OPEN - AND CLOSED-MINDEDNESS AND THE SELF-PERSUASION PHENOMENON

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ABSTRACT

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by Howard Rebach

This study hypothesized that simple commitment to encode a counterattitudinal message would lead to more self-persuasion among high dogmatics while with actual encoding of the counterattitudinal messages there would be greater self-persuasion among low dogmatics than among high dogmatics. With assignment of subjects on the basis of a median split of the dogmatism scores, a non-significant trend in the predicted direction was observed for the self-persuasion scores. Elimination of the middle third of the distribution of dogmatism scores indicated that greater self-persuasion occurred for the high dogmatics in the simple commitment condition and that greater self-persuasion occurred for the low dogmatics in the encoding condition. Internal analysis also suggested that self-persuasion may be depressed when persons are highly ego-involved with the topic or when there are other messages in the environment that support their initial stand.

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By

Howard Rebach

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CHAPTER I

RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESIS

Communication researchers have devoted much attention to the phenomenon of self-persuasion. Considerable prior research (e.g., Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Janis and King, 1954, Janis and Gilmore, 1965, Kelman, 1953) reveals that persons who agree to encode counter-attitudinal messages shift their attitudes in the direction of the role-played position. Obviously, however, this generalization represents an oversimplification of the self-persuasion phenomenon, for a number of relevant variables will determine the magnitude of observed change.

The present study deals with one potentially relevant personality variable: the relative open- or closed-mindedness of the counter-attitudinal communicators. Moreover, the study examines possible differences between open- and closed-minded counterattitudinal communicators at two points of time in the self-persuasion process: first, following simple commitment to engage in counterattitudinal communication, and second, following actual encoding of a counter-attitudinal message. Specifically, it is posited that open- and closed-minded persons will differ as to the point in time that they will manifest self-persuasion effects. The grounds for this interaction prediction are developed in the remainder of this chapter.

Dissonance and Incentive Explanations of the Self-Persuasion Phenomenon:

One of two explanatory principles are generally invoked to account for the self-persuasion effect. Dissonance theorists (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Brehm and Cohen, 1962) hold that a state of cognitive imbalance or dissonance exists if a person is aware of two propositions or cognitive elements, one of which implies the obverse of the other. In the counterattitudinal role-playing situation a person is aware that "I believe X," and he is also aware of the conflicting cognition that "I advocated (or am committed to advocate) not-X." Since the counterattitudinal encoding task presents the person with a *fait accompli* whose existence cannot be denied and since the existence of dissonance results in motivation for dissonance reduction, the prediction is that subjects will alter their beliefs to be more consistent with the role-played position.

Altering one cognitive element toward greater consonance with another--i.e., changing opinion-- is but one mode of dissonance reduction. Another mode is to add cognitive elements that bring the original two cognitions into a consonant relationship. When people feel they have no choice but to perform the belief discrepant behaviors, they may reduce the inconsistency by adding the cognition that they were forced to comply. Research indicates that attitude change is more likely to occur under conditions of high rather than low or non-existant choice of participation (Brehm, 1956; Brehm, 1959; Rabbie, Brehm and Cohen, 1959; Penner, Fitch, and Weick, 1966).

Similarly, a person who is offered a large reward for counter-attitudinal advocacy will experience little motivation to change opinion. Rather, his dissonance is reduced by the consonant cognition that the reward was the reason for his behavior. Low justification does not result in such a consonant cognition and dissonance is likely to be reduced by altering one's attitude; i.e.,by manifesting self-persuasion (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Carlsmith, Collins, and Helmreich, 1966; Greenbaum, 1966).

Thus, the generalization offered by the dissonance theorists is that when a person commits himself to expend effort in counter-attitudinal behavior, particularly if there is little justification for such behavior, dissonance is aroused. In turn, this dissonance produces pressures toward consonance which are manifested in a change of attitude toward the belief discrepant position (Cohen, 1959; Brehm and Cohen, 1962, pp. 73-78).

Set against the dissonance theory rationale is that of the so-called incentive theorists. The basic idea underlying incentive theory is far simpler and has the added feature of squaring with common sense predictions: incentive theory states that greater rather than lesser reward is more likely to result in self-persuasion. Under conditions of greater rewards the subject is more likely to rehearse the new position more fully, and, as some have held (e.g., Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1953) such rehearsal fosters the learning of the counterattitudinal position which is required for attitude change. Therefore, with respect to the self persuasion situation, incentive theory argues that the more

effectively the person encodes the counterattitudinal communication, the more likely he is to adopt the new position. In addition, a large reward will motivate him to do a more adequate job of encoding, and more self persuasion is likely to occur.

> According to this 'incentive theory' when a person accepts the task of improvising arguments in favor of a view at variance with his own personal convictions, he becomes temporarily motivated to think up all the good positive arguments he can, and at the same time suppresses thoughts about the negative arguments which are supposedly irrelevant to the assigned task. This 'biased scanning' increases the salience of the positive arguments and therefore increases the chances of acceptance of the new attitude position. A gain in attitude change would not be expected, however, if resentment or other interfering affective reactions were aroused by negative incentives in the role-playing situation.
>
> (Janis and Gilmore, 1965)

This biased scanning argument is supported by the work of Janis and King (1954), Janis and Gilmore (1965), Rosenberg (1965), and Elms and Janis (1965).

The issue, then, is whether the self-persuasion effect is based on rehearsal of counterattitudinal arguments or on a desire to maintain cognitive balance. While the two viewpoints have been presented as a dichotomy, some recent work hints that it may not be an either/or matter (Carlsmith, Collins and Helmreich, 1966; Greenbaum, 1966). In addition, some researchers have attempted to add specificity to the findings by investigating ways that differences in an individual's belief structure may affect the outcomes of counterattitudinal role-playing (Hunt and Miller, 1968; Greenbaum, 1966). The present study considers

that these two approaches are related. The suggestion is that given the organization of the individual's belief system, some situations allow him the opportunity to rehearse the belief-discrepant position free of the threat of imbalance, while other situations lead to closure and rejection of the new position in favor of cognitive balance.

Simple Commitment , Post-encoding, and Dissonance and Incentive Explanations--Some Possible Relationships:

As has been noted, dissonance theory explains the effect of counterattitudinal encoding in terms of motivation toward cognitive consistency. Brehm and Cohen (1962, p. 255) assert that mere commitment to the role-playing task is dissonance producing and that subsequent pressures to restore consonance lead to opinion change (Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen, 1959).

If, however, as incentive theory posits, self-persuasion results from the rehearsal of the belief-discrepant position, actual encoding should result in greater self-persuasion than simple commitment. Studies by Janis and Gilmore (1965) and Elms and Janis (1965) found that actual encoding produced more self persuasion than simple commitment.

Another of Janis and Gilmore's findings may assist in reconciling the two positions. These researchers manipulated level of justification as well as simple commitment vs. actual encoding. Though Janis and Gilmore found the overt role-playing superior, they found that dissonance predictions were supported in the simple commitment condition. That is, in the simple commitment condition, self-persuasion was negatively related to justification, while in the overt role-playing condition,

the two variables were positively related.

Thus the relationship posited in this study--one consistent with the reconciliation presented by McGuire (1965)--is that dissonance interpretations are most applicable to simple commitment situations, while incentive theory predictions are more closely associated with the post encoding effects of counterattitudinal advocacy.

But once again, this is rather a sweeping generalization. It assumes that commitment to a counterattitudinal task is dissonance-producing for everyone, and that actual encoding does indeed lead to biased scanning of the part of all counterattitudinal communicators. While these situational inducements apparently have their effects, they may be mediated by the characteristics of the individual's belief system: the individual's characteristic mode of processing information may interact with situational demands to determine the outcome. This possibility will be considered at greater length in the next section which will culminate in the presentation of hypotheses.

The Mediating Effects of Open- and Closed-Mindedness on the Self-Persuasion Paradigm:

According to Rokeach (1960, p. 68) an individual's belief system is in the service of two very important and potentially conflicting values: A person will be open to information if the need to know is paramount, and closed to information if he is primarily concerned with warding off threat. Striving for cognitive clarity represents movement in the direction of uncertainty reduction. To reduce uncertainty, the person

must be able to experiment with new courses of action, pursuing them as long as they seem to be working and abandoning them if they prove to be unworkable. If the person controls his own outcomes, he can choose to continue or to reject the new course of action as he sees fit. There is no threat to the stability of his belief system.

