AMERECé MUST N6? SLEEP: _
EHE SEVELGPMEPST 0F EQHN F. KENNEDYS

FQREiGN POUCY AWEWSES, 1946-1960

'fhesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHEGAN STAKE UféliiERSiTY
mmw i. NURSE
2971

MUIUMZIIWUMIUMHIH(I!MW

17 58

ll"

 

This is to certify that the
thesis entitled

AMERICA MUST NOT SLEEP: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF JOHN F. KENNEDY'S FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES, 194l-1900

presented by

RONALD J. NURSE

 

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph .D . degree in His torv

W

Mnjor professor -

Date June I, 1.9/1

0-7639

AMERICA MUST NOT SLEEP:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JOHN F. KENNEDY'S

FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES, 19u7-1960

By

5st,.-
3 *"
Ronald J?’Nurse

 

 

 

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

 

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1971

© Copyright by
RONALD JOSEPH NURSE
1971

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For making the pursuit of my degree financially possible, I would
like to record my profound thanks to the Canada Council for the three-
year fellowship extended to me.

I would like to express a special note of gratitude to my thesis
director, Professor Warren I. Cohen, for his many cogent suggestions
and helpful criticisms in the preparation of this study. I will
always remember those spirited, free-wheeling discussions in the friend-
1y atmosphere of his home, along with Sandy, Dennis, Dick, Bob and Jay.
I would also like to thank Professor Madison Kuhn, Professor Donald
N. Lammers, and Professor Paul A. Varg, all of whom were kind enough
to read the entire manuscript and give me the benefit of their seasoned
advice and judgment. Each of these men, over the years, has had an
important influence on my intellectual development and, happily, each
has been a warm friend.

For their helpfulness and cooperation I wish also to thank
Mr. John F. Stewart and his staff at the John F. Kennedy Library in
Waltham, Massachusetts, especially Mrs. Sylvie Turner, research
archivist, for her cheerful and efficient service.

My greatest debt is to my wife, Florrie. Not only did she type
and proofread the entire manuscript, but she was a constant source of
encouragement. It was the loving presence of my wife and daughter,

Julie that sustained me through the low periods.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter

I THE AMBASSADOR'S SON . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

II THE COLD WARRIOR, 1947-1950. . . . . . . . . . 36

III PREPARATION FOR THE SENATE, 1951-1952. . . . . 63

IV THE YOUNG SENATOR AND INDOCHINA, 1953-1956 . . 105

V ALGERIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1957-1958 . . . . 141

VI A DEMOCRAT LOOKS AT FOREIGN POLICY, 1957-1958 177

VII THE CAMPAIGN YEARS, 1959-1960. . . . . . . . . 214
VIII EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

iii

INTRODUCTION

Very appropriately, Senator Mike Mansfield and the late Senator
Everett M. Dirksen called John F. Kennedy's tenure in Congress the
"years of emergence" for the ideals and policies he pursued as
President. But since some of Kennedy's most deeply-rooted beliefs
on foreign policy were formed before he entered Congress, during and
even before the war years, the introductory chapter is devoted to this
formative period. Kennedy came of age, both emotionally and intellec-
tually, amid the upheaval of World War II and that experience left a
lasting imprint on his outlook.

His interest in international relations was first publicly ex-
hibited in 1940, shortly after the fall of France, when his senior
thesis at Harvard, "Appeasement at Munich," was published as

Whyfingland Slept. Here Kennedy explained the various reasons for

 

Britain's lack of military preparedness in the face of German rearma-
ment which, he believed, made Neville Chamberlain's "surrender" at
Munich inevitable. As a warning to America, he wrote in the intro-
duction: "In studying the reasons why England slept, let us profit
by them and save ourselves her anguish." This was a message he
continued to urge throughout his years in Congress. The importance
of armaments to the conduct of foreign policy registered deeply on
Kennedy; he remained steadfastly convinced that military power was

the essential ingredient of successful negotiation.

The story of Kennedy's meteoric rise to political prominence

has been told well in James MacGregor Burns' John F. Kennedy, A Political

 

Profile. Only the highlights need be mentioned here to serve as a frame
of reference. He entered the House of Representatives in 1947 at the
age of twenty-nine and served there for six years. In 1952 he scored

an upset victory over Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., for the Senate, the only
Massachusetts Democrat to withstand the Eisenhower tide. At the
Democratic National Convention in 1956, he was narrowly edged out by
Senator Estes Kefauver for the vice-presidential nomination. In 1958

he was re-elected to a second Senate term by a record-smashing margin,
the largest in Massachusetts history, thus setting the stage for his
drive for the presidential nomination in 1960.

Kennedy once remarked to an aide that his central interest in
public life was the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. This is
vividly borne out by his enthusiastic and informed participation in the
give and take of debate on the major foreign policy issues of the day.
He prized his appointment to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at
the beginning of the legislative session in 1957.

As one reads through Kennedy's Speeches on foreign policy during
the years 1947-1960, three predominant unifying themes are apparent.
The first was his constant emphasis on military preparedness in
conventional weapons as well as nuclear striking-power. Kennedy disagreed
with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on many issues during the
1950's but his major criticism centered on the so-called New Look
defense policy and Dulles' concept of massive retaliation. He
believed that total reliance upon such a retaliatory policy, coupled

with the scaling down of conventional forces, was both ineffective and

dangerous in an era of brush-fire wars. And he suggested further that
this policy actually encouraged guerrilla-type aggression. Kennedy was
always the advocate of a flexible military capability, which required
a larger military establishment and a larger defense budget.

The second theme was anti-colonialism. Kennedy spoke often of
the "challenge of imperialism", which he called the single most
important test of American foreign policy. He urged the United States
to oppose both Soviet and Western imperialism, and by so doing win
the support of the emerging nations of Africa and Asia. As a young
Congressman, he became aware that the growing importance of the
newly emerging nations demanded changes in America's foreign policy.
He recognized very early the force of nationalism in the nations
of the Third World and beginning in 1951, after he returned from a
study trip to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, he repeatedly urged
the United States to dissociate itself from Western colonialism. He
was not unaware of the dilemma this posed for the United States--
caught between the need to support the interests of its major EurOpean
allies, Britain and France, while at the same time remain sympathetic
to the drive for independence in the emerging nations.

Although Kennedy persistently spoke on the need for the United
States to adopt a forthright policy of anti-colonialism in support
of self-determination, there were two particularly dramatic episodes,
and each of these involved an attack on France's colonial policy.
Since 1951, Kennedy had warned that France and the United States
had underestimated the importance of the independence movement in
Indochina and in 1954, at the height of the military struggle there,

he advocated independence for the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos

and Cambodia. However, there was always to remain a fundamental
contradiction in Kennedy's attitude toward the independence movement in
Indochina. In a Senate address three years later he once again
criticized French colonial policy when he called for the Eisenhower
Administration to support the cause of Algerian independence.

The third theme was closely related. Just as he urged the United
States to pursue a policy of anti-colonialism in order to win the
support of the emerging nations and thwart Communist advances, so,
too, did he place an increasing emphasis on economic and technical
assistance programs to the underdeveloped countries. Over the years
he became steadily disillusioned with military aid programs which,
he believed, tended only to perpetuate military hierarchies which
lacked the support of the people. He underscored the importance of
economic growth in the new and uncommitted nations, and came to
believe that economic and technical assistance from the West was the
only effective basis on which the emerging nations of Africa and Asia
could be encouraged to resist the lure of Communism.

As many have noted, one of Kennedy's strongest and most idealistic
beliefs was that the United States shared a common bond with the
emerging nations of the world and could help them advance their social
revolutions. This fundamental conviction permeated all of his speeches.
Many American politicians and statesmen, ofcourse, have shared this
belief, including President Franklin D. Roosevelt. However, as perhaps
with others, Kennedy's commitment to the cause of the emerging nations
was not motivated strictly by idealism. It is true that in his speeches
he expressed a concern for the people who sought independence, and a

concern for the principle of self-determination, but his primary

concern was that the West, and the United States in particular, was
losing to the Soviet Union the support of those nations struggling for
independence. He stated on many occasions his belief that the emerging
post-colonial nations would increasingly control the world balance of
power. So, he was always the "pragmatic idealist", as he liked to
refer to himself--support of the worldwide movement for independence
was clearly in America's national interest.

There was, of course, change as well as continuity in Kennedy's
outlook during his fourteen years in Congress. He had adopted the
unyielding Cold War state of mind earlier than most. As far back as
the campaign of 1946 he advocated a "get tough policy" toward Russia
and characterized that nation as a "ruthless dictatorship" that was
"on the march". And in 1949 he assailed the Truman Administration
for having "lost" China even before Senator Joseph McCarthy convulsed
the country with his witch-hunt. But gradually he evolved from this
stridently hard-line, anti-Communist frame of mind to become more
moderate and flexible in his thinking.

Yet, Kennedy always operated from a premise of aggressive anti-
Communism. His increased flexibility, which was so apparent during
the 1950's, indicated two very different things. On the one hand,
it reflected his growth, his greater sophistication and, to a degree,
his mellowing of attitude. But his advocacy of flexibility in
dealing with the Communist world, in contrast to the rigid outlook
of Secretary Dulles and others, was primarily because he simply
considered this approach to be a more effective method by which to

combat and restrict the advance of Communism.

Although Kennedy was not representative of all post-war American
politicians and statesmen, the development of his thinking on foreign
policy reflects, in important ways, the changing climate of opinion
in the Cold War from 1947 to 1960. During this period, American
attitudes, generally, evolved from a rigid, simplistic view of the

Communist world and became more enlightened and moderate.

CHAPTER I

THE AMBASSADOR'S SON

The international scene during the final years of the 1930's was
increasingly turbulent and ominous. The unsteady structure of inter-
national order established at Versailles following World War I was
teetering on the verge of collapse. In the Far East, Japan was on the
march, determined to strengthen her position on the Asian mainland. Even
more foreboding was the growing militancy of Nazi Germany and the
general heightening of tensions in Europe.

The response of the two major European democracies, Great Britain
and France, to the threat of aggression was not unlike that of the United
States. Like many Americans, large numbers of Englishmen and Frenchmen
were disillusioned with the unsatisfactory results of World War I. As
much as they disliked and feared Japanese, German, and Italian expansion
during the 1930's, they disliked the thought of war even more. Pacifism
reached new heights. The appeasement policies of the British and French
governments, combined with the neutrality laws of the United States,
failed completely to meet these bold challenges to the prevailing
structure of international order.

In the autumn of 1937, a sick and dying Robert Worth Bingham, the
United States Ambassador to the Court of St. James since 1933, returned
home from London and submitted his resignation to President Roosevelt.
The President, in the closing months of 1937, departed from tradition
E11nd appointed a Catholic, Joseph P. Kennedy, to replace Bingham in London.

7

For Joseph P. Kennedy, his tenure as ambassador, from 1937 to 1940,
was doomed to end in personal frustration, humiliation and defeat. He
was an outspoken and controversial figure. His close identification with
Neville Chamberlain and Britain's policy of appeasement angered Roosevelt
and was one of the prime factors that led eventually to his resignation.1
But the appointment provided his son with a rare opportunity to observe
firsthand the impending European crisis.

It was in this setting of international upheaval that the young
John F. Kennedy first developed an interest in foreign affairs and
began to express his views. Kennedy was an undergraduate at Harvard
during most of his father's tenure as ambassador. As a result of
privileged Opportunities, he had an uncommonly broad exposure to foreign
affairs as a young man. Not surprisingly, his Opinions during those
years were strongly influenced by the views of his father.

As Kennedy began his junior year at Harvard in September, 1938,
Britain's policy of appeasement reached its zenith. In an effort
to reach an accommodation with Hitler, Britain and France, led by
Neville Chamberlain, compelled the Czechoslovaks to yield the
Sudetenland to Germany. The underlying reasons for Chamberlain's policy
at Munich would later consume Kennedy's interests and become the subject
of his senior thesis.

By the time of Munich, relations between Ambassador Kennedy and
President Roosevelt were beginning to grow strained. Secretary of the
Treasury Morgenthau, no friend of Kennedy, wrote later that the President
was irritated by the Ambassador's close association with the Cliveden
Set, (the informal Conservative clique that was supposedly the center

of the pro-appeasement policy in England).2 Kennedy did have a close

relationship with Chamberlain and they were in basic agreement on
policy. During the Munich crisis they consulted almost daily.3 This
association reportedly led Roosevelt to exclaim: "Who would have thought
that the English [the Cliveden Set] could take into camp a redheaded
Irishman?"4

A few weeks after Munich the Ambassador spoke in defense of
Chamberlain's policy. He addressed the Trafalgar Day Dinner of the Navy
League and urged coexistence between the dictatorships and the democra-
cies. "After all," he said, "we have to live together in the same
world, whether we like it or not."5 His Navy League speech was not
popular with certain groups in Britain, of course, especially the foes
of appeasement. But from Harvard, James MacGregor Burns noted, John
Kennedy wrote his father that the speech "was considered to be very good
by everyone who wasn't bitterly anti-fascist. . . ."6

In 1939, Kennedy was granted a leave of absence from Harvard for
the entire second semester of his junior year to allow him to take an
extended trip to Europe. The purpose of the trip was to see if he wanted
a career in the diplomatic service after he graduated from Harvard. A
New York Times dispatch from London on February 13, 1939, quoted Mrs.
Kennedy as saying that "it was Mr. Kennedy who thought of John's making
the experiment."7 Kennedy's older brother, Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., had
served as a secretary to his father in the London Embassy and he planned
to transfer to some other American legation in Europe. It was this
position in London that Kennedy was to fill. But first, his father
arranged for him to take a wide tour of Europe and the Middle East.

Kennedy arrived in London in the late winter of 1939 just before

Germany seized the rest of Czechoslovakia. From London he went to Paris

10

where he stayed with United States Ambassador William C. Bullitt during
the spring. From there he went on to Poland where he spent two or
three weeks. Here he visited Warsaw and Danzig, the pressure point of
the coming crisis between Poland and Germany. He travelled on across
the Soviet Union to Moscow. From the Soviet capital he went to Turkey,
Palestine, and then back through the Balkans, stopping over at Berlin
and Paris before returning to London.8 The Ambassador had arranged for
him to stay at the United States embassies during the trip and asked
only that he submit back to London detailed reports from each capital.
James MacGregor Burns noted that Kennedy sought out representatives of
all parties in order to get a balanced point of view and that his reports
revealed a "cool detachment".9

In a long letter outlining the Polish and German positions on
Danzig, he concluded that: "Probably the strongest impression I have

goten [sic] is that rightly or wrongly the Poles will fight over the

 

question of Danzig."10 The Ambassador received another letter from his
son on June 7, 1939, in which he reported on some talks he had had with
certain Naziofficials in Danzig. He wrote that he was very disappointed
in the unsoundness of the Danzig arguments put forth by the Danzig Germans.
He wrote of the "petty grievances" of the Danzig Nazi officials and
concluded that although the Poles would negotiate on specific issues
they "have made their stand for fear that defection might spread and
will prevent their making any compromise."11

Kennedy had.just returned to London when Germany invaded Poland. In
early September, just after war was declared, the Ambassador sent his
twenty-two year old son to Glasgow to assist the American survivors of

the British liner Athenia, which had been torpedoed by a German

11

submarine. A short time later Kennedy sailed for home to begin his
senior year at Harvard.

Kennedy had been stimulated by his European trip and his observa-
tions became the subject of his senior thesis. The complete title of
his thesis, which reveals his central argument, was ”Appeasement at
Munich: The Inevitable Result of the Slowness of the British Democracy
to Change From a Disarmament Policy."12 The idea grew out of the
various impressions he had gathered in EurOpe-—most particularly from
the criticisms he had heard of Chamberlain's policy at Munich. The work
was his first real success as a student and shortly after his graduation
in 1940, he re-wrote parts of the thesis, largely following his father's

direction and advice, and had it published under the title Why England

 

Slept: James MacGregor Burns noted that one of the most striking aspects
of the book, which differed little from the thesis, was its agreement
with his father's position on the EurOpean war. This can be seen in

the Ambassador's reports to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State
Cordell Hull during the same period of time that Kennedy was researching
and writing the thesis.

The book was timely, of course, being released when the United
States was preoccupied with problems of national defense. At the time
of its publication in the summer of 1940, France had fallen and Britain
was fighting the blitz. Kennedy wrote his father that Arthur Krock,

of the New York Times, a family friend, suggested the title, Why England

 

Slept, as a contrast to Churchill's While England Slept.13 The

 

implication of the title was that Kennedy's study would probe deeper
into the reasons for the conditions described by Winston Churchill's

C011ection of speeches, While England Slept. Henry Luce, of Time, Inc.

 

12

wrote a highly laudatory foreword insisting that the book should sell

a million copies! The Ambassador sent copies of the book to Harold

Laski, Winston Churchill and Queen Elizabeth. Ultimately, the book be-

camea.best-seller and sold about 40,000 c0pies in both the United States

and Britain.

There is some slight question concerning the original motivation

for the study. In August of 1940, shortly after Why_England Slept came

out, the Ambassador, a firm supporter of Chamberlain's policy at
Munich, told a British correspondent that the study had been his idea:

"When I was in the States with Jack, and heard some professors talking

about Munich, I realized they knew nothing about it. I said to Jack,

'You get down to it and tell them all about it.'" Many years later,

(an the eve of the 1960 election, Kennedy himself had a different
"The subject interested me ever since I was over there to

recollection:

ssee’the results of the Chamberlain thing. I wouldn't say that my father

They were things that I saw for myself. No,

got me interested in it.
tJie book didn't contain anything that differed with my father's opinions

eat: that time except perhaps in the final part. There was the Chamberlain

<31)isode in Munich and all that resentment in America about Munich and
I (didn't think that it was justified on our part in view of the fact
that we weren't ready to do anything."

Why England Slept was not concerned with the consequences of

aIDPeasement at Munich. Rather, it was an analysis of the various

influences operating within Britain during the l930's--pacifism,
IJLII3’.'l.:ic.apathy, business and labor self-interest, and weak political
leadership which, in Kennedy's opinion made Chamberlain's concessions at

Ft - . . . . .
Llr11ch ineV1table and even de51rable because the Pact gave Br1ta1n

‘

13

precious time to rearm. Mainly, he argued, it was the "poor condition
of British armaments that made the "surrender" inevitable. ."17
Although he recognized that Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain,

as national leaders, bore a heavy responsibility for Britain's military
unpreparedness, his primary target in explaining Britain's failure to
rearm was the entire British people.

Even though the content of Why England Slept differed little from

the thesis, the Ambassador did suggest one significant change. His
advice was ironic considering his close identification with Chamberlain

and Britain's policy of appeasement. However, in a longer letter written

on May 20, 1940, he informed his son that he had gone too far in
absolving Chamberlain and Baldwin from blame for Britain's weakness at
'the time of Munich. According to James MacGregor Burns, he urged his
sson to blame both the people and the leaders. Kennedy responded: "Will
:stop white-washing Baldwin."18 Although he dutifully followed the
zadvice, his main focus remained on the diverse, impersonal forces under-
.1)ning Britain's weakness, rather than on personalities. It is entirely
IDINDbable that the Ambassador, in his advice to his son, was influenced
ti)? the mounting p0pu1ar hostility, both in England and the United States,
‘txavvard the spokesmen for appeasement.
Kennedy began his account of Britain's policy toward armaments
With the year 1931 and traced its slow evolution to the outbreak of
“'€11‘ in 1939. He supported his analysis with figures showing money
5513(31rt on armaments, and included a sampling of the views of the major
British spokesmen as expressed in the Parliamentary Debates, the Times
of London, and various journals, most notably the Economist.

He clearly established that the slow conversion from a disarmament

 

14

psychology in Britain, at the beginning of the 1930's, to one of
rearmament at the end of the decade, was impeded by a diverse variety
of influences that reached into all sectors of British society.

Rearmament in Britain was opposed by pacifists and by those who supported

the League of Nations. It was Opposed by many members of the Labour Party,

he argued, as well as by the Conservatives. This was a point well
worth emphasizing because many later analysts absolved the Labour Party

of any such complicity. Also, the national mood was affected by a

general disillusionment over the results of World War I and the feeling

that certain German claims were justified. It was public opinion

generally, he argued, that was to blame for Britain's state of military

txnpreparedness. The Opposition to rearmament in Britain, much like

tJIe policy of appeasement, he reasoned, could not be limited to any
Shingle group. Both developed out of a state of mind that was
icientifiable in virtually every sector of British society.

From this general line of reasoning, of course, it was but a

Sllcxrt step to defend Chamberlain's policy at Munich. It was short-

Sighted, he argued, to blame Britain's position on "one man or one

group of men's blindness."19 Rearmament had begun slowly in 1934 and

hiici jpicked up by 1936, but the rate was still woefully inadequate.
Britain did not wake up effectively to the need of rearmament until

Muni ch, he contended.

Kennedy did detect, however, a certain flaw in Chamberlain's
out look that contributed to Britain's tardiness in rearming.
Chanllberlain's foreign policy, he noted, was motivated by two factors.
Through appeasement he tried to remove the causes of war. But, on the

Qt .
her hand, he urged rearmament. H15 rearmament efforts were weakened,

15

Kennedy suggested, because Chamberlain had so much hOpe and confidence
in his appeasement policy that he could not conceive of a war as being
inevitable. Kennedy likened the state of mind of Britain and especially
Chamberlain to that of a boxer "who cannot work himself into proper
psychological and physical condition for a fight that he seriously
believes will never come off."20 Nonetheless, Kennedy defended
Chamberlain's actions at Munich and declared that the criticism should
be directed not at the Pact itself but to the underlying conditions
such as the state of British public opinion and Britain's military
unpreparedness, which made the policy "inevitable .

Quite apart from the defense of Chamberlain, Why Enggand Slept
had another major theme. Kennedy saw Britain's disastrous failure to
:rearm as, in large part, a weakness of democracy itself and a warning
'to the United States. He suggested that democratic, capitalist
Iiations, such as Britain and the United States, contain inherent
ciisadvantages that prevent speedy and effective responses to a threat
iirom a totalitarian form of government. A democracy, subject to the
HHi]J.and self-interests of the peOple, moves slowly. This was es-

IJGBCially true in the short run. A totalitarian state, in contrast,

ins geared to mobilize swiftly. "We must realize," he argued, that

"democracy and capitalism are institutions which are geared for

:1. wvorld at peace. It is our problem to find a method of protecting

them in a world at war."21 He was aware of the dangerous possibility
that democratic nations might not be able to meet the demands of
War without becoming totalitarian states themselves. In his
cc’IIClusion he cautioned the United States that it is one Of democracy's

tFEiJi-Jhings that it seeks to make scapegoats for its own weaknesses,

l6

and warned the United States to profit from Britain's example.

Kennedy was thorough, perceptive, and judicious in his outlining
of the broad impersonal forces which left Britain unprepared. He
did not fall victim to the common oversimplification of making Stanley
Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain the scapegoats--although he did criticize
their leadership and he praised Winston Churchill for his warnings. His
description of the problem, however, was far more developed than his
remedy.

He concluded that it was only through strong political leadership
that the apathy, self-interests, and party squabbles, which were in-
herent in a democracy, could be overcome. He was forever after to
;place great importance on the necessity for strong political leadership
as an activator of public Opinion.

Why Ehgland Slept was highly praised by a wide range Of reviewers.22

 

TFhey were impressed both by the perceptive observations and Kennedy's

nmature handling of the research data involved. The London Times

_£giteraryfiShpplement for example, remarked that although it was "a young
23

man's book", it contained "much wisdom for older men."

Kennedy's views in Why England Slept are interesting in a strictly

 

Plinstoriographic sense. The Munich crisis remains one of the great
Flixstorical controversies of modern history. For the most part, historians,
Infllczh like the public, have been bitterly critical of Chamberlain's
IJC>JJicy. Indeed, Munich and appeasement have become words of universal
55‘3<3111 and nothing is ever likely to change that image in the public mind.
This predominant view, it is fair to say, was strongly influenced not
only by the disastrous consequences of Munich, when seen in retrospect,

but also by Winston Churchill's highly popular The Gathering Storm, which

17

offered a blistering assessment of Chamberlain's policy Of appeasement.
So, Kennedy's understanding explanation of Munich and Chamberlain's
policy has not been the prevailing view. In more recent years, however,
there has been a growing awareness among historians of the tremendous
complexity of problems that Chamberlain was confronted with as he
approached Munich.24' Many of these problems--political, military, and
psychological--were discussed in Kennedy's Why England Slept. In this
sense, the book was more in line with historiographical trends in the
1960's than it was in the late 1940's and 1950's.

Until quite recently, one of the most neglected factors in
weighing the Munich decision was the role of the Dominions.25 For the
lDOSt part, historians tended to focus exclusively on the European
ssituation. But, at the British Imperial Conference of 1937, some of
the Dominion Prime Ministers refused to give a firm commitment to
resist Hitler by force and, during the Munich crisis they stated that
tJIey did not consider a German attack on Czechoslovakia an adequate
:rfaason for war. Kennedy, in Whthngland Slept, wrote of this additional

restraining pressure on Chamberlain and that increases the value of his

ana lysis . 26

Kennedy spent an aimless year following his graduation from Harvard
1111 1940 and the publication Of Why Ehgland Slept. At first, he decided
to enter Yale Law School, then abruptly changed his mind. Instead, he
entered Stanford's Graduate School of Business in the fall, but dropped
out after six months and left for a long tour of South America. Finally,
’1‘3 ‘Vtis commissioned in the United States Navy in September, 1941. At
Pi rst, he was assigned to rather tedious administrative duties in

W .
ashlngton, D.C., but was then transferred to Charleston, South Carolina.

18

Ultimately, late in 1942, he prevailed upon his father to obtain an
assignment for him in PT boat training which would provide overseas
service.

In early March, 1942, while Kennedy was still stationed at
Charleston, he read Blair Moody's recently published book, Boom or
2222: A Washington news correspondent, Moody later became a United
States Senator from Michigan. Although the central focus of Moody's
book was on the economic policy of the United States in the post-war
world, Kennedy was stimulated by some of Moody's observations on
international relations prior to the outbreak of war. Kennedy typed
a long letter to Moody challenging certain of his ideas about the
causes of World War II. There is no indication that Moody ever
responded to the letter.27

In the first part of his letter, Kennedy contended that it was
the failure of the Western democracies to solve the problem of
disarmament that "really doomed peace for our time." He recognized
the importance of the various crises of the 1930's-—Manchuria, the
Rhineland, Spain and Munich-~but he suggested that the pivotal
turning point came during the Disarmament Conference of 1932, when
the French refused to grant any concessions to the German moderates
on armaments. This action, he said, weakened the position of the German
moderates at home and paved the way for the rise of Hitler. The
German people, he continued, "despairing of achieving equality through
negotiations, decided to gain superiority through force." Kennedy's
brief assessment displayed a sharp awareness of the intricate workings

of international politics.

19

Kennedy's second point related to Munich and appeasement.
Moody had expressed the common view that it was the "British upper—
crust" who should be blamed for the policy of appeasement. Although
Kennedy agreed that one of the bases of Britain's appeasement policy
was the British aristocracy's fear of Red Revolution at home, he
emphasized that this feeling was not confined to the Tories but
permeated the entire country. Kennedy also agreed, and this is a
debatable issue among historians even today, that a "fundamental Of
British foreign policy during the 30's was to see that Hitler never
forgot that his principal objective, as set down in his Kampf, was

Russia." At this point, Kennedy reiterated the thesis of Why England

 

Slept; Munich and appeasement were the natural result of Britain's
failure to provide armaments.

Kennedy did not know Moody personally and it is unlikely that he
was in the habit of writing to authors. His letter mainly illustrated
his continued interest in foreign affairs and his commitment to
armaments. According to the recollections of his war-time friends,
Kennedy maintained a lively interest in international relations during
his war years.28

As is well known, Kennedy served most of 1943 on PT Boat
assignment in the South Pacific. In August, 1943, PT 109 went down
in the Solomon Islands and his experience has since become a part of
American folklore. The PT 109 sinking marked the virtual end of
Kennedy's war-time service. He was shipped back to the States in
December, 1943 because of his aggravated back injury. He also had a

siege of malaria which dropped his weight to 125 pounds. In the spring

20

of 1944, still ailing, he was admitted to Chelsea Naval Hospital

near Boston for a disk operation on his back. In June, 1944, he was

awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal for "extremely heroic conduct."
Kennedy was discharged from the Navy in January, 1945 and in

February he wrote a short essay titled "Let's Try An Experiment in Peace".

It was a curious piece for the author of Why England Slept. Here he

 

dramatically reversed his pro-armament outlook expressed in the

earlier thesis and book and came out against the buildup of armaments
in the post-war world. It was the only time that he took such a
position on armaments and national defense. Throughout his public
career, his constant concern for national defense was much more in tune

with the views in Why England Slept. Essentially, Kennedy advanced

 

the argument that after the war, nations should make efforts to prevent
the recurrence of an arms race. He advocated that the United States
the Soviet Union and Britain reach an agreement for limiting postwar
rearmament plans. But, the question how Big Three unity was to be
maintained, was not effectively answered.

Apparently, his essay, which was never published, was in rebuttal
to Harry Hopkins' plea for rearmament, published in the American
Magazine. Kennedy recalled sometime later that he wrote it "more as
a kind of exercise for my own satisfaction than as a serious effort,"
because, he said, he was "outraged" at HOpkins' judgment that "we did
everything possible to prevent war--except prepare for it."29 Why
Kennedy was "outraged” with a viewpoint that he once held was not
apparent. Perhaps the long years of war caused him to pin his hopes

on mutual international trust and cooperation as the key to peace.

21

There is something intriguing about this essay. He had written

earlier in Why England Slept of the double-barrelled policy pursued

 

by Chamberlain; on the one hand Chamberlain had sought to eliminate
the causes of war through negotiation, but on the other hand, he built
up the nation's armaments. Kennedy was caught by this same dualism;
much like Chamberlain, he was now urging international negotiation
and trust as the basis for a peaceful world. But, he would later revert
back to his emphasis on armaments. The reconciliation of these two
divergent ideas, of course, is the central dilemma which confronts
anyone who grapples with the shaping of foreign policy.
In the essay, Kennedy took a sympathetic view toward Russia and
he noted that mutual trust would not come easily between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Many Americans distrusted the Russians,
he said, because of the Soviets' actions in Eastern Europe and he
recognized that a radical change in the Soviet attitude was necessary
before arms limitations could be worked out. But, he also declared
that Americans would have to demonstrate to the Russians their own
willingness to try to work out European problems on equitable lines.
Only then, he said, would the Russians place any genuine confidence in
America's protestations of friendship. "The Russian memory is long."
he explained, "and many of the leaders of the present government
remember the years after the last war when they fought in the Red
Armies against the invading troops of many nations, including Britain's
and the United States'."30
Through his father's connections, Kennedy became a special

correspondent for Hearst's New York Journal American shortly after

 

writing this essay. This was in the spring of 1945 and it was a brief

22

stint. His column was billed as "the GI viewpoint". He was first
assigned to cover the organizational convention of the United Nations
in San Francisco.31 Later, he reported on the British elections of
1945 in which Churchill was upset.32
In his early dispatches from the San Francisco conference, Kennedy
wrote of the general organizational problems being encountered. But
increasingly, during his month on the scene, he focused on the growing
conflict in aims between Russia and the West. Like everyone else,
he was skeptical about continued cooperation among the powers.
Generally, he continued to express the understanding but realistic
view toward Russia that he had outlined in his essay. In attempting
to explain the reasons for the Russian intransigence in one of his
early columns, he pointed out that "there is a heritage of twenty-five
years of distrust between Russia and the rest of the world that cannot

."33 In a

be overcome completely for a good many more years.
later column, on May 4, 1945, he Observed, realistically that because
of this it would be a long time "before Russia will entrust her safety
to any organization other than the Red Army." Russia remembered,
he noted, the years before the war when she was ostracized and kept
"only looking in the kitchen window.” With this being the case, he
concluded that the new United Nations could only be a skeletal
organization with very limited powers. "It will reflect the fact,"
he noted, "that there are deep disagreements among its members."

In one of his last columns from San Francisco, written on May 18,
he mentioned that there was talk there of fighting the Russians

within the next ten or fifteen years. The mutual distrust between

Russia and the West, he lamented, was "causing grave concern and

23

considerable discouragement." But, he personally did not regard war
as probable. Because Russia, the United States, and Britain were all
"have" nations, he reasoned, they would have little to gain from a
"ruinous war."

Generally, during his month covering the conference, his view
evolved from one of restrained Optimism for the new United Nations
to one of deepening pessimism. This was conditioned, of course, by the
increasing deterioration in the relationship between Russia and the
United States and Britain. But Kennedy continued to hope for COOpera-
tion between the Big Three and, as the conference ended, he gave his
approval to the new organization even though he recognized that it was
a product of many of the same compromises that had rendered the
League of Nations ineffective. It is important to note his sympathetic
view of Russia's position in the post-war world, because his attitude
was to stiffen later.

Kennedy ended his stint at journalism with his coverage of the
British elections in the summer of 1945. The only notable aspect to
his columns here is that he warned that Churchill might be defeated
at a time when scarcely anyone thought 50, thus displaying a sharp
political sense. He headlined his first article, "Churchill May Lose
Election" and went on to say” "This may come as a surprise to most
Americans, who feel Churchill is as indomitable at the polls as he
was in war." However, he cabled, "Churchill is fighting a tide
that is surging through Europe, washing away monarchies and conserva-
tive governments everywhere, and that tide flows powerfully in England.
England is moving towards some form of socialism--if not in this

election, then surely at the next."34 Arthur Krock recalled later

24

that Kennedy was the only one who intimated to him that Churchill
would be defeated, and that Kennedy, therefore, "had the makings of
a very good political observer."35
Unfortunately for Kennedy, allegedly under pressure from Hearst,
he changed his position in his subsequent dispatches and predicted a
moderate Conservative victory over Labour. Years later, he recalled
to reporter Peter Lisagor his experience: "One of my first stories
predicted that Winston Churchill and the Tory Party were going to lose
the election to Attlee and Labour. NO sooner did that story hit New
York than I got a rocket from Hearst, practically charging me with
being out of my mind. Well, in the next several days, I gradually
worked it around to where Churchill had rallied and now looked like
an easy winner. If I had stuck to my original story, I'd have been
a red-hot prophet."36
When the war ended, Kennedy was twenty-eight. He faced the
problem which confronted many millions of his generation--
assimilation back into civilian life. And he had yet to form definite
plans on a career. During the war his older brother, Joe, Jr., had
been killed in an experimental bomber mission over the Belgin coast.
Joe, Jr., was the "star" of the family and the one who was planning
a political career after the war. Kennedy once told Theodore
Sorensen: "I never would have run for office if Joe had lived. ."37
He told Sorensen that he had considered careers as a lawyer, a
journalist, a professor of history or political science, or as an
officer in the Foreign Service.38 Ironically, no one at the time,

including himself and his parents, felt that he was suited to a career

in politics because of his shy, reserved manner.39

25

Notwithstanding these considerations, Kennedy's political career
began in the Eleventh Congressional District of Massachusetts-~a
Democratic stronghold, where the party's nomination was equivalent
to election. In 1945, James Michael Curley, a political enemy of
the Kennedys', had vacated the seat to become Mayor of Boston again.
The district was a study in contrasts; it was made up largely of Irish
and Italian slum areas in the Boston area, but also included Cambridge
and Harvard and some Old Yankee families.40 Kennedy had various
political disadvantages. Not only was he shy and reserved but he
did not have the support of the political bosses in the district.
Furthermore, he did not live in Boston and he knew virtually nothing
about the district he wanted to represent in Congress. But both
of his grandfathers had been prominent Boston politicians and he did
not lack money. At first, he was laughed off by the ten other Democra-
tic primary candidates and was quickly dubbed "the poor little rich
kid".

But Kennedy began his campaigning several months before the others-—
this was to become one of his characteristic campaign techniques.
Also, he built his own personal organization composed of friends from
his days at Choate, Harvard, and the Navy, plus new-found Boston
contacts. Most were young and politically inexperienced, but they
were zealous and loyal. At the center Of the group, of course, was
the candidate's father, Joseph P. Kennedy, who made use of his power,
wealth, and influence. The campaign was a wide-open affair and
Kennedy ran long and hard, canvassing the entire district. John

Hersey had written an account of the PT 109 episode for The New Yorker

 

26

in the summer of 1944, entitled "Survival". This was condensed into
pamphlet form, mass produced, and distributed widely throughout the
district. Kennedy won an immediate rapport with veterans, of course.
He was elected general chairman of a Veterans of Foreign Wars national
convention held in Boston during the campaign.41 He campaigned on
bread-and-butter issues of jobs, housing, low rents, medical care,
veterans' benefits and social security, taking the New Deal-Fair Deal
position and he won the primary with about 42 percent of the votes

in a ten-man race.

One foreign policy issue during the campaign was the 3.75 billion
dollar low interest American loan to Britain, which Kennedy supported.
Here he was supporting the position of the Truman Administration,
which held that Britain's recovery was crucial for world recovery.
During the campaign, he also came out strongly for the United Nations
and urged a strong Army and Navy for the United States.43

By the time Of the campaign of 1946, the mounting animosity
laetween Russia and the West was becoming increasingly apparent and
Keninedy's speeches reflected this development. Speaking on October 21,
15146, before the Boston Business and Professional Women's Club, he
gave strong support to Secretary of State Byrnes' so~called "get tough
pCXIicy" with Russia and stressed the necessity of blocking Russian
expansion. His tone now was much more emotional than it had been
heretofore. "We should recognize the fact," he urged, "that internally
SOViet Russia is a ruthless dictatorship and externally is on the
'“artfll."44 In his speech, Kennedy was also sternly critical of Henry

A: Wallace, Truman's Secretary of Commerce, who was urging a more

27

conciliatory policy toward Russia at the same time Secretary of State
Byrnes was advocating a "get-tough" policy. Kennedy compared their
conflicting interpretations of Russia's actions and then sided

with Byrnes. Wallace, said Kennedy, contended that Russia must be
understood because since 1917, that nation had been threatened with
capitalistic encirclement, was cruelly maligned in the twenties,

and made the object of British appeasement in the thirties. This being
the case, Kennedy continued, Wallace believed it natural that Russia
should be suspicious of America and England in the post-war days.
These, of course, were precisely the sentiments that Kennedy had
aired at San Francisco. But now, he made clear, he supported Byrnes'
"get-tough" policy toward Russia as "the best hope for peace."

The reason for the dramatic shift in Kennedy's attitude toward
Russia is not entirely clear. By mid-1946, however, American public
opinion generally was swinging around to favor a hard-line policy
against Russia. This was primarily due to Russia's domination of
the satellites in Eastern Europe. Being now a politician, rather than
a casual observer, it is probable that Kennedy became much more
attuned to the shifting trends of public opinion. And, certainly his
Congressional district, with its large Catholic constituency, and
especially its Polish-Americans, was one of the most anti-Communist
in the nation. At this point in his career, and on this particular
issue, Kennedy appeared less as a man committed to one point of view
than as a barometer registering the shifting winds.

After the election campaign of 1946, Kennedy continued to speak

out against Russia. Speaking in late November, before 500 members of

28

the Boston Boot and Shoe Club he attacked Russia as a "slave state

run by a small clique of ruthless, powerful, and selfish men."45 It was
essentially the same speech he had delivered in October. He again
assailed Henry A. Wallace and called his statements "irresponsible"

and stated he "vigorously" favored the policy of Secretary of State
Byrnes.

Kennedy was now about to enter Congress. The pre-Congressional
phase of his life was at an end. He had travelled extensively during
these early years, and had given serious and thoughtful consideration
to the problems of international relations. He had written an
impressive book. Over the years his views remained essentially
consistent, with the exception of his temporary shift on the issue of
armaments outlined in his February, 1945 essay. But during the
campaign of 1946, he reverted to his pro-armament position and there he
remained. The intellectual detachment he displayed in his early
writings was clearly abandoned during the election speeches of 1946,
but that was to be expected since he was now playing a different
role. Kennedy entered the Cold War earlier than most but, as has
been suggested, the shift in his thinking toward Russia between the
spring of 1945 at the San Francisco conference and the campaign in the
fall of 1946, to some degree reflected the changing climate of opinion
in the United States in general during this period, and most especially
in his district.

There are a few points that should be emphasized. To a large
extent, Kennedy's views seem to be much like the views of others of
his generation. The main difference was that, because of his father's

position and money, he was privileged to have a greater exposure to

29

foreign affairs. During this period of his life, also, the influence
of his father's opinions on his thinking cannot be overemphasized.

As one observer noted, very accurately, some of the ideas Kennedy
developed in Why Ehgland Slept guided his thinking for the remainder
of his life--the difficulty for democracies to adjust to the challenge
of totalitarian states and, most significantly, the importance of
armaments to the conduct of foreign policy.46 The essence of Kennedy's

concluding remarks in Why England Slept was to be repeated many times

 

during his years in Congress: ”We must always keep our armaments equal
to our commitments. Munich should teach us that; we must realize that
any bluff will be called. We cannot tell anyone to keep out of our

hemisphere unless our armaments and the peOple behind these armaments

 

[italics is Kennedy's] are prepared to back up the command, even to

the ultimate point of war."47

In a certain sense Why England Slept seems dated. Based upon the

 

experience of the 1930's, Kennedy was worried that democracies were
unwilling to devote enough of their budgets to armaments. "There is
no lobby for armaments," he said, "as there is for relief or for
agriculture."48 Times have changed. His concern has almost a ring
of quaintness in an era when the defense budget of the United States
is astronomical and many fear the power of the military-industrial
complex. Without doubt, it was Munich, and Hitler's dominance in
armaments, and the searing experience of World War II, and books

such as WhyEngland Slept, which transformed, perhaps forever, Americans'

 

commitment to a colossal defense establishment.

