Reggio nell'Emilia	172,535	1.2	31.6	32.1
Arezzo	126,501	1.1	32.3	48.1
Firenza	228,849	1.0	24.8	73.8
Grosseto	205,778	1.2	38.0	41.9
Livorno	236,378	1.2	22.8	69.7
Lucca	154,195	0.9	43.7	54.4
Massa-Carrara	160,832	1.2	47.8	45.8
Pisa	183,757	1.0	28.8	55.3
Pistoia	168,705	0.9	37.7	61.5
Siena	193,147	1.0	25.1	62.1
Perugia	130,881	1.1	37.0	45.5
Terni	192,172	1.3	37.6	49.1
Ancona	161,387	1.1	30.6	60.2
Ascoli Piceno	128,101	1.2	36.9	44.4
Macerata	137,054	1.1	35.4	47.4
Pesaro e Urbino	114,015	1.2	37.0	40.9
Frosinone	103,957	1.5	64.8	28.6
Latina	121,578	1.7	56.8	42.0
Rieti	127,329	1.3	65.9	35.9
Roma	245,530	1.4	26.6	76.6
Viterbo	151,287	1.3	46.6	51.5

TABLE 38--Continued

Province	Per Capita Income	Persons per Room	Percent of Persons Liv- ing in Own Homes	Civilization Index
Campobasso	94,177	1.4	67.4	36.5
Chieti	102,110	1.3	60.2	39.1
L'Aquila	99,012	1.3	65.4	42.5
Pescara	122,477	1.4	48.5	42.3
Teramo	101,084	1.4	47.2	27.1
Avellino	75,913	1.6	55.9	30.2
Benevento	86,679	1.5	60.6	30.2
Caserta	74,986	1.8	48.1	35.6
Napoli	119,472	2.2	21.6	62.7
Salerno	97,888	1.7	46.9	41.4
Bari	112,111	2.1	32.9	50.8
Brindisi	113,928	1.8	44.4	36.1
Foggia	119,593	2.5	39.6	54.7
Lecce	78,031	1.8	51.5	38.4
Taranto	92,604	2.0	36.8	53.5
Matera	126,994	2.4	51.0	37.3
Potenza	80,007	2.0	58.4	37.9
Catanzaro	91,841	2.0	57.9	34.3
Cosenza	86,286	2.0	53.5	34.8
Reggio di Calabria	78,741	1.8	57.2	35.2
Agrigento	82,699	2.0	61.1	51.3
Caltanissetta	93,525	2.2	54.9	54.6
Catania	103,826	1.7	40.6	54.1
Enna	95,479	1.9	64.0	50.6
Messina	119,221	1.4	48.8	42.5
Palermo	116,951	1.7	39.1	71.7
Ragusa	112,718	1.6	65.3	51.0
Siracusa	141,157	1.8	53.3	64.5
Trapani	136,096	1.3	56.3	45.5

TABLE 38--Continued

Province	Per Capita Income	Persons per Room	Percent of Persons Liv- ing in Own Homes	Civilization Index
Cagliari	139,934	1.2	61.3	39.5
Nuoro	101,634	1.3	80.1	32.8
Sassari	93,317	1.6	54.2	48.4
ITALIA	180,279	1.3	40.1	44.3

^aPer capita income figures are from: Guglielmo Tagliacarne, "Calcolo del Reddito del Settore Privato e della Pubblica Amministrazione nelle Province Risparmio Bancario e Postale," Moneta e Credito, (second quarter, 1954), 187-189. Other statistics were calculated from: Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, IX Censimento Generale della Popolazione, 4 Novembre 1951, I (Roma: Soc. Abete, 1946).

^bIncome expressed in lire.

^cIndex derived by averaging provincial figures for homes having electricity, inside toilets and internal running water.

^dData not available.

province in the Mezzogiorno that had a per capita income of 150,000 lire, and the vast majority had figures under 100,000. A disproportionate share of the personal income of the nation is in the North and, to a much lesser extent, in the Center, as Table 39 shows.

TABLE 39
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND INCOME
BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGION^a

Region	Population	Income
North	44.2	59.6
Center	18.3	19.3
South	25.3	13.7
Islands	12.3	7.4

^aFigures are for 1954. Guglielmo Tagliacarne, "Italy's Net National Product by Regions," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VIII, No. 35 (1955), 217.

Obviously the two southern areas are receiving only slightly over one-half of the income that their population merits. With per capita income ranging between \$119 and \$240, with the majority nearer the lower extreme, these regions are on a par with some of the most underdeveloped countries in the world.⁴ Incomes such as these would make

⁴Italy is ranked with such countries as Poland, Spain, Cuba, Chile, Japan, Hungary and Puerto Rico since its per capita income falls in the \$150-\$450 range. Many

a "wretched" standard of living inevitable--particularly since these averages include the incomes of multi-millionaires such as Achille Lauro.

It would not have been surprising if economic conditions such as these had produced serious reactions against the parties in power in the form of anti-Government votes in low income areas. Logically, the expectations would have been that provinces with a high per capita income would support the Center. Persons in those provinces presumably had profited under the predominantly Christian Democratic Government, had the most to lose if a change were made and, consequently, had little reason to support the opposition. If they were to decide on a non-Center vote, the Right was the obvious choice over the radical Left. As Table 40 indicates, however, these expectations were not fulfilled.

In every geographical region and for the entire nation, the Christian Democratic vote is negatively influenced as provincial per capita income rises. In the Center and South the figures are high enough to indicate that income is a serious inhibiting factor. Obviously, it is the low income, or "wretched", province that aids the D.C. party. The other Center parties vary widely, all being negative in the South and positive in most other areas. Only

provinces of the Mezzogiorno, however, are in the \$150 (93,750 lire) or less range which puts them on a par with Costa Rica, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, India, Greece, Jordan, and Yugoslavia.

TABLE 40

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND PER CAPITA INCOME

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.20	-.59	-.29	-.62	-.03
P.S.D.I.	+.19	+.08	-.30	+.41	+.62
P.L.I.	+.15	+.01	-.32	+.34	-.16
P.R.I.	-.13	+.06	-.26	+.38	-.03
P.C.I.	+.02	+.58	+.59	-.06	+.09
P.S.I.	+.18	-.02	+.27	+.38	+.48
P.N.M.	+.13	-.28	-.21	+.03	-.52
M.S.I.	+.09	+.05	-.05	+.05	-.50

in the Islands do their correlations even approach the point of being significant. Nationally, the Social Democrats are alone in having a high positive relationship with income.

The opposition to the Right is in much the same position as the minor-Center. Geographically, the P.N.M. and M.S.I. have no significant correlations. Nationally, however, a definite negative relationship is indicated by the .52 and .50 figures they achieved. Evidently, the Right is also hurt as per capita income rises in a province.

For the Left, however, a different picture is presented. The P.S.I. has low positive figures in three of the four regions and a similar but moderate relationship for Italy as a whole. (Interestingly, the two socialist parties again appeal to the same type of province nationally.

It will be recalled that this was the case with education and literacy.) The Communist party is affected geographically, with definite positive correlations in the Center and South. In these two areas the picture is presented of increased P.C.I. vote as income rises.

For the Center, Right and Left the results are precisely the opposite of what might have been anticipated. The question that immediately arises is, how can these unexpected correlations be explained? Obviously, no definitive answer can be given here, but one possible interpretation lies in the aggregate character of the statistics used. In Italy it unfortunately is the case that a rise in per capita income does not necessarily indicate a rise in income for the average person (or voter). It is perhaps more likely that a high per capita rate merely represents a widening of the gap between the highest and the lowest, i.e., the average person has the same income but the upper bracket person is higher. It is worth noting that in the North, where the variation in income is probably least, there is no correlation of even slight significance. It is the other areas where the income variable influences vote. Quite possibly the peculiar correlation figures in these areas are accounted for, in part, by the fact that the voters in high per capita income provinces are more aware of the discrepancy between their own incomes and those of persons in the upper brackets. The positive vote for the Left

could well represent a protest against the uneven distribution of wealth. In low income areas the variation is not so great and, therefore, not such an influential factor.

Another possible explanation of the correlations between vote and per capita income has to do with the relationship between income and two variables discussed previously, education and occupation. It is generally accepted that education increases earnings; this is graphically shown for Italy by comparing these two variables. Between per capita income and the "no degree" part of the population there is a $-.80$ correlation, indicating that the lack of at least an elementary education almost precludes a high income. For each of the other educational levels discussed in Chapter VI, there is a positive correlation; $+.70$ with elementary degrees, $+.81$ with intermediate degrees, $+.69$ with high school degrees and $+.43$ with university degrees. Obviously there is a very close relationship between education and income, with only the acquisition of a university degree having doubtful economic advantage.

The relationship between per capita income and occupation is almost as definite. Provinces where agricultural employment predominates have a $-.73$ correlation with income. Each of the other major categories is positive: $+.73$ for industry and commerce, $+.45$ for service and $+.25$ for public administration. (While the correlation figures are not high for the latter two variables, the probability

of increased income is markedly lower than that of industry and commerce.)

A final relationship of interest is that between education and occupations. (Tables 41, 42 and 43 give the relationships among income, occupation and education.)

TABLE 41
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PER CAPITA INCOME AND
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
No Degree	-.42	-.61	-.40	-.43	-.80
Elementary	-.05	+.24	+.32	+.22	+.70
Intermediate	+.78	+.77	+.39	+.53	+.81
High School	+.72	+.64	+.31	+.44	+.69
University	+.73	+.45	+.30	+.25	+.43

TABLE 42
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PER CAPITA INCOME AND
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY

	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
Agriculture	-.62	-.75	-.34	-.55	-.73
Industry	+.62	+.58	+.34	+.55	+.73
Service	+.40	+.86	+.41	+.33	+.45
Public Administration	+.02	+.70	+.24	+.42	+.25

TABLE 43
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND OCCUPATIONAL
CATEGORY

	Agri- culture	Industry	Service	Public Administration
No Degree	+.66	-.70	-.27	-.25
Elementary	-.51	+.59	+.11	+.11
Intermediate	-.83	+.72	+.68	+.59
High School	-.73	+.58	+.75	+.65
University	-.51	+.41	+.69	+.32

Quite obviously occupation is greatly affected by education. The reverse is also true, particularly for agricultural provinces where school attendance is severely limited when children begin helping on the farms at a very early age. (In addition, persons in agricultural regions have a tendency to leave agriculture when they become educated.) Neither variable, education or occupation, is completely independent of the other.

Actually, this interdependence of these variables with each other and with per capita income is what is important here. The income correlations, which seemed to run counter to the logical pattern, become more understandable when the impact of these other factors is considered. The Christian Democrats are supported in agricultural provinces and where education is low. (These coincide in most cases.) Since these two variables lead to low income, it logically follows that high incomes and D.C. vote will have a negative correlation.

Similarly, the Right is supported in provinces where service and public administration occupations are numerous and where there is a high educational level. Whereas high education tends to lead to high income, service and public administration occupations are not particularly remunerative. The result is the inconclusive correlations in the geographical regions of Italy. However, the high negative relationship between the rightist vote and per capita income over the entire nation seems to indicate that occupation may be a greater determinant of vote than education for the P.N.M. and M.S.I. For the Left the picture is not clear, although the generally positive correlations with industrial occupations and higher per capita income probably outweigh a tendency toward a negative relationship with increased education.

While it is evident that no variable is either completely dependent or independent, it is likely that per capita income is more dependent than either education or occupation. This appears to be the case because each of the other variables generally fits the pattern expected of Italy. Income runs counter to the anticipated course but can be explained in terms of the other two. If this is the case, per capita income can be used to understand vote only as an adjunct, and qualifying factor, to education and occupation.

