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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF VERBAL CUEING AND INITIAL ETHOS UPON PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION, RETENTION, ATTITUDE CHANGE, AND TERMINAL ETHOS

By

James Franklin Weaver

This study was designed to answer two overriding questions: First, what are the effects of verbal cueing? Second, what are the effects of initial *ethos*? Given a well-organized message, are there any advantages to high-lighting or emphasizing the organizational pattern? At the other extreme, might bad cueing prove disadvantageous? Might the credibility of the source produce any interaction or main effects.

In an effort to avoid any of the effects that oral presentation might have on the results, a written message was employed. Three versions of the speech were devised, exemplifying accurate cueing (good use of the preview, sign post language, internal summaries, and a

final summary), no cueing, and inaccurate cueing. Each version of the written message was attributed to a high-credible source and a low-credible source.

The 242 subjects, students enrolled in public speaking courses at Iowa State University during the first summer session, 1969, were randomly exposed to one of the six treatments. The effects of verbal cueing and initial credibility upon four dependent variables were measured: perceived organization, retention, attitude change, and terminal ethos.

Specifically, sixteen hypotheses were tested:

H_1a: Accurate cueing produces higher perceived organization of the message than does no cueing.

H_1b: Accurate cueing produces higher perceived organization of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_1c: No cueing produces higher perceived organization of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_2: High credibility produces higher perceived organization of the message than does low credibility.

H_3a: Accurate cueing produces more retention of the message than does no cueing.

H_3b: Accurate cueing produces more retention of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_3c: No cueing produces more retention of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_4: High credibility produces more retention of the message than does low credibility.

H_5a: Accurate cueing produces more positive attitude change than does no cueing.

H_5b: Accurate cueing produces more positive attitude change than does inaccurate cueing.

H_5c: No cueing produces more positive attitude change than does inaccurate cueing.

H_6: High credibility produces more positive attitude change than does no cueing.

H_7a: Accurate cueing produces higher terminal *ethos* than does no cueing.

H_7b: Accurate cueing produces higher terminal *ethos* than does inaccurate cueing.

H_7c: No cueing produces higher terminal *ethos* than does inaccurate cueing.

H_8: High credibility (initial *ethos*) produces higher terminal *ethos* than does low credibility.

Results of analysis of variance revealed a significant cueing effect upon perceived organization and retention of the message. Analysis of variance revealed a significant credibility effect upon attitude change and terminal *ethos*. Where analysis of variance showed a significant F, *t*-tests were employed to find significant differences between the effects of the versions of the message.

Support was found for the following hypotheses:

H_1a: Accurate cueing produces higher perceived organization (and clarity) of the message than does no cueing.

H_3b: Accurate cueing produces more retention of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_3c: No cueing produces more retention of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_6: High credibility produces more positive attitude change than does low credibility.

H_8: High credibility (initial *ethos*) produces higher terminal *ethos* than does low credibility.

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DEDICATION

--to my parents who sparked my interest
in experimental research when they
taught me how to count.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem and Purpose

From the earliest writing on rhetoric, the importance of the arrangement or organization of a message has been recognized. The development of the first systematic treatment of rhetoric is generally attributed to Corax and his pupil Tisias, both Sicilian Greeks. Thonssen and Baird (1948) describe organization as one of the main contributions of this earliest theoretic Greek book.

> Corax's system of rhetoric had three distinctive features, each of which contributed materially to the modern conception of speech theory: (1) It defined rhetoric . . . . (2) Arrangement of material received the first formal consideration . . . . (3) Corax showed how *probability* applied to rhetorical invention . . . (p. 35).

According to the classical tradition, as set forth in the *ad Herennium*, all rhetoric is divided into five parts: invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and delivery. What the Greeks called *taxis*, the Latins referred to as _dispositio_. It has been defined as that constituent of rhetoric which "covers the concept of arrangement, of orderly planning and movement of the whole idea" (Thonssen and Baird, p. 79).

Classical references tend to dwell on one main issue: How many parts should a message contain? A fairly faithful reproduction of the more complex classical division is found in the late nineteenth-century speech plan discussed by Charles Coppens. He says that

> the following parts may appear in an oration: introduction or exordium, narration or explanation, proposition, division, proofs or argumentation, pathetic (or emotional excitement), and conclusion or peroration (Coppens, 1885, p. 107).

In the _Rhetoric_ Aristotle wrote:

> A speech has two parts. Necessarily, you state your case, and you prove it. Thus we cannot state a case and omit to prove it, or prove a case without first stating it; one who proves must have something to prove, and one who advances a statement does so for the sake of proving it . . . . Well, then, the indispensable consituents are simply the Statement and the ensuing Argument. These are the essential elements of a speech; at most, the parts cannot exceed four--Proem, Statement, Argument, and Epilogue (Cooper, 1960, p. 200).

Over the centuries rhetoricians have suggested that a speech ought to contain from two to seven or eight main parts. At the present time, with the possible exception of those who follow Monroe's Motivated Sequence (Monroe, 1964, p. 208), quite typically, a speech is thought to contain three parts: introduction, body, and conclusion. Plato's advice parallels this modern practice, when in the <u>Phaedrus</u> he has Socrates say:

> But this at least I think you will allow, that every speech ought to be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own, so as to be neither without head, nor without feet, but to have both a middle and extremities described proportionally to each other and to the whole (Thonssen, 1942, p. 29).

The classical writers had other advice concerning the arrangement of the message. In Book VII of his <u>Institutes of Oratory</u>, Quintilian wrote:

> As to what concerns the accuser, I do not altogether dissent from Celsus, who, doubtless following Cicero, persists in maintaining somewhat too positively, on this head, that strong arguments should be advanced in the first place, the strongest of all in the last, and the weaker in the middle; because the judge requires to be moved at the beginning, and pressed forcibly at the end. But on the side of the accused, the strongest argument against him must first be attacked, lest the judge, looking to that point, should regard with too little favour our establishment of other points. Yet this order may occasionally be changed, if the lighter points be evidently false, and the refutation of the heaviest charge extremly difficult; so that, after thus detracting from the credit of the

> accusers, we may proceed to the last point, when the judge is ready to suppose that <u>all</u> the charges may be false (Thonssen, 1942, pp. 133-34).

Besides the number of parts a speech should contain, and the best order for the arguments, there were other concerns expressed by the classical writers. Quintilian offered suggestions about the coherence or flow between the parts of a speech.

> There remains then only the arrangement of <u>parts</u>; and in the parts themselves there must be some one thought first, another second, another third, and so on; and we must take care that these thoughts be not merely placed in a certain order, but that they be also connected one with another, cohering so closely that no joining may appear between them; so that they may form a body, and not a mere collection of members. This object will be attained, if we take care to observe what is suitable for each place, and study to bring together words that will not combat but embrace each other. Thus different things will not seem hurried together from distant parts, all strangers one to another, but will unite themselves, in a sure bond and alliance, with those that precede and those that follow; and our speech will appear not merely a combination of phrases, but all of a piece (Thonssen, 1942, p. 136).

Contemporary public speaking textbooks present at least a chapter of advice to the speaker on the organization of a communicative message. Arrangement has maintained its place of importance through the centuries, good organization being regarded as absolutely essential. "Without reasonable organization, oral messages simply do not come across" (Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell, 1969, p. 179).

The justification for organization is ever present.

> Essentially, we organize what we say in speaking because (1) we want to make sense and (2) we recognize the need within our listeners for a psychological feeling of unity. What we have to say--particularly in speaking at any length--arouses no meaning or at least not our intended meaning within the listener unless we organize the message so that the listener can form within himself a pattern that both reasonably satisfies him and reflects the source's meaning. The importance of order or structure in this sense has long been recognized by rhetorical theorists (Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell, p. 180).

The value of organization exists both for the speaker and for the listener. Strother (1968) listed at least four benefits of organization for the speaker.

> A sense of order enables the speaker to put all parts of his speech in their proper relationship. It enables him to use each idea in its most logical and advantageous place. It enables him to detect the weak spots in development of his speech and to shore them up with additional materials. And at the moment of speaking, this concern with order helps the speaker stick with his ideas (p. 127).

Monroe (1964) indicated that the listener, too, benefits from a well-organized message.

> Always arrange the points in your speech in a systematic sequence so that one idea leads naturally into the next. Not only will such an order make it easier for you to remember what you planned to say, but it also will enable your audience to follow your thoughts more readily (p. 138).

Strother (1968) implied that clear organization is almost an ethical necessity.

> By the use of good organization, the effective speaker reveals much more than the clarity of his ideas. He reveals both the nature and the sources of his evidence. Further, he indirectly reveals a sense of honesty. He implies: "I make no attempt to send up a smoke screen to hide the issues. I want us to meet them head on" (p. 15).

The communicator's job is not completed when the message is cast into outline form. Even the best outline, on paper or in the mind of the speaker, will not guarantee that the receiver will be able to follow clearly the speaker's ideas. The next, and perhaps most important, task is to <u>present</u> the message in an organized fashion so that the receiver can follow easily the pattern of the speaker's message. Ideally, the audience should be able to "see" the pattern of organization as the speaker delivers the speech.

> If the speech pattern is clear, it shows them [the listeners] the progression and relative importance of ideas. It should also make clear the general speech purpose. Unity and coherence in the speech are perceived by the way the materials are arranged. Much of the persuasive quality of a speech also comes from effective arrangement of ideas . . . . Therefore, we need to plan speech content so that the order is easily seen (Anderson, Lewis, and Murray, 1964, p. 243).

While some rhetoricians would lead us to believe that a carefully planned outline is enough to assure clarity for the audience, this investigator believes that for maximum clarity more than a well-outlined message is required. During the presentation, certain factors must be included in the message to help guide the listener. Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell (1969) suggested:

> Remember that the speech plan is an outline of what the speaker intends to say, not a manuscript, and it is frequently necessary to supply transitional statements in order to clarify the intended meaning for the speaker and to remind him of his obligation to be clear to his listeners (p. 201).

Strother corroborates, "It is not enough that the speaker's meaning be clear in his own mind; he must make it clear to his audience or fail to achieve his purpose" (p. 142).

There are at least four ways of clarifying the organizational pattern of the message for the audience: initial summary, transitions, internal summaries, and a closing summary. One of the most common methods of clarification is the use of the initial summary, preview, or forecast of what is to follow.

Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell wrote:

> Sometimes a speaker, after acknowledging his hosts or referring to the occasion, tells his listeners what his major points will be . . . (p. 197).

McCroskey (1968) offered similar advice when he stated: "There are three main functions an introduction may serve--to arouse audience attention, to enhance the ethos of the source, to preview the body of the message" (p. 188).

Monroe justified the preview when he wrote:

> The initial summary provides a skeleton around which to group your facts and indicates the relationship each idea bears to the others. It also helps your listeners to follow your pattern of development--to see clearly where your speech is going . . . . The initial summary should be brief and simple, since a complex statement is difficult to remember and needlessly repetitive. Moreover, the order of points which it announces should be followed exactly in the presentation of the information or the listener will be confused (pp. 187-88).

There certainly seems to be ample support for the inclusion of this first method of verbal cueing.

Second, the speech textbooks suggest the use of the transition. Typical of the advice which is given is that by Dickens (1954) when he wrote:

> During the delivery of the sppech the function of your transitions is to show the listeners how each part fits into the scheme of the speech . . . . The relationship among points is clearer to the speaker than to the listeners. In the first place, the speaker can see the points, all labeled and indented, as he reads his outline. The listener can only hear them--he cannot pause to think about the relationship involved or go back and relisten; he must perceive the relationship instantaneously. In the second place, the speaker has been through the mental processes of preparing the speech and may forget that what seems clear to him now was not clear earlier. The listener has no such advantage . . . . Therefore, transition statements should be scattered liberally throughout the speech . . . (p. 305).

Monroe stressed the importance of the relationship between the preview and the transition when he said:

> As you advance from one point to the next, use connective sentences or phrases to emphasize the transition; if you use an initial summary, relate each new point to the plan you announced there (p. 188).

Bryant and Wallace (1960) in discussing transitions, advocate use of signpost language.

> <u>Use signpost devices</u>. Number the main heads: <u>First, Second, Third</u>, and so on. Variations of this are: <u>In the first place</u>, <u>The first step</u>, <u>The first matter to be discussed is</u> . . . , <u>Let us first discuss</u> . . . . Although such labels may seem obvious and somewhat wooden here alone on the page, usually they are not distractingly obvious in a speech (p. 184).

A third method of verbally cueing the organizational pattern is the internal summary. Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell remind us that "the speech plan, in outline form, does not in itself help the speaker or the listener to keep in mind what has been said in a previous section of the speech as they move together to another section." Therefore, an internal summary is necessary (p. 201).

Andersch and Staats (1960) offered similar advice when they wrote:

> Give your audience time to adjust its thinking to the new idea after filing away the old. You may wish to summarize briefly the point you have just made and then point to the new idea in your transitional statement (p. 128).

Soper (1963) concurs with the statement,

> Restatement in most cases serves as <u>internal summary</u>--a restating of a main head or subhead after it has been developed through exposition or evidence. Internal summary is vital in most speeches, particularly if the organization is complex or the subject matter involved or abstract (p. 77).

A fourth, and final, method of verbal cueing is use of the final summary. This is the last chance for the speaker clearly to impress the organizational pattern upon the listener's mind. Strother indicates that there are several purposes of the conclusion in a speech.

> The conclusion of a speech also serves a specific purpose: to summarize or underscore the main ideas in the speech, to appeal for action, to elicit sympathy or understanding, or to add a note of finality and climax . . . (p. 175). Even though a speaker has a single controlling motive for presenting his speech, he will frequently summarize each of the major subdivisions (pp. 179-80).

Bryant and Wallace (1960) strongly suggest that the speaker include a final summary in his speech.

> Some kind of summary is necessary, and we urge that the beginning speaker not leave its formulation to the spur of the moment. Any hearer will welcome a summary, because the summary appeals to his sense of order and proportion; the speech as a whole, the multitude of stimulus-ideas he has heard, suddenly are revealed again as orderly and systematic, rather than chaotic (p. 182).

Brigance (1961) advocated and justified the use of a final summary when he wrote:

> If the speech is complex, or if the speaker's purpose is to present information, then you had best draw together the important points in condensed and unified form. "If you can sum up your arguments," said J. H. Gardner, so that listeners "will go off

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> and unconsciously retail your points to their neighbors, you probably have them." Likewise, if you can sum up your information so that listeners can carry it away in condensed and unified form, they likely will remember it (p. 244).

Thus we have seen four methods of clarifying the organizational pattern of the message: a preview, transitions, internal summaries, and a final summary.

Up to this point the writer has been concerned with four points. First, an attempt has been made to show that organization or _dispositio_ has been an important element of rhetoric both to classical and contemporary writers. Second, it has been pointed out that organization has a value to both source and receiver. Third, it should be the goal of the communicator to help the listener "see" the organizational pattern of the message. Finally, there are at least four methods which can be used to assist the listener follow the structure of the message.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of verbal cueing and initial _ethos_ of the speaker upon the receiver's perception of the organization of the message, the receiver's retention of the message, the attitude of the receiver, and the terminal ethos of the speaker. For purposes of this study the following definitions shall be used:

1. Verbal cueing--highlighting or emphasizing the organizational pattern of the message through the use of a preview, transitions, internal summaries, and a closing summary.

2. Initial ethos--the attitude or perception of the audience toward the source at the beginning of the communicative act.

3. Perceived organization--the evaluation of the organizational pattern of the message.

4. Retention--the ability to recognize and recall specific facts presented in a message.

5. Attitude--the tendency or predisposition to respond favorably or unfavorably toward an object or class of objects.

6. Terminal ethos--the attitude or perception of the audience toward the source of communication at the end of a communicative act.

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The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to five items: a) a statement of hypotheses, b) a justification of the project, c) the limitations imposed, d) a review of the relevant experimental literature, and e) a final summary.

