CMSSECAL CONCEPT-“£3545 OF “PLACES":
A STUDY (N ENVENTEON

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. Dd
MICHiGAN STATE UNIVERSITYu
Robert John Brake
196.4

iii-1:515

  
     

  

LIBRARY

Michigan State
University

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF "PLACES":
A STUDY IN INVENTION

presented by

Robert John Brake

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph. D. Speech

degree in

. W
Major professor \

Date Janm 20, 1965

0-169

 

 

 

ROOM USE ONLY_

ROOM USE ONLY,
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ABSTRACT

CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF "PLACES":
A STUDY IN INVENTION

by Robert John Brake

Body of Abstract
The study involved a survey of classical conceptions of the

' roughly understood as sources from which argu-

rhetorical "places,‘
ments could-be obtained. The "places" were an important part of the
narrow View of invention and concerned the discovery and analysis
of speech materials. This view of invention was one aspect of the
broad view, which stressed the liberal education of orators and a
far-ranging search for speech materials. This study primarily con-
cerned the narrower "places" approach to invention, as either ac-
cepted or rejected by selected Greek and Roman rhetoricians from the
fifth century B. C. to the time of Quintilian.

The purpose of the study was to attempt to find answers to the
following questions: (1) What were some of the Greek and Roman views
of the "places"? (2) In what ways were they similar? (3) In what ways
did they differ? (45 What conclusions can be drawn regarding (a) the
nature of the "places," (b) the importance attached to the "plaees,"
and (c) the persistence of the "places" concept throughout the ancient,
medieval, Renaissance, and modern periods.

The study consisted of seven chapters, the first five concerning
the classical period, the sixth being a survey of medieval, Renais-

sance, and early modern rhetoricians who discussed the classical

Robert John Brake

H H
places,

and the last chapter containing conclusions of the study,
along with recommendations for future studies. Each chapter, except
the last, contained a section on "Introductory Considerations," de-
signed to familiarize the reader with the rhetorician(s) discussed,
political, economic, and cultural conditions of the period, or changes
in rhetoric which had influenced, or were about to influence, concep—
tions of "places." Historical considerations were introduced wherever
deemed appropriate to the study.

The following conclusions were drawn regarding the classical
"places." (1) The early Greek Sophists systematically explored gen-
eral ideas and offered their students collections of commonplaces.
These were especially helpful for orators who wished to insert "little
orations" in their speeches for purposes of amplification. (2) Isoc-
rates paid little heed to "places," preferring to emphasize a broad
View of invention. (3) Plato's antipathy to the rhetoric he saw prac-
tised around him, coupled with his preference for the dialectical
method, led him to reject "places." (4) In Rhetorica ad Alexandrum,

a handbook which stood firmly in the sophistic tradition, "places"
were treated as pre-processed materials selected by the author for
use in particular parts of a speech.

(5) Aristotle conceived of £2223 ("places") as pigeonholes from
which dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms drew their premises and
forms. 2922; were of two kinds, material and formal. Material £9221
were special or common, special E2293 providing premises for enthy-
memes used in each type of oratory, and common £2221 being useful for
all types of oratory. Formal £9221 provided the modes of reasoning a
speaker could employ.

(6) Hellenistic rhetoricians related the "places” to the parts

Robert John Brake

of a speech and to Hermagoras' reorganization of speech materials

under status. Two treatises, Rhetorica ad Herennium and De Inven-

 

tione, contain mostly forensic "places" and those for amplification.

(7) The elder Cicero protested against the narrowing of rhetoric
and proposed a system of general culture which would train orators
to speak competently on all subjects. Hence, his broad view of in—
vention came to dominate the narrow View expressed in De Inventione;
and the concrete lool favored in his youth were abandoned in favor
of formal lool (examined in Topica).

(8) Like Cicero, Quintilian censidered lool as seats of argu-
ments, drawn from persons or from things. He warned that a mere know-
ledge of lool is inadequate since a speaker needs to examine for him-
self the peculiar facts of each case.

(9) In the period of the Second Sophistic, invention became bar—
ren and stereotyped; and the "places" taught and used were conven—
tional in form and empty of real content. (10) In the medieval period,
"places"found their greatest use in sermons and letters. Various wri-
ters (saint Augustine and Alcuin, for example) followed Cicero, Aris—

totle, and the author of Rhetorica ad Herenniom in their conceptions

 

of "places." (11) During the Renaissance, Thomas Wilson and Francis
Bacon gave favorable attention to the classical "places." (12) From
the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, few rhetoricians considered
the classical "places" useful. George Campbell and Whately paid them
little heed, while Hugh Blair spoke slightingly of them. Among those
who considered "places" useful were John Ward and John Quincy Adams.
Ward presented an extensive treatment of "places," following Cicero
and Quintilian closely, while Adams divided "places" into internal

and external, and followed Cicero's Topica. After Adams, other Boyl-

Robert John Brake

ston Professors gradually de-emphasized classical concepts of rhetoric,
until, by the twentieth century, few direct references were made to

the "places."

CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF "PLACES":

A STUDY IN INVENTION

By

Robert John Brake

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Speech

1964

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The writer wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Kenneth G.

Hance for his advice and guidance in the preparation of this study.

 

CONTENTS

Chapter
INTRODUCTION .

II.

III.

IV.

Purpose of the Study .
Limitations Imposed .
Significance of the Study

A Review of the Sources . .
Documentation and Abbreviations
Design of the Study

. PRE-ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE PLACES

Introductory Considerations

The Sophists

Isocrates and Fourth Century Greek Rhetoric
Plato's Rejection of the "Places'l Approach .
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum

 

ARISTOTLE AND THE CONCEPT OF "PLACES"

Introductory Considerations

Aristotle's View of the "Places"

Dialectical Syllogisms and Topoi .

The Enthymeme and Topoi

The Relation of Topoi to Other Modes of Proof
Summary of Aristotle s Conception of Topoi .

CONCEPTIONS OF PLACES IN THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD
Introductory Considerations . . . . . .

Rhetorica ad Herennium .
De Inventione,

 

 

CICERONIAN RHETORIC AND THE CONCEPT OF PLACES

Introductory Considerations . . . . . .
Cicero's Broad View of Rhetoric
Cicero's Narrow View of Rhetoric .

Topica .

Summary of Cicero's Conception of Places

. QUINTILIAN AND THE CONCEPT OF PLACES

Introductory Considerations . .
Quintilian's Broad View of Rhetoric
Quintilian's Concept of Loci .

Page

ii
iv
vii

50

50
54
61

64

64
66
67
73
75

77
77

82
83

Chapter Page
VI. CONCEPTIONS OF THE PLACES IN THE MEDIEVAL,
RENAISSANCE, AND MODERN PERIODS . . . . . . . . . 88

Introductory Considerations . .9. . . . . . . . . . 88
Medieval Conceptions of the Places . . . . . . . . 91
Renaissance Conceptions of the Places . . . . . . . 97
Modern Conceptions of the Places . . . . . . . . . 106
VII. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Suggestions for Future Studies . . . . . . . . . . 119

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Stuoy

 

Invention, broadly considered, is the speaker's search for sound
subject matter, through the discovery and analysis of logical, ethi-

cal and emotional proofs. It concerns the relations among the sub-

3
ject, speaker, and audience.1 But it has also been considered in a
more narrow sense as a scheme for finding speech material for an im-
mediate occasion, involving, among other things, such devices as catch-
word suggestions or "places" from which arguments could be drawn.2
‘While some classical rhetoricians (Isocrates, Plato, Cicero, and Quin-

tilian, for example) preferred the broad approach to invention, others

(such as the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum) favored the more nar-

 

row approach. The two views of invention ran parallel throughout the
classical period, and every rhetorician had to take each of them into
account as he developed his concept of rhetoric. This study particu-

larly concerns the narrow view of invention, as either accepted or

 

1Traditionally rhetoric has been divided into five parts—-inven-
tion, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. This study mainly con-
cerns invention. However, since classical rhetoricians frequently dis-
cussed the content of a speech as it related to various patterns of
arrangement or matters of stylistic embellishment, these parts are also
treated.

2The narrow view of invention may be considered as one aspect of
the broad View, which stressed the liberal education of orators and a
far-ranging search for speech materials. The "places" and other aspects
of the narrow, more technical, approach to invention (see, for example,
note 3, page iv) could be employed by any orator.

i

rejected by the major rhetoricians from the fifth century B. C. to
the time of Quintilian.
The study is principally one of definition. It is a survey of an-

cient conceptions of the rhetorical "places,"

roughly understood as
sources from which arguments could be obtained. The "places" were an
important part of the narrow view of invention and concerned the dis-
covery and analysis of the subject matter of speeches. The Greeks called
these sources of arguments topoi; the Romans labeled them lool. To avoid

confusion in terminology, the word "places,"

as used throughout this
study, signifies both the Eopol_and lool of classical rhetoric.

The purpose of the study is to attempt to find answers to the fol-
lowing questions: (1) What were some Greek and Roman views of the places?
(2) In what ways did they differ? (3) In what ways were they similar?

(4) What conclusions can be drawn regarding (a) the nature of the places,
(b) the importance attached to the places, and (c) the persistence of
the places concept throughout the ancient, medieval, Renaissance, and
modern periods. Since conceptions of the places changed as historical

conditions prompted changes in rhetoric, the study also takes into ac-

count various political, economic, and cultural developments.

Limitations Imposed

 

There are four major limitations imposed on this study. First, it
principally concerns that period from the fifth century Greek Sophists
to Quintilian. While one chapter treats the medieval, Renaissance, and
modern periods, it does so only insofar as later writers accepted or
rejected the classical places. Thus, attention is given to those writ-
ers (Saint Augustine, Alcuin, Thomas Wilson, Francis Bacon, George Camp-
bell, Hugh Blair, Richard Whately, John ward, and John Quincy Adams)

who either accepted, for example, Aristotelian or Ciceronian views of

ii

the "places,' or rejected the "places" altogether. The study, then,

is largely restricted to the ancient period.

Second, the study considers "places" in the theoretical sense. For
purposes of illustration, some occasional mention is made of the use of
"places" by ancient orators, poets, or philosophers. The writer has,
however, largely confined his attention to the rhetoricians' theoreti-
cal views of the places, rather than examining various orations, poems,
,or philosophical treatises to find their application. If, however, a
rhetorician cited in his treatise the use of places by orators, poets,
or philosophers, this fact is noted in the study.

Third, the study does not include all rhetoricians of the ancient
period. Rather, attention is devoted mainly to the Sophists, Plato,

Aristotle, the authors of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and Rhetorica ad Her-

 

 

ennium, Cicero, and Quintilian. Other rhetoricians, such as Demetrius,

the author of On the Sublime, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and the two

 

Senecas receive little or no attention. Principal concern is with those
rhetoricians who treated invention at some length and accepted or re-
jected the places doctrine. Rhetoricians principally interested in style
or critical commentary are mentioned only in connection with discussions
of changes in rhetoric throughout the ancient period.

Finally, the places are considered chiefly as devices for logical
development. Some attention is given to the use of commonplaces (lool
communes) as devices for amplification, embellishment, or as fully de-

" for insertion in a speech. Since this concep-

veloped "little orations
tion coexisted with the one stressing places as "seats of arguments,"
it is necessary to consider it, particularly in relation to the Sophists

and the Roman rhetoricians. But the main interest of this study is with

the places as_aids in the speaker's selection of arguments and modes of

iii

3

reasoning.

Significance of the Study

 

The places were an integral part of the narrow view of classical
invention. Despite Isocrates and Cicero's emphasis on the broad view
(liberal education of orators), the places view gradually gained sup-
remacy. In the late Republic and Imperial age, the "places" concept
dominated the broad view, with only a few voices raised in protest.
The rise to prominence of this narrow View of invention was a major
factor in the decay of eloquence in the classical period.

The fact that almost every rhetorician for whom.we have extant
treatises gave attention to the "places," and the fact that poets,
playwrights, philosophers, and orators used them makes a study of them

' as part of invention, were related

significant. Moreover, the "places,'
to many other concepts of rhetoric. To determine how they related to
the materials and forms of the enthymeme (rhetorical syllogism), ethos,
pathos, arrangement, and of course the broad view of invention, is im-
portant.

Although the concept of the "places" appears all through the an-

cient, medieval, and Renaissance periods, it seems either misunderstood

 

3The loci communes, one aspect of the narrow View of invention,
were carefully developed bits of composition to be used by speakers
whenever they were handy. Such rhetoricians as Aristotle, the author
of Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero, and Quintilian treated them. The
Sophists first developed them, believing that such ready-made mater-
ials, when called upon by an orator, added copiousness and elegance
to an oration. Aristotle, while acknowledging some usefulness for loci
communes, preferred places which aided the orator's search for ideas,
rather than those that provided fully-developed bits of composition.
Roman rhetoricians, however, gave great emphasis to loci communes, par-
ticularly as devices to enhance style. The Aristotelian view of places
was eventually dominated by the loci communes concept and, by the Ren-
aissance, the latter reigned supreme. See R. C. Jebb, Attic Orators from
Antiphon to Isaeos (London: Macmillan, 1876), I, p. cxiv; Everett Lee
Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," Historical

iv

 

 

 

 

or insufficiently explored. Perhaps the technical nature of the sub-
ject and the confusion of views regarding the places have been res-
ponsible for the insufficient treatment of that part of ancient rhet-
oric. While the "places" have been discussed in connection with nu-
merous concept studies, they have usually received only passing atten-
tion. James H. McBurney discussed them in relation to the enthymeme.4
Irving J. Lee considered them in his discussion of the emotional
proofs of rhetoric.5 William M. Sattler noted them in his discussion
of ethos.6 Elinor Drafahl Carrino included a section on the "places"

in her discussion of dispositio (arrangement).7 And Marie E. Brittin

 

included the "places" as one kind of evidence found in the rhetorical
tradition.8 All of the above studies treated the "places" in their re-
lation to other rhetorical concepts. However, a comprehensive review
of the "places" themselves yet remains to be done.9

The subject has also been treated as part of many general rhetor-

ical studies. Donald Lemen Clark considered them in Rhetoric in Greco-

 

 

Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 26f.; Sister Joan.Marie
Lechner (O.S.U.), Renaissance Concepts of the Commonplaces (New York:
Pageant Press, 1962), pp. 28-64.

 

 

4"The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Mono-
graphs, III(1936), pp. 49-74.

 

5"Some Conceptions of Emotional Appeal in Rhetorical Theory,"
Speech Monographs, VI(1939), pp. 66-86.

 

6"Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric," _peech Menographs,
XIV(l947), pp. 55-65.

 

7"Conceptions of Dispositio in Ancient Rhetoric" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1959).

 

8"Conceptions of Evidence in Rhetoric" (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Northwestern University, 1949).

9This is not to disparage in any way the excellent treatments
given the "places" by the above writers or by such scholars as Wilbur
Samuel Howell, whose introduction to The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charle-

 

V

10

Roman Education. J. W. H. Atkins gave them some attention in his

 

two-volume study, Literary Criticism in Antiquity: a Sketch of its

 

Development.11 George Kennedy frequently referred to them in his Art

 

of Persuasion inGreece.12 And Elbert W. Harrington surveyed the en-

 

tire concept of invention in Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of

 

Inquiry.13 Of the above, Harrington is the only one who limited his
study to invention; but in his brief work, he divided his attention
between the broad and narrow views of invention, and did not treat

the "places" in depth. Charles Sears Baldwin's Ancient Rhetoric and

 

Poetic14 affords only meagre treatment of the places. Moreover, he
did not consider at any length such pre-Aristotelian writers as the

Sophists, Plato, and the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum.

 

Other works that offer valuable commentary on the "places" con-
sider but one phase of ancient history, such as the Greek period or
Roman period. An excellent work of this type is M. L. Clarke's
Rhetoric at Rome: a Historical Survoy;15 which contains extensive dis-

cussions of the "places," but only in connection with Roman rhetoricians.

 

magne (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941), contains an
excellent review of Roman conceptions of rhetoric. The present writer
is well aware of the many fine works which treat the "places," but
wishes in this study to examine fully the concept in its own right.
10(Morningside Heights, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1957).
11(Cambridge: University Press, 1934).
12(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).
13(Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1948).
14(New York: Macmillan, 1924).
15(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963).

vi

Thus, while the "places" have been discussed in many works, there
has not yet been a study which attempts solely to analyze the Greco-
Roman conceptions of this subject. Moreover, research done in the past
few years has offered new materials and viewpoints for an evaluation
of the "places." One example is Harry Caplan's translation of Rhetor-

16

ica ad Herennium, which was, of course, not available to Baldwin,

 

Atkins, Harrington, and others. Yet an understanding of Hellenistic
conceptions of the "places" necessitates a consideration of this trea-
tise (in its best translation). In addition, recent works, such as those
of George Kennedy and M. L. Clarke offer valuable insights concerning
the ancient rhetorical tradition. With the publication of new trans-
lations and commentaries in recent years, there appears to be the room

and the need for a new study of the classical places.

A Review of the Sources

 

A review of the more important primary and secondary sources used
in this study may be helpful. Although the extant treatises by the
Sophists are fragmentary, the writer has found Mario Untersteiner's

The Sophistsl7 a valuable source. Also helpful were articles by Henry

20

 

Jackson,18 George Kennedy,19 Everett Lee Hunt, and Bromley Smith.21

 

16(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).
17Trans. Kathleen Freeman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954).

18"Sophists," Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed. (Chicago: Werner
1895), XXII, pp. 263-71.

 

Co.

9

19"The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks," American Journal of Phil-
ology, LXXX(1959), pp. 169-78.

 

20"Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," Historical
Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, pp. 19-70.

 

 

21Between 1918 and 1928 Bromley Smith wrote a series of seven
articles (published in the Qparterly Journal of Speech), on the Soph-
ists. These studies offer helpful information. See "The Father of

 

O.

V11

From the Loeb library the writer used the George Norlin-LaRue Van Hook
translations of Isocrates22 and the Rackham translation of Rhetorica

ad Alexandrum.23 For Plato the Jowett translations were used.24

 

Translations and commentaries on Aristotle's works are voluminous.
The writer has mainly used W. Rhys Roberts' translation of the 322E;
.QEEEZS and the W. A. Pickard-Cambridge translations of Topica and Do
Sophisticis Elenchis.26 One of the best commentaries on Aristotle's

Rhetoric is Edward Meredith Cope's Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric.27

 

Also significant are W. D, Ross' work on Aristotle,28 Georgiana Paine

29 and

Palmer's study of the formal topoi ("places") of the Rhetoric,
Friedrich Solmsen's articles.30

For Cicero's rhetorical works, letters, and speeches, the Loeb

 

Debate: Protagoras of Abdera," V(March, 1918), pp. 196-215; "Prodicus
of Ceos: the Sire of Synonymy," VI(April, 1920), pp. 51-68; "Corax and
Probability," VII(February, 1921), pp. 13-42; "Gorgias: a Study of Ora-
torical Style," VII(November, 1921), pp. 335-59; "Hippias and a Lost
Canon of Rhetoric," XII(June, 1926), pp. 129-45; "Thrasymachus: a Pio-
neer Rhetorician," XIII(June, 1927), pp. 278-91; and "Theodorus of By-
zantium: Word-Smith," XIV(February, 1928), pp. 71-81.

22Three vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928, 1929, 1945).
Van Hook translated Vol. III, published in 1945.

23(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937).

24The Dialogues of Plato, 4 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953).

25In The Works of Aristotle, ed. w. D. Ross, XI(Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1924). This choice was dictated by Roberts' clear translation

and excellent commentary. The Cooper, Jebb, and Cope-Sandys editions
have also been used.

 

26Ibid., vol. 1, 27(London: Macmillan, 1867).

28Aristot1e: a Complete Exposition of his Works and Thought, 5th
ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1953).

29The ’IQIaL of Aristotle's Rhetoric as Exemplified in the Ora-
tors (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

30For example, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric,"
American Journal of Philology, LXII(1941), pp. 35-50, 169-90.

viii

editions were employed.31 An excellent literary biography of Cicero is

Torsten Petersson's Cicero: a Biography.32 The writer selected the

 

H. E. Butler translation of Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria.33 Sev-

 

eral articles by Harry Caplan provided an excellent account of the

34

"places" as conceived in the medieval period. And Sister Joan Marie

Lechner's Renaissance Concepts of the Commonplaces was helpful.35

 

For information on the extent and quality of classical scholar-

ship, the writer consulted John Edwin Sandys' History of Classical

 

Scholarship36 and Fiftngears of Classical Scholarship.37 H. 1. Mar-
38

 

 

rou's History of Education in Antiqpipy is an excellent recent work

 

in this area. For historical information, the writer consulted several

 

31Brutus, trans. G. I. Hendrickson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1939); De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, trans. H. Rack-
ham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951); De Inventione,
trans. H; M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1949);
De Oratore, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, 2 vols. (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948); De Partitione Oratoria, trans.
H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948); Epistu-
lae ad Familiares, trans. W. Glynn Williams (New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1928); Orator, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1939); The Speeches, trans. N. H. Watts (New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931); and Topica, trans. H; M. Hubbell (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949).

 

 

 

 

 

32(New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1963).
33Four vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953).

34For example, "Rhetorical Invention in Some Medieval Trattates
on Preaching," Speculum, II(1927), pp. 284-95.

35(New York: Pageant Press, 1962).

36(New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1958).

37Ed. Maurice Platnauer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954).
38Trans. George Lamb (London: Sheed and Ward, 1956).

ix

works, including Rostovtzeff's History of the Ancient World.39

Documentation and Abbreviations

Any study which involves the examination of a large number of
primary sources necessitates frequent source citations. To avoid ex-
cessive citations of passages from a single work, the writer has a-
dopted the following procedure. Since several lengthy discussions will
center mainly on one treatise (for example, Aristotle's Rhetoric), the
primary source first is cited fully at the bottom of a page, and there-
after cited in parentheses in the text. Citation of secondary sources
and explanatory notes is always at the bottom of a page. It is hoped
that this procedure will facilitate the reading of this work. Also,
abbreviations are used wherever possible. Frequent mention of indi-
vidual treatises makes the use of abbreviations both convenient and

less tiring to the reader.

Design of the Study

 

The study consists of seven chapters. The first five chapters
concern the classical period; the sixth is a survey of the classical
places as they were viewed during the medieval, Renaissance, and mod-
ern periods; and the last chapter is a summary of the study, along
with recommendations for future research. Each chapter, except the
last, includes a section on "Introductory Considerations," designed
to familiarize the reader with the rhetorician(s) discussed, the po-
litical, economic, and cultural conditions of the period, or changes
in rhetoric which had influenced, or were about to influence, concep-

tions of places. Historical considerations are introduced wherever

 

39Trans. J. D. Duff, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press,
1926-27).

 

deemed appropriate to the study. Three chapters (1, III, and VI) treat
groups of rhetoricians, as for example, Chapter I concerns the early

Sophists, Isocrates, Plato, and the (unknown) author of Rhetorica ad

 

Alexandrum. Each of the other chapters (II, IV, and V) deals princip-
ally with a single rhetorician.

Chapter summaries are added only to Chapters II and IV, which
concern Aristotle and Cicero. It is believed that the extent and com-
plexity of their views necessitate summaries. Elsewhere, however, the
writer prefers to review, within a chapter, trends and developments,
and otherwise maintain the continuity of the study by providing tran-

sitions to the following chapter.

xi

CHAPTER I

PRE-ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE PLACES

Introductory Considerations

 

In his Funeral Oration of 431 B. C., Pericles declared: "For we
are lovers of the beautiful, yet with economy, and we cultivate the
mind without loss of manlineSS. . . . I say that Athens is the school
of Hellas and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to
have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action
with the utmost versatility and grace."1 In those words Pericles gave
an extraordinary reason why men should gladly die for their country.
It is probably the only instance in history of a statesman's urging
his people to be patriotic because their state offered them aesthetic
opportunities. Yet such an appeal was not strange to fifth century
Athenians. Nearly every citizen of Pericles' Athens engaged in public
service of some kind, whether military training, sharing in decisions
concerning government policies, listening to debates, or serving on
juries. To this informed and experienced citizenry public activity
itself was a liberal education.2

The period between the end of the Persian Wars (479 B. C.) and

the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (431 B. C.) was one of conflict

1Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Benjamin Jowett,
The Greek Historians, ed. Francis R. B. Godolphin, I(New York: Random
House, 1942), ii 49-50.

2Walter R. Agard, What Democraoy Meant to the Greeks (Chapel
Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1942), p. 72.
Also see R. C. Jebb, Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos, I, p. cxxxv.

 

 

3

 

 

2
between new and old ideas and practices. It was a transition period in
educational, religious, and moral ideas, a time of philosophical activity
and the development of formal education by the Sophists. It was a period
favorable for the growth of individualism, as the extension of trade,
improvements in agriculture and industry, and other changes prompted a
constant conflict between capitalism and individualism on the one hand,

and democratic institutions on the other.3

In the midst of this instability
was the art of rhetoric.

Rhetoric arose in connection with events surrounding the expulsion
of the Tyrants of the Theron dynasty of Agrigentum (471) and those of the
Hieron dynasty at Syracuse (463). The ensuing annulment of confiscations
decreed by the Tyrants and the resulting litigation concerning property
ownership prompted the Greeks to an even greater concern for effective
speaking. Beginning with the readily observable facts, early theorists

such as Corax and Tisias were able to formulate general rules, later to

be codified into a body of doctrine.

The Sophists

 

Unfortunately little is known about pre—Aristotelian rhetoric. For
example, Corax and Tisias, the founders of the rhetorical art, still
remain little more than names to many modern researchers.4 There has been
almost a total loss of the writings, not only of Protagoras, but also of

the Sophists in general. Probably many teachings of the Sophists were

 

3M. Rostovtzeff, A History of the Ancient World, trans. J. D. Duff
(London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1926), I, pp. 315-16.

4H. Ll. Hudson-Williams, "Greek Orators and Rhetoric," Fifpy Years

of Classical Scholarship, ed. Maurice Platnauer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1954), p. 203.

 

 

 

 

3
later incorporated in systematic wroks such as the Rhetoric of
Anaximenes.5 Moreover, the Sophists wrote for living men, not future
readers.6 Because a writer's personal experiences, livelihood, family
life, political sentiments, religion, home town, and imagination, as
well as the customs and folkways of the ordinary people of his time,
all influence his work, it is regrettable that there remain but a few
fragments of the Sophists' works.

However, it is known that the Sophists had a monopoly on Greek
education for almost a hundred years. For purpose of clarity, the
Sophistic tradition may be considered in terms of the four principal
types of Sophists, roughly covering the period 450-350 B. C.7 The first
type of Sophists appeared around 450 B. C. and was concerned principally
with cultural matters. Protagoras of Abdera, interested in epistemology.
and humanistic education of the young, was an example of this type.

The Sophist of culture, while continuing to flourish, then yielded to
Sophists chiefly interested in rhetoric. Gorgias of Leontini was the
foremost member of this group. Visiting Athens on a political mission in
427 B. C., he greatly impressed the Athenians with his florid and graceful
prose style. He and his followers exerted great influence on Greek youth.

After Gorgias, the political Sophists came to the fore in the early fourth

 

5Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists, trans. Kathleen Freeman (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 9.

 

6Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert
Highet (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1939), I, p. 302.

 

7Henry Jackson, "Sophists," Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed. (Chicago:
Werner Co., 1895), XXII, p. 263.

