CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF "PLACES": A STUDY IN INVENTION

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Robert John Brake

1964

THESIS

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF "PLACES":
A STUDY IN INVENTION

presented by

Robert John Brake

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph. D. degree in Speech

Major professor

Date January 20, 1965

O-169

ROOM USE ONLY

ROOM USE ONLY
NOV 16 1966
NOV 30 1966

ABSTRACT

CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF "PLACES": A STUDY IN INVENTION

by Robert John Brake

Body of Abstract

The study involved a survey of classical conceptions of the rhetorical "places," roughly understood as sources from which arguments could be obtained. The "places" were an important part of the narrow view of invention and concerned the discovery and analysis of speech materials. This view of invention was one aspect of the broad view, which stressed the liberal education of orators and a far-ranging search for speech materials. This study primarily concerned the narrower "places" approach to invention, as either accepted or rejected by selected Greek and Roman rhetoricians from the fifth century B. C. to the time of Quintilian.

The purpose of the study was to attempt to find answers to the following questions: (1) What were some of the Greek and Roman views of the "places"? (2) In what ways were they similar? (3) In what ways did they differ? (4) What conclusions can be drawn regarding (a) the nature of the "places," (b) the importance attached to the "places," and (c) the persistence of the "places" concept throughout the ancient, medieval, Renaissance, and modern periods.

The study consisted of seven chapters, the first five concerning the classical period, the sixth being a survey of medieval, Renaissance, and early modern rhetoricians who discussed the classical

"places," and the last chapter containing conclusions of the study, along with recommendations for future studies. Each chapter, except the last, contained a section on "Introductory Considerations," designed to familiarize the reader with the rhetorician(s) discussed, political, economic, and cultural conditions of the period, or changes in rhetoric which had influenced, or were about to influence, conceptions of "places." Historical considerations were introduced wherever deemed appropriate to the study.

The following conclusions were drawn regarding the classical "places." (1) The early Greek Sophists systematically explored general ideas and offered their students collections of commonplaces. These were especially helpful for orators who wished to insert "little orations" in their speeches for purposes of amplification. (2) Isocrates paid little heed to "places," preferring to emphasize a broad view of invention. (3) Plato's antipathy to the rhetoric he saw practised around him, coupled with his preference for the dialectical method, led him to reject "places." (4) In _Rhetorica ad Alexandrum_, a handbook which stood firmly in the Sophistic tradition, "places" were treated as pre-processed materials selected by the author for use in particular parts of a speech.

(5) Aristotle conceived of _topoi_ ("places") as pigeonholes from which dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms drew their premises and forms. _Topoi_ were of two kinds, material and formal. Material _topoi_ were special or common, special _topoi_ providing premises for enthymemes used in each type of oratory, and common _topoi_ being useful for all types of oratory. Formal _topoi_ provided the modes of reasoning a speaker could employ.

(6) Hellenistic rhetoricians related the "places" to the parts

of a speech and to Hermagoras' reorganization of speech materials under status. Two treatises, Rhetorica ad Herennium and De Inventione, contain mostly forensic "places" and those for amplification.

(7) The elder Cicero protested against the narrowing of rhetoric and proposed a system of general culture which would train orators to speak competently on all subjects. Hence, his broad view of invention came to dominate the narrow view expressed in De Inventione; and the concrete loci favored in his youth were abandoned in favor of formal loci (examined in Topica).

(8) Like Cicero, Quintilian considered loci as seats of arguments, drawn from persons or from things. He warned that a mere knowledge of loci is inadequate since a speaker needs to examine for himself the peculiar facts of each case.

(9) In the period of the Second Sophistic, invention became barren and stereotyped; and the "places" taught and used were conventional in form and empty of real content. (10) In the medieval period, "places"found their greatest use in sermons and letters. Various writers (Saint Augustine and Alcuin, for example) followed Cicero, Aristotle, and the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium in their conceptions of "places." (11) During the Renaissance, Thomas Wilson and Francis Bacon gave favorable attention to the classical "places." (12) From the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, few rhetoricians considered the classical "places" useful. George Campbell and Whately paid them little heed, while Hugh Blair spoke slightingly of them. Among those who considered "places" useful were John Ward and John Quincy Adams. Ward presented an extensive treatment of "places," following Cicero and Quintilian closely, while Adams divided "places" into internal and external, and followed Cicero's Topica. After Adams, other Boyl-

ston Professors gradually de-emphasized classical concepts of rhetoric, until, by the twentieth century, few direct references were made to the "places."

CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF "PLACES":

A STUDY IN INVENTION

By

Robert John Brake

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Speech

1964

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The writer wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Kenneth G. Hance for his advice and guidance in the preparation of this study.

CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
	INTRODUCTION	i
	Purpose of the Study	i
	Limitations Imposed	ii
	Significance of the Study	iv
	A Review of the Sources	vii
	Documentation and Abbreviations	x
	Design of the Study	x
I.	PRE-ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE PLACES	1
	Introductory Considerations	1
	The Sophists	2
	Isocrates and Fourth Century Greek Rhetoric	8
	Plato's Rejection of the "Places" Approach	12
	Rhetorica ad Alexandrum	15
II.	ARISTOTLE AND THE CONCEPT OF "PLACES"	19
	Introductory Considerations	19
	Aristotle's View of the "Places"	23
	Dialectical Syllogisms and _Topoi_	28
	The Enthymeme and _Topoi_	31
	The Relation of _Topoi_ to Other Modes of Proof	44
	Summary of Aristotle's Conception of _Topoi_	48
III.	CONCEPTIONS OF PLACES IN THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD	50
	Introductory Considerations	50
	Rhetorica ad Herennium	54
	De Inventione	61
IV.	CICERONIAN RHETORIC AND THE CONCEPT OF PLACES	64
	Introductory Considerations	64
	Cicero's Broad View of Rhetoric	66
	Cicero's Narrow View of Rhetoric	67
	Topica	73
	Summary of Cicero's Conception of Places	75
V.	QUINTILIAN AND THE CONCEPT OF PLACES	77
	Introductory Considerations	77
	Quintilian's Broad View of Rhetoric	82
	Quintilian's Concept of _Loci_	83

Chapter | Page
VI. CONCEPTIONS OF THE PLACES IN THE MEDIEVAL, RENAISSANCE, AND MODERN PERIODS 88

Introductory Considerations 88
Medieval Conceptions of the Places 91
Renaissance Conceptions of the Places 97
Modern Conceptions of the Places 106

VII. CONCLUSIONS 115

Suggestions for Future Studies 119

BIBLIOGRAPHY 121

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

Invention, broadly considered, is the speaker's search for sound subject matter, through the discovery and analysis of logical, ethical, and emotional proofs. It concerns the relations among the subject, speaker, and audience.[1] But it has also been considered in a more narrow sense as a scheme for finding speech material for an immediate occasion, involving, among other things, such devices as catchword suggestions or "places" from which arguments could be drawn.[2] While some classical rhetoricians (Isocrates, Plato, Cicero, and Quintilian, for example) preferred the broad approach to invention, others (such as the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum) favored the more narrow approach. The two views of invention ran parallel throughout the classical period, and every rhetorician had to take each of them into account as he developed his concept of rhetoric. This study particularly concerns the narrow view of invention, as either accepted or

---

[1]Traditionally rhetoric has been divided into five parts--invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. This study mainly concerns invention. However, since classical rhetoricians frequently discussed the content of a speech as it related to various patterns of arrangement or matters of stylistic embellishment, these parts are also treated.

[2]The narrow view of invention may be considered as one aspect of the broad view, which stressed the liberal education of orators and a far-ranging search for speech materials. The "places" and other aspects of the narrow, more technical, approach to invention (see, for example, note 3, page iv) could be employed by any orator.

rejected by the major rhetoricians from the fifth century B. C. to the time of Quintilian.

The study is principally one of definition. It is a survey of ancient conceptions of the rhetorical "places," roughly understood as sources from which arguments could be obtained. The "places" were an important part of the narrow view of invention and concerned the discovery and analysis of the subject matter of speeches. The Greeks called these sources of arguments _topoi_; the Romans labeled them _loci_. To avoid confusion in terminology, the word "places," as used throughout this study, signifies both the _topoi_ and _loci_ of classical rhetoric.

The purpose of the study is to attempt to find answers to the following questions: (1) What were some Greek and Roman views of the places? (2) In what ways did they differ? (3) In what ways were they similar? (4) What conclusions can be drawn regarding (a) the nature of the places, (b) the importance attached to the places, and (c) the persistence of the places concept throughout the ancient, medieval, Renaissance, and modern periods. Since conceptions of the places changed as historical conditions prompted changes in rhetoric, the study also takes into account various political, economic, and cultural developments.

Limitations Imposed

There are four major limitations imposed on this study. First, it principally concerns that period from the fifth century Greek Sophists to Quintilian. While one chapter treats the medieval, Renaissance, and modern periods, it does so only insofar as later writers accepted or rejected the classical places. Thus, attention is given to those writers (Saint Augustine, Alcuin, Thomas Wilson, Francis Bacon, George Campbell, Hugh Blair, Richard Whately, John Ward, and John Quincy Adams) who either accepted, for example, Aristotelian or Ciceronian views of

the "places," or rejected the "places" altogether. The study, then, is largely restricted to the ancient period.

Second, the study considers "places" in the theoretical sense. For purposes of illustration, some occasional mention is made of the use of "places" by ancient orators, poets, or philosophers. The writer has, however, largely confined his attention to the rhetoricians' theoretical views of the places, rather than examining various orations, poems, or philosophical treatises to find their application. If, however, a rhetorician cited in his treatise the use of places by orators, poets, or philosophers, this fact is noted in the study.

Third, the study does not include all rhetoricians of the ancient period. Rather, attention is devoted mainly to the Sophists, Plato, Aristotle, the authors of *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero, and Quintilian. Other rhetoricians, such as Demetrius, the author of *On the Sublime*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and the two Senecas receive little or no attention. Principal concern is with those rhetoricians who treated invention at some length and accepted or rejected the places doctrine. Rhetoricians principally interested in style or critical commentary are mentioned only in connection with discussions of changes in rhetoric throughout the ancient period.

Finally, the places are considered chiefly as devices for logical development. Some attention is given to the use of commonplaces (*loci communes*) as devices for amplification, embellishment, or as fully developed "little orations" for insertion in a speech. Since this conception coexisted with the one stressing places as "seats of arguments," it is necessary to consider it, particularly in relation to the Sophists and the Roman rhetoricians. But the main interest of this study is with the places as aids in the speaker's selection of arguments and modes of

reasoning.[3]

Significance of the Study

The places were an integral part of the narrow view of classical invention. Despite Isocrates and Cicero's emphasis on the broad view (liberal education of orators), the places view gradually gained supremacy. In the late Republic and Imperial age, the "places" concept dominated the broad view, with only a few voices raised in protest. The rise to prominence of this narrow view of invention was a major factor in the decay of eloquence in the classical period.

The fact that almost every rhetorician for whom we have extant treatises gave attention to the "places," and the fact that poets, playwrights, philosophers, and orators used them makes a study of them significant. Moreover, the "places," as part of invention, were related to many other concepts of rhetoric. To determine how they related to the materials and forms of the enthymeme (rhetorical syllogism), _ethos_, _pathos_, arrangement, and of course the broad view of invention, is important.

Although the concept of the "places" appears all through the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance periods, it seems either misunderstood

---

[3]The _loci communes_, one aspect of the narrow view of invention, were carefully developed bits of composition to be used by speakers whenever they were handy. Such rhetoricians as Aristotle, the author of _Rhetorica ad Herennium_, Cicero, and Quintilian treated them. The Sophists first developed them, believing that such ready-made materials, when called upon by an orator, added copiousness and elegance to an oration. Aristotle, while acknowledging some usefulness for _loci communes_, preferred places which aided the orator's _search_ for ideas, rather than those that provided fully-developed bits of composition. Roman rhetoricians, however, gave great emphasis to _loci communes_, particularly as devices to enhance style. The Aristotelian view of places was eventually dominated by the _loci communes_ concept and, by the Renaissance, the latter reigned supreme. See R. C. Jebb, _Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos_ (London: Macmillan, 1876), I, p. cxiv; Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," _Historical_

or insufficiently explored. Perhaps the technical nature of the subject and the confusion of views regarding the places have been responsible for the insufficient treatment of that part of ancient rhetoric. While the "places" have been discussed in connection with numerous concept studies, they have usually received only passing attention. James H. McBurney discussed them in relation to the enthymeme.[4] Irving J. Lee considered them in his discussion of the emotional proofs of rhetoric.[5] William M. Sattler noted them in his discussion of _ethos_.[6] Elinor Drafahl Carrino included a section on the "places" in her discussion of _dispositio_ (arrangement).[7] And Marie E. Brittin included the "places" as one kind of evidence found in the rhetorical tradition.[8] All of the above studies treated the "places" in their relation to other rhetorical concepts. However, a comprehensive review of the "places" themselves yet remains to be done.[9]

The subject has also been treated as part of many general rhetorical studies. Donald Lemen Clark considered them in _Rhetoric in Greco-_

Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 26f.; Sister Joan Marie Lechner (O.S.U.), _Renaissance Concepts of the Commonplaces_ (New York: Pageant Press, 1962), pp. 28-64.

[4]"The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," _Speech Monographs_, III(1936), pp. 49-74.

[5]"Some Conceptions of Emotional Appeal in Rhetorical Theory," _Speech Monographs_, VI(1939), pp. 66-86.

[6]"Conceptions of _Ethos_ in Ancient Rhetoric," _Speech Monographs_, XIV(1947), pp. 55-65.

[7]"Conceptions of _Dispositio_ in Ancient Rhetoric" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1959).

[8]"Conceptions of Evidence in Rhetoric" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1949).

[9]This is not to disparage in any way the excellent treatments given the "places" by the above writers or by such scholars as Wilbur Samuel Howell, whose introduction to _The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charle-_

Roman Education.[10] J. W. H. Atkins gave them some attention in his two-volume study, Literary Criticism in Antiquity: a Sketch of its Development.[11] George Kennedy frequently referred to them in his Art of Persuasion in Greece.[12] And Elbert W. Harrington surveyed the entire concept of invention in Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry.[13] Of the above, Harrington is the only one who limited his study to invention; but in his brief work, he divided his attention between the broad and narrow views of invention, and did not treat the "places" in depth. Charles Sears Baldwin's Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic[14] affords only meagre treatment of the places. Moreover, he did not consider at any length such pre-Aristotelian writers as the Sophists, Plato, and the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum.

Other works that offer valuable commentary on the "places" consider but one phase of ancient history, such as the Greek period or Roman period. An excellent work of this type is M. L. Clarke's Rhetoric at Rome: a Historical Survey;[15] which contains extensive discussions of the "places," but only in connection with Roman rhetoricians.

---

magne (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941), contains an excellent review of Roman conceptions of rhetoric. The present writer is well aware of the many fine works which treat the "places," but wishes in this study to examine fully the concept in its own right.

[10](Morningside Heights, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1957).

[11](Cambridge: University Press, 1934).

[12](Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[13](Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1948).

[14](New York: Macmillan, 1924).

[15](New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963).

Thus, while the "places" have been discussed in many works, there has not yet been a study which attempts solely to analyze the Greco-Roman conceptions of this subject. Moreover, research done in the past few years has offered new materials and viewpoints for an evaluation of the "places." One example is Harry Caplan's translation of Rhetorica ad Herennium,[16] which was, of course, not available to Baldwin, Atkins, Harrington, and others. Yet an understanding of Hellenistic conceptions of the "places" necessitates a consideration of this treatise (in its best translation). In addition, recent works, such as those of George Kennedy and M. L. Clarke offer valuable insights concerning the ancient rhetorical tradition. With the publication of new translations and commentaries in recent years, there appears to be the room and the need for a new study of the classical places.

A Review of the Sources

A review of the more important primary and secondary sources used in this study may be helpful. Although the extant treatises by the Sophists are fragmentary, the writer has found Mario Untersteiner's The Sophists[17] a valuable source. Also helpful were articles by Henry Jackson,[18] George Kennedy,[19] Everett Lee Hunt,[20] and Bromley Smith.[21]

---

[16](Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).

[17]Trans. Kathleen Freeman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954).

[18]"Sophists," Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed. (Chicago: Werner Co., 1895), XXII, pp. 263-71.

[19]"The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks," American Journal of Philology, LXXX(1959), pp. 169-78.

[20]"Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, pp. 19-70.

[21]Between 1918 and 1928 Bromley Smith wrote a series of seven articles (published in the Quarterly Journal of Speech), on the Sophists. These studies offer helpful information. See "The Father of

From the Loeb library the writer used the George Norlin-LaRue Van Hook translations of Isocrates[22] and the Rackham translation of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum.[23] For Plato the Jowett translations were used.[24]

Translations and commentaries on Aristotle's works are voluminous. The writer has mainly used W. Rhys Roberts' translation of the Rhetoric[25] and the W. A. Pickard-Cambridge translations of Topica and De Sophisticis Elenchis.[26] One of the best commentaries on Aristotle's Rhetoric is Edward Meredith Cope's Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric.[27] Also significant are W. D, Ross' work on Aristotle,[28] Georgiana Paine Palmer's study of the formal topoi ("places") of the Rhetoric,[29] and Friedrich Solmsen's articles.[30]

For Cicero's rhetorical works, letters, and speeches, the Loeb

---

Debate: Protagoras of Abdera," V(March, 1918), pp. 196-215; "Prodicus of Ceos: the Sire of Synonymy," VI(April, 1920), pp. 51-68; "Corax and Probability," VII(February, 1921), pp. 13-42; "Gorgias: a Study of Oratorical Style," VII(November, 1921), pp. 335-59; "Hippias and a Lost Canon of Rhetoric," XII(June, 1926), pp. 129-45; "Thrasymachus: a Pioneer Rhetorician," XIII(June, 1927), pp. 278-91; and "Theodorus of Byzantium: Word-Smith," XIV(February, 1928), pp. 71-81.

[22] Three vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928, 1929, 1945). Van Hook translated Vol. III, published in 1945.

[23] (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937).

[24] The Dialogues of Plato, 4 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953).

[25] In The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, XI(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924). This choice was dictated by Roberts' clear translation and excellent commentary. The Cooper, Jebb, and Cope-Sandys editions have also been used.

[26] Ibid., vol. I. [27] (London: Macmillan, 1867).

[28] Aristotle: a Complete Exposition of his Works and Thought, 5th ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1953).

[29] The τοποι of Aristotle's Rhetoric as Exemplified in the Orators (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

[30] For example, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," American Journal of Philology, LXII(1941), pp. 35-50, 169-90.

editions were employed.[31] An excellent literary biography of Cicero is Torsten Petersson's Cicero: a Biography.[32] The writer selected the H. E. Butler translation of Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria.[33] Several articles by Harry Caplan provided an excellent account of the "places" as conceived in the medieval period.[34] And Sister Joan Marie Lechner's Renaissance Concepts of the Commonplaces was helpful.[35]

For information on the extent and quality of classical scholarship, the writer consulted John Edwin Sandys' History of Classical Scholarship[36] and Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship.[37] H. I. Marrou's History of Education in Antiquity[38] is an excellent recent work in this area. For historical information, the writer consulted several

---

[31]Brutus, trans. G. I. Hendrickson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939); De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951); De Inventione, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1949); De Oratore, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948); De Partitione Oratoria, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948); Epistulae ad Familiares, trans. W. Glynn Williams (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928); Orator, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939); The Speeches, trans. N. H. Watts (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931); and Topica, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949).

[32](New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1963).

[33]Four vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953).

[34]For example, "Rhetorical Invention in Some Medieval Tractates on Preaching," Speculum, II(1927), pp. 284-95.

[35](New York: Pageant Press, 1962).

[36](New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1958).

[37]Ed. Maurice Platnauer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954).

[38]Trans. George Lamb (London: Sheed and Ward, 1956).

works, including Rostovtzeff's History of the Ancient World.[39]

Documentation and Abbreviations

Any study which involves the examination of a large number of primary sources necessitates frequent source citations. To avoid excessive citations of passages from a single work, the writer has adopted the following procedure. Since several lengthy discussions will center mainly on one treatise (for example, Aristotle's Rhetoric), the primary source first is cited fully at the bottom of a page, and thereafter cited in parentheses in the text. Citation of secondary sources and explanatory notes is always at the bottom of a page. It is hoped that this procedure will facilitate the reading of this work. Also, abbreviations are used wherever possible. Frequent mention of individual treatises makes the use of abbreviations both convenient and less tiring to the reader.

Design of the Study

The study consists of seven chapters. The first five chapters concern the classical period; the sixth is a survey of the classical places as they were viewed during the medieval, Renaissance, and modern periods; and the last chapter is a summary of the study, along with recommendations for future research. Each chapter, except the last, includes a section on "Introductory Considerations," designed to familiarize the reader with the rhetorician(s) discussed, the political, economic, and cultural conditions of the period, or changes in rhetoric which had influenced, or were about to influence, conceptions of places. Historical considerations are introduced wherever

---

[39]Trans. J. D. Duff, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1926-27).

deemed appropriate to the study. Three chapters (I, III, and VI) treat groups of rhetoricians, as for example, Chapter I concerns the early Sophists, Isocrates, Plato, and the (unknown) author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. Each of the other chapters (II, IV, and V) deals principally with a single rhetorician.

Chapter summaries are added only to Chapters II and IV, which concern Aristotle and Cicero. It is believed that the extent and complexity of their views necessitate summaries. Elsewhere, however, the writer prefers to review, within a chapter, trends and developments, and otherwise maintain the continuity of the study by providing transitions to the following chapter.

CHAPTER I

PRE-ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE PLACES

Introductory Considerations

In his Funeral Oration of 431 B. C., Pericles declared: "For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet with economy, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. . . . I say that Athens is the school of Hellas and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace."[1] In those words Pericles gave an extraordinary reason why men should gladly die for their country. It is probably the only instance in history of a statesman's urging his people to be patriotic because their state offered them aesthetic opportunities. Yet such an appeal was not strange to fifth century Athenians. Nearly every citizen of Pericles' Athens engaged in public service of some kind, whether military training, sharing in decisions concerning government policies, listening to debates, or serving on juries. To this informed and experienced citizenry public activity itself was a liberal education.[2]

The period between the end of the Persian Wars (479 B. C.) and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (431 B. C.) was one of conflict

---

[1]Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Benjamin Jowett, The Greek Historians, ed. Francis R. B. Godolphin, I(New York: Random House, 1942), ii, 49-50.

[2]Walter R. Agard, What Democracy Meant to the Greeks (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1942), p. 72. Also see R. C. Jebb, Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos, I, p. cxxxv.

between new and old ideas and practices. It was a transition period in educational, religious, and moral ideas, a time of philosophical activity and the development of formal education by the Sophists. It was a period favorable for the growth of individualism, as the extension of trade, improvements in agriculture and industry, and other changes prompted a constant conflict between capitalism and individualism on the one hand, and democratic institutions on the other.[3] In the midst of this instability was the art of rhetoric.

Rhetoric arose in connection with events surrounding the expulsion of the Tyrants of the Theron dynasty of Agrigentum (471) and those of the Hieron dynasty at Syracuse (463). The ensuing annulment of confiscations decreed by the Tyrants and the resulting litigation concerning property ownership prompted the Greeks to an even greater concern for effective speaking. Beginning with the readily observable facts, early theorists such as Corax and Tisias were able to formulate general rules, later to be codified into a body of doctrine.

The Sophists

Unfortunately little is known about pre-Aristotelian rhetoric. For example, Corax and Tisias, the founders of the rhetorical art, still remain little more than names to many modern researchers.[4] There has been almost a total loss of the writings, not only of Protagoras, but also of the Sophists in general. Probably many teachings of the Sophists were

---

[3]M. Rostovtzeff, A History of the Ancient World, trans. J. D. Duff (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1926), I, pp. 315-16.

[4]H. Ll. Hudson-Williams, "Greek Orators and Rhetoric," Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship, ed. Maurice Platnauer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954), p. 203.



later incorporated in systematic wroks such as the Rhetoric of Anaximenes.[5] Moreover, the Sophists wrote for living men, not future readers.[6] Because a writer's personal experiences, livelihood, family life, political sentiments, religion, home town, and imagination, as well as the customs and folkways of the ordinary people of his time, all influence his work, it is regrettable that there remain but a few fragments of the Sophists' works.

However, it is known that the Sophists had a monopoly on Greek education for almost a hundred years. For purpose of clarity, the Sophistic tradition may be considered in terms of the four principal types of Sophists, roughly covering the period 450-350 B. C.[7] The first type of Sophists appeared around 450 B. C. and was concerned principally with cultural matters. Protagoras of Abdera, interested in epistemology and humanistic education of the young, was an example of this type. The Sophist of culture, while continuing to flourish, then yielded to Sophists chiefly interested in rhetoric. Gorgias of Leontini was the foremost member of this group. Visiting Athens on a political mission in 427 B. C., he greatly impressed the Athenians with his florid and graceful prose style. He and his followers exerted great influence on Greek youth. After Gorgias, the political Sophists came to the fore in the early fourth

---

[5]Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists, trans. Kathleen Freeman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 9.

[6]Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1939), I, p. 302.

[7]Henry Jackson, "Sophists," Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed. (Chicago: Werner Co., 1895), XXII, p. 263.

century. Isocrates and his followers avowed to train Greek youth for citizenship and responsible political leadership. The last group to dominate the education of Greek youth consisted of the *eristic* Sophists. These masters of disputation, usually followers of Hippias of Elis, were active in the time of Plato and were among the most severely criticized by him.

The Sophists taught much, wrote much, criticized political affairs, and diffused ideas. They were usually teachers of a superior grade who, distinguishing themselves from philosophers on the one hand and craftsmen on the other, claimed to prepare their students, not for any particular study or profession, but for civic life.[8] Corax, Protagoras, Prodicus, Gorgias, and Hippias (among others) were teachers with practical doctrines to spread throughout Greece. They never comprised a school or sect of teachers with identical aims or methods; nor did they develop a common epistemology or ethical theory. On the contrary, they had great differences in thought and methodology.

Despite the varying doctrines and methodologies among the early Greek Sophists, two distinct rhetorical traditions existed. One was the *theoretical*, of which Tisias and Theodorus were examples. The other was that of the *exemplar* or collection of commonplaces.[9] Concerning the theoretical tradition, it is believed that early handbooks were numerous (owing to the great demand from litigious citizens facing court contests), that the handbooks

---

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] See George Kennedy, "The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks," *American Journal of Philology*, LXXX(1959), p. 172.

were devoted principally to forensic rhetoric (since that type best lent itself to rules),[10] and that theoretical discussion at first involved only invention and arrangement.[11] The Sophists' analytical attitude toward invention led them to formulate a mass of rules which together comprised a complete method for extracting every possible topic for any given case.[12]

Concerning the *exemplar* tradition, standard passages were available on such matters as how to flatter judges and how to criticize evidence obtained under torture.[13] Also, the Sophists prepared general reflections on such topics of universal concern as justice, injustice, nature, and convention. It was found that, through manipulation, any subject could be reduced to simple ideas which students could easily grasp.

