LOCAL POLICY CHOICES AND PARTY CONTROL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION AMONG FRENCH URBAN COMMUNES

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ABSTRACT

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Most hypotheses describing the relationships between political variables and policy have been formulated with little regard as to the historical characteristics of the political systems under scrutiny. This dissertation, in testing for the effects of party control on French local Social Welfare policy, attempts to explain such relationships in the context of the political institutionalization process which in the case of France, features a close correspondence between social and political cleavages and the local entrenchment of political parties.

The testing uses two samples of French cities, one of which encompasses 36 cities of the Paris Basin where the Communist Party has developed such local power that the area has often been called the Paris Red Belt. The other sample includes nine cities from the Lyon urban area, as well as some outlying Parisian suburbs.

The study compares the effects of political variables on redistributive policies such as Welfare with policies such as Education and Total Expenditures for the year 1963. The political variables are descriptive of the size of the Left parties (Socialist and Communist) representation, as well as of the size of the Communist Party alone. The analysis can be said to stand out from other previous efforts in that the spuriousness tests are structured so as to control for the

size of taxable resource levels on one hand and service need on the other. This was possible because one of the need indicators, personal income, was not highly correlated with taxable resources in the chosen samples (industrial cities with high tax base and poor populations). Suppressor effects were detected in that controlling for personal income highlighted the true impact of resource levels.

The results confirmed income as a need indicator in that it was negatively related to all three policy areas. The basic hypothesis was confirmed in that party control had a very powerful effect on Social Welfare in the Paris Basin sample and a still significant effect in the provincial cities sample. In Paris, party control effects on Education and Total Spending were diminished considerably (often to the point of insignificance because of collinear interactions), but in the provinces no relationship existed to begin with. Educational Spending in Parisian cities was seemingly determined equally by the preference of people in rich communities for private education, as well as by the budgetary commitment of Communist municipalities.

Among other findings was the apparent ability of Left administrations to qualify for more central grants-in-aid than their need indicated. The presence of Socialists on city councils was found to result in even greater increases in Social Welfare expenditures in Paris while in the provinces, their presence was a moderating influence. This was a by-product of divergent political strategies after the introduction in 1959 of the Two Ballot Electoral System, and the more consensual culture of the provinces.

Voter turnout was found to have no effect on policies and grants-in-aid were equally weak determinants in both samples. Finally, a

minor policy area, Business Taxation (symbolic of class conflict), was adequately explained by the same determinants used in explaining Social Welfare (also in both samples).

In comparing these findings to similar efforts conducted in Europe, the author concluded that sharp discontinuities in resources and industrialization levels between the units of analysis must somehow be accounted for by the methodology used (i.e., sampling or dummy variables) if meaningful findings are to result.

This conclusion emerged as the author observed that such discontinuities seemed to account for the divergent findings between the two samples.

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To Jenny and Nick

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the Study

A study of policy choices implies that policies are dependent variables to be explained by a host of independent variables,[1] one subset of which can be so-called political variables such as: inter-party competition, party control and voter turnout.[2] Initial results from research on the expenditures of American states and localities

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[1] Studies structured in this way include Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics, 25 (May, 1963), pp. 265-289; Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Rand McNally, 1966); Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," American Political Science Review, 60 (March, 1966), pp. 73-82. For similar research on city policy, see John H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities," American Political Science Review, 56 (September, 1962), pp. 615-620; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics, 29 (1967), pp. 94-108. Similarly structured were studies of the economics of public policy; see John F. Due, Government Finance: Economics of the Public Sector, 4th Ed. (Irwin, 1968) and more specifically Julius Margolis, "The Demand for Urban Public Services," in Harvey S. Perloff and Lowdon Wingo, Jr. (eds.) Issues in Urban Economics (Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 548-552.

[2] Dawson and Robinson, op. cit.; Dye, op. cit. See also Otto A. Davis and George H. Haines, "A Political Approach to a Theory of Public Expenditure: The Case of Municipalities," National Tax Journal, Vol. 19 (September, 1966), pp. 259-275; and William C. Birdsall, "A Study of the Demand for Public Goods," in Richard A. Musgrave (ed.) Essays in Fiscal Federalism (Brookings, 1965), pp. 235-294, for a different conceptualization of "political" variables.

have shown such variables to have little, if any, independent effect when that of socioeconomic variables has been controlled.[3]

Interpretations of such findings[4] have often revolved around the "End of Ideology" debate[5] which has had its counterpart in Europe

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[3]Dawson and Robinson, op. cit.; Dye, op. cit.; Hofferbert, op. cit.; Ira Sharkansky, Spending in the American States (Rand McNally, 1966). Exceptions include Charles F. Cnude and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (September, 1969), pp. 858-866; and Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics and Public Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (September, 1969), pp. 867-879, where some effect of political "dimensions" is detected among so-called redistributive policies,most notably welfare.

[4]The results of Dye and others have also been used by Dye himself in his common effort with Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970) as evidence of policy control by a non-political (the military-industrial complex) alliance of elites. Similarly, T. J. Lowi points to the irrelevance of the Conservative-Liberal debate in the major policy decisions of the recent years in his End of Liberalism, (Norton, 1969). Policy is viewed as the result of an unstructured bargaining between interest groups and governmental bureaucracies, and therefore devoid of any political ideological pattern.

[5]The debate as to the end of ideology is an old one and is best known from the work of Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas of the Fifties, new ed. rev. (Collier Books, 1962). An updating of the literature, arguments and research findings can be found in Harvey Waterman, Political Change in Contemporary France (Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969). As for a rebuttal to the hypothesis, see Chaim I. Waxman (ed.), The End of Ideology Debate (Funk and Wagnalls, 1968) especially the papers by C. Wright Mills, Henry D. Aiken, William Delaney, Robert A. Haber and Irving Louis Horwitz.

in the phenomenon described by some French scholars as "dépolitisation."[6] It is therefore pertinent to ask whether the same process can be said to have affected European (French) budgetary patterns, and whether these also reflect mainly socioeconomic forces.

This study aims to do just that. We hypothesize that in France, regardless of any so-called signs of depoliticization[7] among the electorate, the budgets of French municipalities for any one year, still reflect strong partisan and political choices, more specifically, we expect that the variable "party control" has an important (statistically significant) effect on the spending policies, (i.e., welfare) of

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[6] See Jean-Yves Colvaz, "L'idée de dépolitisation: Jugement de Valeur," in Georges Vedel (ed.) La Dépolitisation (Caliers de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, N:120: Paris, Armand Colin, 1962), pp. 181-182; and other articles in the same source by Georges Lavau "Les aspects socioculturels de la dépolitisation," and by Henri Mendras "Politisation, dépolitisation, répolitisation du milieu rural." For formulations of the same problem in England, see Norman Birnbaum, "Great Britain: The Reactive Revolt," in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.) Revolution in World Politics (J. E. and Sons, 1962), pp. 46-47. Part of this debate focuses on the class basis of politics and the contention that sections of the working class are voting conservative in Europe; see Seymour M. Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," in Mattei Dogan and Richard Rose (eds.) European Politics (Little and Brown, 1971), pp. 146-158; and in the same volume, articles by Otto Kirchheimer, "The Waving of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes," pp. 280-295, and Richard Rose, "Class and Party Divisions: Britain as a Test Case," pp. 159-182. Also see Ralf Dahrendorf, "Recent Changes in the Class Structure of European Societies," Daedalus (93, L, 1964), pp. 232-244.

[7] Vedel in his "Rapport Introductif," op. cit., p. 20, denies that electoral participation and organizational membership as indicators of depoliticization have declined in France or Britain. Moreover, there is a question as to how much politicization has already existed in the French system. Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (Spring, 1962), pp. 1-23, show that party identification is weakly transmitted among French families. Similarly, Georges Lavau has claimed that France has fewer associations than other Western societies in his essay, Partis politiques et realites sociales (Paris, Colin, 1953). This has more recently been contradicted by Duncan MacKae in Parliaments, Parties and Society in France, 1946-58 (St. Martin's, 1967).

French Communes even after "socioeconomic" variables have been controlled. Through regression analysis, we expect to find that the effect of party control is much more pronounced on Social Welfare policies than on either Education Spending or Total Spending. This also means that Communist and Socialist administrations tend to spend more in general, than equally wealthy non-Left administrations.

B. Concept Formation

1. Some Theoretical Considerations

Imbedded within the "End of Ideology" debate are numerous problems of conceptualization, the most acute of which is the meaning of the concept of "ideology" itself.[8] All too often it has been used interchangeably to describe the political belief systems of mass publics as well as those of certain elites and organizations. We concur here with the previous writers on the subject[9] that if ideology is to mean anything it must exhibit constraint; that is, stand for a "belief system that is

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[8] We must differentiate between ideology as a problem in cognition and social context derived from Karl Manheim's Ideology and Utopia, translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (Harvest, 1936); see Willard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," American Political Science Review, 66 (June, 1973), pp. 498-510, for the most recent treatment of an age-old problem -- and ideology in politics. While the two are related as Giovanni Sartori shows in "Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems," American Political Science Review, 63 (June, 1969), pp. 398-411, it is the latter which is our concern.

[9] Sartori, op. cit., p. 401; see also, David W. Minar,"Ideology and Political Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 5 (1961), pp. 371-373, and Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

internally consistent and consciously held."[10] Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that mass publics seldom exhibit constraint in their belief systems and that it is through organizations (i.e., political parties) that the ideologies of elites affect the belief systems of mass publics on one hand and the outputs of governmental structures on the other.[11] In fact, the latter (outputs) can in turn become a key tool in the perpetuation of the organization and its ideology.[12]

The degree to which organizations such as parties will continue translating their belief systems into budgetary patterns congruent with

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[10]Samuel H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict: On the Relationship Between Political Thought and Behavior," Journal of Politics, 28 (1966), pp. 513-530:514. See also Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology," American Political Science Review, 65 (September, 1971), pp. 651-681.

[11]Barnes, op. cit., p. 515. For empirical validation we have of course the by now classic Herbert McCloskey, et. al. "Issues and Followers," American Political Science Review, 54 (June, 1969), pp. 406-427. For France, see Duncan MacRae, Jr., Parliament, Parties and Society in France 1956-58 (St. Martin's Press, 1967). MacRae has been criticized by Howard Rosenthal for overemphasizing the role of ideology in the motivations of party militants, see "The Electoral Politics of Gaullists in the Fourth French Republic: Ideology or Constituency Interests?" American Political Science Review, 63 (June, 1969), pp. 476-487, and his Review Article, "Commentary on Duncan MacRae, Jr.'s Parliament, Parties and Society in France 1946-58," American Political Science Review, 63 (September, 1969), pp. 907-914.

[12]This feedback cycle is what Mark Kesselman characterizes as Over-Institutionalization in "Over-Institutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France," Comparative Politics, 3 (October, 1971), pp. 21-44.

such beliefs, will vary between organizations[13] but it will depend also on the setting that saw their emergence -- the political institutionalization[14] of past conflicts and cleavages and the nature and rate of social change -- political institutionalization is conceptualized here as a feedback cycle which includes as elements: the initial degree of hostility or consenses generated by the configuration of cleavage patterns, at the early stages of modernization;[15] the opportunity

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[13]This will depend on the organization's size, membership, function and initial structure. See Anthony Downs Inside Bureaucracy (Little and Brown, 1966) for a good theorization of such factors. For applications to political parties, see Philip Selznick The Organizational Weapon (McGraw-Hill, 1952). Finally, Richard M. Cyert and James G. March A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Prentice-Hall, 1964) have shown how the internal coalition formation within an organization will determine its decision-making. It must be noted that many explanations of organizational structure use exogenous variables.

[14]For definitions of institutionalization, see Talcott Parsons Essays in Sociological Theory (rev. ed., Free Press of Glencoe, 1954), pp. 143-239. For a definition of institutionalization which takes the role of bureaucracy in a historical perspective, see S. N. Eisenstadt, "Initial Institutional Patterns of Political Modernization," Civilizations, 12 (1962), pp. 461-472, and "Institutionalization and Change," American Sociological Review, 24 (April, 1964), pp. 235-247. Finally, the most recent theorist on institutionalization is Samuel P. Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 12-27. Huntington, however, does not dwell enough on the importance of the cleavage patterns in a society undergoing modernization.

[15]The literature here is quite voluminous although only recently has the linkage between cleavage patterns and policy outcomes been made. See Bingham Powell Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility (Stanford University Press, 1971) and B. Guy Peters, "The Development of Social Policy in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom: 1950-1965," in Martin O. Heisler (ed.) Politics in Europe (McKay, 1974), pp. 257-292. The earliest treatment can be traced to Karl Deutsch Nationalism and Social Communication (M.I.T. Press, 1953). See also, Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments (The Free Press, 1967); Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections and Parties (David McKay Company, 1970); and E. Allardt and Stein Rokkan (eds.) Mass Politics (The Free Press, 1969). Finally, Robert Dahl uses similar explanations of American historical development in a comparative perspective in three articles, "The American Oppositions: Affirmation and Denial," "Patterns of Opposition," and "Some Explanation," in Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (Yale University Press, 1966). Finally, in the same tradition is Robert E. Alford Party and Society (Rand-McNally, 1965).

structures created by policy outputs[16] and the degree to which social change is exogenous to this process.[17]

From various theoretical efforts we derive two models of political institutionalization,[18] one that is characterized as Fluid and the other as Structured.[19] They in turn lead us to formulate two corresponding models of policy-making which can guide our hypothesizing.[30]

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[16] See Joseph Schlesinger Ambition and Politics (Rand-McNally, 1966) and Lewis Edinger (ed.) Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies (Wiley and Sons, 1967).

[17] This implies that not only the rate of change, but its sources and channels are of importance. Moreover, the nature of previous institutionalization (i.e., monarchies, nobilities and merchant classes) will determine the patterns by which change itself may be institutionalized. Huntington, op. cit. On a smaller scale, Anthony Downs in Inside Bureaucracy, op. cit., pp. 5-10, exemplifies this in his concept of age lump phenomenon.

[18] The inspirations for these come from Robert Dahl's "Patterns of Oppositions," in Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 332-347. See Val Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological-Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Small European Democracies," Comparative Politics (January, 1971), pp. 141-175; Bingham Powell, op. cit.; and particularly Arendt Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (University of California Press, 1968). For a recent elaboration of a model that summarizes much of the findings of the above cited literature and which bears striking resemblance to our Structured Policy-Making Model, see "Patterns of European Politics: The European Policy Model," by Martin O. Heisler in collaboration with Robert B. Kvavik in Politics in Europe, op. cit., pp. 27-90.

[19] The main variable that can be used to differentiate between the two models is the so-called class vote as operationalized by Robert R. Alford, op. cit., Ch. 5. But they can also be distinguished by the degree of party voting in the legislative roll-calls of each political system. The Structured Model includes political systems with or without ethnic cleavages, i.e., Austria, France, the United Kingdom, as well as Belgium. When ethnic cleavages exist, they are cumulative to class cleavages. (See Note 18, 15 and 12.)

[20] These models are not elements of competing and alternative theories of policy-making, they are analytical constructs with empirical referents (political systems) which may vary in their actual functioning from their respective model. Elements of both models may be present in specific subsystems of each society.

2. The Policy-Making Models

The Fluid Policy-Making Model is characterized by constantly fluctuating structures,[21] where bargaining occurs even over decision rules. Political leaders are often left to their own devices, subject to competing influences among which we find that of their constituents, the major interest groups (industries, unions) in their constituency, their party's ideology and their own perception of the national interest.[22] As described in the American State Politics literature, community resources appear to exert such a pervasive influence that the range and number of policy options available to the community's political leadership are severely circumscribed. At the local level, those limitations are manifested partly through fears about the mobility of the community's tax base, in the event of high tax burdens.[23] More importantly, however,

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[21] By fluctuating structure we mean the changing coalitions within each of the major parties on one hand the constant formation of new regulatory bureaucracies. Both phenomena change the acors involved in the bargaining. See T. J. Lowi, op. cit., pp. 29-97.

[22] See Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), pp. 45-56. For a testing of such formulations, see Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis Dexter American Business and Public Policy (Atherton Press, 1963).

[23] Studies of the impact of taxation on the locational considerations of businesses are numerous and even though most locational decisions can be more readily explained by other factors (i.e., transportation, raw materials, labor force, etc.) and only marginally by taxes; the political use of the argument goes on. See Glenn W. Fisher Taxes and Politics: A Study of Illinois Finance (University of Illinois Press, 1969), Ch. 6.

are the model's assumptions of a media (T.V.) informed, cross-pressured[24] electorate, which gives preference to pragmatic vote maximizing political leaders. The latter are organized into part-time political parties with little discipline. Bureaucracies, private and public have much more permanence.

The Structured Policy-Making Model assumes that political leaders are well shepherded by well organized political parties with tight control over distinct constituences[25] seeking to maximize policy benefits for that constituency.[26] The level of resources is limiting to some extent but the political party in power (party control) may chose to reorder priorities so as to maximize a policy of greater importance to its constituency. In this model, slow social change has strengthened the parties and the bureaucracies and made these all the more able to stem or alterate it. In fact, these institutions

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[24] See Dahl, op. cit.; also David Truman The Governmental Process (Knopf, 1951) was among the first scholars to make the point that multiple memberships in groups or categories with opposite orientations, contributes to a less intense form of participation.

[25] See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, op. cit. Downs makes the point that in multi-party systems there is an advantage for parties in keeping their ideologies distinct and representing only a small but well defined constituency. French constituencies have been characterized as "political chapels" and the working class as a "political ghetto." See Stanley Hoffman, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community" in Stanley Hoffman, et. al., In Search of France (Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 1-117; and Mattei Dogan "Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy," in Lipset and Rokkan Party Systems...op. cit., pp. 129-195. See also Mattei Dogan, "Le Vote Ouvrier en France, Analyse ecologique des elections de 1962," Revue Francaise de Sociologie, 6 (December, 1965), pp. 435-471.

[26] It must be pointed out that hostility between classes limits the ability of parties to appeal to larger sections of the electorate, thus a stalemate ensues.

are able to control the flow of most extra-systemic inputs[27] better than is done in the Fluid Model.

It is this ability of political parties to alter (even if it is to slow down) the impact of some basic socioeconomic forces that leads us to expect that party control in France will explain large parts of the variance in local Social Welfare spending.

The French political behavior deviates somewhat from the Structured Model in that organizational membership is not as closely coincident with political party lines as in Austria.[28] On the other hand, the existence of a Communist Party and of a particularly Stalinist Party at that[29] increases the degree of rigidity in the attitudes of a large part of the electorate[30] and in the policy-making of certain cities.

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[27] See Kesselman, op. cit.; extra-systemic inputs for French local government would include policies of the central government (i.e., grants-in-aid) or of large corporations wishing to locate in the community.

[28] See Val Lorwin, op. cit.

[29] The existence of a Communist Party means the importation of extra-systemic tensions and the isolation of a large political party from national policy-making. Variations in the circumstances surrounding the growth of such a party will produce a more or less Kremlin relying organization. See Thomas H. Greene, "The Communist Parties of Italy and France: A Study in Comparative Communism," World Politics, 21 (October, 1968), pp. 1-38. On the pragmatism of Italian Communism, see Sidney G. Tarrow, "Political Dualism and Italian Communism," American Political Science Review, 61 (March, 1967), pp. 39-53. For the meaning of this pragmatism in the fiscal policy of Italian Communist municipalities, see Robert C. Fried, "Communism, Urban Budgets and the Two Italies: A Case Study in Comparative Urban Government," Journal of Politics (July, 1971).

[30] See Richard Hamilton Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic (Princeton University Press, 1967) for the persistent radicalism of the French working class; and Henry W. Ehrman, Politics in France (Little, Brown, and Company, 1968), p. 215.

The French Communist rigidity in policy-making is best exemplified by the comparison between the Italian Communist Party's effort at making Bologna a model of fiscal responsibility,[31] and the fears of a French Communist mayor that his efforts at making Aubervilliers (a low income suburb in our sample) a model of slum clearance and low income housing, may attract a middle-class migration which may put him out of office.[32]

Thus, the Structured Model may still be useful in developing hypotheses about French policy-making, at the local level.

3. The Concepts

Policies vary in salience[33] to the public. Budgetary policies such as taxation and expenditures are not too meaningful to the electorate. But it has been found that the organizations (i.e., interest groups) who compete for the benefits of such policies usually

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[31] See Fried, op. cit.

[32] For comments on Communist policy in the municipalities, see Paul Thibaud, "Le Communisme municipal," Esprit, 34 (October, 1966), pp. 413-422. For a more partisan viewpoint, see Jacques Duclos, "Les Municipalités Communistes au Service des Populations," Nouvelle Revue Internationale, 9 (May, 1966), pp. 89-99.

[33] The concept of salience is mainly to be found in voting and public opinion studies, but the first research results are to be found in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (John Wiley and Sons, 1960)and by the same authors in Elections and the Political Order (John Wiley and Sons, 1966). For research relating salience to party identification, see V. O. Key, Jr. Public Opinion and American Democracy (Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 445; and John G. Pierce, "Party Identification and the Changing Role of Ideology in American Politics," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 14 (February, 1970), pp. 25-42.

behave differently according to how redistributive a policy is.[34] Since V. O. Key's formulations, it is those so-called have-not policies which are expected to be more determined by political variables.[35]

Resources and needs are two concepts which help us understand how the so-called socioeconomic variables or the level of economic development impinge on budgetary policies.[36] They are also derived from the Eastonian systems framework[37] (demands and supports), which guides most studies of policy choice.

While resource indicators (total amount of goods available for taxation) are usually highly correlated with need indicators (level of income), a distinction is always worthwhile given the differing patterns of income distribution, but it is all the more useful when the

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[34] For a classification of policies, see Robert Salisbury and John Heinz, "A Theory of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications" in Ira Sharkansky (ed.) Policy Analysis in Political Science (Markham, Chicago, 1970), pp. 39-59. See also the earlier typology by T. J. Lowi in his "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," World Politics, 14, #4 (July, 1964), pp. 677-715.

[35] V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (Vintage Books, 1949), p. 307.

[36] Dye, op. cit. More recently Ira Sharkansky has attempted to conceptualize what he calls resource-policy as opposed to need-policy linkages in "Economic Theories of Public Policy: Resource-Policy and Need-Policy Linkages Between Income and Welfare Benefits," Midwest Journal of Political Science (June, 1972), pp. 722-739. We do not, however, agree with his approach.

[37] David Easton, The Political System (Alfred A. Knopf, 1953) is the main work cited by policy analysts, but Karl Deutsch's systems model should also be considered. See his "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, 54 (September, 1961), pp. 493-514.

testing universe is made up of urban units where migration from place of residence to place of work results in sharp disparities between resource levels and personal income for the same city. If we are to measure the true impact of party control on spending for any one policy, we must first know how much a city spends in relation to an existing need and given a specific level of resources.

Personal income is a valid indicator of need in Social Welfare as well as education since poverty should always result in a greater demand for public services. In education, private schools are available to the rich so that cities with poor populations will need more and larger public schools. Similarly, the size of the school-age population will also reflect the need for that service.

The concept of social structure is also imbedded within that of economic development, through the usual linkage between social class and personal income. A community's social structure is usually measured by the number of people belonging to specific socioeconomic categories. Among industrial societies the proportion of the community's population belonging to the so-called working class is one commonly used measure of social structure.

Distinguishing between social class and personal income may be difficult.[38] It is nevertheless useful to include it in policy analysis for if its impact on policy can be distinguished from that of personal

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[38]Difficult because of problems in multicollinearity that arise in regression analysis when two or more independent variables are highly correlated. See Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modeling," American Political Science Review, 62 (December, 1968), pp. 1258-1264; and Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of Multicollinearity" in Edward R. Tufte The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems (Addison-Wesley Company, 1970).

income, we would be able to know if policy makers respond to objective needs or to socially defined needs (since social classes differ in their definition of the same objective need).

Social structure is also usually correlated with party control in that a high proportion of the working class vote for a Left party. Again, distinguishing their effect on policy may be difficult, but nonetheless useful to the interpretation of our results. Three possibilities can be anticipated. If the effects of the variables cannot be differentiated,[39] then we must accept a null hypothesis that party structure is essentially a reflection of the social structure. If, however, social structure is a more powerful explainer, then we would have to discount the importance of parties as organizations shaping policy alternatives. If party control seems to have a noticeably stronger effect, then we can conclude the political organizations amplify the demands of their constituents, as described in the Structured Policy-Making Model.

Party control is the concept which will reflect the strength of parties on the city council. Since time reinforces the effects of party control on budgetary patterns, we will use more than one election to derive indicators of party strength. Ideally, we would have liked to have had the size of party membership or the size of politically meaningful organizations (i.e., unions and church-going populations) in order to

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[39] If through substitution of one variable for the other, there is no noticeable (significant) increase in explained variance.

test out other elements of the Structured Model but unfortunately such data is hard to come by.[40]

Party control is also operationalized through a measure of the size of the Left representation (Socialist and Communist councilors are added up) on the city council because we assume a certain continuity in the intensity and consistency of policy choices (more spending) between the two parties. We are, thus, still measuring the degree to which the ideology has been institutionalized.

C. The Setting and the Study Sample

The study sample which will be used for the testing of hypotheses includes 54 urban communes of over 10,000 population. Thirty-six of these are situated in the immediate Paris urban area (excluding Paris proper which is centrally administered), nine are in the outlying suburban area, eight of them represent the Lyon urban area in the Southern part of France (including the city of Lyon proper). Except for the cities of Lyon and Clermont-Ferrand, which can be called agglomeration centers, all the other communes are essentially satellites of such centers. The distribution by population size for these satellite communities is:

10,000 - 20,000	9 communes (3 in Paris)
20,000 - 50,000	29 communes (21 in Paris)
50,000 - 99,000	12 communes (11 in Paris)
100,000 - 120,000	2 communes (1 in Paris)

Lyon and Clermont-Ferrand have populations respectively of 524,000 and 134,000.

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[40] Communist unions such as C.G.T. are very secretive about membership and even when such data is given it is not broken down by communes (cities). Moreover, the reliability is questionable.

The budgetary year chosen is 1963, midway between the municipal elections of 1959 and 1965. The data were collected by me from French archives in the summer of 1970. Population figures used are those of the 1962 Census.

The commune is the only unit of French local government whose executive officer, the mayor, is elected (indirectly by the municipal councilmen whose own election comes every six years). In 1953 the elections took place under the Proportional Representation System, which results in municipal councils reflecting the approximate strength of each major political party's vote. In 1959, the Two-Ballot Majority System, which encourages coalitions to form before elections, and even more urgently before the second ballot, was used. While absolute majority is necessary on the first ballot, a simple plurality is all that is needed on the second.

While the French central government has important statutory and supervisory powers, the right of a commune to establish new services as new needs arise has always been accepted.[41] Central influence is most important in the fields of education and security. Grants-in-aid are for the most part designed to finance new investments. Loans are also available but regulated by a central credit organization. Despite the fact that French municipalities cannot float bonds and are not

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[41] For works on French local government, see F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public Administration in France (Routledge and Kegan, Paul, London, 1964); Brian Chapman, Introduction to French Local Government (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1953); and Mark Kesselman, The Ambiguous Consensus: A Study of Local Government in France (A. Knopf, 1967).

supposed to go beyond certain limits of indebtedness, in practice the variation in contracted debts is considerable.[42] Similarly, the form and incidence of local taxation varies substantially, even though here again formal guidelines do exist.

Thus, we can see that French communes are quite suited for the type of analysis we wish to undertake.

D. Implications of this Study

This study straddles many fields, sub-fields and frameworks. As a policy analysis study it of course has relevance to this mushrooming field, which itself has links to the comparative study of administration and practical policy-making (i.e., Planning, Programming, Budgeting).[43]

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[42] Joseph Duplouy, Le Credit aux Collectivities Locales (Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1967).

[43] See Notes 1 and 2, and of course Solomon Fabricant, The Trend in Government Activity in the United States Since 1900 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952); and Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis," National Tax Journal (December, 1961), pp. 349-355. Also by the same author, "Interstate Variations in State and Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal (March, 1964), pp. 57-74. Finally, see Seymour Sachs, Robert Harris and John T. Carroll, The State and Local Government...The Role of State Aid, Comptroller's Studies in Local Finance, #3 (State Department of Audit and Control, 1963). For more pragmatically oriented, see Austin Ranney (ed.) Political Science and Public Policy (Markham, 1968). This literature was first spurred by Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Harvard University Press, 1960) and E. E. Quade (ed.), Analysis for Military Decisions (Rand McNally, 1964) and furthered by Fremont J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller (eds.), Planning, Programming, Budgeting (Harvard University Press, 1965). For a more recent and more critical view of this approach, see Robert H. Haveman and Julius Margolis (eds.), Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis (Markham, 1970).

As a study of local government, its findings can be compared to those in the field of American state and local government, but even more to those in the new cross-national study of local governments.[44]

As a case study of French local government, it is likely to be of interest to those scholars specializing in the study of whole systems (Western European democracies, and more specifically, France). Since quantitative studies of French institutions are few,[45] an important contribution can be made by demonstrating their feasibility.

For the specific field of French local government, we hope that our study demonstrates that despite the high degree of centralization presumed to prevail in France, local governments still exercise their policy options and differ widely in their policy choices.

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[44] See James Alt, "Some Social and Political Correlates of County Borough Expenditures," British Journal of Political Science, 1 (January, 1971), pp. 49-62, and Noel T. Boaden and Robert R. Alford, "Sources of Diversity in English Local Government Decisions," Public Administration, 47 (Summer, 1969), pp. 203-23. Also, F. R. Oliver and J. Stanyer, "Some Social Aspects of the Financial Behavior of County Boroughs," Public Administration, 47 (Spring, 1969), pp. 169-184. Robert C. Fried, "Politics, Economics and Federalism: Some Aspects of Urban Government in Mittel-Europa," unpublished paper delivered at the conference on "Problems of European Bureaucracy" of the Europe Committee of the Comparative Administration Group, American Society of Public Administration, University of Indiana, October, 1970. For a summation of such findings and an exhortation to the creation of a field of comparative local politics, see Mark Kesselman and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Local Power and Comparative Politics: Notes Toward the Study of Comparative Local Politics," in Rodney P. Stiefbold (ed.) Frontiers in Urban Research (University of Miami Press, forthcoming).

[45] See Jean Meynaud and Alain Lancelot, Les Attitudes Politiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1964) and finally, Howard Rosenthal "The Electoral Politics of Gaullists in the Fourth French Republic: Ideology or Constituency Interest?", American Political Science Review, 63, #2 (June, 1969), pp. 476-87; "Voting and Coalition Models in Election Simulation" in William Coplin (ed.) Simulation and the Study of Politics (Markham, 1968), and "Size and Winning Coalitions in the Fourth French Republic" in Sven Groennings et. al. (eds.), op. cit.; and more recently, Howard Rosenthal and Subrata Sen, "Electoral Participation in the French Fifth Republic," American Political Science Review, 67 (March, 1973), pp. 11-54.

In this chapter we have delineated the main problem, explained the conceptual tools to be used, and described the sample and the setting.

In Chapter 2, we focus on a thorough description of the French setting; the political institutionalization patterns and their manifestations at the local level at the time when the French system is undergoing unprecedented change. A description of the sampling universe and the sample itself through some basic characteristics will hopefully situate the reader. Chapter 3 will describe the research design, and as such link theory to hypothesis formulation through the construction of the variables as required by the methodology to be used. Coverage of specific literatures and previous research efforts will be undertaken as it becomes necessary to the buttressing of descriptions, characterizations or explanations of specific choices (i.e., choices in research design). Needless to say, this author (as others before him) will not shy away from comments, on substance or methodology, which although seemingly peripheral to the actual experiment, may in his opinion be useful in fleshing out the implications of his more central arguments.

Chapter 4 will report on the testing of the hypotheses in the immediate Paris area. Chapter 5 will examine how the same hypotheses fare in the remainder of the sample and draw from these findings the qualifications that can legitimately be made. Finally, Chapter 6 will summarize our findings and suggest possible improvements for any future replications.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SETTING: CHANGES IN THE FRENCH STALEMATE

In this chapter we will describe French economic and social development in the context of the Structured Model of Policy-Making and the particular institutionalization process which it entails.

In the first part of this description, we will focus on the institutionalization of cleavages, then turn to the growth of the administrative system and explain its general principles of operation today. The special status of the Paris area will be of central concern here, since it is to be the site of the testing of our major hypotheses. This will raise the question of the area's representativeness of French urban life and the justification for our choices in research design.

