gs:

ABSTRACT

THE QUEST FOR ORDER AMONG AWLAD ALI
OF THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

By

Safia K. Mohsen

The study deals with the ways in which disputes are settled
within a tribal society with no centralized authority. One way these
disputes are settled is through the application of a set of formal
rules known as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are
kept in force through an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process
in which the local political leaders play a key role.

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves, but
rather the ways they are implemented. More specifically, the study
examines the ways in which judicial reasoning is related to certain
realities of the social and political life of the group. Using mainly
the case-study method, this relationship is examined.

The first part of the thesis provides an account of the historical
and ecological features of the groups total context of action. This
is followed by a rather detailed analysis of the tribal organization
of the group. In dealing with the tribal organization two modes of
analysis are employed. A structural form of analysis which focuses
on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribal members
order themselves; and a description of these groups in terms of the

processes through which they are maintained. In this context, special

attention is paid to the nature of political leadership; the domains
within which the leaders function, the bases of their political
support and how all these are related to their role in dispute settle-
ment.
Through the analysis of cases some of the salient features of
the process of judicial reasoning are examined in the remaining part
of the thesis. Distinction is made here between cases involving
personal injuries and those arising from contractual relationships.
Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of

the study.

THE QUEST FOR ORDER AMONG AWLAD ALI
OF THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

By

Safia K. Mbhsen

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University

in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Anthropology

1970

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Rarely, if ever, is a thesis the work of one person. The present
thesis is no exception. Many individuals and institutions have contrib-
uted time, effort, and funds toward its completion. Not all can be
mentioned here, but I do hOpe that those omitted will know how deeply
indebted I am to them.

My profound thanks are due to my doctoral committee whose compo-
sition has changed considerably from the beginning of the original
research design until the completion of the thesis, and yet, all members
of which allowed me a continuity of my basic orientation. They were
Professors Marc Swartz, Charles Hughes and Leonard Kasdan, who, in that
order, acted as Chairman, and Professors Bernard Gallin and Iwa Ishino,
who acted as members of the committee.

While in the field, my task was made much easier by the patience-
hospitality and c00peration extended to me by all members of Awlad Ali
without whose help the study would not have been possible. To all of
them I extend my apology if unintentionally I misinterpreted their
culture.

Finally, my thanks to Professor Ahmad Abu-Zeid of the University
of Alexandria whose help, comments and friendship made the field work

a totally new and worthwhile experience.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

CHAPTER TWO

CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER FOUR

CHAPTER FIVE

CHAPTER SIX

CHAPTER SEVEN

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

iii

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ......

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY .........

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION .........

POLIGICAL LEADERSHIP AND
JUDICIAL PROCESS ............

MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHIP 00......00000000

HOMICIDE AND BODILY
INJURIES COCCOOOOOCOOOOOOOOOO

CONCLUSIONS OOOOOOOOOIOOOOOOO

GLOSSARY OOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOO

TRIBALMAPOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCO

17

32

61

103

148

178

181

184

185

Chapter I

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The Comparative Studies of Law

This study is based on field work carried out among Awlad Ali, of the
Western Desert of Egypt, between August 1965 and August 1966. The study
deals with the processes by which order is maintained within a tribal society
with no centralized authority. One way that order is maintained is through
the application of a set of formal rules known to the peOple of the area
as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are kept in force by an
elaborate, yet informal, judicial process in which the tribal political
leaders play the most important part.

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves but rather the
ways in which they are implemented, or the judicial process. More speci-
fically, the study deals with the ways in which the process of dispute
settlement is related to certain realities of the social and political life
of the group.

Concern with the legal systems of non-literate societies has been an
interest of anthropologists since the classical monographs of the nineteenth
century (Maine 1861, 1871; and Fustel de Coulanges 1864), directed the
attention of anthropologists to the laws of ancient civilizations. Those
‘monographs were followed at a later date by the work of anthr0pologists
such as Malinowski (1926), Hogbin (1934), and Schapera (1938). In more
recent years most anthropological work on legal systems has been done in
Africa. Most notable among these are Gluckman's treatise on the Barotse of
Northern Rhodesia (1955, 1963), Bohannan's account of the Tiv of Nigeria

(1957), and Howell on the Nuer Law (1954). Other studies of primitive law

in other parts of the world include Llewellyn and Hoebel on the Cheyenne
(1941), Pospisil's analysis of the Kapauku Papuan 1a (Pospisil 1958), Smith
and Roberts' description of the Zuni law (1954) and Laura Nader's work on
Zapotec law.

Despite this interest in the comparative study of legal institution
among anthropologists, yet the fields of legal anthropology still lacks a
coherent body of theory to bear upon the analysis of the institutions
described. The theoretical questions represented in most of these writings
seem to center around two main problems: the problem of definition, and
that of methodology. With regard to the problem of definitions the various
writers seem to be influenced by one or the other of two main schools of
jurisprudence: the analytical school and the sociological school. The
analytical school flourished in the late nineteenth century following the
writings of its leader, John Austin, the British jurist. According to the
analytical school law is a set of rules imposed upon society by a sovereign
will. The picture is that of a supreme authority standing high above
society and issuing its command downwards. This supreme authority is the
creator and the ultimate source of law. These views are exemplified in
Austin's famous definition of law as "a rule laid down for the guidance of
an intelligent being by an intelligent being having the power over him"
(1885: 316-7). Since the will of that political superior has to be exact,
the only way to express it, according to Austin, is by means of legislation.
According to the views of this school, the existence of a supreme authority
is a prerequisite to the existence of law. Any social rules of Observances
existing before or without the issuing authority are not considered law.
This excludes from being law rules which were not enacted such as the

British common law, as well as all forms of primitive customary law.

Later, members of the analytical school shifted the emphasis of their
definition of law from its enactment by a supreme authority to its enforce—
ment by that authority. Salmond defined law by reference to a court. Law,
according to him, is "the body of principles recognized and applied by the
state in the administration of justice" (1946:41). Gray, another member,
went even further to deny the name, law, to a statute until it has been used
as a basis of decision by the court (1921:82). Similarly, Diamond, who has
contributed to the study and appreciation of 'primitive' law, hardly goes
beyond arguing that societies without courts have no laws (Diamond 1935).

The influence of the analytical school on the anthropological writings
on law is reflected in two ways. In the first place, it led some writers
to maintain that since primitive societies lacked a supreme authority in
the Austinian sense, they had no rules that may be called 'legal‘ and that
among these societies "custom is the King0 (Seagel 1941:iii). In the second
place, the concept of the court as stated by members of the analytical school
seems to influence to a greater or lesser degree the definition of law by
many anthropologists, a point which will be discussed later in the chapter.

The sociological school of jurisprudence came as a reaction against
limitations inherent in the analytical school with its glorification of
the supreme will. According to the views of this school, law deve10ps
within society of its own vitality. It is not an artificial creation of
a supreme will but is spontaneous and independent of any formal authority.
These views do not exclude the notion of enforcement of law by a supreme
authority which becomes necessary as the society reaches a certain level of
complexity, but unlike the analytical school, the supreme authority in the
latter case is not the creator of law but a creation of it.

The movement was led by Von Saveigny, the French jurist who viewed

law as a rule existing for the purpose of regulating the actions of the

4

individual in the interest of the whole community (1937). He regarded
law as one of the many factors of the morphology of society. Roscoe Pound
continued that tradition in his famous article, "The Scape and Purpose of
Sociological Jurisprudence" (1910-11), in which he viewed law as "one side
of the process of social control...a task or great series of tasks of social
engineering." The purpose of law, according to Pound, is to eliminate
friction and waste in the satisfaction of the human needs (l9lO-ll;59l-6l9).

To turn from jurists to anthropologists, we find the list of those who
subscribe to the sociological view quite extensive. To try to enumerate
them would be a very lengthy endeavor. Malinowski states that law and
order arise out of the very process which they govern. He sees laws as
existing in all human societies and attributes the failure of the analytical
jurists to perceive the existence of legal systems among primitive societies
to the faulty habit of identifying the legal system with the person or organ
possessing the power to make laws and enforce them. He defined law as a
body of binding obligations, regarded as a right by one party and acknowl-
edged as a duty by the other, kept in force by a special mechanism of
reciprocity and publicity inherent in the structure of their society"
(1926:58). Radcliffe-Brown (1933), Lewellyn and Hoebel (1941), Hoebel
(1961), Bohannan (1957) and Gluckman (1955, 1965) to give examples, all
view law as an aspect of the society independent of any sovereign in the
Austinian sense. This does not mean that they all agree in their defini-
tion of law. For they exhibit a considerable difference in their views.
The difference, however, does not stem from their view of the sociological
rather than the formal nature of law, but in their attempt to separate law
from other aspects of social life of the group.

The main difficulty with the sociological view of law is that it does

not provide a reliable criteria by which one can differentiate between that

aspect of the social life that one may call law and other aspects. This
does not pose any problem for those who use the concept of law in a very
wide and general sense to man "the totality of people's culture" (Hartland
1924:191). But for later writers, who tend to take a more or less re-
stricted view of law, the problem was there. Malinowski states that the
rules of law in primitive society stand out from other social norms in

that they are felt and regarded as "obligation of one party and the rightful

' This, of course, gives law a very broad definition and

claim of another.‘
does not really help in distinguishing law from non-law.

One of the most commonly used criterion is that of a "sanction" behind
the legal norms. But the mere fact that legal norms have sanctions behind
them does not help in drawing the line between them and other norms since
all norms are backed by sanctions of some kind or another. It is the kind
of sanction, then, not just any sanction, that differentiates law from.non-
law. In other words, there are classes of sanctions that may be called
"legal sanctions." For Malinowski, the loss of reciprocal relations in
primitive society constituted the sufficient basis for the legal sanctions
(1934). Allen (1958) maintained that legal sanctions are "completely com-
pulsory." "No one is under an absolute compulsion to visit the barber or
to wear garments " (1958:59), while, on the other hand, members of the
society are under an absolute compulsion not to steal or take the life
of mother person. Like Malinowski's notion of the loss of reciprocal re-
lations, Allen's concept of "absoluteness" as the basis of legal sanctions
is not adequate. For even under the modern legal system, were the penalty
for stealing or murder specific and clear, the individual is not under an
"absolute" compulsion not to steal or kill. He still can, and the mere
existence of the penal institution in modern societies is a living proof

that many do violate the legal norms if they are willing to take the risk

of such violation, the same risk the person takes who violates the norm

of modesty and walks naked in the streets. Some may even find it easier to
accept the risk of penalty for stealing than the social sanctions for violat-
ing the norms of modesty.

But although the notion of absolute vs. relative compulsion is arbi-
trary and artificial as a criterion for defining legal rules, yet Allen is
close to another related and widespread criterion of legal sanctions, that
is, the idea of the "use of force." Hoebel maintains that "the really

fundamental sine qua non of law in any society - primitive or civilized -

 

is the legitimate use of physical coercion.... The law has teeth, teeth
that can bite if need be..." (l96la:26) Pound defines law as "social con-
trol through the systematic application of the forces of a politically or-
ganized society" (1910-ll:591). This definition has later been adapted by
Radcliffe-Brown (1940) who considers the obligations imposed upon the indi-
vidual but for which there is no sanction backed by the use or the possibility
of use of physical force as merely a matter of social conventions or custom
but not law.

It is evident, then, that those who used the concept of "coercion"
as the basis for their distinction of law needed a further specification
of the concept. For, as Hoebel has noticed, "There are as many forms of
coercion as there are forms of power...and only certain methods and forms
are legal" (1961:26). He states that coercion by gangsters is not legal
coercion; neither is the parents' physical coercion if it is extreme in
form. The essential element in legal coercion according to Hoebel, is
"the general social acceptance of the application of physical power, threat
or, in fact, by a privileged party, for a legitimate cause, in a legitimate
way, and at a legitimate time." The privilege of applying physical force
constitutes, according to Hoebel, the official element in law. The person
who is recognized as having the right to exercise force is the symbol of

authority. This does not mean that he has to be an official or a holder

of any permanent office; it is any person who is exercising the legiti-
mate use of force. Simple as the above argument might seem, it really
offers very little in refining our conception of legal sanctions. For we
are still left with the question of how a person acquires the right to
exercise the physical force. What gives his action the legitimacy that
is otherwise lacking in other forms of coercion? In trying to deal with
this problem anthropologists resorted to a concept that is used by the
analytical jurists, that is, the court. There is a basic difference, how~
ever, between the anthropologists' view of the court and that of the ana-
lytical jurists. The latter see the court as the ultimate source of law:
court creates the law. Anthropologists, on the other hand, tend to use the
court as the source of law but as a criterion of its existence. An example
of such views is Max Radin who maintained that the infallible test "for
recognizing whether an imagined course of conduct is lawful or unlawful...
is to submit the question to the judgment of a court" (1938:1145).
Anthropologists differed among themselves, however, on what constitutes
a court. While Radcliffe-Brown (1940) insists that it must be a body of
people acting on behalf of the community as a whole and therefore does not
exist in all societies, Hoebel (1961), on the other hand, extends the con-
cept to include the diffused public opinion or sentiment of the people in
a given society as a kind of court that gives legitimation to the use of
force by individuals or grows in the absence of a recognized body acting
on behalf of the community. He sees a court in cases of self-help where
the aggrieved party or his kinsmen carry on the procedures of redress
without the intervention of a third party. He maintained that if the pro-
cedures are right, there will be "at least the compulsion of recognized
'legal' procedure, though the ultimate court may be the 'bar of public

Opinion'" (1961:25).

The concept of the court has been prominent in the writings of sev-
eral other anthropologists besides Radcliffe—Brown and Hoebel. Bohannan
(1957, 1964, 1965), Redfield (1964) and Pospisil (1958) all imply the
existence of a court of some kind or another as the identifying mark of
the existence of legal rules. In his attempt to distinguish between law
and custom, Gluckman thought of law to exist "as a series of acceptable
judgments of rightdoing and wrongdoing in particular cases" (1955:262).
Custom and other social Observances function as corpus juris and as such
a basis for the judgment of where the behavior of one of the litigants in
a case is reasonable or unreasonable, lawful or unlawful. As such, custom
is a source of law, but not law itself. It becomes law when drawn upon in
passing judgment in a given case. In commenting on a passage on the Nuer
by Evans-Pritchard, Gluckman made it clear what he meant by the court.
"This passage shows that even in a society where 'self-help' is the en-
forcing sanction, people judge situations of dispute in terms of rights
and duties, and wrongs....Therefore, it seems fair to say that among the
Nuer, though they have no courts, there is a process of judgment by media-
tors and ordinary people in which custom and morality as part of the corpus
juris constitute 'sources of law' for particular decisions" (l955a:263).

The importance of the above passage from Gluckman is his distinction
between the concept of the court and the judicial process, a distinction
lacking in the writing of most other anthropologists dealing with the
study of law. Failure to distinguish the two aspects of the legal system
resulted in confusing a basic societal process with one of the mechanisms
through which the goals of that process achieved in certain societies.

In its broadest sense, the judicial process refers to the ways disputes
are settled within society. Since didsputes arise out of the very nature
of social interaction, some form of dispute settlement is found in all

societies.

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from
one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through
a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it
is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In so-
cieties with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by
judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the
facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another"
(Gluckman 1965:183).

Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set
of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As
long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these
principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that so-
ciety. This is true whether the process is carried on b y means of informal
mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the ex-
pression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special mechan-
ism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate Opinion
with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate
source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield
1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to
undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences
among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their
main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition
of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach
which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely,
the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways
by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and
Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was

followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

10

document statements concerning the substantive law of the society studied,
or to abstract and elucidate that law. An example of the first technique
is Howell's analysis of the Nuer court decisions (1954) where he collected
a large number of court cases, cla-sified them and abstracted the substan-
tive aspect of the native law. Gluckman's study of the Lozi (1955) repre-
sents the second technique. Smith and Roberts used the same method of
case analysis to abstract certain principles of the Zuni law (1954), and
Nader utilized it in her study of the Zapotecan law (1964). The list of
those who utilized the case-study approach is quite extensive, and the
range of the societies they studied is quite varied. But most of them
share the interest in the substantive rather than in the procedural aspect
of the law.

When referring to the procedural aspect of the law one should keep
in mind the difference between the technical and the abstract components
of procedural law. The first refers to the activities and steps involved
in the settlement of disputes in the society as well as the person or body
undertaking the responsibility of such settlement. The second involves a
number of abstract principles reflecting the values of the society with re—
gard to the goals of the judicial process, and which the judicial persons
use as a guide in achieving a settlement or in passing a judgment of one
kind or another. These are the bases of judicial reasoning. Although
judicial reasoning represents one of the most interesting and important
aspects of the judicial process, it attracted very little attention among
legal anthropologists. With the exception of Gluckman and his analysis
of the concept of "reasonable man" among the Lozi (l955a), no significant
work has been done in this area. In dealing with the concept of the reason-
able man, Gluckman was more interested in discovering universals in laws

than in the process of judicial reasoning as such. He implied that an

ll

element of reasonableness is a universal principle in any judicial logic.
Nadel reacts to Gluckman's implication of the universality of the concept
suggesting that it is valid only in certain contexts, and that the cases
reported by Gluckman from which he abstracted that concept are minor ones.
Nadel maintained that the principle seems inadequate in major crimes such
as homicide, witchcraft or assault. "If I am right, the Lozi would, in
these situations, discard their guiding fiction of ‘reasonable man' for
the sharper dichotomy of things simply lawful and unlawful, permitted and

forbidden" (1956:162).

METHODOLOGY

 

One of the characteristics of legal anthrOpology is the absence of a
coherent body of theory that could be utilized in the analysis and inter-
pretation of the ethnographic data. What do exist, however, in the area
of the ethnography of law are a variety of what may be called "tools of
analysis." These are mainly methods and orientations which help to direct
the researcher's attention to a certain area of behavior which describes
best the phenomenon under study. Their main purpose is to help the re-
searcher isolate particular portions of the phenomenon he is studying and
as such enables him to conceptualize the problem. A number of these tools
have been employed in the present study. One of these tools is Turner's
"social drama" which was employed in the analysis of the political leader-
ship and the judicial process. Since this approach depends upon the inti-
mate knowledge of the sequential development of a given case, or cases,
over a period of time, it was quite difficult to employ it in more than that
particular context. As will be apparent in the later chapters, the judicial
process among the group is highly informal. Most of the disputes are settled
by means of mediation which is done behind the scene and with a great deal

of secrecy.

12

I managed, however, during my stay to be closely in touch with one
of the major cases and with almost all the parties involved. This case
was used as the basis for the "social drama" analyzed in chapter three
of the present study.

In addition to the social drama, I have used the case study method
to analyze aspects of the substantive law of the group especially with
regard to concepts such as that of criminal responsibility and the nature
of the contractual relations as exemplified by the marriage contract.
Cases utilized in the study include ones that I observed myself as well
as cases taken from texts and some which.were told to me by informants.

Most of the data was collected through the time-honored technique
of participant observation which was facilitated by the fact that the
group spoke the native language of the researcher (or vice versa). Formal
interviewing was conducted on a very limited scale, thirty-five extensive
questionnaires in all. These questionnaires were originally designed and
administered to supplement the life history material and to assess the
attitudes of the particular people involved with regard to particular
issues. Some of the results of these questionnaires are used in the
chapter. Due to the non-representation of the sample interviewed, these
results are used merely as illustration and not as representing any kind

of statistical frequency.

ENTRY TO THE FIELD

 

It is common among anthropologists to talk with nostalgia about their
field experience and about the group they studied. This usually gives the
impression that field work is always an enjoyable experience. Although my
field work seems at the present time to have been a pleasant experience,

especially when comparing it to the pressures of everyday living in a

13

"modern industrial society," it was not easy work. This, despite the
fact that there was no language barrier, seeing that I spoke the same
language of the group, or rather they spoke my native language; I had

no problems of introduction because I had worked in the area and become
acquainted with a number of the tribal members in 1958. When I went to
the field, I then sought out these old friends who introduced me to other
members of the group.

At the beginning, I made a deliberate effort to avoid associating
with the government officials who worked in the area, even though they were
quite willing to help and seemed to have an intimate knowledge of the people
in the area. I had thought that any identification with the government
would put me in a suspicious situation as far as the tribal groups were con-
cerned, and thus prevent me from having good rapport with them. Later, how-
ever, I realized that the relationship between the government officials in
the area and the tribal population was extremely good, and they always looked
to the government as a source of aid and support to them. There was no con-
flict of interest between the state administration and the tribal groups. In
fact, peOple accepted me more readily whenever they knew that I had worked
for the Egyptian government. This later developed into a timevconsuming and
disappointing experience when many of the tribal members came to me asking
for help getting employment in the government projects in the area, or to
have their sons accepted in certain government schools, or to get some
favored treatment from the government relief organizations.

The difficulty I encountered in my field work stemmed from the inter-
play of three major factors: the reliance on the case study method which
necessitates the intimate knowledge of the events, facts, and parties in-
‘volved in each case; being a female anthropologist in a society where

‘women by definition are barred from public participation and particularly

14

from the process of dispute settlement; and the semi-nomadic nature of
the population in the area.

The reliance on the case-study method and especially that of Turner's
"social drama" which requires extensive and detailed knowledge of the se-
quential development of a number of cases over a long period of time proved
to be a major task in a society where disputes are settled not in formal
hearings, but by means of informal mediation and behind the scene negotia-
tions. These activities covered a large area, and were shrouded in a great
deal of secrecy. The assumption is that the parties involved in the dispute
should be given the privacy and chance to arrive at an acceptable settle-
ment without being conscious of or influenced by the opinion of non-
interested parties. The public hearing, or the mglad, loves the announce-
ment of the agreement arrived at in private. As will be seen later, very
little factual information about the dispute is discussed in the milgd.

No record is kept of either the discussion in the miLad or the preceding
negotiations. The process of dispute settlement is, then, highly decentral-
ized. To be able to follow one particular dispute involves the constant
reliance on informants not only to acquaint the anthropologist with the
places of negotiations, but also to fill the gaps in the information

about the process of negotiation itself.