Opposed cognitive elements are imbalancing only if they raise uncertainty to a level that makes coping behavior difficult. Extant balance theories apparently fail to make a distinction between imbalance and the threat of imbalance. They remove from the individual choice and control of behavior. For Festinger, an individual is said to be in a dissonant state--unbalanced--when faced with mutually contradictory propositions. The position taken here is that imbalance occurs when the individual is unable to cope with a situation. Two contradictory propositions create imbalance only if the individual cannot cope with the existing state of affairs. On the other hand, some people appear to relish and to seek out ambiguous situations and are usually able to cope with them. For these people, such situations carry no threat to equilibrium, and offer opportunities for growth and development. It is when the situation threatens to, or has in fact exceeded the individual's ability to cope that other adaptive, threat escaping mechanisms--withdrawal, denial, etc.-- are invoked. Thus, as Ackerman (1958, p. 76-78) has suggested, it is not so much a question of whether or not a balanced state is achieved; it <u>will</u> be achieved. The question is <u>how</u> this balance will be achieved.

Thus, apparent inconsistencies of behavior are not ruled out. An individual may deviate from his normal path to do something different and to try out new ideas. The opportunity to invoke a host of psychological adaptive mechanisms enables the individual to maintain balance.

Lest this view be taken to imply that this process is always conscious and rational, no such suggestion is intended. The rehearsal, consideration, and reasoned acceptance or rejection of arguments, the altering of beliefs to retain cognitive consistency, the processes of avoidance, distortion, and denial are all potentially functional cognitive processes. For the individual, they all serve his need to achieve greater cognitive clarity while at the same time warding off threats to his stability. At various times, cognitive consistency may be a function of both drives. Sometimes it may help the individual reach greater clarity, at other times it may be the only avenue open to him to maintain his equilibrium. This latter point is especially crucial to the present study. If the person is unable to extricate himself from a self-persuasion situation and if he is unable to invoke other psychological mechanisms, attitude change in the direction of the discrepant position may be the only means at his disposal for warding off threat to the stability of his belief system. In the extreme, Rokeach's definition of an ideological conversion--the party line change--is an example of this kind of change.

It is assumed that open- and closed-minded persons differ in the extent to which they perceive the world as generally hostile or friendly. This belief as to the friendliness of the world is a very primitive one. Emerging from such a belief is an orientation that the person develops toward authority and the self, as well as toward various other beliefs and disbeliefs.

If an individual perceives the world as hostile and threatening, he will have a lower threshold for assigning a threatening meaning to a particular situation, and consequently a significantly greater number of situations will be perceived as threatening to the belief system. This circumstance will enable the more open person to handle greater amounts of information, since fewer inputs will threaten imbalance. The open person is thus more likely to be able to tolerate greater ambiguity or inconsistency. Thus, the more open a person's belief system, the more receptive he will be to information seemingly inconsistent with a particular belief. When compared to the closed person, open individuals will more frequently be motivated by the drive toward cognitive clarity.

What seems to be involved in open- or closed-mindedness is a cluster of traits descriptive of the belief system, the person's capacity to make certain kinds of connections among beliefs, and his ability to consider alternatives free of the threat of imbalance. These traits are related to the individual's threshold for perception of threatening ambiguity, to his desire for certainty as opposed to his desire for further expansion of his belief system. Such differences

will in turn influence his behavior in the face of belief-discrepant materials. In general these differences suggest that the closed-minded individual will be more likely to avoid materials not consistent with his attitudes and to be unfamiliar with materials related to positions in his disbelief system. Thus, when asked to engage in counterattitudinal communication, his rehearsal will be less adequate due to his lack of information concerning the new position and the rehearsal itself will be highly threatening to him. Culbertson (1957) and Elms (1966) found that role players with traits suggestive of closed-mindedness showed less attitude change than did those with traits suggestive of open-mindedness.

In a study directly relevant to the present research, Hunt and Miller (1968) found that closed-minded persons showed greater self-persuasion after agreeing to engage in counterattitudinal communication. However, the dependent measures were obtained prior to any actual counterattitudinal encoding by the subjects. Hunt and Miller theorized that closed-minded persons would be relatively unfamiliar with the discrepant beliefs required of their role-playing assignment and that this unfamiliarity would lead to tension. Also, the magnitude of dissonance would be increased by the closed-minded subjects' perceptions that the task would require substantial effort on their part. It was suggested that this would not be true for the open-minded persons.

The present study accepts the rationale presented by Hunt and Miller for situations involving only commitment to engage in counter-attitudinal communication. The closed-minded person should be moderately

threatened by the inconsistency. This in turn should produce pressures culminating in self-persuasion. By contrast, the request to encode a counterattitudinal message should have no threat to the balance of the open-minded person's belief system. In the commitment situation, he has agreed to perform a specific task requested by a relatively benign sponsor, but he has not actually come into contact with the material. Neither has he rehearsed the new position. Thus, the absense of tension and the lack of having processed or explored the new position offer the open-minded individual no inducements for self-persuasion. This interpretation is enhanced by Hunt and Miller's finding that the mean change scores for open-minded subjects who agreed to encode belief-discrepant messages was virtually zero.

But what would have happened if self-persuasion measures had been obtained for the open- and closed-minded subjects after they had actually encoded belief-discrepant communications? It is suggested that closed-minded individuals who actually come face-to-face with the belief-discrepant material will be unable to tolerate it. Instead of dealing with the cognition of engaging in the role-playing task, they must now confront a set of more highly disbelief-relevant cognitions, those in the message that they encode. Not only should closed-minded persons do a poorer job of encoding the counterattitudinal messages, they should also be more upset by them than the open-minded persons. The belief-discrepant material should create high uncertainty, and attitude change toward consistency should no longer be the easiest means of tension reduction.

Conversely, open-minded subjects should be less likely to perceive the situation as threatening, and the rehearsal effect is more likely to produce substantial selfpersuasion. It was stated earlier that when conditions are relatively free of threat, the individual's desire for cognitive clarity will cause him to explore and to experiment with new courses of action and new beliefs. Thus, when counterattitudinal role-playing actually occurs, it seems likely that the open-minded person will manifest greater self-persuasion.

Taken as a whole, these considerations lead to the following hypotheses:

H_1: When persons are commited to but do not actually encode counterattitudinal messages, closed-minded persons will exhibit more change in the direction of the role-played position than will open-minded persons.

H_2: After the messages are actually encoded, open-minded persons will show more change in the direction of the role-played position than will closed-minded persons.

The first hypothesis suggests a replication of the findings of the Hunt and Miller study, and the second predicts a reversal of that finding when the subjects actually encode belief-discrepant messages. Taken together, the two hypotheses stipulate an interaction between relative open- or closed-mindedness and the point in time at which measures of self-persuasion are obtained.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Topic: Of the five topics tested for use, the issue of whether or not 18 year olds should be given the vote was chosen. Four statements were used to measure attitudes toward the issue. Ss indicated their position by marking their agreement or disagreement with each statement on a seven point scale ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. These items were coded so that a score of 28 indicated that the S was maximally favorable toward giving the vote to 18 year olds, while a score of four indicated strong opposition. A random sample of 50 questionnaires was used to estimate the item intercorrelations. Table 1 presents these correlations, which seem sufficiently high to treat the items as a scale. Since the control group received no intervening treatment their pretest and posttest scores may be considered as a test-retest. The test-retest reliability coefficient was .90.

Also included was a measure of Ss' latitudes of acceptance and rejection on the issue of 18 year old voting developed according to methods outlined by Sherif and Hovland (1961) and Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (1965).

Table 1. Item intercorrelations of opinion items

item	1	2	3	4
1	--	.96	.89	.66
2		---	.91	.71
3			---	.72
4				---

Subjects: Ss were undergraduates enrolled in communication and business letter writing courses at Michigan State University. Their participation was secured with the cooperation of their instructors. During the first week of the term 213 Ss completed a pretest which included a 20 item short-form dogmatism scale (Troldahl and Powell, 1965), items for measuring opinions on the issue of lowering the voting age to 18, and a number of filler items. Ss were told that the questionnaire was part of a general survey of how college students feel about themselves and about a number of public issues.

