THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE UNEMPLOYED BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS - Thesis for the Degree of PIL D. MICHIGAN STATE umvmsm DUANE E. LEIGH 1968 ......... [HESIb LIBRARY ., Michigan State University This is to certify that the thesis entitled THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE UNEMPLOYED BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. presented by Duane Ernest Leigh has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degree in EconOmIgs Majbr/ professor Date @A/{g/ é/y/f 0-169 ABSTRACT THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE UNEMPLOYED BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS By Duane E. Leigh‘ This dissertation is an application of the tools of economic theory to the problem of constructing a short-run model which determines the distribution of unemployment by occupational groups through time. The level of unemploy— ment in a particular occupation is defined to be the differ- ence between the number of workers supplied and the number demanded at a given wage rate. This difference is, in general, positive because unemployed workers cannot obtain information on job opportunities instantaneously or at zero cost. The short-run demand for the members of an occupation is specified to depend on the expected wage in the occu- pation and on an index of industry product demand. The short-run supply of workers to the occupation is a function of expected wage rates, the probability of employment in this occupation and in other occupations, and the level of expected nonwage earnings. The probability of employment Duane E. Leigh in an occupation is hypothesized to depend on the ex— pected unemployment rate in the occupation. The model was tested using time-series data for six major occupational groups and six major industries during the 1958-66 period. A system of six demand and six supply equations was estimated. Each equation was first esti— mated by single—equation least squares for alternative values of the parameter in a first-order autoregressive process. The value which minimizes the sum of squares of residuals and the corresponding coefficient estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the equation. The entire system of equations was also esti- mated by a two-step Aitken procedure. This procedure is intended to take account of possible correlation in con— temporaneous disturbances across equations in addition to autocorrelation in individual disturbances. The most significant variables in the demand equa- tions were the indices of product demand. This result is expected from the theory of derived demand. However, a given increase in aggregate demand does not improve em- ployment opportunities in all occupations equally. The evidence indicates that the low skill (high unemployment) occupations benefit less than do the higher skill occu- pations. A policy implication is that expansionary monetary and fiscal policies are effective policy instru— ments for reducing unemployment only if they are coupled Duane E. Leigh with retraining programs designed to increase the occu- pational mobility of low skilled workers. The results for the wage variables in the supply equations are consistent with several long-run studies which show that individuals respond to differentials in present values of expected earnings in choosing among occupations. In addition, significant coefficient esti- mates were obtained for the unemployment rate variables. With the exception of the unemployment rates for laborers, the sign of these estimates verifies the use in the model of "probabilistic" supply functions. The results for laborers can be rationalized by consideration of the probable effect of "hidden unemployment" concentrated among the low skilled. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE UNEMPLOYED BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS By Duane E. Leigh A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Economics 1968 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the College of Business and the Department of Economics of Michigan State University for making funds available for me to proceed with this study. The University also allowed me the free use of its CDC 3600 computer. I was particularly fortunate in having the assis- tance of a very able guidance committee. Professor James B. Ramsey read the last two drafts of the study and made numerous very helpful comments. The suggestions of Professor Jan Kmenta were beneficial in all phases of the study. I am also indebted to Professor Kmenta for his stimulating and very useful courses in mathematical economics and econometrics. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance and support of Professor Thomas R. Saving who served as chairman of the committee. Professor Saving initially suggested the tOpic, and as the study progressed, he was an unfailing source of additional ideas and much needed encouragement. Of course, the author is solely responsible for any errors, logical or otherwise, which appear in this dissertation. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . ii LIST OF TABLES 0 O O O O O O O O O 0 O V LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Chapter I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . I II. THE MODEL. . . . . . . . . . . . 9 I. Introduction . . . . . . . 9 II. The Demand for Labor. . . . . . 11 III. The Supply of Labor . . . . . . 16 A. Expected Wage Rates as Argu- ments in the Labor Supply Function . . . . . . . . 16 B. Incorporation of Short-Run Unemployment Into the Model . . 21 C. Expected Unemployment Rates as Arguments in the Labor Supply Function . . . . . . 27 IV. The Complete Model . . . . . . A2 A. Determination of the Desired Vector of Industry Output. . . AA B. Determination of Firm and Worker Expectations of Wage Rates . . . . . . . . A5 C. Determination of the Vector of Expected Unemployment Rates . . 48 D. Determination of the Vector of Current Wage Rates . . . . . 50 E. Consolidating the Model . . . 51 iii Chapter III. THE DATA AND THE ESTIMATION PROCEDURE I. The Data . . . . . . . II. The Estimation Procedure . . IV. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND CONCLUSIONS. I. The Results of the Estimation A. The Demand Results. B. The Supply Results. . . . II. The Interpretation of the Results A. Interpreting the Demand Results B. Interpreting the Supply Results III. Summary and Conclusion. . . . APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . iv Page Table LIST OF TABLES Alternative Occupations for Members of Each Occupational Group . . . . . OLS Estimates of Parameters Appearing in the Demand Equations Specified in (4.1). Aitken Estimates of Coefficients Appearing in the Demand Equations Specified in (14.1) o o o o o o o OLS Estimates of Parameters Appearing in the Supply Equations Specified in (A.2). Aitken Estimates of Coefficients Appearing in the Supply Equations Specified 111(2402) 0 o o o o o o c o o OLS Estimates of the Beta Coefficients of the Standardized Variables Appearing in (“‘0 l) o o o o o o Page 71 80 83 86 87 94 LIST OF FIGURES Figure l. The Orthodox Theory of Work-Leisure Choice. 2. Time Paths of Adjusted Expected Wages of an Employed and an Unemployed Worker in the rth Occupation. . . . . . 3. Time Path of Adjusted Expected Wages in Occupation q Viewed by a Member of Occupation r. . . . . . . . . A. Work- Leisure Choice Incorporating the Possibility of Unemployment in an Occupation . . . . . vi Page 20 32 33 36 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This dissertation is an application of the tools of economic theory to the problem of explaining the short- run distribution of occupational unemployment. At neither the micro nor the macro level is the present state of economic analysis entirely satisfactory with respect to the labor market. At the microeconomic level of analysis, the traditional theory of competitive equilibrium essenti- ally precludes the unemployment problem because the attain- ment of general equilibrium implies that all the marginal conditions are met including those for full employment. Thus, unemployment functions as a signal that the system is out of equilibrium; but it is not clearly explained how the unemployment comes about, nor is the mechanism specified by which full employment is regained as the system approaches equilibrium. Arrow neatly sums up the problem in the following passage: Neoclassical microeconomic equilibrium with fully flexible prices presents a beautiful picture of the mutual articulations of a complex structure, full employment being one of its major elements. [But] What is the relation between this world . and the real world with its recurrent tendencies to unemployment of labor . . .?1 At the aggregate level of analysis, excess supply in the labor market is a stable solution to the general class of macroeconomic models in which all markets but the labor market are simultaneously cleared. But here the inadequacy of the micro foundation is reflected in the seemingly ad hoc assumptions which are employed to arrive at the unemployment solution. Well-known examples are the cases of rigid money wages, money illusion on the part of labor suppliers, and the liquidity trap. Clearly, the descriptive power of the standard Keynesian model would be increased if the existence of unemployment could be demonstrated on the basis of assumptions consistent with economic theory.2 1Kenneth J. Arrow, "Samuelson Collected," Journal of Political Economy, LXXV (October, 1967), p. 73A. 2Axel Leijonhufvud argues persuasively that Keynes' theory, as distinct from the Keynesian model, is consistent with economic theory. In his theory, Keynes discusses wage rigidity as a policy recommendation rather than as a behavioral assumption. Hence, to move from general equilibrium theory to Keynes' world, it is sufficient only to give up the assumption of instantaneous price adjustments. Leijonhufvud