 

A.
century. Isocrates and his followers avowed to train Greek youth for
citizenship and responsible political leadership. The last group to
dominate the education of Greek youth consisted of the eristic Sophists.
These masters of disputation, usually followers of Hippias of Elis, were
active in the time of Plato and were among the most severely criticized
by him.

The Sophists taught much, wrote much, criticized political affairs,
and diffused ideas. They were usually teachers of a superior grade who,
distinguishing themselves from philosophers on the one hand and craftsmen
on the other, claimed to prepare their students, not for any particular
study or profession, but for civic life.8 Corax, Protagoras, Prodicus,
Gorgias, and Hippias (among others) were teachers with practical doctrines
to spread throughout Greece. They never comprised a school or sect of
teachers with identical aims or methods; nor did they develop a common
epistemology or ethical theory. On the contrary, they had great differences
in thought and methodology.

Despite the varying doctrines and methodologies among the early Greek

Sophists, two distinct rhetorical traditions existed. One was the theoretical,

 

of which Tisias and Theodorus were examples. The other was that of the

9

exemplar or collection of commonplaces. Concerning the theoretical tradi-
tion, it is believed that early handbooks were numerous (owing to the great

demand from litigious citizens facing court contests), that the handbooks

 

81bid.

9See George Kennedy, uThe Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks," American
Journal of Philology, LXXX(1959), p. 172.

 

 

5
were devoted principally to forensic rhetoric (since that type best lent
itself to rules),10 and that theoretical discussion at first involved
only invention and arrangement.11 The Sophists' analytical attitude
toward invention led them to formulate a mass of rules which together
comprised a complete method for extracting every possible topic for any
given case.

Concerning the exemplar tradition, standard passages were available
on such matters as how to flatter judges and how to criticize evidence
obtained under torture.13 Also, the Sophists prepared general reflections
on such topics of universal concern as justice, injustice, nature, and
convention. It was found that, through manipulation, any subject could be
reduced to simple ideas which students could easily grasp.

The usefulness of such commonplaces was first seen by the Sophists;
their systematic exploration and exploitation of great themes was to help
mold the very strong Greek and Roman taste for general ideas.14 A brief
consideration of some individual Sophists should help clarify their role
in the development of the commonplace tradition in rhetoric.

Plato had Protagoras, the oldest of the Sophists, profess to make

 

10lbid., p. 173.

11Ibid., p. 178. Also see Bromley Smith, "Corax and Probability,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech,,VII(February, 1921), pp. 13-42, passim, for
an account of the earliest theories on the rhetorical art.

12H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquipy, trans. George

Lamb (London: Sheed and Ward, 1956), p. 54.

13Ibid. 14Ibid.

 

15John Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato (London: Macmillan,
1914), p. 111.

 

 

6
. . l6 . .
men good c1t1zens. To become good c1tizens, says Protagoras, men must
place education at the very center of their lives and pursue great learning.

Thus, in his work On Personal Qualities he maintains (in the few fragments

 

we have from the treatise) that education requires natural gifts and
practice, that a man begins to learn in his youth, and that education
cannot occur unless great depth is reached.17
Although it does not appear that Protagoras taught a special art of
rhetoric,18 he did develop the doctrine of antinomies. He taught that,
of two statements, a stronger and a weaker, the stronger one (or one made
to appear stronger) will be accepted. He maintained that the expert Sophist
could teach the art of strengthening statements, an art indispensable for
success in debates and litigation.19 He also was credited with the handling
of general questions as a mode of practice and with the writing of common-
places.20 Protagoras practised his pupils in the development of commonplaces
to be used in speeches of praise and blame. Hence, pupils might discuss
patriotism, friendship, or courage, with no reference to concrete situations,

and yet be fully equipped with a stock of thoughts and phrases for use when

an occasion demanded ready speech. Commonplaces, in the sense of little

 

16Protagoras 319a. All references to Plato's dialogues are from
The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 4 vols. (Oxfordf Clarendon
Press, 1953). Protagoras, Phaedrus, and Symposium are found in Vol. I,
Gorgias in Vol. II, and Theatetus in Vol. III.

17Eduard Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, trans.
L. R. Palmer, rev. Wilhelm Nestle, 13th ed. (New York: Meridian Books,
1957), p. 100.

18

 

 

 

 

 

Untersteiner, p. 70.

19It is difficult, however, to determine whether Protagoras foresaw
any immoral applications of the doctrine. Jebb, Attic Orators, I, p. cxiv.

20See Plato Protagoras 318e-3l9a; Aristotle Rhetoric 1402a 20-27;
Cicero Brutus 46.

 

 

7
orations to be inserted in a regular oration for amplification purposes,
gave speakers a certain copiousness and elegance.21

After Protagoras, the most prominent of the literary Sophists was
Prodicus of Ceos. However, he was "without any purely rhetorical interests,
since he defined the Sophist as 'midway between the philosopher and the
statesman."'22 Hence, there is little of the commonplace tradition in the
few surviving fragments of Prodicus' writings. It is known that he estb-
lished himself at Athens and taught virtue, in the sense attached to the
word by Protagoras (partly by means of literary subjects, partly in dis-
course upon practical ethics). His conventional morality found favor and
his knowledge of synonyms prompted Socrates (Theatetus 151b)occasionally
to recommend students to him.

Gorgias of Leontini gave Sophistry a new direction by bringing to
Greece new ideas on oratorical style. While there is no evidence to show
that he ever called himself a Sophist at any time in his life,23 he did
concern himself with subjects such as philosophy, politics, and oratory.

In his own Speaking, it is believed that be employed the commonplace
technique to spin out a speech to any appropriate length.24 Moreover, his
pupils were trained to employ stock issues and aphorisms adaptable to the

25
needs of the moment.

 

21Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians,"
p. 26. Jebb believed that the commonplace taught by Protagoras and other
Sophists became popular at a time when public speaking was neither purely
extemporaneous nor wholly written. Speakers thus committed to memory pas-
sages they considered important. Attic Orators, I, p. cxiv.

22

 

Untersteiner, p. 206. 23Jackson, p. 265.

2"George Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1963), p. 63. Cicero said that Aristotle ascribed
the use of commonplaces to Gorgias, as well as to Protagoras. Brutus 46-47.

 

25H. Ll. Hudson-Williams, "Political Speeches in Athens," Classical
Quarterly, XLV(1951), p. 71. Students could use commonplaces to magnify a

theme or bring out the enormity of a wrong. Jebb, Attic Orators, I, p. cxxiv.

8

Finally, Hippias of Elis, who gave lectures on such diverse subjects
as arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, music, grammar, mythology, Homerology,
and the education of youth,26 was the typical polymath of the ancient
world. Besides his extensive knowledge on many subjects of the day, he
also studied mnemonics and taught the eristics method which prevailed in
Plato's time. The successors of Hippias "claimed to possess and to com-
municate, not the knowledge of all branches of learning, but an aptitude

for dealing with all subjects."27

Isocrates and Fourth Century Greek Rhetoric

 

In fourth century Athens, many citizens remained aloof from politics
and retired into private life, thinking that public duties were a grievous
burden. The richer and more educated citizens ran the government, largely
because men earning good wages were not inclined to sacrifice them for
the small sums paid to judges, magistrates, or other public servants.

While Athens was economically strong, she was a picture of political
anarchy and weakness, owing largely to the public bent for individualism.28

In this setting Isocrates developed a broad approach to rhetoric which

stressed the importance of good speech to the citizens of a democracy.

From the purely technical point of view he simply continued the tradition

29

But although he was familiar with the "places'

30

of the Sophists' teaching.

’

concept of invention, his chief emphasis was on a broad View of invention.

 

26Jackson, p. 265. 27Ibid. 28

29

Rostovtzeff, I, pp. 318-19.
Marrou, p. 82.

3OElbert W. Harrington, Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry
(Boulder: Univ. of Colorado Press, 1948), p. 5.

 

9
Hence, he believed that (l) rhetoric, properly taught and conceived, led
to what was good for society and for the individual; (22 the power to
speak and write distinguished man from the animals; and (3) godd speech was
"the surest index of a sound understanding."31 Such oratory not only would
benefit an audience, but also would bring about fundamental changes in the
character of the speaker. While Isocrates did not contend that virtue could
be taught, he did say that people would become better and worthier if they
realized an ambition to speak well, to persuade others, and to seize the
advantage (in the better sense of the word). Speakers would naturally find
it better to deal with cases involving honor and praise than those of a
less noble type, and the good speaker of Isocrates would try at all times
to speak on such subjects. He would, moreover, seek to find material that
was edifying and illustrious. Also, the good speaker would strive to be a
man of good character (Antidosis 278).

Since Isocrates upheld such a broad view of rhetorical invention, it
was natural that he should be skeptical of the more narrow "places approach"
taken by the fifth century Sophists. Hence he disclaimed the ability to
teach invention by means of the "places." For example, in his Encomium
on Helen he attacked philosophers and rhetoricians who used this means of
teaching their students, and claimed that sUch "places" were too difficult

33 . .
to learn. A harsh critic of rhetorical handbooks, Isocrates 1n31sted on

 

31ép£ldooi§, trans. George Norlin (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1929), 255.

32Against the Sophists, trans. George Norlin (New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1929), 13.

33In the first three sections of Helen, Protagoras, Gorgias, Zeno,
Antisthenes, and Melissus are attacked for maintaining that courage, wisdom,
and justice are identical, and that there was one knowledge concerned with
all three. Moreover, Isocrates considered the subjects they chose for discus-
sion a waste of time (Helen 11). He attacked as trivial their encomia on
bumblebees, salt, and other such subjects (12). Their composition, he said,
"is more difficult in the same degree as it is more difficult to be dignified
than to scoff and to be serious than to joke (ll).

 

10

the need for practice, innate gifts, personal qualities, inventiveness,
capacity for work, memory, voice, and tact (Antidosis 189-92). He listed
as the requirements of an orator: (1) natural aptitude (paramount in
importance); (2) training (mastering the knowledge of a particular subject);
and (3) practice (Antidosis 187-89).

Yet, while he was not much interested in the narrow aspects of invention,
Isocrates did on occasion speak favorably of "places." Referring to the
kind of commonplaces usually inserted into a speech to support some position,

he viewed them as building blocks from which a speech was constructed

(Against the Sophists 12). The orator typically memorized them and no doubt

 

used them again and again in different speeches. Their actual composition
was often largely extempore, the orator drawing upon the material in his
memory.34 The composition of such commonplaces was one of the most charac-
teristic features of the classical tradition.35 Subjects were gradually
amplified in the direction of universal ideas and great and noble feelings.

In Against the Sophists (12) Isocrates considers that speaker most

 

skillful who is able to discover in his subject, "places" which are unlike
those used by others. Again, speaking of the value of formal training in
rhetoric, he says (15) that a teacher is able to give to his pupils the

ability to "take from a readier source the topics which they otherwise

 

34The construction of these commonplaces resembled the composition
of poetry out of themes and formulas. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece,
p. 53.

35Marrou, p. 88. This was probably due to the prominence of epideictic
oratory. Until after Aristotle, epideictic oratory "had a higher dignity in
general estimation than either the forensic or deliberative." Jebb, Attic
Orators, II, p. 425.

11
hit upon in haphazard fashion." In Hglgp (12-16) he prides himself on
having composed such a work without dealing in any of the "places" which
Gorgias had used in his encomium on Helen. And he wrote the Busiris prima-
rily to show how to develop the places of an encomium.36
It should be pointed out, however, that all of the above-mentioned
works were written in the early years of Isocrates' career as a rhetorician,

antedating the Antidosis (353 B. 0.), his most extensive exposition of

educational ideals. For instance, Against the Sophists was composed shortly

 

after he opened his school in the first decade of the fourth century.
'Holoo'was an experimental work, written in the early 380's, when he was
still seeking to discover a satisfactory subject for his own conception of
oratory.37 And Busiris, because of its connection with Socrates, also seems
early.38 It appears then that all of Isocrates' works (composed after he
opened his school) were in some degree Sophistic specimen speeches addressed
to the Greeks in general and to his school in particular. They were usually
composed in response to rhetorical challenges and must be evaluated in that

light. Although Isocrates recognizes that a trained speaker will know how

 

to discover the resources of a theme (Against the Sophists 13) and despite
the numerous references to "places" which appear throughout his earlier

works, the Antidosis (written in his eighty-second year) contains a more

 

 

, 36See Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece, pp. 180-81. The speech
was named for a mythical king of Egypt.

37Ibid., p. 187. Kennedy suggests that Helen was written as a criticism
of other educators, as experimentation with a serious theme, and clearly as a
composition of a model encomium for imitation by the pupils in his school.

 

38Ibid., p. 186.

12
complete explanation of his art. In that work, he gives his chief emphasis
to the broad view of invention, deeming mechanical formulas as insufficient,
and stressing the need for inventiveness and resourcefulness.39
While Isocrates' students were probably familiarized with the "places"

40

approach to invention, their chief training was in connection with a
large number of subjects, thoroughly examined. The references to "places"

in the works of Isocrates were casual as contrasted with the more extended

treatments by such rhetoricians as Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.

Plato's Rejection of the "Places" Approach

 

In only two dialogues, Gorgias and Phaedrus, was rhetoric treated in
any extended way by Plato. But because the dialogue approach allowed him
to touch here and there on a diversity of subjects, he did comment on

rhetoric in other treatises, such as Symposium, Protagoras, Republic,

 

Theatetus, and Sophists.

Plato's distinction between knowledge and Opinion was probably the
chief basis for his antipathy to rhetoric.41 Rhetoric was based on opinion,
which, even when correct, lacked the permanence and stability of real

knowledge. Opinion, in turn, was gained from sense perceptions which stem

 

3QIsocrates' insistence on extensive study prompted Marcus Cato to
charge that scholars were old men before they were ready to leave Isocrates'
school. Plutarch, Plutarch's Lives: the Translation Called Dryden's, rev.
A. H. Clough (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1875), II, p. 346.

 

4OIsocrates' pupil, Kallippos, for example, included in his art of
rhetoric the topic of consequence and the topic of possibility. Aristotle
Rhetoric 1399a 16-18.

41Plato's indictment of rhetoric included charges that: (1) it was
unnecessary; (2) it was dangerous; (3) it did not convey knowledge; (4) it
did not convey power; and (5) it was not an art. (Gorgias 447ff.)In attacking
rhetoric as he did, Plato may have had any of a number of purposes in mind.
Perhaps he was indulging in humor or satire. He may habe been reprimanding
specific rhetoricians practising in his time. He may have been combatting
What he thought was an unwholesome influence by the rhetoric of his time.
Or, finally, he may really have thought that rhetoric was a knack, a form
of flattery that did not belong in any respectable system of education.

 

 

 

 

13
from particulars. This foundation for rhetoric made it unacceptable to
Plato for three reasons: (1) a speaker might not possess genuine knowl-
edge (Phaedrus 260); (2) even if he knew the truth, a speaker still would
rely for effectiveness on putting his materials in terms of the beliefs,
customs, and prejudices of his audience (Phaedrus 273); such beliefs were
simply rough crude knowledge based on sense perceptions and, even if the
speaker relied on probability, he still dealt with the same kind of
would-be knowledge?2 and (3) Plato was suSpicious of long, sustained
discourse. Such a method was likely to obscure truth.

This, however, does not mean that Plato could find no place for
rhetoric in his scheme of knowledge. In the logo, which was written at
the end of his life, he found an important use for rhetoric--lawgivers,
he suggested, should never weary of persuading the citizens. In Phaedrus
(270-79), also, he presented a broad outline of a true rhetoric, the
necessary steps or factors in good rhetorical practice including: knowl-
edge of the nature of the soul and the ability to adapt to it; ability
to define terms (classify particulars or break up universals into partic-
ulars); knowledge of the "truth" of a subject; knowledge and use of
principles of order and arrangement; knowledge of style and delivery;
little attention to the art of writing; and an endeavor to "grow beautiful
within." Rhetoric, then, could be acceptable to Plato, but only if it was
based on truth.

To learn the truth, a speaker must first learn the proper method of

knowing the truth--dialectic. This short question and answer method of

 

2Socrates scorned those who "run after probability, and say good-
bye to truth" (Phaedrus 273). And Plato condemned spurious arguments
based on probability, calling such an approach empirically acquired
and devoid of rational basis (Gorgias 453f.).

14
conversation, conducted exhaustively on a subject, allowed a speaker to
divide properly a complex subject, to name and define its parts, and to
bring the scattered particulars of the subject within the scope of one
general idea. Since "he who would be a master of the art [rhetorigl must
understand the real nature of everything" (Phaedrus 262), the dialectical
method must be learned first. For dialectic was, to Plato, the indispensable
science, the "coping-stone" of all the other sciences (Republic 532, 533, 536).

Thus, Plato's emphasis on dialectical method (as a necessary part of
the orator's training), coupled with his antipathy to the rhetoric which
he saw practised around him, led him to uphold a broad approach to inven-
tion. Like Isocrates, he gave the narrow approach little attention. On
some occasions he even spoke derisively of the "places." For example, in
Phaedrus (236) he had Socrates say that although he could not avoid using
the commonplaces that Lysias had used in his speech, it was when the speaker
left the realm of such commonplaces that he was forced to be original in
his thinking. Or again in Sypposium (198) Socrates was made to say: "For
I in my simplicity imagined that the topics of praise should be true . . .
and that out of them the speaker was to choose the best and arrange them
in the best order.9 Again and again Plato returned to the theme--rhetoric,
to be useful and productive, must be based on truth, not the catalogued
opinions of the multitude.

Yet the catalogued opinions of the multitude were often ingeniously
employed by Plato himself, as he sought to persuade his readers. (For
example, he frequently employed myths as a device to persuade others to
live the philosophical life.) But whether he had in mind particular
"places" for the development of emotional and ethical proof as a means

of more effectively presenting the truth is a question that cannot be

 

 

15

answered definitely.43 It is true that, in Phaedrus (277), he upheld
the general view that a speaker must be "able to discern the nature
of the soul and discover the different modes of discourse which are
adapted to different natures." (Else he would be unable to handle
arguments according to any rules of art.) But it is apparent that
Plato did not care to catalogue any "places" of emotional and ethical

proof.

Rhetorica ad Alexandrum

 

Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, a practical handbook for public speakers,

44

 

probably was written near the beginning of the third century B. C.
Although authorship of the treatise has not been definitely established,
there is general agreement that it was not written by Aristotle.45
Even though there are some superficial points of resemblance between
this treatise and Aristotle's Rhetoric, there are several significant

reasons for eliminating Aristotle from consideration as author of the

work. First, ad Alexandrum represents the Sophistic school of rhetoric

 

 

43Harrington, p. 10.

4"H. Rackham, "Introduction," Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1937), p. 258. The authorship and date of
composition, while disputed matters among numerous classical schblars,
here must be of secondary importance. The nature of the work itself
commands primary attention. Even though the work is not, by chronological
standards, pre-Aristotelian, this writer believes the treatise to be
pre-Aristotelian in the sense that it mirrors Sophistic conceptions of
rhetoric.

 

45Kennedy represents the prevailing thinking on the authorship
of the treatise. Rejecting Aristotle as the author, he believes that
Anaximenes of Lampsacus probably wrote it. (Art of Persuasion in Greece,
p. 12, 115.) T. A. Sinclair also favors Anaximenes and.emphasizes the
influence of Isocrates' rhetorical views on the work. (A History of Greek
Political Thought[london: Routledge and Kegan, 1951] , p. 255.) Rackham,
while not identifying Anaximenes as author, does detect Isocrates' in-
fluence. ("Introduction," p. 258.) Cope suggests that Anaximenes may have
written it, but prefers the more modest "Anonymous." (Introduction to
Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 413-14.)

 

 

16
that Aristotle opposed.46 The treatise seems clearly in sympathy with
the Sophistic tradition that made rhetoric the "art of persuading,"
whereas Aristotle defined it as "the faculty of observing or discovering
in every case the possible means of persuasion."47 Moreover, the work
is Sophistic in that it makes success at any price the aim of the art.48
A second reason for eliminating Aristotle from consideration as author
of the treatise concerns the quality of the work, as contrasted with
the Rhetoric. Rackham remarked that it was a work "proceeding from an

entirely different and inferior order of mind and character."49

E. M. Cope
noted that the work was markedly inferior to Aristotle's in subtlety and
spirit, power and interest, and in differences of style.50 It is apparent,
then, that the work must be regarded as the product of a pedantic scholar
with Sophistic sympathies.

The author begins his treatise by listing the three genera and seven

species of oratory. Oratory is deliberative, epideictic, and forensic, and

concerns exhortation and dissuasion, eulogy and vituperation, prosecution

 

46Rackham, p. 258. The resemblance between the ad Alexandrum and the
Sophistic conception of rhetoric is especially striking in respect to such
matters as the emphasis on commonplaces, the moral tone of the treatise,
and the author's lack of scientific exactness. E. M. Cope, in comparing
this treatise with Aristotle's Rhetoric, has called attention to the work's
"want of skill and inappropriateness in composition" (p. 401) and its
"highly immoral character" (p. 403). While the present writer would not go
so far as Cope and deem it an "Art of Cheating" (p. 460), he does agree that
the work is highly Sophistic, in its emphases on giving effectiveness to
the speaker (moreso than truth) and in the achievement of effects, at almost
any price.

47John Edwin Sandys, "Introduction," The Rhetoric of Aristotle: a
Translation, trans. R. C. Jebb (Cambridge: University Press, 1909), p. xix.
Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is in Rhetoric 1355b 26-27.

48Sandys, ibid. Jebb has called this treatise the "best practical
treatise on Rhetoric which has come down to us in Greek." Attic Orators,
II, p. 431.

 

 

 

9"Introduction," Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, p. 260.

 

50Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 401ff.

 

17

and defense, and investigation (1421b 9-25).51 The general "places" of
deliberative speaking are seven in number (1421b 24-1423a 12): (1) justice,
(2) legality, (3) expediency, (4) honor, (5) facility, (6) practicability,
and (7) necessity. These places, to be used solely for exhortation or
dissuasion, are further subdivided in the following manner: (1) just
things (honor of parents, friends, and benefactors); (2) legality (the
"common agreement of the state enjoining in writing how men are to act
in various matters"); (3) expediency (the preservation of existing good
things, acquisition of things not possessed, rejection of existing evils,
and prevention of harmful things; further subdivided into expediency for
individuals I?‘ the body, including strength, beauty, and health; b. mind,
including courage, wisdom, and justice; c. external possessions, including
friends, wealth, and properti] and expediency for a state [honcord, military
strength, property and plentiful revenue, and good and numerous allie§});
(4) honorable things (distinctions accruing to the agents); (5) easy things
(those that require little effort, time, or expense); (6) practicable
matters (things able to be done); and (7) necessary things.52
Next, using the above seven "places" in each instance to develop the
subject, the author considers seven kinds of subjects for public speaking
(1423a 21-1425b 31), including (1) religion, (2) legislation, (3) form of
the constitution, (4) alliances and treatises, (5) war, (6) peace, and

(7) finance. Turning to the places of eulogistic speaking, the author

 

51Investigation, the seventh species, could stand alone, or be
introduced into an oration of any genus. 1421b 24f.

52Only the first three "places" were treated in any depth, others
being merely mentioned.

18
offers the same places used for deliberative speaking. For example,
praiseworthy things include the just, lawful, expedient, noble, pleasant,
and the easy to accomplish (1425b 40-1426a 3). In chapter three, the
author offers six methods of amplification and minimization (1426a 20ff.).
A speaker can (1) show that the actions of a person have produced many
good or bad results; (2) introduce a previous judgment, favorable or
unfavorable, and compare it with his own statement, making his own appear
stronger; (3) compare with his subject the smallest of the things that
fall into the same class; (4) prove that the agent acted in a premeditated
manner and had done so for a long time; (5) prove a man responsible for
many things; and (6) mention the opposite of something judged a great good,
making it appear a great evil.

Concernin the treatment of the " laces " then the Rhetorica ad
8 P 3 :

 

Alexandrum stood firmly in the tradition of the early handbooks. (The end
of the dedicatory epistle says that the work is indebted to the handbook
of Corax and the technai written by Aristotle for Theodectes.) Similar

to the early handbooks, the materials of this treatise are quite specific,
and one can see that they could be learned as commonplaces and adapted

to almost all possible speeches. The "places" discussed in the treatise
were those materials that had been selected by the author and then ordered

into arguments for the speaker's use in particular parts of the speech.

CHAPTER II

ARISTOTLE AND THE CONCEPT OF "PLACES"1

Introductory Considerations

Aristotle's Rhetoric has been called the "best book for

written composition and as a practical guide to public speaking

that ever was put forth."2 The treatise, probably written in

 

1To aid the reader's understanding of this chapter, the writer
offers the following sketch of its contents.

1. Aristotle's preliminary observations on rhetoric

a.
b.
c.
d.

. An

a.
b.

C.

do

Rhetoric concerns matters of opinion

Rhetoric is an offshoot of ethics and politics

Rhetoric is a counter-part of dialectic

Rhetoric involves the attempt to discover available means
of persuasion for a given situation

overview of Aristotle's conception of topoi

Aristotle's disagreement with Sophistic views on "places"
‘What Aristotle meant by the term topoi=-interpretations
by modern researchers

Approaches to Aristotle's concept of topoi

(1) Common and special topoi

(2) Material and formal topoi

(3) Analytic, subject, and abstract topoi

Material-formal distinction selected by the present writer

The four kinds of syllogism

a.
b.

C.

Apodeictic (scientific)
Contentious (spurious)
Dialectical (disputatious)

d. Rhetorical (enthymeme)
Dialectical syllogisms and topoi
a. Relation between dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms

b. Dialectical topoi (as found in Topica)
Enthymemes and topoi

a. Aristotle's logical proofs

(l) Artistic and inartistic

(2) Artistic proofs based on examples and enthymemes

(3) Enthymemes based on probabilities, signs, and examples
(4) Materials and forms of enthymemes supplied by topoi

l9

20

330 B. C. during his second residency in Athens,3 was an analy-
tical investigation of the art of rhetoric. The genesis of the
work was influenced by Plato's emphasis on sound subject matter
and a knowledge of the soul.4 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle replied
to Plato's strictures on the art, while also gaining inspiration
and guidance from his teacher. Hence, any discussion of Aristotle's
conceptions of rhetoric necessitates frequent comparison between
the two thinkers.

Aristotle makes a distinction between science and opinion

5 For instead of

which really determines his rhetorical theory.
distrusting sense perceptions as Socrates and Plato had, Aris-
totle begins with them. From sense perceptions of particulars
comes memory, and from.memory, experience, until finally the uni-
versal is reached. Man is led to see the universals through his
knowledge of particulars. Primarily a scientist, Aristotle held

that universals or general notions, abstracted from particulars,

are the objects of scientific knowledge and only in science is

 

b. Material topoi, divided into
(1) Special topoi (supply premises for enthymemes)
(2) Common topoi (supply premises for enthymemes)
c. Formal topoi (supply modes of reasoning for enthymemes)
(l) Twenty eight valid
(2) Nine sham
6. Relation of topoi to ethos and pathos
7. Summary

2Lane Cooper, "The Rhetoric of Aristotle," Quarterly Journal
of Speech, XXI(February, 1935), p. 18.

 

3Cope, p. 38.