The implication is that Parisian urban settlement and politics, particularly as embodied in the suburban inner ring of communities, display the closest approximation of the Structured Model of Policy-Making to be found in France. It must be specified, however, that even in that area major departures from the ideal model exist.[1]

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[1] We have throughout the course of this description of the French political system, as well as in the conceptualization outlined in the previous chapter, relied extensively on the model of institutionalization as described by Rodney P. Stiefbold in "Segmented Pluralism and Consociational Democracy in Austria, Problems of Stability and Change," in Martin O. Heisler, et. al. (eds.), Politics in Europe, Structure and Processes (David McKay, 1973), pp. 117-177.

The existence of a multitude of parties, the relative ambiguity of ideological boundaries between parties of the Right, and the relatively weak organizational encapsulation of an individual's life are some of the more easily observable deviations. Yet the Structured Policy-Making Model still applies, because political parties find it in their mutual interest to perpetuate its features in the patterns of policy outputs.

If some variations from the Model have always existed in Paris, they are all the more numerous in the new areas of urban settlement. This is what we will describe in the last part of this chapter, in an attempt to show how the cities of our sample fit within the context of these changes. This in turn will set the stage for some of the choices in sampling design to be more thoroughly described and explained in Chapter Three.

There is no doubt that the French nation has undergone some radical changes since the end of World War II. Works on France have had to be revised as if they dealt with a "third world" nation. Various authors citing the periodicity of past French crises clearly predicted one for Après-Gaullisme or Post-Gaullism.[2] A major crisis did occur in 1968, but De Gaulle was still in power.[3] Since his retirement and death,

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[2]The substance of these predictions varied from expectations of a return to Fourth Republic ministerial crises to major confrontations. See Ch. 12, "Après De Gaulle," in Lowell G. Noonan France: The Politics of Continuity in Change (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).

[3]Various commentators in L'Express have made the point that Apres-Gaullisme has been so successful because in reality it began while De Gaulle was still in power and thus a transition period was provided. Some date the start of Après-Gaullisme to the Presidential Elections of 1965 when De Gaulle's showing in the first round was somewhat disappointing. See Philip Williams, "The French Presidential Elections of 1965," Parliamentary Affairs, XIX:1 (1965-66), pp. 14-30 and Francois Goguel, "L'Election Presidentielle Francaise de Décembre 1965," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, XVI:2 (1966), pp. 242-44.

the French system has gone through two presidential, one municipal and one legislative election and despite some problems, neither the Fifth Republic nor the General's Party seem about to be repudiated by the citizens of this old nation.[4] French politics today are becoming more and more like those of other industrial nations concerned with pollution, growth, the quality of life, political apathy and corruption in high places.[5] The focus is also on new emerging groups like the young and women.[6] The issues of monarchy as opposed to Republicanism, the separation of religion from the State[7] have almost disappeared and even the old fear of Communist participation in government seems to have receeded extensively.[8] The Communist Party itself, which as we described in this study has been a paragon of rigidity and

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[4]The most recent test for the Gaullist "system" was the legislative election of 1973 where the UDR (ex-UNR) was challenged by the largest Left Wing alliance since the Popular Front.

[5]The career of Jacques Chaban Delmas, the first Prime Minister to serve President Pompidou was seriously damaged by disclosures that he had not paid taxes for years.

[6]More recently an important issue of French public life has been the right to abortion for the women of Catholic France.

[7]See René Rémond, et. al., Forces Religieuses et attitudes politiques daus la France contemporaine (Paris, Colin, 1965) for a series of surveys on French religious attitudes and the problems of Left Wing Catholics. The last major clash on religious matters was over governmental aid to Catholic schools. There have been skirmishes on matters of censorship and the recent abortion issue, but not much else.

[8]The literature and the number of inquires made through surveys on this subject are numerous. See Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique, Les Francais devant le Communisme (mimeographed, Paris, February, 1966) "Questions au Parti Communiste." Most findings show that some 60% of Frenchmen find the Party more conciliatory and only 30% would oppose its participation in government. See Sondages, N-1 (1966), pp. 65-67.

atavism, seems to be undergoing revitalization and change under its young new leader, Georges Marchais.[9]

A. Development and the Institutionalization of Cleavages

If we accept that Stanley Hoffman's depiction of French society as "Stalemated,"[10] was relevant until recently, now it can be said that the Stalemate is in process of dissolution. The shock of World War II; the collapse of 1940; and the occupation and soul searching[11] that followed it made its continuation impossible even though at first glance the Fourth Republic seemed like a repeat performance of the Third. Nevertheless, many of the institutions of that Stalemate remain and in 1963, the year for which we have data reflective of policy-making, few major administrative changes had yet gone into effect.[12]

Most observers of French history will agree that the Stalemate lasted so long, partly because it could be afforded by a nation that had essentially solved some basic problems of national-building that seem unsolvable for most political communities.[13]

First, an abundant agricultural production from some of the richest soil in Europe, minimized the need to trade and industrialize. Second,

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[9] The recent Popular Front alliance is credited to have been partly the result of his efforts and diplomacy.

[10] In Search of France (Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 3-20.

[11] Most indicative of that soul searching is the recent excellent motion picture documentary "Le Chagrin et la Pitié" (The Sorrow and the Pity). Its scholarly quality and fairness to both sides has surprised many.

[12] The choice of 1963 was imposed on this researcher by the lack of uniformity in the adoption of certain budgetary innovations which would have created problems in comparability.

[13] Ehrman, op. cit., p. 1.

the national identity has not been a question of concern to Frenchmen since Protestant King Henry IV converted to the Catholic faith in order to capture Paris and said that the city was well worth a mass.[14] Even though some anti-Semitism still lingers on from the late 19th Century[15] when the word Métèque was used to describe a small wave of migrants from Eastern Europe,[16] such manifestations of hostility to other Frenchmen for ethnic reasons are relatively mild and scarce.

The Stalemate also lasted because it supported a blend of traditional and modern values and goals -- a "Civilisation" that has captivated even the imagination of non-Frenchmen.[17] French modernity was and still consists of a series of no-trespassing signs to basic principles of industrial organization such as the division of labor and competition.[18] These stop signs took the form of:

1. The inheritance system[19] and the perpetuation of a multitude of small family farms in agriculture.

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[14] See Ernst Robert Curtius, The Civilization of France (Vintage Books, 1962), p. 85.

[15] There was a recent occurrence in the City of Orleans.

[16] See Charles Micaud, The French Right and Nazi Germany (Durban, 1943). The word Métèque is part of French slang today but in the 1930's it was used by many of the Right Wing groups such as the Maurassiens and Action Francaise.

[17] A most recent manifestation of such a phenomenon was the initiative of President Senghor of Senegal to foster a French-speaking community.

[18] It is interesting to note that other countries are today questioning the universality of these principles.

[19] The French system of inheritance forces the distribution of land to all the heirs of the deceased.

2. The small size of the non-agricultural labor force resulting from the greater attractiveness of farm life.[20]

3. The low rates of geographical mobility and urban migration.[21]

4. The slower urbanization and the few truly metropolitan centers.[22]

5. The low rates of population and economic growth.[23]

6. The family firm in industry with antiquated business methods and a resulting weak investment market.[24]

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[20]Here again it is worth noting that the system of family farms is part of the American ideal of yeomanry that motivated the Homestead Acts of the 1860's. In America, however, Richard Hofstadfer tells us that this ideal was only partly fulfilled and not for long. See The Age of Reform (Vintage Books, 1955), pp. 1-23.

[21]See Niles M. Hansen French Regional Planning (Indiana University Press, 1968), pp. 26-31.

[22]This feature has recently been sloganized to "Paris and the French Desert," the title of a book by J. F. Gravier, Paris et la désert francais (Paris, Le Portulan, 1947).

[23]The low rate of population growth (often negative) has been cited as a troublesome morale problem for the whole nation, provoking moreover a sense of insecurity in the face of the rise of a strong and populous Germany from 1870 on. Conversely the upward trend in population growth after World War II has been cited also as an indication of a healthy development and dynamism. Strangely again, the limiting of population growth is a major concern in industrial nations today. In the light of other characteristics, one must ask if it is French society that has become modern, or the industrial nations that have been converted to its philosophical premises.

[24]Cited by various economists, this feature has come to be questioned lately as causing slow economic development. See Charles P. Kindleberger Economic Growth in France and Britain 1851-1950 (Harvard University Press, 1965). There is no doubt, however, that French workers have particularly been given additional cause for alienation, when their bourgeois bosses (patrons) displayed a narrow conservatism that often resulted in bankrupcies and inefficiences.

7. The protectionism which perpetuated these features both in agriculture and industry.[25]

8. The late and slow unionization of the labor force.[26]

The above mentioned features explain why it is difficult to specify any one date as the starting point for the Stalemate. Most observers have always focused on the unresolved conflicts brought about by the Revolution of 1789, and the inconclusive end of the other outbursts (i.e., the failure of 1848, the temporary character of the Third Republic of 1871). If we, however, observe the pattern of cabinet stability in the Third Republic, we cannot help but notice the contrast between the period preceding the Dreyfus Affair, and what was to follow. From 1896 to 1940 the Stalemate becomes less of a compromise and more of an overriding fear of change.

The social and political meaning of the Stalemate was the predominance of a bourgeoisie and of a consensus of values (stability, harmony, moderation and equilibrium, craftsmanship and esthetic considerations) derived partly from the defeated aristocracy and the independent peasantry.[27] The urban proletariat was kept in a social and political ghetto from which, as Hoffman tells us, periodic thrusts would be attempted to overturn the status-quo.[28] But that, to some

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[25]Protectionism commands much more respect in a country where mercantilism flourished under the "ancien regime."

[26]This is a feature of French society that is not easily deducible from the present strong position of some unions. But even today more than 75% of French workers do not belong to any trade union organization at all. Stanley Rothman European Society and Politics (Bobbs-Merill, 1970), pp. 171-174.

[27]Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[28]Ibid; p. 7.

extent has been the experience of the urban proletariat in a large number of other nations in the process of industrialization.[29] What gave special meaning to the French social and political ghetto was a series of factors that in combination increased the level of hostility and the feeling of entrapment of the classes.

Patterns of social mobility were among the first. Even when it occurred, French social mobility has been described as one "where class barriers could be crossed but not destroyed. When one jumped over such a barrier, one had to leave one's previous way of thinking and living...."[30] That such patterns can produce distinct subcultures among classes, even in the face of relatively fast rates of economic growth, can be easily observed among England's working class.

As if this low rate of social mobility was not enough to increase hostility among groups, the religious conflict in France was to feature

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[29] It is only in some of the underdeveloped nations today that industrialization is taking place in a climate seemingly emphasizing proletarian or peasant values. But most cases of Western industrialization display a dominance of bourgeois or aristocratic values, even where as in the United States, egalitarianism and a belief in the common man also prevailed. And, there is little doubt as to the class origins of major decision-makers in such systems.

[30] Edmond Goblot, La Barriere et le Niveau (Paris, 1925), p. 6.

a clerical/anti-clerical cleavage which is considerably more disruptive in that it divides nations into communities of believers and unbelievers.[31]

Ironically it seems that countries where only one organized religion predominated, the Catholic bastions of the Counter Reformation,[32] are those that were more affected by this conflict. In France, the Church was the subject of violent attacks from the time of the Revolution when it sided with the Monarchy.[33] It suffered its worst defeats after the Dreyfus Affair,[34] when a complete separation of Church and State was

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[31]Studies that find this type of cleavage as giving a special imprint to French political beliefs and conflicts include Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter (Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261; Mattei Dogan, "Le Vote Ouvrier en France," Revue Francaise de Sociologie, 6 (October, 1966), pp. 435-471; and Vincent McHale, "Religion and Electoral Politics in France: Some Recent Observations," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 2 (September, 1969), pp. 292-311. Val Lorwin made the same distinction we make here in "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Small European Democracies," Comparative Politics (January, 1971), pp. 141-175; but it is in Derek Urwin and Richard Rose, "Social Cohesion and Political Strains in Regimes," Comparative Political Studies, 2, #1 (April, 1969), pp. 7-67, that this cleavage is found to account for most variations in political stability.

[32]France, Austria, Spain, we well as some of the American colonies of the latter (Mexico notably) have displayed a virulence in their anti-clericalism which culminated (as in the Spanish Civil War and the Mexican Revolution) with the execution of priests.

[33]The Church resisted the takeover of Church property and of Papal prerogatives (i.e., the nomination of bishops) by the State. The Church was also involved in Vendée in an insurrection against the Revolution.

[34]The Dreyfus Affair exemplified the cumulation of cleavages at its most intense level, in that anti-semitism was found to correspond with devout Catholicism and pro-militarism, while the forces opposed to Dreyfus's incarceration had exactly opposite beliefs on all three levels. Thus, a miscarriage of justice came to symbolize the political struggle of two distinct forces. See D. W. Brogan, The Development of Modern France (revised edition, Harper and Row, 1966).

legislated and previous Concordats revoked.[35] This was a time when even the groups on the Right were progressively parting company with the Church.

The correspondence between the religious and class cleavages has been recently explained by two outstanding works which depict the roots and sources of radical discontent among workers in France and Italy.[36] Both show how the anti-clericalism of the rural areas (agricultural workers angry at the Church's landholdings) has in Italy, as well as France, helped the recruitment efforts of unions and Left parties when new migrants arrive in the medium-sized, unemployment ridden cities of the French and Italian provinces.

The religious conflict, moreover, creates on the part of those rebelling against Church authority a need for an associational life as rich and as all encompassing as that provided by the Church for its faithful.[37] It is this need that the Communist Party has been able

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[35] Adrien Dansette, Religious History of Modern France, Vol. II: Under the Third Republic (Herder and Herder, Inc., 1961). See also Aline Controt et Francois Dreyfus, Les Forces religieuses dans la société francaise (Colin, 1965).

[36] See Sidney G. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (Yale University Press, 1967), and Richard Hamilton, Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic (Princeton University Press, 1967). Also showing the same is the article by Mattei Dogan, "Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Allignments (The Free Press, 1967).

[37] The similarities between the value structures of Catholic and Communist voters has been noticed since Gabriel Almong, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton University Press, 1954) propounded the idea that Communist strength resulted from the alienation of the working class.

to meet, and its eventual triumph over the Socialist Party in France must be seen in this perspective.[38] In Austria, the Socialist Party quickly developed the needed parapolitical structures and this is why the Communist Party never grew even in circumstances of deeper hostilities than in France.[39]

Among the other political implications of the religious conflict was its linkage with the monarchy-republic debate which in my opinion is one of the most futile conflicts to have preoccupied Europe in the 19th Century.[40]

The institutionalized Stalemate could only be broken by exogenous factors. The Depression and the discontents it evoked broke the solidarity of the "status quo groups," the peasantry and the intellectuals.[41] The various humiliations that led to Munich and Danzig dissolved the one

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[38]The French Communist Party underwent at first so many purges and splits that it was on the verge of extinction. It is understood, however, that this has also resulted in a more disciplined party, which was from the start an oddity in France.

[39]Even though the so-called Austrian Lager was a civil war fought by the paramilitary organizations belonging to each of the parties, the Communists were singularly unimportant throughout this period. Thus, it cannot be argued that their insignificance is due to the nearness of the Russian threat--there was no such threat in the 1930's. See Frederick Engelman, "Austria: The Pooling of Opposition," in Robert Dahl (ed) Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 260-283.

[40]The futility of the conflict over support or opposition for a monarchy can be best appreciated by a view of the various divisions of the Right, making it impossible for responsible rule to take place. We discuss this particular problem later in this chapter.

[41]Hoffman, op. cit., p. 22.

truly nation-wide consensus on the country's international posture -- the so-called "grandeur." Others saw in the Communist Party an outside threat as unpalatable as the legions of Hitler.

The collapse of 1940 made it plain that the Stalemate and its institutions could no more be afforded in a world where change exogenous or endogenous cannot be controlled or predicted. Laurence Wylie's villagers will be buying items on credit the second time he visits them, not because they are confident in the economy, but because the alternative is just as risky.[42]

If the Stalemate was a series of compromises with the principles of modern organization, it did not apply to the French concept of the State, its system of representation of interests, and even less to its system of administration. Rationalized unitary control with all sovereignty vested in a parliament and exercised by a well trained pyramidal civil service, was put into application with so few departures from the theory[43] that distortions appeared more because of this excess of rigorousness. The bureaucracy came to be a most important policy-making structure, in contradiction to Weberian principles, because of a strict adherence to a Rousseau-inspired theory of democracy.[44] The System of

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[42] Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 159-235.

[43] We refer to the seemingly strong French insistence that all shades of popular opinion be represented regardless of any costs in governmental stability, through the use of electoral systems that accentuate the number of parties and factions.

[44] The implications of Rousseau's idea of the "general will," namely that it somehow arises out of full discussion of all facets of a proposal, have influenced France's constitution makers, and particularly the Revolutionaries of 1789, 1848 and 1870.

Proportional Representation not only accurately reflected the community's "general will" (or lack of it), but institutionalized the socioeconomic Stalemate into a parliamentary immobilism which made policy-making by administrators inevitable.[45]

It must be observed that it is the adequate functioning of such a unitary national administration that made the Stalemated conflict, a tolerable reality in the National Assembly and in the municipalities where we will study its budgetary expression. It is because the national bureaucracy functioned with little ambiguity (expressing the values of the dominant middle-class), that local administrations could express their ideologies with lesser restraint.

But unitary control raises certain questions as to the degree of local autonomy and the uniqueness of areas where the administrative center is located. Such questions have a certain relevance to the appropriateness of the units of analysis chosen for this study. Let us, therefore, consider these two questions in order to rise above the superficial generalizations that have been made about French local autonomy and the uniqueness of Paris.

B. Administrative Development and Local Autonomy

It has been said that in France, political orders may come and go but administratively little has changed since Napoleon instituted his strongly centralized system. But in reality there have been constant changes though not easily detected because they rarely took

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[45] It must be specified that France did not stay with a Proportional Representation system for long periods. Most of the Third Republic operated under the system of Two Ballot Majority, which today seems to lead to a bipolarity in the party system.

the form of new formal structures, but that of changes in administrative practice. More recently, however, there have been actual changes in structures and procedures and even one might say in the philosophy of French administration.[46]

1. Pre-Modern Period

The pluralism of medieval France has been revived and is quickly gaining in legitimacy in a debate with the centralist and unitary conception of the State.[47]

Medieval France featured a pluralism with genuine self-government at the local level. Provincial "Parliaments" could impose taxes and exact ordinances while also acting as law courts. "Chartered towns had considerable powers of administering their own affairs through their own offices." Alongside charter towns were feudal fiefs and ecclesiastical domains and they each had distinct rights and duties. In fact, some provinces charged duties on goods and persons coming into their territory. The absolute monarchy of the Sun King and his successors gradually whittled these rights away and by the 18th Century representatives of the King (the Intendents) exercised fiscal, police and political powers in the provinces. "Appointed officials replaced elected officers in the towns and these were controlled by subordinates of the Intendants, known as sous-délégués."[48]

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[46] This point has often been made. De Gaulle's Cabinets have included a large number of technocrats, and much of French modernization after the War took place under the watchful eye of planners and Common Market bureaucrats.

[47] See Jean de Savigny, L'Etat Contre les Communes? (Seuil, 1970).

[48] F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public Administration in France (Barnes and Noble Company, 1969), p. 85n.

The Revolution did not show any zeal for the idea of local autonomy. The latter would have meant accepting the legitimacy of pockets of royalist and ani-revolutionary sentiment. In fact, revolutionaries in France could rarely count on the support of the provinces.[49] Ideologically the nation was viewed as an indivisible community with a Rousseau-type social contract. The State was its embodiment and there were to be no intermediaries between the citizen and his government. All interest groups of factions were viewed as dangerous in that they needlessly divide citizens and impede the process by which a "general will" appears. Thus, autonomous local governments were seen as just another divisive faction. This fear of intermediary mechanisms culminated in the "Loi Le Chapelier"of 1791 which prohibited associations.[50]

2. The Napoleonic System

Napoleon made sure there were no such intermediaries between him and the citizen, at least none that he could not control! Napoleon was often out of France and needed a more predictable and of course controllable administrative system. He divided the country into 89 geographical areas which had no relationship to any previous political units and called these départements.[51]

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[49] Time and again it will be conservative rural France, the provinces that will send troops to recapture their capital city. In 1940 Marshall Petain will think it his duty to quickly conclude the war in order to come back with troops to squash another potential insurrection of the capital, another Commune, as in 1870.

[50] See Ridley and Blondel, op. cit., "Introduction: The State and Society in France," by Peter Campbell, p. xiii.

[51] Ridley and Blondel, op. cit., p. 88.

He appointed an executive to administer them, borrowed the Roman title of prefect, made each of these officials capable of appointing every mayor in the area, and he had a system which he could directly control through 89 men.[52] It has been observed that this system resembled that of the Intendants, but with republican trappings.[53]

One of the important features of the French system of local government that must be grasped is that "unincorporated" areas do not exist. And conversely, incorporations cannot occur. This has not impeded the fractionalization of local government, which has occurred more because the multitude of units already existed. The territory was subdivided (under Napoleon) into 38,000 communes which can vary from a few hundred population to half a million (See Table 1). The commune is the only unit that has survived from the "ancien regime" and while at first even their councils were appointed by the prefect in an advisory capacity, by the 1830's councils became elected and later received more powers (i.e., the law of 1871). By 1882, mayors ceased to be appointed and were elected by the councils of the commune as they still are today.

Here we see evidence of an evolution from the Napoleonic system and become aware of the fact that true local autonomy dates from the Third Republic.

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[52] Ibid, p. 92.

[53] Idem.

TABLE II-1

COMMUNES BY POPULATION SIZE

Population Size	Number of Communes	1962 Population
from 0 - 399	21,012	4,265,181
400 - 699	7,120	3,759,340
700 - 999	3,079	2,549,523
1,000 - 1,999	3,670	4,999,534
2,000 - 4,999	1,904	5,738,620
5,000 - 9,999	590	3,993,280
10,000 - 19,999	305	4,143,210
20,000 - 49,999	199	5,948,547
50,000 - 99,999	51	3,409,365
100,000 - 299,999	28	4,289,957
300,000 and higher	3	1,649,492
TOTALS	37,961	44,746,625

Figures compiled from a report called "Les Finances des Communes de plus de 5,000 habitants" (Exercise, 1965); Les Communes à l'Heure de la Région; Ministère de l'Interrieur; Direction Générale des Collectivites Locales Service de Statistiques et d'Analyses Financieres. From here on we will abreviate to "Les Finances des...."[54]

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[54] Brian Chapman, Introduction to French Local Government (George Allen and Unwin, 1953), pp. 19-22.

3. The Administrative Structure Today

The Units. Much of the administrative structure has, however, survived. Ninety départements[55] are governed by 90 centrally appointed prefects, presiding over locally elected councils (conseils generaux) located in the capital of the department.* The offices of the prefect are called the préfecture. Each département is subdivided into arrondissements (three or four in each, 450 in all), and each arrondissement is governed by a sub-prefect who has his offices in a city that is designated as the site of the sous-préfecture. It is a purely administrative unit and is used partly to supervise and advise the communes (100 to 150 in each) of the area. They also bring government closer to the people; they are the units of national legislative elections. They usually have about 100,000 citizens. Communes must, for instance, send their budgets to the sous-préfecture for audits, and to insure that compulsory functions are adequately funded. These remain there for a few years until they are finally deposited with the Archives Départementales.[56]

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[55] The départements are classified into three classes. This is a device which helps give incentives to civil servants by making status differentiations and thus stimulating greater discipline and compliance lest a département's rating be revised downward. The same grading system exists for arrondissements. Finally, when we speak of 90 departements, it must be remembered that this was under the old system (changed in 1964), and that even then there were Overseas départements in addition to the metropolitan units (France Metropolitaine & France d'Oûtre Mer).

[56] That is where this researcher was able to secure the budgetary data for the analysis.

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*When not underlined, "department" will be the anglicized version of département.

Finally, each arrondissement is divided into cantons (35 in each département and 3,000 in all). They are used for administrative purposes by the army and the judiciary and serve as units of election for the department's conseil general.

The Officials. The two most important local officials are the prefect and the mayor. Brian Chapman says of the prefect: "At the head of the departmental administration and the hierarchic superior of all State officials in the département, no matter what their seniority, is the prefect."[57]

Ridley and Blondel classify his powers into four categories:

> (1) He is like the Lord-Lieutenant in an English country, the representative of the State: he wears a uniform on ceremonial occasions (recently drastically simplified by General De Gaulle), and takes precedence over all other persons in the department....
>
> (2) He is the representative of the whole government (i.e., not merely of his own ministry, the Ministry of the Interior). He is officially the head of all government services in the department and is responsible for their coordination. His functions are political as well as administrative. He is the 'eyes and ears' of the government, and even now, periodically writes confidential reports describing the morale of the population....
>
> (3) He is the representative of the Ministry of the Interior, which is the ministry directly responsible for the supervision of local authorities. He is the middle link of the chain which goes from the central administration to the commune; helped by the sub-prefects, he supervises the activities of mayors and municipal councils.

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[57] Ridley and Blondel, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

> (4) He is the chief executive of local government at the level of the department. Since he is appointed by and responsible to the central government, his position is independent of the departmental council of which he is an agent: it resembles that of the executive in a system of separation of powers. The fact that the same man can be an official of the central government and the chief executive of a local authority is of major importance in the working of French local government and in particular, for the nature of central-local relationships.[58]

They point out that:

> ....Governments have had and, theoretically at least, still have complete discretion in appointing prefects; they may even choose men from outside the civil service. They can dismiss them at discretion. In practice, however, the prefectoral career is now a regular civil service career. It is open to graduates of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration and, as one of the grands corps, it attracts some of the very ablest of them. A member of the corps starts as a sub-prefect in a minor sub-prefecture and gradually moves up to more important sub-prefectures before becoming a prefect; the same process is then repeated unless he moves to a post in the Ministry of the Interior. Prefects are frequently transferred, since governments have always felt it best to prevent them from forming too close ties with a particular area.[59]

Chapman describes how the prefect is assisted by other officials:

> The prefect is assisted in his duties by certain officers who are members of the corps préfectoral. Firstly, he has a personal assistant, who is the most junior member of the corps, called the chef de cabinet. His right-hand man in the préfecture is the secretary-general, who is the head of all the administrative organizations of the department, and who also has certain responsibilities for the arrondissement in which the department capital is situated....
>
> An important point about the career of the corps préfectoral is that there is no automatic direct line of promotion from the ranks of the sub-prefects to those of the prefects....

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[58] Idem.

[59] Idem.

> The career of sub-prefect is today comparatively clear and straightforward, with entry as chef de cabinet and promotion by steps to the grade of hors classe sub-prefect. There it may stop. An hors classe sub-prefect may or may not achieve promotion to prefect.[60]

Of particular importance for the smooth functioning of French administration is the posting of officials in charge of external services of particular ministries under the prefect's authority so as to facilitate coordination at the local level, while those, who recruited locally, remain there. Both types of personnel, however, belong to the national civil service.

The external services which the French describe as "technical services" are called directions départementales, but some have retained their older names, inspections de l'Académie (education), service des Ponts et Chaussée (roads), trésoreries-paieries generales (finance). Ridley and Blondel point out that their officials in practice enjoy a considerable independence, and are generally "members of specialized civil service corps. They move from one department to another and also spend part of their career in Paris."[61]

The mayor is like the prefect, a representative of the State as well as head of his community and can often simultaneously be a deputy to the National Assembly. Elected by the municipal council every six years, mayors often remain in office for many decades. They enjoy a series of independent powers. Able to appoint officials and make by-laws, the mayor dominates above all because of a certain charisma. Modern urban problems have actually increased the glamour of the office.

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[60] Chapman, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

[61] Op. cit., p. 96.

The set of interactions between the prefect and the mayor will determine to a large extent the content of policy at the local level. In this relationship, the mayor clearly enjoys most of the advantages if he cares to use them. The mayor has greater permanence, local support and popularity and multiple contacts with the central administration, through the local elected leaders and members of various ministries.[62]

If he happens to be a deputy, he can appeal to his fellow parliamentarians who may solicit his vote in various logrolling situations. The prefect, on the other hand, is the top law enforcement official of the area (he is in charge of the National Police). In a divided France, at least half of the population will see in him the repressive arm of the bourgeoisie. All the same, he is a bureaucrat and if he hopes to move up in the hierarchy, he had better have his

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[62]There are numerous works on the subject of French mayors and their roles (official and unofficial at the local level). In the English language the most pertinent is Mark Kesselman's The Ambiguous Consensus: A Study of Local Government in France (Alfred A. Knopf, 1967). Also useful are some of the ethnographic studies in English of French village life, the most well known of which is Lawrence Wylie's Village in the Vaucluse (Harper and Row, 1964); and also by Wylie, Chanzeaux: A Village in Anjou (Harvard University Press, 1966). See also Robert T. Anderson and Barbara G. Anderson, Bus Stop for Paris: The Transformation of a French Village (Doubleday, 1965). For a French view of the office of the mayor in French cities and towns, there cannot be more indicative a title than Robert Buron's Le Plus Beau des Métiers (Plon, 1963). See also Charles Schmidt, Le Maire de la Commune Rurale (Berger-Levrault, 1959); Jean Singer, Le Maire et ses Pouvoirs de Police (Berger-Levrault, 1959); Jean-Louis Quereillac, Un tel....maire (France-Empire, 1962); and Pierre Wantzenriether, "Le Maire rural et son sous-prefet," Etude des problèmes municipaux, #6 (June, 1965), p. 27.

house in order.[63] To achieve this goal, he will have to apply just the right kind of diplomacy mixing the carrots and sticks which his office allows him to use.

a. Tutelage and Other Controls

Under the category of tutelage powers, Ridley and Blondel distinguish two types -- those exercised by virtue of the administrative subordination of the mayor, whereby the latter can be suspended for not carrying out his duties or for acting improperly; and those powers of tutelage in which the prefect supervises in the very exercise of the function.[64]

Chapman specifies that while a prefect can have a mayor suspended for a month, only the Minister of the Interior has power to suspend a mayor for up to three months or dismiss him from office. This would, of course, happen upon advice to that effect by the local prefect. Chapman goes on to explain that:

> ....Normally, consistent refusal to perform their duties properly comes from mayors of communes which are firmly in the hands of an extremist party, and suspensions or dismissal involve no change of political control, since the senior assistant mayor is generally designated to take the mayor's place. A strong majority of one party in a commune

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[63] For works on the roles of the prefect, see Brian Chapman, The Prefects and Provincial France (George Allen and Unwin, 1955), and Jean PierreWorms, "Le Prefet et ses notables," Sociologie du Travail, #8 (July, 1966), pp. 249-275.

[64] Op. cit., p. 104. See also Roland Maspetiol and Pierre Laroque, La tutelle administrative (Sirey, 1930); Jean Cathlineau, Le Controle des Finances Communales en France (Libraries Generales du Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1963); and on the subject of local autonomy, see Paul Lambin, "Projet de Defense de l'autonomie des communes rurales," in Departements et Communes (July-August, 1960).

> can make this form of tutelage extremely difficult to exercise; for example, when the Communist mayors of seven communes in the Department of the Seine (Paris) were suspended for three months, all the assistant mayors (who were also Communists) refused to take office, and eventually the Minister of the Interior had to nominate a councilor of the opposition to look after current business....[65]

Chapman gives us some excellent illustrations of other sorts of clashes between prefect, mayor and municipal councilors.

> The prefect can also require the mayor to take steps which the prefect considers to be necessary in the interests of public order, and if the mayor refuses to obey the prefect can take the necessary measures in his own name, even though the law reserves the police municipale to the mayor. Several laws explicitly grant the prefect power to intervene in communal affairs if the communal authorities fail to perform their duties. For example, conseils municipaux who fail to provide the necessary facilities for public assistance institutions or who refuse to provide accommodation for State primary schools, may find their powers of acquisition used by the prefect. The latter provision has been a cause of frequent disturbance in the west, where there is a predominantly Catholic population which resents having to spend communal funds on State schools when it is forbidden to make grants towards the maintenance of Church schools. Otherwise, well-administered communes with sober conseils have come into conflict with prefectoral authority on such an issue, and a sub-prefect, supported by a squad of gendarmerie, has had to brave local wrath in order to extract the keys from the mayor and let the instituteur into the school. He was immediately faced with mass-resignations by the local conseils municipaux, who used the new elections to mark popular disapproval.[66]

These examples are of particular relevance given our choice of policy areas. Tutelage can be exercised in any of three ways:

1. The simple power of supervision allows the prefect to use delays and litigation in administrative courts to make any local decision more costly.

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[65] Chapman, op. cit., p. 126.

[66] Ibid., p. 128.

2. Financial supervision means also that loans and grants that the community needs can be hopelessly delayed. If opposition by the commune creates certain administrative costs, they can be written into the latter's budget.