notes that "The removal of the [Walrasian] auctioneer simply means that the gener- ation of the information needed to coordinate economic activities in a large system where decision making is decentralized will take time and will involve economic costs. No other 'classical' assumptions need be relin— quished." "Keynes and the Keynesians: A Suggested Interpretation," Proceedings of the American Economic Association, LVII (May, 1967), p. AOA. As will be seen in the following paragraphs in the text, this is very much the general approach taken here. The purpose of this dissertation is to construct and empirically test a model constructed from economic theory which determines the occupational structure of unemployment through time. The model is a short-run model because it is primarily short-run fluctuations in the unemployment vector in which we are interested. The level of unemployment in an occupation is defined to be the number of members of the occupation who are unem— ployed. Hence, the level of unemployment is the differ- ence between the number of workers willing to supply their labor in the occupation at a given wage and the number of workers demanded by firms at this wage. The plan of attack is to develop market demand and supply functions for each occupational group. Then at the market wage rate, the quantity of labor supplied and demanded, and hence the level of unemployment, is determined at any particular moment. Each occupational supply and demand function is con- structed assuming rational decision making on the parts of individual firms and labor suppliers. But because product demand fluctuates unexpectedly and information and mobility are not costless, wage offers by firms and reservation prices of individuals will not in general adjust with sufficient speed to assure that the number of workers who desire to work will be equated to the number of workers demanded by firms in the short run. Therefore, a positive level of unemployment can exist in the model without the assumption that labor unions or other institutions enforce rigid wages. Rather than serving as an indicator of disequilibrium, as in the traditional theory of competitive equilibrium, a posi- tive level of unemployment is inherent in the system because of the costs involved in supply adjustments. The labor economics literature related to the topic of this dissertation is voluminous. Of the studies examining unemployment as the dependent variable in the analysis, a large number are concerned with determining which of two contending hypotheses provides the better explanation of observed unemployment in the past ten to fifteen years. The two hypotheses are the inadequate- aggregate demand hypothesis and the structural unemploy- 3 ment hypothesis. It is widely recognized that empiri- cal information on the relative importance of the two hypotheses is critical, particularly from the policy point of View.“ The present model is not explicitly constructed 3The former hypothesis expresses the macro view— point that unemployment rates throughout the labor force rise and fall with changes in the total demand for goods and services. The latter hypothesis is based on micro considerations. It states that "structural" changes have occurred in the economy which have resulted in sub- stantial changes in the composition of labor demand. Since workers are not instaneously mobile, unemployment has become concentrated in particular segments of the labor force while other segments enjoy a surplus of job Opportunities. “A widely quoted monograph supporting the inade- quate-demand hypothesis is that by James W. Knowles and to distinguish between the hypotheses; however, the demand side of the model does provide evidence as to the impact of changes in product demand on the occupational structure of labor demand. In developing the supply side of the model, exten- sive use is made of two well-developed bodies of liter- ature. These are the studies examining investment in human capital and the studies analyzing labor force participation rates. In the human capital literature, an individual's effort to increase his earning capacity is treated as an investment to raise the level of human 5 capital he possesses. As in the case of investment in Edward Kalachek, Higher Unemployment Rates,l957-l960: Structural Transformation or Inadequate Demand, Sub- committee on Economic Statistics of Joint Economic Committee, U. S. Congress (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961). Two brief statements of the views of Charles C. Killingsworth, the chief prOponent of the structural hypothesis, are found in Jack Stieber (ed.) "StruCtural Unemployment in the United States," Employment Problems of Automation and Advanced Techno- logy: A International Perspective TLondon: Macmillan and—Company, Ltd., 1966), pp. 128:156 and Garth L. Mangum (ed.) "Automation, Jobs, and Manpower: The Case for Structural Unemployment," The Manpower Revolution: Its Policy Consequences (Garden City, New York: Double- day & Company, 1965), pp. 97—117. 5Gary S. Becker was instrumental in laying out the theoretical framework upon which this literature developed. See his Human Capital (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 196A) and "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Policital Economy, LXX, Part 2 (Supplement: October, 1962), pp. 9-A9. In this Supplement, the contributions of Jacob Mincer, Larry A. Sjaastad, and George J. Stigler should also be noted. An additional fruitful application of capital theory to individual investment decisions is Yoram Ben-Porath, "The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earn- ings," Journal of Political Economy, LXXV, Part I (August, 1967). pp. 352-365. physical capital, investing in oneself yields a return, but only at a cost. Therefore, it is postulated than an individual will invest in himself up to the point at which the present value of additional earnings equals the additional costs. The studies of labor force participation attempt to isolate the variables which determine whether or not individuals will offer their services in the labor market.6 Of special relevance to this dissertation is Mincer's fundamental contribution examining the supply behavior of married women.7 In the past few years, a literature has begun to grow delving into the response of both employers and workers to changes in product and labor demand.8 Because 6Two fine surveys of this literature are: Jacob Mincer, "Labor-Force Participation and Unemployment: A Review of Recent Evidence," in R. A. Gordon and M. S. Gordon (eds.) Prosperity and Unemployment (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 73-112 and Anthony Fisher, "Poverty and Labor-Force Participation," Research Paper P-273, Economic and Political Studies Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, February, 1966. 7Jacob Mincer, "Labor Force Participation of Married Women: A Study of Labor Supply," Aspects of Labor Economics, Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 63-97. 8A survey of this literature is found in Charles C. Holt, "Job Search, Phillips' Wage Relation and Union Influence, Theory and Evidence," Firm and Market Workshop Paper 6705, Social Systems Research Institute, University of Wisconsin, December 1A, 1967. (Mimeographed.) Of particular use in this dissertation is the approach to analyzing the costs and returns to information search information cannot be obtained instantaneously or at zero cost, some lag in response almost always exists for both parties. In the development of the present model, the lag in labor supply is utilized to demonstrate the plausibility of an unemployment equilibrium situation. The hypothesis proposed is that individuals view a positive level of unemployment as the normal case rather than as a transitory phenomenon which can safely be ignored in making supply decisions. Consequently, they consider the relevant set of unemployment rates in eval- uating alternative occupations against each other. The import of this hypothesis is that the past levels and distributions of unemployment become crucial variables determining workers' supply decisions in the current period, so that past unemployment is an important determi- nant of the characteristics of the present structure of unemployment. The dissertation is organized in the following manner. In Chapter II the model is constructed. The labor demand function for members of an occupation by a firm is derived from the firm's production function, the developed by Armen A. Alchian in his yet unpublished paper "Information Costs and Unemployment" (Mimeographed) and in University Economics (co-authored with William R. Allen) (2d ed.; Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publish- ing Company, Inc., 1967), Chapter 25. Special reference should also be given the interesting application of Markov processes by Martin David and Toshiyuki Otsuki to the problem of predicting short-term movements between the states of employment, unemployment, and nonpartici- pation. See their "Forecasting Short-Run Variation in Labor Market Activity," Review of Economics and Statistics, XLX (February, 1968), pp. 68—771 definition of the profit function, and the profit- maximizing constraints. Aggregation is performed first over all firms in an industry and then over all rele- vant industries to arrive at the total demand function for a particular occupation. The supply function to an occupation is the out— come of a theory of short—run occupational choice. The theory is developed on the hypothesis that individuals behave as if they decide between occupations by compar- ing the present values of the time streams of adjusted expected wages in alternative occupations over a short- run earnings horizon. The adjusted expected wage in an occupation at any moment in time is the expected wage adjusted by the probability of employment at that moment. The expected unemployment rate enters the supply function as the