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RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS
OF .A DECISION EVENT: DECISION PROCEDURE,
DECISION CONTEXT, AND DECISION-MAKER

Thesis for {ht Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN ,STATE UNIVERSITY

Jean Rowan Halliday.
1964

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thesis entitled

Relationships Among Certain Characteristics Of
A Decision Event: Decision Procedure, Decision
Context, and Decision-Maker

presented by
Jean Rowan Halliday

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

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ABSTRACT
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS

OF A DECISION EVENT: DECISION PROCEDURE,
DECISION CONTEXT, AND DECISION-MAKER

by Jean Rowan Halliday

This comparative and descriptive study explored
relationships among decision procedure, decision context,
and the decision-maker with respect to belief about the
nature of the world as controllable or subject to chance.
Decision procedure was defined as the way of approaching
decision respecting extent of rationality. Decision con-
texts were defined as the areas of family living, technical
through affective, in which decision is made.

To elicit decision-making behavior, three open-ended
questions were devised around: (1) food buying to represent
a technical context, (2) organization of work in the home
to represent a technical-affective context, and (3) child
discipline to represent an affective context of family living.

For measuring respondents' beliefs about the nature
of the world, the “Test of Epistemological and Instrumental
Beliefs,” devised by Brim, Glass, Lanvin, and Goodman, was
used.

The sample consisted of sixty student wives chosen
randomly from the population of student wives having child-

ren at least two years of age and living in married student

Jean Rowan Halliday

housing at Michigan State University. Data were gathered

by personal interviews, the interviewer recording as the

respondents thought aloud through the decision questions
presented. Demographic data were also obtained.
The data were analyzed and quantified for extent

of rationality as follows: four categories were established,

each of which was subdivided, defined in detail, and given

a numerical weighting for three degrees of rationality--

most rational, intermediate, and least rational. The four

categories were based on literature reviewed and were: 1)

whole response, 2) reasoning, 3) weighing, and 4) inquiry

for and use of information. Rationality scores were deter-
mined for each respondent for each decision context. Scores
were also determined for each respondent for each of the
sub-tests in the "Test of Bpistemological and Instrumental

Beliefs" and were statistically correlated with the ration—

ality scores.

The following hypotheses were tested:

1) Homemakers will make decisions using a re rational pro-
cedure in the more highly technical con ex 5, and a less
rational procedure in the more fiIgEly affective contexts
of family living.

2) Homemakers will tend to show consistency in approaching
decisions, i.e., those using a more rational procedure
in the technical contexts will tend to use more rational
procedures in the affective contexts, while those who
use less rational procedures in the technical contexts
will also tend to use less rational procedures in the
affective contexts of family life.

3) Homemakers who use a more rational approach to decision

will tend to perceive themselves as being able to exer-
cise control over their environment, while those using

Jean Rowan Halliday
a less rational approach will tend to perceive themselves
as being.more subject to chance or fate.

The first hypothesis was rejected, the second was
accepted, and the third was accepted on the basis of nega-
tive correlation between scores of rationality and the "be-
lief in fate" sub-test of the "Test of Epistemological and
Instrumental Beliefs . "

No relationship appeared to exist between decision
procedure (extent of rationality) and age or religion, but
the data suggested a relationship with education. Respond-
ents varied in their preferences for sources of information
depending upon the context in which the decision was made,
and further research is needed in this respect.

The importance which the respondents attached to
the decision appeared to be the most significant variable
influencing the amount of reasoning, weighing, and informa-
tion-using they were willing to do in thinking through the
decision questions presented.

Further research is required into the mental proc-
esses of decision-making and to find out what variables
are most crucial in influencing decision-making. A great
deal more study is needed about how individuals view their
world, how they perceive themselves in relation to it, and
how these perceptions affect their decision-making.

RELATIONSHIPS ANDNG CBRIAIN CHARACTERISTICS
Of A DECISION EVENT: DECISION PROCEDURE,
DECISION CONTEXT, AND DECISION-MAKER

BY
Jean Rowan Halliday

A THESIS

Submitted to
Hichigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Home Management

1964

ACKNOWLEDGNBNTS

lany people have contributed help, interest, sug-
gestions, and encouragement in the development and execu-
tion of this research. A

I am grateful to the members of my Guidance Com-
mittee: Miss Esther Everett, Dr. Jean Schlater, Dr. Alice
Thorpe, Dr. William McKee, and to a former committee mem-
ber, Dr. Iwao Ishino; I appreciate especially the time,
unceasing interest, inspiration, and patience given by the
Chairman of this Committee and director of this research,
Dr. Beatrice Paolucci.

I wish to acknowledge advice about statistical
procedures from Dr. Hillard warrington of Evaluation Servb
ices and from members of the Statistics Department, also
the cooperation and kindness of the student wives who comp
prised the sample for this study.

And, finally, I wish to thank my friends for moral
support in this enterprise.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK . . .

Importance of Decision-Making in Families
03:me DeCi31on-m1nge e e e e e e e
Necessity for Decision-Making Research.
Objective O O O O O O O
Definition of Terms . .
Conceptual Framework. .

Decision Procedure. .

Decision Context. . .

Decisioanaker. . .
Hypotheses. . . . . .
Assumptions . . . . .

II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE. . .

Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Related Research. . . . . . . . . . . .
Measuring Rationality. . . . . .
Uniqueness and Flexibility of Approach.
Relationships Among Characteristics in
Decision Situation . . . . . . . . . .
k1 16f sys tems O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

I II O MEmODOLOGY O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

Selecting the Sample. . .
Rationale for Choice of the Sample.
Criteria for Choice of the Sample .
Choosing the Sample . . . . . . . .
Developing the Instrument . . . . . .
Decision Procedure. .
Method Developed and Abandoned for
Decision Procedure . . . . .

Method Developed and Adopted for Decision

Procedure O O O O O O O O O

Decision Contexts . . . . . . . .
DQCiSion-mere e e e e e e e e 0
Data Collection . . . . . .
Method of Analysis and Quantific tion

“lief Test O O O O O O O O O
Decision Procedure. . . . . .
Criteria for Judging. . .
Analysis and Quantification
Reliability. . . . . . . . . .
Testing the Hypotheses. . . . .

Chapter Page
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Age Of Wives O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 48
m Of mldren O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 49
Age of Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Eduution O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 51
R81 1910:! O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 54
v O FINDINGS O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 5 5

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . .
Decision Procedure and Decision Context
Consistency of Decision Procedure . . .
Decision Procedure and Decision-Maker .
Decision Procedure and Other Variables.
Preferred Sources of Information. . .

Comparative Importance of Decision Contexts

O O O O O O
O O O O O O

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SWY O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 6 9
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS. . . . . . . . . . 71
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . 71

Decision Procedure and Decision Contexts
Rationale . . . . . . . .
Adequacy of Decision Questions. . .

Consistency of Decision Procedure . .

Decision Procedure and Decision-Maker
Epistemological Beliefs . . . . . .
Instrumental Beliefs. . . . . . . .

Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . .

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L ITERAWRE CITED O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

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APPENDIX I. MODIFIED "TEST OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND
INSTRUMEM& BEEFS " O O O O O O O O O O O O 89

APPENDIX II. INTERVIEW GUIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
APPENDIX III. CRITERIA FOR JUDGING DECISION PROCEDURE. 97
APPENDIX IV. SCORING SHEET FOR DECISION PROCEDURE. . . 101

APPENDIX V. CORRELATION FORMULA FOR TESTING HYPOTHESIS
III O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 103

APPENDIX VI. SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF HYPOTHESIS I. . 105

Table
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

LIST OF TABLES

Ages of student wives. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Number of children per wife. . . . . . . . . . .
Age of children. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Student level of the husbands. . . . . . . . . .
Education level of wives . . . . . . . . . . . .
Amount and kind of home economics training . . .
Religious affiliation of wives . . . . . . . . .

Individual decision procedure scores by decision
contexts O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

Order of decision procedure scores in decision
contexts O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

Decision procedure by decision contexts. . . . .
Consistency of decision procedure. . . . . . . .

Correlation between belief sub-tests and de-
cision procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Age compared with decision procedure . . . . . .
Education compared with decision procedure . . .
Religion compared with decision procedure. . . .
Preferred sources of information . . . . . . . .

Rank-ordering in importance of decision context.

Page
48
49
so
51
52
53
54

56

58
59
60

62
64
65
66
68
69

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Importance of Decision-Making in Families
wise decision-making in families is crucial for

creating conditions that will promote development of the
full human potential of all family members. That optimum
conditions are not obtaining in many families may be deduced
from such evidence as broken homes, alcoholism,lemotiona1
disturbance, and crime.

within the context of a rapidly changing world,
management in families, through its central decision-making
activity, performs two functions: 1) to bring about change,‘
and 2) to stabilize and maintain the family's most impor-
tant values.

As it moves through its life-cycle, periodically
the family must make critical decisions for change. Out-
side the family, rapidly changing science and technology,
with all their ramifications, create new conditions of
living, and correspondingly, the need to manage in the
home in new and different ways. Rapid social change brings
about different family interaction patterns and the need
of new role definitions within the family itself and for
the family within the community. In addition to coping
with these changes, the family must cope with the varied

pressures and tensions they cause. As world-wide communi-
cations reduce distances and differences among peoples and
races, an awareness of "one world“ increasingly influences
families' views of themselves, their goals and values, and,
consequently, their decisionpmaking and resource use.

Perhaps even greater difficulties arise as manage-
ment in families performs its second function: to maintain
stability. Because families are a part of the society,
some changes are mandatory and imposed. But some values
in family life must be retained and strengthened. Families
must continuously carry out a process of reorientation and
evaluation to maintain stability. They must frequently
decide upon new ways of actualising the values that they hold
in highest priority as well as guiding value change over time.

while in some respects management in the home is
more difficult than ever before, in other respects it is
easier. Because of increased knowledge in the physical
and behavioral sciences, families today can control more
aspects of their lives than in earlier times; that is, less v
needs to be left to chance. But in order to control, fam-
ily managers must be able to make wise decisions.

Defining Decisionqlaking
For rigor in home management theory, ”decision-

making” needs precise definition. It is frequently defined'\
as a step-like process: seeking alternatives, thinking I
through the consequences of the alternatives, and choosing

one alternative. Some models of the decision process in-
clude additional steps (9:65), or steps are combined in
various ways, but essentially the definition usually ac-
cepted reduces to "choosing among alternatives."

This definition of decision-making may be inade-
quate; on the one hand, it seems too inclusive, and on the
other, it is too restrictive.

Because it leads to equating "decision-making" with
”evaluating," the definition is too inclusive. Evaluating
can be part of decision-making, e.g., in weighing alterna-
tives we evaluate one against another according to a set
of criteria suitable to the situation. But can we say that
"evaluating"‘ig,'decision-making"?

In Hermetive Discourse, Taylor (20) appears to
equate “evaluation” and “decision.” He states:

The process of evaluation consists in trying to
determine the value of something. . . . The aim
of the process is to come to a decision; the proc-
ess terminates when a decision is reached. . . .

I shall refer to this evaluation, the product of
the process, as a value judgment. (20:3)

But he makes a clear distinction between value Judgments
and other decisions in terms of action:

A value judgment may be formed without being ut-
tered in an evaluative sentence, but it must al-
ways be possible in principle to utter such a sen-
tence. To have come to a decision implies that
one can answer the question, "What have you de-
cided?" We may answer the question by saying ”I
have decided to do such-and-such" or by saying "I
have decided that such-and-such is the case."

Only the second answer is pertinent here [in dis—
cussing normative discourse], since the evaluation
process leads to a settled opinion that something
is the case; it does not (directly) lead to a de-
cision to act in a certain way. (20:3-4)

while Taylor makes a distinction between value judg-
ments and other decisions, Simon differentiates decisions
as to kinds of judgments:

Insofar as decisions lead toward the selection of
final goals, they will be called "value judgments";
so far as they involve the implementation of such
:31: ghey will be called "factual judgments."

Both Taylor and Simon, however, make their distinctions
on the basis of whether or not the decision leads to action.

C. L. Lewis, in The Ground and Nature of the Right
(12), discusses the relationship between decision-making
and action:

Every governed act begins as a mental process.
There is some sense of alternative possibilities-
at least the alternatives to do or not to do.
These may be subject to reflection or even to long
deliberation, but in any case there must be an
expected sequel which figures in the decision to
do. As we have seen, however, the decision and
the commitment are distinct. The commitment is
that inscrutable fiat of the will, the “oomph”

of initiation, which terminates the mental part
and is the bridge to the physical part of the act.
(12:43)

As used in home management, "decision-making" seems
not to be equated with "evaluating." The key to distinguish-
ing these similar mental activities is that decision-making
leads to action, while evaluating is judgmental. It would
seem prudent to define decision-making so as to make the
distinction clear. .

On the other hand, "choosing among alternatives“
or a similar definition is too restrictive. Newman and

Summer discuss their using “decision-making" synonymously

with "planning," and they proceed: "But decision-making
has a much narrower and more precise meaning in management
circles; it refers to determining positive guides to action."
(13:253) To define decision-making in this way allows for
different m of determining courses of action, that is,
different ways of deciding: a reasoned, rational approach,
or an unreasoned, intuitive, insightful way of arriving
at decision closure, or a melding or integrating of alter-
natives rather than accepting one and rejecting others.
To define decision-making as "choosing among alternatives"
is too restricting because it rules out the last two ways
of deciding.

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ing among alternatives" is too inclusive a definition be-
cause it allows equating ”decision-making" with "evaluate
ing," the definition "determining positive guidesto action"
allows for including evaluation as part of the decision

process and at the same time allows for decisions about
goals and values. Therefore, the definition seems to be
adequate, inclusive, and non-restrictive.

Decision-making so defined could provide the ”base-
line" or common meeting ground for home management theoret-
ical use. It could then be variously qualified by such
adjectives as ”rational," "reasoned," "economic,” "non-
rational,” I'extra---rational," "non-economic," or by other
adjectives defined to denote various means of reaching de-

cision closure.

