



ABSTRACT

THE LABOR POLICY OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

by Robert S. Cutler

Three aspects of the Eisenhower administration's policy were examined in an effort to determine the administration's response to the problems posed by organized labor in the 1950's. President Eisenhower's first unhappy encounter with organized labor came when he appointed a labor official, Martin P. Durkin, as Secretary of Labor in a gesture of goodwill toward the labor movement. Labor policy in 1953 was mainly concerned with preparing a program to revise the Taft-Hartley act. Eisenhower, apparently urged to appoint Durkin by the moderate Republicans in his administration, showed very little enthusiasm for Durkin's proposed revisions for the law. By failing to act in Durkin's behalf during the struggle that ensued with Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks, Eisenhower strengthened the hand of old guard Republicans who had violently protested the appointment in the first place. The effort to present a new, positive image of the Republican party by moderate Republicans was stymied by Eisenhower's refusal to intervene.

The ill will created by the Durkin "experiment" between labor and the administration was only partly eradicated by Durkin's successor, James P. Mitchell. The strike policy of the Eisenhower administration was an important factor in the hostility which labor demonstrated toward the administration as the years passed. Although Eisenhower sincerely tried to protect the public interest by urging the union and management to be statesmenlike in the steel strikes of 1956 and 1959, the President's "hands-off" policy ignored other issues besides the simple economic argument involved. The pressure of public opinion, the demands of partisan politics and the needs of national defense were primary factors that forced the administration to bring pressure to bear on the parties to compromise in both cases by behind-the-scenes intervention. Clinging to an overly simple vision of a free economy Eisenhower delayed acting until the last possible moment, further alienating the labor movement by encouraging a long strike that brought greater hardships to the union members.

The enmity of labor was sealed by the President's decision to support a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats who favored repressive, punitive legislation to correct union abuses revealed by the McClellan Rackets Committee after 1957. On this issue Eisenhower first followed the advice of Mitchell, a moderate Republican who favored labor policies that

would convince the labor leaders that the Republicans were not anti-labor. Eisenhower's disenchantment with labor leaders, whom he viewed as mere "special pleaders," was complete by 1958. Instead of supporting bipartisan moderate reform legislation Eisenhower permitted the issue to linger on until the 1958 congressional elections were over. No gains were won by Republican candidates on the issue of union corruption. But the continued efforts of the McClellan Rackets Committee plus the reluctance of labor leaders to back any reform program in 1959 lent strength to the movement in the Congress to write more restrictive legislation. Eisenhower found the congressional consensus in 1959 and vigorously supported legislation that appeared to carry majority support. The influence of his active participation in labor policy formation was clearly seen after 1958, and he secured legislation in 1959 that he considered close to his own program.

Between 1953 and 1958 Eisenhower passively supported moderate efforts to improve the Republican party's relations with labor. He wavered frequently in this effort, which might have been a decisive factor governing its failure. After 1958 Eisenhower chose to support many of the views of his party's old guard, especially those of the late Senator Robert A. Taft, Sr. His transition from a passive to an active President brought his conservative views of labor into clearer focus.

The memoirs by various members of the Eisenhower administration provided important information about the setting in which labor policy was formulated although they offered slightly less reliable evidence pertaining to the various aspects of labor policy itself. For the administration's official position on labor policy various hearings and reports were consulted, which also provided a good indication of public, labor and management reaction to Eisenhower's policy. Hearings on revision of the Taft-Hartley act, and the McClellan Rackets Committee hearings were valuable sources.

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by

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CHAPTER I

THE DURKIN "EXPERIMENT"

Conspicuously absent from the ranks of the "Crusaders" who cast their votes in 1952 for President Dwight D. Eisenhower were the leaders and members of organized labor.¹ Unable to accept Eisenhower's proposals for only minor changes in the controversial Taft-Hartley act, the American Federation of Labor, in an unusual display of political partisanship, publicly endorsed Adlai E. Stevenson, who supported the Democratic platform demand for repeal of the law.² Despite the A. F. of L.'s blunt rejection of his views on labor legislation, Eisenhower turned to its leadership in selecting his Secretary of Labor, Martin P. Durkin. In the months that followed, Durkin attempted to commit the Eisenhower administration to partial restoration of Wagner act policies, but he was opposed at every turn by the Secretary of Commerce, Sinclair Weeks. After prolonged bargaining with hostile members of the admin-

¹Louis Harris, Is there a Republican Majority? Political Trends, 1952 - 1954 (New York: harper, 1954), pp. 141-43, 147.

²Report of the Proceedings of the Seventy-First Convention of the American Federation of Labor (1952), pp. 62, 511-12.

istration and the Congress, Durkin managed to prepare a list of nineteen recommendations for revision of the Taft-Hartley act. When Eisenhower refused to support these suggestions, Durkin resigned in disgust, charging that the President had broken his promises to organized labor.³

In Mandate for Change Eisenhower wrote that he considered his effort to include a labor leader in his Cabinet an "experiment".⁴ Sherman Adams used the same term in Firsthand Report and grimly observed that "it was an experiment doomed from the start to failure."⁵ That it failed, of course, was evident, but it represented the earliest example of the path of development which Eisenhower's labor policy was to follow. The conflicting elements which refused to combine in the Durkin experiment continued to influence Eisenhower and Durkin's successor, James F. Mitchell, as they attempted to put into practice a program that would assure a greater measure of industrial peace and a greater measure of political support from organized labor. The conflict in the Republican party between the "moderates" and the "old guard" helped assure the failure of the Durkin experiment, and this conflict was revealed later

³A. F. of L., Proceedings (1955), p. 480.

⁴Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1955-1956 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 91.

⁵Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: the Story of the Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper, 1961), p. 62.

as Eisenhower tried to guide labor reform legislation through the Congress. Eisenhower's cautious wooing of the A. F. of L. was hampered by the fact that the "conservative" A. F. of L. found more in common with its rival, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, than it did with the Republican party. When the two unions merged in 1955, it became even more difficult for Eisenhower to win labor's political support. Finally, Eisenhower's equivocal attitude toward organized labor - a mixture of "naive idealism" and practical politics - further complicated his efforts to formulate practical policies for labor.

Except for his opinion about the Tidelands oil issue, Eisenhower was not well-acquainted with the extent and complexity of the domestic problems, including the Taft-Hartley act, before the nation when he entered the 1952 campaign for the Presidency.⁶ By September 17, he was ready to present his views on the labor law to the delegates of the seventy-first convention of the A. F. of L. The less than enthusiastic greeting he received was caused by the fact that Eisenhower, on September 12, had negotiated a truce with Senator Robert A. Taft, Sr. at the now-famous Morningside Heights conference. In the statement released following the meeting, Eisenhower said that he was satisfied with the Taft-Hartley act's purpose and that only minor changes might be

⁶Mandate, pp. 55-56; cf. Ibid., pp. 196-97.

needed to improve it.⁷

In his speech, perhaps prepared by Harold Stassen and Emmet John Hughes, Eisenhower urged his audience to be "realistic" and give up their demands for repeal of what, in his opinion, was basically sound legislation.⁸ Their own Executive Council had adopted such an attitude, and it compared to his own, he said. But while Eisenhower repeated that only minor changes were required, the Executive Council's report suggested that only drastic revision of the law would eliminate the abuses it contained.⁹

Since 1947, when the act was passed, labor leaders had cried, perhaps somewhat hysterically, that the act was a "slave labor law". The council's report was more restrained, but it continued to raise objections long a part of labor's attack upon the bill. Citing the expense of seemingly endless litigation created by the provisions restricting traditional organizing practices, as well as the general anti-labor intent of the law, the council's report, though favoring amendment rather than repeal, clearly went far beyond Eisenhower's modest proposals to change only minor parts of the law.

⁷New York Times, September 13, 1952. Also William S. White, The Taft Story (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 190.

⁸A. F. of L., Proceedings (1952), p. 363.

⁹Report of the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor to the Seventy-First Convention (1952), pp. 76, 83-86, 162, 215-17.

On this issue the A. F. of L. more closely agreed with its rival, the C. I. C.¹⁰

Eisenhower informed his audience that he was aware that the law could be a threat to union security. He avoided specific details in saying that "I know how the law might be used to break unions. America wants no law licensing union-busting. And neither do I."¹¹ When compared to his Morningside Heights statement, this was strong criticism, and it seemed out of place in the context of his message. But he cautioned that before anything could be done to correct this aspect of the law, more study was needed. Eisenhower promised in his speech to consult labor, industry, and the public in preparing changes for the law.

By bringing all parties concerned with the law together, Eisenhower optimistically expected the problem to solve itself. In keeping with this method, he firmly declared that the issue was too important to be a political issue. He intended to make no "slanted appeals" to labor or anyone else, and his efforts would not be "empty theatrical gestures."¹²

Although Eisenhower promised labor a "fair hearing" in his administration, he gave no hint during

¹⁰U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, Hearings, Labor-Management Relations, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1952, pp. 955-58.

¹¹A. F. of L., Proceedings (1952), p. 204.

¹²Ibid.

the campaign that he intended to appoint a union leader to his Cabinet. That decision probably was not made until after the election. In choosing his Cabinet, Eisenhower relied upon the device of a "screening committee," composed of Herbert Brownell Jr., and General Lucius D. Clay, to narrow down lists of potential appointees submitted by top Republicans to one or two names. After a thorough security check of eligible candidates, Eisenhower, according to his account, made the final decision.¹³

No record is available to indicate the alternatives to Durkin which the President considered. He "wanted no one who had evidenced extreme views in labor-management relations," and, despite Durkin's support of Stevenson and his opposition to the Taft-Hartley act, he apparently met Eisenhower's requirements.¹⁴ Durkin was president of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, a post he had held since 1945. He had been affiliated with his union as a business agent and secretary-treasurer prior to his election. Between 1935 and 1943 Durkin was head of the Illinois Department of Labor. During that time, on at least one occasion, Durkin earned the enmity of the United Mine Workers, then an affiliate of the C. I. O., when he refused to

¹³Mandate, p. 115.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 64.

permit striking miners to receive unemployment benefits. At the time of his appointment to Eisenhower's Cabinet, observers recalled his apparent hostility toward the C. I. O. and speculated as to whether or not it would continue.¹⁵

Sherman Adams asserted that Eisenhower was unaware of the conflict between the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O. until after his meeting with Walter Reuther, late in February 1953.¹⁶ According to this view, Eisenhower was not only naively optimistic, but also apparently abysmally ignorant of the most elementary facts about the labor movement. Even if this were the case, Herbert Brownell was not ignorant of the cleavage between the two unions. Harold Stassen, the man who recommended Durkin, according to Adams, was well-acquainted with the labor movement "and worked hard to bring leaders of organized labor into the Republican camp" during the campaign.¹⁷ He could not have been unaware of the rivalry between the unions either. Eisenhower trusted the advice of both men implicitly, and in the case of Stassen, unwisely, in Adams' opinion.¹⁸ Adams's argument that Eisenhower was unaware of the split between

¹⁵Wall Street Journal, December 2, 1952; Ibid., December 11, 1952.

¹⁶Firsthand Report, p. 6.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 64-65.

the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O. at the time he decided to appoint Durkin as Secretary of Labor seemed unfounded.

Eisenhower discussed his motives for appointing Durkin in Mandate for Change.¹⁹ A labor leader, in his opinion, should have been best qualified to understand the complex problems of organized labor. A labor "expert" in the Department of Labor would achieve one of Eisenhower's main goals of removing pressure from the President to intervene in problems between labor and management. In addition, a labor leader in the Cabinet would serve to "counterbalance" the business-oriented views of the Secretary of Commerce, Sinclair Weeks. But most important, Durkin was intended to serve as a symbol of the Eisenhower administration's "goodwill" toward the labor movement. No motives remotely reflecting political aims for the appointment were suggested, of course, but without them the appointment appeared to have been a senseless experiment.

In the light of Durkin's unfavorable attitude toward the C. I. O., which Eisenhower must have known, if the examination of Durkin's past activities were as thorough as the President said it was, it seemed unlikely that organized labor was destined to receive a "fair hearing." Did Durkin understand the problems of the industrial unions of the C. I. O.? Probably not. On the other hand, the C. I. O. could hardly be expec-

¹⁹ P., 90, 196-97.

ted to take its problems to the Department of Labor directed by a rival union leader. Adams argued that it was this obvious problem which Eisenhower was unaware of when he chose Durkin.²⁰ Perhaps, instead, the appointment was designed to close off one more avenue by which the C. I. O. could bring pressure on the administration. Since Eisenhower had already made it clear that he intended not to intervene directly in labor-management problems, the C. I. O. had no way of securing support from the administration.

The argument that Durkin would serve to balance the views of the Secretary of Commerce was equally unsatisfactory. In view of the fact that Eisenhower deliberately selected a Cabinet that was "business-oriented," Durkin could have been at best a voice crying in the wilderness. One needs only to recall Durkin's remark to a friend that when he entered a room "everyone stopped talking" to measure the transparent inappropriateness of Eisenhower's motive.²¹

The intention to use Durkin as a symbol of goodwill seemed to fit best into the picture of Eisenhower as an optimist and an idealist. The presence of Durkin, in Eisenhower's opinion, "would serve notice on the unions and the public that government deliberations at the highest levels were open and aboveboard

²⁰Firsthand Report, pp. 6, 7, 302.

