(W?R {U (a 9523 39.4913 r-Oq‘a 1. AZ vww- -“ ‘4' _ .t'f."“'~ ‘ 5‘ =3éble. hi me .1» ABSTRACT DEMOCRATIC SENTIMENTS IN UNIONISM A CASE STUDY OF THE U.A{W. CONVENTION by George Y. M. Won The data for this study were gathered by personal interviews of all delegates from the United Auto WOrkers Union in Lansing and Flint, Michigan who attended and were "seated" at the 17th Constitutional Con- vention of the U. A.‘W. International Union held in Atlantic City, New Jersey, October 1959. The study first tried to reconcile theoretically the apparent contradiction between two major American cultural themes -- a tradi- tional adherence to democratic values and a keen admiration and desire for maintenance of bureaucratic efficiency. It was suggested that a possible answer in the face of such opposing values was to distinguish two functionally important roles that structure the bureaucratic order -- polity decision-making and policy implementation. It was presumed that, in a democratically ordered system, these two roles are clearly distin- guishable. The primary objective of this study was to identify and analyze certain variables most concerned with role orientations of the active leadership in the locals who help make policy decisions for the Inter- national union. In this case, the delegates to the convention were ,‘l “E i u ~g. v" - 1": ‘ 7H,! Savers; ii:e::.y to r zegree the Jr- “' ‘nvav;nt: -.. H u... cu .x. (V i ram; 323. f:- .a:e: to the c . . \‘-' QV-‘-.'..‘ lv-t r.c..~“‘ u ‘c\ i». C : “‘LPECLVE c 8“ g u Lie demC’ I-"-:’-\ ‘I “‘ w . ““‘dt t; George Y. M. WOn selected as the focus of the study. The important variables considered here were organizational values, representational types, allegiance, and mobility aspirations. It was assumed that the particular orientations held by the delegates to these variables determined the character of the union organization. Several attitudinal variables were also considered which related directly to rank and file control of the organization. These were to what degree the delegates felt accountable to their constituents for actions at the convention and the extent to which they felt that the expectations of the rank and file were legitimate. These attitudinal variables were re- lated to the dimensions of role orientation listed above. For example, some prediction was made in regard to the relationship between these attitudinal variables and the delegate's commitment to democratic or bureaucratic values, whether he held primary allegiance to the local or to the International, the extent of his mobility aSpirations, his prefer- ence for upward mobility in terms of elective or appointive channels, and, finally, his concern with acting as a representative of the constituents' views and desires as against acting in the interest of the constituents irrespective of their views and general desires. In addition, the level of political activity of the local was deter- mined and this factor was presumed to condition the delegate's perception of the democratic character of his union as well as his behavior as a representative of his local. In general, some relationships were found between the role orienta- tion variables and the accountability and legitimacy variables introduced above. Also, fairly strong association between level of political activity 0' U... “'55“ E fl! .. Lei George Y. M. Won of the local and how the delegate relates himself to the members of the local was discovered. In all the data suggest that there is a strong commitment to democratic values among the convention delegates in this union. This conclusion further suggests that, in addition to certain structural guarantees, leadership in the organization must hold certain attitudes and values essential to a democratically ordered organization. DEMOCRATIC SENTIMENTS IN UNIONISM A CASE STUDY OF THE U.A.W. CONVENTION BY George Y. M. WOn A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Sociology and Anthropology 1962 Hume 1"“ ‘ M 8 . . __‘ .. .SCALS l. :. . n~-¢ . rd...“-:cg ‘. 3.. I. a; L..ES€ 9:3; I at? meant: “Va-‘1. Emilie 1;- A: . “3- ' ’n‘. “W -e : . .uL; ‘w-b ." ..' , \u ACKNOWLEDGMENTS To successfully carry out field studies of the magnitude and character herein described entails the cooperation and collaboration of many persons. The author is deeply indebted to all of them. My appreciation is first directed to the delegates of the U. A. W. locals in Flint and Lansing who readily submitted themselves to fairly prolonged interviews. The trusting and cooperative attitude demonstrated by these people toward the members of the research team provided that extra incentive that made the project a pleasant task. ‘My deepest gratitude is directed also to those various executives in the U. A. W., from the International office to the local offices, whose assistance contributed greatly to the accomplishment of this study. I wish to express special gratitude to Professor Jack Stieber, Director, Labor and Industrial Relations Center who gave me wholehearted support and encouragement to complete my graduate program. I am well aware that it was through his personal efforts I was able to pursue this particular research project. To my major adviser, Professor William A. Faunce, a valuable teacher and fellow-worker, who more often treated me as a colleague rather than a subordinate, I give sincere thanks for the many patient hours Spent on my behalf. His never failing interest in my problems and the many stimu- lating discussions we've had were encouraging especially during those moments of frustration when things didn't seem to progress rapidly enough. ii . . .- _ _',- OI- . 2'.--C\'¢ I .‘ ’ -.o" ‘. 1:05-40." 5. Q t " ‘ . ‘0 3"‘- r -‘ .. Cub Bu” A4. I believe most important I want to thank him for making me aware of the pitfalls of hasty analysis just to get the work done. It has been a great privilege for me to carry out this research project under very favorable conditions. The stimulating and chaflenging ideas emanating from the staff of the Labor and Industrial Relations Center helped the author clarify his thoughts concerning the central pro- blem of research. In this regard Special thanks go to Professors William H. Form, Einar Hardin (who also served on my Guidance Committee), and Charles P. Larrowe. It was my pleasure to consult with the other members of my Guidance Committee and this is certainly an appropriate moment to thank them for their help in my graduate program. Sincere thanks to Professors Archie O. Haller, Iwao Ishino, and Donald Olmsted. For assistance given me in the field work, I thank the Research Assistants of the Labor and Industrial Relations Center -- Heinz Bloch, Steven Deutsch, William Eddy, Murray Frost, and Paul Vaughan. My sincere thanks to Mrs. Donna Bernard and Mrs. Kathleen Wode of the Labor and Industrial Relations Center for the typing of the final manuscript. For inSpiration and moral support, I thank my wife, Irene. ‘With patience, efficiency, and ability, she projected the Spirit of enthusiasm into the typing of the first draft of this research project. Truthfully, my son Gregory hindered the progress of the work by demanding equal time. iii “u .... .L n._ 1 v r u .r\ ., a 3! .\\. o-u A "5 HP. \c S I 0.5 ..w an ”n I 9.1. I. P '5‘ V v . . VL r mi“ QL “L tL I Va. a u Hun “L. I I I .. I I u i VI.‘ V hill“ T. . TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I A REVIEW OF SOME THEORIES AND RESEARCH RELATED TO UNIONISM, LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATIONS, AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 0.0.0....OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO... 1 Introduction 0000000000ooooo00000000oooooooooooooooooooooooo 1 A. A Perspective on the American Trade Union Movement 00.000ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooococo. 1 B. Theory of Organization -- Bureaucratization ....... 9 CO Bureaucracy in a Democracy oooooooooooooooooooooooo 16 D. Studies of Union Democracy ........................ 26 II THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ............................... 41 I. Concerning the Structural Forms of the Convention ...... 41 A. The Role of the Convention in Trade Union Democracy ......................................... 43 B. The Function of the Convention .................... 46 C. Democratic Forms of the Convention ................ 49 D. The Importance of the Role of the Delegate ........ 53 II. Procedural Concerns .................................... 61 A. Initiation of the Study ........................... 61 B. The Interview Schedule ............................ 63 C. The Interview ..................................... 65 III THE INTERNAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION ....................... 68 IntrOdUCtion 0.00.000...0.0.00000.00000...0.0000000000000000o 68 A. Leadership Selection Process - General Qualifications 00......OCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOO0...... 68 B0 Government 0f the Union " The convention 090000000 77 C. Impressions of the Convention Proceedings ......... 84 D. Delegate Feelings About the Convention ............ 87 IV THE DELEGATE 0.00.00.0000.00.00.0000.0.0.0....000.000.00.00. 94 IntrOductj-On 0.0.0....OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOOO... 94 A. BaCkground CharaCteriStiCS oooooooooooooooooooooooo 94 B. Experience in the Labor Movement .................. 100 C. The Local Environment ............................. 105 D. Role Orientation .................................. 108 B. Social Characteristics and Role Orientation ....... 136 F. Social Background Characteristics and Mobility Orientation .......................... 149 iv 5;:7 F THE ( Ittr: o (v- '¥oa- . 1“ nyu?“~~. b“. ' ‘- . O I . 9,‘~ :1 - .A/‘u'. I ‘- AUQJJAV‘“D_ .I ‘c 1“ Chapter Summary of Delegate Role and Mobility Orientation .......... A. Organizational values (Democratic Participation versus Bureaucratic Efficiency) ..... B. Allegiance ........................................ C. Representational Types ............................ D. ‘Mobility Orientation .............................. V THE CONVENTION DELEGATE AND TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY .......... Introduction: Factors Associated with Democratic Sentiments .................................. A. Delegate's Perception of the Union as a Democratic Organization ........................... B. Delegate's Perception of the Convention and his Role in the Decision-Making process ........... C. Reasons for First Becoming Active in the Union Movement .................................... D. Delegate's Career Orientation ..................... E. Level of Political Activity of Local .............. F. Delegate Role Orientation ......................... CODClUSion O...0.00.00.00.0000.0.00...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO VI SIJWARYANDCONCLUSION OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOIOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO I. Democracy in Large-Scale Bureaucratic Organizations .... A. Defining Structure of Bureaucracy ................. B. Defining Structure of Democracy ................... C. Adaptation of Democratic Structure in Bureaucratic Organizations ........................ D. The Case of Democratic Unionism ................... II. The Importance of Motivation or Orientation to Democratic Values ...................................... A. A Review of Some Findings ......................... B. Some Inferences Concerning Organizational Processes coco...coo-cocoa...0000000000000ooooooooo APPENDIX OOOOOOOOOOO...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOCOOO0.00.00.00.00 BIBLIOGRAPI-IY OOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO Page 160 162 163 163 164 166 166 171 184 188 190 197 200 206 210 210 211 212 214 216 219 220 226 228 258 II s at. .Arw . A. A." .C .. .L AI. .I I ._ . I l I . . . .C a .C .v A.“ S M.“ .0” Ms» M.» NIL“ AI. MN» .Au Ail» ”Au. Ms... .A .t . . c ,2. I .Ad .3. c J U «C. $1.34 C ”be . I. Cu A A 0 S Cu 5 .11» S In... Alb 3 3“. I) 6 I] Ac 9 m l 1'. I o I I D I I I I i . . I I I I I I I . A u I \ I I I . I I D I I I I I I I I I Q 0 I I , I I , I I I J A I . I I , . I z . I I I I I I I I I I I I I ,, I I I I I I I a . . I I I I n O I . I I I . A I I a . A I I I I I I _ o I I I I o I I c I I I , a I I I I I . o I A. _ I _ I I I I l I I I I I I I . I t o . . U .. I I I I I I I I I Q I I I . I I _ A I . I I I I I . I I U o H I o I I I I _ I . I I u I I I I o . a I I a I I I I I I I I I I I I . , I I . u I . l O t ' o O o O Q A . I I I I I o I I I I I I I I I _ I I o I I I I I a I I I I 0 I I I I _ . I V I 1 H I . I I I I I I I I I , I ._ I I , a ._ A a I . I l / O I C I ' C I I U C I I ' I o I I I I I . ., I I u I _ I I . I I n I . . . I I U I I I o I I I . I A I I I I .I I I I I a I I I I c I I . I _ I I J I I I I I I I 0 a I _ I I I I a o I Q I I I I 0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I . I I I I I I . o I I I I I I I I I c I o O I I I I O I I I O I n . I I I I I I 1w . I o I I I I I I I A I I I I I I I I v o I I I I I I I I I o I I a I . I Q I I A. o A I I I . I I I I I I I . I O a I I I I I I I I I 0 I Q I I I I I I I O I I I I I I I I I I . I I o v I I I I I I I 4 I I I I I O I I I I I I I I I o I I I I I I I I I I I I c I I I u I x I I I I 0 I O I I I O I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I . I I . I I I I I {Ir}, . ‘4.— ii i I-“ “J, Number 1 10 11 12 13 LIST OF TABLES Important purposes of the convention as enumerated by the delegates 0.0.0.0..0000......OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO The three most important issues facing the U.A;W. as perceived by the convention delegates ................. Specific issues listed as the most important by con- vention delegates COO...O..00.0.0...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO A comparison of age distribution between the total sample of convention delegates to the 17th U.A;W. constitutional convention and the delegates from the Flint-Lansing study .................................. A comparison of educational experience of delegates to the 17th U.A;W. constitutional convention and the Flint-LanSing delegation OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00......O Occupational classification of Flint-Lansing dele- gates to the 17th constitutional convention .............. Social class identification by Flint-Lansing dele- gates to the 17th U.A;W. constitutional convention ....... Household income of delegates to the 17th U.A{W. con— stitutional convention from Flint and Lansing ............ Number of years a member of a labor uninn for the Flint_LanSing delegates 0.0...OOOCOOOCOOOOOCCOOOOO00...... Union positions held by the delegates to the 17th constitutional convention from Flint and Lansing ......... Score distribution from the political activity scale for the Flint‘LanSing dalegates IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Importance of maintaining position held in the union among the Flint'LanSing delegates IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Importance of moving up to a higher position in the union among the Flint-Lansing delegates .................. vi Page 89 90 92 95 96 96 97 99 101 103 107 111 112 ‘6': [I , I” r,’ .' '5 o o ............. ooooooooo oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo .............................. ............................. .............. cccccccc ....................... ooooooooo ooooooooooooo ,,,,,,,,,,,, ................ ..... ...... [,2 n h’u“ 0“.) (3“ 33 LA) L‘ Number 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Experience in the labor movement and importance 0f mOVing Up in the union COO...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO. Experience in the U.A;W. and importance of moving up ....... Age and importance of moving up in the union with experience in labor movement controlled .................. Age and importance of moving up with experience in UOAOW. contrOII-ed 0.0.0.0.....0.000000IOOOOOOOO0.0.000... Score distribution for representational types for the Flint-Lansing delegates 00000000000000.0000.oooooooooo Score distribution on the allegiance scale for the Flint'LansiIIg delegates 00......00.0.00...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO Distribution of Guttman scale types on the democra- tic values versus bureaucratic values Spectrum ........... Age level and organizational values ........................ Age level and Allegiance .o................................. Age level and representational types ....................... Educational level and organizational values ................ Educational level and allegiance ........................... Educational level and representational types ............... Income levels and organizational values .................... Income levels and allegiance .o............................. Income levels and representational types ................... Community-type and organizational values ................... Community-type and allegiance .............................. Community-type and representational types .................. Job classification and organizational values ............... Job classification and allegiance .......................... Job classification and representational types .............. Age and mObility orientation 00000000000000.000000000000000. vii Page 113 114 115 116 120 126 134 137 138 139 140 140 141 142 142 142 146 146 147 148 149 149 152 n_-. ‘— hug .. I )A V. .y...‘ C“—-—-- \. 4....” fl» . Q Q Q «k filu. \v c s «P; Y.’ *4 \ A . ‘4 . 1 a I II .2 L .t 1.. ,1. .. ... . a .2 _ .1.“ .9“- ...s vnlu .C .t 5 LB 1‘. r: .. .s 3; Hr.‘ Lu. . I 1H“ t d T . .l 1:. 3C “5 L.“ to t . .A A L\ .ws » . l n. \ D C D D Tm R; DE 9 a W all alyh ,.§. D I) .3 ”I‘d“ V.” “b | ‘ . . . . U ' ‘ . . . . . o o n n n a . O C y 0 O ‘ l . . . o . . . l I I D l I O O n o o o o y a u a u I I x l O O D O I . . . . . . . . ‘ ‘ . . . . . . . . . . . . v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c . . . . a . . . . . . a . . . . Number 37 38 39 4O 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 Educational level and mobility orientation ................. Race and mobility orientation .............................. Job classification and mobility orientation ................ Job satisfaction and mobility orientation .................. Income and mobility orientation ............................ Geographical origin of delegate and mobility orientation ... Community-type and mobility orientation .................... Social interaction on job and mobility orientation ......... Fellow workers in neighborhood and mobility orientation .... Father's occupation and mobility orientation ............... Delegate's definition of trade union democracy ............. Reasons given by delegates to why they consider it very important that a union be run democratically ........ Delegate's perception of how democratically his union is run in comparison to other International unions ....... Criteria used for making comparative judgment concerning the delegate's union vis-a-vis other unions on how democratically it is run 0......000.0..0.0.....00.0...0000 Delegate's perception of how democratically his local is run in comparison to other locals in the union ........ Delegate's perception of membership voice in union government comparéd to 20 years ago 0.....0.00..0......0.. Level of political activity of delegate's local and his perception of membership voice in union government ... Responses given by the delegates to the question: would you say that the really important decisions in the union are made by the convention? .0.0....0.0.0.0..0.0 Delegate's perception of local constituent's attitude toward the convention as a policy-decision-making body ... viii Page 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 159 160 160 172 175 177 178 179 182 183 185 186 . - l was t: LIL’ :-_' '1-'..-__.__' M RISE! r . g . g - . - ................ . :1 7v”? d, "r-“.l 3: DE‘J‘LL ‘. . g. 'A 1 33 Sc.t:: - 0 4 . of : c Q C 0 I ' p I 1 . u o a I 0 . . 0 . A 1 r - /‘ n.2'“. OJ bc§L5£ 5‘11: I! ‘ . . - - - N Ségt.‘ act . u u 0 a 0 0 . D 0 ’7, ' v a. x‘It. C32 5* ~ 1 uéVt. C C I . U C . ... ,_. i \‘T ‘3 6‘ ALLL c: Orr- cunt-0 65 u. I Number Page 56 Level of political activity at the local and delegate's perception of his constituent's attitude toward the convention 0.0...0..0.0...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.0.... 188 57 Explanation given by delegates for deciding to become active in the union movement ............................. 189 58 Selected channels of career orientation and attitude toward membership right of expectations .................. 193 59 Selected channels of career orientation and feelings 0f POIitical pressures from the local 0....0000.0.00.0.000 195 60 Selected channels of career orientation and concern with accounting behavior to the local constituents ....... 195 61 Selected channel of mobility and justification of actions to the members who react unfavorably ............. 197 62 Level of political activity of local and delegates' concern with their constituent's reactions ............... 198 63 Level of political activity of local and delegates' concern With CODStituent'S expeCtationS ..000000.000.00000 199 64 Allegiance and representational types ...................... 201 65 Organizational values and representational types ........... 201 66 Organizational values and legitimacy of expectations ....... 203 67 Organizational values and accountability ................... 203 68 Allegiance and legitimacy of expectations .................. 204 69 Allegiance and accountability .............................. 204 70 Representational types and legitimacy of expectations C.OOOCCCCOCOCOOOOO0.0.0.0...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 205 71 Representational types and accountabiliy ................... 205 ix ‘ l.g_~fl‘! -' ,1. .'-.d -x . . p- 0—4 In Ln K r. LéttLL (‘1 rd 7.! n) U '1 ,0 "I (J ’1 In H {I to "J LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix A Issues listed as of first importance by U.A.W. convention dalegates 0.0.00COOOOOOOOOIOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOI0.. Locals and number of delegate representation by cities ..... Letter from Director, Region l-C, U.A.W. to Region l-C delegates to the 1959 Constitutional Convention Of the UQAOW. 00......000.......0...OOOIOOOOOOOOCOOOOOO... Political activity scale and critical ratios for the items on the Scale 0000.000..00000000.000.0...0.000000 Representational type scale and critical ratios for the items on the scale 0000.00.0.0.0.00....00000000000 Allegiance scale and critical ratios for the items on the scale OIOOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.00.000.000.0.0.0... Method of computing critical ratios for scale items ........ InterVieW SChedule 0.00.0...O...00.0.00...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO Page 228 229 230 231 233 235 236 237 1...?!“ «~— -—--I a o o u . . "T-‘4.‘ .uLt‘- Uv\. '- '- -.‘A it?“ 2 Sky. oi . '. '_ “5 ‘ :3: 1.03.” 7' v " - .41 tracn. I. - .43: a: ails: :2 Lie 1:41: ALu v ‘3‘ £336 of l ._;- Cratzc i; I n r" I r? :4 H H . — — — 5133;, «“1133, 093-: Ix) may- . ‘ i‘-‘. h ”‘2‘; ‘L‘A‘ \ N3 2‘- N CHAPTER I A REVIEW OF SOME THEORIES AND RESEARCH RELATED TO UNIONISM, LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATIONS, AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES Introduction: We are faced with a pervasive contradiction in American society today: 1) human organizations operate on such a scale that the individual seems insignificant in the complex structure; 2) our traditional adherence to democratic political processes demands that we allot and maintain a measure of significance to the individual. In the light of such a paradox, it seems a legitimate task to examine one type of large-scale organization, the trade union, to see how a democratic ideology emerged given the prevailing structure of human ins titutions . A. A Perspective on the American Trade Union Movement A Trade Union, as we understand the term, is a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or imprOVing the conditions of their employment. Sociologically Speaking, the trade union may be viewed as a formal organization which evolved from a collective reSponse to a common Problem. The underlying dynamics of the American labor movement appear to be generally similar to those of Western Europe. Certainly the o . . O O I O O 2 . 1118 titutional conditions were quite Similar. However, labor relations 1Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, New Edition, opening statement, Chapter I, New York: Longmans, Green 6: Co., 1902. 2Robin M. Williams, Jr., American Society: A Sociological Inter- W, New York: Alfred A. KnOpf, 1955, p. 185. ~ |-. :‘a J \ 12 543-8“ “c its :urcpe i. . 3:76.296: 11‘. ”I" : ’1"; ' u a .ri‘ntdi. 21:3; tor a: E 16331?th tie contract; irséiizent t; Along '. as a Illicit ( u _ a“ but tin. :‘a‘xr in a c, in America developed in an economy in some re3pects unlike that of its European counterpart. Broadly speaking, American labor relations developed in an economy of relative abundance, sparcity of population and a frontier of open resources. ‘Within this kind of environment, making for an open-class structure, and with a religious desire for a democratic political order, certain unique features characterized American labor relations. From the beginning labor developed an individualistic orientation. The American worker did have his tradi- tional social ties. But, as Williams demonstrates, American workers were more heterogeneous than European workers which prevented them from developing, at an early stage, a tradition of solidarity among themselves as a working class.3 The emphasis on individualismé and the contractual nature of labor-management relations proved a great :impediment to the development of unionism in America. Along with this individualistic orientation, labor was regarded as a market commodity. This was no different from the European situ- c'Elii.‘.:i.on but the environmental conditions in America peculiarly placed Zléibor in a seller's market while in EurOpe the situation was more nearly the reverse. Thus, in the latter case, a paternalistic system ‘fléis more likely to develop along with personalized ties and notions of rMDblesse-oblige not too different from the fairly recent feudalistic Ilattern. For the American situation the market bargain became the bond 31bid., pp. 185-186. 4The tradition of Protestant Ethics -- individual re8ponsibility and advancement through personal effort -- contributed to this individualistic Orientation. See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons, New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1958. See also, Paul Sulton, Labor Economics, New York: Henry Hblt & Col, 1957, pp. 33-34. . '- mrjifl‘ u. "‘Iéva .41: . . . . ,pa ‘0. , . 5‘3. pip-fir , . ' .‘n q. " . :'\‘: y" totL ltisi u n '5‘. \I‘—-_¢- am. Illuiu £.n~'....;...' J -9 Anio‘ QUMG¢ob . q’;q--qb-A‘ L. . rc-ItuLCu L3. Sena-er. the i 9:..ZiCal grj and employer-employee relations were tied primarily by the impersonal basis of the cash nexus. It is important to note that the economic systems of Western Europe and America were the same -- i.e. a capitalistic system. However, the features described above presented a uniqueness to the American labor movement apart from.the similarity of the institutional base. The individualistic orientation and the fluid class structure not only prevented the rapid formation of a class ideology and thereby the possibility of rapid unionization, but also explains the relative absence of political emphasis at this early stage. The underlying theme to be emphasized here is the compatibility between the individualistic philosoPhy and the desire for a democratic jpolitical order. The impersonal market situation contributed to both of 'these orientations. The employee was free to quit his job any time he zaleased and the employer was free to release his worker any time it be- <=£une necessary. However, this kind of reasoning did not square with the eVolving moral order. Each party, still adhering to the individualistic Iihlilosophy, held a firm belief in its ”rights," and these so-called ITights were very often incompatible.6 What was believed to be an insti- tllltional principle -- the right to operate the business as one sees fit -- Cliallenged the worker's rights to improve himself. In this reSpect, as 5Attention is directed to "The Principle of Voluntarism” as expounded by'Samuel Gompers during the early formation of the A. F. of L. A brief SUmmary of this principle is explained in the following: Clyde E. Dankert, .antempora y Unionism in the U. 8., Chapter 6, "Principles and Activities of the American Federation of Labor," New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948, PP. 89-103. 6Robin M. Williams, Jr., gp.cit., p. 188. em! A‘“¢F‘R v‘: ‘. -q""\‘-._ u: can”. gza. aczzevgg .‘, ‘ a. 1—. Lag.¢. 4...... :. :— &.:cti“€ £k1 1 {fie-gill" 0 remtile the Eliérprise 3: “tier to at: 5"- ‘5 F ’ ._- I «IA ““115: the mm c: Williams noted, labor relations were (and are) essentially moral relations. Businessmen's vehement claim to the sanctity of the internal affairs of the enterprise was now challenged by labor's claim for a voice in these affairs. The result of this was a continuous struggle between these two forces, each ironically holding on to their individualistic philosoPhy and desirous of maintaining a democratic political order. The fact that both forces held the same philos0phies was crucial in the selection of the arena in which the "battle” was to take place. American unions have been primarily capitalistic--they have fought for economic gains within the given system. Although there were a few attempts made by radicals, American unionism never became a large-scale political movement. Its emphasis was on peaceful expansion with tangible gains as the primary goal achieved through sound business principles. 8 Initially for labor this individualistic orientation was self- defeating in any kind of a struggle for so-called "rights." The idea of "free-will" or self determination associated with the concept failed to reconcile the fact that labor was still a commodity in the productive enterprise and, as such, the impersonal market base pitted worker against Worker to achieve an equilibrium on the price of labor. Though the individualistic orientation was consistent with democratic sentiments, the market exchange system did not incorporate such values. Ideas cOncerning civil rights emphasized the individual while rational economics had no place for such a sentiment. Of course entrepreneurs readily accepted this basic idea of self-determination for bargaining power clearly 71bid., p. 188. 8Clyde E. Dankert, 92.cit. k .yy-. :...£ ‘ »~~~ y" ‘y' D ‘5 .mw-b c. :q":“ ‘ J 2.-.“.ucu I - v ”~na ‘- fé.l.uc a p'. se:t;:x':.ts vi. ‘ v LIa;~‘.- F “10 ~ U 6- The f; fut“- Carats ; :5; - . remained beyond the reach of labor as long as this orientation was maintained. Nevertheless, the fundamental condition which promoted this individualistic orientation in turn worked to secure a unity for the preservation of a common interest. Trade unionism could never have existed where such fundamental individual rights as freedom of Speech, press, and assembly were denied. The tradition of individualism nurtured basic democratic sentiments which formed the basis of early collective bargaining. It must be recognized, however, that some individualism was relinquished in the area of labor relations to form a unity that would provide a power base for a particular kind of relationship. Democratic sentiments were carried over into early unionism perhaps with less re- servation than noted in the contemporary setting. The turbulent and explosive character of early unionism depicted the extent to which militancy (expressed suppressed individual views. In briefly summarizing the general orientation of the American trade IJIIion movement, two important points have been emphasized: l) the similarity of institutional bases upon which Western European and American trade unions emerged--the capitalistic system; 2) the assertion of indivi- ‘1tLal "rights" which was essentially a manifestation of a strong adherence ‘t&> a.basic democratic sentiment. This second point is esPecially important Since it was at this incipient stage that the idea of democracy became entrenched strongly enough in the mind of the American worker to become a tradition guarded with zeal. The first point made above enabled theorists to make some general Statements in regard to the trade union movement in Western society. From these theories of the labor movement one notes the dynamic character of the capitalistic system. It is quite apparent that it was this system of e312; one: :21? at the :7 3 Séfiéts Id. :EL...3tI&IL. a;" «an: -. .G.'.. 31": d... - ‘9 l‘ . v v « 3‘ Berg. 9%.. o... .3 . tw:at:.‘:-‘ {— t 33% int‘ \ ‘x AOJI- othet C‘ x .: I “Emu: . .F “' SO val , “ t: It a~41 .abfiv ‘ Rd tn. ‘\ economic orientation that had given impetus to the labor movement not only at the incipient stage but during subsequent periods of growth. Commons, in illustrating this particular thesis, saw that the extension of markets had been an important influence on the growth of unions.9 He illustrated his points be describing the types and forms into which labor organizations developed in the shoemaking industry at different stages of the market evolution (i.e., handicraft to factory). Expansion of the market meant intensified competition in the sale of products -- e.g., shoes made in Philadelphia competed increasingly with shoes made in New York, Baltimore, and other cities. The merchant capitalist appeared, playing off small masters against each other and forcing them to cut wages in order to survive. This particular activity seriously ‘threatened the journeymen's customary way of life and thus forced them to move into some defensive action -- organization. Concomitantly, growth of markets meant improvements in tranSpor- tation. The impact of this was a greater labor mobility. Journeymen, formerly secure in their status, were threatened by an influx of workers from other cities and also by Eur0pean immigrants who were willing to 1ltldercut the established wage scale. This meant the search for some means 10 'tfi) control this type of competition. In addition, the growth of markets also fostered the division of liibor and the development of larger production units. With the ever irising size of the business enterprise, it became more difficult for the 9John R. Commons, ”American Shoemakers, 1648-1895: A Sketch of Industrial Evolution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 24 (1910), pp. 39-84. loIbid., p. 44. u e-terprisixg i pcrzenid a Si 2:113: 33 is: the paprictsr rise of a 9.: imbped :i . Per liar. Hat 3% lam-:3 2F?3It‘.1:itics ““ as a ris 1e ‘31- Scarci S}; .1 - “'36 C: an. enterprising individual to start an independent business. All these portended a widening rift between employers and workers for the journey- man had no foreseeable chance to rise to the master's level and eventually the proprietor class. From such a disenchanted group Commons saw the rise of a permanent group of wage-earners and it was this group that developed and nourished unionism. Perlman11 derived his concept of job-conscious unionism out of what he interpreted to be the psychological characteristics of laborers. In this particular thesis he maintained that the typical manual worker is consciously aware of his limitations for availing himself of economic opportunities in the complex matrix of modern business. The competitive business would appear too complex for him and he doesn't perceive him- self as a risk taker. With this is added a conviction that the world is cxne of scarcity set up by the institutional order in which the best Opportunities are reserved for the landlords, capitalists and other Privileged groups. Being scarcity conscious, the group then asserts its CKDILlective ownership over the entire amount of opportunity making it ‘alféiilable among its recognized membership. In this respect, free competi- tiic>n now becomes a sin against one's fellows and an anti-social act.12 Perlman further noted that labor, though constantly straining toward SCMcial reforms, had been successful "only when it limited its efforts to tluose changes which did not turn loose a veritable hornets' nest of 11Selig Perlman, A.Theory of the Labor Movement, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1928. lzlbid., p. 242. l, :l mic-22ml” A N ’ REV?“ .u- - I , . . -a no -"‘3" .. a... or -! ‘ Qu-quq ' :c Q “U bU5>.v.a to as“ n0~ v '- Lk~.CLC.} a» n a. n.; a 'V: O Ub 5...)..5 A; ~“‘9"H" l-‘=53u-p l: --~o.' .- 5:.u32$ C. I: a::: .a:-:.r have :1. \ 13 I 56:1, :tSIIial Rt I: Y c 4;- ‘ ”'5" " P ' <3: (LZLL ‘3 r." lCJ-leé. 13. ‘ ‘ LIGHT; #Lewagd, \3 socio-political opposition."13 Reynolds sees the deve10pment of strong union organization only in an urban, industrial economy.14 He notes that where industrial pro- duction has scarcely gained a toe-hold, union organization is almost completely absent. Strongly implied is the thesis of concomitant growth of unions with industrial growth.15 Moreover, the growth of union membership in recent decades has come about through the penetration of unionism into new sectors of the economy -- among new industries, and new sections of the country where new plants and new jobs have arisen.16 In appraising the role of unionism under capitalism, students of 17 labor have not arrived at any agreement. For the purpose of this 13Selig Perlman, "Theory of the Labor Movement -- A Reappraisal," from Itndustrial Relations Research Association, Proceedings of Third Annual Imeeting (Chicago, Illinois, Dec. 28-29, 1950), Part IV, Concluding Remarks, pp. 165- 168. 14Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations, 2nd edition, E'l'lglewood, New Jersey: Hentice-Hall, Inc., 1956, pp. 33-34. lslbid o 3 PP. 38-39 0 16Ibid., pp. 50-54. 17The following represent the divided Opinions on some of the theories presented above. A. From IRRA, Proceedings, Part VI, "Theory of the Labor Movement -- A Reappraisal,” (Chicago, Illinois, Dec. 28-29, 1950): 1. Philip Taft, "Commons-Perlman Theory: A Summary" pp. 140-145. 2. J. B. S. Hardman, "From.Job-Consciousness to Power Accumu- lation" pp. 146-157. 3. David Kaplan, "Job Conscious Unionism as a Form of Economic Citizenship," pp. 169-171. 4. Russell 8. Bauder, (A discussant) pp. 169-171. 5. Philip'M. Kaiser, (A discussant) pp. 172-176. 6. Everett Kassalow, (A discussant) pp. 177-183. B. From Industrial and Labor Relations Review: 1. C. A. Gulick and M. K. Bers, "Insight and Illusions in Perlman's Theory of the Labor Movement," 6 (July 1953), pp. 510-531. 2. A. Sturmthal, "Comments on Selig Perlman's A Theory of Tnese m pt; Date the ex: ' I. I." 1: Feat ..-’ ‘I -'¢ 0-" -.‘~ ~33L.Luts:..d- 5». .. : «attrqgt‘oq S l.“ \ F: D. A. \ 1n 6,, nar: ‘1... _ . “NH 3. ’ . 19* I a. la;; “’33-‘Hv n "LY o “ ' d 0‘ 0r study, the historical perspectives presented above were included primarily to illustrate two evolutionary trends within the trade-union movement which are of relevance: 1) the steady, though at times irregular, growth of union organizations which in essence is a consequence of the dynamic character of the capitalistic system, 2) the changing character of political orientation -- from individualism to group (class) identity. These two points present our problem for this study. In point #1, we note the emergent problems of management of large-scale organizations, in point #2, we note the adaptibility of human beings to the changing institutional structure of a dynamic society. B. Theory of Organization -- Bureaucratization The concept "organization" has reference to a system of inter- eaction. More specifically it has reference to the structure of this ianteraction system to the extent that it has some bearing on the achieve- Insult of the group's goal.18 To Parsons, this "primary of orientation to the attainment of a Specific goal" is the unique characteristic about an 19 Organization which makes it distinguishable from other types of social systems. the Labor Movement," 4 (July 1951), pp. 483-496. 3. Philip Taft, ”A Rereading of Selig Perlman's A Theory of the Labor Movement," 4 (Oct. 1950), pp. 70-77. C. Other theorists not discussed but with essentially the theme of psycho-social adaptation are: Robert F. Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United States, New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1920; and Frank Tannenbaum, ”The Social Function of Trade Unionism,” The Political Science Quarterly, 52 (June 1947), p. 176. 18Harry‘M. Johnson, Sociology: A Systematic Introduction, New York: ‘Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1960, p. 280. 19Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations - 1," Administrative Science Quarterly, 1 (1956), p. 640 i I Ann... - . ‘Q"‘ 0‘ -,4 .bhtgrakéon L- a “u-- :1 ~ ,.- :“~..A “(1“tnt CI: : ‘— fiiJns . -.. .- L“: ‘ q - ‘Jllctle- ‘ he 7'. "z“: a 4 L ‘ L -'. . p'._- ‘\-\:13FS I. h~c Ix.) '— -J — 10 Since organizations are task oriented, the nature of the task becomes the chief determinant of the character of the organization.20 Organiza- tion, then, is a cdflective effort to get a job done and it is this fact which places it in a tenuous position. Organizational survival depends upon the achievement of particular goals. Thus, the organization is subject to crisis situations, which in extreme cases may lead to dis- integration of the organization or to an increase of the feeling of solidarity among the membership and a resurgence of goal direction. As an example, a union's decision to strike presents a major crisis situation since its impact may have far reaching consequences. Thus, in the case where the strike is prolonged, external pressures may bear upon the organization and either force the weakening of organizational ties or increase the feeling of hostility toward out-groups and further solidify group cohesiveness. Where organizational survival is at stake, the organization may become a fighting force.21 The existence of relatively frequent crisis situations helps to explain the militant character of unions. There are three ”decision-making” processes, which have primacy in the functioning of the organization.22 The first is policy decisions, which, in essence, commit the organization to particular goals. Thus, the "bread and butter" goals of American unionism reflect the kinds of policy decisions made. Because at this level the organization as a_whglg is committed and thereby the interest of every member of the organization 20Edward A. Ross, "The Organization of Effort," American Journal of Sociology, 22 (1916), pp. 1-18. 21Ibid. 22 Talcott Parsons, gp.cit., pp. 70-80. £1 E V ,v .' 9 .x 3 i L I g g 5 by. 11 affected, the manner in which important policy decisions are authorized becomes particularly crucial. In democratic organizations the value orientation of the membership at large determines the legitimacy of policy decisions made by those in authority. Decision-making functions may also require the support of the membership in order to have any meaningful force. A.threat to strike may be ineffective if management discerns a note of apathy on the part of union membership at large, union leadership claims notwithstanding. Thus, support is essential for the organization and in order to have this, there must be consensus in regard to group actions. The second process is one of allocative decisions. As the organiza- tion becomes larger and/or because of its complexity there arises a need for the distribution of resources within the organization. Ross refers to this as the "Spacing between the organized."23 Individuals, by their knowledge and training, are set apart from others and the relation of superior and subordinate become rationalized. Wilensky's study of "intellectuals" in labor unions seems to support the idea that this rationalization is essential for the effecient functioning of the union organization.24 The final process is one which essentially presents a facade of unity and coherence for the organization--coordinated decisions. Maintenance of this facade may take any one or a combination of three fundamental forms. Parsons refers to these forms as: 1) co-ercion, 23Edward Ross, gp.cit. 24Harold Wilensky, Intellectuals in Labor Unions, chapter 6, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956. . - . 4 ‘A ‘4“. ‘q," -) Lawn“ “' C negatlve an: H cs::a:;s:, OI raver: 1: so: a A fix! ‘0- 62,.-Cb C. In 1 c::;.ex a2: _; 0, .¢.'-.' - , L3 5d5.:'.att- 0'... _ _ sac Weft 0 :Z r O f I H (TI (‘3 n ‘(J u 1 l. 5' in eok§nctlen o .\~tlons ‘- \. 12 25 2) inducement, and 3) "therapy." Coercion and Inducement are, in order, negative and positive sanctions. Thus coercion may involve reprimand, ostracism, or expulsion while inducements may involve commendation and/or reward in some tangible form, e. g., promotion. The third formr-therapy-- is applied on a more subtle plane. As Parsons puts it, ". . . by a complex and judicious combination of measures the motivational obstacles to satisfactory cooperation are dealt with on a level which 'goes behind' the overt ostensible reasons given for the difficulty by the persons involved."26 Therefore, in terms of latent and manifest functions, the socializing activities promoted by the group may have consequences far beyond the immediate pleasures enjoyed by the individual members. Implicit in these types of decision-making processes is the reduction of direct participation or control in all phases of organizational functions on the part of the general membership. Allocative decisions and £27 ordinated decisions need not be made by the membership at large to fulfill the democratic criteria. What is crucial for democratic control is that policy decisions be clearly reserved for the constituency at large. This distinction between implementation functions and policy decision-making functions would allow one to reconcile the apparent contradiction in large- scale voluntary organizations, such as trade unions, in a democratic setting. Ross states that the primary problem for unions is institutional survival.27 This is true for any type of organization. In this reSpect 25Talcott Parsons, gp.gl£., pp. 79-80. 26Ibid. 27Arthur M. Ross, Trade Union Wage Poligy, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1956. {I H 5—: 5-..“. . -4 . - -v-1' . F ‘7‘ ‘L- ..5 II... R. A 'V .2..-'- r ‘dobvun t: Ln 5:1-.. -..,....‘ Lou-0‘. :UQ‘O ‘ - "'\~. 5 . .. - u‘ _ ‘ M:nss tut I " .. ' :s’ "'r"‘~ . dukg‘. -A~$~ \ E 53196::ed to . a‘. - ‘3 AQ‘\ ,- “‘=3I’y o 1 e I ‘- ‘n A. 3‘ ."i'u " i; A a ‘§U. r39 ~s O a; ., n. ‘ L‘anslao :K2f A- L “j 1332‘) \a 5v A «1 1' ~'... 9?‘ v_ ‘. \“ . ‘J‘f . 13 the "cultural," "educational" and "expressive" functions are not necessar- ily reserved for what Parsons refers to as the pattern-maintenance organi- zations.28 Nearly all organizations perform some peripheral function, which, to the proper functionary, fulfills a manifest desire for institu- tional survival. When and where exactly an organization evolves into a bureaucracy is not clearly defined. A reasonable point of departure may be the classical definition of Weber. In general, the ideal conceptualization depicts the organization as highly rational and impersonal in the 29 structuring of interpersonal relationships. These characteristics are expected to provide the basis for technical efficiency, which is congruent with modern economic theory. Broom and Selznick, in their definition of bureaucracy, emphasize the importance of the formal structural aSpects of administration.30 Perhaps this particular interpretation arises from the fact that the term bureaucracy originally referred to the administra- tion of government by means of bureaus, e.g., tax, communications, military, etc.31 What particular compartments of large-scale organizations may be defined as bureaus is not at issue here. The fact that bureaus are a functional part of large-scale organization is our particular concern. 28Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organization - 11," Administrative Science Quarterly, 1 (1956), pp. 228-229. 29Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, editors and translators, Egoquax Weber: Essays in Sociology, (New York: Galaxy Book, 1958) 30Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, Sociology, 2nd edition, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1960, p. 210. 1 . . 3 Kimball Young and Raymond W. Mack, Sociology and Soc1a1 Life, New York: American Book Company, 1959, p. 435. .Y-:‘:-“ . ; CLA..3LCICM :' \- 5",- the 5):; Q :“- :— .: ““CW‘W nJJ h .. K'OCL. .‘1‘ :0 y.‘_‘\‘. 33:: . 14 In this resPect large-scale organization becomes synonymous with bureau- m- Gouldner, in his well known treatment of organization analysis discusses two distinct approaches: 1) rational-model, 2) natural-system model.32 The rational model type of organization is conceived as an "instrument." Behavior is viewed as rational and changes are rationally administered and viewed as a device to improve efficiency. Any departure from.the explicit rules of procedure may be regarded as random mistakes. In reflecting the impersonal character of relationships entailed in this model, Gouldner calls it "mechanical.” Weber's conception of bureau- cracy typifies this particular model.33 The natural system model regards the organization as a "natural whole." In this respect the model is organismic and stresses the inter- dependence of all component parts. More important, this system focuses on the unplanned and Spontaneous patterns of beliefs and interaction. An example of this is given in Michels' "Iron Law of the Oligarchy."3 In essence, what Michels tried to illustrate was that incumbency in a power position sets a pattern of belief and action oriented to solidifying the existent relationship. Thus those in leadership roles try to build a patronage system to entrench their relative power positions. Realistically, both rational and natural System.models apply in 32Alvin‘W. Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in Sociology Today, edited by Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959. 33Max Weber, gp.cit. 34Robert‘Michels, Political Parties, Part 6, Chapter II, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1946. neg-9.5:“ .3: ‘5;‘ ts' A “‘“o‘rrrr' 3 *1 {u i (1 I n| 0 U) f) (u ‘1 .. 5..‘..—...~ ' ..L...~oce:— t v '1 p '0' til 56‘ u. a L \- y» . . 12"": .VE a C I“ --~-.‘. nf:fi,‘ t.-$..-zGL-L.. - a e..- - ‘V‘ n‘.‘ L~.C C._a..-._a“ v R, -.-'-:r v :a Q _ . -- c~§;?4‘ “:‘ ‘ w L» :5: 5“ . . p.=‘9~' . ‘L‘ ""5 Val an“; 4 “ " «uLcnance 9-. : sc;-&.nal 2‘“ \.\q An ESE ““Ctions . 15 all large-scale organizations. The formal organizational structure strives for rationality and the unmanaged human relations aspect within the structure is allowed to emerge and give the structure its uniqueness. According to Bendix, any analysis of large-scale organization from just one of these vantage points is deficient.35 In fact, all organizations involve a combination of these types. The effective operation of the organization demands a clearly understood hierarchy of authority. Yet the organization would break down if every situation were narrowly adhered to according to explicit rules. All organizations depend upon ability and cooperation of individuals to employ some creative initiative properly balanced with compliance to formal rules. In this manner, according to Bendix, an effective organization is possible. However, the effect of this creative energy may be development of a perception of indispensability in the extreme as Michels tried to point out. Selznick also noted this deteriorating effect whereby the incumbent, holding a positive valuation of the office soon becomes preoccupied with the maintenance of office rather than the concern primarily with the organi- zational goals.36 An essential characteristic of a bureaucracy is the delegation of functions. In this reSpect then, all actions are through intermediaries or agents who are called officials. The use of such intermediaries tends to create a "bifurcation 2: interest" between the agent and the initiator 35Reinhard Bendix, "Bureaucracy: The Problem and its Setting," American Sociological Review, 12 (Oct. 1947), pp. 502-503. 36Philip Selznick, ”An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy", American Sociological Review, 8 (1943), pp. 52-53. K's‘f-Y" ’4: kn) \ I ' -‘o: C: 35g-..oo ‘ ‘—v- . “ ‘ . a» v"‘ -'. 53““: u - ‘—~.y— . ' _ .— . L13 -n-S ‘42:... r . L11 I 51 "Y N? ; byepyeat-3::. :IE- ‘3 9". t “3.3‘et L 37,,“ l A ‘ N' .:~. ‘*~- ‘wL £. ‘ \ I . s t‘,\_‘ v 16 of action. The social position as an agent may involve a value system wholly incompatible with the professed aims of the organization or, for that matter, quite compatible but with such latent effects as th entrench the incumbent's position. Apprehending this kind of drift in bureau- cratic structures, Michels hypothesized his "Iron Law of the Oligarchy."38 C. Bureaucracy in a Democracy Bureaucracy then, appears to be an unavoidable consequence of large scale, unified effort in goal attainment. This is especially true of the state. But also in relatively highly developed capitalistic systems like the United States and Western Europe, bureaucracy is a characteristic feature of private enterprise.39 For the entreprenuer, as well as the corporation, bureaucratization exemplifies efficiency. Our relatively free market economy, with its impersonal relationships, hinges on the cash nexus as the bargaining point for both employer and employee. With this as the basis of relation in the work organization, democratic procedures are unlikely to be built into the organizational structure. One the individual chooses to become part of the organization he relinquishes some features of individuality and becomes part of the organization. However, in a so-called voluntary organization, such as a labor union, the raison d'etre is the membership itself. And whatever goals may be defined are likely to be the goals as defined by the membership at large and not 37Ibid., pp. 50-51. 38Robert'Michels,gp.cit. 39Robin Williams, Jr., gp.cit., Chapter 6, "American Economic Institutions." L-b. $.73 '4; f. In .4. 17 the profit motive of a legitimized controlling elite. This distinction appears to be crucial since the concern with democratic processes is consistently directed at large-scale labor organizations and not at large-scale corporate organizations. In other words, autocratic control in business organization is legitimized while the same form of control 40 is looked upon as a dangerous trend in unions. 1. Character of "Big Unionism" To Saposs, "the cardinal and irrevocable principle of Voluntarism dictated that the worker must be taught to rely exclusively on his trade union for the promotion and protection of his interests in connection with his job."41 In this reSpect the individual member had to be made to depend upon his union to safeguard his personal interests and not on any other organization, political or governmental. Though voluntarism is not the central emphasis in union philosophy today, the reliance of the worker upon the union is still a major theme. Thus, along with the growing pains characteristic of large-scale organizations, unions have had to broaden their sphere of interest for the benefit of their member- ship. Thus, two kinds of adaptive changes are discernable in the trade union movement: Structural changes, and functional re-orientation. The structural changes which have occurred have generally been in the direction 40Henry Simons, "Some Reflections on Syndicalism," Journal of Political Economy, (March 1944), pp. 1-25. 41David J. Saposs, "Rebirth of the American Labor Movement," from IRRA, Proceedings of Eighth Annual Meeting, edited by L. Reed Tripp, (New York City, December 28-30, 1955), pp. 16-17. . ‘41 57.15% ._ -g. 1'. Y'Il“ L. . .' vi :3: 6311-3»- (3 -' 14’. 2.- -S “SE t.'.1.‘.t of authority xii it P355. 1: do its 0‘... {1(1332L1 I -«CV’ a a L: dEVe 14 18 42 of an emulation of the managerial, vertical organizational hierarchy. To increase their bargaining power, unions have seen the need to create and set up functionaries of equal expertise to those in the management hierarchical structure. Thus, also, unions have developed a refined bureaucratic order with a status system quite similar to other business organizations. Certainly the general value orientation toward efficiency is like that of management. Administrative practices, the system of accounting, orderliness, and economic utilization of time and resources all reflect the union's recognition of the need for efficient manage- 43 Thus, the highly bureaucratized structure ment of the organization. that produces an efficient and integrated machine is not only management's standard of operation but typical of American unions today. There are two significant structural changes discernable in this kind of value orientation. The increased tendency toward centralization of authority and the fact of increased gigs. Centralization not only made it possible to maximize bargaining power but also enabled the union to do its own police work and "house cleaning." Unions also have almost thoroughly accepted the value of "bigness" and thereby have attempted to develop a broader base. In keeping with this, they have attempted to organize crafts throughout a relevant competitive labor and product market 42John R. Coleman, "The Local Industrial Union in Contemporary Collective Bargaining," from.IRRA, Proceedings of Eighth Annual Meeting, edited by L. Reed Tripp, (New York City, December 28-30, 1955). 431bid., p. 278. a In‘,‘ .. a." . ~ I .160 O"t’) A“-v“-. "‘ “I a '1': .u .w in ’ , . 4- ~n -\ H 5.. . 4 -.~I .. _“.C,,..uL..\ . .O:--I" >~v ’l" x 55.-.... .55 bu l- f:‘-- \‘\‘Ad‘: ~~. a, I ‘ H V “M11, 9’ .~\:_ " L 63\ Cit? C v 3 u iii «.“56 ‘- . ‘ Lr‘a . O 'L‘s ‘ a “'t.‘ “a “i '4 . . r. t»- :“ ‘4‘)” I ‘_ 5‘. a“: 19 area.44 These two structural changes have brought about outstanding changes in the industrial relations scene -- a reduction of the number of independent unions and a tremendous increase in the scale of oper- ations for the existing unions. This particular point has been expressed many times but perhaps with greatest emphasis by Henry Simons.45 In this same theme, Pierson more recently concluded that unions' use of the power inherent in their Size has significantly affected the industries within which they operate.46 Functional re-orientation merely reflects the union's consistency in its desire to maintain the worker's dependency upon the union for the protection of his interests. In this respect unions have broadened their scope to include activities fairly well removed from "bread and butter” goals.47 To the extent that unions have tended to increase their Sphere of influence upon the membership to include a larger part of the worker's life plans, it becomes increasingly important to ask the following question: To what degree does the individual worker have the power to decide how the union is to be run and what its goals are to be? 4"Mark L. Kahn, "Contemporary Structural Changes in Organized Labor," from IRRA, Proceedings of Tenth Annual Meeting, edited by Edwin Young, (New York City, September 5-7, 1957), pp. 171-179. See also John T. Dunlop, "Structural Changes in the Labor Movement and Industrial Relations System," from IRRA, Proceedings of Ninth Annual Meeting, edited by L. Reed Tripp, (Cleveland, Ohio, December 28-29; 1956), pp. 12-22. MI. Dunlop discusses here the setting up of bilateral agreements between national unions to eliminate the problems of jurisdictional diSputes. 45Henry Simons, gp.cit. 46Frank C. Pierson, "The Economic Influence of Big Unions," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (January 1961), pp. 96-107. 47Harold Wilensky, gp.cit. . .5 0" »L..LC$-‘ “-L‘l .-..-1--' 5-.£v—-“ , . f“”" C int. ll: ‘ .. . ill .A fl ’ -g: I .36...th28 c .c L Q» n\~ “U .C a .h. .c E “V . b E J. a a .3 in.“ here There re t' n p. s v: 20 Curiously enough, the membership themselves have not expressed a strong concern with the issue of internal democracy. In relation to the concern with unions and their impact on the economy, the more frequent critics are to be found among businessmen, legislators, and academicians. These peOple are concerned primarily with the general question of HES controls the union. Unconsciously per- haps these men have not been able to visualize any kind of structural alternative to democratic process apart from that which emulates the traditional town-hall meeting. True, they have allowed for some changes as may be seen in the concern with the two-party system.48 This is so only because they see in this two-party system (or perhaps even a multi- party system) opposition and threat to office-holders which prevents autocratic control on the part of those in power. On the other hand, where there is a one-party system, these people choose to emphasize the general apathy of the membership as portending imminent autocratic control and overlook other possible mechanisms which may result in leadership values not far removed from those of the general membership. So long as such formal mechanisms as conventions, elections, etc. exist, the so-called facade of democracy may not be entirely what Blau refers to as "symbolic gesture."49 2. Decision-making Process and Democratic Action There appears, however, a prevailing opinion that, in Spite of 48For example see Seymour Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James 8. Coleman, Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956. 49PeterM. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Sociegy, chapter on "Bureau- cracy and Democracy," New York: Random House, 1956. ‘. ..~. mat on max 15 2'. . . - ~.,..;-.'-.~o . .fl'.»-&C.o§ ‘- v ,. . - . . mafia 7"“ .8..an ‘..4L:‘. . :‘-.- — . .~:Lt O: ai. ‘HA. .- LMSE. '~. ~_ -. . . 3- h‘m‘:QCvo 21 union leadership declarations of faith in democracy, no more than lip service is being paid to the idea of democratic rule. Indeed, this opinion rests upon the theme, as cited above, of the absence of rival centers of power (political parties) which are seen as the necessary ingredient for democratic processes.50 The International Typographical Union, which has a two party system in operation, is often introduced as a prime example of a private organization truly run by a democratic ideology.51 'Magrath, not able to reconcile the size of large-scale organization and the ideal democratic process, perceives democracy as operational only at the local level.52 Roberts concludes that even locals have grown into units too large for the "successful preservation of democracy."53 But the charges made here do not condemn the present state of all union governments as being undemocratic. In fact they do concede, that there is generally what might be referred to as individual democracy.54 This is Specifically to mean that individual members do have the right to elect their leaders, to decide on issues of policy by 50B. C. Roberts, Unions in America: A British View, chapter 3, "Union Democracy," Princeton, New Jersey: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 1959. 518. M. Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman, 92.235. See also: S. M. Lipset, "Democracy in Private Government," British Journal of Sociology, 3 (1952), and "Organizational Democracy in a Trade Union” in Political Behavior, edited by Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956. 52Peter C. MaGrath, "Democracy in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union Democracy," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 12 (July 1959). 53 B. C. Roberts, gp.cit., p. 41. 54B. c. Roberts, 22.335” pp. 33-34. Q _:,“,.'oo 1' 2545.4‘) rb.t . ~ 9 _ . ~q 1 1-: I-»...t “ __ “'F‘" .- r‘.‘ & ‘v‘utct: t“ - I a. o . S. \fi'uso. fic {.Vl...“-\ sh eager -- z: EZZLCIEIIt. at ":11" . J ‘ “v 1t .s £32321}: 9n; ‘ ‘.‘1 i: k- 35 H L' 1‘3'61'1 5.33%.: - - . IS the: 22 majority rule, etc. However, according to Roberts, they do not have the right to combine in any organized group to exercise these functions.55 As Roberts explains it, practices prohibiting the formation of organized rival groups result from.the fear that organized opposition may tear the union organization apart. The consequence, of course, being a debilitating effect on bargaining power. But Roberts is apprehensive of this kind of prohibition because it may well present what he defines as a greater danger -- that of "entrenching a leadership that is unpopular, in- . . 56 , eff1c1ent, and even corrupt." Organized or formalized opposition seems to be the magical word. However, in this formulation of the problem only one significant reference point is involved -- the relation of the worker to his union. But for the worker (and leadership in the union) it is not only this particular relationship but that with the employer which is important. The history of trade union opposition lies in the too recent past for the worker to want anything which might reduce the countervailing influence of the union. Given the conditions under which the worker views his union, it appears that not only may the tradition of democratic ideals affect the structure of the organization, but the external factors that gave rise to the organization also modify the conception of what form union structure will take. The conditions that enabled the International Typographical Union to establish and maintain a democratic two party 551bid. 56Ibid. ‘ .J ‘as :C’b-:cu t <-~ -. “.9, . u:5.“— ...~—-L I o DO.s—~ A I. n :L.-..& G06 “1 ' 1 . ""\a . En- ~C5.~ua$ Cc..s '331 int \ Brier-E k. 1111.31,} k (:5: 23 System appear to be unique to this particular union.57 One condition was its strong position in the printing industry -- thus less time and energy was directed toward struggling with the employer and more time was devoted to developing the internal machinery of union government. The second condition was that the I. T. U. was formed by the combining of many strong and independent locals. Here was a ready-made rivalry for organi- zational control. Thirdly, the printers are a special class of workers -- they enjoyed a fairly high income and developed a more serious identifi- cation or involvement in their work. Thus, changeover in leadership held no serious status diminution on the part of the defeated party -- return to the shop was not an unbearable humiliation for the I. T. U. official. This certainly is not true of most other unions. Finally, the I. T. U. had developed a widening sphere of peripheral activities within the organization so that even apathetic members do find something of personal interest. These activities, then, build an interest in gener- al union activity. Thus, from a traditional democratic base, the I. T. U. through some unique features of its external relationships, was able to develop into a unique type of union government. But what of those unions with less fortunate earlier experiences? Most industrial unions have a history of violent conflicts with management. Their growth, up until recent years, was through their own organizing of those yet unorganized, and not through amalgamation of independent locals and there was and still is a significant status difference between full time union work and factory work. Under these conditions, is it possible that these unions should develop in a fashion identical to that of the 57Peter M. Blau, 92.333, pp. 112-113. .7“ 3 GL-‘ c "‘ ‘eu .- -.. a.it . a" “a-" a," CA- - yv b. ..V. 55.6.." :‘1’ o v4 .Usb‘. a- .Avu. -....~o- ‘ . .L “t C3736 «‘ 24 I. T. U.? What seems more reasonable is to expect varying patterns of organizational structure even though there may be the same historical tradition of democratic ideals. The town-hall model not being feasible for present day large-scale organizations, what are the structural alternatives possible which may also produce democratic processes, given the extenuating factors of the particular industrial climate? A two-party system is one type of formal structural guarantee of democratic processes. The true merit in the system is the formal guarantee that insures the relative stability of these processes. The foundation stone, however, is not the system but the provisions which formally guarantee that the system will function and that people will be active in the organization who value the democratic traditions inherited from the past. No less meritorious in principle are those constitutional provisions in other unions which structure their internal relationships in terms of the industrial climate but consistent with membership desires. Thus, those unions which depend uponthe convention have come upon, according to their estimation, an effective substitute for the meeting of the entire membership. The convention then is a quasi-town hall meeting. It represents the embodiment of the sovereign power of the general membership when in session and is not merely a legislature in session.58 In theory, the executive body of the union is merely a committee gf the membership as embodied in the convention. The membership as em- bodied in the convention has, in fact, the delegating authority to legiti- mize the exercise of power after the convention is dissolved. While the 58Grant‘McConnell, ”The Spirit of Private Government," The American Political Science Review, (Sept. 1958), pp. 756-757. ‘-.'; y..‘ b n' ' ‘ “5“ : O-n- ‘ C". 5.3: r‘ ”'5‘" .‘ 5 .3..- . - . -1.--- W .- . .A w~-h the uzio: ., , c.;gar;:; 3... AAA: . .~ 9.x... u v- a._ ~Ju ‘ “u; ‘ ~ I :h‘.‘ .\.V*$&S E ‘L. L a “a 501;: la: C: 25 convention is in session, leadership theoretically serves as an extension of the role of a moderator at a group meeting.59 The leadership has no authority during this period, to constitute independent action. Only the mandate of collective decision is the final word. The charge that the union convention is "little more than an organized claque"6o depicts the vulnerability and susceptibility of large-scale organizations to certain unethical practices. It certainly is an unfair charge to describe all such conventions as mere comic operas. In some instances, oligarchic tendencies have led to corruption and exploitation for per- sonal gains. In most unions this is not the case. This vulnerability of union organizations emphasizes the need for individual reSponsibility, i.e., leaders Should be cognizant of their reSponsibility and should act in accord with ethical standards necessary for representing the interests of their constituents. The structural guarantees, be they party systems or delegate-convention systems without formalized opposition are only as effective as the leadership quality permits. In this reSpect then, the recruitment of competent leadership becomes an important task. And it is upon the active local members that this source of union vitality is most highly dependent.61 Taking account of the considerations above, a preliminary definition of union democracy will be attempted. The distinction made by Parsons 591bid., p. 758. 60B. C. Roberts, gp.cit., p. 40. 61George‘W. Brooks, The Sources of Vitality in the American Labor Movement, New York School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Bulletin 41, (July 1960), p. 7. ELJCEIIYE-C —~ .. : n.- o.‘ .. D. Itlatdc ( In; ' 0‘... ea, ‘ 26 between the different decision-making processes in large-scale organi- zations permits a reconciliation of the apparent contradiction of democratic processes within a bureaucratic structure. As mentioned earlier, poligy-decision making is the important factor which must remain in control of the membership at large. Once policy-decisions are made by the constituency, key functionaries may be assigned to make allocative-decisions and gg-ordinated-decisions to maintain a structure of relative efficiency. It must be emphasized that it is through their own policy-decisions that the constituency relinquishes its rights so that policies instituted may be implemented by these key functionaries. This framework permits a broad definition of the concept democracy in which varying types of Structural guarantees may be obtained. Democracy is defined in this study as: Decision-making by those who, in the end, are affected by_the decisions. Proceeding with this defini- tion the study of any large-scale organization requires the following question: How are policy-decisions made? This approach avoids a rigid adherence to a single theme such as organized conflict, participation, etc. It recognizes the existence of structural alternatives that may fulfill a democratic value orientation. As one author puts it, "Democracy is a dynamic idea . . . It must continually work out new patterns appropriate to changing circumstances." D. Studies of Union Democracy Michels' hypothesis of the ”iron law of the oligarchy" seems to have resulted in the casting of many a doubtful glance toward labor unions. 62Clinton 8. Golden, "New Patterns of Democracy," The Antioch Review, 3 (Fall, 1943), pp. 391-404. ‘ . -A..... “ tw~¢b.\.ua- 1:..Jb *---55[ 1:: n 9.. _\ 1”“R ~¢s.‘.‘_r,_ _n‘ - P06 ‘ ““4 LG.¢-... a...“ . EPIaiSaE’ '75: inter “i "hcre t {Ii-.St 33'..- c. 1: . . . ‘ML‘ Inlc s. 6.. \-C‘" v (*1 27 Thus, in the past decade or so this hypothesis was used as the point of departure for many studies of democracy in unionism. Lipset tried to probe into the psycho-social background of working class people that made them susceptable to such movements.63 According to Lipset, working class people are primarily concerned with short-run problems of survival rather than long-run social and economic trends. WOrking class people (here identified as low status groups) are more likely to have a lower educational level than those of higher socio-economic status. This limitation tends to impel them toward association with others of similar background thus creating an atmosPhere of limited experience, sophisti- cation, and understanding of others different than they are. These characteristics, then, tend to produce a narrow perSpective whereby politics, personal relationships, etc., are viewed in Simple black or white terms, where actions are based upon impulse rather than reflective appraisal, where talk and discussions are looked upon with impatience, where interest is lacking in organizations that offer a long-range program, and where there is ready reSponse to certain leadership types and ex- 64 tremist movements. A Significant consequence of these features is that they are associated with low levels of political interest and involve- ment. This certainly ties in well with Michels' thesis. In the same theme, Herberg perceives a systematic narrowing of democracy within the labor organization. ”As long as things go well the average union member doesn't want self-government and is annoyed and resentful when an attempt 63Seymour‘Martin Lipset, "Democracy and WOrking-Class Authoritar- ianism," American Sociological Review, 24 (August, 1959), pp. 482-501. 