CLASS AND POWER IN THE PANJABE VILLAGE The“: for Hm Degree of ph. D. MICHEGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Saghir Ahmad 3.9637 JIWRW MiChlE'e 1 ”at: University)! mum; 5qu m1 ii“ (lfll 1| 111w M m; m 1| mm This is to certify that the thesis entitled ‘ CLASS AND POWER IN THE PANJABI VILLAGE presented by \ SAGHIR AHMAD has been accepted towards fulfillment t of the requirements for Ph.D. degree in Sociology 5. x __fi 9 ”'fi 1 /\04‘f Major professor mew 18. 19€fl__ 0-169 ,‘ I . ; DEQrte 20,07; CLASS AND POWER IN THE PANJABI VILLAGE By Saghir Ahmad A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Sociology and AnthrOpology 1967 ABSTRACT CLASS AND POWER IN THE PANJABI VILLAGE by Saghir Ahmad This is a study of social stratification and power structure in a village community of the west Panjab in Pakistan. Theoretically, it is an attempt to test the Marxian thesis of class structure in an agricultural community. The data was collected from a landlord village in the West Panjab during 1964-65. The sampled village was selected on the basis of its being representative of many others in the area. Living in the village for eight months, the author used both anthrOpological and sociological techniques to collect data. Some comparative infor- mation was also collected from adjoining villages and the nearest small town. The major findings of the study show that the primary source of an individual's power is control over the economic resources of the community. By virtue of the control over the economic resources, the powerfuls direct the political and other social behavior of the subordinates. As a result of applying the ”issue" and "reputational" approaches to the analysis of community power structure, it was found that there are a group of individuals other than the powerfuls, who greatly influence certain types of communal actions. These individuals are referred to as influentials. One of the important characteristics of the influentials is member ship in a large biraderi--e5pecia11y a biraderi which has a claim upon a large number of males. Both ethnographic and statistical data support the thesis that social hierarchy in the village is largely determined by the position in the "organization of production". Using Marriott's (1955) approach to caste ranking, it was found that within the same community there occurred two distinct systems of hierarchy. Firstly, the agriculturist aggm as a whole is placed higher than the 3222 of artisans. Secondly, there is distinct rank differentiations within both the agriculturist and the artisan gugm_. However, little evidence is found to support the thesis that the village gggm§_are analogous to Hindu castes. In- stead, behavioral and attitudinal differences are best explained in terms of class rather than "caste" or "status". TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE Chapter I. THE VILLAGE II. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE III. POLITICAL STRUCTURE IV. SOCIAL STRATIFICATION V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION APPENDICES I. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN JALPANA II. LAND REFORMS REGULATIONS III. BASIC DEMOCRACIES HIERARCHY IV. CENSUS GUIDE V. INTERVIEW GUIDE BIBLIOGRAPHY Page 19 37 81 107 114 115 117 120 123 134 PREFACE In the brief history of Pakistan, the year 1958 signified a major turn of events. In October of that year, the Civilian govern- ment of the Center was replaced by a group of army generals headed by the then commander-in-chief of the army, Mohammad Ayub Khan. Soon after assuming authority as Chief Martial Law Administrator, Ayub dismissed the cabinet and the legislature, abrogated the con- stitution, and declared himself President of the country. In his first address to the nation, he explained the reasons for his inter- position: Ever since the death of the Quaid-i-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan, politicans started a free-for-all type of fighting in which no holds were barred. . . . There has been no limit to the depth of basensss, deceit, chicanery and degradation (February, 1959). In some respects this verbalized the disillusionment of many Paki- stanis and appeared as the dawn of a new era. Indeed, the period between 1947 and 1958 had been.marked by many unwarranted political changes, shifts in political alliances, and in the public image one of vast wastage of national resources.1 During 1958 to 1960, the Ayub regime busied itself in formulating and enacting many reforms, the purpose of which was said to be to "eliminate the ills of our past history, straighten our organizational and structural setup and prepare the peOple for a tremendous effort to embark upon the stupendous task of self-improvement" (Ayub, February, 1959). 1For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Hugh Tinker (1962) and Keith Callard (1959). ii Among the various reforms, two, namely the Land Reforms of 1959 and the Basic Democracies Order of 1959, were concerned with altering the economic and political structures at the grass-roots level, i.e., the villages. It was argued that since a majority of Pakistanis lived in the villages and were dependent upon agriculture, any program of economic and political reforms must begin at this level. Land Reforms Immediately after the "October Revolution,” Ayub Khan appointed a nine-man commission to "consider problems relating to the ownership and tenancy of agricultural land and to recommend measures for better production and social justice as well as security of tenure for those engaged in cultivation" (Bakhsh, 1960, p. 6). Let us therefore briefly review the "problems" associated with the land which called for amelior- ation. According to the 1951 census of Pakistan, three-fourths of the population of west Pakistan was directly engaged in or dependent upon agricultural and pastoral pursuits. 'More than eightyper cent of the West Pakistanis live in villages. In the words of the Commission, "Land is the most precious asset and agriculture is the base of the economy of the province". In spite of the fact that, Land does not only provide means of subsistence for a preponderant majority of the peOple, but its ownership is also regarded as "a symbol of prestige". The owner— ship is not, however, equitably distributed. Reliable statistics for West Pakistan are not available. Accor- ding to the data compiled by the Planning Board, on the one hand 3.3 million persons owning less than five acres owned 7.4 million acres of land; on the other, only 6061 persons owning 500 acres or more owned 7.5 million acres of land. In other words, 65% of the owners with holdings of less than five acres each owned lesser area as compared with 0.1% of the land- owners holding 500 acres or more. . . . This marked iii disparity in ownership of land had created a situation in the province on account of which a preponderant ma- jority of the total p0pulation were at the mercy of an insignificant minority (Bakhsh, 1960, pp. 3-4). This pattern of land distribution exhibits the peculiar feature associated with the system of tenure called "zamindari of landlord type." As will be obvious in the zamindari tenure of landlord type, the property rights in land are possessed in full by a single owner. In cases where an area of land owned by a single owner is large, the land is most commonly cultivated by tenants. Though there are many forms of tenancies, the most prevalent in the Panjab has been the Batai system. In this form of tenancy, the tenant receives half or less than half of the produce, resulting in reduced incentive for improvement. Speaking of the sociological consequences of this type of tenure system in India, Singh said: Thus the general pattern that emerges from the study of the power system of the village before abolition of land- lordism is that master of economic resources and its centralisation in a certain class remained by far the most important source of power. . . . The other interest- ing point that emerges is that village settlement and its land tenure had deep relationship with not only the power structure of the village, but also its social system. The pattern of leadership was structured around the system of Zamindari on the one hand and caste on the other. Hence the circulation of leaders and their selection was rela- tively closed (Singh, 1958, in Desai (1961), p. 678). Similarly, Shah notes that the "economic status (moreover) puts an individual in a particular social station as well. Hence ownership of land becomes a major determinant of socio-economic status of an individual in an agrarian society" (Shah, 1961, p. 333). It was against this background that various attempts at land reform have been made in Pakistan since 1948, of which the 1959 iv . . 2 act was considered the most radical and revolutionary. Some Of the major decisions of the 1959 act were as follows: 1. No person shall own more than 500 acres of irrigated or 1000 acres of unirrigated land. 2. Land owned over and above this ceiling will be resumed by the government to be distributed among tenants and other deserving claimants. To avoid diaplacement the tenants already cultivating will be given option to buy it on installments, Spread over a period of 25 years. Landlords will be paid fair compensation for land resumed over a period of years. 3. Occupancy tenants shall be converted into full owner throughout West Pakistan. 4. Tenants everywhere will have security of tenure. 5. All Jagirs will be resumed without payment of com- pensation. 6. To prevent fragmentation of holdings, the division of land below a certain economic (50 acres) and sub- sistence (12 1/2) level will be forbidden by law and joint management will be facilitated by law. Basic Democracies While the Land Reforms of 1959 appeared to aim at a more equit- able distribution of wealth, the Basic Democracies was conceived as a scheme for the distribution of political authority among a larger number of peOple. The chief characteristic of Basic Democracies is the five-tiered system of councils in East and West Pakistan. Although the Provincial Development Advisory Council is the highest rung on the ladder, it is not strictly a govern- ing body in the same sense that other councils are. In de- 2For a detailed summary of various land reform proposals and acts, see Niazi, Land Reforms i§_Pakistan (1959). 3For greater detail, see Appendix II. V scending order, the others operate on the levels of divisions, districts, tehsils/thanas and unions. Union Councils may be the bottom rung of the ladder, but in many reapects they are the most fin- portant feature. At the union level, the council is unique in that it contains directly elected mem- bers. For that reason, it represents the closest link of government with the people. Approximately 10 elected members, chosen from a population of about 10,000, join five appointed members to make up the4 union council total of 15 (Friedman, 1961, p. 10). It was hOped that by entrusting a wide variety of political and administrative responsibilities to the elected members of the Union Councils, the scheme would be able to create a genuine sense of participation among the local population. It was also thought that by limiting the electorate to seven hundred to a thousand adults that "true" leaders would emerge. Research Pr0posa1 In 1964, four years after the implementation of the above men- tioned reforms and at the time of the second general election for the Basic Democracies, I planned to do a systematic analysis of the changes brought about by these reforms. I reasoned that theoretically such an analysis could be most fruitfully conducted within the frame- work of changing power structure. Following C. W.‘Mills, it was ar- gued that "men, not events shape big decisions. The course of events in our time depends more on a series of human decisions than on any inevitable fate" (Mills, 1959, p.21). Power, for the purposes of this study, was defined as the "chance of a man or group of men to 4For greater detail, see Appendix III. vi realize their own will in communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (Gerth and Mills, 1946, p. 180). It was further argued that since the economic structure of society is the real basis on which the juridical and political superstructure is raised and to which definite social forms of thought correspond, and the mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, poli- tical and intellectual processes of life (Marx, in Bottomore, 1956, p. 107), attention.must be paid to the area which was reported to have been affected by the land reforms. It was hypothesized that with the re- distribution of economic wealth (land) in a landlord village, there will also occur an alteration in the distribution of power. Follow- ing the Weberian thesis, that manifestation of power could be ob- served in communal action, I proposedto concentrate on the election and the functioning of the Basic Democracies among other communal actions. The very logic of the above formulation, and the limitation of time and money, demanded that I should select a landlord village which was reported to have been affected by the 1959 Land Reforms and which was large enough to elect at least one Basic Democrat. To fulfill the first criterion, I collected data on the extent of land reforms in various districts, shown in Table I. As the table indicates, the area of land resumed under land reforms is on the average higher in the districts where irrigation is dependent upon rainfall. This implies that these districts also had landlords with larger holdings. From this point of view one of the first three districts should have been selected for the present study but were whm H >Hmm ”menace ocHnHHmm >nnmm om Hoan om Honmw won nmvwnm >onmm UHmnHHonm cmoosmmnn coo: we»: U. a. firms m.um.uoH mm.m uo.m H.mm Zwmafimww H.NH.wNu bm.w mw.w N.mN omaodeHocn ow.bow us on nu chNmmmnmmnr so.bHH Nm.H ub.w H.0b unmwca ~.~wk so.u um.u c.0b memHuwnaw um bk.~ mm.o o.mm GOHODV UHmnHHonm urmnm mm.uoH mm.o bH.H H.Nm Rowan: hm.0uw VN.H -.w H.HN mmnmoarm ww.wou me.m um.w H.bu Konnmoamnw HN.VbH uw.b no.u o.mo hmwonm m.wmw No.0 No.H o.bb mrmwrocnm wsmmu o~.m wu.m o.mu hwmpwocn ~.uuo um.o N~.o o.u~ ncumnmnsmpm o.¢om om.o we.» o.uo nagmflmn Nmm uw.o mm.o o.um mwmwwon H mo.m Hw.w o.mw viii not, for the following reasons: Firstly, the percentage of cultivated area is much lower in these districts than in the colony districts, which means a Sparser population. Secondly, because of the dependence upon rainfall, in fiseason‘when rain is scarce, the p0pulation tends to be migratory, leaving only women and children in the villages. Thirdly, except for the districts of Jhelum and Rawalpindi, the three districts fall on the border of the Panjab, with a consequent mixed population of Panjabis and Pathans. Hence, the decision was made to study a village of one of the colony districts. In terms of areas with large landowners whose lands were resumed, Jhang, Multan and Sargodha were most qualified. IMultan was rejected because the language spoken in this district, Multani, is quite dissimlar from Panjabi. The learning of this language would have posed some difficulties. Also, Multan is not exactly in the main stream of Panjabi culture, having been influenced by Bhawalpur and Sindh. Furthermore, after partition, many of the Multan residents left for India and were replaced by peOple from India who have not, as yet, been fully assimilated. Because I wanted to control as many variables as poséible, I decided against selecting Multan. The district officials of both Sargodha and Jhang were contacted and, after a more prompt reaponse from Sargodha, in addition to discussions with knowledgeables, the district of Sargodha was chosen. The choice of Sargodha was further reinforced by two other factors. The city of Sargodha houses not only the office of the district, but also the headquarters of the division where repre- senatives of all the districts-~Sargodha, Mianwali, Lyallpur and Jhang-- ix meet. Thus, while being in the town I could observe the activities of not only the district, but also those of the division. The im- portant landlords of the Sargodha district have probably played a more important role in the national, provincial and local politics than any district other than Lahore. Names like Noon, Tiwanas, Maikans, Kaliars, Biloochs, and others, are only too well known in Pakistan to need any introduction. Having selected the district, the choice of the tehsil was made in a similar fashion: Data on the amount of land resumed was col- lected from the district headquarters. Keeping the above in.mind, other factors such as the c00peration of the tehsil officials, near- ness to the district town, and availability of certain facilities led to the choice of Shahpur. While the collection of data about the amount of land resumed in various districts and tehsils had been relatively easy, similar information could not be gathered for the various villages in the tehsil. Thus, the list of villages which I prepared as possible communities to be studied, were based upon the information gathered from the knowledgeable officials and non-officials. The heads of various villages were contacted either personally or by letters. Jalpana, a village about three and a half miles from Shahpur, was selected. The following study is based on data collected from that village during a period of eight and a half months in 1964 to 1965. The decision was based upon the fact that the village land which was under the control of the two landlords was said to have been resumed under the Land Reforms of 1959. Jalpana had also a large enough papu- lation to have elected one Basic Democrat. Furthermore, since I was x interested in studying power in a situation of competition, for reasons eXplained in the third chapter, Jalpana provided an ideal situation. The two landlords of the village, though related through kin ties, were in opposition to each other. One was a strong sup- porter of the Ayub regime, while the other had staked his reputation by working for the presidential candidate of the opposition party. Thirdly, the two landlords of Jalpana were generally categorized as "progressive" and "traditional" in their approach to agricul- tural work and in their relation to their tenants. Lastly, Jalpana is not only a village but is also a 25223, which meant that it is the headquarters of two other villages, Bhabrani and Bhakri. Thus, while stationed in Jalpana, I could easily collect data about the residents of the other two villages who came daily to Jalpana. As will be recalled, the major independent variable was the land reforms and its consequences in the social relations of the villages. Soon after settling down in the village, I attempted to gather information about those who had received land under the 1959 act. The information was not available in any recorded form. How- ever, at my constant urging, the Patwari did provide me the names of forty-one recipients of land who are called allottees. On en- quiry from these allottees, I discovered that they were still working as tenants of one of the two landlords, and that only two were 9E £3252 owners of the land which was, according to the records, allotted to them. After investigation, it was found that little or no atten- tion had been paid to the Land Reforms Commission recommendation that land should not be subdivided into holdings smaller than twelve and xi a half acres, which was called a "subsistence level" holding. This meant that while the tenant was allotted land resumed under the act, thirty-seven of the forty-one had less than the recommended amount. Only one was allotted the right area, the remaining six had managed by devious and dishonest means to secure more than twelve and a half acres. Hence, most of the thirty-seven were forced to seek additional land to fulfill their needs; that which was available belonged to the landlords under the tenancy system. These cultivators were then pres- sured either to give up the allotted land and obtain land under tenancy, or else not to expect any "favors" from the landlord. Most chose to remain tenants rather than become owners of smaller pieces of land. Those who refuesed to give up their allotted land were further pres- sured by other means to give up land; e.g., the allottee was deprived of water to irrigate his land. In another instance, servants and ten- ants were asked to graze their cattle in the field of one of the al- lottees, thus causing much loss to his crop. Secondly, in.many cases, the tenants were asked by the landlord to buy the land simply to cir- cumvent the law. Thetenant became only the legal owner, while 92 fgg£g_ control of the land and its produce remained in the hands of the origi- nal owner. Thirdly, while the law required that the tenant of the parti- cular piece of land be given first choice to buy the resumed land from the government, much of the land of this and other villages was actu- ally auctioned. It goes without saying that in this situation the poor tenants could hardly compete with landlords or other moneyed peOple. In brief, the land reforms had little or no impact as far as the redistribution of land among the tenants was concerned. xii Thus, soon after starting the field work, it became apparent that the landlords, using their high economic positions, had managed to undermine the effectiveness of the program which had threatened their position. Their actions had many historical precedents, and failure of the land reforms reflected the government's lack of real— istic appraisal of the power structure. In view of this failure, the original proposal, which was conceived within the framework of changing power structure, needed no further empirical verification. Thus, what follows in the next four chapters is an empirical and theoretical analysis of the relation between power structure and social stratification. The collection of the data and the conse- quent analysis was done within the theoretical framework mentioned above. The first of the four chapters introduces the reader to some of the salient features of the village and its environs, which will facilitate the understanding of the next three chapters. The chapter on economic structure describes the various economic roles and their interrelation. It also describes the general pattern of agricultural production and how this affects social relations within the village. The justification for discussing the economic structure first lies in the assumption that economic roles are independent variables which impinge upon other asPects of the social structure of the village. This assumption is tested in the next two chapters. The basic theme of the third chapter is analysis of the relation between economic and political roles. In so doing, I discuss the various forms and xiii manifestations of political control.5 To discover those who have political control, I make use of two approaches, namely, "reputational" and "issue," and discuss their relative advantages and disadvantages. The fourth chapter analyzes the basis of social hierarchy. It was found that the concept of class as used by Marx could be most fruit- fully used in the analysis of village social stratification. This conclusion is reached after testing the validity of other frequently used concepts and frameworks. More than anyone else, a researcher is dependent upon the co- Operation, kindness, generosity and encouragement of people without whom his task would be very difficult if not impossible. But, though dependent upon others, he is never really able to repay them except by acknowledgment in his work. Knowing this to be poor compensation, I nevertheless wish to take this Opportunity to express my gratitude to the following organizations and persons. I am very grateful to the Agricultural DevelOpment Council of New York which, without grudging the investment, supported my graduate work at Michigan State University from 1961 to 1964. In 1964 they made it possible for me to go to Pakistan to conduct this study. I hope their generosity has not been wasted. I wish to thank the ESperanza Trust of London and the Royal AnthrOpological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland for financial assistance during my three months stay in London. I also wish to thank Professor Adrian.Mayer of the School of Oriental and 5"Control" is used here as a general term to designate power, authority, influence, etc. xiv African Studies, who not only made my stay in London possible, but who also helped me gain new insight both during and after the field work. To the participants of the Tuesday Seminar at S.O.A.S., in which I was able to present the rough draft of this thesis, and to other friends in London as well, I owe more than they perhaps realize. Dr. W. T. Ross has been a most benevolent co-chairman of my thesis committee. I am grateful for his kindness, patience and en- couragement during the frustrating hours of this study. My Special thanks are due to Professor Ralph Nicholas, who has played the most "influential" and "powerful" role from the beginning to end in this research. From him, more than any other one person, I learned the meaning of academic excellence and intellectual rigor. If this study fails to show these qualities, the fault is mine alone. I also wish to thank the members of my committee for reading and commenting on this thesis. Last, but not least, I wish to acknowledge the hospitality of the two landlords of the village, without whose permission I would not have known Jalpana. I wish particularly to thank Mr. Shahnawaz Khan who introduced me to many significant aSpects of the village life and whose willingness to share his observations and data was overwhelming. I am also thankful to the many villagers who, without fully appreciating the meaning of my enquiries, willingly answered my unending questions. Finally, I would like to thank the many friends and officials who rendered aid and services. To Peter and Anne I offer thanks for their friendly encouragement during difficult times. Chapter I THE VILLAGE History Jalpana, a village and mau§a_in the Central Panjab of Pakistan, is primarily owned by two landlords, Khan Sahib and Haji Sahib. Both of the landlords are descendants of Sarfaraz Khan, their great- grandfather, who was awarded the land of Jalpana 33252 in 1865 for his services to the British regime. As an abadkar (literally, a set- tler) he was allowed land revenue concessions for some years which enabled a more rapid develOpment of the 922223 Neither a resident of the district nor a Panjabi, Sarfaraz Khan was a member of the Niazi Pathans, a tribe which, according to Ibbetson, was driven away from the Bannu district by Marwats, "eastward across the Kurram.and salt range into Isa Khel on the banks of the Indus, where they found a mixed Awan and Jat papulation, expelled the former and reduced the latter to servitude" (Ibbetson, 1915, p. 76). Isa Khel, a tehsil town, named after one of Sarfaraz Khan's ancestors, now forms a part of the district Mianwali and lies eighty- five miles northwest of Jalpana. Since the time of Sarfaraz Khan, Jalpana has been controlled, directed and developed from Isa Khel by three generations of absentee landlords. Knowledgeable villagers report that the village is named after the once prominent tribe of the Jalaps. Some say that they were killed and driven away and the village was burnt to ashes by the in- vading army of Nuruddin Bamzai. According to the villagers, Bamzai l 2 destroyed the village in 1400 or 1500 A.D. But the District Gazetteer states: In the year 1757, a force under Nuruddin Bamzai, deputed by Ahmad Shah to assist his son Timur in repelling the Mahrattas, crossing the rive Jhelum at Khushah marched up the left bank of the river. The proceedings of this man may be taken as a type of excesses committed by the invading armies; and some ideas will be formed of the amount of misery caused by these inroads. Nuruddin, finding that the inhabitants would not pay the large ransoms demanded of them, successively plundered and laid waste with fire and sword three of the largest towns of the district. Two of these, Bhera and Miani, rose again on the ruins, without, however, completely recovering the shock they had sustained, but of the third Chah Sanhu, nothing remains but a mound of earth and potsherd. (District Gazetteer, 1916, p. 35). Thus it appears that the villagers' explanation--except for the dates-- is reasonable, especially since Jalpana lies between Khushah and Bhera or Miani. The history of Jalpana begins with the first Settlement Re- port of 1867, which makes no attempt to reconstruct the past and only mentions that the land was a wilderness at the time of the settlement. I have earlier mentioned that the land of Jalpana magza was set- tled under the title of abadkaran. This implies a certain revenue concession and zamindari-type land tenure. In regard to the land revenue concession, the following figures show the gradual increase: for the first two years the total revenue was Rs 375; for the next three years (October 1879-October 1882), the revenue was raised to Rs 610; and it was then increased during a periOd of another five years to a total sum of Rs 850. In 1891, the time of the first set- tlement in the Panjab, the revenue was fixed for the mggza_Jalpana, an area of 4572 acres, at Rs 2000 per year. At the second and last settlement in 1911, the land revenue was set at Rs 3069.56 per year, 3 of which forty per cent is paid in the rabbi season and sixty per cent in the kharif. In terms of land tenure, the area was under zamindari or "landlord" type until 1930. This meant that proprietary rights were possessed in full_by a single owner, who was in this in- stance the eldest son of the original owner. In 1931, due to some family feuds, to which reference will be made later, the zamindari tenure was transformed into bhaiachara. Bhaiachara is very much like the pattidari system of tenure in that the lands are held in severality by each owner. But unlike pattidari tenure where "the share regulates the revenue payable," in bhaiachara "the revenue payable regulates the share" (Douie, 1915, p. 139). For the villagers in general the subtle distinction between pattidari and bhaiachara are of little consequence, and instead they refer to the land division as pattidari. Though the type of land tenure is an economic factor, it has important social and political effects for those who are directly or indirectly related to that land. In later pages numerous references will be made to those consequences; at this point it will be sufficient to point out that most of the villagers perceive themselves as belonging to either the patti of the elder, or Khan Sahib, or the patti of the younger, Haji Sahib. The social and political division of the village population between the two pattis is only of recent origin, dating from 1930. ‘Many of the older villagers remember with nostalgia when all worked under the same Khan. Nearly ninety per cent of the present day village population are descendants of early settlers whom Sarfaraz Khan had lured with at- tractive benefits from various parts of the district and the province. 