ALBERT" GALLATIN AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
A STUDY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN SFATE UNWERSITY
JAMES ALEXANDER BDXALL, JR.
1967

THESIS

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

ALBERT GALLATIN AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
A STUDY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

presented bg

James Alexander BoxaII, Jr.

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

__Ph-_D-___ degree in m

‘ {LL-R'Z'Jl";

Major pro(essor

Datem /% /€Z/7

0-169

 

James Alexander Boxall, Jr.

mainly because the European War led to the evolution of
an important American neutral carrying trade° Anglo-
American relations had deteriorated so badly by 1794 that
war seemed imminent. Although peace was preserved by the
signing of the Jay Treaty, political warfare exploded in
the United States. Republican criticism of the British
Treaty failed to stop its ratification. France responded
by expanding her harassment of American ships, and a
period of quasi—war followed until 1800 when the two na—
tions reached an accommodation. A sudden shift of French
policy in 1803 resulted in American acquisition of Louisi-
ana. However, the new territory encouraged the United
States to look south toward Spanish territory in Florida.
When the Napoleonic Wars reached a stalemate in late
1805, harsh commercial restrictions which threatened to
destroy American commerce were adopted by both Britain
and France. America reSponded in December, 1807 with the
embargo which was later changed to more submissive meas—
ures. Because Britain seemed to violate American inter-
ests at so many points war with the former mother country
resulted in June, 1812.

Albert Gallatin confronted the major issues which
tested American foreign policy in different ways. During
his Congressional years he opposed the Jay Treaty and re—
fused to admit that a crisis with France existed. As
Treasurer his views changed. He supported the use of
force to seize Louisiana if necessary. While he worked

to restrain Jefferson in Florida, he favored war against

 

 

 

ABSTRACT

ALBERT GALLATIN AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: A STUDY
IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

by James Alexander Boxall, Jr.

Albert Gallatin, Republican Congressman 1795-1801,
Secretary of the Treasury 1801—1813, and American diplomat
1813—1827, was one of the most significant public figures
of his time. Although most historians agree on Gallatin’s
contributions as a financier, few acknowledge his influence
upon American foreign policy prior to 1813. This study is
concerned with two aspects of Albert Gallatin’s relation—
ship to American foreign policy 1795—1812: his suggestions
for and criticisms of American policy and the influence he
exerted upon the adOption of various courses of action.

The Albert Gallatin Papers at the New-York Histori-
cal Society, the Thomas Jefferson Papers in the Library of
Congress, and the James Madison Papers at the Library of
Congress constitute the major sources of this investiga—

tion. In addition, the Annals of Congress served as a

 

major source for the study of Congressional opinion, and

the American State Papers outlined the course of American

 

foreign relations.
For most of the time between 1795 and 1812 the

United States was deeply involved in foreign affairs

James Alexander Boxall, Jr.

mainly because the European War led to the evolution of
an important American neutral carrying trade. Anglo-
American relations had deteriorated so badly by 1794 that
war seemed imminent. Although peace was preserved by the
signing of the Jay Treaty, political warfare exploded in
the United States. Republican criticism of the British
Treaty failed to stop its ratification. France responded
by expanding her harassment of American ships, and a
period of quasi~war followed until 1800 when the two na—
tions reached an accommodation. A sudden shift of French
policy in 1803 resulted in American acquisition of Louisi-
ana. However, the new territory encouraged the United
States to look south toward Spanish territory in Florida.
When the Napoleonic Wars reached a stalemate in late
1805, harsh commercial restrictions which threatened to
destroy American commerce were adopted by both Britain
and France. America responded in December, 1807 with the
embargo which was later changed to more submissive meas—
ures. Because Britain seemed to violate American inter-
ests at so many points war with the former mother country
resulted in June, 1812.

Albert Gallatin confronted the major issues which
tested American foreign policy in different ways. During
his Congressional years he opposed the Jay Treaty and re-
fused to admit that a crisis with France existed. As
Treasurer his views changed. He supported the use of
force to seize Louisiana if necessary. While he worked

to restrain Jefferson in Florida, he favored war against

James Alexander Boxall, Jr.
Britain rather than a permanent embargo in 1808. Later he

attempted to avoid complete submission, and when the nation—
al mood changed he resigned himself to war. From 1795—

1812 Gallatin advised both Jefferson and Madison on foreign
affairs. On many occasions his advice helped modify poli—
cies, but he was frequently overruled. As a loyal member

of the administration he faithfully implemented even those
policies he found most distasteful. Gallatin approached
questions of foreign relations judiciously and with as little
bias as could be expected. As Treasurer he tried to recon—
cile domestic policy and foreign affairs by working for
peace consistent with American national honor. An idealist
at heart in time of crisis he exhibited a tough textured

realism.

 

 

ALBERT GALLATIN AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: A STUDY IN
THOUGHT AND ACTION

By

James Alexander Boxall, Jr.

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History

1967

240533

[OM/(fl

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is indebted to his wife, Nancy, for
her constant encouragement, editorial criticism, and
help in typing the preliminary manuscript; to my parents,
Mr. and Mrs. James Boxall, and to my wife's parents, Dr.
and Mrs. L.G. Ferrand, for their assistance and encour—
agement; to Dean Paul A. Varg for his many helpful sug—
gestions and much valued assistance without which this
study could not have been completed; and to Mrs. Inez
Shapiro for her unceasing devotion in typing the final

manuscript.

 

 

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
INTRODUCTION .
Chapter
I. FROM GENEVA T0 PHILADELPHIA: THE
MAKING OF AN AMERICAN
II. A REPUBLICAN CONGRESSMAN LOOKS AT
FOREIGN POLICY
III. THE FAILURE OF FRENCH INTIMIDATION
IV. THE JEFFERSONIANS IN POWER
V. THE SPANISH QUESTION .
VI. CRISIS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
VII. THE PITFALLS 0F PEACEFUL COERCION
VIII. JAMES MADISON AT THE HELM
IX.

ALBERT GALLATIN AND AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY ESSAY

Page

ii

31

70
102
124
ISO
177
203

229

236

INTRODUCTION

I was introduced to Albert Gallatin during my first
graduate reading course, an inquiry into American foreign
policy 1789—1812. At that time I was impressed with Gal—
1atin's astute observations and recommendations concerning
American foreign policy when he was Secretary of the
Treasury in President Jefferson's cabinet. Three facets of
Gallatin‘s approach to policy formulation struck me as es—
pecially important. First, he was very careful to gather
all facts relevant to a problem before rendering an opin-
ion. Secondly, he was systematic and consistent in his
analysis of a prospective policy. Finally, he cut through
the partisan rhetoric of the day and came to grips with
the heart of the problem he was considering. As outstand-
ing as these traits were my intellectual interests shifted
to another phase of American diplomatic history in subse-
quent stages of my graduate career.

Not until I was engaged in a thorough study of
American foreign policy in the two decades following World
War I, considered by many observers as the apogee of Amer-

" did my interests and thoughts return

ican "isolationism,
to the formulative period of American diplomatic history.
At this point two ideas struck me. First, one could not

deal adequately with the problem of American ”isolationism"

l

2

without studying the early period of America's national
history in some depth, for it was during this early period
that the so-called ”isolationist" policy was forged. Sec-
ondly, the term "isolationism" as applied to the early
national period, or indeed to any period of American history,
is a misnomer. From the inception of the Republic in 1776
the United States engaged in relations with foreign nations;
the term "isolation" meant no more than an aversion to po-
litical and military alliances. These considerations led
me to recommit my intellectual career to a study of the
period from 1789 to 1815 when foreign affairs played such a
crucial role in the life of the republic.

During the early national period Washington, Hamilton,
Adams, Jefferson, and Madison were the leaders of the na-
tion. Their deeds are widely known and appreciated. How—
ever, no conscientious student of the Jeffersonian period
can ignore the contributions of Albert Gallatin, for it is
hard to imagine how Jefferson and Madison could have pro-
ceeded without him. Yet Gallatin‘s role in American his-
tory, while generally well known to serious students and
scholars, is virtually unknown to the public. Many reasons
can be found for this wideSpread ignorance of Gallatin. He
was never President or even Secretary of State. He was not
as colorful as many of his contemporaries. Probably the
best reason for his obscurity is that his personal papers
remained closed for almost seventy years after the Gallatin
family allowed Henry Adams to use them. Perhaps this last

reason best explains why Gallatin's role in helping to

3
shape American foreign policy prior to the War of 1812 is

not sufficiently appreciated even among professional his-
torians.

The major thesis of this study is that throughout
the period 1795-1812 Albert Gallatin exhibited three high-
ly significant characteristics when considering problems
of foreign relations. First, he was careful to marshall
all relevant facts prior to making an analysis, expressing
an opinion, or forwarding a recommendation. Secondly, he
was systematic, logical, and consistent in his scrutiniza-
tion of a prOSpective policy. Finally, he ruthlessly, al—
most bluntly, cut through peripheral matters to reach the
heart of the problem he was considering. There are also
several minor threads which must be considered when dis—
cussing Gallatin’s foreign policy. He was acutely aware
of the relationship between domestic and foreign affairs.
He frequently alluded to these connections, and his foreign
policy bears the sign of this inter-relationship. More—
over, Gallatin frequently combined realistic and idealistic
strains of thinking in forging a policy.

Before embarking upon an analysis of Albert Gala
latin‘s role in foreign policy it would be well to place
the international position of the United States in an his-
torical perSpective. One of the predominant realities
today is the division of the world into three camps: the
Western World led by the United States, the Communist
World with the Soviet Union and China contending for lead—

ership, and the "Third World" consisting of the uncommitted

n

nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The gigantic
struggle for political freedom and economic advancement
which this large bloc of uncommitted nations are waging is
being conducted in the cross-fire between the Western
World and the Communist World. At the same time while the
"Third World” may accept economic aid from either or both
sides, there is a genuine desire for independence of
action. In other words, most states in the "Third World”
want no military or political commitments to either of the
contending factions. Often this desired status of ”non—
alignment" is difficult to achieve because economic pres—
sures or economic attachments may tend to impinge on a
nation’s political independence.

Although conditions were different, similar problems
present themselves in the study of this period. Then the
independent nations of the world seemed to be divided into
three camps: the French nation, her opponent‘s led by
Britain, and the young republic on the other side of the
Atlantic. The United States occupied a position similar
to today’s uncommitted states, for she believed in com—
mercial relations with all nations but political or military
involvements with none. Prior to 1801 the conflict be-
tween the terms of the French Alliance of 1778 and economic
ties to Great Britain posed a dilemma for the United
States. However, after the recommencement of the Napole-
onic Wars in 1803 the American position became more diffi-
cult, for she found that neutral rights were often disre-

garded by both sides. How to preserve her neutral status,

 

5

retain her independence, and remain at peace was as great
a problem for the United States in the early years of the
nineteenth century as it is for the non-aligned nations

today.

CHAPTER I

FROM GENEVA TO PHILADELPHIA:
THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN

Albert Gallatin’s family had ancient roots both in
Europe and in Geneva. The Gallatins of Geneva could trace
their heritage as far back as the thirteenth century, but
until the first years of the sixteenth century the Gallan—
tini family, as they were known then, resided in Savoy.

In 1510 Jean Gallantini took up citizenship in Geneva.
After the establishment of Geneva as a republic in 1535

the Gallatins played a prominent role in the history of

the city-state. Five members of the family served as first
syndics, chief magistrate of the republic. Others were
clerics and professors at the local college. Still others
went abroad in the service of their native state.1

By the middle of the eighteenth century four branches
of the Gallatin family lived in Geneva. One was headed by
Abraham Gallatin who had prOSpered largely as a result of
his marriage to Louise—Susanne Vaudenet, the daughter of a
wealthy Geneva banker. Mme. Gallatin-Vaudenet had two

daughters and a son, Jean who was born in 1733. Jean be-

 

1Henry Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin (Phila-
delphia: J.P. Lipincott and Co., 1879), pp. 1-3; Raymond
Walters Jr., Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier and
Diplomat (New York: The Macméllan Company, 1957), p. 1.

7

came a partner with his father in the family business,
selling timepieces, and married Sophie Albertine Roloz du
Rosey in 1755. Jean and SOphie had two children, Susanne
born in 1756 and Abraham Alphonse Albert born January 29,
1761 and known to history as Albert Gallatin.2

Young Albert eXperienced an unusual childhood. His
father died in 1765 when he was only four years old, and
his mother assumed her late husband‘s share of the family
partnership. It soon became apparent that she could not
do justice to the family business, care for her daughter
who had been perpetually ill since birth, and be a good
mother to Albert. Thus on January 8, 1766 Albert went to
live with Catherine Pictet, a maiden lady of about forty,
and a close friend of the family. In 1770 Albert's mother
died, and in 1777 his sister passed away from a nervous
disease. Albert lived with Mlle. Pictet and was privately
tutored until he was twelve. Then in January, 1733 he
entered the College of Geneva boarding with a master, and
in August, 1775 he matriculated at the Academy of Geneva.
During his school days a sizeable part of his expenses
were paid by the Bourse Gallatin, a trust that had been
established by one Francois Gallatin near the end of the
seventeenth century "for the Aid and Relief of the mem—
bers of the family."3

Gallatin's education prepared him well for his

future in public service. The College of Geneva stressed

 

2Walters, Gallatin, pp. 1—2.

 

3Ibid., p. 23 Adams, Life of Gallatin, pp. 10—11.

8

classical languages and literature. A student with the
tough intellectual fibre which Gallatin possessed thrived,
for the classics were taught without notes or translation.
At the Academy Albert followed a curriculum known as the
"belles-lettres" which included lectures in the classics,
history, and philosophy. At the close of the school year
each student received a public oral examination conducted
in Latin. Gallatin found the exams severe but fair and
observed that most American colleges followed the same
system of promotion}I
In May, 1779 Albert completed his fourth year at the
academy and faced the problem of choosing a career. The
number of occupations that were open to a young person of
Gallatin’s ability and temperament were indeed restricted.
The small population and limited resources of Geneva con—
stituted one reason why so many young sons of this proud
and independent city-state had emigrated. The Geneva
Academy offered training for two professions, the clergy
and the law. Young Albert was too fond of independent
speculation and too humanistic in spirit too consider the
first alternative. While law held some attraction the
prospects for making anything above a subsistance living
at this occupation in Geneva were dim. Therefore as Gal-
latin reflected on this problem he became convinced that

he too probably would have to leave Geneva to make his

place in the sun.5

 

uWalters, Gallatin, pp. 5—7. 5Ibid., pp. 7-8.

9

For almost a year Albert avoided a decision. After
completing his formal education he tutored Mlle. Pictet’s
nephew, Issac Pictet, in a number of subjects including
English. He enjoyed this rather easy—going life which al—
lowed him to read widely and think Speculatively. However,
several considerations brought the situation to a head and
led to Gallatin’s decision to leave Geneva. At the Academy
Albert had become very friendly with several young vision—
aries who were highly imbued with the philosophy of Jean
Jacques Rousseau. Allowing romantic thoughts to rule their
thinking Albert and his friends found many drawbacks to
Geneva. Moreover, Albert's grandmother had already selected
his occupation, and she tried to coax him to follow her
advice. She wanted him to take a commission as lieutenant—
colonel in the military service of the Landgrave of Hesse,
whose troops were fighting against the American colonists.
Such a suggestion was anathema to a nascent democrat, and
Albert told his grandmother rather bluntly that he did not
want to fight for a tyrant. His dependence upon others
and especially upon his guardian Mlle. Pictet also irked
him. Thus a combination of factors led Albert to seek out
his two romantic friends, Jean Badollet and Henri Serre,
who also yearned to escape from Geneva.6

The three young romantics met often and planned their
future outside of Geneva. These talks increasingly turned

to the possibility of going to America. They were not at

 

6Adams, Life of Gallatin, pp. 16—18, Walters, Gal-
latin, p. 9.

10
all sure of what they would do when they reached the dis-

tant shore of the Atlantic, but they were fervently de-
sirous of going to the land of hOpe and opportunity in
the New World. Because of family affairs Badollet could
not leave Geneva, but Serre and Gallatin decided to pro-
ceed with their plan. It was understood that Badollet
would join them as soon as possible.7

On April 1, 1780 Gallatin and Serre secretly left
Geneva. Nbbody knew of their plans for fear they would
be stopped. They passed through France and made their way
to the Atlantic port of Nantes where they arranged for
passage to Boston on board the American vessel HEIDI!
While waiting to embark the two adventurers bought some
tea hoping to sell it at a profit in America. On May 27,
1780 the HEB y set sail across the Atlantic, and Albert
Gallatin left his native continent not to return for
thirty—three years.8

Gallatin’s family disapproved of his decision to
leave Geneva. Both his family and Mlle. Pictet tried to
persuade him to return. Unfortunately none of Gallatin’s
letters in his defense are preserved, and it is impossible
to trace his thinking. Although downcast, Gallatin's
family made great efforts to secure the best for him once

he got to America, writing to every person who might ex-

—.‘

TWalters, Gallatin, pp. 5-7.

 

8

Albert Gallatin to Jean Badollet, May 16, 1780,
$¥lbert Gallatin Papers, New-York Historical Society. Cited
huereafter as Gallatin Papers; Walters, Gallatin, p. 10.

 

ll
ercise influence there.9

After a long journey which lasted forty—nine days
the Eat y landed at Cape Ann in Massachusetts on July 15,
1780. Gallatin and Serre proceeded to Boston where they
made the acquaintance of a Frenchman named Tahon who kept
an inn "At the Sign of the Confederation." Through Tahon
they were introduced to a married couple named Delesdernier
who were also emigres from Geneva. With the exception of
these two pleasant contacts the two young adventurers found
conditions in Boston dismal. Their slight knowledge of
English made selling their tea very difficult. Nor did
the unstable economic conditions imposed by six years of
war help their entrepreneurial aspirations. Moreover,
they found the atmOSphere far from congenial, for most
Bostonians had little reSpect for Frenchmen or even those
who Spoke the French language. Furthermore, Boston’s pur-
itanical atmOSphere disturbed Gallatin who found that city
a frightfully boring town which reminded him too much of
Geneva. For these reasons Gallatin and Serre decided to
leave Boston in the fall.10

From Boston the two young Genevans journeyed north-
ward with the Delesderniers. They located in northern
Maine at the settlement of Machias which has one hundred—

fifty people living in a ten square mile area. Conditions

 

9Adams, Life of Gallatin, pp. 19—24; Duc de Rochefou-

cauld d’ Enville to Benjamin Franklin, May 22, 1780, Gal—
latin Papers; Franklin to the Duc de la Rochefoucauld d‘
Enville, May 24, 1780; Adams, Life of Gallatin, p. 24.

IO

 

Walters, Gallatin, p. 11.

 

12
in Maine, while quite different from Boston, were not

much more promising for Gallatin and Serre. The constant
threat of attack by the British hung over the settlement.
Few opportunities for trade existed because goods and
money were scarce. DeSpite the rudimentary conditions the
two young Genevans decided to test their romantic ideas
about farming. Thus they Spent one year at Machias. In
late fall, 1781, when both their resources and prOSpectS
were dubious, Gallatin and Serre heard of the decisive
American victory at Yorktown. Not being able to face the
prOSpect of another winter in Maine they went back to
Boston to wait for Spring and new opportunities.ll
Gallatin remained in Boston from the winter of 1781
until the summer of 1783. At first both he and Serre
tutored on a casual basis. On July 2, 1782, largely
through the efforts of Catherine Pictet, who had influential
Genevans contact friends in Boston, Albert Gallatin was ap-
pointed as a tutor at Harvard College. Remaining in this
capacity until the summer of 1783 he taught French to stu—
dents on an individual basis. During his stay at Harvard
the hope of discovering a rustic paradise in America was
rekindled, for he met a dreamy Frenchman Jean Savary de
Valcoulon. Savary was an agent of one Rene Rapicault, a
Frenchman who had advanced money and supplies to the state

of Virginia during the Revolutionary War. Gallatin accom—

panied Savary southward on a business trip beginning on

 

ll .
Ibid., pp. 12—13.

13
July 11, 1783. They traveled Slowly and passed through

Providence, Newport, New York, Trenton, and finally term-
inated at Philadelphia.12

While they were in Philadelphia Gallatin told Savary
of his aSpirationS to become a farmer and a land promoter.
Philadelphia was a most congenial place for men with such
ideas, for the capital of the Confederation was saturated
with both news and rumors of Opportunities for Speculation
in western land. From what he heard Gallatin became con-
vinced that the best place for such an enterprise was along
the Ohio River and its tributaries. Although he thought the
land north of the Ohio River would be best, it had not been
officially opened for settlement. However, the state of
Virginia had already offered its holdings south of the river
for sale, and it was against Virginia that Rapicault, whom
Savary represented, held claims. Hence the two would—be
entrepreneurs easily secured title to about one hundred
thousand acres of land in the Ohio River Valley. After
negotiating this deal in Philadelphia the two partners
moved to Richmond where they Spent the winter preparing for
an eXpedition to inSpect their holdings as soon as spring

arrived.

In April, 1784 Gallatin and Savary crossed the
Allegheny Mountains for the first time. They Spent the
summer trying to locate their property in Monongalia

County, Virginia. After careful inSpection they concluded

 

13

2 .
1 Ibid., pp. 14—15. Ibid., pp. 15—16.

14

that the land in this county was too mountainous and not
fertile enough to be a good area for settlement. However,
just north of Monongalia in Pennsylvania’s Fayette County
they found the kind of land they sought. Within this ter-
rain lay George‘s Creek, an artery which flowed into the
Monongahela River and appeared to link the Ohio and Potomac
Rivers. If so this land would be located on an important
tranSportation route between the Ohio Valley and Richmond.
Five months of exploring the frontier exhausted Gallatin’s
romantic streak, and he turned to the practical problem of
making a living. Accordingly he concluded arrangements with
Thomas Clare, a local farmer, to establish a store on
Clare's land in order to sell goods to pioneers passing
through the territory on their way west.

Gallatin and Savary Spent the winter of 1784-1785 in
Richmond, but in the Spring of 1785 they returned to the
frontier. In June the two established what was to be a
permanent settlement known as Friend’s Landing. This set—
tlement was Short-lived as Indian depredations in the fall
caused the project to be abandoned. Not to be deterred,
in the late fall of 1785 Gallatin and Serre established a
settlement on George’s Creek, not far from the Monongahela
River. As further proof of his determination to link his
destiny to the western country Gallatin journeyed to Mor—
gantown, Virginia, the seat of Monongalia County and took

"the Oath of Allegiance and Fidelity to the Commonwealth

 

14
Ibid., pp. 17-18.

15

of Virginia." Under the Articles of Confederation American
citizenship was granted through the states, and Gallatin
selected Virginia rather than Pennsylvania because his future
speculation projects involved Virginia. Thus he believed
citizenship there would benefit his anticipated ambitions.15

Gallatin and Savary returned to Richmond in November,
1785, but Gallatin returned alone to George‘s Creek in Feb—
ruary, 1786 to purchase a four hundred acre lot just south
of the creek on the Monongahela. He named this picturesque
property which became his permanent residence ”Friendship
Hill" probably in token of his esteem for Serre, Savary,
and Badollet. Soon Gallatin’s dream of making his farm a
center of activity for his friends vanished. Serre died in
Jamaica, and Savary decided that business prospects in
Richmond were more agreeable to his temperament than frontier
life. However, Gallatin’s Genevan friend, Jean Badollet,
did come to America and settled on a farm near Friendship
Hi11.l6

During the next three years Gallatin settled into a
fairly regular pattern of life. He spent the summers at
Friendship Hill where he ran his store, farmed on a small
scale, and indulged himself in reading and reflection. He
spent the winter in Richmond, Philadelphia, and New York
conducting land transactions. He also did some traveling,

and evidence indicates that he went as far north as Maine

 

l5Ibid., pp. 18—21, Albert Gallatin, ”Oath of Allegi—
ance," October, 1785, Gallatin Papers.

6
l Walters, Gallatin, p. 21.

16

in 1788. During this period Gallatin continued to receive
regular correSpondence from Catherine Pictet still advising
him of the error of his ways. 0n the other hand, few peo—
ple heard from Gallatin during his journeys into the in—
terior, and it was once feared that he had been the victim

of Indian hostility.l7

Prior to August, 1788 Gallatin sat on the Sidelines
of American political life. All this changed with the
ratification of the Constitution by Pennsylvania in 1788.
WideSpread sentiment in western Pennsylvania thought that
the Constitution was undemocratic and too centralized.
Therefore dissatisfied local politicians organized a meet-
ing at Uniontown, the county seat, to recommend means to
make the Constitution "less objectionable." The Uniontown
meeting was to elect two delegates to a statewide meeting
at Harrisburg where amendments to the new Constitution
would be drawn up. AS an interested citizen sympathetic
to his area‘s grievances Albert Gallatin went to Uniontown.
There Gallatin, a mere political novice, mixed with the
veteran politicians of Fayette County. Surprisingly enough
he was elected as one of the two members to represent his

district at the Harrisburg meeting.

While Albert Gallatin undoubtedly was one of the

least eXperienced men of the thirty—nine who gathered at

 

17

Ibid., pp. 21-23.
l8Nathaniel Breading, et. a1., "Certifying Albert
Gallatin and John Smilie as Fayette County Representatives,
August 18, 1788, Gallatin Papers.

I

17
Harrisburg on September 3, 1788, he nevertheless played a

very large role in this meeting. Prior to the gathering
he had framed a series of resolutions which declared that
a new and early convention of all the states to revise the
Constitution was necessary to prevent the dissolution of
the Union and to secure the liberties of Americans. Among
Gallatin’s papers several long memoranda indicate that he
found fault with many provisions in the Constitution. At
this point Gallatin was a strict constructionist. He
wanted little leeway left for interpreting the Constitution's
powers. For example, taxes Should be Specifically fixed by
the Constitution. The time and place of elections Should
be clearly Spelled out in the fundamental law. The
"Necessary and Proper Clause" was too vague. He favored
restricting the Executive to the enforcement of existing
laws only. These ideas placed Gallatin in the radical mi—
nority. However, he quickly sensed the more moderate tone
of the majority and modified his position. Thus he sub-
mitted a drastically revised set of resolutions in place
of his original propositions. Both his Speech and his
resolutions reflected close study of ancient, modern Euro-
pean, and American government. Yet, even with wholesale
revisions, Gallatin’s resolutions were far too drastic for

19

the delegates at Harrisburg.

 

19Albert Gallatin, ”Reflections on the U.S. Constitu-
tion," 17883 Gallatin memorandum, ”Problems of the Consti—
tution," 1788, Gallatin Papers; It is interesting to com—
pare Albert Gallatin, ”Draft of a Statement on the U.S.
Constitution,” n.d., Gallatin Papers with Gallatin memo-
randum, "Record of the Resolution of the Harrisburg Con-
ference," September 3, 1788, Gallatin Papers, to note the

18

The Uniontown and Harrisburg meetings marked an im-
portant transition in Gallatin's career. His participation
in these convocations launched his career in public affairs.
He had clearly articulated his many misgivings about the
Constitution. In addition, he had met political leaders
from all over Pennsylvania. Also he had identified himself

with the dominant sentiments of western Pennsylvania.20

Nascent political interests were not the only matters
on his mind in the late 1780’s. Having settled at George’s
Creek Gallatin began to feel the need for a wife. He was
attracted to Sophie Allegre, the daughter of the proprietess
of the Richmond boarding house where he stayed during the
winter. Although enchanted, Gallatin had been too Shy to
make his affection known. Summoning his courage he pro—
posed in the Spring of 1789, and on May 16 Albert and
Sophie were married without the blessings of Sophie's mother
who considered her son—in-law ”a man without accomplish-
ments or fortune." In late May Gallatin took his bride
west to Friendship Hill where she contracted a fatal illness
and died in October. Gallatin was broken—hearted and
morose.21

Pennsylvania politics helped draw the grieving widower
back into public life, for the state assembly called a con-
vention to revise the state constitution which had been

promulgated in 1776. While SOphie lived Gallatin strongly

Opposed the convention, and he eXpressed his sentiments to

 

many changes made in Gallatin's original idea.

BOWalterS, Gallatin, p. 30 21Ibid., pp. 23-25.

 

19

the leading politicians. Forces which Gallatin’s opposition
could not deter were at work, and the convention was held.
Chosen as a delegate from Fayette County, Gallatin accepted
perhaps because he desired an escape from his grief. On
the whole he played a rather minor role at this convention,
but he campaigned for a number of changes. He argued for
an enlargement in the number of members of the Assembly.

He supported direct popular election of state senators.

He defended liberty of the press. Unquestionably the most
important reform he championed was a liberalization of the
suffrage. According to Gallatin’s plan every ”freeman who
had attained the age of twenty-one years and had been a
resident and inhabitant during one year before the day of

' every naturalized freeholder, every naturalized

election,’
citizen who had been assessed for State or County taxes for
two years before election day or who had resided ten years
successively in the State Should be allowed to vote. Only
paupers and vagabonds would be excluded. Surely one must
classify Gallatin as an advanced democrat using support

for universal white male suffrage as a yardstick. Look—
ing back on this convention which produced the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1790 in the twilight of life, Gallatin con—
cluded that it was one of the ablest bodies to which he
ever belonged. Because of his strong support for liberal

reform measures Gallatin became even closer identified

22
with the democratic political group.

 

22Albert Gallatin, "Draft of a Speech in Constitution-
a1 Convention, 1790, Gallatin memorandum, ”Notes on Dis-
cussion of Suffrage," 17903 Gallatin memorandum, "Notes

2O

No sooner had Gallatin concluded his service at the
constitutional convention than he was elected to the state
legislature as assemblyman in the fall of 1790. He was
re-elected in 1791 and 1792. Quickly he became one of the
pillars of the assembly. In the 1790—1791 session he was
placed on twenty-seven committees, and in the second ses-
sion, 1791-92 he served on thirty—five committees. Under
these conditions Gallatin acquired an extraordinary influ-
ence in the Pennsylvania Assembly.

Committee assignments tell only part of the story,
for in almost every case Gallatin drew up the bills these
committees presented and prepared their reports. Gal-
latin’s continued democratic proclivity is demonstrated by
the measures he championed. He urged the establishment of
internal improvements including enhanced water and land
communications. The restoration of Pennsylvania's fiscal
integrity constituted his most important contribution.

In the 1790-91 session Gallatin helped execute fiscal re-
form. Paper money was extinguished, and all treasury
expenses were paid for in Specie. A state bank, the Bank
of Pennsylvania, was chartered by the legislature in order
to employ the surplus funds created by a boom in the public
land sales. Almost as important as his accomplishments

was the manner in which he conducted himself, for all his
activities in the assembly were businesslike, and con-

ducted with non-partisan objectivity.23

_

on Election of Senators,” 1790, Gallatin Papers; Adams,
Igfe of Gallatin, pp. 79—83.

23Gallatin memorandum, "Committee Book Session,"

 

21
During his first years in the legislature a series

of events occurred which Gallatin later had reason to re—
gret. The federal excise tax on whiskey passed by Con—
gress in March, 1791 caused Gallatin‘s discomfort. In
western Pennsylvania whiskey was the only currency that
most farmers possessed because they used that commodity
for barter. Therefore western Pennsylvania was against
the excise almost to a man. Although Gallatin did not own
a still and had leSS material interest than many of his
neighbors, he opposed the federal excise as both uncon—
stitutional and unfair. During the summer of 1791 he be-
came convinced that few of his western neighbors intended
to submit to the hated tax. In July Gallatin received a
letter from James Marshel, the register of Washington
County, inviting him to a meeting which would ”state to
the people at large some general objections to the Said
Law and propose some plan by which their sense on that sub-

ject may be fairly collected and stated to the General

24
Government." When Gallatin decided to attend the meet—

ing held at Redstone Old Fort on July 27, 1791, he em-
barked on a course which he later regretted. At this meet-
ing Gallatin acted as clerk, and a resolution was passed
that declared the excise to be unequal, immoral, dangerous

to liberty, and oppressive to the inhabitants of the west—

ern county.

 

 

1790-1791, Gallatin Papers; Adams Life of Gallatin, pp.
84—863 Walters, Gallatin, pp. 38-49

24Walters, Gallatin, pp. 45~46, 653 James Marshel to
Albert Gallatin, July 16, 1791, Gallatin Papers.

 

22
During the fall and winter of 1791-1792 opposition

to the excise shifted from rational protests to violent
action as hotheaded agitators led by James Marshel and
David Bradford, a young Washington County lawyer, took
matters into their hands. Three men were tarred and
feathered for aiding the enforcement of the law, and a
Washington County excise Collector's office was ransacked.
Gallatin condoned this violence, and the following August

21 he served as clerk at a Pittsburgh meeting of anti-excise
politicians. There a far reaching resolution was adopted
which unanimously singled out excise revenue collectors as

' and condemned them both to a

"unworthy of friendship'
social and economic isolation. Moreover, the resolution
invited the populace to treat them "with that contempt
they deserve." The meeting also drafted a petition to
Congress which included much more moderate language re-
sembling the resolutions at the Redstone Old Fort a year
earlier and Gallatin’s arguments in the legislature. Un—
fortunately this petition never reached Congress, and the
Pittsburgh meeting was known by its resolution which in-
cited the peOple to possible violence.

Shortly after the Pittsburgh meeting Gallatin real-
ized his great mistake: " . . . we are generally blamed
by even our friends for the violence of our resolutions
at Pittsburgh," he wrote to his friend John Badollet,
"and they have undoubtedly tended to render the Excise

I

law more pOpular than it was before.I On the same day he

wrote to Thomas Clare: "To everybody I say what I think

23

on the subject, tO wit that our resolutions were perhaps
too violent and undoubtedly highly impolitick, but in my
Opinion contained nothing illegal." Thus long before Gal-
.1atin made his public confession tO the Pennsylvania As-
sembly in January, 1795, referring to his action at Pitts-
burgh as "my only political Sin” he made his private mis—
givings known to close friends.25

Gallatin’s part in the early whiskey excise tax
Opposition did not materially affect his political for—
tunes. In gratitude for his yeomen service in the leg-
islature and out of reSpect for his ability a Federalist
legislature on February 28, 1793 elected him United States
Senator. This was neither a post that Gallatin sought
nor one that his friends tried to Obtain for him. Never-
theless, to the credit Of Pennsylvania politics, party
allegiance did not prevent the election Of an eminently
well qualified man. Gallatin accepted this honor only be—
cause he was finally convinced that no other man Of true
republican principles could be elected.26

During 1793 Gallatin’s private life was transformed.
Work in the Pennsylvania legislature consumed Gallatin’s

time and energy until June when his Philadelphia friend,

 

25Gallatin memorandum, ”Broadside Against the Excise
Tax, August 22, 1792; Gallatin memorandum, ”Petition
Against the Excise," 1792; Albert Gallatin to John Badol—
let, December 18, 1792, Albert Gallatin to Thomas Clare,
December 18, 1792, Gallatin Papers.

26Gallatin memorandum, "Certification Of Election to
U.S. Senate,” February 28, 1793, Albert Gallatin to John
Badollet, March 9, 1793; Albert Gallatin tO Thomas Clare,
March 9, 1793, Gallatin Papers.

I!

24

Alexander J. Dallas, persuaded him that he needed some
relaxation. Dallas, his wife, Gallatin and another friend
went on a pleasant trip including stops at Pabjack Falls
in New Jersey, New York, and then by water up the Hudson
River to Albany. This journey which consumed four weeks
left Gallatin in better Spirits and health than he had
been in several years. During the trip the Senator—elect
became entranced with Hannah Nicholson, a friend of Mrs.
Dallas’s who had joined the party in New York. Gallatin
was SO fascinated with Miss Nicholson that he proposed
marriage in July.27

Hannah Nicholson was the daughter Of a retired Navy
Captain, Commodore James Nicholson who had served in the
American Revolution. Hannah's father was an active Repub—
lican in New York City, and his house was a frequent meet-
ing place for the leaders of that political persuasion.
Thus Albert's new family was acquainted with Aaron Burr,
the Livingstons, the Clintons and many others. Coming
from these surroundings it is not surprising that she was
"a pretty good democrat." Her frontiersman husband also
found that she was "what you will call a city belle” and
"has always lived in a Sphere where she has contracted or
should have contracted habits not very well adapted to a

country life, and especially tO a Fayette County life."28

 

27Albert Gallatin tO John Badollet, July 31, 1793,
Albert Gallatin to Commodore James Nicholson, July 20,
17933 Gallatin to Nicholson, July 25, 1793, Gallatin
Papers.

28Adams, Life Of Gallatin, pp. 100—102, Albert Gal—
latin to John Badollet, February 1, 1794, Gallatin Papers.

 

 

 

 

25
Originally the wedding was scheduled for the next

winter. However, several events acted as a catalyst in
the romance. After sealing the engagement in July, Gal—
1atin returned to Philadelphia in August for a special
session Of the legislature. A yellow fever epidemic broke
out there, and the legislature adjourned on September 6.
Gallatin, who needed no prodding to leave Philadelphia,
went to New York to be with Hannah. He planned to spend
only a few weeks in New York and then journey west to
Fayette County. In the presence Of his fiancéS Gallatin
lost all sense Of time, and when he was finally preparing
to leave he fell ill with yellow fever. He was moved to
the Nicholson's home where Hannah helped nurse him back
to health. When he recovered it was tOO late tO go West
prior to the convening Of Congress. Moreover, living in
the same house made Albert and Hannah inseparable. Con—
sequently, they were married November 11, 1793 in the
Dutch Reformed Church or New York City.29

Less than a month after his second marriage Albert
Gallatin became a member Of the United States Senate which
convened on December 2, 1793, but his stay in that body
was short-lived. The handwriting was on the wall from his
first day in that august group, for a petition was sub—
mitted by nineteen citizens of Yorktown objecting to Gal-
latin‘s election on the grounds that he had not been a
citizen for nine years as stipulated in the Constitution.

As time passed Gallatin became quite pessimistic over his

 

29Walters, Gallatin, pp. 55-56.

 

26

chances to remain. He confided to his wife that he ex—
pected to be expelled. During Gallatin’s first month in
the upper house of Congress from outward appearance the
junior Senator from Pennsylvania seemed to be concerned
solely with his fate.