determinant of the probability of employment in the occupation. Chapter III is divided into two sections. The first is a description of the data chosen to test the model. In the second, the model is condensed for statistical estimation, and the statistical techniques used are considered. Finally, Chapter IV contains a report of the empirical results and suggests some con- clusions that may be drawn from the study. CHAPTER II THE MODEL I. Introduction The model presented in this chapter is an attempt to explain short—run fluctuations in the occupational structure of unemployment. We proceed under the assump- tion that individuals and firms act so as to maximize utility and profits, respectively. However, supply and demand decisions in occupational markets must be made in an uncertain and rapidly changing environment. The effects of external events and shifts in consumer tastes result in changes in the level and composition of product demand. These changes are reflected in the demand for labor, and, after a lag, in the vector of wage offers. However, in- formation on wage rates in alternative occupations is not available to workers instantaneously or at zero cost. Nor is mobility costless after information is obtained. As information is collected, the market works toward equating supply and demand, but, in general, this process is not completed in a short-run period. Consequently, a positive level of unemployment can exist in every occupational 10 group. There is no need to place institutional or other constraints on wage flexibility to demonstrate the V existence of unemployment. Suppose we describe the occupational structure of unemployment at a particular moment in time by the following m-dimensional vector: (2.1) (U U ... U lt’ 2t’ ’ mt)’ where th (q=l,...,m) is the number of unemployed workers in the qth occupational group at time t. Each component of this vector is defined to be the difference between the quantity of labor supplied and the quantity demanded at a given wage rate. We denote the number of workers who are willing to supply their services in occupation q by tat and the number of members of occupation q demanded by d qt’ qt’ the unemployment vector at time t may be written: firms by A At a given wage w the qth component of " ”d (2.2) th = tat - tqt (q=l,...,m). Our approach is to construct supply and demand functions for the qth occupation at time t. Using (2.2) we are then able to solve for the level of unemployment in the occu- pation at a given wage. This chapter is divided into three sections. In Section II, static general equilibrium theory is utilized to construct a short-run demand function for workers in 11 the qth occupation. Section III is devoted to the develop- ment of the corresponding short-run supply function. These functions are expressed in terms of the vectors of expected wage and unemployment rates and the endogenous vector of industry output. Section IV contains hypotheses specifying how expectations are formulated and how the other endogenous variables are determined. To complete the system, a set of relationships is introduced to determine the vector of current wage rates. II. The Demand for Labor We begin the construction of the demand side of the model by deriving the short-run labor demand function for an individual firm. Then aggregation is performed over all firms in the industry and over all industries to ob- tain the total short—run demand function facing the mem— bers of the qth occupation. Each multi-product firm is viewed as a combination of two or more single-product firms. Furthermore, each single-product firm is assumed (l) to be perfectly competitive on both the product and the factor markets, and (2) to employ the same factors of production as the other firms producing the same product. An implication of these assumptions for the multi-product firm is that the level of output of any single product does not affect the output of its other products. We define an industry to be the number of single-product 12 firms producing a distinct product. The model is con- structed for a short-run situation in which there are m variable inputs (types of labor) and one fixed input (the stock of capital) in the economy. Consider the ith firm in the jth industry, i=l,...,nJ and j=l,...,M. The firm's demand for the qth labor input is derived from its production function, the definition of profit, and the profit—maximizing constraint. The following general production function is employed:1 (2.3) yij = fiJ(Al,...,£m,kJ) (i=l,...,nJ;j=l,...,M), where yiJ denotes the level of output, £l""’£m denote levels of the m variable (labor) inputs, and k denotes J the quantity of the fixed input capital in the jth in- dustry. The definition of expected total profit for the firm is (2.A) w* = a _ x s a 13 pjyij (wlfil + ... + wmim + w k ), k 3 where p3 is the expected market price of the jth product and (w§,...,w;,wfi) is the (m+l)—dimensiona1 expected input price vector facing the firm. Differentiating (2.A) 1Since the analysis in this and the following section is static, the time subscript on all variables is omitted to simplify the notation. l3 partially with respect to each variable input, setting the resulting equations equal to zero, and introducing a random disturbance term yields the following m profit- maximizing conditions: 3y *__£l.= * = (2.5) pjalq wq + eqij (q 1,. ,m) A rationale for the disturbance term (eqij) is that entrepreneurs modify their profit-maximizing input de- cisions in response to essentially random disturbances occurring outside the system which are not reflected in the eXpected wage and price parameters. With the m+2 equations of (2.3), (2.A), and (2.5) in the unknowns yij’flIj’zl""’£m’ we can solve for the levels of profit, output, and labor inputs in terms of the expected para- meters given to the firm. The profit-maximizing level of the qth labor input is ~ = * * * (2-6) £qij hqu(pJ:wls°'°swm3€qu)3 ~ where lqij is the number of members of occupation q which the firm desires to employ. To derive the labor demand function for the industry, we cannot simply sum the demand functions of the individual firms for the reason that the product price is not fixed to the industry. The industry product demand function is based on the results of individual consumer utility 1A maximization aggregated to the industry level. For our purposes, it is specified that the desired level of out- put of an industry is a function of the own expected price and the expected prices of all other products. Hence, the demand function for the jth product may be written (2.7) §, = gj (i=l,---,M), where §J is the desired level of output of industry j. We assume that the Jacobian of the system of functions designated in (2.7) exists and is nonsingular for the relevant intervals on the pJ's, that is, 5p1 5p2 5pM 3g2 3g2 3g2 # O apl¥ 3p2¥ O O O 3pM¥ O BgM BgM agM Appeal to the Inverse Function Theorem allows us to rewrite (2.7) as (2.9) p3 = hj(§l,...,§M) (j=l,...,M). 15 Substituting, the labor demand function of the jth in— dustry is I (2.10) 1 go I _ ~ ~ * * qj quEhJ(yl,...,yM),wl,...,wmeqj = a x ” " nqj(wl’°"’wm’y1"'°’yM’€qj)’ where A is the number of members of the qth occupation qJ which the firms in industry j desire to employ, and e qJ is the sum of the disturbances for the individual firms. The total demand function for the members of the qth occupation is obtained by summing over all the in- dustries employing members of this occupation. The total demand function is ~d M (2.11) A = Z n 3 q 3:1 q = Gq(w§’...’W;,yl,...,yM,Eq) (q=l,ooo’m), with the partial derivatives2 3G 8G. 3G (2.12) W3 < 0, WA > o (rat'q), 5-37—91 > o (j=l,...,M). .q r J, 2The sign of the partial derivative of G with re- spect to yJ is due to the assumption that 8G M 3G a~ a * __9 > 2 ~ 5:; _g_ ay i=1 8y p1 3y J #3 i 3 That is, the direct effect of a change in the quantity 16 III. The Supply of Labor In this section, the supply side of the model is developed from a theory of short-run occupational choice. Since it is a short-run model, we consider only the be- havior of individuals who are in a position to move be— tween occupations or between market and nonmarket activity within a short period of time. That is, we are interested in those individuals whose supply decisions have a shorte run impact on the occupational distribution of the labor force. Here, the labor force is defined as the total number of workers either employed or unemployed in an occupation. Unemployment in the short run comes about because the time period selected for analysis is frequently too short to allow an individual to both choose an occu- pation and choose a job within the occupation. In the first part of this section, the individuals whose supply behavior is relevant to a short-run model are identified, and then we supply a rationale for the in- clusion of current expected wages in the supply functions of these individuals. A. Expected Wage Rates as Apguments in the Labor Sppply Function It is first assumed that occupational groups may be ranked by the stock of human capital that must be demanded of product j on the demand for workers of the qth type exceeds the indirect effect appearing via substitute and complement relationships in the product markets of all other goods, even in the most extreme case. 17 possessed by a worker in order to enter the occupation. Secondly, it is assumed that an individual possessing a given stock of capital may enter any of the occupations (if such occupations exist) requiring a lower stock. Upward mobility, however, requires that he first invest in himself in order to increase his level of skills. Examples of pertinent investment in human capital are information gathering, education, migration, and on-the— job training. The costs of the investments described above may be separated into two components: (I) the direct costs of purchased goods and services, e.g., tools, tuition, moving costs, etc., and (2) the earnings foregone, that