4 As are most Panjabis, the villagers are ethnically Jats, although a few prefer to claim that they are descendants of the Prophet Mohammad or of Arab immigrants. The Jat has been described ethnologically as "the peculiar and most prominent product of the plains of the five rivers. And from an economical and administrative point of view, he is the husbandman, the peasant, the revenue payer par excellence-- sturdy independence indeed, and patient vigorous labor are his strong- est characteristics" (Ibbetson, 1915, p. 102). ‘When the tenants, many of whom belonged to agriculturist "castes" were invited to cultivate land, they brought with them their £21217 kammis or artisans. Thus, like all villages in the sub-continent, Jalpana began with a complete set of functionaries. Hence, today, in terms of an occupational or "caste" hierarchy, the villagers divide themselves into two major groupings: agriculturists (zamindars) with 107 households, and artisans (kammis) with 167 households. The former differentiate themselves into twenty-three distinct 322mg, and the latter into fifteen qggm_, ‘Whether these 32222 are castes, classes, statuses or occupational groups shall be discussed in a later chapter. The Household The basic sociological unit of the villagers' life is the ghag, 3223;, or household, which for the purpose of the present research is focused upon rather than the family. Though in most cases the family and the household are the same, there are exceptions; hence, a house- hold has been defined as an aggregate of individuals who reside in the same house, maintain a common purse, andgprepare food and eat together. 5 For example, in the case of families consisting of married sons, with or without the father, who live in the same compound, cultivate land inrconrnon, and own cattle jointly, but who divide their income and cook and eat separately, they were considered as distinct households. According to this definition there are a total of 274 households which includes a population of 1590 in the village of Jalpana. In general, the eldest male in residence is the head of the household, which averages 5.8 persons. Married sons, with or without children, usually form a separate household, thus contributing to family nucleation, which appears to be slightly higher among the agriculturists than the artisans. The primary explanation for family becoming nuclear seems to have economic roots, for the son of an agriculturist separated from his father's household usually acquired an independent portion of land through the generosity of the landlords. In the case of the artisans, extra benefits were not gained by nucleation, resulting in a larger number of joint families. Birth, marriage and death--the significant events in a villager's 1ife-—are of concern first to the members of his household and then progressively inclusive to the khandan (family), biradari (patrilineal group), gggm (caste), and lastly to the village as a whole. As the household is the significant unit, social, political and economic decisions are made by the head of the household for all its members. An individual's act reflects upon the group, and therefore the head is primarily reaponsible for the conduct of the household's members. In view of the importance attached to the household and its head, let us look at some of the social characteristics of these. Head 9; the Household In the majority of cases both parents of the head of the house- hold (H of H) had died, though the instance of the father's death was higher (78%) than that of the mother's (67%). In almost all cases where the father was not alive, the mother was living with one of the sons-~the eldest or the youngest. If, however, there were any unmarried sons and daughters, the mother lived with them rather than with a married son. The instances of a mother living with one of the middle sons was rare. Among the majority of parents (84.3%), both the father and the mother belonged to the same uom. Of the ascertainable cases only 25.2% of the mothers belonged to the village and 31.0% came from outside the village. The age distribution of all the 274 H of H is as follows: TABLE I Distribution of Ages of Heads of Households Years Frequency Percentage 25-29 27 9.9 30-34 41 15.0 35-39 59 21.5 40-49 60 21.9 50-59 56 20.4 60 or more 31 11.3 Total 274 100.0 It must be noted that the age distribution in the above table is only an approthation. The villagers never remember the date of birth, and seldom the year of birth. When asked to give the age, the usual reply is, for example, "The beard had just started growing when the Kahtri's 7 left" (1947), or "My son was born the year the canal was built" (1952). In view of this, estimate was made by relating the stage of growth with some significant event. Older men usually tend to exaggerate their age, hence it was not unusual to find many ninety- or one-hundred- year old men in the village who, on enquiry, were discovered to be not more than sixty or seventy years old. This should be understood in terms of the societal value, where old age demands reverence and res- pect. In regard to marital status, 2.8% of the H of H were never married, 2.6% were widowers, and 1.1% were deserted by their wives. Married to women of their own 3292 were 74.5% of the H of H, and to women of dif- ferent qggm_were 19%. The percentage of exogamy (marriage with women of different 329m) was much higher in case of the zamindars than among the kammis, e.g., of all those who were married to women of different gggm, 88.2% were zamindars and only 11.8% were kammis. This fact will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV. In general the incidences of 9222 exogamy had increased by four per cent within one generation. This trend appears to be confirmed by the information regarding the marriages of the sons and daughters. Of the seventy households which had one or more married sons, 21.4% were married to women of different SEEEL: Similarly, of the sixty-seven househohis with one or more mar- ried daughters, 18% were married into gggm§_different than that of their fathers. But while the exogamy with reSpect to gggg had increased, exogamy with reapect to the village had decreased, as is shown in Table II. This tends to suggest that the choice of marital partner is dictated by the number of eligible men and women available within the village. TABLE II Origins of Wives of Heads of Households in Jalpana Location Frequency Percentage From Jalpana 128 46.7 From husband's ancetral village (not Jalpana) 9 3.3 From a village 1-4 miles away 25 9.1 From a village 5-9 miles away 65 23.7 From a village 10-15 miles away 30 10.9 From a village 16 or more miles away 6 2.2 Not ascertainable 11 4.1 Table III shows the number of children per household. The aver- age number of children per married couple was found to be three to four, while 13.6% of the married couples had no children and 2.9% had nine or more. The highest number of living children was eleven in the case of only one married couple. Although 107 of the H of H place themselves in the social category of agriculturists and 167 in the category of artisans, this does not necessarily indicate their actual occupational grouping. In compre- hensive terms, 47.8% are engaged in agricultural work, 22.3% follow an ancestral artisan occupation, 16.4% are in service or other occu- pations which do not correspond to their "caste” or hereditary occu- pation, and 3.6% earn their living in part by one of the "caste" TABLE III Distribution of Male and Female Children Number of Number of Male Children Households Female Children 1 59 (21.5) 67 (24.4) 1 2 66 (24.1) 63 (23.0) 2 3 34 (12.4) 34 (12.4) 3 4 31 (11.4) 19 ( 6.9) 4 5 10 ( 3.6) 8 (2.9) 5 6 5 ( 1.8) 1 (0.4) 6 7 3 ( 1.1) l (0.4) 7 8 0 ( 0.0) 1 (0.4) 8 occupations and by other types of work--main1y manual labor. Nearly ten per cent of the H of H had no regular occupation and worked at any job that was available. Albeit these various occupations brought differences in the socio-economic status of the individual households, the village as a whole, in comparison to other villages of Pakistan, is prosperous. Tables on capital holdings and earnings are attached in the appendix, but a few salient features will be indicated here. In general summarization, a typical village household consists of a married man and his children, usually three or four in number, and in some cases a widowed mother, an uncle or an aunt, giving the average size of 5.8 persons. The head of the household is between forty-three and forty-five years of age, is married to a woman from the village and from his own 322m, He is illiterate and follows one of his ancestral occupations. The Household Economy Members of a household reside in rectangular or square mud houses; three walls surround the inner courtyard and one or two rooms. They 10 are built by the residents on land provided for their use without charge by the landlords. Legally the prOperty renains the possession of the landlord, but the members of the household are allowed residence for as long as they desire. If and when they permanently leave the house, the tenants are not permitted to dismantle it. The type of house constructed is the resident's choice, determined by economic considerations. The landlord does provide the wood for the roof and the doors. In Jalpana, there are three 22552 (cement and brick) houses built by the two goldsmiths and a blacksmith. This is unusual and re— flective of the village's prosperity. All those who cultivate land have a second building, a £252, in the middle of their agricultural plot. Egggg, a characteristic of colony villages of the Panjab, are used for sheltering the cattle and storing the harvest. At least one member of the household sleeps in the dg£a_to guard against theft. The prosPerity of an individual household is reflected in the type and size of the house and the $232, the presence of a separate sitting place for the men, and the number of cattle owned. Cattle are probably the Single most significant indicator of a villager's socio-economic status. The number and quality of the cattle are important to a household. Cattle are arranged in a hierarchy: possessing a buffalo indicates higher status than owning a cow, which is in turn better than having a goat or a sheep. The owner of an aver- age buffalo considers himself superior to the owner of a high quality cow. The possession of a horse in addition to other animals is the sign of great prestige. The differential evaluation of various animals appears to be based on traditional values rather than economic determin- ants. For example, buffalo's milk is said to give more strength and '1’er 11 energy than cow's milk. Similarly, a Panjabi proverb states that a horse is the highest reward a pious Panjabi can receive from God for good deeds in this life. It is in this context that we must understand that most villagers accumulate their wealth, not in the form of orna- ments, as has been reported for most other villagers of India and Pakistan, but rather in bettering the number and quality of their cattle. These values attached to cattle also explain the time and energy spent in growing fodder. We shall return in a later chapter to discuss in detail the economics of agricultural production; for the present let us turn to some of the summarized figures concerning this tOpic. On an average, each household has one to two buffaloes and one cow or less. As oxen are not owned by non-cultivators, there is an average of three oxen per cultivator household. Out of total of 106 sampled households, 43 were said to possess no ornaments. Of the 63 who owned ornaments, 25.4, or nearly a quarter, claimed their value to be more than Rs 1000, bringing the average value of ornaments to Rs 672.22 per household of owners and Rs 399.52 for both owners and non-owners. This, without doubt, appears a high average and lends sup- port to the village's superior economic position. This economic pros- perity is further confirmed by a relatively high annual per capita in- come of Rs 167.00.1 Although the per capita income of Pakistan on the 1The annual per capita income, like other items, was calculated by converting the produce at the current market rate. Afar adding the total income, it was divided by the number of persons in the household; children under ten were considered as half, i.e., two children under ten equalled one adult. The inevitability of certain errors in totaling the produce (grain, milk, services and accompanying payments) is not denied. But the chances of errors are evenly distributed, and no section seems to be affected positively or negatively. 12 whole is Rs 255.00, it incorporates in its calculation a very wide variation. In the case of the village, I have not included the income of the landlords, which averages in the thousands, thus distorting the per capita income. The incidence of indebtedness is also much lower than in other villages. The villagers stated that before partition, when a few families of moneylenders lived in the village, most households were in debt. At this time, only fifty per cent had borrowed money and the other half had no debts outstanding. The three sources of credit are relatives (34.7%), goldsmiths (34.7%), and friends (30.8%. No interest is paid to relatives and friends. A goldsmith is said not to charge interest, but one is obligated to buy ornaments from him for which the quality is somewhat lowered and the price slightly in- creased. The major reasons for borrowing appeared to be for the buy- ing of cattle, the marriage of children, and illness of some member of the household. Food, Clothing and Health Food, clothing and health eXpenditures figure significantly in considering how the villagers spend their money and to what use they ‘make of capital goods. In general the villagers eat two meals a day, the first being in.mid-morning and the other at sunset. Between these two meals he has an occasional glass of l§§§i_(buttermilk), some roas- ted corn, rice or millet, and perhaps some kind of fresh vegetable such as carrots. Early in the morning, the men have a glass of milk or tea, and some leftovers from the previous night. The first regular meal consists of bread, cooked in butter or ghea, and a few glasses of milk 13 or laggi, Those who can't afford pure milk dilute it with water. The evening meal is the larger, with bread, $31, or one of the vege- tables in season. Meat is only occasionally eaten; the rich have it approximately six or eight times a month, the average villager about four times a month, and the poor may not have meat more than once a month. An elaborate meal, which is only eaten on Special occasions, is considered to be rice and meat (pillao) cooked together, and a meat and vegetable curry. Some type of dessert is a special addition to the meal. The quality of the food is determined by the villagers according to the amount of clarified butter (ghgg) used in cooking--the more the better. There is no apparent difference in the everyday work clothes of the rich and the poor villagers. All dress in a shirt (kameez), a wrap-around (dhggi), and a turban which are of similar quality. WO- men's dress is similar to men's, except for the differing cut of shirt and turban being replaced with dupata, which covers the upper part of the body. The men wear shoes, no matter how tattered they may be, but the women generally do not, and when going out they prefer to carry them on top of their heads. In the opinion of almost all the villagers, an adult requires three sets of clothes and two pairs of Shoes every year. Real distinctions are observed in the differences between the ceremonial dress of the rich and the poor. While everyday dress is woven on a hand loom, cloth for the ceremonial dress is machine-made. A.more wealthy villager wears a finer quality of machinedmade clothes. Silken clothes are considered superior. The amount of cloth used in making the dress is a mark of distinction; a rich villager uses half a yard to one-and-a-half yards more than the average villagers for his 1.x a 14 dhggi and turban, a distinction which he makes others aware of. The craftsmanship in.making a shirt is also considered important, but an elaborate cut and design is a mark of youth rather than a distinction for older men. While food and clothes account for a substantial portion of the villagers' income, another major item of expenditure is for the care of their health. Given the food and the environment the villagers live in, it is not surprising that a large part of a man's income is spent forreasons of health. But health care is curative rather than preventive, as doctors or hakims are consulted only after an individual is visibly affected by some physical malady. From a sample of 106 households, 33 reported having Spent no money on illness in the pre- ceding twelve months. This figure is somewhat doubtful in view of the fact that some types of physical problems are not reported. Ac- cording to various estimates much money is spent in seeking a cure for impotence among men, which appears to be very common. Of those who stated money had been spent on illness, twenty-three households expended between 10 and 55 Rupees, and eight between Rs 500 and 900. The entire distribution may be found on the following page, under Table IV. There is a general belief among educated Pakistanis that the villagers spend most of their money during times of illness by going to tombs and making offerings to the Pirs etc. The figures shown in Table V on the following page shed a different light. The popularity of the hakim_as opposed to all other categories seems to be based upon a number of factors. Firstly, he enjoys a good reputation which 15 TABLE IV Money Spent for Cure of Illness Amount (Rs) Number of Households 10-55 24 56-90 16 100-150 13 200-250 7 300-350 5 500-599 4 600-699 1 700-799 1 800 and above 2 Total 73 is combined with easy accessibility at all times due to his presence in the village. Secondly, he gives medicine on the long-term credit. Thirdly, he has automatic rapport with the villagers. The preference for the private practitioner over the hOSpital, in spite of the higher cost, reflects the distrust of the villagers for government institutions. Also, the hospital is true to the general bureaucratic tradition, and doctors behave more as officials than as professional men. It appeared TABLE V Consulted for Cures Namber Hakim (indigenous doctors) 31 Hospital (staffed with doctors qualified in Western medicine) 13 Private practitioner (qualified in Western medicine) 1 Fire (holy men) Both the hakim and private practitioner All of the above None, but used folk medicine O‘NWI-‘N Total 73 16 that the hospital was used mostly by women because of the presence of a woman doctor. Geography g£_the Village Earlier I used two terms, village and magga, in respect to Jal- pana, implying that the same unit (Jalpana) is both, though the con- cepts are not synonymous. Some authors, such as Lewis (1958, p. 68), equate the two terms, which is incorrect and misleading. A village is a community in the sociological sense, while a 22252.13 the smallest and lowest revenue unit. Sir James Douie stated that "Mauza is usually translated as village, but they are two distinct entities--village is not defined in the Land Revenue Act. A village, as a rule, consists of a single block of land. But occasionaly the whole of its land does not lie in a ringed fence and some outlying lands are found mixed with the land of another village” (Douie, 1915, p. 16). In other words, a m§g§a_may consist of more than one village, and in all such cases EEEEE is named after the largest village. If the village is substantially large in terms of agricultural land and productivity, it may be treated as a magga, The Patwari records which are concerned with land revenue refer to the magga_and not the village, though they contain information about each of the villages within the 93253 and can be so discerned. Thus, in correct terminology, there is not a village Patwari (accountant) but a magga Patwari, and this has been the case since the time of Akbar, who bureaucratized the office of the Patwari. In this sense, then, the mag§§_Jalpana includes two villages (Jalpana, 274 households, and Bhab- rani, 100 households) and a hamlet (Bhakri, 23 households), covering a total area of 4572 acres. The Patwari is responsible for keeping the 17 records of these three units. The present work concerns only the sociological village Jalpana, the unit which in terms of the residents means the sum total of all the farmers and artisans within the boundaries of the village who were identified by the villagers as belonging to the village. Thus, the statistics do not include such households as those of the managers (employees of the landlords), the Patwari and other residents who were brought from outside and were treated as "outsiders" by the vil- lagers. However, I must hasten to add that though the primary focus in terms of the collection of detailed statistics was Jalpana village, the information from the other two units does not alter the pattern mentioned above. In fact, the patterns mentioned above, and others to be discussed later, hold for many other villages in the area. In this sense care was taken to minimize the possibility of choosing a typical village, but as is well known, a typical village is atypical in many ways. Among the three units Jalpana is the most important and most socially significant for a number of reasons. It is not only the largest of the three, but was also the first to be settled. It houses the managers, the agents of the landlords, and the landlords whenever they visit their land. It also takes pride in housing the Patwari. Both of the latter two factors bring the members of the other two units to Jalpana. A few of Jalpana's artisans also serve the other two vil- lages. Furthermore, Jalpana is nearer the tehsil and market town of Shahpur. Shahpur, which lies three and a half miles southeast of Jal- pana, is the nearest town in the vicinity with several important faci- lities. It is the headquarters of the tehsil and has a police station; 18 other attractions are the jail, hospital, veterinary clinic, post office, commerical banks and a large bazaar. Still another of its features is the bus terminal where buses to and from large cities stop. Thus, any person who makes use of public transport to visit Jalpana must first travel by bus to Shahpur and from there hire a £22ga_which in the dry season takes approximately forty-five minutes on a part metalled and part dirt road to reach Jalpana. An individual with private transport can travel by a longer but better road along the canal. In the rainy season the frequency of visits to Shahpur is considerably reduced. But in the dry season a number of men, women and children go to Shahpur to use its facilities or for the sake of entertainment. Chapter II ECONOMIC STRUCTURE The preceding chapter provides an overview of the village. This chapter is concerned with abstracting those aspects of the economic organization which directly or indirectly bear upon the main theme of this thesis: social stratification and the power relations. Therefore, the "economic structure" of the society is taken to refer to the modes of production, the forces of production, and, most im- portant, the social relations entailed by the particular modes and forces of production. It must be noted that neither this chapter, nor this study, is concerned with the economics of the village p§£.