²¹New York Times, September 11, 1953.

and precluded the possibility of any cabals developing counter to the interests of labor."²² At the same time Eisenhower took precautions with Durkin that he did not take with other Cabinet leaders. According to Ezra Taft Benson, once Eisenhower selected his man for a job he did not attempt to supervise him.²³ Durkin was not able to operate freely, however. The Secretary of Commerce was assigned, or appointed himself, to serve as a "watchdog" over Durkin's attempts to write recommendations for revising the Taft-Hartley act. At a critical juncture in their relationship, Eisenhower demanded that the members of the "informal" committee with whom Durkin was working on the labor law, be in unanimous agreement on suggested changes.²⁴ At the same time Eisenhower described Durkin and Weeks as "poles apart" on many issues affecting the law.²⁵ Under such circumstances Durkin's hands were effectively tied by the President. Symbolic gestures were inadequate to win the political support of organized labor, as A. F. of L. president George Meany implied in his public statement approving the Durkin appointment.²⁶

²²Mandate, p. 198.

²³Cross-Fire: the Eight Years with Eisenhower (New York: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 72, 122-24.

²⁴Mandate, p. 198.

²⁵Ibid., p. 196.

²⁶American Federationist, LIX, 28. Also New York Times, December 2, 1952.

1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions and activities. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for transparency and accountability, particularly in financial matters. The text suggests that organizations should implement robust systems to track every detail, from budget allocations to expenditure reports.

2. The second section addresses the challenges faced by organizations in managing their resources effectively. It highlights the need for strategic planning and the allocation of funds based on long-term goals. The author argues that without a clear vision and a structured approach, organizations risk mismanaging their assets and failing to achieve their intended purpose.

3. The third part of the document focuses on the role of leadership in ensuring the success of an organization. It stresses that leaders must be proactive in identifying potential risks and opportunities, and they must communicate these insights effectively to their teams. The text also discusses the importance of fostering a culture of innovation and collaboration, where team members are encouraged to share their ideas and work together to solve problems.

4. The fourth section explores the impact of external factors on an organization's performance. It notes that organizations must remain vigilant in monitoring their environment, including market trends, regulatory changes, and technological advancements. The author suggests that organizations should develop flexible strategies that can adapt to these external influences, ensuring their continued relevance and success.

5. The fifth part of the document discusses the importance of regular communication and reporting. It states that organizations should establish a clear protocol for how and how often information should be shared. This includes providing regular updates to stakeholders and ensuring that all team members are kept informed of the organization's progress and challenges.

6. The sixth section addresses the issue of financial management and budgeting. It emphasizes that organizations should create a realistic budget that accounts for all potential costs and revenues. The text also discusses the importance of reviewing the budget regularly to ensure it remains accurate and that funds are being used as intended.

7. The seventh part of the document focuses on the importance of maintaining high standards of quality and integrity. It argues that organizations should implement strict quality control measures to ensure that all products and services meet the highest standards. Additionally, the text stresses the importance of ethical behavior and transparency in all business dealings.

8. The eighth section discusses the role of technology in modern organizations. It notes that technology can significantly enhance an organization's efficiency and productivity. However, the author also warns that organizations must be cautious in adopting new technologies, ensuring they are secure and that their use complies with relevant regulations.

9. The ninth part of the document addresses the importance of employee development and training. It suggests that organizations should invest in their workforce by providing ongoing training and development opportunities. This helps to keep employees' skills up-to-date and ensures they are equipped to handle the challenges of the modern workplace.

10. The final section of the document provides a summary of the key points discussed and offers some concluding thoughts. It reiterates the importance of maintaining accurate records, strategic planning, effective leadership, and regular communication. The author concludes by expressing optimism about the future of organizations that embrace these principles and work towards continuous improvement.

Although President Eisenhower harbored a distaste for political "in-fighting," he was not unable to pursue political objectives, as Samuel Lubell observed in his book, The Revolt of the Moderates.²⁷ During the campaign Eisenhower had abandoned his old friend General George C. Marshall on the advice of trusted advisers, by refusing to criticize Senator Joseph F. McCarthy for his unwarranted attack upon Marshall's loyalty.²⁸ Having only recently acquired an "ideal" method for solving labor's problems, it was perhaps less difficult for the President to set aside this method when urged to appoint a labor leader who would be politically useful as well as serving as a symbol. During his campaign he had raised labor issues above politics, and he continued to espouse this theme in his first State-of-the-Union message when he said that "the determination of labor policy must be governed not by the vagaries of political expediency but by the finest principles and convictions."²⁹ Perhaps at this point Eisenhower saw no conflict between the

²⁷Dean Albertson (ed.), Eisenhower as President (New York: Hill and Wang, 1962), "Ye Compleat Political Angler", p. 19.

²⁸Firsthand Report, pp. 31-32. Also Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York: Atheneum, 1962), pp. 41-45.

²⁹Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1955 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 28-30.

Durkin appointment and the realization of his non-political solution for the problems of labor and management.

The potential political value of the Durkin appointment made it a worthwhile gamble for the Republican administration since a political alliance forged between the Republican party and the A. F. of L. would serve to weaken the old "Roosevelt coalition" by offsetting the strength of the alliance of the Democratic party and the C. I. O. Even if no votes were forthcoming, the identification of A. F. of L. interests with the "moderate" Republican position would serve to assure the continued disunity of the labor movement.

Since 1947 efforts to merge the two unions had failed, but their waning political influence coupled with the new strength of the Republican party created a situation encouraging new merger efforts. The Taft-Hartley act was one focus of unity for the rival unions since it applied to both groups. Was it unreasonable to hope that a political alliance could be at least tentatively formed by trading revisions in the Taft-Hartley act suited to the interests of the A. F. of L.? The presence of an A. F. of L. leader alone was insufficient; tangible benefits had to be offered. By limiting changes in the law to those which had been suggested by Senator Taft there was little danger of alienating the old guard members of the party who looked

upon the Taft-Hartley act as a major instrument of balancing power between labor and management. In a sense, the Durkin appointment would serve to unify the Republican party, at least partially, as well as to advance the political interests of the party.

Perhaps, if Eisenhower had discussed the appointment with Senator Taft before announcing his decision, the President could have prevented the angry outburst which Taft delivered in a news conference published in the New York Times on December 3, following the announcement that Durkin had been selected for the Cabinet. Eisenhower said in Mandate for Change that he expected bitter opposition from the old guard, and that he feared violent criticism would frighten away likely candidates for the post.³⁰ His secrecy only angered the old guard, however.

Presented with a fait accompli Taft rebelled. The appointment apparently confirmed his suspicion that Eisenhower was politically ignorant. But most of his criticism was aimed at Brownell who had ignored Taft's Cabinet suggestions. In the case of the Department of Labor, Taft had suggested Clarence Manion, Dean of the Notre Dame Law School and an ultra-conservative. While Manion might have impressed Eisenhower's screening committee as a "union-buster," the Durkin appointment, in

³⁰Mandate, p. 30.

Taft's opinion, was "incredible."

Taft could not believe that a Stevenson supporter and a foe of the Taft-Hartley act could have been appointed. "This appointment," said Taft, "leaves without representation in the Cabinet those millions of Democrats . . . who left their party to support General Eisenhower, and gives representation to their most bitter opponents."³¹ Taft wondered how Brownell could have been so misinformed on political realities to encourage such a decision. Eisenhower was surrounded by men of the Dewey camp, and for Taft the Durkin nomination was an indication of their political incompetence.³²

Eisenhower appeared to have an inadequate grasp of sound Republican principles. Although William S. White, Taft's sympathetic biographer, said that the question was not important enough to make an issue of it, for a time, it appeared that Taft intended to do just that.³³ Taft had argued often that the union "bosses" were not acting in the interests of their rank-and-file members. He called the selection of Durkin "an affront to the millions of union members and their officers who had the courage to defy the edict of

³¹New York Times, December 3, 1952.

³²White, The Taft Story, pp. 209-10

³³Ibid., pp. 210-11.

officials like Mr. Durkin that they vote for Stevenson."³⁴ For the moment at least, Taft appeared uneasy about Eisenhower's grasp of this fundamental fact.

The uneasy truce which Eisenhower had negotiated at Morningside Heights on September 12, appeared to have ended. But two days later Taft relented. No reasons were given for his change of mind although his biographer said that Taft was determined to provide the necessary political wisdom so obviously lacking in the new administration to insure the success of a sound Republican program.³⁵ Perhaps another, more practical reason lay in the fact that Taft was unable to muster much support from other members of the old guard. Senator Eugene A. Milliken of Colorado one of Taft's staunch supporters observed for reporters that the President was entitled to select his own Cabinet.³⁶ Although he refused to comment on the wisdom of the choice, he expressed no violent opposition. According to Adams' account, a delegation of old guard Republicans visited Eisenhower at Morningside Heights soon after the announcement, admonishing him to avoid a repetition of the Durkin appointment in the future.³⁷ The

³⁴New York Times, December 3, 1952.

³⁵White, The Taft Story pp. 212, 213, 216.

³⁶New York Times, December 3, 1952.

³⁷Firsthand Report, p. 58.

Durkin experiment failed to receive the endorsement of the old guard, as much from the tactical blunder Eisenhower committed, as from distaste for an alliance with even a supposedly conservative branch of the labor movement.

With the old guard glowering in the background, Eisenhower attempted to put into effect his method of resolving the problems created by the Taft-Hartley act. By bringing labor, management, and the public together, Eisenhower hoped to secure recommendations for changing the law that would satisfy everyone. In his first State-of-the-Union message Eisenhower said he had authorized Durkin to establish promptly a tripartite advisory committee consisting of employers, labor, and the public to prepare recommendations that would direct the President's efforts to revise the law.³⁸

After a month of preparation Durkin announced that fifteen people had been selected to serve on the tripartite Labor Department Advisory Commission.³⁹ The "public" was represented by Jean T. McKelvey, Dean of Cornell University; Dr. Sumner H. Schlichter, from Harvard University; Cyrus S. Ching, a former director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) during the Truman administration; Dr. Maurice T. Van

³⁸Public Papers . . . 1952, p. 29.

³⁹New York Times, March 5, 1953.

Hecke, of North Carolina University; and Dr. Paul A. Dodd, of the University of California. The management representatives were drawn from a wide range of industries. Harry R. Moses, President of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association; David Zellerbach, of Crown-Zellerbach Corporation; John J. O'Donnell, President of the National Constructors Association; Ben Moreel, of Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation; and Frank Risling, President of the Auto Parts Manufacturers Association presented management's views. Durkin assembled an impressive group of union leaders for the conference. George Meany, Walter Reuther, David J. MacDonald, President of the United Steelworkers of America; George Harrison of the Brotherhood of Railway Workers; and John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers provided a cross-section of union leadership.

On March 6, 1953 the group assembled in Washington, D. C. to discuss a twenty-point agenda prepared by Durkin. At the top of the list was the provision of the Taft-Hartley act which denied economic strikers voting rights in representation elections. This was the provision which Eisenhower apparently referred to during his campaign as a potential threat to union security. Labor leaders had argued that in a period of job scarcity an employer, seeking to reduce labor costs, could provoke a strike bring in strikebreakers, and then demand a representation

election. The result, the unions argued, was that the union would lose the right to represent the workers involved, thus undermining union security.

According to a press conference statement by George Meany, reported by the New York Times on March 7, the commission spent the morning discussing this provision, and during the afternoon session the labor leaders suggested that the issue be put to a vote. The management representatives withdrew for a "caucus" and returned to state that they would not vote on this or any other issue since it went beyond the purpose of the group. The industrial representatives said they would exchange views on issues but refused to vote. The majority of the group favored easing the restriction, according to Meany; management was attempting to prevent any changes. He said "I am forced to the inescapable conclusion, from their actions that these representatives of industry are perfectly content to sit tight with the Taft-Hartley act as now written - with all its unfairness and union-busting provisions - and will take part in no move to make the law more acceptable to labor."⁴⁰ The group met the next day, reached no compromise, and adjourned indefinitely.

Eisenhower's campaign promise to avoid "empty theatrical gestures" was not to be easily kept as this

⁴⁰Ibid., March 7, 1953

conference demonstrated. Eisenhower's simple solution to the labor law problem was no solution at all. Instead, the tripartite commission almost became a source of embarrassment for the administration. By voting on recommendations the labor leaders could have forced Eisenhower to make far more extensive changes in the law than he had planned. The industrialists, apparently sensing that a majority of the public representatives were on labor's side, preferred to end the conference in deadlock rather than risk extensive changes.

President Eisenhower made no public effort to save the tripartite commission despite his earlier enthusiasm for the idea. Perhaps he realized the extent of the gulf that separated labor and management on the issue of the Taft-Hartley act. Perhaps, also, he realized that if the commission succeeded he might possibly be committed to extensive revisions of the law, an event which would alienate the old guard and destroy the political value of the Durkin appointment. By not acting, the President eliminated the influence of the C. I. O. in his administration.

In addition, Meany's belligerent statements indicated perhaps that the A. F. of L. sought more changes than the Republicans would give. The Taft-Hartley act continued to serve as a focus of unity for the rival unions. By eliminating a cross-section of unions and concentrating upon the A. F. of L. repre-

sented by Durkin, the stage was set for changes that would enhance rivalry rather than promote unity. In the months to come, the C. I. O. was significantly absent from discussions of revisions. Thus, the "fair hearing" which Eisenhower promised for "labor" was interpreted to mean labor as represented by the A. F. of L.