In this regard, one final word must be said of Munich because it

30

had a profound influence on Kennedy and all post World War II politicians
and statesmen. The Munich Conference of 1938 was clearly the most
controversial episode in international relations between the wars.

It was the high point of appeasement. It has since become common to
conclude that if there had been no concessions made at Munich, if a

hard line had been taken, there would have been no World War II.

Even though today there is still no agreed interpretation of Munich
among historians, foreign policy-makers in the post-war world repeatedly
point to the "lesson" of Munich. It became for many the one certain
lesson of the 1930's--aggression must be checked early and forcibly

and negotiation Of issues must not be considered, except from a

position of military superiority, because of the insatiable appetites

of aggressors. Negotiation could invite greater transgressions. A

hard line seemed the only sensible course to pursue.

There developed something of a Munich syndrome in the post-war
world; there was a certain fear to negotiate.49 The so—called lesson
of Munich became one of the accepted premises in the deliberations
of the Cold War. Many were quick to draw historical analogies and
the practice has continued to the present day. Historical parallels
are usually inapprOpriate and risky at best, but that does not prevent
them from being drawn.

All this warrants emphasis because during Kennedy's years in
Congress the "lesson" Of Munich and the resultant frame of mind was a
dominant influence on the discussion and formulation of foreign
policy; And the memory of Munich, coupled with the threat from
another "aggressor", was especially sharp when Kennedy entered the

House of Representatives in January, 1947.

FOOTNOTES

1For a full account of Joseph P. Kennedy's role as ambassador

see: William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to
Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952); Gordon
A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (ed.), The Diplomats 1919-1939 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 649-681; Richard J. Whalen,
The FoundinghFather: The Story of Joseph P. Kennedy (New York: The
New American Library, 1964), 207-348.

 

 

2Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 58.

 

3Craig and Gilbert, The Diplomats, p. 661.

 

41bid., p. 660.

51bid., p. 664-665,

6James MacGregor Burns, John Kennedy, A Political Profile (New
York: Harcourt, Brace 8 World, Inc., 1959), p. 37.

7Harold Faber (ed.), The Kennedy Years (New York: The Viking
Press, 1964), p. 21. Kennedy was interviewed by a Boston Globe
reporter on January 24, 1939, shortly before he departed for England.

 

 

8A report came back that Kennedy shocked the British in Palestine
by wearing a lounge suit instead of the traditional morning coat to
the British High Commissioner's party given in honor of King George VI's
birthday. See Boston Globe, June 9, 1939. Kennedy's father had created
a similar stir in England because of his violations of tradition.

 

9For an account of the trip see Burns, p. 37-38.

10Quoted in Burns, p. 38.

11Jan Wszelaki (ed.), John F. Kennedy and Poland! Selection of

Documents! 1948-1963 (New Yofk: Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences
in America, Inc., 1964), p. vi.

 

12Goddard Lieberson and Joan Meyers (ed.), John Fitzgerald

Kennedy. . .As We Remember Him (New York: A Columbia Records Legacy
Collection Book, 1965), p. 35.

 

31

32

13Ibid., p. 33.

14Over the years there has been some question as to the degree of

help Kennedy received in writing the thesis and subsequent book.
Certainly, he had privileged access to his father's files and benefited
from his advice as well as others. The historian John Wheeler Bennett,
for instance, is thanked in the preface of the book for his suggestions.
But informed Opinion makes it clear that the work was mainly the result
of his own efforts. In an Oral History for the John F. Kennedy Library
Waltham, Massachusetts, Arthur Krock recalled when Kennedy first brought
the thesis to him: "It was in the shape of his senior thesis at Harvard
which his professor had given good marks to, but his father wanted me
to read it, I suppose; I doubt that Jack would have had any idea of
showing it to me particularly, but I had been visiting the Embassy

in London at the time that the war was developing and the time of
Munich and since this book concerned the study of the reasons for
Britain's lack of preparedness, for the war that came, I assumed that's
why his father suggested that he should show it to me. At any rate,

it was amateurish in many respects but not, certainly not, as much

as most writings in that category are. And the result was that I told
him I thought it would make a very welcome and very useful book, and

I would if he wanted me to, and his father wanted me to, I would

attempt to get him a publisher, but before we thought of that it ought
to be gone over a bit. So he would come to my library in Georgetown
and we would work over the book a bit but I can't say that I did more
than polish it and amend it here and there, because it was very, very
definitely his own product."

 

15George Bilainkin, Diary of a Diplomatic Correspondent (London:
George Allen 6 Unwin, 1942), p. 194.

 

16Ralph G. Martin and Ed. Plaut, Front Runner, Dark Horse (Garden

City: Doubleday 8 Company, Inc., 1960), p. 127-128.

 

17John F. Kennedy, Why England Slept) (New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc.,

1940), p. xxvii-xxviii.

 

18Cited in Burns, John Kennedy, p. 43.

 

19Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. xxi-xxii.

 

201bid., p. 157.

21Ibid., p. 226. This was a major theme of Stanley Baldwin's in

the House of Commons in 1935 and after and probably influenced Kennedy's
thinking. See Winston Churchill's The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 216.

 

33

22See: Christian Science Monitor, (August 31, 1940), p. 10;

Commonweal, (September 13, 1940), p. 433; Current History and Forum,
(September, 1940), p. 6; New Republic, (September 16, 1940), p. 393;
New York Times, (August 11, 1940), p. 3; Saturday Review of Literature,
(September 7, 1940), p. 20; Spectator (October 18, 1940), p. 391;
Times Literary Supplement, (October 12, 1940), p. 514.

 

 

 

 

 

23Review of Why England Slept by John F. Kennedy, London Times
Literary Supplement, (October 12, 1940), p. 514.

 

 

 

24For an excellent summation of the issue see: D. C. Watt,

"Appeasement, The Rise of A Revisionist School?”, Political Quarterly,
XXXVI (1965), p. 191-213; and "Appeasement Reconsidéred, Some Neglected
Factors," Round Table, LIII (1962/63), p. 358-371.

 

 

25For a full analysis of this aspect of the issue see: D. C. Watt,

”The Influence of the Commonwealth on British Foreign Policy: The Case
of the Munich Crisis," in Personalities and Policies: Studies in the
Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, (1965),
p. 159-176.

 

26Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. 192-193.

 

27The background information on Kennedy's letter tO>Moody was
taken from: "A Dreamer Wide Awake," American Heritege, (October, 1965),
p. 71. The original letter is in the Michigan Historical Collections
at the University of Michigan where it was deposited by Senator Moody's
widow after his death in 1954. The letter, with a brief introduction,
was published in American Heritege, October, 1965, p. 71.

 

 

28Paul B. "Red" Fay, Jr., a long-time Kennedy friend, and former

officer in Kennedy's PT Boat squadron, stated later that the officers

of the squadron "used to gather in his quarters and get him talking

on world affairs, politics, and the war. We enjoyed it more than
playing poker." See: Joe McCarthy, The Remarkable Kennedys (New York:
The Dial Press, 1960), p. 188. Another war-time friend, James A. Reed,
recalled a spirited argument over Chamberlain and.Munich in which, of
course, Kennedy argued in behalf of Chamberlain. Not surprisingly, Reed,
who had taken the position against Chamberlain, was impressed by
Kennedy's "knowledge" on the subject. See: Lieberson G Meyers (ed.),
John Fitzgerald Kenneey, p. 39.

 

29See Victor Lasky, JFK, The Man a The Myth (New York: The

Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 86-87; and Burns, John Kennedy, p. 55 for
an analysis of the essay.

 

 

30Lasky, p. 87.

34

31These columns are found in the New York Journal American
(April 28, 30, and May 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 16, l8, 19, 21, 23 and
28, 1945).

 

32These columns are found in the New York Journal American (June
24, July 10, and 27, 1945).

 

33Ibid., April 30, 1945.

34Ibid., June 24, 1945.

35See: Arthur Krock Oral History, p. 12, John F. Kennedy Library,

Waltham, Massachusetts.

 

36James Tracy Crown, The Kennedy Literature: A Bibliographical

Essey on John F. Kennedy (New York: New York University Press, 1968),
p. 31.

 

37Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper 6 Row, Inc.,
1965), p. 16.

38Ibid., p. 15.

39For his father's assessment see: Lieberson 6 Meyers (ed.)

John Fitegerald Kennedy, p. 26.

 

40For a useful discussion of the shifting political alliances in

the district see: Burns, p. 58-62. J. J. Huthmacher's Massachusetts
People and Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959),
offers a much more comprehensive and definitive account.

 

 

41See Boston Globe, December 8, 1945 and Look, June 11, 1946, p. 32.

 

42The most thorough account of the 1946 campaign is in Burns,

p. 64-70.

43See: Time, July 1, 1946, p. 23.

44The speech can be found at the John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham
Massachusetts, Pre-Presidential Papers, Boston Office Files, 1946-1952,
Box #25. For newspaper coverage ofgthe speech see the Boston Globe,
October 22, 1946.

 

 

45See: Boston Globe, November 21, 1946.

 

35

46Crown, The Kennednyiterature, p. 52.

 

47Why England Slept, p. 183-184.

 

48Ibid., p. 180.

49It seems clear that it was to this state of mind to which Kennedy
himself referred years later in his Inaugural Address: "Let us never
negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

CHAPTER II

COLD WARRIOR, 1947-1950

During Kennedy's first two terms in Congress, from 1947 to 1950,
he was mainly preoccupied with the bread-and-butter domestic concerns
of his district. According to James MacGregor Burns, Kennedy closely
followed the Truman Fair Deal policies; he favored labor, social-welfare
programs, broadened social security, higher minimum wage provisions,
more immigration and, most importantly for his district, expanded
housing programs for veterans.1 However, Kennedy Spoke out on the
major foreign policy issues of the day.

The Cold War was the dominant reality in international relations.
To many Americans at the time it seemed that Communism was winning in
the struggle for power in the world. These were the years when the
Truman Doctrine, the policy of containment, the Marshall Plan, the
Berlin airlift, NATO, the Point Four program of technical assistance,
the Korean War, the House Un-American Activities Committee, Senator
Joseph McCarthy, Alger Hiss, and the charge that President Truman
was "soft" on Communism, became topics of major public concern in
the United States. American attitudes toward the Soviet Union and
the Communist world hardened when, in early 1948, Czechoslovakia fell
into the Soviet orbit and more especially, in 1949, when the Chinese
Communists forced Chiang Kai-shek to flee the mainland of China

for Formosa. The "loss" of China unleashed a bitter storm of criticism.

36

37

Truman and the State Department were charged by Republicans, and

many Democrats, with responsibility for the loss. In fact, many

alleged that Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Chinese had been
"sold-out" by a pro-Communist clique in the United States Government.
This line of criticism was, in part, a continuation of the anti-Roosevelt
feeling caused by what many considered the "betrayal" of China and

Poland at the Yalta Conference.

As a young freshman Congressman with a keen interest in foreign
affairs, of course, Kennedy was swept up in the public debate over these
issues. In addition to his being strongly defense-minded, there were
several important characteristics to his thinking during this early
phase of his career that deserve emphasis. First, and most striking,
was his stridently anti-Communist attitude; he was among the first to
ride the bandwagon of anti-Sovietism. Second, although he fully
supported much of the Truman Administration's foreign policy, the
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, he very early ascribed to the
"betrayal" theses on Poland and China and bitterly attacked these
aspects of the Roosevelt and Truman record in foreign policy. Third,
although Kennedy and his father were both violently anti-Soviet,
and although their views coincided at times, they increasingly took
opposite positions on the issues of the day. This indicates, at least,
that the son was beginning to grow independent of the father's
influence.

Joseph P. Kennedy continued to advocate a policy of isolationism
as the most prudent course for the United States to follow. He favored
the fortress America concept and considered foreign assistance programs

a waste. John Kennedy, in contrast, perhaps as a concession to his

38

party's policy, supported foreign economic and military programs
although he demanded that the Allied nations of Western Europe do
more to bear their share of the burden. Unlike his son, Joseph
Kennedy opposed both the Truman Doctrine's aid to Greece and Turkey
and the Marshall Plan's authorization of aid to Western EurOpe.

President Truman first outlined his program of aid to Greece and
Turkey on.March 12, 1947, before a joint session of Congress. In
Boston five days later, Congressman Kennedy told an audience: "If
Greece and Turkey go down, the road to the Near East is Open. We
have no alternative but to support the President's policy."2 In a
lengthy speech at the University Of North Carolina several days later,
on March 27, he further outlined his reasons for his complete support
of the Doctrine and he defended the policy as being "consistent"
with America's traditional foreign policy even though, in point of
fact, the Truman Doctrine actually reversed the nonintervention
principle of the Monroe Doctrine.3

In his speech Kennedy answered the various Objections that had
been raised against the Truman Doctrine. Although the Doctrine was
generally popular with the American public, critics charged that it
would cost too much; that it would weaken the United Nation's influence;
that it could goad the Soviet Union into war; and that it established
a precedent of meddling in the internal affairs of other nations.
Kennedy argued that the United Nations was not capable of handling
the problem at that time. Further, he disputed the view that
international loans were unfriendly acts which enhanced the prospects
of war. He feared that American neutrality or inaction on this
question would result in the loss of Greece and Turkey and open the

Middle East to Russian expansion. Moreover, he argued that war with

39

the Soviet Union could come as a result of that country underestimating
American resolve. At this point in his speech, he recalled how Nazi
Germany's intelligence system had misled Hitler into believing that
Britain and France would do nothing if Poland were invaded in 1939.
Kennedy then contended that Russia's information gathering system was
among the poorest in the world because of the absence of Russian
newspapermen, foreign traders and tourists through the world. Because
of possible misinformation, he argued, Russia might attack a country
while believing that the United States would not respond in its defense.
Due to this possibility, he believed the Truman Doctrine would clarify
America's resolve to the Soviet Union and thus avert any repetition
of the process that led to World War II. All in all, this was an
unusual defense of the Truman Doctrine. However, the central theme
of American foreign policy at issue, Kennedy concluded, was "the
prevention of Russian domination of EurOpe and Asia."4

Throughout his first two terms in Congress, Kennedy consistently
urged that America bolster the nations of Western Europe against the
threat of Communism. On November 20, 1947, he rose in the House of
Representatives and spoke in favor of Secretary of State Marshall's
request for a grant of $227 million interim aid to Italy on the grounds
that Italy "can become a bastion of democracy in EurOpe" in its struggle
against the Communist Party of Italy.5 In part, at least, his speech
was designed to appeal to the Italian-American sector of his constituency
for he had the speech printed for wide distribution. Italian-Americans
were numerous in Kennedy's district and he was naturally influenced
by their interests. His campaign literature stressed that he was

the only Congressman who had ever been decorated by the Italian

40

Government for his constant assistance to Americans of Italian descent.
In his speech, his anti-Soviet attitude was apparent. He spoke of the
"cold contempt" that was the attitude of the Soviet Government,
"which seeks to destroy the freedoms of all peoples everywhere."

In mid-February, 1948, Kennedy had an interesting interview with

the Boston Globe.6 The purpose of the interview was to see if the

 

author of Why England Slept saw any parallels between England's situation
in the 1930's and America's position in 1948. Kennedy stated that

their positions were similar in the sense that they were both democracies
facing a struggle against totalitarianism. However, the main difference
as he perceived it, was that England during the 1930's was not aware

of the Nazi danger whereas America in 1948, he said, was "very definitely
aware of the Russian menace." Kennedy stated that he still favored a
strong defense program although he was "not quite sure" if the emphasis
should be on a powerful airforce or a strong peace-time army. He

voiced his complete approval to the Marshall Plan as a bulwark against
Russian expansion, and termed the program "the only hope for world
peace". British public Opinion during the 1930's had worried that

a strong defense program and a build-up in armaments would indicate a
lack of faith in the League of Nations and could lead to war. Kennedy
was asked if he saw a similar attitude in America in 1948. His answer
was a strong, "No". "The measures before Congress right now prove it,"
he said. "And the people today aren't afraid defense measures will
indicate a lack of faith in the United Nations. If you're strong in
national defense, you have a force for maintaining your own security
because a strong national defense will result in diplomatic strength."

Shortly after this interview, in a speech in which he again

 

41

strongly supported the Marshall Plan, Kennedy unleashed his first attack
on President Roosevelt's war-time foreign policy.7 It is entirely
possible that in his criticism of Roosevelt, he was, in part at least,
echoing the sentiments of his father. He branded Roosevelt's Lend
Lease program with Russia as America's "greatest mistake during World
War II." He was speaking in Boston to a mass meeting of Lithuanian
societies. It was a receptive audience for this kind of speech, of
course. Lithuania, like the other former Baltic nations, had been
annexed by the Soviet Union; a fact that the United States (officially)
refused to recognize. Kennedy urged passage of the Marshall Plan
to prevent further Russian aggression. Lithuania, and especially
Lithuanian-Americans, received Kennedy's attention again in early 1949
when he rose in the House of Representatives to pay honor to the 3lst
Anniversary of the Lithuanian Declaration of Independence even though
that independence, he noted, existed "only in their hearts."8 He
praised the United States for not granting official recognition to
”Russia's greedy annexation.”9

In a Massachusetts speech in March, 1948, Kennedy again slapped
at Roosevelt's war-time foreign policy, this time more boldly.10 He
told his audience that the Communist grab of Poland and Czechoslovakia
was the direct result of the Yalta and Teheran Conferences where
Roosevelt failed to recognize that he had been misled by Stalin. He
contended that Roosevelt had been "fooled completely" by the mistaken
belief that he could trust Stalin. Secretary of State Marshall came
in for criticism also. This was in reference to China and Kennedy
claimed that Marshall erred when he encouraged Chinese Communist

participation in the Chinese National Government. Kennedy's speech

42

was delivered more than a year before the Chinese Communists ousted
Chiang Kai-shek. When Chiang fled the mainland for Formosa in 1949,
Kennedy's criticism of Marshall became much more bitter and emotional.
In subsequent speeches, he continued to attack both Roosevelt's
wartime policy toward Russia and Marshall's attempt to form a coalition
government in China. Speaking in Massachusetts in the spring of

1948, Kennedy held that the coalition concept was a mistake. However,
he was by no means clear as to what alternate policy he favored.

He appeared to be hopelessly confused; he concluded that the answer to
the China situation was either to send more relief to China or to
attempt once again to forge some type of coalition government.11 On
this issue his criticisms shed more heat than light.

Kennedy's criticism of Roosevelt's war-time foreign policy reached
its height when he spoke to the Massachusetts Association of Polish-
American Citizens Club in Roxbury on June 6, 1948. The bold head-
line in the next morning's Boston Herald read: 'KENNEDY SAYS ROOSEVELT

SOLD POLAND TO REDS.12 This happened, Kennedy declared, because

 

 

Roosevelt did not understand the Russian mind." TO his Polish—America
audience, he advocated passage of an immigration bill, which would
have aided Polish citizens, and predicted that the Marshall Plan would
forge non-Communist Europe into a great third power. This optimism
was tempered slightly when Kennedy made a brief tour of Europe in

the summer of 1948 which persuaded him that the Marshall Plan was not
working satisfactorily. He stated that Europe was shirking its
responsibilities. He was constantly wary of the European Allies not
bearing their share of the burden and relying too heavily upon

United States aid.13

43

Kennedy's most emotional revolt against the Democratic Party's
foreign policy came in January of 1949, when it became apparent that
Chiang's position in China was hopeless. In January, 1949, Mao Tse-tung
and the Chinese Communists captured Peking and destroyed the main
Nationalist force north of the Yangtze. In the House of Representatives
on January 25, Kennedy levelled a scathing one minute address against
President Truman, the State Department, and certain prestigious Far
Eastern scholars.14

"Mr. Speaker," he intoned, "over this weekend we have learned
the extent of the disaster that has befallen China and the United
States. The responsibility for the failure of our foreign policy in
the Far East rests squarely with the White House and the Department
of State.

"The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming,
unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed, was a
crippling blow to the National Government.

"So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the
Lattimores and the Fairbanks,15 with the imperfection of the democratic
system in China after 20 years of war and the tales of corruption
in high places that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a
non-Communist China.

"Our policy, in the words of the Premier of the National
Government, Sun Fo, of vacillation, uncertainty, and confusion has
reaped the whirlwind.

”This House must now assume the responsibility of preventing
the onrushing tide of Communism from engulfing all of Asia."

Just a few days later, on January 30, Kennedy expanded upon this

44

. . . . . . l6
cr1t1c1sm in a h1ghly intemperate speech at Salem, Massachusetts.

He wanted to "search out and spotlight," he said, "those who must

bear the responsibility of our present predicament." He briefly

sketched the United States's war-time efforts to aid China and

concluded that at Yalta a "sick Roosevelt, with the advice of General

Marshall and other Chiefs of Staff, gave the Kurile Islands, as well

as the control of various strategic Chinese ports, such as Port

Arthur and Dairen, to the Soviet Union." He castigated the Roosevelt

and Truman Administrations for trying to force Chiang Kai-shek to bring

Chinese Communists into his government and blamed General Marshall for

not giving full military support to Chiang's National Government.

United States assistance, he decried, was "too little and too late"

and Marshall "blundered". Kennedy even criticized President Truman

and the United States State Department for their treatment of

Madame Chiang Kai-shek which in his opinion bordered on "indifference,

if not contempt." Kennedy again lashed out at the professional

diplomats and their advisers "the Lattimores and the Fairbanks"

and concluded that in the tragic story of China: ”What our young

men had saved, our diplomats and our President have frittered away."
James MacGregor Burns commented, quite prOperly, that these

were far stronger words than Kennedy had used against Chamberlain

and the proponents of appeasement in Why England Slept, ten years

 

before.17 Then he had perceived the complexities underlying

public policy. Here he did not. He gave no indication that he

had an understanding of the complex forces within China which
produced the Communist victory. Many wondered about Kennedy's motive

in attacking the leader of his party and so respected a figure as

45

General Marshall. And why did he not fear political retaliation

from the leadership of his party? Burns quoted Kennedy as explaining:
"We were just worms over in the House--nobody pays much attention to
us nationally, and I had come back from the Service not as a
Democratic wheelhorse who came up through the ranks--I came in sort
of sideways. . . . I never had the feeling I needed Truman."18 His
speeches certainly indicated that he did not consider Truman's
support essential to his political future.

Kennedy differed with President Truman and the Democratic Party‘s
foreign policy position on other issues as well. In February, 1949,
shortly after his initial speeches on China, he voted to kill a bill
to extend the Reciprocal Trade Program, although when the bill
finally passed he reversed his position and voted in its favor. Quite
accurately, Burns interpreted Kennedy's opposition to the three-year
extension of the Trade Agreements Act as an attack on one of the
programs most sacred to the Democratic Party-~the reciprocal trade
policies created by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and backed by
both Roosevelt and Truman.19 A further example of Kennedy's revolt
against President Truman was his public complaint about the inadequacies
of the nation's civil defense regarding air raid shelters.20

He also Opposed the Truman Administration's economy program
in the defense establishment. He preferred a seventy-group air force
over the fifty-five groups requested by Secretary of Defense Louis A.
Johnson. Defense Secretary Johnson, who had succeeded James Forrestal
in the post, was denounced in many quarters for the country's state
Of military unpreparedness; critics argued that he had overly

emphasized economy and sacrificed security. And in February, 1950,

46

Kennedy inserted an article by Joseph and Stewart Alsop into the
Cohgpessional Record in which they warned of the effect that defense
economy was having on the American defense structure. In his intro-
duction to the article in direct reference to Defense Secretary Johnson,
Kennedy declared: "Important economies should be made in other sec-
tions of our appropriations because upon the degree of strength in
our armed services rests our survival."21

However, it was on the "loss" of China that Kennedy clashed
most dramatically with the Truman Administration. In December, 1949,
Chiang Kai—shek and his defeated army fled to Formosa and a heated
controversy develOped in America over whether Chiang and the Nationalists
on Formosa should receive United States military aid and support. For
a variety of reasons, the Truman Administration staunchly opposed the
granting of such aid. But many leading Republicans demanded action.
At this time there were many "Asia-first" Republicans who urged a
strong American military commitment to Chiang and the Nationalists.
Ironically, many of these Republicans were isolationist-minded when
it came to the question of American assistance to Europe. During
this period, certain of the more bellicose "Asia-first" Republicans
were charging that China had fallen to the Communists because there
were Communist agents in the United States State Department who
had blocked any effective aid to Chiang and the Nationalists. The
highly publicized trial and conviction of the former State
Department officer, Alger Hiss, made this charge seem credible to
many Americans.

In some of his speeches on the China issue, Kennedy appeared to

share some of the views of the "Asia-first" Republicans. In January,

47

1950, he spoke to a Veterans of Foreign Wars conference. He warned
that the United States lacked a policy in the Far East and declared that
"in our zeal to protect the integrity of Western Europe we are per-
mitting the Russians to gain dominance over an area containing a
billion people.22 He demanded a "shake-up" of the Far East section
by the State Department, he said, "so that those who were connected
with our failure in the Far East may not have further jurisdiction

in that area." Regarding Truman's refusal to provide military aid

to Chiang, Kennedy voiced his complete agreement with General Douglas
MacArthur and the Chiefs of Staff, and others who urged that the
United States send military aid and advisers to Formosa. He likened
the situation to that of Greece and Turkey when the Truman Doctrine
was implemented. "Unless we take immediate and vigorous action," he
concluded, "our lack of policy in the Far East will reap the whirl-
winds. Our bases in the Far Pacific, from the Philippines to Alaska,
must be brought up to date, and the Communists must be clearly warned
that any military act against the countries to the South of it will
be viewed as a threat to the security of the United States."

In all of Kennedy's fiery outbursts against the Truman Administra—
tion's China policy, he was stronger on criticism than positive
proposals. And he was also guilty of the very error in judgment he
saw in the critics of Chamberlain's policy at Munich as outlined in
his Why England Slept. Then he had carefully examined the various
underlying causes which explained the necessity of Chamberlain's
appeasement policy and he had warned against over-simplification and

the making of scapegoats. But on the China issue he fell victim to

the same sort of over-simplification which caused him to search for

48

scapegoats. For the most part he spoke in sweeping generalities and
did not come to grips with the problem of delineating a specific policy
which might have been effective, or for that matter, even helpful.
The day came, however, some years later, when he modified his
view Of Truman's China policy. In these early years he was a leading
exponent of what came to be known as the China Lobby line. The China
Lobby included both Republican and Democratic critics of Truman's
China policy, who favored a hard line against Communist China and
support for Chiang, in the hopes of re-establishing a non-Communist China
on the mainland. But gradually, over the years, Kennedy's attitude
evolved to where he favored a more flexible and conciliatory policy.
From the mid 1950's on, for example, he urged the exclusion of the
off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu from the Formosa Straits
defensive perimeter not only because of their military vulnerability
but because he considered them a needless irritant in Sino-American
relations. In several of his speeches during the 1950's, he
acknowledged that he had modified his 1949 opinion on Truman's
China policy. When a Republican Congressman in 1961 quoted one of
his free-wheeling 1949 China speeches Kennedy made this response:
"In my speech of 1949 I placed more emphasis on personalities than
I would today. . . . I would say that my view today is more in
accordance with the facts than my view in 1949."23
In the summer of 1950, Kennedy focused his concern on EurOpe
rather than the Far East. This was a surprising development for two
reasons. First, he had stated in previous speeches that, in his view,

the United States had neglected the Far East in favor of Western Europe.

49

And secondly, in the summer of 1950, the Korean War had broken out.
Considering Kennedy's earlier blasting of Truman for the inadequacy of
his policy against Communist aggression in China, one would have
expected him to give enthusiastic support to the President's forceful
policy in Korea, but such was not the case. Not only that, during
this period when American eyes were glued on Korea, Kennedy was
warning that Western Europe was in military danger from Russia and
arguing that the United States should send sufficient American
divisions there to demonstrate to the Europeans, and to the Russians,
the United States commitment to that area. "Western Europe armed
forces," he stated, "are in a deplorable condition in relation to

the strength the Soviets could bring to that area."24 This required,
he realized, the mobilization of additional American troops to

send to EurOpe, and in the debate over appropriations for the Mutual
Assistance Act, that was precisely what he called for. Mere financial
aid to the area was "a waste of money," he concluded, "unless we are
willing to raise troops and put them in Western Europe."

In connection with his concern over Western Europe's military
vulnerability, Kennedy Offered an amendment to the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1949, which was being debated on the floor of the
House of Representatives on July 19, 1950.25 He indicated that
he favored realism and expediency in foreign policy and suggested that
a nation should not be restricted by moral or ideological considerations.
He felt that it was unfortunate that Spain was excluded from the
current United States military assistance program to Europe. His

amendment would have given Spain $74 million in military assistance.

50

Many American and European liberals opposed aid to the Fascist regime
in Spain for ideological and moral reasons but Kennedy regarded this
as unrealistic. He argued, simply, that Spain could make a substan-
tial contribution to the defense of Western Europe and pointed out
that the United States gave aid to Marshall Tito, the Communist
dictator of Yugoslavia, even though that government was not completely
acceptable ideologically: "If we are willing to help Yugoslavia
in her struggle for independence from Russia because it is to our
benefit," he concluded, "so we should be willing to help Spain."
Kennedy continued to hold this view. Nearly five years later, on
May 24, 1955, he was one of the authors of concurrent resolution
#34 which called for Spain's admission to NATO.

As his speech on aid to Spain illustrated, Kennedy favored a
pragmatic, flexible approach to foreign policy. He made this
attitude more evident on September 22, 1950, when he inserted into

the Congressional Record a letter to the editor of the New York Times

 

 

which openly advocated expediency in foreign policy.26 The letter,
written by William S. Reisman, who supported an American alliance
with Franco's Spain, cited various instances in the past when the
United States had formed alliances or close working relationships
with anti-democratic powers. This practice began, he noted, with
America's alliance with the very undemocratic, absolute monarchy

of Louis XVI of France during the Revolutionary War and it appeared
again when President Lincoln courted the friendship and aid of

Czar Alexander 11 of Russia during the Civil War. It was very evident
in the 20th Century, he contended, first when President Wilson fought

against German imperialism "with every other imperialist nation in

51

the world" and again during World War II when the United States was allied
with the Soviet Union. Reisman concluded his letter by stating that
it was indefensible for "confused liberals" to refuse to accept reality
on "moral" grounds. This, apparently, was Kennedy's view as well.
There was one other instance during 1950 when Kennedy inserted
in the Conghessional Record a statement concerning foreign policy
which further illustrated his thinking at that time. The issue this
time was the nation's defense program. For some months during 1950,
a group of scholars (including John K. Fairbank, whom Kennedy had
earlier denounced) from the Harvard and.Massachusetts Institute Of
Technology faculties had been meeting to discuss the problem of
American security, and specifically, the issue of America's national
defense policy.27 It was this group's conclusion that the defense
policy of the United States was weakened by relying too heavily on the
use of atomic weapons and strategic bombardment or, in other words,
massive retaliation. They urged that steps be taken immediately to
correct the deficiencies in conventional armaments. This was a posi-
tion that Kennedy was to argue consistently with the Eisenhower
Administration through the 1950's. He opposed Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles' reliance upon massive retaliation. Since this
document constituted his first reference to the problem it is quite
possibly the original source of his attitude on the subject. The
document outlined several reasons why the United States' predominant
reliance on atomic warfare weakened the defense posture of the country.
The first argument, and the one used most frequently by Kennedy in
subsequent speeches on the issue, was that a policy relying on

atomic weapons and strategic air power was not well equipped to deal

52

with the problems of limited aggression or guerrilla warfare. Only
a conventional military force, which could supplement the bomb as
a deterrent, would be an effective response to guerrilla war. 80, even
though a defense policy with its emphasis on atomic weapons promised
great economies in financial outlay, or what became commonly known
under Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson as ”a
bigger bang for the buck," these scholars, and later Kennedy himself,
were urging the development and buildup of conventional military forces,
which would provide the President with an option of responses. Of
course, one of the prime aims of both the Truman and Eisenhower
Administrations was to try to hold defense costs down and these
suggestions were not especially helpful in that respect.

On November 10, 1950, Kennedy addressed a small seminar of
Harvard University students and professors.28 He was very candid
and his remarks caused a sensation. John P. Mallon, then a teaching
fellow in government at Harvard was present and in 1952, during
Kennedy's election campaign against Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. for the

Senate, Mallon published his account of the seminar in the New Republic,

 

which caused some embarrassment to Kennedy. During the seminar,
according to Mallon, Kennedy said that "(3) he could see no reason
why we were fighting in Korea; (b) he thought that sooner or later
we would "have to get all these foreigners Off our backs" in Europe;
(c) he supported the McCarran Act and felt that not enough had been
done about Communists in government; (d) that he rather respected
Joe McCarthy and thought he "knew Joe pretty well and he may have
something;" (e) that he had no great respect for Dean Acheson or

indeed almost any member of the Fair Deal Administration; (f) that he

S3

personally was very happy that Helen Gahagan Douglas (a noted liberal)
had just been defeated in California by Richard Nixon." The article,
of course, was a bombshell during the 1952 campaign and especially
angered liberals who never really trusted Kennedy anyway. Friends

and supporters of Kennedy, of course, challenged the accuracy of

some of'Mallon's statements, but James MacGregor Burns, who inter-
viewed witnesses of the episode, indicated that Mallon's account was
essentially accurate.29 Strictly on the question of foreign policy
Kennedy's remarks generally conform to the sentiments expressed in

his previous speeches, but his reference to getting the Europeans

"off our backs" was somewhat contrary to his public stance and appeared
to be more in line with his father's isolationist views on the subject.
However, the remark was ambiguous. Getting the Europeans "off our
backs" may have referred to getting them to contribute more to the
NATO defence forces and their own security, and this would be consis-
tent with his earlier statements. Kennedy's earlier castigation of
President Truman, General George Marshall, the State Department,

Owen Lattimore and John K. Fairbank was not unlike the later sledge-
hammer blows Joe McCarthy ultimately directed against the same subjects.
80 it was not surprising that Kennedy should imply sympathy for
McCarthy's efforts.

The motivation for Kennedy's maverick speeches on foreign policy
puzzled many observers. If he was not adhering to the Democratic
Party's policy line, as he clearly was not, then was he merely
echoing the sentiments of his father? There were some similarities

in their views. However, there were many more instances where Kennedy

expressed opinions which were diametrically opposed to the views of

54

his father. Unlike his son, Joseph Kennedy was flatly against
United States military involvement in Europe, or the Far East for
that matter. If necessary, he was willing to write off Western
Europe to Communism.

In a well-publicized speech at the University of Virginia in
December, 1950, Joseph Kennedy denounced the foreign policy of the
Truman Administration as "suicidal" and "morally bankrupt". He
favored abandoning Asia and Europe in the face of the "massed
manpower and military strength of a type that the world has never
seen."30 He preferred to concentrate United States troops and arms
strictly in the Western Hemisphere. It was the voice of the isolation-
ist. His viewpoint was essentially the same as the one he held prior
to World War 11. Korea, he said, was a "costly and staggering extra-
vaganza." Postwar handouts to Western Europe, he contended, had
netted the United States not one "foul-weather friend." He depicted
the United Nations as a "hopeless instrumentality for world peace."
America must rely on its own strength and restrict it commitments
and the first was "to get out of Korea. . . ." He held the same
view toward EurOpe. "What have we gained by staying in Berlin?" he
asked. "Everyone knows we can be pushed out the moment the Russians
choose to push us out. Isn't it better to get out more and use
the resources that otherwise would be sacrificed, at a point that
counts?" Clearly, unlike his son, Joseph Kennedy recognized no
vital American interest in Western Europe.

During this period, 1947 to 1950, Joseph Kennedy attacked the

United States' loan to Britain, the Truman Doctrine's aid to Greece

55
and Turkey, and by implication at least, the Marshall Plan. John
Kennedy supported all these policies, and in addition urged a United
States troop commitment to Western EurOpe. Although they both criticized
aspects of Truman's foreign policy, Joseph Kennedy's criticism was much
more far-reaching and all inclusive. For the most part, Joseph Kennedy
opposed overseas commitments whereas John Kennedy supported foreign
economic and military commitments even though he was determined that
the Allies carry their share of the burden. Given all their
differences of opinion, it does not seem adequate to simply suggest
that Joseph Kennedy's influence inspired his son to revolt against
parts of Truman's foreign policy.

Kennedy's main criticism of Truman was with his China policy. Con-
sidering the high-pitched emotionalism in America at the time of the
"loss" of China, and the fuzzy and shallow thinking Kennedy displayed
on the issue, it is probable that he was genuinely shocked and that his
speeches were the result of an instinctive, emotional reaction. It is
also probable that his Speeches were conceived primarily as popular
attention-getting devices rather than as substantive critiques Of policy.
His speeches were undoubtedly popular with his strongly anti-Communist
constituency. The issue allowed him to play the maverick against the
leadership of his party without antagonizing local interests. And
Kennedy later acknowledged that he never had the feeling that he needed
Truman. Victor Lasky contends that Kennedy's personal revolt against
the Truman Administration was motivated in part by the findings of
pollsters, financed by his father, which concluded that Truman's
policies, particularly in the foreign policy sphere, were becoming
increasingly unpopular in Massachusetts.31

As Kennedy's second term in Congress drew to a close in 1950,

56

he focused on an issue that became a major theme of his Congressional
years-~that of anti-colonialism. Specifically, he referred to France's
struggle with the Viet Minh nationalists in Indochina. His speech at
Boston University on May 26, 1950, was the first of his many addresses
on the problems in French Indochina.:52 Kennedy spoke of the steadily
mounting pressure against the French in Indochina and he emphasized
the necessity for France to win the support of the Indochinese people
in that struggle. This was to become the major point of his frequent
speeches on Indochina during the early years of the 1950's. The
Communists, he argued, gained control of the nationalist movements in
Southeast Asia following World War II because nationalism expressed
itself in protest against Western colonial systems. "The Communists
in Southeast Asia rarely sell Communism," he stated. "They sell
nationalism." This was especially true in French Indochina, he said,
the "new frontier" in the Cold War. "In that country the Nationalist
movement held the stirrup by which Ho Chi Minh, a Communist of

unusual ability, has mounted to control." As he was to advocate much
more openly and vigorously following his 1951 visit to Indochina, his
statements in this speech implied that the French should grant increased
independence to the Indochinese states in order to win the support

of the nationalist sentiment.

Kennedy recognized the difficult position of the United States.
America was confronted with a dilemma. "Faced with the choice of
supporting the French or the Communists," he said, "we have had by
necessity to choose the French, and have thus become involved with
a colonial power which is opposed by the majority of the people."

Partly as a result of the disastrous French experience in Indochina,

57

Kennedy began to urge the United States to adopt a clearly defined
anti-colonial policy. In this speech, Kennedy indicated his acceptance
of what came to be known as the "domino theory". In addition, he
believed that America's national interest was at stake in Indochina.
"Not merely the fate of Indochina hangs in the balance," he warned,
"not merely the fate of the whole of Southeast Asia, but in some
measure the fate of the United States." This was a sweeping proclama-
tion. As he was to continue to do, Kennedy firmly backed the sending
of American military assistance to the French but urged that they
make efforts to broaden their pOpular support among the people.

There was to be a persistent contradiction in Kennedy's thinking
on Indochina, and in particular Vietnam. In essence, the French
were waging a colonial war against nationalist forces led by Ho Chi
Minh and the Viet Minh. Kennedy became very well-informed on the
Indochina issue and he clearly recognized that it was nationalism,
not Communism, that was the driving force in Indochina. He Opposed
French colonialism and he consistently urged France to grant "genuine"
independence to the Vietnamese in order to rally the people against
Ho and the Viet Minh. However, enlightened as he was, that was the
contradiction. Ho Chi Minh was the true spokesman for the nationalist
movement in Vietnam and any real independence for that country
necessitated the recognition of that fact. There was no viable third
alternative between French colonial rule and Vietnamese independence
under HO. However, Kennedy consistently Opposed both French colonial
rule and Ho Chi Minh and sought an elusive, and perhaps illusory,

third alternative.

58

During his first two terms in Congress, Kennedy was curiously
inconsistent on the question of whether the United States should
concentrate its efforts in Western Europe or the Far East. In 1949
when he assailed Truman's China policy and again in his speech at
Boston University in the spring of 1950, he asserted that the United
States had "neglected and ignored" the Far East in favor of Western
Europe. But, as has been indicated, he displayed no strong enthusiasm
for Truman's resolute stand on Korea. In fact, in August of 1950,
after the Korean War had begun, he urged increased deployment of
American troops to Western Europe, not the Far East. But in 1951,
following his trip to Southeast Asia, he returned to his earlier
theme and contended that the United States had concentrated its
attention too much in Western Europe. So there was inconsistency but
in general he favored an American commitment to both areas. He
fluctuated on which should receive priority. It is unclear why
Kennedy was lukewarm in his support for Truman's Korean action-—
especially since he was so concerned about the future of the struggle
in French Indochina. It is possible that on the Korean issue, he was
influenced by his father's opposition to the war. However, why should
this be the case when they differed on so many other issues? Many
members of the United Nations, of course, most notably Britain, were
less than enthusiastic in their support for Truman's policy in Korea.
Perhaps Kennedy was influenced by this attitude. In any event, from
his statements and the available evidence, it is unclear why he was
not more consistent in his urging of an increased American commitment

to the Far East.