Necessity for Decisioanaking Research
Home management teaching and writing have emphasized

the rational, reasoned approach to decision-making, not
because other means are considered invalid, but because a
prime function of management is to enable families to exer-
cise control so that desirable outcomes are maximized and
unanticipated and unpredicted events are minimized. At

the present development of knowledge, too little is known
about what comprises intuitive decision-making to be able
to develop family managers' ability to make this kind of
decisions. Home management theorists, therefore, have
promoted the rational process of making conscious choice,
Dased upon knowledge, using the ”normative" step-like model
or parts or variations thereof: 1) recognizing a decision-
making situation; 2) seeking information about and formu-
lating alternatives; 3) weighing alternatives in terms of

consequences (outcomes and resource use); 4) arriving at
closure and implementing the decision; and 5) accepting
consequences of the decision.
But little research evidence exists to indicate
how closely family managers really do conform to the ”norma-
tive" model, or to answer our questions about how they do in
fact make their decisions and why they make them in the ways
they do. How much do families weigh and reason in their
decision-making? Does the context of family living within
which the decision is made affect the extent of reasoning
used? we do not know how they approach the crucial, cen-
tral decisions throughout the family's lifetime, nor the
little day-to-day decisions which implement the larger
crucial ones. Knoll has rightly suggested that more at-
tention needs to be given to the ranges in magnitude of
decisions in families, and that "we may be less inclined
in the future to plot all decisions, great and small, on
the same map." (27:336)
Another gap in our knowledge concerns families'

use of information, which Anshen calls "the raw material
for decision-making." (2:68) How do families process this
raw material into decisions? In discussing decisions in
law, in relation to computing machines, Cowan makes the
interesting point that:

. . . nothing exists in the computer analogous to

the power of the human mind to forget, to ignore,

to pass over as irrelevant matters obviouslycggf

inconveniently relevant and the like . . .
puter designers] are concerned with computers that

can learn, but they apparently do not yet wish to

tackle the much more difficult problem of creative

unlearning. (23:1070)
We do not know how family decision makers select, out of
all information at their disposal, what to include in de-
cisions and what to ignore; how they assess which bits of
information are relevant and important, relevant and unimn
portant, or irrelevant to the decision; how much ”creative
unlearning" takes place; what sources of information are
drawn upon, and why these are drawn upon rather than others.
In short, we know little about family decision-makers' use
of information.

We know very little about the relationships between
family managers' decision-making and their philosophic
"stance to life.” Psychologists and social psychologists
provide the bulk of what little is known about the effects
of man's belief system on his behavior. Little is known
about the relationships between the way man perceives the
world to be and his decision-making as a specific kind of
behavior. This whole dimension has been largely ignored

in decision-making research.

Objective
The objective in this study is to analyze possible

relationships among certain characteristics of decision,
viz., decision procedure (extent of rationality in approach-
ing decision), decision context (the area of family living,
technical through effective, in which decision is made),

and W (respecting beliefs about the nature
of the world as controllable or subject to chance).

Definition of Terms

Decision-making: determining positive guides to
action.

Rational decision-makppg: a reasoned, information-
using way of determining positive guides to action.

Decision ppocedure: way or manner of approaching
decision with respect to degree of rationality or reason-,
ing: most rational, intermediate, and least rational.

Decision contex : the area of family living, tech-
nical through affective, in which decision is made.

1) Technical contexts of family living-those
areas about which information based upon empirical evidence
is readily available and in which little emotion or family
interaction is inherent, e.g., food buying.

ii) Affective contexts of family living--those
areas about which information is less available, in which
folklore or "conventional wisdom" persists, and in which

emotion or family interaction is inherent, e.g., child dis-
cipline. ‘

Conceptual Framework
Decision Procedure

In assessing rationality in decision-making, one
must ask on what basis the presence of rationality is judged
and how it can be quantified.

The literature reviewed supported the establishment
of criteria for identifying evidence of rationality in de-
cision-making under the following headings: Reasoning,

10

weighing, and using information. An absolute rationality
is not sought, but a relative rationality; the individual
may show more or less rationality with respect to other
individuals or with respect to kind of decision being made.
To quantify, three degrees of rationality are established:
most rational, intermediate, and least rational. Full dis-
cussion of the established criteria is presented in the
"criteria for judging" section of the chapter on methodol-
ogy (Ch. III). In summary form, these criteria in relation
to the decision problems in the study are as follows:

Most rational-oglobal appraisive approach, broad
consideration of the whole problem; reasoned approach, con-
sidering many aspects of the problem and making relation-
ships among them; weighing, comparing, ranking, allocating;
using evaluated information (trial and error, observation,
experience of self or others, authoritative sources).

Intermediate-somewhat appraisive approach but
omission of some obvious aspects of the problem; some reas-
oning, fewer aspects of the problem considered, suggestion
of making relationships among them; suggestion of weighing,
comparing, ranking, allocating; using unevaluated informa-
tion (unqualified trial and error, experience gpp,experi-
ence of self or others uncritically stated or unspecified
sources of information).

Least rational-problem seen as a whole or only part
of the problem seen, without component analysis or specu-
lation; no evidence of reasoning, making relationships,

weighing, comparing, ranking, or allocating; little evi-
dence of seeking or using information.

In judging the presence and amount of rationality,
no attempt is made to judge the rightness or wrongness of
the decision procedure employed or to judge the quality
of the decision.

Decision Contpgt

Home management cuts across all contexts of family

11

living, some being quite technical and some highly affective.
Family managers may approach decisions in these different
contexts in different ways: they may do more or less reas-
oning, seek and use more or less information, depending
upon the decision being made. In a technical context such
as food buying, there is little inherent emotion or family
interaction, and a considerable body of precise information
is available: about nutrients necessary for the body, what
foods provide which nutrients and in what quantities, weights,
grades, brands, prices, as well as knowledge about local
stores; even family likes and dislikes are facts known to
the family food buyer. A highly reasoned decision seems
possible in such a technical context.

-On the other hand, in an effective context, such
as child discipline, emotion and family member interaction
are inherent and a smaller amount of precise information
is available than in the more technical contexts. Folklore
and ”conventional wisdom" may be the preferred sources of
information, e.g., "mothers instinctively know best," "I
was raised this way and I turned out all right," and so
forth, as well as dependence upon relatives and friends.
Parents may be less prone to make reasoned decisions and
to seek and use empirically tested information in such af-
fective contexts of family living.

Between the two ends of the technical-affective
continuum lie contexts varying in amount of emotion and

family interaction and in the precision and amount of

12

available information, e.g., organization of work in the
home. Some emotion inheres, such as personal threat, frus-
tration, "cognitive dissonance" (8), or satisfaction in
meeting standards and role expectations. While a consider-
able amount of research-based information is available,
a preferred source may be experience of self or others.
The occasion for family member interaction is present to
a higher degree than in the technical but to a lesser de-
gree than in the more effective contexts. Home managers,
for these reasons, may make decisions in such a context
in an intermediately rational way.
Decision-Maker

Individuals vary, even within the same culture,
in their beliefs about the nature of the world, destiny,
and their place in the scheme of things. If family mana-
gers view the world as controllable and see themselves as
having influence over their own destinies and environment,
it seems reasonable to suppose that such a view would ef-
fect the way they make decisions. If they see it as con-
trolled by fate or chance, such a view would affect not
only the alternatives they perceive in the decision situ-
ation and the acceptability of these alternatives, not only
how they consider consequences, but also the very feasibil-

ity of attempting to make decisions at all.

flypptheses

l. Homemakers will make decisions using a more rational

13

procedure in the more highly technical contexts, and a less
rational procedure in the more highly affective contexts,

of family living.

2. Homemakers will tend to show consistency in approach-
ing decisions, i.e., those using more rational procedures
in the technical contexts will tend to use more rational
procedures in the affective contexts, while those who use
less rational procedures in the technical contexts will
also tend to use less rational procedures in the affective
contexts of family living.

3. Homemakers who use a more rational approach to decision
will tend to perceive themselves as being able to exercise
control over their environment, while those using a less
rational approach will tend to perceive themselves as being

more subject to chance or fate.

Assumptions
1. Individuals exhibit a degree of variability of ration-

ality in approaching decision—making.

2. Individuals' belief systems regarding the nature of
the world are relatively stable over time and can be iden-
tified.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Because rationality is an important variable in
this study, literature was reviewed in sociology, economics,
philosophy, and a very limited amount in psychology, to
clarify the concept and to establish criteria for judging
A respondents' rationality in decision-making.

Review of decision-making literature was limited
to closely related research.

As another variable in this study is beliefs about
the nature of the world, a brief review of some work on
belief systems is included.

The review of literature, then, is organized under:
Rationality, Related Research, and Belief Systems.

Rationality

A standard dictionary definition of ”rational” is:
”having or exercising reason; proceeding or derived from
reason or based on reasoning." (1:1005)

Parsons (l4) emphasizes the relationship of means
to ends and the place of knowledge in rational decision.
He defines the concept:

. . . in the ordinary sense of the maximization
of ”efficiency" or "utility" by the adaption of
means to ends. It is the sense of rationality

which underlies most current analysis of techno-
logical processes in science, industry, medicine,

14

15

military strategy and many other fields, which lies
at the basis of economic theory, and much analysis
of political processes regarded as processes of
maintaining, exercising, and achieving power. The
common feature of all these modes of analysis of
action is its conception as a process of attaining
specific and definite ends by the selection of the
"most efficient" means available in the situation
of the actor. (14:22)

He states that economic theory is the analytical scheme

in which the role of knowledge has been most highly elab-

orated and conceptually refined.

Arrow (21) surveys the literature in economics,
philosOphy, mathematics, and statistics on the subject of
choice among alternatives under uncertainty (which covers
most choices, he affirms, if attention were paid to the
ultimate implications). He defines rationality thus:

In its broadest sense, rational behavior simply
means behavior in accordance with some ordering
of alternatives in terms of relative desirabil-
ity, . . In some situations, however, there
are additional conditions which appeal to the in-
tuition as being rational. nAlmost all the the-
ories discussed here seem to be rational in the
first sense, but not in the second. (21:406)
0n the basis of his wide review of different disciplines'
interpretation and usage, Arrow explicitly denies intuition
as part of rationality.

A growing disenchantment with the notion that man
is indeed rational is evident in the literature. After
reviewing decision theory, largely economic, which he ate
tempts to relate to psychological theory, Edwards asserts
that economic theorists assume "an economic man" who is

1) completely informed, 2) infinitely sensitive, and 3)

16

rational. By "rational" is meant that economic man can
"weakly order the states into which he can get, and he makes
his choices so as to maximize something." (26:381) Psychol-
ogists, Edwards maintains, consider that the economic man

is very unlike a real man, and that economists themselves
are somewhat distrustful and have therefore attempted to
relax these assumptions.

Simon says virtually the same thing: "Traditional
economic theory postulates an 'economic man' who, in the
course of being 'economic' is also 'rational.'" After out-
lining assumptions made, Simon states that:

. . . recent developments in economics, and partic—

ularly in the theory of the business firm, have

raised great doubts as to whether this schematized

model of economic man provides a suitable founda-

tion on which to erect theory--whether it be a

theory of how firms do behave or of how they "should"

rationally behave . (IF: 241)
Simon's dissatisfaction with the "global rationality of
economic man," which he claims makes severe demands on the
decision-maker, led to his developing a model of decision-
making that more closely resembles what he believes to be
the actual decision processes in the behavior of men. He
postulates an "approximate" rationality in which humans
”adapt well enough to 'satisfice'; they do not, in general,
'optimize.'" (18:261)

Diesing, also, considers that defining rationality
in the traditional sense limits its scope quite severely.
He distinguishes "substantial" rationality, referring to

individual decisions, and ”functional" rationality,

17

which refers to organizations. He states:
A decision or action is substantially rational when
it takes account of the possibilities and limita-
tions of a given situation and reorganizes it so
as to produce, or increase, or preserve, some good.
This definition includes two points: the decision
must be an effective response to the situation in
that it produces some possible good, and the ef-
fectiveness must be based on intelligent insight
rather than on luck. Effectiveness I define as
a wider concept than efficiency. The efficient
achievement of predetermined goals is a special
kind of effectiveness. . . .
An organization is functionally rational, . . .
when it is so structured as to produce, or increase,
or preserve, some good in a consistent, dependable
fashion. (6:3)
He further states that decisions are made according to prin-
ciples, including principles of order, and that principles '
can be thought of as rational. "Rationality is a special
kind of order, that which is intelligible due to the pres-
ence of a governing principle.” (6:239)

With reference to decision-making, Diesing dis-
tinguishes five types of rationality: technical, economic,
social, legal, and political. He relates these five types
to the three major conceptions of practical reason in the
history of philosophy, which he states are "not basically
incompatible but differ primarily in emphasis”: 1) reason
as creativity, which he relates to social and'pglitical
rationality; 2) reason as the discovery and application
of rules to cases, which he relates to legal rationality;
and 3) reason as calculating, literally adding and subtract-
ing, which he relates to technical and economic rationality.

(63244-47)

18

In a previous work (25) Diesing postulated two dif-
ferent kinds of decision-making: economic (which might
be considered to combine his later formulation of technical
and economic rationality) and non-economic, appropriate to
interpersonal relations (which might encompass his concepts
of social, political, and legal rationality).

Like Simon and Diesing, Stevenson uses a different
approach in considering the inadequacy of traditionally
defined ”rationality" when applied to ethical judgments,
and he discusses the ”nonrational” methods of ethics in
changing attitudes and beliefs to reach solution:

The most important of the nonrational methods will
be called “persuasive", in a somewhat broadened
sense. It depends on the sheer direct emotional
impact of words--on emotive meaning, rhetorical
cadence, apt metaphor, stentorian, stimulating,

or pleading tone of voice, dramatic gestures, care
in establishing ra rt with the bearer or audience,
and so on. (l9:l§§§

Persuasio is nonrational i a sense that must be
contrasted with irrational, no less than with ra-
tional. Irrational methods are rational in the
sense of ”reason-using", and are distinguished by
the fact that the reasons themselves (as distinct
from the judgments they support in turn) are de-
fended by invalid methods. But nonrational methods
go beyond the use of reasons altogether--always
provided, of course, that the term "reasons" is
togdegggnate statements that express beliefs.