Two weeks later Ss in the various classes were requested by their instructors to participate in some research projects requiring about an hour of their time one of three evenings. Of the 213 Ss taking pretests 123 chose to participate in the remainder of the study. Table 2 shows the distribution of dogmatism scores for these 123 Ss, 120 of whom returned usable data. Three Ss were eliminated because they did not follow instructions.

Table 2. Distribution of Ss' dogmatism scores (N = 123)

Score	Freq	Cum. Fr.	Score	Freq.	Cum Fr.	Score	Freq.	Cum Fr.
113	1	123	88	1	115	63	5	42
112	0	122	87	1	114	62	3	37
111	0	122	86	2	113	61	2	34
110	0	122	85	2	111	60	9	32
109	0	122	84	3	109	59	3	23
108	0	122	83	1	106	58	0	20
107	0	122	82	1	105	57	1	20
106	1	122	81	2	104	56	0	19
105	0	121	80	3	102	55	2	19
104	0	121	79	3	99	54	3	17
103	0	121	78	1	96	53	2	14
102	0	121	77	8	95	52	0	12
101	0	121	76	3	87	51	4	12
100	1	121	75	1	84	50	2	8
99	1	120	74	1	83	49	1	6
98	1	119	73	4	82	48	1	5
97	1	118	72	6	78	47	0	4
96	0	117	71	4	72	46	0	4
95	0	117	70	1	68	45	1	4
94	0	117	69	1	67	44	0	3
93	0	117	68	6	66	43	0	3
92	1	117	67	7	60	42	1	3
91	0	116	66	4	53	41	1	2
90	1	116	65	3	49	40	0	1
89	0	115	64	4	46	39	1	1

Comparison of the dogmatism scores of pretest Ss who participated in the study with those who did not revealed no significant differences. The mean score for those participating was 69.3, while for those not participating the mean was 67.1 ($t = 1.21$, df = 212, $p > .05$ two tailed test). Thus, it would appear that there were no selective factors operating which would result in a disproportionate number of high or low dogmatic Ss volunteering for the study.

Moreover, a comparison of the pretest attitudes of Ss who participated and those who did not yielded no significant differences ($\bar{X}$, participators = 17.6; $\bar{X}$, non-participators = 17.7, $t < 1$). Thus the available evidence indicated that those Ss who actually participated were a representative subset of the original sample.

Procedures: As a result of the pretest measures Ss were classified as high or low dogmatic on the basis of whether they were above or below the median dogmatism score of 67. Within high and low dogmatic groups, Ss were randomly assigned to the "Write" condition, the "Not Write" condition, or to the control group. Ss scoring below 16 on the attitude items--i.e., Ss who were more or less against extending the vote to 18 year olds--were assigned to write essays supporting the proposition that 18 year olds should be given the vote. Ss scoring above 16 were assigned to write an essay arguing that 18 year olds should not be given the vote.

About two weeks after administration of the pretest, Ss' instructors announced that volunteers were needed to participate in some research projects, and promised extra credit for those who were willing to participate. Instructors were cautioned not to mention the pretest when soliciting the cooperation of Ss.

When Ss arrived at the experimental sessions, they found their sign-up sheets posted with assignment to rooms entered beside their names. They were told that they had been randomly assigned to the various rooms, although, as mentioned above, actual assignment was made on the basis of pretest scores.

Two rooms were used for the "Write" group and two for the "Not Write" group. Within each condition, one room was for those assigned to the pro 18 year old voting essay, and the other for those assigned to the anti 18 year old voting essay. A fifth room contained all controls.

At the outset, Ss were told that there were two experiments, each taking about one-half hour, that they should participate in both to get the credit promised by their instructors, and that some would do one first and some the other. The two ostensible experiments were the actual essay writing task and a task called a test of creative imagination which involved writing stories about slides.

Actually the slide task was a subterfuge used to mask the connection between the experimental treatments and the post-test. Controls were sent directly to the slide task on arrival. Ss in the Not Write condition--the treatment calling for only simple

commitment--went directly to their treatment rooms. When everyone had arrived, the E read the following instructions:

> The president has recently suggested that 18year olds should be given the right to vote. We are interested in how well college students know the issues involved and whether or not they are able to verbalize the arguments pro and con. We have randomly assigned you to the various positions that can be taken on the issue and we ask you to write an essay with as many arguments as you can think up taking the position indicated by the topic at the head of the sheet to be passed out. Try to think up as many good arguments as you can for the topic assigned. You have a half hour and please remain here for the whole time. After you're finished there is another study you are also to participate in in room 202. Please put your name, student number, and the class and teacher to be notified for your extra credit. Your papers will, of course, be anonymous and no names will be attached to papers in the analysis or at any other time.

The task assignment sheets were then distributed, and the E asked that everyone go over the instructions as they were read aloud. When the instructions were finished, E asked if there were any questions. When there were no further questions, a confederate entered and said that due to scheduling problems with the projector, the Ss should participate in the other study first. The Ss were then told to leave everything and to go across the hall where the projector was set up.

When the Ss in the Not Write condition arrived at the next room, the E announced that the task was a test of creative imagination and passed out materials which included a questionnaire to be filled out before beginning with the slides. Included with a number of demographic questions and other attitude items were the critical posttest items.

When all Ss had completed the questionnaire, the slides were presented as if it were an actual research project. These procedures were used to obtain posttests from both the control group and the Not Write treatment. When the slide task was completed, Not Write Ss were sent back to the original rooms to write the essay for the "other" study.

The introduction and instructions for the Write treatment were the same as for the Not Write condition. Ss were told that they had a half-hour to write as many arguments as they could, and that they should use the whole time.

By the time the Write group had finished, the control and Not Write conditions had completed the slide task and had gone back to the other rooms. The Write group was then told to report to the projection room to participate in the other task. Again, materials were passed out for the test of creative imagination, the first part of which was the questionnaire containing the critical attitude items.

Although the various subterfuges called for complex timing and maneuvering of people, the procedures functioned without any problems. It was critical that Not Write Ss understood the task they had to perform and they believed the deception associated with the administration of the posttest. It was also important that no Ss see the relationship between the two tasks.

It can be reported that the movement of Ss was quite successful. In general, less than a minute elapsed between the time Ss in both

the Write and Not Write conditions left their original rooms and began work on the posttest questionnaire. Post experimental discussions with Ss also indicated that the various subterfuges were apparently accepted at face value. In no case was anyone able to state accurately the purpose of the study, and no Ss reported a connection between pretest and experiment or experiment and posttest. Most expressed surprise when the nature of the experiment was disclosed and when told that pretest, manipulation, and posttesting were all part of the same study.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Data for the present study consisted of pretest to posttest attitude change scores. Changes were calculated so that positive change indicates change in the direction of the belief discrepant position advocated, while negative change indicates a contrast effect where the subject shifted to a stand even more strongly in favor of his initial position.

Comparison of Treatment Groups With Controls:

The mean pretest to posttest attitude change scores for subjects in the experimental and control groups are found in Table 3. Dunnett's test (Winer, 1962) was used to compare the amount of attitude change in each of the treatment groups with the change occurring in the combined All Controls group. As Table 3 indicates, only low dogmatic subjects in the encoding condition reported significantly greater self persuasion than the control subjects; i.e., when compared with All Controls, only the Low Dogmatic; Write subjects demonstrated a significant amount of self persuasion.

Table 3. Attitude change scores for subjects in experimental and control groups.

	Not Write	Write	Control	
High Dogmatic	$\bar{X}$ = 2.65 n = 20	$\bar{X}$ = 2.48 n = 23	$\bar{X}$ = 0.52 n = 19	All Controls $\bar{X}$ = 0.89 n = 39
Low Dogmatic	$\bar{X}$ = 0.52 n = 21	$\bar{X}$ = 4.24 n = 17	$\bar{X}$ = 1.25 n = 20	

Table 4. Comparison of mean attitude change scores of treatment groups to All Controls: Dunnett's test.

Comparison	Difference	t	p
High Dog.: Not Write vs All Controls	1.76	1.23	ns
High Dog.: Write vs All Controls	1.59	1.19	ns
Low Dog.: Not Write vs All Controls	-0.37	<1	ns
Low Dog.: Write vs All Controls	3.35	2.20	$<.05$

In addition to comparing each treatment group with the combined controls, Dunnett's test was also used to compare treatment and control groups at each of the two levels of dogmatism (Table 5). The results of these comparisons were identical to the first analysis: only low dogmatic subjects in the writing condition reported significantly greater self-persuasion than their counterpart control subjects.