However, Gallatin was convinced that Alexander Ham-
ilton's handling of the Treasury Department was entirely
tOO high handed. Since he believed that Congress was not
being given enough information by Secretary Hamilton, and
because he believed firmly that the Treasury should be
made to account specifically for every appropriation, on
January 8, 1794 Gallatin moved in the Senate that the
Secretary Of the Treasury should make a public accounting
of almost every important act of his department since its
inception. Gallatin's action must have made Hamilton
ever more determined to see the Pennsylvanian removed
from the Senate. Even so he lost his seat by the very
close vote of fourteen to twelve on February 28, 1794.
Gallatin's removal ended the embarassing inquiries and
saved Hamilton a great deal of work.30

After the expulsion Gallatin and his wife set out
for Friendship Hill in June. While he expected some
trouble in Hannah's adjustment to frontier life, Gallatin

did not anticipate the tumultuous summer that took place

 

3OAlbert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin, De—
cember 3, 1793, Adams, Life of Gallatin, p. 111; Gallatin
to his wife, December 18, 1793, Ibid., . 113; Gallatin to
his wife, December 20, 1793 Ibid., p. 114, Ibid., pp. 114
—ll5; Gallatin memorandum, 'Record of Vote on Expulsion
from the Senate,” February 28, 1794, Gallatin Papers.

 

27

in western Pennsylvania in 1794. Since his misgivings

about the Pittsburgh resolutions in December, 1792, Gal-
latin had nearly lost sight of the whiskey excise agitation.
However, western Pennsylvania continued to simmer. In June,
1794 the Whiskey Rebellion broke out. United States Mar-
shall David Lenox attempted to enforce a number of writs
issued by a Philadelphia Court requiring that violators be
tried in Philadelphia. What irked the westerners so much
was that these writs were issued after the passage of a law
that allowed violations more than fifty miles from a fed-
eral district court to be tried in state courts.

Gallatin and Congressman John Smilie were forces for
moderation and persuaded the distillers who had been served
to submit peaceably. In August Gallatin attended a gen—
eral meeting at Parkinson’s Ferry. He went reluctantly,
but he attended out Of a sincere conviction that he must
preach moderation. Gallatin who acted as secretary of
this meeting and Hugh Henry Brackenridge prevented hasty
action. However, before the meeting adjourned the news
reached Parkinson Ferry that President Washington was
sending three commissioners to visit the western country.
If this measure was unsuccessful, then the militia would
be called out to suppress the "Treasonous acts." After a
heated debate the moderates led by Gallatin and Bracken—
ridge succeeded in getting a committee of fifteen named
to meet with the federal commissioners. SO far violence

had been avoided, but Gallatin feared the worst was yet

to come.31

 

31Walters, Gallatin, pp. 70—75.

 

28

The terms which Gallatin and his committee received
from the federal commissioners were far from generous. In
return for assurances by means Of secret voting that the
people Of the western country would abide by the law, the
commissioners promised that the federal military forces
would not enter the area before September 1. Only stupend-
ous efforts by the moderates led by Gallatin persuaded the
Whiskey rebels to agree to the federal commissioner's
terms. Gallatin Spent many hours convincing the residents
of Fayette County that the only alternatives were civil war
or the payment Of the Whiskey tax. The results Of the vote
in Fayette County was as disappointing as elsewhere, for
only a handful Of citizens voted. Unfortunately, the
federal government would not accept the results Of the
plebiscite as evidence Of compliance, and the militia was
diSpatched.32

As soon as the government‘s decision to send troops
was announced Gallatin received a disturbing report to
the effect that he Should flee to Philadelphia for his
safety because some Of the Federalists were eager for his
head. October witnessed the end of the Whiskey Rebellion,
for prior to the militia’s arrival another meeting at
Parkinson's Ferry unanimously agreed to resolutions af—
firming the general submission. By October 14 written

assurances Of submission were universally signed. Thus

 

32Ibid., pp. 76-82; Gallatin memorandum, ”Declaration
Of the Committee Of Fayette County," September, 1794,
Gallatin Papers.

29
by the time the troops reached the west order had been

completely restored.

Perhaps one of the greatest paradoxes of the fall
in western Pennsylvania were the elections held on Oc-
tober 14, 1794. Gallatin was sent back to his old
Assembly seat by the voters of Fayette County. In ad—
dition, on the same day he was elected to Congress from
Washington and Allegheny Counties, the very seat of the
most violent whiskey excise tax feeling. Gallatin, who
had left for Philadelphia, was astounded by the news of
his election to Congress. After winning a second election
to his assembly seat necessitated because the Federalists
succeeded in having the October, 1794 election results in
Western Pennsylvania disqualified he served in the as—
sembly during the session of 1794-95. Then he began a
long and distinguished national political career as a
member of Congress in December, 1795.33

Pennsylvania politics consumed the lion's share Of
Gallatin’s attention during the crucial early years Of
the federal republic. In almost every instance Gallatin
stood in Opposition to Alexander Hamilton. His uneasiness
with centralizing tendencies Of the Constitution, his
battle to democratize Pennsylvania’s political life, his

distrust Of the Treasury Secretary's high handed methods,

 

33Nathaniel Breading toAlbert Gallatin, October 10,
1794, Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin, De-
cember 7, 1794; Albert Gallatin to Commodore James
Nicholson, December 26, 1794; Albert Gallatin to Thomas
Clare, March 5, 1795, Gallatin Papers, Adams, Life of
Gallatin, pp. 140-141.

30
and his sympathy with the grievances (although not the

methods) Of the whiskey rebels all indicated that Gallatin
questioned the chief tenets Of Federalist domestic policy.
Nor was Gallatin alone, for critics Of Hamiltonian pol—
icies led by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson had begun
to form an opposition party which took the name Republi-
can. That Gallatin would join this party was hardly sur-
prising. However, domestic events alone did not account
for the division between followers Of Hamilton and
apostles Of Jefferson and Madison. Indeed the conflict
first arose as early as 1789 Over conflicting views on
the direction which American foreign policy ought to

follow.

CHAPTER II

A REPUBLICAN CONGRESSMAN LOOKS

AT FOREIGN POLICY

Students Of the early national period generally
group Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Albert Gal—
latin together as the triumvirate which was responsible
for making policy during Jefferson's Presidency. Since
Gallatin was not directly involved with national politi-
cal life until 1794, the main outlines Of the original
rift over foreign policy were drawn without his partici—
pation. However, before turning to the origins Of the
diSpute over foreign policy Gallatin‘s general outlook
on foreign affairs derived from his interpretation Of
the Constitution must be considered.

The young Pennsylvanian’s first statements on
foreign affairs were purely theoretical and were enunci-
ated as a part Of his general outlook on the Constitution
in 1788. At that point he assumed the mantle of a strict
constructionist. Although he was critical Of many pro-
visions in the Constitution, it is significant that Gal—
latin had favored replacing the Articles Of Confederation.
Under the system Operative since 1781 the individual
states had been too weak to protect themselves against

possible assaults by foreign nations or even to settle

31

32

disputes among themselves. In Gallatin's eyes one Of the
two chief reasons for replacing the Articles was that doc—
ument's inability to provide the machinery necessary to
cope with foreign affairs.

The Constitution empowered the general government
to employ the united strength of all the states against
foreign nations if necessary. Within the central govern-
ment Gallatin believed that Congress should exercise pri-
mary control over foreign relations. He especially fav-
ored limiting the power Of the President. Thus many
Constitutional stipulations needed revision in order to
make Congress supreme in matters Of foreign policy. In-
stead Of the President alone acting as Commander—In-Chief
in case Of war, Gallatin thought the President and a
special committee appointed by Congress should conduct
the war jointly. While the Constitution provided that
treaties Should be ratified by the President and the Sen-
ate, Gallatin wanted to substitute the House of Represent—
atives for the President.

He saw two benefits in removing the President from
the treaty ratification process. The term treaty referred
to a number Of different agreements ranging from commerce
to those Of alliance and peace. Possibly the President
might use his power to involve states in a war which
would not be beneficial to their interests. In commercial
matters the President might favor the economic interests
Of his home state and refuse to accept a treaty which did

not benefit those interests. Gallatin also favored trans-

 

 

33

ferring the President's power tO appoint foreign mini-
sters to Congress. Unquestionably in 1788 Gallatin be-
lieved in almost total Congressional control of foreign

affairs.1

Gallatin’s ideas did not gain acceptance, but during
the first session Of the First Congress James Madison pro—
posed a sweeping departure for the United States in the
realm Of foreign policy. Madison's scheme turned on the
idea Of commercial discrimination, for he intended to
favor those nations which had commercial treaties with
the United States over those which did not. The main pur-
pose in these suggestions was to divert American commerce
from Great Britain and Shift it into other channels. This
diversion Of commerce would Obtain new markets for the ex-
panding production of the American farmer. This proposal
underscored the strong nationalism Of James Madison, for
he believed the political independence would not long
survive unless economic independence was also achieved.
The Virginia Congressman emphasized the importance Of de—
veloping an American navy and an American merchant marine.
Madison also stressed the importance Of standing up to
Britain to secure reSpect and dignity.2

Despite Madison's eloquent pleas Congress turned

 

lGallatin memorandum, "Problems Of the Constitution,"
1788; Albert Gallatin, "Memorandum on the Constitution,”
1788, Albert Gallatin, ”Reflections on the United States
Constitution," n.d., Gallatin Papers.

2Annals Of Congress, First Congress, First Session,

pp. 182, 189, 201-202, 237, 238.

 

 

34

down his proposals for discriminatory tonnage duties.
However, Congress did enact a navigation system which
favored American Shipping by granting much lower rates to
American bottoms. All foreign shipping paid the same high
rates. Several considerations explain this Congressional
decision. Commercial interests which stood to benefit in
the long run from Madison‘s resolutions strongly Opposed
discriminatory duties because they saw no suitable sub-
stitute for Britain. In addition, the full weight Of
Alexander Hamilton’s influence was thrown against Madison’s
discriminatory proposals.

Alexander Hamilton stands as the supreme realist in
foreign policy during the early years Of the republic. To
the Secretary of the Treasury foreign policy must serve
the best interests Of the state, and in 1789 the leading
American concern was to establish credit. This paramount
domestic Objective necessitated friendship for Great
Britain, for only the former mother country had the capi—
tal so crucial to American development. Trade with Eng—
land was essential because Americans desired British
manufactures and the nation's principal revenue was the
tariff. Anti—British and pro—French sentiment on the
part of the people constituted the two gravest threats to
Hamilton's Objectives. Thus the Treasurer worked behind
the scenes to convince the British that American friend-

ship was assured.3

3The Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Henry Cabot
:Lodge (Constitutional Edition; New York: G.P. Putnam‘s

Sons, 1903), IV, 116, 323; Ibid., IX, 527.

 

35

The early disputes Over foreign policy laid the
groundwork for a major crisis in 1793. When Britain and
France went to war in February, 1793, the United States
was forced to decide what its Obligations were under the
Treaty Of 1778. While honoring the treaty with France,
in April, 1793 America proclaimed her neutrality. NO
sooner had one problem been resolved than Citizen Edmond
Charles Genet arrived with many schemes to use the United
States to French advantage.

Genet landed in Charleston, South Carolina on April
19 and did not arrive in Philadelphia until one month
later. The French minister freely interpreted the Treaty
of 1778. Therefore he issued many letters of marque
which empowered Americans tO outfit privateers designed
to cripple British commerce. Genet himself condemned and
sold some Of the first prizes brought into American ports.
He further instructed French consuls to establish prize
courts on American soil. While he had not come to the
United States to ask for military aid, he seriously com—
promised American sovereignty.

As Secretary Of State Thomas Jefferson dealt with
the flamboyant Frenchman who provoked so many incidents.
Jefferson‘s pro-French sympathies did not Obscure the
fact that he was first and foremost an American. He
treated Genet as a diplomat not as a revolutionary agent.
LMoreover, he refused to condone much Of the Frenchman‘s

(conduct. He did not accept Genet's arming Of French pri-

XJateers on American soil. Nor did he recognize the

36

French right to use American ports as bases Of operation
or places where prizes could be established. "Indeed the
diplomatic correspondence Of Jefferson establishes that

he firmly resisted every act Of Genet that would have com—
promised the neutrality of the United States."4 By August
Jefferson had completely lost faith in Genet and asked for
his recall.

Since Albert Gallatin was involved in Pennsylvania
politics during the years when the first conflict over
foreign policy took place, we know very little about his
views on economic foreign policy and Madison’s discrimi-
natory tonnage duties. However, in 1793 Gallatin was
United States Senator-elect from Pennsylvania and was
waiting tO take his seat in the Third Congress which
would convene in December, 1793. During this period his
thoughts turned to matters Of foreign policy. In the
early part Of that year the war in Europe engrossed Gal-
latin’s attention. At the outset his sympathies were de—
cidedly pro-French. He looked on republican France as a
nation just liberated from the forces Of darkness. That
she was being Opposed by the collective forces Of monarchy
and deSpotism dismayed him. If the European nations suc-
ceeded in restoring a monarchy in France, Gallatin feared
that they might turn on America next in an attempt to
snuff out republican principles completely. Consistent

tfiith his Francophilism he assumed an anti-British tone.

NPaul A. Varg, Foreign Policies Of the Founding
FBathers (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press,

1963), p. 88.

 

37
"The British peOple,” he told his friend John Badollet,

"seem to me to be out Of their senses; very nearly unani—
mous in favour Of the war against France, which is carried

on by the Government merely to enslave their Own people."5

By August, 1793 Gallatin had slightly moderated his
enthusiasm for France. By then he was able to discern
both positive and negative aspects in French behavior.

He was critical Of the many excesses of the war and the
Revolution. He saw that some Of the French leaders were
more interested in power for themselves than liberty for
the nation. Nor did he believe that France would emerge
with a very good government for a long time. Neverthe-
less, he reaffirmed his view that the French cause was
that Of mankind against tyrants and ”no foreign nation
has a right tO dictate a government to them."6

As far as American policy was concerned Gallatin
supported his nation’s decision to remain neutral. On
the one hand, he thought that the United States really
had no alternative because she was too weak for any meas-
ures except self-defense. Unless either England or
France attacked the United States, a possibility Gallatin
considered very remote, America would remain at peace.

On the other hand, he believed that his country would "be

guilty Of political and moral crime” if she either de-

 

5Albert Gallatin to Thomas Clare, May 3, 1793;
éAlbert Gallatin to John Badollet, May 3, 1793, Gallatin
EDapers.

6Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson, August 25,
1'793, Adams, Life Of Gallatin, p. 104.

38

clared war or behaved in a manner that justified another
nation in attacking her. At the heart of his thinking on
the conflict between war and neutrality was the belief
that only a defensive war could be justified. Holding
these beliefs Gallatin was able to reconcile what he

deemed American self-interest with his ideals.7

Citizen Genet presented a most excruciating dilemma
for those who supported American neutrality but held sym—
pathetic views toward France. When Genet first arrived in
America, Gallatin was mildly enthusiastic. However, as
time passed he became disturbed with Genet's conduct.
While some Of his political bed—fellows were still sing—
ing the praises Of the French minister Gallatin lost his
previous enthusiasm for the representative of Republican
France. Although he believed Genet tO be a man Of ability
and firmness, Gallatin concluded that he lacked the highly
important diplomatic virtues of prudence and self-control.
By December, when Genet's schemes to interfere in Ameri-
ca’s domestic affairs were completely known, Gallatin
registered his unmitigated disgust with the Frenchman.

"He is a man totally unfit for the place he fills,” he
told his wife, "His abilities are but slender, he pos—
sesses some declamatory powers, but not the least Shadow
Of judgment. Violent and self-conceited, he has hurted

(sic) the cause of his country here more than all her

7Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson, August 25,
-l793, Ibid, pp. 103-105.

39
8

enemies could have done."

The Federalists quickly took advantage Of Genet’s
indiscretions. Alexander Hamilton led the onslaught
against the friends Of France within the United States.

His attacks became SO heated that Jefferson contemplated
resigning from the government. However, Madison cautioned
him against hasty action, and after careful consideration
Jefferson decided to stay awhile longer.

In the late summer Of 1793 the Secretary Of State
read neWSpaper reports that new British orders would affect
American commerce. England had ordered that all neutral
ships headed to French ports or ports controlled by France
would be subject to seizure. Jefferson planned to instruct
the American minister in London to seek a revocation Of
these orders. He also intended to submit the whole prob—
lem to Congress. At this point the idea Of commercial
discrimination reappeared. The weapon Of economic coer—
cion could be used to hurt the British and to convince
France that America did not plan to submit to British

outrages. "Pinching their commerce,’ wrote Jefferson of

economic retaliation against the British, "will be just
against themselves, advantageous to us, and conciliatory

9

towards our friends."

 

8Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson, August 25,

1793, Ibid., Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gal-
1atin, December 6, 1793, Ibid., p. 111.

9Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, September 1,

1793, James Madison Papers, Library Of Congress. Cited
hereafter as Madison Papers.

 

40

Thomas Jefferson‘s righteous indignation toward
Britain was not completely a product Of the cleavage be-
tween the two emerging political parties. Indeed America
had a long list Of grievances against Britain. Some Ob-
jections stemmed from unfulfilled pledges in the Peace Of
Paris. The English still retained a string Of frontier
ports in the Northwest which they had promised to relin-
quish in 1783. The presence Of Redcoats on the frontier
was considered detrimental tO America‘s relation with the
Indians. NO compensation had been Offered for slaves
carried Off during the Revolution. Perhaps the worst
British crime lay in her making the most out Of trade
with the United States while she refused continually to
Offer America reciprocal advantages in a commercial treaty.

In addition to these long standing Objections new
problems arose in 1793. Britain who had been at war with
France since February adhered to a maritime policy which
collided with the American view Of neutral rights. As
mistress Of the seas England had always followed the prin—

ciple Of consolato del mare which gave a belligerent the

 

right to seize enemy goods which were being carried on
neutral ships. The British naval commanders carried out
this policy quite stringently although not without fre-
quent American protest. By the summer British policy was
further clarified. Through an Order-In—Council of June
8, 1793 Britain instructed her naval commanders to seize
all ships carrying provisions and foodstuffs to France.

.In other words, foodstuffs were now considered contraband.

41
Secretary Of State Jefferson quickly graSped the implica-

tions of this for neutral America. This order placed the
United States in the position Of supplying Britain but not
France. Such a Situation could easily provoke France to
attack, and thus the United States because of British pol-
icy would be at war. Not only did this compromise Ameri-
can interests but it also denied the American stance that
"free ships make free goods." Even Alexander Hamilton

considered this an unnecessarily harsh order.lO

Foreign affairs received the close attention Of the
Third Congress which assembled on December 2, 1793. Pres-
ident Washington submitted voluminous documentation to
illustrate the course Of the negotiations which had been
carried on both with foreign nations and with the Indians
while Congress was not in session. These papers related
that no settlement had been reached with the hostile
Indians. They also showed that Britain was extremely re—
luctant to continue negotiations over the outstanding
difficulties. These two unresolved matters increased
American bitterness against Britain. Indignation against
Britain rose to further heights when Congress was told on
December 16 that England had arranged a truce between
Portugal and the Dey of Algiers. While the British mo—
tive had been to free her ally from possible harassments

in the Mediterranean SO she could concentrate on the war

 

lOVarg, Founding Fathers, pp. 96—973 Samuel Flagg

Bemis, Jay’s Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy

rev. ed.; New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1962), p. 212.

 

42

against France, the result also liberated the Algerine
pirates to attack American commerce. Taking into consid-
eration only the result Of this diplomacy members Of Con—
gress blamed Britain for creating the hostile conditions

for American commerce.ll

After Congress had considered all aSpects Of British
transgressions Jefferson sent his report on the state Of
American commerce to Congress on December 16. In this
paper the Secretary of State pointed out that American
tonnage was greater with France although trade was much
greater with Britain. However, many American exports tO
Britain were re—exported, a practice which resulted in use-
less charges and unnecessary double voyages. Moreover,
American ships were excluded from the British West Indies,
and no American produce was allowed in British continental
colonies. All Of these facts taken together amounted to
English disregard for American interests. The solution
to this terribly crucial problem thought Jefferson lay in
the adoption of a rigorous commercial discrimination

against Great Britain.12

After reviewing the Situation Gallatin concluded

 

11

12American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and_
Executive, Of the Congress Of the United States, From the
First Session Of the First to the Third Session Of the ‘—
Thirteenth Congress, Inclusive: Commencing March 3, 1789,,
and Ending March 3, 1815. Selected and Edited, Under the
Authority Of Congress, by Walter Lowrie, Secretary Of the
Senate, and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, Clerk Of the House
of Representatives (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832),
Class 1: Foreign Relations, 1, 300—304. Cited Hereafter
as American State Papers: Foreign Relations.

Bemis, Jay’s Treaty, pp. 254-256.

 

 

 

43

that the United States was in a dilemma. In the face Of
all these threats he was greatly concerned that America
was so weak that she would have trouble preserving her

national honor. Reluctantly he admitted that the use Of
force might be justified. "I guess the first step might

" he wrote, "but

be tO establish some kind Of naval force,
I have as yet formed no fixed opinion Of my own." In the
midst Of this crisis Gallatin wanted the two political
factions to stop contesting and draw together for the pro—
tection and defense Of the nation. He was critical Of
both domestic political groups. "None but such as are
entirely blinded by self-interest or their passions, and
such as wish us to be only an appendage Of some foreign
power, can try to increase our weakness by dividing us,"
he confided to his wife. He knew that only cooperation
between both domestic political factions could realize his
desire "that the public measures will Show firmness temp-
ered with moderation." Unfortunately, Gallatin stood
almost alone among Americans in political life during

1793 in seeking to set aside partisan politics in favor

13

Of a united defense of national interests.

On January 3, 1794 the House Of Representatives
took up Jefferson's Report on Commerce, and James Madi—
son introduced a set of resolutions designed to implement

Jefferson’s recommendations. In essence these proposals

 

l3Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin, De—
cember 11, 1793, Adams, Life of Gallatin, pp. 111-112;

Gallatin to his wife, December 15, 1793, Ibid., pp.
112-113 0

44

would establish an American navigation system. While
these resolutions closely resembled previous suggestions
by Madison, they contained an added provision. The addi—
tional tariff revenue derived from the new duties was to
be employed to liquidate claims of American citizens
arising out Of damages sustained by the operations of
"particular nations in contravention to the law Of

"14

nations.

Madison’s resolutions touched Off a critical debate
on foreign policy. The Federalists staunchly Opposed
these resolutions. They employed many Of the same argu-
ments that they had used previously to refute the logic
and necessity Of such a drastic program. That Great
Britain would dominate American trade was natural they
pointed out given the need and desire on the part Of Am—
erica for more manufactured goods. Moreover, it was ab—
solutely fundamental that nothing be done tO disturb
Britain because that nation could supply the badly needed
credit without which American economic development would
be severely curtailed. In answer to these Hamiltonian
arguments the Republicans stressed the necessity for
America to find new markets in order to fulfill the needs
Of the agrarians. That the Republicans ignored the im-
portance Of credit in their Speeches underscored their

15

inability to think in economic terms.

 

lLIAnnals Of Congress, Third Congress, First Session,
pp 0 155-156 0

15Bemis, Jay’s Treaty, pp° 259-260.

 

 

 

45

James Madison was the leading spokesman for the Re-
publicans. He repeated many Of the same arguments he
Offered in his two previous attempts tO chastize England.
The monopolistic system Of Britain was an attempt to reduce
an independent nation to the status Of vassalage. That
Britain both disregarded American rights on the high seas
and refused to honor Obligations she had agreed to in the
peace treaty of 1783 only added further to Republican in-
dignation. Since Britain would not negotiate her differ-
ences, the Republicans believed that if the United States
were to retain her self-respect she must establish her
own system Of commercial discrimination.16

The leading Federalist Spokesman was really Alex—
ander Hamilton, but since he was not a member Of Congress
his ideas were articulated by William Smith Of South Car—
olina. Smith pointed out that there was no discrimination
pointed directly against the United States. In fact with
regard to some commodities Britain even gave special con—
cessions to the United States. The British levied lower
duties on tobacco, rice, naval stores, and pig iron than
did France. Three—quarters of American trade was carried
on with Great Britain while only one-seventh Of the total
British trade was with the United States. It was Obvious
that the United States was deeply dependent on Britain
and would be badly hurt if she engaged in a legislative

war with her.17

 

16Ibid., p. 260

17Annals Of Congress, Third Congress, First Session,
pp. 174-209.

 

 

46
The debate lasted from January 13 to February 3 and

resulted in a virtual standoff. The resolutions were
neither passed nor rejected, and further action was post-
poned until March. When the debate resumed conditions
had been drastically altered for the worse. On November
6, 1793 an Order—In—Council far more drastic than the one
in June was issued. By this order British commanders
were instructed to seize all ships carrying goods or pro-
duce of any French colony or carrying provisions or sup-
plies for the use of any French colony. This order was
not made public until late December, but by that time the
damage had been done. News of this order reached the
British West Indies early in 1794 at a time when the
waters Of the Caribbean were filled with American ships.
The order was carried out swiftly and rigorously. Con—
sequently over two hundred-fifty unsuspecting American
ships had been seized by March. News of these captures
reached Philadelphia early in March before Madison's
proposals had been acted upon.18
Word Of the latest British depredations caused
immediate and WideSpread consternation amongst Congress-
men no matter what their political persuasion. Hamilton
himself was indignant and urged the immediate raising Of
an army. The Secretary of the Treasury's views were in-
dicative Of the thoughts of most Federalists who were

Americans first and friends Of Britain only because the

American national interest, up to that point, had dic-

 

18Bemis, Jay's Treaty, pp. 262-264.

 

47

tated cordial relations with the mistress Of the seas.
Since the immediate problem was how to Obtain relief Fed—
eralists favored preparing for defense by raising an

army. On the other hand, the Republicans preferred res-
olutions and economic weapons such as an embargo and
sequestration Of British debts.19 These two quite dif—
ferent responses illustrated the great differences that
existed between the two parties. The Federalists took a
realistic stand, and the Republicans relied on an idealis—
tic stance backed largely by rhetoric.

The renewal Of the debate on Madison's discrimina-
tory tonnage duties tOOk place under vastly different
circumstances from which it had begun. Not only were the
British seizures well known but news had also reached
Philadelphia Of Lord Dorchester‘s inflammatory speech of
February tenth to the Western Indians. Consequently
Madison’s tonnage duties program was drOpped by the Re—
publicans in favor Of more drastic action.

While it was ludicrous to discuss enlarging the
American merchant marine at precisely the time Britain was
swallowing up all the available shipping, Madison appar—
ently did not grasp the gravity Of the situation, ”The
commercial propositions are in this state Of things not
the precise remedy to be pressed as first in order,” he
admitted. Yet he was extremely reluctant to drop these
propositions completely for ”they are in every View and

argument proper to make part Of our standing laws till

 

l91bid., pp. 264—266.

48

the principles Of reciprocity be established by neutral
20

II

arrangements, he argued.

Others in Congress disagreed with Madison, and an
embargo for one month on all shipping in American ports
was agreed to by Congress. AS if this action was not
enough Jonathon Dayton Of New Jersey proposed the se—
questration Of all debts Owed by Americans to British
creditors as compensation for the injuries received at
English hands. While the sequestration resolution was
being debated another resolution was introduced which
called for suspension of all commerce with England until
compensation was made for the illegal captures, the fron—
tier posts evacuated, and the Owners reimbursed for the
slaves carried Off by the British during the Revolution.
This resolution was Offered in spite Of the fact that
news had reached America stating that Britain had issued
new Orders—In—Council of January 8, 1794 which superceded
the order Of November 6. The new policy allowed non
contraband trade between the United States and the French
islands. Nevertheless, the Non-Intercourse Bill was
passed by the House and the embargo was extended for an—

other month.21

 

 

20James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 12, 1794,
Madison Papers.

21Very little evidence can be found to substantiate
Gallatin's views at this time. He exhibited a typical
Republican attitude, for he endorsed the plan to stop all
commercial intercourse with Britain and to sequester all
British debts. Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gal-
latin, April 7, 1794, Adams, Life Of Gallatin, pp. 121-
122.

 

49
Throughout the whole crisis the Federalists had

been on the defensive. Thanks to the seriousness Of the
British transgressions they were unable to protest against
the Republican measures as vehemently as they desired.
Even when the Federalists called for defense measures in
the national interest they were suspected Of plotting to
subvert republicanism. "You understand the game behind
the curtain too well not to perceive the Old trick Of
turning every contingency into a resource for accumulating

I

force in the government,’ wrote Madison as he looked ask—

ance at Federalist suggestions.22 Nevertheless, while
urging preparations for defense the Federalists also de—
cided to make one last effort to keep peace. Therefore
they urged that a special mission be sent tO England.
Hamilton finally convinced Washington on the propriety Of
such action, and John Jay was appointed to make a crucial
effort to avoid an Open breach or possibly even war with
Great Britain.

Jay was successful in reaching a settlement, and a
treaty was signed in November, 1794. The United States
reaped Obvious benefits from this agreement. First, the
Western problem would be alleviated, for Britain agreed
to evacuate the frontier posts on American soil by June
1, 1796. She also agreed to submit boundary disputes
both in the Northeast and the Northwest to Commissions

for settlement. Secondly, England agreed to compensate

 

22James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 14, 1794,

Madison Papers.

SO

Americans for losses on the high seas which had been a
result of the most Obnoxious Orders-In-Council. This pro-
vision removed some Of the sting from the controversy over
neutral rights. Yet Britain refused to repudiate the
orders in principle. Thirdly, American ships would be
admitted into the East Indies. Most Americans agreed that
these provisions Of the treaty were beneficial. However,
apart from these considerations, many found the rest Of
the treaty disagreeable. The treaty placed commercial re—
lations between the two nations on a non—discriminatory
basis by containing an American guarantee renouncing
either sequestration Of British debts or discriminatory
commercial legislation. By far the most criticized pro—
visions were those which recognized the British concep—
tion of neutral rights. The American doctrine that free
ships make free goods was ignored. Also scuttled was the
right Of neutrals to trade in non—contraband gOOdS with
belligerents. The United States acquiesced in the Rule

of 1756 which stated that ports closed to a nation in
peacetime were not Open in wartime. They also agreed to
allow Britain to seize enemies’ goods on neutral ships.
Naval stores were also included as contraband. Moreover,
Britain refused to end the practice Of impressment. Nor
did she Offer any compensation for slaves carried Off
during the Revolution. All these provisions were con—
sidered detrimental to American interests.23

Although some Americans viewed the Jay Treaty as a

 

23Bemis, Jay's Treaty, pp. 346-373.

 

 

 

51

complete sell-out to Britain, it was in fact proof that
Britain considered the United States important enough to
win concessions from a Great Power. Undoubtedly the new
nation had made great concessions to Britain. However,
they had gained a great deal. This settlement with Brit-
ain meant that American commerce would continue tO prOSper
and the nation's financial structure would remain strong.
In addition removal Of the British from the Northwest
meant that American territorial integrity would be pre-
served. These factors guaranteed that the American
nation would continue to exist. Peace with England was
necessary to maintain Hamilton's fiscal system which was
the cornerstone Of the federal republic. The leading
student Of Jay’s Treaty, Samuel Flagg Bemis, correctly
summed up the significance Of this treaty: "It is not an
exaggeration to believe that Jay’s Treaty, saved Ameri—

"ELI

can nationality in an hour Of crisis.

On March 7, 1795 the treaty arrived in Philadelphia,
but its provisions were kept secret until action could
be taken by the Senate. In a Special session on June 22,
1795 the Senate ratified the Treaty by exactly a two—
thirds majority. The vote was twenty to ten. In the
meantime the terms had been leaked to Benjamin Bache,
publisher Of the Philadelphia General Advertiser or

Aurora and an ardent Republican. When leading Republicans

 

24Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History Of the
United States (4th ed.3 New York: H. Holt and Company,
1955), p. 103.

 

 

52
saw the actual terms of the treaty, they were horrified.

Four days after the Senate ratified the document Albert
Gallatin read the entire treaty. ”It exceeds everything
II expected,” he told his wife. Once the treaty's prO-
xzisions became public knowledge a tremendous debate en—
:311ed between the two domestic political factions. Gal—
JLeatin, who never found the vicious in—fighting Of parti-
ssain.politics very attractive, was sincerely disturbed by
the proportions of the controversy. ”I wish the ratifi-
c:&a,tion Of the treaty may not involve us in a more serious
S:i_.tuation than we have yet been in,” he wrote. Notwith-
S‘t; anding Gallatin's desires the furor continued even
ELJE“ter President Washington finally signed the treaty.25
Because the vote in the Senate had been SO close
ELItL<i also because Washington himself was dissatisfied with
Illilee terms Of the treaty he had delayed ratifying the
tI‘eaty himself. As he considered the treaty both Alex—
EiliL<ier Hamilton and the Secretary Of State Edmund Ran-
C1<3>:].ph recommended ratification. Hamilton prepared a
IF>€iQQer for Washington recommending ratification. He saw
as the major benefit of the treaty that it settled the
QOhtroversies with Great Britain. 0n the other hand,
REELIndolph based his recommendation largely on the consid—
exr‘éation that the treaty kept the peace. In addition to

aci-‘\zising the President Hamilton also sought to change the
\

25Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin, June

ES}: 1795, Adams, Life Of Gallatin, p. 151, Gallatin to
3-8. wife, September 6, 1795, lbid., p. 153.

—‘

>‘-.eri .- ......_ _ .

53

image of Jay’s Treaty by writing a series of articles in
the Aggus under the name Camillus. In these articles he
warned that peace was necessary for the development Of

the nation and that war would serve to destroy the young
republic. That these articles must have been effective
can be deduced from Jefferson's comments to Madison after
reading them. "Hamilton is really a Collosus to the anti—

republican party,"

remarked the Sage Of Monticello, "with-
out numbers he is an host within himself." After thorough

deliberation Washington decided to sign the treaty.26

Although the ratification process had been com-
pleted, the Republicans led by James Madison intended to
have the last say in the House Of Representatives. Mad—
ison thought the House Of Representatives could kill the
treaty by refusing tO pass the enabling legislation nec-
essary tO make the treaty Operative. Rather than intro-
duce the question Of the treaty himself Madison decided
tO let the Federalists bring up this delicate matter.
However, another faction within the Republican Party pre-
ferred more radical action. This group wanted to intro—
duce the question Of Jay’s Treaty themselves, and their
attitude ultimately prevailed. On March 1, 1796 Presi-
dent Washington sent the British Treaty to the House,

and on the following day Edward Livingston of New York

introduced a resolution that the President lay Jay’s in—

structions and correspondence relating to the treaty be-

 

26Varg, Founding Fathers, pp. 106-1083 Thomas Jeffer—
son tO James Madison, September 21, 1795, Madison Papers.

 

54
fore the House.27

Debate on Livingston's motion raged for nearly three
weeks in the House Of Representatives. Both sides con-
sidered this motion SO important that almost all other
business was temporarily sidetracked. In general the
Federalists argued that the treaty had been ratified and
that the House had no business with the papers unless the
purpose was to impeach the President, a strategy some High
Federalists attributed to the Republicans. The Federal—
ists also argued that since the House could not repeal the
treaty, they must Obey it. On the other hand, the Repub-
licans led by James Madison and Albert Gallatin argued
that the House had a constitutional right to refuse to
pass legislation for executing a treaty which touched

legislative subjects vested in Congress.28

On March 7 Gallatin delivered his first major
foreign policy Speech in the House Of Representatives.
He stressed two major points in this speech. First,
since the treaty had been referred to a Committee Of the
Whole in the House, it would be useful to have as much
information as possible in order to take any action.

Secondly, Gallatin raised the Constitutional question.

 

27Irving Brant, James_Madison, Father of the Consti—
tution, 1787-1800 (New‘York:_Bobbs-Merrill and CO., 1950),
pp. 429—434; Noble Cunningham Jr., The Jeffersonian Re-
publicans: the Formation Of Party Organization, 1789-1801
(Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute Of Early Ameri—
can History and Culture at Williamsburg by the University
Of North Carolina Press, 1957), pp. 80—81.

28

 

Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, pp. 81-82.

 

55

He pointed out that certain powers were delegated to Con-
gress by the Constitution. The regulation Of trade was
one of the foremost of these powers. Perhaps the treaty—
making powers delegated to the Executive closed with its
Congressional right to regulate trade he pointed out.

"The question may arise,"

cautioned Gallatin, "whether a
Treaty made by the President and Senate, containing reg-
ulations touching objects delegated to Congress can be
considered binding, without Congress passing laws to carry
it into effect." While the questions he raised were im-
portant, he merely outlined issues which he considered
worthy of analysis. With this Speech the young Congress—
man established himself as an important figure in the Re-
publican Party. Jefferson was highly impressed with the
Pennsylvanian‘s analysis. ”It is worthy of being pre-
sented at the end of the Federalist as the only rational
commentary on the part of the Constitution to which it
relates,” Observed Jefferson.29

In subsequent speeches on March 9 and March 24 Gal-
latin elaborated on the two points he had raised earlier.
In his concluding speech on March 24 he developed fully
the Constitutional aspect Of the treaty making power.
First, he analyzed the Federalist point of view which he
labeled the "Treaty Doctrine." According to this theory
the President and the Senate could negotiate a binding

compact which left Congress no choice except to approp—

 

29Annals Of Congress, Fourth Congress, First Session,

pp. 436:H37.

¥

 

56

riate the money necessary for the execution Of the treaty.
This doctrine was both dangerous and unconstitutional the
Pennsylvania Congressman warned because it abridged the
clauses of the Constitution which vested Specific powers
in Congress. Secondly, Gallatin pointed out that the
treaty-making power would not be destroyed if the House
had access to treaty papers. The only power claimed by
the House was really a negative power which was confined
to the subjects over which Congress had the right to leg—
islate. A treaty that was not acted on by the House was
still the law of the land and binding upon the United
States except for matters Of legislative Object. The
final fate Of the treaty Gallatin argued would remain in
the hands Of the other signatory nation who must decide
whether they wished to honor the treaty without some Of
its original conditions. If the other nation accepted
the treaty without the portions embracing legislative
Objects, it remained a treaty. On the other hand if the
other nation chose not to be bound, they could do so. In
that case the treaty would be defeated, but the final de-
cision did not rest in the House.30

Following a rancorous debate the call for the
treaty papers was carried by a vote of 62-37 on March 24.
Six days later the House received its answer from the
President in the form of a sharply worded rejection. The
President thought that the papers requested were not rel—

evant to any purpose except his impeachment. Both Wash-

 

3OIbid., pp. 739—746.