Eisenhower did not discuss this abortive effort to find a solution for the Taft-Hartley act problem in Mandate for Change. Sherman Adams ignored it also. Instead they provided an account of Durkin's efforts to work with members of an "informal" committee within the administration.⁴¹ Bernard Shanley and Gerald Morgan, both lawyers who had helped prepare the original language of the law, served as Eisenhower's "liaison" men. The rest of the group included Senator Taft, Senator H. Alexander Smith, Representative Samuel K. McConnell, and Sinclair Weeks. Durkin met with these men or their representatives regularly from March through July in an effort to prepare the administration's position on the labor law. Two congressional committees waited more or less impatiently for Durkin to appear before them; but he never came.

Progress was painfully slow. Durkin and Weeks were unable to agree on many key issues; Eisenhower

⁴¹Mandate, pp. 196. Firsthand Report, pp. 7, 303.

described them, as we have noted, as being "poles apart." Yet the President did nothing to resolve the dispute. The duel continued unabated. On May 16, according to the New York Times Durkin announced that he intended to submit a separate set of suggestions to Eisenhower, and on May 23 the same paper quoted the United States Chamber of Commerce's special bulletin to its members, which charged that Durkin intended to "wreck" the Taft-Hartley act. At the same time Durkin denied charges that he intended to resign, and he insisted that the administration would be able to state its position on labor legislation before the first session of the Eighty-Third Congress adjourned.

In the June issue of the American Federationist George Meany charged that the administration did not intend to produce a constructive legislative program in this area for 1953. Recalling Eisenhower's pledge to remove the "union-busting" features of the law Meany called upon Eisenhower to take definite steps toward achieving that goal.

Meany's charges came up in Eisenhower's news conference, reported in the New York Times on June 19. Characteristically evasive, Eisenhower refused to get involved in a public argument with Meany. He did say that he favored easing the voting restrictions on economic strikers, and that the non-Communist affidavit should apply to management as well as labor. He then

urged Meany to be patient since only five months of study had elapsed.

Perhaps sensitive to Meany's criticism, Eisenhower attended a meeting of the informal committee on the following day. In an effort to reassure Meany, Eisenhower praised the group's "excellent progress" as he left the meeting. But he suggested no future date on which the administration would be ready to state its position. Representative McConnell quoted Eisenhower as being aware that someone was going to be displeased with the group's results. Eisenhower was willing to settle now for a position that was "reasonably satisfactory, because you can't get something completely satisfactory . . . to labor, industry, and the public," according to McConnell.⁴² Senator Taft indicated that labor would be satisfied with the proposals, but he indicated also that it would be impossible to prepare a position statement before the first session adjourned.⁴³

The time element was of special importance to Durkin since he had taken only a year's leave-of-absence from his union duties. His participation in the Eisenhower administration, which labor was beginning to suspect of deliberately delaying action on the labor

⁴²New York Times, June 20, 1953.

⁴³Ibid.

law, endangered his union position. Since his future as an "Eisenhower" Republican was questionable, Durkin understandably intended to return to his duties as a union leader. Eisenhower's reluctance to assist the Labor Secretary in his dispute with Weeks, which promised to continue, perhaps persuaded Durkin to seek an opportunity to retire gracefully from the fray and preserve his own influence in the A. F. of L. while causing as much embarrassment to the Eisenhower administration as possible. Either through conscious preparation or fortuitous circumstances the opportunity soon presented itself.

The series of events culminating in Durkin's resignation began in July. According to Durkin's account, delivered on September 22 to the delegates of the 72nd convention of the A. F. of L., enough progress had been made to permit the President to deliver his special message on the Taft-Hartley act on July 31.⁴⁴ But the message was not delivered because of Senator Taft's death on that date. On August 3, what Durkin called the "official draft" and what Eisenhower called only a very rough working draft of the message appeared in the Wall Street Journal. The question of who released the draft remains a mystery since both sides denied it and both sides would have gained by it.

⁴⁴A. F. of L., Proceedings (1953), p. 479.

In either case, the significant factor was the "tone" as well as the substance of the message. The tone indicated that the administration had retreated from its position favoring only minor changes in the law. The opening paragraph said that the law now required "amendments in a number of important respects."⁴⁵ Durkin had bargained long and hard for nineteen amendments that brought a greater measure of "fairness and balance" to the labor law. The Wall Street Journal of August 3, credited Durkin for his persuasive powers and said that "as some labor sources noted, it embodied far from a substantial revision of the Taft-Hartley act."

Three measures favored management. The first established that once a contract had been negotiated issues related to it could not be discussed without mutual consent until the contract expired. Another settled the issue of the "no man's land" in labor-management relations. Industries engaged in only minor aspects of interstate commerce would be under the jurisdiction of state labor laws if the National Labor Relations Board declined to act. Finally, wording was inserted to protect the right of the states to maintain order in "emergencies" created by strikes.

The balance of the proposals were aimed at eliminating some of labor's complaints about the law. For

⁴⁵Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1953.

the most part the changes affected the interests of the A. F. of L. Two exceptions included a statement that unions could not be held responsible for the misbehavior of members simply because they were union members; another gave unions greater latitude in their efforts to rid unions of communist infiltrators and to protect their confidential information.

The A. F. of L. benefited by a proposal designed to ease the "pre-hire" restrictions of the law. People employed in the building trades unions or the actor's union would be required to join the union within seven rather than thirty days. The secondary boycott, banned by the law, was redefined to permit picketing under certain conditions on jobs where more than one union was at work. Again, this favored the peculiar interests of the building trades unions. Companies doing "farmed out work" were still subject to secondary picketing under the proposed revisions.

Durkin had not succeeded in removing the injunction provisions of the law, nor had the "closed shop" been revived. On the issue of economic strikers and representation elections some improvement was made, but strikers still could not vote. Instead the company could not demand an election until four months after the strike began, on the assumption, apparently, that in bad times the process would become too expensive to tempt employers.

The proposals as published in the Wall Street Journal brought no comment from Eisenhower. Two days later, August 5, Senator H. Alexander Smith observed for New York Times reporters that he doubted if Eisenhower even had seen the message which Smith described as "a very rough draft." Durkin in the days that followed behaved as if he were certain of Eisenhower's support. On August 6, Durkin delivered the commencement address at Duquesne University in which he said that changes were being made in the law "more likeable to representatives of organized labor."⁴⁶ Both the Senate and House labor committees, he said had approved certain unidentified changes, and more were being submitted to Eisenhower for his approval.

Durkin made more positive statements during one of his rare news conferences reported by the New York Times on August 12. He defended the administration's labor policies from an attack by the acting-president of his own union which charged the administration with opposition to labor's interests.⁴⁷ Durkin argued that Eisenhower's extension of Social Security coverage to include ten million more people was not anti-labor, nor was his protection of minimum wage legislation. Durkin was particularly pleased with Eisenhower's efforts to

⁴⁶New York Times, August 7, 1953.

⁴⁷Ibid., August 10, 1953.

revise the Taft-Hartley act. Many "top-level conferences" had produced good results, he said. As evidence of Eisenhower's favorable labor views Durkin said that "a number of amendments have been agreed upon and others are under consideration - all of which will bring fairness and balance to the Labor Management Relations act of 1947. What better evidence can there be of the President's desire to live up to his promises?"⁴⁸ According to the same New York Times account, Durkin asserted categorically that "if he had not been satisfied with Eisenhower's record in labor matters he would have resigned." From his public statements it appeared that he was satisfied with his achievement. The occasion might also have served to block any administration effort to back away from the proposed amendments. The hint that there were more in the offing perhaps indicated that Durkin considered continuing with Eisenhower.

Eisenhower met with Durkin in New York City on August 19. They discussed the proposals, but Eisenhower later denied that he had approved them. Durkin had been inadvertently "misled" on some "particulars" according to Eisenhower.⁴⁹ No final decision had been made; Durkin misunderstood the liaison men, Shanley and

⁴⁸Ibid., August 12, 1953.

⁴⁹Mandate, p. 198.

Morgan, and their function as mediators.⁵⁰ When Durkin returned to Washington on August 20, he discovered that the informal committee offered "something less than the agreed upon amendments."⁵¹ After eleven more days of fruitless bargaining, Durkin wrote his letter of resignation. He withheld the letter until September 10 when, in his last meeting with Eisenhower, he learned that the President now refused to support the nineteen revisions. He insisted that the President accept his resignation.

Durkin told his version of events to the A. F. of L. convention delegates on September 22. The convention adopted a resolution thanking him and dismissing the revisions as inadequate.⁵² Vice-President Richard Nixon delivered Eisenhower's message, and he added a preface in which he insisted that Eisenhower had not broken his word as Durkin charged; the whole episode resulted from a "misunderstanding."⁵³ The delegates were unconvinced since Nixon offered little evidence to support his contention.

Less than a month after Durkin resigned, Eisenhower, on October 8, appointed James P. Mitchell as

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹A. F. of L., Proceedings (1953), pp. 479-480.

⁵²Ibid., p. 618.

⁵³Ibid., p. 516.

interim-Secretary of Labor. In November, an article by Mitchell appeared in the American Federationist which echoed Eisenhower's campaign speech in promising to consult labor on changes in the law. By the end of December, Mitchell had prepared Eisenhower's special message for Congress. There is no evidence to indicate whether or not Mitchell discussed the law with labor leaders. On January 11, 1954, Eisenhower delivered a special message on the Taft-Hartley act which embodied all of the nineteen proposals.⁵⁴

But Eisenhower's message also included some suggestions which had not been part of the original proposals. Foreshadowing the investigation of labor racketeering which dominated his second term, Eisenhower recommended that union welfare and pension fund management be examined. Another proposal that reflected, in some labor leaders' opinion, an inherent prejudice against labor, called for legislation to require a secret ballot on strike votes by workers.⁵⁵ Eisenhower avoided detailed recommendations in an effort, he said later at a news conference, to establish guiding "principles."⁵⁶ Congress was expected to work out the details along with Mitchell. While the two additions

⁵⁴Public Papers . . . 1954, pp. 40-44.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 44.

⁵⁶New York Times, January 13, 1954.

reflect perhaps more anti-labor sentiment, the remarkable fact is that the fruits of Durkin's labors were preserved by Mitchell after Eisenhower had once rejected them.

Mitchell perhaps owed his success to his background as a labor relations expert for two New York City department stores, as much as Durkin owed his failure to his origins as a union leader. Mitchell spoke the language of management and Durkin spoke that of labor. Eisenhower trusted the former and distrusted the latter.

In his criticism of Durkin in Mandate for Change, Eisenhower focused upon Durkin's intransigent attitude.⁵⁷ Instead of finding common ground on which to meet Durkin, Eisenhower saw Durkin as a "special pleader" for labor instead of his personal adviser on labor problems.⁵⁸ Durkin viewed his position in the administration as comparable to a union negotiator at contract time. He saw a simple "collective bargaining" situation and acted as his long experience had taught him. The result was disastrous. Eisenhower was greatly annoyed by Durkin's references to his meetings with the informal committee as "collective bargaining"

⁵⁷Pp. 198-99. Benson was critical of Durkin for his reticence during Cabinet meetings; he was sul-
len and withdrawn, pp. 135-36.

⁵⁸Mandate, p. 198.

sessions.⁵⁹ Eisenhower simply did not trust Durkin enough to back him in his quarrel with Weeks. He abandoned thoughts of a political alliance, thoughts which perhaps disturbed him from the beginning as running counter to his idealism. Mitchell, on the other hand, was circumspect enough to present his views in language less blatantly pro-union. Eisenhower trusted him almost immediately, and with perhaps a sigh of relief turned over to Mitchell the details of his labor policy.⁶⁰

The emphasis of Eisenhower's labor policy shifted over the course of a year from idealism to practical politics and back once more to idealism. The conflict between his honest desire to encourage industrial peace and the political ambitions of the Republican party would return to plague him in his strike policy and in his effort to secure labor reform legislation. Within his party the conflicting interests of the moderates and the old guard continued to affect the course of his policy, as they had done with Durkin. Labor on the other hand grew more critical of Eisenhower's policies although many labor leaders respected Mitchell's honest concern for labor's problems.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 198-99.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 291.

CHAPTER II

EISENHOWER'S STRIKE POLICY

Benjamin Franklin wrote of Governor Keith of Pennsylvania in the Autobiography that "he wished to please everyone; and having little to give, he gave expectations."¹ Such was the case, albeit under different circumstances, with President Eisenhower and his strike policy. Alarmed by his vision of a "free economy" in danger of permanent corruption by the continued extension of federal power which accompanied the New Deal and the Fair Deal, the President "gave expectations" to labor and management that the collective bargaining process would be allowed to operate freely. While the Congress was quietly shelving his proposals to revise the Taft-Hartley act in 1954, Eisenhower, relying on Mitchell to work out details, prepared to adopt the traditional method of non-intervention in major strikes. Where the public interest required intervention, the President resolved to use only the legal authority provided in the national emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley act, abandoning all other

¹Russell B. Nye (ed.), Benjamin Franklin: Autobiography and Other Writings (Boston: Riverside Press, 1958), p. 37.

methods as beyond his power or harmful to serious collective bargaining. The major tests of his policy in the steel strikes of 1956 and 1959 forced him to abandon it although he continued to cling to his vision.