3. Certain large transactions require previous approval by the prefect.

We will review the powers of tutelage more closely when we examine the financing of services among communes of our sample. Nevertheless, we can conclude that both the importance of the two local executives and the provisions for tutelage provide ample illustration of the unitary concept of the State, where local authorities exist only at the sufferance of the State.

The organization of services. Communes and départements are general-purpose units of government, but even though some administrative duplication occurs, départements have a greater role in some areas (highways) and communes in other areas (education).

The commune, being nearer to the citizen, organizes most services and the département is "left with the residuum." Police and education are two services the State is particularly concerned with. Thus, it regulates them more closely even though they both take up large chunks in a commune's budget.

In education, Ridley and Blondel tell us that:

> "....powers are shared between the central government and the commune. The basis of the division is broadly as follows. The central government has been responsible for teaching staff and curricula ever since Napoleon; the provision and upkeep of school buildings and the employment of domestic staff are the responsibility of the commune. There are exceptions to this broad distinction. Large communes often run schools of their own (generally technical schools) where they appoint the staff and whose curricula they determine. The better grammar schools,

> on the other hand, are state institutions and fall entirely outside the concern of local authorities. For all other public schools, however, the communes are responsible for the school building programme and are therefore able to influence the pace of education development in their area...."[67]

We will have more to say on the administration of education when we consider the variety of services provided by the communes.

b. Social Welfare

The unitary conception of the State implies that the State intervenes actively in many areas of social and economic importance. It also implies that such intervention can occur at whatever level of government, the central administration may choose. This has been the case in the field of Social Welfare which we conceive as emcompassing health and hospitals, public assistance, and Social Security. Hospitals are generally organized at the departmental level. A minimum amount of spending and some responsibility for public assistance are mandatory. Financial costs are apportioned between central government, department and commune, with the department spending the majority of such funds. (In fact, welfare accounts for fully one-half of a department's budget.) Moreover, a recent law reorganized the service and transferred most of the administrative work to its officials. Nevertheless, as Ridley and Blondel point out, "Claims for assistance are still made in the name of the commune, decisions are taken in the

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[67] Op. cit., p. 105.

first instance by a committee composed of all the mayors of the canton in which the applicant's commune is located, subject to appeal at departmental level."[68]

While the evolution of services is undoubtedly upward, that still does not eliminate a sizeable role played by communes willing to meet a need that is far from completely fulfilled by the activities of a relatively weak Social Welfare System.

France has no national health service. There is a national insurance system (under Social Security) which reimburses for medical expenses. There are public hospitals where certain categories of patients are treated free of charge. There is, moreover, a whole patchwork of arrangements which helps the poor and indigent not only in money payments but also in kind (fuel and clothing). These services emanate from the local welfare agencies called "bureaux d'aide sociale."

On the other hand, public hospitals are few. Certain categories of people who are only marginally able to pay are excluded from certain categories of aid. The system then displays a number of areas where additional aid is needed to fill an important need, thus encouraging other units of government such as communes to participate more than is required by law.

The Social Security System through its generalized features as well as through its allocations to large families, and a miriad of other privately operated, but nationally subsidized insurance systems, put money in the hands of the public and make the construction of communal hospitals more possible. Large governmental grants are also available for large capital outlays.

The voluntarism of the system is such that private charitable institutions still exist providing services parallel to those of local authorities. Such institutions may be reimbursed for services rendered to persons entitled to assistance.

We conclude that welfare services can be provided by local government, the social security organs, by the mutual aid societies, by charitable institutions, or by industry particularly in the nationalized sector. The central government provides welfare services for its own employees, for school children and servicemen.

Supervision of standards and coordination of health services lies with the Ministry of Public Health and Population. The Ministry of Labour and Social Security is the other central supervisory administration. It will be noticed how both ministries have two basic functions which seem to overlap and involve a sharing of responsibilities. Both are administrative umbrellas for a host of agencies and services.

We conclude that in the absence of a unified system, such as England's, local authorities have a large amount of autonomy in this policy area. Local hospitals once established cannot easily be eliminated.[69] They acquire the status of a public corporation and although the mayor and three councilors (as well as three prefectoral nominees) are on each hospital board, these develop a large degree of autonomy even from the parent commune.

Their sources of revenue include fees paid by patients, costs reimbursed through the Social Security and Social Aid System and local

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[69] Ibid., pp. 285-313.

government grants for investment. The "bureaux d'aide sociale" are also public corporations and although each is almost completely financed by the commune, and is administered by a committee which includes the mayor and other councilmen, the prefect exercises close supervision, through his nominees to the committee. Sources of revenue are (1) assigned taxes (part of the local entertainment tax), (2) annual grants from the municipal and departemental councils, and (3) income from property.

We will come back to the local financing and operation of welfare services later when we will also consider the special arrangements available in Paris.

We can, however, conclude that when it comes to sum up what would maximize the degree of local autonomy (given what we know of the mayor-prefect relationship), we can definitely say that the commune's size is likely to be a crucial variable.[70] The prefect can afford to be very difficult with a small village, which might happen to be the only Communist commune in the department. He is likely to be more careful with mayors of large industrial suburbs, where even if the whole département and its conseil general are not controlled by the Communist Party, the latter is adequately represented and has many allies. This is particularly likely to happen in the "Red Belt of Paris." Thus, by chosing to sample in Paris and among communes of over 10,000 population, we are hoping to maximize the possibilities for large variances in policy, resulting from greater local autonomy,

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[70] Ibid, p. 107. Ridley and Blondel concur with this distinction between large and small communes.

even though communities of the Paris area are also more closely supervised by the central government. In addition, the higher standard of living of the area makes for larger resources on one hand, and expectations of higher standards of performance from the citizenry. But let us look at how and why Paris is so different.

C. The Administrative Center in a Stalemated Society

One implication of centralized unitary control is an over-development of the political and administrative center, which eventually becomes an economic center too. The site of the political center has a special administrative status in most nations. In France this is motivated even more by the fact that all revolutions and revolts have begun in Paris and ended there too.

1. Administration and Local Government in Paris

Until 1964, the Paris area included three départements -- the Seine, the Seine-et-Oise the Seine et Marne, and the City of Paris proper. The latter has had a special status within the Department of Seine (see Chart II-1). Since the expenditures to be explained in this study were made in 1963, we will focus on the structure prevailing at the time and describe it as if it still existed.

The administrative features that make the Paris area different are:

1. The Department of Seine has two executives:
   (a) The Prefect of Seine
   (b) The Prefect of Police
2. The City of Paris is subdivided into wards which have the name of arrondissement and 20 appointed "mayors."

MAP 1

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTEMENTS
OF THE REGION, 1964-68



Before 1964

1	Ville de Paris	5	Hauts-De-Seine		Seine
2	Seine-St. Denis	6	Val-De-Marne		Seine Et Oise
3	Val-D'Oise	7	Seine-Et-Marne		
4	Yvelines	8	Essonne		

Source: Délégation Genérale au District de la Region de Paris.

Adapted from Annmarie Hauck Walsh Urban Government for the Paris Region, (Praeger, 1968), p. 53.

CHART I

TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS,
PARIS REGION, 1964



TABLE 2

POPULATION OF THE DEPARTEMENTS OF THE
PARIS REGION (1962)

	1962	Number of Communes
Département of the Seine	4,657,000	80
City of Paris	2,800,000	1
Suburban Communes	2,800,000	80
Département of Seine-et-Oise	2,297,000	691
Département of Seine-et-Marne	524,000	533

Adapted from Préfecture de la Seine, Annuaire Statistique de la Ville de Paris et des Communes Suburbaines de la Seine, "Annee 1965," Paris, 1968. Hereafter referred to as Annuaire Statistique de Paris, 1965.

3. The City of Paris does not have its own administrative structure. It functions like a department in that it has an elected council and the two prefects of the Seine are its chief executives.[71]

4. The powers of the conseil general of the Seine Département are enumerated rather than residual. The prefect can act in various policy areas without council approval.

5. All police powers (some of which would belong to the mayors of communes elsewhere) are centralized in the Police Prefect. The Paris police is autonomous of the remainder of the State Police, although still ultimately under the control of the Minister of the Interior.

6. The Prefect of Seine and the Minister of Interior have greater powers of tutelage over Paris and to some extent over the other communes of the area, but the various other ministries and some of their agencies could also intervene if the matter concerns them.

7. The conseil genéral of the Seine Département includes all 90 members of the Paris municipal council. The other 60 members are elected on a Proportional Representation System, from five constituencies covering the 80 suburban communes of the Seine Departement.

8. Elections for the seats of the municipal council itself are from fourteen districts and also under the P. R. System (until 1965).

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[71] These points have been summarized from Annmarie Hauck Walsh Urban Government for the Paris Region (Praeger, 1968), pp. 35-45.

9. The functions of the Paris municipal council were until 1961 largely consultative.

10. The president of the municipal council represents the city ceremonially.

2. The Supply of National Services in Paris

Thus, there is little doubt that Paris is different from the rest of France. It is governed differently. Moreover, the difference is not just a matter of structure. It is a matter of quality, quantity and variety of services supplied paternalistically by that structure to the people of Paris.

The differences in service delivery are of course most easily observed when it comes to the concern that the central government shows for the beautification of the city. This concern dates from the work of the Prefect of the Seine under Louis Napoleon, Baron Haussman[72] to the efforts of the recent Minister of Culture, Andre' Malraux.

Other differences appear from the better performance of functions which the central State assumes in other parts of France also. In education, some of the better, if not the best, lycees (high schools) are in Paris; the universities of the Paris area are better equipped, particularly with better library facilities than in the provinces. The same can be said, although not with equal vehemence, about public

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[72] Baron Haussman is known as the man who gave Paris its present architectural design and the layout of its major arteries. It is to him that is attributed the system of 12 avenues originating at the Arc de Triomphe. He is also known to have been an ardent advocate of the special status (lack of autonomy) of the City of Paris.

assistance (welfare) and housing. Similarly, in public transport Parisians can avail themselves of a thorough system of buses, trains and subways that is presently being improved with the kind of lavish expenditures that no local government could afford. More specifically there is little doubt that governmental services in the Paris area are supplied by a higher caliber of civil service personnel. It is certainly better trained, yet qualities such as courteousness and devotion to the public are more likely to be randomly distributed.

But it is financially that ultimately the difference shows. The Département of Seine accounts for "20% of all departmental expenditures in France (having roughly 12% of the nation's population) and the City of Paris accounts for 20% of all communal expenditures in France (having only about 6% of the nation's population)...." The part of the national government in capital expenditures in the Paris Region is even larger; 54% of all capital authorizations in the area. The City of Paris contributed 14%, and three départements 11%. The sum total of all the communes contributed 12% and other public corporations 9%.[73]

Finally, the Paris area enjoys better coordination and planning of expenditures, and the sponsoring of inter-communal cooperation through a number of organisms (i.e., syndicates for water facilities).

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[73]Walsh, op. cit., pp. 72.

The most important of these, as far as planning is concerned, is the recently created District of Paris and now the Paris Region as such.[74]

Do these differences amount to such a complete divergence in life styles and policy-making imperatives, that as some have said Paris is not France and vice versa? It can be concluded from the preceding that the City of Paris cannot be included in a study of policy choices. The extra-systemic inputs are simply too strong and the local autonomy too restricted. The same cannot be said of the remainder of the Paris area. The caliber and variety of national services available to the inhabitants of the various suburban areas of Paris do not differ all that radically from those made available to inhabitants of other major metropolitan areas such as Lyon or Marseilles. (They do differ from those available in rural and small town areas.)

Certainly, other differences exist (the level of wealth, the degree of mobilization of political parties), but there too, when it comes to urban areas, the differences are a matter of degree. This is why it can be said that Paris displays an amplification of features existing elsewhere. Which features and where? This is what we turn to next.

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[74] Ibid, p. 55-58. Walsh says: "In 1961, the government created the District of the Paris Region....Its executive, the Delegate General, rapidly became a dynamic leader who wore several other hats--staff adviser to the Prime Minister, Secretary to the Interministerial Committee for the Paris Region, and President of a separate Planning and Research Body (Institut d'Amenagement et d'Urbanisme de la Region de Paris). In 1966, he became the Regional Prefect of Paris, a new post....that added to his powers and duties."

The Paris District is neither a general government tier nor a regional council, but a special district with generalized functions to plan, to coordinate, to study and advise, and to stimulate planned development of limited funds.

D. Urbanization: Old and New

Most observers who conclude that Paris is not France, really mean that Paris is not like most of the rest of France, which is rural or small town. Undoubtedly, they are right. Rural France is altogether a different world, but then so is rural England or rural Germany. However, they have neither the economic importance nor the population of rural France. The works of Wright, Tarrow and Kesselman have particularly emphasized how different the politics of French small towns and villages are.[75] Recent electoral turnout data confirm Kesselman's main findings of a decreasing voter turnout in municipal elections as the size of the commune increases (see Table II-5). The same authors have also drawn attention to the consensual nature of local small town politics, contrasting them with the polarized and conflictual politics of legislative elections and those of urban areas.

1. The Two Models of Urbanization

While Paris and rural France are not on the same continuum, urban France presents more than one pattern of development. Again, proceeding

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[75] See Gordon Wright, "Four Red Villages in France," Yale Review, L, (March, 1952), pp. 361-372; also Rural Revolution in France (Stanford University Press, 1964). Sidney G. Tarrow, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Political Involvement: The Case of France," American Political Science Review, Vol. 65 (June, 1971), #2, pp. 341-357. Kesselman, The Ambiguous....op. cit. See also, Jacques Fauvet and Henri Mendras Les Paysans et la politique dans la France Contemporaine (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Cahier #94, Colin, 1958).

TABLE II-3

POPULATION GROWTH BY REGIONS AND
TYPE OF CITY

Region	All Comunes	Suburban Communes
Paris (excluding city)	35.87%	38.06%
Province[b]	32.09%	28.22%
Rhone-Alpes[a]	29.92%	56.48%
Franche-Comte[e]	29.46%	73.33%
Nord[c]	10.90%	18.27%
Pays de la Loire[d]	22.18%	65.64%
NATIONAL AVERAGE	25.23%	35.76%

Adapted from Les Finances des...., op. cit., pp. 79-82.

[a]Includes Lyon and Grenoble. The latter is well known for its high growth and modernism.

[b]Includes Marseilles.

[c]Includes Lilles.

[d]Includes Orleans (medium size city).

[e]Includes Dijon (medium sized city).

TABLE II-4

DENSITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED COMMUNES, IN 1962, PARIS AND LYON AREAS

Communes	Density (# of Persons/km^2)	Population Growth 1954-1962	Income Status	Settlement Type
Highest Density (Paris Core)				
St. Mande	26,505	-0.96	Medium	Residential
Montrouge	21,544	18.42	Medium	Mixed
Neuilly	19,213	7.73	Very High	Residential
Boulogne-Brillancourt	17,022	11.64	High	Industrial
Asnieres	16,723	3.49	Med-Low	Industrial
Medium Density (Paris Core)				
Aubervilliers	12,069	18.35	Low	Industrial
Puteaux	12,205	-0.46	Very Low	Industrial
St. Ouen	11,807	5.39	Low	Industrial
Bourg-La-Reine	9,306	47.84	Medium	Residential
(Lyon Area)				
Lyon	11,553	10.13	Medium	Mixed
Low Density (Paris Core)				
Villejuif	8,531	55.44	Poor	Residential
Fontenay/Bois	6,746	2.33	Medium	Residential
Gennevilliers	3,601	20.93	Very Poor	Industrial
Antony	4,814	87.14	Medium	Mixed
(Lyon Area)				
Villeurbanne	7,260	22.26	Poor	Industrial
Oullins	4,243	20.69	Poor	Industrial
(Outer Paris)				
Houilles	5,980	11.05	Med-Low	Industrial
Viroflay	4,680	15.70	Medium	Mixed
Sartrouville	3,696	29.27	Low	Industrial
Maisons-Lafitte	2,814	18.38	Medium	Residential
St. Germain-en-Laye	704	19.93	High	Residential

Compiled from data in the French Census of 1962 (INSEE) and city budgets.

TABLE II-5

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY CITY SIZE

	Percent Non-Voters	
	1965	1971
Cities of 30,000 to 50,000	25.3	30.6
Cities of 50,000 to 100,000	76.8	32.7
Cities of more than 100,000 (except Paris)	31.1	38.0
Paris	34.7	44.3

Adapted from Frederic Bon and Jean Ranger, "Bilan des Elections Municipales de Mars 1971 dans les villes de plus de 30,000 habitants," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, Vol. XXII, #2, April 1972, pp. 213-236.

through the heuristic potential of the ideal model one can say that the urban implications of the Structured Model are:

(1) Low rates of urban growth.

(2) High densities in residential patterns.

(3) Low geographical mobility (few cars).

(4) Polarized class conflict (large working class in a state of near poverty).

(5) Heavy industry and small commerce.

(6) Center oriented (centritripetal) and a rings pattern of settlement.

(7) Little residential segregation by class.

(8) Strongly articulated parties.

There is, of course, little doubt that variations on that model abounded even in the past. Today, mixtures with the more recent urban patterns create even more variations. This is why it is important to make certain distinctions.

Table II-3 shows how the largest urban growth has been taking place in the suburbs, as has been the case for the United States. It is important to notice that Parisian suburban growth is very much average (even though Paris leads in total growth). The actual figure should be somewhat higher because some growth has also taken place among suburbs of less than 5,000 population. Table II-3 also shows how the Département of Nord (which includes the oldest industrial area in France and the City of Lille) has registered the same low growth rate as that other example of the Stalemated Society's urbanization; the central core area of Paris.

The inner ring of Paris communes represents the old urbanization also in its high density (see Table II-4) characteristic of the European patterns of urban settlement. Stanley Rothman says:

> "In Europe, the middle- and lower-classes could live side-by-side because the vast differences in their States certified that the working class would exhibit deference, social segregation was not in the least compromised by close physical proximity. In the United States, social segregation could be achieved only by physical separation."[76]

But Parisian densities are high, even by European standards. Peter Hall points out that London's area equivalent of the City of Paris (Inner London) has a desnity of 43 persons per acre which is much less than the 114 per acre in Paris. While the highest density in London is 86.2, this is still less than the densities of the upper-class neighborhoods of Paris (i.e., the 16th Arrondissement) and certainly less than the densities of Paris's 9th Arrondissement with its 325 to 365 per acre.[77]

It will also be noticed in Table II-4 that the densities of most of the Inner Paris ring are much higher than those of the Lyon area on the one hand, and of the Outer Paris ring on the other. The Lyon urban area being described here represents a variation on the old pattern which is more typical of urban France than Paris.

E. The New Urban Political Patterns

If French urban areas have been becoming more like the American in terms of growth, density and social structure, can it be said that this change has been accompanied by a similar change in political

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[76] Rothman, op. cit., p. 789.

[77] The World Cities, pp. 59-91.

patterns? The evolution of the French political system and particularly at the local level, provides an experimental case of testing the effect of structural changes. It must be pointed out at the outset that the structural changes brought about by the 5th Republic have had the impact we will show, partly as a by-product of the socioeconomic and cultural changes mentioned above.

The Gaullists have, through the 5th Republic, attempted four major structural manipulations and seem to have succeeded in all four.

(1) The creation of a truly powerful, popularly elected, national executive.

(2) The creation of disincentives to governmental instability through the President's power of dissolution of the legislature.[78]

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[78]The Fifth Republic Constitution grants the power of dissolution of the National Assembly to the President of the Republic. This feature and others of lesser scope (i.e., the requirement of an absolute majority to overthrow a government and the requirement that Cabinet members abandon their Assembly Seat) can be said to have made it more costly to overthrow governments. If we accept Duncan MacRae's findings that instability within the Fourth Republic Legislatures was the result of the volatility of backbenchers and less due to the intrigues of the so-called "Ministrables," then it is plausible to conclude that the power of dissolution would create the most disincentives to such marginal members fearing defeat at the polls. See Duncan MacRae, Jr., Parliament Parties and Society in France, 1946-1958 (St. Martin's Press, 1967). See also Mark Kesselman, "Recruitment of Rival Party Activists in France: Party Cleavages and Cultural Differentiation," Journal of Politics, Vol. 35, #1 (February, 1973), pp. 2-44.

(3) The use of the Two Ballot Majority Electoral System to create strong parties in a bipolar party system.[79]

(4) The attempted linkage between national and local politics.

The first two structural changes have been more than sufficiently commented upon by others and are self-explanatory.

There is a seeming contradiction in comparing the old politics of the Stalemated Society to the new. It is that while the political Stalemate was predicated on an ideological bipolarity and an organizational multipolarity, the new French politics assumes the exact opposite. It is here that we see the divergence of the French system from the idealized Structured Model which we derived from the Austrian Lager.[80] There, ideological bipolarity was also an organizational bipolarity

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[79] The rules of the Two Ballot System are: Any list receiving on the first ballot an absolute majority of the votes cast and one-quarter of the registered voters, automatically was elected. On the second ballot, the list with a relative majority was elected. Voting was restricted to, but one list per ballot. The second ballot contained only those lists that claimed on the first ballot at least 10% of the votes cast. In municipal elections, fusions of lists and candidates between the two ballots were prohibited for cities of over 30,000 population after 1965. For such cities "panachage," which allows the voter to chose among lists and write his own list, was forbidden after 1965. This was not the case in 1959 for which we have electoral data. On the effects of the Municipal Electoral Law of 1965, specifically in creating bipartyism, see Lowell G. Noonan, France: The Politics of Continuity in Change (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 173-176.

[80] See Stiefbold, op. cit. and Engelman, op. cit. For the psychological and symbolic ingredients of the Austrian Stalemate, see Frank Pinner, "On the Structure of Organizations and Beliefs: Lagerdenken in Austria," a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5-9, 1967.

The new politics that the UDR is fostering aims at exactly such an organizational bipolarity (UDR versus Communists),[81] while the mood of the voters is described as anywhere from centrist, to neutral, to apathetic and alienated (see Table II-5). At the local level, voter turnout was often low, even under the old pattern because of the lack of opposition that often resulted from the domination by one party. Table II-5, however, shows abstentations to be on the rise, suggesting new motivations for low turnout, namely the kind of apathy witnessed in American municipal elections. Thus, while we are witnessing some behavioral patterns that show similarities to those of the Stalemate, the motivations can often be quite different.

One of the major changes that make bipolarity possible is the partial unification of the French Right. The Two Ballot Electoral System is not alone the cause of bipolarity, since it had existed through much of the 3rd Republic. In the absence of a strong party on the Right, the Two Ballot System favored the political Center occupied mainly by the Radical-Socialists.[82] The latter was, however, a

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[81] UDR, the Union of Democrates for the Republic is the present name of the Gaullist Party. Before 1968 it was known as UNR, the Union for the New Republic. Under the Fourth Republic the Gaullists were known as the RPF, the Rally of the French People.

[82] In Duverger's theory of parties, the Two Ballot Majority System would have the same effect on party organization and discipline as the Single Member District System with only one ballot. Both systems result in small constituencies which allow mavericks to get elected on their own and with little party help. See Maurice Duverger Political Parties (2nd Ed., Translated by Barbara and Robert North, London, Methuen and Company, 1959). Rothman describes provisions for a second ballot as attempts at "minimax" solutions with voters whose candidate has no chance to be able to vote their second preference.

floating center with little organizational strength. This party has been described as mostly a coalition of notables pooling their electoral organization.[83]

The Fourth Republic reverted back to Proportional Representation[84] which in the absence of any strong parties on the Right favored the better organized parties of the Left and particularly the Communist. The effect of the Two Ballot System at the local level was not immediate. The 1953 election under the Proportional Representation System had featured many Socialist-Communist alliances against a Right composed mainly of the Gaullist R.P.F., the C.N.I.P. (an amorphous alliance of conservative and rural leaders), local action groups, and the Catholic M.R.P. (whose local leaders were more in tune with their right of center electorate).[85] The 1959 municipal elections took place in an atmosphere of determination (on the part of the U.N.R. and the Socialists) to weaken Communist control of municipal councils. This was after Communist representation in the 5th Republic's new Assembly had been

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[83]This is how they are characterized by Joseph Schlesinger in Lewis Edinger (ed.) Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies (Wiley and Sons, 1967).

[84]Until 1951, when after the great increase in Communist representation, a new law was voted.

[85]The M.R.P. is known to have been replaced today by the Party called the Democratic Center whose leaders, Jean Lecanuet and Alain Poher, have already been noticed in Fifth Republic politics. Poher recently served as Interim President of the Republic after De Gaulle's retirement. One section of the Democratic Center has, however, supported Gaullism and is usually distinguished by the name of its leader Jacques Duhamel.

drastically curtailed.[86] The results were disappointing to the Gaullists, but they had one main effect -- they eliminated the Communists from various municipal councils where they were minorities, capable of prevailing on some issues (i.e., increasing budgetary expenditures). Cities larger than 100,000 and smaller than 10,000 remained on the P. R. System. The 1965 municipal elections saw a re-emergence of Socialist-Communist alliances, which continued into 1971 and yielded a national alliance in 1973.[87] The elections of 1959 and 1965 demonstrated the imperviousness of local politics to the national political movements in that the UNR did not gain as many councilor seats and mayoralties as some had predicted[88] given the size of the De Gaulle majorities at the national level. But in 1971, possibly because of the devastating impact of May, 1968, and many years of undisputed Gaullist rule, the UDR (ex. U.N.R.) was seemingly linking the two levels of politics by gaining considerably at the expense

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[86] Although its percentage of the vote declined from 26% in 1956 to 18% in 1958, its representation in the legislature fell from 150 to 10 delegates.

[87] That the alliance occurred and was successful in maximizing Left gains, despite all the issues that separate the two parties (Foreign Policy, Defense Spending, etc....), is testimony of the strong effect exercised by the new electoral law in forcing parties that are ideological neighbors to cooperate.

[88] Most of the UNR gain was among communes of less than 9,000 population. Among works written on the Gaullist Party are Jean Charlot, Etude de Pouvoir au sein d'un parti politique (Colin, 1967), Charlot, The Gaullist Phenomenon (Praeger, 1971).

of the Center parties.[89] The Left was losing ground, but slowly, despite the coalition strategy. With the Right on its way to unification, it was easy to observe that in France, the latter had always had a slight electoral edge on the basis of its small town strength.

The linkage between national successes and local ones is very important to the process of institutionalization in an era when the citizen's interest in politics precludes the forms of political participation of the old mass parties. For the UDR, national success must be translated to local control, if its existence as a party is to be assured. The strategy is complex in that it is two-pronged; on one hand, it proceeds from the national successes, on the other it attempts to consolidate gains made in the municipal elections of 1965.[90]

The two strategies are not identical, for national successes are built with the U.D.R. in a leadership role in a right of center coalition; while local successes necessitate for the most part a coalition of equals where even the Socialists are solicited to participate. The second strategy is a slow process of Gaullist infiltration into Right Wing (CNIP)

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[89] See Frederic Bon and Jean Ranger, op. cit. Results show that the Gaullists have increased their share of the vote in the 193 cities of more than 30,000 population from 26.8% in 1965 to 32.9% in 1971, while the Left parties (Socialists, Communists, and PSU) increased theirs from 33.7% to 35.3%. Since the Gaullists' allies also increased their representation, the great loss was at the expense of the center parties.

[90] That the UDR is indeed a party of the new France is even better understood by examining the social extraction of its adherents, which is not limited to any one social strata. This is what Kesselman shows in his "Recruitment of Rival Party Activists...", op. cit.

and Center (Radical or Catholic) bastions while enticing Socialist mayors whose electorate is changing (becoming more centrist) to join a right of center coalition.

In concluding this description of the evolution of French institutions, we will point out that local government has at the same time been one of the major instruments of adaptation and change, as well as the refuge of the Old Stalemate.[91] This has produced a variety of urban political settings and policy-making styles. In attempting to distinguish some major patterns, we must remember that while the political Stalemate at the national level implied a competitive deadlock between numerous parties, at the local level it implied a variety of political control patterns, from complete control by one party (of the Left usually), to competitive politics with Center parties dominating, to the apolitical, consensual politics of small towns. The superimposition of the new urbanization and the new politics on these three styles has resulted in a multiplicity of patterns which often makes analysis difficult. The last three municipal elections have shown this complexity to such an extent that it was possible for both Communists and Gaullists to claim victory and impossible for impartial observers to make any clear generalizations. We will, however, attempt to describe the present political patterns in French local government through the following typology:

1. Perpetuated Communist Control. In some of these cities, the Socialists have been given some seats on the council, more as part of the nation-wide coalition effort.

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[91] There is no real contradiction here, since no form of political change can truly be called major unless it has seeped down to the grass roots of any political community.

2. Marginal Communist Control. These are cities in the old urban areas where the new urbanization is creating more deterioration rather than any improvements. The Communists sweep in with Socialist support, or replace a Socialist mayor.

3. Perpetuated Socialist Control.

4. Center coalitions with Socialist mayors.

5. Center coalitions with Radicals or Catholic-Democrats as mayors.

6. Center coalitions with UNR domination and mayoralty.

7. UNR Control of Ex-Socialist strongholds.

8. UNR Control of Ex-Right of center cities and towns. These are the cities with apolitical, consensual patterns which now feature a more dynamic leadership and a technocratic orientation.

9. Perpetuated Right Wing Coalition.

This typology, constructed with type and degree of party control of the municipal council as main organizing principle, will be of valuable use in the following chapter when we describe the cities in our sample and the policy mixtures they display.

F. Summary

In this chapter we have looked at French society and politics as displaying a state of transition between what we have called two models of institutionalization and policy-making -- the Structured and the Fluid. Moreover, we have shown that even the Structured Model was only partially applicable to the society and politics of the 3rd

Republic -- the Stalemated Society. The major deviations from that Model can be summed up as:

1. Organizational multipolarity.
2. Relatively lower rates of political participation.
3. Less structured participation.

Thus, the process of institutionalization in France has relied more on the governmental opportunity structures to perpetuate previous hostilities and cleavages.

We have diagrammed the major lines of those structures, at the national as well as at the local level and in that special French microcosm -- the Paris area.

We have attempted to describe an urban system in the process of change from a model that has had as one of its main features a high residential density in upper-class neighborhoods and a limited geographic segregation of the classes.

Similarly, we have tried to describe a political system in flux, with local politics being the last to change. Here, we have preferred to concentrate on the theoretical insights that recent French political change seems to inspire, more specifically, the interplay between a change in structure (i.e., the electoral system) and changes in socio-economic and political patterns (i.e., the consolidation of the French Right). While the study of such interactions cannot be undertaken here, we can nonetheless conclude that none of these changes can be minimized in relation to the others.

Having thus given an overview of the French political system, we can now proceed to examine in what sense our sample represents the features we have described above, and whether we have a good data base for statistical analysis.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter, we want to come back to the two models of policy-making that have guided us so far, and show how they yield a set of testable hypotheses. We then address ourselves to the type of methodology required to test such hypotheses and more specifically, explain the implications of regression analysis. This will necessitate a clear exposition of some of the assumptions underlying a regression model and of the possible pitfalls, one that concerns us most -- the problem of common variances.

Also linked to the choice of methodology is the matter of sampling and the characteristics (i.e., representativeness, variability) displayed by the sample. Some sample variables are presented. In a more descriptive section, we attempt to illustrate in a substantive way the validity of the sample, and explain the choice of variables within the context of French municipal services as performed by various administrations. The chapter ends with a more complete elaboration of the hypotheses to be tested.

A. Framework and Propositions

1. Models of Policy-Making Revisited

We have up to this point made various reference to the two models that have inspired our conceptualizing. As we have previously stated,

these are not competing theories of the policy-making process, they are both part of one theory of policy-making, with its own set of assumptions which we want to outline here. The models have been primarily characterized in terms of policy-making styles, but they also refer to corresponding social settings.

These social settings can also be characterized as Structured or Fluid, by assessing to what extent certain social structures (class or ethnic organizations) determine the life patterns of individuals. Social settings with coinciding cleavages and high organizational membership, will subject voters, elites and political leaders to a few reinforcing influences, while in the Fluid setting of criss-crossing cleavages, no one influence may consistently prevail. Issue salience and consequently, media focus may then play an all important role.[1]

The likelihood is that Structured settings will lead to Structured Policy-Making and conversely Fluid settings to Fluid Policy-Making, but much will depend on the development of the party system and the activities of parties as organizations. This is what we have referred to as political institutionalization.