The usefulness of such commonplaces was first seen by the Sophists; their systematic exploration and exploitation of great themes was to help mold the very strong Greek and Roman taste for general ideas.[14] A brief consideration of some individual Sophists should help clarify their role in the development of the commonplace tradition in rhetoric.

Plato had Protagoras, the oldest of the Sophists, profess to make

---

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 178. Also see Bromley Smith, "Corax and Probability," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*,,VII(February, 1921), pp. 13-42, *passim*, for an account of the earliest theories on the rhetorical art.

[12] H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. George Lamb (London: Sheed and Ward, 1956), p. 54.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] John Burnet, *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato* (London: Macmillan, 1914), p. 111.



men good citizens.[16] To become good citizens, says Protagoras, men must place education at the very center of their lives and pursue great learning. Thus, in his work On Personal Qualities he maintains (in the few fragments we have from the treatise) that education requires natural gifts and practice, that a man begins to learn in his youth, and that education cannot occur unless great depth is reached.[17]

Although it does not appear that Protagoras taught a special art of rhetoric,[18] he did develop the doctrine of antinomies. He taught that, of two statements, a stronger and a weaker, the stronger one (or one made to appear stronger) will be accepted. He maintained that the expert Sophist could teach the art of strengthening statements, an art indispensable for success in debates and litigation.[19] He also was credited with the handling of general questions as a mode of practice and with the writing of commonplaces.[20] Protagoras practised his pupils in the development of commonplaces to be used in speeches of praise and blame. Hence, pupils might discuss patriotism, friendship, or courage, with no reference to concrete situations, and yet be fully equipped with a stock of thoughts and phrases for use when an occasion demanded ready speech. Commonplaces, in the sense of little

---

[16] Protagoras 319a. All references to Plato's dialogues are from The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 4 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953). Protagoras, Phaedrus, and Symposium are found in Vol. I, Gorgias in Vol. II, and Theatetus in Vol. III.

[17] Eduard Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, trans. L. R. Palmer, rev. Wilhelm Nestle, 13th ed. (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 100.

[18] Untersteiner, p. 70.

[19] It is difficult, however, to determine whether Protagoras foresaw any immoral applications of the doctrine. Jebb, Attic Orators, I, p. cxiv.

[20] See Plato Protagoras 318e-319a; Aristotle Rhetoric 1402a 20-27; Cicero Brutus 46.

orations to be inserted in a regular oration for amplification purposes, gave speakers a certain copiousness and elegance.[21]

After Protagoras, the most prominent of the literary Sophists was Prodicus of Ceos. However, he was "without any purely rhetorical interests, since he defined the Sophist as 'midway between the philosopher and the statesman.'"[22] Hence, there is little of the commonplace tradition in the few surviving fragments of Prodicus' writings. It is known that he established himself at Athens and taught virtue, in the sense attached to the word by Protagoras (partly by means of literary subjects, partly in discourse upon practical ethics). His conventional morality found favor and his knowledge of synonyms prompted Socrates (Theatetus 151b)occasionally to recommend students to him.

Gorgias of Leontini gave Sophistry a new direction by bringing to Greece new ideas on oratorical style. While there is no evidence to show that he ever called himself a Sophist at any time in his life,[23] he did concern himself with subjects such as philosophy, politics, and oratory. In his own speaking, it is believed that he employed the commonplace technique to spin out a speech to any appropriate length.[24] Moreover, his pupils were trained to employ stock issues and aphorisms adaptable to the needs of the moment.[25]

---

[21]Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," p. 26. Jebb believed that the commonplace taught by Protagoras and other Sophists became popular at a time when public speaking was neither purely extemporaneous nor wholly written. Speakers thus committed to memory passages they considered important. Attic Orators, I, p. cxiv.

[22]Untersteiner, p. 206. [23]Jackson, p. 265.

[24]George Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963), p. 63. Cicero said that Aristotle ascribed the use of commonplaces to Gorgias, as well as to Protagoras. Brutus 46-47.

[25]H. Ll. Hudson-Williams, "Political Speeches in Athens," Classical Quarterly, XLV(1951), p. 71. Students could use commonplaces to magnify a theme or bring out the enormity of a wrong. Jebb, Attic Orators, I, p. cxxiv.

Finally, Hippias of Elis, who gave lectures on such diverse subjects as arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, music, grammar, mythology, Homerology, and the education of youth,[26] was the typical polymath of the ancient world. Besides his extensive knowledge on many subjects of the day, he also studied mnemonics and taught the eristics method which prevailed in Plato's time. The successors of Hippias "claimed to possess and to communicate, not the knowledge of all branches of learning, but an aptitude for dealing with all subjects."[27]

Isocrates and Fourth Century Greek Rhetoric

In fourth century Athens, many citizens remained aloof from politics and retired into private life, thinking that public duties were a grievous burden. The richer and more educated citizens ran the government, largely because men earning good wages were not inclined to sacrifice them for the small sums paid to judges, magistrates, or other public servants. While Athens was economically strong, she was a picture of political anarchy and weakness, owing largely to the public bent for individualism.[28]

In this setting Isocrates developed a broad approach to rhetoric which stressed the importance of good speech to the citizens of a democracy. From the purely technical point of view he simply continued the tradition of the Sophists' teaching.[29] But, although he was familiar with the "places" concept of invention, his chief emphasis was on a broad view of invention.[30]

---

[26]Jackson, p. 265. [27]*Ibid.* [28]Rostovtzeff, I, pp. 318-19.

[29]Marrou, p. 82.

[30]Elbert W. Harrington, *Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry* (Boulder: Univ. of Colorado Press, 1948), p. 5.

Hence, he believed that (1) rhetoric, properly taught and conceived, led to what was good for society and for the individual; (2) the power to speak and write distinguished man from the animals; and (3) godd speech was "the surest index of a sound understanding."[31] Such oratory not only would benefit an audience, but also would bring about fundamental changes in the character of the speaker. While Isocrates did not contend that virtue could be taught, he did say that people would become better and worthier if they realized an ambition to speak well, to persuade others, and to seize the advantage (in the better sense of the word). Speakers would naturally find it better to deal with cases involving honor and praise than those of a less noble type, and the good speaker of Isocrates would try at all times to speak on such subjects. He would, moreover, seek to find material that was edifying and illustrious. Also, the good speaker would strive to be a man of good character (Antidosis 278).

Since Isocrates upheld such a broad view of rhetorical invention, it was natural that he should be skeptical of the more narrow "places approach" taken by the fifth century Sophists. Hence he disclaimed the ability to teach invention by means of the "places." For example, in his Encomium on Helen he attacked philosophers and rhetoricians who used this means of teaching their students, and claimed that such "places" were too difficult to learn.[33] A harsh critic of rhetorical handbooks, Isocrates insisted on

---

[31]Antidosis, trans. George Norlin (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), 255.

[32]Against the Sophists, trans. George Norlin (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), 13.

[33]In the first three sections of Helen, Protagoras, Gorgias, Zeno, Antisthenes, and Melissus are attacked for maintaining that courage, wisdom, and justice are identical, and that there was one knowledge concerned with all three. Moreover, Isocrates considered the subjects they chose for discussion a waste of time (Helen 11). He attacked as trivial their encomia on bumblebees, salt, and other such subjects (12). Their composition, he said, "is more difficult in the same degree as it is more difficult to be dignified than to scoff and to be serious than to joke (11).

the need for practice, innate gifts, personal qualities, inventiveness, capacity for work, memory, voice, and tact (Antidosis 189-92). He listed as the requirements of an orator: (1) natural aptitude (paramount in importance); (2) training (mastering the knowledge of a particular subject); and (3) practice (Antidosis 187-89).

Yet, while he was not much interested in the narrow aspects of invention, Isocrates did on occasion speak favorably of "places." Referring to the kind of commonplaces usually inserted into a speech to support some position, he viewed them as building blocks from which a speech was constructed (Against the Sophists 12). The orator typically memorized them and no doubt used them again and again in different speeches. Their actual composition was often largely extempore, the orator drawing upon the material in his memory.[34] The composition of such commonplaces was one of the most characteristic features of the classical tradition.[35] Subjects were gradually amplified in the direction of universal ideas and great and noble feelings.

In Against the Sophists (12) Isocrates considers that speaker most skillful who is able to discover in his subject, "places" which are unlike those used by others. Again, speaking of the value of formal training in rhetoric, he says (15) that a teacher is able to give to his pupils the ability to "take from a readier source the topics which they otherwise

---

[34]The construction of these commonplaces resembled the composition of poetry out of themes and formulas. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece, p. 53.

[35]Marrou, p. 88. This was probably due to the prominence of epideictic oratory. Until after Aristotle, epideictic oratory "had a higher dignity in general estimation than either the forensic or deliberative." Jebb, Attic Orators, II, p. 425.

hit upon in haphazard fashion." In Helen (12-16) he prides himself on having composed such a work without dealing in any of the "places" which Gorgias had used in his encomium on Helen. And he wrote the Busiris primarily to show how to develop the places of an encomium.[36]

It should be pointed out, however, that all of the above-mentioned works were written in the early years of Isocrates' career as a rhetorician, antedating the Antidosis (353 B. C.), his most extensive exposition of educational ideals. For instance, Against the Sophists was composed shortly after he opened his school in the first decade of the fourth century. Helen was an experimental work, written in the early 380's, when he was still seeking to discover a satisfactory subject for his own conception of oratory.[37] And Busiris, because of its connection with Socrates, also seems early.[38] It appears then that all of Isocrates' works (composed after he opened his school) were in some degree Sophistic specimen speeches addressed to the Greeks in general and to his school in particular. They were usually composed in response to rhetorical challenges and must be evaluated in that light. Although Isocrates recognizes that a trained speaker will know how to discover the resources of a theme (Against the Sophists 13) and despite the numerous references to "places" which appear throughout his earlier works, the Antidosis (written in his eighty-second year) contains a more

---

[36]See Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece, pp. 180-81. The speech was named for a mythical king of Egypt.

[37]Ibid., p. 187. Kennedy suggests that Helen was written as a criticism of other educators, as experimentation with a serious theme, and clearly as a composition of a model encomium for imitation by the pupils in his school.

[38]Ibid., p. 186.

complete explanation of his art. In that work, he gives his chief emphasis to the broad view of invention, deeming mechanical formulas as insufficient, and stressing the need for inventiveness and resourcefulness.[39]

While Isocrates' students were probably familiarized with the "places" approach to invention,[40] their chief training was in connection with a large number of subjects, thoroughly examined. The references to "places" in the works of Isocrates were casual as contrasted with the more extended treatments by such rhetoricians as Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.

Plato's Rejection of the "Places" Approach

In only two dialogues, *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*, was rhetoric treated in any extended way by Plato. But because the dialogue approach allowed him to touch here and there on a diversity of subjects, he did comment on rhetoric in other treatises, such as *Symposium*, *Protagoras*, *Republic*, *Theatetus*, and *Sophists*.

Plato's distinction between knowledge and opinion was probably the chief basis for his antipathy to rhetoric.[41] Rhetoric was based on opinion, which, even when correct, lacked the permanence and stability of real knowledge. Opinion, in turn, was gained from sense perceptions which stem

---

[39]Isocrates' insistence on extensive study prompted Marcus Cato to charge that scholars were old men before they were ready to leave Isocrates' school. Plutarch, *Plutarch's Lives: the Translation Called Dryden's*, rev. A. H. Clough (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1875), II, p. 346.

[40]Isocrates' pupil, Kallippos, for example, included in his art of rhetoric the topic of consequence and the topic of possibility. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1399a 16-18.

[41]Plato's indictment of rhetoric included charges that: (1) it was unnecessary; (2) it was dangerous; (3) it did not convey knowledge; (4) it did not convey power; and (5) it was not an art. (*Gorgias* 447ff.)In attacking rhetoric as he did, Plato may have had any of a number of purposes in mind. Perhaps he was indulging in humor or satire. He may habe been reprimanding specific rhetoricians practising in his time. He may have been combatting what he thought was an unwholesome influence by the rhetoric of his time. Or, finally, he may really have thought that rhetoric was a knack, a form of flattery that did not belong in any respectable system of education.



from particulars. This foundation for rhetoric made it unacceptable to Plato for three reasons: (1) a speaker might not possess genuine knowledge (Phaedrus 260); (2) even if he knew the truth, a speaker still would rely for effectiveness on putting his materials in terms of the beliefs, customs, and prejudices of his audience (Phaedrus 273); such beliefs were simply rough crude knowledge based on sense perceptions and, even if the speaker relied on probability, he still dealt with the same kind of would-be knowledge;[42] and (3) Plato was suspicious of long, sustained discourse. Such a method was likely to obscure truth.

This, however, does not mean that Plato could find no place for rhetoric in his scheme of knowledge. In the Laws, which was written at the end of his life, he found an important use for rhetoric--lawgivers, he suggested, should never weary of persuading the citizens. In Phaedrus (270-79), also, he presented a broad outline of a true rhetoric, the necessary steps or factors in good rhetorical practice including: knowledge of the nature of the soul and the ability to adapt to it; ability to define terms (classify particulars or break up universals into particulars); knowledge of the "truth" of a subject; knowledge and use of principles of order and arrangement; knowledge of style and delivery; little attention to the art of writing; and an endeavor to "grow beautiful within." Rhetoric, then, could be acceptable to Plato, but only if it was based on truth.

To learn the truth, a speaker must first learn the proper method of knowing the truth--dialectic. This short question and answer method of

---

[42]Socrates scorned those who "run after probability, and say good-bye to truth" (Phaedrus 273). And Plato condemned spurious arguments based on probability, calling such an approach empirically acquired and devoid of rational basis (Gorgias 453f.).

conversation, conducted exhaustively on a subject, allowed a speaker to divide properly a complex subject, to name and define its parts, and to bring the scattered particulars of the subject within the scope of one general idea. Since "he who would be a master of the art [rhetoric] must understand the real nature of everything" (Phaedrus 262), the dialectical method must be learned first. For dialectic was, to Plato, the indispensable science, the "coping-stone" of all the other sciences (Republic 532, 533, 536).

Thus, Plato's emphasis on dialectical method (as a necessary part of the orator's training), coupled with his antipathy to the rhetoric which he saw practised around him, led him to uphold a broad approach to invention. Like Isocrates, he gave the narrow approach little attention. On some occasions he even spoke derisively of the "places." For example, in Phaedrus (236) he had Socrates say that although he could not avoid using the commonplaces that Lysias had used in his speech, it was when the speaker left the realm of such commonplaces that he was forced to be original in his thinking. Or again in Symposium (198) Socrates was made to say: "For I in my simplicity imagined that the topics of praise should be true . . . and that out of them the speaker was to choose the best and arrange them in the best order." Again and again Plato returned to the theme--rhetoric, to be useful and productive, must be based on truth, not the catalogued opinions of the multitude.

Yet the catalogued opinions of the multitude were often ingeniously employed by Plato himself, as he sought to persuade his readers. (For example, he frequently employed myths as a device to persuade others to live the philosophical life.) But whether he had in mind particular "places" for the development of emotional and ethical proof as a means of more effectively presenting the truth is a question that cannot be



answered definitely.[43] It is true that, in Phaedrus (277), he upheld the general view that a speaker must be "able to discern the nature of the soul and discover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to different natures." (Else he would be unable to handle arguments according to any rules of art.) But it is apparent that Plato did not care to catalogue any "places" of emotional and ethical proof.

Rhetorica ad Alexandrum

Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, a practical handbook for public speakers, probably was written near the beginning of the third century B. C.[44] Although authorship of the treatise has not been definitely established, there is general agreement that it was not written by Aristotle.[45] Even though there are some superficial points of resemblance between this treatise and Aristotle's Rhetoric, there are several significant reasons for eliminating Aristotle from consideration as author of the work. First, ad Alexandrum represents the Sophistic school of rhetoric

---

[43]Harrington, p. 10.

[44]H. Rackham, "Introduction," Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1937), p. 258. The authorship and date of composition, while disputed matters among numerous classical scholars, here must be of secondary importance. The nature of the work itself commands primary attention. Even though the work is not, by chronological standards, pre-Aristotelian, this writer believes the treatise to be pre-Aristotelian in the sense that it mirrors Sophistic conceptions of rhetoric.

[45]Kennedy represents the prevailing thinking on the authorship of the treatise. Rejecting Aristotle as the author, he believes that Anaximenes of Lampsacus probably wrote it. (Art of Persuasion in Greece, p. 12, 115.) T. A. Sinclair also favors Anaximenes and emphasizes the influence of Isocrates' rhetorical views on the work. (A History of Greek Political Thought [London: Routledge and Kegan, 1951], p. 255.) Rackham, while not identifying Anaximenes as author, does detect Isocrates' influence. ("Introduction," p. 258.) Cope suggests that Anaximenes may have written it, but prefers the more modest "Anonymous." (Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 413-14.)

that Aristotle opposed.[46] The treatise seems clearly in sympathy with the Sophistic tradition that made rhetoric the "art of persuading," whereas Aristotle defined it as "the faculty of observing or discovering in every case the possible means of persuasion."[47] Moreover, the work is Sophistic in that it makes success at any price the aim of the art.[48] A second reason for eliminating Aristotle from consideration as author of the treatise concerns the quality of the work, as contrasted with the Rhetoric. Rackham remarked that it was a work "proceeding from an entirely different and inferior order of mind and character."[49] E. M. Cope noted that the work was markedly inferior to Aristotle's in subtlety and spirit, power and interest, and in differences of style.[50] It is apparent, then, that the work must be regarded as the product of a pedantic scholar with Sophistic sympathies.

The author begins his treatise by listing the three genera and seven species of oratory. Oratory is deliberative, epideictic, and forensic, and concerns exhortation and dissuasion, eulogy and vituperation, prosecution

---

[46]Rackham, p. 258. The resemblance between the ad Alexandrum and the Sophistic conception of rhetoric is especially striking in respect to such matters as the emphasis on commonplaces, the moral tone of the treatise, and the author's lack of scientific exactness. E. M. Cope, in comparing this treatise with Aristotle's Rhetoric, has called attention to the work's "want of skill and inappropriateness in composition" (p. 401) and its "highly immoral character" (p. 403). While the present writer would not go so far as Cope and deem it an "Art of Cheating" (p. 460), he does agree that the work is highly Sophistic, in its emphases on giving effectiveness to the speaker (moreso than truth) and in the achievement of effects, at almost any price.

[47]John Edwin Sandys, "Introduction," The Rhetoric of Aristotle: a Translation, trans. R. C. Jebb (Cambridge: University Press, 1909), p. xix. Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is in Rhetoric 1355b 26-27.

[48]Sandys, ibid. Jebb has called this treatise the "best practical treatise on Rhetoric which has come down to us in Greek." Attic Orators, II, p. 431.

[49]"Introduction," Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, p. 260.

[50]Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 401ff.

and defense, and investigation (1421b 9-25).[51] The general "places" of deliberative speaking are seven in number (1421b 24-1423a 12): (1) justice, (2) legality, (3) expediency, (4) honor, (5) facility, (6) practicability, and (7) necessity. These places, to be used solely for exhortation or dissuasion, are further subdivided in the following manner: (1) just things (honor of parents, friends, and benefactors); (2) legality (the "common agreement of the state enjoining in writing how men are to act in various matters"); (3) expediency (the preservation of existing good things, acquisition of things not possessed, rejection of existing evils, and prevention of harmful things; further subdivided into expediency for individuals [a. the body, including strength, beauty, and health; b. mind, including courage, wisdom, and justice; c. external possessions, including friends, wealth, and property] and expediency for a state [concord, military strength, property and plentiful revenue, and good and numerous allies]); (4) honorable things (distinctions accruing to the agents); (5) easy things (those that require little effort, time, or expense); (6) practicable matters (things able to be done); and (7) necessary things.[52]

Next, using the above seven "places" in each instance to develop the subject, the author considers seven kinds of subjects for public speaking (1423a 21-1425b 31), including (1) religion, (2) legislation, (3) form of the constitution, (4) alliances and treatises, (5) war, (6) peace, and (7) finance. Turning to the places of eulogistic speaking, the author

---

[51]Investigation, the seventh species, could stand alone, or be introduced into an oration of any genus. 1421b 24f.

[52]Only the first three "places" were treated in any depth, others being merely mentioned.

offers the same places used for deliberative speaking. For example, praiseworthy things include the just, lawful, expedient, noble, pleasant, and the easy to accomplish (1425b 40-1426a 3). In chapter three, the author offers six methods of amplification and minimization (1426a 20ff.). A speaker can (1) show that the actions of a person have produced many good or bad results; (2) introduce a previous judgment, favorable or unfavorable, and compare it with his own statement, making his own appear stronger; (3) compare with his subject the smallest of the things that fall into the same class; (4) prove that the agent acted in a premeditated manner and had done so for a long time; (5) prove a man responsible for many things; and (6) mention the opposite of something judged a great good, making it appear a great evil.

Concerning the treatment of the "places," then, the <u>Rhetorica ad Alexandrum</u> stood firmly in the tradition of the early handbooks. (The end of the dedicatory epistle says that the work is indebted to the handbook of Corax and the <u>technai</u> written by Aristotle for Theodectes.) Similar to the early handbooks, the materials of this treatise are quite specific, and one can see that they could be learned as commonplaces and adapted to almost all possible speeches. The "places" discussed in the treatise were those materials that had been selected by the author and then ordered into arguments for the speaker's use in particular parts of the speech.

CHAPTER II

ARISTOTLE AND THE CONCEPT OF "PLACES"[1]

Introductory Considerations

Aristotle's Rhetoric has been called the "best book for written composition and as a practical guide to public speaking that ever was put forth."[2] The treatise, probably written in

---

[1]To aid the reader's understanding of this chapter, the writer offers the following sketch of its contents.

1. Aristotle's preliminary observations on rhetoric
   a. Rhetoric concerns matters of opinion
   b. Rhetoric is an offshoot of ethics and politics
   c. Rhetoric is a counter-part of dialectic
   d. Rhetoric involves the attempt to discover available means of persuasion for a given situation
2. An overview of Aristotle's conception of topoi
   a. Aristotle's disagreement with Sophistic views on "places"
   b. What Aristotle meant by the term topoi--interpretations by modern researchers
   c. Approaches to Aristotle's concept of topoi
      (1) Common and special topoi
      (2) Material and formal topoi
      (3) Analytic, subject, and abstract topoi
   d. Material-formal distinction selected by the present writer
3. The four kinds of syllogism
   a. Apodeictic (scientific)
   b. Contentious (spurious)
   c. Dialectical (disputatious)
   d. Rhetorical (enthymeme)
4. Dialectical syllogisms and topoi
   a. Relation between dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms
   b. Dialectical topoi (as found in Topica)
5. Enthymemes and topoi
   a. Aristotle's logical proofs
      (1) Artistic and inartistic
      (2) Artistic proofs based on examples and enthymemes
      (3) Enthymemes based on probabilities, signs, and examples
      (4) Materials and forms of enthymemes supplied by topoi

330 B. C. during his second residency in Athens,[3] was an analytical investigation of the art of rhetoric. The genesis of the work was influenced by Plato's emphasis on sound subject matter and a knowledge of the soul.[4] In the Rhetoric, Aristotle replied to Plato's strictures on the art, while also gaining inspiration and guidance from his teacher. Hence, any discussion of Aristotle's conceptions of rhetoric necessitates frequent comparison between the two thinkers.

Aristotle makes a distinction between science and opinion which really determines his rhetorical theory.[5] For instead of distrusting sense perceptions as Socrates and Plato had, Aristotle begins with them. From sense perceptions of particulars comes memory, and from memory, experience, until finally the universal is reached. Man is led to see the universals through his knowledge of particulars. Primarily a scientist, Aristotle held that universals or general notions, abstracted from particulars, are the objects of scientific knowledge and only in science is

---

b. Material topoi, divided into
   (1) Special topoi (supply premises for enthymemes)
   (2) Common topoi (supply premises for enthymemes)
c. Formal topoi (supply modes of reasoning for enthymemes)
   (1) Twenty eight valid
   (2) Nine sham

6. Relation of topoi to ethos and pathos
7. Summary

[2]Lane Cooper, "The Rhetoric of Aristotle," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXI(February, 1935), p. 18.

[3]Cope, p. 38.

[4]J. W. H. Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity: a Sketch of its Development (Cambridge: University Press, 1934), I, p. 134.

[5]Harrington, p. 11.

complete certitude to be realized. Elsewhere, as for example the areas of ethics and politics (the conduct of men as individuals and as members of groups), men must seek the best knowledge in their efforts to influence their fellow men. Thus, a good speaker, as perceived by Aristotle, gathers all the possible facts and opinions on a subject[6] and pursues many fields of study.

The area of knowledge in which rhetoric functions (opinion) is that which concerns variable and contingent premises (in contrast to the certain premises of science). Because it deals in this area, rhetoric is said by Aristotle (1356a 25-30) to be an offshoot of ethics and politics. Moreover, because it is based essentially on methodology, having no particular subject matter of its own, rhetoric is a counter-part of dialectic (1354a 1-5). The problem of rhetoric is to find all the available means of persuasion pertinent to a given rhetorical situation (1355b 26-27).

The relationship between rhetoric and dialectic is important to Aristotle, for these arts concern the whole realm of human conduct and the beliefs concerning such conduct.[7] He theoretically

---

[6]Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, XI(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 1396a 5-10. The Roberts translation will be used throughout this study. Except where otherwise noted, all references to other works of Aristotle are from the Oxford collection, W. D. Ross, ed.

[7]The discussion of the dialectic-rhetoric relationship found in Wilbur Samuel Howell's Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941), pp. 45-57, here deserves special mention. Howell points out that the contrast between rhetoric and dialectic first became apparent in fifth century Greece when the rhetoric of Corax was a method of practical dispute and the dialectic of Zeno was a method of theoretical dispute. Both arts, Howell states, "claimed as their prerogative the function of acquainting young men, not only with a basic habit of procedure, but also with the necessary information with which that procedure was conversant." (p. 46) Hence, the Sophists' students of rhetoric were taught how to persuade audiences on such subjects as law, politics, and morals, while students

regards rhetoric and dialectic as applicable to the same range of subjects; theoretically, anything can be discussed by either method (1354a 1-10). Both methods use arguments, both deal with probabilities, and neither concerns scientific demonstration. The Isocratean notions of practical men, the common sense views of mankind, could be the subject matter of both methods.[8] These opinions are largely formed by the process of dialectic. As conceived by Aristotle, dialectic is a mode of discussion which concerns the investigation of opinions, with a view toward bringing them into some kind of consistency.[9] The objective of dialectic is not truth,

---

of dialectic were taught to exercise their talents on ultimate principles of science and conduct, thus acquiring a fund of philosophical knowledge. In the fourth century, Aristotle saw rhetoric and dialectic as complementary arts of composition. Dialectic was the "art of invention in disputes upon alternate beliefs before audiences so constituted by training and temperament as to respond to an appeal to reason alone;" rhetoric was the "art of invention in disputes upon alternate policies or actions before audiences which respond when their emotions and moral sentiments, as well as their reason, are brought into harmonious relation." (Howell, pp. 47-48) Rhetoric, as viewed by Aristotle, thus shared its complete function with no other art (1355b 25-27). It employed the logical, emotional, and ethical means of persuasion, while dialectic centered on logical appeal. Among the differences between the two arts (pointed out by Howell) was the kind of questions each art concerned. Whereas dialectic surveyed scientific and learned questions, rhetoric mainly took up practical questions of policy. Also, whereas dialectic dealt with a learned audience, rhetoric involved the popular audience. Finally, states Howell, there was one other not very important distinction. Dialectic proceeded by question and answer; rhetoric was the art of long, continuous discourse. This, however, referred to external appearance rather than fundamental objectives. Moreover, it was not even a constant external difference, since dialogues often contained lengthy discourses and speeches were often of the short question and answer type.