Table 5. Comparison of mean attitude change scores of treatment groups to control groups at each level of Dogmatism: Dunnett's test.

Comparison	Difference	t	p
High Dog.: Not Write vs High Dog. Controls	2.13	1.22	ns
High Dog.: Write vs High Dog. Controls	1.96	1.18	ns
Low Dog.: Not Write vs Low Dog. Controls	-0.73	< 1	ns
Low Dog.: Write vs Low Dog. Controls	2.99	1.93	$< .05$

These treatment and control group comparisons should be considered in view of the interaction hypothesis posited in the present study. Ideally, it was hoped that the high dogmatic subjects in the simple commitment condition and the low dogmatics in the encoding condition would report significantly more self-persuasion than the control subjects, while the rest of the subjects in the other conditions would not. Although the actual comparisons did not conform exactly to this ideal situation, it is encouraging to note that the amount of self-persuasion in the writing condition by low dogmatic persons was significantly greater than that occurring in the control group, and that the amount of self-persuasion observed among high dogmatics in the simple commitment condition, while not significantly different from the control condition, was somewhat greater than the change for high dogmatic subjects in the writing condition and low dogmatic subjects

in the simple commitment condition. As expected, this latter group reported practically no pretest to posttest attitude change in the direction of the belief discrepant position.

Test of the Hypotheses Using the Original Median Split on Dogmatism:

As indicated above, the following hypotheses were tested in this study:

H_1: When persons are commited to but do not actually encode a counterattitudinal message, closed minded persons will exhibit more change in the direction of the role-played position than will open-minded persons.

H_2: After the messages are actually encoded, open-minded persons will show more change in the direction of the role-played position than will closed-minded persons.

Taken together, these hypotheses predict that whether or not subjects encode counterattitudinal communications will interact with level of dogmatism in producing a self-persuasion effect. The predicted effect is schematized in Table 6: It was predicted that in the Not Write condition the mean attitude change score of the high dogmatic persons would be greater than the mean change score for the Low Dogmatic group, and that in the Write condition, the mean attitude change score of the low dogmatic subjects would be greater than the mean change score of the High Dogmatic group.

Table 6. Schematic of predicted differences in mean attitude change scores.

	Not Write		Write
High Dogmatic	$\bar{X}_{11}$	$>$	$\bar{X}_{12}$
	$\vee$		$\wedge$
Low Dogmatic	$\bar{X}_{21}$	$<$	$\bar{X}_{22}$

Though differences were in the predicted direction, the hypothesized interaction was not statistically significant. Table 7 presents the analysis of variance summary of the effects of the level of dogmatism and the treatment condition on the self-persuasion scores of subjects, using a median split of the dogmatism scores. It can be seen that the largest F-ratio was obtained for the interaction effect; however, the effect is not statistically significant.

Table 7. Analysis of Variance Summary: The effects of dogmatism level and treatment condition on attitude change scores.

	Not Write	Write
High Dog.	$\bar{X}$ = 2.65 (n=20)	$\bar{X}$ = 2.48 (n = 23)
Low Dog.	$\bar{X}$ = 0.52 (n=21)	$\bar{X}$ = 4.24 (n = 17)

SOURCE	SS	df	MS	F	p
Dogmatism (A)	0.03	1	0.03	< 1	ns
Treatment (B)	3.13	1	3.13	1.84	ns
A x B	3.77	1	3.77	2.22	ns
Error		77	1.70		

Test of the Hypotheses Using Upper and Lower Thirds of the Dogmatism Range:

Dogmatism is a complex set of traits. Persons who score high or low on the dogmatism scale must be high or low on a majority of the factors that constitute the scale. On the other hand, people in the middle of the distribution constitute a heterogeneous group--at least

more so than those scoring high or low. In order to determine if the upper and lower thirds of the dogmatism score distribution would function more discriminatively, the opinion change scores of subjects between the 33rd and the 67th percentiles of the distribution were dropped out and the attitude change scores were reanalyzed. Table 8 presents a summary of this analysis:

Table 8. Analysis of Variance Summary: The effects of dogmatism level and treatment condition on attitude change--upper and lower 3rds of dogmatism range.

	Not Write	Write
High Dog.	$\bar{X}$ = 3.35 (n = 14)	$\bar{X}$ = 1.14 (n = 14)
Low Dog.	$\bar{X}$ = 1.67 (n = 15)	$\bar{X}$ = 5.70 (n = 10)

SOURCE	SS	df	MS	F	p
Dogmatism (A)	2.05	1	2.05	<1	ns
Treatment (B)	0.82	1	0.82	<1	ns
A x B	9.77	1	9.77	4.07	$<.05$
Error		49	2.40		

As the table shows, the interaction effect originally hypothesized for the entire group was found to be significant when the subjects in the middle of the dogmatism distribution were eliminated; i.e., when subjects were commited to but did not write counterattitudinal messages, the high dogmatic group showed greater shift of opinion than did the

low dogmatic group. When counterattitudinal messages were written subjects in the low dogmatic group showed greater self-persuasion than did high dogmatics.

A Possible Side Effect of Treatments: Differences in the Distributions of Attitude Change Scores Between Write and Not Write Conditions:

An interesting unanticipated result was revealed when the within cell variances of the four treatment groups were studied. The variance of the Not Write group was approximately half that of the Write group and the ratio of these variances was significant ($p < .05$). Apparently the act of writing the counterattitudinal message exercised an effect on the distribution of attitude change scores.

The rationale for this study suggested that high dogmatic subjects in the Write condition would experience greater threat to their belief system and that such threat should result in a contrast effect. The finding concerning the differential variance of attitude change scores for the Not Write and Write groups suggested further inspection of these distributions. For purposes of this analysis, a shift of +3 or more was classified as a positive shift, ± 2, ± 1, and 0 were classified as no change, and a negative shift of -3 or less was classified as a negative shift. Table 9 presents the frequencies for these results within each cell.

Table 9. Frequencies of positive opinion shift (+), negative shift (-), and no change within each cell, All Ss

		Not Write	Write	Control
	+	8	10	6
High Dogmatic	0	11	6	12
	-	1	7	1
	+	4	7	4
Low Dogmatic	0	14	9	15
	-	3	1	1

Inspection of the distribution of opinion change scores shows that a greater number of high dogmatic subjects in the Write condition demonstrated a contrast effect. The distribution of positive, negative, and no change scores in this cell was compared to that of high dogmatic Control subjects ($\chi^2 = 7.5$, $p < .05$, one tail test), to that of High Dogmatic Not Write subjects ($\chi^2 = 5.9$, $p < .05$, one tail test), to that of Low Dogmatic Not Write subjects ($\chi^2 = 4.8$, $p < .05$, one tail test), and to that of Low Dogmatic Not Write subjects ($\chi^2 = 7.3$, $p < .05$, one tail test). Thus the distribution of self-persuasion scores of the high dogmatic subjects in the Write group appears to differ from that of each of the other groups, a difference due to the greater number of High Dogmatic Write subjects who demonstrated a contrast effect.

After eliminating attitude change scores for the middle third of the dogmatism range, the distributions were again studied in terms of positive, negative, and no change, using the same criterion for classifying change scores. Table 10 summarizes these frequencies:

Table 10. Frequencies of positive opinion shift (+), negative shift (-), and no change within each cell, upper and lower thirds of dogmatism range only.

		Not Write	Write
	+	6	4
High Dogmatic	0	7	5
	-	1	5
	+	3	5
Low Dogmatic	0	12	5
	-	0	0

Because of the zeroes in two of the conditions, statistical tests of the differences between the distributions was not appropriate. Even so, comparison of Table 10 with Table 9 reveals the influence that the middle third of the dogmatism distribution had on the overall result. The High Dogmatic Write group still shows a relatively strong contrast effect, while the relative frequency of positive opinion change

sharply drops. Examination of the cells suggests that dropping out the subjects scoring in the middle third of the dogmatism distribution eliminates many of the cases that deviate from the hypothesized effects of the treatments.

