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ABSTRACT
THE LABOR POLICY OF THE
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

by Robert S. Cutler

Three aspects of the Eisenhower administration's
policy were examined in an effort to determine the ad-
ministration's response to the problems posed by or-
ganized labor in the 1950's. President Eisenhower's
first unhappy encounter with organized labor came when
he appointed a labor official, Martin P. Durkin, as
Secretary of Labor in a gesture of goodwill toward the
labor movement. Labor policy in 1955 was mainly con-
cerned with preparing a program to revise the Taft—
Hartley act. Eisenhower, apparently urged to appoint
Durkin by the moderate Republicans in his administra-
tion, showed very little enthusiasm for Durkin's pro-
posed revisions for the law. By failing to act in
Durkin's behalf during the struggle that ensued with
Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks, Eisenhower
strengthened the hand of old guard Republicans who had
violently protested the appointment in the first place.
The effort to present a new, positive image of the Re-

publican party by moderate Republicans was stymied by

Eisenhower's refusal to intervene.

Robert S. Cutler

The ill will created by the Durkin "experiment"
between labor and the administration was only partly
eradicated by Durkin's successor, James P. Mitchell.
The strike policy of the Eisenhower administration was
an important factor in the hostility which labor demon-
strated toward the administration as the years passed.
Although Eisenhower sincerely tried to protect the pub-
lic interest by urging the union.and management to be
statesmenlike in the steel strikes of 1956 and 1959,
the President's "hands-off" policy ignored other issues
besides the simple economic argument involved. The
pressure of public opinion, the demands of partisan
politics and the needs of national defense were primary
factors that forced the administration to bring pres-
sure to bear on the parties to compromise in both cases
by behind-the-scenes intervention. Clinging to an over-
ly simple vision of a free economy Eisenhower delayed.
acting until the last possible moment, further alien-
ating the labor movement by encouraging a long strike
that brought greater hardships to the union members.

The enmity of labor was sealed by the President's
decision to support a coalition of Republicans and
Southern Democrats who favored repressive, punitive
legislation to correct union abuses revealed by the
McClellan Rackets Committee after 1957. On this issue
Eisenhower first followed the advice of Mitchell, a

moderate Republican who favored labor policies that

Robert S. Cutler

would convince the labor leaders that the Republicans
were not anti-labor. Eisenhower's disenchantment with
labor leaders, whom he viewed as mere "special plead-
ers," was complete by 1958. Instead of supporting bi-
partisan moderate reform legislation Eisenhower per—
mitted the issue to linger on until the 1958 congres-
sional elections were over. No gains were won by Re-
publican candidates on the issue of union corruption.
But the continued efforts of the McClellan Rackets
Committee plus the reluctance of labor leaders to back
any reform program in 1959 lent strength to the move-
ment in the Congress to write more restrictive legis-
lation. Eisenhower found the congressional consensus
in 1959 and vigorously supported legislation that ap-
peared to carry majority support. The influence of
his active participation in labor policy formation was
clearly seen after 1958, and he secured legislation
in 1959 that he considered close to his own program.
Between 1955 and 1958 Eisenhower passively
supported moderate efforts to improve the Republican
party's relations with labor. He wavered frequently
in this effort, which.might have been a decisive fac-
tor governing its failure. After 1958 Eisenhower chose
to support many of the views of his party's old guard,
especially those of the late Senator Robert A. Taft,
Sr. His transition from a passive to an active Presi-
dent brought his conservative views of labor into

clearer focus.

Robert S. Cutler

The memoirs by various members of the Eisen—
hower administration provided important information
about the setting in which labor policy was formulated
although they offered slightly less reliable evidence
pertaining to the various aspects of labor policy it-
self. For the administration's official position on
labor policy various hearings and reports were con-
sulted, which also provided a good indication of pub-
lic, labor and management reaction to Eisenhower's
policy. Hearings on revision of the Taft-Hartley act,
and the McClellan Rackets Committee hearings were valu-

able sources.

THE LABOR POLICY OF THE
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

by

Robert S. Cutler

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1965

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Dr. Madison Kuhn for his
patience and kindness in directing the preparation
of this thesis. His patience was matched and perhaps

exceeded by that of my wife who typed the manuscript.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

Chapter
I. THE DURKIN "EXPERIEENT". . . . . . . . 1

II. EISENHOWER'S STRIKE POLICY . . . . . . 52

III. LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION:
MITCHELL'S PROGRAM . . . . . . . . 48

IV. POLITICS AND LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION. 65

V. LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION:
EISENHOWER'S PROGRAM . . . . . . . 75

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

iii

ChaLTER I
TLE bdnnln "EXPEslnEXT"

ConSpicuously absent from the ranks of the
"Crusaders" who cast their votes in 1952 for Eresident
Dwight D. Eisenhower neie the leaders and members of
organized labor.1 Unable to accept Eisenhower's pro-
posals for only minor changes in the controversial Taft-
hartley act, the American Federation of Labor, in an
unusual display of i.olitical partisanship, publicly en—

T\

dorsed Adlai a. Stevenson, who supported the Democratic
platform demand for repeal of the law.2 Deepite the

A. F. of L.'s blunt rejection of his views on labor leg-
islation, Eisenhower turned to its leadership in selec-
ting his secretary of Labor, hartin P. Durkin. In the
months that followed, Durkin attemptec to comhit the
Eisenhower administration to partial restoration of
wagner act policies, but he was Opposed at every turn

.1.

by the Secretary of Commerce, Sinclair weeks. After

prolonged bargaining with hostile members of the admin—

 

lLouis Harris, Is there a Republican hajority?
Iolitical Trends, 1352 - 19j4 (New York: hcrper, 1y54),
pp. lfll-Hj, 147:

 

2. i. w .
Report of the Proceedings of the Seventy—First
Convention of the American Federation of Labor (1954),

 

 

l

2
istration and the Congress, Durkin managed to prepare
a list of nineteen recomaenoatipns for revision of the
Taft-Bartley act. hhen Eisenhower refused to support
these suggestions, Durnin resigned in disgust, charging
that the President had broken his promises to organized

labor.5

In hanoate for Change Eisenhower wrote that he

 

considered his effort to include a labor leader in his
Cabinet an "eXperiment".4 Sherman Adams used the same
term in Firsthand Report and grimly observed that "it
was an experiment doomed from the start to failure."5
That it failed, of course, was evident, but it repre—
sented the earliest example of the path of develOpment
which Eisenhower's labor policy was to follow. The
conflicting elements which refused to combine in the
Durkin experiment continued to influence Eisenhower and
Durkin's successor, James P. Mitchell, as they attempted
to put into practice a program that would assure a
greater measure of industrial peace and a greater meas-
ure of political support from organized labor. The con-
flict in the Republican party between the "monerates"
and the "old guard" helped assure the failure of the

Durkin experiment, and this conflict was revealed later

 

_,

9A. F. of L., Proceedings (1959), p. 400.

 

4Dwight D. Eisenhower, handate for Change 1959-
1956 (New York: Doubleday, 1985), p. 91.

5Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: the Storyiof
the Eisenhower Administration (New York: harper, 1901),
p. 62.

 

 

 

\JN'

as Eisenhower tried to guide labor reform legislation
through the Congress. Eisenhower's cautious wooing of
the A. F. of L. was hampered by the fact that the "con-
servative" A. F. of L. found more in common with its
rival, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, than

it did with the Republican party. when the tto unions
merged in 1955, it became even more difficult for Eisen-
hower to win labor's political support. Finally, Eisen—
hower's equivocal attitude LOWer organized labor — a
mixture of "naive idealism" and practical politics —
further complicated his efforts to formulate practical
policies for labor.

Except for his Opinion about the Tidelands oil
issue, Eisenhower was not well-acquainted with the ex-
tent and complexity of the domestic problems, including
the Taft-Hartley act, before the nation when he entered
the 1952 campaign for the Presidency.b By September 17,
he was ready to present his views on the labor law to
the delegates of the seventy-first convention of the A.
E. of L. The less than enthusiastic greeting he receiv-
ed was caused by the fact that Eisenhower, on September
12, had negotiated a truce with Senator Robert A. Taft,
Sr. at the now-famous Morningside heights conference.

In the statement released following the meeting, Eisene

hower said that he was satisfied with the Taft—hartley

act's purpose and that only minor changes might be

 

Ohandate, pp. 55—58; cf. Ibid., pp. 198-97.

needed to improve it.7

In his speech, perhaps prepared by Harold Stas-
sen and Emmet John Hughes, Eisenhower urged his audi-
ence to be "realistic" and give up their demands for
repeal of what, in his opinion, was basically sound

legislation.8

Their own Executive Council had adopted
such an attitude, and it compared to his own, he said.
But while Eisenhower repeated that only minor changes
were required, the Executive Council's report suggest-
ed that only drastic revision of the law would elimi-
nate the abuses it contained.9
Since 1947, when the act was passed, labor lead—
ers had cried, perhaps somewhat hysterically, that the
act was a "slave labor law". The council's report was
more restrained, but it continued to raise objections
long a part of labor's attack upon the bill. Citing
the expense of seemingly endless litigation created by
the provisions restricting traditional organizing prac-
tices, as well as the general anti-labor intent of the
law, the council's report, though favoring amendment

rather than repeal, clearly went far beyond Eisenhower's

modest proposals to change only minor parts of the law.

 

7New York Times, September 15, 1952. Also
William S. White, The Taft Stogy (New York: Harper,
1954), P- 190-

8A. F. of L., Proceedings (1952), p. 565.

9Report of the Executive Council of the Ameri-

can Federation of Labor to the Sevent -First onvention
(195259 PP- 76, 55-369 162: 215’170

5

On this issue the A. F. of L. more closely agreed with
its riVal, the c. I. 0.10

Eisenhower informed his audience that he was
aware that the law could be a threat to union security.
he avoided specific details in saying that "I Know how
the law might be used to break unions. America wants
no law licensing union-busting. And neither do I."11
When compared to his morningside Heights statement,
this was strong criticism, and it seemed out of place
in the context of his message. But he cautioned that
before anything could be none to correct this aspect
of the law, more study was needed. Eisenhower promised
in his speech to consult labor, industry, and the pub—
lic in preparing changes for the law.

By bringing all parties concerned with the law
together, Eisenhower optimistically expected the prob—
lem to solve itself. In keeping with this method, he
firmly declared that the issue was too important to be
a political issue. he intended to mane no "slanted ap-
peals" to labor or anyone else, and his efforts would
not be "empty theatrical gestures."l2

Although Eisenhower promised labor a "fair

hearing" in his administration, he gave no hint during

 

10 . a, .
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education
and Labor, Hearings, Labor-Managenent Relations, 85rd

ll

 

A. F. of L., Iroceedings (1955), p. 584.

 

lalbid.

6

the campaign that he intended to appoint a union lead-
er to his Cabinet. That deCision probably was not made
until after the election. In choosing his Cabinet,
Eisenhower relied upon the device of a ”screening com-
mitteefl'composed of herbert Brownell Jr., and General
Lucius D. Clay.to narrow down lists of potential ap—
pointees submitted by tOp Republicans to one or two
names. After a thorough security check of eligible can-
didates, Eisenhower, according to his account, made the
final decision.lj

No record is available to indicate the alter-
natives to Durmin which the lresident considered. he
"wanted no one who had evidenced extreme views in labor—
management relations," and, deSpite burnin's support
of Stevenson and his Opposition to the Taft—hartley
act, he apparently met Eisenhower's requirements.l4
DurKin was president of the United Association of Jour-
neymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting
Industry, a post he had held since 1945. He had been
affiliated with his union as a business agent and sec-
retary-treasurer prior to his election. Between 1955
and 1945 Durkin was head of the Illinois Department of
Labor. During that time, on at least one occasion,
DurKin earned the enmity of the United hine workers,

then an affiliate of the C. I. 0., when he refused to

 

l4Ibid., p. e4.

7
permit striKing miners to receive unemployment Lenefits.
At the time of his appointment to Eisenhower's Cabinet,
observers recalled his apparent hostility toward the C.

I. O. and speculated as to whether or not it Would

r—

continue.17

Sherman Adams asserted that Eisenhower was una-
ware of the conflict between the A. F. of L. and the
C. I. 0. until after his meeting with walter Reuther,
late in February 1955.16 According to this View, Eisen—
hower was not only naively Optimistic, but also appar—
ently abysmally ignorant of the most elementary facts
about the labor movement. Even if this were the case,
Herbert Brownell was not ignorant of the cleavage bet—
ween the two unions. harold Stassen, the man who recom-
mended Durxin, according to Adams, was well—acquainted
with the labor movement "and woraed hard to bring lead—
ers of organized labor into the Republican camp" during

17 he could not have been unaware of the

the campaign.
rivalry between the unions either. Eisenhower trusted
the advice of both men implicitly, and in the case of

n . . . . lo ..
btassen, unWisely, in Adams' Opinion. Adans's argu-

ment that Eisenhower was unaware of the split betteen

 

lbnall Street Journal, December 3a 19523 2229-,
December ll, 1954.

lo . . a. ,
Firsthand Heport, L. b.

 

l7Ibido , p. 61;}.

lalbid., pp. 64-65.

8
the A. F. of L. and the C. I. L. at the time he oecideo
to appoint Durwin as secretary of Labor seemed unfounded.

Eisenhower discussed his motives for appoin—

_. V n -. . - : . l9 . _. _

ting UUIKIQ in hanoate for Change. A laoor leader,
in his Opinion, should have been best qualified to un—
derstand the complex problems of organized labor. A
labor "expert" in the Department of Labor would achieve
one of Eisenhower's main goals of removing pressure
from the lresident to intervene in problens between la—
bor and nanagement. In addition, a labor leader in the
Cabinet would serve to "counterbalance” the business-
oriented views of the Secretary of Comrerce, Sinclair
weeks. But most important, Durkin was intended to
serve as a symbol of the Eisenhower administration's
"goodwill" toward the labor movement. Ho motives re—
motely reflecting politiCal aims for the appointment
were suggested, of course, but without them the appoint—
ment appeared to have been a senseless experiment.