Per capita income, however, is the only variable available that can be used in an effort to discover a specifically economic basis for vote. Consequently, it is necessary to turn to variables that reflect the economic position of the voter in an indirect manner. The first two of these to be discussed have to do with housing--persons per room and home ownership.

Housing has been one of the biggest problems facing the Italian Government--both before and after World War II. This problem was the result of the natural population increase and the destruction or damaging of 5.6 million rooms (the unit used in Italian statistics) during the war. In 1945 it was estimated that 854,000 persons were homeless and that another 3.5 million were living in rooms too badly damaged to be considered habitable.⁵ By 1953, 4.4 million rooms had been repaired and another 775,000 rooms constructed with Government assistance and about three million rooms had been built privately.⁶ (How many homes these rooms represent is not reported.) Obviously this construction had done little more than replace rooms destroyed or damaged and had not begun to meet new demands.

⁵Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955), p. 212.

⁶Gastone Silvano Spinetti, (ed.), Italy Today (Roma: The Documentation Center of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Italy, 1955), pp. 60-61.

Much of the housing was substandard by any rating system. People were crowded, often with more than one family in a single house. Large families, particularly in the Mezzogiorno, were forced to live in one or two rooms. In addition, when the census was taken in late 1951, 876,903 persons were living in 252,980 "habitations" such as caves, huts, cellars, warehouses, shops, offices, etc.⁷ This situation was particularly bad in Matera where entire families and their livestock lived in caves without electricity, running water, sanitary facilities or any other modern amenities. Some families had lived in these caves for generations.

The immediate problem is to discover how much the voter's housing situation influences his vote. The first variable to be analyzed is the average number of persons per room in the various provinces--a measure of the extent of crowding. As is indicated by Table 38, the range of variation is not high over the country, the low being .8 per room and the high being 2.5 (average 1.37), but as is usual, the worst conditions exist in the Mezzogiorno.⁸

⁷For Italy the number of families in a habitation averaged 1.07. The average for huts and caves was 1.13. Nora Federici, "Some Aspects of the Italian Demographic Situation: the First Results of the 1951 Census," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, VI, No. 25 (1953), 114.

⁸The Italian average was 1.3 persons per room according to the census of 1951. Equivalent averages were 1.1 for France, .78 for the United Kingdom and .67 for the United States. Spinetti, op. cit., p. 60.

Only one province in either the South or Islands has fewer people per room than the national average; only five provinces in the other two regions have a higher total than the national average. It is primarily in the southern areas that two or more families share a house, and it is in these areas that families are largest.

Since this crowding is essentially due to low income, it might well be anticipated that the correlations for the persons per room variable would be very similar to those for income.

TABLE 44
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND AVERAGE NUMBER
OF PERSONS PER ROOM

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.02	+.06	-.40	+.05	-.10
P.S.D.I.	-.47	-.36	-.11	-.23	-.60
P.L.I.	-.27	+.25	-.41	-.24	+.07
P.R.I.	+.12	+.16	-.59	-.36	-.11
P.C.I.	+.11	-.41	+.56	+.41	+.01
P.S.I.	+.21	-.39	-.02	-.15	-.48
P.N.M.	-.46	+.80	+.14	-.12	+.60
M.S.I.	+.07	+.69	-.33	+.44	+.54

(Opposite signs would be expected since persons per room goes up as income goes down.) With respect to the national figures, this is precisely the case. Where the P.S.D.I. receives its best support in areas with high incomes, it is equally weakened when crowding is extensive. Exactly

the same statement applies to the P.C.I. The parties of the Right are strongly supported when persons per room is high and income is low. Other parties have no significant correlations with either variable.

When the country is divided into geographical regions, however, a completely different picture is presented. Several parties which manifest clear dependence upon the persons per room variable have no such relationship with income. The P.N.M. and M.S.I. are prime examples of this. Neither party evidences any relationship between its vote and income in the Center, but both have very high persons per room correlations in that area. The Monarchists, with their $+ .80$, apparently receive their votes in this region almost exclusively in provinces with extensive crowding; the $+ .69$ of the M.S.I. is only slightly less conclusive. Since there are fewer provinces in this region with crowded conditions, these parties gain comparatively little from this positive relationship.

Another considerable change that occurs has to do with the Christian Democrats. This party has significant negative correlations with income in the Center and Islands, but no such figures result with persons per room. This latter variable obviously has no influence over the D.C. vote in the Center and Islands. An even more peculiar circumstance is revealed in the South for the Christian Democrats and the other three Center parties. All four

parties have very slight negative relationships with income, indicating strength where income is low. At the same time, these four parties show negative correlations with person per room, indicating support where crowding is least. The P.C.I. is in exactly the same position; it has a high positive correlation with both variables in the South.

It appears that the persons per room variable is related to per capita income when the nation is taken as a unit, but geographically the relationship breaks down. This is, perhaps, due to the dependence of income upon education and occupation while crowding is more independent (being affected by factors such as availability of housing and, perhaps most important, the consciousness of being crowded). The result is that, regardless of income, the D.C. and other Center parties are opposed in crowded provinces of the South. At the same time, crowded conditions in the same area lead to a Communist vote, again regardless of income. It would take a province by province survey to determine if this explanation is accurate. It does appear, however, that from the standpoint of the Center parties, reduction of crowding is desirable for more than humanitarian reasons.

The second housing variable is home ownership. As Table 38 indicates, this is one factor which shows the Mezzogiorno ahead of the two northern areas--only four

provinces of the South and one of the Islands fall below the national average. The unfortunate fact of the matter, however, is that many of the southerners live in their own homes, but those homes are overcrowded and, all too often, virtually uninhabitable. The industrial workers of the North and Center live in rented houses and apartments; farmers in these areas usually have comparatively good accommodations. In the United States home ownership is taken as a sign of financial stability and good income; in Italy home ownership is highest in the area where income is least and economic prospects are bleakest. Nonetheless, the correlations resulting from analyzing the relationship between party vote and the percent of residents living in their own homes are precisely what might have been expected --home ownership leads to a vote for the Government or the Right and opposition to the radical Left. (It should be remembered, however, that these figures are for aggregates of voters, not individuals.)

Over the nation as a whole only the Left has what might be termed significant correlations. Both the P.C.I. and the P.S.I. have their vote negatively influenced, i.e., as home ownership goes up in a province, their vote goes down. Geographically, the same relationship is shown, for both parties in the North and for the Communists in the Center and South (the P.S.I. is negative in the latter two areas also, but the figures lack significance). The

TABLE 45

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION LIVING IN THEIR OWN HOMES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.47	+.47	+.69	+.53	+.36
P.S.D.I.	+.43	-.31	+.18	-.14	-.13
P.L.I.	+.13	+.25	+.51	-.23	+.30
P.R.I.	-.08	+.12	+.62	-.03	-.06
P.C.I.	-.58	-.67	-.43	+.21	-.49
P.S.I.	-.53	-.31	-.15	+.16	-.54
P.N.M.	+.47	+.71	-.37	-.55	+.37
M.S.I.	-.17	+.42	+.19	-.64	+.31

leftist parties have very slight positive correlations in the Islands, but is is doubtful if they are meaningful.

The party with the most uniform relationship is the D.C. In each area this party has a definite positive correlation, indicating that provinces with a high percentage of home ownership, regardless of their location, are likely to vote Christian Democrat. (This is particularly true in the South where the cultivatori diretti strongly support the D.C.) For the Center parties as a group, the South is the region where this variable most influences voting. All have positive correlations, with only the P.S.D.I. not having a significant relationship. However, only the D.C. party is positively affected in each geographical region.

Of the rightist parties, the Monarchist vote is more influenced than that of the M.S.I. The P.N.M. has a high positive correlation in the Center and lower but still positive figures in the North and for the nation as a whole. The M.S.I. has moderate positive correlations in the Center and for all of Italy. Both, however, have significant negative figures in the Islands where the Left has its very low positive correlations.

One conclusion can be made about the influence of home ownership on vote--except for the Christian Democrats, the geographical region must be known before any prediction can be made. It is obvious that home ownership is one factor which decidedly raises the possibility of a pro-D.C. vote. The minor-Center parties appear to be next in line with the Right as third choice (except for the Central area). Home ownership clearly inhibits the chances of the Left.

The final variable to be discussed in connection with the Italian standard of living is a combination of three factors--electricity, running water and interior bathrooms. The percentages of houses having these features in the various provinces have been combined into a single variable somewhat euphemistically called a "civilization" index. It is not contended that these three items singly or collectively influence the vote--it is, for example, highly unlikely that a person will vote for or against a

political party merely because his house is or is not wired for electricity. It was thought, however, that the lack of features such as these could conceivably cause a citizen to feel underprivileged or, in fact, indicate that he was underprivileged. The range of variation with these three factors was such as to lend credence to such a contention.

The percent of homes wired for electricity, for example, varied between 97.6% (Como) and 48.4% (Teramo). The national average was 70.8%, with the highest percentages in the North. Houses with internal running water ranged from 77.0% (Genova) down to 9.6% (Lecce), the national average being 35.1%. Here there was little geographical variation. Interior bathrooms existed in 77.0% of the homes in one province (Genova) and in only 12.1% of the homes in another (Rovigo). The national average was 26.9%, but surprisingly the South and Islands were better equipped than the North.

Rather than attempting to analyze each of these variables, which probably was insignificant alone, the index was created by averaging all three together. The resulting figures are meaningless in themselves, but they do indicate how the provinces relate to each other. Correlations were then computed between this index and the vote of the various parties.

As can be seen from Table 46, high correlations between vote and this variable are not numerous--none, in

TABLE 46

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE CIVILIZATION INDEX

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.01	-.38	-.52	-.37	-.11
P.S.D.I.	-.12	+.23	-.20	+.16	+.12
P.L.I.	-.08	-.07	-.33	+.04	-.19
P.R.I.	-.17	-.14	-.42	-.06	-.09
P.C.I.	-.15	+.54	+.34	+.06	+.14
P.S.I.	-.09	-.05	+.08	-.06	+.12
P.N.M.	+.07	-.36	+.18	+.19	-.22
M.S.I.	+.34	-.10	+.13	+.54	+.03

fact, for the whole of Italy. However, several interesting figures are indicated in the geographical regions. For example, it appears that the D.C. party is faced with difficulty in regions in which the index figures are high, i.e., areas where conditions are best. The negative correlations in the Center and the Mezzogiorno indicate this fact. At the same time, the Communists have positive figures in the same areas, showing an improvement in vote potential as "civilization" services are extended. The only other figure of significance is the +.59 correlation for the M.S.I. in the Islands, a region where provinces with high index numbers are few.

It is apparent that the civilization index is not a particularly productive variable to relate to party vote. In essence it bears out a fact that has become evident in

past chapters--the Christian Democrats are not dependent upon the existence of good conditions. In fact, as the income and educational variables showed, this party is most likely to achieve a high vote in the poorer provinces. On the other hand, it is just as clear that the Communists (and to a limited extent, the P.S.I.) are far from dependent upon depressed areas for their vote.

Actually, the economic, or standard of living, variables discussed in this chapter have all (with the exception of home ownership) indicated about the same thing as the civilization index. Unfortunately, they contribute very little to an understanding of influence on vote. It must be said that for Italy economic motivation for voting is comparatively slight or is the result of interrelation with other variables.

CHAPTER VII

AGE, MARITAL STATUS AND URBAN RESIDENCE

In the preceding chapters the variables discussed were largely grouped around a single focal point such as education or unemployment. This is not the case with the last set of factors to be analyzed. The only mutual relationship here is that each might logically be expected to influence voting behavior. These last variables are age, marital status, and urbanization.