1 :l

Stevenson's distinctions seem applicable to decisions other
than ethical ones, e.g., consumer decisions may be rational,
based on valid reasons, or nonrational, based on emotion,
or irrational, based on illogical reasoning.

Back (22) draws a different distinction than

I"

19

Stevenson in his use of "rational,” ”nonrational,” and "ir-
rational." Back contends that rational models of decision-
making are equated with "decision theory“:

The essence of models of this kind is to simulate
the situation by a mathematical system and to com-
pare the actor's actual decision with decisions

in accordance with this system. (22:14)

Using a rational model it is possible to define the value

of each possible outcome (utility) and to compute an optimal
solution which will maximize some function of the utility,
and this is the traditional view of rational decision-mak-
ing. But Back states that the rational model can be used
only for decisions in the middle range of importance. He
contrasts the other kinds:

As the rational model derives the decision from
the structure of the situation, the irrational
model derives it from the structure of the person.
The factors considered lie in the psychodynamics
of the individual. . . .

Taking the rational solution as a base-line, de-

viations from it can be explained by psychological

mechanisms such as compulsions, prejudices, or

strong urges. Thus the irrational model is useful

in explaining those decisions which seem to run

cggntzr to the long-range utility of the outcome.
:1

Of the postulated nonrational model, Back says:
At the extremes of the continuum of importance,
however, neither the rational nor the irrational
model applies. . . . The sources of the nonrational
model are not mathematical nor psychodynamic, but
rest more on the analysis of experience by phenom-
enologists and existentialists. (22:17)

He explains that the irrational model can be applied to

situations where little is known of the relevant facts,

the results are vital, and the opportunity will not repeat,

20

e.g., command decisions of a general, or the model can be
applied to trivial decisions "where reasoning and emotion
are either not possible or not necessary." (22:17)

Stevenson's usage of "nonrational" and Beck's of
"irrational" are roughly equivalent, Stevenson considering
that nonrationality is related to emotion and Back that
irrationality is related to the psychodynamics of the in-
dividual; that is, these words represent unreasoned ways
of reaching solutions. Stevenson's use of ”irrational"
grants reasoning but on illogical grounds, while Beck's
use of "nonrational” is quite a specialized one.

Other definitions of rationality were used in the
related research and will be discussed in that connection.

This review has indicated some of the agreement,
diversity, and contradiction among certain writers from
different disciplines in their definition and usage of
”rational." One can agree with Brim and associates:

It [defining rationality] is an impossible task
unless one states the conditions under which the
definition can be applied. It is not sufficient,
for example, to define rationality as "the selec-
tion of the most appropriate means to a given end
after careful weighing of all available informa-
tion" without first determining how the judgment
of appropriateness is to be made; e.g., whether
by external observers possessing the most advanced
ascientific knowledge, or by the actor himself given
only limited information. Kochen, Levy, and Simon
argue effectively on the need for a continual qual-
ifier to the term "rational". They point out that
rationality must be regarded as a concept which
haszgo meaning apart from a given set of rules.

4:

21

Related Research

Decision-making research has been conducted at an
accelerating rate, particularly within the last decade.
Much of it has been what we might call “mechanistic": who
makes the decisions and about what, processes and models
of decision-making, attempts to categorize and classify,
and so forth. Less attention has been given to the psy-
chological aspects of decision-making regarding cognition
and what affects it. Least attention of all has been de-
voted to the philosophical dimensions of decision-making;
perhaps we may yet discover that decision-making is essen-
tially a philosophic enterprise. Because decision-making
was treated somewhat philosophically in the discussion of
its definition in Chapter I, the review of research is quite
severely limited here to brief descriptions of research
that is closely related to this study: attempting to
measure rationality, exploring uniqueness and flexibility
of individuals' approaches to decision, and seeking rela-
tionships among internal and external environmental char-
acteristics of the decision-maker and decision processes.
Measuring_Rationality

As discussed in the chapter on methodology, for
this study the original plan for determining rationality
was to use a forced-choice technique, and this method was
abandoned in favor of open-ended questions. The original
forced-choice instrument was based on a study by Rieck and

Pulver. (29) Their research was designed to evaluate the

22

effects of Farm and Home Development in Wisconsin in teach-
ing better decision-making. They developed an empirical
measure of decision-making ability through which a ration-
ality rating was established to represent the individual's
ability relative to the norm of rational decision-making.
Rational decision-making was defined as "a conscious process
of setting goals, recognizing problems, getting information,
and analyzing alternatives which will maximize family sat-
isfactions." (29:1) The researchers established thirty-
one individual measures, of which twenty-four were forced-
choice questions and seven were observations. The responses
to the questions were pre-coded into rational, intermedi-
ate, and non-rational categories depending upon the degree
of agreement with the rational model of decision-making.
Numerical ratings of 1, 2, and 3 respectively were assigned
to these categories. The mean response value was obtained
for each respondent, which represented his decision-making
rating. While this study had some obvious weaknesses,
mainly in the method of testing validity, this type of
instrument appears to have some merit as a methodological
tool in decision-making research.

In a similar study, Dean and co-workers (24) in-
vestigated the relationship between rationality in decision-
mmking and eight.socio-cultura1 variables considered to
be associated with adoption of recommended farm practices.
They defined rationality as involving ”the use of delibera-
tion, planning, and the best available sources of information

23

and advice in arriving at decision as a means of achieving
maximum economic ends." (24:123) They combined nine ques-
tions into a "rationality index" and placed the responses
’on a 3-point scale of rationality: rational, intermediate,
and non-rational in a similar fashion to Rieck and Pulver's
method.

Uniggeness and Flexibility of Approach
Bustrillos (32) studied the flexibility of the de-

 

cision process in exploring homemakers' decision-making
styles. A decision-making style was_conceptualized as the
behavior profile resulting from the combination of the di-
mensions of the three elements: mode (hypothetical, factual,
and action-suggestive); time reference (future, past, and
present); and decision-making rule (preference ranking,
objective elimination, and immediate closure). These di-
mensions could combine into twenty-seven styles. Three
hypothetical problems were developed to elicit information
about decisionpmaking style; the responses were subjected
to content analysis using pre-established categories, and
then analyzed for decision-making styles. The significance
of this research appears to be its recognizing and attempt-
ing to study another way of making decisions than the "nor-
mative' model, which may be inappropriate for studying de-
cisions in families. Another significant feature is that
the researcher attempted to explore the notion that indi-
viduals approach decision-making uniquely.

Research into‘hg!,people think through their decisions

24

might well be classified as research into thinking or cog-
nition, rather than decision-making research, depending
upon its focus. In their research into thinking, Bruner,
Goodnow, and Austin studied the sequence of decisions lead-
ing to concept formulation in relation to problem solving,
the nature of psychological categories, and the strategies
by which people discover cues appropriate to use in cate-
gorizing. They defined categorizing as "discovering the
defining attributes of the environment so that they may
serve with their preper values as the criteria for making
judgments about identity." (5:30) They formulated two broad
types of categorizing responses: identity and equivalence
responses and three category types: conjunctive, disjunc-
tive, and relational. They postulated four types of strat-
egies: successive scanning, simultaneous scanning, con-
servative focussing, and focus gambling. Findings from
their research indicated that the subjects differed in the
sequence of decisions made in attaining a concept, that
subjects displayed flexibility in adapting their strategies
to the information, capacity, and risk requirements imposed
on them, and they were able to adapt to imperfect cues.
This research lends support to the notion of individual
differences in approaching problem solving and decision-
making.
Relationships Among Characteristics in Decision Situation
Among studies concerning‘hgg,people make decisions,

the research by Brim, Glass, Levin, and Goodwin (4) is among

25

the most ambitious and comprehensive. Their research was
exploratory, and they attempted to identify relationships
among decision-making processes, personality characteris-
tics, sex, social class, and type of situation, using paper
and pencil tests with 100 pairs of parents. They devised
a Decision Process Test around four child-rearing problems
(masturbation, homework, obedience, and stealing), and the
decisions concerned actions the parents might take. Out

of six phases of the decision process, the research focussed
on two: 1) the evaluation phase, which concerned the eval-
uation of provided courses of action in terms of probabil-
ity of occurrence, the desirability and rapidity of the
outcomes expected from each action, and 2) the strategy-
selection phase which concerned the choice among alterna-
tive actions and selection of a sequence for their perform-
ance. Various personality tests were administered (i-Tests
of Ability; ii-Tests of Affect Level-~drive level, desire
for certainty, general personality traits; iii-Tests of
Beliefs; and iv-Social Background Characteristics question-
naire--social class, sex, religion). The researchers sought
for relationships among over fifty variables tested, for
consistency of people in their methods of decision-making,
for congruence between some of the current models for ra-
tional decision-making and the decisions of the 200 men

and women studied, and they attempted to compare individual
and group thinking processes in decision—making. Because

the study was exploratory and tapped so many dimensions,

26

the conclusions were complex. Rather than for its findings,
this study seems most valuable for methodology and for the

further research it may generate.

Belief Systems
Basic assumptions about man underlie any attempt

to study his personality and behavior. That an individual
views his world from within his own unique and quite con-
sistent frame of reference and acts accordingly is an as-
sumption shared by many behavioral scientists, particularly
psychologists. While authors in various disciplines have
dealt with belief systems and some research has been done,
investigation into the relationships between belief systems
and decision-making is scanty.

Brim and associates (4), as part of their research
discussed above, created a ”Test of Epistemological and
Instrumental Beliefs" in an attempt to determine subjects'
beliefs about the nature of the world. They related these
beliefs to other personality dimensions and to decision-
making.

Epistemological beliefs tested include: The degree
of mastery which one believes he has over his environment,
the opposing belief in fate, whether events occur through
some natural order or whether they arise from supernatural
or mystical causes, whether the world is viewed as predict-
able, whether events which occur in the world are mainly
good or bad, and one's view of the complexity of the causal

relations between events in nature.

27

The instrumental beliefs tested include: the emphasis
on consideration of future events as against past or pres-
ent, value placed upon originality and creativity, the de-
gree of goodness or badness and of the probability or im-
probability of events, i.e., whether the world is an "either-
or” type of environment, emphasis on considering a number
of outcomes of a proposed solution, emphasis on selecting
several potentially workable alternatives, and value placed
upon being thoughtful and deliberate rather than spontane-
ous and impulsive.

To construct their test, they compiled a list of
800 proverbs that seemed relevant to "thinking" and which
voiced some prevalent beliefs. They allocated these to
sixteen categories or sub-tests under the two major head-
ings of epistemological and instrumental beliefs. From
the original proverbs they finally devised five test items
for each category. The subjects were to check their agree-
ment with the items on a 5-point continuum: ”strongly
agree, agree, 7 , disagree, strongly disagree." The re-
searchers assigned numerical scores to each item, and a
high total score denoted a high degree of the indicated
belief.

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (ll) classified value ¢//’
orientations (essentially belief systems) into five vari-
ations: 1) human nature (innate goodness and badness of ,/
human nature); 2) man-nature (subjugation-to-nature, har-

mony with nature, mastery over nature); 3) time dimension

28

(past, present, future); 4) activity (being, being-in-be-
coming, doing): and relational (lineality, collaterality,
individualism). This framework is useful for cross-cultural
studies of beliefs, and these researchers used it in their
studies with different cultural groups in southwest U.S.A.
(Spanishquerican, Navaho, Anglo-Saxon).

Rokeach (15) studied the structure of belief sys-
tems, not their content, and the relationship between belief
and thought. He constructed two objective-type tests:

The Dogmatism Scale and The Opinionation Scale. He suggests
that if we know something about the way a person believes,
it may be possible to predict how he will go about solving
problems that have nothing to do with his ideology.

Both Boulding (3) and Kelly (10) recognize the im-
portance of the individual's beliefs about the world as
they relate to decision. Boulding states:

Now we must ask what determines a person's value
ordering, and what determines his image of the

field of choice. It is evident that what deter-
mines his behavior is not the real field of choice,

whatever that may be, but the rceived field of
choice as it exists in his pichre of the situa-
tion. These are large and difficult questions.
They involve the whole mysterious process by which
the person's "image", or ”view of the universe”

in all its manifoldness and complexity, is built
up not only out of information actually received
but also out of the power of inner growth which

it possesses and exerts through the imagination.

(3:423)
Kelly's work supports the notion that an individual's basic
beliefs about the nature of the world will affect both the

characteristic way he approaches making decisions and also

29

what alternatives he actually chooses. In Kelly's words:

. . . our clients were making their choices, not
in terms of the alternatives we saw open to them,
but in terms of the alternatives they saw open to
them. It was their network of constructions that
made up the daily mazes that they ran, not the
pure realities that appeared to us to surround
them. (10:53)

O O O O O O O O O Q 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O

. . . the criteria by which a perso choose be-
tween the alternatives, in terms of which he has
structured his world, are themselves cast in terms
of constructions. Not only do men construct their
alternatives, but they construe also criteria for
choosing between them. (10:55)

How an individual perceives the world will influence how

he anticipates the future, and Kelly says, "A person's proc-
esses are psychologically channelized by the way in which

he anticipates events." (10:56) He considers that an in-

dividual's construct system

provides him with both freedom of decision and
limitation of action--freedom, because it permits
him to deal with the meanings of events rather
than forces him to be helplessly pushed about by
them, and limitation, because he can never make
choices outside the world of alternatives he has
erected for himself. (10:58)

One of the conclusions drawn by Brim and associates

in their study is that:

. . . general values and orientation toward life,

together with the cultural background of the re-

spondents, seem to account for more variability

in decision making than the more traditional per-
4

sonality traits. :234)

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

This comparative and descriptive study was under-
taken in an effort to determine relationships among decision
procedure (the extent of rationality in decision-making),
context within which the decision is made, and the decision-
makers' beliefs about the nature of the world as control-

lable or subject to chance or fate.