As a woman anthropologist, I found myself at a disadvantage in a
society where women were excluded from public participation. It is true
that from the very beginning of the field work I was never cast into the
role of the native woman, yet, my position as a woman posed a certain
number of problems. When I first arrived in the area, I made a deliberate
effort not to identify with the native women. When it was suggested to me

that the relatively short skirts I wore were not practical for riding donkeys

15

or walking in the strong winds characteristic of the area, and that the
floor-length native dress would be more appropriate, I refused the advice
for fear of being identified in the minds of the peOple with the natives,
and thus being treated in the same way. The possibility of being identi-
fied with native women was not very strong, because from.the very beginning
I did not act like one. I did things and talked about things that native
women had never done or talked about. I drove a car, read, and wrote, and
talked about national and local politics. More important than that though,
to the tribal papulation, was that I was a member of the bar association of
Egypt, and that I had practiced law for a year in Cairo. Every time I was
introduced, the fact that I was an attorney was made evident. This gave
legitimacy to my interest in studying the tribal legal system, and in many
ways they were flattered than an attorney, especially a woman city attorney,
would be interested in their law. Yet, in native clothes or not, in the
native female role or not, I was still a woman, and as such I was not part
of any serious activity, especially those of dispute settlement. My mere
presence in any part of the dispute settlement made the gathering seem some-
how less serious. At the beginning of the field work a deliberate effort
was made to keep me from knowing anything about the whereabouts of the nego-
tiations or what was going on. I had to bribe men, women and children to
tell me where the negotiations were taking place and who they involved, and
then appear on the scene uninvited. This condition lasted for about two
months. At that time the news of my presence in the area spread around,

and I had attended many of the negotiations that men became less conscious
of my presence. In fact, some even asked me to attend the meetings where
some parts of the negotiations were conducted and give them my opinion as

to the fairness of the settlement.

16

Yet, even when the problem of role definition was solved, it was
still difficult to follow closely all aspects and phases of any particu-
lar dispute. This was mainly the result of the semi-nomadic nature of
the population. In settled communities, the anthr0pologist usually finds
himself in the midst of the social life of the community. He might not
be a part of it, but at least a major portion of it is happening around
him. In the case of nomadic or semi-nomadic papulations, the situation is
different. There were no large tribal concentrations in the area. The
largest residential unit was the camp, and it consisted of no more than
thirteen tents which changed in composition quite rapidly. In one camp,
out of the thirteen tents which were there when I joined, only six re-
mained unchanged by the time I left three months later. Originally I had
planned to stay in the small village of El-Hammam, which was believed to
be in the tribal route of the major tribal segment in the area. It took
me only a few weeks to realize that the tribal segments did not follow
any definite migratory route, and for more than four weeks I saw nothing
of be life of the group more than the few individuals who came occasion—
ally to the small settlement to buy tea or sugar, or to catch the train
to Alexandria. It was then that I decided to leave the settlement and
live with the camp. My stay in the camp was very insightful as far as
information about the daily activities of the camp members and the rela-
tionship between the camp and other tribal segments in the area. But the
camp was a very small group and fairly isolated. Besides, there was no
way of knowing how typical that camp was to the other camps in the area.

I finally decided that the best strategy was to live with a number of camps
in the surrounding area for relatively short periods of time, making my base
of Operation a relatively settled camp in close proximity to a number of

other camps.

CHAPTER II

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY

Awlad Ali are a number of Arabic-speaking semi-nomadic tribes of
sheep and goat herders who inhabit the northern part of the Western
Desert of Egypt. The total population of Awlad Ali, according to the
1965 preliminary census, was about 100,000 inhabitants. This esti-
mate is, however, very tentative and fluctuates from one year to the
next, depending on the circumstances of the pasture in the area. The
area they occupy consists of the narrow strip of fertile land which ex-
tends along the Mediterranean coast from near Alexandria in the east
some 350 miles westward to the UAReLibyan border town of Sallum, and
varying in width from ten to thirty miles. Vegetation in the area de-
pends on rainfall, supplemented by a number of artesian wells. The
rainy season extends from November to March, but the rain is extremely
erratic in nature, varying from one year to another and from one place
to the next. Draught has been experienced every three to four years,
one of them being experienced at the time of the study. The water situ-
ation is further aggravated by the low technological level of the people
which prevents them from making the best use of the available rain water.
There have been some attempts made to store as much of the rain water
as possible, but these attempts are usually made by individuals and in
too crude and primitive a way to prevent most of the water from being
lost by seepage or by evaporation. The most commonly used method of
water preservation in the area is digging cisterns in the ground. But
most of these cisterns are too shallow to keep large amounts of water.

Some deeper wells are found in the area and are called "beer sama"

l7

l8

(literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and
preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were
claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into
use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a
number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years
from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide
the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water be-
cause of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the
scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been
made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large
number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supple-
mented by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the varia-
tion in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the
important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence
vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal
populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in
the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands
are available.

Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important
of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The
economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of
these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides.

Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's
diet. Milk is never consumed fresh. It is always made into sour milk

(maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

19

Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
large urban centers like Alexandria.

The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
the women in the nearby markets.

The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from.December to May; then the land is turned

into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

20

The grazing season extends between November and April. As the dry sea-
son advances, the flocks are moved northward to the cultivated lands so
as to be nearer to fodder and to the waterholes which stand usually
very close to the coastal zone. During the dry season, animals live
mainly on barley straw and very little dry grass. In exceptionally bad
years, the people are compelled to dispose of their animals or to sell
some of them in order to be able to maintain the rest. In such years
the shepherds find it necessary to cross the border to the permanent
pasture of Cyrenaica in northeastern Libya, or to move to the Delta
where they may purchase the right to graze in.wheat fields after reap-
ing the crop.

Grain crops, mainly barley, are also grown in the area. Depending
on the rainfall, pockets of land characterized by deep alluvial soil
and underground water at various depths are cultivated with barley and
other grain crops. Barley cultivation is preferred by the peOple be-
cause it grows quickly and matures faster than wheat; also, it can be
cultivated in a range of soils and climates; it is mostly used as ani—
mal feed. Barley straw is also used as fodder for animals. Because of
the erratic nature of rainfall, barley production is hazardous in most
of the region. For this reason, pastoralism remains the most impor-
tant mode of subsistence,and cultivation becomes secondary. Cultiva-
tion is done on the basis of shifting cultivation, which means that the
areas cultivated vary from one year to the next following the rainfall.

Land Tenure

 

Most of the cultivable lands, as well as the grazing lands, are

under tribal occupation. Awlad Ali have, by custom and usage, had for

21

many generations a recognized right by the Egyptian government to use
the land for grazing and cultivation, and the tribal concept is that
the land belongs to the tribe.

The concept is true with regard to wells and cisterns. But
legally speaking, land belongs to the state, and the tribal papulations
in the area have only the right of usufruct. This does not mean that
the land is exploited jointly by all members of one tribe or tribal
segment, or that a man can cultivate or graze his flocks in any part
he chooses, for there is a certain correlation between the right of
usufruct and the distribution of the tribes in the area on the one hand,
and the inner tribal segmentation on the other. Although land is not
an object of ownership in itself, and wealth is not spoken of in terms
of land, yet, the distinction between ownership and usufruct in the
area is sometimes very hard to draw. Each tribal segment has its name
associated with a specific area of land which it regards as its own
and whose boundaries it defends against other tribal segments. The
tribal segment whose name is associated with a certain locality not only
has the right to use the land, but this right is also vested in it to
the exclusion of other segments. Within such an area, each subsegment
has the right to a portion of the land to the exclusion of the other
subsegments. While individual members of the tribal segments know the
land belonging to their tribal segments, their right is not associated
with a specific patch within the total area. Individuals usually cul-
tivate different patches within that total area as the need may arise;
but one cannot cultivate a patch in an area belonging to another tribal
segment except under certain conditions. This does not mean that the

individual cannot claim the right to a specific patch, for not only

22

can he do this, but he can also sell that right. The right to sell the
share of the tribal land has recently become recognized in the Western
Desert, and the usufruct right is being treated in the same way as
ownership.

While the boundaries of the cultivable land belonging to the tribe
are guarded, when it comes to grazing land, the boundaries are not so
much enforced. The tribes of the Western Desert of Egypt are quite tol-
erant in allowing members of other tribal segments to graze their flocks
wherever grazing lands are available. Everyone from any tribe can graze
his flocks in areas that offer better pasture. But in doing so, he does
not have the right to use the wells and cisterns of the tribal segment.
Water is scarce and valuable. Cisterns are owned by the tribal segments,
and if an outsider wants to use the water, he has to buy it from the
owner for the whole season for a sum ranging between $100-$180.

In 1958, with the extension of the Mariut irrigation project, a
Desert Land Possession Law was enacted and came into force in 1960.

This law restates the right of the government to the ownership of the
land, and therefore does not recognize the tribal possessions of the
land, even when they have made certain improvements in it, such as
planting trees or digging wells. However, it gave the right of the
occupants of a certain area of land to request either the purchase of
the land or its lease for a period not exceeding nine years, granted
that such is made within one year of the passing of the law. Failing
to do so within one year, the government will either remove the plants

and buildings, or confiscate them without compensation.

23

The above law met with opposition from the tribal population in
the area. As a result of this opposition, a new law was enacted in
1964 (Law #100). Although this later law eliminated some of the short-
comings of the previous one, it is not itself without disadvantages.
The 1964 law recognizes the Bedouins' right of ownership only in areas
where the fairly permanent trees were planted before 1958. Rain-fed
areas cultivated from season to season are excluded. The new law also
provides for the sale and transfer of land. Any person can purchase up
to 50 feddans (acres) provided that he can develOp it into an economic
enterprise. The law also provides for the distribution of arable lands
in such a way as to permit each head of household to own 10 feddans and
to be provided with water possibilities. The price of this kind of land
is to be paid over a period of 30 years. Settlers are encouraged and
helped in planting trees and building dikes. So far, 8,600 feddans ir-
rigated by windmills have been pssessed by members of Awlad Ali tribes,
and titles to their holdings are being issued.

With regard to grazing lands, no legislation has yet been issued,
and the government feels that at this stage of development, it is es-
sential to start educating and inducing the tribal population of the
Western Desert in initiating and implementing new programs for prevent-
ing overgrazing and controlling the number of flocks.

The Group

The name Awlad Ali covers a number of ethnically distinct groups.
In addition to Awlad Ali prOper (the descendents of Ali), referred to
as the Sa'adi, it includes a number of Murabiteen (holy men) tribes
who are attached to various segments of Awlad Ali and occupy an in-

ferior political position. The name also includes various peasant

24

groups and individuals who migrated from the Nile valley and who were
incorporated into the tribal organization by a system of tribal adop-
tion called "Iktitab." Most of these peasant groups came to the desert
to avoid military drafting by becoming part of Awlad Ali, who, until
1947, were exempted from serving in the Egyptian army. Although groups
and individuals thus adopted become part of the pedigrees of the adopt-
ing tribal segments and are supposed to enjoy equal status, yet, insofar
as their origin is still remembered, they are looked down upon by the
Sa'adi and occupy a position somewhere between that of Awlad Ali Sa'adi
and that of the Murabiteen.

The Sa'adi tribes consider themselves to be the descendants of a
certain Aqqar Ben Sa'ada or Aqqar El-Sherif, a descendant of Bani Suleim,
who settled in Cyrenaica in the Fifth Century. Although they claim to
be of pure Arab ancestory, all sources agree that a considerable amount
of mdxture between Arab and indigenous Berber populations took place

during the period they have been in North Africa.

 

 

 

 

Sa'adi
r I l
Jabarna Aggar Bani Sallam
l l '
r 1 1' | F’ I I I 7—7
Jawazi Baraghith. 'afiaqir Magarba. Awlad 'ali Harabi Gemei'at Hanadi Bani 'unah

Fig. 1. The Sa'adi Tribes

 

* The exact relationship of the Gemeiat tribe to the Sa'adi tribes is
not exactly known. Many informants, as well as accounts of earlier
travelers in the area, assert that descent from Hkadiga, a sister of
Ali and Harb, and therefore are cousins of Awlad Ali. Others, espe-
cially members of Sa'adi tribes, themselves, deny any genealogical

25

Until two centuries ago Awlad Ali lived in eastern Cyrenaica.
After the death of Aqqar, his two sons, Ali (founder of Awlad Ali) and
Harb (founder of Harabi tribe on chart), competed for the leadership of
the tribe. This competition involved their respective tribes in a
bitter war which existed for more than fifty years. In one of the major
battles between the two tribal segments, the Harabi segment with help
from the Caramanli rules of Tripoli were able to defeat Awlad Ali and
to drive them eastward across the Libyan-Egyptian borders into the
Egyptian Western Desert. This happened about 150 years ago. At that
time, the area was occupied by the Hanadi, a warlike cousin of Awlad
Ali, who had established a system of dominance over the Murabiteen
tribes who are believed to be the original inhabitants of the desert.
The area also was inhabited by the Gemeiat tribe, which, although be-
lieved to have Murabiteen status, yet were not treated as clients of
the powerful Hanadi, as were the other Murabiteen tribes in the area.
With the help from the Murabiteen, Awlad Ali were able to defeat the
Hanadi and to drive them eastward into the Nile Delta, where they
settle now as cultivators.

During the rule of Muhammad Ali (1815-1848), the warlike Awlad
Ali were frequently used by the government to subdue the tribal upris-
ings in the Delta and other parts of Egypt, and to hold the Mamlukes
in check. There was no organized army in Egypt at that time except for
a few remnants of the Turkish soldiers. The tribal population of
Awlad Ali agreed to supply Muhammad Ali with fighting men on the con-

dition that they would be provided with food and arms and also exempted

 

connection to Gemeiat and insist that they are a Murabiteen tribe who ac-
quired their relatively higher status through their assistance to Awlad
Ali during their fight with the Harabi.

26

from forced labor in government projects and released from the pay-
ment of taxes. The government agreed to these demands, and on their
part, Awlad Ali helped Muhammad Ali extensively in his military expe-
dition in Syria and Arabia and were a major factor in the battle of
1815 at Bissel where he succeeded in breaking Wahabi power. They also
helped his son, Ismeal, in his expedition to the Sudan.

Later, when the Egyptian army was organized, the government ex-
empted Awlad Ali and other tribal groups which helped in the military
conquests from military service, but required them to undertake the
guarding of the desert roads and the frontiers of Egypt. Also, in
exchange for their previous services, they were given the right to use
the land of the Western Desert and left the question of its distribu-
tion among the various tribal segments to the native tribal leaders.
Finally, in 1832, Awlad Ali were granted a form of legal and political
autonomy whereby the government acknowledged the tribal legal and
judicial system as the means to settle disputes between members of the
tribe. The government also recognized the authority of the native tribal
leaders and allowed the tribal populations to be governed by their own
native system of leadership.

This political autonomy of Awlad Ali existed until 1947. Although
their usefulness to the government had long ceased to exist, they had
continued to enjoy the privileges they had obtained earlier. This was
partly due to the fact that the various governments that came after
Muhammad Ali showed no interest in the area occupied by Awlad Ali.
There were no taxable lands in the area, no natural resources of any
promise, and the tribal population did not present any particular prob-

lem to attract the attention of the government. There was some smuggling

27

of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a

very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions

on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to
their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which
were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered
a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this
situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt
threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching
its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to
the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as

a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects
are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The
most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is
directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert

through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network

of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western
Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since
the end of the Second World war, the area has been a major attraction

for tourists.

More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from
Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a
scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their
price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity.

An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from.Egypt to Libya
created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the dis-

covery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

28

market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-

thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and
from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young
tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of
sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of sheep and goats in
Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable

to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself
and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats.
The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and
hence, the price of sheep. In-the last decade, the number of smuggled
sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in
Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either
direction have failed.

All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the
area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became
evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a
population which is constantly on the move, the first step the govern-
ment took to control the tribal population was to settle them in perman-
ent villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these
projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures
by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where
agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote
local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government
to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of

many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

29

full-time employment with the government projects in the area and
settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.

With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and
political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This
was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the
draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including
Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due
to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954,
the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt
was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit
the tribal organization of papulations in the area. This put a strain
on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in
later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda sys-
tem, the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended
over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process.

The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still func-
tioning side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In
many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under
both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the

same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects

of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious,

since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily

bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore,

they can choose between the traditional legal system.and the modern courts
of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only

when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

30

modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal
justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure
an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court
proceedings.

The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is de-
fined as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing
it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as
such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is
not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft or
adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault re-
sulting in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to
keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings
in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases
are hard to conceal. Besides, serious cases start a whole series of
mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge
in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people.
When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate
action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authori-
ties know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case.
Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to mini-
mize the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district
attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved
according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for
the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has
been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are in-

structed by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

31

required for the indictment of the offender according to the modern
legal system. If this is not possible and the offender is sentenced
by the government court, only half the tribal settlement is paid, and
the rest is postponed pending the release of the offender. If the
offender is executed or he dies in prison, then the unpaid part of

the settlement is dropped.

CHAPTER III

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION

In discussing the tribal organization of Awlad Ali two modes of
analysis are employed. One is a structural form of analysis in which
emphasis is on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the
tribesmen order themselves. This view of the system is an outside
one regarding all smaller units as parts of a delimited whole: Awlad
Ali. The other mode of analysis involves the description of some of
these groups in terms of the processes by which they emerge and main-
tain themselves.

The first problem one encounters in pursuing the first kind of
analysis is that of definition of the tribal boundaries. It has been
mentioned earlier that the name Awlad Ali includes a number of groups
of different ethnic backgrounds. Some of these have been incorporated
into the tribe by the system of tribal adoption known as "Iktitab."
Such groups consider themselves as Awlad Ali and are considered as
such by Awlad Ali proper as well as by outsiders. Other groups such
as the Murabiteen are not thus incorporated into the tribe; and although
they consider themselves to be Awlad Ali, they are not viewed as such
by Awlad Ali themselves who prefer to keep the position of the
Murabiteen distinct as an inferior group. On the other hand, many
Awlad Ali have moved outside the area of the Western Desert and have
become settled cultivators on the banks of the Nile. These retain a
vague and remote genetic connection to the name Awlad Ali.

To avoid this problem, it is best to define the tribe by political

rather than by ethnic criterion. There is no paramount chief of the

32

33

tribe at the present time; yet, the unifying force is the recognition
by the group of the tribal law, the Daraieb, as a binding set of rules
and as the regulator of behavior within the area. In these terms,
Awlad Ali are a clearly delimited group, and it is in terms of the
jurisdiction of these rules that Awlad Ali are treated as a unit for
administrative purposes by the Egyptian government. Viewed this
way, Awlad Ali will be defined as those who recognize and abide by
the Daraieb or the customary law. This includes the Murabiteen tribes
as well as all those who became part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali by means of Iktitab. Since the territorial jurisdiction of
the Daraieb is limited to the Western Desert of Egypt, those groups
and individuals of Awlad Ali origin who have moved on a permanent basis
from the area will be excluded from the group. Groups and individuals
who live in the area but are not part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali are not subject to the Daraieb.

Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt are an offshoot of the
Cyrenaica tribes who in turn believe themselves to be the descendants

of a unique ancestress Sa'ada.

 

 

 

 

Sa'ad /’
5.3an I 4 ‘ ,
tvibts ' ,
Baraghuth Aggar /
l I F’ / 1 I
El-Saghir Jibran Harb ,/ Ali
, .. , 4 " F I j
-' ':: ._ _ m-.. Abiad Ahmar Senenah

'bv. ' I 1
‘Tv‘ ' " "’ " “" '—'Awlad Kharouf Awlad Mansur El-Sanagrah

 

 

 

'Ei‘\ I I 1
" ” "“ "" "El-‘aggary Gedeidah Bu-Mutair
Bout ’ T T l . u
("0' M) -.El-Asabei Yousef ' afash Helleis Daghash
r A j r ‘3

 

 

Bait .. .Semeida Yunis Makhum Hussein

34

Awlad Ali themselves are divided into three major sections: Ahmar
(the Reds); Abiad (the Whites); and Senenah. Each of these sections is

referred to as "tribe" and sometimes "tribes."

The first two major sec-
tions, those of Ahmar or the Reds and Abiad (Whites), are named after
their mothers, the wives of Ali (founder of Awlad Ali). The Whites are
named after their white mother, and the Reds after their Sudanese
mother who, owing to her dark complexion, was known as El-Hamra (the
red one).

In the past, writers such as Robertson-Smith (1903) have inter-
preted the reference to female names in patrilineal genealogies as in-
dicating an earlier matrilineal descent. I tend to agree with a more
recent writer, E. Peters (1959), who explains the reference to female
ancestors by two factors: patrilineal descent and polygyny. According
to him, it is a way of distinguishing full brothers from half brothers
and a means to show this genealogically. "The concept of the 'one
womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social
cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves a
sense to enforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion
of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a
female name . . . is that it is symbol of full brother unity at the
highest political level." (p.29).

This can be further supported by evidence from my own data which
show that reference to female names occur more frequently in charts
where tribal names rather than proper names are used. In genealogies
using proper names, informants rarely, if ever, trace their descent to

an ancestress. But when charts of tribal names are used, it is not

35

uncommon to find reference to female names. This indicates that it is
only when the unity of the full brothers becomes politically signifi-

cant that the name of the mother rather than the name of the father is
used. This may explain why the occurrence of female names in Awlad Ali
genealogies is not as common as one might expect judging from the fre-

quency of polygynous marriages among the group.