Age

The electoral impact of the first of these, age, has been the cause of much speculation. For example, it has been generally accepted that the youth of Italy is radical. Disillusioned with the present society in Italy, youth has been thought to have turned to the extreme Right or Left. It has been pointed out by various writers that the M.S.I. attracts young people by its appeals to the glorious past and by its rampant nationalism. At the same time, other young people presumably have turned to the Left, particularly the P.C.I., as the savior of their country.

Other assumptions were made concerning the impact of age on vote, but all (including the influence of youth) were based almost exclusively on personal opinions and observations without scientific basis. To discover, by more systematic means, the actual relationship between age and provincial vote, each of the seven age categories of the 1951 census was correlated with the vote of each political party.

Before turning to the results of that analysis, it might be well to look at the distribution of age groupings over the country. It is obvious from Table 47 that the Mezzogiorno contains (at least as of 1953) the youngest part of the Italian population. The vast majority of provinces in that area have over 40% of their population under the age of 21, the highest figure being 46%; only one province, Pescara, falls below the national average. It is also evident that there is little geographical variation in the percentage of the population in the 21 through 34 range. Above 35, the figures for the Mezzogiorno fall well below the national average. Clearly a party that has a high positive correlation with the under 21 category is well off in the southern areas (and less successful in the North and Center). In view of the assumed affinity of youth for the radical parties, this presumably hurts the Center parties.

TABLE 47

AGE, MARITAL STATUS AND URBAN RESIDENCE^a
(By Percentage of the Total Population)

Province	Under 21	21-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-Over	Unmarried ^b	Urban Residence ^c
Alessandria	24.7	6.0	13.3	16.0	14.7	12.1	13.2	41.5	72.3
Asti	26.0	6.4	12.8	15.3	14.6	11.8	13.2	40.2	57.9
Cuneo	31.4	6.7	13.3	14.9	13.0	10.2	10.5	47.2	54.7
Novara	27.6	6.1	13.2	16.0	14.5	11.2	11.5	40.9	81.8
Torino	25.4	6.2	14.4	16.9	15.1	11.6	10.4	40.8	85.2
Vercelli	25.3	6.0	13.0	15.7	15.1	12.0	13.0	40.5	79.8
Valle d'Aosta	32.5	6.6	14.7	15.8	12.3	8.9	9.1	44.6	65.6
Bergamo	40.3	7.3	14.2	13.9	10.5	7.6	6.2	48.2	74.6
Brescia	39.3	7.1	14.4	13.8	10.8	8.0	6.6	46.2	75.5
Como	32.1	6.6	13.9	15.7	13.2	9.6	8.9	45.3	84.1
Cremona	33.4	6.8	14.2	14.7	12.8	9.6	8.6	44.4	78.0
Mantova	32.9	6.6	14.6	15.0	12.5	9.3	9.0	40.3	57.7
Milano	29.6	6.5	14.9	17.3	14.3	9.9	7.6	41.8	92.2
Pavia	26.2	6.3	13.4	16.2	14.8	11.3	11.8	41.6	79.2
Sondrio	38.6	6.8	13.4	13.8	10.6	7.7	9.0	49.2	74.5
Varese	30.0	6.3	14.2	16.5	13.9	9.8	9.3	41.7	87.7
Bolzano	38.5	6.8	14.6	14.5	11.8	7.3	6.6	51.7	67.1
Trento	34.6	6.5	14.1	14.1	12.1	9.0	9.6	52.4	83.4

TABLE 47--Continued

Province	Under 21	21-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-Over	Unmarried ^b	Urban Residence ^c
Belluno	33.8	6.8	15.0	14.6	11.7	8.5	9.6	46.5	67.8
Padova	39.5	7.3	14.1	13.4	10.8	7.5	7.3	47.3	43.3
Rovigo	40.5	7.4	14.2	13.1	10.4	7.2	7.2	42.6	49.1
Treviso	38.7	7.3	14.0	13.7	10.9	7.7	7.7	47.3	47.2
Venezia	39.3	7.1	14.8	13.9	10.7	7.5	6.7	45.1	62.1
Verona	35.9	6.8	14.4	14.3	11.7	8.6	8.3	45.6	59.8
Vicenza	39.9	6.9	13.7	17.7	10.7	8.0	8.1	47.2	53.2
Gorizia	31.3	6.6	16.1	15.7	12.8	9.3	8.2	45.0	89.0
Udine	34.4	6.6	14.6	15.0	11.5	8.7	9.1	44.4	78.1
Trieste	24.5	5.6	15.4	17.8	16.0	10.9	9.8	41.8	95.7
Genova	25.2	5.9	14.5	16.9	15.2	11.7	10.5	43.7	89.4
Imperia	23.9	6.0	13.7	15.7	14.3	11.6	12.6	41.9	86.3
La Spezia	30.3	6.5	15.7	15.8	13.2	10.2	9.1	41.0	78.6
Savona	27.2	6.1	14.3	16.5	13.8	10.9	11.1	42.8	75.0
Bologna	29.0	6.6	15.9	16.5	12.8	10.0	9.2	41.7	64.8
Ferrara	35.7	7.0	15.7	15.0	11.1	7.9	7.6	39.5	53.5
Forlì	35.3	7.0	15.1	14.7	10.5	8.2	8.2	41.8	51.6
Modena	33.4	7.0	15.9	15.6	11.7	8.6	7.8	41.7	45.0
Parma	30.1	6.6	15.1	16.5	12.8	9.5	9.4	42.9	52.4
Piacenza	30.3	7.0	14.8	15.8	12.7	9.4	9.4	48.5	56.0
Ravenna	39.9	6.7	15.1	15.7	12.0	9.9	10.8	42.4	52.9
Reggio nell'Emilia	32.2	6.8	15.7	16.0	12.2	9.1	7.9	42.3	49.6

TABLE 47--Continued

Province	Under 21	21-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-Over	Unmarried ^b	Urban Residence ^c
Arezzo	34.1	7.0	15.1	14.7	11.4	9.1	8.6	39.8	44.9
Firenze	31.7	6.2	15.0	15.7	13.6	11.0	10.3	40.1	70.9
Grosseto	32.9	6.9	15.6	15.3	11.8	9.2	8.5	35.9	66.1
Livorno	30.8	6.4	16.0	16.0	12.6	9.5	9.0	37.4	81.2
Lucca	31.8	6.5	14.1	14.8	12.8	9.5	10.5	43.1	63.1
Massa-Carrara	34.7	7.1	15.0	14.5	11.6	8.7	8.4	40.5	77.2
Pisa	29.6	6.3	14.7	15.3	13.1	10.2	10.9	37.7	65.9
Pistoia	29.9	6.2	14.5	15.5	13.0	10.4	10.6	38.6	49.8
Siena	29.6	6.5	15.2	15.8	12.7	10.2	10.0	38.1	50.5
Perugia	35.7	7.3	15.8	14.2	10.5	8.4	8.1	39.4	45.5
Terni	34.0	7.0	16.0	15.0	11.0	8.7	8.4	37.8	57.8
Ancona	31.1	7.1	15.4	15.0	11.4	8.7	8.0	41.1	57.0
Ascoli Piceno	36.6	7.5	15.0	14.1	10.5	8.0	8.2	43.5	45.5
Macerata	35.3	7.2	14.8	15.0	11.0	8.4	8.3	41.9	45.3
Pesaro e Urbino	36.9	7.0	14.9	14.4	10.7	8.0	8.1	39.9	47.5
Frosinone	41.9	7.5	14.4	12.7	9.2	7.0	7.3	40.4	40.9
Latina	44.6	7.3	14.6	12.9	8.9	6.0	5.8	40.6	61.5
Rieti	36.6	6.8	14.4	13.4	10.5	8.8	9.6	40.7	66.0
Roma	34.9	6.9	15.9	15.7	11.9	8.1	6.6	43.0	93.9
Viterbo	35.1	7.1	15.3	14.0	10.7	8.9	9.0	39.1	78.8

TABLE 47--Continued

Province	Under 21	21-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-Over	Unmarried ^b	Urban Residence ^c
Campobasso	39.9	7.4	13.8	13.4	10.3	7.0	8.2	39.9	79.5
Chieti	39.7	7.5	14.6	13.2	9.7	7.1	8.2	40.4	57.9
L'Aquila	37.6	7.6	14.8	13.2	10.3	7.8	8.7	43.5	91.0
Pescara	35.4	7.6	14.5	13.5	10.3	7.0	7.9	42.2	53.6
Teramo	39.7	7.5	14.0	13.0	10.2	7.2	8.3	43.7	45.4
Avellino	43.6	7.7	13.9	12.4	9.2	6.2	6.9	43.2	66.5
Benevento	41.3	7.6	13.9	13.1	9.9	6.7	7.4	43.5	63.7
Caserta	43.8	7.5	13.8	12.3	9.6	6.7	6.3	45.6	85.8
Napoli	42.9	7.1	14.2	12.5	9.7	7.3	6.3	47.2	92.0
Salerno	43.2	7.8	14.2	12.5	9.3	6.6	6.4	45.2	77.5
Bari	43.7	6.9	13.3	12.4	9.2	6.9	7.5	42.6	94.9
Brindisi	42.4	7.1	14.6	12.8	8.6	7.2	7.2	43.5	84.9
Foggia	45.3	7.0	13.5	12.0	9.1	6.5	6.6	41.2	93.6
Lecce	42.9	7.6	13.5	12.4	9.0	7.3	7.4	45.2	93.8
Taranto	44.5	7.1	14.5	12.4	8.6	6.6	6.3	41.7	91.3
Matera	44.0	7.5	13.8	12.7	9.2	6.1	6.6	41.8	92.5
Potenza	43.4	7.6	13.8	12.6	9.4	6.4	6.6	41.4	80.0
Catanzaro	46.0	7.1	13.5	12.0	8.7	6.2	6.5	42.9	85.2
Cosenza	45.0	7.5	14.0	12.2	8.8	6.1	6.4	43.7	68.5
Reggio di Calabria	42.5	7.1	13.5	12.7	8.5	6.6	7.5	45.0	78.8

TABLE 47--Continued

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Province	Under 21	21-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-Over	Unmarried ^b	Urban Residence ^c
Agrigento	42.0	7.2	13.6	13.1	10.0	6.7	7.4	43.1	96.3
Caltanissetta	44.0	7.3	13.8	12.4	9.4	6.3	6.8	42.7	91.6
Catania	39.9	7.1	14.1	13.1	10.0	7.9	7.9	41.3	93.5
Enna	42.6	7.2	13.7	12.9	9.6	6.6	7.4	40.1	95.7
Messina	38.6	7.0	14.2	13.6	10.0	8.0	8.5	44.3	81.3
Palermo	40.8	6.9	13.9	13.2	10.2	7.3	7.7	44.5	97.2
Ragusa	37.8	6.9	14.1	13.5	9.8	8.4	9.5	38.3	87.1
Siracusa	40.5	6.8	14.2	13.1	9.7	7.8	8.0	37.7	94.0
Trapani	38.4	6.9	13.7	13.6	10.6	7.9	8.9	42.1	83.7
Cagliari	44.9	6.7	14.3	12.3	9.1	6.7	7.2	46.5	92.8
Nuoro	42.7	7.0	13.0	11.4	9.7	7.6	8.6	51.3	96.9
Sassari	41.7	6.8	12.5	12.5	9.8	7.5	8.5	49.2	86.7
ITALIA	36.4	6.9	14.4	14.3	11.4	8.4	8.2	43.2	75.9

^aCalculated from: Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, IX
Censimento Generale della Popolazione, 4 Novembre 1951, I (Roma: Soc. Abete, 1946).

^bIncludes widowed and divorced persons.

^cFigures represent the percentage of the provincial population that lives in concentrations of over five families.