§g; that is, with the problems and analysis of "how menand society choose, with or without the use of money, to employ scarce productive re- sources to produce various commodities over time and distribute them for consumption now and in the future, among peOple and groups" (Samuelson, in Smelser, 1963, p. 23). The concern with production, distribution and consumption is only incidental and is relevant only insofar as these help to understand social interaction between and within groups. The emphasis is primarily on the patterning of economic behavior through whichLemerges certain social roles and organization. Given the above considerations, let us look at some of the technical and social arrangements of the village economic structure. It was mentioned earlier that Jalpana is an absentee-landlord-owned l9 20 village, with its economy primarily based upon agriculture. "Absentee” denotes that the owners of the land do not live permanently in the village. Jalpana is not the home of either of the two landlords; their primary social identification lies with another village and a town. In economic terms, this means that the landlords' major in- terests in Jalpana lie in its wealth or productivity. In administra- tive terms, absenteeism implies that the management, the care of the land and administration of labor on the land, is through one or more appointed agents, who in this case are called "managers." From this it can be inferred that in the absentee-owned village, the managers assume some of the same rights and obligations which are due to the owners. The term "landlord" is not only confusing but is also a value- laden concept. Often landlordism is equated with feudalism, and be- cause of such an equation it is loaded with negative connotations in Pakistan today. In this study, the sociological use of the term de- notes those proprietors of land who employ others to work full time on their land without ever personally engagingin the actual (physical) agricultural work, for example, of irrigating, planting, ploughing, harrowing, etc. This definition therefore excludes "middle and lower peasants," who have proprietary rights on the land and engage laborers or tenants, but who are not in a position to completely disengage themselves from agricultural work. In other words, "landlord" denotes the owner of a relatively large tract of land. The conditions under which others are employed to work on the land vary from village to village or landlord to landlord, but in all cases the contract is 21 supposed to be spelled out in the records of the settlement and the Patwari. In recent years, however, the system of employing laborers on a daily wage is becoming more common; this kind of entrepreneurship is called "farm." In this case the workers on the farm are paid in accordance with the current wage rate, and are paid in cash rather than the customary form of payment, which is in agricultural produce. All aspects of "farm" management (revenue, irrigation, decisions re- garding harvesting) are the responsibilities of the landlord or his agent; the farm workers have no voice in the decision-making. Both landlords have recently converted part of their land (Haji Sahib, 200 acres; Khan Sahib, 75 acres) into "farms.” However, the major portion of both landlords' land is still under tenancy. Various forms of tenancy are the oldest and the most prominent features associated with landlordism. In all cases the conditions of the tenancy contract are guided and regulated by customary laws which were recorded in the first Settlement Report of the village or maggg. This does not imply that change never occurs, for change in customary shares does take place, but only rarely, because much of the social and economic life of the village is guided and controlled by customs and traditions. A major portion of land of the EEEEE Jalpana is cul- tivated on terms of tenancy. All of the village tenants are "non-occu- pancy" tenants as compared to "occupancy" tenants who, according to the law, become owners of the tenanted land if they occupy it for twelve years or more, while the "non-occupancy" tenants never acquire the right of ownership. Thus the non-occupancy tenant's right to cul- tivate a piece of land is at the landlord's pleasure. However, according to custom, a tenant (hereafter ”tenant” means "non-occupancy" tenant) 22 is not expelled from the land during the middle of the agricultural season. Contracts are broken or made only at the beginning and the end of the agricultural year. The village tenants were brought and still work under some of the following stipulations. In the early days of settlement, the land was unlimited; hence, the landlords "begged” the tenants to cultivate as much as they could. This re- sulted in a situation whereby a tenant who had a pair of oxen acquired approximately twelve acres of land. Thus, when a tenant is asked how much land he cultivates, he answers, "one half or "one plough," meaning twelve acres. This was only an approximation, as some had more and some less than twelve acres. According to my first estimates, tenants with one pair of oxen had on an average nine and a half acres. But, during my field work, both landlords had brought most of the tenants at par, allotting ten acres per plough. The latest allotment was more accurate because of the introduction of the new system of measurement brought about by the Scheme of Consolidation initiated by the Government of West Pakistan. It is, therefore, safe to say that at this time a "plough" of land in this village designates ten acres. It must, however, be remembered that the men re5ponsib1e for the allotment--the managers--can and do manipulate and exercise power in the reallotment of land. They are able not only to manipulate the actual amount of land allotted, but also to control who gets what quality of land. Until recently, a tenant made independent decisions about the variety of crops and the amount of land to be planted in a particular crop. Traditionally, this has meant more land under wheat.and fodder, less under cotton, and less still under sugar cane. This pattern has 23 now been changed, and an increasing emphasis is laid by the landlords on growing cash crops rather than food crops. This emphasis appears to have been caused by multiple factors. First and foremost, in my opinion, it seems to have been one of the "unanticipated consequences" of the land reforms of 1959. Indeed, as stated earlier, although the land reforms achieved little in terms of the anticipated results, it nevertheless has created in the minds of many landlords a possibility of more drastic reforms and their implementation in the future. Coup- led with this, there also appeared to be concern among the landlords about their declining position of power and prestige. One of the pro- minent features in Pakistan today is the growing influence of the busi- ness and industrialist class. These changing power relations have led many landlords to compete for their old positions of prestige and power. One form that this competition has assumed can be seen in the partici- pation of many landlords in industrial and business activities. One of the landlords of Jalpana was exploring the possibility of starting an enamel factory. The other had begun a transport company. The accumula- tion of cash, which is essential in any business enterprise, has been stimulated by the development of new market situations. In the past, the grower had to tranSport his cotton to the market town; now, instead, market agents come to the village to buy the cotton. Similarly, the establishment of a sugar mill about twenty miles from the village in- sures a quick disposal of the sugar cane. Hence, the decision regarding the variety of craps and the area of land to be cultivated in a parti- cular crOp, is made by the landlords in favor of cash crops. In this context, then, the landlord found it advantageous to make the decisions regarding the variety of crops and the area of land to 24 be cultivated in a particular crop, in order to profit from the im- portance of cash crops. The rights and obligations of the landlord-tenant relationship on the one hand and the tenant-artisan on the other is guided by a complicated set of norms and customary laws. As investment and return vary with different crops, I shall discuss this in a later section for each of the major crOps (wheat, sugar cane, cotton and fodder) separately. At this point, let us look at some of the other general features. The total area within.mauza Jalpana is 4572 acres and, according to the statistics of 1963-64, these areas fall into the following categories: Chair Mamkin 323 acres Not available for cultivation. This includes 81 acres of residential areas of the two villages, one hamlet, and the area covered by roads, the canal, etc. Banjar Jadid and Qadim 203 acres Cultivable land but not cultivated for four or more agricultural season Nahri 4046 acres Irrigated by the canal Total 4572 acres Previously, some land was categorized as Eah£i_and other as ghahi (irrigated by wells). But since 1952 when a large government canal was constructed, all land is irrigated by the canal. During the early days of the settlement, Sarfaraz Khan had built many wells and, after a few years, had also constructed a canal which was twenty miles long but quite narrow. This was one of the few private canals in the Panjab and was a source of large revenue for the owner, who did not have to pay water revenue to the government. But in 1952, a law was passed against the private ownership of canals, and in its place government- 25 controlled canals were provided. While this has resulted in better irrigation and higher productivity, it has also increased the tax for the tenant and the landlords. The taxation of agricultural land is of two types: the Land Revenue or Malia_which is assessed by the Revenue Department, whose lowest officer is the well-known Patwari of the Indian village, and the water tax which is levied by the Department of Irrigation, whose lowest employee is also called Patwari. In the canal-irrigated tenant villages, the canal Patwari occupies a very significant position, be- cause tenants can be harmed or helped by him. The land revenue is fixed for a long period of time; in the case of Jalpana it was fixed in 1911-12 at the time of the last settlement survey. The land revenue is assessed on the basis of the quality of the land, which is solely determined by the irrigation facilities. Thus, for example, land ir- rigated by wells and the canal is taxed at Rs 1.36 per acre, while land irrigated by the canal alone is taxed at Rs 0.62 per acre. The total land revenue of Jalpana is Rs 3069.62 per year. The above rate of taxation is applied over the entire province, hence one can obtain a fair estimate of a landowner's worth by Simply knowing the amount of land revenue he pays. In Jalpana, the land revenue is paid by the landowners only. But the water tax is shared on a half and half basis between the owners and the tenants. The water tax is based upon the type of crop, because various crops require varying amounts of water. The rules and regulations regarding the water tax are complicated and need not be considered here since they are not relevant to social organization. It is enough to point out that both these taxes are figured by the revenue Patwari, who submits them to the managers for 26 collection from the tenants. It must be mentioned that the Patwari is not responsible for delinquent tenants. Collection from the tenants is the responsibility of the landlords or their employees. This adds to the manager's control over the tenant. Other kinds of control will become apparent from the following discussion of the norms regulating production and the distribution of produce. Different sets of rules guide the investment, production and sharing between the landlord and tenant and between the tenant and artisan and other functionaries of the village. Thus, when new crOps are introduced, old relations are disturbed and new norms have to be developed. I shall begin the discussion with the case of wheat, which has been the most important crop of the Panjab. Because of its economic Significance--it is the staple diet of the Panjabis--its sowing and har- vesting have also assumed social significance. The wheat harvest marks the end of the agricultural season, which is celebrated with many rural festivities such as fairs, wrestling matches, horse and cattle shows, etc. It is a time for relaxation, enjoyment and new hopes for a better new year. It is also the time when the year's debts and credits are cleared. Traditionally, a tenant would plant as much as half of his land in wheat. But, in recent years, this freedom has been restricted by both the landlords, and he is now allowed to plant only two or three acres. The seed for the wheat is obtained by the tenant himself. But, if the landlord wishes to plant a better quality wheat, he must pay half the cost of the seed. As the tenant is as anxious to have a better crap of wheat as the owner, less superviSion is required during the period of growth. When the harvest has matured, the 27 landlords increase their vigilance against any tenant pilfering the crop, which is said to be very common. Harvesting the wheat involves three distinct steps: cutting, threshing and winnowing. The first process is not performed by the tenant or his household alone unless the area is very small or the household very large. The tenant farmer is assisted by others by two fonms of assistance, vangar and lazyer. In the case of vangar, one of the seipi-kammis (barber of potter) tells the villagers that tenant X "will have a vangar" on a particular day. On that morning the village drummer goes to X's plot and beats his drum. Upon hearing the drum those who wish to help X start to gather, and when enough have congregated they commence to cut, beginning with shouts and laughter. Tenant X.mingles with the workers, smoking his hggkg, greeting and exchanging a few pleasantries with each participant. Wamen of X's household help tie the cut wheat. WOmen and children of the participants' households do not participate in the work. A rich tenant may also offer a cold drink to the workers. The wheat is cut within a day and the men then return home to feed their cattle or do other chores. Soon after sunset the drummer once again beats his drum; this time outside of X's house. This signifies that the parti- cipants of the day must now return to have their meal. The meal ser- ved is a significant indicator of the tenant's prosperity, but in all cases it is a better meal than that which the tenants ordinarily have. The serving of food is obligatory, as is the return of a day's labor, when any of the participants hold vangar, unless one is unable to do so for some acceptable reason. The number of volunteers for the vangar is an indication of the farmer's prestige and status in the community. It is also a rough indication of social cleavages. 28 Another form of traditional assistance that a tenant or farmer may employ is laxag (labor). At the beginning of the season a large number of people travel from village to village in search of work in harvesting wheat. These men, who are mostly kammis or, if agricul- turists, come from rain-irrigated areas, travel with their cattle but without their women and children. As they travel through villages, a farmer who is short of hands seeks their assistance. There is no bargaining over wages because these are traditionally determined. The 12335 is provided with a Sleeping place, a few pots and pans, grain and fodder for the cattle. He stays with the farmer until the end of the harvest. When he leaves, he is paid in grain, the quantity of which is determined by his conduct, his work, and the amount of produce. Many of the lavars come back to the same farmer every year. The Rural Werks Program, which is dependent upon the supply of labor from the villages, is said to be adversely affected during this period of the year. The second step, threshing, involves only the tenant and his household and cattle. I was told that the current threshing technique has been essentially the same for generations. The harvested wheat stalks are laid in a circle around a wooden pole on the mud-plastered floor and a draft animal led by a man, woman or child is driven around the pole dragging a heavy wooden plank. The friction and weight of the plank separate the grain from the stalk and readies it for winnow- ing. The third step, winnowing, poses serious problems for many tenants of the agriculturist "caste." Traditionally, winnowing has been set aside for those members of the Mussali "caste" known as "Mehnati Mussali," 29 who Specialize in this work. The association of this work with the Mussalis reflects upon its lowly nature, and the members of the za- mindar "caste" regard it as degrading. This feeling is so strong that many zamidars refuse to winnow even to save their wheat, even when rain or storm is predicted which would certainly damage the grain. During my stay in the village I found that Mehnati Mussalis were in Short supply, and some zamindars had to wait for a month for their services. While the zamindars waited for Mehnati Mussalis, the village was hit by rain and storm, as had been foreseen, and the piled up unwin- nowed wheat was damaged. People complained of "Fate," but would not winnow even after the first rainfall. When the process is completed the grain is piled into one heap and the top is plastered with mud and stamped down by the employees of the landlord to guard against theft. Similarly, hay is piled, plastered and stamped down. Then a day and time is fixed for the distribution of the wheat; this information is made known throughout the village. All claimants of shares in that tenant's produce come to the $232 where the wheat has been piled. Along widn the rightful claimants come the beggars and hawkers. The latter bring edible items such as sweets, popcorn, ices, etc. The ceremony begins with prayers of thanks and hOpes for a better new year led by the most holy one pre- sent. Then the head of the household and a representative of the land— lord take their shoes off and go to the edge of the pile where the wheat is separated into two equal numbers of sacks, one belonging to the ten— ant, the other to the landlord. Enough is left on the ground to be given to each of the seipi-kammis. After each claimant has been paid his due share, which is given in a Summary table at the end of this 30 chapter, some wheat is left for the others to take. The quantity left at the end is indicative of the landlord's generosity, not the tenant's, for the latter has no say in determining the amount. The village ten- ants do not sell the wheat even if there is an excess, but they do lend it to fellow villagers. The landlords, however, sell their wheat to brokers who come to the village to purchase it. Second in importance to wheat is fodder. The seed and quality of the fodder is the tenant's responsibility, but the area to be culti- vated is determined by the landlord and was fixed at two acres. One acre belongs to the tenant and the other to the landlord. Because the landlord does not require all the fodder, the tenant or other who keep animals purchase it from him. One method of assessing the value is traditional and is still practiced by one of the two landlords. When the crop is ready, the manager assesses the price of each tenant's plot on the basis of the prevailing market value and the quality of the crop. For a crOp of high quality fodder, the price could be as high as Rs 60.00 per canal (1/8 of an acre). The low quality fodder is sometimes as low as Rs 15.00 per cana1.' When the tenant or other buyer protests, a bit of haggling ensues, and either the price remains the same or is reduced. As can be easily inferred, this method allows for considerable control by the manager. If he wishes to favor any tenant, he lowers the price; if he wants to make a profit, he announces one price but enters a lower price in his books. One landlord stated that the above method had meant considerable financial loss for him. He therefore devised a new method against the protests of his manager. According to this scheme no tenant was allowed to cultivate more or less than two acres or sixteen canals. After 31 calculating the average price for one canal of fodder for a number of years, he fixed a uniform price of Rs 30.00 per canal. In other words, each tenant had to pay the landlord Rs 240.00 for an acre of fodder that he purchased. This meant an annual income of Rs 480.00 per acre per year. For the tenant this implied either a gain or a loss, depen- ding on the quality of the crop. But given the high value attached to cattle, a tenant generally strives to obtain a good cr0p of fodder. Cotton seed is also provided by the tenant alone, and both land- lord and tenant share the produce equally. Cotton is planted by the tenant, but is not picked by him. In fact, cotton picking is an ex- clusively female function. WOmen of all ages and social groups pick cotton. Payment for this work is made in cotton and depends upon the quantity picked. However, because the quantity of cotton picked is relative to the condition of the cotton itself, the ratio of payment varies. For example, at the beginning of the season when more can be picked in a shorter time, each woman is paid 1/16 of the total amount She picks. This ratio increases as the season advances with its con- sequent decrease in the amount picked, reaching as high as 1/8 or 1/6 of the total. No accurate or precise measurement is used in paying the women's wages or later in the division between landlord and tenant. This leads to gossip about relations between the landlord's employee and a particular woman if others see one person receiving more than her wage. When the cotton is sold in the market or to the shopkeeper, it is weighed by the standard measure. Those women who sell their cotton and buy things for personal adornment instead of for the household are said to be of bad moral character. In general, cotton is need in the household to Spin thread 32 which is then given to the weaver to make clothes. If a household obtains more cotton than is needed, the surplus is sold to the village shapkeepers. The villagers appear fairly content to sell to the shop- keeper even though he pays less than the market rate. The reasons for this obvious financial loss could be explained only in terms of a) distrust for the market and its agents, b) the general value of mutual help, and c) the establishment of credit with the shapkeeper. The final major crop is sugar cane. Before the establishment of sugar mills, tenants cultivated only small parcels of land under sugar cane, which was used for making g2; (lump sugar) and as fodder. But with increased demand, landlords have put strict control over the ten- ants; thus, if any tenant is suspected of feeding the young plants to the cattle, he is heavily fined. Also, no one is allowed to make gag, whichssome tenants said brought them.more cash. The cost of the cut- tings from which Sugar cane is grown, unlike seed for other crops, is shared on a half-and-half basis between landlord and tenant. New cut- tings are planted every two or three years instead of every year, as with other crops. In the early part of the sugar cane season, each 1 . .43; landlord has to give/aE/hstimate to the mills as to the quantity he y’ will supply. If he fails to supply that amount, the mill imposes a fine, the rate of which increases with the reduction in quantity. Each tenant's produce, combined with the landlord's share, is loaded in a truck and sent to the mill where it is to be weighted. Thus, a tenant does not really know how much his share will weight and he must depend upon the managers to tell him. A tenant also has to share the expenses of tran8portation. These factors, in addition to the fact that he seldom, if ever, receives any cash from his sugar 33 cane, make him rather dissatisfied with this crop. The cash is kept by the landlord, who uses it to deduct the tenant's share of the water tax or of the cost of fodder. If there is a balance remaining, the tenant receives a receipt and can draw on this remainder for various purposes during the next season. When a tenant's earnings from sugar cane do not cover his debts to the landlord, he is forced to pay the balance in cash, else he is not allowed to keep his share of the wheat. This is reminiscent of the days of the moneylenders, who always confis- cated the borrower's wheat production. At this point, let us turn to the tenant and artisan relationship. Since Wiser wrote about the Jajmani system, it has become very widely known and hence needs little elaboration. The chart below gives the details of the work done by various artisans and the amount received by them. However, a few introductory remarks seem apprOpriate. The system is not called Jajmani in this village and others nearby; instead, it is known as agipi. The word ggipi denotes the participants in the contract. Hence, from the point of view of the tenant, certain kammis are his E2323) and for the kagm§_a certain number of tenants are his ggipi. Thus, a EEAEA can be either a ten- ant or EEEEES depending upon who is the referent. Furthermore, there are two categories of kammis; one is the agricultural kammi, the other is simply kammi, The former are peOple of artisan "castes" and include blacksmiths, carpenters, potters and barbers. These are considered more important than the latter. The general category of kammis does not necessarily include people of the artisan "caste." They may belong to any "caste" group. Thus, for example, in this village the Fir, who belong to the Syed "caste," and the Maulvi, who ~¢‘vv 34 belong to one of the agricultural "castes," are considered kammis. From this, then, one concludes that the generic term kammi, which has been usually translated as artisan, refers to a) members of artisan occupational groups, and b) anyone who serves the village. Before discussing work and wages, we must look at the over-all relation of the landlord with his tenants and kammis. As has been implied earlier, and elaborated below, the kammis are paid from the joint produce of the tenant and landlord. Like the tenants, the kammis live in rent-free houses provided by the landlords. This creates certain obligations, of which one form is the REESE; a pecu- liar feature of landlord villages. Because of the facilities provided by the landlord, a resident of the village (including tenants, artisans and others), is obligated to contribute free labor when demanded by the landlord. The demands for labor might be for a very brief or a very long period of time. Refusal to fulfill this demand can have detrimental consequences. Usually only one or two days' labor was demanded, and when the resident worked for the landlord he was served with at least one meal. One of the two landlords said that he had abolished bgggg and that everyone was to be paid for work done. But such was not the case, for the manager was apparently pocketing the money. The other landlord still used bggag, though he did not serve the meal, which was resented by the villagers. Though all villagers are obligated to go for bggag, all were not called upon to participate. Firstly, it depended greatly on the managers whom they called; secondly, only members of the same pa££i_were called by the landlord (i.e., no one who belonged to the 23523 of Khan Sahib was called by Haji Sahib, or vice versa. And thirdly, certain villagers were not called upon; 35 these included most of those employed outside the village, those who seemed to be neutral (i.e., working for both pattis), and older res- pected members of the community. Incidentally, the institution of begar was abolished by the government of West Pakistan in 1952. RULES OF SERVICES AND PAYMENT Those Who Render Service to Their Seipis Only and Those Who Receive Payment from Tenant and Landlord Agricultural Services to Kammis the Tenant Payment Blacksmith 'Maintenance of l) l paropi of all grain agricultural 2) 4 tOpas of wheat in implements addition to (l) 3) 3 seers of cotton per plough 4) Rs 2 for sugar cane per plough (recently insti- tuted) 5) 'Money payment for making new implanents Carpenter As above As above Barber Shaves, massages, 1) As above, except (5) acts as messenger 2) Paid cash at marriages, at time of births, births and other occasions. marriages or deaths, Amount varies according to performs important his status. functions on special occasions Kumbar Used to provide bowls As above (as potter) for Persian wheel. Few specific functions now General Kammis Services Payment Kumbar Carries loads of 1) 1 topa per pukka maund (as teamster) wheat, sugar cane or fodder 2) for carrying load 1 topa for having come to carry load. 36 Mehnati Winnower Mussali Mochi Repairs shoes 1) 2) Mirasi Genealogist and bard (only 4 heads of the household qualify) Wazan Kash Employed by each head of the Patti (land- lord) to distribute wheat and cotton to landlord, tenant and others. One person in each patti. Mussali Employed by the two landlords to keep the dera clean, wait on guests, keep hooka ready, etc. 1 topa from each pukka maund While wheat is still in field collects 4 gaddis Collects from each house a minimum of 8 t0pas (Payment made by tenants only) 4 t0pas of wheat 1/2 parOpi per pukka maund 1 topa from each tenant of landlord's patti Other Kammis (who serve the whole village and receive payment from all the tenants) Pir No specific function. Full-time religious devotee. Faqir Caretaker of village saint's tomb. Acts as host in the annual fair. Drummer Announces special oc- casions. Wakes pe0p1e for Sehri during Ram- zan. Acts as chief drummer at marriages. Maulvi Previously, both Maul- vis got from all ten- ants. Now two mosques identified with each patti. Leads prayer performs marriages. 