In the light of Durkin's unfavorable attitude
toward the C. I. L., which Eisenhower must have known,
if the examination of Durxin's past activities were as
thorough as tie liesident said it was, it seemed un—
likely that organized labor was destined to receive a
"fair healing." Did LurKin understand tie proLlens
of the industrial unions of tie C. l. o.? lrobably not.

Ln the other hand, the C. I. L. could hardly be eXpec-

 

193;. 90, 196—97.

9
ted to taKe its problems to the Department of Labor
directed by a rival union leader. Adams argued that
it was this obvious problem which Eisenhower was una—
ware of when he chose DurKin.20 ‘erhaps, instead, the
appointment was designed to close Off one more avenue
by which the C. I. 0. could bring pressure on the ad-
ministration. Since Eisenhower had already made it
clear that he intended not to intervene directly in la—
bor-management problems, the C. I. 0. had no way of
securing support from the administration.

The argument that Durmin would serve to balance
the views of the secretary of Commerce was equally un-
satisfactory. In View of the fact that Eisenhower de-
liberately selected a Cabinet that was "business—ori-
ented," Durkin could have been at best a voice crying
in the wilderness. One needs only to reCall DurKin's
remarx to a friend that when he entered a room "every-
one stopped talKing" to measure the tranSparent inap-
propriateness of Eisenhower's motive.21

The intention to use Durwin as a symbol Of
goodwill seemed to fit best into the picture of Eisen-
hower as an optimist and an idealist. The presence of
Durkin, in Eisenhower's Opinion, "would serve notice
on the unions and the public that government deliber-

ations at the highest levels were Open and aboveboard

 

doFirsthand Report, pp. 6, 7, 502.

 

21New York Times, September ll, 1955.

 

lO
and precluded the possibility of any cabals develOping

"a2 At the same

counter to the interests of labor.
time Eisenhower took precautions with Durain that he
did not take with other Cabinet leaders. According to
Ezra Taft Benson, once Eisenhower selected his man for
a job he did not attempt to supervise him.25 DurKin
was not able to Operate freely, however. The Secretary
of Commerce was assigned, or appointed himself, to
serve as a "watchdog" over DurKin's attempts to write
recommendations for revising the Taft-hartley act. At
a critical Juncture in their relationship, Eisenhower
demanded that the members of the "informal" committee
with whom DurKin was worKing on the labor law, be in

f.

. _ I _ a4 ,
unanimous agreement on suggested changes. At the

0
same time Eisenhower described Durkin and weens as

25 Un—

"poles apart" on many issues affecting the law.
der such circumstances Durkin's hands were effectively
tied by the President. Symbolic gestures were inade-
quate to win the political support of organized labor,
as A. F. of L. president George heany implied in his

_. . u. . 26
public statement apprOVing the Lurmin appOintment.

 

2ahandate, p. 198.

a" . n. . , l.
eross-Fire: the might Years with Eisenhower
(New York: Doubleday, laba), pp. 72, 199—94.

 

:4. l .
Liana at e , i} o 1 ad 0
2 .- .,
51b1a., p. 19a.
26 . t . . _ ,m, . ,
American Federationist, LIX, co. Also New
Yorm Times, December 5, 1972.

 

ll
Although President Eisenhower harbored a dis—
taste for political "in—fighting," he was not unable
to pursue political objectives, as Samuel Labell oh—

27

served in his book, The Revolt of the Loderates.

 

During the campaign Eisenhower had abandoned his old
friend General Georbe C. harshall on the advice of
trusted advisers, by refusing to criticize Senator
Joseph P. McCarthy for his unwarranted attack upon
harshall’s loyalty.2d havinb only recently acquired
an "ideal" method for SOlVifl5 labor's problems, it was
perhaps less difficult for the President to set aside
this method when urged to appoint a labor leader who
would be politically useful as well as serving as a
symbol. During his campaibn he had raised labor issues
above politics, and he continued to eSpouse this theme
in his first State-of—the-Union messabe when he said
that "the determination of labor policy must be gov-
erned not by the vagaries of political eXpediency but

"29

by the finest principles and convictions. Perhaps

at this point Eisenhower saw no conflict between the

 

d“Jean Albertson (ed.), Eisenhower as Presi—

dent (New York: hill and want, laop), "Ye Compleat
Political Anbler", p. 19.

 

ddFirsthand Report, pp. El-jE. Also Emmet
John hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Eolitical hemoir
of the Eisenhower YearsifNew YorK: Atheneum, lady),
pp. 41—45.

dgfublic Papers of the Eresidents of the Unit—
ed States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 19;; (washington,wD.A
C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1360), pp. 25—90.

 

 

12
Durkin appointment and the realization of his non—po—
litical solution for the problems of labor and manage-
ment.

The potential political value of the Durkin
appointment made it a worthwhile gamble for the Repub-
lican administration since a political alliance forged
between the Republican party and the A. F. of L. would
serve to weaken the old "Roosevelt coalition" by off-
setting the strength of the alliance of the Democratic
party and the C. I. 0. Even if no votes were forth-
coming, the identification of A. F. of L. interests
with the "moderate“ Republican position would serve to
assure the continued disunity of the labor movement.

Since 1947 efforts to merge the two unions had
failed, but their waning political influence coupled
with the new strength of the Republican party created
a situation encouraging new merger efforts. The Taft-
Hartley act was one focus of unity for the rival unions
since it applied to both groups. Was it unreasonable
to hope that a political alliance could be at least
tentatively formed by trading revisions in the Taft-
Hartley act suited to the interests of the A. F. of L.?
The presence of an A. F. of L. leader alone was insuf-
ficient; tangible benefits had to be offerred. By
limiting changes in the law to those which had been
suggested by Senator Taft there was little danger of
alienating the old guard members of the party who looked

15
upon the Taft-Hartley act as a major instrument of bal-
ancing power between labor and management. In a sense,
the Durkin appointment would serve to unify the Repub-
lican party, at least partially, as well as to advance
the political interests of the party.

Perhaps, if Eisenhower had discussed the ap—
pointment with Senator Taft before announcing his de-
cision, the President could have prevented the angry
outburst which Taft delivered in a news conference
published in the New York Times on December 5, follow-
ing the announcement that Durkin had been selected for
the cabinet. Eisenhower said in Mandate for Change
that he expected bitter Opposition from the old guard,

and that he feared violent criticism would frighten

-v

away likely candidates for the post?0

His secrecy
only angered the old guard, however.

Presented with a fgip accompli Taft rebelled.
The appointment apparently confirmed his suspicion that
Eisenhower was politically ignorant. But most of his
criticism was aimed at Brownell who had ignored Taft's
Cabinet suggestions. In the case of the Department of
Labor, Taft had suggested Clarence Manion, Dean of the
Notre Dame Law School and an ultra-conservative. While

Manion might have impressed Eisenhower's screening com-

mittee as a "union-buster," the Durkin appointment, in

 

50Mandate, p. 50.

l4
Taft‘s opinion, was "incredible."

Taft could not believe that a Stevenson sup-
porter and a foe of the Taft-Hartley act could have
been appointed. "This appointment," said Taft, "leaves
without representation in the Cabinet those millions
of Democrats . . . who left their party to support Gen-
eral Eisenhower, and gives representation to their most

‘51 Taft wondered how Brownell could

bitter Opponents.
have been so misinformed on political realities to en-
courage such a decision. Eisenhower was surrounded by
men of the Dewey camp, and for Taft the Durkin nomina-
tion was an indication of their political incompe-
tence.52
Eisenhower appeared to have an inadequate grasp
of sound Republican principles. although William S.
White, Taft's sympathetic biographer, said that the
question was not important enough to make an issue of
it, for a time, it appeared that Taft intended to do
just that.55 Taft had argued often that the union
"bosses" were not acting in the interests of their rank-
and-file members. He called the selection of Durkin

"an affront to the millions of union members and their

officers who had the courage to defy the edict of

 

51new York Times, December 5. 1952-

32White, The Taft Story, pp. 209-10
aanido’ Pp. 210-110

15
officials like Mr. Durkin that they vote for Steven-
3011.";AL For the moment at least, Taft appeared uneasy
about Eisenhower's grasp of this fundamental fact.

The uneasy truce which Eisenhower had negoti-
ated at Morningside Heights on September 12, appeared
to have ended. But two days later Taft relented. No
reasons were given for his change of mind although his
biographer said that Taft was determined to provide
the necessary political wisdom so obviously lacking
in the new administration to insure the success of a
sound Republican program.55 Perhaps another, more
practical reason lay in the fact that Taft was unable
to muster much support from other members of the old
guard. Senator Eugene A. Milliken of Colorado one of
Taft‘s staunch supporters observed for reporters that
the President was entitled to select his own Cabinet.56
Although he refused to comment on the wisdom of the
choice, he expressed no violent opposition. According
to Adams' account, a delegation of old guard Republi-
cans visited Eisenhower at Morningside Heights soon af—
ter the announcement, admonishing him to avoid a repe-

tition of the Durkin appointment in the future.57 The

 

34New York Times, December 5, 1952.

55White, The Taft Story pp. 212, 215, 216.

56New York Times, Decembery}, 1952.

57Firsthand Report, p. 58.

16
Durkin experiment failed to receive the endorsement of
the old guard, as much from the tactical blunder Eisen-
hower committed, as from distaste for an alliance with
even a supposedly conservative branch of the labor
movement.

With the old guard glowering in the background,
Eisenhower attempted to put into effect his method of
resolving the problems created by the Taft-Hartley act.
By bringing labor, management, and the public togeth-
er, Eisenhower hOped to secure recommendations for
changing the law that would satisfy everyone. In his
first State-of—the-Union message Eisenhower said he
had authorized Durkin to establish promptly a tripar-
tite advisory committee consisting of employers, labor,
and the public to prepare recommendations that would
direct the President's efforts to revise the law.38

After a month of preparation Durkin announced
that fifteen pe0ple had been selected to serve on the
tripartite Labor Department Advisory Commission.39
The "public” was represented by Jean T. McKelvey, Dean
of Cornell University; Dr. Sumner H. Schlicter, from
Harvard University; Cyrus S. Ching, a former director

of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)

during the Truman administration; Dr. Maurice T. Van

 

5Brubnc Papers . . . 1955. p. 29.
59New York Times, March 5, 1955.

 

1?
flecks, of North Carolina University; and Dr. Paul A.
Dodd, of the University of California. The management
representatives were drawn from a wide range of indus-
tries. Harry R. Moses, President of the Bituminous
Coal Operators Association; David Zellerbach, of Crown-
Zellerbach Corporation; John J. O'Donnell, President
of the National Constructors Association; Ben Moreel,
of Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation; and Frank Ris—
ling, President of the Auto Parts Manufacturers Asso-
ciation presented management's views. Durkin assembled
an impressive group of union leaders for the confer-
ence, George Meany, Walter Reuther, David J. MacDonald,
President of the United Steelworkers of America; George
Harrison of the Brotherhood of Railway Workers; and
John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers provided a
cross-section of union leadership.

On March 6, 1955 the group assembled in Wash-
ington, D. C. to discuss a twenty—point agenda pre-
pared by Durkin. At the top of the list was the pro-
vision of the Taft-Hartley act which denied economic
strikers voting rights in representation elections.
This was the provision which Eisenhower apparently re-
ferred to during his campaign as a potential threat
to union security. Labor leaders had argued that in
a period of job scarcity an employer, seeking to re-
duce labor costs, could provoke a strike bring in

strikebreakers, and then demand a representation

18

election. The result, the unions argued, was that
the union would lose the right to represent the work-
ers involved, thus undermining union security.

According to a press conference statement by
George Meany, reported by the New York Times on March
7, the commission spent the morning discussing this
provision, and during the afternoon session the labor
leader: suggested that the issue be put to a vote.
The management representatives withdrew for a "caucus"
and returned to state that they would not vote on this
or any other issue since it went beyond the purpose of
the group. The industrial representatives said they
would exchange views on issues but refused to vote.
The majority of the group favored easing the restric—
tion, according to Meany; management was attempting to
prevent any changes. He said "I am forced to the in—
escapeable conclusion, from their actions that these
representatives of industry are perfectly content to
sit tight with the Taft-Hartley act as now written -
with all its unfairness and union-busting provisions -
and will take part in no move to make the law more ac-

ceptable to labor."40

The group met the next day,
reached no compromise, and adjourned indefinitely.
Eisenhower's campaign promise to avoid "empty

theatrical gestures" was not to be easily kept as this

 

“0.1.92.9... March 7. 1955

19

conference demonstrated. Eisenhower's simple solution
to the labor law problem was no solution at all. In-
stead, the tripartite commission almost became a source
of embarassment for the administration. By voting on
recommendations the labor leaders could have forced
Eisenhower to make far more extensive changes in the
law than he had planned. The industrialists, apparent-
ly sensing that a majority of the public representa-
tives were on labor's side, preferred to end the con-
ference in deadlock rather than risk extensive changes.

President Eisenhower made no public effort to
save the tripartite commission despite his earlier en-
thusiasm for the idea. Perhaps he realized the extent
of the gulf that separated labor and management on the
issue of the Taft-Hartley act. Perhaps, also, he re-
alized that if the commission succeeded he might pos-
sibly be committed to extensive revisions of the law,
an event which would alienate the old guard and des—
troy the political value of the Durkin appointment.