Before turning to the correlation tables, a very important fact should be recognized. The figures presented in these tables do not indicate that if a party has a positive or negative correlation with an age category that persons of that age vote for or against that party. This is obviously not true of those under 21. A positive correlation with a particular age grouping merely means that as the percentage of the population that is in that grouping goes up, the chances of the party receiving votes also goes up.

In the first region, the North, it appears that age was not an especially potent factor in the 1953 election.¹

TABLE 48
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES
IN THE NORTH

Party	Under 21	21-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65- Over
D.C.	+.37	+.23	-.38	-.32	-.26	-.25	-.14
P.S.D.I.	-.34	-.30	-.19	+.08	+.29	+.29	+.41
P.L.I.	-.20	-.18	-.45	+.29	+.29	+.33	+.31
P.R.I.	-.08	+.04	+.20	+.03	-.13	+.03	+.11
P.C.I.	-.37	-.12	+.55	+.35	+.16	+.25	+.13
P.S.I.	-.07	-.09	+.03	+.06	+.13	+.07	-.05
P.N.M.	-.28	-.24	-.59	+.03	+.37	+.36	+.44
M.S.I.	-.01	-.06	+.42	+.08	-.04	-.07	-.18

¹The age categories have been combined into tables by geographical regions to better present the impact of age on the vote of each party. Individual tables for each party will be included below, pp. 286-287.

Most parties have insignificant correlations with each age grouping, with only the Communists and Monarchists showing any high figures. The most interesting part of the table probably is the direction of the signs for all parties; in almost every case there is a distinct point where the sign reverses. For the Christian Democrats, for example, the figures are positive below age 25 and negative above. The P.S.D.I. and P.L.I. have almost precisely opposite relationships, being negative in the lower categories through the 25-34 grouping and positive thereafter. (The P.R.I. figures are so low with all ages as to be almost completely without significance, indicating that age is not a major factor in determining its vote.) The opposition parties, Right and Left, show much the same trend, having slightly negative correlations where persons under 25 make up a relatively high percentage of the population. (The M.S.I., of course, has its most significant correlation in the 25-34 range, a $-.59$) Despite the trends shown in this table, however, the low figures greatly limit the usefulness of age as a voting predictor in the North.

A similar tendency for each party to have positive correlations with either the younger or older portions of the population is manifested in the Center. Here, however, the higher figures add a great deal to the significance of the age variable. With several parties age appears to be crucial.

TABLE 49
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES
IN THE CENTER

	Under 21	21-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65- Over
D.C.	+.40	+.36	+.67	-.52	-.33	-.35	-.09
P.S.D.I.	-.27	-.26	-.13	+.35	+.33	+.25	+.15
P.L.I.	+.19	+.09	-.06	-.16	-.16	-.10	-.09
P.R.I.	+.02	+.33	+.20	-.01	-.15	-.21	-.31
P.C.I.	-.62	-.63	+.41	+.68	+.62	+.63	+.44
P.S.I.	-.35	-.04	+.41	+.23	+.14	+.29	-.22
P.N.M.	+.77	+.41	-.33	-.69	-.62	-.69	-.56
M.S.I.	+.53	+.36	+.12	-.37	-.47	-.54	-.55

Of the Center parties, only the D.C. has clear correlations. As in the North, the Christian Democrats receive their strongest support in provinces with a high percentage of young people, but fall off even more definitely after age 25. The party's appeal in areas where a high percentage of the population is 25-45 is particularly low. In this respect the Christian Democrats are in exactly the same position as the parties of the Right. Both of these groups especially the P.N.M., appeal most strongly in provinces with a high percentage of the populace under 21. In the provinces where the percentage of persons over 35 is high, these parties (again with emphasis on the Monarchists) have very little chance of succeeding. While strong support for the M.S.I. might have been expected in "young" provinces, the support for the P.N.M. in such areas is very surprising.

It was thought that this party would appeal to those with fond memories of a monarchist past, not to a new generation. The Center is the only area in which this pro-Right correlation with the under-25 grouping is so definite.

As can be seen, the Left parties have a relationship with age which is opposite to that of the Right and Center. The Communists, in particular, have little chance of success in provinces with high percentages of persons under 25. This party has moderate strength with the 25-34 grouping but is strongest in provinces with older populations. It appears that, in the Center, being young does not lead to a radical vote for the Left.

TABLE 50
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES
IN THE SOUTH

Party	Under 21	21-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65- Over
D.C.	-.24	+.38	-.08	+.36	+.26	+.04	+.47
P.S.D.I.	-.02	+.48	+.16	-.17	-.00	-.11	-.14
P.L.I.	-.02	+.15	-.15	+.45	+.39	+.15	+.32
P.R.I.	-.33	+.28	+.13	+.26	+.23	+.14	+.53
P.C.I.	+.18	-.28	-.02	-.28	-.15	-.31	-.27
P.S.I.	-.22	-.42	+.18	+.14	-.27	+.19	+.23
P.N.M.	+.35	+.06	-.15	-.33	-.10	-.08	-.46
M.S.I.	-.37	+.03	+.57	+.24	+.04	+.59	+.39

In the South there is no evident relationship shown between vote and age, whether in terms of clear correlations

or general trends. The only exceptions to this statement are the positive figures applying to the M.S.I. in the 25-34 55-64 groupings. Apparently the age of the voters in the South has little to do with their choice of parties.

The other region of the Mezzogiorno presents a completely different situation, however. In the Islands, at least for the Center parties, clear and definite relationships can be drawn between vote and age.

TABLE 51
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES
IN THE ISLANDS

Party	Under 21	21-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65- Over
D.C.	+.54	+.22	-.73	-.84	-.34	-.30	-.11
P.S.D.I.	-.65	-.58	+.44	+.40	+.21	+.78	+.71
P.L.I.	-.43	-.25	+.53	+.42	+.08	+.40	+.27
P.R.I.	-.63	-.13	+.45	+.53	+.68	+.41	+.54
P.C.I.	+.13	+.25	+.07	+.08	-.22	-.24	-.21
P.S.I.	+.15	-.24	-.25	+.09	-.02	-.20	-.13
P.N.M.	-.18	-.19	+.21	+.21	+.26	+.17	+.03
M.S.I.	-.03	+.43	+.58	+.38	+.07	-.23	-.45

The Christian Democrats, again, have strong support where the percentage of persons under 25 is high. However, a high proportion of persons in any of the 25 and above categories is likely to lead to a decline in Christian Democratic vote. Where the percentage of the population in the 25-34 or 35-44 brackets is high, this decline is

almost certain. (Note that for these two groupings the level of significance is better than 1%.) On the other hand, the correlations of the minor-Center parties are diametrically opposed; their support is weakest where that of the D.C. is strongest. A young population militates strongly against a P.S.D.I., P.R.I. or P.L.I. vote. The P.L.I. is best supported where there is a high percentage of persons in the 25-34 or the over-65 range; the P.R.I. is strongest when the age is 35-44; the P.S.D.I. when persons 55 and up are numerous. All of these parties, however, have positive relationships above the age of 25. Since the Islands have (with the exception of the South) the highest percentage of persons under 21 of any region of Italy, the D.C. clearly has the advantage over the other Center parties.

Among the opposition parties, only the M.S.I. evidences a clear relationship with any specific age category, a $+ .58$ correlation with the 25-34 grouping. Most of the other figures for the M.S.I. and all those for the other parties are insignificant.

For Italy as a whole, the general tendency of the parties to have positive relationships with either the population below or above the age of 25 and negative correlations with the other is continued. Of the eight parties analyzed, seven show this distribution, the only exception being the P.R.I. which has no correlations of value.

TABLE 52

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES
IN ITALY

Party	Under 21	21-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65- Over
D.C.	+.13	+.10	-.38	-.09	-.04	-.09	-.02
P.S.D.I.	-.63	-.52	+.07	+.59	+.65	+.60	+.52
P.L.I.	+.12	+.12	-.29	-.11	-.10	-.08	+.03
P.R.I.	-.13	+.07	+.31	+.10	-.02	+.06	+.08
P.C.I.	-.27	-.39	+.49	+.25	+.16	+.23	+.14
P.S.I.	-.52	-.39	+.37	+.53	+.48	+.48	+.29
P.N.M.	+.57	+.43	-.48	-.63	-.52	-.50	-.35
M.S.I.	+.52	+.39	-.04	-.53	-.57	-.51	-.40

Among the Government parties, only the P.S.D.I. has truly significant relationships indicated. The size of the figures and their uniformity with all age groupings would seem to mean that this is an especially important factor in the Social Democratic vote over the nation. This party has its best chances of success in those provinces without high percentages of the population under the age of 25. Precisely the same situation applies to both parties of the Left (particularly the P.S.I.), but with somewhat smaller correlation figures.

The only parties with substantial positive relationships with the under-25 segment of the population are the P.N.M. and M.S.I. Thus, over the entire country, as in the Center (and, with the exception of the youngest group, the

Islands), the vote of the Right depends upon "youthful" provinces. These provinces support the appeals for monarchy and fascism. Areas where older persons predominate vote Left or for one of the minor-Center parties (specifically the P.S.D.I., which might also be considered leftist). To a certain extent, this type of support for the M.S.I. is directly in line with the pre-election estimates of neo-Fascist strength among the young people of the country.

In addition to the suggestions of the importance of a high percentage of youth in a province to the vote of the Right, certain characteristics of the appeal of other Italian parties are shown by these correlations. To make the impact of age on vote more clear, the correlations for each party were rearranged in individual tables presented on the next pages.

Looking first at the D.C. table, it can be seen that in every region and in the nation as a whole this party has a fairly low but definite positive relationship with the two lowest age categories and negative correlations with all others. (The only exception to this is the below-21 grouping in the South. However, in that area virtually every party has correlations which run counter to their national pattern.) Since the Italian population is relatively young (as compared to the rest of Europe), this would appear to put the Christian Democrats in an advantageous position.

TABLE 53
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN D.C. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

Age	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
Under 21	+.37	+.40	-.24	+.54	+.13
21-24	+.23	+.36	+.38	+.22	+.10
25-34	-.38	-.67	-.08	-.73	-.38
35-44	-.32	-.52	+.36	-.84	-.09
45-54	-.26	-.33	+.26	-.34	-.04
55-64	-.25	-.35	+.04	-.30	-.09
65-Over	-.14	-.09	+.47	-.11	-.02

TABLE 54
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.S.D.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

Age	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
Under 21	-.34	-.27	-.02	-.65	-.63
21-24	-.30	-.26	+.48	-.58	-.52
25-34	-.19	-.13	+.16	+.44	+.07
35-44	+.08	+.35	-.17	+.40	+.59
45-54	+.29	+.33	-.00	+.21	+.65
55-64	+.29	+.25	-.11	+.78	+.65
65-Over	+.41	+.15	-.14	+.71	+.52

TABLE 55
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.L.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

Age	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
Under 21	-.20	+.19	-.02	-.43	+.12
21-24	-.18	+.09	+.15	-.25	+.12
25-34	-.45	-.06	-.15	+.53	-.29
35-44	+.29	-.16	+.45	+.42	-.11
45-54	+.29	-.16	+.39	+.08	-.10
55-64	+.33	-.10	+.15	+.40	-.08
65-Over	+.31	-.09	+.32	+.27	+.03

TABLE 56

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.R.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

Age	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
Under 21	+.08	+.02	-.33	-.63	-.13
21-24	+.04	+.33	+.28	-.13	+.07
25-34	+.20	+.20	+.13	+.45	+.31
35-44	+.03	-.01	+.26	+.53	+.10
45-54	-.13	-.15	+.23	+.68	-.02
55-64	+.03	-.21	+.14	+.48	+.06
65-Over	+.11	-.31	+.53	+.54	+.08