is, the present value of productive services withdrawn from another occupational group. The individual will in- vest in himself up to the point at which the present value of additional earnings from investing equals the present value of the additional costs. To acquire a higher level of skills for upward occupational mobility, an individual must normally under- take an investment over a long—run period. The direct and opportunity costs of this type of investment are large enough that in order to justify such investments the present value of prospective earnings over a long- run horizon (perhaps a lifetime horizon) must normally be considered. Because of the length of time required 18 to complete the necessary investment, we ignore upward mobility as a possible short-run supply adjustment. Therefore, the short—run sources of additional members to an occupation, say occupation q, are: (1) members of occupations which require higher levels of skills than does the qth occupation, and (2) workers currently outside the labor force (i.e., workers not currently members of any occupation) who possess at least the minimum level of skills to enter occupation q. For these individuals, the costs of investing in occupation q involve only the costs of collecting job information and moving costs. Since their investment costs are relatively minor, they are in a position to enter occupation q in response to favorable job conditions which may prove to be only "temporary." That is, these individuals may make their supply decision with respect to the qth occupation on the basis of the present value of expected returns in the occupation for a short-run earnings horizon. Over a short—run horizon, it is reasonable to assume that the current expected wage is a reliable measure of future expected wages. The work- leisure analysis of traditional wage theory provides a useful point of departure for developing a theory of short-run occupational choice. Suppose that the decision to work in the short-run is an all—or—nothing decision, meaning that an individual anticipates either working full time, say, eight hours 19 per day, or specializing in leisure, where leisure refers to all forms of nonmarket activity. Further, assume that an individual may be a member of only one occupation at any moment in time. In Figure l, we depict an individual's indifference map with income per unit of time on the vertical axis and leisure per unit of time on the horizontal axis. The distance OLm represents twenty-four hours per day of leisure and OLO represents sixteen hours per day of leisure. The level of income OY is the income received other than that O earned from supplying labor on the market, and Y Y is O T wage income. Points A and B are assumed to be the only alternatives available to the individual. Conceptually, it is possible to distinguish between the following two decisions for an individual: (1) whether to choose the qth occupation over all other relevant occupations; and if occupation q is selected, (2) the choice between this occupation and full-time leisure. He makes the first decision by picking out the set of occupations for which he is qualified, and from the corresponding set of eXpected wage rates selecting the highest. Suppose that the expected wage in the qth occupation is the highest. This expected wage is repre- sented in Figure l by the slope of the line segment BC. Any lower wage is represented by a line segment, such as BD, of slope less than BC in absolute value. 20 Y/ A Figure l.--The orthodox theory of work-leisure choice. The individual's second decision depends on whether the indifference curve passing through point A is higher than the indifference curve passing through point B. In Figure l, I2I2 exceeds IlIl so that the individual will supply his labor to the qth occupation. However, if the expected wage in occupation q should fall to a level lower than the wage rate represented by the slope of BD and still remain the highest of the set of available expected wage rates, the individual will choose to specialize in leisure. 21 The analysis depicted in Figure l is deficient in that attention to expected wage rates may not be sufficient to evaluate expected earnings in alternative occupations if conditions of less than full employment prevail. In the next part of this section it is argued that short- run unemployment arises because of the time involved in the adjustment process required to move from one occu- pation to another or to move into or out of the labor force. The essence of the argument is that the adjust— ment process may be carried out most efficiently while a worker is unemployed. Differences in demand conditions across occupations give rise to the occupational distri- bution of unemployment. The discussion is carried out in a framework of individuals' reservation prices. B. Incorporation of Short-Run Unemployment Into the Model5 The reservation price represents a worker's evalu— ation of his market alternatives. Consider an individual employed in an industry which suffers a decrease in pro- duct demand. Given that the labor supply function is 3Many of the important concepts in this discussion of reservation prices are developed in Alchian, "Infor- mation Costs and Unemployment" and in Alchian and Allen, University Economics, pp. A9A-509. Other papers dealing with the topic of job search are George J. Stigler, "Information in the Labor Market," Journal of Political Econom , LXX, Part 2 (Supplement: October, 1962), pp. 95-105; Albert Rees, "Information Networks in Labor Mar- kets," Proceedings of the American Economic Association, LVI6(May, 1966), pp. 559-5663 and Holt, op. cit., pp. 59- 5. 22 not perfectly elastic, he can be employed in this in- duStry only at a lower wage. Suppose, however, he feels that he has alternative employment opportunities in his occupation (or in occupations requiring a lower level of skills) at a higher wage than that now offered him. That is, his reservation price exceeds the wage his employer is offering. Rather than lowering his reser- vation price, we expect that he will make an effort to obtain information on job vacancies in other industries!4 Since this information is not available instantaneously, time is consumed in the search process. As the worker continues to search out information, he will acquire an ever larger sample of the wage offers being made by em- ployers. Finally, he will terminate the job search when the increment in earnings by which his best offer exceeds his next best offer suggests that the expected increment from further search is less than the cost of the addi- tional search.5 At this time he will adjust his reser- vation price if he concludes that an adjustment is neces- sary to secure employment. There is a limit to the length of the search process because the "law" of diminishing returns suggests that increments in earnings “The principles outlined here also apply to the case of a worker who revises his reservation price up- ward and quits his job even though he could continue to work at his previous wage rate. 5Alchian, 0p. cit., p. 12. 23 will begin to decline after some positive level of investment in search. The costs to be considered are the earnings foregone during the period of search, the direct costs of search (e.g., the costs of using the services of employment agencies and of traveling to job interviews), and the costs of moving. The individual in the above situation has the following short-run alternatives Open to him: (I) continue working at the reduced wage and engage in job search during leisure hours, (2) begin working in the highest—wage job immediately available and engage in job search during leisure hours, or (3) devote himself full time to searching for a job. Except in the unlikely situation that an immediately available job is a global optimum, the second alternative is more costly than the first because it involves two moves, whereas the other alternatives involve only one. The first move is to the immediately available job, while the second is to the job chosen at the end of the search period. Consequently, the second alternative will never be selected over the first unless the increment in earnings exceeds the addi- tional cost of an extra move. The third alternative would seem to be the highest cost in terms of foregone earnings, but because the un- employed worker specializes in job search, he can, in general, accumulate more information about wage offers 2A in a given period of time than an employed worker is able to acquire. Consider two workers who possess equivalent levels of skills. If the above proposition holds, the unemployed worker is able to make his choice from a set of alternatives and begin work some time be- fore the employed worker is in a position to choose among a comparable set of job offers. For this reason, it is likely to be the employed worker who is at a net disadvantage with respect to foregone earnings. If so, it would be completely rational for a worker to select unemployment as the best alternative state during his adjustment period.6 The fact that information is not available instantaneously or at zero cost implies, in this case, that a positive level of unemployment is con- sistent with optimal individual behavior. Thus, unem- ployment may be said to exist in short-run equilibrium where supply adjustments are a part of the unconstrained functioning of labor markets. However, unemployment is not consistent with long-run equilibrium which occurs only when all adjustments have been carried out. Returning to Figure 1, if a worker determines that his highest expected wage is less than the expected wage rate represented by the lepe of line segment BD after his period of search is completed, he will leave the 6The result that it is rational does not imply that unemployment is painless to the worker and his family. Indeed, every effort should be made to increase the flow of job information and hence shorten the period of ad- justment. 