1) 1 marla of any one crOp 2) 1 tOpa of wheat 3) l seer of cotton 1) 3 t0pas of wheat 2) Anything left on tomb (cash, oil, food) 1) 4 gaddis of wheat 2) Receives cash at mar- riages l) 1 marla of any crop 2) l t0pa of wheat 3) 1 seer of cotton 4) Cash at marriage or death Chapter III POLITICAL STRUCTURE In the preceding chapter, among other things, I described the various positions in the economic organization. These positions can be seen to be forming a hierarchy of control in the cluster of econo- mic activities. Thus, the landlords who own the village and surroun- ding agricultural land also occupy the highest position of economic control. The kammis, on the other hand, who are economically depend- ent not only on the landlords but also on the tenant cultivators, occupy the lowest position. In this chapter, I address myself to one of the basic assumptions of this thesis, which suggests the dependent relation of political to economic roles. To do so, I will begin with the analysis of village politics, in which I will refer "to those activities, through which a man achieves command over resources or power over men or both these things" (Bailey, 1960, p. 10). The first part of this paper will therefore deal with the process of achievement of "command" or power, as illustrated or exemplified by the case of the election of Basic Democracies and other case histories, in which men are seen as cooperating or competing for certain goals. Along with this, an attempt will be made to search for factors which lead individuals to cooperate or compete within and between groups. To test uniqueness or generality of those particular factors which lead to cooperation and/or competition, I will compare the village politics with that of a larger entity. To test and expand upon the findings 37 38 of the first part, the second part of this chapter is devoted to the utilization of two sociological approaches, reputational and issue, to the study of power Structure. The conclusions drawn from the analysis of these various kinds of data are presented in the last part. Related concepts like power, authority, influence, etc., are defined as we proceed. To facilitate the understanding of what follows, let us briefly recapitulate some salient features about the village. Firstly, we know that the village is a landlord village, which implies that the major source of authority and power lies with the landlords. Se- condly, it is absentee owned, which means that in the absence of the landlords, their agents--the managers--exercise control. Thirdly, the agricultural land is divided between the landlords. The division is called patti, and the tenants and their agipi artisans are divided between thse two pattis. Fourthly, at least some of the kammis are economically subordinated to the agriculturists. Lastly, there are some villagers who are not directly dependent upon the economic sup- port of either of the two landlords and who do not have to choose one patti against another. With this in mind, let us look at the Basic Democracies and the 1964 elections. Basic Democracies Election The Basic Democracies scheme was first introduced as a political and administrative arrangement in 1959 to create democracy at the grass-roots level and to decentralize the administration. The first election under this new system was held during 1959-60, when the country elected 80,000 Basic Democrats as members of the electoral 39 college (MEG).1 Because all the political parties were banned and candidates for the presidency were discouraged by the regime, the 80,000 MEC'S had to vote for or against Ayub Khan's becoming President. The election of one Basic Democrat from every 700 to 1000 of the adult p0pulation was said to create "a Spirit of genuine parti- cipation in the affairs of the country and a link between the grass- root and provincial and national governments." In its limited member- ship, the electorate was assumed to have a greater knowledge of the candidates' qualifications. Thus said a Pakistani social scientist: The very fact that one representative is chosen from 1000 people is an assurance that only those persons will be elected who are known to the community as honest, God-fearing individuals, who have the interest of the community at heart (Omar, 1961, p. 27). All this was aimed at changing the traditional power structure; social scientists, both foreign2 and/antional, said this goal had been fulfilled or was in the process of being fulfilled. The report of a 1962 survey said: In view of the fact that before basic democracies most of the members in the rural local government came from among the big landowners, the present composition seems to be indicative of diffusion of power in the rural society (Innayatullah, 1962, p. 4). Another article claimed that the basic democracies elections have initiated a process of slow but discernible transition of power from estab- lished and traditional village leadership to new sources 1The term "Basic Democrat" is used to denote the dual roles of the elected member, political and administrative; MEC when the reference is made only to political role. _ 2For example, Robert Campbell (1963) or Rushbrooks Williams (1962) 40 based on achieved status and supported by kinship group (Ansari, in Dube, 1965, p. 54). There are also many reports which claim there has been unsurpation of political power by low-status persons, such asbarbers and cobblers, from the traditional leadership of landlords and the village religious leaders. There is no denying that many of the Basic Democrats do not have the social characteristics (assumed or real) of the old powerfuls. But this fact alone does not warrant the statement regarding "diffusion of power" or "transition" of power structure. A few related factors must be remembered before making any conclusive statement regarding the power structure. Even at the expense of brevity I will mention a few important factors which demand our attention with regard to village political structure. 1. To assert that the composition of the elected membership in the Basic Democracies is indicative of a change lacks empirical justification: there has never been any comparable structure. Some have compared the lowest tier-~the Union Councils--to the panchayats. But this is nothing more than the fiction of social scientists' or administrators' imagination. The panchazat of the early days is still in operation in Panjabi villages. Neither its functioning nor the process of recruitment of its members has points of comparison to the Union Council. Also, I am not aware of any empirical study showing the social characteristics of the members of panchayats. ‘My own ob- servation has been that the panchayat was not always controlled by the economic dominants, i.e., big landowners, nor were its members drawn from any particular class or status groups. In fact, one of the dominant features of the old panchayat has been its representation 41 of the various economic and social strata. 2. In a country whose vast majority is economically poor, there are not enough wealthy individuals to fill the 80,000 seats. Studies giving empirical data Show that land ownership or some other criterion of wealth is low among the Basic Democrats. One study (Innayatullah, 1962) showed that 65% of the Basic Democrats owned one to forty acres of land, and 46% had only one to twenty acres of land. But no compari- son is made to the national average of landholding, where more than 80% of landowners own only one to five acres of land. So even if we agree that the first set of figures is low in an absolute sense, the question remains regarding the relative wealth of the Basic Democrats. Nicholas (1965) shows that a person owning as little as two and a half acres of land exercised considerable power in a Bengali village. It is finerefore necessary that any assessment of a Basic Democrat's wealth or other social characteristics must be madeonly with reference to his consituency. 3. Another important sociological factor regarding the nature of social control also appears to have been neglected in the literature. When the B.D. was first introduced, the big landlords and other high- stratum persons thought it to be a temporary phenomenon. Thus little excitement and participation was evidenced in the first elections. For many, then and now, the office of Basic Democrat was a very in- ferior position. The landlords valued the higher offices; membership in a Union Council appeared much below their dignity. The goal of the "high and mighty" is still the offices at provincial and national levels. .Also, many of these men are confident, and perhaps correctly 42 so, that they can keep the ultimate control in their hands in any case; they simply lend their support to a few petty politicians who, after the election, remain in their Sphere of influence. In many ways, the behavior of Pakistani village powerfuls is analogous to the American "economic-dominants" who, instead of personally parti- cipating in local affairs, encourage the lower echelons of their corporations to participate in the community political activities.3 In the following account of the B.D. elections, I shall attempt to substantiate the above arguments and bring to light some new facts of Pakistani village politics. During September and October of 1964, Pakistanis twenty-one years of age and older elected 80,000 MEC. In January of 1965, the MEC'S in turn selected one of the four contestants as the President of Pakistan. Contrary to the preamble of the constitution, the election of the one national and the two provincial legislatures was held after the presidential election. The change in the timing of the two elections was, I believe, introduced to ensure a sizable majority of Ayub's supporters in the legislatures. Unlike those in 1959, the 1964-65 elections were lively and well contested for a variety of reasons. 1) Having been in existence for five years, it seemed inevitable that the system of B.D. had come to Stay; thus the initial rejection was replaced by active participation. 2) The functioning of the B.D. had also brought the realization that it was 3Reference is to various studies of community power structure in America, for example; Form and Miller (1960), D'Antonio and others (1961), Hunter (1956), Schulze (1957). 43 a new source of power, prestige, and--most important of a11--money. One foreign observer commented: "Because of the funds at their dis- posal the basic democrats are becoming aware of the power residing in the union councils. This is partly why the elections of 1964 were much more keenly contested than were those of 1960" (Mayer, 1966). 3) There was also relatively more organization in 1964. In 1959, political parties had just been banned and no functional alternative existed for political participation. Combinations of these and other factors brought into the open the clash of ever-present factions which are always in ooggnizations of the villages. In most Panjabi villages the contest for the seat of Basic Democrat became a struggle and a fight between two or more factions. In the Panjab the factional fights of election time fol- lowed a well-established pattern, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. No observer of village politics could escape witnessing one or two such fights. One might ask why there is such violent political competition. Firstly, defeat is considered a loss of face and prestige; the honor of a group depends on victory. Secondly, a winner is not always gracious; he bears a grudge against all those who did not support him, and he has a sense of obligation to his sup- porters. In this regard, Darling's observation some thirty-five years ago still holds true: In India friend and protector are expected to help a man whether he is right or wrong, indeed, more than ever, when he is wrong, for friendship and protection are matters not of morals but of needs (Darling, 1929, p. 245). In a society with this value system, it is expected that a contest for 44 any source of power, prestige, or honor would be keen. Therefore, to say that the forceful contest was evidence of the people's support for the B.D. system or the regime is somewhat untenable. The election onMEC's was not contested on party tickets. In fact, at the time of the Basic Democracies elections, the six op- position parties had not yet crystallized into the single Combined opposition Party (COP). The failure to issue party tickets at the grass-roots level was either an oversight or miscalculation, to be regretted later by the ruling party. The campaign was carded out on an individual and personal basis. The pamphlets and posters urged the voters to vote for a particular symbol (each candidate was as- signed a specific one by the Department of Basic Democracies), and stressed the candidate's personal qualifications. The emphasis on person, rather than on party or program, continued even during the presidential election. Miss Fatima Jinnah, the candidate of COP, was in fact not even a member of any party. Her choice was dominated by nothing more than her personal qualities and charisma. In my numerous talks with'MEC's at the tehsil level, nothing was stressed more than the individual contestants' personal qualities, such as sex, age and physical looks. A.really thoughtful MEC added "the manner of Speech." On all personal qualities (not to mention his other assets!) Ayub Khan scored the highest. Ayub Khan won with an absolute majority in all districts of West Pakistan except Karachi. The percentage of votes for Ayub was eSpecially high in the rural areas, particularly where there were landlords. For example, Sargodha district gave Ayub 913 of 45 its total 1369 votes. The provincial, district, and tehsil voting patterns were very much as expected. But what surprised many was the voting distribution in Tehsil Shahpur. On the basis of the obvious characteristics of Shahpur, one would have expected a large margin of victory for Ayub Khan. But Ayub won in Shahpur Tehsil by a margin of only ten electoral votes; eighty-five were cast for the opposition. As far as I can tell, this was perhaps the highest percentageof Opposition votes in West Pakistan outside Karachi. Among the explanations given me for this trend in voting were the following: 1. "Politicians" claimed that there was little or no inter- ference from government officials; consequently, people exercised their free choice. 2. The officials argued that it was a reaction against the land reforms enacted by the Ayub regime. And since the area was predominantly controlled by the landlords, the votes went against Ayub. The above arguments given by two opposing interest groups do not fully explaind the situation, though they do contain some truths. The problem with the first argument is that it does not explain why the administrator applied more pressure on one area than in another. The Deputy Commissioner, who is the fountainhead of legal and extra- 1egal pressures and controls in a district, had no reason to apply control in one of his tehsils and not in others. Similarly, the official version overlooks the high percentage of votes Ayub received from areas which were equally or more adversely affected by the land 46 refonms. But looked at from a different point of view these arguments reveal interesting facets of Pakistani political life. The politicians' argument, which was also one of the most popular arguments given by the public at large, reveals either perceived or real use of "force" by government officials to ensure victory of one candidate over another. If "force" was used by the government officials, then it remains to be argued whether this can be conducive to the attainment of the pro- fessed goal of ”genuine participation" and "true democracy" among the masses. If the ordinary people did have a voice, Ayub should have received a far higher percentage of votes because he was instru- mental in "bettering" the economic condition of the masses through the land reforms. These arguments aside, let us see what other explanations one can find for this unexpected voting pattern. Shahpur Tehsil is dominated by landlords, famous among whom are the groups of Tiwanas, Qureshis, Syeds, Maikans, and Nagyanas. The rest of the land is controlled by smaller landowners holding under one hundred acres. These landlords have been associated with politics for a long time. Nagyanas, Maikans, and part of the Tiwanas were allied to the provincial governor, but the part they played in pre-l959 politics was minor compared to that of the Qureshis. Qureshis and their rishtadars (bilateral kinsmen), the Dultanas of Dera Ghazi Khan and.Mmltan were very active in pre- partition and pre-l959 politics. The elder Dultana, who is married to one of the Qureshi women, had been the Chief'Minister of West Pakistan and had held a number of cabinet posts in the central govern- ment. In 1959 he was barred from political participation for the next 47 six years. Qureshis, who are also related to the Syeds through many marital ties, had also been in the pre-Ayub provincial cabinets and were similarly debarred. Tiwanas are perhaps the biggest landlords in the district, and one of the four or five biggest in the country, but their family history has been characterized by internal feuds. The large number of Tiwanas families are usually organized into two or more opposition groups, so that when one group of Tiwanas families supported the regime, the other reacted by joining the opposition. Thus Shahpur had two major divisions among its big landlords: Qureshis, Syeds, and a group of Tiwanas supporting and working for the opposition; and Maikans, Nagyanas, and the rest of the Tiwanas for the regime. While the two factions of the Shahpur landlords may be considered equally powerful, the Maikans, Nagyanas and the Tiwanas--those who supported Ayub Khann--had the added advantage of help from the govern- ment officials, who were often accused of being the "party workers" by the opposition. In view of this situation, 10 extra votes for Ayub Khan hardly needs any further explanation. The interesting fact is that practically none of the members of these groups personally contended for the office of MEG. Instead, they put up candidates who were either their economic subordinates or petty landowners who could not win without their support. Obviously some'MEC's were independents or pretended to independent once they were elected. I was told by many that such people were either ”bought" by the Qureshi group or pressured by the supporters of the regime. Though the facts would be difficult to ascertain, I was told that the Qureshis paid as much as Rs 5000 for a vote. This might be an 48 exaggeration, but money was definitely used as a means of getting votes. Also, some officials did confess to me that they had brought a "little pressure" on the "neutral and indecisive fellows." My own data and other reports are definitely suggestive of an alliance between administration and pro-government politicians. Thus the electors were organized in factions rather than political parties, whereby allegiance was given to the factional leader rather than to the program or policies of a particular party. The factional leaders were economic dominants, and those who were in favor of the regime had the advantage of the administration's support. The con- flict and cleavages between the factional headers were determined by past enmity, kinship ties, and real or perceived economic, social or political benefits. Politics ig_the Village Let us now turn our attention to the village and look for simi- larities and differences between the tehsil and the village, in the context of the B.D. election. The village of Jalpana is divided among two landlords-—Khan Sahib and Haji Sahib. People refer to the two divisions as the "patti of the elder" (Khan Sehib) and the "patti of the younger" (Haji Sahib), even though the village as such is under zamindari tenure rather than pattidari. The rivalry between Khan Sahib and Haji Sahib dates from 1925, when Khan Sahib's elder brother mur- dered Haji Sahib's father. Since then Khan Sahib has sought and re- ceived support from the Awans, one of whom has been the governor of West Pakistan since the inception of Ayub's regime. Since the Awams have supported Khan Sahib, he in turn has been obliged to support the Ki 49 regime and its policies. Haji Sahib, because of his enemity to Khan Sahib, has also been opposed to the Awans and consequently to the regime, even though he was a personal friend of President Ayub. Though the conflict and enemity between the two landlords goes back many years it did not come to an organized clash until 1959, when the first elections were held. In 1959, they were rivals for poli- ticial power for the first time. Each put up a candidate for the one seat of Basic Democrat in Jalpana maggg; Mallik, Haji Sahib's manager, was run against Sandarana, a tenant who was at that time Khan Sahib's kardar. Sandarana was thought to be "religious," "simple," and "honest” person; Mallik, a "drinker of wine, a womanizer, corrupt," but "helpful." Mallik won. In 1964 there were again two candidates, but prior to the election an important change was effected. Jalpana 93253, which in 1959 had been a single unit, was divided into two constituencies in 1964. Thus, in 1964, two Basic Democrats were to be elected: one from Jalpana vil- lage (823 votes) and the other from Bhabrani and Bhakri (515 votes).4 The change was brought about through the influence of Khan Sahib, who wanted to ensure at least one victory. But from all points of view, the Jalpana election was more cruicial; victory or defeat here determined the gain or loss of prestige. In Bhabrani both landlords put up minor employees. In Jalpana, on the other hand, the candidates were the two managers, Mallik and Raja. The residents of Bhabrani and Bhakri elected It is worth mentioning that according to the rules an area with less than 700 votes does not qualify for constituency. In this case, the argument of distance of the two villages from the other villages was used to justify the change. 50 Khan Sahib's candidate; Jalpana elected Haji Sahib's--one vote each for the regime and COP, reSpectively. Following is a reconstructed account of the political mobilzation in Jalpana in 1964. The problems of re- constructing the voting pattern need no emphasis, but an effort was made to be as accurate as possible. ‘Membership in the two factions is primarily based upon the nature of economic alliance that the individual villager has with the two landlords. The tenants of each landlord were an essential and certain part of the two factions; the other employees and kammis who served exclusively the tenants of one faction or the other can be almost automatically added. This accounts for 245 votes for Raja (Khan Sahib) and 220 votes for Mallik (Haji Sahib). Jalpana had a total of 823 voters, five of whom were absent from the village and did not vote, leaving 353 votes to account for. These 353 votes belonged to the kammis who served the whole village or an equal proporation of tenants on both sides, and the "independents"-- including shopkeepers, goldsmiths, and other outside employees. To my first enquiry, these neutrals said they had divided their votes into two as "was only right." If they really did this, then Raja should have won--not Mallik, who got 421 votes, a majority of 20. In fact, Mallik needed 49 votes to lead by the percentage he secured. Raja explained that the decisive votesvere cast by the Mussalis who, shortly before the elections, were employed by Haji Sahib to work on his ZOO-acre farm. But in face of the facts, it was hard to accept Raja's explanation, because those Mussalis would have accounted for only 30 votes. Further enquiry among the villagers revealed that pressures and promises were used by both parties. A sample of the 51 villagers' reports, given below, gives some idea of the nature of persuasion. One person said that the total vote of his household went to Raja because "he had promised to get me a job at the Rural Works Department." This "neutral" did not get the job and was thoroughly bitter. Another individual--a barber--was made to give up his few customers in Raja's section because he had voted for Mallik, in whose section the majority of his customers lived. One of Khan Sahib's tenants, a friend of Mallik, was pressured to move over to Haji Sahib's section, where he was promised an equal amount of land. But because of his stronger loyalties he stayed and even successfully persuaded Khan Sahib to employ him temporarily as a kardar, so as to increase his bonds with his old landlord. He did this even though his personal choice was Mallik. Later this man suffered at the hands of Mallik, who opposed an allotment of land to him. Subsequent findings revealed that the unaccounted-for votes were cast not by the Mussalis as Raja had said, but by the two barber families, both of whom are educated and upwardly mobile. Both admitted that they were approached by Haji Sahib's son, who was supervising the election, but claimed that it had little effect upon their decision, which they said was independent of any kind of persuasion or pressure. The reason they gave for their inclination towards Mallik was the reSpect they had for the personal qualities of Haji Sahib in preference to those of Mallik. This was an interesting facet in political alliance. From the vieWpoint of the villagers, both landlords appeared to enjoy equal power. Objectively, Khan Sahib had more land and more men under his control; but enquiry among the villagers revealed that Haji Sahib 52 had greater prestige. Some of the sources of this prestige, as given by the villagers, are summarized below. Disposal g£_Wealth: The important thing is not the possession of money or property; rather, it is its expenditure and consumption. ConSpicuous consumption and generosity are valued positively. On this account, Khan Sahib is negatively evaluated because he is thought to be tight with his money. Haji Sahib, on the other hand, maintains big cars, a train of servants, dresses well, entertains lavishly, maintains houses in the city and hill resorts, etc., none of which are done by the other landlord. Haji Sahib invited 12,000 guests to the marriage of his eldest son, while Khan invited only 800 guests when his eldest son was married. Interation with the Poor: Haji Sahib maintains good rapport with the villagers. Whenever he visits the village, a large crowd gathers to sit with him. His behavior with his subordinates is also more democratic than Khan Sahib's. He visits bereaved families and makes appropriate gestures at times of happiness. Interest in and Knowledge 2: Agriculture: Much of a landlord's prestige depends upon his knowledge and interest in agricultural work. Farmers show little reSpect for someone who does not know about his work. And in this reSpect Haji Sahib has proved to be more proficient. Moral Character: In this respect the two landlords enjoy some- what equal prestige. But occasionally stories of Khan Sahib's youth are mentioned that throw some unfavorable light upon him. Also, it seems that he has inherited the bad reputation enjoyed by his elder brother. Haji Sahib's trip to Mecca seems to have contributed to his 53 prestige. Few villagers made a differential evaluation of the two candi- dates themselves. The two men were much alike and had similar occu- pational histories. To my enquiry, the villagers eXpressed equal preference for Raja and Mallik. In fact, these two men were known to have been good friends for a long time, and each privately re- gretted that they had become victims of the landlords' factional competition. While previously one was ready to give even his life for the other, during the election they were ready to kill each other. The decision in the election was made primarily on the existing eco- nomic alliances and secondarily on the promises and hopes of benefits in the future, and the prestige of the candidates' sponsors. These factors were strong enough, at least in this case, to override the ties of friendship, kinship, and caste. Exercise g£_ggg§£ The election was one of the rare occasions when the landlords used their power directly to "realize their goal in communal action." In most other cases, they do not intervene in village affairs; the situation is left either to the managers or the village influentials. But when a solution cannot be reached or when one of the parties in a diapute requests their intervention, they do bring their influence to bear. One such instance was the case of a goldsmith who was finally, against his wishes, pressured by Kha Sahib to reach a compromise. The particular instance to which the goldsmith's story relates had occurred in 1963. One night, while pe0ple were asleep, three dacoits broke into the house of one of the goldsmiths. It was reported 54 that they got away with some cash and ornaments; they were also accused of molesting the women. The case was registered with the police, and through the efforts of the goldsmith the three were punished with seven to ten years of imprisonment. One of the three dacoits was the son of a tenant of Khan Sahib. The other two be- longed to landowning families of another village, who were said to be well known to Khan Sahib. During my stay in the village, the families of the dacoits-~who were then in prison--were trying to arrive at a settlement with the goldsmith outside of court to secure their release. They had secured Khan Sahib's help in their efforts. I talked to the goldsmith shortly before he was obliged to follow Khan Sahib's suggestion, and the following is what he told me: (Case 1) As long as it was a case of police and courts, we did all that we could and spent thousands of rupees to get these men (robbers) prosecuted. Our efforts suc- ceeded and justice was done. Had the case required more money, we would have spent it even if it meant selling some of our ornaments, because they took not only our money but also molested our women. They attacked our izzat. But now Khan Sahib wants us to make a settlement so that these men get free. If we had wanted to make a compromise, we could have got a better deal a year ago. We do not like to compromise our izzat for money. But we can not afford to refuse Khan Sahib. If we do, we know we will lose our house, our shop and the business. We can not do that, so we have to go along with his sug- gestion. The above illustration suggests that the landlords, by virtue of their position in the organization of production, enjoy both authority and power. I use the two concepts, in spite of the diffi- culties of empirical distinction between the two, to emphasize the differential quality of control. The particular case of the gold- smith serves as a good illustration of the exercise of power rather r o- ~ , _ . _, _ ‘ fl N .. _ .A ». . , I .; , . r , 1 , a .4 7 r l . . O v 0 . , .. 