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ABSTRACT

DEMOCRATIC SENTIMENTS IN UNIONISM A CASE STUDY OF THE U.A.W. CONVENTION

by George Y. M. Won

The data for this study were gathered by personal interviews of all delegates from the United Auto Workers Union in Lansing and Flint, Michigan who attended and were "seated" at the 17th Constitutional Convention of the U. A. W. International Union held in Atlantic City, New Jersey, October 1959.

The study first tried to reconcile theoretically the apparent contradiction between two major American cultural themes -- a traditional adherence to democratic values and a keen admiration and desire for maintenance of bureaucratic efficiency. It was suggested that a possible answer in the face of such opposing values was to distinguish two functionally important roles that structure the bureaucratic order -- policy decision-making and policy implementation. It was presumed that, in a democratically ordered system, these two roles are clearly distinguishable.

The primary objective of this study was to identify and analyze certain variables most concerned with role orientations of the active leadership in the locals who help make policy decisions for the International union. In this case, the delegates to the convention were

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selected as the focus of the study. The important variables considered here were organizational values, representational types, allegiance, and mobility aspirations. It was assumed that the particular orientations held by the delegates to these variables determined the character of the union organization.

Several attitudinal variables were also considered which related directly to rank and file control of the organization. These were to what degree the delegates felt accountable to their constituents for actions at the convention and the extent to which they felt that the expectations of the rank and file were legitimate. These attitudinal variables were related to the dimensions of role orientation listed above. For example, some prediction was made in regard to the relationship between these attitudinal variables and the delegate's commitment to democratic or bureaucratic values, whether he held primary allegiance to the local or to the International, the extent of his mobility aspirations, his preference for upward mobility in terms of elective or appointive channels, and, finally, his concern with acting as a representative of the constituents' views and desires as against acting in the interest of the constituents irrespective of their views and general desires.

In addition, the level of political activity of the local was determined and this factor was presumed to condition the delegate's perception of the democratic character of his union as well as his behavior as a representative of his local.

In general, some relationships were found between the role orientation variables and the accountability and legitimacy variables introduced above. Also, fairly strong association between level of political activity

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of the local and how the delegate relates himself to the members of the local was discovered. In all the data suggest that there is a strong commitment to democratic values among the convention delegates in this union. This conclusion further suggests that, in addition to certain structural guarantees, leadership in the organization must hold certain attitudes and values essential to a democratically ordered organization.

DEMOCRATIC SENTIMENTS IN UNIONISM
A CASE STUDY OF THE U.A.W. CONVENTION

By

George Y. M. Won

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

1962

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To successfully carry out field studies of the magnitude and character herein described entails the cooperation and collaboration of many persons. The author is deeply indebted to all of them.

My appreciation is first directed to the delegates of the U. A. W. locals in Flint and Lansing who readily submitted themselves to fairly prolonged interviews. The trusting and cooperative attitude demonstrated by these people toward the members of the research team provided that extra incentive that made the project a pleasant task. My deepest gratitude is directed also to those various executives in the U. A. W., from the International office to the local offices, whose assistance contributed greatly to the accomplishment of this study.

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To my major adviser, Professor William A. Faunce, a valuable teacher and fellow-worker, who more often treated me as a colleague rather than a subordinate, I give sincere thanks for the many patient hours spent on my behalf. His never failing interest in my problems and the many stimulating discussions we've had were encouraging especially during those moments of frustration when things didn't seem to progress rapidly enough.

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I believe most important I want to thank him for making me aware of the pitfalls of hasty analysis just to get the work done.

It has been a great privilege for me to carry out this research project under very favorable conditions. The stimulating and challenging ideas emanating from the staff of the Labor and Industrial Relations Center helped the author clarify his thoughts concerning the central problem of research. In this regard special thanks go to Professors William H. Form, Einar Hardin (who also served on my Guidance Committee), and Charles P. Larrowe.

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For inspiration and moral support, I thank my wife, Irene. With patience, efficiency, and ability, she projected the spirit of enthusiasm into the typing of the first draft of this research project. Truthfully, my son Gregory hindered the progress of the work by demanding equal time.

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CHAPTER I

A REVIEW OF SOME THEORIES AND RESEARCH RELATED TO UNIONISM, LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATIONS, AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

Introduction: We are faced with a pervasive contradiction in American society today: 1) human organizations operate on such a scale **that** the individual seems insignificant in the complex structure; 2) our traditional adherence to democratic political processes demands **that** we allot and maintain a measure of significance to the individual. In the light of such a paradox, it seems a legitimate task to examine **one** type of large-scale organization, the trade union, to see how a **democratic** ideology emerged given the prevailing structure of human **institutions**.

A. A Perspective on the American Trade Union Movement

A Trade Union, as we understand the term, is a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment.¹

Sociologically speaking, the trade union may be viewed as a formal **organization** which evolved from a collective response to a common **problem**. The underlying dynamics of the American labor movement appear to be generally similar to those of Western Europe. Certainly the **institutional** conditions were quite similar.² However, labor relations

¹Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, New Edition, opening statement, Chapter I, New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902.

²Robin M. Williams, Jr., American Society: A Sociological Interpretation, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955, p. 185.

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in America developed in an economy in some respects unlike that of its European counterpart. Broadly speaking, American labor relations developed in an economy of relative abundance, sparsity of population and a frontier of open resources. Within this kind of environment, making for an open-class structure, and with a religious desire for a democratic political order, certain unique features characterized American labor relations. From the beginning labor developed an individualistic orientation. The American worker did have his traditional social ties. But, as Williams demonstrates, American workers were more heterogeneous than European workers which prevented them from developing, at an early stage, a tradition of solidarity among themselves as a working class.³ The emphasis on individualism⁴ and the contractual nature of labor-management relations proved a great impediment to the development of unionism in America.

Along with this individualistic orientation, labor was regarded as a market commodity. This was no different from the European situation but the environmental conditions in America peculiarly placed labor in a seller's market while in Europe the situation was more nearly the reverse. Thus, in the latter case, a paternalistic system was more likely to develop along with personalized ties and notions of noblesse-oblige not too different from the fairly recent feudalistic pattern. For the American situation the market bargain became the bond

³Ibid., pp. 185-186.

⁴The tradition of Protestant Ethics -- individual responsibility and advancement through personal effort -- contributed to this individualistic orientation. See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons, New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1958. See also, Paul Sulton, Labor Economics, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1957, pp. 33-34.

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and employer-employee relations were tied primarily by the impersonal basis of the cash nexus.

It is important to note that the economic systems of Western Europe and America were the same -- i.e. a capitalistic system. However, the features described above presented a uniqueness to the American labor movement apart from the similarity of the institutional base. The individualistic orientation and the fluid class structure not only prevented the rapid formation of a class ideology and thereby the possibility of rapid unionization, but also explains the relative absence of political emphasis at this early stage.⁵

The underlying theme to be emphasized here is the compatibility between the individualistic philosophy and the desire for a democratic political order. The impersonal market situation contributed to both of these orientations. The employee was free to quit his job any time he pleased and the employer was free to release his worker any time it became necessary. However, this kind of reasoning did not square with the evolving moral order. Each party, still adhering to the individualistic philosophy, held a firm belief in its "rights," and these so-called rights were very often incompatible.⁶ What was believed to be an institutional principle -- the right to operate the business as one sees fit -- challenged the worker's rights to improve himself. In this respect, as

⁵Attention is directed to "The Principle of Voluntarism" as expounded by Samuel Compers during the early formation of the A. F. of L. A brief summary of this principle is explained in the following: Clyde E. Dankert, Contemporary Unionism in the U. S., Chapter 6, "Principles and Activities of the American Federation of Labor," New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948, pp. 89-103.

⁶Robin M. Williams, Jr., op.cit., p. 188.

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Williams noted, labor relations were (and are) essentially moral relations.⁷ Businessmen's vehement claim to the sanctity of the internal affairs of the enterprise was now challenged by labor's claim for a voice in these affairs. The result of this was a continuous struggle between these two forces, each ironically holding on to their individualistic philosophy and desirous of maintaining a democratic political order. The fact that both forces held the same philosophies was crucial in the selection of the arena in which the "battle" was to take place. American unions have been primarily capitalistic--they have fought for economic gains within the given system. Although there were a few attempts made by radicals, American unionism never became a large-scale political movement. Its emphasis was on peaceful expansion with tangible gains as the primary goal achieved through sound business principles.⁸

Initially for labor this individualistic orientation was self-defeating in any kind of a struggle for so-called "rights." The idea of "free-will" or self determination associated with the concept failed to reconcile the fact that labor was still a commodity in the productive enterprise and, as such, the impersonal market base pitted worker against worker to achieve an equilibrium on the price of labor. Though the individualistic orientation was consistent with democratic sentiments, the market exchange system did not incorporate such values. Ideas concerning civil rights emphasized the individual while rational economics had no place for such a sentiment. Of course entrepreneurs readily accepted this basic idea of self-determination for bargaining power clearly

⁷Ibid., p. 188.

⁸Clyde E. Dankert, op.cit.

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remained beyond the reach of labor as long as this orientation was maintained. Nevertheless, the fundamental condition which promoted this individualistic orientation in turn worked to secure a unity for the preservation of a common interest. Trade unionism could never have existed where such fundamental individual rights as freedom of speech, press, and assembly were denied. The tradition of individualism nurtured basic democratic sentiments which formed the basis of early collective bargaining. It must be recognized, however, that some individualism was relinquished in the area of labor relations to form a unity that would provide a power base for a particular kind of relationship. Democratic sentiments were carried over into early unionism perhaps with less reservation than noted in the contemporary setting. The turbulent and explosive character of early unionism depicted the extent to which militancy expressed suppressed individual views.

In briefly summarizing the general orientation of the American trade union movement, two important points have been emphasized: 1) the similarity of institutional bases upon which Western European and American trade unions emerged--the capitalistic system; 2) the assertion of individual "rights" which was essentially a manifestation of a strong adherence to a basic democratic sentiment. This second point is especially important since it was at this incipient stage that the idea of democracy became entrenched strongly enough in the mind of the American worker to become a tradition guarded with zeal.

The first point made above enabled theorists to make some general statements in regard to the trade union movement in Western society. From these theories of the labor movement one notes the dynamic character of the capitalistic system. It is quite apparent that it was this system of

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economic orientation that had given impetus to the labor movement not only at the incipient stage but during subsequent periods of growth. Commons, in illustrating this particular thesis, saw that the extension of markets had been an important influence on the growth of unions.⁹ He illustrated his points by describing the types and forms into which labor organizations developed in the shoemaking industry at different stages of the market evolution (i.e., handicraft to factory). Expansion of the market meant intensified competition in the sale of products -- e.g., shoes made in Philadelphia competed increasingly with shoes made in New York, Baltimore, and other cities. The merchant capitalist appeared, playing off small masters against each other and forcing them to cut wages in order to survive. This particular activity seriously threatened the journeymen's customary way of life and thus forced them to move into some defensive action -- organization.

Concomitantly, growth of markets meant improvements in transportation. The impact of this was a greater labor mobility. Journeymen, formerly secure in their status, were threatened by an influx of workers from other cities and also by European immigrants who were willing to undercut the established wage scale. This meant the search for some means to control this type of competition.¹⁰

In addition, the growth of markets also fostered the division of labor and the development of larger production units. With the ever rising size of the business enterprise, it became more difficult for the

⁹John R. Commons, "American Shoemakers, 1648-1895: A Sketch of Industrial Evolution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 24 (1910), pp. 39-84.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 44.

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12 Ibid

enterprising individual to start an independent business. All these portended a widening rift between employers and workers for the journeyman had no foreseeable chance to rise to the master's level and eventually the proprietor class. From such a disenchanted group Commons saw the rise of a permanent group of wage-earners and it was this group that developed and nourished unionism.

Perlman¹¹ derived his concept of job-conscious unionism out of what he interpreted to be the psychological characteristics of laborers. In this particular thesis he maintained that the typical manual worker is consciously aware of his limitations for availing himself of economic opportunities in the complex matrix of modern business. The competitive business would appear too complex for him and he doesn't perceive himself as a risk taker. With this is added a conviction that the world is one of scarcity set up by the institutional order in which the best opportunities are reserved for the landlords, capitalists and other privileged groups. Being scarcity conscious, the group then asserts its collective ownership over the entire amount of opportunity making it available among its recognized membership. In this respect, free competition now becomes a sin against one's fellows and an anti-social act.¹² Perlman further noted that labor, though constantly straining toward social reforms, had been successful "only when it limited its efforts to those changes which did not turn loose a veritable hornets' nest of

¹¹Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1928.

¹²Ibid., p. 242.

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Reynolds sees the development of strong union organization only in an urban, industrial economy.¹⁴ He notes that where industrial production has scarcely gained a toe-hold, union organization is almost completely absent. Strongly implied is the thesis of concomitant growth of unions with industrial growth.¹⁵ Moreover, the growth of union membership in recent decades has come about through the penetration of unionism into new sectors of the economy -- among new industries, and new sections of the country where new plants and new jobs have arisen.¹⁶

In appraising the role of unionism under capitalism, students of labor have not arrived at any agreement.¹⁷ For the purpose of this

¹³Selig Perlman, "Theory of the Labor Movement -- A Reappraisal," from Industrial Relations Research Association, Proceedings of Third Annual Meeting (Chicago, Illinois, Dec. 28-29, 1950), Part IV, Concluding Remarks, pp. 165-168.

¹⁴Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations, 2nd edition, Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956, pp. 33-34.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 38-39.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 50-54.

¹⁷The following represent the divided opinions on some of the theories presented above.

- A. From IRRA, Proceedings, Part VI, "Theory of the Labor Movement -- A Reappraisal," (Chicago, Illinois, Dec. 28-29, 1950):
 1. Philip Taft, "Commons-Perlman Theory: A Summary" pp. 140-145.
 2. J. B. S. Hardman, "From Job-Consciousness to Power Accumulation" pp. 146-157.
 3. David Kaplan, "Job Conscious Unionism as a Form of Economic Citizenship," pp. 169-171.
 4. Russell S. Bauder, (A discussant) pp. 169-171.
 5. Philip M. Kaiser, (A discussant) pp. 172-176.
 6. Everett Kassalow, (A discussant) pp. 177-183.
- B. From Industrial and Labor Relations Review:
 1. C. A. Gulick and M. K. Bers, "Insight and Illusions in Perlman's Theory of the Labor Movement," 6 (July 1953), pp. 510-531.
 2. A. Sturmthal, "Comments on Selig Perlman's A Theory of

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study, the historical perspectives presented above were included primarily to illustrate two evolutionary trends within the trade-union movement which are of relevance: 1) the steady, though at times irregular, growth of union organizations which in essence is a consequence of the dynamic character of the capitalistic system, 2) the changing character of political orientation -- from individualism to group (class) identity. These two points present our problem for this study. In point #1, we note the emergent problems of management of large-scale organizations, in point #2, we note the adaptibility of human beings to the changing institutional structure of a dynamic society.

B. Theory of Organization -- Bureaucratization

The concept "organization" has reference to a system of interaction. More specifically it has reference to the structure of this interaction system to the extent that it has some bearing on the achievement of the group's goal.¹⁸ To Parsons, this "primary of orientation to the attainment of a specific goal" is the unique characteristic about an organization which makes it distinguishable from other types of social systems.¹⁹

the Labor Movement," 4 (July 1951), pp. 483-496.

3. Philip Taft, "A Rereading of Selig Perlman's A Theory of the Labor Movement," 4 (Oct. 1950), pp. 70-77.

- C. Other theorists not discussed but with essentially the theme of psycho-social adaptation are: Robert F. Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United States, New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1920; and Frank Tannenbaum, "The Social Function of Trade Unionism," The Political Science Quarterly, 52 (June 1947), p. 176.

¹⁸ Harry M. Johnson, Sociology: A Systematic Introduction, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1960, p. 280.

¹⁹ Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations - I," Administrative Science Quarterly, 1 (1956), p. 64.

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Since organizations are task oriented, the nature of the task becomes the chief determinant of the character of the organization.²⁰ Organization, then, is a collective effort to get a job done and it is this fact which places it in a tenuous position. Organizational survival depends upon the achievement of particular goals. Thus, the organization is subject to crisis situations, which in extreme cases may lead to disintegration of the organization or to an increase of the feeling of solidarity among the membership and a resurgence of goal direction. As an example, a union's decision to strike presents a major crisis situation since its impact may have far reaching consequences. Thus, in the case where the strike is prolonged, external pressures may bear upon the organization and either force the weakening of organizational ties or increase the feeling of hostility toward out-groups and further solidify group cohesiveness. Where organizational survival is at stake, the organization may become a fighting force.²¹ The existence of relatively frequent crisis situations helps to explain the militant character of unions.

There are three "decision-making" processes, which have primacy in the functioning of the organization.²² The first is policy decisions, which, in essence, commit the organization to particular goals. Thus, the "bread and butter" goals of American unionism reflect the kinds of policy decisions made. Because at this level the organization as a whole is committed and thereby the interest of every member of the organization

²⁰Edward A. Ross, "The Organization of Effort," American Journal of Sociology, 22 (1916), pp. 1-18.

²¹Ibid.

²²Talcott Parsons, op.cit., pp. 70-80.

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affected, the manner in which important policy decisions are authorized becomes particularly crucial. In democratic organizations the value orientation of the membership at large determines the legitimacy of policy decisions made by those in authority. Decision-making functions may also require the support of the membership in order to have any meaningful force. A threat to strike may be ineffective if management discerns a note of apathy on the part of union membership at large, union leadership claims notwithstanding. Thus, support is essential for the organization and in order to have this, there must be consensus in regard to group actions.

The second process is one of allocative decisions. As the organization becomes larger and/or because of its complexity there arises a need for the distribution of resources within the organization. Ross refers to this as the "spacing between the organized."²³ Individuals, by their knowledge and training, are set apart from others and the relation of superior and subordinate become rationalized. Wilensky's study of "intellectuals" in labor unions seems to support the idea that this rationalization is essential for the efficient functioning of the union organization.²⁴

The final process is one which essentially presents a facade of unity and coherence for the organization--coordinated decisions. Maintenance of this facade may take any one or a combination of three fundamental forms. Parsons refers to these forms as: 1) co-ercion,

²³Edward Ross, op.cit.

²⁴Harold Wilensky, Intellectuals in Labor Unions, chapter 6, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956.

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2) inducement, and 3) "therapy."²⁵ Coercion and Inducement are, in order, negative and positive sanctions. Thus coercion may involve reprimand, ostracism, or expulsion while inducements may involve commendation and/or reward in some tangible form, e. g., promotion. The third form--therapy--is applied on a more subtle plane. As Parsons puts it, ". . . by a complex and judicious combination of measures the motivational obstacles to satisfactory cooperation are dealt with on a level which 'goes behind' the overt ostensible reasons given for the difficulty by the persons involved."²⁶ Therefore, in terms of latent and manifest functions, the socializing activities promoted by the group may have consequences far beyond the immediate pleasures enjoyed by the individual members.

Implicit in these types of decision-making processes is the reduction of direct participation or control in all phases of organizational functions on the part of the general membership. Allocative decisions and co-ordinated decisions need not be made by the membership at large to fulfill the democratic criteria. What is crucial for democratic control is that policy decisions be clearly reserved for the constituency at large. This distinction between implementation functions and policy decision-making functions would allow one to reconcile the apparent contradiction in large-scale voluntary organizations, such as trade unions, in a democratic setting.

Ross states that the primary problem for unions is institutional survival.²⁷ This is true for any type of organization. In this respect

²⁵Talcott Parsons, op.cit., pp. 79-80.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Arthur M. Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1956.

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the "cultural," "educational" and "expressive" functions are not necessarily reserved for what Parsons refers to as the pattern-maintenance organizations.²⁸ Nearly all organizations perform some peripheral function, which, to the proper functionary, fulfills a manifest desire for institutional survival.

When and where exactly an organization evolves into a bureaucracy is not clearly defined. A reasonable point of departure may be the classical definition of Weber. In general, the ideal conceptualization depicts the organization as highly rational and impersonal in the structuring of interpersonal relationships.²⁹ These characteristics are expected to provide the basis for technical efficiency, which is congruent with modern economic theory. Broom and Selznick, in their definition of bureaucracy, emphasize the importance of the formal structural aspects of administration.³⁰ Perhaps this particular interpretation arises from the fact that the term bureaucracy originally referred to the administration of government by means of bureaus, e.g., tax, communications, military, etc.³¹ What particular compartments of large-scale organizations may be defined as bureaus is not at issue here. The fact that bureaus are a functional part of large-scale organization is our particular concern.

²⁸Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organization - II," Administrative Science Quarterly, 1 (1956), pp. 228-229.

²⁹Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, editors and translators, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (New York: Galaxy Book, 1958)

³⁰Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, Sociology, 2nd edition, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1960, p. 210.

³¹Kimball Young and Raymond W. Mack, Sociology and Social Life, New York: American Book Company, 1959, p. 435.

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In this respect large-scale organization becomes synonymous with bureaucracy.

Gouldner, in his well known treatment of organization analysis discusses two distinct approaches: 1) rational-model, 2) natural-system model.³² The rational model type of organization is conceived as an "instrument." Behavior is viewed as rational and changes are rationally administered and viewed as a device to improve efficiency. Any departure from the explicit rules of procedure may be regarded as random mistakes. In reflecting the impersonal character of relationships entailed in this model, Gouldner calls it "mechanical." Weber's conception of bureaucracy typifies this particular model.³³

The natural system model regards the organization as a "natural whole." In this respect the model is organismic and stresses the interdependence of all component parts. More important, this system focuses on the unplanned and spontaneous patterns of beliefs and interaction. An example of this is given in Michels' "Iron Law of the Oligarchy."³⁴ In essence, what Michels tried to illustrate was that incumbency in a power position sets a pattern of belief and action oriented to solidifying the existent relationship. Thus those in leadership roles try to build a patronage system to entrench their relative power positions.

Realistically, both rational and natural system models apply in

³²Alvin W. Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in Sociology Today, edited by Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959.

³³Max Weber, op.cit.

³⁴Robert Michels, Political Parties, Part 6, Chapter II, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1946.

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all large-scale organizations. The formal organizational structure strives for rationality and the unmanaged human relations aspect within the structure is allowed to emerge and give the structure its uniqueness. According to Bendix, any analysis of large-scale organization from just one of these vantage points is deficient.³⁵ In fact, all organizations involve a combination of these types. The effective operation of the organization demands a clearly understood hierarchy of authority. Yet the organization would break down if every situation were narrowly adhered to according to explicit rules. All organizations depend upon ability and cooperation of individuals to employ some creative initiative properly balanced with compliance to formal rules. In this manner, according to Bendix, an effective organization is possible. However, the effect of this creative energy may be development of a perception of indispensability in the extreme as Michels tried to point out. Selznick also noted this deteriorating effect whereby the incumbent, holding a positive valuation of the office soon becomes preoccupied with the maintenance of office rather than the concern primarily with the organizational goals.³⁶

An essential characteristic of a bureaucracy is the delegation of functions. In this respect then, all actions are through intermediaries or agents who are called officials. The use of such intermediaries tends to create a "bifurcation of interest" between the agent and the initiator

³⁵Reinhard Bendix, "Bureaucracy: The Problem and its Setting," American Sociological Review, 12 (Oct. 1947), pp. 502-503.

³⁶Philip Selznick, "An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy", American Sociological Review, 8 (1943), pp. 52-53.

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of action.³⁷ The social position as an agent may involve a value system wholly incompatible with the professed aims of the organization or, for that matter, quite compatible but with such latent effects as to entrench the incumbent's position. Apprehending this kind of drift in bureaucratic structures, Michels hypothesized his "Iron Law of the Oligarchy."³⁸

C. Bureaucracy in a Democracy

Bureaucracy then, appears to be an unavoidable consequence of large scale, unified effort in goal attainment. This is especially true of the state. But also in relatively highly developed capitalistic systems like the United States and Western Europe, bureaucracy is a characteristic feature of private enterprise.³⁹ For the entrepreneur, as well as the corporation, bureaucratization exemplifies efficiency. Our relatively free market economy, with its impersonal relationships, hinges on the cash nexus as the bargaining point for both employer and employee. With this as the basis of relation in the work organization, democratic procedures are unlikely to be built into the organizational structure. One the individual chooses to become part of the organization he relinquishes some features of individuality and becomes part of the organization. However, in a so-called voluntary organization, such as a labor union, the raison d'etre is the membership itself. And whatever goals may be defined ~~are~~ likely to be the goals as defined by the membership at large and not

³⁷Ibid., pp. 50-51.

³⁸Robert Michels, op.cit.

³⁹Robin Williams, Jr., op.cit., Chapter 6, "American Economic Institutions."

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the profit motive of a legitimized controlling elite. This distinction appears to be crucial since the concern with democratic processes is consistently directed at large-scale labor organizations and not at large-scale corporate organizations. In other words, autocratic control in business organization is legitimized while the same form of control is looked upon as a dangerous trend in unions.⁴⁰

1. Character of "Big Unionism"

To Saposs, "the cardinal and irrevocable principle of Voluntarism dictated that the worker must be taught to rely exclusively on his trade union for the promotion and protection of his interests in connection with his job."⁴¹ In this respect the individual member had to be made to depend upon his union to safeguard his personal interests and not on any other organization, political or governmental. Though voluntarism is not the central emphasis in union philosophy today, the reliance of the worker upon the union is still a major theme. Thus, along with the growing pains characteristic of large-scale organizations, unions have had to broaden their sphere of interest for the benefit of their membership. Thus, two kinds of adaptive changes are discernable in the trade union movement: structural changes, and functional re-orientation. The structural changes which have occurred have generally been in the direction

⁴⁰Henry Simons, "Some Reflections on Syndicalism," Journal of Political Economy, (March 1944), pp. 1-25.

⁴¹David J. Saposs, "Rebirth of the American Labor Movement," from IRRA, Proceedings of Eighth Annual Meeting, edited by L. Reed Tripp, (New York City, December 28-30, 1955), pp. 16-17.

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of an emulation of the managerial, vertical organizational hierarchy.⁴² To increase their bargaining power, unions have seen the need to create and set up functionaries of equal expertise to those in the management hierarchical structure. Thus, also, unions have developed a refined bureaucratic order with a status system quite similar to other business organizations. Certainly the general value orientation toward efficiency is like that of management. Administrative practices, the system of accounting, orderliness, and economic utilization of time and resources all reflect the union's recognition of the need for efficient management of the organization.⁴³ Thus, the highly bureaucratized structure that produces an efficient and integrated machine is not only management's standard of operation but typical of American unions today.

There are two significant structural changes discernable in this kind of value orientation. The increased tendency toward centralization of authority and the fact of increased size. Centralization not only made it possible to maximize bargaining power but also enabled the union to do its own police work and "house cleaning." Unions also have almost thoroughly accepted the value of "bigness" and thereby have attempted to develop a broader base. In keeping with this, they have attempted to organize crafts throughout a relevant competitive labor and product market

⁴²John R. Coleman, "The Local Industrial Union in Contemporary Collective Bargaining," from IRRA, Proceedings of Eighth Annual Meeting, edited by L. Reed Tripp, (New York City, December 28-30, 1955).

⁴³Ibid., p. 278.

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area.⁴⁴ These two structural changes have brought about outstanding changes in the industrial relations scene -- a reduction of the number of independent unions and a tremendous increase in the scale of operations for the existing unions. This particular point has been expressed many times but perhaps with greatest emphasis by Henry Simons.⁴⁵ In this same theme, Pierson more recently concluded that unions' use of the power inherent in their size has significantly affected the industries within which they operate.⁴⁶

Functional re-orientation merely reflects the union's consistency in its desire to maintain the worker's dependency upon the union for the protection of his interests. In this respect unions have broadened their scope to include activities fairly well removed from "bread and butter" goals.⁴⁷ To the extent that unions have tended to increase their sphere of influence upon the membership to include a larger part of the worker's life plans, it becomes increasingly important to ask the following question: To what degree does the individual worker have the power to decide how the union is to be run and what its goals are to be?

⁴⁴Mark L. Kahn, "Contemporary Structural Changes in Organized Labor," from IRRA, Proceedings of Tenth Annual Meeting, edited by Edwin Young, (New York City, September 5-7, 1957), pp. 171-179.

See also John T. Dunlop, "Structural Changes in the Labor Movement and Industrial Relations System," from IRRA, Proceedings of Ninth Annual Meeting, edited by L. Reed Tripp, (Cleveland, Ohio, December 28-29, 1956), pp. 12-22. Mr. Dunlop discusses here the setting up of bilateral agreements between national unions to eliminate the problems of jurisdictional disputes.

⁴⁵Henry Simons, op.cit.

⁴⁶Frank C. Pierson, "The Economic Influence of Big Unions," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (January 1961), pp. 96-107.

⁴⁷Harold Wilensky, op.cit.

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Curiously enough, the membership themselves have not expressed a strong concern with the issue of internal democracy.

In relation to the concern with unions and their impact on the economy, the more frequent criticisms are to be found among businessmen, legislators, and academicians. These people are concerned primarily with the general question of who controls the union. Unconsciously perhaps these men have not been able to visualize any kind of structural alternative to democratic process apart from that which emulates the traditional town-hall meeting. True, they have allowed for some changes as may be seen in the concern with the two-party system.⁴⁸ This is so only because they see in this two-party system (or perhaps even a multi-party system) opposition and threat to office-holders which prevents autocratic control on the part of those in power. On the other hand, where there is a one-party system, these people choose to emphasize the general apathy of the membership as portending imminent autocratic control and overlook other possible mechanisms which may result in leadership values not far removed from those of the general membership. So long as such formal mechanisms as conventions, elections, etc. exist, the so-called facade of democracy may not be entirely what Blau refers to as "symbolic gesture."⁴⁹

2. Decision-making Process and Democratic Action

There appears, however, a prevailing opinion that, in spite of

⁴⁸For example see Seymour Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman, Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956.

⁴⁹Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society, chapter on "Bureaucracy and Democracy," New York: Random House, 1956.

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union leadership declarations of faith in democracy, no more than lip service is being paid to the idea of democratic rule. Indeed, this opinion rests upon the theme, as cited above, of the absence of rival centers of power (political parties) which are seen as the necessary ingredient for democratic processes.⁵⁰ The International Typographical Union, which has a two party system in operation, is often introduced as a prime example of a private organization truly run by a democratic ideology.⁵¹ Magrath, not able to reconcile the size of large-scale organization and the ideal democratic process, perceives democracy as operational only at the local level.⁵² Roberts concludes that even locals have grown into units too large for the "successful preservation of democracy."⁵³ But the charges made here do not condemn the present state of all union governments as being undemocratic. In fact they do concede, that there is generally what might be referred to as individual democracy.⁵⁴ This is specifically to mean that individual members do have the right to elect their leaders, to decide on issues of policy by

⁵⁰ B. C. Roberts, Unions in America: A British View, chapter 3, "Union Democracy," Princeton, New Jersey: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 1959.

⁵¹ S. M. Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman, op.cit. See also: S. M. Lipset, "Democracy in Private Government," British Journal of Sociology, 3 (1952), and "Organizational Democracy in a Trade Union" in Political Behavior, edited by Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956.

⁵² Peter C. MaGrath, "Democracy in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union Democracy," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 12 (July 1959).

⁵³ B. C. Roberts, op.cit., p. 41.

⁵⁴ B. C. Roberts, op.cit., pp. 33-34.

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majority rule, etc. However, according to Roberts, they do not have the right to combine in any organized group to exercise these functions.⁵⁵ As Roberts explains it, practices prohibiting the formation of organized rival groups result from the fear that organized opposition may tear the union organization apart. The consequence, of course, being a debilitating effect on bargaining power. But Roberts is apprehensive of this kind of prohibition because it may well present what he defines as a greater danger -- that of "entrenching a leadership that is unpopular, inefficient, and even corrupt."⁵⁶ Organized or formalized opposition seems to be the magical word. However, in this formulation of the problem only one significant reference point is involved -- the relation of the worker to his union. But for the worker (and leadership in the union) it is not only this particular relationship but that with the employer which is important. The history of trade union opposition lies in the too recent past for the worker to want anything which might reduce the countervailing influence of the union.

Given the conditions under which the worker views his union, it appears that not only may the tradition of democratic ideals affect the structure of the organization, but the external factors that gave rise to the organization also modify the conception of what form union structure will take. The conditions that enabled the International Typographical Union to establish and maintain a democratic two party

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid.

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system appear to be unique to this particular union.⁵⁷ One condition was its strong position in the printing industry -- thus less time and energy was directed toward struggling with the employer and more time was devoted to developing the internal machinery of union government. The second condition was that the I. T. U. was formed by the combining of many strong and independent locals. Here was a ready-made rivalry for organizational control. Thirdly, the printers are a special class of workers -- they enjoyed a fairly high income and developed a more serious identification or involvement in their work. Thus, changeover in leadership held no serious status diminution on the part of the defeated party -- return to the shop was not an unbearable humiliation for the I. T. U. official. This certainly is not true of most other unions. Finally, the I. T. U. had developed a widening sphere of peripheral activities within the organization so that even apathetic members do find something of personal interest. These activities, then, build an interest in general union activity. Thus, from a traditional democratic base, the I. T. U. through some unique features of its external relationships, was able to develop into a unique type of union government.

But what of those unions with less fortunate earlier experiences? Most industrial unions have a history of violent conflicts with management. Their growth, up until recent years, was through their own organizing of those yet unorganized, and not through amalgamation of independent locals and there was and still is a significant status difference between full time union work and factory work. Under these conditions, is it possible that these unions should develop in a fashion identical to that of the

⁵⁷Peter M. Blau, op.cit., pp. 112-113.

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I. T. U.? What seems more reasonable is to expect varying patterns of organizational structure even though there may be the same historical tradition of democratic ideals.

The town-hall model not being feasible for present day large-scale organizations, what are the structural alternatives possible which may also produce democratic processes, given the extenuating factors of the particular industrial climate? A two-party system is one type of formal structural guarantee of democratic processes. The true merit in the system is the formal guarantee that insures the relative stability of these processes. The foundation stone, however, is not the system but the provisions which formally guarantee that the system will function and that people will be active in the organization who value the democratic traditions inherited from the past. No less meritorious in principle are those constitutional provisions in other unions which structure their internal relationships in terms of the industrial climate but consistent with membership desires. Thus, those unions which depend upon the convention have come upon, according to their estimation, an effective substitute for the meeting of the entire membership. The convention then is a quasi-town hall meeting. It represents the embodiment of the sovereign power of the general membership when in session and is not merely a legislature in session.⁵⁸ In theory, the executive body of the union is merely a committee of the membership as embodied in the convention. The membership as embodied in the convention has, in fact, the delegating authority to legitimize the exercise of power after the convention is dissolved. While the

⁵⁸Grant McConnell, "The Spirit of Private Government," The American Political Science Review, (Sept. 1958), pp. 756-757.

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convention is in session, leadership theoretically serves as an extension of the role of a moderator at a group meeting.⁵⁹ The leadership has no authority during this period, to constitute independent action. Only the mandate of collective decision is the final word. The charge that the union convention is "little more than an organized claue"⁶⁰ only depicts the vulnerability and susceptibility of large-scale organizations to certain unethical practices. It certainly is an unfair charge to describe all such conventions as mere comic operas. In some instances, oligarchic tendencies have led to corruption and exploitation for personal gains. In most unions this is not the case.

This vulnerability of union organizations emphasizes the need for individual responsibility, i.e., leaders should be cognizant of their responsibility and should act in accord with ethical standards necessary for representing the interests of their constituents. The structural guarantees, be they party systems or delegate-convention systems without formalized opposition are only as effective as the leadership quality permits. In this respect then, the recruitment of competent leadership becomes an important task. And it is upon the active local members that this source of union vitality is most highly dependent.⁶¹

Taking account of the considerations above, a preliminary definition of union democracy will be attempted. The distinction made by Parsons

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 758.

⁶⁰B. C. Roberts, op.cit., p. 40.

⁶¹George W. Brooks, The Sources of Vitality in the American Labor Movement, New York School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Bulletin 41, (July 1960), p. 7.

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between the different decision-making processes in large-scale organizations permits a reconciliation of the apparent contradiction of democratic processes within a bureaucratic structure. As mentioned earlier, policy-decision making is the important factor which must remain in control of the membership at large. Once policy-decisions are made by the constituency, key functionaries may be assigned to make allocative-decisions and co-ordinated-decisions to maintain a structure of relative efficiency. It must be emphasized that it is through their own policy-decisions that the constituency relinquishes its rights so that policies instituted may be implemented by these key functionaries.

This framework permits a broad definition of the concept democracy in which varying types of structural guarantees may be obtained. Democracy is defined in this study as: Decision-making by those who, in the end, are affected by the decisions. Proceeding with this definition the study of any large-scale organization requires the following question: How are policy-decisions made? This approach avoids a rigid adherence to a single theme such as organized conflict, participation, etc. It recognizes the existence of structural alternatives that may fulfill a democratic value orientation. As one author puts it, "Democracy is a dynamic idea . . . It must continually work out new patterns appropriate to changing circumstances."⁶²

D. Studies of Union Democracy

Michels' hypothesis of the "iron law of the oligarchy" seems to have resulted in the casting of many a doubtful glance toward labor unions.

⁶²Clinton S. Golden, "New Patterns of Democracy," The Antioch Review, 3 (Fall, 1943), pp. 391-404.

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Thus, in the past decade or so this hypothesis was used as the point of departure for many studies of democracy in unionism. Lipset tried to probe into the psycho-social background of working class people that made them susceptible to such movements.⁶³ According to Lipset, working class people are primarily concerned with short-run problems of survival rather than long-run social and economic trends. Working class people (here identified as low status groups) are more likely to have a lower educational level than those of higher socio-economic status. This limitation tends to impel them toward association with others of similar background thus creating an atmosphere of limited experience, sophistication, and understanding of others different than they are. These characteristics, then, tend to produce a narrow perspective whereby politics, personal relationships, etc., are viewed in simple black or white terms, where actions are based upon impulse rather than reflective appraisal, where talk and discussions are looked upon with impatience, where interest is lacking in organizations that offer a long-range program, and where there is ready response to certain leadership types and extremist movements.⁶⁴ A significant consequence of these features is that they are associated with low levels of political interest and involvement. This certainly ties in well with Michels' thesis. In the same theme, Herberg perceives a systematic narrowing of democracy within the labor organization. "As long as things go well the average union member doesn't want self-government and is annoyed and resentful when an attempt

⁶³Seymour Martin Lipset, "Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism," American Sociological Review, 24 (August, 1959), pp. 482-501.