64Ibido, pp. 495-4960 l. . a: .. . cars: l ‘1 .l:" ‘5 v..-~ - ._- a‘. Ceob‘» \ I;_ a O I e..- L. 5 Q L C. re axe ~--4VK . 1.117: bLé ax— ”A. ~..'1 ‘. N... ‘« th Ji"‘- a K. r ac :\ AC .2 .3 L» \e Z. .1 C CL S. \ul .- ‘Au ~\d H-v rh. 28 is made to force its reSponsibilities upon him. What he wants is pro- tection and service, his money's worth for his dues."65 Summers feels that even the law could not decree democracy since apathetic members cannot be compelled to action nor indifference transformed into interest . . 66 , 1n union government. To him, the most that the law can do is to safe- guard certain basic rights essential for the life of union democracy and to encourage those institutions which give it vitality.67 In this reSpect, the labor movement itself must assume the reSponsibility of strengthening union democracy. The values held by union leaders have an important bearing upon whether this reSponsibility is exercised. Lipset, in expounding the virtues of the two-party system in the I. T. U, emphasized the importance of leadership roles. "The leaders on each Side attempt to bring into their party any union member who seems to have leadership ability and has won a personal following. At the local level, the party leaders look for individuals who have proven themselves in their shop unit, the chapel, while at the International level, party leaders attempt to win over convention dele- 68 gates from small locals where the party System is not strong." Pierson, though recognizing several conditions in modern trade union- ism which work against democracy, still notes some forces tending to pro- . 69 . duce union democracy. First of all, he reports that the democratic, 65Will Herberg, "Bureaucracy and Democracy in Labor Unions," The Antioch Review, 3 (Fall, 1943), pp. 410-411. 66Clyde W. Summers, "The Usefulness of the Law in Obtaining Union Democracy," Monthly Labor Review, 18 (March 1958), pp. 258-259. 67Clyde W. Summers, "Legislating Union Democracy," from IRRA, Proceedings of Tenth Annual Meeting, edited by Edwin Young, (New York City, September 5-7, 1957), pp. 228-239. 8Seymour M. Lipset, "Democracy in Private Government," British Journal of Sociology, gp.cit., p. 51. 9Frank C. Pierson, ”The Government of Trade Unions," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,l(July 1948), pp. 594-596. 'j .- '_ :... ~:"~ .qu--~“ _ . . .‘---, v [2: ..:....t. :3a..e.‘.ge ...~o. ‘—“ c.t.5.»..:‘ ::?:n u : an.‘ 2a: -L‘o ‘M—L . ‘J -. .-& “ACLv .. w H ”E .‘c... C“. V ~1- ‘ ~t :-~,‘. ‘I . ‘ku; .“ ‘V .t . M”! .-\ ' “L \ ‘5 I; g ‘7 \ v;. . ‘1 , ,. II' 1? cl 4 29 idealistic tradition still exerts a powerful influence in decision-making. Union officials are aware of this and many do reSpond to the mandates of the membership. Second, there is the threat of rival groups emerging to challenge the in-group. Structural guarantees like conventions and elections may provide the wedge for rivalries or political machines. Reynolds raises the question of what is meant by "democracy" when applied to a trade union.70 He is not sure what standards we might use to determine how closely a union approximates the democratic norm. It appears to him that the existence of key structural requirements such as general suff- rage, free election of legislators and control by legislators over expenditures of funds and other executive actions are met in most unions. Though he recognizes the basic weakness of indirect elections, he never- theless emphasizes that their affect may be that the self interest of leaders are canalized in directions beneficial to the membership. What is apparent and most significant in these remarks is that democracy appears to be possible within the framework of large-scale organization but it is meaningful only to those active in the union move- ment. Most studies of large-scale organizations have centered around the theme of rule or power as emanating from the top down. Eby expressed concern over the "drip effect" of union programs where leadership seems to be generating ideas and decisions for an apathetic group of followers.71 He further suggested that a "percolator effect" be generated whereby, 70Lloyd G. Reynolds, ”Discussion," in section of Postwar Labor Rela- tions, The American Economic Review, 36 (May 1946), pp. 380-381. 71Kermit Eby, "The 'Drip' Theory in Labor Unions," The Antioch Review, 13 (March 1953), pp. 95-102. l .‘r Ana" nine-0. *- .p-Jrv. 1w?» ‘ \ r .J- “ 3 #vi‘ 5..» -..-— in..." R.--- p.. y- . A “no A “vs . l" (J V". r) .. e“, r Nye-o. .. "‘<;' “3"“ . l n... S! "‘ . ...,_ ,. ‘0. .-, ze ‘5“ x- ‘h. . ‘ W'3. A fit“ L, 30 instead, these ideas and decisions flow in the reverse direction. Structurally, Eby suggested that even status differentials Should be minimizedtn the effect that democracy as an ideal may not be merely a propaganda line but truly a "plumb-line" for organizational vitality.72 But by implication, the "percolator effect" makes a plea for the awakening of the apathetic mass at the general membership level. One thing Eby did not consider and which seems to be part of the thesis is that leadership recruitment itself may be part of the "percolator effect." It may be sufficient that within the local there may be a seed-bed of active union members who are the generating force leading the membership at large. This to Brooks, is one of the sources of vitality in unionism today.73 Lipset also mentions the ”party activists" who do not seem to be motivated by hope of gaining some union office. These are people with relatively little talent for leadership but are active participants and help Spread the news around. These are people essentially interested in politics and who like to be "in on things” and near the center of power activities.74 Certainly this is not unique to the two-party system. What is important here are the structural provisions that make it possible for "actives" to participate in this manner. But given this basic guarantee, the motivation to participate must come from.the individual himself. As one active member said, after contemplating resignation from a Union Education Committee due to lack of membership interest and participation, "you can 72Kermit Eby, "Organization, Bureaucracy, Loyalty," The Antioch Review, 15 (June 1955), pp. 202-203. 73George W. Brooks, gp.cit., pp. 7-8. 74 S. M. Lipset, "Democracy in Private Government," gp.cit., p. 51. m y m ‘Mmau -- ' (W '~' we r“: b.“t v~ .A‘ H-I- - ed: u“... h-LT’I ‘J-Cu C owl ,;_~ ‘LSZAJC‘. . f -, 93.: at ffi~‘:.., \k-e...LC \‘::._._ L.“ktez 31 bring water to them but you can't make them drink it." 1. Focus on Rank and File Participation. Most studies of union democracy have concentrated on rates of participation in the locals. Tannenbaum and Kahn, not necessarily working on the theme of democracy, analyzed and compared locals composed of what they defined as "active" and "inactive" members.75 The measurement of the union member's activity in his local was based upon a "participation index" composed of six items: 1) number of regular union meetings attended; 2) number of Special union meetings attended; 3) number of things done at the meetings; 4) holding union office; 5) membership on union committees; and 6) voting behavior during the last union election for officers. In terms of organizational structure, the locals with a greater proportion of "actives” demonstrated a more predictable kind of behavior. At least shared norms were perceived. However, the study takes primarily a narrow view of the problem since less emphasis was placed on the struc- ture of roles and more on the statistical analysis of locaLparticipation. Miller and Young tried to probe into the social-psychological aSpects of participation.76 Their study of the members of six locals in Columbus, Ohio revealed that many of them were little interested in the day-to-day routine functioning of the union. Family affairs and other interests loomed as more important than union meetings for these people. However, 75Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Robert L. Kahn, Particlpation in Union Loaals, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson & Co., 1958. 76GlennW.‘Miller and James E. Young, “Member Participation in the Trade Union Local: A Study of Activity and Policy-making in Columbus, Ohio," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 15 (Oct. 1955), pp. 31-47. ‘ cl . . ... . . u u. a. ..l v.\ .. CI .cc .P~ {A 01. ‘c n‘ .u 1.. .x. o s o» .1. ,. . ... .. . .. a . a 1L .2 .C it . a F. .~ . .r. .C a? Kw .L .3 — 95 .s .L L. .p» 3... hrs . . .L .5 v .nw L“ .M a. . .u 3.. .M rs .L a .e .L .a. I“ e... Z. ... C. 1 5 0L .. a» .a. .C .5 \J .3 .C v. .C p oL —. vi 5» .C .\ .\ . . . . . . . . . .,.. Lav tu—Am.lwi. i {445. . . 32 the Study revealed a small, hard core of active unionists who accepted the union and were emotionally involved in the union movement. More important, those who diSplayed little interest in union activities do, on the other hand, express loyalty to the idea of the union as an institution. In times of stress, such as strike actions, these appar- ently apathetic members do support the union. When the ”threat" once again subsides, they tend to revert back to their old complacency.77 During these periods of normalcy, the union looks toward the hard core activists for support. Kyllonen found positive relationships between level of union activity and wage level rise, length of time in union, best production ratings and high supervisor rating on workers quality of work. In addition, the following social characteristics differentiated the actives and inactives: the single are more likely to be active than the married, those married and with children are less likely to be active than those married and without children, and those with more visiting of or by relatives are less likely to be actives than those with less visiting of or by relatives. The author also found a positive relationship between social activities and attendance of union meetings. Those who play cards more often were more likely to attend union meetings than those who play less cards. In addition, greater church attendance, more regular visits to town, and fishing more often with others were related to greater union 77Ibid., p. 47. 78Toimi E. Kyllonen, "Social Characteristics of Active Unionists," American Journal of Sociology, 56 (May 1951), pp. 528-533. bl-— L-~u u —»_‘ mug. -qc. —.’.5 ~-—.' '1' “Jed. (I) .1.-.‘ 33 attendance.79 Spinrad listed three major variables associated with union parti- cipation: Objective features, such as job and residence; Personal association, such as contacts; and Orientations, such as job satisfac- tion.80 These variables support and supplement some of the findings reported above. On the whole, participation in union activities on the part of the membership has been notoriously poor. And it is upon this fact that most of the claims for the demise of democratic processes in American unions have been based. In response to these attacks, the unions them- selves have made attempts to encourage member participation.81 However, Tannenbaum does not believe that participation is an absolute requisite to determine level of membership control.82 He points to the signifi- cance of the informal mechanisms of control outside of the meeting hall. Informal representation may occur among groups of friends or associates at the shop level. This is defined by Kovner and Lahne, as sample representation.83 The formal meeting is essentially a meeting of activists. JQIbid. 80William Spinrad, "Correlates of Trade Union Participation: A Summary of the Literature," American Sociological Review, 25 (April 1960), pp. 237-244. 81Don A. Seashore, ”The Nature of Union Attempts to Encourage Member Participation," from IRRA, Proceedings of Tenth Annual Meeting, edited by Edwin Young, (New York City, September 5-7, 1957), pp. 180-191. 82Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "Mechanisms of Control in Local Trade Unions," British Journal of Sociology, 6 (1956), pp. 307-311. 83Joseph Kovner and Herbert J. Lahne, "Shop Society and the Union," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 7 (1953), pp. 3-14. II. "' I..-- Cé I“ . o-—‘- bu- tire ' Q. N‘ w .— U‘.. 4. , “(1‘ . .. - ... -\ I‘d. . ““. w. -. ~ r- ~§ . . . b \ I . U “3‘. , “ . . x 34 These authors feel that the shop society does manifest "participation" whereby the active and passive members do relate to each other. In addition, Tannenbaum raises the question of members making the distinction between crucial issues and those of less relevance. For instance, in one study a decision on Strike action was participated in by 72 percent of the membership. On the other hand, when it came to deciding on bargaining demands, only 40 percent of the group represented the entire membership.84 Seidman also emphasizes the need for membership participation for effec- tive democracy and is apprehensive about the possible domination by.a 85 small cohesive group of leaders and active members. However, Coleman believes that members' interest in democracy is tempered with both a certain amount of apathy toward means and an admiration for efficiency.86 In his interpretation, the members do not necessarily have an interest in democracy either exclusively or principally. Indeed, as Selekman says, the union is not an idealistic organization nor a revolutionary one.87 Its aims are primarly practical and thereby revolve around economic gains. Accoring to Coleman, the significant point to remember, however, is that the members do have a sufficient interest in democracy to be a compelling influence upon leadership to conform to democratic 88 . practices. Rosen and Rosen, in a study of bu81ness agents found that 84Ibido, pp. 308-3090 85Joel Seidman, Democracy in the Labor Movement, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, New York, Bulletin 39 (February 1958), pp. 20-22. 86John R. Coleman, "The Compulsive Pressures of Democracy in Unionism," American Journal of Sociology, 6 (May 1956), p. 523. Benjamin M. Selekman, "Trade Unions -- Romance and Reality," Harvard Business Review, 36 (May-June 1958), pp. 76-90. 881bid. tie :6: r\-:-4 .' ESQ.-.” O f I O.“ : j ' is but A' ‘ 0J1. _‘ ' I ' “Vo¢ do.\ u n 35 these people were motivated to do a good job by group pressure.89 From the agent's point of view, satisfying the members was a crucial part of his job and he realistically knows that the growing size and com- plexity of his union create barriers that make it almost impossible to consider each individual's personal problems. ‘What is involved here is the important dimension of democratic process -- leadership recogni- tion and reSponse to membership desires. All in all, if level of participation is to be made a principal issue in regard to democratic process in the union, the future of democratic unionism is dim indeed. According to Seidman, ”One cannot realistically anticipate a sharp rise in meeting attendance in most unions in the forseeable future."90 He presents three factors that are likely to play an important role here: 1) most of the members, though highly valuing their union, are not interested in the daily routine business affairs; 2) growth of bargaining units and the spread of pattern bargaining have reduced the importance of the business that the local can transact; and 3) increasingly, other leisure time activi- ties compete with union meetings for the members' free time.91 In addition, Seidman reminds us that virtually all other types of organiza- tions (e3pecially voluntary organizations) have low levels of attendance. This, then, should not be cited as a unique defect in the trade union 89Hjalmar Rosen and R. A. Hudson Rosen, "The Union Business Agent's Perspective of His Job," Journal of Personnel Administration and lndustrial Relations, 3 (July 1957), pp. 49-57. 90Joel Seidman, Democracy in the Labor Movement, gp.cit., p. 21. 911bid., pp. 21-22. 36 organization. Here, we might aptly cite Brooks: On the contrary, it is merely evidence that the members are exercising their inalienable right to be indifferent. Abstention is one of the most useful devices by which voluntary democratic organizations are controlled, and to regard attendance at union meetings as some kind of index of the health of a union is very far from the mark. 92 2. Theme of Internal Conflict The Significance of rank and file apathy in discussions of union democracy lies in the relationship postulated between institutionalized opposition and accountability of leadership. Fisher and McConnell, like Lipset, feel that constitutional provisions such as freedom of Speech, non-discrimination for reasons of race, creed, sex, or citizenship, honest elections, etc., will not be implemented unless they are associa- "93 The central theme here is the ted with "political institutions. importance of conflict formalized by a competitive party system. To these authors, this method, and only this, has proven to be a sufficient check to autocratic control. In citing the I. T. U. as the prime example of a democratic union, these authors imply that this union is the demo- cratic exception in the labor movement. However, at the same time, they fail to demonstrate that other unions, such as the U. A. W., with no such formalized conflict system are essentially undemocratic in form. The statement that only institutionalized conflict produces accountability ‘remains an assumption and not an empirically validated generalization. 92George Brooks, The Sources of Vitality in the American Labor Movement,_gp.cit., pp. 5-6. 93Lloyd H. Fisher and Grant McConnell, "Internal Conflict and Labor Union Solidarity," in Industrial Conflict, Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin, and Arthur M. Ross, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954, pp. 132-133. .' .5 :““‘_V L n“: . a :Lg'y‘l llLEVE l C0124“ ~ 135! 37 It should be noted, first of all, that "political institutions" or simply conflict groups are sociologically emergent phenomena rather than mandated structures. As described above, the two-party system within the I. T. U. emerged from a unique historical development within this union and the printing industry. No constitutional provisions can create opposition where none exists. In the complete absence of value conflict, a democratic organizational structure would, in fact, not be necessary to achieve congruence between organizational and membership goals. Where conflict exists, it may be, as MaGrath suggests, that organized opposi- tion is the most reliable way of securing accountable rulers.94 The question of whether this is the nnly way remains unanswered. The two variables, Opposition and accountability, may be viewed in the following manner: (1) OPPOSITION may be either: diSpersed........or........institutiona1ized; (2) ACCOUNTABILITY of leadership may be either high000000000r00000.001ow The two variables may then be related in the following manner: Institutionalized 2: C) H E (D 8 Q4 c> DiSpersed Low High ACCOUNTABILITY 94 Peter C. MaGrath, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, np.cit., p. 521. ‘ l .- any “mi 55... Lou-A. 33.65 E ‘“C':"~ finct.L“ 38 Ideally, institutionalized opposition fairly well guarantees high accountability. This accountability then makes for a responsible leader- ship and thus a highly democratic organization. Two basic weaknesses appear in this argument: 1) the assumption that responsible leadership is primarly a dependent variable; and 2) the assumption that the only way of achieving reSponsible leadership is through institutionalized Opposi- tion. Even partially accepting Michels' thesis that those in leadership roles eventually develop goals unique to their immediate interests and apart from that of the organization, we cannot exclude from consideration leadership orientation to democratic or autocratic values. Highly institutionalized Opposition may increase the probability for accountability but this need not mean that diSpersed opposition or even the absence of opposition eliminates the possibility of accountability. In a study of leadership behavior, Ferenc Merei found that when a leader is confronted by a group with its own basic tradition (e.g., a democratic tradition) his social influence is relatively weak vis-a-vis the group's although he may have much stronger influence than any one member confronted singly. With leadership also committed to democratic values, it may be highly sensitive to membership reactions and, even with a non-institutionalized state of opposition, accountability would very likely be high. ‘We might inject The Thomas Theorem at this point: "If men define Situations as real, they are real in their consequences."96 Such being the case, given 95Ferenc‘Merei, "Group Leadership and Institutionalization," in Eleanor E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley, Readings in Social Psychology, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958, pp. 522-532. 96Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, chapter 11, "The Self-Fulfilling PropheCy," Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957. r. .e. . . .C p.. .2 .Q —.~ van .. . .uo 7.- : .t ms «c 75 e... at . . u I ...C .5 I a _ _ . _ m M .r w .. u H ' fly at O~A L..: .L .: R LT“ 'NI {4 u g . '~ Q‘w » 39 the basic guarantees of freedom Of expression, etc., any rumbling of discontent may result in highly reSponsive action no matter in what form this opposition may be. On the other hand, no matter how institutional- ized the opposition, leadership, if not committed to democratic values, may still challenge the relative strength of the groups by refusing to reSpond readily to symptoms of discontent. In conclusion, it appears evident that, given the traditional guarantees of democratic processes, large-scale voluntary organizations can operate basically in a democratic fashion in Spite of their bureau- cratic structure. However, recognizing that each organization, in its evolutionary growth, has unique experiences, the central question to pose seems to be: What alternative forms are there that might assure member- ship participation in policy decisions? Since accountability seems to be the central issue in democratic processes, most of the scholars in the field have emphasized the "political institutions" aSpect or what might be defined as organized or institutionalized opposition. More Specifically, a truly democratic system is defined as one with organized opposition parties with each party being a constant threat to the other for the control of the organization. Since parties or organized opposition are emergent phenomena rather than mandated structures, their existence appears to be almost a fortuitous event. ‘What of those organizations without the benefit of such "political institutions?" It seems that an organizational structure in which policy decisions are made by delegates to a constitutional convention meeting at regular intervals may at least provide a framework for democratic processes. This is possible to the extent that leaders value democratic processes and that channels are . I“..‘ 9‘1 5,4 .. .84 a _ v .vr- LDC. 5‘ " A d b“-\ .. 3:“— 40 open for sentiments from the membership (locals) to flow upward (percolator effect). So from this perspective, how democratically a union operates is determined by the degree to which their sentiments are channelled (perked) up to the International body and have a bearing upon the formulation of policy. This dissertation is concerned primar- ily with some aSpects of this process in the U. A. W. CHAPTER II THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM I. Concerning the Structural Forms of the Convention Introduction: Unions, on the whole, being representational organizations, still claim to be democratic. In the light of the many unique experiences to which particular unions have been subjected, it would seem realistic to expect, however, varying orientations regarding the structural forms of union organization which may result in democratic processes. Tannenbaum and Kahn have recognized the forces impinging upon the union that in some measure determine its orientation.97 "It follows that the internal structure of the union must be designed to meet such demands, and the internal processes of the union paced to such external requirements. To this extent, the internal structure and character of the union can be properly considered the creature of its organizational environment. This organizational environment may foster or frustrate union democracy at the local level, may facilitate its growth or permit it to occur only as a kind of internal tour de force. It may be, for example, that the larger community Often urges upon unions two kinds of demands which are not wholly compatible: that unions take a restrictive view of their functions and areas of interest, and at the same time that they maintain a sophisti- cated and effective kind of internal democracy. Yet internal union democracy may thrive best in a union which is oriented toward broad issues of social welfare and attempting to contribute to the community in these terms as well as by way of the Specialized function of collective bargaining. The management or community or nation that places a positive value upon union democracy must ask itself to what extent it contributes to an organizational environment in which democracy will grow." 97Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Robert L. Kahn, Participation in Union Locals, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Co., 1958, pp. 236-237. 41 42 From the perSpective of the trade unionist, there might be greater need for militancy in the light of a "hostile world" or a broadening of the union's orientation in response to a "mature relationship" with these external forces. Depending on the particular perSpective taken by the trade unionist and other unique experiential factors, it becomes under- standable that, given a democratic ideological orientation, alternative structural forms for implementing democratic values have emerged. Any model for democracy in trade unions should, however, have at least the following elements: 1) citizenship and suffrage; 2) opposition; 3) participation; 4) forms of representation; and 5) due process. Citizenship, suffrage and due process are procedural guarantees Spelled out explicitly in most union constitutions. Opposition and participa- tion are implicit in the procedural guarantees. Thus, the freedom of self-expression and the regular election procedures for selection of officers imply free participation and the right to agree with or oppose those in office regarding whatever issue is at hand. None of the union constitutions so far as can be seen, nor even the constitution Of the United States, define the structural form of the Opposition. The crucial aSpect of formal organization, then, is not whether opposition is insti- tutionalized but whether barriers exist for such sociologically emergent phenomena. If no such barriers exist, then the degree to which opposition is institutionalized is hinged on situational factors and the social- psychological character of the group. Forms of representation are eSpecially important in the light of the mass character of organizations today. This study, then, conceives of democracy as a type of decision-making process with various structural alternatives whereby common substantive goals may be achieved but, basically, where decisions are made by those who .pnrlll .d-P‘a . 1rypw3444 .,.1.. i A.» ; . ,. O- 1 A . "s. - Have. h:' t l5 :1: 43 are affected by the decisions. In this way the study of any large-scale voluntary organization may be approached in terms Of the consideration of its unique structure and how this particular structure facilitates or inhibits democratic processes. A. The Role of the Convention in Trade Union Democracy In most trade union governments the primary policy-making structures are the convention and the executive board or council. A survey of the literature on trade union government reveals that hardly more than scant attention has been directed to these bodies. Studies of trade union democracy, though concerned with such things as control of the executive, appeals procedure, self-regulation, and certain other rights of membership, have failed to focus on the policy-making structure per se. This deficiency is unexplainable since the character of the mechanism provided for arti- culation Of the memberships' expressed desires, and the process through which leadership is made accountable to the membership would appear to be crucial in establishing the extent to which a union is functioning democratically. The concern of this study is with the convention and, more Speci- fically, with the role of the convention delegate. The assumption here is that a democratically ordered convention which functions as a policy- making body is among the Strongest safeguards for democracy in union govern- ment. Blau98 differentiates six types of "structural effects" upon indivi- dual behavior. These "structural effects" are essentiall common values Y 98Peter‘M. Blau, "Structural Effects," American Sociological Review, 25 (April 1960), pp. 178-193. 44 and norms Of the group. The important aSpect is the influence that structure has upon individual behavior. Here group norms and values are differentiated from individual norms and values and the pressure of the former upon the latter is revealed as a strong determinant of behavior. The existence of democratic structures (e.g. conventions) within a bureaucratic organization may help produce behavior consistent with a democratic idealogy. Although, as Michels states, the danger always exists that leader- ship may exploit the masses through their control of key positions, this danger can be lessened through "communication" between these two dis- tinct groupings. The role of the convention delegate in this process "99 The delegate to the may be analogous to Loomis' "systemic linkage. convention may be viewed as the link between two distinct groupings (locals and the International) through which is channeled what Loomis might call democratic sentiments. Thus, instead of developing ends other than the group goals, leadership may be oriented toward common values and norms. The systemic link thereby provides a mechanism for identification with and accountability to the membership. The contention here is that the degree to which the convention exhibits a democratic atmOSphere will depend to a considerable degree upon the role orientation of the convention dele- gates who form the actual link between the two systems. The delegate, as a significant figure among the "actives" of local union government, trans- mits the general sentiment of the membership at large to the greater policy-making body. This indirect procedure of decision-making through a 99CharleSaP. Loomis, "Systemic Linkage of El Cerrito," Rural Sociology, 24 (March 1959), pp. 54-57. 45 body with authority to establish policies makes the delegate role a crucial one in union government. In Spite of the various exhortations of campaign orators and other so-called champions of freedom, neither the citizen in a mass society nor the rank and file member in a large union play a dominant role in determining the character of national and union political processes. The political process is shaped by people in leadership positions either in the informal sense (influentials) as opinion leaders or in the formal sense of having the authority of office. This was probably the case in the New England town meeting as well as in contemporary, large scale organizations. In any kind of social organization there must exist a structure of leadership -- formal or informal. There will also almost inevitably be "active" participants and "passive" participants -- those seriously concerned with certain problems and those indifferent and apathetic. It is also undoubtedly a rare occurence that everyone really has the change to express himself on all issues beyond the casting of his vote. In short, allusions to the tradi- tional townhall meeting as the epitome of democratic process probably over estimate the degree of influence of the individual citizen even in this relatively uncomplex decision-making system. The proposition here is that a necessary condition for a union to function democratically is the existence of a core of localleaders capable of and willing to articulate local interests and committed to a democratic value orientation. The delegates to the convention, at least in the U. A. W., are drawn from the general membership and to a large degree they constitute this core of local leaders. Though this study focuses upon the U. A. W. convention, it has a broader significance. A democratic society such as ours is typified by many so-called voluntary associations -- political -a-a’ t4 6... 3 6L .» e .- A\v .\. . « nah 46 parties, co-operatives, professional organizations, bureaus, lodges, etc. The acknowledged mass character of our society necessitates the segmental participation of every citizen in selected groups and differential degrees of participation depending upon the degree of interest in the particular group.100 It would be a physical and mental impossibility to be totally involved in all the areas of interest.101 The ”actives" of the parti- cular organization who form the core of leadership within the organization thereby assume the primary responsibility for maintaining the central values of the group. B. The Function of the Convention "A national union is born at a convention and is then presumed to have a continuous existence, its periodic sessions being successively 102 The convention is presumed to be the numbered from its first meeting." central governing body where all major policy issues are resolved. In reconciling bureaucratic ideals with democratic processes, it is necessary to structurally differentiate the policy-making function from the policy implementing function. It is with regard to policy implementation that bureaucratic values (e.g., efficiency) become paramount while democratic values (e.g., participation in decision-making, etc.) become paramount 100Philip Selznick, "Institutional Vulnerability and Mass Society," The American Journal of Sociology, 56 (January 1951). 101George Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in Cities and Society, revised reader in urban sociology, edited by Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957, pp. 635-646. 102WilliamM. Leiserson, American Trade Union Democragy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 146. 47 in the policy-making aSpect. At the convention, policy-making being the prime function, the delegates and the International executive board appear as the primary decision-makers. But, as decision-makers, each body plays a different representative role. Each delegate is assumed to carry the voice of his local while the executive board presumably represents the interests of the whole union. Procedurally, however, the delegate has the final word since it is only he who votes on the particular issue at hand.103 In addition, the executive board, as officers of the International, are accountable to the congress of delegates Since the positions they hold are elective. Thus it seems that within the setting of the convention each body plays two reciprocal roles -- subordinate and superordinate. The members of the executive board are accountable to the delegate body (as representatives of the membership at large) and the delegates look toward the executive body for leadership and guidance. It is clear that members of both these groups also play dominant leadership roles within the policy implementation structure. At the locals, the delegates, in many cases, hold one or several Official posi- tions. At the International level, the executive board, outside of the convention, assumes the role of policy implementers. Decisions made at the convention are delegated to the executive board for implementation in the expedient manner. Thus, the hierarchy of leadership positions at the International level can be seen as a policy implementation structure in which the various functionaries or "experts" perform Specific roles 103Article VIII, Section 13, of the U. A. W. constitution permits voice but nn_vote to the International officers and International representatives of the International Union. See Constitution of the International Union -- October, 1959. 48 in the complex organizational structure under the direction of Inter- national Officers and representatives who have been delegated their power to direct. The functions of the convention itself may be divided into four categories: 1) reports; 2) information; 3) policy-making; and 4) election of Officers. These may be defined as the manifest functions of the con- vention. In addition, there is a psychological atmOSphere which emerges from such congress which may be seen as a latent function of the con- vention. The fanfare, the camaraderie, the leveling relationship where all are "brothers" seem to have a unifying effect. This may be described as a revitalization effect. Attendance at the convention seems to bring a resurgence of one's identity in the labor movement. Some delegates have noted this latter effect: "The convention has its purpose in developing union solidarity." The four procedural categories, in principle, place the power of rule into the hands of the delegates. 