Ego-Involvement and Self-Persuasion:

Another analysis sought to examine the effects of subjects' ego-involvement on subsequent self-persuasion, using the experimental issue of extending the vote to 18 year olds. Five issues were pre-tested: draft deferrments for college students, 18 year old voting (the one used), gun control laws, the election, and radical or hippie groups (the SDS) on campus. Of these, the first two resulted in the most extreme polarization of opinion scores. Dissonance theory posits that the more involved the person is with the issue, the greater the dissonance that is aroused by counterattitudinal material. The greater the magnitude of dissonance, the greater should be the pressures to change.

Conversely, Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (1965, p. 198) report a study by Elbing, who found that higher ego-involvement tended to depress the self-persuasion effects of counter attitudinal role-playing. According to Sherif and his co-workers, ego-involvement is reflected in: (1) the extremeness of the position the person adopts as his own, (2) the size of his latitude of rejection, and (3) the size of his latitude of non-commitment. Thus, highly ego-involvement persons will mark the most extreme positions as most acceptable, will reject

relatively more positions, and will consequently remain uncommited on relatively fewer positions. Taking those predicted behaviors into account, an index was constructed to rank order subjects on ego-involvement on the basis of their pretest scores. The rank ordered positions were assigned a value according to the method of rank order (Guilford, 1954). The product of this value, times the size of the latitude of rejection, plus 9 minus the latitude of non-commitment provided a rough index on which to order the subjects. A median split was then made on the basis of this index of ego-involvement, and a 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of variance was performed, using opinion change scores as the dependent variable. Table 11 presents a summary of the analysis:

Table 11. Analysis of Variance Summary: The effects on attitude change of treatment conditions, level of dogmatism, and level of ego-involvement.

	Not Write		Write	
	High E-I	Low E-I	High E-I	Low E-I
High Dogmatic	$\bar{X}$ = 1.88 n = 9	$\bar{X}$ = 3.27 n = 11	$\bar{X}$ = 0.58 n = 12	$\bar{X}$ = 4.56 n = 11
Low Dogmatic	$\bar{X}$ = -0.40 n = 10	$\bar{X}$ = 1.36 n = 11	$\bar{X}$ = 7.14 n = 7	$\bar{X}$ = 2.20 n = 10

SOURCE	SS	df	MS	F	p
Dogmatism (A)	0.20	1	0.20	<1	ns
Ego-involvement (B)	0.14	1	0.14	<1	ns
Treatment (C)	9.94	1	9.94	3.02	ns
A x B	11.56	1	11.56	3.70	ns
A x C	10.09	1	10.09	3.23	ns
B x C	3.52	1	3.52	1.12	ns
A x B x C	13.67	1	13.67	4.68	$<.05$
Error		73	3.12		

As Table 11 indicates, the double interaction was statistically significant. Examination of the mean attitude change scores in each cell shows that in three of four cases low ego-involvement leads to greater self-persuasion than high ego-involvement. The interaction, however, arises from the fact that differences in attitude change scores between high and low ego-involvement and high and low dogmatics are greater in the Write condition than in the Not Write condition. This would suggest that ego-involvement does not simply add a constant to the self-persuasion effect, but interacts with other factors in a non-additive fashion.

Application of the conservative Scheffe's test indicated that none of the observed means differed significantly from each other. One possible conclusion is that neither the dissonance explanation nor the Sherif position will entirely account for the observed results, given that it is a reliable finding. The findings suggest that further attention should be given the variable of ego-involvement in future study of the self-persuasion phenomenon.

A Note on Some Possible Contaminating Environmental Factors:

Prior to the experimental sessions, but after the administration of the pretest, the 18 year old voting issue selected for the present study received a considerable amount of public attention, all in one direction. There were articles in the student newspaper, a public rally that received local television news coverage, and posters on campus, all urging support for giving 18 year olds the right to vote.

Given unidirectional inputs on a current issue in which many subjects are generally ego-involved, a depressing effect on the attitude change scores of those initially favoring 18 year old voting would be expected. On the other hand, the attitude change scores of those initially opposing 18 year old voting should be magnified.

As Table 12 indicates, the subject's prior stand was indeed a highly significant source of variance in the attitude change scores.

Table 12. Analysis of Variance Summary: Analysis of the effects of Ss' prior position on attitude change scores.

	Not Write		Write	
	Pro	Con	Pro	Con
High Dogmatic	$\bar{X}$ = -1.10 n = 10	$\bar{X}$ = 6.4 n = 10	$\bar{X}$ = 1.16 n = 12	$\bar{X}$ = 3.91 n = 11
Low Dogmatic	$\bar{X}$ = -0.31 n = 13	$\bar{X}$ = 1.88 n = 8	$\bar{X}$ = 3.43 n = 14	$\bar{X}$ = 8.00 n = 3

SOURCE	SS	df	MS	F	p
Dogmatism (A)	0.86	1	0.86	<1	ns
Side (B)	36.11	1	36.11	9.84	<.01
Treatment (C)	11.61	1	11.61	3.16	ns
A x B	1.52	1	1.52	<1	ns
A x C	12.71	1	12.71	3.46	ns
B x C	0.70	1	0.70	<1	ns
A x B x C	6.38	1	6.38		ns
Error		73	3.67		

It can also be seen from the table that subjects who were initially opposed to giving the vote to 18 year olds (Con group) showed greater average shift of opinion than subjects who were initially in favor of lowering the voting age (Pro group). Moreover, among the groups initially opposed to changing the voting age, mean attitude change scores followed the pattern predicted by the hypotheses: high dogmatic Not Write subjects showed greater change than Low Dogmatic Not Write subjects, but Low Dogmatic Write subjects showed greater change than High Dogmatic Write subjects.

Further evidence on the effects of outside influences may be seen when the mean attitude change scores of experimental groups are compared to those of the control group, also divided with respect to initial stand. If, as has been held, the outside influence boosted or depressed the attitude change due to experimental treatments, and if the control group reflects changes of opinion due to outside input only, then perhaps the differences in net gains in self-persuasion observed between Pro and Con groups are due to such influences. Specifically, among the Cons only, net gains in self persuasion occurred among the High Dogmatic Not Write and Low Dogmatic Write groups. These gains are consistent with the hypotheses. Among those initially in favor of giving the vote to 18 year olds, the net gains in self-persuasion that did occur seemed to be associated with the Write groups, with greater net gains for the low dogmatics. Table 13 presents this information.

Table 13. Mean attitude change scores of all groups when divided with respect to initial position.

	CONS ONLY		
	Not Write	Write	Control
High Dogmatic	$\bar{X}$ = 6.4 n = 10	$\bar{X}$ = 3.91 n = 11	$\bar{X}$ = 3.75 n = 8
Low Dogmatic Dogmatic	$\bar{X}$ = 1.88 n = 8	$\bar{X}$ = 8.00 n = 3	$\bar{X}$ = 3.43 n = 7
	PROS ONLY		
	Not Write	Write	Control
High Dogmatic	$\bar{X}$ = -1.10 n = 10	$\bar{X}$ = 1.16 n = 12	$\bar{X}$ = -0.91 n = 11
Low Dogmatic	$\bar{X}$ = -0.31 n = 13	$\bar{X}$ = 3.43 n = 14	$\bar{X}$ = 0.07 n = 13

In summary, the data, although strongly suggestive, do not provide clear cut support for the hypothesized interaction. Some implications and conclusions drawn from these data are considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

This study was based on the rationale that the openness or closedness of a person's belief system interacts with situational factors in determining self-persuasion effects resulting from counterattitudinal communication. It was suggested that dissonance reduction would operate in the simple commitment situation, but only for the person with the more closed belief system. It was argued that the closed-minded person experiences tension because of the inconsistency between the assigned task and his own beliefs and because he lacks practice in considering discrepant positions. On the other hand, the relatively open person is less likely to experience tension resulting from the apparent inconsistency between task and beliefs and is also more practiced in considering positions other than his own. Thus, for the relatively closed-minded person, tension resulting from the inconsistency should motivate tension reduction, which may be manifested in self-persuasion. If the more open person does not perceive inconsistency and/or experiences no tension, he is much less likely to change his opinion than is the closed-minded person, since the open person is not motivated to change.