[8]Harrington, p. 13. Plato's dialectic, in contrast to Aristotle's, was purely speculative and had as its end, truth. Plato would have a speaker use dialectic to invent, test, and arrange the substance of his discourse. In Phaedrus (260), he has Socrates maintain that rhetoric begins to function as an art after the subject matter of the speech has been discovered and put in order. See Wilbur Samuel Howell, "Nathaniel Carpenter's Place in the Controversy between Dialectic and Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, I(1934), p. 27.

[9]Harrington, p. 13.



for the discussion concerns matters on which truth could not be known for sure; and any truth discovered by such investigation can only be roughly indicated. Hence, while rhetoric is theoretically applicable to the same range of subjects, in a practical sense rhetorical argument is much more limited than dialectical argument, because the subject matter of rhetoric is largely limited to the practical aspects of ethics and politics.[10]

It is clear then that Aristotle (1) distinguishes between science and opinion, placing rhetoric and dialectic in the latter area; (2) considers rhetoric as an offshoot of ethics and politics; and (3) views rhetoric as the counter-part of dialectic, since both operate in the realm of the variable and contingent and are employed by all men.

Aristotle's View of the "Places"

Before Aristotle, the Sophists[11] had treated "places" as ready-made arguments "into which they expected the speeches of both parties

---

[10]Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," p. 67. Cf. Topica and Rhetoric of Aristotle. In Topica Aristotle offered laborious explorations of the dialectical places or topoi. These were pigeonholes in which dialectical reasoning was to draw its arguments. The Topica represented one of the last Greek efforts toward a general culture that attempted to discuss all manner of subjects without studying their appropriate first principles. (See Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. [New York:Barnes and Noble, 1953], p. 61) Aristotle in this respect followed the Sophists, though his motive, in contrast to the Sophists, was to aid his hearers and readers not to win glory or gain by an appearance of being wise, but to discuss questions as sensibly as they could be discussed without special knowledge. Thus, his dialectical places could concern specualtive matters of philosophical inquiry, or purely casual encounters, or even the principles of the several sciences. (Topica 101a 25-40) But rhetorical places, as James H. McBurney points out, largely concerned human actions, characters, motives, and feelings, and were hence clearly associated with politics (including ethics). (See "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Mohographs, III(1936), pp. 54-55.) A more complete discussion of the dialectical and rhetorical places follows later in this study. For the present, it is sufficient to note that Topica was very important, not only in its relationship to Rhetoric, but also as the spring-board for

to fall most frequently."[12] "Places" concerned particular subjects in the sense that speakers had ready-made materials for enhancing or minimizing, for example, the trustworthiness of a witness or the importance of an oath.[13] Their use was primarily for judicial orations. Aristotle examined the previous views of "places" and expressed dissatisfaction with them. In De Sophisticis Elenchis (183b 36-184a 8) he declares:

> For the training given by the paid professors of contentious arguments [Sophists] was like the treatment of the matter by Gorgias. For they used to hand out speeches to be learned by heart, some rhetorical, others in the form of question and answer, each side supposing that their arguments on either side generally fall among them. And therefore the teaching they gave their pupils was ready but rough. For they used to suppose that they trained people by imparting to them not the art but its products, as though anyone professing that he would impart a form of knowledge to obviate any pain in the feet, were then not to teach a man the art of shoemaking or the sources whence he can acquire anything of the kind, but were to present him with several kinds of shoes of all sorts; for he has helped him to meet his need, but has not imparted an art to help him.

Also, in the Rhetoric (1402a 23-26) Aristotle declares that people are correct in objecting to Protagoras' training, making the worse argument appear the better. "It was a fraud; the probability it handled was not genuine but spurious."[14] Having expressed this

---

the development of formal places by Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and other rhetoricians.

[11]See above, pp. 4-8.

[12]De Sophisticis Elenchis, trans W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, The Works of Aristotle, I, 183b 36-184a 1. Also Cicero Brutus, trans. G. I. Hendrickson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939), 46f.

[13]Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," American Journal of Philology, LXII(1941), p. 40.

[14]Cf. Plato Protagoras 319a. Also see Aristotle Rhetoric 1402a-3-27, where the places of sham enthymemes are discussed.



dissatisfaction, then, Aristotle offers his own conception of _topoi_ ("places"), conceiving them as sources from which arguments could be obtained.[15]

To understand better Aristotle's system of _topoi_, it may be helpful to review some modern interpretations of the term _topoi_, before proceeding to examine other matters.[16] Among the modern students of Aristotle, Lane Cooper considers _topos_ as the "seat" of an argument or, when transferred to the memory, something like a pigeonhole in the mind where one goes to seek material for a speech.[17] Cooper believes that _topos_ must be interpreted as "region" or the like.[18] Moreover, he stresses the notion of "from" or "out of" as found in the _Rhetoric_. The speaker "is supposed to have resources _from which_ he draws his arguments and illustrations."[19] _Topos_ is a "place where" arguments are found. As the hunter pursuing game knows that each kind of game has its own kind of haunt, so too the speaker knows that each kind of argument resides in its own place.[20] Another scholar, W. D. Ross, considers _topoi_ as places or regions haunted by

---

[15]McBurney, p. 59. Aristotle's conception of _topoi_ has made for confusion on the part of many modern scholars. Even E. M. Cope, who so greatly clarified Aristotle's use of the term _topoi_ (pp. 124-33), had some difficulties in interpretation. (See, e.g., _Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric_, p. 253.) McBurney's interpretation is reasonable and clear, and will be followed throughout this chapter.

[16]The following review of Aristotle's conceptions of _topoi_ is a cursory one, for, in order to grasp the significance of _topoi_ to Aristotle's rhetorical theory, it is necessary first to examine his theory of the enthymeme. Only then can one proceed to a more detailed examination of the topoi as treated in the _Rhetoric_. The present review of definitions is offered, then, only to establish a foundation for more detailed discussions later in the chapter.

[17]_The Rhetoric of Aristotle: an Expanded Translation_ (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1932), pp. xxiv and 155.

[18]_Ibid._, p. xxii. [19]_Ibid._, p. xxiii. [20]_Ibid._, pp. xxiv-xxv.

arguments.[21] Since the most frequent interpretation of the term is that of "seats of argument," it shall be the guiding definition in this analysis of Aristotle's work. In general, it can be said that Aristotle's *topoi* were areas or locales in which ideas were grouped according to their kinds and from which they could be drawn.

Topoi are divided by Aristotle according to genus and species. According to this view, there are two kinds of *topoi*, common and special. Common *topoi* are subsumed (*Rhetoric* 1392a 1-20) under the following heads: (1) possible and impossible; (2) past fact; (3) future fact; and (4) degree, which served as proper subjects for dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms. Special *topoi* are peculiar to specific subjects, such as ethics and politics. Since these are related to a particular species, they can not be applied to any other subject, while common *topoi* can be applied to all subjects.

Another classification of Aristotle's *topoi* is that of material and formal.[22] According to this broader analysis, material *topoi* concern those facts and opinions sought as a basis for inference. Material *topoi* are further divided into (1) special (*eidē*) and (2) common (*koinoi topoi*). Special *topoi*, as noted above, embrace substantive items or propositions found largely in the areas of

---

[21]*Aristotle*, p. 263. Other classical rhetoricians also considered "places" as regions. Cicero and Quintilian, for example, compared places to haunts of game, veins or mines where metals could be sought, and stores which could be drawn upon. (Cicero *Topica* ii. 7; *De Oratore* ii. 147, 174; *De Finibus* iv. 4; Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* v. 10. 20-22.) The metaphorical way of viewing places persisted throughout the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance periods.

[22]McBurney, p. 60; Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 101; and Marie Brittin, "Concepts of Evidence in Rhetoric," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern Univ., 1949), p. 334.



ethics and politics, and furnish the premises for enthymemes. _Topoi_ of the common or universal sort concern general principles of probability, applicable to all subjects. _Topoi_ as the materials of which proofs are made are discussed in Books I and II of the _Rhetoric_. Formal _topoi_ are places concerning the interpretation brought to bear on evidence already possessed by the speaker.[23] These include lines of argument or the methods of reasoning which a speaker can employ in constructing enthymemes.[24] Of these _topoi_ Aristotle lists twenty eight valid and nine sham (1397a 5-1402a 25).

In addition, _topoi_ can be classified as either (1) analytic, (2) subject, or (3) abstract. Analytic _topoi_, in this scheme, are the common or universal _topoi_ (possible and impossible, past fact, future fact, and degree).[25] Subject _topoi_ concern the more concrete subjects such as finance and defense. Abstract _topoi_ are general propositions similar to the categories or the "predicables" of Aristotle's logical treatises--items such as definition, division, cause, effect, difference, and similarity. Focus here is on the form of the argument, independent of any particular subject matter or content.[26]

---

[23]Brittin, p. 334. [24]McBurney, p. 60.

[25]The _topos_ of degree, for example, if once grasped, could be applied to innumerable situations. A speaker could argue that, if not even the gods know everything, human beings will certainly not know everything. Or he might contend that whoever beats his father will also beat his neighbors. Always proceeding from the less likely thing (which has nevertheless occurred) to the more likely, a speaker could employ this formal _topos_ to great advantage. See Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," pp. 40-41.

[26]This concept of _topoi_ presupposed a capacity for abstracting from material content. Such a capacity had not been fully developed by the Greeks before Plato and Aristotle. Previous teachers of rhetoric lacked it. But Aristotle, setting out to elevate rhetoric to a subject of philosophical dignity and standing, based his approach to rhetoric on his conception of the organic unity of a thing, as implying a principle of structure and being different from a mere accumulation of its parts.

Whatever scheme of classification is applied to Aristotle's *topoi*, there still remain two basic types, material and formal. Material *topoi*, both common and special, form the premises for enthymemes (rhetorical syllogisms), while the formal *topoi* supply the modes of reasoning or lines of argument. Since *topoi* were considered such an important part of rhetoric, and since rhetoric and dialectic were counter-parts, the dialectical art must be examined further.

Dialectical Syllogisms and Topoi

Aristotle's logical works, which have been grouped together under the name of the *Organon*, were concerned with two major problems, the technique of proof and the principles of proof. In regard to the first, Aristotle developed the syllogism, a method of building propositions and arguments from combinations of terms. Of the treatises in the *Organon*, the first, *Categories*, was concerned with simple, uncombined terms. *On Interpretation*, the second treatise, was concerned with pairs of terms combined in propositions and expressive of truths and falsities conceived by the mind. *Prior Analytics* then treated the subject of inference or that combination of three terms in an argument which we call a syllogism. In the last three treatises of the *Organon* (*Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*), Aristotle distinguished three kinds of syllogisms according to their principles or premises. The conditions relevant to the selection of true first principles, particularly of definitions, were treated in *Posterior Analytics*; syllogisms based on such premises were scientific and demonstrative. The conditions relevant to the selection or rejection of principles which expressed

only opinions, whether generally accepted or stamped with the authority of experts, were treated in *Topics*; syllogisms based on such premises were dialectical and probable. The analysis of arguments dependent on opinions which seemed to be generally accepted but were not (or which consisted not in reasoning, but in apparent reasoning from generally accepted opinions or from opinions apparently accepted) was taken up in *Sophistical Refutations*.

The enthymeme or rhetorical syllogism was analyzed in *Rhetoric*. Enthymemes were similar to dialectical syllogisms in that they sought to establish belief, dealt with opinions, and employed *topoi* in the construction of arguments. To understand better the relation of the enthymeme to the dialectical and other syllogisms, the similarities and differences among all four kinds of syllogism are shown in the following analysis.

Aristotle's Four Kinds of Syllogism

Apodeictic Syllogism	Dialectical Syllogism
Along with complete enumeration (induction), leads to scientific demonstration	Along with admissions by respondents or group consensus, leads to establishment of belief
Deals with certainties	Deals with probabilities
Premises based on first principles	Premises based on opinion, either generally accepted or expert
Employs axioms as the foundation of scientific demonstration	Employs *topoi* (general principles of probability) which yield middle terms

Contentious Syllogism	Rhetorical Syllogism
Leads to erroneous conclusions	Along with examples (induction), leads to establishment of belief
Deals with probabilities	Deals with probabilities
Premises based on opinions not generally accepted	Premises based on probabilities and signs (fallible or infallible)

Contentious Syllogism	Rhetorical Syllogism
Employs _topoi_ which do not yield proper middle terms	Employs _topoi_, material or formal. Material _topoi_ supply premises; formal _topoi_ supply modes of argument

The dialectical syllogism is employed in conventional disputation, just as the enthymeme is the mainstay of persuasion. The premises of disputants are drawn from _topoi_, or general principles of probability. The dialectician's _topoi_ are universal propositions latent in certain "seats" or "places," and based on generally accepted opinions.[27] (Spurious or contentious reasoning, on the other hand, starts from untrue or unaccepted opinions [_Topica_ 100b 24-25].)

In the _Topica_, Aristotle does not present a list of _topoi_ discussed in any great detail. Rather, he briefly discusses a very large number of them.[28] These include such _topoi_ as name, genus, species, definition, time, similarities, contraries, and the like.[29]

While it appears that nearly every general statement or common principle found in _Topica_ might be called a _topos_,[30] several conclusions can be drawn regarding the relation of the _topoi_ to the

---

[27] _Topica_, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, _The Works of Aristotle_, I, 100a 30-31.

[28] Estimates of the number of _topoi_ listed in _Topica_ vary. Walter J. Ong, S.J., in _Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958), p. 122, estimates the number of dialectical places at three hundred sixty. McBurney says (p. 54) there are nearly two hundred dialectical _topoi_.

[29] The list of _topoi_ is found in chapters two through seven (185aff.). The _topoi_ there listed re-appear, in part, in Aristotle's _Rhetoric_ (1397a 7-1400b 25). The grouping of _topoi_ offered above is that of the writer, and is intended only to suggest some kinds of _topoi_ Aristotle discussed.

[30] Octavius Freire Owen, _The Organon, or Logical Treatises of Aristotle_ (London: George Bell and Sons, 1878), II, p. 358. Also see Cicero _De Inventione_, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1949), ii. 4.

dialectical syllogism. It is clear that (1) topoi may be considered as general principles of probability, standing in the same relation to the dialectical syllogism as axioms to the apodeictic syllogism; (2) dialectical topoi are places where one seeks middle terms; (3) Aristotle's topoi are always propositions; (4) dialectic, the art of probable reasoning, is based on a knowledge of topoi; and (5) dialectic is principally involved in the explanation and delivery of topoi (hence the treatise on dialectics takes its title from its principal part).[31]

The Enthymeme and Topoi[32]

At the very beginning of the Rhetoric, Aristotle accuses the writers of handbooks of neglecting the enthymeme, the very substance of persuasion. Rather, he alleges, they concern themselves with non-essentials (1354a 14-15), occupy themselves with the question of how to put a judge into the proper frame of mind (1354b 19-22), and say nothing about deliberative oratory (1354b 26-28). After those preliminary remarks, Aristotle then treats the enthymeme in the following manner: (1) he introduces the reader to the enthymeme, offering important preliminary definitions and classifications; (2) he discusses the topoi from which enthymemes are drawn, explaining that logical, pathetical, and ethical appeals are projected through enthymemes; and

---

[31]Owen, ibid., pp. 358-59.

[32]In this section of the chapter, the writer is particularly indebted to the fine scholarship of James H. McBurney. His work (summarized in the article, "Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Monographs, III [1936], pp. 49-74) provides both accurate generalizations and painstaking detail, which the present writer follows in this analysis of Aristotle's topoi.

(3) he analyzes the enthymemes in their several forms.

Aristotle begins by calling persuasion a form of demonstration, "since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated" (1355a 5-7). The orator's demonstration is the enthymeme, which, in general, is the most effective of the modes of persuasion (1355a 7-8). Then, before introducing the reader to the types of proof, he notes that "the Enthymeme is a sort of syllogism, and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches" (1355a 8-10). Thus, he who can see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced will also be best skilled in the Enthymeme, when he has further learned what its subject matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogisms of strict logic (1355a 10-14).[33]

Next, the two types of proof, artistic and inartistic, are discussed (1355b 36ff.).[34] Inartistic proofs (laws, witnesses, written

---

[33]McBurney aptly notes that "the passages in which Aristotle discusses the relation of the enthymeme to the topoi or topics are especially helpful in clarifying the relations between dialectical and rhetorical reasoning on the one hand and scientific demonstration on the other" (p. 59).

[34]Concerning the relation of Aristotle's artistic and inartistic proofs, a brief discussion in Wilbur Samuel Howell's Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961), p. 68, is here worth citing. Howell declares:

> Invention, as the process of discovering valid or seemingly valid arguments to render one's case plausible, sounds at first like an invitation to master the appearances rather than the realities of tight and honest proof. Actually, however, it was an invitation to speaker or writer to find the best of available materials, wherever they might be. Some of these available materials would be documentary evidence, eyewitness testimony, confessions, and the like. Perhaps on occasion such proofs as these would be sufficient. The art of rhetoric, according to the ancient idea, did not extend to the discovery or use of such proofs as these, which were called non-artistic, in the sense that they were there to start with, and had only to be used, not discovered by a theoretical process. Rhetorical invention was concerned rather with the theoretical process by which proofs not there to start with could be discovered or uncovered. These proofs were called artistic, not because

contracts, oaths, and evidence obtained under torture) do not strictly belong to rhetoric, since they were there to start with, and had only to be used, not discovered by any theoretical process.[35] Artistic proofs, on the other hand, are those proofs which can be discovered or uncovered by a theoretical means that is always available for that use.[36] These include: (1) proof or apparent proof provided in the speech itself; (2) the personal impression brought about through the speaker's character; and (3) the speaker's appeals to the emotions of his hearers. Artistic proofs are based on either examples (rhetorical induction) or enthymemes (rhetorical syllogisms). Both concern the conduct of classes of men, who concern themselves with subjects which offer in the main alternate possibilities in the sphere of human action. Examples and enthymemes have to be adapted to audiences of untrained thinkers, unable to follow a long line of reasoning (1356b-1357a 15).

The premises from which enthymemes are formed are (1) probabilities, (2) examples, and (3) signs (fallible or infallible). Probabilities

---

they were considered more ingenious if less convincing than the others, but simply because they were regarded as being subject to discovery by a theoretical means that was always available for that use.

[35]McBurney suggests that the non-artistic proofs discussed by Aristotle are "roughly comparable to what contemporary writers in argumentation call 'evidence.'" (p. 55) Howell believes that "our modern distinction between direct and indirect evidence is parallel to the ancient distinction between non-artistic and artistic proofs." (Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p. 69.)

[36]Howell notes that Aristotle's distinction was later accepted by Cicero and Quintilian as an important dividing line, "on one side of which lay relatively unpredictable materials, varying greatly in weight and number from case to case, while on the other side lay the relatively predictable materials that tended to be of constant application to all sorts of cases, and that could usually be brought to light by systematic analysis." (Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, pp. 68-69.) Also see Cicero De Inventione ii. 14; De Oratore ii. 116-117; and Quintilian Institutio Oratoria v. 1. 1.

concern what as a rule is or is thought to be true; fallible signs are subject to refutation; and infallible signs are irrefutable (1357a-1357b 20). Probabilities and signs are based on all the possible facts obtainable by the speaker. Topoi in turn furnish both the materials and forms of arguments used in discourse. The relation of these topoi to the other elements of logical proof (discussed above) is shown in the following analysis.



The material of enthymemes, then, comes from topoi, both special and common. Special topoi come from the special sciences such as physics and politics, and are not by nature rhetorical (1358a). Beginning with I,4 of Rhetoric, Aristotle presents an extensive collection of such topoi, according to the kind of oratory (deliberative, epideictic, or forensic) to which each is most appropriate (1359a 30-1375a 20).[37] Common topoi, on the other hand, apply to all subjects alike and include such topoi as "more and less." These are introduced in Book I (1358a 10ff.). Both kinds of material topoi, special and common, are enumerated in the following analysis.

Aristotle's Material Topoi

Special (Rhetoric i. 4-14)	Common (Rhetoric ii. 18-19)
Relative to a particular species or class of things. As numerous as the subjects men discuss.	Applicable to all subjects and kinds of oratory. 1. Possible and Impossible 2. Past Fact 3. Future Fact 4. Degree
Deliberative oratory concerns topoi of 1. Ways and means 2. War and peace 3. National defense 4. Imports and exports 5. Legislation Also the knowledge of happiness, the good, and the kinds of government.	Most appropriate to deliberative oratory are topoi of Possibility and Future Fact.
Epideictic oratory concerns virtue and vice, especially justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom.	Most appropriate to epideictic oratory is the topos of Degree.

---

[37]See Richard C. Hueeman's "Modern Approaches to the Aristotelian Concept of the Special Topic," Central States Speech Journal, XV(February, 1964), pp. 21-22.

Aristotle's Material *Topoi*

Special	Common
Forensic oratory concerns wrong-doing (its motives, perpetrators, and victims), the knowledge of pleasure, and the knowledge of law.	Most appropriate to forensic oratory is the *topos* of Past Fact.

Enthymemes, according to Aristotle, are formed mostly from the special *topoi* (1358a 26-28), not so many coming from the common *topoi* because they do not give a man special knowledge in any one science. Yet, Aristotle advises, the proper subjects of both dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are common *topoi*, those lines of argument that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics, and many other things that have nothing to do with each other (1358a-10-15). For the more correctly one handles a particular subject, the further he will get from pure rhetoric or dialectic. Or, stated another way, the better the selection one makes of propositions suitable for special *topoi*, the nearer one comes, unconsciously, to setting up a science that is distinct from both dialectic and rhetoric (1358a 20-25).

Thus, the speaker might be successful in stating the propositions, but his science will no longer be rhetoric, but the science to which the propositions thus discovered belong (1358a 24-26). The proper *topoi* of rhetoric then are not peculiar to a particular field of investigation, but are rather the common *topoi*, such as justice or expediency, which express common human relations. To deviate from them into a method peculiar to a given subject, physics for example, is to pass from the rhetorical method of presentation over to the scientific method of analysis. This the speaker must do to the extent of mastering his subject matter before he presents it.[38] But he should follow scientific method only

---

[38]Charles Sears Baldwin, *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York: Macmillan, 1924), p. 14.

insofar as he investigates and employs the special *topoi* proper to the subject. Hence, his education requires study of special *topoi*, particularly of ethics and politics. Of those he must have a working knowledge.

Special *topoi* provide the premises of enthymemes. Premises in the form of general propositions about the "good" (a thing which everyone seeks to attain is good), the useful, the beautiful, the just, the possible, and their opposites were standard equipment of ancient orators. Even before Aristotle discussed these *topoi*, it is highly probable that there were other rhetoricians who had also adopted the practice of providing their students with general propositions as to what was good, just, and desirable, and, more particularly, of enumerating good, just, and desirable things. This may be regarded as a step in the same direction, and yet an important difference lay in the fact that behind Aristotle's procedure there is a definite logical conception of the nature of the rhetorical argument. His special *topoi* are really intended to be major premises in a rhetorical syllogism (enthymeme).[39]

The four common *topoi* were useful for deliberative, epideictic, and forensic oratory. Deliberative speakers could best employ the *topoi* of Possibility and Future Fact. A speaker employing the *topos* of Possibility might contend that, if one pair of opposites could exist, so could the other. Or, it might be alleged, if a man could get well, then he could also fall sick (1392a 10-1392b 15). If the political orator chose to use Future Fact, he could assert that a thing will be done if there is both the power and the wish to do it. (1393a 1-10)

---

[39]Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," pp. 41-42.

Forensic speakers found the _topos_ of Past Fact most useful. Speakers calling on it could contend, for example, that, if the less likely of two things had occurred, the more likely must have occurred also. Or that if one thing that usually followed another had happened, then the other thing has occurred (1392b 15-30). Finally, all types of speakers could use the _topos_ of Degree. Deliberative orators could discuss the relative greatness of various goods, forensic orators could discuss the more and less of justice, and epideictic orators could discuss the degree of nobility. Every orator then could use the _topos_ of Degree (1393a 10-20).

Before turning to Aristotle's formal _topoi_, one other distinction must be noted regarding the common _topoi_. Amplification and depreciation, Aristotle states, are material _topoi_, not formal _topoi_. In an important passage (1403a 17-25) he remarks:

> Amplification and Depreciation are not an element of enthymeme. By 'an element' [elementary class, a primary type] I mean the same thing as 'a line of Enthymematic argument'--a general class embracing a large number of particular kinds of Enthymemes. Amplification and Depreciation are one kind of Enthymeme, viz., the kind used to show that a thing is great or small; just as there are other kinds used to show that a thing is good or bad, just or unjust, and anything else of the sort. All these things are the _subject-matter_ of syllogisms and Enthymemes; none of these is the line of argument of an Enthymeme; no more, therefore, are Amplification and Depreciation.

The common _topoi_, then, are general principles of probability, related to all the types of oratory.

In contrast to the special and common _topoi_, the formal _topoi_ in Aristotle's _Rhetoric_ are methods of reasoning rather than material propositions.[40] The list of _topoi_ in II, 23-24, is a random list of some

---

[40]W. D. Ross noted that the relation of the formal _topoi_ to the common _topoi_ was "something of a puzzle, which can perhaps best be explained by supposing the _Rhetoric_ to represent the notes for more than one course of lectures." _Aristotle_, p. 273.

of the more usual arguments from cause, sign, and example encountered in speaking.[41] While the material topoi provide the premises of argument, these formal topoi supply the modes of reasoning; and together they comprise the enthymeme.[42] The following list should suggest the nature and diversity of the formal topoi.

Aristotle's Formal Topoi

Line of Argument	Illustration
1. Opposites	If war is the cause of present troubles, peace is what is needed to put things right again.
2. Inflections of the same stem	Use of the word "just." Does not always mean "beneficial."
3. Correlative terms	If the deed is good, the doer is justified.
4. More and less	A man who has done this would certainly not hesitate to do that.
5. Time	What is true or proper at one time is true or proper at another.
6. Opponent's utterances turned against him	Inconsistencies between speaker's way of life and charge he brings.
7. Definition	State a particular aspect of a thing under discussion to make it correspond to something else, usually to something about which the audience has a settled opinion.
8. Ambiguous terms	Use of words which have more than one meaning to confuse opponent.
9. Division	Split a statement up according to possible ways in which it maybe true and then rebut the divisions.
10. Induction	Use of two or three cases to prove a general rule from which an inference is drawn.

---

[41]McBurney suggests (pp. 61-62) that Aristotle apparently intended the list of twenty eight valid and nine sham formal topoi to be correlated, at least roughly, with the causes, signs, and examples discussed in another connection.