4J. W. H. Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity: a Sketch
of its Development (Cambridge: University Press, 1934), I, p. 134.

5Harrington, p. 11.

21
complete certitude to be realized. Elsewhere, as for example the
areas of ethics and politics (the conduct of men as individuals
and as members of groups), men must seek the best knowledge in
their efforts to influence their fellow men. Thus, a good speaker,
as perceived by Aristotle, gathers all the possible facts and opin-

ions on a subject6

and pursues many fields of study.

The area of knowledge in which rhetoric functions (opinion)
is that which concerns variable and contingent premises (in con-
trast to the certain premises of science). Because it deals in
this area, rhetoric is said by Aristotle (1356a 25-30) to be an
offshoot of ethics and politics. Moreover, because it is based
essentially on methodology, having no particular subject matter of
its own, rhetoric is a counter-part of dialectic (1354a 1-5). The
problem of rhetoric is to find all the available means of persuasion
pertinent to a given rhetorical situation (1355b 26-27).

The relationship between rhetoric and dialectic is important

to Aristotle, for these arts concern the whole realm of human con-

duct and the beliefs concerning such conduct.7 He theoretically

 

6Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. W. Rhys Roberts,
The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, XI(Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1924), 1396a 5-10. The Roberts translation will be used throughout
this study. Except where otherwise noted, all references to other
works of Aristotle are from the Oxford collection, W. D. Ross, ed.

 

 

7The discussion of the dialectic-rhetoric relationship found
in Wilbur Samuel Howell's Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne (Prince-
ton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941), pp. 45-57, here deserves
special mention. Howell points out that the contrast between rhetoric
and dialectic first became apparent in fifth century Greece when the
rhetoric of Corax was a method of practical dispute and the dialectic
of Zeno was a method of theoretical dispute. Both arts, Howell states,
"claimed as their prerogative the function of acquainting young men,
not only with a basic habit of procedure, but also with the necessary
information with which that procedure was conversant." (p. 46) Hence,
the Sophists' students of rhetoric were taught how to persuade aud-
iences on such subjects as law, politics, and morals, while students

 

22
regards rhetoric and dialectic as applicable to the same range
of subjects; theoretically, anything can be discussed by either
method (1354a 1-10). Both methods use arguments, both deal with
probabilities, and neither concerns scientific demonstration. The
Isocratean notions of practical men, the common sense views of
mankind, could be the subject matter of both methods.8 These opin-
ions are largely formed by the process of dialectic. As conceived
by Aristotle, dialectic is a mode of discussion which concerns the
investigation of opinions, with a view toward bringing them into

some kind of consistency.9 The objective of dialectic is not truth,

 

6f dialectic were taught to exercise their talents on ultimate prin—
ciples of science and conduct, thus acquiring a fund of philosophical
knowledge. In the fourth century, Aristotle saw rhetoric and dialectic
as complementary arts of composition. Dialectic was the "art of inven-
tion in disputes upon alternate beliefs before audiences so consti-
tuted by training and temperament as to respond to an appeal to reason
alone;" rhetoric was the "art of invention in disputes upon alternate
policies or actions before audiences which re3pond when their emotions
and moral sentiments, as well as their reason, are brought into harmon-
ious relation." (Howell, pp. 47—48) Rhetoric, as viewed by Aristotle,
thus shared its complete function with no other art (1355b 25-27). It
employed the logical, emotional, and ethical means of persuasion, while
dialectic centered on logical appeal. Among the differences between

the two arts (pointed out by Howell) was the kind of questions each

art concerned. Whereas dialectic surveyed scientific and learned ques-
tions, rhetoric mainly took up practical questions of policy. Also,
whereas dialectic dealt with a learned audience, rhetoric involved the
popular audience. Finally, states Howell, there was one other not very
important distinction. Dialectic proceeded by question and answer;
,rhetoric was the art of long, continuous discourse. This, however,
referred to external appearance rather than fundamental objectives.
Moreover, it was not even a constant external difference, since dialogues
often contained lengthy discourses and speeches were often of the short
question and answer type.

8Harrington, p. 13. Plato's dialectic, in contrast to Aristotle's,
was purely speculative and had as its end, truth. Plato would have a
speaker use dialectic to invent, test, and arrange the substance of his
discourse. In Phaedrus (260), he has Socrates maintain that rhetoric
begins to function as an art after the subject matter of the speech has
been discovered and put in order. See Wilbur Samuel Howell, "Nahhaniel
Carpenter's Place in the Controversy between Dialectic and Rhetoric,"
Speech Monographs, 1(1934), p. 27.

9Harrington, p. 13.

 

 

23

for the discussion concerns matters on which truth could not be
known for sure; and any truth discovered by such investigation
can only be roughly indicated. Hence, while rhetoric is theoreti-
cally applicable to the same range of subjects, in a practical
sense rhetorical argument is much more limited than dialectical
argument, because the subject matter of rhetoric is largely limited
to the practical aspects of ethics and politics.10

It is clear then that Aristotle (l) distinguishes between science
and opinion, placing rhetoric and dialectic in the latter area; (2) con-
siders rhetoric as an offshoot of ethics and politics; and (3) views

rhetoric as the counter-part of dialectic, since both operate in the

realm of the variable and contingent and are employed by all men.

Aristotle's View of the "Places"

 

Before Aristotle, the Sophists11 had treated "places" as ready-

made arguments "into which they expected the speeches of both parties

 

10Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians,"
p. 67. Cf. Topica and Rhetoric of Aristotle. In Topica Aristotle
offered laborious explorations of the dialectical places or topoi.
These were pigeonholes in which dialectical reasoning was to draw its
arguments. The Topica represented one of the last Greek efforts toward
a general culture that attempted to discuss oll manner of subjects with-
out stud ing their appropriate first principles. (See Ross, Aristotle,
5th ed. New Yorszarnes and Noble, 1953 , p. 61) Aristotle in this
respect followed the Sophists, though h1s motive, in contrast to the
Sophists, was to aid his hearers and readers not to win glory or gain
by an appearance of being wise, but to discuss questions as sensibly
as they could be discussed without Special knowledge. Thus, his dialec-
tical places could concern specualtive matters of philosophical inquiry,
or purely casual encounters, or even the principles of the several
sciences. (Topica 101a 25-40) But rhetorical places, as James H. McBurney
points out, largely concerned human actions, characters, motives, and
feelings, and were hence clearly associated with_politics (including
ethics). (See "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," Speech
Monographs, III(1936), pp. 54-55.) A more complete discussion of the
dialectical and rhetorical places follows later in this study. For the
present, it is sufficient to note that Topica was very important, not
only in its relationship to Rhetoric, but also as the spring-board for

 

24
to fall most frequently."12 "Places" concerned particular subjects
in the sense that speakers had ready-made materials for enhancing
or minimizing, for example, the trustworthiness of a witness or the
importance of an oath.13 Their use was primarily for judicial ora-
tions. Aristotle examined the previous views of "places" and ex-

pressed dissatisfaction with them. In De Sophisticis Elenchis

 

(183b 36-184a 8) he declares:

For the training given by the paid professors of contentious argu-
ments [Sophistgl was like the treatment of the matter by Gorgias.
For they used to hand out speeches to be learned by heart, some
rhetorical, others in the form of question and answer, each side
supposing that their arguments on either side generally fall among
them. And therefore the teaching they gave their pupils was ready
but rough. For they used to suppose that they trained people by
imparting to them not the art but its products, as though anyone
professing that he would impart a form of knowledge to obviate any
pain in the feet, were then not to teach a man the art of shoe-
making or the sources whence he can acquire anything of the kind,
but were to present him with several kinds of shoes of all sorts;
for he has helped him to meet his need, but has not imparted an
art to help him.

Also, in the Rhetoric (1402a 23-26) Aristotle declares that
people are correct in objecting to Protagoras' training, making the
worse argument appear the better. "It was a fraud; the probability

it handled was not genuine but spurious."l4 Having expressed this

 

the development of formal places by Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian,
and other rhetoricians.

11See above, pp. 4-8.

12De Sophisticis Elenchis, trans W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, The
Works of Aristotle, 1, 183b 36-184a 1. Also Cicero Brutus, teans.
G. I. Hendrickson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939), 46f.

l3Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhet-
oric," American Journal of Philology,LXII(l94l), p. 40.

14Cf. Plato Protagoras 319a. Also see Aristotle Rhetoric 1402a-
3-27, where the places of sham enthymemes are discussed.

 

 

25

dissatisfaction, then, Aristotle offers his own conception of
topoi ("places"), conceiving them as sources from which arguments
could be obtained.15

To understand better Aristotle's system of topoi, it may be
helpful to review some modern interpretations of the term topoi,
before proceeding to examine other matters.16 Among the modern
students of Aristotle, Lane Cooper considers topos as the "seat"
of an argument or, when transferred to the memory, something like a
pigeonhole in the mind where one goes to seek material for a speech.17
Cooper believes that topos must be interpreted as "region" or the

18

like. Moreover he stresses the notion of "from" or "out of" as
,

found in the Rhetoric. The speaker "is supposed to have resources
from which he draws his arguments and illustrations."19 lopoo is a

"place where" arguments are found. As the hunter pursuing game knows
that each kind of game has its own kind of haunt, so too the speaker

knows that each kind of argument resides in its own place.20 Another

scholar, W. D. Ross, considers topoi as places or regions haunted by

 

15McBurney, p. 59. Aristotle's conception of topoi has made for
confusion on the part of many modern scholars. Even E. M. Cope, who so
greatly clarified Aristotle's use of the term topoi (pp. 124-33), had
some difficulties in interpretation. (See, e.g., Introduction to Aris-
totle's Rhetoric, p. 253.) McBurney's interpretation is reasonable and
clear, and will be followed throughout this chapter.

16The following review of Aristotle's conceptions of topoi is a
cursory one, for, in order to grasp the significance of topoi to Aris-
totle's rhetorical theory, it is necessary first to examine his theory
of the enthymeme. Only then can one proceed to a more detailed examina-
tion of the topoi as treated in the Rhetoric. The present review of
definitions is offered, then, only to establish a foundation for more
detailed discussions later in the chapter.

17The Rhetoric of Aristotle: an Expanded Translation (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1932), pp. xxiv and 155.

l8Ibid., p. xxii. 191bid., p. xxiii. 201bid., pp. xxiv—xxv.

26

arguments;21 Since the most frequent interpretation of the term

is that of "seats of argument," it shall be the guiding definition
in this analysis of Aristotle's work. In general, it can be said
that Aristotle's Eopol were areas or locales in which ideas were
grouped according to their kinds and from which they could be drawn.
lopol are divided by Aristotle according to genus and species.
According to this view, there are two kinds of lopol, common and
special. Common Eopol are subsumed (Rhetoric 1392a 1-20) under
the following heads: (1) possible and impossible; (2) past fact;
(3) future fact; and (4) degree, which served as proper subjects
for dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms. Special popol_are pecul-
iar to specific subjects, such as ethics and politics. Since these
are related to a particular species, they can not be applied to any
other subject, while common lopol can be applied to all subjects.
Another classification of Aristotle's Eopol_is that of material
and formal.22 According to this broader analysis, material Eopoi
concern those facts and opinions sought as a basis for inference.
Material Eopol are further divided into (1) special (oldg) and

(2) common (koinoi topoi). Special topoi, as noted above, embrace

 

substantive items 6r propositions found largely in the areas of

 

21Aristotle, p. 263. Other classical rhetoricians also con-
sidered "places" as regions. Cicero and Quintilian, for example,
compared places to haunts of game, veins or mines where metals
could be sought, and stores which could be drawn upon. (Cicero
Topica ii. 7; De Oratore ii. 147, 174; De Finibus iv. 4; Quintilian
Institutio Oratoria v. 10. 20-22.) The metaphorical way of viewing
places persisted throughout the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance
periods.

 

 

22McBurney, p. 60; Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece, p. 101;
and Marie Brittin, "Concepts of Evidence in Rhetoric," (unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern Univ., 1949), p. 334.

 

27

ethics and politics, and furnish the premises for enthymemes.
lopol_of the common or universal sort concern general principles
of probability, applicable to all subjects. lopol as the materials
of which proofs are made are discussed in Books I and II of the
Rhetoric. Formal Eopol_are places concerning the interpretation
brought to bear on evidence already possessed by the speaker.23
These include lines of argument or the methods of reasoning which
a speaker can employ in constructing enthymemes.24 Of these lopol
Aristotle lists twenty eight valid and nine sham (1397a 5-1402a 25).

In addition, Eopol can be classified as either (1) analytic,
(2) subject, or (3) abstract. Analytic lopol, in this scheme, are
the common or universal Eopol_(possible and impossible, past fact,
future fact, and degree).25 Subject lopol concern the more concrete
subjects such as finance and defense. Abstract popol_are general
propositions similar to the categories or the "predicables" of Aris-
totle's logical treatises--items such as definition, division, cause,
effect, difference, and similarity. Focus here is on the form of the

argument, independent of any particular subject matter or content.26

 

23Brittin, p. 334. 24McBurney, p. 60.

2‘5The topos of degree, for example, if once grasped, could be
applied to innumerable situations. A speaker could argue that, if
not even the gods know everything, human beings will certainly not
know everything. Or he might contend that whoever beats his father
will also beat his neighbors. Always proceeding from the less likely
thing (which has nevertheless occurred) to the more likely, a speaker
could employ this formal topos to great advantage. See Solmsen, "Aris-
totelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," pp. 40-41.

26This concept of topoi presupposed a capacity for abstracting
from material content. Such a capacity had not been fully developed
by the Greeks before Plato and Aristotle. Previous teachers of rhetoric
lacked it. But Aristotle, setting out to elevate rhetoric to a subject
of philosophical dignity and standing, based his approach to rhetoric
on his conception of the organic unity of a thing, as implying a prin-
ciple of structure and being different from a mere accumulation of its
parts.

28
‘Whatever scheme of classification is applied to Aristotle's
topoi, there still remain two basic types, material and formal.
Material topoi, both common and special, form the premises for
enthymemes (rhetorical syllogisms), while the formal topoi supply
the modes of reasoning or lines of argument. Since topoi were con-
sidered such an important part of rhetoric, and since rhetoric and
dialectic were counter-parts, the dialectical art must be examined

further.

Dialectical Syllogisms and Topoi

 

Aristotle's logical works, which have been grouped together
under the name of the Organon, were concerned with two major prob-
lems, the technique of proof and the principles of proof. In regard
to the first, Aristotle developed the syllogism, a method of build-
ing propositions and arguments from combinations of terms. Of the

treatises in the Organon, the first, Categories, was concerned with

 

simple, uncombined terms. On Interpretation, the second treatise,

 

was concerned with pairs of terms combined in propositions and ex-

pressive of truths and falsities conceived by the mind. Prior Anal-

 

ytics then treated the subject of inference or that combination of
three terms in an argument which we call a syllogism. In the last

three treatises of the Organon (Posterior Analytics, Topics, and

 

Sophistical Refutations), Aristotle distinguished three kinds of

 

syllogisms according to their principles or premises. The conditions
relevant to the selection of true first principles, particularly of

definitions, were treated in Posterior Analytics; syllogisms based

 

on such premises were scientific and demonstrative. The conditions

relevant to the selection or rejection of principles which expressed

29

only opinions, whether generally accepted or stamped with the

authority of experts, were treated in Topics; syllogisms based on

such premises were dialectical and probable. The analysis of argu-

ments dependent on opinions which seemed to be generally accepted

but were not (or which consisted not in reasoning, but in apparent

reasoning from generally accepted opinions or from opinions appar-

ently accepted) was taken up in Sophistical Refutations.

 

The enthymeme or rhetorical syllogism was analyzed in Rhetoric.

Enthymemes were similar to dialectical syllogisms in that they sought

to establish belief, dealt with opinions, and employed topoi in the

construction of arguments. To understand better the relation of the

enthymeme to the dialectical and other syllogisms, the similarities

and differences among all four kinds of syllogism are shown in the

following analysis.

Aristotle's Four Kinds of Syllogism

 

Apodeictic Syllogism

 

Along with complete enumeration
(induction), leads to scientific
demonstration

Deals with certainties

Premises based on first principles

Emphys axioms as the foundation
of sEientific demonstration

Contentious Syllogism

 

Leads to erroneous conclusions

Deals with probabilities

Premises based on opinions
not generally accepted

Dialectical Syllogism

 

Along with admissions by res-
pondents or group consensus,
leads to establishment of belief

Deals with probabilities

Premises based on opinion, either
generally accepted or expert

Employs topoi (general principles
of probability) which yield middle

terms

Rhetorical Syllogism

 

Along with examples (induction),
leads to establishment of belief

Deals with probabilities

Premises based on probabilities
and signs (fallible or firfifillible)

30

 

 

Contentious Syllogism Rhetorical Syllogism
Employs topoi which do not Employs topoi, material or
yield proper middle terms formal. Material topoi supply

premises; formal topoi supply
modes of argument
The dialectical syllogism is employed in conventional disputa-
tion, just as the enthymeme is the mainstay of persuasion. The
premises of disputants are drawn from.£opol, or general principles
of probability. The dialectician's Eopol are universal propositions

latent in certain "seats" or "places,"

2

and based on generally ac-
cepted opinions. 7 (Spurious or contentious reasoning, on the other
hand, starts from untrue or unaccepted opinions [Topica 100b 24-25].)T

In the Topica, Aristotle does not present a list of Eopol dis-
cussed in any great detail. Rather, he briefly discusses a very large
number of them.28 These include such topoi as name, genus, species,
definition, time, similarities, contraries, and the like.29

While it appears that nearly every general statement or common

30

principle found in Topica might be called a topos, several con-

clusions can be drawn regarding the relation of the topoi to the

 

27Topica, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, The WOrks of Aristotle,
I 100a 30-31.

3

 

28Estimates of the number of topoi listed in Topica vary. Walter
J. Ong, S.J., in Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958), p. 122, estimates the number of
dialectical places at three hundred sixty. McBurney says (p. 54)
there are nearly two hundred dialectical topoi.

 

29The list of topoi is found in chapters two through seven
(185aff.). The topoi there listed re-appear, in part, in Aristotle's
Rhetoric (1397a 7-1400b 25). The grouping of topoi offered above is
that of the writer, and is intended only to suggest some kinds of
topoi Aristotle discussed.

30Octavius Freire Owen, The Organon, or Logical Treatises of
Aristotle (London: George Bell and Sons, 1878), II, p. 358. Also
see Cicero De Inventione, trans- H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1949), ii. 4.

 

 

31
dialectical syllogism. It is clear that (l) Eopol may be considered
as general principles of probability, standing in the same relation
to the dialectical syllogism as axioms to the apodeictic syllogism;
(2) dialectical Eopol are places where one seeks middle terms;
(3) Aristotle's Eopol are always propositions; (4) dialectic, the
art of probable reasoning, is based on a knowledge of Eopol; and
(5) dialectic is principally involved in the explanation and delivery
of Eopol (hence the treatise on dialectics takes its title from its

principal part).31

The Enthymeme and Topoi32

 

At the very beginning of the Rhetoric, Aristotle accuses the
writers of handbooks of neglecting the enthymeme, the very substance
of persuasion. Rather, he alleges, they concern themselves with non-
essentials (1354a 14-15), occupy themselves with the question of how
to put a judge into the proper frame of mind (1354b 19-22), and say
nothing about deliberative oratory (1354b 26-28). After those prelim-
inary remarks, Aristotle then treats the enthymeme in the following
manner: (1) he introduces the reader to the enthymeme, offering impor-
tant preliminary definitions and classifications; (2) he discusses
the £opol_from.which enthymemes are drawn, explaining that logical,

pathetical, and ethical appeals are projected through enthymemes; and

 

310wen, ibid., pp. 358-59.

321n this section of the chapter, the writer is particularly
indebted to the fine scholarship of James H. MoBurney. His work
(summarized in the article, "Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical
Theory," Speech Monographs, III(1936), pp. 49-74) provides both
accurate generalizations and painstaking detail, which the present
writer follows in this analysis of Aristotle's topoi.

 

32
(3) he analyses the enthymemes in their several forms.

Aristotle begins by calling persuasion a form of demonstration,
"since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have
been demonstrated" (1355a 5-7). The orator's demonstration is the
enthymeme, which, in general, is the most effective of the modes of
persuasion (1355a 7-8). Then, before introducing the reader to the
types of proof, he notes that "the Enthymeme is a sort of syllogism,
and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction,
is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of
one of its branches" (1355a 8-10). Thus, he who can see how and from
what elements a syllogism is produced will also be best skilled in
the Enthymeme, when he has further learned what its subject matter is
and in what respects it differs from the syllogisms of strict logic
(1355a 10.14).33

Next, the two types of proof, artistic and inartistic, are dis-

cussed (1355b 36ff.).34 Inartistic proofs (laws, witnesses, written

 

33McBurney aptly notes that "the passages in which Aristotle
discusses the relation of the enthymeme to the topoi or topics are
especially helpful in clarifying the relations between dialectical
and rhetorical reasoning on the one hand and scientific demonstration
on the other" (p. 59).

34Concerning the relation of Aristotle's artistic and inartistic
proofs, a brief discussion in Wilbur Samuel Howell's Logic and Rhetoric
in England, 1500-1700 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961), p. 68, is
here worth citing. Howell declares:

 

 

Invention, as the process of discovering valid or seemingly valid
arguments to render one's case plausible, sounds at first like

an invitation to master the appearances rather than the realities

of tight and honest proof. Actually, however, it was an invita-

tion to speaker or writer to find the best of available materials,
wherever they might be. Some of these available materials would

be documentary evidence, eyewitness testimony, confessions, and

the like. Perhaps on occasion such proofs as these would be suf-
ficient. The art of rhetoric, according to the ancient idea, did

not extend to the discovery or use of such proofs as these, which
were called non-artistic, in the sense that they were there to

start with, and had only to be used, not discovered by a theoretical
process. Rhetorical invention was concerned rather with the theoret-
ical process by which proofs not there to start with could be dis-
covered or uncovered. These proofs were called artistic, not because

33

contracts, oaths, and evidence obtained under torture) do not strictly
belong to rhetoric, since they were there to start with, and had only
to be used, not discovered by any theoretical process.35 Artistic
proofs, on the other hand, are those proofs which can be discovered
or uncovered by a theoretical means that is always available for that
use.36 These include: (1) proof or apparent proof provided in the
speech itself; (2) the personal impression brought about through the
speaker's character; and (3) the speaker's appeals to the emotions
of his hearers. Artistic proofs are based on either examples (rhet-
orical induction) or enthymemes (rhetorical syllogisms). Both concern
the conduct of classes of men, who concern themselves with subjects
which offer in the main alternate possibilities in the sphere of human
action. Examples and enthymemes have to be adapted to audiences of
untrained thinkers, unable to follow a long line of reasoning (1356b-
1357a 15).

The premises from.which enthymemes are formed are (1) probabilities,

(2) examples, and (3) signs (fallible or infallible). Probabilities

 

they were considered more ingenious if less convincing than the
others, but simply because they were regarded as being subject
to discovery by a theoretical means that was always available
for that use.

35Mchurney suggests that the non-artistic proofs discussed by
Aristotle are "roughly comparable to what contemporary writers in
argumentation call 'evidence.'" (p. 55) Howell believes that "our
modern distinction between direct and indirect evidence is parallel
to the ancient distinction between non-artistic and artistic proofs."
(Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p. 69.)

36Howell notes that Aristotle's distinction was later accepted
by Cicero and Quintilian as an important dividing line, "on one side
of which lay relatively unpredictable materials, varying greatly in
weight and number from case to case, while on the other side lay the
relatively predictable materials that tended to be of constant applica-
tion to all sorts of cases, and that could usually be brought to light
by systematic analysis." (Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700,
pp. 68-69.) Also see Cicero De Inventione ii. 14; De Oratore ii. 116-
117; and Quintilian Institutio Oratoria v. 1. l.

 

 

 

34
concern what as a rule is or is thought to be true; fallible signs
are subject to refutation; and infallible signs are irrefutable
(1357a-1357b 20). Probabilities and signs are based on all the pos-
sible facts obtainable by the speaker. lopol in turn furnish both the
materials and forms of arguments used in discourse. The relation of
these Eopoi to the othereflements of logical proof (discussed above)

is shown in the following analysis.

 

 

Rhetoric
Non-artistic Proofs Artistic Proofs
Witnesses \\\\$E
Admissions under torture Enthyoeme xample
Oaths (Rhetorical (Induction)
Written contracts Syllo ism)
Laws Historical

Invented

Signs Examples Probabilities

‘\\\\ I ’,/’

 

 

 

To oi
Material Topoi Formal Topoi
Special Topoi \\C;mmon Topoi Lines Jf Argument

 

 

 

Special topoi, growing General principles of Methods of reasoning
out of the analysis of probability, applic- which a speaker employs
subject matter and the able to all subjects in constructing enthy-
situation memes

Drawn mainly from areas Drawn from no parti- Independent of particular
of ethics and politics cular subjects, but content or subject matter
from general observa-

tions
Provides premises for Provides materials of Provides form the argu-
enthymemes which proofs are made. ment takes

Common to all oratory

Innumerable Four kinds Twenty eight valid;
nine sham

35

The material of enthymemes, then, comes from Eopol, both
special and common. Special Eopol come from the special sciences such
as physics and politics, and are not by nature rhetorical (1358a).
Beginning with 1,4 of Rhetoric, Aristotle presents an extensive col-
lection of such Eopol, according to the kind of oratory (delibera-
tive, epideictic, or forensic) to which each is most appropriate
(1359a 30-1375a 20).37 Common Eopol, on the other hand, apply to
all subjects alike and include such Eopol_as "more and less." These
are introduced in Book I (1358a 10ff.). Both kinds of material popol,

special and common, are enumerated in the following analysis.

Aristotle's Material Topoi

 

Special Common
(Rhetoric 1. 4-14) (Rhetoric ii. 18-19)
Relative to a particular species or Applicable to all sub-
class of things. As numerous as the jects and kinds of
subjects men discuss. oratory.

1. Possible and Impos-
sible

2. Past Fact

3. Future Fact

4

 

. Degree
Deliberative oratory concerns topoi of Most appropriate to
"1. Ways and means deliberative oratory are
2. War and peace topoi of Possibility and
3. National defense Future Fact.
4. Imports and exports
5. Legislation

Also the knowledge of happiness, the
good, and the kinds of government.

 

Epideictic oratory concerns virtue and Most appropriate to
vice, especially justice, courage, temp- epideictic oratory is
erance, magnificence, magnanimity, liber- the topos of Degree.

ality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom.

 

37See Richard C. Hueeman's "Modern Approaches to the Aristotelian
Concept of the Special Topic," Central States Speech Journal, XV(February,
1964), pp. 21-22.

 

36

Aristotle's Material Topoi

 

Special Common
Forensic oratory concerns wrong-doing Most appropriate to
(its motives, perpetrators, and victims), forensic oratory is the
the knowledge of pleasure, and the know- topos of Past Fact.

ledge of law.

Enthymemes, according to Aristotle, are formed mostly from the
special Eopol_(l358a 26-28), not so many coming from the common topoi
because they do not give a man special knowledge in any one science.
Yet, Aristotle advises, the proper subjects of both dialectical and
rhetorical syllogisms are common.lopoi, those lines of argument that
apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics,
and many other things that have nothing to do with each other (1358a—
10-15). For the more correctly one handles a particular subject, the
further he will get from pure rhetoric or dialectic. Or, stated another
way, the better the selection one makes of propositions suitable for
special Eopol, the nearer one comes, unconsciously, to setting up a
science that is distinct from both dialectic and rhetoric (1358a 20-25).