Awlad Mansur

 

 

 

I I 4J7 1
Mutair 'aggary Gedaidah
F I
Bu—Zewah El—Hafian
I I
El-Marries Suliman

Fig. 3. Recognized tribal segments of Awlad
Mansur (a segment of Awlad Ali)

Mansur

 

I r I I
BueAsabei Bu—Mutair 'aggar Muhammed

 

I
Bu-Zewah AbdelIah Hussein
(Hafian)

 

I
Muhammed

 

I
Suliman

 

I
Muhammed

 

I
Suliman

36

The two charts show the same unit of Awlad Mansour. The first of
the two charts shows the tribal segments in which Eilat Gedaida ( a fe-
male name) appears as one of the segments. When the actual genealogical
chart of one of the living members of that segment was drawn, descent
was traced to Mohammed, the husband of Gedaida, as shown on the second
Chart. In this case Gedaida is not a member of Awald Mansour segment.
The unity of the full brothers is emphasized without changing the affil-
iation of the segment. It is simply a means of carrying on the patriline
using the mother's name. This is not always the case, however. Examin-
ation of other cases in which the female name was used reveals the fact
that in certain instances using the female name is a means of carrying
on the line of descent through a daughter. This meant incorporating
within the tribal segment a whole group of individuals who otherwise
would have belonged to a different patriline. Carrying the line through
the daughter in this manner has the same result as adopting her husband
unto the tribe. The question then is why wasn't adoption used. Examin-
ation of the two cases in which this happened indicates that a possible
explanation may be that this occurs whenever the husband is unadoptable.
Adoption is possible whenever a man does not have any tribal affiliation.
In one of the two cases the husband belonged to the Gemei'at tribe, a
Murabiteen tribe which enjoys a relatively higher status than the
other Murabiteen tribes by virtue of their being the original settlers
of the area and helping the Awald Ali in their fight with the Hanadi,
yet compared to Awlad Ali proper occupies an inferior position. In

this case, relating to the patriline of the mother carried with it a

37

definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female
name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya.
Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no
political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affilia-

tion carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal

segment.

In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of
the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border,
while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria.
The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is
located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The
territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad
Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been
a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displace-
ment occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second
WOrld War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however,
there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and
tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of
segmentation than on the lower ones.

Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of
segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kabila (tribe),
Eila (family), and Bait (house).

The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent
units but of highly variable size. Each of them has its traditional

history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

38

Such traditions differentiate between these segments which otherwise
occupy an equivalent position in the formal system.

This level of segmentation has no particular political significance
except that it is at this level that the client tribes of Murabiteen are
attached. People in the area differentiate between Awlad Ali proper,
who are called the Sa'adi, and the Murabiteen tribes. Murabiteen tribes
occupy a special position which tends to complicate the formal analysis
of the tribal organization of the Awlad Ali. The Murabiteen are a number
of tribes of varying sizes and origin which are attached to the Sa'adi
tribes as their vassals or clients. They exhibit the same principles of
tribal organization as the Sa'adi tribes escept that they have no common
origin similar to that of the latter groups.

The original division of the Murabiteen tribes among the Sa'adi was
made in the famous meeting at El-Haqfa in which the division of land was
also made and the Awlad Ali law was first enacted. The number of client
groups attached to each Sa'adi tribe reflects the relative prestige and
power of thatparticular tribe at the time of the meeting. Having a re-
latively large number of client tribes meant, in addition to prestige of
the patron tribe, large financial support. Until half a century ago
this financial support was in the form of an obligatory tribute or
"sadaqa" which the client tribes had to pay. This tribute is no longer
mandatory, but the client groups are still expected to present members
of their patron tribes with gifts on occasions such as weddings, funerals
or feasts of the tribal saint. Large vassal groups also meant support in
fights. Although the client groups did not constitute part of the vene

geance group of their Sa'adi, when the Sa'adi tribe fought, their client

39

groups were expected to help. For these reasons the Sa'adi tribes com-
peted and even fought among themselves for the newcoming Murabiteen
groups which continued to migrate into the area, escaping the strong
dominance of the Cyrenaica Bedouins..Many of the major tribal wars which
occurred in the area before the turn of the century had as their major
cause the competition over the Murabiteen.

As a vassal group the Murabiteen tribes are kept in an inferior
position. This inferiority has certain manifestation, the most obvious
of which is the deprivation of the Murabiteen of the right of "nazala"
or refuge. When a person is killed the killer and his kin unit seek re-
fuge at a neutral tribal segment, and for a period of twelve months they
are safe from the revenge of the victim's kin group. The victim's family
cannot follow them to the refuge place, for to do this is to violate one
of the basic principles of Awlad Ali law. The philosophy behind the rule
of "nazala" is to give time for "the blood to cool off" as one of the in-
formants described it. It also gives the host group a chance to start
immediate negotiations with the victim's group to settle permanently the
dispute. As soon as the murderer's group takes refuge, which is done
either by moving along with their tents and flocks and settling in the
locality of the host group or symbolically by having the head of the
host group send one of his sons or male relatives to pitch his tent in
the locality of the murderer's group, the head of the host group contacts
the victim's group, informs them that he has been chosed by the murderer's
group in accordance with the right of nazala, and asks for their per-
mission to grant his protection to the murderer's group. To ask for the
permission of the victim's group is a matter of formality since, by custom,

they cannot refuse to grant this permission except on one single ground:

40

if the host group is genealogically close enough to the murderer's group
as to be themselves part of the vengeance group. As soon as the per-
mission is granted the head of the host group starts negotiations on be-
half of the murderer. Since the basic reason for the nazala is to avoid
the direct confrontation between the two opposing groups, the first task
of the negotiations is to define which places and markets each group can
go to during the year of the nazala. Once this has been agreed upon,
the difficult task of settling the dispute begins. The success or fail-
ure of the negotiations depends on the skill of the negotiator and the
weight his tribal segment has in the area. This makes it of extreme im-
portance for the murderer to select the tribal segment which can affect
such a settlement. In cases where the host group is not particularly
powerful, the victim's group pretends to agree to a settlement in order
to have the murderer and his group leave the locality of the host group
and then takes revenge by killing the murderer. This cannot happen when
the host group is powerful, since such an action would automatically make
the host group enemies of the victim's group.

With very few exceptions which will be dealt with later, the right
to offer refuge is limited to the Sa'adi tribes. No Murabiteen tribe can
grant refuge to a murderer, although they themselve can seek refuge at a
Sa'adi tribal segment if one of them is involved in murder.

Another less conspicuous manifestation of the inferior position of
the Murabiteen relative to the Sa'adi is the fact that the bloodmoney
for the Murabit is two-thirds that for the Sa'adi man. Also, until very
recently, marriage of a Sa'adi to a member of the Murabiteen tribes was

considered by the Sa'adi as a very poor choice and was discouraged.

41

In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance
of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the en-
dogamous tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth
noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same
position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Ac-
tually, there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen (in-
dependent Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are
further subdivided into Murabiteen bil—baraka (with the blessing); and
Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabi-
teen in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers
of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the
latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert.
For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad
Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan).
In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same
rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protec-
tion which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however,
this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could re-
member a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment
of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be
safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the
mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the
murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a
permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even

after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

42

the negotiator has to have behind him the full weight of his tribal se-
gment. Since the origin of the Gemei'at tribe as a Murabiteen tribe is
well known, any negotiator has to rely almost entirely upon his own skill
to affect any settlement; even if he is able to affect such a settlement,
there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.

The Murabiteen bil-baraka and Murabiteen bil—sadaqa occupy the same
position as vassal groups. The only difference between the two is that
the first, the religious men, are much more respected than the latter.
They are feared by the other tribes because of the belief that they have
direct contact with the religious and spiritual world and can harm those
who dare to offend them in one way or another. Because of this factor
and of their neutral position with regard to the rest of the tribes, they
play an important role in mediation and dispute settlement.

The origin of inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes in general is
hard to account for. Kenneth (1925) believes that hundreds of years ago
the Murabiteen were essentially the holymen. They learned to read and
write the Qoraan and grouped themselves around the "zawias' which were
the centers of learning and religion. While indulging in their religious
practices their flocks ere grazed miles away in the open desert under the
charge of the Sa'adi shepherds, who originally were the poor paid workers
of the Murabiteen. These shepherds, living out in the open, were busy
fighting away the raiders attempting to steal their flocks. As time
passed the Sa'adi shepherds became not only tough fighters but also wealthy.
This latter end was achieved partly as a result of successful raids on
neighboring tribes. Later when the Sa'adi planned a large raid, they en-
trusted their flocks to the Murabiteen, who by that time had become depen-

dent upon the Sa'adi for their protection from the raids of other tribes.

43

The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming
the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fight-
ing ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the
Sa'adi fighters. Inthe old inter—tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a
very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for
a yearly tribure guaranteed theprotection of the Murabiteen from ex-
ternal aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen
tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their
own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained in—
dependent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector
against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and
in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the
Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to
their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes as
stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare

(1845).

The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the
Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the
Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from
the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Amar El-Dam (unity of
the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the
actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengence

for a homocide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

44

member falls on all members alike, regardless of the exact genealogical
relationship to the victim. When bloodmoney is to be paid, its members
pay it as a group, divided among all male adults; and although when they
receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnates of the victim,
the remainder is distributed equally among all its members.

The genealogical depth of the Eila is usually five generations.
This is not always true, however, In certain instances the number of
generations intervening between the founder of the Eila and its living
members is nine or even ten. Naturally, the more generations the larger
the size of the Eila. Sometimes the Eila becomes so numerous that it is
hard to keep records of all members who are supposed to share in the pay-
ment of the bloodmoney in a specific case. When the size of the Eila
reaches this point, one of two things may happen. The first is an attempt
to make lists of the members. Many of the Eilas have such lists. This
is usually accompanied by a tendency toward writing down the specific
rules and regulations of the vengeance group. These lists are referred
to as Amar papers.? They constitute a formal statement of an otherwise
informally recognized responsibility of the group for certain actions of
its members. The other is a tendency toward the fission of one or more
of its constiuent units which, after separation, establishes itself as
an independent Amar. The factors underlying this process of fission are
discussed in the next chapter.

The following is an example of an Amar paper, that of the Eilat

Aggary, which was put into effect in 1954.

45

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE FORGIVER

The following Awaqil (sing. aqila, the leader of a bait) represent-
ing the various "buite" (sing. bait, the tribal segment below the level
of eila) of the Aggary Family were witnesses to the treaty and their
signatures signify their commitment and that of their respective buite
to the content of this agreement.

(a list of the various awaqil)

The above signing awaqil agreed unanimously on the content of the docu-
ment and all the conditions included. No objection by any of the above
persons was noted at the meeting.

Article 1:

The content of this document should be kept as a secret of the
Aggary Family. It constitutes the Aggary Amar in accordance with the
customs and the Daraieb of Awlad Ali. The content of the document should
be revealed only at the request of both parties of a dispute which in-
volves a member of the Amar.

Article 2:

Peace should exist between members of the Amar. No secret grudges
or open disputes should be permitted between them. In case such an un-
fortunate situation exists, the other non-involved members of the Amar
should intervene between the disputants, try to solve the dispute, and
prevent it from damaging the solidarity of the Amar. They should in-
vestigate the facts of the case and force the guilty party to compensate
his brother (the wronged party) without giving the former a chance to
object.

Article 3:

When the Amar is called upon because of obligation involving the
payment of money, all the Awaqil should meet and decide the amount of
money that should be collected from each Bait of the Aggary Family. It
becomes then the responsibility of each Aqila to collect the amount from
his Bait.

Article 4:

The share of each Bait is based upon the number of "Sayems", (lit-
erally, "fasting males", which is interpreted to mean 15 years of age or
over), regardless of whether or not they have a source of income for
themselves. The share of those without means of their own is distributed
among the other members of the Bait.

46

Each Aqila is responsible for submitting to the Amar a list of the
Sayems in his bait, and this will be the basis for establishing the
share of the bait in payment or receipt of the money.

Article 5:

No Aqila can act on any matter involving loss or gain to the Amar
without the presence of the other Awaqil of the Amar, unless an urgent
matter occurs in which waiting for the rest of the Awaqil might jeopar-
dize the interest of the Amar. In such cases the Awaqil present can act
on behalf of the Amar as a whole.

Article 6:

The following acts should not involve the Amar as a whole and the
offender is considered individually (or with his own Bait) responsible
for them:

1. Theft and cheating.

2. Insult or disrespect of a younger member of the Amar to

an older person whether from the Amar or not.

3. Entering someone's tent or home without permission.

4. Seduction of women (including rape and adultery).
In all the above cases the individual has to bear the responsibility for
his own actions. For to let the Amar pay for him in such circumstances
is to encourage him and other such members of the Amar to commit more of
such acts and bring disgrace to the Amar. If the offender is unable to
pay for his crime, his nearest male kin should pay for him in accordance
with the Awlad Ali Daraieb. Such payments are considered as personal
debts which the offender has to pay back as soon as he is financially
able.

Article 7:

When an older person does injustice to a younger one, the latter
should take his complaint to the Aqila of his own bait. The Aqila in
turn should take the matter up with the Aqila of the older man or to all
the awaqil of the Amar if the matter is serious enough. The awaqil must
assess the facts and prevent the older man from doing any more injustice
to the younger man and have the former compensate him for any damage he
might have caused the younger man by his actions. If the awaqil fail to
do this and if their failure resulted in the younger insulting or hurting
the older, his acts become no longer an individual responsibility for
which he has to pay alone, and the Amar should pay fOr him.

Article 8:

No members of the Amar should take sides in disputes involving
families or individuals outside the Amar unless the awaqil in the Amar
investigate the matter and the reasons for the dispute and decide that
the Amar as a whole should be on one side of the dispute or the other.

47

Article 9:
The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if
it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.

Article 10:

Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider
should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the
matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the
outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make
him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their ef-
forts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. If he refuses, they
should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties in~
volved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

 

Article 11:

With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to
join the Aggary Family or one of its constiuent buite must be asked first
about the reason or reasons for ‘his desire to join. This must be done
in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a
burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable stand—
ing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without con-
sultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found
to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over
him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation
with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him,
he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and
bearing the same responsibilities.

 

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and
get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the
obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the
barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its
members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore
his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to
avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership un-
less he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar
has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

 

Article 13:

If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by
the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of
hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil
are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that
the accusation is false.

 

48

Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate house-
holds seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
ever—increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human popu-
lation has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be con-
tinued for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be pur-
chased, and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and re-
stricted by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
the individual owner of a'herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary

source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

49

through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed
find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the un-
certainty of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral
life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a
decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, es-
pecially those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One im-
portant gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney
for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in
his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time
of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the
membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney
which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney.
Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from
the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as
well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the re-
ceipt of bloodmoney.

Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led
many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given

Bait from the Amar.

50

Another factor which led to the need to formalize the rules of the
Amar was the increase in the kind of disputes for which there is no pro-
vision in the customary law of Awlad Ali. Such disputes arise mainly out
of situations which are relatively novel to the area. A large number of
these situations involve the relationship between the tribal population
and the government authorities recently taking a major part in managing
the affairs of the area. There were no rules in Awlad Ali law to guide
decisions in cases involving financial liability of a member of the Amar
in cases such as confiscation of smuggled goods, destruction of govern-
ment property, or false testimony leading to the conviction of a fellow
tribesman by the government authorities. The list of cases such as these
is rapidly increasing. Many members of the Amar refuse to share in the
payment of liabilities arising out of such cases on the basis that since
no provision has been made in the customary law of Awlad Ali, then the
Amar as a whole should not take corporate responsibility for such actions.
They assert that corporate responsibility of the Amar is the exception
rather than the rule and therefore, where there is no specific rule, the
responsibility is an individual one. Others insist that it is the cor-
porate responsibility of the Amar in such matters that maintains the Amar
as a group and gives incentives to the members to retain their membership
in the Amar, and therefore, should be the rule rather than the exception,
covering any form of liability unless individual responsibility is
specified.

This made it essential to specify in some kind of formal statement
which liabilities are to be considered collective for which the Amar has
to pay as a corporate unit and which are to remain as individual respon-

sibility. This is done either by listing the cases of individual

51

responsibility, leaving any other situation a collective responsibility,
or by specifying the cases of collective responsibility, implying that
all other responsibilities are as a rule individual ones. The Amar paper
of the Aggary, for example, chose to list offenses for which the Amar is
not responsible, leaving the rest of the liabilities to be covered by the
Amar as a whole. This is not always the case. In some papers offenses
for which the Amar is responsible are the ones listed leaving the general
rule as the non-responsibility of the Amar.

It is in this respect that the Amar papers are considered an im-'
portant source of legislation. Although the new rules incorporated in
an Amar paper start with the limited applicability to members of the
Amar, yet, as time passes and as these rules affect the relationship of
the Amar members to outsiders, one rule may acquire a wide practice and
become part of the customary law itself. An example of the point in
question is the rule regulating the payment of the bloodmoney in cases
where the murderer is tried by the state courts for the same crime. In
cases of arrest of the murderer by the government, only half the blood-
money is paid and the other half is withheld until the trial is over. If
the killer is acquitted by the court, then the other half becomes imme-
diately due for payment. If, on the other hand, as mentioned before, the
killer is convicted, half the bloodmoney is postponed until the person
completes his sentence and is released unharmed and with his full senses.
If he dies in prison or sustains an accident which affects his physical
or mental capacities, the rest of the bloodmoney is automatically dropped.
This rule was first included in a number of Amar papers, especially those

of the Eilat of Awlad Kharouf tribe. In less than twenty years since it

52

first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the re—
sponsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in-
come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a cor-
porate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal '
segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual respon-
sibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific
rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which
extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adop-
tion. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are be-
lieved to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the
peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area
may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an

area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

53

This makes it possible for those adopted by the tribe to keep in touch
with their relatives and friends they left behind in the Delta while en-
joying the military exemption gained from their adoption by the Awlad Ali
population. It is also believed that Eilat Aggary, made up mostly of
peasants themselves, are very lenient in the conditions they put for
tribal adoption. Finally, the Eilat Aggary is not among the most power-
ful tribal segments of Awlad Ali, possibly because of their composition.
This assures the adopted peasant groups an equal status not normally ob-
tained if ad0pted by one of the powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali.
The Amar paper of the Aggary explicitly states some of the basic
characteristics of the Amar as a unit in the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali. The most distinctive aspect of the Eila or the Amar as a
political unit is the absence of any formalized leadership. Although
the Amar is viewed by outsiders as a corporate group as far as its legal
responsibility in certain cases, from the standpoint of its members, the
Amar is no more than the sum total of its constiuent units or Baits.
This is shown in the Amar paper of Aggary which states that matters affect-
ing the Amar be decided upon by all the bait represented by their respec-
tive leaders, the awaqil. There is no formalized authority above the
awaqil, although one of the awaqil might acquire a position of informal
leadership by virtue of personal or other qualities. He will be con-
sidered as a mediator and go-between for the various leaders of the Baits.
In the case of the Aggary, Sheihk Selouma, the Aqila of Bait Eweida, has
acquired such a leadership among the Eilat Aggary. Although Shiehk
Selouma is relatively young, (he is about 40 years old), he has the re-

putation of getting things done. His Bait is the wealthiest in the

54

Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial con-
nections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar

who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of in—
stances he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who

had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar

is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in

the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare al—
though not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collec-
tion of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about

the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circum-
stances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This

has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

55

responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple per-
sonal persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the ma—
jority decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up p0p-
ular support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents.
If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by
another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is
more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own
Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify
the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in
their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around
their leader.

The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases
is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Origi-
nally this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of blood—
money. If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an
increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to
avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when dis-
tribution is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
"barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular
Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to
which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put
in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is

done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

56

for the actions of the members of their former Amar, nor is the Amar
responsible for theirs.

Units thus separated establish themselves as separate Amars. These
units are commonly referred to as Eila, thus retaining the structural
label of the higherlorder of segmentation. This is not always the case,
however, and other segments may refer to them as Baits rather than as
Eilat. This explains, at least in part, the tendency toward blurring
the formal scheme on the next level of segmentation, that is, of the

Bait, and may account for the variable meaning of the term Eilat itself.

The Bait

While the Eila or Amar-el-dam is the most important political unit
by virtue of being the vengeance group and therefore, the individual's
major support group, it is the Bait that constitutes the most visible
political unit.

The Bait is the only corporate land-holding group. While the Eila
is usually associated with a certain geographical locale which it con-
siders as its homeland or "watan", it rarely, if ever, utilizes this land
as a corporate unit. Instead, the land is divided among the various Baits
constituting the Eila. The land of the Bait is not divided and each mem-
ber of the Bait can, at least theoretically, cultivate or graze on any
part of it.

But the one important characteristic of the Bait which distinguishes
it as a political unit is the existence of a formally recognized leader-
ship in the position of the Aqila (lit. wiseman). The Bait is the only
structural unit with such formalized leadership. The Aqila is responsi-

ble for all members of his own Bait whose number varies from 20 to 60

57

individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal seg-
ments. He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from mem-
bers of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigid-
ity of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selec-
tion have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which oc-
curred during my stay in the area.

Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with

her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance

58

which ranges from two to ten kilometers. The camp coincides with the
herding unit. The herd of the camp is usually grazed as a unit, often
by a paid shepherd hired by the members of the camp as a whole. Origi-
nally the camp moved as a unit for grazing. This was essential in the
era of the tribal warfare and raiding where the security of the herd
and that of the people depended on such collective movement. In a type
of organization adapted to periodical movement, the camp offered the
optimum sized community: small enough to permit easy movement and large
enough to offer the kind of protection which individual families could
not have offered. In this era the camp seemed to have been a closely
knit group. Many of the informants still remember the time when the
camp was under the strong control of the headman who made the major de-
cisions of where and when the camp should move. It was those decisions
that determined the safety and the security of the group. The headman
had strong authority over members of his camp. Such authority was based
mainly on his ability to exercise valid judgments as to whether or not
the group should move and the route that it had to take if movement was
decided upon. At the present time, and with the diminishing of raiding
and tribal warfare in the area, the authority of the headman seems to
have diminished along with it. The camp appears at the present time to
be mostly a residential unit with minimal leadership and with a rapidly
changing composition. Different families join the camp at different
times during the year.