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 495-496.

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is made to force its responsibilities upon him. What he wants is protection and service, his money's worth for his dues."⁶⁵ Summers feels that even the law could not decree democracy since apathetic members cannot be compelled to action nor indifference transformed into interest in union government.⁶⁶ To him, the most that the law can do is to safeguard certain basic rights essential for the life of union democracy and to encourage those institutions which give it vitality.⁶⁷ In this respect, the labor movement itself must assume the responsibility of strengthening union democracy. The values held by union leaders have an important bearing upon whether this responsibility is exercised. Lipset, in expounding the virtues of the two-party system in the I. T. U., emphasized the importance of leadership roles.

"The leaders on each side attempt to bring into their party any union member who seems to have leadership ability and has won a personal following. At the local level, the party leaders look for individuals who have proven themselves in their shop unit, the chapel, while at the International level, party leaders attempt to win over convention delegates from small locals where the party system is not strong."⁶⁸

Pierson, though recognizing several conditions in modern trade unionism which work against democracy, still notes some forces tending to produce union democracy.⁶⁹ First of all, he reports that the democratic,

⁶⁵Will Herberg, "Bureaucracy and Democracy in Labor Unions," The Antioch Review, 3 (Fall, 1943), pp. 410-411.

⁶⁶Clyde W. Summers, "The Usefulness of the Law in Obtaining Union Democracy," Monthly Labor Review, 18 (March 1958), pp. 258-259.

⁶⁷Clyde W. Summers, "Legislating Union Democracy," from IRRA, Proceedings of Tenth Annual Meeting, edited by Edwin Young, (New York City, September 5-7, 1957), pp. 228-239.

⁶⁸Seymour M. Lipset, "Democracy in Private Government," British Journal of Sociology, op.cit., p. 51.

⁶⁹Frank C. Pierson, "The Government of Trade Unions," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1 (July 1948), pp. 594-596.

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idealistic tradition still exerts a powerful influence in decision-making. Union officials are aware of this and many do respond to the mandates of the membership. Second, there is the threat of rival groups emerging to challenge the in-group. Structural guarantees like conventions and elections may provide the wedge for rivalries or political machines. Reynolds raises the question of what is meant by "democracy" when applied to a trade union.⁷⁰ He is not sure what standards we might use to determine how closely a union approximates the democratic norm. It appears to him that the existence of key structural requirements such as general suffrage, free election of legislators and control by legislators over expenditures of funds and other executive actions are met in most unions. Though he recognizes the basic weakness of indirect elections, he nevertheless emphasizes that their affect may be that the self interest of leaders are canalized in directions beneficial to the membership.

What is apparent and most significant in these remarks is that democracy appears to be possible within the framework of large-scale organization but it is meaningful only to those active in the union movement. Most studies of large-scale organizations have centered around the theme of rule or power as emanating from the top down. Eby expressed concern over the "drip effect" of union programs where leadership seems to be generating ideas and decisions for an apathetic group of followers.⁷¹ He further suggested that a "percolator effect" be generated whereby,

⁷⁰Lloyd G. Reynolds, "Discussion," in section of Postwar Labor Relations, The American Economic Review, 36 (May 1946), pp. 380-381.

⁷¹Kermit Eby, "The 'Drip' Theory in Labor Unions," The Antioch Review, 13 (March 1953), pp. 95-102.

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instead, these ideas and decisions flow in the reverse direction. Structurally, Eby suggested that even status differentials should be minimized to the effect that democracy as an ideal may not be merely a propaganda line but truly a "plumb-line" for organizational vitality.⁷² But by implication, the "percolator effect" makes a plea for the awakening of the apathetic mass at the general membership level. One thing Eby did not consider and which seems to be part of the thesis is that leadership recruitment itself may be part of the "percolator effect." It may be sufficient that within the local there may be a seed-bed of active union members who are the generating force leading the membership at large. This to Brooks, is one of the sources of vitality in unionism today.⁷³ Lipset also mentions the "party activists" who do not seem to be motivated by hope of gaining some union office. These are people with relatively little talent for leadership but are active participants and help spread the news around. These are people essentially interested in politics and who like to be "in on things" and near the center of power activities.⁷⁴ Certainly this is not unique to the two-party system. What is important here are the structural provisions that make it possible for "actives" to participate in this manner. But given this basic guarantee, the motivation to participate must come from the individual himself. As one active member said, after contemplating resignation from a Union Education Committee due to lack of membership interest and participation, "you can

⁷²Kermit Eby, "Organization, Bureaucracy, Loyalty," The Antioch Review, 15 (June 1955), pp. 202-203.

⁷³George W. Brooks, op.cit., pp. 7-8.

⁷⁴S. M. Lipset, "Democracy in Private Government," op.cit., p. 51.

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bring water to them but you can't make them drink it."

1. Focus on Rank and File Participation.

Most studies of union democracy have concentrated on rates of participation in the locals. Tannenbaum and Kahn, not necessarily working on the theme of democracy, analyzed and compared locals composed of what they defined as "active" and "inactive" members.⁷⁵ The measurement of the union member's activity in his local was based upon a "participation index" composed of six items: 1) number of regular union meetings attended; 2) number of special union meetings attended; 3) number of things done at the meetings; 4) holding union office; 5) membership on union committees; and 6) voting behavior during the last union election for officers. In terms of organizational structure, the locals with a greater proportion of "actives" demonstrated a more predictable kind of behavior. At least shared norms were perceived. However, the study takes primarily a narrow view of the problem since less emphasis was placed on the structure of roles and more on the statistical analysis of local participation. Miller and Young tried to probe into the social-psychological aspects of participation.⁷⁶ Their study of the members of six locals in Columbus, Ohio revealed that many of them were little interested in the day-to-day routine functioning of the union. Family affairs and other interests loomed as more important than union meetings for these people. However,

⁷⁵Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Robert L. Kahn, Participation in Union Locals, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson & Co., 1958.

⁷⁶Glenn W. Miller and James E. Young, "Member Participation in the Trade Union Local: A Study of Activity and Policy-making in Columbus, Ohio," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 15 (Oct. 1955), pp. 31-47.

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the study revealed a small, hard core of active unionists who accepted the union and were emotionally involved in the union movement. More important, those who displayed little interest in union activities do, on the other hand, express loyalty to the idea of the union as an institution. In times of stress, such as strike actions, these apparently apathetic members do support the union. When the "threat" once again subsides, they tend to revert back to their old complacency.⁷⁷ During these periods of normalcy, the union looks toward the hard core activists for support.

Kyllonen found positive relationships between level of union activity and wage level rise, length of time in union, best production ratings and high supervisor rating on workers quality of work.⁷⁸ In addition, the following social characteristics differentiated the actives and inactives: the single are more likely to be active than the married, those married and with children are less likely to be active than those married and without children, and those with more visiting of or by relatives are less likely to be actives than those with less visiting of or by relatives.

The author also found a positive relationship between social activities and attendance of union meetings. Those who play cards more often were more likely to attend union meetings than those who play less cards. In addition, greater church attendance, more regular visits to town, and fishing more often with others were related to greater union

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 47.

⁷⁸Toimi E. Kyllonen, "Social Characteristics of Active Unionists," American Journal of Sociology, 56 (May 1951), pp. 528-533.

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Spinrad listed three major variables associated with union participation: Objective features, such as job and residence; Personal association, such as contacts; and Orientations, such as job satisfaction.⁸⁰ These variables support and supplement some of the findings reported above.

On the whole, participation in union activities on the part of the membership has been notoriously poor. And it is upon this fact that most of the claims for the demise of democratic processes in American unions have been based. In response to these attacks, the unions themselves have made attempts to encourage member participation.⁸¹ However, Tannenbaum does not believe that participation is an absolute requisite to determine level of membership control.⁸² He points to the significance of the informal mechanisms of control outside of the meeting hall. Informal representation may occur among groups of friends or associates at the shop level. This is defined by Kovner and Lahne, as sample representation.⁸³ The formal meeting is essentially a meeting of activists.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰William Spinrad, "Correlates of Trade Union Participation: A Summary of the Literature," American Sociological Review, 25 (April 1960), pp. 237-244.

⁸¹Don A. Seashore, "The Nature of Union Attempts to Encourage Member Participation," from IRRA, Proceedings of Tenth Annual Meeting, edited by Edwin Young, (New York City, September 5-7, 1957), pp. 180-191.

⁸²Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "Mechanisms of Control in Local Trade Unions," British Journal of Sociology, 6 (1956), pp. 307-311.

⁸³Joseph Kovner and Herbert J. Lahne, "Shop Society and the Union," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 7 (1953), pp. 3-14.

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These authors feel that the shop society does manifest "participation" whereby the active and passive members do relate to each other. In addition, Tannenbaum raises the question of members making the distinction between crucial issues and those of less relevance. For instance, in one study a decision on strike action was participated in by 72 percent of the membership. On the other hand, when it came to deciding on bargaining demands, only 40 percent of the group represented the entire membership.⁸⁴ Seidman also emphasizes the need for membership participation for effective democracy and is apprehensive about the possible domination by a small cohesive group of leaders and active members.⁸⁵ However, Coleman believes that members' interest in democracy is tempered with both a certain amount of apathy toward means and an admiration for efficiency.⁸⁶ In his interpretation, the members do not necessarily have an interest in democracy either exclusively or principally. Indeed, as Selekman says, the union is not an idealistic organization nor a revolutionary one.⁸⁷ Its aims are primarily practical and thereby revolve around economic gains. According to Coleman, the significant point to remember, however, is that the members do have a sufficient interest in democracy to be a compelling influence upon leadership to conform to democratic practices.⁸⁸ Rosen and Rosen, in a study of business agents found that

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 308-309.

⁸⁵Joel Seidman, Democracy in the Labor Movement, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, New York, Bulletin 39 (February 1958), pp. 20-22.

⁸⁶John R. Coleman, "The Compulsive Pressures of Democracy in Unionism," American Journal of Sociology, 6 (May 1956), p. 523.

⁸⁷Benjamin M. Selekman, "Trade Unions -- Romance and Reality," Harvard Business Review, 36 (May-June 1958), pp. 76-90.

⁸⁸Ibid.

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these people were motivated to do a good job by group pressure.⁸⁹ From the agent's point of view, satisfying the members was a crucial part of his job and he realistically knows that the growing size and complexity of his union create barriers that make it almost impossible to consider each individual's personal problems. What is involved here is the important dimension of democratic process -- leadership recognition and response to membership desires.

All in all, if level of participation is to be made a principal issue in regard to democratic process in the union, the future of democratic unionism is dim indeed. According to Seidman, "One cannot realistically anticipate a sharp rise in meeting attendance in most unions in the foreseeable future."⁹⁰ He presents three factors that are likely to play an important role here: 1) most of the members, though highly valuing their union, are not interested in the daily routine business affairs; 2) growth of bargaining units and the spread of pattern bargaining have reduced the importance of the business that the local can transact; and 3) increasingly, other leisure time activities compete with union meetings for the members' free time.⁹¹ In addition, Seidman reminds us that virtually all other types of organizations (especially voluntary organizations) have low levels of attendance. This, then, should not be cited as a unique defect in the trade union

⁸⁹Hjalmar Rosen and R. A. Hudson Rosen, "The Union Business Agent's Perspective of His Job," Journal of Personnel Administration and Industrial Relations, 3 (July 1957), pp. 49-57.

⁹⁰Joel Seidman, Democracy in the Labor Movement, op.cit., p. 21.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 21-22.

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organization. Here, we might aptly cite Brooks:

On the contrary, it is merely evidence that the members are exercising their inalienable right to be indifferent. Abstention is one of the most useful devices by which voluntary democratic organizations are controlled, and to regard attendance at union meetings as some kind of index of the health of a union is very far from the mark.⁹²

2. Theme of Internal Conflict

The significance of rank and file apathy in discussions of union democracy lies in the relationship postulated between institutionalized opposition and accountability of leadership. Fisher and McConnell, like Lipset, feel that constitutional provisions such as freedom of speech, non-discrimination for reasons of race, creed, sex, or citizenship, honest elections, etc., will not be implemented unless they are associated with "political institutions."⁹³ The central theme here is the importance of conflict formalized by a competitive party system. To these authors, this method, and only this, has proven to be a sufficient check to autocratic control. In citing the I. T. U. as the prime example of a democratic union, these authors imply that this union is the democratic exception in the labor movement. However, at the same time, they fail to demonstrate that other unions, such as the U. A. W., with no such formalized conflict system are essentially undemocratic in form. The statement that only institutionalized conflict produces accountability remains an assumption and not an empirically validated generalization.

⁹²George Brooks, The Sources of Vitality in the American Labor Movement, op.cit., pp. 5-6.

⁹³Lloyd H. Fisher and Grant McConnell, "Internal Conflict and Labor Union Solidarity," in Industrial Conflict, Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin, and Arthur M. Ross, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954, pp. 132-133.

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
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It should be noted, first of all, that "political institutions" or simply conflict groups are sociologically emergent phenomena rather than mandated structures. As described above, the two-party system within the I. T. U. emerged from a unique historical development within this union and the printing industry. No constitutional provisions can create opposition where none exists. In the complete absence of value conflict, a democratic organizational structure would, in fact, not be necessary to achieve congruence between organizational and membership goals. Where conflict exists, it may be, as MaGrath suggests, that organized opposition is the most reliable way of securing accountable rulers.⁹⁴ The question of whether this is the only way remains unanswered.

The two variables, opposition and accountability, may be viewed in the following manner:

- (1) OPPOSITION may be either:
dispersed.....or.....institutionalized;
- (2) ACCOUNTABILITY of leadership may be either
high.....or.....low

The two variables may then be related in the following manner:



⁹⁴Peter C. MaGrath, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, op.cit., p. 521.

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Ideally, institutionalized opposition fairly well guarantees high accountability. This accountability then makes for a responsible leadership and thus a highly democratic organization. Two basic weaknesses appear in this argument: 1) the assumption that responsible leadership is primarily a dependent variable; and 2) the assumption that the only way of achieving responsible leadership is through institutionalized opposition. Even partially accepting Michels' thesis that those in leadership roles eventually develop goals unique to their immediate interests and apart from that of the organization, we cannot exclude from consideration leadership orientation to democratic or autocratic values. Highly institutionalized opposition may increase the probability for accountability but this need not mean that dispersed opposition or even the absence of opposition eliminates the possibility of accountability. In a study of leadership behavior, Ferenc Merei found that when a leader is confronted by a group with its own basic tradition (e.g., a democratic tradition) his social influence is relatively weak vis-a-vis the group's although he may have much stronger influence than any one member confronted singly.⁹⁵ With leadership also committed to democratic values, it may be highly sensitive to membership reactions and, even with a non-institutionalized state of opposition, accountability would very likely be high. We might inject The Thomas Theorem at this point: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."⁹⁶ Such being the case, given

⁹⁵Ferenc Merei, "Group Leadership and Institutionalization," in Eleanor E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley, Readings in Social Psychology, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958, pp. 522-532.

⁹⁶Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, chapter 11, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957.

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the basic guarantees of freedom of expression, etc., any rumbling of discontent may result in highly responsive action no matter in what form this opposition may be. On the other hand, no matter how institutionalized the opposition, leadership, if not committed to democratic values, may still challenge the relative strength of the groups by refusing to respond readily to symptoms of discontent.

In conclusion, it appears evident that, given the traditional guarantees of democratic processes, large-scale voluntary organizations can operate basically in a democratic fashion in spite of their bureaucratic structure. However, recognizing that each organization, in its evolutionary growth, has unique experiences, the central question to pose seems to be: What alternative forms are there that might assure membership participation in policy decisions? Since accountability seems to be the central issue in democratic processes, most of the scholars in the field have emphasized the "political institutions" aspect or what might be defined as organized or institutionalized opposition. More specifically, a truly democratic system is defined as one with organized opposition parties with each party being a constant threat to the other for the control of the organization. Since parties or organized opposition are emergent phenomena rather than mandated structures, their existence appears to be almost a fortuitous event. What of those organizations without the benefit of such "political institutions?" It seems that an organizational structure in which policy decisions are made by delegates to a constitutional convention meeting at regular intervals may at least provide a framework for democratic processes. This is possible to the extent that leaders value democratic processes and that channels are

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open for sentiments from the membership (locals) to flow upward (percolator effect). So from this perspective, how democratically a union operates is determined by the degree to which their sentiments are channelled (perked) up to the International body and have a bearing upon the formulation of policy. This dissertation is concerned primarily with some aspects of this process in the U. A. W.

CHAPTER II

THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

I. Concerning the Structural Forms of the Convention

Introduction: Unions, on the whole, being representational organizations, still claim to be democratic. In the light of the many unique experiences to which particular unions have been subjected, it would seem realistic to expect, however, varying orientations regarding the structural forms of union organization which may result in democratic processes. Tannenbaum and Kahn have recognized the forces impinging upon the union that in some measure determine its orientation.⁹⁷

"It follows that the internal structure of the union must be designed to meet such demands, and the internal processes of the union paced to such external requirements. To this extent, the internal structure and character of the union can be properly considered the creature of its organizational environment.

This organizational environment may foster or frustrate union democracy at the local level, may facilitate its growth or permit it to occur only as a kind of internal tour de force. It may be, for example, that the larger community often urges upon unions two kinds of demands which are not wholly compatible: that unions take a restrictive view of their functions and areas of interest, and at the same time that they maintain a sophisticated and effective kind of internal democracy. Yet internal union democracy may thrive best in a union which is oriented toward broad issues of social welfare and attempting to contribute to the community in these terms as well as by way of the specialized function of collective bargaining. The management or community or nation that places a positive value upon union democracy must ask itself to what extent it contributes to an organizational environment in which democracy will grow."

⁹⁷Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Robert L. Kahn, Participation in Union Locals, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Co., 1958, pp. 236-237.

From the perspective of the trade unionist, there might be greater need for militancy in the light of a "hostile world" or a broadening of the union's orientation in response to a "mature relationship" with these external forces. Depending on the particular perspective taken by the trade unionist and other unique experiential factors, it becomes understandable that, given a democratic ideological orientation, alternative structural forms for implementing democratic values have emerged. Any model for democracy in trade unions should, however, have at least the following elements: 1) citizenship and suffrage; 2) opposition; 3) participation; 4) forms of representation; and 5) due process. Citizenship, suffrage and due process are procedural guarantees spelled out explicitly in most union constitutions. Opposition and participation are implicit in the procedural guarantees. Thus, the freedom of self-expression and the regular election procedures for selection of officers imply free participation and the right to agree with or oppose those in office regarding whatever issue is at hand. None of the union constitutions so far as can be seen, nor even the constitution of the United States, define the structural form of the opposition. The crucial aspect of formal organization, then, is not whether opposition is institutionalized but whether barriers exist for such sociologically emergent phenomena. If no such barriers exist, then the degree to which opposition is institutionalized is hinged on situational factors and the social-psychological character of the group. Forms of representation are especially important in the light of the mass character of organizations today.

This study, then, conceives of democracy as a type of decision-making process with various structural alternatives whereby common substantive goals may be achieved but, basically, where decisions are made by those who

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are affected by the decisions. In this way the study of any large-scale voluntary organization may be approached in terms of the consideration of its unique structure and how this particular structure facilitates or inhibits democratic processes.

A. The Role of the Convention in Trade Union Democracy

In most trade union governments the primary policy-making structures are the convention and the executive board or council. A survey of the literature on trade union government reveals that hardly more than scant attention has been directed to these bodies. Studies of trade union democracy, though concerned with such things as control of the executive, appeals procedure, self-regulation, and certain other rights of membership, have failed to focus on the policy-making structure per se. This deficiency is unexplainable since the character of the mechanism provided for articulation of the memberships' expressed desires, and the process through which leadership is made accountable to the membership would appear to be crucial in establishing the extent to which a union is functioning democratically.

The concern of this study is with the convention and, more specifically, with the role of the convention delegate. The assumption here is that a democratically ordered convention which functions as a policy-making body is among the strongest safeguards for democracy in union government. Blau⁹⁸ differentiates six types of "structural effects" upon individual behavior. These "structural effects" are essentially common values

⁹⁸Peter M. Blau, "Structural Effects," American Sociological Review, 25 (April 1960), pp. 178-193.

and norms of the group. The important aspect is the influence that structure has upon individual behavior. Here group norms and values are differentiated from individual norms and values and the pressure of the former upon the latter is revealed as a strong determinant of behavior. The existence of democratic structures (e.g. conventions) within a bureaucratic organization may help produce behavior consistent with a democratic ideology.

Although, as Michels states, the danger always exists that leadership may exploit the masses through their control of key positions, this danger can be lessened through "communication" between these two distinct groupings. The role of the convention delegate in this process may be analogous to Loomis' "systemic linkage."⁹⁹ The delegate to the convention may be viewed as the link between two distinct groupings (locals and the International) through which is channeled what Loomis might call democratic sentiments. Thus, instead of developing ends other than the group goals, leadership may be oriented toward common values and norms. The systemic link thereby provides a mechanism for identification with and accountability to the membership. The contention here is that the degree to which the convention exhibits a democratic atmosphere will depend to a considerable degree upon the role orientation of the convention delegates who form the actual link between the two systems. The delegate, as a significant figure among the "actives" of local union government, transmits the general sentiment of the membership at large to the greater policy-making body. This indirect procedure of decision-making through a

⁹⁹Charles P. Loomis, "Systemic Linkage of El Cerrito," Rural Sociology, 24 (March 1959), pp. 54-57.

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body with authority to establish policies makes the delegate role a crucial one in union government. In spite of the various exhortations of campaign orators and other so-called champions of freedom, neither the citizen in a mass society nor the rank and file member in a large union play a dominant role in determining the character of national and union political processes. The political process is shaped by people in leadership positions either in the informal sense (influentials) as opinion leaders or in the formal sense of having the authority of office. This was probably the case in the New England town meeting as well as in contemporary, large scale organizations. In any kind of social organization there must exist a structure of leadership -- formal or informal. There will also almost inevitably be "active" participants and "passive" participants -- those seriously concerned with certain problems and those indifferent and apathetic. It is also undoubtedly a rare occurrence that everyone really has the chance to express himself on all issues beyond the casting of his vote. In short, allusions to the traditional townhall meeting as the epitome of democratic process probably overestimate the degree of influence of the individual citizen even in this relatively uncomplex decision-making system.

The proposition here is that a necessary condition for a union to function democratically is the existence of a core of local leaders capable of and willing to articulate local interests and committed to a democratic value orientation. The delegates to the convention, at least in the U. A. W., are drawn from the general membership and to a large degree they constitute this core of local leaders. Though this study focuses upon the U. A. W. convention, it has a broader significance. A democratic society such as ours is typified by many so-called voluntary associations -- political

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parties, co-operatives, professional organizations, bureaus, lodges, etc. The acknowledged mass character of our society necessitates the segmental participation of every citizen in selected groups and differential degrees of participation depending upon the degree of interest in the particular group.¹⁰⁰ It would be a physical and mental impossibility to be totally involved in all the areas of interest.¹⁰¹ The "actives" of the particular organization who form the core of leadership within the organization thereby assume the primary responsibility for maintaining the central values of the group.

B. The Function of the Convention

"A national union is born at a convention and is then presumed to have a continuous existence, its periodic sessions being successively numbered from its first meeting."¹⁰² The convention is presumed to be the central governing body where all major policy issues are resolved. In reconciling bureaucratic ideals with democratic processes, it is necessary to structurally differentiate the policy-making function from the policy implementing function. It is with regard to policy implementation that bureaucratic values (e.g., efficiency) become paramount while democratic values (e.g., participation in decision-making, etc.) become paramount

¹⁰⁰Philip Selznick, "Institutional Vulnerability and Mass Society," The American Journal of Sociology, 56 (January 1951).

¹⁰¹George Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in Cities and Society, revised reader in urban sociology, edited by Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957, pp. 635-646.

¹⁰²William M. Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 146.

in the policy-making aspect. At the convention, policy-making being the prime function, the delegates and the International executive board appear as the primary decision-makers. But, as decision-makers, each body plays a different representative role. Each delegate is assumed to carry the voice of his local while the executive board presumably represents the interests of the whole union. Procedurally, however, the delegate has the final word since it is only he who votes on the particular issue at hand.¹⁰³ In addition, the executive board, as officers of the International, are accountable to the congress of delegates since the positions they hold are elective. Thus it seems that within the setting of the convention each body plays two reciprocal roles -- subordinate and superordinate. The members of the executive board are accountable to the delegate body (as representatives of the membership at large) and the delegates look toward the executive body for leadership and guidance.

It is clear that members of both these groups also play dominant leadership roles within the policy implementation structure. At the locals, the delegates, in many cases, hold one or several official positions. At the International level, the executive board, outside of the convention, assumes the role of policy implementers. Decisions made at the convention are delegated to the executive board for implementation in the expedient manner. Thus, the hierarchy of leadership positions at the International level can be seen as a policy implementation structure in which the various functionaries or "experts" perform specific roles

¹⁰³Article VIII, Section 13, of the U. A. W. constitution permits voice but no vote to the International officers and International representatives of the International Union. See Constitution of the International Union -- October, 1959.

in the complex organizational structure under the direction of International officers and representatives who have been delegated their power to direct.

The functions of the convention itself may be divided into four categories: 1) reports; 2) information; 3) policy-making; and 4) election of officers. These may be defined as the manifest functions of the convention. In addition, there is a psychological atmosphere which emerges from such congress which may be seen as a latent function of the convention. The fanfare, the camaraderie, the leveling relationship where all are "brothers" seem to have a unifying effect. This may be described as a revitalization effect. Attendance at the convention seems to bring a resurgence of one's identity in the labor movement. Some delegates have noted this latter effect: "The convention has its purpose in developing union solidarity."

The four procedural categories, in principle, place the power of rule into the hands of the delegates. Where delegates are informed and election of officers occurs directly the incumbents in the International offices are more likely to be accountable to the delegates. Policy-making though flavored with much of the politicking commonly noted in American political processes is, ideally, the final analysis, the private domain of the delegate body. Granted the advantages of incumbency such as primary access to communication channels, identification with achievements, etc., these procedural guarantees tend to place these officials in a tenuous position. Security is a question of perception and purely relative to the situation. Where decisions are ultimately made by the delegate body, a constant threat is posed to security in office. Thus, the formal accountability feature of the convention cannot be minimized

in analyzing democratic processes in unionism.

C. Democratic Forms of the Convention

Two convention functions have been alluded to which basically serve as procedural guarantees of democracy. To achieve the desired condition of decision-making by those who will be affected by the decision, the convention makes possible the articulation of membership desires and accountability of leadership behavior. These two variables appear to be interdependent. The membership must have its desires expressed in order for leadership to develop some pattern of response. On the other hand, the final accounting to the membership gives some assurance of a pattern of response falling within the limits of the memberships' expectations.

1. The Articulation of Membership Desires

Ideally, the convention is established by the constitution so that the membership may have a voice in government. This is presumed to be the most expedient democratic form in large-scale organizations. Granted the limitations of time, the complexity and variety of issues, the apparent control (by parliamentary procedures) of the floor by the executive officers, the sessions still represent, in principle, the town-hall meeting on a grander scale. As enumerated above the manifest function, or what might be termed the business of the convention, is decision-making. However, decision-making (especially in a democratic setting) involves a process more complex than just the act of voting. As Leiserson points out "business comes to the convention in three forms: resolutions, reports, and appeals."¹⁰⁴ The resolutions represent the specifically expressed

¹⁰⁴William M. Leiserson, op.cit., p. 194.

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desires of the membership at large. Granted that some of these resolutions may be introduced by the executive board members through their locals, the majority of them, in the U. A. W. at least, appear to represent views of the locals.¹⁰⁵ Membership desires with respect not only to specific local concerns but also general operating procedures of the International Union and the forms of union government are expressed through resolutions since amendments to the constitution are introduced to the body in this form. Appeals or grievances may also be taken through regular judicial channels to the constitutional convention of the International union or, in the case of the U. A. W., to the Public Review Board.¹⁰⁶ This final step is open to the appellant in case he is not satisfied with the decision of the International Executive Board or an International Trial Committee and represents another way in which membership views are made known.

The more interesting feature of this articulating function is debate on the convention floor itself. Here, before the general assembly and the members of the International Executive Board, proponents and opponents of the particular resolution are granted "equal time" to express their views and exhort their fellow delegates to support their particular views. Voting from the floor (except in the case of a roll call vote) perhaps leaves much to be desired since there appears to be no adequate

¹⁰⁵Three hundred and seventy-four resolutions were presented to the Resolutions Committee for introduction at the 17th Constitutional Convention of the U. A. W. See Proposed Resolutions Submitted by Local Unions to the 17th Constitutional Convention -- U. A. W., Atlantic City, New Jersey, October 1959.

¹⁰⁶See Constitution of the International Union -- U. A. W., adopted October 1959, Article 32, Section 9, p. 90.

reassurance that the differential voting power of each delegate has been taken into consideration.¹⁰⁷ However, the fact that any obvious misrepresentation or distortion of this procedure may be challenged and appealed leaves this articulating function fairly well accepted by the delegate body.

A significant articulating function may also be the election of officers of the International. To the extent that views of candidates for office are known to the delegates and to the extent that these views differ from each other, the election may be an opportunity for expression of membership desires. This convention function serves primarily, however, to assure the accountability of the International body to the membership at large.

2. Accountability of Leadership

As stated earlier, the International executive body assumes the dual role of policy decision-makers and policy implementers. Policy decision-making is a shared responsibility with the delegate body. During the period of the convention, the executive body still maintains its leadership functions and may influence the direction of policy-making. However, once outside of the convention, the executive body assumes complete authority to implement the program outlined by the delegate body. The crux of the matter is that these leaders have assumed both the respon-

¹⁰⁷To approximate proportional representation without imposing a heavy financial burden upon the larger locals, the number of delegates is determined by a ratio system. Thereby, though limited in number, each delegate from these larger locals is assigned a weighted voting power. Thus, a delegate from the smaller local may have one vote while the delegate from the larger local may have any number or fraction beyond one depending upon the size of his local.

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sibility of influencing the decision-making process and the task of carrying out the program to its successful end. The convention establishes the subsequent convention date, as well as the site, but the interim between conventions is largely controlled by the executive board of the International. Except for the provisions allowing for appeal, the members of the executive board assume full authority as decision-makers and definers of the constitution. The resulting situation finds these leaders with rather wide discretionary privileges both as decision-makers and policy decision-implementers. This fact makes the accountability structure extremely important. Although the leadership role at the International level has been invested, apparently, with rather broad powers to carry out the organizational goals, the level of satisfaction of the membership with their performance may still be a matter of concern. The International leadership not only must exhibit a successful program but also must engage in continuing salesmanship with the membership at large. Though incumbency derives all the advantages of the control of available resources (such as communication channels, clerical help, etc.), some evidence that accountability is acknowledged in the U. A. W. can be seen in the attempt to "sell" the virtues of the administration. Assuming the desirability of the reward system, both tangible (material wealth) and intangible (prestige, influence, etc.) and with the achievement orientation of American culture, it is easy to see why there might be a strong inclination toward oligarchic rule. This fact makes the accountability structure of the convention a central focus of democratic process. The delegate to the convention individually reserves the right to cast his vote (in the name of his respective local) and by doing so signifies his approval or disapproval of the past behavior of the International officers. In other

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words, success or failure of union programs, as perceived by the delegate, is likely to be attributed not to the convention but to the instrumental figures in the International body. Thus, holding frequent conventions may have a counteracting effect to the oligarchic tendencies. Tighter control by a few is the inevitable result when conventions are postponed time and again. Explicit assurance given in the constitution that a convention is to be held at regular and specified intervals tends to maintain democratic control.

D. The Importance of the Role of the Delegate

The International union is basically an amalgamation of local unions. The establishment of this larger body, however, makes each local subordinate to it and subsequently much of the local's activities are controlled by this higher centralized authority. However, the general convention, composed of delegates from all the local organizations, remains, in principle, the supreme authority as well as the legislative body of the International. The International officers are delegates by virtue of the position they occupy. They are, in fact, responsible for implementing the constitutional provision which calls for the convention.

The central interest here, however, is the delegate from the local who attends the convention and takes part in the decision-making process in the name of his local. Up to this point, a case was made for the democratic function of the convention itself. Assuming that the delegates genuinely represented the interests of their respective locals, the argument was presented that their actions constituted basically the actions of the membership at large. In principle, the functions of the convention fulfill the criteria set forth for democracy earlier in the discussion.

These procedural guarantees all fall under the two general categories of articulating functions and accountability functions.

However, all this hinges on the assumption that the delegate truly represents the local. It has been suggested that the delegate is likely to be part of the core of leaders in the local and thereby among the influential members of the local. But the essential point to remember is that usually only a minority of the local members are concerned enough with union affairs to be part of the "active" group. Form and Dansereau offer some insight into this specific problem in their attempt to delineate the differential orientations of workers to union membership.¹⁰⁸ The authors found that three dominant life styles seem to underlie union orientations in addition to other, broader patterns of social integration. These were "a working class life style", whereby the union and the work place play a dominant role, an "individualistic life style," whereby community associations seem to be more vital, and "isolated life style," in which the family and perhaps the neighborhood play the dominant role in the social integration of the individual. (This analysis is consistent with the notion of "segmental participation" discussed above.) From the above, it follows that it would be the "core" of active and dedicated men who make the local union a "going concern." These "actives" make up the relatively small percentage that researchers in union government have referred to in their analysis of union participation. It is from this circle of active participants that local leadership is recruited

¹⁰⁸William H. Form and Harry K. Dansereau, Union Member Orientations and Patterns of Social Integration, Michigan State University: Labor and Industrial Relations Center, reprint series, 1957-58. Reprinted from Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (October 1957), pp. 3-12.

and, quite naturally, the delegates to the International convention are selected. In many cases, the delegates are selected from those already in some functional role in the local or who have served in such roles in the past. All this illustrates the crucial role that the delegate plays in local trade union government. The role of the delegate at the convention ideally guarantees the democratic process at the International level. But what of the delegate himself in the particular role that he plays? Once selected as a delegate to the convention, how does he define his role? Each delegate, emerging from a relatively small core of active members, carries to the convention a role orientation which may affect the process of delegate representation at the convention. In the language of role analysis, the delegate can be seen as a "focal position" in relation to the "counter positions" of the membership body and the International body.¹⁰⁹ The general membership looks to the delegate for representation in the International. Through the delegate they hope to have their desires expressed. In turn, the International officers look toward the delegates for support since it is through these people that their programs become union policy. The delegate thus finds himself in a marginal position and exposed to potentially conflicting role expectations. As noted earlier, structurally, the delegate may be viewed as the systemic link between the local and the International organization. He is a member of his local and, by the formal definition of his role, also a member of the International organization. In the performance of his role he is responsible for articulating one organization with the other.

¹⁰⁹ Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958.

Thus, he may carry with him to the convention various role orientations with differing implications for trade union democracy.

One variable dimension of delegate role orientation is the extent to which the delegate himself is committed to democratic values. As mentioned earlier, with the increasing size and complexity of trade union organization, the conflict is intensified between value placed upon direct participation by membership in the decision-making process and value placed upon efficiency of operation. Subjectively, these may not necessarily be incompatible positions. There seems to be no reason why one should not desire both democratic participation in decision-making and efficiency in organizational operation. However, objectively speaking, one facet of bureaucratic efficiency is unilateral decision-making to facilitate the implementation of organizational goals. Democratic processes, such as participation in decision-making by the membership at large, may become a hindrance to efficiency. For the delegate, then, this becomes a role conflict situation, with respect to issues where he must decide whether he values participation in decision-making or efficiency of operation. The former is regarded as a focal value for one with a democratic value orientation and the latter as a focal value for one with a bureaucratic value orientation. The conflict between these values may be particularly acute since both are centered around an interest in the well-being of the organization itself. The selection of either of these values may reflect a genuine concern for the membership. The delegate who values participation may be one who is concerned primarily with the rights of the membership and with the procedural aspects of democracy. The other type, who values efficiency, may be one concerned primarily with achieving certain job-related benefits for the membership.

This study is designed to ascertain the delegate's commitment to one or the other of these value positions.

Another dimension of role orientation, perhaps closely related to the first, is how the delegate relates himself to the local and the International inasmuch as he is a member of both of these bodies. Since, as stated earlier, the delegate's main function is to articulate one organization with the other, it is important to know where his primary identification or allegiance lies. For instance, does he see himself as primarily a member of the local or does he see himself as primarily a member of the larger and more authoritative body -- the International? In all probability there will be instances of conflicting expectations from local membership and International officers regarding the delegate's actions at the convention. His primary identification then becomes crucial in determining his attitude toward the legitimacy of these various expectations.

A third dimension of delegate role orientation is how he relates himself to his local constituents per se. Political scientists have differentiated three types of role performance for the representative in a republican form of government.¹¹⁰ These are the trustee, the delegate, and the politico. The trustee conceptualizes his role in two ways: that he is a free agent acting upon the basis of what he considers right and that he follows a rational approach based upon his assessment of the facts

¹¹⁰Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan and Leroy C. Ferguson. "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," Reprint from The American Political Science Review, 53 (September 1959), pp. 742-756.

in the particular case at issue. The delegate does not use independent judgment or convictions as criteria for decision-making. Rather, he prefers to consult his constituents and may consider consultation as mandatory. As a result of this consultation, he gets specific instructions which serve as the basis for decision-making. The politico is one who assumes a flexible orientation. He resolves the conflict of alternatives by being less dogmatic in his representational style. Depending on the situation, he might be a trustee type at one time and a delegate type at another time. Admittedly, the pure polar types may not exist. What is implied is that these role types may be a continuum along which the delegate may be placed. For the purpose of this study, two types will be distinguished: one who is more nearly a delegate-type and one who is more nearly a trustee-type. Along with the identification of these types, comparative attitudes toward rank and file expectations will be measured.