President Eisenhower was not alone in his desire to reverse the trend toward increased government intervention in major strikes. In their pre-strike maneuvers, both the twelve major steel companies and the United Steelworkers of America, led by David J. MacDonald, endorsed the intent of the President's policy.² Both groups had been alarmed at the implications of President Truman's dramatic seizure of the steel mills in 1952. In Eisenhower's opinion, Truman had damaged the dignity of his high office by the personal role which he chose to play in negotiations in the steel industry during his administrations.³ Illegal methods, smacking of "paternalism" roused the ire of Eisenhower during the 1952 campaign, and he promised to seek industrial peace through other means.⁴

Restoring the lost dignity of the Presidency, and employing collective bargaining more fully, were subordinate to Eisenhower's intention to combat one

²New York Times, May 6, 1959.

³Firsthand Report, p. 62; A. F. of L., Proceedings (1952), p. 363.

⁴A. F. of L., Proceedings (1952), p. 363.

worrisome aspect of inflation by pursuing a "hands-off" policy. The upward spiral of prices and wages which had accompanied the postwar readjustment period was traced to the Truman strike policy. In his eagerness to use Presidential prestige to support organized labor's wage demands, according to Eisenhower, Truman had helped force unreasonable demands upon employers who, in turn, were forced to raise prices.⁵ "Wage-push" inflation was the result.

The public interest, according to Eisenhower, was best served by encouraging non-inflationary settlements achieved through collective bargaining rather than preventing strikes.⁶ Eisenhower's confidence in the business community's wisdom is a fact well known, which makes his confidence in the maturity and responsibility of labor leaders seem surprising. He called on both camps repeatedly during the 1956 and 1959 steel strikes to exercise "statesmanship" by finding a contract acceptable to the public interest as well as their own interests.⁷ Short of invoking the Taft-Hartley act provisions, Eisenhower had no other method for

⁵Ibid.

⁶Robert E. Livernash (ed.), Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry: A Study of the Public Interest and the Role of Government (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't. P.O., 1961), p. 103. Also, New York Times, March 26, and May 10, 1959.

⁷Public Papers . . . 1959, p. 12.

dealing with long strikes.

Sherman Adams was awed and perhaps somewhat dismayed by Eisenhower's blind faith in the goodwill of labor and management at the bargaining table. In Firsthand Report Adams wrote that:

in his determination to reach a difficult but desirable objective, the idealistic and optimistic Eisenhower would reveal a faith in the higher motives of mankind that astonished the more cynical members of the Cabinet. For awhile he was hopeful that the administration could persuade businessmen to hold the price line and stop labor leaders from demanding higher wages simply by appealing to their patriotism and sense of fair play. His Cabinet cynics argued a little vainly that in a free enterprise system something much stronger than inspirational exhortation would be needed to prevent men from trying to make more money.⁸

Even when privately angry at both groups, Eisenhower publicly continued to evince great confidence in their sense of responsibility. But the demands of practical politics, the requirements of national defense, and the pressure of public opinion forced Eisenhower to seek more effective means of resolving the conflicts between labor and management.

The events which marked the two steel strikes were monotonously similar, despite the fact that the 116-day strike in 1959 was the longest in the industry's history. Little purpose would be served by recounting the details here. In both cases the union

⁸P. 7.

and the companies adopted unyielding positions and flooded the press with statistical arguments to prove the justice of their respective claims. The companies posed as the protectors of the national economy by resisting inflationary wage demands, while the union argued that increased worker productivity and high profits supported their wage demands. Eisenhower relied on Mitchell to serve as his liaison man between the groups and maintained a determined neutral position. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, in which Eisenhower had placed high hopes during the 1952 campaign, carried on mediation activities to no avail in both strikes. The Taft-Hartley injunction which stopped the 1959 strike failed to settle it. In both cases, Eisenhower relied on high-ranking administration members to persuade the steel companies to modify their position in order to reach an agreement with the union.⁹

Eisenhower might have had a precedent for trusting in the good sense and restraint of the parties since the first three steel contracts negotiated during Eisenhower's term were achieved without strikes. The three peaceful years in steel between 1953 and 1956 were perhaps the result of changes in the union's leadership as well as unfavorable economic conditions. David J. MacDonald represented a different type of union leader than his predecessor, Philip Murray. MacDonald had

⁹Livernash, Collective Bargaining, pp. 201-202.

never led a strike, or walked a picket line. Equally important, the recession of 1954 did not encourage a strike. In 1955, foreshadowing the rigid positions taken in 1956, MacDonald suddenly stiffened his demands in the face of peak profits in steel, and called a one-day "token" strike to win his demands. The Eisenhower administration remained inconspicuously in the background during this period, and in 1956 attempted to follow the same course.

The twenty-seven day steel strike in 1956 was brought to an abrupt halt by the high-level intervention of Mitchell and Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey. Although the companies reluctantly listened to the administration's plea, they raised the price of steel in 1957 in order, they argued, to offset the increased costs produced by the 1956 settlement.¹⁰ Eisenhower expressed his anger much later, in 1959, at one of his famous "stag" dinners when he told a guest that the companies had failed to calculate the exact cost of the increase before raising prices.¹¹ Careful to remain neutral, in the same remarks Eisenhower also criticized the union leadership for approaching the bargaining table intent upon getting as large an increase as possible in order to assure the maintenance of their

¹⁰New York Times, March 21, 1956.

¹¹Ibid., July 22 and 23, 1959.

positions within the union.

Perhaps disturbed by the apparent duplication of the results of Truman's policy, Eisenhower nevertheless was forced to consider other aspects of the problem in 1956 besides the simple economic issues involved. Political requirements were of first importance to the administration in the election year. The good work which Secretary Mitchell had done since 1954 to repair the damage caused by the Durkin experiment was threatened by Eisenhower's determination to use only the Taft-Hartley act national emergency provisions to intervene. Had he waited until a national emergency developed in 1956, Eisenhower would have forced the mills to operate during the period including the election. Obviously, such an act would have been interpreted as an anti-labor move by the Democrats. The President's inflexible policy threatened to lower his stock with labor - never very high - to a point comparable to the immediate post-Durkin period. The records available did not indicate who persuaded Eisenhower to change his mind on this matter, although Vice-President Nixon, a perpetual "fence-mender," might have had a hand in affairs as he did in the 1959 strike.

The uncertainties of domestic politics were matched by a difficult international situation that developed during the strike. The Suez crisis, generated by Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal in July, apparently

convinced the administration that no interruption of vital defense supplies could be tolerated although the situation had not yet approached open conflict.¹² Truman had seized the steel mills in 1952, in part, to assure continued supplies to Korea, and Eisenhower on a much less impressive scale in a less pressing situation followed a course of intervention also.

Although his strike policy had been tried and found inadequate to cope with the situation in 1956, Eisenhower proposed to follow the same course in 1959. He began his campaign to keep the government out of negotiations in his State-of-the-Union message. Once more he stressed the twin themes of "wage-push" inflation and the "statesmanship" necessary to achieve a settlement in the public interest.¹³ In March, during a news conference, he continued to press both sides, and he presented a thinly veiled warning implying that the process of collective bargaining was on trial.¹⁴ New controls were darkly forecast if the parties failed to agree, or produced a settlement that forced another round of price and wage increases. Although both sides interpreted Eisenhower's remarks to suit their respec-

¹²Livernash, Collective Bargaining, p. 298.

¹³Public Papers . . . 1959, p. 12.

¹⁴New York Times, March 26, and May 6, 1959.

tive points of view, it was clear that he attempted to follow a truly neutral course although vitally interested in the outcome.

In the strike that finally began in July, the government made only token efforts to bring the parties closer together on terms. In the past the President had refused to use impartial fact-finding boards empowered to suggest a settlement, a favorite device of Truman, because, in his opinion they interfered with the process of serious collective bargaining by delaying negotiations.¹⁵ Finally after sixty-five days Eisenhower reluctantly offered to empanel a board if both sides wanted one, an offer refused immediately by the companies and accepted by the union.¹⁶ There the matter was dropped. Labor, already distressed by Eisenhower's reliance on the hated Taft-Hartley injunction, became more and more critical of the failure to intervene via a fact-finding board despite company objections.

At the AFL-CIO convention, Mitchell tried to placate labor leaders who were solidly united in support of the steelworkers, morally and materially. Mitchell revealed that he thought the companies unrea-

¹⁵Ibid., September 17, 1959.

¹⁶Ibid.

sonable in their pose as defenders of the economy, but it was too late. The convention unanimously passed a resolution, in Mitchell's presence, condemning the administration for its irresponsible position on the strike and for its support of labor reform legislation considered "repressive."¹⁷ It would be difficult to separate the two policies and measure which generated more anger on the part of labor. Walter Reuther condemned not only the administration, but also those who had invited Mitchell, and Mitchell himself for accepting the invitation to address the convention when he heard Mitchell say that the administration probably would use the Taft-Hartley injunction.¹⁸

The Taft-Hartley injunction, invoked in October, solved nothing. Negotiations dragged on toward the deadline, January 26, 1960, when the strike was due to resume. Private polls indicated that the strikers backed the union and were prepared to continue the strike, especially since the companies had introduced the issue of work rules into the economic dispute. On this symbolic issue the union refused to negotiate.

Having thoroughly tested his strike policy, Eisenhower sought a new approach in December when he authorized Mitchell and Nixon to intervene in nego-

¹⁷AFL-CIO, Proceedings (1959), pp. 101-102, 106-110, 118.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 116-117.

tiations. The political aspect of the strike, which Eisenhower had vainly tried to ignore, once more proved to be one of the determining factors in forcing intervention. Equally critical in the eyes of the Supreme Court which upheld the administration's use of the law in October, was the problem of national defense.¹⁹ Since 1957 and the launching of the Soviet Union's space satellite, the United States had revived its own missile program which depended upon a steady supply of special steel products cut off by the strike. The complex relationship between domestic policy and international policy was ignored in the administration's strike policy.

As the 1960 election year drew near it appeared that the Congress would soon have to deal with the strike, the last resort provided for by the cumbersome Taft-Hartley machinery. No more undesirable prospect could have been imagined as the Democratic congress, fresh from enacting labor reform legislations anticipated a possible chance to redress the balance between the two powers by passing restrictive legislation affecting the recalcitrant companies. The possibility of political reprisals combined with the absence of strong support from other major industries who had granted gen-

¹⁹United Steelworkers of America v. U.S., 361 US 39 (1959).

erous increases were strong arguments presented by Vice-President Nixon and Mitchell during the month of December.²⁰

Nixon's presence, which perhaps fulfilled the psychological "prestige" requirement that Eisenhower had successfully withheld, suggested another political problem closer to the Vice-President's personal fortunes. Since he had to campaign on the basis of Eisenhower's record, and not his own, Nixon perhaps hoped to improve his standing with labor by securing a settlement acceptable to labor. Despite his efforts, which brought the strike to an end, Nixon did not win labor's support. The union accepted a compromise settlement, and the companies held the price line, but the labor reform issue had tarnished the administration's relations with organized labor beyond repair.

The defense of President Eisenhower's strike policy was included in a study of collective bargaining in the steel disputes of the postwar period undertaken at the request of Mitchell in 1959 by representatives of several schools of business administration.²¹ Among other conclusions endorsed by Mitchell in his preface to the study was one which repudiated the

²⁰Livernash, Collective Bargaining, pp. 201-202.

²¹Ibid., p. v.

primary contention upon which Eisenhower had based his policy, that of inflation.²² The report argued that strikes and contracts left no long term scars on the economy, that settlements affected relations between the two groups but had little impact on the overall economy.

But Eisenhower defended the right course, if for the wrong reasons, since past efforts to force settlements in steel had produced no results.²³ Intervention at the eleventh hour, when economic forces were about to force a settlement anyway, appeared to this group to be less harmful to the collective bargaining process than early intervention.²⁴

Despite the efforts of this study to defend important elements of Eisenhower's policy, it was unable to defend the method of high-level intervention, or "mediation-with-a-club," as it termed it.²⁵ Such mediation, the report noted, was described by critics as "an illegitimate device, in that its reality is compulsion behind a facade of voluntarism. Free collective bargaining is not served when government power is used to force bargainers to change their positions, to make

²²Ibid., pp. v, vi, 151.

²³Ibid., pp. 11, 18.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 207-208.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 214-215.

offers and accept proposals that are contrary to what the parties privately judge to be their own best interests."²⁶ The report was unable to deny the validity of this charge, but it argued that it was the best alternative as yet devised, if a free economy were to be preserved.

Eisenhower's strike policy was conceived in righteous indignation at the paternalism, illegal methods, and inflationary settlements of his predecessor, but it failed to meet the demands of reality. Public opinion, whose "outcry" was unwarranted in Mitchell's opinion, nevertheless was conditioned to regard steel strikes as serious threats to the economy. The Eisenhower policy attempted to ignore or to placate this force without taking significant action to end the strike. The end result was additional confusion. Subtle arguments about the effects of the strike on the long range economic situation were of less consequence than the immediate effects of a long strike. Short supplies and increased unemployment were readily observable. The half-measures taken by the administration to avoid involvement were interpreted by an anxious public as signs of indecision and vacillation and contributed to the image of the President as one who was uncertain of the course he

²⁶Ibid.

should follow.²⁷ On the contrary, Eisenhower adopted a rigid policy from the start and held faithfully to it until forced to abandon it for political and defense purposes.