25 labor force and specialize in leisure, either investing in himself to upgrade his level of skills or devoting full time to home work. This expected wage may there- fore be defined to be the worker's reservation price for remaining in the labor force. The above analysis implies that except in the case where changes in product demand are always positive, there will exist a positive level of unemployment con- sistent with short-run equilibrium in any occupational market. The level of unemployment depends on the nature of fluctuations in product demand faced by the industries which employ the members of the occupation.7 The greater are the frequencies and magnitudes of the fluctuations, the larger is the number of workers placed in a position where they may choose to be unemployed during their ad- justment period rather than to accept a lower wage. Consequently, the level of unemployment in the occupation increases, even in the case in which the fluctuations average out to zero across industries. In the case of a downward shift in the entire vector of industry product demand, workers do not, in general, immediately recognize that the distribution of wage ovvers has shifted downward. This realization occurs only after they have collected a sufficiently large 7This discussion abstracts from the unemployment impact of changes in supply due to long-run forces such as changes in the demographic composition of the pOpu- lation. 26 sample to infer that the reason wage offers are lower than anticipated is a decrease in demand rather than simple bad luck. Hence, while the market eventually forces workers to adjust their reservation prices down- ward, the length of the average adjustment period in- creases so that the level of short-run unemployment is higher in each occupational group. To conclude the discussion of short-run unemploy- ~ment, the special cases of fixed proportions in pro- duction and downward rigid wages are incorporated into our theory. These are the two cases usually pointed out as the causes of unemployment. In a full-employment situation with fixed pro- portions, a shift in the composition of product demand results in an excess supply of the members of some occu— pations. The marginal product of these workers falls to zero so that there is no positive wage at which employers find it profitable to retain them on the payroll. Simi- larly, effective minimum wages remove the option for some workers of working at reduced wages in the face of a de- crease in demand. In periods of a general decrease in demand, effec- tive minimum wages and/or fixed proportions reduce the total number of positive wage offers that employers can make. Thus, an individual finds that he must increase his investment in search in order to obtain a given 27 sample of wage Offers. TO the extent that these con- straints on firm behavior are more significant in some occupational markets than in others, they serve to accentuate inter-occupational differences in unemploy- ment rates. Indeed, the least—skilled unemployed workers may find employment Opportunities entirely closed Off, with a consequent rise in hard-core unem- ployment. C. Expected Unemployment Rates as Arguments in the Labor Supply Function The analysis presented in Figure 1 does not take into account the existence of unemployment. The inclusion Of unemployment in the system means that occupational choice must be made under conditions of uncertainty. A particular job does not guarantee a certain time path of earnings, even over a short—run horizon. Consequently, the vector of expected wages is not the only factor in— volved in short—run decision making. The rational indi- vidual will also take into consideration the possibility that unforeseen changes in demand may occur which result in his unemployment. At each moment in time he will com- pare his current position (whether employed or not) with the information he has on the conditions existing in the occupations he is qualified to enter. Consider his evaluation at time t=tO on the assumption that if he selects a particular occupation he expects that he will 28 be a member of this occupation for at least the duration of his short-run earnings horizon, which we suppose to end at t=T. In what follows, a theory is developed in which the individual first chooses among occupations, taking into account the possibility that he may be un- employed for a period of time in any one of the occu- pations. Then he decides whether to enter or to remain in the occupation judged to be the best among those con— sidered. An individual belonging to a particular occu— pational group is either employed or unemployed in that group; hence, at any time t, his employment position in the occupation may be described by a binomial probability distribution. Moreover, it is expected that the proba- bility of employment in occupation q at a future moment in time for a worker currently employed in the occupation is not the same as the probability Of employment for a worker currently unemployed in the occupation. Suppose that an individual is employed in occupation Viewed at t q at time t the conditional probability 0' O’ Of being employed at the expected market wage in the qth occupation at time t (tO 0. Bug at The negative sign of the second of the two partial derivatives in (2.15) is rationalized as follows: the further in the future is t, the less certain is the indi- vidual that he will continue to be employed. On the other hand, the sign Of the second of the partial deriva- tives in (2.16) is positive because the individual may be more certain of finding a job the longer the period in which he engages in search. 30 At any time t, it is hypothesized that a worker adjusts the expected wage rate in occupation q, denoted by x3, by the conditional probability Of employment at t--either (2.13) or (2.1A) depending on the worker's current employment state. We define the adjusted ex- pected wage in occupation q at time t to be x3 times the conditional probability Of employment in occupation q at t. Thus, if a worker is employed in the qth occupation at time t the present value of the time path Of ad- 0’ justed expected wages in occupation q is given by T (2.17) pvq = {O[g(t,ua)-Xa]e i(t—to)dt 3 where the expression in brackets is the adjusted expected wage of an employed worker at time t, and i is the rate of interest. The interest rate is assumed constant during the short-run horizon. Conversely, the present value of adjusted expected earnings in occupation q as viewed by a worker currently unemployed in the occupation is T = , -i(t-t ) (2.18) qu I [h(t,ua) xale 0 dt. to Finally, the present value of adjusted expected earnings in occupation q evaluated by an unemployed individual outside the qth occupation is 31 T (2.19) PV = I [h(t,u*)-x*]e’i(t'to)dt - $[1-e‘i(t1’to)] q to q q 1 3 where c is the direct cost Of investment in occupation q at time t (toststl), and t1 is the end of the investment period. The individual's choice among the set of occu- pations available to him depends upon which one Offers the highest present value Of adjusted expected earnings net of any direct investment costs. Figure 2 presents two time paths of adjusted ex- pected earnings drawn for i; and E: which are assumed to be the current values Of the expected wage and the ex- pected unemployment rate, respectively, in occupation r, an alternative to occupation q. The function AA repre- sents the time path of adjusted expected earnings for a member Of occupation r employed at time to, while BB represents the time path for the same worker should he currently happen to be unemployed in the occupation. The vertical axis measures adjusted expected wages, denoted by A(x;), and time is measured on the horizontal axis. The second partial derivatives with respect to t of the conditional probabilities of employment (2.13) and (2.1A) are not specified so that the time paths AA and BB could be re-drawn in several alternative ways consistent with E; and 5; so long as the SIOpes of the functions are negative and positive, respectively, in the interval 32 (tO,T].8 However, the partial derivatives with respect1 to us in (2.15) and (2.16) imply that for any fig>fi¥, each time path would shift such that every point on the new function is lower than the corresponding point on the old function for any t (tOt T t 0 Figure 2.——Time paths of adjusted expected wages of an employed and an unemployed worker in the rth occu- pation. 8The particular time paths depicted in Figure 2 are drawn on the assumption that at any time t, a cur- rently employed worker never evaluates the probability Of retaining his job to be less than the probability he would assign to Obtaining employment were he currently unemployed. A further assumption that might be made is that in either case the worker views his probability Of employment to be asymptotic to (l-u*). On this assumption, the_timg paths AA and BB would be dann asymptotic to (l-u;)-x;. 33 As mentioned previously, the sources of short—run change in the relative quantities of labor supplied to occupations are (1) members of higher occupational groups who switch to lower occupations, and (2) individuals who move into and out of the labor force. We examine first the considerations relevant to a worker deciding between occupations. Figure 3 illustrates the position of a member Of occupation r, either employed or unemployed, who is Figure 3.