'Where delegates are informed and election of officers occurs directly the incumbents in the International offices are more likely to be accountable to the delegates. Policy-making though flavored with much of the politicking commonly noted in American political processes is, ideally, the final analysis, the private domain of the delegate body. Granted the advantages of incumbency such as primary access to communication channels, identification with achieve- ments, etc., these procedural guarantees tend to place these officials in a tenuous position. Security is a question of perception and purely relative to the situation. Where decisions are ultimately made by the delegate body, a constant threat is posed to security in office. Thus, the formal accountability feature of the convention cannot be minimized 49 in analyzing democratic processes in unionism. C. Democratic Forms of the Convention Two convention functions have been alluded to which basically serve as procedural guarantees of democracy. To achieve the desired condition of decision-making by those who will be affected by the decision, the convention makes possible the articulation of membership desires and accountability of leadership behavior. These two variables appear to be interdependent. The membership must have its desires expressed in order for leadership to develop some pattern of response. On the other hand, the final accounting to the membership gives some assurance of a pattern of response falling within the limits of the memberships' expectations. 1. The Articulation of Membership Desires Ideally, the convention is established by the constitution so that the membership may have a voice in government. This is presumed to be the most expedient democratic form in large-scale organizations. Granted the limitations of time, the complexity and variety of issues, the apparent control (by parliamentary procedures) of the floor by the executive officers, the sessions still represent, in principle, the town- hall meeting on a grander scale. AS enumerated above the manifest function, or what might be termed the business of the convention, is decision-making. However, decision-making (eSpecially in a democratic setting) involves a process more complex than just the act Of voting. As Leiserson points out "business comes to the convention in three forms: resolutions, reports, 104 and appeals." The resolutions represent the specifically expressed 104WilliamiM. Leiserson, gp.cit., p. 194. O: {I lOCé. ..._- ‘m t...» .. SlECé than: in th step : of th‘ and re ‘\ H'wyf a. v. 5' |-.. ~~:. 50 desires of the membership at large. Granted that some of these resolu- tions may be introduced by the executive board members through their locals, the majority of them, in the U. A. W. at least, appear to represent views of the locals.105 Membership desires with reSpect not only to specific local concerns but also general operating procedures of the International Union and the forms of union government are expressed through resolutions since amendments to the constitution are introduced to the body in this form. Appeals or grievances may also be taken through regular judicial channels to the constitutional convention of the International union or, in the case of the U. A. W., to the Public Review Board.106 This final step is open to the appellant in case he is not satisfied with the decision of the International Executive Board or an International Trial Committee and represents another way in which membership views are made known. The more interesting feature Of this articulating function is debate on the convention floor itself. Here, before the general assembly and the members of the International Executive Board, proponents and opponents of the particular resolution are granted "equal time" to express their views and exhort their fellow delegates to support their particular views. Voting from the floor (except in the case of a roll call vote) perhaps leaves much to be desired since there appears to be no adequate 105Three hundred and seventy-four resolutions were presented to the Resolutions Committee for introduction at the 17th Constitutional Con- vention of the U. A. W. See Proposed Resolutions Submitted by Local Unions to the 17th Constitutional Convention -- U. A. W., Atlantic City, New Jersey, October 1959. 106See Constitution of the International Union -- U. A. W., adopted October 1959, Article 32, Section 9, p. 90. 51 reassurance that the differential voting power of each delegate has been taken into consideration.107 However, the fact that any obvious mis- representation or distortion of this procedure may be challenged and appealed leaves this articulating function fairly well accepted by the delegate body. A significant articulating function may also be the election of Officers of the International. To the extent that views of candidates for office are known to the delegates and to the extent that these views differ from each other, the election may be an opportunity for expression of membership desires. This convention function serves primarily, however, to assure the accountability of the International body to the membership at large. 2. Accountability of Leadership As stated earlier, the International executive body assumes the dual role of policy decision-makers and policy implementers. Policy decision-making is a shared reSponsibility with the delegate body. During the period of the convention, the executive body still maintains its leadership functions and may influence the direction Of policy-making. However, once outside of the convention, the executive body assumes com- plete authority to implement the program outlined by the delegate body. The crux of the matter is that these leaders have assumed both the reSpon- 107To approximate proportional representation without imposing a heavy financial burden upon the larger locals, the number of delegates is determined by a ratio system. Thereby, though limited in number, each delegate from these larger locals is assigned a weighted voting power. Thus, a delegate from the smaller local may have one vote while the dele- gate from the larger local may have any number or fraction beyond one depending upon the size of his local. “In ." :7 : F" Sczilobt" carrying the 53:5 ..u- y: Chu'vcnba the ca .5 ' ‘ I. “‘4. A: .a‘u‘t “‘5 -~ .~_‘ '- .~r‘bwc. ltpcrta: 1 Q: - e s 0L 5":- ‘.::D?"“ . _ «‘V 52 sibility of influencing the decision-making process and the task of carrying out the program to its successful end. The convention establishes the subsequent convention date, as well as the Site, but the interim between conventions is largely controlled by the executive board of the Interna- tional. Except for the provisions allowing for appeal, the members of the executive board assume full authority as decision-makers and definers of the constitution. The resulting situation finds these leaders with rather wide discretionary privileges both as decision-makers and policy decision- implementers. This fact makes the accountability structure extremely important. Although the leadership role at the International level has been invested, apparently, with rather broad powers to carry out the organizational goals, the level of satisfaction of the membership with their performance may still be a matter of concern. The International leadership not only must exhibit a successful program but also must engage in continuing salesmanship with the membership at large. Though incumbency derives all the advantages Of the control of available resources (such as communication channels, clerical help, etc.), some evidence that accountability is acknowledged in the U. A. W. can be seen in the attempt to "sell" the virtues of the administration. Assuming the desirability of the reward system, both tangible (material wealth) and intangible (prestige, influence, etc.) and with the achievement orientation of American culture, it is easy to see why there might be a strong inclina- tion toward oligarchic rule. This fact makes the accountability structure of the convention a central focus of democratic process. The delegate to the convention individually reserves the right to cast his vote (in the name of his respective local) and by doing so signifies his approval or disapproval of the past behavior of the International officers. In other now ab 0... w... .J . ‘fi ‘- .3 53 words, success or failure of union programs, as perceived by the delegate, is likely to be attributed not to the convention but to the instrumental figures in the International body. Thus, holding frequent conventions may have a counteracting effect to the oligarchic tendencies. Tighter control by a few is the inevitable result when conventions are postponed time and again. Explicit assurance given in the constitution that a convention is to be held at regular and Specified intervals tends to maintain democratic control. D. The Importance of the Role of the Delegate The International union is basically an amalgamation of local unions. The establishment of this larger body, however, makes 2225 local subordinate to it and subsequently much of the local's activities are controlled by this higher centralized authority. However, the general convention, composed of delegates from ill the local organizations, remains, in principle, the supreme authority as well as the legislative body Of the International. The International Officers are delegates by virtue of the position they occupy. They are, in fact, responsible for implementing the constitutional provision which calls for the convention. The central interest here, however, is the delegate from the local who attends the convention and takes part in the decision-making process in the name of his local. Up to this point, a case was made for the demo- cratic function of the convention itself. Assuming that the delegates genuinely represented the interests of their respective locals, the argu- ment was presented that their actions constituted basically the actions Of the membership at large. In principle, the functions of the convention fulfill the criteria set forth for democracy earlier in the discussion. ov- k- a: cue LU». ~33». ,..a.,...,| . . .lxx. int-l3 ’ y! .me Nibblijlll . a >1 5.5!!! -1 3.: 1V V. :5 54 These procedural guarantees all fall under the two general categories of articulating functions and accountability functions. However, all this hinges on the assumption that the delegate truly represents the local. It has been suggested that the delegate is likely to be part of the core of leaders in the local and thereby among the influential members Of the local. But the essential point to remember is that usually only a minority of the local members are concerned enough with union affairs to be part of the "active" group. Form and Dansereau offer some insight into this specific problem in their attempt to delineate the differential orientations of workers to union membership.108 The authors found that three dominant life styles seem to underlie union orientations in addition to other, broader patterns of social integration. These were "a working class life style", whereby the union and the work place play a dominant role, an "individualistic life style," whereby community associations seem to be more vital, and "isolated life style," in which the family and perhaps the neighborhood play the dominant role in the social integration of the individual. (This analysis is con- sistent with the notion of "segmental participation? discussed above.) From the above, it follows that it would be the "core" of active and dedicated men who make the local union a "going concern." These "actives" make up the relatively small percentage that researchers in union govern- ment have referred to in their analysis of union participation. It is from this circle of active participants that local leadership is recruited 108William H. Form and Harry K. Dansereau, Union Member Orientations and Patterns of Social Integration, Michigan State University: Labor and Industrial Relations Center, reprint series, 1957-58. Reprinted from Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (October 1957), pp. 3-12. 55 and, quite naturally, the delegates to the International convention are selected. In many cases, the delegates are selected from those already in some functional role in the local or who have served in such roles in the past. All this illustrates the crucial role that the delegate plays in local trade union government. The role of the delegate at the con- vention ideally guarantees the democratic process at the International level. But what gf the delegate himself in the particular role that n2 playg? Once selected as a delegate to the convention, how does he define his role? Each delegate, emerging from a relatively small core of active members, carries to the convention a role orientation which may affect the process of delegate representation at the convention. In the language of role analysis, the delegate can be seen as a "focal position" in relation to the "counter positions" of the membership body and the International body.109 The general membership looks to the delegate for representation in the International. Through the delegate they hope to have their desires expressed. In turn, the International officers look toward the delegates for support since it is through these people that their programs become union policy. The delegate thus finds himself in a marginal position and exposed to potentially conflicting role expecta- tions. As noted earlier, structurally, the delegate may be viewed as the systemic link between the local and the International organization. He is a member of his local and, by the formal definition of his role, also a member Of the International organization. In the performance of his role he is reSponsible for articulating one organization with the other. 109Neal Gross,‘Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W.‘McEachern, Explora- tions in Role Analygis, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958. 56 Thus, he may carry with him to the convention various role orientations with differing implications for trade union democracy. One variable dimension of delegate role orientation is the extent to which the delegate himself is committed to democratic values. As mentioned earlier, with the increasing size and complexity of trade union organization, the conflict is intensified between value placed upon direct participation by membership in the decision-making process and value placed upon efficiency of operation. Subjectively, these may not necess- arily be incompatible positions. There seems to be no reason why one should not desire both democratic participation in decision-making and efficiency in organizational operation. However, objectively speaking, one facet of bureaucratic efficiency is unilateral decision-making to facilitate the implementation of organizational goals. Democratic processes, such as participation in decision-making by the membership at large, may become a hindrance to efficiency. For the delegate, then, this becomes a role conflict situation, with reSpect to issues where he must decide whether he values participation in decision-making or efficiency of operation. The former is regarded as a focal value for one with a democratic value orientation and the latter as a focal value for one with a bureaucratic value orientation. The conflict between these values may be particularly acute since both are centered around an interest in the well-being of the organization itself. The selection of either of these values may reflect a genuine concern for the membership. The delegate who values participation may be one who is concerned pri- marily with the rights of the membershipand with the procedural aSpects of democracy. The other type, who values efficiency, may be one concerned primarily with achieving certain job-related benefits for the membership. 57 This study is designed to ascertain the delegate's commitment to one or the other of these value positions. Another dimension of role orientation, perhaps closely related to the first, is how the delegate relates himself to the local and the International inasmuch as he is a member of both of these bodies. Since, as stated earlier, the delegatels main function is to articulate one organization.with the other, it is important to know where his primary identification or allegiance lies. For instance, does he see himself as primarily a member of the local or does he see himself as primarily a member of the larger and more authoritative body -- the International? In all probability there will be instances of conflicting expectations from local membership and International officers regarding the delegate's actions at the convention. His primary identification then becomes crucial in determining his attitude toward the legitimacy of these various expecta- tions. A third dimension of delegate role orientation is how he relates himself to his local constituents per se. Political scientists have differentiated three types of role performance for the representative in a republican form of government.110 These are the trustee, the delegate, and the pglitico. The trustee conceptualizes his role in two ways: that he is a free agent acting upon the basis of what he considers right and that he follows a rational approach based upon his assessment of the facts 110Heinz Eulau, John C. wahlke, William Buchanan and Leroy C. Ferguson. "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," Reprint from The American Political Science Review, 53 (September 1959), pp. 742-756. 58 in the particular case at issue. The delegate does not use independent judgment or convictions as criteria for decision-making. Rather, he prefers to consult his constituents and may consider consultation as mandatory. As a result of this consultation, he gets Specific instruc- tions which serve as the basis for decision-making. The politico is one who assumes a flexible orientation. He resolves the conflict of a1- ternatives by being less dogmatic in his representational style. Depending on the situation, he might be a trustee type at one time and a delegate type at another time. Admittedly, the pure polar types may not exist. ‘What is implied is that these role types may be a continuum along which the delegate may be placed. For the purpose of this study, two types will be distinguished: one who is more nearly a delegate-type and one who is ‘mg£§_near1y a trustee-type. Along with the identification of these types, comparative attitudes toward rank and file expectations will be measured. Another dimension of concern in this study is the delegate's per- ception of the convention and his role in the performance of convention functions. Of central interest is whether or not the delegate sees him- self as actually a participant in the decision-making process. If he does consider himself an active participant in this important function, the next important question will be: does he regard the decisions made as important and inclusive enough to provide the policy framework within which the bureaucratic implementation structure can operate without necessarily usurping the policy~making function? The answer should provide some clues regarding the feasibility of democratic processes in a bureaucratic structure. A final dimension of delegate role orientation to be considered is the function this role serves for the incumbent of the position. As dis- 59 cussed in an earlier section, the individuals filling this role are likely to have other functional roles in the local organization. They are part of the core of active members who keep the union vital as an organization. 'What is of concern here is the motivational factors that drive these people toward active union work. Two types are discerned in this particular area: those who perceive their work in the union as a "calling"; and those who perceive it as part of a "career” leading toward more rewarding and perhaps more prestigeful positions in the organizational l hierarchy.11 The latter type may be defined as mobility oriented. Once it is ascertained that the individual is mobility oriented, the problem will be to discover the primary mobility channel he seeks in order to achieve his goal. In this respect it is important to note whether he seeks to rise in the union hierarchy through elective channels or through appointive channels. For the delegate who is mobility oriented, the accountability pattern may be determined by the primary channel through which he seeks vertical mobility. If he seeks mobility in terms of the elective channels, one can predict that he will be concerned with accounting his actions to the local membership, be concerned with communication in the local and owe allegiance mainly to the local. On the other hand, for one who seeks mobility in terms of the appointive channels, these concerns would seem to be directed to the International executive body. The sub- stance of this is that given a mobility orientation, the channel through which mobility is sought may affect attitudes regarding the legitimacy of expectations from the local membership and from the International officers 111These character types are taken from Lipset. See Seymour‘Martin Lipset, Political Man, gp.cit., pp. 383-389. ‘7' kn «PETA: ..- .h P. 5'! fatty. gill . s . . A: ‘I. 60 or representatives. In order to account for the different types of delegate role orientation, certain social and personal background factors will be treated as independent variables. In this reSpect the following general proposition may be posed: VARIOUS SOCIAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS ARE RELATED TO DIFFERENCES IN DELEGATE ROLE ORIENTATION. It is to be remembered that, while this corps of local leaders have one thing in common, they are the "actives" of their union, they may represent a wide range of social and personal characteristics. It is assumed that these differences will be associated with differences in delegate role orientation. Delegate role orientation may also be treated as an independent variable. As already suggested, the issue of democracy vs. bureaucracy is concretely a matter of procedure in the allocation of power and the resolving of conflicts. Commitment to either of these values is not necessarily outside the major sphere of value orientations of American society.112 However, since in many instances they may be mutually exclu- sive, one must hold primacy over the other as a belief system. It is anticipated that the pattern of variation along the different dimensions of delegate role orientation will show two clusters: one related to democratic values and the other to bureaucratic values. The following general proposition is a major concern of this study: DELEGATE ROLE ORIENTATIONS ARE A DETERMINANT OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES MAY OPERATE IN TRADE UNIONS. 112Williams lists both efficiengy and practicality and democracy as part of the total major value orientations in American society. Robin Williams, Jr., chapter 11,‘gp.cit. 1.. -. Chalk was E .:,_,_ . . t 5.15 in L1: sun :Y‘ a s“- ‘ 61 These propositions will be examined in detail in subsequent chapters in terms of Specific hypotheses. II. Procedural Concerns \ Introduction: Prior to conducting the present study, the writer was an observer at the 1959 U. A. W. constitutional convention.113 This witnessing of the convention in action, supplemented by background readings in unionism, provided valuable insight into the development of the pro- blem for this study. The following discussion is concerned with the research procedures used in the investigation of this problem. A. Initiation of the Study The research problem, democracy in unionism, seems a timely one in view of the current "concern" in the business, political, and public arena with internal union affairs and with the relations of unions with other institutions in society. Further, since there have been many studies of trade union government at the local level but few studies at the International level, and since there has been no thorough investigation of the relationship between the locals and the International, it was thought that such an investigation would be a contribution to knowledge in the problem area of reconciling democratic processes with large-scale bureaucratic voluntary organizations. 113The writer accompanied Professors Stieber, Form and Faunce to the 17th Constitutional Convention of the U. A. W. held in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in October 1959. In addition to helping administer a ques- tionnaire to the delegates seated at the convention, the writer was allowed to mix with the delegates and officials of the convention. By this approach perhaps a more sensitive feeling was derived in regard to the "Spirit" of the convention. 62 Since a study of role orientation of delegates (or even a sample of delegates) from the entire U. A.‘W. was not feasible, a case study was chosen as the more practical means toward arriving at some knowledge about these "actives." It was decided, on the basis of their accessibility and the fact that a wide range of types of locals would be included, to limit the study to all delegates to the 17th U. A. W. Constitutional Convention from locals in Lansing and Flint, Michigan.114 One methodological problem was the strategy gf approach in gaining access to an organization whose life history in relation to management has made its membership generally suSpicious of all "outsiders" who come to "investigate" the inner life of the organization. However, in this particular case, the problem of accessibility was minimized by the fact that staff members of the Labor and Industrial Relations Center at Michigan State University had established previous research relation- ships with this union.115 The director of the Center asked for and received the support of the regional director of the U. A. W. under whose territory were included both the Lansing and Flint locals. The regional director, in turn, requested the support of the locals concerned. The important thing to note here is that the regional director solicited 114See Appendix B for listing of locals from both cities. 115Two immediately notable ones are by Harry Kirk Dansereau, "Orientations Toward Unionism: An Attitudinal Study of a Local Union," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1956 and William A. Faunce, "Autamation in the Automobile Industry: Some Consequences for In-Plant and Union Management Relationships," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Sociology, wayne State University, 1957. 63 the support of the member locals.116 No directives were channeled to these locals for support of the study. Each member local independently (through the local officials) made the decision to cooperate with the project. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the appeal made by the regional director had a definite positive affect upon the locals' atti- tude toward the proposed study. Following this formal exchange, the local officials were contacted and the project explained in detail. A different strategy of approach was used with various locals. For instance, though in many cases the local president's support was solicited, in other cases, the financial secretary was the key functionary whose support was called for. Also, in other cases, the Shop Committee Chairman was the key functionary whose support was necessary. Again, in one relatively small local, the clerk in the local office was the instrumental figure to whom support for cooperation was directed. B. The Interview Schedule The interview schedule for the study consisted of eight parts.117 {The first part was a series of questions dealing with the political "climate" (of the local. In this section were included Specific questions on election Inethods, party systems or opposition groups, activities of opposing groups, «amid whethercor not such groups had a "tie-in" with other groups in the IIIJternational union and/or other locals. In addition, membership orienta- t:ion.to union politics was probed. Here, questions dealing with relative ccxncern of membership with local politics, the degree of contest in elections, 116See Appendix C. 117See Appendix H for complete interview schedule- “umm' "ff 3 ‘32. 64 and the level of participation in elections were asked. In addition, some impressions about the membership's attitude toward the convention were sought. The next section of the schedule was directed toward the delegate's own experience at the convention. Here information was sought on the delegate's opinions about the reasons for having conventions, the things that affected his decision-making, his attitude on the importance of various issues, and the level of his participation at the convention. The third section tried to elicit some indication of identification on the part of the delegate. Specifically, questions were directed toward his reSponses to cross pressures that come from the International and the local. In addition, various measures of his role orientation as a dele- gate were obtained in this section. In the fourth section, questions were directed at getting informs ation-on the events that took place after the delegate reported back to his local. Specifically, this section dealt with the accountability aSpect of the delegate's role behavior. The fifth section sought to derive some information about the dele- gate's experience in the labor movement and the degree to which he had committed himself as an active union member. Positions held in the present and in the past, reasons for being active in the union, reasons for running for delegate, and his attitude about achieving and maintaining union positions were among the questions asked. The sixth section sought the delegate's opinion of the U. A. W. as an operating organization. The delegate was asked to make statements comparing his union with others and his local with other locals in regard 65 to questions of efficiency and democratic practices. The delegate was also asked to define the concept democracy. In addition, he was asked to compare his union today with what it was (impressionisticélly if not through firsthand experience) twenty years ago in terms of efficiency and democratic practices. The seventh section sought to measure the delegate's general orienta- tion toward the values of bureaucratic efficiency of operation and demo- cratic participation in decision-making. The final section of the interview schedule was used to gather personal data about the delegate including age, schooling, sex, race, household income, job classification, degree of satisfaction on the job, his place of residence, and his social class identification. In addition, some measure of his social integration within the union organization as well as with the wider community was sought. The interview schedule was pre-tested and subsequently slightly modified by the addition of some alternative reSponse categories to some of the items in the schedule. In one case, a reSponse category was elimina- ted. Primarily to expedite the field work phase of the project, the pre- testing was conducted with delegates included in the final sample. Ten delegates from the Lansing locals were interviewed before the final form of the schedule was completed. No major modification of the sched11e appeared to be required, however, so it was not deemed necessary to re- interview these ten delegates. C. The Interview Two approaches to scheduling the interviewing of the delegates were used. One approach was that names, addresses and phone numbers of 66 the delegates were supplied by the local office but the appointments were made individually by the interviewer. The second approach called for the local office to schedule the interviews by arranging to have its delegates appear at the local hall at a Specified time with a team of interviewers prepared to meet them. There did not appear to be any appreciable difference in reSponse to the interviewing situation associated with whether or not the interview appointment was made by the local. Interviews scheduled through both approaches were conducted for the most part at the local halls. Those on the day-shift usually were interviewed immediately after work let out and those who worked on the afternoon-shift usually were interviewed sometime before they left for work. A few were inter- viewed during the early evening hours at their homes. The interview time ranged from an hour to three hours and a half. The longer interviews were usually those done at the reSpondent's homes while the shorter interviews were usually cases where the reSpondents had just been let out of the plant. However, longer interviews do not necessarily mean better quality interviews. In many cases, the extended sessions were the result of too much "free information" given without solicitation. How to channelize an enthusiastic informant back to the relevant problem area without breaking rapport is a methodological task not usually explained in textbooks. The length of the typical interview session was somewhere around two hours. Delegates from both the Lansing and Flint locals numbered a hundred and thirteen. Interviews were completed with a hundred and eight delegates. The five remaining cases were left uninterviewed for the following reasons. One Small Lansing local which was entitled to one delegate at the convention did IHJt send any. One delegate from a Flint local had moved out of the 67 state and a second delegate from another Flint local had passed away sometime during the period between the convention and the initiation of the study. The two remaining cases could not be contacted either by phone or in person. The interviewing began during the Winter of 1961 and was completed during the following Spring. The actual field work took approximately three months. The relatively short period in which the interviews were completed limits the possibility that changed conditions during the study may have affected the attitudes of the delegates. _.m I pl. arr ar total CHAPTER III THE INTERNAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION Introduction: We have recognized so far that labor organizations are in some reSpects no less bureaucratic than corporations and govern- mental agencies. A formal organization chart showing the structural arrangements by which the individual relates himselfto others in the total organization of the U. A. W. would look much like that of other large scale bureaucracies. Such a chart, however, would reflect primar- ily the structure through which policies are implemented. The focus of this study is upon the policy-making process. This chapter is concerned with internal mechanisms within the U. A. W. relating to this process. In this reSpect, the concern here is not with the relationship between the constituent and autonomous units of the organization but rather with the articulating Structure of the union through which the membership relates itself to the total organization. A. Leadership Selection Process -- General Qualifications The constitution of the U. A. W. Internationalestablishes the various elective offices of the International union and also the executive board members of the local union. On both levels no member may be nominated or elected into office unless he has been a member ”in continuous good standing" for a period of one year. This provision is a little more Spe- cific at the local level in that it Spells out that this good standing AmuSt lae one year "immediately prior to the nomination, except in the case 68 ____w._d 69 of a newly organized Local Union."118 ”Good standing" is perhaps not too clearly defined but may be abstracted from the various membership requirements. Article 5 of the constitution proclaims the jurisdiction of the U. A. W. over "all employees of plants and shops engaged in the manufacture of parts (including tools, dies, etc.), and the assembly of these parts into farm, automobile, automotive propelled products, air- craft and agricultural implements, including employees engaged in office work, sales, distribution and maintenance thereof and such other branches "119 of industry . . Section 2 of Article 6 states that anyone so eligible (as defined in Article 5) may apply to the local union having jurisdiction over the local plant for membership into the organization providing he is not affiliated with any organization whose principles and philosophy are contrary to those of the International union as out- lined in the preamble to the constitution. At the time of application the individual must be an actual worker in or around the plant. In the formal statement of application, the prosPective member signs a promise to abide by all laws, rules and regulations and the constitution of the International union. 'Within sixty days of the receipt of applica- tion the local union must give due consideration and act upon the request for membership. Any application for membership rejected by the local 120 union cannot be reconsidered until a lapse of 30 days. Upon acceptance 118Constitution (1959) Article 38, Section 4, p. 105. 119Ibid., Article 5, page 7. Hereon, all reference to the constitu- tion, unless otherwise stated will have specific reference to the U. A. W. International Constitution, adopted October 1959, at Atlantic City, New Jersey. lzolbid., Article 6, Section 5, page 8. YA .V.‘ .