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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

Frederick Libby and the American
Peace Movement, 1921-1941

presented by
George Peter Marabell

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph .D. Hictory

 

 

degree in

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Major professor

Date June 13, 1975

 

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ABSTRACT

FREDERICK LIBBY AND THE AMERICAN
PEACE MOVEMENT, 1921-1941

BY

George Peter Marabell

Disillusionment and the fear of war after World
War I led to the emergence of impatient peace activists
like Frederick Joseph Libby. Stung by the horror of war
and encouraged by pacifist beliefs, Libby organized the
National Council for the Prevention of War as a clearing—
house for peace work. Libby believed that the "forces
of war" exerted pressure on policy makers because they
were organized, thus, he organized the "forces of peace."
Peace activists welcomed the NCPW and quickly joined
Libby to influence the proceedings of the Washington
Conference of 1921-1922.

During the twenties, as Libby organized one
successful campaign after another, he constantly sought
support for his analysis of international affairs and
his solution to international political problems. The
world was divided into "have" and "have-not" nations,

he argued, in which the "haves" controlled the

George Peter Marabell

"have-note" until the "have-nots" challenged the status-
quo in order to enjoy equal access to the world's
resources and markets. Libby advocated an end to
colonial empires and the dropping of all trade restric-
tions so that "have" and "have-not" alike might acquire
their fair share. He also suggested that the best way
to avoid war was to deal with a problem before it became
a crisis. In order to accomplish this he advocated the
establishment of peace machinery: a world organization,
a world court and the outlawry of war.

Libby was primarily a political organizer and
therefore he concentrated his efforts on coordinating
peace activists. To this end, he refined as yet unsophis—
ticated mass communications techniques--letters, petitions,
telegrams, news releases--for his own purposes. Libby
brought into the NCPW nonpeace groups who expressed an
interest in avoiding war but who had never before had a
voice in Washington. The peace groups and nonpeace groups
who comprised the NCPW could, at Libby's request, flood
Congress or the President with letters and petitions.

Libby also created an effective lobbying force
through the use of staff personnel and allies in Congress.
On several occasions significant pressure was exerted to
accomplish a specific task. Libby's belief in the neces-

sity of pressure politics brought him and the NCPW into

George Peter Marabell

the political arena where his decisions reflected not only
his moral and ethical beliefs but his political judgment.

As long as Libby focused his efforts on the
attainment of internationalist goals like disarmament,
as he did in the twenties, Libby enjoyed substantial
support from the peace movement. But, as the inter—
national order began to crumble, first in Manchuria and
finally in Europe, many peace activists withdrew their
support. The internationalists increasingly advocated
collective action to halt the aggressors while Libby
ignored internationalist goals in his pursuit of
American isolation from war. Libby now directed all
his efforts at keeping America out of war and advocated
learning "to live in a world dominated by Hitler." The
distaste for that position cost Libby his influence and
support within the peace movement. The leadership and
flexibility he had shown in the 19205 was superseded by
his fear of war and the spiritual and physical devas-
tation it caused. His fanatical determination to keep
America out of war was not in keeping with his judgments
in the twenties and was unacceptable in a world on the
brink of global war.

It is unfortunate that much of what Libby had
worked so hard to achieve should be obscured by the
rigidity of his position in the thirties. He helped

remove the negative connotations from the word "pacifist"

George Peter Marabell

and brought peace activism a new respectability it
deserved. But through his advocacy of isolationism
Libby allowed pacifists and peace activists to again be
judged within the confines of rigid moral guidelines.

In the preparation of this dissertation the public
and private writings of Frederick Libby were examined.
Particular attention was paid to the newsletters which
Libby edited for thirty-three years. Also consulted were
his two books, his diaries and his correspondence. Many
of the more important secondary works on the interwar

period were also examined.

FREDERICK LIBBY AND THE AMERICAN

PEACE MOVEMENT, 1921-1941

BY

George Peter Marabell

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1975

Copyright by
George Peter Marabell

1975

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Warren I. Cohen for all
the usual reasons, but particularly for understanding me
and being willing to accept it. Deep appreciation is
due my editor, Linda Marabell, for making the writing
so much better and improving the quality of all my work.
Thanks also goes to Bernice Nichols and Nina Walls at
Swarthmore for all their help and for telling me about
the Inglenook. I would like to thank the other members
of my committee, William B. Hixson, Madison Kuhn and
Paul Sweet, my parents and all my friends in and out of
academia for making these years enjoyable. Lastly, a
very special thanks goes to Gloria, for reasons only

Linda and I understand.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . . . . 250

iii

CHAPTER 1

The Metropolitan police estimated that on
November 12, 1921 almost 1,500 people withstood a cold
wind to watch the foreign dignitaries arrive: Briand
from France, Balfour from England, Shidehara and Kato
from Japan and Schanzer from Italy. To Congress,
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and President
Warren G. Harding the visitors were representing their
governments in discussions that would lead to new agree-
ments on armaments. But to the people in the streets
they represented the belief that people around the world
agreed on the necessity of arms limitations.

The atmosphere of post-war America was charac-
terized by disillusionment over the horror of war, the
failure of the Senate to ratify the Versailles Treaty
and the failure of the United States to join the League
of Nations. But disillusionment was tempered by a faint
optimism brought on by the acknowledged necessity of
coming to grips with the problems of war and peace,
armaments limitations and the settlement of disputes if
the world was to have any chance of avoiding another

holocaust. Such feelings were nothing new and the

National Council for the Limitations of Armaments was
organized to effectively express American opinion on

the subject and to make " . . . an outstanding success

of the Hughes Conference."1 Many people such as Frederick
J. Libby, founder of the Council, worked actively toward

the resolution of these problems.

I

The 19208 have frequently been described by
observers as "normalcy" at home and as a time of isolation
from world affairs. But the validity of these judgments
depended largely on the perspective used. If the domestic
scene was viewed as a return to the noStalgic calm of an
earlier time, of jazz, automobiles and F. Scott Fitzgerald
then "Normalcy" is as useful a label as any. If the per-
spective is enlarged somewhat, prohibition, the Ku Klux
Klan, Teapot Dome and the "Red Scare" quickly come to
mind. It was not if a person was a "flapper" that
mattered, but whether one was a "radical" or a "one-
hundred percent American." Only those of British stock
were above suspicion; all others were suspect and the
intensity of suspicion depended on one's reaffirmation
of America's traditions, beliefs and symbols. Not

adhering to these vague standards could result in being

 

1Frederick J. Libby, To End War: The Story of
the National Council for the Prevention of War TNyack,
N.Y.: Fellowship Publications, 1969Y, p. 10.

 

 

railroaded out of town by the local constable or being
shipped out of the country by an enterprising Attorney
General with eyes on the White House.2

The degree to which America was judged to be
isolationist presented similar problems. Compared with
America's participation in the war, in the peace con-
ference and her brief attempts at internationalism through
the League of Nations, the 19205 did indeed seem isola-
tionist. But viewed within a larger framework encom-
passing at least the pre—war years, America's partici-
pation in world affairs was significant. Cooperative
efforts with other governments on the problem of armaments
and arbitration of disputes and the expansion of economic
interests were important concerns to America's policy
makers.

Perhaps a more accurate description of the mood
of the period (also frequently used) was disillusionment.
It was the mental void of disillusionment that would be
filled by "Red Scares" and the rise of economic nation-
alism. "The events of 1919," said Scott Fitzgerald,
"left us cynical . . . " about America's entrance in

the Great War and about continued participation in the

 

2Stanley Cohen, "A Study in Nativism: The
American Red Scare of 1919-1920," Political Science
Quarterly 79 (March 1964): 73. For a different assess-
ment see William J. Preston, Jr., Aliens and Dissenters:
Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933 (New York:
Harper & Row, 1963; Harper Torchbookélp pp. 181-276.

 

 

3 This war had been dif-

political affairs of the world.
ferent. There were few songs sung or romantic adventures
told to trigger the memory about the war. Instead people
questioned the rationale President Wilson used as he led
the nation to war and measured it against the results of
the Treaty of Paris. In attempting to gain enthusiastic
support for the war, Wilson resorted to rhetoric and
moralistic images rather than concrete issues. By con-
trasting the nature and motives of autocratic and demo-
cratic governments, he hoped to arouse the moral indig-
nation of the people against Germany for putting an end

to world peace. "A steadfast concert for peace," he
argued, "can never be maintained except by a partnership

of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be
trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenents."4
Wilson's assertions about the illegitimacy of autocratic
governments and their tendency to ignore such vague con-
cepts as neutral rights were difficult concepts for the
average American to comprehend. Had he chosen less lofty

reasons for fighting; that a victorious Germany would

threaten the United States or that the defeat of the

 

3F. Scott Fitzgerald, "The Crack—up," in The
Diversity of Modern America: Essays in History Since
Werld war One, ed. David Burner (New York: Appleton-

Crofts, I970}, p. 56.

4Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Record, 65th Con-
gress, lst Session, April 2,—1917, vol. 55, Part I,
p. 104.

 

Allies would have destroyed the community of interest
between Atlantic neighbors, the nation probably would
have understood. But, as Walter Lippmann argued shortly
before the United States began fighting, "If we put the
matter on the basis of neutral rights we shall never know
whether we have vindicated them or not, and our partici-
pation in the war would be as futile as a duel of honor."5
By linking entrance in the war with its outcome, Wilson
tied the validity of his rationale for intervention to
the perceived accomplishments of the treaty conference.
Adverse reaction to the treaty negotiated by the
Allied representatives at Paris thus contributed to the
feeling of disillusionment. What Americans observed was
not the acceptance of fourteen honorable points but the
assertion of nationalistic desires by the victors, and a
compromise of ideals by Wilson. The world, it seemed,
was no better off than before the war. The bitter debate
at home that followed, symbolized by Wilson and Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge, added to the confusion. The futile
battle over the Treaty, the League and Article X led
Americans into the 19205 with the determination to avoid
another war and maintain the peace. In this atmosphere
pacifist thought was to gain wider acceptance than any-

time before or since.

 

5Walter Lippmann, "The Defense of the Atlantic
World," New Republic 10 (February 17, 1917): 61.

 

Pacifist sentiment has always lived on the fringe
of respectability.6 It has gained marginal acceptance
only when joining movements with wider support. Such was
the case during the interwar years. Historically, the
nature of pacifism has been either religious or ethical.
Positive and optimistic, the religious pacifist valued
such things as trust, good will and love. Their personal
relationships, particularly the family set the standards
by which all other relationships were measured including
a pattern for operating in the national and international
world. For the religious pacifist, this approach to life
was the example they offered for others to follow.

Less theologically oriented, the secular pacifist
focused on the value of humanity and the consequences of
war and violence on the human spirit. The secular
pacifists were those who saw violence and war as irra-
tional and costly in terms of its effects on human pro-
gress and society and in terms of money, lives and

property wasted.7

 

6Several useful works, of varying quality, were

used for this overview, including: Peter Brook, Pacifism
in the United States: From the Colonial Era to the First
WOrld war (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

; Merle Curti, Peace or War: The American Struggle
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1936); and’C. Roland’Marchafid]
The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898—1918
(Princeton, N.J.: University of Princeton Press, 1972).

 

 

7John K. Nelson, The Peace Prophets: American
Pacifist Thought, 1919-194IT(Chape1 Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1967). p. 5.

 

 

The American pacifist experience has manifested
itself in several forms with significant yet subtle
intellectual differences. The Mennonites, for example,
adhere to the separation of church and state quite
literally and refuse participation in worldly-govern-
mental affairs. Although they oppose war and violence
they refuse participation in activities working to alle-
viate them. Quakers, on the other hand, are more likely
to be activists, working tirelessly toward their goal of
changing the order of things. Because they are not bound
by dogma, Quakers are constantly questioning and changing
the tactics used. Their attempts to change the order of
things have led them to oppose not only war and violence
but oppression of the human spirit. It would not be until
after the war that the Quaker ideal of working for a new
social order would gain pre-eminence. Political action
was still a secondary tactic to education and discussion.8

Before 1917, many pacifists joined nonpacifist
peace societies as an outlet for their ideas on the con-
duct of national and international affairs. Two of the
earliest societies, the Massachusetts Peace Society
(1815) and the first New York Peace Society (1828),

argued not only against war but were influenced by

 

8Charles Chatfield, "World War I and the Liberal
Pacifist in the United States," American Historical Review
75 (December 1970): 1921.

 

humanitarian motives as they opposed social ills ranging
from the disenfranchisement of women to slavery.9 With
the establishment by Andrew Carnegie of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in 1910, peace socie-
ties were cast in a different light. Their primary goal
was now the prevention of war and their activities were
called pacifistic. Although the label was incorrect, it
was one that would remain through, and following, the war
to describe any and all peace efforts irrespective of
group membership, aims or methods.10 The label would
also take on negative connotations--Communist, draft
dodger--and the accepted definition of the day was
governed not by principles or ideology but by rapidly
changing circumstances in foreign affairs. As the
nation progressed toward involvement in World War I

the definition narrowed to "opposition to all war" with
decidedly negative descriptions. As the desire for
peace gained wider acceptance, as it did in the 19208,
the definition broadened with equally favorable

descriptions.ll

 

9Curti, Peace or War, p. 35. For a discussion of
early peace society activity see Curti, Peace or War,
pp. 16-103 and Peter Brook, Pacifism in the United States,
pp. 333—866.

 

 

 

loNorman Angell, "Pacifism," Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences, vol. 11, 527-28.

 

 

llCharles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice:
Pacifism in America, 1914—1941 (Knoxville: University
of Tennessee Press, 1971): P. 4. '

 

 

In understanding the mind and methods of pacifists
like Frederick Libby, a narrow definition of pacifism.is
misleading. A more appropriate label, one that leads to
greater understanding of post-war motives and tactics,
would be "peace activist." The term permits flexibility
in our understanding and it grants, to those under exami-
nation, flexibility not allowed by the narrow confines of
the term "pacifist." All too often those studying
pacifism have evaluated pacifists only in terms of the
rigid moral guidelines that that term permits. This
built-in qualification has led to restricted and often
shallow judgments of those working for peace, allowing
for little or no intellectual change, of cynically calling
intellectual change opportunistic and of such crude
appraisals of pacifism as too idealistic, overly moral
and irrelevant.12 It will be seen shortly that to define
a person like Frederick Libby solely in terms of his
pacifism restricts not only accurate judgments but limits
an appreciation of a man who was intellectually open,
broadminded and never ceasing in his efforts to expand

his thinking.

 

12For example, see the treatment of pacifists
and pacifism in Robert Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest
in America's Forei n Relations (Chicago: Universityof
CHicago Press, 19 ; Selig Adler, The Isolationist
Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York:
Abelard-Schuman, 1967); andeonald B. Meyers, The Pro-
testant Search for Political Realism, 1919-1941
(Berkley: UnIVersIty of California Press, 1960).

 

 

 

 

 

10

Despite the stereotypes imposed on pacifists,
they frequently confused their contemporaries with
several opinions on issues many nonpacifists believed
had only one position. Their emphasis on tactics and
the use of worldly apparatus, for example, led to varying
opinions on the legitimacy of the use of force. The
seriousness of this debate manifested itself as pacifists
joined so-called internationalists prior to World War I
in an attempt to establish some form of machinery for
settling disputes. The argument focused on the role, if
any, the use of force through sanctions and mutual defense
agreements should play in the mechanism of an organization.
Those who " . . . thought in terms of an organic function—
ing body," the "internationalists," supported, in varying
degrees and methods, the use of economic and military
sanctions as a means of enforcing compliance with the
will of the organization.13

Although most pacifists accepted the use of
diplomatic sanctions, the debate over sanctions of force
can be seen by briefly examining the League to Enforce

14

Peace. Considered the " . . . most active and

influential . . . ” of the pre-war internationalist

 

13Warren F. Kuehl, Seeking World Order: The
United States and International Organization to 1920
TNashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 19697,
pp. viii, 200-19.

 

14Nelson, The Peace Prophets, p. 111.

 

11

societies, the League came into being following a series
of organizational meetings leading to a statement of
principles.15 That statement--the League's program--was
deliberately worded to encourage wide support among dis-
organized internationalists. Although its tenets sug-
gested the supremacy of dispute settlement by methods
generally referred to as arbitration and conciliation,
which pleased pacifists, its advocacy of force produced
dissent. Nicholas Murray Butler of the Carnegie Endowment
argued that the use of sanctions was unacceptable. He
suggested that if any organization was forthcoming it

should be based on a system of justice via courts,

 

15Kuehl, Seeking World Order, pp. 200, 214. The
final resolutions of the group were:

”1. That it is the opinion of those present that it
is desirable for the United States to form a
League of all great nations in which all jus-
ticiable questions between them would be sub-
mitted to a judicial tribunal.

2. That members of the League shall jointly use
their military force to prevent any one of their
number from going to war or committing acts of
hostility against any member before the question
at issue has been submitted to the tribunal.

3. That nations shall be compelled to submit non—
justiciable questions to a Council of Concili-
ation before going to war, under the same penalty
as provided above.

4. That conferences between the parties to this
agreement shall be held from time to time to
formulate and to codify rules of international
law which, unless some nation shall signify its
dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter
govern in the decision of the aforementioned
tribunal." p. 190.

 

12

inquiries and commissions.16 Other pacifists argued that
some form of neutral enforcement agency was permissible.
Their rationale was based on the analogy of the domestic
police force which was necessary to maintain order but
was not considered, at least theoretically, a military
unit, but an impartial administrator of the law. The
distinction was not one clearly understood by inter-
nationalists. During the crises of the inter-war years,
pacifists would reluctantly advocate economic sanctions
ranging from simple threats to complete blockades and
boycotts.

The argument over sanctions in the pre-war years
was clearly symptomatic of a deeper, more fundamental
dispute over the nature of man and the ability of an
international organization to succeed in a hostile
environment. The internationalists believed that a
workable system could be imposed to accomplish highly
desirable ends regardless of the environment, but
sanctions would be needed to enforce compliance. The
pacifists responded that no imposed system could succeed
without a basic change in the outlook of people. They
felt that if people believed in and actively sought the
benefits of peace, resorting to sanctions and force would
be unnecessary. Pacifists refused support for inter-

nationalists as the debate continued and neither group

 

161bid., p. 208.

13

was to be satisfied with the international organization
that came out of Paris. The problems of that organization
and its environment would be left largely to a new gen-
eration~-"liberal pacifists" Charles Chatfield called
them--whose opposition to war and violence deve10ped
during and immediately following WOrld War I. They

included A. J. Muste, Kirby Page and Frederick J. Libby.

II

The Libby heritage was firmly rooted in south-
eastern Maine farming beginning with John Libby in 1637.
On November 24, 1874, in the small town of Richmond,
Frederick Joseph Libby was born into a family in which
community service was both vocation and avocation. His
father, Abial Libby, who rejected farming to study
medicine at Bowdoin College, was the epitome of the
country doctor. Using an "open sleigh in winter and a
buggy in summer . . . " he never refused a patient's
request for help and payment was often made with apples
or potatoes.17 At great personal risk, Abial Libby often
advocated Democratic politics in solidly Republican Maine
and taught his son to be an independent thinker.

Libby's mother, Susan Lennan Libby, also served
the community well as a schoolteacher. Libby called her

a "born teacher," the truth of which was reflected in her

 

17Libby, To End War, p. 2.

 

l4

preparing him so well that he began college at the age

of fifteen--after waiting a year to mature. Like his
father, Libby attended Bowdoin College in nearby Brunswick.
In 1894, at the age of nineteen, he graduated ” . . .
second in a class of forty-eight and 'magna cum laude'

lest anyone should think I was too young for college."18

Uncertain of his future, Libby followed the
family's tradition of community service as high school
principal in Boothbay Harbor and Richmond, Maine. He
rather vaguely defined his goals as international travel
and expanding his education, and for the next twenty
years he would do both. His experiences in England and
the Continent, the Middle East, the Pacific and the Far
East contributed to his fundamental understanding of
people and lay the foundations for his pacifist senti-
ments and his dedication to working for peace.

After the death of his father in 1898, Libby
made his first trip to Germany, where he studied German
philosophy. He returned to Germany in 1902 after grad—
uating from Andover Theological Seminary with a two-year
travel/study fellowship award. He traveled extensively
throughout the Continent and the Middle East during
vacations from study at universities in Marburg and
Berlin, Germany and Oxford, England. Libby felt that

he had profited from study in two completely different

 

181bid., p. 3.

15

educational systems: " . . . the accurate and precise
scholarship . . . " of the German university and the

” . . . broad grasp of principles . . . " offered at

Oxford.19
It was while studying at the Congregational
Mansfield College (Oxford) that Libby met pacifist Leyton
Richards. Richards gained prominence while a pastor in
Melbourne, Australia fighting that country's conscription
laws and was a leader of the British Fellowship of Recon-
ciliation. Through his friendship with Richards, Libby
gained a broad understanding of pacifism and pacifist
thinking prior to his peace activism in the twenties.20
He recalled Richards answering all the hard questions put
to him on the subject. Libby was no doubt impressed by
his willingness to discuss issues ranging from simple to
complex and with his well thought-out answers. Several
years later, in preparation for an interview that pro-

bably began with questions as basic as those he first

asked Richards, Libby wrote a long memo entitled "Answers

 

lgIbid.

20Three sermons on pacifism by Libby, 1904-05;
Libby letters to parents, August 17, 1918 and December 15,
1918; Frederick J. Libby Papers, MS Division, Library of
Congress (hereafter cited as Libby Papers).

16

to Hard Questions."21

After dispensing with the mundane,
he offered some responses that, although directed to
personal conduct, were indicative of his outlook on the
conduct of international affairs.22 Responding to an
either-or question; would he take the life of an attacker
if that was the only way to prevent the death of a loved
one, Libby said, "Probably I should if I allowed the
situation to reach that (point) . . . "23 The impli-
cations for conduct were clear; all necessary steps
should be taken to prevent tension from turning into
crisis. Furthermore, steps should be taken to reduce
tension and discourage policies that lead to it. At the
time this was written, Libby was actively engaged in
efforts to influence policy along precisely those lines.
Answering the question, "Do you 'turn the other cheek'
when anybody hits you?," Libby said, "Nobody lives up to

24

his ideals." This statement predated by ten years

 

21F. J. Libby Memo, August 24, 1928, Archives of
the National Council for the Prevention of War (hereafter
cited as NCPW files), Swarthmore College Peace Collection,
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.

22Not without a certain degree of humor, the
memo went, in part:
"Question: Would you fight for your wife?
Answer: I am not married.
Question: Would you fight for your mother?
Answer: My mother is dead. . . ."

23 24

Ibid., p. 1. Ibid., p. 2.

17

Libby's moral predicament over the use of sanctions as
the world crept closer to another war. His "ideals"
were based on his understanding of pacifism, to which
Richards contributed so much. Their friendship was one
of the two most important influences directing Libby
towards a life devoted to peace activism.

Libby was an intellectual adventurer, always
questioning, seeking and explaining. Although a person
of firm convictions, he was always allowing them to be
challenged on the theory that great harm was done by
closing one's mind to new ideas. If beliefs were soundly
based on evidence and morality they would not suffer from
re-examination. If they were unsound, the only acceptable
alternative was change. A brief examination of Libby's
evolving attitude toward the struggle of blacks for
acceptance and equality exemplifies this point. In 1908
Libby spent a month touring the states of the Old Con-
federacy " . . . to study the Negro problem. . . . '25
In his journal of the trip, after many pages of descrip-
tion, anecdote and personal observation, Libby concluded
by paternalistically speculating on the future of blacks
in this country, focusing on blacks not on whites, or on
white racism. The solution to the "Negro problem” was

through "Industrial education for the masses. . . . They

 

25Journal of Southern Trip, September 23-
October 17, 1908, Libby Papers.

18

need development of their powers. They are but ignorant
children else [gigj." Regarding social and political
justice, Libby suggested that whites must "give it,"

that by "clamoring for it" blacks only weaken their
position. "The Negro must depend on the sense of justice
of the best whites" if not for himself then "for his

children."26

The origins of anti-black bias are fre—
quently debated, but the effects of that bias are long
term and usually strengthen with age. And yet, in 1930
at the age of fifty-six, while speculating on what the
empires of Africa and Asia would be like in twenty years,
he argued that " . . . the white man loved to boss other
people around for their own good and for his own . . .
the white man with one-eighth of the population of the
world dominates three-fourths of the earth's surface."
But in the 19308 black people were "clamoring" for social
and political justice: "The principle of self-determi-
nation is loose in the world." The quelling of discon-
tented peoples " . . . would certainly require the aid
of force," which Libby did not condone. Thus, he advo-

cated a voluntary end to white domination.27

 

26Ibid., last three pages of Journal. (pages
unnumbered)

27"Where Shall We Be in 1950?," JUIY 10' 1930'
NCPW files.

19

It could, of course, be argued that Libby's new
attitude reflected sixty years of changed circumstances,
but this would be only partially correct. Changing con—
ditions alone are no guarantee of flexibility unless one
is predisposed to such mental activity. Libby's open-
mindedness existed before his acceptance of pacifist
thought and his evolving attitude toward the black struggle
was indicative of his application of both to explain the
causes of war. Minority oppression was a major cause of
conflict and war, which the ethnic problems of Central
Europe prior to World War I clearly demonstrated. "A
nation is judged by its treatment of minorities," he
argued, and there was little doubt in his mind that the
”underprivileged nations" and "exploited peoples of Africa
and the Orient are 'on the move.’ . . . The colored races
are not content with a white man's world and the 'Have
Nots' are determined to resist the domination of the
more fortunate 'Haves.‘ . . . We are confronted with
the problem of achieving peace in the whole world and

28 Thus, to Libby,

not in a small portion of it."
whatever threatened peace-—imperialism, economic
exploitation or, in this case, oppression--mu8t be
eliminated to reduce tensions that ultimately lead to

violence and war.

 

28Notes by Libby, 1943, NCPW files: Notes on
"Peace" by Libby, late 19308 (no date), NCPW files.

20

The important point, for understanding Libby,
was his ability and willingness to change because cir-
cumstances had indeed changed, but also because the
accomplishment of desirable goals (peace) necessitated
changing the means (opposition to oppression, etc.) by
which those goals were attained. Since he was convinced
that his own willingness to change had furthered his
efforts for peace, Libby argued that change also played
a significant role in international affairs and the quest
for peace. "We shall have to begin by ridding our minds
. . . and the world of the notion that peace means pre—
servation of the status-quo." Belief in this "fallacy"
has caused numerous conflicts. "The plain fact is that
there is no 'status-quo' to be disturbed . . . change is
the only constant in human relations." Libby argued that
the Versailles Treaty was an attempt to preserve the
status-quo that was doomed to failure because change
was "inevitable." " . . . Our choice is only between

29 The political

violent change and peaceful change."
world, unfortunately, was not as openminded as Frederick
Libby.

Except for a year (1911) of travel in the Pacific

and the Far East, Libby remained in the United States

from 1904 to 1917 as pastor of Union Congregational

 

29"The Problem of Peace." June 11: 1937' NCPW

files.

21

Church in Magnolia, Massachusetts and then as a member
of the faculty at Phillips Exeter Academy teaching
Religion and German and as an advisor to the Christian

Fraternity.30

As the stability of the European alliance
system deteriorated into war, he spoke out against the
inhumanity and destructiveness of it and cautioned the
United States against involvement. But in the Spring of
1917 American participation was a fact, and like millions
of people on both sides of the Atlantic, Libby's future
was directly affected by his experiences with the war.
Following considerable anti-pacifist pressure from some
Exeter alumni, Libby was among nine faculty members who
tendered their resignation from the school. Rather than
agree to his resignation, the trustees of the Academy
offered Libby a leave of absence, which he accepted.31
He now turned his attention to the task of how
best to serve the cause of peace and humanity in the
midst of war. As an ordained Congregational minister
who also happened to be forty-four years old, Libby was

not subject to the draft. He offered his services to

the Young Mens Christian Association which was working

 

3oMyron R. Williams, The Stogy of Phillips Exgter
(Exeter, N.H.: Phillips Exeter Academy, 1957), pp. 157-
58.

 

31Libby, To End War, p. 5; Laurence M. Crosbie,
The Phillips Exeter Academy: A History (Norwood, Mass.:
Plimpton Press, 1924), p. 261.

 

 

22

in German prisoner of war camps. Despite his fluency in
German, the application was rejected because of mounting
criticism that the YMCA was a refuge for conscientious
objectors. Quite by accident—-"God took a hand in my
affairs. . . . " Libby reflected-—he read in the New

York Post, which he subscribed to "out of loyalty" to

 

its pacifist publisher, Oswald Garrison Villard, that
conscientious objectors were authorized by the Secretary

32 The work

of war to help in restoring French villages.
was being done by a newly organized Quaker group, the
American Friends Service Committee. This time his offer
of help was accepted and Libby sailed for France in

July, 1918. Through the AFSC, Libby's experience with
the aftermath of war was to be the other important
influence leading him to a life dedicated to working

for peace. Visiting a recent battlefield, Libby wrote:
"We happened upon several bodies that had been overlooked.
There sprawled the remains of husbands, fathers . . .
sons, sodden bodies rotting in the sun. The roots of my
pacifism sank deep into that rich earth."33

In the Spring of 1920, after a brief stay at

Phillips Exeter Academy, Libby returned to Europe at the

 

32Libby, To End War, p. 5.

 

33Ibid., p. 6. Libby letter to parents,
February 15, 1919, Libby Papers.

23

invitation of the AFSC as European Commissioner to
coordinate Friends missions in Central Europe. After
visiting Germany, Austria and Poland, Libby returned to
the United States to help make public opinion aware of
the need for food and clothing by the victims of the war.
It had been more than two years since Libby stood
in that French battlefield and he wrote later that
" . . . the purpose of my life was growing clearer and

34 The culmination of events and emotions sur—

clearer."
rounding werld War I left many "cynical," but Libby's
resolve led him to what was left of the peace movement.
”The growth of peace sentiment in our country in the
Spring of 1921," he said, "was as striking as was the
lack of coordination among the many peace movements."35
After joining the Religious Society of Friends in Phila-
delphia, Libby, who had resigned from the AFSC, and
several leading Friends exchanged ideas about the "next"
war, and the future of the peace movement. Their first
decisive step was the founding of the ten—member Friends
Disarmament Council, the nucleus for a larger organization

that would act as a clearinghouse for those dedicated to

working for peace. The calling of the Washington

 

34Ibid., p. 6.

35Libby biographical information sheet,
December 6, 1924, NCPW files.

24

Conference provided them with their first opportunity
for effective action.

In the years immediately preceding the 1921 Con—
ference, Libby's decision to dedicate his life to working
for peace was based on his pacifism, his relief work and
his estimate of the nation's sentiment for peace. The
Friends Disarmament Council was his first practical step
toward organizing peace advocates. Libby's intention
was to bring them together not on an ideological basis,

but with a clear view of real-world problems and real—

world solutions.

CHAPTER 2

The goals had been peace, security and an end to
war. But publication of the Versailles Treaty and its
rejection by the United States Senate made those goals
seem just as illusive as before. Many people who had
supported Wilson and the war became cynical and with their
despair indulged in the trivia of the 19208--the "Lost
Generation," Gertrude Stein called them. But at the
same time there were those, Frederick Libby among them,
who did not resign from the world, who embraced not trivia

but the belief that those goals were still attainable.

I

Explaining why some were disillusioned and some
were not is a difficult task but for Libby and others
like him one thing seemed certain: unlike the reformers
and liberal intellectuals such as John Dewey who had
accepted Wilson's lofty rhetoric, Libby had no illusions
about the reality of war. He was not persuaded by
‘Wilson that the war was a positive good or that its
outcome would mean security or the realization of
idealism. Libby would have agreed with Randolph

Bourne, the war's anti-hero, that:

25

26

. . . values such as artistic creation, knowledge,
reason, beauty, the enhancement of life, are
instantly and almost unanimously sacrificed.

. . . The war--or American promise: one must
choose. One cannot be interested in both. For
the effect of war will be to impoverish American
promise.

With this thought in mind, many peace activists began
thinking about the methods and tactics needed to face
the challenges of the post-war era and they hOped for

the right opportunity to act.

Libby was convinced that the disillusionment of

both activist and average American was so widespread
that the desire for peace was a deeply felt emotion.
He was correct, but the problem was how to translate
that desire into effective, meaningful action. By the
Spring of 1921, there were literally dozens of peace
societies in addition to numerous groups, like the
YMCA, the Parent-Teachers Association and the newly
formed National League of women Voters whose secondary
concern was peace. They all acted independently on
peace-related issues resulting in needless duplication

of effort and expense. According to Libby, the "chief

subject of conversation everywhere" was the "next war."

 

1Randolph S. Bourne, War and the Intellectuals:

Collected Essays, 1915-1919, ed. Carliiesek (New York:
Harper & Row, 1964; Harper Torchbooks), pp. 46, 71.

 

2Libby, To End War, p. 8.

 

2

27

The impetus for action came from fear and des-
peration felt by many activists over the armament pro-
grams of the United States, Great Britain and Japan.

The rivalry among these nations expressed itself in a
race to build naval armaments "but it went much deeper,
it had its origins in a shifting distribution of world
power."3 The crucial point for understanding this
rivalry was the rise in power of Japan and the United
States and the relative decline of Germany and Great
Britain. In the Pacific, defeated Germany was gone and
victorious England had reduced her presence considerably.
Thus it was left for the United States to meet the
increasingly powerful Japanese. But, Tokyo was clearly
distrustful of Washington's intentions. Their relation-
ship had been characterized by America's opposition to
Japanese rights in Shantung, by continuing immigration
restrictions and by continuing anti-Japanese sentiment
on the West Coast. Across the Atlantic, England, weak-
ened financially by the war, refused to relinquish her
superior position at sea but found underwriting that
position extremely costly. Most important for the
Japanese and the British was America's stronger phy-
sical and financial position should a naval race continue

unabated. Faced with just such a prospect and a massive

 

3Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's
Foreign Relations, p. 334.

 

 

28

building request from the Navy Department, Idaho Senator
William E. Borah, who later became Chairman of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a reso-
lution in December, 1920 calling on President Harding

to initiate a three-way conference to discuss the dangers
of, and hopefully an end to, the armaments race.

Robert Endicott Osgood argued that these two
events-~the Naval appropriations request and the Borah
Resolution--made the desire for arms limitations "a
full-fledged movement in December, 1920." But this
judgment seems premature. Libby, certainly at the
center of any "movement," found it difficult to rally
any sizable support until the late Spring of the
following year. Charles Chatfield has argued that
even peace societies were slow to act and John Chalmers
Vinson argued more cautiously that the appropriations
request and the resolution "awakened an . . . enthu-
siastic response from the American peOple," but little
else.4 It was only after numerous groups like the
National League of Women Voters and the Federal Council
of Churches took up the cause of disarmament that public

momentum really began.

 

4Chatfield, For Peace and Justigg, p. 149; John
Chalmers Vinson, The—Parchment Peace: The United States
Senate and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Athens:
UnIVersity of Georgia Press, 1955), pp. 51-52. Also
see Vinson, William E. Borah anglthe Outlawry of War
(Athens: University of—Georgia Press, 1957), pp. 37, 38.

 

29

Disarmament, or more properly, arms limitation,
was of high priority with many of the groups interested
in securing peace. It was an issue easily comprehended,
for the "connection" between arms and war missed no one.
A limitation on armaments was seen by peace activists
as a preventative to war. According to their line of
thinking, armament building programs always led to war;
the arms were built to be used. Thus, any government
that reduced its armament program was thought to be more
interested in securing peace than in preparing for war.
Furthermore, a reduction in arms building would have
been in keeping with America's traditional policy of
disarming at the conclusion of a war. Peace activists
also argued that a reduction in arms building would
mean a reduction in taxes on the average citizen since
tax revenues financed the armaments programs.