Although the membership of the camps is drawn from the bait, a camp
does not, in terms of its genealogical composition, make up a descent

segment of that Bait. The membership of a camp is based on a completely

59

different principle from the principle of patrilineal succession charac-
teristic of the bait and all other units on the higher levels of tribal
segmentation.

Some of the camps I visited were composed of three patrilines, while
others contained individuals belonging to five patrilines. In some camps
each tent belonged to a different patriline, some of which did not even
belong to the same bait. The composite nature of the camps is partic-
ularly clear in the case of what the people in the area called "nagei
gheir aseil" or the artificial camp. This kind of camp is usually found
near the towns and settled communities of the area. They include one or
two tents of individuals belonging to the bait whose land the camp is
built one, and who give the camp its name, but the rest of the tents are
occupied by individuals from different baits or even tribes and also by
outsiders who came to work in the area. Such a camp does not act as a
unit for any purpose. It has a rudimentary structure, and is held to—
gether by mere physical proximity of its members which stems from the
need of "wanas" or togetherness. The composition of the artificial camps
is highly changeable with new members joining and others leaving through-
out the year. When I joined the camp of Ragi from the Sanagra tribe, it
consisted of twelve tents. Four of the twelve tents were occupied by
Sheihk Ragi (two tents for the two wives) and his two married sons, five
occupied by members of tribal segments other than Sanagrah, and four by
workers who came from Alexandria to work for the government project in
the area.f One week after I joined the camp another tent was added to
the camp. It belonged to a man from the Geneishat tribe of the Natruh

area. He came with his wife to work on the new irrigation project which

 

60

had started in the area at that time. No special permission was re-
quired for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission
of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next
door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited
all members of the camp.

Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the
Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the mem-
bers of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems be-

tween brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of

I II

minor importance. "A headman is like a father,‘ said one informant, we
call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the

nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle

the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

 

 

Group Leadership Identifying aspects
Kabila None Client groups attached.
Eila None Vengeance group, Vaguely

defined tribal land ("watan").

Bait Aqila Corporate land-holding.
Formally recognized leadership.

Nagei Headman Residential unit with
unsegmented structure.

CHAPTER V
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
AND
JUDICIAL PROCESS

One of the most idstinguishing aspects of the legal system of Awlad
Ali is the absence of any formalized judicial structure. Disputes are
solved mainly through the mechanism of informal mediation rather than
through formal hearings of a court during which the facts of each case
are presented and judgment based on the facts is passed. This does not
mean that formal hearings are not known on the area. For the "Mi'ad" or
tribal hearing is a common and very important practice in the tribal
proceedings. The Mi'ad, however, is not a tribal court. It is merely a
gathering of all interested parties and anyone else who wished to attend,
in which the agreement reached behind the scenes by means of negotiations
are announced.

The first Mi'ad I attended was held in the house of Sheikh Mughaieb,
the Aqila (tribal leader) of bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribal segment
in the area of Hammam, 60 miles west of Alexandria. The case that was to
be settled at the Mi'iad involved the assaulting of Sheikh Mughaieb ty
two younger members of bait Dauoud who lived in a nearby camp. The dis-
pute started when Ali, the youngest brother (14 years old) of the two
assailants, found a piece of iron in the desert. Suspecting that it was
a mine, he took it away from the camp to the small garden in the backyard
of Sheikh Mughaieb's house, surrounded it with dry weeds and set fire to
it. The piece of iron was in fact a mine and it exploded, damaging the
trees and a window on the Sheikh's property. At the sound of the explo-

sion Sheikh Mughaieb rushed out and found the boy trying to run away from

61

62

the area. He caught him and slapped him and ordered him not to do it
again. After a short while the boy returned with his two older brothers
who protested Sheikh Mughaieb's hitting their younger brother. The ar-
gument developed into a fight during which the two brothers hit Mughaieb
with a heavy stick over his head making him unconscious.

The Mi'ad was held two weeks after the incident. When I arrived at
Sheikh Mughaieb's house, the meeting was being held in the guest room in
the back of the house. Present at the meeting were Sheikh Mughaieb, his
father, two distant relatives of Mughaieb who were visiting the area at
the time; Sheikh Mutair, the Aqila of the powerful bait of Mutair lo-
cated some twenty miles east of Mughaieb; the two assailants, their
father who at the same time was the Aqila of their bait, and two neigh—
bors of Sheikh Mughaieb.

For the first half hour or so nothing was said. People were sitting
silently except for occasional greetings of "how are you?" and the re-
sponse of "thank God for everything". Tea was served frequently. Then
Sheikh Mutair addressed the gathering and read the "fatha" or the be-
ginning passage of the Qoraan (which appeals to God to show his right
ways to the believers and to guide them to wisdom). He then said, "In
the blessed presnece of all these honorable guests and with the help of
God and his prOphet we will clear the hearts of those concerned of the
grudges caused by the shameful and unfortunate incident in which the
devil has played a major role." Then Sheikh Karim, the Aqila of the
bait to which the accused belonged, continued the speech saying that
this shameful thing should never have happened and that his sons must
have been possessed by the devil to have done it. After all, they have

been brought up to respect their elders and especially Sheikh Mughaieb,

63

who was like a second father to them. He praised Sheikh Mughaieb for be-
ing understanding. He then said that Sheikh Mughaieb was very generous
and that his sons had come to Mughaieb the day before and kissed the top
of his head (an expression of respect for forgiveness). He said that no
money, no matter how great, could erase the harm done by his sons but
that he had offered to pay Sheikh Mughaieb the sum of 400 pounds as
"kabara" or face—saving compensation. (The kabara will be discussed in
a forthcoming chapter, but for the time being it is worth noting that
the above amount is the maximum for such compensation since it equals
the bloodmoney for a man). Then he turned to Sheikh Mughaieb and asked
him to accept it in front of the respected guests. Sheikh Mughaieb then
spoke for the first time and said that the two boys were like sons to
him and that he had no hard feelings toward them anymore, since he be-
lieved that young people were sometimes carried away in their actions.
He then proceeded to say that in honor of the honorable guests who took
the time to attend the hearing he was forfeiting half the amount. At
that time a woman brought the food the women were cooking for the gather-
ing, and Sheikh Karim asked Mughaieb, "How about the honor of the good
women of the house who have done all the work and cooked all the food?
If you ask me, they deserve at least another hundred pounds." Mughaieb
said, "All right, fifty pounds for the home of the women, but no more."
After that Sheikh Karim paid the amount of a hundred and fifty pounds to
Sheikh Mughaieb and shook hands with him. He also shook hands with the
two young men who had assaulted him, and the gathering started the dinner
and tea.

Not all Mi'ads in the area proveed with that smoothness. Many of

them are characterized by shouting and arguments and frequently no .~

64

agreement is reached. In fact, later one of the people attending said
that my presence made everything run smoothly in that particular Mi'ad
because they felt that they should show me how peaceful Awlad Ali were.
This was mainly supported by my own observation of other Mi'ads, some of
which are described later, where parties were less understanding of one
another and where no forfeiting of any part of the compensation occurs.
This is particularly true when the Mi'ad is held to acknowledge the fail-
ure of the negotiators to reach an acceptable agreement among the parties.
This is also true when one of the parties to a dispute denies the charge
and insists on not paying any kind of compensation. In such cases the
Mi'ad is held to decide upon a different course of action, usually the
administration of the oath, as will be discussed later in the chapter.
Despite its typical nature, the Mi'ad described above exemplifies the
nature of the Mi'ad and its purpoSe as a process of making public what
has been achieved in private negotiations. No evidence is presented and
evaluated in the Mi'ad, no hearing of witnesses, no passing of judgment
based on the evaluation of the facts of the case. Actually, the facts of
the case are never presented and a person who is not acquainted with them
before hand has no way of learning what the dispute is all about by merely
listening to the discussions of the Mi'ad.

The key role in the process of mediation in dispute settlements is
done by the Aqila or the leader of the bait. When a diSpute occurs be—
tween members of different baits, each party goes to the Aqila of his bait
who takes immediate steps tomeet with the Aqila of the other party and
discuss the matter with him in an attempt to reach a settlement. He acts

as a representative of members of his bait and defends their interests in

65

the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.
Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own
bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonable-
ness and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila,
they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally signi-
ficant source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This
principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and
economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role
of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more
than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the
time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it.
The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that
happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers
what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise
opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The politi-
cal unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all
baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves,
some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they

operate at a given point, were revealed.

66

EILAT AGGARY AND ITS CONSTIUENT BAITS

 

 

BA_I_T ' NUMBER OF'ADULT MALES (Sayems)1 AQILA
Eweidha (El—Burg)* 28 Ta'eb
Eweidha (El-Alamein)* 31 Selouma
Yusef** 30 Suliman
Helleis 22 Hussein

I, v-- _\\ ’1‘“. I’-‘.\

, EL-Asabei‘: I ~ ~ 5.6‘ _} ’\ Sheiieb ,‘
Abdel Hamid* 20 Haj Musa
Risq** 30 Yadem
Afash 25 Nayer
Daghas** 25 Daghash
Bul-Yazid* 21 Haj Shousha
Makhyum** 23 Abdel fattah
Hussein** l7 Masri
El-Ramly** 25 Salem
Rashwan** 30 Rashwan
Attya* 31 Masu'd
Abdella* 22 Abdel Galil

 

1 Numbers are taken from the Amar list which is used to distribute the
amount of bloodmoney on the various baits. An adult male or "sayem"
is anyone 15 years of age or older. The word "sayem" means fasting
individual and the age of 15 is when a child is forced to observe
the duties of fasting.

** Refers to adopted tribal segments (Muktatibeen).
* Baits of doubted origin. Some claim these baits are adopted, while
others insist that they are Awlad Ali proper.

w>HH Nfi >m>wMH.

 

 

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mmamozs mwmsm: ammo» msomsm mmsmd

 

 

 

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mmama
Omaha
Name
mmHzme mmrmmmwmu we mwozmr mwlmmSe
mcham wmmmma mmnrmwpm meanon mmwzsm medwmnwrm.wovammmwa mores

(l‘(

NW D V V

woods: wmmmmHmH wcome. wowed

 

L9

 

68

PHASE I

In September of 1956, Mansur from bait Eweidha of the Aggary Eila,
who works as a driver in one of the government projects in the area, went
to Alexandria with a friend, a member of the Gemei'at tribe. In one of
the bars there, Mansur got drunk and entered into an argument with his
friend. The argument turned into a fight during which he hit his friend
with a broken bottle. Two days later, the friend died. A settlement was
made between Mansur and the victim's family and bloodmoney was established
at L. 300.

Two weeks after the above incident, the same person, Mansur, was
driving the government car on his regualr duty when he ran over two mem-
bers of the Sanagrah tribe who were sitting on the side of the road,
killing one and breaking the leg of the other. Another settlement was
made with the families of the victims. The bloodmoney for the dead man
was established at L. 300 and another L. 50 was set as the compensation
for the broken leg of the other man.

The total sum of compensations in the two incidents was divided
among the sixteen baits constituting the Aggary Amar. .The share of each
bait was decided in proportion to the number of adult males (sayems) in
each. The share of bait Asabei' alone was established at about L. 100.

As the Aqila of Bait Asabei', Shei'eb was responsible for collecting
the money from members of his bait. But for the following six months he
was unable to collect from any member of his bait, including Sheikh Hakim,
Shei'eb's cousin and the wealthiest person in bait Asabei' and the Aggary
Amar as a whole. Most of them gave the execuse that it was a bad year

and they had lost most of their herds. When the money was not collected,

69

the victims' families sent their representatives to demand that the money
be paid. To face the situation, a meeting of all the Awaqil of Eilat
Aggary was called and Sheikh Selouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, took the
responsibility of notifying the other Awaqil. The meeting was held in
the tent of Hemeida (my driver and informant) from the Sanagrah tribe.
Each bait was represented by its Aqila with the exception of bait Asabei',
from.which both Shei'eb and Hakim were present. Since bait Asabei' was
the only bait which did not submit to its share of the bloodmoney, the
discussion centered around the inability of Shei'eb to collect it. In a
gesture which he meant to appear as helping out Shei'eb, Hakim offered

to pay not only his share but that of all members of bait Asabei', and
followed his offer by handing the money to Sheikh Selouma. After this
act which was a complete surprise to Shei'eb, Sheikh Slouma, the Aqila

of bait Eweidha, suggested that Hakim should be considered as the Aqila
of bait Asabei' instead of Shei'eb, who had demonstrated his inability

to collect from members of his own bait. He emphasized the fact thatwhe
had nothing against Shei'eb who had legitimately acquired his position

as Aqila by means of succession. But he insisted that the survival of
the Amar depended upon the fulfullment of its financial obligations to
outsiders and that Hakim was wealthy and could pay. Shei'eb did not
comment and the rest of the Awaqil nodded indicating their agreement with

Sheikh Selouma.

The above is the summary of events that happened before I came to
the area, and which were told to me by informants including the parties

involved. Since most of these events occurred more than ten years ago,

70

it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei',"
said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to
make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as
a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei'
deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
that it has earned him the nickname of "the thier. The nickname was
given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca
Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed
to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as
stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also

a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told
his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later,
on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's
luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
"the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout _

the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing

I/

71

equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and mer-
chandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case in~»
volved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to.have been taken as an ex-
cuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': pat-
rilineal succession.

Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from.Mecca and contain all the judg-
ments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

72

exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.

"He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Mbst people
thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, es—
pecially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for

wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II
On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe
of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled

cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

’3

73

Aggary Eila. When they arrived with the cigarettes, Hadi was not at his
tent; he was in the market of the nearby town selling sheep. They left
the cigarettes and left for Alexandria to arrange for their distribution.
In Alexandria they met Rabbuh Hakim, the son of Hakim, who married a

girl from Alexandria and lived there. He made his income from buying
smuggled goods at wholesale prices and selling them at a profit. When

he met the two members of the Geneishat tribe and learned from them about
the shipment they left at Hadi's place, he wanted to buy it. But they
refused on the grounds that Hadi had already contacted someone and that
all they could do was to give the first option to that individual. Two
hours after the conversation between Rabbuh Hakim and the Geneishat, the
police officer on duty at the station of Burg el-Arab received an anony—
mous call from Alexandria informing him that a shipment of smuggled cig-
arettes worth more than three thousand pounds was hidden in Hadi's olive
mill (which was not in use at that time). The call was overheard by a
member of the Sanagrah tribe who works as a detective with the police.

He tried to warn Hadi of the police raid but it was too late. The officer
found the cigarettes in Hadi's olive mill in the exact place where the in-
formant said they would be. The cigarettes were confiscated and Hadi was
arrested and later released when the officer didn't find enough evidence
to prove that he knew about the shipment or that it belonged to him.

The confiscation of the cigarettes enraged both Hadi and his part-
ners. They went to Sheikh Ta'ib, the Aqila of bait Eweidha to which Hadi
belonged. They told him about their conversation with Rabbu in Alexandria
and said that they thought he was the one who informed the police about

the shipment. Ta'ib said that Rabbu must have done this because of old

74

grudges that he had against Ta'ib when the latter dissolved the partner—
ship which had existed between them for more than ten years, because of
Rabbu's attempt to cheat Taieb in dividing the profit gained from smug-
gling goods. They asked Sheikh Ta'ib to be their mediator to Sheikh
Hakim and his son. Ta'ib went to Hakim himself and informed him of the
accusations directed against his son and asked to arrange for a "Mi'ad"
or legal hearing. Hakim agreed and told Taieb that his son accepted
Taieb as a mardi and would abide by whatever decision he made. After
that both parties to the dispute wrote specifying their agreement on Taieb
as a mardi and all signed it. (It is not customary to write the agree-
ment on the mardi but Taieb insisted on that on the grounds that he did
not trust Hakim or his son and that several times they had backed down
on their promises). The Mi'ad was held and all interested parties attend-
ed. It lasted only half an hour, most of it spect drinking tea. Nobody
presented his case or any facts related to it since both parties had
apparently discussed it earlier with Taieb. The only one to Speak was
Sheikh Taieb. He stated that Hadi and his partners believed that Rabbu
had informed the police which caused them to loose merchandise worth
more than three thousand pounds. He also said that the accusation had
been denied by Hakim on behalf of his son, after having his son swear by
the Qoraan that he hadn't informed the police. Then in the traditional
phrase, Taieb said, "I therefore follow the Awlad Ali Daraieb and make
the judgment to the oath. Rabbu will have to take the oath supported by
fourteen male members of his bait to be selected by the Geneishat." He
added that he had discussed the matter with both parties before announc-

ing it and that both had agreed to it.

H

75

The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plain-
tiff is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint
selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the
Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plain-
tiff who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of sup—
porters in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or
compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men
needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given
kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would
have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the
oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated
in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have
been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the
matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb

gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

76

such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the cus-
tomary law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date Of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six O'clock on
the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
tomb of the saint. The granddaughter Of the saint works as a mediator
between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and

lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge Of most of the
men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation Of Hakim they
asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was ab—
sent and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat

learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

77

no one else could take his place. They were mainly angry at Hakim's
attempt to cheat them and refused Hakim's offer to substitute ten men
for Qudura. The temper of the meeting was becoming very tense; then
Taieb, who was working very hard to achieve a settlement between the
disputants, took the Geneishat aside and tried to convince them to accept
another man instead of Qudura. When he found that to be impossible, he
asked them to agree to a postponement of the oath until they saw what
prevented Qudura from coming as he had promised. The Geneishat agreed
to the postponement because of the absence of one of the men to swear.
According to Awlad Ali Daraieb, if one of the individuals to take the
oath fails to show up in the saint's tomb for any reason or if he comes
but refuses to take the oath, the whole case for the defense fails, and
the judgment is awarded automatically for the plaintiff. In this case
the Geneishat were entitled to immediate compensation for their confis-
cated goods. Nobody knew the reason that led the Geneishat to forfeit
their right to immediate compensation and to give Hakim and his son a
second chance despite their intense dislike for the latters. Some at—
tribute this to the skill Of Taieb and the respect he commands among all
tribes. Others believe the Geneishat movement to be a reciprocal act to
bait Asabei' as a whole which long ago had one a similar favor for the
Geneishat. Still others beliebe it to be a gesture of good will on the
part Of the Geneishat who needed to retain a good and friendly relation—
ship with the tribal segments On their smuggling route.

NO date was set at that time for the oath. The parties as well as
the witnesses returned to their houses. Hakim then took Shei'eb and

went to visit Qudura to see why he hadn't come to the oath but Qudura

78

refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura
had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the
story Of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim
and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the
Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the
Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil
was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it.
His reaction was not out Of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very
unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resent-
ment Of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met
with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who
share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could

not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time
that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed pub-
licly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many be-
lieved that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait
Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was
the Oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was
known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact
many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only
honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all

the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that
Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither
the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also
conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced

Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

79

was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
ward the inadequacy Of Shei'eb as the Aqila.

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people
in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his
agreement with Hakim tO become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing
Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but
instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had
been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to
Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone
not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement
was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing
the camp Of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including
Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the
meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police)
and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger
myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me
to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to
swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before

I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and

If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without

fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It

involves the supernatural.

When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh

Saleh, the Aqila Of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk

80

to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This
means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money.
Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived
with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats
was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests
were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for
more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim anr.'
nounced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault
that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and
misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting
of the Aggary awawil.. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant
at one time and probably said it to Sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to
be the Aqila Of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh
Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura
addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am
glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The
gathering lasted for most Of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-
scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as
the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout
the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had
tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura ‘
still refused to take the oath.

Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all
the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event

and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

H
81

Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar Supported the position of
Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his hon-
esty and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They
were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest
techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with
Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to
support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in
their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and
showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's
refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compen-
sation for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the
amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events
affected bait Asabei'itself and left it one step from complete fission
into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against
Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila,
stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the
other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he
started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He in-
sisted that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and

given the barawa.

The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to
cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with
undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restrited
sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself

from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

f

2V

82

mainly a declaration that, that particular person is no longer a member
of the tribal segment and that his actions should not in any way reflect
upon the tribal segment. The tribal segment referred to is usually the
amar since it is only politically corporate group amoung Awlad Ali. The
procedure is usually undertaken in cases of habitual offenders whose ac-
tions consistently bringing liability to the amar or disgracing it in
relations with other tribal groups in the area. Due to the seriousness
of the procedure (since it leaves the individual without the protection
of his group), it is restricted. First, to announce the barawa of any
of its members the amar has to get the unanimous agreement of all adult
males of the gorup as represented by their Awaqil of their reSpective
baits. Lately such decisions have to be put in writing. The barawa
from the amar does not include the man's father, brothers, or sons.
These immediate relatives remain responsible for his actions even if they
desire to detach themselves from such responsibility. This is mainly
maintained not so much for the protection of the repeated offender but
rather for the protection of unsuspecting people who happen to have deal-
ings with him and who would be protected by the corporate responsibility
of the man's immediate kin. In addition to repeated Offenders, the
barawa or the threat of it is used to back the awaqil in their exercise
of persuasion to get members of their baits to agree to their decisions,
expecially those affecting the amar, like the collection of bloodmoney
or the taking of the oath.

A man, on his part, may ask to be given a barawa from his amar. In
this case, as shown in the amar papers of Aggary, he has to give good

reasons for such a demand. The awaqil of the amar meet and discuss» such

83

a request and examine the reasons behind it in an attempt to remedy them
if possible. They have to be sure first of all that by his request the
person is not avoiding the paymnet of his share in a particular case.
If this is proven to be the case, then no barawa is granted unless the
person pays all his debts to the amar. This, like the amar's barawa of
the individual, has to be put in writing.

I left the area a month after the meeting held at Qudura's camp.
By the time I left, bait Asabei' was almost in a chaotic situation.
Many thought that the outcome would be in favor of Qudura, who would
emerge from all the happenings as the leader of bait Asabei' as a whole.
Others thought that the only possible outcome was for bait Asabei' to be
divided into two or even three separate units with their own respective

leaders.