Statement of Hypotheses

The use of two independent variables--verbal cueing and initial *ethos*, and four dependent variables--perceived organization, retention, attitude, and terminal *ethos*--results in the following hypotheses:

H_1: Accurate cueing (AC) produces higher perceived organization of the message than does no cueing (NC) or inaccurate cueing (IC) and no cueing produces higher perceived organization and does inaccurate cueing.

- H_1a: Accurate cueing produces higher perceived organization of the message than does no cueing.
- H_1b: Accurate cueing produces higher perceived organization of the message than does inaccurate cueing.
- H_1c: No cueing produces higher perceived organization of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_2: High credibility produces higher perceived organization of the message than does low credibility.

H_3: Accurate cueing produces more retention of the message than does no cueing or inaccurate cueing and no cueing produces more retention of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_3a: Accurate cueing produces more retention of the message than does no cueing.

H_3b: Accurate cueing produces more retention of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_3c: No cueing produces more retention of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_4: High credibility produces more retention of the message than does low credibility.

H_5: Accurate cueing produces more positive attitude change (in the direction advocated by the speaker) than does no cueing or inaccurate cueing and no cueing produces more positive attitude change than does inaccurate cueing.

H_5a: Accurate cueing produces more positive attitude change than does no cueing.

H_5b: Accurate cueing produces more positive attitude change than does inaccurate cueing.

H_5c: No cueing produces more positive attitude change than does inaccurate cueing.

H_6: High credibility produces more positive attitude change (in the direction advocated by the speaker) than does no cueing.

H_7: Accurate cueing produces higher terminal <u>ethos</u> than does no cueing or inaccurate cueing and no cueing produces higher terminal <u>ethos</u> than does inaccurate cueing.

H_7a: Accurate cueing produces higher terminal *ethos* than does no cueing.

H_7b: Accurate cueing produces higher terminal *ethos* than does inaccurate cueing.

H_7c: No cueing produces higher terminal *ethos* than does inaccurate cueing.

H_8: High credibility (initial *ethos*) produces higher terminal *ethos* than does low credibility.

Justification of the Project

At this point there should be little doubt in the reader's mind that the arrangement of a speech is an integral part of rhetorical theory. What was true when the systematic development of rhetoric was beginning, is just as true in 1969. In the preceding pages a rough attempt has been made to justify this project. The purpose of this investigation, as stated above, is to examine the specific effects of the methods of clarifying the structure of the message (verbal cueing) and initial *ethos* upon the listener. This research project in its present form seems justified for three reasons.

First, a good amount of advice is available to the student of public speaking concerning methods of verbal cueing. Wayne Thompson in his Fundamentals of Communication (1957) reports that an old time parson once commented, "First I tells 'em where we're going. Then I tells 'em where we is. And then I tells 'em where we's done been!" (p. 262) Other recent texts seem to echo this advice.

> By following a well-planned outline, the speaker continually indicates the direction and progress of his thought. Every succeeding idea is related to the previous one, builds on it, and inevitably leads to the next. As he speaks, his audience is able to follow the development of his ideas, relate them properly, and see clearly where the speech is leading (Strother, p. 142).

Monroe puts the point more succinctly.

> Keep the audience constantly aware of where you are, where you have been, and where you are heading (p. 188).

One reason for pursuing the present research is to answer the simple question: Is such advice justified? Do the methods of verbal cueing have any effect upon the listener?

Second, the present project can be justified as an attempt to affirm or negate the reservations concerning the use of verbal cueing. Up to this point the writer has tried to report accurately the intent of contemporary rhetoricians concerning the use of verbal cueing. There are, however, some reservations lurking between the lines of advice which these writers quoted have suggested. These reservations provide principal justification for the present study.

The advice concerning the use of the preview seems to depend upon the purpose of the communicator, whether the intent is informative or persuasive. Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell wrote: "If the purpose of the talk permits, the speaker should also work a 'preview' of the purpose into the introduction" (p. 198).

Based on research by Kiesler and Kiesler (1964), McCroskey (1968) suggests "that the communicator often should not preview the body of the message in his introduction if the audience is not yet aware of his persuasive intent" (p. 190). Is it possible that a preview might actually hinder persuasion?

After suggesting the use of signpost language (first, second, and third), Soper concludes, "But what you gain in clarity by this method you may lose in interest" (p. 203). In an earlier chapter Soper writes, "The repetitive use of first, second, and in conclusion is appropriate when enumerative precision is desired. But greater conversational informality is ordinarily preferable" (p. 80). Is it possible that such signpost language might make the message less interesting?

Based on the advice of contemporary textbooks and the reservations expressed above, it seems justified to test under controlled conditions the effects of verbal cueing in a persuasive message.

The third justification for the project comes from the use of initial _ethos_ as a second independent variable. Since the time when Aristotle wrote

> It is not true, as some writers on the art maintain, that the probity of the speaker contributes nothing to his persuasiveness; on the contrary, we might almost affirm that his character (_ethos_) is the most potent of all the means to persuasion (Cooper, 1960, p. 9),

rhetoricians have suspected the power of source credibility in persuasion. Anderson and Clevenger (1963, p. 77) were able to conclude that

> the _ethos_ of the source is related in some way to the impact of the message . . . . Research shows that expert opinion may be about as influential as majority opinion in inducing attitude change.

Likewise, McCroskey and Dunham (1966, p. 463) concluded, "The research and analyses reported here lend support to the theory that ethos is a very important factor in persuasive communication." But more important is the statement of McCroskey and Dunham that ethos is a confounding variable. Concerning "confounding" variables, Kerlinger (1965) wrote:

> The term "confounding," often used in treatises of statistical research design, means the "mixing" of the variance of one or more independent variables, usually extraneous to the research purpose, with the independent variable or variables of the research problem. As a result it cannot be clearly said that the relation found is between the independent variables and the dependent variable of the research, or between the extraneous independent variables and the dependent variable, or both (p. 308).

McCroskey and Dunham continued:

> If ethos can confound research on evidence, why can't it also confound research on other variables? And is there any theoretical ground for supposing it would not do so in all cases where ethos of any sort could operate? . . . On the basis of our own experience with discrepant findings, we would be very hesitant to accept any findings of research in persuasive communication unless the ethos level were measured (p. 463).

These conclusions seem to supply a third reason for the present research. In the belief that ethos might be a confounding factor, it was included as an independent variable in the study. Kerlinger suggested:

> An extraneous variable can be controlled by building it into the research design as an assigned variable, thus achieving control and yielding additional research information about the effect of the variable on the dependent variable and about its possible interaction with other independent variables (p. 285).

The inclusion of _ethos_ as a second independent variable not only avoids the effect of source credibility as a confounding factor, but supplies the answer for two questions: What effect does credibility have on the four dependent variables? Does credibility interact with verbal cueing?

Limitations Imposed

At least two limitations were imposed in the present study. The first was the decision to use a written message. There are some good reasons for proceeding with a written message. In the first place, this investigator was convinced that a tighter study could be performed as described. Although some might argue that verbal cueing would be more important in an oral message than in a written message, investigation of this variable has to begin somewhere. Given the time and resources available, it was believed that more sound conclusions could be drawn from the present study than from one incorporating the use of an oral message.

Second, because verbal cueing (emphasizing the organizational pattern of the message) is so directly related to even minor aspects of delivery, reliance upon an oral message could easily lead to false conclusions. A gesture, a facial expression, a tone of voice, any number of delivery factors, could cause one to reject (or accept) an hypothesis in error. It was hoped that the use of a written message would avoid this pitfall, and would come closer to measuring the effect of verbal cueing, as defined above.

A second general area of limitation has to do with devising the messages with various levels of verbal cueing. In terms of possibilities for cueing, at least three broad areas exist: preview, development, and summary. In other words, there are opportunities for cueing in the introduction, in the body, and in the conclusion of the message.

Possibilities	Examples
I. Preview	
A. General	("I have three points.")
1. None	(No preview given)
2. Inaccurate	(Preview of four points, a different number developed)
B. Specific	("My three points are: (1) . . . .")
1. None	
2. Inaccurate	(Preview of four points, more or less developed)
a. More or less	(In relation to how points are developed)
b. Out of order	
II. Development	
A. Internal summaries	
1. None	
2. Weak or inaccurate	
B. Transitions	
1. None	
2. Weak or inaccurate	
III. Final Summary	
A. General summary	
1. None	
2. Inaccurate	
B. Specific	
1. Incomplete	
2. Out of order	

With all of these choices available, an almost endless number of messages could be devised. Therefore, some limitations had to be imposed. It was decided that the main effects of cueing could be measured with the use of three messages: an accurate cueing version, a no cueing version, and an inaccurate cueing version.

The preceding pages have included what might be considered an informal review of the literature, with both classical and contemporary references to organization of the message. Before proceeding to a description of the method used in the present experiment, it seems appropriate to take a more formal and detailed look at the available experimental literature relevant to this study.

Review of Experimental Literature

We are concerned with the effect of two independent variables (verbal cueing and initial *ethos*) upon four dependent variables (perceived organization, retention, attitude change, and terminal *ethos*). There is no one clear-cut area of research to which we can turn for all of the

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of the answers. In an effort to achieve maximum clarity, we shall examine first, the effects of source credibility, and second, the effects of those areas of communication most closely related to verbal cueing.

Effects of Source Credibility

Hovland, Janis, and Kelley in Communication and Persuasion (1953), one of the earliest summaries of the effects of source credibility, wrote:

> In summary, the research evidence indicates that the reactions to a communication are significantly affected by cues as to the communicator's intentions, expertness, and trustworthiness. The very same presentation tends to be judged more favorably when made by a communicator of high credibility than by one of low credibility. Furthermore, in the case of two of the three studies on credibility, the immediate acceptance of the recommended opinion was greater when presented by a highly credible communicator (p. 35).

With notable reservation, Anderson and Clevenger (1963) indicated: "The finding is almost universal that the ethos of the source is related in some way to the impact of the message" (p. 77).

A year later, Arthur R. Cohen, in his book Attitude Change and Social Influence (1964), began his second cha

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chapter on the characteristics of the communicator, with these statements:

> Who says something is as important as _what_ is said in understanding the effect of a communication on an attitude. How the listener perceives the communicator can affect attitude change in numerous ways (p. 23).

In light of these three statements, one of the most unexpected conclusions concerning _ethos_ is that of Wayne N. Thompson. In _Quantitative Research in Public Address and Communication_ (1967), he wrote: "The available evidence does not support the position that ethos increases persuasiveness in speech situations" (p. 59). Thompson is making two points. First, most of the studies concerned with the effects of _ethos_ upon persuasion did not use oral communication. Second, results from the few studies using oral communication are inconclusive.

Results from the Hovland and Mandell (1952) study showed that there appeared to be no differences in attitude between subjects (Ss) who heard a speech by a highly credible source and those who heard the speech by the low credible source.

Gilkinson, Paulson, and Sikkink (1954) found that speeches in which quotations were attributed to well-recognized authorities and those in which the attributions were removed did not differ significantly on attitude shift, retention, or convincingness ratings.

Sikkink's study (1956) showed that authority and nonauthority presentations did not differ significantly in attitude shifts or in ratings of persuasiveness.

Ludlum (1958) found that attempts at increasing _ethos_ actually backfired. However, he did not validate his variable by measuring _ethos_ as received by the listeners.

There are at least four studies which lead to the opposite conclusion. In 1949 Haiman found that variations in ethical appeal significantly affected persuasiveness.

Wayne Thompson (1967) wrote:

> It is worth considering that the one study [Haiman, 1949] that found the effects of ethos to be significant was very carefully conducted, but the failure of other experimenters to confirm this result also is impressive (p. 60).

Another study reporting positive results, not mentioned by Thompson, was the research by Hovland and Weiss (1951).

> Change of attitude in the direction advocated by the communication was greater when it originated from the highly credible source than when it came from the low one (Cohen, p. 24).

In 1953 Kelman and Hovland reported:

> The data on attitude are consistent with the perceptions of the source: the group hearing the communication from the positive source favored more lenient treatment than those hearing it from the negative source (Cohen, p. 25).

In a study by Paulson (1954) ethos was significantly related to shift of opinion for men, but not for women.

Granted, the results of these studies are not totally conclusive. The evidence for the effects of credibility upon attitude change with a written message seems stronger than with an oral message. Nevertheless, Cohen concluded:

> The data from these different experiments show with reasonably good agreement that variations in the credibility of the communicator do indeed determine variations in attitude change (p. 29).

The relationship between source credibility and retention seems more conclusive. One might hypothesize that a receiver would be more inclined to understand and remember a greater amount of a message presented by a highly credible source than by a low credible source. However, experimental evidence fails to confirm this.

Wayne Thompson (1967) wrote,

> The most striking of the six generalizations . . . is the statement that ethos does not affect learning . . . . Factors such as motivation, selection and arrangement of materials, and clarity all seem to have much more to do with retention than does the ethos of the speaker (p. 58).

Charles Petrie (1963) reached the same conclusion when he wrote, "There is little experimental support for the assumption that source credibility or source sincerity influences the amount of information learned and retained from an informative speech" (p. 81).

Effects of Verbal Cueing

The second independent variable of major concern is verbal cueing. To predict accurately the effects of verbal cueing, we should consider the research performed in five areas: forewarning, verbal emphasis, conclusion-drawing, organization, and three studies directly measuring the effects of verbal cueing.

Forewarning

One aspect of verbal cueing is a preview or initial summary of what is to follow in the body of the speech. Those rhetoricians who offer reservations concerning the use of the preview base their advice primarily on research concerning forewarning the audience of the intent of the communicator. Their reasoning is as follows. If the audience is hostile to the position of the communicator, then it would be better to "sneak up" or use an inductive approach. The use of a specific preview would be counter to this advice.

Allyn and Festinger (1961) found that Ss who were forewarned of the nature of the communication changed their opinion less and rejected the communicator as biased to a greater degree than unprepared Ss.

Kiesler and Keisler (1964) confirmed the results obtained in other experiments that warning the subject about the intent of a communication has the effect of nullifying the persuasive influence of a communicator.

Verbal Emphasis

Another area somewhat closely related to verbal cueing is the work done with verbal emphasis. Arthur Jersild in a study reported in 1928 and 1929 presented 70 statements of fact to some 253 Ss. The investigation was designed to test the relative effectiveness of various degrees and forms of primacy, recency, frequency, and vividness on the immediate memory of meaningful material. The material consisted of 70 narrative statements presenting a biographical sketch of a victitious character. The most effective devices included: "five, four, and three distributed repetitions, first degree primacy, proactive verbal emphasis ('Now get this'), and two widely distributed repetitions" (Jersild, 1929, p. 69).

Ray Ehrensberger (1945) attempted to relate the Jersild finding to a more realistic public speaking situation. His five most significant findings are as follows:

1. The most effective means of assuring retention of a statement is to precede the statement by pro-active emphasis such as "Now get this."

2. The immediate repetition of a statement early in the discourse assures high retention.

3. The immediate repetition of a statement late in the discourse assures high retention.

4. The difference between immediate repetition early in the discourse and immediate repetition late in the discourse is not significant.

5. Three scattered repetitions are very effective and more significant than two or four (p. 111).

It is the belief of this investigator that forms of verbal cueing (the preview, internal summaries, transitions with signpost language, and the final summary) are similar to the successful forms of verbal emphasis. If these modes of emphasis are successful in producing retention, then certain aspects of verbal cueing should also produce higher retention than would a message without these elements. Therefore, a higher amount of retention can be predicted for the message incorporating the use of accurate cueing.

Conclusion-Drawing

Several researchers have been concerned with the question: Should the speaker draw a conclusion or let the audience draw its own conclusion?

Hovland and Mandell (1952) reported that

> over twice as many Ss changed their opinions in the direction of the position advocated by the communication when the speaker drew the appropriate conclusion than when drawing of the conclusion was left to the audience (p. 588).