 

 

57

ington's refusal and the tone of his address surprised
the House leadership. Consequently, on April 2 the Re-
publicans in the House caucused to decide on their next
move. After a thorough discussion Of the alternatives
James Madison decided that he had the votes necessary to
continue the battle. Thus on April 6 William Blount Of
North Carolina introduced resolutions in the House stating
that when a Treaty depended upon laws Of Congress for its
implementation the House Of Representatives had a consti-
tutional right to deliberate on carrying such a treaty
into effect. These resolutions passed without any dis—
cussion by a division of 57 to 35 which indicated that a
number Of Federalists voted with Madison’s party.31

The vehemence with which Republicans viewed Jay’s
Treaty was illustrated well by Jefferson. ”The whole
mass of your constituents have condemned this work in the
most unequivocal manner,” Jefferson told Madison. The
House was ”the last hope” to Spare the nation ”from the
effects of avarice and corruption Of the first agent.n
”Which had sacrificed the rights, the interest, the honor
and faith Of our nation."32

On April 13 Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts in—
troduced a resolution which called for appropriations to

carry four treaties, Jay’s Treaty, Pinckney’s Treaty with

 

3llbid., pp. 771-772, Cunningham, Jeffersonian Re-

ublicans, pp. 81-83, John C. Miller, The Federalist Era,
1789-1801 (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 175.

 

32Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, March 27, 1796,
Madison Papers.

iIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIE

58

Spain, a treaty with Algiers, and an Indian treaty into
effect. Under this plan the Federalists intended to
Shield the British treaty behind the Treaty Of San
Lorenzo which was generally conceeded to be highly advan-
tageous to American interests. In addition, the Spanish
Treaty’s great popularity in the West, a Republican
stronghold, was considered an asset for the Jay Treaty.
Albert Gallatin, disturbed by this Federalist maneuver,
urged that each treaty be voted upon separately. He took
special cognizance Of the fact that the Spanish Treaty
was solidly backed by his western Pennsylvania constitu-
ents. The idea which had gained credence in the West
that the Jay Treaty and the Spanish Treaty were linked
caused him great anguish. According to this theory the
Spanish would refuse to carry out the terms Of Pinckney’s
Treaty which opened the Mississippi River to American
commerce and established New Orleans as an entreport for
American goods unless the United States ratified Jay's
Treaty. Since consideration Of the Treaty Of San Lorenzo
would evoke little controversy, Gallatin proposed that it
be considered first by the House. By bringing the Spanish
Treaty to a vote first he planned to disarm those Feder—
alists who threatened to vote against it if Jay’s Treaty
was successfully blocked.33

Gallatin thought the Federalistst omnibus treaty
resolution highly threatening because he had already

received a petition from the constituents in his district

33Annals of Congress, Fourth Congress, First Session,
pp. 940, 964-965.

IIIIIIIIIIIn-_______________________________________

 

59

signed by fifty persons including such solid Republicans
as Alexander Addison and Hugh Henry Brackenridge. This
petition argued exactly as the Federalists did that the
Jay and Pinckney Treaties were closely related and fail—
ure to carry out the Jay Treaty would also doom the gener-
ous compact concluded with Spain. Gallatin had also re-
ceived other letters and petitions from Republican friends
and from normally Republican areas which favored imple-
menting the Jay Treaty with no reference to the Spanish
Treaty. One letter even suggested that he could use
these petitions as an excuse to desert the anti—treaty
forces. Knowing that public Opinion in his constituency
favored the Jay Treaty placed Gallatin in a very diffi-
cult position. His Own sentiments were undoubtedly
against the treaty, but after he began to receive prO—
treaty petitions and letters he was forced to reappraise
his thoughts.34

As the debate continued in the House on the Jay
Treaty Gallatin felt the brunt Of the attack by the Fed-
eralists. Harrison Gray Otis, one Of Gallatin's former
students at Harvard and an influential Boston lawyer,
referred to Gallatin as a ”vagrant” and a man who came to
America "without a second shirt to his back." Secretary

Of the Treasury, Oliver Wolcott, Jr., was convinced by

 

3l‘l”Petition of Sundry Inhabitants Of the Western
Counties of Pennsylvania in Favor Of the Treaty with
Great Britain,” March 21, 1796, David Redick to Albert
Gallatin, April 7, 1796, Alexander Addison to Albert
Gallatin, April 7, 1796, Gallatin Papers.

 

60

his own party's propaganda that the Western Pennsylvania
Congressman was "directed by foreign politics and influ—
ence." As odious as the Federalists’ personal attacks
were, it is probable that they played only a small part,
if any, in influencing Gallatin's attitude on the Jay
Treaty. The letters and petitions from Western Pennsyl-
vania which he continued to receive weighed much more
heavily. Probably correspondence from home constituted
one of the leading reasons that he was silent during most
of the crucial debate in the later days of April.35

Gallatin‘s one important speech on the substance Of
the treaty reflected an attempt to combine elements of
idealism and realism. Although he was genuinely Opposed
to most provisions Of the treaty and wanted to vote
against its implementation, he knew that his district
favored the treaty because they thought it would insure
peace on the frontier. Gallatin was in the difficult
position of maintaining that the Jay Treaty was not in
the national interest although some provisions were defin—
itely in his district‘s interest. His speech of April 26
reflected an attempt to reconcile these two points of
view.

The first part of his speech carefully reviewed the
provisions Of the Treaty in an effort to balance the as-
sets and defects. He began by stating that the differ—
ences between the two nations sprang either from the

failure to execute some articles of the treaty of peace

 

35Wa1ters, Gallatin, pp. 100-101.

 

61
of 1783 or from the effects Of the European war. He

found that the treaty remedied the past differences that
Britain had with America, for the United States had agreed
to full compensation for losses arising from the debt
question. Having done justice to Britain the United
States should expect equal treatment of her claims aris—
ing from the treaty Of 1783. Although the British had
agreed to evacuate the frontier posts, they insisted that
British traders be allowed to remain on the frontier with-
out becoming American citizens. Nor could the United
States exert any control over these aliens. In Gallatin's
eyes this new condition outweighed the positive effect of
the British relinquishment of the frontier posts because
British influence which had incited the Indians in the
past would remain. However, the concessions that the
United States received from the British on the subject

of Spoilations of American commerce constituted an im-
portant benefit. "When a weak nation had to contend with

" he observed, ”it was gaining a great

a powerful one,
deal if the national honor was saved even by the shadow
Of an indemnification, and by an apparent concession on
the part of the aggressor.” Nevertheless, Gallatin was
particularly angry at the abandonment of the American
doctrine Of neutral rights, ”free ships make free goods,"
in favor of the British contention that an enemy’s prop-
erty on board a neutral vessel was fair game. The worst

part of abandoning the American concept of neutral rights

was that it would encourage British aggression on the

 

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII————————————————————————————————————’

62

high seas. Not only had America acquiesced in the British
interpretation Of maritime rights, but they also had re-
nounced all weapons of self-defense. Since the United
States had no naval fleet which could Oppose the British
Navy, she had to rely on other defensive measures such as
restrictions on trade, a prohibition on British manufac-
tures, or a sequestration of British debts. However, in
the Jay Treaty the United States had voluntarily re-
nounced all three measures: the first two for the dur-
ation Of the European war and the latter forever. The
renunciation Of commercial weapons was particularly gall—
ing to Gallatin because it repealed the whole Republican
foreign policy toward England.36

The second portion of Gallatin‘s speech considered
the probable consequences if the House refused to approp—
riate the funds necessary to execute the Treaty. If the
Treaty were rejected, three conditions would likely re—
sult. First, the British would continue to retain the
posts. Secondly, no reparations for British Spoilations
on American commerce would be forthcoming. Consequently
American national honor would continue to suffer. Finally,
the day when a lasting adjustment Of American differences
with Britain could be effected would be further post—
poned. After enumerating the evils of rejecting the
treaty Gallatin made a very significant statement which

indicated that public Opinion in Western Pennsylvania had

 

36

Annals of Congress, Fourth Congress, First Session,
pp. 1184—1193.

lIIIIIIIIIn._____________________________________________________________ 1--IIIIIIII

 

63

caused him to moderate his View of the treaty. He stated:

. . . and when to these considerations

be added that Of the present situation

of the country, of the agitation of the

public mind, and of the advantages that

would arise from the union of sentiments,

however injurious and unequal he con—

ceived the Treaty to be, however repug-

nant it might be to his feelings and

perhaps to his prejudices, he felt in-

duced to vote for it, and would not give

his assent to any proposition which

would imply its rejection.37

The latter part Of this quotation has been cited to

prove that Gallatin shifted his position in response to
his constituent's wishes. This interpretation is not
completely valid when one considers the rest Of Gallatin’s
Speech, for he articulated the reasons why he did not vote
to implement the Treaty. Since the Treaty had been
signed, British conduct on the high seas had become worse
not better. Gallatin considered the continuation Of im-
pressment and violations on shipping as an attempt by His
Majesty’s government to force the United States into
adopting the treaty. True, a very important reason for
negotiating the Treaty had been to halt British violence
on the seas, but these depredations continued. He won—
dered what logic would dictate American acceptance Of the
Treaty designed to stop the very acts which Britain was
using to bludgeon the United States into acceptance. In
In his Opinion such action would constitute "a dereliction

of national interest, of national honor, of national in-

dependence.” Basing his decision on the preceding ideal-

 

37Ibid., p. 1196.

64

istic factors Gallatin announced that he would vote
against implementing the Treaty.38

Other Republicans were even more skeptical of the
treaty than Gallatin. The Jay Treaty was unacceptable to
almost all Jeffersonians for three reasons. First, it
committed the United States not to establish discrimi—
natory tonnage duties nor to resort to other forms of
economic coercion. Secondly, it offended the national—
istic and democratic sentiments of the agrarians. Fin—
ally, it surrendered a major principle of international
relations: neutral rights. James Madison expressed Ob-
jections to nearly every article. Some Republicans be—
lieved that the Federalists were attempting to create a
crisis psychology by speaking of war as the alternative
to the treaty. Many Republicans thought the strength of
the United States would act as a deterent to the British.
In addition, most Republicans emphasized only the Amer—
ican side of relations with Britain. Some could not see
that the British had any valid arguments at all. There-
fore compromise was rejected.39

In the beginning Of the battle in the House over
Jay’s Treaty in April James Madison thought he held a
healthy majority. By April 23 a Shift had occurred.
”The majority has melted by changes and abscences (sip),

to 8 or 9 votes,” Madison confided to Jefferson, "Whether

 

38Ibid., pp. 1193-1198.

39Varg, Founding Fathers, pp. 111—112.

 

65

these will continue firm is more than I can decide," he
confessed. In fact these votes also shifted, for on April
30 the House voted 51 to 48 to authorize the appropria-
tions for the Jay Treaty. Gallatin voted against the
resolution. In less than three weeks the anti-treaty
bloc in the House of Representatives had lost their
majority. Perhaps the best explanation of this shift in
sentiment can be traced to the tremendous pressure which
the Federalists applied at the ”grass-roots” levels. Un—
doubtedly these efforts were crucial in many Congressional
districts. Gallatin himself received many letters and
petitions urging him to vote for execution Of the Jay
Treaty. He assumed that his correspondence was inspired
by Federalist James Ross, but after the treaty was car—
ried into effect he discovered that his original premise
was wrong. In reality the enthusiasm for the treaty had
been inspired from within the heart Of the Republican
ranks by Alexander Addison and Hugh Henry Brackenridge.
Although he received many petitions and letters, Gal-
latin's final attitude on the treaty was determinated by
two factors. First, he was not certain that true popular
support for the treaty really existed. Referring to pub—
1ic opinion in the closing part Of his April 26 speech
Gallatin stated that the full range of public opinion was
not known. Secondly, he was convinced that what he con-

ceived to be American interests would be served best by

America‘s refusal to implement the British treaty.)‘LO

 

“ODavid Redick to Albert Gallatin, April 20, 1796; A.

66

While Jay’s Treaty ironed out some of the most
pressing problems between Britain and the United States,
it further complicated the already difficult relations
with France. When the French learned of the terms of the
settlement with Britain, they were furious for several
reasons. France had not wanted the negotiations to suc-
ceed, for her interests would be best served if the
United States went to war with England. In addition,
James Monroe, the American minister in Paris, on the
basis of inadequate information from the State Depart—
ment had told the French that they had nothing to fear
from the negotiations between Britain and his nation.
Consequently, France believed Monroe had deliberately
deceived them, and the American minister was thoroughly
discredited. Technically no conflict existed between
the British Treaty and American Obligations to France.
However, the agreement with Britain did violate the
Spirit Of the Commercial Treaty Of 1778 because British
ships might seize and confiscate American ships carrying
foodstuffs to France. As far as the French were con—
cerned the United States had turned her back on them and
virtually allied herself with archenemy England. The
Official French reaction to Jay’s Treaty soon followed.
On July 2, 1796 She announced that France would treat

neutrals exactly as they allowed England to treat them.

 

Robertson to Albert Gallatin, April 27, 1796; Alexander
Addison to Albert Gallatin, May 4, 1796, Albert Gallatin
to Alexander Addison, May 13, 1796, Gallatin Papers.

 

67

In short, France planned to seize American Ships again.41

Nor did France confine her anti—Federalist activity
to the high seas. The ratification of the British Treaty
which had been bitterly Opposed with all the resources at
their command by French ministers, Joseph Fauchet and
Pierre Adet, convinced the Paris government that they
must work to defeat George Washington. Consequently Adet
campaigned against Washington until he announced his re-
tirement. Then the French minister focused his attention
on preventing John Adams, who was assumed to be pro-
British, from succeeding Washington.42

Certainly French interference in American political
life was not novel. Fauchet and Adet were merely continu—
ing a theme Of French diplomacy established in 1776 by
Vergennes and further elaborated upon by Genet. These
men all intended to use the United States as a French
pawn in international politics. When he issued his Fare-
well Address President Washington was acutely aware both
Of French meddling and fertile soil in the United States
occasioned by the pro-French sympathy Of some Americans.
Therefore part Of the Farewell Address was devoted tO de-
ploring the growth of a violent partisanship that inflamed
peoples with violent passions or hatreds for foreign
nations. ”Nothing is more essential than that permanent,
inveterate antipathies against particular nations and
passionate attachments for others should be excluded,”

he warned, ”and that in place Of them just and amicable

 

41Miller, Federalist Era, pp. 193-195.
2Ibid., pp. 198-200.

 

——,__ _-¥

 

 

68
feelings toward all Should be cultivated.43

Washington also focused on formal entanglements.
Surely he had in mind the disputes and embarrassments al—
ready caused by the "perpetual" French Alliance of 1778.
”It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alli—
ances with any portion Of the foreign world,” he asserted.
However, he did not rule out all entanglements, for ”We
may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary
emergencies." This was sound advice for a young and
divided nation which had suffered from recent and bitter
experience with France. The policy of noninvolvement
that he suggested was designed to exclude European agents
and intrigue from the United States. If this advice were
followed, Americans might enjoy real independence.“L

Although somewhat tempered with realism Gallatin‘s
attitude on the Jay Treaty differed only slightly from
the idealistic viewpoint of the Republican party and its
leaders, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Unlike many
Republicans he took into consideration the fact that Amer—
ica was receiving some concessions from a Great Power.
However, he was very disturbed that the treaty repealed his
party’s foreign policy of economic retaliation against
England. Moreover, he dismissed the benefits of the
treaty when he thought of British violation of the con—

cept Of national honor and national independence by their

 

43A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, 1789-1902, ed. James D. Richardson (New York:
Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1896) I, 221.

44:bid., 223.

 

 

 

69

spoliations of American commerce. It was mainly that
consideration which led him to vote against the treaty.
Yet his April 26 speech also shows the careful and
thorough analysis which characterized Gallatin's foreign
policy as Congressman. Nevertheless, idealism triumphed,
and Gallatin was typical of most Republicans with some
reservations. In spite Of a certain immaturity Gallatin
does present some promise Of tough minded approach to
foreign policy in the future.

The Jay Treaty was the great foreign policy issue
which confronted the Fourth Congress in 1796. Although
the Federalists succeeded in Obtaining the appropriations
they sought and carried the treaty into effect, Albert
Gallatin also benefitted from this foreign policy debate.
Through his logical analysis and perceptive Observations
the Congressman from Western Pennsylvania distinguished
himself in his first term in the House. Consequently,
even before James Madison retired from Congress in 1797
Gallatin was looked to by many, both friends and enemies,
as the leader of the Republicans in the House. This dis—
tinction bore much bitter fruit for the task Of fighting
the Federalists' policies was hard work with little

45

reward.

 

45Adams, Life of Gallatin, p. 166.

 

CHAPTER III
THE FAILURE OF FRENCH INTIMIDATION

French reaction to the Jay Treaty had not reached
its zenith when the Federalists began to push for the
creation of a Naval establishment in addition to in-
creased appropriations for new frigates and other defense
measures. The Federalist Party responded to the crisis
precipitated by France in 1796 much as they had reacted
to the crisis created by Britain in 1794. In both cases
American commerce was being harassed by a European Power,
and in each instance the Federalists recognized the nec—
essity of using force to defend American neutrality. For
this reason bills were introduced into Congress late in
the second session of the Fourth Congress calling for the
strengthening of the regular army, the creation of a pro-
visional army Of 15,000 men, the construction of three
frigates, the levying Of new taxes to obtain revenue, and
the granting of large discretionary powers to the
President.1

Albert Gallatin like most Republicans also followed
the precedents Of 1794 in responding to the French crisis.

In contrast to the Federalists Republicans Opposed defense

 

lMiller, Federalist Era, pp. 207-208.

70

dIIIIIIIIIIIZ::;_______________________________________________________

 

71
measures in each case. In 1794 the Republicans had fav-

ored punitive action against Britain by means Of economic
coercion, but in 1796—1797 most Republicans would not even
admit that France presented a legitimate threat to Amer—
ican interests.

Gallatin especially Opposed the creation of a large
navy and increased naval appropriations. He was convinced
that the existence of a heavy debt constituted bad national
policy. For a young state to encourage indebtedness would
be disastrous. Since the United States already had a
large debt, only greater financial burdens, the passage
of new taxes, or both would result from higher appropri—
ations for the navy. Nor did Gallatin think a navy could
protect commerce. Moreover, he viewed the creation of a
navy as the erection of an instrument Of force not con—
sistent with American national purpose. Finally, he
feared that increased sea power would be directly linked
with the augmentation of the army, a step which might be
used for domestic political purposes by the majority party.

Gallatin was particularly anxious to demolish the
Federalist notion that commerce could not exist without
the protection of a navy. He addressed himself to this
point in a major speech in the House Of Representatives
on February 10, 1797. Although American commerce had
been subject to continual depredations since 1793, its
volume was exceeded only by England and Holland he point-
ed out. Most European nations demonstrated that no log-

ical connection existed between the size of a state's

 

 

 

72

navy and the extent Of its commercial transactions. For
example, Russia and Sweden had large navies but little
commerce. On the other hand, Holland which had a small
navy carried on a volume of commerce second only to Eng-
land. Instead of acting as agents of commercial success
navies "were the instruments of power more calculated to
annoy the trade Of other nations, than to protect that of
the nation to which they belong.”2
In the same speech Gallatin warned that the United
States could not support a navy. He asked the proponents
of a large naval establishment to consider how much three
frigates had cost before they decided to create a fleet
capable of commanding European respect. In addition to
financing a navy, the Pennsylvania Republican wondered
how it would be possible for America to man a large fleet
given the fact that European naval nations were forced to
practice impressment in order to staff their navies. Yet
Gallatin did not ignore the problem of defense. If abso—
lutely necessary he would support a policy Of placing
American seamen on board privateers and covering the

3

ocean with these privateers.

Before concluding this Speech Gallatin declared
that a much more effective way to secure the respect Of
foreign nations existed. Rather than using force America

should apply all her resources to paying the debt. He

 

2Annals of Congress, Fourth Congress, Second Ses-
sion, p, 2129°
31bid., pp. 2129-2130.

 

73

argued in the most idealistic terms that a nation with a
balanced budget and a small national debt would be an un-
likely target for European agressionfI In employing these
arguments Gallatin ignored the very real question Of French
seizures. Moreover, his solution betrayed a passionate
attachment to a governmental economy which seriously
twisted his views Of American national interests in foreign
policy. As well this stand inhibited his ability to make
adjustments for harsh and unforeseen contingencies. Nev-
ertheless, even in moments Of his most idealistic commit—
ment to governmental economy Gallatin still retained
enough foresight to admit that someday a navy might well
be necessary. However, in the future sea power could be
forged from a surplus Of Treasury funds. As a token Of
his willingness to consider a future navy the Pennsyl-
vania Congressman was willing to appropriate a small amount
Of money for the purchase Of live oak to be used as a fu-
ture resource for ship building.5

The debate Over defense policy temporarily subsided
with the eXpiration Of the Fourth Congress in March, 1797.
On March 4, 1797 John Adams was inaugurated as President
Of the United States. One Of the new President’s foremost
concerns was settlement Of the French question. "I have
it much at heart to settle all disputes with France," he

told Henry Knox. He intended that "nothing shall be

 

uMiller, Federalist Era, p. 208.

 

5Annals of Congress, Fourth Congress, Second Ses-
sion, p. 2130.

 

h.._‘

 

 

74
wanting On my part to accomplish” this Objective. How-
ever, Adams set certain limits to his search for peace.
"But old as I am," he cautioned, "war is, even to me,
less dreadful than iniquity or deserved disgrace."6
Although he sought peace with France, President
Adams held no illusions concerning the ease of this task.
His appraisal of France was brutally realistic. Above
all he understood the fundamental basis Of international
relations was self-interest. A11 European nations began
from this basis, but this assumption was particularly
pronounced in the French. "They consider nobody but
themselves,” Observed the President. In many respects
Frenchmen had a highly exalted Opinion of themselves and
their nation. ”Their apparent respect and real contempt
for all men and all nations but Frenchmen, are proberbial
among themselves." Recent French efforts to influence
American politics confirmed Adams'opinion that "They think
it is in their power to give characters and destroy char-
acters as they please.” The only rule that guided French
action was "to give reputation to their tools, and to de-
stroy the reputation of all who will not be their tools.”
Adams view Of the French concluded:
TO a Frenchman the most important man

in the world is himself, and the most im—

portant nation is France. He thinks that

France ought to govern all nations, and

that he ought to govern France. Every man
and nation that agrees to this, he is will—

 

6John Adams to Henry Knox, March 30, 1797, The Works
of John Adams, ed. Charles Francis Adams (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1853), VIII, 535.

*—

75

ing to 'pOpulariser‘: every man or
nation that diSputes or doubts it he
will 'depopulariser' if he can.

 

 

While Adams himself sought peace with France on
terms honorable to the United States, he realized that he
would be forced to struggle with many problems. One Of
the foremost difficulties was the nature of the American
political system. Foreign attachments explained the
"different gradations of attachment and aversion to me in
different parties" Adams believed. ”The difference be-
tween France and England occasions the difference here.

8

This is to me a frightful consideration.” The President

found comfort in the Observation that the majority Of the
nation like himself, was not passionately attached to any
party.

Indeed John Adams had good reason to be concerned
with political parties and the loyalties they commanded.
Thomas Jefferson shared the same fear, but his emphasis
was quite different. The Vice-President‘s chief concern
lay in the kind Of policies the new chief Executive would
pursue toward England and France. Jefferson's first esti-
mate of Adams was Optimistic. ”I dO not believe Mr. A.
wishes war with France,” he confided to fellow Virginian

James Madison. "Nor do I believe he will truckle to Eng—

 

7John Adams to Henry Knox, March 30, 1797, Ibid.,

8John Adams to Dr. Walsh, March 10, 1797, quoted
in Alexander De Conde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and
Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France 1797-1801
(New York: Charles Scribner‘s Sons, 1966), p. 16.

536.

 

 

76

land as servilely as has been done. If he assumes this
front at once and shews that he means to attend to self
reSpect and national dignity with both nations, perhaps
the depredations of both on our commerce may be amicably
arrested."9

On March 14, 1797 the very day after John Adams had
expressed his desire to maintain peaceful relations with
France to Pierre Adet, the recalled French minister who
had worked for the President‘s defeat in the election Of
1796, bad news arrived in Philadelphia. Before leaving
Office President Washington had sent Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney, a South Carolina Federalist, to replace the in—
discreet James Monroe as American minister in Paris. The
Directory, the ostensible French government, not only had
refused to receive Pinckney, but they had also forced him
to leave Paris. Pinckney had retreated to Amsterdam.to
await further instructions from his government.10

News of the treatment accorded Pinckney was bad
enough, but even worse news followed. On March 2, 1797
the Directory had issued a decree which violated the
Franco-American commercial treaty of 1778. They annulled
the principle of free Ships, free goods thus allowing
French warships to capture all neutral vessels caught
carrying British goods. This order also stated that any

American found serving under an enemy flag, a category

 

9Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, January 22,
1797, Madison Papers.

loDeConde, Quasi-War, pp. 16-17.

;.__—_—___

77

which would include all American seamen impressed by the
British, would be treated as pirates. Furthermore, all
American ships which did not carry a list Of crew and
passengers or role d’ eguipage in a form approved by
France would be liable to seizure. In total these stip—
ulations amounted to limited maritime hostilities on the
part of France against the United States, a nation with
whom she was at least technically still allied.ll

French actions were critical enough to convince
the President that Congress should be convened as soon
as possible. Thus he issued a call for a Special session
to Open May 15. On May 16 the President addressed a joint
session of Congress on the French question. He devoted
the first part of his message to outlining French re—
jection Of Pinckney. "The refusal on the part of France
to receive our minister, is then the denial Of a right,”
he Observed, "but the refusal to receive him until we
have acceded to their demands without discussion and with-
out investigation, is to treat us neither as allies, nor
as friends, nor as a sovereign State." Worse than simply
rejecting an American minister France had compounded the
crime. They attempted to separate Americans from their
governments and "to produce divisions fatal to our peace."
This French interference "ought to be repelled with a
decision which shall convince France and the world that

we are not a degraded people, humiliated under a colonial

 

11Ibid., p. 17.

78

Spirit of fear and sense of inferiority, fitted to be the
miserable instruments Of foreign influence, and regardless
of national honor, character, and interest."12

Although France had ”inflicted a wound in the Amer—
ican breast," Adams still desired peace. Hence he announced
that he would "institute a fresh attempt at negotiations."
He expected to seek a settlement compatible with "the
rights, duties, and honor Of the nation." Nevertheless,
at the same time he recommended defense measures such as
the arming of merchant ships, the augmentation Of the navy,
the formation of a provisional army, and new laws to
strengthen the militia.13

Adams' speech embodied many Of Alexander Hamilton's
ideas, and it satisfied most Federalists. On the other
hand, Republicans considered it warlike and were "sur—
prised, shocked, and alarmed." They were surprised be—
cause the tone Of the speech was completely unexpected.
They were shocked because they thought perhaps Adams was
more inclined toward peace than his address indicated.
Finally they were alarmed because they believed the Pres—
ident had given in to the warlike Hamiltonian wing Of the
Federalist Party.lu

If Albert Gallatin had been looked to as a leader

of the Republicans in the Fourth Congress, his position

 

12Works Of John Adams, 1x, 113-114.
13lbid., 114-117.

lD'Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, May 18, 1797,
Madison Papers; De Conde, Quasi-War, p. 26.

 

 

79

was enhanced considerably in the Fifth Congress. James
Madison had retired from public life, and aside from Gal-
latin only Edward Livingston, John Nicholas, and William
Branch Giles could be considered candidates for leadership
positions. Gallatin easily stood out among these men and
was the undiSputed Republican leader. Consequently, in
most instances his comments on American policy toward
France were indicative Of the Republican position.

On May 25 Gallatin made an important speech in
answer to President Adamsx address tO Congress. At the
outset he established clearly that he did not plan to
apologize for French conduct. However, he did think that
France should be placed on an equal footing with all other
nations as far as her treaty with the United States was
concerned. If nothing else was accomplished, Gallatin
thought that his country should take measures to make it
abundantly clear to France that no division existed with—
in the United States over the course Of American policy.
To accomplish this Objective he favored a stiff ultimatum
to the French Directory tO demonstrate American solidar-
ity. Finally, he urged that no time be wasted in begin-
ning negotiations.15

Gallatin fought most Federalist projects for chas-
tizing the French. He Opposed a convoy system because
he thought that it would be more expensive and yield
fewer benefits than continuing the status quO. He rea-

soned that individuals would lose more paying taxes for

 

15Annals Of Congress, Fifth Congress, First Session,
pp. 144-150.

 

—

80

a large navy than paying higher prices for commodities,
the logical result Of continued French Spoilations. He
also challenged allowing merchant vessels to arm because
neither international law nor the practice of nations
sanctioned this mode of protection. He advised Congres-
sional silence on this matter so that the American govern—
ment could not be blamed for any acts of violence under—
taken by individuals. He also maintained that American
ships should submit to search as stipulated in her com—
mercial treaties because a failure to allow for a proper
search was grounds for hostile action.16

In the meantime John Adams had appointed a three
man commission to negotiate with France. Originally he
selected John Marshall, the Virginia Federalist, and
Francis Dana, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme
Court, to join Charles Cotesworth Pinckney in Paris.

When Dana refused to serve because of poor health, Adams

replaced him with Elbridge Gerry, a Massachusetts Repub-

lican, who had been the President‘s original choice prior
to rejection by the cabinet. In July Marshall and Gerry

departed on their mission, and in early October they both
arrived in France.

Meanwhile John Adams speculated that French policy
would not become any more bellicose toward the United
States. ”Tallyrand, I should suppose, could not be for
war with this country," he Observed to his Secretary of

State Timothy Pickering. Nor could Adams believe that

lbIbid., pp. 245, 256—257, 278—279.

 

81

the Directory would support such a radical move. The
President expected French policy to remain constant, for
"a continued appearance Of umbrage, and continued deprada—
tions on a weak, defenceless commerce, will be much more

convenient for their views.”17

During the remainder Of 1797 Gallatin remained
fairly Optimistic regarding American policy toward France.
He thought that the majority of the Federalists wanted to
negotiate with France and favored peaceful resolution Of
the crisis as long as some compensation was exacted for

" he wrote, "I believe

French violations. ”Upon the whole,
that we will not adopt a single hostile measure, and that
we will evince such a spirit as will induce Mr. Adams tO
negotiate on the very ground we propose." He was con—
vinced only a few Federalists led by Oliver Wolcott Jr.,
Secretary Of the Treasury; Timothy Pickering, Secretary
of State, William Smith; and Fisher Ames were determined
to go to war. AS late as December, 1797 after the second
session Of the Fifth Congress Opened Gallatin retained
this optimism. "I think that unless the French Govern—
ment treat our Commissioners very 111 this session will
pass on quietly and without much mischief being done," he
18

predicted tO his wife.

Most Republicans agreed with their Congressional

 

lTJOhn Adams to Timothy Pickering, October 31, 1797,
Works Of John Adams, VIII, 560.

18Albert Gallatin to Commodore James Nicholson, May
26, 1797; Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin,
December 19, 1797, Gallatin Papers.

 

 

82

leader that only extreme Federalists sought to provoke

war with France. Since the Republicans had enough strength
in the House Of Representatives to delay action on almost
any matter, decisive measures could not pass. Yet a sig-
nificant and ominous change fell over Gallatin as 1797
drew to a close. Between December, 1797 and January, 1798
his thoughts on relations with France shifted. He grew
tense in early January as Congress awaited news Of the
negotiations with France. As time passed with no news
forthcoming he became decidedly pessimistic. In a letter
full of revealing political news Gallatin unburdened him—
self to his wife:

Our Situation grows critical. It will
require great firmness to prevent this
country being involved in a war should our
negotiation with France meet with great de-
lay or any serious interruption. We must
expect to be branded with the casual epi-
thets of Jacobins and tools of foreign
influence. We must have fortitude enough
to despise the calumania of the war—faction
and to do our duty not withstanding the
situation in which we have been dragged by
the weakness and party spirit of our ad-
ministration and by the haughtiness of
France. We must preserve self dignity, not
suffer our country to be debased, and yet
preserve our Constitution and our Fellow
citizens from the fatal effects of war.

The task is difficult and will be imprac—
ticable unless we are supported by the body
of the American people. You know, my love,
that I am not deficient in political forti—
tude, and I feel, therefore, perfectly dis—
posed to do my duty to its full extent and
under every possible circumstance.l

 

19Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin, Janu—
ary 19, 1798, Gallatin Papers, Gallatin to his wife, Janu—
ary 2, 17983 Gallatin to his wife, January 11, 1798, Adams,
Life Of Gallatin, p. 189. Gallatin predicted that nothing
would be done until the fate of the negotiations was known.

 

L-

83

Gallatin and the Republicans had good reason to be
suspicious, for events which were to have momentous im-
pact in the United States had transpired in France during
the fall Of 1797. Shortly after the trio of American
negotiators reached Paris they were approached by three
French agents, later designated as Messieurs X, Y, and Z
by President Adams. These mysterious diplomatists enum—
erated several necessary prerequisites to negotiations.
They demanded an apology for President Adams’ statements
about France, a bribe of 1,200,000 livres, and a loan of
32,000,000 florins which would be used to purchase sup-
plies from the United States.

The American diplomats were not naive enough to be
terribly shocked by talk Of money, but they refused these
demands for very good reasons. First, they had not been
instructed to deal with financial problems such as these.
Secondly, to accept the French demand for a loan would
constitute a breach Of neutrality almost certain to cause
war between the British and the United States. For a
neutral nation to make loans to a belligerent was tanta—
mount tO throwing her weight behind that nation. In this
case the United States could not risk war with Britain
for obvious reasons. America needed British manufactures
and the revenue derived from the preponderance of trade
with Britain. Indeed Tallyrand’s agents were asking for
far more than a loan, they were demanding a radical shift
in American foreign policy that would lead to disaster

for the young republic.2O

 

dUVarg, Founding Fathers, pp. 131-132.

 

84

While the Americans rejected the French terms, this
action did not end negotiations summarily. In fact, talks
continued over a five month period from October, 1797 un-
til March, 1798. One of the leading reasons these con-
ferences continued lay in the fact that France did not
want war with the United States. Finally, in March, 1798
when it was clear that the price Of a settlement with
France would be war with England, negotiations broke
down. Marshall and Pinckney left Paris in disgust but
Elbridge Gerry remained at Tallyrand's request to prevent
a complete rupture between France and America.

While diplomacy between France and the United
States deteriorated, Gallatin avoided public discussion
of Franco-American relations. During the first three
months Of 1798 Gallatin’s Observations on American foreign
policy were confided to a critique of foreign political
intercourse. In his discussion he drew a sharp line be—
tween commercial and political intercourse. The primary
thrust of his argument was that normal commercial inter—
course, while highly necessary to the nation, could be
carried on by consular agents. Ministers and other
agents of political intercourse were not only superfluous,
but they also could be harmful to a nation‘s interests
because the United States should avoid political con-
nection with Europe. If commercial treaties were advan-
tageous, a Minister Extraordinary could be dispatched
for the sole purpose of concluding the agreement. Min-

isters and other members of the diplomatic establishment

85

only aided the United States in extending in political
influence in Europe, a circumstance which should be

avoided.21

In the eyes of the Pennsylvania Republican only the
complete dismantling of the diplomatic establishment could
save America from the corruption of the European. In ad—
vocating such action Gallatin went almost as far as any
American politician in espousing nearly complete political
and diplomatic (although not commercial) isolation from
Europe. That he suggested this radical course indicated
that indeed Gallatin was still a child of the Enlighten-
ment. In his eyes two worlds existed. One world, rep—
resented by America was good, virtuous, and republican.
The other world, represented by Europe, was evil, cor-
rupt, and tyranical.

In a speech on March 1 which the Republicans con—
sidered so noteworthy that it was specially printed and
distributed Gallatin even went so far as to question
whether commercial treaties aided American commerce.

He was suspicious that commercial treaties often con—
tained provisions which were political in nature. He
argued that prior to 1787 the commercial treaties which
America had signed with France, Holland, Sweden, and
Prussia had not prevented a depression of commerce. How-
ever, between l787 and 1793 American trade boomed without

the negotiating of any new trade treaties. From this

reasoning Gallatin concluded that the formation of the

 

21 Annals of Congress, Fifth Congress, Second Session,

pp. 8561857, 859, 886-887.

 

 

86

general government which could regulate commerce was the
crucial factor which had stimulated commerce. He also
proposed that the diplomatic establishment be trimmed as
a gesture to Europe that America did not want to mix in
their political affairs. Referring to the European
balance of power Gallatin made an oft quoted statement:

But, however interesting that balance
may be to Europe, how does it concern us?
We may lament the fate of Poland and Venice,
and I never can myself see without regret,
independent nations blotted from the map of
the world. But their destiny does not affect
us in the least. We have no interest what-
ever in that balance, and by us it should be
altogether forgotten and neglected. If we
ever think that we have an interest in it,
shall we not be induced to throw our weight
in the scale; shall we not involve ourselves
in the destinies and the wars of Europe? If
we act on our ground, is it likely that other
nations will ever consider us as forming a
weight in their balance?

Part of this statement has been cited as an example
of Gallatin’s isolationism by John C. Miller in The Fed—

eralist Era. In reality Gallatin was doing little more

 

than echoing the advice in Washington’s Farewell Address,
wise council that was generally accepted by most Amer-
icans at this time. Both defined America‘s rightful
foreign relations as commercial relations. The Pennsyl-
vanian subscribed to Washington's thesis that Europe and
America each had a primary set of interests which were

not related. Gallatin also left room for the distasteful
contingency that America may have to intervene in European

affairs in the future. He did underestimate, as most

 

22Ibid., pp. 1124-1129.

87

Republicans, usually did, the role of Britain and the
British Treaty which he had opposed.

Much of what Gallatin advised with regard to the
diplomatic establishment can be explained through his
attempt to cut expenditures. Moreover, part of his atti—
tude on this question was conditioned by his frustration
on the unresolved state of Franco-American relations.
However, the best explanation of the attack on the dip—
lomatic establishment lies in Gallatin’s fear of the ex-
tension of Executive power. He worried that the increase
of the diplomatic establishment would mean more patronage
and the use of influence by the Executive branch. This
speech was also a reaction to the Federalist's emphasis
on Executive power.