59

In 1950, Kennedy was about to enter his final term in the House
Of Representatives. During 1951 and 1952, just prior to his
Senate race against Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., he increased the frequency
of his speeches on foreign policy. He was stimulated, in part, by
his two study trips abroad, the first to Europe in early 1951 to gather
information regarding the sending of American ground troops to Western
Europe to bolster that area against a possible Russian attack, and the
second to the Middle and Far East late in 1951. It was this second
six—week trip, in particular, on which he was accompanied by his
brother Robert, that had lasting significance for Kennedy. French
Indochina became the dominant topic of his speeches during these next
few years and once in the Senate, because of his early interest in
the area, many considered Indochina, or Vietnam, to be "his" issue.
In the main, his views on the subject were shaped by the information

he gathered on this 1951 trip.

FOOTNOTES

1James MacGregor Burns, Kennedy, p. 79.

2Boston Post, March 18, 1947.

 

3See: U.S. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, lst Session,
1947, XCIII, Part 10, A1422. In the speech Kennedy stated: "Our
foreign policy is the same as it has always been, from the day that
discerning Monroe first enunciated the principle of the Monroe Doctrine.
It merely means that time and space have brought a new interpretation
to that historical document."

 

4In the spring of 1947, in contrast to his son's view, Joseph
P. Kennedy stated his opposition to the entire concept of the Truman
Doctrine and contended that the United States could best combat
Communism by developing its own prosperity at home. See: New York
Journal—American, May 25, 1947.

 

 

5U.S. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, lst Session, 1947,
XCIII, Part 9, 10695.

6Boston Globe, February 15, 1948.

 

7Ibid., February 16, 1948. For another John F. Kennedy speech
in support of the Marshall Plan see his address to the National Guard
of Massachusetts on January 6, 1948. This speech can be found in the
John F. Kennednyibrary, Waltham, Massachusetts, Pre-Presidential
Papers, 1946-1952, Boston Office Files, Box 25.

 

8U.S. Congressional Record, Blst Congress, lst Session, 1949, XCV,
Part 12, A904.

 

91bid.

 

10For an account of the speech see the Springfield Union (Massachusetts)
March 15, 1948.

 

11Boston News, May 8, 1948.

 

60

61

12Boston Herald, June 7, 1948. Kennedy had earlier expressed his

views to the Polish-Americans in a speech over radio station WCOP (Boston)
delivered to the Polish—American Congress on June 16, 1947. See

John F. Kennednyibrary, Waltham, Massachusetts, Pre-Presidential

Papers, 1946-1952, Boston Office Files, Box 25.

13For an account of his views see the Boston Gazette, September

20, 1948 and the Boston Sundey Post, October 31, 1948.

 

 

14U.S. Congressional Record, 8lst Congress, lst Session, 1949, XCV,

Part 1, 532-533. See the Boston American, January 25, 1949, for an
account of the speech. For an earlier example of Kennedy's excited
concern on the China issue see an account of his Milton, Massachusetts
speech in the Boston Globe, November 15, 1948.

 

 

 

15Kennedy was referring here to Owen Lattimore, the Johns Hopkins

specialist on Far Eastern Studies, and John K. Fairbank, Harvard's
specialist on China, both eminent scholars.

16See: U.S. Congressional Record, Slst Congress, lst Session,

1949, XCV, Part 12, A993. The Speech can also be found at the
John F. Kennednyibrary, Waltham,!flassachusetts, Pre-Presidential Papers,
1946-1952, Boston Office Files, Box 25.

17James MacGregor Burns, John Kennedy, p. 81.

 

18Ibid., p. 93.

191bid., p. 81.

20See the New York Times, October 10, 1949, "Kennedy Upset Over

Shelters" and the New York Times, October 31, 1949, which indicated
Bernard Baruch's support for Kennedy's position.

 

21For the Alsop's article see U.S. Congressional Record, Blst

Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, SCVI, Part 13, A1242. See also James
MacGregor Burns, Kennedy, p. 81.

 

22Boston Post, January 13, 1950.

 

23Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Bantam Books, Inc.,
1966, p. 27.

24U.S. Congressional Record, Blst Congress, 2nd Session, 1950,

XCVI, Part 10, 13489-13490.

62

25U.S. Congressional Record, 8lst Congress, 2nd Session, 1950,

XCVI, Part 8, 106715.

 

26U.S. Congressional Record, Slst Congress, 2nd Session, 1950,

mm, Part 18, A7010.

 

27U.S. Congressional Record, 8lst Congress, 2nd Session, 1950,
XCVI, Part 15, A3251. The group included: Duncan S. Ballentine;
Crane Brinton; McGeorge Bundy; Saville R. Davis; Martin Deutsch;
John K. Fairbank; Francis L. Friedman; J. K. Galbraith; Myron P. Gilmore;
Seymor Harris; William R. Hawthorne; John E. Sawyer; Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Sr.; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.; Charles H. Taylor;
Robert Wolff; Jerome Weisner; and Jerrold R. Zacharias.

 

28J. P. Mallon, "Massachusetts: Liberal and Corrupt,"

The New Republic, October 13, 1952, p. 10-12. Professor Arthur
Holcombe of Harvard who was also present at the seminar later disputed
this account. See The New Republic, November 3, 1952, p. 2.

 

 

29Burns, Kennedy, p. 133-134 and 289.

30U.S. Congressional Record; 81$t Congress, 2nd Session, 1950,
XCVI, Part 18, A7723-7724. For an account of the speech see the
New York Times, December 13, 1950, and Time magazine, December 25, 1950,
p. 9.

 

 

31Victor Lasky, JFK, The Man and The Myth, p. 118.

 

32The speech can be found in the John F. Kennedy Library,
Waltham, Massachusetts, Pro-Presidential Papers, 1946-1952, Boston
Office Files, Box 23.

 

CHAPTER III

PREPARATION FOR THE SENATE, 1951, 1952

Kennedy had been re-elected to the House of Representatives
with little difficulty in 1948 and 1950. He had never planned to
remain in the House for long. AS early as 1948, after just two
years in the House, he had considered, then discarded, the possibility
of challenging Republican Leverett Saltonstall for his Senate seat.
During 1951 and 1952, Kennedy actively broadened his political base
in Massachusetts. He travelled extensively through the state making
speeches wherever and whenever he could. He divided each week
between Washington and Massachusetts, leaving Washington late on
Thursday night and returning on Monday morning after a full and
hectic weekend of campaigning.1

During Kennedy's last term in the House, 1951-1952, his legisla-
tive accomplishments were as minimal as they had been during his
previous two terms. His record of absenteeism was one of the worst
in the House. To be sure, he carefully looked after the needs of
his constituents, but the legislative concerns of the House did
not stimulate him. He felt politically insignificant in the House.2
The main thrust of his energy and interest during these years was
directed toward increasing and broadening his voter appeal throughout
Massachusetts.

But Kennedy maintained his keen interest in foreign affairs
during this period when he was gearing for his campaign against

63

64

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and he greatly intensified the
frequency with which he spoke on foreign policy issues. In
Massachusetts he spoke to many different clubs and organizations

and foreign policy was the predominant topic. He was clearly
stimulated by his two study trips abroad, the first to Europe in
early 1951, and the second to the Middle East and Far East in

the fall of 1951. In addition to his ever-present concern for
America's military preparedness, there were three conspicuous
foreign policy issues that attracted Kennedy's attention during

1951 and 1952. The first concerned the heated debate over whether
or not the United States should commit ground troops to the

Western Europe NATO Allies, to help protect them against a possible
Russian attack. The second issue grew out of his trip to the Middle
East and Far East. Although Kennedy supported American military
assistance to the NATO Allies for the defense of EurOpe, he strongly
criticized the colonial policies Of Britain and France for thwarting
the nationalistic aspirations of the people in the underdeveloped
world. Specifically, he attacked French policy in Indochina and
British policy in Iran. The theme of anti-colonialism was consistently
evident. The third issue which also developed out of this trip,
concerned America's economic assistance programs to the underdeveloped
nations, especially those to the Middle East. During this phase of
his career, Kennedy adamantly opposed straight economic aid to the
underdeveloped world but, as a result of his trip, he reversed his
Opinion sufficiently to become an enthusiastic supporter of technical
assistance programs as a means to combat Communism.

During 1951 and 1952, Americans were frustrated with the military

6S

stalemate in Korea. Partly as a result of the huge military
commitment in Korea, many Americans vigorously Opposed sending any
additional troops to Europe for defense purposes. However, in late
1950, President Truman announced that he was substantially increasing
the strength of American forces in Western Europe. This statement
angered many leading Republicans, such as former President Hoover

and Senator Taft and others, who strongly opposed the sending of more
troops to EurOpe. They argued that Europe's defense was the
responsibility of the Allies. Many Senators also contended that
Truman's commitment of troops to Europe was a usurpation of Congress's
authority. In this vein, Senator Kenneth Wherry introduced a resolution
in early January, 1951, which stated that no American ground forces
could be assigned to Europe without Congressional approval.

Beginning in January, 1951, at his own expense, Kennedy took a
five-week tour of Europe, visiting the major nations of NATO in order
to determine his position on the issue. He managed an interview
with Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia, who told him that 1951 would be
a "dangerous year" for the peace of Europe and the world. At a
news conference in Belgrade, Kennedy stated that Tito vowed to support
the United Nations if Russia attacked Western Europe.3 Kennedy
explained that he included Yugoslavia on his tour because it was
"useless to talk about the defense of EurOpe without also talking
about Yugoslavia in its position against Russia." Kennedy had an
audience with the Pope and interviews with Franco in Spain and some
cabinet level Officials in the various countries. However, according
to James MacGregor Burns, most of his information on Western Europe's

defense efforts and capabilities came from off-the-record talks with

66

second-level government officials such as deputy ministers.4 While
on his tour, Kennedy kept a record of his various observations and
interviews and on his return home, in early February, he delivered
a nationwide radio report of his findings, broadcast over the
Mutual Broadcasting network, originating from New York.

Kennedy had visited England, France, and Italy, the major
European members of the North Atlantic Pact and three other countries--
West Germany, Yugoslavia and Spain, which were not members of the
Pact, but whose problems, loyalties, and capabilities, Kennedy
explained, were vital to the question of the defense of Western Europe.
In his radio broadcast, Kennedy made a lengthy assessment of each
nation‘s defense efforts.S On the whole he charged that Europe was
not carrying its Share of the defense burden. Except for Yugoslavia
and Spain, where he detected a willingness to fight, he thought the
nations of Western Europe were not drafting enough men, were not
devoting enough money, and were not in a sufficiently determined mood
for a real defense effort. In his country-by-country appraisal
of national defense abilities, Kennedy sympathized with the general
war weariness of the European peOpleS and recognized the argument
that their economic recovery could be hampered by a heavy burden of
rearmament. But he felt that it was necessary for them to do more.
They were not making enough sacrifices.

He made an attempt to understand the attitudes of the various
countries toward rearmament. In addition to the general war
weariness in England, he noted clear resentment against the United
States' policy in Korea, partly because the British thought it a

waste and a diversion of valuable resources which might be devoted

67

to Europe, and even more because it enhanced the chances of war with
Russia. Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia stated this view to Kennedy
also. Kennedy was most critical of France's efforts. In France he
detected a "sense of division and confusion" and charged that her
economy gave "little sense of being attuned toward a war effort."
In short, he felt that France's military production and planning
was both ineffective and inefficient.6

Kennedy was impressed by West Germany's post—war economic resur-
gence and considered it imperative to incorporate that nation into
the Western European defense system. With respect to Italy, he voiced
his sympathy for its precarious economic state and he understood the
prevalent argument that the burden of rearmament might so lower
the standard of living that it would aid the growth of the Communist
parties. The peace treaty with Italy following World War II, he pointed
out, still placed limitations on the Size of an armed force permitted.
But even so, he contended that Italy could do more to fill her allow-
able quota. The great need in Spain, as in Yugoslavia, was for
military equipment. Kennedy considered Spain vitally important to
Europe's defense and argued that the nation should be involved in
any plans for the defense of Western Europe, even though he found
sharp "distrust and distaste" for the France regime in both Britain
and France. But, Kennedy concluded, Spain, with an army willing to
fight, and "as a base for operations, as a source of power, and because
of its strategic position straddling the Mediterranean, [Spain] can
no longer be ignored." Kennedy had urged this general policy earlier,
in the summer of 1950, when he offered his amendment to the Mutual

Defense Assistance Act of 1949, calling for the United States to direct

68

$75 million in military assistance to Spain.

In his radio address, Kennedy essentially argued that the United
States should help EurOpe but only if EurOpe was willing to help
itself. Compared to the gloomy defeatism of his father's December,
1950, University of Virginia speech, in which the ex-Ambassador
declared that Europe was physically and morally bankrupt and that
the United States Should forego assistance there, Kennedy was more
hopeful at least. He was not ready to write Off Europe as an ally.
However, in his conclusion he declared: "We can and will survive
despite Europe, but with her it will be that much easier." It is
interesting that Kennedy was understanding of Italy's position and
harsh on France, despite some parallels in their economic situations.
However, Kennedy's district was heavily populated with Italian-
Americans.

One of the more controversial issues in Congress during 1951
concerned President Truman's decision to integrate American troops
within a North Atlantic Pact military force with General Eisenhower
as the Supreme Commander. There was substantial Congressional oppoSi-
tion to this policy. Senator Wherry's resolution would have denied
the President the authority to send American troops abroad in
peacetime without Congressional approval. President Truman, of course,
believed that he had the authority without Congressional approval.
The issue ultimately led to a Congressional hearing conducted by
the Joint Senate Committees of Foreign Relations and Armed Services.
There were two questions under consideration--the proposed assignment
of American troops to Europe and the related issue raised by the

Wherry resolution. Kennedy was invited to present his on-the-spot

69

observations to the joint committee hearing. He followed such
notables as General Eisenhower, Dean Acheson, General Marshall, and
various other military figures. Serving on the joint committee,
along with Senators Tom Connally, Richard Russell, Wayne Morse, and
Others, ironically, was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

In his testimony Kennedy stated that he was convinced of the
strategic importance of Western Europe.7 He urged that the troops
be sent and feared the possible collapse of the European defenses
without more American troops. However, he was adamant in his
demand that Western Europe increase its military efforts. In order
to ensure this he advocated the adoption of a ratio system, 6 to l,
by which the Europeans would be compelled to supply six military
divisions for every division sent from the United States. He felt
this was the only way the United States could force Europe to do
more. Kennedy avoided taking a position on the constitutional question
involved in the Wherry resolution itself but he did favor Congressional
supervision of his proposed ratio system. He left the implication that
he favored Congressional supervision of the ratio system because
he felt the Truman Administration might not enforce it. The Truman
Administration was opposed to any ratio system--all the more so if
it was subject to Congressional supervision, of course. So, once
again, Kennedy was exhibiting his independence from the Truman
Administration's policy. In response to a question from Senator
Morse, however, he emphasized that he was not advocating a ratio
system in order to reduce the American commitment to Western Europe
but only to make the Europeans do more. "It is not a backhanded way

of trying to pull out of Western Europe," he said.

70

Kennedy was asked by Senator Wiley if he felt that increased
European rearmament might not stimulate Russia to attack. Kennedy
stated that he recognized the inherent danger of this possibility
but that to refuse to rearm Europe because of this reason would, in
his opinion, be the "height of foolishness." Senator Wiley also
asked the Congressman if he considered Europe to be the first line
of United States defense. Kennedy said yes. This statement, of
course, was in conflict with the view held by his father, who most
emphatically did not consider Europe to be the first line of American
defense. It was to this matter of the elder Kennedy's views that
Senator Walter George directed his next question: "The question I
am going to ask you, I want to assure you in advance is an impersonal
one," he said, "although you might at first blush to think it is a
personal question, I mean it not as personal."

"You come from a very distinguished American family that exercises
a great influence on American public opinion. I want to ask you
very impersonally, whether you remember the able Speech of your father
in December, 1950?" At this point, Senator George quoted from Joseph
P. Kennedy's speech delivered two months earlier at the University
of Virginia Law School in which he strongly opposed American commit-
ments overseas. In that speech the Ambassador had urged the United
States to get out of Korea and Berlin and confine American defenses
to the Western Hemisphere.

Senator George asked if the Congressman agreed with his father's
views. Kennedy's reply was both thoughtful and diplomatic. He did
not presume to speak for his father, he said. Personally, he would

regard the loss of Europe and its productive facilities as a threat

71

to American survival so he urged that "we do our utmost within reason
to save it." He was in favor of sending four additional American
divisions to Europe. But, he said, as a result of his trip, he
realized the tremendous difficulties in building a sufficiently strong
military force in Western Europe. He was aware of the reasons for

his father's skepticism: "To him and to a lot of other Americans it
looks like an almost hopeless job and that we are committing troops

to be lost."

"But after adding up all the factors," he continued, "and
considering them as cold-bloodedly as I can, I still feel that we
should take the risk to save Western Europe. . . ."

"That is my position. I think you should ask my father directly
as to his position."

A few months later, Kennedy returned to the issue of developing
military strength for the defense of Western Europe against the
threat of a Soviet attack. On the floor of the House, he denounced
the harshness of the 1947 Italian Peace Treaty, realizing that Italy
was needed in the military defense system.8 The treaty placed sharp
military restrictions on Italy's ability to contribute effectively
to Western European defenses. Kennedy spoke of the paradox of United
States policy toward Italy. On the one hand, the United States
adhered to a policy which severely limited Italy's defense rearmament,
yet on the other hand, gave substantial assistance to the present
Italian defense program. He explained that the terms of the
Italian Peace Treaty had been negotiated during the days when the
United States was "appeasing Russia" in the hope that America could

live in peace with Russia. But now the United States pursued a

72

policy of containing Russian expansion, he explained, and strong
Italian assistance was needed. Kennedy introduced a resolution which
provided for the release of the Government of Italy from its obligations
to the United States under the present treaty, and called for the
negotiation of a new peace treaty. His speech would have Strong
appeal, of course, to the large Italian-American population in Massa-
chusetts.

Kennedy's substantial Irish-American constituency also found
something to favor in the Congressman's advocacy of strengthening
the European defense system. In the House on September 27, 1951,
Kennedy spoke in favor of a resolution which would have paved the way
toward the unification of Ireland. In addition to the other obvious
motivations, the defense-minded Kennedy argued: "A free, united,
integrated Ireland would provide an important bastion for the
defense of the West, and would contribute to the strategic security
of the United States."9 His fellow Congressmen must have been amused
by this line of argument.

During 1951, of course, the Korean War was the dominant issue in
American foreign policy. In the Spring of 1951, Americans learned
that Great Britain, and other countries, were supplying Communist
China with rubber and other articles which could be considered useful
to China in her war effort in Korea. Kennedy was outraged by this
shipment Of materials to China which he termed "trade in blood."10
He urged Congress to take action that would forbid any further
shipment of materials, useful in war, to Communist China directly,
or even indirectly through Hong Kong. This ban would apply to the

United States as well as any other member nation of the United

73

Nations whose military forces were engaged in Korea. He cited
statistics which indicated the increased importance of Hong Kong

as a gateway for goods to China. Natural rubber was the most crucial
item going to China from Great Britain, but lesser amounts of iron and
steel were also involved. According to Kennedy, the United States

had placed an effective embargo on American Shipments of goods directly
to China, but there was still a substantial export trade with Hong
Kong. The bill also attempted to restrict exportation of war
materials to China or Hong Kong by other nations. This would be
accomplished by denying American economic aid, except assistance
granted under the Mutual Defense Act, to any nation that engaged in
such trade.

Kennedy did not Speak very often on the Korean conflict itself.
However, he did voice his opinion on the dramatic Truman-MacArthur
controversy which finally resulted in the General being removed from
all his commands on April 11, 1951. The removal of MacArthur from
command touched off an emotional nation-wide debate. In a Speech
in Worcester on May 7, 1951, Kennedy came out against General
MacArthur's proposal to bomb Manchuria because he believed Russia
would go to war to prevent the collapse of Communist China.11 However,
he supported three of MacArthur's main proposals; prevention of
Communist seizure of Formosa; naval and economic blockades of
Communist China; and the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea.
But Kennedy did not want to "risk World War III" by a direct attack
on Communist China. Kennedy praised the General, especially for his
"tremendous performance" in the Congressional hearings then being

conducted. It was unfortunate, Kennedy felt, that the MacArthur

74

removal had a tendency to follow party lines--Republicans often
pro4MacArthur and Democrats, anti-MacArthur. In this speech, Kennedy
returned to the issue of the military Situation in Europe and stated

he was against sending any more troops to Europe until the North
Atlantic Pact nations had provided 36 divisions for General Eisenhower's
command.

Kennedy's concern for America's national defense affected his
attitude toward domestic programs. In a debate in the House on May 15,
1951, over a Department of Agriculture flood control program, Kennedy
introduced an amendment that would have Sharply reduced the appro-
priation from $8,000,000 to $2,500,000.12 He thought the program was
"most worth while" but believed it could be postponed. This was a
"critical" year for defense, he argued, and "we Should not go ahead
with projects which are not of a defense nature." Kennedy was conser-
vative fiscally except when it came to defense expenditures and, of
course, the flood control program did not vitally effect his state.

In August, 1951, the House was debating the issue of building
United States air bases in Europe as a deterrent to possible Soviet
aggression. Some raised the question whether the rearmament of
Western Europe generally would serve as a deterrent to war or as a
stimulus. Would a speedy rearmament program cause Russia to feel
sufficiently endangered that she would attack? Kennedy believed the
opposite to be true--that a slow rate of rearmament would be more
likely to invite a Soviet attack. The rearmament of Europe was not
being done quickly enough, he Stated. And the European nations were
not doing their part. Not one of these nations, with the possible

exception of Breat Britain, he argued, was "devoting the percentage

75

of her income anywhere near equal to that of our country for
rearmament."13 "I do not Object to sending American troops or
American money there if I thought that the Europeans were doing their
part," he asserted. And he felt that a half-hearted rearmament
program would be "the best way to bring on a war with Russia."

In the fall of 1951, Kennedy prepared to take his extended study
trip to the Middle East and Far East. His observations on this trip
caused him to revise his earlier attitude on America's economic aid
program to the Middle East, especially under the Point Four Program.
In August, 1951, prior to his trip, he introduced an amendment calling
for a reduction in United States economic aid to the Middle East
but the following year, after his trip, he admitted he had been mis-
taken and came out for economic-technical aid to the area as a means
of preventing Communist advances. In the August debate in the House,
Kennedy's amendment would have cut economic aid from $175,000,000
to $140,000,000. He supported military assistance to the area but
did not think the United States could afford to "raise the standard
of living of all the people all over the globe who might be subject
to the lure of communism because of a low standard of living."14
The debate also related to military and economic aid to EurOpe. Kennedy
felt it would be a great mistake to cut military assistance to Europe,
as one prOposed amendment would have done, but he did favor an
amendment which called for a cut in economic aid to EurOpe. He again
Stated his disappointment with the slowness and the inadequacy of
the EurOpean commitment to rearmament.

Congressmen Jacob Javits and Abraham Ribicoff tried to change

Kennedy's mind on his amendment to reduce economic aid to the Middle

76

East, arguing that the aid was necessary if you supported technical
assistance and the Point Four Program. Kennedy believed that his

cuts could be applied to selected specifics of which he disapproved.
Javits and Ribicoff tried to explain to him that the cuts would be
across the board but Kennedy did not yield. If his amendment had
passed, which it did not, it would have hurt the new state of Israel.
Some contended later that Kennedy simply misunderstood the language

of the original bill.15 In any event, it was clear from Kennedy's
statements, at this time, that he was not an eager advocate of economic
aid to underdeveloped countries.

However, at the time of this debate the question of aid to Latin
America was also under consideration. Kennedy offered another amend-
ment, which was also defeated. Here he wanted to reduce aid from
$40,000,000 to $20,000,000. But there was a difference. Whereas in
Europe and the Middle East he supported military assistance and
Opposed economic aid, in Latin America he took the Opposite position.
He favored giving the Latin American nations economic assistance but
saw no point in giving them $40,000,000 of military assistance when
Latin America "was not in the line Of the Soviet advance."16 Military
equipment was needed much more in Western Europe, he said. He
suggested that it might be feasible to cut out military aid to
Latin America completely but conceded "there may be some use for it."
Therefore, he prOposed a reduction. However, his amendment was defeat-
ed by a vote of 108 to 98.17

Even before taking his trip to the Middle-East and the Far East
in the fall of 1951, Kennedy was critical of United States policy in

those areas. On April 21, 1951, he spoke to the Annual Meeting of the

77

Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Associations.18 He spoke of

the rise of nationalism in the Far East as well as the Middle East

and observed that the force of these movements was directed "primarily
against the colonial policies of the West." He expressed sharp concern
over the recent nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by

the Iranian Government and the effect this could have on the strategic
position of the West. He understood the reasons for Iran's action,
however, and the reasons for discontent in the underdeveloped nations
generally. He spoke of the exploitation by foreign countries of the
resources and manpower of backward nations, and of the widespread illi-
teracy, misery and starvation. He noted the "domination by venal and
corrupt politicans," and the "massive and inefficient bureaucracy."

All this breeds turmoil and discontent, he said. And faced with

these disruptive forces in a vital strategic area, he asserted, "United
States policy has been weak and vacillating." He believed Britain's
"exploitation policy" in the area was even more "Short-Sighted" and he
feared the consequences if the British Government decided to retaliate
by moving troops into Iran. "We could be carried into World War III,"
he warned, "by a series of chain reactions over which our control

would be limited."

He urged the United States to develop a firm policy with respect
to the Middle East because of the importance of that area to the sys-
tem of collective defense that the United States was developing
throughout the world. For strategic reasons, the United States could
not afford to allow the Soviet Union to gain control of the Middle
East. Therefore, he suggested the advantages of initiating a regional

defense pact there, similar to the North Atlantic Pact or of extending

78

the North Atlantic Pact to include both Greece and Turkey, and the
other countries of the Middle East. He recognized the importance of
attempting to correct the serious domestic conditions which caused
the internal instability in these countries, but he was quick to
point out that because the economy of the United States was "already
strained from bearing the financial burdens of the free world," only
economic measures that could be considered "primarily in relation to
the security" of the area must be considered.

With respect to alleviating the abject poverty of the peoples
throughout Asia, Kennedy felt that the policy of the United States
was inadequate. ”Asia's problem is landlordism," he declared. Because
the United States did nothing to urge a basic revision in the land sys-
them in these nations, he believed the various United States technical
assistance programs would be hopeless and ineffective. He was critical
of the billions of dollars the United States placed behind "corrupt
and reactionary governments" which only tightened the hold of the
oligarchy. The great weakness of United States policy in this area
he lamented, was that it was merely anti-communist and "Pro-nothing".
Too often the United States was placed in partnership with reactionary
groups, he said, "whose policies breed the discontent on which Soviet
Communism feeds and prospers."

All in all, Kennedy's address dealt in sweeping generalities
and focused more on criticisms than in offering thought-out
alternatives. Just how does the United States force a policy
of land reform in an undeveloped nation against the wishes of the
ruling oligarchy? His speech was perceptive but Short on specific

suggestions. He recognized the need for fundamental reform programs

79

in the underdeveloped nations, but stated his unwillingness to
initiate a broad program of economic assistance because of the
"strained" economy of the United States. In subsequent speeches
following his trip to the Middle East, he returned to many of the
themes stated in this speech. The only shift in his opinion was his
switch to support for technical assistance programs.

Kennedy left on his trip in early October, 1951, accompanied by
his brother Robert and Sister, Pat. In addition to the Middle East,
he stOpped in Pakistan, India, French Indochina, Malaya, Korea,
Okinawa and Japan. The trip ended on November 8, in Japan, after
Kennedy suffered a relapse of malaria with which he was stricken
during the war in the Pacific. He became ill on Okinawa and had to
postpone a trip to Formosa.19 For a time there was some doubt that
he would survive.

At the outset of the trip Kennedy flew to Israel after having
first conferred with General Eisenhower in Paris.20 He proceeded to
Iran. He spoke with a number of high government officials in Iran
and concluded that there was danger Iran might fall under Soviet
influence unless the Oil revenues were restored to Iran and aid

was received from the United States.21

"I believe the overriding
United States consideration here should be to keep Russia out Of
Iran," he said.22 But he Spoke with a measure of uncertainty. "If
we give economic aid to Iran," he said, "the British may accuse

us of interfering with her efforts to squeeze Iran into negotiating

a settlement in the oil controversy. If we don't aid Iran, then Iran

will think we are siding with the British." It was not clear just what

he was advocating that the United States Should do.

80

As on his EurOpean tour earlier in the year, Kennedy kept notes
on his Observations and interviews on this seven week trip. Among
others, Kennedy had managed interviews with General Eisenhower and
General Ridgway, with Prime Ministers Ben Gurion, Nehru, and Liaguat
Ali Khan of Pakistan (only hours before his assassination), and with
Emperor Bao Dai of Indochina.

When interviewed upon his arrival in New York, and again in a
nation-wide radio broadcast two days later, Kennedy stressed the

23 He said that America's diplomacy in Southeast Asia

same themes.
had been in many ways a failure and he saw the Situation as deteriora-
ting. America's prestige which had been high in Southeast Asia
following World War II, he said, had been "lost" in the minds of the
people. His major criticism was that the United States had tied
itself too closely with the colonial policies of Great Britain and
France and, as a result, had lost the support of the peoples of
the underdeveloped world. In contrast, he said, the Communists had
allied themselves with the desires of the people for complete
independence.

Of American policy in Indochina, Kennedy had little good to say:
"We have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime
to hang on to the remnants of power," he said. He emphasized that
there was no broad, general support for the native Vietnam Government
among the people of that area and he said there would be none "until
the French give clear indications that, despite their gallantry, they
are fighting not merely for themselves but for the sake of strength-
ening a non-Communist native government so that it can move safely

toward independence." His criticism was sharp and constructive. He

81

stated that the Indochinese states were merely puppet states and

were as typical examples of empire and colonialism as could be found
anywhere. Force of arms alone would not stop the southern drive of
Communism. It was necessary to build strong native non-Communist
sentiment, he said, and rely on that rather than upon the legions

of General de Lattre. And to do this, he said, "apart from and in de-
fiance ixf innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure."

He said the United States should not merely support the French
but "should stand for the aspirations of the peOple for independence
and reforms." The American position in Indochina, he said, should
have been defined "in the beginning" as backing independence. He
warned that the position of the French in Indochina was "extremely
serious" and he declared flatly that there was "no doubt that the
majority of the peOple are on the side of the guerrillas." He urged
that the position of the United States be made distinct from that
of the French: "We should make it clear to the people that while
we are helping a colonial power fight Communism, that we stand for
independence and better conditions once the fight against the Reds
has been won."

Kennedy made it clear, however, that he did not want the French
and the Americans to pull out of Indochina. He firmly believed in
the domino theory and warned that if Indochina fell, "we can write
Off the rest of Southeast Asia." He went even further. If Indochina
was lost, he said, it would be "a major crisis" for the United
States. India would be endangered and the Middle East would be in
a serious position. He also suggested that the Far East generally

had been neglected by the United States because of its concern with

82

Western European defense. He quoted a State Department official in
Saigon as saying that no member of Congress had visited there in the
past two years.

In his radio broadcast, Kennedy also spoke of the Middle East.

He lamented, but understood why, the Arabnations' hostility toward
England and France was directed toward the United States. Not only
did America support the colonial policies of Britain and France, but
America also supported Israel. In contrast, he noted the growing
friendship between Russia and the Arab nations. He emphasized,
however, that "Communism cannot be met effectively by merely the force
of arms." The main problem in the Arab world was poverty and want and
the United States Should focus its policy there. Instead, he Observed,
the United States had too often supported an "inequitable status quo"
involving the protection of foreign investment. He recognized the
adverse consequences of America's support for England's oil invest-
ments in Iran. In all, he offered a very sympathetic understanding

of the Arab nations' problems and the valid reasons for their distrust
and suspicion of the West. Kennedy spoke of the anti-Western and
anti-America sentiment he observed in India but noted it was more of

a neutralistic attitude than was the case in the Arab world. India
simply wished to remain outside the confines of either America or
Russia.

Kennedy's comments constituted a bold criticism of America's
tendency to support its European allies' policies at the expense of
the peOples of the Middle and Far East. He blamed American represen-
tatives stationed in these critical areas for "toadying to the

Shorter aims of other Western nations, with no eagerness to understand

83

the real hopes and desires of the peOples to which they are accredited,
too often aligning themselves too definitely with the "haves" and
regarding the actions of the "have-nots” as not merely an effort to
cure injustice but as something sinister and subversive." Viewed
from the perSpective of 1971, Kennedy's criticisms take on an even
heightened measure of validity. He quite effectively pinpointed the
shortcomings of American foreign policy in the underdeve10ped world
but he did not Specify exactly what the United States could do to
alter appreciably British or French policies. Should the United
States ever align itself with the nationalist groups in opposition to
British or French policy? This problem, of course, is an extremely
difficult and sensitive one. However, Kennedy gradually became per—
suaded that such a policy was at times necessary. Several years
later, in regard to France's colonial policy in Algeria, Kennedy
did openly urge the United States to actively support the cause of
the Algerian nationalists in their fight for independence from French
colonial rule. At the time, he referred to the harsh and tragic
lesson of Indochina.

According to both Victor Lasky and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
Kennedy's views on Indochina were influenced substantially by
Edmund A. Gullion who was attached to the Saigon legation at the time
Of Kennedy's visit to Vietnam. Also, according to reports, Kennedy
annoyed and argued with the United States minister to Vietnam,
Donald M. Heath, and the Commander-in-Chief of the French forces,
General Jean Marie de Lattre de Tassigny, during his ten-day stay
in Saigon. The Official American policy line at the time was uncritical

support for the French in their struggle against the Vietnamese

84

nationalists. However, Gullion strongly disagreed with the pro-French
American policy and considered France's military and political policies
to be doomed to failure. Evidently, Gullion continued to influence
Kennedy's views on Indochina throughout the 1950's.25 Schlesinger wrote
that years later, as President, Kennedy wanted to send Edmund Gullion

to Saigon as Ambassador but that Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "in a
rare moment of self assertion," was determined to make the appointment
himself. Ironically, the eventual candidate was none other than Henry
Cabot Lodge, Jr., Kennedy's opponent in the 1952 Senate race.26

In November, 1951, just a few days after his radio broadcast on
his trip, Kennedy delivered a major foreign policy address to one of
the largest audiences in the history of the Boston Chamber of Commerce.27
He again attacked British and French colonial policies, but the main
thrust of his speech was his strong OppOSition to unlimited economic
assistance to foreign nations. He warned that "Uncle Sugar is as
dangerous a role for us to play as Uncle Shylock." He reasoned that
grants of money were "debilitating and wasteful" and that they tended
to favor the "ins” as contrasted with the "outs." However, he Stated
his approval of technical assistance programs. Quite obviously,
Kennedy drew a sharp distinction between technical assistance and
economic aid.

"We cannot reform the world," he asserted. "There is just not
enough money in the world to relieve the poverty of all the millions
of this world who may be threatened by Communism. We Should not
attempt to buy their freedom from this threat." He stated further
that expenditures of money bring no lasting results-—"peOple who are

with us merely because of things they get from us are weak reeds to

85

lean upon." He criticized the "naive belief" that the export of
money would solve the world's ills. He advocated the export of
techniques. As a result of his trip, Kennedy had also formed some
strong Opinions on the quality of United States diplomats overseas.

He was not impressed. With some exceptions, he said, ”our representa-
tives abroad seem to be a breed of their own, moving mainly in their
own limited circles, not knowing too much of the people to whom they
are accredited, unconscious of the fact that their role is not tennis
and cocktails. . . ."

Kennedy also criticized America's propaganda efforts in the form
of the Voice of America because it did not reach the rank and file of
the people. He explained that the Voice of America broadcasts were
picked up on short-wave radios that only the rich could afford; and
that the broadcasts were often transmitted in languages that only
the rich were educated to understand. Therefore, he said, we do
not reach the poor, have-not peoples of the world. Communist propa-
ganda methods were much more effective, he declared.

In a similar Speech the following day, Kennedy Spoke further
about the crisis in Iran.28 The Iranians, under Premier Mossadegh,
had nationalized the British Oil refineries and many feared that if
the British reacted militarily, the Russians might retaliate in
force. Kennedy declared that the Iranian oil issue offered no simple
solution. He did not wish to see the Russians move into Iran, nor
did he wish to gain the enmity of Iran or see its economy collapse.
He feared such an economic collapse would more likely result in a
Communist coup "than bring about an invitation to the British to

return." He also recognized that America should not create

86

unnecessary enmity with the British "as long as we link their fortunes
so closely to ours in Europe." Finally, he did not want to see the
tide of nationalization, attempted by Iran, "sweep southward to the
American operated oil fields of Kuweit and Saudi Arabia, or westward
to the important oil producing area in Iraq." What should be done?
What did he advocate? "We may be damned if we do, but we are certainly
damned if we don't" he said. "Personally, I believe we should work
to prevent an economic collapse on the part of Iran, preserve her
integrity as a nation, and thereby help her to resist whatever Russian
pressure may develop from the north." Just how that should be done he
did not say.

On December 2, 1951, Kennedy made his first appearance on Meet_
The Press.29 Lawrence Spivak, the regular panel member, asked Kennedy
about his recent trip to the Middle and Far East. Why did United
States policy fail to win friends? First, Kennedy mentioned the pro-
blem of United States identification with Western imperialism. Also,
there was a racial element to the problem, he said, the yellow versus
the white and the United States had fallen heir to much of the hatred
the British and French had incurred. Secondly, he stated that American
policies "have not been too wise since the end of the war." He did
not elaborate on that statement. "In the third place," he suggested,
"we are a strong power and a rich country and therefore, I think
there's a natural animosity that goes with that sort of power,
especially when we try to impose our will on those countries."
Spivak also asked if Kennedy really meant the "tennis and cocktails"
quote in reference to United States diplomats overseas. Kennedy

responded in the affirmative and stated the need for more well-rounded

87

young people in the foreign service.

Miss May Craig asked Kennedy for his view with reSpect to General
MacArthur's recommendations for Korea. Kennedy said he would support
some of the General's recommendations, "Perhaps the use of Chiang's
troops in Korea," but stated that he would not support the bombing
of Manchuria due to the danger of drawing the country into a war with
Russia.

Mr. Ernest Lindley asked Kennedy how he would improve the
position of the United States in the Middle and Far East aside from
improving the quality of the Foreign Service personnel. First,
Kennedy stated that our propaganda methods must be improved. Secondly,
he said, that the United States Should expand its program of technical
assistance. He also emphasized the harmful effects of America's
identification with French colonialism in Indochina. He stated the
importance of winning the support of the people in Indochina and
said: "I think we shouldn't give the military assistance until the
French clearly make an agreement with the natives that at the end
of a certain time when the Communists are defeated that the French
will pull out and give this country the right of self—determination
and the right to govern themselves. Otherwise, the guerrilla war
is just going to Spread and grow and we're going to finally get
driven out of Southeast Asia."

James Reston asked him: "Would you do that in other parts of the
world that you were in? Iran, for example, would you ally yourself
there with the nationalistic forces?"

Kennedy replied: "I certainly would. It's the only hope. I

think we've allied ourselves too closely with the British. After the

88

last year the British position was hopeless. They haven't got a chance
to come back and we have paid the price for it."

The moderator interrupted. The time was up. Next week's guest
would be Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. .

Not everyone agreed with the general foreign policy views of

the Congressman. The editorial page of the Boston Traveller took issue

 

with Kennedy's statement that America's close alliance with Britain
and France had lost the United States many friends in the Middle and
Far East. What was Kennedy proposing? Did he suggest that the
United States should dissociate itself from its strongest allies?

Was he proposing that the United States maintain no close allies?

The editorial asked that "in the interest of world safety and that of
America," Kennedy should elaborate his position.30 Kennedy replied
to the papers. He stated that he recognized that it was essential

to the security of the United States that Western Europe remain free
and he supported American assistance to the European nations to help
them rebuild their military strength. But, he said, in American
policy in the Middle East and the Far East, the United States "should
not oppose the nationalistic aspirations of the people of these areas
because of our European ties." He favored, for instance, the American
support of independence in Indonesia against the Dutch, even though
the United States was closely allied with the Dutch in Western Europe.
In a personal letter to the paper submitted on December 7, 1951,
Kennedy focused on Indochina and Iran. To win the struggle in
Indochina, he argued, the support of the people must be gained and
and to accomplish that a guarantee of future independence must be

given. In Iran, he said, "our support of the British position increases

89

greatly the possibility of a Communist seizure of power." He closed
his letter with some quotes from his Boston Chamber of Commerce
speech.

In late 1951, Kennedy delivered a Speech in Massachusetts that
was similar to those delivered earlier which dealt with his trip, but

he expanded his remarks.31

He placed more emphasis on racism as one
of the root causes of America's problems in the underdeveloped world.
"We are a white race," he explained, "and it is against the white
race that all of these peoples have had to make their fights for
independence." He Spoke of the Iranians and the Indians ousting the
British and of the French trying to hang on in Indochina. The clash
of races was also involved in the Korean campaign, he said. In each
case, the enemy of the people seemed to be the white peoples and
as a result, he said, "the prestige of the United States sank to an
all-time low with that of Great Britain and France." He noted also
that the drive for independence in these areas was always against a
Western power, not Russia.