Analysis

All events of the second phase occurred while I was in the area.
Nonetheless I was not able to observe directly all of these events, due
to the nature of the judicial process among Awlad Ali which relies, as
has been mentioned earlier, on informal mediation and influence, rather
than on formal court hearings. MOst of the above events happened behind
closed doors and with a great amount of secrecy. For this reason I had
to rely partly on informants' accounts of what exactly had happened be—
tween the parties involved.

The dispute in its two phases revealed a major weakness in the
social structure of the major bait of the Aggary family. As the events

of the case unfolded, they shed light on some of the important principles

{\3

84

underlying the authority of the Aqila and the source of his political
support. Three such principles were evident in the above case: patri-

lineal succession, wealth, and social and personal renown.

 

Ability to deal fairly
with disputes involving____ _ _
members of his bait and
outsiders

(wisdom and social ——————
renown)

Ability to fulfil financial

obligations Patrilineal —*
0f the bait succession

( wealth )

To better understand the importance of the three principles to the '
authority of the Aqila, it is important to examine the domains within the
Aqila normally functions. First, the Aqila is the leader of a certain
kinship unit: the bait. Historically, the bait has been the main field
of action for the Aqila and from it he draws his main political support.
As the leader of his bait, the Aqila settles disputes among members of
his bait and represents the group for political and administrative pur-
poses. His function is to hold the bait together by preventing major
disputes between members from leading to the fission of the group into
smaller, separate units. He performs his function by exercising authority

and/or personal influence to establish long-lasting agreements.

85

In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as
wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance.
But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila
has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the
wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The
nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awald Ali is
such that the economic position of the individual is always flucuating.
Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any com-
mand of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding
upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's
decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to
make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the
legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad
Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as
Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a
woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to
her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solid-
ary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilateral cousins. It
is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually
to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as
the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable,
whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's posi-
tion and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main pur-
pose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who

makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

86

everything ... his property, his name, and anything he can give him, like
the position of the Aqila. This is only natural." While the office of
the Aqila is inherited through the male line, there seems to be no spec-
ial regard for seniority. Any son of the Aqila can succeed him in the
position and it is usually left to the Aqila to select the son who is to
succeed him. This decision is not usually the subject matter of brother-
ly rivalry since the position of Aqila is regarded more as a duty than

as a privilege. There has been only one case in the entire area Of the
Western Desert in which such a decision has lead to open fighting between
brothers. "When my father became very old and his eyes bothered him, he
told me that I should become the Aqila and could not say no to him,"

said Shei'eb. "I didn't want to become the Aqila but this was the choice
of my father and I have to Obey .... You owe it to your father and family
to carry on his responsibilities the same way you carry his name." It
was patrilineal succession upon which Shei'eb based his case. Most un-
interested parties believe that he and he alone had the legitimate claim
to the position.

The importance of patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila'a
authority may be better understood by contrasting it to a closely related
position, that of the "mardi". A man within a bait may acquire, by virtue
of personal qualities, a reputation for wisdom and soundness of opinion
which may overshadow that of the Aqila. Such a person becomes known
throughout a certain area as a successful mediator and go-between; and
therefore is called upon to solve disputes not limited to members of his
own bait. He thus acquires an informal position which cuts across a

number of baits and sometimes larger political units.

L7
87

The word mardi is derived from the Arabic verb "yardi" which means
to accept or agree upon. The mardi therefOre is the person who is ac-
cepted by one or both.parties to a dispute as a mediator. If he is ac-
cepted by only one of the parties, his work is more that of a legal
representative of that party. He makes all efforts, using all powers of
persuasion to get the other party to concede to the demands of the party
he represents. If, on the other hand, he is chosed by both parties to
a dispute, he acts as an impartial judge and avoids taking sides in the
case. His fame is determined by his ability to achieve permanent, long-
lasting settlements. His success in this area depends, in addition to
personal qualities, upon the respect he has within his own tribal segment
and the weight that tribal segment has among other tribal segments.
Similarly, his success and the fame he gets as a mardi may give him con-
siderable influence within the bait. But this influence does not develop
into authority because the mardi in this case does not have an established
basis for the effective maintenance of that authority, in this case, patri-
lineal succession.

The other domain within which the Aqila performs his duties is that
of the Eila or the amar. His main function within this area is to repre-
sent his bait in matters involving the collection or the distribution of
bloodmoney within the vengeance group. Within the amar, the aqila is
considered successful insofar as he is able to fulfill his bait's finan-
cial obligations to the amar. This ability is in turn determined by his
success in collecting money from individual members of his bait and/or
his willingness to pay from his own money for those members who are unable

or unwilling to pay their share. Where kinship ties are strong, the Aqila

88

usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on sal-
aries and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
ties among members Of these baits. With the prevalence of the individ-
ualistic attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
from.bis own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are un-
able to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's per-
formance of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.
In a well—integrated bait the popularity (or unopopularity) of the Aqila

among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

89

position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal suc—
cession is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other con-
sideration. This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, es-
pecially when they entail any financial liability. The older members
complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and
the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people."
Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to
fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they

do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to
obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and

" said a

children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts,
member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organi-
zation in Alexandria.

When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the po-
litical support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective

Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of

money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

90

that prevents the Awaqil of the amar from rallying support around another
person.

In the case Of the Aggary amar Hakim was their choice as the man to
replace the original Aqila. What happened in the Aggary amar could never
have happened if bait Asabei' were more cohesive than it was or if the
kinship ties "were still strong and durable" as one important member of
the Sanagrah tribe commented. "If there was any respect to the fore-
fathers left, Hakim could never have agreed to replace Shei'eb....Nobody
would dare take a position from someone who inherited it from his father....
but bait Asabei' is not as it used to be."

The third domain within which the Aqila normally pursues his ac-
tivities is that of the wide scope of tribal society in the area. The
Aqila represents his bait in all matters involving the bait either as a
unit or any particular member of it with other tribal segments. When an
individual from the bait is involved in a dispute with a member of another
tribal segment, the Aqila acts as the legal representative and the attorney
of that member trying to achieve a settlement which is not fair for his
client but also fair for the other party. To be successful in this area,
the Aqila relies on his own personal qualities and persuasive abilities.
If the Aqila is known to be fair and honest, a quick and permanent settle—
ment is usually achieved since he is trusted also by the other party. If,
on the other hand, he has the reputation of using dishonest techniques,
mistrust prevails and achieving a settlement is usually delayed.

Like the domain of the amar, the.present field of activities is no
major source for the Aqila's political support in the baits where kinship

solidarity is strong. His success in solving disputes between members

I \“x

91

of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and r
write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and

all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

92

His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
crininals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship be-
tween the government and his village. Because of his position as the
representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain
personal benefits.

In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possi-
bility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the
sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area
simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few
settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few
stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or adminis-
trative existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten adminis-
trative districts, each having a police station. These districts cor-
respond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of, the Senusi order. One of the ways
the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way

into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

93

them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tri-
bal segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriv-
ing him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that member-
ship in the zawyas offered.

After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tri-
bal population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
to establish one Office of leadership for the whole district was to im-
pose a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the prin-
ciple Of tribal representation and came up with a system.which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,

a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose

tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

94

and numerous segments are then represented by the omda, and the lesser
ones are represented by a sheikh. Unlike the system in the rural areas
where the sheikh is a subordinate to the omda, the sheikh in the Western
Desert does not occupy the same position. Instead he has the same func-
tions and occupies, with regard to his tribal segment, the same position
the omda occupies with regard to his. He does not take orders from the
omda and has direct relations with the administration. Sheikhs and omdas
from one district are supposed to meet periodically in the police station
and discuss with the police officer in charge of the station matters con-
cerning the district and their own tribal groups. The only difference
between the omda and the sheikh in the Western Desert seems to be the
label of the office. The label itself carries a certain amount of pre-
stige to the tribal segment represented by the omda, since it is an ac-
knowledgement by the government of its importance. This is why many of
the tribal segments try to be represented by an omda rather than by a
sheikh. In certain districts where two or more strong tribal segments
compete for the honor of being represented by an omda, the district may
have two or more omdas representing the strong tribal segments and a numr
ber of Sheikhs representing the lesser tribal groups in the district.
NOt every tribal segment in a district is represented by an omda or even
a sheikh, however. Very small tribal segments may join together and have
one sheikh, while Others may agree to be represented by one of the larger
segment's sheikh or omda.

Obviously, the number of omdas and Sheikhs differ from one district
to another depending on the number of important tribal segments in each.

There is no specific rule whereby a certain tribal segment is considered

95

by the government to be significant enough to be represented. This matter
is left almost entirely to the ability of members of a given tribal seg—
ment to convinceathe authorities that their group is sizable enough to
give them the right of omda, or at least Sheikh's representation. A seg-
ment represented by a sheikh may later ask for an omda because of the
prestige involved. It is worth noting in this respect that the various
tribal segments in the area are eager to be represented in the govern-
ment administrative structure. Gaining prestige among the other tribal
segments is only one motive for such eagerness. Unlike the omda in the
rural areas who functions mainly as a representative of the government

to the village, the omda or sheikh in the Western Desert is a represen-
tative of the people to the government. This is not a theoretical diff-
erence but involves a real difference in the relation of the government
and the omda, on the one hand, and between the latter and the people

his represnets, on the other. The omda in the village is a symbol of

authority to his people. He is the undisputed ruler of the village. His

2...
v.5

authority is backed by his ability to mobilize and use the force put at
his diposal by the government, in the implementation of his decisions.
Since he is appointed by the government and not elected by the people,
he does not have to rely on his popularity to hold or maintain office.
His main concern is to please the government, rather than the people of
the village to whom he is merely a symbol of authority. There is very
little that the village omda can bring to his people form the outside,
while he has to implement government policies, collect taxation, appre—

hend criminals, all tasks which the villagers are not eager to have done.

96

The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although
it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes
the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appoint-
ment is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment
or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually
nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the
examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the
basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the
council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal
segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the
Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the govern-
ment of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to repre-
sent more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the
council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the best
qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real re-
presentative of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part Of a
governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest
of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the ser-
vant of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment
is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So
far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the
tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in
the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land
to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these
are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the govern-

ment is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

97

who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report

the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report
crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal
segment he represents.

The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are con-
sidered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields,
Awlad Ali look at military service as
1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.
an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed pay—
ment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individ-
uals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shep—
herd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostil-
ities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the govern-
ment projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find.
Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all-civil
disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of

the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

98

which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly
minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authori-
ties through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation
for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases
are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting
the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dis—
pute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police au-
thorities to find.

While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of
loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the
government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These bene-
fits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids in-
cluding fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people
during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal
population with Olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman
wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the
area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A success—
ful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for
his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have
the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative
units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of
the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting
loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by
them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government

man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

99

government." But due to the nature of the representation and the spe-
cific relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda
does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal
group.

Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal seg-
ment from.the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative
officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given
individual for the position Of the omda. "The omda is one who can
speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government Officials."
Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than Old
people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things
done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to
nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in
front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council
would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can
get things done..."

Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the
district of Haman, described the circumstances Of his nomination as
follows:

Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he

was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argu-

ment with the police Officer in charge Of the police station in

the district. The tribesman insulted the police Officer who in-
sisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police

Officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal

segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that

particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila Of

100

bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the Officer and apol-
ogized to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
known as an expert in handling the government Officials. One year
later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was
held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal
segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the posi-
tion of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who
was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and
he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah
later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot
get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or
in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing...
not even the gratitude of his peOple. To them, he is a servant of
the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he
doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to ac-
cept the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not
to embarrass the awaqil and the important peOple of the tribe who
put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is

six pounds a month."

101

"The omda or sheikh is both a blessing and a curse to his tribe,"
said one member of the Aggary 'eila. "He can bring benefits to his
tribe, but at the same time, he has to report his own peOple if one of
them breaks the city laws... His position is like that Of a double-
edged razor."

Most of the people in the area, however, tolerate the negative
aspects of the omda's functions as a moderate price for the possible
benefits they may get through his position. This is why each tribal
segment does its best to be represented by an omda, or at least by a
sheikh.

Within his tribal segment he enjoys a great deal of respect. He
does not, by means of position alone, command any power over members of
his group similar to the power the omda Of the village has over his
people. It seems, however, that although the position itself does not
carry with it any power, yet, when the holder of that position is at
the same time a native tribal leader or aqila, it tends to enhance his
position as a tribal leader and to give him.more respect among members
of his tribal unit as well as among the rest of the tribal groupings.
This may be explained by the fact that the establishment of the omda
system in that area did not involve direct interference with the native
political systen except in a minimal way, mainly to keep the tribal
populations in the area from interfering in the progress of various
government projects in the area. As such, the system did not impose
too many demands upon the tribal loyalties of the omdas or sheikhs.

In the relationship between the government and the tribal population,

the balance so far has been in favor of the latter, who, by means of

102

omda representation, are taking from the government much more than
they are giving in return. Being the link between his peOple and
the government in such a system gives the aqila a new basis Of

political support.

CHAPTER V
MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

A survey of all disputes occurring among the eilat Aggary in the
last five years shows that more than 70% were disputes over "women,"
the usual phrase referring tO cases involving marital relations. Dis-
agreement over matters arising out of quarrels between husband and wife
or between one of the spouses and his or her in-laws often constitute
the basis for these disputes. What seems to make marriage and the
family particularly productive of conflict is the fact that although
residence is commonly virilocal, and the majority of the women leav-
ing their own families to live with the husband, the woman retains her
membership in her father's family after the marriage, and her agnatic
group keeps an active interest in her, even after she is married. Mar-
riage then brings face to face the interests of two groups. These in—
terests affect the relationship between the married couple; and, more
importantly, the relationship between the latter affects the interests
of their respective groups. This, in many instances, leads to direct
conflict between the two groups.

The position of the Awlad Ali daraieb with regard to marriage rela-
tions is based on the Islamic law with minor modifications to suit the
requirements of local life. According to the Muslim law, marriage is
a civil contract affected by the request of one party and the agree-
ment of the other. NO witnesses are needed for the legalization of the
marriage, according to some of the Shi'a sects, although the Sunni schools

of Muslim jurisprudence insist that two adult male and two adult females

103

104

are necessary for the validation Of the marriage contract. Modern
legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
and the family further required the registration Of the marriage con-
tract for the marriage to be legal.

The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
(wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
is not required. Some persons might invite a member Of the Murabiteen
tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence

gives "baraka, or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application Of
the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of

the tribal pOpulations, more and more marriages are being registered in

the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

105

only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to ful-
fill his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal popula-
tion still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that
should be kept away from the State legal system.

Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in
turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's
choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained
relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of
the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries
to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is
dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr"
and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in
the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases
where the son has independent means of support for himself and his
bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking
the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subse-
quent marriages, the approval of the Older wives is essential. The
Older wives have no right to Object to the husband taking an additional
wife, but they have the right to Object to the choice on the basis that
the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity be-

tween her family and the families of the other wives which makes

106

cooperation between the wives in household activities difficult. The
wives have to have reasonable grounds for their objection to the new
bride. But even then, the husband could still marry the woman of his
choice, although in this case he has to bring gifts to the other wives

' or making-up present.

as "nasafa,'
If the family has no objections to the marriage, the proceedings
start. The initial proceedings are undertaken by the women on both
sides. The groomis mother or a female relative of his mother's genera-
tion or older visits the mother of the prospective bride and tells her
Of her son's intention to marry the latter's daughter. The bride's
mother then discusses the matter with the girl's father who has the
final say in the matter. If the father is dead, then the authority on
giving the girl in marriage goes to her brother or closest male kin in
the order specified before. The girl has no say in the matter of mar-
riage and cannot refuse to complete the marriage, although after marriage
she can resort to a certain practice which helps her to terminate the
marriage without the consent of her guardian, as will be seen later in
the chapter. From this moment until the conclusion of the marriage
negotiations are done by the men of both families. The first thing to
be discussed is the amount of bridewealth, a "mahr." If the two families
agree on the marriage, a small ceremony is held. This ceremony is called
"el-fatha" in reference to reading the first "sura" Of the Koraan known
as el-fatha, or "the beginning." The ceremony includes members of the
two families and very few friends. After the fatha is read, the agreement
is achieved. This is considered as an engagement and means that the girl
is spoken for and therefore no other man can ask to marry her.

To break the fatha agreement, the father of the prospective bride

107

has to have a good reason. If he breaks it without sufficient reason,

he may be liable to pay "kabara,' or fine, for insult to the prospec-

tive groom and his family. Adequate reasons for breaking the fatha
agreement vary from one case to another and include such things as the
discovery that the prospective groom or any of his family is of ques-
tionable character. This applies to the groom as well as to any member

of his immediate family, the implication being that if he has such a
person close to him, he is likely to be influenced by him in his treat-
ment of his wife. If, however, the questionable character of the groom
or the member of his family was known to the guardian of the bride-to-

be before the fatha was read, then to break the agreement is considered
unjustifiable. This has been upheld in a number of cases which I recorded
during my stay in the area. One of these cases involved the agreement
between a member of the Sanagra tribe in the area of Alamein to marry

his daughter to a member of the powerful Bara'sa tribe in Libya. After
the fatha was read, a wealthy merchant from Alexandria saw the girl and
asked her father to marry her, and the father agreed. To justify his
breaking of the fatha agreement, the father claimed that he had discovered
that the first prospective groom and his father were involved in smuggling
goods across the Libyan borders. In the Mi'ad that was held upon the re-
quest Of the first groom and his father, the father claimed that the
bride's father had known about the smuggling and even participated in

the distribution of the smuggled goods. The father of the bride was

made to pay the sum of ten pounds as kabara to the first groom and to

pay him another ten pounds for the expenses of the ceremony in which he
had slaughtered two goats. The settlement was based on the fact that all

indications show that he must have known about the smuggling activities

108

of his future in-law before he agreed that his daughter marry him.
So, to break the agreement on the basis of discovering that defect is
not permissible and is a kind of behavior not to be encouraged. To
encourage such behavior would lead to the waste of time and money and
would lead to the disgrace of the fatha as a preliminary agreement.*
Permitting the father to break the fatha agreement when discovering an
unknown condition related to the prospective groom or his family, is
to apply an important principle in the Islamic law with regard to all
contractual relations. This principle maintains that any contractual
agreement pertains only to the facts and conditions specified at the time
of the contract. This implies that the conditions of the contract have
to be explicitly stated. A deliberate effort to conceal an undesirable
condition has the equivalent effect of specifying the existence of its
opposite. Such concealment invalidates the contract and permits the
aggrieved party to dissolve the contract on the basis of cheating or
unfair deal, or "ghish."

If, on the other hand, no deliberate attempt is made to conceal
the undesirable condition at the time of the contract, then there is no
basis for dissolving the contract on the basis of cheating or unfair
deal. Thus, in the case above, neglecting to mention the fact that the
groom and his father were involved in smuggling could not be taken as
the basis for unfair or unreasonable behavior on the part of the groom,
unless there was proof that they intended to cheat and conceal that fact
deliberately, and that they knew that if not concealed, the fact would
affect the acceptance of the bride's father to the marriage. All indica-

tions of the case above point to the lack of intent to defraud. On the

 

* The same rule applies to the breaking of the "fatha" agreement by the
groom.

109

contrary, there is enough evidence to indicate that the father of the
bride by participating in smuggling should have known about that fact,
or at least it would not have affected his decision had he known about
it. The grounds for unreasonable or unfair behavior is therefore not
present in the above case.

If, on the other hand, the condition is specified at the time of
the contract which is proven later to be false, then the behavior is
considered as unreasonable. An example is the case of Mahdi, who, after
reading the fatha to marry a woman from his tribe, was discovered to have
had tuberculosis and was forced to forfeit the gifts and other expenses
on the basis that he had had the illness for a long time and knew about
it, but he deliberately concealed it when he asked to marry the girl.
Not all concealed conditions are considered as an adequate basis for
the breaking of the fatha. Only conditions are adequate which, had they
been known at the time of the agreement, would have made the party's
decisions different. One case involved a man who had concealed the
fact that he had a wife in Alexandria when he asked to marry a tribal
girl. Although the intention to conceal the fact was very evident, for
this is the first question that the girl's father or her guardian asks
the suitor, yet, breaking the fatha agreement by the girl's father when
he discovered the previous marriage was considered as unfair and un-
reasonable since, had he known about the marriage, it would have made
no difference in his decision. The go—betweens disagreed, however, on
this. One of them thought that although the concealed condition is by
itself not Objectionable, yet, the mere act of concealment indicated a
bad character on the part of the prospective groom, and that by itself,
apart from the concealed condition, is not a good basis for marriage re-

lations. The bride's father did not have to pay kabara, although he held

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a big feast in which he slaughtered three sheep and invited the groom,
his father and a number of his friends and friends of the girl's father
in honor of the groom as a compromise.

Before the fatha is read, the two families usually agree on the
amount of bridewealth, or "mahr", to be paid by the groom or his father.
The amount of bridewealth depends upon a number of criteria, important
among which is the relative position of the bride's and groom's families
and the degree of relationship that exists between them. The lowest
mahr is usually paid in the case of cousin marriages. The amount ranges
from 10 to 50 pounds. Sometimes when the groom cannot afford any mahr,
he pays only the religiously required sum of 25 Egyptian piasters.

This is never the case if the groom and bride are more distantly re-
lated. When the groom is an outsider or a member of another tribe, the
mahr is usually much higher. Several cases of mahr of more than 2,000
pounds are reported in the area. There was a case in which the mahr
reached 10,000 Egyptian pounds ($22,000). The amount of mahr also de-
pends on the beauty Of the bride. In the case of the highest known
mahr mentioned above, the woman was known to be of great beauty. There
is no distinction made between previously married women and ones mar-
ried for the first time. In the case above, the woman was married three
times before, and the mahr was apparently higher than that paid for her
in her first marriage. Increasing the mahr according to the kinshp
distance between the bride and groom reflects the preference of endoga-
mous marriages. The preferred marriage match in the area is that of
the patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. The father's brother's son,
"ibn 'amm," has an undisputed claim over his cousin, "bint 'amm." Even

when they are of incompatible age, or even if the man is married or for

111

some reason or other cannot marry his cousin, he still has that legal
claim on his cousin. She cannot marry another man without the consent
of her cousin. He has the right to forcibly take her away and even
kill her or her husband in protection of his right. Although in the
few cases where this had happened in the past, the groom had to pay full
blood money. Such killing, however, was considered as justified and
never resulted in retaliation or feuds among the tribal segments in-
volved.