On March 4, 1798 the period of tense anticipation of
news from France ended, for the first dispatches from the
American commissioners arrived in Philadelphia that
evening. Upon a first reading of the uncoded papers
both Secretary of State Pickering and President Adams
were convinced that the climax to the French crisis had
arrived. Adams told Congress that the dispatches had
arrived, and from what he had already read he was certain
the mission had failed. Consequently he recommended
measures to protect commerce until he could give a full
report on all the papers. While the nation waited un-
easily the dispatches were deciphered. After ascertain-
ing the complete picture the President leaned toward war

and believed at the very minimum that the nation was in

 

 

88

for a long hard struggle. Albert Gallatin was so alarmed
at the thought of open hostilities that he closed a letter
to his wife with these words, "May God save us from a
war!"23

On March 19 the President sent Congress a message
much milder than he had originally intended. While he
did not call for a formal declaration of war, it did
establish a state of limited hostilities against France.
Having read the reports of Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry,
Adams sadly reported, "I perceive no ground of expectation
that the objects of their mission can be accomplished on
terms compatible with the safety, the honor, or the es—
sential interests of the nation." Nor did this failure
result from lack of effort or desire for peace on the part
of the United States. "I can discern nothing," Adams
concluded, "which could have insured or contributed to
success, that has been omitted on my part, and nothing
further which can be attempted." He repeated his recom—
mendations for defense of shipping, the protection of
coastal areas, manufacture of arms, and the raising of
the revenue necessary to finance these measures.24

Gallatin was irked by Adams‘ tactics which he con-
strued as an attempt to put America on a war footing with—
out a declaration of war. He thought that the situation

demanded an immediate decision for war or peace. After

 

23Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin, March
6, 1798, Adams, Life of Gallatin, p. 195.

24Works of John Adams, IX, 156—157.

 

 

89

carefully weighing the consequences the Republican leader
counseled that it would be better for the United States

to submit to French seizures of vessels rather than go to
war. He carefully pointed out that he no longer considered
French influence strong in the country and that he was not
trying to defend French actions. In fact, he thought some
defensive measures against France were justified. Yet he
refused to advocate such action because he could not dis-
tinguish between offensive and defensive war at sea. The
main reason Gallatin was willing to council submission
was that he was convinced that war would soon terminate

in Europe. Then the obnoxious maritime practices of the

25

French would cease.

The Republicans in Congress believed that the Presi-
dent and his party were creating a crisis which did not
really exist in order to justify high handed defensive
measures which by-passed the legislative branch. There—
fore much pressure accumulated for Adams to submit the dis-
patches of the American commissioners to Congress. On
April 2 the House of Representatives by an overwhelming
vote demanded the papers. A combination of Republicans
and extreme War Hawk Federalists was responsible for this
action. The former believed that once these papers were
made public clamor for war would subside for lack of

cause: while the latter thought these documents would

 

25Annals of Congress, Fifth Congress, Second Session,

pp. 1328-1330, 1370; Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson
Gallatin, March 13, 1798, Adams, Life of Gallatin, pp. 195

-196.

 

__,_,

9O

disclose evils calculated to stir the nation's patriotism
to demand outright war. Suspecting a trap Gallatin re-
fused to vote for the resolution. William Branch Giles,
a Republican leader from Virginia, warned his colleagues,
"You are doing wrong to call for these dispatches. They
will injure us."26

On April 3 the XYZ dispatches, the diplomatic
documents which contained the details of the French at—
tempt to extort a bribe along with the details of the
negotiations by the American commissioners, were released
to Congress by the President. Once the country learned
of their contents war hysteria flamed. Gallatin‘s worst
fears were confirmed for indeed his position and the
stance of his party was greatly weakened. Indeed Wil-
liam Branch Giles had been a most accurate prophet; the
Republicans did regret that they had aided the bellicose
wing of the Federalist Party in calling for the papers.
With the dramatic disclosures of the XYZ affair the Fed-
eralists rose to a new height in popularity.

The publication of the XYZ papers touched off one
of the most vitroilic and surely one of the most fright-
ful political battles in American history. As Vice Pres—
ident Thomas Jefferson was in an excellent position to
observe the struggle. While Jefferson found "that these
papers do not offer one motive the more for our going to

war," he admitted that his interpretation was not widely

26Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, April 5, 1798,
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul Leicester
Ford (New York: G.P. Putnam‘s Sons, 1896), VII, 230—232;
Walters, Gallatin, p. 107.

 

91

shared. The Vice President revealed that the dispatches
contained material ”calculated to excite disgust and in—
dignation in America generally." If anything, Jefferson
believed these disclosures would prove especially offensive
to Republicans "when they (France) so far mistake as to
presume an attachment to France, and hatred to the Federal
party, and not the love of their country, to be their
first passion.”27

As time passed the warfare between the parties in—
creased. ”Party passions are indeed high," Jefferson re—
corded, "At this moment all the passions are boiling over,
and one who keeps himself cool and clear of the contagion,
is so far below the point of ordinary conversation, that
he finds himself insulted in every society." In spite of
these conditions Jefferson retained his optimism and faith
in the ability of reason to guide men‘s actions. No doubt
lingered in his mind that right thinking and ”the princi-
ples of '75" would ultimately triumph. Thus the duty of
the Republicans was clear, they must ”endeavor to avoid
war.”28

Throughout the French crisis of all leading Repub-
licans Madison adhered to one of the most radical inter-
pretations. While the results of the negotiations were
still unknown, Madison was leary of unfavorable rumors con—

cerning the negotiations, for the failure of this mission

 

27Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, April 6, 1798,
Madison Papers.
Thomas Jefferson to James Lewis, Jr., May 9, 1798,
Writings of Jefferson, VII, 250.

92

might well lead to "a war on the side of England the most
formidable means put in the hands of her partizans (gig)
for warping the public mind toward monarchy." This con—
sideration constituted the best argument for peace he
asserted.29

Madison unlike Gallatin and Jefferson went out of
his way to argue that France was justified in retaliating
against the United States because of the Jay Treaty. The
Treaty of 1794 was the real stumbling block. He saw no
solution unless Jay’s Treaty was repealed or unless France
was allowed to "plunder us, as we have stipulated that
Britain may plunder US-"BO On numerous occasions he jus—
tified the French position and pointed out past American
folly.31

Unfortunately Gallatin left no letters or memoranda
in his papers concerning the XYZ dispatches. Nor did he
make any public Speeches regarding them. However, he did
not change his position, for he continued to argue that
war should be avoided. Significantly he made no speeches
on foreign relations in the Second Session of the Fifth

Congress after April 3. Instead he bitterly fought all

 

29James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, January El, 1798,
Madison Papers.

30James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, February 12,

1798, Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress.
Cited hereafter as Jefferson Papers.

31James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 4, l798;

Madison to Jefferson, April 2, 1798; Madison to Jefferson,
April 15, 1798, Jefferson Papers. All are examples of
Madison's willingness to search diligently to criticize

American policy.

93

Federalist measures for defense as well as the passage of
the Alien and Sedition Acts which took place during the

second session.32

The Federalists were approaching war on a step by
step basis, and Jefferson believed the Republicans in
Congress could defeat the more drastic measures if they
acted together. Instead enough Republicans left Congress
in the midst of this most crucial session to give the Fed-
eralists commanding majorities even in the House of Rep-
resentatives where Federalism had been weakest.33 As
April passed into May Gallatin was the only Republican of
stature who remained in Congress to attempt to slow the
Federalist onslaught. As a result he bore the brunt of
the brutal, sometimes vicious, Federalist attacks.

Gallatin insisted that war was unnecessary because
it was in itself a humiliation. Nor did he think French
domination of the United States was the sole alternative
to war. Americans should accept the losses they suffered
from the French and seek to avoid new injuries. War
would bring even greater losses. Patience not hysteria
should be the theme of American foreign policy. Ameri-
cans should wait for the war in Europe to end, for that

occasion would bring an end to French attacks on American

 

32Gallatin’s views on defensive measures are spelled
out in speeches of April 19, 20, 25, May 23, June 1, 8,
l2, and July 5 in Annals of Congress, Fifth Congress,
Second Session, pp. 1456 lhéé luos 1471—1472, lfl75,
1510, 1512-1516, 1545, 1810, 1861, 1882, 1913, 2126.

 

33De Conde, Quasi—War, p. 92.

 

94
shipping. Gallatin also pointed out that the British
were as guilty of deSpoiling American shipping as were
the French, and the Federalists were not entirely con—
sistent in wanting war only with France for the reasons

they gave.34

Throughout the crisis with France Gallatin considered
the domestic consequences of the Federalist foreign policy
the greatest threat. "But the highest misfortune," he
wrote, "is that the opportunity is seized by the Execu—
tive party to exercise this power and to bind us by the
table chair of fiscal, legal, and military deSpotism. I
allude to the necessary burden of taxes and debts that
must follow a war, to the proposed sedition bill which
will be made a mere instrument of party and in which the
Constitution must be set aside, and to the Pretorian
bands and standing army already adopted."35

All Gallatin‘s efforts to block Federalist measures
failed, for between March 27 and July 16, 1798 twenty
laws were enacted to strengthen national defense, to
suppress opposition at home, and to change relations with
France. The capture of armed French ships was author-
ized. An act on June l3 suspended commercial intercourse
with France. On July 7 both the commercial treaty and

the treaty of alliance of l778 with France were declared

void on the grounds that they had already been violated

 

34

35Albert Gallatin to Commodore James Nicholson, May
18, l798, Gallatin Papers.

Adams, Life of Gallatin, pp. 200-20l.

 

95

by France. Furthermore to combat foreign influence and
domestic heresy a series of four acts known collectively
as the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed.

The "undeclared war with France" was confined to
the sea in the summer of 1798. Nevertheless, an army of
10,000 men was raised, and George Washington was summoned
from retirement to command this force. The former Presi-
dent wanted Alexander Hamilton to serve as active com-
mander, and his will finally prevailed although not with-
out creating serious cracks in the Federalist wall. Many
Republicans stated that the real purpose of the army was
to finish off domestic opposition, a thesis admirably

documented by Stephen Kurtz in his fine study, The Presi—
36

 

dency of John Adams. Expansion into Spanish territory

 

in Florida, New Orleans, Louisiana, Texas, perhaps Mexico,
and points even further south constituted a secondary
reason for the creation of the large army.

While the United States assumed a stiff posture
toward France during 1798, Tallyrand reconsidered his
attitude toward America and finally shifted to a more con-
ciliatory approach. A number of considerations convinced

him to change his policy. First, Elbridge Gerry who re-

 

36Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency of John Adams: The
Collapse of Federalism 1795-1800 (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, I957), pp. 313-3143 Kurtz contends
that, ”The army raised in l 98 and 1799 was the principal
cause of the split in the Federalist Party that revealed
itself blatantly when Adams suddenly announced his inten-
tion to accept the peace feelers from Paris. There can
be no doubt that the party was already badly divided at
the time of that startling announcement in February, 1799,”
Ibido. pp. 330— 331.

 

 

 

96

mained in France was firm and tough—minded. A previous
proclivity toward sympathy for France could not obscure
the American diplomat‘s nationalism. Secondly, Tallyrand
had received numerous reports that the United States was
determined to resist French aggression. Thirdly, French
merchants were unhappy that profitable trade with the
United States was being ruined. Moreover, Tallyrand was
extremely fearful of the consequences of unrestrained war
with the United States. France had too much to lose from
such an engagement: the destruction of French commerce;
the loss of her colonies; the squandering of an opportun-
ity to get Louisiana, and the acquisition of a new inter-
national foe. Consequently for all these reasons Tally-
rand made it clear that he would receive an American
minister and treat him decently.37

News of Tallyrand‘s conciliatory gestures reached
the President in late September, 1798. Adams had recoiled
from the prospect of full fledged war, and was unquestion—
ably buoyed by this turn of events. In the meantime the
effect of the new direct taxes as well as the practical
consequences of raising an army helped sap the desire for
war on the part of many Americans. In this shifting at-
mosphere President Adams weighed the prospect of changing
American policy.

The third session of the Fifth Congress opened in
a highly charged atmosphere in December, 1798. All out-

ward signs pointed to the increased possibility of war

 

37Varg, Founding Fathers, p. 137.

97

with France. Thus Gallatin was pleasantly surprised by
the temperateness of the President's annual message.
Adams‘ offer to negotiate if France sent an Ambassador to
the United States lifted his spirit. Wisely Gallatin de-
cided that the Republican strategy in the House should be
to avoid ”French questions and foreign ground.” Instead
they would Oppose the Alien and Sedition laws at whatever
point possible. However, he did Speak on several related
affairs. He urged that the United States not encourage
the rebels in Santo Domingo no matter how much American
trade would benefit from a new outlet for goods in an in-
dependent state in the Caribbean. Encouraging the inde-
pendence movement in the French colony would only further
inflame affairs with France. Gallatin also repeated his
familiar arguments against higher naval appropriations
and the role of the navy. Otherwise the third session of
the hectic Fifth Congress passed without any significant

38

comments on foreign policy.
The ”brink of war” atmosphere changed dramatically
when President Adams announced on February 18, 1799 that
he had nominated William Vans Murray, then American min—
ister at the Hague, envoy to France. This action termi—
nated the tremendous rivalry between the two parties over
policy toward France. Instead a wide chasm was opened
within Federalist ranks between the followers of Hamilton

who wanted war and the moderates now led by the President

 

35Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin, De-
cember 14, 1798, Adams, Life of Gallatin, p. 2333 Gallatin

to his wife, December 21, 1798, Ibid., p. 2243 Annals of

‘ h' d 8““ . 2315-2347,
Coggfessg’Flgth_C§n§fes§éoT 1r ’ ess1on§8gp_28 5’ 2 70.

 

98

who desired a peaceful solution consistent with American
interests and honor.

President Adams exemplifies the realist in foreign
policy. As he explained to George Washington he nomi—
nated Murray on the strength of assurances from Tallyrand
that he would receive an American minister. Nomination
of a minister did not mean that peace was to be sought re—
gardless of its price or the consequences for the United
States. "Tranquility upon just and honorable terms, is
undoubtedly the ardent desire of the friends of this coun-
try,” stated Adams, ”and I wish the babyish and womanly
blubbering for peace may not necessitate the conclusion
of a treaty that will not be just nor very honorable. I
do not intend, however, that they shall.”39

Surely one of Adams' most pertinent observations
lay in his appraisal of political parties and foreign
policy. He did not take the Republicans' desire for peace
very seriously. "In elective governments, peace or war
are alike embraced by parties, when they think they can
employ either for electioneering purposes."LLO The nomi—
nation of Murray illustrated a number of tendencies in the
American political system. "It has also produced a dis—
play of the real spirit of the parties in this country,
and the objects they have in view." However, Adams was

not to be intimidated particularly by his own party. If

 

39John Adams to George Washington, February 19, 1799,
Works of John Adams, VIII, pp. 625—626.

4OIbid., 626.

 

99

any one entertains the idea, that, because I am a President
of three votes only I am in the power of a party,” he
warned, "they shall find that I am no more so than the
Constitution forces upon me.”LLl
President Adams was forced to bow to Federalist
pressure and he enlarged his peace commission to three
men. When the commissioners in America threatened to
delay their departure he ordered the two then in America,
Oliver Ellsworth and William R. Davie to depart. Negotia—
tions began in April, 1800 and repaidly became deadlocked.
After seven months the log jam was broken, and an agreement
was signed officially at Montrefontaine in October. Ac—
cording to the terms of the agreement France consented to
cancel the treaties of 1778 after the United States agreed
to assume the financial claims of its own citizens aris-
ing from French Spoilations upon American shipping. Al-
though this amounted to a sum of 20 million dollars, it
was a cheap price to pay for annulment of a twenty—two
year mismarriage.42
Gallatin‘s Congressional career came to a close in
March, 1801. The Pennsylvanian offered few suggestions
on foreign policy throughout 1799 and 1800. Several rea-
sons explain this silence. During most of this time he

was unusually active working for the election of Thomas

Jefferson as President. Despondency over the course of

 

41

De Conde, Quasi-War, pp. 181-186, 220-222, 229-
244, 253-258.

John Adams to Charles Lee, March 29, 1799, Ibid.,

 

100
public affairs was linked with dejection stemming from

personal attacks upon him by Federalists. His proud and
sensitive nature coupled with a nascent political realism
dictated silence particularly on foreign affairs as the
wisest policy both for himself and his party. Neverthe-
less, he expressed approval of the work of Murray and

his associates.43

During the Presidency of John Adams Gallatin took
positions that are still open to dispute in his sugges—
tions on policy toward France. He argued from an agrarian
oriented Republican viewpoint which considered domestic
affairs of primary importance. A foreign policy which
strengthened the power of the Executive held evil con—
sequences for the nation. A commitment to the enhancement
of governmental economy led him to vote against defense
preparations. Seriously misjudging the European situa—
tion, he believed that peace would soon be achieved in
Europe. Therefore he urged patience and a policy of
cautious waiting.

Yet as Congressman Gallatin had served both the
nation and his constituents well. Looking back over these
years of service the Pennsylvanian considered the two
most important matters he dealt with the Jay Treaty and
the French crisis. Acknowledging that his chief liabili—

ties were a lack of eloquence and a thick French accent,

 

43Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin,
March, 1799, Adams, Life of Gallatin, pp. 227-2285 Gal-
latin to his wife, January 15, 1801; Gallatin to his
wife, February 5, 1801, Gallatin Papers.

 

101
he concluded that his assets were ”laborious investiga-

tion, habits of analysis, thorough knowledge of subjects
under discussion, and more extensive general information
due to an excellent early education."44 These traits to
a large degree did characterize the more positive aspects

of Gallatin’s foreign policy in the closing years of the

Federalist period.

 

44Adams, Life of Gallatin, pp. 155—157.

CHAPTER IV
THE JEFFERSONIANS IN POWER

Upon assuming the Presidency in 1801 Thomas Jeffer-
son appointed Albert Gallatin Secretary of the Treasury.
Gallatin was the logical choice, for he was the most gifted
financial expert in the Republican Party. Moreover, the
Pennsylvanian epitomized the Jeffersonian economic philos—
ophy. The cornerstone of his fiscal policy rested on a
fervent desire to retire the debt as quickly as possible.
Throughout his career in the Treasury Department he lab—
ored diligently to reach this objective. Achievement of
this goal depended upon the extent to which unnecessary
spending could be slashed. Reduction of the naval and
military establishment was the best place to launch the
economy campaign. Desire to repeal the internal taxes
passed by the Federalists necessitated stringent econo—
mizing in all departments.1

Peace constituted one of the most crucial prerequi-
sites in Gallatin's fiscal system. "No nation can, any
more than any individual, pay its debts unless its annual
receipts exceed its expenditures, and the two necessary

ingredients for that purpose, which are common to all na-

 

lAlbert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, March 14,
1801, Jefferson Papers.

102

103
tions are frugality and peace,” he observed.2 The pre-

servation of peace was the special concern of James Mad-
ison, the Secretary of State. Yet Gallatin’s importance
in advocating policies which would further the course of
peace cannot be ignored.

Indeed Gallatin‘s influence extended well beyond
the limits of the Treasury Department. The scope of the
Treasurer‘s knowledge and the soundness of his judgment
enhanced his importance within the government. Jefferson
found him indispensable as an advisor and consultant on
numerous matters. Often the President submitted messages
and other important policy questions to Gallatin first so
that he could benefit from his suggestions. Frequently
Jefferson ignored advice which he found uncongenial; yet
he accepted many of the Treasurer’s modifications. Like
all strong Presidents Jefferson made the final decisions,
but Gallatin contributed much of importance to Jefferson's
administrations.3

Formation of a new American policy toward the Bar-
bary Pirates constituted the first problem in foreign re-
lations for the Jefferson administration. Since achiev-
ing independence the United States had followed the policy
of other European nations by paying, annual tribute to
Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, the pirate states of

North Africa. These payments which amounted to nearly ten

 

2Adams, Life of Gallatin, p. 271.

3Walters, Gallatin, pp. 144-145.

 

104
million dollars from 1789 until 1801 had exempted Ameri-

can commerce from raids by the Mediterranean marauders.
Thomas Jefferson had always objected to the idea of brib-
ing the African cutthroats. In his service abroad during
the Confederation period he had attempted unsuccessfully
to organize a league of the European powers against the
pirates to stop permanently this obnoxious practice. Nor
had Jefferson changed his opinion upon assuming the Presi-
dency. Thus he rejected the idea of paying tribute as a
reflection on national honor.LL

Outrages by the North African pirates required Jef-
ferson to consider stringent measures. In October, 1800

the Dey of Algiers forced the George Washington to sail

 

for Constantinople under an Algerian flag with gifts for
the Sultan. A far worse affront occured in May, 1801.
The Pasha of Tripoli, believing that the United States
ought to pay more tribute, declared war by cutting down
the flag at the American consulate. This crime merited a
strong American answer. On May 15, 1801 Jefferson raised
two questions for the cabinet's discussion. ”Shall the
squadron now at Norfolk be ordered to cruise in the Medi-

H

terranean?, and, ”What shall be the object of the
cruise?”5

The cabinet agreed that the cruise should be under-

 

uIbid., p. 1503 Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jefferson:
The Apostle of Americanism (2nd. ed. rev.; Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1957), pp. 205—207.

5Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson: A Biography
(New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1951), II, 885-686.

 

 

 

105
taken, but differences of opinion existed over the goals

of this action. Attorney General Levi Lincoln believed
that force should be used only to repulse attacks on Amer-
ican commerce. Gallatin, having arrived only the day
before and not having had time to familiarize himself
thoroughly with the question, reluctantly agreed to send-
ing the squadron. The Secretary of the Treasury supported
Lincoln’s position, arguing that only defensive efforts
could be justified. Any other course would mean war

which only Congress had the power to declare. Secretary
of War Dearborn and Secretary of State Madison thought
that the purpose of the voyage must be the protection of
American commerce no matter what measures were required.6
On June 1 the squadron sailed to reinforce the few Amer-
ican ships in the Mediterranean, but no decisive action
followed in 1801.

Almost as soon as the Tripolitans had been threat-
ened with the use of American force other Barbary states
began to cause trouble. Algiers had been uneasy because
America had suspended the payment of tribute. Jefferson
finally agreed with Madison that a payment of $30,000
annual tribute for three years might pacify them.7 Morocco
had assumed a more insolent stance and had ordered the

American consul to leave the country. "This demand of

 

6Ibid., 686.

7James Madison to Albert Gallatin, July 22, 1802;
Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, July 28, 1802, Gal—
latin Papers.

106

' wrote Jefferson, ”is so palpably against reason and

his,’
the usage of nations as to bespeak a settled design of war
against us . . -"8 Although the President favored keeping
the fleet in the Mediterranean in preparation for the inevi—
table hostilities he asked for the advice of his cabinet.9

Gallatin was concerned that Jefferson might engage
in hostilities against Morocco. "Our object," he pointed
out, ”must clearly be to put a speedy end to a contest
which unavailingly wastes our resources, . . ." The Sec-
retary of the Treasury opposed half way measures which
would be stringent enough to evoke Moroccan hostility but
too mild to bring about a redress of grievances. He also
believed that America was in no position to pursue vigor-
ous measures without jeopardizing domestic objectives.
He urged restraint by pointing out that compared to the
other Barbary states past Moroccan conduct had been far
superior. Nor did he think the mere dismissal of the Am-
erican consul merited the strong action Jefferson
favored.lo

Gallatin suggested a peaceful settlement of the dis—
pute based on the payment of twenty or thirty thousand

dollars. One of the principal reasons the Treasury Sec—

retary supported such a solution lay in his analysis of

 

8Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, August 9,
1802, Gallatin Papers.

9Jefferson to Gallatin, August 9, 1802, Gallatin
Papers.

loAlbert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, August 16,
1802, Jefferson Papers.

 

 

107

the forces necessary for a successful Mediterranean war.
Hostilities with Morocco would necessitate the deployment
of at least four frigates and possibly more. If Tunis
entered the struggle, more than five ships would be needed
for the United States merely to compete on even terms.ll

Gallatin‘s greatest fear was a naval war against
the combined forces of the Barbary states. "I much ap-
prehend that if we have to encounter Tunis, Tripoli, and
Morocco, we will be compelled to give up the Mediterranean
trade," he warned. Therefore he favored the payment of
tribute to Tripoli as well as Morocco. That America was
following a terribly inconsistent and illogical policy
seemed clear to Gallatin. Commenting upon the possibil-
ity of settling peacefully with Tripoli he stated, "I
consider it not greater disgrace to pay them than Algiers."
Considered in relative terms Gallatin, unlike Jefferson,
failed to see dishonor accruing to America from such a
position. "We share the dishonor of paying those barbar-
ians with so many nations as powerful and interested as
ourselves that in our present situation, I consider it a
mere matter of calculation whether the purchase of peace
is not cheaper than the expense of war, which shall not
"12

even give us free use of the Mediterranean trade.

Although war would achieve at best only limited

 

llGallatin to Jefferson, August 16, 1802, Jefferson

Papers.
12
Papers.

Gallatin to Jefferson, August 16, 1802, Jefferson

108

American objectives, Gallatin feared that it would create
more problems than it would solve. He Speculated that the
capture of American ships might result in payment of large
sums for their redemption in addition to continued payment
of tribute. The sum of Gallatin‘s suggestions was that
while national honor constituted an important principle
for a nation this consideration must be subordinated to
present needs. "Eight years hence," he observed, "we
shall, I trust, be able to assume a different tone; but
our exertions at present consume the seeds of our great-
ness and retard to an indefinite time the epoch of our
strength."13

Gallatin’s sentiments coincided with Jefferson’s
views on relations with most nations, but the President
frequently lost sight of his principles when the North
African pirates were concerned. Hence he disregarded Gal-
latin's cautious but prudent advice. Instead he recalled
a cargo of gun carriages earmarked for Morocco as tribute
and ordered two frigates to prepare to sail to the Medi-
terranean. He calculated that this force combined with a
Swedish fleet already in the troubled area would be suf-
l4

ficient to subdue America’s enemies.

Gallatin continued to argue that the Treasury could

 

l3Gallatin to Jefferson, August 16, 1802, Jefferson
Papers.

lLLThomas Jefferson to James Madison, August 23, 1802,
Jefferson Pa ers; Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin,
August 23, 1802, Gallatin Papers; Thomas Jefferson to
Robert Smith, August 30, 1802, Jefferson Papers.

109
not absorb the deployment of two more frigates. The New

Ygrk was already scheduled to sail for France, but Gal-
latin strongly recommended that the John Adams not be
allowed to embark. Upon hearing that the Emperor of
Morocco had asked the American consul to remain, Jeffer-
son planned to countermand the sailing of the second
ship.15 However, both Madison and Secretary of the Navy
Robert Smith thought the ship should be sent, and Jeffer—
son bowed to their wishes. This action deeply disappointed
Gallatin, but Jefferson defended his decision on the basis
of Madison’s and Smith’s support for the strong action.
Yet the President was so impressed with his Treasurer’s
financial representations that he recommended that the
expenses of the John Adams be recorded as "a debt incur—
red, the arrearages of which might be covered by a future
appropriation.”l6
When Jefferson returned to Washington in October,
1802 news had reached the capital that peace had been
made in Morocco. Moreover, danger of war with Tunis and
Algiers had subsided. In a cabinet meeting on October 21
Gallatin‘s wishes were finally adopted, for $20,000 was

appropriated as a guarantee that "a firm establishment of

a state of peace" might follow with Morocco.17

 

15Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, September 8,
1802, Gallatin Papers.

l6Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, September 9,
1802, Jefferson Papers; Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin,
September 14, 1802; Jefferson to Gallatin, September 17,
1802, Gallatin Papers.

l7Thomas Jefferson to Robert Smith, October 16, 1802,
Jefferson Papers.

110
In 1803 the Emperor of Morocco was brought to terms.

Meanwhile Tripoli captured the Philadelphia which had run
aground. The crew of nearly three hundred was arrested and
forced to perform hard labor. When news of the Tripolitan‘s
action reached Washington in March, 1804, Jefferson re—
solved to raise a navy large enough to force the pirates
both to release the prisoners and to submit to American
terms. Gallatin reluctantly supported this decision which
meant that the naval appropriations were raised to nearly
$750,000 a year. In 1805 problems with Tripoli were settled
temporarily when the United States paid $60,000 for the re—
lease of the Philadelphia prisoners.18
The disputes with the Barbary powers were minor com—
pared to the issues that Napoleon Bonaparte was to raise
over the Louisiana question. Although France had trans-
ferred Louisiana to Spain in 1763, French hopes for re—
gaining this territory were aroused in the 1790's. Spain
did not appreciate the importance of her inland empire
because it failed to produce discernable wealth while re-
maining very costly to administer. After the Treaty of
San Lorenzo of 1795 which opened the mouth of the Missis-
sippi to the American frontiersman Spain realized her in-
ability to defend the western bank of the Mississippi.
Consequently France persuaded her to return Louisiana to
its pre-l763 owners in the Treaty of San Ildefonso of
October 1, 1800. In October, 1802, Spain issued the

orders authorizing the turnover of this territory to France.

 

l8Walters, Gallatin, pp. 150-151.

Ill

The Treaty of San Ildefonso was secret, but rumors
of the transfer drifted into official circles in the
United States during 1801 and 1802. As early as May 29,
1801 Jefferson referred to the possibility in a letter to
James Monroe. ”We have great reason to fear that Spain
is to cede Louisiana and the Floridas to France,” the
President confided to his fellow Virginian.19 By the
spring of 1802 Jefferson not only knew of the transaction,
but he had also given considerable thought to the adjust—
ment of American policy to this new situation. In a most
remarkable letter to Robert R. Livingston, the American
minister to France, the President discussed the tremen—
dous impact of the French acquisition.

"The session of Louisiana and the Floridas by Spain

to France works most sorely on the U.S.,”

Jefferson point—
ed out. That this transfer was one of the truly momentous
events of history was clear. ”It completely reverses all
the political relations of the U.S. and will form a new
epoch in our political course." Previously France and the
United States enjoyed a great community of interest while
having only a few conflicts. While France had previously
been an American friend, this was changed with the French
encroachment on New Orleans. ”There is on the globe one
single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and

habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the

produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass to

 

19Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, May 29, 1801,
Writings of Jefferson, VIII, 62.

 

112
market . . ." By stepping into this strategic center

France proclaimed herself an enemy to the United States.20
Jefferson could tolerate Spanish control of New
Orleans. Spain and America were on relatively good terms.

In addition Spanish feebleness would inevitably lead to
increased American influence there. New Orleans under
Spanish control may well have fallen into American hands
with relative ease. On the other hand, France with her
impetuous temper and restless character would always be
in friction with America.21
The consequences of actual French occupation of
New Orleans would be tremendous. "The day that France
takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentences which
is to restrain her forever within her low water mark. It
seals the union of two nations who in conjunction can main-
tain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment
we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation."
America would be forced to turn her attention to the con—
struction of a large naval force. Moreover, the out-
breaks of war in Europe involving France would allow the
United States to destroy any French settlements in the
New World. While America neither sought nor desired such

a policy, France would force this action upon her if she

took New Orleans.22

 

20Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, April 18,
1802, Ibid., 144.

21Jefferson to Livingston, April 18, 1802, Ibid.,
1.44-1.45 0

22Jefferson to Livingston, April 18, 1802, Ibid.,
145.

113
Jefferson saw only one alternative to an Anglo-

American alliance directed against France. Cession of
New Orleans and the Floridas ”would certainly in great
degree remove the causes of jarring and irritation be—
tween us.” If France would be willing to make this ar—
rangement, at the very least the United States would not
be driven to deSperate extremes. The President urged
Livingston to prosecute the American case with utmost
vigor.23

Jefferson‘s observations to Livingston were ex—
tremely remarkable for several reasons. First, the
President’s attention was concentrated entirely on the
immediate problems of New Orleans and the Floridas.
Either he failed to recognize the great Significance of
Louisiana as a whole, or he might have thought that with-
out New Orleans, the gateway to control of the Mississippi
River, France would not be able to build an empire in the
West which could withstand the pressure exerted by expand—
ing American frontiersmen. Secondly, the Napoleonic
threat to the Southwest so disturbed him that even Jef—
ferson's extreme distaste for Britain could not inhibit
his willingness to turn to that nation in order to defend
American interests.24 Jefferson’s consideration of such
a drastic alternative suggests both his flexibility in

adjusting his policies to unforeseen contingencies and

 

23Jefferson to Livingston, April 18, 1802, Ibid.,
146.

24Schachner, Jefferson, II, 716.

114
that an idealist when confronted with a crisis can become

a realist.

Before receiving Jefferson‘s letter and instructions
from Secretary of State Madison, Robert Livingston had
attempted to persuade the French that they Should not take
New Orleans. If they did so, he tried to obtain the same
rights enjoyed under Pinckney's Treaty. His efforts were
uniformly rebuffed by Tallyrand often in hostile tones.

In spite of these reversals he followed Madison's instruc-
tions which urged him to purchase both New Orleans and the
Floridas.25

While these negotiations transpired, developments of
great significance were taking place in America. In 0c—
tober, 1802 the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans suspend—
ed the right of deposit for American commerce. Westerners
whose prosperity had been adversely effected by the Peace
of Amiens were furious. Many feared that unless swift
action was forthcoming the West would take matters into
their own hands. Federalists were delighted at the pros-
pects the situation offered them. Spain had given them
their first genuine issue which they could exploit at the
Republican‘s expense. They could slap France and at the
same time support Western interests. Republican inaction
could only play into their hands.

Obviously prompt and decisive measures on the part

of the administration were necessary. During January,

1803 a resolution was introduced in the House of Repre-

 

25Varg, Founding Fathers, p. 153.

115
sentatives which authorized the expenditure of $2,000,000

to purchase Florida and New Orleans. Meanwhile the West
had been much cooler to Federalist advances than had been
expected. They decided to give Jefferson a chance, and
to confirm their faith the President sent James Monroe as
Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary to France and
Spain.

Although Jefferson had established machinery to ac—
quire the disputed regions, he was uneasy concerning the
constitutionality of purchasing territory for the purpose
of adding it to the United States. Attorney General Levi
Lincoln doubted the constitutionality of territorial in—
corporation. Gallatin, disagreed with Lincoln‘s interpre—
tation. "But does any constitutional objection really
exist?," he asked rhetorically. After a thorough analysis
of the whole question the Secretary of the Treasury con-
cluded that ”the power of acquiring territory is delegated
to the United States by the several provisions which
authorize the several branches of government to make war,
to make treaties, and to govern the territory of the
Union."26

Indeed this position marked a great shift from
Gallatin’s earlier strict constructionism. Surely this
was not the same man who had been critical of many phases
of the proposed federal Constitution in 1788. Perhaps a

more realistic public policy maker was emerging under the

 

26Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, January 13,
1803, Jefferson Papers.

116
forge of necessity. That Gallatin was challenging many

of his ideas seems clear. At the same time the transition
from agrarian idealism to a modified Hamiltonian realism
was painful and not thorough-going by any means.

The logical conclusions drawn from his thorough
evaluation of the constitutional problem disturbed him.
After carefully developing an elastic interpretation Gal—
latin in an abrupt departure recoiled from his own findings.
"I must, however, confess that after all I do not feel my-
self perfectly satisfied; the subject must be thoroughly
examined; and the above observations must be considered
as hasty and incomplete."27

His Treasurer’s cogent reasoning convinced the Pres-
ident that territorial acquisition fell within constitu—

” Jefferson wrote to

tional limitations. ”You are right,
Gallatin, ”as to Mr. Lincoln’s proposition; there is no
constitutional difficulty as to the acquisition of ter-
ritory." Whether the newly acquired territory could be
incorporated into the Union consistent with constitutional
principles ”will become a question of expedience." Jef-
ferson himself retained many of his legalistic scruples.
”I think it will be safer," he concluded, "not to permit
the enlargement of the Union but by amendment of the Con—

stitution."28 Like most skillful politicians the President

retreated from this position when necessity dictated

 

27Gallatin to Jefferson, January 13, 1803, Jefferson
Papers.

28Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, March 3, 1803,
Gallatin Papers.

' 117

speedy action.

Although James Madison and Thomas Jefferson exerted
diplomatic pressure upon France, the United States ac—
quired Louisiana because Napoleon decided to abandon his
projects for the resurrection of a French empire in the
New World. Santo Domingo formed a strategic link in this
chain for that island would act as the military keystone
for the French Western Hemisphere possessions. However,
Santo Domingo was in revolt led by Toussaint L' Ouverture.
Consequently French reconquest of the island was a pre—
requisite to empire. France was hard pressed to subdue
the natives and after the loss of 50,000 Frenchmen
Napoleon dropped his plans for reconquest. Other matters
influenced the French decision as well. France desper-
ately needed money, particularly if warfare resumed in
Europe. In the event of war Napoleon contended that Louis-
iana could not be defended. Consequently in April, 1803
Napoleon instructed his ministers to sell all of the Louis—
iana territory to the United States.29

James Monroe arrived in Paris on April 12 one day
after Napoleon's fateful decision. From his arrival un-
til the signing of the treaty on May 2 Monroe and Living-
ston haggled over terms. Finally eighty million livres
($15,000,000) was agreed upon. Three-fourths of this

amount was to be paid to France and the remainder to Amer-

 

29James Madison‘s diplomatic role is spelled out in
detail in Irving Brant, James Madison: Secretary of State
1800-1809 (New York: BobbS—Merrill Company, 1953), pp.

111-140.

118
icans holding damage claims against the French govern-

ment. In return France ceded "The colony or province of
Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the
hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it;
and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently
entered into between Spain and other states."

Although the treaties were Signed May 2 and ante—
dated April 30, news of the Louisiana Purchase did not
reach the United States until the end of June. Albert
Gallatin was delighted with the new acquisition. Prior
to the cabinet level decision to negotiate for the Floridas
and New Orleans the Secretary of the Treasury had noted
the importance of the West. Gallatin’s vision which was
truly continental in scope did not stop at the Mississippi
River but extended as far westward as the Pacific Ocean.
The sprawling territory lying between the river and the
ocean which was popularly referred to as the "Missouri
Country" was desired by several powers including England.
Legally this territory belonged to Spain, but many ob—
servers feared that renewed fighting in Europe would pre-
sent a convenient rationalization for Britain to seize
this area. In December, 1802 when President Jefferson
suggested an exploring expedition to this country, Gal-
latin was intrigued. "I feel warmly interested in this
plan," he responded.30

Gallatin encouraged Jefferson to pursue his project

 

3OAlbert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, November 21
1802, Jefferson Papers.

119

for Western exploration. He believed future American
settlement in this territory was inevitable. ”The future
destinies of the Missouri country are of vast importance
to the United States, it being perhaps the only large
tract of country, and certainly the fi£§p_which, lying

out of the boundaries of the Union, will be settled by the
people of the United States."31 That Gallatin placed a
high value on this territory can be ascertained from his
suggestion of "preclusive imperialism.”32 ”The present
aspect of affairs," he pointed out, "may ere long render
it necessary that we should, by taking immediate possess—
ion, prevent Great Britain from doing the same."33 When
Jefferson appointed Captain Meriwether Lewis, head of the'
expedition, Gallatin enumerated some suggestions for

their explorations. "The great object to ascertain,” he
wrote, "is whether from its extent and fertility that
country is susceptible of a large population in the same
manner as the corresponding tract on the Ohio."34

The news that Monroe and Livingston had purchased

 

31Emphasis is Gallatin‘s. Albert Gallatin to Thomas
Jefferson, April 13, 1803, Jefferson Papers.