He Spoke of the pressing need for technical assistance to the
Arab nations of the Middle East. Concluding his informal talk,
Kennedy told his listeners that "young college graduates would
find a full life in bringing technical advice and assistance to the
underprivileged and backward Middle East.” "In that calling," he
said, "these men would follow the constructive work done by the
religious missionaries in these countries over the past 100 years."
Essentially, this was the general idea of the Point Four program

and later, the Peace Corps.

Kennedy spent the Christmas holidays of 1951 in Miami with his

9O

father and the family. But he continued to be heard from. On
December 27, he sent a bold telegram to President Truman. It concerned
the treatment four American airmen had received from the Hungarian
Government. Kennedy urged Truman that once the airmen were released,
to summon the Hungarian Minister in Washington and demand restitution.
"If such restitution is not forthcoming," he demanded, "I urge you

to immediately sever diplomatic and commercial relations with that
barbarous government." "I believe that the prestige of the United
States throughout the world is involved and that vigorous determined
action must be taken forthwith."32 President Truman may not have
appreciated this timely advice from the young Congressman.

During early 1952, Kennedy increasingly Spoke out on what he
considered unnecessary waste in American foreign economic aid programs.
He had once been an enthusiastic supporter of the Marshall Plan but
in mid-January, 1952, he assailed the "shocking" Marshall Plan waste
in Europe. He asserted that the billions of dollars in aid to
Europe was not "getting down to the people.”33 Speaking at a luncheon
of the Springfield, Massachusetts Rotary Club a Short time later,
Kennedy demanded an immediate investigation of America's foreign
aid program in order to "clamp down on mushrooming costs and extra-
vagance in overseas expenditures."34 He revealed that he had filed
legislation calling for a bipartisan commission composed of eight
members from Congress and from the executive branch to study and
report on the entire foreign aid program. He stated that almost every
member of Congress who had returned from an overseas inspection trip
had brought back "startling examples of confusion and inefficiency

in our government's activities abroad." One of the main objectives

91

of his bill was to keep Congress informed of overseas programs so
that an efficient administration of foreign aid could be achieved.
This idea was in general agreement with the prOposals of the Hoover
Commission then being discussed which called for government reorganiza-
tion. Kennedy's father was a member of the Commission. In this
luncheon speech, Kennedy stated his support for the general
recommendations of the Hoover report.

Kennedy's concern for military preparedness was characteristically
in evidence during his last year in the House of Representatives.
On April 9, 1952, he offered an amendment to a Defense Department
appropriation bill which would have increased funds to the Department
of the Air Force from $12,125,044,000 to $13,560,044,000.35 He ex-
plained that America's most serious deficiency in military strength
was the weakness in the air. "We started late," he urged, "and even
with a maximum effort at the present time it will be 1955 before we
overtake the lead the Soviets developed during the ”locust years"
of 1946 to 1950." The Committee on Appropriations had cut the budget
for the air program and Kennedy did not believe the country could
afford "this calculated risk with our national security." In support

of his amendment, Kennedy read into the Congressional Record a letter

 

that he had received that day from R. L. Gilpatric, Under Secretary
of the Air Force, which emphasized the sense of urgency.36 The
following month, in May, Kennedy again displayed his concern for
defense. He labelled a proposed J. William Fulbright amendment to
reduce the Defense Production Act as "injurious" to the nation.37

On the floor of the House on May 23, 1952, Kennedy addressed his

remarks to Israel. He Spoke in support of a $76,000,000 appropriation

92

in a mutual security bill for the Israel refugee program.38 He

extended his remarks by reading into the Congressional Record a speech
39

 

he had just delivered to a group of Jewish war veterans in Boston.
In an election year, his Speech did not convey the same sense of
sympathetic understanding toward the plight of the Arab nations that
he had spoken of earlier after returning from his trip to the Middle
East. His speech was fervently pro-Israel.

As has been mentioned, Kennedy's trip to the Middle East caused
him to change his mind on the value of technical assistance programs
to the area. In 1951, he had offered an amendment to cut technical
assistance to the Middle East, but in June, 1952, the technical
assistance program was again under debate. Now, Kennedy rose to Oppose
any cuts in the program to the Middle East.40 "We would be making a
tremendous mistake to cut this money out of the bill," he warned.
He mentioned that as a result of his trip to the area, he had changed
his mind. Communism was making giant strides in these areas, he
said, and technical assistance was the most effective weapon America
had to StOp it. In fact, he went so far as to say: ”Many Of us
feel that the United States has concentrated its attention too much
on Western Europe." The situation, he warned, was desperate. The
peOple need some hope to prevent them from being attracted to the
Communists. He concluded: "We are planning to spend a very large
amount of money in this area for military assistance, which is of
secondary importance compared to this program. To cut technical assis-
tance when the Communists are concentrating their efforts in this
vital area seems to me a costly and great mistake." This is, of course,

precisely the Opposite view from that which he argued in 1951 when he

93

had favored only military aid to the area.

Before his trip in 1951, he had also proposed another amendment
to cut military assistance to the South American Republics from
$40,000,000 to $20,000,000. But on this matter he had not changed
his mind. During this same debate he re-introduced the amendment.
Since the South American Republics were not in a direct line of
Soviet invasion, he argued, this military aid was unnecessary. In
fact, he said, "we are giving them a much smaller sum of money for
technical assistance which they need far more than military assis-
tance."41

By the summer of 1952, Kennedy was increasingly preoccupied with
his hectic campaign for the Senate against Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. The
two candidates made an interesting contrast. Lodge, age 50, was the
national figure. Kennedy, age 35, was the comparative unknown. It
was not supposed to be a contest. Their grandfathers had opposed
each other for the Senate in 1916, with Henry Cabot Lodge emerging
the easy victor. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. had first entered the Senate
in 1937, and thus had a record of fourteen years service. Unlike his
grandfather, and to the surprise of many, he became an internationalist.
Like Kennedy, he supported the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan,
the North Atlantic Treaty, and the commitment of American troops to
Europe. He was an important member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. During World War II Lodge had resigned from the Senate
for a tour of combat service. He had an excellent war record, with
service in Libya, Italy and France. After the war he returned to the
Senate by defeating the isolationist Senator David I. Walsh. In all,

Senator Lodge was an impressive figure. In addition, he was a

94

formidable vote-getter. No other ranking Democrat in Massachusetts
had dared to challenge him in 1952.

But Senator Lodge had certain political weaknesses. In the
eyes of many, he was the leader of the Republican party's international-
ist faction. This did not endear him to those who favored a more
unilateral, nationalist position. His image as an internationalist
made him vulnerable to an attack from the right flank on foreign
policy. Also, Lodge was the national campaign manager for General
Eisenhower. He had engineered Eisenhower's successful nomination
campaign in Chicago and this won him the lasting enmity of supporters
of Senator Robert Taft. Because of his duties as the national campaign
manager for the Eisenhower campaign he was forced to neglect his own
re-election campaign in.Massachusetts. In contrast, Kennedy had
been criss-crossing the state for years and was now devoting all of
his time to the campaign. He launched one of the most intensive
Senate campaigns Massachusetts had ever seen. But he had some weaknesses
also. His comparative youth and inexperience were a drawback in some
quarters. His record of absenteeism was the worst of any member of
the Massachusetts Congressional delegation and was one of the worst
in the entire House. During the campaign, however, in addition to
Kennedy's pOpularity, his money, and his help, he was aided by the
strong Republican factionalism of 1952. Taft Republicans' hatred for
Lodge and his record proved useful to Kennedy.

On the whole, Senator Lodge had been less critical of President
Truman's foreign policy than Kennedy had been. AS a result, some
Kennedy advisers urged that the candidate attack Lodge from the

right flank rather than from the left. James MacGregor Burns found

95

that elaborate studies were prepared by Kennedy's staff to Show

that on foreign policy Kennedy stood closer to Taft's position

than did Lodge.42 The staffers used Kennedy's Congressional record
to Show that he had attacked some of Truman's foreign policies, that
he had supported cuts in certain foreign-appropriations bills, that
he had generally supported governmental economy, and that he had
criticized Europe for not carrying its share of the defense burden.
These advisers, Burns noted, saw Kennedy's record as not too far from
the Republican nationalists, who believed that Europe was worn out,
that the Democrats had "lost" China, and that Korea was "Truman's
war."43 The leader of this "Keep Right" group of advisers was
Kennedy's father. But there was another group of advisers who recom—
mended that Kennedy attack Lodge from the left. They would select
different examples of Kennedy's record in the House to emphasize. He
favored overseas military commitments, and to a lesser extent, some
form of economic or technical assistance to underdeveloped areas. In
the minds of these advisers, therefore, he should campaign as a

Fair Deal Democrat. As any shrewd candidate would do, Kennedy used
both battle plans when each most effectively suited his needs.

Taken separately, neither of these two conflicting images of
Kennedy's foreign policy record was entirely accurate, of course. To
some extent, Kennedy's record supported both claims. While he did
support much of Truman's foreign policy, he also had certain views
in common with the Taft Republicans. His record did not fit into a
neat category and suggested, quite Strongly, that he had pursued an
independent course on foreign policy. Certainly, it would be a

distortion to depict Kennedy as a quasi-nationalist-isolationist

96

on foreign policy who was in complete agreement with the views of
men like his father. But he did not fit the mold of the complete
Democratic-internationalist either.

In any event, after studying the campaign of 1952, Burns con-
cluded that Kennedy did receive significant behind-the-scenes assistance
from some Taft Republicans. But Burns also concluded that the Senate
campaign was not won on issues, but more on personality. The voters,
he contended, were not able to see any clear distinction between
the two candidates on foreign policy. Their records were very Similar.
However, Kennedy won the election by a margin of some 70,000 votes
in a year when Eisenhower carried the state by a substantial margin.
Indeed, it was an impressive upset.

Shortly after the election, on November 9, 1952, Kennedy made

his second appearance on Meet The Press. He was fresh from his

 

sensational victory. Lawrence Spivak, in his introduction, in rather
expansive terms, hailed Kennedy as "the most important Democratic
figure in New England" as a result of his upset victory.44
The first question addressed to the Senator-elect focused upon
the foreign policy issue in the recent campaign. Senator Lodge was
"the outstanding Republican symbol of international foreign policy,
a symbol of bipartisan foreign policy." Did Kennedy believe his
defeat of Senator Lodge was a repudiation of that policy? Kennedy
thought not since, he said, "there was not a tremendous difference
between us on foreign affairs." How then, the panelist asked, did
Kennedy explain the support he received from the Taft wing of the

Republican Party in Massachusetts? Kennedy replied that his help

from that quarter was small. The panelist reminded Kennedy that he

97

had also had the support of the Chicago Tribune which was a very

 

"strong isolationist pro-Taft paper." AS was well-known, the paper
had long been an enthusiastic supporter of Joseph Kennedy's views

but Kennedy Stated that he did not know exactly why the paper had
supported him. He suggested that the support came not because they
agreed with his politics but because "they disagreed with the part Mr.
Lodge played in defeating Senator Taft." In any event, he said,

while he appreciated their support, the Chicago Tribune did not have

 

great influence in Massachusetts. The Senate election could not have
been a repudiation of Lodge's foreign policy, he said, because he
"had supported it in the main."

Later in the interview, the questioning returned to foreign
affairs. Kennedy was asked what he would suggest in terms of a new
policy for the Middle East Since he had been critical of the Truman
Administration's policy in the area. He Stated that as a result of
his trip to the Middle East a year ago, he concluded that Britain's
position in Iran was hopeless. He believed the United States "should
have thrown its weight completely with the Iranians." He thought
time would prove him correct. Also, Kennedy pointed to his record
of encouraging more extensive assistance to the area under the Point
Four program. He implied that this assistance should be expanded.

He did not say so, but he was undoubtedly referring to technical
assistance rather than straight economic aid. He acknowledged that
he had agreed with the Truman Administration's policy of support
for Israel.
What did he think the United States should do in French Indochina?

Should the United States increase its aid to the French in that

98

struggle? Kennedy re-stated the view that he had uttered many times
following his trip, that the United States had identified itself too
much with the French. He regretted that American assistance to the
French had not required, as a prerequisite, that the French guarantee
to the people of Indochina that they would leave the country once
the Communist movement had been crushed. Only this, Kennedy felt,
would win the support of the native people in the struggle. He
urged that the United States do more to win the support of the native
groups, but he did not suggest exactly how this should be done. He
was certain, however, that the war would eventually be lost if the
support of the natives was not won. Most of the Asiatics regard the
French as imperialists, he said, and the United States, by merely
supporting the French with no guarantees to the people, ran the risk
of financing a losing cause. However, he favored continued assistance
to the French. The implication of his remarks was that America Should
continue to support the French effort, but should somehow force the
French to offer meaningful guarantees of independence to the people,
which was necessary to win the native support, which in turn was so
vital to the success of the struggle against the Communists. Un-
fortunately, he did not suggest exactly how the United States could
achieve such cooperation. Following the questions on Indochina, the
panelists shifted to domestic issues concerning the budget, parochiaid,
and Taft-Hartley.

During Kennedy's final term in the House of Representatives,
1951-1952, he consistently supported America's military commitment
to Western Europe, although he demanded that Europe contribute more.

Similarly, he was consistent in his criticism of British and French

99

colonial policies, especially in Iran and Indochina. And, he warned
that the United States suffered from too close an identification with
Western colonialism. During this period, he reversed his opinions
on the value of technical assistance prOgrams, especially in the
Middle East. He became convinced that technical assistance was an
essential tool with which to combat Communism in the underdeveloped
world. However, he consistently opposed Straight economic aid programs
for two reasons; first, the United States did not have sufficient
capital to "reform the world”, and second, he contended that economic
aid frequently served to entrench the anti-democratic ruling
oligarchies and did not reach the people.

As the campaign of 1952 illustrated, during his years in the
House, Kennedy had managed to deve10p an independent record on
foreign policy which enabled him to project a double image. He had
shared common views with both the Taft-Republican-nationalists and
the Truman Administration. During the period 1953-1956, he greatly
expanded his involvement in Congressional debates on foreign policy.
The issues were many but the heightening crisis in French Indochina
. attracted more of his time and was the subject of more of his Speeches

than any other.

100

FOOTNOTES

lGoddard Lieberson and Joan Meyers (ed.), John Fitzgerald Kennedy
. . . .AS We Remember Him (New York: A Columbia Records Collection
Book, 1965), p. 54. Francis X. Morrissey, Kennedy's executive assis-
tant in Massachusetts, who accompanied him on automobile trips through-
out the state reminisced: "In four and a half years we never took
more than ten minutes to eat. We lived on cheeseburgers, hamburgers,
malted milks and "frappes"--mi1k shakes with ice-cream in them. By
election day, 1952, he had been in 351 cities and towns, appeared
many times in each. I'll bet he talked to at least a million people
and Shook hands with 750,000."

 

 

ZSee James MacGregor Burns, John Kenneey, p. 93. Kennedy later
reflected to James M. Burns, "We were just worms over in the House--
noboby pays much attention to us nationally." Charles Bartlett, a
long-time Kennedy friend, recalled: "I don't think he ever was really
stimulated by the House of Representatives. I always had the feeling
that when he ran against Henry Cabot Lodge in 1952, he really wanted
to get out of the House of Representatives, even if it cost him his
political life. He said it was an Odds-on effort against Lodge, but
he really didn't care. I think he felt that the House, for him, had
become a waste of time. . . I think the same frustration that he felt
in the newspaper business worked against him here." For Bartlett's
remarks, see: AS We Remember Him, p. 54.

 

 

3For an account of this press conference see: New York Times,
January 26, 1951. The Boston Herald, January 26, 1951, carried~_
the lengthiest account of the conference. See also the Boston Post
and the Worcester Telegram both on January 26.

 

 

 

 

4Burns, Kennedy, p. 82.

5A complete account of the radio broadcast can be found in:
U. 8. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, lst Session, 1951, XCVII,
Part 1, 1301-1303. The following newspapers carried an analysis
of the speech on Feburary 7, 1951: The Boston Globe; the Worcester
Tele ram; the Boston Herald; and the Boston Post. For a critical
editorial comment on the speech, which offered a sympathetic defense
of Europe's efforts see, the Worcester Gazette, February 8, 1951.

 

 

 

 

 

6Kennedy reiterated many of these same points in a Speech to the
Crosscup-Pishon Post of the American Legion in Boston. See: Boston

101

Post, February 9, 1951. Several days after Kennedy's address, Albert
Chambon, the French Consul in Boston, sharply disagreed with Kennedy's
assessment of France's efforts. Kennedy had implied that one reason
France was tardy in taking the necessary steps to meet the Russian
threat was the presence of 5 million Communists in France. Chambon
charged that this figure was based on the 1945 election records and
was, therefore, outdated and a gross exaggeration. The strength of
the Communists had greatly decreased, Chambon insisted. Also, he
contended that France' rearmament program had doubled in the past year,
that the French economy was healthy, and that France had already agreed
to furnish 25 divisions to the Pact. For Chambon's criticisms see:

the Boston Globe and the Boston Post on February 11, 1951. Kennedy's
response to Chambon's comments appeared in the Boston Globe, on
February 11, 1951.

 

 

 

7See: Hearings Before The Committee on Forehgh Relations and The

Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, lst
Session, on 8. Con. Res. 8, A Concurrent Resolution Relative To The
Assighment of Ground Forces of the United States To DutyInThe
European Area. pp. 424—444. For a newspaper account of the hearing
see: Boston Globe, February 23, 1951. On March 1, 1951, about a
week after testifying, Kennedy spoke to a Junior Chamber of Commerce
meeting in Massachusetts and repeated the same points. See: Lawrence
Evening Tribune, March 2, 1951. He delivered another variation of the
same Speech on March 4, 1951, to 500 alumnae of Emmanuel College in

in Massachusetts. See: Boston Globe, March 5, 1951. Kennedy
returned to the same theme again in an early April speech. See:
Berkshire Evening Eagle, April 9, 1951.

 

 

 

 

8U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, lst Session, 1951, XCVII,
Part 3, 3561-3562. The Boston Globe carried an account of the Speech
on April 9, 1951.

 

 

9U. S. Congeessional Record, 82nd Congress, lst Session, 1951,

XCVII, Part 9, 12276. Three years later, on January 6, 1955, Kennedy
submitted a resolution for the unification of Ireland.

 

10U. S. Cohgressional Record, 82nd Congress, lst Session, 1951, XCVII,

Part 4, 5145-5146, and 5154. For an account of his remarks and
resolution see: New Yopk Times, May 10, 1951.

 

 

11Worcester Telegram, May 7, 1951.

 

le. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, lst Session, 1951, XCVII,
Part 4, 5352. See also Boston Globe, May 16, 1951.

 

 

13U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, lst Session, 1951, XCVII,
Part 8, 10185-10186.

102

14U. S. Conghessional Record, 82nd Congress, lst Session, 1951,
XCVII, Part 8, 10265, and 10234-10235.

 

15See: Ralph G. Martin and Ed Plaut, Front Runner, Dark Horse
(Garden City: Doubleday E Company, Inc., 1960), p. 171.

 

16U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, lst Session, 1951,
XCVII, Part 8, 10290.

 

17Ibid.

 

18The speech can be found in the John F. Kennedy Library,
Waltham, Massachusetts, Pre-Presidential Papers, 1946-1952, Boston
Office Files, Box 25.

 

19See: Lawrence Evening Tribune, November 8, 1951.

 

20Boston Globe, October 4, 1951.

 

21Lawrence Evening Tribune, October 11, 1951.

 

221b1d.

 

23 .

For newspaper accounts of the airport press conference see:
Boston Globe; Boston Daily Record; Boston Evening American; Boston
Daily Globe; Manchester, New Hampshife Union-Leader; and’the Lawrence
Evening Tribune, aIl on November 12, 1951. For a copy of the radio
report‘see JOhn F. Kennedy Library Boston Office Speech Files, 1946-
1952, Box 23} The Boston Herald'and the Boston Globe carried an account
of the address on NovemberIIS, 1951. There is anothér Kennedy Speech,
undated, in Box 23 devoted entirely to the question of French Indochina.
It appears as though it was written a short time after the radio address.
In this speech he spoke of General de Lattre's death. Here Kennedy
Opposed the idea of direct United States intervention in Indochina.
He favored rather the intervention of the nations of Asia, such as
India, Pakistan and Indonesia. Without the support of the people of
Asia, he believed any intervention would fail. But with the support
and leadership of these nations he felt the war in Indochina "would
cease to appear as a war between native communists and western
imperialists, between the white and yellow man." "It would then
become a struggle to preserve Asiatic democracy and the independence
of native governments against the new imperialism of the communists."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

24See Victor Lasky, JFK, The Man and the Myth, p. 127-128, and
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Greenwich: Fawcett
Publications, Inc., 1967), A Fawcett Crest Book, pp. 299-300.

 

 

103

25In his Kennedy, Sorensen stated that one of Kennedy's 1954

speeches on Indochina was checked with Gullion. See p. 74.

26Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 299-300.

 

27For various accounts of the speech see: Boston Globe and New
York Herald Tribune on November 19, 1951; and the New YorkTTimes,___'
Boston Herald, andTBoston Evening American on November 20, 1951. Be-
tween the time of his radio address andifhe Boston Chamber of Commerce
speech, Kennedy spoke to 400 members of the Goodyear Parent Teachers
Association at the Goodyear Elementary School, Boston. Here he
emphasized the theme that many Asians saw the United States as
imperialistic because of the close identification with Britain and
France. See the Boston Globe, November 18, 1951.

 

 

 

 

 

 

28For an account of this speech see: Lowell Sun, November 21, 1951.

 

29Meet The Press, December 2, 1951. Transcript.

 

0See Dec. 4,1951 issue. Kennedy replied to the paper Dec. 5-14, 1951.

31For an account of the speech see the Lowell Sun, December 9,

1951. Kennedy spoke on the same general themes in a speech on
December 18, 1951. He outlined a "Four-Point Plan" to thwart
Communist expansion in the underdeveloped world: (1) Improved prOpa-
ganda methods that would effectively reach the people; (2) Encourage-
ment of technical assistance programs; (3) Encouragement of an
"economic confederation of homogeneous peoples" in the Middle East an
Southeast Asia--"peoples divided too often by artificial, historical
barriers," as a foundation for eventual political union; (4) wwake
plain that at all times that our objective is not aggrandizement

but peace." The speech was carried in the Springfield Union, December
19, 1951. For a subsequent speech which offered some further
elaboration see: Haverhill Gazette, February 12, 1952.

 

 

 

32The telegram was carried in the Boston Globe, December 28, 1951.

 

33See the Boston Globe, January 20, 1952.

 

34For an account of this speech see the Waltham-NewS-Tribune,

January 25, 1952.

 

35U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1952,

XCVIII, Part 3, 3871-3872.

36Ibid., 3871.

 

104

37Boston Globe, May 18, 1952.

 

38U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1952,
XCVIII, Part 5, 5894.

 

391b1d.

 

40U. 8. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1952,
XCVIII, Part 7, 8492-8493.

 

41Ibid., p. 8493.

42Burns, Kennedy, p. 104. Burns offers a very thorough account
of the campaign on pages 98-116.

431bid.

4%Meet The Press, November 9, 1952. Transcript.

 

Chapter IV

THE YOUNG SENATOR AND INDOCHINA, 1953-1956

On January 3, 1953, Kennedy was officially sworn in as a United
States Senator. In many ways, both public and private, the years
1953-1956 form a distinct phase in the development of his career. His
life during these early years in the Senate was touched by both
happiness and tragedy. On September 12, 1953, he married Jacqueline
Bouvier, who was then twenty-three years old. He was no longer the

"gay, young bachelor," as the Saturday Evening Post characterized him

 

in a June, 1953 article. Life looked promising. But during the
legislative year 1954-1955, Kennedy was hOSpitalized for several months.
On two separate occasions during this period he hovered near death as

a result of two delicate Spinal operations to correct his old back
injury. Any proper assessment of his early Senate career must consider
this illness that disabled him for several months. It was during his
extended convalescence in 1955 that he wrote his Pulitzer Prize-winning

Profiles in Courage,

 

During these years, also, Kennedy confronted two of the most
difficult and troublesome decisions of his political career. While
neither concerned foreign policy directly, they warrant brief mention
because his actions in each case indicate something of the man's charac-
ter and conviction. One issue catches him at his best while the other

finds him lacking.

105

106

During the 1952 campaign Kennedy had pledged to do more for
Massachusetts and immediately upon entering the Senate, with the help
of his new assistant, Theodore Sorensen, he concentrated his efforts
on researching the economic problems of the entire New England region.
In May of 1953, in his maiden effort, he delivered a series of lengthy
Speeches in the Senate in which he outlined various proposals designed
to alleviate the area's problems. Many of his proposals were accepted
and enacted, but the following year the St. Lawrence Seaway bill was
once again up for consideration in the Senate. Previously, Massachusetts
representatives had always opposed the Seaway because of the adverse
economic effect it would reputedly have on the state, especially the
port of Boston. In fact, on six different occasions over a period of
twenty years not one Senator or representative from Massachusetts had
ever voted for the Seaway. Kennedy publicly admitted it was one of his
most agonizing decisions, but in January, 1954, he delivered a force-
ful speech in the Senate in support of the Seaway.1 Even though his
arguments in justification of his vote were sensible and pragmatic it
was a bold decision to make, politically. For his action certain
Massachusetts newspapers dubbed him the "suicide" senator.2

The most politically damaging issue to Kennedy was the McCarthyism
issue, at its height in 1953-1954, and the charge that Kennedy straddled
the fence when the Senate voted to censure the controversial Wisconsin
senator in December, 1954. To many, McCarthy symbolized the complete
negation of American liberalism and the censure vote, therefore, was
considered a moral one. Kennedy did not cast a vote on the censure
motion. He was in the hOSpital at the time but critics charged that

he could have "paired" his vote as other absent senators had done, or at

107

least have made his position known publicly. In fairness, Kennedy's
record in relation to the rise and fall of McCarthyism was a mixed one
but, nonetheless, he carefully avoided taking a public position on the
matter. The issue, to be sure, was a particularly difficult one for
Kennedy--McCarthy was very popular among Kennedy's fervently anti-
Communist constituents; for a time, his brother Robert was a member of
McCarthy's staff; and Kennedy's own father was a supporter of McCarthy.
But when all the evidence is considered, Kennedy's evasion of the
December censure vote warranted the criticism it received. The issue
dogged him throughout his remaining days in the Senate. In the ensuing
years, Kennedy had many interviews and it was a rare occasion when
someone failed to ask if he had not in fact dodged the issue in 1954.
It became one of the vulnerable Spots in his political armor.

The years 1953-1956 serve well as a separate unit by which to
examine the develOpment of Kennedy's foreign policy attitudes. For the
most part, his interests and attitudes remained consistent with those
expressed earlier. He remained concerned about Europe's defense posture.
In March, 1953, for instance, he introduced a resolution calling for a
plebiscite to settle the dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia concern-
ing the free area of Trieste because he considered that area
strategically essential to the defense of Western Europe.3 On other
issues, also, there was continuity: he continued to make speeches of
encouragement to those nations in Communist East Europe, most notably
Poland; he remained staunchly pro-Israel; and he continued to favor
increases in technical aid, to Latin America and elsewhere.4 But
these were not Kennedy's primary foreign policy concerns.

One particular foreign policy issue dominated his attention during

108

this period and that was the steadily deteriorating situation in French
Indochina. During 1953 and 1954, especially, when the debate on
Indochina was most intense, and the real possibility existed that the
war might involve the major powers, Kennedy was one of the leading
Congressional spokesmen on the issue. In fact, he touched off one

of the major debates by calling for France to promise independence

to the people of Indochina in order to Stimulate them to support the
French effort against the Viet Minh guerrillas.

Kennedy saw two larger issues of American foreign policy
manifested in the Indochina war and he consistently referred to them,
either explicitly or implicitly, in virtually all of his speeches on
Indochina during this period. First, he saw the West's problems in
Indochina as the direct result of a history of colonial domination which
either alienated the native peOple or made them coldly neutral to any
Western military effort. He frequently asserted that one essential
element of American policy, and Western policy generally, must be
the granting of independence to all peoples who were sufficiently
prepared for self-government but were currently under Western colonial
domination. The theme of anti-colonialism was consistently apparent
in his Speeches and at the height of the crisis in Indochina, in July,
1954, when frustration was high, Kennedy made his most forthright
statement on colonialism. The United States must "clarify" its
position on colonialism, he demanded, "and then adopt a policy of
encouraging all the peoples of the earth, regardless of what alliances
we may have in other parts of the world, to move towards independence."5

The second theme related to his criticism of the Eisenhower

Administration's new defense strategy. The new Administration under

109

the leadership of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, revamped America's
defense policy by cutting defense spending on conventional arms and
relying more on nuclear weapons. This "New Look" strategy with its
emphasis on "massive retaliation" meant direct savings in defense spend-
ing but, for a variety of reasons, Kennedy Opposed the defense cuts
and the shift of emphasis from conventional to nuclear power. In
June, 1954, in a debate on the Administration's military budget, Kennedy
and Six other democrats offered an amendment in opposition to the
Administration's plan to reduce army strength from 20 divisions to 17.
The Kennedy amendment, which was ultimately defeated by a vote of
50 to 38, would have provided funds for maintaining 19 divisions
rather than 17.6 On more than one occasion in his speeches on
Indochina, Kennedy remarked that he thought it particularly unwise
that at a time when the United States was considering military
intervention in the war the Administration was reducing conventional
military strength.7 Throughout the first term of the Eisenhower
Administration, Kennedy repeatedly questioned the wisdom of the ”New
Look" defense strategy but perhaps his most comprehensive single
attack on the policy came in a New York speech in January, 1954,
shortly after Dulles announced the new strategy. He addressed the
Cathedral Club in a speech entitled "A Strong and Vigorous Foreign
Policy".8

In Kennedy's opinion, the war in Indochina illustrated one of
the glaring weaknesses in Dulles' strategy. In essence, he argued
that the threat of massive retaliation was ineffective in guerrilla

or brush-fire wars. In these cases, strength in conventional forces

110

was required. On more than one occasion, in fact, Kennedy asserted
that the new defense strategy actually encouraged expansion by the
Communists in guerrilla-type action, such as Indochina. He reasoned
that by announcing a decrease in the strength of American resistance
to localized wars the United States invited expansion "through those
techniques which they [Communists] deemed not sufficiently offensive
to induce us to risk atomic warfare."9

Following World War II, the French were bent on re-establishing
their Empire in Indochina. The three French colonies in Indochina,
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, had been under attack by nationalist,
guerrilla forces since 1946 and it was clear that in Vietnam the rebel
leader Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh had broader support among the
peOple than did the pro-French regime of Bao Dai. American policy-
makers were faced with a dilemma. Uniformly, they did not want the area
to fall to the Communists but they were not happy with supporting
a colonial power, especially against a popular nationalist movement.
But there did not seem to be a viable alternative. As France became
increasingly bogged down in the war, the United States assumed a
greater proportion of the financial burden under a mutual defense
assistance agreement. By 1952, the United States was bearing roughly
a third of the cost of the French effort in Vietnam but the French
military position continued to crumble.

Kennedy spoke often of the serious dilemma Indochina presented
to American policy-makers. On the one hand, to gain native support,
which he deemed necessary, and to conform to America's tradition
of support to the principle of self-determination, the United

States had to urge a French grant of genuine independence to the

111

people of Indochina. But on the other hand, many American policy-
makers feared that with an immediate and total grant of independence,
the French would probably withdraw, with disastrous political
consequences for all Southeast Asia. In all of the Speeches on
Indochina, Kennedy's and others, this was the essential problem being
grappled with.

On June 30, 1953, Kennedy rose in the Senate and spoke emphatically
in support of continued aid to France in Indochina but urged that the
funds "be administered in such a way as to encourage through all
means available the freedom and independence desired by the peoples
of the Associated States" [Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia].10 He did
not criticize the French and he did not wish his proposal to discourage
their continued military efforts. But he felt that only with a grant
of genuine independence could the French mission succeed. In his
speech, Kennedy spent some time reviewing the French history in
Indochina, and interestingly, he suggested that political concessions
might profitably have been made to Ho Chi Minh in 1945 or 1946 which
might have "changed the entire history of that area." This view
indicated something of a change of attitude from 1949, when Kennedy
scornfully rebuked the State Department for advocating just that policy
with the Communists in China. There were other indications in
subsequent speeches that he now saw the "loss" of China in somewhat
different terms.

In this Senate speech, Kennedy restated his belief in the domino
theory which he had espoused on earlier occasions. His words were
strikingly alarmist. A French defeat would not only mean the loss of

all Southeast Asia and endanger the French position in North Africa,

112

he warned, but it could threaten the "security of Metropolitan France
itself." 50, France must fight on, and the United States must
continue its wholehearted support. But the grant of independence,

he believed, would not only enhance the prospects for military victory
but would improve the image of the West in Asia generally. Even
though Kennedy was a firm believer in the domino theory, it is certain
that he did not regard the possible loss of Indochina as a "threat"

to metropolitan France. The French were fighting an exhausting and
inconclusive war and he was plainly worried about their willingness

to continue, especially in light of its increasing unpOpularity at
home. Statements like this were designed to help Spur France on.

On July 1, 1953, a few days after Kennedy's speech, the Senate
considered an amendment to a foreign aid bill, submitted by Senator
Goldwater, designed to prod France to make an early promise of
independence to the Associated States. Goldwater's amendment, which
had the support of Senator Dirksen and others, was a strongly worded
ultimatum to the French which provided for a withholding of American
funds unless France made "satisfactory assurances" to the President
of the United States of its intention to grant independence. Kennedy
was in complete agreement with the objective of Goldwater's amend-
ment but he offered a substitute amendment which eliminated the
ultimatum but conveyed the same sentiments. Kennedy's amendment,
similar to his remarks on June 30, urged that France administer United
States funds in such a way as "to encourage the freedom and
independence desired by the peoples of the Associated States."11
Goldwater accepted Kennedy's substitute amendment but a lengthy debate

ensued. In the course of the debate, Senator Cooper voiced his

113

objections to both amendments and he reminded the Senate of the
Chinese precedent where conditions were imposed on American aid to
the Nationalist Government. Many Americans have Since charged, he
asserted, that China "fell" because of these American restrictions
and the ultimate withholding of aid from the Nationalist Government.
(This, of course, had been the essence of Kennedy's charge in 1949
and later, before he modified his view). Cooper urged that that
mistake not be repeated.

Senator Knowland, who led the opposition to the amendment,
emphasized that independence was clearly desirable but he feared
the amendment might discourage the French and cause them to consider
a military withdrawal from the area, leaving the United States alone
to pick up the burden. The debate was long and both sides argued
effectively. Kennedy and his supporters contended that the French
would be more likely to remain if the prospects for success were
enhanced and this could only happen if they won the popular support
of the peOple. And this, he maintained, would require the promise
of independence.

According to a New York Times account the following day, it

 

appeared as though the Kennedy amendment might carry until Senator
Walter George, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Spoke in opposition and concluded the debate. Senator George was

one of the most prestigious of Senate members and was then at the
peak of his influence. He, too, was concerned that the amendment
might encourage a French withdrawal from the area but he also
emphasized that the United States should not challenge a nation that

was so necessary to the defense of Western Europe. He characterized

114

the amendment as an "offense to a sorely beset and sorely pressed
friend and ally". We cannot be helpful, he warned, "by officious
intermeddling in the affairs of a friendly nation." In the end, the
opposition view prevailed. By a vote of 64 to 17 the Senate rejected
the Goldwater amendment as modified by Kennedy.12 In light of future
images, the Goldwater-Kennedy alliance seems like a curious one but
at this time, on this issue, their views were the same.
Kennedy Spent much of August in France, with his old friend
Torbert MacDonald, attempting to assess French Opinion at the govern-
mental level on the divisive Indochina issue. When he returned he
told reporters that he found French opinion sharply divided on
continuation of the war in Indochina and divided also on his proposal
encouraging independence for the Indochinese. Again, he lamented
the French failure to grant the necessary political concessions to
achieve Indochinese support for the war. The war was a terrific
drain on the French economy, he added, and without it France could
contribute more to the defense of Western Europe. But, once again, he
emphasized the strategic importance of Indochina to the West. "Indochina
is the key to Southeast Asia," he said, and was very important to
America's defense.13
By early 1954, the French military position in Indochina had
grown desperate. Secretary of State Dulles was eager to use the Foreign
Ministry Conference at Berlin in January, 1954, to end the Indochina
war but he was unsuccessful. It was at this time, in January, 1954,
in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, that
Dulles outlined his "New Look" in American foreign policy strategy.

Interestingly, it was the mounting crisis in Indochina in 1954 that

115

ultimately provided the initial test of Dulles' new strategy.

Kennedy reacted to Dulles' new policy immediately. In his
speech before the Cathedral Club in New York, he sharply challenged
the viability of the entire concept of massive retaliation.14 He
perceived various weaknesses in the concept, one of which was its
ineffectiveness in combating guerrilla insurrections. This brought
him to a brief discussion of the current state of affairs in Indochina.
He restated his view that Indochina was vital to the security of all
Southeast Asia but he introduced something new. He Spoke of the
heightening tendency within France to favor a negotiated settlement
with the leaders of the Viet Minh, and asserted that SUCh a settlement
would "inevitably result in Communist domination of French Indochina"
because, he warned, Indochina was the only country in the world where
the Communist faction would win a free election. It was not clear what
he was suggesting. He implied that the United States should intervene
if France was on the verge of a military defeat or weakening such
so as to consider a negotiated settlement. He also implied that
if Indochina was the key to all of Southeast Asia, as he believed
it was, then the United States Should pick up the burden if France
withdrew.

AS a guest on Meet The Press a few days later, one of the panelists,

 

Miss May Craig, pursued these questions.15 Kennedy stated that he
did not believe American intervention would be successful owing

to the hostility of the native population. He explained that the
Indochinese people withheld their support from the French because
(1) they were not convinced the French would win and (2) because the

French refused to provide real guarantees of independence. A similar

116

situation would prevail, he said if the United States replaced the
French. But, Miss Craig asked,: "Are you saying if France gives

up Indochina we should give up all Asia?" Kennedy responded that

he did not mean that. He stated that Should France withdraw

the United States could not hOpe to hold French Indochina so it would
be necessary "to move back to a secondary line."

His response to Miss Craig's questions indicated just how
difficult the issue was, especially when one was pressed to answer
the hard questions involved. Clearly, it was much easier to make
speeches. Kennedy believed that French Indochina was the key to all
Southeast Asia and he believed in the domino theory. But yet, he
did not believe that unilateral American intervention would be any
more successful than was the French experience. How then, could
Indochina be held? The only hope, as he saw it, was to encourage
the French to remain and also gain the active support of the people--
thus the absolute necessity of urging independence. But, if
necessary, he favored moving "back to a secondary line" [wherever
that might be] over American intervention. Kennedy here was both
vague and confused. To suggest that the French remain while at the
same time grant independence was a basic contradiction.

A few months after the interview, in March of 1954, at a time
when the French forces were under Siege at Dien Bien Phu, certain
Senators were worried that the presence of American mechanics in
Indochina might draw the United States into the war. Senator Stennis
requested that American Air Force mechanics be withdrawn because
the risk of direct military involvement by the United States was

becoming too great. Kennedy objected to this. He did not wish

117

to see them withdrawn.16 He, too, along with Senator Stennis,
regretted that American mechanics had been sent in the first place,
but Since they were there, he emphasized, it was important they remain.
He feared that at the upcoming Geneva conference, scheduled for April,
the Communists might successfully negotiate a partition of Indochina
and the total withdrawal of French forces. The position of the
United States, he said, Should be one of firm support for the French
military effort. If the United States should withdraw its mechanics
"at this very sensitive time" he warned, it would indicate a lack

of American support for the French and perhaps encourage them to
withdraw their forces or agree to a partition. And he did not wish
any such settlement to be made at Geneva. The position of the United
States at Geneva, he said, Should be to oppose any such agreement.
"The war should be continued and brought to a successful conclusion,"
he declared. Although he was Opposed to withdrawing the American
mechanics from Indochina, he and Senator Stennis did agree that it
would be wise to transfer them to a better protected area.

Talk of outright American intervention in Indochina became wide-
spread in March and April. In late March, Paris informed Washington
that only an American air strike could save the French from disaster
at Dien Bien Phu. At first, intervention was considered by the
Eisenhower Administration, and in Washington, Vice President Nixon
spoke of the possibility of committing American trOOps. But the
Administration's policy was contradictory and unclear. Support
was needed. In early April, Secretary of State Dulles met with a
group of senators and representatives in an attempt to secure their

support for intervention. Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint

118

Chiefs of Staff, persuaded Dulles that a massive carrier-based air
Strike might save Dien Bien Phu. Dulles wanted a resolution from
Congress authorizing the President to commit air and naval forces
in Indochina. The congressmen withheld their support, however,
when it became known that no other chief of staff supported the
idea and that England had not been consulted. Gradually, the air-
strike prOposal grew less persuasive with highly-placed policy-
makers. Ultimately, Dulles abandoned the Radford prOposal and
concentrated his efforts on persuading the British to join in a
Southeast Asian organization equivalent to NATO, in an attempt to
Stem Communist aggression. Meanwhile, the Senate debated.