However, it is difficult to call cousin marriage among the group
"preferential" marriage. In a limited quantitative study I asked 35
tribal members who have unmarried daughters over the age of 12 the fol-
lowing question: "If you had your choice, to whom would you give your
daughter in marriage: your brother's son or another man who is wealth-
ier or more respected?" Twenty-six said they would rather have their
daughters married to someone other than their nephews. The reasons
given were that their nephews did not make enough money to either pay
her a good mahr or to support her without outside help. The nine who
preferred to marry their daughters to their nephews emphasized the fact
that the girl's cousin is likely to look after her interests and take
care of her more than the outsider "who may not fear God in his treat-

' as one of the respondents to the questionnaire

ment of my daughter,’
expressed it. They also said that their nephew is more under their con-
trol than the outsider. They further maintained that a person is likely
to know his nephew more than he knows an outsider or a more distant
relative. One of the informants put it, "Even if my nephew is a cheat,

at least I know that this is all that is wrong with him." All thirty-five

informants felt that they were obliged to give their daughters in marriage

112

to their nephews if the latter demanded "because it is the right of
the girl's cousin." And all but two said they would ask the permis-
sion of the girl's cousin before marrying her to an outsider, even if
they knew that the nephew had no intention of marrying her himself,
"to prevent the development of difficulties in the future."

On the other hand, when the same group was asked, "If you had your
choice, would you rather marry your cousin or another woman who was

wealthier or more beautiful," they answered as follows:

Marry their cousin ll
Marry someone else 24
Total 35

Two reasons were given by the eleven who chose to marry their cousins.
The first is that they knew more about the temperament and the moral
character of their cousin than about the other woman no matter how
beautiful or wealthy she might be. Four of the eleven respondents said
they would like to marry their cousin because they could not afford to
pay the high bridewealth for a distant relative or an outsider. Although
the sample I selected was by no means representative of the total tribal
population in the area, yet, it points at least to the fact that parallel
cousin marriage is considered by the father of the girl more as a duty or
obligation than a choice, while from the standpoint of the suitor, it is
viewed as a right which he can invoke at will.

It seems that many invoke such a right even when they have no serious
intention of marrying their bint'amm. The purpose apparent in the numer-
ous cases where this happened was to Obtain money from the prospective
groom who has to get the approval of the cousin to prevent trouble. In
some cases the man invokes his right to force his uncle or the groom

to concede to some demands, such as the sale of the right to use a piece

113

of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smug—
gling activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes

in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had

no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number Of disputes
that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was
suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair
behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which speci-
fies that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from.marrying an
outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry
her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circumr
stances show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.

TO prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the fore-
seeable future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which
ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the
prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to
the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the awaqil
and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are con-
cerned. Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agree—
ment and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad All
which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved
in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm

selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the

114

agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by its contents.

The lack of serious intentions to marry one's cousin is reflected
in the actual frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage in the
area. The following table is taken from the genealogies of five camps

in the area of Burg el Arab. The camps belong to different tribal

groupings:

Agnatic cousins 5
Other cousins 12
Within the bait

(other than above) 9
Within the Eila

(other than above) 13
Within the tribe

(other than above 11
With members of the client

tribe 15
With outsiders 9
Total 74

The above table shows that the frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin
marriage is less than eight per cent of the total marriages included in
the genealogies of the camps studied. It also shows that the largest
frequency of marriage is with a member of a client tribe of Murabiteen.
In the majority of the fifteen cases (eleven cases), it is the woman

who is a member of the Murabiteen tribe while the man is a member of the
Sa'adi tribe. The Murabiteen tribes from which the wives came are not
always the clients of the particular tribal segment to which the husband
belonged. One explanation of the popularity of marriage to the Murabiteen
is that the bridewealth among them is generally less than it is for the
Sa'adi girls. It therefore gives the man the advantage of lower bride-
wealth without the lack of choice involved in the cousin marriage. It
is important to bear in mind, however, that the sample given above is

by no means representative of the entire tribal pOpulation. Furthermore,

the material presented above was based on the actual marriages at the

115

time of the study. I have no information about the marital history of

the men included in the genealogies. This is particularly important if
we realize that the frequency of divorce in the area is quite high and

that there is a certain prohibition against ever marrying within a cer-
tain degree of relationship of his first wife.

According to the Koraan, a man is forbidden to marry certain
classes of women. Some Of these women are permanently prohibited and
others are only temporarily so. Marriage is forbidden with what are
called the "maharem" (sing. mahram or non-marriageables). They are one's
female ascendants and descendants; the former wives of one's ascendants
or desendants; one's sister and the female descendants of one's sister
and brother; one's paternal and maternal aunts and the sisters and aunts
of the ascendants; one's mother-in-law and all female ascendants of one's
wife. Marriage with the first cousin and the half-brother's half-sister
(from another marriage) is therefore permitted. The second category of
forbidden women are those related to the man by nursing. The wet nurse
takes the place of the mother, and her relatives are treated as if she
was the actual mother of the person in question.

In addition to the above, there is the prohibition of the simul-
taneous marriage of two women who are related to each other to the ex-
tent that had one of them been male and the other female, they would
have come to the forbidden degree in marriage. This latter prohibition
is not a permanent one and is restricted to the marriage of the two
women at the same time. As soon as the marriage with one of them is
dissolved, there is no prohibition on marrying the other one. Yet, al-

though aware of the lecense given by the Islamic law to such marriage,

116

and although they are not considered wrong or sinful, there is a gen—
eral feeling of distaste among the tribal population to such marriages.
They usually attribute this distaste to the fact that if the marriage
with the first sister did not work out, there is no reason to expect
the marriage with the second to be successful.* Although this might
account, in part, for the low rate of cousin marriage in the group when
present wives of the individuals are taken into consideration, yet, the
effect of that practice should not be exaggerated. For although that
prohibition might curb the marriage with the cousin who is the sister
of a previous wife, it does not restrict the marriage with another cousin
who is a cousin, rather than a sister of the first wife.

During the period that follows and until the marriage is final,
the groom is supposed to bring gifts to the bride. These gifts are
usually a wide silver bracelet that is used as an engagement ring. Also
gifts of clothes and jewelry are quite customary. Such gifts become the
private property of the bride and are to be returned only if the engage-
ment is broken for fault on the part of the bride or any member of her
family. In such cases, her father has to return all the gifts his
daughter has accepted as well as the expenses that the groom's visitations
have cost him.

The marriage is affected and finalized by the payment of the bride-
wealth. In Islamic law the bridewealth is supposed to be paid to the
bride herself as a gift and not to her father, which had been a signifi-
cant departure from the pre—Islamic practice where two types of bride-

wealth were paid: the sadaqa paid to the father of the bride or her

 

* This does not apply to cases where the first wife dies. In such cases,
it is not objectionable to marry her sister, although the incidences of
sororate are rare among the population.

117

legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistin-
guishable and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which
the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift
for a legal marriage: "And give them.whom ye have enjoyed their reward
as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their
dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the
mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the
marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is
considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law,
unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the
two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the mar—
riage is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr.
The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some
regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad)
for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like
a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr
a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security Of property

for the woman.

118

Among Awlad Ali the payment Of the bridewealth signifies the com?
pletion of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
emphasis on the reciprocal Oblications that the marriage created between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an in-
surance for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the mar-
riage is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's

household even after marriage.

119

As a girl in her father's household, the woman is under the di-
rect authority of her father, who is responsible for her. When the father
dies, this responsibility, as well as the authority, goes to her brother
or her closest male kin in the order specified earlier. At marriage the
girl usually moves to live with her husband, and this subjects her to
his control and sometimes to that of his parents, if the couple lives
with them. But the authority of the husband over his wife remains
secondary to that Of her father. The woman's membership in her father's
household does not cease with marriage, and the strength Of her rela-
tions to her kin is maintained by their frequent visits to her new res-
idence and by her occasional visits to them. This right of visitation
cannot be denied by the husband who not only has to allow such visits,
but is also required to treat members of his wife's family, especially
her father, with great respect and hospitality. If the husband fails
to do so, the wife's father can order her to leave her husband and go
back to his household with him.

This point is illustrated by the case of Muftah from the Esheibat
tribe in the area of Matruh, whose older daughter is married to Hemeida
from the Geneishat segment, which lives in the area of Fokah some 80
miles to the east of Matruh. One winter day in 1965, while passing near
the area where his daughter lived, Muftah decided to pay her a visit.
When he arrived, her husband was not at home; he was in the market in a
nearby town selling sheep. When he came back late that evening, he
greeted Muftah with the customary slaughter Of a goat and invited the
neighbors to the occasion. After dinner Muftah wanted to rest. It was
a very hot night, so his sonrin-law brought a rug and spread it outside

the tent in the cool air. After that he retired to his tent where he

120

spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away.
The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he
said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at
any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her
father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.

The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close
friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was
also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is
important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi
is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to
mediate between the two parties without being accused Of taking sides.

The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
relative position Outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is fre-
quently balanced Off by the fact that these religious men lack the sup-
port of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi
has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for
being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends author-
ity to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client

tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

121

requirement for the selection Of the mardi. This does not mean that
religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they
do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number
of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some Of these
cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are
not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the
religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious
nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibil-
ity for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a
better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking
divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than any-
thing else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman
asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which.I will return later
in the chapter.

The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad
were Muftah, his son-in—law, Hemeida, the heads of households in.Muftah's
camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members Of
different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighbor-
ing Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the
tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start.
He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not
develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a
son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a
son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and
said that in that spirit he was asking him.why he had taken his daughter

away from her husgand. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

122

to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of Older people,
especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy

is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"

for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
(lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act Of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.

The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argu-
ment between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took.Muftah outside

the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm.Hemeida down. The other
members Of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of Older peOple. They also re-
minded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and

a goat. Muftahb brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and

123

went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone re-
turned to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man

read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah
and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations
between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls
of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good peOple present,
they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to
where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah

and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left
the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced
that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat.
Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her
husband the following day.

While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have
been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right
to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian,
even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her guard-

ian. One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

124

member of the same tribe. At the time that the dispute had occurred she
had been married for fifteen years and had four children ranging in age
from thirteen to two years. The husband possessed a piece of land on

the coast where a few Olive and fig trees were growing. The husband,
Mukheimer, made no use of either the land or the trees. Then, in 1966,
the father became employed by the government organization in the area
where his daughter and her husband lived and where the land was. He
asked his son-in—law to give him the right to use the land for one pound
a year. Mukheimer, who at that time worked part-time for the same govern-
ment organization as a driver, refused. The reason was that his job with
the government made it possible for him to apply for a power pump to be
installed over the Roman well that existed on the land, and he intended
to utilize the land himself. All attempts to convince Hukheimer to let
him use the land failed. Then one day Mukheimer came back to his tent

to find that his father-in—law had taken his wife and the youngest child
and left the other three children with the second wife. The father-in-
law told the second wife to inform Mukheimer that if he wanted his wife
and child back, he had to think about the land he wanted to take posses-
sion of. Mukheimer tried to discuss the matter with his father-in—law,
buth the latter refused to see him. After a month there were rumors that
the daughter was not happy that her father had taken her away from her
husband and children and that she wanted to go back to her family. She
asked a number of people to help her, including myself, since her father
was one of my informants at that time; but he insisted that the only way
Mukheimer could have his wife and child back.was by giving him the rights
to the land. Mukheimer, on the other hand, threatened to divorce his

wife and marry another woman iftns father-in-law did not return his wife.

125

The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either
party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the
area before any solution to the case was achieved.

Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between
Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his
daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same
area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the
Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an Old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night
that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about
marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and re-
spected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed
that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and
asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein sug-
gested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective
groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the
matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his
daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in ad-
dition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him.with the
appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was
read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left
the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the
morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby
Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back
late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding
the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival

of the new wife.

126

Two days after the groom left,the bride's father (who is at the
same time Hassanein's daughter's father-in—law) came to Hassanein and
told him that the marriage was called Off and that he should send a
letter to the groom telling him the news. The reasons given by the
bride's father were that the groom showed improper manners when he
stayed overnight at the camp and that he followed the prospective bride
to the water well to have a close look at her. He gave the money to
Hassanein and asked him to return it to the man in.Matruh. Hassanein
was very disappointed and considered this an insult to him, Since he
was the mediator in that marriage, and insisted that the bride's father
go on with the marriage. When the latter refused, Hassanein went to his
daughter and ordered her to leave with him. Her husband was there and
could not refuse to let her go with her father, even when Hassanein
made it clear that her husband could not have her back unless his father
kept his agreement with Hassanein's guest. Elewah, the daughter's hus-
band, asked for a mi'ad to discuss the matter with his father-in—law.
The mi'ad was held in Hassanein's house and was attended by Hassanein,
his son-in-law, and two people from a different lineage, each selected
by one of the disputing parties. Hassanein refused to give any reason
for taking his daughter away from her husband except that he was exer-
cising his rights. Eleway, on the other hand, insisted that Hassanein
was not justified in his actions and that it was not right to punish
him for something that his father did. The two representatives tried
to calm both parties and to reach an agreement but were not successful.
The mi'ad dissolved with Hassanein not only insisting on keeping his
daughter, but also threatening to marry her to a rich man in the area.

The case was not solved by the time I left the field.

127

Taking his daughter away from the marital residence is treated
as an undisputed right of the father. This is true whether he is
justified in his actions or not and whether the girl approves of her
father's decision or not. The general view is that the father, having
raised his daughter, is entitled to her Obedience and that taking her
away from her husband, even against her will, is the symbol of authority
over her. It also signifies that the girl has someone to look after her,
to protect her and prevent the husband or any member of his family from
mistreating her. Awlad Ali differentiate, however, between cases in
which the father has exercised his right in an arbitrary and unreasonable
manner and those in which he has reasonable grounds for his actions. A
father is considered justified in taking his daughter away if her hus-
band or members of his family fail to fulfill their obligations towards
the wife or members of her family. Mistreatment of the woman (the defini-
tion of which will be discussed later), and disrespect to members of her
family, or preventing her from visiting her family or them visiting her
in the customary specified manner are always justifiable grounds. As a
justifiable action, the father is not obliged to return his daughter until
he gets full apologies and any gifts for the woman or himself that he con-
siders as kabara. If the husband refuses to concede to the demands of the
father, the latter can force him to divorce her without having to return
the bridewealth to the husband. Although the father's right still exists
when no justifiable grounds are present, in this case he is required to
return his daughter to her husband after a short period. If he refuses,
the husband is entitled to ask for a kabara. He also can divorce his
wife and is entitled to get back his mahr and possible all the marriage

expenses. It is this possibility of having to pay back the mahr and

128

and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his
daughter.

The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her Off from the
family, which means that she is left without any support or protection.

A woman who is cut off from.her family is left vulnerable to her husband
and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible
for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not
transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to prOperty
for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering
the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. How-
ever, in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite Old,
her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved out-
side the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had
no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest
male kin.

0n the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we
have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It

has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective

129

husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr.

In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in—law to out-
fit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other house-
hold items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest
to keep her clothes in. These items become the private prOperty of the
wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man
expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad
Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her
sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to
her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her Obedience. Of the
three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband
have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he
also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the
first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he
can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to
his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping
out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby.
Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordin-
ated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his
daughter.

If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all
or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence
of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of
avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since

she is still a member of that family.

130

The contractual nature of marriage is most clearly manifested in
the case of the wife's adultery. Since the woman belongs to her ag-
natic group, her behavior has direct effect on the honor of that group.
It is, therefore, the responsibility of her closest kin to keep an eye
on her. If the woman commits adultery, it is her father or her male
kin who is supposed to avenge the honor of the family by taking drastic
actions, including killing, against the adulteress and/or her partner.
But the marriage usually takes the woman away from the close watch of
her family and puts her under the supervision Of her husband who becomes
entrusted with the duty of guarding her, and therefore partially respon-
sible for her action. His responsibility is enhanced by the fact that
although the wife's behavior does not affect him or his famdly, it has
a definite effect on the honor and reputation of his children.(Abou-Zeid,
1965).

The gravest insult that one can direct to a person in the area is
to describe his mother of being of disrepute. In their joking relations,
young men usually refer to eachother's father as being a dog or a theif
or a chest, but none could refer to the mother. A woman Of questionable
reputation affects the reputation of her family in general and her child-
ren in particular. Any reference to the mother in the form of an accusa-
tion is supposed to be cleaned only by blood. Not only does this apply
to the woman's voluntary behavior, but also to her physical and mental
condition. If a woman loses her mind, the news is usually kept a secret,
especially by her children. The responsibility for retaliation in the
case of adultery, then, is divided between her nearest kinsman and her
husband. This gives both sides a vague and undetermined right of re-

venge. This division of the right of revenge explains the infrequency

 

131

of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases

of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the
killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her
partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger
was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the
bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the blood-
money, among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband

to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad A11. A11
agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because
of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information
about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gath-
ered from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already
been solved. For the two cases which were still Open at the time of
the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted
with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to
them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve
women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress
or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an
adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for com-
pensation from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this re-
sepct, adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen
the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The come
pensation for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the
mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her

adultery.

132

The ten pounds paid to the husband in this case is considered as
a kabara for the husband's injured pride. The kabara is one of the
vaguest and least determined fines in the tribal law. As a face-saving
device, it varies from one case to another. It is determined in each
case by the seriousness of the insult, the publicity of that insult
(insults in a public place require a much larger kabara than insults
in a private place). The relative age of the insulted and the Offender
is also taken into consideration in assessing the kabara. If the in-
sulted is Older than the offender, the kabara is much higher than if the
situation were reversed. In fact, in the last case the insulted might
not be able to collect any kabara at all. The relative status of the
two parties is also a factor. A member of a Murabiteen tribe who insults
a Sa'adi is likely to be charged with a larger kabara than the reverse
situation. The amount of kabara is left for the bargaining of the two
parties and their representatives and varies greatly from one case to
another. As such, the kabara is not exactly a fine or an independent
punishment. In most of the cases it is an additional punishment added
to a regular one. It is hard to imagine a crime in.which the victim is
not considered hione way or another insulted or belittled. The only
specified kabara that I found in the tribal law was in the case of adul-
tery. The kabara in that case is the same regardless of the relative
position of the people involved. The kabara differs, however, according
to a standardized set of circumstances surrounding the place in which the
adultery is committed. Adultery committed in the husband's tent requires
kabara of the maximum L.E. 20; adultery within the camp of the husband
but outside his tent can bring a kabara of only L.E. 10, while adultery

committed outside the camp brings a mere L.E. 5. The justification for

133

this variation is that committing the adultery within the camp of the
husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor
among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple car-
ries with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent
at least implies an element Of consent on the part of the wife. The
penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of
the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts
the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a
further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible

for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that
the crime of adultery differs from.theft. In the case of theft, the
thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated
Offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a cer-
tain amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is
not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft
constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of
adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the
punishment-—an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among
the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person
involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such
cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his
behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which
should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go
to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, uten-
sils, or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is

paid.

134

Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an ex-
clusive one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. MOst informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past

when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

135

case its return to the husband would have caused great financial in-
convenience for the wife's family.

Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his
wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband
has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children
with adequate food and prOper clothing. If the husband fails to do so
because of poverty, sickness, crOp failure or unexpected disaster, the
wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the neces-
sary food and clothing. If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties
is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother
who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees
to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's Obedi-
ence is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a
number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punish-
ment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in
the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw
a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe
if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the
husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if
he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is
severe.

A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married
to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats
her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have ad-

ditional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

136

providing them with the same kind of food and clothing.* It also in-
cludes dividing his time equally between them, spending one night in
each wife's tent. The first wife, being the chief one, has certain
privileges: her tent is the guest house, food is brought to her resi-
dence, and she is the one to divide it among the other wives, and her
house is the place for the husband to stay if he becomes sick and unable
to move every night from one tent to another. Other than the exceptions
given to the first wife, the husband has to treat all his wives equally.

Normally, such cases of mistreatment do not result in divorce un-
less they are persistent. In most cases, if the wife is mistreated, she
goes to her father's or brother's house or sends for them to come and
take her. For the husband to bring her back to his tent, he must pay
her "nasafa." This is a gift given by the husband to his wife as an
acknowledgement of guilt and as a form of apology for not giving her
fair treatment. In some cases the nasafa is equal to what the husband
originally paid as mahr.

These are some of the rights that marriage gives both men and women
in the tribal society of Awlad Ali. These rights, however, are useless
unless they are backed by certain means of enforcing them. The husband's
rights are guaranteed by his ability to dissolve the marriage at will.
According to Islamic law, a man can divorce his wife by simply pronounc-
ing the sentence "I divorce you" in the presence of credible witnesses.

No justification for divorce is demanded from the husband according to

the Koraan. No such privilege is given to the wife. She can Obtain a

 

* With provision for wives with more children.

137

divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
husband can force her to live with.him. Following the Koraanic rules,
Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and with-
out any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between
cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a
case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and pos-
sibly all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce,
the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified
whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or
members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as
justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be
considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the
reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in

a similar situation.

What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
with the relative position in the social structure of the parties in-
volved and their initial relations to one another. In the case of di-
vorce, what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may
not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis
for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position

of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed.