TABLE 57

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.C.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

Age	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
Under 21	-.37	-.62	+.18	+.13	-.27
21-24	-.12	-.63	-.28	+.25	-.39
25-34	+.55	+.41	-.02	+.07	+.49
35-44	+.35	+.68	-.28	+.08	+.25
45-54	+.16	+.62	-.15	-.22	+.16
55-64	+.25	+.63	-.31	-.24	+.23
65-Over	+.13	+.44	-.27	-.21	+.14

TABLE 58

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.S.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

Age	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
Under 21	-.07	-.35	-.22	+.15	-.52
21-24	-.09	-.04	-.42	-.24	-.39
25-34	+.03	+.41	+.18	-.25	+.37
35-44	+.06	+.23	+.14	+.09	+.53
45-54	+.13	+.14	-.27	-.02	+.48
55-64	+.07	+.29	+.19	-.20	+.48
65-Over	-.05	-.22	+.23	-.13	+.29

TABLE 59

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN P.N.M. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

Age	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
Under 21	-.28	+.77	+.35	-.18	+.57
21-24	-.24	+.41	+.06	-.19	+.43
25-34	-.59	-.33	-.15	+.21	-.48
35-44	+.03	-.69	-.33	+.21	-.63
45-54	+.37	-.62	-.10	+.26	-.52
55-64	+.36	-.69	-.08	+.17	-.50
65-Over	+.44	-.56	-.46	+.03	-.35

TABLE 60

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN M.S.I. VOTE AND AGE CATEGORIES

Age	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
Under 21	-.01	+.53	-.37	-.03	+.52
21-24	-.06	+.36	+.03	+.43	+.39
25-34	+.42	+.12	+.57	+.58	-.04
35-44	+.08	-.37	+.24	+.38	-.53
45-54	-.04	-.47	+.04	+.07	-.57
55-64	-.07	-.54	+.59	-.23	-.51
65-Over	-.18	-.55	+.39	-.45	-.40

Interestingly enough, the chief rival of the D.C. party, the P.C.I., shows exactly the opposite tendency in two regions and over the country. Only in the Islands do the Communists appeal in areas where young people make up a relatively high percentage of the population (and even there the figures are insignificant). The other Leftist party, the P.S.I., has only one, very low, positive relationship with a young group--the below 21 category in the

Islands. This is interesting, of course, because of the anticipated radical behavior of the younger elements of the society. Quite obviously, this expected result did not materialize. Explanations of this situation must be hypothetical; e.g., in provinces with a high number of families with young children (thus lowering the average age and increasing the total under 21) the parents might vote for the Center or Right to ensure economic security (because they cannot afford to support radical parties); or perhaps more logically, a radical youth element might cause a reaction in favor of the Center or Right by the older portion of the population.

While these conjectures may have a degree of validity, there is considerable evidence that a simpler explanation--that youth is not so radical as previously thought--is more correct. A recent study of Italian young people has shown them to be a somewhat conservative group who value security over risky, but potentially remunerative undertakings. When, for example, young Italians were queried concerning employment, 44.1% evidenced a preference for employment by a state agency; only 29.4% would choose a private firm (26.5% either had no preference or made no response).² Despite

²Joseph G. LaPalombara and Jerry B. Waters, "Values, Expectations and Political Predispositions of Italian Youth," Unpublished manuscript (to be published in the Western Political Quarterly, February, 1961).

the fact that upward mobility and high salaries were more likely with private employment, the "security of employment in the public bureaucracy, the social insurance benefits available to bureaucrats, and the promise of pension benefits on retirement,"³ seemed more attractive.

Facts such as these are sufficient to cast considerable doubt on any claim about a radical youth. The same study, also, provided what appears to be the evidence that completely belies any such contention. Table 61 indicates the distribution of responses when young people were asked to indicate the party which they considered most worthy of support. These are scarcely the replies expected of a radical youth; actually, the Center percentage was greater than that it achieved in any election after 1948 until 1958.

If it is recognized that Italian youth, as a group, is not radically inclined, the correlations between party vote and the below-25 age categories are what could be logically expected, i.e., positive correlations for the Christian Democrats and negative relationships with the Left. This would reasonably lead to the deduction that the D.C. party is due to continually increase its vote as the present-day youth replaces the older, more radical voters. Conversely, the futures of the P.C.I. and P.S.I. would seem to be bleak.

³Ibid.

TABLE 61

PARTY PREFERENCES OF YOUTH IN 1958 AND
ACTUAL RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1958^a

Party	Youth Preference	1958 Election
D.C.	39.2%	42.3%
P.S.D.I.	7.0	4.6
P.L.I.	3.8	3.5
P.R.I. (and P.R.)	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Center	51.1	51.8
P.C.I.	5.6	22.7
P.S.I.	<u>10.2</u>	<u>14.3</u>
Left	15.8	37.0
P.N.M. (and P.M.P.)	3.8	4.9
M.S.I.	<u>5.2</u>	<u>4.8</u>
Right	9.0	9.7
Other responses	24.1	1.5

^aIn this table, P.R. refers to the Radical Party: P.M.P. refers to the Popular Monarchist Party. Joseph G. LaPalombara and Jerry B. Waters, "Values, Expectations and Political Predispositions of Italian Youth," Unpublished manuscript (to be published in the Western Political Quarterly February, 1961).

Unfortunately for the D.C. party, this reasoning does not fit the facts. It appears from the correlations on the previous pages that youth in Italy has been inclined toward the Center, at least since the 1951 Census and the 1953 election. Since the youth of 1953 was five years older in 1958, a tremendous victory for the D.C. in the election of the latter year would be expected; the actual gain was only 2.2%. It definitely appears that the youth did not stay with the D.C.

This points up the importance of the sudden switch from positive to negative at the 25-34 age category (and from negative to positive for the Left at the same point). The explanation probably lies in the increasing disillusionment that all too frequently faces Italian youth as it matures. The thousands of young men that have never obtained their first jobs are only one indication of the causes of this disillusionment. It was suggested earlier (Chapter IV) that disassociation from society and a swing to the radical parties might well result from the economic status, and future, of these men. The correlation figures in the present chapter seem to confirm the thought that this is occurring. The Italian youth study referred to above comes to a very similar conclusion when noting that membership in the P.C.I. comes several years after voting age is attained, the result of "long-term dissatisfaction with one's personal economic condition, growing lack of confidence in the promise of socio-economic betterment, and the development of strong negative expectations regarding the future."⁴

The conclusion that these facts leads to is that the D.C. party, if it is to retain its preeminent position in Italian politics, must improve economic conditions to the point that it can hold the allegiance of the new generation. If this can be accomplished, and the positive-

⁴Ibid.

negative swing at age 25 eliminated, the vote of the Left should steadily decline.

An interesting element that complicates the picture is the relationship between age and the minor-Center. As the preceding tables show, these parties, the P.R.I., P.L.I. and particularly the P.S.D.I., have generally negative correlations with the younger age groupings. The switch from negative to positive occurs at approximately the same place as with the Left, at age 25. This fact leads to the conjecture that the disillusionment of youth does not necessarily lead to a radical vote; the minor parties of the Center may be the beneficiaries. (These votes would, perhaps, represent a non-radical protest.) The failure of the Left to improve its position between 1953 and 1958 lends credence to this thought. However, the importance of this point is mitigated by the comparatively low total vote (whether protest or not) of the minor-Center, and by the fact that these parties also failed to markedly increase their support between 1953 and 1958. In addition, if the minor-Center does secure any respectable portion of its vote from these discouraged persons who pass the age of 25, these parties will also suffer if the Christian Democrats succeed in improving conditions.

The final two parties to be discussed are the P.N.M. and M.S.I. These parties present a very peculiar relationship with age, neither confirming nor denying the validity

of the belief that the former is supported by older voters and the latter by youth. Nationally, each party has fairly significant positive correlations with the below-25 age category and equally significant negative relationships with every age grouping over 25. Geographically, however, this pattern is continued only in the Center. In that region each party, particularly the P.N.M., has a high positive correlation with the under-21 category, a lesser but still positive figure for the 21-24 grouping, and significant negative correlations with all other ages. (The P.N.M. has the same relationship in the South, but the figures are too low to have significance.) In the other geographical areas the general tendency is for the relationship to be negative below 25 and positive above. However, the correlations are too mixed to establish a real pattern.

The result of this analysis is to throw considerable doubt upon the assumed source of rightist support. For the P.N.M., it is certainly evident that a high percentage of persons over 25 in a province does not materially enhance the chances of this party in that province. Only in the North and Islands do the 25-plus age categories show even low positive correlations. In the Center and for Italy as a whole the relationship is significantly toward support in "young" provinces.

At the same time, the source of M.S.I. support in three of the four geographical regions is in provinces

where a high percentage of persons in the 25-44 age range; a high proportion in the 21-24 group is slightly helpful. Only for the nation as a whole and the Center does the M.S.I. have strong support in "youthful" provinces. Thus, for both parties of the Right there is considerable variation in the effect of age on vote. Before any generalizations or predictions could be made, the geographical region would have to be known.

The overall influence of age on vote is difficult to assess. Certainly there are many very definite and significant correlations. Certainly, also, previous assumptions about age and party support should be revised. In any case, age is clearly one of the variables which must be considered when voting analyses and predictions are being made. It should be recognized, however, that age is not independent of other variables. Families are largest among agricultural workers and probably among those with the least education, two factors which previously have indicated support for the D.C. and opposition to the Left. This may at least partly explain the positive correlations of the Christian Democrats in provinces with a high percentage of the population under the age of 25. That age is more than the mere reflection of other variables is shown, however, by the fairly consistent relationship of the major parties, including the D.C., in most regions of the country. Age certainly is an important variable.

The same statement cannot be made for the next variable, the percent of persons in a province that lives in cities or towns, those living in concentrations of five or fewer families, and those living in the country. For purposes of the present investigation, the first category is contrasted against the latter two to gauge the influence of urbanization on vote. As Table 47 shows, there is a wide range in the percentage of persons residing in cities and towns (a low of 40.9%, a high of 97.2%), and, consequently, it was expected that this influence might be considerable.⁵ However, as Table 62 shows, the correlations are generally insignificant.

It is only in the Islands that this variable appears to have materially affected the vote (and even there the correlations are not quite at the 5% level of significance). In that region each of the Center parties has its vote influenced, positively for the D.C. and negatively for all others. A look at Table 10 will show that the Christian

⁵It should be noted that the term "urbanization" as used here does not have the connotation commonly ascribed to that term in the United States. In Italy, urbanization does not necessarily imply industry or commerce; it frequently (particularly in the Mezzogiorno) means simply that great numbers of families live in a concentrated area. Farm workers (especially the sharecroppers and agricultural laborers) live in these urban areas and travel to the farms every day. These concentrations frequently achieve considerable size, but still are composed of essentially rural citizens. The urbanization variable is of use here in that it indicates the political effect of living in concentrations of five or more families.

TABLE 62

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION LIVING IN CITIES AND TOWNS

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.16	-.24	-.31	+.50	+.02
P.S.D.I.	+.13	-.21	-.10	-.54	-.22
P.L.I.	-.06	+.16	-.08	-.41	+.13
P.R.I.	-.22	+.20	-.45	-.54	-.23
P.C.I.	-.26	+.08	+.10	+.08	-.18
P.S.I.	+.14	-.22	-.09	+.07	-.33
P.N.M.	+.14	+.16	+.20	-.20	+.42
M.S.I.	+.32	+.40	+.13	+.12	+.47

Democrats are quite fortunate in this relationship; the Islands have the highest urbanization rate of any geographical area, the lowest percentage being 81.3%. The other Center parties, of course, are at a considerable disadvantage.