——Time path Of adjusted expected wages in occupation q as viewed by a member of occupation r. considering the possibility of entering occupation q. For this worker, one may conceptually distinguish the process Of selecting an occupation on the basis of general information on wage and employment conditions from the process of selecting a particular job within 3A the chosen occupation. In the figure, it is assumed that the time required to complete investments in infor- mation and/or geographical mobility in selecting occu- pation q is the interval [t0,tl]. The direct cost of these investments charged against expected earnings in the occupation is shown by the rectangle (chtotl). In addition, further investment in job search may be necessary to sample the industry wage Offers being made to members of the occupation. If this investment has a direct cost, the net expected wage in occupation q is negative for an additional time period, say (t1,t 2). For tat however, the individual can anticipate a 2: positive adjusted expected wage. A portion of total short—run unemployment in an occupation therefore arises because the time interval considered is long enough to allow a worker to select an occupation, but it is too short for him to search out the best available job. The Opportunity cost Of investing to enter occu- pation q is the present value of the time path of ad- justed expected earnings in occupation r--either AA or BB in Figure 2. But it is unlikely that a worker who is dissatisfied with his present job in occupation r can Obtain the information necessary to locate the best job in an alternative occupation with instant search or while working at the old job to avoid unemployment. Hence, the time path AA in Figure 2, the present value 35 Of which is calculated by (2.17), does not represent the relevant Opportunity cost of investment in occupation q for most individuals. In what follows, we consider explicitly only the case of workers who are unemployed for some positive period of time. The decision between any two occupations is therefore made by comparing pre- sent values calculated by (2.18) and (2.19). It is reasonable to assume that an individual's utility function includes the following arguments: the rate of consumption Of goods and services, the rate of consumption of leisure, and tastes for particular occu- pations. Define the total present value of expected earnings in an occupation (TPV) to be the sum of the pre- sent value of expected nonwage earnings (PVO), which is assumed to be invarient between occupations, and the present value Of adjusted expected earnings from working in the occupation (PV). Then in the two-occupation case, the utility function may be rewritten in the arguments TPVq, TPVr, and leisure, since tastes for occupations exist. Each argument may be measured on one axis of a three-dimensional diagram. Assume, as in Figure 1, that an individual anticipates working either eight hours per day or not at all during his short-run horizon, and that he works in either occupation but not in both. To choose between the occupations, he will select the one which puts him on the higher indifference curve at a level Of 36 leisure equal to sixteen hours per day. This will neces- sarily be a corner solution. Suppose that occupation q is preferred to occupation r. The indifference curves presented in Figure A are slices of the three-dimensional indifference map at TPVr = PV As in Figure l, the distance OLm represents 0' twenty-four hours per day Of leisure and OL represents 0 sixteen hours per day Of leisure. The vertical axis measures TPVq; the distance OPVO is the present value of expected nonwage earnings, while OPVq—OPVO is the present value of adjusted expected earnings in occupation q. Given the assumptions stated above, points E and H TPV PV PV >L/t Figure A.-—Work-1eisure choice incorporating the possibility of unemployment in an occupation. 37 are the only possible solutions. Since point H lies on a higher indifference curve than does point B, market labor in occupation q is preferred to specialization in leisure. The higher is PVq, in general, the more likely an individual is to enter the qth occupation rather than to devote full-time to leisure. In this way, the level of PVq enters an individual's supply Of labor function to occupation q by determining the choice between this occu- pation and others, and, if occupation q is selected, it also determines the choice between the occupation and full-time leisure. Now suppose that the ith individual Obtains wage and unemployment information for mi alternative occu- pations (mism), including the qth occupation. Then the following mi-dimensional vector is included as an argu- ment in his supply function to the qth occupation: (2.20) (PV .,PVm ). ,.. l 1 To simplify further, the following assumptions are made: (1) the direct costs of investment are a minor consider- ation in inter-occupational mobility; (2) the discount rate applied to the time streams Of adjusted expected earnings is the same for all occupations; and (3) an unemployed worker assigns the same conditional proba- bility distribution to all occupations, so that if ua=u;, the worker views the probability Of being 38 employed in occupation q at time t to be the same as in occupation r. Under this set Of assumptions, (2.20) may be rewritten as (2.21) (x§,...,x;i,u§,...,u;i). It is mathematically equivalent to express this vector in the following manner: x* Xx * u* (2.22) (fin-~56} ,xgm WES ,ua). 1 mi 1 mi Up till now, no attention has been given to how the level Of nonwage earnings is determined. Clearly, a number of variables are involved including the level of nonhuman wealth an individual possesses. In what follows, we continue to ignore the effect of fluctuations in non- wage income except for the important special case of "secondary workers," i.e., males younger than 25 years and Older than 5A years of age and all females. Exactly the same principles of occupational choice outlined above apply in this case, except that one additional feature-- the level Of nonwage earnings—-is given explicit consider- ation. Most secondary workers are assured Of a positive level of nonmarket income simply by virtue Of being a family member and supplying their services within the 39 family.9 This is true except during periods in which the "primary" wage earner is unemployed. Therefore, the present value of expected nonwage earnings of a secondary worker over his short-run horizon depends on the expected employment position of the primary wage earner during this interval. It is assumed that the expected employment position is an inverse function of the current unemployment rate of married males, up. In terms of Figure A, an increase in up is shown by a de- crease in the distance OPVO, and, hence, a downward movement Of point E on the vertical line drawn perpendi- cular to the leisure axis at OLm. The higher is up, the more likely it is that there will exist a wage Offer which has a present value that exceeds the secondary worker's reservation price for market labor.10 The ith individual's supply function to the qth occupation may now be written as 9The inclusion Of family income in the labor supply functions Of married women, the major component of total secondary workers, is theoretically and empirically treated in Mincer, "Labor Force Participation of Married Women: A Study Of Labor Supply," pp. 63—97. lOThis type of supply behavior is referred to in the literature as the "additional worker" hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, as the level Of economic activity falls, labor force participation increases as secondary workers enter the market in an attempt to Offset the loss Of income by primary wage earners. AO X* X* u* u* = * (2.23) lqi fqi(xls'°°s§%iaxqsfi%a°° Wagg’: qu) where nqi is a random disturbance term reflecting the short—run impact Of random nonmarket variables on the individual's labor market behavior. Equation (2.23) is not an individual supply function in the usual sense Of a worker supplying his services in a particular occupation if the expected wage rate exceeds his reservation price for entering the occupation. Instead, joint consideration is given the expected unemployment rate in the occupation. Viewed in this manner, the equation is correctly labeled a "probabilistic" supply function since it is the ex- pected wage rate adjusted by the probability of employ— ment through time in each occupation that is the crucial variable to the individual. A worker either supplies his services to the qth occupation or he does not. Hence, equation (2.23) may =1 if the worker qi enters occupation q, and fiqi=0 if he does not. Aggre— gating across individuals, the probabilistic supply be regarded as a step function where A function to the qth occupation takes the following form: ~ x* x* u* u* S (2.2“) Qq = Hq(xl,...,-X%,Xa,ul’oo.’-‘lfi’ué’up’nq) (q=l,ooo,m), ' m m Al where I: is the number of workers who are willing to supply their services in the qth occupation, and nq is the sum Of the individual disturbances.ll If we assume that equation (2.2A) is a continuously differentiable function, the partial derivatives are assumed to have the following signs: 8H OH > O (isq); 53%> 0; u q 3 a? i (2.25) < 0; Q) 0) 9:4...