Disarmament advocates also believed that a con-
ference for arms limitation would appeal to those like
Senator Borah who argued against c00peration with any
League of Nations efforts at arms limitation. According
to Borah, by taking the initiative for reducing armaments
itself,'the United States could preserve the sovereignty
it would lose by cooperating with the League. Such
voluntary action would result in specific requirements
agreed to in writing instead of adhering to the vague

pronouncements of the League. Thus, the United States

30

could not be caught off guard by unforeseen contingencies.
California Senator, Hiram Johnson, a long-time opponent
of international c00peration, voiced his support for
Borah's resolution. So, two of the most stalwart, vocal
opponents of international cooperation through the

League, came out in favor of international cooperation
sponsored by the United States because they believed

her freedom of action was preserved.

Throughout the Winter of 1920-21, Libby spoke
on behalf of peace and the necessity of arms limitation
but he was frustrated that the Quaker Speakers Bureau
limited his speaking engagements to audiences so pre-
disposed to their line of thinking. Libby pleaded with
the Bureau to schedule appearances before groups with
more diverse opinions on peace and war. He believed
that those most in need of hearing his speeches were
the opponents of arms limitation and those who had
decided for peace but had yet to become actively
involved in working for it.

On June 22, 1921, shortly before Congress was
to consider the Borah Resolution, Libby was invited by
the leaders of several Philadelphia Quaker groups to
join them in discussions concerning tactics and the
limitation of armaments. Sympathetic to Libby's desire
to reach more people, these Quaker leaders hoped Libby

could contribute to the development of some type of

31

coordinated, effective plan to further the cause of arms
reduction. The outcome of this meeting was the formation
of the Friends Disarmament Council whose objective was
"to coordinate the disarmament work of Friends while
not displacing . . . (other) peace committees . . . (and)
to articulate . . . the great disarmament sentiment of
America and the world." It was the hope of those present
that the Council would be the forerunner of a larger
clearinghouse of the nation's diversified groups that
sought peace; "we should appeal not only to friends but
to the general public . . . (and) farmer organizations,
labor, women's clubs, churches, etc. . . . "5
The formation of the Council did not initially
meet with universal Quaker approval. The American
Friends Service Committee objected to the political
nature of the Council's raison d'etre. The AFSC was
organized to conduct relief work and its brief but
solid tradition, pointedly nonpolitical, frowned on
political action by its workers. Since most of the
Council's members belonged to the AFSC, the Committee
felt its traditions and policies were being violated.
Libby, apparently aware of the problem ahead of time,
was prepared to defend the Council against the Com-

mittee's objections. The Friends Disarmament Council,

 

5"Suggestions for Consideration," F. J. Libby
memo, Spring, 1921, NCPW files.

32

he argued, "will not concern itself with relief work;
will be from the start politically active at Washington
and will extend its influence as rapidly as possible
throughout the country . . . ; will need to break its
own path in a new field unhampered by traditions; and
will demand of those who determine policy . . . to make
wise decisions unhurried by the unrelated specific
problem of feeding children. . . . "6 Libby further
contended that the purpose, function and objective of
the two groups was "related only . . . in that both . .
serve the cause of peace." It would be dysfunctional
to put a politically oriented group under the direction
of a relief committee since "decentralization" was what
would best serve the needs of the AFSC and the Disarma-
ment Council. Libby's rationale overcame the AFSC's
objections and the Council began its work "limited
to the propogation and organization . . . of sentiment
for disarmament, to render it effective to the point of
making every nation secure and . . . safe."7

Through the Spring of 1921, Libby's Speaking
engagements emphasized the subject of disarmament. It
had been decided by the members of the Council that
rather than spread themselves too thin by dealing with

too many peace-related topics, they would focus on dis-

armament and capitalize on its growing popularity

 

7

61bid., p. 3. Ibid., pp. 3, 4.

33

around the nation.8 The handling of too many tOpics
was one of the chief criticisms they had of most peace
groups. Emphasizing one objective at a time was here-
after characteristic of Libby's work in the 19208 and
19308.

Senate consideration of the Borah Resolution
calling on Harding to initiate an arms limitation con-
ference began in the Spring of 1921 without Administration
support. Generally, Harding was opposed to international
cooperation through the League of Nations favoring
instead an "association of nations," a vague concept
he never defined but used effectively in the campaign
of 1920. The President also spoke favorably about the
need for disarmament, but his continued advocacy of a
strong United States Navy implied he favored more tra-
ditional avenues toward peace and security.

Despite Administration objections, Senator Borah
eventually won the day and the Senate passed his reso-
lution on May 25 by a vote of 74-0. The Senate's
unanimous adoption of the Borah Resolution was also
the result of increased public pressure from organized

groups. It was the activities of these groups that

 

8Letter from M. Albert Linton to Allen T. Hole,
August 19, 1921, NCPW files. Linton wrote to fellow
Council-member Hole: Our speakers should "not take
up the broad question of peace excepting as it relates
to the disarmament issue."

34

convinced members of the Senate of the public sentiment
favoring an arms limitation conference.9 It was also
these pressure groups that Libby hoped to coordinate
because they could effectively compel participation from
their members to write letters and circulate petitions.
What would help keep them enthusiastic and convince them
that their work was not being done in vain, would be the
figure of Senator Borah, powerful, influential and, most
important, vocally supportive of their efforts. With
such a person on their side, they believed that success
was only a matter of time.

A month later, on June 29, the House adOpted the
Borah Resolution 332-4. Congressional acceptance of
Borah's call for a conference on arms limitation
reflected both the public pressure in favor of such
action and the desire of Congress to move the President
away from his preoccupation with American naval strength.
These pressures helped change the Administration's mind
and invitations to the conference were issued in
August, 1921.10

Libby and the Friends Disarmament Council did
not ignore the effectiveness of the groups that helped

gain passage of the Borah Resolution. Libby saw the

 

9Vinson, The Parchment Peace, pp. 92—95.

1°Ibid., pp. 97-98, 114-16.

35

calling of the conference as the opportunity he had

hoped for and he quickly urged the Council to take the
initiative of organizing a clearinghouse for disarmament
work. Most of the organizations mentioned by Vinson as
being most influential on Congress and the Administration;
The Women's Committee for World Disarmament, The National
League of Women Voters, The National Consumer League,

The National Council of Jewish Women and The Women's
Christian Temperance Union soon accepted invitations to

a meeting to discuss the formation of a clearinghouse.

II

The issuing of invitations to a conference on
arms limitation was a positive step toward international
cooperation and peace. In the 19208, when the mood of
America was divided between disillusionment and the faded
idealism of Wilson, the conference seemed to be a compro-
mise for those like Libby who sought c00peration for
peace and those who sought a return to traditional pre~
war isolation. Several of America's peace societies
tried to alter the conduct of foreign affairs to suit
their particular vision of the world. The WOmen's Peace
Union, for example, tried to gain support for a Consti-
tutional amendment outlawing war while pacifist Kirby
Page advocated the establishment of a cabinet level
post entitled "Department of Peace." In addition to

these various methods of securing peace, most societies

36

supported the calling of the arms conference as a step

in the right direction.11

Frederick Libby's first con-
cern was to seize the moment and not let the opportunity
of the conference pass.

Sharing Libby's concern for peace and sympathetic
with his impatience, AFSC member Harold Evans discussed
the formation of a clearinghouse with Christina Merriman,
Executive Secretary of the Foreign Policy Association.

As a member of the Association and as a representative
of the National League of WOmen Voters, M8. Merriman
was, according to Libby, experienced in foreign affairs.
Respected by her colleagues and influential among them,
her knowledge of, and contacts in, a wide assortment

of civic groups was to prove indispensable to Libby's
efforts. Evans was able to convince her of the need
for a nationwide clearinghouse and she soon became
enthusiastic about its chances for success. After dis-
cussing some preliminary matters with the Disarmament
Council, M8. Merriman issued invitations in the name

of the Foreign Policy Association to all "concerned"
groups to attend an organizational meeting in Washington,
D.C.

On the morning of September 8, 1921, thirty-one
men and women met at the Shoreham Hotel "filled with

determination to prevent America's involvement in

 

11Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, p. 147.

37

another war. America's recent participation in one of
EuroPe's wars had been a costly experience," Libby wrote

12 They met because

later, "It must not be repeated."
they shared a desire to influence the forthcoming con-
ference not simply by creating another peace society,
but by forming a group to coordinate the activities of
those societies already in existence. The problem in
the past of needlessly duplicated efforts by the over-
lapping goals of many societies had created more con—
fusion than anything else. If‘a new organization could
establish some sense of order, and if a list of priori-
ties for all the peace societies could be established,
the effectiveness of campaigns on behalf of specific
goals would definitely be increased.

That first meeting and two that quickly followed
were largely organizational. Libby's recollections of
the initial gathering reflected his confidence in the
organization's attractiveness to diverse segments of
America: "We represented nearly the whole range of
American life," he wrote, "farm organizations . . .
women's organizations, all three of the great religious
groups . . . the National Education Association and the

Parent-Teacher Association . . . the National League of

 

12Libby, To End War, p. l.

38

Women Voters and two labor unions."13 Since the task
was to influence the Conference on the Limitation and
Reduction of Armaments, they constituted themselves as
the National Council for the Limitation of Armaments
(NCLA). Each member group would be represented on the
Council whose activities would be directed by an execu—
tive board. An Executive Secretary, Frederick J. Libby,
was chosen to run the organization.

It was clear from the beginning that Libby saw
the NCLA as an ongoing organization whose work would not
end with the conclusion of the Conference. In the first
Bulletin issued by the Council, he stated unequivocally
that the Conference "will constitute chapter one of our
work. Chapter two will begin when the conference is
over. . . . "14 In the same issue of the Bulletin,
Libby discussed the functions of the new organization
and the tactics they planned to use to influence the
Washington Conference. "To coordinate the work of the
member organizations . . . to cooperate with them in
maintaining an information service (and) . . . to sug-

gest . . . possible lines of action based on the findings

 

13Ibid., pp. 9-10; "Bulletin for Workers Among
Friends," September 19, 1921; "Bulletin . . . ,"
October 14, 1921.

l4"Disarmament Up to the Minute: Bulletin for
Workers Among Friends," September 9, 1921, p. 2, NCPW
files.

39

of the executive board" were listed as its primary

15 These would serve as a framework for the

functions.
members as they began to employ the tactics outlined by
Libby. The tactics were designed to arouse and maintain
grass roots enthusiasm because Libby was convinced that
"the people" were always more peace oriented than the
governmental bureaucracy but were without effective
means to make their views known and felt. Therefore,
he suggested "rousing" the local newspaper editor through
the use of pamphlets, books and speakers on the need for
disarmament. He urged that each library have a "Dis-
armament shelf"; that schools award prizes for the "best
essays on Disarmament"; and that disarmament should be
discussed at all fraternal or civic association meetings.
The ultimate goal of all this was "a great outpouring
of the people" during the week prior to the opening of
the Conference on November 12.16

With very little time to spare, Libby began the
task of putting together a working organization. He

opened the NCLA headquarters on Seventeenth Street,

N.W. in Washington, a mere two blocks from the site of

 

lsIbid., p. 1.

16Ibid., p. 4. A few of the titles for the "dis-
armament shelf"; Will Irwin's The Next War, Kirby Page's
The Sword and the Cross, and John Maynard Keynes' Th3
EEonomic Consequences of the Peace.

 

40

the Conference and directly across the street from the
departments of Navy, State and War. Assembling an
efficient office was his next responsibility. Gladys
Gould Mackenzie was chosen by Libby to run the office
and Laura Puffer Morgan became the resident expert on

foreign affairs.17

Most important in terms of her con"
tribution was Florence Brewer Boeckel, the chief pub-
licist of the Council. Quite literally walking in off
the street one day to offer her services, Ms. Boeckel

was at one time editor of the Suffragist and was pub-

 

licity director and a founder of the National WOmen's
Press Club. These three people, the heart of the
organization, would remain with Libby through the 19308.
In the weeks before November twelfth the staff sent
hundreds of mailings to its members. Posters, pamphlets,
reprints and peace bibliographies were aimed at informing

and explaining the task at hand.

III
As the Washington Conference convened on
November 12, 1921, the NCLA began a campaign aimed at
informing the public of Conference activities. The
Council's weekly Bulletin provided a constant flow of

information to NCLA members about the "trend of thought

 

17To Ms. Mackenzie fell the task of the prelimi-
nary arrangement of the NCPW files for presentation
to the Swarthmore College Peace Collection.

41

in Washington."18

The staff also sent mailings to
members relating progress on specific items under dis-
cussion. Libby also asked members to help in their area
by organizing study groups, holding public meetings
and keeping themselves well informed.19 The most impor-
tant, and certainly the most useful, activity of the
Council during the months of the Conference was forty-one
international forums held at NCLA headquarters. Under
the direction of Laura Puffer Morgan, the forums pro-
vided up-to-date information about the Conference and
presented many speakers, including delegates to the
Conference. Since most of the Conference sessions were
closed to the public, the forums were an important and
popular source of information. As Libby wrote later,
"They kept the Washington Conference before the public
and at the same time introduced our infant Council to
Washington and the world."20
When the Washington Conference adjourned in

February, 1922, it had concluded three important

treaties, the first of which was the Four-Power Treaty

 

18"Statement of the National Council for the
Limitation of Armaments," December 6, 1921, NCPW files.

19Ibid.; "Statement of Activities," March 31,
NCPW files.

20Libby, To End War, p. 13.

 

42

of December 13, 1921. Under the terms of this agreement
the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan each
agreed to support the Pacific Ocean possessions of the
others. All disputes among the four were to be settled
by negotiation and, in the event of attack by another
power, the signatories were obliged to confer before
action was taken. The treaty was to expire in ten years.

On February 6, 1922, the Five-Power Treaty was
signed and for the first time large nations voluntarily
agreed to restrictions in naval armaments. The United
States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy agreed to
end all capital ship (battleship) programs for at least
ten years and to place limits on their size. Most impor-
tant, however, was the tonnage ratios for the countries
involved which were distributed on a 5:5:3:l.7:l.7 basis
for the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy
respectively. Finally, there were to be no new for-
tifications built by the signatories on their Pacific
possessions.

The last treaty, also signed on February 6, was
designed to respect the territorial integrity of China.
Under the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty, the United
States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium,
the Netherlands and China agreed to allow the Chinese
people to be masters of their own fate and agreed not

to seek special privileges, either legal or economic.

43

Reaction to the treaties was generally favorable
and all were finally ratified by the Senate. Only the
Four-Power Treaty was received critically, largely
because many people, including some Senators who voted
against it, saw its nonaggression agreement as an
entangling alliance to be avoided.

Libby's appraisal of the Conference was also
favorable. "The treaties complimented one another," he
wrote later. "Their aim was to make war impossible across
the Pacific and to remove the possible causes of future

"21

war. More specifically, he saw the 5:5:3 ratio as

a step in the right direction toward the "gradual
reduction in armaments advocated by the Council," and

the Four-Power Treaty "as a small step toward the world

22

organization which (the Council) advocates." "Has

the Washington Conference been a success?" Libby asked
rhetorically in an address given to the League of WOmen
Voters.

Yes . . . if only for the better understanding
that it has brought among nations, particularly
between the English speaking nations and between
America and Japan. The United States and Japan
were drifting rapidly towards war . . . at the
time the Conference was called.23

 

21Ibid., p. 17.

22F. J. Libby memo, March 28, 1922, p. 1, NCPW

files.

23January 25, 1922, NCPW files.

44

Libby had hoped for more, like a greater, more all
encompassing, reduction in armaments and that more
nations would have been included in the Four-Power
Treaty, but he and the NCLA were pleased. Before the
Washington Conference adjourned in February, 1922, the
Council voted unanimously to remain constituted and
changed its name to the National Council for the
Reduction of Armaments. "Some limitations (had been)
achieved," Libby suggested as he cast his vote in
favor of the name change, and the next step was the
”worldwide reduction of armaments by international
agreement."24
Libby also gained a great deal of satisfaction
from the accomplishments of the new clearinghouse. He
had a right to be satisfied, for they had come together
quickly, almost haphazardly, and had created an efficient
operation coordinating activities of so many independent
and diverse groups. Much of the success of the NCLA
was due to the competency of its workers, but Libby
overlooked the fact that they were able to capitalize
on the slow, steady growth of disarmament sentiment
and its prestigious advocate, Borah. Although the

Washington Conference had been the "rallying point for

 

24NCLA form letter; "Constitution of the
National Council for the Reduction of Armaments,"
January, 1922, NCPW files.

45

our group," Libby wrote later, it remained to be seen
if public enthusiasm and support would surface as
quickly the next time he issued a call to action.

Allen A. Kuusisto argued that the influence of
the NCLA on the Washington Conference "was probably not
too great"; that the "lion's share" of the credit should
go to the Federal Council of Churches.25 While it is
true that the NCLA did not officially come into being
until shortly before the Conference convened, it must
be remembered that the Friends Disarmament Council (the
nucleus of the NCLA) was at work five months earlier
in the Spring of 1921. Since real momentum for calling
the Conference did not begin until that time, the Dis-
armament Council functioned at the same time to arouse
support. This is not to suggest that the role of the
Federal Council of Churches was less than Kuusisto
argues, but rather to elevate the efforts of Libby
and his peace activists. The NCLA also pulled many
groups into concerted activity between September and
November, 1921, and the respect that Libby and the Dis-

armament Council gained among these groups during the

Spring and Summer was aptly rewarded.

 

25Allen Kuusisto, "The Influence of the National
Council for the Prevention of War on United States
Foreign Policy, 1935—1939" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University, 1950), P. 35ff.

46

One last problem, however, was that Libby's
enthusiasm for the success of the NCLA obscured his
assessment of the overall impact of the Conference.

His assumption that "future wars" were "impossible"
overlooked not only changing circumstances, to which

he seemed so attuned, but the strength and determination
of the "opposition." No sooner had he stated his belief
that the shipbuilding ratios defined maximum naval
strength, than the Navy Department, with the aid of

the NCLA's opposite number, the Navy League, urged the
necessity of "building up to the Washington Treaty."

As if this was not enough, the Navy then called for an
increase in personnel and Libby described the "astonish-
ment" of the Council as they read the proposed increase.26
Frustration turned their thoughts to educating the people
as well as themselves for what they saw as a continuing
fight. Libby believed that if the "forces of war" had
not ceased their efforts, neither could the "forces of
peace." The decision facing Libby was the direction the
NCLA should now take. It seemed that if the enemy was
the forces of war, their efforts should now turn toward
the prevention of war.

The first test of Libby's new coordinating group
was passed successfully because he correctly assessed

both the need for the Council and the popular sentiment

 

26Libby, To End War, p. 18.

 

47

for limits on armaments. By mobilizing the latter
through the effective use of the former, Libby estab-
lished his credentials among peace advocates. He clearly
demonstrated the need for coordinated action on the very
practical level of informing Congress and the President
of public attitudes on peace-related issues. Libby
learned much about popular and elite opinion from this
early episode and he now sought ways to improve the

Council's effectiveness.

CHAPTER 3

The realization that fighting for peace did not
end with the limited accomplishments of the Washington
Conference, nor would it end with international dis-
armament, persuaded Libby and the NCLA staff to rethink
their position. Libby determined that the focus of the
National Council for the Reduction of Armaments (NCRA)
was too narrow. Although Libby would continue to con-
centrate on each issue as it arose, the outlook and
orientation of the NCRA had to change to meet the

challenge of the “forces of war."

I

Although it was not until October 31, 1922 that
the executive board voted unanimously to change the
NCRA's name to the National Council for the Prevention
of War, an evolution of outlook was taking place. With
the end of the Washington Conference, popular momentum
for disarmament and arms limitation quietly declined.
Wheat worried Libby most was how the staff would hold the
meniber organizations together so the clearinghouse would

continue to function. The Council had come into being

48

49

and gained support by its advocacy of arms limitation
which, as a topical issue, was now gone. By mid-1922

the Council's Bulletin had a circulation of almost 10,000,
most of whom were affiliated with a member group.1 Since
to most of these people the aims of the NCPW were ranked
behind the primary aims of the group to which they
belonged, Libby wanted to use the Bulletin to broaden

the NCPW's appeal and keep the clearinghouse alive. He
therefore emphasized an earlier theme, the substitution
of law for war, hoping to capitalize on their inclination
for reason and logic. He urged members to "keep a con-
stant watch" on the activities and statements of Congress
and the Administration and to scrutinize legislation
"from the point of view of . . . (being) for or against
war." Readers were urged to support, as the Council did,
the Washington Conference treaties as steps toward world
organization and disarmament. They were encouraged to
write their Congressmen and demand a "50 per cent cut

in army and navy appropriations . . . " and "government
control" of the manufacturing of munitions. Support for
American participation in the WOrld Court was also

advocated.2

 

1F. J. Libby, "Statement of Activities of the
National Council for the Reduction of Armaments,"
March 31, 1922, p. 2, NCPW files.

21bid., p. 1.

50

What Libby was trying to do seemed clear. He
was emphasizing policy positions that the NCLA/NCRA had
always advocated but which had been given only secondary
attention to the primary objective of arms limitation.

As that topic faded, the more general concerns involved
with opposing war surfaced.

From March until July, 1922, Libby had no real
indication whether his messages were favorably received,
much less listened to. But in late July, the opportunity
came to test the response. Libby learned that the
British National Peace Council was planning mass demon-
strations for July 29 and 30, the eighth anniversary of
the outbreak of WOrld War I. It was to be called "Inter-
national No More War Day." Realizing that a summer
weekend was not the best time for organizing a demon-
stration, Florence Boeckel suggested printing cheap
"No More War" window stickers to be used that weekend
as part of the demonstration and offering them in the

Bulletin. By the time "No More War Day" arrived, almost

 

two hundred thousand copies of the sticker had been

3 The staff was encouraged by this

requested and mailed.
response and Libby believed it was indicative of a
general feeling among the NCPW's members that the pre-

vention of war was important and that the clearinghouse

was still a useful mechanism for expressing that feeling

 

3Libby, To End War, p. 21.

 

51

and furthering public education on peace-related matters.
But competition for the public attention was not left

to the peace activists alone. Responding to "No More
War Day," the Navy League held (on Teddy Roosevelt's
birthday, no less) "Navy Day," filled with pomp and
circumstance and supported by the Administration. The
Navy League even Opened its new office just down the
street from the NCPW headquarters. After his earlier
experience with the League, this episode merely con-
firmed Libby's suspicion, and stiffened his resolve to

keep the NCPW at the forefront of the peace movement.

II

The National Council for the Prevention of War,
which was chartered for one hundred years in the District
of Columbia in 1922, was similar to its predecessors in
terms of its principles, its staff, its middle-of-the-
road outlook and its middle-class constituency.4 But
it was more tightly organized, more efficient and bore
little resemblance to genteel pre-war peace societies.

In fact it resembled only a handful of other peace

 

4Libby, "What Is the NCPW," in "Program of the
NCPW-1923," NCPW files; Chatfield, For Peace and Justice,
pp. 107-08; Kuusisto, "The Influence of the NCPW,"
pp. 27-28, 54-55; also see James Wechsler, "War in the
Peace Movement," Nation, March 19, 1938.

 

52

societies (characterized as radical by Robert H. Ferrell)
because they were "impatient for peace."5

During the twenties, the relationship between
Libby and the leaders of other peace societies was cordial
and productive. But in the thirties, it became strained
and counter-productive. Libby's originalintention in
organizing the Council was to coordinate peace group
activity by emphasizing common goals. In the twenties
the most important goals--disarmament and world organi-
zation--were common to several important peace leaders:
James T. Shotwell (Carnegie Endowment), Clark Eichelberger
(League of Nations Association), Dorothy Detzer (Women's
International League) and John Nevin Sayre (Fellowship
of Reconciliation). The general overlap of goals among
these groups made cooperation for their attainment
through Libby's NCPW attractive.

Libby worked most effectively with Detzer and
Sayre whose groups were participating members of the
NCPW.

The organizational structure of the Council
resembled a confederation; each member group was, in
theory, autonomous and had a voice in the decision-

:naking process. Thus, when the Council met annually

 

5Robert H. Ferrell, "The Peace Movement," in
Isolatign and Security, ed. Alexander DeConde (Durham,
ri.C.: Duke University Press, 1957), pp. 100-03.

 

53

to decide policy matters each participating group sent
one representative.6 In practice, however, the Executive
Board, run by Libby, made the important decisions which
were then ratified by the representatives. The relation-
ship between Libby's Washington staff and the member
groups was mutually dependent. Libby needed the groups
because of the public access they offered him for money,
letters and petitions. On the other hand, the groups
needed the NCPW, as long as it generally reflected their
sentiments on peace issues, to voice their beliefs in
Washington. Should either side fail to meet the needs
of the other, the relationship would break down. This
was precisely what happened in the late 19308 when
Libby's increasingly isolationist stand no longer
reflected the feeling of the members. As a result
his influence and support in the movement declined.
Despite agreement on goals in the twenties,
there were disagreements on other matters. Shotwell
and Eichelberger and their organizations were represen-
tative of those groups who sought to influence political
elites and officials in high places. They endeavored
to educate the people on the necessity of disarmament
or international organization. They promoted inter-

national agreements and were generally satisfied with

 

6"The By-Laws of the National Council for the
Prevention of War," NCPW files.

54

the existing relationships among nations. They saw no
need for basic political or economic change; the exist-
ing system did not hinder the path to peace.

Libby, Detzer and Sayre agreed with their col—
leagues on the need for education and the promotion of
disarmament or international agreements. But they sought
to organize public opinion, to rally it to the cause of
peace by exerting pressure on the President or Congress.
But this was a matter of approach and technique and did
not pose a problem for coordinated action between the
"conservative" groups and those "impatient for peace."
Libby was simply of the Opinion that peace forces could
be organized and that advocates needed to work to achieve
their goals.

What differentiated these segments of the peace
movement was Libby's attitude toward existing political
and economic relationships. Unlike the "conservative”
groups, Libby saw the political and economic order that
followed the Versailles Treaty as a threat to peace
because of its inherent antagonisms. Rivalries that
could lead to violence and war were an integral part
of colonial empires. Not only were colonies a constant
threat to peace should they challenge their mother
country, but competing imperial powers often collided
in their quest for more colonies to renew the balance

«of power. Competition for the world's resources and

55

access to the world's markets also produced rivalries
that could lead to war. This situation only hindered
the chances for peace and therefore, Libby, Detzer and
Sayre argued that the status-quo had to be changed in
order to attain a peace system. Thus, by advocating
political and economic change, Libby was to the "left"
of Shotwell and Eichelberger who felt there was no need
for such change.

Although the label of "radical" was attached to
Libby or Detzer in the twenties because they sought to
change the status-quo, it still did not prevent coOper-
ative efforts with the "conservative" groups when common
goals were at stake. Thus, Libby could call on Shotwell
to help rally peace forces during the Mexican war scare
of 1927 and virtually all peace groups could, without
hesitation, join to push for ratification of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact in 1928.

This loose, but amicable, relationship began to
sour in the thirties as Shotwell and Eichelberger
increasingly advocated collective security at the risk
of American involvement while Libby and Detzer argued
for mandatory neutrality to keep America out of war.

As the split widened, the opposing sides could still
join in two movement-wide campaigns in the mid-thirties:
the National Peace Conference and the Emergency Peace

Campaign. When friends asked Libby how well he was

56

working with Clark Eichelberger, his colleague on the
steering committee of the NPC, Libby responded,

"Admirablyl"7

But below this facade of c00peration
existed divergent opinions on neutrality. Libby and
Detzer adamantly demanded isolation from foreign con—
flicts while Eichelberger and Shotwell supported col-
lective action to halt aggressors. Illustrative of the
depth of division between these peace movement leaders
was a two-author symposium answering the question "How
Can (the) United States Serve Peace?" The authors,
Libby and Eichelberger, agreed only on the desirability
of peace. Eichelberger ridiculed Libby's naive adherence
to negotiation and arbitration. We have reached a stage
in world affairs, he argued, "at which practices of the
past must be abandoned for better ones" in which a
society of nations "guarantees the security of its
members." Libby criticized Eichelberger for adhering

to the status-quo which "resists peaceful change" and to
"old fashioned military and naval alliances." He con-
cluded by wondering why Eichelberger "should continue

to put faith in the blind and stupid unrealities of
militarism when its bankruptcy . . . (was) so strikingly

manifested in the quick reversal of the outcome of the

 

7peace Action 2 (April 1936): 2.

 

57

World War."8

The disagreement over method and outlook
between the "radicals" (Libby) and the "conservatives"
(Eichelberger) in the twenties was qualitatively dif-
ferent from the degree of division evident in that
exchange. Even the very fundamental argument over
the necessity for changing the status-quo could be
overlooked while common goals were being pursued. But
when Libby ranked those goals behind isolation, dif-
ferences became division and the movement was split
irrevocably.

Libby worked with other peace leaders, like A. J.
Muste and Kirby Page, who continued to support him even
after the movement divided in the thirties. Like
Libby, Muste and Page were strongly influenced by their
wartime experiences and sought to develop a peace system
as an alternative to war. They agreed with Libby on
the need for changes in existing political and economic
relationships, and so, they too were labeled "radical."
Their work brought Muste and Page a higher degree of
public recognition than Libby achieved. Page was a

prolific writer whose works (like War: Its Causes,

 

Consequences and Cure, 1923) were widely distributed

 

among church organizations, civic groups and peace
societies. Muste's notoriety resulted from his

integrating his peace work with labor organizing and

 

8Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 1938.

 

58

the establishment of Brookwood Labor College for the
education of workers. While Libby agreed with them on
the need to educate the public on the wisdom of a peace
system based on peaceful change, he saw education not as
an end (as did Muste and Page) but a beginning. Edu-
cation was the foundation upon which Libby organized
pressure to try and influence policy making. Thus,
Libby spent more of his time away from the public eye,
attempting to use the ideas pOpularized by people like
Muste and Page to marshall the grass roots into an

effective voice for peace sentiment.

III

When Libby organized the Council in 1921 the
staff totaled five people including himself. Since
their attention was aimed at the Washington Conference
little time was left for fund raising among the twenty-
six participating groups. As a result, the Council's
initial budget of $10,000 came from the three Phila-
delphia Friends organizations that were instrumental
in forming the Friends Disarmament Council several
months earlier.9

After incorporation, Libby devoted more time to

the necessities of organization and finance. At the end

 

9The three Friends groups were the Five Year
Meeting, the Philadelphia Orthodox and the Philadelphia
Hicksite. "Details of Plans for National Council for
Limitation of Armaments," January 13, 1922, NCPW files.

59

Of the NCPW's first year Of operation, Libby reported
that the Council had receipts of $42,179 and expenditures
Of $42,103. Slightly over half of that income was the
result of small contributions ($1 to $5) from Quakers
throughout the country. The remaining money came from
unsolicited contributions, subscriptions to the N335
Bulletin (circulation: 10,000), and the sale of
pamphlets, reprints, peace literature and speaker's
fees. During that year the NCPW increased its official
membership to thirty-nine groups.10

The growth of the Council can be seen by compar-
ing these early figures with the statistics for 1931
after ten years of Operation when the NCPW was at the
height Of its influence and popularity. Throughout the
twenties, contributions, subscriptions to the Eggs
Bulletin, and the budget (which averaged $130,000 a
year) all increased. At the close of its tenth year,
Libby reported that expenditures for 1931 ($170,000)
exceeded income ($165,000) by $5,000. Over half of its
income (60%) still came from Quakers ($1 to $10) and

subscriptions to the News Bulletin doubled to 20,000.

 

The remaining money was raised through the sale of
peace literature, speaker's fees and unsolicited

contributions. The most impressive growth, however,

 

10"Report of the NCPW," October 31, 1922, NCPW

files.

60

NCLA Member Groups, 1921

Participating

 

American Association Of University WOmen

American Farm Bureau Federation

American School Citizenship League

American Union Against Militarism

Association to Abolish War

D.C. WOmen's Council for Limitation of Armaments

Farmer's National Council

Fellowship of Reconciliation

Foreign Policy Association

Friends' Disarmament Council

Girl's Friendly Society of America

International Lyceum and Chautauqua Association

National Board of Farm Organizations

National Board of YMCA

National Congress of Mothers

Parent-Teacher Associations

National Federation Of Business and Professional
Women's Clubs

National Education Association

National League of Women Voters

National Milk Producers Federation

National WOmen's Trade Union League

Society to Eliminate the Economic Causes of War

Veterans of Foreign Wars

WOmen's Committee for WOrld Disarmament

WOmen's Christian Temperance Union

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

World Friendship Information Bureau

Cooperating

 

Central Conference of American Rabbis

Church Peace Union

Commission on International Justice and Good Will
of the Federal Council of Churches

Council of Women for Home Missions

General Federation of WOmen's Clubs

Federal Council Of Churches

Intercollegiate Liberal League

International Association of Machinists

National Committee on American—Japanese Relations

National Consumers League

National Council of Jewish WOmen

United Society of Christian Endeavor

61

was in the size Of the staff. In 1931, it totaled
fifty-two workers in six Offices in the Midwest, West
and, the most important, in Washington. Libby also
noted other graphic statistics: a mailing list of
125,000 names, receipt of 36,000 letters and the mailing
of 2,000,000 pieces of literature. Libby's salary
during these ten years increased $500 to $4500 in 1931.11
From 1931 to 1936 the Council's income and
financial activity declined slightly during the depres-
sion. In 1934, a representative year, the budget was set
at $115,000 based on receipts ($100,000) from the usual
sources that included individual contributions ranging

from 50¢ to $11,000. Subscriptions to the new news-

letter, Peace Action, remained at the 20,000 level of

 

its predecessor while the mailing list dropped to 115,000
names. The staff made 2,030 speeches (Libby made 250)

to Over a half million peOple in forty states during the
year and they distributed one and one-half million

pieces Of literature. Thus, during its first fifteen
years, the NCPW increased its activity, contributions

and budget and remained mostly debt free.12

 

11"Report Of the Executive Secretary of the
NCPW," October 30, 1931, NCPW files.

12peace Action 1 (November, 1934), 4-7, 13.

 

62

By 1939, however, the situation had changed
considerably. In 1937-38, contributions dropped to the
point Of placing the Council $70,000 in debt.13 In
1939 Libby was forced to restrict NCPW activity: the
staff was pared to twelve in the only remaining office
in Washington, the budget was cut to a meager $76,000
and 10 percent was cut from all salaries.l4 Libby
sadly noted in his diary that for the last six months
Of 1939 only $18,600 in contributions could be counted

on.15 Although subscriptions to Peace Action remained

 

at their pre-l937 level, Libby was forced to replace the
June-July-August edition with a single issue because of

16 Further complicating this grim

"curtailed income."
financial picture, the Internal Revenue Service billed
Libby for $11,000 in back taxes Owed since the Council's

tax-exempt status was lifted for "lobbying."

 

13"Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting,"
January 18, 1939, NCPW files.

14"Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting,"
January 21, 1940, NCPW files.

15January 18, 1939, Libby Papers.

16Peace Action 5 (Summer 1939): 2.

 

63

Libby attributed declining revenues primarily
to differences over his stand on neutrality.17 As he
aligned himself more and more with isolationism regular
supporters withheld contributions because the NCPW was
no longer a clearinghouse but a voice for a single cause.
The extent of dissatisfaction with Libby was reflected
by the 1939 mailing list which had lost nearly 100,000
names over the 1931 list. Numerous staff resignations
were also blamed on the neutrality controversy.18 It
seemed quite likely that the general recession in 1937-38
also affected contributions to the NCPW since over half
of them in any given year were from individuals.