The only other correlations of interest are those of the Right, principally those of the M.S.I. The neo-Fascists achieve low to moderate positive figures in all regions and for the nation, while the Monarchists have a negative relationship only in the Islands. However, it is the consistency rather than the size of the correlations that makes this interesting. The explanation probably lies in the appeal of these parties, particularly the M.S.I., to voters with higher education and to those engaged in service and public administration occupations. These factors

presumably lead to a predisposition for city residence.

Despite these few correlations, it is evident that the percent of persons living in cities and towns has little effect on voting behavior in the provinces. This variable adds little to an understanding of party support in Italy.

If the correlations with the above variable are surprising in their lack of significance, those with the next variable are equally surprising because they are significant. This factor, the percent of persons in a province that is unmarried, widowed or divorced, provides some of the highest correlation figures obtained in the present study.

TABLE 63

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY VOTE AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE POPULATION THAT IS UNMARRIED, WIDOWED OR
DIVORCED

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.59	+.79	-.45	+.66	+.57
P.S.D.I.	-.08	-.08	+.34	-.35	+.13
P.L.I.	-.12	-.34	-.13	-.17	-.00
P.R.I.	-.18	-.05	-.22	-.26	-.28
P.C.I.	-.70	-.74	-.29	-.36	-.64
P.S.I.	-.47	-.35	+.09	-.18	-.29
P.N.M.	-.05	+.32	+.46	+.14	+.15
M.S.I.	-.03	+.32	+.03	-.49	-.02

As can be seen on the above table, only two parties have clear relationships with this variable, the D.C. and P.C.I. The Christian Democrats are affected more than any

other group, having high positive correlations over the nation and in every region except the South. The Communists have equally high negative correlations in the North and Center and for Italy as a whole and smaller figures in the South and Islands. For each party a high percentage of unmarried, widowed or divorced persons in a province appears to be a vital factor in determining vote.

Other parties, while not having high correlation figures, do present a pattern that indicates some relationship between their vote and this variable. Each of the minor-Center parties has low but negative correlations, the P.L.I. and P.R.I. in every region and for the nation as a whole and the P.S.D.I. in the North, Center and Islands. The P.S.I. is negative everywhere but in the South. The patterns for the parties of the Right are not so definite. The P.N.M. is generally positive while the M.S.I. has as its highest correlation, a $-.49$ in the Islands. The influence of this variable cannot be denied; explaining that influence, however, is not so easy as recognizing it.

On the surface it does not appear that there is a logical way to account for a high percentage of unmarried, widowed or divorced persons in a province indicating support for the D.C. to the virtual exclusion of all other parties (unless it could be postulated that married persons are more painfully aware of the limitations of the existent social system and, consequently, support the opposition.) The

only explanation that seems to fit the facts lies in the composition of the variable itself. Of the 15,142,013 persons (men 16 and over, women 14 and over) who were unmarried, widowed or divorced in Italy in 1951, only 2,990,795 fit into the two latter categories. In other words, 12,151,218 had never been married. Since it is quite likely the vast majority of these unmarried persons were under the age of 25, it appears that the governing factor may have been age.

A comparison of the marital status table with the age correlations lends support to this hypothesis. The D.C. has a positive correlation with both age categories below 25 except in the South (where it is positive with the 21-24 group). With marital status it is positive everywhere but the South. The P.C.I. is negatively related to the lower two age groupings in the North and Center with insignificant positive figures in the South and Islands. With marital status the Communists have very high negative correlations in the North and South and relatively insignificant negative figures in the Mezzogiorno. The M.S.I., the only party without a clear pattern with marital status has a wide regional variation with age. A juxtaposition of the age and marital status charts shows a very definite dependency of the latter on the former.

If this explanation of the influence of marital status is accepted, it becomes obvious that the only

variable of real importance discussed in this chapter is age. Urbanization has little, if any, influence and is probably dependent on other variables; marital status is dependent on age. It definitely appears, however, that age is a very important factor in the Italian political scene, and it must be taken into account if the vote received by each party is to be understood. Age joins education and occupation as a crucial variable.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

After completing the variable by variable analysis in the preceding chapter, it is now possible to present a picture of the socio-economic factors that provide optimum conditions for each political party. For several of the parties this picture is clear and lucid; for others the correlations are so low or contradictory that the party appeal is not intelligible in terms of the variables examined. Before giving this résumé of the factors that contribute to individual party success, however, there is one more group of relationships to discuss--those between the parties themselves.

While inter-party relationships are not of direct concern in a study of social and economic factors, it was thought that some further understanding of the Italian political party system might be obtained from such a discussion. As Tables 64-71 illustrate, however, very little information of value is found.

There are numerous correlations of significant size, but only rarely is any pattern shown. Most correlations probably are fortuitous and the result of regional factors

unrelated to the impact of one party upon another. The few patterns that do appear indicate negative relationships, i.e., as one party's vote goes up, another's goes down. The only two parties with a consistently positive relationship are the P.S.I. and P.C.I. (and here the correlations are only of moderate size). This merely indicates that both parties tend to be successful in the same provinces. A perusal of Table 12 will show that it is unusual for either the P.C.I. or P.S.I. to be markedly successful when the other has little support.

A second relationship that is interesting is that between the D.C. and the Left. As Table 64 shows, the Christian Democratic vote is severely affected in a negative manner by increased vote for the P.C.I. and, to a much less significant extent, the P.S.I. This points out what appears to be a polarization of vote between the two major parties of the Left and the major party of the Center. These three parties, between them, receive over 70% of the total vote cast in Italian elections and, as a result, a change in the vote of either the Left or the D.C. almost necessarily causes a change in the support for the other. In addition, certain Regions of Italy are inclined to vote Left in every election (e.g., Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria) and others are inclined to vote for the D.C. (e.g., Valle d'Aosta, Veneto, Udine and much of the South). The D.C.-P.C.I.-P.S.I. correlations in Table 64 merely reflect this inclination and

TABLE 64

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATS AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
P.S.D.I.	+.20	-.01	-.22	-.43	+.24
P.L.I.	+.14	+.14	+.43	-.57	+.05
P.R.I.	-.31	-.07	+.54	-.49	-.29
P.C.I.	-.73	-.80	-.27	+.05	-.68
P.S.I.	-.21	-.46	-.33	-.14	-.15
P.N.M.	+.17	+.37	-.46	-.32	-.03
M.S.I.	-.05	+.12	+.22	-.46	-.17

TABLE 65

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE SOCIAL
DEMOCRATS AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.20	-.01	-.22	-.43	+.24
P.L.I.	+.17	-.37	-.43	+.42	-.15
P.R.I.	-.30	+.03	+.18	+.24	-.15
P.C.I.	-.10	+.27	+.01	-.13	-.09
P.S.I.	-.10	-.04	+.09	-.14	+.33
P.N.M.	-.26	-.37	+.04	+.24	-.41
M.S.I.	-.06	-.59	+.14	-.19	-.60

TABLE 66

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE LIBERALS
AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.14	+.14	+.43	-.57	+.05
P.S.D.I.	+.17	-.37	-.43	+.42	-.15
P.R.I.	-.12	-.22	+.11	+.01	-.12
P.C.I.	-.17	-.28	-.67	-.44	+.31
P.S.I.	-.14	-.25	-.38	-.54	-.37
P.N.M.	+.42	+.30	-.12	+.54	+.42
M.S.I.	-.31	+.54	-.11	+.15	+.17

TABLE 67

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE REPUBLICANS
AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.31	-.07	+.54	-.49	-.29
P.S.D.I.	-.30	+.03	+.18	+.24	-.15
P.L.I.	-.12	-.22	+.11	+.01	-.12
P.C.I.	+.30	-.29	-.30	-.09	+.20
P.S.I.	-.16	+.18	+.03	+.34	+.08
P.N.M.	-.17	-.07	-.37	-.03	-.19
M.S.I.	-.11	+.03	+.33	+.11	-.01

TABLE 68

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE COMMUNISTS
AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.73	-.80	-.27	+.05	-.68
P.S.D.I.	-.10	+.27	+.01	-.13	-.09
P.L.I.	-.17	-.28	-.67	-.44	+.31
P.R.I.	+.30	-.29	-.30	-.09	+.20
P.S.I.	+.25	+.27	+.18	+.58	+.27
P.N.M.	-.53	-.37	-.42	-.85	-.33
M.S.I.	-.48	+.03	-.05	-.23	-.07

TABLE 69

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE SOCIALISTS
AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.21	-.46	-.33	-.14	-.15
P.S.D.I.	-.10	-.04	+.09	-.14	+.33
P.R.I.	-.16	+.18	+.03	+.34	+.08
P.C.I.	+.25	+.27	+.18	+.58	+.27
P.N.M.	-.26	-.71	-.42	-.56	-.65
M.S.I.	-.06	-.37	+.26	-.20	-.46

TABLE 70

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE MONARCHISTS
AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	+.17	+.37	-.46	-.32	-.03
P.S.D.I.	-.26	-.37	+.04	+.24	-.41
P.L.I.	+.42	+.30	-.12	+.54	+.42
P.R.I.	-.17	-.07	-.37	-.03	-.19
P.C.I.	-.53	-.37	-.42	-.85	-.33
P.S.I.	-.26	-.71	-.42	-.56	-.65
M.S.I.	-.26	+.70	-.54	+.36	+.43

TABLE 71

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE OF THE M.S.I.
AND THE VOTE OF OTHER PARTIES

Party	North	Center	South	Islands	Italy
D.C.	-.05	+.12	+.22	-.46	-.17
P.S.D.I.	-.06	-.59	+.14	-.19	-.60
P.L.I.	-.31	+.54	-.11	+.15	+.17
P.R.I.	-.11	+.03	+.13	+.11	+.01
P.C.I.	-.48	+.03	-.05	-.23	-.07
P.S.I.	-.06	-.37	+.26	-.20	-.46
P.N.M.	-.26	+.70	-.54	+.36	+.43

the polarization referred to above.

No such patterned relationships are revealed for the other parties. All Center parties have negative or insignificant relationships with the Left and mixed correlations with the Right. As Table 70 and 71 show, the rightist figures are definitely negative with the Left and are mixed with the Center. These relationships of the minor parties do not seem to be of particular importance, and, in fact, the usefulness of the inter-party correlations as a whole, to the present study is doubtful. These relationships cannot be included in the list of variables affecting party vote since presumably it is these other variables that cause the inter-party correlations to be what they are.¹

With this last series of relationships disposed of, a summary can now be made of the impact on each party of the variables discussed in earlier chapters. Since the influence of the party vote-variable relationships has been discussed previously, the party "portraits" presented below do not go into detail. The only exceptions to this are the descriptions of the two largest parties, the D.C. and the P.C.I.

¹ However, it must be recognized that the interparty relationships may actually affect the vote, e.g., strong P.C.I. support in a province may well cause a reaction in favor of the D.C. among independent voters.

Christian Democrats

As indicated in a previous chapter, the Christian Democrats are not dependent for votes upon areas where economic conditions are best (at least as of 1953). In fact, it is in provinces with low education and low income that support is greatest. The preeminent position of the D.C. party in agricultural areas, which are economically the poorest parts of Italy, is a further indication of this fact. It is when income goes up, when education passes the elementary level, that the Christian Democrats are in trouble. Actually, these facts are not surprising since they are in line with the D.C. support in previous elections.