A strike policy that did not take into account the peculiar needs of national defense in the 1950's was doomed to fail, and Eisenhower's policy did not. Perhaps his experience with strikes and defense influenced the tone of his farewell address in 1961 when the President warned that the industrial-military complex threatened to destroy the economic system of "free enterprise."²⁸

The economic "model" which Eisenhower envisioned was incomplete. Consequently the strike policy which he devised to fit the model was inadequate. The intangible factors, the "non-quantifiable variables" in economic parlance, were sufficiently active to undermine and destroy Eisenhower's position on strikes. Although he had warned that new controls might be necessary if collective bargaining failed, the President undertook no new legislation in this area in the months remaining in his second term. During 1960 the President enthusiastically endorsed the principle of regular

²⁷Marquis Childs, Eisenhower Captive Hero: A Critical Study of the General and the President (New York: Harcourt, 1958), pp. 110-119.

²⁸Public Papers . . . 1961, p. 1038.

meetings between labor and management to iron out difficulties, an approach which suggested a return to a policy unsucessfully attempted during the Durkin experiment.²⁹ Eisenhower's idealism had forced him into a rigid position from which there was no escape without appearing to violate his often-cited principles. Throughout the course of his strike policy Eisenhower managed to remain aloof, helping neither labor or management. Labor leaders found little merit in Eisenhower's policy. But management leaders were disillusioned also since Eisenhower, through Nixon and Mitchell, forced them to concede to union demands without permitting them to raise the price of steel. The general welfare appeared to have been Eisenhower's first concern in his strike policy.

²⁹New York Times, September 15, 1960.

CHAPTER III

LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION:

MITCHELL'S PROGRAM

When the issue of union corruption gained national attention in 1957, President Eisenhower turned to Mitchell, as he had done in the past on other labor issues, for guidance in preparing a legislative program. Confident in the ability of Mitchell to cope with the problem, Eisenhower maintained a passive attitude toward union corruption between 1954 and the middle of 1958. Mitchell, who had vigorously praised and defended labor in his speeches between 1954 and 1957, prepared a program which reflected his conviction that organized labor was willing and able to eliminate corrupt elements from its ranks with a minimum of Federal assistance. Until the middle of 1958 Eisenhower passively supported a labor reform program that sought to encourage union democracy without significantly restricting traditional union organizing practices. When the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee rejected Mitchell's program in favor of the Kennedy-Ives bill, a less restrictive, bi-partisan measure, Mitchell prepared to accept defeat. But Eisenhower refused to

1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions and activities. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for transparency and accountability, particularly in financial matters. The text outlines various methods for organizing and storing data, suggesting that digital tools can be more efficient than traditional paper-based systems.

2. The second section focuses on the role of communication in project management. It argues that clear and consistent communication is the foundation of any successful team effort. The author provides several practical tips for improving communication, such as holding regular meetings, using clear language, and being open to feedback. It also stresses the importance of listening to team members and addressing their concerns promptly.

3. The third part of the document addresses the challenges of time management. It acknowledges that everyone faces time constraints and offers strategies to help prioritize tasks and avoid procrastination. The text suggests creating a detailed schedule, delegating responsibilities, and setting realistic deadlines. It also encourages the use of time-saving techniques, such as batching similar tasks together.

4. The final section discusses the importance of continuous learning and professional development. It notes that the field is constantly evolving, and individuals must stay updated on the latest trends and technologies. The author recommends attending workshops, conferences, and taking courses to enhance skills and knowledge. It also encourages a growth mindset, where challenges are seen as opportunities for learning and improvement.

support Mitchell's position, thus ending, the first, "moderate", phase of the President's labor reform effort.

Eisenhower's confidence in his second Labor Secretary was not misplaced, for after 1953 the tension between the administration and organized labor, created by the failure of the Durkin experiment, gradually subsided. Mitchell's capacity to deal effectively with labor leaders relieved the President of the necessity to meet personally with labor officials, a goal which Eisenhower pursued with determination after 1953.¹ Aside from diverting labor leaders from the "side door" of the White House Mitchell's sincere defense of labor's interests appeared to reap political rewards as the commitment of some labor leaders to the Democratic party was shaken.²

In order to win labor's tentative approval, Mitchell had to go far in the direction of supporting labor's programs. Privately, he appeared willing to do this, but publicly he was forced to compromise regularly with the rest of the Cabinet, Republican Con-

¹Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: the Story of the Eisenhower Administration, p. 62.

²New York Times, May 24, 1956. But union members stayed with the Democrats in 1956; see Charles A. H. Thomson and Frances M. Shattuck, The 1956 Presidential Campaign (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 352.

gressmen, and the President. Sherman Adams considered this one of Mitchell's best traits; Mitchell was "blessed with a rare intuition" that told him how far he could go in defending labor's interests without "disassociating himself from administration policy."³ Emmet John Hughes ignored this characteristic, ultimately a "fatal flaw," in Mitchell's character, when he wrote that Mitchell was a "liberal," unencumbered by the cliches of the Taft tradition.⁴ While Mitchell sounded like a "liberal," his program was dictated by the character of the administration to which he belonged.

Since the death of Taft, Taft's successor, William F. Knowland, was hostile to much of Eisenhower's program, and Sherman Adams noted the President's distaste for Knowland's extreme views on many issues.⁵ The aura of Eastern Republicanism was still strong in the administration, and Mitchell represented an important part of that influence in Eisenhower's domestic program. Eisenhower continued to value the advice of Harold Stassen, according to Adams, and Stassen perhaps provided Mitchell with valuable support since both sought to ally their party with certain elements of

³Firsthand Report, p. 304.

⁴The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years, p. 68.

⁵Firsthand Report, pp. 26, 108-109.

• $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$

• $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{8}$

• $\frac{1}{4} \times \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{16}$

• $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{8} = \frac{1}{16}$

• $\frac{1}{4} \times \frac{1}{8} = \frac{1}{32}$

• $\frac{1}{8} \times \frac{1}{8} = \frac{1}{64}$

• $\frac{1}{16} \times \frac{1}{16} = \frac{1}{256}$

• $\frac{1}{32} \times \frac{1}{32} = \frac{1}{1024}$

• $\frac{1}{64} \times \frac{1}{64} = \frac{1}{4096}$

• $\frac{1}{128} \times \frac{1}{128} = \frac{1}{16384}$

• $\frac{1}{256} \times \frac{1}{256} = \frac{1}{65536}$

• $\frac{1}{512} \times \frac{1}{512} = \frac{1}{262144}$

• $\frac{1}{1024} \times \frac{1}{1024} = \frac{1}{1048576}$

• $\frac{1}{2048} \times \frac{1}{2048} = \frac{1}{4194304}$

• $\frac{1}{4096} \times \frac{1}{4096} = \frac{1}{16777216}$

• $\frac{1}{8192} \times \frac{1}{8192} = \frac{1}{67108864}$

• $\frac{1}{16384} \times \frac{1}{16384} = \frac{1}{268435456}$

• $\frac{1}{32768} \times \frac{1}{32768} = \frac{1}{1073743872}$

• $\frac{1}{65536} \times \frac{1}{65536} = \frac{1}{4294967296}$

• $\frac{1}{131072} \times \frac{1}{131072} = \frac{1}{17213766144}$

• $\frac{1}{262144} \times \frac{1}{262144} = \frac{1}{68719476736}$

• $\frac{1}{524288} \times \frac{1}{524288} = \frac{1}{274877986304}$

• $\frac{1}{1048576} \times \frac{1}{1048576} = \frac{1}{1099511627776}$

• $\frac{1}{2097152} \times \frac{1}{2097152} = \frac{1}{4398046580736}$

• $\frac{1}{4194304} \times \frac{1}{4194304} = \frac{1}{17590532681728}$

the labor movement.⁶ While the old guard regrouped after Taft's death, Mitchell benefitted by the moderate eastern influence included in the Eisenhower administration.

Labor leaders were willing to praise Mitchell's sincerity but were reluctant to vote Republican perhaps because they saw that Mitchell's views were not shared enthusiastically by the rest of the administration. By his silence Eisenhower appeared to endorse Mitchell's programs, but the President appeared at the same time to set limits to the support of labor that Mitchell would not have done.

When Mitchell condemned "right-to-work" laws as threats to union security, Eisenhower publicly rejected Mitchell's views insofar as they represented administration policy.⁷ Although the President refused to support such legislation directly, he considered the matter one better left to the various states to decide for themselves.⁸ The problem of union security was less important to the President than the more general issue of Federal versus State power. Mitchell's campaign to improve relations between labor and the administration was hampered by Eisenhower's

⁶Ibid., pp. 64-65.

⁷Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1954, p. 1091.

⁸Adams, Firsthand Report, p. 301.

• The first step in the process of creating a new product is to identify a market need. This can be done through market research, which involves gathering information about the target market and its needs. Once a market need has been identified, the next step is to develop a product concept. This involves creating a detailed description of the product, including its features, benefits, and target market. The product concept is then used to create a business plan, which outlines the company's strategy for developing and marketing the product. The business plan is then used to secure funding for the product development process.

• The second step in the process of creating a new product is to develop a prototype. This involves creating a physical model of the product, which can be used to test the product's design and functionality. The prototype is then used to create a small-scale production run, which can be used to test the product's marketability. The small-scale production run is then used to create a larger-scale production run, which can be used to launch the product in the market.

• The third step in the process of creating a new product is to launch the product in the market. This involves creating a marketing plan, which outlines the company's strategy for promoting the product. The marketing plan is then used to launch the product in the market. The company then monitors the product's performance in the market, and makes adjustments as needed. The final step in the process of creating a new product is to evaluate the product's performance. This involves gathering feedback from customers and analyzing the product's sales and profit. The company then uses this information to make decisions about whether to continue producing the product or to discontinue it.

• The process of creating a new product is a complex and time-consuming one. It requires a lot of research, development, and marketing. However, it is also a very rewarding process. When a new product is successfully launched in the market, it can bring in a lot of new customers and revenue for the company. It can also help the company to stay competitive in the market. Therefore, it is important for companies to have a clear understanding of the process of creating a new product, and to follow the steps carefully.

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conservative attitude on this crucial issue.


While Mitchell strove to improve the image of the Republican party in the eyes of labor leaders, a movement in the Congress to explore corrupt union practices developed. Representative Clare E. Hoffmann of Michigan conducted short-lived hearings in 1953 that focused on the activities of James R. Hoffa and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in Kansas City and Detroit.⁹ Eisenhower's special labor message, delivered in January of 1954, indirectly acknowledged Hoffmann's findings by requesting additional government regulation of union-operated pension and welfare funds.¹⁰

The fiery Hoffmann lost control of the investigation in 1954 as Senator Paul A. Douglas, a friend of labor, conducted a special Labor and Public Welfare subcommittee's investigation of the problem.¹¹ Early

⁹U.S., Congress, House, Special Subcommittee of Education and Labor Committee, Interim Report, Investigation of Welfare and Pension Funds (Committee Print), 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, pp. 1-13. Also, House, Committee on Government Operations, Investigations of Racketeering in the Detroit Area, Report No. 1324, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, pp. 1-12. And U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, C, Part 1, 270.

¹⁰Public Papers . . . 1954, p. 43.

¹¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, Hearings, Welfare and Pension Plans Investigation, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, Parts 1-3.



in 1956, Douglas' committee reported findings of abuses by employers and insurance companies as well as unions in the administering of pension and welfare funds.¹² The moderate tone of the report was perhaps its most noticeable feature. Eisenhower supported Douglas' findings and called for legislation to correct conditions every year thereafter, but the Congress took no action.¹³

In 1957 the issue of union corruption was revived by Democratic Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas, who proposed to launch a much broader study of "improper practices" among unions. According to him, the initial impetus for further studies of labor racketeering came as a result of his discovery, while serving on the Government Operations Committee, that some unions, specifically the Teamsters union, had followed irregular procedures in supplying the government with military uniforms.¹⁴ McClellan ignored earlier efforts to explore Teamster activities, but the link was apparent.

¹²Ibid., First Interim Report, Welfare and Pension Plans Investigation, (Committee Print), pp. 44-45.

¹³Public Papers . . . 1956, p. 23.

¹⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, Final Report, Report No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960, Part 4, p. 867.

The total impact of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Practices in the Labor or Management Field - better known as the McClellan Rackets Committee - would be difficult to measure. In its final report the committee suggested that its work had led to the passage of the Landrum-Griffin labor reform bill and suggested that its impact had even more far-reaching effects.¹⁵ The careful selection of unions investigated was one indication that the members were not blind to the political value of their work.¹⁶ In 1958 the efforts of the Republican members to turn attention on broader issues of union power instead of specific problems of corruption marked an obvious attempt to create useful political ammunition for the 1958 congressional elections.¹⁷

The full impact of the committee's revelations did not register with Eisenhower during 1957. Secretary Mitchell, secure as Eisenhower's labor spokesman, provided the President's first response. On April 25 after a meeting with Mitchell on the golf course in Atlanta, Georgia, Eisenhower issued a statement, reported in the New York Times, that stressed labor's

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 869, 877-78.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 870.

¹⁷Ibid., Part 2, pp. 141-319, 320-332.

ability to cleanse itself of corrupt elements. Following Mitchell's lead, Eisenhower noted the small proportion of corrupt labor leaders when compared to the vast majority of officials who faithfully represented their members, and he implied that any legislation would be moderate not punitive.