In contrast to the Hovland and Mandell study, Thistlethwaite, De Hann, and Kamenetzky found that "conclusion-drawing and no conclusion-drawing by the speaker were not differentially effective in changing attitudes" (p. 112). However, conclusion-drawing was more effective in producing comprehension of the intended conclusion.

One final study by Tubbs (1968) adds support to the Hovland and Mandell finding. The results of the Tubbs study indicate "that regardless of the audience's degree of commitment, the explicit conclusion was more effective in eliciting attitude change" (p. 117).

Believing that use of a specific final summary is similar to conclusion-drawing, again this investigator has reason to predict more attitude change with an accurate cueing message, where the conclusion is specifically summarized.

Organization

Before examining the three experiments which have attempted to measure the effects of verbal cueing, it seems appropriate to look at the large body of research which most nearly relates to the present study--organization. There are at least two areas of research which are closely related to organization which are not considered relevant to the present study by this investigator: the work with particular orders (climax, anti-climax, etc.), and the examination of primacy vs. recency. The most useful work to our present purpose concerns the "quality" of organization rather than the "type" of organization. This review of research on organization will progress from what is considered to be the largest distortion of organization by the researcher, up to the most subtle changes of structure of the message.

Donald Darnell (1963) chose the sentence as the basic variable unit.

> The same sentences compose each message, but their order varies. The sentence was chosen as the unit to be manipulated because the effect of order at letter level and the word level seems obvious and because at least one study at the paragraph level had been reported (p. 97).

Seven versions of the message were devised. Cloze procedure was chosen as the measuring instrument. Words were deleted from the message according to some fixed system--from a random start, every fifth word. Blanks of uniform size replaced the deleted words; and the mutilated message was presented to a group of Ss, who attempted to reproduce the missing words. The number of deleted words which a subject replaced was his "cloze score." "Cloze procedure is a highly reliable index of the comprehension of a written message" (p. 97).

Darnell concluded that "the seven forms of the message were significantly different and the differences were in the expected direction" (pp. 99-100). Darnell's study showed "that disorder can affect comprehension adversely and that the amount of loss of clarity becomes greater as the degree of disorganization occurs" (p. 100).

In terms of organization and disorganization, it seems appropriate to consider next the work of K. C. Beighley, who used the paragraph as the basic unit. Beighley (1952b) randomly (with controls) rearranged paragraphs from two speeches, so that he had an organized and disorganized version of each. Comprehension was the main dependent variable. Beighley concluded: "It is apparent from these comparisons that organization shows no statistically dependable superiority for comprehension over the kind of disorganization used in this study" (p. 255). It should be pointed out that at least three differences exist between the work of Darnell and that of Beighley, besides different messages with different topics. Beighley's messages were oral; he used the random paragraph as disorganization; and he used a different measure for comprehension. It appears that any one of these differences could account for the different results.

Beighley (1954) replicated the original experiment and found that with a different population, again "organization shows no statistically dependable superiority for comprehension over the kind of disorganization used" (p. 253). In the second study it was also hypothesized "that if it were true that an audience achieves about equal comprehension from the disorganized material because it works harder to make sense of the material, then that audience might possibly remember it longer" (p. 253). No support was found for this second hypothesis.

Smith (1951) devised nine messages by transposing the main parts of a well-arranged speech. He concluded that "the transposition of a single main part of a speech to a position in the sequence other than its normal one does not affect the persuasive outcome of the speech" (p. 299). When two parts were transposed, however, the differences between the effectiveness of the resultant speeches and that of the respective normal order speech did prove (in Experiment II) to be significant. When all of the parts were transposed, with complete randomization of the main part order, the second experiment actually yielded a negative audience reaction.

> Thus the evidence indicates that with certain topics and/or methods of total organization in the compositional pattern of the original speech, over-all organization _per se_, is an extremely important factor in persuasion (p. 299).

These messages devised by Ernest Thompson (1960) have been used in several studies of organization.

> In order to achieve variation of the structure, each sentence of Communication I was arbitrarily treated as a unit. A second communication (Communication II) was prepared by randomly re-arranging the units (sentences) of Communication I within each of the eight main points presented in the communication. Thus, while the original order of the main points was

> preserved, point one preceded point two, etc., the arrangement of the units within each main point was a matter of chance. A third communication (Communication III) was prepared by randomly re-arranging the units of Communication I within each of the three divisions of the communication: introduction, body, and conclusion (p. 62).

Results of the Thompson study (1960) were as follows:

> Subjects who listened to a better structured communication consistently and significantly scored higher on the immediate retention test than did Ss who listened to a less well-structured communication. The same trend was observed in delayed retention results as well, but the differences were not significant . . . . The shift of opinion results were inconclusive; no significant differences were observed (p. 69).

A second study using two of the three speeches by Thompson was reported by Sharp and McClung (1966). Sharp and McClung were concerned with the effects of organization on the speaker's _ethos_. The researchers found that

> students exposed to a disorganized speech thought less of the speaker after hearing his talk than before he spoke. In contrast, students listening to the organized address shifted very little in their attitude toward the speaker (p. 183).

A third study employing these same speeches by Thompson is reported by McCroskey and Mehrley (1969). These researchers were interested in the effects of nonfluency and disorganization upon attitude change and source credibility. They found that "the well-organized, fluently presented message produced significantly more attitude change than another condition, and the other three conditions were not significantly different from each other" (pp. 18-19). In other words,

> the presence of either serious disorganization or extensive nonfluencies was sufficient to significantly reduce the amount of attitude change produced by a speaker; but the presence of both of these detracting elements produced no greater reduction of attitude change than did the presence of either one alone (p. 20).

Eldon Baker (1965) devised a speech which advocated the legality and social acceptance of euthanasia. The only variation in content between the two forms of the message was the inclusion of eighteen speaker disorganization cues.

> These cues, or verbal/non-verbal suggestions of the speakers' difficulty in presenting his ideas systematically, included apologies for not remembering the next point, apologies for including an idea out of sequence, explanations for not being able to place materials in proper sequence, and long silent pauses (p. 150).

Baker found that

> perceived speaker disorganization cues did <u>not</u> significantly reduce the credibility of the speaker . . . . There <u>was</u> a significant increase in speaker credibility in the <u>absence</u>

> of speaker disorganization cues . . . . Speaker disorganization cues did <u>not</u> significantly or differentially affect audience attitude change (pp. 160-161).

In summary, the studies dealing with the organization of messages indicate that there is rather strong support that organization and disorganization can affect the amount of retention of the message by the receiver. There is only moderate support that organization has an effect on speaker credibility or attitude change.

Verbal Cueing

We shall complete our review of the literature by looking at three studies which have been concerned with verbal cueing as defined in the present study.

Thistlethwaite, De Haan, and Kamenetzky (1955) first concerned themselves with methods of verbal cueing as they hypothesized

> that well organized communications (those with liberal sign posts and guides for orientation) would aid the listener in "getting the point," and thereby increase the effect of the communication in changing attitude (p. 107).

Two conclusions were reached:

> The programs with well-defined organizations of content similarly produced greater comprehension than the programs having poorly defined organizations of content . . . . There were no significant over-all differences between experimental treatments in effects upon attitude scores (p. 113).

Parker (1962) probed the effectiveness of four widely used rhetorical elements: topic sentence, cross headings, the beginning summary, and the closing summary. The use of topic sentences increased comprehension when the Ss were tested immediately. No effect was found for delayed recall. College freshmen generally were unaware of the presence or absence of the organizational devices included in the study. Over-all, the more devices used, the more interesting the readers found the material. "Some readers, however, noted the presence of both beginning and concluding summaries and found the use of both objectionable" (p. 29).

The most recent study concerning the use of verbal cueing was performed by Ernest Thompson (1967). This is the fourth experiment using the Thompson speeches devised in 1960, and referred to above. Thompson concluded that the addition of statements to highlight relationships among units in a speech can enhance comprehension (p. 56).

Summary

A careful review of the literature can be just as frustrating as it is valuable. There are few rhetorical factors which can be counted on always to make a difference. Whereas most contemporary public speaking textbooks would lead us to believe that in most cases the use of verbal cueing is well advised, experimental literature would lead us to conclude that in many cases verbal cueing would have little effect.

In light of this review of the experimental literature, one would expect that high credibility would produce a significant increase in attitude change, but would most likely not affect retention of the message. On the other hand, verbal cueing is likely to produce greater retention, but most likely will not produce a significant increase in attitude change. The effects of credibility and cueing on the other dependent variables is difficult to predict.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

This chapter includes a full discussion of the following: a) design of the study, b) subjects for the experiment, c) procedures of the study, d) measurement, and e) methods of statistical inference.

Experimental Design

This study employed a 2 X 3 factorial analysis of variance design. Lindquist (1953) described factorial designs as "those in which there are two or more cross-classifications of treatments, or in which the effects and interactions of two or more experimental variables are simultaneously observed" (p. 8). Use of this factorial design enabled the experimenter (E) to observe the possible main effects for two levels of credibility and three levels of cueing, as well as the possible interaction effects between these variables.

In the research study reported by this thesis, two variables were manipulated (cueing and credibility) and four variables were observed (perceived organization, retention, attitude change, and terminal _ethos_).

The following section will offer an operational definition of each of the variables of the study.

Verbal cueing was defined in Chapter I. For this experiment three levels or degrees of cueing were created: accurate cueing, no cueing, and inaccurate cueing.

1. Accurate cueing includes:

the use of a specific preview	("Specifically, I would offer three indictments . . . .")
the use of signpost language	(_First_, U.S. aid has been . . . ." "A _second_ area of concern is . . . ." "The _third_ indictment of U.S. aid . . . .")
the use of internal summaries	("Because of lack of careful planning, and . . . ." "Second, then, I would contend . . . ." "In this case U.S. aid actually backfired . . . .")

the use of a specific final summary	("In summary, I have suggested three problems.")

2. No cueing--the omission of all devices used in the accurate cueing version.

3. Inaccurate cueing includes:

the use of an inaccurate preview	(Specifically, I would offer four indictments . . . ." Four indictments were previewed out of order, and only three were actually developed.)
the use of some signpost language	("First, United States foreign aid . . . ." The second indictment was introduced but never developed. The third indictment was not highlighted until the internal summary. The fourth point was introduced by "final" rather than by "fourth." The last internal summary included the word "final" rather than "fourth." The closing summary was general--"I

have suggested several problems . . . ." Only two points were mentioned in the final summary. Four points had been previewed and three points had been developed.)

4. High initial <u>ethos</u>--attributing the message to the former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Thomas A. Wilson.

5. Low initial <u>ethos</u>--attributing the message to the Red Chinese Ambassador to Brazil, Lin Tai.

6. Perceived organization--the degree of agreement with the statements: "The Ambassador's speech was very well organized," and "The main points developed by the speaker stood out very clearly."

7. Retention--the score on a 13-item multiple choice examination (subsequently reduced to 10 items as a result of item analysis) administered after the message was presented.

8. Attitude toward the topic (Attitude Change)--the score on a set of semantic differential scales

measuring attitude toward the statement "The U.S. has a well administered foreign aid program for Brazil."

9. Terminal *ethos*--the score on six semantic differential scales for each of three dimensions of *ethos*: authoritativeness, dynamism, and character.

Subjects

The purpose in choosing subjects (Ss) for the experiment was to select subjects, as nearly as possible, who were similar to those persons in the "real" world. With one eye on generalizability, with a second eye on practicality, and a third eye, figuratively speaking, on the factors which might affect the main effects of the study, an effort was made to secure Ss with a minimum amount of speech training. This is not meant to imply that a majority of persons in the "real" world have not had some speech training, but at least that training has not come in the last several months, or even years. In the belief that such recently trained speech students might be sensitized to the manipulated and observed variables, beginning speech students were sought.

The Ss for the experiment were students enrolled in five different speech classes[1] during the first six-week session in the 1969 summer quarter at Iowa State University. Some 257 students, 140 males and 117 females, participated in the experiment. The vast majority (73%) of these Ss were enrolled in one of ten sections of public speaking (Speech 211). Twenty-three students were enrolled in another beginning class, Speech 30. The remaining 47 Ss were enrolled in advanced speech courses: 305, 312A, and 336A. The Ss were randomly assigned to one of the six treatments of the experiment.

As mentioned above, 257 Ss participated in the study. Only 15 students were dropped from the experiment, leaving a total sample of 242. Six students were dropped from the study because they circled two answers for one of the retention questions. Three Ss were dropped because

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[1]Speech 30--Public Speaking for students in Iowa State University's Technical Institute

Speech 211--Fundamentals of Speech (Public Speaking)

Speech 305--General Semantics

Speech 312A--Business Speaking

Speech 336A--Group Discussion

they omitted one or two of the retention questions. Likewise, three Ss were not included in the final analysis because they omitted an entire page of the questionnaire. One student was dropped because of an inability to finish after a twenty-five minute attempt.[2] One student was dropped from the study because of the negative nature of his comments toward the purpose of the research. His answers were little more than an attempt at humor. Finally, one student was dropped from the study because of his knowledge of the purpose of the experiment. This student had participated in the pre-tests and it was believed best not to include his responses in the analysis. After attrition, the total number of Ss was 242, 94% of the original sample.

Procedures of the Experiment

A four-page message indicting the United States foreign assistance program for Brazil was devised. This

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[2]Average administration time for the project was eighteen minutes.

particular topic was chosen in an effort to obtain a topic toward which the Ss would have an essentially neutral attitude and little specific knowledge. Although Ss might possess some definite attitude toward the United States foreign assistance program in general, or even toward U.S. aid for Latin America as a whole, it was believed that by concentrating upon one specific country, Brazil, the experimenter would be relatively safe in assuming a neutral topic.

Persons familiar with the events of June, 1969, might be inclined to ask if factors other than the experimental treatment might have influenced attitudes toward U.S. aid to Brazil. One such factor was the publicity prior to and during Governor Nelson Rockefeller's trip to South America in the early part of June, 1969. However, Governor Rockefeller's visit to Brazil did not occur until after the experiment was completed. At any rate, any negative effect toward U.S. aid to Latin America caused by this bad publicity must be assumed to have been randomly distributed throughout all six treatment groups.

From the basic 1,226-word message, which contained no verbal cueing of the organizational pattern of the message, the E devised the accurate cueing version (1,311 words) and the inaccurate cueing version (1,336 words). The accurate cueing version, the no cueing version, and the inaccurate version are shown in Appendix A.

A cover page was prepared, attributing each of the three versions of the message to one of two fictitious, but believable-sounding, sources. As previously stated, the high-credible source was Thomas A. Wilson, former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, and the low-credible source was Lin Tai, Red Chinese Ambassador to Brazil. In all, there were six treatments:

Treatment Groups	Size (n) of Treatment Groups
1. High-Credible Source--Accurate Cueing	45
2. High-Credible Source--No Cueing	41
3. High-Credible Source--Inaccurate Cueing	40
4. Low-Credible Source--Accurate Cueing	39
5. Low-Credible Source--No Cueing	35
6. Low-Credible Source--Inaccurate Cueing	42

A sample packet of treatments 1 and 5 can be found in Appendices B and C.

Instructors of 14 sections of speech gave permission for the experimenter to visit their class (or classes) during one of the first three days of the first summer session, June 4-6, 1969. Two persons, the E and an associate, administered the experiment. The following introduction was delivered extemporaneously by both the E and his associate.

> First, I want to thank [Miss, Mrs., or Mr. Instructor] for allowing us to conduct this bit of research. As is stated on the cover sheet of the packet which you will receive in just a few minutes (and I hope you'll read that cover sheet carefully), the Department of Speech is interested in isolating some of the factors that contribute to successful communication. You can help us by simply reading this four-page message and then by answering some questions on what you've read.
>
> So that everyone is playing by the same rules, we ask that you not look ahead at the questions before you read the speech. Second, we ask that you not look back at the speech once you have started to answer the questions.