Another dimension of concern in this study is the delegate's perception of the convention and his role in the performance of convention functions. Of central interest is whether or not the delegate sees himself as actually a participant in the decision-making process. If he does consider himself an active participant in this important function, the next important question will be: does he regard the decisions made as important and inclusive enough to provide the policy framework within which the bureaucratic implementation structure can operate without necessarily usurping the policy-making function? The answer should provide some clues regarding the feasibility of democratic processes in a bureaucratic structure.

A final dimension of delegate role orientation to be considered is the function this role serves for the incumbent of the position. As dis-

cussed in an earlier section, the individuals filling this role are likely to have other functional roles in the local organization. They are part of the core of active members who keep the union vital as an organization. What is of concern here is the motivational factors that drive these people toward active union work. Two types are discerned in this particular area: those who perceive their work in the union as a "calling"; and those who perceive it as part of a "career" leading toward more rewarding and perhaps more prestigious positions in the organizational hierarchy.¹¹¹ The latter type may be defined as mobility oriented. Once it is ascertained that the individual is mobility oriented, the problem will be to discover the primary mobility channel he seeks in order to achieve his goal. In this respect it is important to note whether he seeks to rise in the union hierarchy through elective channels or through appointive channels. For the delegate who is mobility oriented, the accountability pattern may be determined by the primary channel through which he seeks vertical mobility. If he seeks mobility in terms of the elective channels, one can predict that he will be concerned with accounting his actions to the local membership, be concerned with communication in the local and owe allegiance mainly to the local. On the other hand, for one who seeks mobility in terms of the appointive channels, these concerns would seem to be directed to the International executive body. The substance of this is that given a mobility orientation, the channel through which mobility is sought may affect attitudes regarding the legitimacy of expectations from the local membership and from the International officers

¹¹¹ These character types are taken from Lipset. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, op.cit., pp. 383-389.

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In order to account for the different types of delegate role orientation, certain social and personal background factors will be treated as independent variables. In this respect the following general proposition may be posed:

VARIOUS SOCIAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS ARE RELATED TO DIFFERENCES IN DELEGATE ROLE ORIENTATION.

It is to be remembered that, while this corps of local leaders have one thing in common, they are the "actives" of their union, they may represent a wide range of social and personal characteristics. It is assumed that these differences will be associated with differences in delegate role orientation.

Delegate role orientation may also be treated as an independent variable. As already suggested, the issue of democracy vs. bureaucracy is concretely a matter of procedure in the allocation of power and the resolving of conflicts. Commitment to either of these values is not necessarily outside the major sphere of value orientations of American society.¹¹² However, since in many instances they may be mutually exclusive, one must hold primacy over the other as a belief system. It is anticipated that the pattern of variation along the different dimensions of delegate role orientation will show two clusters: one related to democratic values and the other to bureaucratic values. The following general proposition is a major concern of this study:

DELEGATE ROLE ORIENTATIONS ARE A DETERMINANT OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES MAY OPERATE IN TRADE UNIONS.

¹¹²Williams lists both efficiency and practicality and democracy as part of the total major value orientations in American society. Robin Williams, Jr., chapter 11, op.cit.

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These propositions will be examined in detail in subsequent chapters in terms of specific hypotheses.

II. Procedural Concerns

Introduction: Prior to conducting the present study, the writer was an observer at the 1959 U. A. W. constitutional convention.¹¹³ This witnessing of the convention in action, supplemented by background readings in unionism, provided valuable insight into the development of the problem for this study. The following discussion is concerned with the research procedures used in the investigation of this problem.

A. Initiation of the Study

The research problem, democracy in unionism, seems a timely one in view of the current "concern" in the business, political, and public arena with internal union affairs and with the relations of unions with other institutions in society. Further, since there have been many studies of trade union government at the local level but few studies at the International level, and since there has been no thorough investigation of the relationship between the locals and the International, it was thought that such an investigation would be a contribution to knowledge in the problem area of reconciling democratic processes with large-scale bureaucratic voluntary organizations.

¹¹³The writer accompanied Professors Stieber, Form and Faunce to the 17th Constitutional Convention of the U. A. W. held in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in October 1959. In addition to helping administer a questionnaire to the delegates seated at the convention, the writer was allowed to mix with the delegates and officials of the convention. By this approach perhaps a more sensitive feeling was derived in regard to the "spirit" of the convention.

Since a study of role orientation of delegates (or even a sample of delegates) from the entire U. A. W. was not feasible, a case study was chosen as the more practical means toward arriving at some knowledge about these "actives." It was decided, on the basis of their accessibility and the fact that a wide range of types of locals would be included, to limit the study to all delegates to the 17th U. A. W. Constitutional Convention from locals in Lansing and Flint, Michigan.¹¹⁴

One methodological problem was the strategy of approach in gaining access to an organization whose life history in relation to management has made its membership generally suspicious of all "outsiders" who come to "investigate" the inner life of the organization. However, in this particular case, the problem of accessibility was minimized by the fact that staff members of the Labor and Industrial Relations Center at Michigan State University had established previous research relationships with this union.¹¹⁵ The director of the Center asked for and received the support of the regional director of the U. A. W. under whose territory were included both the Lansing and Flint locals. The regional director, in turn, requested the support of the locals concerned. The important thing to note here is that the regional director solicited

¹¹⁴See Appendix B for listing of locals from both cities.

¹¹⁵Two immediately notable ones are by Harry Kirk Dansereau, "Orientations Toward Unionism: An Attitudinal Study of a Local Union," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1956 and William A. Faunce, "Automation in the Automobile Industry: Some Consequences for In-Plant and Union Management Relationships," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Sociology, Wayne State University, 1957.

the support of the member locals.¹¹⁶ No directives were channeled to these locals for support of the study. Each member local independently (through the local officials) made the decision to cooperate with the project. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the appeal made by the regional director had a definite positive affect upon the locals' attitude toward the proposed study. Following this formal exchange, the local officials were contacted and the project explained in detail. A different strategy of approach was used with various locals. For instance, though in many cases the local president's support was solicited, in other cases, the financial secretary was the key functionary whose support was called for. Also, in other cases, the Shop Committee Chairman was the key functionary whose support was necessary. Again, in one relatively small local, the clerk in the local office was the instrumental figure to whom support for cooperation was directed.

B. The Interview Schedule

The interview schedule for the study consisted of eight parts.¹¹⁷ The first part was a series of questions dealing with the political "climate" of the local. In this section were included specific questions on election methods, party systems or opposition groups, activities of opposing groups, and whether or not such groups had a "tie-in" with other groups in the International union and/or other locals. In addition, membership orientation to union politics was probed. Here, questions dealing with relative concern of membership with local politics, the degree of contest in elections,

¹¹⁶See Appendix C.

¹¹⁷See Appendix H for complete interview schedule.

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and the level of participation in elections were asked. In addition, some impressions about the membership's attitude toward the convention were sought.

The next section of the schedule was directed toward the delegate's own experience at the convention. Here information was sought on the delegate's opinions about the reasons for having conventions, the things that affected his decision-making, his attitude on the importance of various issues, and the level of his participation at the convention. The third section tried to elicit some indication of identification on the part of the delegate. Specifically, questions were directed toward his responses to cross pressures that come from the International and the local. In addition, various measures of his role orientation as a delegate were obtained in this section.

In the fourth section, questions were directed at getting information on the events that took place after the delegate reported back to his local. Specifically, this section dealt with the accountability aspect of the delegate's role behavior.

The fifth section sought to derive some information about the delegate's experience in the labor movement and the degree to which he had committed himself as an active union member. Positions held in the present and in the past, reasons for being active in the union, reasons for running for delegate, and his attitude about achieving and maintaining union positions were among the questions asked.

The sixth section sought the delegate's opinion of the U. A. W. as an operating organization. The delegate was asked to make statements comparing his union with others and his local with other locals in regard

to questions of efficiency and democratic practices. The delegate was also asked to define the concept democracy. In addition, he was asked to compare his union today with what it was (impressionistically if not through firsthand experience) twenty years ago in terms of efficiency and democratic practices.

The seventh section sought to measure the delegate's general orientation toward the values of bureaucratic efficiency of operation and democratic participation in decision-making.

The final section of the interview schedule was used to gather personal data about the delegate including age, schooling, sex, race, household income, job classification, degree of satisfaction on the job, his place of residence, and his social class identification. In addition, some measure of his social integration within the union organization as well as with the wider community was sought.

The interview schedule was pre-tested and subsequently slightly modified by the addition of some alternative response categories to some of the items in the schedule. In one case, a response category was eliminated. Primarily to expedite the field work phase of the project, the pre-testing was conducted with delegates included in the final sample. Ten delegates from the Lansing locals were interviewed before the final form of the schedule was completed. No major modification of the schedule appeared to be required, however, so it was not deemed necessary to re-interview these ten delegates.

C. The Interview

Two approaches to scheduling the interviewing of the delegates were used. One approach was that names, addresses and phone numbers of

the delegates were supplied by the local office but the appointments were made individually by the interviewer. The second approach called for the local office to schedule the interviews by arranging to have its delegates appear at the local hall at a specified time with a team of interviewers prepared to meet them. There did not appear to be any appreciable difference in response to the interviewing situation associated with whether or not the interview appointment was made by the local. Interviews scheduled through both approaches were conducted for the most part at the local halls. Those on the day-shift usually were interviewed immediately after work let out and those who worked on the afternoon-shift usually were interviewed sometime before they left for work. A few were interviewed during the early evening hours at their homes.

The interview time ranged from an hour to three hours and a half. The longer interviews were usually those done at the respondent's homes while the shorter interviews were usually cases where the respondents had just been let out of the plant. However, longer interviews do not necessarily mean better quality interviews. In many cases, the extended sessions were the result of too much "free information" given without solicitation. How to channelize an enthusiastic informant back to the relevant problem area without breaking rapport is a methodological task not usually explained in textbooks. The length of the typical interview session was somewhere around two hours.

Delegates from both the Lansing and Flint locals numbered a hundred and thirteen. Interviews were completed with a hundred and eight delegates. The five remaining cases were left uninterviewed for the following reasons. One small Lansing local which was entitled to one delegate at the convention *did* not send any. One delegate from a Flint local had moved out of the

state and a second delegate from another Flint local had passed away sometime during the period between the convention and the initiation of the study. The two remaining cases could not be contacted either by phone or in person.

The interviewing began during the Winter of 1961 and was completed during the following Spring. The actual field work took approximately three months. The relatively short period in which the interviews were completed limits the possibility that changed conditions during the study may have affected the attitudes of the delegates.

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CHAPTER III

THE INTERNAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION

Introduction: We have recognized so far that labor organizations are in some respects no less bureaucratic than corporations and governmental agencies. A formal organization chart showing the structural arrangements by which the individual relates himself to others in the total organization of the U. A. W. would look much like that of other large scale bureaucracies. Such a chart, however, would reflect primarily the structure through which policies are implemented. The focus of this study is upon the policy-making process. This chapter is concerned with internal mechanisms within the U. A. W. relating to this process. In this respect, the concern here is not with the relationship between the constituent and autonomous units of the organization but rather with the articulating structure of the union through which the membership relates itself to the total organization.

A. Leadership Selection Process -- General Qualifications

The constitution of the U. A. W. Internationale establishes the various elective offices of the International union and also the executive board members of the local union. On both levels no member may be nominated or elected into office unless he has been a member "in continuous good standing" for a period of one year. This provision is a little more specific at the local level in that it spells out that this good standing *must* be one year "immediately prior to the nomination, except in the case

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of a newly organized Local Union."¹¹⁸ "Good standing" is perhaps not too clearly defined but may be abstracted from the various membership requirements. Article 5 of the constitution proclaims the jurisdiction of the U. A. W. over "all employees of plants and shops engaged in the manufacture of parts (including tools, dies, etc.), and the assembly of these parts into farm, automobile, automotive propelled products, aircraft and agricultural implements, including employees engaged in office work, sales, distribution and maintenance thereof and such other branches of industry . . ."¹¹⁹ Section 2 of Article 6 states that anyone so eligible (as defined in Article 5) may apply to the local union having jurisdiction over the local plant for membership into the organization providing he is not affiliated with any organization whose principles and philosophy are contrary to those of the International union as outlined in the preamble to the constitution. At the time of application the individual must be an actual worker in or around the plant.

In the formal statement of application, the prospective member signs a promise to abide by all laws, rules and regulations and the constitution of the International union. Within sixty days of the receipt of application the local union must give due consideration and act upon the request for membership. Any application for membership rejected by the local union cannot be reconsidered until a lapse of 30 days.¹²⁰ Upon acceptance

¹¹⁸Constitution (1959) Article 38, Section 4, p. 105.

¹¹⁹Ibid., Article 5, page 7. Hereon, all reference to the constitution, unless otherwise stated will have specific reference to the U. A. W. International Constitution, adopted October 1959, at Atlantic City, New Jersey.

¹²⁰Ibid., Article 6, Section 5, page 8.

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of the application, membership begins from the first day of the month for which dues are paid. Unless waived by the local union, the candidate must present himself for initiation within 4 weeks after he has been notified of his acceptance into the union. Failing to do so without "good and sufficient reason being given" subjects one to forfeiture of all money paid by him and by this also the cancellation of membership is assumed.

The constitution explicitly defines the dividing line between managerial functions and union concerns. Any head of a department directing company policy or reserving the authority to hire and discharge workers will not be accepted into the union. In the same light, any one promoted to such positions will be issued a withdrawal card. However, Section 11, of Article 6 clearly states that where one is promoted to a minor position but does not reserve the power to hire and discharge, membership in the local union may be retained.

A series of provisions in Article 10 of the constitution prohibits one from holding any elective or appointive positions if he is a member of any organization declared illegal by the U. S. or Canadian governments (Section 7) and if he is a member of or subservient to any political organization which owes allegiance to any government other than the U. S. A. or Canada. In this case the communist, fascist, and nazi groups are listed as cases in point. (Section 9) Finally, Section 13 disqualifies one's eligibility for office if he is found actively supporting the cause of another union in its attempt to supplant the U. A. W. as the recognized collective bargaining agent.

Any violation of Sections 7, 8, or 9 subjects the member to a penalty which may also include his expulsion from the union. If a member in office is found to have violated the provision in Section 13, the Inter-

national president or the International executive board may summarily suspend the accused party from office or if the party is seeking such office or position, suspend his rights to do so. The suspended party maintains the right to appeal all such acts which may lead directly up to the International Convention or the Public Review Board.

Finally, Article 9 stipulates that all officers -- International officers, International Board members, International Representatives and Local Union officers -- upon the date of taking office, must participate in election for civil office in the area in which they legally reside if they are qualified to do so. With certain qualifications, violation of this provision subjects the person or persons charged to disciplinary action.

1. Election of International Officers

The constitution enumerates the elective offices of the International union to be: 1) an International President, 2) an International Secretary-Treasurer, and 3) four International Vice-Presidents. Regional Directors are nominated and elected from the various geographic regions as established by the International Constitution. These Regional Directors serve on the International Executive Board. The constitution also provides that the International president, the International secretary-treasurer, and the International vice-presidents are to be included as members of the International Executive Board with voice and vote.¹²¹

The term of office for all these elective positions runs for the period immediately upon installation to the following convention when new elections are held. Nominations and elections are part of the regular order

¹²¹Ibid., Article 12, Section 4, p. 34.

of business of the convention. Candidates are elected to the various offices by majority vote of the convention.

a) Duties of the International President

The International president is primarily responsible for the union's affairs in between conventions and between the regular meetings of the International Executive Board. All his activities are therefore reported to these two bodies. Though he is accountable to the Executive Board and to the general membership through the convention there is no denying that the actual power and influence exercised by the president is determined to a large extent by his personal will and ability as well as the formal authority granted to the office. The personal factor combines with the prestige of office to influence the course of action on many issues faced by the International. Since the dividing line between personal qualities and actions and the union's behavior is rather vague, the President's behavior vitally affects public opinion in regard to the unionism. The general duties of the president are described in Article 13 of the constitution. Among the duties defined are: . . . execute the instructions of the International Executive Board and have full authority to direct the working of this organization within the provisions of this Constitution and shall report his acts to the regular quarterly meeting of the International Executive Board. . . . assign any elected officer to represent or direct the workings of this International Union. . . . withdraw any field assignment made to any elected officer when he becomes convinced that the officer has been derelict in his duty or been guilty of a dishonest act. . . . appoint such Representatives as he may deem necessary from time to time, such appointments to be pending the approval of the International Executive Board. . . . hire such legal, technical or

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professional help as is necessary to efficiently operate such departments of this International Union, except in the department of the International Secretary-Treasurer. . . . fill by appointment all vacancies occurring in the International Office Staff, except in the department of the International Secretary-Treasurer as otherwise provided for in this Constitution. . . . decide disputes or questions in controversy, including all questions involving interpretation of this Constitution. . . . to call special meetings of Councils or Local Unions whenever he deems such meetings necessary to protect the interests of its membership, after proper notification or consultation with officers of subordinate bodies involved. . . . be a delegate to all Conventions of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. . . . convene regular and special sessions of the International Executive Board, whenever necessary. . . . to grant to Local Unions or Units dispensations relating to initiation fees, per capita tax and/or Strike Insurance Fund dues, to the International Union with the approval of the International Executive Board, when in his judgment such dispensations will add to the growth of or conserve the interests of this International Union. . . . devote all his time to the affairs of this International Union, executing the instructions of the International Executive Board and exercising general supervision over all departments of this International Union." In addition, the constitution explicitly demands that during his term of office the president must "establish his residence in the metropolitan area of the city where the headquarters of this International Union is established."¹²²

¹²²Ibid., p. 40.

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In spite of all the authority invested in the office of president, most of the important decisions are subject to approval by the International Executive Board. The International Executive Board thereby provides the direct check on the president's actions in the administration of union affairs.

b) Duties of the International Executive Board

The International constitution describes the duties of the International Executive Board in the following manner: ". . . shall execute the instructions of the International Convention and shall by the highest authority of the International Union between Conventions, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, and shall have the power to authorize strikes, issue charters, and punish all subordinate bodies for violation of this Constitution."¹²³

The International Executive Board has the power to resolve disputes within a subordinate body (local union) that threatens the existence of that body. It has the power under such circumstances to order a special election of officers in that subordinate body. In the same respect, the Board has the responsibility and authority to revoke the charter of a subordinate body. It has the authority to assume direct charge of the local by suspending all officers and officials of the local union where it believes that it is necessary. Such actions usually occur for inefficiency or nonperformance of duties. The Board also has the power to "repeal any By-Laws of any subordinate body, which do not conform to this Constitution. . . . furnish all charters and initial supplies necessary to operate the subordinate bodies of the International Union. . . . review and decide,

¹²³Ibid., Article 12, Section 1, p. 32ff.

between Conventions, all questions involving interpretation of this Constitution when any member or subordinate body wishes to appeal, or the Board on its own initiative wishes to consider, the decision on any such question made . . . by the International President." The Board also serves as a appellate body on matters referred to it by individual members as well as the subordinate body. In such matters, the Board appoints a three man committee to consider the appeal and make recommendations. The committee is composed of the International Executive Board members but disallows membership to the Regional Director from whose region the appeal originates. Any member or a subordinate body may appeal the decision of the Board to either the Constitutional Convention of the International Union or to the Public Review Board.

In the large context, the Board has the power to adjust disputes between employers and employees and to make contracts with employers. It also may institute such changes as may be deemed necessary such as creating new departments for the promotion of union affairs and the welfare of its members. If the Board approves a strike, it assumes the responsibility of rendering financial aid to the members.

2. The International Board of Trustees

Perhaps a more or less intermediary function is that performed by the members of the International Board of Trustees.¹²⁴ The Board of Trustees is comprised of three members and is specifically charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the funds and property of the International Union. In this respect the board reserves the right to retain or designate a certified public accountant to audit the books and accounts

¹²⁴Ibid., Article 51, pp. 123-124.

of the International Secretary-Treasurer on a semi-annual basis. In this capacity, the board reports to the International Executive Board as well as to the International Convention. In the same capacity, the board makes recommendations to the International Executive Board and the International Convention whenever it seems necessary.

Clearly the role of the Board of Trustees is that of watchdog over one of the most vulnerable positions for corrupt practices. The Board's power to cause audit is relatively independent of the Executive Board, and thereby minimizes possible charges of collusion.

Members of the Board of Trustees, except for the initiating period, are not elected together for the same period of office. At the initial election, three candidates for trusteeship were nominated and elected. Three separate elections were held -- a three-term trusteeship, a two-term trusteeship and a one-term trusteeship. Thereafter, at each convention, a trustee is elected for a three-term period. This method gives some assurance that stability of the Board would be perpetuated for working efficiency given the possible maximum turnover of one board member at each election period.

A maximum time limit of 30 days for any six months period is set for the Board to devote time to the duties involved. During this period, the Trustees are compensated on the basis equal to the maximum salary of the International Representatives plus necessary expenses.

Another condition clearly setting the position of the members of the Board of Trustees is that no one, during his term of office, may be employed by the International union in any capacity. One becomes eligible for employment by the International union only subsequent to an International Convention which follows his resignation from the Board of Trustees.

At least on the surface this prevents any direct collusive practices between the two parties.

In general the International President is responsible to the International Executive Board for the administration of the Union "between International Executive Board meetings."¹²⁵ On important measures, the International President consults the International Executive Officers and his actions are subject to approval or rejection by the International Executive Board. Between conventions, the highest authority of the International union is the Executive Board. This Board holds regular quarterly meetings and various special meetings that may be required. In turn, the highest tribunal is the International Convention which is composed of delegates elected by the various constituent local unions. It is important to note here that the International officers and International representatives of the International union have a voice but no vote in the convention "unless they are duly accredited delegates from Local Unions."¹²⁶

B. Government of the Union -- The Convention

The typical union convention, though a meeting of the representatives of the various locals, is still regarded as if it were a general meeting of all the membership of the International union. Evidence of this is seen in the assignment of various number of votes to each delegate proportionate to the size of the local that he represents. Thus, even though there may be disproportionate representation in terms of number of delegates

¹²⁵Ibid., Article 7, Section 1, p. 12.

¹²⁶Ibid., Article 8, Section 13, p. 19.

sent by locals (as designated by the International body) the number of votes that each delegate is allotted purports to equate representation. Though in many cases delegates are instructed or "told" how to vote on certain issues by their local constituencies, the U. A. W. constitution provides that these are not binding on the delegate "on any issue he may vote at the Convention."¹²⁷

The convention is the meeting place where all affiliated subordinate bodies participate as one. Thus it is the most formal and most authoritative meeting and the document (constitution) formulated there is defined as the legal code for all members. Although this codification of the "rules of the game" and the adherence to these rules appear to be the prime motive for the congress of delegates, an analysis of the formal and informal relationships reveals latent as well as the manifest functions. Both of these types of functions have import in the maintenance of a democratic organization.

1. Selection of Delegates to the International Convention

Delegates to the International Convention are elected by secret ballot in the local union of which they are legally constituted members. In no case is one appointed to delegateship. In the case of unopposed candidacy, the candidate is considered elected without the need for election procedure.¹²⁸ The process of selecting delegates begins with the issuance of the Convention Call by the International Secretary-Treasurer. Each local then issues a call for nomination of delegates to the convention. An election committee, a body elected by the membership at large, of each local, assumes the responsibility of conducting and insuring a "fair elec-

¹²⁷Ibid., Article 8, Section 23, p. 22.

¹²⁸Ibid., Article 8, Section 23, p. 22.

tion." There is no provision in the U. A. W. Constitution prohibiting local presidents and other local officers from being chosen as delegates. Apparently, in many cases, especially in the larger locals where local officers are accompanied by other members elected as delegates by the membership, the local officers act as spokesmen for the delegation.

The U. A. W. Constitution does not provide for compensation of delegates for attendance at the Convention. The International does not reimburse the delegates for expenses incurred while attending the convention. For this particular union, the locals assume the burden of such expenses. For example, one local provides for "twenty-five dollars (\$25.00) per day, plus twenty-five dollars (\$25.00) expenses, plus eight cents (\$.08) per mile by the shortest route to and from his or her destination and shall not be paid time equal to his or her earning capacity.¹²⁹

Each local union is entitled to one delegate at the convention for the first two hundred or less members and an additional delegate for the next three hundred members or a major fraction of this number. For the larger locals, an additional delegate is allowed for each additional eight hundred members or a major fraction of this number. This allotment applies to all locals except the amalgamated locals which are allowed special dispensation in the selection of delegates due to their unique situation.¹³⁰

Each local is entitled to one vote for the first one hundred members or less and one additional vote for each additional one hundred members or

¹²⁹Constitution and By-Laws of Chevrolet Local Union No. 659, Article XX, Section 5, (June 1960), p. 31.

¹³⁰Constitution (1959) op.cit., Article 8, Sections 5 & 6, pp. 16-17. Subsequent discussion on delegate representation is based on provisions in Article 8 of the Constitution.

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a major fraction of this number. However, no delegate is entitled to carry more than eight votes and all votes must be equally apportioned among all the elected delegates of the local. This provision forces especially the larger locals to send at least a set minimum number of delegates. Since the constitution guarantees independent action on the part of the delegates, equal apportionment of votes in principle eliminates any unfair advantage on the part of any one or more delegates. In order to be entitled to representation at the convention the local must have been affiliated with the International Union for at least three months prior to the convention date.

No member of a local is eligible to serve as a delegate unless he has been in continuous good standing in the International Union for twelve months immediately preceding the first day of the month in which the convention is to be held. He must also have been a member of the local that he wished to represent for at least three months preceding the first day of the month in which the convention is to be held. To be an eligible member for the delegateship one must have paid his dues or else secured "out-of-work" receipts as specified in the constitution.

Aside from the "good standing" rule, there appears to be no limitation on the number of times one may run for delegate. Past convention proceedings reveal a fairly large turnover for each new convention yet a noticeable number of delegates have been re-elected for a series of these conventions.

2. Call to Convention

The constitution as adopted includes a provision assigning a date for the following constitutional convention. Unless otherwise amended in later conventions, the provisions made in the 1959 constitutional convention specifies that all subsequent regular constitutional conventions are to be

held biennially during the month of April.¹³¹ Due to the fairly large amount of business that has to be handled, the constitution also spells out the order in which business is to proceed at the convention. This order is subject to modification by the convention if it is deemed necessary.

Special conventions¹³² of the International union may be called by the International President under the following conditions: 1) when instructed to do so by the International Executive Board upon a two-third majority vote. In the event that the President fails to call such a meeting, another board member so designated by the International Executive Board may call the meeting; 2) by a referendum vote of the membership initiated by a written request of at least fifteen locals among at least five different states with such locals comprising not less than 20 percent of the total membership of the International union. Such special conventions will be served by the same delegates who attended the previous regular constitutional convention with each local represented by the same number of votes it carried to the regular convention. In addition, the locals demanding the convention must state the reason(s) for desiring such a convention and include the place and date for the convention. These locals must also spell out the date for mailing out and returning of ballots. The International union then assumes the responsibility to transmit such proposals to the local unions for a referendum vote. At the same time reasons for and against such a convention are published and forwarded to all locals. The constitution makes it mandatory that all locals hold a secret vote on the issue involved.

¹³¹Constitution (1959), Article 8, Section 1, p.13.

¹³²Article 8, Section 4, p. 14.

Not less than sixty days prior to the convening of the convention (regular or special) the International Secretary-Treasurer issues a Call to the Convention and furnishes all local unions with credential and alternate credential forms to identify the respective delegates. The original of these forms are retained by the delegates and the duplicates are sent to the International Secretary-Treasurer who in turn will certify the incoming delegates by checking their original forms against the record. To avoid later confusion a deadline of twenty-one days prior to the convention is set after which no credentials are accepted.¹³³

Three weeks prior to the date set for the convening of the convention copies of all resolutions, grievances and constitutional amendments for possible consideration by the convention must be submitted to the International Secretary-Treasurer for processing, sorting and distribution to the various and appropriate committees. Protests concerning delegate elections must be received by the International Secretary-Treasurer by one of two dates, whichever occurs first: 1) within seven days following the local delegate election, or, 2) not less than ten days prior to the convening of the convention. These protests are then properly referred to the Credentials Committee for examination and recommendation for proper action.

3. Selection of Committees

The constitution of the International union¹³⁴ places upon the International Executive Board the responsibility of selecting from the

¹³³Article 8, Section 10, p. 18.

¹³⁴Article 8, Sections 15-19, pp. 20-21.

elected delegates a Constitution committee, a credentials committee, a resolutions committee, and the various other committees as may be deemed necessary for the successful promotion and efficient execution of the convention.¹³⁵ All convention committees are to be composed of odd number of members with a maximum number set at eleven.

a) Constitution Committee

The duty of this committee is to take up all recommendations concerning changes or additions to the constitution. In addition, this committee has the authority to originate proposals regarding amendments to the constitution. Recommendations made by the committee are introduced at the convention floor for question and discussion and subsequently put to a vote for adoption. For proper preparation and consideration of all recommendation for changes and additions to the constitution submitted to the International union, the committee is required to assemble at least two weeks prior to the meeting of the convention.

b) Credentials Committee

This committee meets ten days prior to the convening of the convention and during this period examines all credentials submitted to the International office in regard to the standing of the delegate as well as the standing of the local union he represents. If for some reason the committee decides that an election in a local union had been improperly conducted and therefore the delegate elected had no right to be seated at the convention, it may, with the joint approval of the International President, order a rerun of the delegate election in the particular local union prior to the

¹³⁵Other committees listed in the Proceedings of the 17th Constitutional Convention, UAW are: Grievance Committee, Competitive Shop Committee, Education Committee, Officers Reports Committee, Rules Committee, and Union Label Committee. (See pp. 65, 66, 67)

convening of the convention. This rerun is then supervised by a sub-committee of the credentials committee. Under such circumstances all time limitations for reporting to the convention are waived. If subsequently the convention reverses the credentials committee's judgment and approves the initial election results, the delegates elected in the initial election will be seated at the convention and the International union assumes all financial responsibility for the local union in the rerunning of the election.

c) The Resolutions Committee

This committee must be comprised of at least seven members and, like the credentials committee, must meet ten days prior to the convening of the convention. The primary responsibility of this committee is to consider all the resolutions that have been properly submitted to the International union. In addition, this committee has the authority to originate resolutions to be presented to the convention.

C. Impressions of the Convention Proceedings

Certain traditional ritualistic ceremonies mark the opening day. While the delegates slowly stream into the convention hall a band plays a spirited tune. At regular intervals, an organist takes the turn at filling the hall with music. Table placards identifying the locals are placed on the numerous tables set before the stage where the officers, speakers, and distinguished guests are to be seated. From the outset it becomes fairly obvious that the convention is more than a meeting of a legislative body. Intermixed with all the serious business of the convention, which lasts a week, is a series of social events, formal and informal that serve primarily other than a legislative function. These "actives" converging from various sections of the country (including Canada) have the initial problem

of trying to get acquainted with "brothers" that they've never met; old friendships are renewed and notes are compared on the relative state of progress of other locals. As one delegate remarked, one purpose of the convention is "to see what the other locals are getting." Long sessions are spent in the various bars surrounding the convention area, in hotel lobbies, restaurants, and on the convention floor itself in various corners of the hall.

The opening of the convention is marked by an air of solemnity. Invocation is given by a representative from one of the religious denominations and the national anthems of the United States and Canada are sung by those assembled. After a brief opening address by the temporary chairman, the U. A. W. International President is introduced. The International President then makes his report to the convention. This address often has as much content symbolic of group solidarity as anything substantive. In this "opening address" the president is likely to acknowledge the greetings of the delegates present, welcome the "distinguished" visitors, express gratification at the work done by all those responsible for arranging the convention before turning to the more serious business confronting the convention. He will probably not only review the state of progress of the union in terms of its bargaining goals but elaborate on the broader economic and political issues of the day and discuss the place of the union in this broad setting and the strategic role that it plays. He may often appeal for further cooperative efforts on the part of the delegates and outline in general fashion the serious work ahead for the union appealing to all "to work together," "... march together," "...build together," "...fight together."¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Proceedings, 16th Constitutional Convention, U. A. W., April 1957, concluding remarks of the presidential report, pp. 9-21.

With the convention thus formally opened, the rather prolonged sessions begin with the serious work that is supposed to be accomplished within the relatively few days allocated for the convention. The credentials committee first presents its "partial report" followed by a motion for its adoption. Other committee reports and recommendations follow in the same suit. In many cases, lively discussions take place before the motions to adopt the reports and/or recommendations are considered.

The election of International officers of the U. A. W. has in recent years been conspicuously lacking in any form of organized opposition to the incumbents. This fact may explain the relative lack of a heated political atmosphere during the election period. The presiding officer, who temporarily assumes the chair relinquished by the International officer during this period, calls for the nomination of the International officers beginning with the office of the president. Inevitably a delegate requests recognition and begins to extol the virtues of the incumbent beginning with his early career in the labor movement. Finally he sums up his eulogy with a concluding statement like the following:

For all these reasons, and for many more, we in the West Side Local are proud of our brother member, Walter Reuther. We glory in the enormous contribution which he has made to the welfare of our brother members, the people of the nation, and the world. We proudly offer in nomination for re-election as president of what we believe to be the world's finest organization of working men and women, Local 174's and the UAW's favorite son -- Walter Reuther. (Proceedings of the 17th Constitutional Convention, UAW, p. 352)

After a tumultuous ovation, the chairman finally restores enough order to recognize any further nomination. Individual nominations are made but in recent conventions these people have regularly declined the nomination.

In turn the incumbent president is asked whether he accepts or declines the nomination. He accepts the nomination and subsequently is unanimously elected to office.

Elections for other offices in the International union follow in the same general manner with those in office accepting the nominations and others declining in favor of these people. While there may be disillusionment among some delegates, the overall reaction has seemed to indicate a general satisfaction with the chosen leadership. Among the advantages of incumbency is a halo effect upon these people when the record of achievement of the union is considered. Generally, faith in the present administration of the U. A. W. appears to be sufficiently strong and widespread that a coalition of dissidents into an effective opposition party is unlikely.

D. Delegate Feelings About the Convention

Data obtained from a questionnaire administered to all delegates attending the 1959 U. A. W. Convention as a part of the earlier study referred to above helped the writer develop a profile of delegate attitudes toward the convention. From this profile, subsequently, was developed the idea of setting up the possible types of role orientation which is the central focus of this study. A review of some findings from this earlier study seems warranted.

The overwhelming majority of the delegates (about 91 percent) felt that the convention was very important in determining U. A. W. policies. Another 7 percent felt that the convention was somewhat important in determining such policies while less than 2 percent felt that the convention was not important at all. In addition, the delegates were asked what,

in their opinion, were the three most important purposes for the convention. Table 1 lists these purposes in order of importance in addition to an overall frequency score. The orders of importance for each response category were collapsed into a summated score and a percentage figure was computed for each response category based upon the total of the summated score.¹³⁷ Here we note an interesting response pattern. About 24 percent of the delegates believed that the most important purpose of the convention was to have some assurance that the "views of the local unions are represented in making U. A. W. policies." Related to this idea, better than 19 percent felt that the important purpose was to determine policies "to be carried out by U. A. W. officers and the International Executive Board." In addition, better than 11 percent believed the purpose was "to elect the International officers and regional directors." In all better than 54 percent of the responses related to some phase of the decision-making function as the purpose of the convention. It appears quite clear that these delegates regard themselves as the policy-making body. Fairly high on the response category is the delegates' feeling that they form the communication channel for the general membership. Approximately 16 percent felt that the important purpose was to have assurance "that members back home are informed about UAW policies." In addition, there was a feeling of group identity among the delegates vis-a-vis "others." About 22 percent expressed a feature of group cohesiveness as the important purpose for having a convention. This feeling was evenly

¹³⁷No differential weighting system was applied to these responses in terms of their order. This eliminates the problem of how much to weigh each alternative ranking. No justification can be given for this approach except that the writer feels that three (purposes) should have been asked for without any ordering necessary since there is no adequate way of measuring the relative values of each order with every respondent.

Table 1 Important purposes of the convention as enumerated by the delegates

Purposes	Order of Importance			Summated Score	Percentage
	1 (Frequency)	2	3		
To make sure that members back home are informed about UAW policies	366	210	297	873	16.04
To increase the feeling of union solidarity. .	200	220	181	601	11.04
To show the public that the rank and file approved the policies made by the officers and International Executive Board	166	219	233	618	11.36
To make sure that views of local unions are represented in making UAW policies	548	489	262	1299	23.87
To determine policies to be carried out by UAW officers and the International Executive Board .	354	430	273	1057	19.42
To elect the International officers and regional directors	80	141	403	624	11.47
Not classified or no response	100	105	165	370	6.80
Total	1814	1814	1814	5442	100.00

split between those who believed that the main purpose was to increase group solidarity and those who felt it was "to show the public that the rank and file approved the policies made by the officers and International Executive Board."

Finally, the majority of the delegates considered labor-management

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1. *Journal of Management Studies*, 1996, 33, 1, 1-14.

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problems and internal union problems as the main issues facing their union. The delegates were asked what, in their opinion, are the three most important issues facing the U. A. W. The following is a composite view of their responses.