In December, Eisenhower presented a legislative program, prepared and delivered by Mitchell, to the delegates to the AFL - CIO convention which continued to emphasize moderate measures.¹⁸ Concentrating on union democracy, Eisenhower suggested that officials be elected by secret ballot, a practice he had endorsed in 1954. In addition, he called for the publication of union constitutions and by-laws in order that members could know their rights. Eisenhower also suggested that union financial data be made public as a means of checking the abuses of union funds that had been uncovered. To more effectively root out corrupt labor officials, he intended to increase the powers of the Secretary of Labor to conduct investigations of complaints. In an effort to make his program more acceptable, Eisenhower also suggested that the Taft-Hartley act be revised along lines advocated earlier by both Durkin and Mitchell. The President revived the program for revision of the act which the Congress had side-tracked after 1954.

¹⁸New York Times, December 6, 1957.

But, while the suggested Taft-Hartley revisions favored labor in some respects, some restrictions were placed on traditional organizing practices as well.¹⁹ Perhaps in this aspect of the program Mitchell had been forced to compromise with the old guard and Eisenhower. The McClellan committee noted that the Teamsters union had applied the secondary boycott as a means of forcing union recognition.²⁰ In other cases, pickets were placed in front of a place of business in an effort to "coerce" the employer into recognizing the union as bargaining agent despite the fact that the employees were already represented in some cases.²¹ Eisenhower consistently opposed these practices between 1957 and 1959, but at this stage he emphasized the fact that other forms of the boycott were to be preserved.²²

The first reaction of labor leaders to Eisenhower's program was one of relief.²³ They saw no threat to union security in the proposals, and they

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, First Interim Report, Report No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 6.

²¹Ibid.

²²New York Times, December 6, 1957.

²³Ibid.

were pleased by the expressions of confidence in their ability to solve their own problems. James Carey of the International Union of Electrical Workers observed enthusiastically that "If the delivery in Washington is as good as the delivery here today, it will be a real contribution to labor-management relations."²⁴ During the next three days the convention voted to oust the offending unions, indicating their willingness to reform themselves.²⁵

Eisenhower's program, subjected to the second thoughts of George Meany, was criticized after the first wave of relief had subsided.²⁶ Meany objected to the restrictions on union organizing practices contained in the modifications of boycott and picketing regulations. Nor did he approve of the secret ballot suggestion since it implied, in his opinion, a basic distrust of union officials and their motives.²⁷ Eisenhower countered with the observation that the democratic process was not hindered by the secret ballot and that Meany's allegation of prejudice against

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., December 7, 1957. Ibid., December 10, 1957, and Ibid., December 13, 1957.

²⁶Ibid., December 11, 1957. Also, Proceedings of the Second Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO (1957), I, 502-507.

²⁷New York Times, December 11, 1957.

labor was unfounded.²⁸ By the end of 1957, organized labor was persuaded that Eisenhower's program, despite its moderate tone, went too far in its attempt to insure reform of the labor movement. Mitchell failed to win labor's support for his program.

While labor complained that the measures were too strong, the United States Chamber of Commerce condemned the program as weak and ineffective.²⁹ Since the suggestions focused on corrupt practices without limiting significantly the power of organized labor, the actual cause of corruption remained unaltered in their opinion.³⁰ Certain Republicans, among them Senator Barry Goldwater, shared the position of the Chamber of Commerce.³¹ But Eisenhower had refused to apply the extreme measures they advocated, such as the use of anti-trust legislation or a national right-to-work law, in dealing with the problem. He continued to refuse to support such measures between 1957 and 1959. But his 1959 statements emphasized the need for restrictions on union organizing practices, in one sense

²⁸Ibid., January 24, 1958.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, Final Report, Report No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960, p. 331.

a concession to the more conservative elements within his party.³²

Mitchell's efforts to steer the administration's program on labor reform through the Congress were unsuccessful. Since 1947 the Congress had attempted to present bipartisan legislation on labor matters. Mitchell's program was admittedly a partisan measure designed to convince the union leaders that the Republican party was not anti-labor.³³ However effective this was as part of his public relations campaign, Mitchell's position had little hope of success in the Congress as a result.

In the hearings on reform legislation conducted by the Senate Labor and Public Welfare committee in 1958, Mitchell defended his bill which was opposed by Senator John F. Kennedy, sponsor of the bipartisan Kennedy-Ives bill.³⁴ Senator Irving F. Ives from New York apparently undertook to sponsor the bill with the approval of Eisenhower although the records are silent on this question. As the hearings progressed Mitchell apparently saw that his bill would fail to pass in

³²See below, Chapter IV, pp. 83-84.

³³New York Times, December 6, 1957.

³⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Labor, Hearings, Union Financial and Administrative Practices and Procedures, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 46.

committee, and he prepared to compromise with Kennedy. He admitted that the two bills were similar in tone and intent although he objected to the failure to provide the Secretary of Labor with broader investigative powers.³⁵ The impression which Mitchell's testimony left with the committee on March 23, was that the administration would be willing to lend tacit support to the bipartisan measure in order to insure that some step was taken to eliminate union corruption.

Between March 23 and June 9, the Eisenhower administration performed a volta face on the issue of labor reform legislation. Two factors perhaps explained the sudden change in the administration's position on the issue. First, the Kennedy-Ives bill did not go as far as Eisenhower wanted it to on the matters of restricting secondary boycott and picketing practices. Only carefully selected practices were limited in very specific terms which prevented broader application of the restrictions by the National Labor Relations Board.³⁶ Second, since the resignation of Sherman Adams Republican congressmen who were hostile to labor, apparently were in more frequent contact with Eisenhower.³⁷

³⁵Ibid., p. 1406.

³⁶Ibid., p. 1401-1405.

³⁷Cf. Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 51, 54-55, 216, and Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, pp. 202, 266-269, 270.

Senator Goldwater, who had evoked images of the unlimited power of labor unions as the cause of union corruption, was the administration's spokesman on labor reform by 1959.³⁸ Perhaps in the past, as Sherman Adams suggested in his account, Mitchell had been able to discount such influences, but it was no longer possible by this time.

Mitchell's statement released on June 9 from Geneva harshly criticized the bill he had described on March 23 as similar in tone and intent to his own.³⁹ He now said that the Kennedy-Ives bill failed "to meet the recommendations for labor-management legislation made to the Congress by President Eisenhower last January," and weakened "the already pitifully ineffective legal protection presently provided by law to union members and the public."⁴⁰ Now moderate self-help legislation to supplement local ordinances was "pitifully ineffective." The moderate Republicans in the Congress apparently were caught by surprise, as Senator Ives ruefully remarked that "somebody" was "trying to make a Republican thing out of this when we were trying to make it bipartisan."⁴¹

³⁸New York Times, January 14, 1959.

³⁹Ibid., June 10, 1958.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid., June 11, 1958.

Eisenhower's conservative tendencies, which had flared intermittently in the past three years perhaps rose once more under pressure from equally, or more, conservative Congressmen and Cabinet members. In addition, since Mitchell's program had failed to win labor's support, perhaps Eisenhower saw little to gain by continuing to advocate a policy of moderation. In the process of shrugging off the passive role which he had adopted since Mitchell's appointment. Eisenhower abandoned the effort to improve relations with labor in hopes of gaining its political support.

Labor leaders, shocked by Mitchell's strong criticism of the Kennedy-Ives bill, accused the Eisenhower administration of cynicism in its attitude toward labor reform.⁴² On the surface the charge appeared well-grounded. But Eisenhower's sudden change of mind more clearly indicated his growing determination to take a firmer hand in the direction of labor policy. When he abandoned his passive attitude, his conservative nature appeared. The sharp contrast with Mitchell's views suggested the gulf between the men on labor issues that the President had overlooked or ignored for the past three years because Mitchell had quieted labor's suspicions temporarily.

Eisenhower's action placed Mitchell in a difficult position, assuming that he sincerely cared about

⁴²Ibid., August 20, 1958.

labor's interests, since the reversal of policy promised to bring more restrictive reform measures. Instead of resigning, Mitchell chose once more to compromise with the conservative elements within the administration, by issuing the critical "blast from Geneva" which threatened chances of bipartisan support needed to pass the bill. This trait, which Sherman Adams praised in Firsthand Report was ultimately the cause of the destruction of Mitchell's private political ambitions which he was rumored to hold. Mitchell became the real cynic. While Eisenhower cannot be excused from the same charge, he was perhaps less cynical and simply more unaware of the implications of Mitchell's program between 1954 and 1958. As in the case of his opposition to "right-to-work" laws, Eisenhower exercised the prerogative he had consistently maintained of setting the limits of policy which he expected Mitchell to follow. The devastating effect of his action on the critical issue of labor legislation pending before the Congress was more far-reaching in its implications than his earlier resistance to Mitchell's views on "right-to-work" laws.

Mitchell's value as a ~~liaison~~ man between Eisenhower and labor was greatly diminished by Eisenhower's decision to oppose the Kennedy-Ives bill. The painstaking campaign to establish the Republican party in the good graces of the labor movement was swept away

by Mitchell's decision to accept Eisenhower's position on the labor reform issues. Without an effective buffer between himself and labor, Eisenhower perhaps was forced to take a more active part in working out a labor policy after 1958.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICS AND LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION

The change in the Eisenhower administration's labor reform policy, indicated by Mitchell's surprise attack on the Kennedy-Ives bill on June 9, 1958, was part of an effort to create a useful political issue for the 1958 congressional election campaign. Following a strategy conceived by the Republican old guard in the Congress, Eisenhower supported a two-pronged effort to block labor reform legislation and to link the Democratic party with "corrupt" union leaders. Success of the strategy would have permitted the Republicans to charge that the Democrats, who controlled the Congress numerically, blocked labor reform legislation in order to shield corrupt union leaders who provided valuable political support for the Democratic party. The old guard leadership apparently expected the public to react to the "evidence" of a "corrupt bargain" between the Democrats and labor by voting Republican in 1958. But the Democratic congressional leaders skillfully parried the Republican thrusts, and, as is well-known, the Democratic party swept the

1958 elections.¹

As a participant in the political maneuver Eisenhower concentrated primarily on cancelling Mitchell's labor policy and subjecting the Labor Secretary to the President's will on labor reform legislation. As a good subordinate Mitchell swung into line behind the President, but he was reluctant to do so, as his equivocal statements between June 9, and August 19, suggested.² Mitchell's criticism of the Kennedy-Ives bill, noted in the last chapter, was followed by a statement on June 18, that implied administration support for the bill as modified by amendments from the floor of the Senate.³ While Mitchell vacillated Eisenhower remained silent on reform; not until after the Kennedy-Ives bill had been blocked in the House did the President come forward to criticize the bill and urge passage of labor reform legislation before the Congress adjourned.⁴ And on August 18, just before

¹Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1959) XVI, Part 2, 1399. Democrats gained 26 seats in the Senate and 47 seats in the House for totals of 62 and 282 respectively.

²Cf. New York Times, June 10, 1958; Ibid., June 18, 1958, and U.S., Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, CIV, Part 14, 18271.

³New York Times, June 18, 1958.

⁴Ibid., August 7, 1958; Ibid., August 21, 1958, and Ibid., August 28, 1958.

the crucial vote in the House of Representatives to suspend the rules and thereby pass the Kennedy-Ives bill unaltered, Mitchell was quoted by Walter Judd of Minnesota as saying that it was "a bad bill."⁵ The contrast between the statements of June 18, and August 18, suggested that Mitchell first tried to encourage Eisenhower to support the bill, and when that effort failed, Mitchell came to terms with the administration.

Eisenhower's support of the old guard political strategy ultimately dashed any political ambitions which Mitchell might have held, for labor leaders were quick to charge him with cynicism. Senator Kennedy's scathing criticism of Mitchell accused him of being the mastermind of the political maneuver, but the change in policy was too far from Mitchell's past position to support Kennedy's charges.⁶ Mitchell had become the willing instrument, for reasons that were not entirely clear, of a political policy of the old guard.

Eisenhower's political motives were equally difficult to discover, but several factors might have been influential in turning him away from Mitchell's program for labor reform legislation. It has already been suggested that Eisenhower did not enthusiastically

⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, CIV, Part 14, 18271.

⁶New York Times, August 23, 1958.

endorse all of Mitchell's labor policy as the right-to-work issue indicated. In addition, the President's experience with Martin Durkin perhaps left a negative impression on him. Perhaps labor leaders in general were singled out by Eisenhower as "special pleaders" for their own interests when they should have been working for the interests of all Americans. Their economic goals were not compatible with Eisenhower's war on inflation as he learned in the 1956 steel strike. To this distrust of labor officials was added the findings of the McClellan Rackets Committee. A superficial reading of the committee's interim report, reinforced by arguments from Republican Senators, like Goldwater, who served on the committee, perhaps completed Eisenhower's negative image of the "typical" union leader.

Aside from his personal convictions, about which there are only hints in the public record, Eisenhower might have turned to the old guard's political strategy in order to prevent charges within the party that he was a victim of "me-tooism," a well-known label which had been used by old guard Republicans to characterize other Republicans who pursued policies practically indistinguishable from those of the Democratic party. As Emmet John Hughes observed, Mitchell was the only Cabinet member involved in domestic affairs who could wear the label of "liberal"; the rest

with similar convictions were associated with Eisenhower's international policies. Perhaps in the eyes of Republican political observers in the administration, Mitchell's policies were examples of "me-tooism" since his proposals, although they offered slightly less, were similar in tone and intent to Democratic policies. The Mitchell view of the Kennedy-Ives bill, as he gave it in the Senate Labor and Public Welfare hearings, was a case which illustrated this aspect of his program.⁷ Mitchell never suggested in his statements that there was a distinct difference between the interests of labor leaders and the members they represented, a favorite theme of old guard Republicans that had been reinforced by the McClellan investigations. On this issue Eisenhower's views gradually came to reflect the position of the old guard.⁸ Perhaps in 1958 they were formed sufficiently to encourage his break with Mitchell's policy.