Thus, the speaker might be successful in stating the propositions,
but his science will no longer be rhetoric, but the science to which
the propositions thus discovered belong (1358a 24-26). The proper lopol_
of rhetoric then are not peculiar to a particular field of investiga-
tion, but are rather the common Eopoi, such as justice or expediency,
which express common human relations. To deviate from them into a method
peculiar to a given subject, physics for example, is to pass from the
rhetorical method of presentation over to the scientific method of analysis.
This the speaker must do to the extent of mastering his subject matter

before he presents it.38 But he should follow scientific method only

 

38Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (New York:
Macmillan, 1924), p. 14.

 

37

insofar as he investigates and employs the special £opol_proper to
the subject. Hence, his education requires study of special Eopol,
particularly of ethics and politics. Of those he must have a working
knowledge.

Special Eopol_provide the premises of enthymemes. Premises in
the form of general propositions about the "good" (a thing which
everyone seeks to attain is good), the useful, the beautiful, the
just, the possible, and their opposites were standard equipment of
ancient orators. Even before Aristotle discussed these Eopoi, it is
highly probable that there were other rhetoricians who had also adopted
the practice of providing their students with general propositions as
to what was good, just, and desirable, and, more particularly, of enum-
erating good, just, and desirable things. This may be regarded as a
step in the same direction, and yet an important difference lay in
the fact that behind Aristotle's procedure there is a definite logical
conception of the nature of the rhetorical argument. His special lopol'
are really intended to be major premises in a rhetorical syllogism
(enthymeme).39

The four common Eopol_were useful for deliberative, epideictic,
and forensic oratory. Deliberative speakers could best employ the
lopol_of Possibility and Future Fact. A speaker employing the lopoo-
of Possibility might contend that, if one pair of opposites could exist,
so could the other. Or, it might be alleged, if a man could get well,
then he could also fall sick (1392a 10-1392b 15). If the political
orator chose to use Future Fact, he could assert that a thing will be

done if there is both the power and the wish to do it. (1393a 1-10)

 

39Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," pp. 41—42.

38
Forensic speakers found the topos of Fast Fact most useful. Speakers
calling on it could contend, for example, that, if the less likely
of two things had occurred, the more likely must have occurred also.
Or that if one thing that usually followed another had happened, then
the other thing has occurred (1392b 15-30). Finally, all types of
speakers could use the topos of Degree. Deliberative orators could
discuss the relative greatness of various goods, forensic orators
could discuss the more and less of justice, and epideictic orators
could discuss the degree of nobility. Every orator then could use the
topos of Degree (1393a 10-20).
Before turning to Aristotle's formal topoi, one other distinction
must be noted regarding the common topoi. Amplification and depreciation,
Aristotle states, are material topoi, not formal topoi. In an important
passage (1403a 17-25) he remarks:
Amplification and Depreciation are not an element of enthymeme. By
'an element' [elementary class, a primary type] I mean the same
thing as 'a line of Enthymematic argument'--a general class embrac-
ing a large number of particular kinds of Enthymemes. Amplification
and Depreciation are one kind of Enthymeme, viz., the kind used to
show that a thing is great or small; just as there are other kinds
used to show that a thing is good or bad, just or unjust, and anything
else of the sort. All these things are the subject-matter of syllogisms
and Enthymemes; none of these is the line of argument of an Enthymeme;
no more, therefore, are Amplification and Depreciation.

The common topoi, then, are general principles of probability, related

to all the types of oratory.

In contrast to the special and common topoi, the formal topoi in
Aristotle's Rhetoric are methods of reasoning rather than material pr0p-

40

ositions. The list of topoi in II, 23-24, is a random list of some

 

40W. D. Ross noted that the relation of the formal topoi to the
common topoi was "something of a puzzle, which can perhaps best be
explained by supposing the Rhetoric to represent the notes for more
than one course of lectures." Aristotle, p. 273.

39

of the more usual arguments from cause, sign, and example encountered

in speaking.41 While the material topoi provide the premises of argu-

ment,

 

these formal topoi supply the modes of reasoning; and together

they comprise the enthymeme.42 The following list should suggest the

nature and diversity of the formal topoi.

0')

10.

Aristotle's Formal Topoi

 

Line of Argument

Opposites

Inflections of the same stem
Correlative terms

More and less

Time

Opponent's utterances

turned against him

Definition

Ambiguous terms

Division

Induction

Illustration

If war is the cause of present
troubles, peace is what is needed
to put things right again.

Use of the word "just." Does not
always mean "beneficial."

If the deed is good, the doer is
justified.

A man who has done this would
certainly not hesitate to do that.

What is true or proper at one time
is true or proper at another.

Inconsistencies between speaker's
way of life and charge he brings.

State a particular aspect of a

thing under discussion to make it
correspond to something else, usually
to something about which the audience
has a settled opinion.

Use of words which have more than
one meaning to confuse opponent.

Split a statement up according to
possible ways in which it maybe
true and then rebut the divisions.

Use of two or three cases to prove
a general rule from which an infer—
ence is drawn.

 

41McBurney suggests (pp. 61—62) that Aristotle apparently intended
the list of twenty eight valid and nine sham formal topoi to be correl-
ated, at least roughly, with the causes, signs,.and examples discussed
in another connection.

42McBurney, p. 62.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

l6.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

40

Aristotle's Formal Topoi

Line of Argument

 

Existing decisions

From parts to whole

Simple consequences

Criss-cross consequences

Inward thoughts and
outward show

Arguments from similarity

Identical results:

identical antecedents

Altered choices

Attributed motives

Incentives and deterrents

Incredible occurrences

Conflicting facts

Meeting slander

Cause and effect

Course of action

Illustration

 

Appeals to authority.

What is true or untrue of the
whole must be true or untrue of
the parts. Argue from part by
part to the whole.

Education results in unpopularity
(a bad consequence) and wisdom
(a good consequence).

Each of two opposites has both
a good and bad consequence oppo-
site respectively to each other.

Men approve one thing openly,
and another in their secret thoughts.

It would be more reasonable to
spare children because of their
fathers than fathers because of
their children.

To affirm the birth of the gods
is as absurd as to say that they die.

Men do not make the same choices
on a later as on an earlier occasion.

Turning the motive of an action
to better or worse.

Conditions which make men act or
refrain from acting.

The probability of improbability.
"Too poor a story to be a lie."

Inconsistencies in the facts--
conflicting dates, acts, and state-
ments.

Reasons why facts appear in a
wrong light.

If there was no cause, the thing
did not occur.

Devise a better course than one
advocated.

 

41

Aristotle's Formal Topoi

Line of Argument Illustration
26. Actions compared Comparison of previous actions

and intended actions.
27. Previous mistakes Possible uses of mistakes.
28. Meaning of names Plays upon names.

It is difficult to determine how far each formal Eopoo extends,
several seeming to overlap or almost to coincide with one another.
Of the twenty eight formal lopol listed in II, 23, ten are based
either wholly or in part upon probability. They are lopol 4, 6, 10,
13, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 27 above. An additional problem in under-
standing these lines of argument concerns the reader's problem of
distinguishing among the more and less important of the twenty eight

43

Eopol. For example, when the Greek and Roman rhetoricians later
attempted to follow Aristotle's kind of classification, they accepted
his terminology and types only about a third of the time. Hence those
formal Eopol generally retained by such writers as Cicero and Quin—
tilian included: (1) contraries, (3) correlative terms, (4) more and
less, (7) definition, (9) division, (10) induction, (11) existing

decisions, (16) arguments from similarity, and (22) conflicting facts.44

 

43See Georgiana Paine Palmer, The71§ij of Aristotle's Rhetoric
op Exemplified in the Orators (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934),
pp. 80-84. This book exclusively concerns the formal topoi of the
Rhetoric, as exemplified in one hundred fifty of the Attic orators'
speeches.

 

 

44The following is an indication of a few representative passages
in Cicero and Quintilian where the formal topoi are treated. (Aristotle's
formal topoi are in Rhetoric 1397a 7ff.)

Aristotle Cicero Quintilian
(1) contraries De Inv. 1.30 v.10.73
(3) correlative terms De Inv. 1.30 v.10.75-79

(4) more and less Topica 4_23 v,10.87f.

42
One cannot but wonder if Cicero and Quintilian (when one considers
their strong knowledge and understanding of oratory, together with
their respect for Aristotle) would not have kept more closely to
this classification had it more closely corresponded to oratorical
usage.

Nevertheless, some of Aristotle's twenty eight formal Eopol
were used extensively by the Attic orators. For instance, Palmer
found, in her study, hundreds of examples for the fourth Eopoo, the
more and less.‘+5 Over one hundred illustrations were found for (11)
existing decisions, (13) simple consequences, (20) incentives and

46 and (22) conflicting facts. Thirty or more cases were

deterrents,
noted for (7) definition, (9) division, (10) induction, and (19)
attributed motives. Ten to thirty cases were found for (l) opposites,

(6) opponent's utterances turned against him, (14) criss-cross con-

sequences, (16) arguments from similarity, (18) altered choices,

 

Aristotle Cicero Quintilian
(7) definition De Orat. 11.164 v.10.74
(9) division De Orat. 11.165 v.10.66
(10) induction De Orat. 11.40 v.10.73
(ll) existing decisions _De Inv. 1.30 v.11.36—44
(l6) arguments from
similarity Topica 3.15 v.11.34
(22) conflicting facts Topica 13.55 v.10.2

Of these topoi the seventh, definition, was one of the clearest 1n

the Rhetoric. The first six books of Aristotle's Topica were devoted

to it, but from a very different point of View than that of the Rhet-
oric. The ninth topos, division, was treated by Cicero as partitio

and by Quintilian as divisio. The eleventh topos, existing decisions,

was treated by Aristotle as particularly appropriate to deliberative
speaking, while Cicero and Quintilian related it more to forensic oratory.
Cicero and Quintilian often differed from Aristotle in their interpre-
tations of the formal places.

 

45See Palmer, p. 80, for an excellent summary of the employment
of Aristotle's formal topoi by the Attic orators.

W

 

 

43
(23) meeting slander, (24) cause and effect, (25) course of action,
and (27) previous mistakes. The other Eopol_were rarely used, with
no examples found for (2) inflections of the same stem, (8) ambiguous
terms, and (28) meaning of names. The latter had negligible value,
except for dialectic."7
Aristotle also offers (1401a-1402a 27) a list of nine formal

topoi of sham enthymemes, including: diction, combination and separ-

ation, indignation, sign, accident, post hoc ergo propter hoc, con-

 

sequences, time and manner, and substitution of absolutes for partic-

ulars. These all are used in enthymemes that appear genuine, but are

not. Fallacies of diction occur when a speaker attempts to pass a 1
compact and antithetical sentence for an enthymeme, or misuses homo- 1
nyms. Fallacies of combination and separation involve a false identity

between a whole and the combination of its parts. Indignation is em-

ployed when the speaker, without having proved his case, elaborates

on the nature of a deed.48 Fallacies of sign concern the attempt to

 

46This topos, concerning the establishment of motive, was the
core of any deliberative speech and also played an important role
in judicial oratory. Palmer, p. 61.

47Palmer, p. 82. Aristotle's inclusion of such topoi suggests
two conclusions. First, his list of topoi was random. Second, he did
not study oratory too extensively.

48This topos is especially interesting because of the different
interpretations given it later by the author of the ad Herennium and
the younger Cicero. Aristotle especially related it to forensic ora-
tory as did the later writers. Aristotle held that through amplific—
ation the defense could produce the impression that the accused was
innocent. If the prosecutor went into a passion, he could give the
impression that the accused was guilty. The listener would falsely
infer guilt or innocence, without benefit of the facts. This practice
Aristotle condemned. The author of ad Herennium, however, favorably
discussed nine places of pity (11.31). The younger Cicero approvingly
discussed sixteen places of pity (De Inv. 1.55-56). Both considered
such topics valuable for the defense of accused parties.

 

 

   

44

prove something through the presentation of just one case. lopol
from the accidental are treated as though they were essential.
Argument from consequence is essentially an error of omission.
Post hoc ergo propter hoc involves taking what happened before or
along with a thing as the cause of it. Omitting any reference to
time and manner is a fallacy. Finally, substituting the absolute
for what was not absolute but particular is a fallacy. These lopol

49

of sham enthymemes somewhat resembled the Sophistical fallacies

discussed by Aristotle in De Sophisticis Elenchis, just as the twenty

 

eight valid topoi bore slight resemblance to those in Aristotle's

Topica.

The Relation of Topoi to Other Modes of Proof

 

It has been established that the lopol discussed by Aristotle
were the sources to which speakers could turn for both materials
and forms of enthymemes. It is now important to determine what re-
lation, if any, existed between enthymemes and the ethical and pathet-
ical modes of proof.50

To begin, it must be recognized that the enthymeme was a rhet-
orical tool, dependent upon language symbols (terms and propositions
in significant combinations). Persuasion arising from the personality

of the speaker and other factors51 (except as it found its expression

 

49Clearly discussed in Cooper's Rhetoric of Aristotle, pp. 172-77.

 

50The writer here is again indebted to James McBurney's work on
the enthymeme, in particular his section entitled, "The Enthymeme and
Ethos and Pathos," pp. 62-65. Because the writer follows McBurney
closely in this section, footnote references will be held to a minimum.

51For example, such matters outside of the speech composition
as the speaker's previous reputation, advance notices of his speech,
an introduction of the speaker, or the delivery of the speech.

 

 

 

45
in terms and propositions) would be, therefore, clearly outside the
realm of the enthymeme. But personality appeal and attempts to in-
fluence the emotional state of the audience which could be expressed
in words and sentences (for example, a speaker's direct statement
about himself or others) would seem to fall within the realm of the
enthymeme.

An analysis of Aristotle's treatment of the enthymeme suggests
that the enthymeme was the unit or element of oll_persuasive dis-
course--1og1ca1, ethical, and pathetical. The admission of "emotionally
loaded" terms and propositions was in fact one of the important char-
acteristics of the enthymeme; the premises which comprised the enthy-
meme were usually little more than the beliefs of the audience which
were used as causes and signs to secure the acceptance of other prop-
ositions.52 These premises, as has been shown, were drawn from the
special and common.£opol. It is organized around lists of these Eopol_
that Aristotle offers his discussion of ethics and politics, virtues,
vices, and emotions. In other words, Aristotle presents what he has
to say about both ethical and pathetical persuasion in the form of
topoi, and we are explicitly told (1356a, 1366a, 1388b) that these
lopol_are the sources to which the speaker can turn for the proposi-
tions to compose enthymemes.

The order of treatment or sequence of the Rhetoric sustains
the position here taken on the enthymeme in relation to olooo and
pathos. Aristotle begins the Rhetoric by proclaiming the enthymeme

to be the body and substance of all persuasion. In 1,2 he distin-

 

5chBurney, p. 63.

 

 

46
guishes among the three forms of artistic persuasion and explains
the enthymeme in terms of causes and signs. He concludes the same
chapter by explaining the lopol as the places to which one turns
for the premises of enthymemes. Then in 1,3 he distinguishes the
three great divisions of oratory, deliberative, forensic, and epi-
deictic, and states that he will organize his discussion of Eopol
around that division of the kinds of oratory. From 1,4 to 1,9 Aris-
totle gives the reader some practical politics designed to help the
deliberative orator in the selection of enthymemes. In 1,9 he offers
a discussion of virtues and vices designed to help the epideictic
orator. In 1,10 he turns to the Eopol of forensic oratory. The dis-
cussion continues until 1,15 where he closes the first book with a
consideration of non-artistic proofs.

Aristotle begins Book 11 by pointing out the importance of ethi-
cal and pathetical persuasion in the three types of oratory and from
11,1 to 11,19 offers some practical psychology concerning human motives
and emotions. It is with this that Aristotle concludes his discussion
of special popoi begun in 1,4. Having concluded his treatment of special
lopol, he devotes 11,19 to common Eopol. (It will be remembered that
the distinction between common and special £opol_in relation to the
enthymeme was made in 1,3.)

Upon concluding his discussion of the common and special £opol_
from which the premises of enthymemes must be drawn, Aristotle then
in 11,20 takes up the study of the enthymeme in its various forms,
and concludes Book 11 in Chapter 26 with this material. Book 111,

of course, is devoted to style and delivery.

Viewed in the above manner, the organization of the Rhetoric

seems entirely logical and understandable. Aristotle first introduced

 

 

 

47

the enthymeme as an element of rhetorical persuasion and gave some
preliminary definitions and classifications; next, he discussed the
Eopol from which enthymemes were to be drawn, explaining that ethical,
pathetical, and logical persuasion will be projected through those
enthymemes (depending upon one's choice of propositions); and finally
he carefully analyzed the enthymeme in its several forms. Books 1

and 11 treated inventio and Book 111 mainly considered elocutio, to

a lesser extent dispositio and pronuntiatio, with little or no mention

 

being made of memoria. The enthymeme, then, was the rhetorical instru-
ment through which logical, pathetical, and ethical proofs were pro—
jected. And the enthymeme was based on the common, special, and formal
In the last chapter of the Rhetoric (111,19), Aristotle discusses
the conclusion of a speech, pointing out the uses of (previously dis-
cussed) lopol for stirring the emotions of the audience and creating
a good ethical impression. For one thing, the speaker should create
a favorable last impression on the audience by representing himself
and his opponent in favorable and unfavorable lights respectively.
To accomplish this, the speaker is advised to employ certain lopol,
previously discussed in 1,9. Since olooo is manifested through inven—
tion(as well as style, arrangement, and delivery) of a speech,53
these Eopol are of great importance to the speaker. Also in 111,19,
Aristotle states that a speaker should appeal to the emotions of his

audience by employing topoi, previously discussed in 11,1-ll. Now the

 

function of pathos, generally like that of ethos, is to create an

 

53William M. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric,"

Speech Monographs, XIV(1947), p. 58.

 

 

48
attitude in the audience directly through the material, form, and

manner of the speech.54

But Aristotle distinguishes between the

Eopol peculiar to deliberative, epideictic, and forensic argument,

and those lopol peculiar to pathos. He separates and distinguishes

between the emotions and the lopol which give rise to them, and the

Eopol used, for example, in a deliberative speech to prove the good-

ness or expediency of some proposed end.55 Happiness and pleasure

are treated in Book 1 as a part of the development of deliberative

and forensic speaking. They are treated independently of the emotions

analyzed in Book 11. While nowhere in the Rhetoric does Aristotle

expressly show a relationship between (1) the Eopol of happiness and

deliberative speaking, (2) lopol of the pleasant and forensic speak—

ing, and (3) lopol of the emotions and all the types of oratory, there

does appear to be an implicit connection.56
Since the enthymeme is the instrument through which logical,

ethical, and emotional appeals are made, and since Eopol provide the

premises and modes of reasoning of the enthymeme, it is clear that

topoi are closely related to both ethos and pathos.

Summary of Aristotle's Conception of Topoi

 

Aristotle views topoi as pigeonholes from which dialectical and

rhetorical syllogisms draw their premises and forms. In the Rhetoric

 

54Irving J. Lee, "Some Conceptions of Emotional Appeal in Rhet-
orical Theory," Speech Monographs, VI(1939), p. 73. Also see Aris-
totle Rhetoric 1377b.

55Lee, p. 76. 56Lee, p. 77.

 

 

 

49

he presents two kinds of lopol, material and formal. Material lopol
are either special or common. Special Eopol provide premises for
enthymemes used in all three kinds of oratory. The four common lopol~
are not related to particular subject areas, but are useful for all
types of speaking. Formal Eopol, including twenty eight valid and
nine sham, provide the modes of reasoning a speaker might take.

Rhetoric, the counter-part of dialectic and offshoot of ethics
and politics, is concerned with the discovery of all the available
means of persuasion in any given case. The foundation of the art is
the enthymeme or rhetorical syllogism. Through the enthymeme are pro-
jected the logical, ethical, and emotional appeals of the speaker. ,
These appeals are drawn from the speaker's knowledge of lopol, special,
common, and formal. In a very special sense, then, Aristotle's Eopol

are intimately connected with the entire persuasive process.

 

 

CHAPTER III

CONCEPTIONS OF PLACES IN THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD

Introductory Considerations

 

During the two hundred fifty year period between the death
of Aristotle and the first rhetorical efforts of the younger Cicero,l
rhetoric fell into the hands of the schoolmasters. Rhetorical theory
was taught from dry textbooks abounding in technical terms. Hellenis-
tic rhetoricians were usually men of small intellectual calibre,
professionals who disputed among themselves on minor matters of classif-
ication and concerned themselves little with the broader aspects of
the art.2 Aristotle's great effort at synthesis (Rhetoric) did not
standardize the way rhetoric was taught.3 Rather, with each generation,
teaching grew more and more complicated; and dominating that teaching
was a system of rigid conventions which, once recognized and assimil—

ated, allowed the orator complete freedom within the system. Far from

 

lFor purpose of clarity in this and the following chapter, Cicero
will be treated in terms of (1) his youthful rhetorical work, De Inven-
tione (ca. 86 B. C.), and (2) his more mature works. Cicero (106—43 B. C.)
wrote De Inventione as a young man and in that work reflected the Hellen-
istic conception of rhetoric. This work will be examined in the present
chapter. Cicero's six other rhetorical works were written some thirty
to forty years later, after he had gained considerable political and
rhetorical experience. These works (De Oratore, Partitione Oratoria,
Brutus, De Optimo Genre Oratorum, Orator, and Topica) contain a differ-
ent point of view about rhetoric, and will be discussed in Chapter IV.

 

 

 

ZClarke, p. 7. 3Marrou, p. 197.

50

 

 

 

51
hindering originality or talent, the restrictions enabled very
subtle, polished effects to be produced.4 Although no manuals deal-
ing with this system survive, it is apparent from later works em-
bodying similar tenents that the system was a continuation of Sophis-
tic teachings, adapted for school purposes and modified in the light
5

of current literary tendencies.

The ars rhetorica of the Hellenistic period divided the materials

 

of rhetoric according to (1) the types of oratory, (2) the functions
of the orator, and (3) the parts of a speech. The types of oratory

were still deliberative, epideictic, and forensic. However, forensic
oratory was given most attention by the rhetoricians; and epideictic
6

oratory was scarcely recognized as having an independent existence.

The functions of the orator were (1) inventio, (2) dispositio,

 

(3) elocutio, (4) memoria and (5) actio or pronuntiatio. The parts

3

 

of a speech usually included (1) exordium (introduction), (2) narratio
(statement of facts), (3) divisio or partitio (point of issue or what

is to be proved), (4) confirmatio (exposition of arguments), (5) con-

 

futatio (refutation), and (6) conclusio (conclusion).7 The main out-

lines of the ars rhetorica remained much the same over the centuries;

 

even some of the details remained unchanged.
One very important rhetorician of the Hellenistic period was

Hermagoras of Temnos, whose teachings were representative of the

 

4Marrou, p. 204.

5J. W. H. Atkins, "Greek Rhetoric," Oxford Classical Dictionary,
ed. M. Cary et a1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 767.

 

6Clarke, p. 24. The decline of the polis was largely responsible
for the demise of great deliberative oratory. See Marrou, p. 195.

7Cicero De Inv. 1.19; ad Her. i.4. There could, however, be as
many as four or five or even seven parts of a speech.

 

 

52
second century B. C. and were subsequently to be the young Cicero's
guide in matters of rhetoric.8 Maintaining that all non-technical
problems fall within the scope of invention, both particular (hypo-
theses) and general (theses) problems, he prescribed four questions
(staseis) which he held to be adequate for the solution of all such
problems, thus establishing a system (status) which was to be dis-
cussed throughout later antiquity.9 Because his work found great
favor with the schools and influenced such rhetoricians as the

young Cicero and the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium, 10 it is

 

especially unfortunate that the work is lost and must be reconstructed
. . 11
from references in other treatises.
However, two other treatises do offer a notion of rhetorical

developments in the Hellenistic period--the Rhetorica ad Herennium

 

Q
and Cicero's De Inventione. Ad Herennium was probably written between

12

 

86-82 B. C. by an unknown author, who probably had Marian sympa-

thies, as the character of the treatise itself suggests. Sympathy for

13

the populares is evident, and the author's confident tone and

 

8Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity, II, p. 15.

 

9Atkins, Oxford Classical Dictionary, p. 767.
10

 

Clarke, p. 7.

11George Thiele has attempted a reconstruction of Hermagoras'
treatise. See Hermagoras: ein Beitragggur Geschichte der Rhetorik
(Strassburg: Trflbner, 1893). Ray Nadeau states that Thiele recon-
structed Hermagoras' work through sixty quotations from secondary
sources. See "Some Aristotelian and Stoic Influences on the Theory
of Stases,” Speech Monographs, XXVI(l959), p. 248.

 

12Harry Caplan (trans.), Rhetorica ad Herennium (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954), p. xxvi.

 

13See, for example, iv.3l, 68.

 

 

53

simplicity (in preference to scholastic subtlety) suggest a reaction
to the charges of impudence and lack of culture brought by Crassus
(92 B. C.) against the Latin rhetoricians.14 The treatise is a syn-
thesis of various teachings, including: pre-Aristotelian (Isocratean
and "Anaximenean"); Aristotelian and Peripatetic; Stoic; Hermagorean
(especially regarding status); and possibly Epicurean.15 Of the
three types of oratory, forensic oratory claims most attention;16
of the five rhetorical canons, invention and style receive considerable

treatment.

Cicero's De Inventione is another Hellenistic treatise which

 

deserves some attention. The work's composition cannot belong to a

period much later than 91 B. C. when the young Cicero was about

3

to wear the toga virilis.17 Much of the treatise reads like a law

 

book, since most emphasis (as in the ad Herennium) is on forensic

 

oratory. Despite his youth and inexperience, Cicero appears to have
grasped the complicated and elaborate terminology of Hellenistic
18

rhetoric.

While there is frequent agreement between the ad Herennium and

 

De Inventione (some precepts were set forth in virtually the same

 

 

14Clarke, p. 14. 15Caplan, Rhet. ad Her., p. xv.

 

16Caplan, Rhet. ad Her., p. xviii. Of the four books in ad
Herennium, two dealt with invention in forensic oratory. Invention
in deliberative and epideictic oratory received brief mention in
the third book.

 

17H. M. Hubbell, De Inventione (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1949), p. viii. Cicero in 91 B. C. was fifteen years
old and about to don the toga symbolic of manhood. It is likely
that, having heard school lectures on rhetoric, he wrote his treatise
from lecture notes and published his work then or, at best, no later

 

than 86 B. C. The treatise contains no references to events later

than 91 B. C. The youthful quality of the work prompted Torsten Peter-
sson to deem it "a treatise on Invention, a division of rhetoric, and

as impersonal as a graduate student's thesis, which, indeed, it very
much resembles." Cicero: a Biography (New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1963),
p. 11.

 

 

 

 

 

54

language, and even some of the illustrations are identical), there

are also some significant differences. Harry Caplan, translator of

the ad Herennium, has noted that the two authors differ in their
methods of presenting material, in organization, and in the spirit

of the works. Caplan believed that Cicero's quotations are more
accurate, his treatment of the three kinds of oratory is more complete,
and his examination of the doctrine of proof, types of issues, and
sources of law is different.19 Of the two works, the ad Herennium

is a relatively simple guide representing the traditional rhetoric

of the schools, and hence will receive first attention in this study.