“ == 8H 3H . __3 THU? < 0’ Eu > 0' q p The vector Of expected wage rates and the variable up are representative of arguments similar to those fre- quently found in ordinary supply functions. The test of the probabilistic supply function specified here is whether or not the vector of expected unemployment rate variables is significant in the empirical analysis of the model. llThe aggregation process used to Obtain (2.2A) involves the assumption that all individuals' short-run time horizons are approximately the same length. In addition, the aggregation assumes that each individual calculates the present value of adjusted expected earn- ings using the same discount rate. This would be the case if all individuals could borrow and lend in the capital market at the same rate of interest. A2 IV. The Complete Model In this section, the model is formulated in terms of distinct time periods so that it is readily amenable to empirical testing using discrete data. The variables in the model are now defined as follows: ~d iqt number of members of occupation q which firms desire to employ at the beginning of period t; number Of positions filled by individual members of occupation q in period t; number Of workers who desire to provide their services in occupation q at the be- ginning Of period t; number Of members Of the qth occupation employed in period t; number of unemployed members of occupation q in period t; wage which firms expect to pay members of occupation q at the beginning of period t; wage expected in occupation q by labor suppliers at the beginning of period t; market wage in the qth occupation in period t; expected unemployment rate in occupation q at the beginning Of period t; A3 C I pt - unemployment rate of married males in period t; and §jt desired level of output Of industry j at the beginning Of period t. The model develOped thus far for the qth occu- pational group consists Of the following system of equations for period t: ~d = x * ~ ~ (2.26) gqt Gq(wlt"°"wmt’ylt"’°’yMt’€qt) I p X*t X*t "*t u*t S = * x (2.27) qt Hq(§%"°"§%€’xqt’fi%€""’ng’uqt’upt’nqt) (2.28) Uq III p I A Q N H U U 3 v V _ ~s . where uqt - th/th' Equation (2.26) is the market demand function, equation (2.27) is the market supply function, and (2.28) is a definitional equation. The relationships between 2d and Ad and between is and As are the qt qt qt qt following: , ~s ~d . (i) If th > gqt (i.e., th>0), then ”d _ d ~s s _ qt - £qt and gqt - zqt th. ~s ~d (ii) If zqt < th (i.e., th<0), then is = 1 and A - 1d — U AA It is clear that zit a sat. In Part A of this section, a set of equations determining the desired vector Of industry output is specified. Then in Parts B and C, expectations mechan- isms-are formulated for the vectors Of expected wage and unemployment rates. A set Of equations determining the current wage vector is described in Part D. In the final part of the section, Part E, the complete model is drawn together. A. Determination Of the Desired Vector of Industry Output The firm simultaneously determines its desired rate of output and its desired level Of employment; therefore, a set Of equations determining the desired output vector must be developed. For our purposes, a very simple out- put determination model is specified. However, it is recognized that a more detailed treatment of this problem might be desirable. Because the firm must Operate under conditions Of uncertainty, we assume that it utilizes a bit of infor- mation it does possess, namely, last period's sales, to determine its desired output level. At the beginning of period t, this assumption may be written as (2.29) yth = fij(sijt-l) (i=l,...,nj;j=l,...,M), A5 where Sijt—l is the sales volume Of the ith firm in the jth industry in period t-l. Assuming a fixed composition Of the industry, the desired level Of output for industry j at the beginning of period t is (2.30) th = fj(sjt_1). where s. is the sales Of industry j in period t-l. jt—l B. Determination of Firm and Worker Expectations Of Wage Rates Firm Expectations.—-Given a change in the level or composition of product demand, there are two cases to be considered from the point of view of firms in the jth industry. First, suppose that the demand for the "own" product increases. Each firm in the industry now finds it desirable to increase output, and, consequently, ex— pand its labor force in order to maximize profits. One alternative facing firms which find it necessary to attract additional workers is to increase their wage offers.12 Hence, a change in the wages offered in industry j may be assumed to be a function of the change in the demand for the product produced by the industry. Now suppose that the product demand facing the jth industry is constant or declining, but other industries 12Examples of nonwage alternatives are increasing expenditures on search, revising productivity standards downward, upgrading existing employees, and expanding on-the-job training programs. A6 are enjoying an increase in demand. It is likely that some Of these industries employ members Of the same occupations as are employed in industry j, or that some other "spill—over" relationship exists between the wages paid in these industries and in industry j. If so, the firms in industry j may find that they have to raise the wages paid to workers they desire to keep on their pay- rolls in order to match wage offers made by industries in more favorable demand situations. Consequently, the wages Offered in industry j are not only a function Of the "own" change in product demand, but they are also a function of the changes in product demand facing other industries. An increase in demand for the product produced by an industry is observable in a decrease in inventories and/or an increase in product price. The volume of sales Of an industry is measured in nominal terms. Thus, a positive change in sales may measure either the drawing down Of inventories, i.e., an increase in the physical quantity of output sold, or an increase in the price at which each unit Of the product is sold. Both situations indicate to the profit-maizimzing firm that a larger level of output, and, hence, a larger labor force, would be desirable. Using sales as a proxy for industry demand, we specify that the wage firms in industry j expect to pay the members of occupation q at the beginning of period t is A7 * = (2.31) wqjt wqjt_l + qu(Aslt_l,...,AsMJt_l), where wqjt—l = wage paid by firms in the jth industry to members Of occupation q in period t-l; M3 = number of industries whose sales affect the wage paid by firms in the jth industry to members of the qth occupation, léngj; th_l = sales Of industry j in period t-l; and ASjt-i = Sjt-l ‘ Sjt-2' Assuming a given industry composition Of the economy, aggregation across all industries yields: (2.32) wét = wqt-l + gq(Aslt—l’°"’ASMt-l) (q=1,...,m). In this equation, the variable wét an average of the distribution Of industry expected wage may be interpreted as rates and wqt-l as an average of industry wages paid in the last period. Worker Expectations.--Turning to the supply side Of the model, it is simply assumed that workers set their reservation prices equal to the wage they last earned in the occupation of their choice. They have every reason to believe that at this wage they were receiving the value of their marginal product. Hence, they believe that other employers will be willing to Offer them the same wage. This expectation is justified except in a A8 situation Of a general decrease in demand. In this case, the worker perceives the necessity of reducing his reservation price only after he has invested the time to obtain information on his alternative employ- l3 ment Opportunities. As a short-run first approxi- mation, it is assumed that workers expect the wage structure existing last period to carry over into the * = = current period, that is, xqt wqt—l (q l,...,m). C. Determination of the Vector Of Expected Unemplpyment Rates It is hypothesized that at the beginning Of period t, an individual adjusts his expectation of the unemploy- ment rate in the qth occupation in proportion to the discrepancy in the previous period between the market determined unemployment rate (u ) and the rate he qt-l expected to exist at the beginning of the period (uét-l) In addition, we assume that the ratio Of the expected unemployment rate in occupation q to each Of the expected unemployment rates in the other m-l occupations is 13In his study of unemployed Minnesota workers, Hirschel Kasper found that for each month Of unemployment, workers were willing to reduce their reservation prices by only 0.3 per cent. In fact, Kasper suggests that workers who have been unemployed less than six months Often have reservation prices which exceed their former wages. "The Asking Price of Labor and the Duration Of Unemployment," Review Of Economics and Statistics, XLVIV (May, 1967), pp. 165—172. For a summary of this and other studies Of the time path Of reservation prices see Holt, Op. cit., pp. 59-65. A9 determined in the same manner. This hypothesis may be written as (2.33) uat - uat-l = (1 _ dq)(uqt-l _ uat_1)’ and 11* 11* u 11* (2.3A) 3;"; - 1jgizzl ... (1_ 5) ugt-l _ uqt-l it it-l q it-l It-1 (i=l,...,m;i#q), where 0<6q qm umt-l ( q) qm+luqt-l + e u 0 e u + n 0 n . q pt q q t 1 qt q qt-l (2.50) wqt — wqt-l = kq(th - th_l) _ d (2.51) th = tat - Aqt (q=1,...,m). Equations (2.A8) and (2.A9) are already in reduced form. Eliminating the identities, the system Of equations may be written in matrix form as follows: (2.52) fl = K (q=1,...,m), where B -_q and AH: |>< I eqt = pqeqt—l qt’ where the aqt's are normally and independently distri- buted, each with zero mean and common variance 03d, 68 2 that is, NID(0,0qd). Similarly, we assume that nqt satisfies the first-order autoregressive process (308) nqt = gqnqt_l + "qt, where the n 's are NID(0,O2 ) qt qS One method Of consolidating the wage vector in equation (3.5) is to retain the own wage and construct a weighted average Of the other five wage rates. The Optimal weighting scheme would employ as weights the marginal rates of technical substitution between the members of one occupation and the members of each Of the other occupations. However, in the absence Of information on the marginal rates Of technical substi— tution between the broad occupational groups employed here, it is assumed that I: is a function only Of the own wage rate in the wage vector, i.e., a =0 (i#q) in qi equation (3.5)- Suppose that the components Of the sales vector are numbered in the following order: construction, 1; durable good manufacturing, 2; nondurable good manu- facturing, 3; wholesale trade, A; retail trade, 5; and services, 6. The number of arguments in the labor demand function can also be reduced by constructing‘ summary measures of the sales and change in sales vectors. Note, however, that the sales variable for the construction sector is in different units than the sales variables for 69 the other industries; hence, it cannot be included in a summary measure. Assume that R A = _AEE = .932 (3'9) bq2 B U) are a) a)m E E H h 03-! S—I 0‘4 U30) 4-) 0.) H0) (00) HQ) 4-354 CU $4 ex ex >x mo L4 O 01p PIP p a mun a) Q PIC m o O o A O. w 0:?