Table 2 The three most important issues facing the U. A. W. as perceived by the convention delegates

Issues	Order of Importance			Summated Score	Percentage
	1	2	3		
	(Frequency)				
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Shop and Collective					
Bargaining	415	526	418	1359	29.52
Internal U. A. W.	526	440	379	1345	29.22
Broader issues for Trade					
Union Movement	187	161	118	466	10.12
Broader Political and					
Economic issues	461	350	338	1149	24.96
Unclassified	75	86	123	284	6.17
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Subtotal1664	1563	1376	4603	99.99
No Response Given	150	251	438	839	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	
Total1814	1814	1814	5442	

Again, the order of importance in each response category were summated and percentage figures were computed based upon the total of these summated scores less the summated score for no response. Better than 58 percent of the responses were concerned about issues involving shop and collective bargaining and internal union problems. It is fairly understandable that labor-management problems would be of serious concern to the delegates since these are problems most consistently brought to the attention of the membership by the leadership at the International level. "Bread and butter" goals are still of prime concern to the membership at large. What appears significant is that equal concern is shown in regard

to the internal union problems. What is quite apparent here is that these delegates are not complacent in regard to internal issues in their organization. Their cognizance that there are major internal issues facing the U. A. W. and their awareness of the functional role they assume in the decision-making process give some indication that accountability should not be taken lightly by those in policy-implementation roles. It is interesting to note that a fairly large percentage were concerned with broader societal problems. Approximately 25 percent of the delegates believed that the most important issues facing the U. A. W. were political and economic in nature.

A detailed breakdown of specific issues considered as the most important facing the U. A. W. reveals an interesting pattern of response. The following table presents the specific issues under each general category of issues. For the 415 delegates who listed shop and collective bargaining issues as the most important about 35 percent believed that automation was the specific issue to be resolved while a little more than 19 percent believed that shorter work week was the significant issue to be resolved. Working conditions, retirement, and speedups were the concerns of about 23 percent of the delegates.

Of the 526 delegates who listed internal union issues as the most important almost 50 percent believed that increase of dues was the most important specific issue to be resolved. Organizing the unorganized were mentioned by better than 20 percent of the delegates in this category. Solidarity and union finances were the specific concerns of another 11 percent of this particular group.

Finally, for the 461 delegates who listed political and economic

Table 3 Specific issues listed as the most important by convention delegates

General Issues	Specific Issues	Frequency	Percentage
Shop and Collective Bargaining Issues	Combat Automation	144	34.70
	Shorter Work Week	80	19.28
	Better Working Conditions	38	9.16
	Retirement	36	8.67
	Speedups	24	5.78
	Others	93	22.41
Total		415	100.00
Internal U. A. W. Issues	Increase of Dues	260	49.43
	Organize the Unorganized	107	20.34
	Solidarity	32	6.08
	Union Finances	26	4.94
	Others	101	19.20
Total		526	99.99
Political and Economic Issues	Unemployment	248	53.80
	Legislative Action	129	27.98
	Other Economic Issues	20	4.34
	Others	64	13.88
Total		461	100.00

issues as the most important about 54 percent were concerned with the problem of unemployment. Relatedly, perhaps, the issue of legislative action was raised by about 28 percent of the delegates in this category.

The above was intended to be a composite profile of the delegates' perception of the convention. The assumption was made that these people formed the significant core of the union organization; that these people were the dedicated ones who made the union a "going concern." In this respect, it was further assumed that their attitudes concerning the con-

vention have an important bearing upon how the convention functions. The important point here is that these are the significant people to whom leadership in the upper echelon must account and, relatedly, these are the people through whom the "percolator effect" must take place.

CHAPTER IV

THE DELEGATE

Introduction: Proceeding on the premise that the delegates to the International convention, by the nature of their "active" role in the labor movement, form the core by which democratic processes may occur, the major aim of this study was to gather some pertinent information concerning the attitudes and behavior of these people. Though the literature on unions and union membership is fairly abundant, there is an apparent lack of information concerning these key functionaries. In some measure then, this study aims to contribute in a unique sense to the already broad knowledge obtained concerning the trade union movement. In a broader sense, this study will attempt to present a substantive contribution to the theory of organizational behavior and democratic processes. In this chapter we will deal specifically with the delegate and develop some ideas with regard to his orientation to the union as an "active." In this respect we will consider the following: 1) background characteristics; 2) experience in the labor movement and in the U. A. W.; 3) role orientation "types." A final section of this chapter will consider the interrelationship of some of these variables.

A. Background Characteristics

First of all it may be noted that the delegates in this case study appear to approximate the characteristics of the 1800 delegates included in the earlier study.

The overwhelming majority of the total delegation were men, comprising about 96 percent. The delegates in the case study approximated this with 95 percent being men.

The largest age group of delegates were between the middle 30's and the middle 40's. There were approximately 43 percent from the total group and about this same proportion from the case study group. Further, from both groups the population appears to be skewed toward the older side. The following table presents a comparative view of the age distribution of the two groups.

Table 4 A comparison of age distribution between the total sample of convention delegates to the 17th U. A. W. Constitutional Convention and the delegates from the Flint-Lansing study.

Age Category	Number Delegates		Percentages	
	Total Sample	Flint-Lansing	Total Sample	Flint-Lansing
25 or less . . .	19	1	1.08	.93
26-30	117	9	6.67	8.33
31-35	267	13	15.21	12.04
36-40	399	29	22.74	26.85
41-45	360	18	20.51	16.67
46-50	283	17	16.13	15.74
51-55	172	11	9.80	10.19
56-60	93	5	5.30	4.63
61 and over . .	34	5	2.56	4.63
Totals . . .	1755	108	100.00	100.01

Approximately two-thirds of the total delegation had either reached or completed high school. The Flint-Lansing group also had a two-third representation in this category. The following table presents a comparative view of the educational level of these two groups.

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Table 5 A comparison of educational experience of delegates to the
17th U. A. W. Constitutional Convention and the Flint-
 Lansing delegation.

Educational Level	Number of Delegates		Percentages	
	Total Sample	Flint- Lansing	Total Sample	Flint- Lansing
Grade School	32	2	1.85	1.89
Junior High	293	22	16.91	20.75
High School	1150	71	66.36	66.98
College	248	11	14.31	10.38
Graduate	10	-	.58	-
Totals	1733*	106**	100.01	100.00

*81 cases = No response

**2 cases = No response

No comparison can be made between these two groups in regard to occupational classification because of differences in the classificatory systems used in the two studies. The following is a distribution of Flint-Lansing delegates by skill levels.

Table 6 Occupational classification of Flint-Lansing delegates to the
17th Constitutional Convention

Occupational Level	Number delegates	Percentages
Unskilled	33	30.56
Semi-skilled	29	26.85
Skilled	31	28.70
Office-clerical	2	1.85
Fulltime union Worker	13	12.04
Totals	108	100.00

In terms of the inter-generational mobility of this group, there was a wide range of origins. Twenty-five percent of the delegates from

the case study mentioned that their fathers were farmers while another 6 percent mentioned that their fathers were businessmen. About 7 percent of the delegates mentioned their fathers being either a free-professional, a salaried-professional, or an office or sales executive.

An interesting response pattern appeared when the delegates were asked to identify their social-class status. About 57 percent of these people were not able to give an answer spontaneously. However, for those giving a spontaneous reply, 32 percent identified themselves as middle-class and only about 10 percent identified themselves as working-class. Those who could not give any class identification spontaneously, were shown a listing of alternative choices for self-identification. Here we find better than 45 percent identifying themselves as working-class while 9 percent identified themselves as middle-class. Combining these classes of responses -- spontaneous and non-spontaneous -- we find the following distribution.

Table 7 Social class identification by Flint-Lansing delegates to the 17th U. A. W. Constitutional Convention

Class Identification	Number Delegates	Percentage
Lower Class	1	.94
Working Class	60	56.07
Middle Class	44	41.12
Upper Class	2	1.87
Totals	107*	100.00

*One case remained "Don't know"

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This distribution very clearly approximates the results obtained by Richard Centers.¹³⁸ This similarity is rather surprising since the population in this study was made up predominantly of blue collar workers whereas Centers' study involved a national sample of white adult males. The significance of the above distribution is the apparent legitimacy of self-identification as "working-class" only when the choice is given. Lower-class tends to connote some degree of failure, which is to be avoided in a society so strongly achievement oriented. It would also be unrealistic for these people to conceive of themselves as upper-class when such differences as wealth, prestige, and influence and authority are so glaringly obvious in our society. Interestingly enough, many of those who spontaneously classified themselves as middle-class referred to the material abundance of the surroundings (automobile, TV, living-room sets, etc.) to justify their particular self-designation.

When we relate class designation to household income perhaps there is some basis for their "perceived" position. Household income was defined for these people as the average of all income derived by those living in the same household during the past 2 years or more. No distinction was made between what the respondent earned apart from the total household income. The following is the distribution of household income for the delegates from Flint and Lansing.

¹³⁸Richard Centers, "The American Class Structure: A Psychological Analysis," in Newcomb and Hartley, editors, Readings in Social Psychology, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947, p. 483.

Table 8 Household income of delegates to the 17th U. A. W. Constitutional Convention from Flint and Lansing

Household Income	Number Delegates	Percentage
Less than \$4,000	--	--
\$4,000 - \$4,999	3	2.78
\$5,000 - \$5,999	15	13.89
\$6,000 - \$6,999	22	20.37
\$7,000 - \$7,999	25	23.15
\$8,000 - \$8,999	14	12.96
\$9,000 - \$9,999	15	13.89
\$10,000 and over	14	12.96
Totals	108	100.00

Better than 43 percent of the delegates were between the six to eight thousand dollars category. Here also we note the population skewed toward the higher income categories. About 14 percent of the delegates were in the nine thousand dollar income category while about 13 percent were in the ten thousand dollar and over category. Comparing this group with the national average, we found the group average substantially higher and perhaps fairly consistent with their self-image of class status.¹³⁹

While more than 46 percent of the delegates live within the city limits where they work, a substantial number still maintain their residences in small towns or on the farm. In this study more than 31 percent come from small towns and about 12 percent from farms. In addition, about 9 percent live outside the city limits but not on farms.

Most of the delegates belong to one or several formal community organizations. The assumption made here was that these "actives" would

¹³⁹U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, (Eighty-first edition) Washington, D. C., 1960, pp. 320-321.

very likely also be participants in other kinds of community activities. This assumption is well borne out. Eighty-five percent of the delegates were members of one or more community organizations in addition to their union.

On the whole, this group maintains a positive attitude about their jobs. About 77 percent felt that they were either "fairly" or "very" satisfied with their jobs.¹⁴⁰ Only about 16 percent expressed some degree of dissatisfaction with their jobs. Another 7 percent were noncommittal in regard to this particular question.

B. Experience in the Labor Movement

The group represents, on the average, more than 22 years in the labor movement. The following table presents a breakdown of these delegates in terms of the number of years they have been members of some labor union at one time or another including their present membership in the U. A. W. More than 34 percent of the delegates have been in the labor movement somewhere between 21 and 25 years. The next largest group of delegates, (25 percent) have been in the labor movement somewhere between 16 and 20 years, followed by about 20 percent with 11 to 14 years experience.

More than 66 percent of the delegates joined the U. A. W. on or before the year 1945. Approximately 33 percent joined the U. A. W. after 1945. This is particularly noteworthy since in any organization there is a need for experienced leadership to fill the important positions in the

¹⁴⁰In analyzing occupational satisfaction Caplow cautions that no simple correlation exists between the objective conditions presented by an occupation and the relative satisfaction of the worker. See Theodore Caplow, The Sociology of Work, Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1954, p. 133.

Table 9 Number of years a member of a labor union for the Flint-Lansing delegates

Number of Years	Number Delegates	Percentage
5 or less	1	.93
6 - 10	12	11.11
11 - 15	22	20.37
16 - 20	27	25.00
21 - 25	37	34.26
26 - 30	5	4.63
31 and over	4	3.70
Totals	108	100.00

organizational hierarchy. Perhaps equally if not more important is the fact that combining these data with data on age reported above we find a reservoir of potential candidates for important leadership positions who are young but who have considerable experience in the labor movement. A persistent complaint among some "oldtimers" is that the younger generation do not have enough interest in the labor movement to "carry the ball." Essentially what we have discovered here suggests that among the "actives" there is a corps of "younger generation" emerging in sufficient number to "carry the ball."

The majority of the delegates hold some kind of union office. The following table presents a breakdown of the positions these people hold. The fulltime positions are found mostly in the larger locals. The by-laws of the smaller locals usually spell out the conditions under which the executive officer assumes "fulltime" status. The following is abstracted from the by-laws of a local union;

Section 8. The President shall be employed fulltime on Local Union business and shall receive a salary plus expenses as set and approved by the Local Membership.

Section 8a: When the dues paying membership falls below 3400 members for two (2) consecutive months the President shall return to work in the plant until such time as the dues paying membership increases to 3600.

Section 8b: At such time as the President returns to work in the plant he shall be paid the difference of what he makes in the shop and that of the salary of President, plus expenses.¹⁴¹

Most of the positions listed are elective. Although the highest frequencies are noted in the more prestigious and influential jobs, the eleven cases (about 10%) who cited "no positions held" in the locals illustrate the fairly broad range of representation found at the convention. At least officers do not monopolize the decision-making roles.

Related to their experiences in the union are some dimensions of union orientation which were elicited from the delegates. The specific interest here is to derive some knowledge about these people in regard to the character of their interest in the labor movement. Union orientation, as used here, refers to the delegate's own conception of his relationship to the union organization. In this regard, a series of "open end" or unstructured questions were utilized along with some structured items to determine the dimensions of union orientation on the part of these people. The series of descriptive responses that follows are primarily post-hoc categories. One of the major concerns here was to arrive at some reasons

¹⁴¹By-Laws of Local 581, U. A. W. - A. F. L. - C. I. O.; Revised March 13, 1960, Article 10, p. 11.

Table 10 Union positions held by the delegates to the 17th Constitutional Convention from Flint and Lansing

Position*	Number Delegates	Percentage
Fulltime:		
International Repr.	1	1.05
Local President	7	7.37
Secretary-Treasurer	6	6.32
Recording secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>1.05</u>
	15	15.79
Non-fulltime:		
Shop committee	26	27.37
District committee	10	10.53
Chairman - Bargaining committee	6	6.32
Chairman - Shop committee	5	5.26
Unit chairman	5	5.26
Local executive board	3	3.16
Recording secretary	3	3.16
Education committee	3	3.16
Trustee	3	3.16
Local president	2	2.10
Bargaining committee	2	2.10
Alternate - Shop committee	<u>2</u>	<u>2.10</u>
	70	73.68
Others	<u>10</u>	<u>10.53</u>
	80	84.21
Totals**	<u>95</u>	<u>100.00</u>

*In many cases the delegates held multiple positions in the locals. For this presentation, only the highest positions listed is recorded for each delegate.

**There were 11 cases where "no position" was reported. No response was elicited from 2 cases.

for the delegate's interest in union affairs. Directly, the delegate was asked why he decided to become active in the union. More than 48 percent expressed concern with the worker's well-being, with a desire to help improve working conditions, or an overall interest in the betterment of the working-class. This observation must be tempered by the fact that there is a strong likelihood here of some "identification" and that what appears to

be an objective concern may also be a reflection of the desire to improve one's own social and economic welfare.

Better than 19 percent had decided to become active simply because they were dissatisfied with the manner in which the union was run. Another 9 percent reported family influence as the prime factor for their interest in the union. Essentially, these people were "brought up" in an environment of union people. Surprisingly a very small percentage (about 3%) reported mobility interests and personal qualifications as the prime reasons for their initial decision to become active in union affairs. Finally, more than 19 percent of the delegates gave a wide assortment of reasons which did not fit under any of the categories above.

Another direct question asked of these delegates was what they would do subsequently if they were defeated for re-election to office. Almost 52 percent remarked that they would "run again" while another 26 percent expressed the desire to serve the union in some other capacity. The latter case seems to reveal the general tenor of the attitude of the delegates toward the union. An oft-repeated statement here was the wish to "keep active" in the union. In this respect also many committed themselves to "help out" those who replaced them if help was solicited. Only about 13 percent said that they would then remain inactive and just be concerned with their personal problems and concentrate on their jobs at the plant. The remaining small percentage of delegates either held no jobs at present or were not generally classifiable under the above response types.

This general attitude toward union activity is substantially supported by the attitude reflected in other related areas. For instance, the average distance for the group, from their homes to the union halls, is better than 5 miles with the range extending from less than a mile to more

than 20 miles. In spite of this, more than 90 percent of the delegates considered the distance either "just right" or not too far.

Attendance at local meetings again reflect the active character of these unionists. More than 46 percent reported having attended all of the local meetings held during the past year. Approximately 41 percent reported having attended "almost all" of the local meetings and another 8 percent attended "most" of them. Less than 5 percent reported attending only "some" of the meetings. Most of the delegates are officials in some capacity in the union. However, it must be recognized that not every meeting involves all of the holders of office. The relatively high attendance rate on the part of these delegates gives some supporting evidence in regard to their commitment to union affairs.

C. The Local Environment

The particular concern here is to determine the characteristics of the locals in terms of their political environment. The common adage that a person is the "product of his environment" is implicit in the consideration of this subject. Here we may hypothesize that the political character of the local determines largely the character of delegate behavior. Initially then, the problem was to determine how to arrive at some measure of political activity that might differentiate one local from another. The approach taken was to ask a series of questions dealing with situations in the local. These questions dealt with the character of opposition in the local and the extent to which it was in operation. In this manner a series of yes and no answers were obtained in regard to the extent to which opposition existed. Another series of questions aimed at ascertaining whether these opposition groups ran separate slates during elections. Also, questions were aimed at finding out whether there existed

a leadership structure in opposing factions and whether these groups were active in some capacity in-between election periods. One final series of questions dealt with the election process itself. Here information was derived in regard to the degree of concern in union politics on the part of the membership, the degree of closeness of elections, and an estimation of membership participation in the delegate election.

The answers to these questions were combined to form an index of level of political activity in the local. The first question asked whether there was anything like a political party system operating in the local or, if not, whether there were groups in the local with differing ideas than the present administration. Those answering in the affirmative in regard to the first part of the question were given a score of two, and those replying in the negative to the first part but in the affirmative to the second part of the question were assigned a score of one. Those who answered no to both parts of the question were assigned a score of zero. The other questions were scored similarly with all yes answers assigned a score of two and all no answers assigned a score of one. Since all these questions, except for the estimation of voting participation, revolved around the theme of organized opposition, those who were assigned zero in the first question received a zero score on all others. The item requesting an estimation of voting participation was scored arbitrarily by dividing the possibilities into three parts. In this manner, those who estimated participation as being 67 percent or better were assigned two points, those who estimated participation somewhere between 34 percent and 66 percent were assigned a score of one point, and, finally, those who estimated participation as being less than 34 percent were assigned a score of zero. The possible range of score was then zero to sixteen. The following table

presents the score distribution of the delegates on the political activity scale. It is recognized that the scoring system is not an interval scale but more or less an ordinal system for differentiating one local from another in terms of perceived level of political activity.

Table 11 Score distribution from the political activity scale for the Flint-Lansing delegates*

Score	Number Delegates	Percentage	Scale Type
0	0	.00	
1	1	.93	
2	1	.93	
3	0	.00	
4	1	.93	
5	1	.93	1
6	1	.93	
7	0	.00	
8	2	1.85	
9	0	.00	
10	4	3.70	
11	9	8.33	
12	13	12.04	2
13	25	23.15	3
14	21	19.44	4
15	26	24.07	5
16	3	2.78	
Totals		108	100.01

*See Appendix D for items in the scale with critical ratio of each item.

The purpose here was to identify those locals with levels of political activities greater than other locals. Having established this ordinal relationship the above distribution was further reduced to a five point ordinal system to establish some "scale types." The cutoff points are purely arbitrary selections. However, since the main concern is to maintain the ordinal relationship, some confidence is reserved in the approach. The resultant scale types may be interpreted in the following manner:

those assigned to scale 5 represent the locals with the most intense political activity; those assigned to scale type 4 represent the locals with less intense political activity; etc. The distribution is skewed heavily toward the politically more active side. This conclusion supports the other evidence mentioned earlier in regard to the extent of political activity at the local level. In a later part of this chapter, some relationships will be established between level of political activity and delegate behavior.

D. Role Orientation

The following is directed toward setting up a series of "types" reflecting the delegate's specific orientation toward the union and his definition of his role as a delegate. As discussed earlier, the character of the political atmosphere in the union and the convention in particular is determined largely by this significant core of leaders who bear with them certain attitudes and motivations in their work. In the role of delegate, the individual comes under compelling pressures from forces above (the International) and as well as from below (local membership). His reactions to these forces are modified by his own motivations and definitions of the situation which determine to some extent the directionality of his responses. The following then is a consideration of the procedures of how the delegates were "typed."

1. Mobility Orientation

As was recognized earlier, one of the main cultural values that Americans maintain and strive to perpetuate is the dual concept of achievement and success. Chinoy's classic study of automobile workers revealed among them an early desire for upward mobility.¹⁴² But for most of these

¹⁴²Ely Chinoy, Automobile Workers and the American Dream, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955.

people, opportunity for advancement within the factory system is limited. So, as Chinoy pointed out, "dreams of glory" are soon frustrated and mobility aspirations, through time, evolve into security notions.¹⁴³

But no matter how strongly one desires to cling to his job there is the realization that even such provisions as seniority do not guarantee one job security in the midst of rapid technological change. So what was once the carrot, perhaps not within easy grasp, that spurred one to strive, has now become the stick that shakes one out of his lethargy. To the individual worker the work automation has only one meaning -- its employment effects. In effect, security notions, where once perhaps fairly independent from mobility notions, have now become synonymous with the latter for some. Though Chinoy found that "talk" about mobility aspirations had primarily a therapeutic function in the face of reality,¹⁴⁴ it remains a central value concept in American society.

The essential question to ask here is what alternative channels remain in the face of the realization that there is limited mobility within the plant. One alternative may be the desire to "move out" to something better outside the plant. An important channel which has failed to attract much attention is the labor union. Various scholars have investigated the union in terms of its changing structural configuration. For example, Wilensky talked about the "intellectuals" in the labor movement.¹⁴⁵ Lipset discussed the differences among leadership types in unions -- those that

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 124

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 14

¹⁴⁵Wilensky, Intellectuals in Labor Unions, op.cit., Chapter 6.

see unionism as a "calling" and those that see it as a means of achieving a personal goal such as a livelihood.¹⁴⁶ Lipset analyzed the orientations of men already in relatively high offices in the union. From this post-hoc analysis, however, one might gauge the motivations of "actives" in the lower echelon. One might well conceive the possibility that quite a few of these actives perceive in the union a chance to achieve security within the factory system. However, there might appear others who perceive in the union an opportunity to fulfill mobility aspirations. In other words, the union provides for these individuals an alternative in their achievement-success orientation. True, even this channel has certain limitations but at least it broadens the alternatives and it is "open" to all who aspire to realize some further measure of achievement. At least among his peers even the low-level functionary in the local maintains some status distinction in the performance of his "official" role. Since we have already selected an elite group in the union movement (by the definition of "active") we can assume that these people have achieved some measure of mobility. In addition, many of these people by the nature of their union functions have achieved relative stability of job status in the plant.¹⁴⁷ The immediate consideration here is to determine how important it is for these people to remain in the present position that they hold in the union. In response to a direct question the following result was obtained. As readily notices, about 85 percent felt that it was "somewhat"

¹⁴⁶S. M. Lipset, Political Man, op.cit., p. 384.

¹⁴⁷For example, a member of the Shop Committee is not likely to be "laid-off" during periods of "slack" whereas one with greater job seniority but no union position might well be.

or "very" important that they keep the present positions they hold in the union. One inference to be made here is that these positions have provided

Table 12 Importance of maintaining position held in the union among the Flint-Lansing delegates

Degree of Importance	Number of Delegates	Percentage
Very important	59	59.60
Somewhat important	25	25.25
Not important	15	15.15
Totals	99*	100.00

*There were 9 cases who either held no positions in the union at the time of the interview (other than that of delegate) or were no longer in the union. In fact one of the former delegates interviewed now manages a service station.

an outlet for the frustrations perceived by Chinoy in his earlier study.

Assigning importance to maintaining one's position might stem either from what Lipset refers to as a "careerist" orientation (where occupancy of the position serves personal goals) or from what he terms a "committed" orientation (where the position provides opportunity for service). An attempt was made to identify those who seek mobility in the union and those who are serving the union in some official capacity but who have no desire to move up in the union hierarchy. Since we have identified these people as "actives," we might infer that the non-mobility oriented are primarily those "committed" to the union movement. Because these are not mutually exclusive orientations, however, those who are mobility oriented may also have a strong commitment to the union. In response to a direct question concerning mobility, the following distribution resulted.

Roughly 35 percent of the delegates felt it important in some measure to move up in the union hierarchy. We might define these people as primarily,

Table 13 Importance of moving up to a higher position in the union among the Flint-Lansing delegates

Degree of Importance	Number of Delegates	Percentage
Very important	22	21.15
Somewhat important	15	14.42
Not important	67	64.42
Totals	104*	99.99

*There were 4 cases reporting no longer in the union.

though not necessarily exclusively, "career" oriented unionists who perceive in the union a means to fulfill the achievement-success cultural value. Significantly, about 65 percent of these delegates felt it was not important to move up to a higher position in the union. These people may be referred to as the committed ones who actively participate in union government but with no aspirations for higher positions in the union.

Though Lipset had done a post-hoc analysis of union leadership, he tried to establish a time-line relationship between the two types of leadership orientations. Thus, he suggested that the career unionist is often found in the long established unions since mobility within the hierarchy of a stabilized bureaucracy provides many advantages and few liabilities while the committed types are more often found in the newer unions where personal risks are high and monetary rewards relatively low.¹⁴⁸ The distribution shown above seems to contradict this conclusion. Though more than 30 percent of the delegates expressed some degree of mobility

¹⁴⁸Lipset, Political Man, op.cit., pp. 385-387.

100

aspirations, about twice this proportion expressed a negative view to such ideas. In order to support Lipset's statement, the distribution should have been reversed. However, this simple test does not conclusively negate Lipset's conclusions. Since the U. A. W. is relatively a young union it would be difficult to form such a conclusion. To do justice to Lipset's conclusion, the following additional hypothesis is presented: those with more experience in the labor movement are less mobility oriented than those with less experience. Table 14 shows the relationship between experience in the labor movement and mobility aspirations. In suggesting

Table 14 Experience in the labor movement and importance of moving up in the union

Experience in the Labor Movement	Frequency		Total	χ^2
	Important	Not important		
15 years or less	17	17	34	3.18
16 - 20 years	12	14	26	1.22
21 years or more	8	36	44	5.73
	—	—	—	—
Totals	37	67	104	10.13
Degrees of freedom = 2				
$\chi^2 = 10.13$ $P < .01$				

this hypothesis it was reasoned that the more experienced individuals were more likely to typify the dedicated unionist since these are essentially those people who were with the union movement during its more turbulent days. From the results obtained in the above chi square analysis there is definite indication that support Lipset's conclusions. Those delegates who have been in the union movement prior to World War II exhibit a greater propensity toward a non-mobility orientation and might be crudely identified as those who responded to a "calling" as defined by Lipset. On the other hand, those fairly "new" to the labor movement have a greater

inclination than these "oldtimers" to be mobility oriented. As an additional test, a tandem hypothesis was presented: The "more experienced" in the U. A. W. would be less mobility oriented than the "less experienced." The following table again shows this relationship between experience and mobility orientation. Again, there is definite indication

Table 15 Experience in the U. A. W. and importance of moving up

Year Delegate Joined Union	Frequency		Total	χ^2	Yates' Correction
	Important	Not Important			
1946 and after	19	16	35	5.26	4.41
1945 and before	18	51	69	2.67	2.30
	—	—	—	—	—
Totals	37	67	104	7.93	6.71

Degrees of freedom = 1

χ^2 = (with Yates' Correction) = 6.71

P < .01

that those who joined the U. A. W. at an earlier stage, perhaps during its formative period, are less inclined to be mobility oriented. Add to this the fact that these are essentially the "active" core in the union and one might well describe these people as those responding to a "calling." On the other hand, those relatively new to the U. A. W. displayed a greater propensity to be mobility oriented.

These latter conclusions, however, again lend themselves to certain doubts. Longevity in the union, though producing experience with the formative stages of the union movement, also reflects another important characteristic of these delegates -- their age level. In this respect, one might reflect that perhaps age rather than experience in the union conditioned the present career orientation of these delegates. To clarify this point, the hypotheses were re-tested with the age factor controlled.

Arbitrarily, the 40 year margin was used as the cut-off point between the older delegate and the younger delegate. The group divided itself fairly equally at this margin. There were 52 cases among the younger group and 56 cases in the older group. In both dimensions of experience -- experience in the union movement and experience in the U. A. W. -- these data, analyzed separately, did not support the hypotheses. In other words, relative experience in the union revealed no significant association with mobility orientation for both the younger and the older groups.

The conclusion above lends support to the hypothesized relationship between age and mobility orientation. With experience controlled, the following tables show the significance of the age factor.

Table 16 Age and importance of moving up in the union with experience in the labor movement controlled

Importance of Moving up	Sixteen years or more in the labor movement*		Total
	Younger members	Older members	
Important	12	8	20
Not important	8	42	50
	—	—	—
Total	20	50	70

*With 15 years or less experience in the labor movement there was no significant difference between the younger and older members in mobility orientation.

Degrees of Freedom = 1

Chi-Square (with Yates' correction) 11.46

P < .001

Table 17 Age and importance of moving up with experience in the U. A. W. controlled

Importance of Moving up	U. A. W. members on or before 1945*		Total
	Younger members	Older members	
Important	9	9	18
Not important	9	42	51
	—	—	—
Total	18	51	69

For those joining the U. A. W. after 1945 there was no significant difference between the younger and the older members in mobility orientation.

Degrees of freedom = 1

Chi-square (with Yates' correction) = 7.66

P < .01

The results above indicate that with less experience in the union movement and in the U. A. W. the younger and the older members are no different in mobility orientation. However, with greater experience in these areas, the older members reveal a significantly greater disinclination for mobility aspirations than the younger members. Thus, with greater experience in unionism, the age factor appears to be the key variable associated here with mobility aspirations. This conclusion does not imply rejection of Lipset's hypothesis but suggests a qualified acceptance of it.

2. Representational Types

As discussed earlier the problem of representation is of central interest to those concerned with the decision-making process in any political system. In all political systems throughout history, the decision-making processes may be arranged in a spectrum from the most absolute, individual authoritarian rule to rule by a representative body whose will

ideally emanates from the "general will." In the former case, the leader's will is defined as the general will. Varying modifications of this may be discerned along the spectrum just short of the republican form of government. Thus, the leader may be a god-like creature whose word is final and absolute, or he may be guided by an advisor or council of wise-men or chiefs who are more in touch with the problems of those ruled. His behavior may also be modified by notions of nobless-oblige or paternalism. Thus may emerge the "benevolent despot" or a "democratic" monarch. Even in a dictatorial form of government the actions of the supreme authority may be modified by a council of ministers. Thus, in varying degrees, there may be responsiveness to the general public. The fact remains, though, that the decision-maker has both the legitimate and authoritative power to act for the whole body, and is not formally accountable to those affected by his decisions. Although the absolute ruler may act for the benefit of those whom he rules, he is not formally their representative.

In a republican form of government the concept of representation may be variously interpreted. The core of the problem is the relationship between the representative and those whom he purports to represent. On the one hand there is the impression that the term "representative government" involves nothing more than a generally approved process by which representation is formed.¹⁴⁹ Implied here is the notion that representation is achieved by the mere fact that a body of men has been chosen to make decisions for the general public. This means, further, that the representative's decisions must be accepted as legitimate and authoritative. In no way does this necessarily imply that the decisions

¹⁴⁹Heinz Eulau, et al., The American Political Science Review, op.cit., p. 743.

made reflect the specific desires of the citizenry. "Representative" then, merely reflects the processes by which these officials have been chosen.

On the other hand, the term "representative" may denote the fact that one was chosen in response to a definite commitment to legislate in accordance with the expressed wishes of the public. This interpretation of the term implies that the public expects some specific action on the part of the representative. Clearly these two interpretations are distinct from each other. There are two sets of conditions under which possible conflict resulting from these differences in the definition of the role of the representative may be minimized: 1) actions may be in harmony with expectations, 2) the action may be "sold" to the electorate. Where either of these two conditions are not obtained the issue of role interpretation becomes important.

The discussion above suggests that various interested groups may maintain different interpretations of representative roles. The representative and the represented are two groupings whose interpretations of the representative's role might well differ. One could justifiably reason that the "public's" expectations would most often be that the representative respond to their specific demands, however unclear and conflicting they might be. On the other hand, various role definitions may be held by the representative. These representatives may commit themselves to certain general policy measures and promises to serve the "good" of the community but these are vague enough to be subjected to varying interpretations. Thus, though the selection process may be truly democratic, the question arises as to whether or not the attitudes and wishes of the public are taken account of in the legislative process. Given the frequent complexity of issues requiring legislation, the complexity of the legislative

process itself, and generally apathetic electorates, the election process may not in itself be an effective guarantee that legislation will reflect the will of the public. Under these conditions the role orientation of the representative becomes increasingly important.

Except for the study cited above there is an apparent lack of studies of the process of representation. Since the legislative process is crucial in a democratic system such as ours, this gap in the understanding of the role of the representative is an important one. Even though in the end "unsatisfactory" performance on the part of the representative may result in his "defeat" in subsequent elections, the personal orientation to the role by the representative is a crucial variable in understanding his behavior.

In this study of the convention delegate an attempt has been made to distinguish various representational types. The assumption is that with the broad interpretations attributed to the role of the representative varying interpretations may be obtained from these delegates. The concern here is with the stylistic dimensions of representation. For the present purposes, it is not necessary to establish a clear line of demarcation of representative types but to arrange the delegates on a spectrum which more or less distinguishes one from another in terms of their interpretation of the role. A series of direct questions dealing with behavior and role interpretations were used as criteria to arrange these stylistic types. The scoring system was basically the same as that used with previous questions, being more or less arbitrarily set up to obtain an ordinal arrangement. These questions were concerned primarily with whether the delegate, in the legislative process, chose to follow specific instructions from his local constituency or chose to act as his conscience dictated --

that is, in terms of what he thought was "good" or "bad" for his constituents. This second orientation does not necessarily mean that actions will always be contrary to the wishes of the constituency. But what perspective the delegate uses appears crucial to the understanding of his behavior especially when there is incongruency between his views and the specific desires or wishes of the rank and file. From answers to these questions, then, the delegates were scored and arranged in order from lowest score to highest score. The possible range of scores was zero to thirty. The delegates' scores ranged from a low of 9 to a high of 22. The following table presents the distribution of delegates in terms of these scores. Those in the upper range of scores were identified as those who had greater inclination to respond to specific demands of the particular constituency. Those

Table 18 Score distribution for representational types for the Flint-Lansing delegates.*

Score	Frequency	Percentage	Scale Types
9	4	3.70	1
10	6	5.56	
11	6	5.56	
12	5	4.63	
13	13	12.04	2
14	10	9.26	
15	8	7.41	
16	12	11.11	
17	12	11.11	3
18	11	10.19	
19	5	4.63	
20	4	3.70	
21	8	7.41	4
22	4	3.70	
Totals	108	100.01	

*See appendix E for items in the scale with critical ratio of item.

in the lower end of the scale were identified as having greater inclination to make decisions based on their own evaluation of what is or is not beneficial to the union, his constituency, or both. Essentially, this latter group chose to function independently (though conscientiously) in the role of decision-makers.

Again it must be emphasized that the scoring system devised is not an interval system such that it would be isomorphic to the structure of arithmetic. An ordinal system is adequate to establish a relationship of "greater than" among orientations to representational situations. The distribution was further reduced to scale types to simplify the ordinal relationship. The above table shows the cutoff points where these scale types are established. Although these cutoff points were arbitrarily selected, they do not distort the ordinal relationship.

Since no empirically pure type is suggested, the typing of those arranged along this scale would be of the character of more or less. Thus, those on the upper end of the scale are identified as more a "delegate-type" and less a "trustee-type." On the other hand, those on the lower end of the scale may be identified as more a "trustee-type" and less a "delegate-type." These representation types are essentially those described by Eulau, et-al.¹⁵⁰ These types are described as follows:

Trustee: "This role finds expression in two major conceptions which may occur separately or jointly. First, a moralistic interpretation: the representative is a free agent, he follows what he considers right or just -- his convictions or principles, the dictates of his conscience. Second, a rational conception: he follows his own judgments based on an assessment of the facts in each case, his understanding of the problems involved, his thoughtful appraisal of the sides at issue."

¹⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 749-750

Delegate: "All Delegates are, of course agreed that they should not use their independent judgment or convictions as criteria of decision-making. But this does not mean that they feel equally committed to follow instructions, from whatever clientele."

A third type (Politico) described by these men as falling somewhere between these two types has not been included in this study. Since it was preferred to remain with the more or less distinction, a third variable trichotomizing the representational role would presume to delineate a clear line of demarcation between these types. Further, to preserve the conceptual clarity of these types used here as apart from the common usage expressed elsewhere in the present work, this typological expression will be distinguished by quotation marks or used with the suffix "type;" e.g., delegate-type, trustee-type.

With these types thus arranged some hypotheses may be tested in regard to the expected occurrence, in greater frequency, of one type as against the other. The question raised here is whether there is any reason for one type to appear more dominantly on the scene than the other type. In this respect, Eulau, et al., suggest some conditions prevailing today which would indicate the greater likelihood for a trustee-type to appear.¹⁵¹ In summary, they state that the issues arising today in government are more diverse and complex than those of an earlier period. In this "helpless" state, people are more inclined to entrust the affairs of government to the elected representatives who, presumably, are better informed than they. In this kind of setting, these authors claim, people tend to pay lip service to the notion of proper representation but in fact are un-

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 751

able to give instructions as may have been possible when government was less complex. People tend to over-simplify these complex issues, however, and make demands that perhaps tax the representatives beyond their frustration tolerance level. It is not only the people's inability to comprehend the issues but also their diverse and conflicting demands that are likely to give rise to a trustee-type orientation rather than a delegate-type orientation. As these authors say, "the role orientation of a trustee may be a functional necessity."¹⁵² But this would seem so only when expectations conflict and issues are not understood by the electorate. Contrary to the direction predicted by Eulau, et al., there is a preference for a more delegate-type orientation reflected in Table 18. By implication, then, for the present situation, the assumption made above concerning the character of the electorate is not supported. Though these representational types are fairly well spread out to both extremes, thus supporting the notion of the presence of varying role definitions on the part of the representatives, it is also clear that there are other variables impinging on role behavior that result in a more delegate-type representation. In a later section of this chapter, these variables will be analyzed.