During the twenty years under examination
Libby frequently organized fund raising events to meet
unexpected expenses. One example of this type of
activity was the Peace Bond Drive of 1935-36 which
had as its goal the raising Of $1,000,000. The motives
for the Drive were to erase a $30,000 debt and to aug-
ment Libby's "hopelessly inadequate" anti-war budget.19

The Drive was launched with a great deal of fanfare

including pictures of Libby selling bonds to a Senator

 

17"Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting."
January 18: 1939-

18It was now 32,000 names. "Minutes of the
Executive Board Meeting," January 21, 1940.

19Peace Action 2 (September 1935): 5.

 

Z i

/' a.

it:

64

and a film star and dozens of press releases stressing
the advantages of buying bonds.20 Prominent peOple also
offered their support: "a splendid idea" said Senator
Gerald Nye and James T. Shotwell Offered his approval

and cooperation "at this critical time."21

Fortunately
fOr Libby, Washingtonian Mrs. Bancroft C. Davis con—
tributed $50,000 to wipe out the 1935 debt because the
Peace Bond Drive was a failure. By January, 1936,
Libby noted that it had not received the backing he

had hoped for and once the Drive had ended little

mention was made of its success or failure in Peace

Action.22 According to the New York Times the Drive
23

 

netted the NCPW a disappointing $50,000.

IV
Libby listed the general principles which served
as guidelines for the Council and its member organi-
zations as: progressive world organization, worldwide
reduction of armaments to "police status" and education

for world peace.

 

20Peace Action 2 (October 1935): 1; Peace
Action 2 (NovemBer I935): 15.

 

21Peace Action 2 (October 1935): 6.

 

22Peace Action 2 (January 1936): 1; Peace Action
3 (December 1936); Peace Action 3 (January 1937).

 

 

23New York Times, February 11, 1938.

 

 

"1

Il I
“5".

li

()
"I 1

‘h

at;

Va.
‘:VI

65

The philosophy behind the NCPW's three-point
program was based on Libby's personal philosophy. The
purpose of Libby's life, and therefore, the NCPW's, was
the creation of a "more secure, abundant, free life for
the American people and for all the world. (Our) desire
is for a world at peace--not because peace is good in
itself, but because human welfare can advance only in
the conditions of peace."24 He fully realized that the
NCPW was no panacea, but he believed it could contribute
to the development of a peaceful world. Progress could
be made by strengthening the machinery for peace and
Opposing preparation for war, which leads to inter-
national rivalries and, eventually, war itself. Thus,
like the leaders of other peace societies, he urged his
followers to join the World Court and encouraged them to
rally public Opinion to support the Court's decisions.

Libby had great faith in the "weight" of public
opinion, no doubt sustained by popular support for the
Washington Conference. At speaking engagements he was
Often faced with difficult questions concerning the
ability of public Opinion to compel adherence to a
World Court decision. The rationale he most frequently
used to defend his position was the analogy of the

United States Supreme Court. "The founders of the

 

24"The Program of the National Council for the
Prevention Of War," undated, NCPW files.

AV

at
v;

66

Republic," he argued, gave the Supreme Court "no force

25 "Wise

but public opinion to support its decisions."
men" did not need tO make threats, or call for sanctions
or boycotts, because Of the tragic consequences that
would result if decision makers had to back such threats
with actions. On the surface his analogy was most
appealing, but, as is usually the case, analogies can
be dangerous. Certainly the weight of public and
Official opinion help legitimize the decisions of the
American judicial system, especially the Supreme Court.
Although the Executive is required to implement Court
decisions, the foundation of this legitimacy is trust.
Generally, the Supreme Court justices have been among
the most respected, if not revered, individuals in the
public eye. American tradition has given the law almost
unquestioned authority. When this reverence for the law
is added to the prestige of the nine justices, it forms
an almost unbeatable combination. The Court has attained
the status of an "institution" in this country, one that
is trusted by the people to represent both the freedom
Of the individual and the limits Of society.

The problem with Libby's Supreme Court analogy
was its inapplicability to a world where "trust" was

more Often exemplified by alliance systems, economic

 

25F. J. Libby, "My Theory of World Peace,"
Bulletin of the National Council for the Prevention of

0(3-

67

rivalry and Machiavellian politics. Even in situations
where trust had a modicum of tradition behind it, such
as the Anglo—American heritage, suspicion Often occurred,
as it did with the heated arguments over the role British
propaganda played in America's entrance into World War I.
Libby's fondness for the World Court rested on
his belief in arbitration for the settlement Of disputes.
He frequently offered all the right reasons (lives
wasted, dignity lost, etc.) to explain why this method
was preferable to the use of force. But the basis of his
belief went deeper than what was best for mankind in the
19208. He often referred to the early years of his life,
and in various ways suggested that "in Maine we had both
a court and a town meeting to keep us out of war. The
court dealt with our legal disputes and the town meeting
with the rest." He enlarged on his home town experience
to suggest that "the essential institutions" for peace--
the court and the town meeting--"are those with which
New Englanders are familiar. . . . The system worked."26
This seems like Obvious naivete, and perhaps it was.
But for someone so convinced of the essential goodness
and dignity of peOple, it was easy to understand why
he believed such a system could work given half a chance.
If trust could have replaced suspicion, then perhaps

Libby would have been proven correct. But how could

 

26Ibid., p. 2.

 

(I-

C"

SC

()

.
*4

u

"I

ll
‘ 1
:1 .

68

all suspicion and doubt be removed even among friendly
nations, let alone antagonists? He never really sug-
gested how suspicion could be eliminated beyond offering
a few vague generalities about equality, trade and anti-
imperialism. Even if suspicion could be resolved, Libby
never recommended that the country's nationalistic
desires should be forgotten. Protecting one's freedom
to act--sovereignty--was essential to the United States,
as the experiences with the League and disarmament had
just demonstrated.

Libby himself had problems with questions of
sovereignty. The "town meeting" of world affairs he
referred to was the League of Nations. He was initially
Opposed to America's participation in the League because
it was "so tied to the Versailles Treaty (which he also
Opposed) that it was more likely to cause war than pre-
vent it," but by 1924 Libby favored the United States
joining it.27 His change of mind was based on his
realization that the League was here to stay and its
deliberations were crucial. "Important decisions are
being made by the League," he argued, "America should
have a part in making all such decisions, because they
inevitably affect our future. The world is now a com-
munity, and the welfare of each nation is closely wrapped

28

up with the decisions of the rest." Despite his

 

27 28

Ibidol pp. 1, 3e Ibido’ p. 3.

69

changed attitude, Libby took exception to America becoming
a member of the League as it was constituted. Although
his reservations had to do with unforeseen circumstances
that may involve the United States in war, the basic
question was one of sovereignty. He considered Article X
(collective commitment) and Article XVI (sanctions)
"coercive features" that were dangerous and impracticable.
If the United States joined, it should do so with reser-
vations that would "relieve us from every legal and moral
Obligation to go to war or to undertake any coercive
economic measures that might lead to war." He also
wanted the United States to be free Of any "obligations

under the Versailles Treaty."29

Thus, he argued to
preserve America's freedom of action, albeit for dif-
ferent reasons than, say, Borah or Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge.

The next phase of Libby's outline for preventing
war was the outlawry of war. He envisioned this step
to follow the prerequisite establishment of the court
and town meeting because "the honest outlawry of war
demands a higher development of the will to peace and
justice than has been Observed among great nations in

30 Presumably, this "higher development"

the past."
would be the result Of American participation in the

WOrld Court and the League of Nations. If this "higher

 

29 30

Ibid. Ibid.

70

development" occurred then there would be "a general
willingness on the part of nations to be just and by
such an appreciation of others' problems as will lead
to a friendly spirit of 'give and take.'" If it did
not occur, the outlawry of war would be little more than
"political chicanery" protecting injustice and Oppres-
sion.31
Libby also believed that for war to be success-
fully outlawed and branded a crime, "jealous nationalism"
and "national honor" must not be made exceptions. Nor
could domestic questions "that are not exclusively

32 What

domestic" be subject to "private treatment."
he failed to come to grips with was the incompatibility
of this statement with his own reservations concerning
League membership for the United States. By advocating
reservations to Article X and Article XVI, Libby was
asking for the "private treatment" he claimed was
inconsistent with the demands Of a peaceful world.
Furthermore, who was to determine the exact meaning

of "exclusively domestic" questions: the United States,
or Great Britain, or Germany or Russia. It is doubtful
they could have arrived at a mutually agreeable defi-

nition. It is more doubtful that anyone Of them could

have accepted a definition Offered by another, colored

 

31 32

Ibid. Ibid.

71

as it surely would have been by "jealous nationalism,"
"national honor" and each nation's unique biases, fears
and frustrations.

Libby's conviction that peace machinery could be
successfully established was supported by his belief
that international relations were nothing more than
extensions of very human problems. "The spirit that
'removes' our personal 'mountains,'" he wrote "will be

"33 The initial

similarly triumphant between nations.
task was the re-indoctrination Of school children with
love and respect, not hate and war. "If the old style
militant nationalism continues to be taught . . . there
is no hope." All of us were taught, he suggested, the
glorification of war which resulted in hatred--"sometimes
it is called patriotism"--Of England and love of France
or resulted in the inability of North and South to write
a mutually acceptable history. If goodwill replaced
hate then international law could be expanded and
developed to concern itself with the rights of man, not
simply the rights of belligerents.34 "Our realists,"
Libby wrote, "are going to discover some day to their

astOnishment that the 'practical' policy that will bring

security with justice and peace, is the very policy Of

 

33Ibid., p. 5. 34Ibid., pp. 4, 5.

72

audacious friendliness functioning through apprOpriate
machinery. We can climb to peace in no other way."35
While the peace machinery hopefully was being
erected, Libby Offered some interim suggestions to help
the cause of peace. Not surprisingly, preparedness was
thought to be Ehg_villain of the peace movement. Although
the Washington Conference had just placed limits on arma-
ments, by 1925 the military was again suggesting that
preparing for war was the best way to secure peace.
Libby argued that there was no such thing as an adequate
military defense because what might be considered "ade-
quate" against one nation, or two, was not adequate
against the whole world. "National security £395 the
rest is unobtainable . . . (but) OOOperation yigh the

36 His argument rested on

rest is within our reach."
the belief that the growing interdependence of the
nations in the 19208--economically, financially and
culturally-~precluded isolated activity required by
"hostile" armament programs. Despite the urging of
militarists to arm and the isolationists to "keep away,"
Libby knew that through expanding American investments
the United States was involved with the rest of the

world. "Nothing can happen anywhere that does not

 

35Ibid., p. 5.

36F. J. Libby memo, August, 1929, NCPW files.

73

affect our economic interests. . . . The causes Of war
. . . (include) economic disputes."37 Furthermore, when
those disputes arose, extensive military preparedness
only increased the probability of resorting to armed
conflict to resolve them. The chief problem with
increasing a nation's capacity to fight was that it
was not done in a vacuum. Other nations were preparing
also. Thus, at a time of confrontation the only cer-
tainty was an expanded level of fighting among the
antagonists. The ideal solution, of course, was not
to let any situation reach the point of confrontation
which required the use of force for its resolution.
This was precisely why Libby advocated the development
of peace machinery. It could be used to settle minor
disputes before they could become major ones. But since
that machinery had not yet developed, or America was not
yet a participant, the risks of preparedness were even
more perilous. Nations whose leaders had yet to discover
the benefits of "audacious friendliness" were all too
willing to resort to force to solve major disputes with-
out ever having tried to solve them peaceably while they
were still minor disputes.

Libby never objected to the right or necessity

of a nation tO have adequate defenses. But to him,

 

37F. J. Libby, "Why A Peace Movement," December,
1926, NCPW files.

74

adequate meant that a nation maintained its armaments
at the level of "police status." Although he never
specifically elaborated on what he meant by that phrase,
it seems clear that the amount of force adequate to
maintain order--a police force--was considerably lower
than the amount of force President Coolidge or the War
Department believed was necessary to fight a war. Libby
believed that the power behind such a police force was
the power of world opinion, which, theoretically, "no
nation (would dare) defy. . . . "38
Commensurate with Libby's Opposition to prepared—
ness was his desire for economic justice in the years
following the war. He was critical of the reparations
requirements of the Versailles Treaty because Of the
connection between war debts and reparations and because
Of the growing economic interdependence Of the world's
nations and the crucial role America's expanding invest—
ments played in it. Libby's suggestions for economic
stability were founded on his faith in COOperative
effort. Thus, to alleviate the inequities drawn up
at Paris, he urged the calling of a conference on
European reconstruction. Libby did not oppose either
payment of reparations to injured nations or payment of

Allied war debts to the United States. What he did

 

38F. J. Libby, "My Theory of World Peace," p. 1.

75

39 Continued

Oppose was the unrealistic amounts involved.
insistence on payments of debts and reparations at their
original levels would surely "destroy (the) peace in
Europe." Thus Libby quite rightly suggested that "in
the interest of world recovery," both should be reduced
to reasonable levels. He argued that the United States
must "contribute reasonably" to recovery, not by can-
celling all debts owed, but by setting new, lower limits.
But, he added, "definite and reasonable reduction to the
countries that owe us money (would be made) on condition
that they will make similar reasonable concessions for
the common good."40
In 1924, and again in 1926, when echoes of
Wilson's call for self—determination were still being
heard, Libby questioned the continuing colonial policy
of many EurOpean nations. He addressed himself not
only to the Oppressive status of the colonial relation-
ship but to the antagonisms they produced. The exploited
African people were "on the move" and would increasingly
resist imperial policies. This would cause problems

not only within a colonial empire, like the British

system, but between imperial powers as well. As the

 

39F. J. Libby, "After 'NO More War Day' What,"
pp. 1-2, NCPW files.

4°Ibid., p. 2.

76

"have not" colonies attempted to break imperial rule,
they cared very little if their efforts caused tension
between the powers. From their perspective such tension
could only help their awkward position. Libby recognized
that these potentially dangerous situations were threats
to peace because the extension of European influence
into Africa and elsewhere was simply a quest to renew
the balance of power after expansion in Europe was no
longer possible without war. Since the colonial
relationship was in part an economic one, Libby hoped
that the nations of Europe would release their colonies
in favor Of freely negotiated trade agreements. This
would enable the colonial power to ensure itself of
sufficient resources and a market for its goods, but
without the international rivalry colonies so often
produced. Libby believed that the resolution Of these
inequities, existing before the Versailles Treaty and

as a result of it, would aid world peace not only eco-
nomically, but by helping to reduce the tension that so

Often led to confrontation or war.41

V
The foundation upon which the peace machinery
was to be erected was the re-education of the American

people including peace activists. The substitution

 

41Libby, "My Theory of World Peace"; Libby,
"Why a Peace Movement."

77

of law for war could only succeed if hate could be
erased. By 1925 those channels of communication already
proven successful (the Bulletin, pamphlets, etc.) were
being relied on even more heavily and Libby's speaking
engagements increased by almost half. But new programs
were needed if the effort was to succeed.

Under the direction of the NCPW's publicist,
Florence Brewer Boeckel, two new avenues of education
were developed. Although they were of equal importance,
they aimed at different audiences. The first plan dealt
with evaluating the historical reading material of the
"grammar school" student. Libby strongly endorsed such
an effort to help school administrators recognize what
he believed was the teaching of "hate" through stereo-
typing the prejudices of an earlier day.

More than thirty elementary history texts were
examined by the staff to determine, for example, what
percentage of each was given to discussions of war and
what percentage to discussions Of peace. More specifi-
cally, they searched for examinations of peace-making
efforts like the negotiations leading to Jay's treaty

in 1794.42

The survey results predictably demonstrated
the emphasis given to war and violence in the nation's

past. Libby believed that one of the reasons history

 

42Libby, TO End War, pp. 32—33.

 

78

texts were weighted to violence was the bias of the
author who had received similar scholastic training.
Apparently he gave little or no thought to the prOpo-
sition that the texts were geared to youngsters who,
for the most part, had little or no interest in the
subject and were more enthusiastic about reading of

the "excitement" of war than the inherent dullness of
negotiations. Furthermore, history was but one subject
taught by most elementary school teachers, whose sophis-
tication and enthusiasm for discussing the nation's
past was often considerably less than his own. But,
then, awakening teacher-administrator awareness was

the point Of the program.

Hoping to correct this imbalance, the staff
mailed the survey to the teaching members Of the NCPW
and to school administrators in selected areas. Libby
hOped that awakening the attention of administrators
would lead to changes in reading material. Furthermore,
he assumed that the teachers in the NCPW would pressure
their superiors to make the necessary changes. The
response to the survey was more favorable than Libby
had hoped for, and requests for COpies from non-NCPW
teachers was encouraging.

Implementation of the survey findings necessi-
tated the drawing up of practical suggestions that could

be followed to correct the situation. Under the

79

direction Of Isabelle Kendig-Gill, who helped coordinate
the survey, recommendations were written for governments
to use to help promote peace. Based on proposals offered
by a conference of educators, in which Ms. Kendig-Gill
participated, her recommendations urged, among other
things, the appointment of an educational expert to
assist heads of state and an international textbook
exchange. The plan's Objective was the elimination of
misunderstandings and distortions that exist in each
country's own version of world affairs.43

The other "new" educational tool of the NCPW
was the use of a traditional method of communication:
the poster. Aware Of the widespread use of the poster
in America's past, Libby felt they had been particularly
effective as a propaganda tOOl in selling the First World
War to the public. His own limited experience with this
method (the "No More War" window sticker) convinced
Libby that the poster was an easy, inexpensive way to
inform large segments of the general population of the
NCPW program.

Although many posters would be used through the
years, Libby was most pleased with the Council's initial
offering in 1925. Based on a sermon delivered in
Washington's National Cathedral the previous September,

it was entitled "America First." Not to be confused with

 

43Ibid., p. 34.

80

either the program or the organization that would later
use that title, "America First" offered a series of
spiritual, moral objectives to which the nation and
her people should aspire. Two of the poster's urgings
seemed most indicative of Libby's attitude: "America
First, not in splendid isolation but in courageous
cooperation . . . not flaunting her strength as a giant,
but bending in helpfulness. . . . "44
Another effective educational tool was the press
release.45 Although Libby hoped the major daily news-
papers would print the releases verbatim, it was the
smaller papers, without large organizations, that pub-
lished Libby's interpretation Of a critical issue or
an Administration policy. Frequently needing copy,
these papers eagerly accepted Libby's news releases
from Washington.46

Libby believed that for the educational campaign,

or any Council effort, to be successful adequate

 

44Libby, "My Theory of World Peace," p. 8, To
End War, pp. 38-39. Other goals expressed in the poster
were: "America First, not merely in science . . . but
also in ideals, principles, character," and "not in
pride, arrogance and disdain of other races . . . but
in sympathy, love and understanding."

45"Details of Plans . . . "; F. J. Libby memo,
May 11, 1927, NCPW files.

46F. J. Libby, "After 'No More War Day' What?"
February, 1924, NCPW files.

81

information must reach NCPW'members.47 They had to be
made aware of issues, bills in Congress or the sig-
nificance of Presidential directives. Furthermore,
they needed to know what was required of them in a
particular campaign. Although Libby often used per-
sonal communications (telephone, telegraph, visits) in
emergency situations, he relied mostly on letters from
the Washington Office under his name.48

If Libby needed members to write their Congress-
men expressing peace sentiment On a particular bill, for
example, the established procedure was for Libby or a
staff person to first compose the letter which was then
copied on letterhead stationery and mailed to members.
If time or money were short, letters were sent instead
to officials in the member groups who were asked to
explain what was needed to their organizations.

Reinforcing these letters were constant reminders

in the News Bulletin and Peace Action of what readers

 

 

should know and what they should do. Libby repeatedly
supplied such information as addresses of Congressmen
and voting records on peace-related bills. Over the
years Libby found members most responsive to his

requests.

 

47
Activities . . .

"Details of Plans . . . "; "Statement of

48Libby diary, November 30, 1924, Libby Papers.

82

The effectiveness of the NCPW's educational
campaign was measured not only by the favorable response
of those concerned for peace, but by the mounting cri-
ticism directed toward Libby and the Council. Criticism
of the NCPW covered the spectrum from the Administration's
rational critique of Libby's objections to preparedness
to the Navy League's irrational charges. But regardless
Of its source or intensity, Libby believed it to be
indicative of the NCPW's influence and effectiveness.
Little time is spent attacking a weak, ineffective
organization.49

Rational criticism was almost always countered
by equally rational rebuttal. But irrational attacks
were difficult to defend against. Relying on innuendo
and suspicion rather than evidence, the charges that
the NCPW was "red" required more of Libby's time and
energy than all others put together. He quickly deter-
mined that there was no adequate, single defense against
that charge. Instead it necessitated continual denial
and explanations Of who the NCPW's member groups were.
In many cases Libby found he was defending not only
himself and the staff, but the individual member group
as well. Unlike other charges against the NCPW that

came and went, the "red" association began in the early

 

49Kuusisto, "The Influence of the NCPW," p. 41.

83

19208 and continued unabated until the whole debate over
the prevention of war was rendered moot by World War II.

"There is nothing 'red' about the peace movement
. . . ," Libby wrote later. "It is easier to call names
than to argue a great issue . . . (it is) just one more
manifestation of the intolerance which military men are
apt to show when their favorite institutions are

50 The "great issue" to which Libby

threatened."
referred was whether or not increased armaments bring
national security or international insecurity. He
suggested that name calling always seemed to increase
whenever Congress was debating military appropriation
requests and the NCPW was arguing for budget cuts.
Although Libby felt unsubstantiated attacks on
the Council were the only way the military could hOpe to
discredit peace activists, he believed there were deeper
motives involved. Change may have been the only constant
in human relations as far as Libby was concerned, but
that was not the case for everyone. He recognized that
the peace movement was simply the most recent "progres-
sive movement" to be called "red." "The onward march Of

mankind continues but the attitude of the reactionaries

toward every forward step in human progress remains

 

50F. J. Libby, press release, 1928, NCPW files.

84

51 Personally,

the same yesterday, today and forever."
Libby did not feel threatened by what he considered
absurd charges, but nonetheless he understood the neces-
sity of denial and defense that such charges demanded
for the peace of mind it Offered his supporters. The
accusation of "red" association did cause frustration
however, not because he took it seriously, but because
the time wasted defending the peace movement was time
away from discussion of the real issues, the "great
issues," of the day.

Libby's defense of the NCPW was usually explan-
atory, frequently repetitive and aimed at the general
charge of being "red," despite what specific allegations
might arise. "The NCPW is a middle-Of-the-road organi-
zation, neither radical (left) not reactionary (static).
It is not pacifist (refusing to fight); it urges pre-
vention of war in peace time, not Opposition to war in
war time."52 Libby pointed to the wide range of groups
composing the NCPW-~1ike the Association to Abolish War,
the National Education Association, the WOmen's Tem-

puerance Association or the Fellowship of Reconciliation--

tc> support his characterization. That the Council

 

51F. J. Libby, "Pacifists, Socialists and Reds,"
Machinists Monthly Journal (September 1928) .

52"The Program of the National Council for the
I22745379'eention of War," p. 2.

85

itself was not a pacifist organization was self-evident;
Libby was the only one of pacifist beliefs on the staff.
Although some of the member groups and well-known
individuals (the Association to Abolish War or Jane
Addams, for example) were considered more "liberal"
than others, Libby urged critics and supporters alike
to assess them not in terms of their politics or indi-
vidual goals, but in terms of their common desire for
peace and the prevention Of war. Furthermore, if one
examined what kinds of people comprised these groups,
the inevitable conclusion was that they represented
every basic segment of society. In fact, Libby took
pride in discussing the grass roots support for the
Council; farmers, churchgoers, laborers and educators.
And the "backbone of the American peace movement" was
women. "This is true in no other country. . . . In the
United States a dozen great women's organizations not
only constitute a large part of the American peace move-
ment but are also better informed on international affairs

53 Needless to say women

than any similar group of men."

were a primary target for NCPW Opponents. Unfounded

charges of ignorance and incompetence were constantly
being made. Libby quickly found long defenses useless
and instead recounted the civic and humanitarian contri-

butions of, say, Jane Addams in hopes of satisfying the

CZJEJJi-izics.
f’A

 

53F. J. Libby notes, undated, NCPW files.

86

Libby quite simply got used to the attacks and
figured that it was inevitable that someone would "raise
the bogy of 'communist menace,'" that "amazing 'communist
plots' will be unearthed" or that the women of the move-
ment were not in their prOper "place."54 Stoically,
Libby wrote: "steadfastly, resolutely, undeceived by
the propaganda of our foes and sticking together in our
pursuit of peace regardless of efforts to divide us, our
eyes upon our goal . . . we must go forward . . . year
by year . . . until we know without . . . a doubt that
we have put an end to war as an accepted method of
settling nations' quarrels. . . . "55 Before the

Japanese invaded Manchuria, Libby would be given

justification for believing that goal had been reached.

 

54F. J. Libby, "The American Peace Movement:
An Interpretation," Peace Action, June 1, 1928, p. l.

55"Pacifists, Socialists and Reds."

 

CHAPTER 4

If the Washington Conference was looked upon
with pride by the peace movement as indicative Of its
successes, it was merely prologue to the last half Of
the 19208. Small accomplishments were always important
to Frederick Libby, but meeting the very important chal-
lenges determined the real effectiveness of the NCPW.
Although reaponse to NCPW programs was favorable, the
war scare with Mexico was the most difficult task yet
faced by the peace movement. Peace sentiment would
prove to be more influential than even Libby had believed.
By the end of the 19208 Libby would see the realization
of his dream for the outlawry of war. Success filled
the peace movement with confidence. But the peace
machinery--the "court" and "town meeting"--that Libby
believed were prerequisites for the success Of the out-

lawry of war had not been established.1

I
Unlike the Objective of influencing negotiations

at; the Washington Conference, the Mexican war scare of

 

f

1See Chapter 3.

87

88

1927 Offered the Council an Opportunity to alter policy
decisions Libby labeled as "hostile." The origins of
the dispute lay in the Mexican government's attitude
toward foreign owned subsoil resources and changes in
the role of the Catholic Church in Mexico. Unfriendly
policies toward either American companies or Mexican
Catholics were certain to elicit a hostile response from
Americans, particularly from those not satisfied with
the existing boundaries between the two nations.

The crisis Of 1927 began with the Mexican govern-
ment's violation Of the Bucareli Agreements, a series Of
executive agreements regarding the security of American
property in Mexico. Prior to the signing of the agree-
ments in 1923, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes
attempted to settle outstanding American claims against
Mexico by withholding diplomatic recognition Of the
popularly elected Obregén government. The claims,
through which American businessmen filed for compen-
sation for expropriated prOperty, had been left over
from the Wilson administration which never did recognize
(DbregOn. Obregén finally did receive recognition from

Ifughes and the Harding administration by agreeing to
gytmarantee American property rights, particularly subsoil
rights, and to the arbitration of the claims by special

czcafifunissions. More than anything else, Hughes feared

that future Mexican governments would not believe

89

themselves obligated by the Bucareli Agreements.2 Hi8
successor at State, Frank B. Kellogg, did not have to
wait long to see if Hughes had cause for worry.

While the claims commissions slowly deliberated
the questions before them, the new Mexican government of
Plutarco E. Calles decided it was not bound by the agree-
ments Of its predecessor. Thus, in December, 1925,
Calles issued a new petroleum code limiting foreign
ownership of Oil properties purchased before 1917 to
fifty years. The ultimate effect of the code would
have been the nationalization of the petroleum industry.
The expected hostile reaction to the new code by American
investors quickly surfaced, receiving considerable sup-
port from the Hearst press.

Having just returned from Europe, Libby quickly
briefed himself on what he believed was a grave crisis.
He urged the peaceful settlement of the disputed claims
by the existing commissions. But President Calvin
Coolidge and Secretary Kellogg remained convinced of the
«continuing legality of the Bucareli Agreements and in
LLate January, 1926 Kellogg issued a terse reply to Calles

concerning "legally acquired" property rights. "The

position Of this government," argued Kellogg, "has

 

2Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy
of the United States: An Historical Interpretation (New
{01:32: Harcourt, Brace & World, I943), p. 217.

90

been and still is that the . . . land and petroleum laws
. . . are plainly retroactive and confiscatory . . .

upon property rights . . . legally acquired . . . under
prior existing Mexican laws."3

The Administration's position was, of course,
supported by American investors with something to lose,
but support also came from an unanticipated source:
Catholic Church groups in the United States. Their
support Of the Administration had less to do with sym—
pathy for the problems of American investors than it did
with new restrictions placed on the Catholic Church of
Mexico.

The role of the church in the political, social
and economic development of Mexico has been a long and
controversial one. In the years following the First
World War, contending political elements sought to re-
define the position of the church in society. The new
Mexican constitution legalized growing anti-clerical
tendencies and restricted church activities ranging
from where it could hold services, to the supremacy of

secular education, to forbidding the church from holding

.izwvestments or owning prOperty.4

 

3New York Times, January 21, 1926, p. l.

 

4Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico
(Ca-rubridge: Harvard University Press, 19657, pp. 201-03.

 

91

Throughout most of 1926, Libby found himself in a
delicate position. This was not the first time, nor
would it be the last time, that he challenged the claims
of American investors, but in challenging church groups,
like the Catholic Knights of Columbus, he found himself
in the uncomfortable position of opposing those who tra-
ditionally supported his work for the peaceful settlement
of disputes.

By January, 1927, American reaction to these
changes in the Mexican government's policy was pre-
dictably indignant. Hostility toward Mexico spread
rapidly. Oil companies demanded action, hopefully
intervention, and the Hearst press capitalized on the
horrified response of American Catholic groups to the
repressive measures south of the border.

Complicating the already tense situation was
Calles' refusal to aid the United States in preventing
revolution in nearby Nicaragua. The United States had
for some time suspected that Mexico was supplying
Nicaraguan rebels with arms, but it was unable to
secure an agreement preventing such activity. On

January 10, 1927, shortly after President Coolidge made
this charge in a message to Congress, Secretary Of
£3t3€1te Kellogg published a document purporting to show
covert Bolshevik plans for Mexico. Kellogg, not too

4715);].1Lquely, suggested that the atheist Calles was

92

helping to further Russian aims.5 For many Americans

the document answered the dual questions of why Calles

refused to help prevent revolution in Nicaragua and why

he clamped down on the Catholic Church. A tense situ-

ation had clearly become a crisis and a slogan from an
earlier day, "manifest destiny," was heard again.
Events moved so swiftly now that Frederick Libby

felt the use of the Council's normal machinery would be

too slow to prevent an American-Mexican war.

Although he was ready to take immediate steps to

try to prevent a war, Libby believed this was precisely

the kind of major dispute that should never have been

al lowed to develop. Steps should have been taken during

the period of instability to resolve peacefully what

”as still a minor disagreement. Libby felt that aside

frcam the lack of effective machinery to deal with major
di Sputes, the greatest fear of the peace movement was

that rapidly escalating events would lead to a crisis

that decision makers would believe could only be settled

by force .
Following a meeting of the executive board,

Li bby was placed in charge of an emergency campaign.
HQ acted quickly to mobilize peace sentiment. Telegrams

WQ he sent to "hundreds of prominent peOple" around the

\

 

5Kuusisto, "The Influence of the NCPW," pp. 43-44.

93

country asking for their support for arbitration rather
than force to resolve the crisis. While he awaited the
response, Libby began forming an ad hoc committee of
notable people to act as the focal point for urging a
peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Arriving in New York, he asked for and received
the aid of James G. McDonald in organizing the campaign.
He also called on James T. Shotwell and Nicholas Murray
Butler (President of Columbia University). Together
they formed the "Committee on Arbitration with Mexico."
Libby and the Committee drew up an appeal for arbitration
for newspapers that would include the names of well-

known people who supported such action. The response to

Libby's telegram resulted in over four hundred signatures
Of support and the appeal was issued as a news release
to more than 13,000 of the nation's newspapers which
gaVe it prominent coverage.6

The initial Administration response to these
app sale was silence, thus reaffirming Kellogg's previous
9° 8 ition that the legality of American property rights
wa. as not subject to arbitration. Libby's next move was
to recruit Joseph B. Chamberlain Of the Columbia Law
83 hool to draw up a technically worded statement that
th‘ i s dispute between the United States and Mexico was

J“massed an issue that could, and should, be arbitrated.
\

6Ibid., p. 44; Libby, To End War, p. 56.

94

The statement was quickly circulated among selected
5p<>litical scientists and experts on international law.
More than 100 of them signed the statement and it was
forwarded to President Coolidge. By this time, the
Federal Council of Churches joined the effort by urging

support from its clergymen. Letters and petitions urging

peace poured into Washington. Apparently more sensitive

to anti-interventionists' peace sentiment than to the

" threat" of Communism or the "rights" of oil companies,
the Senate, on January 25, 1927, by a vote of 79-0,
passed a resolution urging arbitration of the dispute.
No longer able to disregard public Opinion and now the
sense of the Senate, President Coolidge agreed that the
Problem was subject to arbitration; that Mexico did have
the right to expropriate property if compensation was

made, and the crisis was over.

In the space of a few short weeks Libby had
335 :lEectively mobilized massive peace sentiment Opposing
American intervention in Mexico. Some writers studying
these events have debated the severity of the crisis.
But Libby's actions during the critical months before
the Senate resolution indicate that he perceived the

C3: isis as extremely volatile.
\

7See for example, Bemis, The Latin American

I1,,l-\=’3_icy of the United States, Cline, United States and
gamfico and ROSert Freeman Smith, The United States and

bWtionagy Nationalism, 1916-1932 (Chicago: University
Chicago Press, 1972).

95

Libby's experience in organizing public opinion
had been severely tested by the demands of time but
tzlze Council responded quickly and effectively. Although
anti-interventionists feeling in the Senate helped, to
Libby must go most of the credit for changing the Admin-
istration's hard-line policy on expropriated American
5):":<>per\‘.:y.8

Libby's optimism for the future of American-

Mezican relations and his confidence in the Council's

efforts received a boost when, on September 21, 1927,

Coolidge named financier Dwight W. Morrow as America's

new ambassador to Mexico. Following as it did so closely

the Council's efforts to secure arbitration of the dis-
Pute, Libby felt that the Morrow appointment was indica-
tJimxze of a new policy and a new era of continually improv-
ing relations between the two nations. His faith in
Mo rrow was rewarded as the new ambassador set out to win
the friendship of the Mexican peOple and the respect of
the Calles government. Through his personal style of
d“'i~E-lomacy, Morrow's respect for Mexico and its citizens

SQQn became apparent and by November, 1927, the Mexican

Supreme Court ruled in favor of American oil by
\

p 8Kuusisto, p. 42. Cline, however, disagrees,
‘ 210.

i 9Libby, To End War, p. 59. Cline agreed on the
pubertance of the appointment, pp. 210-12, as did Bemis,
‘3 - 217-18.

 

96

validating the acts of previous Mexican governments.
A short time later Calles issued a new code that in
effect reaffirmed the Bucareli Agreements. Libby's
sszatisfaction with the peaceful settlement of the crisis

was second only to his confidence in the new attitude

of the Coolidge administration toward future questions

about oil properties in Mexico. It was now administra-

tive policy to allow new disputes to be settled by

Mexico's government and court system. To Libby, this

new policy signified Washington's respect for Mexico
and its people, a quality heretofore lacking in the

official relationship of the two governments.

II
While Libby's emergency peace campaign was
a~‘t.‘t:empting to prevent a Mexican-American war, peace
activists increasingly focused their attention on the
a-";‘—‘l;ivities of French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand.
Ca.;>able and politically experienced, Briand's proposal
EQI the renunciation of war struck a responsive cord

in the American peace movement. But, by the Spring of

l 9 27 neither Coolidge nor Kellogg clearly understood
what Briand wanted, thus they had yet to decide just
hQ-W they would respond to Briand and the rapidly growing

p'szular enthusiasm supporting his advocacy of outlawing

"at.