Selecting the Sample
The sample consisted of sixty student wives living

in Spartan Village at Michigan State University.
Rationale for Choice of the Samplg,

It was desired to hold relatively constant some
variables in the study other than the dependent variable
(extent of rationality) and the independent variables (de-
cision context and beliefs). More homogeneity was expected
in this sample than among families in general. Living quar-
ters are identical; pattern of living is similar as all
husbands are students; all are living on a temporary level
of living until studies are completed. Age, social class,
and education levels were not controlled, except that they
were thought to range less widely than among families in
general. No attempt was made to control religion or ethnic

backgrounds, as the test of beliefs would take account, at

30

31

least partially, of these variables. Because the sample
consisted of wives only, the sex variable was held constant.

Because it was desired to provide common stimuli
to elicit responses through using familiar managerial de-
cision problems and because such problems were easier to
develop for wives only than if husbands and wives jointly
were to be selected, wives were chosen as respondents.

Accessibility of the sample is another reason for
its selection; being suitable in other respects, its prox-
imity was thought to be an advantage for facilitating in-
terviewing without car ownership.
Criteria for Choice of the Sample

The sample was chosen by the following criteria:
1) that the respondent be a student wife living in Spartan
Village, and 2) that the respondent should have at least
one child at least two years old. This second criterion
was stipulated because of the decision question asked in
the study concerning a child's being "difficult" in a way
that worried the mother. It is believed that children are
more prone to behavior which their mothers might describe
as "difficult" just prior to and around two years of age
than are infants, e.g., during toilet training and the
negative behavior characteristic of two-year-olds. In
this way an effort was made that the decision question
would be as realistic to the respondents as possible and
thus comparable to the other two questions used.

32

Choosing the Sample
The Michigan State University Housing Office pro-

vided a map of Spartan Village on which were marked the

64 buildings having twelve two-bedroom apartments. (Two-
bedroom apartments are rented only to married students hav-
ing children.) A random sample of B9 apartment numbers

was drawn from the total population of 512 two-bedroom
apartments, by using a table of random numbers. (7:452 ff)

Names corresponding to the apartment numbers were
obtained from the mailboxes, and the 89 student wives were
contacted either by knocking at their doors or by telephon-
ing, and appointments were made.

Cooperation was excellent. Of the eighty-nine stu-
dent wives contacted, twenty-two were ineligible because
their children were under two years old; three were unable
to respond because they did not understand and speak Eng-
lish well enough to be interviewed; three refused because
they were too busy; one was too ill to keep her appointment,
and a later appointment was not sought because she was far
advanced in a difficult pregnancy and the family was moving
the following week. The remaining sixty comprised the
sample for the study.

Developing the Instrument
To determine decision-making ppocedure (extent of

rationality) it was necessary to provide a decision stim-
ulus to elicit decision-making behavior that could be quan-
tified for rationality.

33

As two of the hypotheses to be tested concerned
possible relationships between the extent of rationality
and the contexts within which the decision was made, it
was decided to frame the decision stimulus within the dif-
ferent contexts of family living, varying from technical
through affective.

A means of tapping belief systems had to be found,
to test the hypothesized relationship between the extent
of rationality and the respondent's view of the world as
controllable or subject to chance.

In summary, the method for this study was:

1) To devise decision stimuli for eliciting decision be-
havior, framed within technical through affective contexts
of family living;

2) To devise a means of quantifying the extent of rational-
ity present in behavior so elicited;

3) To devise or discover a means of quantifying beliefs
about the nature of the world as controllable or subject

to chance; and,

4) To identify relationships among extent of rationality
shown in particular decision contexts and strength of beliefs.
Decision Procedure

To determine the decision procedure, i.e., extent
of rationality, one method was developed, tested, and aban-
doned. A second method was then devised and adopted. Be-
cause the first method may be valuable for future studies
if its weaknesses are corrected, it will be described,

34

reasons given for abandoning it, and suggestions made for
possible future use.

Method Developpd and Abandoned for Decision Proced-
ppg,-qAn attempt was made to develop an empirical measure
for assessing extent of rationality, or reasoning, patterned
after Rieck and Pulver's study (29) described in Chapter
II.

Porcedpchoice questions were devised for each of
three decision contexts: food buying, organization of work,
and child discipline. These questions were directed towards
parts of a decision-making model: identifying the problem,
seeking information, and considering consequences. "Seek-
ing alternatives" was omitted, because the alternatives
were provided as the items from among which the respondents
were to choose one. Six items (or alternatives) were de-
veloped to accompany each question, two designed as repre-
senting "most rational," two as "intermediate,” and two
as "least rational" solutions.

Below is an example of a question geared to the
"seeking information” part of the decision model and the
“child discipline" decision context, accompanied by six
items from among which the respondents were to select one.
In parenthesis opposite each item is its designated ration-
ality--HR: most rational, I: intermediate, and LR: least
rational (this key would not, of course, be on the question

as presented to the respondents).

35

"Sometimes children misbehave in ways that we do not under-

stand. How do on decide what to do when you don't under-

stand your chil s misbehavior?

(MR) Discuss the problem with a specialist, e.g., teacher,
doctor. ,

(LR) Punish the child anyway.

(I) Ask relatives what they would do.

(LR) Overlook the misbehavior.

(MR) Look in a book on child care, e.g., Dr. Spock.

(I) Discuss the problem with my friends or neighbors."

As an aid in its development, the instrument was
tested when partially completed with ninety-two undergrad-
uate students enrolled in HMC 331, "Management and Decision-
Making in the Family." To provide a partial test of va-
lidity, these students were asked to indicate the extent
of rationality of each choice item accompanying the ques-
tions, using the following criteria:

Most rational: reasoned approach to decision based on in-
quiry and precise information.

Intermediate: falls between most rational and least ration-
al; evidence of some reasoning and inquiry; infor-
mation less precise.

Least rational: absence of reasoning; illogical; not based
on information and inquiry.

The students also responded to open-ended questions
similar to the forced-choice questions; it was hoped that
their responses might provide additional usable items.

The instrument was then further developed and re-
fined by eliminating items showing disagreement in their
rationality ratings, and by substituting new items devised
from student responses to the open-ended questions. The
instrument was then tested with two selected student wives
in married student housing. As a result of this testing,

36

doubts concerning the validity of the instrument were in-
tensifieds At this point, this method of assessing extent
of reasoning in decision-making was abandoned for the fol-
lowing reasons:

1) Constructing suitable items to accompany the questions
had proved very difficult. Items devised as "most rational"
appeared too obviously the "right” responses; conversely,
the "least rational" items were unlikely to be chosen, being
too obviously "wrong" answers. In addition, developing
short items that were unambiguous and that needed no fur-
ther qualification was difficult.

2) Because of faulty item construction, the instrument was
invalid, that is, it did not test the respondents' extent

of reasoning used in making decisions; it merely tested
their ability to select reasonable alternatives when these
were laid before them.

This method, however, might be developed so that
it would be valid for testing some aspects of people's de-
cision-making, e.g., their preferred sources of information.
Difficulty in item construction might be overcome to a large
extent by using actual responses made by home managers,
collected through use of open-ended responses.

Method Developpd and.Adopted for Decision Proced-
ppg,-~As the attempt to develop a forced-choice instrument
proved unfruitful, it was decided to use open-ended ques-
tions as a means of eliciting evidence of reasoning in de-

cision-making. Instead of fixed responses having pre-determined

37

degrees of rationality, free responses to open-ended de-
cision questions would be assessed against a set of cri-
teria of rationality derived from the literature.

Six open-ended questions were formulated, two for
each of three decision contexts (food buying, organization
of work, and child discipline). These six questions were
tested with four selected respondents. The questions, typed
separately on cards, were handed one at a time to the re-
spondents who were asked to think aloud through the decision.
These responses were recorded by a tape recorder, then typed
and roughly analyzed for evidences of rationality according
to the criterion of the extent of reasoning and inquiry
shown.

The responses from this small sample were encour-
aging; variations in responses appeared, each respondent
having "thought aloud" through each decision in her own
unique fashion. Evidence that this method was more fruit-
ful than the forced-choice technique tried at first seemed
sufficient to justify its adoption. This method seemed to
tap‘ppg,the respondent actually thought through a decision,
therefore showing the extent to which she employed reason-
ing in this particular situation. No hint was given regard-
ing any kind of response desired, and respondents seemed
not to give what they might consider to be ”right" answers.

In addition to answering the questions, the respond-
ents were asked which of each pair of questions for the

three decision contexts was more realistic, or less "armchair"

38

in nature, more important or less trivial. They were also
asked for suggestions regarding the wording of the questions.

Following this trial, the three ”best" questions
were chosen on the basis of 1) productivity of responses
and 2) the respondents' evaluations regarding the questions'
realism, importance, and clarity. These questions were
refined to make them more concise while retaining the mean-
ing, and were used in the study in this form.

On the basis of this pre-testing, also, the decision
was made to abandon the tape recorder, for these reasons:
1) an inhibiting effect was noted, some respondents being
noticeably more self-conscious in answering the first than
the later questions; 2) much editing of irrelevancies was
necessary, e.g., sentences started and broken off, "uh's,"
"I mean's," etc.; and, most importantly, 3) small children
were interested in the recorder to the extent that their
mothers were highly distracted from what they were saying
in their efforts to prevent the children's interference
with the machine. It was therefore decided that the inter-
viewer would write the responses as given, as nearly as
possible in the respondents' own words. In comparison with
a tape-recorded interview, the written version was quite
faithful to the responses as recorded.
Decision Contexts

Food buying, organization of work, and child dis-
cipline were the three contexts within which the decision
questions were to be framed, representing technical through

39

affective aspects of family living (as discussed in Chapter

I). Decision questions were devised to meet the following

criteria: 1) they should be equally important in all con-

texts; 2) they should be realistic decisions common to all
respondents; and 3) they should present occasion for the
respondents to reason, to weigh, and to seek additional
information.

To meet these criteria, it was decided to frame

the food buying question around the problems of meeting

nutritional needs at low cost, and the work organization

question around boredom and unfinished tasks. Because fewer
child discipline problems were thought to be experienced

in common due to age differences in respondents' children,

it was decided to use the general term "difficult," to allow

the respondents to provide their own interpretation of the
word, and to ask them after they had thought through the
decision how they had interpreted "difficult" in order to
assess how serious they regarded the problem to be. The
three decision questions devised are:

1) Mrs. As has to keep food costs down and yet feed her
family nutritiously. If you were in her situation, how
would you decide what food to buy?

2) Mrs. B. becomes bored with repetitive time-consuming
tasks, and she is never caught up with her work (e.g.,
ironing). If this were your problem, how would you de-
cide on ways to get the work done?

3) Hrs. C.'s child became ”difficult” in a way that worried
her. If this were your problem, how would you decide
what to do about it?

In order to probe further without biasing responses,

40

a set of standard questions were devised to use after re-
sponse had been made to each of the three decision questions
above:

a) On what basis would you decide this way?

b) Have you ever had this problem?

c) What did you do then? (If discrepancy with main
response, follow with d) Why did you do what you did?)

As a check on criterion (1) above regarding how
important respondents viewed the problems to be, it was
decided to request them to look at all three problems to-
gether and to ask, "If these three problems were real prob-
lems for you, equally serious, which would worry you the
most”? "Why"? "Which would you consider next in impor-
tance"? "Why"? "Why would you place the remaining one
last”? It was thought that these questions might also
elicit interrelationships respondents saw among the decisions.

The decision questions devised, together with the
standard set of probing questions, were used to elicit de-
cision-making data that could be analyzed for decision pro-
cedure used by each respondent.

Decision-Maker

For measuring respondents' beliefs about the nature
of the world, the "Test of Epistemological and Instrumental
Beliefs" (Appendix I), devised by Brim 9.3.3.1.; . (4:309-311),
was used. It offered these advantages: 1) it had been
pretested on a large heterogeneous sample; 2) its reliabil-
ity had been established statistically; 3) it is semi-projective

41

in nature, including thereby the advantages of both pro-
jective and objective tests. The test has the projective
characteristic of providing "a standard set of stimuli
against which characteristic ways of thinking, speaking,
and perceiving are easily detected and compared." (28:620)
It shows two objective characteristics: the test designers
had predetermined the responses out of which the subjects
could choose, and they predetermined the interpretation.
Satz and Carroll comment on weaknesses in both varieties
of tests:

Objective personality tests have generally been

suspect in the area of validation. Additional

criticism has been levelled at the marked restric-

tion of spontaneous behavior inherent in such

paper and pencil tests. On the other hand, pro-

jective instruments have often been criticized

because of their lack of standardization norms,

scoring objectivity, and low reliability. (30:205)
They believe that incorporating the better features of both
kinds of tests in an instrument permits a larger sample of
spontaneous behavior and yet lends the responses to more
objective measurement. Brim and co-workers' test shares
these claimed advantages.

Following correspondence with Brim, the decision

was made to use only the three items per sub-test showing
the highest reliability instead of the five given in the

test as published. (4:72-73)

Data Collection
After initial contact, the interview took place
in each respondent's apartment at the agreed-upon time.

42

Demographic data were obtained (see Appendix II).

The "Test of Epistemological and Instrumental Be-
liefs" was briefly explained and then administered to the
respondent. This test took 10-15 minutes to complete. The
respondent was then asked to think aloud through the three
decisions, one at a time. The first decision question,
typed on a 3” x 5" index card, was handed to her, and the
interviewer wrote the response as it was given. If the
response was brief, a prompting question such as "Is that
all?" or NAnything else?" elicited a little more data.

The three standard probing questions were then asked. Simp
ilarly, the next two questions were presented. The respond-
ents were then requested to look at all three decision ques-
tions together and to rank them in importance. The same
procedure, including the order of presenting the questions,
was followed in each interview. (See Appendix II for Inter-
view Guide.)

The interview lasted approximately one hour. Re-
spondents were cooperative and most of them talked quite
freely. Many commented that they found the interview in-
teresting.