32William L. Langer, "Farewell to Empire," Foreign
Affairs, XLI (October, 1962), 115—130, uses this term
in reference to the penchant of European nations to
seize overseas territory before competing states could
take it. While Langer‘s definition relates to the
1890"S, it is this writer's contention that such an im-
pulse motivated Gallatin in the early 1800's.

33Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, April 13,
1803, Jefferson Papers.

34

Papers.

Gallatin to Jefferson, April 13, 1803, Jefferson

111

120
the vast acreage of Louisiana in addition to New Orleans

created a sensation among the American people and the Jef-
ferson administration. This diplomatic success stretched
far beyond anyone's wildest espectations. It also raised
several formidable questions. First, the actual extent of
the purchase was unknown. Tallyrand’s evasive reply,
”You have made yourselves a noble bargain, and I expect
that you will make the most of it,” was no substitute for
clearly defined boundaries. It was by no means certain
whether the Floridas, as crucial to the South as New
Orleans and the Mississippi were to the West, were in—
cluded in the purchase. Secondly, the amount of the pur—
chase appeared colossal to an administration dedicated to
thrift and retirement of the debt. Finally, constitu-
tional justification for the transaction still was un-
settled.35

Jefferson did not intend to decline the opportunity
to more than double the territory of the United States,
but he now doubted that the Constitution permitted this
acquisition. This was a reversal of his position in
March which necessitated amending the fundamental law.
The President drafted an amendment, almost long enough to
be a constitution in itself, which specifically permitted
the incorporation of Louisiana in the United States and
gave the federal government jurisdictional powers over

the territory. He sent the members of his cabinet a

 

35Schachner, Jefferson, II, 745-746.

 

 

121
copy of this document for their consideration. Gallatin's

response indicated that he considered the amendment un-
necessary. "The amendment to the Constitution is in—
tended, I presume, for deliberation and reflection, but

H

not for immediate decision, he replied.36
On July 16 the cabinet met to consider the Louisiana
Treaty. Since ratifications had to be exchanged by Octo-
ber 30, and Congress was recessed until November, they de—
cided upon a special session of Congress to be convened
October 17. The cabinet also agreed that Monroe should
be instructed to purchase the Floridas from Spain although
as Jefferson recorded in his cabinet notes, ”We are more
indifferent about pressing the purchase of the Floridas,
because of the money we have to provide for Louisiana,
and because we think they cannot fail to fall into our
hands.”37 Concerning the constitutional difficulty Jef-
ferson planned to ask Congress to ratify the purchase,
and then he intended to go to the country with his con—
stitutional amendment.38
Alarming news from France caused Jefferson to drop
his constitutional scruples. On June 2 Robert Livingston
had written that Napoleon regretted the sale and would
use any pretext to reverse his hasty decision. A similar

letter from Monroe corroberated this observation. French

 

36Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, July 9, 1803,
Jefferson Papers.
37Schachner, Jefferson, II, 746-747.

38Brant, Madison, Secretary of State, pp. 141-142.

 

122

hesitancy caused the President to Shift from an idealistic
strict constructionism to a realistic elastic construction—
ism. "I infer that the less we say about constitutional
difficulties respecting Louisiana the better, and that
what is necessary for surmounting them must be done Sub-
silentio . . ."39 In addition Jefferson now thought that
the United States must prepare to ratify the treaty and
take possession of Louisiana with great Speed.LLO
At first Gallatin did not believe the rumors that
France would not carry out the treaty, and he tried to
convince Jefferson that his fears were ungrounded. How—
ever, he was a realist enough not to take any chances.
"Although I do not Share in the alarm of our ministers,”
he told the President, "I think it wise to be perfectly
prepared as if it had a real ground, and that no time

Should be lost in having a supply of arms at Natchez."LLl

By October Gallatin realized that time was of the essence.

"Situated as we are as respects both France and Spain,

42

" he reminded Jefferson.

every day may be precious,
Therefore he consistently supported the use of force

against the Spanish at New Orleans if they refused to

 

39Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, August 18, 1803,
Writings of Jefferson, VIII, 245.

uoThomaS Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, August 23,
1803, Gallatin Papers.

1+1Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, September 5,
1803, Jefferson Papers.

 

42Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, October 4,
1803, Jefferson Papers.

 

1

 

123
leave peacefully.

Gallatin also embarked on a unilateral policy design-
ed to enhance American strength in the Southwest. In con-
sultations with Congressmen from Kentucky and Tennessee he
developed plans for ”raising volunteers to assist the force
already prepared for occupying New Orleans." He pressured
the War Department into readying both men and supplies to
descend on the city. He also drafted an act which Con—
gress passed in modified form that authorized the govern-
ment to take possession of the territory. After revealing
his actions to the President, he apologized for superced—
ing his duties as Secretary of the Treasury. Nevertheless,
he considered his actions justified for several reasons.
First, he believed a demonstration of strength would raise
foreign opinion ”of our forces, resources, and energy."
Secondly, he thought that ”to lose the object at this time"
because of unwillingness to pursue bold measures would con-
stitute an inexcusable evil.43 Gallatin’s actions in this
instance provide an excellent example of the Jeffersonian
idealist employing the methods of Hamiltonian realism.

Fortunately Gallatin’s vigorous precautions were un-
necessary. Spain yielded to the inevitable and turned over
New Orleans and Louisiana to France. On December 20, 1803
W.C.C. Claiborne and James Wilkinson formally took posses-
sion of the inland empire for the United States. In doing

so they opened a new chapter in American history.

 

1+3Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, October 28,
1803; Albert Gallatin to W.C.C. Claiborne, October 31,
1803, Gallatin Papers.

CHAPTER V
THE SPANISH QUESTION

The Louisiana Purchase ranks as one of the greatest
bargains in American history, but it was not a complete
success. The American envoys, James Monroe and Robert
Livingston had been instructed to buy both New Orleans
and the Floridas with the latter considered of greater
value. While securing the left bank of the Mississippi,
they had apparently failed to purchase the Floridas.
Since the exact boundaries of the purchase were unknown,
Thomas Jefferson attempted to ascertain the extent of the
new territory. After careful study of the treaty and old
maps Jefferson concluded that West Florida as far east as
the Perdido River was included.1

Beginning in July, 1803 American strategy dictated
claims as far east as the Perdido. Wisely Madison merged
these claims with an offer to buy all of Florida. In
sending instructions to James Monroe the Secretary of
State outlined many arguments designed to convince Spain
to part with Florida. Possession of this southern terri—
tory drained the Spanish treasury in peace, and Florida

could not be defended in wartime. Moreover, continued

 

lVarg, Founding Fathers, p. 157.
124

 

125
Spanish control presented a perpetual obstacle to peace-

ful relations with the United States. The chances of
British seizure of Florida in the European war were ex—
cellent, and Spain would be much better off with Florida
in American rather than British hands. Madison proposed
an offer of $2,500,000 as a price for all Florida. Under
no circumstances would the United States agree to an ex—
change of territory on the West bank of the Mississippi
for her desired objectives on the Gulf.2

Albert Gallatin did not share Jefferson‘s or Mad-
ison's enthusiasm for the Floridas. Nor did he originally
agree with the President's interpretation that the Louis—
iana purchase included any part of the Floridas. Jeffer—
son argued the point with his financier until late August,
1803 when Gallatin acquiesced. ”I agree with you that we
have a right to claim that part of West Florida which was
part of Louisiana," the Treasurer conceded. Gallatin did
not explain what had caused him to change his mind, but he
may have done so out of loyalty to the Chief Executive or
an unwillingness to invite further pressure from his
Southern colleagues in the administration.3

After Louisiana had been transferred to the United
States in December, 1803 the prime objective of American

diplomacy was to acquire West Florida. The President in—

 

2James Madison to James Monroe, July 29, 1803,
quoted in Brant, Madison: Secretary of State, pp. 150-151.

3Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, August 23,
1803, Gallatin Papers; Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson,
August 31, 1803, Jefferson Papers.

126

tended to secure this coveted territory, and he pursued
his goal in a highly belligerent manner. Secretary of
State Madison, Pinckney, the American minister at Madrid,
and James Monroe, who had been commissioned to help Pinck-
ney, all shared the President’s self—assertive attitude.LL

On November 30, 1803 John Randolph introduced a
bill in the House of Representatives which provided for
the governing of Louisiana. This legislation also applied
to the disputed areas in West Florida. Section four added
"all the navigable waters, rivers, creeks, bays, and in-
lets lying within the United States which empty into the
Gulf of Mexico east of the River Mississippi" to the
Mississippi customs district. Thus Spanish held land as
far as the Perdido was to be governed under American rev—
enue laws. Section eleven gave the President discretion—
ary authorization to establish the bay and river of Mobile
and all waters flowing into the Gulf of Mexico east of
Mobile as a separate customs district. This bill known
as the Mobile Act was passed by Congress and signed into
law on February 24, 1804.5

The Mobile Act which was strongly supported by Jef—
ferson and John Randolph enjoyed general approval of the
cabinet. Even before the bill was signed Jefferson had
decided not to exercise his discretionary power in the

disputed territory. Since this legislation did not spec-

 

4Varg, Foundin Fathers, p. 158.

5Schachner, Jefferson, II, 757; Brant, Madison: Sec—
retary of State, pp. 192—193.

127
ify the eastern boundary of Louisiana, a certain measure

of flexibility was retained for subsequent negotiations
with Spain.6

Nor did the Mobile Act constitute a bludgeon to be
used against Spain. The peaceful intent of that act was
Spelled out three days after its signing when Albert
Gallatin sent instructions to the collector of the new
District of Mississippi, Hore Brown Trist.v Gallatin in—
dicated that Jefferson intended to bargain for West
Florida rather than forcefully seize it. ”You are there-
fore to exercise no act of territorial jurisdiction within
the said limits, though part of your district,” Gallatin
told Trist. The chief duties of the customs collector
would be to check smuggling and refrain from action which
would arouse Spain.7

The Mobile Act struck directly at Spain and some-
what indirectly at France, for both nations had declared
that West Florida was not included in the Louisiana Pur-
chase. Several weeks after the bill had become law
Marquis Yrujo, the Spanish minister in Washington, entered
the State Department armed with a copy of the loathsome
legislation. Yrujo not only passionately condemned the
law, but he also called for its repeal. Madison‘s ex-
planations of the peaceful intent and discretionary pro—

visions of the law, of course, did not calm the Spanish

 

6Brant, Madison: Secretary of State, p. 193.

7Albert Gallatin to H.B. Trist, February 27, 1804,
Gallatin Papers.

 

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128
minister who viewed the act as a hostile measure.8

Although his actions in the early stages of the West
Florida controversy indicate a strong loyalty to Jefferson
and his administration, Albert Gallatin retained more ob—
jectivity on the Florida Question than either Madison or
Jefferson. While his credentials as a nationalist were
unquestionable, the Secretary of the Treasury as a north—
erner could not work himself into a highly emotional state
over the necessity to acquire Florida. Far more than any—
one else in the administration he was able to view both
sides of this question with a large measure of impartial-
ity. Consequently Gallatin could not in good faith to
his own conscience completely defend the Mobile Act.

Clearly the Spanish minister's protests disturbed
Gallatin, and he communicated his reservations to Secre—
tary of State Madison who also held similar reservations.
Both agreed that the terms of the Mobile Act would be
difficult to justify "to impartial men." They were par-
ticularly concerned over the rule forbidding Spanish
vessels from sailing to Baton Rouge. In conveying his
reservations to Jefferson Gallatin indicated his fear
that the administration had ”not taken solid ground." He
urged Jefferson to reconsider the whole question, and he
suggested a method in which the President could make
changes without losing face. "I will undertake to re-
lieve the Executive from any apparent fluctuation by

writing to Trist that the President, upon full consider-

 

8Edward Channing, The Jeffersonian System 1801-1811
(New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1906), p. 143.

129
ation of the instructions which I had given to the col-

lector, has directed me to alter so much thereof." Jef-
ferson agreed and ordered no interference with Spanish
vessels at Baton Rouge and the other Spanish settlements
in the disputed area were to be regarded as foreign ports.9
Jefferson called the cabinet into session in July to
confer upon the Spanish Question and in particular the in-
structions to be sent to Monroe and Pinckney. Jefferson
drew a number of conclusions from these discussions.
First, acknowledgement of the Perdido constituted a pipg
qpa 292 of negotiations but under no circumstances was
territory west of the Perdido to be considered part of the
purchase. Secondly, territory west of the Rio Bravo del
Norte was not to be exchanged for the Floridas. Thirdly,
an agreement which would prohibit American settlement in
the western areas of the Louisiana Purchase for twenty
years would be acceptable. Finally the United States
would pay up to two million dollars for all Florida.lO
During the drafting of Jefferson's annual message
in October the necessity to clarify the meaning of the
Mobile Act arose. In the first draft Jefferson had in-
dicated that Spain had misunderstood both the terms and

the objectives of the law which authorized "a district

 

9Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, March 15, 1804,
Jefferson Papers; Brant, Madison: Secretary of State, p.
196; Walters, Gallatin, p. 187.

 

10Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, July 3, 1804,
Gallatin Papers; Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, July
5, 1804, Writings of Jefferson, VIII, 309-312.

 

 

 

 

 

130
and port of entry on the waters of the Mobile within the

limits of the United States." Madison quickly pointed
out that the act had provided a port outside United
States territory. Gallatin also objected to the phrasing
of this part of the message. "The public mind is alto-
gether unprepared for a declaration that the terms and
object of the Mobile Act had been misunderstood by Spain,"
cautioned Gallatin. He did not want to discredit the
supporters of the administration who had defended the
law. He also feared that the declaration might be ”dis-
torted into an avowal of some humiliating concession to
Spain-"ll In accordance with Madison‘s and Gallatin's
suggestions Jefferson made thorough revisions in his mes—
sage by limiting Spain‘s misunderstanding to the object
and not the terms of the law.12
In the meantime negotiations were being conducted
in Madrid and Paris. James Monroe was sent from London
to Paris and then on to Spain. Monroe and Pinckney Spent
five months in Madrid attempting to settle the outstand—
ing problems. After making no progress they recommended
the use of force, advice which was echoed by John Arm—
strong, American minister in Paris. As early as May,
1805 upon reading Armstrong's letters Madison became
convinced that the negotiations at Madrid were doomed.

On May 18 Monroe left Spain, but news of the definite

 

llAlbert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, October 29,
1804, Jefferson Papers.
12Writings of Jefferson, VIII, 328.

 

131
failure of negotiations with Spain did not reach the

United States until August, 1805.13

Jefferson was disturbed not only that Spain had
refused to reach an accord, but he was also alarmed at
the apparent agreement between France and Spain which
had stiffened the latter's attitude. When hostilities
ceased in Europe, Jefferson worried that the United States
might be isolated diplomatically. To provide for such a
contingency the President hit upon the idea of an alliance
with Great Britain. He suggested this action to both
Madison and Gallatin for their consideration.14

In the meantime Gallatin had communicated his
thoughts on the failure of the Spanish negotiations to
Secretary of State Madison. Considering the Spanish de-
mands he observed that the negotiations never had any
chance of success. Gallatin thought that the main con—
sideration was not to open negotiations again until the
nation was strong enough to back its diplomacy with the
prOSpective employment of force. For the time being "how
to save character without endangering peace will be a
serious and difficult question.” The Treasurer‘s con-
cern for his nation’s welfare extended far beyond a theo—

retical pacifism, for he suggested that perhaps a dozen

 

13Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, August 4, 1805,
Jefferson Papers.

14Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, August 4, 1805,
Jefferson Papers; Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin,
August 7, 1805, Gallatin Papers; Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison, August 7, 1805, Jefferson Papers.

 

132
naval vessels ought to be constructed as ”the most dig—

nified and most forcible mode of reopening the negotia-
tion.” Yet Gallatin’s support for this rather drastic
action was lukewarm.15 Nor did he think the United States
should go to war for either the western boundary of Louis—
iana or the territory between the Mississippi and Perdido
”after having omitted in our treaty of purchase to bind
France to a certain construction of limits.” In his opin—
ion Spain‘s refusal to accept the claims convention was

16

her most serious offense. After reading the dispatches
from Madrid Gallatin felt relieved, for he found "the
situation of affairs is rather on a more decent footing
than I had expected.”17

Gallatin’s views on the Spanish negotiation indi—
cated a change of heart on the navy. In the past domes—
tic considerations had dictated naval economy, but now
he was willing to permit increased construction. In his
answer to Gallatin James Madison also indicated a shift
away from Jefferson‘s gunboat policy. "I have long been

of the opinion that it would be a wise and dignified course,

 

15The language Gallatin used in making this suggestion
indicates his divided thoughts at the moment. 'Perhaps a
law making efficient provision for building a dozen ships
of the line would be the most dignified and most forcible
mode of reopening the negotiation; but it will be a doubt
with some whether the remedy be not worse than the dis—
order.” Albert Gallatin to James Madison, August 6,1805,
Madison Papers.

l6Albert Gallatin to James Madison, August 6, 1805,
Madison Papers.

l7Albert Gallatin to James Madison, August 12, 1805,
Madison Papers.

 

133
to take preparatory and provisional measures for a naval

force,”

the Secretary of State indicated to Gallatin.
Madison thought the Spanish question made implementation
of a new naval policy urgent. In other particulars Madi—
son agreed with Gallatin’s evaluation of the situation.18
On August 7 Jefferson asked his cabinet officers for
recommendations on the course which the United States
ought to pursue toward Spain. Gallatin considered this
problem for the better part of a month before answering.
During this period the Treasurer‘s mind was diverted from
public business by the illness of one of his children who
finally died. Yet Gallatin’s analysis of September 12,
1805 stands as a model for thorough and judicious exami-
nation of a public question. Not only did he cover the
whole question in detail, but he also wrote in "a spirit
of judicial fairness towards Spain very unusual in Amer-
ican state papers.”19
Gallatin began by considering the alternative of
resorting to war to obtain redress of grievances over the
"boundaries of Louisiana, East and West" and "spoliations,
refusal to ratify Convention, and French Spanish captures.”
First he evaluated the rationality of war over the Western
boundary and concluded that no good reason could be ad-

vanced to justify a war for that object since American

claims were based on doubtful criteria. However, he

 

18James Madison to Albert Gallatin, August 8, 1805,
Gallatin Papers.

l9Adams, Life of Gallatin, p. 334.

 

 

134

favored using the undefined claim in the West as a lever
in negotiating for the eastern boundary, an issue which
he considered more crucial. If no agreement was reached
on the west, Gallatin believed the disputed territory would
fall into American hands, for ”the natural growth of the
United States will hereafter naturally enforce the claim
to its full extent.”20

Gallatin believed the American claim to an eastern
boundary on the Perdido much more justifiable. Yet he
thought that war over the boundary could not be entirely
justified because the claim rested on the construction
the United States placed on the Treaty of San Ildefonso.
Furthermore no attempt had been made by Monroe and Living—
ston when negotiating for Louisiana to secure the territory
between the Mississippi and the Perdido. "The manner in

” Gallatin observed, "betrays

which the treaty is drawn,
either unpardonable oversight or indifference to that ob-
ject, and a disposition to trust to a mere contingency for
securing it.” Even more damaging was the fact that Spain
had not been consulted. If Spain and France had made
prior agreements over the disputed territory, Spain was
justified in opposing American demands in Spite of

French duplicity. Finally the United States knew very
well that neither Spain nor France considered the disputed

territory part of the Treaty of San Ildefonso. Taking an

unusually objective stance Gallatin pointed out, "Laussat

 

2OAlbert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, September 12,
1805, Jefferson Papers.

 

 

135

was instructed to demand and the Spanish officers to de—
liver, east of the Mississippi, that part only which is
in our possession."21
In contrast to the boundary questions the spoliation
claims appeared "a more just cause of war." However, pre—
viously the United States had not considered this issue
momentous enough to engage in hostilities if negotiations
broke down. Moreover, the chief reason Spain refused to
settle the claims convention lay in the American insist—
ence on incorporating a reference to future American
claims based on French spoliations against American prop-
erty in Spanish ports. Since this expression neither
guaranteed the recognition of future American demands nor
excluded her from persuing them, Gallatin believed this
problem did not justify war.22
None of the issues at stake merited the use of
force. Both moral and practical reasons existed for the
United States to avoid war. America and the Jefferson ad-
ministration were held in high regard by other nations be-
cause of policies of wisdom, moderation, and justice.
War could only lower that prestige. 0n the practical
side many undesirable consequences would ensue from hos—

tilities. Commerce would be considerably disrupted,

and revenue would drop sharply. Increased spending for

 

21Gallatin to Jefferson, September 12, 1805, Jefferson
Papers.

22

Papers.

Gallatin to Jefferson, September 12, 1805, Jefferson

 

136

war would mean loans or new taxes. Nor did the gains
America could expect from war justify that policy. Prob—
ably the boundaries would be settled to American desires,
and Florida might be acquired. However, the Treasurer
did not expect that Spain would ratify the claims con-
vention under any conditions. "What are both Floridas
worth?”, Gallatin asked rhetorically. ”What were we
willing to give for them? And what would be the cost of
one year‘s war? Not merely the positive expense, but

the national loss?”23 Gallatin concluded that a war would
be most unprofitable for the young nation. "That there is
a point where forbearance must cease cannot be doubted;"
he stated, ”whether we have reached that point in re—
lation to Spain I doubt."

In fact Gallatin thought that injuries suffered at
the hands of the British were far worse than anything
Spain had done. He believed that the United States could
take the Floridas and seize "the miserable establish-
ments of Sante Fe and San Antonio." However, America
could not strike the sort of bold blows which would force
Spain to her knees. A most decisive stroke would be ac-
complished by seizing Havana, and Vera Cruz but this
could not be done without great expense and naval coop-
eration from the British. Without these exertions Amer-
ica‘s fate would depend on French policy. Gallatin

I

feared that in case of war with Spain 1our fate becomes

 

23

Papers.

Gallatin to Jefferson, September 12, 1805, Jefferson

 

 

137

linked to that of England, and the conditions of our peace
will depend on the general result of the European war.
And this is one of the worst evils which the United States
could encounter; for an entangling alliance, undefined
debts and taxes, and in fine a subversion of all our
hopes, must be the natural consequences.”24
The Treasurer believed that renewed negotiations
would bring at least three benefits to the United States.
First, at best the questions might be solved permanently,
but at worst temporary agreements might prevent war.
Secondly, America could modify her demands so that Span—
ish refusal to negotiate would place responsibility for
the diplomatic crisis on Spain’s shoulders. Thirdly,
time would be gained to prepare America for war. He dif-
ferentiated between ”active negotiations” by which he
meant talks designed to work out all existing differences
and ”suspension of discussion” by which he meant ”some
temporary agreement which, without affecting the question,
might save the rights and credit of both nations, leaving
the final result to future contingencies."25
Gallatin then outlined a series of compromises
which he thought both sides could accept. As far as
boundaries were concerned he believed that chances of

negotiating a settlement were poor, for he surmised that

 

2LLGallatin to Jefferson, September 12, 1805,
Jefferson Papers.

25Gallatin to Jefferson, September 12, 1805,
Jefferson Papers.

 

138

France was the key to such an arrangement. Consequently
he suggested empowering the American ministers in Paris
and Madrid to make an agreement including the Sabine and
Perdido Rivers as boundaries in Louisiana. In the mean—
time he urged propositions for a temporary arrangement.
He proposed an agreement to respect the status quo on the
Louisiana boundaries. Both nations should agree not to
construct any new military posts, but both should be left
free to reinforce any existing posts. He favored saying
nothing about settlements, for the western boundary
questions could be used as an inducement to persuade
Spain to settle the eastern boundary at the Perdido.
Gallatin also proposed an agreement on free navigation
of the Mobile. Believing the claims convention to be
the most difficult problem Gallatin suggested that ratifi—
cations be exchanged which would exempt the problem of
American compensation for French Spoilations should Spain
have no other objections to the convention.26

The problem of new aggression by French and Spanish
privateers operating from Cuba caused great concern. If
Spain appeared amenable to agreeing on other issues,
Gallatin suggested that the United States make representa—
tions to Spain similar to ones made to other aggressors.
However, if Spain refused to agree on settlement of any
of the other issues, he suggested that the United States

"press the subject with great force upon them." Gallatin

 

26Gallatin to Jefferson, September 12, 1805,
Jefferson Papers.

w

 

 

139

concluded his recommendation on this question by urging
that if Spain would ratify the Convention, then each sub—
ject should be taken up separately. "But if no ratifica-
tion is expected, all three, convention, status quo, and
new aggressions, should be pressed together on Spain."27
Gallatin also included a consideration of prepara—
tions that Congress might undertake. Observing that the
recent peace with Tripoli meant an annual surplus of two
million dollars he speculated that most of this surplus
would be applied to the creation of a navy. If Congress
decided on building a navy, Gallatin cautioned against
half—way measures. An American navy ought to be strong
enough to "impress other nations that we are in earnest
about it.” Gallatin thought that enough money was avail-
able to ”lay the foundation of an efficient navy." He
also thought that construction of a navy would have a
desirable effect on America’s foreign relations and per—
haps even on the present negotiations with Spain. The
Treasurer had some misgivings about the course that he
was proposing, but he thought the decision on the navy
must be made after a sober evaluation of all sides of
the question:
Whether the creation of an efficient

navy may not, by encouraging wars and

drawing us in the usual vortex of ex-

penses and foreign relations, be the

cause of greater evils than those it is

intended to prevent, is not the question
which I mean to discuss. This is to be

 

27Ga11atin to Jefferson, September 12, 1805,
Jefferson Papers.

1‘,

 

 

140

decided by the representatives of
the nation; and although I have
been desirous that the measure
might at least be postponed, yet

I have had no doubt for a long

time that the United States would
ultimately have a navy. It is
certain that so long as we have
none, we must perpetually be 11—
able to injuries and insults, par—
ticularly from the belligerent
powers, when there is a war in
Europe; and in deciding for or
against the measure Congress will
fairly decide the question whether
they think it more for the interest
of the United States to preserve a
pacific and temporizing system, and
to tolerate those injuries and in—
sults to a great extent, than to be
prepared, like the great European
nations, to repel every injury by
the sword.28

Gallatin concluded his lengthy memorandum by recom—
mending the adoption of pacific measures with reference to
Spain. War would interfere with his plans for retiring
the debt, but by 1809 financial matters would be placed
on such a footing that over three and one—half million
dollars would be available for pressing demands of state.
These considerations underscored "the importance of our
preserving peace” until 1809.29

The Treasurer’s desire to keep peace represented
not only his thoughts but also the opinions of leading
merchants, insurance agents, and friends of the adminis-

tration. "I am asked every day whether there is any prob-

 

28Gallatin to Jefferson, September 12, 1805,
Jefferson Papers.

29Gallatin to Jefferson, September 12, 1805,
Jefferson Papers.

r..—

141
ability of a war with Spain," he told Jefferson. From

conversations with his friends Gallatin believed that war
would be unpopular. Few thought the boundary question
worthy of hostilities, but more concern sprang from
Spanish refusal to ratify the claims convention and the
continued Spanish depredations against American commerce.
However, in the final analysis the strongest sentiment
counseled peace.30

During October Jefferson dropped the idea of a Brit-
ish alliance. He did so only after the news of Pitt‘s
third continental coalition against Napoleon. This de-
velopment guaranteed at least another year of warfare in
Europe and further removed the possibility of the United
States facing a hostile combination of France and Spain.
Even if the United States was forced into a war Jefferson
now favored action which would allow America to enter it
”without fettering ourselves with an alliance." Then the
United States would "be free to retire whenever our terms
can be obtained.”31

The expanding war in Europe also presented another
opportunity for the United States to make an effort "for
a peaceable accommodation with Spain." Jefferson suggested
that talks be reopened at Paris with Armstrong or Armstrong

and Monroe as the negotiators. Thus France could act as a

 

30Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, September 13,
1805, Jefferson Papers.

31Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, October 23,
1805, Gallatin Papers.

 

 

 

 

142

mediator, and the purchase of the Floridas would consti—
tute the means.32

On November 12 the Cabinet met and came to an agree—
ment on Spanish affairs. Both East and West Florida would
be purchased for five million dollars. Moreover, the
United States was determined to collect the spoliation
claims. Only two concessions were made to Spain. The
western boundary of Louisiana was set at the Colorado
River then due north to the highlands whose waters ran
into the Mississippi or Missouri Rivers. Also a thirty
year prohibition was placed on the western settlement of
Louisiana. In the beginning Gallatin was reluctant to
advocate purchasing Florida in the face of widespread
rumors of war for fear that it would seem that the United
States was purchasing peace. However, the Secretary of
the Treasury was persuaded that such an opportunity might
not arise again. Therefore he withdrew his opposition,
and the cabinet unanimously endorsed the plan.33

On December 3, 1805 President Jefferson sent his
annual address to Congress. The message was particularly
bellicose in reference to Spain. Jefferson strongly crit-
icized the Spanish not only for refusing to ratify the
spoliation claims but also for renewing commercial de—
predations. Spain also was indicted for harassing Amer—
ican commerce on the Mobile. Moreover, Spain had declined

32

Papers.

33Writings of Jefferson, VIII, 383-384; Brant,
Madison: Secretary of State, p. 290.

 

Jefferson to Gallatin, October 23, 1805, Gallatin

l”.-

 

143
to adjust the boundaries of Louisiana, and Spanish troops

seized American property in parts of Louisiana to which
the United States held an undisputed title. Therefore
Jefferson had alerted troops in the Louisiana area to
protect American citizens and ”to repel by arms any
similar aggressions in the future."34
In his annual address Jefferson had promised that
further details would be sent to Congress at a later date.
Jefferson's strategy in dealing with Spain in December,
1805 encompassed a two—headed policy Similar to action
taken in 1802 when Spain had withdrawn the right of de—
posit at New Orleans. Then he had taken a bellicose
stand in a public message while making provision for
peaceful settlement through negotiations. Since he plan—
ned to follow the same course with Spain, he drafted a
secret message to be sent to Congress. Albert Gallatin
carefully read the message and made a number of sugges—
tions that Jefferson adopted. The Gallatin revisions
helped soften the impact of the message. For example the
Treasurer recommended that Jefferson strike out a clause
accusing Spain of avoiding explanations and substitute a
sentence saying that she avoided any "proposition leading
to an arrangement." He also rewrote a sentence which
condemned France too strongly for her silence. He even
suggested structural changes to make the message‘s meaning

35

clearer.

 

34Writings of Jefferson, VIII, 390-391.

35Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, "Remarks on
Spanish Message," December 3, 1805, Jefferson Papers.

 

 

 

144
Although Jefferson accepted most of Gallatin's

Specific suggestions, he ignored his Treasurer's overall
criticism of the message. Gallatin expressed one major
reservation on the thrust of the whole message: he thought
it did not clarify the final objectives. "Omission of the
word Florida may lead to error,” warned Gallatin. The
Treasurer also objected to a lack of candor on Jefferson’s
part. "Nor does the message convey the idea that in order
to effect an accommodation a much larger sum of money will
probably be requisite than has been contemplated,” wrote
Gallatin. His appeal for a recognition that "greater
means" might be needed fell on deaf ears.36
Jefferson also drew up a series of resolutions which
he intended to submit to Congress. Conforming to his
usual custom the President sent these proposals to his
cabinet members for their comments and suggestions.
Gallatin drew up a careful commentary on the Spanish
Resolutions. First, he enumerated the three objectives
to be obtained from Congress: (1) public resolutions pro—
fessing support of legitimate American claims in case no
settlement should be achieved (2) private expression by
Congress that they would enable the President to make
peaceful arrangements as suggested in the private message
(3) immediate appropriation of a sum to carry out the pro-
posed arrangements. Since the Executive had sent two dis-

tinct messages to Congress, the public resolutions would

 

36Gallatin to Jefferson, "Remarks on Spanish Message,"
December 3, 1805, Jefferson Papers.

 

 

145

have to be kept distinct from the private ones. Gallatin
focused on the fifth resolution which provided: I'Resolved,
that in support of these resolutions, and of the conse-
quences which may proceed from them, the citizens of the
United States, by their Senate and Representatives in Con-
gress assembled, do pledge their lives and fortunes; and
that the execution of these resolutions be vested with the
President of the United States."37 The Treasurer saw no
reason for the solemnity of the fifth resolution. He
recommended that it be revised to authorize the President
to carry out the resolutions. Gallatin also urged that
the United States should make it clear that she would not
abandon claims for spoliations provided for in the draft
convention with Spain.38

Jefferson carefully considered Gallatin‘s suggestions
on the resolutions. The following day he submitted a re-
vised set of propositions to Gallatin claiming that he had
adopted his suggestions. ”Enclosed is a revised edition of
the Spanish resolutions, in which you will find most of

' wrote the President. Jefferson

your ideas conformed to,‘
had included his Treasurer‘s suggestions relative to the

fifth resolution and the Claims Conventions. In addition
Jefferson stated, "In the message also I have adopted all

of your amendments except the last, which respected mere-

ly the arrangement of the phrases, and could not be satis-

 

37Writings of Jefferson, VII, 398.

38Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, "Remarks on
Spanish Resolutions," December 3, 1805, Jefferson Papers.

 

 

 

146
factorily altered.”39

No matter what Jefferson said the secret message
read to Congress on December 6 fell considerably short of
Gallatin's ideas. In this message Jefferson referred to
the unsuccessful negotiations conducted by Monroe and
Pinckney at Madrid and Spanish unwillingness to settle
any claims or the limits of Louisiana. Even worse in
Jefferson’s eyes, "They authorize the inference that it is
their intention to advance on our possessions until they
shall be repressed by an opposing force." The President
hoped that France would encourage a settlement of all the
outstanding questions between the United States and Spain.
Moreover, he pointed out that the crisis in Europe created
favorable conditions under which a settlement might be

" Jefferson ob—

reached. "Formal war is not necessary,
served. "It is not probable it will follow. But the pro-
tection of our citizens, the spirit and honor of our coun-
try, require that force be interposed to a certain degree.
It will probably contribute to advance the object of
peace n40 Nowhere was Florida mentioned.

Beginning in December, 1805 Albert Gallatin played
an increasingly important role in the Spanish affair, for
he acted as the liason man between the administration and
Congress. On December 7 he contacted Joseph H. Nicholson

of Maryland, a leading Republican Congressman and his wife‘s

 

39Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, December 4,
1805, Gallatin Papers.

”Writings of Jefferson, VIII, 400-402.

 

 

 

 

147

cousin, to elicit support for the Spanish Resolutions.
The following day John Randolph of Roanoke, the Chairman
of the House Ways and Means Committee and a good friend of
Gallatin‘s, conferred with Jefferson on the Spanish Ques—
tion. Upon learning that two million dollars was necessary
to purchase Florida Randolph told Jefferson that he could
not support such a measure because the money had not been
requested in the message to Congress and because ”after
the total failure of every attempt at negotiation, such a
step would disgrace us forever.” Randolph's opposition
endangered the whole scheme, and after almost two weeks of
inaction Gallatin directly confronted Randolph on the mat—
ter. On December 21 as Randolph was about to enter a
committee room Gallatin buttonholed him and requested his
support for the Florida purchase scheme}Ll
Randolph left the meeting with Gallatin still de-
termined to impede the progress of the bill. Seven weeks
later in February, 1806 Congress voted to appropriate two
million dollars for ”extraordinary expenses” in foreign
relations which meant the purchase of the Floridas. Other
resolutions authorizing the President to raise troops to
protect the Southern frontier and approving an exchange
of part of western Louisiana for the Floridas were also
approved although by narrow margins. These administration

victories were accomplished despite Randolph‘s strong

 

41Albert Gallatin to Joseph Hopper Nicholson, Decem-
ber 7, 1805, The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. Henry
Adams (Philadelphia: J.P. Lipincott, 1879), I, 282.
Adams, Life of Gallatin, pp. 338-339°

 

 

148
42

opposition.
In April John Randolph openly attacked Jefferson’s
foreign policy. The Virginia obstructionist argued that
the administration‘s policy was designed to give Secretary
of State Madison credit for standing up to Spain while
asking Congress to truckle to her. Henry Adams described
Randolph‘s attitude as "Honestly indignant at what he
considered a mean attempt to bribe one nation to join in
robbing another.” Randolph considered "the whole trans-
action only worthy of Madison‘s groveling character."
Randolph’s opposition led to a split in the Republican
Party which was more annoying to the administration than
really serious. When Randolph extended his criticism to
Jefferson, he was removed from the chairmanship of the
powerful House Ways and Means Committee. Even Randolph's
friends were punished, for Nathaniel Macon was removed as
Speaker of the House.43
Randolph‘s actions symbolized dissatisfaction with
Jefferson's policy toward Spain. Negotiations in Madrid
drifted on in 1806 and 1807 without reaching any settle-
ment. Surely Spain could have made a better accommodation
in 1806 than she did in 1819, but Spanish diplomacy was
largely negative and inept at this time. Consequently

James Monroe, one of the negotiators at Madrid, reaped

 

42Adams, Life of Gallatin, p. 339; Walters, Gallatin,
p. 190. ‘-
143Henry Adams, History of the United States During

the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
(New York: Charles Scribner‘s Sons, 1889), III, 137-139.

 

 

 

149

much credit for the purchase of Florida during his
Presidency.

Albert Gallatin’s activities relative to the Spanish
Question are significant for several reasons. First, a
number of his suggestions on policy were accepted by Jef-
ferson. Thus he was important in shaping and modifying
to some extent American policy. Secondly, he provided
an important and highly realistic alternative to the
President’s policies which may be best characterized as
”bluster and bluff.” Gallatin‘s memorandum of September
12, 1805 is the best illustration of his diplomatic real-
ism. Finally, Gallatin‘s views on relationship between
the ability to use force and diplomacy were changing. He
was now willing to countenance the construction of a
large naval force as the best method of deterring in—
juries against the United States. The Treasurer‘s
policies on the Spanish Question indicates a transition

from Old Republicanism to New Republicanism.