97

Although the intellectual origins of outlawing
war predated Libby and peace activism during the inter-
war years, disillusionment following World War I made
t:11e idea more attractive. The suggestion that war could
be made illegal was particularly attractive to peace
groups, like the NCPW, that sought untried solutions
for dealing with the "forces of war." The earliest
articulation of, and support for, the renunciation of
war came, however, not in the impatient 1920s, but,
in the pre-war days of genteel Opposition to war. It
was left, however, to Chicago lawyer and anti-war
campaigner Salmon Levinson to coin the word "outlawry,"
that, after 1918, became the accepted way of referring
to the whole idea of renouncing war. In 1921 Levinson
fO‘Lmded the American Committee for the Outlawry of War.
De Spite a fairly comprehensive program, the committee
f0 oused its attention and activity on outlawing war.10
In February, 1923, Senator Borah offered his own plan
er renouncing war. Following the outline of the

Le\rinson program, Borah's resolution included similar

re commendations for international law and a world court.

\

loThe Committee's program suggested the dele-
ga- lization (leading to the outlawry) of war, the codifi-
ii tion of international law and the establishment of an
bmdependent world-wide court, not unlike the World Court
Ru.- 1: without its ties to the League of Nations. Robert
“‘ Ferrell, Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the

'1‘: 3.10 g-Briandjgct (New York:' w. w. Norton 5. Company:
\GQT:Lpp. 33-35.

 

98

Across the Atlantic, Briand was also intrigued

by this concept; but for different reasons. France's

sorrecariously weak position following the war led to an

c>lasessive quest for security. The foundation of security

rested in part on securing allies that could be called
on when, not if, German militarism again threatened.

Until now, France had only negotiated alliances with

Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland. But Briand set out

to conclude other agreements, particularly with England

or America because of the substantial boost to French

security they would provide.

The impetus for Briand's famous letter to the
Arnerican people came from the suggestions and encourage-
ment of two leaders of the Carnegie Endowment, Nicholas
Murray Butler, President of the Endowment and James T.

Shotwell, Director of the Endowment's Economics and

Hi story Division. On April 2, 1927, Briand wrote his

8":‘-—entement to the American peOple calling for a Pact of

Fe rpetual Friendship and "the renunciation of war as an

in atrument of national policy. . . . "11 Briand's

Pb imary concern was still French security, not the out-

lawn, of war, but that concept gave him another avenue
12

which might lead to an alliance with the United States.

 

111bid., p. 71. lzIbid., pp. 74-79, 263-65.

99

Libby, too, was drawn to the crusade to outlaw

war. He first supported outlawry after talking with

Levinson in 1922. The two had met, according to Libby,

while Levinson was "peddling the idea from door to door

arnong the peace organizations in Washington and New

71(ork."l3 Less than one year later the outlawry of war

was a plank in the NCPW program and Libby was calling
for a conference to "clarify our vision" on the subject

because, he felt, experience has demonstrated "that we

shall not drift into permanent peace. Leadership is

necessary. . . . "14 In 1924, Libby attempted to give

some direction to the movement for outlawry by outlining

the minimum requirements for” its success. He, of course,

advocated the establishment of his two prerequisites--

the "court" and "town meeting"--—before outlawing war

could succeed. Success also required a greater degree

°f commitment, "a higher develOpment of the will to

De ace and justice than has been observed among great

niartions in the past."16 Libby suffered no illusions

about the difficulty in securing that "will to peace

 

\
13.
Libby, To End War, p. 60.

19 14"A Call to Conference on the Outlawry of War,"
23, NCPW files.

15See above, Chapter 3.

16 "My Theory of World Peace," p. 3.

Libby,

100

and justice," but it stood no chance of developing at
all without the illegality of war being clearly defined.
"Until aggressive war has been branded a crime, and
until the aggressor has been defined, the prevention of
war will be haphazard, and the growth of an effective
world opinion against war will be slow and uncertain."17
Libby first encountered French Foreign Minister
Briand in 1926 while in Geneva to observe sessions of the
League of Nations welcoming Germany as a member. As
Briand addressed the delegates Libby observed the
reaction of the German delegation which "had braced
for the worst . . . when (Briand) began." Surprising
'those in attendance, Briand called for friendship,
c00peration and peace through the League. "I can't
describe the effect of Briand's eloquence," Libby wrote

'tc> the staff back home, "except to say that it transformed

a despondent assembly into an assembly full of hope and

courage . "18

When Briand's letter to the American people
calling for the renunciation of war was published in

Several newspapers on April 6, 1927, the reaction of

l7Ibid.

. 18Libby, To End War, pp. 47-49. In his diary,
glbby referred to BrTand as "heavy and lumbering in the
lesh, but a humming bird in spirit," September 8, 1926.

 

101

peace activists was quick and predictable. The hope of
outlawing war had always received near unanimous approval
from the many peace groups (with widely divergent
interests) operating during the interwar years.19
Briand's letter was the first tangible advancement

of the concept at that high level of statecraft since
Levinson first began "peddling the idea" several years
earlier. Libby's reaction was not unlike his contempo-

raries. It "crowded (Mexico) off our front page in the

May News Bulletin," he wrote later, "it is the most sig-

 

nificant proposal that has been made in the hundred years
since Benjamin Rush proposed to England the disarmament

2° The NCPW endorsement of

of our border with Canada."
Briand's proposal was immediate and enthusiastic.
It was not until the end of April, 1927, when

the New York Times published a letter to the editor

 

from Nicholas Murray Butler supporting Briand, and
followed with an editorial endorsing the foreign min-

ister's suggestion, that the proposal began to draw

 

19Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, pp. 102-06,
Chapter 4, passim.

 

20Libby, To End War, p. 60. The Rush-Bagot
Treaty of 1817, which originally disarmed the Great
Lakes and eventually led to disarming the entire border,
has been pointed to as a model for the peaceful arbi-
tration of international disputes.

 

102

widespread attention.21 As support grew, Coolidge felt
no need to respond because Briand had ignored official
diplomatic channels. In addition to the violation of
diplomatic procedures by Briand and several Americans,
Coolidge and Kellogg were suspicious of Briand's
obsession with security. They worried that growing
enthusiasm for the outlawry of war might pressure the
Administration into precisely the type of European
entanglement post—war administrations had hoped to
avoid. They were convinced that peace activists, on
whose support Briand was depending, were not aware of
the potential trap of a military alliance that was
hiding in Briand's recommendations.

Libby was one of those peOple who failed to see
the entangling implications in Briand's proposal pre-
ferring instead to accept it at face value. He,
therefore, directed his protestations not at Briand but
at the Administration for its failure to respond posi-
tively, the niceties of diplomacy notwithstanding.
Criticism within the peace movement of Administration
inaction led to increased efforts to pressure official
Washington into changing its noncommital position.
Unlike the effort seen before the Washington Conference,

no one peace group dominated the campaign on behalf of

 

21Ferrell, Peace in Their Time, p. 75.

 

103

the renunciation of war. It was a simultaneous, if
uncoordinated, effort without immediate success.

The first significant change in the otherwise
static situation came when Briand approached America's
ambassador to France Myron T. Herrick. This first
"official" contact concerning the substance of Briand's
suggestions contained in his published letter was
greeted cautiously in Washington. The Administration
was still wary of Briand's motives and Libby was again
frustrated at Washington's unwillingness, as he saw it,

22 But as word

to cooperate in such a "divine purpose."
spread of official contact between the United States and
France, societies of the peace movement stepped up their
activity to pressure Washington into a favorable response.
The Administration and the Congress were finding it
increasingly difficult "bucking the flood of petitions
and letters which beseeched votes for a treaty against
(what was considered) international sin."23
Temporary unanimity in the peace movement was
apparently paying off, because by the Fall of 1927, both
Coolidge and Kellogg concluded that "something" would

have to be done to "mollify the American peace movement."

 

221bid., pp. 89-90; Libby, To End War, pp. 60, 65.

 

23Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's
Foreign Relations, pp. 319-55.

 

104

The only alternative was a substitute measure "of some
sort."24 By December, 1927, that substitute turned out
to be Kellogg's counter-proposal for a multilateral,
rather than a bilateral, treaty outlawing war. Both
Kellogg and Briand were aware that a multilateral agree-
ment was not a two—power alliance, and a two-power
alliance was precisely what Briand wanted and what
Kellogg hOped to avoid.

As Briand pondered his next move, word of
Kellogg's counter-proposal reached the peace movement.
The response was overwhelmingly favorable. The consensus
seemed to be that if an agreement to outlaw war between
two nations was good, then an agreement among many nations

would have to be better.25

Libby, his contemporaries
and Secretary Kellogg now awaited Briand's reaction
to the new proposal.

After several months of diplomatic haggling,
Briand realizing he had lost to world opinion, acquiesced
to Kellogg's counter-proposal. On August 27, 1928, The
Pact of Paris was signed by the representatives of
fifteen nations at the Quai d'Orsay Palace. The heart

of the treaty was Article I stating that the signatories

"condemn recourse to war for the solution to international

 

24Ferrell, Peace in Their Time, p. 129.

 

25F. J. Libby Notes, 1927,.NCPW files.

105

controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of
national policy. . . . " Article II stated that only
"pacific means" would be used for the settlement of
international disputes.26
American reaction to the Pact was overwhelmingly
favorable. The language of the agreement, simple and
straight forward when compared with most "official"
documents, was clearly understood by even the most
unSOphisticated spectator. Those in the peace movement
were particularly pleased because of the promise that
such an agreement held. The "surrender of the historic
right of sovereign nations to wage war at will was
extremely serious business," Libby concluded.27 The
fact that such a "historic right" had been freely given
up seemed to indicate a degree of commitment to seriously
alter the way in which nations had always interacted.
Libby wanted to believe that the signatories of the Pact
had finally developed that "will to peace and justice"
missing in the past. He hoped that peace would quickly

become the "habit" that war had always been. Only when

war became unthinkable and "peace between nations is

 

26A copy of the Pact is in Ferrell, Peace in
Their Time, pp. 266-69.

 

27Libby, To End War, p. 60.

 

106

taken for granted . . . will the Kellogg-Briand Pact
have fully accomplished its purpose."28

With the memory of what happened to the Versailles
Treaty when it reached the Senate for ratification still
fresh in his mind, Libby was not about to see a repeat
performance with this important document. A special
NCPW broadside carried pictures of the signing ceremony
followed by interpretations of the need for the Pact.29
Libby directed members of the Council to publicize the
treaty and asked the NEA to try and have it incorporated
in school curricula alongside the Constitution. He even
convinced the Post Office Department to display posters
about the Pact in their outlets across the country.30
He also began coordinating a letter writing and petition
signing drive among members of the Council in support
of ratification.

The campaign for ratification began almost
immediately after the signing of the treaty in August,
but the bulk of the effort had to await the result of
the November presidential/congressional elections.

Once the elections were over, the peace movement

began their nonstop campaign. Virtually every peace

 

28Ibid., p. 62.

29September, 1928, NCPW files.

30Libby, To End War, p. 64.

 

107

society, regardless of size or scope, joined the effort,
which was nothing short of "herculean," like a "grand
alliance" pouring "salvos of resolutions, letters and
telegrams" into the capital. "No Senator in Washington
escaped the imperious request of these organizations:
that the anti-war treaty receive promptly and without
reservation the Senate's advise and consent for ratifi-

31 At the end of November, 1928, the foreign

cation."
policy advisor of the NCPW staff, Laura Puffer Morgan,
wrote to her friend and fellow peace advocate Jane Addams
that the State Department was "completely swamped with
our letters and petitions. . . . There is no doubt that

our methods are effective."32

A few days later Kellogg,
in a letter to Borah, confirmed what Ms. Morgan believed.
"I am sure you will be interested to know," the Secretary
wrote, "that a conservative estimate would indicate that
persons who have sought to express themselves through
letters and resolutions . . . exceed 50,000 in number,
and . . . the volume of such communications, at present
about 300 daily, seems to be increasing rather than

diminishing."33

 

31Ferrell, Peace in Their Time, pp. 232-37.

 

32November 30, 1928, NCPW files.

33December 4, 1928, quoted in Ferrell, Peace in
Their Time, p. 238.

108

The net effect Of this massive effort was the
overwhelming ratification of the Pact of Paris by the
United States Senate. The vote was 85 to l, the magni-
tude Of which "fairly represented" the popularity of the

treaty "in the nation as a whole."34

III
Once the euphoria Of the moment passed, how did
Libby assess the Pact of Paris and its chances for
success? Generally, he was enthusiastic and Optimistic.
"We shall support our government in wholehearted Observance
of its pledge to seek the settlement Of all disputes by
peaceful means. That way, and not in mounting armaments,

lies America's great future."35

His Optimism was also
supported by the election to the presidency Of Herbert
Hoover, a Quaker. That combination--the Pact outlawing
war and a Quaker president who supported it--"filled

the peace movement with great hope" that in the future,
nations of the world would conduct foreign policy based
on a new set of priorities in which the use of force was

an unacceptable alternative.36

_.

 

34Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's
Foreign Relations, p. 348.

 

 

35Press Release, October, 1929, NCPW files.

36Libby, TO End War, pp. 65n66. In terms of sig"
nificance, Libby equated ratification of the treaty with
only’one dissenting vote to Hoover's capturing 40 of 48
States in his election.

 

109

Some of those who have studied and written of the
circumstances surrounding the Kellogg-Briand Pact have
been critical of the peace movement and the "false sense
of isolated security" brought on largely by an "appal-
lingly naive" understanding of international politics.37
NO quarrel can be made with the argument that the treaty
produced a false sense of security not only in America
but in Europe as well. The same criticism cannot be made
against Libby, unless one equates support of the Pact
itself as naive. He was quick to realize that many
people, American and European, saw the Pact as a pan-
acea. What was worse was his realization that some of
outlawry's most knowledgeable and hard-working supporters,
like Levinson and Borah, saw the Pact as the final act
of some diplomatic play out of which new attitudes,
actions and priorities would automatically come. Cri-
ticism of these peOple is deserved. But Libby, from

the outset, "warned that . . . the pact was to be con»

sidered the initial step only--a step which in itself

 

meant nothing unless implemented by membership in the

 

World Court," membership in the League and disarmament

(emphasis added).38

 

37For example, see Osgood, Ideals and Self-
Igterest in America's Foreign Relations, pp. 346-50 and
Ferrell, Peace in Their Time, pp. 221u39, 263-65.

 

38Kuusisto, "The Influence of the NCPW," p. 46.

110

Years earlier Libby had made his position on
outlawry quite clear. It was to be only one part of
his three-part program that would help change, but not
automatically, the attitudes, actions and priorities of
decision makers. At that time, Libby saw the "court"
and "town meeting" as necessary prerequisites to the
success of outlawing war.39 But years Of hard work had
failed to gain American membership on the WOrld Court
or in the League of Nations by the time Briand's letter
to the American peOple was published in April, 1927.

TO Libby, outlawing war was to be the most difficult

of the three steps and he saw little chance of it
happening until America's leaders changed their position
on the Court and the League. But when it did happen he
eagerly supported the Pact and worked for its acceptance
and ratification.

All Libby did was to rearrange the three steps
tO take advantage, as he always did, of rapidly changing
circumstances. Rather than meaning less now that out-
lawry was a reality, they meant more if outlawry was to
succeed. Preparing for a round table discussion shortly
after President Hoover had proclaimed the Pact in force
at a White House ceremony in July, 1929, Libby stressed
the new importance Of the "court" and "town meeting."

"The League of Nations supplements the Pact," he argued,

 

 

 

39See Chapter 3.

111

"by providing machinery for carrying out the pledge.
. . . " He went on to suggest that in light of the
pledge of Article II to use "pacific means" to settle
international disputes, joining the World Court "is
obviously the next step."40 His awareness Of the
inherent dangers Of over-reliance on the Pact alone
seems clear.

Libby does deserve criticism, however, for his
uncharacteristic lack of perception in evaluating the
effectiveness of the second article Of the Pact requiring
"a pacific means" for settling disputes. Article I posed
no real problem because saying that war was bad was
quite simple. But Article II required that only "pacific
means" (like arbitration) be used to settle disputes.

The problem was that Kellogg clearly exempted the United
States from compliance with this requirement in situ-
ations where the "inalienable right Of self-defense"
forced America to do otherwise. During the ratification
procedure the Senate added to Kellogg's exception by
exempting all areas "covered" by the Monroe Doctrine.
Diluting Article II even more, Britain and France each
Offered special reasons why exceptions had to be made

for them also. The British held there were certain areas

Of the world that were Of "special and vital interest"

e

40Notes for round table discussion August, 1929,
NCPW files.

112

to Britain's security (read: The Empire). The French
agreed, no doubt with the ever-present threat Of German
militarism on their minds, that Article II did not apply
to any commitments already made with individual countries
or the League Of Nations. Thus the validity Of those
French treaties with Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia
was no longer in doubt.

Even in the face of this kind of diplomatic
doubletalk, Libby could argue, in August of 1929, that
"Article II Of the Pact leaves no loopholes for the age-
Old excuse of counting every war as 'defensive' for it
pledges the signatories to settle egg£y_dispute by peace-

ful means" (emphasis is Libby's).41

Exactly what Libby
was thinking when those words were written is not known.
Since the exceptions were all articulated prior to the
Pact Officially being declared in force, and, therefore,
before Libby wrote his August statement, it is logical
to conclude that Libby was aware Of the British, French
and American positions. The only reference he made to
them was forty years later. At that time he discussed
the questions raised by the United States and Great
Britain only as contributing to the "prolonged dis-
cussions" that took place before Kellogg's counter-

proposal of a multilateral treaty finally became a

reality.

411bid., pp. 1-2.

113

The question that remains is how Libby's acute
perception allowed him to worry about the future of the
Pact without support of the World Court and the League
and at the same time, fail to recognize the implications
of American, British and French actions? One choice
might have been that he chose to ignore those exceptions
and hoped that a situation would not occur where one of
those nations would exempt themselves from the Pact.

A more satisfying explanation was that he believed that
membership on the WOrld Court (the "next step") and
membership in the League ("providing the machinery for
carrying out the pledge") would eliminate the exceptions
because of the credibility and respectability those
organizations would give the Pact. There is no direct
evidence to substantiate this conclusion, but it is a
logical one based on what we know Of Libby and his faith
not only in the Court, the League and outlawry, but his
faith in mankind's ability and willingness to change

the way they have habitually done things.

IV
It seems appropriate at this juncture in the
narrative to draw a few basic conclusions about the
peace movement and Frederick Libby. If Robert Ferrell's
(assessment is correct, and I believe it is, that the

.Kellogg-Briand Pact was the "apogee Of success" for the

114

peace movement, the years following the Japanese invasion
of Manchuria would most certainly be judged disappointing
failures.42
The conservative peace groups, like the Carnegie
Endowment, would continue to Oppose war and plod along.
Not satisfied simply with Opposing war, the radical
peace groups sought to develOp a new system of peace.
The leader of these impatient societies was the NCPW
and Frederick Libby. The leaders of both types of
groups were willing to work with Libby despite dif—
ferences over tactics and philosophy. During this
first decade of the interwar years, attaining their
common goals was more important than outlook. At this
time, differences in outlook among one set of peace
leaders did not seem irresponsible or threatening to
the others. Thus, cooperation within the movement was
frequent and widespread.
The Council and Libby "grew up" during the 19208.

Libby's satisfaction with the peace movement's work in

the 19203 was reflected by his own words in To End War

 

about the changed attitudes following the Kellogg-Briand
Pact: "Patriotism would no longer be identified with

military action alone but would henceforth be associated

 

42Ferrell, Peace in Their Time, p. 264.

 

115

equally with loyalty to our pledged word to settle our
disputes only by pacific means."43
The NCPW had made a success of the Washington
Conference, contributed to the success of the Pact Of
Paris, led the fight to prevent war with Mexico, Opposed
the "forces Of war," and whenever necessary, "laid down
a barrage Of peace propaganda the like Of which has
seldom been seen in the United States."44 By 1930,
the NCPW, thanks mostly to Libby's untiring efforts,
was no longer the ad hoc gathering it was at the Wash-
ington Conference but a "seasoned pressure group well
qualified" to meet the demands of the future.45
Libby's importance in the peace movement during
the twenties was assessed by James T. Shotwell of the
Carnegie Endowment. In 1930, he praised Libby for his
knowledge of the "situation in Washington" and Offered
his thanks to Libby: "let me . . . express my sense Of
deep Obligation to you for all that you have done. . . .
Your organization is no misnomer, for it is genuinely

and fearlessly working for the prevention of war."46

 

43Libby, To End War, p. 63.

 

44Ferrell, Peace in Their Time, p. 28.

 

45Kuusisto, "The Influence of the NCPW," p. 49.

46Letter from James T. Shotwell to Libby,
April 5, 1930, NCPW files.

CHAPTER 5

The Optimism about the future of international
affairs that led the peace movement into the 19305 was
to be short-lived. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria
severely tested the foundation of that Optimism, which
was believed to be on solid ground with the Washington
Conference treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Sup—
ported by these documents, the result Of international
gatherings held almost a decade apart, Frederick Libby
was confident that, working within the framework Of the
League of Nations, disputes could be successfully, and
peacefully, resolved. If the "Mukden Incident" did not
destroy the confidence and optimism Of peace activists,

it certainly gave them a severe jolt.

I
On the night of September 18, 1931, Japanese
troops attacked, and in a few hours captured, the Man-
churian village of Mukden. The rationale for such
action, at least the version Offered initially by the
Japanese, was the Offensive actions of elements of the

Chinese army. Supposedly, companies Of Chinese soldiers

116

117

had blown up sections of the Japanese-owned South Man»
churia Railway which ran close to Mukden. In defense of
their holdings, Japanese troops retaliated and drove the
"provocators" away. But within a few days the Japanese
occupied other towns a considerable distance from the
railway tracks at Mukden. Without letting newsmen verify
their story by seeing the alleged damaged sections of
track, the Japanese army tried to explain how an express
train carrying reinforcements to the scene had bridged
the "gaps" in the track. In fact, evidence later pre-
sented at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials in 1946 established
that the entire incident had been fabricated by the Jap-
anese military. Planned and executed without the
approval of the civilian government, the incident was
only one part Of an elaborate military scheme to conquer
all Of Manchuria. The military argued that Japan's

vital economic and political interests necessitated the
Manchurian action. Only through independent policies,
like the seizure Of Manchuria, would Japan be able to
meet her future economic needs and fulfill certain
imperial desires. Whatever the Japanese intentions

might have been, the whole episode posed a serious

threat to the validity of the Nine~Power Treaty of the
washington Conference and challenged the moral principles

of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.1

_

1The Nine—Power Treaty of February 6, 1922,
Pledged its signatories, the United States, Great Britain,

118

Libby's initial reaction to the Japanese attack
was one of fear that America might somehow be drawn into
the conflict.2 The international reaction to the news
was mixed. The most impassioned plea came, needless to
say, from the Chinese. With an unsettled domestic
political situation complicating the problem, China
called on the League Of Nations to help under Article II
which stated that any threat to peace was the concern of
all the members. China also called upon the United States,
as initiators Of the multilateral Pact to outlaw war, to
ensure that the crisis would be resolved peacefully.

The American reaction, as well as the British, was
cautious and questioning. What concerned both nations
more than military events in Manchuria was the worsening
economic situation at home. The outcome of Britain's
abandonment of the gold standard was watched with a more
critical eye by observers in both countries than the
outcOme Of events at Mukden. Whatever attitudes were
adOpted, or whatever actions were taken, would be

influenced by the world's disastrous economic plight.

e

Japan, France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium and the Nether-
lands tO guaranteeing the territorial integrity Of China
in an effort to let China "develop and maintain . . .
herself."

2F. J. Libby, "My Plan for Peace," March 6,
1932, p. 2, NCPW files.

119

The "Great Depression" began, of course, with
the "Great Crash" Of the stock market in October and
November of 1929. The bull market of 1929 peaked in
September when the index of industrial stocks hit 452.
By the time the market crashed in November, the index
read 224: and when it collapsed in July, 1932, it read
58. Bank failures hit almost 2300 by 1932, up from 491
in the prosperity Of 1928. Unemployment rose from five
million one year after the crash to more than twelve
million by the end Of 1932. The value of America's
foreign trade, which in 1929 was $10 billion, fell to
$3 billion in 1932. But the economic woes were hardly
confined to America. As Libby noted in October, 1930,
before the Depression had reached its worst stage,

The present economic crisis is a world problem,
not a national problem, and can be dealt with only
by the world as a whole. . . . Neither we nor any

other nation can prosper alone because we cannot
sell unless they can buy.

 

3F. J. Libby Statement, October 14, 1930, NCPW
files. Libby had little trouble integrating the aims Of
the NCPW with the dismal economic situation. For example,
in a speech in Denver on March 13, 1933 (on May 10 the
speech was printed in the Congressional Record), Libby
spoke of disarmament: "There is no argument against the
drastic reduction of the world's armaments by inter-
national agreement. Four thousand million dollars a
year is too much for the world to be spending on what it
vainly calls 'national defense.‘ Armaments, like tariffs,
are competitive. We build; they build. NO one can win
this race any more than one can win a race in tariffs.
And it has always led to war." Reprint Of the Congres-
sional Record, NCPW files.

On a more personal level, Libby wrote later
that peace groups were "not spared by the Great

 

120

There were a few lighter almost comic touches to the
despair. Babe Ruth's salary was cut by $10,000, and
the Empire State Building quit running elevators from
the 42nd to the 67th floors, all Of which were unoccu-
pied. But for each Of these events there were more
serious episodes that resulted in tragedy and fear.
The most famous, or infamous, was the plight of the
Bonus Experitionary Force. In June of 1932 thousands
Of World War I veterans converged on Washington to
march in favor of a bill before the House that, if
passed by Congress would have allowed the veterans to
collect $2 1/2 billion in bonus money that originally
was not due to be paid until 1945. The House passed
the bill and sent it to the Senate. With fifteen to
twenty thousand veterans tensely awaiting the outcome,
the Senate voted down the bonus and tension turned to
frustration. Many headed home, but others remained,
and "to the tired, harrassed President in the White
House, the Bonus Army was a hateful, daily reminder
of the ferment of dissatisfaction, bitterness and
distrust that was abroad in the nation."4 Hoover

eventually ordered the army to clear the marchers.

 

Depression" and he complained of the problems of meet-
ing NCPW expenses. Libby, To End War, pp. 94-99.

 

4Walter Johnson, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue:
Presidents and the People Sihce 1929 (Boston: Little,
Brown & CO., 1960), p. 4.

 

 

121

He later told a press conference that force was required
because the marchers were mostly Communists. General
Douglas MacArthur, who led the troops, supported his
Commander-in-Chief by suggesting that the veterans were
"animated by the essence of revolution." If such
activity had been allowed to continue, he added, "the
institutions of our government would have been severely
threatened."5
In this bleak atmosphere it is no surprise that
news Of the events in Manchuria were greeted with caution.
Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson "had no
desire to assume the responsibilities of world leadership
and Hoover, in particular, feared an effort by the
League Council to pass the problem Off on the United

6 Like the United States, Great Britain and

States."
the other signatories Of the Nine-Power Treaty "took

a timid attitude toward the crisis, and though timidity
might well have appeared had there been no economic

troubles, it is certain that the Depression restrained

5Quoted in Ibid., p. 5, and William E. Leuchten-
burg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914—1932 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 263.

 

6Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China:
§§_Interpretive History of Sino-American Relations (New
York: JOhn Wiley & Sons, 1971), p. 128.

 

 

122

all thought of drastic action."7 But the existence of
timidity did not preclude concern. Stimson saw Japanese
actions in Manchuria as a threat not only to the peace,
but to the validity Of the Nine-Power commitment to a
sovereign China and to America's prestige through the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. Nonetheless, Stimson refused to
invoke the Pact Of Paris.

The reaction Of the peace movement to events in
Asia was not surprising. Although concerned about the
economic crisis, peace groups interpreted Japanese
actions as a direct violation of the Pact of Paris.
"Japan," Libby wrote, was guilty of doing precisely
what other nations have done "since the beginning Of

history."8

The initial response Of the peace movement
was for the United States to urge Japan to withdraw.

It was hoped that America would send an investigating
team to Asia to assess the validity of Japan's version
of what happened and report to the League. But Stimson,
remaining cautious, refused this action also. "The

initial mistake," Libby argued, "for which our govern-

ment was partly responsible (was) in not sending

 

7Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the
Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-
1933 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 17.

 

8Libby, "My Plan for Peace," p. 2.

123

immediately a committee of investigation to the region
(as an arbitrator/investigator, not a military par-
ticipant). . . . The reports, . . . in order that the
League may have authoritative information upon which
to act, are . . . essential to the successful function-
ing of the League."9

Those in the peace movement remained unsatisfied
with the Administration's negative response until word
reached the United States that on October 8, the Japanese
had bombed the city of Chinchow. Since Chinchow was
over one hundred miles from the South Manchuria Railway
at Mukden, there seemed to be no doubt about either the
Japanese version of the original incident, or their
ultimate intentions for Manchuria. Stimson, worried
about the future of Manchuria, convinced Hoover Of the
seriousness of the situation. Three days later Hoover,
in an unprecedented move, instructed Prentiss B. Gilbert,
America's Observer at Geneva, to sit with the League's
Council for discussions of the Manchurian problem
relating to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Libby and others
in the peace movement were pleased with this new American
cooperation with Geneva.10

As the situation in Manchuria worsened, one
issue that came before the League was the possible

imposition of economic or diplomatic sanctions should

 

10

9Ibid. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

124

less militant efforts fail. Some peace activists, like
Dorothy Detzer or Kirby Page, favored economic or
diplomatic sanctions but Libby did not. He felt
sanctions of any type would lead to war. He also
argued that the United States should neither lead nor
follow the League in the implementation of a proposed
economic boycott. Any such proposal was "impracticable"
for "Congress, and particularly the Senate, is not going
to offer the League of Nations the use of our navy for
the enforcement Of any economic restrictions. . . . "11
Libby also feared that a debate over sanctions would
Open up Old wounds and politically divide the country.
"The Old bitter struggle would start again," he warned,
"in Congress and in the country at large and the war
would be over before agreement would be reached."12
Libby's primary Objection to all types Of
sanctions was, of course, that they eventually lead
to war. In the circumstances surrounding the Manchurian
situation, Libby offered additional reasons supporting
his contention that an economic boycott was ill advised,
by favoring a group he seldom had anything but criticism
for. He referred to this group as "general business
interests." He was not discussing munitions makers

and others who manufactured the tools of war, who always

were targets for Libby, but those business interests

 

12

111bid., p. 3. Ibid.

125

"on the Pacific Coast . . . (and) throughout the

13 In other words,

country" that traded with Japan.
those business groups that Libby has constantly been
critical of for their over-zealous devotion to profits,
secure markets and sources of raw materials to the
detriment of cooperative international relations, were
now receiving his support.

Libby's rationale for supporting "general busi-
ness interests" was the pathetic state Of the American
economy. SO bad was the general business climate that
boycotting Japan would be a needles burden for business
to bear. Libby envisioned business groups confronting
Congress and demanding: "'Are you not aware that we
are suffering from a great depression now? For God's
sake don't do anything to make it worse than it is.'"
Because Of the dire economic situation, Libby believed
that business interests would never come out in favor
of a boycott.14

The obvious question that occurs at this point
is why Libby was suddenly so concerned with the plight
of American business. Taking into consideration what
we know about Libby's background, his assumptions and
convictions, it is quite feasible that his primary

concern (second, Of course, to peace) was the desperate

economic situation in America and the world and the

 

l4

131bid., pp. 3-4. Ibid.

126

disastrous effect it had on mankind. We know, for
example, that he blamed the Manchurian attack and the
rise of Adolf Hitler, in part, on the Depression. The
desperate state of the world's economy, "forced" Japan
to find a secure supply of raw materials while in
Germany, Hitler promised to restore order and stability

15 The worse the

to a country racked by inflation.
Depression got, the worse the plight for the average
American, or German, or Japanese. Thus, perhaps, to
strengthen his stand against sanctions he placed him-
self in a position of supporting a group he felt was
automatically Opposed to the boycott and, at the same
time, hoping to help the average citizen who he thought
would be hurt by the imposition of sanctions. But he
gravitated to what he believed were interests that
would automatically, regardless of the situation, align
themselves against a boycott. By enlisting business
to his cause, Libby hoped to lend greater credibility
to his argument against sanctions. Of these two ele-
ments, concern for human welfare and increased credi-
bility for his position, the latter led to Libby's
rather unusual advocacy of the business community.

At any rate, Libby's motives notwithstanding,
the support needed in America for sanctions to become

a reality would have caused political division within

 

15Statement Of October 14, 1930.

127

the peace movement. The lingering memory Of the horror
of the Great War, the desire to avoid European political
entanglement and, most importantly, the Depression made
creating the proper atmOSphere for participating in
sanctions difficult. The only way such an effort could
be sustained, Libby wrote, was to launch, a "campaign
of hate . . . sufficiently vigorous and continuous to
divert the majority of our voters from . . . nearby
interests." He went on to describe the need for atrocity
stories of such magnitude that their constant repetition
would lead to hatred for the "enemy." It was clear to
Libby that the "psychology necessary to an economic
boycott is the psychology of war. The methods of
securing a boycott are the same methods that lead to
war." In this highly charged and inflamed atmosphere
such hatred could "bring us within an inch of war."
What Libby feared most was that such an emotional state
would be manipulated by the "jingo press" (meaning
Hearst) and lead America into an unwanted and needless
war.l6

Libby hoped that sanctions would not be imposed
on Japan and refused to accept the idea that peace could
result from such coercive measures. "I cannot believe,"
he wrote, "that . . . peace . . . is going to rest upon

the methods or psychology of war. . . . It must rest on

 

16Libby, "My Plan for Peace," pp. 3—4.

128

the methods and psychology of peace."17 On December 10,

1931, his worst fears were relieved somewhat when the
League Council adopted a resolution establishing a
commission to investigate the circumstances surrounding
the Mukden incident. Chaired by the Earl of Lytton,
the commission soon reported that despite China's
uncertain political climate and Japan's reasonably
legitimate concerns about Manchuria, there existed no
justification for Japanese actions. The commission
recommended the re-establishment of Chinese authority
over Manchuria.

The United States, at the beginning of 1932,
had yet to take any Official action regarding events in
Asia. Although America had participated in the League
Council's discussions and had even sent a representative
to the Lytton Commission, Libby still worried that Stimson
might initiate a potentially disastrous policy. Finally,
on January 7, 1932, Stimson announced the Official
American position regarding Manchuria: the Hoover-
Stimson Doctrine. Hoping for the support of other
governments, Stimson incorporated in the Doctrine a
"universally accepted" treaty. Thus, the substance
of the American position was that the United States

"does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty,

 

17Ibid., p. 4.

129

or agreement which may be brought about by means con-
trary to the covenants and Obligations of the Pact of
Paris."18
Stimson's policy of nonrecognition, reminiscent
of a similar statement issued by Secretary of State
William Jennings Bryan in 1915, was first suggested
the previous November by President Hoover. The Doctrine,
highly moral in tone, was a logical policy given Stim-
son's belief that the foundation of America's foreign
policy was the Washington Conference treaties and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. Quite understandably, Stimson
believed public Opinion would automatically align against
aggressors like Japan. After all, the Paris Pact had
received virtually unanimous support, thus, a policy
Of nonrecognition would demonstrate the moral indig-
nation Of the world and Japan would be "forced" to
settle her grievances peacefully. Although the Doctrine
had the advantage of requiring the United States to do
nothing whether the Japanese accepted the pronouncement
or not, it still needed the support Of other signatories
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to have the weight of public

Opinion. But support was not forthcoming, most

 

18Quoted in Dorothy Borg, The United States and
the Far Eastern Crisis Of 1933-1938: From the Manchurian
Incident through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared
Sino-Japanese War TCambridge: Harvard University Press),
p.—9.