55 than of authority. I think the goldsmith's act of obedience was not a case of "voluntary obedience," but was an example of fear of "nega- tive sanction." As said earlier, the instance of direct action and interference is only rare. Since neither of the two landlords lives in the village, the affairs andissues which they might directly control are controlled in their absence by their senior employees, the managers. Each manager is delegated with authority, and in.many instances he assumes the status of his employer; consequently, many villagers use the blanket term.malik to refer both to the landlords and the managers. It was found that there was some difference in the amount of authority delegated to each of the three managers. Furthermore, for reasons discussed below, the managers assumed control exceeding the limits of their "delegated rights." To understand this better, let us look more closely at the three managers and their activities. Khan Sahib is represented by two managers, Shah and Raja. Shah is a non-Panjabi whose original home was in Uttar Pradesh. He has no member of his biraderi in Pakistan nor does anyone know his family back- ground. His claim of being a Syed is only reluctantly accepted by the villagers. His other claim for prestige and power is that of Marfat-- a form of religious purification in which a person is said to have had communion with God. Like the claim for Syedhood, this is also seriously doubted and makes the villagers only the more suspicious of him. He began his service in the village as a kardar and has been only recently promoted to the post of manager. This promotion is considered by the villagers to be a clever move on the part of Khan Sahib, because 56 it ensures Shah's loyalty to him. Shah's loyalty to Khan Sahib is further reinforced by his vocal rejection of Panjabi culture, which hardly endears him to the proud Panjabi villagers. His recent mar- riage to the butcher divorcee, which had the support of only Khan Sahib, has further alienated the villagers. As a consequence, Shah enjoys very little power or prestige beyond his authority. Raja, a Rajput from the neighboring district, has been in the village for the last twenty-five years. His claims to power or pres- tige are in complete contrast to Shah. He has a large biraderi and everyone knows about it. Some of his kinsmen are also important government officials, a fact which makes quite a difference in one's prestige. His younger brother is the district police chief--an office of higher status than that of a university professor--in the same dis- trict where Khan Sahib's eldest son participates in politics. Further- more, he makes use of his contacts with officials and helps the vil- lagers with their miner problems. Lastly, unlike Shah, he possesses a knowledge of agricultural work. But since he does not enjoy the reputation of being honest, his authority in economic spheres has been curtailed, causing serious rivalry and conflict between him and Shah. By keeping these two managers in a state of conflict, Khan Sahib ensures less pilfering and economic loss. Both these managers find their authority far more limited than that of Mallik. One of the reasons for this restriction appears to be physical proximity: Khan Sahib lives in Shahpur, while Haji Sahib lives eighty miles away. Mallik, an Awan from Mianwali district, has been in the village as long as Raja. Because of greater freedom from supervision by his 57 employers and of access to ready cash, he has developed many valuable contacts among the officials, bettering his own economic condition and creating many faithful followers among the villagers. He is helpful to the villagers, and those who carry out his commands are amply rewarded. Unlike Raja, who sometimes resorts to the use of force, Mallik generally rewards or withholds rewards as a means of positive and negative sanctions to realize his goals. ‘Many of the' villagers who benefit from his generosity, which is always at the expense of Haji Sahib, consider him a very valuable connection. At one point Haji Sahib's son decided to live in the village and increase the productivity of his land, but Mallik sabotaged him. After about six.months of effort, with little or no result, the landlord had to quit his plans and go back to the city. (But I am told that recently his activities were discovered and his service has been terminated.) Let us now look at a few cases which will illustrate the exercise of power by the managers in activities other than economic ones. (Case 2) (This case is representative of many cases which involve women and disputes over them.) Raja (sixty years old) was interested in a local woman of Sheikh guom, who in turn had a continuing affair with a young man of Doogal guom. The Doogal was Khan Sahib's tenant and so was the woman's husband; hence they were subordinate to Raja. Raja used various means of threat, promise, and persuasion to break up the affair. But not much could be achieved because the Doogal's father was also one of the influentials in the village. Finally the young Doogal agreed with Raja and with his father to marry his father's brotherfis daughter, whose father was also Khan Sahib's tenant. Raja approached the Doogal girl's father and proposed the marriage. Ini- tially he agreed, but he soon got a better offer from another village and changed his mind. Raja hit upon another plan. He soon got a rumor started about the prospective bride's moral character and her affair with an Awan boy, who also happened to be Khan Sahib's ten- ant. Raja persuaded the Awan to play his game on the 58 promise of getting him a license for a gun--a highly valued possession in Panjabi villages. The rumor worked. After a few weeks the girl's father came to Raja and requested his help in again arranging the daughter's marriage to the Doogal boy. But now there was the danger of the boy's refusal. To safeguard against any further problems, Raja devised another means of control. One day he asked the Awan, who was ploughing his own field, to plough also the adjoining land, which belonged to the Doogal. Seeing that the Awan was ploughing his land, the Doogals gave a good b< beating to the Awan. The next morning the Awan attached and seriously injured the Doogal boy, the prospective bridgegroom, with an axe. This became a police case, but whether it could be so registered or not depended upon Raja. He politely suggested that everything could be taken care of if his suggestions were followed. The marriage took place, but the Sheikh woman still eluded his control and, instead, started an affair with a weaver. Raja advised his lieutenants to catch them red- handed. One afternoon they were seen entering a room, which was immediately locked by the faithful followers. Raja and other villagers were called, and the unfortunate weaver was extracted from the room and beaten. (Case 3) (The following example is one of many instances of conflict and competition for power between Shah and Raja. The most common means adopted to belittle one another is Spreading false rumors or backbiting. The weakness of one is fully exploited by the other, and all possible alternatives are used to hinder the attainment of each other's goals.) Shah wanted to marry a butcher guom divorcee whose brother was in Shah's employ and whose uncle was Khan Sahib's tenant; but the rest of the biraderi members were either independents or Haji Sahib's tenants. Firstly, at the instigation of Raja, many of the villagers carried rumors about Shah's dishonesty to Khan Sahib. Secondly, at the encouragement of Raja, one of the Mussalis forced his way into her house and was said to have been seen "in a compromising position with her." This almost worked, but soon Shah discovered that it was all grand strategy on the part of Raja. Thirdly, the woman's relatives were mobilized to Oppose the marriage on the basis of caste. The butchers got excited and threatened to kill Shah. The situation was very tense until one day Khan Sahib made up his mind and had the marriage ceremony performed at his house. I am certain that if Khan Sahib had not intervened, Shah would never have succeeded in attaining his goal. (Case 4) (The fourth case is concerned with the combined 59 action of Raja and'Mallik. I was repeatedly told that together they had made life difficult for many of the villagers. Thus their fight at election time had come as a boon to many of the actual and potential victims of their power. Some of the villagers even tried to aggra- vate the conflict and animosity between them, but during the last days of my stay they had become friends again. It was at this time that the following incident occurred.) Raja's barber, Sultan, lived next door to Sunar (goldsmith) Ali. Sultan had only a one-room house and wanted to make use of the adjoining room which was being used by Ali for storing cattle feed. Sultan tried various approaches to gain control of that room, but nothing worked because Ali refused and in so doing had the support of Mallik. Both Mallik and Raja had equal claims on the room, because the village and its houses are the common property of both land- lords. Nothing was done until after Raja and Mallik became friends again. Sultan approached both of them; Raja sup- ported Sultan's claim. The decision was made, and Ali had to vacate the room. He could appeal to no one now. The example of the three managers serves as a good case in our theoretical development. They are illustrations of what has been called "authority code," by which a "differential assignment of rights to use and acquire power" is made to "particular statuses" (Swartz, 1966, p. 17). Though they all hold the same "office," their status varies Xififflf!l§.the landlords and the villagers. The respective status depends partly upon the landlord and partly on other factors, such as adherence to the value system, ability to help others, posses- sion of knowledge of villagers' work, and claims of belonging to a biraderi. Thus, those who enjoy higher status also tend to acquire power which exceeds the limits of their assigned rights. The acquisi- tion of power is also reinforced by the nature of their contact with the villagers, which is characterized by face-to-face contact. Because of the nature of their contact they are in a position to manipulate men, even against their employers, if the latter's action threatens their interest or status. 60 There also appears to be an important difference in the manifestation of power between the landlords and the managers. Though in general, the form of power varies according to the situation, managers mainly resort to "manipulation" or "force," while the landlords achieve their ends by "domination" alone.5 The Influentials Earlier I mentioned that some of the decisions are made by the villagers who do not hold positions in the power hierarchy. I ref- ferred to these individuals as "influentials." Let us see who these individuals are, how they are identified, and what kinds of issues are settled by them. In my first survey of the village every respondent (each head of a village household) was aksed to name the individuals whom he considered influentials6 in the village. No one was asked to give any particular number of individuals, nor was he given any Specific criterion by which to select the influentials. ReSpondents named ' from one to ten persons. Since much of the first survey was conducted either at the reSpondent's house or work place, where others were always present at the time of interview, many hesitated to give any names and some were helped by others in their choice of influentials. Hence, for the present analysis, all such responses have been excluded. The result of this first survey is presented in Table I. 5These concepts are used in the sense given by Goldhammer and Shils (1939) 6For a discussion of reputational versus issue approach, see Polsby (1963), Erlich (1961), Dick (1961). 61 Respondents mentioned a total of thirty-eight individuals as influentials. One person, Sardara Mattan, was mentioned by sixty reapondents, while seventeen individuals were mentioned only once and seven persons twice. A total of nine individuals were mentioned five or more times. There was a slight variation in the response of the zamindars (agriculturists) and kammis (craftsmen). Both groups were similar in their first three choices, Sardara Mattan, Rajadah Doogal, and Dadu Doogal. But the two groups differed in their number of choices. Zamindars mentioned twenty-seven names, kammis twenty-one names, ten names were common in both lists. The eleven different names in the list of kammis included five individuals of their own occupational group. The most conSpicuous absence was that of the managers or the land- lords. No one even once mentioned their names. TABLE I Nominations of Influentials Zamindars Kammis Sardara Mattan 34 26 Rajadah Doogal 29 "I7 Dadu Doogal 18 14 Haji Raja 17 4 Naja Panchoota 10 3 Lala Chaddar 7 3 Doosa Hattar, Ramzan 5 Imam Lohar Gudgor, Haji Sandrana 3 Hamooka 6 Bhai Khan Mattan 5 3 Doosa Mattan, Ramzan Kumahr Raja Panchoota, Sultan Gudgor, Sardara 2 Ali Maikan, Bhaksha Panchoota, Sher Rajha, Mattan Hayat Mattan, Hayat 1 Ali Sunar, Ghula Panchoota 2 Sunar, Nawaz Sunar, Bhaksha Maikan, Mutal Maulvi Rahman, ‘Maikan, Raja Hattar, Rama Maikan, M. H. Rama Mattan, Rajada Jhamat, Shah, Sardara watna Imam Lohar, Sher Awan, K. Ali Rajha, Bhaksha Mattan l 62 The above findings raised a number of doubts and questions. In the face of facts, the non-mention of landlords or the managers, who are certainly powerful, became a great puzzle. Logically, there could be only three explanations: 1) There is a great variation in the "issue versus the reputational" approach. 2) The powerful, i.e., the landlords, are not considered members of the village community. 3) The translation of the concept of influentials was eliciting responses about the individuals who were not really influentials in the accepted meaning of this concept. In order to test these alternative explanations, four new questions were formulated, which then became a part of a larger in- terviewing schedule responded to by a forty per cent random sample of heads of village households. In this case, each individual respondent was interviewed separately. Two of the questions, No. 66 and No. 67, concerned community political activities in which the managers or the landlords generally did not intervene. The other two, No. 65 and No. 68, concerned activities which have been within the sphere of influence of the management (landlords and managers). The responses to these ques- tions are presented in Table II. Let us first take questions 66 and 67, which deal with issues that perhaps the respondents had in.mind when the first survey ques- tion was raised. Even after an interval of nearly four months be- tween the two interviews, there is a strong similarity in reSponse. In both cases Sardara Mattan, Rajadah Doogal and Dadu Doogal are men- tioned as influentials. Comparing the two tables, we find that Naja Panchoota is the only one who suffered a decline, and I think it was for good reasons. During the interval of four months he was the only one whose fortune was adversely affected and he proved to be a failure 63 TABLE II Nomination of Influentials by Issue Names Mattans Sardara Bhai Khan Rama Doosa Hayat Bhaksha Doogals Dadu Rajadha Karam Ali Bhai Khan Amir Panchootas Naja Hayat Sardara Rajha Haji Sher Management Mallik Raja Malik Managers Others M. K. Hamooka Imam Lohar (k) Haji Chaddar Haji Kumhar (k) Haji Sandrana Haji Gudgor Sultan Gudgor Doosa Hattar Raja Hattar Sardara Wetna Maulvi Rahman Q. 66 Zam Kammi Zam Kammi 26 23 2 l HNNUI HNHO‘GVD n-leoo HNH-L‘ 31 28 1 2 21 10 N-L‘O‘ U'IU'I Q. 67 25 22 2 l l 23 H DUI—‘l-‘kfl Huoo l—‘Nt—‘b l—‘NNmO h‘h‘UI 30 26 2 mm NDO‘ Nome O‘OQKDN Q. 65 Zam Kammi 19 ll 17 10 l 1 10 5 4 3 4 2 l l 4 4 l 2 2 2 l 4 2 3 2 1 19 84 7 35 10 35 2 11 3 1 -- -- 1 -- 1 1 -- 1 -- Q. Zam 8 7 l NND NNI-L‘ n—w—I 4—‘0‘0‘0‘ 68 Kammi 2 NW 71 29 26 16 ll—‘lNl Rajadah Jhamat -- l -- -- -- -- - _ Jamal Shah -- 2 -- 2 -— -- - - Ghulam Shah -- 2 -- 1 —- -- - _ Khadim Shah -- -- 1 -- 1 -- - Nawaz Sunar (k) -- 1 -- 1 —- 1 _ in a business venture in which he lost nearly Rs. 6000. Before pro- ceeding any further, let us try to abstract some common characteristics of these individuals. Though an attempt was made to elicit reasons for the choice of each individual separately, no respondent gave the reSponse in the desired manner. Instead, reasons were given for the total choice. Thus, therewas no way of assessing that Sardara was chosen for one reason while Rajadah was chosen for another. The reasons varied from very vague to very specific. A sample follows: Are good persons Are of good moral character Are honest in dealing with others Are judicious in their judgment Command people's respect Are the elders Landlords value their words Can Speak ffankly and without fear to the landlord and can present a case well Are helpful No one mentioned such qualities as piety or religiosity. A few Zamindars mentioned their nominees as "good zamindars," which could mean both a rich farmer or a good farmer. A.few kammis, mentioning the zamindars, simply said "they are zamindars," which implied higher occupational status. In purely objective terms, all three are of advanced age, though certainly not the eldest men in the village nor even eldest among the zamindars. They are, however, elders intheir respective guoms or biraderis. None except Haji Rajha, who also got a high 65 rating, has any claim to religiosity or to membership in a high caste such as Syed or Awan. It is significant that all these men belong to zamindar castes, which as a whole are ranked higher than castes of craftsmen. According to this enquiry, neither religious devotion nor membership in a particular caste seems to have much effect on the hier- archy of influence. Of the three Imams of Mosques, only one was mentioned by three persons, all of whom were members of his caste ofggtters. The village pi; (saint), who is of Syed caste, also was not mentioned. Only three of the Syeds (religiously the highest caste among Moslems) were men- tioned by a total of five persons, and that in the case of question 66 only. Six out of eight Hajis were mentioned, but there is little evi- dence to show that their nomination was determined by their pilgrimage to Mecca. Education also did not appear to be a determining criterion for one's influence. Neither the school teacher nor the only B.A. in the village was mentioned. All these men, including Rajha and Hamooka, command respect and deference inthe village. The managers show respect and never shout at them in the presence of others. Similarly, the landlords address them respectfully and treat them with deference. Though economically they are by no means very rich, even in village terms, they are thought to be good farmers. Sardara Mattan, Rajadah Doogal, and Hamooka also own agricultural land in addition to tenant land, which makes them somewhat more prestigious. In fact, all those who own land among the zamindars were mentioned at least once. I think one of the more important determing criteria of one's influence is the number of individuals and households in a 66 particular 3229, If we look at Appendix I, we find that Mattans and Doogals rank rather closely together in terms of the total number of households and individuals (especially males) in their qggm_, Looking at the first three columns of the appendix, we find that Mattans rank a little lower than Doogals, but this is offset by the higher number of marital relations the Mattans have established outside their 332g, Seven out of seventeen Mattan heads of households are married outside their 3222, compared to three out of sixteen among the Doogals. A large biraderi is considered important in Panjabi villages because the "number of hands" (or arms) available is a crucial factor in the outcome of any fight. A large biraderi is also an asset in times of crisis, be it marriage, birth, death, or harvesting. Responses to questions 65 and 68 are very much as one would have expected. The villagers are aware that activities such as those covered by these two questions cannot be influenced by their fellow villagers, that in these matters they are subordinate to the landlords or the managers. The response to all four questions also lends strong support for the issue approach as opposed to the reputational approach. Given a concrete situation, the respondents tend to think of Specific individuals who might be forgotten when a very general question is asked. The reasons given for nominations of the management were rather Specific. A majority said that they "are the maliks and we are reiaya (subject) or ghulam (slave); hence such decisions can only be made by them." In reSponse to No. 68, almost ninety per cent said that the maliks are the only ones who can get such work done. Only a 67 few mentioned the personal qualities of the managers, and these also were related more to their role than to their personalities. Looking at the responses to the questions and other evidence presented earlier, one cannot help concluding that the nomination of the management was based upon a combination of their power and authority. This is further confirmed by the fact that Shah, who (as was pointed out earlier) has no power beyond his authority, was not mentioned. That they did not mention the landlords as many times as the managers can perhaps be explained by two intervening variables: firstly, landlords are seen as outside the village, only occasionally concerning themselves with village affairs; secondly, they are probably viewed as being above these petty offices and activities. Had the landlords contested for the seat of Basic Democrat, I think that their names would have been mentioned more frequently. A slightly different arrangement of the data presented in Table II in the following four tables, leads to an interesting finding regarding variability in the perception of influence and power. In all four questions, significantly more kammis consider the management to be the influentials. The chi square is significant in all four tables, but the C is as low as 0.1 and 0.2 in questions 66 and 67, while it is 0.3 and 0.4 in the other two questions. In purely statistical terms we cannot put much reliance on the trend found in questions 66 and 67, but nevertheless I think the pattern and direction of relation does warrant some social explanations, especially in view of the fact that managers exercise direct control over the zamindars, while this is indirect with the kammis. 68 Q.67 Category Villagers Management Total Zamindar 68 (+78) 15 (-5) 83 Kammi 99 (-89) 22 (+32) 121 Total 167 37 204N 2 X = 13.9 df = l a = 05 C2 = .2 1 With 1 df (degree of freedom) and a square should be 3.84. = .05 minimum value of chi C, the Contingency of Coefficient "is a measure of the extent of association or relation between two sets of attributes". 2 (Siegal, Sydney, Nonparametric Statistics. 1956) X 2 N + X Q.68 Category Villagers Management Total ZAmindar 9.5 (+20) 26.5 (-l6) 36 Kammi 21.5 (-11) 60.5 (+71) 82 Total 31 87 118N X2 = 22.5 df1 = 1 2 a = .05 C = .4 69 Q.65 Category Villagers Management Total Zamindar 24.3 (+42) 36.7 (-19) 61 Kammi 43.7 (-26) 66.3 (+84) 110 Total 68 103 171N 2 l X = 33.2 df = l a = .05 C2 = .33 Q.66 Category Villagers Management Total Zamindar 67.7 (+74) 10.3 (-4) 78 Kammi 97.3 (-91) 14.7 (+21) 112 Total 165 25 190 2 N X = 7.5 df =1. 2 70 l. The various castes among kammis, such as barbers, cobblers, and blacksmiths, are not organized in biraderis as are the zamindars gugm_. In this sense there is not the same unity among the kammis as there is among the zamindars. For example, an elder among the cobblers does not occupy the same position of authority over other mem- bers of his caste as does an elder among the Mattans or the Doogals. Not only are there distinct caste-like divisions among the kammis (for example, a cobbler would not marry a butcher or a blacksmith a carpenter), there is also subdivision within the same occupational caste. In contrast to the kammis, the various groups of the zamindars intermarry. One might argue, therefore, that this lack of corporate unity among the kammis creates a reliance upon some superior groups, such as the management. 2. A second explanation may be that the kammis view their livelihood as being dependent upon the good wishes of the landlords and the managers and not on the tenants from whom they receive for their services. Thus, for example, when the landlords decided to grow more sugar bane, which was profitable to landlords and tenants alike, the kammis were disadvantaged. Their work (especially that of the blacksmiths and the carpenters), of maintaining the plough was doubled without any additional remuneration. They demanded payment for their increased services, but the tenants paid no heed. Finally, when.Mallik thought that the kammis' demand was legitimate, he instituted cash payment to the agricultural kammis. This money was deducted from the tenants' earnings and given to the kammis. It is also true that the managers can also eaily break the seip relation 71 between any kammi and tenant. 3. Another possibility may be that the kammis have a feeling of class antagonism toward the zamindars, resulting in their rejection of zamindar leadership. 