3. Allegiance

Another dimension to consider in the delegate role orientation is the organizational focus of his orientation. The problem here is to discover just what identity the delegate wants to maintain in the presence of a crucial issue that involves conflicting loyalties. It is recognized that the delegate has two foci of interest that lay claim to his attention

¹⁵²Ibid., p. 751

and loyalty: 1) the local of his origin, 2) the International union. Granted these two foci may loom more significantly as a conceptual distinction than as separate empirical entities since the latter is essentially composed of the sum of the former, nevertheless the difference is recognizable since the local union is sometimes perceived as only remotely associated with the International body. Again, the distinction becomes real when the International impinges on the local body to fulfill certain mandates or when it intercedes in certain internal local problems. In general, the local considers itself as a separate and autonomous unit. This is analogous to the federal system where the individual states of the union conceive of themselves as separate from the federal government. In many cases, there need to be no conflict for the demands and expectations of the two foci of interest may be in harmony so that the delegate easily resolves the issues involved. However, in other cases, the demands made by the larger body may strongly conflict with the expectations of the lesser body and vice-versa. Under these conditions the measure of one's loyalty is judged by his subsequent actions in resolving this basic conflict situation. This role conflict situation is resolved by the delegate when he has determined whether the local or the International is his "significant reference group." The relative importance of a particular focus of orientation rests on several intervening variables that tend to restrict the delegate's choice and minimize whatever conflicts follow from the initial demands and expectations. His personal ambitions, his political orientations, his values, etc. all intercede in some measure to condition his specific focus of loyalty. The relationships of some of these variables to a particular focus of orientation will be analyzed in a later section of this chapter.

The present task is to establish the type of loyalty most important to the delegates in the decision-making process. Since the distinction has been made between two foci of orientation, one might consider these foci as polar extremes and any degree of identification with either of these extremes may be considered an alliance. The typological distinction to be made here, then, is the difference between one with local allegiance as against one with an International allegiance. Here again information was obtained from the delegates regarding their response to some situations both real and hypothetical. For instance, they were asked specifically what things affected their decision about how to vote at the convention and which of these things were most important. Responses to this question often suggested primary allegiance to either the International or the local. Examples of these are such response types as needs of local, needs of region, needs of total union, what International officers wanted, the expressed wishes of rank and file, etc. A hypothetical situation was also posed in which both the demands of the International officers and the local members in regard to a specific resolution were in conflict. The delegate was asked to indicate how he would vote in such an instance. Again, an arbitrary point system was set up to establish the primary focus of orientation of these delegates. All responses to the eight questions included in the scale which suggested allegiance to the larger body of anyone associated with the larger body, e.g., executive officers, etc., were assigned a score of two points while all responses favoring the local or anyone associated with the local were assigned zero scores. Responses that were directed to some intermediate functionary, e.g., other delegates, were assigned a score of one. The possible range of total scores for the allegiance spectrum was zero to sixteen. The range of total scores obtained

by the delegates was zero to fourteen. The following table presents a score distribution on the "allegiance scale." The table strongly suggests that, where issues produce conflict in loyalties, the delegates' primary allegiance will be to their locals.

Table 19 Score distribution on the allegiance scale for the Flint-Lansing delegates.*

Score	Frequency	Percentage	Scale Type
0	4	3.70	1
1	8	7.41	
2	7	6.48	
3	16	14.81	2
4	7	6.48	
5	11	10.19	
6	17	15.74	3
7	12	11.11	
8	6	5.56	
9	6	5.56	4
10	4	3.70	
11	6	5.56	
12	3	2.78	4
13	0	--	
14	1	.93	
Totals	108	100.01	

*See appendix F for items in the scale with critical ratio of each item.

Here again the qualification is made that the scaling technique applied is primarily to set up an ordinal system to identify the delegate's position on the allegiance spectrum. The "scale types" again are derived from arbitrary cutoff points. To the extent that this simplification does not distort nor re-arrange the ordinal relationship, confidence is reserved for the utility of this reduction for subsequent analytical purposes.

4. Bureaucratic versus Democratic Values

The central problem posed in this study earlier was the dilemma faced by those still upholding an idealistic democratic tradition in the face of obvious and necessary changes taking place in modern urban industrial

society -- the impersonal characteristics of large-scale bureaucratic organizations. Moreover, as Weber emphasized, these characteristics of present day large-scale organization tend to devalue the individual even in its structural order in the sense that they are primarily instrumental figures in a complex network of inter and intra stratum relations.¹⁵³ The paradox of the situation is that both these apparently antithetical positions loom large as parts of our major value orientations. However, as Williams points out, this is not so unusual when we consider the entire configuration of American value orientations.

...American society does not have a completely consistent and integrated value structure ... rather, the total society is characterized by diversity and change in values ... Millions of contact points involving problems of values are created in economic dealings, political activity, education and other major areas of life.¹⁵⁴

To illustrate this point made by Williams one might enumerate some of the major value orientations that he defines as characteristic of American society¹⁵⁵ and see how they fit into the particular framework of the dilemma presented above. The ideological commitment to a democratic tradition can be seen in Williams' discussion of such value orientations as democracy, individual personality, freedom, equality, moral orientation, and achievement and success. On the other hand, the inclination toward large-scale organization with all its impersonal characteristics has its roots in such major value orientations as efficiency and practicality, activity and work,

¹⁵³Max Weber, from Hans Gerth and C. W. Mills, editors, From Max Weber, op.cit., Chapter VIII, "Bureaucracy."

¹⁵⁴Robin Williams, Jr., op.cit., pp. 413-414.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 415- 470

material comfort and progress. If these values grouped above are in some measure incompatible with each other what then explains their presence in American society? As Williams points out there are limits to the degree of incompatibility of beliefs and values that can exist in any culture (or for that matter in individuals) short of a breakdown of the total system. In a gross sense Williams explains these conflicts in terms of what is the national or cultural orientation as against the specific orientations of a sub-element of the culture in which there is some detachment from the major traditional values. Earlier, in the theoretical discussion, it was pointed out that the quality of adaptation to specific situational factors (and here we emphasize the situational factors as strong determinants) gives rise to the uniqueness of different organizational structures. In this sense, given the value orientations of the general cultural setting, e.g., efficiency, progress, etc., different degrees of rigidity, impersonality, etc., may be discerned in the unique structural features of particular organizations.

A crucial intervening variable is the factor of personal adaptation. The dysfunctional consequences of large-scale organization may be modified by the different degrees of acceptance of an apparently rigidly defined structure. Thus, ways of "getting around the red-tape" become an adaptive mechanism for one who has not wholly accepted the particular value orientation. Such modes of adaptation make possible the co-existence of what appears to be fundamentally inconsistent and incompatible situations.


In trade unions, both democratic orientation (i.e., consideration of the larger membership in terms of participation, etc.) and bureaucratic efficiency are desirable at one and the same time. And again, as with the case of orientation to representation types, the adherence to one primarily

may not necessarily result in the breakdown of the other since there will be evident some range of tolerance for deviancy from the ideal-type as long as the goals are "culturally" defined. A similar view is offered by Williams who makes the distinction between instrumental values and the formal-universalistic values.¹⁵⁶ Bureaucratic efficiency then, may be a value to the extent it is a means to achieving such desirable features as wealth, work, practicalness, etc., and democratic processes remain the formal-universalistic value in the sense that they encompass all members without prejudice. Another aspect to consider in this case is that bureaucratic efficiency and the wealth it creates may actually assist in the achievement and maintenance of a democratic orientation.¹⁵⁷

Actually then both values -- bureaucratic efficiency and democratic participation may co-exist but in different degrees. Each of these values has a tolerable range of deviancy but one may have to "sacrifice" one value in order to adhere to the other. Since these individual preferences appear in isolated cases, the effects may not become immediately apparent. However, an entire group orientation may reflect a leaning more toward one value than toward the other. According to Wilensky, the union bureaucracy is yet not fully developed though he perceived an eventual movement toward

¹⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 468-469

¹⁵⁷Lundberg, et al., present a concise explanation of social class and life chances. In spite of the greater cultural prescription of equality, freedom, etc., social class levels seem to be associated with differences in health, educational opportunity, justice before the law, etc. George A. Lundberg, Clarence C. Schrag, and Otto N. Larson, Sociology, revised edition, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958, pp. 489-500.



a full-fledged bureaucratic organization.¹⁵⁸ Whether there is a tendency toward primary concern with bureaucratic efficiency in the total structure and the devaluation of the democratic processes depends upon the exigencies of the time. It is fairly well recognized that there are situations where individual rights must be sacrificed for the public weal. For in the status of a citizen or a member of a community, organization, etc., rights and privileges associated with the status are also accompanied by certain expectations and obligations which may include, in some instances, a suspension of certain rights and privileges. In trade unions, it may be expected that at times the need for democratic participation will be secondary to the need for bureaucratic efficiency.

In the present case, the greater desirability of one value as opposed to the other need not be interpreted as dysfunctional. For dysfunction occurs from whatever perspective one perceives the case. A more highly democratic orientation is dysfunctional to those desiring a more highly bureaucratized organization and vice-versa. No matter what proportion of one to the other is maintained by the organization there is inherent in the outcome a process of equilibration.

This process of equilibration suggests another aspect of organization which appears quite crucial for this analysis. That is there may be changes in value orientation depending on the issues and problems emerging. It has been emphasized repeatedly that the convention delegates, because of their active roles, are especially important in determining whether democratic processes will function. By the very nature of their functional role, their actions may be mediated and conditioned by concern for their

¹⁵⁸Harold L. Wilensky, "The Trade Union as a Bureaucracy," in Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader, edited by Amitai Etzioni, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961. pp. 221-234.

constituents. That is, they may realize they must serve the interests of the membership in order to "survive" in the game of politics. But it is generally recognized that "serving the interests of the membership" has broad and varying interpretations. In one case, efficient management of the organization may serve the greater interest while in another an attempt to maximize participation in decision-making by the majority of members may serve the greater interest. In the first case, a highly bureaucratized orientation may be called for, while in the second case, a democratic orientation may be preferable. If expediency becomes the crucial variable, values will shift in response to it. It is important to recognize, however, that neither orientation necessarily results in a lack of consideration of the individual member of the union.

The delegates to the International Convention have this basic dilemma to face. In instances where both values cannot be implemented, should they give primacy to a democratic or a bureaucratic orientation? Recognizing that there may be a shift from one value orientation to the other depending upon the issues involved in specific situations, it may still be possible to differentiate delegates who characteristically respond in terms of a democratic orientation from those who most often value organizational efficiency.

With these basic conditions recognized, the immediate problem for this study was to obtain some index whereby these role orientations may be identified. The differences sought were between those who are more democratically oriented and those who are more bureaucratically oriented. The qualitative term more is applied in recognition of the

fluctuation in orientation due to the possible situational conditions cited above. Thus, one is not necessarily all of one type to the exclusion of the other. This approach permits the placement of these delegates in some order along a spectrum leading from one polar type to the other -- bureaucratic values vs. democratic values. Likert-type items were constructed reflecting varying situations requiring some decision-making process. Each delegate was requested to check one answer in a set of five alternative choices to each item ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Fifteen items were originally constructed and, out of this, ten items were found scalable using Guttman's scalogram analysis.

The following are the items that form this scale:

1. If there are too many disagreements in the union, the International officers should be given full control in order to get things done.

1 ☐ Strongly agree
 2 ☐ Agree
 3 ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 4 ☐ Disagree
 5 ☐ Strongly disagree

2. Once a decision is made by the International officers, the members ought to go along with it whether they think it is right or not.

1 ☐ Strongly agree
 2 ☐ Agree
 3 ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 4 ☐ Disagree
 5 ☐ Strongly disagree

3. As long as the members get what they want, it doesn't make any difference whether they have any say in how the union is run.

1 ☐ Strongly agree
 2 ☐ Agree
 3 ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 4 ☐ Disagree
 5 ☐ Strongly disagree

4. All members of the union should be able to participate and express themselves in union affairs even if it means a delay in the achievement of union goals.

5 ☐ Strongly agree
 4 ☐ Agree
 3 ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 2 ☐ Disagree
 1 ☐ Strongly disagree

5. Once the International officers are elected, they should be free to run the union in whatever way they think best.

1 ☐ Strongly Agree
 2 ☐ Agree
 3 ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 4 ☐ Disagree
 5 ☐ Strongly disagree

6. Individuals should not be allowed to disrupt the smooth running of the union by circulating petitions or making speeches.

1 ☐ Strongly agree
 2 ☐ Agree
 3 ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 4 ☐ Disagree
 5 ☐ Strongly disagree

7. A lot of competition for election to office is good even if the union is being run efficiently by those in office.

5 ☐ Strongly agree
 4 ☐ Agree
 3 ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 2 ☐ Disagree
 1 ☐ Strongly disagree

8. The less the rank and file union members know about how the union is run the better it will be run.

1 ☐ Strongly agree
 2 ☐ Agree
 3 ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 4 ☐ Disagree
 5 ☐ Strongly disagree

9. It is more important that the union be run efficiently even if it means that the members have less to say about how things should be run.

1 ☐ Strongly agree
 2 ☐ Agree
 3 ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 4 ☐ Disagree
 5 ☐ Strongly disagree

10. All the important decisions ought to be made by the International officers because only they know what is best for the union.

- 1 ___ Strongly agree
 2 ___ Agree
 3 ___ Neither agree nor disagree
 4 ___ Disagree
 5 ___ Strongly disagree

Reproducibility was .91, which establishes confidence in the set of items as constituting a scale. The following table presents the scale types and frequency distribution of these types.

Table 20 Distribution of Guttman scale types on the democratic values versus bureaucratic values spectrum

Guttman Scale Type	Frequency	Percentage	Scale Type
1	16	14.81	1
2	7	6.48	1
3	3	2.78	
4	4	3.70	
5	3	2.78	
6	4	3.70	2
7	12	11.11	3
8	16	14.81	
9	24	22.22	4
10	8	7.41	
11	11	10.19	
Totals	108	99.99	

Reduction of the Guttman scale types to more general categories ("scale-types") is primarily to facilitate later cross analysis with other variables. The gaps (in terms of distribution) between Guttman scale types were selected as the cutoff points to arrive at the more general categories.

Those on the lower end of the scale are identified as more oriented toward democratic participation, while those on the upper end of the scale

may be identified as more oriented toward bureaucratic efficiency.

The distribution of responses to these items suggests that most delegates have a fairly strong commitment to bureaucratic values. There was, however, a wide range of response and the data suggest that some delegates are preoccupied with rank and file participation almost to the exclusion of concern with organizational efficiency. Those in the middle range of the scale are presumed to be delegates with no strong commitment to either orientation and are therefore most likely to shift from one set of values to the other depending upon the issues involved in specific situations.

One additional point must be made in regard to the scale. The fact that a relatively high coefficient of reproducibility was obtained does not warrant a conclusive statement about scalability of the universe of content. Goode and Hatt suggest the consideration of the frequency of responses to each separate item.¹⁵⁹ They state that reproducibility can be artificially high simply by one category in the item having a very high frequency. Because of this fact, they claim that it can be proved that reproducibility of an item can never be less than the largest frequency of its categories, regardless of whether or not the area is scalable. They further conclude then, that the more evenly the frequencies are ~~distributed~~ over the categories of the given item, the less likely it is that the reproducibility will be spuriously high. In this respect these authors suggest an empirical rule for judging the spuriousness of scale reproducibility: "no category should have more error in it than

¹⁵⁹William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952. pp. 294-295.

non-error."¹⁶⁰ Inspection of the results obtained on the above scale types leads one to conclude that reproducibility in this case is more genuine than artificial.

It is suggested that judgment of the full utility of this scale be reserved till further tests have been made. Though the reproducibility co-efficient gives some justification for confidence in the scale, reliability measures must be obtained before the final decision of confidence in the scale can be established. It is hoped that subsequent tests will prove the scale stable.

E. Social Characteristics and Role Orientation

A common sociological approach to the understanding of group behavior is to analyze various social background factors and see how these relate to the orientations of the individuals that make up the group. Earlier, in the statement of the problem, a proposition was introduced suggesting the relationship of background factors and delegate role orientation. Assuming that variations in the orientations of the delegates have been reasonably established, a general guiding hypothesis may be proposed:

Union members With Different Social Backgrounds Generally Have Different Orientations toward Union Roles.

For each social background factor considered, there will be a cross analysis with each of the role orientations discussed above -- allegiance, representation types, and values regarding efficiency versus participations. Mobility orientations will be analyzed separately in the closing

¹⁶⁰Ibid., p. 295.

part of the chapter.

1. Age Level and Role Orientation

a) Age and Values Toward Organizational Functions

The common notion that the older person tends to be more rigid in behavior has often been suggested by the use of the descriptive term conservative. If this is true, it might lead one to conclude that the bureaucratic type would be more likely to be found among the upper age levels. The following table suggests acceptance of the null hypothesis. Little consistency was found in the relationship between age and organizational values. However, there is the indication, though slight, that the older member has an inclination to be more a bureaucratic type.

Table 21 Age level and organizational values

Age	Guttman Scale Types				Total
	Democratic 1	2	3	Bureaucratic 4	
Up to 35	5	6	5	7	23
36-40	6	6	5	12	29
41-45	4	7	3	4	18
46 +	8	7	3	20	38
	—	—	—	—	—
Totals	23	26	16	43	108

Degrees of Freedom = 9

Chi-Square = 8.10

.50 < P < .70

b) Age and Allegiance

From earlier arguments, it would seem reasonable to assume that those who have been in the union longer, and thereby the older members, would develop greater affinity for the International union since it is more likely that they are identified with its early struggles to survive. Several authors also seem to indicate that the younger member is more

interested in what the union will do for him without any feeling for reciprocation. Though rather tenuous, these arguments do suggest the following subhypothesis:

The younger members are more likely to form allegiance to the locals, whereas, the older members are more likely to form allegiance to the international union.

The following table presents the relationship of age levels and allegiance.

Table 22 Age level and allegiance

Age Group	Allegiance				Total
	Local 1	2	3	International 4	
Up to 35	8	7	6	2	23
36-40	5	9	11	4	29
41-50	3	11	14	7	35
51 +	3	7	10	1	21
Totals	19	34	41	14	108

Degrees of Freedom = 9

Chi-Square = 9.95

.30 < P < .50

Though the results obtained do not support the hypothesis at the commonly accepted significance level, the chi-square cell values show some supporting evidence for the hypothesis. Those 35 years and younger show a strong inclination to fall nearer the local allegiance pole while the older members (those 51 and over) show a greater inclination toward allegiance to the International.

c) Age and Representational Types

If one follows the arguments made above, one might make the assumption that the older worker would tend toward a trustee-type orientation

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and the younger worker toward a delegate-type orientation. With this hypothesis, the following table shows the relationship between age and representation types. Again, the null hypothesis must be accepted. To the extent that there is any association between these variables, however, it is in the hypothesized direction.

Table 23 Age level and representational types

Age Group	Trustee Delegate				Total
	1	2	3	4	
Up to 35	2	9	10	2	23
36-40	3	9	12	5	29
41-50	10	7	11	7	35
51 +	6	6	7	2	21
	—	—	—	—	—
Total	21	31	40	16	108

Degrees of freedom = 9

Chi-square = 9.24

.30 < P < .50

The expectation that delegate role orientations would vary with age was based primarily upon the assumption that there would be some association between length of experience in the union and role orientation. Analysis of these data indicates that, while more experienced delegates tend toward a more bureaucratic value orientation, International allegiance, and a trustee-type role definition, the association between these variables is slight and none of the observed differences were statistically significant.

2. Educational Level and Role Orientation

Studies relating education to orientations to larger societal problems seem to indicate, in general, that higher levels of achievement in this area are associated with more liberal attitudes. In relation to the

delegate's role orientation, this would suggest that higher levels of education would produce greater tendency to be delegate-type oriented, to have a democratic orientation toward organizational functions, and to hold an allegiance to the local. The hypotheses suggested here are tested in the following tables.

Table 24 Educational level and organizational values

Educational Grouping	Guttman Scale Types				Total
	Democratic 1	2	Bureaucratic 3	4	
Up to Jr. Hi.	2	5	3	14	24
High School	18	20	11	23	72
College & over	3	1	2	6	12
	—	—	—	—	—
Total	23	26	16	43	108
Degrees of Freedom = 6					
Chi-Square = 7.74					
.20 < P < .30					

Table 25 Educational level and allegiance

Educational Grouping	Allegiance				Total
	Local 1	2	International 3	4	
Up to Jr. Hi.	1	8	12	3	24
High School	17	21	27	8	73
College & over	1	5	2	3	11
	—	—	—	—	—
Total	19	34	41	14	108
Degrees of Freedom = 6					
Chi-Square = 9.42					
.10 < P < .20					

Table 26 Educational level and representational types

Educational Grouping	Representational Types				Total
	Trustee	1	2	3	4
Up to Jr. Hi.	7	5	9	3	24
High School	12	22	28	10	72
College & over	2	4	3	3	12
	—	—	—	—	—
Total	21	31	40	16	108
Degrees of Freedom = 6					
Chi-Square = 3.42					
.70 < P < .80					

In general, all three tables suggest the acceptance of the null hypothesis at the commonly accepted significance level (i.e., two-tailed test @ .01 or .05 levels).

3. Income Level and Role Orientation

It has been suggested that there is a relationship between income and class identification. That is the higher the income level, the greater the probability of identification with the middle or upper classes. If any aspects of delegate role orientation tap class related values, a relationship between income level and role orientation might be expected. The following tables present the relationship of income levels to role orientations.

Table 27 Income levels and organizational values

Income Group	Guttman Scale Types				Total
	Democratic	Bureaucratic			
	1	2	3	4	
Up to \$5999	3	7	3	5	18
\$6000-\$7999	10	10	5	22	47
\$8000 & over	10	9	8	16	43
	—	—	—	—	—
Total	23	26	16	43	108

Degrees of Freedom = 6
Chi-Square = 4.66
.50 < P < .70

Table 28 Income levels and allegiance

Income Group	Allegiance		Total
	Local	International	
	1 & 2	3 & 4	
Up to \$6999	22	18	40
\$7000-\$8999	18	21	39
\$9000 & over	13	16	29
	—	—	—
Total	53	55	108

(Allegiance Scale categories were collapsed to eliminate cells with low frequencies)
Degrees of Freedom = 2
Chi-Square = .92
.50 < P < .70

Table 29 Income levels and representational types

Income Group	Representational Types				Total
	Trustee	Delegate			
	1	2	3	4	
Up to \$6999	9	11	14	6	40
\$7000-\$8999	9	11	15	4	39
\$9000 & over	3	9	11	6	29
	—	—	—	—	—
Total	21	31	40	16	108

Degrees of Freedom = 6
Chi-Square = 3.03

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Clearly, the above data show no consistent relationship between income and role orientation and the conclusion must be to accept the null hypothesis of no difference among the categories. Data regarding class identification were also obtained. Almost all the delegates identified with either the working class or the middle class. No differences even approaching statistical significance were found in the role orientations of delegates identifying with one or the other of these class levels. Because the range of both income and class identification was relatively narrow, however, it is still possible that differences might be found between the extremes.

4. Community Type and Role Orientation

Sociologists have often reflected on the nature of community types and their affects on personality structure and behavior. A common practice is the polarization of social entities to exemplify fundamentally different types of social organizations.¹⁶¹ Typically, on one extreme may be found the relatively homogeneous grouping with moral sanctions being the restraining force while at the opposite extreme may be found the relatively heterogeneous grouping where the aspect of law or what Durkheim referred to as restitutive powers may be found in operation. Explicit in these "types" of community is the notion of tradition-oriented relationships versus unstructured and loose relationships of a highly impersonal character.

An extension of this typological tradition is the distinction made

¹⁶¹Ferdinand Toennies, Community and Society, translated and edited by Charles P. Loomis, East Lansing: The Michigan State University Press, 1957, pp. 12-29.

today between rural and urban communities. Actually only the conceptual terminologies have changed for the basic descriptions of these types have remained the same. Thus one may reflect on the traditional aspects of rural life and, conversely, the dynamic aspects of urban life. This latter point has been emphasized in the many works in urban society of recent years.¹⁶² The description of these types, though perhaps presented as ideal-constructed types, are said to "fit" the community types found today, in the sense that the construct is set on a continuum. Thus may be "discerned" distinguishable patterns of behavior of "farm" folks, "small town" folks, and "big city" people.¹⁶³ All this implies that the peculiar characteristics of the community tend to develop a unique kind of personality in general which in turn affects social participation in kind and degree. For instance, Magnus found that, on the whole, farm children differed from city children in that they had a greater sense of personal worth, greater feeling of self-reliance, greater sense of belonging, and greater freedom from withdrawing tendencies and nervous symptoms.¹⁶⁴

On the other hand, there are some who, on the basis of empirical research, are now questioning the conventional rural-urban dichotomy. For instance, Haer suspects that our advanced technology may have reduced the differences between the rural and the urban standard of living

¹⁶²See for example Cities and Society, edited by Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., op.cit.

¹⁶³An interesting descriptive account of life in a small town is presented by Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman in their work Small Town in Mass Society, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1960.


¹⁶⁴A. R. Magnus, "Personality Adjustment of Rural and Urban Children" from Cities and Society, op.cit., pp. 680-691.

enough to make any other differences between the two groups negligible.¹⁶⁵ This latter work is introduced to suggest the notion that perhaps increasingly today the typology as a way of characterizing behavior traits has become relatively useless; that in a modern industrial setting, what remains of the "types" is seen only in terms of spatial distances; that the temporal aspect has been significantly reduced to nullify any differential affects of spatial distribution. This point should be recognized in analyzing the relationship of community type to delegate role orientations.

As indicated earlier in the discussion of social background characteristics, the delegates come from various community types. The classifications of farm, small town, outside city limits (fringe areas), and within city limits might fit well into a rural-urban continuum. But it has been well substantiated that the distances from the outer limits (e.g., farm) to the city have been "reduced" by the construction of super highways and high-powered automobiles in addition to modern mass media of communication. This suggests that the social aspects of the dichotomy may have been greatly changed also and that whatever social cleavage was apparent before between the two extreme types may now no longer exist. Thus, differences in external physical characteristics of these community-types might well exist but patterns of behavior may no longer remain unique.

These arguments suggest that community-types today cannot provide any predictive index for social behavior in a general sense. Thus, one might expect that there would not be a strong relationship between role

¹⁶⁵John L. Haer, "Conservatism-Radicalism and the Rural-Urban Continuum," from Cities and Society, op.cit., pp. 692-697



orientation and community type. The following tables give the distribution of role orientation by community-types of the delegates.

Table 30 Community-type and organizational values

Community-Type	Guttman Scale Types				Total
	Democratic--Bureaucratic				
	1	2	3	4	
Farm	4	4	1	3	12
Small Town	9	7	6	12	34
Outside City Limits	5	1	0	4	10
Within City Limits	<u>5</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>51</u>
Total	23	26	15	43	107*

*1 case = no response

Degrees of Freedom = 9

Chi-Square = 13.64

.10 < P < .20

Table 31 Community-type and allegiance

Community Type	Allegiance				Total
	Local		International		
	1	2	3	4	
Farm	2	4	4	3	13
Small Town	8	10	12	4	34
Outside City Limits	1	5	2	2	10
Within City Limits	<u>8</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>49</u>
Total	19	32	41	14	106*

*2 cases = no responses

Degrees of Freedom = 9

Chi-Square = 6.32

.70 < P < .80

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Table 32 Community-type and representational types

Community-Type	Representational Types				Total
	Trustee		Delegate		
	1	2	3	4	
Farm	4	4	3	2	13
Small Town	8	8	14	4	34
Outside City Limits	1	3	5	1	10
Within City Limits	8	16	18	8	50
	—	—	—	—	—
Total	21	31	40	15	107*

*1 case = no response

Degrees of Freedom = 9

Chi-Square = 3.94

.90 < P < .95

The chi-square values obtained from the distribution in these tables do not lead one to conclude that there are significant differences between community-types in terms of delegate role orientation. Both distributions in representation types and allegiance are shown to be fairly random. The distribution on organizational values lies at the threshold of the significance level. The dominant feature in this particular distribution is that those delegates living within the city limits are less inclined toward democratic participation and more directed toward bureaucratic efficiency. On the other hand, the farm-type shows a stronger inclination toward a democratic rather than a bureaucratic orientation. One explanation may be that the farm family still has stronger familial bonds as a result of which sentiments may affect their external personal relationships whereas the urban dweller might well be thoroughly oriented toward pragmatic efficiency and cold objectivity. This explanation does maintain a logical consistency with earlier discussions of segmentalized participation on the part of the urban dweller and the concomitant blasé attitude that he exhibits in regard to the world about him.

5. Job Classification and Role Orientation

Degree of skill on the job has been considered very frequently as a crucial variable in the determination of various factors (e.g., job satisfaction, job stability, etc.). One might conjecture that the semi-skilled and unskilled group, being the most numerous in industrial unions and at the same time most replaceable on the job, would, as delegates, stress local, job-related issues, would be less concerned with organizational efficiency, and would be most concerned with having and acting upon explicit directions from their constituents in order to minimize the likelihood of loss of the job security provided by their union position. If this argument is tenable, then it would seem that the more skilled would show less concern for democratic participation, less local allegiance, and reflect more a trustee-type orientation. The following tables reveal that the hypotheses suggested here are untenable.

Table 33 Job classification and organizational values

Job Classification	Guttman Scale Types				Total
	Democratic 1	2	Bureaucratic 3	4	
Unskilled and semi-skilled	11	19	12	20	62
Skilled	7	4	4	16	31
White Collar*	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>15</u>
Total	23	26	16	43	108

*Includes both office-clerical and fulltime union workers

Degrees of Freedom = 6

Chi-Square = 9.56

.10 < P < .20

Table 34 Job classification and allegiance

Job Classification	Allegiance				Total
	Local 1	2	International 3	4	
Unskilled and semi-skilled	12	20	23	7	62
Skilled	5	9	13	3	30
White Collar	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>16</u>
Total	19	34	41	14	108
Degrees of Freedom = 6					
Chi-Square = 3.33					
.70 < P < .80					

Table 35 Job classification and representational types

Job Classification	Representational Types				Total
	Trustee 1	2	Delegate 3	4	
Unskilled and semi-skilled	11	19	24	8	62
Skilled	7	6	12	6	31
White Collar	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>13</u>
Total	21	31	40	14	106*
*2 cases = no responses					
Degrees of Freedom = 6					
Chi-Square = 5.34					
.50 < P < .70					

F. Social Background Characteristics and Mobility Orientation

It has been said that work in the industrial urban community is primarily nontraditional.¹⁶⁶ One implication of this label is a strong mobility orientation of functionally task-oriented groups. The fact that

¹⁶⁶Nels Anderson, The Urban Community: A World Perspective, New York: Henry-Holt and Company, 1959. p. 327.

the positions are fluid complements the basic cultural value orientation of achievement and success discussed above. This fluidity accomodates another social aspect which appears to be crucial in the individual's life adjustment -- the prestige value of the occupation. There are a wide variety of factors which, in various combinations, determine the prestige level of different occupations and work role performances. With this structuring of the relevant factors there is a higher probability of fulfilling the achievement motive. In this way, success may be obtained in varying degrees and deprivation may be perceived as relative. A common cultural bias in research on mobility aspiration has been to perceive the larger cultural goals as universals without consideration for the individual's perspective. Thus, the "deviants" would be those without any aspiration for what are culturally defined as the most desirable goals. They may be strongly motivated, however, to achieve some lesser goal even though what has been culturally defined as desirable is inaccessible. Merton explicitly recognized this fact when he set up his typology of modes of individual adaptation.¹⁶⁷ If what the mechanic defines as achievement is to become a better mechanic, success in attaining this goal may be regarded as upward mobility from the perspective of his reference group. The unemployed person is mobile if he becomes employed, though it may be the most unskilled job in other's eyes. The relevant reference group for the unemployed may be those with less skill and those still unemployed. In their own eyes, they have achieved some measure of mobility that gives

¹⁶⁷Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957, pp. 139-156.

personal satisfaction, the larger cultural goals notwithstanding.

It has been suggested earlier that the union could be an outlet for those who find mobility channels blocked in the factory. The available positions have a hierarchical relationship and at each level there are numerous positions with different degrees of esteem attributed to the role. Thus, the Pension Committee may not be very high in the local hierarchy but may be given due respect by the older members of the local. The question of mobility is thus directed to the delegate in terms of his immediate orientation. In this way there may be consistency between the larger cultural goals of achievement and success and the reality of the situation in which the union official finds himself.

The delegates, because they have been elected to this position, may be seen as upwardly mobile. In fact, for the relatively short period during the legislative process of the convention, these people appear to receive the esteem and respect of both the upper levels (International officers) and the lower levels (the constituency). But the question arises as to whether or not these people seek to attain higher positions in the union which would indicate some measure of mobility orientation. The implication here is that some might well have no more desire to move upward in the union hierarchy; that possibly they have achieved a level of personal satisfaction that requires no additional mobility aspirations. With these conditions in mind, the following general hypothesis is proposed:

Different Social Background Characteristics are associated with variations in Mobility Aspirations.

With this guiding hypothesis, some selected social background factors will be considered.

1. Age and Mobility Orientation

An earlier test revealed the significance of this factor to mobility aspirations. In the earlier analysis age was used as a test factor (control) to determine the relevance of experience in the union to a "calling" vs. a "career" orientation to union position. The conclusion arrived at earlier was that age was the significant factor associated with this attitude. The following table substantiates this earlier conclusion.

Table 36 Age and mobility orientation

Age Group	Mobility Orientation			Total
	Very Imp't	Somewhat Imp't	Not Imp't	
Up to 35 years	11	3	8	22
36 - 45 years	10	8	28	46
46 years & over	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>36</u>
Total	22	15	67	104*

*4 cases = no responses
 Degrees of Freedom = 6
 Chi-Square = 20.13
 $.001 < P < .01$

Significantly, the younger members feel that it is very important to move up in the union hierarchy while the older members feel that it is not important to move up. Several factors may explain this difference, which have not been considered in the previous analysis. First, the older workers may actually hold, at present, the more prestigious jobs and thereby have no more desire for upward mobility; second, the competitive aspect of maintaining these elective positions may appear too strenuous to these older members to afford any motivation on their part for any more prestigious job than they presently hold; third, the younger members, in achieving some measure of success have been inspired to achieve higher goals in the

union; and, fourth, for the younger members channels of mobility are more easily perceived in the union than in the plant given this basic orientation to achieve.

2. Education and Mobility Orientation

Consistent with the achievement orientation, part of our cultural heritage has been the push toward higher levels of education for all. Education, then, complements the idea of achievement and success and, as such, has been defined as one of the primary means to achieving those desirable goals. Such being the case, it would seem reasonable to assume a relationship between levels of education and mobility orientation. Thus the following sub-hypothesis is suggested: The higher the level of education, the greater will be the mobility orientation. The following table analyzes this relationship:

Table 37 Educational level and mobility orientation

Educational Level	Mobility Orientation			Total
	Very Imp't	Somewhat Imp't	Not Imp't	
Up to Jr. High	2	1	19	22
High School	16	12	43	71
College and over	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>11</u>
Total	22	15	67	104*

*4 cases = no responses

Degrees of Freedom = 4

Chi-Square = 7.08

.10 < P < .20

The chi-square value obtained indicates a tendency toward the predicted direction though it falls short of the commonly accepted significance value. Cell values indicate that the less educated do not feel strongly about mobility aspirations whereas the more educated do indicate a desire

to move up in the organizational hierarchy.

3. Race and Mobility Orientation

Though traditionally the Negro's "life chances" have been particularly poor, the union nevertheless has been instrumental in making occupational opportunities in the factories more accessible to him. Also, there are many examples to show that, when given the opportunity, the Negro has demonstrated the desire to improve his status. Assuming then, that in the union, there is perceived the opportunity to move up, given the ability, one would expect to find no less a desire among Negroes to achieve status than among whites. The following table reveals an interesting pattern of orientation.

Table 38 Race and mobility orientation

Race	Mobility Orientation			Total
	Very Imp't	Somewhat Imp't	Not Imp't	
White	18	12	64	94
Negro	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	22	15	67	104*

*4 cases = no responses

Degrees of Freedom = 2

Chi-Square = 6.00

.02 < P < .05

What is discovered here is a significant difference between Negroes and whites in their mobility orientations. However, the results show that the Negroes are more mobility oriented than the whites. In terms of ratios, the whites are better than two to one uninterested in mobility aspirations whereas the Negroes are better than two to one inclined toward mobility aspirations.

4. Job Aspects and Mobility Orientation

Two variables are considered here: 1) job classification, 2) job satisfaction. The degree of skill one has on the job may have some association with mobility orientation since with greater ability one might have the necessary confidence as well as greater opportunity to achieve higher levels of prestige. Job satisfaction may be thought to engender this same kind of confidence although it might also reflect satisfaction with one's present level of achievement.

Table 39 Job classification and mobility orientation

Job Classification	Mobility Orientation			Total
	Very Imp't	Somewhat Imp't	Not Imp't	
Unskilled and semi-skilled	16	11	33	60
Skilled	4	2	23	29
White Collar	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>15</u>
Total	22	15	67	104*

*4 cases = no responses
 Degrees of Freedom = 4
 Chi-Square = 5.79
 $.20 < P < .30$

Contrary to expected tendencies, the relatively unskilled group showed a greater inclination toward mobility orientation than the other groups. Both the skilled and the white-collar groups fell short of the expected values in cells with the "mobility important" responses and exceeded the expected values in the cells containing responses regarding mobility as not important. One possible explanation for this pattern is that the relatively unskilled, finding mobility channels in the plant rather limited, have emphasized this alternative opportunity in the union as a "way out" more than those who have achieved some measure of status-distinction in the plant.