After administering the experiment to about six sections, it was noticed that several students had accidently skipped an entire page of the questionnaire. Subsequently, the following sentence was added to the instructions. "And we would ask that you be very careful not to skip any pages." The instructions continued:

> Now, again we ask that you read the message and answer the questions. Are there any questions before you begin?

At this point the packets were distributed. The average time for Ss to complete the experiment was 18 minutes, with a range of 14 to 22 minutes. In one case, mentioned above, a subject had not completed answering the questions after twenty-five minutes. The S's form was taken up and discarded from the study.

After all sections had completed participation in the experiment, the Ss were debriefed. A one-page explanation of the study was given to the instructor of each class used in the study. The instructors were asked to read the explanation of the study to their classes within the next week after completion of the project. A spot check revealed that all had complied. The debriefing statement included the following items:

1. It was explained that both the speakers (Wilson and Tai) and the message were fictitious.

2. The purpose of the study was explained.

3. The hypotheses were briefly presented.

4. For those interested in additional information, an address was given.

5. The Ss were thanked for co-operating.

Measurement

In order to test the hypotheses of this study, four separate measures were necessary: a) a measure of the perceived organization of the message, b) a measure of the retention of the message, c) a measure of the Ss' attitude toward the topic of the speech, and d) a measure of the terminal _ethos_ of the source.

Perceived organization of the message was measured by asking the Ss to check a point on a five-point scale ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree," in response to two statements: "I would say that the Ambassador's speech was very well organized," and "The main points developed by the speaker stood out very clearly."

Retention of the message was measured originally by 13 multiple choice items (Questions 3 through 15, shown in Appendices B and C). After the submission of the questions to an item analysis, the top 10 questions were used, and a second retention score was obtained for each S.

To secure a measure of the Ss' attitude toward the topic of the speech, students were asked to "Please rate the following statement (The U.S. has a well administered foreign aid program for Brazil.) by placing a check mark on the following scales:" Right-Wrong, False-True, Yes-No, Incorrect-Correct, I agree-I disagree, and Foolish-Wise.

The final dependent variable to be measured was the terminal _ethos_ of the source. Semantic differential type scales to measure terminal _ethos_ of the speaker were chosen from previous research by McCroskey (1967). They included six scales for each of the three dimensions of source credibility. The authoritativeness or competence scales were: Informed-Uninformed, Unqualified-Qualified, Reliable-Unreliable, Worthless-Valuable, Intelligent-Unintelligent, and Inexpert-Expert. The six scales used to measure dynamism were: Aggressive-Meek, Hesitant-Emphatic, Forceful-Forceless, Timid-Bold, Active-Passive, and Tired-Energetic. The character dimension of terminal *ethos* was measured by Unselfish-Selfish, Awful-Nice, Friendly-Unfriendly, Dishonest-Honest, Pleasant-Unpleasant, and Sinful-Virtuous.

Statistical Inference

Statistical analysis was performed in three steps. Before the experiment three checks were completed: a test of topic neutrality, a pre-test of the credibility scales, and an evaluation of the messages. After the experiment several preliminary analyses were run on the data. Finally, the data were submitted to a major statistical analysis. The procedures used in these three stages of analysis will be discussed in this section. The results of the preliminary checks will be revealed here. The results of the other analyses will be covered in the next chapter.

Preliminary Checks

The purpose of the first check was to see if the topic chosen was a relatively neutral one. Fourteen students were asked to rate the statement, "The U.S. has a well administered foreign aid program for Brazil," on the six semantic differential type scales noted above. The results of this pre-test, administered two weeks before the actual study, revealed that the topic was indeed one toward which students held a neutral attitude. As shown in Appendix D, Table 11, the mean attitude score was 24.2, on a scale ranging from 6 to 42, with 24 as the neutral point. Students seemed to be neutral toward the topic chosen for the experimental messages. It was hoped that this neutrality would allow for maximum attitude change.

Second, a check was made on the credibility of the two sources used in the study. The fourteen students were asked to rate both Thomas A. Wilson, said to be the former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, and Lin Tai, supposedly the Red Chinese Ambassador to Brazil, on the eighteen semantic differentail type scales mentioned above. The results of this pre-test are shown in Appendix D, Table 12. Although no statistical tests for significant differences were run on this data, the direction seemed clear. Once again scales with a total range from 6 to 42 were used. The mean rating, across dimensions, was 29.0 for Wilson and 26.5 for Tai. On authoritativeness and character

Wilson was judged 2.8 and 5.8 points higher, respectively, than Tai. On dynamism Tai was rated 29.7 to Wilson's rating of 28.5. These results on dynamism are not the first indication this E has received that high dynamism is not necessarily correlated with high credibility.

The results of this pre-test were not as clear-cut as hoped in terms of the credibility of Wilson and Tai. However, these sources, with titles, had been used in a previous study[3] in which the data indicated that the Ss did perceive a significant credibility difference would occur.

Finally, the E asked his colleagues to evaluate the three messages. This evaluation included two steps. First, the three messages were randomly distributed to eighteen English and Speech instructors who were asked to rate the message they received on the following seven-point scales: Clear-Unclear, Not interesting-Interesting, Poorly organized-Well organized, Highly persuasive-Not persuasive, Poor reasoning-Good reasonsing, and Good Evidence-Poor Evidence. It was expected that the accurate

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[3] McCrockey--results submitted for publication at this writing.

cueing message would be judged more organized, and would be judged to possess more clarity than the no cueing or the inaccurate cueing message. The other scales, besides organization and clarity, were included to cover the purpose of the evaluation. Again statistical tests were not used to determine significance, but trends can be noted. In Appendix D, Tables 13 through 16, across all the scales, the messages were ranked as hypothesized: accurate cueing, then no cueing, and finally, inaccurate cueing. However, the <u>only</u> single scale reflecting a similar ranking is Clear-Unclear. On three of the six scales (Highly persuasive-Not persuasive, Poor reasoning-Good reasoning, and Good evidence-Poor evidence) the no cueing message was rated highest. The clarity of the message seems to have little "halo" or carry-over effect for this "expert" audience. The other important finding from this faculty evaluation was that although the accurate cueing version was rated as being most organized, the inaccurate cueing version was judged to be better organized than was the no cueing version. This result was counter to the proposed hypothesis.

A second stage of this evaluation was to explain to the instructors that the purpose of the study was to examine the effects of verbal cueing which had been defined as highlighting or emphasizing the organizational pattern of the message. The "experts" were asked to read the three messages and identify each version. Of the eight instructors who participated in this phase of the evaluation, seven of them accurately identified all three of the speeches. As shown in Appendix D, Table 17, one instructor reversed the inaccurate and the no cueing versions.

In summary, what did the preliminary checks show? First, a neutral topic had been chosen for the study. Second, students rated Ambassador Wilson higher on authoritativeness and character than they rated Ambassador Tai. Third, when asked to read all three messages, a majority (7 out of 8) of the faculty were able to recognize accurate cueing, no cueing, and inaccurate cueing. When the faculty were asked to read and evaluate only one of the three messages, the combined ratings showed that the accurate version was judged more clear and more organized. The inaccurate version was judged more organized, but less clear than the no cueing version. It would seem that while cueing gives some semblance of organization, bad cueing seems to detract from clarity of the message.

Preliminary Analyses

Once the data had been gathered, several preliminary analyses were necessary. First, the 13 multiple choice questions were submitted to an item analysis.[4] With emphasis on the difficulty index[5] and the discrimination index[6] for each question, the top ten items were chosen, and another score for each S was derived. Second,

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[4]Examination of responses of a class to a given question or set of questions is called an item analysis. From an item analysis, easy questions, difficult questions, and non-discriminating questions can be identified. In short, item analysis is a technique for investigating and improving the correlation or degree of relationship among items. The program used in the present study was devised by John W. Menne and provided by the Student Counseling Service at Iowa State University. The program is explained in full in Student Counseling Service Reports 68-01 and 68-12.

[5]"The Difficulty Index is simply one minus the percentage of those who get the item correct. Thus, for an easy item the percentage will be high and the Difficulty Index will be low; for a difficult item the percentage will be small and the Difficulty Index will be high . . . . The average item difficulty for a good test should be mid-range, from .4 to .6" (Menne, 1968b, p. 2).

[6]The Discrimination Index is found as follows: Rank the raw scores of an examination and divide them into two equal groups, top and bottom. Count the number of those in the top group who answered the item correctly. This equals RH. RL equals the number in the bottom group who answered the item correctly. The Discrimination Index is obtained by dividing RH minus RL by 10 percent of those attempting the item. For a good item this index will be over 1.0 (Menne, 1968b, p. 3).

the eighteen individual scales for terminal ethos were submitted to factor analysis and varimax rotation. Results of the factor analysis were interpreted as follows:

Each item or scale was considered independently. A judgment was made as to which factor, if any, the item "loaded." This decision was based on the relative magnitude of the factor loadings for the item on each of the factors. The standard established as a criterion was a loading of .60 or above for the factor on which the item received its highest loading, and a loading of .40 or below for the remaining factors. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical items, factors, and factor loadings:

Item	Factor		
	1	2	3
1	.78*	.10	.12
2	.05	.79*	.02
3	.72	.02	.68
4	.20	.12	.78*

The first item above, according to the criterion used for the factor analysis, would be judged as loading on the first factor, since its loading factor under factor one is above .60 and its loadings on all the other factors

are below .40. Item two loads on factor two. The third item, however, is split between the first and third factors, and cannot be considered a part of either factor. The fourth item loads on factor three.

Once an independent judgment had been made for each item, the scores in each dimension were summed and prepared for the major statistical analysis.

Major Statistical Analyses

Siegel (1956) wrote that in order to use parametric statistics, the following assumptions must be met:

> 1. The observations must be independent.
> 2. The observations must be drawn from normally distributed populations.
> 3. The populations must have the same variance.
> 4. The variables involved must have been measured in at least an interval scale.
> 5. The means of these normal and homoscedastic populations must be linear combinations of effects due to columns and/or rows (Siegel, 1956, p. 19).

The assumption of independence can be met if the selection of any one case from the population for inclusion in the sample does not bias the chances of any other case for inclusion, and the score which is assigned to any case does not bias the score which is assigned to any other case. There is no reason to believe that both of the first two assumptions have not been met in the present study.

Siegel added that with the possible exception of the assumption of homoscedasticity (equal variances), "these five conditions are ordinarily not tested in the course of the performance of a statistical analysis. Rather, they are presumptions which are accepted" (pp. 19-20).

When the experimental groups are relatively equal in size and the size of each group is 15 or more, it has been shown (Boneau, 1960) that even the homogeneity of variance can safely be violated in most cases. Both of the conditions are met in the present study.

The fourth assumption listed by Siegel concerns the use of an interval scale. Kerlinger (1964) wrote that "it is probable that most psychological . . . scales approximate interval equality fairly well." He suggested that "the best procedure would seem to be to treat ordinal measurements as though they were interval measurements, but to be constantly alert to the possibility of gross inequality of intervals" (p. 427). It was decided that the semantic-differential type scales used in measuring attitude and credibility, the Likert type scales used to measure perceived organization, and the retention scores contained no gross inequality of interval. The fourth assumption, therefore, was not violated.

The final assumption listed by Siegel simply states that the effects must be additive. This, too, was assumed for the present study.

To test the hypotheses of this study, two parametric statistical tests were employed: analysis of variance and *t*-tests. As stated earlier in the chapter, the analysis of variance test indicates significant differences among combinations of experimental conditions, as well as significant interactions. The *t*-test (Winer, 1962) was appropriate to estimate between-group probabilities.

The factor analysis[7] and analysis of variance[8] were calculated by means of library computer programs

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[7]A. Williams, Factor Analysis, Technical Report No. 34, Computer Institute for Social Science Research, Michigan State University, 1967.

[8]W. L. Ruble, Analysis of Covariance and Analysis of Variance With Unequal Frequencies Permitted in Cells--

on a Control Data Corporation 3600 computer, in operation at Michigan State University.

(LS Routine), STAT Series Description No. 18, Michigan State University Agricultural Experimental Station, 1968.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

This chapter will include three major divisions. First, the results of the preliminary analyses will be cited. Section two will present the results of the major statistical analyses, and the final section will summarize the findings of the study.

Preliminary Analyses

As stated in Chapter II, two preliminary analyses were completed: an item analysis of the retention questions and a factor analysis of the credibility scales.

Item Analysis

Retention of the message was measured by a 13-item multiple choice examination, questions 3 through 15 on the questionnaire. In an effort to secure the most discriminating measure of retention, an item analysis of the retention questions was performed. Two criteria were employed in order to choose the top questions: difficulty and discrimination. It was decided that because questions 10, 6, and 5 ranked lowest among the 13 on both difficulty and discrimination (See Table 18, Appendix E), the examination should be rescored using only 10 items. This score should represent a better measure of retention of the message.

Factor Analysis

As mentioned in Chapter II, the scales chosen to measure terminal *ethos* for this study had been employed in previous research by McCroskey (1967) and were believed to be reliable measures of three dimensions of source credibility: authoritativeness or competence, character, and dynamism. In that previous research, however, an oral message was used. Therefore, it seemed necessary to confirm the ability of these scales to measure and distinguish between each dimension of terminal *ethos* as affected by a written message.

The 18 semantic-differential type scales used to measure terminal *ethos* were submitted to a factor analysis. Results of the factor analyzed credibility data suggest three dimensions of *ethos*. Table 19, Appendix E, lists the scales and their factor loadings.

It will be noted that only two scales failed to meet the .60 criteria, intelligent-unintelligent (.58), and unselfish-selfish (.57). Since both loadings round off to .6, it was not thought necessary to omit these scales and adjust the scores for authoritativeness and character. As planned, six scales were used to measure each dimension of terminal *ethos*.

AUTHORITATIVENESS:	Informed-Uninformed, Unqualified-Qualified, Reliable-Unreliable, Worthless-Valuable, Intelligent-Unintelligent, Inexpert-Expert.
DYNAMISM:	Aggressive-Meek, Hesitant-Emphatic, Forceful-Forceless, Timid-Bold, Active-Passive, Tired-Energetic.
CHARACTER:	Unselfish-Selfish, Awful-Nice, Friendly-Unfriendly, Dishonest-Honest, Pleasant-Unpleasant, Sinful-Virtuous.

Major Statistical Analyses

A two-way analysis of variance revealed no significant interaction effects between verbal cueing and initial *ethos*. In this section the main effects of cueing and credibility upon each of the four dependent variables will be reported.

Effects Upon Perceived Organization

H_1a: Accurate cueing (AC) produces higher perceived organization of the message than does no cueing (NC).

H_1b: Accurate cueing produces higher perceived organization of the message than does inaccurate cueing (IC).

H_1c: No cueing produces higher perceived organization of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

Two separate measures of "perceived organization" were employed. Ss were asked to evaluate the message in terms of both organization and clarity. The perceived organization analysis of variance (summarized in Table 20, Appendix F) revealed a significant cueing effect ($F = 4.26$, $p < .05$). The results from the *t*-tests[1] for significant

[1] Results of all *t*-tests are shown in Table 29, Appendix F.

differences among the means for the three cueing versions showed a significant difference between the AC version and the NC version ($\underline{t} = 2.93$, $p < .05$). No significant differences were noted between the NC version and the IC version ($\underline{t} = -1.50$, $p < .20$)[2] or the IC version and the AC version ($\underline{t} = 1.46$, $p < .20$). Mean scores for perceived organization and clarity are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

MEAN SCORES FOR PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION AND CLARITY FOR CUEING CONDITIONS

	Accurate Cueing (n = 84)	No Cueing (n = 76)	Inaccurate Cueing (n = 82)
Perceived Organization Means	1.88_a	2.23_a	2.05
Clarity Means	1.94_b	2.25_b	2.10

[a,b]Means with same subscript are significantly different from each other, $p < .05$.