 

 

 

 

130

importantly not from Britain and France. Britain was
worried about the future of trade with Manchuria and
Japan, and London was justifiably concerned about the
potential Japanese threat to other imperial holdings
like Hong Kong. ‘The French, meanwhile, had similar
concerns for Indochina and hoped that Japan would keep
well to the North on the Asian mainland. Other nations,
following the Anglo-French lead, also refused support.

Undaunted by Europe's failure to join in America's
moral condemnation Of Japan, Stimson turned this time to
the Nine-Power Treaty to enlist support against the
aggressor. In his famous Open letter to Senator Borah
published February 23, 1932, Stimson restated the prin-
ciple agreed to in the Nine-Power Treaty and on that
basis appealed to its signatories to endorse nonrecog-
nition. Furthermore, the letter contained a lightly
concealed threat suggesting that continued Japanese
actions in violation of China's integrity would result
in termination of America's commitments by the Nine-
Power Treaty leading, possibly, to the fortification of
Guam and the Phillippines. Independently, Britain and
France were no more willing to support Stimson this time.
But, this time at least, support was granted by the
League of Nations. On March 11, 1932, the Assembly
voted unanimously for a resolution supporting non-

recognition. Not entirely convinced of the League's

131

willingness to back the resolution with action, Stimson
still "had an abiding faith in the ability of the
United States and Great Britain to solve many of the
problems which threatened the stability of the world,
if they would only work together."19
The notion of England and America working
together pleased Libby. He welcomed the Hoover-Stimson
Doctrine and believed it would prove "more fruitful

20

than the boycott." "The great merit of the (Hoover-)

Stimson Doctrine is that it condemns without coercing,
except in a negative (way) . . . it was a bold step."21
Thus, the kind of diplomatic action against aggressors
that Libby had been advocating for years had finally
been taken. What made it possible, of course, was the
existence Of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But he realized
that America's unilateral action, no matter how "bold,"

22 Nonrecognition would be ineffective

was inadequate.
without support from fellow Pact members. Libby ner-
vously awaited the response Of Europe and England in

particular. He had been disappointed twice and was,

 

19Ibid., pp. 9, 16.

20Libby, "My Plan for Peace," p. 4.

21F. J. Libby notes, February, 1932, NCPW files.

22F. J. Libby notes, 1933, NCPW files.

132

therefore, apprehensive, but the tension was lessoned

by the League's endorsement of nonrecognition on March 11.
Although Japan was now "morally isolated," Libby cau-
tioned the peace movement that even though a policy Of
nonrecognition required patience, a military response
would have required more patience and would have been
very "costly in human life and ruinous to an impover-
ished world."23 Libby applauded the moral isolation of
Japan because she was the aggressor who had violated

the peace, and he was willing to act with patience in
the hope that the Hoover-Stimson policy, strengthened

as it was by League support, would be a "warning . . .

to all nations in the future . . . that there is nothing
to be gained . . . " by conquest.24 But despite this
hope, Japan's continued aggression and the establishment,
in March, 1932, Of the puppet state of Manchukuo left
Libby disturbed. Later he wrote that Japan's continued
actions should be "clear warning" to the British and
French that they would need stronger policies than non-
recognition should Hitler decide to duplicate Japan's

25

Manchurian adventure in Europe. Libby's notes were

 

23Libby notes, February, 1932.

24Libby, "My Plan for Peace," p. 4.

25Libby notes, 1933.

133

carefully worded so that the "clear warning" was aimed
at Britain and France and not the United States. He

had yet to acknowledge that the euphoria and accomplish-
ments of the 19203 had ended. Nonetheless, his careful
phraseology brought to mind that the NCPW's goal in
1931-32 was "the goal with which we started, prevention
of a second world war and, if we failed in that, pre-

26 "No

vention of America's involvement in such a war."
injustice that China could conceivably suffer," he wrote

in the NCPW's revamped newsletter, Peace Action, "would

 

compare with the injustice of our embarking on another

world war."27

II

In the Spring of 1932, the realization that the
peace machinery had failed to resolve its first serious
international crisis disheartened many in the peace
movement, including Frederick Libby. Since prOSpects
for the future were none too bright considering the
Depression, the situation in Asia and the increasing
influence of Hitler in Germany, Libby began to re-
evaluate the effectiveness Of some of the NCPW tactics.

It became obvious after the establishment of

Manchukuo that words alone were incapable of halting

 

26Libby, To End War, p. 79.

 

27Peace Action 1 (December 1934-January 1935).

 

134

Japanese aggression. As members of the Interorgani-
zation Council on Disarmament (the forerunner Of the
National Peace Conference), Libby and the Officers of
other peace groups like the WIL and the League Of

Nations Association tried to find an acceptable way

of discouraging aggression without risking American
involvement in war. Libby believed that coercive
measures like boycotts were not the answer since they
increased the risk Of war and were accompanied by
heightened emotional antagonism toward the aggressor.28
Attempting to arrive at an acceptable compromise,
Nicholas Murray Butler, chairman Of the Committee on
Economic Sanctions, Offered a new plan. He argued that
traditional forms of neutrality had been outdated by

the Kellogg Pact and that any nation guilty of aggression
must be Opposed by the Pact's signatories who should
jointly invoke an arms embargo against the violator.29
Libby later expressed his conviction that arms traf-
ficking drew America into the Great War and thus, he
thought that an arms embargo "in full cooperation" with

other nations "might be an effective deterrent" to

 

28Libby, "My Plan for Peace," pp. 3-4.

29Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), p. 20.

135

aggression.3o As radical peace activists turned inward,
mandatory embargoes would have greater appeal, but in
1932, Libby still saw the nonrecognition doctrine as
the "more fruitful" Of the methods suggested for oppos-
ing aggression.31
Another area under re-evaluation was the Council's
efforts at mass education which had been refined con-
tinually until a sympathetic response from public Opinion
was usually assured. However, favorable public support
did not guarantee effective political action or influence.
"The key to the Council's influence . . . (was) in its
ability to translate sympathetic public opinion into

32 But Libby was uncon-

wholesale political pressure."
vinced, in the Spring Of 1932, that such pressure could
be organized. In his annual report at the end of 1931,
Libby was beginning to realize that current efforts,
particularly in light of Manchuria, were not enough.
"We must develop political power," he argued, because

NCPW efforts to educate the people would not be effective

"without corresponding political action." It was decided,

 

30F. J. Libby, letter to Peace magazine,
March 15, 1934, NCPW files.

31Libby, "My Plan for Peace," p. 5.

32Kuusisto, "The Influence Of the NCPW," p. 81.

136

therefore, that a "political machine" was needed to
"channel public sentiment into active support" for the
major issues of the day.33
The NCPW's fledgling effort at direct political
influence began almost immediately. The year 1932 was
a presidential election year and both conventions were
to be held that summer in Chicago a few days apart. In
May, the Council's policy committee met to formulate
strategy for the major parties' upcoming conventions.
The "Chicago Plan," as it was called, advocated
two strategies: one outside the convention for the
benefit of attracting public attention, and the other
inside the convention hall to influence party policy.
There were to be two massive automobile parades, com-
plete with colorful banners and flags proclaiming the
advantage Of peace, preceding each convention.34 To
publicize the beginning of the "plan" Jeannette Rankin,
former Congresswoman and now head Of the NCPW's Legis-
lative Department, left Washington by car with great

fanfare and a lavish sendoff all arranged for the

benefit of press photographers who were, of course,

 

33Libby, To End War, pp. 82, 91; Kuusisto, "The
Influence of the NCPW," pp. 81-82; "Annual Report of
the Executive Secretary of the NCPW," October, 1931.

 

34Minutes of the Policy Committee, May 20, 1932,
NCPW files.

137

informed ahead Of time. Both parades came Off as
scheduled, led by no less a celebrity than Chicago's
own Jane Addams.

The more important part of the "Chicago Plan"
was aimed at the two major parties and their individual
delegates. The strategy developed called for peace
workers to quietly approach delegates, hand them COpieS
of the NCPW's peace plank and be prepared to discuss
the need Of delegate support. The peace plank empha-
sized the regular goals of the NCPW. Foremost, of
course, was disarmament, followed by membership on
the WOrld Court, membership in the League and adherence
to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. While this was going on,
representatives of the Council would be testifying
before the resolutions committee and the platform
committee hoping to have their suggestions incorporated
into the convention either by resolution or as part Of

35 For both conventions, Jane

the party's platform.
Addams was called upon to lead off testimony before
the resolutions committee. In addition to activity
at the two conventions, the Council also drew up plans

for the five-day (June 20-25) layoff between them. The

gap was to be filled by a conference on political

 

351bid.

138

strategy for members of the peace movement so that
workers, resources and plans might be pooled to avoid
any wasteful duplication.36
Although a report of the policy committee
written by Libby in the Fall reported that all plans
drawn up the previous Spring had been successfully
carried out, tangible results were something else.37
They had hoped to have a real impact inside the con-
vention, not outside where enthusiastic public response
to their publicity gimmicks was all but assured. For
it was inside that the real decisions were made that
could affect war and peace. Unfortunately though, the
NCPW stimulated only modest interest among the delegates.
"The Council could be ignored with impunity, since it
represented only a small, insignificant group Of

idealists," Kuusisto wrote.38

Although Libby was aware
that the NCPW did not command much attention, he felt
they had only begun to try and affect the political
process. Furthermore, he felt the Council was less

than effective because of the ever-pressing economic

crisis. Reflecting on the campaign Of Democratic

 

36Ibid.

37"Report of the Policy Committee," OCtOber 25'
1932, NCPW files.

38Kuusisto, "The Influence of the NCPW," p. 83.

139

presidential contender Franklin D. Roosevelt, Libby
wrote that FDR spent almost no time on foreign policy
simply because Of the Depression. In fact, for the
same reason, most people did not even consider foreign
policy matters when voting. Libby concluded that the
NCPW must try and reach people outside that "relatively
small section of our population that is interested in
foreign affairs."39
In order to overcome the twin disadvantages of
insignificantness and the Depression, Libby proposed
the formation of local units, at the grass roots, to
"engage in a systematic . . . door-to-door, face-to-

face campaign."40

The primary thrust of local efforts
was directed towards sending a steady stream of letters
and petitions to Congress on behalf of peace legislation
and the election of peace-minded candidates to national
Office. The NCPW refused blanket endorsement of any
political party preferring instead to support individual

candidates based on their positions on peace issues.41

 

39Memo by F. J. Libby, November 11, 1932, NCPW
files.

4oIbid.; Kuusisto, "The Influence of the NCPW,"
pp. 83-84.

41

"Minutes of the Policy Committee," April 20,
1932; Kuusisto, "The Influence Of the NCPW," p. 89.

140

Direct lobbying proved to be another necessary
tactic. Useful at both the local and national level,
lobbyists sought out Congressmen and their staffs at
home and in Washington whenever the situation warranted.
For the most part, lobbying efforts were directed towards
legislation under consideration on the floor or in com-
mittee. Frequently the NCPW drew up its own legislation,
or its own version of existing legislation, for presen-
tation by sympathetic members of Congress. Occasionally,
the Council presented evidence before investigatory
committees dealing with peace-related issues. In any
case, by the end of 1934, the NCPW's "political machine,"
which lacked sophistication in Chicago two years earlier,
"succeeded through its insight into political techniques
in attaining sufficient influence to place it in the

mainstream of the nation's foreign policy determination.
42
0|

III
One of the first attempts by the NCPW to influence
the course of investigatory proceedings occurred during
the inquiry into the munitions industry and the role it
played, if any, in America's entrance into World War I.
The investigations, which lasted from September, 1934,

until June, 1936, would, Libby hoped, so discredit

 

42Ibid., p. 102.

141

militaristic thinking that a peace philOSOphy, heretofore
looked down upon, would have a chance for wider acceptance.
Since the available peace machinery had failed to resolve
the Manchurian crisis, Libby feared that the United States
might be drawn into a coercive effort to help China.
But he believed that an investigation would arouse
enough public indignation over American participation
in the last war that policy makers would be forced to
regard cooperative sanctions in Asia as an unacceptable
alternative.

The inquiry, Officially known as the Senate
Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry,
had a rather unusual beginning. Since the end of the
war rumors had been circulating, particularly in the
peace movement, alluding to the influence munitions
makers had on the conduct of the nation's foreign policy.
The rumors also suggested that the munitions makers,
along with the manufacturers of other tools of war,
profited enormously from American participation in
World War I. As the stability of the postwar era
began to disintegrate with the Depression, the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria and the rise of Hitler, people
wondered if another war was on the horizon and in their
fervent hope to avoid another holocaust, listened more
carefully to the rumors about the munitions industry.

The call to control arms manufacturers was no longer

142

coming only from the peace movement; it was gaining

more and more attention. "The reason? It came at pre-

cisely the right historic moment, when people were willing

to hear such Odd gospel."43
What helped tip the balance at that "historic

moment" was the appearance Of two books in the Spring

of 1934: Iron, Blood and Profits; An Exposure of the

 

World-Wide Munitions Racket by George Seldes and Merchants

 

 

of Death, A Study of the International Armaments Industry

by Helmut C. Engelbrecht and Frank C. Hanighen.44

 

Journalist Seldes, outlining the activities Of the
manufacturers during and after World War I, argued that
"NO reason for war remains except sudden profits for

45 The more influential

. . . the munitions racket."
Of the two books, if only because it was a best seller
and Book-of—the-Month-Club selection (April, 1934) and,

therefore, enjoyed a wider audience, was Merchants of

 

Death. The book purported to be a scholarly, documented

 

43John E. Wiltz, In Search of Peace: The Senate
Munitions Inquiry, 1934-1936 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1963), p. 3.

 

 

44George Seldes, Iron, Blood and Profits; An
Exposure of the World—Wide Munitions Racket (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 193477 Helmut C. Engelbrecht and
Frank C. Hanighen, Merchants of Death, A Study of the
International Armaments Industry TNew York: Dodd,
Mead & CO., 1934).

 

 

 

 

45Seldes, Iron, Blood and Profits, p. 326; Quoted
in Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, p. 166.

 

 

143

analysis Of the industry, demonstrating a ruthless
campaign to promote war for profits.

These two books led the field in helping to
establish a "mood" in America by 1934. The reality Of
the Depression, the worsening situation in Manchuria
and Germany, numerous other books and articles, news-
paper and magazine stories, a Senate resolution to
investigate manufacturers, and even President Roosevelt's
statement that "the private and uncontrolled manufacture
of arms and munitions . . . has become a serious source
of international discord and strife," all helped to

46 As John E. Wiltz wrote: "Who

establish this "mood."
could blame the people in the mid-thirties for taking
seriously this heady business about the merchants of
death."47
The real push for a congressional investigation
of the arms industry came from Dorothy Detzer, executive
secretary of the American branch of Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom. Like many others in the
19203 and 19303 for whom the pursuit of peace was both

vocation and evocation, Ms. Detzer's life was profoundly

altered by WOrld War I. She had worked with Jane Addams

 

46See, for example, "Arms and Men," Fortune 9

(March 1934): 53; the Roosevelt quote is from Wiltz,
p. 23.

.47Wiltz, In Search of Peace, p. 23.

 

144

and, like her colleague, Frederick Libby, helped with

Friend's reconstruction in France. After another

stint of reconstruction work in Russia, she returned

to the United States determined to dedicate herself to

the cause Of peace. In describing Dorothy Detzer's

ability, Charles Chatfield wrote that she was "aggressive

but diplomatic, possessing stern principles and
faire, backed by a vociferous segment of public
and wise in the ways of committees and pressure

In May, 1933, at its annual convention,

savoir-
Opinion
groups."

the

WILPF reiterating a resolution passed a year earlier,

called on the Senate to begin an investigation of the

private munitions trade. Having failed to receive

senatorial help in 1932, Detzer began as she had before,

with Nebraska Senator George W. Norris. After crossing

virtually every Senator Off the list, Norris finally

told Detzer that her sponsor for the inquiry ought to

be North Dakota's Gerald P. Nye. Nye, who did not have

to face re-election for four years, was sympathetic to

Detzer's desire to investigate the munitions makers.

Although he had refused Detzer once before, Norris'

endorsement changed his mind and he agreed to help.

 

48Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, pp.

 

49Wiltz, In Search of Peace, p. 25.

 

49

159-60.

48

145

Nye had little or no knowledge of the industry
he investigated. But, as a Midwesterner and an ardent
admirer of Progressive Robert M. LaFollette, he inherited
a set of prejudices about Eastern financiers and manu-
facturers and about American involvement in World War I.
He approached his task with a sense of duty.

On February 8, 1934, Nye introduced his resolution
for an investigation before the Senate. It is conceivable
that his resolution would have died in committee had it
not been for the right "historic moment." It was at

this time that Merchants of Death and Iron, Blood and

 

 

Profits were gaining popularity. Capitalizing on popular
momentum, Detzer, having already convinced Norris and

Nye of the necessity of an investigation, attempted to
persuade Secretary Of State Cordell Hull. She succeeded

50 On April 12,

and Hull publicly endorsed the inquiry.
the Senate accepted the idea and a few days later Vice
President John Nance Garner (directed by the resolution
to appoint the members Of the Committee) announced the
names of the Senators that would lead the inquiry. Nye,

a Republican, would chair the committee. He would be

assisted by Democrats Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri,

 

50Divine, Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 64-66;
Lawrence S. Wittner, Rebels Against War: The American
Peace Movement, 1941-1960 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969), pp. 10-11; Wiltz, In Search of Peace,
pp. 24-25, 32.

 

 

 

146

James P. Pope of Idaho, Homer T. Bone Of Washington and
Walter F. George of Georgia, and by Republicans W.
Warren Barbour of New Jersey and Arthur H. Vandenberg

Of Michigan.51

Clark, Vandenberg and Bone shared Nye's
isolationist views, while Barbour and George were con-
sidered more moderate. Senator Pope was the only col-
lective security advocate on the panel.

Libby had supported Detzer's effort to organize
an inquiry as early as 1932. The NCPW Offered help and
encouraged her in late 1933, when she finally won over
Norris. Libby was pleased both by the "excellent bi-
partisan committee" named by the Vice President and
when his and Detzer's "competent and trusted friend"
Stephen Raushenbush was named chief investigator.52
Raushenbush was a Wilsonian liberal who believed in the
ruthlessness of the munitions makers. He and his
assistant, a young lawyer named Alger Hiss, began to
search for evidence with the aid of the WILPF and the
NCPW.

The Nye committee held hearings from September,

1934, until January, 1936. When the committee issued

its report in June, 1936, its "revelations" proved

 

51Before the hearings began, Senator George
replaced the originally named Morris Shepard of Texas.

52Libby, To End War, p. 103.

 

147

"as spectacular and as thorough (an) indictment of
munitions profits as the peace groups had hoped."53
People, both in and out of the peace movement, who
believed in "devil theories" about war were satisfied
that the truth had finally come out. Among its con-
clusions the committee agreed that private companies
had profited excessively both during and after World
War I. The report further charged that manufacturers
were encouraged to sell munitions to foreign governments
by the War Department. The ultimate charge, however,
was that munitions makers conspired to ensure America's
participation in the Great War. The report also offered
a few recommendations for the future. Arguing that wars
could be avoided if munitions traffic was regulated,
the committee endorsed legislation controlling the
sale of arms and recommended the nationalization of
munitions manufacturing. A minority report accompanied
the majority report, in which Vandenberg, Barbour and
George dissented in the committee's ultimate conclusion
of the munitions makers culpability for the war and
Opposed the nationalization of the munitions industry.
Peace groups, Libby and the NCPW included, were
pleased with the committee's report. "It was an oppor-

tunity that was not likely to come again," Libby wrote

 

S3Kuusisto, "The Influence of the NCPW," p. 109.

148

later, "how to make the best use of the revelations . . .
became . . . the concern of the whole peace movement."54
Although the report was full of unproved accusations,
Libby began at once to exploit the committee's findings.55
Workers "chose from the rich mass of materials the
juiciest bits" Of testimony to publicize.56 Libby and
the staff integrated highlights of the findings into
their speeches and Libby ordered the printing of a
pamphlet entitled "Munitions Makers' Plight" from a
Florence Boeckel article. "Now it can be Proved" was
one Of the earliest of Libby's pamphlets that allegedly
proved, through the use of testimony, the charges that
for so long had been leveled against munition makers.
Another member of the staff, Paul Harris, wrote a one-
hour play, "Repeat Hearing," based on actual testimony
and NCPW literature encouraged its production by "promi-
nent citizens" (who would portray the Senators and the

munitions makers) in each community. The scripts were

Offered in Peace Action along with descriptions of how

 

to build scenery depicting the hearing room and

instructions for tailoring the dialogue for two to

 

S4Libby, To End War, p. 105.

 

55Wiltz, In Search of Peace, p. 149.

 

56Libby, To End War, p. 105.

 

149

twenty-one actors. It was usually staged by local peace
societies in cooperation with chapters Of national
groups like the WIL.

Although the munitions inquiry provided "a
great deal of material that was useful to (the NCPW) in
exposing the activities Of the munitions industry,"
Libby failed to see the loopholes in the half-truths
of the report.57 Instead of examining the material
for hard evidence of ruthlessness or conspiracy, he
uncritically accepted it. But, then, he was not alone
in his miscalculation. Others, like Dorothy Detzer,
also accepted it without question for it confirmed what
they had always "known" to be fact. The so—called
"connections" between those who manufactured munitions
and the causes Of war (a simple solution to a complex
problem) is usually accepted most quickly by those who
cannot think, or refuse to think. Its real attractive-
ness is that it requires little or no mental effort on
the part of its advocates. The sad part, of course,
is that neither Libby nor Detzer were as unsophisticated
as their advocacy Of the inquiry would indicate. For
his part, Libby repeatedly demonstrated sophisticated
mental gymnastics, particularly regarding pacifism and

the realities of international politics.58

 

S71bid., p. 112.

58See, for example, "Answers to Hard Questions"
discussed in Chapter 1.

150

At the beginning Of the munitions committee
investigation, Libby hoped that it would help discredit
militarism to such an extent that a peace philosophy
could become widely acceptable. Although a different
philosophy had by 1936 become more acceptable, it was
not entirely the result of Nye's inquiry. A philosophy
of peace, or, more correctly, a fear of war, was more
likely the result Of events in Ethiopia, the Rhineland
and Spain.

Based on the successful experiences of the peace
movement in the 19205, Libby was understandably Optimistic
as the 19303 began. It seemed, perhaps for the first
time, that a truly peaceful world was a distinct pos-
sibility. But the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and
the League's failure to resolve the crisis shattered
that hOpe. Although he still advocated international
cooperation for peace, the League's call for cooperative
sanctions against Japan convinced Libby that the world
was headed for war. As a result he directed his
attention toward efforts designed to keep America out
of war. The flexibility and adaptability that had
helped place Libby in a position of leadership in the
peace movement was superseded by his absolute fear Of
war. Working with Dorothy Detzer he concentrated his
efforts on securing an investigation of the munitions

industry. Libby believed that the conclusions of such

151

an investigation would prove the industry's responsi-
bility for America's involvement in the Great War and
would, therefore, act as a constraint on policy makers.
In the twenties Libby worked to expand and further
administration policies leading to peace, but now he
was working to obstruct policies he believed were
leading America down the road to war. From this point,
Libby's advocacy of mandatory neutrality was a most

logical step.

CHAPTER 6

While the Nye Committee investigated the
munitions manufacturers, with the approval of the
Roosevelt Administration and the peace movement, the
international order continued to disintegrate. Just
as people were beginning to accept the League of
Nation's inability to deal with the Manchurian crisis,
Italy and Ethiopia began fighting, Hitler re-Occupied
the Rhineland and civil war broke out in Spain. Add
to this disastrous European situation a full-fledged
Sino-Japanese war in the midst Of world-wide depression
and it seemed that America would be unwillingly drawn
into a war somewhere. In this volatile atmosphere
frightened Americans, in and out of the peace movement,
sought isolation from involvement in events that seemed
certain to lead to a second holocaust in less than a

generation.

I
In this grim economic and political setting Of
the mid-19303, people like Frederick Libby who feared

that the collective action policies of the League would

152

153

lead to war, were encouraged by the actions Of a few
members Of Congress. Within a few days Of each other,
in early April, 1935, Representatives Maury Maverick of
Texas and Frank Kloeb of Ohio and Senators Gerald Nye
of North Dakota and Bennett C. Clark of Missouri intro-
duced resolutions in their respective houses on behalf
of neutrality legislation. In substance, these measures
called for a prohibition on loans to belligerents, a
ban on travel by American citizens into war zones or

on belligerent ships, and an embargo on all arms and
contraband (war) materials. The ban on loans was to

be applied automatically in the event of a declaration
of war.

The intention of these resolutions seemed clearly
to be the isolation of America from all European or
Asian wars because adherence to the traditional concept
of neutral rights in the 1914-1917 period wars, some
peOple felt, a primary cause of America's involvement
in Europe's war. Since the United States first became
a unified nation in 1787, American neutrality has gen—
erally referred to remaining separate from wars among
other nations. The most recent example of American neu-
trality was the "Great War" during which complete impar-
tiality regarding the belligerents was impossible. By
the Spring of 1915, Germany's new tool of war, the sub-

marine, was beginning to prove its worth with devastating

154

effectiveness. Americans were being killed by this
unconventional weapon while traveling under conditions
in which they would normally be protected as neutrals.
The Wilson Administration challenged Germany's use of
the submarine as not within the rules Of traditional
naval warfare. Germany's response was to ignore both
American protests and the rules of traditional warfare
because military considerations dictated otherwise. 80,
the United States, with common heritage and interests,
soon joined Britain in war against Germany.

Now, almost two decades later, the Nye Committee's
search for culpability and the introduction Of neutrality
legislation in Congress was symptomatic of the belief
that the "mistake" of intervention could be prevented
from happening again.

The peace societies generally reacted favorably
to the introduction of neutrality legislation in the
House and Senate. Libby's support for neutrality in
the Spring of 1935, when the resolutions were Offered,
was in marked contrast to his position only a few
months earlier when the NCPW drew up its "Program for
1935" in the fall of 1934. At that time Libby articu-
lated the Council's position regarding what he called
the "Illusions of Neutrality." "We believe," he wrote,
"that war in which the major powers are involved is

doomed . . . because trading with belligerents leads

155

to the sinking of our ships and eventually to war."1
Placing no faith in neutrality as a viable policy,
Libby went on to suggest an alternative: "Our nation
will best serve itself and the cause of peace, not by
seeking neutrality in war but by COOperation for the
prevention of war."2 What he hoped to avoid was a
repetition Of the problems of neutral trading that
"led" America to war seven years earlier.

By the Spring of 1935, Libby's position had
changed; he now advocated support for a policy Of neu-
trality and the adOption of neutrality legislation.3
What brought about the change? By mid-1935 the already
tense political situations in Asia and Africa were
worsening. Japan was demanding naval parity with the
United States and an end to the Five-Power Treaty of
1922. In Ethiopia, King Haile Selassie was asking
Washington for help in securing Italy's Observance of
the Kellogg-Briand Pact and called on the League to

invoke sanctions against Italy. In both situations

Libby believed that war, particularly in Africa, was

 

l"NCPW Program for 1935," NCPW files.

21bid.

3Libby notes, Summer, 1935, NCPW file; Peace
Action 1 (May 1935): l; Libby, "We Have Just Two Wars
to Prevent," Peace Action (July 1935): 3-4; Kuusisto,
The Influence of the NCPW, p. 134; Divine, Illusion
BfiNeutrality, pp. 92-93.

 

 

 

 

156

almost inevitable. "Not a single member of the League,"
he wrote later, "showed any intention of going to war
in defense of Ethiopia."4 In Asia and Africa, the only
way war could be prevented was through cooperative
coercive actions that Libby could not support. Con-
vinced they were no longer able to prevent war, groups
like the NCPW and the WILPF turned to insulating America
from them.5
Although the peace movement welcomed the Nye-
Maverick resolutions, an unexpected split developed
over how neutrality should be implemented. The argument
focused on whether or not embargoes on war materiél or
loans should be mandatory at the beginning of a war or
should be invoked at the discretion of the president
and, presumedly, only applied to the belligerent he
labeled the aggressor. Those favoring mandatory appli-
cation argued that it was real neutrality because it
kept the United States from taking sides intentionally
or unintentionally. Those favoring discretion, on the

other hand, argued that mandatory application prevented

the flexibility needed to meet unforeseen circumstances.

 

4Libby, To End War, p. 120; Chatfield, For Peace
and Justice, p. 236.

 

 

 

5Warren I. Cohen, "The Role of Private Groups in
the United States," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-
American Relations, 1931-1941, eds. Dorothy Borg and
Shumpei Okamoto TNew York: Columbia University Press,
1973). P. 431.

 

 

157

This disagreement was not always the case, however.

In 1929 and again in 1931, the peace movement supported
legislation for discretionary embargoes.6 In both

cases, the peace movement saw these bills as indicative
Of "American cooperation to prevent war."7 Even Libby,

as late as March, 1934, advocated discretionary embargoes.
Referring to a bill before Congress, Libby argued that
"an embargo (imposed against the aggressor nation only)
would . . . serve as a deterrent to getting into war

and, in full cooperation with other nations, might be

an effective deterrent to nations aggressively inclined."8
But he switched from concerted action to neutrality once
the likelihood of preventing another war had passed.
Libby now supported mandatory embargoes as the most
effective way to implement neutrality. "We support

wholeheartedly (the) neutrality" of the Maverick reso-

lution, he wrote, "unable to prevent war in Europe for

 

6Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, p. 232. In
1929 Senator Arthur Capper and Congressman Hamilton Fish
introduced the embargo legislation. In 1931, it was
Senator Borah. '

 

7Ibid.

8Libby, Letter to Peace magazine, March 15, 1934,
NCPW files. The resolution Libby referred to was intro-
duced by Representative Samuel D. McReynolds of Tennes-
see and later amended by Senator Hiram W. Johnson of
California.

158

the time being, . . . neutrality is the . . . answer."9

The split over implementation Of embargoes developed
along conservative and radical lines. Thus, the Older,
more genteel groups like the Carnegie Endowment and
the League of Nations Association supported discretionary
embargoes. Eventually, they urged repeal in favor of a
policy of collective security which suggested that neu-
trals might be able to stop war through the collective,
selective use of diplomatic and economic sanctions
against aggressors. On the other hand, it was the
impatient, new peace groups, like the NCPW and the
WILPF, that argued for mandatory embargoes.lo In fact,
by 1937, the debate would no longer be discretionary
versus mandatory powers, but would be strict isolation
from the aggressors versus collective action to curb
the aggressors.

In any case, no sooner had the neutrality reso-
lutions of April, 1935 been referred to the appropriate

committees than the NCPW "launched an active (coordinated)

 

9Libby, "We Have Just Two Wars to Prevent," p. 3.

loDivine, Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 92-94;
Ferrell, "The Peace Movement," pp. 104-05; Kuusisto,
The Influence of the NCPW, pp. 132-36; Chatfield, For
Peace and Justice, pp. 230-36. '.—_

 

 

159

campaign to secure enactment Of (the) legislation."11

Libby and the NCPW staff planned and organized most of
the campaign which included many Of the activities that
had proven successful in the past. Affiliates of the
Council were urged to direct their memberships to write
congressmen and senators, local Officials and newspapers
to increase local awareness of neutrality legislation.

He also informed Peace Action readers of Congressional

 

bill numbers and when they were likely to be considered
in committee or on the floor. Libby felt that most
people wanted to avoid another war and the simplest way
to enlist their support was to make them aware Of what
was happening in Washington. Many people responded,
and the usual torrent of telegrams and petitions poured
into the capital. Libby also organized a series of
radio broadcasts. Covering part of New England and the
mid-Atlantic states, the twice weekly programs featured
prominent people speaking on issues affecting world
peace. The fifteen-minute talks, highlighted by people
like Jeannette Rankin and Maury Maverick, focused pri-
marily on the need for neutrality laws. Libby, Rankin,
Detzer and Congressman Maverick lobbied heavily to

pressure Representative Samuel D. McReynOlds, Chairman

 

11Kuusisto, The Influence of the NCPW, pp. 163-
67; Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, pp. 236-37;
Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, p. 94.

 

 

 

160

of the House Armed Services Committee, into scheduling
hearings on the house version of the neutrality bills.
A3 a result Of NCPW efforts the hearings were scheduled.12
Held during June and July of 1935, the Armed
Services Committee heard only three witnesses: Kloeb
and Maverick, the congressmen who wrote the house bills,
and Amherst College professor Phillips Bradley, who
"presented and defended in an effective manner" the
views of the Council.13 Bradley spoke not as a repre-
sentative Of the NCPW but as a member of the National
Peace Conference. The NPC was meant to be a coordinating
organization, not unlike the NCPW, but was comprised of
peace group Officers. It never became the efficient
machine that the NCPW was, but, nonetheless, it counted
among its almost forty members Officials of most of the
conservative and radical peace groups. The NPC was the
arena in which the isolationists (NCPW, WILPF) fought
the collective security advocates (Carnegie, League of
Nations Association) in the late 19303. But in the
Summer of 1935, the NPC remained unified enough to

lobby in favor of the bills and pressure the House

into scheduling hearings. During his testimony,

 

12Kuusisto, The Influence of the NCPW, p. 137;
Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, pp. 236-37; Divine,
Illusion of Neutrality, pp. 95-96.

 

 

 

13Kuusisto, The Influence of the NCPW, p. 137.

 

161

Bradley Offered to the committee a resolution adopted
by the NPC attesting to its position on the proposed
legislation: "The neutrality policy of the United
States should be revised in order that the risk of
entanglement in foreign wars may be reduced and in
order that the United States may not obstruct the world
community in its efforts to maintain peace."14 The
ambiguity Of this statement was such that no matter
what an individual's position was, it could be read
into that phraseology. But to Libby, the statement
was not ambiguous; it represented a unified policy "to
which all members" could subscribe.15 It seems clear
that the peace movement's support for neutrality
legislation was hardly in keeping with its traditional
desire for international cooperation for peace.

By the time the hearings concluded, pOpular
awareness Of the neutrality legislation under consider-
ation had increased considerably and the demand for

16

action by Congress grew. The problem, however, was

to get the legislation on the floor of the House and

 

14Peace Action 2 (August 1935): 8, and quoted in
Kuusisto, The Influence Of the NCPW, pp. 137—38; and
Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, p. 94.

 

 

 

15Peace Action 2 (August 1935): 8.

 

l6Divine, Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 95-96.

 

162

Senate for a vote. President Roosevelt and particularly
Secretary of State Hull had been pressuring both
McReynolds and Senator Key Pittman of Nevada (Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) to delay the
neutrality bills from leaving their committees before
the August recess.17 Hull's aim was to force the neu-
trality legislation to be reintroduced in the 1936
congressional session when, he hoped, the bills would
more closely reflect Administration thinking.

Both Roosevelt and Hull favored neutrality
legislation but hoped for bills quite different from
those introduced in the Spring of 1935. They hoped for
a discretionary policy which would allow the President
to consider the circumstances before deciding whether
or not to invoke neutrality. Roosevelt wanted to retain
control of this aspect of foreign policy; he disliked
any legislation that included mandatory or impartial
features.18 Thus, when it looked as if the bills might

receive favorable treatment, Hull went to work to delay

them.

 

17For a detailed discussion Of the 1935 neutrality
debate see Divine, Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 97-121
and, for a less detailed account, but with greater empha-
sis On the NCPW and the peace movement, see Kuusisto,
The Influence of the NCPW, pp. 134-50.

 

 

18Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, pp. 53-56,
90-92, 98-103, 134-35.