Table 40 Job satisfaction and mobility orientation

Job Satisfaction	Mobility Orientation			Total
	Very Imp't	Somewhat Imp't	Not Imp't	
Very or fairly unsatisfactory	6	5	6	17
No feelings	2	2	4	8
Very or fairly satisfactory	14	8	57	79
	—	—	—	—
Total	22	15	67	104*

*4 cases = no responses

Degrees of Freedom = 4

Chi-Square = 8.50

.05 < P < .10

Those with some degree of dissatisfaction on the job seem to indicate a greater desire for mobility in the union. Contrarily, those satisfied with their jobs seem to regard mobility in the union as not important. This condition may be due to a difference in orientation to mobility in the union. Those unsatisfied with their jobs regard a union position as being an alternative to an unsatisfactory condition thereby making it an important focus of mobility orientation. On the other hand, those satisfied with their jobs may not experience the same degree of concern with getting a full time union position. This does not mean that they necessarily devalue mobility orientation in the union but instead they do not perceive it as an alternative at present. This explanation suggests a basic ambiguity in the question used to measure mobility orientation of the delegates. Perhaps a less strong term than important should have been introduced to elicit some indication about the desirability of maintaining a position in the union.

5. Income Level and Mobility Orientation

As Miller and Form suggest, "Income advancement often provides a sense of career progress . . ." ¹⁶⁸ These variables are complementary in that income represents the tangible reward for achieving. One might suggest that since income and achievement are complementary, greater income would initiate further incentive to achieve. The hypothesis implied here is tested in the following table.

Table 41 Income and mobility orientation

Income Group	Mobility Orientation			Total
	Very Imp't	Somewhat Imp't	Not Imp't	
Up to \$6999	7	7	23	37
\$7000-\$8999	11	1	26	38
\$9000 & over	4	7	18	29
	—	—	—	—
Total	22	15	67	104*

*4 cases = no responses
 Degrees of Freedom = 4
 Chi-Square = 8.23
 $.05 < P < .10$

The chi-square value of the distribution reveals some association between income level and mobility orientation. The higher income group (\$9000 and over) shows a very slight tendency to be mobility oriented to a greater extent than the lower income group (up to \$6999). However, the most interesting response pattern is that of the middle-income group (\$7000 - \$8999). For this group, the observed frequency in both the not important category and in the very important category exceeds the expected

¹⁶⁸ Delbert C. Miller and William H. Form, Industrial Sociology, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951, p. 751.

value. However, in the somewhat important category the observed frequency is far less than the expected value. It appears that there is a greater likelihood of extreme views in this group.

6. Geographical Origin and Mobility Orientation

There is considerable evidence that regional differences do reflect different attitudinal and behavioral characteristics. This only means that there is a recognition of subcultures with varying value orientations. Commonly used expressions such as "Southerner" and "Northerner" have specific reference to peculiar mannerisms and values and consequently connote that one is different from the other. This fact also suggests that there might be regional differences in regard to orientations such as mobility aspirations. The following table reveals some degree of association although the differences are not statistically significant.

Table 42 Geographical origin of delegate and mobility orientation

Regional Area*	Mobility Orientation		Total
	Very and Some- what Imp't	Not Imp't	
Northern	28	58	86
Southern	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>11</u>
Total	35	62	97**

*The terms used here are the result of combining the frequency distribution of geographically contiguous areas. Northern includes those states in the Middle Atlantic, East North Central, and West North Central states; Southern includes the South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central states.

**The total is reduced because the remaining distribution, apart from no response, are too dispersed geographically to be included in the analysis.

Degrees of Freedom = 1

Chi-Square = 2.66

.10 < P < .20

The results show that those from the South have a stronger inclination to be mobility oriented than those from the North.

7. Other Background Factors and Mobility Orientation

The following background factors show little or no association with mobility orientation. The conclusion is thus made that the distributions are fairly random although some minor trends may be noted.

Table 43 Community-type and mobility orientation

Community Type	Mobility Orientation		Total
	Very and Some- what Imp't	Not Imp't	
Farm	5	8	13
Small Town	11	20	31
Outside City Limits	3	7	10
Within city Limits	17	32	49
	—	—	—
Total	36	67	103

Degrees of Freedom = 3

Chi-Square = .20

.90 < P < .95

Table 44 Social interaction on job and mobility orientation

Social Interaction	Mobility Orientation		Total
	Very and Some- what Imp't	Not Imp't	
Very Often	32	57	89
Often and Once in a while	<u>5</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>15</u>
Total	37	67	104

Degrees of Freedom = 1

Chi-Square (with Yates' Correction) = .0091

.90 < P < .95

Table 45 Fellow workers in neighborhood and mobility orientation

No. of Fellow workers in neighborhood	Mobility Orientation		Total
	Very & Some- what Imp't	Not Imp't	
None	20	32	52
Up to 4	7	15	22
5 - 6	4	3	7
7 or more	6	17	23
	—	—	—
Total	37	67	104

Degrees of Freedom = 3

Chi-Square = 2.64

.30 < P < .50

Table 46 Father's occupation and mobility orientation

Father's Occupation*	Mobility Orientation		Total
	Very & Some- what Imp't	Not Imp't	
Entrepreneurial Managerial, Free Professional, & White Collar	12	25	37
Foreman or Skilled	7	17	24
Semi-skilled, Unskilled, Rural & Migrant worker	17	25	42
	—	—	—
Total	36	67	103

*The dispersed nature of the frequency distribution in these categories necessitated the resultant collapsed distribution.

Degrees of Freedom = 2

Chi-Square = 1.00

.50 < P < .70

Summary of Delegate Role and Mobility Orientation: In general, the findings do not support the major hypothesis presented above concerning the relationships of social background characteristics and delegate role and mobility orientations. Those relationships that stand out as statistically significant involved such variables as age, race, income, and job

satisfaction. These variables were found to have a meaningful association with mobility orientation.

Though the remaining relationships do not appear to stand up as statistically significant, this does not mean that no potentially useful information was obtained. Limiting the analysis of field data to testing the statistical significance of observed differences would mean the discarding of valuable information more often than not. An analogy can be made to a test of the "fairness" of a coin. In setting up the normal binomial expansion, one might want to predict that the coin was unbiased if, out of twelve tosses, ten or less heads/tails appeared. Normally, based on the experiment, if ten or less heads/tails did appear one would judge that the coin was fair. But what if the coin was so built that it would always give eight heads/tails in twelve tosses? Or for that matter consistently seven heads? Aren't these relevant data that give some indication of the quality of bias of the coin? This argument, however, is not presented to suggest the disutility of the tests of significance. On the contrary, to have some predictive assurance, the test becomes necessary. The suggestion here is that it is worth while to report patterns in a distribution even though the degree of association may be slight. This appeal is especially emphasized for those cases where there is as yet very little understanding of the phenomena under investigation. As noted above, many of the background characteristics did not display a statistically significant association with role orientation and mobility aspirations. However, certain tendencies did appear that give some indication of the nature of the relationships among these variables.

1

A. Organizational Values (Democratic participation versus Bureaucratic efficiency).

There was indicated no significant relationship statistically between age and organizational values. Though short of the threshold of the significance level the less educated delegates revealed a tendency toward a more bureaucratic orientation while those with higher education were inclined toward a democratic orientation.

No statistically significant relationship was established between income groups and organizational values. On the other hand the relationship between community-type and organizational values fell short of the threshold of the significance level. What was indicated here was that the delegate from the rural area was more strongly inclined toward a democratic orientation than his urban counterpart.

Social class identification did not appear to be associated with role orientation but this was primarily due, perhaps, to the limited range of type of class identification. Since the distribution clustered mainly around middle and working class identification, it is also possible that these terms might have been interpreted interchangeably.

Experience in the union was not associated with differences in organizational values. With age controlled, the "old timers" and "new comers" are fairly equally distributed over both ends of the scale. The skilled group seemed to fall toward the bureaucratic end of the scale while the white collar group fell toward the democratic end. The semi-skilled and unskilled groups seemed to have taken a "middle-of-the-road" approach in regard to this dimension.

B. Allegiance

Statistically no significant relationship was established between age and allegiance. However, the relationship between educational level and allegiance fell just short at the threshold of the acceptance level. There appears to be indicated here a tendency for the less educated to lean toward a local allegiance.

Differential income level revealed no significant difference on the allegiance scale. In addition, no statistical relationship was found to exist between community-type and allegiance.

Relative "new comers" revealed a fairly strong inclination to give allegiance to the locals. This relationship would appear to be a reasonable predictable one since the immediate reference group for the individual during the early period of his work career (during this present period of relative stability for the union) would be the local that determines his immediate relationship with the company. As noted earlier, the chi-square value obtained for this relationship between experience in the union and allegiance fell just short of the threshold of the significance level.

There was no indication that differences in skill level affected the type of allegiance. Both skilled and unskilled appeared to have been randomly distributed along the scale.

C. Representational Types

No significant relationship statistically was established between age and representational types. Also, level of education and level of income revealed no consistent relationship with a particular representational type. Finally, community-type and different job skills, when related to representation types, appeared to be randomly distributed.

D. Mobility Orientation

As noted above, several statistically significant findings were obtained in regard to the relationship of mobility orientation and background factors. These background factors were age, race, income, and job satisfaction. Briefly, the younger delegate, more so than the older delegate, was strongly oriented toward mobility aspirations. The Negro delegates had greater mobility aspirations than the White delegates and those relatively dissatisfied with their jobs were more mobility oriented than those relatively satisfied with their jobs. Finally, the higher income group showed a greater inclination to be mobility oriented than those in the lower income category.

There was also some indication, though short of the statistically significant level, that those with higher levels of education were more mobility oriented than those with less education. Here also, the relatively unskilled groups were more inclined toward mobility orientation than groups at other skill levels. There is also some indication that Southerners have stronger leanings toward mobility orientation than Northerners.

The relationship of this variable with other background factors such as community-type, level of social interaction on the job, number of fellow-workers in same neighborhood, and father's occupation, revealed no significant patterns statistically.

The following presents a composite summary of the relationship between social background factors and the various dimensions of role orientation.

Background factors	Organizational values	Allegiance	Representational types	Mobility orientation
Age	.50<P<.70	.30<P<.50	.30<P<.50	.001<P<.01
Education	.20<P<.30	.10<P<.20	.70<P<.80	.10 < P<.20
Income	.50<P<.70	.50<P<.70	.70<P<.80	.05 < P<.10
Community-type	.10<P<.20	.70<P<.80	.90<P<.95	.90 < P<.95
Job Classifi- cation	.10<P<.20	.70<P<.80	.50<P<.70	.20 < P<.30
Social Inter- action on the job				.90 < P<.95
Fellow workers in same neighborhood				.30 < P<.50
Father's occupa- tion				.50 < P<.70
Regional area				.10 < P<.20
Experience in labor movement				.001<P<.01
Experience in union				.001<P<.01
Race				.02 < P<.05
Job satisfaction				.05 < P<.10

CHAPTER V

THE CONVENTION DELEGATE AND TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY

Introduction: Factors Associated with Democratic Sentiments. It has been the explicit and constant position of this thesis that the delegate to the International convention is the important functionary in the development and maintenance of democratic processes in the union. Before proceeding, a recapitulation of the arguments for this particular position appears appropriate.

Most union locals which have been studied are democratically organized with a leadership structure characterized by a rather precarious and unstable tenure of office. Various techniques of "politicking" are applied at the local level to influence decision-making processes. These techniques are an institutionalized fact in a democratic system. Thus, there are expected in the resolution of issues, the promises, the cajoling, the "call for a showdown," etc., as part of the "game" of decision-making. In addition to the fact that "the vote" is the final step in the decision-making process, these techniques give tangible evidence of the legitimacy of the view that authority rests in the hands of the constituency or general membership.

As is the case with most large-scale organizations, however, the general membership of trade unions is likely to be largely apathetic. As Form and Dansereau pointed out, union membership may be symbolic of various

orientations to the union.¹⁶⁹ The significant group to consider in regard to the issue of democratic practices in the union are the actives whose primary career and/or associational interests are in the union. These are the people that vote on issues, raise issues, run for offices, get elected, get eliminated from offices, get re-elected, etc. These are the people who may sacrifice a large portion of their free (non-work) time to the administration of union affairs.¹⁷⁰ Studies of union locals have essentially revolved around these people and conclusions arrived at concerning the character of the locals are primarily based on these people. The apathetic, the non-participant, cannot and do not determine the character of the organization.

The fact that the active members may be a minority of the total membership does not preclude the possibility of democratic decision-making processes. Given a formal organizational structure encouraging democratic processes and with leadership at all levels committed to a democratic orientation, it is likely that there will be representation of the views of the membership in the policy-making process and accountability of leadership to the members even though a majority of them are not active participants in the organization. It is necessary, however, that there be a core of active members close enough to the general membership to serve as effective spokesmen for them and concerned enough with democratic procedure to take advantage of formal structural guarantees of leadership accountability.

¹⁶⁹William Form and Harry K. Dansereau, "Union Member Orientations and Patterns of Social Integration," op.cit.

¹⁷⁰See Table 10 for distribution of fulltime and non-fulltime union offices.

The delegates interviewed in this study appear to be part of such an active core within the U. A. W. Almost all have held various union positions, attend meetings regularly, vote in elections and are, in general, active participants in local union affairs. At the same time, they are for the most part not fulltime union officials so that much of their time is spent working in the plant where they are exposed to the views of the general membership. From the previous analysis of their orientations to the delegate role, it would appear that through this position democratic sentiments are channeled into the convention and thereby into the total structure of the union. Again, using Loomis' concept, systemic-linkage¹⁷¹ is maintained by these delegates to assure representation of local views in the decision-making process regarding crucial policy issues. This means that the sentiments of the constituent bodies are likely to be expressed and, in fact, may determine the outcome of issues. Though some delegates felt that there was insufficient opportunity to express themselves at the convention, each had one final assurance of his independence -- he carried his own voting power. And in no uncertain terms he expressed the fact that he was voting independently. One delegate said:

"I represent the membership of my local and no one will tell me how to vote. These officers (International officers) may try to pressure me, but I know I'll vote the way I see it as right for my members."

Emerging out of a democratic setting and being assigned a functional role in the decision-making process is, however, no guarantee that each individual will personally adhere to such a philosophy. It is a basic

¹⁷¹Charles P. Loomis, "Systemic-Linkage of El Cerrito," Rural Sociology, op.cit.

orientation of the democratic system that it tolerates the many personal value orientations maintained within the system. But the paradox of this philosophy is that these differing value orientations may weaken the system as a whole. As the previous chapter on the delegates revealed, there are differing personal value orientations. These may be defined here as personal predispositions, which may be in harmony with the general orientation of the system or a contradiction to it. Thus, though one has emerged as a leader through a democratic process, he may desire a bureaucratic orientation to expedite goal achievement or he may want to increase democratic participation in decision-making. In both cases, the goal might be the same -- economic gains for the membership. However, one can easily note the vulnerability of the former orientation to oligarchic tendencies. In the case where personal predispositions are contradictory to the orientation of the system, these become sources of strain to the system. The paradox here is that there is a complementary arrangement between personal compulsions and the system's strain toward consistency. If the system is strongly oriented toward a democratic philosophy, personal orientations which are in harmony with this philosophy, will be supported by others which will contribute toward accentuating this orientation. If personal compulsions are contradictory to a democratic philosophy, the strength of the system's orientation will tend to inhibit these contradictory compulsions. On the other hand, if the system is weakly oriented toward a democratic philosophy, those disposed toward a democratic orientation might accept the prevailing organizational values or, because the larger cultural orientation supports his views, exert pressure to introduce his view into the system. For those negatively dis-

posed toward a democratic orientation, however, the fact that the larger cultural orientation maintains mixed values in regard to bureaucratic efficiency relative to democratic participation, may provide him with both general cultural and subcultural reinforcement of his views.

The above discussion suggests the consideration of two important variables in the analysis of the character of an organization. These are the specific sentiments that are maintained by the important functionaries and the behavior characteristic of these people since they guide the destiny of the organization. In the analysis of these variables which follow, the delegate was placed in two focal positions: 1) as an observer interpreting the character of his organization, 2) as a participant evaluating his own behavior as conditioned by what he perceives.

The following section rests its claim to relevance upon the Thomas theorem previously cited:

"If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."¹⁷²

The first part of the theorem reminds one that men tend to respond not only to the objective aspects of the situation, but, in addition, to the meaning that the situation holds for them. And, as Merton concisely put it, ". . . once they have assigned some meaning to the situation, their consequent behavior and some of the consequences of that behavior are determined by the ascribed meaning."¹⁷³ One type of consequent behavior is defined by Merton as the self-fulfilling prophecy in that the image created determines the course of behavior thus making the original definition of

¹⁷²Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, op.cit. p. 421.

¹⁷³Ibid., p. 422.

the situation true.

But Merton uses this concept only where the original definition of the situation is false but becomes true as a result of subsequent behavior.¹⁷⁴ The application of this concept in analyzing the delegate's perception of his union neither accepts nor rejects the validity of the delegate's initial definition of the situation. This analysis rests upon the assumption, however, that delegates who ascribe democratic characteristics to their union are more likely to act in such a way as to make the organization function more democratically. The truth or falsity of the definition becomes, in this instance, largely an unknown factor. The course of action that follows the definition of the situation is the major concern in this analysis. What is "perceived," then, is the condition that produces a self-fulfilling prophecy; whether it is true or false has little to do with the consequent behavior.

A. Delegate's Perception of the Union as a Democratic Organization

The first major consideration of the delegate's perception of the union is how he evaluates the total organization. As was implied in the above discussion, "social realities" are most significant to those who are active participants in the group. But in order to talk about the particular "social realities" we are concerned with, an understanding must be reached of the guiding concept -- in this case democracy. The essential and crucial question becomes -- how do these people define democracy? The procedure used in obtaining definitions of democracy provided some reference points by asking for a comparison of their union with others.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 423.

In the responses of these delegates to the request for a definition of the concept "democracy," as many as three descriptive definitions were given by some respondents. Some respondents gave only one major description; others gave only two. Since no order of importance was requested, every unique description was assigned equal value. The following table arranged the responses in the order in which they appeared. Thus, the first column of frequency distribution denotes the first set descriptions given by these respondents; in the second column is the second set of descriptions, etc. Those who gave only one answer appear in the first column only and those who gave only two answers appear in the first and second columns only. Analysis is based on the summated column.

Table 47 Delegate's definition of trade union democracy

Definition	First Descrip- tion	Second Descrip- tion	Third Descrip- tion	<u>Summated</u> Frequency	<u>Score</u> Percentage
Officers elected, chosen by rank and file	23	5	1	29	16.11
Rank and file run the union: parti- cipate in deci- sion-making	30	14	1	45	25.00
Freedom to oppose; no reprisals; se- cret ballots; anyone can run for office	7	5	4	16	8.89
Freedom of ex- pression	27	16	8	51	28.33
Leadership demo- cratically oriented; responsive, sincere, accountable	2	2	1	5	2.78
No corruption; honest officers	7	1	1	9	5.00

Table 47 continued

Definition	First Descrip- tion	Second Descrip- tion	Third Descrip- tion	<u>Summated Score</u>	
				Frequency	Percentage
Structural guaran- tees mentioned. e.g., Public Review Bd., Appeals, etc.	2	2	1	5	2.78
Unclassified	9	6	4	19	10.56
No answer	1	-	-	1	.56
Totals	108			180	100.01

It is interesting to note the similarity between the delegates' definition of the term and the conditions necessary for maintenance of democratic processes specified earlier. It was noted above that among these conditions are a democratic ideological commitment and a setting with structural guarantees. By clear implication, the delegates' definitions include an ideological commitment and structural guarantees. But nowhere do the delegates indicate concern with that extra qualification imposed by many who define democracy as though turnover of leadership were the primary indication that the system is actually operating democratically. It is the election process itself which is apparently important and whether the process results in turnover depends, among other things, on the perceived ability of alternatives to the incumbent officials. As one delegate expressed it:

"In spite of all the things I have against Reuther, I guess I would vote for him. There is no one really prepared to take over. At least he is not like Hoffa."

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the author to the reader, explaining the purpose of the study and the methods used. The letter is dated 1950 and is addressed to the reader.

2. The second part of the document is a list of references, which includes books, articles, and other sources used in the study. The references are listed in alphabetical order.

3. The third part of the document is a list of figures, which includes tables, graphs, and other visual aids. The figures are listed in alphabetical order.

4. The fourth part of the document is a list of tables, which includes tables of data, tables of results, and other tables. The tables are listed in alphabetical order.

5. The fifth part of the document is a list of appendices, which includes appendices of data, appendices of results, and other appendices. The appendices are listed in alphabetical order.

6. The sixth part of the document is a list of footnotes, which includes footnotes of data, footnotes of results, and other footnotes. The footnotes are listed in alphabetical order.

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20. The twentieth part of the document is a list of references, which includes books, articles, and other sources used in the study. The references are listed in alphabetical order.

The union member is first oriented toward economic objectives and if these are met he is unlikely to be very dissatisfied with existing leadership. Bread and butter goals are still the primary concerns of the union, and, as implied above, it might be self-defeating to change leadership for the sake of change itself. There was, for the most part, among the delegates interviewed apparent satisfaction with the present leadership. The true test would come if general dissatisfaction were expressed over leadership behavior and there was recognition of alternative choices "perceived" as more competent than those presently in office.

The definitions given by the delegates indicate that democracy means leadership accountability to membership and membership "voice" in controlling the organization. The most dominant theme expressed was freedom of expression in the organization. Better than 28 percent of the definitions given concerned this issue. Twenty-five percent of the definitions were concerned with membership participation in decision-making, while better than 16 percent specifically pointed out the selection of officers by rank and file as the important criterion. These last two points indicate that better than 41 percent feel democracy means the resolution of issues by the rank and file. Related to this, better than 8 percent felt that democracy means freedom to oppose without fear and that one way to assure this is the secret ballot. In addition, this same group expressed the feeling that the concept also means that anyone may run for office.

These delegates also required certain ideological commitments on the part of the leadership. Five percent defined democracy to mean honest officers, and, on the whole, no corruption in the union organization. This last sentiment is perhaps the result of the news items appearing at the time charging several of the major unions with corrupt leadership. Also,


better than 2 percent defined the concept to mean responsive, sincere, and accountable leadership who are "democratically" oriented.

Finally, better than 2 percent cited the presence of other formal structural guarantees such as appeals procedure and the Public Review Board as part of the definition of democracy.

To give a definition to a concept is quite different from the acceptance of that concept as a practicing philosophy. And to accept the concept as a practicing philosophy does not reveal the motivations underlying the acceptance of such a philosophy. Information was also sought regarding whether or not the delegates consider it important for an organization to be democratic. If it is important, why is it so? In response to the first question, the entire sample of delegates considered it very important that the organization be democratic. However, as the following table reveals, some variations appear in the reasons given as to why the organization should be democratically run.

Table 48 Reasons given by delegates to why they consider it very important that a union be run democratically

Reasons	Frequency	Percentage
Union belongs to rank & file; Avoid dictatorship and control by a few; Rank and file participation	50	46.30
Avoid Corruption	5	4.62
Union solidarity, keep rank & file together; Gain respectability	17	15.74
Not classifiable	<u>36</u>	<u>33.33</u>
Total	108	99.99



Clearly, the dominant sentiment expressed for wanting the union to be democratically run is to reserve power in the hands of the membership. Although not spelled out in Michelian terms, these people seemed to have clearly recognized the undesirability of any oligarchic tendency in the organization. In addition, these delegates believed that by being democratically run, the organization will project an image consistent with the larger cultural orientation. In this respect, they feel that unity is preserved within the organization and some measure of respectability is gained for the union.

1. Comparison With Other International Unions

The satisfaction that one derives from his particular situation is likely to be relative to what other situations offer. No adequate objective measure of the extent to which various International unions function democratically is available. Reference group theory may, however, be helpful in understanding the process through which the delegates arrived at an assessment of democracy within the U. A. W.¹⁷⁵

Briefly, in introducing the concept of relative-deprivation, Merton explains that the individual tends to evaluate his particular situation in terms of what he regards as his significant reference group. Where the individual has no objective measure to evaluate his situation, he compares his situation with particular others. The result of this comparison gives him the feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with his own status situation. This initial inquiry into the delegate's perception of his

¹⁷⁵The general framework of Merton's Reference Group Theory is utilized here. See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Chapter VIII, op.cit.

11-11-11

union is not concerned with whether or not he is satisfied with the amount of democracy he perceives but rather to what extent he regards the U. A. W. as being more or less democratic than other union organizations. It is assumed that the relative position in which he places his union will determine the feelings that he will hold. Proceeding from this basic orientation, the delegates were asked to evaluate how democratically their union was run in comparison to other International unions. The following table shows in what light the delegates see their union in comparison to others. The overwhelming majority perceived their union as more democratically run than any other. If the first and second categories are combined, the result will show that better than 98 percent of the delegates "see" their union as equally, if not more democratically run than any other union organization. If it is assumed that no other reference group is significant to the delegates except other union organizations, following the theoretical position that Merton put forth, it would be a fairly valid assumption that the delegates are relatively satisfied with the status of democracy in their union.

Table 49 Delegate's perception of how democratically his union is run in comparison to other international unions

Relative Position	Frequency	Percentage
More	98	90.74
About same	8	7.41
Less	1	.93
Don't Know	<u>1</u>	<u>.93</u>
Totals	108	100.01

Logically, the next question would be to determine how these delegates made such comparative judgments. That is, what criteria did they use to judge the relative position of their union vis-a-vis other unions?

An interesting consistency is revealed in the delegate's definition of the concept democracy and the criteria that he used for his comparative judgment. The 106 cases who were of the opinion that their union was equally or more democratically run than others are included in the following table indicating the criteria used for the comparative judgment.

Table 50 Criteria used for making comparative judgment concerning the delegate's union vis-a-vis other unions on how democratically it is run

Criteria	Frequency	Percentage
Rank and file choose and elect officers	9	8.49
Rank and file participate in decision-making	23	21.70
Freedom to oppose without intimidation, to run for office	4	3.77
Freedom of expression	10	9.43
Leadership sincere, accountable	2	1.89
No corruption, honest officers	18	16.98
Formal structural guarantees	11	10.38
Not classifiable	17	16.04
Don't know and No response	<u>12</u>	<u>11.32</u>
Totals	106	100.00

Similar to the various definitions given, though with slight shifts in emphasis, structural aspects appear to dominate the list. The dominant theme is rank and file participation in the affairs of the union. That this seems to be the most important criterion is perhaps attributable to the recognition that without the active participation of at least the active core of members, structural guarantees are nothing but a facade.

2. Comparison With Other Locals in the Union

Since the U. A. W. locals are fairly autonomous units with respect to issues of local concern, it is conceivable that the locals themselves may vary in rigidity and flexibility of controls. This means that it is

possible that some locals are controlled by a few who have "taken over" the essential responsibility of running the organization while others may be operating with free and active participation encouraged. Internally then, the concept of relative deprivation may well operate to produce some degree of dissatisfaction with the local government. Since the primary foci of interest for these delegates are the locals, the inference may be drawn that the favorable position attributed to the International union may be a function of favorable impressions derived at the local levels. That is, these delegates may "see" their locals in a favorable light compared to other locals within the organization and it may be this which conditioned their responses regarding the comparison of the U. A. W. with other unions. The following table suggests that this is not the case. Almost two-thirds regard their local as "about the same" as others which, by inference from the data in the preceding table (49), suggests that most of these delegates felt that at both the local and International level the U. A. W. was run more democratically than most other unions. The 6 percent

Table 51 Delegate's perception of how democratically his local is run in comparison to other locals in the union

Relative Position	Frequency	Percentage
More	29	26.85
About the same	69	63.89
Less	7	6.48
Don't know	1	.93
No response	<u>2</u>	<u>1.85</u>
Totals	108	100.00

of the delegates who perceived their locals as being less democratically run than others also give some assurance that differences are recognized

as occurring both within the U. A. W. and between the U. A. W. and other unions.

3. Membership Voice in the Union

It was noted earlier that the most general concern expressed in the definition of democracy given by these delegates was that of active participation. Any test of the democratic character of an organization comes when the general membership attempts to operationalize the provisions spelled out in the charter of the organization. To say that an organization is democratic has no meaning if one finds communication channels blocked by the imposition of many formal obstacles in the name of bureaucratic efficiency. To the ordinary member of the local, freedom to participate, whether it is a debate or discussion of significant issues, or even to run for office, looms as the most reliable index of the democratic character of the organization.

Since it is fairly obvious that, at least with respect to policy implementation, the U. A. W. is a large-scale bureaucracy, the concern is to determine how rigidly bureaucratized it is at present. The ideal type of bureaucracy (and thereby the most rigid type) is structured so that communication of the mandate-type is filtered down to the lower levels from the upper levels of the hierarchy. The back-flow of communication from the lower levels to the upper levels is more likely to be simply information of various sorts. In considering the nature of changes in the union organization, the concern here is whether or not there has been a concomitant shift of the flow of communication along with the growth of bureaucratic structure. That is, during the earlier stages of organizing, a rather militant membership body did express the "popular voice" which was interpreted as mandate by the leadership hierarchy. Channels of communica-

tion were mainly directed upward to the leadership. Has the change in organizational structure brought about a reversal of this main flow? More important, do these important functionaries, the delegates, who are the main channel for certain types of communication, perceive such a change? One can reasonably assume that if such changes are perceived, the effects of these changes upon the delegates will be twofold: 1) the image that they hold of their union as a democratic organization will be weakened; 2) the image of their functional utility as delegates to the convention will be lessened. The first effect has, in a sense, been found to be absent already since most delegates regard the U. A. W. as being run democratically. The second effect will be considered in a later section of this chapter. The question used to elicit some response concerning change in membership voice in the union operates in a dual role: 1) as a validating instrument, 2) as a predictive instrument. The impression that the delegates perceive the U. A. W. as a democratic union would tend to be validated if it can be shown that they feel that the membership has a greater "voice" now than before in running the government of the union. In addition, if the delegate claims that the membership has a greater "voice" now in running the government of the union, one can predict that he will perceive the convention as having a decision-making function. The following table reveals that the main flow of directed communication, as perceived by the delegates, still originate from the constituent body. As readily seen, the distribution supports the delegate view of the U. A. W. noted in the data presented previously. About 75 percent of the delegates perceive their union members to have the same or even more voice in the operation of the union than 20 years ago. In some instances, this is an impressionistic statement since some of the delegates were not with the union twenty years

ago at its formative stages. However, consistent with the Thomas theorem, the assumption is that these impressions form the basis of the delegates' response to the organization.

Table 52 Delegate's perception of membership voice in union government compared to 20 years ago

Relative Amount	Frequency	Percentage
More	63	58.33
Same	17	15.74
Less	26	24.07
No response	<u>2</u>	<u>1.85</u>
Totals	108	99.99

4. Level of Political Activity in the Local

The relative intensity of political activity in the local may condition the impression that one derives of the organization. In other words, what one "sees" may be "colored" by the apparent rate of activity taking place in the local government. Thus, the fact that there are parties or factions in operation, several slates of candidates during election periods, and heated discussions, agreement and disagreement during and in-between elections, may well create the image that the individual members is not only participating more intensively but that he is running union government. If this image is important in determining the sentiments that the delegate will hold, it would seem relevant at this point to establish the degree of association between level of political activity at the local and the delegate's perception of membership voice in union government. The following hypothesis is tested in the table to follow: Delegates from locals of relatively high political activity are more likely to perceive their membership as having at least equal or greater voice in union govern-

ment compared to previous years than do delegates from locals of relatively low political activity. The data obtained do not support this hypothesis. The direction of the association is, in fact, in the opposite of that predicted.

Table 53 Level of political activity of delegate's local and his perception of membership voice in union government

Level of Political Activity (Scale Type)*	Membership Voice in Government Compared to 20 Years ago		
	Some or less	More	Total
1 to 3	18	40	58
4 & 5	<u>25</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>48</u>
Totals	43	63	106**

*Scale types have been collapsed because of small cell frequencies

**2 cases = no responses

Degrees of freedom = 1

Chi-Square (with Yates' correction) = 3.97

P < .05

T = .194¹⁷⁶

Delegates from locals having the lower degree of political activity (scale types 1 to 3) had the higher proportion reporting that the members had more voice in union government now than twenty years ago. The greater deviation from expected frequencies, however, is in the proportion of delegates from locals with a high degree of political activity (scale types 4 & 5) who report that the membership has about the same voice or even less in union

¹⁷⁶For this measure of the degree of association, the square root of T was used, where: $T^2 = \frac{X^2}{N\sqrt{(t-1)(s-1)}}$

See J. P. Guilford, Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education 2nd Ed., Chapter 13, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950.

government now as before. It may be that in the politically active locals there has always been a high level of responsiveness to rank and file demands thus reducing the potential for change. The analysis of this variable contained in a later section of this chapter tends to support this view.

B. Delegate's Perception of the Convention and His Role in the Decision-making Process

It has been suggested that the International Convention is one formal structural mechanism which binds the International to the constituent locals. The convention may be referred to as the passageway through which systemic-linkage is maintained. The mediator of the two systems, the delegate, makes possible this systemic linkage. Through the delegate may be passed on those sentiments that he perceives as the dominant orientation of his local. But for the delegate to be motivated to bring these sentiments to the central decision-making body, he must have faith in the importance of the convention. In other words, does he see the convention as operating under a democratic system or is he convinced that it is merely a showcase for the benefit of the general membership as well as the general public? Does the convention appear to him as functionally a policy decision-making body or does he see it as merely a place where policies already made by the International officers are simply accepted? If the delegate does see the convention in terms of this negative view, it is reasonable that he would evaluate his role as non-functional and unimportant. His behavior at the convention would be likely to reflect this view. On the other hand, if he perceives his role as truly functional in the decision-making process, he would be more likely to seek an active role in establishing union policies.

To find out the image that these delegates had of the function of the convention, a simple, direct question was asked to determine whether or not they thought the really important decisions were made by the convention. It was clearly understood that the convention meant the delegate body. The following distribution gives a clear idea of the image that these people have of their role in the convention. Significantly, the

Table 54 Responses given by the delegates to the question: Would you say that the really important decisions in the union are made by the convention?

Response Type	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	83	76.85
No	22	20.37
No response & Don't know	3	2.78
Totals	108	100.00

larger part of the delegate body perceived their roles at the convention as functionally important. With this kind of self-image, it would be a safe to expect active participation at the convention on the part of these delegates. But what kind of image does the minority group hold in regard to the convention proceedings? If they perceive their role as non-functional, who does make the policies for the union? Of the 22 delegates who did not hold the convention as functionally important, 18 of them or approximately 82 percent felt that the International Executive Board really set the policies prior to the convening of the convention. Three delegates or approximately 14 percent of those who perceived the convention as non-functional felt that the local executive board determined policies prior to the convention. One delegate felt that the

committees on the floor really made the decisions.

In addition to this image that the delegate holds of the relative importance of the convention, he must believe that he is performing a necessary and important service for his constituency. An important component of this view may be his impression of whether his constituents regard the convention as important. If the delegate perceives his local membership as considering the convention very important, he is more likely to regard his role at the convention as of importance. The delegates were asked specifically if their local constituencies regarded the convention as important in determining the policies of the union. In addition, they were asked to give some reason as to why they thought the members felt that way. The following distribution shows that a large majority of the membership, in the delegate's eyes, regard the convention as a decision-making body.

Table 55 Delegate's perception of local constituent's attitude toward the convention as a policy decision-making body.

Do Members Regard Convention as Important in Determining UAW Policies? Why?		Frequency	Percentage
Yes:	They demonstrated interest.	31	28.70
	They feel affected by the decisions made.	22	20.37
	Rank and file have participation in decision-making	22	20.37
		—	—
	<u>Totals</u>	75	69.44
No:	They feel disillusioned	16	14.81
	General Apathy	12	11.11
	General Ignorance	3	2.78
	They feel that only the local is important.	2	1.85
		—	—
	<u>Totals</u>	33	30.55
	<u>Grand Totals</u>	108	99.99

The reasons given for the particular response seem worthy of some remarks. The approximately 70 percent who felt positively about membership attitude toward the convention used, on the whole, a fairly common clue for making such an observation -- the demonstrated interest of the membership. The other two reasons seem to be related to the first. Feeling affected by the decisions made and feeling that they are participating in decision-making may also result in demonstrated interest. The majority of delegates who saw the members' attitudes as negative were influenced by the perceived general apathy and disillusionment of the membership toward the convention.

Earlier, it was suggested that the level of political activity in the local might be used also as a predictive variable. Specifically, is it possible to predict from the index of political activity in the local the kind of perception the delegates would hold of their constituencies? The following specific hypothesis is proposed: Delegates from locals of high political activity are more likely to perceive that their constituencies regard the convention as important in policy decision-making than are delegates from locals of low political activity. The following table shows the relationship between level of political activity of the locals and delegates' perception of their constituents' attitude toward the convention.

The chi-square test of significance indicates that the distribution is unlikely to occur simply by chance. The direction of the association tends to support the hypothesis, i.e., where there is a low degree of political activity the convention is likely to be regarded as of less importance. The degree of association between level of political activity

Table 56 Level of political activity at the local and delegate's perception of his constituent's attitude toward the convention

Level of Political Activity (Scale Type)	Do Members Regard Convention as Important in Determining UAW Policies?		Total
	No	Yes	
1 & 2	15	18	33
3	4	21	25
4 & 5	14	36	50
	—	—	—
Totals	33	75	108

Degrees of Freedom = 2

Chi-Square = 6.03

.02 < P < .05

and delegate's perception of membership attitude toward the convention, as measured by T, is equal to .20, a fairly high association.