The influence of the interviewer on the data col-
lected was minimized in several ways: 1) the same inter-
viewer conducted all interviews; 2) the same set of stimuli
was used for all respondents; and 3) the interviewer fol-
lowed a set format in presenting the stimuli and in handling

respondents ' questions .

43

Method of Analysis and Qu_pntification
Belief Test

The "Test of Epistemological and Instrumental Be-
liefs” was scored according to directions given by Brim
‘p§_pl, (4:74), a total score for each sub-test being com-
‘piled for each respondent.

Decision Procedure

Criteria for Judging.-Criteria against which to
judge the presence of more or less rationality were devel-
oped. Eight categories were set up on the basis of reason-
ing, weighing, and information-using. These categories,

together with the justification for their inclusion, follow:

 

ggpgggpy Jpppi‘écppigp

A. Whole Response In making a decision, it seems
more rational to consider all
dimensions of the problem as
presented than to consider only

part.
B. Reasoning

B.l. Diagnostic ap- Many "normative” models of de-
proach--looking cision-making list ”identifying
for cause or root the problem"as the first logical
of the problem step in the process. As the

problem is already identified
in question #1, this category
was expanded to include the no-
tion of assessing or restating
the problem.

8.2. Giving reasons The literature supports “reason-
giving” as rational (e.g.,
Stevenson (19:139)). No judg-
ment would be made regarding the
”goodness” or "badness" of the
reasons given, just whether or
not reasons were given.

C.

D.

8.3. Making relation-
ships: cause and
effect, conse-
quences

8.4. Planning

Weighing

C.1. Comparing, rank-
ing, allocating

C.2. Alternatives

Inquiry for or Use of
Information

44

Rational decision-making involves
maximizing efficiency or utility
by the adaption of means to ends.
(14; 25; 6; 21) Some ”normative”
models of decision-making include
"considering consequences" as a
step in the process.

To make a plan, devise a policy,
or advocate these seems to be
evidence of doing more reasoning
than not.

One of the steps in "normative"
models of decision-making is
"weighing alternatives"; compar-
ing, ranking and allocating can
apply to alternatives in means
or ends, and these mental activ-
ities are evidences of rational-
ity. As a kind of reasoning,
Diesing gives "reason as calcu-
lating.” (6:247)

 

Seeing several alternatives is
more conducive to weighing and
reasoning than seeing only one
way. It was decided arbitrarily
that "seeing three or more a1-
ternatives" would be considered
evidence of more rationality
than seeing two or only one.

Among others, Parsons (14:22)

has indicated the importance of
using knowledge as a necessary
part of rationality. The "good-
mass" or "badness" of the source
of information used by the re-
spondents was not to be judged;
instead, sources were to be judged
according to the extent to which
the respondents gave evidence of
thinking, of discriminating, or of
evaluating the scurces they used.
Thus, in reference to the problem
with the child, a statement in

the form "I'd ask my neighbor"
would be judged less rational

than "I'd ask my neighbor--she's

a teacher."

 

45

Each of the above categories was described in de-
tail for each degree of rationality: most rational, inter-
mediate, and least rational. (See Appendix III for the
full category descriptions.) Some arbitrary decisions were
made regarding the dividing line between "most rational,"
"intermediate," and "least rational"; what has been called
"fuzzy transition zones" between categories needed to be
made less fuzzy and more clear-cut to provide consistency
in scoring.

Analysis and Qpantification.e-Responses to the de-‘
cision questions were then analyzed according to the estab-
lished criteria. The response fitting each category was
quantified by assigning scores of 3, 2, or 1 points accord-
ing to judgment as "most rational," "intermediate," or "least
rational" respectively. Each respondent's total score for
all eight categories for each decision question could there-
fore fall between 8 and 24 inclusive. Responses receiving
a total score of 19-24 inclusive were classified as "most
rational," 14-18 inclusive as "intermediate," and 8-13 in-
clusive as "least rational.” (See Appendix IV for sample

scoring sheet.)

Reliability
To determine the reliability of the analyzing and

quantifying procedure, a home management graduate student
scored approximately one-fifteenth of the responses to de-
cision questions against the established criteria. Where

46

lack of agreement or uncertainty occurred, the criteria
were refined and made more definitive. Two senior staff
members in home management then scored some responses, the
criteria were given slight additional refinement, and they
then scored approximately one-third of the total data.

An independent scorer was hired, and after a short
introductory and training session, she scored the remaining
two-thirds of the responses to the decision questions.
While no statistical measure of reliability was established,
there was high agreement between the scorer's results, per—
formed independently, and the researcher's; on this basis,
the criteria for analyzing and quantifying were accepted
as reliable.

Testing the Hypgtheses

After the responses were analyzed for evidence of
rationality and were quantified, statistical tests were
applied. On these bases, the hypotheses would be accepted
or rejected.

Hypothesis I claimed non-independence between de-
cision procedure (extent of rationality) and decision con-
texts. A 12 test was applied to test the null hypothesis
of independence. Hypothesis I would be accepted or rejected
on this basis, at the 0.05 level of significance.

Hypothesis II postulated consistency of individuals'
decision procedure in relation to the three decision con-

texts. Upon advice from the Statistics Department, no

47

statistical tests were applied. Consistency was compared
on a counting basis, and the hypothesis would be accepted
if more than half the respondents showed consistency in
all or in two out of three contexts.

To test Hypothesis III, a correlation was run on
the decision procedure (rationality) and belief test scores
of each respondent to identify the significant relationships.
The hypothesis would be accepted or rejected on the basis
of negative correlation with fatalistic belief at the 0.05
level of significance. (See Appendix V for correlation

formula used.)

CHAPTER IV
DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE

The description of the sixty student wives compris-
ing the sample includes: age, number and age of children,
husband's education level (academic degree towards which
he is working), own education, home economics education,

and religion.

Age of Wives
Table l.-ques of student wives

 

 

 

Age group Number Percentage
Under 20 years 0 0
20-25 years 18 30
26-29 years 24 40
30 years and over 18 30
Total 60 100

 

How representative this sample is of the total stu-
dent wife population is difficult to say, as statistics on
this population are meager. Several recent studies on dif-
ferent aspects of married students' situations have been
selective from the population, e.g., married undergraduates,
and the data on the wives are scarce. Oppelt (33) found
the mean age of male married undergraduates to be 25.13

years, and while he collected no data on wives' ages, they

48

49

may be presumed to be slightly younger. The present study

may not be any more representative than Oppelt's, for while
it includes respondents having husbands in graduate school

(see Table 4), the criterion for choosing the sample (that

each respondent should have at least one child at least

two years old) may bias the respondents' age upward and

may account for there being none in the "under 20" age group.

Number of Childppp,

In these families, the most common number of child-
ren is two, 33 or 55% of the sample having this number each.
Table 2 shows the distribution of children.

Table 2.-Number of children per wife

 

 

Number of children Number of wives Percentage

l 11 18.33
2 33 55.00
3 11 18.33
4 4 6.67
S l 1.67
6 or more 0 0

Totals 60 100.00

 

Oppelt's study (33) showed married undergraduate
men to have an average of one child each (0.96), while
Shaffer's study (31) of undergraduates indicated that 51%
had children, and 22% had more than one child. This com-

pares with about 83% having more than one child in the

50

present study; the inclusion in the sample of wives whose
husbands were in graduate school and the criterion of having
one child at least 2 years of age would undoubtedly account
for both the presumed higher age of the sample and for the
larger number of children.

Age of Children
Table 3.-Age of children

 

 

Age range Number of children Percentage-
Under 2 years 24 18.75 p
2-6 years 74 57.81
7-12 years 24 18.75
13-18 years 5 3.90
Over 18 years 1 0.78
Totals 128 99.99

 

Because the criterion for sample selection stipu-
lated that each respondent should have at least one child
at least 2 years old, children's ages were biased upwards
slightly, and approximately 58% of all children fell into
the 2-6 year age range. However, each family did not have
a child in this grouping, e.g., some families had only teen-
aged or elementary school aged children; several families
jumped this 2-6 year group, e.g., one having an 8 year old
and a 9 months old child. Many families had several child-
ren in this range. The 5 children in the only family that

had five children fell into the two youngest ranges, being

51

aged 4 1/2, 3 1/2, 2 1/2 years, 16 months, and 3 months.
From these examples, as well as from Table 3, it is evident

that ages and spread of children in families varied.

Education
The sample showed variation in the levels of the
husbands' education. Table 4 presents the academic programs
in which husbands were currently working.

Table 4.--Student level of the husbands

 

 

 

 

Student level Number of!husbands Percentage
Undergraduate 14 23.33
Master's 22 36.67
Doctoral 19 31.66
Other 5 8.33
Total 60 99.99

 

Table 5 shows the distribution of the educational
level of the student wives in the sample.

A fairly high discrepancy shows up between husbands'
and wives' education levels. Approximately 76 per cent
of the husbands were on programs beyond the bachelor's
level compared with only 25 per cent of the wives having
bachelor's or more advanced degrees (excluding the one cur-
rently working on her bachelor's degree), and 40 per cent
of wives having only high school or high school plus addi-
tional training.

While the Oppelt and Shaffer studies concerned under-

graduate students, a comparison of their data with the present

52

Table 5.-Education level of wives

 

 

 

Number of
Education completed student wives Percentage
High school only or high school
and additional training 24 40.00
3 years high school only 1 1.67
Complete high school only 15 25.00
High school + some business
training 1 1.67
High school + special training
(hairdressing, secretarial,
nursing school) 7 11.67
Non-degree professional training 5 8.50
Registered nurse's training 2 3.33
Registered nurse + 2 years
college 1 1.67
Teaching certificate 2 3.33
College training, 1-3 years 15 25.00
College training-~l year 4 6.67
College training--2 years 8 13.33
College training--2 years +
some nurse's training 1 1.67
College training--3 years 2 3.33
College training, degree obtained 11 18.33
Bachelor's degree 8 13.33
Bachelor's degree + teaching
certificate 2 3.33
Master's degree 1 1.67
Currently working on degrees 5 8.50
Currently working on bachelor's
degree 1 1.67
Currently working on master's
degree 3 5.00
Currently working on doctoral
program 1 1.67
Total 60 60 100.01 100.33

 

53

study may provide a check on how representative this sample
is of the married student population. Their samples are
not representative in that they concern only undergraduates,
while the criterion regarding having a child two years old
may bias the representation in this study.

The higher level of education attained by wives
in this sample (25 per cent college graduates plus 8.5 per
cent non-degree professionally trained) may be related to
the presumed older age of the couples and the higher edu-
cation of the husbands. However, it is interesting that
the figures for those having gg_college training or its
equivalent is identical in all three studies, 40 per cent.
Table 6.-~Amount and kind of home economics training

 

'Number of

Kind of training student wives
None 6
High school

1 year or less 13

2 years 21

3 years or more 17
College

Degree course, 1 year 1

Individual courses taken 8
Adult courses 5
4-H club work

1-3 years 7

4-8 years 3

9 years or over 4

‘Numbers do not add to 60 because the same individ-
uals may have had several kinds of training, e.g., high
school and 4-H.

 

54

Religion
Relatively little variation occurred in religious

affiliation, shown in Table 7.
Table 7.--Religious affiliation of wives

 

Number of
Religious affiliation student wives Percentage
Protestant 45 75.00
Roman Catholic 10 16.67
Jewish 1 1.67
Other 2 3.33
None 2 3.33

 

Total 60 100.00

 

CHAPTER V
FINDINGS

Introduction
The variable, decision procedure (extent of ration-
ality) was compared to the two variables, decision-context
and decision-maker's beliefs about fate. The results of
this analysis follow and are presented in relation to each
of the three hypotheses. In addition, descriptions of other
relationships among the data are given.

Decision Procedure and Decision Context

The first hypothesis tested in this study is:
Homemakers will make decisions using a more rational pro-
cedure in the more highly technical contaiss, and a less
rational procedure in the'ESEE-Higfily affective contzxti,
of family living.

Table 8 shows individual decision procedure scores
for the three decision contexts. For each decision context,
a respondent's score could range from 8-24 inclusive. A
total score for each respondent for all three decision con-
‘ texts could range from 24 to 72 inclusive. (Total scores
are not involved in testing hypothesis I but are included
here for later reference.)

The respondents' individual numerical scores for
the three decision contexts, as given in Table 8, could

follow six possible orders: 1) l, 2, 3 (lowest score in

55

56

Table 8.-Individual decision procedure scores by decision
contexts

Decision Decision Decision
Context I Context II Context III
Respondent (food (work or- (child Total for
number buying) ganisation) discipline) all contexts

 

1 18 17 18 53

2 «24 17 22 63

3 13 18 18 49
4 16 16 17 49

5 22 15 22 59

6 20 17 16 53

7 18 23 23 64
8 20 16 17 53
9 23 15 19 57
10 22 14 21 S7
11 23 14 12 49
12 20 15 13 48
13 18 19 14 51
14 21 20 18 59
15 21 14 19 54
16 22 20 21 63
17 9 11 16 36
18 22 16 12 50
19 19 14 19 52
20 22 21 21 64
21 16 13 22 51
22 20 15 22 57
23 17 14 19 50
24 21 19 22 62
25 18 18 17 53
26 14 16 15 45
27 20 19 19 58
28 20 15 21 56
29 19 18 10 47
3O 12 16 8 36

57

Table 8 (continued)

W
Respondent Decision Decision Decision Tetal for
number Context I Context II Context III all contexts

 

31 19 14 13 46
32 23 22 15 60
33 13 11 17 41
34 12 18 14 44
35 2O 17 18 55
36 21 15 16 52
37 17 21 17 55
38 15 16 23 54
39 18 18 21 57
40 15 17 21 53
41 20 17 14 51
42 20 15 18 53
43 21 17 18 56
44 10 16 14 4O
45 23 19 17 59
46 13 17 11 41
47 19 21 19 59
48 20 16 24 60
49 17 13 12 42
50 13 19 18 50
51 22 15 19 56
52 17 18 22 57
53 16 17 19 52
54 16 16 15 47
55 13 17 17 47
56 17 15 21 53
57 18 14 14 46
58 21 20 22 63
S9 20 17 20 57

60 20 17 19 56

 

58

the first context, higher in the second, and highest in
the third); 2) l, 3, 2; 3) 2, l, 3; 4) 2, 3, l; 5) 3, l, 2;
6) 3, 2, 1. Table 9 shows the number of respondents whose
individual scores of decision procedure for the three de-
cision contexts followed the six orders indicated above.
Hypothesis I claims non-independence between de-
cision procedure and decision context. It predicts that
the highest decision procedure scores would be obtained
in decision context I, decreasing through II to III; that
is, the predicted order is 3, 2, 1. Table 9 shows that
14 out of 60 respondents scored in the predicted way, and
15 respondents scored 3, l, 2, representing a trend in the
same direction. ixz test accepted the null hypothesis of
independence (3:2 - 6.8 with 5 degrees of freedom), thereby
denying hypothesis I as stated. The hypothesis was there-
fore rejected at the 0.05 level of significance.