 

 

CHAPTER VI
CRISIS IN ANGLO—AMERICAN RELATIONS

The anti-British orientation of the Republican
Party while the Federalists were in power did not bode
well for Anglo—American relations. However, the Repub—
lican administration continued the cordiality ushered in
with the Jay Treaty in 1795. Good relations were made
possible by the return of peace in Europe. The cessation
of hostilities removed the conditions which had forced
Britain to harass neutral commerce and impress seamen.
In addition, the Republican leaders moderated their
tone toward England when they found it necessary to form—
ulate foreign policy rather than to act as critics of
Federalist policy. The President informed the British
charge dgg affaires, Edward Thornton, that his adminis—
tration would be as friendly as the previous Federalist
government. Also American objectives in the Southwest,
chiefly the desire for Florida, led Jefferson to consider
a British alliance as a means to that end. Truly the
early years of Jefferson’s first administration marked the

continuation of a rapprochement with Britain.1

 

lBradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England
and the United States 1795—1805 (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1955), pp. 129—131.

150

 

 

 

151
Following the renewal of European hostilities in

1803, after only a nineteen month truce, Anglo—American
relations deteriorated to some extent. During the summer
of 1804, in an attempt to seize Jerome Bonaparte who was
known to be departing for France, H.M.S. Cambrian searched
a number of American vessels within New York harbor. This
flagrant violation of American neutrality both aroused
public opinion and raised the President's ire against
Britain. Nevertheless, both Britain and France followed
a cautious policy, and few incidents resulted. At the
same time the President‘s strong desire to obtain Florida
caused him to exercise restraint. The Virginia philosopher
did not hesitate to court the use of British power to help
fulfill American objectives against Spain.2
In the months immediately following the renewal of
fighting the United States derived much benefit from the
hostilities. The American merchant marine as the largest
neutral carrier transported noncontraband goods to and
from the colonies of the belligerents. This situation
led to the accumulation of considerable wealth in Amer~
ica. Since Britain had swept French shipping from the
seas, both France and Spain had opened their colonies in
the West Indies to neutral shipping. To stop this prac—
tice Britain had invoked the Rule of 1756 which stated
that ports closed to a nation in peace time were not open
to her in war time. However, this rule did not apply to

commerce in American bottoms between the Caribbean Islands

 

2Ibid., p. 177

1

 

 

152
and the mainland of the United States. Consequently,

American shippers circumvented this British restriction
by means of the ”broken voyage" or the shipping of goods
from the West Indies to a port in the United States where
it was supposedly unloaded, taxed, and then reloaded for
a journey across the Atlantic. Britain tolerated this
action, and the doctrine of the "broken voyage” had been
upheld by British courts as late as 1800 in the Pglly case.

A sharp departure in British policy toward the United
States appeared in the spring of 1805. In a series of
cases including the celebrated Espgx case British admi—
ralty courts suddenly ruled that neutral bottoms carrying
goods between the West Indies and the Mother Country were
liable to seizure even though they stopped in the United
States. These decisions required that new proof be sub-
mitted to demonstrate convincingly that a "broken voyage”
was not really a continuous voyage in disguise. Many
American Ships were seized under the new rulings. The
efficient enforcement of these decisions threatened to
ruin American commercial interests. Especially galling
was the practice in which British Ships hovered barely
outside of American ports in a manner which virtually
established blockades.3

The dramatic shift in the course of the war in 1805
also modified British and French policy toward the United

States. On October 21, 1805 Admiral Nelson smashed a

 

3Varg, Founding Fathers, p. 175.

 

153

combined Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar. This stirring
naval victory which cost Nelson his life had a double sig—
nificance: it confirmed British mastery of the seas and it
ended fears that Napoleon might invade England. The fol—
lowing month Napoleon achieved domination on the continent
with his victory at Austerlitz. The war now became stale-
mated, for Britain was invincible on the high seas and
France was master of the continent. Drastic measures
would be needed to defeat the enemy.

At approximately the same time that British seapower
was reasserted James Stephen, a British lawyer, published

a pamphlet entitled, War in Disguise; Or, the Frauds of

 

Neutral Flags. This publication was more than a legal

brief, for it also enjoyed the blessings of high figures
in the British government. Stephen's tract expanded upon
the principles lying at the basis of the E§§§x_decision.
The author accused neutrals, especially the United States,
of fraudulently sheltering enemy property. In short, the
neutrals were responsible for sustaining France and pro-
longing the war. The only remedy lay in the rigid enforce—
ment of Britain's maritime laws with the end of disrupting
completely the enemy's colonial trade. War in Disguise
had a powerful effect on British opinion, for it rallied
support behind a policy that treated neutrals harshly. In
the United States War in Disguise was widely read and
roundly criticizedfL

James Madison countered the British jurist's con-

 

4Perkins, First Rapprochement, pp. 180-181.

 

 

 

 

154

tentions in an extended essay entitled Examination of the

 

British Doctrine Which Subjects to Capture a Neutral Trade

Not Open in Time of Peace. Although this work was anony-

 

mous, the phrasing, arguments advanced, and logic of the
piece identified the author. Madison argued that the Rule
of 1756 conflicted with both international law and previous
British court decisions. Nor had English conduct consist-
ently adhered to this ruling. For example, Britain herself

had opened her colonies to neutral shipping in war time.

 

The Secretary of State also marshalled impressive evidence

to show that Britain herself traded with the enemy and in—

vited the enemy to trade with her colonies. After his ex-

haustive analysis Madison concluded that recent British

action could be explained only in terms of ”a mere super-

iority of force.”5
When Congress assembled in December, 1805 strong

sentiment in that body supported measures which would as—

sert American rights on the high seas. Impressment was

singled out as the most serious British transgression.

Congressional opinion remained constant during the dreary

winter, and in January, 1806 President Jefferson delivered

a special message to Congress on the problems of neutral I

trade and impressment. Secretary of State Madison also

supplied a summary of changes in British policy. The ef-

fect on Congress was electric, for resolutions to bar

all imports from Britain were introduced. Albert Gallatin

persuaded his brother-in-law, Joseph Hopper Nicholson of

 

5Brant, Madison: Secretary of State, pp. 297-299.

 

 

155

Maryland, to introduce a more moderate resolution which
stipulated that the prohibition be limited to British
goods that could be either manufactured in the United
States or that could be supplied by other nations. In
April Nicholson's non—importation resolution was passed
by the overwhelming vote of eighty-seven to thirty—five.
The measure was not to take effect until November in
hopes that in the meantime Britain would be induced to
reverse her stringent policies.6

At the very time the Republican dominated Congress
was flexing its muscles against Britain a new ministry
came to power in Britain. The new government, popularly
referred to as the Ministry of All Talents and headed by
Lord Grenville, installed Charles James Fox as foreign
minister. Originally the new government was inclined
toward moderation with respect to the United States, but
the passage of the Non—Importation Act stiffened British
resistance.7

To facilitate negotiations with England President
Jefferson had sent William Pinkney, a Maryland lawyer, to

join James Monroe, the regular American minister in

London. These two American representatives were authorized

to settle all the outstanding disputes between the two
nations including the problems of "broken voyages" and

indemnity payments for maritime spoliations. However,

 

6Ibid., pp. 313—316; Walters, Gallatin, p. 193.

7Varg, Founding Fathers, p. 178.

 

156

Monroe and Pinkney were Specifically instructed not to
Sign a treaty which did not renounce the right Britain
had claimed to impress sailors from American vessels on
the high seas.

In the course of the negotiations it became clear
that the American ministers would not succeed in negoti—
ating a treaty if they insisted on Britain revoking the
Rule of 1756 and dropping the right of impressment. Grad—
ually the American envoys embraced the position that a
treaty which ironed out some of the issues would be bet—
ter than no treaty at all. Consequently, they ignored
their instructions to the extent of signing a treaty on
December 31, 1806 which did not exclude the British right
of impressment although it carefully circumscribed it. A
memorandum was included in the treaty which outlined the
points of difference on that question. Yet the Monroe-
Pinkney treaty did contain advantages for the United
States, and it must be considered from this point of view.
Commercial concessions were won largely in the form of
approval of the re-export trade if the goods actually
paid duties in the United States. James Monroe defended
the treaty in a letter to the President arguing that it
was the best treaty that ”could reasonably have been
expected.”8

Taking into consideration all facets of the situation
in 1806 undoubtedly Monroe was correct, and the actions of

the American ministers at London must be considered real-

 

8W.P. Cresson, James Monroe (Chapel Hill: The Uni—
versity of North Carolina Press, 1946), pp. 224-227.

 

157
istic. During the last days of the-Monroe-Pinkney

negotiations French action further muddied the waters.
On November 21, 1806 Napoleon issued the Berlin Decree
stating that the British Isles were in a state of block—
ade and that any American ship trading with Britain or
allowing herself to be searched by Britain was liable to
French seizure. At the last minute Britain included a
provision in the Monroe—Pinkney Treaty stipulating that
they expected the United States to resist the Berlin
Decree.9

The Monroe—Pinkney Treaty was doomed once its terms
reached the United States. Thomas Jefferson thought that
the nations would be better off without a treaty rather
than agreeing to one which failed to settle the impress-
ment issue. The more the President considered it the
angrier he became. Jefferson worked himself into a state
of mind in which he considered the handiwork of Monroe
and Pinkney even worse than the Jay Treaty. Before he
would even consider a treaty with Britain a number of
changes would have to be made. These alterations in-
cluded British renunciation of impressment, the removal
of all limitations on American trade between the West
Indies and Europe including the repeal of the necessity
for the ”broken voyage," the recognition of claims for
indemnity arising from illegal British seizures, and a

substantial modification of the rider which made any

 

9Ibid;, pp. 228-229.

 

 

158

treaty contingent on American refusal to honor the Berlin
Decree. Jefferson persuaded his Cabinet to agree to these
modifications although the Cabinet preferred to see the
treaty sent to the Senate.10

Rather than taking his Cabinet's advice Jefferson
returned the treaty to the ministers in London along with
his recommendations for alterations. In the meantime the
President and his Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith were
engaged in devising a project to threaten the British and
the Spanish. This was the famous and terribly ill-fated
gunboat scheme. This idea was not new. Indeed the gunboat
was a basic alteration which Jefferson had conceived early
in his first administration. These vessels were little
more than their name implied: flatboats or platforms on
which cannons and heavy guns could be mounted. They were
purely defensive in purpose and could only be used to
protect harbors and river mouths. To Jefferson these
floating forts would provide the answer to the nation’s
needs. They were cheap in comparison to a navy, and their
purpose was to protect American soil and prevent harbor
incidents. What Jefferson largely ignored was that they
were unwieldly, almost totally helpless in rough water,
11

and terribly vulnerable.

AS early as February 28, 1803 Congress had auth-

 

10Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, February 1,1807,
Madison Pa ers; Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Feb—
ruary 1,1 07 Gallatin Papers; ”Notes, '1807; "Draft
Observations,I March 21,1 07, Jefferson Papers.

llSchachner, Jefferson, II, 788—789.

 

 

159

orized the construction of a number of these gunboats, but
in late 1804 only a handful were ready. The President re—
turned to this scheme in the winter of 1806-1807. In a
Special message of February 10 he recommended the eventual
construction of 200 gunboats, 123 of which were to be built
during 1807—1808. Prior to delivering this message he sent
it to the Secretary of the Treasury for his comments.

Gallatin saw no reason for building so many of these
vessels. Not only were they expensive to construct, but
the maintenance of them would prove costly. Moreover, since
they could be provided fairly quickly and would really only
be needed in case of war he recommended a drastic cutback
in their number, "Of all the species of force which war

” he wrote, ”there is none which can be ob—

may require,
tained in a shorter notice than gunboats, and none there—
fore, that it is less necessary to provide beforehand."
Gallatin sought to restrain Jefferson further by recom-
mending that Congress be allowed to consider this issue
carefully and decide whether new gunboats were needed.12
Clearly the Secretary of the Treasury found Jeffer—
son's pet project distasteful. However, Jefferson rejected
Gallatin's careful and well reasoned advice. The Presi-
dent claimed that Gallatin overestimated both the costs of
construction and maintenance. Nor did Jefferson think
enough boats could be built in case of an actual emer—

I

gency. "An enterprising enemy,‘ he declared in rebuttal

 

l2Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, "Notes Respect-
ing Gunboats," February 8, 1807, Jefferson Papers.

   

160
to his parsimonious Treasurer, ”could destroy our sea-

ports and construction yards as the first operation of
war."13

While the President unveiled his enhanced gunboat
policy, changes were taking place in Britain. George
Canning, who became foreign minister in early 1807, em-
barked on a policy designed to crush the United States
as a strong maritime power. One of the reasons for this
determination was the fact that desertion from the British
navy increased as conditions worsened during the war.
Canning proposed that Britain return to her traditional
position that if a man was born an Englishman he was al-
ways an Englishman. In other words, Britain claimed the
right to impress any native Englishman whether he was a
naturalized American citizen or not.

Since impressment stood as one of the major issues
in blocking agreement between Britain and the United States
some compromise was necessary. It was clear that beleag—
uered Britain was not in a position to conciliate her com—
mercial rival across the Atlantic. In the midst of this
imbroglio James Madison proposed that in exchange for a
definite prohibition on impressments the United States
should offer to exclude English sailors from American
ships. This settlement would remove the basis for the
impressment controversy and give the British a legiti—

mate way out of the controversy. No definite decision

 

13Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, February 9,
1807, Gallatin Papers.

[I

 

161
was made on this matter chiefly because the cabinet

wanted to consult a report on the number of seamen in
American employment which was being compiled by Albert
Gallatin.14

AS early as Nevember, 1805 the President had asked
his Treasurer to draw up an estimate ”of the number of
seamen we call ours.” Gallatin’s estimate which he sub-
mitted to Jefferson and Madison on April 13, 1807 bore all
the familiar traits of careful analysis and reflection.
Basing his calculations largely on the hospital tax which
was deducted from all seamen’s pay the Secretary of the
Treasury concluded that 67,000 men were sailing in Amer-
ican ships on the high seas. Gallatin found it difficult
to discern how many of the total were British. However,
judging largely from the reports of collectors who were
specifically asked to ascertain the percentage of British
seamen he thought that ”very few are found on board the
vessels employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, but
that they constitute at least one fifth of the whole num—
ber of persons employed on board vessels in foreign trade.”
Although English sailors numbered only 9,000 men, they ex-
erted more influence than either their number or percent—
age of the total would indicate. Almost every British
sailor was an able bodied seamen, and as such they consti-

tuted nearly one—fourth of the total number of men engaged

 

luBrant, Madison: Secretary of State, pp. 377-378;
Schachner, Jefferson, II, 837.

 

 

162

in foreign trade.15

From his findings the Treasurer reasoned that
Madison‘s proposal to exclude British seamen from the
American merchant marine ”would materially injure the
navigation of the United States." On sober reflection
he thought "that the only positive good resulting from
it would be that the British would then abstain from
impressing in the future." On the other hand, Gallatin
as a realist knew that Americans impressed into British
service would be returned very Slowly, and many would
never be released. In addition, the British had not
modified their commercial regulations enough to offset
the loss which would be suffered from the relinquishment
of such a large number of seamen. Consequently Gallatin
bluntly told the Secretary of State that his proposal
"would more effectively curtail our commerce than any
restrictions they can lay upon it."16

While his letter of April 13 to Madison discussed
only the consequences of the Secretary of State‘s proposal,
the Treasurer’s letter to Jefferson was divided into two
parts. The first half repeated the conclusions regarding
the propriety of sacrificing British seamen which he had
made to Madison. However, Gallatin who had been exceed-

ingly blunt with the Secretary of State minced even fewer

 

l5Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, November 3,
1805, Gallatin Papers; Albert Gallatin to James Madison,
April 13, 1807, Madison Papers.

l6Albert Gallatin to James Madison, April 13, 1807,
Madison Papers.

   

163
words with Jefferson. He thought it "improper to offer

the proposed arrangement." The only exception he made was
in the event that failure to negotiate a treaty would re-
sult in war. The Treasurer devoted the second half of his
letter to that possibility. If the President thought the
risk of sacrificing the merchant marine was necessary to
preserve peace, Gallatin recommended that Jefferson insist
on the abandonment of impressment along with a number of
additional items on commerce. He recommended that more
favorable East Indian and colonial commerce articles be
demanded.l7 Although Gallatin believed it highly unlikely,
he even included a third contingency in case Britain agreed
to drop the right of impressment. In that instance, no
matter what the provisions of the other articles, such a
18

monumental British concession would justify the treaty.

Madison was impressed by Gallatin’s observations,

 

l7Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, April 13, 1807,
Jefferson Papers: "Should you, however, upon a view of the
whole ground, be of opinion that it is better to abandon
the British sailors than to run the risk of the consequences
which may follow a rejection of the Treaty, I would suggest
the propriety of making not only that provision as ultimatum,
but to add to it at least the expunging of the East India
article and such modification or explanation of the fifth
and of the colonial article as will free them from ambigu-
ity, confirming expressly the reciprocity of freedom of com-
merce and equalization of duties to articles the produce of
British dominion in Europe imported into the United States
from Europe in British vessels, and so explaining the colon-
ial article that it may not be susceptible of any construc—
tion which would deprive us of any of the branches of trade
(such as carrying nankeens and other China articles to the
West Indies, and c.) which we have heretofore enjoyed with—
out molestation.”

l8Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, April 13, 1807,
Jefferson Papers.

 

164

but the Secretary of State hit upon a compromise solu—
tion. According to English law alien seamen who served
two years in His Majesty’s service were claimed as Brit-
ish seamen. He suggested that Britain should recognize
this same principle with respect to the United States.
Under this compromise English sailors who had served ex-
clusively on American vessels for more than two years
would remain there. Under this plan a large portion of
the British seamen would remain in the American merchant
marine.19

Jefferson was equally impressed by his Treasurer's
findings. When he discovered that the proposed exchange
would cripple the American carrying trade, the President
took his Treasurer‘s recommendations seriously. "Mr.
Gallatin's estimate of the number of foreign seamen in
our employ" he wrote to James Madison, ”renders it prudent
I think to suspend all propositions respecting our non-em-
ployment of them." Jefferson finally decided to "let the
negotiation take a friendly nap.”2O

While the cabinet debated ways to approach Britain
in renewed negotiations events tranSpired which culminated
in the termination of talks altogether. A relatively in-
nocuous occurence of February, 1807 provided the spark. In

that month a crew escaped from a British ship to the

 

ngames Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 17, 1807,
Jefferson Papers; Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson,
April 16, 1807, Jefferson Papers.

20Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, April 14, 1807,
Jefferson Papers; Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin,
April 21, 1807, Gallatin Papers.

 

165

Virginia Shore, and four of these deserters enlisted on

an American vessel, the Chesapeake. When news reached
Halifax, Nova Scotia, the fire brand British commander,
Vice—Admiral Berkeley issued an order compelling his sub-
ordinates to retrieve the deserters from the American ship.

On June 22 the Chesapeake set sail from Norfolk, but
her progress was halted only ten miles off the coast by
H.M.S. Leopard who claimed the right to search the Amer-
ican vessel. When the commander of the Chesapeake refused
this demand, the British vessel fired three point blank
charges into the defenseless American bottom killing three
and wounding eighteen. Then the British proceeded to search,
and finally they removed four deserters, three American and
one English. After this confrontation the Chesapeake sailed
back into Norfolk. This outrage immediately evinced a wave
of protest and indignation throughout America. For the
first time since 1798 Americans were united against a
foreign power.

Upon receiving news of the Chesapeake affair Jef—
ferson called his cabinet into session. Since the mem—
bers of the administration had dispersed for the summer,
they were unable to meet until July 2. The cabinet agreed
that the President ought to issue a proclamation which he
had drawn up. In this document Jefferson ordered all Eng-
lish armed ships out of American waters, barred further
entry to British armed vessels, and provided punishment

for any American who supplied any ships which refused to

honor the proclamation.21

 

diThomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, June 25, 1807;
Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin, June 28,

 

166
Upon arriving back in Washington Gallatin thought

war was unavoidable. Yet he deplored the probable re-
sults of hostilities. "War will be a most calamitous
event; our immense commerce will be destroyed, our progress
and improvement retarded, and a thousand families be ruined,"
he lamented to his wife. Nor did Gallatin ignore the fact
that the first year of fighting would exact a great toll
from Americans. However, the Treasurer remained optimistic
that his nation would triumph. "Our cause is just," he
reminded his wife, ”and I have no fears of the ultimate
results.”22
Because Gallatin believed war inevitable he was irked
with Jefferson who refused to take resolute action. The
President had proposed to call Congress into session late
in October, but Gallatin favored an immediate call. "It
is our duty to ask for reparation, to avert war if it can
be done honorably, and in the meanwhile not to lose an

” he observed. One of the

instant in preparing for war,
Treasurer’s greatest fears lay in his belief that unless
decisive action was taken quickly the ardor of the over—
whelming majority for reprisals against Britain would

cool.23

Gallatin was not alone among influential Republi-

 

1807, Gallatin Papers; Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson,
June 29, 1807, Jefferson Papers; Thomas Jefferson to Albert
Gallatin, July 1, 1807, Gallatin Papers.

22Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin, July
4, 1807, Gallatin Papers.

23Gallatin to his wife, July 10, 1807, Gallatin Papers.

 

167

cans in criticizing Jefferson for his equivocating stand.
His brother—in-law Joseph Hopper Nicholson, who was now a
Baltimore banker, criticized Jefferson‘s reticence immed—
iately following the Chesapeake Affair. Nicholson, like
Gallatin, considered war inevitable, but he differed from
the Treasurer in welcoming the opportunity to unsheath the
sword against the British dragon. "Nothing is now left to
negotiate on," Nicholson pointed out. Comparing national
conduct to personal conduct he believed that honor could
not be saved by negotiation because it was simply not a
commodity one could barter. Nicholson also thought that
the country was united and would support a war effort.

H

HBut one feeling pervades the nation, he wrote, "All dis—

tinctions of Federalism and Democracy are banished. The
people are ready to submit to any Deprivation."24
Gallatin, who rarely confided in others with the ex-
ception of his wife and then infrequently, revealed to
Nicholson that since war most probably would follow "my
faculties have been exclusively applied to the preparations
necessary to meet the times." Nor did Gallatin appear re-
luctant to consider war although he did acknowledge that
many evil consequences would stem from its prosecution. As
bad as the disruption of commerce, an increase in taxation,
and a heavy national debt were to Gallatin "all those evils

are not only not to be put in competition with the inde-

pendence and honor of the nation; they are, moreover,

 

24Joseph Hopper Nicholson to Albert Gallatin, July 14,
1807, Gallatin Papers.

 

168

temporary, and very few years of peace will obliterate
their effects." He also thought war might have the posi-
tive effect of elevating "nobler feelings and habits" so
that America could be rescued from the fate of "degener—
ating, like the Hollander, into a nation of mere calcula-
tors." While Gallatin generally approached the expected war
boldly, he harbored certain qualms. He believed that war
would also contribute to effects that would not be mitigated
so easily. Unquestionably executive power and influence
would be increased; speculation would be enhanced; and
permanent military and naval establishments would follow.25
Gallatin spent the lion‘s share of his time in July
preparing data on how the United States could wage war.
Financially the nation was in an excellent position, for a
surplus of $7,500,000 had been accumulated. At the same
time systematic repayment had lowered the debt to under
$57,000,000. War would cause expenses to soar and rev—
enue to decline, but the Treasurer was optimistic that the
war could be financed largely by loans. He had already
laid the groundwork for this by inquiring among merchants
and bankers as to their financial support in case of armed
conflict with Britain. Their responses had been so favor-
able that Gallatin estimated he could meet the expenses of

"26

war for three years without "any great amount of new taxes.

 

25Albert Gallatin to Joseph Hopper Nicholson, July 17,
1807, Gallatin Papers.

26Gallatin to Nicholson, July 17 1807, Gallatin Papers;
American State Papers; Finance, II, 246-249.

 

   

169

On July 25 Gallatin presented a long memorandum on
preparatory measures to Jefferson for his consideration
in case of war. He divided his report into suggestions
for defensive and offensive operations. Defensively he
recommended that arms and ammunitions be manufactured and
that the militia be adequately armed throughout the United
States. He also urged strengthening batteries and fortifi—
cations on the coast. In addition he enumerated the strengths
and weaknesses of nearly every coastal town and fort. He
strongly pleaded for immediate attention to the crucial
cities such as New York, Washington, Norfolk, Savannah,
and New Orleans which he believed ill prepared to with—
stand a serious assault. He concluded his defensive ob—
servations by advising the completion of all gunboats under
construction and preparation for renewed naval building.
He also supported the recruitment and preparation of an
adequate number of militiamen.27

Offensively the Secretary of the Treasury surveyed
all points in the Western Hemisphere where Britain was
vulnerable. He favored vigorous strikes at Upper Canada,
Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, New
Providence, and Newfoundland. In addition he counseled
immediate military preparations to enable the United States
to invade Canada as soon as war was declared. He also ad-
vocated increasing the term of enlistment for volunteers

or militiamen from six to twelve months. While not will-

 

27Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, July 25, 1807,
Jefferson Papers.

 

 

170

ing to risk supporting the immediate dispatching of Amer-
ican troops to the Canadian border to wait in a state of
readiness, he recommended consideration of this action.
He also suggested further fact finding regarding British
strength in Canada. He concluded that a total of 30,000
troops would be needed for combined offensive and defensive
operations. He estimated that the war would cost $18,000,000
a year to prosecute, $11,000,000 could be raised from taxes,
and the remaining $7,000,000 would stem from loans.28

Gallatin‘s concern over America's unpreparedness did
not extend to other members of the administration. His
recommendations fell on barren soil as it became clear that
Jefferson did not intend to mobilize popular sentiment be-
hind war measures. AS early as mid-August, less than two
months since the Chesapeake Affair, Gallatin’s fears, that
the popular indignation against Britain would cool unless
prompt and resolute action followed, were confirmed. The
Secretary of the Treasury found conditions in New York
appalling. "The people of this city," he informed Secre-
tary of State Madison, ”do not appear to me to be in favor
of war, and they fear it so much, that they have persuaded

themselves that there is no danger of that event."29

 

28

Papers.

Gallatin to Jefferson, July 25, 1807, Jefferson

29Albert Gallatin to James Madison, August 15,

1807, Madison Papers. That Gallatin’s views on loss of
public support for war were correct can be ascertained
from the correspondence in the Gallatin Papers for August
and September. See especially Joseph Hopper Nicholson to
Albert Gallatin, September 10, 1807: "The public mind has
been suffered to brood so long over our disgrace in the
affair of the Chesapeake, that I fear its ardor is cooling

down."

 

   

171

By October when Congress was to meet in special
session Albert Gallatin’s ardor for the use of force
against Britain had also cooled. Therefore the tone and
"general Spirit" of the draft of the message which the
President intended to present Congress greatly disturbed
him. "Instead of being written in the style of the proc—
lamation, which has been almost universally approved at

" observed the Treasurer, "the message

home and abroad,
appears to me to be rather in shape of a manifesto issued
against Great Britain on the eve of a war, than such as
the existing undecided state of affairs seems to require."
He feared that it could be construed either to mean that
Britain would be unwilling to make any satisfactory ar-
rangement, something to be avoided in an official communi-
cation, or to demonstrate that America had already decided
to fight. Gallatin pleaded with the President to moderate
the tone of his message so that, if even the smallest
chance of an arrangement existed, American action would not
endanger the chances of a peaceful solution.30

Gallatin recommended that the President soften the
message and leave out inflamatory condemnations of past
British conduct. The Treasurer urged Jefferson to keep
policy determination in his hands rather than inciting
Congressional passions and waiting for the result. If the
object was to prepare the nation, this could be pursued by

a strong and direct recommendation based on the uncertainty

 

3OAlbert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, October 21,
1807, Jefferson Papers.

 

 

 

172
of the issue rather than the probability that force would

be required. Then he urged Jefferson to force Britain into
making the choice between war and peace:

That Great Britain will prefer actual
war to any system of retaliation short of
war which we might select, I do believe.
Yet how far it may be proper to leave the
choice to her deserves, at least, consider—
ation. Public opinion abroad is to us highly
valuable; at home it is indispensable. We
will be universally justified in the eyes of
the world; and unanimously supported by the
nation, if the ground of war be England’s
refusal to disavow or to make satisfaction
for the outrage on the Chesapeake. But I
am confident that we will meet with a most
formidable opposition should England do
that and we should still declare war because
she refused to make the proposed arrangement
respecting seamen. It is in that case that
measures short of war may become proper,
leaving to England, if she chooses the
odium of commencing an actual war.31

The Treasurer's proposals were similar to Federalist
policies during both the crisis with Britain in 1794 and
the Quasi War with France in 1797° Preparations for war
were encouraged with the intention of prosecuting hostili-
ties with vigor if they could not be avoided. Concurrently
every diplomatic possibility was explored to preserve peace
consistent with American national honor.

Gallatin made a number of specific suggestions as to
how the address could be modified, and Jefferson did remove
some of the most inflamatory passages. Yet the message re-
mained essentially unfriendly to Britain, for it summarized

the unsatisfactory state of Anglo—American relations prior

 

31Gallatin to Jefferson, October 21, 1807, Jefferson
Papers.

 

 

 

173
to the Chesapeake Affair, narrated the facts of the at-

tack and its aftermath, and recited the defense prepar—

ations which had been undertaken. These measures included

 

the fortification of such key cities as New York, Charles-
ton, and New Orleans, mobilization of gunboats, and a
conditional call for the militia. Reaction to this message
varied depending on one’s perspective. The British min-
ister believed it exceedingly hostile. On the other hand,
Albert Gallatin congratulated himself that he had succeeded
in modifying the terms of the address, an event he be-
lieved fortunate considering the pacific tendencies of the
Congress.32

Britain never intended to make war over the Chesapeake
Affair. Nor did, British Foreign Secretary George Canning
plan to discuss the Chesapeake and impressment issues as
a unit. He sent a Special envoy, George Rose, to Wash-
ington to discuss the June accident while refusing to
reopen negotiations with Monroe. However, the Orders—In-
Council of November 11, 1807 constituted Canning’s cruelest

blow. These orders declared illegal all trade with France,

 

her allies, and any nation not permitting the importation

of British goods. Under the terms of these orders all

 

commerce with the European continent was required to stop
at a British port first and procure a license. Many Amer-

icans viewed this as a further illustration of British

 

32Gallatin to Jefferson, October 21, 1807, Jefferson
Papers; Richardson, Messages of the Presidents, I, 25—
430; Albert Gallatin to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin, October
30, 1807, Adams, Life of Gallatin, p. 364.

 

.1 . _

 

174

hostility, for this order would strike a far more crip-
pling blow at the United States than French action. When
unofficial news of the November orders reached America,
Thomas Jefferson decided to press for an embargo on Amer-
ican commerce.33

Although the cabinet debated a number of policy
alternatives, Jefferson’s strong leadership inclined them
toward applying non-importation against England. However,
Gallatin did not share these views. He favored repealing
the suspended Non-Importation Act of 1806 and substitu—
ting a general non-importation act on British goods to
take effect the following February. Jefferson admitted
his Treasurer’s suggestion contained merit, but Madison
opposed it. On December 5 Gallatin sharpened his attack
on the proposed act. He argued that it was so shot full
of inconsistencies and ambiguities that meaningful re-
vision would be difficult and satisfactory enforcement
would prove nearly impossible. Unfortunately, Jefferson
ignored Gallatin’s protests, and on December 14 the Non—
Importation Act of April, 1806 took effect.34

Only three days later the cabinet met again in an
emergency session. Official news had reached America of

the British Order—In-Council. Nor was news from France

 

33Adams, Life of Gallatin, pp. 364-365; Schachner,
Jefferson, II, 859—860; Varg, Founding Fathers, pp. 193-
194.

3L‘Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, December 2,
1807, Jefferson Papers; Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin,
December 3, 1807, Gallatin Papers; Albert Gallatin to
Thomas Jefferson, December 5, 1807, Jefferson Papers.

 

 

175

encouraging, for it was clear that Napoleon intended to
enforce the Berlin Decree stringently. The President

proposed to ask Congress to enact an embargo on all ship—

 

ping in and out of American ports. Madison heartily ap-
proved the proposal, but Gallatin was conspicious by his
silence. The cabinet approved the measure without dis—
sent, and resolved to convene the following morning.35
That evening Gallatin put his thoughts on paper.
He urged that foreign Shipping be exempted. He was will-
ing to acquiesce in a temporary embargo as a measure pre—
ferable to the non—importation act. However, "In every
point of view, privations, sufferings, revenue, effect on
the enemy, politics at home, etc.," he remonstrated, "I
prefer war to a permanent embargo." He strongly suggested
that the embargo be enacted "for such a limited time as
will afford us all time for reconsideration." Gallatin
thought Jefferson‘s view that economic coercion could be
used to force Britain to modify her policy "entirely
groundless."36
The cabinet met again on the morning of December 18.
On further consideration of the embargo foreign vessels
were permitted to leave American harbors in ballast. On
other changes Gallatin was overruled, for the measure as
presented to Congress carried no reference to a time limit.

The measure was submitted to Congress the same day, and

 

35Walters, Gallatin, p. 198.

36Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, December 18,
1807, Jefferson Papers.

 

 

   

176

action on this bill in the legislative branch was breath-
taking, for it passed within four days. Consequently, on
December 22, 1807 the President signed the embargo into
law, and it took effect immediately. Thus commenced what
both President Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison

believed to be a noble experiment in peaceful coercion.

 

 

 

CHAPTER VII

THE PITFALLS OF PEACEFUL COERCION

Precisely one day after the embargo became law
Albert Gallatin recorded his dissatisfaction with the
legislation. After sending a circular to the custom
collectors in each American port immediately following
the signing of the bill he seriously reflected upon the
nature of the law. He found three major defects. Ade-
quate provision for enforcement was noticeably missing.
Nor did the act cover the operations of coasting vessels.
Although forbidden to clear for foreign ports by the gen—
eral revenue statutes nothing could prevent these vessels
from taking their cargo overseas and disposing of both
ship and contents. Finally, while foreign ships could
not export goods from the United States, they could trade
their wares for specie.l

Gallatin’s terse criticism of the original embargo
statute sounded a call for corrective legislation. Per-

haps the most pertinent commentary on the original act

 

lAlbert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, December 23,
1807; Gallatin to Jefferson, December 31, 1807, Jefferson
Papers.

177

 

 

 

 

 

178

lies in its rapid amendment, for the second embargo act
passed on January 9, 1808 was both more specific and
stronger than its predecessor. Coasting vessels were
required to post bond that they would not go to any
foreign port. Also departures without clearance were
punished by forfeiture of goods or twice the value of
the Ship and cargo. In addition those persons involved in
the evasion were subject to heavy fines.2
As time passed Jefferson recognized a number of de-
fects in the embargo. One lay in the provision which
granted merchants the right to petition the President for
Special permission to sail. Forged papers and fraudulent
voyages constituted another menace. The President favored
taking the most stringent action against these evasions,
for ”it would at least show the world that this govern—

I

ment does not countenance frauds.' Gallatin sympathized
with the President's lamentations and did his best to
correct the abuses, but clearly further corrections in
the law itself was needed.3

A third embargo was enacted March 12, 1808. This
law was primarily concerned with methods to correct hard—

ship cases for small vessels which carried materials em-

ployed daily in domestic life. Congressional pressure

 

2Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A Study in

Administrative History 1801-[829 (New York: The Macmillan

'Company, 1951), pp. 427—428.

3Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, January 14,
1808; Jefferson to Gallatin, February 28, 1808, Gallatin
Papers; Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, February 29,
1808, Writings of Gallatin, I, 373—374.

   

179

resulted in provisions relaxing the harshness of the
legislation. For example, the President was authorized
to clear vessels in ballast so that they could bring home
goods of American citizens. This measure was included to

" Jefferson

provide an obvious loophole. "I understand,
wrote, ”there is scarcely a merchant in the United States
who has not property somewhere beyond the sea." Yet the
act also stiffened penalties and made it illegal to export

4

any goods by any means.

By the end of March the President concluded that
even stiffer means must be employed to prevent evasion of
the embargo. Jefferson even suggested that customs col-
lectors be given the authority to make preclusive seiz—
ures which would allow them to impound provisions any—
where in the United States which were under suspicion of
being exported. Gallatin would not support this proposal
because it was both ”oppressive” and ”very embarrassing
to us." Nor did he believe it held any chance of passage.
In his answers to his Chief‘s proposals Gallatin cautioned
against supporting measures that were ”not strictly con-
stitutional."5

On April 25 Congress passed an enforcement act

which was drastic. Clearance was given only to vessels

 

AWhite, Jeffersonians, pp. 428—429; Thomas Jefferson

to Albert Gallatin, March 11, 1808; Jefferson to Gallatin,
March 13, 1808, Gallatin Papers.

 

5Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, March 30,
1808, Gallatin Papers; Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson,
April 1, 1808, Writings of Gallatin, I, 381-383.

 

 

180
carefully inSpected by revenue officers. Ships could not

sail for ports adjacent to foreign territory without
special permission. Ships could be searched on mere sus-
picion. Coasting vessels could be detained by collectors
on suspicion of intention. Surely the most obnoxious pro-
vision allowed customs collectors to seize any extraordi-
nary accumulation of goods in a port adjacent to a foreign
territory.6

While Jefferson took his "experiment in peaceful
coercion” seriously, as early as May, 1808 Gallatin ex-
pressed fears that the chief effect of the legislation
might be to hurt the Republican Party. Nevertheless,
Jefferson insisted on retaining the embargo. He justi-
fied his decision on numerous occasions to the critical
Gallatin by citing his desire to test the weapon of eco—
nomic coercion. "I place immense value in the experiment
being fully made, how far an embargo may be an effective
weapon in the future as well as on this occasion," he
told Gallatin.7

By July Gallatin candidly informed the President
that if the embargo remained on the books it must be
strongly enforced. He suggested additional means to

strengthen the measure. First, no boats should be allowed

to move without Presidential permission. Secondly, col—

 

6White, Jeffersonians, P. 431.

 

7Albert Gallatin to James Madison, May 10, 1808,
Madison Papers; Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin,
May 15, 1808; Jefferson to Gallatin, May 20, 1808,
Gallatin Papers.

 

181

lectors must have the power to seize property anywhere
and effectively detain property even if it means remov-
ing the rudders from ships. "I am sensible that such
arbitrary powers are equally dangerous and odious,” he
confided. "But a restrictive measure of the nature of
the embargo applied by a nation under such circumstances
as the United States cannot be enforced without the
assistance of means as strong as the measure itself."
After attempting to put teeth in the embargo for seven
months Gallatin had reached the point where he believed
it must either be strongly enforced or dropped entirely.8
Gallatin was not alone among influential Republicans
in his thoughts on the nature of the embargo. Alexander
J. Dallas, the Philadelphia lawyer, observed that Jeffer-
son's desire to continue the embargo in spite of that act’s
declining effectiveness had reduced his popularity to an
all-time low. Dallas believed another year in the Presi—
dency ”would render Mr. Jefferson a more odious President,

' Dallas also

even to the Democrats, than John Adams.‘
feared that Madison's election could well be endangered if
the Republican dissatisfaction spread. Secretary of the
Navy Robert Smith prayed "to be relieved from the various
embarrassments of this said embargo." Smith feared that

the opposition would be boosted immeasurably, and he

earnestly desired that some remedy could be found "for

 

8Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, July 29, 1808,
Writings of Gallatin, I, 396—399.