C. Reasons for First Becoming Active in the Union Movement

No matter what an individual's personal political values may be, if he lives in a society with a cultural orientation based on a democratic ideology, he will be likely to use this ideology to justify actions against what he perceives as undemocratic behavior toward him and his fellow men. Thus the behavior of even those persons with authoritarian or anti-democratic predispositions may, under these circumstances, be consistent with democratic values. One possible consequence of this process is that the individual may, over time, internalize democratic values which were adopted initially for purely expedient purposes. This possibility gives an added twist to the Thomas theorem mentioned above. In other words, a culturally given definition of a situation which is inconsistent with an individual's personal values may, if it is consist-

ently acted upon, result in a change in these personal values in the direction of the cultural definition.

There is no way of discovering what personal values the delegates in this study held when they first became active in the union. It is possible to obtain the reasons they now give for becoming active, recognizing that these explanations may be conditioned by the value system of the organization in which they have been active. The following table shows the explanations given by these delegates for first becoming active in the union movement. With some slight differences, the explanations given approximate those discovered by Seidman, London and Karsh in a study of local leadership.¹⁷⁷

Table 57 Explanation given by delegates for deciding to become active in the union movement

Explanation	Frequency	Percentage
Concern with workers well-being, with working-class, with working conditions, etc.	52	48.55
Dissatisfaction with union administration	21	19.44
Family influence	10	9.26
Feel personally qualified; to do a better job, etc.	3	2.78
Mobility concerns; wanted to improve own status	1	.93
Not classifiable	21	19.44
Totals	108	100.00

¹⁷⁷Joel Seidman, Jack London and Bernard Karsh, "Leadership in a Local Union," American Journal of Sociology, 56 (November 1950), pp. 229-237.

The major explanation given is not concerned with internal union problems but does show very clearly a concern with the problems of the general membership. Though there is no doubt self-interest is involved here also, this concern may reflect a high degree of responsiveness to membership problems on the part of these delegates. The second major reason is directly aimed at internal union problems and is indicative that a democratic structure existed since these delegates are now in leadership positions though opposed to the administration at the time they became active. Other responses of these delegates suggest that some are part of a faction opposed to the present administration of the International union. The third major reason perhaps reflects more tangibly the strength of social and cultural traditions in regard to the acceptance of an ideology. Family influence refers to such background factors as: "father was an active union man," "my uncle belonged to the union," "my brother is a very active union man," "father helped in the early organizing," etc. Being involved actively in affairs of the union is a specific familial heritage for these people. As the distribution indicates, self-interest, (i.e., mobility or career concerns, personal qualifications, etc.), does not appear as a major reason for being active in union affairs. Once having become active, however, it appears that career and mobility considerations assume increasing importance although not necessarily at the expense of concern for serving the membership. As noted above, concern with mobility may be motivated by either self-interest or a desire to serve the union in a more important post.

D. Delegate's Career Orientation

Descriptions of the delegate earlier indicated that, through active

participation, he has often come to assume some functionally important role in the local. These factors -- active participation leading to assumption of leadership in the local -- together or singly, made it possible for these people to become elected as convention delegates. Occupancy of any position in the union hierarchy, including that of convention delegate, is likely to make more visible the channels through which further upward mobility may be achieved.

In spite of the reasons given for initial involvement in union affairs, it was demonstrated earlier that there were among the group of delegates a fairly large number who aspire to hold higher offices at the local and the International level. Two major reasons given for such aspirations were economic rewards and the psychic reward of performing a service for the membership. These various explanations suggest the many dimensions of status distinction which may serve to produce mobility aspirations. Irrespective of the motive for seeking higher office, however, control of mobility opportunities by the general membership of the organization may result in concern with meeting their expectations. For this reason, the following proposition is again introduced:

MOBILITY ORIENTATION IS FUNCTIONAL IN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

In most democratically organized systems, access to key offices is through the method of general election by the membership at large. Other functionally important positions within the organization may be assumed by the method of appointment either by an executive board or by key officials. The analysis of delegate role orientations revealed that a large number aspired to elective positions. Since access to office is limited by the number of offices available, the mobility oriented delegate may be forced to consider appointive as well as elective mobility

channels. Success in moving through these different channels may be dependent upon meeting the expectations of quite different reference groups. For those seeking elective positions, the general membership becomes the significant reference group while for those seeking appointive offices, the various key officials in the local as well as in the International office would be more likely to be the appropriate reference groups. Whenever access to an occupational role is through a competitive system, a major source of strain for the incumbent may be insecurity of tenure. This insecurity of tenure may force the person occupying the particular role to attempt to reduce these tensions. The person devoting time and energy to the security of his tenure will naturally be more responsive to those who govern his tenure.¹⁷⁸ For aspirants to these different positions then, seeking and holding office means conforming to and respecting as legitimate expectations of different reference groups. For those seeking elective offices, sanctions available to the general membership may produce the accountability necessary in a democratic organization. As suggested by Gross, et al., the following assumption has a particular application here: If an aspirant perceives that failure to conform to expectations of his significant reference group will result in the application of strong negative sanctions (in this case, failure to be elected), the aspirant will be predisposed to conform to the expectations of the group.¹⁷⁹ This statement suggests the following series of

¹⁷⁸ William C. Mitchell, "Occupational Role Strains: The American Elective Public Official," Administrative Science Quarterly, (September 1958), Ithaca, New York: Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University, pp. 212-213.

¹⁷⁹ Neal Gross, et al., op.cit., p. 286.

sub-hypotheses:

- a. The mobility oriented delegate who perceives vertical movement through elective channels will more likely feel membership expectations as legitimate than one who seeks vertical movement through appointive channels.¹⁸⁰

The aspirant realizes that the only way to move up to desirable positions is to be elected. In this regard he will be particularly sensitive to the opinions of his constituency and very likely feel that the membership has the right to expect his behavior to conform to its wishes. To measure this legitimacy dimension, the delegates were asked if they felt that the membership had a right to expect them to vote the way they wanted. The following table shows the relationship of mobility orientation and the delegate's attitude toward these expectations. Although the direction of

Table 58 Selected channels of career orientation and attitude toward membership right of expectations

Attitude Toward Membership Right of Expectations	Selected Channel of Mobility		Total
	Elective	Appointive	
Membership has <u>every</u> right	65	9	74
Membership has <u>some</u> right	16	6	22
Membership has <u>no</u> right	2	1	3
	—	—	—
Totals	83	16	99

Degrees of Freedom = 2

Chi-Square = 3.27

.10 < P < .20

the relationship is as predicted, the chi-square value indicates relatively little difference between the two groups and the T value of .116 supports

¹⁸⁰Conversely, of course, the series of hypotheses of this nature implies a similar relationship existing between those who seek mobility through appointive channels and expectations of the relevant superior group.

the observation of low association between the variables. Inspection of the distribution permits a general explanation for this finding. Of the over-all total of 99 delegates who expressed the desire to move up either through elective or appointive channels, the overwhelming majority (96 cases of 99) felt that the membership had a right to expect delegate behavior to conform to membership wishes. There were too few in this sample who disagreed with this view for any difference to show up. It appears from this data, however, that no matter what channel of mobility one selects, there is still the prevailing sentiment that the membership is the reference group of concern. One possible explanation for this may be that the individuals who selected appointive channels for mobility are aware that the "appointor," himself an elected official, must respond to the wishes of his constituency. Value placed upon responsiveness to the membership would therefore be congruent with the "appointor's" orientation which then enhances chances for an appointive position.

A second hypothesis regarding mobility channels is as follows:

- b. The mobility oriented delegate who perceives vertical movement through elective channels will more likely feel pressure from the local than one who seeks vertical movement through appointive channels.

Here again the hypothesis must be rejected. Irrespective of mobility channel, a majority of the delegates felt that there were pressures the members of their local could use if the delegate's actions at the convention did not meet their expectations. Among those seeking mobility through appointment, only one denied that such pressures existed. A T value of .107 also attests to the low degree of association between these variables.

Table 59 Selected channels of career orientation and feelings of political pressures from the local

Feeling of Pressure From the Local	Selected Channel of Mobility		Total
	Elective	Appointive	
A <u>lot</u> of pressure	58	10	68
<u>Some</u> pressure	20	5	25
<u>No</u> pressure	5	1	6
	—	—	—
Totals	83	16	99

Degrees of Freedom = 2

Chi-square = 1.61

.30 < P < .50

The following hypothesis regarding mobility channels was also tested:

- c. The mobility delegate who perceives vertical movement through elective channels will more likely be concerned with accounting his behavior to the general membership than one who seeks vertical movement through appointive channels.

Table 60 Selected channels of career orientation and concern with accounting behavior to the local constituents

Concern with Membership knowledge of Behavior	Selected Channel of Mobility		Total
	Elective	Appointive	
Very concerned	63	11	74
Somewhat concerned	7	3	10
Not concerned	12	2	14
	—	—	—
Totals	82	16	98

Degrees of Freedom = 2

Chi-Square = 1.63

.30 < P < .50

The delegates were asked how concerned they would be if the members of their local knew that they had voted for a resolution at the convention

to which the local membership was opposed. The hypothesis is based upon the assumption that those seeking appointive positions would be less concerned with accounting for their behavior at the convention to their constituents. Consistently, again, the chi-square value shows no significant difference between the two groups and the null hypothesis must be accepted. Irrespective of future career plans, the respondents apparently feel that they must account to their constituents for their behavior in the delegate role.

A final hypothesis concerning mobility channels is as follows:

- d. The mobility oriented delegate who perceives vertical movement through elective channels will more likely be concerned with explaining his actions to those members who reacted unfavorably to them than will one who seeks vertical mobility through appointive channels.

This statement is related to the problem of tension reduction for the delegate. An important source of strain for the incumbent of a political position is the expressed dissatisfaction of any sizeable segment of his constituency. In many cases, the issues involved in decision-making are fairly ambiguous and the opinions of the constituents unpredictable. Many times the functionary will be between two or more cross currents of opinion and consequently may be forced to make decisions in terms of what he defines as the proper action. Of course his decision may be based upon the attempt to lessen the strain on his

role by seeking to mediate such differences among his constituency. A frequent problem for the elected official appears to be one of appeasement and appeal to reduce the tensions and strains of insecurity of his position.

Table 61 Selected channel of mobility and justification of actions to the members who react unfavorably.

Justified Actions to Dissatisfied Members	Selected Channel of Mobility		
	Elective	Appointive	Total
Yes	61	13	74
No	22	3	25
	—	—	—
Totals	83	16	99

Degrees of Freedom = 1

Chi-Square (with Yates' Correction) = .124

.70 < P < .80

The delegates were asked whether, upon returning from the convention, they had attempted to justify their actions to any members of the local who were dissatisfied with decisions made at the convention. Again the distribution shows no difference between those seeking elective and appointive positions. Significantly, a large majority of delegates, no matter what channel of mobility they select, appear to be concerned with justifying their actions to the membership.

E. Level of Political Activity of Local

In a previous section, it was suggested that the relative intensity of political activity in the local would condition the views of the delegate. A fairly high association was discovered between level of political activity of the local and the delegate's perception of membership control of the union and their regard for the convention as a

decision-making body. This variable may also affect their definition of what is the appropriate relationship with their constituents and with those higher up in the union hierarchy.

A series of questions was asked which was designed to measure the relative concern with accountability to the local membership and to the International officers. A second series was concerned with a comparison of the perceived legitimacy of expectations from the local membership and the International officers. In the following table a comparison is made between those concerned only with accountability to the local members and those concerned with accountability to both the International officers and their constituents. A similar procedure is used in the subsequent table dealing with perceived legitimacy of expectations. Using these data, the following hypotheses are tested:

Delegates from locals of relatively high political activity are more likely to consider as legitimate the expectations of their constituents only than are those from locals of relatively low political activity.

Table 62 Level of political activity of local and delegates' concern with their constituents's reactions

Level of Political Activity* (Scale Types)	Concern with:		Total
	Members Only	Officers & Members	
1 & 2	18	12	30
3	13	8	21
4 & 5	33	8	41
	—	—	—
Total	64	28	92**

*Scale types have been collapsed because of small cell frequencies.

** There were 16 delegates who were not concerned with accountability to either group.

Degrees of freedom = 2

Chi-square = 4.19

P < .20

T = .179

Table 63 Level of political activity of local and delegates' concern with their constituents' expectations

Level of Political Activity (Scale Types)	Expectations regarded as Legitimate:		
	Locals Only	Locals & Intern'l	Total
1	2	8	10
2	5	17	22
3	15	9	24
4	9	12	21
5	12	17	29
	—	—	—
Total	43	63	106*

*There were two delegates who did not regard either set of expectations as legitimate.

Degrees of freedom = 4

Chi-square = 9.61

$P < .05$

$T = .213$

The results suggest that the first hypothesis must be rejected although it should be noted that the relationship between level of political activity and delegates' concern with their constituent's reactions stands close to the threshold of acceptance and in the predicted direction. Table 63, presenting data used to test the second hypothesis, indicates that the probability of getting such large sample chi-squares from a universe with no association between level of political activity and delegates' concern with constituent's expectations is less than 5 percent. The measure of association, as indicated by T, reveals a fairly strong relationship between the variables. The intensity of political activity at the local level is apparently a variable which affects orientation of delegates to their role. This suggests another dimension aside from gross participation which so many introduce to analyze the character of union organization. What seems crucial is, given the level of participation, the kind and intensity of political activity taking place within the organization.

Democratic participation involves not only the fact of being present and voting but also various other aspects of issue resolution such as forming alliances, attempting to influence others through cajoling, discussions, etc. In this kind of atmosphere there appears to be a higher probability of accountability of the representative to his constituents.

F. Delegate Role Orientation

In the previous chapter, delegate role orientations were treated, for the most part, as dependent variables. The concern in this chapter has been with how various delegate attitudes may affect the likelihood that the organization will function democratically. More specifically, the concern has been with certain aspects of the relation of the delegate to his constituents with particular emphasis upon whether he sees their expectations as legitimate and whether he is concerned with accountability to them for his actions at the convention. Among the role orientation types considered in the preceding chapter, the delegate vs. trustee dimension appears particularly relevant to the present concerns. Because it specifically involves an aspect of the delegate -- constituent relationship -- it will be treated first as a dependent variable.

It was expected that this variable would be related to other dimensions of delegate role orientation like bureaucratic vs. democratic values and local vs. International allegiance. That is, will those delegates having local allegiance and values toward democratic participation define their roles at the convention as delegate-type or as trustee-type? The following hypotheses test the assumption that relationships exist between these types and definition of role at the convention.

Hypothesis 1: The delegate with local allegiance will

define his role as delegate-type rather than trustee-type.

Table 64 Allegiance and representative types

Allegiance Scale Types*	Trustee		Delegate		Total
	1	2	3	4	
1 & 2	2	12	25	14	53
3 & 4	19	19	15	2	55
	—	—	—	—	—
Totals	21	31	40	16	108

*Scale types have been collapsed due to "empty" cells.

Degrees of freedom = 3

Chi-square = 26.66

$P < .001$

$T = .356$

Hypothesis 2: The delegate who favors democratic participation (Guttman Scale Types 1 & 2) more so than one favoring bureaucratic efficiency will define his role as delegate-type.

Table 65 Organizational values and representational types

Organizational Values*	Trustee 1 & 2	Delegate 3 & 4	Total
1 & 2	19	30	49
3 & 4	33	26	59
	—	—	—
Totals	52	56	108

*Scale types have been collapsed due to small cell frequencies.

Degrees of freedom = 1

Chi-square (with Yates' correction) = 2.52

$.10 < P < .20$

$T = .153$

The results suggest that hypothesis I may be accepted. Those with local allegiance (scale types 1 & 2) clearly tend to see their role more often as that of a delegate. This view is supported by a fairly high T value (.356).

Though short of the accepted significance level, the relationship between organizational value and representational types stands close to the threshold of acceptance and is in the predicted direction. The T value (.153) does not indicate a strong association.

Since democracy has been defined also in this study as responsible representation, the question arises whether or not these role orientations compel one to respond specifically to the wishes of his local constituents or to those of the larger organization. The two variables considered here were legitimacy of expectations and concern for accountability of actions. Responsible representation is defined here as involving accountability to constituents and the view that their expectations are legitimate. In this light, the following hypotheses test the assumption that relationships exist between types of role orientation and direction of legitimacy of expectation and accountability.

Hypothesis 3: The delegate favoring democratic participation will:

- a: define only local membership expectations as legitimate rather than those of the total organization (both local and International).
- b: be concerned with accounting for his actions to the local constituency only rather than to the total organization.

Hypothesis 4: The delegate with local allegiance will:

- a: define only local membership expectations as legitimate rather than those of the total organization (both local and International).
- b: be concerned with accounting his actions to the local constituency only rather than to the total organization.

Table 66 Organizational values and legitimacy of expectations

Organizational Values (scale types)	Expectations are legitimate for:		
	Local members only	Local and Intern'l	Total
1	7	16	23
2	12	13	25
3	11	5	16
4	13	27	40
	—	—	—
Total	43	61	104*

*There were 4 delegates who did not regard either set of expectations as legitimate or did not respond.

Degrees of freedom = 3

Chi-square = 8.39

$P < .05$

$T = .215$

Table 67 Organizational values and accountability

Organizational Values (scale types)	Delegate feels accountable to:		
	Local members only	Local and Intern'l	Total
1	15	7	22
2	18	6	24
3	8	3	11
4	23	12	35
	—	—	—
Total	64	28	92*

*There were 16 delegates who were not concerned with accountability with either group or did not respond.

Degrees of freedom = 3

Chi-square = .64

$.50 < P < .95$

Hypothesis 5. The delegate-type will:

- a: define only local membership expectations as legitimate rather than those of the total organization.
- b: be concerned with accounting his actions to the local membership only rather than to the total organization.

Table 68 Allegiance and legitimacy of expectations

Allegiance (scale types)	Expectations are legitimate for:		
	Local members only	Local & Intern'l	Total
1	8	11	19
2	16	18	34
3	15	24	39
4	4	10	14
	—	—	—
Totals	43	63	106*

*There were two delegates who did not regard either set of expectations as legitimate.

Degrees of freedom = 3

Chi-square = 1.54

$.50 < P < .95$

Table 69 Allegiance and accountability

Allegiance (scale types)	Delegate feels accountable to:		
	Local members only	Local & Intern'l	Total
1	14	5	19
2	25	5	30
3	21	9	30
4	4	9	13
	—	—	—
Totals	64	28	92*

*There were 16 delegates who were not concerned with accountability to either group or did not respond.

Degrees of freedom = 3

Chi-square = 11.83

$P < .05$

$T = .262$

The results indicate that only one specific sub-hypothesis may be accepted (Hypothesis 4-b). The data support the hypothesis that those with allegiance to the local members tended to be concerned more often with accounting their behavior to the local constituency. The T value (.262) indicated a fairly strong association between these two variables.

Table 70 Representational types and legitimacy of expectations

Representational Types (scale types)	Expectations are legitimate for:		
	Local members only	Local & Intern'l	Total
1	6	11	17
2	13	18	31
3	16	24	40
4	7	10	17
	—	—	—
Total	42	63	105*

*There were 3 delegates who did not regard either set of expectations as legitimate or did not respond.

Degrees of freedom = 3

Chi-square = .20

.95 < P < .99

Table 71 Representational types and accountability

Representational Types	Delegate feels accountable to:		
	Local members only	Local & Intern'l	Total
1	8	5	13
2	17	7	24
3	26	14	40
4	12	2	14
	—	—	—
Total	63	28	91*

*There were 17 delegates who were not concerned with either set of accountabilities or did not respond.

Degrees of freedom = 3

Chi-square = 2.49

.30 < P < .50

Not only are the remainder of the hypotheses rejected, but a reversal of the prediction stated in hypothesis 3-a is shown in Table 66. Those with bureaucratic values, more so than those with democratic values, tended to regard the expectations of the local members only as legitimate.

Though most of the hypotheses in this last series were rejected, the

proportional distribution of these delegates between their responses to local concerns vis-a-vis both local and International concerns is noteworthy. A larger proportion of the delegates (about 60 percent) felt accountable to the local constituencies. However, about the same proportion of delegates felt that the expectations of both the local members and the International were legitimate.

Conclusion: In a general sense, the findings in this chapter reveal the difficulty in dealing with the concept of democracy. Contradictions and anomalies appeared where logical relationships were presupposed to exist. However, the theme of democratic value orientation was discerned throughout as characterizing the delegates in this study.

A. Major Conclusions

As representatives of the local organization, the views of these delegates of their union in operation were deemed important. This position was taken on the supposition that any meaningful participation by the delegates is conditioned by their orientation to the situation. In this respect, democratic participation was believed to be obtained only by those who see it as being possible. The delegates in this study generally considered their locals to be equally or more democratic compared to other locals. They also generally considered their union to be equally if not more democratic than other unions.

In general, these delegates chose to define democracy in terms of procedural aspects (i.e., freedom of speech, election of officers, participation, etc.) and the perception of the delegates of the character of their union was primarily based upon these criteria. To these active participants then, the union is perceived as operating in a democratic

fashion. A greater proportion of the delegates felt that the membership today has an even greater voice in union government than during the formative years of the union organization.

The entire body of delegates in this study considered it very important that the union organization be democratic. The major reason given for this attitude was rank and file participation. In other words, they considered it important that the rank and file reserve the right to participate and expressed the fact that the union belongs to them. Also, by participation, they believed that autocratic rule or oligarchic control could be prevented.

These attitudes in turn conditioned other kinds of perceptions and attitudinal responses which supported a democratic value orientation. Over three-fourths of the delegates believed that the really important decisions were made at the convention in which they participated and about the same porportion of these people believed that their constituents held this same view of the convention. In addition, the majority of these delegates became active primarily in response to membership problems and because they felt, at that time, dissatisfied with the union administration. Their willingness to become active for the sake of the membership and the fact that they could and did participate indicate that opposition can take place without formally organized support (institutionalized opposition) and that leadership is generally responsive to membership desires.

Since active participation was perceived as freely permissable in the union, it was assumed that some of these actives would have career patterns outlined for advancement in the union. Furthermore, any advancement which depended upon the expressed support of the membership would mean that these aspirants would be more responsive to membership desires.

In this respect it was assumed that those delegates who sought upward mobility through elective channels would be more responsive to membership wants than those who sought it through the support of the International. The series of hypotheses testing this relationship were rejected because no statistically significant relationship was found to exist between kind of mobility aspirations (elective or appointive) and responsible leadership. However, this conclusion did not contradict the earlier characterization of the democratic nature of the union. The majority of delegates (whether seeking promotion through elective channels or appointive channels) were concerned about membership behavior, pressures from membership, explaining their actions to dissatisfied members, and felt that the membership had the right to expect them to respond to their wishes.

There was discovered a fairly strong association between level of political activity of the local and how the delegate relates himself to the members of the local. Delegates who came from locals defined as highly active politically tended to be concerned with their constituent's reactions and to regard the member's expectations as legitimate. This particular finding concerning active participation supports the arguments made by some to the effect that democracy can be measured by the degree of participation on the part of the general membership.

B. Other Conclusions

Fairly strong relationships were discovered between representational types and the other dimensions of role orientations. Those delegates defined as holding allegiance to the locals were more likely to define their role as delegate-type than trustee-type. Also, though short of the statistically significant level, those delegates maintaining demo-

cratic as opposed to bureaucratic values tended to be delegate-types rather than trustee-types. Contrary to what was expected, it was discovered that those delegates with democratic values were more likely to consider as legitimate the expectations of both the local members and the International rather than only those of the local. A statistically significant relationship was discovered to exist between those maintaining allegiance to the local and their concern in accounting their behavior to the local constituency. Statistically, no significant relationships were discovered between organizational values maintained by the delegates and their regard for accountability to the local members. Representational types were not associated with either accountability or legitimacy of local member expectations. In addition, allegiance types were not associated with legitimacy of expectations.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I. Democracy in Large-scale Bureaucratic Organizations

Introduction: Economists of Western Europe introduced the term efficient as a central concept in the analysis of the distribution of goods and services. This concept, in turn, became an important cultural value in American society in its efforts to achieve its economic and industrial potential. Though it may be questionable whether or not we have reached this potential,¹⁸¹ it is generally agreed that efficiency has become almost a fetish in American society. Concomitantly with the growth of the economy and increasing concern with efficiency came the development of large-scale organizations. The concern with efficiency introduced a special dimension to the evolutionary growth of organizations -- the emergence of bureaucracies. Bureaucratic organizations epitomized the concept of efficiency and became symbolic of the rational growth of the economy.

However, as a result of the desire to maximize the utility of resources available, there seemed to be imposed upon the structure of social relations an irreversible tendency to de-personalize the individual.

¹⁸¹The greatest contradiction in American Society, according to Galbraith, is that we live in an economy of abundance and yet we exhibit a social imbalance of extreme poverty. See John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958.

This was certainly inconsistent with one aspect of the prevailing cultural tradition, the emphasis upon individualism and personal dignity made explicit in the Bill of Rights. But the current of progress quite often flows with various cross currents of contradictions and anomalies. It is an indication of human adaptability that such contradictory orientations co-exist as culturally prescribed values. One of the main problems of this thesis was to explain the contradiction and analyze the adaptive changes that reconciled the differences and promoted the emergence of various unique institutional characteristics.

A. Defining Structure of Bureaucracy

Analysis of formal organizations as bureaucracies began with Weber's constructed type.¹⁸² The basic characteristic of bureaucracy, according to Weber, was strong impersonal base making for high rationality and (ergo) efficiency. This rationality called for the predominance of formal rules which spelled out the structure of the relationships, which in turn ensured a stable and universalistic pattern of behavior. The relationships are regulated by the "rule of law" and the consequent devaluation of personal sentiments makes it possible for the maintenance of strict discipline imposed from above.

Rationality in the bureaucratic structure has its foundation not only in the predominance of rules but also in expertness in the application of these rules. Along with expertise, facts are needed for efficient and

¹⁸²Max Weber, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule," Translated by Hans Gerth in Amitai Etzioni, editor, Complex Organizations, New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, Inc., 1961, pp. 4-14.

rational decisions to be made.¹⁸³ It is therefore necessary in a bureaucracy that more or less systematic files be kept which necessitates the maintenance of a "non-productive" clerical staff.

The characteristics described above set up a cleavage within the organization between the administrators of the organization and the larger body which, in the trade union, utilizes the services of these technician-administrators. A cleavage of this sort, as Michels noted, facilitates the oligarchic tendencies of the elite body.

B. Defining Structure of Democracy

There are widely varying uses of the term democracy. At different times, different emphasis has been placed on the several criteria that may be used to define a democratic structure and many authors seem intent upon imposing new and additional criteria. Perhaps Johnson hit at the crux of the difficulty in the following statement: "Democracy is a mixture of the rational-legal and charismatic types, with a touch of traditionalism in some instances."¹⁸⁴ Even such a basic definition as consent of the governed is filled with ambiguities. Thus, as Lewis stated, consent may be an essential element of democracy but not a distinguishing element for the important point is how consent is achieved.¹⁸⁵

In addition to consent of the governed, the following conditions have been emphasized in various discussions as essential for an organiza-

¹⁸³ Harry M. Johnson, Sociology, op.cit., p. 293.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 341.

¹⁸⁵ John D. Lewis, "The Elements of Democracy," in John Eric Nordskog, Edward C. McDonagh and Melvin J. Vincent, editors, New York: The Dryden Press, 1960, pp. 587-595.

tion to function democratically: 1) responsible leadership, 2) accountability of leadership, 3) organized opposition, 4) guarantee of fundamental rights of the individual (freedom of speech, etc.), 5) proportional representation,¹⁸⁶ 6) high rates of participation by those governed, 7) frequent elections, 8) turn-over of leadership, 9) frequent meetings of policy-making bodies, and 10) commitment of leadership to democratic values.

While the list might be extended, most definitions of democracy center around one or more of these criteria. Four major categories of criteria may be seen in this list: 1) conditions of social structure (organized opposition), 2) organizational processes or procedures (frequent elections), 3) sentiments (leadership commitment to democratic values), and 4) what may be seen as products of the preceding as, for example, guarantees of individual rights.

Democracy, as the term was used in this thesis, refers to a condition whereby policy makers are accountable to those affected by their policies. This definition involves, first of all, a distinction between the policy implementation structure of an organization in which bureaucratic values like efficiency may be paramount and the policy-making structure of an organization in which democratic values like accountability are appropriate. It is also assumed that accountability of policy makers may be achieved in any one of a variety of ways. It may result from conditions of social structure like a two party system. It may also result from organizational processes such as frequent elections with a high rate of participation.

¹⁸⁶Arthur Wallace Calhoun, "Functional Democracy," Analyzing Social Problems, op.cit.

Accountability of policy makers to their constituents may also occur as a result of a strong commitment on the part of the policy makers to democratic sentiments. A major emphasis of this thesis has been that no one organizational form has a monopoly upon democratic procedure. Its primary concern has been with certain attitudes and sentiments which affect the likelihood that policy makers will feel accountable to their constituents.

C. Adaptation of Democratic Structure in Bureaucratic Organizations

From the outset it appears that democracy and bureaucracy are irreconcilable. As ideal types this is certainly true, for essentially these concepts stand in polar opposition to each other. But it was emphasized that even as ideal types these two values -- democracy and bureaucracy -- have been readily adopted as central cultural orientations. Democracy is part of the American historical tradition; bureaucracy is valued as part of the general orientation toward efficiency and progress. How then, with such obvious contradictions, was it possible for these values to be adopted concurrently?

Ideal types as such are rigid and inflexible models. However, social situations reveal that human relations are not rigid nor inflexible but fairly adaptable. In the case of both these types, the rigidities and inflexibilities are modified as their central values become implemented in actual social situations. In this manner, dysfunctions of bureaucracies are sidetracked by such techniques as "by-passing red-tape," "passing the buck," etc. Rigid adherence to democratic participation in decision-making hampers efficient execution of directives by functionaries in bureaucratic organizations. These rigidities are overcome by the extension of representative government from direct control to indirect control.

Bureaucracies require professional administrators who are well-trained and experienced and not subject to the whims of popular feelings. To resolve this problem, a distinction is made between policy implementers and policy decision-makers. The policy implementers comprise those professional administrators who "run the bureaucracy." The policy decision-makers are usually those intermediary functionaries who, in democratic organizations, are directly responsible to the constituents. These policy decision-makers ideally represent the will of the larger membership body and are elected by their direct vote. Democratic ideals such as universal participation meaningfully function at this juncture between the leadership and the constituency. As a matter of practicality, policy implementers or administrators must not be under the direct control of the constituent body. An organization may function democratically without direct election of people in these positions. The emphasis upon direct election of policy makers who control the administrators and select them in terms of their special abilities rather than popularity mediates both the need for an efficient bureaucracy and democratic control of the total organization.

At times both functional roles of policy implementer and policy decision-maker may be held by one and the same person. A prime example would be the presidency of the United States. This dual role need not lead to confusion if the roles are kept distinct and control of the policy formation role is maintained by the constituency.

The method of indirect control of bureaucratic structures by direct control of policy forming representatives ideally maintains responsible leadership and yet makes possible bureaucratic efficiency. The basic principle of control in the hands of the electorate is still maintained without

destroying the efficiency and purpose of the organization.

Organizations have **varying** histories of growth though all may have the same exposure to the cultural themes of democracy and bureaucratic efficiency. Unique experiences lead to various structural features in achieving the balance between these two apparently contradictory values. Thus, formal party systems may typify some organizations, incipient factionalism typify others, and just the notion of universal participation typify still others. No matter what the characteristics of these forms, control through this indirect approach may be effective wherever there is the need to reconcile democratic values with bureaucratic efficiency.

D. The Case of Democratic Unionism

The issue of reconciling these values as part of a single system has been most apparent in the history of labor unions in the United States. As a matter of tradition, democratic values have been imposed on labor unions and discussions of union government have revolved primarily around this central theme.¹⁸⁷

Various cases of alleged corruption among union leadership and the lack of turn-over of International officers in most unions have led to increased concern and direct appeals for greater democratic control in


¹⁸⁷ Discussions on this particular issue seem to have evolved into questions of the following type: In terms of the purposes for its existence and the nature of its problems, can and should unions be democratic? More recent discussions appear to be concerned with not how democratic the union can be but how the union can fairly represent the membership. See for example: Benjamin Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, Reprint No. 98, Los Angeles, Calif.: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1961.

unions. In these appeals can be seen the varying alternative criteria to ensure democratic unionism. With disregard for the possible unique developmental history of each organization, a frequent appeal has been made to other unions to emulate the two party system of the International Typographical Union, the exemplary model of a truly democratic organization. Some unions, perhaps quite sensitive to these kinds of pressures, have imposed upon their membership what one might refer to as compulsory participation in an over-zealous attempt to present a facade of democracy.¹⁸⁸

Evidence, on the whole, demonstrates that the two-party system in the I. T. U. effectively guarantees democratic processes. The conclusion might be reached that this system most closely approximates the ideal organizational form for union government. However, the unique and successful experience of one organization may not be possible to duplicate in another union, which differs with respect to type of industry, early organizing experience, and the status of the kind of work involved. Alternative forms of group structure (e.g., a one party union with or without incipient factionalism), though less vital and explosive in political orientation and perhaps more susceptible to oligarchic tendencies, can and do operate democratically.

The general theme in most studies of union democracy appears to be whether or not unions are democratic in form and how to guarantee democratic processes. The question of whether democratic processes are

¹⁸⁸A sample of local union by-laws do not reveal the existence of such a policy measure. However, the Bureau of Labor-Management Reports of the U. S. Department of Labor has informed this writer that such policies do in fact exist in some locals.



valued by either union leaders or their constituents is less often asked. Different union leaders have, on occasion, affirmed the necessity of a totalitarian type of orientation in the face of the peculiar problems of labor-management relations.

"What is totalitarianism? A country that has a totalitarian government operates like our union operates. There are no political parties. People are elected to govern the country based upon their records . . . That is totalitarianism. If we started to divide up and run a Republican set of officers, a Democratic set, a Communist set and something else we would have one hell of a time."¹⁸⁹

Leaders such as these perceive democracy in the larger context of economic "justice" and define democracy in terms of providing workers with economic security, a fair share in economic gains, equal justice before the law, etc., rather than in terms of internal union organization. It is particularly in organizations having the characteristic advocated in the quotation above, i.e., a one party system, where the definition of democracy held by people in leadership positions is crucial in determining the pattern of accountability. Internal democratic processes are, to some extent, guaranteed by the existence of active, organized opposition groups. The one party system depends much more heavily upon democratic sentiments on the part of both the leadership and the constituents as well as upon external forces which may impose such values upon it.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹Statement made by Harry Bridges, President, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, as quoted by Lipset in Political Man, op.cit., p. 358.

¹⁹⁰Kerr suggests six sources of pressures that impose democratic values upon the union -- these are: 1) membership interest, 2) professional leaders, 3) new faith in the union movement, 4) local autonomy, 5) union decertification, and 6) discharge through rebellion. See Clark Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing, The Free Society, Fund for the Republic Pamphlet, pp. 15-19.

II. The Importance of Motivation or Orientation to Democratic Values

Introduction: Democracy then may be seen as a type of decision-making process in which decision makers may be made accountable to those affected through various kinds of structural alternatives. It is recognized that some of these structural alternatives lend themselves more readily to other political forms and others (like the two party system) seem to safeguard a democratic process. The concern here was not the discovery of the structural form that most guarantees this process but, assuming that certain formal constitutional guarantees exist, to discover what aspects of the definition of the role of policy maker are functional in a democratic system.

At the outset it was maintained that the active participants in any social organization are the significant group in the determination of organizational characteristics. Apathy, unless discovered to be caused by frustrated attempts at active participation, was not regarded as being in itself sufficient cause to describe an organization as lacking a democratic orientation. It was also contended that personal values of active participants largely determine how the organization will run.

This particular investigation was concerned with only one group of active unionists -- the delegates to a U. A. W. International Convention. The U. A. W. is recognized as a one party organization, therefore highly susceptible to undemocratic forms of leadership control. But contrarily, the U. A. W. is generally recognized as a democratic union with responsible leadership by business, government, and the public. The study of convention delegates permitted the analysis of the key functionary through which the formal constitutional guarantee of membership control of the

union operates. As actives and potential leaders in the larger organization, it was contended that the delegate's role orientation is an important factor determining how the government of the union will operate. As actives, as decision makers in a constitutional body, and as individuals with varying value orientations, the delegate was considered as important and neglected focus for the study of democracy in unionism.

A. A Review of Some Findings

The research was focused on delegates from U. A. W. locals situated in the cities of Lansing and Flint. Generalizations about delegate characteristics are therefore limited to the locals in these two cities. One reason for limiting the study to these locals was, of course, their accessibility. In addition, however, it was deemed important to obtain information from all the delegates representing each local rather than from a sample of delegates from a larger number of locals since, by this approach, greater depth was achieved in the understanding of local political processes. Investigation of the local in its entirety enabled the researcher to obtain more intensive, detailed, and subtle observations. By maintaining the unitary character of these locals, the political character of the locals and the decision-making processes at the convention became more meaningfully associated.

A case-study approach still allows for more generalized conclusions to the extent that the cases selected can be shown to be representative of a larger statistical universe. The inclusion of a range of types of locals with different attitudes toward the International administration was assured by selecting locals from these two cities. The Lansing locals are generally viewed as stable with strongly expressed loyalty toward the International

administration. Some of the Flint locals are noted for being among the faction opposing the administration. A study of proceedings of conventions reveals that locals from this latter group have always been more active at the conventions. Industry-wise, the locals from these two cities represent nearly every aspect of the assembly and manufacturing of automotive equipment. In addition, some amalgamated units were included from related parts manufacturing and forging plants. In general, the delegates included in the study appear to be fairly representative of the total delegate body.¹⁹¹

1. Factors Associated with Delegate Role Orientations

Although many of the observed differences between delegates with varying role orientations could have occurred more than once in twenty times by chance, those where there was at least some pattern of association are reported here as perhaps warranting further study. For instance, it was indicated that the older delegates are more bureaucratically inclined than the younger delegates. Relatedly, the older delegates were more inclined to place their allegiance with the International and the younger delegates with the locals. Younger delegates also revealed less inclination toward a trustee-type orientation than the older delegates.