\- m» Bit; int 016 .svls Ah ‘ a‘\ in a: «J A.» NIH C d a c.» a AL ‘A s- 70 of the application, membership begins from the first day of the month for which dues are paid. Unless waived by the local union, the candidate must present hflmself for initiation within 4 weeks after he has been notified of his acceptance into the union. Failing to do so without ”good and sufficient reason being given" subjects one to forfeiture of all money paid by him and by this also the cancellation of membership is assumed. The constitution explicitly defines the dividing line between mana- gerial functions and union concerns. Any head of a department directing company policy or reserving the authority to hire and discharge workers will not be accepted into the union. In the same light, any one promo- ted to such positions will be issued a withdrawal card. However, Section 11, of Article 6 clearly states that where one is promoted to a minor position but does not reserve the power to hire and discharge, membership in the local union may be retained. A series of provisions in Article 10 of the constitution prohibits one from holding any elective or appointive positions if he is a member of any organization declared illegal by the U. S. or Canadian governments (Section 7) and if he is a member of or subservient to any political organization which owes allegiance to any government other than the U. S. A. or Canada. In this case the communist, fascist, and nazi groups are listed as cases in point. (Section 9) Finally, Section 13 disqualifies once's eligibility for office if he is found actively supporting the cause of another union in its attempt to supplant the U. A. W. as the recognized collective bargaining agent. Any violation of Sections 7, 8, or 9 subjects the member to a penalty whiCh may also include his expulsion from the union. If a member in officne is found to have violated the provision in Section 13, the Inter- 71 national president or the International executive board may summarily suspend the accused party from office or if the party is seeking such office or position, suspend his rights to do so. The suspended party maintains the right to appeal all such acts which may lead directly up to the International Convention or the Public Review Board. Finally, Article 9 stipulates that all officers -- International officers, International Board members, International Representatives and Local Union officers -- upon the date of taking office, must participate in election for civil office in the area in which they legally reside if they are qualified to do so. ‘With certain qualifications, violation of this provision subjects the person or persons charged to disciplinary action. 1. Election of International Officers The constitution enumerates the elective offices of the International union to be: 1) an International President, 2) an International Secretary- Treasurer, and 3) four International Vice-Presidents. Regional Directors are nominated and elected from the various geographic regions as established by the International Constitution. These Regional Directors serve on the International Executive Board. The constitution also provides that the International president, the International secretary-treasurer, and the International vice-presidents are to be included as members of the Inter- national Executive Board with voice and vote.12 The term of office for all these elective positions runs for the period immediately upon installation to the following convention when new elections are held. Nominations and elections are part of the regular order 121Ibid., Article 12, Section 4, p. 34. 72 of business of the convention. Candidates are elected to the various offices by majority vote of the convention. a) Duties of the International President The International president is primarily responsible for the union's affairs in between conventions and between the regular meetings of the International Executive Board. All his activities are therefore reported to these two bodies. Though he is accountable to the Executive Board and to the general membership through the convention there is no denying that the actual power and influence exercised by the president is determined to a large extent by his personal will and ability as well as the formal authority granted to the office. The personal factor combines with the prestige of office to influence the course of action on many issues faced by the International. Since the dividing line between personal qualities and actions and the union's behavior is rather vague, the President's behavior vitally affects public opinion in regard to the unionism. The general duties of the president are described in Article 13 of the constitution. Among the duties defined are: . . . execute the instruc- tions of the International Executive Board and have full authority to direct the working of this organization within the provisions of this Con- stitution and shall report his acts to the regular quarterly meeting of the International Executive Board. . . . assign any elected officer to represent or direct the workings of this International Union. . . . with- draw any field assignment made to any elected officer when he becomes convinced that the officer has been derelict in his duty or been guilty of a dishonest act. . . . appoint such Representatives as he may deem necessary from time to time, such appointments to be pending the approval of true International Executive Board. . . . hire such legal, technical or a... PM .3. .— Cu 16 pa IE ‘4.“ ~ KL. sun» 73 professional help as is necessary to efficiently operate such departments of this International Union, except in the department of the International Secretary-Treasurer. . . . fill by appointment all vacancies occurring in the International Office Staff, except in the department of the Inter- national Secretary-Treasurer as otherwise provided for in this Constitu- tion. . . . decide diSputes or questions in controversy, including all questions involvinginterpretation‘gf this Constitution. . . . to call special meetings of Councils or Local Unions whenever he deems such meetings necessary to protect the interests of its membership, after pro- per notification or consultation with officers of subordinate bodies involved. . . . be a delegate to all Conventions of the American Federa- tion of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. . . . convene regular and Special sessions of the International Executive Board, when- ever necessary. . . . to grant 52 Local Unions 2; Units dispensations relating to initiation fees, per capita tax and/or Strike Insurance Fund Eggs, to the International Union with the approval of the International Executive Board, when in his judgment such dispensations will add to the growth of or conserve the interests of this International Union. . . . de- vote all his time to the affairs of this International Union, executing the instructions of the International Executive Board and exercising gen- eral supervision over all departments of this International Union." In addition, the constitution explicitly demands that during his term of office the president must "establish his residence in the metropolitan area of the city where the headquarters of this International Union is established."122 122Ibid., p. 40. . . ufl. .F r 41“.- “4 d 3V ‘1‘ be . .\ l. ~ 74 In Spite of all the authority invested in the office of president, most of the important decisions are subject to approval by the Internation- al Executive Board. The International Executive Board thereby provides the direct check on the president's actions in the administration of union affairs. b) Duties of the International Executive Board The International constitution describes the duties of the Inter- national ExecutiVe Board in the following manner: ". . . shall execute the instructions of the International Convention and Shall by the highest authority of the International Union between Conventions, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, and shall have the power to authorize strikes, issue charters, and punish all subordinate bodies for violation of this Constitution."123 The International Executive Board has the power to resolve diSputes within a subordinate body (local union) that threatens the existence of that body. It has the power under such circumstances to order a Special election of officers in that subordinate body. In the same respect, the Board has the responsibility and authority to revoke the charter of a subordinate body. It has the authority to assume direct charge of the local by suSpending all officers and officials of the local union where it believes that it is necessary. Such actions usually occur for inefficiency or nonperformance of duties. The Board also has the power to "repeal any By-Laws of any subordinate body, which do not conform to this Constitution. . . . furnish all charters and initial supplies necessary to Operate the subordinate bodies of the International Union. . . . review and decide, 1231bid., Article 12, Section 1, p. 32ff. 75 between Conventions, all questions involving interpretation of this Constitution when any member or subordinate body wishes to appeal, or the Board on its own initiative wishes to consider, the decision on any such question made . . . by the International President." The Board also serves as a appellate body on matters referred to it by individual members as well as the subordinate body. In such matters, the Board appoints a three man committee to consider the appeal and make recommendations. The committee is composed of the International Executive Board members but disallows membership to the Regional Director from whose region the appeal originates. Any member or a subordinate body may appeal the decision of the Board to either the Constitutional Convention of the International Union or to the Public Review Board. In the large context, the Board has the power to adjust disputes between employers and employees and to make contracts with employers. It also may institute such changes as may be deemed necessary such as creating new departments for the promotion of union affairs and the welfare of its members. If the Board approves a strike, it assumes the reSponsi- bility of rendering financial aid to the members. 2. The International Board of Trustees Perhaps a more or less intermediary function is that performed by the members of the International Board 9£Trustees.124 The Board of Trustees is comprised of three members and is Specifically charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the funds and property of the Inter- national Union. In this respect the board reserves the right to retain or designate a certified public accountant to audit the books and accounts 124Ibid., Article 51, pp. 123-124. 76 of the International Secretary-Treasurer on a semi-annual basis. In this capacity, the board reports to the International Executive Board as well as to the International Convention. In the same capacity, the board makes recommendations to the International Executive Board and the International Convention whenever it seems necessary. Clearly the role of the Board of Trustees is that of watchdog over one of the most vulnerable positions for corrupt practices. The Board's power to cause audit is relatively independent of the Executive Board, and thereby minimizes possible charges of collusion. Members of the Board of Trustees, except for the initiating period, are not elected together for the same period of office. At the initial election, three candidates for trusteeship were nominated and elected. Three separate elections were held -- a three-term trusteeship, a two- term trusteeship and a one-term trusteeship. Thereafter, at each conven- tion, a trustee is elected for a three-term period. This method gives some assurance that stability of the Board would be perpetuated for work- ing efficiency given the possible maximum turnover of one board member at each election period. A maximum time limit of 30 days for any six months period is set for the Board to devote time to the duties involved. During this period, the Trustees are compensated on the basis equal to the maximum salary of the International Representatives plus necessary expenses. Another condition clearly setting the position of the members of the Board of Trustees is that no one, during his term of office, may be employed by the International union in any capacity. One becomes eligible for employment by the International union only subsequent to an Interna- tional Convention which follows his resignation from the Board of Trustees. 77 At least on the surface this prevents any direct collusive practices be- tween the two parties. In general the International President is responsible to the Inter- national Executive Board for the administration of the Union "between Inter- national Executive Board meetings."125 On important measures, the Interna- tional President consults the International Executive Officers and his actions are subject to approval or rejection by the International Executive Board. Between conventions, the highest authority of the International union is the Executive Board. This Board holds regular quarterly meetings and various Special meetings that may be required. In turn, the highest tribunal is the International Convention which is composed of delegates elected by the various constituent local unions. It is important to note here that the International officers and International representatives of the International union have a voice but n2 vote in the convention "unless they are duly accredited delegates from Local Unions."126 B. Government of the Union -- The Convention The typical union convention, though a meeting of the representatives of the various locals, is still regarded as if it were a general meeting of all the membership of the International union. Evidence of this is seen in the assignment of various number of votes to each delegate propor- tionate to the size of the local that he represents. Thus, even though there may be disproportionate representation in terms of number of delegates 125Ibid.,Artic1e 7, Section 1, p. 12. 126Ibid., Article 8, Section 13, p. 19. 78 sent by locals (as designated by the International body) the number of votes that each delegate is alloted purports to equate representation. Though in many cases delegates are instructed or "told" how to vote on certain issues by their local constituencies, the U. A. W. constitution provides that these are not binding on the delegate "on any issue he may vote at the Convention."127 The convention is the meeting place where all affiliated subordinate bodies participate as one. Thus it is the most formal and most authori- tative meeting and the document (constitution) formulated there is defined as £22 legal code for all members. Although this codification of the "rules of the game" and the adherence to these rules appear to be the prime motive for the congress of delegates, an analysis of the formal and infor- mal relationships reveals latent as well as the manifest functions. Both of these types of functions have import in the maintenance of a democratic organization. 1. Selection of Delegates to the International Convention Delegates to the International Convention are elected by secret ballot in the local union of which they are legally constituted members. In no case is one appointed to delegateship. In the case of unOpposed candidacy, the candidate is considered elected without the need for elec- tion procedure.128 The process of selecting delegates begins with the issuance of the Convention Call by the International Secretary-Treasurer. Each local then issues a call for nomination of delegates to the convention. An election committee, a body elected by the membership at large, of each local, assumes the responsibility of conducting and insuring a "fair elec- 127Ibid., Article 8, Section 23, p. 22. 128Ibid.., Article 8, Section 23, p. 22. 79 tion." There is no provision in the U. A. W. Constitution prohibiting local presidents and other local officers from being chosen as delegates. Apparently, in many cases, especially in the larger locals where local officers are accompanied by other members elected as delegates by the membership, the local officers act as spokesmen for the delegation. The U. A. W. Constitution does not provide for compensation of dele- gates for attendance at the Convention. The International does not reim- burse the delegates for expenses incurred while attending the convention. For this particular union, the locals assume the burden of such expenses. For example, one local provides for "twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per day, plus twenty-five dollars ($25.00) expenses, plus eight cents ($.08) per mile by the shortest route to and from his or her destination and shall not be paid time equal to his or her earning capacity.129 Each local union is entitled to one delegate at the convention for the first two hundred or less members and an additional delegate for the next three hundred members or a major fraction of this number. For the larger locals, an additional delegate is allowed for each additional eight hundred members or a major fraction of this number. This allotment applies to all locals except the amalgamated locals which are allowed special dis- pensation in the selection of delegates due to their unique situation.130 Each local is entitled to one vote for the first one hundred members or less and one additional vote for each additional one hundred members or 129Constitution and By-Laws of Chevrolet Local Union No. 659, Article XX, Section 5, (June 1960), p. 31. 130Constitution (l959)lgp.cit, Article 8, Sections 5 & 6, pp. 16-17. Subsequent discussion on delegate representation is based on provisions in Article 8 of the Constitution. 80 a major fraction of this number. However, no delegate is entitled to carry more than eight votes and all votes must be equally apportioned among all the elected delegates of the local. This provision forces especially the larger locals to send at least a set minimum number of delegates. Since the constitution guarantees independent action on the part of the dele- gates, equal apportionment of votes in principle eliminates any unfair advantage on the part of any one or more delegates. In order to be en- titled to representation at the convention the local must have been affil- iated with the International Union for at least three months prior to the convention date. No member of a local is eligible to serve as a delegate unless he has been in continuous good standing in the International Union for twelve months immediately preceding the first day of the month in which the con- vention is to be held. He must also have been a member of the local that he wished to represent for at least three months preceding the first day of the month in which the convention is to be held. To be an eligible member for the delegateship one must have paid his dues or else secured "out-of- work" receipts as specified in the constitution. Aside from the "good standing" rule, there appears to be no limitation on the number of times one may run for delegate. Past convention proceed- ings reveal a fairly large turnover for each new convention yet a noticeable numberof delegates have been re-elected for a series of these conventions. 2. Call to Convention The constitution as adopted includes a provision assigning a date for the following constitutional convention. Unless otherwise amended in later conventions, the provisions made in the 1959 constitutional convention specifies that all subsequent regular constitutional conventions are to be 81 held biennially during the month oprril.131 Due to the fairly large amount of business that has to be handled, the constitution also spells out the order in which business is to proceed at the convention. This order is subject to modification by the convention if it is deemed necessary. Special conventions132 of the International union may be called by the International President under the following conditions: 1) when instructed to do so by the International Executive Board upon a two-third majority vote. In the event that the President fails to call such a meet- ing, another board member so designated by the International Executive Board may call the meeting; 2) by a referendum vote of the membership initiated by a written request of at least fifteen locals among at least five dif- ferent states with such locals comprising not less than 20 percent of the total membership of the International union. Such special conventions will be served by the same delegates who attended the previous regular constitu- tional convention with each local represented by the same number of votes it carried to the regular convention. In addition, the locals demanding the convention must state the reason(s) for desiring such a convention and include the place and date for the convention. These locals must also spell out the date for mailing out and returning of ballots. The International union then assumes the responsibility to transmit such proposals to the local unions for a referendum vote. At the same time reasons £23 and against such a convention are published and forwarded to all locals. The constitution makes it mandatory that all locals hold a secret vote on the issue involved. 131Constitution (1959), Article 8, Section 1, p.13. 132Article 8, Section 4, p. 14. 82 Not less than sixty days prior to the convening of the convention (regular or special) the International Secretary-Treasurer issues a Call 'Eg the Convention and furnishes all local unions with credential and alter- nate credential forms to identify the respective delegates. The original of these forms are retained by the delegates and the duplicates are sent to the International Secretary-Treasurer who in turn will certify the in- coming delegates by checking their original forms against the record. To avoid later confusion a deadline of twenty-one days prior to the convention is set after which no credentials are accepted.133 Three weeks prior to the date set for the convening of the conven- tion copies of all resolutions, grhvances and constitutional amendments for possible consideration by the convention must be submitted to the In- ternational Secretary-Treasurer for processing, sorting and distribution to the various and appropriate committees. Protests concerning delegate elec- tions must be received by the International Secretary-Treasurer by one of two dates, whichever occurs first: 1) within seven days following the local delegate election, or, 2) not less than ten days prior to the con- vening of the convention. These protests are then properly referred to the Credentials Committee for examination and recommendation for prOper action. 3. Selection of Committees The constitution of the International union134 places upon the In- ternational Executive Board the responsibility of selecting from the 133Article 8, Section 10, p. 18. 134Article 8, Sections 15-19, pp. 20-21. 83 elected delegates 3 Constitution committee, a credentials committee, a resolutions committee, and the various other committees as may be deemed necessary for the successful promotion and efficient execution of the con- vention.135 .All convention committees are to be composed of odd number of members with a maximum number set at eleven. a) Constitution Committee The duty of this committee is to take up all recommendations concern- ing changes or additions to the constitution. In addition, this committee has the authority to originate pr0posals regarding amendments to the con- stitution. Recommendations made by the committee are introduced at the convention floor for question and discussion and subsequently put to a vote for adoption. For proper preparation and consideration of all recommenda- tion for changes and additions to the constitution submitted to the Inter- national union, the committee is required to assemble at least two weeks prior to the meeting of the convention. b) Credentials Committee This committee meets ten days prior to the convening of the conven- tion and during this period examines all credentials submitted to the In- ternational office in regard to the standing of the delegate as well as the standing of the local union he represents. If for some reason the committee decides that an election in a local union had been imprOperly conducted and therefore the delegate elected had no right to be seated at the convention, it may, with the joint approval of the International President, order a rerun of the delegate election in the particular local union prior to the 135Other committees listed in the Proceedings 2f the 17th Constitu- tional Convention, UAW are: Grievance Committee, Competitive Shop Com- mittee, Education Committee, Officers Reports Committee, Rules Committee, and Union Label Committee. (See pp. 65, 66, 67) n01.5-3 1}, War; Lil l 5"} 3 84 convening of the convention. This rerun is then supervised by a sub- committee of the credentials committee. Under such circumstances all time limitations for reporting to the convention are waived. If subsequently the convention reverses the credentials committee's judgment and approves the initial election results, the delegates elected in the initial election will be seated at the convention and the International union assumes all financial responsibility for the local union in the rerunning of the election. c) The Resolutions Committee This committee must be comprised of at least seven members and, like the credentials committee, must meet ten days prior to the convening of the convention. The primary responsibility of this committee is to consider all the resolutions that have been properly submitted to the International union. In addition, this committee has the authority to originate resolu- tions to be presented to the convention. C. Impressions of the Convention Proceedings Certain traditional ritualistic ceremonies mark the opening day. While the delegates slowly stream into the convention hall a band plays a spirited tune. At regular intervals, an organist takes the turn at filling the hall with music. Table placards identifying the locals are placed on the numerous tables set before the stage where the officers, speakers, and distinguished guests are to be seated. Fron the outset it becomes fairly obvious that the convention is more than a meeting of a legislative body. Intermixed with all the serious business of the convention, which lasts a week, is a series of social events, formal and informal that serve prima- rily other than a legislative function. These "actives" converging from various sections of the country (including Canada) have the initial problem 85 of trying to get acquainted with ”brothers" that they've never met; old friendships are renewed and notes are compared on the relative state of progress of other locals. As one delegate remarked, one purpose of the con- vention is "to see what the other locals are getting." Long sessions are Spent in the various bars surrounding the convention area, in hotel lobbies, restaurants, and on the convention floor itself in various corners of the hall. The opening of the convention is marked by an air of solemnity. In- vocation is given by a representative from one of the religious denomina- tions and the national anthems of the United States and Canada are sung by those assembled. After a brief opening address by the temporary chairman, the U. A. W. International President is introduced. The International Pres- ident then makes his report to the convention. This address often has as much content symbolic of group solidarity as anything substantive. In this "opening address" the president is likely to acknowledge the greetings of the delegates present, welcome the "distinguished" visitors, express gratifica- tion at the work done by all those responsible for arranging the convention before turning to the more serious business confronting the convention. He will probably not only review the state of progress of the union in terms of its bargaining goals but elaborate on the broader economic and political issues of the day and discuss the place of the union in this broad setting and the strategic role that it plays. He may often appeal for further cooper- ative efforts on the part of the delegates and outline in general fashion the serious work ahead for the union appealing to all "to work together," ". "136 march together," "...build together," "...fight together. 136Proceedings, 16th Constitutional Convention, U. A. W., April 1957: concluding remarks of the presidential report, pp. 9-21. 86 With the convention thus formally Opened, the rather prolonged sessions begin with the serious work that is supposed to be accomplished within the relatively few days allocated for the convention. The cre- dentials committee first presents its "partial report" followed by a motion for its adoption. Other committee reports and recommendations follow in the same suit. In many cases, lively discussions take place before the motions to adopt the reports and/or recommendations are considered. The election of International officers of the U. A. W. has in recent years been conspicuously lacking in any form of organized oppo- sition to the incumbents. This fact may explain the relative lack of a heated political atmosphere during the election period. The presiding officer, who temporarily assumes the chair relinquished by the Inter- national officer during this period, calls for the nomination of the International officers beginning with the office of the president. Inevitably a delegate requests recognition and begins to extol the vir- tues of the incumbent beginning with his early career in the labor move- ment. Finally he sums up his eulogy with a concluding statement likethe following: For all these reasons, and for many more, we in the West Side Local are proud of our brother member, Walter Reuther. ‘We glory in the enormous contribution which he has made to the welfare of our brother members, the people of the nation, and the world. 'We proudly offer in nomination for re-election as president of what we believe to be the world's finest organization of working men and women, Local 174's and the UAW'S favorite son -- Walter Reuther. (Proceedings of the 17th Constitutional Convention, UAW, p. 352) After a tumultuous ovation, the chairman finally restores enough order to recognize any further nomination. Individual nominations are made but in recent conventions these people have regularly declined the nomination. 87 In turn the incumbent president is asked whether he accepts or declines the nomination. He accepts the nomination and subsequently is unanimously elected to office. Elections for other offices in the International union follow in the same general manner with those in office accepting the nominations and others declining in favor of these people. While there may be disillusionment among some delegates, the overall reaction has seemed to indicate a general satisfaction with the chosen leadership. Among the advantages of incumbency is a halo effect upon these people when the record of achievement of the union is considered. Generally, faith in the present administration of the U. A. W. appears to be sufficiently strong and wide- spread that a coalition of dissidents into an effective opposition party is unlikely. D. Delegate Feelings About the Convention Data obtained from a questionnaire administered to all delegates attending the 1959 U. A. W. Convention as a part of the earlier study referred to above helped the writer develop a profile of delegate atti- tudes toward the convention. From this profile, subsequently, was developed the idea of setting up the possible types of role orientation which is the central focus of this study. A review of some findings from this earlier Study seems warranted. The overwhelming majority of the delegates (about 91 percent) felt that the convention was very important in determining U. A. W. policies. lhnother 7 percent felt that the convention was somewhat important in <1etermining such policies while less than 2 percent felt that the conven- ‘tion.was not important at all. In addition, the delegates were asked what, 88 in their opinion, were the three most important purposes for the convention. Table 1 lists these purposes in order of importance in addition to an overall frequency score. The orders of importance for each response category were collapsed into a summated score and a percentage figure was computed for each reSponse category based upon the total of the summa- ted score.137 Here we note an interesting response pattern. About 24 percent of the delegates believed that the most important purpose of the convention was to have some assurance that the "views of the local unions are represented in making U. A. W. policies." Related to this idea, better than 19 Percent felt that the important purpose was to determine policies "to be carried out by U. A. W. officers and the International Executive Board." In addition, better than 11 percent believed the purpose was "to elect the International officers and regional directors.” In all better than 54 percent of the responses related to some phase of the decision-making function as the purpose of the convention. It appears quite clear that these delegates regard themselves as thg_policy-making body. Fairly high on the reSponse category is the delegates' feeling that they form the communication channel for the general membership. Approximately 16 percent felt that the important purpose was to have assurance "that members back home are informed about UAW'policies." In addition, there was a feeling of group identity among the delegates vis-a- vis "others." About 22 percent expressed a feature of group cohesiveness as the important purpose for having a convention. This feeling was evenly 137No differential weighting system.was applied to these reSponses in terms of their order. This eliminates the problem of hgw much to weigh;each alternative ranking. No justification can be given for this approach except that the writer feels that three (purposes) should have been asked for with- out any ordering necessary since there is no adequate way of measuring the relative values of each order with every reSpondent. 89 Table 1 Important purposes of the convention as enumerated by the delegates Purposes Order of Importance Percentage 1 2 3 Summated (Frequency) Score To make sure that mem- bers back home are in- formed about UAW poli- cies . . . . . . . . . 366 210 297 873 16.04 To increase the feeling of union solidarity. . 200 220 181 601 11.04 To Show the public that the rank and file appro- ved the policies made by the officers and Inter- national Executive Board 166 219 233 618 11.36 To make sure that views of local unions are re- presented in making UAW policies . . . . . . . 548 489 262 1299 23.87 To determine policies to be carried out by UAW of- ficers and the Interna- tional Executive Board . 354 430 273 1057 19.42 To elect the International officers and regional dir- ectors . . . . . . . . . . 80 141 403 624 11.47 Not classified or no reSponse . . . . . . . . . 100 105 165 370 6.80 TOtal o o o o o 1814 1814 1814 5442 100.00 Split between those who believed that the main purpose was to increase group Solidarity and those who felt it was "to show the public that the rank and file approved the policies made by the officers and International Executive Board." Finally, the majority of the delegates considered labor-management 4 {4.7 l.\?.... I. , . Jud gflj .v. .a 90 problems and internal union problems as the main issues facing their union. The delegates were asked what, in their opinion, are the three most impor- tant issues facing the U. A. W. The following is a composite view of their reSponses. Table 2 The three most important issues facing the U. A. W. as perceived by the convention delegates Order of Importance Issues 1 2 3 Summated Percentage (Frequency) Score Shop and Collective Bargaining . . . . . . . 415 526 418 1359 29.52 Internal U. A. W. . . . . . 526 440 379 1345 29.22 Broader issues for Trade Union.Movement . . . . . 187 161 118 466 10.12 Broader Political and Economic issues . . . 461 350 338 1149 24.96 Unclassified . . . . . . 75 86 123 284 6.17 Subtotal . . . . . .1664 1563 1376 4603 99.99 No Response Given . . . . 150 251 438 839 Total . . . . . .1814 1814 1814 5442 Again, the order of importance in each response category were summated and percentage figures were computed based upon the total of these summated scores less the summated score for 23 reSponse. Better than 58 percent of the reSponses were concerned about issues involving shop and collective bargaining and internal union problems. It is fairly understandable that labor-management problems would be of serious concern to the delegates since these are problems most consistently brought to the attention of the membership by the leadership at the International level. ”Bread and butter" goals are still of prime concern to the membership at large. What appears significant is that equal concern is shown in regard 91 to the internal union problems. What is quite apparent here is that these delegates are not complacent in regard to internal issues in their organi- zation. Their cognizance that there are major internal issues facing the U. A. W. and their awareness of the functional role they assume in the decision-making process give some indication that accountability should not be taken lightly by those in policy-implementation roles. It is interesting to note that a fairly large percentage were concerned with broader societal problems. Approximately 25 percent of the delegates believed that the most important issues facing the U. A. W. were politi- cal and economic in nature. A detailed breakdown of Specific issues considered as £hg_most important facing the U. A. W. reveals an interesting pattern of reSponse. The following table presents the specific issues under each general category of issues. For the 415 delegates who listed shop and collective bargaining issues as the most important about 35 percent believed that automation was the specific issue to be resolved while a little more than 19 percent believed that shorter work week was the significant issue to be resolved. 