In the analysis of variance for clarity (summarized in Table 21, Appendix F), similar cueing effects

[2]Negative $\underline{t}$-scores indicate that the difference was in the opposite direction than predicted. In this case the IC version was perceived as being more organized than the NC version. Differences were not significant.

were noted ($F = 2.78$, $p < .06$). Again $\underline{t}$-tests revealed a significant difference between AC and NC ($\underline{t} = 2.41$, $p < .05$), but no significant differences existed between NC and IC ($\underline{t} = -1.16$, $p < .30$) nor between the AC message and the IC message ($\underline{t} = 1.27$, $p < .30$). Therefore, there is a significant cueing effect upon perceived organization and clarity of the message. The AC message was perceived to possess more clarity and to be better organized than the NC message. There were no significant differences between the other messages. Support for the first hypothesis (H_1a) was found. The other two hypotheses were not confirmed (H_1b and H_1c).

> H_2: High credibility produces higher perceived organization of the message than does low credibility.

As shown in Table 2 (and Tables 20 and 21, Appendix F) neither the perceived organization analysis of variance ($F = 0.03$) nor the clarity analysis of variance ($F = 0.01$) showed significant credibility effects. The hypothesis was not confirmed.

TABLE 2

MEAN SCORES FOR PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION AND CLARITY FOR CREDIBILITY CONDITIONS

	High Credibility (n = 126)	Low Credibility (n = 116)
Perceived Organization Means	2.05	2.04
Clarity Means	2.10	2.09

Effects Upon Retention

H_3a: Accurate cueing produces more retention of the message than does no cueing.

H_3b: Accurate cueing produces more retention of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_3c: No cueing produces more retention of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

The analysis of variance of retention scores (summarized in Table 22, Appendix F) showed a significant effect for cueing ($F = 7.84$, $p < .05$). Although no significance was found for the difference between the AC message and the NC message ($\underline{t} = 1.15$, $p < .30$), other differences (see Table 3) were significant. A *t*-score of 2.61 ($p < .05$) was noted between the NC message and the IC message, and a *t*-score of 3.85 ($p < .05$) was obtained between the AC and the IC message. Therefore, a significant cueing effect upon retention of the message was found. The first hypothesis (H_3a) was not confirmed. Support for H_3b and H_3c was found.

TABLE 3

MEAN SCORES FOR RETENTION (10 ITEMS)
FOR CUEING CONDITIONS

	Accurate Cueing (n = 84)	No Cueing (n = 76)	Inaccurate Cueing (n = 82)
Retention Score Means	6.90_b	6.57_a	5.82_{ab}

[a,b]Means with same subscript are significantly different from each other, $p < .05$.

H_4: High credibility produces more retention of the message than does low credibility.

Analysis of variance of retention scores (see Table 22, Appendix F) showed no significant credibility effect ($F = .002$). The means for retention scores for credibility conditions are shown in Table 4. The hypothesis was not confirmed.

TABLE 4

MEAN SCORES FOR RETENTION (10 ITEMS) FOR CREDIBILITY CONDITIONS

	High Credibility (n = 126)	Low Credibility (n = 116)
Retention Mean Scores	6.42	6.44

Effects Upon Attitude Change

H_5a: Accurate cueing produces more positive attitude change than does no cueing.

H_5b: Accurate cueing produces more positive attitude than does inaccurate cueing.

H_5c: No cueing produces more positive attitude change than does inaccurate cueing.

These hypotheses were not supported by the data (see Table 5). Analysis of variance for attitude scores (shown in Table 23, Appendix F) revealed nonsignificant differences ($F = .85$, $p = .43$) among cueing conditions.

TABLE 5

MEAN SCORES FOR ATTITUDE FOR CUEING CONDITIONS

	Accurate Cueing (n = 84)	No Cueing (n = 76)	Inaccurate Cueing (n = 82)
Attitude Score Means	14.64	15.98	15.14

H_6: High credibility produces more positive attitude change than does low credibility.

Table 23 (Appendix F) shows a significant credibility effect from the analysis of variance of attitude scores ($F = 7.62$, $p < .05$). The mean scores for attitude for the credibility conditions are shown in Table 6. The hypothesis was confirmed.

TABLE 6

MEAN SCORES FOR ATTITUDE FOR CREDIBILITY CONDITIONS

	High Credibility (n = 126)	Low Credibility (n = 116)
Attitude Score Means	14.12_a	16.43_a

[a]Significant $p < .05$.

Effects Upon Terminal Ethos

H_7a: Accurate cueing produces higher terminal *ethos* than does no cueing.

H_7b: Accurate cueing produces higher terminal *ethos* than does inaccurate cueing.

H_7c: No cueing produces higher terminal *ethos* than does inaccurate cueing.

No support was found for these hypotheses (see Table 7). An analysis of variance (shown in Tables 24-26, Appendix F) was computed for the results of each of the three dimensions of terminal *ethos*. Cueing did not have a significant effect on authoritativeness ratings ($F = 0.66$), on dynamism ratings ($F = 0.75$), nor on character ratings ($F = 0.09$).

TABLE 7

MEAN RATINGS FOR TERMINAL ETHOS FOR CUEING CONDITIONS

	Accurate Cueing (n = 84)	No Cueing (n = 76)	Inaccurate Cueing (n = 82)
Authoritativeness Rating Means	32.91	32.17	32.13
Dynamism Rating Means	33.51	32.55	33.48
Character Rating Means	28.40	28.30	28.10

H_8: High credibility (initial *ethos*) produces higher terminal *ethos* than does low credibility.

Analysis of variance revealed the significant effect of initial *ethos* upon two of the three dimensions of terminal *ethos*. Analysis of variance of authoritativeness ratings (see Table 24, Appendix F) revealed a significant credibility effect ($F = 49.12$, $p < .05$). Analysis of variance of dynamism ratings (shown in Table 25, Appendix F) revealed no significant credibility effect ($F = .003$). Finally, analysis of variance of character ratings (summarized in Table 26, Appendix F) showed a significant credibility effect ($F = 47.65$, $p < .05$). As indicated in Table 8, the hypothesis was confirmed for two of the three dimensions of terminal *ethos*.

TABLE 8

MEAN RATINGS FOR TERMINAL ETHOS FOR INITIAL CREDIBILITY CONDITIONS

	High Credibility (n = 126)	Low Credibility (n = 116)
Authoritativeness Rating Means	34.54_a	30.10_a
Dynamism Rating Means	33.22	33.18
Character Rating Means	30.26_b	26.11_b

[a,b]Means with same subscript are significantly different from each other, $p < .05$.

Additional Findings

Two additional findings can be reported as a result of the present study. Ss were asked to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with two statements: "The Ambassador's speech was very convincing," and "The Ambassador's speech was very interesting."

Analysis of variance results for convincingness and interestingness are summarized in Tables 27 and 28, Appendix F. Credibility (see Table 9) did not appear to affect either of these dependent variables (Convincingness, $F = 0.79$, and Interestingness, $F = 0.03$). Cueing

TABLE 9

MEAN SCORES FOR INTERESTINGNESS AND CONVINCINGNESS FOR CREDIBILITY CONDITIONS

	High Credibility (n = 126)	Low Credibility (n = 116)
Interestingness Score Means	2.17	2.19
Convincingness Score Means	2.14	2.23

(see Table 10) likewise seemed to have no effect upon perceived interestingness ($F = 1.82$, $p < .20$). Although, as reported above, cueing seemed to show no significant effects upon attitude change, Ss did seem to <u>perceive</u> some differences in terms of convincingness ($F = 4.08$, $p < .05$).

TABLE 10

MEAN SCORES FOR INTERESTINGNESS AND CONVINCINGNESS FOR CUEING CONDITIONS

	Accurate Cueing (n = 84)	No Cueing (n = 76)	Inaccurate Cueing (n = 82)
Interestingness Score Means	2.07	2.16	2.30
Convincingness Score Means	1.98_{ab}	2.33_{a}	2.25_{b}

[a,b]Means with same subscript are significantly different from each other, $p < .05$.

Results of *t*-tests revealed a significant difference for perceived convincingness between the AC version and the NC version ($t = 2.65$, $p < .05$) and between the AC message and the IC message ($t = 2.09$, $p < .05$). The comparison of the differences between the NC and IC messages failed to produce significance (t = -.60). These differences for convincingness are in the same direction as the attitude scores, which did not reveal a significant F.

Summary of Findings

The following hypotheses were confirmed:

H_1a: Accurate cueing produces higher perceived organization (and clarity) of the message than does no cueing.

H_2b: Accurate cueing produces more retention of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_3c: No cueing produces more retention of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_6: High credibility produces more positive attitude change than does low credibility.

H_8: High credibility (initial *ethos*) produces higher terminal *ethos* than does low credibility.

The following hypotheses were <u>not</u> confirmed:

H_1b: Accurate cueing produces higher perceived organization (and clarity) of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_1c: No cueing produces higher perceived organization (and clarity) of the message than does inaccurate cueing.

H_2: High credibility produces higher perceived organization (and clarity) of the message than does low credibility.

H_3a: Accurate cueing produces more retention of the message than does no cueing.

H_4: High credibility produces more retention of the message than does low credibility.

H_5a: Accurate cueing produces more positive attitude change than does no cueing.

H_5b: Accurate cueing produces more positive attitude change than does inaccurate cueing.

H_5c: No cueing produces more positive attitude change than does inaccurate cueing.

H_7a: Accurate cueing produces higher terminal _ethos_ than does no cueing.

H_7b: Accurate cueing produces higher terminal _ethos_ than does inaccurate cueing.

H_7c: No cueing produces higher terminal _ethos_ than does inaccurate cueing.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Discussion of Results

The overriding question for which this study attempted to supply an answer is, "What are the effects of verbal cueing?" Given a well-organized message, are there any advantages to highlighting or emphasizing the organizational pattern? At the other extreme, might bad cueing prove disadvantageous?

In an effort to avoid any of the effects that oral presentation might have upon the results, a written message was employed. Three versions of the speech were devised, exemplifying accurate cueing (AC), no cueing (NC), and inaccurate cueing (IC). Each version of the written message was attributed to a high-credible source and a low-credible source. Students (242 Ss) enrolled in public speaking courses at Iowa State University during the first summer session, 1969, were randomly exposed to one of the six treatments. The effects of cueing and initial credibility upon four dependent variables were measured.

Analysis of variance revealed a significant cueing effect upon perceived organization. The accurate cueing message was judged to be more "organized" and more "clear" than the no cueing version. Differences in organization and clarity between the AC and IC messages and between the NC and IC messages were not significant. Though not a significant difference, the IC version was judged to have better organization and more clarity than the NC message. Faculty experts had also judged the IC version as more organized than the NC version. This would tend to suggest that in some cases even bad cueing is better (in terms of perceived organization) than no cueing. Credibility was found to have no significant effect upon perceived organization or clarity of the message.

The most significant effect of cueing was found to be upon the retention of the message. An analysis of the retention scores revealed that all differences were in the direction predicted and that all were significant, except for the difference between the accurate and no cueing messages. Consistent with previous research, credibility was found to have no significant effect upon retention.

The third dependent variable of interest was attitude change. Given a significant effect upon retention, it was predicted that accurate cueing would likewise produce more positive attitude change. Again, however, consistent with most previous research on organization, cueing had no significant effect upon attitude change. However, when asked to rate the convincingness of the messages, Ss who read the accurate cueing message rated it higher in convincingness than those who read the inaccurate cueing or the no cueing messages. No significant differences were noted between the IC and the NC messages. These differences were also reflected in actual attitude change scores, except that none was significant. As predicted, there was a significant credibility effect upon attitude change.

Finally, it was predicted that accurate cueing would produce higher terminal *ethos*. No support was found for this hypothesis. Credibility effects, on the other hand, were found to be significant on two dimensions of terminal *ethos*, authoritativeness and character, but not on dynamism. Neither cueing nor credibility was found to affect the perceived interestingness of the message.

In short, cueing was found to affect perceived organization and retention, while credibility affected attitude change and terminal ethos.

Implications of the Study

No one study can provide a full, complete, or final answer. As of this time there have been four studies employing verbal cueing, including the present project. Perhaps the best way to summarize the importance of the present study is to return to the three justifications for this research project, presented in Chapter I.

First, as was pointed out earlier, there is a great deal of advice in contemporary public speaking textbooks concerning the use of verbal cueing. Is this advice justified? Does verbal cueing make a difference?

Although Parker (1962) reported that "college freshmen generally are unaware of the presence or the absence of the organizational devices" (p. 29) used in his study, both Ernest Thompson (1967) and the present study confirmed that the messages incorporating good cueing are perceived as possessing more clarity and as being better organized.

All four studies, Thistlethwaite, De Hann, and Kamenetzky (1955), Parker (1962), Thompson (1967), and the present study seem to support the idea that the addition of statements to highlight relationships among units in a speech can enhance the retention of the message. Only one study has been concerned with delayed recall. Parker (1962) found no significant effect of cueing upon delayed recall.

Neither Thistlethwaite nor the present study found any relationships between cueing and attitude change.

Thompson discovered that Ss did not rate the speaker who delivered the speech with accurate cueing as better informed than did Ss who heard one of the other messages. Likewise, the present study found no cueing effect upon terminal *ethos*.

The second justification presented in Chapter I was that there are some reservations concerning the use of verbal cueing. Consistent with research on forewarning, some contemporary textbooks indicate that a preview of the main points might hinder the persuasive effect of the speech. Since this reservation assumes a hostile audience, the present study cannot be considered a really good test for the reservation about the preview. Most of the Ss are believed to have held a neutral attitude before reading the message and could not be considered hostile to the position expressed. At any rate, with a neutral topic, Ss perceived the AC message to be more convincing than the NC or the IC message. But cueing seemed to have no positive (or negative) effect upon actual attitude change. Until more research is available it is reasonable to assume that when speaking to a hostile audience, it would be better not to use a preview.

Another reservation sometimes expressed is that the use of verbal cueing might detract from the interestingness of the message. Thompson (1967) reported that cueing had a positive effect on interestinginess. Parker concluded that "the more devices used, the more interesting the readers found the material" (p. 29). The present study indicated that cueing neither added to or detracted from the interestingness of the message is not greatly endangered with the use of verbal cueing.

The final justification for the present study was the use of initial *ethos* as a second independent variable. There was no observed interaction between initial *ethos* and verbal cueing. The effects of initial *ethos* in the present study were consistent with previous research. Initial *ethos* seemed to have no effect on perceived organization or retention. High initial *ethos* produced more positive attitude change and higher terminal *ethos* (competence and character) than did low initial *ethos*.

Based on past and present research, some advice can be offered to the communicator concerning cueing and initial *ethos*. Accurate cueing seems to enhance the clarity and organization of a message. Likewise, the use of cueing can increase the amount of retention of a message. The use of cueing is likely to produce the impression in the audience that the speaker is more convincing--even though actual attitude change may not be achieved. Unless the audience is hostile to the topic of the speech, the use of verbal cueing does not seem to detract from the amount of attitude change achieved; nor does cueing detract from the interestingness of a message. Finally, a speaker with high initial *ethos* is more likely to change the attitudes of his hearers and is more likely to emerge with high terminal *ethos*.

Suggestions for Future Research

Echoing the very familiar phrase "more research is needed," the writer closes with several specific suggestions for improvements in the present study, and with suggestions for additional research in general.

First, several changes in the message could be made. The differences in cueing among the versions could be made more clear-cut. The ratings of the messages by the faculty experts seemed to indicate that the distinctions in cueing among the versions could be made sharper. Perhaps a longer message should be employed, where cueing might be more important. Though two of the four verbal cueing studies have employed an oral (audio tape) message, more work could be done with oral and visual communication. With some basis for the belief that cueing does have some impact, it seems that video taped speeches could be employed.