By not acting, the President eliminated the influence
of the C. I. O. in his administration.

In addition, Meany's belligerent statements
indicated perhaps that the A. F. of L. sought more
changes than the Republicans would give. The Taft-
Hartley act continued to serve as a focus of unity for
the rival unions. By eliminating a cross-section of

unions and concentrating upon the A. F. of L. repre-

2O
sented by Durkin, the stage was set for changes that
would enhance rivalry rather than promote unity. In
the months to come, the C. I. C. was significantly ab-
sent from discussions of revisions. Thus, the "fair
hearing" which Eisenhower promised for "labor" was in-
terpreted to mean labor as represented by the A. F.
of L.

Eisenhower did not discuss this abortive ef—
fort to find a solution for the Taft—Hartley act pro—
blem in Mandate for Change. Sherman Adams ignored it
also. Instead they provided an account of Durkin's
efforts to work with members of an "informal" commit-
tee within the administration.41 Bernard Shanley and
Gerald Morgan, both lawyers who had helped prepare the
original language of the law, served as Eisenhower's
"liaisod' men. The rest of the group included Senator
Taft, Senator H. Alexander Smith, Representative Samuel
K. McConnell, and Sinclair Weeks. Durkin met with
these men or their representatives regularly from March
through July in an effort to prepare the administra-
tion's position on the labor law. Two congressional
committees waited more or less impatiently for Durkin
to appear before them; but he never came.

Progress was painfully slow. Durkin and Weeks

were unable to agree on many key issues; Eisenhower

 

n .
lMandate, pp. 196. Firsthand Report, pp. 7,

505.

 

 

21
described them, as we have noted, as being "poles
apart.” Yet the President did nothing to resolve the
dispute. The duel continued unabated. On May 16, ac-
cording to the New York Times Durkin announced that he
intended to submit a separate set of suggestions to
Eisenhower, and on May 25 the same paper quoted the
United States Chamber of Commerce's special bulletin to
its members, which charged that Durkin intended to
"wreck" the Taft-Hartley act. At the same time Durkin
denied charges that he intended to resign, and he in-
sisted that the administration would be able to state
its position on labor legislation before the first ses-
sion of the Eighty-Third Congress adjourned.

In the June issue of the American Federationist
George Meany charged that the administration did not
intend to produce a constructive legislative program
in this area for 1955. Recalling Eisenhower's pledge
to remove the ”union-busting" features of the law Meany
called upon Eisenhower to take definite steps toward
achieving that goal.

‘Meany's charges came up in Eisenhower's news
conference, reported in the New York Times on June 19.
Characteristically evasive, Eisenhower refused to get
involved in a public argument with.Meany. He did say
that he favored easing the voting restrictions on eco-
nomic strikers, and that the non-Communist affidavit

should apply to management as well as labor. He then

22
urged Meany to be patient since only five months of
study had elapsed.

Perhaps sensitive to Meany's criticism, Eisen-
hower attended a meeting of the informal committee on
the following day. In an effort to reassure Meany,
Eisenhower praised the group's "excellent progress" as
he left the meeting. But he suggested no future date
on which the administration would be ready to state
its position. Representative McConnell quoted Eisen-
hower as being aware that someone was going to be dis-
pleased with the group's results. Eisenhower was will-
ing to settle now for a position that was ”reasonably
satisfactory, because you can't get something complete-
ly satisfactory . . . to labor, industry, and the pub-

42 Senator Taft indicated

lic," according to McConnell.
that labor would be satisfied with the prOposals, but
he indicated also that it would be impossible to pre-
pare a position statement before the first session
adjourned.“5

The time element was of special importance to
Durkin since he had taken only a year's leave-of—ab-
sence from his union duties. His participation in the

Eisenhower administration, which labor was beginning
to suspect of deliberately delaying action on the Labor

 

42New York Times, June 20, 1955.

45Ibid.

25
law, endangered his union position. Since his future
as an ”Eisenhower" Republican was questionable, Durkin
understandably intended to return to his duties as a
union leader. Eisenhower's reluctance to assist the
Labor Secretary in his dispute with Weeks, which pro-
mised to continue, perhaps persuaded Durkin to seek an
Opportunity to retire gracefully from the fray and pre-
serve his own influence in the A. F. Of L. while caus-
ing as much embarassment to the Eisenhower administra-
tion as possible. Either through conscious preparation
or fortuitous circumstances the opportunity soon pre-
sented itself.

The series of events culminating in Durkin's
resignation began in July. According to Durkin's ac-
count, delivered on September 22 to the delegates of
the 72nd convention of the A. F. of L., enough progress
had been made to permit the President to deliver his
special message on the Taft-Hartley act on July 51.44
But the message was not delivered because of Senator
Taft's death on that date. On August 5, what Durkin
called the "official draft" and what Eisenhower called
only a very rough working draft of the message appeared
in the Wall Street Journal. The question Of who re—

leased the draft remains a mystery since both sides

denied it and both sides would have gained by it.

 

44A. F. of L., Proceedings (1955), p. 479.

24

In either case, the significant factor was the
"tone" as well as the substance of the message. The
tone indicated that the administration had retreated
from its position favoring only minor changes in the
law. The opening paragraph said that the law now re-
quired "amendments in a number of important respects."45
Durkin had bargained long and hard for nineteen amend-
ments that brought a greater measure of "fairness and
balance" to the labor law. The Wall Street Journal of
August 5, credited Durkin for his persuasive powers and
said that "as some labor sources noted, it embodied far
from a substantial revision of the Taft—Hartley act."

Three measures favored management. ”The first
established that once a contract had been negotiated
issues related to it could not be discussed without
mutual consent until the contract expired. Another
settled the issue of the "no man's land" in-labor-man-
agement relations. Industries engaged in only minor
aspects of interstate commerce would be under the ju-
risdiction of state labor laws if the National Labor
Relations Board declined to act. Finally, wording was
inserted to protect the right of the states to maintain
order in "emergencies" created by strikes.

The balance of the prOposals were aimed at elim-

inating some of labor's complaints about the law. For

 

4Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1955.

25

the most part the changes affected the interests of the
A. F. of L. Two exceptions included a statement that
unions could not be held responsible for the misbehav-
ior of members simply because they were union members;
another gave unions greater latitude in their efforts
to rid unions of communist infiltrators and to protect
their confidential information.

The A. F. of L. benefited by a proposal de—
signed to ease the "pre-hire" restrictions of the law.
PeOple employed in the building trades unions or the
actor's union would be required to join the union with—
in seven rather than thirty days. The secondary boy-
cott, banned by the law, was redefined to permit pick-
eting under certain conditions on jobs where more than
one union was at work. Again, this favored the pecul-
iar interests of the building trades unions. Companies
doing "farmed out work" were still subject to secondary
picketing under the pr0posed revisions.

Durkin had not succeeded in removing the in-
Junction provisions of the law, nor had the "closed
shep" been revived. On the issue of economic strikers
and representation elections some improvement was made,
but strikers still could not vote. Instead the com-
pany could not demand an election until four months

after the strike began, on the assumption, apparently,

that in bad times the process would become too eXpen-

sive to tempt employers.

26

The prOposals as published in the Wall Street
Journal brought no comment from Eisenhower. Two days
later, August 5, Senator H. Alexander Smith observed
for New York Times reporters that he doubted if Eisen—
hower even had seen the message which Smith described
as "a very rough draft." Durkin in the days that fol-
lowed behaved as if he were certain of Eisenhower's
support. On August 6, Durkin delivered the commence-
ment address at Duquesne University in which he said
that changes were being made in the law ”more likeable

"46 Both the

to representatives of organized labor.
Senate and House labor committees, he said had approved
certain unidentified changes, and more were being sub-
mitted to Eisenhower for his approval.

Durkin made more positive statements during one
of his rare news conferences reported by the New York
Timgg on August 12. He defended the administration's
labor policies from an attack by the acting-president
of his own union which charged the administration with
opposition to labor's interests.47 Durkin argued that
Eisenhower's extension of Social Security coverage to
include ten million more people was not anti-labor, nor

was his protection of minimum wage legislation. Durkin

was particularly pleased with Eisenhower's efforts to

 

“Gwen York Times, August 7, 1955.

“71b1d., August 10, 1955.

27
revise the Taft—Hartley act. Many ”tap-level confer-
ences" had produced good results, he said. As evidence
of Eisenhower's favorable labor views Durkin said that
"a number of amendments have been agreed upon and oth-
ers are under consideration - all of which will bring
fairness and balance to the Labor Management Relations
act of 1947. What better evidence can there be of the

48 Ac-

President's desire to live up to his promises?"
cording to the same New York Times account, Durkin as-
serted categorically that "if he had not been satis-
fied with Eisenhower's record in labor matters he would
have resigned.” From his public statements it appeared
that he was satisfied with his achievement. The occa-
sion might also have served to block any administration
effort to back away from the proposed amendments. The
hint that there were more in the offing perhaps indi-
cated that Durkin considered continuing with Eisenhower.
Eisenhower met with Durkin in New York City on
August 19. They discussed the prOposals, but Eisen-
hower later denied that he had approved them. Durkin
had been inadvertently ”misled" on some "particulars”

according to Eisenhower.49 No final decision had been

made; Durkin misunderstood the liaison men, Shanley and

 

48Ibid., August 12, 1953.

“9Mandate , p. 198.

28

Morgan, and their function as mediators.50 When Durkin
returned to Washington on August 20, he discovered that
the informal committee offeredt "something less than

"51 After eleven more days

the agreed upon amendments.
of fruitless bargaining, Durkin wrote his letter of
resignation. He withheld the letter until September
10 when, in his last meeting with Eisenhower, he learn-
ed that the President now refused to support the nine-
teen revisions. He insisted that the President accept
his resignation.

Durkin told his version of events to the A. F.
of L. convention delegates on September 22. The con-
vention adopted a resolution thanking him and dismiss-

52

ing the revisions as inadequate. Vice-President
Richard Nixon delivered Eisenhower's message, and he
added a preface in which he insisted that Eisenhower
had not broken his word as Durkin charged; the whole
episode resulted from a "misunderstanding.”53 The dele-
gates were unconvinced since Nixon offereda little evi-
dence to support his contention.

Less than a month after Durkin resigned, Eisen—

hower, on October 8, appointed James P. Mitchell as

 

5oIbid.

51A. F. of L., Proceedings (1955), pp. 479-480.

52 .
'" Iblde, P. 6180
551b1d., p. 516.

29

interim-Secretary of Labor. In November, anarticle
by Mitchell appeared in the American Federationist
which echoed Eisenhower's campaign speech in promising
to consult labor on changes in the law. By the end of
December, Mitchell had prepared Eisenhower's special
message for Congress. There is no evidence to indicate
whether or not Mitchell discussed the law with labor
leaders. On January 11, 1954, Eisenhower delivered a
special message on the Taft-Hartley act which embodied
all of the nineteen proposals.54

But Eisenhower's message also included some
suggestions which had not been part of the original pro-
posals. Foreshadowing the investigation of labor rack-
eteering which dominated his second term, Eisenhower
recommended that union welfare and pension fund manage-
ment be examined. [Another proposal that reflected, in
some labor leaders' opinion, an inherent prejudice
against labor, called for legislation to require a se-
cret ballot on strike votes by workers.55 Eisenhower
avoided detailed recommendations in an effort, he said
later at a news conference, to establish guiding "prin-
ciples."56 Congress was expected to work out the de-

tails along with Mitbhell. While the two additions

 

5M’Public Papers . . . 1954, pp. 40-44.
551b1d., p. 44.
56New York Times, January 13, 1954.

50
reflect perhaps more anti-labor sentiment, the remark-
able fact is that the fruits of Durkin's labors were
preserved by Mitchell after Eisenhower had once rejected
them.

Mitchell perhaps owed his success to his back—
ground as a labor relations expert for two New York
City department stores, as much as Durkin owed his fail-
ure to his origins as a union leader. Mitchell spoke
the language of management and Durkin spoke that of la-
bor. Eisenhower trusted the former and distrusted the
latter.

In his criticism of Durkin in Mandate for Change,
Eisenhower focused upon Durkin's intransigent atti-
tude.57 Instead of finding common ground on which to
meet Durkin, Eisenhower saw Durkin as a "special plead-
er" for labor instead of his personal adviser on labor

58

problems. Durkin viewed his position in the admin-
istration as comparable to a union negotiator at con-
tract time. He saw a simple "collective bargaining"
situation and acted as his long experience had taught
him. The result was disastrous. Eisenhower was great-

ly annoyed by Durkin's references to his meetings with

the informal committee as "collective bargaining"

 

57P1). 198-99. Benson was critical of Durkin
for his reticence during Cabinet meetings; he was sul-
len and withdrawn, pp. 155-56.

58Mandate, p. 198.

51

sessions.59 Eisenhower simply did not trust Durkin
enough to back him in his quarrel with Weeks. He aban-
doned thoughts of a political alliance, thoughts which
perhaps disturbed him from the beginning as running
counter to his idealism. Mitchell, on the other hand,
was circumspect enough to present his views in language
less blatantly pro-union. Eisenhower trusted him al-
most immediately, and with perhaps a sigh of relief
turned over to Mitchell the details of his labor pol-
icy.60

The emphasis of Eisenhower's labor policy
shifted over the course of a year from idealism to
practical politics and back once more to idealism. The
conflict between his honest desire to encourage indus-
trial peace and the political ambitions of the Repub—
lican party would return to plague him in his strike
policy and in his effort to secure labor reform legis-
lation. Within his party the conflicting interests of
the moderates and the old guard continued to affect the
course of his policy, as they had done with Durkin.
Labor on the ether hand grew more critical of Eisen-

hower's policies although many labor leaders respect-

ed Mitchell's honest concern for labor's problems.