'WOrking conditions, retirement, and speedups were the con- cerns of about 23 percent of the delegates. Of the 526 delegates who listed internal union issues as the most important almost 50 percent believed that increase of dues was the most important Specific issue to be resolved. Organizing the unorganized were mentioned by better than 20 percent of the delegates in this category. Solidarity and union finances were the Specific concerns of another 11 percent of this particular group. Finally, for the 461 delegates who listed political and economic 92 Table 3 Specific issues listed as the most important by convention delegates General Issues Specific Issues Frequency Percentage Shop and Collective Combat Automation . . . . . 144 34.70 Bargaining Issues Shorter'WOrk Week . . . . . 80 19.28 Better'WOrking Conditions . 38 9.16 REtirement o o o o o o o o 36 8.67 Speedups . . . . . . . . . 24 5.78 Others 0 0 O O O O O O .0. 93 22.41 Total . . . . 415 100.00 Internal U. A. W. Increase of Dues . . . . . 260 49.43 Issues Organize the Unorganized . . 107 20.34 Solidarity . . . . . . . . 32 6.08 Union Finances . . . . . . 26 4.94 Others 0 C O O O O O O O 0 10 1 19 O 20 Total . . . . 526 99.99 Political and Unemployment . . . . . . . 248 53.80 Economic Legislative Action . . . . 129 27.98 Issues Other Economic Issues . . . 20 4.34 Others 0 o o o o o o o o o 64 13088 Total . . . . 461 100.00 issues as the most important about 54 percent were concerned with the problem of unemployment. Relatedly, perhaps, the issue of legislative action was raised by about 28 percent of the delegates in this category. The above was intended to be a composite profile of the delegates' perception of the convention. The assumption was made that these people formed the significant core of the union organization; that these people were the dedicated ones who made the union a "going concern." In this respect, it was further assumed that their attitudes concerning the con- 93 vention have an important bearing upon how the convention functions. The important point here is that these are the significant people to whom leadership in the upper echelon must account and, relatedly, these are the people through whom the "percolator effect" must take place. CHAPTER IV THE DELEGATE Introduction: Proceeding on the premise that the delegates to the International convention, by the nature of their "active" role in the labor movement, form the core by which democratic processes may occur, the major aim of this study was to gather some pertinent information con- cerning the attitudes and behavior of these people. Though the literature on unions and union membership is fairly abundant, there is an apparent lack of information concerning these key functionaries. In some measure then, this study aims to contribute in a unique sense to the already broad knowledge obtained concerning the trade union movement. In a broader sense, this study will attempt to present a substantive contri- bution to the theory of organizational behavior and democratic processes. In this chapter we will deal Specifically with the delegate and develop some ideas with regard to his orientation to the union as an "active." In this reSpect we will consider the following: 1) background charac- teristics; 2) experience in the labor movement and in the U. A. W.; 3) role orientation "types." A final section of this chapter will consider the interrelationship of some of these variables. A. Background Characteristics First of all it may be noted that the delegates in this case study appear to approximate the characteristics of the 1800 delegates included in the earlier study. 95 The overwhelming majority of the total delegation were men, comprising about 96 percent. The delegates in the case study approximated this with 95 percent being men. The largest age group of delegates were between the middle 30's and the middle 40's. There were approximately 43 percent from the total group and about this same proportion from the case study group. Further, from both groups the population appears to be skewed toward the older side. The following table presents a comparative view of the age distribution of the two groups. Table 4 A comparison of age distribution between the total sample of convention delegates to the 17th U. A. W. Constitutional Convention and the delegates from the Flint-Lansing study. Age Number Delegates Percentages Category Total Flint- Total Flint- Sample Lansing Sample Lansing 25 or less . 19 l 1.08 .93 26-30 . . . 117 9 6.67 8.33 31-35 . . . 267 13 15.21 12.04 36-40 . . . 399 29 22.74 26.85 41-45 . . . 360 18 20.51 16.67 46-50 . . . 283 17 16.13 15.74 51-55 . . . 172 11 9.80 10.19 56-60 . . . 93 5 5.30 4.63 61 and over . 34 5 2.56 4.63 Totals . . . 1755 108 100.00 100.01 Approximately two-thirds of the total delegation had either reached or completed high school. The Flint-Lansing group also had a two-third representation in this category. The following table presents a com- parative view of the educational level of these two groups. .ns- ('2'- , . 9 u , e m‘ r 7 96 Table 5 A comparison of educational experience of delegates to the 17th U. A. W. Constitutional Convention and the Flint- Lansing delegation. Educational Level Grade School Junior High High School College Graduate TOtals o o o c Number of Delegates Total Sample 32 293 1150 248 10 1733* Flint- Lansing 106** 22 71 11 Percentages Total Flint- Sample Lansing 1.85 1.89 16.91 20.75 66.36 66.98 14.31 10.38 .58 - 100.01 100.00 *81 cases = No response **2 cases = No reSponse No comparison can be made between these two groups in regard to occupational classification because of differences in the classificatory systems used in the two studies. The following is a distribution of Flint-Lansing delegates by skill levels. Table 6 Occupational classification of Flint-Lansing delegates to the 17th Constitutional Convention Occupational Level w Unskilled . . . . Semi-skilled . . . 81(11le 0 o o o o Office-clerical . . O O O Fulltime union WOrker . . TOtals o 0 Number delegates 33 29 31 2 13 108 Percentages 30.56 26.85 28.70 1.85 12.04 100.00 In terms of the inter-generational mobility of this group, there was a wide range of origins. Twenty-five percent of the delegates from 97 the case study mentioned that their fathers were farmers while another 6 percent mentioned that their fathers were businessmen. About 7 percent of the delegates mentioned their fathers being either a freesprofessional, a salariedsprofessional, or an office or sales executive. An interesting response pattern appeared when the delegates were asked to identify their social-class Status. [About 57 percent of these peOple were not able to give an answer spontaneously. .However, for those giving a spontaneous reply, 32 percent identified themselves as middle- glass and only about 10 percent identified themselves as workingjglggg. Those who could not give any class identification Spontaneously, were shown a listing of alternative choices for self-identification. Here we find better than 45 percent identifying themselves as working-class while 9 percent identified themselves as middle-class. Combining these classes of responses -- spontaneous and non-spontaneous -- we find the following distribution. Table 7 Social class identification by Flint-Lansing delegates to the 17th U. A. W. Constitutional Convention Class Identification Number Delegates Percentage Lower Class 1 .94 Working Class 60 56.07 Middle Class 44 41.12 Upper Class 2 1.87 Totals 0 o o o o o o o o o o 107* 100000 *One case remained "Don‘t know" 98 This distribution very clearly approximates the results obtained by Richard Centers.138 This similarity is rather surprising since the population in this study was made up predominantly of blue collar workers whereas Centers' Study involved a national sample of white adult males. The sig- nificance of the above distribution is the apparent legitimacy of self- identification as "working-class"lgnlylyhgg‘ghg choice lg giygg. Lower- class tends to connote some degree of failure, which is to be avoided in a society so strongly achievement oriented. It would also be unrealistic for these people to conceive of themselves as BEEEETEAEEE when such dif- ferences as wealth, prestige, and influence and authority are so glaringly obvious in our society. Interestingly enough, many of those who spontane- ously classified themselves as middle-class referred to the material abundance of the surroundings (automobile, TV, living-room sets, etc.) to justify their particular self-designation. When we relate class designation to household income perhaps there is some basis for their "perceived" position. Household income was defined for these people as the average 0f.§ll income derived by those living in the same household during the past 2 years or more. No distinction was made between what the respondent earned apart from the total household income. The following is the distribution of household income for the delegates from Flint and Lansing. 138Richard Centers, "The American Class Structure: A.Psychological Analysis," in Newcomb and Hartley, editors, Readings in Social Psychology, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947, p. 483. 99 Table 8 Household income of delegates to the 17th U. A. W. Constitutional Convention from Flint and Lansing Household Income Number Delegates Percentage Less than $4,000 -- -- $4,000 - $4,999 3 2.78 $5,000 - $5,999 15 13.89 $6,000 - $6,999 22 20.37 $7,000 - $7,999 25 23.15 $8,000 - $8,999 14 12.96 $9,000 - $9,999 15 13.89 $10,000 and over 14 12.96 Totals . . . . . . . . . . . 108 100.00 Better than 43 percent of the delegates were between the six to eight thousand dollars category. Here also we note the population skewed toward the higher income categories. About 14 percent of the delegates were in the nine thousand dollar income category while about 13 percent were in the ten thousand dollar and over category. Comparing this group with the national average, we found the group average substantially higher and per- haps fairly consistent with their self-image of class status.139 While more than 46 percent of the delegates live within the city limits where they work, a substantial number still maintain their residences in small towns or on the farm. In this study more than 31 per- cent come from small towns and about 12 percent from farms. In addition, about 9 percent live outside the city limits but not on farms. Most of the delegates belong to one or several formal community organizations. The assumption made here was that these "actives" would 139D. 8. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 2f the United States, (Eighty-first edition) Washington, D. C., 1960, pp. 320-321. 100 very likely also be participants in other kinds of community activities. This assumption is well borne out. Eighty-five percent of the delegates were members of one or more community organizations in addition to their union. 0n the whole, this group maintains a positive attitude about their jobs. About 77 percent felt that they were either "fairly" or "very" satisfied with their jobs.140 Only about 16 percent expressed some degree of dissatisfaction with their jobs. Another 7 percent were noncommittal in regard to this particular question. B. Experience in the Labor Movement The group represents, on the average, more than 22 years in the labor movement. The following table presents a breakdown of these delegates in terms of the number of years they have been members of some labor union at one time or another including their present membership in the U. A. W. More than 34 percent of the delegates have been in the labor movement some- where between 21 and 25 years. The next largest group~of delegates, (25 percent) have been in the labor movement somewhere between 16 and 20 years, followed by about 20 percent with 11 to 14 years experience. More than 66 percent of the delegates joined the U. A. W. on or be- fore the year 1945. Approximately 33 percent joined the U. A. W. after 1945. This is particularly noteworthy since in any organization there is a need for experienced leadership to fill the important positions in the 140In analyzing occupational satisfaction Caplow cautions that no Simple correlation exists between the objective conditions presented by an occupation and the relative satisfaction of the worker. See Theodore Caplow, The Sociology of Work, Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1954,7753. 101 Table 9 Number of years a member of a labor union for the Flint-Lansing delegates Number of Years Number Delegates Percentage 5 or less 1 .93 6 - 10 12 11.11 11 - 15 22 20.37 16 - 20 27 25.00 21 - 25 37 34.26 31 and over 4 3.70 Totals 0 O O O C O O O O O O 108 100 .00 organizational hierarchy. Perhaps equally if not more important is the fact that combining these data with data on 23E reported above we find a reservoir of potential candidates for important leadership positions who are young but who have considerable experience in the labor movement. A persistent complaint among some "oldtimers" is that the younger generation do not have enough interest in the labor movement to "carry the ball." Essentially what we have discovered here suggests that among the "actives" there is a corps of "younger generation" emerging in sufficient number to "carry the ball." The majority of the delegates hold some kind of union office. The following table presents a breakdown of the positions these people hold. The fulltime positions are found mostly in the larger locals. The by-laws of the smaller locals usually spell out the conditions under which the executive officer assumes "fulltime" status. The following is abstracted from the by-laws of a local union: 102 Section 8. The President shall be employed fulltime on Local Union business and Shall receive a salary plus expenses as set and approved by the Local Member- ship. Section 8a: When the dues paying membership falls below 3400 members for two (2) consecutive months the Presi- dent shall return to work in the plant until such time as the dues paying membership increases to 3600. Section 8b: At such time as the President returns to work in the plant he shall be paid the difference of what he makes in the sh0p and that of the salary of President, plus expenses.1 1 Most of the positions listed are elective. Although the highest frequencies are noted in the more prestigeful and influential jobs, the eleven cases (about 10%) who cited "no positions held" in the locals i1- 1ustrate the fairly broad range of representation found at the convention. At least officers do not monopolize the decision-making roles. Related to their experiences in the union are some dimensions of union orientation which were elicited from the delegates. The specific interest here is to derive some knowledge about these people in regard to the character of their interest in the labor movement. Union orientation, as used here, refers to the delegate's own conception of his relationship to the union organization. In this regard, a series of "open end" or un- structured questions were utilized along with some structured items to determine the dimensions of union orientation on the part of these people. The series of descriptive responses that follows are primarily post-hoe categories. One of the major concerns here was to arrive at some reasons 141By-Laws of Local 581, U. A. W. - A. F. L. - C. I. 0.; Revised March 13, 1960, Article 10, p. 11. 103 Table 10 Union positions held by the delegates to the 17th Constitutional Convention from Flint and Lansing Position* Number Delegates Percentage m Fulltime: International Repr. 1 1.05 Local President 7 7.37 Secretary-Treasurer 6 6.32 Recording secretary _l’ 1.05 15 15.79 Non-fulltime: Shep committee 26 27.37 District committee 10 10.53 Chairman - Bargaining committee 6 6.32 Chairman - ShOp committee 5 5.26 Unit chairman 5 5.26 Local executive board 3 3.16 Recording secretary 3 3.16 Education committee 3 3.16 Trustee 3 3.16 Local president -~v 2 2.10 Bargaining committee 2 2.10 Alternate - Shop committee ._2 2.10 70 73.68 Others 19_ 10.53 80 84.21 Totals** 63 100.00 *In many cases the delegates held multiple positions in the locals. For this presentation, only the highest positions listed is recorded for each delegate. **There were 11 cases where "no position" was reported. No response was elicited from 2 cases. for the delegate's interest in union affairs. Directly, the delegate was asked why he decided to become active in the union. More than 48 percent expressed concern with the worker's well-being, with a desire to help improve working conditions, or an overall interest in the betterment of the working-class. This observation must be tempered by the fact that there is a strong likelihood here of some "identification" and that what appears to 104 be an objective concern may also be a reflection of the desire to improve one's own social and economic welfare. Better than 19 percent had decided to become active simply because they were dissatisfied with the manner in which the union was run. An- other 9 percent reported family influence as the prime factor for their interest in the union. Essentially, these peOple were "brought up" in an environment of union pe0p1e. Surprisingly a very small percentage (about 3%) reported mobility interests and personal qualifications aS the prime reasons for their initial decision to become active in union affairs. Finally, more than 19 percent of the delegates gave a wide assortment of reasons which did not fit under any of the categories above. Another direct question asked of these delegates was what they would do subsequently if they were defeated for re-election to office. Almost 52 percent remarked that they would "run again" while another 26 percent expressed the desire to serve the union in some other capacity. The latter case seems to reveal the general tenor of the attitude of the delegates toward the union. An oft-repeated statement here was the wish to "keep active" in the union. In this respect also many committed themselves to ''help out" those who replaced them if help was solicited. Only about 13 percent said that they would then remain inactive and just be concerned with their personal problems and concentrate on their jobs at the plant. The remaining small percentage of delegates either held no jobs at present or were not generally classifiable under the above response types. This general attitude toward union activity is substantially support- ed by the attitude reflected in other related areas. For instance, the average distance for the group, from their homes to the union halls, is better than 5 miles with the range extending from less than a mile to more 105 than 20 miles. In spite of this, more than 90 percent Of the delegates considered the distance either "just right" or not too far. Attendance at local meetings again reflect the active character of these unionists. More than 46 percent reported having attended 311 of the local meetings held during the past year. Approximately 41 per- cent reported having attended ”almost all" of the local meetings and another 8 percent attended "most" of them. Less than 5 percent reported attending only "some" of the meetings. Most of the delegates are offi- cials in some capacity in the union. However, it must be recognized that not every meeting involves all_of the holders of office. The rela- tively high attendance rate on the part of these delegates gives some supporting evidence in regard to their commitment to union affairs. C. The Local Environment The particular concern here is to determine the characteristics of the locals in terms of their political environment. The common adage that a person is the "product of his environment" is implicit in the consideration of this subject. Here we may hypothesize that the poli- tical character of the local determines largely the character of delegate behavior. Initially then, the problem.was to determine how to arrive at some measure of political activity that might differentiate one local from another. The approach taken was to ask a series of questions deal- ing with situations in the local. These questions dealt with the character of Opposition in the local and the extent to which it was in Operation. In this manner a series of ygs and ng_answers were obtained in regard to the extent to which opposition existed. Another series of questions aimed at ascertaining whether these opposition groups ran separate slates during elections. Also, questions were aimed at finding out whether there existed 106 a leadership structure in opposing factions and whether these groups were active in some capacity in-between election periods. One final series of questions dealt with the election process itself. Here information was derived in regard to the degree of concern in union politics on the part of the membership, the degree of closeness of elections, and an estimation of membership participation in the delegate election. The answers to these questions were combined to form an index of level of political activity in the local. The first question asked whether there was anything likg a political party system operating in the local or, if not, whether there were groups in the local with differ- ing ideas than the present administration. Those answering in the affirma- tive in regard to the first part of the question were given a score of two, and those replying in the negative to the first part but in the affirmative to the second part of the question were assigned a score of one. Those who answered £2_to both parts of the question were assigned a score of zero. The other questions were scored similarly with all ygg answers assigned a score of two and all ng_answers assigned a score of one. Since all these questions, except for the estimation of voting participation, revolved around the theme of organized Opposition, those who were assigned zero in the first question received a zero score on all others. The item request- ing an estimation of voting participation was scored arbitrarily by dividing the possibilities into three parts. In this manner, those who estimated participation as being 67 percent or better were assigned two points, those who estimated participation somewhere between 34 percent and 66 per- cent were assigned a score of one point, and, finally, those who estimated participation as being less than 34 percent were assigned a score of zero. The possible range of score was then zero to sixteen. The following table 107 presents the score distribution of the delegates on the political acti- vity scale. It is recognized that the scoring system is not an interval scale but more or less an ordinal system for differentiating one local from another in terms of perceived level of political activity. Table 11 Score distribution from the political activity scale for the Flint-Lansing delegates* Score Number Delegates Percentage Scale Type 0 0 .00 1 1 .93 2 1 .93 3 O .00 4 l .93 5 l .93 1 6 l .93 7 0 .00 8 2 1.85 9 0 .00 10 4 3.70 11 9 8.33 12 13 12.04 2 13 25 23.15 3 14 21 19.44 4 15 26 24.07 5 16 3 2.78 Totals . . . . . . 108 100.01 *See Appendix D for items in the scale with critical ratio of each item. The purpose here was to identify those locals with levels of political activities greater than other locals. Having established this ordinal relationship the above distribution was further reduced to a five point ordinal system to establish some "Scale types." The cutoff points are purely arbitrary selections. However, since the main concern is to main- tain the ordinal relationship, some confidence is reserved in the approach. The resultant scale types may be interpreted in the following manner: 108 those assigned to scale 5 represent the locals with the most intense political activity; those assigned to scale type 4 represent the locals with less intense political activity; etc. The distribution is skewed heavily toward the politically more active Side. This conclusion supports the other evidence mentioned earlier in regard to the extent of political activity at the local level. In a later part of this chapter, some re- lationships will be established between level of political activity and delegate behavior. D. Role Orientation The following is directed toward setting up a series of ”types" reflecting the delegates specific orientation toward the union and his definition of his role as a delegate. As discussed earlier, the character of the political atmosphere in the union and the convention in particular is determined largely by this significant core of leaders who bear with them certain attitudes and motivations in their work. In the role of delegate, the individual comes under compelling pressures from forces above (the International) and as well as from below (local membership). His reactions to these forces are modified by his own motivations and definitions of the Situation which determine to some extent the direction- ality of his reSponses. The following then is a consideration of the pro- cedures of how the delegates were "typed.” l. Mobility Orientation As was recognized earlier, one of the main cultural values that Americans maintain and strive to perpetuate is the dual concept of gghigyg— Egg; and success. Chinoy's classic study of automobile workers revealed among them an early desire for upward mobility.142 But for most of these #— 142Ely Chinoy, Automobile Workers and the American Dream, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955. 109 people, opportunity for advancement within the factory system is limited. So, as Chinoy pointed out, "dreams of glory" are soon frustrated and o O O o o 143 mobility aSpirations, through time, evolve into security notions. But no matter how strongly one desires to cling to his job there is the realization that even such provisions as seniority do not guarantee one job security in the midst of rapid technological change. So what was once the carrot, perhaps not within easy graSp, that Spurred one to strive, has now become the stick that shakes one out of his lethargy. To the indivi- dual worker the work automation has only one meaning -- its employment effects. In effect, security notions, where once perhaps fairly inde- pendent from mobility notions, have now become synonymous with the latter for some. Though Chinoy found that "talk" about mobility aSpirations had primarily a therapeutic function in the face of reality,14 it re- mains a central value concept in American society. The essential question to ask here is what alternative channels remain in the face of the realization that there is limited mobility with- in the plant. One alternative may be the desire to "move out" to something better outside the plant. An important channel which has failed to attract much attention is the labor union. Various scholars have investigated the union in terms of its changing structural configuration. For example, Wilensky talked about the "intellectuals" in the labor movement.145 Lipset discussed the differences among leadership types in unions -- those that 1431bid., p. 124 144Ibid., p. 14 145Wilensky, Intellectuals in Labor Unions, gp.Cit-a chapter 6' 110 see unionism as a "calling” and those that see it as a means of achieving 146 a personal goal such as a livelihood. Lipset analyzed the orientations of men already in relatively high offices in the union. From this post-hoc analysis, however, one might gauge the motivations of "actives" in the lower echelon. One might well conceive the possibility that quite a few of these actives perceive in the union a chance to achieve security within the factory system. However, there might appear others who perceive in the union an opportunity to fulfill mobility aSpirations. In other words, the union provides for these individuals an alternative in their achieve- ment-success orientation. True, even this channel has certain limitations but at least it broadens the alternatives and it is "Open” to all who aSpire to realize some further measure of achievement. At least among his peers even the low-level functionary in the local maintains some status distinction in the performance of his ”official" role. Since we have already selected an elite group in the union movement (by the definition of "active") we can assume that these people have achieved some measure of mobility. In addition, many of these people by the nature of their union functions have achieved rehtive Stability of job status in the 147 The immediate consideration here is to determine how important plant. it is for these people to remain in the present position that they hold in the union. In reSponse to a direct question the following result was obtained. As readily notices, about 85 percent felt that it was "somewhat" 1468. M. Lipset, Political Man, gp.cit., p. 384. 47For example, a member of the Shop Committee is not likely to be. "laid-off" during periods of "slack" whereas one with greater job seniority but no union position might well be. 111 or "very" important that they keep the present positions they hold in the union. One inference to be made here is that these positions have provided Table 12 Importance of maintaining position held in the union among the Flint-Lansing delegates Degree of Importance Number of Delegates Percentage Very important 59 59.60 Somewhat important 25 25.25 Not important 15 15.15 Totals . . . . . . . . 99* 100.00 *There were 9 cases who either held no positions in the union at the time of the interview (other than that of delegate) or were no longer in the union. In fact one of the former delegates interviewed now manages a service station. an outlet for the frustrations perceived by Chinoy in hfls earlier study. Assigning importance to maintaining one's position might stem either from what Lipset refers to as a "careerist" orientation (where occupancy of the position serves personal goals) or from what he terms a ”committed" orientation (where the position provides opportunity for service). An attempt was made to identify those who seek mobility in the union and those who are serving the union in some official capacity but who have no desire to move up in the union hierarchy. Since we have identified these people as "actives," we might infer that the non-mobility oriented are primarily those "committed" to the union movement. Because these are not mutually exclusive orientations, however, those who are mobility oriented may also have a strong commitment to the union. In response to a direct question concerning mobility, the following distribution resulted. Roughly 35 percent of the delegates felt it important in some measure to move up in the union hierarchy. ‘We might define these people as primarily, 112 Table 13 Importance of moving up to a higher position in the union among the Flint-Lansing delegates Degree of Importance Number of Delegates Percentage Very important 22 21.15 Somewhat important 15 14.42 Not important 67 64.42 TOtals O O O O O C O I O O O 104* 99.99 *There were 4 cases reporting no longer in the union. though not necessarily exlusively, "career" oriented unionists who per- ceive in the union a means to fulfill the achievement-success cultural value. Significantly, about 65 percent of these delegates felt it was .325 important to move up to a higher position in the union. These people may be referred to as the committed ones who actively participate in union government but with no aSpirations for higher positions in the union. Though Lipset had done a post-hoc analysis of union leadership, he tried to establish a time-line relationship between the two types of leadership orientations. Thus, he suggested that the career unionist is often found in the long established unions since mobility within the hierarchy of a stabilized bureaucracy provides many advantages and few liabilities while the committed types are more often found in the newer unions where personal risks are high and monetary rewards relatively low.148 The distribution shown above seems to contradict this conclusion. Though more than 30 percent of the delegates expressed some degree of mobility 148Lipset, Political Man, gB-Cit-: PP- 385'387° 1dr... 3.... 113 aSpirations, about twice this proportion expressed a negative view to such ideas. In order to support Lipset's statement, the distribution Should have been reversed. However, this simple test does not conclusively negate Lipset's conclusions. Since the U. A. W. is relatively a young union it would be difficult to form such a conclusion. To do justice to Lipset's conclusion, the following additional hypothesis is presented: those with more experience in the labor movement are less mobility oriented than those with less experience. Table 14 shows the relationship between experience in the labor movement and mobility aSpirations. In suggesting Table 14 Experience in the labor movement and importance of moving up in the union Experience in the Frequency Total X2 Labor Movement Important Not important 15 years or less 17 17 34 3.18 16 - 20 years 12 14 26 1.22 21 years or more 8 36 44 5.73 Totals 0 O O O O O O O 37 67 104 10.13 Degrees of freedom = 2 x2 = 10.13 P (.01 this hypothesis it was reasoned that the more experienced individuals were more likely to typify the dedicated unionist Since these are essen- tially those people who were with the union movement during its more turbu- lent days. From the results obtained in the above chi square analysis there is definite indication that support Lipset's conclusions. Those delegates who have been in the union movement prior to WOrld War 11 exhibit a greater propensity toward a non-mobility orientation and might be crudely identified as those who reSponded to a "calling" as defined by Lipset. On the other hand, those fairly "new" to the labor movement have a greater 114 inclination than these "oldtimers" to be mobility oriented. As an additional test, a tandem hypothesis was presented: The "more exper- ienced" in the U. A. W. would be less mobility oriented than the "less experienced." The following table again shows this relationship between experience and mobility orientation. Again, there is definite indication Table 15 ExPerience in the U. A. W. and importance of moving up Year Delegate Frequency 2 Yates' Joined Union Important Not Important Total X Correction 1946 and after 19 16 35 5.26 4.41 1945 and before 18 51 69 2.67 2.30 TOtals O O o O O 37 67 104 7 .93 6.7]. Degrees of freedom = 1 X2 = (with Yates' Correction) = 6.71 P<.01 that those who joined the U. A. W. at an earlier stage, perhaps during its formative period, are less inclined to be mobility oriented. Add to this the fact that these are essentially the ”active" core in the union and one might well describe these people as those reSponding to a "calling." On the other hand, those relatively new to the U. A. W. diSplayed a greater propensity to be mobility oriented. These latter conclusions, however, again lend themselves to certain doubts. Longevity in the union, though producing experience with the formative Stages of the union movement, also reflects another important characteristic of these delegates -- their age level. In this reSpect, one might reflect that perhaps age rather than experience in the union conditioned the present career orientation of these delegates. To clarify this point, the hypotheses were re-tested with the age factor controlled. 115 Arbitrarily, the 40 year margin was used as the cut-off point between the gldgg delegate and the younger delegate. The group divided itself fairly equally at this margin. There were 52 cases among the younger group and 56 cases in the older group. In both dimensions Of experience -- experience in the union movement and experience in the U. A. W. -- these data, analyzed separately, did not support the hypotheses. In other words, relative experience in the union revealed no significant association with mobility orientation for both the younger and the older groups. The conclusion above lends support to the hypothesized relationship between age and mobility orientation. “With experience controlled, the following tables Show the significance of the age factor. Table 16 Age and importance of moving up in the union with experience in the labor movement controlled Sixteen years or more in the labor movement* Importance of Younger Older Total Moving up members members Important 12 8 20 Not important 8 42 50 TOtal o o o o O o o o 20 50 7O *With 15 years or less experience in the labor movement there was no significant difference between the younger and older members in mobility orientation. Degrees of Freedom.