Second, better measures need to be devised for perceived organization and clarity. Perhaps semantic differential type scales could be used which could be factor analyzed and thus get at not only organization and clarity, but the additional dimensions of reasoning, evidence, persuasiveness, and interestingness.

Third, quite a bit or work could be done on a measure of retention. In most of the studies reported, the multiple choice or aided recall examination has been used. Other types of questions, including the unaided recall, should be employed. If organization, and particularly verbal cueing, has any value, then it should be able to be measured best by asking Ss to list the main points of the message. A clear distinction is needed among comprehension (questions dealing with understanding), general retention (remembering the main points of a message), and specific retention (remembering specific facts). Because Parker (1962) failed to find significance for delayed recall, more investigation is needed here.

Any time a written message is used as a treatment, the question of reading ability can be raised. Although it is assumed that the Ss' reading ability was controlled by randomization, admittedly there was not a close enough control on the amount of time allowed for Ss to read the message and fill out the questionnaire.

Fifth, very little effort was made in the present research to mask the fact that it was research and that Ss would be asked to answer questions on what they had read. In retrospect, it seems that Ss might very well have been sensitized to retention.

The usual criticisms concerning research on college sophomores can again be leveled. It would be useful to perform a similar experiment using Ss beyond and without college training.

Finally, only in one case in verbal cueing research (Thistlethwaite, De Haan, and Kamenetzky, 1955), has a topic been used which may have had high ego involvement for the Ss. (However, the degree of involvement was not measured.) It seems reasonable that there could be some interaction between a person's desire to remember specific arguments and his own close involvement with and/or attitude toward the topic. At least two additional proposals come to mind. A project could be devised using three topics: one which most Ss would favor, one on which they would be neutral, and a topic toward which they might be hostile. Under controlled conditions the effects of cueing could be tested. Also a project could be devised using at least two topics: one toward which the Ss have little interest (like foreign aid for Brazil!) and another topic with which the Ss are very involved.

A Final Thought

It seems to this investigator that a researcher has two initial choices. He must either choose an area totally unexplored or seek to take a second or third look at ground already covered. The present study has attempted to look at an area where others have previously traveled. The experimenter who takes this second path finds the greatest contribution comes from both a replication of previous work, as well as the use of new and different approaches. When one replicates the work of others, naturally, he either finds support or fails to find support for the previous work. Finding confirmation may be the most comfortable position in which to find oneself, but in either case, the researcher must fully explain his findings. Someone at a later date may be able to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent results. As knowledge increases an inconsistent finding may be discovered to be nothing more than sloppy research, or it could be the key to a new theory.

The present study, for the most part, confirms the work of the past. By doing so it adds a small amount of support to some of the notions of rhetorical theory, and raises questions about others. The investigator is frustrated at the process which seems so slow; but at the personal level, is revived and uplifted at the direct and indirect benefits of the present undertaking.

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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL MESSAGES

1. ACCURATE CUEING
2. NO CUEING
3. INACCURATE CUEING

APPENDIX A-1: ACCURATE CUEING

Mr. Chairman, your Excellencies, and fellow delegates:

Encouragement over developments in Brazil, such as the increase of nearly 20% in tax collections since 1961, must be tempered by the realization of how much more remains to be done in that country. There is the constant spector of the population explosion, often wiping out gains as fast as they are made. Real progress in Brazil can be achieved only by steps--a fact that seems to try the patience of United States citizens far more than it does the people of Brazil. It would be easy to conclude that only more money is needed to aid this progress. Since 1953 the United States has provided $30 billion in aid to Europe, $15 billion to Asia, and only $3 billion to Latin America. Brazil, the largest republic in South America, has received just over 1/3 of that aid. The answer lies not only in more money, but in better use of that money. It is toward the goal of better use of money, that I would like to direct my comments.

Appendix A-1 (Cont.)

Specifically, I would offer three indictments of United States aid to Brazil: U.S. aid has been wasteful, U.S. aid too often supports the leaders of the country rather than the people, and U.S. aid causes resentment.

First, United States aid has been wasteful. The U.S. foreign assistance program to Brazil is not only an inadequate response to the needs of the people, but is hobbled by misunderstanding over its purpose and misallocation of its limited resources. One of the main problems is simply misplaced priorities. The history of the U.S. foreign aid program provides us with many examples of apparent waste. In Brazil, and in Latin America in general, there seems to be an unwarranted emphasis on capital improvements such as highways--where more personal needs such as food, housing, and sanitation improvements are greatly ignored. No one would deny, for instance, the value of educational facilities. In 1967, a little over $250,000 was spent on two large schools. Unfortunately, the area chosen, near Juruá, is one of the least populated areas of Brazil. Other regions of Brazil are still in need of buildings today. Instances such as these

Appendix A-1 (Cont.)

demonstrate an over-all lack of planning which seems to plague the U.S. foreign aid program. I could dwell on other examples such as the issuing of a year's supply of food grants all at one time, or the almost foolish gift of 2000 refrigerators to an area lacking electricity and not scheduled to receive electricity even to this day! The large amount of bureaucracy involved in most U.S. grants results in little direct relief for individual needs. Because of lack of careful planning, and because individual needs are largely ignored, we must conclude that the U.S. aid program is wasteful.

A second area of concern is the support the United States gives to military regimes. A disproportionate amount of United States assistance to Brazil is diverted to military interests. Indirectly the U.S. is encouraging competition among the Latin American republics which may eventually prove detrimental to the South American continent, to the United States, and to the entire world.

The goal of United States aid and U.S. foreign policy in general is clear. Since the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the primary political objective of the

Appendix A-1 (Cont.)

U.S. in its inter-American policy has been the maintenance or attainment of political stability in Latin America. Stability, as understood by U.S. policy makers, has three dimensions: internal Latin American political structures, interstate relations within the hemisphere, and the relationship of the hemisphere to the rest of the world.

The very nature of these republics admittedly complicates this honorable goal of stability. Over the past six years, a wave of militarism has been sweeping across Latin America. Since March, 1962, there have been nine coups. In each case, the armed forces ousted civilian, constitutional presidents. Seven of them had been elected by popular majorities. In Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Honduras the military is still ruling, and in Peru, Guatemala, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic, the governments have been transferred to civilian forces less representative than those that were deposed. Although the U.S. may have tried to discourage those types of military establishments which would become competitive against each other within the inter-American system, this has not always been easy because the military establishments

Appendix A-1 (Cont.)

themselves get nervous about each other. In this instance, I would stand with Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska when he said, not so many months ago, "A re-examination of United States aid to Latin America is sorely overdue. None of the goals of the program have been achieved--not hemisphere defense, not standardization, not modernization, not a reduction of military forces."

I don't believe that it is out of line to suggest that U.S. assistance may have done economic harm to its major recipients. For while military assistance has frequently served purposes which may be described as "economic," such aid is generally employed to meet current expenses of an economy strained by military demands and is not used in ways which contribute to long-term economic growth.

The Latin American military who in a number of countries overrule, or rule through, civilian governments are kept powerful by those governments' excessive spending on arms and most of this is made possible through U.S. aid. This direct and indirect U.S. support has led the Latin American leaders to conclude that the U.S. obligation is

Appendix A-1 (Cont.)

to their regimes, rather than to their peoples. Whether by chance or by design, U.S. aid is serving as a catalyst to Latin American unrest. Second, then, I would contend that U.S. aid supports the leaders of the country rather than the people.

The third indictment of U.S. aid is that it causes resentment. Too often the emphasis of U.S. foreign assistance to Brazil and other Latin American countries has been that of show, rather than real assistance. Administrators have seemed more concerned with recognition and credit, than with sincere service. The matter of "appropriate timing for maximum effect" has dominated too many U.S. aid efforts. Perhaps even more serious has been the tendency of committing large amounts of assistance quickly for projects with high visibility. I am reminded of the incident of the emergency aid to the city of Recife which eventually backfired as many of those present will recall. Is it wrong to suggest that sometimes foreign assistance can be worse than no aid at all?

Imagine how the flood victims of Oregon and California might have felt if after losing their homes and

Appendix A-1 (Cont.)

possessions, they were then asked to participate in little picture taking ceremonies with beaming foreign ambassadors dispersing food and blankets labeled "Gift of the French people" or "Gift of the Russian people."

It only follows that aid-receiving nations think that to maintain their self-respect they have to do something to demonstrate their independence of the aid-giving nations. This something frequently takes the form of rejecting the advice of the aid-giving nations. In this case, U.S. aid actually backfires and causes resentment among recipients, my third indictment.

In summary, I have suggested three problems. U.S. aid has been wasteful, it too often supports the leaders of the country rather than the people, and it causes resentment. I would not want to imply this morning that the aid program is, or has been, of no value. Brazil, with assistance from the U.S. and other countries, has greatly reduced its inflation rate, restored its credit, encouraged private investment, and set its economic institutions. But the indictments I have mentioned are

Appendix A-1 (Cont.)

serious and have greatly curtailed the potential growth and progress in Brazil and other Latin American republics.

PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE.

APPENDIX A-2: NO CUEING

Mr. Chairman, your Excellencies, and fellow delegates:

Encouragement over developments in Brazil, such as the increase of nearly 20% in tax collections since 1961, must be tempered by the realization of how much more remains to be done in that country. There is the constant spector of the population explosion, often wiping out gains as fast as they are made. Real progress in Brazil can be achieved only by steps--a fact that seems to try the patience of United States citizens far more than it does the people of Brazil. It would be easy to conclude that only more money is needed to aid this progress. Since 1953 the United States has provided $30 billion in aid to Europe, $15 billion to Asia, and only $3 billion to Latin America. Brazil, the largest republic in South America, has received just over 1/3 of that aid. The answer lies not only in more money, but in better use of that money. It is toward the goal of better use of money, that I would like to direct my comments.

Appendix A-2 (Cont.)

The U.S. foreign assistance program to Brazil is not only an inadequate response to the needs of the people, but is hobbled by misunderstanding over its purpose and misallocation of its limited resources. One of the main problems is simply misplaced priorities. The history of the U.S. foreign aid program provides us with many examples of apparent waste. In Brazil, and in Latin America in general, there seems to be an unwarranted emphasis on capital improvements such has highways--where more personal needs such as food, housing, and sanitation improvements are greatly ignored. No one would deny, for instance, the value of educational facilities. In 1967, a little over $250,000 was spent on two large schools. Unfortunately, the area chosen, near Juruá, is one of the least populated areas of Brazil. Other regions of Brazil are still in need of buildings today. Instances such as these demonstrate an over-all lacking of planning which seems to plague the U.S. foreign aid program. I could dwell on other examples such as the issuing of a year's supply of food grants all at one time, or the almost foolish gift of 2000 refrigerators to an area lacking

Appendix A-2 (Cont.)

electricity and not scheduled to receive electricity even to this day! The large amount of bureaucracy involved in most U.S. grants results in little direct relief for individual needs.

A disproportionate amount of United States assistance to Brazil is diverted to military interests. Indirectly the U.S. is encouraging competition among the Latin American republics which may eventually prove detrimental to the South American continent, to the United States, and to the entire world.

The goal of United States aid and U.S. foreign policy in general is clear. Since the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the primary political objective of the U.S. in its inter-American policy has been the maintenance or attainment of political stability in Latin America. Stability, as understood by U.S. policy makers, has three dimensions: internal Latin American political structures, interstate relations within the hemisphere, and the relationship of the hemisphere to the rest of the world.

The very nature of these republics admittedly complicates this honorable goal of stability. Over the

Appendix A-2 (Cont.)

past six years, a wave of militarism has been sweeping across Latin America. Since March, 1962, there have been nine coups. In each case, the armed forces ousted civilian, constitutional presidents. Seven of them had been elected by popular majorities. In Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Honduras the military is still ruling, and in Peru, Guatemala, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic, the governments have been transferred to civilian forces less representative than those that were deposed. Although the U.S. may have tried to discourage those types of military establishments which would become competitive against each other within the inter-American system, this has not always been easy because the military establishments themselves get nervous about each other. In this instance, I would stand with Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska when he said, not so many months ago, "A re-examination of United States aid to Latin America is sorely overdue. None of the goals of the program have been achieved--not hemisphere defense, not standardization, not modernization, not a reduction of military forces."

Appendix A-2 (Cont.)

I don't believe that it is out of line to suggest that U.S. assistance may have done economic harm to its major recipients. For while military assistance has frequently served purposes which may be descibed as "economic," such aid is generally employed to meet current expenses of an economy strained by military demands and is not used in ways which contribute to long-term economic growth.

The Latin American military who in a number of countries overrule, or rule through, civilian governments are kept powerful by those governments' excessive spending on arms and most of this is made possible through U.S. aid. This direct and indirect U.S. support has led the Latin American leaders to conclude that the U.S. obligation is to their regimes, rather than to their peoples.

Too often the emphasis of U.S. foreign assistance to Brazil and other Latin American countries has been that of show, rather than real assistance. Administrators have seemed more concerned with recognition and credit, than with sincere service. The matter of "appropriate timing for maximum effect" has dominated too many U.S. aid efforts. Perhaps even more serious has been the tendency of

Appendix A-2 (Cont.)

committing large amounts of assistance quickly for projects with high visibility. I am reminded of the incident of the emergency aid to the city of Recife which eventually backfired as many of those present will recall. Is it wrong to suggest that sometimes foreign assistance can be worse than no aid at all?

Imagine how the flood victims of Oregon and California might have felt if after losing their homes and possessions, they were then asked to participate in little picture taking ceremonies with beaming foreign ambassadors dispersing food and blankets labeled "Gift of the French people" or "Gift of the Russian people."

It only follows that aid-receiving nations think that to maintain their self-respect they have to do someting to demonstrate their independence of the aid-giving nations. This something frequently takes the form of rejecting the advice of the aid-giving nations.

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Appendix A-2 (Cont.)

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PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE.

APPENDIX A-3: INACCURATE CUEING

Mr. Chairman, your Excellencies, and fellow delegates:

Encouragement over developments in Brazil, such as the increase of nearly 20% in tax collections since 1961, must be tempered by the realization of how much more remains to be done in that country. There is the constant spector of the population explosion, often wiping out gains as fast as they are made. Real progress in Brazil can be achieved only by steps--a fact that seems to try the patience of United States citizens far more than it does the people of Brazil. It would be easy to conclude that only more money is needed to aid this progress. Since 1953 the United States has provided $30 billion in aid to Europe, $15 billion to Asia, and only $3 billion to Latin America. Brazil, the largest republic in South America, has received just over 1/3 of that aid. The answer lies not only in more money, but in better use of that money. It is toward the goal of better use of money, that I would like to direct my comments. Specifically,

Appendix A-3 (Cont.)

I would offer four indictments of United States aid to Brazil: U.S. aid too often supports the leaders of the country rather than the people, U.S. aid has been wasteful, U.S. aid causes resentment, and U.S. aid is directed toward American companies rather than to the Brazilian workers.

First, United States aid has been wasteful. The U.S. foreign assistance program to Brazil is not only an inadequate response to the needs of the people, but is hobbled by misunderstanding over its purpose and misallocation of its limited resources. One of the main problems is simply misplaced priorities. The history of the U.S. foreign aid program provides us with many examples of apparent waste. In Brazil, and in Latin America in general, there seems to be an unwarranted emphasis on capital improvements such as highways--where more personal needs such as food, housing, and sanitation improvements are greatly ignored. No one would deny, for instance, the value of educational facilities. In 1967, a little over $250,000 was spent on two large schools. Unfortunately, the area chosen, near Juruá, is one of the least populated

Appendix A-3 (Cont.)

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Appendix A-3 (Cont.)

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Appendix A-3 (Cont.)

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Appendix A-3 (Cont.)