On April 6, 1954, Kennedy precipitated a sharp argument in the
Senate when he delivered a major address on the war in Indochina. In
his speech he stated that he did not wish to demean the gallant French
effort, or criticize the policy of the Secretary of State, but he
felt "the time has come for the American people to be told the blunt
truth about Indochina."17 He chastized the Eisenhower Administration
and the Truman Administration for the long history of falsely
optimistic reports on both the prospects for military victory in
Indochina and the prospects for a French grant of independence to
the Associated States.

Kennedy saw three basic alternatives concerning the war in
Indochina. First, the United States could allow France to withdraw
from Indochina, paving the way for a Communist take-over of the area.
This was clearly unthinkable. Second, France, with the support of the
United States, could sue for a negotiated peace on the basis of the

present military situation. But, as he had done earlier, he again

119

warned that a negotiated settlement of the war, resulting in either
partition or a coalition government, would result in the eventual
domination by the Communists, who had the support of the people. So
this alternative must be resisted.

The third available alternative was to encourage France to
continue the war. This Kennedy favored. He supported Dulles's
efforts to win the support of the free nations of Asia for united
action in Indochina and he realized that this may have necessitated
the involvement of United States manpower. But because the Asian
nations regarded the Indochina war as a war of colonialism he was not
optimistic about the prospects for meaningful united action. He
feared that united action, "which is so desperately needed for victory
in that area" might end up as unilateral action by the United States--
and he fervently opposed unilateral intervention because he thought
it would certainly fail. In principle, he supported Dulles' plan
for united action but he emphasized that so long as the French withheld
the promise of genuine independence for the Indochinese, Asian help
would not be forthcoming and no amount of military intervention by
the United States could win the war. But he was hopeful that with a
grant of independence the Indochinese would raise a "reliable and
crusading native army"18 that would make all the difference.

Should the French persist in their refusal to grant legitimate
independence, however, he hoped Secretary Dulles would "recognize
the futility of channeling American men and machines into that hopeless
internecine struggle."19 He emphasized that before the United States
attempt to call on the nations of Asia for united action in Indochina,

France must grant a sufficient degree of independence. And because the

120

United States was carrying such a heavy percentage of the cost of the
war and considering that outright American intervention was being
considered in order to extricate the French, he believed the United
States was justified in placing these demands on France.

Kennedy was vitally aware of the clear danger of a French
withdrawal from Indochina if the United States should make attempts
to force them to grant immediate independence to the Indochinese. But
he did not believe the resulting military difficulties following a
French withdrawal would be any greater than those resulting from
having the United States intervene unilaterally in support of the
French under the present political setup. "Both policies," he said,
"would end in disaster."20

Following Kennedy's speech, Senator Knowland Spoke in agreement
with much of what he had said. However, Knowland sharply urged America's
allies to be ready to contribute their Share should intervention be
necessary. He had not been entirely happy with the Korean situation
in this regard. Also, he wanted to emphasize the difference between
the nations of the West, especially the United States and England,
who had a proud history of granting independence to the peoples of
Asia--the Philippines, India, Pakistan, and Burma-~from the leaders
of the "godless Communist tyranny" in Russia who destroyed freedom in
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary. The senator did not believe that the "true" story had
been made sufficiently clear to the peOple of Asia.

Senator Dirksen took issue with one of Kennedy's suggestions.
Dirksen believed that it would be a disaster for France to grant

immediate and complete independence to the Indochinese States because

121

they were unprepared and the Communists would quickly take over.

He argued, rather, for a future target date for independence, much as
the United States had done with the Philippines. He asked Kennedy if
he was advocating that France grant immediate and complete independence
to the people of Vietnam. Kennedy replied that he favored two
treaties, one of which would grant Vietnam independence immediately.
The second treaty would bind Vietnam to the French union on the basis
of equality. He did not comment upon the obvious contradiction in
such an arrangement. However, he believed these treaties should be

a prerequisite to any United States intervention. AS time passed,
however, Kennedy agreed more and more with Dirksen's view.

All of the senators who engaged in the debate essentially agreed
with Kennedy's view that American intervention, without the support
of the local population, must be avoided. They also agreed that a
French guarantee of independence was essential to win the support of
the peOple. If a genuinely united effort could be managed, involving
the free nations of Asia, however, they were willing to consider
American military intervention. Various senators, including Senators
Jackson, Mansfield, Symington, Anderson, Stennis, and Magnuson com-
plimented Kennedy on his Speech and his remarks received significant
approval in press editorials.21

In his editorial comment, Walter Lippmann praised Kennedy's
remarks.22 He noted, as had Kennedy in his Speech, that a sub-committee
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee headed by Representative Judd,
had reported in January that "until political independence has been
achieved, an effective fighting force from the Associated States

cannot be expected." Lippmann remarked, however, that the Indochina

122

states were ill-prepared by the French for independence. And he
cautioned the United States not to delude itself into thinking that the
promise of independence would have an immediate impact. It will not
result in a mass movement "eager and willing to conquer the Viet Minh,"
he said. Following a guarantee of independence, Lippmann envisaged

a ten year interregnum in which the Indochinese would have to be
trained for independence such that they could effectively resist the
Communists.

During these fateful days in the Spring of 1954, while the French
military position continued to crumble at Dien Bien Phu, a nineteen-
nation conference was scheduled to assemble at Geneva to discuss the
future of both Korea and Indochina. The essential fact relating to
the Indochina problem was that the military situation favored the
Communists. Also, whereas the Communists operated from a united
front, there was no common agreement among the United States and_
England and France on how to best deal with the problem. Secretary
Dulles was eager to establish an anti-Communist, collective security
pact in Southeast Asia. However, he was unable to persuade Foreign
Minister Eden of Britain. Eden preferred to wait until after the
Geneva Conference and then include the neutral countries of Asia,
such as India, Burma and Indonesia, in the pact. In mid-April,
despite Britain's wishes, Dulles convened a conference, minus the
neutral nations of Asia, to discuss the pact. Eden was dismayed and
refused to send a British delegation to the conference. In all,
there was substantial dissension and distrust between Washington and
London and this, of course, further aided the Communist cause at

Geneva.

123

On April 14, 1954, Senator Mansfield addressed the Senate on
the urgent need for Western unity on Indochina as the major powers
prepared to convene at Geneva. Mansfield had visited Indochina the
preceding October and had reported to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on his return. His assessment of the essential problem in
Indochina was identical to Kennedy's--France's failure to grant meaning-
ful independence to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In the discussion
following Mansfield's Opening remarks, Kennedy questioned Dulles's
emphasis on the establishment of a collective security pact as the
best defense of Indochina.23

He did not think that Dulles' attempt to build up a mutual
defense system among the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand and
Australia met the immediate problem at hand. And he did not think that
guarantees by these nations to come to the aid of Indochina in the
event of an invasion by Communist China were of particular value or
importance because he considered it unlikely that China would feel the
need to intervene. Thus, he did not expect these Asian nations to
intervene. The critical problem, as he saw it, and the one that should
be the center of attention was the need to establish an "effective
native army" to combat Communist aggression.

Later in the month, in a speech to a Democratic Party meeting in
Chicago, Kennedy repeated the view that the war in Indochina was an
internal one which, ultimately, could only be won by the native peoples
of Asia--the Indochinese themselves, with the essential support of
India, Burma, and Indonesia. Guarantees of military assistance from
other nations in the event of outright aggression by the Chinese, he

said, were of little value in a war that was primarily civil. "We

124

cannot save those who will not be saved," he declared.24

The Geneva Conference had begun in April, 1954 and Dien Bien Phu
fell on May 7. That gave caution to those considering American inter-
vention. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of Dien Bien Phu, many
Democrats criticized the Eisenhower Administration's handling of
Indochina. Kennedy, appearing on the CBS television program WWan of
the Week" on May 9, termed the Administration's policy "too little
and too late".25 But, he said there was no outright action that the
United States could take that would be effective and he predicted that
the war "will be won or lost with the forces already there." His
views coincided substantially with the statements of three fellow
Democratic senators, Douglas, Mansfield, and Humphrey, who were also
interviewed that day.26

On May 11, Kennedy participated in Princeton University's American
Whig-Cliosophic Society's colloquium as one of six debating both the
domestic and foreign policies of the Eisenhower Administration.27
Three attacked and three defended the Administration's policies. Kennedy
spoke on "The Dangerous Implications" of the Eisenhower Administration's
foreign policy. On the subject of Indochina he made some fresh state-
ments along with the old. He stated that he understood why the British
preferred to await the results of the negotiations at Geneva before
considering a military intervention that would have widened the war.

And he also understood why the Asians, who because of a long history
of Western exploitation, viewed any call for "united action" with
outright hostility or cold neutrality. Once again, he criticized the

Eisenhower Administration for the falsely optimistic reports on the

state of the war and charged further that the American military

 

 

i '11 ill".
ll llll' III! I

125

intelligence estimates were "woefully and inexcusably inaccurate."
Kennedy was vague on what direction he felt the Geneva negotiations
might take. He stated that "ideally", Should the Communists refuse
the French proposals, he hoped that France, with the help of the United
States would "intensify" the training of native troops, grant complete
independence to the people of Vietnam, and continue the fight long
enough to allow the native armies to be trained and equipped sufficiently
to eventually carry the major burden of the struggle. He realized,
however, that the French might be unwilling to continue the war and if
so, the United States would have to settle for far less satisfactory
terms--coalition government or partition. He still believed, however,
that a coalition government would mean ultimate Communist domination.
He feared that it might be necessary, if the Situation became desperate,
"to draw a line at Cambodia and Laos, beyond which the Communists would
be warned not to move."28
It is interesting that in this speech Kennedy admitted a further
change of mind from his 1949 position on the reasons for the defeat
of the Chinese Nationalists by the Communists. ."I am not as sure as
I once was," he said, "that it ever could have been saved."29 He
now agreed with those who placed the primary responsibility for the
defeat on the Chinese Nationalist Government itself, rather than on
President Truman and the State Department. But he still regarded
American policy there as "inadequate" and implied, at least, that the
commitment of American trOOps, which he saw as "essential to success",
might have made the difference.

On May 28, 1954, Kennedy journeyed to Chicago and delivered a

major foreign policy address to a luncheon meeting of the Executives

126

Club on recent events in Indochina.30 There was a note of urgency in
his speech. He thought it quite possible that President Eisenhower
might soon ask Congress to support intervention. In briefly tracing
the history of American involvement in Indochina, he focused on four
major American miscalculations. First, he believed the United States
had erred in relying on the SO-called Navarre plan, the assumption

of which was that the French could win a total military victory against
the Viet Minh in a pitched battle. The fall of Dien Bien Phu, of course,
was bitter testimony to the lack of reality in that plan. Secondly,

he underscored the United States's persistent inability to recognize
the significance of the independence movement in Indochina.

The third miscalculation, he said, was the gross underestimation
of the complexities involved in achieving united action in Indochina.
The attempt to co-ordinate and unify the non-Communist nations of
Asia, Western EurOpe and the United States on a Single course of united
action in a brief period of time, he maintained, was an "impossible"
task. He believed American leaders were overly influenced by the
experience of successful collective security arrangements in Europe
and failed to comprehend the "fluidity and instability" which was more
the case of the political situation in Asia. Also, he believed
insufficient attention was given to the "traditional hatred for the
white man" in Asia which was a result of the years of Western exploita-
tion. "The cause of the West," he declared, "was blurred by the visual
impact of colonial powers fighting native people." The fourth and
final miscalculation was America's decision to reduce conventional
forces and to rely on massive retaliatory power. This strategy, he

reminded his audience, was completely ineffective in guerrila wars

127

such as the one in Indochina.

Kennedy then turned to the state of negotiations at Geneva and
the question of United States intervention. He suggested five points
for consideration. First, he thought it doubtful that the neutral
nations of Asia, India, Burma and Indonesia would support the American
desire for united action, so this fact must be considered. Secondly,
even a French grant of complete independence to the people of Indo-
china, as a prerequisite to American support was desirable, he
suggested that it might not be practical. Not only did he fear a
possible French withdrawal as a result but he believed that Ho Chi Minh
would win any free election. Thirdly, he maintained that American
intervention could not be considered if the French were unwilling to
continue the struggle, and there were clear signs of such unwillingness.
Fourth, thought of American intervention must consider the lack of
popular support for the war among the Vietnamese people. And, fifth,
because of the difficult jungle terrain, the general unfriendliness
of the population, and the possibility of the introduction of Chinese
trOOps, American intervention must be considered sheerly in terms of
military soundness. These, he said, were the five conditions that
must be weighed. However, he did-not make it clear under what conditions
he personally would support intervention.

Kennedy concluded his remarks by citing four "lessons" the United
States should have learned from the Indochina conflict. First, he
hoped the country had learned the importance of allies, and that America
could not rely solely on the traditional European allies but must secure
the support of the Asian nations. Secondly, he hOped Indochina

revealed the weaknesses of the New Look military Strategy which had

128

the effect of actually encouraging guerrilla aggression. Thirdly,

he hoped the United States realized the importance of the "moral

and ideological principles" at the basis of the world's struggle
between colonialism and nationalism, and of the necessity to adhere

to America's traditional policy of "helping all Oppressed people, even
though it may require unpleasant pressures in our relations with
colonial powers and friends." In the long run, he argued, insistence
upon complete Vietnamese independence, granted at the outset, would
have not only better served the cause of the entire free world but

that of France herself. Fourth and finally, he hoped the United States
now more fully realized the trials of world leadership, so long
experienced by Britain in years past. American policy in Indochina,

he said, was criticized from all sides. The British felt we moved

too fast, while the French felt we moved too slowly. Many Asiatics
interpreted American policy as supporting French colonialism and many
felt the United States should have interceded more to help the Vietnamese,
but others felt our policy was pushing France too hard.’ Leadership

was difficult, he warned, but the criticisms and burdens must not result
in an attitude of disgust and withdrawal. America's position of world
leadership was inescapable.

Kennedy's Executive Club address was knowledgeable and thoughtful
but he cautiously avoided recommending a specific course of action. He
neatly outlined the factors that must be considered and the lessons
that had been learned, but he did not state if he, personally, favored
intervention to aid the French. Also, there were some apparent shifts
in attitude. In earlier speeches he had argued that Asian support

was absolutely essential to the success of any united intervention. Now

129

he implied at least, that more limited, non-Asian support could be
considered. Secondly, in earlier speeches he had been adamant in his
insistence upon immediate and complete independence for the Vietnamese
people. Now he was hedging, at least, on the granting of free elections.
Aside from these two important points, his comments were in general
agreement with his earlier expressed views.

After the fall of Dien Bien Phu in.May, a cease-fire had been
agreed upon. The negotiations at Geneva finally resulted in an armistice
agreement in mid-July. To a certain degree, Ho Chi Minh had been
persuaded to negotiate by the promise of Vietnamese reunification through
elections. From the point of view of the West, much of the settlement
was unsatisfactory. Vietnam was partitioned between Communist North
and Nationalist South with eventual unification to be provided for in
an election in 1956. Laos and Cambodia were declared independent but
the settlement terms provided that neither could join a regional
alliance, solicit foreign military aid, or permit foreign bases in their
territory. It was notable that neither the United States nor the
South Vietnamese government signed the agreement on Vietnam. Many
Americans regarded the settlement as a."Munich" of the Far East.

Unhappy with the situation, Secretary Dulles continued his quest for
a mutual defense Pact and on September 8, 1954, he brought three
Asian nations, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines, together
with the United States, Britain, France and New Zealand into the

new Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) pact. However, SEATO
lacked the support of many important Asian nations. India, Ceylon,
Burma and Indonesia refused to join the pact and Laos, Cambodia and

South Vietnam were not permitted because of the terms of the Geneva

130

agreement.
Most Americans regarded the Geneva settlement as unsatisfactory
and unfortunate and a possible prelude to total Communist domination
of all Indochina. There is no record of Kennedy's attitude on the
Geneva settlement in 1954, but he later recalled that, at the time, he
feared that Ho Chi Minh and his Communists "would ultimately come to
dominate all Indochina. . . ."31 In 1954, Kennedy's close assistant,
Theodore Sorensen, labelled the settlement a victory for the
Communists and predicted further Communist gains in the area.32 In
the Senate on July 29, Kennedy voiced concern about the vast supply of
military equipment still in Indochina. He believed that the United
States still had title to it and Since the material had a huge financial
potential, he urged that future aid to South Vietnam be delayed until
this matter was cleared up.33
Following the Geneva settlement, America's attention no longer
focused on Indochina. The crisis over, that area receded into the
background of world problems. For the next few years, the critical
problem in Indochina was political, rather than military, and,
therefore, less newsworthy. In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem replaced Bao Dai
as the President of South Vietnam. Many Americans, including Kennedy,
were highly optimistic in their hopes for the Diem regime to meet
the problems of South Vietnam. In June of 1956, Kennedy addressed
the Conference of American Friends of Vietnam.34 He lamented the
decreasing attention Vietnam was receiving from the American public
and policy-makers. He attributed America's complacency to the

"amazing success" of President Diem in solving Vietnam's problems

and to America's unfortunate tendency to neglect areas once the crisis

131

stage had passed. He joked that he hoped it would not be necessary
for the Diem government or the organization he was addressing, to
subsidize the growth of the South Vietnam Communist Party in order
to focus American attention on its needs! He spoke of the continued
need for American capital, technicians and guidance to help Vietnam
achieve the necessary "political, economic, and social" revolution.
Of course, military aid was also necessary to "rebuild" the new
Vietnamese Army. With one brief exception, this speech marked the
end of Kennedy's statements on Indochina until he became President.35
Other, more pressing issues crowded in to consume his attention.

In summary, what can be said of Kennedy's involvement with the
Indochina issue, especially during 1953-1956? Certainly, he was
no Johnny-come-lately on the Indochina issue. His views were based
upon the personal observations and interviews dating from his 1951
trip, and he was well-informed. When his views are considered in
the context of the time, and contrasted with the remarks and proposals
of others, he appeared enlightened. Many others echoed his sentiments
during 1953 and 1954 but he was one of the very first to warn that
France would never evoke the essential peoples' support for the war
until it was made clear that the objective of the war was genuine
independence for Indochina rather than the retention of French
colonial rule. Much of what he said in 1951 and 1952 was prophetic.
He consistently held that the French gestures of independence were "too
little and too late", and urged that the United States apply pressure.
Hisdefeated amendment of June, 1953, although weak, was along this
line. He predicted in 1951 that Indochina would develop into an area

of crisis if French policy remained unchanged. His criticism was

132

non-partisan. Over the years, he criticized many men--French Generals
De Lattre and Navarre, Secretaries of State Acheson and Dulles and
many others, for creating the illusion that the war was being won

and that meaningful independence was being granted.

Because of France's refusal to grant independence to Vietnam,

Ho Chi Minh effectively captured and symbolized the nationalist move-
ment in that country. Kennedy fully recognized that in Indochina
nationalism had become largely identified with Communism. And unlike
many Americans, he appeared to realize that Communism, except as
identified with nationalism, was a meaningless concept to most Asians.
Nationalism, not Communism, was the driving force.

Kennedy's suggestions were not simplistic; he was aware of the
terrible dilemma involved and the crucial strategic Significance of
Indochina. He realized that United States policy must not be such
that it would encourage the French to withdraw but, on the other
hand, native support for the war must be won. He considered the
grant of independence to the Indochinese as the one viable solution.
But as one considers his remarks it was clear that he felt the
independence Should have been granted early. Independence for South
Vietnam, based on partition and involving the withdrawal of French
forces, he held little hOpe for. He did not think that state alone
could withstand the force and popularity of the Communists.

For the most part he was consistent. The dominant reality of
Indochina in 1953-1954 was that the position of France, and the West
generally, was steadily becoming less tenable. The fall of Dien
Bien Phu in.May, 1954, was the great watershed. Kennedy's remarks

must be considered in that context. In June, 1953, he offered his

133

amendment to encourage France to grant independence but he wholeheartedly
supported the French military effort. In.March, 1954, prior to Dien
Bien Phu, he speculated about the upcoming Geneva negotiations and
urged that neither partition, nor coalition be accepted--the position
of the United States, he said, should be to see the war continued
and brought to a successful conclusion. In the context of 1954, a
successful conclusion to the war meant a continued French presence
in Indochina and the prevention of Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh from
gaining dominance. But at no time, then or later, did Kennedy favor
United States military intervention. He saw no prospect for victory
in such a venture. Kennedy very effectively analyzed the various
errors in judgment and the faulty assumptions concerning United
States policy toward Indochina but he was not able to solve the
essential dilemma-~how to pressure France effectively, Short of
causing a withdrawal. He favored pressure but he did not support the
idea of an ultimatum, as did Goldwater and Dirksen in 1953. However,
he did urge that genuine independence be a prerequisite to any United
States intervention. In the years following the Geneva settlement,
Kennedy grew more Optimistic and hailed President Diem as the savior
of South Vietnam. In this misjudgment Kennedy was by no means alone.
In essence, there was insight and wisdom in much of what Kennedy said
on Indochina. He understood the Significance of an aroused Asian
nationalism. But, nonetheless, he must have wondered, then and later,
if the problem of Indochina was amenable to an American solution.
However, despite Kennedy's generally enlightened attitude on
Indochina, and in particular Vietnam, there was an important and funda-

mental flaw in his thinking. He favored the end of French colonialism

134

in Indochina; he favored the grant of "genuine" independence to the
Vietnamese; but he also strongly opposed both Ho Chi Minh and the
Viet Minh and any compromise settlement. Along with most American
observers, he realized that Bao Dai could never hold his own in any
coalition government with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh. The essential
problem in all this is that Ho Chi Minh was the true spokesman for
the nationalist movement in Vietnam. Any real independence in Vietnam
necessitated the recognition of this fact. There was no third force
of major consequence in Vietnam, the alternative to pro-French Bao Dai
was Ho Chi Minh. This was the fundamental contradiction in Kennedy's
policy. He urged the turning of an essentially colonial war against
nationalists (Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh), into a war for indepen-
dence, but all the while opposing the true leaders of the independence
movement. However, this was part of the American dilemma. The
Indochina war had always been portrayed not as a colonial war but
as a struggle against Communist imperialism and American policy-makers
uniformly resisted concessions to Ho Chi Minh because that would mean
appeasement to international Communism. In part, Kennedy's thinking
was strait-jacketed by the milieu of the times. The rhetoric
of the Cold War, the "loss" of China, the Korean War, McCarthyism,
and the view of Communism as an international monolith, all combined
to freeze flexibility of thought. No one wished to appear "soft" on
Communism.

The recurrent problem of the struggle between colonialism and
nationalism and the implications this had for relations between the
United States and her allies, continued to dominate Kennedy's Speeches

on foreign policy. One of his very best speeches on this theme was

13S

delivered at Rockhurst College, Kansas City, Missouri, on June 2, 1956.

He criticized the Eisenhower Administration for failing to dissociate
the United States from Western colonialism and referred specifically
to Indochina and Algeria. He disagreed with the Administration's
policy of remaining neutral on colonial issues. While he understood
the complexities involved, he urged the United States to "speak out

boldly for freedom for all peOple," against both Communist imperialism

and Western colonialism, even though it may displease American allies.37

Western colonial policy, he maintained, only made the way easier for
Communist inroads. The task would not be easy, he warned, because of
the colonial hatred for "the white man who bled them, beat them,
exploited them, and ruled them."38 He thought it perhaps already too
late for the United States to undo the centuries of ill-will but,
he said, the United States dare not fail to make the effort.

While the Indochina war had revealed serious divisions
within the Western alliance, it was the Suez crisis in the summer of
1956 that brought the alliance to its postwar nadir. The dissension
and mutual distrust among Britain, France, and the United States,
intensified by the conflicts over Indochina policy, in fact,
contributed to the Suez fiasco. Kennedy's reaction to the Suez
crisis was characteristic and predictable. In a Speech in Boston
in the fall of 1956, he wholeheartedly approved Eisenhower's
Suez policy. According to a Boston newspaper, he declared: "Since
1945 we have been tremendously hampered by diplomatic ties with
Britain and France who wish to preserve their colonial ties. We have
taken a definite moral stand [against colonialism] for the first

time since 1945."39 In a speech to a Zionist organization in

6

136

Baltimore in November of 1956, Kennedy further analyzed the various

reasons for discord in the Middle East. Once again he emphasized

the importance of the struggle between colonialism and nationalism.40
Kennedy's political fortunes rose dramatically in 1956 when he

narrowly missed defeating Senator Estes Kefauver for the Democratic

Party's Vice-Presidential nomination that year at the Democratic

convention in Chicago.41

AS a further indication of his ascending
political prominence, he won an appointment to the prestigious

Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the following legislative
session over the candidacy of Senator Kefauver who had greater
seniority.42 In the years after 1956, Kennedy continued to challenge
Dulles' foreign policy and general defense strategy, especially the

concept of massive retaliation, and his statements in opposition to

Western colonialism reached a new pitch.

FOOTNOTES

1U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, lst Session, 1953, XCIX,
Part 1, 238-240. In his speech Kennedy argued that the Seaway was
inevitable--that Canada was set to build it with or without U.S. coopera-
tion. Also, he reasoned that if New England helped the states that
stood to benefit from the Seaway, especially the mid-West, then those
states might be more willing to help lift New England out of its
economic problems. For a lengthy series Of complimentary editorials on
Kennedy's stand, mainly from the mid-West, see Ibid. Al332-Al338.
Senator George Aiken of Vermont, in an Oral History for the John F.
Kennedy Library, conducted on April 25, 1964, recalled: "When President
Kennedy voted for the construction of the Seaway, and the Power Project,
that, I think, was the first time I realized that he had a great deal
of courage, because he was voting against the desires of influential
peOple in his own community and his own state." p. 4-5.

 

2Boston Globe, July 5, 1956

 

3U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, lst Session, 1953, XCIX,

Part 2, 1849-1850.

 

4For a sampling of his speeches on Poland see Congressional Record,
1953, A2649-A2443; Record, 1954, Part 2, 2035-2036; Record, 1955, Part 4,
5370; and Record, 1956, Part 3, 3962-3963. For a representative speech
on Israel see: Record, 1956, Part 6, 7506. For remarks on Latin
America see: Record, 1954, Part 9, 12694. During these early years
Kennedy did an interesting foreign policy piece for the New York Times
Megazine Section entitled "Foreign Policy is the People's Business" in
which he emphasized the role of a well-informed public on the Shaping
of foreign policy. The article appeared August 8, 1954, pp. Sff.

 

 

 

SU.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C,

Part 8, 10003. The anti-colonial theme ran through virtually all of
Kennedy's Speeches on Indochina but for a sampling of speeches not

cited elsewhere and which deal specifically with anti-colonialism see:
New York Times, January 27, 1956--a Speech to National Women's
Democratic Club; John F. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Speech Files, Box 2--
an April 13, 1956 speech to a Los Angeles Town Hall Luncheon entitled
"Colonialism and Foreign Policy"; and a June 2, 1856 speech at Rockhurst
College, Missouri, found in Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd
Session, 1956, C11, Part 7, 9614-9615.

 

 

 

137

138

6U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C,

Part 6, 8432-8441. For a sampling of Kennedy's many Speeches
urging a defense build-up see: Boston Globe, April 16, 1953; October
26, 1953; and New York Times, February 20, 1956.

 

 

 

7U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C,

1—7

Part 4, 4677.

8Ibid., A727-A729.

9As indicated, the themes of anti-colonialism and defense strategy
exist in most of his speeches on foreign policy during this period.
This particular quotation is taken from a speech delivered on May 11,
1954, at Princeton University. See: John F. Kennedy Library, Sorensen
Speech Files, Box 2, and also Press Releases File, Box 621.

 

10U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, lst Session, 1953,

XCIX, Part 6, 7623.

 

11Ibid., 7779-7789.

12Ibid., 7789.

13Boston Globe, August 27, 1953, and Boston Post, August 28, 1953.

 

 

14U.S. Congtessional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C,

Part Appendix, A727-729.

 

15Meet The Press, transcript, February 14, 1954.

 

16U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C,

Part 3, 2904.

 

17Ibid., Part 4, 4672. For the speech and subsequent debate see:
4672-4681. The remarks by Kennedy and Knowland were reprinted in
Vital Speeches of the Deyg May 1, 1954, and Foreign Policy Bulletin,
May 15, 1954.

 

181bid., 4674.

lglbid.

 

201bid., 4676.

139

21For editorial comment see Ibid., A2882-A2884. In an interview,
President Eisenhower Stated his general agreement with Kennedy's
views: New York Times, April 8, 1954 and Boston Globe, April 8, 1954.

 

 

22Boston Morning Globe, April 12, 1954.

 

23U.S. Cengressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C,

Part 4, 5111-5118, for Mansfield's remarks and the subsequent debate.
For Kennedy's comments see p. 5120.

 

24For the Democratic Party Speech see Sorensen Speech Files,

Box 2, and also Press Releases File, Box 621. The Springfield, Illinois
State Register carried an account of the speech on April 21, 1954.
Similar sentiments were expressed by Kennedy in a May 17, 1954 Speech

in Burlington, Vermont. See Press Releases File, Box 621.

 

25The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 10, 1954.

 

26Ibid.

 

27A transcript of the speech is in Sorensen Speech File Box 2, and

the Press Releases File, Box 621.

28Ibid. Kennedy had a long question and answer interview with

the Hearst newspapers on the subject of Indochina in which he repeated
many of the points in this Speech. See the San Francisco Examiner,
May 19, 1954. A rough c0py of the interview is in the Sorensen Speech
Files, Box 2.

 

29Kennedy Library, Princeton University speech, Sorensen Speech
Files, Box 2.

 

30
For a full text of the speech see: U.S. Congressional Record,
83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C, A4144-A4l45. A partial text
is in the Press Releases File, Box 621. Kennedy repeated some of the
points made in this speech in a Senate debate on Indochina on July 8,
1954: Record, 1954, Part 8, 10003 and 10008.

 

31I was not able to locate any statement by Kennedy om the Geneva

settlement made in 1954. However, he later commented on his reaction
at that time in his Strategy of Peace (New York: Popular Library, 1960),
p. 91.

 

32Springfield, Massachusetts, Springfield Union, July 27, 1954.

 

140

33U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C,
Part 9, 12516, and 12554-12555.

 

34The speech can be found reprinted in Vital Speeches, August 1,

1956, p. 617-619, and also in Strategy of Peace (1960), p. 91-94.

 

 

35The last pre-presidential comment Kennedy made on Vietnam was

in 1959 in an introduction to a 1954 speech in Strategy of Peace. In
1954, he recalled, he had feared a Communist takeover of all Indochina.
But in 1959 he was much more optimistic. He lauded the "near miracle"
Diem had accomplished in Vietnam. See p. 91.

 

36U.S. Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, C11,

Part 7, 9614-9615.

37It Should be noted that while France bore the brunt of most of

Kennedy's attacks on colonial policy, he did single out Britain as

well. See: U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954,
C, Part 8, 10003.

38U.S. Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, CII,
Part 7, 9614-9615.

39The Reporter, December 10, 1959, p. 30.

 

40Strategy of Peace, p. 142-145.

 

41Kennedy had been suggested as a possible candidate prior to

the convention. He was interviewed on Face The Nation on July 1, 1956,
and on Meet The Press on October 28, 1956. Both interviews focused
on his potential candidacy.

 

 

42The Boston Globe on January 9 and 10, 1957 carried an analysis

of the reasons behind Kennedy's victory as did the January 21, 1957
issue of Time magazine, p. 14.

 

CHAPTER V

THE MIDDLE-EAST AND ALGERIA, 1957-1958

During the Eisenhower years, the problems of the Middle East
continued to defy solution and that strategic area became increasingly
the focal point of tensions between the Soviet Union and the West.

Kennedy took part in the formulation of the Eisenhower-Dulles
foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly the Eisenhower Doctrine
in 1957, which he supported, with qualifications. Despite this support
he found much to criticize in United States Middle Eastern policy.
But, for Kennedy at this time, by far the most explosive and urgent
issue was Algeria's prolonged and bloody struggle for independence
from France. His outspoken attack on French and American policy,
coupled with his own proposal for settlement, generated a heated
international controversy. His major Algerian speech of July 2, 1957,
stimulated more public attention and reaction than any other single
Speech he delivered in his pre-presidential career. However, Kennedy
had Spoken out on America's Middle Eastern policy generally, before
he became involved in the Algerian controversy.

The United States' general policy of containment had given rise
to NATO in Western Europe and SEATO in Southeast Asia and American
policy-makers saw the need to draw a mantle of anticommunism around
the Middle East. However, the Middle East was rife with regional
nationalist rivalries that greatly complicated the situation. There

were three particularly divisive conflicts in the Middle East during

141

142

the middle and late 1950's that hampered any policy of containing
Soviet expansion. First and foremost, there was the continuing
impasse between the Arab world and Israel. Second, there was the
rivalry and antagonism between Gamal Abdel Nasser, the new ruler of
Egypt and Nuri Al-Said of Iraq, who had long held British support.
Third, there was the Anglo-Egyptian disagreement over the Suez Canal.

The Soviet Union's policy in the hfiddle East was based on
traditional geopolitical concerns--the security of her southern
border and an Open Bosporus passage to the Mediterranean. And with
a bitter colonial heritage and an impassioned sense of nationalism,
the Middle East was ripe for Soviet penetration. The vulnerability
of the region to Soviet advances was heightened by the crushing
poverty of the masses and also by the uncertainties and divisions
within Western policy in the area. The Middle East, of course, had
long been a region of British predominance and her economy was
dependent upon the region's fabulously rich oil deposits.

In his moralistic aversion to Communism, Secretary of State
Dulles hoped to overcome the national rivalries and conflicts in
the Middle East and establish a pro-Western Middle East defense pact
involving those nations bordering the Soviet Union's southern border--
the so-called "northern-tier" states, with the added membership of
Great Britain. Dulles wanted a mixed Arab-non-Arab coalition and,
in early 1955, the Baghdad Pact was formed, bringing together Turkey,
Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain. The United States cooperated
with the Pact nations, but resisted British pressure to become an
official member for two basic reasons. First, Dulles had hoped to

include Egypt in the Baghdad Pact as the key to the Middle East's

143

military alliance against Communism. He was disappointed that Britain
and Iraq had combined to exclude Egypt from membership. Second,
and more importantly, Dulles was not anxious to become directly
involved in the conflicting ambitions of the Middle Eastern nations,
and did not wish to antagonize Israel.

The question of American arms shipments to members of the Baghdad
Pact was always a delicate matter. For instance, the United States
could not send arms to Iraq without alarming both Egypt and Israel
and, Similarly, military aid to Pakistan alienated India. The
United States had been eager to maintain the status quo in the Middle
East arms race but, increasingly, Iraq relied on Great Britain for
arms; Egypt turned to Russia, and Israel turned to France, who was
then embroiled in the Algerian war. In any case, the Baghdad Pact,
which became the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO, in 1959 after
Iraq withdrew, was a weak and ineffective barrier against Soviet
influence. And, in addition, the Pact alienated President Nasser
because Iraq's inclusion challenged the notion of Egyptian hegemony
in the Arab world.

For a variety of reasons, the West's relations with Egypt reached
a low point in 1956. American policy-makers were offended by
President Nasser's decision to exchange Egyptian cotton for arms
from Communist Czechoslovakia and they were likewise upset by
Nasser's decision to formally recognize Communist China. In July, 1956,
Dulles withdrew America's offer to subsidize construction of Egypt's
Aswan Dam. Nasser was publicly humiliated and his nationalization
of the Suez Canal shortly followed.1 The subsequent Anglo-French-

Israeli attack on Egypt had a divisive effect on Anglo-American

144

relations. Kennedy was in complete agreement with the Eisenhower
Administration's diplomatic intervention in opposition to the military
venture. Both Kennedy and Dulles opposed Western colonialism
almost as much as they did communism. Indeed, Kennedy considered
the former an invitation to the latter. Ironically, in the Suez
crisis, Dulles and Britain's Anthony Eden reversed the stands they had
taken regarding intervention in Indochina in 1954.

The Suez fiasco was a sharp setback for the Western alliance
and seriously weakened the Baghdad Pact. Nasser emerged stronger than
before, Russo-Egyptian ties were strengthened, the British and French
appeared in the worst tradition of old-style imperialism, and Western
unity had been weakened. Following the failure of the Suez venture,
American policy-makers worried that the Soviet Union might make advances
to fill the Middle East power vacuum created by the sudden decline of
British and French power. However, at the time of the Suez crisis,
Russia had a serious crisis of her own--the Hungarian revolt of
October, 1956, and was in no position to consider expansion into the
Middle East.

President Eisenhower's Middle East Resolution or the "Eisenhower
Doctrine" as it was termed by the press, first outlined to Congress
on January 4, 1957, was designed to reinforce the Baghdad Pact in
blocking Soviet expansion. Once again, as in the Formosa Resolution
of 1955, Eisenhower asked Congress for authority to provide direct
economic aid and military support to any Middle East nation that
requested assistance against overt aggression by "international
communism".

During the two-month Congressional deliberation over the

14S

Eisenhower Doctrine, or Senate Joint Resolution 19, Kennedy voiced
his support both in Senate Foreign Relations Committee sessions and
on the :floor of the Senate. However, he would have preferred a much
more far-reaching policy. In a Speech in Albany, Georgia, in early
February, while the resolution was under consideration, he outlined
the major issues the Doctrine did not solve.2 No settlement was
offered, he emphasized, for the Arab-Israeli dispute, the control

of the Suez Canal, or the resettlement of Arab refugees. And he was
most concerned with the policy's failure to combat "indirect"
Communist penetration by subversion and sale of arms. On this point,
we see that Kennedy was inclined to favor a more aggressive kind of
anti-Communism than even the Eisenhower Administration. He regarded
the Doctrine as "a first step" and stated that he would vote for the
resolution because it would help assure the world of "American
concern" for the Middle East.

On March 1, when the Senate resumed consideration of the
resolution, Kennedy led the debate in favor of passage without any
revisions.3 He did this even though he viewed the resolution as
"unsatisfactorily worded", "unsatisfactorily designed", and
"largely unnecessary" in terms of the real problems of the Middle East.
In his view, the resolution was an unnecessary repetition of existing
aid programs and was too hastily presented. But most importantly,
it did not offer a solution to the various long range crises of
Communist subversion, arms traffic, Suez, refugees, boundaries and
other factors in the Arab-Israeli dispute, which he had mentioned
earlier in his Georgia speech.4 However, Kennedy stated that he

feared opposition to the resolution would be interpreted as a

146

repudiation of President Eisenhower's leadership before the eyes

of the world. Defeat of the resolution, he warned, would indicate
domestic dissension and a "lack of confidence" in President Eisenhower
in a time of crisis.

Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon believed the Middle East Resolution,
as worded, sapped Congress of its constitutional authority to declare
war. In Morse's view the Resolution was a dangerous and unconstitution-
al extension of presidential power. With the advance authority the
Resolution granted, the President could send United States troops to
the Middle East prior to a declaration of war by Congress. Kennedy
joined with other Senators to defeat a Morse amendment which would
have required the President to secure prior congressional approval
before committing armed forces. Kennedy did not believe the Resolution
affected the basic constitutional separation of powers. In his view,
the President, as Commander in Chief, had the authority to commit
United States forces without congressional approval if he believed
the national interests were at stake.5

Kennedy also joined with other Senators in opposition to an
amendment to strip the resolution of Presidential authority to spend
up to $200 million in available mutual security funds on a crash
basis in the Middle East. The sponsors of this amendment, principally
Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, feared the resolution would be
used as a springboard for launching a massive Middle East spending
program. The amendment, offered as a substitute for the resolution,
would limit the resolution to a pledge of readiness to use troops
to assist nations requesting help in resisting Communist armed

aggression in the Middle East. Kennedy insisted that to keep the

147

military authority and drop the economic provisions of the resolution
would lead to "disastrous effects" on American leadership in the area.
He said America's friends as well as Communist agitators would cite
it as proof the United States viewed the Middle East "only in terms
of guns and bases and military allies against Communism, not in terms
of friendly people and their economic well-being and stability."6 In
the course of the debate Kennedy lamented on how little economic

aid the Arab nations had received from the United States over the
preceding five years.

Although there was some Opposition to the resolution, mainly
complaints about the cost and the unwarranted extension of Presidential
power, the measure won easy Congressional approval. On March 5, the
Senate passed the resolution by a vote of 72 to 19 and two days later
it passed the House by a margin of 350 to 60. Vice-President Nixon,
then in Uganda, praised Kennedy for his "very statesman-like speech"
in support of the Middle East resolution.7

Although Kennedy voted to support Eisenhower's "prestige" in
the Middle East, less than one month later he criticized Eisenhower's
announcement from Bermuda that the United States had joined the
Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact.8 He charged Secretary of State
Dulles with inconsistency. Dulles, he said, had stated in recent
Middle East hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee, his Opposition
to United States membership in the Pact because of the divisive effect
it would have among the Arab nations that were not members of the
Pact. Furthermore, Kennedy Stated that he did not consider the
Bermuda announcement a "logical development" of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In fact, he believed the announcement aroused "irritation, suspicion,

148

and resentment" among the very Arab states the United States attempted
to woo through the Eisenhower Doctrine. And the fact that the announce-
ment came as a result of bilateral talks with the British, he said,
would only serve to aggravate its divisive effects. He considered it
folly to pretend to Baghdad Pact members that the United States was

a full participant, while pretending to the other Arab states the
United States was not a full member after all. He questioned whether
the purpose of this elusive status of full participation without formal
membership might be designed to avoid Senate approval. However, Kennedy
did not oppose fuller American participation in the Baghdad Pact if

the Pact was a part of a comprehensive policy for the Middle East
"understood and accepted" by all the nations in the area and a policy
which attacked the major problems of the Middle East.