These delegates with less than a high school education showed a greater inclination to be bureaucratically oriented while those with a high school education revealed a more democratic orientation. Those with a college education or more were divided almost equally between these two values. The less educated demonstrated a greater inclination to be trustee-

¹⁹¹See also Tables 4 and 5.

type oriented while the more educated were more delegate-type oriented. Those with some college education tended toward International allegiance more so than others.

The lower income group tended to be more democratically oriented than the higher income group who revealed an inclination toward bureaucratic values. On the other hand, the upper income group tended to be more delegate-type oriented as compared to the lower income group.

Delegates living within city limits revealed a tendency to value bureaucratic efficiency more than democratic participation while delegates from farming areas revealed a greater inclination toward democratic values.

The distribution of social class identification appears to be randomly distributed for organizational values, allegiance and representational types.

The more experienced union member tended to reveal an International allegiance while the relative newcomer expressed greater loyalty toward the local. However, both "young" and "old" members appear to be equally divided in organizational values. The newer members showed a tendency to be more delegate-type oriented than trustee-type oriented.

The skilled workers displayed a greater interest in bureaucratic values while the white-collar group revealed a greater inclination toward democratic participation.

Statistically significant associations were found between mobility orientation and age, race, income, and job satisfaction. The younger members, more than the older members, felt the importance of moving up in the organization. The white members were two to one disinclined toward any mobility interests whereas the negro members revealed a similar ratio

inclined toward mobility interests. Contrary to expectations, the highly skilled workers and the white-collar group showed less inclination toward mobility interests than the relatively unskilled group. With increasing income there was a greater tendency to be mobility oriented. Those with higher job satisfaction, however, revealed a disinclination toward mobility interests.

2. The Delegate and Democratic Processes

The delegates were concerned primarily with procedural aspects of democratic processes like freedom of expression and having a voice in decision-making. There was no apparent concern with leadership turnover or high level of participation as crucial to the process. However, overwhelmingly these delegates perceived their union to be operating currently in a democratic manner and to be maintaining an equal or higher level of membership control as in previous years. If the delegates' behavior is conditioned by this view of union government, a highly democratically oriented union is indicated.

Level of political activity in the local was found to be significantly related to perception of membership voice (or control in the union). A local typified as more highly politically active was very likely to have delegates who perceived their members to have a strong voice in union government.

Level of political activity in the local was also found to be significantly related to perception of membership attitude toward the convention. Delegates from locals of high political activity perceived their constituencies to regard the convention as important in policy decision-making while delegates from locals of low political activity were less likely to perceive their constituencies in the same light.

The delegates' reasons for active participation in the union suggest a pattern of attitudes appropriate to a democratically ordered organization. The major motivation for active participation clearly identified these delegates as responsive leadership types with concern centered around the economic and physical well-being of the working man. The second major reason for active participation indicated a willingness to become active opponents of leadership they regard as inadequate.

A major hypothesis introduced involved the assumed responsiveness of leadership values to particular career orientations. It was thought that those who needed popular support for career advancement would be more likely to respond to popular demands than those seeking advancement through other means such as appointive channels. The data indicated that, irrespective of type of mobility channel preferred, the delegates were overwhelmingly concerned with accounting their behavior to the local constituents, would attempt to justify all actions as policy decision-makers to those elements in the local who reacted unfavorably to their actions, felt pressure emanating from the local, and would consider local constituents' expectations as legitimate. This pattern of attitudes is also consistent with a democratic orientation and necessary if the union is to function democratically.

Level of political activity of the local was also used as a predictor of leadership accountability in the policy decision-making process. It was discovered that delegates from locals of high political activity more often than those from locals with relatively low political activity were concerned about their constituent's reactions and expectations.

Since leadership role performance was considered a crucial factor in determining the character of the organization, some concern was directed to how these leaders would actually carry out their duties. The assumption maintained here was that the personal values held by this functionally important group would be predictive of organizational structure. Specific hypotheses predicting the relationship between the delegate's organizational value orientation and a particular kind of role behavior have been statistically supported in general. Clearly, the delegate with local allegiance was more likely to define his role as delegate-type rather than trustee-type. Though marginal to the significance level, the delegate who valued democratic participation was more likely to define his role as a delegate-type than a trustee-type.

Delegates identified with a democratic value orientation were found to have a broad organizational focus instead of a localistic one. Contrary to what was predicted, the delegate identified as oriented toward democratic processes was more likely to consider as being legitimate the expectations of both the local and the International instead of only those of his local. A statistically significant relationship was discovered between allegiance to the local and the delegate's concern for accounting his behavior to the local constituency. No significant relationship statistically was discovered between kind of organizational value orientation maintained by the delegate and the direction of his concern for accounting for his behavior.

There was indicated a statistically significant relationship between allegiance and attitudes concerning accountability. The delegate identified as maintaining a local allegiance was more likely to be concerned about

answering for his behavior to the local constituency only rather than to both the local and the International. No statistically significant relationships were discovered between allegiance and legitimacy of expectations nor between representational types and either of the two variables -- accountability and legitimacy of expectations.

B. Some Inferences Concerning Organizational Processes

This thesis suggests that democracy is not as evasive as one would imagine in the face of apparent difficulties met by various groups in attempting to achieve some measure of it. The difficulty lies in the preservation and maintenance of this ideal since it makes such direct demands upon the participants in the system. Unlike other political forms which encourage passive acceptance, democracy imposes upon the individual self-commitment in active form. For the democratic act itself begins to engender those ideas that serve to maintain democratic processes.

Then, too, democracy is not a quick panacea to cure prevailing ills of corrupt and inefficient leadership. The relinquishing of control to one's constituents must be part of the established tradition cherished by all -- leaders and the general membership alike. This means a large measure of self-restraint on the part of leadership in the pursuit of personal goals and a constant reappraisal of their functional roles in the pursuit of organizational goals. Active concern on the part of the larger membership with organizational problems acts as a warning light to ease the difficulty of self-restraint. Apathy and indifference form the seedbed of oligarchic tendencies.

As readily seen, the art of democracy is a simple but delicate process. It is readily susceptible to undermining forces by the very principle

it maintains. The important question is not whether a formal guarantee exists but, given the formal guarantee, whether or not democracy exists in fact. This requires a commitment on the part of both leaders and their constituents to democratic values and a willingness to actively participate in fulfillment of the obligations inherent in this set of values.

Appendix A

Issues Listed as of First Importance by U.A.W. Convention Delegates.*

<u>Issues</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Increase of Dues	260	15.63
Unemployment	157	9.44
Combat Automation	144	8.66
Political Action	109	6.55
Organize the Unorganized	107	6.43
Full Employment	91	5.47
Shorter Workweek	80	4.81
Labor Laws	78	4.69
Educational	45	2.71
Better Working Conditions	38	2.29
Retirement	36	2.16
Solidarity	32	1.92
Union Finances	26	1.56
Speedups	24	1.44
Economic Issues	20	1.20
Legislative Action	20	1.20
Other Issues	<u>396</u>	<u>23.81</u>
	1663	99.97
No Responses	<u>151</u>	
Total	1814	

*Data was obtained from a questionnaire administered by the Labor and Industrial Relations Center, Michigan State University at the 1959 U.A.W. International Convention held at Atlantic City, New Jersey.

Appendix B

Locals and Number of Delegate Representation by Cities.*

<u>City</u>	<u>Local</u>	<u>Number of Delegates</u>
Flint	326	7
	581	7
	598	4
	599	19
	651	12
	655	1
	659	28
	708	1
	741	1
	1292	<u>4</u>
	Total	84
Lansing	602	6
	650	2
	652	12
	680	1
	724	7
	728	<u>1</u>
	Total	29
Grand Total		113

*From the above distribution one limitation of the study is readily recognized. In subsequent analyses of delegate role behaviors the impression is given that each of the 108 delegates is acting independently (as if) he represents a separate local. For this study no analysis was made of the possible effects of common group identity upon the total set of response pattern.

Appendix C

January 3, 1961

TO: Region I-C Delegates to the 1959
Constitutional Convention of the UAW

The Michigan State University Labor and Industrial Relations Center is doing a study of trade union government. You may recall that representatives of MSU distributed a questionnaire at our 1959 Constitutional Convention to be filled out by all delegates. They are now going to do a follow-up study which will involve personal interviews with delegates to the 1959 Convention.

The UAW is cooperating with Michigan State University in this study because we think the results will be both interesting and useful to our union and to the general membership of the union.

Since they are interested in the way the convention operates and in the attitudes of convention delegates, only you can give them the information they need. We hope that you will cooperate with them in this study. Your replies will, of course, be considered confidential and will be available only to Michigan State University.

Faternally,

E. S. PATTERSON, Director
Region I-C, UAW

ESP/mm

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Appendix D

Political Activity Scale and Critical Ratios for the Items on the Scale

<u>Item</u>	<u>Critical ratio*</u>
1. Is there anything like a political party system at elections in your local?	
_____ Politically active "yes"	
_____ Politically inactive "no"	3.04
2. Does opposition group run a separate slate of candidates at elections?	
_____ Politically active "yes"	
_____ Politically inactive "no"	2.57
3. Is the opposition group active between elections?	
_____ Politically active "yes"	
_____ Politically inactive "no"	3.04
4. Do the same groups usually oppose each other at elections?	
_____ Politically active "yes"	
_____ Politically inactive "no"	2.41
5. Are there some recognized leaders of the opposition group?	
_____ Politically active "yes"	
_____ Politically inactive "no"	2.55
6. Compared to other U.A.W. locals, how much concern is there in your local with local union politics?	
_____ Politically active "more"	
_____ Politically inactive "less"	4.13
7. Are elections generally close in your local?	
_____ Politically active "yes"	
_____ Politically inactive "no"	2.13

*See Appendix G for computational method for critical ratios

8. What percent of the members of your unit or local would you estimate voted in the election of delegates to the 1959 convention?

_____ Politically active "2/3 or better"
_____ Politically inactive "1/3 or less"016**

**This critical value had no discriminatory power but since it was in the expected direction, the item was retained in the total scale.

Appendix E

Representational Type Scale and Critical Ratios for the Items on the Scale

<u>Item</u>	<u>Critical ratio</u>
1. Did you feel bound by these (rank and file) instructions when you went to the convention? _____ Delegate-type "yes" _____ Trustee-type "no"	2.58
2. Did you vote the way they (members of local) wanted? _____ Delegate-type "yes" _____ Trustee-type "no"	2.97
3. Just in general, what things affected your decision about how to vote at the convention? How did you decide how to vote on these issues? _____ Delegate-type "expressed wishes of rank and file" _____ Trustee-type "used own opinion"	1.46*
4. Should important issues like the dues increase be decided by a referendum vote? Why? _____ Delegate-type "referendum vote" _____ Trustee-type "rank and file are not informed"20*
5. Suppose you found yourself in a situation at a union convention where you knew that the International officers were very much in favor of having a resolution passed and the members of your local were very much opposed to having that resolution passed. What would you do? Why is that? _____ Delegate-type "represent rank and file" _____ Trustee-type "make up own mind"	4.52
6. Do you think the International officers have a <u>right</u> to expect you to vote for the resolution? Why is that? _____ Delegate-type "represent rank and file" _____ Trustee-type "make up own mind"03*
7. Do you think that members of your local have a right to expect you to vote against the resolution? Why is that? _____ Delegate-type "represent the members" _____ Trustee-type "should use own judgment"	2.09

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8. A convention delegate should have instructions from his local about what to vote for at a convention and should always vote according to those instructions.
- | | | |
|-------|-------------------------|------|
| _____ | Delegate-type "agree" | |
| _____ | Trustee-type "disagree" | 5.20 |
9. A delegate should vote for what is best for the whole union even if it is not what the members of his local want. Why is that?
- | | | |
|-------|--|------|
| _____ | Delegate-type "represent the local" | |
| _____ | Trustee-type "rank and file don't understand problems" | 3.37 |
10. A delegate should always vote for what he thinks is best for his local even if it is not what most of the members of his local want. Why is that?
- | | | |
|-------|---------------------------------|------|
| _____ | Delegate-type "represent local" | |
| _____ | Trustee-type "use own judgment" | 5.43 |
11. Did you try to convince anybody who reacted unfavorably that the decision made at the convention was right? Why?
- | | | |
|-------|---------------------------------------|------|
| _____ | Delegate-type "represent all members" | |
| _____ | Trustee-type "use own judgment" | .96* |

*These critical values had no discriminatory power but since they were in the expected direction, the items were retained in the total scale.

Appendix F

Allegiance Scale and Critical Ratios for the Items on the Scale

<u>Item</u>	<u>Critical ratio</u>
1. Just in general, what things affected your decision about how to vote at the convention?	
_____ Local "expressed wish of rank and file"	
_____ International "used own opinion"	1.69*
2. Which of these was most important? (same list above)	
_____ Local "expressed wish of rank and file"	
_____ International "used own opinion"	4.97
3. Whose opinion had the most effect on how you voted?	
_____ Local "members of local"	
_____ International "officers of International"	4.83
4. Suppose you found yourself in a situation at a union convention where you knew that the International officers were very much in favor of having a resolution passed and the members of your local were very much opposed to having that resolution passed. What would you do?	
_____ Local "respond local members' wish"	
_____ International "respond to International"	3.88
5. When you think of yourself as a union member, do you think of yourself mainly as:	
_____ Local "member of local"	
_____ International "member of International"	5.71
6. A delegate should vote for what is best for the whole union even if it is not what the members of the local want.	
_____ Local "disagree"	
_____ International "agree"	3.12

*This critical value had no discriminatory power but since it was in the expected direction, the item was retained in the total scale.

Appendix G

Method of Computing Critical Ratios for Scale Items*

Item: Just in general, what things affected your decision about how to vote at the convention? Which of these was most important?

Item Response	Upper Segment		Lower Segment		Total		
	F	P ₁	F	P ₂	F	P	Q
High Score	17	45.0	4	5.7	21	19.4	80.6
Medium Score	16	42.0	18	25.7	34	31.5	68.5
Low Score	5	13.0	48	68.6	53	49.1	50.9
	38	100.0	70	100.0	108		

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Critical ratio} &= \frac{P_1 - P_2}{\sqrt{(PQ)(1/n + 1/n)}} \\
 &= \frac{.3930}{\sqrt{(.1539)(.0406)}} \\
 &= \frac{.3930}{.079} \\
 &= 4.97
 \end{aligned}$$

*For each scale, the group was divided into two segments (upper and lower) based on the mean score on the scale. A frequency distribution of response to each item was then obtained for each segment. The critical ratio was computed from the proportional difference between the two segments.

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Appendix H

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

CONVENTION STUDY

My name is _____. I am from Michigan State University. You probably received a letter recently describing the study we are doing and you may remember that we passed out a questionnaire at the last convention in Atlantic City. We would like to get some more information now about your experience as a convention delegate.

We are interviewing all delegates to the 1959 convention from Locals here in Lansing/Flint. Your answers to the questions I am going to ask will be considered confidential and the interviews will be kept at Michigan State University.

I. First we would like to know something about how convention delegates were selected in your local or unit.

1. How were they selected?

(If by election) How was the election run?

2. Is there anything like a political party system at elections in your local?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

(If Yes) How does this work? PROBE

a. (If No) Are there any groups at all in your local who usually have different ideas than the present officers about how things should be run?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

b. (If Yes to either 2 or 2a)

(1) Does the opposition group run a separate slate of candidates at elections?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

(a) Did they at the delegate election?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____



(b) Do they at any other elections?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

(c) How many separate slates of candidates are usually run at elections?

____ (Indicate number mentioned)

(2) Is the opposition group active between elections, for example, at local meetings?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

If yes, in what way? What do they do?

(3) Do the same groups usually oppose each other at elections?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

(4) Are there some recognized leaders of the opposition group?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

(5) On what kinds of things is there most disagreement between the different groups in your local?

(6) Is there any tie-in between parties (or factions) in your local with factions in the international union or other locals?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

If yes, in what way?

3. Compared to other U.A.W. locals, how much concern is there in your local with local union politics? Would you say there is: READ

(1) ____ More
(2) ____ About the same
(3) ____ Less

4. Are elections generally close in your local?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

5. What percent of the members of your unit or local would you estimate voted in the election of delegates to the 1959 convention?

____ (Indicate percent mentioned)

Is this higher or lower than the percent that usually vote in the election of local officers?

(1) Higher ____ (2) Lower ____ (3) Same ____

6. Do you think the members of your local regard the convention as important in determining U.A.W. policies?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

Why is that?

II. Now we would like to know something about your experience at the convention.

1. What would you say are the most important reasons for having a convention?

2. Would you say that the really important decisions in the union are made by the convention?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

(If no) Who makes these decisions?

3. What would you say were the three most important decisions made at the 1959 convention?

(1) _____
(2) _____
(3) _____

- a. Would the members of your local agree that these were most important?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

Why?

- b. Do you think the international officers would agree that these were most important?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

Why?

4. Did you get any instructions or suggestions from officers or members of your local before the convention on what to vote for?

(1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

(If yes) (a) Who made the suggestions (Not names, but positions, etc.)

(b) How were they given?

(1) _____ formally (like at a meeting) or

(2) _____ informally

(c) Did you feel bound by these instructions when you went to the convention?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

Why is that?

5. Were there any decisions made at the convention where you had a pretty good idea how most of the members of your local would want you to vote?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

(If no) Why is that?

(If yes) (a) Which decisions?

(b) Did you vote the way they wanted?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

(If no) Which ones?

6. Were there any decisions made at the convention where you knew some members of your local would want you to vote one way and others would want you to vote another way?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

(If yes) (a) Which decisions?

(b) How did you decide how to vote on these issues?

7. Just in general, what things affected your decision about how to vote at the convention? PROBE

a. Which of these was most important?

b. Whose opinions had the most affect on how you voted? (Read list, mark "1")

c. Whose opinions were next most important? (Read list, mark "2")

1

- (1) _____ Other delegates
- (2) _____ Members of your local
- (3) _____ International officers
- (4) _____ Regional officers

8. Would you say the important decisions at the convention are made in the general sessions or in caucuses?

- (1) _____ general session
- (2) _____ caucus

(If caucus) Does this affect how much delegates have to say about how the union is run?

- (1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

Could you explain that?

9. Should important issues like the dues increase be decided by a referendum vote of the membership rather than by the convention?

- (1) _____ referendum
- (2) _____ convention

Why is that?

10. What kind of guarantees are there in the U.A.W. that the officers will actually do what the convention decides?

11. How democratically would you say the 1959 convention was run?

Why is that? PROBE

12. Did you serve on any committees at the international convention?

- (1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

(If yes) List the committee(s) _____

(If yes) How often did you attend the committee meetings? READ

- (1) _____ All meetings
- (2) _____ Most meetings
- (3) _____ Some meetings
- (4) _____ Just a few

13. How often did you attend the general sessions? Counting morning, afternoon, and evening sessions, did you attend: READ

- (1) ☐ All sessions
- (2) ☐ Most sessions
- (3) ☐ Some sessions
- (4) ☐ Just a few

14. Did you "take the Microphone" in any of these sessions?

- (1) Yes ☐ (2) No ☐

(If yes) On what issues?

15. Did you attend any caucus meetings at the convention?

- (1) Yes ☐ (2) No ☐

(If yes) Which caucus (caucuses)?

What issues were discussed?

Is this a permanent caucus?

- (1) Yes ☐ (2) No ☐

III. 1. Suppose you found yourself in a situation at a union convention where you knew that the international officers were very much in favor of having a resolution passed and the members of your local were very much opposed to having that resolution passed.

a. Which of the statements on this card tells best what you would do? (SHOW CARD 1)

- (1) ☐ I would undoubtedly vote for what the international officers wanted.
- (2) ☐ I would probably vote for what the international officers wanted.
- (3) ☐ I really don't know what I would do.
- (4) ☐ I would probably vote for what the members of my local wanted.
- (5) ☐ I would undoubtedly vote for what the members of my local wanted.

Why is that?

b. Do you think the international officers have a right to expect you to vote for the resolution? Which of these statements best answers that question? (SHOW CARD 2)

- (1) ☐ They have every right
- (2) ☐ They have some right
- (3) ☐ They have no right

Why is that?

- c. Do you think the members of your local have a right to expect you to vote against the resolution? Which of the statements on the card best answers this question? (SHOW CARD 2)

- (1) ☐ They have every right
(2) ☐ They have some right
(3) ☐ They have no right

Why is that?

- d. Are there any pressures the international officers could use during the convention to try to get you to vote for the resolution? Which of the statements best answers this question? (SHOW CARD 3)

- (1) ☐ Yes, a lot of pressure
(2) ☐ Yes, some pressure
(3) ☐ No, no pressure

(If (1) or (2)) What kind of pressure?

(If (3)) Why is that?

- e. Are there any pressures the members of your local could use after the convention if you voted for the resolution? Which of the statements best answers this question? (SHOW CARD 3)

- (1) ☐ Yes, a lot of pressure
(2) ☐ Yes, some pressure
(3) ☐ No, no pressure

(If (1) or (2)) What kind of pressure?

(If (3)) Why is that?

- f. If you voted for the resolution, how concerned would you be about what members of your local would think if they knew? Would you be: READ

- (1) ☐ Very concerned
(2) ☐ Somewhat concerned
(3) ☐ Not concerned

- g. If you voted against the resolution, how concerned would you be about what the international officers or others from the international would think if they knew? Would you be: READ

- (1) ☐ Very concerned
(2) ☐ Somewhat concerned
(3) ☐ Not concerned

2. When you think of yourself as a union member, do you think of yourself mainly as (1) a member of the international union, (2) mainly a member of your local union, or (3) about equally a member of both?

(1) ☐ International
(2) ☐ Local
(3) ☐ Both

- (If (3)) If you had to make a choice, would you say you owed allegiance mainly to the international or to the local?

(1) ☐ International
(2) ☐ Local

Now we would like to know if you agree or disagree with some statements. I will read the statement and you indicate which of the expressions on the card tells best how you feel about the statement. (SHOW CARD 4)

3. A convention delegate should have instructions from his local about what to vote for at a convention and should always vote according to those instructions.

(1) ☐ Strongly agree
(2) ☐ Agree
(3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
(4) ☐ Disagree
(5) ☐ Strongly disagree

Why is that?

4. A delegate should vote for what is best for the whole union even if it is not what the members want.

(1) ☐ Strongly agree
(2) ☐ Agree
(3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
(4) ☐ Disagree
(5) ☐ Strongly disagree

Why is that?

5. A delegate should always vote for what he thinks is best for his local even if it is not what most of the members of his local want.

(1) ☐ Strongly agree
(2) ☐ Agree
(3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
(4) ☐ Disagree
(5) ☐ Strongly disagree

Why is that?

6. Once policy is established by the convention the locals ought to go along with it whether they think it is right or not.

- (1) ____ Strongly agree
(2) ____ Agree
(3) ____ Neither agree nor disagree
(4) ____ Disagree
(5) ____ Strongly disagree

Why is that?

7. Do you expect to be elected as a delegate to the 1961 convention?

- (1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

- a. Do you want to be a delegate to the next convention?

- (1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

- b. What things affect the likelihood of being elected again?

8. How many international conventions (including '59 convention) did you attend as a delegate? ____

IV. We would also like to know a little about what happens after a convention.

1. When you returned from the convention did you or any other members of your delegation make a report to the members of your local?

- (1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

(If yes) (a) What were the members' reactions? (READ)

- (1) ____ Mostly favorable (2) ____ unfavorable

(b) What issues were they most concerned about?

2. Did you speak informally with members of your local about decisions made at the convention?

- (1) Yes ____ (2) No ____

(If yes) (a) What was their reaction? (READ)

- (1) ____ Mostly favorable (2) ____ unfavorable

(b) What issues were they most concerned about?

3. (If no to both 1 and 2) How do the members find out about decisions made at the convention?

Is this the best way?

4. If the reactions of most members of your local to decisions made at the convention had been strongly unfavorable would this have affected you in any way?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

(If yes) In what ways? PROBE

(If no) Would anybody be affected?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

What could the members do?

5. Did you try to convince anybody who reacted unfavorably that the decisions made at the convention were right?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

Would you say this is part of the job of being a convention delegate?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

Why?

- V. Now I would like to find out a little more about your experiences as an active union member.

1. First of all, do you hold any union position? For example, are you a local officer, shop steward, committeeman, etc.

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

(If yes) What position do you hold? (Get specific position --
e.g., local president, bargaining committee chairman,
etc.)

(If yes) Is this a fulltime position?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

How long have you had this position? _____

2. Have you held any union positions in the past?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

(If yes) List the position(s).

(If yes) Were any of these fulltime positions?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

Which?

3. Could you tell us why you decided to run for delegate? PROBE
4. In general, why did you decide to become active in union affairs?
5. What would you do if you were defeated for re-election to your present office? (or not re-appointed for those in appointive positions)
6. If you do not move up in the union, how important is it to you to keep your present position? Would you say it was: (READ)

- (1) _____ Very important
(2) _____ Somewhat important
(3) _____ Not important

Why is that?

7. In general, how important is it to you that you move up to a higher position in your union? Would you say it is: (READ)

- (1) _____ Very important
(2) _____ Somewhat important
(3) _____ Not important

Why is that?

8. If you were going to move up in the union, which position would you like to move into next?

Why do you want that position?

What do you think are your chances of getting it? Are they: (READ)

- (1) _____ Very good
(2) _____ Good
(3) _____ Not good
(4) _____ Don't know

9. If you were going to move up in the union, what position would you like to eventually wind up in?

Why would you want that position?

What do you think are your chances of getting it? Are they: (READ)

- (1) _____ Very good
(2) _____ Good
(3) _____ Not good
(4) _____ Don't know

10. Would you rather have a position to which you were appointed or one to which you were elected?

(1) _____ Appointed
(2) _____ Elected

Why is that?

11. Would you say there is a better chance of being appointed to a higher position or being elected to one?

(1) _____ Appointed
(2) _____ Elected

Why is that?

12. Suppose you had a chance to move to a better paying and higher position in the union but were convinced you could serve the union best in your present position. What would you do?

(1) _____ Move
(2) _____ Stay

Why?

- VI. Now I would like to get your opinion on some general questions about how the U.A.W. is run.

1. Compared to other unions, how democratically would you say the International U.A.W. is run? (READ)

(1) _____ More
(2) _____ About the same as others
(3) _____ Less

- a. Were you thinking of some particular other international union in making this comparison?

(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

(If yes) Which one?

(If no) Could you think of one which is (more)
(about the same)
(less)
democratic?

- b. What makes the U.A.W. (more)
(about the same) democratic then
(less)
_____?
(union named)

- c. What do you mean by Trade Union democracy? PROBE

d. How important would you say it is that a union be run democratically? Would you say it was: (READ)

- (1) _____ Very important
- (2) _____ Somewhat important
- (3) _____ Not very important

Why? PROBE

2. Compared to other U.A.W. locals, how democratically would you say your local is run? (READ)

- (1) _____ More
- (2) _____ About the same
- (3) _____ Less

(more)

What makes your local (same) democratic than other locals? PROBE
(less)

3. Compared to other unions, how efficiently would you say the international U.A.W. is run? (READ)

- (1) _____ More
- (2) _____ About the same
- (3) _____ Less

a. Were you thinking of some particular other union in making this comparison?

- (1) Yes _____
- (2) No _____

(If yes) Which one?

(more)

(If no) Could you think of one which is (about the same)
(less)

efficient?

(more)

b. What makes the U.A.W. (about the same) efficient than
(less)

_____?
(union named)

c. How important would you say it is that a union be run efficiently? Is it: (READ)

- (1) _____ Very important
- (2) _____ Somewhat important
- (3) _____ Not very important

Why? PROBE

4. Compared to the automobile companies, how efficiently would you say the U.A.W. is run? (READ)

(1) _____ More
(2) _____ About the same
(3) _____ Less

a. How does this affect collective bargaining with the company?

b. People say unions should be run democratically but they don't expect the automobile companies to be run democratically. How would you explain this?

How does this affect collective bargaining with the company?

5. Would you say U.A.W. members have (1) _____ more; (2) _____ about the same; or (3) _____ less to say about how the union is run than they did 20 years ago? Would you say: (READ) (if response is "not in union then," ask respondent what he thinks and repeat question).

(If more) (1) _____ Much more (2) _____ Somewhat more (3) _____ A
little more
(If less) (1) _____ Much less (2) _____ Somewhat less (3) _____ A
little less

Could you explain that? PROBE

6. Would you say the U.A.W. is run (1) _____ more; (2) _____ about the same; or (3) _____ less efficiently than it was 20 years ago? Would you say: (READ) (if response is "not in the union then," ask respondent what he thinks and repeat question).

(If more) (1) _____ Much more (2) _____ Somewhat more (3) _____ A
little more
(If less) (1) _____ Much less (2) _____ Somewhat less (3) _____ A
little less

Could you explain that? PROBE

7. Who in your opinion is the top labor leader in the U. S.?

8. Who would you say is the top labor leader the U. S. ever had?

VII. Now I would like to know whether you agree or disagree with some more statements. As we did before, I will read the statement and you indicate which of the expressions on the card tells best how you feel about the statement. (SHOW CARD 4)

1. It is more important that the international officers run the union well than it is that they pay strict attention to what the members want.

- (1) ☐ Strongly agree
- (2) ☐ Agree
- (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) ☐ Disagree
- (5) ☐ Strongly disagree

2. Even if the union is not run in the most efficient manner it is more important that the membership have the say about how it is run.

- (5) ☐ Strongly agree
- (4) ☐ Agree
- (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- (2) ☐ Disagree
- (1) ☐ Strongly disagree

3. Unions would generally be better off if they were run by skilled managers instead of people elected by the membership at large.

- (1) ☐ Strongly agree
- (2) ☐ Agree
- (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) ☐ Disagree
- (5) ☐ Strongly disagree

4. All members of the union should be able to participate and express themselves in union affairs even if it means a delay in the achievement of union goals.

- (5) ☐ Strongly agree
- (4) ☐ Agree
- (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- (2) ☐ Disagree
- (1) ☐ Strongly disagree

5. As long as the members get what they want, it doesn't make any difference whether they have any say in how the union is run.

- (1) ☐ Strongly agree
- (2) ☐ Agree
- (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) ☐ Disagree
- (5) ☐ Strongly disagree

6. Once the international officers are elected, they should be free to run the union in whatever way they think best.

- (1) ☐ Strongly agree
- (2) ☐ Agree
- (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) ☐ Disagree
- (5) ☐ Strongly disagree

7. If there are too many disagreements in the union, the international officers should be given full control in order to get things done.
- (1) ☐ Strongly agree
 - (2) ☐ Agree
 - (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 - (4) ☐ Disagree
 - (5) ☐ Strongly disagree
8. It would probably be better if most union officials were appointed instead of elected.
- (1) ☐ Strongly agree
 - (2) ☐ Agree
 - (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 - (4) ☐ Disagree
 - (5) ☐ Strongly disagree
9. The less the rank and file union members know about how the union is run the better it will be run.
- (1) ☐ Strongly agree
 - (2) ☐ Agree
 - (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 - (4) ☐ Disagree
 - (5) ☐ Strongly disagree
10. There isn't any need to waste time and energy on opinions of members who disagree with the majority.
- (1) ☐ Strongly agree
 - (2) ☐ Agree
 - (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 - (4) ☐ Disagree
 - (5) ☐ Strongly disagree
11. A lot of competition for election to office is good even if the union is being run efficiently by those in office.
- (5) ☐ Strongly agree
 - (4) ☐ Agree
 - (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 - (2) ☐ Disagree
 - (1) ☐ Strongly disagree
12. All the important decisions ought to be made by the international officers because only they know what is best for the union.
- (1) ☐ Strongly agree
 - (2) ☐ Agree
 - (3) ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
 - (4) ☐ Disagree
 - (5) ☐ Strongly disagree

13. Once a decision is made by the international officers, the members ought to go along with it whether they think it is right or not.

(1) _____ Strongly agree
(2) _____ Agree
(3) _____ Neither agree nor disagree
(4) _____ Disagree
(5) _____ Strongly disagree

14. It is more important that the union be run efficiently even if it means that the members have less to say about how things should be run.

(1) _____ Strongly agree
(2) _____ Agree
(3) _____ Neither agree nor disagree
(4) _____ Disagree
(5) _____ Strongly disagree

15. Individuals should not be allowed to disrupt the smooth running of the union by circulating petitions or making speeches.

(1) _____ Strongly agree
(2) _____ Agree
(3) _____ Neither agree nor disagree
(4) _____ Disagree
(5) _____ Strongly disagree

VIII. That is all the questions about the union but we need a little more information about you.

1. How old are you? (Check appropriate category)

(1) _____ 25 or less
(2) _____ 26 - 30
(3) _____ 31 - 35
(4) _____ 36 - 40
(5) _____ 41 - 45
(6) _____ 46 - 50
(7) _____ 51 - 55
(8) _____ 56 - 60
(9) _____ 61 and over
(Y) _____ No answer

2. How much schooling did you have? What was the highest grade you completed. (Check appropriate category)

(1) _____ No schooling
(2) _____ 1st to 6th (elementary)
(3) _____ 7th to 9th (Junior High)
(4) _____ 10th to 12th (High School)
(5) _____ 13th to 16th (College)
(6) _____ 17th and over (Graduate work)

3. Sex (NOTE BUT DON'T ASK)

- (1) ☐ Male
(2) ☐ Female

4. Race (NOTE BUT DON'T ASK)

- (1) ☐ White
(2) ☐ Negro
(3) ☐ Other _____ (specify if possible)

5. What is the title of your job at the plant? (give name, not number)

If fulltime union official, give this fulltime position.

6. Were you unemployed or laid off anytime during the past year?

- (1) Yes ☐ (2) No ☐

(If yes) How many weeks?

7. Could you tell us how much you and your family (household) earned altogether on the average for the last two or three years?

- (1) ☐ Under \$2,000
(2) ☐ \$2,000 to \$2,999
(3) ☐ \$3,000 to \$3,999
(4) ☐ \$4,000 to \$4,999
(5) ☐ \$5,000 to \$5,999
(6) ☐ \$6,000 to \$6,999
(7) ☐ \$7,000 to \$7,999
(8) ☐ \$8,000 to \$8,999
(9) ☐ \$9,000 to \$9,999
(0) ☐ \$10,000 and over

8. Would you classify your job as:

- (1) ☐ Unskilled
(2) ☐ Semi-skilled
(3) ☐ Skilled
(4) ☐ Office-clerical
(5) ☐ Not ascertainable
(6) ☐ Fulltime union worker
(Y) ☐ No answer

9. Would you tell us how you feel about the job you have? (in union if fulltime, in plant if not)

- (1) ☐ Very unsatisfactory
(2) ☐ Fairly unsatisfactory
(3) ☐ No feelings either way - neither satisfactory nor unsatisfactory
(4) ☐ Fairly satisfactory
(5) ☐ Very satisfactory

10. How often do you get a chance to talk to other workers on the Job? (READ)

- (1) ☐ Very often
- (2) ☐ Often
- (3) ☐ Once in a while
- (4) ☐ Never

11. In what city do you live?

12. Are there any of the people you work in living in your neighborhood?

- (1) Yes ☐ (2) No ☐

(If yes) How many?

- (1) ☐ 1 - 2
- (2) ☐ 3 - 4
- (3) ☐ 5 - 6
- (4) ☐ 7 - 8
- (5) ☐ 9 or more

13. What was your father's main occupation?

- (1) ☐ Farmer
- (2) ☐ Businessman
- (3) ☐ Free professional
- (4) ☐ Manager
- (5) ☐ Salaried professional
- (6) ☐ Office worker or sales executive
- (7) ☐ Foreman or skilled worker
- (8) ☐ Semi or unskilled worker
- (9) ☐ Rural or migrant worker
- (X) ☐ Don't know
- (Y) ☐ No answer

14. Where did you grow up? (Most years spent before adulthood)

(Community)

Was it a:

- (1) ☐ Farm
- (2) ☐ Small town
- (3) ☐ Outside city limits (fringe area)
- (4) ☐ Within city limits

15. What social class would you say you belonged to? (Ask and if no response then show alternatives on CARD 5. Code whether spontaneous class identification or not)

- | | | | |
|-----------|---------------|-----------|-------------|
| (1) _____ | Lower class | (1) _____ | Spontaneous |
| (2) _____ | Working class | (2) _____ | From list |
| (3) _____ | Middle class | | |
| (4) _____ | Upper class | | |
| (X) _____ | Don't know | | |

16. How many years in all have you been a member of a union? (This includes unions other than the U.A.W., if any)

17. When did you first join the U.A.W.?

18. Can you estimate the distance from your home to the union hall?

- (1) _____ Less than a mile
- (2) _____ 1 to 2 miles
- (3) _____ 3 to 4 miles
- (4) _____ 5 to 6 miles
- (5) _____ 7 to 8 miles
- (6) _____ 9 to 10 miles
- (7) _____ Over 10 miles

a. Would you say that this distance was:

- (1) _____ Short
- (2) _____ Fairly short
- (3) _____ About right
- (4) _____ Fairly far
- (5) _____ Far

19. How many local meetings did you attend last year? Did you attend: (READ)

- (1) _____ All
- (2) _____ Almost all
- (3) _____ Most
- (4) _____ Some
- (5) _____ None

20. Are you a member of any community organization? (SHOW LIST ON CARD 6)

- (1) _____ Lodges
- (2) _____ Vet's group
- (3) _____ Church
- (4) _____ Church group or other social groups
- (5) _____ PTA
- (6) _____ Neighborhood groups
- (7) _____ Sports and other athletic clubs
- (8) _____ Political groups
- (9) _____ Other (e.g., nationality groups, etc.)
- (0) _____ None

- a. (If a member of any one or several) about how many meetings do you attend altogether every month?

- (1) _____ 1 to 3
(2) _____ 4 to 6
(3) _____ 7 to 9
(4) _____ 10 to 12
(5) _____ 13 to 15
(6) _____ Over 15

- b. Are you an official in any one of these groups?

- (1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

(If yes) Which group(s) is this?

21. One final question. Did you fill out one of our questionnaires at the 1959 convention?

- (1) Yes _____ (2) No _____

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!

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
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