138

The husband had a big herd by the standards of the tribe (600 sheep
and goats). In addition, he also cultivated a large stretch of the fig
land in the coastal area and was making good money. In other words, the
husband could afford the standard of living the wife demanded. The other
question that was discussed was the actions of the wife herself. She was
the daughter of one of the wealthiest members of the same tribe as her
husband; and according to the people who knew her, she was used to meat
every day of the week. In other cases, similar demands by the wife to
have a certain kind of food or to be clothed in certain kinds of material
were considered as an intolerable situation, and the husband was justi-
fied in his divorcing her and had the right to retrieve his mahr. This
was Obvious in the case of one of my informants whose wife insisted that
every time he went to Alexandria, he bring her silk material for a dress.
Since the husband could not afford to meet her demands, her insistence
was considered as grounds for the husband. The assessment of reasonable-
ness on the part of the husband in his divorce action and therefore his
right to the mahr paid is frequently influenced by the relative position
of the husband and the wife's guardian in the social structure. An in-
fluential man who marries his daughter to a poor relative or nephew rarely
has to return the mahr.

Although women among Awlad Ali are not given the same legal right

of divorcing the husband by pronouncing the "dismissal formula,"

they are
given the right of certain customary procedures which in practice give
than equal facilities for dissolving the marriage. This is known as the

right of the woman to "throw herself." This means that the woman takes

all her clothes and sometimes her children and goes to the dwelling of

139

the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that
she is the wife Of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she
is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom

she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot
refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her
husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is en-
titled to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to ex-
tend that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad
and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents
in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles
down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find
the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the
man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose
is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband. Some-
times he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his
own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support
the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also
because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the
father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after
getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact
the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr
to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially
unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed
to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to
be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the re-
spected man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the

mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

140

husband. In a number of cases the husband was willing to divorce the
woman after a promise by the man that she would pay him the mahr when
she got married. In most cases, however, the process costs the man a
considerable amount of money. Sometimes, when the woman is young and
attractive, the man finds it to his advantage to keep her as his wife,
since she will cost him no more expenses. 0n the other hand, the man
cannot refuse a woman the right of refuge, since to do this or to deny
her the right of hospitality will make him liable to pay kabara if she
made the refusal known publicly. On the other hand, it is prestigious
to be known in the area as a man to whom women go to be released from
their husbands. In fact, a man who acquires a reputation of getting
wives released is likely to be sought as mardi in other cases as well.
Due to the nature of his role in mediating, the woman must be care-
ful in selecting the man over whom she throws herself. These considera-
tions are manifested in the following case taken from my field notes.
Hadia was forced by her father to marry a man from the same tribe who
paid her father L.E. 100 as mahr. She did not want to marry him because
she was in love with someone else of whom her father did not approve.
One month after she was married, she left the tent and never came back.
Later, she appeared in the house of Omda Ali, the chief of another tribe,
and everyone knew that she had thrown herself on him. She later told me
why she had selected Omda Ali and not the Omda of her own tribe. "Be-
cause my husband works for the Omda of my own tribe, and I thought he
would be biased. Of course, I couldn't have gone to my father; he was
the one who forced me to marry that man. Omda Ali is very respected and
can support me... He is also rich and is known for releasing wives from

their husbands." Omda Ali called the husband in and asked him to divorce

141

his wife. The husband agreed but insisted that she pay him L.E. 300
(this included the mahr and the marriage expenses). The Omda tried to
reduce the amount but could not. He then tried to get the father to
pay, but the father refused. He had to pay the husband L.E. 200 of

his own money and promised that the rest would be paid when the woman
remarried (it would be paid from the mahr). The husband divorced Haida.
One week later she was married to her lover. I have no information
about whether or not the 100 pounds was paid.

In another example, Sabha was forced by her father to marry her
cousin (ibn 'amm). She could not live with him, so she threw herself
on one of the holy men in the area. The holy man convinced the hus-
band to divorce Sabha and then went to her father and convinced him to
pay back the mahr to the husband, and the case was settled. People say
that both the husband and the father agreed to the demands of the holy
man because they were afraid of his supernatural curse. Sabha went
back to her father's house.

It is obvious from these and similar cases that the success or
failure Of the procedure depends on the careful selection of the man
on whom a woman throws herself. It is also apparent from the above
examples that his right of refuge is resorted to only in cases where the
woman cannot go to her father or to her closest kin to help her get a
divorce because he is either unable or unwilling to help her. A father
is unable to help if the husband is powerful or if he is the woman's
ibn 'amm (father's brother's son) who has, according to the tribal law,
the undisputed right to marry his bint 'amm (father's brother's daughter).

The father is usually unwilling to help his daughter if he is the one

142

who forced her to marry the husband, or if she was cut Off from the
family for some reason or another.

From the frequency of women using this right in the area, it
seems that no social disapproval is associated with it, nor is there
a social stigma attached to women who throw themselves. They seem to
find it as easy to find a husband as those women divorced voluntarily
by their husbands or with the help of their fathers. In fact, as was
mentioned earlier, many of them marry the rich men over whom they
throw themselves. As to the amount of mahr paid for their subsequent
marriages, the fact of throwing themselves does not seem to be a factor
in determining the amount of mahr paid. In one of the cases, the woman
threw herself on an 'aqila of one of the Geneishat tribe after her
father refused to help her get a divorce from her husband who had mar-
ried a second wife without first asking the first wife's permission.
When the Geneishat member succeeded in convincing the husband to di-
vorce his wife, the latter had no place to stay so remained in the
house of her protector who acted as her guardian in place of her father
who had refused to take her back in his home. While staying in the
house of her protector, she got many marriage offers; one of the suitors
offered a mahr of L.E. 4,000 ($10,000), one of the highest mahrs re-
ported in the area. She agreed, and the marriage was affected. This
mahr is about ten times the mahr she got for her first marriage. This
procedure offers the woman a considerable guarantee of her marital
rights. It also gives her, as far as the ability to dissolve the mar-
riage, a status close to that of her husband. This relative equality

is reflected is reflected in the lack of stigma associated with divorced

143

women in the Western Desert, and that the women usually have no diffi—
culty in finding another husband.‘-

While the right of "throwing herself" offers the wife some guar-
antee of her rights, her main guarantee is derived from the security
she gets from retaining membership in her father's family. After the
death of the father, the woman's claims extend to the households of her
brothers. She acquires in them the same rights she had in her father's
household, and the brothers take the responsibility of their father in
protecting and defending their sister. The woman achieves this continu-
ation of support partially through forfeiting her rights of inheritance
to her brothers.

Awlad Ali recognize the right of the daughters to inherit in their
father's estate. They accept the system of inheritance specified in
the Koraan which gives the woman half the share of her brother. In prac-
tice, this is usually side-stepped. Only sons inherit their father's
property. The justification given for the non—inheritance of women is
that the main items of inheritance in the Western Desert, livestock and
the right of land use, require certain protection and care which are be-
yond the culturally defined roles of women. Livestock require moving
from one grazing ground to another, almost always crossing tribal lands
belonging to various tribal segments, some of whom might be hostile.
It also requires the ability to protect the herds from predators and
from raids, especially in earlier times. Similarly, land requires prep-
aration and protection against trespassers, especially when the barley
is growing.

Women, however, are supposed to be compensated by their brothers

for their shares. But very few would actually ask their brothers for

144

such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied

in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her
share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who
at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
mediation Of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which
he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing
land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and
irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation
projects carried on by the government in the area as construction
workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were
known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to
visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from

Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

145

lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving
Fatma with a ten-month—old boy. By that time, her father had been dis-
abled, and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her be—
half. Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted
that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the
grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to

the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened
her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she
went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her
brothers, and asked for police protection. The police Officer in charge
brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the
store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influ-
ence to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them
worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister,
buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and some-
times helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls

as a midwife. A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a
distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting
that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claim-
ing her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to
beat her. But the Older members of the bait who were present at the meet-
ing stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her
share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was
nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that
meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer

to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she

left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

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the relationship between her and her brothers.

Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.

She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.

He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospital—
ized for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and con-
vinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as come
pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, in-
cluding members of the local administration. She is known to be reason-
able and of sound Opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the

local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

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This apparently is not a typical case, nor is Fatma by any means
representative of a typical tribal women. It is a case of a marginal
woman who had revolted against the tribal definition of a female role.
She violated the customary ways of her society and claimed her share of
her father's inheritance; and by doing this, she forfeited her right to
protection by her brothers. She was able to do this because of her mar-
ginality which enabled her to draw upon sources of protection outside
the tribal pattern, the police. It is interesting to note here that by
doing so, she was not totally eliminated or ostracized from her society;
rather, her role was redefined as that of a man, and she was treated

as such.

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties

' or evil,

and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar,'
for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and

even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes

are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights

in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punish-
ment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.

The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance

group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances

of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

148

149

last two decades). But a feud in the form of extensive, long-term kill-
ing between two groups is very rare among Awlad Ali. The principle of
life for life upon which a feud operates would rarely lead to a permanent
settlement or peace, even when the sense of revenge is satisfied for the
moment. Among the group, this form of permanent settlement is more likely
to be achieved through the payment of bloodmoney, or "diyya." The pay-
ment of the diyya is based on the assumption that the group has lost,

in the deceased, an economic asset. It has been deprived of his ser-
vices, both in supporting his immediate family and in the collective
activities of his amar. This is illustrated in the distribution of the
bloodmoney. Only half of the bloodmoney is paid to the immediate fam-
ily of the victim, the other half being divided equally among adult

males of his amar or vengeance group. This is intended not only to
satisfy their sense of indignation and curb their desire for revenge,

but also to insure that when the time comes to share in the payment of
the bloodmoney, they will pay.

The cessation of feuds in the area seems to coincide with the cessa—
tion of inter-tribal and intra-tribal warfare. During the era of tribal
warfare, the killing of a tribesman meant the loss in the fighting power
of his tribal segment, and feuding, with its emphasis on life for life,
had the purpose of restoring the balance in fighting power among the
groups involved. Monetary compensations were not known in the area dur-
ing that time, according to the informants' accounts, but they were usu-
ally restricted to cases where either the victim or the killer was a
non—tribal person. With the cessation of tribal warfare, the death of

a tribal member became more an economic, rather than a political, loss,

150

and compensation became more and more accepted in settling murder cases
among the tribal population. Bloodmoney, or diyya," was established
among compensations for injury in general. This scale of compensation
is based on the amount of loss of normal activities the injury caused
the victim with death being the total loss of such activities. The
compensation for homocide is estimated at L.E.400 for intentional kill—
ing, and L.E. 300, for unintentional killing. Although reference here

" the assessment of that intention and its defini-

is made to "intention,
tion are quite different from the general usage of that term among modern
jurists. Among modern jurists, the term refers to a state of mind which
implies that the offender willfully and knowingly committed the prohibited
act. This means, first, that the person is able to recognize the nature

of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong. Secondly, it means
that the person was in a position to choose between committing the act

and not committing it and took the former path. According to this view,
individuals under temporary or permanent insanity, children under the

legal age (the definition of which varies from one legal system to another),
non-human beings and Objects are not capable of having criminal intent,
since they are incapable of having a will of their own. Similarly, indi—
viduals who are capable of having a will but, because of certain circumr
stances their freedom of choice was impaired, cannot also have intentions.
Intention, then, in the modern legal conception is a psychological qual-
ity that connects the Offender with the prohibited result or results. It

is this psychological connection that differentiates in modern legal sys-

tems between murder and manslaughter, between attempted murder and simple

assault, between first and second degree murder, and between justifiable

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and unjustifiable homicide. To examine responsibility in homicide
among Awlad Ali and their definition of "intentional" and "non-
intentional" killing, let us first present some of the cases collected
from the area.
CASE #1: The Case of the Broken Rope
This is one of the classical cases which is told throughout
the entire area. There is some slight variation in the way it is
told, but all accounts refer to the fact that Hemeida from the
'Esheibat tribe inherited the right to use a large area of tribal
land in which there was an old Roman well not used for a long per-
iod of time and which was full of sand. One day he invited the
awaqil of his tribal segment, as well as his neighbors, to consult
them on how to clear the well, since without it the land was almost
useless. They all decided it was a good idea and offered their help.
On the day the well was to be cleared, they all gathered around the
well. Among those present was Do'ah, a poor member of the 'Esheibat
tribe who worked as a paid shepherd for Hemeida. He was watching
from a distance when Hemeida called upon him to give a hand. The
well, like all Roman wells in the area, is about fifty feet deep
and fifteen feet in diameter, and narrows as one goes down the well.
To be cleared, someone has to be lowered by a rope to the bottom of
the well to dig up the sand. Hemeida's cousin, Ali, agreed to go
down, and the gathering looked for a sturdy rope which they found
at one of Hemeida's neighbors. As the group was tying Ali to the
rope, Hemeida suggested that Ali was too heavy for the rope and
that it would be a good idea if a slimmer man did the job. At

this point, everybody looked at Do'ah, since he was the thinnest

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person in the crowd. So, Do'ah volunteered to be lowered down

to clear the well. He then proceeded to the well, glanced at the
bottom of it, and threw a small stone to see if there was any water
left in it. The stone made a faint splash indicating that there
were a few inches of water. After that, he examined the rope and
the equipment used. Satisfied with everything, he tied the rope
around himself and was lowered very slowly and carefully by the
crowd at the top of the well. As Do'ah was more than halfdway
down, the rOpe broke, and he fell. When the crowd called him,
Do'ah answered in a faint voice telling them that he was hurt but
that he would be all right. The crowd then looked for a spare
rope to lower somebody to get Do'ah but could not find any in a
nearby camp. They sent a man to get a rope from the next camp,
but by the time a man was lowered to get Do'ah, he was dead; he
had drowned in six inches of water.

Since the place of the accident was close to the police sta-
tion, word got to the Officer who, after investigating the case,
ruled it as accidental death. But while the government authorities
were investigating the case, members of the Bait to which Do'ah be-
longed were proceeding with the customary ways of Awlad Ali to claim
bloodmoney for their dead kinsman. The idea was that a life had
been lost, and that regardless of the police investigation, someone
must pay for it. The question was who. Since the well belonged
to Hemeida, Do'ah's relatives insisted that he was the one to pay
the bloodmoney. Not denying the fact that someone had to pay for

the death of Do'ah, Hemeida insisted that the one to pay was the

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owner of the rope, since it was the broken rope that had caused

the death of Do'ah. The case stayed unsolved for more than two
months, a record for dispatching of criminal cases in the area.

In the final Mi'ad, the main question was whether or not the owner
of the rope was responsible for the death of Do'ah, and therefore
liable for the payment of the bloodmoney. After extensive nego-
tiations with the parties involved, Sheikh Selouma, the aqila of
Hemeida's Bait, who had also been accepted by Do'ah's family as

the Mardi in the case, convened the Mi'ad and announced the settle-
ment. His announcement came after reading certain passages of the
Koran and reminding the parties that they were all members of Awlad
Ali and therefore brothers. He stressed the necessity of all bro-
thers having clear hearts toward one another and not allowing worldly
disputes to leave any impurities among friends. He then came to the
conclusion that there were two things responsible for the death of
Do'ah. The first was Hemeida's decision to clear the well, for had
it not been for that decision, the accident would not have happened.
The second thing responsible was the rOpe whose breaking was the
direct cause of the death. The responsibility here applies only to
the rape and not to the owner of that rOpe. The reason Sheikh Selouma
gave for not holding the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah
was that the rope by itself is not a lethal weapon for which the
owner has to exercise a great deal of caution in lending it. To
make the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah would, according
to Sheikh Selouma, discourage anyone from lending anything to his

neighbor for fear of becoming liable for any harm it might cause.

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"...It means that I will never lend my cooking pot to my neighbor
lest his child trip over it and I would be asked to pay his blood-
money."

SO, the bloodmoney was divided into two sections, one to be
paid by Hemeida, and the other to be the responsibility of the
rope, which meant that the victim's relatives only took home half
of the bloodmoney.

CASE #2: The Case of the Curious Neighbor

 

This is the case of 66-year-old Selouma whose barley land
bordered that of Muftah, a distant member of the same tribe. A
small area Of rocky land separated the two areas. Throughout the
time that Muftah was preparing his land for barley cultivation,
Selouma used to sit on the dividing rocks, observing his neighbor
work on his land and making jokes about the amount of time and
effort Muftah was putting into his land, especially when it looked
like a dry year, anyway, and no barley would be cultivated. For
more than a week Muftah tolerated his neighbor's remarks. "I always
said to myself, 'Don't follow the devil... He is an old man and
doesn't know what he is saying.' But that day I could not take it
any longer. My wife and children were sick, and I didn't have any
money to bring them.medicine or even food. I wanted to finish pre-
paring the land because it looked like it was going to rain that day.
I went to the area I was working on when Selouma started his jokes.
I was mad. I took a small stone and threw it at him to scare him
and make him.stop. The stone hit his leg. It was a small stone,

and I didn't think it would harm him. Actually, he stood on his

155

feet after that and left." It seems that later the wound got in-
fected. Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from
that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a
full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the
death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah
denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Media-
tions continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by
his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had
to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of

his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of
the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath
was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables
of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath,
went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his
uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that
Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject them-
selves to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts
by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the

three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

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was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all
members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point,
there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's
responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much
had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for
"intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown
the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering
his age.

After long and intensive negotiations with the interested
parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had
to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated
that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it
was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone
which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death
was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily
estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that
followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the
child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at
L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that
Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

 

This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was
the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen ex-
cept in a very few places. One of these places was near the small
town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his
Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had

grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

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was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait
of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who
brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from
Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and
a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is
not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another
tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such re-
striction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that
tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so auto-
matically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such per-
mission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his
tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however,
was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in
an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared
that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked
Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered
into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not
move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following
morning Yadem.went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still
there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks.
As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on
the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him
until he was dead.

In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney
for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejec-
ted the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The

Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

158

agreed that the sticks were not by nature lethal weapons. The
latter, according to the tribal law, are only guns and knives,
since they give the victims no chance to defend himself. They
ruled the case unintentional killing for which only L.E. 300
should be paid.

Since Yadem and his brother were arrested by the police for
their crime, the payment of the bloodmoney was postponed until
the case was settled according to the state legal system. Only
half of the bloodmoney was paid and the rest was postponed until
the case was decided upon by the legal system and Yadem released.
This is obviously a case in which the nature of the killing was
decided upon by drawing upon the material aspect of criminal
causation. The nature of the weapon used was the major determinant
of the crime. Only guns and knives are defined as lethal; all
others are non-lethal by nature, although they might cause the
death of the victim. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon is con-
sidered as unintentional regardless of whether or not the actor
intended the results, while death by a lethal weapon, even without
the intention of killing, is classified as intentional killing, as
appears in the following case.
CASE #4: The Case of the Threatened Tribesman

For more than five years Bait El-Mawi from the Sheibat tribe
had been in a continuous state of feud with Bait El-Asi from the
Gemeiat tribe. One night, during a Khamasein sand storm when visa-
bility was extremely low, Abd-el-Galil from Bait EleMawi heard a
noise outside his tent, and the dogs were barking indicating that

a stranger was there. Being sure that someone was approaching

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the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the
feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family,

Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He
called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer,
he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would
fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no
response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil
heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side
of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of

a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his
stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had
come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the
nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent
when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air.
Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem
died before they reached it.

The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400
to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for in-
tentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was in-
flicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

 

This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal
segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for
'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry
season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the
coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their

fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

160

animals to drink, sat on the edge of the well with his feet in the
cool water of the pool completely absorbed in his thoughts amidst
the quiet surroundings. Passing by the pool at that time was Mahdi
from a neighboring tribal segment. Seeing Idris (whom he had not
known), he shouted the customary greeting, "Peace on you." Startled
by the voice of Mahdi, Idris lost his balance and fell in the deep
water of the pool. Mahdi rushed to help him, but the water was too
deep, and Idris drowned. Feeling sorry for Idris, Mahdi took the
flock and went back to the camp of Idris where he informed the
latter's wife of what had happened. A few days later, Mahdi was
paid a visit by Sheikh Elewa, the aqila of Bait Asabei' and known
mardi in the area who informed Mahdi that the famdly of Idris was
demanding the payment of the sum of L.E. 300 for the death of their
relative. A.Mi'ad was set for the following week. In that Mi'ad,
and after Mahdi admitted that it was his greeting that had startled
Idris and caused him to fall in the well, the two Mardis represent-
ing the two parties agreed that the payment of the sum of three
hundred pounds was in order and that Mahdi and his amar must pay it
to the victim's family as soon as possible. At first, Mahdi seemed
to accept the judgment of the two Mardis, especially when both were
prominant members of some of the influential tribal segments in the
area. But Mahdi was a poor man, and his amar was very small in numr
ber, which made the payment of the bloodmoney almost impossible.
Although appeal in the ordinary legal sense does not exist in such
a system like that of Awlad Ali, where no judgment is forced upon

any of the disputing parties, and where the pronouncement of the

161

settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,

yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he real-
ized that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to ques-
tion the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from.the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,

a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him.that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members

of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Every-
one passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, get-
ting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent peOple.
Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.

It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,

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"If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk
safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them
and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who
should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an
unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morn-
ing the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
do you want me to greet all those peOple who were sitting in front
of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might
have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving
me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the
attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to,
and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in
the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous prece-

dent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, and

hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his

163

own home." The following morning a Mi'ad was called for by the two
aqila who achieved the first settlement, and in it, Mahdi was re-
leased from his obligation to pay the bloodmoney, although he was
asked to pay the sum of fifty pounds to the widow of the deceased
as a gesture of friendship.
CASE #6: The Case of the Careless Guest

The present case involved Ali from the Geneishat tribe who
lives in the desert town of Matruh where he has a general store.
He goes on frequent visits to Alexandria to get supplies for his
store. On one of these trips he passed by the camp of 'Awad from
a different tribal segment. Hungry and tired, Ali decided to spend
the night at the camp and continue his trip the following morning.
He went to the first tent in the camp which happened to be that
of 'Awad, who welcomed him and ordered his wife to prepare dinner
for the guest. He then invited other members of the camp to have
tea with the guest as a gesture of hospitality. When Ali sat down
to eat, he took off his shoes, and put his rifle against a pile of
rugs and blankets behind him. As the group was chatting, a goat
belonging to one of the invited neighbors entered the tent where
the men were sitting. Afraid that it might soil the carpets which
he had put out for the guest, Awad chased the goat out of the tent.
On its way out, the goat touched the guest's gun which fired, kill-
ing Hussein, the brother-in-law of one of the neighbors.