4. A fourth explanation may be that because the nature of the kammis' work brings them in contact with the outside world, and be- cause they have a higher educational standard (of the twelve matri- culates in the village, eleven were among the kammis), and greater occupational mobility, the kammis as a group have a more realistic view of the power structure. The fact is that even though the in- fluentials make some significant decisions and resolve some serious conflicts, the power ultimately lies in the hands of the management. The above explanations are a kind of gx_post facto analysis; it is hoped that there will be further investigation of this phenomenon. Before concluding, let us look at the kinds of issues that the in- fluentials deal with and how they arrive at certain decisions. The influentials are called upon to act in any case which in- volves two or more persons or families. They are asked to act either as judges or as nayans. In the latter role they have the responsi- bility of investigators. And once an investigation is completed, the resulting recommendation is binding upon the disputants who have accepted a 33132, An influential cannot act as either judge or nayag on his own, but must be asked by one party and be acceptable to the other party. The following case will illustrate how an issue is re- solved. (Case 5) A butcher accused a baker of having stolen his lamb. The case was brought to the dara (men's sitting 72 place). After the usual process of accusations and denials, the butcher finally asked the baker for a nayan. The baker asked Sardara to act as his nayan, but he refused and so did Dadu Doogal. (I later dis- covered that these people refused because they did not trust this fellow and thought that he was too smart for them.) None of the influentials present that evening wanted to act as the baker's nayan. Finally, another baker agreed to act as a nayan, but the butcher did not want to accept him. There being no one else, he was persuaded to do so. Both Sardara and Dadu agreed to act as judges. The accused and the nayan were given three days and were then to present themselves at a certain time before the judges. On the appointed day everyone except the accused came. The council waited for him for one hour. He did not come. The decision was reached and he was fined Rs 50, a fairly high fine for the poor villagers. Next day the accused and his nayan came and politely challenged the decision. This created much furor and the judges of- fered to give a Parcha (i.e., a written judgment which the accused could take to any village for judgment by the independent elders of that village). Hearing this offer from the judges, the audience immediately pres- sured the accused to apologize. He did so, but at the same time requested a reduction of the fine. The fine was finally reduced to Rs 30, which the accused paid. (Case 6) (This is an unusual case involving a party from another village. I was told that never before in the memory of the villagers had a case like this been taken up by the influentials. I mention it here to illustrate the extreme role of influentials in bringing about a settlement. The parties concerned were a tenant of Khan Sahib named Hussain and a landlord named Karim from ano- ther village. Karim was distantly related to Hussain.) In 1962 Hussein's aunt, who had lived in Karim's village, died, leaving a hundred acres of agricultural land. Ac- cording to the records the land did not belong to anyone at the time of her death, though the actual control of it was in Karim's hands. Hussain claimed that according to the inheritance law the land belonged to him and not to Karim. But Karim refused to surrender any portion of land in favor of Hussain. Since no compromise was in sight, Hussain filed the case for settlement in the court of Tehsildar. After nearly six months, Tehsildar's court decided in favor of Karim. Next, after borrowing more money, Hussain appealed for revision of Tehsildar's judg- ment in the higher court of the Deputy Commissioner. After the usual delay, the Deputy Commissioner referred the case to the court of the Commissioner. According to 73 Hussein's lawyer and friends, this meant a favorable turn of events, and it was generally assumed that Hussain might win his claim. But while the case was in the courts, nearly two and a half years had elapsed and Hussain was greatly in debt. Also, there was no assurance as to how long it would be beforethe Commis- sioner would make a decision. In.March of 1965, Hussain asked me if I would help bring about a settlement between the two parties. Hussain said he had started negotiations with the other party, who appeared inclined to settle out of court. (I suspect Karim had realized that it would be difficult for him to win by bribery or some similar means in the court of the Commissioner.) In asking my help, Hussain was looking for a neutral acceptable to both par- ties as the "chairman" of a tribunal set up to decide the case. I declined and suggested the village patvari, who enjoyed a good reputation and was also known to the other party. Earlier the patvari had refused to accept the re- Sponsibility, but after some persuasion from me he accep- ted. Now both Karim and Hussain had to select their own representatives--men reputed to be honest and impartial. Hussain requested Sardara Mattan and Rajadah Doogal. Rajadah Doogal refused, so Dadu Doogal was invited. Karim selected two men of good reputation from his village. The day and time for the first meeting were set to take place in Jalpana. The meeting was held in the dag; with judges seated in the middle and a large audience all around. There were no ground rules laid down or procedure outlined. Though much of the argument was made by the representatives of the contending parties, members of the audience gave their opinions whenever they felt like it. Sometimes every- one spoke at once, creating much noise and confusion. The chairman occasionally brought order to the meeting. The discussion lasted for four meetings, and frequent references were made to judgments made by governmental courts in similar cases. It was interesting to note that most of the references were to cases settled by British judges rather than Indian or Pakistanis. In the fifth meeting the decision was finally reached. It called for equal division of the land between the two, to be effected at the end of the agricultural season. Both Hussein and Karim appeared unhappy with the decision, but they accepted it. These two cases illustrate, I hOpe, the role of influentials. I do not know what pressure ebuld have been brought to bear on Karim or Hussain if they had refused to accept the decision. But I was assured that in a case like No. 5, which is typical, once the contending parties have agreed to present their case before the influentials, the decision is binding. Apparently no force other than social pressure enuld be 74 applied against the one who refused to obey. The villagers seemed to have great trust in the judgment of the influentials, because they were thought to be honest men who would not endanger their reputations by making dishonest and partial judgments which could be challenged. I was also told that never in the memory of the villagers had a deci- sion made by the village influentials been taken for review to members of any other village. Such an action would reflect upon the lack of trust in the village influentials. Summary and Conclusion In the discussion of the Basic Democracies elections both in the village and in the tehsil, there appears a certain similar pattern. In both cases, men elected as B.D. were minor politicians who could not have been elected without the support of the economic dominants. The economic dominants appeared to have no interest in the "low" office of B.D. and instead aimed at higher offices which were per- ceived as being more congruent with their position. The support they lent to the minor politicans can be conceived as a means of creating support for their own political goals. On the basis of the data it seems safe to conclude that the economic dominants will with- hold their support of minor, though possibly capable, politicans who were regarded as doubtful with regard to future reciprocal support. The illustration of both presidential and B.D. elections also supports Nicholas' (1965) formulation about factions (i.e., factions are poli- tical conflict groups whose members are recruited on diverse principles). In this case, both at the tehsil and village levels, we found that factional leaders are "big men" and followers are "small men." 75 Similar to Nicholas' findings, the conflict between factional leaders dates from past enmity and in only a few cases is motivated by the desire for personal gain. The followers' affiliation with factional leaders is based upon such factors as economic alliance, kinship, and real or perceived economic or political benefits. In my obser- vations, neither the differences between the leaders nor the alliances between leaders and followers was based upon anything resembling poli- tical ideology or program. This evidence creates doubts about the effectiveness of the Basic Democracies scheme with regard to creation of a "genuine spirit of democracy." Looking at the consequences of the Basic Democracies election in the village, where many villagers felt victimized because of the contest for power between the two landlords, one also sees the disruptive aSpects of the scheme. Many villagers told me they were forbidden even to talk to their brothers, cousins or uncles if these belonged to the opposing patti, ‘Many tenants and seipis of Haji Sahib were inconvenienced for months when Raja forbade them the use of land around the village which had always been used for the "call of nature."7 These villagers had to walk quite a distance to relieve themselves. I also found that the elected B.D. represents, helps and favors only those who supported him. Members of the opposition seldom, if ever, go to the elected man for assistance. The supporters of Raja told me that they do not expect impartial and judicious decisions from Mallik. I am quite certain that Mallik would have found it impossible to enlist the support of Raja or his supporters 7Most of the land around the village belongs to Khan Sahib, while Haji Sahib's land is situated a little distance from the village. 76 in any community activity. Most social scientists (such as Weber, Laswell, Mills, Easton, Smith, Bailey, Nicholas, to name only a few), agree that the basic element of any political structure is power and its distribution. But the literature abounds in controversy over the definitions and forms of power. In their recent book, for example, Swartz and others argue for distinguishing between "consensual power" and "power based on coercion." To them, "power" coreesponds to "consensual power" or, stated differently, power is regarded as "the dynamic aspect of legitimacy” (Swartz, 1966, p. 14). Thus they conceive a political system as being "contingent" upon legitimacy. "Legitimacy," they say, "is a type of support that derives not from force or its threat but from the values held by the individuals formulating, influencing and being affected by political ends" (Ibid., p. 10). From this point of view, then, a political system which makes use of "coercion" is a "crude instrument." This formulation, though interesting, appears to be inherent with some analytical Problems. Firstly, as is well know, values are difficult to assess. Secondly, values like "needs" tend to be many and lead to heuristic explanations. Thirdly, assess- ment of the extent of value commitment of the individual or group is, if not impossible, at least very difficult. Last but not least, in a human society or community it is only logical to conceive of certain political activities as being based upon "consensual" power and certain others on "coercive" power. In view of the above problems, and in light of the data presented, I find it more fruitful to treat political sys- tems as simply those areas of human activity in which "a man achieves 77 command over resources, or power over men, or both these things" (Bailey, 1960, p. 10). The question of whether goals are achieved through consensus or coercion is an empirical question. In our dis- cussion we find that both of these alternatives are used in the achievement of political goals. Another controversy which concerns us here is whether "competition for power" is an essential part of the definition of a political act or not. Bailey argues that "the political is that aspect of any act which concerns the distribution of power, providing that there is competition for this power. . . . Insofar as there may be no com- petition, then the action ceases to be political and becomes merely administrative" (Bailey, 1963, p. 223). According to this definition, the acts which do not involve competition for power are treated as administrative rather than political acts. The cases cited above, like the one of the goldsmith's submission to Khan Sahib, or other instances of control of the tenants or kammis by one of the managers, which do not call for competition, should then be excluded from the analysis of political structure. Because such an exclusion will limit our understanding of village political structure, I have treated poli- tics as "striving to share power or striving to influence the distri- bution of power" (Weber, 1946, p. 78). This definition does net demand that there should be competition or cooperation or both in the sharing and distribution of power. Bailey himself, in one of his earlier de- finitions of politics, speaks of both "cooperation and competition" as means of achieving control. The activities and issues reviewed in the preceding pages can be subsumed under two broad categories: 1) those activities in which the 78 management is involved; 2) those activities in which the management is not involved and in which decisions are reached by the members of the community alone. Examples of the first category are the B.D. elections and work projects which include all members of the village. The second category is exemplified by any conflict which involves only a few members of the community. It must be remembered that the manage- ment possesses the potential of decision-making even in the second category of issues and that the managers do not interfere because they do not have anything at stake in the issue. Being absentee owners, the landlords have "indirect" power over the villagers, and it is only occasionally that they directly and overtly exercise their power. The form of power varies according to the situation. When a conflict arises between two or more relatively equal powerful individuals, "domination" and reward, or the promise of reward to their subordinates, are used as the major means for realization of the goals. If the issue involves no competition with an equal, then "domination" is the only means employed. The managers have "direct" power over the villagers because of the very definition of their office. While the landlords' power is based primarily on their control over the economic resources, the managers draw their power from the authority delegated to them. Because of the nature of contact, the managers use "manipulation" and "force" as forms of power. "Domination" is used by them only when the power is legal, i.e., when they have "authority." . I have used the concept of "influence" to denote the properties of a group of individuals who were named by the villagers as "in- fluentials." The concept of influentials is similar to Parsons' definition of leadership, "gaining compliance through influence” 79 (Swartz, 1966, p. 21). Most authors, except for Bierstedt (1957), Lenski (1966), and Swartz g£_§l. (1966), do not treat influence as a separate analytical category; instead, they use it to denote con- trol in a very general sense, including power, authority, force, dominance, prestige, etc. Of the above mentioned authors, I find that Swartz £5 31, have done most to clarify this terminological con- fusion. Influence is defined as that "process” of gaining complhnce which is "based solely on an appeal that it is independent of induce- ments, threats, and the activation of commitments" (Ibid., p. 21). The village influentials appear to implement "decisions" and win "support through imparting the conviction that the decisions and support are in the best interest of those complying with the decisions and giving the support" (Ibid., p. 21). The fact that only some of the villagers were thought of as influentials, while others were not, demands some explanation of their source of influence. According to the above definition, one of the factors had to be the ability of certain individuals to convince others of the benefits of compliance. This fact was supported by the data. I think it is best to conceive of factors leading to compliance as based upon a large number of variables such as value orientation, psychological variables, or some structural variables. In our case, we find that the influentials were men who belonged to a large biraderi and who were, if not the eldest, at least elder members of their biraderi. They were also a relatively wealthier group and possessed other culturally valued characteristics. In concurring with the above mentioned authors, I find that in view of the data presented the concept of influence de- mands a distinct treatment. This is not to say that one can always 80 find influence independent of other related variables like power or authority. In fact, in most instances influence is involved with power. The case of Haji Sahib seems to serve as a good example of a person having both power and influence, and perhaps because he has influence he is able to enhance "consensual power." In testing the "reputational versus issue" approaches, I found that the issue approach was more comprehensive. Using reputational approach alone, it was found that the villagers gave the names of the influentials only. Relying on this data alone, one was bound to give an incorrect picture of the power structure of the village. It might however be argued that the villagers assumed that anyone living in the village would notice the economic dominants, who are also the "powerfuls." The advantage of the issue approach, however, lies in the fact that one learns not only of the powerfuls, but also of the influentials. The total picture which emerges as a result of this investigation is that even in a supposedly simply society the pattern of political relations are complex. Though the original hypothesis, which stated the dependent relation of power to economic position, is supported, this does not tell the whole story. If for the purposes of analysis we remove the dominant economic positions, then another set of poli— tical relations are revealed. The influentials are not the economic dominants, but men who belong to the zamindar quom.and have claim to a large biraderi. Chapter IV SOCIAL STRATIFICATION The discussion of the economic structure suggested that in terms of organization of production the villagers could be divided into three broad hierarchical categories: the landlords, the tenants, and the kammis. Evidence presented in the third chapter pointed out that the landlords by virtue of their economic position also enjoy high political position. In the absence of the landlords, their political role is as- sumed by their employees, the managers. Corresponding to the hierarchy of economic positions, it was also found that the influentials are drawn from the members of the zamindar quom.and not from the kammis. In short, the last two chapters are suggestive of strong correlation between economic and political positions. Our next task is to explore the relation between the economic and the social positions. This chap- ter, therefore is concerned with finding the basis of social strati- fication in Jalpana. The term "social stratification" is used to denote the hier- archical differentiations of groups in a society or community. Even the most cursory glance at the sociological literature reveals that the hierarchical differentiation has been explained and analyzed by the use of many concepts like caste, class, status, SES, occupation, etc. In view of the theoretical framework of this thesis, the major assumption of this chapter is that the system of social stratification of Jalpana can be most fruitfully analyzed in the framework of social classes as used by Marx. By "social class" is meant: 81 82 . . . any aggregate of persons who perform the same function in the organisation of production. . . .The fundamental determinant of class is the way in which the individual cooperates with others in the satis- faction of his basic needs, food, clothing and shelter (Bendix and Lipset, 1953, pp. 28-29). To test this assumption I will begin with an analysis of the validity of other concepts and frameworks most frequently used in the study of social stratification of the villages of India and Pakistan. Because the ensuing discussion relates to a village in Pakistan, it is appropriate to begin by reviewing what has been said about Pakistani social structure. The studies in the area reflect the pre- ponderance of two concepts, caste and SES. The concept of caste has attracted the attention of the anthropoligists Barth (1960), Eglar (1958), and Karim (1956). While the Cornell-trained sociologists Mangalam (1960), and Raza (1966), seem to be attracted by SES, which explains for them the hierarchical arrangement of a particular village or society as a whole. The exponents of caste find support in three basic arguments to be found in the writings of scholars in allied fields: 1. A few scholars such as Levy (1960), state that the genesis of caste is to be found in Islam. 2. Allied with the first is another group of scholars, Weber (1946), Ansari (1960), O'Malley (1932), Karim (1956), and Slocum (1959), who argue that caste among Indian Muslims is a product of history and cultural contacts with Hindus and has been fein- forced by the religious teachings of Islam. 1A few members of the second group, in their effort to support the thesis, have found supporting verses from the Quran and quotations from the writings of Islamic scholars. But because this study has no pretensions of searching the religious works to support or reject this idea, I will evade the issue and concentrate instead on empirical evi- dence gathered during field work. 83 3. A third group of writers, Barth (1960), Bailey (1964), Berrman (1960), and Ibbetson (1916), define caste structurally and find that strati- fication, at least in certain regions of Pakistan, is amenable to such an analysis. Caste: Cultural 35 Structural Section 1. In short, these three arguments can be subsumed under two broad definitional categories of caste, one cultural and the other structural. Culturally, caste has been conceived as a phenomenon peculiarly associated with Hinduism. Structurally, it has been thought of as an extreme form of class rigidity (Kroeber, 1931), (Lenski, 1966), or an extreme form of status groups (Gerth and Mills, 1946). An examination of the usefulness of these two definitions in explaining the social structure of a Panjabi village in Pakistan follows below: The cultural definition of caste assumes a list of traits which are supposed to form a syndrome. "The authorities, while admitting a great range of detailed variation, have mostly maintained that there is a cer- tain minimal set of primary characteristics which taken together embody a real essence of caste everywhere; Hutton, for example, holds that normally caste conforms to the following criteria: (Emphasis mine) 1. A caste is endogamous. 2. There are restrictions of commensality between members of different castes. 3. There is a hierarchical grading of castes, the least recognized position being that of the Brahmin at the top. 4. In various kinds of context, eSpecially those concerned with food, sex and ritual, a member of 'high caste' is liable to be 'polluted' by either direct or indirect contact with a member of low caste. 5. Castes are commonly associated with traditional occupations 6. A.man's caste status is finally determined by circumstances of his birth, unless he comes to be expelled for some ritual offense. 84 7. The system as a whole is focused around the prestige accorded to the Brahmins (Leach, 1960; p. 4 in part quoting Hutton, 1940). In order to assess whether or not these criteria fit our case, let us briefly mention a few salient features. The villagers divide themselves first into two ranked major quoms, zamindars and kammis. The higher, the zamindar quom, is further divided into twenty-three distinct units which are also called gugm_, Many of these quom§_are regarded as sub-qugm§_or gal of previously umited qugm_, For example, Salmanas claim to be Goondals, but are so referred to because one of the ancestors from whom the Salmanas trace direct descendance was cal- led Suleman. Similarly, Doogals trace their ancestry to the Gujars, but are so named because one of the ancestors was a "double-talker" or dogfgal_(two talk). Since then his descendants have been called Doogal. Similar instances can be multiplied, but I hope it is clear that many of these 322mg are simply extended patrilineal kin groups, tracing their origin to a common ancestor. Many of these zamindars' SEEEE. are made up of cultivators, either as owners or tenants of land. This traditional occupation plays a significant part in their attitudes, desires and aspirations. Though the subdivisions are considered as part of the zamindar quom, not all of the twenty—three guoms can be said to have been cultivators traditionally. The Syeds are des- cendantsofi the Prophet Mohammad or Ali; the Awans are the rajputs-- rulers; the Kookaras are traditionally a priestly class, and so on. The true origin of these quomg is not definite, but they are considered by themselves and supported by others to be of these ancestries. Given the pattern of mobility which is well put in the following 85 quotation, "Last year I was a jullaha (weaver), this year I am a sheikh (disciple), and next year, if prices rise I shall be a saiyed" (Ibbetson, 1916, p. 222), it seems difficult to discover their true origin; henceall are treated in the ensuing analysis as members of zamindar quoms. The kammis divide themselves into fifteen distinct 329mg, the name of each of which refers to occupations, with which it is tra- ditionally associated. Two cautions must be introduced before pro- ceeding further. The first concerns the lack of accord between the 322m name and the actual occupation of its members. For example, out of a total of seventeen households of mirasi (bard), only four were engaged in their traditional occupation. Similarly, of the three households of barbers, only one was still engaged in this type of work. Some of the mussalis (sweepers) have become carpenters, others shop- keepers. Also, a few of the traditional kammi occupations are extinct, forcing members of these 9222§.t° take some other occupation and to become known by the name of the new occupation. Hence, the E222_ (well-cleaner), an occupation which disappeared after the canals were built to irrigate the land, became carpenters. The potters have be- come porters, but are still known by their old name of kumhar. A few years ago the two maulvis, who managed the two mosques and belonged to the augm_of miana, were expelled from the village. Now their posi- tions have been filled by a carpenter (kammi) and a goondal (zamindar), both of whom now call themselves of miana quom and are so treated by others. Some members of the guom of kookara (zamindar) have become fagirs (caretakers) of the village shrine and are so referred to by 86 others. Of the three households of the barbers, the two who have changed their occupation to government service and teaching, insist on being called maliks, a title used by the Awans, the higher qugm_ among the zamindars. However, their claim is not fully recognized by the villagers. This evidence leads me to hypothesize that two factors play an important part in the recognition of change of qggm_ status consequent to occupational mobility. First, if the newly adopted occupation is one which already exists within the village occupational framework, then the change is easily recognized. Thus, since the occupation of clerks or teachers does not exist within the village, a problem of nomenclature arises. Second, if a person of lower 3223, such as a kammi, adopts the name or title of a higher 3292, recognition by others will be withheld for a longer period of time. The second cautionary note is that of the reSpondents of the kammi_caste, when asked to name their "real" caste instead of their "occupational" caste, claimed to belong to one of the zamindar quoms. In other words, many of the Emma; groups think that their occupational caste name is a misnomer and that this is nothing