The rationale also posited that the situation may change when persons go beyond mere commitment to the task and actually encode counterattitudinal messages. Open-minded persons should be more familiar with handling belief-discrepant ideas and should be able to deal with such ideas more comfortably. In contrast, closed-minded persons are less practiced at dealing with positions other than their own. Not only will the closed-minded person be less likely to do an adequate job of rehearsing the counterattitudinal position, but the rehearsal itself may be a threat to his belief system. Rather than resulting in self-persuasion, this situation is more likely to lead to a contrast effect. Thus, if the open person is more accustomed to the juxtaposition of ideas, the rehearsal effect should lead to opinion shift in the direction of the role-played position.

Operationally, the above statement implies that high dogmatic persons should show greater positive change than low dogmatic individuals when there is only simple commitment to engage in counterattitudinal communication, but that a reversal should occur when counterattitudinal messages are actually written. Examination of the data, however, revealed the following:

(1) Only the low dogmatic Write group showed attitude change significantly different from the no-treatment controls.

(2) When data from all subjects were analyzed, the hypothesized interaction was not statistically significant, although differences in attitude change scores were in the predicted directions.

(3) Post hoc analysis of the upper and lower third of the distribution of dogmatism scores did reveal the interaction effect initially hypothesized for the entire group.

(4) The variance of the attitude change scores of the Write group was significantly greater than that of the Not Write group.

(5) Though the means did not differ significantly, the distribution of change scores in the high dogmatic Write group did differ significantly from the distribution of the other groups, apparently due to the greater number of large negative shifts in that group. This result was more pronounced when the middle third of the dogmatism distribution was eliminated.

(6) When all subjects were classified in terms of high or low ego-involvement and the attitude change scores were again analyzed, the ego-involvement by dogmatism by treatment interaction was significant.

(7) When all subjects were classified according to initial position, the results indicated that subjects who were initially opposed to lowering the voting age showed significantly greater self-persuasion than did those initially in favor of lowering the voting age. Among the Cons only, the cell means were also in the predicted direction.

While the overall analysis of the data did not fully support the hypotheses, the fact that the mean opinion change scores were generally as predicted and the fact that elimination of the middle third of the dogmatism distribution did produce the hypothesized reversal effect indicates that the original rationale has some merit. Subsequent analyses, however, suggest that some other factors need to be considered, which may in turn lead to some modifications of the rationale.

First, it sesms plausible to argue that for low dogmatic persons the rehearsal effect may be the main factor influencing self-persuasion. For all analyses performed, the Low Dogmatic Write group showed greater net positive shift of opinion than the Low Dogmatic Not Write group--regardless of whether they were initially Pro or Con or high or low ego-involved. In addition, the Low Dogmatic Not Write group did not differ significantly from the control group, while the Low Dogmatic Write group did. As expected, a rehearsal effect rather than reduction of tensions caused by apparent inconsistency seems to best explain the responses of low dogmatic individuals. This conclusion must be somewhat tempered by the fact that conservative statistical procedures used for internal analysis (e.g. Sheffe's test) do not indicate that the larger mean attitude change scores of the Low Dogmatic Write group are significantly greater than those of the Low Dogmatic Not Write group.

The attitude change scores of high dogmatic persons show no such discernible trends. As previously reported, the mean self-persuasion scores for the high dogmatic groups do not differ significantly from each other or from the controls. One plausible interpretation is that writing the counterattitudinal messages had no effect on the self-persuasion of high dogmatic individuals; i.e., that for high dogmatic persons any attitude change that occurred took place after simple commitment.

The observed similarities between the cell means of the two high dogmatic groups are somewhat deceptive. When the distributions of the

attitude change scores are compared across high dogmatics we find that the High Dogmatic Write group has a slight edge in positive changers (self-persuasion) and a somewhat larger edge in negative changers (contrast effect). As previously noted, this result was more pronounced when the middle third of the dogmatism scores were dropped from the analysis. If, as posited earlier, there is some individual threshold for tension beyond which attitude change toward consistency is no longer possible, then it would be expected that observation of the relative frequency of contrast effects should become clearer when the middle dogmatics are eliminated. Elimination of the middle group primarily eliminates positive changers from the high dogmatic Write group. Perhaps for this middle group the writing task was not sufficiently threatening to exceed threshold.

When considering the interaction between the structure of an individual's belief system and situational determinants in the context of the self-persuasion process, a dichotomous, high/low classification of dogmatism may be inadequate. Perhaps dogmatism as an index of open and closed belief systems needs to be classified as high, low, and medium, or perhaps other. The present level of specificity of the dogmatism variable is such that there is probably a great deal of heterogeneity in the middle of the distribution. Thus, it may be that only on the higher and lower ends of the distribution are persons homogeneous enough to allow for any degree of predictability. This suggestion would seem consistent with some of the results obtained in the present study.

Subsequent analyses revealed two other variables that may have confounded the present findings: prior attitudinal position and ego-involvement with the issue. For instance, it was observed that initial position was a highly significant source of variance. Persons initially against lowering the voting age who wrote belief-discrepant messages demonstrated significantly more self-persuasion than initially favorable persons who wrote belief-discrepant communications. Although this difference may have been partially due to environmental circumstances--the existence of considerable public communication favoring 18 year old voting--the trend of the differences between means of the Cons Only (See Table 12, page 33) was as predicted in the original interaction hypothesis.

Assuming that public communication usually involves exposure to authoritative sources, persons who were initially in favor of 18 year old voting would receive attitudinal reinforcement that would enable them to withstand inducements for change, particularly those stemming from dissonance arousal based on the inconsistencies between private belief and the assigned task. That is, their awareness that a number of authoritative sources, as well as their peers, agree with their initial stands should result in cognitions consonant with their initial position and make situational pressures easier to resist. On the other hand, persons who were initially opposed to 18 year old voting may have experienced heightened inconsistency due to the presence of inconsistent environmental events. Hence the experimental task which

increases and makes salient these inconsistent environmental events may offer strong inducements for self-persuasion.

In general we have posited that high dogmatics have less tolerance for inconsistency than do low dogmatics. It was also hypothesized that self-persuasion in the simple commitment treatment is based on inconsistency or dissonance reduction, while in the encoding condition the effects of rehearsal are observed. Self-persuasion for high dogmatics is viewed as the result of dissonance reduction, while a rehearsal effect is held to account for self-persuasion among low dogmatics. From this general line of argument, we would generally expect a greater self-persuasion effect among persons whose initial position was contrary to that taken in the public communication; i.e., among those initially opposed to changing the voting age to 18.

Considering only those whose initial position was consistent with that taken by the various influencing agents we would expect little if any positive shift among high dogmatics, since dissonance or inconsistency is not likely to be sufficient to overcome their awareness that peer and authority sources support their initial stand. Among low dogmatics initially in favor of lowering the voting age we would expect to find a rehearsal effect operating although somewhat depressed by environmental influences.

Considering persons whose initial position was counter to the environmental influence, we can argue that the task made their cognitions

on the issue highly salient and made them aware of the inconsistency between their private beliefs and that of peers and authority sources. In the simple commitment condition we would expect greater self-persuasion among high dogmatics and less among low dogmatics due to the former's lower tolerance for such inconsistency. When the counter-attitudinal messages are actually written, greater self-persuasion would again be expected among low dogmatics, due in part to the rehearsal effect. While the data are statistically inconclusive, the trends are consistent with the preceding interpretation.

Yet another variable that should influence future self-persuasion research is ego-involvement with the topic. In general, with only one surprising reversal, individuals classified in this study as low ego-involved demonstrated more self-persuasion than did high ego-involved persons. Again, the discussion of ego-involvement is based on trends, since statistical analyses yielded no significant differences.

The significant second order interaction obtained when ego-involvement was included in the analysis suggests that the effects of ego-involvement are linked with both an individual's dogmatism and whether he simply commits himself to, or actually encodes a counter-attitudinal communication. Inspection of the cell means (Table 11) reveals that under conditions of simple commitment, low ego-involved persons reported slightly more self-persuasion than high ego-involved persons.

Dissonance theory suggests that persons who are highly ego-involved with a topic will experience greater dissonance than those who are not highly ego-involved; thus the former should experience greater tension and greater motivation toward opinion change. Still, a study by Cohen, Brehm, and Fleming (1958) produced potentially conflicting evidence. These researchers found that the treatment group who should have exhibited self-persuasion effects had a disproportionate number of subjects with extreme stands--a characteristic of high ego-involvement. For these subjects, an inverse relationship was found between extremeness and attitude change. Although the researchers stated that initial attitudinal extremity contaminated their results, their finding would seem to provide disconfirming evidence for dissonance theory, which would predict that the magnitude of dissonance is directly proportional to the importance of the belief and that attitude change is directly related to the pressures to change.