Rhetorica ad Herennium

 

The author of the treatise notes the three kinds of oratory
and the five canons of rhetoric, and then treats invention in terms
of the six parts of a speech in a judicial setting (i.2—3). The 122;
or places in which arguments could be discovered for making an aud-
ience well disposed are found in the speaker's character, in that
of his opponent, in that of the audience, and in the actual facts of
the case (i.8; cf. De Inv. i.22). Precepts are also offered on how
a speaker can handle the two kinds of introduction, principium and
insinuatio.20 After discussing the statement of facts and the division,

the author turns to the most important part of a speech, the proof or

 

18Clarke, p. 13. That terminology appears to have been in the
main already familiar when Cicero wrote his treatise.

19See Caplan, Rhet. ad Her

., pp. xxvi-xxvii.

20ad Her. i.6-8; also see De Inv. i.22—23; Part. Orat. 28-30;
Quintilian Inst. Orat. iv.l.5f. The principium is direct and to the
point. Insinuatio is an indirect approach useful when the speaker is
in an unfavorable position. Clarke, p. 25.

 

 

55
argument. Before a speaker can present his proofs, he has to deter-
mine the status of the question.21 If the main question concerns
status conjecturalis (whether an action took place or not), six
basic arguments involving a variety of 1221 can be employed. The
following analysis shows the different approaches available to the

pleader (ii. 2-8).

Arguments for Status Conjecturalis

1. Probability of defepdant's guilt22
a. Motive
(l) Benefit from crime (money, honor, power)
(2) Satisfaction of some passion
(3) Desire to avoid some disadvantage
b. Manner of life

2. Comparison (no one less likely to be guilty)

3. Signs pointipg to guilt
a. Place
b. Point of time
c. Duration of time
d. Occasion
e. Hope of success
f. Hope of escaping detection

 

4. Presumptive proof (guilt demonstrated by means of indications
that increase certainty and strengthen suspicion)
a. Preceding the crime
b. Contemporaneous with the crime
c. Following the crime

5. Subsequent behavior (signs attending guilt or innocence)

 

21Status is the doctrine especially associated with Hermagoras.
It is defined as ”the first conflict of the pleas arising from the
answer to an accusation." (Clarke, p. 26) In ad Her. the term consti—
tutio is used, although status is the preferred term in other treatises.
The four staseis used by Hermagoras are (l) fact, (2) definition,
(3) quality, and (4) objection. A pleader seeks to determine whether
an act occurred, what it was, and its quality. In addition, he can
challenge the right of an opponent to speak or the right of the court
to decide the case. Each of the four staseis is discussed in consid-
erable detail by Hermagoras, and many subdivisions are made. The status
doctrine is important because it enables disputants to determine the
question at stake. Through elimination of each stasis a defendant can
show that the case lacks status and hence should not come to trial.
See Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece, pp. 306-314. Also see Howell,
Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne, pp. 35-38. Howell maintains that
the ad Herennium and De Inventione are analogous regarding the status
doctrine.

 

 

 

56

6. Confirmatory Proof (employed when suspicion has been estab-
lished)
a. Special topics (those only prosecutor or only defense
can use)
(1) Defendant can seek pity and accuse prosecutor of slander
(2) Prosecutor can charge that wicked men ought not be pitied
b. Common topics (used by both prosecution and defense)
(1) For and against witnesses
(2) For and against testimony given under torture
(3) For and against presumptive proof
(4) For and against rumors

The common topics included in (6) above are in the tradition of
the non-artistic proofs mentioned by Aristotle, being the non—technical
means of persuasion not inherent in the art or supplied by the speaker's
own efforts. Aristotle lists (Rhetoric 1355b, 1375a) five: laws, oaths,
witnesses, contracts, and evidence given under torture. The author of

Rhetorica ad Alexandrum considers (1428a, 1431b) the supplementary

 

proofs as: the speaker's own opinion, witnesses, admissions under
torture, and oaths. Thus, the author of ad Herennium is discussing a
type of proof which long antedated argumentation in the law courts.
(When the art of argumentation was in its infancy, the theorists'
first function probably was to interpret those l'already existing"
proofs.23)

Turning to deliberative and epideictic oratory, the author con-

siders the following as loci of deliberative speaking (iii. 2—4).24

 

22Similar to Aristotle's topos of inducements and deterrents,
Rhetoric 1399b 30ff.

23Caplan, Rhet. ad Her., note b, pp. 74-75.
24For deliberative oratory, the speaker is advised to build his

speech on the same loci as in forensic speeches and to use the same
methods of argumentation.

 

 

 

57

Advantage
Security Honor
Might Craft‘ The Right The Praiseworthy,
in the opinion of
a. Armies a. Money a. Wisdom a. The proper author-
b. Fleets b. Promises b. Justice ities
c. Arms c. Dissimulation c. Courage b. Our allies
d. Engines d. Accelerated d. Temperance c. All our fellow
of war speed citizens
e. Manpower e. Deception d. Our descendants

The loci of epideictic oratory (iii. 6) are:

External Circumstances Physical Attributes Qualities of Character

 

. Descent a. Agility a. Wisdom
. Education b. Strength b. Justice
. Wealth c. Beauty c. Courage
d. Health d. Temperance

. Titles to fame
. Citizenship

a
b
c
d. Kinds of power
e
f
g. Friendships

Concerning epideictic oratory, the author gives the lggi of
praise and blame full treatment. Beginning with the simple externals
(family background and education), the orator can proceed to discuss
bodily characteristics and then return to the externals and virtues
displayed in connection with them (iii. 15).

The author believes that the conclusion of a speech should involve
recapitulation, amplification, and appeals to pity.25 Of these, ampli-
fication, "the principle of using Commonplaces to stir the hearers"
(ii. 30), especially is emphasized. Such commonplaces can be drawn

from the following formulae (ii. 30; cf. Cicero De Inv. i. 53—54).

 

25Clarke, p. 31. According to Quintilian (v1.1), most Athenians
believed the conclusion should be confined to recapitulation. There
is no evidence to suggest that Roman orators did, however.

58

1. Authority

2. Those affected by the acts on which the charge rests

3. Results if the same indulgences should be granted to all
culprits

4. Encouragement of others to commit crime if the accused is
forgiven

5. Failure to correct the jurors' error or remedy the harm if
a contrary judgment is rendered

6. Lack of excuse for premeditated acts

7. Foulness, cruelty, and tyranny of the crime

8. Uniqueness and baseness of the crime

9. Comparison of wrongs

0. Examination of the actual execution of the deed and all
attendant circumstances

Also nine commonplaces of pity are listed (ii. 31; cf. De Inv.

1. 55—56).26
1. Vicissitudes of fortune
2. Comparison of former prosperity with present adversity
3. Enumeration and explanation of results if case is lost
4. Entreaty of those whose pity is sought
5. Results on kinsmen through the disgrace
6. Kindness, sympathy, and humanity shown to others
7. Depiction of long history of adverse circumstances
8. Deploring of fate and bad fortune
9. Demonstration of a brave heart in the face of adversities

The importance of the loci communes in the ad Herennium can
perhaps be understood better by here reviewing their Greek origins
and development to the first century B. C. Commonplaces or 1222
communes were originated in a school setting and were originally
concerned with general ideas which could be amplified and used as a
"speech-within—a-speech" in order to move the emotions of an audience.
Their usual themes were moral, either praising virtue or blaming vice.
When used in the sense of an oratorical amplification, commonplaces
assumed the facts of a case to be true. Their principle purpose was

to prepare the way for the approval or disapproval of the judge,

whether he was in a court or political rostrum. As long as invention

 

26Cicero was more complete, listing sixteen loci of pity.

59

retained supremacy in rhetoric, these places continued to hold some
prestige in the art.27 The commonplaces for purposes of amplification
were first given prominence by Gorgias and Tisias (Phaedrus 267a).
Aristotle, while holding a very different conception of the places,
yet suggested (Rhetoric l374b-l375a) techniques by which judges

could be moved through application of the commonplaces.28 The author
of ad Herennium and the young Cicero gave considerable attention to
the commonplaces. Their loci communes seemed more comprehensive and
capable of a more extensive application than those of Aristotle.29
They considered the commonplaces (general ideas on justice and happi—
ness, for example) useful because they opened the way to a treatment
of fundamental themes. Roman students could be taught how to handle
great problems by discussing "theses" of general interest. Generali—
zations on well known subjects (patriotism, the wickedness of murder,
the wretchedness of exile) could, in the language of invention, be

places, since they contained thoughts or arguments.30 Hence, loci

 

27Sister Joan Marie Lechner, O.S.U., Renaissance Concepts of
the Commonplaces (New York: Pageant Press, 1962), p. 22.

28Aristotle, however, gave much greater emphasis to a thorough
search for facts and opinions. Although he recognized the uses of
amplification, he did not advise speakers to abandon their search
for sound subject matter and substitute already-developed "little
orations." Amplification, including appeals to pity, was a technique
taught by the Sophists and recognized by Aristotle; but it played a
small role in his concept of rhetoric, as compared with the greater
emphasis given by medieval and Renaissance rhetoricians.

29Cope, p. 130.

3OPetersson, p. 385.

6O

communes were found everywhere-—history, philosophy, poetry, and

oratory.

A speaker's ethical meditations often led to the development
of topics of pity for use in a speech, especially in the conclusion.
Thus, the virtues of caritas (loving reverence men feel for their
state, parents, and gods), BEBE (love for husband or wife, children,
and friends), and honestas (sense of honor) were developed by orators
to exhort an audience to retain the happiness resulting from those
virtues.31 In addition to moving the judge or audience, these common-
places and appeals to pity enabled aspiring young orators like Cicero
to display their talent for amplification, their stylistic power, and
their "philosophy."32

The commonplace concept expressed in the ad Herennium represents
a departure from Aristotle's concept of places. Whereas Aristotle had
considered 52221 as seats of argument, either material (finding facts
and opinions as a basis for inference) or formal (finding modes of
reasoning by which to interpret facts and opinions), the author of
ad Herennium presented a random list of 1221 and loci communes thought
to be serviceable to a speaker. Hence, Aristotle's distinction between
material and formal Egpgi was overlooked in the ad Herennium,33 and
the more careful conceptions of places offered by Aristotle were largely
displaced by the commonplaces in Roman and medieval rhetoric.

Perhaps partly responsible for the emphasis on loci communes in

the ad Herennium was the author's s ecial treatment of memor . Memory
____________ P y

 

31Petersson, pp. 389-90.
32Solmsen, "Cicero's First Speeches: a Rhetorical Analysis,” p. 547.

33See Brittin, p. 334.

61

was considered the "treasure-house of the ideas supplied by Inven-
tion" and the "guardian of all the parts of rhetoric" (iii. 16).
Simonides, considered the father of the "artificial memory,"34
had developed (ca. 535 B. C.) an association technique, involving
the relation between concepts and objects. Thereafter, the Greeks
had typically used a house as an image and placed within its com-
partments sets of symbols, each in its own order and place. This
technique would aid speakers in recollecting material and words
needed for their discourse (iii. 16-20; 29-34). The author of ad
Herennium maintained that improvement of the artificial memory,
along with the careful arrangement of materials, could help equip

a speaker to meet his oratorical needs.35

De Inventione36

 

Although devoting most of his attention to the commonplaces of

amplification, the young Cicero begins his discussion with a general

 

34In contrast to one's natural memory, the "artificial memory"

could be strengthened by training and discipline. ad Her. iii.l6.

35Also the author advised that arguments of greatest strength
be placed at the beginning and end of the pleading. At the conclu—
sion of the speech, the speaker should leave a very strong argument
fresh in the hearer's mind. This arrangement of materials, like
the positioning of troops for battle, could readily bring victory.
iii.lO.

36Cicero's De Inventione is here only briefly treated, owing
to the very strong resemblance it bears to the ad Herennium. The
writer has sought to avoid excessive repetition by (1) previously
citing sections of De Inventione which paralleled those in the 29
Herennium (see above, pp. 54, 57, 58), and (2) here summarizing
only the treatment of loci found in Cicero's work.

 

 

 

62

consideration of the 122; of arguments (i. 24-28). Arguments are
drawn from (1) the attributes of persons, and (2) the attributes
of things. Attributes of persons include: name, nature, manner of
life, fortune, habit, feeling, interests, purposes, achievements,
accidents, and Speeches made. Attributes of things include: con-
sideration of the act itself, performance of an act, adjuncts of
an act, and consequences of an act. Each of these is subdivided

(i. 26-28) in the following manner.37

 

 

 

 

Action itself Performance of the act
a. Means a. Place
b. Motive b. Time
c. Objective c. Occasion
d. Manner
e. Facilities
Adjuncts of the act Consequences of the act
a. Its contrary a. Chief agents and originators
b. Its negative b. Laws and customs regarding
c. Similarity the act
d. Greatness c. Nature of the act (occur fre-

quently or rarely)

Turning to indignatio (the arousing of great hatred against a

 

person or action) Cicero declares (i. 53) that all the attributes
of persons and things can give occasion to any use of amplification

that may be desired. All the loci mentioned in De Inventione are

38

 

similar to those found in the ad Herennium.

 

While Cicero does not explicitly state that a commonplace is a

 

37The following list is incomplete and is intended only to
suggest Cicero's division of the loci. All four Ciceronian categories
overlap and are not delimited with any precision. See Howell, Rhetoric
of Alcuin and Charlemagne, p. 165.

38See above, pp. 55-58.

63

little speech inserted in an oration, he does suggest that the

idea haunts him. He defines loci communes (ii. 15) as "those

 

arguments that can be transferred to many cases" and which "con-
tain an amplification of an undisputed statement . . . as well as
amplification of cases of doubtful statements." Moreover, he be-
lieves that a speech can be rendered distinguished or brilliant
through the introduction of commonplaces, especially when the aud-
ience is already convinced (ii. 15). He cautions, however, that
the commonplaces require elegance and dignity, and should be used
only by orators of long practice and with a vast store of words
and ideas (ii. 15).

De Inventione, then, is very much in agreement with the ad

 

Herennium. Written at the beginning of Cicero's oratorical career,
it represents the lecture notes of an industrious schoolboy. An
older and wiser Cicero was to consider rhetoric in a very different

light.

CHAPTER IV

CICERONIAN RHETORIC AND THE CONCEPT OF PLACES1

Introductory Considerations

 

Charles Sears Baldwin said of Cicero: "The most eminent orator
of Roman civilization, he wrote more than any other orator has ever
written on rhetoric; and historically he has been more than any other
an ideal and model."2 While discussing the efforts of the philosophers--
Aristotle and Theophrastus included--Cicero inquired whether it would
not be advantageous to consider rhetoric from the point of view of
the practising orator E29 the philosopher. Believing that an orator
should be able to set forth with full power those same topics of
virtue and equity discussed by the philosophers, Cicero interested
himself in the development of an orator so accomplished and complete
that he would be able to speak on all subjects with variety and copi-
ousness.3

As his later works show, Cicero tried to restore rhetoric to
something of its earlier scope and vitality. He protested against

the narrowing of the province of the speaking art, hoping to restore

 

lThe Cicero discussed in this chapter was the mature man of
letters, not the writer of De Inventione. See above, p. 50.

2Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 37.

 

3De Oratore, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948), i.59.

64

 

 

65

rhetoric as a "SyStEm of general culture" which would train men to

write and speak competently on all possible subjects. In this effort

he was especially influenced and guided by the doctrines of Isocrates.4
Cicero's attempts were prompted by several developments in Roman

oratory during the first century B. C. In the first place, a trend

toward artificiality in the controversiae (advanced exercises in for-

ensic oratory) had already begun in Cicero's youth. Also, a divorce

between the teachings of the schools and the practice of the courts

was evident (De Oratore ii. 99-101). At the beginning of the century

popular techniques of delivery produced an artificiality which Cicero , H

u

later called "magniloquent, sonorous, and bombastic in its effects."5 3*

The older'Atticist" rhetoric of Aristotle, Plato, and Isocrates was

pitted against the newer "Asiatic" rhetoric.6 Whereas the old oratory

had been an art, based upon theory, the new rhetoric was a knack,

founded largely on practice. "Atticism" was scientific and technical;

"Asianism" was highly empirical and devoted mostly to training in

declamation.7 Cicero's inheritance, then, was a rhetoric in an un-

settled state.

 

4Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity, II, p. 23.

5Brutus, trans. G. I. Hendrickson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1939), xcv. 325.

6The leading Atticists in Cicero's Rome were Calvus and Brutus,
who advocated an oratorical style that was plain, simple, and lucid,
with a minimum of rhetorical ornament, rhythm, and emotional appeal.
As models for imitation they set up the Athenian writers Thucydides,
Lysias, and Xenophon. They accused their opponents, who employed an
ornate style, of Asianism--that is, of having been corrupted by the
bad taste and opulence of Asiatic degeneracy. The Atticist movement
was basically an attack on Cicero, whose oratorical style was copi-
ous, rhythmical, and emotional. Cicero met the attack in two of his
essays on rhetoric, the Brutus and the Orator, See Donald Lemen Clark,
Rhetoric in Greco—Roman Education (Morningside Heights, N. Y.: Colum-
bia Univ. Press, 1957), p.-156f.

 

66

Cicero's Broad View of Rhetoric

 

In later life Cicero came to regard his youthful work, De Inven-
Eigpg, as immature and his De Oratore as something more worthy of
his age and experience (De Oratore i. 5). In it he shunned technical
terms and hurried over the familiar rhetorical rules discussed in

De Inventione. His characters expressed impatience with the Greek

 

rhetoricians (then teaching in Rome), claiming that they did not know
their job and that they failed to classify properly or expound accu-
rately (ii. 39).8 Yet Cicero did have a certain respect for the Grae-
culi. For example, he thought it necessary to bring up his son on the
full rigor of the scholastic discipline.9 Cicero thus allowed him-
self the luxury of sneering at the Greeks and also making use of them.
In proposing his system of general culture, Cicero stresses the
need for sound subject matter, since no man can be eloquent on a sub-

ject he does not understand (De Oratore i. 63).10 He demands of the

 

7Jebb, Attic Orators, II, p. 439. Hermagoras has been credited
with beginning the revival of Atticism in the second century B. C.
Attempting to combine his practical approach with the philosophical,
he founded a subtle and scholastic rhetoric. II, p. 445.

 

8A1so see ii. 323; iii. 54, 70, 121.

9See De Partitione Oratoria, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1948). This brief but detailed essay, written in
54 B. C., was designed to instruct Cicero's son, Marcus Tullius, Based
on the system of rhetoric of the Middle Academy, the treatise was the
"most purely scientific of all Cicero's writings on rhetoric." Rack-
ham, "Introduction," p. 306.

 

10Invention was to Cicero the most important element of the rhet-
orical art. It received great prominence in De Oratore, and Topica
was a tract on inventional method.

 

67
orator a knowledge of all fields of study, especially philosophy
(i. 20).11 And, to illustrate, he claims that his own eloquence
was inspired, "not by the workshops of the rhetoricians, but by the

"12

groves of the Academy. In addition to sound subject matter, the

orator must know the audience's emotions which he wishes to play on,
partly that he may be able to treat themes which are always recurring.13
The orator must actually feel the emotions he tries to arouse.14 Cice-
ro's rhetorical invention is based, on the one hand, on a broad liberal
education, and, on the other hand, on the specific ways to discover

and select good arguments. While rules are considered useful in the

orator's early training, a reading of De Oratore suggests that Cicero

 

considered a sound general education and oratorical experience of more

importance to the orator in his later life.15

Cicero's Narrow View of Rhetoric

 

Cicero's conception of loci ("places") is definitely in the meta-

 

11In De Inventione i.8, Cicero took Hermagoras to task for assign-

ing to the orator questions that had nothing to do with him and which
belonged rather to the philosopher. But Cicero later came to believe
not only that such questions are within the orator's sphere, but that
all such questions should and should be related to them. General ques-
tions (theses) offer more scope for oratorical adornment than partic-
ular ones, and allow the orator to develop his ideas more fully. 22
Oratore iii.l20.

 

12Orator, trans. H; M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1939), iii.lZ. In De Oratore iii.l45, Cicero gave some indica-
tion that his main ideas were associated with the New Academy. But he
did not follow such sources closely. It is probable that De Oratore
was a synthesis of school rhetoric, theories of the philosophers, Greek
and Roman traditions, and his own experience. The choice and combination
of ideas were Cicero's. Clarke, p. 51.

 

 

13For example, religion, piety, concord, friendship, rights of
citizens, laws of nations, justice, temperance, and greatness of soul.
De Oratore i.56.

 

 

68

phorical tradition which held places to be seats of arguments or

storehouses of ideas.16 In De Partitione Oratoria 5, for example,

 

Cicero told his son that arguments are derived from the places.

In De Oratore ii. 112, Antonius advises sending a student to a

 

teacher who will "point out to him the very homes of all proofs,
so to speak, illustrating them briefly and defining them in terms."
Similarly, in Topica ii. 7-8, a locus is a "region of an argument."

In other works, loci are regarded as storehouses,17 haunts,18 or mines.19

 

14Methods of playing on the audience's feelings were usually
enumerated in rhetorical handbooks, but only in connection with
certain parts of a speech (viz., introduction and conclusion). Cicero
followed that approach in De Inventione, but was dissatisfied with it
when he came to write De Oratore in 55 B. C. Therein, the subject was
treated on its own and not subordinated to particular parts of the
speech. The orator himself could be moved to anger, grief, or other
emotions in matters which did not personally concern him, if the senti-
ments and loci he used had power. De Oratore ii.189.

 

 

 

15Tenney Frank, Life and Literature in the Roman Republic (Ber-
keley: Univ. of California Press, 1930), pp. 130-31.

16From the time that rhetoric first became an organized body
of principles to the modern period, the orator's mental and imaginative
activity has been thought of in terms of ”places." Traditionally rhet~
oricians have viewed these places as either locations for arguments
or containers for arguments. Yet, of course, there were no real places
(in any spatial sense) where thoughts were located or stored. The places
referred to operations of thought and expression only in a very loose
sense. Hence, orators seeking arguments were most often compared with
bees gathering honey or hunters tracking game, and, in the Renaissance
period, poetic images used to describe the places included flowers,
stars, and jewels. See Lechner, p. 135.

17De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951), iv.lO.

 

18De Oratore ii.145—47. Antonius, after declaring that all possible
subjects of debate are founded on typical cases and characters, noted
that a speaker, like a hunter, must be familiar with the ground over
which he chases and tracks his quarry. Also see De Inventione i.7.

 

 

19De Oratore ii.174. Antonius, summarizing his remarks on loci,
says: "For if I wished to reveal to somebody gold that was hidden here
and there in the earth, it should be enough for me to point out to him
some marks and indications of its positions, with which knowledge he
could do his own digging, and find what he wanted, with very little
trouble and no chance of mistake; so I know these indications of proofs,
which reveal to me their whereabouts when I am looking for them; all the
rest is dug out by dint of careful consideration."

 

 

69

Generally, a locus is the seat of an argument, an argument being
"a reason which causes men to believe a thing which could other-
wise be doubtful" (Topica ii. 8).

The term lggi as used by Cicero concerns ethical and emotional
as well as logical proof, and applies as well to the development
of the major parts of an oration——introduction, narration, proof,
and conclusion. Thus, the lists of lggi within the works of Cicero
tend to vary, according to the particular uses Cicero saw for them.

Whereas the young Cicero had emphasized the concrete 1221 (in
De Inventione), the more mature Cicero de-emphasizes them, consid-
ering them too numerous for easy memorization and too obvious to
be of much help.20 Formal 1223, on the other hand, assume great
importance in Cicero's later works.21

Cicero's change in attitude (concerning the importance and
usefulness of the 1223) requires that a brief review of his narrow
concept of invention now be given to show his emphasis and line of
thinking.

Cicero recognizes two kinds of questions: the cause or that
which is limited to certain times, places, and persons; and the
proposition or that which is infinite and not bounded by times,
places, or persons. There are two kinds of propositions: one of

investigation, the end of science; the other of action, which has

 

20This is the attitude of the philosopher teaching rhetoric,
rather than that of a professional rhetorician. See Petersson,
p. 379f.

21Cicero's Topica, in particular, dealt with formal places.

 

70

reference to doing something. The two species of causes are em-
bellishment and proof. Since causes concerning proof can be di-
vided further into past and future, there are really three kinds
of causes: epideictic, deliberative, and forensic.22

Given the cause or proposition, the orator's next step is to
determine the status. There are three staseis for forensic cases:
conjecturalis (where the fact has to be ascertained); definitivus
(concerned with defining the admitted deed); and rationis or qug_-
itatis (a question of reason or character which has to do with the
justification of the deed).23 Students trained in forensic oratory
are advised to use common lggi for definition and comparison pur-
poses; and concrete lggi to investigate various phases of the case.24
In cases involving definition, the orator can classify a term under
discussion as a subdivision of a larger conception, or argue about
the essential qualities of a term, or use description. In any event,
he relies on etymology, a favorite Stoic device. Finally, in cases
of quality (where the issue concerns justice) the whole field of

moral philosophy offers loci for argument. Some of them are: nature,

 

22For a more complete discussion of this aspect of rhetoric,
see De Partitione Oratoria 6lff.

 

23See Petersson, pp. 398-405. In Cicero's Rome, status was
most closely associated with forensic oratory. Most cases in Roman
courts belonged to the conjectural class (the accused pleading not
guilty).

24Often, however, the subdividing and refining of concrete loci
was so minute that it could hardly have been too helpful to students.
For example, the locus of time was divided (De Part. Orat. 37—38) into
that due to nature and that due to chance; natural time, in turn,
comprised the present, past, and future, the four seasons of the year,
the different time measurements of year, month, day, night, and hour,
and the weather; time due to chance involved special occasions such
as sacrifices, festal days, and weddings.

 

71
laws, tradition, vengeance, and the repelling of injury.25 After
determining the status, the next step is to develop the theme by
means of 1221.

In De Oratore Cicero chooses to discuss the 12£i_which apply
to the three types of proof earlier developed by Aristotle--logical,
ethical, and pathetical. From the logical point of view, proofs
are either artistic or non-artistic. Whereas Cicero had earlier
(De Inventione) discussed the artistic proofs in terms of specific
1221 derived from persons and from things,26 later in life he does
not emphasize them, considering them too obvious, although they are r

mentioned again in De Partitione Oratoria (34-40), a relatively

 

mature work. Instead he emphasizes the more universal 1221. In the
Orator (xxxvi.126) he emphasizes the point, saying that the central
notion of a controversy "ought to be treated in such a way as to
transfer the subject to the realm of universals and bring about a
discussion of a general principle." In De Oratore (ii. 162) he

has Antonius (sarcastically) say: ”For my part, if just now I were
to want a complete novice trained up to oratory, I should rather en-
trust him to these untiring people, who hammer day and night on the
same anvil at their one and only task, for them to put into his mouth
none but the most delicate morsels-~everything chewed exceedingly
small—-in the manner of wet nurses feeding baby—boys." If, on the

other hand, hhe novice shows signs of natural aptitude, Antonius

 

25Petersson, pp. 404-405.

26See above, pp. 61-62.