Sherman Adams noted in Firsthand Report that the idea of a "modern" Republican party which Eisenhower subscribed to in 1956, after the appearance of a book on the subject by Arthur Larson, emphasized the split in Republican ranks which had characterized the party for so many years although Eisenhower did not

⁷See above, Chapter III, p. 60.

⁸New York Times, August 21, 1958.

seek to divide his party.⁹ Perhaps Eisenhower's labor policy as it developed after 1958 indicated that he had abandoned Larson's position and was ready to return to the fold. Party unity was sacrificed in an effort to turn the labor reform issue to political advantage. Liberal Republicans, like Senator Ives, were left to their own devices by Eisenhower's sudden shift.

The fact that Mitchell had failed to win labor's support for his moderate program might also have convinced the President that further conciliation of labor was useless. By the end of 1957, as we observed above, labor leaders were convinced that the administration's proposals were too severe. This situation, together with the Republican need for an issue to effectively oppose the Democrats in the elections, perhaps persuaded Eisenhower to seek a new direction that promised measurable rewards for his party. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey examined this possibility in a Senate speech in which he accused Senate Republicans of creating a false image of labor in a pamphlet titled "The Labor Bosses - America's Third Party" in order to manufacture a political issue.¹⁰

Eisenhower's decision to cast his lot with the

⁹Firsthand Report, p. 298. See Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party (New York; Harper, 1956), pp. 110-145.

¹⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, CIV, Part 15, 19576-577.

old guard proved disastrous insofar as his good relations with labor were concerned. Political maneuvering on a moral issue was inexcusable in their opinion.¹¹ But Eisenhower, despite his frequent references to moral considerations, chose not to treat the issue in that way.

The Eisenhower administration's attempt to turn labor's troubles to Republican political advantage failed. Although labor reform legislation was successfully blocked, a necessary prerequisite to keeping the issue before the voting public, the Republicans, not the Democrats, were blamed for the failure to pass legislation. The key to the success of Republican efforts was the Democratic chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, Graham A. Barden of Virginia, who was hostile to organized labor.¹² Barden apparently was expected to tie the bill up in his committee until the Congress adjourned, thus lending substance to Republican charges that the Democrats killed the bill. But House majority leader Sam Rayburn prevented that possibility. He held the Kennedy-Ives bill for forty days, giving the administration plenty of time to prepare its case and eliminating the possibility that the bill could be reported out of committee

¹¹New York Times, August 22, 1958.

¹²Ibid., July 31, 1958.

in time for the members of the House to amend it drastically from the floor. On August 18, a motion to suspend the rules was introduced which, if passed, would have forced the bill from committee for a vote and would have prevented amendments from the floor of the House.¹³

The administration was trapped. It could not reverse its position opposing the bill, for the political issue would evaporate if labor reform legislation passed with administration support. On the other hand continued opposition meant that the Republicans would be forced to vote against the bill. The last alternative was selected, as Judd's citation of Mitchell's views made the administration's position very clear.¹⁴

Before Mitchell's attack on the Kennedy-Ives bill in June, the Republicans on the McClellan Committee undertook an investigation on their own of the activities of Walter Reuther and his union, the UAW-CIO, as part of the effort to include the outspoken supporter of the Democratic party among labor officials tainted with corruption.¹⁵ Directed by Senator

¹³U.S., Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, CIV, Part 14, 18260-18288.

¹⁴Ibid., 18271.

¹⁵U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, Hearings, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, Part 25, passim.

Goldwater, the Republicans on the committee questioned Reuther about many of his union's activities. The Kohler strike, which had dragged on since 1954 received searching attention, as did Reuther's political activities.¹⁶ Goldwater later charged that the Kohler strike was indicative of the unlimited and corrupted power of organized labor, and he suggested that Reuther's part in the affair was far more damning than any of the activities engaged in by Hoffa.¹⁷ Reuther's eloquent defense of his and his union's part in the Kohler strike softened the impact of Goldwater's attack, but the Republican charges were undoubtedly effective, as Reuther suggested to the Republican committee members.¹⁸

But with the Republicans on record as opposing labor reform legislation that would have served to correct some of the very abuses which Goldwater complained about, the efforts to use the McClellan Rackets Committee for political purposes were frustrated. In his campaign support of the Republican party in 1958, Eisenhower emphasized the general achievements of his administration. He emphasized the need for reform legisla-

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, Final Report, Report No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960, Part 2, 320-332.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 10163-167, 10195, 10197.

tion also, but he placed little emphasis on Democratic efforts to block his program since his own party bore the burden of guilt.¹⁹

By abandoning Mitchell's long-range effort to improve Republican relations with organized labor in favor of a short-term political objective, Eisenhower achieved very little. The tenuous ties with labor created by Mitchell's goodwill campaign were severed irrevocably. The charge of "cynicism" which accompanied the administration's sudden policy reversal perhaps contributed to the margin of the sweeping Democratic victory in 1958. And Eisenhower's own image as a man above the use of crude maneuvers to gain political advantage for his party was tarnished. The only gain was represented by the fact that more restrictive labor reform legislation would be sought, and with administration support, achieved in 1959 with the passage of the Landrum-Griffin bill.

¹⁹New York Times, October 21, 1958.

CHAPTER V

LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION:

EISENHOWER'S PROGRAM

The evolution of President Eisenhower from a passive to an active President was completed by 1959. Improved health, the resignation of Sherman Adams, and a desire to apply the political knowledge acquired since 1953 were important factors which encouraged Eisenhower to broaden his concept of his office. He became a politician. Through press conferences and television appeals he tried to marshal public opinion behind his program. In his relations with the Congress, Eisenhower became demanding, suggesting that reprisals would follow if members of his party failed to support his programs. The last phase of Eisenhower's labor reform program was influenced by the vigorous role which Eisenhower chose to play in formulating policy and securing legislation in keeping with his policy.

In his 1959 State-of-the-Union message, Eisenhower asserted that "half-hearted measures" were inadequate to solve the problem of union corruption that

the McClellan committee had revealed.¹ He apparently referred to legislation backed by Senator Kennedy in 1958, and Eisenhower implied that he would oppose any comparable bill in 1959. On January 28 the President presented a twenty-point program of his own.² The area of controversy centered on the revisions in the Taft-Hartley act which Eisenhower supported that would close secondary boycott loopholes, restrict certain forms of picketing, and give to the states power to act in cases refused by the National Labor Relations Board. Requirements for reporting financial transactions, for eliminating possible conflict of interest situations, and for imposing strict penalties on criminals discovered in union positions were not greatly different from legislation sponsored by the moderates in the Congress.³

Southern Democrats and Republicans of the old guard provided strong support for Eisenhower's policy in 1959. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, better-known as the Landrum-Griffin bill, was sponsored by this coalition and defended by Eisenhower

¹Public Papers . . . 1959, pp. 16-17.

²Ibid., pp. 143-46.

³U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Hearings, Labor-Management Reform Legislation, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, pp. 1-34, passim.

over the opposition of weakened moderate forces in the Congress.⁴ Eisenhower assumed the leadership of this group, and in so doing he played a role comparable to that played by the late Senator Taft. The President favored strict regulation of unions, but apparently he was not willing to endorse totally anti-labor policies favored by his Senate spokesman, Senator Goldwater.⁵ Although the Landrum-Griffin bill was not in "the middle of the road," it was still compromise legislation which apparently reflected the consensus of the Congress in 1959. By taking a vigorous and firm position on labor reform, Eisenhower perhaps was able to check the drift of his party to the extreme views of Goldwater and Knowland. The new Senate minority leader, Everett M. Dirksen was more cooperative and effectively gathered votes to support Eisenhower's position.

The Congress followed the President's lead on several important issues in 1959 including labor reform legislation.⁶ The 1958 elections brought more Democrats to the Congress, and many came armed to do

⁴Public Papers . . . 1959, pp. 428, 551, 577, 598.

⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, CV, Part 5, 6664-6665.

⁶Congressional Quarterly Almanac 86th Congress 1st Session, (Washington, D.C., 1959), "CQ Fact Sheet on Eisenhower Boxscore," XV, 93.

battle with Eisenhower's contracted program of federal spending. But the recession of 1957 and 1958, which promised to continue in 1959, blunted the point of the Democratic attack. Eisenhower retaliated by leading an attack on the "spenders" who were in his opinion about to contribute to another round of inflation by irresponsible fiscal recommendations.⁷ As the Congress moved to increase appropriations for various projects and start new ones, Eisenhower responded with the veto. And he found much sympathy in the Congress, for the members of both parties joined to block efforts to override his vetoes. To some extent Senator Lyndon B. Johnson contributed to the successful defense of Eisenhower's method of coping with the recession as William Proxmire bitterly pointed out in his attack on Johnson's policy of compromise with the Chief Executive.⁸ The core of the votes supporting Eisenhower was provided again by the coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats.⁹

Fear of undesirable social legislation was another source of unity between the Republicans and the South after 1956. The Republicans walked a narrow,

⁷Public Papers . . . 1959, pp. 189-190. Also Ibid., Items 11, 43, 56, 63.

⁸U.S., Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., CV, Part 2, 2544-2550.

⁹Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XV, 144-46.

shaky fence, but they successfully helped pass weak civil rights legislation, to placate the moderates, and preserved the support of the Southern Democrats at the same time.¹⁰ Since the issue did not die after the civil rights bill was passed in 1957, the Republicans were in a position to trade defense of Southern interests for support of Eisenhower's program. Although this was not perhaps true of every bill passed in 1959, there seemed to be some evidence that the administration had grasped this political reality in 1958 and had acted upon it. Sherman Adams wrote that Knowland told Eisenhower that the South would retaliate by blocking administration programs if Eisenhower pushed strong civil rights legislation in 1957.¹¹ This fact combined with Eisenhower's private reluctance to vigorously support the drive for Negro rights, perhaps proved to be a vital factor in the hesitant administration stand taken on the weak legislation proposed in this area in 1957. Although Eisenhower continued to call for more far-reaching civil rights legislation after 1957, the President chose to place greater emphasis on defending other aspects of his program. The recession was his primary target in the years after 1957.

¹⁰Cf. Hughes, Ordeal of Power, pp. 200-201, 242-43, and Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 337-39, 341-343.

¹¹Adams, Firsthand Report, p. 339.

The influence of the McClellan Rackets Committee was of first importance in accounting for the conservative nature of the 1959 Congress insofar as labor policy was concerned. In keeping with his aim, McClellan had aroused public interest in the corruption problem, and in 1959 all sides realized that a bill would have to pass.¹² To make sure that the public's attention did not slip, just before the crucial debate in the House of Representatives in August, McClellan released a "summary" of the committee's findings since 1957.¹³ Whatever the validity of the charges against the leader of the Teamster's union, who was effectively tried and found guilty by the committee, the nation and the President apparently were convinced that such a serious malady required a strong remedy.

The argument that developed in the Congress in 1959 over labor legislation concerned the extent to which the Taft-Hartley act was to be revised as was noted above. Moderates argued that, except for a few generally agreed upon changes favoring labor, no revisions without study were advisable since the collec-

¹²New York Times, April 26, 1959. Also "The Polls: Attitudes Toward Organized Labor," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVI (1962), 296.

¹³U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, Report, Proposed Findings - International Brotherhood of Teamsters, James R. Hoffa, Report No. 620, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, pp. 1-6.

1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions and activities. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for transparency and accountability, particularly in financial matters. The text suggests that organizations should implement robust systems to track and document every aspect of their operations, from procurement to sales.

2. The second part of the document addresses the challenges of data management in a rapidly changing environment. It highlights the need for flexible and scalable solutions that can adapt to new technologies and data sources. The author argues that organizations must invest in training and development to ensure their staff are equipped to handle complex data sets and analyze them effectively.

3. The third part of the document focuses on the role of leadership in driving organizational success. It stresses that leaders must be able to inspire and motivate their teams, set clear goals, and provide the necessary resources and support. The text also discusses the importance of communication and collaboration, suggesting that leaders should foster a culture of open dialogue and teamwork.

4. The fourth part of the document explores the impact of external factors on organizational performance. It examines how economic conditions, market trends, and regulatory changes can influence an organization's ability to achieve its objectives. The author advises organizations to stay informed about these external factors and develop strategies to mitigate potential risks and seize opportunities.

5. The fifth part of the document discusses the importance of innovation and continuous improvement. It argues that organizations must constantly seek out new ideas and ways to optimize their processes and products. The text suggests that organizations should encourage a culture of innovation, where employees are empowered to propose and implement improvements.

6. The sixth part of the document addresses the issue of sustainability and social responsibility. It emphasizes that organizations have a responsibility to their stakeholders beyond just providing products and services. The text suggests that organizations should adopt sustainable practices, such as reducing waste and promoting ethical sourcing, to enhance their reputation and long-term viability.

7. The seventh part of the document discusses the importance of risk management. It argues that organizations must identify and assess potential risks to their operations and develop strategies to manage them. The text suggests that organizations should implement a comprehensive risk management framework that covers all aspects of their business.

8. The eighth part of the document discusses the importance of talent management. It emphasizes that organizations must attract, develop, and retain top talent to remain competitive. The text suggests that organizations should invest in recruitment, training, and performance management to ensure they have the right people in the right roles.

9. The ninth part of the document discusses the importance of customer satisfaction. It argues that organizations must focus on understanding and meeting the needs of their customers to build loyalty and drive growth. The text suggests that organizations should implement a customer-centric approach, where every aspect of the organization is designed to enhance the customer experience.

10. The tenth part of the document discusses the importance of financial management. It emphasizes that organizations must manage their finances effectively to ensure they have the resources needed to achieve their goals. The text suggests that organizations should implement a robust financial management system that includes budgeting, forecasting, and reporting.

tive bargaining process was being altered.¹⁴ The focus was on corruption not changes in the balance between labor and management, in their opinion, as presented by Senator Kennedy.¹⁵

Eisenhower presented the issues of "blackmail" picketing, designed to force recognition of a union, and the secondary boycott where pressure was brought to bear on the employer to stop dealing with another company by methods other than a strike, as a moral problem.¹⁶ It was unfair to subject the employer to such coercive pressures, in his opinion. Moderates agreed if the purpose of the pressure were to extort money from the employer, evidence of which practice had been presented in the McClellan hearings. The risk was that legitimate objectives of labor unions, waging a losing battle to organize Southern workers, were endangered by the broad language of legislation which Eisenhower supported.¹⁷

Aside from Taft-Hartley revisions, the Senate debated at length the merits of Senator McClellan's

¹⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Labor Hearings, Labor-Management Reform Legislation, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 142-43.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Public Papers . . . 1959, pp. 568-69.

¹⁷U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Labor, Hearings, Labor-Management Reform Legislation, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 139-141.

"bill of rights" for labor's rank and file members. The issue illustrated the gulf that had grown between Eisenhower and Mitchell by 1959, and the apparent recognition by Mitchell of Eisenhower's determination to follow other advice more compatible with his own views of the labor movement. In a press conference Eisenhower praised the McClellan amendments as great improvements of the Kennedy-sponsored bill. Mitchell, on the other hand, very cautiously tried to object to the President's stand by saying that he favored only a bill of rights in "substance."¹⁸ When reporters pointed out that Eisenhower specifically praised McClellan's version, Mitchell circumspectly refused to extend his remarks.¹⁹ In 1954 Mitchell challenged Eisenhower on right-to-work laws by continuing to denounce them after the President publicly declared Mitchell's views not to be administration policy.²⁰ Mitchell feared no reprisals then. But by 1959, Mitchell could no longer pursue an independent stand on labor policy as he perhaps realized when he offered only feeble resistance to the President's views.

Eisenhower withdrew his tentative support for the Kennedy bill as amended by McClellan after the

¹⁸Cf. New York Times, April 26, 1959, and Ibid., June 10, 1959.

¹⁹Ibid., June 20, 1959.

²⁰See above, Chapter III, p. 51.

moderates and Southern Democrats combined to redefine, clarify, limit, and otherwise revise the bill of rights proposals.²¹ The primary reason for southern support came when Kennedy pointed out that the bill of rights had unfavorable implications for segregationist policies.²²

Eisenhower spared no effort to marshal public opinion behind his drive for strict labor reform legislation. In his press conferences he cited the McClellan committee revelations and insisted that boycott, picketing, and "no-man's-land" areas of the Taft-Hartley act had to be revised in order to effectively curb corruption.²³ When the Kennedy bill passed the Senate in April, now amended extensively enough to cause labor to withdraw its support, Eisenhower gave his reaction by saying:

Well, the fact is that this whole labor situation which has been characterized as even worse than malfunctioning even racketeering in some few labor organizations and among certain individuals, has been highlighted by the McClellan committee report . . .

Now, in the Senate bill . . . we think there are very definite weaknesses, and I don't mind saying that I am very much disappointed, particularly in three fields: the secondary boycott . . ., blackmail picketing . . ., and then the field of clarifying the relationships of states

²¹Public Papers . . . 1959, p. 428.

²²U.S., Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., CV, Part

²³Public Papers . . . 1959, pp. 568-69.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1039-1043.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1033-1036.

to those areas where the NLRB has refused to assert any jurisdiction, we believe there ought to be a definite law here to confer or to recognize that authority of the states to meet those particular problems.²⁴

From this position the President never retreated. As forcefully as he could, he tried to impress his views on the public.

New tactics were adopted in July by the Republican - Southern Democratic coalition when the effort to drastically amend the Kennedy bill failed to produce desired results. Two members of the coalition who served on the House Education and Labor committee, Robert P. Griffin, Michigan Republican, and Phil M. Landrum, Georgia, Democrat, sponsored a bill more in accord with the views of about half the members of the committee who reported the Kennedy measure in order to get some kind of a bill onto the House floor.²⁵ Apparently public pressure was too great to allow Barnden to pursue delaying tactics in committee as he had planned to do in 1958.²⁶

The strength of the coalition was demonstrated on August 13 when the Landrum-Griffin bill was adopted as a substitute for the Senate bill, reported by the

²⁴New York Times, April 30, 1959.

²⁵U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, Report to Accompany H.R. 8342, Report No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, pp. 76, 83-92, 93, 99-100.

²⁶"Attitudes Toward Organized Labor," POQ, XXVI (1962), 296.

committee, in the largest vote recorded in the House of Representatives, 229 to 201.²⁷ The next day the bill was sent to conference committee where it was well-defended by Barden, and Goldwater, among others, while the Kennedy forces attempted with only small success to restrict the language of the bill to specific abuses. As the bill was finally reported on September 3 and 4, it represented another victory for the conservative coalition, but the measure had been tempered somewhat by the efforts of Kennedy.²⁸ While the measure was less moderate than Kennedy apparently desired, no extreme expressions of an anti-labor attitude found their way into the bill. Senator McClellan, wrote later that the bill needed more "teeth" but nevertheless was better than the moderate proposals advanced by Kennedy.²⁹

While the House of Representatives debated the merits of the bills, President Eisenhower appeared on television, on August 6 to plead for support of the Landrum-Griffin bill.³⁰ In firm tones, the President denounced union corruption as "a national disgrace"

²⁷Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XV, 167,168.

²⁸U.S., Congress, House, Conference Committee, Conference Report on S. 1555, Report No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 31.

²⁹John L. McClellan, Crime Without Punishment (New York: Duell, Sloan, Pearce, 1962), p. 207.

³⁰Public Papers . . . 1959, pp. 567-69.

and reiterated his demands for labor legislation.³¹

The President's speech combined with the effect of the summary of the McClellan committee's findings released earlier, served to maintain public opinion in support of the Landrum-Griffin bill.³² Letters from home, plus strenuous lobbying activities by supporters of the bill such as the National Association of Manufacturers or the Chamber of Commerce, provided great incentive for the Representatives to vote for the measure.³³ The moderates on the other hand were divided, in part, by labor's decision to support an even less restrictive measure than the Kennedy bill introduced in the House with the Landrum-Griffin bill.³⁴

Eisenhower signed the Landrum-Griffin bill on September 14 without comment, thus ending the last phase of his labor reform program. As the President became more active in the direction of his policies, his attitude toward labor unions solidified. By allowing other members of the administration to formulate policy in his first term, Eisenhower was forced

³¹Ibid., p. 567.

³²"Attitudes Toward Organized Labor," FOQ, XXVI (1962), 296.

³³U.S. Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., CV, Part 12, 16102.

³⁴Ibid.

to equivocate in his stand on labor issues, but in 1959, having decided on a course of action, he followed it relentlessly to its conclusion.

The enmity of labor which Eisenhower thus incurred was directed toward Mitchell and Nixon. Nixon's vain effort to present himself as a friend of labor by encouraging a settlement of the 1959 steel strike and the hostile reception given Mitchell when he spoke to the 1959 AFL - CIO convention have already been discussed. The political results of Eisenhower's labor reform policy were disastrous for both men. Labor united solidly behind Kennedy in the 1960 Presidential election and perhaps provided the narrow margin of victory which he achieved.³⁵

³⁵"Attitudes Toward Organized Labor," POQ, XXVI (1962), 296.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The memoirs by Eisenhower and other members of his administration provided a valuable source of information about the tone and general character of the Eisenhower era. The most useful analysis of Eisenhower as a complex human being was given by Emmet John Hughes in The Ordeal of Power. Not quite as simple a man as his critics have portrayed him, Eisenhower was a perplexing study for Hughes. But on matters related to labor policy, Hughes was unable to provide much firsthand information since he served with the administration only during 1953 and during the 1956 campaign. Hughes was content to ignore the Durkin appointment completely, and he accepted the estimation of Mitchell as a liberal who guided Eisenhower's labor policy after 1954.

In Firsthand Report Sherman Adams described the conflict between the moderates and the old guard of the Republican party and presented Eisenhower as a focus of unity for both groups. Eisenhower's efforts to maintain party unity were not always successful as Adams made clear, but this was his objective. Labor policy was a difficult subject for Adams to cope with, but he managed to give the impression that after the

resignation of Durkin, Mitchell was able to keep in check elements in the Cabinet and the Congress who sought repressive legislation for labor unions. The same praise was given to Mitchell's strike policy. By resisting intervention in the Southern Bell Telephone company the value of the hands-off technique was demonstrated for Adams. But no mention was made of the two steel strikes which thoroughly tested Eisenhower's strike policy. Adams was equally silent about the issue of labor racketeering although it was a major point of division between Mitchell and Eisenhower. Eisenhower's resistance to the old guard might have been less persistent than Adams suggested. Eisenhower's own summary of his years in office recorded by Adams after his resignation, seemed to support this view.

Ezra Taft Benson's memoirs represented the other side of the coin insofar as the rivalry between the old guard and the moderates was concerned. In Cross-Fire, a plodding account of Benson's farm policy difficulties, only two important references were made to labor policy. Benson considered the farmer the victim of the unlimited economic power of unions and industry, an opinion which provoked a public quarrel with Walter Reuther. Among other things, Benson's attitude, reflecting farm-state opinions, suggested that the Senators conducting the investigation of labor unions were not neutral, as they claimed, by virtue of

being from agricultural regions. The second reference revealed the old guard's attitude toward Nixon by 1960. Nixon's attempt to gain lost ground with labor was interpreted by Benson as politically inspired although he ignored the fact that prices were not increased thus checking the tide of inflation that concerned him.

Eisenhower's account of his first term, Mandate for Change was of some value in determining the President's attitude toward organized labor as it had developed by 1963. But on the Durkin experiment, Eisenhower added little that was new. His motives, discussed above, were not very convincing. As for blaming Durkin's intransigent attitude toward revision of the Taft-Hartley act for the failure of the experiment, Eisenhower failed to admit that he had some responsibility to assist Durkin since Eisenhower had appointed him. As a source of reliable information Eisenhower's memoirs are no better than Adams', but they revealed equally well the problems of his administration and some of the efforts to solve them.

Printed government documents pertaining to Eisenhower's labor policy were more abundant and more informative than the memoirs. The 1953 - 1954 hearings on revising the Taft-Hartley act were valuable in establishing the broad range of opinion on the issue. When others were coming forward to testify,

the administration was unable to present its views, indicating the struggle within the administration on this issue.

The hearings conducted to investigate welfare and pension fund abuses, led by Senator Paul H. Douglas between 1954 and 1956 were free of the political overtones that marked the later efforts by the McClellan Rackets Committee. Douglas attempted to explore unions', insurance companies' and employer-operated funds, and the result was a balanced study of the difficulties which the labor movement had encountered in its transition to an institution.

The McClellan Rackets Committee hearings and reports were invaluable sources for the study of Eisenhower's labor policy. Among the 46,000 pages of testimony gathered in the hearings, Part 25 was the most interesting and valuable record of the encounter between the Republicans, Karl E. Mundt, Barry Goldwater, and Carl T. Curtis, and Walter Reuther of the UAW-CIO. For three days in March 1958 Reuther voluntarily answered questions about the Kohler strike and union political activities and parried the verbal blasts launched by Goldwater, Curtis and Mundt. Senator Ives, the fourth Republican on the committee, remained aloof. Reuther's frank answers and his equally frank appraisal of the motives of the examiners did much to counteract the bad publicity for the labor

movement which the McClellan committee produced.

Since the Department of Labor did not preserve copies of Secretary Durkin's speeches, the New York Times served as a valuable source of information about Durkin's opinions while a member of the administration. The same was true of Mitchell's press releases which were indicative of the Labor Secretary's hesitant attitude concerning Eisenhower's determination to abandon organized labor as a source of potential political support.

Equally useful for measuring congressional reaction to Eisenhower's opinions about organized labor was the Congressional Record. Although the remarks recorded there are subject to alteration and extension by the various speakers, the mood of the Congress can often be determined on particular issues. Republican reaction in 1958 to the motion to suspend the rules and pass the Kennedy-Ives bill was easily detected.

A convenient source of statements by Eisenhower on various labor issues was The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, but its value was reduced by the fact that only a selection of news conferences was given. The New York Times was the most complete source of news conference remarks.

Secondary sources that address themselves to

the problem of Eisenhower's relationship with organized labor were of little value in preparing this paper. One exception that should be noted was the article by William V. Shannon, "Eisenhower as President, A Critical Appraisal of the Record," Commentary, XXV, 390-398, in which he asserted that Eisenhower did not share the Taft Republican "animus against union labor" because he sought no form of national right-to-work law. One is reminded that Taft opposed such measures also, which suggests that Eisenhower at least in 1959 was performing a service similar to that performed by Taft in checking the more extreme elements of both parties. Shannon's observation that Eisenhower found the "consensus" of the Congress was correct.

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