The trend of the data in the present study also seems to provide some disconfirming evidence and to agree more closely with Sherif (Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, 1965) who took exception to the dissonance theory argument that the greater the importance of the issue to the individual, the greater the dissonance and the greater the change in attitude. Sherif argues that attitude change, one of the alternative means of reducing dissonance, "...is never a possible alternative for a highly involved person. In such circumstances, our formulation predicts resistance to change and reentrenchment in the person's own position."

Thus, the best prediction would appear to be that highly ego-involved individuals will report less self-persuasion than low ego-involved persons. The reversal observed among low dogmatic subjects in the encoding condition is interesting and points to one area for further research: What effect does ego-involvement with an issue have on the rehearsal of belief-discrepant material?

It is interesting to speculate a bit further on the trends observed in the data when ego-involvement is considered. A high dogmatic person is one who is described as dealing with a wide range of issues in a characteristically closed-minded way. That is, he tends to hold an extreme position, tends to reject a greater number of positions not encompassed by his belief system, shows little differentiation among positions in the disbelief system, and makes sharp distinctions between elements in the belief and disbelief systems. As Sherif has described the variable ego-involvement, the person who is highly ego-involved with an issue tends to behave in the same ways regarding that issue--extremeness of own position, rejection of more positions, etc. Thus where dogmatism is descriptive of the person's characteristic open- and closedness across a wide range of issues, ego-involvement seems to be descriptive of the individual's open or closedness with regard to a particular topic. It seems reasonable to describe an individual as generally open-minded and still find some issue--perhaps one on which he has invested a great deal of energy, has made a great commitment, or which is vital to his self-concept--where he will respond in a very closed manner rejecting all belief-discrepant positions.

As we have argued earlier, attitude change toward consistency is but one response among a number of alternatives that the person has available. Furthermore, we have suggested that the more closed the person, the more threatening or tension-producing the belief-discrepant task, the greater the tension produced, and therefore, the less likely that attitude change will be the chosen alternative. Thus, highly dogmatic persons who are also highly ego-involved with the topic should exhibit only slight self-persuasion with simple commitment and, in line with our original hypothesis, even less when tension is heightened by actual exposure to belief-discrepant material after encoding the counterattitudinal messages. A slight trend of this sort is observable in the data.

High dogmatic persons classed as being low ego-involved with the topic exhibit a different trend. Here we find a slight superiority in self-persuasion for those who encoded the counterattitudinal messages. Perhaps being less ego-involved with the topic, the tensions expected from actual encoding did not occur and the rehearsal effect was able to induce some measure of self-persuasion beyond that induced by dissonance reduction in the simple commitment condition.

It would seem that a similar line of argument should hold for low dogmatic persons: that higher ego-involvement with the topic should lead to generally less self-persuasion than low ego-involvement. This seemed to be the case among those low dogmatics in the simple

commitment condition, however, a rather surprising reversal occurred in the rehearsal condition. Highly ego-involved low dogmatics showed more self-persuasion than those less highly ego-involved. It is difficult to speculate on this result except to say that perhaps low dogmatics who are also low ego-involved may be so indifferent to the issue as to do a less adequate job of rehearsal of the counterattitudinal position and thus be less persuaded by their rehearsal.

Admittedly, the preceding speculation goes far beyond that warranted by the data, particularly in the absence of further research. What does seem to be indicated by the present data, however, is that the person's characteristic mode of processing information on some dimension of open and closedness and his way of processing information with regard to a particular issue need to be considered jointly with the situational demands if we are to understand the processes of attitude change and self-persuasion.

In summary, then, it would seem that in the self-persuasion situation a rehearsal effect is operating for open-minded persons while closed-minded individuals respond more readily to dissonance reduction. This conclusion must be tempered by indicating that the effect may be enhanced or lessened by other factors. Thus, it seems that for some persons the counterattitudinal task made salient the fact that their views were at odds with their peers and authority sources, thus enhancing self-persuasion. For others the perception that their views were in line with these outside sources conferred resistence to

self-persuasion. Also apparently mediating the response to the counterattitudinal task is the importance that the individual attaches to his own position on the issue. Here, however, it is difficult to describe the effect, and further research into the influence of ego-involvement on the self-persuasion phenomenon seems warranted.

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APPENDIX A

PRETEST

OPINION STUDY

PART I

INSTRUCTIONS:

THE ITEMS IN THIS BOOKLET ARE CONCERNED WITH YOUR OPINIONS ABOUT YOURSELF AND A NUMBER OF PUBLIC ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN GETTING ATTENTION IN THE MASS MEDIA AS WELL AS IN THE PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS OF A LOT OF PEOPLE.

SINCE THERE ARE TWO PARTS TO THIS QUESTIONNAIRE AND BECAUSE A NUMBER OF CLASSES WILL BE SAMPLED FOR THEIR OPINIONS, PLEASE PUT YOUR NAME AND STUDENT NUMBER IN THE BLANKS BELOW SO THAT THE PARTS CAN BE KEPT TOGETHER AND TO AVOID DUPLICATION. BE ASSURED OF COMPLETE ANONYMITY. YOUR OPINIONS WILL IN NO WAY BE ATTACHED TO YOU AS AN INDIVIDUAL. THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY ARE CONCERNED WITH THE PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL GROUP AND NO INDIVIDUAL WILL BE IDENTIFIED.

PLEASE READ EVERY ITEM CAREFULLY AND INDICATE YOUR OPINION BY PUTTING AN "X" IN THE BLANK WHICH BEST REPRESENTS YOUR VIEWS. THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS. YOUR OPINIONS AND FEELINGS ARE WHAT MATTERS.

NAME_____

STUDENT NUMBER_____

Dogmatism Scale = items 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30

Opinion items = 6, 10, 18, 28

1. Congress should pass a vigorous gun control law immediately that will outlaw the sale of all weapons, both rifles and hand-guns.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

2. The United States should pull out of Viet Nam immediately

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

3. College students have an obligation to their country, like everyone else. They should not be given draft deferrments.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

4. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

5. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

6. The 18 year old vote is needed. The voice of the younger generation should be heard.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

7. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

8. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

9. Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world, there is probably only one which is correct.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

10. The voting age should be lowered to 18.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

11. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

_____Agree Strongest
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

12. Rockefeller is probably the only Republican that will be able to defeat the Democrats this fall.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

13. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

14. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

15. Richard Nixon is most likely to be the next President.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

16. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

17. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

18. By the age of 18 most people are mature enough to vote and should be allowed to do so.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

19. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or a cause that life becomes meaningful.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

20. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

21. Eugene McCarthy is probably the best candidate for the Presidency on the current scene.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

22. It is often desireable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

23. To compromise with our political opponants is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

24. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

25. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree MOderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

26. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

27. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

28. The average 18 year old hasn't had enough practical experience with the workings of government and politics to be able to choose leaders.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

29. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

30. It is better to be a dead hero than to be live coward.

_____Agree Strongly
_____Agree Moderately
_____Agree Slightly
_____Don't Know, Neutral
_____Disagree Slightly
_____Disagree Moderately
_____Disagree Strongly

OPINION STUDY

PART II

NAME: _____

STUDENT NUMBER _____

INSTRUCTIONS:

ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES ARE SOME STATEMENTS EXPRESSING VARIOUS POSITIONS OF OPINION ON SEVERAL ISSUES. ON EACH PAGE THERE ARE NINE (9) STATEMENTS ABOUT EACH ISSUE.

1. PLEASE READ ALL NINE STATEMENTS ON A PAGE BEFORE MAKING ANY MARK ON THE PAGE.

2. THEN UNDERLINE THE ONE STATEMENT THAT COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR STAND ON THAT ISSUE.

3. THEN INDICATE ANY OTHER STATEMENT ACCEPTABLE BY YOU BY CIRCLING THE LETTER MARKING SUCH STATEMENTS.

4. THEN CROSS OUT THE ONESTATEMENT WHICH IS MOST OBJECTIONABLE FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW.

5. THEN PLACE AN "X" THROUGH THE LETTER OF ANY OTHER STATEMENTS THAT YOU FIND OBJECTIONABLE FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW.

6. GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE AND REPEAT THE ABOVE STEPS.

Critical Scale = #2

A. The election of the Republican presidential and vice-presidential candidates in November is absolutely essential from all angles in the country's interests.

B. On the whole the interests of the country will be served best by the election of the Republican candidates for president and vice-president in the coming election.

C. It seems that the country's interests would be better served if the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of the Republican party are elected this November.

D. Although it is hard to decide, it is probable that the country's interests may be better served if the Republican presidential and vice-presidential candidates are elected in November.

E. From the point of view of the country's interests, it is hard to decide whether it is preferable to vote for presidential and vice-presidential candidates of the Republican party or the Democratic party in November.

F. Although it is hard to decide, it is probable that the country's interests may be better served if the Democratic presidential and vice-presidential candidates are elected in November.

G. It seems that the country's interests would be better served if the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of the Democratic party are elected this November.

H. On the whole the interests of the country will be served best by the election of the Democratic candidates for president and vice-president in the coming election.

I. The election of the Democratic presidential and vice-presidential candidates in November is absolutely essential from all angles in the country's interests.

A. Under no circumstances should 18 year olds be allowed to vote. They are far too young.

B. It is ridiculous to think of 18 year olds being able to vote. The high school graduate just hasn't had enough experience to know the issues involved. How can he vote?

C. Eighteen is too young to make such serious decisions as are involved in government.

D. Maybe it would be best if 18 year olds did not vote.

E. Whether 18 year olds should vote or not is just not that important an issue: the country has more important issues to discuss.

F. Generally speaking 18 year olds are wise enough to vote and probably should.

G. The 18 - 21 year age group is rapidly becoming one of the largest and should definitely get the right to vote.

H. If 18 year olds are old enough to fight for America, then they should be able to vote. It is only fair.

I. If 18 year olds must perform the duties of citizens like paying taxes and the draft, then they must have the right to vote.

A. It is absolutely essential that Congress pass the strongest possible gun control laws.

B. On the whole, the interests of the country will best be served if Congress passes strict gun control laws.

C. The interests of the country will be better served if we have gun control laws.

D. Although it is hard to decide, it is probable that gun control laws will be better for the country.

E. From the point of view of the country's interests, it is hard to decide whether or not gun control laws should be passed.

F. Although it is hard to decide, it is probable that it will be better if everyone retains the right to buy and own guns.

G. The interests of the country will be better served if people can continue to own guns.

H. On the whole, the interests of the country will be best served if if every citizen has the right to buy and own guns.

I. It is absolutely essential to the country that there be no interference with a person's rights to buy and own firearms.

APPENDIX B

POSTTEST

NAME_____ STUDENT NUMBER_____

CLASS_____ INSTRUCTOR _____

- -

sex; M F

AGE_____

Place of residence: _____Urban
_____Suburban
_____Rural

Class year: Freshman Sophmore Junior Senior Other ____

Major_____

What kind of career do you expect to go into after graduation?

_____

_____

THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE A GENERAL OPINION SUTVEY. THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF FAIRLY STANDARD OPINION SURVEY ITEMS. READ CAREFULLY THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT PRECEDE EACH KIND.

Critical items = 5, 14, 19, 24

The first set of items are some sets of statements expressing various positions on the particular issues. Each page has 9 such statements. For each of the next three pages, please do the following:

FIRST, read all the statements.

THEN place a double check (✓✓) in the blank to the left of the one statement that comes closest to your own stand on that issue.

THEN place a check (✓) next to any other statements that you feel you can accept.

THEN place a double "X" (XX) by the statement you find most objectionable from your point of view.

THEN place a single "X" (X) by any other statements you also find objectionable from your point of view.

RADICAL GROUPS ON CAMPUS

_____A. It is absolutely essential to the spirit of academic freedom that there be no restrictions of any kind on any individual or group that wishes to advocate a point of view, even those critical of our society, no matter how radical.

_____B. It is vital that the university be a place where any group of people can come together to express their views in complete freedom.

_____C. Subject to reasonable regulation, groups representing many shades of opinion have a right to be heard on a university campus.

_____D. Although it is difficult to decide, it seems likely that groups such as SDS can have a place on campus if they are not too far out and they are properly supervised.

_____E. The arguments in favor and against allowing SDS and groups like it are nearly equal.

_____F. Although it is difficult to decide, it seems likely that groups such as SDS should not be allowed on campus.

_____G. It would probably be better if meetings of protest groups on campus were discouraged.

_____H. Since the presence of SDS groups on campuses cause unrest and challenge to rightful authority, their meetings should be prohibited.

_____I. It is absolutely essential for the preservation of law and order that meetings of groups such as SDS on campuses be completely abolished.

EXTENSION OF VOTING RIGHTS

_____A. Under no circumstances should 18 year olds be allowed to vote. They are far too young.

_____B. It is ridiculous to think of 18 year olds being able to vote. The high school graduate just hasn't had enough experience to know the issues involved. How can they vote?

_____C. Eighteen is too young to make such serious decisions as are involved in government.

_____D. Maybe it would be best if 18 year olds did not vote.

_____E. Whether 18 year olds should vote or not is just not that important an issue; the country has more important issues to discuss.

_____F. Generally speaking 18 year olds are wise enough to vote and probably should.

_____G. The 18 - 21 year age group is rapidly becoming one of the largest and should definitely get the right to vote.

_____H. If 18 year olds are old enough to fight for America, then they should be able to vote. It is only fair.

_____I. If 18 year olds must perform the duties of citizens like paying taxes and the draft, then they <u>must</u> have the right to vote.

COLLEGE STUDENTS AND THE DRAFT

_____A. Absolutely no draft deferrments should be allowed for college students.

_____B. Beyond any doubts--and there should be no arguments on this point--we cannot afford to have draft deferrments for college students.

_____C. It would probably be better if college students did not get draft deferrments.

_____D. College students shouldn't be deferred unless they're in critical majors, like doctors.

_____E. It is very hard to say whether or not college students should have deferrments.

_____F. Sometimes it is good to give draft deferrments to college students and sometimes its better not to.

_____G. Except in the case of national emergency there are no valid grounds to draft college students.

_____H. College students are our future leaders. We need them. There should be draft deferrments for college students.

_____I. College trained people are the country's most vital resource and without a doubt they should be draft deferred with no exceptions no matter what the circumstances.

Please read each of the next set of items carefully and then place an "X" in the space that comes closest to the way you feel about the statement.

1. Laws should be enacted to ban anti-war demonstrations.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral, Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

2. Physical force should be used to prevent riots.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral, Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

3. Draft Deferrments for college students should be eliminated.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral, Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

4. Persons who avoid the draft should receive long jail sentences.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

5. The 18 year old vote is needed. The voice of the younger generation should be heard.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral, Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

6. The U.S. space program should be drastically curtailed.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral, Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

7. The United States Should pull out of Viet Nam immediately

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral, Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

8. The United States should <u>NOT</u> be responsible for providing military aid to other nations.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral, Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

9. Students should resist the draft by all possible means.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral, Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

10. Television coverage of riots helps to spread rioting throughout the country.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

11. Early predictions of election winners on television influences the outcomes of elections.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral, Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

12. Student ratings of instructors should become a regular part of the personal practices of the University.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

13. It is very unlikely that there will be a third World War though there may be more wars like Korea and Viet Nam.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

14. The voting age should be lowered to 18.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

15. The United States should invade North Viet Nam in order to shorten the war.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

16. Violent programs on television cause some children to become criminals in later life

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

17. Recent Supreme Court rulings have made the job of the police all but impossible.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

18. Students should have a greater voice in making university policy.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

19. By the age of 18 most people are mature enough to vote and should be allowed to do so.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

20. Persons caught with marijuana in their possession should get stiff jail sentences.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

21. Michigan legislators should be exempt from paying Lansing city income tax.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

22. Law enforcement officers need greater freedom to enforce the law.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

23. Our educational system is inferior to that of the Russians.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

24. The average 18 year old hasn't had enough practical experience with the workings of government and politics to be able to choose leaders.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly

25. High school students should be required to take four years of Latin.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Neutral Don't Know	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly