

THE SCHWÄRMER IN THE
NOVELISTIC WRITINGS OF
CHRISTOPH MARTIN WIELAND

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ABSTRACT

THE SCHWÄRMER IN THE NOVELISTIC WRITINGS OF CHRISTOPH MARTIN WIELAND

by Gerhard J. Reimer

This study attempts to show how Wieland portrays the Schwärmer, to evaluate and compare the solutions he proposes to the problem of Schwärmerei, and to determine if there is progress in his approach to the problem. A representative selection of eight of Wieland's novels written between 1760 and 1800 are analyzed in chronological order.

The study interprets the Schwärmer as an individual who bases his action and thought on that which is irrational, subjective or unfounded. It uses the terms fanatic, enthusiast and Schwärmer interchangeably. The author recognizes that Wieland's preoccupation with Schwärmerei derives from his own experience with Pietism and that his approaches in overcoming it were strongly influenced by the Greeks and Laurence Sterne. The Greeks in general appealed to Wieland in his own search for a personally satisfying religion and, more specifically, he was attracted by Lucian's use of satire to resolve the conflict between rationalism and irrationalism; Sterne influenced Wieland in the use of synthesis.

In six of the novels analyzed the major (or a major)

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character is a Schwärmer because of a basic conflict within himself, which he must resolve. (The exceptions are Der goldene Spiegel and Die Abderiten, which both portray groups of people who behave as fanatics and essentially fail to progress in the resolution of their problem.) Araspes of Araspes und Panthea overcomes his conflict between Platonic and erotic love but ends as a sort of moral-religious Schwärmer. Don Sylvio overcomes the conflict between fantasy and reality as the result of his friendship with a sincere and frank young woman. Agathon is cast from moral-religious to erotic to political Schwärmerei and finally achieves an equilibrium through the appropriation of Archytas' teaching of eudaemonia, a philosophy with the synthesis of the animal and the spiritual natures of man at its core. Contrary to what one would expect in a Bildungsroman, Peregrin does not resolve his basic problems, those of establishing a satisfying relationship with the opposite sex and finding a satisfactory religion. Schwärmerei is here, however, described as beautiful and creative, and thus almost a solution. In Agathodämon the conflict between calculating rationalism and pietistic faith which allows no hypocrisy is solved by a form of pantheism, according to which the hero is led to an identification with the god of the universe and achieves a level of

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self-realization and equilibrium new for Wieland. In Aristipp there is, surprisingly, strong emphasis on eudaemonia again, while the more passive trust of Agathodämon is not neglected. There is indication that in this fragment Wieland was trying to synthesize the solutions of Agathon and Agathodämon.

Wieland's attitude and approach towards Schwärmerei changed greatly during the period in which these novels were written. This is especially evident when comparing Der goldene Spiegel (1772) with Peregrinus Proteus (1791). In the former, naive, sincere Schwärmerei is portrayed as much worse than the outright attempt to deceive; the situation is directly reversed in the latter. In his early novel, Don Sylvio, as well as in Agathon, Schwärmerei is a stage that must be overcome at all cost; in Peregrinus Proteus and Aristipp (as demonstrated especially by Lais), Schwärmerei is a quality which keeps the individual from being less than human and, is thus, a stage that need not necessarily be overcome. That Schwärmerei may be a creative force is already alluded to in Don Sylvio but this emphasis increases in his succeeding novels.

Although Wieland's progress in the solution of his problem is sporadic, this analysis demonstrates that, contrary to some criticism, he did approach a solution,

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especially through synthesis, which is increasingly more satisfying to himself and to the reader.

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INTRODUCTION

A significant number of the books, dissertations and essays on Christoph Martin Wieland (1773-1813) make reference to the subject of the Schwärmer in his works. To my knowledge, however, there is no study that concerns itself specifically with this phenomenon and attempts to view it within the perspective of his total work or a representative selection thereof.

In this study on the theme of the Schwärmer in the writings of Wieland I confine myself to his novelistic writings. The works analyzed were written between the years 1760 and 1800, a period of forty years, and thus supply sufficient material for tracing the development and possible changes in the author's treatment of this theme.

To Wieland a Schwärmer is an individual who generates an excess of emotional-feeling or indulges in an undue amount of sentimental day-dreaming. This enthusiastic musing is brought on by an inherent dualism in Wieland's characters, which they seek to resolve. If and when they are successful in restoring harmony to their inner being, they shed their Schwärmer nature. It is obvious that a Schwärmer is a direct opposite of a sober rationalist. My main goal in this dissertation is then, to pursue Wieland's treatment of Schwärmerei from work to work, especially in light of the solutions (if any) he proposes.

In this investigation I also treat such questions as: How does Wieland actually portray the Schwärmer? Is it possible to discern specific types when comparing the Schwärmer heroes of the different novels? In the introduction I also deal with the sources of the Schwärmer figure. This will include Wieland's background in and acquaintance with Schwärmerei and a brief reference to two writers who strongly influenced Wieland in the theme at hand.

At this juncture it will be interesting to trace the meaning of the word Schwärmerei down to Wieland to show how his concept of the term evolved. It is a word that was originally used to describe the flying of a whole swarm of bees as they follow the queen bee leaving the hive. According to Grimm this word developed early into a concept used to describe human behaviour and thought. Beginning in the sixteenth century, Schwärmer is used to designate a heretic. Kant used Schwärmerei to describe the ideas (das Gedankenleben) of those who do not confine themselves to the limits set by experience. After about 1770 (Grimm, 9, 2289) Schwärmerei acquired a milder literary connotation and was used "zur beschreibung einer überwiegenden phantasie und begeisterung."

In his short article entitled "Enthusiasmus und Schwärmerei" Wieland says the following: "Ich nenne Schwärmerei eine Erhitzung **der Seele von Gegenständen,**

die entweder gar nicht in der Natur sind, oder wenigstens das nicht sind, wofür die berauschte Seele sie ansieht . . . Dem Worte Schwärmerei . . . entspricht das Wort Fanatismus ziemlich genau."¹ Wieland then goes on to describe the difference between Schwärmerei and Enthusiasmus, which is actually the purpose of his article, and states that the latter is inspired by the gods, the former by a fetish. Wieland admits that it is often difficult to distinguish between the two. Nor has he himself always made this distinction clear in his novels. The Abderites, for instance, who showed such enthusiasm for many things during the course of the novel by that name, are referred to as both Schwärmer and Enthusiasten, apparently interchangeably.² It would seem that for a large part of his writings at least, Wieland did not clearly make the distinction he outlined here in this article written in 1775. Lessing (e.g., in his Philosophen und Schwärmer) and others, as Wieland realized, did not make this distinction either.

A Schwärmer, then, is an individual who bases his hopes, attitudes or actions on that which is irrational, subjective or unfounded. The opposite of Schwärmerei is

¹Christoph Martin Wieland, Sämtlich Werke, ed. G. J. Göschen (Leipzig, 1855ff.), XXXV, 135-136. (Further reference to this work will occur within parentheses in the text itself.)

²E.g., Die Abderiten, Book I, Chapters 1 and 2.

cold rationalism. The mean, which our author attempts to find between these two, will sometimes be referred to as Natur or nature, a term which Wieland included in the title of his novel Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerei oder die Abenteuer des Don Sylvio von Rosalba.

This mean, Natur, is characterized by genuineness, spontaneity and common sense. Schwärmerei implies an excessive enthusiasm or exuberance, i.e., an enthusiasm which is out of sensible proportion to the actual cause of it.

Schwärmerei may take on very different forms. It may have as its basis belief in fairy tales, the love of an ideal imagined lover, an irrational religion, etc. Likewise Schwärmerei may manifest itself in many different ways; there is, for instance, the Platonic or moral, the religious or the erotic Schwärmer.

In the absence of a satisfactory cognate translation of Schwärmerei (and its related words Schwärmer and schwärmen) the word is frequently used untranslated and interchangeably with such expressions as fanaticism, hyper-sentimentalism and excessive enthusiasm.

Also the word "disenchant" is used in this dissertation in a somewhat special sense. It describes the fanatic's loss of fantasies and seraphic enthusiasm. The connotation of despair or loss of hope, often associated with this word, is not applicable here.

Concerning my hopes and ambitions with regard to this dissertation, they would be fulfilled if this study would arouse a greater interest in Wieland. I have become convinced that Wieland, who is sometimes accused of being tedious because he repeats the same theme over and over without noteworthy variations, can become alive and relevant if one patiently pursues and analyzes the conflicts he deals with in his novels.

The Germany of Wieland's time was dominated by the spirit of Enlightenment but under the surface an excessive sentimentality and irrationalism began to assert itself in the thought of many intellectuals and poets as a type of opposition to the prevailing philosophy of the age. This current, running counter to Rationalistic thinking is often termed "Pietism," especially in a religious connotation. Wieland felt himself caught between these two streams. In his writings one strongly senses a struggle between heart and mind or between Schwärmerei and Vernunft, which doubtless had its roots in his own background and in the time in which he lived. During the course of his struggles with this problem Wieland became acquainted with the writings of Lucian, the Greek satirist. This acquaintanceship helped him to analyze and, to some extent, to overcome his own situation, for Lucian reconciled the rationalism and the irrationalism of the Greeks with satire. The English

writer, Laurence Sterne, influenced Wieland to employ another solution of which our author made constant use as he tried to bring Schwärmerei and Vernunft together, namely synthesis.

Wieland's family roots in Pietism go back to his grandfather, who in 1710 wrote a pamphlet in which he wanted to testify to his own Piety or Rechtgläubigkeit. Consequently the family was in close contact with Halle, the center of early German Pietism. This connection to Halle became even more personal when a young lady, a good friend of the Wieland family, was married to August Hermann Francke (1663-1727), at that time in Halle. Wieland's father, who had studied theology, is generally considered to have been a devoutly pious man, although there are some conflicting reports about this; he was also partly open to the influence of the Enlightenment. It is possible that he already felt something of the conflict between narrow-mindedness and open-mindedness, between Schwärmerei and skepticism, which was later to become so obvious in his son.

Christoph Martin Wieland's education or training, which began at an extremely early age, was strongly influenced by Pietism. Before he was three years old his father had already begun his formal education. He was soon assisted by a teacher who taught according to the methods of the Halle Orphanage, an orphanage founded by

the Pietists. At the age of ten Wieland is reported to have read Horace and Virgil and, as a part of his upbringing, he probably also memorized most of the Bible and the hymn book. By the time he was fourteen he had made such progress that the father could not help but realize that he had outgrown his teachers in Biberach and that it would be necessary to send him elsewhere to receive further training. He was sent to the famous school at Klosterberge, a school built on the model of Francke's preparatory school in Halle. Here Abt Steinmetz, a strong Pietist, whom Wieland later called "bis zur Schwärmerei devot," was the director.³

Böttiger describes Wieland while in Klosterberg as follows:

Beim Abt Steinmetz in Klosterbergen war Wieland anfangs einer der erwecktesten und frömmsten Beter, und wenn Steinmetz (der seiner Anstalt auch den Hallischen Pietismus einzuimpfen wusste) in seiner Salbung zwei Stunden lang in den Betstunden seinen Unsinn herplauderte, wurde niemand so sehr davon gerührt als der Knabe Wieland.⁴

It seems as though Wieland had for a while come completely under the sway of Steinmetz, for he, too, could not occupy himself too much with pious practices. Soon, however, he began to turn away from his pious attitude

³Biographical data to this point concerning Wieland based on Friedrich Sengle, Christoph Martin Wieland (Stuttgart, 1949), pp. 14-18 (Hereafter: Sengle, Wieland.)

⁴C. W. Böttiger, ed., "Christoph Martin Wieland," Historisches Taschenbuch (Leipzig, 1839), X, 381.

and when he succeeded in obtaining a copy of Bayle's dictionary from Pastor Räther (the only teacher on the staff who was not a Pietist), a new world opened up for him. This first introduced him to French skepticism.⁵ The immediate result was that he wrote and published an essay in which he tried to show that this world could have come into existence without God. This marks the beginning of his reaction against irrationalism and the ensuing conflict between reason and Schwärmerei.

The Pietism of Wieland's experience was a religion which constantly emphasized the inner personal contact with God. It demanded of the believer that he give his life over to Christ to the extent where he could say: "I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." (Galatians 2,30)⁶ The struggles of those seeking to achieve this union with Christ were often accompanied by great spiritual fears and depressions (Seelenangst) but the joy of achieving this union was characterized by an extreme exuberance. The Pietists could pursue their convictions with complete abandon because this world was largely considered a transitory stage on the way to another better world, as Zinzendorf states somewhat banally in

⁵Sengle, Wieland, p. 19.

⁶As quoted by the editor and translator in his introduction to Philip Jakob Spener, Pia Desideria, ed. and transl. Theodore Tappert (Philadelphia, 1964).

one of his hymns:

Man hofft, wie David einst, mit denen die auf Erden
verachtetes Geschmeiss in Michals Augen sind,
zum rechten Ehren-Schmuck hinauf gerückt zu werden.⁷

Pietism was not the only movement reacting against the rationalism of the day. There were spiritualists, deviant Pietists and charlatans of various kinds.⁸ Some of these started from a Christian premise, others made no pretense to be motivated by Christianity. An example of the latter would be Cagliostro (1743-1795), an Italian and a contemporary of Wieland's. He travelled widely and in the 1790s he made his influence felt in rather wide circles in Germany, especially among the ladies, because of his supposed rejuvenating elixirs and other mysterious remedies. Starting from a Christian premise and thus more closely related was the Swedenborgian movement. Its founder, Emanuel Swedenborg (1668-1772), a Swedish scientist, had tried to resolve the problem of the relation between body and soul empirically; when he failed, he lost faith in the scientific method. He then turned to Christianity and the world of the spirits and the final

⁷Ludwig Nikolaus von Zinzendorf, Teutsche Gedichte, number 23, as quoted in Gerhard Kaiser, Pietismus und Patriotismus im literarischen Deutschland (Wiesbaden, 1961), p. 87.

⁸Several of these charlatans and their movements are discussed in Eugen Sierke, Schwärmer und Schwindler zu Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts (Leipzig, 1874).

judgement appeared to him in distinct visions. Belief in Swedenborg's claims to have witnessed the events of the end times became the basis for Swedenborgianism.⁹

While Wieland portrays numerous charlatans that remind of Cagliostro and his kind, I have not found that he occupied himself in any distinct way with this specific charlatan. We have a record, however, of his encounter with Swedenborgianism. In the late 1780s, when Wieland was beginning to be considered by some as a defender of religious faith, he began to write a series of articles in which he attempted to expose Schwärmerei in the hope of helping to exterminate it. Shortly after his article entitled "Swedenborgs Offenbarungen und der tierische Magnetismus" appeared in Merkur in 1787, he received a Swedenborgian circular letter in which every form of natural explanation for hypnotism was attacked, while it enthusiastically lauded Swedenborg's "Christian philosophy," claiming that in this new age of grace we again have the power to rule over the spirits as did Christ's original disciples. To Wieland, this proclamation meant that the age of barbarism was making a reappearance. His reply to this circular, which appeared in the Merkur again, almost has overtones of Pietistic

⁹Alexander James Grieve, "Swedenborg," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1956), XXI, 654.

polemics: "Swedenborg lehrt eine Zauberphilosophie welche weder Philosophie noch Christentum mehr ist, sondern ein Hercocervus, der zu nichts taugt, als sie und ihre Anhänger in Sümpfe und Abgründe zu führen."¹⁰

Wieland thus attacks irrational thought systems not so much because they are irrational; he rather attacks those systems that wilfully attempt to blind and to keep mankind ignorant. He senses a responsibility to warn his fellowmen against a false enthusiasm for programs that seek to delude mankind. It is in this connection that Wieland is drawn to Lucian (ca. 125-190 A.D.) who, in his supposed age of Greek enlightenment, was also confronted with spiritual darkness and ecstatic religions which he tried to combat. Both attempted to enlighten those superstitious people (who considered themselves intelligent and enlightened) by exposing the "theological lies of poets and the inventions of visionaries and magicians . . . and above all . . . the hypocrisy, ignorance, and vulgarity of those who had debased philosophy to the stature of a money making enterprise."¹¹

Because of the parallel Wieland saw between himself and Lucian and his age and that of Lucian, this poet had

¹⁰Sengle, Wieland, p. 476.

¹¹William H. Clark, "Christoph Martin Wieland and the Legacy of Greece" (dissertation, Columbia University, 1954), p. 185.

a stronger influence on Wieland than any other Greek writer. Although Wieland did have some criticism of Lucian, Lucian had a sustaining influence and made an enduring impression on Wieland. Sengle¹² refers to Lucian as Wieland's Bruder im Geist and Wieland himself has called him Tröster in der Not. His translation of Lucian--he translated almost all of Lucian's works--is not only a prominent achievement which bespeaks Wieland's learning and industry, but also testifies to his devotion to the Greek writer. For three years Wieland devoted himself almost exclusively to the translation, which is, of course, not merely a translation but also a commentary.

Three works of Lucian discussed by Kersten¹³ which are especially related to Wieland's own experience and attitudes as well as to the theme and contents of several of Wieland's works are Der Lügenfreund, Der Lügenprophet Alexander and Peregrinus Proteus.¹⁴ In all of these Lucian basically demonstrates his dislike and contempt for the Schwärmer, the charlatans and false prophets of his time. He is inspired by reason and a desire for the truth and he wants to destroy these false characters by removing

¹²Sengle, Wieland, p. 327.

¹³Kersten, Wielands Verhältnis zu Lukian (Cuxhaven, 1900), pp.6-10. (Hereafter: Kersten, Lukian.)

¹⁴Titles cited are the German titles as translated by Wieland.

them from their destructive darkness and placing them in broad daylight, thus exposing them as a laughing stock. Wieland's Ueber den Gang der Menschen, an Marie und Geistererscheinungen zu glauben (XXX, 89ff.) is written in entirely the same spirit, although with less satire. Wieland here, too, exposes the reasons for superstition, hoping that reason will overcome ignorance.

Also important to the study at hand is Kersten's comparison of Lucian's and Wieland's attitudes towards the irrational in religion.¹⁵ He states that it was Wieland's desire to free the Christianity of his day from everything that had distorted its true original intent and had become associated with it during the course of the centuries. Unlike Lucian, he does not ridicule religious dogma but he does what he can to bring reason to bear on faith.¹⁶ Dogma to him is valid only if it stands the test of reason. He would attribute to Christ not the desire to found a new religion but the desire--which was also Wieland's--to purify the religion of his day. Inasmuch as he attempts to free his time of error and ignorance he bears a very close resemblance to Lucian. But, continues Kersten, Lucian did not have that respect for religion

¹⁵Kersten, Lukian, pp. 15-17.

¹⁶Cf. Wieland, "Ueber den Gebrauch der Vernunft in Glaubenssachen" (XXX, 11f).

and dogma which Wieland never abandoned. Lucian was called to destroy or give a death blow to that which was already superseded; he was not called to rebuild. It must be remembered, according to Kersten, that Lucian was an atheist, not merely pagan, and Wieland defended himself as a deist.

Thus, although Wieland did not accept everything from Lucian, his practical philosophy, which concerned itself little with the origin and goal of the world and man, but which accepted life as it comes and tried to gain the most out of life, had a profound influence on Wieland, beginning approximately 1763, when he abandoned his enthusiasm for Christian and Platonic idealism.

While Wieland had become especially interested in the Greeks by way of his identification with Lucian, there was still another reason for this interest. Wieland was also probing into Greek antiquity, especially into their clandestine religions, in search of a personally satisfying religion. This is pointed out by Mark O. Kistler in his study of the Dionysian elements in Wieland.¹⁷

Wieland had early turned away from Pietism, to which he had given himself so whole-heartedly as a youth. His search for meaning was now directed especially towards the Greeks, where, according to Kistler, he finally found

¹⁷Mark O. Kistler, "Dionysian Elements in Wieland," Germanic Review, XXXV, 2, p. 83.

a personally satisfying philosophy in a sort of Dionysian pantheism.

The other writer who influenced Wieland profoundly concerning the problem of reason versus enthusiasm was his contemporary, Laurence Sterne (1713-1768). Sterne's great contribution to literature was probably that he combined humor and sentimentality. While there was an abundance of sentimental literature at that time, this combination was new.

When Wieland became acquainted with Sterne in the 1760s through a reading of Tristram Shandy, he was strongly drawn to him. In a letter of 1767 he said the following: "Ich gestehe Ihnen, mein Freund, dass Sterne beinahe der einzige Autor in der Welt ist, den ich mit einer Art von ehrfurchtsvoller Bewunderung ansehe. Ich werde sein Buch studieren so lang ich lebe, und es doch nicht genug studiert haben."¹⁸ One is inclined to ask

¹⁸ Christoph Martin Wieland, Ausgewählte Briefe an verschiedene Freunde in den Jahren 1751 bis 1810 geschrieben und nach der Zeitfolge geordnet (Zürich, 1815), II, 287. (Hereafter: AB.) Note also that C. A. Behmer, "Laurence Sterne und Wieland," Forschungen und Funde, IX, 15 and Sengle, Wieland, p. 215, both place Wieland's first acquaintance with Sterne and Tristram Shandy as 1767, using the argument in the case of Behmer (pp. 16f.), that the letter here cited must mark his first reading of this novel, for he would not have waited long to mention anything that moved him so profoundly as this. Peter Michelsen (pp. 181-186, see footnote 20), however, argues convincingly for the fact that Wieland must have been acquainted with Sterne as early as 1763, using textual evidence in Wieland's writings for the basis of his

whence this sudden affinity for this English author. Richardson, with his sentimentally moralistic novels, had been the idol of Wieland's youthful ascetic-mystical period. Already in 1764 Wieland had begun to make fun of the time of his youthful enthusiasm when he passionately declaimed against certain gens d'esprits forts, such as Ovid, Rousseau and La Fontaine, by referring to this period as the "Don Quichoterien seiner ersten Jugend."¹⁹ In Sterne's parodying of Richardson, Wieland sensed a parallel to the attitude he himself now held towards his own sentimental youth.

In a recent study on Sterne's influence on Wieland, Peter Michelsen points out some aspects of this relationship, which have a very direct bearing on the intent of this study. Michelsen demonstrates that both Wieland and Sterne believed that the responsibility of training or development (Bildung) was basically to concern itself with reconciling the discord of reason (Kopf) and heart (Herz).²⁰ In Wieland, for instance, this is illustrated by Agathon being driven from one extreme to the other.

argument. In this case his first reading of Tristram Shandy would have coincided with the time during which Wieland made his first plans for Don Sylvio.

¹⁹AB, II, 244.

²⁰Peter Michelsen, "Laurence Sterne und der Roman des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts," Palaestra, CCXXXII, p. 178, (Hereafter: Michelsen, Sterne.)

The difference between Wieland and Sterne, with respect to this duality, according to Michelsen, lies in the fact that Wieland felt these to be two contradictory poles, which are in constant struggle with each other, whereas Sterne considered this polarity necessary for the constitution of the world. Sterne, therefore, never did seek a solution--for his characters it is only a matter of following their instincts and personal dictates (ein Nasefolgen), whereas Wieland's characters are much more moralistic. Yet despite the fact that Sterne did not especially need to look for a solution, Wieland found in him a synthesis which offered at least a partial solution. And it is precisely synthesis which Wieland uses most effectively as a solution. Especially in the character of Yorick in Tristram Shandy Wieland found embodied his two favorite characters,²¹ Socrates and Harlequin, representing the two extremes: wisdom and foolishness. Michelsen then describes the solution Wieland saw in Yorick and his application of it to his own problem as follows:

In der in Yorick sich verkörpernden Haltung, die Weisheit und Narrentum in freier Weise vereinigen, schien Wieland die Möglichkeit zu sehen, eine Art Ersatz für die gesuchte Kommunikation und wenn auch

²¹ Christoph Martin Wieland, Auswahl denkwürdiger Briefe, ed. Ludwig Wieland (Vienna, 1815), I, 234: (15. Dez. 1768) "Sokrates und Harlequin sind meine Lieblingscharaktere, und Yorick ist es mehr als Einer von diesen Beyden, weil er Sokrates und Harlequin zugleich ist."

nicht den Frieden, so doch wenigsten eine diplomatische Absprache zwischen Ideal und Leben herzustellen.²²

²²Michelsen, "Sterne," p. 204.

CHAPTER I

ARASPES UND PANTHEA

The problem of two souls within one person and the struggle it involves is an important theme in Araspes und Panthea. Araspes is torn between spiritual love and sensual love for Panthea; to Araspes these two poles represent the opposites of morality and immorality or of good and evil. As such, they are not and can not be synthesized within the framework of this novel.

Araspes und Panthea, based on an episode from Xenophon's Cyropedia, tells in dialog-form the story of Araspes, a young Greek soldier, who is given the task of guarding Panthea, a captured Persian queen. Araspes becomes a Schwärmer because of a basic conflict within him. He would like to love the queen on a spiritual plane, only to lapse into a sensual feeling for her.

This entire work is steeped in sentimentality and enthusiasm, and, even though the hero changes course concerning his conflict between spiritual and sensual love, there is no abatement in his expression of

Schwärmerei, because he cannot resolve his problem.

Still holding to his Platonic ideals in the beginning of the novel, Araspes speaks elatedly of his noble aspirations thus: "Wie verlangt mich nach den goldenen Stunden! Eine Seele, die von Ruhmseligkeiten glühet, kann nichts Lieblicher's hören, als die Thaten der Helden." (XXVII, 23) After he has given in to his erotic desires as a result of secretly having observed Panthea at her bathing place and becoming convinced, as he sees the beauty of her unclothed body, that he must love her as a human being, he continues with the same fervour: "Der Mensch ist nicht zur ätherischen Liebe gemacht! . . . Eine Entzückung wie die meinige war, hätte die Lippen eines Stummen gesprängt!" (XXVII, 107) Nor has the rapture in his tone abated after having regained his virtue: "Mein Herz schwillt von dem Gedanken auf, dass du mich nicht unwürdig hältst, an dem glorwürdigen Werke zu arbeiten, wozu der Himmel dich gerufen hat." (XXVII, 139)

Araspes' sentimentality is accompanied by an overly zealous concern for his fellowmen. He supports and praises Cyrus because of his beneficent attitude towards all mankind. Any battle Cyrus fights is simply fought, so Araspes reports, to deliver peoples from oppression. In his own way, Araspes shows his love and concern even for the supposed enemy by finding great pleasure in announcing to his prisoner, Panthea, that her husband is

alive and in showing her his strong desire to help them be reunited.

His zeal to comfort and help his beautiful prisoner, however, suddenly turns into hot erotic desire. He is now, as much as ever, a true Schwärmer, pursuing an extreme which is certainly equal to his earlier extreme of trying to help her. Where he formerly did his utmost to help Panthea and her husband to be reunited, he now dreads nothing more than that Panthea's husband might arrive on the scene. Araspes is being driven to the brink of disgrace and there seems to be nothing that can stop him. The well-meant warnings of his friend Arasambes serve only to strengthen his intentions of possessing Panthea. He answers Arasambes' warnings as follows: "Wie schändlich lästerst du meine Liebe! . . . Der müsste meine Seele versteinern können, der mir verbieten wollte für diese göttliche Schöne zu brennen." (XXVII, 110)

While in this state of rebellion, Araspes suddenly receives an insight into his own perversion. This is brought about through the return of Cyrus, the general. To Araspes Cyrus represents the sum of all the worthwhile and noble qualities. As soon as Cyrus' pending arrival is announced, Araspes becomes aware of his condition. He falls into a deep spiritual depression, which is accompanied by physical sickness. He feels tortured and condemned by his own conscience: "Mein furchtbarster

Ankläger ist in meiner eigenen Brust! . . . Ich bin verloren! . . . du selbst hast dein Verderben beschleunigt." (XXVII, 129, 132)

Then Cyrus arrives and brings deliverance. "Gleich einer gegenwärtigen Gottheit hauchest du neues Leben in meine Seele," (XXVII, 137) Araspes confesses to Cyrus. It is actually through the presence and the association with one who is so genuinely human and forgiving that Araspes regains the spiritual vitality he needs to face life. Having experienced grace through this association, Araspes is now eager to pursue the divine task which Cyrus lays before him: "an dem glorwürdigen Werke zu arbeiten, wozu der Himmel dich gerufen hat." (XXVII, 137)¹

Araspes has suddenly changed in his whole outlook. This change, however, was not brought about through reason or any metaphysical arguments he is exposed to. The reasoning of Arasambes, who repeatedly warns him, does not bring him any closer to finding his way back. At one point Araspes seems to have some remorse about his actions; Arasambes forthrightly tells him that reason is now appealing to him and advises him to take advantage

¹ Wieland, still very much a Schwärmer himself when he wrote Araspes und Panthea, may have been thinking of Pietistic conversion when he describes how Araspes finds his way back to virtue. The three stages of Pietistic conversion are clearly delineated: 1) Araspes is unaware of his vile condition, 2) he becomes concerned over his lost state and then 3) there comes a breakthrough for him, the joyful experience of finding his sins forgiven.

of this opportunity to reorient himself and to follow a new course. This, however, only hardens Araspes' heart. (XXVII, 116)

As in Wieland's succeeding novels, the Schwärmer hero finally experiences regeneration or disenchantment through association with a sympathetic congenial human being. Cyrus has understanding for the young hero and assumes the blame for his downfall. He admits that he should have known better than to expose Araspes to such temptation and even confesses that he would not have stood the test himself.

In this novel the hero, in retrospect, interprets his whole experience in terms of having two opposing souls in his own breast. After his rescue from disgrace, Araspes says: "Ach, in diesem Augenblick erfahre ich die Wahrheit, dass ich zwei ganz verschiedene Seelen in mir habe. Denn es ist unmöglich zu glauben, dass wenn ich nur Eine Seele hätte, sie zu gleicher Zeit gut und schlimm . . . seyn könnte." (XXVII, 140) The idea of arriving at a harmonious synthesis, which is so marked in Wieland's more mature writings, is still lacking. The two spirits are regarded as diametrically opposed to each other: "Wenn die gute die Oberhand hat, dann handeln wir edel, wenn die böse niederträchtig und schändlich." (XXVII, 140) The only satisfactory solution, then, is for the good spirit to be victorious over the

evil one: "Die schändliche Seele weicht . . . sie taumelt mit gelähmten Flügeln zu Boden--die bessere Seele hat gesiegt!" (XXVII, 141)

While the solution here is different than it is, for instance, in Agathon, the issues are different too. What later turns out to be a conflict between reason and feeling, i.e., between Kopf und Herz or Vernunft und Schwärmerei, is here but a conflict between sensual and spiritual love. The hero began as an enthusiast and ends as such, if anything even more enthusiastic in his pursuit of spiritual love in the end than at the outset. He has simply gone through a stage of erotic enthusiasm and overcome it again. His basic orientation to life has remained unchanged and his problem continues to be that which Arasambes analyzed it to be earlier: he attaches all his attention to one object at one time instead of realizing that all of nature, dieses grenzenlose Ganze, (XXVII, 55) is worthy of his attention. With this unnatural orientation he will immediately focus all his efforts on a new object as soon as he loses sight of the former one. Thus it is not difficult to understand why he can change course so suddenly and completely. As long as he remains a Schwärmer he will go on to a new excess each time he abandons another aspect of Schwärmerei.

The solution and the issues may be different here

than they are in his more mature novels, but a pattern used later in Wieland's resolution of the reason and feeling problem is already evident, and this is significant. The pendulum, which for the more mature Wieland moves between the extremes of reason and feeling, is in a position now where it is ready to move from the extreme of feeling or Schwärmerei--in Araspe und Panthea the problem is still solved within a total framework of Schwärmerei--towards a position where reason or Vernunft will enter the picture in terms of finding a solution to the problem.

CHAPTER II

DON SYLVIO

The basic dualism in Wieland's first major novel, Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerei, oder die Abenteurer des Don Sylvio von Rosalva, is between fantasy and reality. Before the young hero, Don Sylvio, can overcome Schwärmerei, he has to transcend his world of illusion and face the real world.

When considering the background of Don Sylvio and comparing this with that of the other characters in the novel, it quickly becomes evident why Don Sylvio is the only one who became a Schwärmer. He is the child of the nobility, who has much leisure time, lives a secluded life and receives an overly refined education. Pedrillo and Laura, the attendants of Don Sylvio and Donna Felicia respectively, are extremely realistic and practical in their approach to life. When Don Sylvio, living in his dream world, is in a daze over his butterfly-princess and gives Laura an animated account of how Fanferluche turned his princess into her present insect-state, Laura

very matter-of-factly says this: "Ich wette gleich, diese Prinzessin ist weder mehr noch weniger als ein hübsches Bauermädchen, das ihm in die Augen gestochen hat." (I, 184) Also Jacinte, who turns out to be Don Sylvio's sister in the end, lives in a rational world, for she was early compelled to face reality. At the age of three she had been snatched away from the sheltered family environment by a gypsy woman. This gypsy brought her up and tried to force her to become a prostitute. Jacinte's constant struggle with her coarse environment was not conducive to day-dreaming and Schwärmerei.

Don Sylvio's up-bringing was vastly different from that of his kidnapped sister. As a young Spanish nobleman, he was orphaned at a very young age and was consequently reared by his eccentric aunt, Mencia. His up-bringing, as Sengle points out, "ist ein Spott auf die 'romanhafte Erziehung' der Zeit welche . . . Leben und Dichtung phantastisch durcheinander mischte."¹ At first he is sent to the barber to learn some music and to the local pastor to learn the rudiments of Greek. Then Mencia takes over, determined to mould the impressionable young hero into a perfect nobleman. She attempts to do this mainly by prescribing carefully chosen readings for him, which are confined to such books as chronicles,

¹Sengle, Wieland, p. 133

histories, travel journals and especially tales of the heroes. Being emotionally delicate and very sentimental by nature, he is strongly influenced by the noble examples found in these books and declares, "es würde ihm nicht mehr mühe kosten, sie (i.e., the heroic deeds) auszuüben, als er brauchte, sich eine Vorstellung davon zu machen." (I, 7)

In a chapter entitled Psychologische Betrachtungen (I, 7-10) Wieland discourses on the stages which led to Don Sylvio's final inability to distinguish between reality and fantasy. The explanation given partly approaches the idea of environmental conditioning, although the hero's free will plays a strong role in bringing about his condition--he namely strongly desires to have the kind of experiences he read about. (I, 15) Because the hero is by nature endowed with such a penchant for the sentimental (Empfindsamkeit), any impressions he received aroused strong passions in his heart. Furthermore, living in an environment where he was withdrawn from the world and having no responsibility to work, fantasies and imaginations fill the idle hours and gain pre-eminence over actual life. As the mind becomes as intimately acquainted with vain fancies as with actual objects and happenings, it weaves imagination and feeling, the supernatural and the natural and right and wrong into one whole. While being acquainted with the

laws of nature, such as gravity, the force of attraction, elasticity, etc., Don Sylvio is just as sure that witches, fairies and other elementary spirits are in control of his environment. Giving himself over to the imaginary to such a degree and, having the weakness that he is unable to tell when he is being fooled, (I, 3) he finds the step into the dream world, which he is replacing for the physical world, a short and easy one. The hero receives the impetus to take this step when he secretly begins to read the fairy-tales, which his aunt had attempted to keep concealed from him by placing them behind the other books in the library. In these fairy-tales he finds a satisfactory explanation for all the things in life he had formerly not understood. He is now ready to go into the world as a complete Schwärmer!²

Soon, indeed, circumstances arise in the household at Rosalva which provide Don Sylvio with the impulse to

²It should here be pointed out that in this novel it is complete abandonment or complete Schwärmerei that is held up as a state that must at all cost be overcome. Donna Felicia and Jacinte, for example, are enthusiasts or Schwärmer to a certain degree too; they are, however, not blinded by it but rather find simple enjoyment in fantasy, for it makes their lot in life more interesting and bearable. Nor does Wieland deny that any good can proceed from Schwärmerei. After all, when Alexander left Athens he pursued a chimera which made no more sense than did the idea of Don Sylvio's butterfly, yet he became the conqueror of Asia. (I, 56) It was also Don Sylvio's own Schwärmerei that caused him to leave Rosalva, and without leaving Rosalva he would not have been cured of Schwärmerei.

venture out into the world. Mencia, his calculating aunt, approaches him one day and fairly demands that he marry an ugly creature called Mergelina. Such a marriage is completely out of question in the mind of Don Sylvio for thereby--not even considering Mergelina's ugliness--he would prove unfaithful to his true love, the butterfly-princess. In order to escape from this dire fate, Don Sylvio, together with his attendant Pedrillo, secretly leaves the castle at Rosalva. On the short trip which takes the two to the neighbouring castle--our hero mistakes playing truant for going to a far distant exotic place!--Don Sylvio has many adventures which give the reader a keen insight into his state of Schwärmerei.

Once Don Sylvio has left Rosalva he ascribes whatever image his fancy dictates to the objects and persons around him. When he sees a frog he links this with a story he had just imagined and is confident that he is dealing with a fairy. (I, 21) Later on, when encountering a goose-girl his fantasy dictates to him that at this point he should meet a nymph and a nymph she is to him, regardless of her attire or manners. (I, 241) The novel is filled with incidents of this kind. Biribinker, the hero of Don Gabriel's story and the intended counterpart of Don Sylvio, also has the same quality. Because of his ecstasy he believes on one occasion to have found the beautiful salamandrine. He holds her in his arms and

passionately declares his love. Instead of the salamandrine, however, he has been holding some misshapen gnome!

In the same way that Don Sylvio is unable to perceive an actual object as it really is, so he is also unable to relate an incident or happening to actual causes or circumstances. His predilections and passions bar him from differentiating between reality and unreality, causing him to draw completely unfounded conclusions. He has no reason, for instance, to believe that the little image of the beautiful girl he has found has anything whatsoever to do with the blue butterfly, yet he is completely convinced that this is the picture of the princess who has been changed into a butterfly by Fanferluche. (I, 25) Or, when a blue butterfly is caught by a goose-girl and she won't give him to Don Sylvio, he suddenly sees that a dream he had yesterday was inspired by the good fairy to warn him of this catastrophic incident, (I, 241) yet any rational connection between the dream and the actual incident is lacking. His inability to relate cause and effect would also seem to be the reason that he is continually convinced that there is divine intervention in his life. When he awakes from a dream, in which the picture of his princess is about to be stolen, he is confident that a good fairy intervened by awakening him just before the thief actually approached; again the circumstances are purely imagined or dreamed and he has

no reason to be thankful to divine intervention.

His belief in divine intervention fills him with confidence and courage to pursue and undertake anything, regardless of the difficulty entailed. There is an other-worldliness about him which makes him immune to the buffetings of the unfriendly physical world. Don Sylvio also attempts to instill confidence in his chosen course in Pedrillo. When the latter hesitates to follow Don Sylvio in pursuit of the salamander, Don Sylvio promptly assures him that there is nothing to fear; they must simply follow the divine call, "das Uebrige wird sich von selbst geben." (I, 105)

Coupled with the inability to cope with reality is an overt emotionalism. This emotionalism is expressed in many different ways. When Don Sylvio finally locates, what he considers to be the blue butterfly he set out to find, he responds with sighs of longing. (I, 239) Or when the gypsy tells him, for instance, that his butterfly is in love with someone else, he promptly swoons. (I, 146) When the male butterfly, his imagined competitor for the princess-butterfly, appears and drives the blue butterfly away, Don Sylvio becomes very excited and kills the male butterfly. Meanwhile the blue butterfly disappears!

Again referring to Don Sylvio's counterpart in Don Gabriel's story, i.e., Biribinker, one sees a similar

behaviour on the part of the latter on several occasions, notably when Galaktine, the beautiful milk maid Biribinker is pursuing, curses him because the very mention of his name is a threat to her. He is described as follows: "Biribinker zitterte an allen Nerven, er verfluchte im Uebermass seines Schmerzes den Namen Biribinker . . . und er würde vielleicht . . . mit dem Kopfe wieder die nächste Eiche angerennt seyn . . ."

(II, 164)

Don Sylvio's most violent emotional (i.e., schwärmerisch) outbursts are reactions to the threat of reality breaking into his self-created dream-world. The best illustration of this is the incident when his aunt wants him to marry Mergelina. That Mergelina was not beautiful can hardly be doubted but that she was so hideous that he was justified in saying about her: "dessen blossen Anblick zu vermeiden ich bereit wäre in den offenen Rachen eines Löwen zu springen," (I, 70) is improbable. He was at this point unable to love a human being because he was bound by the spell of his world of fantasy; loving another human being would cause the explosion of this self-created world and thus threaten his illusory existence. He then reacts so violently to his aunt's proposal that in his raving condition the servants are ordered to tie his hands and feet and carry him bodily to his bed. (I, 93)

The incongruity one sees between the ordinariness of the actual happenings surrounding Don Sylvio and their significance for him as he interprets them in his dream state is also borne out in his actual physical state and the idea he holds of himself. He seems but a child--he is actually seventeen--and is very effeminate, (I, 183) yet he seems to think he is playing an important knightly role, such as one would expect of a physically strong man. The fight, in which he attempts to come to the rescue of Don Eugenio and his fellow travelers, is motivated by his imagination; there is no reasoning involved when he flies out of the bushes to fall upon the stranger in an effort to help those whom he believes to be attacked. (I, 203) This was merely the heroic type of experience he had been dreaming about.

How does Don Sylvio, this young fantast, who lives in an unnatural state of isolation, find his way to a natural state? How does he overcome his excessive fanatical enthusiasm? According to the title of the novel (Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerei . . .) its theme should give an answer to this question, and so indeed it does. In the first part of the novel Wieland occupies himself with Don Sylvio, the complete Schwärmer. In the second part the author portrays the difficult path which leads Don Sylvio to reality and to contact with his environment. Wieland explains how Natur, namely the

genuine and harmonious, overcomes the artificial or the discordant element represented by imagination and fantasy.

In tracing the path which leads Don Sylvio from his entrenchment in Schwärmerei to his disenchantment, the reader does well to pay attention to the small image in Don Sylvio's possession, which to him represents his princess.³ This image becomes a sort of leitmotiv during the course of the novel and indicates the state of the hero's Schwärmerei.

Natur or nature, the force characterized by genuineness, spontaneity and common sense, begins to instigate the change, that is to change Don Sylvio, through the person of Jacinte, an untrained Naturkind. This comes about when Jacinte for the first time arouses a human sentiment in his heart. At that point it suddenly occurs to Don Sylvio that there is a marked similarity between Jacinte and his cherished image. This frightens him. He had sought an escape into the dream world, partly unconsciously, because he was dissatisfied with the status quo of the real world. If the person represented by his image should now be a flesh and blood human

³Regina Schindler-Hürlimann, Wielands Menschenbild, eine Interpretation des Agathon (Zürich, 1963), p. 100, basing her statement on Leonhard Meister, says that many of Wieland's heroes base their erotic Schwärmerei on some image. (Referred to hereafter as: Schindler-Hürlimann, Menschenbild.)

being, that would shatter his dream of finding the blue butterfly, whose wings he himself would have to pull off before it could change into the beautiful princess. His immediate impulse upon suspecting this similarity is to run away, lest the image of his princess be forced out of his heart. (II, 47) Don Sylvio had sealed himself off from the real world and, cost what may, he seems determined to preserve this seal.

Then one day, to Don Sylvio's great dismay, he loses the image. Immediately he becomes more vulnerable to the attacks of nature. For the first time there begins to be some doubt in his own mind about the validity of his fantasy, (II, 15) There is nothing he did nor any inner reserve he possesses that has brought about these doubts. And in a dream that night, for the first time, he sees his princess without wings. Had nature not begun its work, he would not have been able to forget everything else and think only of Donna Felicia upon his ensuing encounter with her. Heretofore she had held no special attraction for him. He is still far from cured but the process has begun.

At this point Don Sylvio is ready to meet the other inhabitants of the castle of Lirias. It was by coincidence that he had lost the little image at the appropriate time to permit him to benefit from his encounter with Donna Felicia; it is also by coincidence that he should only

now, when he is ready to benefit from it, meet this group of well-adjusted individuals at Lirias who are to play such an important role in his further recuperation. Felicia, who has already been mentioned, has no trouble discerning reality. She is indeed enthusiastic and somewhat fanatical about various writers, (I, 169) but this is only a form of diversion for her. She immediately diagnoses Don Sylvio as being in love with an idea instead of a person. Don Gabriel, her brother, is marked by a special Ruhe seines Herzens (composure) which gives him the power to observe as a friend of humanity. And Don Eugenio, the lover of Jacinte, had immediately had an outgoing interest in Don Sylvio. These people feel that Don Sylvio is a promising young man and that it is only a problem of "sein Gehirn wieder in seine natürlichen Falten zu legen." (II, 41) Somewhat like the Gesellschaft vom Turm in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, although perhaps in a more obvious way, these individuals set to work to bring about the recuperation of Don Sylvio: ". . . in dem Schlosse zu Lirias (wird) alles angewandt, unsern Helden von der Bezauberung seines Gehirns je eher je lieber zu befreien." (II, 221)

Don Gabriel, a wise enlightened mentor, has no plans to change Don Sylvio by force; he is not going to deny Don Sylvio's ideas but through kindness he hopes to bring him to the point where he will come to the correct

conclusions on his own. When Don Sylvio, thereupon, makes his appearance with a book on the subject of natural science, he uses this as a point of contact for engaging in conversation with him. He prefaces this conversation by expressing his high respect for those who, like Don Sylvio, believe in elementary spirits along with the laws of nature. (II, 48) His arguments, however, so convincingly exclude the supernatural that Don Sylvio, in his discomfiture, and not yet ready to forsake his belief in the supernatural, begins to argue from the standpoint of his own experience; he has felt the guidance of fairies in his own life and anything that fails to agree with his experience can not be true. He does not disregard natural science per se, but he considers only that part of it which does not conflict with experience as valid.

Despite Don Sylvio's resistance to Don Eugenio, the latter feels that Don Sylvio has made some progress. Jacinte is thereupon invited to tell her story. It is a truly amazing and adventurous tale of how she was stolen by the gypsy woman who tried to force her to become a prostitute, yet she was protected from falling into any immorality. Don Sylvio is amazed at this story and expresses the idea that the fairies must surely have played an important role in it. He only wonders why she was so careful to omit any reference to them. Jacinte assures

him that she encountered no fairies whatsoever. If we do not believe in fairies, Don Sylvio argues, we would have to give up all belief in history, which then gives rise to Don Gabriel's story of Prince Biribinker.

Since Jacinte's story (which does not mention fairies despite the many strange and marvellous instances it contains) has not effected any marked change in Don Sylvio, Don Gabriel now tells a story steeped entirely in the supernatural. The hero of this tale, Prince Biribinker, is the counterpart of Don Sylvio, inasmuch as they are identical in their submission to fantasy. The whole story takes place in the belly of a whale, which is here a universe unto itself.

Upon completion of this tale, Don Gabriel teasingly comments that this story was intended to cause Jacinte to believe in fairies. (II, 204) Jacinte immediately recognizes that Don Gabriel tried to "treib das Unge-reimte so weit wie nur möglich," (II, 204) but Don Sylvio says he sees nothing absurd or impossible in it and again defends his position on the basis of his personal experience. Although these arguments have an effect on Don Sylvio, it is impossible to free him from his Schwärmerci by any verbal argument, whether it be a metaphysical argument, an illustration of how the amazing is possible without fairies or a story that would seem to put an end to all speculation about fairies.

The author then reports that Don Sylvio spent much of the next night in deliberations which were not very favorable towards the fairies. He begins to think that maybe, after all, it is only fantasy that is the mother of the supernatural; perhaps it was because of inexperience that he had hitherto considered the supernatural a part of nature. It is, however, not because he begins to doubt his fantasies that the change from Schwärmerei to Natur is effected; it has, however, prepared him for his next and decisive encounter with Donna Felicia, for he is now ready to become enamored by her and to forget himself.

Shortly after the two have come together this time, word is received that the lost image has been recovered. This report, however, leaves Don Sylvio completely unmoved at this point--he has now broken with the world of fantasy. Time stands still for the two as they declare their love and make love to each other. Don Sylvio maintains that the only kind of enchantment that exists is love: "Er gestand auch, dass das, was in ihm vorgehe, seitdem er sie kenne, ihm beinahe gänzlich überzeuge, dass es keine andere Bezauberung gebe, als die Liebe selbst." (II, 233) It was thus not a convincing argument (although this played a part) that cured him; it was rather the displacement of fantasy by unselfish love for another person which brought about a synthesis between

fantasy and reality.

The change that has overcome Don Sylvio is a very obvious and drastic one; it can not escape Don Eugenio when he sees the two lovers. He had prepared himself with numerous arguments he was going to employ in another effort to disenchant Don Sylvio. When he now sees him, he finds all his philosophy put to shame and can only utter to himself, "dass ein Paar schöne Augen in etlichen Minuten stärker überzeugen und schneller bekehren, als die Akademie, das Lyceum und die Stoa mit vereinigten Kräften kaum in eben so viel Jahren zu thun vermöchten." (II, 241)

This disenchantment of Don Sylvio, first revealed in his relationship to his redemptress, Donna Felicia, also becomes visible in his relationship to other people. The gypsy, whom he considered to be a wicked fairy in his former state, is nothing but a gypsy to him when he meets her now. (II, 247) And when his aunt, Donna Nencia, comes to Lirias, he is happy to see her, even though he ran away from her but a few days ago. (II, 241) The hero is cured and thus the story can end.⁴ His excessive

⁴The conclusion arrived at here is certainly much more optimistic than that of Hermann Hettner, who says of both Don Sylvio and Agathon: ". . . die Lösung ist keine glückliche. Es ist lediglich eine freche Sinnlichkeit, welche obsiegt . . . Kopf und Herz sollen in Einklang gebracht werden . . . dass der höchste Trumpf, welchen Wieland gegen die Schwärmerei ausspielt, nichts

fantasies having left him, he is ready to benefit from an education, for which Don Gabriel and Don Eugenio take responsibility; the three of them set out an educational tour of the continent to fill Don Sylvio's mind--"den leeren Raum, den die Feen darin gelassen, mit Ideen wirklicher Dinge." (II, 252)

ist als das Erliegen eines unerfahrenen träumerischen Jünglings unter den Verführungskünsten einer geistvollen Buhlerin." (Hermann Hettner, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert [Leipzig, 1928], II, 284. Hettner is probably still in the tradition Seiffert ascribes to a faulty reading of J. G. Gruber's biography of Wieland and, although dutifully including Wieland in his history of eighteenth century German literature, he seems too much influenced by the tradition that considers Wieland depraved and immoral when passing judgment on his writings. Seiffert says the following: "Von Grubers Biographie nimmt man (die deutsche Literaturgeschichtsschreibung) wohlwollend Kenntnis, schliesst sich aber selten seinen Ausführungen an. Seine Feststellung, die für die Jahre um 1830 gilt, dass 'Wieland seine Nation an den Abgrund des ungeheuerlichsten sittlichen Verderbens geführt habe und gleichgültig für die Wahrheit und Tugend mit seinen Schriften die Grundpfeiler und häuslichen Glückseligkeit untergraben habe,' wird man in abgewandelter Form bis zu unseren Tagen überall da finden können, wo man pflichtgemäss in eine Abhandlung über deutsche Literatur auch Wieland einbezog." (Hans Werner Seiffert, "Wieland und Wielandforschung," Vier Biberacher Vorträge [Wiesbaden, 1954], p. 86)

CHAPTER III

AGATHON

Agathon, the hero of Die Geschichte des Agathon, goes through various phases of Schwärmerei. As a young child he is already a moral-religious Schwärmer. Later he turns to political and erotic Schwärmerei.¹ Each time he channels his Schwärmerei in a new direction he does so without actually having resolved the preceding phase, although each experience may represent a certain stage in his development. With his fanatical orientation to life he can not but exaggerate; he only ceases to go from an extreme in one aspect of life to another as he overcomes his Schwärmerei per se. It is through his encounter with Archytas that he finally achieves an enduring equilibrium.

The background of this novel is classical. The setting is the age of Plato, Socrates, Hippias of Elis

¹Schindler-Hürlimann, Menschenbild, basing her approach on the Zürich scholar, Leonhard Meister (born 1858), also differentiates between moral-religious, erotic and political Schwärmerei in her interpretation of Agathon.

and Archytas, all of whom lived during the latter part of the fifth and the first half of the fourth century B.C. Historically Agathon is an Athenian poet who was banished from his native city.

Don Sylvio and Agathon are basically similar characters as far as their fanatical enthusiasm is concerned. There is, however, a vast difference in the way they are portrayed; Don Sylvio is essentially a caricature whereas Agathon is a plausibly realistic character. In Don Sylvio we saw to what extremes Schwärmerei can go in a fairy tale setting whereas Agathon is continually confronted with real life situations to which he reacts in a very idealistic manner.²

Agathon probably did not possess an innate penchant for Schwärmerei, although little is said about his character prior to his training. Danae points to the reason for his Schwärmerei when she says that under other circumstances she too could have become what Agathon and his sister Psyche are: "Wie du siehest, Agathon, hatte die junge Myrtis (i.e., Danae) einen feinen Ansatz zu dieser schönen Schwärmerei, welche in den Hallen und Lorbeerhainen von Delphi deiner Seele die erste Bildung gab.

² Wieland says that in Agathon he attempted to portray himself as he had been or imagined himself to have been in situations similar to those of Agathon (C.M. Wieland, Auswahl denkwürdiger Briefe, ed. Ludwig Wieland [Vienna, 1815], II, 163).

Die Umstände machten den ganzen Unterschied." (VI, 196)
 Like Don Sylvio, Agathon must then be considered largely a product of his training and environment. At an early age Agathon's father had given him over to the priests in the temple of Delphi, where he received special training in recounting "wunderbare Begebenheiten," (V, 4) and where he is encouraged and trained by his superior, Theogiton, to develop the capability to believe and suffer everything.³ This upbringing in religious enthusiasm, which, according to this novel, has the greatest effect when the child is still incapable of asking probing questions, (V, 5) is portrayed as the source of all Aberglaube (superstition) and Schwärmerci. Agathon, when later talking about his travels and observations, says that the result of Aberglaube is everywhere much less obvious among those peoples where the young are not encouraged in and taught irrational thinking.

In following our hero, the Schwärmer destined for eventual self-realization, we encounter a variety of experiences--he is a general at one time, then deposed of his position, captured by pirates, sold as a slave, etc.

³Scheidl (Josef Scheidl, "Persönliche Verhältnisse und Beziehungen zu den antiken Quellen in Wielands Agathon" [dissertation, München, 1904]) suggests that Wieland is here likely thinking of his own Pietistic up-bringing, perhaps especially his training at Klosterberge, where his own ecstatic enthusiasm ran extremely high.

The five different locations or scenes in Agathon each give the reader a particular insight into the life of the hero. These scenes are chronologically Delphi, Athens, Smyrna, Syracuse and Tarent, although they are not encountered in this order in the novel. The Delphi experience shows the hero as a religious-moral Schwärmer, the Athens and Syracuse experiences as a political Schwärmer and the Smyrna experience (which is dealt with in the greatest detail, 300 pages out of a total of about 800 pages) climaxes in erotic Schwärmerei. The Tarent experience then brings about his cure. During the course of each of these experiences Agathon is exposed to circumstances which could make him inclined to and finally cause him to move away from the enthusiasm which he acquired in the temple of Apollo. Yet as long as his basic orientation is schwärmerisch, his path to self-fulfillment is erratic.

Agathon begins his course as a religious-moral Schwärmer at Delphi. For a while his training has such a strong influence that it is impossible to dissuade him from his devout abandon. He has two experiences there which illustrate his abandon to his faith and his final disillusionment with the morality and religion taught there.

The first of these two experiences shows our hero as, in his ecstatic enthusiasm, he tries to approach the

gods directly. As he then calls upon the gods in all good faith, Theocriton attempts to deceive him by posing as Apollo. Even though Arathon quickly discovers the attempted deceit, the hero is so immersed in his mystical probings that he begins to pursue his religious devotion with even greater fervour after this experience. Arathon is emotionally intoxicated to the extent where he is unable to recognize the gravity of the situation. He is in a state of mind where he would take the croaking of frogs for an oracular host. (V, 15) While in this state he can not become disillusioned.

The second attempt to deceive him occurs when Pythia, the priestess who is supposed to utter the oracles of Apollo, attempts to seduce Arathon. Pythia has become so infatuated with the beauty of the young hero that she becomes very jealous when she discovers the nocturnal rendez-vous in which Psyche and Arathon engage for the purpose of cultivating a spiritual relationship. When Pythia then appears at the rendez-vous instead Psyche, and the former clings to Arathon and pleads for his love, the hero is greatly disturbed. Arathon does not relent. When Pythia tells him that, as Psyche's superior, she holds this young girl's life in her hands and that her fate will be determined by the answer he gives, he suddenly realizes the treachery of the situation. He now flees, as he says; "Ich wuoste run alles!" (V, 52)

Agathon has become disillusioned, however, with only one individual and as such his basic orientation to life has not been altered.

The spiritual relationship which Psyche and Agathon cultivated at Delphi (the question can be asked, of course, to what extent it was unconsciously erotic!), has left an image in his heart, which is to sustain him in his idealism for a long time to come. This image, like Don Sylvio's butterfly, may change from bright to dim or even disappear transitorily, depending on the state of his idealism. It is, of course, the image of something unattainable either as a spiritual or as an erotic lover, for Psyche later turns out to be his sister.

Agathon's moral-religious Schwärmerei is characterized by a selfishness. The divine experiences he desires are an end in themselves. He seems only concerned about feeling good and happy himself. His enthusiasm for religion arouses no desire in him to share the happiness to which he aspires with others. The desire to help manifests itself later, however, when he becomes a political Schwärmer, especially at Syracuse.

Agathon's political involvement begins at Athens, after fleeing from Delphi. At Athens he finds his father, who informs him that he is by birth a citizen of Athens. This fills the hero with a great sense of pride and enthusiasm. He is soon a passionately enthusiastic student

and follower of Socrates. The step to political success is a short one for him with all the enthusiastic support he receives from the Athenians--"das Volk fing an, ihn zu vergöttern." (V, 75) The Republic is having difficulties because a number of the Greek islands are rebelling as a result of the oppression they suffer from the mainland government. Agathon idealistically advocates generosity, for Greece, he argues, can only be great if she behaves in a way that will please and attract other peoples. He implements his plan for the islands and in two years he is able to subdue the islanders completely--a task which the Republic had been unable to achieve. With his idealism and implicit faith in his compatriots, his fall from public approval is, however, as rapid as was his rise to fame: a few jealous men successfully manage to arouse opposition to him. He has been too naive and did not realize that his success would arouse envy. He is accused of being haughty and godless and having plotted against the Republic. (V, 92) His sentence is banishment from Greece. Like his experiences at Delphi, this second experience fails to bring him to grips with reality and consequently does not enable him to outgrow his Schwärmer condition. When he finds himself divested of his powers and his dreams for Athens shattered, he longingly thinks of his days in Delphi again. (V, 96) This seemingly futile experience is, however, a necessary

step to his political experience at Syracuse.

Agathon becomes involved politically a second time after he flees from Smyrna and his Danae experience. The perplexing political situation in Syracuse had come to his attention and when he feels forced to choose between returning to Danae or leaving for Syracuse, his recently developed altruistic idealism wins out. He takes the first ship departing from Smyrna and sets sail for Sicily.

In some ways the incident in Syracuse seems to be a quick repetition of the Athens incident but there are some noteworthy differences. Here, in contrast to Athens, his initial motivating factor for becoming involved is the desire to help a nation in difficulty. This would indicate that he learned from the Athens experience, inasmuch as he is now capable of going out beyond himself. His activism is, however, still greatly influenced by his naive, emotional enthusiasm and his decisions, as in Athens, are still based largely on ideas rather than on experience. Coupled with his desire to help is also a spark of selfishness. Plato, who had been brought to the court by Dionysius, had failed to accomplish what Agathon sets out to do in Sicily and now the idea occurs to him, "wie schön es wäre, wenn Agathon dasjenige zu Stande bringen könnte, was Plato vergebens unternommen hatte." (VI, 2) His background for taking over the responsible position given to him thus lacks soundness.

At the court of Dionysius Agathon again is quickly highly successful. The young ruler is as enthusiastic about Agathon as Agathon is about helping him. Unlike the Athens experience, our hero is now willing to be a political realist and compromise to a certain extent if this will expedite the achievement of his goal; he even begins to talk in defense of the monarchy (VI, 25) and, as it were, condones some of the lustful practices of the prince, both very much opposed to his idealism and undertaken merely to gain the confidence of royalty. He thus seems to have become inclined towards pragmatism.

As in Athens, Agathon's success here is short lived. It is difficult for him to face this defeat; he feels that he had a divine call to his position and consequently he can say: "Ich konnte keine andre Feinde als Feinde des guten haben." (VI, 121) His defeat has actually been brought about through the intrigue of a jealous woman, Eleonissa. Agathon's fanaticism is still very evident in his consequent reaction to the prince; like the swing of a pendulum, his zeal for helping him turns quickly to hatred for the tyrant. At this point, the author evaluates the hero as follows: "Man sieht . . . wie weit er noch davon entfernt war, sich von diesem enthusiastischen Schwung der Seele Meister gemacht zu haben, der bisher die Quelle seiner Fehler sowohl als seiner schönsten Thaten gewesen ist." (VI, 91)

Agathon's erotic experience at Smyrna follows his disillusionment in the political arena of Athens and serves as a type of escapism for the emotionally imbalanced young man. Fleeing Athens he takes to the sea. After an adventurous voyage, during which Agathon meets Psyche briefly and is shipwrecked and captured by pirates, our hero lands in Smyrna, where he is sold as a slave to a Sophist, the wealthy Hippias of Elis. Agathon is at first as Platonic and as much a moral Schwärmer as he ever was. Although he is at first strengthened in his moral Schwärmerei as a result of his reaction against the Sophism of Hippias, he soon becomes, in his frustrated attempts to attain clarity, an erotic Schwärmer as he becomes acquainted with Danae.

Initially Agathon shows concern because his master, Hippias, makes no effort to control his sensual nature. The whole environment with which Hippias surrounds himself is geared to arouse rather than to subdue the passions. Agathon, who has developed an appreciation for the arts while at Delphi, reacts against and very strongly disapproves of the paintings on the walls as well as of the music, all of which combine to form an intentional spell to arouse the passions of those present. As one who holds to idealism rather than to materialism, this means danger, for Agathon can maintain his idealism only as long as he numbs any feeling or sensation borne of sensual

materialism. Enthusiastic idealism and sensuality, or, in other words, Platonism and Sophism, are incompatible.

It is the hero's idealism which prevents him from communicating with others as well as with himself. His idealism makes him blind to visible reality. It is obvious to everyone else, for instance, that he is really in love with Danae long before he himself realizes it. Hippias says that Agathon belongs to those idealists, "die man nirgends für einheimisch erkennen kann, weil ihre Moral eine Gesetzgebung voraussetzt, welche nirgends vorhanden ist." (IV, 118) Agathon senses that he is a misfit in this world and actually glories in this other-worldliness attributed to him. He is not insulted by Hippias, for from his superior vantage point (as he would consider it) he can honestly say: "Die Weltleute sind nicht zu verdenken, wenn sie uns andere für ein wenig mondsüchtig halten." (IV, 74)

During his Smyrna experience there are two forces attempting to effect a change towards sensualism and eroticism in Agathon--these are represented by Hippias and Danae. Hippias' attempts are apparently futile whereas Danae can be considered successful.

Although Hippias appears as the antipode of Agathon, there is one thing they have in common--both are looking for personal enjoyment. Here the similarity ends, for where Agathon attempts to achieve pleasure in the

spiritual-moral realm, Hippias spares no means to find it in this world. The three simple laws of nature he attempts to live by are the following:

- 1) Befriedige deine Bedürfnisse,
- 2) vergnüge alle deine Sinnen,
- 3) erspare dir so viel du kannst alle schmerzhaften Empfindungen.

These are the direct denial of everything Agathon held dear and worthwhile. When Hippias then presents a carefully calculated argument attempting to show Agathon that the pleasures of the heart, above all, are sensuous--for in bringing relief to another, one experiences at least in part the same sensuous relief-bringing feeling--it makes no impression whatsoever on the hero. Much is at stake for Hippias, however, for if Agathon successfully continues as a Schwärmer he is a living denial of his Sophism. Finally he states that what he has said so far is sufficient evidence: "Ich habe genug gesagt, um den Zauber zu vernichten, den die Schwärmerei auf deine Seele geworfen hat." (IV, 122) Like Don Sylvio, Agathon now refers to his experience when confronted with an argument intended to dissuade him from his Schwärmerei: he will not accept what Hippias has said, "weil meine Erfahrungen und Empfindungen meine Schlüssen widersprechen." (IV, 125) Hippias then makes arrangements to expose Agathon to an experience of a this-worldly nature by sending him to the hetæra Dæmæ.

Hippias left our hero unaffected, as far as winning him over to Sophism is concerned, partly because of the directness and crassness of his approach; Danae, however, uses a very subtle approach and because of this as well as because Agathon is unconsciously seeking a diversion in his frustrated search for truth, he succumbs to her wiles. When he meets her for the first time she is so modestly dressed that he does not even guess her profession. (IV, 153) Danae tells him that she needs him to supervise the gardeners, although she is actually looking for a new lover after dismissing Hyacinthus. Beneath her guise she has the firm conviction that she will be able to transform this spiritual lover into a physical lover, for "wo ist ein Geist, dem ein artiges Mädchen von achtzehn nicht seinen Leib geben könnte?" (V, 141)

Agathon's experience with reality is now swift in coming. A transformation begins to become evident immediately when he sees Danae on the dance floor: "(er war) auf einmal so bereedt, als er vorher tiefsinnig und stillschweigend gewesen war. Eine lächelnde Heiterkeit schimmerte um sein Gesicht." (IV, 159) The image of Psyche he has been carrying in his heart, that symbol of virginal purity and wholesome innocence is beginning to fade in favor of his new love. (IV, 160) That night, however, he regains the image of Psyche. When Danae then gives another performance (reared to approaching Agathon

through his appreciation for the artistic by a spectacle of true Rococco splendour) he is so strongly attracted to this image of beauty that he wanders to her quarters after the performance and spends all night with her. Now the image of Psyche has disappeared entirely and thus begins a passionate love relationship between Danae and Agathon. The nature of this relationship, however, is not crassly sensual in the manner Hippias had predicted it, but a tender and emotional experience as befits a Schwärmer; as such this relationship changes Agathon and Danae and greatly perplexes Hippias.

The point has been reached where Agathon gives the impression of being disenchanted, of having overcome his excessive idealism; the image of Psyche seems to have been successfully replaced with a fleshly human being. In Don Sylvio the novel ends at this point, that is, the hero is merely dispatched on a journey which will successfully fill the crevices in his mind left empty by the disappearance of his idealism. In the case of Agathon, it is not so simple. The experience with Danae represents an important stage in Agathon's life but it was insufficient in helping him to achieve the state of intelligent disenchantment he is destined for. While he loves Danae sincerely, he soon feels that this relationship is not an end in itself. Before long he begins to question whether his new life--it is vastly different from his former life:

"Arathon war jetzt fähig ganze Stunden, ganze Tage in zärtlicher Trunkenheit wegzutändeln" (IV, 207)--is actually worthy of manhood. (V, 112) Then Hippias, perhaps out of jealousy or perhaps trying to turn Arathon into a hardened sensualist, now that he has experienced the love of a woman, tells Arathon about Danae's past. This is too much for Arathon. He had still been as much in love with an ideal or unreal Danae as with a flesh and blood Danae and when he is forced to face the real hetaera, he is unwilling to accept her past. He despises her and "sobald er sich gezwungen sah, sie zu verachten, hörte sie auf Danae für ihn zu seyn; und durch eine ganz natürliche Folge, wurde er in der nämlichen Augenblicke wieder Arathon." (V, 123) He suffers a relapse, which is accompanied by a return of the image of Psyche in his heart.

After his defeating experiences at Delphi, Athens, Smyrna and Syracuse, our hero's implicit faith in mankind is badly shattered. The experiences with Pythia and Danae disillusioned him only with two specific individuals and with what they represented. He has also suffered defeat twice when working in a political situation. Now he is ready to become a misanthrope. As he sits in jail in Syracuse the ideas of Hippias almost make sense; it is only through Arathon's personal reaction to him, as the Sophist visits the imprisoned hero, that Arathon

realizes that he can never accept this answer of completely selfish living. He closes the door on Sophism forever. He has lost his idealism and enthusiasm. If it can be replaced with something constructive he will be cured; if not he will fall back.

When disillusioned at Syracuse, Archon is diverted to Tarent, on the Italian mainland. It was Archytas who had requested the release of Archon and it is with this wise mentor that Archon is to have a decisive encounter: "Archytas oder sonst niemand, konnte ihn von den leidigen Zweifeln befreien, die ihn seit jenem Zeitraume die erhabenen Grundlehren der Orphischen Theosophie, in welchen er erzogen worden war, und mit ihnen die seligsten Gefühle seiner Jugend verdächtig gemacht hatten." (VI, 280) His experience in Tarent is indeed portrayed as the fulfillment of his childhood aspirations in Delphi. In Archytas he finds the friend of the same sex he had longed for and through an understanding of Orphism, now at a different level, he achieves a peace of mind and soul.

When Archon meets Hippas in prison his faith in his own species has been shattered, yet he is still clinging to the image of his ideal, Psyche. This too is shattered when he discovers that she is the daughter-in-law of Archytas and his own sister and as such must cease to be an ideal. Thus, he becomes disillusioned with

the real and unreal. It is in this state of mind where, through the congenial association (VI, 326) with one who understands and appreciates him, that Agathon can start from scratch, pick up the pieces, and finally arrive at peace with himself by achieving the harmony of heart and mind advocated by Archytas. Archytas, although he disapproves of Agathon's skepticism when he first meets him, has dedicated himself to help him because he sees here an individual with potential, who is worthy of help:

. . . zu diesem hoffte Archytas ihm selbst um so gewisser verhelfen zu können, da er noch nie einen Sterblichen gefunden zu haben glaubte, der einen hellern Sinn für Wahrheit, mit einer so reinen Liebe zum Guten und mit einem so herzlichen Wiederwillen gegen Sophisterei und Selbsttäuschung in sich vereinigt hätte, als Agathon. (VI, 284)

The harmony of heart and mind, as advocated by Archytas, proceeds from the statement of the Delphic Apollo: Know thyself! The first step is the realization that one consists of two natures, the animal and the spiritual. Neither must be allowed to stand by itself: Hippias would be the personification of the animal reigning, the early Agathon the personification of the spirit reigning alone. Man has the fortitude within himself to bring the two natures into the proper relationship with each other, although most individuals do not succeed in the long battle which this involves. The animal nature, destined to serve, becomes elevated as the spirit fulfills

its obligation by ruling over it. The spirit, by aligning itself in this way with the animal, in turn loses those tendencies which could lead to excesses. This understanding of self will lead the individual to a new view of himself as a person within creation and will fill him with a sense of dignity--"die Würde eines Bürgers der Stadt Gottes, die mich zum Genossen einer höhern Ordnung der Dinge macht." (VI, 315) Ascribing such supremacy to the spirit in pantheistic religion, Archytas is quick to point out, could again result in degenerating into irrationalism and Schwärmerei; the pantheist, however, has two maxims to live by, both based on activism, which would prevent any unhealthy schwärmerisch outgrowth:

- 1) bei jeder Aufforderung der Pflicht eben so zu handeln und meiner selbst so wenig zu schonen, als ob alles bloss auf meine eigenen Kräfte ankäme, und nur nach gewissenhafter Erfüllung dieser Bedingung mich eines höhern Beistandes gewiss zu halten
- 2) ungeachtet meines Glaubens an den Zusammenhang unsers gegenwärtigen Lebens mit einem zukünftigen, welches den Schlüssel zu allem, was uns in jenem unerklärbar ist, enthält--mein gegenwärtiges Leben als ein Ganzes zu betrachten, ihm eine eben so grosse Wichtigkeit beizulegen . . . als ob mein ganzes Daseyn auf die Dauer dieses Erdenlebens eingeschränkt wäre. (VI, 322, 3)⁴

⁴This solution to the problem of Schwärmerei, as advocated here by Archytas, is a solution which is in sound agreement with the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Cassirer points out that the period of the Enlightenment seems to be "an era of pure intellectualism, that it

Agathon experiences the conviction that the example set by the congenial Archytas, as he practises his own philosophy, is worthy of emulation. The hero sheds his naive idealism, his misanthropic tendencies, and consequently his Schwärmerei. He soon becomes the image of Archytas in his whole attitude.

While the ending is somewhat idyllic, it is very clear that Agathon has achieved an equilibrium through the synthesis prescribed by Archytas. Where he felt compelled to act politically before, even though he had neither the experience nor the insight, but acted rather out of idealism, he is now willing to retreat into a certain intellectual passivity. This does not indicate a lack of involvement, for he is ever aware of Archytas'

unconditionally upholds the primacy of thought and pure theory. In the formation and development of its religious ideals, however, this view is by no means confirmed." (Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment [Princeton, 1951], p. 165.[The remaining citations in this footnote are from the same source.]) He then continues: ". . . the critical literature of the eighteenth century strives for the freedom of an all-comprehensive, a truly universal awareness of God." (p. 166) With the acceptance of natural religion the tolerant man of the eighteenth century could accept other religions, for behind these he saw natural religion; Archytas is able to advocate Orphism and Pythagorism, therefore, because he sees natural religion behind it. Also "religion is not to be a matter of receptivity; it is to originate from, and to be chiefly characterized by, activity . . . It is not supernatural power nor divine grace which produces religious conviction in man; he himself must rise to it and maintain it." (p. 164) And "there can be and must be no radical difference between morality and religion." (p. 167)

prescription against Schwärmerci: "Gegen diese Krankheit der Seele ist Erfüllung unsrer Pflichten im bürgerlichen und häuslichen Leben das sicherste Verwahrungsmittel."

(VI, 321) He is marked with sincerity, honesty and objectivity, and, like Archytas, is an individual "der nichts scheinen wollte als er war, und an welchem das scharfsichtige Auge nichts entdecken konnte, das man anders hätte wünschen können." (VI, 147)

Whether Archytas' synthesis is entirely successful is open to question. Ernst Rose states that this is a solution which "is more philosophic than poetic."⁵ Indeed, one might ask if Archytas is not possessed with a somewhat too high idealism. As P.A. Graber⁶ suggests, he seems more like a "paper hero" in whom the presence of the flesh is almost absent because of the dominance of the spirit. One also wonders why the hero can not work out any other arrangement with Danae than to consider her his sister, if he has achieved the desired synthesis of the two natures.

In retrospect, Schwärmerci is portrayed as the enemy of man in this novel. It is a stage that must be

⁵Ernst Rose, A History of German Literature, (New York, 1960), p. 152.

⁶P.A. Graber, "Religious Types in Some Representative German Novels of the Age of the Enlightenment" (dissertation, University of Iowa, 1953), p. 234.

overcome. The Schwärmer is incompatible with the well-trained man who possesses an equilibrium, for where the latter must make a contribution to society (even if only in a small sphere of influence, as in the case of Archytas) whereas the former can only withdraw into himself and become a hermit. Even though excessive enthusiasm is an enemy, it is, however, not portrayed as the worst enemy of man. The most ardent antagonist of Agathon's enthusiasm is Hippias, yet, as Wieland says in the Vorbericht to his 1794 revision, the whole novel is to be considered a denial of Hippias' thesis. (IV, XII) Agathon deliberates as follows concerning Orphic theosophy and Sophism: "Aus diesem Gesichtspunkt däuchte ihn der Enthusiasmus des Theosophen zwar unschädlicher als das System des Wollüstlings." (V, 172-3)

As in Don Sylvio, it is not denied that good can come out of Schwärmerei, for Wieland says of Agathon, that it has been "die Quelle seiner Fehler sowohl seiner schönsten Thaten." (VI, 91) What Wieland means here is that Schwärmerei serves a beneficial role as a creative force which unleashes fantasy and the imaginative element in the artist. What is rejected is, of course, not an unqualified Schwärmerei or enthusiasm but rather a digressive or unbridled enthusiasm; Wieland rejects this kind of enthusiasm in the same way that he rejects patent rationalism. The answer given by Archytas consists of a

synthesis of the rational and the emotional. The irrational element tempered by reason need not create any fear concerning deterioration into religious or demonic Schwärmerei for, "es hängt ja bloss von uns selbst ab, dem Hange zum Wunderbaren die Vernunft zur Gränze zu setzen." (VI, 319)

CHAPTER IV

DER GOLDENE SPIEGEL

In Der goldene Spiegel Wieland concerns himself basically with the political problem. He also deals with religion but mainly insofar as it relates to the welfare of the state. While this novel is a frametale, in which Danischmend and Sultaness Nurmahal tell bed-time stories to Shah Gebal, it is essentially a dialogue between Danischmend, who has an idealistic or theoretical political orientation, and Gebal, a somewhat slovenly and selfish yet pragmatic ruler. Unlike many of Wieland's other novels, Schwärmerei as such is not the main and sustaining theme in this novel; the word Schwärmerei seldom occurs. Wieland writes as an enlightened educator of mankind and as he attempts to portray how the ideal state could be achieved, it becomes amply clear that he is concerning himself with the problem of overcoming irrationalism and those qualities associated with Schwärmerei. It is somewhat perplexing, however, that Danischmend is in the end imprisoned by Gebal.

The first of the two political utopias described is the idyllic small nation, composed of 500 families who live by the nature teachings of Psammis. They are called die Kinder der Natur. The emir of Danischmend's story, a man, who at thirty-two is senile because of unnatural living, stumbles upon this nation quite by accident one day when he is lost. There he learns about a way of life which is very different from his own. There moderation and voluntary abstinence are the rule. (VII, 72) This form of living, namely obedience to the laws of nature, is the only preventative for becoming a sick and ailing person, whom Wieland elsewhere would call a Schwärmer and and who is here described as follows:

Ein kranker oder kränkelnder Mensch ist in jeder Betrachtung ein unglückliches Geschöpf. Alle Kräfte seines Wesens leiden dadurch; ihr natürliches Verhältniß und Gleichgewicht wird gestört, ihre Lebhaftigkeit geschwächt, ihre Richtung verändert. Seine Sinne stellen ihm verfälschte Abdrücke der Gegenstände dar; das Licht seines Geistes wird trübe; und sein Urtheil von dem Werthe der Dinge verhält sich zum Urtheil eines Gesunden, wie Sonnenschein zum düstern Schein der sterbenden Todtengruft. (VII, 43)

This is a nation concerned about the harmonious life of each individual. Cooperation with nature is the basis for its constitution. The physical beauty of the citizens of this nation has not been improved only by selective mating, in that the beautiful girls of a neighboring nation have been attracted as wives for their own young men, but also by following the teachings

of Psammis. Strong passions are to be avoided, for these leave an indelible imprint on the human figure. The ear is to be attuned to "kunstlose, aber seelenvolle Melodien, aus welchen schöne Gefühle athmen, die das Herz in sanfte Bebungem stellen." (VII, 76) Every individual must learn to do something useful and the products of his labors must reflect the laborer's relationship to nature. And among the most pleasurable experiences of the citizens of this nation is the joy of hard-earned rest after labour.

The second political state, Scheschian, is dealt with in much greater detail than the first. Scheschian has not always been a utopia; it has had its political and religious problems, which are very severe under certain rulers and are solved only under Tifan. Under this well brought up ruler this state reaches a very ideal level. This nation does not live by the nature teachings of Psammis; it is rather a monarchy with a benevolent ruler. This monarch wavers between absolutism and the freedom that goes with republicanism. He also believes in a form of cooperation with nature; the constitution he sets up is reported to contain the laws which nature itself had written in Tifan's soul. (VIII, 85) Here, however, there is compulsion. Everyone in his kingdom, for instance, who has reached physical maturity, is required to marry, for the king's primary purpose is

to encourage the multiplication of his subjects. This not only produces the desired population explosion but also completely removes the problem of illegitimate births. This monarch has also introduced an income tax in an effort to distribute the national wealth more evenly and required equality of professions. Tifan keeps a frugal household, has the good of his subjects constantly at heart, respects everyone who can do any task whatsoever better than he can do it himself and receives and deserves the loyalty and love of all of his subjects, whom he has filled with a new sense of self-confidence and given a new belief in their country again.

While the author has been describing these political utopias, he leaves the question open in the end and does not say that one of these is superior to the other; he does not even say that either of these is actually good. The former portrays a highly idealistic, indeed an almost schwärmerisch concept of the state. It is unrealistic, since this small nation has to depend on at least twenty other larger nations to enable it to live as it does. This makes it appear in an unnatural light. The question must be asked whether the initiation of this type of political set-up would be possible on a larger scale; if it is not, it is not the satisfactory answer to the problem of helping mankind in general to achieve a greater degree of harmony.

Nor is the Scheschian of Tifan an entirely satisfactory solution to this problem. Through his political system Tifan had hoped to establish in his subjects an enduring self-perpetuating loyalty to the noble principles he taught, yet all this collapsed the moment Akbar, unsympathetic towards the goals of his predecessors, became king. As later in Die Abderiten, Wieland here expresses serious doubt about the possibility of educating mankind. Danischmend finally says about Tifan's constitution that it was a "gar zu schöne, gar zu gute, gar zu vernünftige . . . für so alberne Tiere als die Menschen sind." (VIII, 252) Later he says half-heartedly at one point that "die schlechteste Regierungsform . . . immer besser ist als gar keine." (VII, 158)

Turning now to the religious elements in this novel, Wieland's concern for bringing the rational and the irrational together again becomes very obvious. In the brief portrayal of die Kinder der Natur there is no reference to traditional religion. Their religion is the pursuit of and compliance with nature and consequently they sense no division between religion and life, for it is indeed one. There is, thus, no need for separate religious contemplation.

In sharp contrast to these Kinder der Natur is the emir who stumbled upon them. He is at odds with nature; he cannot integrate pleasure and religion with life.

After he has seen this community he believes that no one should be permitted to hear about it, for he believes that the portrayal of such an ideal would lead to a general loosening of morals. He becomes a dervish, a priest who tries to control his subjects by keeping them ignorant and attempting to force his moralistic teachings on them. He has made the mistake of confusing his feelings and emotions with those of the creator (VII, 86) and sets himself up as a demi-god. The more he preaches his morality, the more he becomes convinced of his own righteousness.

This emir of Danischmend's story then provides the occasion for a discourse on moralistic teachers or priests. Danischmend sees two categories of these, both of whom he considers dangerous and calls Giftmischer. There is the arrogant moralist, whose soul, he says, lies only in his blood. Secondly there is the bastard who is bred by fanaticism and hypocrisy ("Zwitter von Schwärmerei und Heuchelei.") (VII, 103) The emir would probably fall into the second category, which is considered possibly the worse of the two. After this expression of dislike for the priesthood, the novel continues with the story of Scheschian, where the portrayal of the decaying inroads produced by a schwärmerisch and hypocritical religion is not lacking.

The citizens of Scheschian, long before Tifan comes

to the throne, are said to be highly superstitious and to have a bad religion. Their religion is based on the worship of a monkey. On the basis of his study of old monuments, the priest, Ya-Faou Gargarix, establishes that the name of this monkey was originally written Tsao-Faou (which means blue monkey) instead of Tsai-Faou (red monkey), as was the then current practise. (VII, 189) A deep rift consequently develops between the so-called Blauen, those who agree with Gargarix, and the orthodox believers, die Feuerfarbnen. It is a division and a situation which is very reminiscent of the rift, which Wieland later describes in Die Abderiten, between the parties of the donkey and the shadow. As did the Abderites, so the citizens of Scheschian declare themselves in the manner of true Schwärmer for one or the other party: "Eine Menge von Leuten erklärten sich mit grösster Hitze für die eine oder die andere Partei, ohne untersucht zu haben, wer Recht habe, oder zu einer solchen Untersuchung geschickt zu sein." (VII, 191)

This division results in a rivalry which begins to corrode the very fabric of Scheschian. One ruler tries to force his subjects to worship one monkey, the next ruler the other one. When Lili, the mother of King Azor, builds a blue porcelain temple for the worship of Tsao-Faou, a blue monkey--obviously contrived by Lili--makes its appearance in a cloud of smoke at the dedication service.

It becomes illegal to worship anything but the blue monkey. Now those who still possessed reason were among the first to laud the blue monkey, simply out of a desire for self-preservation. This incident demonstrates well how weak the effect of reason becomes when threatened by Schwärmerci and superstition. The tide reverses quickly, however, and when the rebellious Isfandiar ascends to the throne the worship of the red monkey becomes compulsory again, and this for no other reason than that his father had favored the blue monkey.

The relationship between the Blauen and the Feuerfarbnen comes to a climax under the reign of Isfandiar. The most serious Schwärmer portrayed in this novel are the Blauen of this period. Tifan's unfriendliness towards the Blauen seems to fill them with a feeling of self-righteousness. They become religious Schwärmer who fight for an other-worldly unselfish cause. In sharp contrast to these are the promoters of religion at Isfandiar's court. The attitude of the latter towards religion is as follows:

Die Religion . . . ist eine nützliche Erfindung der ältesten Gesetzgeber, um unbändige Völker an ein ungewohntes Joch anzugewöhnen. Sie ist ein Zaum für das Volk; die Beherrscher desselben müssten dem Zügel in ihrer Hand haben: aber den Zaum sich selbst anlegen zu lassen, wäre lächerlich.
(VIII, 63-64)

When comparing the two, the fanatical naive Blauen are of greater danger to the state than the king and his

court, who are actually exploiting their subjects under the guise of religion. The effect of the Blauen is devastating, for they have become the rallying point for various factions who feel persecuted by Isfandiar. This leads to a fanatical revolt, a kind of holy war, which harms everyone in the country. The Feuerfarbnen lacked the divine Zeal and consequently could not pose the same threat to society. Selfish action is portrayed as indeed preferable to action resulting from fanatical, albeit religious, motives.

Although the enthusiasm for religion has subsided to a certain extent when Tifan becomes king, he inherits a tradition according to which a large part of the population still believes in the monkeys. Tifan immediately sets about to remove this condition and attempts to achieve this in an intelligent and genuine manner. The first step in this direction is to get the priests on his side. He succeeds in this. He then continues by attempting to bring the opposing factions together, for it is the rivalry which keeps the interest in religion alive, he realizes. (VIII, 200) Tifan requests his subjects to refrain from this rivalry and the appeal is successful simply because he explains to them to what grief and misery this has led in the past. It was not enough merely to subjugate the priests--they were completely useless to the kingdom and consequently had to

be removed. Many of them quickly realized their uselessness and voluntarily agreed to enter some respectable profession. Their consequent examples of doing good make it unnecessary for them to preach anymore. There is then some reference to Tifan initiating a new kind of worship service for all who desired to participate in it. The core of this new religion was "vermitteltst einer Art von feierlicher Verpflichtung auf die Grundwahrheit der natürlichen Religion, zu besserer Erfüllung ihrer menschlichen und bürgerlichen Pflichten verbindlich zu machen." (VIII, 205)

By the natural religion advocated here, Wieland attempts to bring reason to religion. Nature is considered a reasonable element which, if pursued, will bring man to his desired goal: "Lasst uns also der Natur folgen; einer Führerin, die uns unmöglich irreführen kann--unsere Ungeduld, unsre Gierigkeit im Geniessen, unsre Unachtsamkeit auf ihre Warnungen, ist es, was uns auf Abwege verleitet." (VII, 46) It is this obedience to nature which brings a happiness that a political system alone can not bring: "Zwar ist die Glückseligkeit bei dieser (i.e., a small nation, dependent on twenty other nations) sowohl als bei jenem (i.e., a big independent nation) das Resultat eines der Natur gemässen Lebens." (VII, 96)

Natural religion, which synthesizes Kopf and Herz,

is thus the answer to Schwärmerei and the party spirit, rifts and superstitions which Wieland laments and satirizes. In the same way that the author considers mankind too immature to benefit from Tifan's political constitution, so he expresses grave doubt about his ability to accommodate nature. While the pursuit of such an ideal is beautiful and desirable, those who attempt to promote it may well suffer the same fate that Danischmend suffered. Practical society has no place for such idealism. Danischmend and Gebal represent the dichotomy in Wieland himself; it has been impossible to synthesize these opposing elements.

In the final analysis, though, Sengle is probably right when he says that Wieland should not be taken too seriously in this novel.¹ He considers this a non-committal salon discourse written in the spirit of the enlightenment. As such, however, it presents alternatives worthy of analysis and discussion.

¹ Sengle, Wieland, p. 260.

CHAPTER V

DIE ABDERITEN

In Die Abderiten Wieland portrays satirically a community of people with all their foibles and follies. They are Schwärmer because they tolerate and indulge in all kinds of madness, superstition, and foolishness, while living in a rationalistic age. One almost wonders whether this is merely a community of fools and naive citizens--Sengle calls this novel a Komödie des Narrentums¹--or whether one can apply to them the terms Schwärmer, fanatics or enthusiasts. The Schwärmer, as Lange also points out, is structurally naive², that is to say, in the final analysis the Schwärmer owes his condition to his own choice. The fool, on the other hand, is naive and is not aware of his own foolishness. Both

¹Sengle, Wieland, p. 267.

²Victor Lange, "Zur Gestalt des Schwärmers im deutsch-Roman des 18. Jahrhunderts," Festschrift für Richard Alewyn, ed. Herbert Singer and Benno von Wiese (Cologne/Graz, 1967), p. 159.

would seem to apply to the Abderites. It is often difficult to distinguish between their foolish Schwärmerei and their enthusiastic foolishness! Their Leichtgläubigkeit (gullibility, e.g., XIII, 100) smacks of foolishness, yet their intense desire to have their senses stimulated (XIII, 58) indicates a certain choice and as such marks them as Schwärmer. The author himself refers to them as Schwärmer on many occasions.

The setting of Die Abderiten is Abdera, a small city in Thracia, which, in ancient Greece, enjoyed a reputation somewhat similar to that of the German Schilda with its Schildbürgerstreiche. The novel has neither a central plot nor a single hero as such. Demokrit, the only sensible Abderite, is very much at the center in the first two books but then diminishes steadily in importance during the course of the novel. The only unifying element are the fanatical Abderites as a group, for each one of the five books tells one incident out of the lives of these people, each incident being more or less unrelated to the other as far as a plot is concerned.

During the course of this novel Wieland proceeds deliberately and digresses frequently as he creates a well-rounded description of the behaviour of the Abderites as it applies to the ramifications of their excessive enthusiasm ("Wir haben gesehen, dass die

Abderiten Enthusiasten waren." XII, 15). That this enthusiasm and fanaticism governs every aspect of their lives, is shown here especially as it relates to their cultural life, their political life and their religion.

The Schwärmerei dealt with in the first three books (i.e., the books on Demokrit, Hippokrates and Euripides respectively among the Abderites) relates in particular to the cultural life of the Abderites. When the author first introduces the Abderites, he mentions their enthusiasm for the architecture of their city, but this is by no means the only aspect of cultural life to which they react in a fanatically enthusiastic way.

When the Abderites sit in the theater their fertile imagination gets the better of them. They never tire of seeing themselves portrayed in the family scenes of their writer Thlaps. They forget reality and fancy themselves in the midst of an actual situation concerning their own relatives. (XIII, 240) This identification with what they hear is also very evident when Demokrit, the returned traveller, tells the young female Abderites, who possess an unusually lively fancy, what he saw on his journeys. The author, as though he had an insight into the fantasy world of young ladies, describes the conjured image of one of these listeners as follows:

. . . die gute Dame (schwamm) einige hundert Meilen weit von Abdera unter einen äthiopischen Rosenbaum in einem Meere der süssesten Wohlgerüche, (hörte)

tausend neue Vögel das Glück der Liebe singen, (sah) tausend bunte Papageien vor ihren Augen herumflattern und (hatte) zum Überfluss einen Jüngling mit gelben Locken und Korallenlippen zu ihren Füßen liegen . . . (XIII, 31)

This fantasy and hypersentimentality then results in overt emotions and reactions. Demokrit's young female listener swoons, as a result of which the returned traveller decides to make any future accounts of his travels very dull, in order not to give his listeners the impulse for such extreme reactions again. As they watch the Thlapsodien on the stage, the emotions of the audience are almost as overt:

. . . als ob es ihre nächsten Blutsfreunde gewesen wären, betrübten und ängstigten sich, hofften und fürchteten, liebten und hassten, weinten und lachten, wie es dem Zauberer, unter dessen Gewalt sie waren, gefiel--kurz, Andromeda wirkte so ausserordentlich auf sie, dass Euripides selbst gestand, noch niemals des Schauspiels einer so vollkommen Empfindsamkeit genossen zu haben. (XIII, 240)

And on their way home from the theater they straggle along, not yet recovered from their emotional experiences, loudly declaiming passages from the performance which had been especially meaningful to them.

The Abderites are also characterized by a strong desire to have fantasy and senses stimulated--they want to be moved. "Wir sind zufrieden, wenn uns ein Dichter rührt. Der Mann, der uns lachen oder weinen macht, ist in unsern Augen ein göttlicher Mann," (XIII, 58) they say. They also put much weight on the desirability of an

illusion on the stage. Their objection to Perseus, who comes flying onto the stage in the shoes of Mercury, is that the ropes used were all too clearly visible. They desire to have their ears tickled and were hoping that Demokrit, upon his return from his journeys, would tell them about such things as white Negroes and blue centaurs. (XIII, 24)

The attitude of the Abderites towards every aspect of culture is simply the childish one of whether or not it produces pleasure. Something that stimulates them pleasantly is greeted with great enthusiasm, yet they would be quite incapable of giving the reason for their reaction; Demokrit tells them: "Gleich der Unmündigen und Säuglingen ist euch alles gut und schön, was eure Sinne kitzelt, was euch gefällt . . . Wie verlegen würdet ihr sein, wenn ihr sagen solltet, warum ihr dies liebt und jenes hasset!" (XIII, 62)

Another quality dealt with as it relates to their cultural life is the gullibility of the Abderites. They are frequently described as leichtgläubig and they lack any standard for determining what is true and what is false, what is good art and what is not. Despite the lack of such a standard, they see no reason why they should not always be convinced about and have definite opinions on matters for which they have no understanding. Nor is it difficult to persuade them to go from one

extreme to the other. (XIV, 117) They are thus the ready target of many a joke the outsider would play on them, notably Demokrit, who is actually an outsider in Abdera, because of his exposure to the world:

Man konnte in der Tat nicht lange unter den Abderiten leben, ohne in Versuchung zu gerathen, ihnen etwas aufzuheften. Ihr Vorwitz und ihre Leichtgläubigkeit auf der einen Seite und die hohe Einbildung, die sie sich von ihrer eigenen Scharfsinnigkeit machten, auf der andern, forderten einen gleichsam heraus . . .; und da die Abderiten albern genug waren, alles, was er ihnen ironischerweise sagte, im buchstäblichen Sinne zu nehmen, so entstanden daher die vielen ungereimten Meinungen und Märchen, die auf seine Rechnung in der Welt herumliefen . . . (XVII, 94)

Concerning the philosophy of the Abderites, it is immediately obvious that life for them has no insurmountable problems. They have philosophers and these impress their hearers duly, but besides a few long, meaningless words, these men really know no more than the average Abderite. (XIII, 32) There seems to be the tendency to give one answer to all problems. Their emphasis on music at one point is indicative of this, for they considered music as the foundation not only of their system of ethics but their physicians also brought about cures by means of various tunes and melodies. (XIII, 17)

The picture one gets of the Abderites is that they are sick. In fact, Hippocrates--although the remedy of a shipload of hellebore he prescribes for them is a prank--diagnoses them as sick and states that they are

not aware of this. (XIII, 153) And yet the Abderites would declare Demokrit, because he is so different from them, as mentally ill. They lack a sense of values, they do not know the meaningful from the meaningless, and they think they have art when they have no art. They make fools of themselves when they perform on the stage and yet do it in the name of great art. They are unable to differentiate between the first poem of an untalented beginner and the great odes of Pindar. (I, 174)

Needless to say, the cultural life of the Abderites, despite the fact that they themselves are so enthusiastic about it, is something to be held in very low esteem. It is well-nigh depressing that the best poet of Abdera is always the one who says what the people want to hear and says it in the manner in which they would have said it too: he is able to titillate and delight simply because he is the prototype of the Abderites.

The political Schwärmerei of the Abderites is dealt with especially in the fourth book, namely in Der Prozess um des Esels Schatten. When Struthion, a traveling dentist, hired a donkey and insisted on resting in its shadow on the way through a hot desert area, the donkey-driver informs him that he has rented only the donkey and has no right to sit in his shadow, since he did not rent that. This incident is the cause for a serious political upheaval in the little town.

When the Abderites hear about the shadow incident it does not take long until the whole town is divided into two parties, the Schatten and the Esel. Everyone is violently in favour of one or the other of the two parties, depending on which one he belongs to at the moment, and proudly defends its name. If a Schatten, for instance, should all of a sudden find himself in a larger company of strictly Esel, he has three alternatives: the Schatten could either flee directly, change his party allegiance immediately or permit himself to be thrown out. (XIV, 38) In their community relations a sort of shunning is practised; an Abderite would rather starve than go to a baker of the opposite party to purchase a few pennies worth of bread.

Their penchant for the sensational makes it possible for an individual person, especially one like Agathyrsis, who has "eine schwärmerische Hitze und eine gewisse populäre Art von Beredsamkeit," (XIV, 34) to make himself master of the Abderites. Agathyrsis, for instance, influenced a whole group of his fellow citizens to switch their loyalty from one party, namely the Schatten, to the opposing one, the Esel. (XIV, 60) He required only a few hours in which to bring about this change. These Abderites were completely unaware of what was happening, actually considering themselves to be impartial all the time. Agathyrsis is able to ply and mold them, to have

them almost completely within his own power.

The political concerns of the Abderites are limited to the here and now; their fanaticism leaves them with a very narrow range of vision and blocks out all comprehension for anything beyond their own political borders or beyond the present. Their lack of historical perspective is shown especially in their reception of the archon, Onolaus. Onolaus had a somewhat wider perspective than his fellow citizens, yet he receives no cooperation when he proposes a plan for appeasing the two factions, the Esel and the Schatten. He alone fears that the lawsuit concerning the shadow of the donkey, if pursued any farther, will darken the reputation of Abdera for many centuries. Members of both factions were blinded by prejudices--"der Parteigeist (hatte) alle Augen verblendet." (XIV, 241) Onolaus, who sees beyond the immediate situation, realizes that something like this might have happened earlier and considers it essential to go through the archives to see what solution might at that time have been used to resolve such a partisan problem. No one listens to him, yet his concerns and behaviour at this point were exactly what convinced posterity that here was one Abderite who had possessed the wisdom essential to a person in an administrative position.

The chauvinistic and hypocritical patriotism of the

Abderites, described by Wieland in the chapter on patriotism, is, of course, particular evidence of their self-interest. (XIII, 49ff.) Although they did not exactly consider all those living outside of Abdera to be devils (as the Japanese reputedly did formerly), the Abderites fostered such a high opinion of themselves and their state that they could not feature anything of any importance whatsoever existing beyond their borders. They congratulate themselves for being better than others. (XIII, 50) They are so blindly enthusiastic about their own little domain that anyone who claims to have found better customs or institutions in the outside world is not considered a loyal Abderite. Indeed, a law is passed, after Demokrit's return from abroad, which forbids the young men from travelling to other countries, lest they come back to Abdera disgusted with their own city!

In Agathon, political Schwärmerei was characterized by idealism. Agathon's political acts failed because they were based on moving ideas rather than on experience. The political Schwärmerei of the Abderite is lacking in noble and idealistic qualities, as useless as they proved for Agathon. There is no action springing from a desire to help. The Schwärmerei is so restricting here that no need outside of self is seen. There is hardly any idealistic reasoning involved. The whole division

over the donkey and his shadow only comes to an end when, in a wild frenzy, all the people who have come to the trial descend on the donkey as they spy him, literally tearing him limb from limb. Then the cause for all their troubles comes to an end.

The only redeeming aspect of the political crisis thus overcome is that the Abderites laugh about it. They feel extremely satisfied with themselves for having resolved the problem so creatively. They decide to erect a statue of the donkey, "das zugleich uns und unsern Nachkommen zur ewigen Erinnerung diene, wie leicht eine grosse und blühende Republik sogar um eines Eselsschattens willen hätte zu Grunde gehen können." (XIV, 116) They have, however, learned nothing from all this and remain, therefore, as schwärmerisch as in the beginning.

As for the religion of the Abderites, they find any religion at all better than no religion: "Eine Religion mussten Sie haben!" (XIV, 120) The most meaningful religion for them, however, was one accompanied by something visible and alive; simply a memorial or image around which great celebrations might center would have given the imagination inadequate stimulation and satisfaction. (XIV, 120) When Strobilas then digs the frog pond in the public park and the Abderites accept the belief that these frogs were the peasants of Latona

in their previous incarnation, this "religion" quickly enjoys great popularity. Every good citizen soon has his own little frog pond and does his utmost to protect these divine creatures.

With their keen enthusiasm for this religion, polemicism begins to spring up among the Abderites. Under the influence of his religious fervour, Stilbon, the priest, accuses Korax of having forsaken the faith because he considers the frogs of Abdera to be nothing but ordinary frogs.

While the practise of religion in Abdera seems but a preposterous tragicomedy, the Abderites pursue their sacred goal with great zeal and abandon. Their religion of the frogs finally unites them so strongly that all voluntarily submit to the leadership of the archon Onokradius. Onokradius claims divine inspiration and proposes that the human inhabitants abandon Abdera and leave it to the frogs. They are without concern for the future and bound together by common emotions and faith. Before they depart they already see visions of the beauties of their new homeland: "Ihre leicht bewegliche Einbildungskraft stand auf einmal in voller Flamme. Neue Aussichten, neue Szenen von Glück und Freuden tanzten vor ihrer Stirne." (XIV, 195)

In Don Sylvio and Agathon the author takes great pains to arrive at a solution to Schwärmerei. In Die

Abderiten, however, any attempt to show how these people could achieve a synthesis of heart and mind is lacking. The author is aloof from his subjects and merely observes. During the process of the novel, however, he speaks to the problem of Schwärmerei and, while the Abderites do not change, the tone of the novel changes from despair with mankind in the beginning to one approaching an intelligent good-humoured acceptance of the status quo in the end, which suggests at least a partial although resigned solution to the problem.