Kennedy attempted to come up with some answers of his own to these
problems. In a speech to the National Conference of Christians and
Jews on February 24, 1957, entitled "Comity and Common Sense in the
Middle East", Kennedy had proposed the following solutions to the
problems of the Middle East: (1) Egypt should keep control of the Suez
Canal and most of the revenue derived from it, but should allow Open
transit to the Ships of all nations with no discrimination or political
interference. Future disputes concerning the Canal Should be referred
to impartial arbitration; (2) Permanent international boundaries
should be fixed by an International Boundary Commission, staffed
with experts in geography, economics and international law. Such a
solution, he said, would reduce tensions and the need for arms
expenditures by Israel and the Arab States. A United Nations force

would police the area; (3) All Arab refugees who desire should be

149

repatriated to Israel. Those who wished to remain in Arab jurisdiction
Should do so. Those who suffered loss of prOperty or bank accounts
in flight Should be compensated by Israel; (4) A Middle East Regional
Resources Fund should be established under the auspices of the
United nations and the World Bank. This fund would be controlled by
the nations of the Middle East and would be used to develop irrigation
projects, to establish a Middle East nuclear center and to provide
a loan to Israel to help her make compensation payments to refugees.9
Kennedy recognized that it was much easier to prOpose than to
implement these proposals on Suez, boundaries, arms, refugees, and
economic development, but he believed his prOposals were based upon
comity and common sense.

Throughout the debate over the Eisenhower Doctrine, Kennedy took
care to voice his support for Israel's interests. In February he
sent Secretary Dulles a letter in which he Stated his strong opposition
to the possibility that the United States might support United Nations
sanctions against Israel because of Israel's refusal to abide by
the resolution calling for the complete withdrawal of her troops from
Egyptian territory.10 Even though Kennedy always displayed an en-
lightened concern for the plight of the Arab nations and was eager
to improve American-Arab relations, his views regarding Israel remained
essentially the same as they were in the spring of 1956, when he addressed
a huge Israel celebration in Yankee Stadium and declared: "It is
time that all nations of the world, in the Middle East and elsewhere,
realized that Israel is here to stay. She will not surrender--She

11

will not retreat--and we will not let her fall." Granted, this

Speech was delivered before a Jewish audience--but Kennedy always

150

maintained a strong pro-Israel stance, as did most American politicians.
The essential dilemma that confronted Kennedy and Others was the
difficulty in advocating improved relations with Nasser's Egypt and
the other Arab nations, as Kennedy favored, without thwarting Israel's
interests.

In an October, 1957 article in Foreign Affairs, Kennedy touched
on the problems of the Middle East.12 He criticized the Eisenhower
Administration for relying on the "paper defenses" of the Baghdad
Pact which rested, he said, "on the false assumption that there was
an identity of interest among all the states of the Middle East."
America's response to the Soviet challenge in the Middle East, he
asserted, had been "exaggeratedly military". Kennedy found many
inconsistencies in the Eisenhower Administration's Middle East policy
to criticize, and his own policy proposals were completely non-military.
He urged an American policy which would include a multilateral regional
development fund, the "Jordan River scheme," a food pool making use
of American agricultural surpluses, and a program for Arab refugees.

In his references to the Middle East in this article, however, Kennedy
offered more criticisms than he did proposals.

In a 1959 interview, Kennedy Spoke further, in a brief fashion,
of America's general policy in the Middle East. Although there was
much consistency with his views of 1957, there was change also. For
instance, he now rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine which he had earlier
approved: "We must rethink all of our policies in the Middle East",
he said, "the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the refusal to
go ahead with the Aswan Dam--all mistakes." "They were all based on

concepts of the Middle East," he remarked, "that were no longer

151

valid."13 Just which concepts, precisely, he considered no longer valid

was not clear. The implication was that United States policy Should
have been more conciliatory and sympathetic to the Arab nations.
Certainly the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine were
unsuccessful in the sense that they failed to limit either the
nationalist rivalries in the Middle East or contain the expansion of
Russian influence. President Nasser's influence in the Middle East
continued to grow, as did his relations with the Soviet Union, partially
as a result of American misconceptions and diplomatic blunders.
Kennedy searched for a new policy direction and made some thoughtful
and constructive suggestions, but at no time did he offer a clear
policy alternative on the tough, basic problems confronting Secretary
of State Dulles. Essentially, he advocated a general policy of increased
United States aid to Middle East nations for development purposes.
But the Arab-Israeli conflict was the main obstacle to stability in
the area and Kennedy did not suggest how United States policy could
best ameliorate that issue. Also, if both the Baghdad Pact and
Eisenhower Doctrine were "mistakes", Kennedy neglected to specify with
any clarity an alternate course by which the United States could
effectively block the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East.
However, it was one of America's basic misconceptions that the Middle
East could ever be an exclusively Western sphere of interest and
influence. Any effective guarantee of international stability in the
area necessitated the Soviet Union's influence and support and to
pretend otherwise was unrealistic. The Middle East was of vital
Strategic importance to the Soviet Union.

During the years of the Baghdad Pact, the Suez crisis, and the

152

Eisenhower Doctrine, France was struggling with the revolt in Algeria.
The Algerian revolt was inextricably entangled in Middle Eastern
affairs. President Nasser, for instance, supported the cause of the
Algerian nationalists. Relations between the United States and France
deteriorated at the time of the Suez crisis, when the United States
intervened to support Nasser, and they remained strained. France

was unhappy with the Middle East policy of the United States. One
leading Gaullist complained that the United States was "willing to
sacrifice its European Allies in its ridiculous search for Arab
friends, lest they fall under Communist influence.14

That comment could have been directed at Kennedy. Although he
was clearly unwilling to sacrifice America's European allies, he was
emphatically in agreement with the latter part of that statement
and his outspoken involvement in the Algerian struggle for indepen-
dence was a clear example of that concern.

In 1954, shortly after France had been forced to capitulate in
Indochina, a bloody and prolonged civil war broke out in French Algeria.
The inflamed nationalism in the Middle East had spread westward to
Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. Tunisia and Morocco had been French
protectorates which, after a comparatively brief struggle, eventually
gained their independence. But Algeria was a much more complex issue.
Constitutionally, it was a part of France proper and was under
direct French administration. And although the country was composed
of nearly nine million Moslems, there were one million French residents,
or "colons", and they were Strongly represented in French politics.
'Algerie francaise' was a powerful slogan in France and not one Paris

cabinet members took lightly. Algeria was not a simple question of

153

imperialism. It was an extraordinarily complex problem with political,
economic, racial and military factors all entwined.

The Algerian revolt presented American policy-makers with the
usual dilemma--the problem of maintaining unity in the Western
alliance, while at the same time maintaining a posture in support of
independence and opposition to colonialism. Should the United States
support self-determination for the Algerian Moslems and risk alienating
its old European ally, France, or should it take the position that the
conflict was strictly a domestic matter and one in which the United
States Should not interfere? This latter course had one major
weakness. Such a policy appeared to condone colonialism and would alienate
the emerging nations of Africa and Asia who sensed a common cause with
the Algerian nationalists. American interests were effected in another
way. While the Algerian struggle dragged on, France was forced to
virtually 'denude' her military commitment to NATO and the defense of
Western EurOpe.

France consistently resisted all efforts to place the Algerian
problem before the United Nations. French spokesmen argued the common
refrain that, legally, Algeria was an integral part of France, and the
Algerian revolt, therefore, was a purely internal matter. The United
Nations had no more justification to intervene in the dispute, they
asserted, than it would have in a dispute between the state of Texas
and the United States Government. The Eisenhower Administration, through
its representatives at the United Nations, upheld the French position
and worked to prevent debate of the issue in the General Assembly.
Essentially, the Eisenhower Administration sought a middle course

in the conflict, one that would avoid offending either the Afro-Asian

154

nations or France. But in reality, United States policy was one

of genial compliance with French efforts. In fact, France was heavily
supplied with American military equipment. United States policy

was one of being neutral on France's side--much as it had been with
the French in Indochina.

This was the essential Situation when Kennedy rose in the Senate
on July 2, 1957, and outlined a bold new policy designed to break the
impasse in the French-Algerian conflict. In a lengthy speech, he
attacked both France's unyielding Algerian policy and the Eisenhower
Administration's failure to support the cause of Algerian independence.
Whether by coincidence or not, the date of Kennedy's speech was
symbolic--two days before America's Independence Day celebrations.

The speech touched off a major international discussion and received
more public attention and criticism at home and abroad than any

foreign policy Speech Kennedy ever delivered. For his remarks, Kennedy
received a heavy barrage of criticism. Much of it, from the Eisenhower
Administration and official sources within France, was predictable, but
some of the criticism came from high ranking fellow Democrats such

as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. This underscored the
sensitivity of the issue.

Kennedy's Algerian Speech of July 2 was the first of a two-part
address of the United States's failure to meet "the challenge of
imperialism" which he called the "single most important test of
American foreign policy".15 He urged the United States to oppose Openly
both Soviet and Western imperialism and by so doing, win the support
of the emerging nations of Africa and Asia. This first speech dealt

with America's failure to Oppose French imperialism in Algeria, and the

155

second speech, delivered on August 21, focused on Soviet imperialism
in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland.

At the outset of his Speech, Kennedy took care to praise France
as a valued ally and he recognized that France was a war-weary nation
that had been engaged in a continuous state of war since 1936--against
the Axis, then in Syria, in Indochina, in Morocco, in Tunisia, in
Algeria. And although he strongly denounced France's intransigence
on the Algerian issue, he believed his prOposal was in France's
national interest as well as that of Algeria and the United States.
After a lengthy and tightly-reasoned attack on France's refusal to
grant meaningful concessions to the Algerian nationalists, he came out
strongly for international negotiations leading to Algerian independence.

At the conclusion of his speech he submitted a forthright two-part
resolution which called for the Eisenhower Administration to intervene
and actively utilize either NATO machinery or the good offices of
the Prime Minister of Tunisia and the Sultan of Morocco to achieve a
solution to the war which recognized "the independent personality of
Algeria". And if there was no substantial progress toward that goal
by the time the United Nations General Assembly met in September, 1957,
his resolution, Number 153, urged the United States to support "an
international effort to derive for Algeria the basis for an orderly
achievement of independence."16 His greatest concern, he said, was
that the United States' "retreat from the principles of independence
and anti-colonialism" had damaged America's image and position of
leadership in the eyes of the Afro-Asian world.

In attacking the Eisenhower Administration for its pro-French

posture, Kennedy singled out United States Ambassador to the United

156

Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., for having Opposed United Nations
consideration of the Algerian question, and C. Douglas Dillon, Former
United States Ambassador to France and then Under Secretary of State,
for supporting France's unyielding position. To those who said

that Algeria was not a proper concern for American policy-makers,
Kennedy pointed out that France had been forced to strip her NATO forces
"to the bone" thereby weakening Western Europe defenses against the
Soviet Union. And American military supplies to France, he said,
intended for use in the defense of Western Europe, were being used
against the Algerians. Also, he emphasized, America's support for
France's policy undermined United States relations with Tunisia,
Morocco and other nations who had a sense of common cause with the aims
of the Algerian leaders. And in a broader context, he warned that

the United States' pro-French posture supplied powerful ammunition

to anti-Western propagandists throughout the Middle East and Asia.
American policies in colonial areas, he asserted, must no longer be
"tied to the French".

Interestingly, it was almost exactly four years earlier to the
day that Kennedy had offered his unsuccessful resolution encouraging
France to grant independence to the Indochinese. And in this Speech
Kennedy referred to the lesson of Indochina: "Did that tragic
episode not teach us that, whether France likes it or not, their over-
seas territories are sooner or later, one by one, inevitably going to
break free and look with suspicion on the Western nations who impeded
their steps to independence?" Kennedy's Indochina resolution had
been defeated and he openly admitted that prospects were "rather dubious"

that his Algerian resolution would be ad0pted. But he felt the effort

157

had to be made in order to convey to the people of North Africa
that there was support in the United States for their cause. Also,
he believed that there were many people in France who agreed with
his general view.

Essentially, Kennedy favored the continuation of French influence
in North Africa. But he believed this could only be maintained if
Algerian independence was established along the lines of Morocco and
Tunisia. He argued for a solution under which Algeria would gain
political independence and France would maintain some form of economic
inter-dependence.

Of those who engaged in the debate following Kennedy's speech,
Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois voiced the main opposition. He
had two essential criticisms and they anticipated those unleashed the
following day by various other spokesmen. First, he emphasized the
importance of France, America's oldest ally, to the security of the
United States and urged that nothing be done to antagonize that country.
Secondly, Dirksen argued that even if one agreed with the goal of
Kennedy's proposal, his method was unhelpful. "Caution", "prudence",
"patience" were called for, he said, in such a delicate situation.

He kindly reminded Kennedy that diplomacy was "not always effectuated
17

with a brass band."

In a front page account, the New York Times characterized Kennedy's

 

speech as "perhaps the most comprehensive and outspoken arraignment
of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an American in public
office."18 Reaction to Kennedy's speech followed a predictable pattern.

He was attacking an entrenched policy. At a press conference the

following day, President Eisenhower remarked that the best policy the

158

United States could follow was to "try to be understanding to both
sides" while working behind the scenes for a solution to the problem.
And he remarked: "That means you don't get up and begin to shout about
such things, or there will be no effectiveness." Secretary of State
Dulles, with advance knowledge of the Speech, remarked that if Kennedy
wanted to "tilt against colonialism" he ought to concentrate on the
Communist variety rather than the French and he repeated his view that
Algeria was primarily a French problem. He stated that he would be
"very sorry" to see the Algerian dispute, with its "exceptional
difficulty and complexity" become a United States problem.

According to New York Times' reports, various French spokesmen

 

suggested that Kennedy was encouraging the Algerian nationalists to
prolong the rebellion. Robert Lacoste, the French Minister for Algeria,
was bitterly critical and he invited Kennedy to visit Algeria. Lacoste
described Kennedy as a spokesman for "the old maids of the United
States Senate", and suggested that the United States should solve its
"Negro problem" before telling France how to get along with the Moslems.
French Defense Minister Andre Morice was even more harsh: "I don't
know whether Monsieur Kennedy has nights without nightmares [but] I
know well that [Kennedy's prOposal] will result in a great increase in
innocent victims and the prolongation of a drama that would have been
long ended if so many of our unthinking friends had weighed their
words or their acts. It is the blood of others that pays for their
errors."19

Of all the early criticism levelled at Kennedy's proposal, a ESE.

York Times editorial was the most responsible and persuasive.20 The

major point was that Kennedy probably "added fuel to a raging fire" and

159

made a compromise solution more difficult, not less. Algerian
nationalist resistance against the French would now stiffen because of
the impression that the United States may attempt to mediate on their
behalf. And even those Frenchmen who favored a more conciliatory
Algerian policy would "resent interference from a foreigner." The
editorial also held that Kennedy minimized the unique complexity of the
Algerian problem and contended that Kennedy's comparisons to Indochina,
Tunisia, and Morocco were only partly valid. The editorial supported
Dulles' position that the problem must be left to the French and
Algerians and suggested that to be helpful, quiet diplomacy was
required and "not a smashing public attack on the floor of the United
States Senate."

In the Senate on July 8, Kennedy responded to his critics in a
brief, forceful manner.21 When he prepared his July 2 Speech, he said,
he realized that the State Department and the French Government would
view it with disfavor. He also acknowledged that Algeria was a very
complicated problem. But he believed the Algerian revolt had "grave
international implications" and that if the struggle persisted with
no fresh approach taken, the chances increased that the moderate
Algerian nationalists, with a "pro-western orientation" would lose
control to the extremists. And, he asked, how will the Algerians,
when they inevitably gain their freedom, view an America that pretended
neutrality while at the same time furnished arms that helped crush
them?

"We dare not overlook," he warned, "in our concern over legal
and diplomatic niceties, the powerful force of man's eternal desire

to be free and independent. The worldwide struggle against imperialism,

160

the sweep of nationalism, is the most potent factor in foreign affairs
today." Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, who had been absent
from the Senate on July 2 and had not heard Kennedy's initial address,
voiced his agreement with Kennedy's view. In his concluding remarks,
Kennedy referred to the Soviet Union's suppression of the Hungarian
revolution in 1956, and the United States's support for a United Nations
resolution condemning Soviet imperialism. What will be the decision

of the United States, he asked, when a resolution concerning Algerian
independence is submitted? "We cannot vote 'yea' in one instance

and abstain from voting 'yea' in another."

Kennedy's rebuttal to his critics was persuasive but he did not
answer the major criticism of his proposal. Would not the speech
encourage the Moslem nationalists and also harden French attitudes,
thus making a compromise even more difficult? Although Kennedy did not
address this question directly, it was apparent that he did not regard
this as the paramount issue. He believed that Algerian independence
was inevitable. He was primarily concerned that the West, and the
United States in particular, was losing to the Soviet Union the
support of those nations struggling for independence. When the United
Nations General Assembly meets again, he asked in rebuttal to his
critics, will the United States again vote against the "anti-colonial
block that controls the world balance of power? Or will we finally
take back from the Soviets the leadership that is rightfully ours
of the worldwide movement for freedom and independence?"

Kennedy's remarks on Algeria inspired many editorials to be
written in evaluation of his position.22 Although there was substantial

sentiment in the press both for and against his stand, the majority

161

Opinion was critica1--especially that from influential spokesmen.

Even leading Democrats took issue with his assessment of the Algerian
situation. Adlai Stevenson, in a speech that won the favor of the
French Government, stated that immediate independence for Algeria
would be "an invitation to chaos".23 But by far the sharpest cut from
a fellow Democrat came from former Secretary of State Dean Acheson

in a speech Sponsored by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at
Tufts University.24 In reference to Kennedy's Speech, Acheson
remarked with acerbity that "nothing could be more injudicious than
this prOposal, except making it." He was particularly concerned that
Kennedy did not have a proper appreciation for the "humiliating

agony of the loss of power and position" that France was experiencing
and he argued persuasively the need for a continued French presence

in North Africa. Kennedy, however, was in full agreement with this
last point. At no time did Kennedy ever suggest that the French Should
completely sever ties with Algeria. Acheson recognized that a political
adjustment was necessary and inevitable in Algeria but he cautioned
patience: "It will not help for us to snap impatient fingers at a
people who were great before our nation was dreamt of, and tell

them to get on with it." In essence, he believed France needed
American help and understanding in solving her problems in Algeria

and he considered Kennedy's remarks not only unhelpful but harmful.
"There is no remote possibility," he concluded, "that his Speech can
advance solution." Kennedy and Acheson were not in complete disagree-
ment. Both recognized that an accommodation was necessary; but

Kennedy's call for independence was excessively radical for Acheson's

162

taste. But, primarily, it was Kennedy's method of persuasion that
Acheson attacked.

In an October article in the magazine, America, entitled "The
Algerian Crisis: A New Phase?", Kennedy once again answered the various
critics of his Algerian proposal.25 In a summary fashion, he repeated
the main outlines of his earlier stated position. He admitted that
editorial reaction to his speech had been generally unfavorable
and hostile but he noted that individual letters he had received
were heavily favorable. Some of the most common criticisms he quickly
dismissed: that Algeria was strictly an internal problem, that
criticism was not helpful to an old and valued ally, that America
had Similar internal problems (race relations) of its own that it should
first solve, and that the issue was too "explosive" for foreign comment.

In Kennedy's opinion, the most important and persuasive criticism
of his stand was the argument that a French withdrawal in Algeria
would lead to control either by the Communists or Arab extremists
and possibly turn the country into a state of uncontrollable terrorism
and anarchy. Kennedy Shared these fears. However, he did not
advocate a complete French disengagement. And, he did not agree that
a continuation of the current French policy was the best means to
avert such a danger. Quite the contrary, he held that the longer
moderate Algerian aspirations were suppressed, the greater the danger
of a reactionary or Communist takeover. He hoped for a direct
negotiated settlement of the conflict resulting in Algerian independence,
and preferally within "a federative or interdependent framework." The
West could not afford another Indochina, he said. And it was not a

sentimental and dogmatic anticolonialism", he declared, but "the

163

harsh realities of the world" that necessitated all nations to help
solve the Algerian problem.

Without mentioning the New York Times directly by name, in his

 

America article, he sniped at its editorial position on the Algerian

war.26 He acknowledged, as he had earlier, that the New York Times'

 

reports from the field furnished him with much of his factual data

in his July 2 Speech. But he objected to what he termed the "passive
fatalism" on the issue displayed in the paper's editorial column.
This view, he said, seemed to hold that events must run their natural
course and that Americans must stand by sympathetically "while fate
makes its decrees in the tragic dilemma of the French." The New York
Tinee, editorially, had also stated that Kennedy's intervention in
the struggle had made a compromise settlement more difficult, but
once again, Kennedy did not answer that particular criticism.

The bloody and exhausting struggle in Algeria dragged on through
the end of 1957 with no solution in sight. In February, 1958, the
Tunisian city of Sakiet Sidi Youssef was bombed by French aircraft
stationed in Algeria--by planes that were mostly American made. The
incident created an international crisis. The French claimed they
were pursuing Algerian rebels who enjoyed a privileged sanctuary on
Tunisian territory. As a result of the use of United States planes,
Algerian nationalists demanded a "reappraisal" of all agreements for
American bases in North Africa. Mongi Slim, the Tunisian Ambassador
to the United States, told Secretary of State Dulles that Tunisia
intended to appeal to the United Nations Security Council against the
French attack. Dulles sidestepped the Tunisian dispute and declined

to take a stand. In the Senate, Kennedy blasted Dulles' policy and

164

that of the State Department: "We have ignored the explosive situation
in Algeria and neglected our anxious friends in Tunisia for too long,
both in the United Nations and in our economic aid program, while
handing the Communists and the anti-American extremists every oppor-
tunity to pose as the champions of freedom." He proposed that the
Algerian question, despite French opposition, be submitted to the
United Nations and NATO for settlement. The alternative, he said,
"may well be the loss of all North Africa to our enemies."27
Appearing as a guest on Face The Nation a few weeks later, in

March, 1958, Kennedy took a more subdued tone.28 He was asked what

 

he would do that the Administration had not done with respect to the
Algerian conflict. First, Kennedy replied that the United States was
already indirectly involved in the struggle because of the military
and economic assistance the American Government provided the French,
so a position of neutrality was out of the question. He appreciated
the difficulty of the situation, he said, but he would urge the French
"diplomatically and every other way" to set a future date, perhaps
five years or ten years, at which time the Algerians would have

the right to choose their own future relationship with France. Once
again the old dilemma presented itself, as it had in the case of
Indochina years earlier. Kennedy was asked how far the United States
should go in pressuring France--should military supplies be terminated?
Kennedy thought not because it would probably "result in a rupture"
with France. In this interview he was vague as to the means by which
the United States should persuade France to grant independence to
Algeria.

However, in an article in the Boston Globe appearing at the same

 

165

time, Kennedy was more Specific, at least with respect to the most
advisable course for France to follow.29 Under America's policy of
"drift", he said, the Algerian situation was steadily worsening.
He recognized that only France could forge the ultimate solution but
he believed the good offices of the United States and Great Britain
could be helpful. He discussed the various possible solutions
available: (1) France could abandon Algeria as it did Indochina in
1954, but Kennedy was flatly opposed to this Option for a variety
of reasons. Most importantly, he argued that a viable, independent
Algeria required continued economic interdependence with France. (2)
France could attempt a military reconquest of all northwest Africa
(Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria) but, he warned, such a victory could
only be temporary and such a policy would destroy NATO, inflame the
uncommitted world, and preclude the possibility of establishing an
African government with Western associations and outlook. (3) France
could partition Algeria along national lines. However, Kennedy thought
the time had passed for such a solution to be workable. (4) The fourth
and final alternative was the formation of a Mediterranean pact, or
North African federation, in which Algeria was offered a realistic
time-table for self-determination. Kennedy believed this option
offered the best chance for peace in North Africa. France's legitimate
interests would be protected and such a solution, he said, would
channel the nationalist forces sweeping Africa into "constructive
outlets".

At some point during the heated controversy over his Algerian
prOposal, Kennedy had some doubts about the wisdom of his remarks.

Time magazine reported that he telephoned his father, then in France,

166

sometime in late 1957, and wondered aloud if he had not been mis-
taken. His father replied: "You lucky mush. You don't know it and
neither does anyone else, but within a few months everyone is going
to know just how right you were on Algeria."30 Unfortunately for
the Senator, that was by no means the case and the war dragged on for
many more months. Gradually, Kennedy came to regret that so much
emphasis had been placed on his use of the term "independence" in
relation to Algeria rather than on his plan for negotiation. And
he admitted that he had underestimated the emotionalism attached to
the Algerian issue within France. In 1959, he stated: "We might have
spoken about permitting the Algerians to determine their relationship
with France. The use of the word "independence" may have been unwise
I have never seen an issue which has as much emotion in it as Algeria
in France."31
There were clear signs of cautious reservations in some of
Kennedy's subsequent comments on the issue in 1958 and 1959. He had
had his fingers burnt as a result of his Speeches and perhaps that
was the reason for his increased caution. It is also possible that
the West's loss of Iraq and the rise of de Gaulle in France had a
bearing on his views. At any rate, in a New York Speech in November,
1958, Kennedy spoke on the theme of anti-colonialism, in which he
expressed his regret that the United States had not been as "vigorous"

in condemning colonialism in the West as it was in attacking imperial-

ism in the East.32 According to a New York Times account, Kennedy's

 

prepared text specifically criticized the United States for "trying
to remain aloof from the Algerian and similar controversies, in the

United Nations and elsewhere." But in speaking, he deleted the comments.

167

VHe told reporters later that he had "decided not to get involved
in a particular controversy, as against the whole general question of
colonialism."

A few months later, in February, 1959, Kennedy once again appeared
on Face The Nation and was asked why he hadn't spoken on Algeria in

recent months.33 He stated that he hoped the recently elected de Gaulle

 

government would make some progress toward a satisfactory solution.
Then, he said: "I have refrained [from comment] because I think that
it is unhelpful for a Westerner to make a comment, an American to make
a comment." But, he said, if some progress toward solution was not
made by spring of 1959, then he felt it was incumbent upon the United
States, and Americans generally, to indicate their views. This was
something of a shift in opinion. At first, it sounded as though he
was agreeing with Dean Acheson's general criticisms of his earlier
remarkS--that foreign advice to France was unhelpful. However, he
indicated that this silent posture should only be maintained as long as
there was a hOpe of meaningful progress. Quite possibly, Kennedy had
become cautious partially because it was politically wise to do so.
By 1959, he was clearly a leading candidate for the Democratic
presidential nomination and to repeatedly maintain his July 2 position,
which had evoked such strong and influential Opposition at home and
abroad, would be risky politically and not in his best interests. Per-
haps he thought that it would be wise to allow the controversy to
subside and hope for a French resolution of the problem.

Ultimately, Algeria gained its independence. The issue had torn
France apart internally for several years, and the country verged on

civil war but in the spring of 1958, General Charles de Gaulle returned

168

to power following a rapid succession of French governments. He very
cautiously and courageously eased toward a settlement with the
Algerian nationalists despite violent opposition from various factions
within France, Algeria, and the French Army. Emotions ran high and

an attempt was made to assassinate de Gaulle, but Algerian independence
became a fact in 1961. It was an historic decision. De Gaulle sought
to continue France's special links with Algeria and he hoped that the
settlement would render a model relationship between an industrialized
EurOpean nation and its former colony. The final Algerian settlement
was similar to that which Kennedy had proposed in July, l957--political
independence for the Algerians within a framework of economic inter-
dependence with France.

How Should Kennedy's involvement in the Algerian struggle for
independence be assessed? Much can be said in favor of his remarks.
As a spokesman on the issue, he was concerned, knowledgeable, and
generally restrained, despite the outburst of criticism his speech
produced. The harsh reaction to his Speech came more from the sensi-
tivity of the issue rather than from any rashness or unreasonableness
in Kennedy's proposal. Few critics challenged the content of his
criticism of French policy, most questioned his method. Certainly,
France was intransigent in dealing with the Algerian nationalists and
did place unrealistic demands on the rebels as a prerequisite to
negotiations. In 1957, progress was not being made and American
support of a failing French policy did not appear at all helpful in
resolving the conflict. And Kennedy was justified in pointing to
the inconsistency in United States foreign policy which condemned

the Soviet Union for its practices in Poland and Hungary, while

169

supporting France's policies in Indochina, Tunisia, Morocco, and
Algeria at the expense of the support of the emerging nations of Africa
and Asia. It was reasonable to argue that some fresh, new American
effort was necessary to resolve the Algerian conflict.

The wisdom of Kennedy's outspoken involvement in the Algerian
issue can be fairly questioned, however--especially his method. Perhaps
such harsh truths on such a sensitive issue Should not have been spoken
in a public forum. He later admitted that he had underestimated the
sensitivity of the Algerian struggle within France. It could be
argued, also, that Kennedy oversimplified and underestimated the
difficulties involved in reaching a solution. Certainly the general
political instability within France, coupled with the fierce resistance
to independence, made a compromise solution exceedingly difficult. It
took a masterful effort on the part of de Gaulle to accomplish the
separation. And it is possible that his speech, signifying a measure
of support for the nationalists' cause, did serve to stiffen their
resistance to the French, while at the same time enraging the French
"Ultras", thereby making a compromise solution more difficult. In
other words, perhaps his speech did have the effect of adding fuel
to the fire—-at least in the short run. One cannot conclude, however,
that the speech generated only heat and no light. Kennedy Spoke some
harsh truths and his Speech was not one that would have been proper
for a Secretary of State to give but Kennedy, as a senator, was not
in that sensitive position and he was entitled to criticize both
French and American policies, especially given the attitude that he

had regarding the harmful effect of Western colonialism.

170

Throughout the controversy, Kennedy was consistent in his
insistence on the need for Algerian independence, although in 1958
and 1959 he became more cautious and generally toned down his remarks.
Certainly he was a sensitive and astute politician and, as has been
suggested, he might have considered this a politically wise posture
to assume. But in 1958 and 1959, with the election of de Gaulle
there was a new promise that the Algerian war might be resolved-~a
hOpe that had not existed in 1957 when Kennedy delivered his initial
address. So his new found caution and restraint, and disinclination
to speak out on the subject, was understandable strictly in terms of
the changed French-Algerian Situation.

Human motivation is always difficult to determine. Some have
charged that Kennedy's remarks were politically motivated in an attempt
to enhance his image as a foreign policy Spokesman on an issue that
carried no particular risk to his career. Britisher Alistair Cooke,

for instance, observed in The Manchester Guardian on July 11, 1957:

 

"Senator Kennedy is too shrewd to make a hobby out of Algeria. It
has brilliantly served its purpose of pitching him into center stage.
Precisely because it is a country that knows neither friend nor

enemy in Massachusetts it has no liability to his own constituents.
But it has nicely suggested to his newspaper supporters that the
Senator is a Statesman, something like Stevenson, of majestic
disinterestedness."34 Cooke's assessment certainly makes sense and
has the ring of truth. But there were many issues that Kennedy could
have used in his quest for national prominence and there were far
less enlightened positions he could have taken.

Other commentators praised Kennedy's boldness and courage for

171

assuming an unpopular position against an entrenched policy.35 It is
probable that both assessments bear some truth. The Speech enhanced

his image in certain quarters but it damaged it in others. Considering
the predictably hostile reaction to his speech from influential sources,
both American and foreign, Democratic and Republican, it is highly
doubtful that his motivation was entirely political. Kennedy, of course,
denied that he was politically motivated, and argued that his Algerian
speech was a natural outgrowth of his earlier attack on French colonial-
ism in Indochina. Certainly, his support of Algeria's fight against
France was entirely consistent with his long held opposition to Western

colonialism, dating from 1951.

FOOTNOTES

1 . . . . . . .
Major disagreements in interpretation eXist over PreSident
Nasser's motivation and intent during this period. -

2The Boston Globe, February 8, 1957, carried an account of this
speech. Kennedy delivered a similar speech in Springfield, Missouri
in late February: The Boston Globe, February 24, 1957.

 

 

3U. 8. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, lst Session, 1957,

CIII, Part 3, 2877-3887, March 1, 1957.

41bid., 2877.

7The New York Times, March 11, 1957.

8U. S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, lst Session, 1957,

C111, Part 4j‘4776T47777'fiZFEfi‘73, 1957.

9U. S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, lst Session, 1957,
C111, Part 3, 3178-3180, March 5, 1957. See also: Kennedy's Strategy
of Peace, p. 146-151; and John F. Kennedy, "Comity and Commonsense
in the Middle East," Vital Speeches, April, 1957, 359-361.

 

10John F. Kennedy Libragy, Press Releases Files, 1953-1961, Box
626. The letter was sent on February 13, 1957. On October 28, 1957,
Kennedy stated that the interest of American minority groups in causes
such as Israel's was in line with basic American traditions. His address
on "multiple loyalties" was given at a dinner Sponsored by Yeshiva
University at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel where Kennedy was presented
with an award. See: New York Times, October 28, 1957.

 

11U. S. Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956,
GII, Part 6,-7506, May 7, 1956.

 

12John F. Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks At Foreign Policy," Foreign
Affairs, October, 1957, p. 44-59. This article is examined more
fully in Chapter VI.

172

173

3
Quoted in Burns, Kennedy, p. 272.

14Quoted in Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, And The Cold War,
1945-1966 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 211.

 

15U. S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, lst Session, 1957,

CIII, Part 8, 10780-10792, July 2, 1957. Even in 1955, Kennedy had
criticized the French action in North Africa on the grounds that the
withdrawal of French troops from Europe weakened NATO. See Boston
Globe, November 16, 1955.

 

16Ibid., 10788.

17Kennedy responded that in July of 1953, a "younger, more youth-
ful and vibrant" Dirksen had supported a similar amendment calling
for independence in Indochina. Dirksen replied that responsibility
and four years had "sobered" him.

18New York Times, July 3, 1957. On July 7, the New York Times

described some amusing behind the scenes public relations manoeuvering
by Kennedy and Secretary of State Dulles prior to the delivery of the
speech. Instead of following the usual routine of distributing the
speech in the press gallery, Kennedy had taken care to deliver advance
cOpies of the Speech to the home of all Washington correspondents a
few days before delivery. Herve Alphand, the French Ambassador, heard
of the speech and on Monday, July 1, he informed Dulles that unless
the speech was "officially disavowed quickly" it would cause bad
feeling in France. AS a result, when Dulles met reporters on the
morning of July 2, he was able to react to the speech before it was
delivered and thus reduce the impact of Kennedy's criticism within
France.

 

19All these accounts are taken from the New York Times, July 3 and

4, 1957. Years later, in an Oral History for the Kennedy Library,
Couve de Murville, a prominent French policy-maker, recalled the

strong negative reaction Kennedy's Speech had produced in France.

Couve de Murville had discussed the Algerian problem with Kennedy some
time before the July 2 speech and he recalled that, generally, he did
not think Kennedy's views were completely wrong even though his Speech,
he said, was "very much in contradiction with French feelings in gener-
al at that period." p.2.

 

 

2oNew York Times, July 3, 1957, p. 22:2.

 

21U. 8. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, lst Session, 1957,

C111, Part 8, 10966-10967, July 8, 1957.

 

174

22For a limited sampling of press Opinion both pro and con, see

New York Times, July 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, August 3; Washington Post,
August 1. For a cross-country sampling, all of it favorable to

Kennedy see Congressional Record, 1957, Appendix A5550-5552; A5769-AS770;
A5875-A5876; A5917-A5918; A6066:A6067; A6388; A6445-A6446. On page

A5550 Kennedy introduced an article on Algeria by New York Times corres-
pondent Homer Bigart. Kennedy stated that reports from Bigart and

other New York Times correSpondents in North Africa furnished much of

the data from which he drew the conclusions for his Speech on July 2,
1957.

 

 

 

 

23New York Times, July 30, 1957.

 

24The New York Times carried an account of the speech on October
26, 1957. Acheson's Speech was subsequently published in his book
Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp.
122-126. In his Oral History at the Kennedy Library, Acheson spoke
of an amusing chance meeting he had had with Jackie Kennedy in 1958
shortly after the publication of Power and Diplomacy, Coincidentally,
they were seated next to each other on a train. Acheson recalled:
"She began to attack me about the statement I made on Jack Kennedy's
Speech. I pointed out to her that we were likely to be Spending some
hours together--we had looked at our tickets and found that I had
the chair next to hers on the train-—and I said that we could either
Spend this time fighting or we could be pleasant. And she said, "All
right, let's be pleasant." It was a good thing we did, because we
arrived in Washington at 7:00 o'clock the next morning, after having
sat up all night with desultory conversation and some troubled sleep
So I got the impression that the Kennedy family was not pleased with
my [Speech]. . . ."

 

 

 

25John F. Kennedy, "The Algerian Crisis: A New Phase?" America,

October 5, 1957, p. 15-17. Some of these same points were briefly
touched on in his more comprehensive review of United States foreign
policy in Foreign Affairs, October, 1957, pp. 44-57.

 

26Ibid., p. 16.

7An account of the Tunisian bombing and Kennedy's remarks was
carried in the New York Times on February 12, 1958, and in the Boston
Globe on February 11, 1958. French Ambassador Herve Alphand and
Tunisian Ambassador Mongi Slim both attended a White House diplomatic
dinner and musical that evening but their attitude toward one another
was reported as distinctly cool. Alphand said they shook hands and
"we spoke but we didn't say anything." Slim said he came only because
he considered a White House invitation a "command". He left soon
after President and Mrs. Eisenhower retired from the party. He termed
the bombing incident a "very bad situation" and said that he was
going to New York to seek United Nations action. In an Oral History
for the Kennedy Library Mongi Slim recalled an interview he had had

 

175

with Kennedy shortly after the bombing incident. He stated that

the Senator was "sincerely troubled" about the bombing and searching
for a way to prevent further acts without alienating France, In the
interview, Mongi Slim spoke of several conversations he had with
Kennedy on the Algeria problem during this period and, of course, he
recalled that he had been very pleased and encouraged with Kennedy's
position.

28Face The Nation transcript, March 30, 1958.

 

29Boston Globe, March 28, 1958. The speech was also introduced
in the CongressiOnal Record, 1958, CIV, Part 5, 6757-6758, by
Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin.

 

 

30Time, December 2, 1957, p. 20.

31Quoted in Victor Lasky's JFK, The Man and The Myth, p. 286.
Both Lasky and Burns' Kennedy, p. 196, cite this development in
Kennedy's attitude.

 

32New York Times and Boston Globe, November 24, 1958.

 

 

33Face The Nation transcript, February 22, 1951.

 

34Quoted in Victor Lasky's John F. Kenneey, What's Behind The
Image...? (Washington: Free World Press, Inc., 1960), p. 211.

Many observers speculated as to Kennedy's source of information on the
French-Algerian situation and wondered who his advisers might have
been. Kennedy credited New York Times reports as a basic source of
information. In The Man and the Myth, p. 285, Lasky quoted a statement
made by Robert Lacoste, the French Governor-General in Algiers, to

the effect that Kennedy was advised by "the son of an important North
African political personage," who, according to Lasky, was presumably
Habib Bourguiba, Jr., the son of the Tunisian Premier, a diplomat in
Washington, and a friend of Kennedy. In his Oral History interview,
Mongi Slim, who was then the Tunisian Ambassador, mentioned that he
and other North African diplomats did all they could to help inform
Kennedy by translating for him and reporting information. Mongi Slim
also noted that Kennedy had contact with Algerian nationalists in New
York.

Lasky was absolutely convinced that Kennedy's motivation was
sheerly political but in The Man and the Myth, p. 287, he made
reference to an influence which Kennedy suggested helped shape his
thinking on Algeria. Kennedy had never been to Algeria, but in 1956,
his youngest brother, Teddy, and Frederick L. Holborn, a Harvard
government instructor, visited the troubled area and when they returned
they urged the Senator to support Algerian independence. According
to Lasky, Kennedy stated that he had been "receptive" to their urgings.

 

 

 

 

176

35Numerous editorials praised Kennedy's courage. Many of
these are cited in footnote 22. In his Oral History interview, Mongi
Slim praised Kennedy's courage and added further that Kennedy was more
intelligent and far-sighted on questions of colonialism than were most
other Congressmen and officials that he Spoke with during this period.

CHAPTER VI

A DEMOCRAT LOOKS AT FOREIGN POLICY, 1957-1958

Shortly after Kennedy initially Spoke out on Algeria, he
submitted a more general, far-ranging critique of the Eisenhower-
Dulles foreign policy program to the prestigious quarterly Foreign
Affairs in which he also outlined his own philosophy.1 Interestingly,
his article, which was entitled "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy,"
immediately followed a much publicized article written by Secretary
of State Dulles in defense of American policy.2 It has been suggested
that this article of Kennedy's, more than anything else written by
him at this time, convinced observers that he should be taken
seriously as a thinker on foreign policy.3

The essential thrust of his article was to urge greater flexibility
in American foreign policy in the light of rapidly changing world
conditions--within the Communist bloc, the West, and the emerging
nations. After taking a partisan slap at the Eisenhower Administration's
lack of "decision" and "leadership", he launched into his most
familiar theme. One of the prime weaknesses of the present administra-
tion, he said, was its failure to recognize the impact of the forces
of nationalism in the world, especially in North Africa, southeastern
Europe and the Middle East.