 

591bid., pp. 198-99.
6

 

OIbid., p. 291.

 

CHAPTER II
EISENHOWER'S STRIKE POLICY

Benjamin Franklin wrote of Governor Keith of
Pennsylvania in the Autobiography that "he wished to
please everyone; and having little to give, he gave ex-
pectations."l Such was the case, albeit under differ—
ent circumstances, with President Eisenhower and his
strike policy. Alarmed by his vision of a "free econ—
omy" in danger of permanent corruption by the continued
extension of federal power which accompanied the New
Deal and the Fair Deal, the President "gave expecta-
tions" to labor and management that the collective bar-
gaining process would be allowed to operate freely.
While the Congress was quietly shelving his proposals
to revise the Taft-Hartley act in 1954, Eisenhower,
relying on Mitchell to work out details, prepared to
adapt the traditional method of non-intervention in
major strikes. Where the public interest required in-
tervention, the President resolved to use only the le-
gal authority provided in the national emergency pro-

visionsof the Taft—Hartley act, abandoning all other

 

 

1Russell B. Nye (ed.), Benjamin Franklin: Auto-
bdo ra and Other Writin s (Boston: Riverside Press,
, p. .

$2

55

methods as beyond his power or harmful to serious col-
lective bargaining. The major tests of his policy in
the steel strikes of 1956 and 1959 forced him to aban-
don it although he continued to cling to his vision.

President Eisenhower was not alone in his de-
sire to reverse the trend toward increased government
intervention in major strikes. In their pre—strike
maneuvers, both the twelve major steel companies and
the United Steelworkers of America, led by David J.
MacDonald, endorsed the intent of the President's pol-

2 Both groups had been alarmed at the implications

icy.
of President Truman's dramatic seizure of the steel
mills in 1952. In Eisenhower's opinion, Truman had
damaged the dignity of his high office by the personal
role which he chose to play in negotiations in the
steel industry during his administrations.5 Illegal
methods, smacking of "paternalism" roused the ire of
Eisenhower during the 1952 campaign, and he promised
to seek industrial peace through other means.4
Restoring the lost dignity of the Presidency,

and employing collective bargaining more fully, were

subordinate to Eisenhower's intention to combat one

 

2New York Times, May 6, 1959.

5Firsthand Report, p. 62; A. F. of L., Pro-
ceedings (1952), p. 565.

“A. F. of L., Proceedings (1952), p. 565.

54

worrisome aspect of inflation by pursuing a "hands-off"
policy. The upward spiral of prices and wages which
had accompanied the postwar readjustment period was
traced to the Truman strike policy. In his eagerness
to use Presidential prestige to support organized la-
bor's wage demands, according to Eisenhower, Truman
had helped force unreasonable demands upon employers
who, in turn, were forced to raise prices.5 "Wage-
push" inflation was the result.

The public interest, according to Eisenhower,
was best served by encouraging non-inflationary settle-
ments achieved through collective bargaining rather
than preventing strikes.6 Eisenhower's confidence in
the business community's wisdom is a fact well known,
which.makes his confidence in the maturity and respon-
sibility of labor leaders seem surprising. He called
on both camps repeatedly during the 1956 and 1959
steel strikes to exercise "statesmanship" by finding a
contract acceptable to the public interest as well as
their own interests.7 Short of invoking the Taft-Hart-

ley act provisions, Eisenhower had no other method for

 

5Ibid.

6Robert E. Livernash (ed.), Collective Bar-
gaining in the Basic Steel Ipdustry: A Stu%yofthe
Public gnterest and the Role of Government Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Gov't. P.O., 1961), p. 105. Also, Egg
York Times, March 26, and May 10, 1959.

 

7Public Papers . . . 1222, p. 12.

55
dealing with long strikes.

Sherman Adams was awed and perhaps somewhat
dismayed by Eisenhower's blind faith in the goodwill
of labor and management at the bargaining table. In
Firsthand Report Adams wrote that:

in his determination to reach a difficult .

but desirable objective, the idealistic

and optimistic Eisenhower would reveal a

faith in the higher motives of mankind that

astonished the more cynical members of the

Cabinet. For awhile he was hepeful that

the administration could persuade business-

men to hold the price line and stop labor

leaders from demanding higher wages simply

by appealing to their patriotism and sense

of fair play. His Cabinet cynics argued a

little vainly that in a free enterprise

system something much stronger than inspi-

rational exhortation would be needed to 8

prevent men from trying to make more money.
Even when privately angry at both groups, Eisenhower
publicly continued to evince great confidence in their
sense of responsibility. But the demands of practical
politics, the requirements of national defense, and
the pressure of public opinion forced Eisenhower to
seek more effective means of resolving the conflicts
between labor and management.

The events which marked the two steel strikes
were monotonously similar, despite the fact that the
ll6-day strike in 1959 was the longest in the indus-
try's history. Little purpose would be served by re-

counting the details here. In both cases the union

 

P. 7.

56

and the companies adopted unyielding positions and
flooded the press with statistical arguments to prove
the justice of their respective claims. The companies
posed as the protectors of the national economy by re-
sisting inflationary wage demands, while the union ar—
gued that increased worker productivity and high pro—
fits supported their wage demands. Eisenhower relied
on Mitchell to serve as his lianun,man between the
groups and maintained a determined neutral position.
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, in
which Eisenhower had placed high hOpes during the 1952
campaign, carried on mediation activities to no avail
in both strikes. The Taft-Hartley injunction which
stopped the 1959 strike failed to settle it. In both
cases, Eisenhower relied on high-ranking administration
members to persuade the steel companies to modify their
position in order to reach an agreement with the union.9

Eisenhower might have had a precedent for trust-
ing in the good sense and restraint of the parties since
the first three steel contracts negotiated during Eisen-
hower's term were achieved without strikes. The three
peaceful years in steel between 1955 and 1956 were per—
haps the result of changes in the union's leadership as
well as unfavorable economic conditions. David J. Mac-

Donald represented a different type of union leader

than his predecessor, Philip Murray. MacDonald had

 

9Livernash, Collective Bargaining, pp. 201-202.

 

57
never led a strike, or walked a picket line. Equally
important, the recession of 1954 did not encourage a
strike. In l955, foreshadowing the rigid positions
taken in 1956, MacDonald suddenly stiffened his demands
in the face of peak profits in steel, and called a one-
day "token" strike to win his demands. The Eisenhower
administration remained inconspicuously in the back-
ground during this period, and in 1956 attempted to
follow the same course.

The twenty-seven day steel strike in 1956 was
brought to an abrupt halt by the high-level interven-
tion of Mitchell and Secretary of the Treasury, George
Humphrey. Although the companies reluctantly listened
to the administration's plea, they raised the price of
steel in 1957 in order, they argued, to offset the in-

10 Eisen—

creased costs produced by the 1956 settlement.
hower expressed his anger much later, in 1959, at one
of his famous Wstag" dinners when he told a guest that
the companies had failed to calculate the exact cost of

11 Careful to re-

the increase before raising prices.
main neutral, in the same remarks Eisenhower also criti-
cized the union leadership for approaching the bargain—
ing table intent upon getting as large an increase as

possible in order to assure the maintenance of their

 

lONew York Times, March 21, 1956.

llIbid., July 22 and 25, 1959.

58
positions within the union.

Perhaps disturbed by the apparent duplication
of the results of Truman's policy, Eisenhower neverthe-
less was forced to consider other aspects of the prob-
lem in 1956 besides the simple economic issues involved.
Political requirements were of first importance to the
administration in the election year. The good work
which Secretary Mitchell had done since 1954 to repair
the damage caused by the Durkin experiment was threat-
ened by Eisenhower's determination to use only the Taft-
Hartley act national emergency provisions to intervene.
Had he waited until a national emergency developed in
1956, Eisenhower would have forced the mills to operate
during the period including the election. Obviously,
such an act would have been interpreted as an anti-
labor move by the Democrats. The President's inflexible
policy threatened to lower his stock with labor - never
very high - to a point comparable to the immediate
post—Durkin period. The records available did not in-
dicate who persuaded Eisenhower to change his mind on
this matter, although Vice-President Nixon, a perpetual
"fence-mender," might have had a hand in affairs as he
did in the 1959 strike.

The uncertainties of domestic politics were

matched by a difficult international situation that

developed during the strike. The Suez crisis, generated

by Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal in July, apparently

59
convinced the administration that no interruption of
vital defense supplies could be tolerated although the

12 Tru-

situation had not yet approached Open conflict.
man had seized the steel mills in 1952, in part, to
assure continued supplies to Korea, and Eisenhower on
a much less impressive scale in a less pressing situa-
tion followed a course of intervention also.

Although his strike policy had been tried and
found inadequate to cOpe with the situation in 1956,
Eisenhower proposed to follow the same course in 1959.
He began his campaign to keep the government out of
negotiations in his State-of—the-Union message. Once
more he stressed the twin themes of "wage-push" infla-
tion and the "statesmanship" necessary to achieve a
settlement in the public interest.15 In March, during
a news conference, he continued to press both sides,
and he presented a thinly veiled warningimplying that
the process of collective bargaining was on trial.14
New controls were darkly forecast if the parties failed
to agree, or produced a settlement that forced another

round of price and wage increases. Although both sides

interpreted Eisenhower's remarks to suit their respec-

 

12Livernash, Collective Bargaining, p. 298.

15Public Papers . . . 1959, p. 12.

14New York Times, March 26, and May 6, 1959.

4O
tive points of view, it was clear that he attempted
to follow a truly neutral course although vitally in—
terested in the outcome.

In the strike that finally began in July, the
government made only token efforts to bring the par-
ties closer together on terms. In the past the Presi~
dent had refused to use impartial fact-finding boards
empowered to suggest a settlement, a favorite device
of Truman, because, in his opinion they interfered with
the process of serious collective bargaining by delay-
ing negotiations.15 Finally after sixty-five days
Eisenhower reluctantly offerred to empanel a board if
both sides wanted one, an offer refused immediately by

16 There the

the companies and accepted by the union.
matter was drOpped. Labor, already distressed by Eisen-
hower's reliance on the hated Taft-Hartley injunction,
became more and more critical of the failure to inter-
vene via a fact-finding board despite company objec-
tions.

At the AFL-CIO convention, Mitchell tried to
placate labor leaders who were solidly united in sup-

port of the steelworkers, morally and materially.

Mitchell revealed that he thought the companies unrea-

 

l5Ibido. September 17. 1959-

l6Ibid.

41

sonable in their pose as defenders of the economy, but
it was too late. The convention unanimously passed a
resolution, in Mitchell's presence, condemning the ad-
ministration for its irresponsible position on the
strike and for its support of labor reform legislation
considered "repressive."l7 It would be difficult to
separate the two policies and measure which generated
more anger on the part of labor. Walter Reuther con-
demned not only the administration, but also those who
had invited Mitchell, and Mitchell himself for accept-
ing the invitation to address the convention when he
heard Mitchell say that the administration probably
would use the Taft-Hartley injunction.18

The Taft-Hartley injunction, invoked in Octo-
ber, solved nothing. Negotiations dragged on toward
the deadline, January 26, 1960, when the strike was
due to resume. Private polls indicated that the strik-
ers backed the union and were prepared to continue the
strike, especially since the companies had introduced
the issue of work rules into the economic dispute.
On this symbolic issue the union refused to negotiate.

Having thoroughly tested his strike policy,
Eisenhower sought a new approach in December when he

authorized Mitchell and Nixon to intervene in nego-

 

l7AFL-CIO, Proceedings (1959), pp. 101-102,
106-110, 118.

18Ibid., pp. 116-117.

42
tiations. The political aspect of the strike, which
Eisenhower had vainly tried to ignore, once more prov-
ed to be one of the determining factors in forcing
intervention. Equally critical in the eyes of the
Supreme Court which upheld the administration's use
of the law in October, was the problem of national de—
fense.19 Since 1957 and the launching of the Soviet
Union's space satellite, the United States had reviv-
ed its own missile program which depended upon a steady
supply of special steel products out off by the strike.
The complex relationship between domestic policy and
international policy was ignored in the administration's
strike policy.

As the 1960 election year drew near it appeared
that the Congress would soon have to deal with the strike,
the last resort provided for by the cumbersome Taft-
Hartley machinery. No more undesirable prospect could
have been imagined as the Democratic congress, fresh
from enacting labor reform legislations anticipated a
possible chance to redress the balance between the two
powers by passing restrictive legislation affecting
the recalcitrant companies. The possibility of polit-
ical reprisals combined with the absence of strong sup-

port from other major industries who had granted gen-

 

19United Steelworkers of America v. U.S., 561
US 59 (1959).

45

erous increases were strong arguments presented by
Vice-President Nixon and Mitchell during the month of
December.20

Nixon's presence, which perhaps fulfilled the
psychological "prestige" requirement that Eisenhower
had successfully withheld, suggested another political
problem closer to the Vice-President's personal for-
tunes. Since he had to campaign on the basis of Eisen-
hower's record, and not his own, Nixon perhaps hoped
to improve his standing with labor by securing a set-
tlement acceptable to labor. Despite his efforts,
which brought the strike to an end, Nixon did not win
labor's support. The union accepted a compromise set-
tlement, and the companies held the price line, but
the labor reform issue had tarnished the administra-
tion's relations with organized labor beyond repair.

The defense of President Eisenhower's strike
policy was included in a study of collective bargain-
ing in the steel disputes of the postwar period under-
taken at the request of Mitchell in 1959 by represent-
atives of several schools of business administration.21

Among other conclusions endorsed by Mitchell in his

preface to the study was one which repudiated the

 

20Livernash, Collective Bargaining, pp. 201-

202.