The local authorities were notified of the incident, but after
conducting a preliminary investigation, they filed the case as acci-

dental death. The tribal proceedings continued, however. After

164

negotiations between the parties involved were conducted by their
respective awaqil, a Mi'ad was set, and the settlement was an-
nounced. According to the terms of the settlement, three factors
contributed to the death of Hussein: the goat, whose activity was
directly related to the death by causing the gun to fire; the host,
who had chased the goat, causing it to run over the gun and fire it;
and the guest, without whose negligence in leaving the gun loaded
the accident would not have happened. The bloodmoney was divided
into three equal parts, one of which was to be paid by Awad, the
host, the other to be paid by Ali, the owner of the gun, and the
third part to be attributed to the responsibility of the goat and
therefore would not be paid. I

CASE #7: The Case of the Adulterous Wife

 

For more than a year, rumors spread in the area of Burg El-Arab
that Ghenewa's wife was having an affair with Goma'h, a friend of
her husband and a member of a nearby camp. Ghenewa was operating a
small store and was also involved in smuggling goods from Libya; both
required him to be away frequently and for fairly extensive periods
of time. According to the rumors, as soon as he left, his wife
would put a white cloth on the laundry line as a sign indicating
to Goma'h that the husband had left and therefore the former could
come and visit her. When the husband heard the rumors, he was furious
and decided to test his wife. He pretended that he was going to
Alexandria as usual, went to the train station, waited until the train
had left, and then returned to his tent. As he entered the tent, he
found his wife and his friend in a compromising situation. Before

he could do anything, the friend grabbed a kitchen knife and attacked

165

the husband, who reached for his gun and fired at Goma'h. Three

days later the latter died in the hospital from the gun wound.

The case was investigated by the police and brought to trial,
but the case was dismissed as justifiable homocide by reason of
self defense. The tribal proceedings, however, required Ghenewa
to pay the bloodmoney for intentional homocide, since the weapon
used was a gun. Out of the L. 400 bloodmoney, the sum of L. 20
kabara for committing adultery with the wife was deducted. NOne
had questioned the right of Ghenewa to kill Goma'h in the process
of defending himself.

In his essay on "The Early History of Malice Aforethought" in
English law, Maitland discussed the "utter incompetence of ancient law
to take note of the mental elements of a crime" (1911:327). This state—
ment seems to apply to certain aspects of the tribal law of Awlad Ali.
If one causes the death of another, even accidentally, he is liable to
compensation. This attribute is not restricted to Awlad Ali law, for
it has been documented by a number of other studies. Peristiany found
this to be the case among the Potok (1954),and Dundas documented it
among the Kikuyu (1921). In his analysis of injury and liability among
the Barotse, Gluckman maintained that "whatever the motivation of the
killer or the circumstances surrounding the deed, bloodmoney has to be
paid if a member of one grouping of kinsmen was killed by a member of
some other group. The mental element seems to be irrelevant. What is
important is that "murder" is committed within social relationships
where blood compensation is due (1963:205). Similarly, Howell gives us

one of the most comprehensive accounts of the Nuer "rule of law" and

166

the irrelevance of intention in establishing liabilities for homocide
or injuries (1954).

The neglect of intention in assessing liability in cases of homo-
cide is evident in the cases presented above (Cases 1,2,4,5 and 6),
where compensation was paid although there was no intention established
on the part of the offender.

Awlad Ali use the Arabic word "katl" to refer to any killing. This
is different from the word "mut" which means death by natural causes.
They further differentiate between "katl 'amd," or intentional killing
and "katl khata," or unintentional killing. Although reference here is
made to "intention," yet, from the above cases it is evident that the
basis of establishing that intention is from the type of weapon used in
effecting the death of the victim. Intentional killings are those caused
by a lethal weapon. Lethal weapons are defined as guns or knives.

Death caused by a non-lethal weapon, no matter what the intentions of
the offender, is defined as non-intentional, even when the circumstances
of the act indicates the actual existence of an intention on the part
of the offender to cause the death of the victim (as in Case #3 above).
The assumption is that the use of lethal weapons, such as daggers or
guns, implies intention and possibly a certain degree of premeditation,
since these weapons have no other important use. Moreover, the proba-
bility of death by a lethal weapon is much greater than from.other non-
lethal weapons. These give the victim a chance to defend himself, a
chance which he does tot have in the cases of killing with a gun or
dagger. In other words, Awlad Ali, in assessing responsibility for
homocide, "operate with a legalistic psychology in which intention is

is presumed from action" (Gluckman, 1963:207).

167

In practice, Awlad Ali do look at actual circumstances to assess
the intention of the offender. Although compensation is always required,
the readiness of the victim's kin group to accept a financial settlement
and the final amount to be paid in a given situation is affected by the
presence or absence of an intention on behalf of the offender. In assess-
ing the actual intention of the offender in each case, the mediators rely
on the circumstances of the crime as well as on the past history of the
relationships between the offender and the victim. Although this actual
intention of the offender does not change the payment of bloodmoney, the
deceased's kin are more agreeable to the acceptance of the financial
settlement if the killing is unintentional than if it is intentional and
the possibility of revenge is much less imminent. Unintentional killing,
regardless of the weapon used never results in blood feuds. The possi-
bility, on the other hand, is much greater in the cases where the circum-
stances of the offense indicate an intention on the part of the killer to
take the life of the victim. It is for this reason that the right of
nazala, or refuge, discussed in an earlier chapter, is resorted to only
in the case of intentional killing. Of all the cases described in the
chapter only in the case of the trespasser did the killers' kin group
seek refuge by moving to another area where they were protected until
the dispute was solved by another neutral tribal segment. It is impor-
tant to note that killing in the above case was not done by a lethal
weapon but by sticks, and as such was defined by the tribal law as "un-
intentional" as far as the formal amount of compensation required was
concerned. Not all cases where the intention of the offender to kill
the victim is clear carried with it the threat of revenge. The tribal

law takes into consideration certain mitigating circumstances, such as

168

the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender. In the
case of the adulterous wife (Case #7), the intention of the husband to
kill the wife's lover was clear from the evidence; yet, the husband's
kin group never attempted to take refuge, and the victim's group was
eager to settle the case with the least amount of publicity. On the
other hand, killing in circumstances that offend the tribal standards
of chivalry, like killing from ambush or during the night, are the most
difficult to solve and pose the greatest chance for retaliation.
Although the traditional amount of compensation is not determined
by the actual intentions of the killer, but rather by assumed intentions
as deducted from the type of weapon used in causing death, yet, the final
amount paid is usually determined by such intention. The actual inten-
tion works as the basis for bargaining between the victim's kin and the
kin of the killer. Kin of the victim of an intentional killing are less
likely to agree to any reduction of the amount, and with the threat of
retaliation or revenge present, the killer's kin are bargaining from a
weaker point. This is not the case in unintentional killings or where
the victim's behavior instigated the reaction of the killer. In such
cases, the victim's group is more willing to accept a lesser amount of
compensation, and the killer's group, while not in a good bargaining
position, at least are not under the threat of revenge. And since they
do not resort to the right of refuge, their daily activities are not
disrupted. In this case, they could sustain the bargaining activities
for a relatively longer period of time. Also, there is usually a strong
pressure on the victim's group to accept reduced compensation in the

case of unintentional killing from the rest of the tribal members. If

169

they refuse to accept reduced compensation, they are viewed as unreason—
able by the rest of the groups in the area. One way in which such pres-
sure is brought to bear upon the victim's acceptance of reduced compansation
is in the mi'ad, or the public hearing, in which the settlement achieved
is announced. The common practice is for the killer's group to agree to
pay the full amount specified by the traditional scale for compensation
(L.E. 400 for killing with a lethal weapon and L.E. 300 for killing with
a non-lethal weapon). Then, in the final mi'ad in which such agreement

is achieved, a number of important members of non-involved tribal segments
are invited to the mi'ad. During the mi'ad and immediately following the
announcement that a settlement has been achieved and that the kin group of
the killer has agreed to pay the traditional bloodmoney, the mardi or any
one of the attendants to the mi'ad asks the victim's group to defer part
of the payment in honor of important members of the tribal segments pres-
ent at the meeting. Sometimes a portion of the payment is forfeited in
honor of the tent or the women of the household who prepared the food or
even for the blessing of one of the saints in the area. In the case of
the curious neighbor (Case #2) above, out of the original amount specified
for the death by non-lethal weapon estimated as L.E. 300, only L.E. 100
was actually given to the victim's kin group. In addition to the L.E. 100
deducted because of the death of the unborn infant of the offender, an-
other hundred pounds was deducted in honor of certain important members
who attended the gathering. It is interesting to note that the L.E. 100
is compensation for the loss of the use of a leg in the formal scale of
compensations for injuries as will be shown shortly. No such reduction

in the amount of bloodmoney was done in the case of the trespasser where

170

although the weapon used was not lethal and therefore was classified

as an unintentional killing, yet the nature of the crime and the obvious
intention on the part of the killers made reduced payment difficult to
achieve.

Another way of reducing liability and the amount of money paid in
cases of unintentional killing is by taking into consideration all the
intervening variables that contributed to the death of the victim and
asking them to share the blame. The working of this principle is illus-
trated in the case of the broken rope where the rope was assigned half
the responsibility for the death of the victim. It is also present in
the case of the careless guest where the responsibility was divided
three ways with the host paying one third, the owner of the gun paying
another third, and the goat sharing the responsibility for the rest of
the bloodmoney. It is interesting to note the difference in the responsi-
bility to the owner of the gun in the above case and the owner of the
rope in the case of the broken rope. The owner of the rope was not held
responsible for the death caused by his rope, the same way the owner of
the goat in the case of the careless guest was not held responsible for
the actions of the animal. Both the goat and the rope are not dangerous
things by themselves for which a certain degree of care in handling is
required. If such normally harmless things cause injury or death to a
person, the owner is not held responsible.

The situation is quite different in the case of the gun and the re-
sponsibility of its owner. By nature, the gun is a weapon of death, and
for that reason the tribal law has required certain precautions in its

use or handling. Among such precautions in the requirement that a guest,

171

as soon as he settles in the host's place, should unload the gun. In
addition to reducing the possibility of the gun being accidentally fired
and harming someone, this act expressed the trust of the guest in his
host and signifies the ability of the latter to protect his guest against
any harm. A person visiting another does not need his gun for protection
and therefore must unload it. If the owner of the gun fails to take this
customary precaution and leaves his gun loaded, and because of that fail-
ure the gun causes the death or injury of a person or even damage to prop-
erty, the owner is held responsible for that result. The same rule applies
to other deadly weapons, such as knives or daggers, as well as to animals
which are dangerous by nature, such as dogs. Each tent in the area has a
dog. Starting the first weeks in the puppy's life, he is trained to
guard the tent and to bark at the approach of any stranger. It is also
trained to attack any intruder who comes within fifty yards of the tent
unless accompanied by a member of the tent. When one goes to visit an-
other, he usually stays away from the tent until someone from the tent
hears the dog barking and comes out to get the guest. Most dogs would
not attack a person as long as he is the safe fifty yards away from the
tent. Occasionally, a dog goes behond the safe distance and b ites an
individual passing by or a guest waiting to be let inside the tent. If
the injured person is able to prove, usually by taking the oath, that

he was more than fifty yards away from the tent at the time he was at-
tacked by the dog, the dog's owner is liable to the victim for the in-
jury inflicted by the dog. If, on the other hand, evidence shows that
the victim was bitten by the dog while being less than fifty yards away

from the tent, then there is no responsibility on the part of the dog's

172

owner. This means that an element of neglect has to be proven on the part
of the owner of either a lethal weapon or a dangerous animal before he

is held responsible for the fdamage they cause. But whether dangerous

or not, the role of such objects or animals, in causing the death or in-
jury of the victim, is taken into consideration in assessing the exact
amount to be paid as compensation.

In assessing the intention and consequently the amount of the tradi-
tional bloodmoney to be paid, the behavior of the offender is judged ac-
cording to a traditional standard of reasonableness. In the case of the
curious neighbor, Muftah, in his attempt to evade the payment of the full
bloodmoney, presented an elaborate account of his neighbor's actions in-
cluding the provocative statements that the latter had said, the jokes,
and even the insults he had directed against Muftah. His attempt was to
show that throwing a small rock at his neighbor was not an unreasonable
behavior considering the provocations of that neighbor whose behavior was
itself unreasonable. Although the victim's behavior was unreasonable,
the response of Muftah to the provocations of his neighbor was also con-
sidered as unreasonable. He could have followed the traditional means
of asking a third party to interfere and prevent the neighbor from con-
tinuing his insults. Instead, Muftah took the direct and unreasonable
response which eventually led to the death of Selouma. It is that ele-
ment of reasonableness that led to the reversal of the original settle-
ment in the case of the startled shepherd (Case #4). When considering
a certain behavior in the context of reasonableness, the mediators draw
not only upon the immediate facts of the case under consideration, but

also upon the careful inquiry into the long history of interrelations

173

between the parties involved. The relative position of both the of-
fender and the victim and their relationship to one another is taken
into account. What is reasonable behavior in one case may not be so in
another. Pst disputes are taken as indications of the present situation,
although they may not be directly related to the present dispute.

It is possible to say, then, that Awlad Ali recognize two types of
intentions: an assumed intention deducted from certain material aspects
of the act itself, like the type of weapon used in causing the death of
the victim, and an actual intention which is quite similar to that util-
ized in modern jurisprudence in the sense that it pertains to a state of
mind on the part of the offender that connects him in a special way with
the prohibited results. The assumed intention works to set the initial
guide for the traditional scale of bloodmoney. It sets the basis upon
which compromise could be achieved. Actual intention, on the other hand,
determines the actual course the specific case takes as well as the final

amount of money paid as a settlement.

174

Part 2: Bodily Injuries

Awlad Ali recognize compensation for all sorts of bodily injuries
sustained intentionally or accidentally. An elaborate scale of compen-
sations is set as a basis for compromise. The basic principle involved
is that an injury should be met by compensation in direct ratio to its
severity, and the severity is assessed by the extent of a man's dis-
ability. Disability, in turn, is measured by the extent to which a man
is prevented from participating in the communal activities which enable
him to defend and maintain himself and his family according to the cus-
tomary standards they are used to. It is a collective, as well as an
individual, concern. A head injury or an injury to the hand may amount
to a very serious defect if the person is unable to cultivate the barley
fields or move with the herds for grazing or holding a gun to defend his
family and group against an intruder who intends to do him harm. Death
is considered the maximum disability, as are other injuries that take the
person totally out of the collective activities, as in the case of injury
resulting in paralysis or blindness. All other injuries are compensated
by a fraction of the bloodmoney for homicide or L.E. 400.

Scale of Compensation for Bodily Injuries

El damiah Sughra (a small wound which
does not cut the skin) L. 3

El damiah kubrah (a small wound which
cuts the skin) L. 6

El fakhera (a wound which cuts the
skin and reaches the flesh under it) L. 12

El badi'a (a wound which cuts the flesh
on both sides) L. 25

El mutifah (severe cuts to the flesh) L. 30

175

El malta (a wound which cuts the skin
and flesh and reaches the fat next
to the bone) L. 35

E1 muwadiha (a wound which cuts the skin,
the flesh and the fat next to the bone
and leaves the latter exposed) L. 50

E1 hashima (skull fracture) L. 100

El munkala (a head injury in which a
piece of skull is removed) L. 150

El maimuma (a head wound that causes
permanent brain damage) L. 400

Damage to the head hair:
if permanently damaged L. 100
if grew back without damage L. 20
(The above rule applies to the hair
of the beard, mustache and eyelashes.)

Fracture of the hand: for each finger L. 50
Fracture of the arm: for each bone L. 50
Fracture of the leg: for each bone L. 100
Broken ribs (unspecified number) L. 100
Fracture of the foot L. 100

Paralysis or severance of the fingers:

each joint (except those of the thumb) L. 33
Paralysis or severance of the thumb:

each joint L. 50
Loss of two ears L. 400
Loss of one ear L. 200

If hearing is impared, the defect is measured in rela-
tionship to the total utility of the ears, and compen-
sation is estimated accordingly.

Complete loss of the eyesight L. 400

Partial loss: to be assessed in proportion of that loss
to the total utility.

Nose: if totally cut off L. 400

Piercing the nostrils L. 100

176

If the two lips are cut off: L. 400
just the lower lip L. 300
just the upper lip L. 200

Visible piercing of the lips L. 50

The tongue: if results in total loss
of speech L. 400

Partial loss of speech is measured in prOportion to that
total loss.

All the teeth L. 400
Each tooth L. 50
Testicles: if out off L. 400
The entire genitals L. 800
The breasts:
of a nubile woman L. 200
of an old woman L. 100

As in the case of homicide, the above scale of compensation works
only as a basis for compromise rather than as a definite or exact fine.
To assess the amount of injury and therefore the category of compensation,
the victim and his group, as well as a representative of the offender,

"nazzar" who examines him and de-

have to take the injured person to the
fines the kind of injury sustained. The nazzar is usually a member of

one of the Murabiteen tribes who is known to possess a number of shari's
books specifying the injuries and the amount of compensation required in
each case. Before he assesses the wounds, both parties have to swear that
they will accept his judgment, and they pay him a token fee that varies
according to the ability to pay and the position of the parties involved.
The amount of money estimated by the nazzar is not necessarily the final

amount of money paid. For, as in the case of homicide, it is subject to

deductions in honor of various members who attend the meeting in which

177

the settlement is announced. This deduction is determined by the same
factors involved in the case of homicide, such as the relationship be-
tween the parties involved and the presence or absence of an intention
on the part of the offender to cause bodily harm to the victim, as well
as the role the victim played in provoking the actions that led to his
injury. Injuries sustained during a fight are not as serious as injur-
ies sustained by ambushing the victim. In the latter case, the victim
had no chance to defend himself. Also, the number of people involved in
the actions that led to the injury enter as a variable. If more than one
individual attacks a victim, it is considered more serious than a man-

to—man fight.

CONCLUSIONS

The judicial process among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of
Egypt has been dealt with in the context of political organization of
the group. The main feature of the political organization of Awlad Ali
is the absence of centralized leadership. The only formally recognized
leadership is that of the aqila, the leader of the bait tribal segment.
The sources of the aqila's authority derive from a number of sources,
one of which is his judicial role. It is through him that disputes in-
volving members of his bait are solved.- The process by which he per-
forms this crucial function is that of informal mediation in which both
the personal qualities of the aqila, as well as the weight of his tribal
segment, play an important role. This is especially important in a so-
ciety with no court system or formal hearing and where durability of any
settlement depends on its being accepted by the parties involved.

The main aim of the judicial process is to affect reconciliation of
the parties and to restore a certain degree of social order and cohesion
that was disrupted by the dispute. The need to restore the social order
and to maintain friendly relations between tribal members is a response
to certain aspects of the natural and social environment in which the
group finds itself. Natural resources in the area are very meager, and
subsistence activities require that the tribesmen constantly move with
their herds for pasture throughout an area already divided among the
various tribal segments. Since the place and nature of pasture differ
from one year to the next, the identity of the specific tribal unit which
would be sought for help varies correspondingly. This creates a general

feeling of dependency that characterizes the social relations in the area.

178

179

On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden be-
hind a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another

in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describ-
ing the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usu-
ally dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happen-
ing in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribes-
men get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that

the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties in-
volved and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed

upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

180

so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members

who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is
reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of
that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This
creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals
who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settle-
ment. The social cohesion is maintained.

The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected
in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial
reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases
are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoid-
ing face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an
agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it
that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true
in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face
confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the in-
formality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settle-
ment informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment
of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This
does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that
there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are
very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in
solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to
achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only
through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is

maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

Abb
'acd

Akh

'amar e1 dam
'amd

'amm
'aqila

bait

bait el shan'a

baraka

barawa

bint

bint 'amm
bint haram
beer sama
diyya
daraieb
'eila

el—fatha

feddan
ghish
ibn

ibn 'amm

iktitab

APPENDEX I

94‘»

”gun

181

GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS USED

father

contract

brother

unity of blood (vengeance group)
intention

father's brother

wise man; leader of a bait
house

house of the dreadful deed
blessing

to ostracize from.membership in
a particular group

daughter

father's brother's daughter
illegitimate girl

sky well

bloodmoney

the tribal laws and customs
family

the beginning chapter of the Koran;
the initial ceremony in the marriage

acre

cheating, or unfair deal
son

father's brother's son

tribal adoption

182

jad 4%” grandfather
25-»?
jaddah grandmother
kabara Q,L1 face-saving compensation
kabila ‘4r3 tribe
katl a; killing
khata' \LL by accident
kishk .1111 dried milk
khal 4L} mother's brother
,4
. \ "‘
Koran k'“3 the Islamic sacred book
mahr J§d bridewealth
mardi (beo go-between
maleh CH1 sour milk
mi'ad J\%? tribal hearing
murabiteen LJJng holymen, client tribes
(sing., murabit) (#053)
Mustagilleen krfliiia. independent tribes
nagei' a; camp
nazala AJ\J; refuge
nazzar )T“ one who assesses the amount of
compensation for wounds and bodily
injuries
nasafa cg“; compensation for a wife
omda B_h£' a government appointed tribal leader
sayem 6A1; a male who fasts the month of Ramadan,
an adult
“QJJHp
sadaqa obligatory tribute
sa'adE 8359’“ the original tribes of Awlad Ali
sheikh Ef‘ib any tribal leader, or an old man

sura

Shei'a

Sunni
shar
thebeiha
ukht
umm
watan
wakil
zawya

Z ena

183

a chapter in the Koran

the unorthodox sector of Muslim
practices

the orthodox Muslim group
evil

a sacrifice

sister

mother

homeland

a legal guardian

a religious center

adultry

184

 
                

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