Kennedy went on to say that there was a "double pull" at work

in the world--the nations emerging from Western colonialism were

177

178

searching for a new political identity while the older nations of
Europe were moving toward a greater political unity, such as the

Common Market. The problem for American policy-makers, he explained,
although difficult, was "to strike a realistic balance between the
legitimate appeals of national self-determination which pulsate through
the uncommitted world and the gravitational pulls toward unity which
grow from the technological and economic interdependence of modern
states."

In the course of the article Kennedy found much to fault in
the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy. As James MacGregor Burns
noted, Kennedy warned against rigidity of policy, against relying
on "paper defense" like the Baghdad Pact, against irresponsible promises
such as "liberating" the Communist satellites, against America's
unwillingness to accept partial gains, against getting "lashed too
tightly" to a single man and party, such as Chancellor Adenauer and
his Christian Democrats, against the American tendency to seek
absolutist solutions, against "old liberal bromides" that had no
appeal to nations seeking a quick transition to industrialization
and admiring "the disciplined attack which Communism seems to make
uoon the problems of economic modernization and redistribution." He
also attacked the use of foreign-policy bipartisanship to stifle
dissent.

Kennedy suggested fresh new departures. He advocated amendment
of the Battle Act and other restrictive acts to permit American aid
to the Communist satellites, particularly Poland. Since a "new
generation" was coming to power in Europe, he urged closer ties

with younger leaders and opposition parties such as the West German

179

Socialists. And, of course, he also urged independence for the
Algerians within a framework of economic interdependence with France,
and heightened economic aid to the nations of the Middle East.

Kennedy also urged greater flexibility of policy with the
neutral nations Of the world such as India. There were social forces
at work in the world, he declared, "which have a validity apart from
the bipolar struggle." He noted that Communist gains were being made
at the polls in India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. In his
mind, this nullified the old concept that such Communist gains could
only be made through aggression and subversion. In order to block
these Communist successes, he saw an urgent need to reassess current
American foreign aid programs which, he said, in reference to the Dulles
school of thought, "have reflected an ill-conceived and ill-concealed
disdain for the 'neutralists' and 'socialists' who--in a nation
such as India--represent the free world's strongest bulwarks to the
seductive appeal of Peking and Moscow."

While Kennedy stressed the need for increased economic aid to
the Communist satellites, the neutralist nations such as India, and
the various nations of the Middle East, as an effective means to
combat the Soviet Union, he believed that American aid had to be
selective and not merely scattered at will. American assistance
Should not attempt to reach "each parched patch of misery and need"
in the world, he said, an eye Should be kept for the "likelihood of
success". Also, he warned that if the foreign aid program was not
carefully directed and planned it could serve only to fortify ruling

military dictatorships and "perpetuate feudalism".

180

On the issue of the Cold War, Kennedy declared that the State
Department, under Dulles, was as rigid and "unrelenting" as the
Soviet Union and implied that he favored a more conciliatory policy.4
He even cautiously suggested the future recognition of Communist
China. Although there were Still "compelling" reasons for non-
recognition, he said, the United States must be careful not to
"strait-jacket" its policy "as a result of ignorance and fail to
detect a change in the objective situation when it comes."

There were a few uniquely interesting points raised in the
article which indicated Kennedy's present state of mind on some old
issues. For example, he referred to America's "current and increasingly
successful policy in Indochina. . . ." At this point in time, Kennedy
had great faith in the ability of the Diem regime to solve South
Vietnam's problems and serve as an effective bulwark against the
spread of Communism in Indochina.

His views on the "loss" of China had swung 180 degrees since
1949, when he had charged that President Truman and the State Department
had "frittered away" victory in China because of poor advice from "the
Lattimores and the Fairbanks." Now he stated that it was a myth to
suggest "that China was lost because of the action of a few diplomats,
for instance, rather than because of underlying revolutionary
forces. . . ." Kennedy now had a more sophisticated view of the China
situation but as critic Victor Lasky pointed out, quite fairly, if
there was a myth, then Kennedy himself had helped create it.5

Kennedy touched on the issue of nuclear weapons for defense.

In his own Foreign Affairs article, Dulles had modified his concept

 

of massive retaliation as a means of defense in favor of a more

181

limited "tactical" response with nuclear weapons. While

criticizing America's "pose" of neutrality on the Algerian issue
Kennedy commented on one of the weaknesses of relying on nuclear
weapons for defense: "Washing one's hands of responsibility [Algeria],
like plans for 'sanitary war' and 'clean bombs', induces an illusion
of antisepsis and tidy order, but it is only an illusion."

Near the end of the article, after discussing the many
difficulties, complexities, and dilemmas involved in the decision-
making of foreign policy, Kennedy made an intriguing remark: "If
~Don Quixote is a poor inspiration for the makers of our foreign policy,
so, too is Hamlet." The former appears to be a clear reference to
Secretary of State Dulles but the latter could have been directed at
President Eisenhower, whom Kennedy had charged with vacillation and
drift in the past, or it could possibly have been a subtle swipe at
his competitor, Adlai Stevension, whom many considered overly indecisive.

In the course of the article, while emphasizing the need for
increased allowances for ambassadors so that career Foreign Service
men could serve in the highest posts, Kennedy mentioned "'l'affaire
Gluck". This comment stemmed from a controversy surrounding the
recent appointment of Maxwell H. Gluck as Ambassador to Ceylon. It
was revealed that Gluck was completely ignorant of Ceylonese affairs.
Gluck was being rewarded, it was charged, because he had contributed
liberally to the 1956 Republican campaign. At the time of the
appointment, Ceylon had just elected a neutralist government under
the leadership of Prime Minister Bandaranaike. As Gluck prepared
to leave for Ceylon he unwisely made some disparaging remark about

the Prime Minister which added fuel to the controversy.6

182

Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter appeared before a
hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the appoint-
ment. At the hearing, Kennedy and the other Senators complained of
the general tendency to appoint wealthy non-career men to ambassador-
ships because of the inadequacy of salaries and he urged that allowances
be increased. But more importantly, because of the repercussions in
Asia caused by Gluck's appointment, Kennedy made a formal request to
the Secretary that Gluck be reassigned. Ceylon was an emerging
post-colonial nation, Kennedy pointed out, and as such had strategic
importance. He was concerned that the Soviet Union was exploiting
the ill-will caused by Gluck's appointment.7

AS James MacGregor Burns noted, quite accurately, Kennedy's
article served as a prologue to his various foreign policy stands
during 1957 and the following two years. In addition to his involve-
ment in the Algerian dispute and the Middle East policy generally
during 1957 and 1958, there were three other main foreign policy
issues which dominated Kennedy's attention during this period. First,
he fought long and hard for an amendment to the Battle Act to permit
American economic aid to Poland and other Communist satellites,
thereby weakening their dependence on the Soviet Union. Second, he
worked closely with Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, a former
ambassador to India, and co-Sponsored a resolution which urged
stepped-up American aid to bolster India's sagging economy. The
resolution was designed to commit the United States to the success
of India's second five-year plan. And third, in the wake of the
launching of the first Soviet satellite (Sputnik) in 1957, he became

identified with the famous "missile gap" issue. Along with the

183

ever-present anti-colonialism theme and his increasing emphasis
on economic and technical assistance as opposed to military aid in
foreign aid programs, these were his main concerns during 1957-1958.

Each of these issues was touched on when Secretary of State
Dulles appeared before hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the subject of the Mutual Security Act of 1958.8 "Don't
you think," Kennedy asked Dulles, "that while it is very important
that we maintain our own national defense, particularly in the missile
field, the Soviet Union may be using better judgment in concentrating
on the economic, rather than the military, in contradistinction to
ourselves?" In his response, Dulles stressed the necessity for
military aid to the recipient nations in order to combat internal
Communist subversion.

Burns noted that Kennedy's question suggested a shift in
emphasis in his thinking Since the days when he had stressed military
aid. Although that is true, the shift had been gradual, not abrupt.
Also, Kennedy had long advocated economic rather than military aid to
Latin America and the Middle East.

As the questioning continued, Kennedy declared: "Mr. Secretary,
the point I want to make is that I think the economic assistance that
is prOposed in this bill [Mutual Security Bill] is inadequate, in view
of the very serious nature of the problems within those underdeveloped
countries, the population increase and the effort that the Soviet
Union is making."9 Quite notably, however, in view of later develop-
ments, Kennedy recognized the need for military assistance and defense
support programs to certain underdeveloped countries, such as Vietnam,

which, he said, were faced with "a strong enemy army across the border."

184

Kennedy and Dulles went on to talk of the special economic needs
of India and the necessity to amend the Battle Act. Kennedy asked
Dulles if he thought such an amendment would be in the national interest.
Dulles answered in the affirmative and noted his awareness that Kennedy
had already made a proposal along these lines.

From the time he first entered Congress in 1947, Kennedy had
expressed his concern for the plight of the Polish people. While
on a European trip in October, 1955, he visited Warsaw and cabled
back a press release which urged the United States not to forget the
plight of the Polish peOple.10

The liberation of the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe,
of course, was a prime desire of the Eisenhower Administration but the
question centered on how this could best be accomplished. Prior to
the 1956 revolts in Poland and Hungary the Speeches of Secretary of
State Dulles left the implication that the United States encouraged
satellite resistance to Soviet control, but the 1956 revolts caught
the Eisenhower Administration flat—footed. The United States did not
come to the aid of the Poles, or more particularly the Hungarians and
the Soviet Union crushed the Hungarian insurrection. In the after-
math of the bloody and futile Hungarian revolt, many wondered if the
implied promises of America's policy of liberation had not in fact
led the Hungarian Freedom Fighters to expect United States intervention
and then, when the chips were down, left them in the lurch. President
Eisenhower was forced to clarify the American position and in a
November 14, 1956 press conference, he declared that his Administration
had never advocated Open rebellion for the satellite states against

Soviet control.

185

The Polish revolution, more limited in its aims than was the
Hungarian Revolution, achieved a degree of independence from Soviet
control, while remaining within the Soviet orbit. Despite strong
pressures from the Soviet Union the Poles elected their own nationalist
Communist government under the leadership of Wladyslaw Gomulka. And
in the fall of 1957, the Polish Government turned to the United States
for increased trade and economic assistance. The Soviet Union,
quite naturally, was suSpicious about Poland's new policy of seeking
closer relations with the West and the Gomulka government had to
move cautiously.

In negotiations between a Polish delegation and the Department
of State, the Poles requested $200 million worth of surplus farm
products to be paid for in Polish currency, and a $100 million Export-
Import Bank loan to purchase machinery. From the American Side, the
chief barrier to the loan was the Battle Act of 1951 which prohibited
such aid to countries trading in war materials with the Soviet Union.
Such a definition, of course, included all the Soviet satellite
nations. The Battle Act was inflexible as was the general American
attitude toward the Communist world at the time of its passage. It
recognized only two categories of nations in the world--those in the
Western camp and those of the Communist bloc, and no distinction was
made for those Communist nations, such as Yugoslavia and to a lesser
extent, Poland, that were partially or wholly independent of the Soviet
Union.

The Battle Act was passed during the Korean War and it prohibited
giving aid to any Communist country except under extremely restrictive

conditions. Under the law, the President could authorize economic

186

assistance and trade with Communist satellites if (1) the recipient
nation could be defined as free of Soviet control or (2) the President
certified to Congress that United States trade with such nations

would be in the security interests of the United States. In practice,
these restrictions prohibited virtually all trade and assistance to
the Soviet satellites, especially under the normal foreign assistance
program. Over the years, those who sought to aid Yugoslavia, and more
recently Poland, had been able to circumvent the Battle Act, but the
Act greatly restricted the President's manoeuverability. The State
Department had long favored a more flexible approach believing

that any policy which weakened the dependence of the Communist satellites
on the Soviet Union was in America's best interests.

The Soviet Union regarded United States aid to Poland as inter-
ference and a threat to her national interests. But, for a variety
of reasons, many Americans also opposed such aid. It was argued
that American assistance to the Soviet satellites would strengthen
the economy of the entire Communist bloc and relieve pressure from
the Soviet Union. Also, United States aid would serve to reduce
discontent within the satellite nations and delay the day when the
Communist system would disintegrate from within. This was a pervasive
view within the country at the time and one of its leading spokesmen
was Senate Republican Leader, William F. Knowland of California.

Kennedy immediately became involved in the Polish aid issue.

In March of 1957, he wrote a letter to Secretary of State Dulles
which argued in favor of the economic assistance to Poland despite
the fact that the Polish government was still within the orbit of

the Soviet Union.11 To Kennedy, the Polish request indicated a new

187

degree of independence from Soviet domination, and Poland's ability
and willingness to turn to the United States for assistance, he said,
should be "encouraged, not castigated". He recognized the arguments
of those who opposed aid to Poland but he said: "If there is even a
slight chance that the demonstration of friendship on our part will
help to loosen further the bonds of Soviet domination then the
obvious gains to this nation and the free world will have been well
worth the effort."

A few weeks later, in a speech to a Jefferson-Jackson fund-raising
dinner in Omaha, Nebraska, Kennedy once again called on the United
States to grant Poland's request for aid: "I realize the dangers
involved," he said, "[but if the U. S. rejects the Poles], we will
either be forcing a suffering nation into a fruitless revolt or we
will be forcing the Polish government to again become hopelessly
dependent on Moscow. If we fail to help the Poles, who else in
Germany, Czechoslovakia, or anywhere else behind the Iron Curtain
will dare stand up to the Russians and look westward?"12 The issue
of aid to Poland was a sensitive one, of course, because no Senator
wished to go on record as supporting anything that could possibly be
interpreted as helping Communism.

In June of 1957, the United States agreed to commit $95 million
in aid to Poland. This was approximately one-third of the Polish
request but it did not begin to meet their needs. More could have
been done. However, it should be noted that Poland Still relied
heavily on the Soviet Union for economic assistance and realistically,
no matter what the United States had been willing to do, that basic

arrangement could not have been altered radically, in the short run,

188

at least. The loan illustrated the Administration's lack of
manoeuverability in this area. As Kennedy later pointed out,

in order to circumvent the restrictions of the Battle Act, the Adminis-
tration had been forced to stretch the truth and define Poland as

free from Soviet control.

On August 21, 1957, Kennedy delivered a major Speech in the Senate
entitled "The Struggle Against Imperialism, Part II--Poland and
Eastern Europe."13 Part 1 of the address was the July 2, 1957
Algerian speech which concerned the problem of Western imperialism.

Now Kennedy spoke of the challenge of Soviet imperialism in Eastern
Europe and the emerging opportunities that were open to the United
States.

At the outset, Kennedy noted that the Russians regarded their
actions in Eastern Europe much as the French regarded their actions in
Algeria--as not of the affair of the United States. However, Kennedy
felt that American foreign policy should actively oppose both forms
of imperialism, Western and Soviet. Although his speech related to
all the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, he focused his discussion
on Poland because he believed Poland, with its recently acquired
freedom of action and cautious turn to the West, offered the best
Opportunity for the United States to initiate a policy which would
encourage its gradual evolution away from Soviet domination.

In summary fashion, Kennedy recited the failures of the Eisenhower
Administration's pre—1956 liberation policy and its more current
policy which he characterized as merely "waiting and hoping" for the
satellite nations to become independent. He did not believe that

the satellites in Eastern Europe would become independent as a result

189

of a violent revolt--the revolts of 1956 had proven that. Also, he
said, since the United States made it clear that it was not prepared
to help the satellites revolt or send them arms, then some new
alternative was needed. Independence would more likely come gradually
as a result of a cautious, evolutionary process, Kennedy said, and
therefore, the United States must be ready to take advantage of any
opportunity to lessen satellite dependence on the Soviet Union by having
ready alternative forms of economic aid. The Battle Act and other
acts prevented the President from having such flexibility. Also,
because of these statutory restrictions, there were great delays in
granting aid--delays that resulted in frustration and missed
opportunities. Kennedy termed the June grant of $95 million in
United States aid to Poland as’"too little and too late". The Gomulka
government, he said, had taken a great risk in turning to the United
States for aid and this "frustration of hopes" served to strengthen
the anti-Gomulka faction in Poland, which argued that American aid
was essentially verbal and propagandistic. Also, he continued,
because of the long delay and the inadequacy of the loan, the Gomulka
government had been forced to turn to Moscow once again for assistance.
For all these reasons, Kennedy believed that a more flexible,
imaginative approach was needed to pry the satellites away from
Soviet domination. At the end of his speech, he introduced a bill
to amend the Battle Act. His amendment, which was designed to ease
restrictions on United States trade and assistance to Communist
countries, would free the President to furnish aid to satellite
nations whenever he determined that such assistance would help them

achieve increased independence from the Soviet Union. Kennedy's

190

amendment did not provide actual funds, it merely removed the
prohibitions contained in the Battle Act which restricted
Presidential action.

In the conclusion of his Speech, Kennedy listed various other
measures which would also be helpful: (1) Increased people-to-peOple
contacts between Poles and Americans (2) Expanded trade between the
two countries (3) United States technical assistance to the Gomulka
government (4) United States aid to those Polish repatriates still
returning from Russia following World War II (5) Creation of a tougher
policy of action in the event of another revolt. (Kennedy did not
elaborate on what this might entail). In his Sixth and final point,
he emphasized that Poland must be viewed in the wider European setting.
"Especially," he said, "we cannot honestly overlook the close
connections between our policies toward Germany and those toward Poland."

In this regard, Kennedy stated, as he did in his Foreign Affairs article,

 

that United States policy under both Democratic and Republican adminis-
trations had "unduly neglected" the German Socialists in favor of
Chancellor Adenauer.

During Kennedy's speech, Senator Mansfield of Montana interrupted
to voice his complete agreement with Kennedy's position. He, too,
recognized that there was a calculated risk involved in granting aid
to a Communist country but he thought it a risk worth taking. However,
Senator Knowland spoke out in strong opposition to Kennedy's amendment,
as well as his general line of reasoning. It was in America's intersts
to have discontent in the Communist satellites, he said, not content-
ment. Economic discontent would not only place a greater burden on

the Soviet economy but would lead to a disillusionment within the

191

Communist system. American aid to the satellites, on the contrary,
would reduce discontent and generally strengthen the Communist bloc.
It was clearly evident that to him, Kennedy's proposal made no sense.
Kennedy replied that discontent could lead to revolt but since the
Administration was opposed to direct intervention and since any
revolt lacking outside support would fail, some alternate means must
be established to weaken the satellite's dependence on the Soviet
Union.

Not surprisingly, the policy of American aid to Poland not only
met opposition in America, it also raised the suspicions of many
Polish Communists. Because of the delicacy of the Situation, the
Gomulka government had to publicly praise the lack of political
strings on the loans and credits given to Poland by the United States.
This stance was necessary because it was mainly Gomulka's decision
to resist strong Soviet objections to his policy of seeking American
aid and there were many Polish Communists who Opposed the aid because
they suspected political motives. The very reasons used to justify
the Polish aid policy in America-~that it could cause a break between
Poland and the Soviet Union-~served to arouse opposition in Poland.

It was a delicate matter. However, no American politician could
risk supporting a policy of United States aid to Poland, or any
Communist country, without substantial justification. It had to be
shown that it was in America's interests. That such a policy would
help buttress Polish independence was fine, but it was far more persuasive
to argue that it would drive a wedge between Poland and the Soviet Union.

This, of course, was the line of reasoning that Kennedy employed. But on

192

at least one occasion, according to press reports, his remarks
"roused the wrath" of certain Polish Communists in Warsaw.14 This
reaction came from a speech he delivered in March, 1958, to a Polish
group in Chicago, in which he outlined his reasons for supporting
United Sates aid to Poland. The Speech was subsequently published in

Dziennik Chicagoski (The Chicago Polish Daily News.) Ironically,

 

the occasion for the speech was the newspaper's naming of Kennedy
as its Man of the Year. It was reported that Kennedy was not available
for comment on the Polish anger in Warsaw over his remarks.15

Almost a year elapsed before Kennedy's amendment was brought
before the Senate for a vote. He had introduced the proposal in his
speech on August 21, 1957, and it reached the floor of the Senate for
debate on June 4, 1958. In the interval the proposed amendment was
sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the State Department
for consideration. The Eisenhower Administration publicly endorsed
the proposed amendment to the Battle Act and, in fact, the State
Department helped draft the exact wording of the final amendment.
In its final form, the amendment authorized the President to furnish
economic assistance to any Communist nation except the Soviet Union,
Red China and North Korea, whenever he determined that such aid would
help them achieve increased independence and reduce their economic
dependence on the Soviet Union. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
approved the amendment and passage looked certain but a few days
before the Senate voted on the measure, the Administration began to
reverse its position.

The Administration's sudden reversal on the Kennedy amendment was

generally interpreted in the Senate and the press as being dictated by

193

threats from Republican Senators Knowland, Dirksen, and Styles Bridges
of New Hampshire to the effect that if the Administration persisted
in supporting the Kennedy amendment, they would lead a fight to slash
foreign aid funds from the entire program.16 At first, the President
only partially retreated from his position. He issued a statement that
while he liked the "principle" of the Kennedy amendment he was
leaving it entirely to the Senate to decide. In Other words, he with-
drew his open support. But after a second visit from the three
Senators, Knowland, Dirksen and Bridges, and listening to their
reported threats, the President authorized Knowland to announce to
the press that while he still approved the Kennedy amendment in
principle he opposed including it in the present foreign aid bill.
This statement was released shortly before the final vote.17
The Senate debate on Kennedy's amendment to the Battle Act, on
June 4 and 5, 1958, was long and heated and the discussion carried
late into the evening.18 Kennedy's proposal called for a new departure
and this raised many collateral issues of great complexity. All the
general arguments, pro and con, were tossed back and forth. In the
debate it was clearly substantiated that Secretary of State Dulles
and the State Department had endorsed the amendment when it had been
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and many senators,
including some Republicans, assailed the Administration for shifting
its position.19 Senator Aiken, Republican of Vermont exclaimed: "I am
amazed that the President does not favor the proposal. Why did he let
the Secretary of State favor it all this time without interposing
any objection? If we cannot understand where the Department of State
stands how can a representative of a foreign country credit what

the Department of State says? To me, it is a shocking Situation. It

194

destroys confidence."20 Major press reaction was equally hostile
to the Administration's abrupt shift under pressure.

Senator Knowland had submitted an amendment of his own to strike
the Kennedy provision from the foreign aid bill and on a roll call vote
shortly before 11:30 P.M. on June 5, Knowland's amendment carried by
a single vote, 43 to 42.21 The vote was nonpartisan, 17 Democrats
joined with 26 Republicans to defeat Kennedy's amendment. Most
commentators agreed that if the Administration had sustained its
support, Kennedy's proposal would have carried with ease.

A few days after the defeat of Kennedy's prOposal, President
Eisenhower was asked in a press conference if he again would seek
authority from Congress to give aid to the Soviet satellites. Consider-
ing the President's last-minute opposition to the Kennedy amendment,
his response was amusing: "I would give aid to anything that I would
think would help to weaken the solidarity of the Communist bloc. If
we can set up centrigufal as opposed to centripetal forces, we are,
in my mind, doing a great service to the free world."22

In addition to the aid to Communist satellites amendment, there
was another Kennedy amendment, adopted by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, which became a part of the Mutual Security Bill of 1958
under consideration by the Senate in June, 1958--this was the Kennedy-
Cooper resolution which urged vastly increased aid to India. Kennedy
had been interested in this program Since the beginning of the 1958

legislative session.

Writing in the January, 1958 issue of The Progressive magazine,

 

in an article entitled "If India Falls," he warned that India's second

five-year plan was on the point of failure and that "bold" new assistance

195

in the form of several hundred millions of dollars was needed to
save India's economy from collapse.23 It was not enough, merely
to "proclaim a position of anti-colonialism" he declared, action
must be taken to meet the economic needs of the emerging nations.
The United States had a direct stake in the survival of a free India,
he asserted, because it was the "showcase of the democratic 'experiment'
in Asia," and the only real contender with China for the "faith and
following" of the Asian people. He called for a Wflarshall Plan for
India".

He emphasized the importance of economic growth in the new and
uncommitted nations as a means of combating the lure of communism.
"It has been one of Marxism's cruelest ironies," he said, "that it
[Communism] has gained special force not in the advanced industrial
societies, but in areas of stagnation, peasant economy, or petrified
authoritarianism." And, military aid was inadequate, he said: "We
have begun to learn that a purely military response to the tides in
the Middle East and Asia is an illusory breakwater. For military pacts
and arms shipments are themselves new divisive forces in areas shot
through with national rivalries. . . ."

Kennedy realized that India's stance of neutrality in the Cold
War, the existence of nationalized industries, and the fact that Russia
sent aid to India, all had the effect of cooling America's interest
in committing aid, but he urged that these issues should not be central
considering the importance of India to the West. On the subject of
Russian aid to India, Kennedy said there was no suggestion that
President Nehru was playing off the East against the West: "India has

attempted no such intimidation," he said.

196

Although Kennedy did not picture the United States as coming
alone to the aid of India--he envisioned contributions coming also
from Germany, Great Britain, Canada and the Colombo Plan countries--
he realized that it was primarily the United States, the West's
"wealthiest leader," that held the key to India's future. However, in
his concluding note he admitted the difficulties of "selling" the
India aid program to the American people at a time of high taxes and
pressing defense needs.

About two months later, on March 25, 1958, in an expanded
version of his article in The Progressive, Kennedy made the same appeal

on the floor of the Senate.24 At the end of the Speech, which was

 

entitled "The Choice in Asia-Democratic Development in India,"

Kennedy submitted a resolution on behalf of himself and Senator Cooper,
which pledged Congress to support, in cooperation with other nations,
assistance of the "type, magnitude and duration adequate to assist

India to complete successfully its current program for economic develop-
ment." The resolution did not authorize a specific sum of money, it
merely expressed "the sense of Congress" that it was in the interest

of the United States to aid India.

India was currently receiving American aid but the Kennedy-Cooper
resolution called for vastly increased assistance during the last three
years of India's second five-year plan. The aid would come mainly in
the form of long term loans and technical assistance. Kennedy proposed
that Congress and the Organization of European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC) appoint study committees to go to India to survey its needs
in a massive coordinated plan for help.

In his speech, he examined the various criticisms of any special

197

aid program for India. Many contended that India's economic future
had to rest with private investment and Kennedy agreed that this
was the most "durable and resilient" form of assistance. However,
he noted that private investment alone could not underwrite such
programs as education and health. A second objection held that
America's treaty with Pakistan precluded the possibility of a stepped-
up aid program to that nation's prime enemy, India. To this, Kennedy
answered that the United States Should help both of these nations in
their basic economic needs. To the argument that foreign aid funds
could better be used to combat the recession at home, Kennedy stated
that foreign aid would invigorate America's international trade
relations: "There is no question," he emphasized, "but that foreign
assistance now will mean trade later." The fourth and final source
of criticism concerned the Soviet Union's assistance to India. On
this point, Kennedy said the United States could learn from the
Soviet Union's effective use of technical assistance and cultural
and educational exchange programs. He emphasized that the Soviet
Union could not compete with America's capacity for economic assis-
tance. Therefore, he concluded, India offered an "extraordinary
opportunity to match systems with the Soviet Union on favorable terms,
to Show our true concern for economic develOpment, and to push India
well ahead in its competition with the Chinese economy."

At the conclusion of his speech, Kennedy emphasized that India
was the most important of the uncommitted nations of the world and
he urged understanding for India's policy of neutrality. Wisely, he
pointed out that the United States, during its formative years, had also

pursued a neutralist policy. Economic aid from the West, he said,

198

was the only effective basis on which the emerging nations of Africa
and Asia could be encouraged to resist the Communist alternative and
America's friendships, he warned, "should not be equated with military
alliances or 'voting the Western ticket.'"

"The Russians," Kennedy concluded, are trying to repeat in other
parts of Asia and Africa their takeover of China. They are counting
on the Indian disenchantment with the inadequacy of Western assistance,
and democratic methods of planning and economic life."

Following Kennedy's remarks, Senator Cooper rose to voice his
agreement. The need for economic advancement, he said, was the
"primary fact of political life in Asia." He asserted that if the
democratic governments of Asia failed to better the living standards
of their people, they would lose their support, and their people would
look to the example of Soviet Russia and Communist China. "This," he
warned, "rather than aggression is the threat to the growth of
democracy in Asia."

Several weeks passed. On.May 21, Kennedy read into the Congres-

sional Record three newspaper articles, written by Mr. William Clark,

 

which emphasized the crucial importance of India to the West's struggle
to win the uncommitted nations. On the same day the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee approved the Kennedy-Cooper resolution but Senator
Knowland, an opponent to aid to neutralist nations, said the Committee's
25

decision was tentative and subject to further review.

Russell Baker, writing in the New York Times, noted that the

 

Kennedy-Cooper resolution, for three basic reasons, had only a slender
chance of winning approval in Congress. First, he said, Congress had

grown increasingly reluctant to make long-term advance commitments of

199

foreign aid. Secondly, the resolution lacked both strong senatorial
backing and a "national sense of crisis" about India. Thirdly, he
was of the view that Senatorial opinion was becoming increasingly
hostile toward aid to neutralist nations like India.26

As part of the Mutual Security Bill of 1958, the Kennedy-Cooper
resolution reached the Senate for debate on June 6, the day after
the Senate rejected Kennedy's other amendment on aid to Communist
satellites.27 In the course of the debate, Republican Senator Styles
Bridges of New Hampshire and Everett Dirksen of Illinois, introduced
amendments designed to strike out that section of the bill which
singled out India for Special economic assistance on the grounds that
India should receive no greater consideration than other recipient
nations of United States aid, especially considering India's
neutralist policy.

Both Kennedy and Cooper, of course, spoke out strenuously in
opposition to the Bridges and Dirksen amendments as did many other
Senators. Without going into Specific details, both Kennedy and
COOper drew an analogy between the Situation in India in 1958 and the
situation in China following World War II, when the United States might
have done more to prevent a Communist victory. This was a fairly
prevalent view at the time and one to which Dulles also subscribed.
They did not want to see democracy in India fail because of a lack
of United States commitment.

On the roll call vote the Kennedy-COOper resolution carried as
it had been adopted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The
Bridges-Dirksen amendments, combined as one, was defeated by a vote

of 47 to 35.28

200

A few days later, however, at a Senate-House of Representatives
Conference committee meeting, which was called to resolve differences
on the Mutual Security Bill, the Kennedy-Cooper resolution was
struck from the bill.29 The House conferees did not disagree with the
purposes or objectives of the Kennedy—Cooper resolution, they merely
felt that individual countries should not be given special attention
in the bill. This was the view expressed in the Dirksen-Bridges amend-
ments. In a conference committee report, however, it was noted that
most of the conferees, from the Senate and the House, recognized the
crucial importance of India's economic develOpment and urged that
the Mutual Security Act funds be administered with this in mind.30

Before the conference report on the Mutual Security Act of 1958
was agreed to, Kennedy delivered a sharp, dissenting report which
focused on both of his defeated amendmentS--on Poland and India.31
The first of the amendments, aid to Poland, was defeated, he charged,
because "the administration withdrew the support that had been freely
given during the weeks preceding the debate." Kennedy considered it
a "serious error" for the House conferees to reject the Kennedy-COOper
resolution on India. Once again, he referred to the example of
China. The danger to democracy in India, he said, was "unmistakable--
the peril of another China story." He criticized the tendency for the
United States to respond only to outright crises, when money was
often of little help. "The challenge of India," he warned, "is
the challenge of whether we as Americans have yet learned to act in
foreign affairs on our opportunities, before crisis has closed in."

As with any issue, it is impossible to determine the precise

source of Kennedy's ideas. However, the essence of his India proposal,

201

increased economic aid to assist a democratic state in its competition
with Communism, was in accord with his constant concern for the

future of underdeveloped nations and his heightened emphasis on
economic and technical assistance programs. Critic Victor Lasky
suggested that Kennedy was influenced in October, 1957 by Miss

Barbara Ward, a former editor of London's Economist, whom Lasky
characterized as a "high priestess in the foreign-aid cult."32
Apparently, Kennedy met Miss Ward in 1945 when he covered the British
elections for the Hearst newspapers. In 1957, Miss Ward was an
advocate of vastly increased United States economic aid to India to
meet the challenge of Chinese Communism for the allegiance of the
Asian peOples. "So impressed was Kennedy with her arguments,"

Lasky contended, "that the Senator began telling audiences that 'when
I asked Barbara Ward where the United States should concentrate in
Asia, She said, 'India first, India second, India last.'"

Miss Ward's was not a lone voice, however. Aid to India as a
means of combatting the challenge of Chinese Communism was a very
common sentiment within the United States in 1957 and 1958, as the
Senate's passage of the Kennedy-Cooper resolution indicated. But
it is possible that Miss Ward's views had a Special influence on
Kennedy's thinking.

Kennedy maintained his heightened interest in economic aid
programs, as opposed to military assistance, throughout 1957 and 1958.
However, this did not effect his emphasis on the need for a strong
defense system at home. He continued to advocate a buildup in
conventional weapons and in late 1957, he began to warn Americans

of the so-called "missile gap"--or the disparity between the missile

202

strength of the Soviet Union and the United States.33

In the wake of the launching of Sputnik in late 1957, Kennedy

wrote an article for the New York Times in which he assessed the

 

implications for America's defense and foreign policy posture.34
New American missiles must be produced, he said, and America's allies
should be given intermediate range missiles until the United States
developed an intercontinental missile capable of reaching Moscow from
America's shores. However, he warned: "Sputnik has implications
for conventional weapons and armies as well as modern. If we are
prepared only to fight total wars of massive retaliation. . .we Shall
witness further Soviet advances through the 'sputnik diplomacy' of
intimidation and peripheral wars." In Speeches a few weeks later
Kennedy warned about brush-fire guerrilla wars. He noted that there
was "little value" in spending billions on nuclear weapons if the
United States was unprepared to meet this challenge.35

However, although Kennedy continued to urge a strengthening of
conventional military might for a flexible defense he soon focused
on the more dramatic "missile gap". Sputnik had shown that at least
in the field of guided missiles the Soviet Union had overtaken the
United States. Many commentators made ominous predictions of the
effect the new Soviet dominance would have on American security and
in a well publicized Senate speech on August 14, 1958, Kennedy gave
his assessment.

To convey the mood of bizarre alarmism in the Senate that day
properly, it should be noted that, prior to Kennedy's Speech, the
Senate debated an amendment to a military appropriations bill,

submitted by Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, which forbade the

203

Defense Department to spend any of its apprOpriated funds on any plan
for the surrender of the United States to the Soviet Union! The
amendment was inspired by an article published in the St. Louis

Post Dispetch by Brigadier General Thomas Phillips. General Phillips

 

pointed out that the Rand Corporation had been looking ahead to
the years when the Soviet Union would have an overpowering superiority
in nuclear striking power. In contemplation of this future situation,
scientists at the Rand Corporation made a study of the circumstances
under which the United States ought to surrender. Comfortingly,
by a vote of 88 to 2 the Russell amendment was agreed to.36

That was the atmosphere when Kennedy rose to deliver his speech.
His predictions were gloomy but he offered an alternative.37 He
warned that the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union
in certain vital areas of military defense, namely, nuclear striking
power. He compared America's position in 1958, with that of the
British who, four hundred years earlier, had been forced to surrender
Calais to the French. Calais, Kennedy pointed out, had long been
considered the symbol of British supremacy in Europe. However, the
British recovered from their initial panic to their loss, Kennedy said,
and successfully redirected their policies from Europe to an emphasis
on maritime trade and the navy. America's Calais, which had been
likewise lost, was its superiority in nuclear striking power. This
superiority, Kennedy noted, had been the foundation of America's
basic military and diplomatic strategy since Hiroshima but adjustments
in thinking now had to be made in the light of the new reality of
Russian nuclear superiority.

Kennedy agreed with Lieutenant General James M. Gavin's

204

prediction that the "gap" between the missile strength of the Soviet
Union and the United States would continue to widen until it reached
its most dangerous and critical point in the years 1960-1964. The
nuclear gap would be so large, Kennedy warned, that the Soviet Union
would have "a new shortcut to world domination." In addition, their
superiority in missile power would enable them to make advances
Short of actual nuclear attack-~through "Sputnik diplomacy". "The
periphery of the Free World will slowly be nibbled away," Kennedy
continued, "as the balance of power shifts to the Soviet Union."

Kennedy had never fully supported the Eisenhower-Dulles emphasis
on massive retaliation as a means of defense and now, with the new
Soviet superiority, it was even more apparent that the United States
could not rely on such a concept. In his remarks he stated his
agreement with Professor Henry Kissinger who contended that the
concept of massive retaliation had developed a "Maginot-line
mentality" in the United States which prevented the development of
new alternative defense policies.

"In the years of the gap," Kennedy continued, "every basic
assumption held by the American public with regard to our military
and foreign policies will be called into question." He listed
ten such assumptions but the final one was the most pertinent:
"Victory ultimately goes to the nation with the highest national
income, gross national product, and standard of living." This led
him into an attack on the Eisenhower Administration's willingness
to "place fiscal security ahead of national security."

Kennedy detected a sense of national complacency regarding

armaments and this caused him to draw another analogy: "We have been

205

passing through a period aptly described by Stanley Baldwin, in a
great House of Commons debate, in disclosing Britain's unpreparedness
to the House of Commons in 1936, as 'the years the locusts have eaten.'"38
To clarify this point Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, who was
also strongly defense-minded, asked Kennedy if he saw a "considerable
comparability" between the situation faced by Britain in the late
1930's with that faced by the United States in the late 1950's?
Kennedy replied that he did. Just as Britain, because of various
misconceptions, had allowed the balance of power to shift to Germany,
the United States had permitted a similar shift to the Soviet Union,
he said. And the situation in the 1950's was even more perilous
than the 1930 counterpart, Kennedy noted, because the United States
had no strong ally to turn to as did the British.

It was a glum picture, indeed, that the Senator presented.
What remedies did he suggest? First, he advocated stepped-up spending
on new weaponry in order to reduce the Soviet nuclear advantage, but
even with this he did not believe the missile gap would be closed
until 1964. Therefore, something additional was required. Because
the United States no longer held the "trump cards" and was in a
"temporarily disadvantageous position," he declared, American
negotiators nmmt.demonstrate a new sense of urgency for disarmament
and a reduction of world tensions. He did not comment upon the
apparent contradiction of a policy which called for increased military
Spending, coupled with an invigorated quest for disarmament.

The main thrust of Kennedy's advice, however, was that the
United States must adopt "the classic strategy of the underdog" which,

he pointed out, had been employed by the Soviet Union during the years

206

of their gap. By taking advantage of America's strengths and the
Soviet Union's weaknesses the United States could "buy the time"
necessary to "regain the upper hand." What should be done? Since
the United States still maintained an economic superiority, the
foreign aid program could be used to advantage to assist such "key
areas as India and Tunisia." Also, the United States must make the
most of its ideological advantage--it must "lead, not frustrate, the
nationalist movement against imperialism, of any variety, East and West."
After referring to the importance of the nationalist movements
in the underdeveloped world, Kennedy made an indirect slam at
Dulles' penchant for military alliances. He suggested that certain
military commitments abroad be reduced--"no commitment at all is better
than one which we cannot or Should not honor, which the local popu-
lations did not request, which our Allies do not support and which
is politically or militarily unfeasible." On this point, he
criticized the commitment to the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.
(At this time, in the late summer of 1958, the Formosa crisis was
looming large and many feared that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek
might draw the United States into a confrontation with Communist
China over these two highly vulnerable islands.) There was one
Soviet weakness which should be probed, Kennedy continued, and that
was the "Achilles heel Of the satellite nations." He lamented the
one-vote margin defeat of his amendment in June which would have
provided the necessary flexibility to "wean the satellites from
the Soviets."
So, Kennedy saw hOpe in the midst of the gloom. For effect,

he concluded his remarks by quoting one of Sir Winston Churchill's

207

famous exhortations of encouragement to the British people. Once he
finished, several Democratic senators rose to congratulate him for his
excellent speech, but Republican Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana

was highly disturbed by Kennedy's remarks.

In the ensuing debate, Capehart attacked the speech vehemently
on the grounds that it was selling the United States short and giving
comfort to the Soviet Union.39 Capehart was "alarmed" and "amazed"
that Kennedy had said at least "35 times" that the United States was
behind the Soviet Union. He did not think these weaknesses should be
divulged in a public forum and he served notice that if any similar
remarks were made from then on he would invoke Senate rule XXXV which
provided that the galleries be cleared and the Senate proceed in
closed session. Kennedy replied to Capehart, rather sarcastically,
that all of the facts in his Speech had been a matter of public
knowledge and public discussion for several months although, he said,
"it is obvious they have come as a total surprise to the Senator
from Indiana." Kennedy and several of his colleagues made reference
to the various public articles and reports which had utilized the
same basic facts. To prove his point, Kennedy quoted from an article
by General Gavin which had appeared in hife_magazine a few weeks
earlier. Unfortunately for Capehart, when he attempted to.invoke
Senate rule XXXV, no one was willing to second his motion. The
following day Kennedy introduced into the Congressional Record
quotations from President Eisenhower, the Secretary of Defense, and
various military leaders which proved that his remarks and warnings
were neither confidential nor new.4O

As has been indicated, the views of Lieutenant General James Gavin

208

had had a prime influence on Kennedy's thinking. General Gavin had

resigned from the Army and his recently published book War and Peace

 

in the Space Age! was being widely read at this time. Kennedy reviewed

 

the book in The Reporter magazine and he was in complete agreement
41

 

with the contents. The "missile gap" was not inevitable, the
General argued, it was caused by the Eisenhower Administration's
attempt to achieve a "New Look" defense system "on the cheap".
General Gavin also pointed to the inherent weaknesses of Secretary
Dulles' concept of massive retaliation. Kennedy and Gavin could not
have been in more essential accord on defense policy.