In the beginning of the novel the idea is **presented** that there is an inherently destructive element in Schwärmerei. When the origin of the Abderites is explained, the story of Diomedes, king of Thracia, is told. Diomedes had such an exaggerated or fanatical love for horses that he finally permitted his whole country to be eaten by them. This element of self-induced destruction is a criticism brought up on several occasions in Die Abderiten. The Abderites, as examples of fanatics, can not see destruction coming, and unknowingly welcome it. They consider themselves, for example, deeply indebted to Strobilus, who duped them by causing them to believe that the frogs of Latona were especially sacred. It is their fanatical enthusiasm for the frogs which causes them to become sick and (XIV, 126) eventually compels them to leave their homes.

This novel also indicates pessimism over the possibility of educating society in general to change from Spiessbürgerlichkeit and Schwärmerei--the two always seem to go together in this novel--to a more intelligent or rational state. Hippokrates has diagnosed the Abderites as being sick, yet unconscious of their unhealthy condition.

Not everything concerning the Abderites is pessimistic, however. The author does not really hate the Abderites.³ While Wieland is in Die Abderiten an observer of Toren, Narren and Schwärmer and, as such, is set apart from his subjects, he nevertheless identifies himself with them to a certain extent. The author's portrayal of Demokrit suggests this identification; for the greater part Demokrit is the observer, as Wieland is the observer of society, but the mirror is also turned briefly and we see Demokrit through the eyes of the Abderites. Upon his return to his homeland, for instance,

³In one of his letters to Sophie von la Roche, Wieland writes: "Ma misanthropie n'est que factice; j'aime naturellement l'humanité et les hommes (ce qui pourtant fait deux sortes d'amour) et si j'aime aussi à railler sur les défauts de l'une et les faiblesses des autres c'est ordinairement avec douceur et dans l'intention de leur dire en plaisantant, des vérités utiles, et qu'on n'ose quelquefois dire directement." (As quoted by Fritz Martini in the "Nachwort" in Christoph Martin Wieland, Werke, ed. Fritz Martini & Hans Werner Seiffert [Munich, 1964ff], I.)

his compatriots regard him with great interest. They want to hear all about his adventures. He does not respond the way they expected him to respond--instead of telling them tall tales, which was what they wanted to hear, he gave them the impression that people were generally the same the world over--and therefore he is soon regarded as peculiar or queer. After one month the relationship between him and the other Abderites deteriorates to the extent that they find each other unbearable, as is the case with people, "die mit ihren Begriffen und Neigungen alle Augenblicke zusammenstossen." (XIII, 49) They now have a reciprocal idea of each other--the Abderites evaluate Demokrit in many ways just as Demokrit evaluates them. One sees this, for example, when they try to make a laughing stock of him in the same way that he had formerly tried to do to them.

Once this reciprocal attitude develops there are ever increasing reasons for the Abderites to regard Demokrit as peculiar, odd and fanatic. When he becomes a hermit--and who but a fanatic or an enthusiast would become a hermit under ordinary circumstances?--to flee from the boredom of their company, (XIII, 69) they of course interpret this as fleeing from the world. As they observe how he occupies himself in the wilderness with nature, dissecting plants and animals, being able to

foretell eclipses of the sun and the moon, they conclude that something is wrong. Although there seems to be little maliciousness on their part, the Abderites consider him to be a Narr, a Scharlatan, and a Sonderling. By thus causing Demokrit to take on the appearance of a Schwärmer to a certain extent too, it is suggested that perhaps Schwärmerei is not only a universal element but also somewhat relative. The rational and the intelligent also have their moments and aspects of fanaticism. The hero thus approaches a solution to the problem of heart and reason for, like the Sternesque hero, Demokrit is a sort of verständiger Sonderling, one who embodies in one person two opposites.

The disparaging image of the fanatical Abderites is, at times, also mitigated by the contrasting rationalist, who is not always described sympathetically. Stilbon, as the calculating rationalist, has succeeded in subjugating the Abderites to himself with his cleverly planned system. Although he is not a Schwärmer like his compatriots, he is just as far removed from reality as they are. Stilbon is compared to a philosopher who believes he can determine the colour of the snow on Mount Hämus by sitting down in the confines of his study and thinking the matter through. Korax, who also represents an aspect of the rational (but in contrast to Stilbon, his is an enlightened view) is not depicted as entirely congenial

either. Korax has a passion for enlightening his fellow citizens, yet he sees but one answer to the problem at hand. Consequently he is criticized in the same way that the unenlightened Abderites are criticized. It is unjust, the author says, to consider everyone who thinks differently from oneself as a dangerous person. Indeed, the enlightened Korax is in his attitude still very much an Abderite, the enlightened person or philosopher, by inference, still being very human.

In summary it must be stated that the author has not successfully resolved the problem of heart and mind in Die Abderiten. He has tried, however, to arrive at an attitude which will make it possible to live with the situation. Little hope is expressed that the schwärmerisch Abderites can be cured but, during the course of the novel he learns to be tolerant of human nature and accept it for what it is. By smiling at the foibles of human beings and associating with people in spite of their shortcomings, Wieland has attained clarity for himself. As in Agathon he in a sense comes to terms with Schwärmerei, because it is closely linked with creative fantasy and imaginative power, without which man ceases to be a vital force.⁴

⁴Wieland's contemporary, Lessing, also refers to the vital creative force of Schwärmerei in his treatise "Philosophen und Schwärmer," written during the same

period in which Wieland worked on Die Abderiten. Even the philosophers, Lessing says, are not quite impartial towards the Schwärmer and Enthusiasten, for they are a constant source of new and gay ideas on which to philosophize. He then gives the example of Leibniz, the rational philosopher, who really exploited the enthusiast and said that, if for no other reason, one should at least read them because of the liveliness of their language.

CHAPTER VI

PEREGRINUS PROTEUS

Peregrin, the hero of Die geheime Geschichte des Peregrinus Proteus, is a Schwärmer, because he has been unable to resolve two basic problems in his apprenticeship to life. The first has to do with finding a proper love relationship with the opposite sex, and the second is concerned with groping for a personal religion that satisfies him.

With this novel Wieland is coming to the defense of the little-known historical Peregrin. He believes that Lucian (2nd. cent. A.D.) may have misinterpreted his contemporary, Peregrin, when he presented him as a fanatic who was a hazard to his fellowmen, who were so prone to permit themselves to be led astray by false prophets and charlatans.¹ As Wieland lets Lukian and Peregrin converse

¹Christoph Martin Wieland, "Ueber die Glaubwürdigkeit Lukians in seinen Nachrichten von Peregrinus Proteus," in Lukian, Sämtliche Werke, transl. C.M. Wieland & ed. Hanns Floecke (Munich & Leipzig, 1911), II, 394ff.

with each other concerning Peregrin's experiences--the whole novel is a long dialog between these two--Wieland seems to say: "Let us take a second look at the Schwärmer Peregrin; it might well have been this way."

The author gives two basic reasons as to why Peregrin submits to Schwärmerei to solve his problems. On the one hand, Peregrin has an innate inclination towards this--he calls himself "einen zum Enthusiasten geborenen Menschen"; on the other hand, he owes his Schwärmerei to his upbringing. Peregrin says of himself that his course has been determined by the experiences and the environment of his youth. (XVI, 33)

Our hero grows up in a somewhat unnatural situation. The father has to travel constantly and thus has no time to train his own son. Consequently, his upbringing is relegated to his grandfather. While Peregrin and his grandfather can not be considered kindred spirits, Peregrin is profoundly influenced by his grandfather and the environment that surrounds him there. His grandfather has a library filled with stories of miracles, gods and heroes and he fosters an interest in all kinds of Schwärmerei. He would, however, merely seem to have a collector's interest in such things, having no inclination to become emotionally involved himself. For the grandson, however, this exposure results in complete abandon to that for which he has a strong inclination (XVI, 41) and

it is indeed forming him for his entire life. When Lucian later expresses surprise that Peregrin should believe so easily and be so quickly deceived, Peregrin says that he has been accustomed to illusions since early childhood.

As Peregrin tells Lucian of his experiences after he grew up and left his grandfather, it quickly becomes evident that he is not infrequently blinded to the status quo by his illusions. This permits others to take advantage of him and often leads to grave misunderstanding of his intentions. While not entirely justifying himself, Peregrin explains the combination of his own misguided imagination and others trying to mislead him as follows:

Ich bin getäuscht worden, und habe andere getäuscht; aber jenes immer unwissend; dieses immer ohne Vorsatz: ich gestehe beides offenherzig; aber am Ende ist es doch nur Gerechtigkeit, wenn ich sage, dass ich zu beidem fast immer durch Anscheinungen verleitet wurde, die so lebhaft auf mich wirkten, dass ich sie für Wahrheit hielt. (XVII, 70)

The sincere pursuit of an illusory goal leading sooner or later to a clash between real life and the hero's illusions, and thus causing the hero to be a Schwärmer, is illustrated at the outset of the novel by the familiar conflict between erotic and Platonic love. This episode begins with Peregrin's desire to help his cousin Kalippe, who turns out to be a sort of Potiphar's wife. Kalippe wishes to receive counsel from Peregrin,

her innocent, young and handsome relative, because her husband fails to understand her. When it becomes increasingly difficult to preserve the secrecy of their counseling rendez-vous, Kalippe argues that the only safe place they can meet is in her bedroom. When Peregrin meets her there, he still considers himself to be her counsellor. He is taken by surprise when a general alarm sounds, proclaiming him as her illicit lover, who now has to flee for his life.

With some variations, this theme is repeated in the Mamillia incident and again in the hero's encounter with Faustine. Mamillia poses as a goddess and employs various cunningly designed contrivances in her attempt to attract young men who desire theurgic experiences, hoping actually to win them as her lovers. Peregrin quickly comes under her sway but when crass reality breaks in upon him, he leaves the scene directly. Much later Faustine lays a wager that it would be possible to win Peregrin, now turned ascetic, over to erotic love. Like Kalippe, Faustine comes to him under the guise of seeking counsel; she pretends to want to learn about spiritual love in order to become a better wife to her husband, Marc Aurel. When Peregrin then goes to her room to form an eternal bond of spiritual love between their two souls, he shows his inability to "recognize" her soul as he adoringly falls before another voluptuous woman, whom he takes for

Faustine. Again Peregrin flees as it becomes obvious to him that Faustine was merely trying to use him as a plaything.

In none of the cases mentioned does Peregrin flee because he wants to avoid temptation; he does flee, however, when it becomes clear to him that in his dealings with the world he has been deceived. He will not consider himself defeated, nor will he become angry with the one who has deceived him; he will rather become disgusted for having permitted himself to become deceived. When it becomes clear that Mamilia's intentions with him were of a strictly selfish nature, Peregrin says: ". . . so fühlte ich doch, dass mich dieser Fall nur erniedrigt und besudelt, nicht zerschmettert hatte. Die Schwingen meiner Seele waren nicht zerbrochen . . . Ich schämte mich . . . eine Theatergöttin für Venus Urania genommen zu haben." (XVI, 152) Only after he has this feeling of disgust with himself does he flee.

While Peregrin's concern for Gabius is concern for one of the same sex, this experience, however, has similar overtones of Platonic and erotic love. As in the case of Kalippe and Faustine, it is again the hero's blind desire to help that creates the predicament. He is impressed with the potential of Gabius, the untrained shepherd youth, and decides to educate him so that he will be able to live a beneficial life. When Gabius receives an

invitation from Peregrin to come and live with him, this shepherd boy immediately loses his innocent behaviour. Only then does Peregrin realize that Gabius had certain notions of what it meant to be invited to become the companion of a rich young man. The father of Gabius accuses Peregrin of having led his son astray, and in a sense this accusation is justified. He has unwittingly deceived Gabius but after that Gabius and his father try to take advantage of the hero.

One is inclined to ask why the hero repeats the same mistake over and over. While Peregrin himself on one occasion expresses the idea that a humiliating experience, referring to the Mamilia incident, (XVI, 152) could serve to protect him from making similar mistakes in the future, he is actually portrayed as incapable of learning from his experience. Each incident, except his death, shows him completely dedicated to a cause, and then he is deceived. There is hardly any change in the way he handles the first incident, that with Kalippe, from that of the incident with Faustine, not long before his death. While submerged in Schwärmerei the individual is too subjective, too much influenced by his enthusiasm, to be able to see the issues in broad daylight and to learn from experience.

In the same way that Peregrin experiences a conflict trying to find an ideal form of love, so does he have difficulty in finding a perfect religion. During the

course of his life he went from Orphism and belief in the Greek gods to Christianity to Cynicism. He follows all of these with equal abandon and yet always is primarily a Schwärmer, continually searching in vain for a satisfying religious experience. As a youth his desire for mystical and emotional experiences attracts him to Mamilia and her promised theurgies. When he goes over to Christianity, a new love for the mystical is aroused in him. (XVI, xiv) In each instance Peregrin seems to be attracted initially to a particular religion because it promises to nourish his deepest emotions and inner feelings; but in each instance he is repelled by its rational and practical organization and by the selfish souls of its leaders.

Kerinthus, the Christian, more than anyone else, is guilty of deceiving and taking advantage of Peregrin, however. He sees this enthusiastic young man as a tool he could use in hastening the establishment of his theocracy. After Peregrin has joined the Christians, Kerinthus places a falsified Gospel of John in his hands and dispatches him to the various groups of Christians or Brüdergemeinen to urge them to join in a movement towards consolidation. This is to result eventually in a sort of theocracy, in which Kerinthus would play an important role. He becomes disillusioned with this aspect of Christianity when he begins to sense Kerinthus' plans.

He still clings to another element in Christianity, which he had seen demonstrated in a naive and charitable family of the Brüdergemeinen and which he considered true and unadulterated. His final break with Christianity, however, comes when this family sees him innocently eating something or other forbidden to the sect.

As demonstrated by his life, this Peregrin is an enthusiast or Schwärmer through and through; whatever he does, he does with ardent zeal and singleness of purpose. He says of himself: "Wen ich nicht mit Schwärmerei lieben, mit Entzückung loben konnte, den musste ich mit Abscheu fliehen, mit Bitterkeit tadeln." (XVII, 146) When he gives himself to a cause, he wants to give himself with complete abandon. When he joins the Christians, for instance, he wants to give all his wealth to this group and becomes very depressed when he is advised against it. Later, as a Cynic, attempting to be the moral Hercules of Thebes, he is willing to set his own reputation at stake and is determined to become absolutely without feeling towards anything said about him as he feels the weight of responsibility on his shoulders. (XVII, 109) And finally, he does not count his own life too dear as he places it on the burning pyre, in the hope that this will help his fellowmen by teaching them how to despise death.

Peregrin's idealism is, for a large part of the

novel, fed and symbolized by his mental image of the Christians. Where Don Sylvio is encouraged in his pursuit of idealism by the image of his imaginary princess and Agathon by the image of Psyche he carries in his heart, the impression Peregrin received upon his first encounter with Kerinthus, who at that point symbolized for him the true spirit of the Christians, is a sustaining influence for our hero for a long time:

Mir war, als ob mich die Reden des Unbekannten (i.e., Kerinthus) mit einer neuen Lebenskraft angeweht hätten. Ihre Beglaubigung war in meinen eigenen Gefühlen und Wünschen. Sie blieben mir, wie sein Bild, immer gegenwärtig--mit jeder Erinnerung senkten sie sich tiefer in meine Seele ein, und sein Abschiedskuss brannte noch lange auf meiner Stirne. (XVI, 183)

It is the hero's unbridled zeal that fills him with confidence in his power to overcome and resist temptation. He does not flee when threatened by temptation but even welcomes it, hoping to become stronger through exposure. When he becomes a Cynic, he tests his resistance by inviting a beautiful hetaera to share his bed with him; and she has no influence over him. This, says Lucian, he would call true Schwärmerei, for by it Peregrin would demonstrate that he has an immortal power to resist temptation! (XVII, 127)

Peregrin, as a Schwärmer or a fanatic, is destined to loneliness and isolation. While he longs for fellowship with like-minded individuals, (XVI, 47) he realizes with

Plato and Jesus that the completely good and honest individual--and it is his ideal to be this--will be misunderstood and become isolated because of what he is. To this is added the fact that he pursues a law within himself and thus does not take the civil laws into consideration. (XVI, 50) His refusal to comply with society sets him apart. He is indeed an Einzelfall; but so was Plato as well as Christ. It seems clear that Wieland thinks of Peregrin and Christ in the same way that Peregrin and Dionysius think of Christ, namely, that Christ's will was completely different from what it was popularly interpreted to be and that he was indeed an enthusiast in the most elevated sense. (XVII, 85) Such an enthusiast, Wieland says, must be respected and held in awe and must not be confused with the charlatan and false prophet, who is bent only on deceiving.

It is Peregrin's eschatological hope that makes him satisfied to endure the heartache and pain this world inflicts on him. It is also this subjective hope that gives him the desire to leave this world for a better one. Disgusted with his earthbound condition, he willingly terminates this life to be received into the next. His final words are: "O ihr mütterlichen und väterlichen Dämonen, nehmt mich freundlich auf!" (XVI, 15) His belief in the existence of another friendlier world urges him on to encourage his fellowmen to despise death.

The manner in which Wieland comes to the rescue of Peregrin is a clear indication of the author's mellowed attitude to Schwärmerei at this time. Earlier, in Der goldene Spiegel, any naive religious Schwärmer was considered more harmful than a so-called Schwärmer who acts out of selfish intentions. Here the naive Schwärmer is defended. Where Lucian has portrayed him as an adulterer caught in the act, as one who is trying to mislead a youth, or as the murderer of his father (all this based on hearsay), Wieland goes down the line and shows how Lucian's motivation and intentions might have been of the noblest quality, even though the appearance of his actions, especially to the unsympathetic observer, could have indicated the opposite. Under Wieland, thus, Peregrin remains a fanatic and an enthusiast but he rescues him from disgrace and presents him above all else as an honest individual. Peregrin convincingly defends himself as follows:

Da es mir mit dieser ganzen Beichte meines abenteuerlichen Lebens bloss darum zu thun war, dich, durch umständliche Erzählung dessen, was du nicht wusstest, in den Stand zu setzen, von dem, was du wusstest, oder zu wissen glaubtest, richtiger und billiger zu urtheilen; so kann ich es nun ganz getrost dir selbst überlassen, mich, wo es vonnöthen ist, gegen den Verfasser der Nachrichten von Peregrins Lebensende in deinen Schutz zu nehmen. Alles Missverständniss hört nun auf, und Peregrinus Proteus steht nun, als ein Schwärmer, wenn du willst, aber wenigstens als ein ehrlicher Schwärmer vor dir da. (XVII, 154)

This respectable or honorable enthusiasm is con-

trasted sharply with a dishonest type of enthusiasm, for those who try to seduce and deceive him are also a sort of Schwärmer. Where the former's attitude, i.e., Peregrin's, is unnatural in its abandon to an idealistic otherworldly cause, the latter's attitude is unnatural because of its intense attachment or abandon to a this-worldly cause. It is just as much a defiance of the laws of nature for Mamilia to surround herself with her lovers and her beautiful slave children, or for Kerinthus to attempt to organize a theocracy intended to conquer the world physically, as it is for Peregrin to attempt to form a spiritual union with a woman whose body he supposedly ignores or to let his own body go up in flames for the benefit of his fellowmen. By this contrast Peregrin's fanaticism, even at worst, is at least harmless compared to the fanaticism of those who, through selfish motives, try to deceive others. For the deceivers or false prophets Wieland has nothing but spite.

If Wieland is thus defending Peregrin, the question could be asked, however, why the hero is not presented as more victorious, for in each of the incidents related in the novel he suffers a form of defeat. The most obvious of these defeats is certainly the one he suffers at the hands of Mamilia, where it is clear that he was unable to distinguish between spiritual and erotic love. His death is also marked by an apparent element of defeat, for

there is no immediate indication that he achieved his purpose through it, for he is considered by most (as by the unnamed orator in Lucian's version) (XVI, 13) a fool (Narr) or a mentally deranged individual. Yet his goal had been the noble one of preparing his fellowmen for death by showing them how to despise death itself.

Actually Wieland gives no clear answer to the problem of Peregrin's defeats. It becomes clear, however, that Peregrin must be understood as a seeker and as such he is treated sympathetically by the author--at this time he must have identified with his character--as he shows him maintaining his integrity in spite of each apparent defeat. These defeats thus actually do not take on the character of defeat. As compared to his earlier works, Peregrinus Proteus indeed shows a greatly mellowed attitude towards the Schwärmer on the part of Wieland.