 

182
calling in this mischief—making busy-body.”9

By August Gallatin was convinced that the embargo
was useless unless more force was applied. Even worse
was the prospect that this measure would defeat the Re—
publicans in the Presidential election. At that point
the Treasurer thought only Virginia, South Carolina, and
Georgia could be placed in the Republican columns. The
others were all in doubt.10

The mounting criticism of the embargo from within
his own party led Jefferson to have second thoughts over
his policy. "This embargo law, is certainly the most em-
barrassing one we have ever had to execute,” he admitted
to Gallatin. "I did not eXpect a crop of so sudden and
rank growth of fraud and open opposition by force could

” he confessed. In

have grown up in the United State,
spite of these thoughts he was unwilling to countenance
any repeal of the embargo. Instead he reiterated that
"Congress must legalize all mpgp§_which may be necessary
to obtain its ppfi.ll However, he was hopeful that France
and England would repeal the hated decrees and Orders-In—

Council, steps that would release the beleaguered Presi-

dent from his dilemma.

The passage of time hardened the positions which

 

9Alexander J. Dallas to Albert Gallatin, July 30,
1808; Robert Smith to Albert Gallatin, August 1, 1808,
Gallatin Papers.

loAlbert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, August 6,
1808, Jefferson Papers.

llThomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, August 11,
1808, Gallatin Papers. Underlining is Jefferson’s.

   

183

Gallatin and Jefferson took in August. Gallatin became
increasingly convinced that the unpopular embargo would
not survive the next session of Congress. Nor was he
optimistic regarding his party's chances in the approach-
ing election. He realized that so many Americans lacked
"the patriotism and union sufficient to bear with patience
where there is not stimulus.” One of the chief problems
lay in the fact that the people regarded the embargo as
the cause of commercial stagnation and agricultural de-
pression rather than a Shield protecting the republic. On
the other hand, Jefferson was now willing to clutch at any
straw which promised deliverance. Consequently he read
the most optimistic interpretations into the correspondence
from England and believed that an accommodation was near.
At the same time Secretary of State James Madison took a
more realistic view of the British negotiations and de—
plored the fact that an accommodation appeared elusive.l2
Since the embargo was both unpopular and subject to
frequent violation Gallatin realized the importance of
seeking an alternative both more workable and less obnox-
ious. Exactly what this new policy would be or even could
be was an open question. While devoting a great deal of
thought to this problem in October and November Gallatin
explored the various alternatives. ”If the embargo is

taken off,” he told his brother-in-law, ”I do not perceive

 

l2Albert Gallatin to James Madison, September 9, 1808,
Madison Papers; Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sep-
tember 5, 1808; James Madison to Albert Gallatin, August
31, 1808, Gallatin Papers.

 

184

yet any medium between absolute subjection or war."
The only substitute then under consideration was a
non—importation act which did not adequately replace
the embargo because it represented something less than
a compromise between war and submission. In fact, the
-Secretary of the Treasury feared that Britain had no
intention of striving for an accommodation with America.
Why should they?, he reasoned. Time was on their Side,
and as the months passed their chances to produce "irre-
sistible dissatisfaction to the embargo and a change of
measures and of men "were considerably enhanced."13

The Congress that convened in November, 1808 was
unpredictable because the nation was in a restless mood.
AS was his custom Jefferson submitted his annual message
to his department heads for their comments and sugges-
tions. This particular message seemed to Gallatin more
vacillating and uncertain than necessary. While recom-
mending few important substantive changes he offered
many stylistic revisions. He found Jefferson too vague
in his explanation of America’s negotiating terms with
Britain. It was of cardinal importance that the message
"appraise our citizens and the people of England of the
candid, impartial, and clear proposition which was made."
Gallatin also urged Jefferson to state America‘s case

more confidently. "The conduct of the belligerent af—

 

l3Albert Gallatin to Joseph Hopper Nicholson, October
18, 1808, Joseph Hopper Nicholson Papers, Library of
Congress; cited hereafter as Nicholson Papers; Albert
Gallatin to Charles Pinckney, October 24, 1808, Gallatin
Papers.

 

   

185

fords certainly the most just grounds of complaint," he
reminded Jefferson in urging him to delete phrases border-
ing upon despondency. Also the Chief Executive should
make it abundantly clear that any alterations in policy
would be made with courage not out of fear.11+
Although Gallatin’s substantive criticisms of the
message were few in number, he singled out one crucial
matter for revision and suggested several additions. The
President had commented in his draft that the development
of manufacturing was one of the benefits which had devel—
oped from the embargo. In doing so he had compared the
rise of manufacturing with the decline of commerce. Gal-
latin pointed out that such a statement would indeed
”produce a pernicious effect and furnish a powerful weapon
to the disaffected.” Consequently the Treasurer advised
the omission of statements which appeared to elevate de-
velopments achieved at the expense of commerce. He also
advised that Jefferson candidly admit that more money was
needed to implement foreign policy either in the case of
continued embargo or war. Moreover, he also emphasized
the necessity to enhance the militia.15
Jefferson‘s annual message fell far short of satis-
fying many Congressmen. Yet the President was extremely

reluctant to exercise leadership. Sensing his reticence

Gallatin and Madison urged the President to assert his

 

lqubert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, November 2,
1808, Jefferson Papers.

15Gallatin to Jefferson, November 2, 1808, Jefferson
Papers.

   

 

186

authority and influence over Congress. Both Mr. Madison
and myself concur in opinion," Gallatin told Jefferson,
"that considering the temper of our Legislature, or
rather of its members, it would be eligible to point out
to them some precise and distinct course." The Treasurer
did not pretend to know the dominant sentiment in Congress
or amongst the public at large, nor did he contend that
one single course of action was generally accepted. Gal-
latin himself believed that the choice lay between war
and continued but more effective enforcement of the em-
bargo. However, his chief concern centered upon the
adoption of a firm policy. ”But I think that we must (or
rather you must) decide the question absolutely, so that
we may point out a decisive course either way to our
friends." Gallatin suggested that a cabinet meeting be

16

held shortly to hammer out administration policy.

Jefferson was not swayed by the advice of his two
leading cabinet members. By November the President was
desirous of retiring and leaving the momentous concerns
of government. AS a result he came dangerously close to
abdicating. Consequently Gallatin and Madison moved into
the vacuum and tried valiantly to give direction to the
floundering executive branch. One of the greatest trag-
edies of this period beginning in November, 1808 may be
traced to the interregnum caused by Jefferson's distaste

for the further exercise of power.

 

16

Papers.

Gallatin to Jefferson, November 15, 1808, Jefferson

 

187
One of the first and most important efforts by both

Madison and Gallatin was the authorship of a lengthy Con—
gressional document known as Campbell’s Report. This
paper which was presented to the House of Representatives
by George W. Campbell of Tennessee, chairman of the House
Committee on Foreign Relations, was written by Albert
Gallatin. Internal evidence indicates that this paper
was composed with the collaboration of Secretary of State
Madison, for the long historical survey of American griev-
ances against both Britain and France assumed the same
tone as Madison's previous writings on the subject. This
document Spelled out the position which the new adminis-
tration intended to embrace.

After summarizing the history of the commercial con~
flict between the United States and the belligerent powers
Campbell‘s Report concluded that both the French decrees
and the British decrees were ”equally unprovoked and
equally indefensible on the presumed ground of acqui—
escence." In fact, the orders and decrees fully justified
the United States to declare war against both nations. The
paper explored the policy alternatives available which were
submission, war against both nations, or a continuation of
the embargo with more stringent provisions for enforcement.
Because submission was both degrading and humiliating it
was immediately ruled out. Ruthlessly the report pointed
out that as much as Americans might wish for some middle
course between the embargo and war no such intermediate

solution existed. "There is no other alternative but war

 

188

with both nations or a continuance of the present system,"

the report bluntly stated.17

Especially singled out for extended commentary was
an idea which had gained wide currency in Congress. The
desire to do away with the embargo without submitting to
the belligerents or going to war had become so strong that
a proposal to repeal the embargo with respect to all
nations except Britain and France enjoyed much support.
The utility of this proposition was more apparent than
real for American exports to Asia, Africa, and European
countries not under Napoleon’s control amounted to roughly
fifteen per cent of the total of American exports. This
amount did not justify a change in policy ”even if a ques-
tion affecting the independence of the nation was to be
decided by considerations of immediate profit.” However,
the most important reason for refusing to adopt this
course surely stemmed from the fact that in reality this
policy would open an indirect trade with Britain through
the ports of Spain, Portugal, and Sweden. Such a practice
would constitute submission to Britain. "Nor can it be
doubted,” stated the report, ”that a measure which would
supply exclusively one of the belligerents would be war
with the other.” This contemplated action could be justi—
fied only if France was the only aggressor, and if such
were the case, the United States would be further ahead

to lift the embargo against England and openly join the

 

l7”Campbell’s Report,” November, 1808, Writings of
Gallatin, I, 435-443.

 

 

189

mistress of the seas in war against Napoleon. All these
considerations established beyond doubt that the United
States should refuse to adopt such a futile, weak, and
submissive policy.18
The body of Campbell's Report concluded with a plea
for an immediate honorable stand by Congress. In the
future persistance by the belligerents in their obnoxious
policies would undoubtedly mean war. While the report
shrank from taking the fatal plunge and calling for war,
obviously the author believed that war would be prefer-
able "if a selection could be made on any principle of
justice or without a sacrifice of national independence."
However, the final determination must be made in Congress.
Whatever policy was adopted the most fundamental question
remained to be answered in the heart of each individual.
"The question for every citizen now is, whether he will
rally round the government of his choice or enlist under
foreign banners; whether he will be for his country or
against his country."19
Campbell’s Report suggested three resolutions to
Congress for its consideration. First, it emphasized the
necessity for Congress to declare emphatically its determ—
ination not to sacrifice the ”rights, honor, and independ-
ence" of the United States by submitting to either Britain

or France. Secondly, the report recommended that Congress

prohibit all French and British ships from entering Ameri-

 

18Ibid., 443-445. l9Ibid., 445-446.

 

190

can ports. Also it advised a ban on all imports of goods
and merchandise from either Britain and France or terri—
tory they held. Finally the report called for further de-
fense measures to strengthen the nation.20
The chief objective of Campbell‘s Report was to
unite a Splintering Republican Party behind a uniform
foreign policy. Knowledge of this report was quickly
disseminated amongst the public. Over 5,000 copies were
printed and distributed. Moreover, the whole report was
reproduced in important Republican newspapers. Superfic-
ially this report appeared to enjoy a large measure of
success. The three resolutions were debated in Congress
nearly a month and they all were adopted by large major-
ities.21 Apparently Congress did have a backbone after
all! However, a careful study of the debates reveals
both that the Republican’s commitment to them was hardly
firm and that the Federalists made the most of their op—
portunities to attack them. In the voting on the second
resolution which would ban trade with England and France

22 Some spectators

Republican defections were distressing.
including the British minister to the United States David
M. Erskine were impressed by this Congressional action.

Albert Gallatin, a more penetrating observer, realized that

 

20Ibid., 446.

21wNotes on Campbell’S Report by Daniel Shelton,"
Gallatin Papers.

22Annals of Congress, Tenth Congress, Second Session,

pp. 530, 812, 815-862, 865-895.

 

191
a strong foreign policy, like liberty, depended upon

eternal vigilance.

If Gallatin‘s suggestions in Campbell's Report did
not establish his war-like propensities, surely his annual
Treasury Report for 1808, submitted December 10, confirmed
his bellicose stance. In this report he considered the
financial measures necessary to carry out the alterna-
tives of submission, continued embargo, and war. He de—
voted the lion‘s share of his considerations to war expenses.
Loans would constitute the principle means of financing war.
Internal taxes would not be levied. However, import duties
would be doubled and the system of drawbacks would be modi—
fied. Clearly Gallatin favored war as the best solution
to America's problems and he thought that war should come
within the next year.23

Concurrently with his preparations for war Gallatin
was also conducting diplomacy with British minister David
Erskine. His Majesty’s representative Sincerely desired
the restoration of good relations between the two nations,
and he was willing to go to great lengths to cultivate
American good will. Erskine believed that it would be
feasible to approach members of the new administration
even prior to their elevation to power. Erskine's hopes
were buoyed because each member he spoke with encouraged
him. Even in the deepest doldrums of the embargo days

24

better times seemed ahead.

 

23American State Papers: Finance, II, 307—316.

24Adams, Life of Gallatin, p. 381; Walters,
Gallatin, pp. 206-207.

 

 

 

192
Late in November, 1808 one evening Erskine dropped

in on Gallatin at his home. The two men struck it off
well, and they conferred on the whole range of problems
separating their two nations. Reparations for the attack

upon the Chesapeake, the Orders—In-Council, impressment,

 

the colonial trade, and commercial relations were all dis—
cussed. Agreement was reached on the ground for a settle—
ment if the British government was serious. In return for

apology and damages for the Chesapeake a proposed Non-

 

Intercourse law would exclude both British and French ships
from American ports. This would place France and Britain
on the same footing. In the event of a repeal in the
Orders—In-Council, non-intercourse would apply only to
France. Britain would renounce the right of impressment
if America agreed to exclude from her merchant marine
seamen not citizens of the United States for two years.

On colonial trade the United States would waive the right
to direct commerce between the colony and the belligerent
if Britain recognized the American right to trade between
the colonies and other countries via the "broken voyage."
Finally, with reSpect to commercial relations the United
States would repeal the partial non—importation act if
Britain repealed the extra duties she levied against the
United States. In all cases the two nations were to grant

reciprocally most favored nation status to each other.25

 

25Albert Gallatin to the National Intelligencer,
April 21, 1810, Writings of Gallatin, I, 475-479; David
Erskine to George Canning, December 4, 1808 quoted in

Adams, History, IV, 387—389.

 

193

While Gallatin was conducting private diplomacy
with Erskine he also met with key Congressional leaders
during the period from November through January. In
these meetings he gave no hint that he supported con-
ciliation with Britain. Gallatin’s influence in Con-
gress appeared strong especially to Republicans who did
not share his bellicose outlook. In early December
Nathaniel Macon reported that ”the war men in the House
of Representatives” were enhancing their strength. "I
should not be much surprised if we should be at war with
both Great Britain and France before the 4th of March,"

he told Joseph H. Nicholson. Macon declared himself "as

much against war as Gallatin is in favor of it."26
At the same time the Treasurer sought conciliation
with Britain he worked to strengthen the enforcement of
the embargo law. He suggested a number of stringent
changes he considered necessary, and in January, 1809 a
new enforcement act was passed in Congress. Perhaps the
most remarkable aspect of this law was the fact that it
was passed by a Republican Congress at the request of a
Republican Secretary of the Treasury. The powers granted
to the government by this law were sweeping. Collectors
were given authority to refuse permits for coasting trade
on suSpicion of intent to violate the embargo. The only

grounds upon which coasting vessels could justify failure

to deliver goods was hostile capture, accident or distress

 

26Nathaniel Macon to Joseph Hopper Nicholson, December
4, 1808, Nicholson Papers.

 

194

without negligence. Collectors could seize any items
they suspected would be exported to foreign nations.
Surely the most extraordinary powers conferred were those
granted to employ military force. Under this act those in
authority could use its army, navy, or militia "as may be
judged necessary” to enforce the embargo.2'7

Even while this stringent measure was being proposed
and in spite of the temporary success Gallatin's policy
of firmness apparently enjoyed, thanks to the passage of
the resolutions recommended in Campbell's Report, the
Secretary of the Treasury harbored few illusions. Gallatin
carried much of the weight of the government on his
shoulders. "A great confusion and perplexity reigns in

” Gallatin reported. Nor were the actions of his

Congress,
close associates completely satisfactory. ”Mr. Madison is,
as I always knew him, slow in taking his ground but firm
when the storm arises.” The embargo had become so unpOp-
ular that the majority would not condone it much longer.
Unfortunately Congress did not seem in a mood to adopt

any alternative that would uphold American rights and
honor. "If war be not speedily determined on, submission

H

will soon ensue, Gallatin confided to his brother-in—

law.28
In light of the recommendations in Campbell's Re-

port and the Treasury Report added to the observations

 

27White, Jeffersonians, pp. 462—464.

28Albert Gallatin to Joseph Hopper Nicholson, De—
cember 29, 1808, Gallatin Papers.

 

 

195

in Gallatin’s private correspondence to his most intimate
confidents it seems valid to conclude that in November
and December, 1808 the Secretary of the Treasury believed
the only suitable alternative to the embargo was war.
However, a letter Orchard Cook, a Congressman, who had
conferred with Gallatin in December, wrote to John Quincy
Adams on December 29, 1808 seems to challenge this assump-
tion. According to Cook, Gallatin on December 28 had dis-
cussed foreign affairs with him for nearly an hour and
unveiled a plan which he thought would finally be adopted.
According to this plan Gallatin recommended a non-inter-
course act be passed immediately but not to take effect
until June 1, 1809. This act should be worked so that
its provisions would not apply to a Power that dropped
its commercial retaliation against the United States.
Passage of this act would be coupled with a partial
repeal of the embargo and measures to protect American
commerce such as armed convoys and letters of marque.
These being made known to Great

Britain and France, it is expected that

the obstinate Emperor will not alter his

course, but it is expected that Great

Britain, when she finds the stand we de-

liberately take, that we have no rebellion;

that Madison and a majority of Democrats

are chosen; and that we shall be fighting

a common enemy (France) with her — and

when she finds that we intend living with-

out dishonorable purchases of her goods,2
etc. will study her interest and relax. 9

The importance of this conversation with Orchard

 

29Orchard Cook to John Quincy Adams, December 29,
1808 quoted in Adams, History, IV, 369.

   

196

Cook cannot be minimized. Cook was a friend of John
Quincy Adams' who had advised his new England Republican
colleagues to impress the administration that a continu-
ation of the embargo would drive the New England Federal-
ists into armed rebellion and perhaps secession from the
union. It was Adams‘ suggestion that some measure be
substituted for the embargo that Orchard Cook had conveyed
to Gallatin.30

Compared with Gallatin‘s ideas expressed since
November and December this plan seems to be a radical
shift in his point of view. No doubt this assessment
would be correct except for two very important considera-
tions. First, Gallatin was deeply disturbed at the in-
tensity of the opposition to the embargo. He greatly
feared that New England Federalists might embark on a
course of precipitous action unless prompt measures were
taken. Already rumors of increased activity on the part
of the Essex Junta made this threat seem plausible.31
Secondly, his conversation with British minister Erskine
had convinced him that the possibility of an accommoda-
tion with Britain was good under certain conditions. The
whole matter depended to a large extent on the willing-
ness of the government in London to compromise. Also the

United States had to convince Britain that she would treat

 

30Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foun-
dations of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A.
Knofp, 1956), pp. 149-150.

31Albert Gallatin to Joseph Hopper Nicholson,
December 29, 1808, Gallatin Papers.

   

 

 

197
both belligerents equally. Certainly Britain could not

complain of the terms of the proposed Non—Intercourse Act
which would put both Britain and France on an equal foot-
ing. Moreover, this act would give Britain the Opportun-
ity to bind the United States in a system against France
by relaxing her orders. Consequently both considerations
convinced Gallatin that new paths of conciliation, con—
sistent with national honor, must be explored.

Although Gallatin certainly believed that only fur-
ther coercive measures would render the embargo operative,
the enforcement act of January 9, 1809 undoubtedly short-
ened the life of the embargo. The new legislation stirred
the cauldron of opposition to the embargo in New England.
This measure strengthened Senator Timothy Pickering's hand
as nothing else could have done. The principles of the
Essex Junto dominated New England Federalist politics.
Town meetings denounced the embargo, and both the Massa-
chusetts and Connecticut legislatures passed resolutions
condemning the obnoxious measure and recommending action
similar to that suggested by the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions of 1798. The Specter of revolution in New
England caused panic among the Republicans. Influential
Congressmen such as Samuel Smith of Maryland and Ezekiel
Bacon of Massachusetts warned President-elect Madison
that the embargo must be repealed or it would prove the
engine of the Republicans‘ destruction. Even loyal Re-
publicans who had agreed with Gallatin’s estimation that

the embargo should be retained until June 1 and then re-

 

 

 

198

placed by war yielded. The Republican Congressional re—
bellion was beginning.32

Even before the Republican revolt against the em-
bargo broke out into the Open the signs that the Congress
was on its own became apparent. In January, 1809 sixteen
Republican Senators combined with the Federalists to pass
a naval bill which ordered every armed vessel of the United
States including gunboats to be employed immediately in
active service. In the House George W. Campbell tried to
stop the rebellion by amending the bill to strike out the
clause Obligating the government to outfit all vessels.
When Campbell’s amendment was defeated by five votes Gal-
latin threw himself into the battle against the anti—
administration forces. Finally Gallatin‘s influence pre-
vailed and the House eliminated the worst features of the
bill. After a lengthy struggle the Senate amended the
bill. At first Gallatin considered this the work of the
Smith faction, but as time passed and many House Republi-
cans cooperated the Secretary of the Treasury changed his
estimate. He labeled the whole effort the product of "The
Navy Coalition of 1809 by whom were sacrificed forty Re-
publican members, nine Republican States, The Republican
Cause itself and the People of the United States to a

System of Favoritism, Extravagance, Parade, and Folly.”33

 

32Brant, Madison: Secretary of State, pp. 476-477;
Adams, History, IV, 401—420o

 

33A1bert Gallatin, ”Remarks on the Naval Bill,"

January 10, 1809, Gallatin Papers; Adams, History, IV,
425-428.

 

199

On January 30, 1809 Congressman Wilson Cary Nicholas
moved for a repeal of the embargo and letters of marque.
June 1 was stipulated as the date the new policy should
take effect. Several days later more than half the Re-
publican Congressional delegation deserted and joined the
Federalists to defeat June 1 repeal. March 4 was substi—
tuted as the repeal date, and this bill was passed. Pres-
ident—elect Madison suggested that repeal be coupled with
a non-intercourse law aimed at England and France. The
bill which finally emerged contained a mixture of many
different plans. It repealed the Embargo, prohibited
trade with Britain and France, excluded British and French
armed ships from entering American waters, and authorized
the President to reopen trade with a nation that ceased

to violate American maritime rights.34 As one of the

final acts of his administration Jefferson signed the
non-intercourse law on March 1, 1809.

Clearly passage of the Non-Intercourse Act established
the triumph of the coalition of Congressional rebels. It
was hardly an auspicious prelude for the President-elect
James Madison. Passage of the Non-Intercourse Act showed
that Americans would not tolerate disruption of their econ-
omy as a price to exact concessions from foreign nations.

It also illustrated that the mood of the nation was danger-

ously close to submission. Certainly America was not pre-

 

3U’Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the

United States 1805—1812 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univer—
sity of California Press, 1961), pp. 227—233.

 

 

2OO

pared to use force to defend her rights or as a weapon

in promoting her self interests. This action also consti—
tuted a severe rejection of the Gallatin-Madison leadership
in the interval between the election and Madison’s inaugu—
ration. On January 31 Gallatin wrote to his sister-in-law
Maria Nicholson that ”times are gloomy; and the conduct of

neither the people or their representatives is calculated

to give me Very good Spirits."35 Nothing that transpired
in the final days of Jefferson's second administration
caused him to change this pessimistic evaluation.

In the closing months of Jefferson's administration,
certainly since November, 1808, Albert Gallatin had played
a much larger role in formulating American policy. This
development was not fortuitous or unplanned, for James
Madison and Gallatin had agreed that since the President
was unwilling to exercise the necessary leadership they
must fill the power vacuum. Yet this decision does not ex—
plain why Gallatin in fact did play a dominant role in the
period of transition.

One reason stems from his curious position in the
government. Although Gallatin may have denied it, he
came as close to approaching the position of a British
cabinet member as any member of the Executive branch. A
Secretary of the Treasury enjoyed wide powers in the early
national period, and certainly the Treasury Department

far outranked the other departments in functions and re-

 

35Albert Gallatin to Maria Nicholson, January 31,
1809, Gallatin Papers.

 

201

sponsibilities as the excellent administrative histories

of Leonard D. White have shown. A Treasurer who was in—
tent on exercising wide influence on the course of govern-
ment began from an excellent power base, and both Alex-
ander Hamilton and Albert Gallatin used their immense power
for Objects they believed justified.

A second reason Gallatin's role increased in this
vital period emanated from his ties with Congress. Since
the early days of Jefferson‘s Presidency he had acted as
a key administration liason man with Congress. Amazingly
Gallatin retained the friendship of a large number of im-
portant Republican leaders deSpite several bitter disputes
between Congress and President. Thus Gallatin was the one
administration figure who could exert decisive influence
in Congress.

A third reason for the Treasurer‘s more active role
lies in James Madison’s desire to appoint him Secretary of
State in his administration. In a very real sense Gallatin
acted as Secretary of State during these crucial months
because it was this position that he would fill after
March 4 and no question existed that diplomacy was the
most pressing issue of the day. Nor was there any question
that Gallatin was in a position to accomplish far more
than any single individual. Unfortunately he did not
record all his activities to strengthen his nation's
foreign policy in this period, but judging from the
correspondence of key Congressmen and his family there

can be no doubt that he devoted himself wholeheartedly

 

202
to this cause. Unfortunately his efforts were defeated

in the Congressional rebellion of January and February
Of 1809. These rebuffs were harbingers of even more

drastic Congressional obstructionism to follow.

 

CHAPTER VIII
JAMES MADISON AT THE HELM

That Albert Gallatin1s enhanced role in foreign
policy formulation would culminate in his appointment as
Secretary of State was taken for granted by many observers.
However, this logical development did not bring unanimous
acclaim from Congress. The divisions within the Republi-
can ranks constituted one of the most serious weaknesses
in that party's ability to lead the nation boldly. More—
over, the passage of time had accentuated these cleavages.
In the course of Jefferson's two administrations Albert
Gallatin’s policies as Secretary of the Treasury had caused
some Congressional opposition to him. Some dissatisfaction
with his policies had appeared very early when he had re-
fused to encourage the wide distribution of patronage.
Consequently, for petty political reasons unrewarded pol—
iticians and their friends turned on Gallatin. The most
serious opposition to the Treasurer on this score came
from William Duane, editor of the Philadelphia Aurora, and
Michael Leib, a Philadelphia politician. Gallatin’s tight
fisted appropriation recommendations brought him perpetu—
ally into conflict with Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith.
Also his championing of the Bank of the United States as a

necessary fiscal institution brought him into disrepute
203

 

   

204

with doctrinaire anti—bank Republicans and proponents of
the fast rising state banks. In pursuing his fiscal pol-
icies Gallatin made an enemy of Senator Samuel Smith of
Maryland, the brother of the Secretary of the Navy. A
less tangible but important reason for Republican distrust
of Gallatin lay in his obviously superior ability. Often
lesser men distrust those who are talented, and this ir-
rational impulse accounted for the extreme passion of much
of the opposition to Gallatin.

Prior to Madison's inauguration he received word
that Gallatin’s appointment as Secretary of State would
not be acceptable to a Senatorial faction headed by William
Branch Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib. Further
probing of Senatorial opinion showed that exactly half the
members were opposed to Gallatin's appointment. Madison
was placed in an impossible dilemma. He believed Gallatin
the most qualified candidate to head the State Department,
but he realized that if he fought for Gallatin's nomination
he would split his already factionalized party wide open.
The President hit upon the solution of appeasing the Smith
faction by offering to appoint Robert Smith Secretary of
the Treasury. Gallatin rejected this solution pointing
out that he did not have the energy to run two departments
simultaneously. If an arrangement had to be made, Gallatin
suggested that Robert Smith be appointed Secretary of State
and he remain in the Treasury. In adopting this solution

Madison placed himself in the position of having to dis-

charge the duties of two officers.1

 

lIrving Brant, James Madison: The President 1809-1812
(Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill CO., 1956),
pp. 22-25; Adams, Histor , V, 4-8.

 

 

 

 

205

Gallatin, the Madison administration, and American
foreign policy were all losers in this transaction. Gal-
latin had become tired of treasury business, and with his
flair for diplomacy he was a natural choice for Secretary
of State. His influence with Congress had declined sharply
since late January, and the victory of the Senatorial cabal
in blocking his appointment further reduced his influence.
Hence, his fiscal policies as Treasurer would receive some-
thing less than a friendly reception. The appointment of
Smith also led to bad blood in the official family. Gal—
latin who rarely harbored ill feelings against anyone,
even those with whom he disagreed, regarded Smith‘s ap—
pointment as the result of an intrigue. Consequently, he
held Smith in contempt and the previous cordiality between
the two disappeared. The loss of Gallatin’s ability in the
State Department also handicapped the execution of American
foreign policy at a crucial hour.2

The most pressing diplomatic problem remained Anglo—
American relations. The attempts by Congress to strengthen
the American posture toward the belligerents in late 1808
and early 1809 had impressed David Erskine who had conveyed
his ideas to George Canning. Without knowing the details
of the Congressional rebellion and submission of February
and March Canning, who wanted to achieve an understanding
with the United States providing that it did not infringe
on vital British interests, authorized Erskine to proceed

with serious negotiations. However, he specified three

 

2Adams, History, V, 10.

 

 

206

conditions which had to be met before any agreement could
be consumated. In case of repeal of the Orders—In-Council
the United States must agree not to trade with France.
Secondly, America must adhere to the Rule of 1756. Finally,
Americans must not object to the British navy seizing Ships
headed for French ports illegally. Of these three points
only the first was made a 2122.922 292 of an agreement.3
David Erskine was certain that an accord could not
be reached on the basis of Canning’s instructions so he
disregarded them. In doing so he was able to come to a
rapid understanding with Madison and Robert Smith. On
April 18 and 19 the details of the agreement were worked
out. Britain agreed to suspend the Orders-In-Council of
January and November, 1807 to take effect on June 10 in
return for a proclamation restoring commercial intercourse
between the two nations.4
The President's Proclamation of April 19 which an-
nounced the terms of the Erskine Agreement restored Madi—
son’s administration to popularity. American merchants
made no attempt to wait for June 10 as they rushed to sail
for England. Madison considered this the beginning of a
new era in Anglo-American relations. In his address
slated for delivery to the Special session of Congress
the Chief Executive missed few chances to congratulate

himself on America‘s recent success. In reading a draft

 

3Varg, Founding Fathers, pp. 217-219; Adams, History,
V: 71-73.

Albert Gallatin to Thomas Worthington, April 18,
1809, Gallatin Papers.

 

 

207
of this message Albert Gallatin urged him to Show more

restraint. The Treasurer failed to see how conciliation
on the part of the United States had been the major factor
in promoting the agreement with England. Gallatin bluntly
pointed out that the Erskine Agreement rested simply on
the fact "that the offers of the British Government ac-
corded with the provisions made by the act of Congress."
That executive discretion, an important element in foreign
policy formulation, had played such a small part in the
agreement was something Madison ignored.5

Gallatin was also critical in assessing Erskine‘s
conduct. He detected flaws in the British minister‘s
statements which indicated to him that perhaps the British
position was weaker than America generally supposed. For
example, Gallatin questioned Erskine's authority to announce
that the Orders-In—Council would cease to operate prior to
the actual repeal of Non—Intercourse by the United States.
Gallatin speculated on the meaning of Erskine’s state-
ments. ”Does he only mean that vessels taken under those
orders, subsequent to the day agreed on, will be released,
if we take off the non-intercourse on that day?," asked
the Secretary of the Treasury. Other questions also oc-
curred to him. "Is it possible that the orders are to be
rescinded next week in England, and that he is trying to
make the best bargain he can before we know the fact?,"

Gallatin wondered.6 This attitude can be contrasted with

 

5Albert Gallatin to James Madison, May 18, 1809,
Madison Papers.
Gallatin to Madison, May, 1809, Madison Papers.

 

 

 

208

Madison’s outlook. The Treasurer still approached the
British in the spirit of critical inquiry while the Pres-
ident preferred to accept matters on faith.

As soon as George Canning received news of the agree-
ment he disavowed it. Later to defend his action he released
the instructions to Erskine to prove that the British min—
ister had violated his orders. News of Canning‘s action
reached the United States in July when James Madison was
in Virginia. Gallatin who had remained in Washington
promptly wrote to the President that he should return im—
mediately. He also requested Attorney General Caesar A.
Rodney’s presence. Since news of Canning‘s instructions
to Erskine had not reached America, Gallatin could not
understand British action. Nevertheless, three questions
needed immediate attention. First, since England had not
repealed her orders, the Treasurer thought the provisions
prohibiting intercourse with Britain revived themselves
automatically. Secondly, a decision was necessary on
the propriety of calling Congress into special session.

If possible, Gallatin wanted to avoid this alternative.
Thirdly, the government had to adopt a policy toward the

new British minister, Francis James Jackson, who Canning

had appointed to replace the discredited Erskine.7

Two days later on July 26 an extract of Canning's
instructions to Erskine arrived in the United States.

Gallatin ascertained from Secretary of State Smith that

 

7Albert Gallatin to Caesar A. Rodney, July 24, 1809,
Albert Gallatin Folder, Library of Congress; Albert Gal-
latin to James Madison, July 24,1809, Madison Papers;
Albert Gallatin to John Montgomery, July 27, 1809,
Gallatin Papers.

 

209

some, but by no means all, of Canning's instructions were
used as a basis of the negotiations. This knowledge
coupled with Canning's second condition (colonial trade
and rule of 1756) convinced Gallatin that Britain had
been insincere. Insistence on the renunciation of the
colonial trade indicated that Britain’s primary purpose

8

was the destruction of American commerce.

Gallatin lamented the state of affairs introduced
by Canning's action. One of the worst consequences lay
in the fact that the United States was by no means pre-
pared to resist Britain at this point. A year before
America would have been prepared for war. ”Then all or
almost all our mercantile wealth was safe at home, our
resources entire, and our finances sufficient to carry
us through during the first year of the contest." Now
the situation was quite different. American property
was scattered all over the high seas, and England which
had been relieved by even the temporary American relax-
ations would be in a position to withstand American econ-
omic pressure for at least two years. If war came, it
would have to be financed primarily by loans.9

Nor did the Secretary of the Treasury expect re-
sults from future negotiations with Britain. Gallatin
doubted that Jackson would have any compromises to offer.

”He is probably sent, like Mr. Rose, to amuse and to

 

 

8Albert Gallatin to James Madison, July 26, 1809,
Madison Papers.

9A1bert Gallatin to John Montgomery, July 27, 1809,
Gallatin Papers.

 

 

 

210
divide." In expressing such sentiment Gallatin merely

underscored the fact that he had no confidence in Canning.
He hoped that no concessions would be made and that unless
Britain was serious negotiations would be broken off.10
When Madison received news of Canning's disavowal
his estimate closely agreed with Gallatin's. The Presi-
dent saw the hand of the West Indian merchants behind
much of what was done. Madison even went further in at—
tributing base motives to Britain. ”Such an outrage on

” he assured Gallatin.

all decency was never before heard of,
The President seriously entertained rumors that the evil—
ness of George III had asserted itself again and in fact
had been responsible for the disavowal of the arrangement.
However, Madison did not believe his return to Washington
was necessary. He was willing to rely on the consultation
of the cabinet members there. Gallatin could be trusted
to transmit their decisions to him. The Chief Executive
had decided that the best course of action lay in dis-
patching a circular to the collectors which would put
non—intercourse back in effect.ll
When Madison read Canning’s instructions to Erskine,
he was even more convinced that Britain was insincere.
”If the sketch of Erskine’s instructions be faithful,”

he told Gallatin, ”it shows as clearly that Canning was

determined to prevent an adjustment as that Erskine was

 

lOGallatin to Montgomery, July 27, 1809, Gallatin
Papers.

llJames Madison to Albert Gallatin, July 28, 1809,
Gallatin Papers.

 

 

 

211

to effect it.” Nor did the President think that state—
ments of members of the administration could have been
misconstrued by Erskine. Further proof of British per—
fidity could be found in Jackson's appointment as minister
to the United States. If the mission had been intended as
conciliatory in tone, certainly someone other than Jackson
12

would have been chosen.

In the meantime Gallatin had talked with Erskine.

"He acknowledged that the reason why he did not communicate

 

his instructions as he was authorized to the Secretary of
State," Gallatin reported, ”was that he was sensible that
if we had seen them, we would have considered him unauthor-
ized and have refused to enter into the agreement."
Erskine assured Gallatin that in his representations on
the colonial trade he had spoken only of the direct trade
between the West Indies and Europe.13

Madison reluctantly journeyed to Washington to pre-
side over the formulation of a new policy toward Britain.
On August 9 he signed a proclamation which revived non-
intercourse against England. The same day the Secretary
of the Treasury instructed the customs collectors not to
enforce the law against ships sailing on the grounds that

14

Erskine’s agreement was in effect.

 

l2Madison to Gallatin, July 30, 1809, Gallatin Papers.

l3Albert Gallatin to James Madison, July 31, 1809,
Madison Papers.

14”Circulars to the Collectors," August 9, 1809,
American State Papers: Foreign Relations, III, 304.

 

 

212
Although a policy had been adopted, the former

British minister‘s actions required clarification. David
Erskine was officially requested by Secretary of State
Smith to explain his December report of conversations
with members of the government. Before replying Erskine
had already received Gallatin's account of the conversa-
tions. Whether he believed that the Treasurer‘s recapitu-
lation was accurate or perhaps just by coincidence, Er-
skine’s answer to Smith accepted the major points of
Gallatin‘s version. The Treasurer contended that in their
conversations he had established that the United States
would waive direct trade between West Indian colonies

and the mother country in Europe. However, this trade

had never been seriously carried on. Erskine substanti-
ated this both to Smith and to Gallatin. He believed that
Gallatin referred only to the direct trade which would be
dealt with by a treaty. Erskine had never reported this
point as a condition for British revocation of the Orders—
In-Council. What Gallatin said in August, 1809 varied
from what Erskine had written to his government in De—
cember, 1808. Then he had hinted that Gallatin said that
the United States would "abandon the attempt to carry on
a trade with the colonies of belligerents.n Perhaps the
most charitable explanation is that Erskine distorted what
was said because of his fervent desire to achieve better

Anglo-American relations.15

 

15Robert Smith to David Erskine, August 9, 1809,
American State Papers: Foreign Relations, III, 304-305;
Albert Gallatin to David Erskine, August 13, 1809, Gal—

 

 

 

213

On September 8 Francis James Jackson, the new
British minister arrived in Washington. On numerous
occasions previously Gallatin had concluded that little
could be expected from discussions with this minister.