 

163

When Representative McReynolds favorably
reported the Maverick-Kloeb bills out of committee on
July 3, Hull immediately extracted a promise from the
Congressman not to allow them to come to a vote in the
House. Hull then focused his attention on Pittman and
the Senate. Since the Nye-Clark bills had already
reached the Senate floor, Hull persuaded Pittman to
have them returned to committee "for further study."
The Senate agreed to return the bills to committee, but
Nye quickly began to organize isolationist supporters
to force a vote.19 Nye and a few other senators began
speaking daily to arouse support for the legislation
and compel the Foreign Relations Committee to act.
While the committee seriously considered what to do,
Hull decided it was time for State to make its formal
recommendations to the President. Not unlike the peace
movement, the State Department was divided over dis-
cretionary/mandatory embargoes. But the report that
finally went to Roosevelt reflected Hull's desire for
flexibility and the President supported it.

Meanwhile, frustration with Administration tactics
was beginning to show. Fearful that Congress might
adjourn without action on the legislation, Libby pleaded

with his readership: "Have you written (to Congress)

 

191bid., pp. 97-101.

164

as we urged you to do a month ago . . . ?"20 Letters,

telegrams and petitions in support Of neutrality still
arrived at the Capitol, but with the congressional
session grinding to a close, more help was needed.

When word reached Washington that British and French
attempts to arbitrate the Italian-Ethiopian dispute had
been rejected by Mussolini, making war seem imminent,
the isolationist senators were now determined to act
even if the Administration was not. Under the leader-
ship Of Senator Bone, a small group threatened to fili-
buster until neutrality was voted On by the full Senate.
As the filibuster began, word reached Pittman that
Roosevelt would no longer fight for discretionary
powers. Pittman immediately went to the floor and
reported the bill approved by the Foreign Relations
Committee. Its primary feature was an impartial arms
embargo and on August 21, the bill passed and was sent
to the House.

Libby and the NCPW staff were relieved at the
outcome of the Senate's action but realized that it
still must pass the House. Fortunately, Jeannette
Rankin and Warren D. Mullin, labor secretary of the
NCPW, had been working diligently not only to gather
support for the House bills, but support for House

action before adjournment. In fact, Rankin personally

 

20peace Action 2 (August 1935): 1.

 

165

wrote letters to over 175 congressmen asking for their
support. Encouraged by the favorable response, she
and Mullin began lobbying at the door of the House

21 Shortly

chamber and received even more support.
before the Armed Services Committee was to consider
the measure as passed by the Senate, Libby learned
that Roosevelt had agreed to the mandatory requirement
with the stipulation that the law would have a six-
month expiration date. Apparently worried about the
uncertain future Of needed domestic legislation before
the House should he decide to kill neutrality, Roosevelt
agreed to the compromise (a mandatory requirement in
return for a time-limit) out of political necessity
and the belief that not enough would happen in six
months to seriously alter his control of foreign policy.22
On August 23, the House passed the neutrality resolution
and two days later the Senate passed the House version
containing both mandatory embargoes and the time limit.
President Roosevelt signed the measure into law on
August 31, 1935.

Basically, the Neutrality Law of 1935 required

that the President declare that hostilities existed at

 

21Warren D. Mullin, "The Neutrality Victory,"
Peace Action 2 (September 1935): 6-7; Chatfield, Egg
Peace and Justice, p. 237; Kuusisto, The Influence of
the NCPW, pp. 141-45.

 

 

 

22Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, pp. 113-14;

 

120-21.

166

the outbreak of a war. By so declaring, the President
automatically invoked an embargo on the export of arms
and munitions to any belligerent and a ban on the ship-
ment Of munitions via American ships. The President was
also given discretionary powers in a few specific areas.
He could, if he chose, issue warnings to American citi-
zens traveling on belligerent ships that they did so
at their own risk, and he could decide what items should
be included on the embargo list. The law was to expire
in six months, on February 29, 1936.

The most enthusiastic reception for the Neu-
trality Law came from the peace movement. Libby was

23 Despite

pleased that their efforts had paid Off.
the fact that most of their work was not Obvious to

the casual Observer, the "role of the Council in . . .
the Congressional struggle was substantial."24 While

it was clear that the people sympathized with the intent
Of the neutrality legislation once they had become aware
of it, it is equally clear that the enormous quantity

of telegrams and letters would not have been sent to

Washington without an organized effort. Senator Nye,

in a Senate speech shortly before passage of the bill,

 

23Peace Action 2 (September 1935): 1; (October
1935): 1; and (November 1935): l, 4.

 

24Kuusisto, The Influence of the NCPW, p. 147.

 

167

confirmed that the number of "telegrams and other com-
munications" received by Congress made clear the public

demand for "strong legislation."25

In fact, the heaviest

mail deliveries Of the entire campaign came between

August 20 and 24, the most crucial time of the whole

episode. Senator Nye also confirmed the influence of

the peace movement's lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill.

In a letter to Jeannette Rankin, Nye congratulated her

for the hard work she put in over several months.

"Your work," he wrote, "has been so . . . productive

of results that one would be foolish to discount the

very large hand you have had in (our) success."26
Before Libby could enjoy the fruits of victory

and begin a new campaign for permanent legislation,

disenchantment among some of the NCPW's affiliated

groups had to be dealt with. The disagreement surfaced

at the annual Fall meeting Of the NCPW attended by

representatives of the member groups and the Council

staff. It focused on the executive committee's (meaning

Libby's) new stand favoring mandatory neutrality.

Critics of the new policy, like Paul Harris and Laura

Puffer Morgan, labeled it isolationist and not in

keeping with the NCPW's advocacy of international

 

25Quoted in Ibid.

26Ibid., pp. 147-48.

168

27 Libby responded that the choice was not

cooperation.
isolation or cooperation but the foundation upon which
cooperation would take place. That foundation, without
neutrality, would surely draw America into war, Libby
reminded the delegates. But with neutrality, the

United States was merely Observing strict impartiality
so that it could not again by led into war by trading
with belligerents. Thus, neutrality laws forced the
United States to peacefully deal with wars by preventing
the government from taking actions that would lead to

involvement.28

Ms. Morgan, however, saw the problem

in different terms. She urged Libby to begin a cam-
paign to educate the American people about the differ-
ences between war as an instrument Of policy and military
actions taken to curb the aggressor. She also urged the
NCPW's support for discretionary powers for the President

29 The members of

when the next neutrality debate began.
the Council failed to resolve their differences before
adjournment, but Libby, reporting on the annual meeting

in Peace Action, tried to do so. "We have taken a

 

 

27"Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the NCPW,"
October 16-18, 1935, NCPW files; Also see Peace Action 2
(November 1935): 3-4.

 

28Ibid.; Kuusisto, The Influence Of the NCPW,
pp. 150-52.

 

291bid.

169

middle ground," he wrote, "we support the isolationists
in avoiding Europe's wars but we take the position that
we must cooperate in world organization on a peace basis
for prevention of those wars."30 What he suggested,
then, was neither isolation nor collective security,

but collective cooperation. In other words, Libby
wanted cooperation without resorting to force and he
believed that America's neutrality laws forced the
United States to play it only that way. But Libby's
reasoning did not settle the dispute, it would surface

again when the next neutrality debate began.31

II

In the early morning of October 3, 1935, Italian
troops attacked Ethiopia, and Mussolini's dream of
another Roman empire brought the world a step closer
to a second global war. Although neither side issued
a formal declaration of war, reports to the State Depart-
ment convinced President Roosevelt that it was time to
act under the Neutrality Law of 1935. Through Secretary
of State Hull, Roosevelt declared that a state of hos-
tilities existed in East Africa which automatically

activated the mandatory features Of the law and the

 

30Peace Action 2 (November 1935): 4.

 

311bid.

170

impartial arms embargo took effect. Roosevelt also
issued a warning to Americans not to travel on bellig-
erent ships. On October 7, the League of Nations
Council branded Italy the aggressor and declared her in
violation of the covenant. By so doing, the League now
had the authority to use economic sanctions to halt
Italy's actions. A committee was established to make
recommendations and by mid-October it urged adoption of
specific economic sanctions that included an arms
embargo, a ban on loans and credit, no further impor—
tation of Italian goods and an embargo on certain raw
materials that members could control, but not on impor-
tant strategic necessities like oil and iron that were
available from non-League members. The United States,
not a League member, refused to adhere to the sanctions.
But, Roosevelt's use of the impartial embargo from the
Neutrality Law, actually gave tacit support to the
League. By invoking the arms embargo and issuing the
warning against travel, the American policy hurt Italy,
the aggressor, more than Ethiopia who imported almost
nothing from America and had no navy to threaten Italian
ships carrying American passengers.

The reaction of the American peace movement to

the Administration's policy was generally favorable.32

 

32Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, p. 130.

 

171

But peace advocates were quickly discouraged when trade
in strategic goods, particularly Oil, increased dramati-
cally during October.33 Nor were they Optimistic when
Roosevelt's plea of October 30 calling for pre-war
limits on the export of Oil and strategic goods was
roundly ignored. It seemed as though the League's
effort at curbing the aggressor was failing. This was
confirmed when England and France attempted to by-pass
League machinery by Offering Italy almost one-half of
Ethiopia's territory to end the war. To American neu-
trality advocates there seemed no hope that collective
pressure would halt aggression. The actions of American
Oil exporters and the Anglo-French offer to mollify
Italy convinced Libby that the 1935 Neutrality Act had
its limitations. "It was evident that the 1936 legis-
lation would have to be stricter and more comprehensive

34 Libby's call for including Oil

in its provisions."
and strategic goods on the embargo list was not advocacy
of sanctions against Italy in the present crisis but
aimed at tightening the new legislation. Had such goods
been included in the original Neutrality Law the

question of penalizing Italy by withholding oil would

never have occurred.

 

33Ibid. Oil exports were 1 1/2 times greater in
October; 3 times greater in November.

34Kuusisto, The Influence of the NCPW, pp. 152-53.

 

172

The Ethiopian crisis also brought to the surface
a problem that Libby had yet to resolve. Since he
envisioned that America would one day be a member of
the League, Libby had to decide if he would support a
League decision to invoke sanctions as it did in the
present situation. Although Libby suggested that the
Italian-Ethiopian war was a "laboratory experiment" that
might give some indication Of the practicality Of col-
lectively enforced sanctions he refused to face the

35 The United States "is a non-member

issue squarely.
of the League," he wrote. "This question will have to
be faced when we join the League . . . but our country
is not ready to join . . . yet. . . . This is no time

to raise the issue."36

Although he put Off confronting
the real issue at hand he, nonetheless, gave an indi-
cation of his feelings about the "practicality" of col-
lective sanctions. "We can answer this question now,"
he wrote.

The answer is . . . negative. Pressure alone,

when exerted against determined resistance such

as Italy's presenting, creates a dead lock which

can end only in abject surrender . . . or in a
war of desperation. The humiliation of Italy

 

35Peace Action 2 (December 1935): 6.

 

36Peace Action 2 (January 1936): 2.

 

173

. . . would make peace in Europe impossible for

many years, because history shows that Italy would

seek revenge with the aid of allies.37
Reluctant to "raise the issue," Libby turned his attention
to the weaknesses Of the 1935 law.

As Congress reconvened in January, 1936, the
issue of neutrality and neutrality legislation had not
disappeared. The Italian-Ethiopian war demonstrated
the inadequacy of just limiting embargoed goods to arms
and munitions. "Congress should extend the mandatory
embargo legislation," Libby wrote, "to cover loans and
credits and all contraband of war" including "such
secondary munitions as minerals, Oil and cotton."38
Libby was not the only one concerned about the future
of neutrality laws for the new congressional session.
The State Department, the neutrality bloc in the Senate
and a special committee of the National Peace Conference
had been working during the recess to prepare proposals
for consideration by Congress.
The Administration's policy reflected the reluc-

tant acceptance of a mandatory arms embargo by Roosevelt
and Hull. Roosevelt hoped that his compromise offered

a choice between the mandatory-discretionary sides of

the argument. The year 1936 was an election year and

 

37Peace Action 2 (December 1935): 6.

 

38Ibid., p. 2; Peace Action 2 (November 1935): 3;
2 (January 1936): 10. '

 

174

"Roosevelt hoped to avoid a long and bitter struggle
over neutrality that would create serious divisions

inside his own party."39

Thus his plan, presented to
Pittman of Foreign Relations and McReynolds of Armed
Services, kept the mandatory arms embargo and added
impartially applied trade quotas on raw materials and

a mandatory ban on loans. But in an effort to give the
President some authority, discretion was allowed in
selecting the items placed on the quota. He could
issue a trade-at-your-own-risk warning to those doing
business with belligerents and he could exempt short-
term credit from the ban on loans.

The Senate's neutrality bloc, pleased that the
Administration did not Offer a completely discretionary
bill, prepared its own legislation. Although they
.accepted the concessions and agreed with portions of
the Administration's bill, they felt it did not go far
enough. Therefore, Senators Nye and Clark and Repre-
sentative Maverick introduced their own prOposals which
included the impartial arms embargo, the trade quota and
the ban on loans contained in the Roosevelt plan. But
the congressional plan gave no discretionary power at all
to the President; the quota system became automatic;

and short-term credit was also banned. One further

 

39Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, pp. 134-37.

 

175

measure in the Nye bill was a cash-and-carry provision
instead of the trade-at-your-own-risk warning. It
required that all belligerent trade be via foreign ships
and that all goods be "sold" before leaving the United
States.

In Peace Action, Libby went to considerable

 

lengths analyzing and comparing the congressional and
Administration versions of the legislation.40 He con-
sidered the substance of both versions (particularly
the concessions in the Administration version) reflec-
tive Of the "tremendous pressure from their citizens
who don't want war." Libby criticized the discretionary
features of Roosevelt's plan and called for "amendments
. . . to the administrative bills bringing them in line
with the Nye-Clark-Maverick proposals. . . . "41
The third neutrality proposal came from the
National Peace Conference which selected a committee
headed by James T. Shotwell to draw up another version
for consideration. Although all factions of the NPC
agreed on the necessity of extending the 1935 law and
increasing its scope to include strategic materials, the

division seen earlier over collective action and isolation

remained. Again the disagreement was over mandatory or

 

4opeace Action 2 (January 1936): 2-3; 2 (Feb-
ruary 1936): 6.

 

41Ibid., p. 3.

176

discretionary embargoes. The NCPW and the WILPF argued
for impartially applied embargoes while the collective
security people called for flexibility for the President,
so that embargoes might not be applied to the victims of
aggression. The NPC plan to exclude the impartial
embargo caused dissension within the peace movement and
prompted Libby to write that the NPC plan was a suggestion
and no more. It "possesses solid educational value," he
said, "but it contains a section . . . (on the) contro-
versial question (of impartial embargoes) . . . that
would precipitate a . . . debate in Congress if the bill
were presented there." As with the problem of sanctions,
Libby relegated solving this dilemma to the future.42
As in 1935, the divisive issue within the Admin-
istration and the peace movement was collective security
versus isolation. These conflicting viewpoints were
presented repeatedly as Senate and House committees
conducted hearings on the measures. The already confused
situation was further complicated by a small group Of
congressmen, led by Senator Hiram Johnson of California,
arguing for the reassertion of the traditional concept
of freedom on the seas. Johnson criticized any sug-
gestion, like the trade quota, that violated America's

neutral rights as they had been defined until the

 

42Ibid., pp. 3, 10.

177

mid-19303. Johnson's challenge to the proposals in com-
mittee was aided by economic and ethnic (particularly

Italian-American) interests.43

The Johnson group of
traditional neutrality advocates focused their attacks
on the discretionary powers in the Administration's bill.
Johnson charged that such powers were a "thinly dis-
guised effort to permit cooperation with the League."44
Libby had no more faith in the Johnson group than he
had in the Administration. "NO neutrality bill is
insurance against war," he wrote, "neutrality legis-
lation . . . is only a step . . . in the process (away)
from our futile 'freedom of the seas' position . . .
which has already involved us in two wars."45
As the deadline rapidly approached, at least four
factions-~isolationists, collective security advocates,
freedom-Of-the-seas advocates and the Administration-—
contended that their view of neutrality was the appro-
priate one. To this confusion a new measure aimed at
satisfying all sides was Offered. Utah Senator Elbert

D. Thomas introduced a resolution extending the 1935

law until May 1, 1937. The only change from the Old

 

43Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, pp. 146-47,
150-52; Kuusisto, The Influence of the NCPW, p. 157.

 

 

44Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, p. 146.

 

45Peace Action 2 (March 1936): 1.

 

178

law was the addition of a ban on loans to belligerents.
The immediate reaction of peace advocates and the Admin—

46 Libby's primary Objection

istration was negative.
to the resolution's extension of neutrality was that
it was again only temporary. The NCPW's main Objective
in the current campaign was permanency in the new law.
But, "the enemies of this (permanent) legislation . . .
were pressing hard."47 The Administration, on the
other hand, was less concerned with permanency than it
was with the resolution's lack of some discretionary
power for the President. Thus, both sides Opposed it.
But as the House and Senate committees remained dead-
locked over the Roosevelt and the neutrality bloc's
bills, the attractiveness Of the Thomas resolution grew.
On February 7, less than a month before expir-
ation, Senator Pittman told Roosevelt and Hull that
between the Nye faction and the Johnson group there was
no chance of the Administration's bill passing. At the
urging Of Pittman, Roosevelt reluctantly switched his
support to the Thomas Resolution as the only alternative
to absolute mandatory neutrality or traditional freedom

48

Of the seas. Within a few days, the Senate and House

 

46Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, p. 153;
Kuusisto, The Influence of the NCPW, p. 158.

 

 

47Peace Action 2 (March 1936): l.

 

48Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, p. 155.

 

179

reported out the Thomas Resolution with only a few
changes. In record time, both houses passed the bill
and sent it to Roosevelt for signing. The rationale
for such swift actions was the rapidly approaching end
to the existing law.

On February 29, 1936, the day the 1935 law
expired, President Roosevelt signed into law the 1936
version Of neutrality. The new law continued the man-
datory arms embargo and the travel restrictions Of the
1935 law. But it added the ban on loans advocated by
the neutrality bloc. Furthermore, it changed from
discretionary to mandatory the extension Of the arms
embargo to new belligerents entering the war. The new
law also exempted the Western Hemisphere from its
application. The Neutrality Law Of 1936 was to expire
on May 1, 1937.

Libby and the NCPW believed the new law was a
defeat for peace activists because their aim had been
permanent mandatory legislation. Instead they got
little more than the 1935 law with a slightly longer,

but still temporary, lifespan.49 In Peace Action,

 

Libby complained that the new law was "not so adequate
as we had hoped," and also had harsh words for "so-
called peace-minded citizens." "This year (will be

called) 'Remember the Neutrality Fiasco'" because

 

49Peace Action 2 (March 1936): 3.

 

180

those who wanted peace were apathetic, allowing the
"well-organized pressure of anti-neutrality groups to
go uncombatted. Neutrality is dead (until next year,
so) after you have had time for a good weep, get busy
and educate the country on what is needed in the way Of

50

adequate neutrality legislation." It was obvious that

the NCPW did not create the organized pressure it had in

51 The failure was not due to any laxity on

the past.
the part of Libby or the staff but to the widening split
within the peace movement over the appropriate type Of
neutrality legislation. Normally, Libby's directives

were passed along to affiliated groups who in turn

rallied their membership to the cause. But, now, NPC
groups like the League of Nations Association were

having second thoughts about Libby's stand on neutrality
and were not urging their memberships to act.52 Unfor-
tunately for Libby, he had yet to realize the size of

the gap between the collective security advocates, whether
in the NCPW or the peace movement generally, and the

relatively small faction of isolationists. With his

isolationist stand in 1936, Libby could only effectively

 

S°Ibia.

51Kuusisto, The Influence of the NCPW, pp. 159-
60; Peace Action 2 (March 1936): 3.

 

 

52Ibid., p. 161.

181

influence the Women's International League and the
Friends Of Reconciliation, which were the Council's
closest affiliates. During the 1936 campaign, Libby
placed his resources and influence completely at the
disposal of the Nye-Maverick isolationist faction in
congress which angered others in the peace movement who
were not convinced of the wisdom of isolation. Thus,
while international cooperation for peace had long been
the key phrase of the peace movement, Libby, despite
his references to neutrality as cooperation, had "irre-
vocably merged (himself) with the isolationists" to
whom international cooperation was an invitation to

war. 53

III

By June, the Ethiopian war had ended and Congress
adjourned to begin the political campaign of 1936, a
presidential election year. Libby and the NCPW had
begun in the spring to make plans for that summer's
conventions. Although the neutrality debate had ended
temporarily, the quest for stronger legislation would
be foremost among the suggestions the NCPW would make
during committee hearings at the two conventions.

Libby's attempts to influence the two parties

were made independently Of the peace movement as a whole,

 

53Ibid.; Also see Chatfield, For Peace and
Justice, pp. 223-55.

 

182

largely because the NPC was completely divided over the
appropriate form of neutrality legislation. Thus,
Libby began to work on his own toward the continuance
of mandatory neutrality. In an effort to offset the
loss Of the collective security wing of the peace move-
ment, Libby organized the Emergency Peace Campaign.54
The EPC was Officially launched on April 21, 1936 in
Washington with a nationwide radio address by Hanna
Clothier Hull, President of the Women's International

55 The purpose of the campaign was "To promote

League.
a cooperative national campaign to keep the United States
from going to war and to achieve world peace. . . . "
Libby hoped this could be done by Offering "alternatives
to armed conflict"; by helping to ensure the political
and economic changes that are "essential to a just and
peaceful world order"; and by uniting all those Opposed

56 Although the EPC began with only segments

to war.
of the NCPW, the WILPF, the FOR and the AFSC, it hoped
to influence American decision makers during its pro-

jected two-year life. For Libby, the EPC was merely

 

54F. J. Libby, "Great Emergency Peace Campaign
Is Planned," Peace Action 2 (March 1936): 5.

 

55Eleanor Roosevelt was scheduled to make the
Opening address, but was prevented from attending by the
death of presidential advisor, Louis Howe. Ms. Hull
read a statement from the First Lady.

56"Great Emergency Peace Campaign Is Planned."

183

another vehicle to help keep America out of war. Since
1936 was an election year, Libby suggested that the
NCPW and the EPC jointly sponsore a series of meetings
in cities across the country urging support for peace-
minded candidates.

But Libby's immediate task was the impending

national conventions. In the June issue of Peace Action,

 

Libby outlined the NCPW peace planks he hoped would be
adopted by the two major parties. The first priority
was that "national defense" should be defined solely as
an invasion of "our soil." He also suggested reciprocal
trade agreements to reduce tension; the nationalization
of the munitions industry; and careful maintenance of
First Amendment freedoms. On the question of neutrality,
Libby supported permanence for the 1936 law. The
American people are "overwhelmingly Opposed" to par-
ticipation in a European war, he argued, and there is
"general support for the strengthening Of our neutrality
legislation to include war materials and incorporate

the principal of 'cash and carry.’ Thus we would reduce
the risk of entanglement in foreign wars. . . . "57 The
importance of lobbying at the conventions for a peace

plank can also be seen in Libby's assessment Of the

effect of foreign policy on the continuing economic crisis.

 

57F. J. Libby, "Peace Planks for Party Plat-
forms," Peace Action 2 (June 1936): 3.

 

184

Failure (to unite in Opposition to participation

in foreign wars) would make a farce Of all attempts
at avoiding inflation, relieving the farmer, raising
the laborer's standard Of living. . . . Another war
on top of the last one would . . . wipe out the
middle class, double our debts and our taxes . . .
(and) crush trade unionism. . . . All that any

party may do . . . is futile if it cannot Offer a

. . . program for prevention of war.

While Libby's vision of the future was none tOO
bright, neither was his evaluation of America's current
foreign policy. "Inconsistency and inadequacy" charac-
terized Roosevelt's policies. Libby reacted favorably
to Latin American policy ("we are pursuing a 'good
neighbor' policy"); Hull's reciprocal trade agreements
("one of the greatest achievements . . . "); and he
called withdrawal of marines from Nicaragua and repeal
of the Platt Amendment "real progress." But he was
critical of the Administration for its failure to secure
arms reduction by international agreement; its failure
to join the world court; and for "increases" in army
and navy appropriations.59 Lobbying efforts clearly
followed the pattern set at the 1932 convention. Libby
directed NCPW workers to buttonhole delegates and urged
them to support the peace planks while staffers testified

at committee hearings on the merits Of the planks and

 

58F. J. Libby, "Will the Conventions Meet the
Basic Issue," Peace Action 2 (June 1936): 1.

 

59F. J. Libby, "Our Present Foreign Policies Are
Confused"; "Has the Democratic Party Kept Its Promises?"
Peace Action 2 (June 1936): l, 5.

 

185

the political advantage (read: votes) their formal
adoption would bring the party. The outcome of their
work was more encouraging than the 1932 effort when
fighting the depression was the only goal of the major
parties. Although it was still a goal in 1936, the
aggressive policies of Japan, Italy and Germany commanded
a good deal of attention and resulted in some action.
But the platforms written by the parties were only
partly satisfying to Libby. The Democrats "adopted a
strong and consistent peace program . . . (which) will
necessitate important changes Of policy (if they win)."
On the other hand, the Republicans "made a grave mistake
. . . (and if they win) they will need to be wiser than
their platform."60
The Republicans' "grave mistake," according to
Libby, was allowing Senator Borah to draft the foreign
policy planks in their platform. Borah's effort
. . . even repudiates the World Court. Not a
word is said about neutrality, a fact which
Senator Borah explained as "an oversight." NO
mention is made of taxing the profits out of war
nor of nationalization of the munitions industry
. . . (and he) declares against the reciprocal
trade agreement policy.

SO disillusioned was the NCPW with the Republican plat-

form, that Libby wrote the GOP candidate, Governor

 

60Peace Action 3 (July 1936): 1-2.

 

61Ibid., p. 4.

186

Alfred Landon of Kansas, and pleaded with him to "fill
in some of the . . . gaps in the section dealing with
foreign policy." Most important, Landon was asked to
define his neutrality policy.62
The Democratic platform was greeted more warmly
by Libby. The Administration's party continued its
support Of "true neutrality"; encouraged working to take
the profits out of war, to guard against being drawn
into war by commitments or by munition makers and con-
tinued support for the reciprocal trade agreements.
"What is unusual," Libby commented, "there is nothing
elsewhere in the platform that conflicts with this
peace program."63
Thus, with the two platforms clearly in mind,
Libby urged readers to "question closely all the candi-
dates for Congress. . . . " The objective was to secure
"their interpretation of their party's platform on all

questions affecting Peace and war."64

As in 1932, the
NCPW Offered no blanket endorsement, but urged peace-
minded voters to examine individual candidates. The
Democrats "will undoubtedly" discuss their plank openly

but the Republicans ought to be Offered "the Opportunity

to fill in the gaps in their platform" before the

 

62 63

Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 5.

64Ibid., p. 10.

187

electorate casts its vote. Libby also encouraged
readers to try and get questions and replies published
in local newspapers for all voters to read.65
As a resident Of the District of Columbia, Libby
was disenfranchised. Nonetheless, he did as he urged
his readers to do, and determined for himself which of
the presidential candidates he would support. The
"Republican convention turned us down pretty flat,"
Libby complained, and by mid—October candidate Landon
had yet to "fill in the gaps." The Democrats, however,
"adopted in substance" the NCPW peace planks. Although
Libby was dissatisfied with some Of Roosevelt's policies
like naval appropriations, he "unquestionably" endorsed
the President's re-election.66
As the peace movement began its campaign work
following the conventions, the forces of Francisco
Franco rebelled against the Spanish government in late
July, 1936. For the United States, a new crisis developed
for which its neutrality laws were not equipped to cover:
a civil war. Although the war began as an internal
affair, it quickly assumed international proportions.

By August the war had become a battleground of ideology

and weaponry as Germany and Italy, sympathetic with the

 

651bid.

66F. J. Libby letter to the editor, The New
Republic (October 14, 1936): 277.

188

fascist Franco, supplied him with war materiél and new
weapons technology. The Spanish loyalists, on the
other hand, were being aided by the Soviet Union and
the future Of the European peace was in doubt.

Unable to legally invoke the Neutrality Law of
1936, the Administration on August 22 chose instead to
call for a voluntary embargo on both sides in the
Spanish conflict. The measure was welcomed by Libby
as indicative of FDR's determination to adhere to the
spirit of neutrality, but since moral embargoes were
not legally binding, American firms applied for weapons
export licenses. The problem was resolved when Roosevelt,
through Senator Pittman, requested that an emergency
resolution be adOpted by Congress invoking an impartial
embargo on shipments of arms and war materiel. The
measure was quickly passed by the new Congress on
January 6, 1937.

The civil war in Spain and the new neutrality
law again demonstrated the difficiencies Of existing
mandatory neutrality legislation. The effect of the law
was hardly impartial for it penalized the loyalist
government which was unable to buy arms in America while
Franco's forces received aid from Hitler and Mussolini.
Nonetheless, Libby approved of the new law and believed
that real impartiality was working, German aid to

Franco notwithstanding, because the United States was

189

not in any way involved.67 For Libby the only weakness
was the temporary nature of the 1936 Neutrality Law.
With the European peace about to break up, those work-

ing for permanent neutrality grew more impatient.

IV

Quick congressional action on the Spanish embargo
cleared the way for Congress, the Administration and the
peace movement to return to their consideration of com-
prehensive neutrality before expiration of the current
law on May 1, 1937. In this third round in the fight
over neutrality, more legislative proposals would be
introduced in Congress than appeared in the other two
debates combined.

The Administration's proposals were introduced
in mid-January by Senator Pittman and Representative
McReynolds. Although Roosevelt and Hull hOped for
reasonably flexible powers, they had given up hope of
full presidential discretion. Thus, the Pittman and
McReynOlds measures retained the bans on arms, loans
and travel. They differed only in that Pittman's pro-
posal had a cash-and-carry feature while McReynold's
bill revived the trade quota plan defeated the year
before. Roosevelt's willingness to quit pushing for

full discretionary powers had less to do with foreign

 

67Peace Action 3 (February 1937): 1.

 

190

policy than it did with domestic issues. The so-called
second New Deal was beginning and with it came a new
round of social-welfare legislation. The last thing
Roosevelt needed was an angry Congress more divided than
it was already.

The Pittman bill in the Senate was, relative to
the other measures introduced, a moderate proposal.68
In February, Senate isolationists Nye, Clark and Vanden-
berg introduced a comprehensive measure reflecting Nye's
desire for strict neutrality. Senator Thomas introduced
a bill with broad presidential power and Senator J.
Hamilton Lewis of Illinois Offered one with absolute
discretionary power for the president. Similar measures
appeared in the House, but the bills Offered by Repre-
sentatives Maverick, Jerry Voorhis Of California and
Herman Kopplemann of Connecticut gained the support of
Libby and the NCPW.

Libby supported the Maverick-Voorhis-Kopplemann
bills simply because they most closely resembled the
NCPW's view Of neutrality. The aims, all of which were
contained in the bills, were a mandatory embargo on arms,
loans and credits; an embargo on the sale of any war

material that endangered American neutrality; a

 

68McReynOlds' bill in the House was later changed
to conform with the Pittman version.

191

prohibition on travel; and a cash-and-carry policy.69

Libby's Objection to the Pittman bill was that it fell
"dangerously short" Of the pledge by the Democrats to
avoid being drawn into war by profiteering or political
commitments. He argued that it did not prevent a war
boon in private trade and it did not stop the flow of
strategic materials like Oil. "These are the main holes
in the legislation," Libby wrote, "that must be plugged
if we are to isolate a foreign war."7o Libby was dis-
appointed at the lack Of response to the Maverick-
Voorhis-Kopplemann bills and frustrated with Congress
for its growing support Of the Pittman bill. "If
European nations go to war again," he lamented, "Con—
gress is determined that we shall again try the experi-
ment Of making money out of their war. Already their
preparations for war are glutting our ports . . . we are
in a war boom now!"71
During February, 1937, the House and Senate held
hearings on the various neutrality measures although

only the Pittman (and McReynolds) bill and the Maverick-

Voorhis-Kopplemann bills received serious attention.

 

69Peace Action 3 (February 1937): 7.

 

70F. J. Libby, "Open Letter to Our Readers on
Neutrality," Peace Action 3 (March 1937): 1.

 

71Peace Action 3 (April 1937): l.

 

192

Libby's staffers were out in force to testify on behalf
of strict neutrality. Jeannette Rankin, Florence Brewer
Boeckel and Warren Mullin all testified, stressing the
advantages Of strict neutrality and the dangers of dis—
cretionary power for the president. Their Objections
to Pittman's bill closely followed Libby's arguments
and they stressed that flexibility for the president
would lead, tacitly at least, to support for sanctions
against aggression.72 Such action would not be in the
best interests of peace, Libby contended, "The Object
is to restrict every war, as one would a fire, to the
smallest possible area." Nothing can "justify making
any war a world war. . . . NO injustice to either party
in (a) dispute is regarded as comparable with the vast
injustice of plunging the world into the abyss that
threatens us."73
But that extreme isolationist position was not
the one that was rapidly gaining support in Congress.
On February 20, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reported out the Pittman bill. It contained the man-
datory arms embargo and the ban on loans while adding
a ban on travel on belligerent ships and a cash-and-carry

feature. The "cash" portion of the measure was mandatory,

 

72Peace Action 3 (February 1937): 7.

 

73Libby, "Open Letter."

193

thus, if the embargo was invoked the ownership of
American goods must be transferred to the buyer before
leaving an American port. The "carry" portion was

left to the president to decide if and when American
ships would be banned from carrying the material for
which "cash" had just been paid. On February 25, the
House Foreign Affairs Committee reported out the
McReynolds version of the bill. The only major dif-
ference between it and the Pittman bill was that the
entire cash-and-carry provision was to be discretionary.
Thus, the choice facing Congress in 1937 was simplified
compared with previous debates. There was agreement on
the mandatory embargo and the ban on loans and travel;
only the issue Of whose ships will carry the goods
remained to be decided. Both houses of Congress passed
their respective bills in early March, 1937 and a
Senate-House conference was appointed to work out the
differences. The final compromise of the committee

was adopted by both chambers and Roosevelt signed it
into law on May 1, the day the Old law expired.

The Neutrality Law of 1937 was to take effect
when the President proclaimed that a state of war
existed (between two or more foreign nations or a
civil war). At the moment it became Operative, the
following features were automatically in effect: an

embargo on arms and munitions, a ban on loans, a ban

194

on travel on belligerent ships, a ban on the use of
American ships to transport arms and munitions and the
application Of all these measures to any new belligerent.
In addition, the new law allowed the President, if he
chose, to invoke a cash-and-carry policy, separately
or as one action. The cash-and-carry provision had a
two-year time limit while the rest of the law was per-
manent.

Reaction to the new law was generally favorable.
The Administration and its supporters in Congress were,
of course, pleased. The isolationists in Congress led
by Nye, which had originally supported Pittman's par-
tially discretionary cash-and-carry provision, voted
against the final resolution. Nye did feel, however,
that solid gains had been made, for all Of the law's
:mandatory features were measures advocated by the
isolationists during the first battle over neutrality
two years earlier. Thus, his criticism was largely
confined to cash-and—carry. The collective security
‘wing Of the peace movement (led by Eichelberger and
Shotwell), on the other hand, favored the discretionary
jpower in the cash-and-carry provision but it deplored
the mandatory features as restrictive.