Table 9.--0rder of decision procedure scores in decision

 

 

contexts‘
M
Number of wives Order 3;
7 l, 2, 3 .9
7 l, 3, 2 .9
10 2, l, 3 0
7 2, 3, l .9
15 3, l, 2 2.5
14 3, 2, l 1.6
Total 60 6.8

L

‘Decision contexts: I, food buying; II, organization of
work; and III, child discipline.

59

A descriptive way of comparing decision procedure
scores with decision contexts is shown in Table 10. Prom
the data in Table 8, a "most rational" rating was given
to scores of 19-24 inclusive; “intermediate” rating to
scores of 14-18 inclusive; and "least rational” rating to
scores of 8-13 inclusive. In comparing the number of re-
spondents who received "most rational" scores, 45 per cent
in decision context III is not according to expectations.
The number scoring “most rational" with respect to context
II is very low compared with both other contexts. We note
the very high number (71 per cent) of respondents receiving
an ”intermediate” score for decision context II. Relatively
little difference shows for the number scoring "least ra-
tional" for all three contexts (15, 6, and 13 per cent re-
spectively).

Table 10.--Decision procedure by decision contexts

 

Decision
Decision Context II Decision
Decision Context I (work or- Context III

procedure (food buying) ganization) (child discipline)

 

Number Percent- Number Percent- Number Percent-

of wives age of wives age of wives age
Most
rational 33 55.0 13 21.7 27 45.0
Inter-
mediate 18 30.0 43 71.7 25 41.7
Least
rational 9 15.0 4 6.6 8 13.3

 

Totals 60 100.0 60 100.0 60 100.0

 

60

Consistency of Decision Proceduge

The second hypothesis stated:
Homemakers will tend to show consistency in approaching
decisions, i.e., those using a more rational procedure in
the technical contexts will tend to use more rational pro-
cedures in the affective contexts, while those who use less
rational procedures in the technical contexts will also tend
to use less rational procedures in the affective contexts
Of fully 11f.e

No statistical test of consistency was considered
necessary for accepting or rejecting this hypothesis. From
the data in Table 8, individual respondent's decision pro-
cedure ratings (most rational, intermediate, least rational)
were categorized by amounts of consistency shown. Table
11 presents the number of respondents who showed varying
amounts of consistency in decision procedure ratings for
all three decision contexts.

Table 11.-Consistency of decision procedure

 

 

 

Consistency criteria Number of wives Percentage
Identical rating in all contexts 11 18.3
Identical in 2 out of 3 contexts 42 70.0
Ratings different in all contexts 7 11.7

Totals 60 100.0

 

It had been decided to accept the hypothesis if
over half the respondents showed consistency in all or in
two out of three contexts. (As 53 respondents, or 88 per
cent, showed consistency, the hypothesis was accepted on
sight.

61

Decision Procedure and Decision-Maker
The third hypothesis stated:

Homemakers who use a more rational approach to decision
will tend to perceive themselves as being able to exercise
control over their environment, while those using a less
rational approach will tend to perceive themselves as being
more subject to chance or fate.

This hypothesis postulates a negative correlation
between decision procedure and fatalistic beliefs.

Correlations were used to discover relationships
between total decision procedure scores and scores from
the sixteen sub-tests in the ”Test of Epistemological and
Instrumental Beliefs." Total decision procedure scores
were derived from the data presented in Table 8: "most
rational,” 57-72; "intermediate," 41-56; "least rational,”
24-40. (See Appendix IV for correlation formula used.)

The following correlations were discovered between
decision procedure (extent of rationality) and the sixteen
sub-tests: six sub-tests correlated negatively and no sub-
tests correlated positively at a significant level.

Table 11 shows the direction and correlation of
each belief sub-test with decision procedure.

While other belief dimensions are related, the one
particular sub-test most pertinent to the hypothesis is
"belief in fate." As rationality was negatively correlated
with this sub-test at the high significance level of 0.01,

hypothesis III is accepted.

62

Table 12.-Correlation between belief sub-tests and de-

cision procedure

Belief sub-test

Direction and correlation

 

Epistemological beliefs

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Belief in animism

Belief in supernatural causes
Belief in fate

Belief in predictability of life

Belief in multiple causation of
events

Belief that good things will
happen

Belief that good things won't
happen

Belief that bad things will
happen

Belief that bad things won't
happen

Instrumental beliefs

10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Future time orientation
Anti-traditionalistic orientation

Belief that events clearly are
either good or bad

Belief that events clearly are
either highly probable or highly
improbable

Belief that actions have many
consequences

Belief in trying many actions in
solving problems

Belief in thinking before acting

.2273
.2862‘
.4051“
.2172

.2209

.3024"

.1282

.1259

.0629

.8025”'

.0835

.6528“‘

.2910‘

.0399

.0666
.0073

 

'Significant at 0.05 level.
"Significant at 0.01 level.
"°Significant at 0.001 level.

63

Decision Procedure and Other variables

Besides the relationship stated in the hypotheses,
possible relationships were sought between decision proced-
ure and age, education, and religion. Tables 13, 14, and
15 present these comparisons.

While no statistical tests were applied, an exam-
ination of the data suggests little relationship between
age and decision procedure. In comparing the proportion
in each age group for the whole sample, slight evidence
seems to suggest a relationship: in the 20-25 years age
group, 15 per cent scored "most rational" compared with
30 per cent in the total sample falling into this group;
in the 26-29 years age group, 60 per cent scored "most
rational" compared with 40 per cent in the total sample;
but the trend breaks down in the 30 years and over age
group, only 26 per cent scoring "most rational" compared
with 30 per cent of the total sample falling into this
group. As comparisons by the "intermediate" and "least
rational" ratings also fail to show consistent relation-
ship with age, we can conclude that these data seem to
show little evidence that these variables are related.

A slight relationship is suggested between educa-
tion and the "most.rational" ratings. In the total sample,
40 per cent had high school or high school plus additional
training, and only 26 per cent of those scoring "most ra-
tional" were in this educational group. Above this level
of education, a slightly higher proportion of respondents

64

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cos m ooa mm can on ooa om Hence
6 o em ma mm m on ma ua>o ecu than» on
om v mm m cm Ha ov em mama» mwuew
cm H an we mu m on me than» mmuow
cumsseuudm hone—oz couscouudm Mona?— oomevseuuom b.0832 omscouuem
decadueu.unsoq. ousaoeauousH Hesoauou who: . nobas mo osonm 004
musoououm soauauoo honest deuce

;

suspended sowedueo cud: mommaflou omerl.MH edema

65

.uonesc odors amended on oeocsou omousoouom.

 

OOH m OOH mm OOH ma OOH om deuce

 

o o m m an N m m common :0
mmdxuos haucouusu

o o as m mm m we as confluent cosmos
.mcacecuu oaoHHou

cm a mw m cw m mm ma mucus mam
.mcacecuu omoHHou

o o m m as m m m ecstasy» emcee»
Imomoum oeuumolsoz

om e me me mm m as em masseuse autos»
Idooe moan HoonUm
cues no accrue coax

 

.oosuceuuom wanes: .oueusouuem wonssz commusouuom Hones: .omeucouuom
Hecowuew enema ouefiomauouCH HesOHueu and: mesa: mo fished coaueusom

ousomuoum cadnduoo honest Heuoa

 

ousomuoum coamfiumo cud: omndmaou coaumusomll.ea «Home

66

.uogasc oHocs unease: on neocsou emmusouuomo

 

 

 

 

OOH m OOH mm OOH mH OOH om Hmuoa
o O m H m H m N 6:02
o o m N o O m N Queue
0 o m H O o N H anBOO
ON H ¢H m HN w 5H OH UHHonumU {meow
om v we 5N on «H me me unannououm
.oueuceuuem Hones: .momuceuuom nonsoz commusouuem wanes: .mmeuceuuem
3533 human 3363.8»5 3:033 the: 335 mo 83338.4
ousoeuoum roamaueo Hones: Houoa

owsoououa sOHuHuoo cud: oendmsou cOHUHHamII.mH OHAoB

67

scored "most rational" at each level than in the total
sample, and particularly higher for the level "college
degree obtained." It can be noted that a much higher pro-
portion (80 per cent) of the "least rational" scorers had
high school level of education than the 40 per cent in the
total sample; however, the total number scoring ”least ra-
tional" is very small. These data seem to provide a slight
indication of relationship between education and decision
procedure.

No evidence from the data suggests relationship

between religion and decision procedure.

 

Preferred Sources of Information

Analysis of the responses to the three decision
questions representing the three decision contexts revealed
that respondents varied regarding the sources of informa-
tion they preferred. Table 16 presents the preferred sour-
ces of information, by decision contexts.

For the food buying decision, 34 respondents re-
ferred to "evaluated experience of self or others" as a
source of information, and 24 referred to "authoritative
or evaluated sources."

For the work organization decision, 46 respondents
called upon ”evaluated experience of self or others," while
only 2 referred to "authoritative or evaluated sources."

For the child discipline decision, respondents

turned to "authoritative or evaluated sources" far more

68

frequently than for the other two decision questions, 47
respondents mentioning this source. A quarter of the sample,
15 respondents, referred to "evaluated experience of self

or others."

Table lG.--Preferred sources of information

W
Context I Context II Context III
(Food (Organization (Child

Source of information buying) of work) discipline)
Number' number‘ Number'
of wives of wives of wives

 

Trial and error with ob-
servation and comparison 5 2 9

Qualified observation ll 17 5

 

Evaluated experience of
self or others 34 46 15

Information from authori-
tative or evaluated
sources 24 2 47

Courses, classes, or
other formal learning

situations 8 0 O
Unqualified trial and

error 0 l 2
Unqualified observation 0 O l

Unevaluated experience
of self or others 8 2 7

Uncritically stated or
unspecified sources of
information 4 0 6

Feeling, hunch, or "I
don't know" 0 O l

 

‘Responses do not add to 60 because respondents often cited
more than one source.

69

Comparative Impgrtance of Decision Contexts
After respondents had dealt with each decision ques-

tion representing each context, they were asked to look at
the three together and to compare them in importance, giv-
ing their reasons for so ranking them; Table 17 presents
the rank ordering.

Table l7.--Rank-ordering in importance of decision context

 

 

 

 

 

 

Decision context Rank Number Percentage I
I first 6 10.00
II first 0 0
III first 44 73.33 s
I and II equally first 2 3.33
I and III equally first 5 8.33
II and III equally first 0 0
- not ranked 3 5.00
Totals 60 99.99

A majority of the respondents (73 per cent) rated
decision context III (child discipline) as most important;
decision context I (food buying) was next in importance;
decision context II (organization of work) is obviously
considered least important, 32 respondents (53 per cent)

ranking it in last place.

Summagy
Hypothesis I stated:

Homemakers will make decisions using a more rational pro-
cedure in the more highly technical contexts, and a less

7O

rational procedure in the more highly affective contexts,
of family living.

This hypothesis was rejected.
Hypothesis II stated:

Homemakers will tend to show consistency in approaching
decisions, i.e., those using a more rational procedure in
the technical contexts will tend to use more rational pro-
cedures in the affective contexts, while those who use less
rational procedures in the technical contexts will also tend
to use less rational procedures in the affective contexts

of family life.

min

This hypothesis was accepted.
Hypothesis III stated:

Homemakers who use a more rational approach to decision
will tend to perceive themselves as being able to exercise
control over their environment, while those using a less
rational approach will tend to perceive themselves as being
more subject to chance or fate.

 

{.m—

This hypothesis was accepted.

No relationship appeared to exist between decision
procedure (extent of rationality) and age or religion, but
the data suggested a relationship between decision proced-
ure and education.

Respondents varied in their preferences for sources
of information depending upon the context in which the de-
cision was made.

Respondents ranked the decision question about child
discipline as most important and that of organization of
work as least important.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Introduction
The previous chapter presented findings. In this
chapter conclusions relevant to the findings will be drawn,
limitations in the study indicated, and implications for
teaching and research suggested. The discussion of con-

clusions will center around the hypotheses tested.

 

Decision Procedure and Decision Contexts

Hypothesis I was rejected, that decision procedure
(extent of rationality in approaching decision-making) would
be related to the context within which the decision is made.
Rationale

The rationale underlying hypothesis I was that de-
cision procedure and decision contexts each fall along a
continuum, and that these two continua would parallel each
other in a relative way although not in a direct one-to-one
relationship. It was believed that in a highly technical
context a more reasoned decision is most possible, and,
conversely, in a highly affective context, a highly reas-
oned decision is least possible, because of the character-
istics of the decision contexts, viz., affect and informa-
tion (see Appendix VI).

Responses to the decision questions representing

71

72

the decision contexts support the notion of a continuum

of effect, at least as perceived by the respondents. In
the food buying decision, responses showed little affect.
One respondent was quite explicit on this point in answer-
ing the request to rank-order the three questions in order
of importance, saying,

Number 3 [child discipline] is the most difficult
to solve because personal relationships are in-
volved. It's easier to work with things and lists,
etc. I'd place the problems: 3, 2 l, in that
order. Number 2 [work organization) and number

3 are related in that my mental outlook is re-
flected in my relationship to my child--then maybe
number 2 is the most serious of all-~would see

my child and the problem in a different light.
Number 1 [food buying] last, not because it is

not equally important but easier to solve--when
working with numbers and things you can figure
this out-~but human relations and feelings can't
be reasoned out easily, sometimes impossible.