[42]McBurney, p. 62.

Aristotle's Formal Topoi

Line of Argument	Illustration
11. Existing decisions	Appeals to authority.
12. From parts to whole	What is true or untrue of the whole must be true or untrue of the parts. Argue from part by part to the whole.
13. Simple consequences	Education results in unpopularity (a bad consequence) and wisdom (a good consequence).
14. Criss-cross consequences	Each of two opposites has both a good and bad consequence opposite respectively to each other.
15. Inward thoughts and outward show	Men approve one thing openly, and another in their secret thoughts.
16. Arguments from similarity	It would be more reasonable to spare children because of their fathers than fathers because of their children.
17. Identical results: identical antecedents	To affirm the birth of the gods is as absurd as to say that they die.
18. Altered choices	Men do not make the same choices on a later as on an earlier occasion.
19. Attributed motives	Turning the motive of an action to better or worse.
20. Incentives and deterrents	Conditions which make men act or refrain from acting.
21. Incredible occurrences	The probability of improbability. "Too poor a story to be a lie."
22. Conflicting facts	Inconsistencies in the facts--conflicting dates, acts, and statements.
23. Meeting slander	Reasons why facts appear in a wrong light.
24. Cause and effect	If there was no cause, the thing did not occur.
25. Course of action	Devise a better course than one advocated.

Aristotle's Formal Topoi

Line of Argument	Illustration
26. Actions compared	Comparison of previous actions and intended actions.
27. Previous mistakes	Possible uses of mistakes.
28. Meaning of names	Plays upon names.

It is difficult to determine how far each formal *topos* extends, several seeming to overlap or almost to coincide with one another. Of the twenty eight formal *topoi* listed in II, 23, ten are based either wholly or in part upon probability. They are *topoi* 4, 6, 10, 13, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 27 above. An additional problem in understanding these lines of argument concerns the reader's problem of distinguishing among the more and less important of the twenty eight *topoi*.[43] For example, when the Greek and Roman rhetoricians later attempted to follow Aristotle's kind of classification, they accepted his terminology and types only about a third of the time. Hence those formal *topoi* generally retained by such writers as Cicero and Quintilian included: (1) contraries, (3) correlative terms, (4) more and less, (7) definition, (9) division, (10) induction, (11) existing decisions, (16) arguments from similarity, and (22) conflicting facts.[44]

---

[43]See Georgiana Paine Palmer, *The τόποι of Aristotle's Rhetoric as Exemplified in the Orators* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 80-84. This book exclusively concerns the formal *topoi* of the *Rhetoric*, as exemplified in one hundred fifty of the Attic orators' speeches.

[44]The following is an indication of a few representative passages in Cicero and Quintilian where the formal *topoi* are treated. (Aristotle's formal *topoi* are in *Rhetoric* 1397a 7ff.)

Aristotle	Cicero	Quintilian
(1) contraries	*De Inv.* i.30	v.10.73
(3) correlative terms	*De Inv.* i.30	v.10.75-79
(4) more and less	*Topica* 4.23	v.10.87f.

One cannot but wonder if Cicero and Quintilian (when one considers their strong knowledge and understanding of oratory, together with their respect for Aristotle) would not have kept more closely to this classification had it more closely corresponded to oratorical usage.

Nevertheless, some of Aristotle's twenty eight formal topoi were used extensively by the Attic orators. For instance, Palmer found, in her study, hundreds of examples for the fourth topos, the more and less.[45] Over one hundred illustrations were found for (11) existing decisions, (13) simple consequences, (20) incentives and deterrents,[46] and (22) conflicting facts. Thirty or more cases were noted for (7) definition, (9) division, (10) induction, and (19) attributed motives. Ten to thirty cases were found for (1) opposites, (6) opponent's utterances turned against him, (14) criss-cross consequences, (16) arguments from similarity, (18) altered choices,

---

Aristotle	Cicero	Quintilian
(7) definition	De Orat. ii.164	v.10.74
(9) division	De Orat. ii.165	v.10.66
(10) induction	De Orat. ii.40	v.10.73
(11) existing decisions	De Inv. i.30	v.11.36-44
(16) arguments from similarity	Topica 3.15	v.11.34
(22) conflicting facts	Topica 13.55	v.10.2

Of these topoi the seventh, definition, was one of the clearest in the Rhetoric. The first six books of Aristotle's Topica were devoted to it, but from a very different point of view than that of the Rhetoric. The ninth topos, division, was treated by Cicero as partitio and by Quintilian as divisio. The eleventh topos, existing decisions, was treated by Aristotle as particularly appropriate to deliberative speaking, while Cicero and Quintilian related it more to forensic oratory. Cicero and Quintilian often differed from Aristotle in their interpretations of the formal places.

[45]See Palmer, p. 80, for an excellent summary of the employment of Aristotle's formal topoi by the Attic orators.

(23) meeting slander, (24) cause and effect, (25) course of action, and (27) previous mistakes. The other *topoi* were rarely used, with no examples found for (2) inflections of the same stem, (8) ambiguous terms, and (28) meaning of names. The latter had negligible value, except for dialectic.[47]

Aristotle also offers (1401a-1402a 27) a list of nine formal *topoi* of sham enthymemes, including: diction, combination and separation, indignation, sign, accident, *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, consequences, time and manner, and substitution of absolutes for particulars. These all are used in enthymemes that appear genuine, but are not. Fallacies of diction occur when a speaker attempts to pass a compact and antithetical sentence for an enthymeme, or misuses homonyms. Fallacies of combination and separation involve a false identity between a whole and the combination of its parts. Indignation is employed when the speaker, without having proved his case, elaborates on the nature of a deed.[48] Fallacies of sign concern the attempt to

---

[46]This *topos*, concerning the establishment of motive, was the core of any deliberative speech and also played an important role in judicial oratory. Palmer, p. 61.

[47]Palmer, p. 82. Aristotle's inclusion of such *topoi* suggests two conclusions. First, his list of *topoi* was random. Second, he did not study oratory too extensively.

[48]This *topos* is especially interesting because of the different interpretations given it later by the author of the *ad Herennium* and the younger Cicero. Aristotle especially related it to forensic oratory as did the later writers. Aristotle held that through amplification the defense could produce the impression that the accused was innocent. If the prosecutor went into a passion, he could give the impression that the accused was guilty. The listener would falsely infer guilt or innocence, without benefit of the facts. This practice Aristotle condemned. The author of *ad Herennium*, however, favorably discussed nine places of pity (ii.31). The younger Cicero approvingly discussed sixteen places of pity (*De Inv.* i.55-56). Both considered such topics valuable for the defense of accused parties.



prove something through the presentation of just one case. Topoi from the accidental are treated as though they were essential. Argument from consequence is essentially an error of omission. Post hoc ergo propter hoc involves taking what happened before or along with a thing as the cause of it. Omitting any reference to time and manner is a fallacy. Finally, substituting the absolute for what was not absolute but particular is a fallacy. These topoi of sham enthymemes[49] somewhat resembled the Sophistical fallacies discussed by Aristotle in De Sophisticis Elenchis, just as the twenty eight valid topoi bore slight resemblance to those in Aristotle's Topica.

The Relation of Topoi to Other Modes of Proof

It has been established that the topoi discussed by Aristotle were the sources to which speakers could turn for both materials and forms of enthymemes. It is now important to determine what relation, if any, existed between enthymemes and the ethical and pathetical modes of proof.[50]

To begin, it must be recognized that the enthymeme was a rhetorical tool, dependent upon language symbols (terms and propositions in significant combinations). Persuasion arising from the personality of the speaker and other factors[51] (except as it found its expression

---

[49]Clearly discussed in Cooper's Rhetoric of Aristotle, pp. 172-77.

[50]The writer here is again indebted to James McBurney's work on the enthymeme, in particular his section entitled, "The Enthymeme and Ethos and Pathos," pp. 62-65. Because the writer follows McBurney closely in this section, footnote references will be held to a minimum.

[51]For example, such matters outside of the speech composition as the speaker's previous reputation, advance notices of his speech, an introduction of the speaker, or the delivery of the speech.

in terms and propositions) would be, therefore, clearly outside the realm of the enthymeme. But personality appeal and attempts to influence the emotional state of the audience which could be expressed in words and sentences (for example, a speaker's direct statement about himself or others) would seem to fall within the realm of the enthymeme.

An analysis of Aristotle's treatment of the enthymeme suggests that the enthymeme was the unit or element of all persuasive discourse--logical, ethical, and pathetical. The admission of "emotionally loaded" terms and propositions was in fact one of the important characteristics of the enthymeme; the premises which comprised the enthymeme were usually little more than the beliefs of the audience which were used as causes and signs to secure the acceptance of other propositions.[52] These premises, as has been shown, were drawn from the special and common *topoi*. It is organized around lists of these *topoi* that Aristotle offers his discussion of ethics and politics, virtues, vices, and emotions. In other words, Aristotle presents what he has to say about both ethical and pathetical persuasion in the form of *topoi*, and we are explicitly told (1356a, 1366a, 1388b) that these *topoi* are the sources to which the speaker can turn for the propositions to compose enthymemes.

The order of treatment or sequence of the *Rhetoric* sustains the position here taken on the enthymeme in relation to *ethos* and *pathos*. Aristotle begins the *Rhetoric* by proclaiming the enthymeme to be the body and substance of all persuasion. In I,2 he distin-

---

[52]McBurney, p. 63.



guishes among the three forms of artistic persuasion and explains the enthymeme in terms of causes and signs. He concludes the same chapter by explaining the *topoi* as the places to which one turns for the premises of enthymemes. Then in I,3 he distinguishes the three great divisions of oratory, deliberative, forensic, and epideictic, and states that he will organize his discussion of *topoi* around that division of the kinds of oratory. From I,4 to I,9 Aristotle gives the reader some practical politics designed to help the deliberative orator in the selection of enthymemes. In I,9 he offers a discussion of virtues and vices designed to help the epideictic orator. In I,10 he turns to the *topoi* of forensic oratory. The discussion continues until I,15 where he closes the first book with a consideration of non-artistic proofs.

Aristotle begins Book II by pointing out the importance of ethical and pathetical persuasion in the three types of oratory and from II,1 to II,19 offers some practical psychology concerning human motives and emotions. It is with this that Aristotle concludes his discussion of special *topoi* begun in I,4. Having concluded his treatment of special *topoi*, he devotes II,19 to common *topoi*. (It will be remembered that the distinction between common and special *topoi* in relation to the enthymeme was made in I,3.)

Upon concluding his discussion of the common and special *topoi* from which the premises of enthymemes must be drawn, Aristotle then in II,20 takes up the study of the enthymeme in its various forms, and concludes Book II in Chapter 26 with this material. Book III, of course, is devoted to style and delivery.

Viewed in the above manner, the organization of the *Rhetoric* seems entirely logical and understandable. Aristotle first introduced



the enthymeme as an element of rhetorical persuasion and gave some preliminary definitions and classifications; next, he discussed the *topoi* from which enthymemes were to be drawn, explaining that ethical, pathetical, and logical persuasion will be projected through those enthymemes (depending upon one's choice of propositions); and finally he carefully analyzed the enthymeme in its several forms. Books I and II treated *inventio* and Book III mainly considered *elocutio*, to a lesser extent *dispositio* and *pronuntiatio*, with little or no mention being made of *memoria*. The enthymeme, then, was the rhetorical instrument through which logical, pathetical, and ethical proofs were projected. And the enthymeme was based on the common, special, and formal *topoi*.

In the last chapter of the *Rhetoric* (III,19), Aristotle discusses the conclusion of a speech, pointing out the uses of (previously discussed) *topoi* for stirring the emotions of the audience and creating a good ethical impression. For one thing, the speaker should create a favorable last impression on the audience by representing himself and his opponent in favorable and unfavorable lights respectively. To accomplish this, the speaker is advised to employ certain *topoi*, previously discussed in I,9. Since *ethos* is manifested through invention(as well as style, arrangement, and delivery) of a speech,[53] these *topoi* are of great importance to the speaker. Also in III,19, Aristotle states that a speaker should appeal to the emotions of his audience by employing *topoi*, previously discussed in II,1-11. Now the function of *pathos*, generally like that of *ethos*, is to create an

---

[53]William M. Sattler, "Conceptions of *Ethos* in Ancient Rhetoric," *Speech Monographs*, XIV(1947), p. 58.



attitude in the audience directly through the material, form, and manner of the speech.[54] But Aristotle distinguishes between the *topoi* peculiar to deliberative, epideictic, and forensic argument, and those *topoi* peculiar to *pathos*. He separates and distinguishes between the emotions and the *topoi* which give rise to them, and the *topoi* used, for example, in a deliberative speech to prove the goodness or expediency of some proposed end.[55] Happiness and pleasure are treated in Book I as a part of the development of deliberative and forensic speaking. They are treated independently of the emotions analyzed in Book II. While nowhere in the *Rhetoric* does Aristotle *expressly* show a relationship between (1) the *topoi* of happiness and deliberative speaking, (2) *topoi* of the pleasant and forensic speaking, and (3) *topoi* of the emotions and all the types of oratory, there does appear to be an implicit connection.[56]

Since the enthymeme is the instrument through which logical, ethical, and emotional appeals are made, and since *topoi* provide the premises and modes of reasoning of the enthymeme, it is clear that *topoi* are closely related to both *ethos* and *pathos*.

Summary of Aristotle's Conception of Topoi

Aristotle views *topoi* as pigeonholes from which dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms draw their premises and forms. In the *Rhetoric*

---

[54]Irving J. Lee, "Some Conceptions of Emotional Appeal in Rhetorical Theory," *Speech Monographs*, VI(1939), p. 73. Also see Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1377b.

[55]Lee, p. 76.

[56]Lee, p. 77.



he presents two kinds of _topoi_, material and formal. Material _topoi_ are either special or common. Special _topoi_ provide premises for enthymemes used in all three kinds of oratory. The four common _topoi_ are not related to particular subject areas, but are useful for all types of speaking. Formal _topoi_, including twenty eight valid and nine sham, provide the modes of reasoning a speaker might take.

Rhetoric, the counter-part of dialectic and offshoot of ethics and politics, is concerned with the discovery of all the available means of persuasion in any given case. The foundation of the art is the enthymeme or rhetorical syllogism. Through the enthymeme are projected the logical, ethical, and emotional appeals of the speaker. These appeals are drawn from the speaker's knowledge of _topoi_, special, common, and formal. In a very special sense, then, Aristotle's _topoi_ are intimately connected with the entire persuasive process.

CHAPTER III

CONCEPTIONS OF PLACES IN THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD

Introductory Considerations

During the two hundred fifty year period between the death of Aristotle and the first rhetorical efforts of the younger Cicero,[1] rhetoric fell into the hands of the schoolmasters. Rhetorical theory was taught from dry textbooks abounding in technical terms. Hellenistic rhetoricians were usually men of small intellectual calibre, professionals who disputed among themselves on minor matters of classification and concerned themselves little with the broader aspects of the art.[2] Aristotle's great effort at synthesis (Rhetoric) did not standardize the way rhetoric was taught.[3] Rather, with each generation, teaching grew more and more complicated; and dominating that teaching was a system of rigid conventions which, once recognized and assimilated, allowed the orator complete freedom within the system. Far from

[1]For purpose of clarity in this and the following chapter, Cicero will be treated in terms of (1) his youthful rhetorical work, De Inventione (ca. 86 B. C.), and (2) his more mature works. Cicero (106-43 B. C.) wrote De Inventione as a young man and in that work reflected the Hellenistic conception of rhetoric. This work will be examined in the present chapter. Cicero's six other rhetorical works were written some thirty to forty years later, after he had gained considerable political and rhetorical experience. These works (De Oratore, Partitione Oratoria, Brutus, De Optimo Genre Oratorum, Orator, and Topica) contain a different point of view about rhetoric, and will be discussed in Chapter IV.

[2]Clarke, p. 7.

[3]Marrou, p. 197.



hindering originality or talent, the restrictions enabled very subtle, polished effects to be produced.[4] Although no manuals dealing with this system survive, it is apparent from later works embodying similar tenents that the system was a continuation of Sophistic teachings, adapted for school purposes and modified in the light of current literary tendencies.[5]

The ars rhetorica of the Hellenistic period divided the materials of rhetoric according to (1) the types of oratory, (2) the functions of the orator, and (3) the parts of a speech. The types of oratory were still deliberative, epideictic, and forensic. However, forensic oratory was given most attention by the rhetoricians; and epideictic oratory was scarcely recognized as having an independent existence.[6] The functions of the orator were (1) inventio, (2) dispositio, (3) elocutio, (4) memoria , and (5) actio or pronuntiatio. The parts of a speech usually included (1) exordium (introduction), (2) narratio (statement of facts), (3) divisio or partitio (point of issue or what is to be proved), (4) confirmatio (exposition of arguments), (5) confutatio (refutation), and (6) conclusio (conclusion).[7] The main outlines of the ars rhetorica remained much the same over the centuries; even some of the details remained unchanged.

One very important rhetorician of the Hellenistic period was Hermagoras of Temnos, whose teachings were representative of the

---

[4]Marrou, p. 204.

[5]J. W. H. Atkins, "Greek Rhetoric," Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. M. Cary et al (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 767.

[6]Clarke, p. 24. The decline of the polis was largely responsible for the demise of great deliberative oratory. See Marrou, p. 195.

[7]Cicero De Inv. i.19; ad Her. i.4. There could, however, be as many as four or five or even seven parts of a speech.

second century B. C. and were subsequently to be the young Cicero's guide in matters of rhetoric.[8] Maintaining that all non-technical problems fall within the scope of invention, both particular (hypotheses) and general (theses) problems, he prescribed four questions (staseis) which he held to be adequate for the solution of all such problems, thus establishing a system (status) which was to be discussed throughout later antiquity.[9] Because his work found great favor with the schools and influenced such rhetoricians as the young Cicero and the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium,[10] it is especially unfortunate that the work is lost and must be reconstructed from references in other treatises.[11]

However, two other treatises do offer a notion of rhetorical developments in the Hellenistic period--the Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero's De Inventione. Ad Herennium was probably written between 86-82 B. C. by an unknown author,[12] who probably had Marian sympathies, as the character of the treatise itself suggests. Sympathy for the populares is evident,[13] and the author's confident tone and

---

[8]Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity, II, p. 15.

[9]Atkins, Oxford Classical Dictionary, p. 767.

[10]Clarke, p. 7.

[11]George Thiele has attempted a reconstruction of Hermagoras' treatise. See Hermagoras: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rhetorik (Strassburg: Trübner, 1893). Ray Nadeau states that Thiele reconstructed Hermagoras' work through sixty quotations from secondary sources. See "Some Aristotelian and Stoic Influences on the Theory of Stases," Speech Monographs, XXVI(1959), p. 248.

[12]Harry Caplan (trans.), Rhetorica ad Herennium (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954), p. xxvi.

[13]See, for example, iv.31, 68.



simplicity (in preference to scholastic subtlety) suggest a reaction to the charges of impudence and lack of culture brought by Crassus (92 B. C.) against the Latin rhetoricians.[14] The treatise is a synthesis of various teachings, including: pre-Aristotèlian (Isocratean and "Anaximenean"); Aristotelian and Peripatetic; Stoic; Hermagorean (especially regarding status); and possibly Epicurean.[15] Of the three types of oratory, forensic oratory claims most attention;[16] of the five rhetorical canons, invention and style receive considerable treatment.

Cicero's De Inventione is another Hellenistic treatise which deserves some attention. The work's composition cannot belong to a period much later than 91 B. C., when the young Cicero was about to wear the toga virilis.[17] Much of the treatise reads like a law book, since most emphasis (as in the ad Herennium) is on forensic oratory. Despite his youth and inexperience, Cicero appears to have grasped the complicated and elaborate terminology of Hellenistic rhetoric.[18]

While there is frequent agreement between the ad Herennium and De Inventione (some precepts were set forth in virtually the same

---

[14]Clarke, p. 14. [15]Caplan, Rhet. ad Her., p. xv.

[16]Caplan, Rhet. ad Her., p. xviii. Of the four books in ad Herennium, two dealt with invention in forensic oratory. Invention in deliberative and epideictic oratory received brief mention in the third book.

[17]H. M. Hubbell, De Inventione (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1949), p. viii. Cicero in 91 B. C. was fifteen years old and about to don the toga symbolic of manhood. It is likely that, having heard school lectures on rhetoric, he wrote his treatise from lecture notes and published his work then or, at best, no later than 86 B. C. The treatise contains no references to events later than 91 B. C. The youthful quality of the work prompted Torsten Petersson to deem it "a treatise on Invention, a division of rhetoric, and as impersonal as a graduate student's thesis, which, indeed, it very much resembles." Cicero: a Biography (New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1963), p. 11.



language, and even some of the illustrations are identical), there are also some significant differences. Harry Caplan, translator of the ad Herennium, has noted that the two authors differ in their methods of presenting material, in organization, and in the spirit of the works. Caplan believed that Cicero's quotations are more accurate, his treatment of the three kinds of oratory is more complete, and his examination of the doctrine of proof, types of issues, and sources of law is different.[19] Of the two works, the ad Herennium is a relatively simple guide representing the traditional rhetoric of the schools, and hence will receive first attention in this study.

Rhetorica ad Herennium

The author of the treatise notes the three kinds of oratory and the five canons of rhetoric, and then treats invention in terms of the six parts of a speech in a judicial setting (i.2-3). The loci or places in which arguments could be discovered for making an audience well disposed are found in the speaker's character, in that of his opponent, in that of the audience, and in the actual facts of the case (i.8; cf. De Inv. i.22). Precepts are also offered on how a speaker can handle the two kinds of introduction, principium and insinuatio.[20] After discussing the statement of facts and the division, the author turns to the most important part of a speech, the proof or

---

[18]Clarke, p. 13. That terminology appears to have been in the main already familiar when Cicero wrote his treatise.

[19]See Caplan, Rhet. ad Her., pp. xxvi-xxvii.

[20]ad Her. i.6-8; also see De Inv. i.22-23; Part. Orat. 28-30; Quintilian Inst. Orat. iv.1.5f. The principium is direct and to the point. Insinuatio is an indirect approach useful when the speaker is in an unfavorable position. Clarke, p. 25.



argument. Before a speaker can present his proofs, he has to determine the status of the question.[21] If the main question concerns status conjecturalis (whether an action took place or not), six basic arguments involving a variety of loci can be employed. The following analysis shows the different approaches available to the pleader (ii. 2-8).

Arguments for Status Conjecturalis

1. Probability of defendant's guilt[22]
   a. Motive
      (1) Benefit from crime (money, honor, power)
      (2) Satisfaction of some passion
      (3) Desire to avoid some disadvantage
   b. Manner of life

2. Comparison (no one less likely to be guilty)

3. Signs pointing to guilt
   a. Place
   b. Point of time
   c. Duration of time
   d. Occasion
   e. Hope of success
   f. Hope of escaping detection

4. Presumptive proof (guilt demonstrated by means of indications that increase certainty and strengthen suspicion)
   a. Preceding the crime
   b. Contemporaneous with the crime
   c. Following the crime

5. Subsequent behavior (signs attending guilt or innocence)

---

[21]Status is the doctrine especially associated with Hermagoras. It is defined as "the first conflict of the pleas arising from the answer to an accusation." (Clarke, p. 26) In ad Her. the term constitutio is used, although status is the preferred term in other treatises. The four staseis used by Hermagoras are (1) fact, (2) definition, (3) quality, and (4) objection. A pleader seeks to determine whether an act occurred, what it was, and its quality. In addition, he can challenge the right of an opponent to speak or the right of the court to decide the case. Each of the four staseis is discussed in considerable detail by Hermagoras, and many subdivisions are made. The status doctrine is important because it enables disputants to determine the question at stake. Through elimination of each stasis a defendant can show that the case lacks status and hence should not come to trial. See Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece, pp. 306-314. Also see Howell, Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne, pp. 35-38. Howell maintains that the ad Herennium and De Inventione are analogous regarding the status doctrine.



6. Confirmatory Proof (employed when suspicion has been established)
   a. Special topics (those only prosecutor or only defense can use)
      (1) Defendant can seek pity and accuse prosecutor of slander
      (2) Prosecutor can charge that wicked men ought not be pitied
   b. Common topics (used by both prosecution and defense)
      (1) For and against witnesses
      (2) For and against testimony given under torture
      (3) For and against presumptive proof
      (4) For and against rumors

The common topics included in (6) above are in the tradition of the non-artistic proofs mentioned by Aristotle, being the non-technical means of persuasion not inherent in the art or supplied by the speaker's own efforts. Aristotle lists (Rhetoric 1355b, 1375a) five: laws, oaths, witnesses, contracts, and evidence given under torture. The author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum considers (1428a, 1431b) the supplementary proofs as: the speaker's own opinion, witnesses, admissions under torture, and oaths. Thus, the author of ad Herennium is discussing a type of proof which long antedated argumentation in the law courts. (When the art of argumentation was in its infancy, the theorists' first function probably was to interpret those "already existing" proofs.[23])

Turning to deliberative and epideictic oratory, the author considers the following as loci of deliberative speaking (iii. 2-4).[24]

---

[22]Similar to Aristotle's topos of inducements and deterrents, Rhetoric 1399b 30ff.

[23]Caplan, Rhet. ad Her., note [b], pp. 74-75.

[24]For deliberative oratory, the speaker is advised to build his speech on the same loci as in forensic speeches and to use the same methods of argumentation.



Advantage

Security		Honor	
Might	Craft	The Right	The Praiseworthy, in the opinion of
a. Armies	a. Money	a. Wisdom	a. The proper authorities
b. Fleets	b. Promises	b. Justice	b. Our allies
c. Arms	c. Dissimulation	c. Courage	c. All our fellow citizens
d. Engines of war	d. Accelerated speed	d. Temperance	d. Our descendants
e. Manpower	e. Deception		

The loci of epideictic oratory (iii. 6) are:

External Circumstances	Physical Attributes	Qualities of Character
a. Descent	a. Agility	a. Wisdom
b. Education	b. Strength	b. Justice
c. Wealth	c. Beauty	c. Courage
d. Kinds of power	d. Health	d. Temperance
e. Titles to fame		
f. Citizenship		
g. Friendships		

Concerning epideictic oratory, the author gives the loci of praise and blame full treatment. Beginning with the simple externals (family background and education), the orator can proceed to discuss bodily characteristics and then return to the externals and virtues displayed in connection with them (iii. 15).

The author believes that the conclusion of a speech should involve recapitulation, amplification, and appeals to pity.[25] Of these, amplification, "the principle of using Commonplaces to stir the hearers" (ii. 30), especially is emphasized. Such commonplaces can be drawn from the following formulae (ii. 30; cf. Cicero De Inv. i. 53-54).

[25]Clarke, p. 31. According to Quintilian (vi.1), most Athenians believed the conclusion should be confined to recapitulation. There is no evidence to suggest that Roman orators did, however.