-=l Chi-Square (with Yates' correction) 11.46 P < .001 116 Table 17 Age and importance of moving up with experience in the U. A. W. controlled U. A. W. members on or before 1945* Importance of Younger Older Total Moving up members members Important 9 9 18 Not important 9 42 51 Total C O O . O O 18 51 69 For those joining the U. A. W. after 1945 there was no significant difference between the younger and the Older members in mobility orienta- tion. Degrees of freedom = l Chi-square (with Yates' correction) = 7.66 P 1: .01 The results above indicate that with less experience in the union move- ment and in the U. A. W. the younger and the older members are no differ- ent in mobility orientation. However, with greater experience in these areas, the older members reveal a significantly greater disinclination for mobility aSpirations than the younger members. Thus, with greater experience in unionism, the age factor appears to be the key variable associated here with mobility aSpirations. This conclusion does not imply rejection of Lipset's hypothesis but suggests a qualified accept- ance of it. 2. Representational Types As discussed earlier the problem of representation is of central interest to those concerned with the decision-making process in any poli- tical system. In all political systems throughout history, the decision- making processes may be arranged in a Spectrum from the most absolute, individual authoritarian rule to rule by a representative body whose will 117 ideally emanates from the "general will." In the former case, the leader's will is defined as the general will. Varying modifications of this may be discerned along the spectrum just short of the republican form of government. Thus, the leader may be a god-like creature whose word is final and absolute, or he may be guided by an advisor or council of wise- men or chiefs who are more in touch with the problems of those ruled. His behavior may also be modified by notions of nobless-oblige or paternalism. Thus may emerge the "benevolent deSpot" or a "democratic" monarch. Even in a dictatorial form of government the actions of the supreme authority may be modified by a council of ministers. Thus, in varying degrees, there may be responsiveness to the general public. The fact remains, though, that the decision-maker has both the legitimate and authoritative power to act for the whole body, and is not formally accountable to those affected by his decisions. Although the absolute ruler may act for the benefit of those whom he rules, he is not formally their representative. In a republican form of government the concept of representation may be variously interpreted. The core of the problem is the relationship between the representative and those whom he purports to represent. On the one hand there is the impression that the term "representative government" involves nothing more than a generally approved process by which representation is formed.149 Implied here is the notion that representation is achieved by the mere fact that a body of men has been chosen to make decisions for the general public. This means, further, that the representative's decisions must be accepted as legitimate and authoritative. In no way does this necessarily imply that the decisions 149Heinz Eulau, 22.21., The American Political Science Review, Igp.cit., p. 743. 118 made reflect the specific desires Of the citizenry. "Representative" then, merely reflects the processes by which these Officials have been chosen. On the other hand, the term "representative" may denote the fact that one was chosen in response to a definite commitment to legislate in accordance with the expressed wishes of the public. This interpretation of the term implies that the public expects some specific action on the part of the representative. Clearly these two interpretations are distinct from each other. There are two sets Of conditions under which possible conflict resulting from these differences in the definition of the role of the representative may be minimized: 1) actions may be in harmony with expectations, 2) the action may be "sold" to the electorate. Where either of these two conditions are not obtained the issue of role interpretation becomes important. The discussion above suggests that various interested groups may maintain different interpretations of representative roles. The repre- sentative and the represented are two groupings whose interpretations of the representative's role might well differ. One could justifiably reason that the "public's" expectations would most often be that the representa- tive respond to their specific demands, however unclear and conflicting they might be. On the other hand, various role definitions may be held by the representative. These representatives may commit themselves to certain general policy measures and promises to serve the "good" of the community but these are vague enough to be subjected to varying interpre- tations. Thus, though the selection process may be truly democratic, the question arises as to whether or not the attitudes and wishes of the public are taken account of in the legislative process. Given the frequent comp plexity of issues requiring legislation, the complexity of the legislative 13.x”. .wdlu‘aj - 119 process itself, and generally apathetic electorates, the election process may not in itself be an effective guarantee that legislation will reflect the will of the public. Under these conditions the role orientation of the representative becomes increasingly important. Except for the study cited above there is an apparent lack of studies Of the process of representation. Since the legislative process is crucial in a democratic system such as ours, this gap in the understanding of the role of the representative is an important one. Even though in the end "unsatisfactory" performance on the part of the representative may result in his "defeat" in subsequent elections, the personal orientation to the role by the representative is a crucial variable in understanding his be- havior. In this study of the convention delegate an attempt has been made to distinguish various representational types. The assumption is that with the broad interpretations attributed to the role of the representative varying interpretations may be obtained from these delegates. The concern here is with the stylistic dimensions of representation. For the present purposes, it is not necessary to establish a clear line of demarcation of representative types but to arrange the delegates on a spectrum which more or less distinguishes one from another in terms of their interpretation of the role. A series Of direct questions dealing with behavior and role interpretations were used as criteria to arrange these stylistic types. The scoring system was basically the same as that used with previous questions, being more or less arbitrarily set up to obtain an ordinal ar- rangement. These questions were concerned primarily with whether the delegate, in the legislative process, chose to follow specific instructions from his local constituency or chose to act as his conscience dictated -- 120 that is, in terms of what hg thought was "good" or "bad" for his constit- uents. This second orientation does not necessarily mean that actions will always be contrary to the wishes of the constituency. But what perspective the delegate uses appears crucial to the understanding of his behavior especially when there is incongruency between his views and the specific desires or wishes of the rank and file. From answers to these questions, then, the delegates were scored and arranged in order from lowest score to highest score. The possible range of scores was zero to thirty. The dele- gates' scores ranged from a low of 9 to a high of 22. The following table presents the distribution of delegates in terms of these scores. Those in the upper range of scores were identified as those who had greater inclina- tion to respond to Specific demands of the particular constituency. Those Table 18 Score distribution for representational types for the Flint- Lansing delegates.* Score Frequency Percentage Scale Types 9 4 3.70 10 6 5.56 1 11 6 5.56 12 5 4.63 13 13 12.04 14 10 9.26 2 15 8 7.41 16 12 11.11 17 12 11.11 18 11 10.19 3 l9 5 4.63 20 4 3.70 21 8 7.41 22 '__4 3.70 4 Totals 108 100.01 *See appendix E for items in the scale with critical ratio of item. . "0' ' . . hi‘w. .... 121 in the lower end of the scale were identified as having greater inclination to make decisions based on their own evaluation of what is or is not bene- ficial to the union, his constituency, or both. Essentially, this latter group chose to function independently (though conscientiously) in the role of decision-makers. Again it must be emphasized that the scoring system devised is not an interval system such that itvould be isomorphic to the structure of arithmetic. An ordinal system is adequate to establish a relationship of "greater than" among orientations to representational situations. The distribution was further reduced to scale types to simplify the ordinal relationship. The above table shows the cutoff points where these scale types are established. Although these cutoff points were arbitrarily se- lected, they do not distort the ordinal relationship. Since no empirically pure type is suggested, the typing of those arranged along this scale would be of the character of Eggs or lggg. Thus, those on the upper end of the scale are identified as 9253 a "dele- gate-type" and lesg a "trustee-type." On the other hand, those on the lower end of the scale may be identified as TEES a "trustee-type" and lggs a "delegate-type." These representation types are essentially those described by Eulau, et-al,150 These types are described as follows: Trustee: "This role finds expression in two major conceptions which may occur separately or jointly. First, a moralistic in- terpretation: the representative is a free agent, he fol- lows what he considers right or just -- his convictions or principles, the dictates of his conscience. Second, a rational conception: he follows his own judgments based on an assessment of the facts in each case, his understand- ing of the problems involved, his thoughtful appraisal of the sides at issue." 15°Ibid., pp. 749-750 122 Delegate: "All Delegates are, of course agreed that they Should not use their independent judgment or convictions as criteria of decision-making. But this does not mean that they feel equally committed to follow instructions, from whatever clientele." A third type (Politico) described by these men as falling somewhere between these two types has not been included in this Study. Since it was pre- ferred to remain with the.EEEE or lgsg distinction, a third variable trich- otomizing the representational role would presume to delineate a clear line of demarcation between these types. Further, to preserve the conceptual clarity of these types used here as apart from the common usage expressed elsewhere in the present work, this typological expression will be distin- guished by quotation marks or used with the suffix "type;" e.g., delegate- type, trustee-type. 'With these types thus arranged some hypotheses may be tested in regard to the expected occurrence, in greater frequency, of one type as against the other. The question raised here is whether there is any reason for one type to appear more dominantly on the scene than the other type. In this respect, Eulau, 2E 31., suggest some conditions prevailing today ‘which would indicate the greater likelihood for a trustee-type to appear.151 In summary, they state that the issues arising today in government are more diverse and complex than those of an earlier period. In this "help- less" state, people are more inclined to entrust the affairs of govern- ment to the elected representatives who, presumably, are better informed than they. In this kind of setting, these authors claim, peOple tend to pay lip service to the notion of prOper representation but in fact are un- \ 1511bid., p. 751 123 able to give instructions as may have been possible when government was less complex. People tend to over-Simplify these complex issues, however, and make demands that perhaps tax the representatives beyond their frus- tration tolerance level. It is not only the people's inability to compre- hend the issues but also their diverse and conflicting demands that are likely to give rise to a trustee-type orientation rather than a delegate- type orientation. .As these authors say, "the role orientation of a trustee may be a functional necessity."152 But this would seem so only when ex- pectations conflict and issues are not understood by the electorate. Con- trary to the direction predicted by Eulau, g5 31., there is a preference for a more delegate-type orientation reflected in Table 18. By implica- tion, then, for the present situation, the assumption made above concern- ing the character of the electorate is not supported. Though these rep- resentational types are fairly well spread out to both extremes, thus supporting the notion of the presence of varying role definitions on the part of the representatives, it is also clear that there are other varia- bles impinging on role behavior that result in a more delegate-type rep- resentation. In a later section Of this chapter, these variables will be analyzed. 3. .Allegiance Another dimension to consider in the delegate role orientation is the organizational EEEEE of his orientation. The problem here is to discover just what identity the delegate wants to maintain in the presence of a crucial issue that involves conflicting loyalties. It is recognized that the delegate has two foci of interest that lay claim to his attention 1521bid., p. 751 124 and loyalty: 1) the local of his origin, 2) the International union. Granted these two foci may loom more significantly as a conceptual distinc- tion than as separate empirical entities Since the latter is essentially composed of the sum of the former, nevertheless the difference is recog- nizable since the local union is sometimes perceived as only remotely as- sociated with the International body. Again, the distinction becomes real when the International impinges on the local body to fulfill certain man- dates or when it intercedes in certain internal local problems. In general, the local considers itself as a separate and autonomous unit. This is analogous to the federal system where the individual states of the union conceive of themselves as separate from the federal government. In many cases, there need to be no conflict for the demands and expectations of the two foci of interest may be in harmony so that the delegate easily resolves the issues involved. However, in other cases, the demands made by the larger body may strongly conflict with the expectations Of the lesser body and vice-versa. Under these conditions the measure of one's loyalty is judged by his subsequent actions in resolving this basic con- flict situation. This role conflict situation is resolved by the dele- gate when he has determined whether the local or the International is his "significant reference group." The relative importance of a particular focus of orientation rests on several intervening variables that tend to restrict the delegate's choice and minimize whatever conflicts follow from the initial demands and expectations. His personal ambitions, his political orientations, his values, etc. all intercede in some measure to condition his specific focus of loyalty. The relationships of some of these variables to a particular focus of orientation will be analyzed in a later section ofthis chapter. 125 The present task is to establish the type of loyalty most important to the delegates in the decision-making process. Since the distinction has been made between two foci of orientation, one might consider these foci as polar extremes and any degree of identification with either of these extremes may be considered an alliance. The typological distinction to be made here, then, is the difference between one with 12221 allegiance as against one with an International allegiance. Here again information was obtained from the delegates regarding their response to some situations both real and hypothetical. For instance, they were asked specifically what things affected their decision about how to vote at the convention and which of these things were most important. Responses to this question often suggested primary allegiance to either the International or the local. Examples of these are such response types as needs pf local, needs .pf re ion, needs pf total union, what International officers wanted, the expressed wishes f rank and file, etc. A hypothetical situation was also posed in which both the demands of the International Officers and the local members in regard to a Specific resolution were in conflict. The delegate was asked to indicate how he would vote in such an instance. Again, an arbitrary point system was set up to establish the primary focus Of orientation of these delegates. All responses to the eight questions included in the scale which suggested allegiance to the larger body of anyone associated with the larger body, e.g., executive officers, etc., were assigned a score of two points while all responses favoring the local or anyone associated with the local were assigned zero scores. Responses that were directed to some intermediate functionary, e.g., other delegates, were assigned a score of one. The possible range of total scores for the allegiance spectrum was zero to sixteen. The range of total scores obtained 1: 126 by the delegates was zero to fourteen. The following table presents a score distribution on the "allegiance scale." The table strongly suggests that, where issues produce conflict in loyalties, the delegates' primary allegiance will be to their locals. Table 19 Score distribution on the allegiance scale for the Flint-Lansing delegates.* Score Frequency Percentage Scale Type 0 4 3.70 1 8 7.41 l 2 7 6.48 3 16 14.81 4 7 6.48 2 5 11 10.19 6 17 15.74 7 12 11.11 8 6 5.56 3 9 6 5.56 10 4 3.70 11 6 5.56 12 3 2.78 13 0 -- 4 14 .__l .93 Totals 108 100.01 *See appendix F for items in the scale with crital ratio of each item. Here again the qualification is made that the scaling technique applied is primarily to set up an ordinal system to identify the delegate's position on the allegiance spectrum. The "scale types" again are derived from arbi trary cutoff points. To the extent that this simplification does not dis- tort nor re-arrange the ordinal relationship, confidence is reserved for the utility of this reduction for subsequent analytical purposes. 4. Bureaucratic versus Democratic Values The central problem posed in this study earlier was the dilemma faced by those still upholding an idealistic democratic tradition in the face of obvious and necessary changes taking place in modern urban industrial 127 society -- the impersonal characteristics of large-scale bureaucratic organizations. ‘Moreover, as Weber emphasized, these characteristics of present day large-scale organization tend to devaluate the individual even in its structural order in the sense that they are primarily instru- mental figures in a complex network of inter and intra stratum relations.153 The paradox of the situation is that both these apparently antithetical po- sitions loom large as parts of our major value orientations. However, as Williams points out, this is not so unusual when we consider the entire con- figuration of American value orientations. ...American society does not have a completely consistent and inte- grated value structure ... rather, the total society is characterized by diversity and change in values ... Millions of contact points in- volving problems of values are created in economic dealings, politi- cal activity, education and other major areas of life. To illustrate this point made by Williams one might enumerate some of the major value orientations that he defines as characteristic of American society155 and see how they fit into the particular framework Of the dilem- ma presented above. The ideological commitment to a democratic tradition can be seen in.Williams' discussion of such value orientations as democracy, individual personality, freedom, Equality, moral orientation, and achieve- ment and success. On the other hand, the inclination toward large-scale organization with all its impersonal characteristics has its roots in such major value orientations as efficiengy and practicality, activity and work, 153Max'Weber, from Hans Gerth and C. W. Mills, editors, From Max Weber, gp.cit., Chapter VIII, "Bureaucracy." 154Robin'Williams, Jr., gp.cit., pp. 413-414. 1551bid., pp. 415-,470 128 material comfort and progress. If these values grouped above are in some measure incompatible with each other what then explains their presence in American society? As Williams points out there are limits to the degree of incompatibility of beliefs and values that can exist in any culture (or for that matter in individuals) short of a breakdown of the total system. In a gross sense Williams explains these conflicts in terms of what is the national or cultural orientation aSuagainst the Specific orien- tations of a sub-element of the culture in which there is some detachment from the major traditional values. Earlier, in the theoretical discussion, it was pointed out that the quality of adaptation to specific situational factors (and here we emphasize the Situational factors as strong determi- nants) gives rise to the uniqueness of different organizational structures. In this sense, given the value orientations of the general cultural set- ting, e.g., efficiency, progress, etc., different degrees of rigidity, im- personality, etc., may be discerned in the unique structural features of particular organizations. A crucial intervening variable is the factor of personal adaptation. The;dysfunctiona1 consequences of large-scale organization may be modi- fied by the different degrees Of acceptance of an apparently rigidly de- fined structure. Thus, ways of "getting around the red-tape" become an adaptive mechanism for one who has not wholly accepted the particular value orientation. Such modes of adaptation make possible the co-existence of what appears to be fundamentally inconsistent and incompatible situations. In trade unions, both democratic orientation (i.e., consideration Of the larger membership in terms of participation, etc.) and bureaucratic ef- ficiency are desirable at one and the same time. And again, as with the case of orientation to representation types, the adherence to one primarily 129 may not necessarily result in the breakdown of the other since there will be evident some range of tolerance for deviancy from the ideal-type as long as the goals are "culturally" defined. A.Similar view is offered by Williams who makes the distinction between instrumental values and the formal-universalistic values.156 Bureaucratic efficiency then, may be a value to the extent it is a means to achieving such desirable features as wealth, work, practicalness, etc., and democratic processes remain the formal-universalistic value in the sense that they encompass all members without prejudice. Another aspect to consider in this case is that bureau- cratic efficiency and the wealth it creates may actually assist in the achievement and maintenance of a democratic orientation.157 Actually then both values -- bureaucratic efficiency and democratic partidpation may co-exist but in different degrees. Each of these values has a tolerable range of deviancy but one may have to "sacrifice" one value in order to adhere to the other. Since these individual preferences appear in isolated cases, the effects may not become immediately apparent. However, an entire group orientation may reflect a leaning more toward one value than toward the other. According to Wilensky, the union bureaucracy is yet not fully developed though he perceived an eventual movement toward 156Ibid., pp. 468-469 157Lundberg, pp 31., present a concise explanation Of social class and life chances. In spite of the greater cultural prescription of equality, freedom, etc., social class levels seem to be associated with differences in health, educational Opportunity, justice before the law, etc. George A. Lundberg, Clarence C. Schrag, and Otto N. Larson, Socio- logy, revised edition, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958, pp. 489-500. 130 a full-fledged bureaucratic organization.158 Whether there is a tendency toward primary concern with bureaucratic efficiency in the total structure and the devaluation of the democratic processes depends upon the exigen- cies of the time. It is fairly well recognized that there are situations where individual rights must be sacrificed for the public weal. For in the status of a citizen or a member of a community, organization, etc., rights and privileges associated with the status are also accompanied by certain expectations and obligations which may include, in some instances, a suSpension of certain rights and priveleges. In trade unions, it may be expected that at times the need for democratic participation will be secondary to the need for bureaucratic efficiency. In the present case, the greater desirability of one value as opposed to the other need not be interpreted as dysfunctional. For dysfunction occurs from whatever perSpective one perceives the case. A more highly democratic orientation is dysfunctional to those desiring a more highly bureaucratized organization and vice-versa. No matter what proportion of one to the other is maintained by the organization there is inherent in the outcome a process of equilibration. This process of equilibration suggests another aSpect of organiza- tion which appears quite crucial for this analysis. That is there may be changes in value orientation depending on the issues and problems emerging. It has been emphasized repeatedly that the convention delegates, because Of their active roles, are especially important in determining whether democratic processes will function. By the very nature of their functional role, their actions may be mediated and conditioned by concern for their 158Harold L. Wilensky, "The Trade Union as a Bureaucracy," in Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader, edited by Amitai Etzioni, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961. pp. 221-234. V E:‘ . - (Jun-9,,”- ___.__e . 131 constituents. That is, they may realize they must serve the interests of the membership in order to ”survive" in the game of politics. But it is generally recognized that "serving the interests of the membership" has broad and varying interpretations. In one case, efficient management of the organization may serve the greater interest while in another an attempt to maximize participation in decision-making by the majority of members may serve the greater interest. In the first case, a highly bureaucratized orientation may be called for, while in the second case, a democratic orientation may be preferable. If expediency becomes the crucial variable, values will shift in reSponse to it. It is important to recognize,however, that neither orientation necessarily results in a lack of consideration of the individual member of the union. The delegates to the International Convention have this basic dilemma to face. In instances where both values cannot be implemented, should they give primacy to a democratic or a bureaucratic orientation? Recognizing that there may be a shift from one value orientation to the other depending upon the issues involved in Specific situations, it may still be possible to differentiate delegates who characteristically res- pond in terms of a democratic orientation from those who most often value organizational efficiency. With these basic conditions recognized, the immediate problem for this study was to obtain some index whereby these role orientations may be identified. The differences sought were between those who are ‘mppg democratically oriented and those who are mpgg bureaucratically oriented. The qualitative term more is applied in recognition of the 132 fluctuation in orientation due to the possible situational conditions cited above. Thus, one is not necessarily all of one type to the exclu- sion of the other. This approach permits the placement of these delegates in some order along a Spectrum leading from one polar type to the other -- bureaucratic values vs. democratic values. Likert-type items were con- structed reflecting varying Situations requiring some decision-making process. Each delegate was requested to check one answer in a set Of five alternative choices to each item ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Fifteen items were originally constructed and, out Of this, ten items were found scalable using Guttman's scalogram analysis. The following are the items that form this Scale: 1. If there are too many disagreements in the union, the Inter- national Officers should be given full control in order to get things done. 1 ___ Strongly agree 2 ___ Agree 3 ____Neither agree nor disagree 4 ___ Disagree 5 Strongly disagree 2. Once a decision is made by the International Officers, the members ought to go along with it whether they think it is right or not. 1 ___ Strongly agree 2 ____Agree 3 ___ Neither agree nor disagree 4 ___ Disagree 5 ___ Strongly disagree 3. As long as the members get what they want, it doesn't make any difference whether they have any say in how the union is run. 1 ___ Strongly agree 2 ___ Agree 3 ____Neither agree nor disagree 4 ___ Disagree 5 ____Strong1y disagree 133 All members of the union should be able to participate and express themselves in union affairs even if it means a delay in the achievement of union goals. 5 ___ Strongly agree 4 ____Agree 3 ____Neither agree nor disagree 2.___ Disagree 1 Strongly disagree Once the International officers are elected, they should be free to run the union in whatever way they think best. 1 ___ Strongly Agree 2 ___ Agree 3 ____Neither agree nor disagree 4 ____Disagree 5 Strongly disagree Individuals should not be allowed to disrupt the smooth running of the union by circulating petitions or making Speeches. 1 ___ Strongly agree 2.____Agree 3 ___ Neither agree nor disagree 4 ___ Disagree 5 Strongly disagree A lot of competition for election to office is good even if the union is being run efficiently by those in office. 5 _Strongly agree 4 *Agree 3 _Neither agree nor disagree 2 :Disagree 1 _Strongly disagree The less the rank and file union members know about how the union is run the better it will be run. Strongly disagree 1 ___ Strongly agree 2 ____Agree 3 ____Neither agree nor disagree 4 ____Disagree 5 It is more important that the union be run efficiently even if it means that the members have less to say about how things should be run. 1_Strong1y agree 2 *Agree 3 _Neither agree nor disagree 4: Disagree 5 :Strongly disagree 134 10. All the important decisions ought to be made by the International officers because only they know what is best for the union. 1 ___ Strongly agree 2 ____Agree 3 ___ Neither agree nor disagree 4 ____Disagree 5 Strongly disagree Reproducibility was .91, which establishes confidence in the set of items as consituting a scale. The following table presents the scale types and frequency distribution of these types. Table 20 Distribution of Guttman scale types on the democratic values versus bureaucratic values Spectrum Guttman Scale Type Frequency Percentage Scale Type 1 16 14.81 1 2 7 6.48 3 3 2.78 4 4 3.70 5 3 2.78 6 4 3.70 2 7 12 11.11 8 16 14.81 3 9 24 22.22 10 8 7.41 4 11 11 10.19 Totals . . . . . 108 99.99 Reduction of the Guttman scale types to more general categories ("scale- types") is primarily to facilitate later cross analysis with other variables. The gaps (in terms of distribution) between Guttman scale types were selected as the cutoff points to arrive at the more general categories. Those on the lower end of the scale are identified as more oriented toward democratic participation, while those on the upper end of the scale 3414? lil‘l;! an?!» .rl * v '7 135 may be identified as more oriented toward bureaucratic efficiency. The distribution of responses to these items suggests that most dele- gates have a fairly strong commitment to bureaucratic values. There was, however, a wide range of reSponse and the data suggest that some delegates are preoccupied with rank and file participation almost to the exclusion of concern with organizational efficiency. Those in the middle range of the scale are presumed to be delegates with no strong commitment to either orientation and are therefore most likely to shift from one set of values to the other depending upon the issues involved in Specific situations. One additional point must be made in regard to the scale. The fact that a relatively high coefficient of reproducibility was obtained does not warrant a conclusive statement about scalability of the universe of content. Goode and Hatt suggest the consideration of the frequency of responses to each separate item.159 They state that reproducibility can be artifidally high simply by one category in the item having a very high frequency. Because of this fact, they claim that it can be proved that reproducibility of an item can never be less than the largest frequency of its categories, regardless of whether or not the area is scalable. They further conclude then, that the more evenly the frequencies are distributed over the categories of the given item, the less likely it is that the reproducibility will be Spuriously high. In this respect these authors suggest an empirical rule for judging the Spuriousness of scale reproducibility: "no category should have more error in it than 159William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research, New York: ‘McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952. pp. 294-295. 136 non-error."160 InsPection of the results obtained on the above scale types leads one to conclude that reproducibility in this case is more geniune than artificial. It is suggested that judgment of the full utility of this scale be reserved till further tests have been made. Though the reproducibility co-efficient gives some justification for confidence in the scale, relia- bility measures must be obtained before the final decision of confidence in the scale can be established. It is hoped that subsequent tests will prove the scale stable. E. Social Characteristics and Role Orientation A common sociological approach to the understanding of group beha- vior is to analyze various social background factors and see how these relate to the orientations of the individuals that make up the group. Earlier, in the statement of the problem, a proposition was introduced suggesting the relationship of background factors and delegate role orientation. Assuming that variations in the orientations of the dele- gates have been reasonably established, a general guiding hypothesis may be proposed: Union members With Different Social Backgrounds Generally Have Different Orientations toward Union Roles. For each social background factor considered, there will be a cross analysis with each of the role orientations discussed above -- allegiance, representation types, and values regarding efficiency versus participa- tions. Mobility orientations will be analyzed separately in the closing 1601bid., p. 295. 137 part of the chapter. 1. Age Level and Role Orientation a) Age and Values Toward Organizational Functions The common notion that the older person tends to be more rigid in behavior has often been suggested by the use of the descriptive term conservative. If this is true, it might lead one to conclude that the bureaucratic type would be more likely to be found among the upper age levels. The following table suggests acceptance of the null hypothesis. Little consistency was found in the relationship between age and organi- zational values. However, there is the indication, though slight, that the older member has an inclination to be more a bureaucratic type. Table 21 Age level and organizational values Guttman Scale Types Democratic o o o o o o o o o o Bureaucratic Age 1 2 3 4 Total Up to 35 5 6 5 7 23 36-40 6 6 5 12 29 41-45 4 7 3 4 18 46 + 8 7 3 20 38 Totals . . . . . . 23 26 16 43 108 Degrees of Freedom = 9 Chi-Square = 8.10 .50< P ( .70 b) Age and Allegiance From earlier arguments, it would seem reasonable to assume that those who have been in the union longer, and thereby the older members, would develop greater affinity for the International union since it is more likely that they are identified with its early struggles to survive. Several authors also seem to indicate that the younger member is more 138 interested in what the union will do for him reciprocation. Though rather tenuous, these following subhypothesis: The younger members are more likely to locals, whereas, the older members are allegiance to the international union. without any feeling for arguments do suggest the form allegiance to the more likely to form The following table presents the relationship of age levels and alle- giance. Table 22 Age level and allegiance Allegiance Age Local . . . . . . . . . . . . International Group 1 2 3 4 Total Up to 35 8 7 6 2 23 36-40 5 9 ll 4 29 41-50 3 ll 14 7 35 51 + 3 7 10 l 21 Totals . . . . . 