211bid., p. v.

 

44

primary contention upon which Eisenhower had based his
policy, that of inflation.22 The report argued that
strikes and contracts left no long term scars on the
economy, that settlements affected relations between
the two groups but had little impact on the overall
economy.

But Eisenhower defended the right course, if
for the wrong reasons, since past efforts to force set-
tlements in steel had produced no results.25 Interven-
tion at the eleventh hour, when economic forces were
about to force a settlement anyway, appeared to this
group to be less harmful to the collective bargaining
process than early intervention.24

Despite the efforts of this study to defend im-
portant elements of Eisenhower's policy, it was unable
to defend the method of high-level intervention, or
"mediation-with-a-club," as it termed it.25 Such medi-
ation, the report noted, was described by critics as
”an illegitimate device, in that its reality is compul-
sion behind a facade of voluntarism. Free collective
bargaining is not served when government power is used

to force bargainers to change their positions, to make

 

22Ibid., pp. v, vi, 151.

 

25Ibid., pp. 11, 18.

24Ibide, pp. 207-208.

 

 

2SIbide’ pp. 214-215.

 

45
Offers and accept proposals that are contrary to what
the parties privately judge to be their own best inter-
ests."26 The report was unable to deny the validity
Of this charge, but it argued that it was the best
alternative as yet devised, if a free economy were to
be preserved.

Eisenhower's strike policy was conceived in
righteous indignation at the paternalism, illegal
methods, and inflationary settlements of his predeces—
sor, but it failed to meet the demands of reality.
Public Opinion, whose "outcry" was unwarranted in Mit—
.chell's Opinion, nevertheless was conditioned to re-
gard steel strikes as serious threats to the economy.
The Eisenhower policy attempted to ignore or to pla-
cate this force without taking significant action to
end the strike. The end result was additional con-
fusion. Subtle arguments about the effects of the
strike on the long range economic situation were of
less consequence than the immediate effects of a long
strike. Short supplies and increased unemployment
were readily observable. The half-measures taken by
the administration to avoid involvement were inter—
preted by an anxious public as signs of indecision

and vacillation and contributed to the image Of the

President as one who was uncertain of the course he

 

Ibid.

46
should follow.27 On the contrary, Eisenhower adopted
a rigid policy from the start and held faithfully to
it until forced to abandon it for political and de-
fense purposes.

A strike policy that did not take into ac—
count the peculiar needs of national defense in the
1950's was doomed to fail, and Eisenhower's policy did
not. Perhaps his experience with strikes and defense
influenced the tone of his farewell address in 1961
when the President warned that the industrial-military
complex threatened to destroy the economic system of
”free enterprise."28

The economic "model" which Eisenhower envi-
sioned was incomplete. Consequently the strike policy
which he devised to fit the model was inadequate. The
intangible factors, the "non—quantifiable variables"
in economic parlance, were sufficiently active to un—
dermine and destroy Eisenhower's position on strikes.
Although he had warned that new controls might be nec-
essary if collective bargaining failed, the President
undertook no new legislation in this area in the months
remaining in his second term. During 1960 the Presi-

dent enthusiastically endorsed the principle of regular

 

27Marquis Childs, Eisenhower Captive Hero: A
Critical Study of the General and the PresidentV(New
York: Harcourt, 1958), pp. 110-119.

28Pub1io Pa ers . . . 1961, p. 1058.

47
meetings between labor and management to iron out diffi—
culties, an approach which suggested a return to a pol—
icy unsuddessfully attempted during the Durkin experi-
ment.29 Eisenhower's idealism had forced him into a
rigid position from which there was no escape without
appearing to violate his often-cited principles.
Throughout the course of his strike policy Eisenhower
managed to remain aloof, helping neither labor or man-
agement. Labor leaders found little merit in Eisen-
hower's policy. But management leaders were disillu-
sioned also since Eisenhower, through Nixon and Mit-
chell, forced them to concede to union demands without
permitting them to raise the price of steel. The gen-
eral welfare appeared to have been Eisenhower's first

concern in his strike policy.

 

29New York Times, September 15, 1960.

CHAPTER III

LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION:
MITCHELL'S PROGRAM

When the issue Of union corruption gained na-
tional attention in 1957, President Eisenhower turned
to Mitchell, as he had done in the past on other labor
issues, for guidance in preparing a legislative pro-
gram. Confident in the ability of Mitchell to cope
with the prOblem, Eisenhower maintained a passive atti-
tude toward union corruption between 1954 and the mid-
dle of 1958. Mitchell, who had vigorously praised and
defended labor in his speeches between 1954 and 1957,
prepared a program which reflected his conviction that
organized labor was willing and able to eliminate cor-
rupt elements from its ranks with a minimum of Federal
assistance. Until the middle of 1958 Eisenhower pas-
sively supported a labor reform program that sought to
encourage union democracy without significantly re-
stricting traditional union organizing practices. When
the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee rejected

Mitchell's program in favor of the Kennedy-Ives bill,

a less restrictive, bi-partisan measure, Mitchell pre-

pared to accept defeat. But Eisenhower refused to

48

49
support Mitchell's position, thus ending, the first,
”moderate", phase of the President's labor reform
effort.

Eisenhower's confidence in his second Labor
Secretary was not misplaced, for after 1955 the tension
between the administration and organized labor, created
by the failure of the Durkin experiment, gradually sub-
sided. Mitchell's capacity to deal effectively with
labor leaders relieved the President of the necessity
to meet personally with labor Officials, a goal which
Eisenhower pursued with determination after 1955.1
Aside from diverting labor leaders from the "side door"
Of the White House Mitchell's sincere defense Of la—
bor's interests appeared to reap political rewards as
the committment of some labor leaders to the Democrat-
ic party was shaken.2

In order to win labor's tentative approval,
Mitchell had to go far in the direction Of supporting
labor's programs. Privately, he appeared willing to

do this, but publicly he was forced to compromise reg-

ularly with the rest of the Cabinet, Republican Con-

 

lSherman Adams, Firsthand Report: the Story
of the Eisenhower Administration, p. 62.

2New York Times, May 24, 1956. But union mem-
bers stayed with the Democrats in 1956; see Charles
A. H. Thomson and Frances M. Shattuck, The 1956 Pres-
idential Cam ai n (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti-
tution, 1960 , p. 552.

5o
gressmen, and the President. Sherman Adams considered
this one of Mitchell's best traits; Mitchell was
"blessed with a rare intuition“ that told him how far
he could go in defending labor's interests without
"disassociating himself from administration policy."5
Emmet John Hughes ignored this characteristic, ultimate-
ly a "fatal flaw,” in Mitchell's character, when he
wrote that Mitchell was a "liberal," unencumbered by
the cliches of the Taft tradition.4 While Mitchell
sounded like a "liberal," his program was dictated by
the character of the administration to which he belonged.
Since the death of Taft, Taft's successor,
William F. Knowland, was hostile to much of Eisenhower's
program, and Sherman Adams noted the President's dis-
taste for Knowland's extreme views on many issues.5
The aura of Eastern Republicanism was still strong in
the administration, and Mitchell represented an impor-
tant part of that influence in Eisenhower's domestic
program. Eisenhower continued to value the advice of
Harold Stassen, according to Adams, and Stassen per-

haps provided Mitchell with valuable support since both

sought to ally their party with certain elements of

 

3Firsthand Rgport, p. 504.

4The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir Of

the Eisenhower Years, p. 68.

 

5Firsthand Report, pp. 26, 108—109.

51

6 While the Old guard regrouped

the labor movement.
after Taft's death, Mitchell benefitted by the moder-
ate eastern influence included in the Eisenhower ad-
ministration.

Labor leaders were willing to praise Mitchell's
sincerity but were reluctant to vote Republican per-
haps because they saw that Mitchell's views were not
shared enthusiastically by the rest of the administra-
tion. By his silence Eisenhower appeared to endorse
Mitchell's programs, but the President appeared at the
same time to set limits to the support of labor that
Mitchell would not have done.

When Mitchell condemned "right-tO-work" laws
as threats to union security, Eisenhower publicly re-
jected Mitchell's views insofar as they represented
administration policy.7 Although the President re-
fused to support such legislation directly, he con-
sidered the matter one better left to the various
states to decide for themselves.8 The problem of union
security was less important to the President than the
more general issue of Federal versus State power. Mit-
chell's campaign to improve relations between labor

and the administration was hampered by Eisenhower's

 

6Ibid. , pp. 64—65.

7Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1954, p. 1091.

8Adams, Firsthand Report, p. 501.

52

conservative attitude on this crucial issue.

While Mitchell strove to improve the image of
the Republican party in the eyes of labor leaders, a
movement in the Congress to explore corrupt union prac-
tices develOped. Representative Clare E. Hoffmann of
Michigan conducted short-lived hearings in 1955 that
focused on the activities of James R. Hoffa and the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters in Kansas City
and Detroit.9 Eisenhower's special labor message, de—
livered in January of 1954, indirectly acknowledged
Hoffmann's findings by requesting additional govern-
ment regulation of union-Operated pension and welfare
funds.10

The fiery Hoffmann lost control of the inves-
tigation in 1954 as Senator Paul A. Douglas, a friend
of labor, conducted a special Labor and Public Welfare

ll

subcommittee's investigation of the problem. Early

 

9U. 8., Congress, House, Special subcommittee
of Education and Labor Committee, Interim Report In-
vestigation of Welfare and Pension Funds (Committee
Print), 85rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, pp. 115 Also,
House, Committee on Government Operations, Investiga-
tions of Racketeer__g in the Detroit Area, Report No.
1524, 85rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, pp. 1-12. And U. 8.,

CO ressional Record, 85rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954,
U, gart I, 275.

1°Pub1ic Papers . . . 1954. p. 45.
llU.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the
Labor and Public Welfare Committee, Hearings, Welggre

and Pension Plans Investigation, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
, Part8 - e

 

 

55
in 1956, Douglas' committee reported findings Of
abuses by employers and insurance companies as well
as unions in the administering Of pension and welfare

12 The moderate tone of the report was perhaps

funds.
its most noticeable feature. Eisenhower supported
Douglas' findings and called for legislation to correct
conditions every year thereafter, but the Congress
took no action.15
In 1957 the issue of union corruption was re-
vived by Democratic Senator John L. McClellan of Arkan—
sas, who proposed to launch a much broader study of
“imprOper practices" among unions. According to him,
the initial impetus for further studies of labor rack-
eteering came as a result of his discovery, while serv—
ing on the Government Operations Committee, that some
unions, specifically the Teamsters union, had followed
irregular procedures in supplying the government with

military uniforms.l4

McClellan ignored earlier efforts
to explore Teamster activities, but the link was

apparent.

 

12l§;Q., §;£§§_Igterim Report, Welfare and
Pension Plans investigation, (Committee Print),
pp. 44—45.

15Public Papers . . . 1956, p. 25.

l4U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field,

Final Re ort, Report No. 1159, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1965, Part E, p. 867.

54
The total impact of the Senate Select Commit—
tee on Improper Practices in the Labor or Management
Field - better known as the McClellan Rackets Commit-
tee — would be difficult to measure. In its final
report the committee suggested that its work had led
to the passage of the Landrum-Griffin labor reform bill
and suggested that its impact had even more far-reach-
ing effects.15 The careful selection of unions inves—
tigated was one indication that the members were not

blind to the political value of their work.16

In 1958
the efforts of the Republican members to turn attention
on broader issues of union power instead of specific
problems of corruption marked an obvious attempt to
create useful political ammunition for the 1958 con—
gressional elections.17
The full impact Of the committee's revelations
did not register with Eisenhower during 1957. Secre-
tary Mitchell, secure as Eisenhower's labor spokesman,
provided the President's first response. On April 25
after a meeting with Mitchell on the golf course in

Atlanta, Georgia, Eisenhower issued a statement, re-

ported in the New York Times, that stressed labor's

 

15Ibid., pp. 869, 877-78.
16Ibid., p. 870.
l7Ibid., Part 2, pp. 141-519, 520-552.

55

ability to cleanse itself of corrupt elements. Follow-
ing Mitchell's lead, Eisenhower noted the small propor-
tion of corrupt labor leaders when compared to the vast
majority of Officials who faithfully represented their
members, and he implied that any legislation would be
moderate not punitive.

In December, Eisenhower presented a legislative
program, prepared and delivered by Mitchell, to the
delegates to the AFL - CIO convention which continued

to emphasize moderate measures.ld

Concentrating on
union democracy, Eisenhower suggested that Officials

be elected by secret ballot, a practice he had endors-
ed in 1954. In addition, he called for the publication
of union constitutions and by-laws in order that mem—
bers could know their rights. Eisenhower also suggest-
ed that union financial data be made public as a means
of checking the abuses of union funds that had been
uncovered. To more effectively root out corrupt labor
Officials, he intended to increase the powers of the
Secretary of Labor to conduct investigations of com-
plaints. In an effort to make his program more accept-
able, Eisenhower also suggested that the Taft-Hartley
act be revised along lines advocated earlier by both
Durkin and Mitchell. The President revived the program

for revision of the act which the Congress had side-

tracked after 1954.

 

18New York Times, December 6, 1957.

56

But, while the suggested Taft-Hartley revi—
sions favored labor in some respects, some restric-
tions were placed on traditional organizing practices
as well.19 Perhaps in this aspect Of the program Mit-
chell had been forced to compromise with the Old guard
and Eisenhower. The McClellan committee noted that
the Teamsters union had applied the secondary boycott

20 In other

as a means of forcing union recognition.
cases, pickets were placed in front of a place Of busi-
ness in an effort to "coerce" the employer into recog-
nizing the union as bargaining agent despite the fact
that the employees were already represented in some
cases.21 Eisenhower consistently Opposed these prac~
tices between 1957 and 1959, but at this stage he em—
phasized the fact that other forms of the boycott were
to be preserved.22
The first reaction of labor leaders to Eisen—
hower's program was one of relief.25 They saw no

threat to union security in the proposals, and they

 

19Ibid.