more than a means of identifying one's occupation, while "caste" or "zat" is something dif- ferent; i.e., they, like Swat Pathans, differentiate between caste status and occupational status. In this regard, Ibbetson tells us that the artisans take up the caSte category of the cultivators they serve. However, once again we shall be concerned with what groupings we actually find, rather than with some ideal order of grouping. To turn again to the major question to be answered: Does a guomz 87 in the cultural sense, qualify to be called a caste? The general meaning of the word "augmf is tribe, sect, people or nation. But obviously the villagers do not use the term in this sense. Barth treats Swat qugm§_as "hierarchically ordered social groups" and equates them with castes. Eglar and Slocum treat these 322mg as castes but imply their cultural connotations. A.man's gugm_is determined at birth: he is born into his father's aggm_even.when the father is married to a woman of a different 3323, But as said earlier the qugm_status may be changed within one generation, not to mention more. The case of our two barber households who became maliks is an example. Changing of 929m§_is relatively easy because there are no ritual and commensual rites associated with any one 339m, There are no ritual offenses and hence there are no expulsions. Change in qugm status, though not very frequent, comes automatically with oc- cupational mobility, as compared to Hindu India where such is not pos- sible. Similarly, the concept of caste pollution (criterion 4) is ab- sent among the Muslim villagers of the Panjab. All men sit, eat and smoke together regardless of qggm. Though to a considerable extent SEQEE are associated with traditional occupations (criterion 5), there is a significant deviation as shown in the following table: TABLE I Relations Between Occupations of Present and Past Generations Same as Father's Different from Father's Quoms Occupation Occupation Total Zamindars 99 (81) 8 (26) 107 Kammis 108 (126) 59 (41) 167 Total 207 67 274 x2 a 26.7 a .05 df = 1 88 The data clearly indicate that more cultivators than the kammis have followed their ancestral occupation. On the evidence of this variable alone we might conclude that the zamindar quoms are more caste-like than the kammi quoms. Criterion 3 and 7 indicate a hierarchical arrangement with Brahman at the top and the system focusing around prestige accorded to the Brahman. Some writers, notably O'Malley, have drawn parallels between Hindu Brahman and Muslim Sayed. Even if one accepts the analogy for a moment, the other evidence shows that though the Sayed occupies the highest position in the "hierarchy," the system as such is not focused around the prestige accorded to him. We shall return later in this chapter to discuss the hierarchical grading of quoms as compared to Hindu caste system. The final aSpect of this discussion is endogamy, ofter consi- dered the single most important criterion in the definition of caste. The following table shows the relation between the husband's and the wife's Quoms: TABLE II Quoms Wife Same Quom Wife Different Quom Total - + Zamindars 47 (76) 49 (20) 96 Kammis +156 (127) 4 (33) 160 Total 203 53 256 2 x = 84.0 a:'.05 df r 1 The members of the zamindar quoms do marry outside their own quoms 'much more than do the kammis. The chi square is highly significant, 89 which leads to the conclusion that the kammi quoms are more like castes than the zamindars. This, as will be recalled, contradicts the conclusion drawn from the examination of occupational mobility. In.matters of occupation, zamindars are more caste-like, while in the case of endogamy kammis are more caste-like. The other criteria do not find any support, throwing serious doubts upon the application of the concept of caste (defined in the cultural sense) to the situ- ation imkhe Panjabi village. The preceding discussion, if not conclusive, raises many doubts about the analogy between caste and 3222. However, we still must consider the validity of equating the structural definition of caste with 332m. To test our assumption, which negates such an equation, I will discuss Barth's (1960) arguments. The reason for choosing Barth's work instead of many others are that he is one of the major exponents of structural approach, and much of the descriptive details he presents in his work on Swat is similar to that of Jalpana. Like the villagers, Swat Pathans also differentiate themselves into 32933, distinguish between caste status and occupational status, and do not use the concepts of pollution, commensal rites, etc. But in spite of this, Barth argues that these qugmg_should be treated as castes. His reasoning is based upon two main points: 1) He finds that the concept of class as used by Warner is not very useful in the analysis of stratification. He says, "Swat Pathans are thus not castes in the Hindu sense of the word; yet they are too diverse and rigidly separate to be described simply as social classes” (Barth, 1960, p. 115). The criticisms of Warner's usage of the concept of 90 class are too well known to need repetition. 2) His second argu- ment begins with the observation that though Swat Pathans "distin- quish quite clearly between caste status (quom) and occupational status (kasb-kar . . .), the occupational system provides the basic conceptual framework for the interrelation of caste" (Barth, 1960, p. 118). After showing congruence between various statuses, where occupation serves as the major independent variable, he concludes: . . . because incumbency of one status necessarily im- plies incumbency of a series of other statuses forming the cluster characterizing 'caste position.‘ The prin- ciple of status summation seems to be the structural feature which most clearly characterizes caste as a system of social stratification. It is mainly for this reason that I have referred to the system of hierarchi— cal position in Swat as a caste system (Barth, 1960, pp. 144-145). It appears that such an all-encompassing usage of the term "caste" creates the same methodological and theoretical problems for which Werner has been widely criticized.2 A concept must be precise so as to facilitate research. Also, occupational status seems to play the role of an independent variable; if this is so then why not analyze the system in terms of occupation or, better still, employ the concept of status-group as indeed Leach (1960) suggested in the introduction? It is hoped that the above arguments show the weakness of logic which equates caste and guom. In the concluding section of this chapter, we shall show how other concepts such as class or occupation reveal more about the social structure than the concept of caste. Another interesting approach to the study of the village com- munity structure of India and Pakistan has been suggested by Marriott 2See especially Kornhauser, "The Warner Approach to Social Stratification,” in Bendix and Lipset, 1953. 91 (1955). It has been followed and argued against by other Indianists, notably Freed (1958) and Berrman (1965). Similar to the above-mentioned scholars, Marriott and Freed also use the concept of caste, but as the definition of caste differs it needs special attention. Caste is de- fined as "ethnic groups within larger society which tend to occupy corporate ranks in relation to each other and marry endogenously" (emphasis mine). An ethnic group ”includes both castes and tribes, is generally hereditory, endogamous groups within a society or con- stituting a society, which is defined by its members and by others as separate people, socially, biologically and culturally; it need not be distinquishable in objective fact byiany unique cultural or biological trait? (Marriott, 1955, p. 2). Given these definitions they have col- lected data on villagers' opinions about the ranking of various castes in particular village communities. Caste ranking is thought Of as "elaborate when a given number of ethnic groups is placed in a relatively large number of discrete ranks" and is called "simple or less elaborate when the same given number of ethnic groups is placed in a relatively small number of discrete ranks." The major assumption of their thesis is well put in the following quotation from Marriott: Since caste ranking is here taken to exist in collective community opinion, any elaboration of caste ranking must depend on a high degree of consensus or agreement among individual members of a community as to the standing of each caste. Consensus among individual Opinions can only come about when there is consistency in the structure of social relationships among individuals. Only if the indi- vidual members Of each caste in the community interact with members of other castes in ways consistent with strati- fied order prevailing betwen their castes as wholes will they be able to agree on what that caste order is. Ela- boration Of caste ranking in the community therefore re- quires not only that there be a large number of groups having stratified interaction as wholes but also that interaction among local individuals corre8pond with the trend of interaction among whole groups (Marriott, 1955, pp. 7-8). 92 A.method similar to Freed and Marriott was followed by myself to collect data on the "collective caste hierarchy." Names Of each of the 38 quoms (23 zamindars and 15 kammis) were written on a 3 x 5 card individually. These cards were arranged in English alphabetical order. Before collecting the final data from 27 knowledgeable members Of the community who represented 24 qugmg, pre-testing was done with five informants, whose opinions were not included in the final analy- sis of the data. At an early stage of this experiment, one fact be- came clear; the reSpondents would not agree to rank the kammi quoms in the same hierarchy as the zamindars. They considered that these two major augmg form two different systems. This was the consensus of the other 27 reSpondents too. It was also unanimously agreed that the zamindars as a whole occupy a higher rank than the kammis. Thus the cards were rearranged in alphabetical order for each of the two major groups. Each respondent was then interviewed separately for a minimum Of one to one and a half hours. It was explained to each respondent that the purpose of the experiment was to find the rank each 3222 occupied in relation to other 92293 in the Opinion of the respondent. He was assured that any answer based on his own best judgment would be the correct answer. He was, however, encouraged to place them in the maximum number of ranks, which in the case of the zamindars meant 23 ranks and for the kammis 15. To begin with, two cards of Awan and Bapa were presented and it was then asked, "Who do you think is higher, Awan or Bapa?" The card was then placed accordingly. Next was presented Bhatti and it was asked, ”Is Bhatti higher or lower than Bapa, higher or lower than Awan?" 93 After three or four cards the reapondents picked up the technique and no longer required questioning in the above manner. But when- ever the reSpondent seemed confused about the rank order of a parti- cular 3229, all previous rank orders were read to him. The degree of elaborateness varied with each respondent. In the rank ordering Of the zamindars, 12 out of the 27 reSpondents used 23 ranks, the maximum possible; 3 used only 5 ranks; one did not rank 6 of the gggm_. In the following analysis the data from the latter 4 res- pondents is not included. In ranking the kammis, 14 out Of 27 res- pondents used the maximum Of 15 ranks; only 2 used 5 ranks, and these are excluded in the final analysis. In summary, the following analysis of rank hierarchy of 23 zamindar quoms is based upon data collected from 23 knowledgeable members of the community and the rank hierarchy of 15 kammi quoms is based upon the Opinion Of 25 members of the community. Thus far, I have followed the technique set up by Marriott, Freed and Nicholas (1964), but a significantly different technique is hsed to analyze the data. The raw rank score for each 329m was punched on IBM cards. Thus there were 23 cards correSponding to 23 respondents for zamindars and 25 cards for kammis. Once the cards were punched, the rest Of the calculation was done by a computer, which was so programmed as to compare caste l (Syed) to caste 2 (Awan) to castes 3, 4, 5 and on to 23, and then apply the median test for each paired comparison. The median test gave the value for which alpha was set at .05. The paired comparison and median test were calculated for each caste with another. The same procedure was followed in the case of the 15 kammi 94 gggm_. Once the values were obtained, the hierarchy was arranged as shown in the two diagrams below. Freed and Marriott reach simi- lar diagrams through a much longer manual process. As can be seen in the case of Diagram 1, only 339mg 1, 2 and 3 occupy distinct positions in the hierarchy; the rest are merged with one another and there is a lack of consensus (at least statistically) with regard to the ranks. Not a dissimilar situation is found in the assignment of the ranks of the kammi quoms, though here we do find some major blocks, such as 1 and 2; 6, 8, 9 and 10; and lastly of 14 and 15. What does this poor consensus or agreement mean? It should mean only one thing and that is that there is a lack of con- sistency in the structure of social relationships among individuals; i.e., the individual members Of each caste or qugm_dg_ggt "interact with.members of other castes in ways consistent with stratified order prevailing between their castes as a whole." The inconsistency of interaction is affected by inconsistency in other hierarchies such as economic and political. This conclusion, which is drawn mainly from Marriott is strongly supported by my own data. It is a fact that except for Syeds and Awans, who are strictly endogamous, the other gggm§_marry among each other. Other facts like occupational mobility, where a carpenter has become miana, and many of the other SEQEE have taken over occupations different from their "caste occu- pations," further create inconsistency in social relationships. In conclusion, then, as far aslfierarchy among zamindars is concerned, I am led to quote Marriott, who, when talking of the Middle Indus districts--which would include this village--states: Most peOple of the Middle Indus districts are contained 95 within a large number of hereditary ethnic groups, which may be called "tribes" and "lineages? rather than "castes” since they are not generally agreed to occupy corporate ranks in relation to each other (Marriott, 1955, p. 58). The hierarchy among the kammis is more defined and distinct. This gradation among the kammis suggests more caste-like structure, a fact that is supported by other observed facts. The various households of any particular kammi quom do not constitute a biraderi as in the case of zamindars. Kammis also practice endogamy of 3229, However, on the basis of the evidence presented above, it appears that the concept of caste is inappropriate to analyze the total com- munity structure Of most regions of West Pakistan. The preoccupation with caste is, in my opinion, what Whitehead has called the "fallacy of miSplaced concreteness." Our search must be for a better concept to analyze and explain the social stratification of these regions. In the following section I shall provide the empirical evidence and arguments for the use of a more applicable and explantory concept. Class, Occupation g£_SES The concept of class is not new but was first used in its sociological sense by Karl Marx. Class is determined by the position in the "organization of production," which has two aSpects, "modes of production" and "social relations of production" (see Bottomore, 1961). When an individual's "position" in the organization of pro- duction changes, his class position also changes. Concomitant to change in the class Sgbition occurs the change in the social relations among individuals. It must, at this point, be recognized that Marx's concerns were macroscopic and that he was primarily interested in Diagram I CASTE RANKING (Zamindars) 7] I2 “+31 1. Syeds 2. Awans 2. Bhatti l . Goondal ' 5; Hamooka JO 1 _' “‘l I $7 6. Chaddar 7. Haikan 8 u ----- . RaJha . Kookara 9. Hatter 10. Jhamat 12. Joora 13. Panchoota 15. Bapa 16. Mattan 11. Gudgor 17. Jooya 18. Sandrana l9. Doogal 20. Salmana ’w—————-’— I P—cu——_ —-_—-————- \I' --I o; I In T I I I I I [B d 21. Tula 22. Shaikh 23. Watna —————-P—c- L The ranking positions are ‘based on Median Test. ’ 96 . Diagram II CASTE RANKING (Kammis) . Mdana .' Carpenter . Blacksmith Barber Pbtter __Z5.| ' l 2 5. Baker . 6. l g. Goldsmith . Cobbler 9. Washerman 10. Fakir '11. Weaver l2. Bard l . Drummer l . Butcher 15. Mussali l2 Ranking is based upon the value of chi square, as Obtained by Median Test. ,'97" 98 the industrial society. The present study is microscopic and it deals with an agricultural community. Both these factors con— tribute to an oversimplification of much of what is very complex and "grand" in Marx. Furthermore, Operationalization of a concept like class desires much on the part of the present-day techniques of the social sciences. Thus this must be read with these limi- tations in mind. If one were to look in a strictly Marxian sense, the classes in the village can be seen to be divided into two, the landlord and the rest Of the villagers. But this categorization is not amenable to statistical analysis, and to the extent that they can be described, they have been in the last chapter. There are the landlords, controlling the means of production; and there are the villagers, who contribute their labor. The landlords, by virtue of their class position, also have the power. But we must look deeper into the village and see if the above assumption holds true. The village population can be categorized in terms of "organization of production" into two major groups: cultivators and non-cultivators. There is a third group who are not dependent upon cultivators for their living. But because their number is so small that statistics do not justify their separate categorization, they have been merged with the non-cultivators. Thus, the total sample population is divided into cultivator and non-cultivator. The cultivators and the non-cultivators include both members of the zamindar quom and of the kammi quom. For the present I will call these dividions occupational categories. (The word occupation is used to avoid the value connotation associated with class. I shall return to the use of the concept of class when enough empirical support has been gathered.) The basic assumption is 99 that village social structure can be best described by occupational categorization, and if these categories are valid they must indicate variant group behavior. If the assumption regarding classes which is conceived in terms Of occupation and not membership in a tribe, lineage or caste is correct, then we must find a significant correlation between occu- pation and other independent variables. Occupation must be indi- cative of one's SES, certain recurrent behavior patterns and atti- tudes regarding certain phenomena. Only if we find significant cor- relation can we talk of occupation as a measure of social stratifi- cation. "Socio-economic status is the position that an individual or family occupies with reference to prevailing average standards Of cultural possessions" (Barber, 1957, p. 181). Since a single vil- lage does not provide a large number of cases to divide individuals or families into a number of SES categories, the analysis uses only two categories, one high and the other low. This is also neces- sitated by the lack of wide variation in cultural possessions. Given these limitations, the following table shows that there is a high correlation between occupation and SES. More cultivators occupy high SES than non-cultivators. With the economic structure of the village, this may seem obvious and consequently the question can be raised as to the validity of treating occupation as an inde- pendent variable. In other words, why not treat SES as the indepen- dent variable? Thus, in order to prove the validity of our assump- tion, we must test how SES and occupation correlate with some other variables. All sampled respondents were asked two questions in the 100 crucial area of religious practice and religious knowledge. Question 47 was: "Do you offer Juma (Friday) prayers regularly?" TABLE III Relation Between Occupation and SES Occupation High SES Low SES Total Cultivators 40 (32.7) 23 (30.3) 63 Non-Cultivators 13 (20.3) 26 (18.7) 39 Total 53 49 102 x2= 7.7 a = .05 df = 1 TABLE IV SES and Friday Prayers Yes NO Total High SES 49 (49.4) 12 (11.6) 61 Low SES 32 (31.6) 7 ( 8.4) 39 Total 81 19 100 2 x = 0.1 a = .05 df = l The table shows an extremely low chi square rejecting any assumption of validity about SES. HOwever, this can be only asserted if we get higher and significant relations with occupation as a dependent vari- able. Before discussing these tables let us look at another correlation. Respondents were also asked to name the duties in Islam. It is known that this knowledge is the basis of the Islamic faith. Once again significant variation occurs. 101 TABLE V Occupation and Friday Prayers Occupation Yes NO Total Cultivators 37 (42.5) 15 (9.5) 52 Non-Cultivators 48 (42.5) 4 (9.5) 52 Total 85 19 104 x2 = 10.6 a = .05 df = 1 TABLE VI SES and Duties in Islam SES Correct Incorrect Total High SES 10 (8.6) 48 (49.4) 58 Low SES 4 (5.4) 32 (30.6) 36 Total 14 80 94 x2 = 0.9 a = 05 df = 1 TABLE VII Occupation and Duties in Islam Occupation Correct Incorrect Total Cultivators 3 (8.3) 48 (42.7) 51 Non-Cultivators 13 (7.7) 34 (39.3) 47 Total 16 81 98 x2 = 12.4 a = .05 df = These four tables support the contention that SES does not discriminate 102 villagers either on religious practices or religious knowledge, while occupation (classes) does. If we carry the analysis further and relate the above-mentioned variable with 3223, i.e., between agriculturist and kammi, we find the following situation: TABLE VIII Quom and Friday Prayers Quoms Yes No Total Zamindars 30 (33.0) 11 (8.0) 41 Kammis 54 (51.0) 8 (11.0) 62 Total 24 19 103 TABLE IX Quom and Knowledge About Duties in Islam Quoms Correct Incorrect Total Zamindars 4 (6.5) 35 (32.5) 39 Kammis 12 (9.5) 47 (49.5) 59 Total :6 82 98 Once again we find that there is a lack of evidence for treating 322mg_as a differentiating or stratifying category as far as patterns of behavior are concerned. The above evidence does provide support to the assumption that classes are discriminating variables. Also, class is more discriminating than SES or caste, when correlated with the same independent variables. That SES or caste is related with 103 class is not surprising in view of theoretical formulation that Marx provides us (see Bendis and Lipset, 1953, p. 29). A literal reader of Marx might be confused with the occasional use of "occupation," Marx indeed equivocally denied the equation of class with income or occupation. But the concept of occupation is not used here as it is used in everyday language or even sometimes in sociology. Here it has been used more as a concept of convenience, but nevertheless as a strictly Operational term to denote class. In everyday usage, occupations including those of carpenter, blacksmith, barber, sweeper, etc., are treated as "occupation," but here it means the position in the organization of producion, which Marx defines as "the way in which an individual cooperates with others in the satis- faction Of his basic needs of food, clothing and shelter" (Bendix and Lipset, 1953, p. 29). In my opinion, this is the most useful method of analyzing the system of seipis. Having clarified the above, we must now look at another crucial factor of class. 'Marx argued that the position in the organization of production is not a sufficient condition for the determination of a class. An important factor is the growth or presence of a class consciousness. But how does one measure class consciousness" On a macroscopic level, it can be seen in the social movement Of classes, such as a labor movement, a peasant revolt, etc.; on a microscopic level, as an attempt to measure class consciousness, as provided by Centers (1947). Following Center's technique, I asked the re- spondents to place themselves in relation to Others in the community on a scale which provided five ranks. Almost all reSpondents instead used three ranks of high, middle and low. Those placing themselves A 104 in high were only five, while seven thought it was "not right" for them to do so. The remaining 89 out of 106 samples put themselves in the middle or low. Because of the small number of highs, I have merged them in the middle category. These categories are related with occupation and presented below: TABLE x Occupation and Subjective Class Placement Occupation Middle Low Total Cultivators 23 (18.0) 24 (29.0) 47 Non-Cultivators 13 (18.0) 34 (20.0) 47 Total :6 58 94 x = 4.7 a = .05 df = l The table shows that significantly more cultivators than non-culti- vators place themselves in a higher class. In other words, the non- cultivators have a definite feeling of belonging to a lower social hararchy. This evidence of class consciousness of non-cultivators is also supported by the expression of antagonism toward the zamindars by many of the non-cultivators in their private talk. Conclusion The preceding pages have discussed the analytical usefulness of three concepts which are most prevalent in the study of the strati- fication of a community. Two kinds of data, ethnographic and quanti- tative, have been used to argue in favor Of or against these concepts. At the beginning it was found that if caste is defined culturally, it is not applicable to the particular caSe of a totally Muslim village. 105 This conclusion was based upon ethnographic data. Historical and other cultural factors also lead to a similar conclusion. One such factor is that this region has been predominantly under the influence of Muslim culture, which has discouraged the development of caste among the believers. Our disagreement with Barth has been.more semantic than theoretical. I beli§e that Barth, like Ibbetson, also defines caste in terms of occupational rigidity or, like Weber, in the rigidity of status groups. But if the stratification is to be explained by the use Ofthe concept of occupation, then it must use the actual occupation of the individual and not the traditional one. TO analyze a groupfl in terms Of its traditional occupation would mean that one should consider all business executives named Smith as being in the category of blacksmiths or goldsmiths. The analogy may appear rather obvious or simple, but unfortunately this fact seems to have been neglected by many. Furthermore, if occupation is to be used as a hierarchical category we must first establish the hierarchy of occupation, which to my knowledge still does not exist for the villages of the subcontinent. SES, another variable used to understand the system of strati- fication, was also reviewed. However, as is well known, the SES has come under serious criticism in recent literature on stratification. Among other factors, SES is seriously impaired by the changing value attached to cultural possessions. It was said, for example, that buffaloes or cattle in general are greatly valued by the villagers and that one is able to get a fair estimate of an individual's SES by noting these possessions. However, as mechanization of agriculture increases, the valued cattle will be replaced by other items. 