We have shown how French patterns of institutionalization have displayed striking similarities to the so-called Structured Model, but how in the structuring of political activity some significant deviations and variations from the ideal model (as best approximated by Austrian

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[1] See Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), pp. 45-56.

institutionalization) had appeared. Most important among those deviations was the relatively (in comparison to Austria) unenthusiastic politicization of French voters, even in urban areas.[2]

These deviations are also explainable through the workings of institutionalization in Structured settings. Every increasing hostility would, in fact, have made a rare species of Structured societies. But on the contrary they seem to have had a capacity for enduring even protracted conflicts. This is because hostility is stimulated, but also harnessed, by competing organizations and elites that have learned how to keep the conflict from reaching dangerous levels. At this stage of development, these competing elites having found rewards in the control of specific structures, such as local governments, may not be particularly alarmed by a reduction in the enthusiasm of the voters.

This adaptiveness of organizations has been commented upon by many,[3] but it is not an unlimited capacity. In fact, only dire necessity or threat will elicit any kind of major change in organizational routines.[4] And while they can limit the extent of conflict between each

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[2]The politicization of French voters has been described as weak by Philip Converse and George Dupeux in "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (Spring, 1962), pp. 1-23. But other indices of weak politicization mentioned for France are the overall low organizational membership and, particularly, the declining membership of the French Communist Party.

[3]Huntington's very definition of institutionalization includes adaptiveness of organizations and structures as one of its requisites. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 12-27. See also Mark Kesselman, "Over-Institutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France," Comparative Politics, 3 (October, 1971), pp. 21-44.

[4]See Richard M. Cyert and James March, A Behavior Theory of the Firm (Prentice-Hall, 1964).

other's members and even promote some token conciliation (i.e., such as is happening recently between citizens of the United States and China), the complete overhaul of the institutional bases of the conflict is a restructuring effort that may be too costly to undertake under normal circumstances.

This is all the more visible in the patterns of public expenditures, where the number of token symbolic gestures may be more limited.[5] If the foundations of a political party's strength are built upon policies of favoring one particular class or group to the disadvantage of any other, the party is not likely to change such policies unless forced to do so by threatening circumstances.[6] The same can be said of the political party that has learned to thrive in the climate of consensus characteristic of the Fluid Model. Thus, we conclude that parties are such creatures of habit and routine that they are often found pursuing strategies of consensus, when an electorate has become polarized

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[5] Expenditures are still subject to symbolic manipulations as when bureaus or agencies are created but with relatively little regulative authority (e.g., anti-discrimination commissions and consumer's bureaus). But here too an examination of the magnitude of appropriations over a period will reveal which agencies have only a symbolic function. The question of the meaning of expenditures (as valid conceptualizations of policy) has often been discussed and researched by various policy analysts. See Ira Sharkansky,"Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States," American Political Science Review (December, 1967), pp. 1066-1077. The issue is easily resolved by separating the study of policy-making as such (for which expenditures are adequate dependent variables) from the study of policy impacts (which is a much thornier enterprise). See Brian R. Fry and Richard Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," American Political Science Review, 64 (June, 1970).

[6] By threatening circumstances, we include the threat of civil war, the rise of a Fascist movement or the fear of defeat in war.

(albeit on new cleavage lines),[7] and continuing the use of a phraseology of polarization when it has become meaningless. In both cases we assist at the spectacle of a disaffected electorate, casting ballots equally out of habit, and displaying statistically a partisan spirit, that is not corroborated by the surveys and the polls taken at election time.[8]

2. Assumptions

The implications of the above elaborations are that the two models are to be distinguished more by their policy implications than by the voters' sentiments. Policies and in particular redistributional budgetary patterns, are despite admitted shortcomings,[9] still the most rigorous means of evaluating the activities of parties and bureaucracies and of rising above the rhetoric peddled by such organizations. This statement can in fact be considered as the major assumption on which

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[7] Numerous commentators have pointed out the irrelevance of consensus politics followed by both parties throughout the period leading to the 1968 election, when the Vietnam War debate was at a high pitch of bipolar disagreement. For the view of politics as routine, see Ira Sharkansky, The Routines of Politics (Van Nostrand, 1970).

[8] The United States 1972 election revealed even more disaffection among voters. It is estimated that as many as five million voters may not have voted for President and Vice-President. See Paul Abramson, "Why the Democrats are No Longer the Majority Party," paper prepared for delivery at the 1973 APSA Convention, New Orleans, September 4-8.

[9] See a discussion of the advantages and shortcoming of budgets as instruments of statistical analysis, and the particularly difficult questions that must be answered in applying the policy analysis model in foreign settings such as Italy, in Robert C. Fried's, "Communism, Urban Budgets and the Two Italies: A Case Study in Comparative Urban Government," Journal of Politics (July, 1971).

the policy analysis framework is built. Reformulated in axiomatic terms, it states:

1. Budgetary policies reflect the true policy position of the dominant political party,[10] in proportion to its dominance.

2. Poor people support large spending for welfare policies.

3. Poor people support progressive taxation policies.[11]

Other assumptions of the framework could constitute testable hypotheses:

4. Left parties derive their electoral strength disproportionately from the poorer classes of society.

And conversely:

5. The poorer classes of society give disproportionate support to Left parties.[12]

The above assumptions apply to all industrial democracies, but with varying accuracy. Numerous empirical studies have documented how Fluid Model polities, such as the United States, vary in what

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[10] This implies that regardless of the ideology or party platform, budgetary policies give us the party position because they are the result of the various compromises that are worked out during the policy-making process; they reflect the party's composition and the extent of its dominance over the other party or parties, and its propensity to settle for minimum winning coalitions.

[11] Progressive taxation is defined as any taxation system that places a proportionately heavier burden as one's income increases. See Ira Sharkansky, The Politics of Taxing and Spending (Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).

[12] See the concept of the "class vote" in Robert R. Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Rand-McNally, 1963).

is called the level of "class voting."[13] Moreover, these propositions show how the policy analysis framework assumes that the redistribution of wealth through governmental policy or the achievement of "objective freedom" is the main issue of political conflict in such industrial democracies.[14]

This linkage between class structure, voting behavior and policy outputs was explicity part of the V. O. Key hypothesis on the effects of political party competition, which was to inspire the early work in policy analysis.[15] It is because he viewed the political mobilization of the so-called have-not as being the by-product of party competition, that V. O. Key assumed it would result in increased welfare spending. Conversely, the spuriousness of his hypothesized relationship was viewed as evidence of depoliticization. This has always been a source of puzzlement to me, even though I have seen few objections made by other observers. Why would a Left Party whose electorate consists of

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[13]"Class Voting" is the proportion of working-class respondents who vote Left (or Democratic) minus the proportion of middle-class respondents who vote Left (or Democratic). Apart from Alford's study (op. cit.) there are a number of studies of European democracies with similar concerns. Among them are W. C. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (University of California Press, 1966); Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments (The Free Press, 1967). The extent of "class voting" in the United States has been the subject of periodic surveys by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. See the use made with such data in Paul R. Abramson, "Generational Change in American Electoral Behavior," American Political Science Review, 68 (March, 1974).

[14]Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom (Stanford University Press, 1958).

[15]Southern Politics (Vintage Books, 1949), p. 307, and Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (May, 1963), pp. 265-289.

poor to middle-income citizens, and whose organizational elites consist of labor leaders, unemployed intellectuals, and teachers, spend less on governmental programs when in complete control than when in marginal control, or less than a Right Party in a marginal situation?[16] Yet this is what the hypothesis would predict if confirmed.

Party competition is a phenomenon that varies in meaning and impact with each setting, and at various levels of a continuum (i.e., it may display threshold points and possibly a curvilinear relationship with other factors such as resources). A rigorous study of its impact on governmental spending would be more meaningful within well defined settings such as legislatures or party caucuses, than at the macro-level. This is why we will not attempt to operationalize the concept (a difficult task in a multi-party system), even though it has inspired so much debate in the literature within which this study is situated.

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[16] The example of Sweden is probably the most easily noticed, since the Social Democratic Party there has dominated politics since 1932 and the spending policies that have resulted are only too well known for their thoroughness in comparison to other industrial democracies.

3. Hypotheses

We can now state the major hypotheses in this study.

HYPOTHESIS	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE	CONTROL VARIABLE	RELATIONSHIP EFFECT OF CONTROLS*
H_1	Resources	Welfare Spending	-	Positive
H_2	Income (Personal)	Welfare Spending	-	Negative
H_3	Left Control	Welfare Spending	-	Positive
H_4	Left Control	Welfare Spending	Resources	Positive (Insignificant Change)
H_5	Left Control	Welfare Spending	Income	Positive (Insignificant Change)
H_6	Left Control	Welfare Spending	Resource and Income	Postive (Insignificant Change)

*The effect of control variables will be measured through the size of the change in value of regression coefficients. In other words, the size of partial (b's) is to be watched. (See ensuing section.)

While the first hypothesis is often found in every policy choice study, the second has rarely been tested, partly because it has been difficult to separate the effects of resources from those of need as expressed through personal income variables. We have pointed out in Chapter One that we expect to be able to do so in this study of urban units because migration patterns create experimental settings where a separation between the effects of resources and personal income is possible. One reason why we can expect such a setting is because our sampling universe is confined to highly urbanized and homogeneous areas. Studies of states and regions include units that differ so

radically in levels of industrialization that subtle distinctions are impossible. Even the comparison of large metropolitan areas is subject to the same limitations as these often exhibit radically different settlement patterns.

Thus, in comparing this study's findings to those of others, we must remember that such comparisons are valid only for hypotheses tested in urban settings with similar development patterns. This is also the reason why we will use two samples in testing our hypotheses.

Personal income is hypothesized as being negatively related to expenditures, because it is viewed as an indicator of need. The same hypotheses will be tested with educational expenditures and total expenditures as dependent variables in order to find out whether Left control is a more powerful explainer of Social Welfare expenditures. Finally, the testing will be done among two subsamples to determine how well the Structured Policy-Making Model fits in different French settings. These hypotheses will be restated in more precise terms after the methods to be used, and the operationalization of the variables, have been described. We now turn to the methods.

B. Methodology

Hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between some city attribute and its level of spending could most easily be tested through a "difference of means test."[17] We could, in fact, create as in Tables III-4 to III-12

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[17] A difference of means test is an extension of the t-test which gives confidence intervals for the significance of the difference between the means of two samples drawn from the same population. Thus, as in a simple t-test, the sampling distribution is assumed to be normal. This is best achieved through large samples. See William L. Hays Statistics for Psychologists (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), pp. 314-335.

groups of cities that are differentiated on more than one attribute (i.e., personal income and taxable resources), then test the hypothesis that among such groups, Left controlled city councils spend significantly more than other councils.

While such a design gains in simplicity of exposition, it also limits the analysis to very few and elementary data manipulations.[18] It can be stated that from its very inception, policy analysis has chosen to focus on budgetary policies because they form continuous variables and afford us the major advantages of correlation and regression analysis.

1. Correlation and Regression

The usage of these terms derives from the fact that correlation coefficients are said to express degrees of association or covariation between two variables, while regression coefficients are said to represent the effect of one variable on another; and therefore, allow us to describe a relationship in causal terms. But while the difference between the two types of analyses may sound at first fundamental, they in fact represent different facets of the same technique using the same least-squares mathematical concepts and formulas.[19]

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[18] Moreover a difference of means test in this case would suffer from drawbacks such as small size of groups, non-random sampling, possibly unequal variances and group sizes, which although surmountable as obstacles, minimize the importance of whatever finding may result.

[19] Much of the following discussion here is derived from Mordecai Ezekiel and Karl A. Fox Methods of Correlation and Regression Analysis (John Wiley and Sons, 1967), and Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. Social Statistics, 2nd Edition (McGraw-Hill, 1972). Also instrumental in some areas will be J. Johnston Econometric Methods, 2nd Edition (McGraw-Hill, 1972).

Much has been written as to the legitimacy of implying causation in the experimental sciences, and even more doubt has been cast as to the same practice in the social sciences,[20] but the language of causation compels upon the social scientist a discipline which he sorely needs,[21] even if he does not wish to develop complete causal systems. It is in this sense that we will also use the language of causation.

Among the many advantages of using regression techniques is the ability to introduce many independent variables and ascertain with some accuracy the relative contribution they may make to explaining the dependent variable. But the first step in such an analysis is testing for spuriousness of hypothesized two-variable relationships. The behavior of correlation coefficients upon introduction of a new variable provides a quick insight into the nature of underlying relationships. When a zero order correlation is made insignificant by the new variable, spuriousness is inferred. We conclude that the initial correlation was a product of the relationship of each of the variables to the new variable and not to each other. Needless to say, theory guides the process and determines to what extent a series of such tests constitutes an adequate explanation of the phenomenon under study. In our case, we intend to cap the process with an elaboration of an optimum explanatory model.

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[20] For sources as to this debate, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research (University of North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 5-14.

[21] Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), p. 6.

In testing for spuriousness, regression coefficients have been found more useful than correlation coefficients because they are said to be less affected by sampling errors.[22] Blalock warns, however, that relying on partial correlation coefficients (r's) may mislead us in cases where a particular variant of the developmental relationship may exist.[23] Cnudde and McCrone also advise the use of regression coefficients if what they call a "hybrid relationship" is to be discovered.[24]

The choice between models is the following:

The Developmental

1. $X \longrightarrow Z \longrightarrow Y$

where Z, the political variable, is intervening between antecedent variable X (i.e., Resources) and policy Y (Welfare Spending); and where Z's regression coefficient b must always remain significant. The Spuriousness model

2. $Z \longleftarrow X \longrightarrow Y$

where socioeconomic variable X is causing both the politics and the policies; and where Z's regression coefficient becomes insignificant.

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[22] Ezekiel and Fox, op. cit., p. 62.

[23] Blalock shows that this can happen when the relationships are of the form $X \longleftarrow Z \longrightarrow Y$. Controlling for the effects of Z would yield a partial coefficient of approximately zero value, when, as we can see, spuriousness is not the case. See Blalock, op. cit., pp. 445,448.

[24] Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," American Political Science Review, pp. 858-866.

Cnudde and McCrone have, however, raised the interesting possibility of an alternative to both the spuriousness and the developmental models. The hybrid relationship of the form

3. 

The high plausibility that socioeconomic variables such as personal income or resources may have a direct effect on policy as well as function as antecedents in a developmental sequence which includes political variables, makes it worthwhile to replicate the test that Cnudde and McCrone use in their analysis.[25] The test for a hybrid relationship consists in controlling alternatively for each of the independent variables and noticing a reduction in the regression coefficients of each of the variables in each case. If both reductions are large enough to be significant, the hypothesis of hybrid relationship stands confirmed.

Regression coefficients have one disadvantage, they do not allow for an accurate comparison of the effects of each individual variable. Beta weights, or so-called standardized regression coefficients, allow the quick comparison of the relative contribution made by each variable, because they are computed with standardized data; meaning that each variable has been divided by its respective standard deviation, thus eliminating distortions due to the use of units of measurement that differ in their variance.[26]

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[25] Idem.

[26] Blalock, op. cit., pp. 450-453.

Thus, we see that testing a hypothesis is not simply a matter of comparing simple correlation coefficients with partials. The data cannot speak for themselves. Two particularly interesting possibilities that one must be aware of are suppressor variables and curvilinear relationships.[27] While the two are entirely different phenomena, they may present the researcher with similar manifestations; mainly, initially weak zero order correlations. While the existence of a suppressor effect will become easily detectable once control variables have been introduced and the initially weak coefficient suddenly increases in value, curvilinear relationships can only be detected by trial and error methods, such as plotting each observation on a set of axes or through the careful scrutiny of the residuals.

The examination of the residuals can reveal a curvilinear relationship because they are assumed to represent error variance from the regression line. If we have explained all there is to explain in the dependent variable with our independent variables, then residuals should have a pattern of randomness. If, however, they seem to be related to some exogenous variable, we can conclude that bringing that variable into our explanatory scheme will increase the value of the coefficient of multiple determination, R^2, and bring randomness to the residuals. A curvilinear relationship exists when the residuals are

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[27] See Walter Dean Burnham and John D. Sprague, "Additive and Multiplicative Models of the Voting Universe: The Case of Pennsylvania, 1960-1968," American Political Science Review, 64 (June, 1970), pp. 471-490. On the subject of the effects of suppressor variables and how they can be detected in survey data, see Morris Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis (Basic Books, 1968), Ch. 4.

related to one or more of the independent variables[28] that have already explained part of the variance. The researcher must then exercise his judgement as to what he believes may be the exact algebraic form of the relationships. Multiplicative models may be hypothesized and tested. Through successive data transformations, he may find the most appropriate curve and corresponding algebraic expression.[29] Increases in the total variance explained the R^2 provide indication that a better equation has been found. He can then proceed with the same methods as if he was dealing with a simple additive model.

2. Multicollinearity and Its Remedies

From the above discussion, it becomes obvious that regression analysis is a powerful tool for theory building. There are, however, some pitfalls that are all too easy to fall into, and political

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[28] See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Theory Building and the Concept of Interaction," American Political Science Review, 30 (June, 1965), pp. 374-380.

[29] See N. R. Draper and H. Smith, Applied Regression Analysis (New York, 1966), Ch. 5; and Joseph B. Kruskal, "Transformations of Data" in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (Free Press, 1968), Vol. 16, pp. 182-193.

scientists have not always avoided them.[30] One of these is the problem of multicollinearity which is defined as a high correlation between two or more independent variables. This phenomenon gives rise to a considerable sampling error and makes it difficult to choose reliably between alternative models. Blalock says:

> "The reason why sampling errors become infinite when X and Z are perfectly related is that we can form arbitrary linear combinations of the two simultaneous equations, making the regressions coefficients indeterminate."[31]

Thus, another means by which we detect multicollinearity is a rise in the standard error of the regression coefficients. At the extreme (perfect correlation between the independent variables), least squares estimation yields an unlimited number of equally likely

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[30] Among recent studies that have come in for some criticism are Bruce M. Russet, "Who Pays for Defense?" American Political Science Review (June, 1969), pp. 412-429; and Jerry Hollenhorst and Gary Ault, "An Alternative Answer to: Who Pays for Defense?" American Political Science Review, 65 (September, 1971), pp. 760-763. Another one is Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkages Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," American Political Science Review, 60 (March, 1966), pp. 66-72; also, Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966) are critiqued by Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte in "A Note of Caution in Causal Modeling," American Political Science Review, 62 (December, 1968), pp. 1258-1264. Matthews and Prothro are particularly criticized for allowing intercorrelations of as high a magnitude as (.95) between two independent variables purported to explain Negro political participation. Finally, Fry and Winters, op. cit. are also criticized for multicollinearity in a "Communication," by James J. Noell, American Political Science Review, 64 (December, 1970), pp. 1249-1250 and in John L. Sullivan, "A Note on Redistributive Politics," American Political Science Review, 66 (December, 1972), pp. 1301-1305.

[31] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. Social Statistics (McGraw-Hill, 2nd Ed., 1972), pp. 457, 464. See also by Blalock, "Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of Multicollinearity," Social Forces, 62 (December, 1963), pp. 233-238.

regression lines for the same set of data. J. Johnston explains the problem in these terms:

> "1. The precision of estimation falls so that it becomes very difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the relative influences of the various X variables. This loss in precision has three aspects: specific estimates may have very large errors; these errors may be highly correlated, one with another; and the sampling variances will be very large."[32]

but he adds another set of consequences not mentioned elsewhere....

> "2. Investigators are sometimes led to drop variables incorrectly from an analysis because their coefficients are not significantly different from zero, but the true situation may not be that a variables has no effect, but simply that the set of data has not enabled us to pick it up."[33]

It is interesting to note that these two sets of consequences imply different remedies according to whether one's purpose is the measurement of the net effect of one or more variables or the construction of a predictive model.

The scholar interested in isolating the effects of one variable may prefer to eliminate variables that may be approximations of the same concept, even if the level of explanation is reduced as a result of it (lower R^2). On the other hand, the econometrician may prefer (if other remedies are not possible) to include even variables that may have high levels of collinearity.

But before settling on a specific approach to the problem, we must first examine some of the other signs by which we recognize a level of

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[32] Op. cit., pp. 159-164.

[33] Idem.

collinearity large enough to cast doubt on our findings. Edward Tufte describes some such signs in these terms:[34]

1. Sizable multiple correlations for overall regression appear but with no particular regression coefficient reaching significance; and,

2. Large changes occur in the values of the regression coefficients when new variables are added.

J. Johnston also adds:

> "....estimates of coefficients become very sensitive to particular sets of sample data, and the addition of a few more observations can sometimes produce dramatic shifts in some of the coefficients."[35]

Users of step-wise least-squares computer routines have come to recognize multicollinearity by the fact that values of their parameters may be observed to vary with the order in which they were entered. We will enter our variables in multiple mode (simultaneously), partly because our hypotheses are very specific as to which variables should be entered when.[36]

A crude sign of collinearity has been the level of correlations between any two variables; (.70) and above being viewed as a threshold because more than half the variance explained by these two variables

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[34] "Improving Data Analysis in Political Science," World Politics, 21 (July, 1969), pp. 641-654.

[35] J. Johnston, op. cit., pp. 160.

[36] The specific package of routines used for this study is the Michigan State University Agricultural Station Programs which includes step-wise deletion and addition variants of least-squares routines.

would be common variance.[37] But there can be just as much of a problem when three or more variables intercorrelate at moderate levels (i.e., 50), but again result in as much common variance as is explained.

Johnston citing Farrar and Glauber suggests the computation of an F statistic* for the R^2 of the (k-1) variables in order to discover which of all the variables is most severely affected by the collinearity in its ability to predict the dependent variable.[38]

What are the remedies to multicollinearity? None are too satisfactory. If there is little interest or theoretical reason for keeping the variables separate, the advice has always been to combine them into one through factor analysis or index construction or settle on the use of the most powerful of the variables.

If there is indeed a theoretical reason for keeping the variables distinct, and determining their relative impact on the dependent variable, much will still depend on whether a spuriousness test is required. In

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[37] Some have suggested as much as .85 or .80, but much depends on the quality of the data and measurement. Blalock, op. cit., argues that multicollinearity is a problem because of the error variance existing in any of social science's indicators. See also Donald E. Farrar and Robert Glauber, "Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited," Review of Economics and Statistics, 49 (1967), pp. 92-107. Actually, any particular size of intercorrelation is not a sufficient protection against "harmful multicollinearity." It is more the size of the intercorrelation in relation to the total variance explained (in the dependent variable). This can be expressed as $r_{ij} \langle R_y$; Lawrence R. Klein, An Introduction to Econometrics (Prentice-Hall, 1962).

[38] Op. cit., pp. 163-164.

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*We will rely on the significance levels computed by the least-squares routine we are using. These are derived from a t-test performed for each of the regression coefficients. This is why it will not be necessary to show the value of the standard error of these coefficients.

his study a rigorous spuriouness test is necessary to confirm the effect of political variables on policy, independent of the effects of variables such as resources and personal income. In that case, the only remedy is to construct many indicators for the same concept (i.e., Communist representation, Left representation as percent of total municipal council membership), and use the one that is least correlated with other independent variables.

However, a spuriousness test is not necessary in assessing the net impact of political variables in comparison to the impact of social structure (class) variables. Political theory assumes that the latter encompass and precede the former to some extent. This is why, as described in Chapter One, we will use the variables alone sequentially and determine which yields a better explanatory model.

More radical remedies suggested by Blalock, Coleman and Boudon involve the creation of stratified subsamples out of the main sample, such that the multicollinearity will disappear in one or more of these subsamples.[39] One objection raised here is the same usually made for all stratified samples; that it is difficult to know how other relationships have been affected by this method. But sometimes it is impossible to eliminate all the common variances, even after breaking up the sample.

Finally, a more effective way of dealing with the problem is through the use of time series data. The combination of cross-sectional with time

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[39] James S. Coleman, Introduction to Mathematical Sociology (The Free Press, 1964), Ch. 6. See also "Evaluating the Relative Importance of Variables," American Sociological Review, Vol. 26 (December, 1961), pp. 866-874.

series analysis is in fact often used in econometric studies to solve such problems.[40]

3. Sampling Design

In selecting a sample for policy choice studies which use correlation and regression methods, the concern is less for strict representativeness than for adequate variance. This is because no claim is made that the sample represents anything but its own universe. While this may seem to make the preceeding description of the Stalemated Society superfluous, it is because a distinction must be made between statistical and conceptual representativeness.[41] It is because only conceptual representativeness is claimed here that we have deemed it necessary to present thorough descriptive detail and statistics. If through statistical techniques (i.e., random sampling) we could claim true statistical representativeness, the descriptions would not need to be as painstaking. Actually, various studies of policy choices do not present such descriptions because their sample (i.e., the fifty American states) is coterminous with the real universe, or may come very close to approximating it. But another reason for the lack of thorough description and rigorous sampling procedures in such studies is the ability of readers to judge for themselves as to the validity of the findings. A

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[40] For a recent application of such a combined approach in political science, see Virginia Gray, "Time Series Analysis of State Spending," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago on May 3-5, 1973.

[41] See Hans L. Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology (Bedminster Press, 1965), pp. 128-130 on representativeness in samples.

TABLE III-1

POPULATION GROWTH (1954-62) BY SIZE OF COMMUNE'S POPULATION AMONG SUBURBAN COMMUNES

Population Size	All French Communes	Study Sample
5,000 - 10,000	30.75 (216)	-----, (not present)
10,000 - 20,000	37.94 (167)	26.30, (8)
20,000 - 50,000	43.95 (91)	36.95, (26)
50,000 - 100,000	22.17 (18)	16.65, (12)
100,000 - 300,000	33.20 (2)	14.99, (2)

Figures compiled from a report called, "Les Finances des Communes de plus de 5,000 habitants" (Exercise, 1965); Les Communes à l'Heure de la Region; Ministère de l'Interieur; Direction Generale des Collectivites Locales, Service de Statistiques et d'Analyses Financieres, and from Annuaire Statistique de la Ville de Paris et des Communes Suburbainesde la Seine, "Annee 1965," 1968, and Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques; Recensement General de la Population de 1962 (Résultats du Dépouillement Exhaustif), "Fascicules Départementaux;" Seine, Seine et Oise, Rhone volumes; (INSEE, 29, Quai Branly, Paris 7^{e}, 1966.)

recent study of city council decision-making in the Bay Area of San Francisco was criticized specifically because the sample was hardly representative of American city councils of the Reform type (California's Reform movement having been very unique), and even less of American city councils in general.[42] Given the relative obscurity of studies of French local government, until recently, the description here was necessary to convince the reader of the sample's conceptual representativeness.

The creation of a sample for this study was subject to the combined influences of finite resources and of a concern for the generalizability of any findings. Finite resources dictated that a large portion of the sample be drawn out of the Parisian basin (where more large communes can be found), and more specifically, from the Seine Département whose archives provide easy access to the budgets of 80 large communes. Finite resources and the vagaries of research schedules made it difficult to collect adequately large samples from either the Outer Paris area or other provincial urban areas. To combine them all with those of Central Paris would have created a biased sample.

Another influence, needless to say, was statistical theory, which in the case of least-squares estimation puts emphasis on a minimum sample size (i.e., $N = 30$).[43] This is in order to fulfill the basic assumption of normality of the sampling distribution. Sample size, moreover, imposes limits on the number of variables that can be entered in any one equation without

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[42] See Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy; A Study in Policy Leadership (Bobbs-Merrill, 1971) and Ronald Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics (Bobbs-Merrill, 1971). Also, Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Bobbs-Merrill, 1971). All of these are a part of the so-called Urban Governors Series.

[43] See Ezekiel and Fox, op. cit., pp. 306-317.

TABLE III-2

SOME MEAN*PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES FOR THE SATELLITE COMMUNES
OF SELECTION REGIONS AND OUR SAMPLES

EXPENDITURE AREAS	ALL FRENCH COMMUNES	PARIS REGION	PARIS CORE SAMPLE (N=36)	RHONE-ALPES REGION[1]	LYON COMMUNES (N=7)	OUTER PARIS (N=9)	SUB-SAMPLE (N=18)
Total Operating Expenditures	228.16	276.65	277.61	193.98	259.35	280.9	278.88
Educational Expenditures	51.63	65.65	65.02 (17.04)	45.01	48.29	50.66 (19.90)	46.72
Social Welfare Expenditures	23.02	29.66	34.20 (18.83)	19.68	21.52	19.28 (7.80)	20.32

*Figures in parenthesis are the standard deviation for the respective mean.

[1]The Rhône-Alpes Region includes the urban areas of St. Etienne as well as Lyon.

Figure compiled from a report called "Les Finances des Communes de plus de 5,000 habitants," op. cit., pp. 61, 155, 131-132.

TABLE III-3

MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION FOR SELECTED VARIABLES IN EACH OF OUR TWO SAMPLES

PARIS CORE SAMPLE				18-COMMUNE SAMPLE		
Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Coefficient of Variation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Coefficient of Variation
Dependent:						
Social Welfare	34.2	18.83	55.06	20.32	7.80	38.4
Educational Spending	65.0	17.04	26.21	46.72	19.90	42.6
Total Operating	277.6	85.07	30.64	278.88	135.84	48.7
Independent:						
Income	86.29	55.94	64.80	90.68	37.43	41.28
Resources	367.68	188.92	51.40	325.23	161.69	49.71
Workers Percent	27.31	9.26	33.91	26.10	9.50	36.40
Professionals Percent	4.24	2.76	65.09	3.92	2.78	70.92
Adult Education Percent	21.18	8.78	41.50	21.41	8.98	41.94
Youth Percent	33.30	5.70	22.28	25.02	3.14	12.55
Growth Percent	24.56	33.44	136.15	22.46	11.67	51.95
Communist Representation 1959 -- Percent	35.53	46.27	130.23	18.67	37.88	202.89
Communist Representation 1953 -- Percent	39.87	16.11	40.40	35.22	14.37	40.80
Left Representation 1959 -- Percent	52.69	45.95	87.21	38.52	40.55	105.27
Density (Persons/km^2)	10688	5479.80	51.27	4185	2418.86	57.80

adversely affecting significance levels. This applies all the more when problems of common variances are anticipated.

Thus, even though the eight communes of the Lyon area constitute the totality of all communes of over 10,000 population of that area, it was deemed preferable to combine them with the nine communes of the Outer Paris area into a sample where no systematic bias was known to exist. This decision was particularly reinforced by the comparisons presented in Table III-2. Table III-2 is particularly useful because statistical theory in least-squares analysis puts more emphasis on the validity of the dependent variables.[44]

Table III-2 shows that with the exception of Total Operating Expenditures, all other policy areas justify the decision to create the second subsample out of a combination of communes drawn out of different settings. Moreover, the variability displayed in the dependent variables (standard deviations in parenthesis) is not excessive and reinforces our confidence in the homogeneity of the samples and the reliability of the data gathering methods. It particularly helps alleviate any doubts about the normality of some of the variables of the second sample.

In Table III-3 we find the same evidence reconfirmed. The variability of most of the independent variables is, in fact, somewhat smaller for the second sample. Finally, the ensuing set of tables provide even better evidence of good variability. They show that various segments of each of the continuous variables are well represented, something that even a coefficient of variation could not possibly show.

We have defined as "Poor in Personal Income" cities whose Centime Mobilier (Residential Property Assessment) had a value of 100 per capita

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[44] Idem

TABLE III-4

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF VERY POOR COMMUNES
(POOR IN RESOURCES AND POOR IN PERSONAL INCOME)
IN 1962

Communes	Density in Km^2 (Persons)	Population Growth 1954-1962	Youth Population	Settlement Type	Total Population
Paris Core	7,043	60.38	27.25		
Cachan	8,513	37.3	21.2	Residential	23,293
Creteil	2,628	54.07	30.76	Residential	30,031
Drancy	8,330	21.67	29.10	Residential	64,668
Bagneux	8,950	172.14	31.98	Residential	34,949
Choisy le Roi	7,487	21.60	25.25	Residential	40,552
Champigny-sur-Marne	5,057	54.23	28.34	Residential	56,919
Villejuif	8,531	55.44	25.58	Residential	45,514
Antony	4,814	87.14	27.02	Residential	46,059
Bagnolet	12,023	15.57	24.61	Residential	37,988
Bobigny	5,366	96.24		Residential	36,347
Noisy le Sec	6,083	27.21	26.21	Residential	30,686
Nanterre	6,731	82.10	26.31	Residential	82,089
Outer Paris	6,499	20.32	24.12		
Les Lilas	14,071	5.00	18.03	Residential	17,707
Satrouville	3,696	29.27	26.36	Residential	30,744
Houilles	5,980	11.05	23.23	Residential	26,034
Conflans-Sainte-Honorine	2,250	35.96	28.88	Residential	21,562
Lyon Area	3,650	26.29			
Caluire et Cuire	2,378	22.56	24.72	Residential	25,689
Givors	5,361	14.29	26.53	Residential	16,617
Bron	2,617	47.63	23.53	Residential	24,240
Oullins	4,243	20.69	25.37	Residential	27,109
All Communes (Above)	6,255	45.55	26.18		

Figures compiled from Recensement Genéral de la Population, Résultats du Dépoillement Exhaustif; "Fascicules Departementaux," op. cit. and City Budgets. (Tables 4-11 inclusive.)