20U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field,
First Interim Report, Report NO. 1417, 85th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 1958, p. 6.

21Ibid.

22 ,

New York Times, December 6, 1957.

25Ibid.

57

were pleased by the expressions of confidence in their
ability to solve their own problems. James Carey of
the International Union of Electrical Workers observed
enthusiastically that "If the delivery in Washington
is as good as the delivery here today, it will be a
real contribution to labor-management relations.“24
During the next three days the convention voted to
oust the offending unions, indicating their willing—
ness to reform themselves.25

Eisenhower's program, subjected to the second
thoughts of George Meany, was criticized after the
first wave of relief had subsided.26 Meany objected
to the restrictions on union organising practices con-
tained in the modifications of boycott and picketing
regulations. Nor did he approve of the secret ballot
suggestion since it implied, in his opinion, a basic
distrust of union officials and their motives.27
Eisenhower countered with the observation that the

democratic process was not hindered by the secret bal—

lot and that Meany's allegation of prejudice against

 

24Ibi

p.

 

251b1d., December 7, 1957. Ibid., December 10,
1957, and ISIE., December 15, 1957. ““

26Ibid., December ll, 1957. Also, Proceed' s
of the Second Constitutional Convention of the AFL—gEC
1957 9 It 502-5070

27New York Times, December 11, 1957.

58

88 By the end of 1957, organized

labor was unfounded.
labor was persuaded that Eisenhower's program, despite
its moderate tone, went too far in its attempt to in-

sure reform of the labor movement. Mitchell failed

to win labor's support for his program.

While labor complained that the measures were
too strong, the United States Chamber of Commerce con-
demned the program as weak and ineffective.29 Since
the suggestions focused on corrupt practices without
limiting significantly the power of organized labor,
the actual cause of corruption remained unaltered in

50

their opinion. Certain Republicans, among them

Senator Barry Goldwater, shared the position of the

51

Chamber of Commerce. But Eisenhower had refused to
apply the extreme measures they advocated, such as the
use of anti-trust legislation or a national right—to-
work law, in dealing with the problem. He continued
to refuse to support such measures between 1957 and

1959. But his 1959 statements emphasized the need for

restrictions on union organizing practices, in one sense

 

28Ibid., January 24, 1958.
291bid.
30Ibid.

51U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field,

Final Report, Report No. 1159. 86th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
e130 0

59

a concession to the more conservative elements within
his party.52
Mitchell's efforts to steer the administration‘s
program on labor reform through the Congress were un-
successful. Since 1947 the Congress had attempted to
present bipartisan legislation on labor matters. Mit—
chell's program was admittedly a partisan measure de-
signed to convince the union leaders that the Repub-
lican party was not anti-labor.55 However effective
this was as part of his public relations campaign, Mit-
chell's position had little hOpe of success in the Con-
gress as a result.
In the hearings on reform legislation conduct-
ed by the Senate Labor and Public Welfare committee
in 1958,Mitchell defended his bill which was opposed
by Senator John F. Kennedy, sponsor of the bipartisan

Kennedy-Ives bill.54

Senator Irving F. Ives from New
York apparently undertook to sponsor the bill with the
approval of Eisenhower although the records are silent
on this question. As the hearings progressed Mitchell

apparently saw that his bill would fail to pass in

 

52See below, Chapter IV, pp. 85-84.
55New York Times, December 6, 1957.

54U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on La-
bor, Hearingsi Union Financial and Administrative
Practices and Procedures, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958,
p. 46.

6O

committee, and he prepared to compromise with Kennedy.
He admitted that the two bills were similar in tone
and intent although he objected to the failure to pro-
vide the Secretary of Labor with broader investigative
powers.55 The impression which Mitchell's testimony
left with the committee on March 25, was that the ad-
ministration would be willing to lend tacit support to
the bipartisan measure in order to insure that some
step was taken to eliminate union corruption.

Between March 25 and June 9, the Eisenhower
administration performed a 12133 £223 on the issue of
labor reform legislation. Two factors perhaps explain-
ed the sudden change in the administration's position
on the issue. First, the Kennedy-Ives bill did not go
as far as Eisenhower wanted it to on the matter! of
restricting secondary boycott and picketing practices.
Only carefully selected practices were limited in very
specific terms which prevented broader application of
the restrictions by the National Labor RelationswlBoard.56
Second, since the resignation of Sherman Adams Repub-
lican congressmenywho were hostile to labor, apparently

were in more frequent contact with Eisenhower.57

 

55Ibid., p. 1406.
56Ibide’ Po 1401-1405.

5701‘. Adams, Firsthm d Re ort, pp. 51, 54- 55,
216, and Hughes, The CrdeaI of Power, pp. 202, 266-

269, 270.

61

Senator Goldwater, who had evoked images of the unlim-
ited power of labor unions as the cause of union cor—
ruption, was the administration's spokesman on labor
reform by 1959.38 Perhaps in the past, as Sherman
Adams suggested in his account, Mitchell had been able
to discount such influences, but it was no longer pos-
sible by this time.

Mitchell's statement released on June 9 from
Geneva harshly criticized the bill he had described on
March 25 as similar in tone and intent to his own.59
He now said that the Kennedy-Ives bill failed "to meet
the recommendations for labor-management legislation
made to the Congress by President Eisenhower last Jan-
uary," and weakened "the already pitifully ineffective
legal protection presently provided by law to union

members and the public."40

Now moderate self-help
legislation to supplement local ordinances was “piti-
fully ineffective." The moderate Republicans in the
Congress apparently were caught by surprise, as Sena-
tor Ives ruefully remarked that "somebody" was "trying
to make a Republican thing out of this when we were

trying to make it bipartisan."41

 

58New York Times, January 14, 1959.

591bid., June 10, 1958.

4OIbid.

 

41Ibid., June 11, 1958.

 

62

Eisenhower's conservative tendencies, which
had flared intermittently in the past three years per-
haps rose once more under pressure from equally, or
more, conservative Congressmen and Cabinet members.

In addition, since Mitchell's program had failed to
win labor's support, perhaps Eisenhower saw little to
gain by continuing to advocate a policy of moderation.
In the process of shrugging off the passive role which
he had adopted since Mitchell's appointment. Eisen-
hower abandoned the effort to improve relations with
labor in hopes of gaining its political support.

Labor leaders, shocked by Mitchell's strong
criticism of the Kennedy-Ives bill, accused the Eisen-
hower administration of cynicism in its attitude toward
labor reform.42 On the surface the charge appeared
well-grounded. But Eisenhower's sudden change of mind
more clearly indicated his growing determination to
take a firmer hand in the direction of labor policy.
When he abandoned his passive attitude, his conserva-
tive nature appeared. The sharp contrast with Mit-
chell's views suggested the gulf between the men on
labor issues that the President had overlooked or ig—
nored for the past three years because Mitchell had
quieted labor's suspicions temporarily.

Eisenhower's action placed Mitchell in a diffi-

cult position, assuming that he sincerely cared about

 

42Ibid., August 20, 1958.

65
labor's interests, since the reversal of policy prom—
ised to bring more restrictive reform measures. In—
stead of resigning, Mitchell chose once more to com-
promise with the conservative elements within the ad-
ministration, by issuing the critical "blast from Gene—
va" which threatened chances of bipartisan support
needed to pass the bill. This trait, which Sherman

Adams praised in Firsthand Report was ultimately the

 

cause of the destruction of Mitchell's private politi-
cal ambitions which he was rumored to hold. Mitchell
became the real cynic. While Eisenhower cannot be ex-
cused from the same charge, he was perhaps less cynical
and simply more unaware of the implications of Mit—
chell's program between 1954 and 1958. As in the case
of his Opposition to "right-to-work" laws, Eisenhower
exercised the prerogative he had consistently main-
tained of setting the limits of policy which he expect—
ed Mitchell to follow. The devastating effect of his
action on the critical issue of labor legislation pend-
ing before the Congress was more far-reaching in its
implications than his earlier resistance to Mitchell's
views on "right—torwork" laws.

Mitchell's value as a lianmn.man between Eisen-
hower and labor was greatly diminished by Eisenhower's
decision to oppose the Kennedy-Ives bill. The pain-
staking campaign to establish the Republican party in

the good graces of the labor movement was swept away

64

by Mitchell's decision to accept Eisenhower's position
on the labor reform issues. Without an effective buff-
er between himself and labor, Eisenhower perhaps was

forced to take a more active part in working out a

labor policy after 1958.

CHAPTER IV
POLITICS AND LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION

The change in the Eisenhower administration's
labor reform policy, indicated by Mitchell's surprise
attack on the Kennedy-Ives bill on June 9, 1958, was
part of an effort to create a useful political issue
for the 1958 congressional election campaign. Follow-
ing a strategy conceived by the Republican old guard
in the Congress, Eisenhower supported a two—pronged
effort to block labor reform legislation and to link
the Democratic party with "corrupt" union leaders.
Success of the strategy would have permitted the Repub-
licans to charge that the Democrats, who controlled
the Congress numerically, blocked labor reform legis-
lation in order to shield corrupt union leaders who
provided valuable political support for the Democratic
party. The old guard leadership apparently expected
the public to react to the "evidence" of a "corrupt
bargain" between the Democrats and labor by voting
Republican in 1958. But the Democratic congressional
leaders skillfully parried the Republican thrusts,

and, as is well-known, the Democratic party swept the

65

66

1958 elections.1
As a participant in the political maneuver

Eisenhower concentrated primarily on cancelling Mit-
chell's labor policy and subjecting the Labor Secre-
tary to the President's will on labor reform legisla-
tion. As a good subordinate Mitchell swung into line
behind the President, but he was reluctant to do so,
as his equivocal statements between June 9, and August

19, suggested.2

Mitchell's criticism of the Kennedy-
Ives bill, noted in the last chapter, was followed by
a statement on June 18, that implied administration
support for the bill as modified by amendments from
the floor of the Senate.5 While Mitchell vacillated
Eisenhower remained silent on reform; not until after
the Kennedy-Ives bill had been blocked in the House
did the President come forward to criticize the bill
and urge passage of labor reform legislation before
the Congress adjourned.4 And on August 18, just before
1Con-ressional uarterl Weekl Re ort (Wash-
ington, DTCTé-Congress1%EEI_QE§%EEEI5_IEET§_T959) XVI,
Part 2, 1599. Democrats gained 26 seats in the Senate

and 47 seats in the House for totals of 62 and 282
respectively.

20f. New York Times, June 10, 1958; Ibid.,

June 18, 1958, and U.S., do ressional Record, 85th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, CIV, Part 14, I827l.
5New York Times, June 18, 1958.

4Ibid., August 7, 1958; Ibid., August 21, 1958,
and Ibid., August 28, 1958.

 

 

67

the crucial vote in the House of Representatives to
suspend the rules and thereby pass the Kennedy-Ives
bill unaltered, Mitchell was quoted by Walter Judd of
Minnesota as saying that it was "a bad bill."5 The
contrast between the statements of June 18, and August
18, suggested that Mitchell first tried to encourage
Eisenhower to support the bill, and when that effort
failed, Mitchell came to terms with the administration.

Eisenhower's support of the old guard politi-
cal strategy ultimately dashed any political ambitions
which Mitchell might have held, for labor leaders were
quick to charge him with cynicism. Senator Kennedy's
scathing criticism of Mitchell accused him of being
the mastermind of the political maneuver, but the
change in policy was too far from Mitchell's past posi—
tion to support Kennedy's charges.6 Mitchell had be-
come the willing instrument, for reasons that were not
entirely clear, of a political policy of the old guard.

Eisenhower's political motives were equally
difficult to discover, but several factors might have.
been influential in turning him away from Mitchell's
program for labor reform legislation. It has already

been suggested that Eisenhower did not enthusiastically

5U.S., Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2nd
89350’ 1958, C 9 Part 1 , 10

6New York Times, August 25, 1955.

 

68
endorse all of Mitchell's labor policy as the right-
to-work issue indicated. In addition, the President's
experience with.Martin Durkin perhaps left a negative
impression on him. Perhaps labor leaders in general
were singled out by Eisenhower as "special pleaders"
for their own interests when they should have been
working for the interests of all Americans. Their eco-
nomic goals were not compatible with Eisenhower's war
on inflation as he learned in the 1956 steel strike.
To this distrust of labor officials was added the
findings of the McClellan Rackets Committee. A super-
ficial reading of the committee's interim report, rein-
forced by arguments from Republican Senators, like
Goldwater, who served on the committee, perhaps com-
pleted Eisenhower's negative image of the "typical"
union leader.

Aside from.his personal convictions, about
which there are only hints in the public record, Eisen-
hower might have turned to the old guard's political
strategy in order to prevent charges within the party
that he was a victim of "me-tooism," a well-known la-
bel which had been used by old guard Republicans to
characterize other Republicans who pursued policies
practically indistinguishable from those of the Demo-
cratic party. As Emmet John Hughes observed, Mitchell
was the only Cabinet member involved in domestic af-

fairs who could wear the label of ”liberal"; the rest

69
with similar convictions were associated with Eisen-
hower's international policies. Perhaps in the eyes
ovaepublican political observers in the administration,
Mitchell's policies were examples of "me-tooism" since
his proposals, although they offerred slightly less,
were similar in tone and intent to Democratic policies.
The Mitchell view of the Kennedy-Ives bill, as he gave
it in the Senate Labor and Public Welfare hearings,
was a case which illustrated this aspect of his pro-
gram.7 Mitchell never suggested in his statements
that there was a distinct difference between the in-
terests of labor leaders and the members they repre-
sented, a favorite theme of old guard Republicans that
had been reinforced by the McClellan investigations.
On this issue Eisenhower's views gradually came to re-
flect the position of the old guard.8 Perhaps in 1958
they were formed sufficiently to encourage his break
with Mitchell's policy.