1. Authority
2. Those affected by the acts on which the charge rests
3. Results if the same indulgences should be granted to all culprits
4. Encouragement of others to commit crime if the accused is forgiven
5. Failure to correct the jurors' error or remedy the harm if a contrary judgment is rendered
6. Lack of excuse for premeditated acts
7. Foulness, cruelty, and tyranny of the crime
8. Uniqueness and baseness of the crime
9. Comparison of wrongs
10. Examination of the actual execution of the deed and all attendant circumstances

Also nine commonplaces of pity are listed (ii. 31; cf. _De Inv._ i. 55-56).[26]

1. Vicissitudes of fortune
2. Comparison of former prosperity with present adversity
3. Enumeration and explanation of results if case is lost
4. Entreaty of those whose pity is sought
5. Results on kinsmen through the disgrace
6. Kindness, sympathy, and humanity shown to others
7. Depiction of long history of adverse circumstances
8. Deploring of fate and bad fortune
9. Demonstration of a brave heart in the face of adversities

The importance of the _loci communes_ in the _ad Herennium_ can perhaps be understood better by here reviewing their Greek origins and development to the first century B. C. Commonplaces or _loci communes_ were originated in a school setting and were originally concerned with general ideas which could be amplified and used as a "speech-within-a-speech" in order to move the emotions of an audience. Their usual themes were moral, either praising virtue or blaming vice. When used in the sense of an oratorical amplification, commonplaces assumed the facts of a case to be true. Their principle purpose was to prepare the way for the approval or disapproval of the judge, whether he was in a court or political rostrum. As long as invention

---

[26]Cicero was more complete, listing sixteen _loci_ of pity.

retained supremacy in rhetoric, these places continued to hold some prestige in the art.[27] The commonplaces for purposes of amplification were first given prominence by Gorgias and Tisias (*Phaedrus* 267a). Aristotle, while holding a very different conception of the places, yet suggested (*Rhetoric* 1374b-1375a) techniques by which judges could be moved through application of the commonplaces.[28] The author of *ad Herennium* and the young Cicero gave considerable attention to the commonplaces. Their *loci communes* seemed more comprehensive and capable of a more extensive application than those of Aristotle.[29] They considered the commonplaces (general ideas on justice and happiness, for example) useful because they opened the way to a treatment of fundamental themes. Roman students could be taught how to handle great problems by discussing "theses" of general interest. Generalizations on well known subjects (patriotism, the wickedness of murder, the wretchedness of exile) could, in the language of invention, be places, since they contained thoughts or arguments.[30] Hence, *loci*

---

[27] Sister Joan Marie Lechner, O.S.U., *Renaissance Concepts of the Commonplaces* (New York: Pageant Press, 1962), p. 22.

[28] Aristotle, however, gave much greater emphasis to a thorough search for facts and opinions. Although he recognized the uses of amplification, he did not advise speakers to abandon their search for sound subject matter and substitute already-developed "little orations." Amplification, including appeals to pity, was a technique taught by the Sophists and recognized by Aristotle; but it played a small role in his concept of rhetoric, as compared with the greater emphasis given by medieval and Renaissance rhetoricians.

[29] Cope, p. 130.

[30] Petersson, p. 385.

communes were found everywhere--history, philosophy, poetry, and oratory.

A speaker's ethical meditations often led to the development of topics of pity for use in a speech, especially in the conclusion. Thus, the virtues of caritas (loving reverence men feel for their state, parents, and gods), amor (love for husband or wife, children, and friends), and honestas (sense of honor) were developed by orators to exhort an audience to retain the happiness resulting from those virtues.[31] In addition to moving the judge or audience, these commonplaces and appeals to pity enabled aspiring young orators like Cicero to display their talent for amplification, their stylistic power, and their "philosophy."[32]

The commonplace concept expressed in the ad Herennium represents a departure from Aristotle's concept of places. Whereas Aristotle had considered topoi as seats of argument, either material (finding facts and opinions as a basis for inference) or formal (finding modes of reasoning by which to interpret facts and opinions), the author of ad Herennium presented a random list of loci and loci communes thought to be serviceable to a speaker. Hence, Aristotle's distinction between material and formal topoi was overlooked in the ad Herennium,[33] and the more careful conceptions of places offered by Aristotle were largely displaced by the commonplaces in Roman and medieval rhetoric.

Perhaps partly responsible for the emphasis on loci communes in the ad Herennium was the author's special treatment of memory. Memory

---

[31]Petersson, pp. 389-90.

[32]Solmsen, "Cicero's First Speeches: a Rhetorical Analysis," p. 547.

[33]See Brittin, p. 334.

was considered the "treasure-house of the ideas supplied by Invention" and the "guardian of all the parts of rhetoric" (iii. 16). Simonides, considered the father of the "artificial memory,"[34] had developed (ca. 535 B. C.) an association technique, involving the relation between concepts and objects. Thereafter, the Greeks had typically used a house as an image and placed within its compartments sets of symbols, each in its own order and place. This technique would aid speakers in recollecting material and words needed for their discourse (iii. 16-20; 29-34). The author of *ad Herennium* maintained that improvement of the artificial memory, along with the careful arrangement of materials, could help equip a speaker to meet his oratorical needs.[35]

De Inventione[36]

Although devoting most of his attention to the commonplaces of amplification, the young Cicero begins his discussion with a general

---

[34]In contrast to one's natural memory, the "artificial memory" could be strengthened by training and discipline. *ad Her.* iii.16.

[35]Also the author advised that arguments of greatest strength be placed at the beginning and end of the pleading. At the conclusion of the speech, the speaker should leave a very strong argument fresh in the hearer's mind. This arrangement of materials, like the positioning of troops for battle, could readily bring victory. iii.10.

[36]Cicero's *De Inventione* is here only briefly treated, owing to the very strong resemblance it bears to the *ad Herennium*. The writer has sought to avoid excessive repetition by (1) previously citing sections of *De Inventione* which paralleled those in the *ad Herennium* (see above, pp. 54, 57, 58), and (2) here summarizing only the treatment of *loci* found in Cicero's work.

consideration of the _loci_ of arguments (i. 24-28). Arguments are drawn from (1) the attributes of persons, and (2) the attributes of things. Attributes of persons include: name, nature, manner of life, fortune, habit, feeling, interests, purposes, achievements, accidents, and speeches made. Attributes of things include: consideration of the act itself, performance of an act, adjuncts of an act, and consequences of an act. Each of these is subdivided (i. 26-28) in the following manner.[37]

<u>Action itself</u>

a. Means
b. Motive
c. Objective

<u>Performance of the act</u>

a. Place
b. Time
c. Occasion
d. Manner
e. Facilities

<u>Adjuncts of the act</u>

a. Its contrary
b. Its negative
c. Similarity
d. Greatness

<u>Consequences of the act</u>

a. Chief agents and originators
b. Laws and customs regarding the act
c. Nature of the act (occur frequently or rarely)

Turning to _indignatio_ (the arousing of great hatred against a person or action) Cicero declares (i. 53) that all the attributes of persons and things can give occasion to any use of amplification that may be desired. All the _loci_ mentioned in _De Inventione_ are similar to those found in the _ad Herennium_.[38]

While Cicero does not explicitly state that a commonplace is a

---

[37]The following list is incomplete and is intended only to suggest Cicero's division of the _loci_. All four Ciceronian categories overlap and are not delimited with any precision. See Howell, _Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne_, p. 165.

[38]See above, pp. 55-58.

little speech inserted in an oration, he does suggest that the idea haunts him. He defines loci communes (ii. 15) as "those arguments that can be transferred to many cases" and which "contain an amplification of an undisputed statement . . . as well as amplification of cases of doubtful statements." Moreover, he believes that a speech can be rendered distinguished or brilliant through the introduction of commonplaces, especially when the audience is already convinced (ii. 15). He cautions, however, that the commonplaces require elegance and dignity, and should be used only by orators of long practice and with a vast store of words and ideas (ii. 15).

De Inventione, then, is very much in agreement with the ad Herennium. Written at the beginning of Cicero's oratorical career, it represents the lecture notes of an industrious schoolboy. An older and wiser Cicero was to consider rhetoric in a very different light.

CHAPTER IV

CICERONIAN RHETORIC AND THE CONCEPT OF PLACES[1]

Introductory Considerations

Charles Sears Baldwin said of Cicero: "The most eminent orator of Roman civilization, he wrote more than any other orator has ever written on rhetoric; and historically he has been more than any other an ideal and model."[2] While discussing the efforts of the philosophers--Aristotle and Theophrastus included--Cicero inquired whether it would not be advantageous to consider rhetoric from the point of view of the practising orator _and_ the philosopher. Believing that an orator should be able to set forth with full power those same topics of virtue and equity discussed by the philosophers, Cicero interested himself in the development of an orator so accomplished and complete that he would be able to speak on all subjects with variety and copiousness.[3]

As his later works show, Cicero tried to restore rhetoric to something of its earlier scope and vitality. He protested against the narrowing of the province of the speaking art, hoping to restore

---

[1]The Cicero discussed in this chapter was the mature man of letters, not the writer of _De Inventione_. See above, p. 50.

[2]_Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic_, p. 37.

[3]_De Oratore_, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948), i.59.

rhetoric as a "system of general culture" which would train men to write and speak competently on all possible subjects. In this effort he was especially influenced and guided by the doctrines of Isocrates.[4]

Cicero's attempts were prompted by several developments in Roman oratory during the first century B. C. In the first place, a trend toward artificiality in the controversiae (advanced exercises in forensic oratory) had already begun in Cicero's youth. Also, a divorce between the teachings of the schools and the practice of the courts was evident (De Oratore ii. 99-101). At the beginning of the century popular techniques of delivery produced an artificiality which Cicero later called "magniloquent, sonorous, and bombastic in its effects."[5] The older "Atticist" rhetoric of Aristotle, Plato, and Isocrates was pitted against the newer "Asiatic" rhetoric.[6] Whereas the old oratory had been an art, based upon theory, the new rhetoric was a knack, founded largely on practice. "Atticism" was scientific and technical; "Asianism" was highly empirical and devoted mostly to training in declamation.[7] Cicero's inheritance, then, was a rhetoric in an unsettled state.

---

[4]Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity, II, p. 23.

[5]Brutus, trans. G. I. Hendrickson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939), xcv. 325.

[6]The leading Atticists in Cicero's Rome were Calvus and Brutus, who advocated an oratorical style that was plain, simple, and lucid, with a minimum of rhetorical ornament, rhythm, and emotional appeal. As models for imitation they set up the Athenian writers Thucydides, Lysias, and Xenophon. They accused their opponents, who employed an ornate style, of Asianism--that is, of having been corrupted by the bad taste and opulence of Asiatic degeneracy. The Atticist movement was basically an attack on Cicero, whose oratorical style was copious, rhythmical, and emotional. Cicero met the attack in two of his essays on rhetoric, the Brutus and the Orator. See Donald Lemen Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (Morningside Heights, N. Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1957), p. 156f.

Cicero's Broad View of Rhetoric

In later life Cicero came to regard his youthful work, De Inventione, as immature and his De Oratore as something more worthy of his age and experience (De Oratore i. 5). In it he shunned technical terms and hurried over the familiar rhetorical rules discussed in De Inventione. His characters expressed impatience with the Greek rhetoricians (then teaching in Rome), claiming that they did not know their job and that they failed to classify properly or expound accurately (ii. 39).[8] Yet Cicero did have a certain respect for the Graeculi. For example, he thought it necessary to bring up his son on the full rigor of the scholastic discipline.[9] Cicero thus allowed himself the luxury of sneering at the Greeks and also making use of them.

In proposing his system of general culture, Cicero stresses the need for sound subject matter, since no man can be eloquent on a subject he does not understand (De Oratore i. 63).[10] He demands of the

---

[7]Jebb, Attic Orators, II, p. 439. Hermagoras has been credited with beginning the revival of Atticism in the second century B. C. Attempting to combine his practical approach with the philosophical, he founded a subtle and scholastic rhetoric. II, p. 445.

[8]Also see ii. 323; iii. 54, 70, 121.

[9]See De Partitione Oratoria, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948). This brief but detailed essay, written in 54 B. C., was designed to instruct Cicero's son, Marcus Tullius, Based on the system of rhetoric of the Middle Academy, the treatise was the "most purely scientific of all Cicero's writings on rhetoric." Rackham, "Introduction," p. 306.

[10]Invention was to Cicero the most important element of the rhetorical art. It received great prominence in De Oratore, and Topica was a tract on inventional method.

orator a knowledge of all fields of study, especially philosophy (i. 20).[11] And, to illustrate, he claims that his own eloquence was inspired, "not by the workshops of the rhetoricians, but by the groves of the Academy."[12] In addition to sound subject matter, the orator must know the audience's emotions which he wishes to play on, partly that he may be able to treat themes which are always recurring.[13] The orator must actually feel the emotions he tries to arouse.[14] Cicero's rhetorical invention is based, on the one hand, on a broad liberal education, and, on the other hand, on the specific ways to discover and select good arguments. While rules are considered useful in the orator's early training, a reading of De Oratore suggests that Cicero considered a sound general education and oratorical experience of more importance to the orator in his later life.[15]

Cicero's Narrow View of Rhetoric

Cicero's conception of loci ("places") is definitely in the meta-

---

[11]In De Inventione i.8, Cicero took Hermagoras to task for assigning to the orator questions that had nothing to do with him and which belonged rather to the philosopher. But Cicero later came to believe not only that such questions are within the orator's sphere, but that all such questions should and should be related to them. General questions (theses) offer more scope for oratorical adornment than particular ones, and allow the orator to develop his ideas more fully. De Oratore iii.120.

[12]Orator, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939), iii.12. In De Oratore iii.145, Cicero gave some indication that his main ideas were associated with the New Academy. But he did not follow such sources closely. It is probable that De Oratore was a synthesis of school rhetoric, theories of the philosophers, Greek and Roman traditions, and his own experience. The choice and combination of ideas were Cicero's. Clarke, p. 51.

[13]For example, religion, piety, concord, friendship, rights of citizens, laws of nations, justice, temperance, and greatness of soul. De Oratore i.56.



phorical tradition which held places to be seats of arguments or storehouses of ideas.[16] In De Partitione Oratoria 5, for example, Cicero told his son that arguments are derived from the places. In De Oratore ii. 112, Antonius advises sending a student to a teacher who will "point out to him the very homes of all proofs, so to speak, illustrating them briefly and defining them in terms." Similarly, in Topica ii. 7-8, a locus is a "region of an argument." In other works, loci are regarded as storehouses,[17] haunts,[18] or mines.[19]

---

[14]Methods of playing on the audience's feelings were usually enumerated in rhetorical handbooks, but only in connection with certain parts of a speech (viz., introduction and conclusion). Cicero followed that approach in De Inventione, but was dissatisfied with it when he came to write De Oratore in 55 B. C. Therein, the subject was treated on its own and not subordinated to particular parts of the speech. The orator himself could be moved to anger, grief, or other emotions in matters which did not personally concern him, if the sentiments and loci he used had power. De Oratore ii.189.

[15]Tenney Frank, Life and Literature in the Roman Republic (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1930), pp. 130-31.

[16]From the time that rhetoric first became an organized body of principles to the modern period, the orator's mental and imaginative activity has been thought of in terms of "places." Traditionally rhetoricians have viewed these places as either locations for arguments or containers for arguments. Yet, of course, there were no real places (in any spatial sense) where thoughts were located or stored. The places referred to operations of thought and expression only in a very loose sense. Hence, orators seeking arguments were most often compared with bees gathering honey or hunters tracking game, and, in the Renaissance period, poetic images used to describe the places included flowers, stars, and jewels. See Lechner, p. 135.

[17]De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951), iv.10.

[18]De Oratore ii.145-47. Antonius, after declaring that all possible subjects of debate are founded on typical cases and characters, noted that a speaker, like a hunter, must be familiar with the ground over which he chases and tracks his quarry. Also see De Inventione i.7.

[19]De Oratore ii.174. Antonius, summarizing his remarks on loci, says: "For if I wished to reveal to somebody gold that was hidden here and there in the earth, it should be enough for me to point out to him some marks and indications of its positions, with which knowledge he could do his own digging, and find what he wanted, with very little trouble and no chance of mistake; so I know these indications of proofs, which reveal to me their whereabouts when I am looking for them; all the rest is dug out by dint of careful consideration."

Generally, a *locus* is the seat of an argument, an argument being "a reason which causes men to believe a thing which could otherwise be doubtful" (*Topica* ii. 8).

The term *loci* as used by Cicero concerns ethical and emotional as well as logical proof, and applies as well to the development of the major parts of an oration--introduction, narration, proof, and conclusion. Thus, the lists of *loci* within the works of Cicero tend to vary, according to the particular uses Cicero saw for them.

Whereas the young Cicero had emphasized the concrete *loci* (in *De Inventione*), the more mature Cicero de-emphasizes them, considering them too numerous for easy memorization and too obvious to be of much help.[20] Formal *loci*, on the other hand, assume great importance in Cicero's later works.[21]

Cicero's change in attitude (concerning the importance and usefulness of the *loci*) requires that a brief review of his narrow concept of invention now be given to show his emphasis and line of thinking.

Cicero recognizes two kinds of questions: the *cause* or that which is limited to certain times, places, and persons; and the *proposition* or that which is infinite and not bounded by times, places, or persons. There are two kinds of propositions: one of investigation, the end of science; the other of action, which has

---

[20]This is the attitude of the philosopher teaching rhetoric, rather than that of a professional rhetorician. See Petersson, p. 379f.

[21]Cicero's *Topica*, in particular, dealt with formal places.

reference to doing something. The two species of causes are embellishment and proof. Since causes concerning proof can be divided further into past and future, there are really three kinds of causes: epideictic, deliberative, and forensic.[22]

Given the cause or proposition, the orator's next step is to determine the *status*. There are three *staseis* for forensic cases: *conjecturalis* (where the fact has to be ascertained); *definitivus* (concerned with defining the admitted deed); and *rationis* or *qualitatis* (a question of reason or character which has to do with the justification of the deed).[23] Students trained in forensic oratory are advised to use common *loci* for definition and comparison purposes; and concrete *loci* to investigate various phases of the case.[24] In cases involving definition, the orator can classify a term under discussion as a subdivision of a larger conception, or argue about the essential qualities of a term, or use description. In any event, he relies on etymology, a favorite Stoic device. Finally, in cases of quality (where the issue concerns justice) the whole field of moral philosophy offers *loci* for argument. Some of them are: nature,

---

[22]For a more complete discussion of this aspect of rhetoric, see *De Partitione Oratoria* 61ff.

[23]See Petersson, pp. 398-405. In Cicero's Rome, *status* was most closely associated with forensic oratory. Most cases in Roman courts belonged to the conjectural class (the accused pleading not guilty).

[24]Often, however, the subdividing and refining of concrete *loci* was so minute that it could hardly have been too helpful to students. For example, the *locus* of time was divided (*De Part. Orat.* 37-38) into that due to nature and that due to chance; natural time, in turn, comprised the present, past, and future, the four seasons of the year, the different time measurements of year, month, day, night, and hour, and the weather; time due to chance involved special occasions such as sacrifices, festal days, and weddings.

laws, tradition, vengeance, and the repelling of injury.[25] After determining the status, the next step is to develop the theme by means of loci.

In De Oratore Cicero chooses to discuss the loci which apply to the three types of proof earlier developed by Aristotle--logical, ethical, and pathetical. From the logical point of view, proofs are either artistic or non-artistic. Whereas Cicero had earlier (De Inventione) discussed the artistic proofs in terms of specific loci derived from persons and from things,[26] later in life he does not emphasize them, considering them too obvious, although they are mentioned again in De Partitione Oratoria (34-40), a relatively mature work. Instead he emphasizes the more universal loci. In the Orator (xxxvi.126) he emphasizes the point, saying that the central notion of a controversy "ought to be treated in such a way as to transfer the subject to the realm of universals and bring about a discussion of a general principle." In De Oratore (ii. 162) he has Antonius (sarcastically) say: "For my part, if just now I were to want a complete novice trained up to oratory, I should rather entrust him to these untiring people, who hammer day and night on the same anvil at their one and only task, for them to put into his mouth none but the most delicate morsels--everything chewed exceedingly small--in the manner of wet nurses feeding baby-boys." If, on the other hand, the novice shows signs of natural aptitude, Antonius

---

[25]Petersson, pp. 404-405.

[26]See above, pp. 61-62.

(ii. 164ff.) would send him to a teacher who could instruct him in the loci, both intrinsic (concerning the character of the subject as a whole, or part of it, or anything related to the subject) and extrinsic (assembled from without and not inherent in the nature of the case). If the inquiry concerns the whole subject, definition is in order. If it concerns a part or parts, partition is necessary. If it concerns that which is closely connected with a subject, there are numerous loci such as adjuncts, general views, particulars falling under general views, things similar and dissimilar, contrary, or consequential; causes of circumstances and whatever has arisen from such causes; and causes stronger, weaker, or similar (ii. 162-173). Such loci can be composed, memorized, and declaimed upon, and a good fund of them helps the orator to amplify effectively, whenever he finds it necessary or desirable to do so.[27]

Cicero also considers loci as important regarding ethical and pathetical proofs. For example, Antonius is made to say (De Oratore ii. 178): "For men decide far more problems by hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion than by reality, or authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute." And Caius Julius Caesar discusses the numerous loci of humor in De Oratore (ii. 216-95).

Loci are to be used intelligently and with judgment, for "just as fruitful and fertile fields produce not only crops but harmful

---

[27]Cicero uses the term "amplification" to mean exalting a theme as well as enlarging on it. Amplification is that which "agitated or tranquilized" the mind of the hearer. (Topica xxvi) Or it is a sort of vehement argumentation, or a kind of grave affirmation, which conciliates belief to one's assertion. (De Partitione Oratoria 27; Orator xxxvi. 126)

weeds, so sometimes from these categories arguments are derived which are inconsequential, immaterial or useless" (Orator xv. 48). Cicero advises his son to examine all the loci, rejecting the weak ones (De Partitione Oratoria 8). In Orator (xiv. 47), he declares that the wise speaker will run rapidly over the loci, select those that fit the subject, and then speak in general terms. Antonius advises that the good orator should weigh, rather than count, loci (De Oratore ii. 309).

While loci, firmly established in the mind and memory, can be invaluable to an orator, their use only indicates where to search. All else, says Antonius (ii. 150), depends on care, mental concentration, reflection, watchfulness, persistence, and hard work. Moreover, the best loci are useful only to a speaker who is a man of affairs, "qualified by experience, which age assuredly brings, or by listening and reflection, which through careful study outruns age" (ii. 131). Thus, the rules provide a system for discovering the loci of argument inherent in a particular situation. While orators find it useful to run through the classification in case something suitable has escaped them, experienced speakers can find arguments without much difficulty (ii. 120).[28]

Topica

Cicero had a copy of Aristotle's Topica in his library and knew

---

[28]Generally, Cicero made little use of loci in his own orations. Pro Milone is one example of a speech employing textbook loci. In it he argued from: probability (including motives and previous life); comparison; circumstantial evidence (place, time, and opportunity); and arguments drawn from behavior before and after the event. (The Speeches, trans. N. H. Watts [New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931], 32, 36, 41, 45, 53, 61.) Little evidence of school rhetoric, however, is found in his forensic speeches, and even less in his deliberative speeches. Also see Clarke, p. 70.



something of its contents.[29] When a friend, Trebatius, found this in the orator's library at Tusculum and puzzled over its contents, Cicero undertook the writing of his own Topica, purportedly to be an account of the contents of Aristotle's work. However, the treatise, completed in July, 44 B. C.,[30] bears little resemblance to Aristotle's treatise.[31] Although there is some resemblance to II, 23 of Aristotle's Rhetoric, the work is in the main a contemporary system.[32]

In this brief treatise on invention, Cicero expresses agreement (ii. 7-8) with Aristotle's definition of topoi as regions from which arguments are drawn. Cicero's loci are then divided into intrinsic and extrinsic, intrinsic loci (loci proprii) being sixteen in number (ii. 9-iv. 23).

1. Definition (applies to the whole subject)
2. Partition (enumeration of parts)
3. Etymology (arguments derived from word meanings)
4. Conjugates (arguments from words of the same family)
5. Genus (thesis)
6. Species (hypothesis)
7. Similarity (analogy)
8. Difference

---

[29]Cicero Topica i.1. For accounts of how Cicero came to write Topica, see H. M. Hubbell's "Introduction" to Topica (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1949), pp. 377-78; E. G. Sihler, Cicero of Arpinum: a Political and Literary Biography (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1914), p. 417.

[30]With the Topica Cicero sent a letter to Trebatius, written on July 28, 44 B. C. from Rhegium. The composition of the treatise took seven days. Epistulae ad Familiares, trans. W. Glynn Williams (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), vii.19.

[31]Hubbell, Topica, p. 377; Sihler, p. 417; Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings," Classical Philology, XXXIII(1938), p. 401; Sandys, History of Classical Scholarship, I, p. 182; L. Minio-Paluello, "The Text of Aristotle's Topica and Elenchi: the Latin Tradition," Classical Quarterly, V(1955), p. 109.

[32]It is largely identical with that of De Oratore ii. 163ff. Cicero may also have adapted from some late Hellenistic treatise. See Hubbell, Topica, p. 378.

9. Contraries
10. Adjuncts (corollaries)
11. Antecedents (past circumstances attendant on main point)
12. Consequents (past circumstances attendant on main point)
13. Contradictions
14. Cause
15. Effect
16. Comparison (more and less)

Loci for extrinsic arguments are drawn mainly from authority (iv. 24).

After a detailed discussion of the intrinsic and extrinsic loci (iv. 26-xx. 78) Cicero suggests the best kinds of loci for deliberative, epideictic, and forensic oratory (xxiii. 89-90). For questions concerning what to seek and what to avoid, the best loci are those related to advantages and disadvantages of mind, body, or external circumstances. Questions of honor or baseness involve loci related to the virtues. Finally, for questions of right and wrong, the orator can turn to loci regarding equity. To conclude the treatise, Cicero shows what loci are most appropriate to the introduction, statement of the case, proof, and conclusion (xxvi 97-98). In his accompanying letter to Trebatius, he offers the following apology: "This stuff, my dear Trebatius, you will find a bit dry. But you as an expert in the Civil Law are not unacquainted with some measure of dryness and obscurity" (ad Fam. vii. 19). Yet the treatise, however dry, does offer a valuable treatment of the formal places.

Summary of Cicero's Conception of Places

While the young Cicero closely follows the Hellenistic conceptions of loci in De Inventione, the mature Cicero protests against the narrowing of rhetoric evident during the first century B. C. Rather, he proposes a system of general culture which will train all men to speak competently on all subjects. The complete orator

will study all subjects, and through natural talent, training, and practice he will be equipped to discuss any question. The rules of the Graeculi are considered helpful for the oratorical training of young men, but ideally devices such as *loci* can either be discarded or de-emphasized in later life.

Following Aristotle in his definition of places, Cicero presents different lists of *loci* in his several works. In general, he abandons the concrete *loci* treated in *De Inventione* in favor of the common and formal *loci*. The formal *loci* are thoroughly examined in *Topica*, a work slightly resembling Aristotle's logical treatise.