The distinction between residential, industrial and commercial has been made taking into account density, growth, income and indicators of economic activity (assessed valuations and size of working force).

TABLE III-5

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF POOR COMMUNES
(POOR IN PERSONAL INCOME, RICH IN
TAXABLE RESOURCES) IN 1962

Communes	Density[a] in Km^2	Population Growth[b]	Youth Population	Settlement Type	Total Population
Paris Core	9,631	20.5	23.94		
Charenton	12,178	1.93	25.25	Industrial	22,514
Alfortville	5,057	54.24	28.34	Industrial-Residential	31,714
St. Denis	7,540	13.43	23.04	Industrial	93,231
Clichy	17,994	0.37	17.60	Industrial	55,383
Villeneuve-La-Garenne	4,232	70.20	36.08	Industrial	13,542
Puteaux	12,205	-0.46	18.58	Industrial	38,969
Auvervilliers	12,069	18,35	25.12	Industrial-Residential	69,521
St. Ouen	11,807	5.39	20.03	Industrial	50,856
Gennevilliers	3,601	20.93	21.38	Industrial	40,911
Outer Paris					
Poissy	2,302	46.52	30.94	Industrial	28,142
Lyon Area	3,745	21.25	26.46		
Villeurbanne	7,260	22.26	22.81	Industrial-Residential	105,189
St. Fons	2,081	12.59	27.36	Industrial	12,700
Venissieux	1,894	28.90	29.20	Industrial	28,656
All Communes(Above)	7,709	22.67	25.05		

[a] Persons per km^2.

[b] 1954-1962.

TABLE III-6

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RICH COMMUNES
(RICH IN RESOURCES AND PERSONAL INCOME)
IN 1962

Communes	Density[a] in Km^2	Population Growth[b]	Youth Population	Settlement Type	Total Population
Paris Core	16,733	9.09	21.29		
Nogent-sur-Marne	8,756	3.91	19.67	Residential	24,541
Montrouge	21,544	18.42	20.43	Residential	44,497
Courbevoie	14,099	-1.69	17.70	Residential-Commercial	58,736
La Garenne-Colombes	15,237	1.17	18.41	Residential	27,072
Boulogne-Billancourt	19,213	7.73	17.94	Industrial-Residential	104.943
Asnieres	16,723	3.49	19.43	Industrial	80,555
Neuilly-sur-Seine	19,213	7.73	17.36	Residential-Commercial	71,636
St. Mande'	26,505	-0.96	16.31	Residential	24,287
Bourg-La-Reine	9,306	47.84	24.55	Residential	17,310
Lyon Area	16,215	9.25	21.20		
Lyon	11,553	10.73	20.31	Residential-Commercial	524.569
All Communes (Above)	16,681	9.11	21.27		

[a] Persons per km^2.

[b] 1954-1962.

TABLE III-7

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERATELY RICH
(POOR IN RESOURCES, RICH IN PERSONAL INCOME)
IN 1962

Communes	Density[a] in Km^2	Population Growth[b]	Youth Population	Settlement Type	Total Population
Paris Core	8,176	11.86	21.90		
Clamart	5,402	19.91	24.09	Residential	47,357
St. Maur-des-Fosses	6,162	7.14	21.75	Residential	69,338
Vanves	16,416	17.40	19.65	Residential	25,527
Villemomble	6,137	12.52	23.19	Residential	24,217
Fontenay-Sous-Bois	6,746	2.33	20.84	Residential	37,719
Outer Paris	3,221	17.48	24.31		
Le Chesnay	3,125	28.75	29.41	Residential	12,996
Versailles	3.352	9.31	21.65	Residential	93,341
Le Vesinet	3,593	13.36	22.51	Residential	18,082
Maisons-Lafitte	2,814	18.38	23.67	Residential	18,969
All Communes (Above)	4,900	14.36	22.97		

[a] Persons per km^2.

[b] 1954-1962.

TABLE III-8

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL VARIABLES OF VERY POOR COMMUNES
(POOR IN RESOURCES, POOR IN PERSONAL INCOME) IN 1962

Communes	Percent Working Class	Percent Professionals	Percent Communist Vote 1959	De Gaulle Vote 1965*	Voter Turnout 1959	Centimes Mobiliers
Paris Core	41.5	16.42	51.01	38.38	44.85	58.21
Cachan	30.8	19.4	42.49	41.4	37.09	71.09
Creteil	35.3	22.4	39.2	46.09	34.80	62.54
Drancy	48.5	9.42	65.33	33.90	51.30	47.16
Bagneux	36.70	25.70	55.41	37.70	31.13	55.08
Choisey-le-Roi	42.2	15.10	45.72	38.40	45.10	56.33
Champigny-sur-Marne	44.40	11.84	54.09	41.80	45.83	64.96
Villejuif	51.80	17.40	62.91	33.66	45.08	44.48
Antony	28.80	27.30	27.97	40.39	40.33	85.36
Bagnolet	45.70	8.94	67.70	32.60	54.37	45.42
Bobigny	50.70	11.80	61.42	33.20	51.92	58.53
Noisy-le-Sec	39.31	17.08	40.98	41.40	51.60	72.07
Nanterre	48.80	13.70	57.90	36.30	41.11	41.24
LesLilas	35.95	13.33	42.01	42.10	53.40	52.47
Outer Paris	40.1	17.02	37.96		46.52	81.03
Sartrouville	40.11	18.53	36.21	n.a.	45.10	93.23
Houilles	39.20	16.40	44.64	n.a.	56.36	71.72
Conflans-Sainte-Honorine	40.96	16.13	33.03	n.a.	44.10	78.13
Lyon Area	42.0	15.39	39.92		42.59	56.11
Caluire-et-Cuire	30.38	21.21	35.85	n.a.	50.70	68.04
Givors	51.07	9.16	56.12	n.a.	55.82	33.04
Bron	40.30	18.70	30.04	n.a.	27.02	68.09
Oullins	46.30	12.50	37.66	n.a.	36.76	55.26
All Communes	41.36	16.30	46.83		44.95	61.21

*De Gaulle Vote in 1965 is the first round results in Annuaire Statistique de la Ville de Paris et des Communes Suburbaines dela Seine, op. cit., pp. 501-502. (Tables III-8 to III-11.)

Other vote statistics from Le Monde (March 27, 1959).

TABLE III-9

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL VARIABLES OF POOR COMMUNES
(POOR IN INCOME, RICH IN TAXABLE RESOURCES) IN 1962

Communes	Percent Working Class	Percent Professionals	Percent Communist Vote 1959	De Gaulle Vote 1965	Voter Turnout 1959	Centimes Mobiliers
Paris Core	44.9	-13.50	48.72	36.60	49.96	58.66
Charenton	31.6	18.3	32.52	44.30	54.70	79.36
Alfortville	37.0	16.7	37.31	38.10	57.92	85.07
St. Denis	50.2	9.7	65.92	33.60	48.05	27.33
Clichy	39.1	14.4	39.70	39.40	55.04	61.83
Villeneuve-La-Garenne	51.8	17.4	31.89	41.30	31.00	48.16
Puteaux	42.4	14.6	35.22	37.70	59.30	56.69
Aubervilliers	52.2	9.8	61.70	33.00	45.35	58.53
St. Ouen	43.5	11.64	65.20	33.90	55.85	67.18
Gennevilliers	56.3	9.0	69.02	28.10	42.04	43.82
Outer Paris	49.8	15.3	39.54		44.90	88.71
Poissy	49.8	15.3	38.54		44.90	88.71
Lyon Area	53.9	10.07	49.68		38.18	62.18
Villeurbanne	43.7	13.55	35.86	n.a.	36.26	82.12
St. Fons	57.4	7.65	40.88	n.a.	50.40	56.32
Venissieux	60.6	9.01	72.30	n.a.	27.87	48.11
All Communes(Above)	47.35	12.85	48.16		46.85	61.94

TABLE III-10

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL VARIABLES OF MODERATELY RICH COMMUNES
(POOR IN RESOURCES, RICH IN PERSONAL INCOME) IN 1962

Communes	Percent Working Class	Percent Professionals	Percent Communist Vote 1959	De Gaulle Vote 1965	Voter Turnout 1959	Centimes Mobiliers
Paris Core	30.82	22.02	31.73	43.40	53.46	96.80
Clamart	34.50	22.5	32.93	40.6	48.40	103.21
St. Maur	27.80	22.2	24.67	46.2	61.60	94.64
Vanves	30.30	25.3	35.56	41.9	51.37	96.29
Villemomble	27.00	22.7	25.45	45.0	52.93	91.42
Fontenay-sous-Bois	34.50	17.4	40.04	43.3	53.00	98.42
Outer Paris	22.89	28.66	21.41		46.10	141.35
Le Chesnay	28.10	25.3	24.23		50.61	179.66
Versailles	26.60	24.0	22.37		46.89	106.18
Le Vesinet	14.95	39.45	16.47		42.59	151.72
Maisons-Lafitte	21.90	25.90	22.58		44.30	127.83
All Communes	27.30	24.97	27.14		50.19	119.60

TABLE III-11

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL VARIABLES OF RICH COMMUNES
(RICH IN RESOURCES AND RICH IN PERSONAL INCOME) IN 1962

Communes	Percent Working Class	Percent Professionals	Percent Communist	De Gaulle Vote 1965	Voter Turnout 1959	Centimes Mobiliers Per Capita
Paris Core	26.32	24.11	26.36	45.01	50.61	152.14
Nogent-sur-Marne	27.04	23.33	27.07	48.00	48.30	102.68
Montrouge	30.60	24.72	31.63	42.00	47.80	118.89
Courbevoie	32.45	21.52	32.11	45.00	52.75	104.08
La Garenne-Colombes	32.10	21.80	32.95	44.60	55.20	104.53
Boulogne-Billancourt	31.80	11.80	32.46	40.90	45.76	146.61
Asnieres	30.50	22.25	26.95	44.80	58.86	130.25
Neuilly-sur-Seine	11.41	36.63	11.57	46.00	43.35	353.54
St. Mande	14.63	30.83	16.17	48.80	52.86	156.55
Lyon Area						
Lyon	31.97	17.40	19.94	-n.a.	42.71	105.44
All Communes (Above)	26.94	23.36	25.65		49.73	146.95

(mean = 86.29). Cities as defined as "Poor in Taxable Resources" were those whose Centime Demographique total had a value of less than 300 per capita. This classification was made on the basis of my knowledge of these cities in order to create homogeneous subsamples for a display of the relationship between socioeconomic and political variables (i.e., Social Class and Communist Vote). These tables provide evidence of the validity of some indicators which were used as best available proxy (i.e., the Centime Mobilier; see next section). Finally, they also provide setting for the initial formulation of hypotheses.

The creation of two samples implies that the outcome of hypothesis testing is likely to differ with the setting. We have pointed out in Chapter Two that Central Paris is likely to differ partly in service provision, but most importantly, in the nature of the political institutionalization process that it has experienced. We have specified that Central Paris is a closer approximation of the Structured Model of Policy-Making. Despite the fact that the Communist Party is much more powerful in the Paris Core communes than almost anywhere else in France, it is less of an oddity there than in provincial France where local politics have been more consensual. This has specific implications for our hypothesis and results in the following corollaries:

H_7 - The effect of political variables will be weaker outside of the Paris Core area.

H_8 - Political variables will have an effect only when expressing the size of the Communist representation.

H_9 - The effect of the level of resources will be all the more powerful.

In other words, Socialists and Communists differ little in policy-making in Central Paris, but they do in the provinces where Socialists are closer to the center of the political spectrum. The functioning of the Structured Model in the provinces is predicating to some extent on the isolation of the Communist Party and the political strategies of its national leaders. This does not mean that the Structured Model would cease to exist if the Communists did not control the Left vote. If provincial politics are somewhat more consensual than in Paris, this does not mean that particularly in the medium-sized cities, the Left-Right conflict has become meaningless. The Communists simply add more rigidity to it.

As far as this study is concerned, we can expect to find a variant of the Structured Model in our second sample.

C. Sample Description

1. The Cities

Tables III-1 through III-11 give a statistical picture of the cities in our sample and provide ample evidence that the criterion of variance, which guided our selection, was indeed realized. An example is the variable of population growth which varies from 5.4% to 172.14% for the Paris Core area and has a mean value of 24.56. Some representativeness has also been achieved in that the mean rate of growth of all the Paris inner ring of communes is given as 22.5 and the mean density as 9,000 persons per square kilometer (sample mean = 10,383 persons per square kilometer). Variance was also achieved in terms of population size (from 13,542 to 104,943 for a mean of 44,940). Our average is not atypical since the cities of the Seine Département are all sizable. We have included in our sample most of the large well-known suburbs,

from the most notorious slums of the Banlieu-Nord (St. Denis) to the wealthiest refuge of the Paris upper-class (Neuilly-Sur-Seine).

We have also included in our sample three cities that became sites for the prefectures of the newly created départements. These are Nanterre for the Hauts-de-Seine in the west, Bobigny for Seine-St. Denis in the east, and Créteil for Val-de-Marne in the south. Antony and Boulogne-Billancourt became sous-préfectures for Hauts-de-Seine while I was collecting data, and of course Versailles (in the Outer Paris sample) had been the préfecture for the old Seine-et-Oise. It has now become the same for the newly created Département des Yvelines.

In addition, some of the cities in our sample are widely known for other reasons. For example, Boulogne-Billancourt in the southwest is well known for being one of the main sites of the Renault assembly plants. Courbevoie on the west bank of the Seine is the location of the impressive new office complex-development called La Défense, which is mentioned by every Frenchman as the paragon of French modernity.

Paris has been undergoing extensive renovation, but somehow most of this effort has bypassed the communes of the Seine. The new towns are being built in the Outer Paris area and particularly in the north (i.e., a new International Airport at Roissy-en-France is three times the size of Orly). Moreover, a lot of the new high-rise buildings and parking facilities are within the City of Paris itself, to the chagrin of those of us who want Paris to remain as it has aleays been, a pedestrian's paradise.

But the area of the Inner Paris suburbs, as Peter Hall puts it, is a "world which the tourist hardly glimpses except on his journey by rail or from the airport or on his ritual trip to the Flea Market just beyond the

Porte de Clignancourt."[45] It is a densely populated area which Hall compares to the London suburban ring.[46]

> ....In 1961 the 605 square miles of the London suburbs held 4,916,800 people at a density of 13 per acre. In 1962 the Paris suburbs -- 144 square miles in extent -- contained 2,856,000 people at a density of 31 per acre....One-family dwellings are mixed with high-rise structures to an extent unimaginable in England, Germany or the American suburbs.... In recent years, many of these have been developed by the public housing organizations known as HLM (Habitation à Loyer Modere*) with large blocks of flats. The resulting landscape is often so ragged and anarchic as to be bizarre; high blocks stand next to still undeveloped weed covered plots. It stands in sharp contrast to the well-kept monotony of British, American, or German suburbs.

Apart from the high density, the two other predominant features of the area are the age of these cities and their sociopolitical structures. Most of the cities have been sizable since the 1800's. By 1890, Aubervilliers, Saint Ouen and St. Denis in the north; Clichy, Boulogne-Billancourt in the southwest; and Asnieres, Neuilly and Courbevoie in the west had reached populations upwards of 20,000. Yet, that is precisely when the first suburban expansion took place in Paris. When the second wave of expansion occurred after World War I (500,000 people were added to the inner ring between 1921 and 1931), large areas were flooded with a proletariat that found itself clashing with the small bourgeoisie which had dominated the suburbs until that time.[47] This Parisian population boom coincided with a general population stagnation in the rest of France.

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[45] The World Cities (McGraw-Hill Company, 1966), pp. 63-64.

[46] Ibid., p. 65.

[47] See Pierre George, et. al, Etudes sur la banlieu de Paris (Cahiers de Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Colin, 1950) which includes separate studies on Bobigny, St. Maur, Aubervilliers and Montrouge.

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*Translation: Dwellings of moderate rent.

The period between the wars was a very divisive era and the political life of each of the communes in the Paris area reflected it. The divisions within the Radical Party representing the small bourgeoisie, the clashes between Communists and Socialists over the support of the new proletariat, and finally, the creation of the Popular Front of 1936 were developments that had deep impacts on the nature of local politics in Paris. Slowly, even though the Communist party structure was decimated by periodic Kremlin originating purges, the disciplined and faithful Communist electorate began to take shape. Some Communist administrations appeared as early as 1936 in such cities as Villejuif, Bobigny, St. Ouen, Malakoff, and Kremlin-Bicetre.

Much has been written on the activities of the party at that time, but the fact that this was the only major Communist Party operating in an unrestricted environment has been largely ignored.[48] With the German and Italian parties forced into a clandestine existence, the French party must have been the subject of special attention by the Kremlin authorities. Thus, it was to reflect the rigidity of the Russian model, and would later experience the same purges that Stalin imposed upon his own party. That it survived such purges and numerous slavish policy reversals, and still managed to expand its electorate in this period is a testimony to the superiority of a well organized party. It would later emerge even stronger out of the Occupation and Resistance. In the municipal elections of 1947, 27 cities of the Seine fell under Communist control. By 1959, this figure had risen to 30.

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[48]For some recent works on French Communism, see Frederic Bon, et. al. Le Communisme en France (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, #175, Colin, 1970). Also, Annie Kriegel Les Communistes Francais: Essai d'Ethnographie Politique, 2nd Edition (Seuil, 1970) and Andre Barjonet Le Parti communiste francaise (Paris, 1969).

That such a dominance creates a world all of its own, a counter-society, is easily noticeable upon visiting one of these cities. Even a cursory glance in the streets of Nanterre, reveals names such as Rue Staline, Place Maurice Thorez, and leafing through the budgets of such cities reveals expenditures for May 1st celebrations which equal those for Bastille Day. Similarly, small donations by the city to funds of striking workers in various parts of France are not unusual. But perhaps a truer reflection of the feelings of the citizenry of such cities was revealed to me purely by chance as I was shopping in a Nanterre grocery, when a dissatisfied customer raised a clenched fist and said, "Ca s'appelle des commerçants....il faut des lois," which translates approximately, "You call yourself a merchant?....Laws are needed."

However, out of the same Occupation emerged the Gaullist forces, and Paris in 1947 represented the site of their most impressive local successes. Relying at first on De Gaulle's charisma, they nonetheless represented a new generation of elites which was later to heed the General's second call in 1958. It was not until 1965 that they too began to understand the importance of organization.[49]

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[49] For recent works on the Gaullists, see in English, Jean Charlot The Gaullist Phenomenon (Praeger, 1971). In French, see Bernard Le Calloc'h La Révolution silencieuse: du Gaullisme au pouvoir (Didier, 1971); Roger-Gerard Swartzenberger La Guerre de Succession (Presses Universitaires, 1973). Charlot points out that the disparity between elections which reflected Gaullist organizational strength and those that were tests of De Gaulle's popularity, declined rapidly since 1965. Swartzenberger claims that it was in the presidential election of 1969 that the Gaullists finally became an organized political force, but that the man who led them to victory in that year had been doing his work before 1968. All the preceding is based on the excellent review article by Mark J. Kesselman, "Changes in the French Party System," in Comparative Politics, 4 (January, 1972), pp. 281-301.

D. The Variables: Choice and Operationalization

1. Data Sources: Budgets

In a policy analysis study, the budget is an important source of data. In this study, it was to prove even more crucial because not only were the dependent variables derived from it, but two of the most important socio-economic variables -- resources and personal income were to be found in the same French municipal budgets.

The data contained in a budget cannot always be accepted at face value. This applies equally in France as in the United States. Even the skill of an accountant would not be sufficient to detect the manipulations to which the data are subjected to by the accountants who prepare them. In the United States, this is an even greater problem since there is no uniform accounting system for all cities.[50]

This presents the problem that an entry in one city's budget may not exist or mean something else in another city's budget. Fortunately for the student of French local government, this problem is minimized by the budgetary review (the "tutelle") that all city finances are subject to. All city budgets, until recently, followed one uniform system of accounting called the B-12 Form and are inspected by the Prefect's Direction des Affaires Locales. They in fact use books with printed entries, subheadings and special accounting pages (where the efficiency of certain city services is assessed). This still did not remove all problems of intercity comparability.

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[50] Some states like California have developed a system of state-wide accounting which all cities are required to use. But there are many other states that have yet to enforce any similar system. All of which raises some questions of reliability of indicators in many of the American state and local government censuses of expenditures and budgets.

The main problem consisted in the increasing compliance of cities with a new system of accounting, sponsored by the Ministries of Interior and Finance and the Commissariat du Plan.[51] The changeover was to a double-entry bookkeeping system, which as a political scientist, I found more confusing than the archaic B-12. The latter's clearly delineated policy areas, such as education and welfare, and the division of the budget into revenue and expenditure, investment (capital outlay) and operating sections were easier to work with.

Despite the uniformity regulations and the printed entries, optional services often vary in the mode of financing and can therefore also vary in their location. Other more easily observable cases of juggling figures were the inclusion of previously collected funds or contracted deficits and the drawing upon operating funds to finance unusually large investment expenditures. The student of budgets quickly learns to adjust his measures accordingly. Following prevailing practice, we used mainly Final Budgets (Comptes Administratifs) and relied mainly on the operating section of the budget for measures of services.

2. The Services

While some services, as mentioned earlier, are compulsory (i.e., primary education), the right to establish new services as new needs arise has always been recognized. Such services may include parks, baths and swimming pools,

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[51] See Groupe Réstreint d'Etudes des Finances Locales, Rapport Introductif sur l'élaboration d'un Compte Financier Prospectif des Collectivités Locales pour 1975 et sur les Orientations Possibles de Reformes des Finances Locales pendant le Vieme Plan (Commissariat General du Plan d'Equipement et de la Productivité, 1970). See also Annexes to the above Rapport, and also "Vers la reforme de la fiscalite directe locale," Actualités-Services, #76 (May, 1970).

libraries, theatres and museums. Some that are more self-sustaining include municipal slaughter houses, cemetaries, hospitals, nurseries for poor mothers, transport services and even public utilities. Garbage collection is supported in some cities with general tax funds, and elsewhere with specific taxes or user charges. Finally, cities also operate stadiums, vacation facilities for the local children, and some even go as far as running municipal shops, savings banks, and pawn broking establishments (the latter are a municipal monopoly in France).[52] In many cases they create joint boards (syndicats de communes) with other communes to run a more efficient service.[53]

> "Local authorities may either regulate public services of an industrial and commercial character" (the traditional French expression for economic services), or they may provide such services themselves. Broadly speaking the law recognizes three ways in which such services can be organized. Services provided by the authority itself may be directly administered by the authority's own staff under the control of the mayor. It is then described as being en regie. The accounts of the service must be kept separate from the general budget, and revenue must balance expenditure. This system is now frequently used for public transport and water supply. Services may also be administered indirectly through a public corporation dependent on the local authority (this is known as an "establissement public municipal" or, sometimes, as an "office municipal"). Communes normally set up such public corporations for housing and hospitals. In this case there is not only a separate budget but the service has a legal personality of its own, with a board directly supervised by central government agents. In practice, these corporations have close links with the parent local authorities. The boards consist partly of representatives of the mayor and municipal councils (or of the departmental councils). Except in large towns, the officials of these corporations may also work for the local authority.

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[52] F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public Administration in France (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 100.

[53] Ibid., pp. 101-102. See also, Joseph Duplouy, Le Credit aux Collectivites Locales (Berger-Levrault, 1967).

> "The local authority may, thirdly, regulate public services, the provision of which it entrusts to private enterprise. The authority enters into a contract (concession) with a firm to which it gives the right to operate the service."

In our operationalization of policy variables, we attempted to form distinct spending categories. This entailed decisions as to which entries truly belonged in educational spending and which in social welfare (assistance publique). Some school services such as school lunch programs seem to belong more in social welfare, but we deemed it important to have welfare spending reflect purely redistributive policies. The existence of sizable grants from the central state to encourage such programs made this budgetary entry more similar to the spending for primary schools.

Another thorny question was the matter of user financed services as opposed to those financed from general funds. While data was gathered that would have allowed such differentiations, we eventually discovered that the user charges were not all that substantial for the services under consideration. In the final analysis, it can also be argued that since it is non-Communist municipalities which resort to that form of service financing, omission of such a variable does not weaken our hypothesis while we gain in simplicity of exposition. As for educational policy, we decided to operationalize it in per capita terms to facilitate comparability. Expressing it in per pupil terms seems to eliminate whatever variance may be reflected in the spending of low income communities that have large youth populations (not a rare occurrence). Moreover, it is always possible to introduce the size of the youth population as an additional independent variable in the equation.

3. Revenue Sources

There are four main sources of funds for the financing of services. As elsewhere, taxation is the predominant form. User's fees and revenue from concessions is another. Central grants-in-aid and loans constitute almost all the funds used in capital outlay. Most of the grants-in-aid pertaining to operational expenditures (called Répartitions) are allocated for the operation of the compulsory primary education system. Grants-in-aid for investment purposes (called Subventions) are policy specific and linked to equally policy specific loans. In general, it can be concluded that the size of grants-in-aid is miniscule in relation to the total budget, particularly the operating part of it, and in comparison with American municipalities. But, we must remind the reader that in a unitary state, many of the local services are supplied directly by the central state (or by an administrative unit such as the departement). To some extent this may give municipalities more freedom to operate certain additional services with greater freedom.

French cities are not allowed to borrow on the open market and float bonds. Most loans are granted by one central governmental organism called Caisse des Dépots et Consignations according to a set of regulations which establish priority areas such as education, hospital construction, and cultural development.[54] The laws and by-laws by which such loans are granted equal in complexity the American Tax Code, and sufficient loopholes exist for each municipality to get funds for all sorts of purposes. To a large extent the ability of any one municipality to qualify for funds will be more

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[54] More recently the rule against borrowing on the open market has been relaxed, and in 1966 a new organism was established to cater specifically to the problem of local underfinancing. The Caisse d'Aide a l'équipement des collectivités locales will manage local authority bonds, make regional issues, and utilize funds temporarily unspent. See Ridley and Blondel, op. cit., p. 355.

a function of its determination and the quality of its bureaucracy than of the priorities set by the laws. Mark Kesselman has hypothesized that Communist municipalities which indeed have a greater determination for more revenue in general (given their high level of need) and are well-known for the diligence of their bureaucracy, are likely to be able to extract more funds from the central government than non-Communist municipalities.[55] We will test that hypothesis.

Anne Marie Hauck Walsh gives us an idea of the distribution of capital expenditures in the Paris Region:[56]

> The national government invests directly the largest amount of public capital expenditure in the Paris Region, with the City of Paris supplying the second greatest amount of capital. In 1962, of total capital authorizations by government in the Region, roughly 54% was by the national government, 14% by the City of Paris, 12% by all other communes, 11% by the three departments, 7% by the district, and 2% by local special districts and public corporations. The City of Paris accounted for two-thirds of communal operating expenditure in the Region.
>
> Central government dominance of financial resources appears even greater upon analysis of the revenue sources from which local expenditures are made. Local taxes accounted for about 45% of department operating revenues in the Paris Region in 1960. Some 25% was dervied from national funds, and most of the remainder came from contributions from national, and to some extent from local, units for particular services, notably social security and public assistance programs. About 17% of communal operating revenues in the urban area were from higher government funds (remboursements, subventions) in 1960 and 1962.

4. Taxation

Local authorities are given the choice between a variety of taxes. The two forms of taxation that provide the bulk of tax revenue are a set

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[55] The Ambiguous Consensus (Knopf, 1967), p. 25.

[56] Urban Government for the Paris Region (Praeger, 1968), pp. 71-72.

of property taxes called centimes additionels and a sales tax called taxe locale.

The centimes are a peculiar French institution. In the 19th Century, all taxation (national and local) was based on the occupation or ownership of real estate. Local taxes amounted to but an addition of a few centimes (mils) of assessed valuation to the larger amount collected by the State.

These types of taxable property were unimproved real estate (not built upon), improved real estate, personal property (residential) and patantes (industrial property). It is the central government that changes the assessed valuation every year and the city council decides whether more centimes should be levied on the basis of anticipated financial needs. The number of centimes[57] is a good indicator of the tax burden in that community.

The other important tax is the Taxe Locale, a transaction tax on services, wholesale and retail sales. The rate varies somewhat but does not exceed 2.75%. From the yield of this tax a national equalization fund (Fonds de Perequation) is formed. Annemarie Hauck Walsh says:[58]

> "A national equalization fund absorbs 10%. Prior to 1964, another 35% went into a Department of Seine equalization fund. The remainder is returned to the commune of collection.
>
> "The equalization funds have failed to offset substantially the inherent bias of this tax against the rapidly growing suburban residential communes, which must levy far higher rates of 'additional centimes' in order to provide lower levels of public services than communes in the urban center. This prevailed in spite of the fact that Seine made contributions from its own equalization fund to Seine-et-Oise and Seine-et-Marne."

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[57] The number of centimes must be distinguished from the value of a centime.

[58] Op. cit., p. 74.

But it continued on behalf of the local governments to set the assessment for each of the four types of taxable property and to collect the revenue for what came to be called the centimes additionels.

Ridley and Blondel point out that the tax had a particularly bad effect on authorities with little commercial activity, which had to increase their direct taxation, thus, discouraging new industrial locations and placing them at a yet greater disadvantage.[59]

Recent reforms have radically changed the local taxation system. Since France had to comply with common market fiscal policy and use the "value-added" tax for national purposes, the Taxe Locale was abolished and the localities were given another taxation system that the State had just vacated -- the Taxe sur les Salaires (a form of income tax). Again, the localities were given a field of taxation which had already been systematized and organized by the State.[60]

For our purposes of measurement construction, the knowledge that a central government is responsible for a uniform tax assessment which (for the centimes) is also impervious to inflation[61] is sufficiently reassuring to offset certain criticisms and disadvantages.

There is little doubt that the value of the centimes per capita (centime demographique) is a valid measure of the concept of taxable resources. If, as has been charged, the centimes tend to undervalue

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[59] Op. cit., p. 354.

[60] Ibid., pp. 353-354. It is interesting to note that Communist municipalities will now have to raise funds from a more visible and thus more painful taxation source. The Taxe Locale never appeared on one's sales slip.

[61] Some of the values are estimated in relation to what they would have been in 1916; thus, a base year is always chosen to eliminate the effects of inflation which in France have often been severe. See Jean de Savigny, L'Etat contre les Communes? (Seuil, 1970).

certain forms of property (i.e., recent apartment buildings), they are still the bases on which policy-makers[62] rely to formulate spending policies.

The measure of personal income was derived from the assessment on personal property (mostly residential) called centime mobilier. It was adopted because it was found to have been used by the central government in various studies of local governmental finance, as a measure of per capita income.[63] The actual measure used by such studies was called centime menage. The centime mobilier figured foremost in the computations. Testing an approximation of that measure on a subsample of the Paris communes, we discovered that the measure correlated so well with the centime mobilier as to be indistinguishable. Moreover, we also found it to correlate well (as it should) with measures of social structure such as percent working-class. Finally, it seemed to give accurate reflection to the relative differences in wealth as I intuitively perceived them while on the field.

The centimes are, despite their defects, excellent measures of resources, personal income and industrialization (i.e., the patante). In comparison, students of American local government areas often have to contend with data on assessed valuation which are as reliable as the local assessor's need to hide a tax increase.

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[62] De Savigny, op. cit., pp. 147-150.

[63] See Service de Statisiques et d'Analyses Financieres, Contribution a l'Analyse Financiere des Budgets Communaux par la Methode des Ratios (Ministere de l'Interieur, Direction Generales des Collectivities Locales, 2eme Edition, September, 1969), p. 26.

The Political Variables. We decided to operationalize the party control variable in terms of Left Party control, since it is more justifiable to say that Left Parties form a continuum.

Data sources for political variables came from the newspaper Le Monde, which prints a detailed breakdown of municipal elections in the Paris area, and some results from the large communes of the other départements of France.

The advantage in using Le Monde consists in the fact that the newspaper reveals the true political composition of the various lists that compete for French local offices. Any other official source (i.e., the Conseil Constitutionel) would only reveal the meaningless labels that each list uses to claim that they represent local interests.

The Ministry of Interior keeps its own records but would rarely reveal them for fear of complaints by the candidates of any of the lists.

The electoral laws prevailing at the time (1963) of analysis were the following:[64]

1. Members of municipal councils were elected by universal suffrage for terms of six years each.

2. All communes whose populations did not exceed 120,000 elected municipal councilors by list voting on a majority basis with two ballots.

3. Panachage was allowed. This allows the voters to choose among several lists, each choice constituting a fraction of a vote. If he wishes he can write his own list. This was not allowed in the 1953 municipal elections which took place under the Proportional Representation system.