However, there are some indications that the perpetuation of low economic and educational levels is not in the interests of the D.C. party. The correlations in preceding chapters indicate that the Christian Democratic vote is likely to be highest in areas where the poorest conditions exist. For example, Table 22 shows a clear positive relationship between the D.C. and agricultural provinces (which are, of course, the poorest provinces), but the decline of the Christian Democratic vote in these areas between 1948 and 1953 makes it probable that the correlations would have been even more definite in the former election. Further evidence of this point is the fact that the D.C. party suffered its greatest losses and

the Left made its greatest gains in the agricultural Mezzogiorno. However, in provinces where the embryonic land reform program had been implemented, the general trend of leftist gains was halted.²

There are other indications that improved economic conditions are imperative for the Christian Democrats if the support of the non-Center parties is to be cut. The LaPalombara-Waters study referred to in Chapter VIII gives evidence that youth is inclined to support the Christian Democrats. The age-party vote correlations reported in the same chapter indicate that "youthful" provinces (i.e., those with a high proportion of the population in the under-21 and 21-24 age groupings) are likely to favor the D.C. party. As the percentage of the population in the over-25 categories grows, however, the election prospects of the Christian Democrats decrease.

The evidence (as discussed in Chapter VIII) seems to show that the advent of maturity and experience with the economic facts of life cause a change in the political outlook of those who make up the youthful part of the population. The disillusionment that sets in as this maturity comes is a serious blow to the D.C.; if support (at the

² Francesco Compagna and Vittorio de Caprariis, Geografia delle Elezioni Italiane dal 1946 al 1953 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1954), pp. 53-56.

level indicated for the younger age groups) had continued past the age of 25, the Christian Democrats almost undoubtedly would have won their majority in 1953.³

In addition, there is a very grave question as to how long the support for the D.C. (as indicated by the youth study) even among the youth can continue unless the job market is expanded. It is quite possible that the age of disillusionment will drop and the radical youth thought to exist in Italy will actually appear if more jobs do not become available. If this should occur, negative rather than positive correlations might result with the below-25 groups (indicating a loss of support in provinces with a youthful age structure). This would be particularly damaging since the Christian Democrats already have moderate to low negative correlations with every category of ages from 25-65 in every geographical area but the South. It seems logical to say that the D.C. must retain the support of provinces with a youthful age structure if it is to continue as the leading party of Italy; at the same time, it must increase its appeal to provinces with older populations if it is to cut the opposition's strength.

³There is no evidence (or logic) to suggest that this switch occurs at or about the age of 25; it may well occur before or after that age--or never. The age of 25, however, is the lower end of the first category (25-34) that shows a negative relation to D.C. vote.

The only apparent way to accomplish this is by improving economic conditions. D.C. support is now centered in the poorer areas (particularly the Mezzogiorno), but this support presumably exists despite poor conditions rather than because of them. By improving the economy, the D.C. party could expect to hold on to these votes and, at the same time, cut down the number of protest votes going to the opposition. Maturing youth quite probably would retain its allegiance to the Christian Democrats if the future looked promising.

It is also probable that improved economic conditions would help cut the antipathy of the educated to the Christian Democrats. It was anticipated that education would work to the detriment of the D.C. party, and this expectation materialized. As Chapter VI indicates, any education past the elementary degree clearly inhibits the D.C. vote. People with comparatively advanced education are in the best position to perceive the flaws in the present economic structure and, at the same time, are most likely to resent a lack of opportunities for themselves.⁴ While there certainly are other reasons why these educated people do not support the Christian Democrats (e.g., dislike of a

⁴This is particularly the case in the Mezzogiorno. See Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955), pp. 198-199.

Catholic party), economic conditions undoubtedly play a major role when protest votes are cast.

Thus, while the Christian Democratic correlations indicate a reliance on provinces where depressed circumstances are the rule, future success may depend upon improved economic standards. The party cannot expect to cut the opposition's strength, or perhaps even hold its own, unless improvements are made. For the present (at least as of 1953), the Christian Democratic situation is as follows. The most important variables are age, occupation and education. The D.C. support is at its strongest in a province that has a high percentage of its population under the age of twenty-one (or twenty-five), engaged in agricultural employment and owning, at most, an elementary school degree. Favorable conditions which are secondary include high percentages of employment and home ownership. Provinces where unmarried persons make up a large proportion of the population are also likely to support the D.C.

The principal inhibiting factors in a province are a high percentage of persons engaged in public administration or service occupations and a high percentage of professionals and administrators. (These, of course, are in addition to education past the elementary level and age past twenty-five.) Secondary variables that hurt the D.C. are high per capita income and a large proportion of male illiterates.

In summation, it appears that the Christian Democratic vote is more influenced by socio-economic factors than that of any other party. If the social and economic structure of an Italian province is known in advance, the D.C. success or failure in that province might well be predicted.

Communists

When discussing the Christian Democrats it was pointed out that that party's strength is not located in the most advanced provinces. A far more surprising bit of information is that the P.C.I. does not necessarily depend upon poor economic conditions for its votes.

The general view of Communist support has always been that that party has its greatest appeal in depressed areas. This belief, in fact, was the basis of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan aid after World War II. Since that time, however, this belief in the vulnerability of communism to improved economic standards has lessened.⁵ The correlations discussed in previous chapters indicate that this lessening of belief has some basis in fact. For example, the P.C.I. correlation with per capita income shows that the party's chances of success go up as income rises.

⁵Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton, N.Y.: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 286.

The same relationship exists with education--generally positive with provinces with a high percentage of the population owning high school or more advanced degrees. In addition, the party has a generally positive relationship with non-agricultural independents, a group that cannot be considered underprivileged.

Another difference from the prevailing view of P.C.I. support is the lack of a positive correlation with youth and the existence of such correlations with older groups. As has been indicated several times before, the youth of Italy was assumed to be radically inclined, either from dissatisfaction with its future prospects⁶ or through the attractiveness of radical philosophies.⁷ Certainly the Communists enroll some youth into its organizations, but the correlations show that the P.C.I. electoral appeal does not come from provinces with a "young" structure. This, coupled with the economic variables discussed above, indicates that changes are due in the generally held image of the Communist voter.

However, indications also exist that the P.C.I. does have considerable attractiveness for those persons who

⁶Grindrod, op. cit., p. 223.

⁷Riccardo Bauer, "The Drama of Italian Youth," Nineteenth Century and After, CXLVI (July-December, 1949), pp.297-303.

are in unhappy circumstances. Negative correlations with persons per room, home ownership and high employment levels are evidence of this appeal. Even more indicative, however, are the data given above when discussing the Christian Democrats. Communist advancement in the South and Islands was greatest where conditions were worst and where the land reform program was not yet in effect; as said before, that advancement was halted in the few areas in which land had been distributed.

This points up a fact that has become increasingly apparent as the correlation tables were analyzed--there are considerable and seemingly crucial socio-economic and electoral variations between geographical regions. This variation is particularly noticeable between the two northern areas and the Mezzogiorno. The result is that a party can easily have two sorts of appeal, depending upon the area of the country.

While this is true to a greater or lesser extent for all parties, it is especially evident for the P.C.I. In the poorest regions, where the people expect little from the Center parties, the Communists have their traditional appeal to the depressed portions of the population--those who are crowded, those who own their own poor homes (often caves), those who are unemployed. In Italy, however, it appears that these people may not be ideologically committed and that concrete improvements in the economy may win their votes for the Center.

In the better areas, where income is high, where education and literacy are high, the P.C.I. still pulls votes, but probably from ideological motivation rather than from a protest against the Center. The Communists are still very strong among industrial workers (although their correlations with industrial provinces are not high for the reasons discussed in Chapter V above); as said before, these workers have not deserted the P.C.I. as their economic position has improved.

Consequently, the positive correlations between the P.C.I. and variables that contradict each other can be explained by this dual appeal. It is likely that the first type of appeal can be cut drastically if economic conditions (particularly in the poorer areas) improve. The latter, ideological, appeal, however, cannot be overcome easily or in the foreseeable future. In any case, it is necessary to know the location of the province as well as its socio-economic characteristics before predictions of Communist strength can be attempted.

These geographical differences, of course, influence the vote of other parties as well as the P.C.I. and make generalizations on vote-variable correlations dangerous. This should be remembered when reading the short summaries that follow.

Social Democrats

The Democratic Socialists have their best opportunities in provinces which have high per capita income, where the percentage of the population over the age of twenty-five is high and where persons with at least an elementary degree predominate. Industrial provinces with a high percentage of professionals and administrators are favorable. In addition, chances for a strong P.S.D.I. showing are slightly increased if there are high percentages of employment and home ownership.

This party is weak in agricultural provinces (although a high percentage of agricultural independents is favorable). Other inhibiting factors include high persons per room and urbanization rates. The P.S.D.I. also has less probability of securing a substantial vote in a province if persons under twenty-five and with no school degree make up a large proportion of the population. As would be expected from the negative relationship with the no school degree variable, the party is hurt by illiteracy and particularly by male illiteracy.

It was expected that the Social Democratic vote would be favorably affected by increased education, and the correlations confirm this belief. This party is hurt more than any other if the educational level in a province is low. The negative correlations with the under-25 age

categories is also not particularly surprising since the P.S.D.I.'s rather limited appeal was not expected to be to this group. (It is interesting to note, however, that the LaPalombara-Waters study found youth favoring this party at a considerably higher rate than did the general electorate in 1958.)

Liberals

The Liberals have comparatively few positive correlations, fewer, in fact, than any party except the Republicans. They are most successful in agricultural provinces, particularly where employment is high. The P.L.I. has few relationships with age but tends to be better off with ages of twenty-five and up. Provinces with a high percentage of home ownership, and those where a high proportion of the population has at least an elementary degree are also favorable. These correlations fit the picture that was generally held of Liberal support. The most conservative of the Center parties, the P.L.I.'s slight appeal is to the older, educated part of the population which can see a reason for supporting such a minority party.

The Liberals are weakest in industrial provinces and in those where urbanization is high. They also have negative relationships with the lowest educational level, the no degree group. This negative relationship is repeated for male illiteracy (but not for illiteracy in general).

Consequently, the Liberals could expect little support in provinces where low education prevailed. In addition, the P.L.I. vote is slightly limited in provinces where unmarried persons make up a considerable proportion of the population. (This, quite probably, is due to the negative tendency toward "young" provinces.) It is obvious that these many negative factors severely limit the electoral prospects of the Liberals. It must be recognized, however, that the P.L.I. is a very minor party with very little support over the nation. The reasons for supporting it are few--the most important of which may be tradition. Consequently, its negative correlations may very well be the natural result of a general lack of support rather than the effect of socio-economic factors.

Republicans

Actually, the same reasoning applies to the last Center party, the P.R.I. This is also a very small party, and its electoral support is minute. Its appeal is so small that it is doubtful if socio-economic factors play any significant role in securing support; as with the Liberals, its following is probably based largely on tradition and remembrance of the past. In any case, the Republicans, as indicated above, have the fewest positive relationships of any party. Actually, the only factor that favors the P.R.I. is a high percentage of the population over the age

of twenty-one. (This, of course, includes most of the population, but the negative relationships with many other variables cancel this advantage.) The Republican chances are also slightly enhanced by agricultural independence and home ownership. They are also aided in the North by high percentages of illiterate and no degree persons, but have little relationship with education in other areas.

The Republican's chances are severely limited in provinces where the persons per room and urbanization rates are high and where a large percentage of the populace is under twenty-one and unmarried. In addition, this is one of the few parties for which the civilization index shows a relationship--negative in this case. It is obvious that if the P.L.I. has few provinces that can approach the optimum, the P.R.I. has even fewer.

Socialists

The ideal province for the Socialists is primarily industrial and has a high per capita income. A large proportion of "no degree" persons and male illiterates in the population is advantageous to a limited extent. (However, as the income and occupation correlations with education show, no single province in Italy is likely to have all these attributes, i.e., a province with a high percentage of persons without degrees is unlikely to be industrial or to have a high per capita income.) A high

percentage of persons over twenty-five also inclines a province to be favorable to the P.S.I.