72

(ii. 164ff.) would send him to a teacher who could instruct him in
the 1231, both intrinsic (concerning the character of the subject

as a whole, or part of it, or anything related to the subject) and
extrinsic (assembled from without and not inherent in the nature of
the case). If the inquiry concerns the whole subject, definition is
in order. If it concerns a part or parts, partition is necessary.

If it concerns that which is closely connected with a subject, there
are numerous 1221 such as adjuncts, general views, particulars fall-
ing under general views, things similar and dissimilar, contrary,

or consequential; causes of circumstances and whatever has arisen

 

from such causes; and causes stronger, weaker, or similar (ii. 162— J
173). Such lggi can be composed, memorized, and declaimed upon, and
a good fund of them helps the orator to amplify effectively, whenever
he finds it necessary or desirable to do 50.27
Cicero also considers 1223 as important regarding ethical and
pathetical proofs. For example, Antonius is made to say (De Oratore
ii. 178): ”For men decide far more problems by hate, or love, or lust,
or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or illusion, or some
other inward emotion than by reality, or authority, or any legal
standard, or judicial precedent, or statute." And Caius Julius Caesar
discusses the numerous 122i of humor in De Oratore (ii. 216-95).
L221 are to be used intelligently and with judgment, for "just

as fruitful and fertile fields produce not only crops but harmful

 

27Cicero uses the term "amplification" to mean exalting a
theme as well as enlarging on it. Amplification is that which "agi-
tated or tranquilized" the mind of the hearer. (Topica xxvi) Or it
is a sort of vehement argumentation, or a kind of grave affirmation,
which conciliates belief to one's assertion. (De Partitione Oratoria
27; Orator xxxvi. 126)

73
weeds, so sometimes from these categories arguments are derived
which are inconsequential, immaterial or useless" (Orator xv. 48).
Cicero advises his son to examine all the 1223, rejecting the weak
ones (De Partitione Oratoria 8). In Orator (xiv. 47), he declares
that the wise speaker will run rapidly over the 1221, select those
that fit the subject, and then speak in general terms. Antonius ad-
vises that the good orator should weigh, rather than count, lggi

(De Oratore ii. 309).

 

While 122i, firmly established in the mind and memory, can be
invaluable to an orator, their use only indicates where to search.
All else, says Antonius (ii. 150), depends on care, mental concen-
tration, reflection, watchfulness, persistence, and hard work. More-
over, the best 123i are useful only to a speaker who is a man of
affairs, "qualified by experience, which age assuredly brings, or
by listening and reflection, which through careful study outruns
age" (ii. 131). Thus, the rules provide a system for discovering the
_lggi of argument inherent in a particular situation. While orators
find it useful to run through the classification in case something

suitable has escaped them, experienced speakers can find arguments

without much difficulty (ii. 120).28

Topica

Cicero had a copy of Aristotle's Topica in his library and knew

 

28Generally, Cicero made little use of loci in his own orations.

Pro Milone is one example of a speech employing textbook loci. In it
he argued from: probability (including motives and previous life);
comparison; circumstantial evidence (place, time, and opportunity);
and arguments drawn from behavior before and after the event. (Egg
Speeches, trans. N. H. Watts [New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 193;],
32, 36, 41, 45, 53, 61.) Little evidence of school rhetoric, however,
is found in his forensic speeches, and even less in his deliberative
speeches. Also see Clarke, p. 70.

 

 

74

. . 29
something of its contents. When a friend, Trebatius, found this

in the orator's library at Tusculum and puzzled over its contents,
Cicero undertook the writing of his own Topica, purportedly to be
an account of the contents of Aristotle's work. However, the treatise,
completed in July, 44 B. C.,30 bears little resemblance to Aristotle's
treatise.31 Although there is some resemblance to II, 23 of Aristotle's
Rhetoric, the work is in the main a contemporary system.32

In this brief treatise on invention, Cicero expresses agreement
(ii. 7-8) with Aristotle's definition of topoi as regions from which
arguments are drawn. Cicero's loci are then divided into intrinsic
and extrinsic, intrinsic loci (loci proprii) being sixteen in number
(ii. 9-iv. 23).

1. Definition (applies to the whole subject)

. Partition (enumeration of parts)
. Etymology (arguments derived from.word meanings)
. Conjugates (arguments from words of the same family)
. Genus (thesis)
Species (hypothesis)

. Similarity (analogy)
. Difference

oowomewN

 

29Cicero Topica i.l. For accounts of how Cicero came to write
Topica, see H. M. Hubbell's "Introduction" to Topica (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1949), pp. 377-78; E. G. Sihler, Cicero
of Arpinum: a Political and Literary Biography (New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 1914), p. 417. '

30With the Topica Cicero sent a letter to Trebatius, written
on July 28, 44 B. C. from Rhegium. The composition of the treatise
took seven days. Epistulae ad Familiares, trans. W. Glynn Williams
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), vii.l9.

 

31Hubbell, Topica, p. 377; Sihler, p. 417; Solmsen, "Aristotle
and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings," Classical
Philology, XXXIII(1938), p. 401; Sandys, History of Classical Schol-
arship, I, p. 182; L. Minio-Palaello, "The Text of Aristotle's Topica
and Elenchi: the Latin Tradition," Classical Quarterly, V(1955), p. 109.

32It is largely identical with that of De Oratore ii. l63ff.
Cicero may also have adapted from some late Hellenistic treatise.
See Hubbell, Topica, p. 378.

 

75
9. Contraries
10. Adjuncts (corollaries)
ll. Antecedents (past circumstances attendant on main point)
12. Consequents (past circumstances attendant on main point)
13. Contradictions
l4. Cause
15. Effect
16. Comparison (more and less)
Loci for extrinsic arguments are drawn mainly from authority (iv. 24).
After a detailed discussion of the intrinsic and extrinsic loci
(iv. 26-XX. 78) Cicero suggests the best kinds of loci for delibera-
tive, epideictic, and forensic oratory (xxiii. 89-90). For questions
concerning what to seek and what to avoid, the best loci are those '

related to advantages and disadvantages of mind, body, or external

circumstances. Questions of honor or baseness involve loci related

 

to the virtues. Finally, for questions of right and wrong, the orator
can turn to 1923 regarding equity. To conclude the treatise, Cicero
shows what 1223 are most appropriate to the introduction, statement
of the case, proof, and conclusion (xxvi 97—98). In his accompanying
letter to Trebatius, he offers the following apology: "This stuff,

my dear Trebatius, you will find a bit dry. But you as an expert in
the Civil Law are not unacquainted with some measure of dryness and
obscurity" (ad Fam. vii. 19). Yet the treatise, however dry, does

offer a valuable treatment of the formal places.

Summary of Cicero's Concgption of Placgg

 

While the young Cicero closely follows the Hellenistic concep-
tions of 1223 in De Inventione, the mature Cicero protests against
the narrowing of rhetoric evident during the first century B. C.
Rather, he proposes a system of general culture which will train

all men to speak competently on all subjects. The complete orator

76
will study all subjects, and through natural talent, training, and
practice he will be equipped to discuss any question. The rules of
the Graeculi are considered helpful for the oratorical training of
young men, but ideally devices such as ABE; can either be discarded
or de-emphasized in later life.

Following Aristotle in his definition of places, Cicero presents
different lists of 1231 in his several works. In general, he abandons
the concrete 1221 treated in De Inventione in favor of the common and
formal 1221. The formal 1221 are thoroughly examined in Topica, a work

slightly resembling Aristotle's logical treatise.

CHAPTER V

QUINTILIAN AND THE CONCEPT OF PLACES

Introductory Considerations

 

From Cicero's Brutus to the Controversiae and Suasoriae of the
elder Seneca, one moves into a different world. The school was now
the center of interest, while the forum seemed forgotten as a center V?
of eloquence. Rhetoricians threw open their school doors and became
star performers, presenting what were known as declamations.1

The advocate still found many speaking opportunities, however.
Though the great political trials of the Republic were a thing of
the past, the courts continued to flourish, even if Augustus did
set the fashion of personally administering justice, and Tiberius
and Claudius did likewise. It could hardly be expected that an ad-

vocate would enjoy full freedom before the Emperor himself or before

 

1Declamations first appeared in the time of Demetrius of Phalera,
ca. 318-307 B. C. (Quintilian Institutio Oratoria ii.4.4l) Near the
end of the Roman Republic, when the loss of political liberty deprived
genuine eloquence of any real significance, declamations of a degen—
erate type assumed great importance. The kind of declamatio recom-
mended by Quintilian in the first century A. D. concerned speaking
from outlines on hypothetical cases. Both suasoriae (elementary delib-
erative speeches) and controversiae (more advanced forensic speeches)
were recommended as school exercises (Inst. Orat. ii.lO.l-6). But,
Charles Sears Baldwin suggests, "evidently the declamatio Quintilian
recommends is not the declamatio that he heard about him." (Ancient
Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 70; also see pp. 69, 71, 87-89, 93-94, and
100-101) Quintilian wished to recall to its original purpose what was
already out of hand. Declamatio had, with the narrowing of the field
of public speaking, become an end in itself, an exhibition of rhetor's
skill to attract pupils. Quintilian, says Baldwin, ”would recall g2;
clamatio from invention to actuality, and from display to exercise.”
(AEEIEEE Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 71)

77

78

a Senate that had lost much of its independence.? Moreover, even the

conditions of oratory were less favorable under the Empire. The length
of speeches, the number of pleaders, and the duration of trials were
all restricted.3 The informal manner of speaking, meagre audiences,
and even the dress worn by the advocates were all inimical to great
eloquence.4
Three reasons help explain the decline of eloquence during the
Empire.5 First, the luxury of the age prompted a moral decay, espec-
ially among the younger generation. While there had always been a
sense of the unscrupulous about the Roman orator, under the Republic
he had not been so subjected to the corrupting influences of des-
potism. Hence, unscrupulous accusers were often matched by unscru-
pulous defenders; and if justice was not always achieved, at least
both sides had some voice in the outcome. But under the Empire not

even this rough kind of justice was accomplished. All too many viri

mali dicendi_periti placed their talents at the service of power.

 

 

2Clarke, p. 101. The Senate did acquire a new importance as a
criminal court, concerning itself especially with cases of treason.

3The dominating political influence of Caesar apparently was
responsible for beginning these restrictions on oratory. The first
blow was the quiet introduction of stenographers into the Senate in
59 B. C. By requiring publication of the minutes of the Senate pro-
ceedings, Caesar compelled speakers to consider the outside public,
to drop the orotund periods addressed to their colleagues alone, and
to confine themselves to pertinent details. In 52 B. C. the triumvirs
passed a bill limiting the length of pleas in the courts. Enacted to
expedite the business of overburdened courts, this act suggests that
politics was now concerned with getting results, not with encouraging
time-consuming oratory. After the Rubicon, speeches in the Senate were
like business reports in committees that met before a very curt pre-
siding officer. In the courts, persuasion gave way to a very rapid
estimation of the facts. See Frank, pp. 166-67.

4See Tacitus Dialogus, trans. William Peterson (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1932), 38-39.

5See Clarke, pp. 102-103.

79

A second reason for the decline was the lack of rewards for
good speaking. In addition to the loss of old incentives to speak
well, the very character of society under the Empire had contributed
to the decline. The less stable society under the Republic had pro-
vided conditions for the growth of great oratory. These were lacking
in the well-ordered society of the Empire.6

A third possible reason for the decline of eloquence is that
"decline often follows climax." In Imperial Rome there was a general
feeling that the summit of oratorical achievement had been reached.
Hence, Cicero was accepted as the classical orator of Rome; and by
the time of Quintilian, he dominated the rhetorical teaching and
theory.7

In addition to the above causes, there was the unhealthy influ-
ence of the schools on the practice of the courts. Thus, a young orator
carried his school habits with him when he went out into the world,
and did his best to reproduce the manner of the declamation hall in
the court of law. And a man's manner of pleading did, according to

Quintilian (ix. 2. 81), depend on his manner in declamation. But while

the teachers of declamatio did acquaint their students with some impor-

 

 

6Whereas the state's "bad citizens" (Catiline and Verres, for
example) gave Cicero much material for oratory, such "inspiration"
was lacking during the Imperial age. Tacitus Dialogus 36-37.

7Clarke, p. 103. Rhetoricians after Cicero (and before Quinti-
1ian) apparently had little influence on the practice of oratory.
For example, during the early Empire the most important controversy
to agitate the rhetoricians was that between the followers of Apol-
lodorus (the teacher of Augustus) and the followers of Theodorus
(who taught Tiberius). See Inst. Orat. iii.l.17-l8. Apollodorus was a
dry pedantic writer (Tac. Dial. 19f.) who believed in maintaining the
full rigor of the rules, whereas Theodorus allowed for some latitude.
While this quarrel preoccupied rhetoricians, it had little effect on
the practice of oratory (Inst. Orat. v.13.59; ii.ll.2). Moreover,
ordinary people probably had great difficulty understanding what the
controversy was about. (Strabo The Geography of Strabo, trans. Horace
Leonard Jones, VIINew York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929?, xiii.4.3)

 

 

80

tant themes and did produce many capable speakers, all too often
this training engendered a pretentious glibness of speech, a heed-
lessness of truth or falsity, and a narrow and unreal range of
training, built on threadbare themes.8

One teacher who reacted against these excesses in the education
of orators was Quintilian, who taught and wrote in the Flavian period.
(This was a time of reaction against Neronian excesses in finances,
morals, the Imperial household, and literature.) Quintilian was al-
most completely in tune with his times, with the Imperial house and
its activities, with the adoption of stern measures against the phil-
osophers,9 with the contemporary taste in style (swinging away from
the epigrammatic techniques popular earlier in the century),10 and
with the renewed interest in education.

"Quintilian, writing long after rhetoric had ceased to function
as an instrument of assembly government, nevertheless comprehend Eng

its best older tradition and the whole scope of its classical devel-

opment in a great work of pedagogy, De Institutione Oratoria (about

 

 

81t must be remembered, however, that the preliminary rhetorical
exercises in the schools (including, for example, controversiae, sua-
soriae, and loci communes) could be beneficial as well, especially
insofar as they imparted nimbleness of mind, skill in refutation, and
a "finished" speech. See J. Wright Duff, A Literary History of Rome
in the Silver Age: from Tiberius to Hadrian (New York: Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons, 1927), pp. 34-35; also see pp. 9-12, 30-36. (The "Silver
Age" covered the period 14-117 A. D.)

 

 

 

 

9See, for example, Inst. Orat. i.pref.9-18; v.11.39; x.l.35;
and xii.2.6-8. Philosophers were expelled from Rome by both Vespasian
and Domitian.

 

10Quintilian had to contend against the great popularity of the
younger Seneca, who, after the fall of Nero, set the stylistic fashions
in literature. Untouched by and opposed to these, Quintilian protested
against the inflated and exaggerated rhetoric then popular.

81

95 A. D.)"11 The purpose he noted for the treatise was not so much
to invent new theories as to judge between the conflicting and contra-
dictory old ones (i. pref. 1-2). To accomplish that task, be employed
a wide knowledge of both Latin and Greek sources and revealed a list
of sources which almost amounted to a catalogue of rhetorical liter-
ature.12
Probably no other ancient treatise was so exhaustive.13 Including
all the traditional topics, Quintilian proceeded upon the classical
theory of systematic guidance, but made the important contribution
of pedagogical order, his plan being progressive. While the traditional
five canons of rhetoric stood out clearly, they covered only about half
of the space and did not determine the plan of the work. Rather, Quin-
tilian proceeded from less to more, from boyhood through adolescence
to manhood. His idea was to widen and deepen the practice of public
speaking as it opened more and more to the growing public speaker.
In his treatise, Quintilian displayed what H. E. Butler called

"robust common sense and sound literary judgment."14 Never affected or

extravagant, always practical in retrospect and outlook, be displayed

 

l1Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 62. George Kennedy
notes that Quintilian arrived in Rome ca. 68 A. D., retired after twenty
years of teaching, and worked two or three years on Institutio Oratoria.
Kennedy estimates the publication date at between 90 A. D. and the
death of Domitian in 96 A. D. ("An Estimate of Quintilian," American
Journal of Philology, LXXXIIII196Z], p. 132) Duff places the date of
the treatise at between 92 or 93 and 96 A. D., at the latest. (Literary
History of Rome, p. 392)

 

 

 

 

12Duff, p. 407. 13Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 84.

 

14"Introduction," Institutio Oratoria, p. viii.

 

82

a zest for truth which made Institutio Oratoria more than a manual

 

of rhetoric. Perhaps no ancient writer has rivalled him in varied
fullness of achievement, or approached so nearly the reputation of

ideal schoolmaster.

Quintilian's Broad View of Rhetoric

 

Quintilian considers rhetorical education as something more than
training in speaking. It includes the building of character and cul-
tivation of the liberal arts as well.15 In agreement with Cicero,
he views ideal oratory as founded upon a strong moral and intellectual
basis.16 While his requirements (for the ideal orator) seem more moder-
ate than Cicero's demand for wide knowledge of all great subjects,17
he does emphasize the study of subjects aside from rhetoric, espec-
ially ethics, physics, dialectic, law, and history.18 Thus, the suc-
cessful cultivation of the speaking art depends upon hard work, con-

tinual study, varied practice, repeated experiments, and profound sa-

gacity.19 This view is implicit and explicit throughout his work.

 

15Duff, pp. 392-93.

16Inst. Orat. xii.1.l. Quintilian is well known for his concept
of the "good man speaking well." This idea is stressed throughout his
treatise. See, for example, i.proem 9-10; ii.2 (whole section); and
ii.15.1.

 

17See Inst. Orat. 11.21.14; also Duff, p. 35.

 

l8Inst. Orat. i. proem l6; xii.2.10.

 

19Inst. Orat. ii.13.15-l7. The orator could also be assisted by
rules, provided they pointed out the straight road instead of one
fixed wheel-rut.

 

83

Quintilian's Concept of Loci
Quintilian discusses the narrow approach to invention in Books

III-VIII of Institutio Oratoria, where he considers the steps by

 

which the orator may find the proper materials for the different
kinds of speaking.20 The first step in the analysis of any question

is to determine the status of the question,21

the process by which
the orator discovers the essential character of the case as it ap-
pears in a preliminary survey of all the material and all the bear-
ings. This is accomplished through the application of the staseis of
fact, definition, and interpretation.

The speaker next turns to the 1221, which help him to discover
arguments or develop certain parts of his speech. £223 can also be
employed for panegyrical purposes (praise of a man, his country,
parents, his qualities of mind and body, and various virtues such as
fortitude, justice, and temperance).

By the term rpgr_Quintilian means ”seats of argument, in which
they lie concealed, and from which they must be drawn forth" (v.10.20;
v.12.2). L223 can be drawn from persons or from things (v.8.4). Those

from persons include: birth, country, sex, age education, discipline

3 3

bodily constitution, fortune, condition, natural diSposition, manner

of living, occupations, affectations, and previous doings and sayings

 

20H. E. Butler suggests that in the more technical portions of
his work (for example, discussions of status and loci) Quintilian was
unequal in his treatment. The reader, says Butler, "feels that he
cares little about the minute pedantries of rhetorical technique."

(p . iX)

21See Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 74. Quintilian
discussed status in iii.6, a chapter which Baldwin calls "one of his
most important, both as specific doctrine and as typical of ancient
method."

 

 

84

(v. 10. 24-28). L3 1 pertaining to things include: place, time (pre-
ceding, contemporary, and subsequent), means (instruments), manner
(how a thing was done), definition, genus, species, difference, prop-
erty, elimination, division, beginnings, increase, consummation, simil-
arities, dissimilarities, contradictions, consequents, causes, effects,
results, and comparison, all of which are subdivided into several
species (v. 10. 32-94).22 These common 1221 are appropriate to the
investigation of all questions.

In addition, there are lpgr,e3pecially appropriate to each kind
of oratory. For example, forensic speakers frequently turn to justice
and equity, and their opposites. Epideictic orators speak of virtues
and vices. Political orators examine possibility, honor, and exped-
iency. Moreover, the 1221 for exciting laughter are as many as those
for finding thoughts.23,Lpgr for laughter can be found in words or
things, in some act, look, or gesture, in all the 122$ for finding
arguments, in tropes and figures, in refutation, and in apparent absur-
dities.24

One other kind of 1223.13 treated by Quintilian; the loci communes
which are passages dealing with some general principle or theme.25 These
commonplaces are discussed at several points (ii. 4. 22; v. 12. 6;

v. 13. 57), principally in connection with the use of documentary

 

22Quintilian's list of loci is more complete than that of Cicero.
23Harrington, p. 37.

24Apparently Quintilian chose to treat the loci of laughter so
that he might not be accused of neglecting them.

ZSSee Butler, Inst. Crat., note, p. 208.

 

85

evidence and witnesses to impress judges. At one point (ii. 4. 22)

he refers to the locus communis as an oratoria or little oration to

be inserted in a speech for purposes of amplification; and elsewhere

he acknowledges the usefulness of a more brilliant style for the £223

in the sense of "speeches—within-speeches" (V. 14. 33-35).
Like Cicero, Quintilian regards the loci communes as helpful,

not simply because they furnish arguments for all cases, but because

they are particularly appropriate for important cases. However, he

disapproves of orators who write out and memorize loci communes before—

hand, calling such passages artificial ornaments tacked unto a speech,

not interwoven in its texture (ii. 4. 31).26 'i3
As he discusses the various kinds of £221: Quintilian shows great

concern for the intelligent use of them by orators. Hence, while he

believes that the use of 1221 can increase an orator's fluency and

prepare him to deal with any case (v. 10. ll-l4), he cautions that one

 

26To appreciate the role of the loci communes in Quintilian's
rhetoric, it seems appropriate to review here their tradition. Loci
communes were treated by such rhetoricians as Aristotle, the author
of ad Herennium, Cicero, and Quintilian. Since the early Sophists had
emphasized training in the moral virtues, loci communes often became
principal arguments in every kind of discourse (Inst. Orat. ii.l.9).
Aristotle, for example, had held that the knowledge and practice of
virtue was essential in every kind of oratory. The political orator
persuaded an audience to seek the happiness of the good life, the
forensic orator urged the securing of justice, and the epideictic
orators persuaded others to seek an honorable life. In addition to
his emphasis on virtue, Aristotle treated the common topos of Degree
(more and less), which came to dominate the other three (Possibility,
Past Fact, and Future Fact). In later rhetoric this topos was consid-
ered an essential part of the conclusion of a forensic speech. Then
Roman rhetoricians added, or at least more greatly emphasized, a more
immediate concern for the styllistic embellishment of the loci (per-
haps owing to the growing importance attached to epideictic oratory).
The young Cicero, for example, believed that a speech could often be
rendered distinguished or brilliant through the introduction of loci
communes (De Inv. ii.15). And when Quintilian came to survey the class-
ical rhetorical tradition, he chose to emphasize the "seats of argument"
view of loci, rather than that of the loci communes. Hence, while he

 

 

86

should go beyond the rules, because a knowledge only of them does

not give an orator a perfect and absolute knowledge of the whole
subject. Knowing only the rules makes one the "possessor of a dumb
science" (v. 10. 119).27

Knowing that all 1221 are drawn from either persons or things
is not sufficient because each group is subdivided into a number of
different heads. Hence, the orator must also know methods of handling
arguments in order to understand what arguments can be drawn from
the circumstances of each particular case. Orators must discover for
themselves what is peculiar to the case at hand. "For, just as weapons
are superfluous for one who does not know what his target is, so too
arguments are useless, unless you see in advance to what they are to
be applied. This is a task for which no formal rules can be laid down"
(v. 10. 109).

Quintilian's admonitions on the use of 1221_no doubt stemmed from
his reactions to the degenerate invention he saw taught around him.
He protested against the sort of rhetorical training that destroyed
the boy's curiosity and instead encouraged a conventionality of thought.

Typically the schoolboy was taught to find materials for his speeches

 

mentioned loci communes several times, his real concern was with loci
as aids to the discovery of speech materials. Yet, owing to the great
importance attached to loci communes in the first century A. D., Quin-
tilian had to treat them and admit some usefulness for them. Had he
considered a knowledge of them useless, he probably would have passed
them by.

 

 

27The discovery of arguments, therefore, was not the result of
the publication of textbooks containing detailed lists of loci, for
every kind of argument had been considered long before rules were laid
down, and the rhetorician later merely collected them for publication
(v.10.120).

87

and to practise speeches according to rules. He was taught the trad-

itional 1221 to draw on and the usual themes to employ. Although the
1221 were ultimately based on experience, generations of teachers
before Quintilian had reduced them to a system, so that observation
and personal experience no longer played much part in invention. By
the end of the first century A. D. rhetoricians were providing ready-
made sets of arguments and modes of treatment, and those youth who
were educated according to that system might go on through life with-
out ever enlarging or deepening the inherited common stock from

their own personal experience and observations. Against that sort of

training, Quintilian advanced the precepts of Institutio Oratoria.28

 

 

28Quintilian's protest also was voiced by other literary figures
of the period, including the author of On the Sublime, Pliny (a pupil
of Quintilian), Juvenal, and Tacitus.

CHAPTER VI

CONCEPTIONS OF THE PLACES IN THE MEDIEVAL,
RENAISSANCE, AND MODERN PERIODS

Introductory Considerations1

 

From the time of Quintilian to Saint Augustine, oratorical
training was still directed toward the perfect orator, but became
absorbed in minutiae of style. Suasoriae and controversiae, imitation,
and systematized language were among the results of a further narrow-
ing of public speaking which occurred in the Imperial age. 0f the
three types of oratory, the epideictic reigned supreme. 0f the canons
of rhetoric, invention became barren and stereotyped, memory became
verbal, arrangement became patterned, and delivery became more tech-
nical.2

However, whatever the status of rhetoric, the ”places" were always
available to provide directives for use in persuasion, amplification,
or embellishment. "Places" were still the seats of argument which con-

tained key ideas of universal application, and the sources of count-

 

1The purpose of this chapter is to review the classical concep-
tions of the places as they were restated in medieval, Renaissance,
and modern rhetorical works. With few exceptions, there will be little
pause to consider at length the views of particular writers. Rather,
the writer will assume the reader's familiarity with the rhetoricians
discussed, or refer the reader to primary sources and commentaries
for further information.

2See Charles Sears Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (New
York: Macmillan, 1928), pp. 8-50, for an excellent discussion of the
Second Sophistic period. Baldwin claims_(p. 3) that while Aristotle

88

89

less moral dicta destined to influence the character and mold the

opinion of an audience. The "places" of praise were now applied not
only to virtuous men, but to cities, countries, and harbors as well.
Moreover, "places" were becoming cliches useful in biography, sermons,
letter-writing, and virtually all other literary forms (whether already
developed or in their infancy).

A brief glance at four Sophists of the period will illustrate
the directions which rhetoric took after Quintilian. The second-century

Sophist, Hermogenes, for example, devoted the first twenty—seven pages

 

of his Elementary_Exercises to a discussion of exercises in composition,
controlled by fixed "places." Baldwin said of Hermogenes' rules: "Arid,
impersonal as arithmetic, pedantically overclassified, sometimes incon-
sistent, these rules are nevertheless illuminating. They expose soph-

istic oratory."3

Flavius Philostratus (fl. 230-238) wished to preserve for all time

a picture of the triumphs of the Sophists.4 In his Lives of the Sophists

 

he treated Gorgias, Isocrates, and other early Sophists, as well as the
contemporary Sophists. Philostratus was particularly fond of Gorgias,
who he claimed used stock themes and founded the art of extemporaneous
oratory (11222 i. 481-82). Philostratus was an excellent representative

of the new Sophistry.5

 

settled the question of rhetoric philosophically and established its
theory, the theory was more often merely accepted but not followed.
Hence, while the Sophists had been put in their place more surely by
Aristotle than by Plato, they continued to thrive, until ancient rhet-
oric became more and more Sophistic.

3Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 38; also see p. 23. Wilmer Cave
Wright called Hermogenes the most famous technical writer on rhetoric
in the second century. See Philostratus and Eunapius: The Lives of the
Sophists (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1922), p. xxxvi.

 

 

4Wright, ibid., p. xii.

 

90

Ausonius, a fourth-century poet and rhetor, well illustrated
the typical conception of "places" held by the later Sophists.6
He preferred "places” that came handily in series; the order of the

daily round or of noble cities, the twelve Caesars, the seven sages,
or a roster of Trojan heroes. These were "places" for Latin verse in

7 While Ausonius' own verse was often clever and facile,

the schools.
it was barren of ideas and without a gleam of insight;8 and the rhet-
oric he taught was a mere display of verbal dexterity.

Finally, Apollinaris Sidonius (born about 430 A. D.) may be taken
to represent fifth-century Sophistry.9 A Roman prefect and Christian

10

bishop, he was obsessed with style, and his letters and poems were

consistently in the modes of Sophistic.11 His commentaries, addresses

 

SDuring Philostratus' lifetime, political oratory was further
reduced to school exercises and the arguing of historical themes.
Forensic oratory was on a still lower plane. 0f great importance were
epideictic orations, particularly encomia. Pupils were required to
improvise themes and prepare encomia on such subjects as houseflies,
salt, and the like. Wright, ibid., pp. xvii-xviii.

6See Ausonius, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn White, 2 vols. (New York:
G. P. Putnamds Sons, 1919).

7See, for example, Books xiii-xiv (pp. 311-47). Places were for
Ausonius little more than thought markers in the process of an oration.
They were empty of content and conventional in form.

8White, Ausonius, I, p. xxv1.

9See Sidonius: Poems and Letters, trans. W. B. Anderson, 2 vols.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1936).

 

10Forced antithesis, unnatural use of words, far-fetched conceits,
and a straining after effect are all found abundantly in Sidonius.
Anderson, "Introduction," I, p. xxxv.

11Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic, pp. 78-79.

 

91

of welcome or congratulation, and panegyrics,12 all followed the

tradition of declamatio.l3

Mgdieval Conceptions of the Places

 

Meanwhile Christianity was growing up in a culture strongly
influenced by rhetoric.l4 Saint Augustine, attempting to restore

15 believed that it

rhetoric to its earlier Ciceronian excellence,
should be an instrument of discovery which, with dignity of expression,
would move men to see truth.l6 Believing that rhetoric would be help-
ful in the training of preachers, he advised the use of summaries and
began the compilation of a compendium which would enable Christian

ministers to bring together the essential facts on a number of impor-

tant subjects and give young people access to screened information

 

12Many of his letters, for example, were simply miniature pan-
egyrics, and nearly every letter was assiduously worked up according
to the principles of contemporary rhetorical teaching. Anderson,
"Introduction," p. lxii.

13Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 79. Sidonius felt
himself the representative of a great tradition, Sophistry. See iv.3.l.

 

l4See Richard McKeon, ”Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,” Speculum,
xv11(1942), pp. 1-32.

15See the following works: Saint Augustine, De doctrina Chris-
tiana, trans. John J. Gavigan, C.S.A., Writings of Saint Augustine,
ed. Ludwig Schopp et al (New York: CIMA Pub. Co., 1947), IV; Baldwin,
Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic, pp. 51-57; and James J. Murphy, "Saint
Augustine and the Debate about a Christian Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal
of Speech, XLVI(December, 1960), pp. 400-410. Baldwin claims (p. 51)
that Book IV of De doctrina Christiapg began rhetoric anew, in that it
ignored Sophistic and returned to the ancient idea of moving men to
truth. Augustine gave to the counsels of Cicero a new emphasis for the
urgent tasks of preaching the word of God.

 

 

 

l6In Augustine's day, Sophistic was "almost the only lore of
public speaking then active." (Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric 222 Poetic,
p. 52) It dominated criticism and education. Augustine himself had
been brought up on Sophistic rhetoric and had been, in Plutarch's
sense and Strabo's, a Sophist. Yet an uninformed reader of Book IV
(De doc. Christ.) would hardly be aware that Sophistry existed, as ”no
denunciation could be more scathing than this silence.” (Baldwin, p. 53)
Augustine, it may be noted, neither cited nor quoted any rhetorician
but Cicero.

92
which they would otherwise need to seek directly from pagan sources.
Illustrating the precepts of rhetoric from the Scriptures,17 Augustine
believed that with a technical treatise to guide them and a Bible in
which to find examples, ministers could be adequately equipped.

In De doctrina Christiana Augustine discusses only two of the
five traditional canons of rhetoric, invention and style.18 In con-
nection with training in invention, he makes it plain throughout that
he intends the student to master the ordinary things taught in the
schools.19 He observes that rules should claim the attention of young
men (iv. 3. 4)20 and disclaims any intention on his part of supplying
the rhetorical precepts taught in the secular schools (iv. 1. 2).
(These precepts included the ordinary instruction in the 1221.)

After Augustine, Boethius and Cassiodorus also discussed the
"places." Boethius followed Cicero in viewing places as seats of argu-
ment, useful for the discovery of ideas. He wrote extensively on Aris-
totelian logic, discussed Porphyry's commentary, and wrote a commentary
in six books on Cicero's Topica. Cassiodorus defined 1221 as "the

places from which arguments are derived" and classified them according

 

17Two things are necessary to the treatment of the Scriptures,
said Augustine (ii.1.l). One needs a way of expressing to others what
he has learned, and a way of discovering those things which are to be
understood.

180f the four books in De doctrina Christiana, the first three
concern invention, and the fourth, expression. More specifically, Book
1 deals with the signs of realities, Book II with words as conventional
signs, and Book III with the problem of ambiguity. These books were
composed between 396 and 426 A. D., and Book IV was added nearly a
quarter of a century later. (Murphy, "Saint Augustine and the Debate
about a Christian Rhetoric, p. 407) It has been contended that Augus-
tine restored invention to its rightful place and gave it a new appli-
cation to the exegesis of Scripture. (Baldwin, pp. 56-57) 0f the re-
maining canons of rhetoric, Augustine discusses only style (Book IV),
mentions memory and delivery only incidentally, and omits arrangement.

 

19Murphy, p. 407.

20Cf. Cicero De Oratore iii.125; Quintilian Inst. Orat. i.l.2.

 

 

 

 

93

o c o a I ' ' c o 21
to Cicero's d1v181on of intr1n81c and extr1n31c places.

In the eighth century, Alcuin wrote a rhetorical treatise which
contained an extensive discussion of the classical "places."22 The

work was "a texture of excerpts from Cicero's De Inventione and Jul-

 

ius Victor's Ars Rhetorica."23 In general, Alcuin treats Cicero's

 

text with reverence, borrowing whole passages almost verbatim, and
seeking to preserve the integrity of Cicero's phraseology; but the
desire to condense that source occasionally leads him to piece to-
gether within consecutive paragraphs sentences often widely separated
in Cicero's treatise.24
Alcuin discusses the "places" of argument in terms of the parts
of a speech, particularly the Proof section. Proof is defined as the
"adducing of argument in such a way as to lead trustworthiness and
strength to your side of the dispute" (592-93). Proof can be estab-

lished in two ways--from the persons or from the events involved in

the case (593-94).25 Places from persons include: name, hereditary

 

21See An Introduction to Divine and Human Readings, trans. Leslie
Webber Jones (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1946), pp. 172-76.

 

22See The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne, trans. Wilbur Samuel
Howell (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941). Howell's inter-
pretations will be followed closely.

 

23Alcuin found the De Inventione useful only so far as invention
was concerned. Julius Victor was followed regarding the other four
canons. In general, it can be said that Alcuin's treatise was thorough-
ly Ciceronian. (Howell, p. 30) Alcuin depended on Cicero four times as
much as upon Victor.

 

24For example, Alcuin's treatment of Cicero's places of indignation
and pity was a very free paraphrase of Cicero's longer analysis. (Alcuin
ii.888-933) But, suggests Howell, this was an exceptional instance. (p.28)

25Cf. Cicero De Inv. i.24-28. Also see Howell's notes, pp. 164-65;
and above, p. 62.

94

disposition, way of living, state of fortune, habitual bents,
emotional proclivity, moral propensity, rational purpose, and

things a person has done, things which have happened to him, and
things which he has said. (These are further subdivided [LOO-638'.)
These "places" can be used by either plaintiff (645-58) or defen-
dant (661-80). The plaintiff, for example, can discredit the life

of the accused prior to the crime under dispute, dwell upon his
shameful lineage, or his immoral propensities, or his bent for habi-
tual wickedness, or the cruelty of the things he has done. He can,
moreover, show that the defendant previously has also been convicted
of a similar crime, or reveal how dishonorable, covetous, ill-humored,
or inhuman he has been. The defendant, on the other hand, can show
that his life has been honorable and steadfast toward the State,
parents, relatives, and friends, demonstrate that his deeds were well
done, faithfully, and bravely, or Show that the deed was done by ac-
cident, in ignorance, or at the instigation of another.

"Places” from events (685-704) involve (1) what took place before
the crime (motive, for example), (2) what took place during the crime
(place, time, opportunity, and manner), (3) what took place after the
crime (signs pointing to the guilt of the accused), and (4) what laws
apply to the crime, who wrote the laws, and what name should be given
to the crime.26

In discussing the summary of a speech, Alcuin also notes the

 

26Cf. De Inv. i.26-28; also see above, pp. 61-62. Howell notes
(p. 165) that Alcuin's first three categories were merely subdivisions
of Cicero's first, and that his fourth was an abridgement of Cicero's
fourth category.

 

95
"places" of indignation (884-911) and those of pity (919-33). An
orator applying the "places" of indignation can, for example, show
that the subject upheld by his opponent is degrading in the eyes of
the immortal gods, the wisest men, the Senate, and the people. Or he
can show that his opponent's actions are cruel, unjust, and dishonest.
0r again he can condemn his opponent's past life, ShOW'What evil will
befall if he is not punished, or emphasize his pride or arrogance.
"Places" of pity can be employed to indicate how shameful and ungen-
erous are the accusations of an opponent, or to deplore one's poverty,
physical disabilities, or unhappiness, or to reveal one's feelings of
sympathy toward others.27

In the twelfth century, John of Salisbury devoted Book III of

his Metalogicon to a commentary on the categories and topoi of Aris-

 

totle.28 Aristotle's Topics is considered not merely helpful to rhet-
oricians, but vitally important "as the initial starting point for the

study of rhetoric, which subsequently expanded and acquired its own

 

27Compare Alcuin's places of indignation (884-911) with Cicero's
(De Inv. i.53-54), and Alcuin's places of pity (919-33) with Cicero's
(De Inv. i.55-56). For a more detailed discussion of the individual
places as treated by both rhetoricians, see Howell, p. 166.

28See Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: a Twelfth-Century Defense
of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium, trans. Daniel D. McGarry
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1962), pp. 142-202. John was a
statesman and scholar, secretary to two archbishops of Canterbury, and
Bishop of Chartres. His work was the most extensive medieval survey of
the Trivium, "a unified and carefully coherent presentation of all
teaching that deals with words." (McGarry, p. 156) Most space, however,
was given to logic. 0f the four books, the first treated grammar and
the Trivium in general, and the last three concerned logic. In Book
III, 5-10, John offered a book-by—book digest of Aristotle's Topica.
But rhetoric, in his scheme, appears to have had no distinctive com-
posing function. (McGarry, p. 157) It was, for that matter, barely
mentioned (for example, i.l7, ii.10). John was preoccupied with logic
and his favorable comments about "places” referred to the dialectical
places.

 

 

 

 

96

particular rules" (iii. 10).29 From an understanding of Aristotle's
r2p21, says John, a student can not only build up his powers of
invention, but also improve his judgment (iii. 5).

During the medieval period, however, "places" found their
greatest use in sermons.30 They were needed for the selection of
texts and materials for preaching, applying the methods of amplific-
ation, and studying the demands of an audience.31 Hence, many com-
mentaries and translations of classical treatises which dealt with
places (Aristotle's Organon, Cicero's De Inventione and Topica, and
the ad Herennium, for example) were used as aids to the invention
of sermons.32 .‘

The "places" also were used for letter—writing during the

medieval period. There were ”places" for salutations, stock proverbs,

 

29The usefulness of Aristotle's Topics was also acknowledged
by Cicero (Orator 32, ll3ff.) and Quintilian (xii.2). John's comment
(above) was in connection with the dialectic-rhetoric relation.

30See Harry Caplan's articles on medieval preaching, including:
”Classical Rhetoric and the Medieval Theory of Preaching," Historical
Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. Raymond F. Howes (Ithica,
N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 71-89; and ”Rhetorical Inven-
tion in Some Medieval Tractates on Preaching,” Speculum, II(1927),
pp. 284-95. In the former article (p. 81), he observed that "the
richest legacy bequeathed to medieval rhetoric from the ancient period
was the principle of the inventional use of the topos or commonplace,
the artistic finding of the right argument communicable to the right
audience in the right circumstances.'l

 

31Caplan, "Classical Rhetoric and the Medieval Theory of Preach-
in " 81
g, P- -

32The medieval sermon typically followed definite patterns of
development. The most popular and most characteristically medieval
method was the thematic method, in which the minister began with an
announcement of the theme, usually from the Gospel of the day and
always from Scripture. He then presented the protheme, a prayer to
capture attention. Next he presented the introduction to the theme
proper, employing examples, arguments from induction, and syllo-
gisms. After presenting a division of the theme, he usually ended the
sermon with moral exhaltations. If the places for the development of
the theme (for example, God, the devil, the Heavenly City, the Inferno,

 

97
Scriptural quotations, devices of amplification for persuasion,
and "places" of a dialectical nature (usually found in the narration
and petition). These for the most part were touchstones for the divi-

sions in the logical development of the letter.33

Renaissance Concgptions of the Places

 

The use of ”places" (particularly loci communes) was common in

 

the Renaissance; but rhetoricians who treated the places often tended
to group together (with little or no distinction) the categories of
Aristotle, the 1221 of Cicero, and the subject "places" popular in
the Renaissance. While the ancient system of invention, as planned by
Aristotle and elaborated by later theorists, chiefly Cicero and Quin-
tilian, had survived and answered men's needs, by the time of the
Renaissance ”it began to lose favor and to be supplanted by modes of
assembling factual data in connection with the process of delibera-
tion and decision."34

Thomas Wilson, however, was very much in the classical tradi-

tion of the places. His Arte of Rhetorrque (1553)35 was the first

 

attempt in English to enunciate a full, rounded set of principles

 

the world, the soul, the body, sin, penitence, virtue) were committed
to memory and used. Scripture could be used to teach, argue, and
arrest injustice so that by instruction men would be perfected in
every good work of God. (See Caplan, "Rhetorical Invention in Some
Medieval Tractates on Preaching," pp. 284-95.)

33Lechner, pp. 56-57.

34Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700,
p. 69. By the seventeenth century, there was a definite decline of
interest in artistic proofs, and the development of a belief in non-
artistic proofs as a better way to persuade. The decline of interest
in the classical concept of artistic proofs was inevitable with the
development of science, with the expansion of facilities for the
study and dissemination of facts, and with the growth of respect for
direct observation and controlled experiment (largely owing to Francis
Bacon's writings). Moreover, the rhetoric of the seventeenth century
included the idea that learned exposition as well as popular argument

and exhortation was within rhetoric's proper scope. See Howell, pp.
365, 375-76.

 

 

 

98
for artistic prose composition, in particular for those engaged

36

in public, oral communication in the vernacular. In definition

and doctrine, as well as in the allocation of space given to inven-
tion, Wilson's Rhetorique conformed closely to classical doctrine.37

Devoting two—thirds of his treatise to invention, Wilson held
to the view that sound subject matter is the foundation of good
rhetoric. The method for finding subject matter is that of the places,
as employed in the three kinds of oratory, deliberative, epideictic,
and forensic.38

Before more specifically considering Wilson's concept of ”places,”
it may be helpful to review briefly the theory of ”places" as it had
developed prior to him. The theory was that the ”places” or lists of

ideas, subdivisions, and statements could be provided to insure that

 

35G. H. Mair ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909).
36Russell H. Wagner, ”Thomas Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique,”
Speech Monographs, XXVII(1960), p. 2. Wagner was one of the best
authorities on Wilson's Rhetorique, and here is followed closely.
His article, ”Wilson and His Sources,” Quarterly Journal of Speech,
XV(November, 1929), pp. 525-37, is also valuable.

 

37Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique," p. 13. However,
rhetoric, since Republican Rome, ''was no longer the art of the persu-
asive speaker, but the art of ornamentation of style in Latin composi-
tion." (p. 11) The typical Renaissance rhetoric said little or nothing
of persuasion, and the marshalling of proofs and consideration of the
hearers had largely been forgotten. (p. 14) Wilson on the whole was
also little concerned with persuasion or the methods of achieving it.
But he was very much interested in the methods of topical analysis
and the varied modes of amplification. (p. 15)

38Wagner notes that ”the whole theory of invention in Wilson
consists of providing all of the topics needed or possible in each of
the three kinds of oratory." Further, claims Wagner, Wilson said nothing
(under invention) regarding the ways of appealing to the emotions. (This
was treated under disposition in Book II.) And nothing was said about
ethical proof. Ibid., p. 19.

 

   

 

99
a speaker would be able to develop fully any subject whatsoever and
that he would not overlook any points applicable to his case. Pos-
sessing the "places," he would be able not only to analyze and de-
velop any ideas he had, but to apply all his knowledge, all the
facts, and all his powers of reasoning, elucidation, and persuasion
on any problem that might confront him. These "places" were of vary-
ing types. Some derived from logic and had the appearance, at least,
of the accuracy, completeness, and finality of an exact science. Some
were lists of the most likely "haunts of arguments." Some were mere
word lists; and some, called "commonplaces," were completely pre-
pared "purple patches" which could be used for a considerable variety
of subjects.

Wilson's fiplaces" are also of several kinds. He couples with his
definition of invention ("the finding out of apt matter") a strong
recommendation of the ”places" of logic, especially when a speaker
wishes to prove a case and to teach the truth, and he urges the speak-
er to study these before turning to the places of rhetoric (pp. 6, 23).39
In developing the proof section of a forensic oration, Wilson is espec-
ially firm in his recommendation of the places of logic, so that the
speaker can understand cause and effect, and the methods of proof (112—

113). The places of logic are, therefore, the elemental, bare, but

 

39A statement by Wilbur Samuel Howell (Logic and Rhetoric in
England, 1500-1700, p. 24) deserves mention here: "Invention in
scholastic logic was a process in which an author found subject matter
by connecting his mind with the traditional wisdom of his race and by
allowing that content to induce a flow of ideas from the general store
into himself. This process involved his knowing what were called 'the
places.’ Nowhere is scholastic logic more attractive than in Wilson's
definition of a place." (Underlining supplied by the writer) In the
Rule of Reason, Wilson called a place "the restying corner of an argu-
mente, or else a marke whiche geve warning to our memorie." ([London:
Richard Grafton, 15533, folio 37)

 

 

 

   

 

100
complete and indispensable parts of any subject, such as definition,
causes, parts, effects, adjuncts, and contraries.4O Somewhat similar
"places" (in the sense that they are absolute and complete divisions)
are the three main ”places" for praising a man: "before his life,
in his life, after his death (11);41 and the three kinds of staseis
or issues in the forensic speech: "conjectural, legal, juridical . . .
whether the thing be, or no, what it is, what manner of thing it is"
(89).

However, Wilson mainly provides places like the sedes argument-
2r22 of the Latin rhetorics42--lists of haunts or abodes of arguments,
sometimes fairly exhaustive, always covering the most important sub-
divisions and the indispensable points, as a matter of course, and
often suggesting other possibilities. Such are almost all of the many
lists of places found in Book I, from those ”before a man's life"

(11) to the places of proof for the assumptive plea in the juridical

state of the forensic oration (98).43

 

4OWilson followed Cicero regarding the intrinsic-extrinsic dis-
tinctions for the "places” of logic. (See Cicero Topica 8-24.) He
followed him with respect to the terms used and the functions assigned
to the "places." But he did not follow Cicero in limiting the number
to sixteen, or in Cicero's allotting of them all to the intrinsic group.
In the final analysis, Wilson would seem to allow fifteen ”places,”
although his first illustration of their use as a system names exactly
sixteen, and his second illustration names nineteen. In reality, some
of these nineteen were species of genera named among the original fif-
teen, and some of the original fifteen were dismissed as inapplicable
to the second illustration.

41Things before a man's life include parents and birthplace;
things in his life are birth, infancy, childhood, manhood, old age,
and death; and things after death include funeral honors and coat of
arms. If the epideictic orator chooses to praise deeds, he can consider
who did the deed, what was done, where, how, and when it was done.

42Wagner states that the ad Herennium, doubtless considered by
Wilson to be Cicero's, was one of Wilson's chief authorities, and that
Wilson also drew to some extent upon Cicero's De Inventione, De Oratore,
De Partitione Oratoria, and Brutus, as well as upon Quintilian's Insti-
tutio Oratoria. ("Wilson and His Sources," p. 528)

 

 

 

 

 

101

In the first book there is no evidence that Wilson regarded
commonplaces as part of his theory of invention; but in the second
book there are many examples in connection with amplification. He
says, in fact: "Therefore in praising or dispraising we must be well
stored ever with such good sentences as are often used in this our
life, they which through art being increased, help much to persua-

sion” (116). These "sentences,"

as he illustrates abundantly, are

aphorisms, proverbs, and maxims, some quoted directly from the Bible

and elsewhere, some adapted or original. However, these are not methods

of invention or part of the doctrine of invention; they are rather a

part of the process of achieving "copie," of developing and expressing ‘
fully ideas which have been summoned and selected through the preceding
processes of invention and disposition.

Mainly, then, Wilson's conception of invention as propounded in
the Rhetorigue is that one can discover what must be proved (if proof
is in question), what is appropriate, and all that it is possible or
necessary to say on any subject, by knowing and using the "places"
of logic, by conning the lists of "places" provided, understanding
them well, storing them in the mind, and consulting and using them as

needed. The proper use of "places" he illustrates with two long examples

 

43While Wilson treats epideictic places (see above, p. 100) and
deliberative places (including: things honest, pleasant, profitable,
safe, easy, hard, lawful, praiseworthy, or necessary {29-3 ), these
are far less important than the places of forensic oratory. Wagner
states: "Thus it seems safe to say that deliberative and demonstrative
oratory are not important concepts with Wilson; that they are insignif—
icant in comparison with judicial oratory." (Thomas Wilson's Arte of

Rhetorique," p. 23)

   

102

44

and many shorter ones.
In presenting this scheme of invention, however, Wilson adds
some important qualifications. He emphasizes the need of judgment,
a factor so important as to have been made a division of rhetoric
equal to invention by some rhetoricians, and a very important topic
or division in his own and other logics. In his commentary on judg-
2222 he says it is necessary not only to know the nature of the sub-
ject, but also to consider the audience, occasion, and all the cir—
cumstances under which the speech is to be given. With that in mind,
the search for, and selection of, material in the process of invention
will be a more economical and generally successful task (8, 18).
What he says concerning the "places" of proof in the deliberative
oration would appear to be of general application: "It is not thought
that either they E'places'fl should all be used in number as they are,
or in order as they stand; but that any one may use them and order
them as he shall think best, according as the time, place, and person
shall most of all require" (86).
Like Thomas Wilson, Francis Bacon gave considerable attention to

the classical ”places." While he did not compose a rhetorical treatise,

 

44The following is one concrete example of the way in which Wilson
believed the "places” were useful in the religious controversies of
the time. After posing the question whether it be lawful for a priest
to have a wife, he examines the question by taking the two key words
"priest" and "wife” to the "places," and by seeing whether the con-
clusions obtained in respect to one of these words agrees with the
conclusions obtained in respect to the other. His assumption is that
where there is agreement between the conclusions reached in the case
of priest and the conclusions reached in the case of wife, then to
that extent the proposition that it is lawful for a priest to have a
wife is good. When there is disagreement, of course, the proposition
is not good. Wilson, then, examines priesthood from nineteen different
”places” (see Rule of Reason, folio 114), including definition, genus,
species, property, whole, and parts. After examining wifehood under
the same aspects, he next shows how.to obtain arguments for and against

the lawfulness of marriage among the clergy” (Wilson incidentally
3 3

 

 

103

his Advancement of Learnir_1g_45 does contain numerous references to

 

rhetorical precepts. (This inventory of the learned disciplines,
along with his comments upon their adequacies and inadequacies,
became the greatest native influence in English during the seven-
teenth century.46) Although it cannot be said that he proposes a
complete new rhetoric, as distinguished from the Ciceronian and
Ramistic systems then in existence,47 he does take a fresh look at
the theory of communication and indicates that rhetoric has oblig-
ations to learned as well as popular discourse--obligations more
48

comprehensive and vital than it had in the older systems.

When he speaks of the humanistic sciences, Bacon dwells at

 

some length upon four great intellectual arts: invention, judgment,
memory, and elocution. These four processes and the wisdom built up
from the contemplation of them are what Bacon discusses under the arts

49

belonging to the four terms which he borrows from Ciceronian rhetoric.

 

believed it was lawful for a priest to marry.) See Howell, Logic and
Rhetoric in Epgland,715OO-l700, pp. 25-26.

 

4SIn The Works of Lord Bacon (London: Henry Bohn, 1854), I.

 

46Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p. 365.

 

47During the later Middle Ages and Renaissance, the belief

that dialectic contributed invention and arrangement to the art of
composition, and rhetoric merely style and delivery, was by all odds
the prevalent conception. (See Wilbur Samuel Howell, "Nathaniel Car-
penter's Place in the Controversy between Dialectic and Rhetoric,"
Speech Monographs, 1 E93 , p. 29.) A few of the proponents of that
view were John of Salisbury, Agricola, Peter Ramus, and (Ramus' dis-
ciple) Talon. To the degree that Bacon departed from this notion of
rhetoric, his theory was new.

48Bacon's theory of rhetoric, it seems clear, emphasized the
place of logical proof and imaginative appeal, and indicated in general
how reason may be applied to imagination for the better moving of the
will. See Karl R. Wallace, "Bacon's Conception of Rhetoric,” Speech
Monographs, III(1936), p. 36.

49Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p. 366;

 

 

104

Concerning the art of invention, Bacon distinguishes two kinds,
One pertains to the bringing of new arts and sciences into being and
involves the discovery of something not known before. The other per-
tains to the discovery of materials for speech and involves the re-
discovery of something previously known but temporarily forgotten.50
This invention concerning the discovery of arguments is clearly dis-
tinguished from the procedure of scientific inquiry (which draws con—
clusions from tabulated particulars).