Sherman Adams noted in Firsthand Report that
the idea of a "modern" Republican party which Eisen-
hower subscribed to in 1956, after the appearance of a
book on the subject by Arthur Larson, emphasized the
split in Republican ranks which had characterized the
party for so many years although Eisenhower did not

 

7See above, Chapter III, p. 60.

8New York Times, August 21, 1958.

7O

seek to divide his party.9 Perhaps Eisenhower's la-
bor policy as it developed after 1958 indicated that
he had abandoned Larson's position and was ready to
return to the fold. Party unity was sacrificed in an
effort to turn the labor reform issue to political ad-
vantage. Liberal Republicans, like Senator Ives, were
left to their own devices by Eisenhower's sudden shift.

The fact that Mitchell had failed to win la-
bor's support for his moderate program might also have
convinced the President that further conciliation of
labor was useless. By the end of 1957, as we observed
above, labor leaders were convinced that the adminis-
tration's prOposals were too severe. This situation,
together with the Republican need for an issue to ef-
fectively oppose the Democrats in the elections, per-
haps persuaded Eisenhower to seek a new direction.
that promised measurable rewards for his party. Sena-
tor Hubert H. Humphrey examined this possibility in a
Senate speech in which he accused Senate Republicans
of creating a false image of labor in a pamphlet titled
"The Labor Bosses - America's Third Party" in order to*
10

manufacture a political issue.

Eisenhower‘s decision to cast his lot with the

 

9Firsthand Report, p. 298. See Arthur Larson,

A Republican Looks at His Party (New York; Harper,
9 PP- ' .

loU.S., Con ressional Record, 85th Cong., 2nd

Sess., 1958, CI , Part , l 57 ~577.

71
old guard proved disastrous insofar as his good rela-
tions with labor were concerned. Political maneu—
vering on a moral issue was inexcusable in their opin-

ion.ll

But Eisenhower, despite his frequent references
to moral considerations, chose not to treat the issue
in that way.

The Eisenhower administration's attempt to
turn labor's troubles to Republican political advan-
tage failed. Although labor reform legislation was
successfully blocked, a necessary prerequisite to keep-
ing the issue before the voting public, the Republi-
cans, not the Democrats, were blamed for the failure
to pass legislation. The key to the success of Repub-
lican efforts was the Democratic chairman of the House
Education and Labor Committee, Graham A. Barden of

12 Bar-

Virginia, who was hostile to organized labor.
den apparently was expected to tie the bill up in his
committee until the Congress adjourned, thus lending
substance to Republican charges that the Democrats
killed the bill. But House majority leader Sam Rayburn
prevented that possibility. He held the Kennedy-Ives
bill for forty days, giving the administration plenty
of time to prepare its case and eliminating the possi-

bility that the bill could be reported out of committee

 

11New York Times, August 22, 1958.
12Ibid., July 51, 1958.

 

72

in time for the members of the House to amend it dras-
tically from the floor. On August 18, a motion to sus-
pend the rules was introduced which, if passed, would
have forced the bill from committee for a vote and
would have prevented amendments from the floor of the
House.15

The administration was trapped. It could not
reverse its position opposing the bill, for the politi-
cal issue would evaporate if labor reform legislation
passed with administration support. On the other hand
continued opposition.meant that the Republicans would
be forced to vote against the bill. The last alter-
native was selected, as Judd's citation of Mitchell's
views made the administration's position very clear.14

Before Mitchell's attack on the Kennedy—Ives
bill in June, the Republicans on the McClellan Commit-
tee undertook an investigation on their own of the
activities of Walter Reuther and his union, the UAW-
CIO, as part of the effort to include the outspoken

supporter of the Democratic party among labor offi-

cials tainted with corruption.15 Directed by Senator

15U.S., Con essional Record, 85th Cong., 2nd
Sess., l958, CIV, Part is, 18265-I8288.

14Ibid., 18271.

 

15U. 8., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on
ImprOper Activities in the Labor or Management Field,
Hearings, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, Part 25, passim.

75

Goldwater, the Republicans on the committee questioned
Reuther about many of his union's activities. The
Kohler strike, which had dragged on since 1954 received
searching attention, as did Reuther's political activ-

ities.16

Goldwater later charged that the Kohler
strike was indicative of the unlimited and corrupted
power of organized labor, and he suggested that Reuth-
er's part in the affair was far more damning than any
of the activities engaged in by Hoffa.l7 Reuther's
eloquent defense of his and his union's part in the
Kohler strike softened the impact of Goldwater's at-
tack, but the Republican charges were undoubtedly ef—
fective, as Reuther suggested to the Republican com-
mittee members.18
But with the Republicans on record as Opposing
labor reform legislation that would have served to cor—
rect some of the very abuses which Goldwater complain-
ed about, the efforts to use the McClellan Rackets Com—
mittee for political purposes were frustrated. In his
campaign support of the Republican party in 1958, Eisen—

hower emphasized the general achievements of his admin-

istration. He emphasized the need for reform legisla—

 

Ibid.

 

l7U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on

Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field,

Final Re ort, Report NO. 1159, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
, 3r 9 320‘5320

18Ibid., pp. 10165-167, 10195, 10197.

74

tion also, but he placed little emphasis on Democratic
efforts to block his program since his own party bore
the burden of guilt.19

By abandoning Mitchell's long-range effort to
improve Republican relations with organized labor in
favor of a short-term political objective, Eisenhower
achieved very little. The tenuous ties with labor
created by Mitchell's goodwill campaign were severed
irrevocably. The charge of "cynicism" which accom—
panied the administration's sudden policy reversal per—
haps contributed to the margin of the sweeping Demo-
cratic victory in 1958. And Eisenhower's own image
as a man above the use of crude maneuvers to gain polit-
ical advantage for his party was tarnished. The only
gain was represented by the fact that more restrictive
labor reform legislation would be sought, and with ad-
ministration support, achieved in 1959 with the passage
of the Landrum-Griffin bill.

 

191!» York Times, October 21, 1958.

CHAPTER V

LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION:
EISENHOWER'S PROGRAM

The evolution of President Eisenhower from a
passive to an active President was completed by 1959.
Improved health, the resignation of Sherman Adams, and
a desire to apply the political knowledge acquired
since 1953 were important factors which encouraged
Eisenhower to broaden his concept of his office. He
became a politician. Through press conferences and
television appeals he tried to marshall public opin-
ion behind his program. In his relations with the
Congress, Eisenhower became demanding, suggesting that
reprisals would follow if members of his party failed
to support his programs. The last phase of Eisen—
hower's labor reform program was influenced by the
vigorous role which Eisenhower chose to play in formu-
lating policy and securing legislation in keeping with
his policy.

In his 1959 State—of-the-Union message, Eisen—

hower asserted that "half-hearted measures" were inad-

equate to solve the problem Of union corruption that

75

76

the McClellan committee hadrevealed.1

He apparently
referred to legislation backed by Senator Kennedy in
1958, and Eisenhower implied that he would oppose any
comparable bill in 1959. On January 28 the President
presented a twenty-point program of his own.2 The area
of controversy centered on the revisions in the Taft-
Hartley act which Eisenhower supported that would
close secondary boycott lOOphOles, restrict certain
forms of picketing, and give to the states power to
act in cases refused by the National Labor Relations
Board. .Requirements for reporting financial trans-
actions, for eliminating possible conflict of interest
situations, and for imposing strict penalties on crim-
inals discovered in union positions were not greatly
different from legislation sponsored by the moderates
in the Congress.5
Southern Democrats and Republicans of the old
guard provided strong support for Eisenhower's policy
in 1959. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, better-known as the Landrum-Griffin bill, was

sponsored by this coalition and defended by Eisenhower

 

lggubiic Papers . . . gm, pp. 16-17.

2Ibid., pp. 145-46.

5U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Labor
of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Hear§ggs,'
t

Labor-Management Reform Legislation, 86th Cong., s
3638., l , PP. 1-54, 28.881111.

77

over the Opposition of weakened moderate forces in the
Congress.4 Eisenhower assumed the leadership of this
group, and in so doing he played a role comparable to
that played by the late Senator Taft. The President
favored strict regulation of unions, but apparently
he was not willing to endorse totally anti-labor poli-
cies favored by his Senate spokesman, Senator Gold-
water.5 Although the Landrum-Griffin bill was not in
"the middle of the road," it was still compromise leg—
islation which apparently reflected the consensus of
the Congress in 1959. By taking a vigorous and firm
position on labor reform, Eisenhower perhaps was able
to check the drift of his party to the extreme views
of Goldwater and Knowland. The new Senate minority
leader, Everett M. Dirksen was more cooperative and
effectively gathered votes to support Eisenhower's
position.

The Congress followed the President's lead on
several important issues in 1959 including labor re-
form legislation.6 The 1958 elections brought more

Democrats to the Congress, and many came armed to do

 

4Public Papers . . . 1959, pp. 428, 551. 577.

598.

SU.S., Congressional Record, 86th Cong., lst
Sess., 1959, CV, Part 5, 6664-6665.

6CO ressional.Quarterl Almanac 86th Con ress
lst Session, (Washington, D.C., 1§5§S, "CQ Fact Sheet

on Eisenhower Boxscore,“ XV, 93.

 

 

 

78

battle with Eisenhower's contracted program of federal
spending. But the recession of 1957 and 1958, which
promised to continue in 1959, blunted the point of the
Democratic attack. Eisenhower retaliated by leading
an attack on the "spenders" who were in his Opinion
about to contribute to another round of inflation by
girresponsible fiscal recommendations.7 As the Congress
moved to increase appropriations for various projects
and start new ones, Eisenhower responded with the veto.
And he found much sympathy in the Congress, for the
members of both parties joined to block efforts to
override his vetoes. To some extent Senator Lyndon B.
Johnson contributed to the successful defense of Eisen-
hower's method of cOping with the recession as William
Proxmire bitterly pointed out in his attack on Johnson's
policy of compromise with the Chief Executive.8 The
core of the votes supporting Eisenhower was provided
again by the coalition of Republicans and Southern
Democrats.9

Fear of undesirable social legislation was

another source of unity between the Republicans and

the South after 1956. The Republicans walkeda narrow,

7Public Pa ers . . . 1 , pp. 189-190. Also
Ibid., ItWems , , , 5.

8U.S., Congpessional Record, 86th Cong., lst

Sess., CV, Part 2, 2544-2550.

9Congressional QuarterlyvAlmanac, XV, 144-46.

 

 

79
shaky fence, but they successfully helped pass weak
civil rights legislation, to placate the moderates,
and preserved the support Of the Southern Democrats

10 Since the issue did not die after

at the same time.
the civil rights bill was passed in 1957, the Republi-
cans were in a position to trade defense of Southern
interests for support of Eisenhower's program. Al-
though this was not perhaps true of every bill passed
in 1959, there seemed to be some evidence that the ad-
ministration had grasped this political reality in 1958
and had acted upon it. Sherman Adams wrote that Know-
land told Eisenhower that the South would retaliate by
blocking administration programs if Eisenhower pushed
strong civil rights legislation in 1957.11 This fact
combined with Eisenhower's private reluctance to vig-
orously support the drive for Negro rights, perhaps
proved to be a vital factor in the hesitant administra-
tion stand taken on the weak legislation proposed in
this area in 1957. Although Eisenhower continued to
call for more far-reaching civil rights legislation,
after 1957, the President chose to place greater em—
phasis on defending other aspects of his prOgram. The

recession was his primary target in the years after 1957.

 

10Cf. Hughes, Ordeal of Power, pp. 200-201,
242-43, and Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 557-39, 541—
543.

11Adams, Firsthand Report, p. 559.

80
The influence of the McClellan Rackets Com-
mittee was of first importance in accounting for the
conservative nature of the 1959 Congress insofar as
labor policy was concerned. In keeping with his aim,
McClellan had aroused public interest in the corruption
problem, and in 1959 all sides realized that a bill

would have to pass.12

To make sure that the public's
attention did not slip, just before the crucial debate
in the House Of Representatives in August, McClellan
released a "summary" of the committee's findings since
1957.15 Whatever the validity of the charges against
the leader of the Teamster's union, who was effectively
tried and found guilty by the committee, the nation
and the President apparently were convinced that such
a serious malady required a strong remedy.

The argument that developed in the Congress in
1959 over labor legislation concerned the extent to
which the Taft-Hartley act was to be revised as was
noted above. Moderates argued that, except ibr a few

generally agreed upon changes favoring labor, no re-

visions without study were advisable since the collec-

 

12New York Times, April 26,1959. Also "The
Polls: Attitudes Toward Organized Labor," Public

Qpinion Quarterly, XXVI (1962), 296.

13U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field,
Report, Progosed Findgggs - International Brotherhood
of Teamstersngames R. Hoffa, Report NO. 0, t
Cong., lst Sess., 1959, pp. l-6.