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[64] Lowell G. Noonan, France: The Politics of Continuity and Change (Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp. 158 and 173. See note on Panachage.

4. In cities of over 120,000 population, elections were by Proportional Representation. The method of the highest average (which is more favorable to large parties) has always been used in France.

Our political variables were operationalized both in terms of a party's voting strength and a party's representational strength on the city council. Moreover, we measured only the Communist Party's strength and combined Socialist and Communist strength into a Left vote and Left representation variable.

Finally, voter turnout was operationalized through two indicators, one based on the size of the adult population (the eligible voters) and the other based on the number of registered voters. We used the first more extensively as it seemed to be a more valid measure of turnout.

Social Structure Variables. Here again, two indicators for each of the two variables were formed. The two variables are: size of the working-class and size of the so-called professional-class. One set of indicators uses the number of people in these "socioprofessional categories" as the French Census of 1962 calls them. The other set uses the number of households whose head is in the given category. Data for other categories, such as employees, small artisans and entrepreneurs was available and used on our pilot study of 14 cities. When they failed to provide any additional differentiations, we chose the two variables mentioned above. They varied inversely as social theory predicts. We can now state the hypotheses in operational form. One further clarification is needed, however. We will use the terms Resources and Income even though the indicators are the centime demographique and the centime mobilier respectively.

TABLE III-12

LIST OF VARIABLES AND LABELS

1. ADED: Adult Education. Percent of the adult population (over 18 years of age) with a secondary degree and equivalent or higher education.
2. ADUNED: Adult Illiteracy. Percent of the adult population (over 18 years of age) with no more than a primary school education.
3. Adm.Sp.: Administrative Expenditures per capita in 1963.
4. Bus.Tax.: Business Tax Revenue per capita in 1963 (Taxe Professionelle)
5. CIST59: Communist Vote in 1959. Percent of total vote for the Communist Party in the municipal election of March 1959.
6. CISTRP59: Communist Representation in 1959. Percent of municipal council seats controlled by the Communist Party as a result of the municipal elections of March 1959.
7. CISTRP53: Communist Representation in 1953. Percent of municipal council seats controlled by the Communist Party as a result of the municipal elections of March 1953 (Proportional Representation).
8. DENS.: Density of city population. Inhabitants per km^2.
9. Ed.Sp.: Educational Expenditures in 1963.
10. GROWTH: Growth rate of the population (period: 1954-1962).
11. Inv.Sp.: Total Investment Expenditures per capita in 1963 (Capital Outlays).

12. I: Personal Income. Per capita assessed valuation of residential property in 1963 (Centimes Mobiliers).
13. LFT59: Left Vote in 1959. Percent of total vote for Communist Socialist parties combined.
14. LEFTRP59: Left Representation. Percent of municipal council seats controlled by the Communist and Socialist parties combined, as a result of the municipal election of 1959.
15. PRO: Professionals. Percent of adult population (over 18 years of age), classified as holding jobs in the professions in 1962.
16. POP62: Population in 1962. City population in 1962.
17. REPART: Grants for Operating Expenditures per capita in 1963 (Repartitions).
18. R: Taxable Resources per capita in 1963 (Centimes Demographiques).
19. S.W.Sp.: Social Welfare Expenditures per capita in 1963.
20. SUBV: Grants for Investment Expenditures per capita in 1963 (Subventions).
21. Tot.Sp.: Total Operating Expenditures per capita in 1963.
22. TRNOUT: Voter Turnout. Percent of adult population (over 18 years of age) eligible to vote, voting in the municipal elections of 1959.
23. W: Workers. Percent of adult population (over 18 years of age) classified as skilled and unskilled workers in 1962.
24. YOUTH: Youth population. Percent of a city's population of school age (5 - 18 years of age).

E. Operational Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Control Variable(s)	Relationship
H_1	Resources	S.W.Sp.	-	Positive
H_2	Income	S.W.Sp.	-	Negative
H_3	LEFTRP59	S.W.Sp.	-	Positive
H_4	LEFTRP59	S.W.Sp.	Resources	Positive Insignificant Change
H_5	LEFTRP59	S.W.Sp.	Income	Positive Insignificant Change
H_6	LEFTRP59	S.W.Sp.	(R) and (I)	Positive Insignificant Change
H_7	CISTRP59	S.W.Sp.	Resources	Positive Insignificant Change
H_8	CISTRP53	S.W.Sp.	Resources	Positive Insignificant Change
H_9	CISTRP59	S.W.Sp.	(R) and (I)	Positive Insignificant Change
H_{10}	CISTRP53	S.W.Sp.	(R) and (I)	Positive Insignificant Change
H_{11}	LEFTRP59	S.W.Sp.	Workers	Positive, Decreased but remains significant
H_{12}	LEFTRP59	S.W.Sp.	(R) and (W)	Positive, Decreased but remains significant
H_{13}	Income	S.W.Sp.	Workers	Not significant
H_{14}	Youth	Ed.Sp.	-	Positive
H_{15}	Resources	Ed.Sp.	-	Positive
H_{16}	Income	Ed.Sp.	-	Negative
H_{17}	LEFTRP59	Ed.Sp.	-	Positive
H_{18}	Youth	Ed.Sp.	Resources	Positive (Increased)

Hypothesis	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Control Variable(s)	Relationship
H_{19}	Resources	Ed.Sp.	Youth	Positive (Weak) but Increased
H_{20}	Income	Ed.Sp.	Youth	Insignificant Change
H_{21}	Youth	Ed.Sp.	Income	Positive (Decreased) Made Significant
H_{22}	Youth	Ed.Sp.	(I) and (R)	Positive (Increased)
H_{23}	LEFTRP59	Ed.Sp.	Youth	Positive (Weak)
H_{24}	LEFTRP59	Ed.Sp.	(Y) and (R)	Not Significant
H_{25}	LEFTRP59	Ed.Sp.	(I) and (R)	Positive (Weak)
H_{26}	LEFTRP59	Ed.Sp.	(I), (Y) and (R)	Not Significant
H_{27}	CISTRP59	Ed.Sp.	(Y) and (R)	Positive (Weak)
H_{28}	CISTRP59	Ed.Sp.	(I), (Y) and (R)	Not Significant
H_{29}	CISTRP53	Ed.Sp.	(I), (Y) and (R)	Positive (Weak)
H_{30}	Resources	Tot.Sp.	-	Positive
H_{31}	Income	Tot.Sp.	-	Negative
H_{32}	LEFTRP59	Tot.Sp.	-	Positive
H_{33}	LEFTRP59	Tot.Sp.	Resources	Positive (Decreased)
H_{34}	LEFTRP59	Tot.Sp.	Income	Positive Insignificant Change
H_{35}	LEFTRP59	Tot.Sp.	(R) and (I)	Positive (Weak) Made Significant
H_{36}	CISTRP59	Tot.Sp.	Resources	Positive (Increased)
H_{37}	CISTRP53	Tot.Sp.	Resources	Positive (Increased)
H_{38}	CISTRP59	Tot.Sp.	(R) and (I)	Positive Remains Significant
H_{39}	CISTRP53	Tot.Sp.	(R) and (I)	Positive Remains Significant

Hypothesis	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Control Variable(s)	Relationship
H_{40}	CISTRP53	REPART	(R) and (I)	Positive Remains Significant
H_{41}	CISTRP53	SUBV	(R) and (I)	Positive (Weak)
H_{42}	CISTRP53	Bus.Tax.	(R) and (I)	Positive Remains Significant
H_{43}	CISTRP53	Adm.Sp.	(R) and (I)	Not Significant

*(Increased) and (Decreased) mean that the relationship has been strengthened or weakened upon introduction of a control variable; it may still, however, be strong. (Weak) does not involve comparisons.

CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS (PART ONE)

In this first reporting of the results of the data analysis, we will as previously stated, focus on the subsample of 36 cities of the Inner Paris urban ring; also alternatively referred to as the Paris Core area.

The data analysis will proceed in five stages. The first stage will consist of a preliminary perusal of budgetary trends, viewed through a partisan control breakdown. Means and averages for grouped data will help us draw some initial generalizations. Zero order correlation coefficients between independent and dependent variables will also be used to ascertain the internal validity of our research design.

The subsequent three stages will entail a rigorous testing of the hypotheses pertinent to each of the three main policy areas chosen: Social Welfare, Education and Total Operating Expenditures. Such a testing can best be described as consisting of two phases. The first is a series of spuriousness tests which isolate the more powerful explanatory and statistically significant variables and indicators, and the second phase can then specify the optimal combination of variables and explanatory model.

TABLE IV-1

SELECTED PER CAPITA POLICY AREAS OF 54 FRENCH CITIES, GROUPED BY TYPE OF PARTISAN CONTROL OF MUNICIPAL COUNCILS IN 1963

Number of Cities	Partisan Control	S.W.Sp.[a]	Ed.Sp.[b]	Tot.Sp.[c]	REPART[d]	SUBV[e]
17	Communist	43.658	72.704	309.866	15.298	37.784
10	Socialist	29.355	52.045	280.987	9.727	14.894
8	Center Left	27.900	56.030	264.540	9.542	12.324
11	Gaullist	18.200	55.351	267.080	7.412	28.701
8	Conservative	19.537	45.866	236.768	9.464	21.669
19	Right	18.762	51.357	254.317	8.276	25.740
54	All Cities	30.527	58.937	278.109	10.872	25.538

See Table III-12 for a list of the variables and their labels.

[a]Social Welfare Spending.

[b]Educational Spending.

[c]Total Operating Expenditures.

[d]Grants-in-Aid for Operating Expenditures.

[e]Grants-in-Aid for Investment Expenditures.

NOTE: The Right Category is made up of Gaullist and Conservative cities combined. The Center Left Category describes cities whose municipal council is controlled by a coalition of Socialists, Radical Socialists, Christian Democrats, and Left Gaullists, where no one party affiliation prevails. Various combinations are possible.

TABLE IV-2

SELECTED PER CAPITA POLICY AREAS OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES, GROUPED BY TYPE OF PARTISAN CONTROL OF MUNICIPAL COUNCILS IN 1963

Number of Cities	Partisan Control	S.W.Sp.[a]	Ed.Sp.[b]	Tot.Sp.[c]	REPART[d]	SUBV[e]
14	Communist	47.125	76.674	319.160	14.457	39.203
5	Socialist	38.308	62.789	291.291	10.260	6.053
5	Center Left	31.787	63.751	267.469	10.012	11.363
8	Gaullist	19.017	52.527	214.134	6.467	28.122
4	Conservative	20.333	53.847	255.729	10.012	11.503
12	Right	19.455	52.967	228.000	7.649	22.581
36	All Paris Cities	34.201	65.021	277.612	10.659	25.194

See Table III-12 for a list of the variables and their labels.

[a]Social Welfare Spending.

[b]Educational Spending.

[c]Total Operating Expenditures.

[d]Grants-in-Aid for Operating Expenditures.

[e]Grants-in-Aid for Investment Expenditures.

NOTE: The Right Category is made up of Gaullist and Conservative cities combined. The Center Left Category describes cities whose municipal council is controlled by a coalition of Socialists, Radical Socialists, Christian Democrats, and Left Gaullists, where no one party affiliation prevails. Various combinations are possible.

Finally, the fifth stage will consider two other interesting policy areas: Business Taxation and Grants-in-Aid, which also display the impact of party control.

A. Expenditure Patterns

Even though Tables IV-1 and IV-2 outline only some very general patterns of spending and grant allocation, they already provide indications as to the nature of the hypothesized relationships.

Both tables show that Social Welfare Spending (S.W.Sp.) follows a Left to Right continuum more closely than any other policy area. The correspondence is not as strong for the Center to Right segment of the continuum. Gaullist cities are seemingly spending less than Conservative cities. This effect, however, could possibly be due to the fact that the Left Wing elements of the Gaullist party, UNR, are more likely to be found in Center-Left coalitions. Gaullist dominated cities are therefore controlled by the Right Wing elements of that party. Moreover, most Gaullist cities are rich in personal income and likely to have less need for large welfare spending.

The spending variances between Communist and Socialist cities seem in fact to be as marked as those between Right and Left. This observation applies all the more to policy areas such as Education and Total Operating Expenditures and even Grants-in-aid. Communist cities present such a distinctly different pattern of spending and revenue collection that we will have to devote special attention to them.

It can also be observed that Total Operating Expenditures exhibit a pattern somewhat in-between that of Social Welfare and Education.

This is understandable since these two areas account for one-fourth to more than a-third of Total Expenditures. In the field of Education, any correspondence between spending and a Left to Right continuum seems to be non-existent except for Communist cities.

Tables IV-1 and IV-2 also show that Grants-in-Aid for Operating Expenditures tend to be higher when the party in power is more Left. Controls for possible intervening variables are, however, needed if we are to make definitive conclusions. These grants are usually given to help pay for ongoing educational programs, so that the high level received by Communist cities may be the result of their larger than average youth populations. This, incidentally, could explain their higher educational spending.

Similarly, Communist cities have high population growth rates, which could explain their larger than average grants for Investment Expenditures. These figures, nevertheless, point out that Communist administrations avail themselves of all the central funds they can possibly qualify for. It is interesting to note that Gaullist administrations seem equally diligent in seeking central funds (for investment purposes) even though they spend less than all other cities, in specific policy areas. This leads us to speculate that the low spending level and few Operating Expenditure Grants of Gaullist cities may partly be a function of the relative newness of the Gaullist ascendancy in 1963.

We also speculate that Gaullist ideology implies a greater activism in governmental spending than that displayed by the old traditional Right. Were we to observe the spending levels of Gaullist cities today, after a long stay in power, we probably might not find as great a difference between them and Communist cities. This is not to deny that their spending priorities and even more, the means of financing services (i.e.,

user charges), might not still display diverging patterns. But the spending policies of each of the major French parties are a somewhat peripheral concern to this study.

B. Zero Order Relationships

Turning now to the intercorrelations among the various independent variables (Table IV-3), we discover how well they describe the situational nexus of this study. We begin with the correlations between the Income indicator and other similar socioeconomic variables such as Workers, Professionals, Adult Education, as well as with the various political indicators.

These correlations enhance the validity of the Income indicator. The almost exact reverse relationships observed confirm these indicators as mirror images of each other, even though they were arrived through different data sources.

The low correlation between Income and Resources on the other hand (.31), justifies the conceptual distinction that we have insisted on drawing in this study of cities, where migration creates industrial strongholds with poor populations and a rich tax base.

As for the political variables, it must be noted at the outset that voter turnout has weak and insignificant correlations with indicators of party control. In fact, the only variables that are significantly correlated (negatively) with turnout are Youth and Growth. These often characterize the process of political institutionalization because cities with newly arrived large families have a weak political organization.

TABLE IV-3

INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN SIXTEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
(36 PARIS CORE CITIES)
IN 1963

	DENS	GROWTH	YOUTH	ADED	WORK	TRNOUT	CIST59	LFT59	LFTRP59	CISTRP59	CISTRP53	R	I	REPART	SUBV	PRO
DENS		-.392	-.588	.350	-.354	.368	-.134	-.355	-.459	-.257	-.219	.361	.517	-.402	-.329	-.419
GROWTH			-.641	.066	-.009	-.754	.188	.148	.247	.332	.134	.368	.215	.761	.617	-.309
YOUTH				-.267	.416	-.547	.414	.205	.320	.491	.266	-.489	-.429	.679	.586	-.362
ADED					-.694	-.176	-.663	-.552	-.487	-.451	-.577	-.016	.660	-.177	-.072	-.741
WORKERS						-.059	.788	.650	.647	.628	.671	.030	.695	.159	.068	-.806
TRNOUT							.140	.013	-.123	-.224	-.017	-.192	.063	-.588	-.561	-.006
CIST59								.719	.767	.882	.917	.044	-.690	.346	.199	-.805
LFT59									.837	.570	.780	-.009	-.594	.233	.102	-.616
LFTRP59										.780	.883	-.002	-.486	.400	.159	-.528
CISTRP59											.815	-.081	-.484	.393	.297	-.587
CISTRP53												-.095	-.592	.236	.233	-.677
R													.309	-.329	-.434	.100
I														-.309	-.232	.866
REPART															.395	-.253
SUBV																-.683

See Table III-12 for a list of the variables and their labels.

Old cities with increasing populations have as poor a turnout as the newly sprouting bedroom communites. Fast change seems to be breaking down the Old Stalemate, with its high levels of intensity and political participation. In these old bastions of the Left or the Right, the clash produces high participation, regardless of which side has established dominance over the years. We can now appreciate why party competition means altogether something else in the French urban context. Moreover, Table IV-4 shows turnout to have very little correlation with any of the policy variables. Repeated efforts to develop more complex explanatory models with voter turnout as an independent variable have failed.

As for the main political indicators, those measuring party control are all strongly intercorrelated as we would expect. We see particularly how the correlations between Communist Vote in 1959 and the Communist Representation of 1953 (which resulted out of Proportional Representation) is the highest of all. We also notice how the same Communist Vote is highly correlated with the two social structure variables of Workers (.788) and Professionals (.805). We thus have additional evidence of the politicization of cleavages under the Old Stalemate.

Table IV-4 summarizes the testing of hypotheses of simple relationships between individual independent variables and each of the policy areas. The first surprise is that the Taxable Resource level is not very highly correlated with either Social Welfare or Educational Spending. This is in opposition to most findings of previous research. The predicted negative and significantly higher correlation between Personal Income and each of the three policy areas provides us with a

TABLE IV-4

ZERO ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES FOR 1963 (36 PARIS CORE CITIES)

	S.W.Sp.	Ed.Sp.	Tot.Sp.
Demographic Measures			
Population Growth (GROWTH)	-.050	.042	-.097
Population of School Age (YOUTH)	.116	.390	.015
Socioeconomic Measures			
Adult Education (ADED)	-.572	-.475	-.515
Illiteracy (ADUNED)	.669	.545	.647
Workers (W)	.567	.665	.607
Income (I)	-.460	-.566	-.375
Taxable Resources (R)	.270	.162	.501
Political Measures			
Voter Turnout (TRNOUT)	.188	.122	.061
Left Vote (LFT59)	.620	.521	.523
Communist Vote (CIST59)	.661	.696	.586
Left Party Representation (LFTRP59)	.685	.517	.437
Communist Representation (CISTRP59)	.579	.572	.453
Communist Representation (CISTRP53)	.616	.561	.490
Governmental Variables			
Grants for Operating Expenses (REPART)	.155	.327	.062
Grants for Investment Expenses (SUBV)	-.119	.165	-.097

See Table III-12 for a more detailed description of all variables.

clue as to the seemingly weak effect of Resources. Income as an indicator of poverty (thus of need and demand for services), acts as a suppressor variable.[1] We will have better evidence of this peculiar effect when control variables are introduced.

Equally surprising is the weak relationship between the Youth variable and Educational Spending. The coefficient is as large as that of Grants for Operating Expenditures. This seems to indicate how such grants are distributed.

On the other hand all political variables are strongly correlated to each of the policy areas, and the coefficients are in fact larger than those of relationships with socioeconomic variables. Particularly strong is the relationship of Left Representation with Social Welfare Spending. Since LEFTRP59 includes Socialist Representation, we conclude that even though Socialist cities spend less on Social Welfare than Communist cities (Tables IV-1 and IV-2), a marginal increase in Socialist strength in city councils is translated into larger corresponding increases on Social Welfare Spending than equivalent marginal increases in Communist strength. Since Socialists often participate in Center coalitions, they are able to ask for higher Social Welfare Spending as one of the payoffs for their participation in the coalition. Communists must often wait until they have at least majority status in a coalition, or sheer outright control of the city council, to be able to enact large spending programs. In other words, Left Representation has more of a truly linear relationship with Welfare Spending.

The two other policy areas, however, show Communist Representation as the more powerful variable. Thus, it appears that Communist

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[1] See Morris Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis (Basic Books, 1968), Ch. 4.

TABLE IV-5

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES FOR 1963

(36 PARIS CORE CITIES)

	S.W.Sp.	Ed.Sp.	Tot.Sp.	Adm.Sp.[2]	Inv.Sp.[1]
S.W.Sp.	-	.558	.704	.549	.287
Ed.Sp.	-	-	.743	.691	.519
Tot.Sp.	-	-	-	.786	.550
Adm.Sp.	-	-	-	-	.470

[1]Investment Spending (Capital Outlays).

[2]Administrative Spending (Expenditures for General Control).

For other details on variable labels, see Table III-12.

municipalities differ on all policies and that they differ particularly from Socialist administrations in their commitment to spending across-the-board. This would be proof of the complete distinctiveness of the Communist ghetto. However, such conclusions must await a more thorough test of relationships.

Finally, Table IV-4 again displays a certain consistency in the relationships of independent variables to each of the dependent. The intercorrelations between budgetary areas on Tables IV-4 and IV-5 also tend to show the distinctiveness of each policy. The correlation with Investment Spending (capital outlays) seems to confirm Education as a more capital intensive policy area than Social Welfare. At the bottom of Table IV-4, the two types of grants are both weakly related to the spending policy areas. It must be noted, however, that both of them are strongly related to Growth and Youth, projecting a picture of fast growing cities with many newly arrived families, with multitudes of children, and requiring more central help than other French communities.

These are but preliminary generalizations and we turn now to more rigorous tests of relationship.

C. The Determinants of Social Welfare Spending

1. Spuriousness Tests

The behavior of regression coefficients upon introduction of specific variables will be relied upon to provide us with evidence as to the nature of relationships in each of our spuriousness tests.

As Tables IV-6 and IV-7 show, the effects of the Left Representation variable are so strong as to reduce the regression coefficient of Income by 64%. Conversely, the Resources variable has no appreciable

TABLE IV-6

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND LEFT REPRESENTATION ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.42 (.27)	.31	.031 (.026)	.011
LEFTRP59[a]	.60 (.69)	.70	.264 (.280)	.0005

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .565$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-7

PARTIALS, BETAS, AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF INCOME AND LEFT REPRESENTATION ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Income	-.23 (-.46)	-.16	-.055(-.150)	.190
LEFTRP59[b]	.60 (.69)	.61	.251 (.280)	.0005

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .499$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]LEFTRP59 is Left Representation, 1959.

[b]Same as above.

TABLE IV-8

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND INCOME ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.48 (.27)	.45	.045 (.026)	.003
Income	-.59 (-.46)	-.60	-.202 (-.150)	.0005

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .400$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-9

PARTIALS, BETAS, AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND WORKERS ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Resources	.31 (.27)	.25	.026 (.026)	.072
Workers	.58 (.56)	.56	1.139 (1.139)	.0005

Coefficients of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .386$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

TABLE IV-10

PARTIALS, BETAS, AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF WORKERS AND LEFT REPRESENTATION ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Workers	.21 (.56)	.20	.417 (1.154)	.211
LEFTRP59[a]	.51 (.69)	.55	.229 (.280)	.001

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .503$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-11

PARTIALS, BETAS, AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF WORKERS AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) IN 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Workers	.32 (.56)	.33	.683 (1.154)	.060
CISTRP59[b]	.35 (.58)	.37	.150 (.236)	.040

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .404$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]LEFTRP59 is Left Representation, 1959.

[b]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

effect on Left Representation. Thus, from the outset, the independent nature of the effects of Left Representation are well established. Corroborative evidence comes also from Table IV-10, where we find that the regression coefficient of the Workers variable has also been reduced by approximately 64%.

The strength of political variables in this policy area is also demonstrated by the powerful effects of the Communism indicators. Tables IV-11 and IV-12 show the effects of Communist Representation of 1959. Although weaker than Left Representation (it accounts for only 14.9% net explained variance in Table IV-14), its effects are not weakened by the introduction of Resources, Income or Workers. The effects of Income and Workers are in fact again reduced by the political variable (the regression coefficients here decline by 48% and 41% respectively.)

Finally, the variable Communist Representation of 1953 is even stronger in Table IV-15. We have not deemed it necessary to present more data on CISTRP53, because its intercorrelations with Income and Workers are large enough to produce multicollinearity and the reductions of significance levels which usually accompany it. Nonetheless, the use of this variable has demonstrated very clearly the very close correspondence between social and political cleavages and their durability in societies where the Structured Model prevails. It is also an indicator of the durability of the Communist Party's hold on certain segments of the electorate, and of its impact on local policies. We find here a little of what policy analysts call the effect of incrementalism. Certain policies introduced by the Communists in 1953, when they had some influence on municipal councils, have not been eliminated by succeeding administrations.

In Table IV-8 we see definitive confirmation of the suppressor effect of the Income variable on Resources. The size of the regression coefficient of Resources is increased by 78%.

In summation of all the spuriousness tests, it can be said that most tables seem to confirm the developmental hypothesis[2] (both regression coefficients remain strong and are often increased). This means that both variables contribute to the explanation independently, but are linked in some form of causal sequence.

Tables IV-7 and IV-10 seem to be excellent examples of spuriousness. Yet the alert researcher must distinguish between the causes of such a finding. While the low significance of the Income variable is due to the suppressor effect between it and Resources, the Workers variable remains insignificant because of high collinearity with LEFTRP59. This is what is revealed in Tables IV-13 and IV-16. Thus, we cannot conclude that either Income or Workers as indicators of need and demand are not important explainers of Social Welfare policy. It is simply that their effect is difficult to detect embedded as it is in covariations with other variables.

Table IV-11, on the other hand, is a good example of a hybrid relationship[3] (as explained in Chapter Three), where both regression coefficients decline significantly. In other words, the social structure

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[2]We have been guided in our distinction between spuriousness and developmental models by those made by Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone in "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," American Political Science Review (September, 1969), pp. 858-866; who in turn relay on Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research (University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

[3]Cnudde and McCrone, op. cit., pp. 860-862.

of a city determines whether the city will be communist controlled, which in turn increases Social Welfare expenditures. The latter are also, in addition, increased by the same type of social structure that brings about a Communist administration.

2. The Explanatory Model

We have thus established that the basic equation explaining the determinants of Social Welfare Spending is of the form

$$Ei = f(R,I,P) + e$$

where,

Ei = Expenditures in function i

P = Party Control Variable

I = Income Variable

R = Resource Variable

e = Error term which can be reduced if other minor variables are included.

Table IV-13 portrays this equation in the best combination of high explanatory variance (62.7%) and parsimony of variables used. Moreover, in this version of the basic equation, Left Representation accounts for a full 22% of the variance explained, independent of other parameters. Income, which had been found insignificant, now explains 6.6%. This means that even though it may appear, at first, that in Left cities the level of Poverty (Income) has no effect on spending, the conclusion is reversed when we distinguish between Left cities with high Resources (industrial strongholds) and those with low Resources (working-class bedroom communities). Tables IV-14 and IV-15 show variations of the basic equation when other indicators of party control are used. The relatively weaker effects of CISTRP59 and CISTRP53 reconfirm what we had previously surmised as to the results of marginal increases in Socialist

TABLE IV-12

PARTIALS, BETAS, AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF INCOME AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Income	-.25 (-.46)	-.23	-.079 (-.150)	.145
CISTRP59[a]	.46 (.58)	.46	.190 (.236)	.005

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .378$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-13

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, INCOME AND LEFT REPRESENTATION ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level	Variance Explained
Resources	.50 (.27)	.38	.038 (.026)	.002	12.7
Income	-.39 (-.46)	-.31	-.105 (-.150)	.023	6.6
LEFTRP59[b]	.61 (.69)	.55	.225 (.280)	.0005	22.7

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .627$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

[b]LEFTRP59 is Left Representation, 1959.

TABLE IV-14

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, INCOME AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level	Variance Explained
Resources	.51 (.27)	.42	.42 (.026)	.002	16.1%
Income	-.42 (-.46)	-.38	-.129(-.150)	.012	10.2%
CISTRP59[a]	.48 (.58)	.43	.174 (.236)	.004	14.0%

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .539$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-15

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, INCOME AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1953, ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level	Variance Explained
Resources	.49 (.27)	.41	.041 (.026)	.003	13.8%
Income	-.32 (-.46)	-.30	-.103 (-.150)	.059	5.4%
CISTRP53[b]	.49 (.61)	.47	.555 (.720)	.003	14.4%

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .544$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

[b]CISTRP53 is Communist Representation, 1953.

TABLE IV-16

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, WORKERS AND LEFT REPRESENTATION ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Resources	.41 (.27)	.29	.029 (.26)	.041
Workers	.26 (.56)	.22	.443 (1.154)	.131
LEFTRP59[a]	.58 (.69)	.57	.215 (.280)	.0005

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .595$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-17

PARTIALS, BETAS, AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, WORKERS AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.38 (.27)	.29	.029 (.026)	.027
Workers	.31 (.56)	.29	.606 (1.154)	.079
CISTRP59[b]	.41 (.58)	.41	.170 (.236)	.016

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .490$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]LEFTRP59 is Left Representation, 1959.

[b]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

strength on city councils as compared to the more discontinuous effects of Communist political power on the field of Social Welfare.

Can we draw the conclusion that the existence of many Communist administrations causes Socialists to push for even more radical policies in an effort to compete effectively with Communists for the working-class vote? The statistical analysis seems to support such a conclusion. This is not, however, what an astute observer of the local politics of the Paris basin would conclude. The Socialists are simply in a better bargaining position in many cases. Moreover, their efforts are limited to one policy area in exchange for lesser spending (as we will soon see) in other areas.

Finally, their tendency to finance services through user charges must also be considered. We thus conclude that the Socialists are simply playing the role that we would expect in a Structured Model setting which features a multi-party system. They express the basic underlying social conflict and perpetuate it organizationally, but in a slightly milder form. The tendency towards bipolarity introduced by the Two Ballot Electoral System will make them move closer to the Communists organizationally (as percent elections show), even though it can be said that their constituency has increasingly become more like that of Center Parties.

Another set of variations on the main equation comes from the substitution of the Workers variable for Income in Tables IV-16 and IV-17. In both tables we find that this indicator of social structure is not as good of an explainer as Income. Multicollinearity makes it impossible to include in one equation indicators of social structure and income, as well as some political variable (i.e., LEFTRP59).

Finally, questions as to the causal sequence between social structure and politics cannot be answered satisfactorily without survey data (to ascertain the true class vote) and time series data (to solve the multicollinearity problem). Various attempts were made to improve on the total variance explained through the addition of new variables, but the trade-off was in each case a reduction in the significance of these and other component variables.

A different approach met with greater success, as Tables IV-18 and IV-19 show. Various non-linear models were tested through variable transformations. In Table IV-18, an equation of the form

$$\text{Log } Y = a + b_1 x_1 = b_2 x_2$$

not only increased the total variance explained, but improved the significance levels of individual variables. The logic behind such a transformation was inspired by an examination of predictors and residuals of the Social Welfare Spending equation (including R, I and LEFTRP59). Since some of the predicted values turned out to be negative, it was hypothesized that a logarithmic expression would be more appropriate.

Table IV-19 is an attempt to improve on the explanatory power of a model which includes the effects of Communism. Using CISTRP53 squared increases the total variance explained in Tables IV-14 and IV-15, as well as the relative strength of the political variable. A better mathematical expression of the phenomenon of institutionalization could not be found. In 1953, the electoral system used was the P. R. System which means that Communist Representation was a much closer reflection of Communist electoral strength. Table IV-19 tells us that the Two Ballot Majority System, the effect of time and the coinciding cleavages have converted certain cities into Communist strongholds, not only in

TABLE IV-18

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF INCOME AND RESOURCES AND LEFT REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON THE LOGARITHM OF PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (LOG S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Income	-.47 (-.55)	-.40	-.0018	.004
Resources	.43 (.17)	.31	.0004	.011
LEFTRP59[a]	.60 (.71)	.52	.0030	.0005

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .642$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-19

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF INCOME, RESOURCES AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1953, SQUARED ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Income	-.32 (-.46)	-.29	-.0097	.067
Resources	.48 (.27)	.38	.0380	.004
CISTRP53.SQ[b]	.53 (.65)	.50	.0070	.001

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .566$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]LEFTRP59 is Left Representation, 1959.

[b]CISTRP53.SQ is Communist Representation, 1953, squared.

terms of representation, but also in terms of policy. We also tested multiplicative models which featured an interaction effect between politics and resources but with lesser success.

D. The Determinants of Educational Spending

1. Spuriousness Tests

Tables IV-20 and IV 21 seem to demonstrate that in Educational Spending, the Political variable CISTRP59 is not much weaker than in Social Welfare. We chose to present the results of spuriousness tests, using CISTRP59 as the main political variable, because it was somewhat stronger than LEFTRP59 and about as strong as CISTRP53. The results of tests with these other indicators were essentially the same. In all cases, the political variable appeared at first as having an important effect on spending. It is eventually reduced to insignificance in Table IV-23 by the combined effects of Resources, Income and Youth.