106 Another major problem in the use of SES is the assessment of an individual's income or wealth. Assessment of income is the most difficult task and is so recognized even by those who worked with American or other western repondents. This problem is multiplied; in the case of Pakistani or Indian respondents they first of all distrust any outsider, and secondly, they themselves have no realistic idea of their income. In view of these facts, it seems only logical that class should be a useful concept. We have shown that in accordance with Marxian conceptualization it can be applied with certain modifications to the village. There is no denying the fact that what has been said of class in the preceding pages is somewhat of a simplification. But it must be remembered that in the process of Operationalization of any theory, a certain amount of reductionism is inevitable. Based on the evidence provided above, there are two ways of analy- zing the village class structure. One sees all the participants in the village structure to be two classes: owners of land and workers on the land. This provides us with an insight into the village economic and political life. We can call this approach to be the analysis of Level 1. The other way is to look at the vil- lagers alone, excluding the landlords and their employees. This is not to say that they are not important. They are, and for a holistic study they must be included. But to do a micro-analysis, we can subdivide the villagers in terms of their position in the organization of production. By so doing, we discover a differential in attitudes, behavior and knowledge and, most important of all, class consciousness. Chapter V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION The original plan of this study was to analyze the change in the distribution of power and authority and consequent rearrangement of social hierarchy of a village community in West Panjab due to the enactment of the Land Reforms Acts of 1959. Based on the Observations of other researchers, it was argued that the power of a person or of a group Of persons is dependent upon the amount of control that per- son or group has over the economic resources of a community. Thus it was hypothesized that any redistribution of wealth will also lead to an alteration in the power structure of the community. Theoreti- cally the land reforms of 1959 provided an excellent Opportunity to test the above hypothesis. But, as stated in the Preface, a few weeks of field work led me to conclude that much was needed as far as the implementation of the various clauses of the Land Reforms Acts were concerned. In practice, the de_fagtg_control Of land had remained in the hands of the original owners. This discovery called for a slightly different emphasis than was originally prOposed, the results of which have been presented in the preceding four chapters. Though brief theoretical links have been made between various chapters, for the most part they stand independently as descriptions Of some of the major aSpects of the village. In this section of the thesis I will, then, try to summarize not only the major findings, but also to establish links between each of these chapters and to point out 107 108 the theoretical relevance of such research. In describing the village, the first of the four chapters aims to acquaint the reader with details, concepts and local terms which are frequently used, the knowledge of which will help the understand- ing Of the following topics. It is fully recognized that many more details could have been incorporated in that chapter, but it is hOped that in terms Of the next three chapters--which are considered cru- cial--the details included therein will suffice. The significance of starting with a description and analysis of the economic structure lies in the theoretical framework of this thesis, which assumes the independence of the economic variable. The description of the economic structure reveals that, in terms of the organization of production, the villagers can be divided into three major groups: landlords, cultivators, and artisans. There is a small group of others--workers outside the village, shopkeepers, etc.--which I shall for present purposes treat as residual. Because neither of the two landlords lives in the village, the task of eco- nomic and administrative management is performed by the managers. In this sense, Jalpana can be compared to American communities of absentee-owned corporations. In both cases, the interests and the image Of the owners are handled by the top executives. For most practical purposes the managers enjoy the same position as the land- lords, except for the fact that their job is considered temporary; hence many villagers consider them outsiders. Both the cultivators and the artisans collectively occupy positions subordinate to the owners and the managers, which in many ways is similar to those of 109 workers in an industrial organization. However, a significant rank differentiation occurs between the cultivators and the artisans, who are considered of lower rank. Furthermore, we find that within the various groups Of artisans there is some distinction of rank. Agricultural kammis (carpenter, blacksmith, barber, and potter) are thought of as being of higher rank than the other kammis. This system of ranking seems to be apparent in Diagrams I and II in Chapter IV, except in the case of potters, which will be explained presently. In view of the relative ranks of the cultivators, agri- cultural kammis, and kammis in general, it seems reasonable to argue that the hierarchy of economic positions is determined to a large extent by the kind of association the various groups have with the means of production. Thus the cultivators who are most directly related to the land, which is the base of village economy, are con- sidered higher; the agricultural kammis, whose functions are the second most important in agricultural production, occupy the rank below the cultivators. The case of the potter, an agricultural kammi_occupying a lower position than the other agricultural kammis, requires some explanation. It will be recalled that since the con- struction of the canal the traditional function of the potters has disappeared, and this loss Offunction appears to explain the lowered position. I would hypothesize that in well-irrigated villages the pOtters occupy the same rank as the other three agricultural kammis. In.view of the above, I will argue that the importance of one's function to the means of production is an important criterion of the economic hierarchy. 110 It was further found that the ranks in power hierarchy corres- ponded to the economic hierarchy. The power of the landlords is illustrated first by the fact that they managed to maintain control of the land in spite of legislation. Second, by virtue of their economic position the landlords also control public Office. Third, in any situation in which two contending parties fail to arrive at a decision, the landlords hold the potential of decision-making, which is illustrated in Case 1. However, interesting factors emerge in situations of competition between two or more equally powerful persons. Thus when the two landlords competed for the same public goal, one was more successful because he enjoyed prestige as well as power. It therefore seems useful to be aware of other variables like prestige, influence, charisma, etc., while analyzing power. The above conclusion also raises a question about the measurement of power; namely, how do I conclude that Haji Sahib's victory was not a case Of more power, but rather of power combined with prestige? Indeed, there is no precise way of measuring power, but in a case such as ours, we can arrive at a fairly good estimate of one's power by determining the economic resources under one's control and by counting the number of men who are dependent upon those economic resources. Further precision can be attained by determining the kind of control one has over men and resources. When I state that Haji Sahib and Khan Sahib had qual power, I base this on the fact that both had more or less the same amount of land under their ownership and that the number of men dependent upon their individual portions of land was also more or less equal, although Haji Sahib had 111 fewer people dependent upon him. Also, the two barber households who voted for Haji Sahib were equally dependent upon the two land- lords for their residence in the village, but their choice of Haji Sahib rather than Khan Sahib was determined by the former's pres- tige. It was also discovered that the cooperation and competition between those having power is more a matter of personal alliances and animosity than the differences in ideology or points of view. Ideology or political program plays the part of justifying competition and struggle for power. Unlike the landlords, the managers' primary source Of power lies not in their economic position but in their authority. The power of the managers is concomitant to their jurisdiction of decision-making, i.e., the more areas they are delegated by the landlords for making and implementing decisions, the more will be their power. The potential of exercising power is further enhanced by the presence of other qualities, like claim to biraderi, asso- ciation with government officials, etc. In replicating the approaches used to study community power in.America, we were led to some unexpected findings resulting in the elaboration of the concept of influentials. The concept of influentials was, I think, a significant diversion in our theoretical framework. Though in a sense the influentials, who belong to the group of cultivators, occupy a high position in the economic hier- archy, not all cultivators or even those who cultivate the same amount Of land are influentials. The most significant characteristics Of the influentials, as pointed out earlier, are the size of their 112 biraderi. It appears that the role of influentials could be most fruitfully utilized in local development programs. They, more than the landlords or the managers, seem to provide the local leadership. The experience of this research also points out the limitations of applying the ”issue" approach to the study of decision-making and decision-makers in the villages of Pakistan. unlike American com- munities, the Pakistani village communities do not have the tra- dition of initiating and deciding plans or programs for the total community. Almost always all programs of development or change are initiated and carried on by governmental agencies. The most that one can hOpe to Observe is who supports and who does not support a particular program or issue. In my observation, however, the people in general remain apathetic. It was for this reason that I had to pose hypothetical cases. In the chapter on social stratification we concluded that the system of stratification can be analyzed in the framework of class. The empirical evidence provided above shows that variation in class, more than in other categories, shows a differential in patterns of behavior. This statistical evidence was also supported by the data collected on everyday behavior of the villagers. It is common to hear the derisive remarks of the zamindars for the kammis and vice versa. One alsocbserves a form of class competition between the zamindars and the kammis when one realizes the efforts of the kammis to improve their lot. Out of the efben high school graduates, ten belonged to the kammi quom. Of the three cement and brick houses, all belonged to the kammis. 113 Even though the data lend strong support for our thesis, there is other evidence which call for an explanation. In using the "caste ranking" technique, we find that the cultivators as a whole occupy higher rank than the kammis, which lends support to the above con- clusion; however, significant differences do occur within the various 32223 Of the zamindars. {A similar situation is found among the kammis. Thus Syeds and Awans among the zamindars and Miana among the kammis occupy the top rank. Both the Syeds and the Awans are primarily en- dogamous groups and have traditionally occupied a high rank. Similar to the Syeds, the Mianas have religious connotations attached to themselves. In view of this, one is led to conclude that village ranking is a mixture of class and status. This can only be tested empirically if one has a larger number of cases, which would require studying more than one village. It is hoped that future researches will explore in this direction. Appendix I POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN JALPANA No. of NO. of Married Land Holding Quoms Households Persons in Quom Tenanted Owned Zamindars: Awans 4 l6 3 37 1/2 11 1/2 Bapa 2 8 2 -- Bhatti 1 3 1 12 1/2 -- Chaddar 3 16 3 31 7 Doogals 16 90 15 135 17 1/2 Goondals l 10 1 20 -- Gudgor 3 22 0 27 -- Hamooka 3 l 7 3 40 14 Hattar 6 50 l 82 -- Jooya l 5 0 10 -- Jhamat 4 21 2 53 4 Joora l 2 0 10 Kookara 3 ll 0 30 -- Mattan 17 77 10 146 22 Maikan 10 49 4 99 1/2 11 1/2 Panchoota 5 21 2 49 -- Rajha 4 31 2 64 -- Selmana 3 l6 0 l9 4 Sandrana 8 39 3 79 1/2 -- Shaikh l 10 0 20 -- Syed 9 61 8 76 -- Tula 1 5 1 8 -- ‘Watna l 7 0 ll -- 'Kammis: Carpenter 6 36 6 20 1/2 1/2 Blacksmith 5 35 5 -- -- Barber 3 22 3 -- -- Baker 12 99 17 90 -- Bard 16 122 16 67 1/2 Butcher 19 105 198 69 -- Cobbler 25 156 25 29 Drummer l 9 1 0 -- Fakir 3 24 3 24 -- Goldsmith 10 59 10 0 60 Miani 2 l 9 2 0 - - Mussali 24 125 24 6 -- Potter 20 120 20 10 Weaver 14 70 14 0 -- Washerman 2 10 2 0 -- Total 274 1590 114 Appendix II Maximum size of landholdings The ceiling is placed at 500 or 1000 unirrigated acres, but additional land is allowed so the holding will amount to the equivalent of 36,000 Produce Index Units (PIU). The PIU involves a system of land classification based on past yields and returns per acre which was developed for use in the resettlement of refugees on land in lieu of land in India. Exceptions: II. A. Larger farms belonging to some institutions are allowed. B. An orchard area of up to 150 acres above the ceiling is allowed if it is in blocks of at least 10 acres and has been orchard since the winter of 1956-57. C. Land above the ceiling may be transferred to heirs up to a total of 18,000 PIU's including such trans- fers made since August, 1947. D. Land above the ceiling may be transferred to the owner's female dependents who are entitled to a share Of the ancestral property up to a maximum of 6000 PIU's each. Landlords may select the area they wish to retain; they will be compensated for land resumed from them in bonds at a sliding scale-~a higher price for the first 18,000 PIU's and less for subsequent PIU's, if any. Prevention of excessive subdivision Of landholdings Landholdings may not be divided into holdings Of a size less than that Of a subsistence holding, nor less than that of a larger "economic holding" if the holding is now above the size of the latter. Landholdings already smaller than a "subsistence holding" may not be further subdivided. A. A "subsistence holding" is defined as one of 16 acres in the former Sind and 12 1/2 acres in the former Panjab. 115 III. For 116 B. An "economic holding" is defined as one containing 64 acres in Sind and 50 acres in the Panjab. Other regulations A. Jagirs shall be abolished without payment of any compensation. A few institutions holding jagirs are excepted. B. Tenants already considered occupancy tenants (having considerable security through specified rights, mainly in Panjab) shall become owners. C. Other tenants are guaranteed greater security. Rules are established spelling out the only allow- able reasons for evictions. D. Landlords are prohibited from requiring free labor or from levying taxes in excess of the rent. E. Consolidation of fragmented holdings is to be encouraged. F. Owners of land not cultivated for two years will be given notice to do so or become subject to the loss of such land. G. Institutions from which new owners may receive help in the form of credit, improved seed, fertilizer and implements are to be strengthened. further information, see Government of Pakistan, Report p£_the Land Reforms Commission for West Pakistan (Lahore: Government Printing, West Pakistan, 1959). This includes not only the findings and discussions that preceded their adoption. Government of Pakistan, Land: A_New Pattern (Karachi: The Department of Advertising, Films and Publications, 1959). A shorter summary of the regulations and why they were adopted. 1". poem} 1.}: III STRUCTURE. “RELATIONSHIP. AND COMPOSITION OF UNION COUNCILS Village Village Village F Union Council. elected Chairman Appointed members Government department representatives Appointed members Tehsil/Thane Council Tehsil/Thane Sub- District Officer. Chairmen of Union Coun- cil Chairman 7 Seniormost Government department. representa- tives District Council Deputy Commissioner/ District Magistrate. Chairman Appointed Union Council Chairmen Other appointed membe r s Chairmen Of Tehsil/ Thane Councils Municipalities and V.P. Cantonment boards Appointed Union Council Chairmen ernment departments Of Divisional level Divisional Council Representatives Of Gov- . Commissioner. Chairman Appointed non-Official members Chairmen of District Councils Representatives of Mu- nicipalities and Canton- ment board - appointed One Union Council mem- ber from each Division - appointed _ Provincial Development Advisory Council Governor. Chairman Appointed. non-Official members Official members equal to non-Official members 117 From: Basic Democracy. NDO-BD Integration and Training Programs. Gov- ernment Of Pakistan. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. Social Welfare and Community Development Division. p. 23. Appendix III The Basic Democracies will have a five-tier herarchy; six, if the central government is included: 1. Union Council or Panchayat, Union and Town Committees . Tehsil (West Pakistan); Thana (East Pakistan) . District Councils . Divisional Councils . Provincial Development Advisory Councils LJ'I-I-‘UDN A (rural) Union will consist of several villages (all-Pakistan average is 13 villages per Onion) having a total population of be- tween 10,000 and 15,000 (Pakistan average is about 11,500). Union Council members are being elected on a population basis, one member for every 1,000 to 1,500 persons. Additional members to serve as technical advisers will be nominated, but will never exceed the number of elected members. Average size of the Union Council will be 10 elec- ted, 5 nominated members. At its first meeting, the Uhion Council will elect one of its members as Chairman. The envisaged functions of the Union Council include: power to tax real estate and agricul- tural land (with Commissioner's approval) in order to support its activities; registration of vehicles, animals, boats, births, mar- riages, deaths, etc.; control of local trade; authority to require labor tax in order to improve the Union. The Union Council will also be responsible for designing and implementing programs in connection with village AID (Agricultural and Industrial Development) Officials. A budget will be prepared at the beginning of each fiscal year and taxes planned accordingly. Urban Union Councils (or Town Committees) will be constituted identically to the rural councils, but already functioning adminis- trative units will not be disturbed. The urban council chairman be- comes an ex-Officio member of the municipal or cantonment governing bodies. The functions of the urban councils primarily revolve around reconstruction progress and social reforms. The Tehsil/Thana Councils will consist of several unions. The Pakistan average is 144,000 people, 13 unions, 165 villages. Member- ship includes all chairmen of Union Councils and Union/Town Committees, National Building Department representatives, and several nominated Official and non-Official members. At least fifty per cent of the Tehsil/Thane Council must be Union Council and Town Committee chairmen. The local Tehsilder (subdistrict governor) is chairman. Generally, the Tehsil/Thane Council will function as a forum to discuss problems and plans. In an educational sense the District Councils are second in im- portance to the Union Councils, and consist of an average of 1,300,000 118 119 people, 9 Tehsils, 117 unions, 1,500 villages. Membership includes all Tehsil/Thana Council chairmen, National Building Department re- presentatives, and an appointed group which must be at least fifty per cent of total membership. Of the appointees, at least half must be Uhion Council or Town Committee chairmen. The District Deputy Commissioner serves as chairman. The District Council has several extremely important functions: maintenance of primary schools, libraries, reading rooms; promotion of cultural and athletic activi- ties; building and maintaining public roads, bridges, and culverts; maintenance of water supply; promotion of village AID and OOOperative 'movement projects; extension of cottage industries; improvements of agricultural and dairy techniques; sanitation and the control of in- fectious diseases. The Divisional Council has jurisdiction over an average of six million people, or three districts, and is selected in the same com- positional pattern as the District Council. The Division Commissioner will be the chairman. The Division Council's function is to coordinate the development activities of the lower echelon councils. Provincial Development Advisory Councils coordinate develOpment activity within the two provinces and design development plans for the lower echelon councils, as well as advising the central govern- ment and recommending the allotment of funds to the various councils. Membership of the Provincial Council consists of the Provincial Governor (chairman), heads of appropriate government departments, and an equal number of members appointed by the President on the recommendation of the provincial governors. At least one-third of the appointed members must be Union Council or Town Committee chairmen. An important feature is the presence of elected Union Council and Union/Town Committee chairmen at all levels. Adapted from.American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, South Asia Series, IV, NO. 1 (Pakistan). Appendix IV CENSUS GUIDE 1. House number 2. Name of head of household Son of 3. 'What caste or quom would you be outside the village? 4. Is your father living? _____ Dead? ______ If dead, how old was he? 5. Is your mother living? _____ Dead? ______ If dead, how old was she? 6. MOther's caste 7. Which village did she come from? District ‘ 1 Distance from here 8. Wife's caste 9. If she does not belong to this village, name Of the village Distance in miles 10. Number Of children: Male Female 11. Children: Name Age Education Occupation Unmarried iMarried Eldest Second Third Fourth Fifth 120 121 11. Children (cont.): If married, Wife's/Husband's Caste Village Distance Eldest Second Third Fourth Fifth 12. How many live with parents? ______ Away from parents but in this village? ______ In some other village? 13. Is the house joint property of the Khans? Yes ____ No ____ If no, whose? 14. Number of rooms ______ Area occupied by house 15. Use of each room (1) ______ (2) ______ (3) (4) 16. DO you have dera? Yes _____ No ______ If yes, area occupied by it _____3 If no, do you have a separate place for the cattle? 17. Is there a nalka in the house? ______ If yes, when was it installed? 18. If no, where do you get water from? 19. Are you: Zamindar Yes NO If zamindar, how much land do you cultivate? acres. Whose land? If part of land is yours, how did you acquire it? Who cultivates that for you? If not zamindar, description of work 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 122 Kammi Yes No Occupation If kammi and dd'not do occupational work, which family are you attached to? Name of family Its caste Occupation In the case of zamindar, the area of landholding: If kammi, and pursuing the ancestral profession, do you have a specific clientele? Servant Yes No If servant, specify the payment in cash , kind , both Others Yes No What? How many generations ago did you come to this village? Where did your ancestors come from? What brought them here? For how many past generations do you remember the genealogy? Did your father cultivate land? Did your grandfather have land? How many Of your relatives live here? What relation? How many others of your caste live here? How many Of your caste are related to you? Who are some of the influentials in this village? Appendix V INTERVIEW GUIDE Confidential; to be filled in before starting the interview with earlier data. Date Identification NO. Place Previous Serial No. Time started Time finished 1. Name Son of 2. Caste: ‘Main Sub 3. Occupation: Tenant Kammi Service 4. Amount Of land (his own estimate) Recorded Allotted In case of kammi, number of seipis Number Of children: Sons Daughters Married Unmarried Living with parents Living away Living away in different village Educated or getting education WOrking in same profes- sion WOrking in different profession Any other relevant information which may help in conducting in- terview 123 124 Economics 10 Livestock No. Home-bred Bought Price Value Now Buffaloes Cows Oxen Goats Sheep Donkeys Horses Camels Chickens Dogs Others How many canals of fodder have you fed your cattle in the past season of onala siala ? How many of these (i.e., canals) did you buy in: Onala __ Price __ Siala __ Price If he does not know the price, find out category of fodder: A. __ canals B. __ canals C. __ canals Also, find out kind of fodder; i.e., loosan, rishka, etc. What other expenses have you had in the last year in the upkeep of your cattle, as in Khal, Paiwa, etc.? Approximately Does your family have a radio? Yes ______ No Does anyone in your family have a watch? Yes No If yes, how many? 10. ll. 12. 13. 125 Do you possess Niwar cots? Yes _____ No If yes, how many? DO you have furniture other than charpai and morla? Yes No If yes, Specify kind and number of each: Approximate value of utensils in your house Approximate value of ornaments: Silver Gold Current value Of your implements DO you have a fodder-cutting machine? Yes No When did you buy it? For how much? What is its present value? Yearly income (approximately): From Cash Maundage Kammad Cotton Cotton picked by women Wheat Any other anaj Animal produce Other (specify) To be asked of kammis and other classes only: Amount of wheat you got from seipis Amount of cotton you got from seipis Amount of fodder you got from seipis Amount of cash for various work (e.g., at time of marriage or mela) Approximate income, monthly or yearly or 126 Expenditures 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. Approximately how many maunds of wheat did your family consume last year _? How many did you buy ? How many seers Of milk or lassi does your family use daily DO you buy any? Yes No If yes, how much do you Spend per day or per month How many seers of ghee do you use per month ? How many of these do you buy ? An estimate of the expenses for your family last year How much was Spent on clothes and shoes last year How much was Spent on illness last year ? DO you usually consult manzoor , other hakims , doctors (hospital ______private _____), pirs How much did you spend on your children's education last year ? How much for religious purposes (charity, mosque, etc.) ? How much did you pay in fines last year ? How much was Spent on entertainment ? How much was spent for Sickness of cattle ? How much did you pay in taxes last year ? Other expenses last year (Specify): Have you loaned anyone money? Yes No If yes, have you recovered all of it , part of it none ? 28. 29. 30. 127 Have you borrowed money from anyone? Yes No 0'9 If yes, from whom ? For what purpose Have you paid it back? All Some None Payment was made, or will be made, all in cash ? A11 in kind ? Partly both ? Are you satisfied with your present condition? Yes NO If no, why not What do you suggest the solution to be? Family and'Marriage 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. For the most successful marriage one should seek the partner (check order of importance): a) _____ Within one's own biraderi b) Within one's caste but not biraderi c) ______Outside of one's caste In what caste would you prefer to marry your son? 1 2 3 4 5 Daughter? 1 2 3 4 5 Given a choice, among what relations would you like to marry your son? 1 2 3 4 Daughter? 1 2 3 4 To insure successful marriage, amno-samna is good. Yes No A bride bought is better than exchanged. Yes NO In seeking a marital partner for your children, caste is more important , or less important than wealth. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 128 In your Opinion what is the right age for marriage of son? Daughter? What is the ideal age difference between husband and wife? a) No difference b) l to 4 years c) 4 to 8 years d) 8 to 12 years a) 12 or more years What is the ideal number of children? Sons Daughters The most important purpose of marriage is a) Satisfaction