CHAPTER V

QUINTILIAN AND THE CONCEPT OF PLACES

Introductory Considerations

From Cicero's Brutus to the Controversiae and Suasoriae of the elder Seneca, one moves into a different world. The school was now the center of interest, while the forum seemed forgotten as a center of eloquence. Rhetoricians threw open their school doors and became star performers, presenting what were known as declamations.[1]

The advocate still found many speaking opportunities, however. Though the great political trials of the Republic were a thing of the past, the courts continued to flourish, even if Augustus did set the fashion of personally administering justice, and Tiberius and Claudius did likewise. It could hardly be expected that an advocate would enjoy full freedom before the Emperor himself or before

---

[1]Declamations first appeared in the time of Demetrius of Phalera, ca. 318-307 B. C. (Quintilian Institutio Oratoria ii.4.41) Near the end of the Roman Republic, when the loss of political liberty deprived genuine eloquence of any real significance, declamations of a degenerate type assumed great importance. The kind of declamatio recommended by Quintilian in the first century A. D. concerned speaking from outlines on hypothetical cases. Both suasoriae (elementary deliberative speeches) and controversiae (more advanced forensic speeches) were recommended as school exercises (Inst. Orat. ii.10.1-6). But, Charles Sears Baldwin suggests, "evidently the declamatio Quintilian recommends is not the declamatio that he heard about him." (Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 70; also see pp. 69, 71, 87-89, 93-94, and 100-101) Quintilian wished to recall to its original purpose what was already out of hand. Declamatio had, with the narrowing of the field of public speaking, become an end in itself, an exhibition of rhetor's skill to attract pupils. Quintilian, says Baldwin, "would recall declamatio from invention to actuality, and from display to exercise." (Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 71)

a Senate that had lost much of its independence.[2] Moreover, even the conditions of oratory were less favorable under the Empire. The length of speeches, the number of pleaders, and the duration of trials were all restricted.[3] The informal manner of speaking, meagre audiences, and even the dress worn by the advocates were all inimical to great eloquence.[4]

Three reasons help explain the decline of eloquence during the Empire.[5] First, the luxury of the age prompted a moral decay, especially among the younger generation. While there had always been a sense of the unscrupulous about the Roman orator, under the Republic he had not been so subjected to the corrupting influences of despotism. Hence, unscrupulous accusers were often matched by unscrupulous defenders; and if justice was not always achieved, at least both sides had some voice in the outcome. But under the Empire not even this rough kind of justice was accomplished. All too many _viri mali dicendi periti_ placed their talents at the service of power.

---

[2]Clarke, p. 101. The Senate did acquire a new importance as a criminal court, concerning itself especially with cases of treason.

[3]The dominating political influence of Caesar apparently was responsible for beginning these restrictions on oratory. The first blow was the quiet introduction of stenographers into the Senate in 59 B. C. By requiring publication of the minutes of the Senate proceedings, Caesar compelled speakers to consider the outside public, to drop the orotund periods addressed to their colleagues alone, and to confine themselves to pertinent details. In 52 B. C. the triumvirs passed a bill limiting the length of pleas in the courts. Enacted to expedite the business of overburdened courts, this act suggests that politics was now concerned with getting results, not with encouraging time-consuming oratory. After the Rubicon, speeches in the Senate were like business reports in committees that met before a very curt presiding officer. In the courts, persuasion gave way to a very rapid estimation of the facts. See Frank, pp. 166-67.

[4]See Tacitus _Dialogus_, trans. William Peterson (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932), 38-39.

[5]See Clarke, pp. 102-103.

A second reason for the decline was the lack of rewards for good speaking. In addition to the loss of old incentives to speak well, the very character of society under the Empire had contributed to the decline. The less stable society under the Republic had provided conditions for the growth of great oratory. These were lacking in the well-ordered society of the Empire.[6]

A third possible reason for the decline of eloquence is that "decline often follows climax." In Imperial Rome there was a general feeling that the summit of oratorical achievement had been reached. Hence, Cicero was accepted as the classical orator of Rome; and by the time of Quintilian, he dominated the rhetorical teaching and theory.[7]

In addition to the above causes, there was the unhealthy influence of the schools on the practice of the courts. Thus, a young orator carried his school habits with him when he went out into the world, and did his best to reproduce the manner of the declamation hall in the court of law. And a man's manner of pleading did, according to Quintilian (ix. 2. 81), depend on his manner in declamation. But while the teachers of _declamatio_ did acquaint their students with some impor-

---

[6]Whereas the state's "bad citizens" (Catiline and Verres, for example) gave Cicero much material for oratory, such "inspiration" was lacking during the Imperial age. Tacitus _Dialogus_ 36-37.

[7]Clarke, p. 103. Rhetoricians after Cicero (and before Quintilian) apparently had little influence on the practice of oratory. For example, during the early Empire the most important controversy to agitate the rhetoricians was that between the followers of Apollodorus (the teacher of Augustus) and the followers of Theodorus (who taught Tiberius). See _Inst. Orat._ iii.1.17-18. Apollodorus was a dry pedantic writer (Tac. _Dial._ 19f.) who believed in maintaining the full rigor of the rules, whereas Theodorus allowed for some latitude. While this quarrel preoccupied rhetoricians, it had little effect on the practice of oratory (_Inst. Orat._ v.13.59; ii.11.2). Moreover, ordinary people probably had great difficulty understanding what the controversy was about. (Strabo _The Geography of Strabo_, trans. Horace Leonard Jones, VI [New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929], xiii.4.3)

tant themes and did produce many capable speakers, all too often this training engendered a pretentious glibness of speech, a heedlessness of truth or falsity, and a narrow and unreal range of training, built on threadbare themes.[8]

One teacher who reacted against these excesses in the education of orators was Quintilian, who taught and wrote in the Flavian period. (This was a time of reaction against Neronian excesses in finances, morals, the Imperial household, and literature.) Quintilian was almost completely in tune with his times, with the Imperial house and its activities, with the adoption of stern measures against the philosophers,[9] with the contemporary taste in style (swinging away from the epigrammatic techniques popular earlier in the century),[10] and with the renewed interest in education.

"Quintilian, writing long after rhetoric had ceased to function as an instrument of assembly government, nevertheless comprehend[ed] its best older tradition and the whole scope of its classical development in a great work of pedagogy, De Institutione Oratoria (about

---

[8]It must be remembered, however, that the preliminary rhetorical exercises in the schools (including, for example, controversiae, suasoriae, and loci communes) could be beneficial as well, especially insofar as they imparted nimbleness of mind, skill in refutation, and a "finished" speech. See J. Wright Duff, A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age: from Tiberius to Hadrian (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), pp. 34-35; also see pp. 9-12, 30-36. (The "Silver Age" covered the period 14-117 A. D.)

[9]See, for example, Inst. Orat. i.pref.9-18; v.11.39; x.1.35; and xii.2.6-8. Philosophers were expelled from Rome by both Vespasian and Domitian.

[10]Quintilian had to contend against the great popularity of the younger Seneca, who, after the fall of Nero, set the stylistic fashions in literature. Untouched by and opposed to these, Quintilian protested against the inflated and exaggerated rhetoric then popular.

95 A. D.)"[11] The purpose he noted for the treatise was not so much to invent new theories as to judge between the conflicting and contradictory old ones (i. pref. 1-2). To accomplish that task, he employed a wide knowledge of both Latin and Greek sources and revealed a list of sources which almost amounted to a catalogue of rhetorical literature.[12]

Probably no other ancient treatise was so exhaustive.[13] Including all the traditional topics, Quintilian proceeded upon the classical theory of systematic guidance, but made the important contribution of pedagogical order, his plan being progressive. While the traditional five canons of rhetoric stood out clearly, they covered only about half of the space and did not determine the plan of the work. Rather, Quintilian proceeded from less to more, from boyhood through adolescence to manhood. His idea was to widen and deepen the practice of public speaking as it opened more and more to the growing public speaker.

In his treatise, Quintilian displayed what H. E. Butler called "robust common sense and sound literary judgment."[14] Never affected or extravagant, always practical in retrospect and outlook, he displayed

---

[11]Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 62. George Kennedy notes that Quintilian arrived in Rome ca. 68 A. D., retired after twenty years of teaching, and worked two or three years on Institutio Oratoria. Kennedy estimates the publication date at between 90 A. D. and the death of Domitian in 96 A. D. ("An Estimate of Quintilian," American Journal of Philology, LXXXIII [1962], p. 132) Duff places the date of the treatise at between 92 or 93 and 96 A. D., at the latest. (Literary History of Rome, p. 392)

[12]Duff, p. 407. [13]Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 84.

[14]"Introduction," Institutio Oratoria, p. viii.

a zest for truth which made Institutio Oratoria more than a manual of rhetoric. Perhaps no ancient writer has rivalled him in varied fullness of achievement, or approached so nearly the reputation of ideal schoolmaster.

Quintilian's Broad View of Rhetoric

Quintilian considers rhetorical education as something more than training in speaking. It includes the building of character and cultivation of the liberal arts as well.[15] In agreement with Cicero, he views ideal oratory as founded upon a strong moral and intellectual basis.[16] While his requirements (for the ideal orator) seem more moderate than Cicero's demand for wide knowledge of all great subjects,[17] he does emphasize the study of subjects aside from rhetoric, especially ethics, physics, dialectic, law, and history.[18] Thus, the successful cultivation of the speaking art depends upon hard work, continual study, varied practice, repeated experiments, and profound sagacity.[19] This view is implicit and explicit throughout his work.

---

[15]Duff, pp. 392-93.

[16]Inst. Orat. xii.1.1. Quintilian is well known for his concept of the "good man speaking well." This idea is stressed throughout his treatise. See, for example, i.proem 9-10; ii.2 (whole section); and ii.15.1.

[17]See Inst. Orat. ii.21.14; also Duff, p. 35.

[18]Inst. Orat. i. proem 16; xii.2.10.

[19]Inst. Orat. ii.13.15-17. The orator could also be assisted by rules, provided they pointed out the straight road instead of one fixed wheel-rut.

Quintilian's Concept of Loci

Quintilian discusses the narrow approach to invention in Books III-VIII of Institutio Oratoria, where he considers the steps by which the orator may find the proper materials for the different kinds of speaking.[20] The first step in the analysis of any question is to determine the status of the question,[21] the process by which the orator discovers the essential character of the case as it appears in a preliminary survey of all the material and all the bearings. This is accomplished through the application of the staseis of fact, definition, and interpretation.

The speaker next turns to the loci, which help him to discover arguments or develop certain parts of his speech. Loci can also be employed for panegyrical purposes (praise of a man, his country, parents, his qualities of mind and body, and various virtues such as fortitude, justice, and temperance).

By the term loci Quintilian means "seats of argument, in which they lie concealed, and from which they must be drawn forth" (v.10.20; v.12.2). Loci can be drawn from persons or from things (v.8.4). Those from persons include: birth, country, sex, age, education, discipline, bodily constitution, fortune, condition, natural disposition, manner of living, occupations, affectations, and previous doings and sayings

---

[20]H. E. Butler suggests that in the more technical portions of his work (for example, discussions of status and loci) Quintilian was unequal in his treatment. The reader, says Butler, "feels that he cares little about the minute pedantries of rhetorical technique." (p. ix)

[21]See Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 74. Quintilian discussed status in iii.6, a chapter which Baldwin calls "one of his most important, both as specific doctrine and as typical of ancient method."

(v. 10. 24-28). *Loci* pertaining to things include: place, time (preceding, contemporary, and subsequent), means (instruments), manner (how a thing was done), definition, genus, species, difference, property, elimination, division, beginnings, increase, consummation, similarities, dissimilarities, contradictions, consequents, causes, effects, results, and comparison, all of which are subdivided into several species (v. 10. 32-94).[22] These common *loci* are appropriate to the investigation of all questions.

In addition, there are *loci* especially appropriate to each kind of oratory. For example, forensic speakers frequently turn to justice and equity, and their opposites. Epideictic orators speak of virtues and vices. Political orators examine possibility, honor, and expediency. Moreover, the *loci* for exciting laughter are as many as those for finding thoughts.[23] *Loci* for laughter can be found in words or things, in some act, look, or gesture, in all the *loci* for finding arguments, in tropes and figures, in refutation, and in apparent absurdities.[24]

One other kind of *loci* is treated by Quintilian; the *loci communes* which are passages dealing with some general principle or theme.[25] These commonplaces are discussed at several points (ii. 4. 22; v. 12. 6; v. 13. 57), principally in connection with the use of documentary

---

[22]Quintilian's list of *loci* is more complete than that of Cicero.

[23]Harrington, p. 37.

[24]Apparently Quintilian chose to treat the *loci* of laughter so that he might not be accused of neglecting them.

[25]See Butler, *Inst. Orat.*, note, p. 208.

evidence and witnesses to impress judges. At one point (ii. 4. 22) he refers to the _locus communis_ as an _oratoria_ or little oration to be inserted in a speech for purposes of amplification; and elsewhere he acknowledges the usefulness of a more brilliant style for the _loci_ in the sense of "speeches-within-speeches" (v. 14. 33-35).

Like Cicero, Quintilian regards the _loci communes_ as helpful, not simply because they furnish arguments for all cases, but because they are particularly appropriate for important cases. However, he disapproves of orators who write out and memorize _loci communes_ beforehand, calling such passages artificial ornaments tacked unto a speech, not interwoven in its texture (ii. 4. 31).[26]

As he discusses the various kinds of _loci_, Quintilian shows great concern for the intelligent use of them by orators. Hence, while he believes that the use of _loci_ can increase an orator's fluency and prepare him to deal with any case (v. 10. 11-14), he cautions that one

---

[26]To appreciate the role of the _loci communes_ in Quintilian's rhetoric, it seems appropriate to review here their tradition. _Loci communes_ were treated by such rhetoricians as Aristotle, the author of _ad Herennium_, Cicero, and Quintilian. Since the early Sophists had emphasized training in the moral virtues, _loci communes_ often became principal arguments in every kind of discourse (_Inst. Orat._ ii.1.9). Aristotle, for example, had held that the knowledge and practice of virtue was essential in every kind of oratory. The political orator persuaded an audience to seek the happiness of the good life, the forensic orator urged the securing of justice, and the epideictic orators persuaded others to seek an honorable life. In addition to his emphasis on virtue, Aristotle treated the common _topos_ of Degree (more and less), which came to dominate the other three (Possibility, Past Fact, and Future Fact). In later rhetoric this _topos_ was considered an essential part of the conclusion of a forensic speech. Then Roman rhetoricians added, or at least more greatly emphasized, a more immediate concern for the styllistic embellishment of the _loci_ (perhaps owing to the growing importance attached to epideictic oratory). The young Cicero, for example, believed that a speech could often be rendered distinguished or brilliant through the introduction of _loci communes_ (_De Inv._ ii.15). And when Quintilian came to survey the classical rhetorical tradition, he chose to emphasize the "seats of argument" view of _loci_, rather than that of the _loci communes_. Hence, while he

should go beyond the rules, because a knowledge only of them does not give an orator a perfect and absolute knowledge of the whole subject. Knowing only the rules makes one the "possessor of a dumb science" (v. 10. 119).[27]

Knowing that all loci are drawn from either persons or things is not sufficient because each group is subdivided into a number of different heads. Hence, the orator must also know methods of handling arguments in order to understand what arguments can be drawn from the circumstances of each particular case. Orators must discover for themselves what is peculiar to the case at hand. "For, just as weapons are superfluous for one who does not know what his target is, so too arguments are useless, unless you see in advance to what they are to be applied. This is a task for which no formal rules can be laid down" (v. 10. 109).

Quintilian's admonitions on the use of loci no doubt stemmed from his reactions to the degenerate invention he saw taught around him. He protested against the sort of rhetorical training that destroyed the boy's curiosity and instead encouraged a conventionality of thought. Typically the schoolboy was taught to find materials for his speeches

---

mentioned loci communes several times, his real concern was with loci as aids to the discovery of speech materials. Yet, owing to the great importance attached to loci communes in the first century A. D., Quintilian had to treat them and admit some usefulness for them. Had he considered a knowledge of them useless, he probably would have passed them by.

[27]The discovery of arguments, therefore, was not the result of the publication of textbooks containing detailed lists of loci, for every kind of argument had been considered long before rules were laid down, and the rhetorician later merely collected them for publication (v.10.120).

and to practise speeches according to rules. He was taught the traditional *loci* to draw on and the usual themes to employ. Although the *loci* were ultimately based on experience, generations of teachers before Quintilian had reduced them to a system, so that observation and personal experience no longer played much part in invention. By the end of the first century A. D. rhetoricians were providing ready-made sets of arguments and modes of treatment, and those youth who were educated according to that system might go on through life without ever enlarging or deepening the inherited common stock from their own personal experience and observations. Against that sort of training, Quintilian advanced the precepts of *Institutio Oratoria*.[28]

---

[28]Quintilian's protest also was voiced by other literary figures of the period, including the author of *On the Sublime*, Pliny (a pupil of Quintilian), Juvenal, and Tacitus.

CHAPTER VI

CONCEPTIONS OF THE PLACES IN THE MEDIEVAL, RENAISSANCE, AND MODERN PERIODS

Introductory Considerations[1]

From the time of Quintilian to Saint Augustine, oratorical training was still directed toward the perfect orator, but became absorbed in minutiae of style. *Suasoriae* and *controversiae*, imitation, and systematized language were among the results of a further narrowing of public speaking which occurred in the Imperial age. Of the three types of oratory, the epideictic reigned supreme. Of the canons of rhetoric, invention became barren and stereotyped, memory became verbal, arrangement became patterned, and delivery became more technical.[2]

However, whatever the status of rhetoric, the "places" were always available to provide directives for use in persuasion, amplification, or embellishment. "Places" were still the seats of argument which contained key ideas of universal application, and the sources of count-

---

[1]The purpose of this chapter is to review the classical conceptions of the places as they were restated in medieval, Renaissance, and modern rhetorical works. With few exceptions, there will be little pause to consider at length the views of particular writers. Rather, the writer will assume the reader's familiarity with the rhetoricians discussed, or refer the reader to primary sources and commentaries for further information.

[2]See Charles Sears Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York: Macmillan, 1928), pp. 8-50, for an excellent discussion of the Second Sophistic period. Baldwin claims (p. 3) that while Aristotle

less moral dicta destined to influence the character and mold the opinion of an audience. The "places" of praise were now applied not only to virtuous men, but to cities, countries, and harbors as well. Moreover, "places" were becoming clichés useful in biography, sermons, letter-writing, and virtually all other literary forms (whether already developed or in their infancy).

A brief glance at four Sophists of the period will illustrate the directions which rhetoric took after Quintilian. The second-century Sophist, Hermogenes, for example, devoted the first twenty-seven pages of his Elementary Exercises to a discussion of exercises in composition, controlled by fixed "places." Baldwin said of Hermogenes' rules: "Arid, impersonal as arithmetic, pedantically overclassified, sometimes inconsistent, these rules are nevertheless illuminating. They expose sophistic oratory."[3]

Flavius Philostratus (fl. 230-238) wished to preserve for all time a picture of the triumphs of the Sophists.[4] In his Lives of the Sophists he treated Gorgias, Isocrates, and other early Sophists, as well as the contemporary Sophists. Philostratus was particularly fond of Gorgias, who he claimed used stock themes and founded the art of extemporaneous oratory (Lives i. 481-82). Philostratus was an excellent representative of the new Sophistry.[5]

---

settled the question of rhetoric philosophically and established its theory, the theory was more often merely accepted but not followed. Hence, while the Sophists had been put in their place more surely by Aristotle than by Plato, they continued to thrive, until ancient rhetoric became more and more Sophistic.

[3]Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 38; also see p. 23. Wilmer Cave Wright called Hermogenes the most famous technical writer on rhetoric in the second century. See Philostratus and Eunapius: The Lives of the Sophists (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1922), p. xxxvi.

[4]Wright, ibid., p. xii.



Ausonius, a fourth-century poet and rhetor, well illustrated the typical conception of "places" held by the later Sophists.[6] He preferred "places" that came handily in series; the order of the daily round or of noble cities, the twelve Caesars, the seven sages, or a roster of Trojan heroes. These were "places" for Latin verse in the schools.[7] While Ausonius' own verse was often clever and facile, it was barren of ideas and without a gleam of insight;[8] and the rhetoric he taught was a mere display of verbal dexterity.

Finally, Apollinaris Sidonius (born about 430 A. D.) may be taken to represent fifth-century Sophistry.[9] A Roman prefect and Christian bishop, he was obsessed with style,[10] and his letters and poems were consistently in the modes of Sophistic.[11] His commentaries, addresses

---

[5]During Philostratus' lifetime, political oratory was further reduced to school exercises and the arguing of historical themes. Forensic oratory was on a still lower plane. Of great importance were epideictic orations, particularly encomia. Pupils were required to improvise themes and prepare encomia on such subjects as houseflies, salt, and the like. Wright, _ibid._, pp. xvii-xviii.

[6]See _Ausonius_, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn White, 2 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1919).

[7]See, for example, Books xiii-xiv (pp. 311-47). Places were for Ausonius little more than thought markers in the process of an oration. They were empty of content and conventional in form.

[8]White, _Ausonius_, I, p. xxvi.

[9]See _Sidonius: Poems and Letters_, trans. W. B. Anderson, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1936).

[10]Forced antithesis, unnatural use of words, far-fetched conceits, and a straining after effect are all found abundantly in Sidonius. Anderson, "Introduction," I, p. xxxv.

[11]Baldwin, _Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic_, pp. 78-79.

of welcome or congratulation, and panegyrics,[12] all followed the tradition of declamatio.[13]

Medieval Conceptions of the Places

Meanwhile Christianity was growing up in a culture strongly influenced by rhetoric.[14] Saint Augustine, attempting to restore rhetoric to its earlier Ciceronian excellence,[15] believed that it should be an instrument of discovery which, with dignity of expression, would move men to see truth.[16] Believing that rhetoric would be helpful in the training of preachers, he advised the use of summaries and began the compilation of a compendium which would enable Christian ministers to bring together the essential facts on a number of important subjects and give young people access to screened information

---

[12]Many of his letters, for example, were simply miniature panegyrics, and nearly every letter was assiduously worked up according to the principles of contemporary rhetorical teaching. Anderson, "Introduction," p. lxii.

[13]Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 79. Sidonius felt himself the representative of a great tradition, Sophistry. See iv.3.1.

[14]See Richard McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," Speculum, XVII(1942), pp. 1-32.

[15]See the following works: Saint Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, trans. John J. Gavigan, C.S.A., Writings of Saint Augustine, ed. Ludwig Schopp et al (New York: CIMA Pub. Co., 1947), IV; Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic, pp. 51-57; and James J. Murphy, "Saint Augustine and the Debate about a Christian Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI(December, 1960), pp. 400-410. Baldwin claims (p. 51) that Book IV of De doctrina Christiana began rhetoric anew, in that it ignored Sophistic and returned to the ancient idea of moving men to truth. Augustine gave to the counsels of Cicero a new emphasis for the urgent tasks of preaching the word of God.

[16]In Augustine's day, Sophistic was "almost the only lore of public speaking then active." (Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 52) It dominated criticism and education. Augustine himself had been brought up on Sophistic rhetoric and had been, in Plutarch's sense and Strabo's, a Sophist. Yet an uninformed reader of Book IV (De doc. Christ.) would hardly be aware that Sophistry existed, as "no denunciation could be more scathing than this silence." (Baldwin, p. 53) Augustine, it may be noted, neither cited nor quoted any rhetorician but Cicero.

which they would otherwise need to seek directly from pagan sources. Illustrating the precepts of rhetoric from the Scriptures,[17] Augustine believed that with a technical treatise to guide them and a Bible in which to find examples, ministers could be adequately equipped.

In De doctrina Christiana Augustine discusses only two of the five traditional canons of rhetoric, invention and style.[18] In connection with training in invention, he makes it plain throughout that he intends the student to master the ordinary things taught in the schools.[19] He observes that rules should claim the attention of young men (iv. 3. 4)[20] and disclaims any intention on his part of supplying the rhetorical precepts taught in the secular schools (iv. 1. 2). (These precepts included the ordinary instruction in the loci.)

After Augustine, Boethius and Cassiodorus also discussed the "places." Boethius followed Cicero in viewing places as seats of argument, useful for the discovery of ideas. He wrote extensively on Aristotelian logic, discussed Porphyry's commentary, and wrote a commentary in six books on Cicero's Topica. Cassiodorus defined loci as "the places from which arguments are derived" and classified them according

---

[17]Two things are necessary to the treatment of the Scriptures, said Augustine (ii.1.1). One needs a way of expressing to others what he has learned, and a way of discovering those things which are to be understood.

[18]Of the four books in De doctrina Christiana, the first three concern invention, and the fourth, expression. More specifically, Book I deals with the signs of realities, Book II with words as conventional signs, and Book III with the problem of ambiguity. These books were composed between 396 and 426 A. D., and Book IV was added nearly a quarter of a century later. (Murphy, "Saint Augustine and the Debate about a Christian Rhetoric, p. 407) It has been contended that Augustine restored invention to its rightful place and gave it a new application to the exegesis of Scripture. (Baldwin, pp. 56-57) Of the remaining canons of rhetoric, Augustine discusses only style (Book IV), mentions memory and delivery only incidentally, and omits arrangement.

[19]Murphy, p. 407.

[20]Cf. Cicero De Oratore iii.125; Quintilian Inst. Orat. i.1.2.



to Cicero's division of intrinsic and extrinsic places.[21]

In the eighth century, Alcuin wrote a rhetorical treatise which contained an extensive discussion of the classical "places."[22] The work was "a texture of excerpts from Cicero's De Inventione and Julius Victor's Ars Rhetorica."[23] In general, Alcuin treats Cicero's text with reverence, borrowing whole passages almost verbatim, and seeking to preserve the integrity of Cicero's phraseology; but the desire to condense that source occasionally leads him to piece together within consecutive paragraphs sentences often widely separated in Cicero's treatise.[24]

Alcuin discusses the "places" of argument in terms of the parts of a speech, particularly the Proof section. Proof is defined as the "adducing of argument in such a way as to lead trustworthiness and strength to your side of the dispute" (592-93). Proof can be established in two ways--from the persons or from the events involved in the case (593-94).[25] Places from persons include: name, hereditary

---

[21]See An Introduction to Divine and Human Readings, trans. Leslie Webber Jones (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1946), pp. 172-76.

[22]See The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne, trans. Wilbur Samuel Howell (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941). Howell's interpretations will be followed closely.

[23]Alcuin found the De Inventione useful only so far as invention was concerned. Julius Victor was followed regarding the other four canons. In general, it can be said that Alcuin's treatise was thoroughly Ciceronian. (Howell, p. 30) Alcuin depended on Cicero four times as much as upon Victor.

[24]For example, Alcuin's treatment of Cicero's places of indignation and pity was a very free paraphrase of Cicero's longer analysis. (Alcuin ii.888-933) But, suggests Howell, this was an exceptional instance. (p.28)

[25]Cf. Cicero De Inv. i.24-28. Also see Howell's notes, pp. 164-65; and above, p. 62.

disposition, way of living, state of fortune, habitual bents, emotional proclivity, moral propensity, rational purpose, and things a person has done, things which have happened to him, and things which he has said. (These are further subdivided [600-638].) These "places" can be used by either plaintiff (645-58) or defendant (661-80). The plaintiff, for example, can discredit the life of the accused prior to the crime under dispute, dwell upon his shameful lineage, or his immoral propensities, or his bent for habitual wickedness, or the cruelty of the things he has done. He can, moreover, show that the defendant previously has also been convicted of a similar crime, or reveal how dishonorable, covetous, ill-humored, or inhuman he has been. The defendant, on the other hand, can show that his life has been honorable and steadfast toward the State, parents, relatives, and friends, demonstrate that his deeds were well done, faithfully, and bravely, or show that the deed was done by accident, in ignorance, or at the instigation of another.