In Don Sylvio, for instance, Schwärmerei, while not being portrayed as entirely bad in itself, is strictly a stage to be overcome; in Peregrinus Proteus it is an unnatural stage which is not overcome. To a certain extent, however, it is something beautiful in itself, for it is through the attempt to aspire to a divine level that the individual is prevented from sinking to a level which is less than human, as the transfigured Peregrin asserts. (XVI, 24) In the earlier novels the role of the humanistic educators, such as Don Gabriel and Archytas, was a very

important one, but their counterparts in Peregrinus Proteus (Dioklea and to some extent Dionysius) play very weak roles. Dioklea appears to reason with Peregrin and tries to open his eyes to the actual situation, but she has no ideal to offer to Peregrin in exchange for his Schwärmerei. Her only concern is Peregrin's personal physical welfare, for she has selfish reasons in bringing about his release from prison. She can only say: "Nein, mein lieber Peregrin! du sollst nicht ein Opfer des schwärmerischen Eifers werden." (XVII, 53) Fittingly, thus, Dioklea is only his physical benefactress. The idealistic Peregrin despises her in spite of any physical help she gives him and flees from her as soon as he is released from prison. (XVII, 60)

The whole issue surrounding Schwärmerei is thus depicted as much less black and white here than it is in Wieland's earlier novels. The author would even seem to express some doubt in this novel over the separability of objectivism and subjectivism, of Vernunft and Schwärmerei. Lucian, who in his earthly life ridiculed the enthusiast, now in Elysium and able to perceive more clearly, almost expresses doubt over the fact that in this earthly life Peregrin would have been less objective than he himself. Belatedly Lucian realizes, "dass es nicht die Dinge selbst, sondern unsere durch die Individualität bestimmten Vorstellungen von Ihnen sind, was die Wirkung

auf uns macht, die wir den Dingen selbst zuschreiben, weil wir sie unaufhörlich mit unsern Vorstellungen verwechseln." (XVI, 95) In this life both were too prejudiced to see clearly: "Wir waren beide zu ganz das was wir waren, ich zu kalt, du zu warm." (XVI, 32)

This relativity of objectivity and subjectivity rules out reason or Vernunft as an answer to enthusiasm. Lucian advocates reason and so did Peregrin's friend Dionysius, who invites him to give reason a try when he finds Peregrin dejected because of his experiences with Kerinthus. Dionysius has said: "Die Vernunft ist der gute Dämon der Menschen," (XVII, 84) but now, when Lucian and Peregrin regard life in retrospect, it becomes obvious that that, which had passed as reason, was also coloured by subjectivism. Wieland, of course, had to have the whole story of Peregrin told by the dead, for, as he seemed to suspect concerning Lucian's version, the living are too limited or subjective in their views to present it accurately!

By transposing the whole dialogue between Lucian and Peregrin to Elysium, Wieland, thus, has achieved much that would seem to favour Schwärmerci. Peregrin can now say that he doesn't regret having gone into the world as an enthusiast. And Lucian, who in his earthly life ridiculed the Schwärmer, has now received a new impression of Peregrin, for Peregrin has indeed experienced a varied

and interesting life. Lucian has to admit the truth of Peregrin's statement: "Und doch lehrt dich nun die Erfahrung, dass es nicht geschwärmt gewesen wäre, wenn du damals über diese Dinge gedacht hättest wie du jetzt denkst." (XVI, 20) Lucian, speaking the last word, seems almost convinced that there is a certain virtue in Schwärmerei.

The author, however, does not justify his hero entirely, for Peregrin has made many foolish mistakes. Peregrin has, nevertheless, approached the truth, but the truth has been difficult to comprehend; he could see only "as through a glass darkly." This, as Sengle also indicates, approaches a justification for Peregrin.²

In the final analysis it must be admitted, however, that the author has here been unable to achieve a synthesis of heart and mind. Peregrin's Schwärmer existence can not be completely justified, and Lucian, the rationalist, although partly convinced of the values of Peregrin's life, is not ready to become a Schwärmer himself. Peregrin remains a Schwärmer, albeit an elevated one, and Lucian a rationalist.

²Sengle, Wieland, p. 435.

CHAPTER VII

AGATHODÄMON

As in Wieland's Peregrinus Proteus, so the basic problem in his Agathodämon arises out of the conflict in the hero between a rationalistic, humanistic religion incorporating selfish and ulterior motives and a religion based on an emotional and Pietistic faith which allows no hypocrisy. However, where Peregrin is an intuitive religious Schwärmer, Agathodämon is, until he retires, a sincere calculating charlatan. In his old age Agathodämon is attracted to the entirely sincere Schwärmer Christ; the hero can then find peace and fulfillment only after he succeeds in synthesizing rationalism, which heretofore dictated his every action, with the religious Schwärmerei of Christ.

Agathodämon is the name Wieland has bestowed on the historical Apollonius. Like Peregrinus Proteus, Agathodämon is intended as a Rettung (i.e., a sort of justification) for what Wieland considers a historically misunderstood and misinterpreted figure. As in the case

of Peregrin, the actual facts surrounding the life of Apollonius are not clear. Philostratus wrote the only full account of his life around 200 A.D., or two hundred years after the birth of Apollonius, who was a contemporary of Christ's. Philostratus' account is highly romanticized and, on his own evidence, based on the work of Damis, which was almost certainly only fiction. It is also possible that Philostratus intended the account of Apollonius' life to be a sort of pagan gospel to counteract the effect of the Christian gospel.¹ Pröhle² says that he was most likely only an adept magician or charlatan and that, as a man supposedly endowed with supernatural powers, he had a wide following. In any event, Wieland calls Apollonius the good spirit or Agathodämon (from Greek agathos daimôn) and portrays him as such.

The novel itself consists mainly of a series of conversations between Agathodämon (who lives with his sister, Terpsinoe, her husband Kymon, and their daughter, Appolonia) and his guest, Hegesias, in an isolated dwelling in the mountains. Agathodämon feels that his role in life has ended and he now wants to confess his

¹Arthus Hilary Armstrong, "Apollonius," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1966), II, 123.

²Loebell in his biography of Wieland, as cited by Pröhle in Christoph Martin Wieland, Aristipp und einige seiner Zeitgenossen, ed. and with an introd. by H. Pröhle (Berlin/Stuttgart, n.d.), LIV, iii.

experiences to his quest.

The hero begins with his youth, stating that he was born with an exaggerated ambition, which was fed by the attention which he attracted wherever he went. To become human to the fullest extent, i.e., to become everything that it is possible for a human being to be, is his goal from early youth on. To this end he devotes himself to extreme asceticism for some time and is consequently attracted to the Orphics.

With his rational mind his relationship with the Orphics is short-lived. He observes much corruption there and becomes convinced that this order has lost its relevance. Nevertheless, he stays on with this order for some time, mainly to observe, for Agathodämon has decided to establish his own order for the purpose of creating a new world. He feels that he has much to learn from the Orphics that will be useful to him in the carrying out of his plans later on.

Just how this new order will achieve its goals is at first not clear in the mind of its founder. The whole movement is enshrouded in great secrecy and owes its strength to the unflinching loyalty of its members. While this order hopes to banish superstition and ignorance by educating mankind on the one hand, it attempts to improve conditions for mankind on the other hand by manipulating at top political levels. Members of this

order infiltrate every city and important office of the empire in true Freemason style. It is easy for them, for instance, to dispose of the tyrant Domitian and to have him successively followed by Trajan and Nerva.

As Agathodämon now looks back on his life he confides to Hegesius that he has merely played a role and has been untrue to himself. Everything he achieved, despite the altruism of his intentions, seems to him completely useless. His interventions, he is convinced, have had no influence on the course of events. What causes him to feel his inadequacy so acutely is the example of Christ. Christ, the contemporary of Agathodämon, was that which Agathodämon only appeared to be. Agathodämon's attempts to help his fellowmen by means of his secret organization and well-meaning trickery are completely put to shame by Christ, who brought about the salvation of many by the simplest and most direct means.

This Agathodämon is, above all, portrayed as a sincere person, despite the fact that he did not hesitate to deceive his fellowmen. Like Kerinthus, he wants to free mankind from all forms of oppression. Where there is some question about Kerinthus' unselfishness, perhaps because we see him mainly through the eyes of Peregrin, who considers him only a great deceiver, there can hardly be any doubt about Wieland's intention to portray Agathodämon as a completely sincere swindler.

To enable him to play this role, it is necessary to portray Agathodämon as an intelligent rational individual who is in complete control of himself and has a keener understanding of his fellowmen than these have themselves. Kymon describes him as possessing these qualities: "Die Natur scheint kein Geheimnis vor ihm zu haben--und seine Gewalt über sich selbst, und über alle Arten von Menschen, ist beinahe unglaublich." (XVIII, 97)

This human superiority together with the circumstances it creates (for wherever he went, he created a sensation), encouraged him to become a "god." (XVIII, 44) He sets about to develop himself into the ultimate human being, determined to become nothing less than the great men about whom he heard from his pedagogues. He is urged on by the questions: "Warum . . . sollt' es einem Menschen nicht möglich seyn, alles zu werden was Menschen waren? Was ist dem unverdross'nen Fleiss und dem hartnäckigen Willen unmöglich?" (XVIII, 44) The resources for achieving this goal he considers nature to have put in man when he was created. Man must, therefore, have a high esteem of himself and learn to utilize all the powers within himself to the fullest. (XVIII, 48) He must be educated to reason. Only thus can he become truly free.

Agathodämon gradually comes to realize, however, that the greater part of mankind is in a stage of child-

hood, (XVIII, 59) steeped in superstition and suffering because of its bent to look for assistance in an outside source, i.e., they are plagued with their inclination to believe. Mankind must, therefore, be helped and educated. But how? He comes to the conclusion that the only way the human race can be approached is through beliefs and superstitions, for this is the level on which everything is interpreted. Under his own influence he now attempts to see, "ob sich der Aberglaube dieser Leute, der ihnen bisher so schädlich gewesen ist, nicht zu ihrem Vorurtheil benutzen lasse." (XVIII, 79ff.) He does not object if the people consider him a prophet and he soon adjusts his behaviour in a willful attempt to create the impression that he can perform miracles. He does not shy away from any means, no matter how deceptive or even uncharitable these may be, if he feels that they will serve the purpose of helping mankind to become free in the end.

The hero pursues his goal with a zeal and an enthusiasm which is unexpected in one so rational. This earns for him the somewhat contradictory description of rational enthusiast, for there is, indeed, a marked contradiction in the life of Agathodämon. He is the openly declared enemy of all superstition and Schwärmerei; (XVIII, 95) his sole concern in life is supposedly to help mankind become more noble. And yet he stoops to trickery and outright

deceit in order to free man from being a victim of these very elements.

Christ, whose goal is the same as Agathodämon's (namely, to set men free), is presented as entirely honest in his approach to his fellowmen--in sharp contrast to Agathodämon's sincere pretension. At ninety-five, Agathodämon, looking at his own life in retrospect and accusing himself of not having accomplished anything in this life, says of Christ:

Ich würde es vielleicht weniger seyn (i.e., critical of himself), wenn nicht unter meinen Zeitgenossen ein Mann gelebt hätte, der das war, ohne alle Geheimanstalten, Kunstgriffe und Blendwerke, auf dem geradesten Wege und durch die einfachsten Mittel, zum Heil der Menschheit zu Stande bringen wird, was ich vermuthlich durch die meinigen verfehlte. (XVIII, 253)

In Peregrinus Proteus Christ is already called der erhabenste Enthusiast, (XVII, 85) an idea which is developed farther here. Christ is described as one who believes in all sincerity in his calling and his good works and actions are an outgrowth of his deep faith. It is his enthusiasm which entitles him to be called a god-man: "Wenn man einen Sterblichen, der mit einem so hohen und anhaltenden Enthusiasmus begabt ist, dass er sich selbst und alles gleichsam nur in Gott sieht, einen Gottmenschen nennen könnte, so hätte wohl noch niemand diese Benennung so sehr verdient wie er." (XVIII, 301) Here is a convinced enthusiast whose god controls

his every fibre and who has no self-made plans for freeing his fellowmen. The purity of the life of this Schwärmer, according to this novel, would seem to become particularly distinct in the hour of his death. (XVIII, 303-4) In his dying hour Christ for the first time expresses doubt about his being the Son of God ("My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"). This doubt, however, does not cause him to feel defeated; instead of demanding reinstatement of the conviction that he really is God, his final words indicate complete commitment and dedication ("Into thy hands I commit my spirit!").

Agathodämon may feel that he sees through Christianity. He has grave misgivings about it as he foresees how it will go the way of all religions and aspire to world-power. In spite of all this, however, he is disquieted by his own rationalism when he sees the impact which Christ, the Schwärmer, has had on his fellowmen. He is so strongly influenced by the purity of Christ's enthusiasm that it moves him to abandon his philosophy of self-sufficiency (where the individual is considered to have within himself the sufficient wherewithal to bring the two contending spirits into the proper relationship necessary for achieving the highest possible goals in life)³ for a philosophy that involves

³While still playing the role of a false prophet,

irrationalism and emphasizes a simple dependence on an exterior power greater than himself. Now in his old age he is willing to admit that fulfillment can come only as he, a mortal being, submits to and assumes his responsibility as a part of a Pantheistic system, of which he is a minute but important part:

Das allgemeine Leben der Natur drängt sich wieder warm an mein Herz, ich webe in allem was webt, und fühle mich in allem was athmet . . . und mit süßem Schauern umfasst mich die Gegenwart des allgemeinen Genius der Natur, des liebenden, versorgenden Allvaters, oder wie der beschränkte Sinn der Sterblichen den Unnennbaren immer nennen mag, und ich bin--mit einem Worte, wieder was ich seyn soll. (XVIII, 348)

Agathodämon thus discredits the solution he considered valid in his youth--a solution which was essentially also that which Agathon accepted from Archytas.⁴

Agathodämon verbalizes his philosophy as follows: "Aber irrig ist es, wenn man sich diese so ungleichartige Naturen als Ein Ganzes zusammengeschmelzt vorstellt . . . Geist und Körper, Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft, verhalten sich im Menschen zu einander, wie die Sehkraft zum Auge und die Hand zum Willen. Ich betrachtete meine geistige Natur als mein eigentliches Ich; und meiner Natur gemäss leben, hiess mir, das thierische Leben dem geistigen dergestalt unterordnen, dass dieses so wenig als möglich durch jenes gestört und eingeschränkt werde." (XVIII, 50)

⁴This change in Agathodämon's philosophy has a distinct parallel in Wieland's own life. Reichert (Herbert W. Reichert, "The Philosophy of Archytas," Germanic Review [Jan. 1949], p. 12) shows by means of Wieland's correspondence of the early 1790s that the philosophy or ethical view of Archytas, which shows a strong Kantian influence, was at that time the author's own. In 1796 Wieland announces that this is unfortunately no longer his philosophy and that he plans to include his own new philosophy in the final book of Agathodämon.

For Archytas, bringing the intellectual or spiritual nature into right relationship with the animal nature, was to result in action, yet rather contradictorily, the hero retired to the idyllic and found his fulfillment where there would be little cause for action. The solution in Agathon thus seemed somewhat unconvincing. Agathodämon would seem to have applied Archytas' philosophy more directly, inasmuch as he placed himself where one would expect to find the man of action, namely at the crossroads of encounter with his suppressed fellowmen. Yet rational action does not bring fulfillment to Agathodämon, for he does not believe that his fellowmen have been helped through it. He has to submit himself to a role which is different from his previous one in every way. Instead of being self-sufficient, he must become dependent--he must realize his dependence on God, the

Wieland describes his dilemma of faith and his need for a new philosophy as follows: "Wie ich mir am Ende aus diesem Gedankenlabyrinth wieder heraushelfe, bleibt für diesmal noch ein Geheimnis und soll es so lange bleiben, bis der das letzte Buch vom Agathodämon--zu seiner Zeit--das Allerheiligste meiner eigenen Haus Philosophie (wenn ich so sagen kann) auf geschlossen haben wird, welche leider! nicht Philosophie des Archytas im Agathon ist. Ich sage leider! Weil ich in der Tat, um meines innern Vergnügens und Gewinns an Zufriedenheit glauben. Aber auch Glauben hängt nicht mehr von meiner Willkür ab, als die Einrichtung meiner äusserlichen Umstände--und ich muss glauben was ich glaube, wie ich mir gefallen lassen muss was ich nicht ändern kann." (Robert Keil, ed., Wieland und Reinhold [Leipzig & Berlin, 1885], p. 144.

Father of the universe. Instead of being active and conniving, he must settle for a sort of passiveness, realizing that he is but a small part of all-encompassing nature. He calls himself but "einen Wassertropfen im uferlosen Ocean." (XVIII, 348)

This retreat into a composed passiveness is evident in much of the thought of the retired Agathodämon. He sees that Christ, the great divine Schwärmer, had no program of action. For him it had been merely a matter of doing the will of God which meant only to love God above all else and others as yourself. (XVIII, 327) Christ did not strive for success and yet he achieved more in a short life than Agathodämon achieved in a long one. Agathodämon believes that he has achieved nothing that will outlast him and amount to anything of enduring value at all; to any credit Hegesias would attribute to him he only answers: "die reife Frucht wäre auch gefallen, wenn wir sie nicht geschüttelt hätten." (XVIII, 251)

The philosophy which Agathodämon here expounds to Hegesius thus indicates a second very notable attempt after the third revision of Arathon to bring head and heart together. This time the attempt to suppress the irrational, which was strongly represented in Arathon, is lacking. Where the philosophy of Archytas in Arathon strongly emphasized fulfillment in this present world, Agathodämon expresses concern about the next life. For

the young and active Agathodämon Schwärmerei meant dependence on some power outside of self, Schwärmerei being closely related in his judgment to all forms of belief in the supernatural. The only way for him to overcome it was, then, to become independent. As already stated, however, Agathodämon turns to a dependence on God, thus becoming in part a Schwärmer. He has not lost his own identity, however, but admits in humility that he has no desire to be more than he can be and should be. (XVIII, 348) This relationship with the God of the universe has led him to a self-realization at a level not before suggested by Wieland.

Finally, the question must also be asked, why Agathodämon did not become a follower of Christ, for whom he expresses such admiration. The answer is, I believe, that he could not accept a religion which, in his opinion, owed its strength to a reportedly supernatural element--Christ's resurrection. (XVIII, 295) While he has no objection to the pedagogical value of a popular religion (Volksglauben) with its related supernatural aspects, Agathodämon sees too clearly to accept such a religion personally in its entirety. He considers it useful mainly for the uneducated masses.

⁵Teesing points out that Wieland, by sanctioning Volksglauben with its related supernatural elements, sets himself apart from the Enlightenment in this respect. (H. P. H. Teesing, "Wielands Verhältnis zur Aufklärung im Agathon," Neophilologus, XXI [1935-36], p. 107.)

The hero, in his own personal philosophy, thus attempts to go beyond Christianity. He has eaten of the tree of knowledge; his dependence on the God of the universe is conscious whereas Christ's dependence on God the Father was strictly intuitive. One thus sees a synthesis of reason and emotionalism in Agathodämon which is more satisfactory than that of Agathon.

With the solution in Agathodämon the author also strikes a contemporary-sounding note. Agathodämon was not satisfied with mere activism, as advocated by Archytas; he needed a deep emotional faith to satisfy his yearning. Today, too, there are many who feel that the scholarly and humanistically oriented approach to religion with its emphasis on morality and social activism must be supplemented with a religious faith. The current renascence in interest in such a contemplative philosopher as Schleiermacher is evidence of this.

CHAPTER VIII

ARISTIPP

Aristipp, the hero of Wieland's last novel, Aristipp und einige seiner Zeitgenossen, is not a Schwärmer nor an extreme rationalist. Nor is this last novel a developmental novel (ein Entwicklungsroman), as are most of Wieland's other novels. It is rather an extended discussion on humanism in the form of a series of 144 letters (ein Briefroman) of which well over half are by the hero. The humanistic instigator of this volume of correspondence, Aristipp, is described as a man, "dem alles Uebertriebene, Angemasste und über die Proportionen der menschlichen Natur Hinausschwellende lächerlich oder widrig ist." (XXIV, 257) By portraying Aristipp as he moves about among extremists--both rationalists and Schwärmer--the author speaks to the question of the relationship and the desirable synthesis of Schwärmerei and reason.

The setting of the novel is Greece of the time of Socrates and Plato, that is Greece of the latter part of

the fifth and the first part of the fourth century B.C. (the dates of the historical Aristipp are ca. 435-336 B.C.), a time during which Greek civilization had already surpassed its climax. One once more meets in this novel many of the characters of Wieland's earlier works, for example Hippias of Agathon, Demokrit and his compatriots of Die Abderiten and others.