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The final indictment of U.S. aid is that it causes resentment. Too often the emphasis of U.S. foreign assistance to Brazil and other Latin American countries has been that of show, rather than real assistance. Administrators have seemed more concerned with recognition and credit, than with sincere service. The matter of "appropriate timing for maximum effect" has dominated too many U.S. aid efforts. Perhaps even more serious has been the tendency of committing large amounts of assistance quickly for projects with high visibility. I am reminded of the incident of the emergency aid to the city of Recife which eventually backfired as many of those present will recall. Is it wrong to suggest that sometimes foreign assistance can be worse than no aid at all?

Imagine how the flood victims of Oregon and California might have felt if after losing their homes and possessions, they were then asked to participate in little picture taking ceremonies with beaming foreign ambassadors dispersing food and blankets labeled "Gift of the French people" or "Gift of the Russian people."

It only follows that aid-receiving nations think that to maintain their self-respect they have to do something to demonstrate their independence of the aid-giving nations. This something frequently takes the form of rejecting the advice of the aid-giving nations. In this case U.S. aid actually backfires and causes resentment among recipients, my final indictment.

In summary, I have suggested several problems: U.S. aid is directed toward American companies rather than to the individual workers and U.S. aid supports the leaders of the country rather than the people. I would not want to imply this morning that the aid program is, or has been, of no value. Brazil, with assistance from the U.S. and other countries, has greatly reduced its inflation rate, restored its credit, encouraged private investment, and set its economic institutions. But the indictments I have mentioned are serious and have greatly curtailed the potential growth and progress in Brazil and other Latin American republics.

PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE.

APPENDIX B: TREATMENT ONE

(High-Credible Source--Accurate Cueing)

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING:

The Department of Speech is interested in isolating the factors that contribute to successful communication. Your co-operation with this project will be greatly appreciated.

The following speech was delivered September 3, 1968, by the former United States Ambassador to Brazil, Thomas A. Wilson. Ambassador Wilson was addressing delegates to the Latin American Affairs Institute held in Paris, France.

The speech by Ambassador Wilson is presented as reported in the Washington Post.

APPENDIX B: TREATMENT ONE

Mr. Chairman, your Excellencies, and fellow delegates:

Encouragement over developments in Brazil, such as the increase of nearly 20% in tax collections since 1961, must be tempered by the realization of how much more remains to be done in that country. There is the constant spector of the population explosion, often wiping out gains as fast as they are made. Real progress in Brazil can be achieved only by steps--a fact that seems to try the patience of United States citizens far more than it does the people of Brazil. It would be easy to conclude that only more money is needed to aid this progress. Since 1953 the United States has provided $30 billion in aid to Europe, $15 billion to Asia, and only $3 billion to Latin America. Brazil, the largest republic in South America, has received just over 1/3 of that aid. The answer lies not only in more money, but in better use of that money. It is toward the goal of better use of money, that I would like to direct my comments.

Appendix B (Cont.)

Specifically, I would offer three indictments of United States aid to Brazil: U.S. aid has been wasteful, U.S. aid too often supports the leaders of the country rather than the people, and U.S. aid causes resentment.

First, United States aid has been wasteful. The U.S. foreign assistance program to Brazil is not only an inadequate response to the needs of the people, but is hobbled by misunderstanding over its purpose and misallocation of its limited resources. One of the main problems is simply misplaced priorities. The history of the U.S. foreign aid program provides us with many examples of apparent waste. In Brazil, and in Latin America in general, there seems to be an unwarranted emphasis on capital improvements such as highways--where more personal needs such as food, housing, and sanitation improvements are greatly ignored. No one would deny, for instance, the value of educational facilities. In 1967, a little over $250,000 was spent on two large schools. Unfortunately, the area chosen, near Juruá is one of the least populated areas of Brazil. Other regions of Brazil are still in need of buildings today. Instances such as these

Appendix B (Cont.)

demonstrate an over-all lack of planning which seems to plague the U.S. foreign aid program. I could dwell on other examples such as the issuing of a year's supply of food grants all at one time, or the almost foolish gift of 2000 refrigerators to an area lacking electricity and not scheduled to receive electricity even to this day! The large amount of bureaucracy involed in most U.S. grants results in little direct relief for individual needs. Because of lack of careful planning, and because individual needs are largely ignored, we must conclude that the U.S. aid program is wasteful.

A second area of concern is the support the United States gives to military regimes. A disproportionate amount of United States assistance to Brazil is diverted to military interests. Indirectly the U.S. is encouraging competition among the Latin American republics which may eventually prove detrimental to the South American continent, to the United States, and to the entire world.

The goal of United States aid and U.S. foreign policy in general is clear. Since the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the primary political objective of the

Appendix B (Cont.)

U.S. in its inter-American policy has been the maintenance or attainment of political stability in Latin America. Stability, as understood by U.S. policy makers, has three dimensions: internal Latin American political structures, interstate relations within the hemisphere, and the relationship of the hemisphere to the rest of the world.

The very nature of these republics admittedly complicates this honorable goal of stability. Over the past six years, a wave of militarism has been sweeping across Latin America. Since March, 1962, there have been nine coups. In each case, the armed forces ousted civilian, constitutional presidents. Seven of them had been elected by popular majorities. In Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Honduras the military is still ruling, and in Peru, Guatemala, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic, the governments have been transferred to civilian forces less representative than those that were deposed. Although the U.S. may have tried to discourage those types of military establishments which would become competitive against each other within the inter-American system, this has not always been easy because the military establishments themselves get

Appendix B (Cont.)

nervous about each other. In this instance, I would stand with Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska when he said, not so many months ago, "A re-examination of United States aid to Latin America is sorely overdue. None of the goals of the program have been achieved--not hemisphere defense, not standardization, not modernization, not a reduction of miliatry forces."

I don't believe that it is out of line to suggest that U.S. assistance may have done economic harm to its major recipients. For while military assistance has frequently served purposes which may be described as "economic," such aid is generally employed to meet current expenses of an economy strained by military demands and is not used in ways which contribute to long-term economic growth.

The Latin American military who in a number of countries overrule, or rule through, civilian governments are kept powerful by those governments' excessive spending on arms and most of this is made possible through U.S. aid. This direct and indirect U.S. support has led the Latin American leaders to conclude that the U.S. obligation is

Appendix B (Cont.)

to their regimes, rather than to their peoples. Whether by chance or by design, U.S. aid is serving as a catalyst to Latin American unrest. Second, then, I would contend that U.S. aid supports the leaders of the country rather than the people.

The third indictment of U.S. aid is that it causes resentment. Too often the emphasis of U.S. foreign assistance to Brazil and other Latin American countries has been that of show, rather than real assistance. Administrators have seemed more concerned with recognition and credit, than with sincere service. The matter of "appropriate timing for maximum effect" has dominated too many U.S. aid efforts. Perhaps even more serious has been the tendency of committing large amounts of assistance quickly for projects with high visibility. I am reminded of the incident of the emergency aid to the city of Recife which eventually backfired as many of those present will recall. Is it wrong to suggest that sometimes foreign assistance can be worse than no aid at all?

Imagine how the flood victims of Oregon and California might have felt if after losing their homes and

Appendix B (Cont.)

possessions, they were then asked to participate in little picture taking ceremonies with beaming foreign ambassadors dispersing food and blankets labeled "Gift of the French people" or "Gift of the Russian people."

It only follows that aid-receiving nations think that to maintain their self-respect they have to do something to demonstrate their independence of the aid-giving nations. This something frequently takes the form of rejecting the advice of the aid-giving nations. In this case U.S. aid actually backfires and causes resentment among recipients, my third indictment.

In summary, I have suggested three problems. U.S. aid has been wasteful, it too often supports the leaders of the country rather than the people, and it causes resentment. I would not want to imply this morning that the aid program is, or has been, of no value. Brazil, with assistance from the U.S. and other countries, has greatly reduced its inflation rate, restored its credit, encouraged private investment, and set its economic institutions. But the indictments I have mentioned are

Appendix B (Cont.)

serious and have greatly curtailed the potential growth and progress in Brazil and other Latin American republics.

PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE.

Appendix B (Cont.)

Without turning back to the speech, please answer the following questions.

1. First, rate the speaker by placing a check mark on <u>each</u> of the following scales:

U. S. AMBASSADOR TO BRAZIL
THOMAS A. WILSON

Informed	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Uninformed
Unqualified	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Qualified
Reliable	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unreliable
Worthless	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Valuable
Intelligent	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unintelligent
Inexpert	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Expert
Aggressive	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Meek
Hesitant	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Emphatic
Forceful	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Forceless
Timid	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Bold
Active	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Passive
Tired	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Energetic
Unselfish	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Selfish
Awful	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Nice
Friendly	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unfriendly
Dishonest	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Honest
Pleasant	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unpleasant
Sinful	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Virtuous

HAVE YOU SKIPPED ANY SCALES?

Please turn to the next page.

Appendix B (Cont.)

2. Please rate the following statement by placing a check mark on each of the following scales:

THE U.S. HAS A WELL ADMINISTERED FOREIGN AID PROGRAM FOR BRAZIL.

Right ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ Wrong

False ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ True

Yes ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ No

Incorrect ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ Correct

I agree ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ I disagree

Foolish ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ Wise

Please answer the following questions by circling the letter beside the best answer.

3. The speaker indicated that

A. Brazil has reached the point where no more foreign aid is needed.
B. Brazil has made progress, but additional help is needed.
C. Brazil has made little progress since 1961.
D. Brazil has made little progress since 1961 and all is hopeless.
E. All that is needed is more money for Brazil.

4. The speaker stated that since 1953 Latin America has received

A. $60 billion in aid from the U.S.
B. $35 billion in aid from the U.S.
C. $20 billion in aid from the U.S.
D. $ 3 billion in aid from the U.S.
E. $ 1 billion in aid from the U.S.

Appendix B (Cont.)

5. The largest republic in Latin America is

   A. Brazil.
   B. Colombia.
   C. Venezuela.
   D. Argentina.
   E. Chile.

6. Brazil has received ____ of United States aid to Latin America.

   A. 1/5
   B. 1/4
   C. 1/3
   D. 1/2
   E. all

7. The speaker actually <u>developed</u> ___ indictments of U.S. aid to Brazil.

   A. 2
   B. 3
   C. 4
   D. 5
   E. 6

8. Which of the following points was <u>not</u> actually developed by the speaker?

   A. U.S. aid has been wasteful.
   B. U.S. aid too often supports the leaders rather than the people.
   C. U.S. aid is directed to American companies rather than to Brazilian workers.
   D. U.S. aid causes resentment.
   E. All of the above points were actually developed by the speaker.

9. The ambassador suggested that

   A. All U.S. aid goes toward capital improvements.
   B. Too much U.S. aid goes to capital improvements to the detriment of the needs of the people.
   C. More money should go to capital improvements.
   D. All U.S. aid should go to capital improvements.
   E. None of the above.

Appendix B (Cont.)

10. According to the speaker, the least populated area of Brazil is near

    A. Manaus.
    B. Juruá.
    C. Campinas.
    D. Salvador.
    E. Recife.

11. The ambassador stated that the primary objective of U.S. policy in Latin America is

    A. reduction of the population explosion.
    B. to increase the number of democratic governments.
    C. to increase the number of military rulers.
    D. to create stability.
    E. to create "little America's."

12. Which of the following points was <u>not</u> made by the speaker?

    A. A large amount of U.S. aid is diverted to military interests.
    B. The U.S. is encouraging competition among the South American republics.
    C. A wave of militarism has been sweeping Latin America.
    D. U.S. aid has caused economic harm to its recipients.
    E. All of these points were presented.

13. The speaker said that our economic aid encourages unrest in Latin America because

    A. All of U.S. aid is in the form of military assistance.
    B. U.S. economic aid enables the countries to meet current expenses of an economy strained by military demands.
    C. The U.S. supports only military rulers.
    D. The military establishments get nervous about each other.
    E. Both B and D above are correct.

Appendix B (Cont.)

14. The speaker indicated that

    A. the U.S. is too conerned with getting credit for its aid.
    B. the U.S. should be more concerned with getting credit for its aid.
    C. flood victims in Oregon rejected Russian aid.
    D. the over-concern with visibility by the U.S. causes resentment.
    E. at least two of the above statements are correct.

15. The speaker suggested that resentment among recipient nations is present because

    A. the U.S. has given too little aid to Latin America.
    B. the U.S. has put too much emphasis on loans.
    C. the countries feel they must maintain their self-respect and demonstrate their independence.
    D. the countries are made to feel like beggars.
    E. both B and C above are correct.

Indicate your reaction to the following statements by placing a check mark in one of the five spaces.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Unde-cided	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree
16. I would say that the ambassador's speech was very well organized.	___	___	___	___	___
17. In general, the speech was very convincing.	___	___	___	___	___
18. The main points developed by the speaker stood out very clearly.	___	___	___	___	___
19. In general, the ambassador's speech was very interesting.	___	___	___	___	___

Appendix B (Cont.)

20. I suspect that the purpose of this research project is:

Other comments:

Thank you for your co-operation.

APPENDIX C: TREATMENT FIVE

(Low-Credible Source--No Cueing)

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING:

The Department of Speech is interested in isolating the factors that contribute to successful communication. Your co-operation with this project will be greatly appreciated.

The following speech was delivered September 3, 1968, by the Red Chinese Ambassador to Brazil, Lin Tai. Ambassador Tai was addressing delegates to the Latin American Affairs Institute held in Paris, France.

The speech by Ambassador Tai is presented as reported in the Washington Post.

APPENDIX C: TREATMENT FIVE

Mr. Chairman, your Excellencies, and fellow delegates:

Encouragement over developments in Brazil, such as the increase of nearly 20% in tax collections since 1961, must be tempered by the realization of how much more remains to be done in that country. There is the constant spector of the population explosion, often wiping out gains as fast as they are made. Real progress in Brazil can be achieved only by steps--a fact that seems to try the patience of United States citizens far more than it does the people of Brazil. It would be easy to conclude that only more money is needed to aid this progress. Since 1953 the United States has provided $30 billion in aid to Europe, $15 billion to Asia, and only $3 billion to Latin America. Brazil, the largest republic in South America, has received just over 1/3 of that aid. The answer lies not only in more money, but in better use of that money. It is toward the goal of better use of money, that I would like to direct my comments.

Appendix C (Cont.)

The U.S. foreign assistance program to Brazil is not only an inadequate response to the needs of the people, but is hobbled by misunderstanding over its purpose and misallocation of its limited resources. One of the main problems is simply misplaced priorities. The history of the U.S. foreign aid program provides us with many examples of apparent waste. In Brazil, and in Latin America in general, there seems to be an unwarranted emphasis on capital improvements such as highways--where more personal needs such as food, housing, and sanitation improvements are greatly ignored. No one would deny, for instance, the value of educational facilities. In 1967, a little over $250,000 was spent on two large schools. Unfortunately, the area chosen, near Juruá, is one of the least populated areas of Brazil. Other regions of Brazil are still in need of buildings today. Instances such as these demonstrate an over-all lack of planning which seems to plague the U.S. foreign aid program. I could dwell on other examples such as the issuing of a year's supply of food grants all at one time, or the almost foolish gift of 2000 refrigerators to an area lacking

Appendix C (Cont.)

electricity and not scheduled to receive electricity even to this day! The large amount of bureaucracy involved in most U.S. grants results in little direct relief for individual needs.

A disproportionate amount of United States assistance to Brazil is diverted to military interests. Indirectly the U.S. is encouraging competition among the Latin American republics which may eventually prove detrimental to the South American continent, to the United States, and to the entire world.

The goal of United States aid and U.S. foreign policy in general, is clear. Since the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the primary political objective of the U.S. in its inter-American policy has been the maintenance or attainment of political stability in Latin America. Stability, as understood by U.S. policy makers, has three dimensions: internal Latin American political structures, interstate relations within the hemisphere, and the relationship of the hemisphere to the rest of the world.

Appendix C (Cont.)