81

14 The fo-

tive bargaining process was being altered.
one was on corruption not changes in the balance be-
tween labor and management, in their opinion, as pre-
sented by Senator Kennedy.1

Eisenhower presented the issues of "blackmail"
picketing, designed to force recognition of a union,
and the secondary boycott where pressure was brought
to bear on the employer to stop dealing with another
company by methods other than a strike, as a moral

problem.16

It was unfair to subject the employer to
such coercive pressures, in his Opinion. Moderates
agreed if the purpose of the pressure were to extort
money from the employer, evidence of which practice

had been presented in the McClellan hearings. The risk
was that legitimate objectives of labor unions, waging
a losing battle to organize Southern workers, were
endangered by the broad language of legislation which
Eisenhower supported.l7

Aside from Taft-Hartley revisions, the Senate

debated at length the merits of Senator McClellan's

 

14U.S., Congress, Senate, subcommittee on La-
bor Hearings, Labor-Management Reform Legislation,
86th Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 142-43.

15Ibid.

16Public Papers . . . 1959, pp. 568-69.

17U. 8., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on La-
bor, Hearings, Labor-Management Reforg_ng;§lgtign,
86th Cong., lst Sess., pp. 159— 141.

82

"bill of rights" for labor's rank and file members.
The issue illustrated the gulf that had grown between
Eisenhower and Mitchell by 1959, and the apparent re-
cognition by Mitchell of Eisenhower's determination
to follow other advice more compatible with his own
views of the labor movement. In a press conference
Eisenhower praised the McClellan amendments as great
improvements of the Kennedy-sponsored bill. Mitchell,
on the other hand, very cautiouslytried to object to
the President's stand by saying that he favored only

a bill of rights in "substance."18

When reporters
pointed out that Eisenhower specifically praised Mc-
Clellan's version, Mitchell circumspectly refused to
extend his remarks.19 In 1954 Mitchell challenged
Eisenhower on right-to—work laws by continuing to de-
nounce them after the President publicly declared Mit-

20 Mit-

chell's views not to be administration policy.
chell feared no reprisals then. But by 1959, Mitchell
could no longer pursue an independent stand on labor
policy as he perhaps realized when he Offerbdr only
feeble resistance to the President's views.

Eisenhower withdrew his tentative support for

the Kennedy billas amended by McClellan after the

 

180:. New York Times, April 26, 1959, and
id., June 10, 1959.

19Ibid., June 20, 1959.

20$ee above, Chapter III, p. 51.

85
moderates and Southern Democrats combined to redefine,

clarify, limit, and otherwise revise the bill of rights

21

proposals. The primary reason for southern support

came when Kennedy pointed out that the bill of rights

had unfavorable implications for segregationist poli-

cies.22

Eisenhower spared no effort to marshall pub-
lic Opinion behind his drive for strict labor reform
legislation. In his press conferences he cited the
McClellan committee revelations and insisted that boy-
cott, picketing, and "no-man's-land" areas of the Taft-
Hartley act had tohe revised in order to effectively
curb corruption.25 When the Kennedy bill passed the
Senate in April, now amended extensively enough to
cause labor to withdraw its support, Eisenhower gave
his reaction by saying:

Well, the fact is that this whole labor
situation which has been characterized as even
worse than malfunctioning even racketeering in
some few labor organizations and among certain
individuals, has been highlighted by the McClellan
committee report . .

Now, in the Senate bill . . . we think there
are very definite weaknesses, and I don't mind
saying that I am very much disappointed, parti-
cularly in three fields: the secondary boycott
. . ., blackmail picketing . . ., and then the
field of clarifying the relationships of states

 

21

22U.S., Congressional Record, 86th Cong.,
lst Sess., CV, Part

25Public Paper . . . 1959, pp. 568-69.

Public Papers . . . 1959’ P. 428.

84

to those areas where the NLRB has refused to

assert any jurisdiction, we believe there ought

to be a definite law here to confer or to re-

ifiifitzsafi‘iiuifihfiiifiiefii.E29 “at“ t" me“
From this position the President never retreated. As
forcefully as he could, he tried to impress his views
on the public.

New tactics were adopted in July by the Repub-
lican — Southern Democratic coalition when the effort
to drastically amend the Kennedy bill failed to pro-
duce desired results. Two members of the cOalition
who served on the House Education and Labor committee,
RObert P. Griffin, Michigan Republican, and Phil M.
Landrum, Georgia, Democrat, sponsored a bill more in
accord with the views of about half the members of the
committee who reported the Kennedy measure in order
to get some kind Of a bill onto the House floor.25
Apparently public pressure was too great to allow Bar-
den to pursue delaying tactics in committee as he had
planned to do in 1958.26

The strength of the coalition was demonstrated
on August 15 when the Landrum-Griffin bill was adopted

as a substitute for the Senate bill, reported by the

 

2"New York Times, April 50, 1959.

25U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Educa-

tion and Labor, Report to Accompggy H.R. 8§42, Report
No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, pp. 76, 85—92,
92’ 99-100-

26"Attitudes Toward Orsanized Lab°r'" 255”
XXVI (1962): 296'

85
committee, in the largest vote recorded in the House
of Representatives, 229 to 201.27 The next day the
bill was sent to conference committee where it was
well-defended by Barden, and Goldwater, among others,
while the Kennedy forces attempted with only small
success to restrict the language of the bill to spe—
cific abuses. As the bill was finally reported on
September 5 and 4, it represented another victory for
the conservative coalition, but the measure had been
tempered somewhat by the efforts of Kennedy.28 While
the measure was less moderate than Kennedy apparently
desired, no extreme expressions of an anti-labor atti-
tude found their way into the bill. Senator McClellan,
wrote later that the bill needed more "teeth” but
nevertheless was better than the moderate prOposals

advanced by Kennedy.29
While the House of Representatives debated the

merits of the bills, President Eisenhower appeared on
television, on August 6 to plead for support of the
Landrum—Griffin bill.50 In firm tones, the President

denounced union corruption as "a national disgrace"

 

27Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XV, 167,168.

28U.S., Congress, House, Conference Committee,
Conference Report on S. 155%, Report No. 1147, 86th
Cong., lst Sess., 1959, p. 1.

29John L. McClellan, Crime Without Punishment
(New York: Duell, Sloan, Pearce, , p. .

aoPublic Papers . . . 1959. pp. 567-69.

86
and reiterated his demands for labor legislation.51
The President's speech combined with the effect of the
summary of the McClellan committee's findings released
earlier, served to maintain public Opinion in support
of the Landrum-Griffin.bill.52, Letters from home, plus
strenuous lobbying activities by supporters of the bill
such as the National Association of Manufacturers or
the Chamber of Commerce, provided great incentive for
the Representatives to vote for the measure.55 The
moderates on the other hand were divided, in part, by
labor's decision to support an even less restrictive
measure than the Kennedy bill introduced in the House
with the Landrum—Griffin biii.54

Eisenhower signed the Landrum-Griffin bill on
September 14 without comment, thus ending the last
phase of his labor reform prOgram. As the President
became more active in the directionaof his policies,
his attitude toward labor unions solidified. By al-
lowing other members of the administration to formu-

late policy in his first term, Eisenhower was forced

5lIbid. , p. 567.

52"Attitudes Toward Organized Labor," £999
XXVI (1962). 296-

53U.S. Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., CV, Part 12, 16102. _

34Ibid.

87
to equivocate in his stand on labor issues, but in
1959, having decided on a course of action, he fol-
lowed it relentlessly to its conclusion.

The enmity of labor which Eisenhower thus in-
curred was directed toward Mitchell and Nixon. Nix-
on's vain effort to present himself as a friend of la-
bor by encouraging a settlement of the 1959 steel strike
and the hostile reception given Mitchell when he spoke
to the 1959 AFL - CIO convention have already been dis-
cussed. The political results of Eisenhower's labor
reform policy were disastrous for both men. Labor
united solidly behind Kennedy in the 1960 Presidential
election and perhaps provided the narrow margin of vic-

tory which he achieved.55

 

55"Attitudes Toward Organized Labor," E99,
XXVI (1962). 296-

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The memoirs by Eisenhower and other members
of his administration provided a valuable source of
information about the tone and general character of
the Eisenhower era. The most useful analysis of Eisen-
hower as a complex human being was given by Emmet John
Hughes in The Ordeal of Power. Not quite as simple
a man as his critics have portrayed him, Eisenhower
was a perplexing study for Hughes. But on matters re-
lated to labor policy, Hughes was unable to provide
much firsthand information since he served with the,
administration only during 1955 and during the 1956
campaign. Hughes was content to ignore the Durkin
appointment completely, and he accepted the estimation
of Mitchell as a liberal who guided Eisenhower's labor
policy after 1954.

In girsthand Report Sherman Adams described
the conflict between the moderates and the old guard
of the Republican party and presented Eisenhower as a
focus of unity for both groups. Eisenhower's efforts
to maintain party unity were not always successful as
Adams made clear, but this was his objective. Labor
policy was a difficult subject for Adams to cope with,

but he managed to give the impression that after the
88

89

resignation Of Durkin, Mitchell was able to keep in
check elements in the Cabinet and the Congress who
sought repressive legislation for labor unions. The
same praise was given to Mitchell's strike policy.
By resisting intervention in the Southern Bell Tele-
phone company the value Of the hands-Off technique
was demonstrated for Adams. But no mention was made
of the two steel strikes which thoroughly tested Eisen-
hower's strike policy. Adams was equally silent about
the issue of labor racketeering although it was a major
point Of division between Mitchell and Eisenhower.
Eisenhower's resistance to the old guard might have
been less persistent than Adams suggested. Eisenhower’s
own summary of his years in office recorded by Adams
after his resignation, seemed to support this view.

Ezra Taft Benson's memoirs represented the
other side of the coin insofar as the rivalry between
the old guard and the moderates was concerned. In
Cross-Fire, a plodding account of Benson‘s farm policy
difficulties, only two important references were made
to labor policy. Benson considered the farmer the vic-
tim of the unlimited economic power of unions and
industry, an Opinion which provoked a public quarrel
with Walter Reuther. Among other things, Benson's at-
titude, reflecting farm-state Opinions, suggested that
the Senators conducting the investigation of labor

unions were not neutral, as they claimed, by virtue of

90
being from agricultural regions. The second reference
revealed the Old guard's attitude toward Nixon by
1960. Nixon's attempt to gain lost ground with labor
was interpreted by Benson as politically inspired al-
though he ignored the fact that prices were not in-
creased thus checking the tide Of inflation that con-
cerned him.

Eisenhower's account of his first term, Mag:
date for Change was Of some value in determining the
President's attitude toward organized labor as it had
develOped by 1965. But on the Durkin experiment,
Eisenhower added little that was new. His motives,
discussed above, were not very convincing. As for
blaming Durkin's intransigent attitude toward revision
of the Taft-Hartley act for the failure of the experi-
ment, Eisenhower failed to admit that he had some re-
sponsibility to assist Durkin since Eisenhower had
appointed him. As a source Of reliable information
Eisenhower's memoirs are no better than Adams', but
they revealed equally well the problems of his admin-
istration and some Of the efforts to solve them.

Printed government documents pertaining to
Eisenhower's labor policy were more abundant and more
informative than the memoirs. The 1955 - 1954 hear-
ings on revising the Taft-Hartley act were valuable
in establishing the broad range of Opinion on the

issue. When others were coming forward to testify,

91
the administration was unable to present its views,
indicating the struggle within the administration on
this issue.

The hearings conducted to investigate welfare
and pension fund abuses, led by Senator Paul H. Doug-
las between 1954 and 1956 were free Of the political
overtones that marked the later efforts by the McClel—
lan Rackets Committee. Douglas attempted to explore
unions', insurance companies' and employer-operated
funds, and the result was a balanced study of the
difficulties which the labor movement had encountered
in its transition to an institution.

The McClellan Rackets Committee hearings and
reports were invaluable sources for the study Of
Eisenhower's labor policy. Among the 46,000 pages
of testimony gathered in the hearings, Part 25 was the
most interesting and valuable record of the encounter
between the Republicans, Karl E. Mundt, Barry Gold-
water, and Carl T. Curtis, and Walter Reuther of the
UAW-CID. For three days in March 1958 Reuther volun-
tarily answered questions about the Kohler strike and
union political activities and parried the verbal
blasts launched by,GOldwater, Curtis and Mundt. Sena-
tor Ives, the fourth Republican on the committee, re-

mained aloof. Reuther's frank answers and his edually

frank appraisal Of the motives of the examiners did

much to counteract the bad publicity for the labor

92
movement which the McClellan committee produced.

Since the Department of Labor did not preserve
copies of Secretary Durkin’s speeches, the New York
Times served as a valuable source Of information about
Durkin's opinions while a member Of the administration.
The same was true of Mitchell's press releases which
were indicative of the Labor Secretary's hesitant
attitude concerning Eisenhower's determination to aban-
don organized labor as a source Of potential political
support.

Equally useful for measuring congressional
reaction to Eisenhower's opinions about organized la—
bor was the Congressional Record. Although the re-
marks recorded there are subject to alteration and ex-
tension by the various speakers, the mood of the Con-
gress can often be determined on particular issues.
Republican reaction in 1958 to the motion to suspend
the rules and pass the Kennedy—Ives bill was easily
detected.

A convenient source Of statements by Eisen—
hower on various labor issues was The Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eiseg;
hpggg, but its value was reduced by the fact that only
a selection of news conferences was given. The E2!
York Times was the most complete source of news con—
ference remarks.

Secondary sources that address themselves to

93
the problem of Eisenhower's relationship with organized
labor were of little value in preparing this paper.
One exception that should be noted was the article by
William V. Shannon, "Eisenhower as President, A Criti-
cal Appraisal of the Record," Commentary, XXV, 590-598,
in which he asserted that Eisenhower did not share the
Taft Republican "animus against union labor" because
he sought no form of national right-to-work law. One
is reminded that Taft Opposed such measures also, which
suggests that Eisenhower at least in 1959 was perform-
ing a service similar to that performed by Taft in
checking the more extreme elements of both parties.
Shannon's observation that Eisenhower found the "con-

sensus" of the Congress was correct.

V

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