Responses provided some evidence of more family
interaction and affect in the work organization decision
than the first more technical context represented by food
buying. Evidence of feelings regarding role expectation,
family interaction, and other emotional overtones may be
seen in such fairly frequent and typical responses as:

If my husband criticized I'd go right through the
ceiling because I'm touchy about it. .

I hate housework. I just hate it. That's my down-
fall-too repetitious-~you never get done, never
accomplish anything. I don't get any thrill out
of seeing a nice clean ironed shirt-~it's the

least of my thrills. I'd get help if I had money.

My husband cares how the house looks, so I care,
but if just myself, I wouldn't care so much.

I go through a period of being irritable and ner-
vous before I get busy and reorganize.

 

iF ~_.nl mug—aw

73
About once a week everything seems to be glaring
at me.

When I'm not caught up with my work, my husband
lets me know about it, so I try to keep caught up.

Some people work with a schedule, but I prefer to

have variety. Want to be able to change my mind

without feeling guilty.

Respondents provided much evidence of affect and

family member interaction in connection with the third con- “h
text, e.g., many statements regarding how important and
"dear” their children were to them, that they worried whe-
ther they were doing the right things, and the importance

of giving love and understanding.

 

The rationale seems to be sound with respect to
a continuum of affect and family interaction in the three
decision contexts.

The precision and amount of available information
pertaining to the respective decision contexts can be ver-
ified empirically. But the sources of information preferred
by the respondents did not conform to the characteristics
stated for technical through affective decision contexts
(see Appendix VI). As shown in Table 16 (page 68), re-
spondents' preferred sources of information in decision
context I (food buying) were "evaluated experience of self
or others" and "authoritative or evaluated sources"; in
decision context II (work organization), "evaluated expe-
rience..." was the highly preferred source; and in decision
context III (child discipline), "authoritative or evaluated

sources" were preferred by many more respondents and

74

"evaluated experience..." by fewer than chose these sources
in the other two decision contexts.

According to the rationale, in decision contexts
where a greater amount of precise information is available,
such information will be used, especially when affect is
low; where less precise information is available, "conven-
tional wisdom" (beliefs based on collective experience and
wide acceptability) will supplement or replace it, partic-
ularly where high affect exists simultaneously to make
reasoning difficult and to influence people to live by

 

”conventional wisdom." That more ”experience" and less A
"precise information" is sought in decision context I and
the reverse in decision context III may indicate that the
rationale may be unsound with respect to preferred sources
of information, and the findings could be biased as a re-
sult. However, the criteria for judging decision procedure
in this study protected against this bias. Judgments were
not made about the source per se but about the evidence
given by the respondent of thinking, of discriminating,
or of evaluating the source she mentioned. In quantifying
the responses, equal weight was assigned to "evaluated ex-
perience..." and to "authoritative or evaluated sources,"
because choosing either provided such evidence.

In this study, the data seem to be in accord with
the rationale underlying hypothesis I. Support is seen
for the notion of a continuum of affect through the decision

contexts. While the respondents' preferred sources of

75

information ran counter to the rationale, the criteria for
judging decision procedure seem to protect the findings
from.the bias that this discrepancy might have introduced.
Adeggacy of Decision Questions

While the rationale regarding the decision contexts
themselves may be sound, the decision questions represent-
ing them could introduce bias; that is, respondents could “m
react to content rather than context.

In devising the decision questions for each context,
an attempt had been made to make all three equally realise

tic and important to the respondents. The responses indi-

 

cated that all questions were realistic to the majority
of respondents. Because respondents ranked decision con-
text II (work organization) so low in importance (see Table
17, page 69), it is interesting to note that they neverthe-
less identified strongly with the decision question; a few
typical reactions serve to show that this question was truly
realistic to them:

This is my.probleml

Mrs. B. sounds like me!

Do you hit everything on the head:

This is my problem! I can tell you intellectually

but I don't do ite-about the world's worst—~never

up to date.

This sounds so true.

That's my problem--have never decided how to get
the work done.

Oh, boy! This is me!

76

In ranking all three decision questions in order
of importance, giving their reasons, 73 per cent of the
respondents ranked the child discipline decision question
(III) as most important, and 53 per cent ranked the work
organization decision question (II) least important (Table
17). In addition to ranking II least important, respond-

ents' reasons were revealing. A few typical examples follow:

 

I'm not really caught up and I don't worry-~always A
another tomorrow. -
Wouldn't worry about the work-it'll get done

sooner or later. ' g
I do what's vital; it's amazing how little is vital. L

Relatively trivial.

Annoying to me most of the time but not to the
point I'm worried.

Number 2 is the least of my worries, guess because

I could always lie down beside a big pile of work

and go to sleep-I think there are so many things

so much more important.

. It is also interesting that those who ranked this
question other than least important usually did so because
they saw its relationship to the child discipline decision
or to total family well being. A good example was seen
in the earlier quotation,

Numbers 2 and 3 are related in that my mental out-

look is reflected in my relationship to my child-

then maybe number 2 is the most serious of all--

would see my child and the problem in a different

light.
Others sometimes qualified their ranking, e.g., "I'd feel
that the child would come first, feeding the family second,

and work third, though I believe it is bad for the family

77

to live in a place that is chaotic all the time."

The last two examples are atypical, however; very
few of the total sample saw the work organization decision
as anything but their own problem, something that was an-
noying but not important enough to worry or do anything
about, and generally saw it as unrelated to family well-
being. 71

The decision question on food buying was seen as E
important in relation to health or to worries about money.
Because it affected everyone in the family and on a longer 3

 

range basis, respondents considered it more important than
the decision question about work organization.

In placing the decision question about child dis-
cipline first in importance, respondents stated as reasons
the long-range consequences to the child and the immediacy
of the problem, e.g., “if the problem isn't solved now,
it may affect his whole life; it cannot be let go,” the
effect on the whole family, and above all, the importance
of the child to them.

As devised, then, the decision questions seemed
not to be equally important to the respondents. The im-
portance of the decision may be the only vital, the only
significant variable. Neither decision context, per se
.(which was hypothesized to influence decision procedure
through its amount of affect and the amount of precise in-
formation available), nor the realism of the decision ap-
pear to have much to do with the way people approach decision

78

making or with the amount and kind of information used.
What does appear to make a difference is the importance

to the decision-maker of the decision. The readiness with
which respondents turned to information from authoritative
or evaluated sources in the decisions that were important
to them is striking. The family doctor, and recognized
authors to a lesser extent, the teacher if the problem was
seen as a school difficulty, child guidance clinics, the
visiting psychiatrist in the school, nursery school teachers,
and pediatricians were among those most frequently mentioned.
In the food buying decision, second in importance to the
child discipline decision, many mentioned government bul-
letins, home economics departments, the basic four food
groups, books from the library, courses in buying, series
on TV, and so forth. In the decision question regarded

as least important and most trivial (and yet one with which
respondents identified strongly), only two respondents sug-
gested going to outside sources: one stated that magazines
give suggestions and hints, e.g., Redbook, and another sug-
gested that one could go to a family service center for
help in scheduling for housework.

The importance of the decision seems to be related
to decision procedure, although not conclusively. As shown
in Table 10, the smallest proportion, only 21 per cent,
of the respondents were rated "most rational" in the work
organization decision, which was considered the least im-

portant of the three. The largest proportion of respondents,

79

55 per cent, were rated "most rational" in the food buying
decision, which was rated second in importance to the de-
cision-maker. A smaller proportion, 45 per cent, of re-
spondents were rated "most rational” in the child discipline
decision, although this decision was considered most impor-
tant by them. Affect and precision of information may have
had enough influence on the decision procedure to offset

the importance of the decision to the decision-maker.

Consistency of Decision Procedure

The second hypothesis was accepted, that respond-

 

ents would show consistency in decision procedure in the L—
three decision contexts. Behavioral scientists believe

that man exhibits a certain consistency in his behavior,

otherwise his actions would be completely unpredictable.

That individuals exhibit similar decision procedure (extent

of rationality in approaching decision) seems to be one

instance of behavioral consistency. If we know how a home-

maker habitually approaches her decision-making, we are

in a better position to make predictions about her decis-

ions and about her management in the home.

Decision Procedure and Decision-Maker
Hypothesis III was accepted, that homemakers who
use a more rational approach to decision will tend to per-
ceive themselves as being able to exercise control over
their environment, while those using a less rational ap-

proach will tend to perceive themselves as being more subject

80

to chance or fate.
Epistemological Beliefs.

In this study, the modified "Test of Epistemological
and Instrumental Beliefs" (see Appendix I) was used to test
the third hypothesis. Only three of the nine epistemolog-
ical beliefs in the test are shown to be related to decis-
ion procedure (extent of rationality): "Belief in fate"
(negatively correlated at the 0.01 level of significance),
"belief in supernatural causes" (negatively correlated at
the 0.05 level of significance), and "belief that good
things will happen" (negatively correlated at the 0.01

 

level of significance). The hypothesis was accepted on

the basis of the negative correlation between decision pro-
cedure and "belief in fate." The significant negative cor-
relation with ”belief in supernatural causes" further sup-
ports the hypothesis. In their discussion (4:54-S7), Brim
35:51, relate both “belief in supernatural causes" and "be-
lief in animism" to fatalistic beliefs. "Belief in animism"
shows some correlation in a negative direction, but not
significantly.

As stated above, "belief that good things will hap-
pen," is negatively correlated with decision procedure.
This is one of two sub-scales comprising the test of opti-
mism; the other, "belief that bad things won't happen,"
was not significantly correlated. Brim‘g§_gl, expected
that these beliefs would be related to desirability esti-
mates in decision-making (4:55-56). By extension, they

81

should be related to decision procedure in a positive di-
rection, because estimating desirability of outcomes is a
rational (reasoning, weighing) activity. On the other hand,
"belief that good things will happen" may indicate a chancey,
laissez-faire view of the universe: good things will hap-
pen whether we do anything to bring them about or not, it's
the nature of the world that good things happen. That both
this belief dimension and the "belief in fate" dimension
are negatively correlated with decision procedure at the
0.01 level of significance, as well as "belief in supernat-
ural causes" at the 0.05 level, seems to indicate a rela-
tionship among the three beliefs with respect to decision
procedure. The negative correlation of optimism to decision
procedure seems to present a contradiction to Brim's expec-
tation of its role in decision-making.
Instrumental Beliefs
Of the seven instrumental beliefs in the "Test of
Epistemological and Instrumental Beliefs," only three are
significantly related to rationality in this study, but
negatively, which is the opposite direction than was expected.
That ”future time orientation" should be negatively

correlated with rationality and at such a high level of
significance (0.001) is surprising in the extreme. Of this
sub-test, Brim says:

An orientation toward consideration of future con-

sequences of one's actions reflects a prior epis-

temological view that the individual believes hime

self to be involved in and in part responsible for
some of the outcomes and events in the world. He

 

82

sees himself, that is, as having sufficient control

over events actuall to influence these distant

consequences. (4:56)
The negative correlation of "future time orientation" with
decision procedure is not compatible with the negative cor-
relation of "belief in fate." If a high rationality score
corresponds with a low one in "belief in fate" (and, by
inference, with a high belief in having control over one's
environment), a high rationality score should correspond

with a high score in "future orientation," which, Brim says

above, reflects a belief in having a degree of control over

.‘l .‘a .‘I.Y"m- K'f

events. This finding is difficult to explain. That the

 

correlation is coincidental is ruled out by the high level
of significance. It may be that the test items devised by
Brim 93;]: do not actually test future time orientation.

Because the "Test of Epistemological and Instru-
mental Beliefs” is semi-projective in nature, it is open
to the most frequently levelled criticisms of this type
of test, viz., that validity is difficult to establish.
The three items for the test of future time orientation
were:

Happiness comes from living day to day.

Our grand business is not to see what lies dimly
at a distance but to do what lies clearly at hand.

The pleasures of one day today are worth those of
two tomorrows. (See Appendix I.)

These items clearly seem to indicate preference for present
over future time.

This seems not to be the same interpretation given

83

by Brim M” viz., "An orientation toward consideration
of future consequences of one's actions." Consideration
of future consequences is assumed to be related to reasone
ing and weighing in decision-making, but preference for
future time may not be.

The remaining two instrumental beliefs that showed
correlation with rationality are "belief that events clearly as
are either good or bad" (negatively correlated at the 0.001
level of significance) and "belief that events clearly are
highly probable or improbable" (negatively correlated at

 

 

the 0.05 level of significance). Of these belief dimensions
Brim says that the objective is to determine the degree to
which individuals view the world as an "either-or" type of
environment, and says:

The beliefs should be related to the decision proc-

ess through their effects upon the amount of con-

sideration given to middle-range probabilities and

to a mixture of good and bad outcomes, in contrast

to extreme judgments of both in the evaluation

process. (4:56

These beliefs seem less related than future time

orientation to decision procedure.

Implications
Variations observed among respondents in their pre-

ferred sources of information suggest that more needs to
be known about what or whom families consider to be valid
sources of information. Little is known about the use made
of information from the home economics field, how this pro-

fession is evaluated as a source of information, or for

84

what kinds of information home economics is considered a
valid source. Such knowledge would be helpful, especially
for professionals working with families. Perhaps home econ-
omists can work most productively with and through sources
that families consider significant. The family doctor, for
example, was a significant source to many respondents for
information about nutrition and child growth and develop-
ment. Home economists having specialized knowledge in these
areas need to be alert regarding the quality of information
being disseminated by change agents whom families trust and
respect as information sources. ””'I
The findings suggest relationship between decision

procedure employed and the importance of the decision as
perceived by the decision-maker. The possible relationship
between importance of the decision and the amount and kind
of information sought suggests a fruitful line of inquiry.
We need to know, and to find ways of knowing, what is re-
ally important to families. In working with families and
in teaching, professional home economists need to emphasize
the integrated nature of home management. If families can
see interrelationships among their problems, rather than
viewing them in isolation, they are more likely to assess
accurately the true importance of each.