The Socialist chances are lessened if the province is predominantly agricultural. Other limiting factors include a high persons per room rate along with high percentages of home ownership, unmarried persons and persons under twenty-five.

The P.S.I. is similar to the P.C.I. in that it appeals to two types of provinces; those with industry, high income, a low persons per room rate and an older population (all attributes, more often, of the North and Center), and those with low education, youth, unmarried persons and home ownership (which generally are attributes of the South and Islands). The negative relationship with agricultural employment presumably limits the gains made in the latter type of province and accounts, in part, for the comparatively low Socialist vote in the South.

Monarchists

The factors that make a province ideal for the Monarchists fit together in a logical pattern. A relatively high percentage of the population engaged in service and public administration occupations is favorable, particularly if professionals and administrators are numerous. These occupations lead naturally to high urbanization and persons per room rates. A high proportion of the population in the

unmarried and under twenty-one categories is also advantageous. There is a slight tendency to be aided by home ownership in the North and Center, but this factor is damaging in the South and Islands.

Other limiting factors include high per capita income and high percentages of elementary degrees and persons over twenty-five. The relationships with these variables are mixed or very slight and the picture is not clear. With age, for example, the trend is negative above twenty-five, but significant positive correlations do exist. With education, the relationship is clearly negative with elementary degrees but mixed above and below that level. The impact of these variables is difficult to measure, but the limiting effect would appear to be marginal.

The most surprising of the Monarchist correlations are the ones related to age. It was expected that the P.N.M. would have its strongest appeal to older persons who remembered the King--there should have been little appeal in provinces with a youthful age structure. It should be remembered, however, that the older voters in these "youthful" provinces may have been the cause of the positive correlations, i.e., they may have tended to vote as a bloc for the P.N.M., perhaps even as a reaction to the youthfulness of the province.

A second explanation, that also partly accounts for the largely mixed correlations of the P.N.M., is that that

party received many votes from Catholics in protest against the Christian Democrats. It will be recalled that the P.C.I. urged dissatisfied Catholics to support the Monarchists if their religion prevented a Communist vote. These votes, if at all numerous, would greatly distort the socio-economic correlations of the P.N.M. The extent to which this actually occurred, unfortunately, cannot be measured, but it seems likely that the correlations would be clearer if the protest votes of this type could be isolated from the P.N.M. figures.

Neo-Fascists

The M.S.I. has almost the same favorable factors as the Monarchists, but are negative with more variables. As with the P.N.M., the M.S.I. is at its best in provinces where service and public administration employment make up a relatively large proportion of the working force. A high percentage of professionals and administrators is slightly favorable. In addition, high persons per room and urbanization rates are advantageous.

There is no clear picture of the age and education factors which most favor the M.S.I. The relationship with age is mixed with the below-21 category, favorable with the 21-24 grouping and generally negative above. The M.S.I. has a negative relationship with elementary degrees, but with the other education variables only a trend is evident-- a tendency to be negative with "no degree" and positive

with intermediate and above.

Other negative factors include high per capita income, unmarried status and a high percentage of agricultural independents. There is a slight tendency to be hurt by high employment. It is quite obvious that the M.S.I. vote is more inhibited than aided by the socio-economic factors discussed in this study. (This presumably held down its vote in 1953 and accounts, in part at least, for the slight drop in M.S.I. support in 1958--from 5.8% to 4.8%, as shown in Chapter VIII.)

In general, these correlations were expected. For example, the bureaucracy is known to favor the M.S.I. to a considerable extent, particularly in the South. In that area the civil service is largely staffed by disgruntled persons who are educated for professions but who cannot find jobs. These positive correlations with public administration and "advanced" education are logical. The only correlations that are not what might have been expected are those relating to age.

Most writers on the subject assume that M.S.I. support is basically among the youth.⁸ The correlations in the present work and the LaPalombara-Waters youth study cast some doubt on this belief. The latter study indicates

⁸Ibid.,; Mario Rossi, "Neo-Fascism in Italy," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXIX, No. 4 (1953), pp. 506-507.

that youth supports this party in approximately the same degree as does the general population. The correlations show, at most, a tendency for the expected pattern to develop. Certainly there is no clear evidence to prove that M.S.I. support basically comes from "youthful" provinces. (This, of course, does not necessarily indicate that young voters do not vote for the neo-Fascists.)

Overall Variable Impact

The above summaries (and the earlier discussions) show that the influence of socio-economic factors on party vote varies widely, depending principally upon the party being discussed. This variation is in the number of factors influencing the vote and the intensity of that influence. Certain of the variables discussed, however, are much more productive than others. Some produce surprises in the impact they have on the electoral results; others produce equally great surprises in their lack of impact. Perhaps a final summary of the important variables would be illuminating.

The unemployment variable was expected to provide considerable insight into voter motivation, particularly as it pertains to the Christian Democrats. As Table 18 shows, however, virtually no significant correlations result from this analysis. It appears that the level of employment has little actual effect on electoral outcome.

The occupation of the voter, however, seems to have considerable impact. Almost all parties have definite correlations with one or more of the occupational categories. In general, these correlations were expected (e.g., positive correlations between the vote of the Right and service and public administration occupations). The most surprising finding related to this variable has to do with the two major parties, the D.C. and P.C.I., in the North. In that region the Christian Democrats have a positive relationship with industry and negative correlations with agriculture. The Communists have precisely the opposite relationships. The P.C.I. finds its greatest support in agricultural provinces such as Emilia-Romagna while the D.C. party pulls votes where manufacturing is heavy (although not necessarily from the actual workers themselves.).

The next major variable discussed was education. This turned out to be one of the most important subjects analyzed. It appears that when a high proportion of the population of a province has a moderate (i.e., elementary) education, that province is inclined to vote for the Center. Less education (and illiteracy) inclines a province toward the Left; more education brings on a mixed relationship. Actually, the correlations on education indicate that the efforts being made to cut illiteracy and provide at least an elementary education for most Italians could eventually result in greater support for the Center.

The fourth major category of variables has to do with economic status, the principal factor being per capita income. As Table 40 shows, correlations between income and party vote are quite definite, particularly for the D.C. and P.C.I. The peculiar fact is that they indicate that the Communist vote is likely to rise as income goes up; conversely, the Christian Democratic vote rises as income drops. Further analysis seems to indicate, however, that per capita income is clearly a dependent variable and that the correlations actually indicate the impact of education and occupation rather than income (i.e., income depends upon education and occupation). The surprising result is that income per se can largely be discounted in assessing the effect of socio-economic factors on the election.

The final major variable is age, a variable that joins education and occupation as the most important subjects analyzed. Perhaps the most interesting fact revealed by the age-party vote tables is that almost every party has a specific age category at which its relationship switches from positive to negative (or vice versa). At one end of the age scale the party is supported; at the other it is not. The most surprising fact revealed by these tables has to do with the lack of radical feeling among the youth and has been discussed several times before. Sufficient to say here that the age structure of a province plays a major role in determining the relative success of a political party.

There are two other findings of importance which come out of the present study; first, the influence of a high vote on the prospects of the Christian Democrats and, second, the major difference that appears between the two northern areas and the Mezzogiorno.

The first of these was discussed in Chapter III. Political writers before the 1953 election were unanimous in their belief that the higher the vote the better the chances of the D.C. (and the other Center parties). However, the correlation tables show that in 1953 the Christian Democrats had a negative relationship with a high vote and, thus, found their percentage declining as the total vote rose. Conversely, the opposition was favorably affected by a greater turnout.

The conclusion to be reached from this is that there is, for the D.C. party, an optimum point between the very low total vote of 1951-52 and the very high vote of 1953. Below that point the more regimented (or dedicated) supporters of the Left and Right easily outnumber those of the Christian Democrats. Above that point a new element enters that appears to be uncommitted and, perhaps, inclined to cast protest votes (e.g., against the Scelba Law). The optimum point would seem to be somewhere around the voter turnout of 1948. The simple statement that the D.C. party's vote goes up as the turnout gets larger definitely needs to be revised.

The second finding of this type has to do with the tremendous differences in voting motivation between the Mezzogiorno and the North-Center. For almost every variable analyzed there is a clear line of distinction between the two areas, almost as if two different countries are being discussed.

In actuality, of course, this concept of two different countries is not far from the truth. Even the most cursory examination of the major variable tables (i.e., Tables 17, 21, 29, 38 and 47) cannot help but indicate that the differences between the areas are basic and that similar voter motivation is not to be expected. In every economic aspect the Mezzogiorno is poorer; in every social variable, it is different. The natural result is that all the major parties (and to a lesser extent the minor ones) have what amounts to two types of appeal (as discussed above with the P.C.I.). This variation in appeal, of course, puts a premium on parties that can stand for diverse programs, depending upon the geographical region. For example, the separate wings of the Christian Democratic party (as discussed in Chapter II) undoubtedly aid in securing nationwide support by saying just what the voters in each area wish to hear. (Of course, the Catholic Church also helps the D.C. party pull votes in all areas.) Certainly the ability of the P.C.I. to adjust its stand to circumstances and location is a considerable advantage. This varying

motivation in voting may also partly explain the failure of most of the minor parties to achieve uniform support over the country--they frequently have a comparatively rigid philosophy that is not adaptable to regional differences.

The meaning, for the present study, of these geographical variations is that generalizations on voter motivation are likely to apply to only one-half of the country. At the same time, these variations practically negate the usefulness of the correlations based on Italy as a whole. Saying, for example, that a party has a positive national correlation with a variable means little if the equivalent correlations for the South and Islands are negative. Thus, the geographical region must be known before an accurate statement can be made about voter motivation.

Conclusion

With the party "portraits" and the general impact of socio-economic variables summarized, it is now possible to make a final comment on the usefulness of the study and the correlation method of approach. The above summaries and the analyses in the preceding chapters indicate that knowing the socio-economic environment that exists in a province will tell a great deal about the probable electoral outcome in that province. While age, occupation and education undoubtedly provide the clearest insight into and

give the most understanding of Italian politics, almost all the variables discussed contribute to the final picture.

It appears that correlational analysis of elections is very efficacious for Italy and that further studies of this type would contribute greatly to an understanding of that country's politics. While, as has been pointed out before, the positive and negative correlations between party vote and the individual factors do not show causation, this matters little in assessing the value of this approach to interpreting Italian elections. It is enough to be able to say that socio-economic factors act as indicators of probable vote. That age, education and occupation are the variables that actually cause the vote to be distributed as it is cannot be proved, but if, in a province, the average age, the percentage of persons in each educational category and the proportion of the population in various occupational groupings are known, the potential of each party in the following election can be estimated with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

Of perhaps greater importance than predictability, the electoral results can be analyzed after an election to determine precisely the elements of the population for which the various parties did or did not have appeal. A prime example of data to be derived from such an analysis is the relationship between Christian Democratic vote and

age; the concentration of support in "young" provinces and the sudden adverse swing at the 25-34 age category is certainly crucial information for the D.C. The value of this type of knowledge to a party, particularly in its efforts to retain its supporters while seeking converts, is obvious. No other system of analysis (with the exception of time consuming and expensive surveys) can present this information as clearly and succinctly as statistical correlations.

Thus, for Italy, at least, the evidence seems to be that socio-economic factors provide a considerable amount of voter motivation in elections and that correlational analysis of electoral returns can give a good picture of the particular variables that influence the vote of each party. Since the present study covers only the one election, 1953, there is some question as to the permanency of the relationships discovered; no answer to this question can be found unless similar analyses are made of other censuses and other elections. For the present, however, it is clear that the correlations described in preceding chapters give considerable insight into the electoral process in Italy and provide information that was never available before. Certainly the relationships discussed must be studied if voter motivation in Italy is to be understood. They do not provide a complete picture in themselves, but the picture is not complete without them.

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