Libby and the NCPW, although disappointed that
any'flexibility had been built into the law, were not

completely dissatisfied. The 1937 law was, after two

195

years of struggling, the permanent one they had worked
so hard to achieve. It contained more mandatory features
(like the travel ban) than Libby had thought possible
in 1935. Even the cash-and-carry feature, although he
disliked the President's power, was a step in the right
direction because it reduced the chances of American
ships being sunk as they had been in 1917. Despite these
solid accomplishments, there were "several bad holes" in
the new law. The specter of a trade boom still loomed
large without adequate measures to prevent it. More
important, trade in strategic materials like Oil and
scrap iron was not covered and could, therefore, add to
the tension as was the case with Ethiopia. Clearly,
Libby and the Council were ready to begin to "plug the
holes," and they were encouraged by increasing congres-
sional support for mandatory neutrality, particularly
when compared with 1935. This Libby felt was "a sign
Of health and hope."74

The neutrality debate had now monopolized
foreign policy decision making in the United States
for two years. Many Americans, caught up in the imme-
diacy of the depression, only slowly became aware Of
that debate. To these people, and others, more knowl-

edgable in foreign affairs, the defense of traditional

 

74Peace Action 3 (May 1937): 1, 3.

 

196

neutral rights--like freedom Of the seas--had caused
America's involvement in the European war. Thus, when
members Of Congress, such as Nye and Maverick, and
leaders of the peace movement like Libby offered neu-
trality as an alternative, public Opinion accepted
embargoes on arms and loans and restrictions on sea
travel. But, agreement on surrendering traditional
neutral rights came much easier than did the agreement
on implementation of the new neutrality. By early 1937
the split was less disagreement than division. The
Roosevelt Administration, members of Congress like
Senator Pittman, and a significant portion of the peace
movement (generally, and within the NCPW) advocated
collective action internationally to prevent war or,

at least, halt aggression. On the other hand, a small
but effective segment of the peace movement (WIL, FOR),
led by Libby's NCPW, joined a vocal group Of congressional
isolationists led by Senator Nye to prevent American
participation in any war, not by COOperating to prevent
war, but by legally preventing American decision makers
from acting in anything but an impartial way. By May,
1937, Libby and his supporters had even moved away from
Senator Nye's faction in their quest to keep America out
of war. SO the result was a redefinition of neutrality--
it now meant isolation--quite unlike that sought by the

traditionalists or the advocates Of collective security

197

and the irrevocable division of the peace movement
into factions supporting international action to pre-
vent or halt war and those supporting complete non-
involvement in war.

Although Libby accepted this division, he
deepened it by criticizing his former colleagues in
the peace movement who were advocating collective
action against aggression. Collective security
"stripped of its disguise," Libby wrote, "is an old-
fashioned military . . . alliance of certain states
against certain other states." Those who support it,
support only a "myth" because "collective security is

75 The

impossible . . . in a freely armed world."
support within the peace movement Libby enjoyed in the

twenties was rapidly disappearing.

 

75F. J. Libby, "Cooperation with All Nations,"
The Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 1938.

 

CHAPTER 7

The Neutrality Act of May, 1937, which had
satisfied no one completely, soon faced its first
serious challenge. Surprisingly, the challenge came
not from Europe, but from Asia, as Japanese and Chinese
troops renewed their fighting. The Roosevelt Adminis-
tration was reluctant to invoke the neutrality law and
Frederick Libby was critical of the President for his
inaction. Thus, before the NCPW could again work for
restrictions on executive authority, through additional
neutrality legislation or through enactment of a pro-
posed referendum on war, the immediate crisis Of war

in Asia had to be dealt with.

I
The civil war in Spain and the increasing bel-
licosity of Hitler in Germany convinced most Observers
that the tenuous peace would most likely break down in
Europe, particularly since the volatile situation in
Asia had remained quiet, though unresolved, since the
.Manchurian incident in 1931. But on the night of

July 7, 1937, Japanese troops stationed in north China

198

199

fought with units of the Chinese army less than twenty
miles from Peking. After three days of fighting, a two-
week truce was declared while negotiations took place.
But the Japanese took advantage of the truce to send in
reinforcements and the fighting was renewed. By the
end of July, Japanese troops occupied Peking, and a few
days later, attacked the port of Shanghai. Although no
declaration of war had been issued, the two countries
were fighting a full-scale war.

The immediate problem for the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration was how to act under the Neutrality Act of 1937.
Since no formal declaration Of war had been issued, the
President was not required to invoke the law. The
problem as the President saw it was that invoking the
Neutrality Law (which was advocated by Libby and the
isolationist wing of the peace movement) would not
guarantee an impartial stance for the United States.
China was heavily dependent on imports for arms and
munitions while Japan was much less so. Furthermore,
if Roosevelt used the cash-and-carry provision only
Japan had a merchant marine capable of taking advantage
Of it. Thus, since official neutrality would have
benefited the aggressor, Roosevelt and Hull waited,
hOping that the fighting would end.

By mid-August, the Administration announced

that neutrality would not be invoked but was being

200

considered on a stand-by basis.1 Worried that the Sino-
Japanese war posed a threat to world peace, Libby was
fearful Of the implications of Roosevelt's reluctance
to act.2 Responding to the argument that neutrality
for the United States would not be an impartial policy,
Libby wrote,
Many of the appeals to our sympathy for the Chinese
are unfortunately traceable to selfish (economic)
interests. . . . To go to war with Japan in behalf
of China would be a supreme disaster and the height
of folly. To try and sell our goods when Japan
controls the seas would be to assure our involvement
in a war five-thousand miles from home.3
Libby and the Council staff quickly began working
to bring pressure on Roosevelt to declare neutrality.
On August 20, after he had sought the support Of repre-
sentatives like Ludlow and Voorhis, Libby released a
"Statement by (25) Congressmen of All Parties," urging
Roosevelt to invoke neutrality "in the immediate future"
and "stop feeding the war which means destruction of

thousands Of lives in the Orient and the danger Of war

to all the world." The statement also called on Congress

 

1Divine, Illusion Of Neutrality, p. 203.

 

2
1937): 1.

Peace Action 4 (August 1937): l; 4 (September

 

3peace Action 4 (August 1937): 1.

 

201

not to adjourn until "every possible action has been
taken" to keep the United States out of the Asian war.4

But Congress did, in fact, adjourn and the NCPW
shifted its focus directly to Roosevelt. In a letter
to him, Libby protested the President's delaying tactics
and argued that if the Neutrality Law failed it would be
because of the Administration's "failure to apply it."5
As in the past, Libby requested that NCPW member groups
send telegrams and letters to the White House in support
Of neutrality. The staff also wrote a radio address
for Senator Nye stressing the impartiality of the law,
arguing that Japan, too, would be hurt by an embargo
because it would prevent her from Obtaining loans to
procure raw materials.

Libby's efforts to pressure Roosevelt into
declaring neutrality were not accepted unanimously by
the peace movement. The internationalist wing challenged
Libby's assertion that an embargo would insure impartial
treatment of the belligerents. Indicative of this
division was a radio debate between Senator Nye and
Clark Eichelberger Of the League Of Nations Association
in which Eichelberger challenged Nye's advocacy of neu-

trality and argued that the only way to stop aggression

 

4Peace Action 4 (September 1937): 7.

 

5F. J. Libby letter to Roosevelt, August 18,
1937, NCPW files.

202

was through collective action. Much to the conster-
nation Of Libby, he even went so far as to advocate
revision of the Neutrality Law to allow presidential
discretion.6
After several Americans were killed during the
fighting in Shanghai, the war in China grew even more
perilous for the United States as Roosevelt sent marines
to the city to protect American nationals. Libby felt
that sending in the marines could lead to American
involvement and he called for the immediate evacuation
of Americans from the war zone. He also urged that a
"definite date" be set for evacuation of American
nationals, after which they remained at their own risk
and without military protection. The marines must also
be withdrawn, he demanded: "Their presence between two
hostile forces is a continued menace to peace and
therefore to the lives of millions of Americans in

7 Although Roosevelt urged Americans

our own country."
to leave the war zone, he declared no cut-Off date and
had no intention of doing so.

America's precarious position was further com-

plicated when, at the end of August, the nation learned

that a government-owned ship, the Wichita, Operated by

 

6Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, p. 282.

 

7Peace Action 4 (September 1937): 2.

 

203

a private American company, was in route to China carry—
ing nineteen Bellanca war planes. Angered by what they
considered a serious threat to peace, Libby and the
representatives of the WIL, the EPC, the FOR, WOrld
Peaceways and the Committee on Militarism and Education
gathered to formulate strategy and demand the implemen-
tation of the arms embargo. "Stop the Bellancas!"

Libby demanded in Peace Action. "Wire . . . the Presi-

 

dent tO stop the Bellanca planes. Ask him to declare
our neutrality, to set a date for evacuation of our
nationals . . . and then withdraw our . . . forces per—
manently from China."8 Those demands were the substance
of the strategy with which the board of six hoped to
awaken public Opinion to the need for immediate enact-
ment Of the Neutrality Law. For the benefit Of public
consumption, Libby drew parallels between the Wichita
incident and the action of "aggressive business interests"
prior to the Great War: "A deadly parallel . . . is
becoming apparent," he wrote, private companies are
"filling our press with appeals to our sympathies, our
pride, our anger. Public Opinion is . . . being delib-
erately inflamed against Japan. The time for putting out
a fire is before it starts. The Neutrality Law is on the

books . . . (it) should be obeyed."9 The pressure of the

 

8Peace Action 4 (September 1937): 1.

 

91bid., p. 2.

204

campaign paid off and on September 14 Roosevelt issued
an order prohibiting government-owned ships from trans-
porting munitions tO belligerents, and the Wichita
remained at the California port where she had made a
scheduled stop.

Although Libby was pleased with Roosevelt's
ship order, he still argued for invocation of neutrality.lo
"The choice faced by America today," he said, is "the

11 The President, of course, had

neutrality law or war."
not chosen to invoke the law, thus, "The policies of
President Roosevelt are policies that lead straight to

12 "He is disobeying the law and substituting an

war."
Opposite policy of his own. Whether or not . . . his
disobedience of the law (is sufficient) to justify
impeachment . . . the law is plain enough . . . (and)
he is disobeying it."13
The Roosevelt Administration, since the beginning
of the Sino-Japanese war, had repeatedly chosen delay to

avoid taking a firm stand. As the situation in Asia

 

10Press Release, September 24, 1937, NCPW files.

11Ibid.

12F. J. Libby, "Statement on Roosevelt Policy,"
October, 1937, NCPW files.

13F. J. Libby, "Should the Existing Neutrality
Law of the United States be Applied in the Sino-Japanese
Dispute? Yes," October 18, 1937, NCPW files.

205

worsened the tactic Of delay became more and more pre-
carious. Then, on October 5, 1937, Roosevelt, during
a speech in Chicago, suggested that an

. . . epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.

. . . When an epidemic Of physical disease starts
to spread the community approves and joins in a
quarantine of the patients in order to protect

the health of the community against the spread Of
the disease. . . . There must be positive endeavors
to preserve peace.14

The meaning and implications of this now famous quarantine

speech are still the subject of historical debate.15 But

to Libby the implications were clear enough:

The President's Chicago speech . . . has been
recognized as a reversal of the policy of the
Neutrality Law . . . the spirit as well as a
plain act of Congress had been not only nullified
but violated. . . . The President is himself
thwarting the will Of the nation as expressed in
an overwhelming vote of Congress. . . . We are
again on the road to war. . . . 5

The day after Roosevelt's quarantine speech, the
NCPW Opened its annual meeting with a press release
arguing that "the only protective quarantine for the
people of this country is the invocation of the neutrality

17

law." The tone of the 1937 meeting was set by the

 

14Quoted in Borg, The United States and the Far
Eastern Crisis, p. 381.

 

 

15See Ibid., pp. 369-98; Divine, Illusion of
Neutrality, pp. 210-19; Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest
in America's Foreign Relations, p. 405.

 

 

 

16peace Action 4 (November 1937): 1.

 

17Press Release, October 6, 1937, NCPW files.

206

President's speech and the objective quickly became
how to combat its disastrous implications as the NCPW
viewed them. The members resolved to work toward
strengthening the existing law to include further
restrictions on trade in strategic materials and the
nationalization Of the munitions industry. Libby also
managed to manipulate an endorsement for a proposal to
seek a joint resolution of Congress to force the Presi-
dent to invoke the Neutrality Law ("although there were
able advocates of the opposing viewpoint").18
Calling for measures such as these only sought
to insulate America from war, but Libby also dealt with
the root causes Of war by advocating peaceful change.
A brief reiteration of a theme Libby had been discussing
for some time concerning "have" and "have-not" nations
was included in the meeting's annual report.19 Libby
felt the need to reiterate this theme while he was so
disillusioned by Roosevelt's Chicago address. He hoped
its retelling might impress the seriousness of the world
situation upon those in the peace movement less inclined

toward mandatory neutrality. What Libby suggested was

that the post-war world was geared to the preservation

 

18"Report of the Annual Meeting of the NCPW,"
October 6, 7, 8, 1937, NCPW files; quoted in Peace
Action 4 (November 1937): 4-5.

 

19See Chapter 3 for a general discussion of
this theme.

207

of the status—quo of the Versailles Treaty by the "have"
nations (the United States or the British Empire, for
example) who benefited from it. The "have-not" nations
(Italy or Japan) were prevented from legitimate access
to needed resources by the maintenance of the status-quo.
This imbalance resulted in repeated challenges to the
status-quo like the events in Ethiopia and China. The
only way to stop those whom the "haves" called the
aggressors, or disturbers of the peace, was through
force. A better way, Libby suggested, was for the "haves"
to take the lead to eliminate the imbalances and, thus,
the causes of war.20

On December 12, Libby's worst fears were realized
when Japanese planes sunk the American gunboat nggy
stationed on the Yangtze River near Nanking killing two
Americans. "The inevitable incident has come," Libby
wrote, there must be "means by which people can check
a government policy heading toward war. . . . " In
desperation, Libby's campaign to avoid war reached new

extremes as he turned to another recommendation of the

NCPW's October meeting to limit executive discretion.

 

20"Report Of the Annual Meeting . . . ," 1937.
For a more elaborate discussion of this theme see Peace
Action 4 (October 1937): 1-2; "Should the Existing Neu-
trality Law . . . ," and To End War, pp. 132-34.

 

208

"The need for adOption of the War Referendum Amendment,"

. 21
he wrote, "needs no argument in words."

II

The NCPW's failure to satisfactorily limit
presidential authority by the Winter of 1937, convinced
Libby to push harder for the "War Referendum Amendment."
The Pgnay affair proved to be the shot in the arm the
amendment needed to reach the House floor and Libby took
advantage of it.

The idea Of establishing a popular referendum
before Congress would be allowed to declare war had been
a part of peace activist programs for a number of years.
Its enactment through a Constitutional amendment was
first introduced in the House of Representatives in
1935 by Indiana Democrat Louis Ludlow. Ludlow's
referendum was a response to the Nye Committee's
investigation of the munitions industry which was taking
place when he introduced the bill. Ludlow was convinced
that America's involvement in the Great War resulted, as
he believed Nye was proving, from the actions of munitions
makers. He, therefore, saw the referendum as a means of
checking that industry's influence on policy makers by
leaving the decision of whether or not to go to war to

the people.

 

21Peace Action 4 (January 1938): l.

 

 

 

209

Libby supported the amendment shortly after the
resolution was introduced by Ludlow in February, 1935.22
"This bill," Libby wrote, "is in line with our proposed
revision Of our foreign policy to make United States
entry into war more difficult. . . . "23 But, despite
Libby's support for the proposal, it did not command the
attention or efforts of the NCPW in mid-1935. Neutrality
legislation took precedence and all the Council's efforts
were directed at securing mandatory embargoes. For
nearly two years, until early Summer, 1937, the refer-
endum was of secondary importance not only because neu-
trality continued to be the issue of the day, but because
the resolution was kept tightly bottled-up in the House
Judiciary Committee whose responsibility it was to con-
sider the measure.

The pseudo-campaign on behalf of the referendum
was largely ineffective until late 1937 when the Council
began to slowly step-up its effort. Urged on because of
repeated disappointments in his battle for adequate neu-

trality legislation, Libby and the NCPW paid the publi-

cation costs for Ludlow's book Hell or Heaven, a two-

 

hundred page tract outlining Ludlow's plan for the

 

22peace Action 1 (March 1935): 5; 1 (June 1935):

 

12.

23Peace Action 2 (July 1935): 8.

 

210

decentralization of war powers.24 At Libby's urging,
Ludlow began a campaign with the new Congress to force

25 According to House pro-

the bill out of committee.
cedure, a bill for a Constitutional amendment can be
brought to the floor for a vote without recommendation

by the appropriate committee if a simple majority (218)
of House members signed a discharge petition in favor

of such action.

The outlook for Obtaining the required signatures
was dim because in the previous Congress Ludlow was only
able to secure seventy names. But Libby Offered to help
by authorizing Jessie M. MacKnight, the NCPW's legis-
lative researcher-writer and Stephen Raushenbush, the
counsel from the Nye Committee, to organize the effort.
They were supported by various members of the staff and
by a $4000 fund set aside especially for that purpose.26
Signatures accumulated gradually; 110 by June, 172 by
August and by the beginning of December, 205. Then, on

December 12, the Panay was sunk and the "inevitable

incident" secured the remaining signatures and the

 

24Louis Ludlow, Hell or Heaven (Boston: Strat—
ford, 1937); Peace Action 3 (February 1937): 7.

 

 

25Peace Action 4 (November 1937): 4; 4 (December
1937): 4-5.

 

26Memo from Raushenbush to Libby, April 30,
1937, NCPW files.

211

amendment was headed for a floor debate and vote on a

. . 27

motion to conSider.
The House was scheduled to vote on the motion to

consider on January 10, 1938, leaving one month for both

the peace activists and the Opposition to organize their

forces. "The Ludlow Amendment Must Be Passed!" Libby

pleaded in the lead story in January's Peace Action, "Get

 

the word to your Congressman before it comes to a vote
on January 10."28 In the same issue, Libby listed, by
districts and states, all congressmen who did not sign
the discharge petition and urged readers in those dis-
tricts particularly to contact their representatives.29
The Opposition to the amendment was concentrated pri-
marily within the White House and its supporters in Con—
gress. Roosevelt believed that a war referendum would
further restrict his already diminished power in the
conduct of foreign affairs. Numerous public figures
like former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson came
out in support of the President. Clark Eichelberger

organized an ad-hoc committee to back Roosevelt which

included former Libby supporters like the Church Peace

 

27Kuusisto, "The Influence of the NCPW," p. 195;
Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, p. 283; Divine, Illusion
of Neutrality, pp. 219-20; Peace Action 4 (January 1938):
3.

 

 

 

28Peace Action 4 (January 1938): 1.

 

29Ibid., p. 4.

212

Union and the Board of the YMCA. The Administration
was forming a strong hand and, according to Secretary
Hull, every bit Of influence the executive branch could
exert was used to defeat the bill.30
After a brief, spirited debate the House of
Representatives voted 209 to 188 against consideration
of the Ludlow Amendment. The vote was a turning point
for Libby and his influence in the peace movement even
though the measure failed by a mere twenty-one votes.
During the neutrality debates from 1935 to 1937, Libby
was spokesman for many peace activists who disagreed
with him on how embargoes should be applied. But as
Libby became less and less flexible on neutrality and
the international order continued to crumble, many
activists, some within the NCPW itself like Ms. Morgan,
questioned the validity of policies that ignored the
spread Of fascism and aggression in the world. As long
as the NCPW's programs were focused on international
cooperation with a wide range of goals, those who dis-
agreed with Libby on particular policies like the
implementation of embargoes, could remain with him in
pursuit of common Objectives. But as he increasingly
focused NCPW resources on isolationist measures,
'internationalists moved slowly, but deliberately, away

from Libby. Just as he had given up hope of preventing

 

3oCordell Hull, The Memoirs Of Cordell Hull,
2 vols. (New York: MacMillian, 1948), I, p. 564.

 

213

war (thus, concentrating on keeping America out Of it),
so too did Eichelberger and the collective security wing
of the peace movement see no hope in keeping America out
of war without collective action to halt the aggressors.
Thus, Libby's influence slowly declined.

It seemed that by the beginning of 1938, Libby
had not truly realized the depth of the division.
Throughout the debate over neutrality his references
to those against his policies were patronizingly char-
acterized ("although there were able advocates of the
Opposing viewpoint"), and not taken very seriously.

But his advocacy of the Ludlow amendment, seen in the
context of international politics, was for many the
final bit of evidence that Libby's search for peace was
unrealistic. The realization of the seriousness of the
division finally reached Libby when Laura Puffer Morgan,
virtually a charter member of the NCPW, resigned in
protest in early 1938. Although Libby wrote later that
the resignation was accepted "with no bitterness and
caused none" he did acknowledge the lack of unity
within the peace movement and within the NCPW.31 In
addition to the resignation of individuals, the Council's
affiliated members slowly began to do likewise. The

WCTU, the American Association of University Women and

 

31Libby, To End War, pp. 147-48.

 

214

the National Council of Jewish Women were among the
first to leave. The only advantage of these resig—
nations for Libby was to purge the NCPW Of dissidents
which allowed him to freely pursue isolationism. This
new "unity" brought Libby in contact with a new group
Of isolationists, like aviator Charles Lindburgh, who

agreed with Libby that America should come first.

III

Libby spent most of 1938 opposing a 20 percent
increase in naval appropriations and a proposed naval
base at Guam. Not until the Fall did he begin to pre-
pare for another neutrality debate for the new Con-
gressional session Opening in January. Libby was con-
vinced that a new debate was certain to occur because
of President Roosevelt's less than enthusiastic reception
of the Munich agreement in late September.

The Munich agreement, by which Hitler was "given"
part Of Czechoslovakia by Mussolini, French Premier
Eduoard Daladier and British Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain, was welcomed by Libby in part because "war
has been averted." But he also believed that the redraw-
ing of Czech boundaries corrected the "most serious
maladjustment that remained from the war treaties. The
real betrayal Of Czechoslovakia's true interest," he
wrote, did not result from the partition, but "came

twenty years ago when minorities that have proven

215

32 Libby

unassimilable were included in the new state."
believed that Hitler's demands were legitimate and con-
sistent with his own belief that the inequities Of the
status quo, initiated in the Versailles Treaty and main-
tained by the powerful "have" nations, would eventually
be challenged. "The unquestioned fact," he continued,
was "that these were just grievances in the heart of
Europe to be corrected and that no attempt was made to
correct them in any fundamental way. . . . "33
Libby's reaction to the Administration's critical
response to the Munich Pact was unfavorable. In £2322
Action, he questioned the President's sincerity in keep-
ing America out of war and yet, at the same time, seek-
ing increased appropriations for the army and navy.34
He wondered why so many "liberals (were) resentful of
the Munich peace that they (gave) the definite impression
that they would have preferred war. The policy of

negotiating peace between the democracies and the dic-

tatorships looks to our State Department apparently like

 

32Peace Action 5 (October 1938): 1-2.

 

33Ibid., p. 2.

34Peace Action 5 (November 1938): l.

 

216

condoning sin.‘ Therefore, he regarded as a "dangerous

hinderance to peace our government's huge armament
program. . . . "35
Libby's interpretation of Roosevelt's actions

appeared valid when the President delivered his message
to the new Congress on January 4, 1939. "We have
learned," Roosevelt said, "that when we deliberately
try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may
Operate unevenly and unfairly--may actually give aid
to an aggressor and deny it to the victim. The instinct
of self-preservation should warn us that we ought not
to let that happen any more."36 In a piece entitled
"President Says Peace But Policies Say War," Libby
responded that

. . . when a neutral abandons neutrality and takes

sides between belligerents, he becomes a bellig—

erent . . . he is in the war. . . . If the Presi-

dent believes that the American people want to

wage war . . . why does he not ask Congress to

declare that war instead Of proposing that we

slide into it?37

Libby concluded that Roosevelt, "almost in the

very phrases of President Wilson, is asking us to abandon

our neutrality. . . . " Therefore, the strategy of the

 

351bid., p. 2.

36Quoted in Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, p. 234.

37Peace Action 5 (January 1939): 1-2.

 

217

NCPW was clear: "American neutrality must be main-
tained." In fact, Libby called for tightening the law
to include "an all time embargo on munitions to all
nations as a consistent policy."38 The gulf between
the Administration and the isolationist wing of the
peace movement had widened considerably since passage
of the existing law in May, 1937. Compromise was now
impossible.

The next several months saw the introduction of
almost twenty resolutions dealing with neutrality, the
most important Of which were those sponsored by Senators
Thomas, Pittman and Nye-Bone-Clark. The Thomas reso-
lution, introduced with the assistance of Clark Eichel-
berger and other collective security advocates, would
have granted the president the power to prohibit the
export Of all war materiél to belligerents and to remove
the embargo from the victims Of aggression with Con-
gressional approval. The proposal received support
from internationalist groups like the League of Nations
Association. Despite the resolution's rejection Of
39

mandatory neutrality, the Administration Opposed it.

Libby also Opposed the Thomas resolution, but because

 

38Ibid., p. 2.

39Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, p. 240.

 

218

it gave Roosevelt additional power when the NCPW
believed he already had too much.40

The Pittman resolution, introduced in the
Senate on March 20, reflected the position Of the
President and the State Department although it lacked
the power to discriminate against aggressors which
Roosevelt really wanted. Its introduction, coming as
it did after two months of relative inaction by the
Administration, was apparently in response to Hitler's
seizure of Czechoslovakia. Congressional supporters
of the Administration responded favorably to the bill
which called for a repeal of the arms embargo and the
extension of the cash-and-carry provision to include
arms. Libby's reaction to the bill was predictable.
It would "have the United States line-up against Germany
and Italy" and further increase executive authority.41
The most vocal Opposition to Pittman's bill came from
the Chinese who saw the cash-and-carry provision as
benefiting only Japan. The Chinese criticism was
quieted when Pittman attached a proposal to the
original measure that, in effect, prevented the Japa-

nese from taking advantage of the cash-and—carry pro-

vision.

 

40Peace Action 5 (April 1939): 2-3.

 

41Ibid.

219

The third proposal before Congress, the Nye-Bone-
Clark resolution, would have given the president and
Congress equal power in deciding if war existed and it
placed further restrictions on American shipping and
American citizens. The Administration and the inter-
nationalists who supported the Thomas resolution opposed
this further limiting of presidential power. But Libby
supported the resolution because it sought to "diminish
the president's discretion," limiting presidential power
to take sides, halting American arms traffic and keeping
the United States out of war--so "write your Senators
and Congressmen now" to support the Nye-Bone-Clark
resolution.42

The NCPW campaign in the Spring and Summer of
1939 reflected Libby's frustration over the approaching
war in Europe. More than in the earlier debates, his
efforts were directed not to passage of legislation he
supported (Nye-Bone-Clark) but to preventing the enact-
ment Of the Thomas and Pittman resolutions. As a
result, Libby found himself attacking both the Admin-
istration and his former allies in the peace movement.
He criticized Roosevelt for following a policy of
"Obstruction to Chamberlain-Daladier policy of peaceful

negotiations" to alleviate just grievances and charged

 

42Ibid.

220

that the President had nullified the Neutrality Law "by
refusing to find that a state of war exists" in China.43
Libby then leveled his first serious blast at his former
colleagues as he Opposed the Thomas resolution. He
charged that the advocates of collective security were
using a "dishonest name for a crude military alliance

of one group of imperialist powers against a rival group
that is challenging its control Of the world."44 Once
again, Libby was consistent in his criticism of the
"haves" in the world. But in criticizing the supporters
of collective security, Libby demonstrated the depth of
division within the peace movement. What Libby had yet
to realize, and in fact never would, was the seriousness
Of the Fascist threat. It was the understanding Of that
threat that led many of his former supporters to advocate
collective security. The support for mandatory neu-
trality in the 1935-1937 period no longer existed largely
due to the increasing belligerency of Tokyo and Berlin.
Libby's rigidity on neutrality, which had caused
defections earlier, coupled now with his attacks on
internationalists, left only a few affiliated groups

like the WILPF and the FOR as staunch supporters Of the

NCPW.

 

43Peace Action 5 (March 1939): 1; 5 (Summer 1939):

 

1.

44F. J. Libby letter to Council affiliates,
April 5, 1939, NCPW files; Libby, To End War, pp. 141—44.

 

221

Once the cash-and-carry provision of the 1937
law expired on May 1, the battle over the new proposals
gained momentum. Both the NCPW and the Administration
lobbied heavily in Congress for adoption of their par-
ticular view. Libby accused the Administration of
tacitly cooperating with the British, Offering as evi-
dence the impending visit Of King George VI and Queen
Elizabeth to Washington.45

At the end of May, Congressman Sol Bloom intro-
duced yet another resolution in the House repealing the
arms embargo and instituting a modified cash-and-carry
feature allowing American ships to carry "sold" goods.
"We are equally Opposed to such repeal," Libby wrote,
for "if Europe should blunder into war, the President's
proposal (the Bloom resolution) would make our country
the arsenal" for the war. Recalling 1914, Libby
explained how money would flow to America in large
quantities and then as the money ran out," we should
be tempted to legalize loans . . . rather than let our
war boom collapse into a major depression." According
to Libby's scenario, the United States would then be
subjected to intense British propaganda until "we

corrupted our youth to fight in Europe's trenches.

 

45Peace Action 5 (Summer 1939): 1—2.

 

222

46 The

. . . The Bloom resolution is the road to war."
Bloom bill finally passed in the House but not before
the isolationist bloc removed the repeal of the arms
embargo.

In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the
isolationists led by Senator Clark won approval to table
the entire neutrality issue until the next session of
Congress. The successful motion to postpone the issue
reflected growing Congressional Opposition to Roosevelt,
particularly on domestic legislation. A coalition of
Republican and conservative Democrats was responding
negatively to domestic issues like the Supreme Court
packing in 1937 and the intervention of the President
in political campaigns during the 1938 Congressional
elections.

The deadlock in Congress thus ended temporarily,
the 1939 neutrality debate. The 1937 law including the
arms embargo but without the cash-and-carry provision,

a reflection of the declining but still effective
strength of the isolationists in Congress and the peace

movement, remained on the books as Hitler's troops

marched into Poland.

IV
The beginning Of the war in Europe on September 1,

1939, brought the neutrality issue into focus once again.

 

46Ibid., p. 1.

223

President Roosevelt scheduled a special session Of
Congress for September 21 and it was clear that the
arms embargo would be his chief topic. Libby was
convinced that the President would ask for its repeal
in his message.47 He was aware Of the arguments
Roosevelt would use for aiding Great Britain and France
but he remained unsympathetic. "From the standpoint
Of our first great Objective, keeping America out of
war, the arms embargo is vital . . . the interests of
Great Britain and France or what will 'please Hitler'
(should not) be deciding factors . . . the Object is to
prevent our involvement. . . . "48
In his message, the President expressed regret
for his earlier support of neutrality legislation and
called for repeal Of the arms embargo and tacitly
endorsed a cash-and-carry proposal that included the
sale of munitions. Several times during the speech,
he referred to his desire to remain neutral and keep
America out of the European war. But Libby responded,
"Since when has the President wanted our country to be
neutral in a war between Great Britain and Germany?"
as he reminded readers of Roosevelt's earlier repudi-

ations of neutrality like the quarantine speech and

 

47Peace Action 6 (September 1939): 2.

 

48Ibid.

224

his January 4 message to Congress. "If the Adminis-
tration were candid, it would admit . . . that they
don't want us to be neutral, that they want our country
to help Great Britain and France . . . that is why they

49 Libby argued

support repeal Of the arms embargo."
that the best way to remain out of the war was to com-
bine the existing arms embargo with a cash-and—carry
provision "on other trading" so that the United States
could "avoid the moral and economic implications Of
'blood money.'" Together, they would Offer "more pro-
tection than either alone."50
The movement for revision Of the Neutrality Law
began almost immediately. Both isolationists forces
and those supporting repeal began extensive public
lobbying campaigns. Senators Nye and Borah made radio
addresses, Libby called for his followers to "write nOw
. . . don't delay" and prominent Americans like Lind-
bergh were called on to make speeches.51 The Adminis-
tration rallied its supporters like former Secretary of
State Stimson, and Roosevelt successfully appealed to

Clark Eichelberger and the collective security wing of

the peace movement for help.

 

49Peace Action 6 (October 1939): 1.

 

50Ibid., pp. 2, 3.

51Ibid., p. l; Divine, Illusion of Neutrality,
pp. 297-99.

 

225

In Congress, the task of presenting the Admin-
istration's plan for repeal once again fell to Senator
Pittman. On September 26, he presented his bill to the
Foreign Relations Committee, where it received swift
approval two days later. During debate on the Senate
floor, Opponents of the bill--1ed by Senators Nye,
Clark and Vanderberg--argued for implementation of the
cash-and-carry feature but only if the arms embargo was
retained, which coincided with Libby's position. Advo-
cates of the bill like Pittman and Tom Connally of Texas
argued that repeal would help avoid involvement in the
war and restrict American commerce. The unspoken
reason for repeal, however, was that it would allow
Britain and France to buy munitions from the United
States. After four weeks of debate, the Senate passed
the Pittman bill 63-30 on October 27 and sent it on to
the House. A week later, after some heated debate and
several motions to amend, the House voted 237-177 in
favor of repeal. A conference committee quickly ironed
out minor differences and Roosevelt signed the new
measure into law.

Under the Neutrality Law Of November 4, 1939,
the president had the power to declare a state of hos-
tilities. Following such a declaration, the belligerents
were identified and America could no longer ship goods

or passengers to these nations. American goods,

226

including munitions, could be purchased in the United
States and shipped in foreign vessels under the cash-
and—carry provision. A few provisions of the 1937 law,
such as prohibiting Americans from traveling on bel-
ligerent ships, remained. The new law had no expiration
date.

Libby's reaction to the new law was unequivocal.
"Repeal Of the arms embargo was a step towards war.
. . . "52 Referring to Roosevelt in particular, Libby
wrote, "We are not safe while one man has the power to
bring about a reversal Of an almost unanimous decision,

53 Despite such feelings,

Of three sessions of Congress."
Libby believed gains had been made. "The educational
campaign (speeches in Congress) that accompanied the
debate in Congress crystallized public Opinion . . .
against participation," he wrote, and "the Speeches
made in both Houses of Congress are . . . in favor of
staying out of Europe's war." Thus, Libby concluded
that such public support against American participation
"for the time being (makes us) safer from involvement

54

than we were a month ago." Libby was correct in his

 

52Peace Action 6 (November 1939): l.

 

53"Mr. Libby's Proposed Statement," November 2,
1939, NCPW files.

54Peace Action 6 (November 1939): l.

 

227

Observation that during the debate most congressmen who
spoke opposed American participation. But supporters

of repeal differed from Libby and the isolationists in
their willingness to aid, via cash-and-carry munitions,
Great Britain and France. Curiously, in their support
for cash-and-carry, both Libby and the Administration
were advocating a very un-neutral position since Britain
ruled most of the Atlantic and could therefore benefit
from it. Even though Libby favored retention of the arms
embargo, he advocated cash-and-carry for "other" goods.
Although he did not admit it at the time, his position

was, nonetheless, un-neutral.

' V
The winter of 1939-1940, with Hitler's "phony
war" bogged down in Europe, was very much the lull
before the storm. During the lull Libby continued
his efforts to keep America out of the war by advocating
another war referendum, limits on military spending and

55 But in the Spring

a negotiated settlement Of the war.
of 1940, Hitler's "blitzkrieg" rolled through Denmark,
Norway, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg in a matter of
weeks. The most devastating blow of all came on June 22

when France surrendered to Germany.

 

55Peace Action 6 (November 1939): 2; (December
1939): 1-2, 4, 8; (January 1940): 1-2, 6, 8; (February
1940): 1-3; (March 1940): 2, 5; (April 1940): 2-4, 6.

 

228

With the fall Of France the attention of the
Administration and the isolationists was broadened to
include the Asian holdings of the British, French and
Dutch which were now virtually unprotected from Japanese
attack. Although events in Asia would remain Of secon—
dary importance to the Administration and Libby until
the attack on Pearl Harbor, they could no longer be
entirely ignored. As Hitler consolidated his gains in
Europe, the Japanese army seized control Of the govern-
ment in Tokyo and Foreign Secretary Yosuke Matsuoka
and War Minister Hideki TOjO reaffirmed their country's
previous agreement with Germany (the Tri-partite Pact)
and tacitly threatened European imperial holdings in
Asia.