"Places" from events (685-704) involve (1) what took place before the crime (motive, for example), (2) what took place during the crime (place, time, opportunity, and manner), (3) what took place after the crime (signs pointing to the guilt of the accused), and (4) what laws apply to the crime, who wrote the laws, and what name should be given to the crime.[26]

In discussing the summary of a speech, Alcuin also notes the

---

[26]Cf. De Inv. i.26-28; also see above, pp. 61-62. Howell notes (p. 165) that Alcuin's first three categories were merely subdivisions of Cicero's first, and that his fourth was an abridgement of Cicero's fourth category.

"places" of indignation (884-911) and those of pity (919-33). An orator applying the "places" of indignation can, for example, show that the subject upheld by his opponent is degrading in the eyes of the immortal gods, the wisest men, the Senate, and the people. Or he can show that his opponent's actions are cruel, unjust, and dishonest. Or again he can condemn his opponent's past life, show what evil will befall if he is not punished, or emphasize his pride or arrogance. "Places" of pity can be employed to indicate how shameful and ungenerous are the accusations of an opponent, or to deplore one's poverty, physical disabilities, or unhappiness, or to reveal one's feelings of sympathy toward others.[27]

In the twelfth century, John of Salisbury devoted Book III of his Metalogicon to a commentary on the categories and topoi of Aristotle.[28] Aristotle's Topics is considered not merely helpful to rhetoricians, but vitally important "as the initial starting point for the study of rhetoric, which subsequently expanded and acquired its own

---

[27]Compare Alcuin's places of indignation (884-911) with Cicero's (De Inv. i.53-54), and Alcuin's places of pity (919-33) with Cicero's (De Inv. i.55-56). For a more detailed discussion of the individual places as treated by both rhetoricians, see Howell, p. 166.

[28]See Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: a Twelfth-Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium, trans. Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1962), pp. 142-202. John was a statesman and scholar, secretary to two archbishops of Canterbury, and Bishop of Chartres. His work was the most extensive medieval survey of the Trivium, "a unified and carefully coherent presentation of all teaching that deals with words." (McGarry, p. 156) Most space, however, was given to logic. Of the four books, the first treated grammar and the Trivium in general, and the last three concerned logic. In Book III, 5-10, John offered a book-by-book digest of Aristotle's Topica. But rhetoric, in his scheme, appears to have had no distinctive composing function. (McGarry, p. 157) It was, for that matter, barely mentioned (for example, i.17, ii.10). John was preoccupied with logic and his favorable comments about "places" referred to the dialectical places.

particular rules" (iii. 10).[29] From an understanding of Aristotle's topoi, says John, a student can not only build up his powers of invention, but also improve his judgment (iii. 5).

During the medieval period, however, "places" found their greatest use in sermons.[30] They were needed for the selection of texts and materials for preaching, applying the methods of amplification, and studying the demands of an audience.[31] Hence, many commentaries and translations of classical treatises which dealt with places (Aristotle's Organon, Cicero's De Inventione and Topica, and the ad Herennium, for example) were used as aids to the invention of sermons.[32]

The "places" also were used for letter-writing during the medieval period. There were "places" for salutations, stock proverbs,

---

[29]The usefulness of Aristotle's Topics was also acknowledged by Cicero (Orator 32, 113ff.) and Quintilian (xii.2). John's comment (above) was in connection with the dialectic-rhetoric relation.

[30]See Harry Caplan's articles on medieval preaching, including: "Classical Rhetoric and the Medieval Theory of Preaching," Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. Raymond F. Howes (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 71-89; and "Rhetorical Invention in Some Medieval Tractates on Preaching," Speculum, II(1927), pp. 284-95. In the former article (p. 81), he observed that "the richest legacy bequeathed to medieval rhetoric from the ancient period was the principle of the inventional use of the topos or commonplace, the artistic finding of the right argument communicable to the right audience in the right circumstances."

[31]Caplan, "Classical Rhetoric and the Medieval Theory of Preaching," p. 81.

[32]The medieval sermon typically followed definite patterns of development. The most popular and most characteristically medieval method was the thematic method, in which the minister began with an announcement of the theme, usually from the Gospel of the day and always from Scripture. He then presented the protheme, a prayer to capture attention. Next he presented the introduction to the theme proper, employing examples, arguments from induction, and syllogisms. After presenting a division of the theme, he usually ended the sermon with moral exhaltations. If the places for the development of the theme (for example, God, the devil, the Heavenly City, the Inferno,

Scriptural quotations, devices of amplification for persuasion, and "places" of a dialectical nature (usually found in the narration and petition). These for the most part were touchstones for the divisions in the logical development of the letter.[33]

Renaissance Conceptions of the Places

The use of "places" (particularly loci communes) was common in the Renaissance; but rhetoricians who treated the places often tended to group together (with little or no distinction) the categories of Aristotle, the loci of Cicero, and the subject "places" popular in the Renaissance. While the ancient system of invention, as planned by Aristotle and elaborated by later theorists, chiefly Cicero and Quintilian, had survived and answered men's needs, by the time of the Renaissance "it began to lose favor and to be supplanted by modes of assembling factual data in connection with the process of deliberation and decision."[34]

Thomas Wilson, however, was very much in the classical tradition of the places. His Arte of Rhetorique (1553)[35] was the first attempt in English to enunciate a full, rounded set of principles

---

the world, the soul, the body, sin, penitence, virtue) were committed to memory and used. Scripture could be used to teach, argue, and arrest injustice so that by instruction men would be perfected in every good work of God. (See Caplan, "Rhetorical Invention in Some Medieval Tractates on Preaching," pp. 284-95.)

[33]Lechner, pp. 56-57.

[34]Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p. 69. By the seventeenth century, there was a definite decline of interest in artistic proofs, and the development of a belief in non-artistic proofs as a better way to persuade. The decline of interest in the classical concept of artistic proofs was inevitable with the development of science, with the expansion of facilities for the study and dissemination of facts, and with the growth of respect for direct observation and controlled experiment (largely owing to Francis Bacon's writings). Moreover, the rhetoric of the seventeenth century included the idea that learned exposition as well as popular argument and exhortation was within rhetoric's proper scope. See Howell, pp. 365, 375-76.



for artistic prose composition, in particular for those engaged in public, oral communication in the vernacular.[36] In definition and doctrine, as well as in the allocation of space given to invention, Wilson's Rhetorique conformed closely to classical doctrine.[37]

Devoting two-thirds of his treatise to invention, Wilson held to the view that sound subject matter is the foundation of good rhetoric. The method for finding subject matter is that of the places, as employed in the three kinds of oratory, deliberative, epideictic, and forensic.[38]

Before more specifically considering Wilson's concept of "places," it may be helpful to review briefly the theory of "places" as it had developed prior to him. The theory was that the "places" or lists of ideas, subdivisions, and statements could be provided to insure that

---

[35] G. H. Mair ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909).

[36] Russell H. Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique," Speech Monographs, XXVII(1960), p. 2. Wagner was one of the best authorities on Wilson's Rhetorique, and here is followed closely. His article, "Wilson and His Sources," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XV(November, 1929), pp. 525-37, is also valuable.

[37] Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique," p. 13. However, rhetoric, since Republican Rome, "was no longer the art of the persuasive speaker, but the art of ornamentation of style in Latin composition." (p. 11) The typical Renaissance rhetoric said little or nothing of persuasion, and the marshalling of proofs and consideration of the hearers had largely been forgotten. (p. 14) Wilson on the whole was also little concerned with persuasion or the methods of achieving it. But he was very much interested in the methods of topical analysis and the varied modes of amplification. (p. 15)

[38] Wagner notes that "the whole theory of invention in Wilson consists of providing all of the topics needed or possible in each of the three kinds of oratory." Further, claims Wagner, Wilson said nothing (under invention) regarding the ways of appealing to the emotions. (This was treated under disposition in Book II.) And nothing was said about ethical proof. Ibid., p. 19.



a speaker would be able to develop fully any subject whatsoever and that he would not overlook any points applicable to his case. Possessing the "places," he would be able not only to analyze and develop any ideas he had, but to apply all his knowledge, all the facts, and all his powers of reasoning, elucidation, and persuasion on any problem that might confront him. These "places" were of varying types. Some derived from logic and had the appearance, at least, of the accuracy, completeness, and finality of an exact science. Some were lists of the most likely "haunts of arguments." Some were mere word lists; and some, called "commonplaces," were completely prepared "purple patches" which could be used for a considerable variety of subjects.

Wilson's "places" are also of several kinds. He couples with his definition of invention ("the finding out of apt matter") a strong recommendation of the "places" of logic, especially when a speaker wishes to prove a case and to teach the truth, and he urges the speaker to study these before turning to the places of rhetoric (pp. 6, 23).[39] In developing the proof section of a forensic oration, Wilson is especially firm in his recommendation of the places of logic, so that the speaker can understand cause and effect, and the methods of proof (112-113). The places of logic are, therefore, the elemental, bare, but

---

[39]A statement by Wilbur Samuel Howell (Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p. 24) deserves mention here: "Invention in scholastic logic was a process in which an author found subject matter by connecting his mind with the traditional wisdom of his race and by allowing that content to induce a flow of ideas from the general store into himself. This process involved his knowing what were called 'the places.' Nowhere is scholastic logic more attractive than in Wilson's definition of a place." (Underlining supplied by the writer) In the Rule of Reason, Wilson called a place "the restying corner of an argumente, or else a marke whiche geve warning to our memorie." ([London: Richard Grafton, 1553], folio 37)



complete and indispensable parts of any subject, such as definition, causes, parts, effects, adjuncts, and contraries.[40] Somewhat similar "places" (in the sense that they are absolute and complete divisions) are the three main "places" for praising a man: "before his life, in his life, after his death (11);[41] and the three kinds of staseis or issues in the forensic speech: "conjectural, legal, juridical . . . whether the thing be, or no, what it is, what manner of thing it is" (89).

However, Wilson mainly provides places like the sedes argumentorum of the Latin rhetorics[42]--lists of haunts or abodes of arguments, sometimes fairly exhaustive, always covering the most important subdivisions and the indispensable points, as a matter of course, and often suggesting other possibilities. Such are almost all of the many lists of places found in Book I, from those "before a man's life" (11) to the places of proof for the assumptive plea in the juridical state of the forensic oration (98).[43]

---

[40]Wilson followed Cicero regarding the intrinsic-extrinsic distinctions for the "places" of logic. (See Cicero Topica 8-24.) He followed him with respect to the terms used and the functions assigned to the "places." But he did not follow Cicero in limiting the number to sixteen, or in Cicero's allotting of them all to the intrinsic group. In the final analysis, Wilson would seem to allow fifteen "places," although his first illustration of their use as a system names exactly sixteen, and his second illustration names nineteen. In reality, some of these nineteen were species of genera named among the original fifteen, and some of the original fifteen were dismissed as inapplicable to the second illustration.

[41]Things before a man's life include parents and birthplace; things in his life are birth, infancy, childhood, manhood, old age, and death; and things after death include funeral honors and coat of arms. If the epideictic orator chooses to praise deeds, he can consider who did the deed, what was done, where, how, and when it was done.

[42]Wagner states that the ad Herennium, doubtless considered by Wilson to be Cicero's, was one of Wilson's chief authorities, and that Wilson also drew to some extent upon Cicero's De Inventione, De Oratore, De Partitione Oratoria, and Brutus, as well as upon Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria. ("Wilson and His Sources," p. 528)



In the first book there is no evidence that Wilson regarded commonplaces as part of his theory of invention; but in the second book there are many examples in connection with amplification. He says, in fact: "Therefore in praising or dispraising we must be well stored ever with such good sentences as are often used in this our life, they which through art being increased, help much to persuasion" (116). These "sentences," as he illustrates abundantly, are aphorisms, proverbs, and maxims, some quoted directly from the Bible and elsewhere, some adapted or original. However, these are not methods of invention or part of the doctrine of invention; they are rather a part of the process of achieving "copie," of developing and expressing fully ideas which have been summoned and selected through the preceding processes of invention and disposition.

Mainly, then, Wilson's conception of invention as propounded in the _Rhetorique_ is that one can discover what must be proved (if proof is in question), what is appropriate, and all that it is possible or necessary to say on any subject, by knowing and using the "places" of logic, by conning the lists of "places" provided, understanding them well, storing them in the mind, and consulting and using them as needed. The proper use of "places" he illustrates with two long examples

---

[43]While Wilson treats epideictic places (see above, p. 100) and deliberative places (including: things honest, pleasant, profitable, safe, easy, hard, lawful, praiseworthy, or necessary [29-31]), these are far less important than the places of forensic oratory. Wagner states: "Thus it seems safe to say that deliberative and demonstrative oratory are not important concepts with Wilson; that they are insignificant in comparison with judicial oratory." ("Thomas Wilson's _Arte of Rhetorique_," p. 23)



and many shorter ones.[44]

In presenting this scheme of invention, however, Wilson adds some important qualifications. He emphasizes the need of judgment, a factor so important as to have been made a division of rhetoric equal to invention by some rhetoricians, and a very important topic or division in his own and other logics. In his commentary on judgment he says it is necessary not only to know the nature of the subject, but also to consider the audience, occasion, and all the circumstances under which the speech is to be given. With that in mind, the search for, and selection of, material in the process of invention will be a more economical and generally successful task (8, 18). What he says concerning the "places" of proof in the deliberative oration would appear to be of general application: "It is not thought that either they ["places"] should all be used in number as they are, or in order as they stand; but that any one may use them and order them as he shall think best, according as the time, place, and person shall most of all require" (86).

Like Thomas Wilson, Francis Bacon gave considerable attention to the classical "places." While he did not compose a rhetorical treatise,

---

[44]The following is one concrete example of the way in which Wilson believed the "places" were useful in the religious controversies of the time. After posing the question whether it be lawful for a priest to have a wife, he examines the question by taking the two key words "priest" and "wife" to the "places," and by seeing whether the conclusions obtained in respect to one of these words agrees with the conclusions obtained in respect to the other. His assumption is that where there is agreement between the conclusions reached in the case of priest and the conclusions reached in the case of wife, then to that extent the proposition that it is lawful for a priest to have a wife is good. When there is disagreement, of course, the proposition is not good. Wilson, then, examines priesthood from nineteen different "places" (see Rule of Reason, folio 114), including definition, genus, species, property, whole, and parts. After examining wifehood under the same aspects, he next shows how to obtain arguments for and against the lawfulness of marriage among the clergy. (Wilson, incidentally,



his Advancement of Learning[45] does contain numerous references to rhetorical precepts. (This inventory of the learned disciplines, along with his comments upon their adequacies and inadequacies, became the greatest native influence in English during the seventeenth century.[46]) Although it cannot be said that he proposes a complete new rhetoric, as distinguished from the Ciceronian and Ramistic systems then in existence,[47] he does take a fresh look at the theory of communication and indicates that rhetoric has obligations to learned as well as popular discourse--obligations more comprehensive and vital than it had in the older systems.[48]

When he speaks of the humanistic sciences, Bacon dwells at some length upon four great intellectual arts: invention, judgment, memory, and elocution. These four processes and the wisdom built up from the contemplation of them are what Bacon discusses under the arts belonging to the four terms which he borrows from Ciceronian rhetoric.[49]

---

believed it was lawful for a priest to marry.) See Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, pp. 25-26.

[45]In The Works of Lord Bacon (London: Henry Bohn, 1854), I.

[46]Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p. 365.

[47]During the later Middle Ages and Renaissance, the belief that dialectic contributed invention and arrangement to the art of composition, and rhetoric merely style and delivery, was by all odds the prevalent conception. (See Wilbur Samuel Howell, "Nathaniel Carpenter's Place in the Controversy between Dialectic and Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, I [1934], p. 29.) A few of the proponents of that view were John of Salisbury, Agricola, Peter Ramus, and (Ramus' disciple) Talon. To the degree that Bacon departed from this notion of rhetoric, his theory was new.

[48]Bacon's theory of rhetoric, it seems clear, emphasized the place of logical proof and imaginative appeal, and indicated in general how reason may be applied to imagination for the better moving of the will. See Karl R. Wallace, "Bacon's Conception of Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, III(1936), p. 36.

[49]Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p. 366.



Concerning the art of invention, Bacon distinguishes two kinds. One pertains to the bringing of new arts and sciences into being and involves the discovery of something not known before. The other pertains to the discovery of materials for speech and involves the rediscovery of something previously known but temporarily forgotten.[50] This invention concerning the discovery of arguments is clearly distinguished from the procedure of scientific inquiry (which draws conclusions from tabulated particulars).

In his analysis of rhetorical invention, Bacon divides the "places" into two species, general and particular. The former he dismisses, calling them sufficiently handled in logic.[51] Particular places, unlike general places, are special lines of inquiry applicable to a special subject and to no other.[52] These aid the speaker by recalling to mind ideas and arguments which he has previously unearthed, and by prompting lines of inquiry which will bring forth new material appropriate to the purpose at hand.[53] While these "places" are of great importance to Bacon, he (unfortunately) never explains precisely what they mean to rhetoric.[54] But, says Karl Wallace, the inference is clear that a speaker, if he wishes to discover true and solid reasons, can not rest

---

[50]Advancement of Learning, I, p. 48.

[51]Wallace claims that Bacon was here probably referring to the traditional "places" of invention found in Aristotle's Analytics and subsequent logical treatises down to Bacon. These "places" drawn from logic (like and unlike, equal and unequal, greater and less, subject and adjunct, cause, effect, genus, species, and definition) would help the speaker to discover logical proof. ("Bacon's Conception of Rhetoric," p. 38)

[52]The idea behind this conception was that each science, as it pursued its special inquiries, would develop its own art of invention.

[53]Wallace, p. 38.

[54]Wallace, p. 39.



content with the lines of inquiry suggested by general "places"; if the occasion demands it, he must push his investigation into a special subject-matter until he learns what problems are peculiar to it.[55] Hence, Bacon would probably advise young speakers to delve into the natural and social sciences, ethics, psychology, and politics, and to frame for themselves question-topics that would facilitate the invention of technical arguments, should an occasion require them.

Besides the general and particular "places," Bacon also notes four other aids to invention.[56] For instance, the Colours of Good and Evil, a compilation of generalizations that have become commonplace in discussion as premises for arguments, serves to aid deliberative speakers in the detection of sophistic reasoning. These "places" of persuasion and discussion can help the speaker to arrive at true and safe judgments. The Antitheta are ready-made briefs (forty-seven arguments, pro and con, similar to modern affirmative and negative briefs). Formulae are small parts of a speech, fully composed and ready for use. These include prefaces, digressions, conclusions, transitions, and the like, and serve to add ornament to a speech. And Apothegms are clever rejoinders ("pointed speeches") attributed to famous persons. While all of the above serve to "recommend reason to imagination," they do take on a prominence in Bacon's works which seem (to Wallace) somewhat disproportionate to their real value. Probably they represent mainly the deficiencies which as handmaids attend the art of rhetoric. Certainly they are not meant to be regarded

---

[55]"Bacon's Conception of Rhetoric," p. 39.

[56]See Wallace, pp. 39-42.



as substitutes for wide and deep knowledge of a subject.[57]

Modern Conceptions of the "Places"[58]

After the Renaissance only a few major rhetoricians (John Ward and John Quincy Adams, for example) made favorable references to the classical "places." Others (among them George Campbell, Hugh Blair, and Richard Whately) either avoided the concept or threw it out altogether.

When the rhetorical theories of the early modern British rhetoricians are compared, striking differences appear in concept as well as in approach to the problem of discovering logical proofs. John Ward's System of Oratory, for example, represented one current of

---

[57]Wallace, p. 42. Howell contends that Bacon half-heartedly assigned the commonplaces to rhetoric. (See "Nathaniel Carpenter's Place in the Controversy between Dialectic and Rhetoric," p. 39.) Yet a further examination of Advancement of Learning (I, p. 48) suggests that Bacon was not quite so averse to the commonplaces as both Wallace and Howell believe. For instance, Bacon strongly disagrees with Aristotle regarding the Sophists' use of the commonplaces. He declares that "Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near his time, saying, 'They did as if one that professed the art of shoe-making should not teach how to make a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes.' [See Aristotle De Sophisticis Elenchis 184a.] But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed." Bacon then cites the precepts of Cicero in support of his position on commonplaces, suggesting that if a man carefully prepared thesi or general questions, when he came to a particular question he would already be prepared, except to add names, places, and times. Also, he cites the example of Demosthenes, who used a number of ready-made introductions for his orations. Thus, concludes Bacon, these authorities and precedents outweigh Aristotle's opinion, "that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears."

[58]Since the primary interest of this study is with the classical rhetoricians who treated the "places," it is necessary to restrict the treatment of the more recent rhetorical figures. To attempt adequately to explain the bewildering blending of the old and the new in rhetorical theory would lead the writer too far astray from his central purpose. Therefore, in this remaining section, rhetoricians such as Campbell, Blair, and Whately will receive only passing attention, principally because they said little about the "places." John Ward and John Quincy



English theory that was thoroughly classical in tendency.[59] George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) is usually regarded as a treatise which marked a transition from classical to modern concepts of oratory. His text retained much of value from classical theory but displayed the influence of eighteenth-century thought in its observation that oral discourse is directed toward other ends than that of persuasion, in its recognition of common shortcomings in language usage, in its analysis of audience psychology, and in its approach to logical proof.[60] Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783) was primarily devoted to stylistic matters such as taste, language, poetry, comedy, and the like.[61] And Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric (1828) and Elements of Logic (1826) helped stimulate renewed interest in the study of logic and helped initiate a trend of theory which moved rapidly in the direction of argumentation and debate.[62]

Adams, on the other hand, were more heavily classical in emphasis and treatment, and will receive a more extended treatment. The study will end with a consideration of Adams' view of the "places." (See above, note 34, p. 97.)

[59]Clarence W. Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in Nineteenth-Century America," History of Speech Education in America: Background Studies, ed. Karl Wallace (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954), p. 80. See John Ward's System of Oratory, two vols. (London: 1759), especially I, pp. 44-76; and Bert E. Bradley's "The Inventio of John Ward," Speech Monographs, XXVI(1959), pp. 56-63.

[60]Clarence W. Edney, "George Campbell's Theory of Logical Truth," Speech Monographs, XV(1948), p. 19. Also see Lloyd F. Bitzer's "A Re-Evaluation of Campbell's Doctrine of Evidence," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI(April, 1960), pp. 135-40. And, of course, see Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1871), especially "On the Nature and Use of the Scholastic Art of Syllogizing," pp. 83-92 (Book I, chapter 6). One looks in vain in Campbell's treatise for mention of the classical places.

[61](Philadelphia: Porter and Coates, n.d.) Blair treated invention specifically in just two pages (pp. 353-54), wherein he spoke slightingly of the "places" doctrines of the ancient rhetoricians. Upon such

Of the above rhetoricians, John Ward was the only one who treated the classical "places" favorably.[63] Suggesting that they can lessen the difficulty of finding arguments (I, 45-46), he divides them according to internal and external heads. His list of sixteen internal places (I, 44, 51-52) is an exact repetition of the sixteen listed in Cicero's Topica (18).[64] And his division (I, 61-62) of external "places" into human testimony (writings, witnesses, and contracts[65]) and divine testimony is based on classical precepts.

In his treatment of the "places" of praise and blame (epideictic oratory), Ward follows Quintilian quite closely (cf. Inst. Orat. iii. 7. 1-18). Praise can be bestowed on persons or things. Praise of persons

---

doctrines, he maintained, it was "superfluous to insist," for if anyone wanted to find good materials he should go to the original sources. Hence, Blair discounted the usefulness of the classical "places" for finding arguments.

[62]See Elements of Rhetoric (New York: Sheldon and Co., 1871); Orville L. Pence, "The Concept and Function of Logical Proof in the Rhetorical System of Richard Whately," Speech Monographs, XX(1953), pp. 23-38; and Wayland M. Parrish, "Whately and His Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XV(February, 1929), pp. 58-79. Whately, like Campbell and Blair, said little regarding the classical places.

[63]Douglas Ehninger points out that all three major British rhetoricians--Campbell, Blair, and Whately--made significant departures from classical doctrine. None of them, for example, organized his work according to the standard classical pattern; all of them abandoned the inventional schemes of status and "places." Faculty psychology, literary concepts of genius and taste, the identification of rhetoric with belles lettres--all these movements were afoot in eighteenth-century English rhetoric. See "Campbell, Blair, and Whately: Old Friends in a New Light," Western Speech, XIX(October, 1955), pp. 263-69.

[64]Also see Quintilian Institutio Oratoria v.10.94.

[65]For his discussion of writings, Ward drew upon Cicero's De Oratore ii.37; on witnesses he consulted Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria v.1.2, and v.7.1-37; and on contracts he drew upon Aristotle's Rhetoric 1376a-1376b. See Ward, I, 62-75.

includes places such as country, family, and intellectual and physical virtues (I, 92-100). Praise of things (I, 100-106) includes places of countries (topography, size, cities, government, wealth, and culture), cities (nature and beauty of buildings), and facts (honor, justice, and advantage).

Concerning forensic oratory, Ward follows Cicero and Quintilian regarding the status doctrine.[66] Noting the conjectural, definitive, and qualitative states (I, 124-33), he closely paraphrases Quintilian's discussion of the "places" for the conjectural state and Cicero's discussion of those for the definitive state.

John Ward's System of Oratory, then, was an important eighteenth-century compendium of classical doctrine which gave considerable attention to the doctrine of "places." The work was also significant in another important respect. The statutes outlining the rhetorical theory of the Boylston lectures at Harvard were modeled upon Ward's treatise.[67]

Of the Boylston Professors of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard,[68] John Quincy Adams was perhaps best known, and here will receive extended

---

[66]See Cicero De Oratore ii.24; Quintilian Institutio Oratoria iii. 6.80-81.

[67]Ronald F. Reid, "The Boylston Professorship of Rhetoric and Oratory, 1806-1904: a Case Study in Changing Concepts of Rhetoric and Pedagogy," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLV(October, 1959), p. 241. Ward was widely used in America until about 1780; the statutes outlining the duties and responsibilities of the Boylston lecturers were written a quarter century later. Since the laymen who wrote the statutes were trained in the classical tradition, says Reid, it would be natural for them to look to the major interpreter of that tradition (Ward). A comparison of Ward's treatise and the statutes reveals remarkable similarities, especially in their organizational schemes.