- C03 U13 0023 O Q Alternative 2 l 6 5 6 3 Occupations 3 3 6 3 6 6 3 With respect to the supply equation for craftsmen and foremen, one further assumption will be made. The variable upt is included in the model because the supply decisions Of secondary workers hinge on the employment state of the primary wage earner in the family. In view of the component occupations of craftsmen and foremen and the fact that most Of these workers are males, it 72 seems likely that the vast majority Of the members of this occupation are primary wage earners. Hence, the variable upt will be excluded from this equation. Consider now any one of the six supply equations, for example, the equation for laborers which is written as follows: ~ ~ W s _ s 6t-l (3.12) A6t - (1-06)c6O + 56£6t—l + 063 A w3t—1 O 6t-2 A A ‘ 56063 g + C67W6t_1 ‘ 56067W6t—2 3t-2 + d (l 5 ) u6t"l + d [(1 5 ) J 63 ‘ 6 63t_l 67 ’ 6 u6t—1 + e6upt ‘ 66e6upt—1 + n6t ' 56A6t—1' ~s _ Note that u6t—l is a component Of £6t-l by the construc- tion Of the latter variable (see (3.1)). Consequently, in what follows, the own lagged unemployment rate is omitted from each supply equation. The effect of this omission on the estimated coefficients of the unemploy- ment rate Of married males is discussed in Chapter IV. As is usual in distributed lag models, equation (3.12) is overidentified with respect to certain para- meters. For example, an estimate of 56 may be Obtained from an estimate of the coefficient of QEt-ls however, 73 yet another estimate Of 56 may be Obtained from estimates of the coefficients Of w6t-l/w3t-l and w6t-2/w3t-2' These two estimates will not, in general, be the same. In particular, the coefficients of w6t-2/w3t—2’ w6t-2’ are nonlinear in the parameters /u and u u6t-1 3t-l’ pt-1 of the model. To estimate the parameters of this equation, nonlinear restrictions must be placed on each of these four coefficients (d67=0 by assumption). Following Zellner g£_al., a nonlinear estimation techni- que that could be applied is the Gaushaus method.10 An alternative nonlinear technique, which we shall employ, is described most easily by first rewriting (3.12) as ~ ~ w s s _ 6t-l (3.13) £6t — 6626t“l - (1-66)C60 + C63 A w3t-1 lw6t-2 A A ‘ 56 Q + 067(W6t-l-56w6t-2) I 3.-. (u 6t-1 + d (1—5 ) 63[ 6 u3t_1U + 86(upt-66upt-1) + n6t ‘ 66"6t-1' 10A. Zellner, D. S. Huang, and L. C. Chau, "Further Analysis Of the Short-Run Consumption Function with Emphasis on the Role of Liquid Assets," Econometrica, Vol. 33 (July, 1965),-pp. 571-581. 7A Equations (3.11) and (3.13) are now expressed in a form such that unique parameter estimates Of both equations may be Obtained by single—equation application of ordi- nary least squares (OLS) for selected values of the parameters pq and éq, where 0mfi pcmo Loo OH may pm opmm 50pm osmpmgwflo hflpcmOHmficmeo .Hm>ma pcmo pod m on» pm opmm 509% pcmpmoMHo meQmOHchmHm Q .Ho>ma pcoo Loo H map pm opmm Eogm osmpommflo mflpcmOHchwfimm .mpmoplp ooafimplozp ohm mpmmp Ham paw mpcmfloflgmmoo opp ZOHmD mommzpcmhma Cw pmmoam mpopho opmocmpmx Ammo.ov Amwmv Aomsv Ammm.fiav Ammv memo.o mm.o 5oz- mmm :ss.mfiu mama mumpopmq Aaao.ov Amaa.mmv Ammm.mav “moo.mmv Ammmv mmma.o mm.o m:o.oan mzmm.mw mm:.m mmms.m mm>flpmcmao Aaao.ov Azmmv Ammav “mam.mv Ammav swampom a mmma.o no.0 mmHH.H- mamm.a mm: momm.m cmempoato Ammo.ov Amma.fiv Azmm.av Amma.mmo game mtmxpoz msmo.o mm.o :Hm.H- mmoq.m om:a.mm mmm: moa>pmm Ammo.ov Ammqv Aoozv Azam.fiav AHOHV mcmxpoz momfi.o mm.o mmm scam mam. . mmfie mmflmm Ammo.ov Aozm.mv Ammm.:v “cam.mmv Ammav mp@&toz mmoa.o mw.o ooma.mu mmom.mm mmm.m mmmw HmOHcmHo mm Ga ANIwaV Aslwaxv Annmaxv .pmcoo COHpmasooo ,. a m *.Aa.zv CH oofimHoon meowpwzom ocmEmo who CH mcfipmoadm mtmmemcma so mmpasapmm moo-n.m momaw 81 equations and 0.8 in the other four indicates that posi- tive autocorrelation exists in the eqt's (q=1,...,6). In addition, each estimate of pq is significant. The Durbin-Watson statistiasfbr the disturbances e -p 8 qt q qt-l (q=1,...,6) range from 1.91 to 2.50. This range is well above the tabulated upper bound for the sample size and number of explanatory variables. Hence, we do not re— ject the hypothesis of random disturbances when a first— “4‘ “‘9 _-..- 2 order autoregressive process is assumed. For the set of OLS estimates of pq and Sq, the Zellner procedure described in Chapter III was then applied to the twelve equation system.3 These Aitken 1-8 2 S; = J— ’ pq n where n is the sample size. This formula was derived by Professor J. Kmenta. 2The Durbin—Watson test is derived for the case of nonstochastic regressors; consequently, if the lagged dependent variable Rat—l were considered a predetermined variable whose coeffgcient is to be estimated, the con— ditions required for use of the Durbin-Watson test would not be met. However, all the regressors in (4.1) are nonstochastic so that the Durbin-Watson test is appropriate. 3The OLS estimates of 6 (q=1,...,6) are obtained in exactly the same way as the estimates of p . They are discussed in Part B of this section. q 82 estimates of the demand equations are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of multiple determination were not calcu— lated for this procedure. The coefficient estimates obtained by OLS and the Aitken procedure differ because the data in the sample are given identical weights equal to unity in the OLS estimator; whereas, the elements of the inverse of the variance—covariance matrix are utilized as weights in the Aitken estimator. As anticipated, the standard errors reported for the Aitken procedure in Table 3 are uniformly lower than the corresponding standard errors reported in Table 2. This is also the case for the standard errors estimated for the coefficients of the supply equations (see Tables u and 5). In general, the gain in efficiency obtained by using Zellner's technique is a maximum for a given level of correlation between contemporaneous disturbances if the explanatory variables in different equations are un- correlated. This is clearly not the case in the system of equations presented here, particularly in that five of the six supply equations contain the variable up. However, it is also clear that we obtain a significant gain in efficiency by using the Aitken estimator. Turning to the coefficient estimates, the estimates of the constant terms obtained by both estimation lmf. I 3 L. 83 .Ho>oa osmo pod OH who pm ohmm Eosm ocopmmmflo zapcwofiMflcmeo .Ho>mH pcmo pod m who pm opmN Sosa pcmhmmmfio mapcmofimficwfim Q .Hm>ma pcmo pod H onp pm opmm Eopm pcopmmwfio meQmOHchmem .mpmmunp ooafimpuozp ohm mpmmp Ham ocm mpcmHOfiwmmoo mg» soamp mommgpcmzmd cfl zmoddm whoppm osmocmpm* Ammo.ov Ammzv Aomzv Amma.av Ammo mw.o was: mmam.a mmo.m| mozm whopoowq Aaao.ov Amflo.afiv Amm:.mv Amsm.aav Aommvr «0.0 mmH.HHu mmmz.mm mam.ma- azao.m mmsfipmcmao Asso.ov Aomfiv Ammav Aaqs.:v Ammo swamtom a mm.o mammn mmmwaa 0:0.H mmmm.m cosmpmmpo Ammo.ov mamas Ammo.av Aoam.mav Ammo mtmxcoz mm.o owmm.fil mamm.: mwmm.mm mmom oofl>pmm Aaoo.ov Ammav “sass Amoo.mv gems mutate; mm.o float wmow Hum: mmow moamm Ammo.ov Amm:.mv Aqom.mv Amsm.aflv Amaav mtmxtoz mm.o mwms.oa- ama:.mm om:.am «mam amoutmao A -OHXV A -OHXV A -onv Ga 5 U N U m U .pmsoo coaquSooo . m m m *.AH. v CH omfimfloodm mcofipmsom ocmEmo onp CH wcfipmo m gm mpsmHOHoumoo no mmpmsflpmm :mxpfl<--.m mamas 84 techniques are uniformly positive and highly significant. The lagged indices of industry sales (Eét_l) also per- formed very strongly. Each of the estimated coefficients of sét_l is positive as expected, and five of the six OLS estimates and all of the Aitken estimates are signifi— cantly different from zero. The lagged change in sales index (As ) was intro— qt—l duced into the model as part of the hypothesis determining the wage rates expected by employers. The hypothesis states that the greater is AEét_l, expected to exist in occupation q in period t. Thus, it the higher is the wage is anticipated that the coefficients attached to the change in sales indices will be negative because the number of workers desired by firms is specified to be inversely related to the expected wage rate. This is the case for five of the six OLS estimates and for each Aitken estimate. Two of the OLS estimates and three of the Aitken estimates are significantly different from zero. More of the estimated coefficients might be ex— pected to be significant except that variation in Asét_l very likely has a direct impact on the demand for labor which partially offsets the indirect effect appearing via the expected wage. The performance of the lagged real wage variables is somewhat disappointing in that only two of the OLS coefficient estimates and three of the Aitken estimates 85 have the anticipated sign. Both the OLS and Aitken esti— mates of a3 are positive and significant, while the only negative estimate approaching significance is the OLS estimate of a6. Part of the lack of significance of the lagged wage variables may be traced to the high correlation be— tween the wage and sales indices. The existence of multi— collinearity suggests that reliable estimates of the ef— fect of changes in wage rates are not obtainable without utilizing some prior information about the relationship between the wage and sales variables. B. The Supply Results The OLS estimates of the parameters of the six supply equations, along with the corresponding standard errors and R2's, are reported in Table u. Table 5 con- tains the coefficient estimates calculated using the two- step Aitken procedure. In all six supply equations, we assume that the expectations coefficient éq equals the parameter Sq in a first—order autoregressive process. The parameter Eq is successively assigned the values 0.1,0.2,...,0.9 in each equation; the estimates reported in Table 4 minimize the sum of squares of OLS residuals. Again, there is signifi- cant positive autocorrelation among the nqt's with E (=8q) equaling 0.9 in four equations and 0.8 and 0.6 q in the remaining two equations. 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