Lais, in her relationship to Aristipp, lends the first part of this novel the slight semblance of possessing a plot--with her disappearance the plot essentially ends. Lais is one of the historical hetaera of Aristipp and a devout disciple of his. The elevated relationship of the two is based on denial, on possessing each other as though not possessing each other. They meet rarely and when they do, their meetings are so brief that the spell of their being together is not broken by its commonplaceness. Once they meet for only fifteen minutes, even though they have not seen each other for a long time. The two then grow farther apart as Aristipp settles down in Athens and marries Kleone, the sister of his friend Kleonidas, an amiable artistic Schwärmer. Lais meanwhile abandons the doctrine of Aristipp and falls passionately in love with a young man, Pausanias (Drosylas), who came to her disguised as a slave. As a result of her fanatical love for this young man, she severs her ties with her former friends. There are rumors of orgies in her house

but her last days as well as her death are shrouded in uncertainty and mystery. The last letter of the second volume (XXIII, 414) is her farewell to her friends. It is not clear whether Lais, who has become a Schwärmerin, is simply leaving the area or whether, like Sappho, she has jumped off Leukadia. The letters in the third part or last book, which deals mainly with Plato's works, refer to her on occasion but fail to explain what happened to her. Whether Wieland intended to come back to her during the course of the novel--Aristipp is a fragment despite its length and the fact that it approaches tedium--is not certain.

That Agathon and Agathodämon with their respective solutions to the basic dualism in man preceded Aristipp is very clear. Unlike these earlier heroes, Aristipp does not have to go through the tribulations of finding his way from Schwärmerei to Natur or to self-fulfillment. Although Aristipp was a Schwärmer in his childhood, he was cured so thoroughly of it at an early age that this conflict does not enter the novel at all. Nor is this novel good-humoredly cynical with regard to the human race, as is Die Abderiten. Aristipp is aware of the foibles and tendencies of mankind but rather than being cynical about these, his faith is able to conquer his fleeting inclinations towards cynicism or self-pity.

The characters with whom Aristipp interacts in this novel serve two closely related functions: 1) as a contrast to Aristipp and to set him off as the truly rounded-out individual who has overcome the crippling tendencies of life and 2) to give the author an opportunity to deliberate on and discuss the way of life which Aristipp finds satisfying. Of greatest importance here is Lais, although Socrates and Plato as well as Hippias (suffice it to say that he serves as the antipode to the schwärmerisch tendencies represented in this novel), Kleonidas, Arasambes and others are also important in this connection. Let us briefly turn our attention to the first three, beginning with Lais.

Lais, who turns into an erotic Schwärmerin, is a Don Sylvio or an Agathon in reverse. She is at first portrayed to all outward appearance as a wholesome well-balanced individual who extends her own wholesomeness to those around her. Her affect on Aristipp, mentioned in the quote below, reminds one strongly of the role attributed by Don Eugenio to Felicia in the curing of Don Sylvio: "Du ahnest wohl nicht, schöne Lais, dass drei in deinem Hause gelebte Tage mich dem höchsten Ziele der Philosophie näher gebracht haben als vier Jahre in der Sokratischen Schule." (XXII, 260) Her affect on Socrates is somewhat similar, for it is she, according to Aristipp, who was able to bring out a certain warmth in this great

philosopher which no one else was able to bring out. Through association with her Plato becomes a sort of hermaphrodite, incorporating in one person both Vernunft and Schwärmerei. (XXII, 196)

Towards the end of the second book it becomes apparent that Lais is going to go off on a tangent. Aristipp prepares the reader for this when he indicates (XXIII, 29) that Lais will probably be unhappy during the second half of her life. The reason given is that she has had everything she could desire and yet she always desires more. She has, with her feminine charm, conquered every man's heart and made all men her slaves. She has but to mention to Arasambes, for instance, that it would be nice to have a certain kind of exotic fish for her garden pool, when he dashes off to a remote place to fetch her one of these, driving twenty horses to death in the process. (XXIII, 34) This attention brings her no lasting peace, for it is after this that she writes to Aristipp about ending her life, referring to Sappho's jumping off Leukadia.

How is it possible that Lais, who according to all outward appearance is emotionally stable, can suddenly retrogress and come to an end such as this? The answer given is that her true inner resources have never been tested before her encounter with Drosylas and that she has actually lived in an unnatural state all her life.

As long as she is not forced to face reality, everything seems to go well for her. She has been in a state of dormant Schwärmerei until the raving Drosylas awakens her. As was the case with the other Schwärmer characters of Wieland, her unnatural upbringing is to blame for this to a large degree. At the age of eight she had been brought to Leontides, who brought her up. She was his favorite and he spoiled her, thus contributing early to her awareness of her unusual gifts of nature.

Having this disposition for Schwärmerei, being only interested in and gifted for the art of making men happy, she is able to keep from succumbing to her narrow interests--the hallmark of Schwärmerei--only by paying attention to many men, treating all equally and permitting special privileges to none. There is at first no enthusiastic abandon in her love. She is living by the Cyrenaic maxim of Aristipp, i.e., possessing as though she didn't possess; but she applies this maxim only to the narrow area of her love life. She obtains favorable responses from her many lovers and is able to achieve everything she sets out to achieve. However, "auf Vollgenuss folgt Sättigung, auf Überfüllung Ekel," (XXIII, 374) she has to experience after twenty years of this life. As long as she was satisfied to make many happy, she was the most beautiful and successful of all hetaerae, but now that she fixes her total attention on Drosylas,

and hence has become selfish, she can only love as a Schwärmer.

Inasmuch as Lais has been able to cope with life until she becomes disillusioned and misanthropic, thus becoming unfit for existence in this world any longer, she bears a resemblance to Peregrin. While the reason for her exit is less idealistic than that of Peregrin, who thereby hoped to teach his fellowmen a useful lesson, the basic reason both can not continue in their earthly existence is the same--their idealism clashes with reality, making further existence within the confines of the mortal body impossible.

Peregrin did not stand condemned. There was a certain futility about his death but his honest Schwärmerei was not attacked; instead it was portrayed as something almost divine. This is also true of Lais. Aristipp describes her as follows: "Lais ist dazu gemacht, in allem gross und ausserordentlich zu sein." (XXIII, 408) She does not fit into this life.

A new element introduced here concerning the Schwärmer, which is not yet present in Peregrin, is the admission through Aristipp that one can not understand the reason for the end which the Schwärmerin takes. This is contained in the implicit trust that an eternal will overrules all: "Es habe dennoch so gehen müssen, und wie unbegreiflich uns auch die Verkettung unsrer Freiheit mit

dem allgemeinen Zusammenhange der Ursachen und Erfolge sein möge, immer bleibe das Gewisseste, dass das ewige, mit der schärfsten Genauigkeit in die Natur der Dinge eingreifende Räderwerk des Schicksals nie unrichtig gehen kann." (XXIV, 22) Her fate was unavoidable and who are we as humans to question it, Wieland seems to say. The older more mellow Wieland is loathe to sit in judgment on the Schwärmer.

Concerning Socrates and Plato, Aristipp calls the former healthy (gesund) and the latter divine (göttlich). What justifies these descriptions?

Socrates is an example of Wieland's ideal, in that he is a man subscribing to both Verstand and Herz. He is a practical philosopher who, at the same time, is also the liebenswürdigster Schwärmer. He is described as a hermaphrodite who is able to keep the two poles in a healthy relationship to each other, so that neither overrides the other. It is not surprising that the humanistic Aristipp appreciates the philosophy of Socrates, which makes an important contribution towards the wholesome education and development of all levels of society. Diogenes, the cynic, indeed considers Socratism to be the philosophy which will always benefit the greatest number of people.

Plato, called divine here, is treated with much greater reserve than Socrates. Although the exchange of

letters concerning Plato's works occupies the major part of the last book of Aristipp, the point made is mainly that the systems of philosophers are, in the final analysis, nothing but poetical works or Dichtung. As Sengle suggests,¹ Wieland is quite likely taking revenge on the idealistic philosophers Fichte and Kant, his contemporaries. In comparing the different systems of various philosophers to different paths leading over the face of our world, Plato's is compared to that of Ikarus, whose path does not lie in this world but in the air. He is described by Diogenes as one who has "eine warme Einbildungskraft und zu viel Neigung zur dialektischen Spinnweberei." (XXII, 281) The utilitarian Diogenes, who is a fitting mouthpiece for Wieland as a "citizen of the world" and an advocate of the natural life, suggests that there is a group of people who will benefit from Plato. This group, which possesses the combination of melancholy and fantasy which characterized Plato, is, however, very small. In comparing Plato's philosophy with that of Aristipp, Diogenes says, that if the former is the philosophy or religion of the noblest of Schwärmer, then Aristipp should be the pattern for all eupatrids (i.e., law makers and administrators), for thus Schwärmererei would be rendered harmless and nobility and wealth

¹Sengle, Wieland, p. 506.

would become amiable and charming. (XXIV, 275) According to degrees of practically benefitting his fellowmen, Plato ranks the lower of these three with Socrates in the middle and Aristipp at the top.

Turning our attention now to the hero, Aristipp, in an attempt to explore his significance as it relates to the problem of Schwärmerei, we find in him a kindly adaptable man. Aristipp, the founder of Cyrenaic philosophy, states that there is nothing we can really know about life after death, yet no one need fear death. He will also never argue with anyone about religion, for no definite statement can be made about death. He has confidence that nature would not advocate volcanic change when going from death to life. He also thinks all people would be good, if it were possible for everyone to be happy.

Although Aristipp's Cyrenaic philosophy embodies much of Socrates, the latter is chided for not being open to a more thorough synthesis of the two elements within the human breast. Once more a philosophy essentially the same as that of Archytas is described, as Aristipp argues that he is not planning to permit the spiritual nature to choke the animal nature, for both are an essential part of him. The two must come to a reasonable agreement with each other. This time, however, the spiritual is not specifically supposed to be in a position

superior to that of the animal nature. Should the resulting compromise between the two be unsatisfactory, however, Aristipp would then want reason to subordinate the animal nature, thus making a worthy existence possible. Aristipp, thus, actually has nothing new to say about this synthesis of the spiritual and the animal, for as in Agathon, the animal nature must not be allowed to gain the upper hand at any cost.

Aristipp's desire for synthesis is also evident in other ways. He himself more than once expresses the idea that he, too, is an occasional or partial Schwärmer. He admits this to the Schwärmer Kleonidas: "Ich glaube gar, ich schwärme, Freund Kleonidas? Beim Anubis! es ist nicht ganz richtig mit mir." (XXIII, 68) Yet this is only one facet of his person. He, too, can be compared to the many heroes of whom he says: "Ich denke, wir werden den Helden überhaupt kein Unrecht tun, wenn wir voraussetzen, dass sie alle, soviel ihrer je gewesen sind, immer mehr oder minder ein wenig geschwärmt haben." (XXII, 313) He does not hesitate to credit Socrates, one of these heroes, with having received genuine strength as the result of an occasional divine voice.

Aristipp's interest in synthesizing is also symbolized in his marriage to Kleone, the artistic sister of the Schwärmer Kleonidas, whom she resembles so closely. Kleone is in some ways Aristipp's opposite yet Lais was

able to detect at the first glimpse of Kleone the other half of Aristipp. (XXIII, 33⁴) Aristipp himself finds extreme contentment in this union. In the circle of his own family and associates there is present and alive that harmony of human relationships which in Plato's Republic is only on paper. The openness of his heart indicates that he is not a Sektenstifter (XXIV, 261) (that distinguishing mark of narrowmindedness and Schwärmerei), but his attitudes help to bring about reconciliation and understanding.

In summary, in the same way that many characters encountered in Wieland's earlier novels make their re-appearance in this novel, there is also much recapitulation concerning what Wieland earlier said about Schwärmerei. When he wrote Agathodämon he announced that the philosophy of Archytas, Agathon's solution to Schwärmerei, was no longer his own personal philosophy but that he had a new philosophy which he would expose in Agathodämon. This shift was essentially one from eudaeмония, with the synthesis of the two natures in man at its core (the animal nature and the spiritual nature), to a sort of pantheism. While Wieland in Aristipp expresses greater confidence in a universal force than he does in Agathon, one might expect more exposure of his pantheism than is here the case. Instead of this, he again strongly emphasizes eudaeмония and synthesis and one wonders whether

the solution of Agathon has perhaps increased in importance again to where it ranks equal with the pantheism of Agathodämon. It must be remembered, of course, that Aristipp is only a fragment, which permits one to speculate that the author perhaps intended to proceed towards a synthesis of the two solutions found in Agathon and Agathodämon. The groundwork for such a synthesis is actually laid in Aristipp. Such a synthesis would result in a solution which would be even closer to the mean between Vernunft und Schwärmerei, for the solution of Agathon tended towards the former and the solution of Agathodämon somewhat towards the latter.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The hallmark of the Schwärmer characters of Wieland's novels is a singleness of interest or purpose: The Schwärmer is capable of directing himself only at one thing at a time. Thus one has in Wieland's novels characters who are preoccupied exclusively with sensual love for an individual of the opposite sex, i.e., erotic Schwärmer, or, by the same token, religious, moral or political Schwärmer. Basically, all of the fanatical characters discussed in this study fit into one or more of these categories during the course of their Schwärmerei or enthusiasm. Araspes, for example, changes from moral to erotic enthusiasm and Agathon goes from moral-religious to erotic to political enthusiasm. The emphasis in Der goldene Spiegel and in Die Abderiten is somewhat different from that of Wieland's other novels; here there are no main characters or specific individuals who are portrayed as Schwärmer. In the former novel Schwärmerei centers mainly around the fanatical priests and in

Die Abderiten the enthusiasm of the Abderites for different aspects of their community and immediate environment, such as their religion and art, are emphasized. In Die Abderiten Wieland places Schwärmerei in a position tantamount to Spießbürgerlichkeit.

Wieland basically portrays Schwärmerei as an unnatural state and the Schwärmer as owing his condition to an unnatural upbringing. There may have been some innate tendency towards deviant behaviour, but it is training that produces Schwärmerei. In most cases the child was taken from its natural parents for some reason or other and brought up by some peculiar or eccentric person. A moralistic aunt raised Don Sylvio, the Orphans were in charge of Anathon's upbringing, an eccentric grandfather was responsible for young Peregrin, and Leontides, who spoiled his charge and contributed to her self-centeredness by making her aware of her unusual feminine charms at a very early age, trained Lais. It is not the primitive child or the child that receives no upbringing that turns towards fanaticism.

In most of the novels analyzed, the hero makes an attempt, varying in degrees of effectiveness, to resolve a basic conflict which prevents him from realizing his true potential.

In Araspe und Panthea there is no solution yet in terms of overcoming Schwärmerei. The conflict is between

spiritual and erotic love and these are presented as more or less parallel to good and evil. Araspes begins as an enthusiast for divine love for Panthea, only to discover that erotic love suddenly replaces divine love. In the end he returns to a form of divine love again, but by his eager desire to risk everything for the cause that Cyrus lays before him, he demonstrates that he is as much a Schwärmer as he was at the outset. The idea of the two souls in the human breast, as presented here, is, however, of continued importance in Wieland's later works. This concept increases in significance as the author persists in his attempts to find a solution to the problem of Schwärmerei through synthesis.

Since the Schwärmer essentially owes his condition to an unnatural upbringing, he must be re-educated to Natur, that is, to a life in harmony with the world, his fellowmen, and his inner self. Thus, especially in Don Sylvio and Agathon, the Schwärmer heroes are symbols of Bildung or development. Schwärmerei, as a source of imagination, is portrayed as healthy and helpful; as a state, however, it must be overcome and the Schwärmer brought face to face with reality. What happens to the hero after his disenchantment is of secondary importance. For Don Sylvio the course more or less ends when he achieves a certain state of Natur or harmony of character through association with the well-adjusted and genuine Felicia.

Don Sylvio was a Schwärmer because of a conflict between the dream world and the real world. He lived in his world of fantasy and was unaware of his environment until he became disenchanted. After that he is suddenly able to communicate with himself and his fellowmen. When the hero is healed--not through the acceptance of some rational philosophy--everything falls into place. Agathon, however, goes beyond this. In Agathon one can talk of disenchantment too, but the change is not so complete and sudden as in Don Sylvio. During the course of his apprenticeship to life he had been cast from moral-religious to erotic to political Schwärmerei and after he became disenchanted the pendulum moves farther and farther in the direction of rationalism. It started to swing at Schwärmerei and headed towards rationalism, its opposite, actually passing Natur at mid-point. From Archytas, his humanistic mentor, he accepts a philosophy of eudaemonia which, although based on a synthesis of the animal and spiritual natures, in practice results in the subordination of the animal nature to the spiritual.

In both Die Abderiten and Peregrinus Proteus the protagonists have not been able to resolve their polar conflicts and consequently remain Schwärmer. Unlike Agathon, who finds a solution in the philosophy of Archytas, the citizens in Die Abderiten continue in their confused, emotional and irrational state, because they

cannot and are unwilling to learn from experience. By inference Wieland is expressing a pessimistic view of society and its capacity to reform. But by smiling at the people's foibles and their incapacity to shed their Schwärmer cloak, Wieland demonstrates his tolerance of humanity and at the same time devises a comforting, personal philosophy. Humour and satire, however, are not entirely satisfying answers.

Although Wieland still expresses pessimism about the possibility of reforming and educating mankind in Peregrinus Proteus, he has become much more mellow towards Schwärmerei than he was in Der goldene Spiegel. Those priests who were convinced and naive Schwärmer in Der goldene Spiegel were portrayed as a greater hazard to their fellowmen than the shrewd calculating Schwärmer who dealt out of strictly selfish motives. In Peregrinus Proteus as well as in Agathodämon the tide is reversed. In these novels there is only spite for the calculating charlatans, while the sincere honest enthusiast, although he may be ineffective, is upheld as something almost to be envied. After Lucian hears about Peregrin's experiences he is convinced of his sincerity and impressed with the beauty of the life he lived. The solution in Peregrinus Proteus is, thus, not a practical one, for the hero does not overcome his Schwärmerei, which stemmed from his intense pursuit of a satisfying relationship with the

opposite sex and a satisfying religion. The portrayal of Schwärmerei as a positive creative force, however, largely eliminates the need for the practical solution.

In Agathodämon one finds the author's second major attempt (after Agathon) to formulate by synthesis a satisfying practical solution to his dilemma. The philosophy of Archytas had been a sincere attempt to synthesize Herz and Vernunft; the author had hoped thereby to achieve Natur, the mean. The resultant submission of the animal nature to the spiritual nature (which must here be understood as man's intellect), results in a suppression of the impulsive and irrational. The pendulum, which in its final position, thus, inclined towards rationalism, swings somewhat past the mean of Natur and inclines towards Schwärmerei and irrationalism in Agathodämon.

According to Archytas, the individual had the strength within himself to bring about self-realization; Agathodämon depends on an outside force to bring this about. Where Archytas emphasized only fulfillment in this world and disregarded the idea of the next, Agathodämon is also concerned about the next world. Agathodämon realizes his own freedom and strength and finds contentment as he submits himself to and accepts his role within the framework of an all-encompassing universe, of which he is a minute yet an integral and significant part. In his conscious submission to and dependence on this god, whom he

does not understand in a completely rational way, one sees a synthesis of reason and emotion which is more satisfying than that of Agathon.

The hero of Aristipp, the kindly adaptable old man who is willing to recognize Schwärmerei, might well portray the older, mellowed Wieland, who is unwilling to sit in judgment of the Schwärmer. The question pertaining to an actual solution in this, Wieland's final novel, is somewhat problematic, inasmuch as this novel is a fragment. It seems somewhat perplexing, at first, that the philosophy of Archytas, which the author claimed to have abandoned with Agathodämon, has again gained in importance, although the deep confidence in nature, as portrayed in Agathodämon, still continues. It may, however, indicate that our author is once more attempting to arrive at a still more satisfying solution, which would be even closer to the mean, by synthesizing Agathodämon's solution with that of Archytas. These solutions both approached the mean, the former inclining slightly towards Schwärmerei or irrationalism and the latter tending towards rationalism. Whether this was the author's actual intent, I can, however, not assert.

Although Wieland's solutions tend to become increasingly more satisfying as he attempts to resolve the problem of Schwärmerei, his Urerlebnis, we cannot say that he finally resolved it once and for all. In his continuing

struggle with this problem he arrived at a series of solutions, but each time he felt the need to deal with it again. He does not, however, merely come to an armistice with the subject at the end of each novel, by simply displacing the solution to a future date, as some would say. It was inherent in the nature of Wieland to be inquisitive and he explored a variety of possible solutions in his search.

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