19 34 41 14 108 - — Degrees of Freedom 9 Chi-Square = 9.95 .30( P C .50 Though the results obtained do not support the hypothesis at the commonly accepted significance level, the chi-square cell values show some support- ing evidence for the hypothesis. Those 35 years and youngergshow a strong inclination to fall nearer the local allegiance pole while the older members (those 51 and over ) show a greater inclination toward allegiance to the International. c) Age and Representational Types If one follows the arguments made above, one might make the assump- tion that the older worker would tend toward a trustee-type orientation 139 and the younger worker toward a delegate-type orientation. ‘With this hypothesis, the following table shows the relationship between age and representation types. Again, the null hypothesis must be accepted. To the extent that there is any association between these variables, however, it is in the hypothesized direction. Table 23 Age level and representational types Age Trustee . . . . . . . . Delegate Group 1 2 3 4 Total Up to 35 2 9 10 2 23 36-40 3 9 12 5 29 41-50 10 7 11 7 35 51 + 6 6 7 2 21 TOta]. o o o o o 21 31 4O 16 108 Degrees of freedom = 9 Chi-square = 9.24 .30( P < .50 The expectation that delegate role orientations would vary with age was based primarily upon the assumption that there would be some associa- tion between length of experience in the union and role orientation. Analysis of these data indicates that, while more experienced delegates tend toward a more bureaucratic value orientation, International allegiance, and a trustee-type role definition, the association between these variables is slight and none of the observed differences were statistically signi- ficant. 2. Educational Level and Role Orientation Studies relating education to orientations to larger societal pro- blems seem to indicate, in general, that higher levels of achievement in this area are associated with more liberal attitudes. In relation to the 140 delegate's role orientation, this would suggest that higher levels of education would produce greater tendency to be delegate-type oriented, to have a democratic orientation toward organizational functions, and to hold an allegiance to the local. The hypotheses suggested here are tested in the following tables. Table 24 Educational level and organizational values Guttman Scale Types Educational Democratic . . . . Bureaucratic Grouping l 2 3 4 Total Up to Jr. Hi. 2 5 3 14 24 High School 18 20 11 23 72 College & over 3 l 2 6 12 Total . . . . 23 26 16 43 108 Degrees of Freedom = 6 Chi-Square = 7.74 .20( P ( .30 Table 25 Educational level and allegiance Allegiance Educational Local . . . . . . International Grouping l 2 3 4 Total Up to Jr. Hi. 1 8 12 3 24 High School 17 21 27 8 73 College & over 1 5 2 3 11 Total 0 o o o 19 34 41 1.4 108 Degrees of Freedom = 6 Chi-Square = 9.42 .10( P ( .20 141 Table 26 Educational level and representational types Representational Types Educational Trustee . . . . . . Delegate Grouping l 2 3 4 Total UP to Jr. Hi. 7 5 9 3 24 High School 12 22 28 10 72 College & over 2 4 3 3 12 Total . . . . . 21 31 40 16 108 Degrees of Freedom = 6 Chi-Square = 3.42 .70( P ( .80 In general, all three tables suggest the acceptance of the null hypothesis at the commonly accepted significance level (i.e., two-tailed test @ .01 or .05 levels). 3. Income Level and Role Orientation It has been suggested that there is a relationship between income and class identification. That is the higher the income level, the greater the probability of identification with the middle or upper classes. If any aSpects of delegate role orientation tap class related values, a relationship between income level and role orientation might be expected. The following tables present the relationship of income levels to role orientations. 142 Table 27 Income levels and organizational values Guttman Scale Types Income Democratic . . . . Bureaucratic Group 1 2 3 4 Total Up to $5999 3 7 3 5 18 $6000-$7999 10 10 5 22 47 $8000 & over 10 9 8 16 43 Total . . . . . 23 26 16 43 108 Degrees of Freedom = 6 Chi-Square = 4.66 .50( P C .70 Table 28 Income levels and allegiance Allegiance Income Local . . . . . .International Group 1 & 2 3 & 4 Total Up to $6999 22 18 40 $7000-$8999 18 21 39 $9000 & over 13 16 29 Total . . . . . 53 55 108 (Allegiance Scale categories were cdflapsed to eliminate cells with low frequencies) Degrees of Freedom = 2 Chi-Square = .92 .50( P < .70 Table 29 Income levels and representational types Representational Types Income Trustee . . . . . . Delegate Group 1 2 3 4 Total Up to $6999 9 ll 14 6 40 $7000-$8999 9 ll 15 4 39 $9000 & over 3 9 11 6 29 Total . . . . . 21 31 40 16 108 Degrees of Freedom = 6 Chi=Sauare = 3.03 143 Clearly, the above data show no consistent relationship between income and role orientation and the conclusion must be to accept the null hypo- thesis of no difference among the categories. Data regarding class identi- fication were also obtained. Almost all the delegates identified with' either the working class or the middle class. No differences even approaching statistical significance were found in the role orientations of delegates identifying with one or the other of these class levels. Because the range of both income and class identification was relatively narrow, however, it is still possible that differences might be found be- tween the extremes. 4. Community Type and Role Orientation Sociologists have often reflected on the nature of community types and their affects on personality structure and behavior. A common practice is the polarization of social entities to exemplify fundamentally differ- ent types of social organizations.161 Typically, on one extreme may be found the relatively homogeneous grouping with moral sanctions being the restraining force while at the opposite extreme may be found the relatively heterogeneous grouping where the aSpect of law or what Durkheim referred to as restitutive powers may be found in operation. Explicit in these "types" of community is the notion of tradition-oriented relationships versus unstructured and loose relationships of a highly impersonal character. An extension of this typological tradition is the distinction made 161Ferdinand Toennies, Community and Society, translated and edited by Charles P. Loomis, East Lansing: The Michigan State University Press, 1957, pp. 12-29. 144 today between.£g£§l and urban_communities. Actually only the conceptual terminologies have changed for the basic descriptions of these types have remained the same. Thus one may reflect on the traditional aSpects of rural life and, conversely, the dynamic aSpects of urban life. This latter point has been emphasized in the many works in urban society of recent years.162 The description of these types, though perhaps pre- sented as ideal-constructed types, are said to "fit" the community types found today, in thesense that the construct is set on a continuum. Thus may be "discerned" distinguishable patterns of behavior of "farm" folks, "small town" folks, and "big city" people.163 All this implies that the peculiar characteristics of the community tend to develop a unique kind of personality in general which in turn affects social participation in kind and degree. For instance, Magnus found that, on the whole, farm children differed from city children in that they had a greater sense of personal worth, greater feeling of self-reliance, greater sense of belonging, and greater freedom from withdrawing tendencies and nervous symptoms.16 On the other hand, there are some who, on the basis of empirical research, are now questioning the conventional rural-urban dichotomy. For instance, Haer suSpects that our advanced technology may have re- duced the differences between the rural and the urban standard of living 162See for example Cities and Society, edited by Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., gp.cit. 163An interesting descriptive account of life in a small town is presented by Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman in their work Small Town in Mass Society, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1960. 164A. R. Magnus, "Personality Adjustment of Rural and Urban Children" from Cities and Society, gp.cit., pp. 680-691. 145 enough to make any other differences between the two groups negligible.165 This latter work is introduced to suggest the notion that perhaps increas- ingly today the typology as a way of characterizing behaviortraits has be- come relatively useless; that in a modern industrial setting, what remains of the "types" is seen only in terms of spatial distances; that the temporal aspect has been significantly reduced to nullify any differential affects of spatial distribution. This point should be recognized in analyzing the relationship of community type to delegate role orientations. As indicated earlier in the discussion of social background charac- teristics, the delegates come from various community types. The classifi- cations of farm, small town, outside city limits (fringe areas), and within city limits might fit well into a rural-urban continuum. But it has been well substantiated that the distances from the outer limits (e.g., farm) to the city have been "reduced" by the construction of super highways and highppowered automobiles in addition to modern mass media of communication. This suggests that the social aspects of the dichotomy may have been greatly changed also and that whatever social cleavage was apparent before between the two extreme types may now no longer exist. Thus, differences in external physical characteristics of these community- types might well exist but patterns of behavior may no longer remain unique. These arguments suggest that community-types today cannot provide any predictive index for social behavior in a general sense. Thus, one might expect that there would not be a strong relationship between role 165John L. Haer, "ConservatismPRadicalism and the Rural-Urban Continuum," from Cities and Society, op.cit., pp. 692-697 7 r 146 orientation and community type. The following tables give the distribu- tion of role orientation by community-types of the delegates. Table 30 Community-type and organizational values Guttman Scale Types Community-Type Democratic-~Bureaucratic Total 1 2 3 4 Farm 4 4 1 3 12 Small Town 9 7 6 12 34 Outside City Limits 5 l 0 4 10 Within City Limits ._5 '14 ‘_§ ‘24 51 Total 23 26 15 43 107* *1 case = no response Degrees of Freedom * 9 Chi-Square = 13.64 .10( P C .20 Table 31 Community-type and allegiance Allegiance Community Type Local International Total 1 2 3 4 Farm 2 4 4 3 13 Small Town 8 10 12 4 34 Outside City Limits 1 5 2 2 10 Within City Limits _8 13 _2_3_ _5 49 Total 19 32 41 14 106* *2 cases = no responses Degrees of Freedom = 9 Chi-Square - 6.32 .70<.zo .30...-..( . . v:....~0u...--. , . 10. 11. -234- A convention delegate should have instructions from his local about what to vote for at a convention and should always vote according to those instructions. Delegate-type "agree" Trustee-type "disagree" ....................... 5.20 A delegate should vote for what is best for the whole union even if it is not what the members of his local want. Why is that? Delegate-type "represent the local" Trustee-type "rank and file don't under- stand problems" ............................... 3.37 A delegate should always vote for what he thinks is best for his local even if it is not what most of the members of his local want. Why is that? Delegate-type "represent local" Trustee-type "use own judgment" ............... 5.43 Did you try to convince anybody who reacted unfavor- ably that the decision made at the convention was right? Why? Delegate-type "represent all members" Trustee-type "use own judgment" ............... .96* *These critical values had no discriminatory power but since they were in the expected direction, the items were retained in the total scale. Item Appendix F Allegiance Scale and Critical Ratios for the Items on the Scale Critical ratio Just in general, what things affected your decision about how to vote at the convention? Local "expressed wish of rank and file" International ”used own Opinion" .............. Which of these was most important? (same list above) Local "expressed wish Of rank and file" International ”used own opinion" .............. Whose opinion had the most effect on how you voted? Local ”members of local" International ”Officers of International" Suppose you found yourself in a situation at a union convention where you knew that the International Of- ficers were very much in favor of having a resolution passed and the members of your local were very much opposed to having that resolution passed. What would you do? Local ”reSpond local members' wish" International ”reSpond to International" When you think of yourself as a union member, do you think of yourself mainly as: Local "member of local" International "member of International" A delegate should vote for what is best for the whole union even if it is not what the members of the local want. Local "disagree" International "agree" ......................... *This critical value had no discriminatory power but since it was expected direction, the item.was retained in the total scale. -235- 1.69* 4.97 4.83 3.88 5.71 3.12 in the - .1.- .u-0.-...~ ,» »‘ . n. «...... ~.~-.. , l A o - ..ucv r 1 — a ‘ n , A l4 --.n.. , 7, n , , . 7 , 0., \ ~> ..x.... to a , , _.- -- r I . 40 , IJ ., ..p...’.. c..a......-n-.. , , 0. a _. , , Appendix G Method of Computing Critical Ratios for Scale Items* Item: Just in general, what things affected your decision about how to vote at the convention? Which of these was most important? Item Response Upper Segment Lower Segment . Total F P1 F P2 F P Q High Score 17 45.0 4 5.7 21 19.4 80.6 ‘Medium Score 16 42.0 18 25.7 34 31.5 68.5 Low Score 5 13.0 48 68.6 53 49.1 50.9 38 100.0 70 100.0 108 Critical ratio = P1- P2 film (l/n + l/n) «a _ .3930 J(.1539)(.0406) = .3930 .079 = 4.97 *For each scale, the group was divided into two segments (upper and lower) based on the mean score on the scale. A frequency distribution of response to each item was then obtained for each segment. The critical ratio was computed from the proportional difference between the two segments. -236- Appendix H INTERVIEW SCHEDULE CONVENTION STUDY My name is . I am from Michigan State University. You probably received a letter recently describing the study we are doing and you may remember that we passed out a questionnaire at the last con- vention in Atlantic City. We would like to get some more information now about your experience as a convention delegate. We are interviewing all delegates to the 1959 convention from.Locals here in Lansing/Flint. Your answers to the questions I am going to ask will be considered confidential and the interviews will be kept at Michigan State University. I. First we would like to know something about how convention delegates were selected in your local or unit. 1. How were they selected? (If by election) How was the election run? 2. Is there anything like a political party system at elections in your local? (1) Yes (2) NO (If Yes), How does this work? PROBE a. (If No) Are there any groups at all in your local who usually have different ideas than the present Officers about how things should be run? (1) Yes (2) No b. (If Yes to either 2 or 2a) (1) Does the Opposition group run a separate slate of can- didates at elections? (1) Yes (2) No (a) Did they at the delegate election? (1) Yes (2) No -237- J . .L, . 0 . . 0 I O r ' , . r 0 . O 4. 5. -238- (b) Do they at any other elections? (1) Yes (2) No (c) How many separate slates of candidates are usually run at elections? (Indicate number mentioned) (2) Is the opposition group active between elections, for example, at local meetings? (1) Yes _____ (2) No ____ If yes, in what way? What do they do? (3) Do the same groups usually oppose each other at elections? (1) Yes __ (2) NO __ (4) Are there some recognized leaders of the Opposition group? (1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (5) On what kinds of things is there most disagreement between the different groups in your local? (6) Is there any tie-in between parties (or factions) in your local with factions in the international union or other locals? (1) Yes (2) No If yes, in what way? Compared to other U.A.W. locals, how much concern is there in your local with local union politics? Would you say there is: READ (1) ‘More (2) About the same (3) Less Are elections generally close in your local? (1) Yes __ (2) No __ What percent of the members of your unit or local would you esti- mate voted in the election of delegates to the 1959 convention? (Indicate percent mentioned) —. c . U 0 . . I 1 0 II. -239- Is this higher or lower than the percent that usually vote in the election of local officers? (1) Higher (2) Lower (3) Same Do you think the members of your local regard the convention as important in determining U.A.W. policies? (1) Yes (2) No Why is that? Now we would like to know something about your experience at the con- vention. l. 4. What would you say are the most important reasons for having a con vention? Would you say that the really important decisions in the union are made by the convention? (1) Yes (2) NO (If no) Who makes these decisions? What would you say were the three most important decisions made at the 1959 convention? (1) (2) (3) a. ‘Would the members of your local agree that these were most im- portant? (1) Yes (2) No Why? b. Do you think the international officers would agree that these were most important? (1) Yes (2) No Why? Did you get any instructions or suggestions from officers or mem- bers of your local before the convention on what to vote for? (1) Yes (2) NO -240- (If yes) (a) Who made the suggestions (Not names, but positions, etc.) (b) How were they given? (1) formally (like at a meeting) or (2) informally (c) Did you feel bound by these instructions when you went to the convention? (I) Yes (2) No Why is that? 5. Were there any decisions made at the convention where you had a pretty good idea how most of the members of your local would want you to vote? (1) Yes ____ (2) No ____ (If no) Why is that? (If yes) (a) Which decisions? (b) Did you vote the way they wanted? (1) YES __ (2) NO __ (If no) Which ones? 6. Were there any decisions made at the convention where you knew some members of your local would want you to vote one way and others would want you to vote another way? (1) Yes (2) No . (If yes) (a) Which decisions? (b) How did you decide how to vote on these issues? 7. Just in general, what things affected your decision about how to vote at the convention? PROBE a. ‘Which of these was most important? b. Whose opinions had the most affect on how you voted? (Read list, mark "1") c. Whose Opinions were next most important? (Read list, mark II 2") -241- (1) Other delegates (2) Members of your local (3) International officers (4) Regional officers 8. Would you say the important decisions at the convention are made in the general sessions or in caucuses? (1) general session (2) caucus (If caucus) Does this affect how much delegates have to say about how the union is run? (1) Yes (2) No Could you explain that? 9. Should important issues like the dues increase be decided by a referendum vote of the membership rather than by the convention? (1) referendum (2) convention Why is that? 10. What kind of guarantees are there in the U.A.W. that the officers will actually do what the convention decides? 11. How democratically would you say the 1959 convention was run? Why is that? ‘ERQBE 12. Did you serve on any committees at the international convention? (1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (If yes) List the committee(s) (If yes) How often did you attend the committee meetings? READ (1) All meetings (2) Most meetings (3) Some meetings (4) Just a few 13. How Often did you attend the general sessions? Counting morning, afternoon, and evening sessions, did you attend: READ III. 14. 15. 1. -242- (1) All sessions (2) Most sessions (3) Some sessions (4) Just a few Did you "take the MicrOphone" in any of these sessions? (1) Yes __ (2) No _— (If yes) On what issues? Did you attend any caucus meetings at the convention? (I) Yes ____ (2) No ____ (If yes) Which caucus (caucuses)? What issues were discussed? Is this a permanent caucus? (1) Yes ____ (2) NO ____ Suppose you found yourself in a situation at a union convention where you knew that the international officers were very much in favor of having a resolution passed and the members of your local were very much Opposed to having that resolution passed. 3. Which of the statements on this card tells best what you would do? (SHOW CARD 1) (l) I would undoubtedly vote for what the international officers wanted. (2) I would probably vote for what the international Of- ficers wanted. (3) I really don't know what I would do. (4) I would probably vote for what the members of my local wanted. (5) I would undoubtedly vote for what the members of my local wanted. Why is that? b. Do you think the international officers have a right to expect you to vote for the resolution? Which of these statements best answers that question? (SHOW CARD 2) (1) They have every right (2) They have some right (3) They have no right Why is that? e. -243- Do you think the members of your local have a right to expect you to vote against the resolution? ‘Which of the statements on the card best answers this question? (SHOW CARD 2) (1) They have every right (2) They have some right (3) They have no right Why is that? Are there any pressures the international officers could use during the convention to try to get you to vote for the reso- lution? ‘Which of the statements best answers this question? (SHOW CARD 3) (1) Yes, a lot Of pressure (2) Yes, some pressure (3) NO, no pressure (If (1) or (2)) What kind of pressure? (If (3)) Why is that? Are there any pressures the members of your local could use after the convention if you voted for the resolution? ‘Which of the statements best answers this question? (SHOW CARD 3) (1) Yes, a lot of pressure (2) Yes, some pressure (3) No, no pressure (If (1) or (2)) What kind of pressure? (If (3)) Why is that? If you voted for the resolution, how concerned would you be about what members of your local would think if they knew? Would you be: READ (1) Very concerned (2) Somewhat concerned (3) Not concerned If you voted against the resolution, how concerned would you be about what the international officers or others from the international would think if they knew? Would you be: READ (1) Very concerned (2) Somewhat concerned (3) Not concerned 2. -244- When you think of yourself as a union member, do you think of yourself mainly as (l) a member of the international union, (2) mainly a member of your local union, or (3) about equally a member of both? (1) International (2) Local (3) Both (If (3)) If you had to make a choice, would you say you owed allegiance mainly to the international or to the local? (1) International (2) Local Now we would like to know if you agree or disagree with some statements. I will read the statement and you indicate which of the expressions on the card tells best how you feel about the statement. (SHOW CARD 4) 3. A convention delegate should have instructions from his local about what to vote for at a convention and should always vote according to those instructions. (l) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree Why is that? A delegate should vote for what is best for the whole union even if it is not what the members want. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree Why is that? A delegate should always vote for what he_thinks is best for his local even if it is not what most of the members of his local want. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree Why is that? 6. -245- Once policy is established by the convention the locals ought to go along with it whether they think it is right or not. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree Why is that? Do you expect to be elected as a delegate to the 1961 convention? (1) Yes _____ (2) NO ____. a. Do you want to be a delegate to the next convention? (I) Yes _____ (2) No _____ b. What things affect the likelihood of being elected again? How many international conventions (including '59 convention) did you attend as a delegate? IV. We would also like to know a little about what happens after a conven- tion. 1. 2. When you returned from the convention did you or any other members of your delegation make a report to the members of your local? (1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (If yes) (a) What were the members' reactions? (READ) (l) __ Mostly favorable (2) __ unfavorable (b) What issues were they most concerned about? Did you Speak informally with members of your local about deci- sions made at the convention? (I) Yes __ (2) No __ (If yes) (a) What was their reaction? (READ) (l) ____ Mostly favorable (2) _____unfavorable (b) What issues were they most concerned about? (If no to both 1 and 2) How do the members find out about deci- sions made at the convention?" Is this the best way? 4. 5. -246- If the reactions of most members of your local to decisions made at the convention had been strongly unfavorable would this have affected you in any way? (1) Yes (2) NO (If yes) In what ways? PROBE (If no) ‘Would anybody be affected? (1) Yes (2) No What could the members do? Did you try to convince anybody who reacted unfavorably that the decisions made at the convention were right? (1) Yes (2) No WOuld you say this is part of the job of being a convention dele- gate? (1) Y6!8 (2) No Why? V. Now I would like to find out a little more about your experiences as an active union member. 1. 2. First of all, do you hold any union position? For example, are you a local officer, shop steward, committeeman, etc. (1) Yes (2) No (If yes) What position do you hold? (Get Specific position -- e.g., local president, bar- gaining committee chairman, etc.) (If yes) Is this a fulltime position? (1) Yes (2) No How long have you had this position? Have you held any union positions in the past? (1) Yes (2) No (If yes) List the position(s). (If yes) ’Were any of these fulltime positions? ~247- (1) Yes __ (2) No __ Which? Could you tell us why you decided to run for delegate? [PROBE In general, why did you decide to become active in union affairs? 'What would you do if you were defeated for re-election to your present office? (or not re-appointed for those in appointive positions) If you do not move up in the union, how important is it to you to keep your present position? 'Wbuld you say it was: (READ) (1) Very important (2) Somewhat important (3) Not important Why is that? In general, how important is it to you that you move up to a higher position in your union? 'WOuld you say it is: (READ) (1) Very important (2) Somewhat important (3) Not important Why is that? If you were going to move up in the union, which position would you like to move into next? Why do you want that position? What do you think are your chances of getting i2 Are they: (READ) (1) Very good (2) Good (3) . Not good (4) Don't know If you were going to move up in the union, what position would you like to eventually wind up in?’ Why would you want that position? 'What do you think are your chances of getting it? Are they: (READ) (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Not good (4) Don't know VI. 10. ll. 12. Now -248- Would you rather have a position to which you were appointed or one to which you were elected? (1) Appointed (2) Elected Why is that? Would you say there is a better chance of being appointed to a higher position or being elected to one? (1) Appointed (2) Elected Why is that? Suppose you had a chance to move to a better paying and higher po- sition in the union but were convinced you could serve the union best in your present position. ‘What would you do? (1) Move (2) Stay Why? I would like to get your opinion on some general questions about how the U.A.W. is run. 1. Compared to other unions, how democratically would you say the International U.A.W. is run? (READ) (1) More (2) About the same as others (3) Less a. Were you thinking of some particular other international union in making this comparison? (1) Yes (2) No (If yes) Which one? (more) (If no) Could you think of one which is (about the same) (less) democratic? (more) b. What makes the U.A.W. (about the same) democratic then (less) ? (union named) c. What do you mean by Trade Union democracy? PROBE ~249- d. How important would you say it is that a union be run demo- cratically? WOuld you say it was: (READ) (1) Very important (2) Somewhat important (3) Not very important Why? PROBE Compared to other U.A.W. locals, how democratically would you say your local is run? (READ) (1) More (2) About the same (3) Less (more) What makes your local (same) democratic than other locals? PROBE (less) 3. Compared to other unions, how efficiently would you say the inter- national U.A.W. is run? (READ) (1) More (2) About the same (3) Less a. Were you thinking of some particular other union in making this comparison?’ (1) Yes (2) No (If yes) Which one? (more) (If no) Could you think of one which is (about the same) (less) efficient? (more) b. What makes the U.A.W. (about the same) efficient than (less) ? (union named) c. How important would you say it is that a union be run effic- iently? Is it: (READ) (1) Very important (2) Somewhat important (3) Not very important Why? PROBE VII. 7. 8. ~250- Compared to the automobile companies, how efficiently would you say the U.A.W. is run? (READ) (1) More (2) About the same (3) Less a. How does this affect collective bargining with the company? b. PeOple say unions should be run democratically but they don't expect the automobile companies to be run democratically. How would you explain this? How does this affect collective bargaining with the company? Would you say U.A.W. members have (1) more; (2) about the same; or (3) less to say about how the union is run than they did 20 years ago? WOuld you say: (READ) (if reSponse is ”not in union then," ask reSpondent what he thinks and repeat question). (If more) (1) Much more (2) Somewhat more (3) A little more (If less) (1) Much less (2) Somewhat less (3) A little less Could you explain that? PROBE Would you say the U.A.W. is run (1) more; (2) about the same; or (3) less efficiently than it was 20 years ago? WOuld you say: (READ) (if response is "not in the union then," ask reSpondent what he thinks and repeat question). (If more) (1) 'Much more (2) Somewhat more (3) A little more (If less) (1) Much less (2) Somewhat less (3) A little less Could you explain that? PROBE Who in your opinion is the top labor leader in the U. 8.? Who would you say is the top labor leader the U. 3. ever had? Now I would like to know whether you agree or disagree with some more statements. As we did before, Ivaill read the statement and you indi- cate which of the expressions on the card tells best how you feel about the statement. (SHOW CARD 4) 1. It is more important that the international officers run the union well than it is that they pay strict attention to what the members want. ~251- (l) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree Even if the union is not run in the most efficient manner it is more important that the membership have the say about how it is run. (5) Strongly agree (4) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly disagree Unions would generally be better off if they were run by skilled managers instead of people elected by the membership at large. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree All members of the union should be able to participate and express themselves in union affairs even if it means a delay in the achieve- ment of union goals. (5) Strongly agree (4) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly disagree As long as the members get what they want, it doesn't make any difference whether they have any say in how the union is run. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree Once the international officers are elected, they should be free to run the union in whatever way they think best. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree 10. ll. 12. -252- If there are too many disagreements in the union, the international officers should be given full control in order to get things done. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree It would probably be better if most union officials were appoint- ed instead of elected. (l) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree The less the rank and file union members know about how the union is run the better it will be run. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree There isn't any need to waste time and energy on opinions of mem- bers who disagree with the majority. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree A lot of competition for election to office is good even if the union is being run efficiently by those in office. (5) Strongly agree (4) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly disagree All the important decisions ought to be made by the international officers because only they know what is best for the union. (5) Strongly disagree (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree l3. 14. 15. -253- Once a decision is made by the international officers, the mem- bers ought to go along with it whether they think it is right or not. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree It is more important that the union be run efficiently even if it means that the members have less to say about how things should be run. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree Individuals should not be allowed to disrupt the smooth running of the union by circulating petitions or making Speeches. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree VIII. That is all the questions about the union but we need a little more in- formation about you. 1. 2. How old are you? (Check appropriate category) (1) 25 or less (2) 26 - 30 (3) 31 - 35 (4) 36 - 4O (5) 41 - 45 (6) 46 - 50 (7) 51 ~ 55 (8) 56 - 6O (9) ____ 61 and over (Y) No answer How much schooling did you have? ‘What was the highest grade you completed. (Check apprOpriate category) (1) No schooling (2) lst to 6th (elementary) (3) 7th to 9th (Junior High) (4) 10th to 12th (High School) (5) 13th to 16th (College) (6) 17th and over (Graduate work) -254- 3. Sex (NOTE BUT DON'T ASK) (1) Male (2) Female 4. Race (NOTE BUT DON'T ASK) (1) "White (2) Negro (3) Other (specify if possible) 5. What is the title of your job at the plant? (give name, not num- ber) If fulltime union official, give this fulltime position. 6. Were you unemployed or laid Off anytime during the past year? (1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (If yes) How many weeks? 7. Could you tell us how much you and your family (household) earned altogether on the average for the last two or three years? (1) Under $2,000 (2) $2,000 to $2,999 (3) $3,000 to $3,999 (4) $4,000 to $4,999 (5) $5,000 to $5,999 (6) $6,000 to $6,999 (7) $7,000 to $7,999 (8) $8,000 to $8,999 (9) $9,000 to $9,999 (0) $10,000 and over 8. WOuld you classify your job as: (l) Unskilled (2) Semi-skilled (3) Skilled (4) Office-clerical (5) Not ascertainable (6) Fulltime union worker (Y) No answer 9. WOuld you tell us how you feel about the job you have? (in union if fulltime, in plant if not) (1) Very unsatisfactory (2) Fairly unsatisfactory . (3) No feelings either way - neither satisfactory nor unsatis- factory (4) Fairly satisfactory (5) Very satisfactory 10. ll. 12. 13. 14. 15. -255- How often do you get a chance to talk to other workers on the Job? (READ) (1) Very often (2) Often (3) Once in a while (4) Never In what city do you live? Are there any of the people you work in living in your neighbor- hood? (1) Yes (2) NO (If yes) How many? (1) l - 2 (2) 3 - 4 (3) 5 - 6 (4) 7 - 8 (5) 9 or more What was your father's main occupation? (1) Farmer (2) Businessman (3) Free professional (4) Manager (5) Salaried professional (6) Office worker or sales executive (7) Foreman or skilled worker (8) Semi or unskilled worker (9) Rural or migrant worker (X) Don't know (Y) No answer Where did you grow up? (Most years spent before adulthood) (Community) Was it a: (1) Farm (2) ____ Small town (3) Outside city limits (fringe area) (4) 'Within city limits *What social class would you say you belonged to? (Ask and if no response then Show alternatives on CARD 5. Code whether Sponan- eous class identification or not) l6. 17. 18. 19. 20. -256- (1) Lower class (1) Spontaneous (2) 'WOrking class (2) From list (3) Middle class (4) Upper class (X) Don't know How many years in all have you been a member of a union? (This includes unions other than the U.A.W., if any) Whendid you first join the U.A.W.? Can you estimate the distance from your home to the union hall? (1) Less than a mile (2) to 2 miles (3) to 4 miles (4) to 6 miles (5) to 8 miles (6) to 10 miles (7) Over 10 miles a. WOuld you say that this distance was: (1) Short (2) Fairly short (3) About right (4) Fairly far (5) Far How many local meetings did you attend last year? Did you at- tend: (READ) (1) All (2) Almost all (3) Most (4) Some (5) None Are you a member of any community organization? (SHOW LIST ON CARD 6) (l) Lodges (2) Vet's group (3) Church (4) Church group or other social groups (5) PTA (6) Neighborhood groups (7) Sports and other athleticcflubs (8) Political groups (9) Other (e.g., nationality groups, etc.) (0) None -257- a. (If a member of any one or several) about how many meetings do you attend altogether every month? (1) l to 3 (2) 4 to 6 (3) 7 to 9 (4) 10 to 12 (5) 13 to 15 (6) Over 15 b. Are you an official in any one of these groups? (1) Yes _ (2) No __ (If yes) Which group(s) is this? 21. One final question. Did you fill out one of our questionnaires at the 1959 convention? (1) Yes (2) No THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION! BIBLIOGRAPHY Benjamin Aaron, "Protecting Civil Liberties of Members Within Trade Union,” reprint no. 12, Los Angeles, California: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1950. Reprinted from Industrial Relations Research Association, Proceedings of the Second Annual Meeting. 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