The very nature of these republics admittedly complicates this honorable goal of stability. Over the past six years, a wave of militarism has been sweeping across Latin America. Since March, 1962, there have been nine coups. In each case, the armed forces ousted civilian, constitutional presidents. Seven of them had been elected by popular majorities. In Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Honduras the military is still ruling, and in Peru, Guatemala, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic, the governments have been transferred to civilian forces less representative than those that were deposed. Although the U.S. may have tried to discourage those types of military establishments which would become competitive against each other within the inter-American system, this has not always been easy because the military establishments themselves get nervous about each other. In this instance, I would stand with Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska when he said, not so many months ago, "A reexamination of United States aid to Latin Ameria is sorely overdue. None of the goals of the program have been

Appendix C (Cont.)

achieved--not hemisphere defense, not standardization, not modernization, not a reduction of military forces."

I don't believe that it is out of line to suggest that U.S. assistance may have done economic harm to its major recipients. For while military assistance has frequently served purposes which may be described as "economic," such aid is generally employed to meet current expenses of an economy strained by military demands and is not used in ways which contribute to long-term economic growth.

The Latin American military who in a number of countries overrule, or rule through, civilian governments are kept powerful by those governments' excessive spending on arms and most of this is made possible through U.S. aid. This direct and indirect U.S. support has led the Latin American leaders to conclude that the U.S. obligation is to their regimes, rather than to their peoples.

Too often the emphasis of U.S. foreign assistance to Brazil and other Latin American countries has been that of show, rather than real assistance. Administrators have seemed more concerned with recognition and credit, than

Appendix C (Cont.)

with sincere service. The matter of "appropriate timing for maximum effect" has dominated too many U.S. aid efforts. Perhaps even more serious has been the tendency of committing large amounts of assistance quickly for projects with high visibility. I am reminded of the incident of the emergency aid to the city of Recife which eventually backfired as many of those present will recall. Is it wrong to suggest that sometimes foreign assistance can be worse than no aid at all?

Imagine how the flood victims of Oregon and California might have felt if after losing their homes and possessions, they were then asked to participate in little picture taking ceremonies with beaming foreign ambassadors dispersing food and blankets labeled "Gift of the French people" or "Gift of the Russian people."

It only follows that aid-receiving nations think that to maintain their self-respect they have to do something to demonstrate their independence of the aid-giving nations. This something frequently takes the form of rejecting the advice of the aid-giving nations.

Appendix C (Cont.)

I would not want to imply this morning that the aid program is, or has been, of no value. Brazil, with assistance from the U.S. and other countries, has greatly reduced its inflation rate, restored its credit, encouraged private investment, and set its economic institutions. But the indictments I have mentioned are serious and have greatly curtailed the potential growth and progress in Brazil and other Latin American republics.

PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE.

Appendix C (Cont.)

Without turning back to the speech, please answer the following questions.

1. First, rate the speaker by placing a check mark on <u>each</u> of the following scales:

RED CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO BRAZIL
LIN TAI

Informed	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Uninformed
Unqualified	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Qualified
Reliable	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unreliable
Worthless	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Valuable
Intelligent	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unintelligent
Inexpert	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Expert
Aggressive	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Meek
Hesitant	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Emphatic
Forceful	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Forceless
Timid	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Bold
Active	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Passive
Tired	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Energetic
Unselfish	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Selfish
Awful	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Nice
Friendly	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unfriendly
Dishonest	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Honest
Pleasant	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unpleasant
Sinful	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Virtuous

HAVE YOU SKIPPED ANY SCALES?

Please turn to the next page.

Appendix C (Cont.)

2. Please rate the following statement by placing a check mark on each of the following scales:

THE U.S. HAS A WELL ADMINISTERED FOREIGN AID PROGRAM FOR BRAZIL.

Right ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ Wrong

False ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ True

Yes ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ No

Incorrect ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ Correct

I agree ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ I disagree

Foolish ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ Wise

Please answer the following questions by circling the letter beside the best answer.

3. The speaker indicated that

A. Brazil has reached the point where no more foreign aid is needed.
B. Brazil has made progress, but additional help is needed.
C. Brazil has made little progress since 1961.
D. Brazil has made little progress since 1961 and all is hopeless.
E. All that is needed is more money for Brazil.

4. The speaker stated that since 1953 Latin America has received

A. $60 billion in aid from the U.S.
B. $35 billion in aid from the U.S.
C. $20 billion in aid from the U.S.
D. $ 3 billion in aid from the U.S.
E. $ 1 billion in aid from the U.S.

Appendix C (Cont.)

5. The largest republic in Latin America is

   A. Brazil.
   B. Colombia.
   C. Venezuela.
   D. Argentina.
   E. Chile.

6. Brazil has received ____ of United States aid to Latin America.

   A. 1/5
   B. 1/4
   C. 1/3
   D. 1/2
   E. all

7. The speaker actually <u>developed</u> ___ indictments of U.S. aid to Brazil.

   A. 2
   B. 3
   C. 4
   D. 5
   E. 6

8. Which of the following points was <u>not</u> actually developed by the speaker?

   A. U.S. aid has been wasteful.
   B. U.S. aid too often supports the leaders rather than the people.
   C. U.S. aid is directed to American companies rather than to Brazilian workers.
   D. U.S. aid causes resentment.
   E. All of the above points were actually developed by the speaker.

9. The ambassador suggested that

   A. All U.S. aid goes toward capital improvements.
   B. Too much U.S. aid goes to capital improvements to the detriment of the needs of the people.
   C. More money should go to capital improvements.
   D. All U.S. aid should go to capital improvements.
   E. None of the above.

Appendix C (Cont.)

10. According to the speaker, the least populated area of Brazil is near

    A. Manaus.
    B. Juruá.
    C. Campinas.
    D. Salvador.
    E. Recife.

11. The ambassador stated that the primary objective of U.S. policy in Latin America is

    A. reduction of the population explosion.
    B. to increase the number of democratic governments.
    C. to increase the number of military rulers.
    D. to create stability.
    E. to create "little America's."

12. Which of the following points was <u>not</u> made by the speaker?

    A. A large amount of U.S. aid is diverted to military interests.
    B. The U.S. is encouraging competition among the South American republics.
    C. A wave of militarism has been sweeping Latin America.
    D. U.S. aid has caused economic harm to its recipients.
    E. All of these points were presented.

13. The speaker said that our economic aid encourages unrest in Latin America because

    A. All of U.S. aid is in the form of military assistance.
    B. U.S. economic aid enables the countries to meet current expenses of an economy strained by military demands.
    C. The U.S. supports only military rulers.
    D. The military establishments get nervous about each other.
    E. Both B and D above are correct.

Appendix C (Cont.)

14. The speaker indicated that
    - A. the U.S. is too concerned with getting credit for its aid.
    - B. the U.S. should be more concerned with getting credit for its aid.
    - C. flood victims in Oregon rejected Russian aid.
    - D. the over-concern with visibility by the U.S. causes resentment.
    - E. at least two of the above statements are correct.

15. The speaker suggested that resentment among recipient nations is present because
    - A. the U.S. has given too little aid to Latin America.
    - B. the U.S. has put too much emphasis on loans.
    - C. the countries feel they must maintain their self-respect and demonstrate their independence.
    - D. the countries are made to feel like beggars.
    - E. both B and C are correct.

Indicate your reaction to the following statements by placing a check mark in one of the five spaces.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
16. I would say that the ambassador's speech was very well organized.	___	___	___	___	___
17. In general, the speech was very convincing.	___	___	___	___	___
18. The main points developed by the speaker stood out very clearly.	___	___	___	___	___
19. In general, the ambassador's speech was very interesting.	___	___	___	___	___

Appendix C (Cont.)

20. I suspect that the purpose of this research project is:

Other comments:

Thank you for your co-operation.

APPENDIX D

PRELIMINARY CHECKS

APPENDIX D: PRELIMINARY CHECKS

TABLE 11

SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY CHECK OF ATTITUDE TOWARD TOPIC

Class	Mean
Speech 334A	25.2
Speech 334B	22.4
Total	24.2*

*On a scale ranging from 6 to 42, 24.0 is the neutral point.

TABLE 12

SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY CHECK OF INITIAL ETHOS

Source	Combined Rating	Authoritativeness	Dynamism	Character
Wilson	29.0	29.9	28.5	28.5
Tai	26.5	27.1	29.7	22.7

Appendix D (Cont.)

TABLE 13

SUMMARY OF FACULTY RATINGS FOR ACCURATE CUEING MESSAGE

Instructor	Clear	Interest	Organi-zation	Persua-sive	Reason-ing	Evi-dence
A	7	6	7	6	6	6
B	7	4	7	5	5	6
C	7	5	6	5	5	6
D	7	5	5	3	5	4
E	6	5	6	2	5	2
F	7	3	7	3	4	6
Total	41	29	38	24	28	28

TABLE 14

SUMMARY OF FACULTY RATINGS FOR NO CUEING MESSAGE

Instructor	Clear	Interest	Organi-zation	Persua-sive	Reason-ing	Evi-dence
G	6	6	6	6	7	3
H	6	4	1	3	3	6
I	5	4	4	3	3	4
J	6	5	3	6	6	6
K	7	2	2	6	7	6
L	7	7	5	7	7	7
Total	37	28	21	31	33	32

Appendix D (Cont.)

TABLE 15

SUMMARY OF FACULTY RATINGS FOR INACCURATE CUEING MESSAGE

Instructor	Clear	Interest	Organization	Persuasive	Reasoning	Evidence
M	7	5	6	5	6	6
N	3	4	2	4	3	3
O	5	4	2	2	3	4
P	5	4	6	5	5	5
Q	6	6	6	5	6	4
R	6	6	5	6	6	6
Total	32	29	27	27	28	28

TABLE 16

SUMMARY OF FACULTY RATINGS FOR THE THREE MESSAGES

Message	Clear	Interest	Organization	Persuasive	Reasoning	Evidence	Total
Acc Cue	41	29	38	24	28	28	188
No Cue	37	28	21	31	33	32	182
Inacc Cue	32	29	27	27	28	28	171

Appendix D (Cont.)

TABLE 17

SUMMARY OF FACULTY PLACEMENT OF THE THREE MESSAGES

Instructor	Accurate Cueing	No Cueing	Inaccurate Cueing
B	A	N	I
C	A	N	I
D	A	I*	N*
E	A	N	I
G	A	N	I
I	A	N	I
O	A	N	I
Q	A	N	I
	100.0%	87.5%	87.5%

APPENDIX E

PRELIMINARY ANALYSES

APPENDIX E: PRELIMINARY ANALYSES

TABLE 18

ITEM ANALYSIS RESULTS

Question	Difficulty Index	Discrimination Index
12	.51	1.40
13	.46	1.98
7	.43	1.53
14	.40	2.60
8	.40	1.53
15	.36	2.02
4	.27	1.57
9	.26	1.49
3	.25	1.69
11	.23	1.45
10	.15	.95
6	.06	.41
5	.02	.21

Appendix E (Cont.)

TABLE 19

FACTOR ANALYSIS OF TERMINAL ETHOS RATINGS

Scales	Dimensions and Factor Loadings:		
	Authoritativeness	Dynamism	Character
Informed-Uninformed	.78*	.10	.12
Qualified-Unqualified	.66*	.07	.19
Reliable-Unreliable	.62*	.04	.37
Valuable-Worthless	.63*	.18	.35
Intelligent-Unintelligent	.59*	.28	.20
Expert-Inexpert	.73*	.26	.00
Aggressive-Meek	.05	.79*	-.02
Emphatic-Hesitant	.07	.82*	.04
Forceful-Forceless	.14	.81*	.09
Bold-Timid	.15	.84*	-.11
Active-Passive	.18	.78*	.05
Energetic-Tired	.25	.70*	.08
Unselfish-Selfish	.31	-.04	.57*
Nice-Awful	.09	.02	.83*
Friendly-Unfriendly	.10	-.12	.78*
Honest-Dishonest	.34	.11	.68*
Pleasant-Unpleasant	.15	.01	.76*
Virtuous-Sinful	.14	.14	.69*
Proportions of variance (59%)	.17	.22	.20

APPENDIX F

MAJOR STATISTICAL ANALYSES

APPENDIX F: MAJOR STATISTICAL ANALYSES

TABLE 20

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION

Source of Variance	df	M.S.	F	Probability
Credibility	1	0.02	0.03	0.86
Cueing	2	2.40	4.26	<0.05
Credibility X Cueing	2	0.34	0.61	0.55
Error	236	0.56		

TABLE 21

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR CLARITY

Source of Variance	df	M.S.	F	Probability
Credibility	1	0.01	0.01	0.92
Cueing	2	1.84	2.78	0.06
Credibility X Cueing	2	0.25	0.38	0.69
Error	236	0.66		

Appendix F (Cont.)

TABLE 22

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR 10 RETENTION ITEMS

Source of Variance	df	M.S.	F	Probability
Credibility	1	0.01	0.00	0.96
Cueing	2	25.40	7.84	<0.05
Credibility X Cueing	2	0.59	0.18	0.83
Error	236	3.24		

TABLE 23

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR ATTITUDE SCORES

Source of Variance	df	M.S.	F	Probability
Credibility	1	323.43	7.62	<0.05
Cueing	2	36.12	0.85	0.43
Credibility X Cueing	2	8.68	0.20	0.82
Error	236	42.46		

Appendix F (Cont.)

TABLE 24

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR AUTHORITATIVENESS RATINGS

Source of Variance	df	M.S.	F	Probability
Credibility	1	1185.76	49.12	<0.05
Cueing	2	15.87	0.66	0.52
Credibility X Cueing	2	52.32	2.17	0.12
Error	236	24.14		

TABLE 25

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR DYNAMISM RATINGS

Source of Variance	df	M.S.	F	Probability
Credibility	1	0.09	0.00	0.96
Cueing	2	23.01	0.75	0.47
Credibility X Cueing	2	0.87	0.03	0.97
Error	236	30.65		

Appendix F (Cont.)

TABLE 26

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR CHARACTER RATINGS

Source of Variance	df	M.S.	F	Probability
Credibility	1	1033.13	47.65	<0.05
Cueing	2	1.91	0.09	0.92
Credibility X Cueing	2	38.71	1.79	0.17
Error	236	21.68		

TABLE 27

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR PERCEIVED INTERESTINGNESS

Source of Variance	df	M.S.	F	Probability
Credibility	1	0.02	0.03	0.87
Cueing	2	1.15	1.82	0.17
Credibility X Cueing	2	0.07	0.11	0.90
Error	236	0.63		

Appendix F (Cont.)

TABLE 28

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR PERCEIVED CONVINCINGNESS

Source of Variance	df	M.S.	F	Probability
Credibility	1	0.55	0.79	0.38
Cueing	2	2.83	4.08	<0.05
Credibility X Cueing	2	0.42	0.06	0.94
Error	236	0.69		

TABLE 29

RESULTS OF *t*-TESTS ON ORGANIZATION, CLARITY, RETENTION, AND CONVINCINGNESS FOR CUEING CONDITIONS

DV	AC vs. NC X X *t*/p	NC vs. IC X X *t*/p	AC vs. IC X X *t*/p
Perceived Organization	1.88 2.23 *t* = 2.93 p < .05	2.23 2.05 *t* = -1.50 p < .20	1.88 2.05 *t* = 1.46 p < .20
Perceived Clarity	1.94 2.25 *t* = 2.41 p < .05	2.25 2.10 *t* = -1.16 p < .30	1.94 2.10 *t* = 1.27 p < .30
Retention 10 Items	6.90 6.57 *t* = 1.15 p < .30	6.57 5.82 *t* = 2.61 p < .05	6.90 5.82 *t* = 3.85 p < .05
Convincingness	1.98 2.33 *t* = 2.65 p < .05	2.33 2.25 *t* = -.60 p < .60	1.98 2.25 *t* = 2.09 p < .05