Back in the United States, Roosevelt took steps
to increase America's preparedness for war. The Presi-
dent requested over $1 billion in appropriations for
tanks, ships, planes and men to maintain them and Con-
gress quickly gave its approval. "Congress is acting too
promptly for wise action," Libby argued, and after con-
sultation with some "experts," concluded that over two
million men would be needed (the regular military and
support forces). "There is no way," Libby wrote, "to
get an army Of two million men in America save by . . .

56

universal military conscription." Libby soon found

 

56Peace Action 6 (May 1940): 1-2.

 

229

that he was correct when, in August, Congress considered
the adoption Of a bill providing for America's first
peace time military conscription. Libby's criticism Of
the bill focused primarily on required service and
presidential authority. He argued that mandatory ser-
vice was tantamount to a "totalitarian" system where

the individual gives up all rights and is little more
than a "chattel slave." Thus, conscription was incon-
sistent in a century where "we have grown up as free
men. . . . "57 His criticism of presidential authority
was more pointed. It was "so drawn as to give the
President dictatorial power over all males. . . . He
may send them anywhere . . . for any purpose. . . .

This is not the American way of life. This is Hitlerism."
Arguing that the real danger faced by America was "the
contagion of regimentation" and not Germany, Libby
Offered an alternative to forced military service:

"We must . . . find out how to live in the same world

58 Libby's rejection

with a Europe dominated by Hitler."
of Hitler and his dislike for Hitler's methods were

still insufficient to make him realize the threat posed
by a "EurOpe dominated by Hitler." His willingness to

"live in the same world" with a government whose tactics

 

57Peace Action 6 (August 1940): 6.

 

58Ibid.

230

he so despised reflected his determination to keep
America out of war. It is difficult to think what
would have had to happen to the international order to

change his mind. In Peace Action, Libby argued that

 

resorting to war took a disputed issue "completely out
of the field Of morals" and placed it instead with the
likes of medieval combat. The war in Europe, like
medieval combat, only proved the relative strength of
weaponry. TO Libby, it made little difference if
Britain or Germany won the war; neither the "rightness"
of their respective causes nor peace and justice would
result because "the fault is in the method. Victory

becomes the Objective."59

In that at least, Libby was
right.

And what of the chances for "victory" if America
should enter the war? In the end, according to Libby,
whether the enemy was Japan in the Pacific or Germany
in Europe, America would lose. In the Pacific, the
"United States is stronger than Japan" but a war would
take five years and an incalculable number of lives.
Despite the advantage the United States would be
"defeated by the magnitude of the problem of landing

and maintaining a sufficient army across an English

 

59"What Has a Pacifist to Say Now?" Peace Action
6 (May 1940): 4. '

 

231

Channel 6,000 miles wide." If, on the other hand, the
United States turned Japan into a "desert," pushed her
armies into China and destroyed them (leaving both China
and Japan "devastated and starving"), America would still
lose because "Communism would sweep over" them and
"Stalin would win our war."60
In Europe, the American prospects for winning
were even dimmer, particularly in light of the failure
Of "Churchill's reckless attempts at landing expedi-
tionary forces on an enemy's shore." Even if an American
invasion were successful, years would be required to
defeat Hitler. The devastation of Germany would spread
"chaos and revolution . . . over Europe . . . (and) by
the time the fighting ended, Stalin could virtually take
Europe over by telephone."61
Despite Libby's belief that Josef Stalin's vic-
tories in Europe and Asia were "inevitable," he still
felt that the war could only be successfully resolved
through negotiation. A settlement in which the outcome
was not dictated but arbitrated was the only way in
which civilization could "progress." The advocacy of

such a policy again demonstrated Libby's singular

inability to evaluate the situation realistically.

 

60Peace Action 7 (October 1940): 1-2.

 

61Ibid., pp. 2-3.

232

Advocating arbitration of "just grievances" before the

war was one thing (he so advocated), but to suggest that

negotiations were possible, let alone had any chance for

success, after the fall of France, was fantasy. Further-

more, he failed to consider that negotiations to alle—

viate grievances prior to the war (at Munich, for

example) failed miserably.62
But Libby stubbornly stuck to his beliefs despite

massive evidence to the contrary and, for all practical

purposes, the effectiveness of the NCPW collapsed with

the enactment of the 1939 Neutrality Law. The decline

of its influence closely paralleled the disintegration

of world peace that had begun in Manchuria in 1931.

The Council made its last stand in helping to prevent

neutrality revision in late 1939. But once the European

war began, and certainly after the fall of France,

almost no one listened. The internationalist wing of

the peace movement had long since departed and it was,

in 1940, counted among the advocates of collective

security. Some internationalists like Eichelberger

were supporting Roosevelt's lightly concealed attempts

to aid Britain. Within the NCPW, affiliated groups like

the AAUW pulled out as did trusted individuals such as

Ms. Morgan. By 1940, Libby's staff was reduced to a

 

62Ibid., p. 4.

233

handful, and only the WILPF and the FOR remained loyal
to the NCPW's chief aim of staying out of the war.
Libby remained loyal to that goal regardless of the
NCPW's loss of influence or the goal's loss of practi-
cability. In that sense, Libby was consistent. He
firmly believed that involvement in war solved nothing
except proving who had superior weaponry, thus, he was
willing to accept and advocate virtually anything to
preserve peace for America. His fear of the effects of
war, and particularly American participation in war,
left him in charge of a rapidly diminishing group of
supporters. Learning to "live with a Europe dominated
by Hitler" was symbolic of the advocacy that cost

Libby his following. As the European situation worsened,
his pleas for America to remain aloof from Europe were

little more than yelling into the wind.

VI

The United States abandoned any semblance of neu-
trality with the so-called Destroyers-Bases agreement
with England. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
began lobbying for American aid almost as soon as the
war started. By the Summer of 1940, Britain was
desperate and Churchill requested the loan of fifty
overaged American destroyers to replace those England

had lost. Simple transfer of the warships to Britain

234

would push neutrality to the limit, so a compromise was
arranged. The United States exchanged the destroyers
for bases in British possessions in the Western Hemis-
phere on the grounds, not of helping Britain, but of
shoring-up the national defense.

Libby's criticism of the agreement was predictable
but calm compared with his response to Roosevelt's next
step away from neutrality.63 In January, 1941, Roosevelt
asked Congress for the authority to sell, lease, transfer,
etc. any war material to Britain as she needed them.

A "Blank Check for War Dictatorship" Libby called the
Lend-Lease bill. It gave "the President the authority
to take us to war if he chooses. . . . It means surrender

64 After the passage of the Lend-Lease

of our rights."
Act on March 11, 1941, Libby urged his readers to keep
their "chins up." But even Libby seemed resigned to
eventual American participation in the war, for he began
speculating on the effect of American aid. It "could
certainly prolong the war. But it is equally certain
that (it) could not bring Britain victory."65

The German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22,

1941, changed the complexion of the European war by

 

63Peace Action 7 (September 1940): 2.

 

64Peace Action 7 (January 1941): 1-2, 4-5.

 

65Peace Action 7 (March 1941): 1-3.

 

235

relieving some of the pressure on Britain and allowing

the United States time to arm. In Peace Action, Libby

 

criticized Churchill for the Prime Minister's warm wel-
come to his new ally, Stalin: "Churchill threw to the
winds the last shreds of idealism . . . " and Libby
remained convinced that America's only role was to
"remain aloof and wait patiently" to help establish a
negotiated peace.66

Libby's tone changed perceptably, however, when
it came to the increasing aggressiveness of the Japanese.
Their occupation of southern Indochina in July, 1941,
led to Roosevelt's freezing of Japan's assets in America
virtually cutting off all trade. Libby supported the
President's action, albeit reluctantly. So great was
his fear that American participation in a European war
was close at hand that he now feared a two—front war.67
Although advocacy for economic sanctions was uncharac-
teristic for Libby, as early as October, 1940, while
advocating American negotiations with the Japanese, he

wrote: "Our position in such negotiations, considering

economic dependence of Japan on this country, (should be)

 

66Peace Action 7 (June 1941): l.

 

67peace Action 7 (August 1941): 1-2.

 

236

strong enough for us to safeguard vital . . . interests.68

Libby's support for sanctions was not given in the hope
they would deter the Japanese (in the same sense as col-
lective security advocates believed they would), but in
the frustrated hope that they would prevent a Japanese-
American war and lead to negotiations. In October, 1941,
he advocated a resumption of trade "so long as no further
military . . . action is taken by (Japan) to aggravate
the situation." In fact, if negotiations could have
taken place, Libby was quite clearly sympathetic to the
Japanese desire for "raw materials and world markets."69
Libby's advocacy of sanctions against Japan,
seen in isolation with his consistent opposition to
coercion, appears as though he altered his position
considerably. For someone so convinced of the evil
and futility of coercive actions, Libby's change of
mind was significant. But, seen in the context of the
time, arguments over the use of sanctions had now been
superseded by arguments over how much aid America should
give to Britain, and over America's state of preparedness
for war. Sanctions, once considered a hostile policy,

were now passé. Thus, Libby supported a policy deemed

 

68"Seek a Settlement in the Far East," October 15'
1940, NCPW files.

69Peace Action 7 (October 1941): 2.

 

237

obsolete by his contemporaries in the peace movement

and as they moved on to consider other courses of

action, Libby remained the advocate of the least hostile,
least dangerous of the alternatives offered.

Libby's actions during the last years of peace
(particularly advocating sanctions) demonstrated how
desperately he wanted to keep America out of war. That
was the only goal Libby still strived for; the others
had long since been abandoned for isolation. He firmly
believed he was right and thus ignored or attempted to
refute the arguments of his former colleagues who sup-
ported collective security. He could no more accept
their position, than they could accept his. During the
harmonious years of the twenties there were numerous
differences over which methods were most effective for
securing their common goal. But once Libby decided that
the United States must remain isolated from the war
that would inevitably come, he refused to consider the
merits of other methods of securing peace. There was
for Libby no alternative to staying out of war.

By November, 1941, Congress had repealed most
of the remaining restrictions of the 1939 Neutrality
Law. Most important in terms of impact was that American
ships were now allowed, with armed escort, to transport
goods anywhere, even to belligerents. Libby, needless

to say, was critical of Congress' action but, reflecting

238

his belief that America was inevitably headed for war,
the edge was gone from his words. In a rare display of
compassion for the "forces of war," Libby wrote, "It
should be added in all fairness that many Congressmen
who have supported the President's foreign policy have
done so, not for political reasons, but because they
sincerely believe that is the best policy for this

country to pursue."70

By the time the issue of Peace
Action in which those words were written reached Libby's

readers, the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor.

 

70Peace Action 7 (November 1941): 1—2.

 

CONCLUSION

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought to
an end Frederick Libby's twenty-year struggle to keep
America out of another war. Throughout the Second World
War, Libby adhered to a three-point program designed not
to obstruct the war effort: "curb the growth of hate
and intolerance; educate on the elements of a just and
lasting peace; (and) work for the earliest possible peace
by negotiation."1 Libby wrote later that he was pleased
that America was "free from the hysteria" of the first
war and surprised that the NCPW was not subjected to
government censorship.2

Since Libby was committed to not interfering with
the war effort, he focused most of his attention on how
the post-war world ought to be constructed to avoid

3

future wars. The thrust of his argument was that col-

lective security failed to prevent two world wars and

 

1F. J. Libby, "Men of Goodwill in Wartime,"

August 16,'l942, NCPW files; Libby, To End War, p. 171.

 

2Libby, To End War, p. 172.

 

3See for example, Peace Action 8 (January 1942):
l; 8 (March 1942): 2-3; 8 (June 1942): l; 8 (September
1942): l; 9 (April 1942): l; 9 (July 1943): l;

 

239

240

should therefore not be the basis of the new world
organization as outlined in the San Francisco Charter.
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee in July, 1945, Libby explained his position:
"There is nothing in the Charter . . . to prevent war
among the 'Big 3.‘ . . . The much-touted theory of col-
lective security based on force goes bankrupt . . . "
when the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Bri-
tain talk of spheres of influence. "It is precisely at
this point that the gravest danger of war confronts us
. . . (because the interests of those nations) have
never clashed more sharply than they do today in the
continuing game of power politics."4
The onset of the Cold War confirmed Libby's fear
that peace and stability would be challenged again.
Although he went to great lengths to explain the "aims
of the Communist International" and concluded that their
"aim" was a "Blueprint for World Conquest," he argued
that Washington should not prepare for war with Moscow,

and should abandon programs like conscription that lead

to war.5 Instead, the United States should adhere to

 

9 (October 1943): l; 10 (February 1944): l; 10 (October
1944): 1; 11 (March 1945): 1.

4peace Action 11 (July 1945): 1-3.

 

5Peace Action 12 (March 1946): 1-2; 12 (October
1946): 1-3; 12 (November 1946): 1-3.

 

241

policies that imply "friendly firmness." Libby never
precisely defined "friendly firmness," but he did sug—
gest that America had "more to offer" than the Soviets,
thus, he supported post-war economic programs aimed at
reconstructing and stabilizing war-torn Europe.6 But
Libby refused to go beyond economic aid when, in 1947,
President Harry S. Truman advocated military assistance
for Greece and Turkey. "The 'Truman Doctrine' is the
new name for another global Lend-Lease program of 'aid
short of war' in an undeclared war with Soviet Russia."7
The Truman Doctrine

. . . should be repudiated (because) it is an

attempt to prevent the spread of Communism on a

global scale by the use of military power and

wealth of the United States. . . . It will bleed

our taxpayers white and drain our manpower until

collapse becomes inevitable.8

By 1950, Libby was suggesting the "encouragement

of East-West trade, neutralization of Germany and

increased use of the facilities of the United Nations

for better cooperation" as "positive" steps toward

 

6Peace Action 12 (November 1946): 3.

 

7"Testimony of Frederick J. Libby . . . before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 3, 1947,"
NCPW files.

8"Statement to the National Republican Reso—

lutions Committee by Frederick J. Libby . . . June 18,
1948," NCPW files.

242

reducing tension and ending the Cold War.9 Despite
this desire to reduce Cold War tension with the Soviet
Union, he did support the United Nations in the Korean
War. "Our commitment to protect South Korea from
aggression is . . . clear," he wrote. It should be
pointed out, however, that Libby's support was not for
"our government (which) jumped the gun by several hours
by its unilateral action (of committing troops)," but
for America's action through the U.N. Although he
advocated a negotiated settlement, the war meant that
Korea would "sink into misery and hopelessness—-a fruit-
ful soil for the spread of Communism."10
After Korea, Libby believed that "Russia's
probing of our willingness and ability to fulfill the
requirements of (our) excessive obligations may be
expected almost anywhere now. . . . " The consequences
of these obligations were clear to Libby: "If this
(the presence of American troops but not Soviet troops
in Korea) is to be repeated in other parts of the world--
perhaps . . . Indo-China . . . it will be hard for us to
escape being 'stuck' with the charge of 'imperialism' in

the eyes of (other) peoples."11

 

9"NCPW Program for Peace--l950," January, 1950,
NCPW files.

10"Statement of Policy on Korea." June 20, 1950'
NCPW files.

llIbid.

243

***

When Frederick Joseph Libby died in 1970, the
United States was again at war and the world's super
powers still expressed little interest in disarmament.
Peace and disarmament seemed as illusive in 1970 as
they did when Libby began actively working for peace
in 1921. But the organization that he built and con-
trolled, the National Council for the Prevention of War,
was not without accomplishments. From the Washington
Conference in 1921 to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria
in 1931, Libby created an effective, influential peace
group ready to face the challenges of the 1930s.

During the twenties, Libby worked with other
peace activists like Clark Eichelberger, Dorothy Detzer
and Kirby Page. He originally organized the NCPW to
coordinate peace group activity by emphasizing common
goals like disarmament and the outlawry of war.
Although they all agreed, for example, on the necessity
of educating the public about the advantages of a
peaceful world, there were differences in outlook.
Libby, Page and Detzer, unlike Eichelberger, were
disenchanted with the antagonisms inherent in the
political and economic relationships that grew out of
the Versailles Treaty. Colonies were always a threat
to the mother country and rival imperial powers often

collided in their quest to renew the balance of power.

244

Rivalries that could lead to war also resulted from
competition for the world's resources and markets.
Libby, Page and Detzer argued that the status—quo had
to be changed in order to attain a peace system. Thus
by advocating political and economic change, they were
considered more "radical" that activists like Eichelberger
who saw no need for such changes. But in the first decade
of the interwar years, their differences of opinion could
be overlooked while common goals were being pursued.

The NCPW's prominent role in the quest for these
goals was due to its ability to attract support, not
only from peace groups, but from many other groups
(like the NEA or the League of Women Voters) for whom
a peaceful world was a secondary goal. Through the
expert use of such publicity devices as letters, tele-
grams, petitions and press releases, Libby was able to
marshall support for his programs when it was needed.
It is important to realize, however, that he was only
able to capitalize on existing support. "We cannot
create sentiment on an issue," Libby wrote, "(we) must
be content with mobilizing existing and scattered

12 Libby's ability to mobilize existing

sentiment."
sentiment was due primarily to the fact that he offered

organization and coordination to those interested in

 

12F. J. Libby letter to Morrell Heald, February
12, 1948, NCPW files.

245

peace where there had been none before. To peace groups,
this meant increased strength for their position and
increased resources from which they could draw. To
groups whose secondary concern was peace, Libby offered
regular memberships in the NCPW no matter what their
primary focus happened to be, thus giving them an effec-
tive outlet for peace work. The number of people that
Libby brought together not only made the peace movement
larger but made its voice in Washington louder.

Libby also created an effective lobbying force
through the use of staff personnel and allies in Congress.
On more than one occasion significant pressure was
exerted to accomplish a specific task. But the role
of lobbyist, even more than organizing peace groups
or perfecting communication techniques, brought Libby
and the NCPW into the political arena where they sought
not simply to "educate for peace" but to influence
foreign policy decision makers. As a result, Libby's
own decisions reflected not only his ethical and moral
beliefs, but his political judgment. In the twenties
his judgments frequently supported Administration pro-
grams like arms limitation and he worked for their
success. But in the thirties his judgments, colored
by fear of war, could not always support Administration
programs, and thus, Libby frequently worked against

their enactment.

246

Libby's decision to move beyond "educating for
peace" separated him from his colleagues like Page and
A. J. Muste. Their efforts on behalf of a peace system
based on peaceful change brought Page and Muste a great
deal of public attention. But they saw education only
as an end while Libby saw it as a foundation upon which
he could build organized pressure to try and influence
policy makers. Thus Libby was the organizer who spent
most of his time away from the public eye, trying to
use the ideas popularized by Page and Muste to rally
grass roots sentiment into an effective voice against
war.

As lone as Libby focused NCPW efforts on attain-
ing internationalist goals as he did in the 19203, the
Council was indeed the clearinghouse through which
internationalist sentiment was organized and spoken for
in Washington. Libby and the Council acted as the
countervailing force to militarists who constantly
defined patriotism in their own terms. But in the 19303,
as the international order began to crumble in Manchuria,
Ethiopia, Spain, China and finally in Europe, the peace
movement gradually divided. The internationalists (like
Eichelberger) increasingly advocated collective action
to halt the aggressors while Libby (along with Detzer)
sought ways to keep America isolated from the conflicts.

As Pearl Harbor drew nearer, the division widened with

247

Libby continually ignoring internationalist goals in
his pursuit of American isolation from war.

Libby's prominence in the peace movement
declined. Almost all his supporters but Detzer had
left him; his influence had diminished and yet he con-
tinued until the bitter end to try and keep America out
of war. What had happened to the man who in the 19203
was so flexible and so attuned to changing circumstances?
Why did he give up in the 19303 all that he had so skill-
fully built in the 19203? It was because of his fear
of war and the physical and spiritual devastation it
caused. His flexibility during the NCPW's early years
was supported by success-—the Washington Conference or
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, for example--that made war
seem less likely. With that in mind, Libby had little
trouble believing that policies of "audacious friendli-
ness" might indeed be instituted by the nations of the
world. In this atmosphere, arbitration (through the
"court" and the "town meeting") seemed not only possible
but logical to Libby. While all this may seem unrealistic
in retrospect, it is not difficult to understand Libby's
optimism in a world that had just outlawed war.

But the false sense of security that came after
the Kellogg-Briand Pact was quickly shattered in the
19303. Once Libby decided that preventing another war

was impossible he directed all his efforts to keeping

248

America out of it. As the attractiveness of "audacious
friendliness" lessened and arbitration seemed further
away than ever, Libby's mood changed. Several years
earlier, he had perceptively argued that "wise men make
no threats, knowing that they may not want to carry them
out and that . . . to do so would be . . . folly."13
But in the late thirties, Libby saw few wise men in the
Capitol. "The President and our State Department (were)
seeking to break down our neutrality," he complained,
as his attention remained riveted on isolating America
from war.14 It had been more than twenty years since
Libby had stood on that WOrld War I battlefield in France
where the roots of his pacifism "sank deep into . . .
the earth." He quite simply never forgot the horror of
that experience. His almost fanatical determination to
keep America out of war led him to make statements--
particularly, that we should learn to "live in a world
dominated by Hitler"--not in keeping with his judgments
in the 19203 and quite unacceptable in a world on the
brink of global war.

It is unfortunate that much of what Libby worked

so hard to achieve should be obscured by the rigidity

of his position in the 19303. He had done much to

 

13NCPW Bulletin 3 (December 13, 1924): 3-4.

 

14Peace Action 5 (January 1939): 2.

 

249

remove the negative connotations from the word "pacifist"
and helped bring peace activism a new respectability it
deserved. But through his advocacy of isolationism

Libby allowed pacifists and peace activists to again

be judged within the confines of rigid moral guidelines
even though their thinking was influenced as much by the
political climate as by morality. In the end, however,
it should not be forgotten that, for a time at least,
"patriotism (could) no longer be identified with military

action alone. . . . "15

 

15Libby, To End War, p. 63.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

This study was primarily based on the public and
private writings of Frederick Joseph Libby which are
located at the Swarthmore College Peace Collection,
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania and the Manuscript Division
of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. At Swarth-
more, Libby's papers constitute the most significant
portion of the files of the National Council for the
Prevention of War. In Washington, the Manuscript Division
holds the remainder of the papers which are considered
to be "not peace—related" material.

The most valuable files for this study were those
at the Peace Collection. The NCPW file contains all of
Libby's peace-related writings from 1920 to 1957. It
includes: position statements on such matters as world
organization, war, conscription; letters to Congress,
the press, staff members and colleagues in the peace
movement; speeches, radio addresses, debates and
articles for publication; copies of statements made
before Congressional committees and the Resolutions

committee of the two major political parties. Most

250

251

important, it includes many pages of notes, memos, etc.
Libby wrote for himself on a wide range of peace-related
subjects.

The most helpful of the NCPW papers for sorting
out and understanding Libby and his thinking as it

evolved over the years, are the Council's News Bulletin

 

and Peace Action. Libby was the sole editor of these

 

newsletters for thirty-three years. Ranging in length
from one to sixteen pages, the monthly newsletters
provide a vivid picture of Libby and his thinking. The
reader is able to trace the development of Libby's
thoughts, detect subtle changes in position and compre-
hend his sense of priorities. Used effectively, these

newsletters, particularly Peace Action, provide a

 

valuable framework for understanding Libby and his
writings described above.

The NCPW file also includes "minutes" of Council
meetings, "minutes" of the annual meetings and the
"Annual Reports," almost all of which were written by
Libby. They allow the reader to see the harmony or
discord among staff members, the control Libby had over
policy decisions and Libby's estimate of the Council's
effectiveness and shortcomings.

Other files in the NCPW papers that proved useful
were the records of the Council's Legislative Department

and the Press and Publicity Department. They not only

252

provide an accurate view of their activities but also
show Libby's influence in determining the kinds of
activity they should pursue. There are also files
detailing the attacks on the NCPW and Libby. It is
interesting to note that the number of attacks increases
or decreases depending on the attacker's estimate of
Libby's effectiveness.

Libby wrote two books during his career of peace

activism: War on War: Campaign Textbook (Philadelphia,

 

1922) and To End War: The Story of the National Council

 

for the Prevention of War (Nyack, New York, 1969). As

 

the subtitle indicates, War on War is a textbook of how

 

activists ought to go about working for peace while
Libby offers his appraisal of international politics
and the chances for peace in 1922. The book is little
more than a compilation of Libby's writings that can be

found elsewhere in his papers and in the News Bulletin.

 

The more important of the two books is To End War, the

 

"story" of the NCPW according to Libby. Its importance
lies not in his description of the Council's various

"fights" (the News Bulletin and Peace Action are more

 

 

useful), but in Libby's reflections on the people he
encountered and the episodes he was involved in during
the Council's most important years. The book does not,
however, capture Libby's thoughts or the intensity of

his convictions. In the NCPW papers is a "Subject and

253

Special Project File" tracing the fourteen-year evo-

lution of To End War from the initial outline to the

 

published version.

A complete historical record of the Council is
also among the NCPW papers. It outlines the founding
of the Council, its changes in direction and includes
such items as the NCPW Constitution and bylaws. Here,
Libby's influence even on day-to-day administrative
decisions of the NCPW is clearly shown.

The Libby papers at the Library of Congress
were, generally, less useful than those at Swarthmore.
For the most part they were very personal materials
(sermons, family correspondence) and only infrequently
referred to peace-related issues. Most helpful were
two "Journals" that chronicled trips to the Southern
United States and to Palestine early in Libby's life.
They contributed to the understanding of his upbringing
and outlook on life before his peace activism. Compre-
hending his changing sympathy for oppressed people
(black people discussed in the Southern trip) and his
optimistic religious philosophy (despite the bleak out—

look for Palestine) helped the reader to understand his

later opposition to imperialism and his firm belief that

popular opinion against war could be effectively

organized to prevent war.

254

The Libby diaries (1919-1969) proved to be only
partially useful. The early years (1919-20) again con—
tributed to understanding the man and his thinking.

But from 1921 to 1954, the same thirty—three years that
Libby edited the newsletter, they were virtually useless

because as long as he had the News Bulletin and Peace

 

 

Action as a written outlet for his thinking, the diaries
were little more than a calendar of his movements.
After 1954, however, when the newsletters were no longer
being written, the diaries became the outlet for his
thoughts. Thus, the primary focus of this study (1921-
41) depended less on Libby's diaries than on the news-
letters.
A small amount of general correspondence did
contain a few references to peace and war, but it did
not materially add to that found at Swarthmore. There
were also several larger boxes of unprocessed material
at the Library of Congress but they are not open for
examination. At the time of my visit (Winter, 1974)
there were no plans to process it in the near future.
I was able to glance through two of these boxes finding
such items as photographs and postcards. What the
others contained is unknown, but, according to the
staff all the "important" materials have been processed.
This study also relied on numerous other pri-

mary sources that complimented the Libby papers. The

255

New York Times Index was a useful guide to the Times

 

 

and the Washington Post. But pieces on Libby and the

 

NCPW in both papers were mostly confined to simple

reporting on a speech or a debate. The United States

 

Congressional Record contains all of Libby's testimony

 

before Congress with c0pies appearing in the papers at
Swarthmore. The wartime essays of Randolph S. Bourne,

War and the Intellectuals: Collected Essays, 1915-1919

 

(New York, 1964) edited by Carl Resek captured precisely
the aversion to war felt by Libby. Pacifist Kirby Page
wrote numerous books and pamphlets during the interwar

years, the most useful of which was War: Its Causes,

 

Consequences and Cure (New York, 1923). The religious

 

opposition to war is best seen in Realistic Pacifists:

 

The Ethics of War and the Politics of Peace (New York,

 

1935) by Leyton Richards. It was Richards, the Aus-
tralian pacifist, who had such a strong impact on Libby's
development as a pacifist and on his determination to
adhere to pacifism against increasing opposition. Jane

Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War (New York, 1922),

 

outlines her struggles in the peace movement in the post-

war years. Dorothy Detzer's Appointment on the Hill

 

(New York, 1948) is an interesting account of her efforts

at lobbying for an investigation of the munitions industry.

256

***

The interwar period has been the subject of many
fine works, some of which contributed to the understand-
ing of the events and issues that prompted Frederick
Libby to work for peace. John Chalmers Vinson, The
Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the

Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Athens, Georgia, 1955)

 

examines the impact of public opinion, including peace
groups, operating before and during the Conference. In
Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand
East (Durham, 1957) Robert Ferrell shows how shrewd
diplomacy and unsophisticated public opinion combined
to outlaw war. Robert Divine's The Illusion of Neu-
trality: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Struggle Over

the Arms Embargo (Chicago, 1962) helped clarify a com-

 

plex subject. These books were particularly useful in
sorting out the details and thus, making Libby's role
clearer.

The peace movement (pacifist and nonpacifist)
has received considerable attention. Selig Adler, The
Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction
(New York, 1957) and Robert Osgood, Ideals and Self
Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great

Transformation of the Twentieth Century(Chicago, 1957)

 

both examine pacifism within the movement but are skeptical

of its impact and doubt its usefulness. Merle Curti,

257

Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636-1936 (New

 

York, 1936), focused on the organization of the peace
movement and the place of pacifists within it. Two
brief but extremely useful works are Robert Ferrell's

"The Peace Movement" in Isolation and Security (Durham,

 

1957) edited by Alexander DeConde and the first chapter
(an overview of the peace movement in the 19303) of

Rebels Against War, 1941-1960 by Lawrence S. Wittner

 

(New York, 1969). Both pieces are an excellent starting
point for an examination of peace activity in the 19203
and 19303. Ferrell outlines the major goals of peace
groups and sketches the most important leaders and

their groups while Wittner explores the breakup of

peace movement unity as world War II approached.

warren F. Kuehl in Seeking world Order: The United

 

States and International Organization to 1920 (Nashville,

 

1969) traces the development of the concepts of world
organization that gave the peace movement its basic

philosophy on the subject. The American Peace Movement

 

and Social Reform, 1898-1918 (Princeton, 1972) by

 

Roland Marchand explored the relationship between peace
activists and social reformers and their desire to

change the order of things. Peter Brock's Pacifism in

 

the United States: From the Colonial Era to the First

 

WOrld War (Princeton, 1968) is a tedious account of

 

America's pacifist heritage. More useful, and more

258

readable, is John K. Nelson's The Peace Prophets:

 

American Pacifist Thought, 1919-1941 (Chapel Hill,

 

1967) which examines not only the pacifist heritage
but explains the difference between its religious,
moral and ethical roots before discussing the role of
pacifism during the interwar years.

The merging of pacifism and the politics of the
period can be found (after Ferrell and Wittner) in
Charles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in

America 1914-1941 (Knoxville, 1971) and Chatfield,

 

"WOrld war I and the Liberal Pacifists in the United
States," in the American Historical Review 75 (December
1970). His examination of peace groups, their leaders
and how they worked to affect policy through ideology
and po1itics is fascinating and most helpful in keeping
the complexity of peace groups and their aims clear.
Four brief studies published by the NCPW attempted to
analyze some of the peace groups between the wars, but
they were less useful than their titles indicate:
Organizations in the United States That Promote Better
International Understanding and World Peace (Washington,
D.C., 1921), The American Peace Movement (1930), Between
War and Peace: A Handbook for Peace WOrkers (1928)

and, The Turn Toward Peace (1930). The only analysis

 

of the NCPW itself is Allan A. Kuusisto's "The Influence

of the National Council for the Prevention of War on

259

United States Foreign Policy, 1935-1939" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1950). Kuusisto concludes
that Libby did indeed affect policy particularly through
lobbying and praises Libby for his determination. For

another view, Armin Rappaport's The Nagy League of the

 

United States (Detroit, 1962) describes the limited

 

achievements of the NCPW's opposite number and the
extent to which the peace movement restricted Navy
League activity.

The period between the Washington Conference and
the Manchurian crisis is explained adequately in The Far
Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938)
by A. Whitney Griswold; America's Response to China:

An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations

 

(New York, 1971) by warren I. Cohen. A somewhat dif-
ferent perspective is offered by Sadao Asada, "Japan's
Special Interests and the washington Conference, 1921—

1922," American Historical Review 67 (1961) and by

 

Akira Iriye, After Imperialism.(Cambridge, 1965).

 

The Manchurian crisis which produced Secretary
Stimson's "nonrecognition" doctrine that was supported

by Libby is discussed in Robert Ferrell, American

 

Diplomacy in the Great Depression (New Haven, 1957)

 

and Richard Current, "The Stimson Doctrine and the

Hoover Doctrine," American Historical Review 59 (1954).

 

260

The Secretaries of State during the period
under study, Hughes, Kellogg, Stimson and Hull are

best seen in Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the

 

Illusion of Innocence (Urbana, 1966); Ethan Ellis,

 

Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations (New

 

Brunswick, 1961); Elting Morison, Turmoil and Tradition

 

(Boston, 1960); Harold Hinton, Cordell Hull (New York,

1942) and Hull's Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols.

 

(New York, 1948).
America's relations with the League of Nations

are discussed in Denna F. Fleming, The United States

 

and WOrld Organization, 1920-1933 (New York, 1938)

 

and in F. P. Walters, A History of the League of

 

Nations, 2 vols. (New York, 1952). Although they

agree that American resistance to membership helped

kill the League, Fleming believed the United States

ignored its responsibility while Walters argued that

America supported the League without commitment.
America's role in the Mexican land expropriations

is explained in Howard F. Cline, The United States and

 

Mexico (Cambridge, 1965), who argued that the NCPW
played an important role in quieting the crisis. Samuel

Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United

 

States: An Historical Interpretation (New York, 1943)

 

and Robert Freeman Smith, The United States and

261

Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932

 

(Chicago, 1972), on the other hand do not see the
NCPW's role as significant.
The Nye Committee investigation is best described

by John E. Wiltz, In Search of Peace: The Senate

 

Munitions Inquiry, 1934-36 (Baton Rouge, 1963). Wiltz

 

stresses the lobbying efforts of Dorothy Detzer and
Libby's staff. Several books and articles were popu-
larized by Libby and others in favor of placing the
blame for Wbrld War I on the munitions industry. The
two that were most effectively propagandized are Irgp,

Blood and Profits: An Exposure of the World-Wide

 

Munitions Racket (New York, 1934) by George Seldes,

 

and Merchants of Death: A Study of the International

 

Armaments Industry (New York, 1934) by Helmuth C.

 

Englebrecht and F. C. Hannighen.
The neutrality controversy, at best a very com-
plicated issue, is best sorted out in Divine's Illusion

of Neutrality, cited earlier. William Langer and Everett

 

Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis

 

of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1952)

 

and Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American Neu-

 

trality, 1937-1941 (Ann Arbor, 1955) are useful intro-

 

ductory examinations of the subject. Two other books
that discuss the peace movement and the neutrality

question are Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant

 

262

Belligerent: American Entry Into world War II (New

 

York, 1965) and Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America,

1935-1941 (Ithaca, 1966).

 

The last years before the war are best described
by Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern

Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge, 1964); Herbert Feis,

 

The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, 1950) and Paul

 

Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American

Relations, 1941 (Ithaca, 1958). The role of Libby and

 

other peace group leaders in the last days is discussed
in "The Role of Peace Groups in the United States" by
warren I. Cohen, in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-

American Relations, 1930-1941 (New York, 1973), edited

 

by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto. Those like Libby,
who still held out against war but who did not share
his philosophical base are discussed by Wayne S. Cole,
America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940-
1241_(Madison, 1953).

One final note, an extremely useful biblio-
graphical aid, not only for the focus of this study but
for war and peace generally, is Bibliography of Books

on war, Pacifism, Nonviolence and Related Studies

 

(Nyack, 1960) by William Robert Miller.