Interestingly, the effects of CISTRP59 seem to fare well in the initial tests against each of the variables, and even against any two variables combined (see Table IV-22). How can this be? We will see that this is because of a double suppressor effect. But in more practical terms, the higher spending of Communist cities on education is seen as the combined product of their larger youth population, poorer families and usually strong industrial base.

But let us first examine the two-variable tests. Table IV-20 shows that again, as in Social Welfare, Resources has no significant effect on the regression coefficients of CISTRP59. In Table IV-21, we again have a case of declining coefficients, but with CISTRP59 appreciably less affected than Youth. Thus, it appears at first that Communist cities

TABLE IV-20

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL SPENDING (Ed.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Resources	.25 (.16)	.21	.019 (.014)	.139
CISTRP59[a]	.59 (.57)	.59	.217 (.211)	.0005

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .371$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-21

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, AND YOUTH ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL SPENDING (Ed.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
CISTRP59[b]	.47 (.57)	.50	.184 (.211)	.004
Youth	.15 (.39)	.14	.472 (1.284)	.381

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .343$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

[b]Same as above.

TABLE IV-22

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, YOUTH AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL SPENDING (Ed.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Resources	.39 (-.56)	.37	-.033 (.014)	.021
Youth	.34 (.39)	.36	1.204(1.284)	.046
CISTRP59[a]	.43 (.57)	.42	(.211)	.010

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .439$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-23

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF YOUTH, RESOURCES, INCOME AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITAL EDUCATIONAL SPENDING (Ed.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Youth	.33 (.39)	.30	1.010 (1.284)	.055
Resources	.53 (.16)	.47	.042 (.014)	.002
Income	-.52 (-.56)	-.47	-.143 (-.172)	.002
CISTRP59[b]	.27 (.57)	.23	.083 (.211)	.119

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .596$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

[b]Same as above.

TABLE IV-24

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND YOUTH ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL SPENDING (Ed.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.44 (.16)	.46	.042 (.014)	.008
Youth	.54 (.39)	.61	2.029 (1.284)	.001

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .315$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-25

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND INCOME ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL SPENDING (Ed.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.43 (.16)	.37	.033 (.014)	.010
Income	-.65 (-.56)	-.68	-.208 (-.172)	.0005

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .447$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

spend more in relation to their younger population. This is equivalent to saying that they spend more on a per pupil basis. In Table IV-23, we again find that it is Youth that is made insignificant in a four-variable test. How is it then that CISTRP59 becomes insignificant in a five-variable relationship? To understand, we must again look at suppressor effects impinging on the relationship between (Taxable) Resources and Educational Spending.

Just as in Social Welfare, Income acts as a suppressor (see Table IV-25), but in Table IV-24 we find the Youth variable having the same effect on Resources. This means that some cities with a high level of Taxable Resources spend more on Education, because their industrial base also implies a population with large families, while other cities spend less because their Resources are the result of high personal income and therefore smaller families (with private school-attending children). We see how the nature of the suppressor effect is much more complex in this policy area.

2. The Explanatory Model

Thus it is that these suppressor effects are strong enough to create a four-variable equation which accounts for 56.2% of the variance (see Table IV-26). And while CISTRP59 increase the R^2 to .596 in Table IV-23, its own low level of significance (.119) compels us to eliminate this political variable from the basic equation. The political variable plays only a minor part in Education. Thus, we are again left with a four-variable equation

$$Ei = f(R,I,Y) + e$$

where Ei = Expenditures in function i.

TABLE IV-26

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF YOUTH, RESOURCES AND INCOME ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL SPENDING (Ed.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Youth	.45 (.39)	.41	1.360 (1.284)	.007
Resources	.57 (.16)	.53	.048 (.014)	.0005
Income	-.60 (-.56)	-.55	-.169 (-.172)	.0005

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .562$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-27

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF INCOME, RESOURCES AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL SPENDING (Ed.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
CISTRP59[a]	.42 (.57)	.36	.132 (.211)	.013
Resources	.43 (.16)	.34	.031 (.014)	.010
Income	-.52 (-.56)	-.50	-.152 (-.172)	.001

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .544$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

Table IV-26 not only shows the importance of adequate taxable resources in Educational Spending, which is a widespread phenomenon, but it points out that (lack of) personal income as an indicator of demand is just as important a determinant. This is peculiar to French cities and can be attributed to the fact that upper income French communities will send their children to private religious schools rather than invest in a high quality public school as is often done in American upper-class suburbs. In turn, this behavior may be the result of the fact that Education is controlled by the central government which establishes nation-wide standards. Moreover, since incorporations and the creation of exclusionary school districts are not allowed, and since, as we have seen, classes are often not geographically segregated, it will be only when a city is homogeneously lower income that there will be an unequivocal demand for more public education. In the stimulation and articulation of such a demand, the Communists will play an important role. The Socialists here exert a more centrist influence on spending levels.

This then is the pattern of Educational Spending in the Paris Core area. Even though the Communism variable was eventually found insignificant, we cannot say that the Structured Model of Policy-Making does not apply to this issue area. The powerful effect of the need variable, the fact that Communist cities spend more in relation to the size of central grants they receive (see Table IV-29), leads us to conclude that Educational Spending displays distinct patterns that are defined by the coinciding of social and political cleavages.

Finally, Table IV-29 shows why we have not included Grants for Operating Expenditures in our equations; its effect parallels that of

TABLE IV-28

PARTIALS, BETAS, AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF INCOME, YOUTH, AND THE INTERACTION OF RESOURCES AND COMMUNISM (CISTRP53xR) ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Income	-.44 (-.56)	-.41	-.1246	.008
Youth	.36 (.39)	.29	.9690	.040
CISTRP53xR[a]	.47 (.67)	.48	.0004	.003

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .612$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-29

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF GRANTS, OPERATING EXPENDITURES, (REPART), RESOURCES, INCOME AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES (Ed.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
REPART[b]	.25 (.33)	.19	.463	.163
Resources	.48 (.16)	.40	.036	.004
Income	-.52 (-.56)	-.49	-.149	.002
CISTRP59[c]	.34 (.57)	.29	.107	.049

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .572$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP53xR is Communist Representation, 1953, multiplied by Resources.

[b]REPART is Grants for Operating Expenditures.

[c]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

the Youth variable (and is actually slightly weaker) as we would expect since the size of the pupil population is the allocation formula used by the central government.

Since the Communism variable was seemingly close to being significant, we attempted to find an explanatory model which would include this light, but nonetheless detectable effect. As previously, our concern was again the discovery of non-linear effects and possible increases in total variance explained. Table IV-28 shows that the inclusion of an interactive effect best describes the reality. Admittedly, the Resources variable was already quite important on its own, in Table IV-26 and IV-27, but the fact that the resulting model accounts for more variance (61.2%) explains and describes a likely variant of the process of political institutionalization; makes it all the more satisfactory. We can say that Taxable Resources is the main determinant of Educational Expenditures and that the presence of Communist administrations in 1953 has amplified its impact. This contrasts with Social Welfare where Resources is only a limiting factor, not a major determinant.

E. The Determinants of Total Operating Expenditures

1. Spuriousness Tests

Tables IV-30, IV-31, and IV-33 show that in this policy area, the political variable (although not as strong as in Social Welfare) has a significant effect. Here, too, CISTRP59 was used to demonstrate results, which were somewhat weaker with LEFTRP59 and as good with CISTRP53. As in previously described policy areas, the nature of the Income-Politics-

TABLE IV-30

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES (Tot.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.60 (.50)	.54	.243 (.226)	.0005
CISTRP59[a]	.57 (.45)	.50	.915 (.834)	.0005

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .497$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-31

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF INCOME AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES (Tot.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Income	-.19 (-.37)	-.20	-.309 (-.571)	.250
CISTRP59[b]	.33 (.45)	.35	.653 (.834)	.049

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .237$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

[b]Same as above.

Policy relationships was again ascertained as hybrid (regression coefficients declined 46% for Income, 22% for CISTRP59 in Table IV-33). As elsewhere, Income regains significance in the four-variable test.

This policy area differs from the others in that it is strongly related to Resources to begin with (.50). The suppressor effect is detectable (see Table IV-34) in this case too; the Resources correlation reaches (.76) and its regression coefficient is increased 35%. But the effect is all the stronger on Income whose regression coefficient is increased by 56%. Thus, the single dominant fact about Total Operating Expenditures is the powerful role played by Resources, accounting as it does for 39% net variance.

2. The Explanatory Model

In Tables IV-35, IV-36, IV-37, and IV-38, we observe that the Social Structure variable, Workers is even more problematic as an indicator of demand for Total Expenditures. Its high level of inter-correlation with Income and CISTRP59 creates highly unstable coefficients for any of these variables. Any additional effect it accounts for is rendered insignificant. Thus again, we chose as our best explanatory model (combining parsimony in variables and high variance explained) the same four-variable equation as in Social Welfare (Table IV-35).

$$Ei = f(R,I,P)$$

where this time, P = CISTRP59

The relative strengths have, however, changed. As previously mentioned, Resources is much more important. Other variables such as Youth and Growth were added but the resulting increase in variance explained was relatively insignificant. Table IV-38 shows that Density and Population were among minor variables that fared the best. Even

TABLE IV-32

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND INCOME ON PER CAPITA TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES (Tot.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.76 (.50)	.68	.307 (.226)	.0005
Income	-.64 (-.37)	-.58	-.892 (-.571)	.0005

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .562$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-33

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, INCOME AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITAL TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES (Tot.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Signficance Level	Variance Explained
Resources	.71 (.50)	.66	.297 (.226)	.0005	39.2
Income	-.51 (-.37)	-.43	-.663 (-.571)	.002	13.2
CISTRP59[a]	.39 (.45)	.29	.544 (.834)	.023	6.7

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .629$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

TABLE IV-34

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, WORKERS, AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES (Tot.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.63 (.50)	.50	.227 (.226)	.0005
Workers	.50 (.61)	.46	4.262 (5.575)	.002
CISTRP59[a]	.24 (.45)	.20	.373 (.834)	.157

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .626$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-35

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, INCOME AND WORKERS ON PER CAPITA TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES (Tot.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level	Variance Explained
Resources	.64 (.50)	.57	.259 (.226)	.0005	26.1
Income	-.28 (-.37)	-.28	-.423 (-.571)	.107	3.2
Workers	.40 (.61)	.39	3.638 (5.575)	.018	7.7

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .633$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

though the Workers variable is not insignificant, its elimination would still leave 74.7% of the variance explained.

The fact that Density and Population are negatively related seems to suggest an "Economies of Scale" effect. This means that for a given level of Resources and Need, there is likelihood of less spending in heavily population areas, since more people can be serviced out of the same facilities. In the teeming urban slums, it costs less to administer governmental services (possibly because quality suffers too).

Finally interactive effects are even more evident in this policy area. In Table IV-39, the interaction of Resources and Communism adds explanation over and above that accounted for by Resources alone, and increases the amount of variance explained to 65.5%. Table IV-40 provides one final variation on the basic equation.

The higher percentage of variance explained in this policy area (65% and above) was a source of puzzlement to this researcher, who assumed that functional policy areas could more easily be explained by specific variables (i.e., Youth and Education), than total spending where a host of influences can be conjured. Yet the results of the data processing seem to show that in the final analysis, most influences cancel each other out for Total Expenditures, while one influence, that of Resources, is amplified.

Finally, it can be said that functional areas can fluctuate both in total magnitude and relatively to their share of the total budget. That is where much of the political give-and-take is likely to occur. Thus, the fact that the Communism variables remain significant points to an undeniable tendency among Communist cities of the Paris Red Belt

TABLE IV-36

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, WORKERS, POPULATION, DENSITY, AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES (Tot.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level	Variance Explained
Resources	.780 (.50)	.72	.325	.0005	36.0
Workers	.288 (.61)	.25	2.265	.116	2.1
POP62[a]	-.421 (.90)	-.28	-.001	.018	5.0
DENS[b]	-.470 (-.26)	-.32	-.0047	.008	6.6
CISTRP53[c]	.499 (.61)	.43	2.297	.004	7.7

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .768$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-37

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, INCOME AND THE INTERACTION OF RESOURCES AND COMMUNISM (CISTRP53xR) ON PER CAPITA TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES (Tot.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level	Variance Explained
Resources	.48 (.50)	.43	.193 (.226)	.004	10.2
Income	-.43 (-.37)	-.36	-.548 (-.571)	.011	7.0
CISTRP53xR[d]	.46 (.73)	.41	.0016	.006	9.3

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .655$ Significant at .005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]Population Size, 1962.

[b]Density

[c]Communist Representation, 1953.

[d]Communist Representation, 1953, multiplied by Resources.

to spend more across-the-board. They also are deeply in debt and tax heavily. This is in contrast to Robert C. Fried's finding among Italian cities where Communist administrations had a mild tendency[4] to underspend, undertax and balance their budgets.

We must, however, point out that Fried's conclusion of the weakness of party control as a variable in Italian local policies is not convincing without looking at the specific policies included in Total Expenditures. To expect that poor provincial and non-industrial cities will display an across-the-board spending pattern (as opposed to emphasizing one main policy area) because of party ideology is unrealistic. We will find in Chapter Five that even the more radical French Communist Party will not display such a pattern in the French provinces, and will choose to focus on only Social Welfare Spending given the limited resources.

F. Two Other Minor Policy Areas

Expenditure are of course not the only part of a budget that are likely to reflect local policy choices.

1. The Business Tax

Methods of revenue collection can equally reflect which segments of a society are to shoulder a heavier burden and which are to be spared. As pointed out in Chapters Two and Three, French communes are not free to levy whichever taxes, at whatever incidence, their

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[4] Robert C. Fried, "Communism, Urban Budgets and the Two Italies: A Case Study in Comparative Urban Government," Journal of Politics (July, 1971).

TABLE IV-38

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, WORKERS, POPULATION AND THE INTERACTION OF RESOURCES AND COMMUNISM (CISTRP53xR) ON PER CAPITA TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES (Tot.Sp.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.48 (.50)	.41	.185 (.226)	.005
Workers	.52 (.61)	.40	3.733 (5.575)	.003
POP62[a]	-.30 (.09)	-.18	-.00068	.053
CISTRP53xR[b]	.43 (.73)	.36	.0014	.016

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .709$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-39

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF INCOME, RESOURCES, COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA BUSINESS TAXATION REVENUE (Bus. Tax.) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level	Variance Explained
Income	-.45 (-.27)	-.28	-.040	.007	6.0
Resources	.85 (.62)	.74	.032	.0005	40.0
CISTRP59[c]	.66 (.54)	.46	.082	.0005	17.5

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .791$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]Population Size, 1962.

[b]Communist Representation, 1953, multiplied by Resources.

[c]Communist Representation, 1959.

administration might choose. For the most part, they must rely on the Centimes and the Taxe Locale, which can vary only in magnitude and only within centrally defined limits. The Taxe Locale rates, in fact, vary very little. There are, however, some minor taxation areas that are left to the community's option and discretion.

One of these is called Taxe sur les Professions and is usually collected in the form of a license fee from those operating a business or more properly, those we might call self-employed. This is a tax that is very much recurred to by Communist municipalities. To a large extent this can be considered a symbolic policy area, since not more than 10 Francs per capita are ever raised in this fashion. Its almost punitive aspect symbolizes the dominance of a proletariat over an embattled middle-class. It, above all, reflects the community's political ideology within the Left-Right dimensions of French politics and society.

This is indeed what we find in Tables IV-39 and IV-40. The equation of Table IV-39 was also attempted with LEFTRP59, but this yielded a smaller R^2. In other words, this particular policy area is characteristic of Communist municipalities exclusively. Socialist administrations use this tax only in so much as their resource level (and as explained below, their spending programs) warrant it.

There is, moreover, an unusual effect imparted here by Resources. It is not the lack of Taxable Resources that causes a city to levy this additional tax, but exactly the opposite. This means that it is to the extent that a city is capable of spending, that it will raise such a tax. Table IV-39 proves the purely optional character of this tax.

TABLE IV-40

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF INCOME, RESOURCES AND THE INTERACTION OF RESOURCES AND COMMUNISM (CISTRP53xR) ON PER CAPITA BUSINESS TAXATION REVENUE (Bus.Tax) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level	Variance Explained
Income	-.30 (-.27)	-.14	-.020	.084	1.0
Resources	.61 (.62)	.36	.015	.0005	7.1
CISTRP53xR[a]	.83 (.90)	.69	.000257	.0005	25.5

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .882$ Significant at .0005.

TABLE IV-41

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF YOUTH, GROWTH AND LEFT REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA OPERATING EXPENDITURE (Op.Exp.), GRANTS (REPART) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Youth	.36 (.68)	.34	.470	.041
Growth	.47 (.76)	.46	.0986	.006
LEFTRP59[b]	.33 (.35)	.25	.0365	.047

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .669$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP53xR is Communist Representation, 1959.

[b]LEFTRP59 is Left Representation, 1959.

TABLE IV-42

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF YOUTH AND GROWTH ON PER CAPITA INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE GRANTS (SUBV) OF 36 PARIS CORE CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Youth	.29 (.58)	.32	2.164	.072
Growth	.39 (.62)	.41	.429	.023

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .442$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

Table IV-40 puts the argument even more succinctly: the interactive term summarizes the spending capability of high Resources with the spending commitment of Communist municipalities. The 25.5% variance explained by the multiplicative variable is not truly reflective of its true strength because of the occurrence of common variances. If we compare with Table IV-39 and observe that the R^2 has been increased from 0.791 to 0.882, we can conclude that this one variable must account for approximately all but the 6% of variance explained by Income.

2. Central Grants-In-Aid

Tables IV-41 and IV-42 demonstrate the contrast between the two types of grants-in-aid. Grants for Operating Expenditures can be more adequately explained (R^2 = .669) and the political variable is a sizable part of this explanation.

These tables substantiate the statements we made on the basis of the averages reported in Table IV-1 and IV-2. Table IV-43 shows that REPART is a policy area, which has been shaped by previous investment programs and acquired a greater predictability. Left cities are those that have developed such programs over time and have thus been able to qualify for the grants.[5] Above all, Table IV-41 demonstrates that the size of such grants is determined by the size of the Youth population. This is as we would expect, since a good chunk of REPART grants are available for the financing of primary school expenditures.

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[5] See Mark Kesselman, The Ambiguous Consensus: A Study of Local Government in France (A. Knopf, 1967).

The LEFTRP59 variable was best at explaining than the other political variables. This shows that this is one policy area where, again, Socialists are even more effective (in relation to their control of councils) than Communists in making their cities qualify for every franc and centime that can be extracted from central coffers.

Table IV-42 demonstrates that Youth and Growth are different facets of the same phenomenon and are the main determinants of the size of grants that are aimed mainly for capital outlays.

G. Conclusions

This chapter has demonstrated that Social Welfare Spending, Business Taxation and Grants for Operating Expenditures are the three policy areas which can be explained in terms of a Left to Right continuum.

In Educational Spending, Communist cities stand out in the magnitude of their outlays, but as we have seen, this to a large extent is the product of their peculiar combination of characteristics. This much must, however, be said -- Communist cities spend as much and slightly more than their resources allow, even when we consider their larger youth populations and higher poverty. This, therefore, can be taken as evidence that party control has an effect that operates within the context of many other correlated factors.

The same to some extent can be said of Total Operating Expenditures. We have discovered that there is indeed a greater commitment to spending across-the-board by Communist cities, but it is, again, an evidence that must be put in the context of the other operating variables.

Resources emerges as an important variable in all policy areas, even after we have made the crucial distinction between it and personal wealth.

We can see, however, how a research design which omits that distinction and uses blunt measures such as Economic Development Indices[6] and the like, would have difficulty in discovering any independent effect by political variables. It is important to note at this stage that the only other study that was able to detect the impact of party control was conducted among English and Welsh County Boroughs with socioeconomic variables that resemble ours in that they were based on taxable property values.[7]

James Alt was able to prove conclusively (his cross-sectional analysis was repeated for ten consecutive years) that Labor Party control is a powerful explainer of Educational, Housing and Taxation policies (higher spending and lower tax rates). He, too, found party competition to have no significant effect (with or without controls) on policy. Alt did not differentiate between need and resources, but his Wealth variable seems to be a closer approximation of our Income variable (it is highly correlated with socioprofessional categories) than of our Taxable Resources. Thus, it is no surprise to find that Alt's variable is also negatively related to policies.

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[6] See Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Rand-McNally, 1966).

[7] James Alt, "Some Social and Political Correlates of County Borough Expenditures," British Journal of Political Science (January, 1971).

Finally, I believe that the reason why his findings are so similar to those we have just outlined is because English County Boroughs are also heavily industrialized. More importantly, their industrialization took place under the English equivalent of class polarization.

Such heavy industrialization produces both the mobilized working-class and the industrial tax base that its representatives can tax to finance adequate welfare programs. Findings such as Fried's in Austria, that Socialist rule explains only housing policy,[8] must again be considered within the sampling frame chosen (which includes cities with as low a population as 1,000).

We turn now to our second subsample to see exactly what happens to our hypotheses in a more impoverished and less industrial setting.

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[8] Robert C. Fried, "Politics, Economics and Federalism: Some Aspects of Urban Government in Middle-Europe," unpublished paper delivered at the Comparative Administration Group, American Society of Public Administration, University of Indiana, October, 1970.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS (PART TWO)

In this chapter we address ourselves to the question of the generalizability of the hypotheses tested in Chapter Four. For this purpose we must first establish what the second sample represents in relation to French urban patterns, old and new. We must also specify some of the methodological limitations inherent in the small (18 cities) size of the subsample.

We can then proceed to the data analysis in the same fashion as in Chapter Four. Again, we will first look at means and averages for each of the policies concerned, and at simple correlations, so as to establish the overall patterns of relationships and test some of the basic two-variable hypotheses.

Since the sample size limits the number of variables that can be included in the development of an explanatory model, we will use one stage to test the basic hypothesis and identify some of the major determinants of each policy area. As in Chapter Four, these will consist of the major ones of Social Welfare, Education, Total Operating Expenditures and the two minor ones of Business Taxation and Grants-in-Aid.

A. The Validity of the Second Sample

1. The Sample and French Urbanization

In Chapter Two we specified that French urbanization does not present the same features everywhere. We made a distinction between a new and an old urbanization. It is, however, useful in the process of identifying a city as belonging in one or the other category of the dichotomy; to start with, a non-mutually exclusive typology of French urban societies. These are:

1. The Industrial-Urban
2. The Parisian
3. The Provincial-Commercial
4. The Suburban-Low Density
5. The New and Fast Growing Towns

Each of these categories constitutes a particular variety of the urban phenomenon worthy of study in isolation. It can, however, be seen that the first two categories have some of the features of what we have previously called the Stalemate or the Structured Policy. The other categories are mixtures: of old and new urban patterns, of urban and rural cultures, of Stalemated conflict and American-style growth inspired consensus.

The sample of 18 communes from Lyons and the Outer Paris urban ring represents these three categories. It is a mixture of nine cities of the old non-industrial, provincial urbanization and nine cities of the new urbanization or suburbanization. Their political behavior, however, presents similar features. Relatively less mobilized electorates and less active administrations are witnessed in both cases. In the case of

the Lyons communes, a relative economic stagnation had dried up resources for any major spending programs. In 1963 when we observe these communes, economic renewal was just barely starting. In fact, such a stagnation remains typical of most other provincial areas until the late 1960's. Today this trend has completely been reversed.

The long stagnation was particularly aggravated by a relative neglect on the part of the central government's policies, again until the recent efforts at deconcentration and regional planning. Needless to say, the outer ring communes received even less attention than the provincial suburbs of major metropolises. The political climate of such areas has been characterized by Mark Kesselman as much more consensual than that of Paris.[1] While the cleavages are still more pronounced than in rural areas, it can be said that the center of the political spectrum is much larger than in Paris. Socialism in the provinces is a respectable middle-of-the-road umbrella for politicians of various extractions. The remnants of the old anti-clericalism still play a role as common denominator for worker, farmer and small shopkeeper, alike. Thus, we find that Socialists and Gaullists collaborate in coalition more often than in Paris to keep the Communists out of power. In this they are more successful: St. Fons in the Lyons area, and Houilles in the Paris suburban ring are both cases where the Communists lose in the second ballot after having dominated the first. They lose to a Gaullist-Socialist alliance.

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[1] The Ambiguous Consensus (A. Knopf, 1967).

We see that in politics, the two urban areas of the second sample display striking similarities. If a difference must be drawn, it is that the Gaullists thrive with greater ease in the quickly growing suburban areas where other parties have not had time to institutionalize their hold on parts of the electorate. They make deep inroads in newly growing cities, such as Poissy, where they lure enough of a newly arrived working-class to win.

2. Methodological Limitations

We have just shown that despite the distinct character of the two urban areas from which we drew the second sample, the similarities are such as to allow for a meaningful analysis. Comparisons with our first sample may thus prove valuable. But this is not the only problem.

A sample size of 18 is bound to lower the significance levels of the structural equations and even more, that of the individual explanatory variables, below what we have so far taken as acceptable levels. Stated differently, the problem is that for a given significance level, the number of variables that can be added to an explanatory model is bound to be even more limited than in our previous sample. Similarly, our ability to distinguish between the effects of each variable and correctly gauge the magnitude of its explanatory power is also hindered.

More potentially harmful to the meaningfulness of our tests and results would be a lack of sample homogeneity, and variables that seem to have two distinct sampling distributions. While the assumption of normality of the variables is all too often taken for granted, there is nonetheless little doubt that some of the practical implications of this assumption must be checked. Such checks include plotting the data and

assessing the size and nature of the variances, standard deviations and coefficients of variation. (See Table III-3.)

Such scrutiny in our case (see Chapter Three) seems to confirm the assumptions of homogeneity that we already have supported in terms of the French urban context. Tables III-2 through III-12 in Chapter Three provide ample evidence. In each of the income categories the cities of the second sample display a greater poverty and lower political mobilization as well as lesser Communist penetration; regardless of whether they are located in the Paris Outer Ring or in the Lyons area.

On the other hand, however, we find that as previously stated, growth levels are still not substantially different from those of the Paris Core. This growth statistic, however, presents lesser deviations from its mean than for the Paris sample. We found, in fact, that most of our variables in this sample had smaller standard deviations than for the Paris sample. Smaller standard deviations improve the reliability of measurements.

These are then surmountable limitations. Moreover, this small sample is not being used in isolation. Since the task here is one of corroborating previously tested hypotheses, we can tolerate lower significance levels for those relationships that are in the same direction as those of the initial sample. On the other hand, if some relationships are reversed or radically changed in magnitude, we must have at least as high a significance level as for the initial hypothesis testing.

We will have more to say on the validity of the discovered relationships (effects on the dependent variable) when we examine the patterns of independent variable intercorrelations. But let us now look at the policy areas through some sample means.

B. Expenditure Patterns

Even though Table V-1 presents even fewer consistent patterns than Tables IV-1 and IV-2, it nevertheless makes it possible to describe the nature of some expected unambiguous relationships. Despite the small size of each category of party control, one unequivocal trend emerges: Social Welfare Spending continues to follow a Left to Right continuum.

The second generalization to be drawn is that whereas the effect of party control on the other spending areas was minor and disappeared after appropriate controls in the Paris sample, it is non-existent in Table V-1 from the outset. Similarly, Gaullist cities show an even greater propensity to spending in Education and total spending, and continue to be the recipients of large central grants for investment purposes, while drawing few, as yet, for Operating Expenditures. Interestingly, this latter area continues to display a slight Left to Right pattern as we demonstrated in the previous chapter.

Finally, Table V-1 demonstrates that if there is one major difference between the two samples, it is that regardless of party control, the suburban and provincial cities consider Social Welfare a costly luxury, while Education seems to warrant more of their efforts. Also, expenditures associated with other policy areas than those just mentioned (i.e., roads), seemed to take up more of their share of the budget. This may be due to the fact that in the outer suburban areas and in the provinces, local governments have to concern themselves with matters (i.e., country roads or cultural facilities) which are amply and centrally supplied in the Paris Core.

Needless to say, most of these generalizations require further testing through the introduction of appropriate controls. But let us first turn to the zero-order correlations.

TABLE V-1

SELECTED PER CAPITA POLICY AREAS OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES, GROUPED BY TYPE OF PARTISAN CONTROL OF MUNICIPAL COUNCILS IN 1963.

Number of Cities	Partisan Control	S.W.Sp.[a]	Ed.Sp.[b]	Tot.Sp.[e]	REPART[d]	SUBV[e]
3	Communist	27.47	54.18	266.49	19.22	30.26
5	Socialist	20.39	41.30	269.25	10.68	24.24
3	Center Left	19.77	43.89	259.37	8.94	13.06
3	Gaullist	16.02	62.88	408.28	9.93	30.24
4	Conservative	18.74	37.88	217.87	8.92	31.83
7	Right	17.50	48.14	299.43	9.30	31.15
18	All Cities	23.18	46.76	279.11	11.30	26.22

See Table III-12 for variable labels and their meanings.

[a]Social Welfare Spending.

[b]Educational Spending.

[c]Total Operating Expenditures.

[d]Repartitions, Grants for Operating Expenditures.

[e]Subvention, Grants for Investment Expenditures.

NOTE: The Right category is made up of Gaullist and Conservative cities combined. The Center Left Category describes cities whose municipal council is controlled by a coalition of Socialists, Radical Socialists, Christian Democrats and Left Gaullists, where no one party affiliation prevails. Various combinations are possible.

C. Zero-Order Relationships

A quick glance at Table V-2 is all that is needed to remove any lingering doubts as to the validity of this sample. The socioeconomic variables are even more closely intercorrelated than in the Paris area. Correlation between Adult Education and measures of the social structure (Workers, Professionals) are of the order of .85 and above, while they did not exceed .74 in the Paris sample. Similarly, the Income indicator is more closely related to the Workers variable and less related to the Professionals variable. What does this tell us about the socioeconomic setting of the second sample?

In the provinces, the chances for a worker to have an education above the primary level are remote, while in Paris the better educational system (endowed with major national lycees and technical colleges), to say nothing of cultural institutions such as libraries, museums, etc., makes it more feasible for him to break out of his proletarian ghetto. Conversely, while in Paris professionals are among many with a better education (.74), in the provinces they are practically the only ones (.900). Similarly, while they constitute the majority of those with higher incomes in Paris (.866), they are among many others (i.e., landowners and wealthy merchants) in the provinces (.807).

Finally, the relationship between Personal Income and Taxable Resources is even weaker (-.113) than in the previous sample (+.309). In the provinces, as well as in the suburban fringe, the industrial base of some communities does not come even close to compensating for the abject poverty of the population, which may include many semi-rural families. On the other hand, the rich communities are exclusively residential with little of the commercial base or the dense structures of the Inner Paris.

TABLE V-2
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG SIXTEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN 1963
(18 CITY SAMPLE)

	GROWTH	YOUTH	ADED[a]	WORK	TRNOUT	CIST59[b]	LFT59[c]	LFTRP59	CISTRP59	CISTRP53	R	I	REPART[d]	SUBV[e]	PRO[f]
DENS	-.477	-.627	-.005	-.075	.082	-.212	-.049	.116	.015	-.123	.038	.053	-.228	-.153	.020
GROWTH		-.598	-.245	-.216	-.469	.159	.004	.015	.011	.095	-.055	-.100	.429	.268	.330
YOUTH			-.523	.555	.044	.538	.310	.198	.284	.516	.289	-.173	.446	.204	-.398
ADED				-.938	.023	-.769	-.665	-.715	-.510	-.843	-.322	.763	-.430	.058	.900
WORKERS					-.122	.800	.778	.709	.467	.877	.473	-.771	.419	-.025	-.861
TRNOUT						-.113	-.227	-.274	-.025	-.009	.066	.129	-.404	.121	.149
CIST59							.771	.660	.680	.940	.175	-.680	.482	-.125	-.624
LEFT59								.783	.504	.787	.283	-.668	.460	-.122	-.677
LEFTRP59									.689	.712	-.015	-.653	.552	-.139	-.667
CISTRP53										.617	-.046	-.404	.637	.073	-.369
CISTRP53											.344	-.695	.421	-.096	-.709
R												-.113	-.055	.030	-.265
I													-.214	.145	.807
REPART														.315	-.324
SUBV															.050

See Table III-12 for variable labels and their meaning.

[a]Adult Education.

[b]Communist Vote, 1959.

[c]Left Vote, 1959.

[d]Repartitions, Grants for Operating Expenditures.

[e]Subventions, Grants for Investment Expenditures.

[f]Per Cent Professionals in the Population.

Youth and population Growth correlate as in the previous sample. Cities with young populations are again cities with large working-class and high Communist vote. However, Communist controlled cities are not particularly populated by young people, as in the Paris Core area.