In his analysis of rhetorical invention, Bacon divides the ”places"
into two species, general and particular. The former he dismisses, call-

ing them sufficiently handled in logic.51

Particular places, unlike ‘
general places, are special lines of inquiry applicable to a special

subject and to no other.52 These aid the speaker by recalling to mind

ideas and arguments which he has previously unearthed, and by prompt-

ing lines of inquiry which will bring forth new material appropriate

to the purpose at hand.53 While these "places" are of great importance

to Bacon, he (unfortunately) never explains precisely what they mean

to rhetoric.54 But, says Karl Wallace, the inference is clear that a

speaker, if he wishes to discover true and solid reasons, can not rest

 

50Advancement of Learning, I, p. 48.

 

51Wallace claims that Bacon was here probably referring to the
traditional "places" of invention found in Aristotle's Analytics and
subsequent logical treatises down to Bacon. These "places” drawn from
logic (like and unlike, equal and unequal, greater and less, subject
and adjunct, cause, effect, genus, species, and definition) would help
the speaker to discover logical proof. ("Bacon's Conception of Rhet—
oric," p. 38)

52The idea behind this conception was that each science, as it
pursued its special inquiries, would develop its own art of invention.

53Wallace, p. 38.

54Wallace, p. 39.

 

105
content with the lines of inquiry suggested by general ”places”;
if the occasion demands it, he must push his investigation into a
special subject-matter until he learns what problems are peculiar
to it.55 Hence, Bacon would probably advise young speakers to delve
into the natural and social sciences, ethics, psychology, and poli-
tics, and to frame for themselves question-topics that would facili-
tate the invention of technical arguments, should an occasion require
them.

Besides the general and particular "places," Bacon also notes
four other aids to invention.56 For instance, the Colours of Good
and Evil, a compilation of generalizations that have become common-
place in discussion as premises for arguments, serves to aid delib-
erative speakers in the detection of sophistic reasoning. These
"places" of persuasion and discussion can help the speaker to arrive
at true and safe judgments. The Antitheta are ready-made briefs
(forty-seven arguments, pr2 and 222, similar to modern affirmative
and negative briefs). Formulae are small parts of a speech, fully
composed and ready for use. These include prefaces, digressions, con-
clusions, transitions, and the like, and serve to add ornament to a
speech. And Apothegms are clever rejoinders (”pointed speeches") at-
tributed to famous persons. While all of the above serve to "recom-

" they do take on a prominence in Bacon's

mend reason to imagination,
works which seem (to Wallace) somewhat disproportionate to their real

value. Probably they represent mainly the deficiencies which as handmaids

attend the art of rhetoric. Certainly they are not meant to be regarded

 

55"Bacon's Conception of Rhetoric," p. 39.

56See Wallace, pp. 39-42.

 

 

106

as substitutes for wide and deep knowledge of a subject.57

Modern Conceptions of the "Places"58

 

After the Renaissance only a few major rhetoricians (John Ward
and John Quincy Adams, for example) made favorable references to the
classical l'places." Others (among them George Campbell, Hugh Blair,
and Richard Whately) either avoided the concept or threw it out al-
together.

When the rhetorical theories of the early modern British rhet-
oricians are compared, striking differences appear in concept as well
as in approach to the problem of discovering logical proofs. John

Ward's System of Oratory, for example, represented one current of

 

 

57Wallace, p. 42. Howell contends that Bacon half-heartedly
assigned the commonplaces to rhetoric. (See "Nathaniel Carpenter's
Place in the Controversy between Dialectic and Rhetoric,” p. 39.)
Yet a further examination of Advancement of Learning (1, p. 48)
suggests that Bacon was not quite so averse to the commonplaces as
both Wallace and Howell believe. For instance, Bacon strongly dis-
agrees with Aristotle regarding the Sophists' use of the commonplaces.
He declares that "Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the
sophists near his time, saying, '’They did as if one that professed
the art of shoe-making should not teach how to make a shoe, but
only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and
sizes.’ [Bee Aristotle De Sophisticis Elenchis 184a. But yet a man
might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no she s in his shop,
but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed."
Bacon then cites the precepts of Cicero in support of his position
on commonplaces, suggesting that if a man carefully prepared thesi
or general questions, when he came to a particular question he would
already be prepared, except to add names, places, and times. Also,
he cites the example of Demosthenes, who used a number of ready-made
introductions for his orations. Thus, concludes Bacon, these authori-
ties and precedents outweigh Aristotle's opinion, "tham would have
us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears."

 

 

58Since the primary interest of this study is with the classical
rhetoricians who treated the "places,” it is necessary to restrict the
treatment of the more recent rhetorical figures. To attempt adequately
to explain the bewildering blending of the old and the new in rhetori-
cal theory would lead the writer too far astray from his central pur—
pose. Therefore, in this remaining section, rhetoricians such as Camp-
bell, Blair, and Whately will receive only passing attention, principally
because they said little about the "places." John Ward and John Quincy

   

107

English theory that was thoroughly classical in tendency.59 George
Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) is usually regarded as a
treatise which marked a transition from classical to modern concepts
of oratory. His text retained much of value from classical theory
but displayed the influence of eighteenth-century thought in its
observation that oral discourse is directed toward other ends than
that of persuasion, in its recognition of common shortcomings in lan-
guage usage, in its analysis of audience psychology, and in its ap-

proach to logical proof.60 Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and

 

Belles Lettres (1783) was primarily devoted to stylistic matters
such as taste, language, poetry, comedy, and the like.61 And Richard

Whately's Elements of Rhetoric (1828) and Elements of Logic (1826) ,w

 

helped stimulate renewed interest in the study of logic and helped
initiate a trend of theory which moved rapidly in the direction of

argumentation and debate.62

 

Adams, on the other hand, were more heavily classical in emphasis and
treatment, and will receive a more extended treatment. The study will
end with a consideration of Adams' view of the "places.” (See above,
note 34, p. 97.)

59Clarence W. Edney, ”English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in
Nineteenth-Century America," History of Speech Education in America:
Background Studies, ed. Karl Wallace (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1954), p. 80. See John Ward's System of Oratory, two vols. (London:
1759), especially I, pp. 44-76; and Bert E. Bradley's "The Inventio of
John Ward," Speech Monographs, XXVI(1959), pp. 56-63.

6OClarence W. Edney, "George Campbell's Theory of Logical Truth,"
Speech Monographs, XV(1948), p. 19. Also see Lloyd F. Bitzer's "A Re-
Evaluation of Campbell's Doctrine of Evidence," Quarterly Journal of
Speech, XLVI(April, 1960), pp. 135-40. And, of course, see Campbell's
Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1871), espec-
ially "On the Nature and Use of the Scholastic Art of Syllogizing,"
pp. 83-92 (Book I, chapter 6). One looks in vain in Campbell's treatise
for mention of the classical places.

 

 

61(Philadelphia: Porter and Coates, n.d.) Blair treated invention
specifically in just two pages (pp. 353-54), wherein he spoke slight-
ingly of the "places" doctrines of the ancient rhetoricians. Upon such

   

108

Of the above rhetoricians, John Ward was the only one who
treated the classical "places” favorably.63 Suggesting that they can
lessen the difficulty of finding arguments (I, 45-46), he divides them
according to internal and external heads. His list of sixteen internal
places (I, 44, 51-52) is an exact repetition of the sixteen listed in
Cicero's Topica (18).64 And his division (I, 61-52) of external "places"
into human testimony (writings, witnesses, and contracts65) and divine
testimony is based on classical precepts.

In his treatment of the "places" of praise and blame (epideictic
oratory), Ward follows Quintilian quite closely (cf. Inst. Orat. iii.

7. 1-18). Praise can be bestowed on persons or things. Praise of persons

 

doctrines, he maintained, it was "superfluous to insist," for if anyone
wanted to find good materials he should go to the original sources.
Hence, Blair discounted the usefulness of the classical "places" for
finding arguments.

62See Elements of Rhetoric (New York: Sheldon and Co., 1871);
Orville L. Pence, "The Concept and Function of Logical Proof in the
Rhetorical System of Richard Whately," Speech Monographs, XX(1953),
pp. 23-38; and Wayland M. Parrish, "Whately and His Rhetoric," Quar-
ter1y Journal of Speech, XV(February, 1929), pp. 58-79. Whately, like
Campbell and Blair, said little regarding the classical places.

 

63Douglas Ehninger points out that all three major British rhet-
oricians—-Campbell, Blair, and Whately--made significant departures
from classical doctrine. None of them, for example, organized his work
according to the standard classical pattern; all of them abandoned the
inventional schemes of status and "places." Faculty psychology, literary
concepts of genius and taste, the identification of rhetoric with belles
lettres--all these movements were afoot in eighteenth-century English
rhetoric. See "Campbell, Blair, and Whately: Old Friends in a New Light,"
Western Speech, XIX(October, 1955), pp. 263-69.

64Also see Quintilian Institutio Oratoria v.10.94.

65For his discussion of writings, Ward drew upon Cicero's De Orat-
2r2 ii.37; on witnesses he consulted Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria
v.1.2, and v.7.1-37; and on contracts he drew upon Aristotle's Rhetoric
l376a—1376b. See Ward, 1, 62-75.

 

109

includes places such as country, family, and intellectual and physi-
cal virtues (I, 92-100). Praise of things (I, 100-106) includes places
of countries (topography, size, cities, government, wealth, and cul-
ture), cities (nature and beauty of buildings), and facts (honor, jus—
tice, and advantage).

Concerning forensic oratory, Ward follows Cicero and Quintilian
regarding the status doctrine.66 Noting the conjectural, definitive,
and qualitative states (I, 124-33), he closely paraphrases Quintilian's
discussion of the "places" for the conjectural state and Cicero's dis-
cussion of those for the definitive state.

John Ward's System of Oratory, then, was an important eighteenth-
century compendium of classical doctrine which gave considerable atten-
tion to the doctrine of "places." The work was also significant in an-
other important respect. The statutes outlining the rhetorical theory
of the Boylston lectures at Harvard were modeled upon Ward's treatise.67

Of the Boylston Professors of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard,68

John Quincy Adams was perhaps best known, and here will receive extended

 

66See Cicero De Oratore ii.24; Quintilian Institutio Oratoria iii.
6.80-81.

67Ronald F. Reid, ”The Boylston Professorship of Rhetoric and
Oratory, 1806-1904: a Case Study in Changing Concepts of Rhetoric and
Pedagogy," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLV(October, 1959), p. 241.
Ward was widely used in America until about 1780; the statutes out-
lining the duties and responsibilities of the Boylston lecturers were
written a quarter century later. Since the laymen who wrote the stat-
utes were trained in the classical tradition, says Reid, it would be
natural for them to look to the major interpreter of that tradition
(Ward). A comparison of Ward's treatise and the statutes reveals re—
markable similarities, especially in their organizational schemes.

 

68Much has been written on the Boylston lecturers. Because there
is so much material readily available to the reader, the writer will
not delve into the history of the Boylston Professorship, or the partic-
ular lecturers (excepting Adams) who were employed during the nineteenth
century. Rather, he will examine the treatment John Quincy Adams gave
the places, and elsewhere refer the reader to various articles for

 

   

110
treatment. His lectures, it has been said, "constitute one of the

earliest and most systematic American contributions to the theory

of speaking."69 These lectures were based upon the requirements

. 0
stated in the statutes,7 and Adams' adherence to those statutes

placed his lectures squarely in the classical tradition.71

 

additional information. See, for instance, Ronald F. Reid, ibid.,

pp. 239-57; Horace Rahskopf, "John Quincy Adams: Speaker and Rhet-
orician," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXII(December, 1946), pp.
435-41; Paul E. Ried, "Joseph McKean: the Second Boylston Professor
of Rhetoric and Oratory," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI(December,
1960), pp. 419-24. And, of course, see John Quincy Adams, Lectures

on Rhetoric and Oratory Delivered to the Classes of Senior and Junior
Sophisters in Harvard University, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Hilliard
and Metcalf, 1810).

 

 

 

 

 

69Rahskopf, p. 437. Rahskopf adds (p. 438) that Adams ignored
the work of the English elocutionists (Sheridan, Steele, Walker) and
often disagreed with Campbell and Blair.

7OThe statutes' outline of rhetorical theory was rigidly class-
ical. The professor was to begin his course with an historical and
biographical account of ancient oratory and orators. He was to explain
the nature of rhetoric, its subjects, and several kinds, and to show
the connection with the powers of the human mind. Rhetoric was to be
divided into four parts, to be discussed in the following manner.
First, invention was to include a treatment of the state of a contro-
versy, "places” (internal and external), the different arguments pro—
per to demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial oratory, the charac-
ter and address of a finished orator, and the use and excitation of
the passions. Second, disposition was to include a treatment of the
properties and uses of the parts of a discourse (Introduction, Narra-
tion, Proposition, Confirmation, Confutation, and Conclusion), with
suitable remarks on digression, transition, and amplification. Third,
elocution was to include elegance, composition, and dignity, and the
types of style. Finally, delivery was to involve a discussion of voice
and gesture, as well as a statement of the importance of good delivery.
(Harvard College Records, IV, lOff., Harvard Archives; also see Ronald
F. Reid, l'Boylston Professorship of Rhetoric and Oratory," pp. 240-41)
Now early in the preparation of his lectures (he delivered thirty—six
of them between 1806-1809) Adams objected to the rigidity of these
statutes. Although one might naturally expect, then, to find substan-
tial departures from the statutes (especially from a man as independent
as Adams), his modifications were actually quite minor. The only note-
worthy ones were (1) a restoration of memory as one of the five parts
of rhetoric, (2) omission of the low-middle-grand stylistic classific-
ation, (3) failure to discuss the styles of various compositions, and
(4) a transfer of amplification from the lecture on digression and

 

 

111

In his inaugural lecture, Adams declared that Aristotle, Cicero,

and Quintilian had already thoroughly studied rhetoric, and that "In
the theory of the art, and the principles of exposition, novelty will
not be expected, nor is it perhaps to be desired" (I, 28). In his
subsequent treatment of the five canons of rhetoric, he adhered to
that view. Thus, a profile of the classical influences on Adams looks
like this. i

Invention--Aristotelian approach regarding the logical, ethical,

and pathetical proofs,
Ciceronian approach to the "places,” and

Quintilian's precepts regarding speech purposes
Disposition-—mainly a repetition of Cicero's division

Elocution----mainly the Ciceronian approach

Memory ------- a summary of the precepts of numerous ancient and ,
modern rhetoricians C

Delivery ----- mostly the precepts of Quintilian

Before discussing the classical "places," Adams presented six
lectures concerning such matters as the general view of rhetoric and
oratory, objections frequently raised against rhetoric, and the origins
of oratory. Then, after treating the ”state of the controversy," he

turned to his analysis of the classical ”places" (1, 208-28).

 

transition to the one on conclusions. (Ronald Reid, p. 242) In addi-
tion, Adams did modify slightly some classical precepts, in keeping
with the developments of his own time. Hence, he offered his own
ideas on purity of style, figurative language, and pulpit speaking.
Judicial speaking was analyzed according to American law and judi-
cial procedure; and principles of deliberative oratory were illus-
trated with parliamentary rules and procedures of modern political
assemblies. Also, at times Adams disagreed with the ancients, par—
ticularly in connection with the minute divisions and subdivisions
to which classical rhetoricians reduced the science.

71In general, says Ronald Reid (p. 244), Adams' lectures were
classical (though not slavishly so), not because he was afraid to
violate the statutes, or because he lacked originality, but because
he believed sincerely in classicism's vitality and usefulness in
the nineteenth century.

   

112

Adams begins by calling the Greek word Ma place or common
seat, to which every speaker must resort for his arguments (I, 209).
They are "general incidents, or circumstances, belonging alike to
every subject, and distributed under a certain number of heads, to
facilitate the invention of public speakers" (I, 209). The "places"
are next divided into two general classes, internal and external,
the internal arising from the subject itself and the external from
any other source outside the subject (1, 209-10).

Of the sixteen internal "places,' the first three (definition,

enumeration, and notation) embrace the whole subject under analysis.
The other thirteen, on the other hand, are less comprehensive, and

are derived from the subject's properties, incidents, and relations.72

 

The six external (or inartificial) "places" are prejudications,
common fame, torture, written documents, oaths, and witnesses.73 In
discussing these, Adams notes (I, 217) the great diversity and con-
fusion among ancient rhetoricians.

After completing his survey of the internal and external "places,"
Adams concludes his lecture by turning to an evaluation of the useful—

ness of the "places." Whereas the doctrine of the "places" has been

 

72See Adams, I, 209-16; also cf. Cicero Topica ii.9—iv.23. The
sixteen internal ”places" were: definition, enumeration, notation
(etymology), conjugates, genus, species, antecedents, consequents,
adjuncts, cause, effect, contraries, repugnances, similitude, dis—
similitude, and comparison.

73See Adams, I, 217-24. Of these "places," Adams points out
that torture, though a topic of continual recurrence among Greeks
and Romans, was not among the ways and means of his time. And com-
mon fame was then generally excluded from judicial practice (though
it was a copious source for deliberative and epideictic discourse).
The other four places, however, were especially appropriate to judi-
cial oratory. Written documents, prejudications (precedents), oaths,
and witnesses were all admitted as evidence in law courts.

 

 

113

deemed of vast importance by students of ancient rhetoric, modern
teachers of eloquence have almost unanimously pronounced them utter-
ly worthless (I, 226). Yet, they can be useful, said Adams; they

can suggest a train of thought and add facility to the copiousness
of an orator (I, 228). (That, however, is all the benefit that could
be derived from a thorough knowledge of the ”places.") Generally,
they assist invention by exhibiting a subject in all its attitudes
(I, 228), and an accomplished orator should not disdain a thorough

knowledge of them. The "places, then, are given a qualified endorse—

ment by John Quincy Adams, the first Boylston Professor.74

 

74After his lecture on the "places," Adams presented other
lectures on invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and delivery.
Then, after completing his lectures, he resigned in the summer of
1809 to accept a diplomatic appointment, and a new Boylston Professor,
Joseph McKean, was appointed.

McKean's tenure (1809-1818) resulted in no radical change in
the concept of rhetoric. (Ronald Reid, "Boylston Professorship of
Rhetoric and Oratory," p. 244) Less original than Adams, McKean or-
ganized his lectures in strict accordance with the statutes. Never-
theless, his lectures foreshadowed changes to come. There were traces
of Blair and numerous references to Campbell, especially when treat-
ing emotional proof. Furthermore, although McKean defended the in-
ventional schemes of status and "places" against Blair's charge of
pedantry, he was less enthusiastic about their utility than was
Adams.

Edward T. Channing took over from McKean in 1819 and remained
as Boylston Professor until 1851. His lectures bore little resem-
blance to those of Adams and McKean. (Ronald Reid, p. 246) He aban-
doned not only the classical pattern of organizing his lectures, but
also the classical orientation of much of the theory. Invention, for
instance, was stripped of its analytical schemes (including "places”),
which were considered of no practical use. Moreover, Channing's lec-
tures contained no detailed accounts of emotional and ethical proof,
which were integral to Adams' and McKean's classical doctrine.

During the last half of the nineteenth century, two other men
occupied the Boylston chair, Francis James Child (1851-1876) and Adam
Sherman Hill (1876-1904). During their tenure, however, rhetoric turned
away even further from the classical authors. Whereas in 1806 rhetoric
was concerned primarily with persuasive oratory and had its roots sunk
deeply in the classical tradition, by the time of Hill's retirement
what was called "rhetoric" was concerned not with oratory, but with
written composition, expository and literary as well as persuasive,
and made little direct reference to classical authors.

 

 

114

John Quincy Adams' extensive review and favorable reception

of the classical "places" suggests an appropriate point at which

to end this survey.75

 

75For fear of going far astray from the central purpose of
his study, an analysis of classical conceptions of "places," the
writer has chosen to conclude with a consideration of the classical
rhetorical concepts discussed by John Quincy Adams. The writer's
intent in this chapter has been to inform the reader of some of the
rhetoricians after Quintilian who accepted or rejected the classical
concept of "places." A survey of twentieth century rhetorical views
of "places," however, would seem more appropriate for a separate
study.

T311.-

   

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions may be drawn regarding the classical
"places."

(1) There were two rhetorical traditions among the fifth century
Sophists, the theoretical and the exemplar. The theoretical tradition,
as represented by the handbooks, was devoted entirely to forensic ora-
tory and concerned only invention and arrangement. In the exemplar
tradition, standard passages were made available on such universal
subjects as justice, injustice, nature, and convention. The Sophists'
great regard for general ideas and their systematic exploration and
exploitation of great themes made them the founders of the common
places. Their emphasis on moral training also prompted the develop-
ment of commonplaces as ”little orations" to be inserted in a speech
for purposes of amplification. This conception of "places" was to
coexist with, and eventually dominate, the Aristotelian conception.

(2) Isocrates paid little attention to “places," preferring to
emphasize a broad view of invention. Disclaiming the ability to teach
invention by means of "places,'' he proposed that the first require-
ment in the training of the good speaker should be a liberal education.
The subject matter of speeches should be noble, dignified, politically
practical, and honorable. His few favorable references to "places"
were to universal ideas which serve to amplify a speech. Otherwise his

115

 

 

116

references to "places" were casual as contrasted with the more
extended treatment of the theory by such rhetoricians as Aristotle,
Cicero, and Quintilian.

(3) Like Isocrates, Plato gave "places" little attention. On
some occasions he even spoke derisively of them. His antipathy to
the rhetoric he saw practised around him, together with his prefer-
ence for the dialectical method, led him to reject Sophistic concep-
tions of ”places."

(4) Rhetorica ad Alexandrum was a practical handbook on public

 

speaking which stood firmly in the Sophistic tradition. "Places"
were treated as pre-processed materials selected by the author for
use in particular parts of a speech. The author recognized both
those peculiar to one type of oratory and those common to all types.
(5) Aristotle bequeathed to later rhetoricians a new conception
of "places." His new approach sprang from the idea that instead of
providing a great number of ready-made arguments (one and all apply-
ing to quite definite and specific subjects or situations) the rhet-
oricians should concentrate on general forms or types of arguments.
He viewed r2p21 as pigeonholes from which dialectical and rhetorical
syllogisms draw their premises and forms. 12p21 are of two kinds,
material and formal. Material 12221 are either special or common,
special r2p21 providing the premises for enthymemes used in each type
of oratory. The four common r2p21 (Possibility, Past Fact, Future
Fact, and Degree) are not related to particular subjects, but are use-
ful for all types of oratory. Formal 12p21, including twenty-eight
valid and nine sham, provide the modes of reasoning a speaker can take.
12p21 provide the materials and forms of enthymemes, through which

logical, ethical, and pathetical proofs are projected.

 

 

117
(6) During the Hellenistic period, places were closely related
to the parts of a speech and to Hermagoras' reorganization of speech

materials under status. Two surviving treatises, Rhetorica ad Herennium

 

and De Inventione, reveal Hellenistic conceptions of the places. Ad Her-
ennium was, in the main, a consideration of forensic places and places
for purposes of amplification. The author provided a random list of

loci and loci communes thought to be serviceable to a speaker. Cicero's

 

De Inventione was similar in most respects to ad Herennium. Loci were

 

drawn from persons and from things, and considerable attention was given
to 1221 for purposes of amplification.

(7) The elder Cicero protested against the narrowing of rhetoric
and proposed a system of general culture which would train orators to
speak competently on all subjects. His broad view of invention came to

dominate the narrow view expressed in De Inventione. Hence, the concrete

 

.1221 favored in his youth were abandoned in favor of the formal 1221,
examined in Topica. These 1221, intelligently selected and used, were
considered helpful in the young orator's training.

(8) Quintilian considered 1221 as seats of arguments, drawn from
persons or from things. He followed Cicero in distinguishing common
and special 1221_and in recognizing some value in carefully handled
loci communes. He warned that a mere knowledge of 1221_is inadequate
since a speaker needs to examine for himself the peculiar facts of each
case.

(9) Hermogenes, Philostratus, Ausonius, and Sidonius lived in the
period of the Second Sophistic. After Quintilian, invention became bar-
ren and stereotyped; and the places they taught and used were conven-
tional in form and empty of real content.

(10) Medieval writers conceived places as seats of arguments,

 

 

118

or vehicles for amplification and embellishment, or as a "speech—
within-a-speech." In the fourth century, Saint Augustine attempted

to restore the vitality of Ciceronian rhetoric and saw some use for
places in the training of Christian ministers. Later, Boethius, Cas-
siodorus, and Alcuin followed the Ciceronian concept of 1221 as treated
in De Inventione and Topica. And in the twelfth century, John of Salis—
bury followed Cicero's Topica in his study of the places of logic.

Medieval "places" found their greatest use, however, in sermons
and letters. "Places" helped preachers to select their materials, study
audiences, and amplify ideas. For these purposes, the works of Aristotle
and Cicero (together with the ad Herennium) were most frequently used.

(ll)'Tlaces" were commonly discussed and used during the Renais-
sance. Because rhetoricians grouped together the categories of Aris-
totle, the 1221 of Cicero, and the subject places popular in the Ren-
aissance, there was usually confusion regarding the places. Thomas
Wilson and Francis Bacon, however, stood in the classical tradition.
Wilson followed Cicero in viewing "places" as rhetorical suggestions
for locating arguments for deliberative, epideictic, and forensic ora-
tory. Bacon recognized the common and special r2p21 of Aristotle as
useful in recalling knowledge. And he considered the formal "places”
useful in directing inquiry.

(12) From the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, few rhetor-
icians considered the classical "places" to be useful. George Campbell
and Richard Whately paid them no heed, while Hugh Blair spoke slight-
ingly of the "places" doctrines of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.

Among those who considered the "places" useful were John Ward and John

Quincy Adams. Ward offered an eighteenth-century compendium of classical

 

 

 

119

doctrine which presented an extensive treatment of the "places,"

his chief guides being Cicero and Quintilian. John Quincy Adams,

the first Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory, divided the
"places" into internal and external, and followed Cicero's Topica
closely. Adams, acknowledging the discredited state of the "places,''
yet saw some usefulness for them, particularly in suggesting a train
of thought and adding facility to the copiousness of an orator.

The Boylston Professors who followed Adams gradually de-emphasized
classical doctrines until, by the time of Adam Sherman Hill's retire-
ment (1904), what was called "rhetoric" was concerned not with ora-
tory, but with written composition--expository and literary as well

as persuasive-—and made little direct reference to classical authors.

 

Suggestions for Future Studies

 

Scattered throughout the literature on the classical period are

works which, because of the pervasive influence of the "places,"

give
attention to that concept. There remains to be done, however, a com-
prehensive study of the use of the places by Greek and Roman orators.
Such a study could do much to bridge the apparent gap between know-
ledge of classical theories of invention and the actual practice of
oratory. Cicero's speeches could serve as specimens for analysis.

Also, a study of the theory and practical application of the
loci communes is in order.

In addition, the "places" treated by classical rhetoricians found
great use in literature other than oratory. A study of the "places"
employed in drama, history, or philosophical treatises may be profit-

able.

Finally, the medieval, Renaissance, and modern conceptions of the

   

120
"places" need more investigation. The changing views of invention,
both in relation to the other canons of rhetoric and to dialectic
and grammar, brought about new conceptions of the "places." In par-
ticular, it may be valuable to explore the twentieth-century ap—
proaches to rhetorical invention, in light of the presence or ab-

sence of the classical tradition of the "places."

 

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