[68]Much has been written on the Boylston lecturers. Because there is so much material readily available to the reader, the writer will not delve into the history of the Boylston Professorship, or the particular lecturers (excepting Adams) who were employed during the nineteenth century. Rather, he will examine the treatment John Quincy Adams gave the places, and elsewhere refer the reader to various articles for



treatment. His lectures, it has been said, "constitute one of the earliest and most systematic American contributions to the theory of speaking."[69] These lectures were based upon the requirements stated in the statutes,[70] and Adams' adherence to those statutes placed his lectures squarely in the classical tradition.[71]

---

additional information. See, for instance, Ronald F. Reid, ibid., pp. 239-57; Horace Rahskopf, "John Quincy Adams: Speaker and Rhetorician," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXII(December, 1946), pp. 435-41; Paul E. Ried, "Joseph McKean: the Second Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI(December, 1960), pp. 419-24. And, of course, see John Quincy Adams, Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory Delivered to the Classes of Senior and Junior Sophisters in Harvard University, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Hilliard and Metcalf, 1810).

[69]Rahskopf, p. 437. Rahskopf adds (p. 438) that Adams ignored the work of the English elocutionists (Sheridan, Steele, Walker) and often disagreed with Campbell and Blair.

[70]The statutes' outline of rhetorical theory was rigidly classical. The professor was to begin his course with an historical and biographical account of ancient oratory and orators. He was to explain the nature of rhetoric, its subjects, and several kinds, and to show the connection with the powers of the human mind. Rhetoric was to be divided into four parts, to be discussed in the following manner. First, invention was to include a treatment of the state of a controversy, "places" (internal and external), the different arguments proper to demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial oratory, the character and address of a finished orator, and the use and excitation of the passions. Second, disposition was to include a treatment of the properties and uses of the parts of a discourse (Introduction, Narration, Proposition, Confirmation, Confutation, and Conclusion), with suitable remarks on digression, transition, and amplification. Third, elocution was to include elegance, composition, and dignity, and the types of style. Finally, delivery was to involve a discussion of voice and gesture, as well as a statement of the importance of good delivery. (Harvard College Records, IV, 10ff., Harvard Archives; also see Ronald F. Reid, "Boylston Professorship of Rhetoric and Oratory," pp. 240-41) Now early in the preparation of his lectures (he delivered thirty-six of them between 1806-1809) Adams objected to the rigidity of these statutes. Although one might naturally expect, then, to find substantial departures from the statutes (especially from a man as independent as Adams), his modifications were actually quite minor. The only noteworthy ones were (1) a restoration of memory as one of the five parts of rhetoric, (2) omission of the low-middle-grand stylistic classification, (3) failure to discuss the styles of various compositions, and (4) a transfer of amplification from the lecture on digression and



In his inaugural lecture, Adams declared that Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian had already thoroughly studied rhetoric, and that "In the theory of the art, and the principles of exposition, novelty will not be expected, nor is it perhaps to be desired" (I, 28). In his subsequent treatment of the five canons of rhetoric, he adhered to that view. Thus, a profile of the classical influences on Adams looks like this.

Invention--Aristotelian approach regarding the logical, ethical, and pathetical proofs,
Ciceronian approach to the "places," and
Quintilian's precepts regarding speech purposes
Disposition--mainly a repetition of Cicero's division
Elocution----mainly the Ciceronian approach
Memory-------a summary of the precepts of numerous ancient and modern rhetoricians
Delivery-----mostly the precepts of Quintilian

Before discussing the classical "places," Adams presented six lectures concerning such matters as the general view of rhetoric and oratory, objections frequently raised against rhetoric, and the origins of oratory. Then, after treating the "state of the controversy," he turned to his analysis of the classical "places" (I, 208-28).

---

transition to the one on conclusions. (Ronald Reid, p. 242) In addition, Adams did modify slightly some classical precepts, in keeping with the developments of his own time. Hence, he offered his own ideas on purity of style, figurative language, and pulpit speaking. Judicial speaking was analyzed according to American law and judicial procedure; and principles of deliberative oratory were illustrated with parliamentary rules and procedures of modern political assemblies. Also, at times Adams disagreed with the ancients, particularly in connection with the minute divisions and subdivisions to which classical rhetoricians reduced the science.

[71]In general, says Ronald Reid (p. 244), Adams' lectures were classical (though not slavishly so), not because he was afraid to violate the statutes, or because he lacked originality, but because he believed sincerely in classicism's vitality and usefulness in the nineteenth century.



Adams begins by calling the Greek word τοπος a place or common seat, to which every speaker must resort for his arguments (I, 209). They are "general incidents, or circumstances, belonging alike to every subject, and distributed under a certain number of heads, to facilitate the invention of public speakers" (I, 209). The "places" are next divided into two general classes, internal and external, the internal arising from the subject itself and the external from any other source outside the subject (I, 209-10).

Of the sixteen internal "places," the first three (definition, enumeration, and notation) embrace the whole subject under analysis. The other thirteen, on the other hand, are less comprehensive, and are derived from the subject's properties, incidents, and relations.[72]

The six external (or inartificial) "places" are prejudications, common fame, torture, written documents, oaths, and witnesses.[73] In discussing these, Adams notes (I, 217) the great diversity and confusion among ancient rhetoricians.

After completing his survey of the internal and external "places," Adams concludes his lecture by turning to an evaluation of the usefulness of the "places." Whereas the doctrine of the "places" has been

---

[72]See Adams, I, 209-16; also cf. Cicero Topica ii.9-iv.23. The sixteen internal "places" were: definition, enumeration, notation (etymology), conjugates, genus, species, antecedents, consequents, adjuncts, cause, effect, contraries, repugnances, similitude, dissimilitude, and comparison.

[73]See Adams, I, 217-24. Of these "places," Adams points out that torture, though a topic of continual recurrence among Greeks and Romans, was not among the ways and means of his time. And common fame was then generally excluded from judicial practice (though it was a copious source for deliberative and epideictic discourse). The other four places, however, were especially appropriate to judicial oratory. Written documents, prejudications (precedents), oaths, and witnesses were all admitted as evidence in law courts.



deemed of vast importance by students of ancient rhetoric, modern teachers of eloquence have almost unanimously pronounced them utterly worthless (I, 226). Yet, they can be useful, said Adams; they can suggest a train of thought and add facility to the copiousness of an orator (I, 228). (That, however, is all the benefit that could be derived from a thorough knowledge of the "places.") Generally, they assist invention by exhibiting a subject in all its attitudes (I, 228), and an accomplished orator should not disdain a thorough knowledge of them. The "places," then, are given a qualified endorsement by John Quincy Adams, the first Boylston Professor.[74]

---

[74]After his lecture on the "places," Adams presented other lectures on invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and delivery. Then, after completing his lectures, he resigned in the summer of 1809 to accept a diplomatic appointment, and a new Boylston Professor, Joseph McKean, was appointed.

McKean's tenure (1809-1818) resulted in no radical change in the concept of rhetoric. (Ronald Reid, "Boylston Professorship of Rhetoric and Oratory," p. 244) Less original than Adams, McKean organized his lectures in strict accordance with the statutes. Nevertheless, his lectures foreshadowed changes to come. There were traces of Blair and numerous references to Campbell, especially when treating emotional proof. Furthermore, although McKean defended the inventional schemes of <u>status</u> and "places" against Blair's charge of pedantry, he was less enthusiastic about their utility than was Adams.

Edward T. Channing took over from McKean in 1819 and remained as Boylston Professor until 1851. His lectures bore little resemblance to those of Adams and McKean. (Ronald Reid, p. 246) He abandoned not only the classical pattern of organizing his lectures, but also the classical orientation of much of the theory. Invention, for instance, was stripped of its analytical schemes (including "places"), which were considered of no practical use. Moreover, Channing's lectures contained no detailed accounts of emotional and ethical proof, which were integral to Adams' and McKean's classical doctrine.

During the last half of the nineteenth century, two other men occupied the Boylston chair, Francis James Child (1851-1876) and Adam Sherman Hill (1876-1904). During their tenure, however, rhetoric turned away even further from the classical authors. Whereas in 1806 rhetoric was concerned primarily with persuasive oratory and had its roots sunk deeply in the classical tradition, by the time of Hill's retirement what was called "rhetoric" was concerned not with oratory, but with written composition, expository and literary as well as persuasive, and made little direct reference to classical authors.



John Quincy Adams' extensive review and favorable reception of the classical "places" suggests an appropriate point at which to end this survey.[75]

---

[75]For fear of going far astray from the central purpose of his study, an analysis of classical conceptions of "places," the writer has chosen to conclude with a consideration of the classical rhetorical concepts discussed by John Quincy Adams. The writer's intent in this chapter has been to inform the reader of some of the rhetoricians after Quintilian who accepted or rejected the classical concept of "places." A survey of twentieth century rhetorical views of "places," however, would seem more appropriate for a separate study.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions may be drawn regarding the classical "places."

(1) There were two rhetorical traditions among the fifth century Sophists, the theoretical and the exemplar. The theoretical tradition, as represented by the handbooks, was devoted entirely to forensic oratory and concerned only invention and arrangement. In the exemplar tradition, standard passages were made available on such universal subjects as justice, injustice, nature, and convention. The Sophists' great regard for general ideas and their systematic exploration and exploitation of great themes made them the founders of the common places. Their emphasis on moral training also prompted the development of commonplaces as "little orations" to be inserted in a speech for purposes of amplification. This conception of "places" was to coexist with, and eventually dominate, the Aristotelian conception.

(2) Isocrates paid little attention to "places," preferring to emphasize a broad view of invention. Disclaiming the ability to teach invention by means of "places," he proposed that the first requirement in the training of the good speaker should be a liberal education. The subject matter of speeches should be noble, dignified, politically practical, and honorable. His few favorable references to "places" were to universal ideas which serve to amplify a speech. Otherwise his

references to "places" were casual as contrasted with the more extended treatment of the theory by such rhetoricians as Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.

(3) Like Isocrates, Plato gave "places" little attention. On some occasions he even spoke derisively of them. His antipathy to the rhetoric he saw practised around him, together with his preference for the dialectical method, led him to reject Sophistic conceptions of "places."

(4) *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* was a practical handbook on public speaking which stood firmly in the Sophistic tradition. "Places" were treated as pre-processed materials selected by the author for use in particular parts of a speech. The author recognized both those peculiar to one type of oratory and those common to all types.

(5) Aristotle bequeathed to later rhetoricians a new conception of "places." His new approach sprang from the idea that instead of providing a great number of ready-made arguments (one and all applying to quite definite and specific subjects or situations) the rhetoricians should concentrate on general forms or types of arguments. He viewed *topoi* as pigeonholes from which dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms draw their premises and forms. *Topoi* are of two kinds, material and formal. Material *topoi* are either special or common, special *topoi* providing the premises for enthymemes used in each type of oratory. The four common *topoi* (Possibility, Past Fact, Future Fact, and Degree) are not related to particular subjects, but are useful for all types of oratory. Formal *topoi*, including twenty-eight valid and nine sham, provide the modes of reasoning a speaker can take. *Topoi* provide the materials and forms of enthymemes, through which logical, ethical, and pathetical proofs are projected.



(6) During the Hellenistic period, places were closely related to the parts of a speech and to Hermagoras' reorganization of speech materials under _status_. Two surviving treatises, _Rhetorica ad Herennium_ and _De Inventione_, reveal Hellenistic conceptions of the places. _Ad Herennium_ was, in the main, a consideration of forensic places and places for purposes of amplification. The author provided a random list of _loci_ and _loci communes_ thought to be serviceable to a speaker. Cicero's _De Inventione_ was similar in most respects to _ad Herennium_. _Loci_ were drawn from persons and from things, and considerable attention was given to _loci_ for purposes of amplification.

(7) The elder Cicero protested against the narrowing of rhetoric and proposed a system of general culture which would train orators to speak competently on all subjects. His broad view of invention came to dominate the narrow view expressed in _De Inventione_. Hence, the concrete _loci_ favored in his youth were abandoned in favor of the formal _loci_, examined in _Topica_. These _loci_, intelligently selected and used, were considered helpful in the young orator's training.

(8) Quintilian considered _loci_ as seats of arguments, drawn from persons or from things. He followed Cicero in distinguishing common and special _loci_ and in recognizing some value in carefully handled _loci communes_. He warned that a mere knowledge of _loci_ is inadequate since a speaker needs to examine for himself the peculiar facts of each case.

(9) Hermogenes, Philostratus, Ausonius, and Sidonius lived in the period of the Second Sophistic. After Quintilian, invention became barren and stereotyped; and the places they taught and used were conventional in form and empty of real content.

(10) Medieval writers conceived places as seats of arguments,

or vehicles for amplification and embellishment, or as a "speech-within-a-speech." In the fourth century, Saint Augustine attempted to restore the vitality of Ciceronian rhetoric and saw some use for places in the training of Christian ministers. Later, Boethius, Cassiodorus, and Alcuin followed the Ciceronian concept of loci as treated in De Inventione and Topica. And in the twelfth century, John of Salisbury followed Cicero's Topica in his study of the places of logic.

Medieval "places" found their greatest use, however, in sermons and letters. "Places" helped preachers to select their materials, study audiences, and amplify ideas. For these purposes, the works of Aristotle and Cicero (together with the ad Herennium) were most frequently used.

(11) "Places" were commonly discussed and used during the Renaissance. Because rhetoricians grouped together the categories of Aristotle, the loci of Cicero, and the subject places popular in the Renaissance, there was usually confusion regarding the places. Thomas Wilson and Francis Bacon, however, stood in the classical tradition. Wilson followed Cicero in viewing "places" as rhetorical suggestions for locating arguments for deliberative, epideictic, and forensic oratory. Bacon recognized the common and special topoi of Aristotle as useful in recalling knowledge. And he considered the formal "places" useful in directing inquiry.

(12) From the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, few rhetoricians considered the classical "places" to be useful. George Campbell and Richard Whately paid them no heed, while Hugh Blair spoke slightingly of the "places" doctrines of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Among those who considered the "places" useful were John Ward and John Quincy Adams. Ward offered an eighteenth-century compendium of classical



doctrine which presented an extensive treatment of the "places," his chief guides being Cicero and Quintilian. John Quincy Adams, the first Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory, divided the "places" into internal and external, and followed Cicero's _Topica_ closely. Adams, acknowledging the discredited state of the "places," yet saw some usefulness for them, particularly in suggesting a train of thought and adding facility to the copiousness of an orator.

The Boylston Professors who followed Adams gradually de-emphasized classical doctrines until, by the time of Adam Sherman Hill's retirement (1904), what was called "rhetoric" was concerned not with oratory, but with written composition--expository and literary as well as persuasive--and made little direct reference to classical authors.

Suggestions for Future Studies

Scattered throughout the literature on the classical period are works which, because of the pervasive influence of the "places," give attention to that concept. There remains to be done, however, a comprehensive study of the use of the places by Greek and Roman orators. Such a study could do much to bridge the apparent gap between knowledge of classical theories of invention and the actual practice of oratory. Cicero's speeches could serve as specimens for analysis.

Also, a study of the theory and practical application of the _loci communes_ is in order.

In addition, the "places" treated by classical rhetoricians found great use in literature other than oratory. A study of the "places" employed in drama, history, or philosophical treatises may be profitable.

Finally, the medieval, Renaissance, and modern conceptions of the



"places" need more investigation. The changing views of invention, both in relation to the other canons of rhetoric and to dialectic and grammar, brought about new conceptions of the "places." In particular, it may be valuable to explore the twentieth-century approaches to rhetorical invention, in light of the presence or absence of the classical tradition of the "places."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Adams, John Quincy. Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory Delivered to the Classes of Senior and Junior Sophisters in Harvard University. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Hilliard and Metcalf, 1810.

Alcuin. The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne. Trans. Wilbur Samuel Howell. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941.

Aristotle. The Organon, or Logical Treatises of Aristotle. Trans. Octavius Freire Owen. 2 vols. London: George Bell and Sons, 1878.

________. The Rhetoric of Aristotle: an Expanded Translation with Supplementary Examples for Students of Composition and Public Speaking. Trans. Lane Cooper. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1932.

________. Rhetoric of Aristotle. Trans. E. M. Cope and J. E. Sandys. Cambridge: University Press, 1877.

________. The Rhetoric of Aristotle: a Translation. Trans. Sir Richard Claverhouse Jebb. Ed. and introd. John Edwin Sandys. Cambridge: University Press, 1909.

________. The Rhetoric of Aristotle. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. In The Works of Aristotle. Ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924.

________. De Sophisticis Elenchis and Topica. Trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge. In The Works of Aristotle. Ed. W. D. Ross. Vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928.

Augustine (Saint). De doctrina Christiana. Trans. John J. Gavigan, C.S.A. In Writings of Saint Augustine. Ed. Ludwig Schopp et al. 16 vols. New York: CIMA Pub. Co., 1947, IV.

Ausonius. Ausonius. Trans. Hugh G. Evelyn White. Loeb library. 2 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1919.

Bacon, Francis. Advancement of Learning. In The Works of Lord Bacon. 2 vols. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854, I.

Blair, Hugh. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Philadelphia: Porter and Coates, n.d.

Campbell, George. Philosophy of Rhetoric. New York: Harper & Bros., 1871.



Cassiodorus. An Introduction to Divine and Human Readings. Trans. Leslie Webber Jones. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946.

Cicero. Brutus. Trans. G. I. Hendrickson. Loeb library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939.

________. De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. Trans. H. Rackham. Loeb library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951.

________. De Inventione. Trans. H. M. Hubbell. Loeb library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949.

________. De Oratore. Trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. Loeb library. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948.

________. De Partitione Oratoria. Trans. H. Rackham. Loeb library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948.

________. Epistulae ad Familiares. Trans. W. Glynn Williams. Loeb library. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928.

________. Orator. Trans. H. M. Hubbell. Loeb library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939.

________. The Speeches. (Pro Milone) Trans. N. H. Watts. Loeb library. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931.

________. Topica. Trans. H. M. Hubbell. Loeb library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949.

Isocrates. Trans. George Norlin and LaRue Van Hook. Antidosis. Against the Sophists. Encomium on Helen. Loeb library. 3 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928, 1929, 1945.

John of Salisbury. The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: a Twelfth-Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium. Trans. Daniel D. McGarry. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

Juvenal. Satires in Juvenal and Perseus. Trans. G. G. Ramsay. Loeb library. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1930.

Longinus on the Sublime: the Greek Text Edited After the Paris Manuscript with Introduction, Translation, Facsimiles, and Appendices. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. Cambridge: University Press, 1899.

Philostratus. Philostratus and Eunapius: the Lives of the Sophists. Trans. Wilmer Cave Wright. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1922.

Plato. The Dialogues of Plato. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.

Plato. Phaedrus, Ion, Gorgias, and Symposium, with Passages from the Republic and Laws. Ed. and trans. Lane Cooper. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1938.

Plutarch. Plutarch's Lives: the Translation Called Dryden's. Rev. A. H. Clough. 5 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1875, II.

Quintilian. The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian. Trans. H. E. Butler. Loeb library. 4 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953.

Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. Trans. H. Rackham. Loeb library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937.

Rhetorica ad Herennium. Trans. Harry Caplan. Loeb library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Sidonius. Sidonius: Poems and Letters. Trans. W. B. Anderson. Loeb library. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936.

Strabo. The Geography of Strabo. Trans. Horace Leonard Jones. Loeb library. 8 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929, VI.

Tacitus. Dialogus, Agricola, Germania. Trans. William Peterson. Loeb library. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932.

Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. In The Greek Historians. Ed. Francis R. B. Godolphin. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1942, I.

Ward, John. A System of Oratory. 2 vols. London: 1759.

Whately, Richard. Elements of Logic. London: Parker, 1855.

________. Elements of Rhetoric. New York: Sheldon & Co., 1871.

Wilson, Thomas. Arte of Rhetorique. G. H. Mair ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909.

________. The Rule of Reason, Conteinying the Arte of Logique, Sette Furthe in Englishe and Newly Corrected. 1st ed. London: Richard Grafton, 1553.

Secondary Sources

Agard, Walter R. What Democracy Meant to the Greeks. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1942.

Atkins, J. W. H. "Greek Rhetoric" and "Latin Rhetoric." Oxford Classical Dictionary. Ed. M. Cary et al. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949, 766-68.

Atkins, J. W. H. Literary Criticism in Antiquity: a Sketch of its Development. 2 vols. Cambridge: University Press, 1934.

Baldwin, Charles Sears. Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic. New York: Macmillan, 1924.

________. Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic. New York: Macmillan, 1928.

________. "Rhetoric." A Cyclopedia of Education. Ed. Paul Monroe. New York: Macmillan, 1919, V, 173-79.

Bitzer, Lloyd F. "A Re-Evaluation of Campbell's Doctrine of Evidence," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI(April, 1960), 135-40.

Bradley, Bert E. "The Inventio of John Ward," Speech Monographs, XXVI(1959), 56-63.

Brittin, Marie Eleanor. "Concepts of Evidence in Rhetoric." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1949.

Burnet, John. Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato. London: Macmillan, 1914.

Caplan, Harry. "Classical Rhetoric and the Medieval Theory of Preaching," Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians. Ed. Raymond F. Howes. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961, 71-89.

________. "Rhetorical Invention in Some Medieval Tractates on Preaching," Speculum, II(1927), 284-95.

Carrino, Elinora Drafahl. "Conceptions of Dispositio in Ancient Rhetoric." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1959.

Clark, Donald Lemen. Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education. Morningside Heights, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1957.

Clarke, M. L. Rhetoric at Rome: a Historical Survey. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963.

Cooper, Lane. "The Rhetoric of Aristotle," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXI(February, 1935), 11-19.

Cope, Edward Meredith. An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric. London: Macmillan, 1867.

Dick, Robert C. "Topoi: an Approach to Inventing Arguments," Speech Teacher, XIII(November, 1964), 313-19.

Duff, J. Wight. A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age: from Tiberius to Hadrian. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927.

Edney, Clarence W. "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in Nineteenth-Century America." A History of Speech Education in America: Background Studies. Ed. Karl R. Wallace. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954, 80-104.



Edney, Clarence W. "George Campbell's Theory of Logical Truth," Speech Monographs, XV(1948), 19-32.

Ehninger, Douglas. "Campbell, Blair, and Whately: Old Friends in a New Light," Western Speech, XIX(October, 1955), 263-69.

Frank, Tenney. Life and Literature in the Roman Republic. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930.

Grote, George. Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates. 2nd ed. 3 vols. London: John Murray, 1888.

Harrington, Elbert W. Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry. Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1948.

Highet, Gilbert. The Classical Tradition: Greek and Roman Influences on Western Civilization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949.

Howell, Wilbur Samuel. Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700. New York: Russell & Russell, 1961. (Reprint of work published at Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956)

________. "Nathaniel Carpenter's Place in the Controversy between Dialectic and Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, I(1934), 20-41.

Hudson, Hoyt H. "Can We Modernize the Theory of Invention?" Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, VII(November, 1921), 325-34.

Hudson-Williams, H. Ll. "Greek Orators and Rhetoric," Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship. Ed. Maurice Platnauer. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954, 193-213.

________. "Political Speeches in Athens," Classical Quarterly, XLV(1951), 68-73.

Hunt, Everett Lee. "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," Historical Studies on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians. Ed. Raymond F. Howes. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961, 19-70.

Huseman, Richard C. "Modern Approaches to the Aristotelian Concept of the Special Topic," Central States Speech Journal, XV(February, 1964), 21-26.

Jackson, Henry. "Sophists." Encyclopedia Britannica. 9th ed. Chicago: Werner Co., 1895, XXII, 263-71.

Jaeger, Werner. Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture. Trans from the second German edition by Gilbert Highet. 3 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, I.

Jebb, Sir Richard Claverhouse. The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos. 2 vols. London: Macmillan, 1876.

________. "Rhetoric." Encyclopedia Britannica. 9th ed. Chicago: Werner Co., 1895, XX, 508-16.



Kennedy, George. *Art of Persuasion in Greece*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963.

________. "The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks," *American Journal of Philology*, LXXX(1959), 169-78.

________. "An Estimate of Quintilian," *American Journal of Philology*, LXXXIII(1962), 130-46.

Lechner, Sister Joan Marie (O.S.U.). *Renaissance Concepts of the Commonplaces*. New York: Pageant Press, 1962.

Lee, Irving J. "Some Conceptions of Emotional Appeal in Rhetorical Theory," *Speech Monographs*, VI(1939), 66-86.

McBurney, James H. "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," *Speech Monographs*, III(1936), 49-74.

McKeon, Richard. "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," *Speculum*, XVII(1942), 1-32.

Marrou, H. I. *A History of Education in Antiquity*. Trans. George Lamb. London: Sheed and Ward, 1956.

Minio-Paluello, L. "The Text of Aristotle's *Topics* and *Elenchi*: the Latin Tradition," *Classical Quarterly*, V(1955), 108-18.

Monroe, Paul. *Source Book of the History of Education for the Greek and Roman Period*. New York: Macmillan, 1928.

Murphy, James J. "Saint Augustine and the Debate about a Christian Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XLVI(December, 1960), 400-410.

Nadeau, Ray. "Some Aristotelian and Stoic Influences on the Theory of *Stases*," *Speech Monographs*, XXVI(1959), 248-54.

Ong, Walter J. (S.J.) *Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958.

Palmer, Georgiana Paine. *The τοποι of Aristotle's Rhetoric as Exemplified in the Orators*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

Parrish, W. M. "Whately and His Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XV(February, 1929), 58-79.

Pence, Orville L. "The Concept and Function of Logical Proof in the Rhetorical System of Richard Whately," *Speech Monographs*, XX(1953), 23-38.

Petersson, Torsten. *Cicero: a Biography*. New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1963.

Rahskopf, Horace. "John Quincy Adams: Speaker and Rhetorician," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XXXII(December, 1946), 435-41.

Reid, Ronald F. "The Boylston Professorship of Rhetoric and Oratory, 1806-1904: a Case Study in Changing Concepts of Rhetoric and Pedagogy," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLV(October, 1959), 239-57.

Ried, Paul E. "Joseph McKean: the Second Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI(December, 1960), 419-24.

Ross, W. D. Aristotle: a Complete Exposition of his Works and Thought. 5th ed. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1953.

Rostovtzeff, M. A History of the Ancient World. Trans. J. D. Duff. 2 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1926-27.

Sandys, Sir John Edwin. A History of Classical Scholarship. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1958, I.

Sattler, William M. "Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, XIV(1947), 55-65.

Sihler, E. G. Cicero of Arpinum: a Political and Literary Biography. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1914.

Sinclair, T. A. A History of Greek Political Thought. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951.

Solmsen, Friedrich. "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," American Journal of Philology, LXII(1941), 35-50, 169-90.

________. "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing Upon the Feelings," Classical Philology, XXXIII(1938), 390-404.

________. "Cicero's First Speeches: a Rhetorical Analysis," TAPA, LXIX(1938), 542-56.

Thiele, George. Hermagoras: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rhetorik. Strassburg: Trübner, 1893.

Untersteiner, Mario. The Sophists. Trans. Kathleen Freeman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954.

Wagner, Russell H. "Thomas Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique," Speech Monographs, XXVII(1960), 1-32.

________. "Wilson and his Sources," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XV(November, 1929), 525-37.

Wallace, Karl R. "Bacon's Conception of Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, III(1936), 21-48.

Zeller, Eduard. Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy. Trans. L. R. Palmer. Rev. Wilhelm Nestle. 13th ed. New York: Meridian Books, 1957.







MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
3 1293 03196 4699