On September 11 Gallatin informed Madison that from what
he gathered of talks between Smith and Jackson the British
minister"had nothing to say of importance.” Nevertheless,
President Madison still wanted to give England the benefit
of the doubt. Somehow he hoped that Canning had not sent
Jackson to chastize the Americans. How else could one
account for "Jackson’s apparent patience and reserve with—
out supposing that his authorized disclosures would not

be either operative or agreeable?” However, Smith and
Jackson did not get along. On October 9 written communi-
cations were substituted for oral discussions, and in
November negotiations completely collapsed.l6

America‘s prospects were not bright in the fall of
1809 when Congress convened. In his annual report the
Secretary of the Treasury announced the first financial
deficit since he assumed his post. He also pointed out
that neither non-intercourse nor any other partial com—
mercial restriction would work. Renewal of the embargo

or a complete abandonment of all restrictions constituted

 

latin to David Erskine, August 13, 1809, Gallatin Papers;
David M. Erskine to Robert Smith, August 14, 1809,
American State Papers: Foreign Relations, III, 305-306;
David Erskine to Albert Gallatin, August 15, 1809,
Gallatin Papers.

l6Albert Gallatin to James Madison, September 11,
1809, Madison Papers; James Madison to Albert Gallatin,
Se tember 25, 1809, Gallatin Papers; Adams, History, V,
115-132.

 

 

 

214
the only feasible alternatives. Since the mood of the

nation ruled out a return to the embargo, Gallatin drafted
a bill which encompassed the second solution. This act,
introduced by Congressman Nathaniel Macon, dropped all
restrictions on the American carrying trade and permitted
the importation of French and British goods in American
vessels. It closed American ports to both the armed
vessels and merchant ships of Britain and France. If

either nation dropped its commercial restrictions, the

 

United States would remove the prohibition against the

17

nation.
The Macon Act passed the House, but Samuel Smith
and his friends blocked its passage in the Senate. The
stalemate which followed was finally broken on March 1
when Congress passed a law known as Macon's Bill Number
Two. This statute, which was really the work of Senator
John Taylor of South Carolina, merely forbade British and
French bottoms from entering American waters. Otherwise
it repealed the Non—Intercourse Act and removed all re—
strictions upon American trade. One provision in particu—
lar stood out. If either England or France modified their
edicts against American commerce prior to March 3, 1811
and the other nation did not, after three months the
United States would apply the provisions of the Non—Inter—

18

course Act to the offending party.

 

l7American State Papers: Finance, II, 373—384; Annals
of Congress, Eleventh Congress, First Session, pp. 754—755.

18

 

 

 

Walters, Gallatin, pp. 232—233.

215
France quickly took advantage of this loophole.

In August, 1810 Napoleon Bonaparte hinted that he planned
to repeal the Berlin and Milan decrees on NOvember 1 con-
tingent upon British repeal of the Orders-In—Council or
American enforcement of the discriminatory provisions of
the Macon Act against England. Word of Napoleon’s appar-
ent change of heart reached the United States late in
September. In fact, Napoleon did not repeal his decrees,

but James Madison accepted his conciliatory gesture without

 

waiting for proof of the Frenchman’s good faith. There—
fore on November 2, 1810 the President announced the
”revocation of the edicts of France which violated the
neutrality of the United States.” Madison suspended the
provisions of Macon’s Act against France, and gave Britain
until February 2, 1811 to follow the French example or
suffer the economic consequences.19

Curiously Albert Gallatin was as gullible as James
Madison in the fall of 1810. The Treasurer did not sus—
pect French duplicity; indeed he was shocked in 1821
when he discovered documents which confirmed French in-
sincerity. However, he expected Napoleon’s dramatic
shift to bring Anglo-American relations to a head. If
Britain did not alter her policy, war between the two

English speaking nations would probably result.2O

 

19Perkins, Prologue to War, pp. 245—250; "Circular
from the Treasury Department," November 2, 1810, American
State Papers: Foreign Relations, III, 392.

20Albert Gallatin to John Quincy Adams, September 15,
1821, The Writings of Albert Gallatin ed. Henry Adams
(Philadelphia: J.P. Lipincott, 1879), II, 196-199; Albert
Gallatin to Caesar A. Rodney, September 27, 1810, Albert
Gallatin Folder, Library of Congress.

 

 

 

 

216

European concerns yielded slightly to problems in
the Western Hemisphere during 1810. Traditionally Amer—
ican interest to the South had been limited to the Spanish
borderlands, mainly Florida. In 1808 momentous European
events caused repercussions in the.Americas. In that
year Napoleon finally succeeded in placing his brother
Joseph on the Spanish throne. This event led to a Span-
ish rebellion and the formation of an opposition junta at
Cadiz. Civil War in Spain increased the likelihood of
revolution in Spain’s colonies in America.

In response to European events the United States re—
newed and intensified her interest in Latin America.
Moreover, American objectives in the hemisphere shifted
from a narrow concentration on Florida to "the large
policy of 1808." This new orientation created a new set
of vital interests:

These policies were encouragement
to Latin America in establishing and
maintaining its independence, Opposition
to the transfer of an American colony from
one European power to another, resistance
to the extension of the commercial as well
as the political influence of any European
power in America, and, as the ultimate ob—
jective the exclusion of all European in-
fluence from the western hemisphere.21

Albert Gallatin played an important role in the
revitalized Latin American policy of the United States.

The shift to ”the large policy of 1808" failed to convince

the foreign diplomats who resided in Washington Of any

 

21Arthur Preston Whitaker, The United States and the
Independence of Latin America 1800-1830 (New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 1964), p. 45.

 

 

 

 

 

217

real change in fundamental American objectives. The

French minister, Louis Marie Turreau, believed that the
professed change was window dressing designed to camoflage
renewed assaults on Florida. This belief was enhanced
early in 1809 when General James Wilkinson embarrassed the
administration by calling for the immediate occupation of
the Floridas. Madison not only disavowed expansionist in-
tentions but also sent his Treasurer to assure Turreau
privately. In late April Gallatin conferred with the
French minister and repudiated the pre-l808 Jeffersonian
policy toward Spain. He renounced all American intentions
in contiguous Spanish territory. ”You would be mistaken

if you supposed that Mr. Madison wished the possession

of the Floridas," Gallatin told him. Although possession
of Florida had been Jefferson’s ”hobby,” Madison valued it
only if necessary ”to secure an outlet for the produce of
our Southern States” or to "prevent every kind of misunder—
standing with Spain." Gallatin denied any American in-
volvement in the agitation by American frontiersmen or in
precipitating Wilkinson's actions. Before he concluded

the Treasurer also renounced any interest in the Carib—
bean. ”I am authorized to protest to you," stated Gallatin,
”that even if Cuba were offered us as a gift, we would not
accept it.”22

Although the ”large policy” had been Jefferson‘s crea—

 

22Gallatin’s conversation with Turreau is recorded in

Turreau to Champagny, June 1, 1809, quoted in Adams,
History, V, 38—39.

 

 

 

 

218

tion, the men responsible for making foreign policy in
Madison’s administration, the President himself, Secretary
of State Robert Smith, and Albert Gallatin were all com-
mitted to its objectives. Prior to the outbreak of the
War of 1812 much energy was devoted to furthering Amer—
ica‘s ties with Latin America. The year 1810 merely
intensified attempts to implete this policy, for in that
year the Spanish colonies erupted in revolution.

As Arthur Preston Whitaker demonstrates, the United
States operated at "cross currents" in Latin America 1810—
1812 and never did fulfill the promise of the "large
policy." American diplomacy followed several threads in
these years. Traditional accounts have emphasized the
West Florida question, but James Madison was far more
interested in capturing South American markets for the
United States in the early months of 1810. Britain
posed the gravest threat to American ambitions in Latin
America. England already had established considerable
commerce there, and with her large merchant marine she
threatened to exclude the United States entirely.23

To meet the British threat the President sent
Americans to the revolutionary area in 1810. Three
types of agents were employed. Special agents were ap-
pointed to undertake a specific mission in a limited
time. Agents for commerce and seamen were commissioned

under a Congressional Act of 1796 for the protection

 

23Whitaker, Independence of Latin America, pp. 61-62.

 

 

   

219
of American sailors in foreign ports. These ministers’

first duty lay in fostering closer commercial ties, but
they were also instructed to profess American friendship
and good will. Regular consular agents were also
appointed.24

Albert Gallatin actively encouraged the dispatch—
ing of American agents to Latin America. It was he who
highly recommended David Gelston, the customs collector
at New York, for one of the most important assignments.
When Gelston declined Gallatin recommended Joel Roberts
Poinsett of South Carolina to replace him as agent to
Buenos Aires. The Treasurer also urged that Poinsett be
given an extremely broad field of operation: "consider—
ing the immediate land communication between Buenos
Ayres (pig) and Peru, and the difficulty of obtaining
agents perfectly qualified and willing to go; might not
Mr. Poinsett‘s commission be extended to the last: or
some contingent instructions be given applicable to it,
if in the course of his mission he Should think it nec-
essary for the public service to go there or to do some—
thing in relation to it." The President accepted Gallatin's
suggestions and agreed to commission Poinsett to Buenos
Aires, Chile, and Peru.25

The British threat to Latin America concerned the

 

24Ibid., pp. 63-66.

25Albert Gallatin to James Madison, July 16, 1810;
Gallatin to Madison, August 15, 1810; Gallatin to Madison,
August 16, 1810, Madison Papers; James Madison to Albert
Gallatin, August 22, 1810, Writings of Gallatin, I, 483.

 

 

 

220
Treasurer greatly. When the Spanish revolted in 1808,

Britain invaded the Iberian Peninsula. Gallatin was
certain that England would continue fighting in Spain
so that she might control Latin America through a nominal
Spanish regency. Thus she would oppose revolution in the
colonies. By far the greatest English threat lay in
Cuba. ”I think also," wrote Gallatin, ”That she will at-
tempt tO take possession of Cuba where the Spanish reg-
ency may, if necessary be removed. The English interest
and prejudices against us arising from that source will
therefore be the principal Obstacles to our views in that
quarter." Since Cuba was of such pressing importance
Gallatin suggested that a Special minister be sent there.26

While the Spanish American colonists were revolting
throughout Latin America in 1810, American frontiersmen
in West Florida were becoming more restless. In the sum-
mer meetings were held to protest Spanish policies and
suggest more liberal methods of administration. By Sep-
tember the American settlers had established the independ-
ent republic of West Florida, and had requested the United
States to annex the new republic.27

President Madison had been watching carefully events
in West Florida. He had asked Gallatin’s advice on the
legality of annexing this territory. The Treasurer

thought no question existed on that point, for the Mobile

 

26Albert Gallatin to James Madison, September 17,
1810, Madison Papers.

27Varg, Founding Fathers, pp. 253-258.

 

221
Act covered the area between the Mississippi and Perdido

Rivers. If other legal precedents were needed, they ex—
isted in the laws which authorized the President to take
possession of Louisiana. However, he was not convinced
that because legal precedents existed, West Florida
should be annexed. "But what growth ought generally to
be taken consistent with justice, the rights and interests
of the United States, and the preservation of peace, is
the difficult question" he argued. Gallatin’s protests
fell on deaf ears, and on October 27 President Madison
annexed West Florida as far west as the Pearl River by
Presidential proclamation.28
In 1810 Gallatin's main influence on foreign policy
was exercised in Latin America through the encouragement
of American diplomatic activity there. He failed to re—
strain Madison from annexing West Florida, an action which
jeopardized American interests as defined in the "large
policy." Florida in the possession of Spain constituted
no threat to the United States, but an American Florida
might endanger British interests. As a Spanish ally Eng—
land had extensive commercial interests in the Caribbean.29
By the fall of 1810 Madison had changed his Objec-
tives in Latin America. Now he wanted to use France as a
counterbalance against Britain in the western hemisphere.

Thus the United States encouraged French commerce with the

28James Madison to Albert Gallatin, August 22, 1810,

Writings of Gallatin, I 485; Albert Gallatin to James
Madison, September 5, 1810, Madison Papers.

29Varg, Founding Fathers, p. 262.

 

 

 

 

 

222

former Spanish colonies. By August, 1811 France was

ready to promote revolution in Latin America if the newly
liberated states would agree not to forge ties with Britain.
To Americans the French policy seemed merely an extension
of the continental system to include Latin America. Madi—
son could not support such a system especially when he be—
lieved the real rationale lay in preserving the western
hemisphere for Joseph Bonaparte.30

In many respects the year 1810 marks a turning point
in James Madison‘s first administration. Not only was this
the year in which French duplicity and the western hemi-
sphere question compounded foreign policy questions for
America, but this was also the year in which many War
Hawks were elected to the Twelfth Congress. As far as Al—
bert Gallatin‘s contributions to influencing American
foreign policy this year constitutes a watershed. Prior
to 1810 Gallatin played a major role in formulating foreign
policy, but in 1811 and 1812 the Treasurer had much less
influence in making foreign policy.

After being denied the post of Secretary of State
Gallatin thought of retiring. The extreme villification
which he had suffered made him very reluctant to continue
in public service. "I want peace, retirement, and to
have nothing to mind but the education of my children and
the social intercourse of a few friends," he told his Ohio
friend Thomas Worthington in April, 1809. Later that

month in a visit with his close friend, Joseph Hopper

 

30Ibid., pp. 265-267.

 

   

223

Nicholson, in Baltimore he conveyed similar thoughts.
”Your resigning from office is a subject upon which I do
not like to reflect because I believe you will be a great
public loss," Nicholson told him. Madison would feel his
absence immediately although the nation might not appreci-
ate his contributions for some time. Yet he appreciated
Gallatin’s situation and urged him to confront the Presi-
dent with the choice of retaining either Smith or himself.
"I have never believed that you took as strong ground in

the cabinet as you ought to do,”

Nicholson admonished,
”and it is time that you should do more than content your—
self with a bare expression of opinion."31 This advice
was sound, and nearly two years later the Treasurer fol—
lowed it.

The attacks on Gallatin did not cease, and he went
to Monticello to confer with Jefferson regarding his future.
The former President persuaded him to remain in the govern-
ment as long as conditions did not become too unbearable.
In replying to the Virginian Gallatin told him that he was
still bothered by the attacks. ”It has seemed to me from
various circumstances that those who thought they had in-

jured were disposed to destroy, and that they were sufficient-

1y skillful and formidable to effect their object," he

wrote.32

 

31A1bert Gallatin to Thomas Worthington, April 18,
1809, Gallatin Papers; Albert Gallatin to Joseph Hopper
Nicholson, April 20, 1809, Joseph H. Nicholson Papers,
Library of Congress; Joseph Hopper Nicholson to Albert
Gallatin, May 14, 1809, Gallatin Papers.

32Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, November 8,
1809, Jefferson Papers.

   

224

As time passed Gallatin’s position within the govern-
ment became worse. In 1810 the Treasurer recommended that
the charter of the Bank of the United States be renewed,
and a recharter bill was making satisfactory progress
through the House when the session ended. However, the
state banking interests rallied their forces, and in 1811
a combination of doctrinaire states rights advocates, state
banking men, and anti—Gallatin Republicans combined to de-
feat the Bank bill by one vote in the House and the tie—
breaking vote of Vice-President George Clinton in the
Senate. Gallatin was horrified and attributed the defeat
to the Smith faction. Thus the bitter feud between Gal-
1atin and the Smiths erupted again.33

Now the Treasurer decided to follow Nicholson's ad—
vice and require Madison to choose between Robert Smith
and himself. Hence on March 4, 1811 Gallatin tendered
his resignation to the President. "I clearly perceive that
my continuing as a member of the present administration,”
wrote the Secretary of the Treasury, ”is no longer of any
public utility, invigorates the opposition against your-
self and must necessarily be attended with an increased
loss of reputation to myself." One of the foremost
reasons he gave for leaving was the conflict within the
administration. Obviously Madison had to decide whether
he would retain a first rate Treasurer or a third rate

Secretary of State. The President chose wisely as the

 

33Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from
the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 209-225.

 

   

225

back of Gallatin‘s letter of resignation records: "Mr.
Madison declined receiving Mr. Gallatin’s resignation and
Mr. Robert Smith Secretary of State was removed from

It 34

office.

James Monroe became Secretary of State on April 1,
1811. Two months prior to his assumption of office the
United States under Macon’s Act Number Two had applied
non—intercourse against Britain. Retaliation against
Britain was taken in spite of the fact that France had
not provided satisfactory evidence of rescinding her de-
crees, and despite the election of a Congress ill-disposed
to the continuation of an appeasement policy. The mem—
bership of the Twelfth Congress had a decided new look.
Almost half of the Representatives in the new body were
War Hawks,young men (mostly under forty) elected gener-
ally from the South and the West. Although Republicans,
they placed no faith in peaceful coercion. Henry Clay of
Kentucky, one of the undisputed leaders of this group, who
was elected Speaker of the House summed up their attitudes:
he was tired of seeing his country tied ”eternally to the
tail of the British kite."35

Considering the composition of the Twelfth Congress
Gallatin was shocked when he saw Madison’s draft of the
annual message. It was not only bitterly critical of

Britain, but the Treasurer considered it a war message.

 

34Albert Gallatin to James Madison (March 4, 1811 - ?),
Gallatin Papers.

35Walters, Gallatin, p. 244.

 

 

 

226
Gallatin believed that a recommendation of war would be

unwise at this point. He doubted that the people would
really support the use of force with their manpower and
money. In addition, war measures would make the admin-
istration unpopular. The possibility that the United
States might suffer humiliation and be subservenient to
Britain for years to come was another undesirable possi—
bility that Britain might relax her orders when faced with
American determination. However, this contingency was
extremely doubtful.36

Madison accepted Gallatin's advice to remove mili-
tant anti-British phrases, but his message still adhered
to a hostile posture toward Britain. The President enum—
erated British transgressions including vigorous enforce—
ment of the Orders—In—Council and insistance that British
goods when owned by neutrals be admitted to enemy ports.
Nor did Madison ignore France. Napoleon was criticized
for not relaxing commercial restrictions and not restoring
American property seized under past edicts. Madison rec—
ommended many defense measures including the construction
of harbor fortifications, the employment of gunboats, en-
hancement of coastal protection, the dispatchment of troops
to the frontier, and the recruitment of an army.37 While
the speech was not warlike, it surely called for prepara—

tion for war.

 

36Albert Gallatin, ”Notes on Madison’s Message,”
November 5, 1811, Madison Papers.

37Brant, Madison the President 1809-1812, pp. 356-359.

 

 

 

227

Unfortunately, Gallatin remained silent on many
important matters during the crucial year of 1811-1812.
However, that he had resigned himself to war after the
President’s annual address seems clear. The financial
calculations in his annual Treasury report issued late
in November were based on the probability of war within
a year. In January, 1812 he told Ezekiel Bacon, Chairman
of the House Ways and Means Committee, how much war would
cost and what measures were needed. An annual loan of

$10,000, increased customs duties, and internal taxes

 

wOuld all be necessary. "What appears to be of vital im-
portance is, that the crisis should at once be met by the
adoption of efficient measures which will certainly provide
means commensurate with the expense, and . . . will enable
the United States to persevere in the contest until an
honorable peace shall have been obtained," he wrote. In
March he told Jefferson that he expected the overwhelming
majority of the American people ”to support their own
government in an unavoidable war."38
When Britain published a report in May, 1812 enum-
erating French violations of neutrality, prospects for
any British relaxation of her orders seemed remote. In
late May James Madison told his cabinet that he planned
to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Britain,

and on June 1 the President’s war message was read to

 

38American State Papers: Finance, II, 495-507;
Albert Gallatin to Ezekiel Bacon, January 10, 1812,
Writings of Gallatin, I, 501-517; Albert Gallatin to
Thomas Jefferson, March 10, 1812, Jefferson Papers.

 

228

Congress. It gave many reasons for commencing hostilities:
impressment, violation of American neutrality on the coast,
blockades, Orders-In-Council, and British encouragement of
the Indians in the Northwest. Madison's request was ap—
proved in the House by a vote of seventy~nine to forty.

The Senate gave its begrudging support nineteen to sixteen.
Ironically two days before the President signed the de—
claration, on June 16, Britain repealed the Orders-In—
Council. Nevertheless, other reasons for hostilities existed,

and war commenced officially on June 18.39 "On to Canada!"

 

39Perkins, Prologue to War, pp. 403-417.

 

CHAPTER IX
ALBERT GALLATIN AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

After the outbreak of war Albert Gallatin remained
in the Treasury Department until 1813. Then he embarked
on a long and important diplomatic career. Originally he
went to Russia to take advantage of the Tsar‘s mediation
offers. Then he served as one of the five American com-
missioners at Ghent. After the conclusion of peace Gal-
latin helped negotiate an Anglo-American commercial
treaty. The following year President Madison appointed
him minister to France where he remained until 1823. Be-
cause of his quickly achieved status as senior American
diplomat abroad his talents were not restricted to France.
For example, he helped Richard Rush conclude crucial
Anglo-American discussions in London. After a three year
American interlude he traveled to London in 1826 in an
attempt to restore better relations with Britain. Upon
returning to the United States in 1827 at age sixty—six
Gallatin retired from public life.

This study has focused on the first phase of Gal—
1atin‘s national life: the years as Congressman and Sec-

retary of the Treasury. His experience prior to 1812 pre-

229

 

 

 

230
pared him well for his diplomatic career. As a freshman

Congressman he engaged in the heated debates on the Jay
Treaty. Later as Republican leader in the House of Rep-
resentatives he led the Opposition to Federalist policies
during the Quasi-War against France. As Secretary of the
Treasury Gallatin played at least three roles in foreign
policy formulation. First, as a cabinet member he advised
both Jefferson and Madison on important aspects of foreign
policy. He read the annual messages and made numerous
suggestions to improve them in every area. In cabinet
meetings where prospective actions were thoroughly debated
he presented his views. Sometimes he was asked to compose
Special memoranda on pressing foreign business, and at
other times he authored memoranda designed to influence a
policy. Secondly, he helped coordinate foreign policy and
Treasury policy by reconciling Republican fiscal goals and
diplomatic objectives. Sometimes he masked his parsimony
behind other considerations, but many of his ideas can be
traced to his desire to economize. Thirdly, he acted as
an important liason man between administration and Congress.
Gallatin had numerous friends in the legislative branch,
and he kept in very close contact with them. A final role,
one not in keeping with his character, must be mentioned.
After the United States purchased Louisiana Gallatin con—
ducted a unilateral policy which reminds one of the first
Secretary of the Treasury. He secretly organized a band
of militia to seize New Orleans if Spain would not re-

linquish it.

 

 

231
Gallatin‘s Congressional career may be divided into

two parts: his abbreviated three month term as United States
Senator (December, 1793 - February, 1794) and his Six years
in the House of Representatives (1795-1801). A comparison
between Gallatin's thoughts on foreign policy during 1793,

a most difficult year, and his views during his House ca-
reer is enlightening. When one compares Gallatin as Sen-
ator, Representative, and Treasurer, an even more sugges—
tive explanation emerges. In 1793 the Senator—elect, while
mildly enthusiastic for France and Genet, adopted an un—
usually moderate approach. His years in the House contrast
with his earlier views, for he adopted a more doctrinaire
approach. Although he did not go as far as some Republicans
in attacking the Jay Treaty, his arguments bore the stamp

of party regularity with some exceptions. During the French
crisis 1797-1801 Gallatin was largely silent. He knew
Opposition to Federalist foreign policy would not only be
futile, but it would also further weaken his party. When
Gallatin did Speak, he argued the party line: that relations
with France had not assumed crisis proportions. His Con—
gressional career coincided with an extremely unusual
period. The conflict between political parties in the
United States has never been so intense as it was in the
period 1793-1800. Since no agreement existed as to desir—
able objectives for the nation, accommodation was impos—
sible. Any explanation of Gallatin’s behavior at this

time must account for the tenacity of the political

struggle. Had it not been for party politics the Pennsyl-

 

 

232

vania Congressman probably would never have taken some
of his more extreme positions.

Surely any study of Gallatin‘s role as Secretary of
the Treasury convinces one that Thomas Jefferson was not
his own Secretary of State and that James Madison as
President depended closely on his Treasurer in foreign
policy. From 1801 until 1808 Jefferson, Madison, and
Gallatin acted as a team in forging many policies. Often
they blended their collective wisdom together in such a
manner that it is nearly impossible to measure their in-

dividual contribution. Jefferson's greatness as Presi-

 

dent is more apparent than real because of this three-
cornered collaboration. However, one must not push this
idea too far. On many occasions Gallatin found himself
outnumbered, and Jefferson frequently overruled him. In
these cases Gallatin's ideas may be contrasted with Jef-
ferson's, Madison’s, and the actual policy followed.
Since Madison desired to appoint Gallatin Secretary of
State, their close collaboration on foreign policy was
natural. In contrast to Jefferson, Madison had to act as
his own Secretary of State at least until April, 1811 be-
cause he allowed the unqualified Robert Smith to head the
State Department. During this time he depended on his
Treasurer a great deal for help in implementing policy.
Gallatin‘s views on foreign affairs cannot be eas-
ily categorized. Each policy he advocated must be consid-
ered in terms of the situation from which it arose. Yet

several general characteristics form a consistent pattern

 

 

233
throughout his career from 1793 until 1812. First, in

considering any question Gallatin was reluctant to commit
himself unless he had thoroughly explored every facet of
the situation. His judicious marshalling of relevant
data is remarkable in itself. Secondly, he generally ap—
proached each question from the broadest possible point
of view. Thus he also ascertained the other nation’s
outlook. He was so adept at viewing American diplomacy
from an unbiased perspective that he could, and sometimes
did, assume the role of the devil‘s advocate. Finally,
with the exception of his career in the House he cut
through the partisan rhetoric of the day and considered
problems in terms of the intrinsic merits of the case.

In many respects his analysis was so objective because

it was purged of the most odious distractions of nation—
alism.

As Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin attempted to
reconcile foreign and domestic affairs. Reduction of the
debt, elimination of unnecessary expenses, and repeal of
the internal taxes constituted the foremost Jeffersonian
domestic objectives. Therefore, he supported foreign
policies that would preserve peace. Arguing that it was
cheaper to build a completely new navy in case of war
than maintaining a small number of ships in peacetime
Gallatin urged the dismantling of the small navy. He
also opposed Jefferson's costly gunboat scheme. For
reasons of economy he supported continued payments to

the Barbary Powers rather than attempt to chastize the

 

 

 

234

Mediterranean brigands. However, he was willing to spend
money for legitimate American interests such as the pur-
chase of Louisiana.

The relationship between realism and idealism forms
another important theme in Gallatin's outlook on foreign
affairs. Some political scientists enjoy portraying
American foreign policy in terms of the conflict between
realism and idealism. According to their interpretation
American policy has suffered and failed because it has
been too idealistic. A minority of realists whose advice
is constantly rejected are the heroes of this school. In
reality no such dichotomy now exists or ever existed in
the formulation of American foreign policy. Most men
constantly struggle to combine realism and idealism in
their everyday lives, and traditionally American foreign
policy has attempted to combine these elements.

Albert Gallatin is an excellent example of a Jef—
fersonian idealist who adopted realistic solutions when
necessary. Although he disliked most provisions of the
Jay Treaty, he realized that it would keep peace. Con-
stitutionally a strict constructionist as a Congressman,
Gallatin altered his views as Secretary of the Treasury
to support the purchase of Louisiana without amending the
fundamental law. While opposing Hamilton's full use of
the powers of the Treasury, Gallatin himself organized a
military expedition in the Southwest in the fall of 1803
to seize New Orleans if Spain would not relinquish it.

A pacifist at heart, the Treasurer found war justified

 

235

after the Chesapeake Affair. In his eyes no other alter—

 

native would preserve American national honor in the face
of British outrages. A foe of domestic coercion, Gallatin
enforced the embargo which he himself disliked by the un-
paralleled assertion of governmental power. A staunch
opponent of submissive measures, he helped draft the first
Macon Act to preserve a measure of American dignity. An
opponent of war with Britain in 1811, he not only recon-
ciled himself to hostilities, but he also recommended the
measures necessary to prosecute the action. Aside from
numerous other considerations his flexibility and will-
ingness to adjust to the situation at hand mark Gallatin
as one of the truly outstanding diplomatists of the early

national period.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Primary Material

 

This study is based largely on the manuscripts
of Albert Gallatin, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison.
The Albert Gallatin Papers at the New—York Historical
Society form one of the richest and most important manu—
script collections relating to any American statesman.
In total it comprises over eighty boxes. Much of the
material is uncatalogued and still unexplored. Unfor-
tunately these papers were closed for nearly seventy
years after the Gallatin family allowed Henry Adams to
use them. One of the greatest strengths of this col-
1ection lies in the many memoranda Which Gallatin wrote
on so many different questions. These documents allow
one to trace the evolution of his thought on major ques—
tions. However, there are at least two drawbacks to his
papers. First, while voluminous, his manuscripts contain
relatively few of his own letters. Secondly, Gallatin him-
self was close-mouthed. Early in Jefferson’s first admin-
istration the Pennsylvanian told Jefferson that "I hope
your administration affords but few materials for histor-
ians." Obviously Gallatin hoped for tranquility, but in
’his own letters he was extremely reluctant to comment on

public affairs. Nevertheless, the Gallatin collection is

236

 

237

the starting point for any serious student of Jefferson—
ian America.

The Thomas Jefferson Papers at the Library of Con—
gress constitute one of the most important sources for
this study because Gallatin’s letters to his Chief Exec—
utive may be found here. In its own right these manu-
scripts are one of the largest and most important col—
lections on any American. Between 1801 and 1808 Jefferson
and Gallatin corresponded frequently and often at some
length on important state business. Thus much of impor-
tance on Gallatin can be found here. This collection
also contains many letters from James Madison. A careful
reading of the letters from Madison and Gallatin reveals
how important the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
the Treasury were to Jefferson.

The James Madison Papers in the Library of Congress
do not equal either the Gallatin or Jefferson collections
in size, but the Fourth President‘s manuscripts are of
major importance. A number of crucial letters which
properly belonged in this collection were lost for nearly
one hundred years in William C. Rives' personal papers.
Rives was Madison's first biographer, and he merely
helped himself to many of his subject‘s papers without
ever returning them. Addition of the relevant manu-
scripts in Rives’ papers has enhanced the value of this
collection. Since a number of the lost letters were from
Albert Gallatin, this collection sheds lights on the

Treasurer's contributions to Madison‘s administration.

 

   

238

ESpecially important are a number of letters indicating
Gallatin's interest in Latin America. Also the Treasurer’s
comments on Madison's proposed annual message of 1811 are
here. Only these criticisms indicate that, as originally
planned, this address may have been a war message.

Other manuscript collections of importance may be
found in the Library of Congress. There is a small folder
of Gallatin papers which contains many letters to Caesar
A. Rodney. Only several of these were pertinent to this
study. Although not very extensive, the Joseph Hopper
Nicholson Papers are an important source for the student
of Jeffersonian America. Nicholson, a cousin of Gallatin’s
wife, was one of the Pennsylvanian's good friends and a
close confidant. Aside from letters to his wife Gallatin
revealed himself more to Nicholson than any other person.

A number of printed collections were useful. Th3

Works_pf_Alexander Hamilton, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge (12

 

vols.; New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904) provides enough
material to allow good insights into the first Treasury

Secretary’s ideas on foreign policy. The Works of John

 

Adams, ed. Charles Francis Adams (10 vols.; Boston: Little
Brown and Company, 1850—1856) contains some, but by no
means all, of the Second President’s most important let-

ters. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul Leicester

 

Ford (10 vols.; New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1892-1899)
is the most accurate comprehensive printed collection of
Jefferson's writings. This collection will be superceded

by The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Julian P. Boyd (17

 

 

239

vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950-1965)
which has only reached 1791. Boyd’s work is monumental,
and this is surely a model editing job. However, at the
present pace this collection will not be finished until

well into the twenty—first century. The Writings of Albert

 

Gallatin, ed. Henry Adams (3 vols.; Philadelphia: J.P.
Lipincott, 1879) contains a number of errors and does not
do justice to the fine Gallatin collection at the New—York

Historical Society. Selected Writings of Albert Gallatin,

 

ed. E. James Ferguson (Indianapolis and New York: The
Bobbs—Merrill Company, Inc., 1967) is a much needed paper—
back edition Of Gallatin’s writings. The selections are
representative, and the editing is very good. Ferguson’s
editorial commentary comprises the most penetrating analy-
sis of Gallatin in print today.

Two major government documents were consulted in

preparing this study. Numerous volumes of the Annals of

 

Congress yield much important information on Congressional

 

attitudes. The volumes for the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Congress in which Gallatin participated were especially
useful for his many important Speeches. Unfortunately,
many of the debates are not reported accurately or in any
detail. American State Papers: Documents, Legislative,
and Executive of the Congress of the United States, From
the First Session of the First to the Third Session of the
Thirteenth Congress, Inclusive: Commencing March 3, 1789,
and Ending March 3, 1815, Selected and Edited; Under the

Authority of Congress, By Walter Lawrie, Secretary of the

 

1

 

 

240
Senate, and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, Clerk of the House

of Representatives (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832)
is a most important source. The volumes on foreign re-
lations allow one to trace the diplomacy of the early
national period. Although many of the most important
documents are included here, inevitably errors appear.
The volumes on finance Show how Gallatin attempted to

reconcile fiscal objectives with diplomatic policy.

Secondary Materials

 

For years the only scholarly biography of Albert

Gallatin was Henry Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin

 

(Philadelphia: J.P. Lipincott, 1879). Adams cast Gal-
latin in his own image and oversimplifies the Pennsyl-
vanian's New Republicanism into refined Federalism. As a
biography Adam's book is not adequate, but it does have
lasting value because Adams included the text of many im-
portant letters written by Gallatin which are not avail—
able elsewhere. Like many older biographies this book is
a quasi—primary source. In 1957 a much needed modern bio-
graphy of Gallatin appeared. Unfortunately Raymond

Walters Jr., Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier and

 

Diplomat (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957) is not a

 

particularly penetrating study. In this writer‘s opinion

E. James Ferguson, the editor of Selected Writings of A1—

 

bert Gallatin, comes closer to a meaningful portrayal of

 

Gallatin than any other historian. Lack of a solid bio-

graphy of Gallatin constitutes an important void in Jef—

fersonian historiography.

 

   

241

Thomas Jefferson is the subject of biographies too
numerous to mention. Perhaps the most outstanding one-

volume work is Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jefferson: The

 

Apostle of Americanism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan

 

Press, 1964). However, this account is thin on Jefferson’s

Presidency. Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson: A Biog-

 

raphy (2 vols.; New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1951)
in general is a balanced, unbiased account which contains
much information on the Presidential years. Dumas Malone,

Jefferson and His Time (3 vols.; Boston: Little Brown and

 

Company, 1948-1962) promises to be the definitive work on
the Sage of Monticello, but the latest volume concludes
in 1800.

James Madison has been the subject of a recent six-

volume biography. Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of

 

the Constitution 1787—1800 (Indianapolis and New York: The

 

Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1950); Irving Brant, James Madison:

 

Secretary of State 1800-1809 (Indianapolis and New York:

 

The Bobbs—Merrill Co., 1953) and Irving Brant, James

Madison: The President 1809-1812 (Indianapolis and New

 

York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1956) have all proved useful
in this study. Brant’s detailed work rescues James Mad-
ison from his critics, but in doing so the author is
overly favorable to his subject. However, Brant’s re-
search which is broad and impressive commands reSpect.

Henry Adams, History of the United States During the

 

Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (9

vols.; New York: Charles Scribner‘s Sons, 1889—1891) is a

 

 

242

brilliant and monumental work. The first six volumes
have been useful in considering the years after 1801.
Adams did research in British and French sources as well
as in the Obvious American materials. However, Adam’s
hostility to both Jefferson and Madison mars his work.
Many of his judgments have been revised in light of more
critical research. Nevertheless, any serious student of
the Jeffersonian period must contend with Adams.

A number of important monographs were useful in
studying the period from 1789 to 1801. John C. Miller,

The Federalist Era 1789—1801 (New York: Harper and Row,

 

1960) is a well written survey of the period. He is par—
ticularly strong on the years when Hamilton was in the
government, but he slights John Adams. Leonard D. White,

The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History (New

 

York: The Macmillan Company, 1948) reveals how the ma-
chinery of government worked 1789—1801. Noble E. Cun—

ningham Jr., The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation

 

of Party Organization, 1789-1801 (Chapel Hill: Published

 

for the Institute of Early American History by the Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1957) discusses the evolu—
tion of party machinery on the part of the Republicans.

Samuel F. Bemis, Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and

 

Diplomacy (rev. ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press,

 

1962) presents a definitive account of events leading up
to the treaty of 1794 between England and the United
States. Both Alexander DeConde, The Quasi—War: The P011—

tics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France

 

243
1797-1801 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1966) and

 

Stephen Kurtz, The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse

 

of Federalism 1795-1800 (Philadelphia: University of Penn—

 

sylvania Press, 1957) should be consulted for developments
during Adams' administration. Kurtz is particularly
strong on domestic developments, and DeConde discusses
diplomacy in great detail.

Many monographs deal with Special problems of the
Jeffersonian period. Of these Leonard D. White, Thg
Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1951) contains much of value. His
chapters on the embargo are particularly important. Many
books of varying quality deal with the diplomacy of the
Jeffersonian period. Two studies on Anglo-American re—

lations stand out. Bradford Perkins, The First Rapproche-

 

ment: England and the United States 1795—1805 (Philadelphia:

 

University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955) emphasizes that
relatively good relations existed between the English
speaking nations after the Jay Treaty until the Napoleonic

Wars were stalemated in 1805. Bradford Perkins, Prologue

 

to War: England and the United States 1805-1812 (Berkeley

 

and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961) is
critical of both Jefferson and Madison as well as the Re-
publicans in Congress. Perkins stresses maritime griev-
ances as a major cause of the war. Both books are based
on wide research in British and American sources. Arthur

Preston Whitaker, The United States and the Independence

 

of Latin America 1800-1830 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1964)

 

 

 

244

admirably documents the develOpment of American interest
in Latin America and the shift in American policy in

1808. Paul A. Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding

 

Fathers (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press,

1963) is the only study which deals with the diplomacy of
the period 1789—1812 as a whole. This book which stresses
American nationalism and the interrelationship of foreign
and domestic affairs combines superb analysis with stimu—

lating narrative.