Turning now to the political variables, we notice that voter turnout has weak and insignificant correlations with indicators of party control. As previously, we again notice that turnout is correlated with low population growth; slowly growing cities are again those with high turnouts. In Table V-3 voter turnout has little, if any, effect on policy.

Some interesting differences appear in the intercorrelations between the main political indicators. While the same high levels of association remain between Communist Vote in 1959 and Communist Representation in 1953, the correlation between the latter and Communist Representation in 1959 is much weaker (.617). In other words, the Two Ballot System introduced in 1959 had its greatest impact outside of the Paris Core, and the lower correlation between CISTRP59 and LEFTRP59 points to the cause mentioned earlier: Socialist defections out of Left Wing alliances.

But the lower correlation between Workers and CISTRP59 (.467), while very high correlations persist between Workers and Communist vote, indicates that many workers in the provinces may be voting Communist on the first ballot as a way to express their alienation, but abandon the party when it comes to chosing who will govern on the second ballot. This has been the pattern recently in many national elections. The fact that LEFTRP59 remains highly correlated with Workers (.709) allows us to specify that the major difference between Inner Paris and the provinces is the ability of the Socialists to attract the second ballot vote of

of workers away from the Communists, while the exact opposite happens in Paris.

We turn now to Table V-3 which summarizes the testing of hypotheses between each individual independent variable and each of the policy areas. Here we find more pronounced differences with the first sample. Taxable Resources is definitely an important variable for all three policies. Few suppressor effects can therefore be expected since the effect of the Income variable on policies is less important. On the other hand, the better indicator of demand for Social Welfare Spending seems to be the Workers variables. The Income indicator based as it is on residential property cannot reflect the variations in demand in the provinces as well as the social structure indicator.

The other major difference in the outcome of hypotheses is the distinctiveness of Social Welfare Spending as compared to the other policy areas. This is reconfirmed in Table V-4, but it can be seen from the outset that political variables are not likely to have a significant effect on Education or Total Spending.

Finally, Table V-3 shows that Socialist presence on city councils does not bring about high Social Welfare Spending; in fact, it can be said that it lowers it. This is, no doubt, the result of the Socialist-Gaullist coalitions referred to earlier. (LEFTRP59 is weakly correlated with Social Welfare Spending [.353].)

In Table V-4 we discover a striking contrast between the predictability of the independent variables and the seemingly indeterminate patterns of most of the policy variables. Of all policies, only Educational and Total Spending correlate significantly, while Social Welfare is quite distinct of other policy patterns. It is quite surprising to find that

TABLE V-3

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES FOR 1963 (18 CITY SAMPLE)

	S.W.Sp.	Ed.Sp.	Tot.Sp.
Demographic Measures			
Population Growth (GROWTH)	-.051	.565	.247
Population of School Age (YOUTH)	-.468	.556	.375
Socioeconomic Measures			
Adult Education (ADED)	-.614	-.320	-.239
Illiteracy (ADUNED)	.554	.193	-.389
Workers (W)	.617	.321	.294
Income (I)	-.206	-.161	.110
Taxable Resources (R)	.541	.417	.756
Political Measures			
Voter Turnout (TRNOUT)	.284	-.189	.111
Left Vote (LFT59)	.332	-.042	.023
Communist Vote (CIST59)	.518	.277	.071
Left Party Representation (LFTRP59)	.353	.035	-.130
Communist Representation (CISTRP59)	.459	.142	-.027
Communist Representation (CISTRP53)	.659	.302	.153
Governmental Variables			
Grants for Operating Expenditures (REPART)	.248	.134	-.117
Grants for Investment Expenditures (SUBV)	.080	.222	.247

TABLE V-4

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES FOR 1963

(18 CITY SAMPLE)

	S.W.Sp.	Ed.Sp.	Tot.Sp.	Adm.Sp.	Inv.Sp*
S.W.Sp.		.233	.339	.092	.124
Ed.Sp.			.698	-.294	.284
Tot.Sp.				.149	.542
Adm.Sp.					.239

*Inv.Sp. is the label used for Total Capital Outlay per capita; as can be seen this variable follows altogether a different pattern from the Operating Expenditures of any functional area.

Administrative Spending does not correlate with any of the other spending categories. Also, Investment Spending correlates only mildly with Total Spending (.542) and even less with Educational Spending (.284).

What can we conclude from these patterns? The first generalization is that the city with an across-the-board spending tendency is a much rarer phenomenon in the provinces. With debt ceilings more rigorously enforced outside of Paris[2] and fewer loans available from central institutions, each city must choose a specific spending mix within relatively rigid limits. The ability to spend profusely on more than one policy is strongly constrained. Communist cities with their extreme poverty are particularly affected, even though they attempt to get the most out of central government funds.

D. The Determinants of Social Welfare Spending

As in Chapter IV, we shall begin with a series of spuriousness tests which become even more important when the sample size limits the number of variables in any one equation.

Tables V-5 to V-7 reveal that the party control variable is still quite significant in explaining Social Welfare. LEFTRP59 is, however, not the most powerful explainer in this case and most of its effect is due to the Communist Representation component within it. Both indicators of Communist strength fare well when Resources are controlled. Table V-14, in fact, shows that CISTRP53 is the most powerful variable (r = .60) in the equation that yields the highest proportion of explained variance. Thus, again we see how important the election of 1953 was in determining

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[2] Joseph Duplouy, Le Credit aux Collectivites Locales (Berger-Levrault, 1967).

TABLE V-5

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND LEFT REPRESENTATION ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.57 (.54)	.54	.026 (.026)	.016
LEFTRP59[a]	.41 (.35)	.34	.066 (.068)	.103

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .412$ Significant at .019.

TABLE V-6

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Resources	.57 (.54)	.56	.027 (.026)	.006
CISTRP59[b]	.63 (.46)	.48	.100 (.094)	.015

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .521$ Significant at .004.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]LEFTRP59 is Left Representation, 1959.

[b]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

TABLE V-7

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1953, ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.44 (.54)	.56	.017 (.026)	.073
CISTRP53[a]	.60 (.66)	.54	.291 (.354)	.011

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .547$ Significant at .003.

TABLE V-8

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, INCOME AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level
Resources	.63 (.54)	.57	.027 (.026)	.008
Income	.08(-.21)	.06	.014 (-.043)	.751
CISTRP59[b]	.56 (.46)	.51	.105 (.094)	.023

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .531$ Significant at .012.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP53 is Communist Representation, 1953.

[b]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

spending patterns as observed ten years later. The Communists have left an even clearer mark here, on the communities where they once held policy-making power. The proof that these patterns are mostly the result of that once existant power and not as much the result of today's Communist electorate, is in the lesser strength of the variable CIST59 (.52) (see Table V-3).

Needless to say, comparisons between the effects of highly inter-correlated variables are risky. The Workers variable, nonetheless, appears throughout most of these spuriousness tests as playing a more powerful role in the determination of Welfare Spending than it did in the Paris area (compare Tables V-8 and V-10).

This is partly because of the lesser validity of Income as a demand or need indicator in the provinces where fluctuations in propertied wealth are not as sharp. This is why it fares so poorly in Table V-7.

We are thus in a position where no one explanatory design provides a completely satisfactory causal structure. In Table V-10, CISTRP59 is rendered insignificant. Moreover, any design where CISTRP53 and Workers appear together runs into very strong collinearity (+.877). We can, nonetheless, conclude that Communism past and present does seem to have detectable effects on Social Welfare Spending. The size of the working-class is an equally good explainer. This means that Gaullist and Socialist controlled councils spend more if their constituencies are dominated by Workers. Finally, the level of Resources plays its important delimiting effect, but not as powerfully as in other policy areas (i.e., Total Spending) as we shall soon see. Thus, many similarities to the Paris Core area can still be observed.

TABLE V-9

PARTIALS, BETAS, AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES AND WORKERS ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significiance Level
Resources	.36 (.54)	.32	.016 (.026)	.156
Workers	.49 (.62)	.46	.381 (.506)	.047

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .461$ Significant at .010.

TABLE V-10

PARTIALS, BETAS, AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, WORKERS AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING (S.W.Sp.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.40 (.54)	1.08	.052 (.026)	.006
Workers	.28 (.62)	.26	.215 (.506)	.067
CISTRP59[a]	.13 (.46)	.10	.021 (.094)	.100

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .556$ Significant at .011.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

TABLE V-11

PARTIALS, BETAS, REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF YOUTH, RESOURCES, INCOME AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL SPENDING (Ed.Sp.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Youth	.47 (.55)	.46	2.966 (3.533)	.073
Resources	.31 (.42)	.27	.034 (.028)	.253
Income	-.05 (-.16)	-.04	-.025 (-.085)	.847
CISTRP59[a]	.01 (.14)	.00	.002 (.075)	.989

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .384$ Significant at .150.

TABLE V-12

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF GROWTH (OF POPULATION) AND YOUTH ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL SPENDING (Ed.Sp.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weight	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Growth	.35 (.56)	.36	.618	.170
Youth	.33 (.55)	.34	2.161	.194

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .394$ Significant at .023.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

TABLE V-13

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF GROWTH (OF POPULATION) AND RESOURCES ON PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL SPENDING (Ed.Sp.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weight	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Growth	.65 (.56)	.59	1.008	.005
Resources	.54 (.42)	.45	.055	.024

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .521$ Significant at .004.

TABLE V-14

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES, INCOME AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES (Tot.Sp.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weight	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Resources	.75 (.75)	.75	.632 (.635)	.001
Income	-.04 (-.11)	-.03	-.095 (-.400)	.894
CISTRP59[a]	.00 (-.03)	.00	.008 (-.097)	.990

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .572$ Significant at .006.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

E. The Determinants of Educational Spending

This policy area displays a non-partisan pattern. None of the party control variables yielded any significant explanation; in fact, even their simple correlation coefficients are weak (see Table V-3).

Table V-15 summarizes the results of a series of spuriousness tests, permutations and other explanatory models. As we can see in Table V-12, the highly intercorrelated variables of Youth and Growth explain a larger proportion of the variance than the four of Table V-11.

The optimal explanatory model includes two variables that we can call environmental: Growth and Taxable Resources. The growth variable is descriptive of the new patterns of French urbanization which resemble more the American suburban phenomenon with its non-partisan commitment to public education. This is in contrast to the old urbanization of the Paris inner ring, where private (parochial) education plays a larger role and separates classes and political constituencies, and where it was the older communities that spend more.

F. The Determinants of Total Operating Expenditures

If the influence of Resources was quite powerful in the first subsample, it becomes the only determinant of Total Expenditures in this subsample. Table V-14 shows that it alone accounts for 56% of the variance, and all other indicators do not add anything of significance.

The fact that cities of the provinces receive lesser attention from the central government, and are required to remain closer to official indebtedness ceilings than those of the old Seine Departement, has already been mentioned as a reason for the stronger impact of Resources. This is corroborated by various observers and studies[3] even though it

[3]Idem. This is also to be found in the report called "Les Finances des...." (See Chapter Two, Table II-1 n.)

would seem at first that Inner Paris communes would be more closely supervised and therefore required to stay closer to official ceilings. The fact is that the supervision is closer mostly in matters such as police and communications (roads). The financial supervision has more often meant encouragement in following certain policies of a central government keen on reducing the blight of certain areas of its capital city.

G. Other Policy Areas

1. Grants for Operating Expenditures

However weak the influence of party control variables on Education (the main recipient of such grants), we nonetheless discover that the diligence of Communist administrations to qualify for every franc and centime dispensed by central authorities is still as important in the provinces as in the Paris inner ring (see Table V-15). The only difference here is that the Socialists are not as diligent.

2. Business Taxation

This small and symbolic policy area again displays the impact of party control variables at its highest level. And, again, it is not the lack of resources that explains the need for such revenue but the opposite. The results of Tables V-16 and V-17, with the very high variance explained (91%) by the same three independent variables we used to explain Social Welfare Spending in the Paris inner ring, seem to confirm that cities displaying a combination of those characteristics constitute a distinct form of urbanization and policy-making. As a

TABLE V-15

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF YOUTH, RESOURCES AND COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA OPERATING EXPENDITURE GRANTS (REPART) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weight	Regression Coefficient	Significance Level
Youth	.39 (.44)	.33	.574	.149
Resources	-.15 (-.05)	-.12	-.004	.582
CISTRP59[a]	.57 (.64)	.56	.081	.027

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .497$ Significant at .043.

TABLE V-16

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF INCOME, RESOURCES, COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION, 1959, ON PER CAPITA BUSINESS TAXATION REVENUE (Bus.Tax.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level	Variance Explained
Income	-.57 (-.46)	-.26	-1.762	.021	5.8
Resources	.92 (.83)	.81	.032	.0005	64.8
CISTRP59[b]	.56 (.32)	.25	.042	.024	5.5

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .882$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP59 is Communist Representation, 1959.

[b]Same as above.

TABLE V-17

PARTIALS, BETAS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF INCOME, RESOURCES AND THE INTERACTION OF RESOURCES AND COMMUNISM (CISTRP53xR) ON PER CAPITA BUSINESS TAXATION REVENUE (Bus.Tax.) OF 18 PROVINCIAL FRENCH CITIES IN 1963.

Variable	Partial Correlation	Beta Weights	Regression Coefficients	Significance Level	Variance Explained
Income	-.57 (-.46)	-.23	-1.961	.022	4.5
Resources	.93 (.83)	.78	.030	.0005	60.5
CISTRP53xR[a]	.68 (.47)	.32	.00016	.004	7.5

Coefficient of Multiple Determination: $R^2 = .907$ Significant at .0005.

Figures in parenthesis are zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship between the particular variable and the dependent variable.

[a]CISTRP53xR is Communist Representation, 1953, multiplied by Resources.

social phenomenon, they display striking consistencies through time (i.e., CISTRP53) and space (Inner and Outer Paris). This minor field of Business Taxation shows that when symbolic gestures are needed, provincial Communism is not different from Parisian Communism.

H. Conclusions

We have shown in this chapter that despite the limitations on thorough analysis imposed by sample size, it is still possible to discern specific spending patterns. In summary, we can say that the second sample does not constitute a completely distinct universe. Provincial city budgets differ from Parisian cities to the extent of their lesser resources and industrialization, but these differences are compounded by resulting in less mobilized workers, less well organized Communist organization and more consensual Socialists.

The confirmation of some hypotheses relative to minor policy areas (Grants and Business Taxation) leads us to conclude that the Structured Policy Model is not a special case of Parisian urbanization. It can be said that it is found in its ideal form in Paris, but has existed in varying purity throughout all French urban areas of the pre-World War II era (i.e., Le Havre and the Département of Nord). Its features (i.e., class warfare through the use of the budget) were somewhat moderated by the more consensual culture of the provinces. Today, this trend is accelerated by the new urbanization.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

In concluding this study, we can ask -- what was accomplished here? We began by deriving from the research and literature of policy analysis, one major hypothesis pertaining to the impact of party control as a political variable on budgetary policies. We hypothesized that in France, at the local level, changes in the party in power are likely to result in detectable (non-spurious) changes in the levels of local social welfare expenditures.

In conceptualizing why political variables should have an impact on policy in France, we constructed two models of policy-making, the Fluid and the Structured. The Structured Policy-Making Model describes a number of political systems such as Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden and Britain, with the following features:

1. Crystallization of social cleavage hostility into corresponding permanent political and parapolitical structures.
2. Political parties make policy by seeking to maximize benefits only to their limited and captive constituencies.

Political variables can also be expected to affect Social Welfare expenditures because of the redistributive nature of that policy area.

To test this hypothesis, we collected budgetary data for 1963, from French municipalities in the Paris and Lyon urban areas. We formed two

samples, one of 36 cities from the Paris Core area and one of 18 cities from the outlying Paris suburbs and the Lyon urban area in order to avoid a biased sample.

Budgetary data was available from the archives of French local governments; socioeconomic data was made available through French census publications, even though some crucial variables (Taxable Resources and Personal Income) were also found in the budgets (assessed valuations) of local governments. Finally, the political variables, operationalized as percent of council controlled by Left parties (and more specifically by the Communist party), were developed out of electoral results in Le Monde for 1953 and 1959. The newspaper was particularly useful in that it identifies the party affiliations of electoral lists, which often carry misleading labels.

The method of least-squares was chosen to test the main hypothesis and its corollaries. This entailed the use of computer routines which allow for the simultaneous controlling of the effects of many variables. We were also fortunate that our particular program included the automatic calculation of significance levels for individual variables through a t-test performed on the standard error of the regression coefficients.

This was particularly useful in alerting us to cases of multicollinearity, also known as high intercorrelation between independent variables (such as income and social structure).

In coping with the problem we followed two strategies. When testing for spuriousness (as when controlling for resource levels), alternative indicators were used. Those that were not as highly correlated with other independent variables allowed us to perform a conclusive test.

In cases where no such tests were called for, because political theory did not indicate such a possibility, we chose to introduce each of the correlated variables in alternative sequences. We were thus able to compare the relative impact of each (in terms of total variance explained) on the dependent variable.

The results of the testing were quite conclusive. In the Paris Core area, the effect of party control was very strong in determining Social Welfare expenditures, but played an intervening role in Total expenditures and to some (although less detectable) extent, seemed to increase Educational expenditures. In the 18 provincial cities, party control had an effect only on Social Welfare and was not even associated with any pattern in Educational and Total expenditures, where the pervading influence of taxable resource levels was all too powerful.

The divergent findings justified our sampling strategy and allowed us to discover the powerful effect exercised by sharp disparities in resources and industrialization. Thus, we can add one more basic assumption to the Structured Model of Policy-Making -- the necessity for a minimum overall level of industrialization and taxable resources.

Thus, while the Paris sample exemplified the ideal of the Structured Model, the second was a variant which finds all cities spending less and the Communists expressing their relative isolation amid a more consensual setting by making the expected choice to overspend only in Social Welfare.

In comparing our two sets of findings to those of Fried in Italy and Austria on one hand, and to those of James Alt[1] in England on the other,

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[1] See footnotes 7 and 8 in Chapter Four.

we find confirmation to the conclusion that for political variables to have an effect on policy, a certain threshold of industrialization must have been achieved and with it an adequate resource base. In a systemic perspective, we can say that the relationship between socioeconomic development and policy with politics as an intervening variable is not continuous or linear over time. It is only after industrialization has sufficiently mobilized an electorate (along well defined cleavages) that political parties will begin to add to policies an imprint that can be attributed only to them.

Such discontinuities should be a warning signal to students of expenditure determination that great attention should be given to their settings and to the composition of their samples.

Also in comparing our results to those of James Alt's[2] in Britain, we can at least minimize the plausibility that the effect of party control in France can be explained by the special status of the French Communist Party (whose political strategies could be extra-systemic in their inspiration).

The British Labor Party finds as much difficulty in turning out the working-class vote in the countryside as the French Communist Party in holding on to such a vote on the runoff elections in the provinces.

Among the more interesting corollary findings was the tendency for Left and Communist administrations, in both settings, to qualify for more grants-in-aid than their socioeconomic situation warranted. Grants-in-aid in turn were found to have little impact on spending levels in either samples, except in Education where they expectedly paralleled the effect of the size of the pupil population.

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[2] See footnote 7 in Chapter Four.

We were also able to demonstrate (in a minor policy area, Business Taxation) how political variables can be found to have a powerful effect regardless of setting when the policy is largely symbolic in nature.

Equally interesting was the pattern of Educational Spending in the Paris Core area where the negative impact of the Personal Income variable seemed to indicate a preference of people in rich communities in France for private education.

We have shown in this study how electoral systems, such as Proportional Representation, can institutionalize a set of voting patterns and policy-making trends that can be detected ten years later.

On the other hand, we have also seen how the Two Ballot Majority System had resulted as of 1959 in divergent electoral and policy-making strategies for the Socialists. In Paris, Socialist leaders would act like Communists (even when not in coalition with them) in increasing Social Welfare expenditures. Socialist leaders in the provinces acted more like Center politicians in keeping expenditures within range of the community's resource base. In coalition with Center politicians, they routed the Communists out of communes where the latter had a plurality.

Finally, voter turnout was found to have no relationship to policy or party control. The same could be said also of the degree of party competition. Even though we did not specifically test this hypothesis, it was not difficult to observe that the least competitive cities often had the highest expenditures.

In summarizing the more meaningful contributions that this study can be said to have made to political science, we can categorize these

into theoretical clarifications, substantive arguments and use of concepts and methods. Needless to say, whatever was accomplished here was possible only because of previous efforts by ingenious scholars in many fields and disciplines.

The theoretical clarifications pertain to our use of the concept of institutionalization in explaining why and how some political systems display a higher politicization. In substantive matters, we hope to have presented a more accurate and up-to-date description of a political system (the French) which has often seemed to be the subject of cliches and caricatures. This applies all the more to the study of French local government.

In our efforts at concept formation, we hope to have convinced fellow researchers of the necessity of differentiating between taxable resources and personal income. The powerful suppressor effects discovered in the form of highly industrialized communities with an impoverished population have applicability in all urban expenditure studies. We have pointed out that in order to be able to detect such a suppressor effect, special care must be given to the composition of a sample. What are the ranges in life styles that the sample represents -- industrial, rural, commercial or neo-industrial (clean industries and services)? Too much of a mix will cloud subtle relationships. But the conceptual distinction will allow the researcher more unequivocal conclusions as to the limiting influence of resource levels on governmental spending.

1. Theoretical Considerations

If there is one area where we have relied more heavily on the efforts of others, it must be in the field of cleavage theory. The works of Dahl, Rokkan, Lorwin, Liephart, Powell and Stiefbold have already been acknowledged in inspiring us.[3] Their value has been in providing answers imbedded in the historical context on one hand, and organizational theory on the other. Their focus on the system of conflict resolution adopted by nations and more specifically democracies, allows to often uncover unsuspected reasons for the stability and maintenance of democracies. Their work on fragmented societies shows that high levels of consensus are not the most important underpining in the functioning of democracies. Of greater importance seems to be the patterns of reward and payoff distribution among competing elites. The behavior of Communists in bringing down the Weimar Republic must be contrasted to that of the French Communists during the crisis of 1968, and points to one major difference. In the France of 1968, the Communists had something to lose (namely their control of certain institutions, like municipal councils studied here).

In other words, cleavage theory provides us with answers to questions of systemic importance. It has also began tidying up the definitional looseness that had so far pervaded the study of ideology, conflict, hostilities, and participation. These are now defined in more concise

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[3] See footnote 18 in Chapter One and also footnote 1 in Chapter Two.

and behavioral terms (i.e., ideology must exhibit constraint). Many of them are tied to specific and observable entities -- organizations.

One particular type of organization -- the political party, will affect the persistance of political attitudes and ideologies. We have, however, pointed out that while political parties usually have an interest in politicizing most social issues, some party systems can develop which may minimize such a politicization, particularly as it may be reflected in expenditures. This is why we have deemed it important to make the distinction between a Fluid and a Structured policy-making system.

Finally, cleavage theory reminds us of the importance of the stakes and terms of the conflict in bringing about polarization or consensus. This is why, since V. O. Key, political scientists have expected to find higher politicization reflected in issues that were called redistributive (i.e., Social Welfare Spending). It must be remembered, however, that the prevailing state of the economy will determine to a large extent which issues can truly be regarded as redistributive (zero-sum) conflicts. Expanding economies can allow even the most faithful followers of Herbert Spencer to establish large Social Welfare Programs, and turn most governmental spending into a giant pork barrel with a bit for everybody. Conversely a stagnating economy (which has often been the case of pre-war European democracies) may make it impossible to define any issue in other terms than "us versus them." The end of idology argument has in fact been made under the assumption of a prevailing prosperity that was supposed to be here to stay.

Today, when most industrial democracies are beset with shortages, production cutbacks and conservation problems, zero-sum issues are again more numerous. Whether a new politicization emerges out of new conflicts and resultant cleavages will, however, still depend on the nature and depth of past institutionalization patterns. It is interesting to speculate what changes such an increase in zero-sum issues will bring about to the American party system and the Fluid policy-making system.

2. Substantive Arguments

In our inquiry into the workings of French local government, we discovered that generalizations made on the premise that the French state is unitary and centralized in structure, can hide a much more complex picture of the reality. Beyond the usual question as to how rigorously central decisions are enforced, we discovered that a strong local party system can often overcome the restrictions on local autonomy imposed by constitutions and legislation, and display a surprising spirit of local initiative.

We can conclude that in the burgeoning field of cross-national comparative local government, the study of local party systems and more specifically that of the local roots of national party systems,[4] must not be overlooked.

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[4] This is what is advocated also by Mark Kesselman in his "Changes in the French Party System," Comparative Politics, 4 (January, 1972), pp. 281-301.

The relative atrophy of local party systems among American communities, often means that local interests are helpless against the power of national executive agencies and nation-wide corporations. Paradoxically, federalism can often mean more restrictive federal and state guidelines in the granting of loans and subsidies than in a system where the central state does not have to worry over the definition of its formal powers. And the actions of various federal agencies in leapfrogging local structures, and operating through their own system of service delivery can often result in lesser local consultation than what usually happens in the French prefectoral system.

In a trend paralleling the increase in power of the national Presidency, responses to the urban crisis have also featured increases in local administrative personnel and executive (mayoral) power.[5] Such a strategy has often weakened even further any form of local political will. Rarely do we see working-class towns and cities able to mount their own welfare and poverty rehabilitation schemes as we have witnessed in the Paris Red Belt. All too often American working-class communities (e.g., Toledo) are still governed by middle-class "managers" able to predominate over a party system weakened by the blows of the "reform movement." It is no wonder that we have witnessed many periodic uprisings by elements of the working-class over the power of what they call

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[5] In manager-council type cities, it is the manager who has assumed powers beyond the definition of his office; in cities like New York, the mayoral office was enhanced; more recently, Atlanta and Detroit have revised their charters to grant more power to the mayoral office.

"pseudo-intellectuals" attempting to impose reforms without any consultation.[6] In the meantime, the multiplicity of administrative arrangements and these uprisings help perpetuate the myth of local autonomy.

This observer's recommendation is that at the national, as well as at the local level, a revitalizing restructuring of the party system is needed. It is more likely to improve the quality of our democracies than the continuing obsession with administrative tinkering. Why is it that the same innovative spirit cannot be applied to input structures?

3. Research Implications

For the social scientist, the administrative complexity of local government poses immense challenges to any attempt at evaluating the performance of such governments; the same problems of comparability remain.[7] Some highly qualified users of multivariate techniques throw their hands up in despair and seriously advise a return to case studies.[8]

This may indeed be useful and necessary if we are to understand the actual functioning of administrative interrelationships and their economic-budgetary implications.[9] But on the wider and more theoretic

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[6] The feelings of supporters of George Wallace in the busing controversy, and also the response of some communities to the fluoridation problem, are to be remembered. See Robert L. Crain, Elihu Katz and Donald B. Rosenthal, The Politics of Community Conflict, the Fluoridation Decision (Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969).

[7] See, for example, Terry N. Clark's compendium of articles in his Community Decision-Making (Chandler Press, 1966).

[8] See Roy Bahl, who wrote Metropolitan City Expenditures (University of Kentucky Press, 1968), and recently expressed such a feeling in a conversation.

[9] See footnote 2 in Chapter One.

plane, the functioning of more homogeneous local government systems such as those of France, England, or Austria, may constitute a more fruitful field[10] for the systematic testing of hypotheses, as we have done in this study.

The application of multivariate techniques in the realm of political phenomena is hardly a new development, yet even if the conceptual problems are improved, some problems remain in the limitations imposed by the data and format of simple cross-sectional analysis. Multicollinearity is one such problem. The simultaneous use of time series and cross-sectional analysis has recently been attempted.[11] Path analysis and other econometric techniques are also resulting in interesting studies; and while it is true that technique alone cannot solve all our problems, it can still be of help.

When a good research design has been found, tested in a microcosm, and when interesting and meaningful results have indeed emerged, it is valuable to pursue it further, enlarge the scope, improve the data, expand the number of variables to include those that are more difficult to construct, and bring to bear more powerful statistical techniques.

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[10] See footnote 43 in Chapter One.

[11] See Virginia Gray, "Time Series Analysis of State Spending," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago on May 3-5, 1973.

4. Improvements and Future Research

The possible improvements to this study are numerous. First and foremost would be an expansion in the sample size to include more cities from the Outer Paris Area, and newly growing urban areas similar to Lyon's. Conversely it would be useful to include the cities of the Lille urban area, which is the oldest industrial area of France. This would allow us to ascertain the uniqueness of the Paris Core Area, and whether the Stalemate as we have described it was indeed part of the Old Urbanization. We suspect that results would not differ. By and large, the addition of cities from the Southern areas would present only marginal benefits, each of the latter (i.e., Toulouse, Bordeaux, Marseilles) being relatively distinct from each other administratively, as well as politically.

A different research strategy would be to focus data gathering at the level of the large metropolis of 100,000 population and above. This would be a study of central cities.

The second most obvious improvement in the quality of the data, would result from the use of more than one time period for the budgetary data. Using an average of two or three consecutive years of expenditures would improve significance levels and allow some analysis of capital outlay patterns.

Change patterns can be studied by duplicating the same data for 1955 (two years after the 1953 municipal elections, which we have found to have set a trend) and 1968 (three years after the 1965 elections which represent the first efforts by Gaullists at institutionalizing their rule). Studies of French cities after 1970 might run into some problems of comparability, given the changes brought about in tax collections and

assessment practices. The interesting problem of metropolitan consolidation would, however, be the main focus of any post-1970 study. This would present an excellent opportunity for the testing of various hypotheses pertaining to the effect of structural changes.

Finally, the relationship between national and local government could be better explored through a study of the allocations of the national budget in each policy area. In other words, it would be useful to know the size of the local effort in relation to national expenditures in each policy area (i.e., education). This would allow a better measurement of the effectiveness of certain central directives aimed at inducing specific local policies. We could then have a somewhat more substantiated base of comparison between a centralized and a federal system.

As far as improvement in the operationalization of specific variables, we can point to one possible fruitful area. Political variables, measuring the strength of partisan structures and secondary organizations (i.e., party membership lists or finances, unionization and church attendance data), would allow us to have a better operationalization of what we have called political institutionalization. We could then ascertain to what extent such institutionalization is based on control of governmental bureaucracies and budgets, and how much of it is based on participatory structures.

Finally, improvements in technique can go beyond the use of multiplicative models attempted in this study. The political scientist stands to gain from a scrutiny of the more recent trends in the econometric

analysis of expenditures. Policy analysis was born out of the initial efforts of economists such as Fabricant, Fisher and Sachs. Today other economists are experimenting with new and more sophisticated models[12] (i.e., wage and employment functions for expenditure determination) that merit our attention.

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[12]See Richard Gustely, The Process of City Government Determination, unpublished doctoral dissertation (Syracuse University, 1973). See also Roger Schmenner, "On the Determinants of Municipal Employee Wages," Review of Economics and Statistics (February, 1973), pp. 83-90.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

Data Sources

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4. Le Monde (March 27, 1959).

5. Le Monde (March 15, 1953).

6. Compte Administratif de la Ville de Alfortville

" " " " " d' Antony
" " " " " d' Asnieres
" " " " " d' Aubervilliers
" " " " " de Bagneux
" " " " " de Bagnolet
" " " " " de Bobigny
" " " " " de Boulogne-Billancourt
" " " " " de Bourg La Reine
" " " " " de Bron
" " " " " de Cachan
" " " " " de Caluire et Cuire
" " " " " de Charenton Le Pont
" " " " " de Choisy le Roi
" " " " " de Clamart

6. Compte Administratif de la Ville de Clichy
" " " " " de Clermont-Ferrand
" " " " " de Conflans Sainte Honorine
" " " " " de Courbevoie
" " " " " de Creteil
" " " " " de Drancy
" " " " " de Genevilliers
" " " " " de Givors
" " " " " de Houilles
" " " " " de Fontenay Sous Bois
" " " " " de La Garenne Colombes
" " " " " de Le Chesnay
" " " " " de Le Vesinet
" " " " " de Les Lillas
" " " " " de Lyon
" " " " " de Nanterre
" " " " " de Neuilly
" " " " " de Noisy Le Sec
" " " " " de Nogent Sur Marne
" " " " " de Maisons Lafitte
" " " " " de Montrouge
" " " " " d' Oullins
" " " " " de Poissy
" " " " " de Puteaux
" " " " " de Sartrouville
" " " " " de Saint Fons
" " " " " de Saint Mande
" " " " " de Saint Maur des Fosses
" " " " " de Saint Ouen
" " " " " de Vanves
" " " " " de Venissieux
" " " " " de Versailles
" " " " " de Villeneuve La Garenne
" " " " " de Villeurbanne

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