' Much more needs to be known about decision proced-
ures and variables affecting them so that people working
with families may define their tasks. If we know that fam-

ilies see consequences and relationships, that they reason

 

lllllll illlllllllil‘ (l

85

and weigh, and that they will seek information, even if
reasons are invalid and the information is ”poor," our task
is to make well-established information available. But

if they cannot or do not reason, the task in working with
them is a very different and a more difficult one.

This research investigated one approach to studying
decision procedure; others could be tried. Using the raw
data obtained, an instrument could be developed for further
testing in a larger and more varied population.

Further research into the mental processes of de-
cision-making is required. Much more investigating is
needed to find out what variables are most crucial in in-
fluencing decision-making.

In this study, a slight relationship was seen be-
tween education and decision procedure; this relationship
needs further exploration. Also, this study provides ten-
tative evidence that decision procedure is related to an
individual's view of the world as controllable or controlled
by fate. A great deal more study is needed about how in-
dividuals view their world, how they perceive themselves
in relation to it, and how these perceptions affect their
decision-making.

10.

11.

LITERATURE CITED

Books

nggAmerican College Dictionary. N.Y.: Random House,
1 .

ANSHEN, MELVIN. ”Managerial Decisions," in Automation
and Technological Change. John T. Dunlop, ed. Engle- sex
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. (Spectrum),
1962. f

BOULDING, KENNETH. "Decision Making in the Modern
World,” in Lyman Bryson, ed. An Outline of Man's Know-
ledge of the Modern World. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1960.

BRIM, ORVILLE 6., JR., GLASS, DAVID C., LANVIN, DAVID E.,
and GOODMAN, NORMAN. Personality and Decision Proc-
esses: Studies in the Social Psychology of Thinking.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962.

 

‘1“

BRUNER, JEROME S., GOODWIN, JACQUELINE J., and AUSTIN,
GEORGE A. A Study of Thinking. N.Y.: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., 1956.

DIESING, PAUL. Reason in Society: Five Types of De-
cisions and Their Social Conditions. Urbana, Ill.:
University of Illinois Press, 1962.

DIXON, WILFRED J., and MASSEY, FRANK J., JR. Intro-
duction to Statistical Analysis. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., Inc. 2nd ed. 1957.

FESTINGER, LEON. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.
Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957.

GROSS, IRMA H., and CRANDALL, ELIZABETH w. Management
for Modern Families. 2nd ed. N.Y.: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1963.

KELLY, GEORGE A. "Man's Construction of His Alterna-
tives," Assessment of Human Motives. Gardner Lindsey,
ed. N.Y.: Grove Press, Inc., 1958.

KLUCKHOHN, ELORENCE, and STRODTBECK, FRED L. Varia-

tions in Value Orientations. Evanston, Ill.: Row,
Peterson, 1961.

86

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23..

24.

87

LEWIS, C. L. The Ground and Nature of the Right.
N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1955. (Series of Wood-
bridge Lectures.)

NEWMAN, WILLIAM H., and SUMMER, CHARLES E., JR. The
Process of Management: Concepts, Behavior, and Prac-
tice. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1961.

PARSONS, TALCOTT. Essays in Sociological Theory Pure
and.Apglied. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. Revised
ed. 1 54.

ROKEACH, MILTON. The Open and Closed Mind. N.Y.:
Basic Books, 1960.

SMITH, CLAIRE, JAHODA, MARIE, DEUTSCH, MORTON, and
COOK, STEWART. Research Methods in Social Relations.
Revised ed. N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 1959.

SIMON, HERBERT A. Administrative Behavior. N.Y.:
The Macmillan Co., 1961.

SIMON, HERBERT A. Models of Man: Social and Rational--
Mathematical Essays On Rational Human Behavior in a
Social Setting. N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,

1957.

STEVENSON, CHARLES L. Ethics and Language. New Haven:
Yale University Press, Yale Paperbound, 1960.

TAYLOR, PAUL W. NOrmative Discourse. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961.

Bulletins and Periodicals

ARROW, KENNETH J. "Alternative Approaches to the The-
ory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations." Econometrica.
1951, 19, pp. 404-437.

BACK, KURT W. "Decisions Under Uncertainty: Rational,
Irrational, and NOn-Rational." The American Behavioral
Scientist. 1961, 4, 14-19.

COWAN THOMAS. "Decision Theory in Law Science, and
Technology." Science. 140, June 7, 1963, pp. 1065—75.

DEAN,.ALFRED, AURBACH, HERBERT.A., and MARSH, C. PAUL.
"Some Factors Related to Rationality in Decision Mak-
ing Among Farm Operators." Rural Sociology. 1958,
23, pp. 121-135 e

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

88

DIESING, PAUL. "Noneconomic Decision-Making." Ethics.
66, 1’ 18-35 e

EDWARDS, WARD. "The Theory of Decision Making." Psy-
chological Bulletin. 1954, 51, pp. 380-417.

-KNOLL, MARJORIE M. "Toward a Conceptual Framework in

Home Management.” Journal of Home Economics. 55,

KORNER, A. F. "Theoretical Considerations Concerning
the Scope and Limitations of Projective Techniques."
Jr. Abn. Soc. Psych. Vol. 45, 1950, pp. 619-627.

RIECK, ROBERT E., and PULVER, GLEN C. An Empirical
Measure of Decision Making in Evaluating Farm and Home
Development in Wisconsin. Research Bulletin 238.
University of Wisconsin Agr. Expr. Sta. and Coop. Ex-
tension Service, June, 1962.

SATZ, P., and CARROLL, L. T. "Utilization of the
Proverbs Test as a Projective Instrument: An Objec-
tive Approach Throu h Language Behavior." Jr. Gen.

SHAFFER, JAMES D. Financial Aspects of Undergraduate
Student Life at Michigan State University, 1961-62.
Office of Institutional Research, Michigan State Uni-
versity, 1963.

Unppplished Materials

BUSTRILLOS, NENA. "Decision-Making Styles of Selected
Mexican Homemakers." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
Michigan State University, 1963.

OPPELT, NORMAN. "A Study of the Relationship of Mar-
ital Status to Selected Characteristics of Male Under-
graduate Students at Michigan State University." Un-
published Ph.D. Dissertation, Michigan State Univer-
sity, 1962.

APPENDIX I

 

1.

2.

10.

11.

name

 

TEST OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL.AND INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

These are proverbs and statements about life. You
will find you agree with some, and disagree with others.
For each of these sayings, circle the answer at the
right which.best expresses how you feel about it.

Strongly
Agree Agree

Flowers know where the
sun is, and feel its
warmth. SA

Every human problem can

be solved and every

hunger satisfied and

every promise can be
fulfilled if God so

“1113 0 SA

Man's existence is com-
pletely under the control
of destiny. SA

Things that seem mys-
terious and unpredict-
able now will one day
be predicted by science. SA

Few things have but a
single cause; for most

the "cause" is really a
multitude of little

things happening to-
gether. SA

The highest wisdom is
continual cheerfulness. SA

He who never hopes can
never despair. SA
To fear the worst often
cures the worst. SA
One often expects misery

in vain. SA
01d houses, like Old

peOple, feel very tired
at times. SA

As God created the world,
so He can change or end
it as He pleases. SA

90

Strongly
7 Disagree Disagree

7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD

 

J r’,l’:vr.!.lie1r a! . Fully?" Ill-ll-
. I

 

91

Strongly Strongly
Agree Agree 7 Disagree Disagree

12. There is a divinity
that shapes our ends,
roughhew themias we

will. SA A 7 D SD
13. The world moves in an
orderly fashion. SA A 7 D SD

14. For any event there are
an infinite number of
results. SA A 7 D SD

15. To fear the worst is to
go through life with an

unnecessary burden. SA A 7 D SD
16. One's fondest hopes
rarely come true. SA A 7 D SD

17. Life Often presents us
with a choice of evils
rather than of good. SA A 7 D SD

18. It is madness to be
expecting evil before
it comes. SA A 7 D 30

19. The unlighted match)
feels its own heat when
lighted. SA A 7 D SD

20. God is powerless in the
face of natural laws
and to ask Him for help

is to shout at the wind. SA A 7 D SD
21. NOthing comes to pass
but what fate wills. SA A 7 D SD

22. People try to find
order in the world when
in fact there is none. SA A 7 D SD

23. The causes of any event
are so intertwined that
it is difficult to know
how important each may
be. SA A 7 D SD

24. It is worth a thousand
dollars a year to have
the habit of looking on
the bright side of
things. SA A 7 D SD

25. He that lives on hope
will die starving. SA A 7 D SD

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

Strongly
Agree Agree

Forewarned is fore-
armed.

Nothing is so wretched
or foolish as to antic-
ipate misfortunes.

Happiness comes from
living day to day.

When ancient opinions
and rules of life are
taken away, the loss to
people cannot possibly
be estimated.

One of the most impor-
tant things in life is
to be absolutely sure

of what you want.

Uncertainty and expecta-
tion are the Joys of
life.

For every action there's
a limited number of out-
comes; it's smart to
conSider them all be-
forehand.

It's important to decide
upon one thing and stick
to it.

Nothing is less in our

power than the heart,

and far from commanding

it we are wiser to obey
t.

Our grand business is
not to see what lies
dimly at a distance,
but to do what lies
clearly at hand.

The tried and true ways
are the best.

It is easy to classify
most things as either
good or bad.

To know what may happen
tomorrow is one of the
dullest things in life.

92

SA

23

SA

Strongly

7 Disagree Disagree

7 D
7 D
7 D
7 D
7 D
7 D
7 D
7 D
7 D
7 D
7 D
7 D
7 D

SD

SD

SD

SD

SD

SD

SD

SD

SD

SD

SD
SD

SD

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

93

Strongly
‘Agree Agree

You can only confuse

yourself by thinking

of all that might

happen. SA A

Each important thing

that happens to man can

be traced to a single

cause. SA A

Happiness comes from
impulse, rather than
reason. SA A

The pleasures of one
today are worth those

of two tomorrows. SA A
To live by custom is a
foolish thing. SA A

It's best not to get
too excited about any-

thing. SA A
Certainty alone brings
peace of mind. SA A

In deciding whether or

not to do something it's

wise to make as long a

list as you can of all

the outcomes. SA A

To try to do many things
is to do none of them
well. SA A

Our first impulses are
good; thought usually
weakens them. SA A

Strongly
7 Disagree Disagree

7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD
7 D SD

Brim, Orville 6., Jr., David C. Glass, David-E.

n vers ress, 1962.

Lanvin, and Nerman Goodman. Personali§¥ and 33-
cision Processes. Stanford, .: or

APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Demggraghic Data

Name: Age group:

Number and age of children: under 20 years -—-
Student level of husband: 20 to 25 years ---
wife's education: 26 to 29 years _--
Home economics training received: Over 30 years --—
Religion:

1.

 

Decision Questions
(Typed on 3 x 5" index card and handed to respondent)
Mrs. A. has to keep food costs down and yet feed her
family nutritiously. If you were in her situation,
how would you decide what food to buy?

(Standard probing questions asked after respondent ap-
peared to have no more to say)

a) On what basis would you decide this way?

b) Have you ever had this problem?

c) What did you do then7 // If discrepancy with
main answer, d) This is a little different from
your answer to the problem question. Why did
you do what you did? //

. (On 3 x 5” index card)

Mrs. 8. becomes bored with repetitive time-consuming
tasks, and she is never caught up with her work (e.g.,
ironing). If this were your problem, how would you
decide on ways to get the work done?

(Standard probing questions asked as above)

95

96

3. (On 3 x 5” index card)
Hrs. C.'s child became "difficult” in a way that wor-
ried her. If this were your problem, how would you
decide what to do about it?
(Standard probing questions asked as above)
(On completion of the three decision questions and probing
questions) ”Now that you have thought through these three
decision questions, will you look at all three again [hand-
ing all three back and spreading out]. If these three prob-
lems were real problems for you, equally serious, which
would you consider most important, that is, which would
worry you the most"? “Why”? ”Which would you consider
next in importance"? "Why"? “Why would you place this

remaining one last"?

.‘K‘.rae hint. .-

APPENDIX III

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APPENDIX IV

SCORING SHEET FOR DECISION PROCEDURE

Below is the format of the scoring sheet used in
scoring the responses for decision procedure. Scores for

each category were allocated as indicated in Appendix III.

Decision Context I (II or III)

 

Respondent number: 1 2 3 4‘

 

Category

A. Whole Response
B. Reasoning
Bl. Diagnostic
approach

32. Reasons

83. Relation-
ships

34. Plan
C . Weighing 4

Cl. Comparing,
ranking,
allocating

C2. Alternatives

D. Inquiry for Use
of Information «

D a) Trial and
error

D b) Observation

D c) Experience

D d) Sources E 'through 60

D e) Other

 

 

Total decision -
procedure score , ~ I

 

 

 

 

 

102

APPENDIX V

CORRELATION FORMULA FOR TESTING HYPOTHESIS III

an aim: - (ix) (g2)
thixz-(ixVJENgPL:(éY)ZJ

 

104

APPENDIX VI

 

SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF HYPOTHESIS I

 

Decision procedure

continuum:

Most rationa1...Intermediate...Least rational

Decision context

continuum:

Technical...Technical-affective...Affective

Characteristics of

1)

2)

decision contexts:

Affect:
LeaSt affeCteeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeMOSt affeCt

Little emotion Intermediate amount Most emotion and

and/or family of emotion and/or family interac-
interaction family interaction tion inherent
inherent inherent
Information:

Most precise...................Least precise
Large body of Intermediate amount Smallest amount

precise infor- of precise informa- of precise infor-
mation available tion available; some mation available;
"conventional wis- "conventional

dom" preferred wisdom" frequent
source of informa- source of infor-
tion mation

Decision question

representing context:

Food buying Organization of work Child discipline

106

are, ,' Irvine.

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