There is an interesting twist in all this. As a potent political
issue, the "missile gap" became completely identified with Kennedy
and he reaped the benefits. However, Senator Stuart Symington of
Missouri had spoken out on the issue with frequency long before
Kennedy picked it up. It has been suggested that it was Kennedy who
attracted the excitement because he was a fresh spokesman on the
subject. In any case, not only was Symington the long-time voice
in the wilderness on defense, but he was also a personal friend of
General Gavin--however, it was Kennedy, not Symington, who reviewed
his book.42 I

Kennedy's first term in the Senate drew to a close in 1958.

His issues of the past two yearS--anti-colonialism, 43 Algeria and
the Middle East, aid to Communist satellites, support of India's
five-year plan, increased economic assistance in foreign aid, the
buildup of conventional arms as well as nuclear weapons, and the
vacating of Quemoy and Matsu44--all of these helped to establish

an identity for Kennedy in the foreign policy Sphere and many

209

of these issues recurred in 1959 and 1960, but it was the sensationalism
of the "missile gap" issue that dominated center state during the
next two years.

In the election of 1958, Kennedy won by a margin of some 870,000
votes--the largest in Massachusetts history and the largest of any
senatorial candidate in the nation. It was a stunning victory and

his campaign for the Presidency Shifted into high gear.

FOOTNOTES

1John F. Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks At Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, #1, October, 1957, pp. 44-59.

 

2John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States

Policy," Ibid., pp. 25-43.

3James Tracy Crown, The Kennedy Literature, p. 57.

 

4There was also an article by Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia in
this issue of Foreign Affairs. Tito blamed many of the tensions of
the Cold War on the rigidity of Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov
but he asked whether the time had not come when the West should
view with "more realism and greater confidence" the steps he said
the Soviet Union was taking to alleviate tensions. See: Josip
Broz-Tito, "On Certain Current International Questions," Ibid., pp.
68-77.

 

5Victor Lasky, JFK, The Man and the Myth, p. 293.

 

6On July 28, 1957, the Washingtpn Post carried an article on

the implications of Gluck's appointment.

 

7For Kennedy's remarks see: "Ambassadorial Appointments,"
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate,
85th Congress, lst Session, August 1, 1957, pp. 26-30. Approximately
two years later, at a Hearing on the nomination of Ogden R. Reid
to be Ambassador to Israel, Kennedy again expressed his belief that
career men should be selected for ambassadorial appointments. For
Kennedy's remarks see: "Nomination of Ogden R. Reid," Hearings
Before the Committee on ForeignhRelations, U. S. Senate, 86th Congress,
lst Session, May 12 and 19, 1959, pp. 45-51.

 

 

8"Mutual Security Act of 1958," Hearinge Before the Committee
on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd Session,
March 24, 1958, pp. 179-184.

 

 

9Later in the year, Kennedy and seven other members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, all Democrats but one, urged
President Eisenhower to place greater emphasis on economic aid to
under-developed countries. In a letter to the President they spoke

210

211

of the "serious distortion" between military aid and economic
assistance. "Overemphasis on military assistance," they wrote, "has
tended to involve the United States in situations in which our aid
may have contributed to the maintenance in power of regimes which
have lacked broad support within the countries we have assisted."
The policy tended to project a "militaristic image" abroad, they said,
and also military assistance by its very nature "tends to create

and then perpetuate military hierarchies which even in the most
well-developed countries may endanger the very values of individual
freedom which we seek to safeguard." The other eight Senators who
signed the letter were Republican William Langer of North Dakota

and the following Democrats: Theodore Francis Green of Rhode Island,
Committee Chairman; J. William Fulbright of Arkansas; John J.
Sparkman of Alabama; Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota; Mike Mansfield
of Montana and Wayne Morse of Oregon. See: New York Times,
September 10, 1958.

 

10A portion of the press release is quoted in Evelyn Lincoln,
My TWelve Years hith John F. Kenneey (New York: David McKay Company,
Inc., 1965), p. 70.

 

11Kennedy Library, Press Releases File, 1953-1961, Box 626.
The letter was dated.March 12, 1957 and the press release was dated
March 13. The text of the letter, along with a rebuttal on the
issue, by Senator William F. Knowland of California, was reprinted
in Foreign Poliey Bulletin, April 15, 1957, p. 117-119, under the
title "Should the U. 5. Give Aid to Communist Countries?"

 

 

12New York Times, May 18, 1957, and Time magazine, May 27, 1957,
p. 19.

 

13U.S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, lst Session, 1957,
C111, Part 11, 15446-15454. August 21, 1957.

 

14New York Times, March 25, 1958.

 

lslbid.

 

16Ibid., June 6 and 7, 1958.

17Iihe_magazine, June 16, 1958, pp. 12-13.

18U.S. Congpessional Record, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958,

CIV, Part 8, 10139-10163 and 10260-10303. June 4-5, 1958.

 

191bid., 10278, 10294.

201bid., 10278.

212

21Ibid., 10302.

22New York Times, June 19, 1958.

23John F. Kennedy, "If India Falls," The Prggressiye. January,
1958, pp. 8-11.

24Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, CIV,

Part 4, 5246-5255. March 25, 1958.

 

251219,. A4672-A4674. May 21, 1958. Also, New York Times, May
22, 1958.

 

26New York Times, March 26, 1958.

27Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 10384-10414.

June 6, 1958.

281bid., 10413-10414.

29New York Times, June 19, 1958.

 

30Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, CIV,

Part 10, 12480. June 27, 1958.

 

3libid., 12481-12482. June 27, 1958. Kennedy and Cooper also
wrote a joint letter to the New York Times on July 29, 1958, which
outlined the strategic importance of India and its vital need for
economic assistance. The New York Times had endorsed the Kennedy-
COOper resolution.

 

32Lasky, JFK, The Man and the Myth, p. 291.

 

33New York Times, November 7, 1957, p. 16:5.

 

34Ibid., December 8, 1957, p. 81:1.

35Ibid., January 21, 1958, p. 19:2. Also, on February 3, Chairman
of the JOint Chiefs of Staff, General Nathan Twining, appeared before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to present an evaluation of
the comparative military strength of the United States and the Soviet
Union. In addition to questions on America's missile strength,
Kennedy voiced concern about the United States' ability to fight
limited wars. See: "Review of Foreign Policy," Hearings Before
the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. 8. Senate, 85th Congress,
2nd Session, February 3, 1958, pp. 34-38.

213

36Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, CIV, Part 14,
17743. August 15, 1958.

 

371bid., 17569-17575. August 14, 1958. The speech is also

included in Kennedy's The Strategy of Peace, pp. 60-73.

 

Interestingly, this brief quotation was deleted from the speech
when the speech was later published in Kennedy's Strategy of Peace.
The reason seems clear. Kennedy implied here, mista enly, that it was
Baldwin who termed Britain's years of unpreparedness as "the years the
locusts have eaten." Actually, the famous remark was made by Winston
Churchill in his charges against the Baldwin Government in an angry

debate in the House of Commons in 1936. This undoubtedly explains
why the quotation was deleted.

39Ibid., 17574-17575; 17600-17613.

40Ibid., 17714.

41"General Gavin Sounds the Alarm" The Repprter, October 30.
1958, pp. 35-36.

 

42Ralph G. Martin and Ed Plaut, Front Runner, Dark Horse, pp. 194-
195.

 

43This, of course, had been a persistent theme since 1951. His

most recent proclamation on that issue came shortly after his re-election
in 1958 in a speech to a Jewish Theological Seminary. The New York
Times, in its coverage of the speech, carried the following caption:
"Kennedy Decries Colonial Policy--Says U.S. Has Not Always Backed
Self-Determination for Dominated Peoples." New York Times, November

24, 1958, p. 7:3.

 

44This was a sensitive issue and Kennedy received substantial

mail because of his position. In response to questions, he prepared

a statement which suggested that a clear distinction should be drawn
between the defense of Formosa and the defense of the off-shore islands.
New York Times, October 1, 1958, p. 1:6. A few days later, commenting
on the Formosa Crisis of 1958, Kennedy charged that Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek should not be allowed to decide America's foreign
policy. In an apparent reference to Chiang, Kennedy stated further
that the United States should not try to maintain world leadership
"simply through paper alliances with reactionary, unpopular govern-
ments." Boston Herald, October 9, 1958, p. 14.

CHAPTER VII

THE CAMPAIGN YEARS, 1959-1960

During the 1959 legislative session, Kennedy pursued many
familiar themes. He continued to speak out in favor of his two defeated
proposals, on India and Poland, and finally, they both won acceptance
in the Senate.1 Kennedy and Cooper offered a compromise resolution
on India which was broader in sc0pe and provided for economic aid
to other Asian nations as well as India. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee approved the resolution in July and the Senate passed the
measure on September 10, 1959.2 With respect to American aid to Poland,
Republican Senator George Aiken of Vermont joined Kennedy and co-
sponsored a re-introduction of his amendment to the Battle Act (5.1697,
April, 15, 1959) and in September, 1959, the Senate passed the bill.3
Unfortunately, opposition in the House of Representatives prevented
final action in this bill.

Kennedy also continued to warn Americans of the "spectacular"
Russian gains and American "gaps" in missiles, economic growth, education,
and science and research. In a speech delivered before the Wisconsin
State Democratic Convention, he accused the Eisenhower Administration
of allowing the United States to slip behind the Soviet Union and
characterized the Eisenhower years, in words borrowed from Sir Winston
Churchill, as "the years the locusts have eaten."4

In addition to the "threatening" missile gap, Kennedy perceived

214

215

another equally disturbing problem for American policy-makers--the
increasing "economic gaps" between the wealthy, industrial nations of
the West and the poverty-ridden nations of the underdeveloped world.
In a major Senate speech in February, 1959, he called for a revitalized
and sustained American policy to meet the economic problems of the
underdeveloped areas of the world.5 He criticized the Eisenhower
Administration for not doing enough and for expending money only on

a crisis basis, without any follow-through programs. The Russians,

he said, were exploiting the gap between the have and the have-not
nations with their stepped-up "aid and trade penetration" of the
underdeveloped world. The United States had failed to give the poorer
nations hope, he warned, and they were being attracted to Russia and
China.

In the course of his speech, Kennedy referred to the crucial
economic contest between India and China for the leadership of the
Asian people. He also spoke of the need for a better balance between
America's military and economic assistance programs and the need for
expanded technical assistance programs.6 However, he declared, the
"heart of any solution" was a substantial long-term program of
productive loans to the underdeveloped nations. He urged that the
Development Loan Fund, established by Congress in 1957, be given the
funds and long-range authority to meet the needs of the underdeveloped
areas.

Later in the year, in a speech to the Conference of the American
Society of African Culture in New York, he returned to the same theme.7
At the time, he was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations

Subcommittee on African Affairs. The Development Loan Fund and the

216

technical assistance programs must be used to build a strong,
independent Africa, he said, but not because that continent was a
pawn in the Cold War. He insisted that the primary object of America's
policy should be to make Africa strong and he observed that the people
of Africa "were more interested in achieving a decent standard of
living than in following the Standards of East or West." The EurOpean
nations who "for centuries extracted the wealth of that continent,"
he declared, also bore a responsibility to help. Kennedy returned
to the anti-colonialism theme by emphasizing the importance for the
United States to support the African nations' quest for independence
even if, he said, "it brings us into disagreement with countries of
Western Europe who have been our traditional allies."8

During 1959, nuclear tests, the defense of Berlin, disarmament,
Quemoy and Matsu, Fidel Castro's emergence, and Premier Khrushchev's
visit to the United States, were topics of public discussion. Kennedy
favored an extended suspension of nuclear tests;9 he agreed with
President Eisenhower that it was vital to retain American rights of
access to Berlin;10 he hoped for meaningful disarmament negotiations
but cautioned Americans not to "neglect" its armaments in the meantime;11
he indicated that he considered the off-shore islands of Quemoy and
Matsu as militarily indefensible and not essential to the defense of
Formosa;12 although he quickly became anti-Castro, he originally
praised Castro as "part of the legacy" of the great ”Liberator", Simon
Bolivar;13 and he warned Americans that Khrushchev was "shrewd", "tough",
"well-informed", and "confident" even though he viewed his visit as
a hopeful sign for a relaxing of tensions.14

At the close of The Strategy of Peace there is an interesting

 

217

discussion of future American foreign policy between Kennedy and John
Fischer, editor-in-chief of Harper's magazine. The discussion took
place in New York City on December 9, 1959, and according to the
publishers, Kennedy's answers were given extemporaneously.15 Kennedy
displayed a broad grasp of the issues, and even his most bitter critics
would have to admit that his remarks were intelligent and knowledgeable.

In the course of the discussion, Kennedy noted that events had
dictated an expansion of Presidential control over foreign policy and
a lessening of the power of Congress. But he was not alarmed; he con-
sidered this to be a natural development. Did he believe Senator Van-
denberg's old concept of bipartisanship in foreign policy was still
practicable? Kennedy thought not. Realistically, only the "appearance"
of bipartisanship could exist, he said. He could recall only one
example during the 1950's when the Democratic opposition had a signi-
ficant influence on a major foreign policy decision and that was in
the Indochina crisis of 1954 when the leaders of Congress influenced
Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford to reconsider their plan for
intervention at the time of Dienbienphu.

Kennedy outlined his views on specific questions of policy. He
said that chances were "dim" for any permanent solution to the problem
of Berlin; that the United States must be willing to go to war over
the defense of Berlin; that conventional forces in NATO were inadequate;
that he opposed a mutual Russian and American disengagement from
Central Europe because Russian troops would still be in close proximity;
that although America's commitment to Israel must be maintained, steps
should be taken to solve the economic problems of the Arab nations;

that a strong, independent Arab world was in the long-range interest

218

of the United States and would provide stability to the Middle East;
that the nations of the underdeveloped world must be allowed to

pursue neutralist foreign policies; that the United States must commit
vastly increased economic aid to the underdeveloped nations in Latin
America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, especially to India, so that
she would be successful in her competition with Communist China.

Throughout 1959, Kennedy had been asked repeatedly about his
political aspirations and intentions. And to the surprise of no one, he
formally announced at a news conference in the Senate Caucas Room the day
after New Year's, 1960, that he was a candidate for the Democratic nomin-
ation for President. He challenged others seeking the nomination to
enter the presidential primaries. Thereafter, he was little seen in the
Senate. He missed most of the roll-call votes during the session and
according to Mr. Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Kennedy attended only three out of ninety-six Committee
sessions during 1960.16 He was busy campaigning.

Yet, in February, 1960, he delivered a dramatic Senate Speech on
the theme of the "missile gap", which stimulated a lengthy discussion.17
In his opening statement he quoted Sir Winston Churchill's famous
remark: "We arm--to parley." He was concerned, he said, about both
defense and arms control. Accordingly, he devoted this speech to
a call for much larger defense spending in both the missile program
and conventional forces. The purpose, however, was not to prepare
for war but to enable the United States to bargain effectively for
disarmament from a position of strength. As he indicated he would,
he spoke a week later, at the University of New Hampshire, on the need

. . . . . 18
for the United States to make "p051t1ve preparations" for disarmament.

219

In the discussion following this initial Senate speech on defense,
Senator Goldwater agreed with Kennedy's sense of urgency about America's
military posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union's position. But Goldwater
contended that the American people were too willing to compromise to
avoid war; what was needed was a national resolve "to win the Cold War".
He asked if Kennedy agreed. Kennedy deftly responded that while he
was unclear about the Senator's precise meaning of "win the Cold War",
he did not believe the United States should attempt to impose its will
on Russia or China at the risk of war; he preferred a policy of co-
existence.

In early 1960, the Cold War appeared to be thawing. Following
Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September, 1959, there
had been some lessening of tensions in American-Russian relations and
plans were made for a summit conference involving Eisenhower,
Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan of Britain and de Gaulle of
France. These chiefs of state of the major powers were to meet in
Paris in mid-May to discuss the arms race and the vexatious problem
of Berlin. But in early May, in the wake of the downing of America's
U-2 reconnaissance plane well within Soviet territory, the conference
collapsed. The Eisenhower Administration's handling of the U-2
affair was clumsy and America's national image was tarnished. Kennedy
impulsively remarked that Eisenhower should have "expressed regrets"
to Khrushchev for the incident. He was, of course, immediately
attacked for making such a suggestion, and being aware of the damaging
'position he had placed himself in, he quickly modified and toned down

his subsequent remarks on the issue.

220

On June 14, 1960, in the wake of the U-2 incident and the collapse
of the highly-publicized summit conference, Kennedy rose in the Senate
and outlined a twelve-point foreign policy which he believed the United
States should pursue.20 His suggestions were familiar. First, the
United States must strengthen its nuclear striking power. Second,
in order to fight limited wars, the conventional forces must also be
strengthened. .Third, NATO must be rebuilt into a "viable" and

"consolidated" military force. Fourth, the United States, Western

M

.g-

Europe and Japan must greatly increase the flow of capital to the
underdeveIOped world to frustrate Communist hOpes. Fifth, America

must improve its relations with Latin America through increased economic
aid programs and expanded cultural exchanges. Sixth, the Arab nations
of the Middle East must be helped with their economic problems.
Seventh, the United States must encourage and assist the newly emerging
post-colonial nations in Africa. Eighth, while searching for a
solution to the problem of Berlin, America must show "no uncertainty

in its determination to defend the city. Ninth, a more flexible policy
was needed in dealing with the nations of Eastern EurOpe, the Soviet
Union's most "vulnerable" area. Tenth, America must "reassess" its
China policy and be willing to increase its contacts with Communist
China, especially in nuclear test ban talks, even though official
recognition and United Nations membership must still be opposed.
Eleventh, workable programs must be found for a nuclear test ban

and arms control. Twelfth, and finally, America's economy, educational
system, and research programs must be expanded and improved. As
Senator Capehart remarked in the discussion following the speech,

Kennedy's proposals "covered the entire waterfront."21

221

As a result of his jet-propelled political bandwagon, Kennedy was
nominated on the first ballot at the Democratic National Convention
in Los Angeles, which convened in July. The Republican convention met
in Chicago that year and Richard Nixon was also chosen on the first
ballot with Kennedy's old opponent, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., being
selected as his running mate. Throughout the campaign, Kennedy
effectively forced Nixon and the Republicans on the defensive; he
contended that America's prestige abroad had declined, and that the
Soviet Union had forged ahead in both missile development and economic
growth. He proclaimed over and over again: "It is time to get this
country moving again." Nixon, of course, denied the validity of
Kennedy's charges; America's prestige had not sagged and there was no
”missile gap". The highlight of the campaign was a series of four
joint television debates on September 26 and October 7, l3, and 21.22

In the course of the debates, Kennedy reiterated all of his
old foreign policy concerns and proposals on Eastern Europe, India,
foreign aid, the "missile gap", and disarmament. But on two specific
foreign policy issues which arose in the last three debates, Nixon
managed to seize the initiative. He accused Kennedy of appeasement
and retreat when Kennedy indicated that he Would yield the offshore
islands of Quemoy and Matsu because they were militarily indefensible
and not essential to the defense of Formosa.2:5 Kennedy believed the
line of defense should be restricted to Formosa and the Pescadores.
However, under heavy attack, he adjusted his stand and adapted the
official Eisenhower Administration position which called for a defense
of the two islands if the primary thrust of a Communist Chinese attack

was actually aimed at Formosa. As the campaign progressed, and as

222

Kennedy consistently moved closer to Nixon's position, the issue faded
from prominence.

The other conspicious foreign policy issue involved in the debates
related to Cuba. And there was a bizarre twist. Kennedy charged that
Castro's victory in Cuba was a striking example of Republican ineptitude
and he openly advocated American support for the "non-Batista democratic
anti-Castro forces" who were seeking to overthrow Castro. This was a
common theme for Kennedy; his basic solution for revolutionary instability
in the Third World was to seek out and support the non-Communist, non-
fascist, liberal, democratic nationalists. Such leaders, however, were
not in vast supply. At the time, the CIA was secretly training an exile
invasion force and Nixon, who was aware of the top-secret invasion plans,
was unable to discuss the preparations. But in the debate he indignant-
ly condemned Kennedy's recommendations for intervention as being "danger—

ously irresponsible. ."24

Nixon subsequently asserted that Kennedy
had been briefed on the CIA operation all the while and that he had
taken unfair advantage of Nixon's position.25 At any rate, outside of
these two particular issues, the candidates did not differ significantly
on other foreign policy matters.

Interestingly, during the campaign, Kennedy found time to read

and review H. Liddell Hart's Deterrent or Defense, A Fresh Look at

The West's Militarnyosition.26 It is possible, of course, that a

 

staff member wrote the review, but the words sound like Kennedy's and
certainly the themes are familiar. He agreed completely with Hart's
attack on the concept of massive retaliation and the author's emphasis
on the need to expand conventional forces to deal with limited warfare.

The review also further illustrated Kennedy's firm belief in the

223

importance of military strength as a bargaining point in disarmament
negotiations.

There is one recurring question concerning Kennedy's adOption of
issues in the presidential campaign of 1960. He very effectively used
the "missile gap" as a potent vote-getting device but his talk of the
"gap" disappeared almost as soon as he became President. And subsequent
evidence has made it clear that there was no "missile gap". It is still
debatable in 1971, whether Kennedy's use of the issue was the result of
honest misinformation, or outright distortion and Opportunism, or a
combination of both. All that can be said at present is that the
belief in the existence of a missile gap was widespread during 1958-
1960. Whether Kennedy actually believed in the existence of a gap
is unknown, but he definitely capitalized on it as an issue.

There were no real fresh departures for Kennedy during the campaign
years 1959-1960; he continued to stress all the old themes. The only
theme that was conspicious in its absence was that of anti—colonialism.
But since Kennedy had soon to deal personally with the leaders of the
nations of Western Europe it is not surprising that he avoided comment
on that issue.

Since the candidates were not in disagreement on the basic
direction of American foreign policy, Kennedy's razor-thin election
victory cannot be interpreted as a mandate from the voters for or
against any specific change in policy. But Kennedy was now the
President-elect and he would soon be in a position to create and

implement policy along the lines that he had so long advocated.

FOOTNOTES

1For a series of Kennedy speeches during 1959 on the importance of
U. S. economic aid to India see: "The Basis of U. S. Interest in India--
Its New dimensions," delivered to the Conference on India and the United
States, May 4, 1959. Kennednyibrary, Sorensen Speech Files, 1953-1960,
Box 11. The speech can also be found in the U. S. Congressional Record,
86th Congress, lst Session, 1959, CV, Part 7, p. 8721. Accounts of
similar speeches on India can be found in the New York Times, May 3,
1959, pp. 54:4, and The Strategy of Peace, pp. 177-179. For his
remarks on Poland see U. S. Congressional Record, 86th Congress, lst
Session, 1959, CV, Part 5, pp. 5901-2, and Ibid., Part 15, p. 18933.

 

 

 

2New York Times, July 24, 1959, p. 6:8.

 

3Ibid., September 11, 1959, p. 17:7.

4The Strategy of Peace, pp. 235-241.

 

5U. S. Congressiopal Record, 86th Congress, lst Session, 1959,
CV, Part 2, pp. 2737 2740. The speech can also be found in The Strategy_
of Peace, pp. 73-82.

 

6Eric Sevareid, in a CBS radio news analysis on May 13, 1959,
emphasized many of these same points and Kennedy inserted his analysis
into the U. S. Coggressional Record, 86th Congress, lst Session, 1959,
CV, Appendix, June 4, 1959, pp. A4750-A4751.

 

7Kennedy Libragy, Press Releases File, 1953-1961, Box 626, and
The Strategy of Peace, pp. 158-165. In October, 1959, Kennedy
delivered a similar speech on Africa at Wesleyan University, Lincoln
Nebraska. See The Strategy of Peace, pp. 165-167.

 

 

 

8Interestingly, as Victor Lasky pointed out, this quotation, which
appeared in the New York Times account of the speech, was excised
from the text of the speech as it was published in The Strategy of
Peace. See Victor Lasky, John F. Kennedy, What's Behind The Imagg?
p. 223. Undoubtedly, as a Presidential aspirant in 1960, Kennedy did
not wish to provoke an unnecessary controversy such as this quotation
might generate.

224

225

9New York Times, November 3, 1959, p. 3:1,2.

 

10Face The Nation transcript, February 22, 1959.

 

11The Strategy of Peace, pp. 51-66.

 

12Ibid., pp. 134-138.

13Ibid., pp. 167-169. During the campaign of 1960, of course, the
Republicans attacked his characterization of Castro as being in the
revolutionary tradition of Bolivar. Unlike the bulk of The Strategy
of Peace, Kennedy's remarks on Castro were not a part of a speech.-—
Theodore Sorensen recalled that Kennedy "regretted the implication," and
"was angry that he had not caught it," but "nevertheless he refused to
disown either the words or the junior staff member who had written
them from a wholly different perspective." See Sorensen, Kennedy,
pp. 231-232.

 

14The Strategy of Peace, pp. 33-39.

 

15Ibid., pp. 245-269. James MacGregor Burns had a similar, although
shorter discussion with Kennedy in 1959, which appears at the close
of his biography. See Burns, John Kennedy, pp. 268-276.

 

16U. 8. National Archives, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Records,

John F. Kennedy Folder, Sen. 86 A-F8. Marcy advised Kennedy of his
attendance record in a memo dated October 28, 1960.

17U. S. Congressional Record. 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960,

CVI, Part 3, pp. 3801-3808.

 

181bid., pp. 4707-4709.

1911310., p. 3806.

20U. 8. Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960,

CVI, Part 10, pp. 12523-12429, June 14, 1960. The Speech minus the
ensuing debate, was published in The Strategy of Peace, pp. v-XV.

 

 

21Ibid., p. 12528. Two days later, on June 16, 1960, Senator

Dirksen attacked Kennedy's speech for downgrading America's strength and

for blithely promising "more of everything, for everybody, everywhere."
Ibid., pp. 12847-12848.

226

22A complete transcript of the four debates can be found in
the following government report: Freedom of Communications: Report
of a Subcommitee of the Committee on Interstate and Forpigp Commerce,
United States Senate, 87th Congress, lst Session, Washington: G.P.O.,
1961. Part III, The Joint Appearances of Senator John F. Kennedy
and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon and Other Campaign Presentations.
September 26 debate, pp. 73-92; October 7, pp. 146-165; October 13,
pp. 204-222; October 21, pp. 260-278.

2312i£:, See pp. 162-164; 204-207; 208-210; 224; 260-263.

24Ibid., p. 265.

25See Richard Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962),
p. 354. Former CIA director Allen W. Dulles denied that Kennedy had
been briefed. See New York Times, March 21, 1962.

 

 

26John F. Kennedy, "Book in the News," ReView of H. Liddell
Hart's Deterrent or Defense, Saturday Review, September 3, 1960,
pp. 17-18. The editor noted that both Kennedy and Nixon had been
invited to review the book but Nixon explained that his "present
schedule prevented him from accepting the invitation."

 

CHAPTER VIII

EPILOGUE

As previously mentioned, Kennedy's tenure in Congress has been
called the "years of emergence" for the ideals and policies he pursued
as President. Certainly, the origins of the ideas behind many of his
major Presidential programs are discernible during this period. As
far back as 1951, for example, he told an audience that "young college
graduates would find a full life in bringing technical advice and
assistance to the underprivileged and backward Middle East."1 In an
expanded fashion, this was the general idea behind the Peace Corps.

As he had in Congress, he continued to emphasize the importance of

the underdeveloped nations in the world balance of power. In a special
message to Congress on May 25, 1961, he warned: "The great battle-
ground for the defense and eXpansion of freedom today is. . .Asia,
Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, the lands of the rising
peoples."2 Of the three recurring themes of his Congressional years,
military preparedness, foreign assistance, and anti-colonialism, the
first two remained dominant in his pronouncements and policies as
President. Inevitably, however, on the third theme, anti-colonialism,
his policies as President reflected the vast chasm between the rhetoric
of anti-colonialism and the harsh dictates of international politics.

Kennedy remained strongly defense-minded as President. As a

Congressman, he had gained substantial mileage out of Winston Churchill's

227

228

"locust years" comment. He first characterized the years 1946-1950,
under the Truman Administration, as the "locust years"3 and he later
directed the charge against the Eisenhower Administration.4 Kennedy
was always more flexible in his proposals to combat and restrict
Communism than was the Eisenhower Administration but his proposals
were also frequently more aggressive and dangerous. While Eisenhower
was alerting America to the dangers of the "military-industrial complex,"
as he left office, Kennedy was ordering a spectacular increase in the
defense establishment, in the missile development program, in
conventional forces, and in the strengthening of America's counterinsur-
gency forces. All of this was a natural development of his expressed
views during the 1950's. He had long warned of the challenge of
guerrilla insurgency and his concern with the problem began in 1951
with his trip to Indochina. On many occasions during the 1950's
he pointed to the weaknesses of Dulles' strategy of massive retaliation
in an era of guerrilla wars. The main point of his program of increased
military strength was the strategy of flexible military response, an
idea advocated by General Maxwell Taylor, among others. Accordingly,
it was logical that Kennedy as President should select General Taylor
to serve as his military advisor.

In many ways, the "Alliance for Progress" most perfectly embodied
Kennedy's "pragmatic idealism". Although as a young Congressman
Kennedy originally labelled grants of economic aid "debilitating and
wasteful," he came to believe strongly that foreign aid pppld_be an
effective means by which to combat Communism and revolutionary instabili-

ty. The large-scale economic aid program, "Alliance for Progress,"

229

for the countries of Latin America was also a natural culmination of the
concerns he expressed while in Congress. The Alliance, which was designed
to stabilize Latin America and prevent Castro-type revolutions, provided
vastly increased economic aid to Latin America and in return the Latin
American governments were to make the necessary social-economic reforms.
Kennedy always believed that the United States could help the
underdeveIOped nations advance their social-economic revolutions. In
this regard, he said on more than one occasion: "Those who make
peaceful revolutions impossible, make violent revolutions inevitable."
However, despite his faith in foreign aid, he was always aware that
American aid programs could be counter-productive and actually foment
revolution by artificially propping up unpopular dictatorships. For
this reason, he preferred technical assistance and long-term develop-
ment programs which would reach the people.

Very early in his career, Kennedy became identified with the up-
heaval in Indochina. The original purpose behind American involvement
there was to contain Communism, but yet, with tragic irony, the thrust
of American policy had the effect of strengthening the appeal of the
Communists. Kennedy's ideas on Indochina as President were shaped
during the 1950's when he became one of the more enlightened leaders
with insight into the problems in Indochina. He recognized that it
was nationalism, not Communism, that was the driving force in Indochina
and he Opposed French colonialism and urged the French to grant "genuine"
independence to the Vietnamese in order to rally the people against
Ho Chi Minh and the Communists. He consistently sought an elusive,

and perhaps illusory third alternative between colonial rule in

230

Indochina on the one hand, and Vietnamese independence under Ho Chi
Minh on the other. For this reason he placed great hope in Ngo Dinh
Diem's ability to solve the problems of South Vietnam and serve as a
bulwark to Communism. As a Congressman, Kennedy opposed Western colonial-
ism almost as much as he did Communism; indeed, he considered the former
an invitation to the latter. He perceived France's colonial errors.
Yet, as President, he pursued a policy in Indochina that repeated their
tragic mistakes and, which ultimately had even more catastrophic
consequences.

There have been few American Presidents better prepared to conduct
foreign policy than John F. Kennedy. He had travelled extensively, was
well-informed, flexible and inventive. He was both idealistic and a
tough-minded realist. He shared the liberal belief that revolutionary
instability in the underdeveloped world was primarily attributable
to poverty and he believed the United States could effectively attack
these causes, thereby thwarting the spread of Communism. As a Senator,
he always sought liberal, democratic, nationalist, anti-Communist
leaders to support in the underdeveloped world and he criticized the
Eisenhower Administration for failing to oppose Western colonialism
and for failing to develop policies in support of constructive reform
programs in these areas. But as one author observed, Kennedy was
too inclined to believe that it was Eisenhower and not America's
position itself which frequently forced the United States to assume
a counter-revolutionary posture throughout the underdeveloped world.5

He was to learn.

FOOTNOTES

1For an account of the speech see the Lowell Sun, December 9, 1951.

 

2U. S. Government Printing Office, Public ngers of the Presidents,

J. F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington: 1962), p. 397:

 

3See U. 8. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1952,

XCVIII, Part 3, 3871-3872.

4See Strategy of Peace, pp. 235-241.

 

5James Tracy Crown, The Kennedy Literature, pp. 59-60. Crown
noted that The Stratggy of Peace, which advanced Kennedy's belief that
the United States could help the underdeveloped nations speed their
social-economic revolutions, ultimately "proved embarrassing" to
Kennedy once he entered the White House. According to Crown, Kennedy's
"relatively small reservoir of irritation was spent liberally on those
who pointedly asked whatever became of those specific hopes." Ibid.,
p. 60.

231

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

This study is based chiefly on primary sources. These materials
fall into four separate categories: United States Government Publica-

tions, materials at the John F. Kennedy Library in Waltham,!flassachusetts,

 

newspaper coverage of Kennedy's speeches and remarks, and books and

articles written by John F. Kennedy.

Government Publications

 

Of government publications, of course, the most important and

essential was the Copgressional Record, for the years 1947-1960. In

 

1964 the United States government published a collection of Kennedy's

Congressional speeches entitled: John Fitzgerald Kennedy: A Compendium

 

of Speeches, Statements and Remarks Delivered During_His Service in the

Congress of the United States. 88 Congress, 2nd Session, Senate

 

Document No. 79. Washington: G.P.O., 1964. This is a very useful com-
pilation of Kennedy's speeches made while he was in Congress but it is

not an entirely complete record. Statements he made while engaged in
debate, as opposed to the delivery of a prepared speech, for instance, are
not included, nor are his votes, or many of the articles he read into the
Congressional Record, which offered a further guide to his thinking on
foreign policy. Consequently, in order to examine the complete record of
Kennedy's statements and thought on foreign policy matters, the Congres-

sional Record must be relied upon, but the Compendium is a useful guide.

232

233

The Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the
years 1957-1960, when Kennedy was a member, provided a further indication
of his thought and involvement but due to his substantial absenteeism
the Hearings were of marginal value for this study.

The official record of Senate Foreign Relations Committee correspondence
which is housed in the National Archives, contains some correspondence
between Kennedy and the chairman, J. William Fulbright, but the file on
Kennedy is slight and the exchanges between him and Fulbright of little
value.

For the presidential campaign of 1960 there exists a unique six-part
government report which provides a complete and exhaustive record of the
Speeches, statements, remarks, and press conferences of both candidates,

Kennedy and Nixon. The report is entitled: Freedom of Communications:

 

Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreingommerce,
United States Senate, 87th Congress, lst Session. Washington: G.P.O., 1961.

The two parts most useful for the study were: Part 1, The Speeches,

 

Remarks, Press Conferences, and Statements of Senator John F. Kennedy,

Apgust 1 through November 7,,1960; and Part III, The Joint Appearances

 

of Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice-President Richardlw. Nixon and Other

 

CampaigpyPresentations.

John F. Kennedy Library

 

Of the materials at the Kennedy Library, the Speeches and Statements

 

File, 1946-1960 was by far the most useful. This file of some 50 boxes

 

contains drafts, reading copies, and transcripts of Congressman and
Senator Kennedy's speeches. The file is much more complete for the
Senate years, 1953-1960, than for the House of Representatives years.

This is due in part to the systematic organization of the files by

.234

Theodore Sorensen when he became a staff member in 1953.

The Press Release File, 1947-1960, 42 boxes, was also of value

 

as were the twenty overflowing scrapbooks of news clippings that

were maintained by Kennedy's office staff during his career. The
news clippings on matters pertaining to foreign policy speeches were
e5pecially helpful for the early years, 1946-1953, when the record of

his speeches in the Speeches and Statements File was less complete.

 

The oral history program of the Kennedy Library_is one of the

 

largest in the nation. To date, almost 900 people have been interviewed,
ranging from heads of state to the White House gardener. A few hundred
of these oral history transcripts are currently available and open for
research. However, since the emphasis of these interviews is on the
presidential years, these transcripts were of limited value for this

study.

Newspapers

 

As a further means of tracing the development of Kennedy's
involvement in foreign policy issues, every article by or about
him relating to foreign policy during the years 1946-1960, contained in

the New York Times and the Boston Globe, was consulted, This task was

 

 

made less laborious by using the New York Times Index and a guide kindly

 

provided by Edward W. Quill, librarian for the Boston Globe. Both of

 

these newspapers were very helpful as a further source. There were
many occasions, for instance, when a Kennedy speech delivered outside

of Congress was not inserted into the Congressional Record or found in

 

the speeches file at the Kennednyibrary but was recorded in one or

 

both of these newspapers.

Research was limited to these two newspapers for coverage primarily

235

for reasons of time. Coverage of Kennedy's speeches, and editorial
analyses, from other newspapers were consulted only when they appeared

in the Congressional Record or, as previously mentioned, as they appeared

 

in the News Clippings File at the Kennedy Library. The clippings in

 

 

the File for the early years, of course, were drawn almost exclusively
from local Massachusetts newspapers.
Two other valuable primary sources which fall into this general

category were the transcripts of NBC's Meet The Press and CBS's Face The

 

Nation. Kennedy was a frequent guest on both of these programs and the
discussions often touched on foreign policy issues. Transcripts of

Meet The Press, prior to 1960, are unpublished but they were donated

 

to the Library of Congress by the Meet The Press staff and are available.

 

Face The Nation transcripts are likewise unpublished but the producers

 

of the program courteously provided them to this writer on request.

Kennedy Publications

 

Of the several Kennedy writings in book form there are two that
are indispensable for assessing the development of his thought on foreign

policy. They are Why England Slept (New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1940),

 

the published version of his senior honors thesis at Harvard, and The

Strategy of Peace, edited by Allan Nevins, (New York: Harper and Brothers,

 

1960), which is a selective collection of Kennedy speeches on foreign
policy during the 1950's. The volume concludes with an absorbing informal
discussion of future American foreign policy between Kennedy and John
Fischer, Editor-in-Chief of Harper's Magazine. This discussion took
place on December 9, 1959, in New York City and Kennedy's answers were

given extemporaneously.

236

Articles

The following is the complete chronological list of articles,
published speeches, and book reviews, written by Kennedy on various
foreign policy issues, that were used in this study:

"War in Indo China," Vital Speeches, May 1, 1954, pp. 418-24.

 

"What Should The U.S. Do in Indo-China?" Foreign Policy Bulletin,
May 15, 1954, pp. 4-6.

 

"Foreign Policy is the People's Business," New York Times Magazine,
August 8, 1954, pp. 5 ff.

 

"America's Stake in Vietnam," Vital Speeches, August 1, 1956, pp. 617-19.

 

"Comity and Common Sense in the Middle East," Vital Speeches, April 1,
1957, pp. 359-61.

 

"Should U.S. Give Aid to Communist Countries?" text of Kennedy letter
to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Foreigp Policy Bulletin,
April 15, 1957, p. 117-18.

 

"A Democrat Looks At Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1,
October, 1957, pp. 44-59. Also in Jacobson, Harold K., ed. America's
ForeigpPolicy (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 349-64.

 

"Algerian Crisis: A New Phase?" America, October 5, 1957, pp. 15-17.

"If India Fails," Prpgressive, January, 1958, pp. 8-11.

 

"General Gavin Sounds the Alarm," Reporter, October 30, 1958, pp. 35-36.

"Book in the News: Review of B. H. Liddell Hart's Deterrent or Defense,
Saturday Review, September 3, 1960, pp. 17-18.

 

 

"The Crisis in Foreign Affairs," American Federationist, November, 1960,
p. 7-11.

 

Other

 

There are a few other Kennedy writings, which were useful for this
study, that do not fall neatly into the above categories. In March, 1942,
Kennedy wrote a lengthy letter to Blair Moody, then a Washington news
correspondent, in which he challenged certain interpretations concerning the

causes of World War II. The letter was subsequently published by American

237
Heritage, October, 1965, under the title "A Dreamer Wide Awake." The

original letter is in the Michigan Historical Collections of the University

of Michigan. In addition to Why England Slept, the letter to Moody provides

 

one of the few available indications of his ideas on foreign policy prior to
his entering Congress.
Of a similar nature are Kennedy's by-line articles for William

Randolph Hearst's New York Journal American (and other Hearst newspapers)

 

which he wrote in 1945 when he covered the San Francisco Conference in
April and May, and the British elections in June and July.

In the Manuscript Collections at Yale University and Boston
University there are small collections of Kennedy materials but they

contained little of value for this study.

Secondary Sources

 

Hundreds of books have been written on the life and career of Kennedy
but only a few shed light on his involvement in foreign policy during his
years in Congress. By far the most authoritative single book on Kennedy's
career during the pre-presidential years is James MacGregor Burns'

John Kennedy: A Political Profile (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,

 

Inc., 1960), a solid, well-balanced and highly readable biography. The
book's value is enhanced by the lengthy chapter-by-chapter source notes

and by the informal discussion between the author and Kennedy on matters

of policy at the conclusion of the book. Burns had unrestricted access to
Kennedy's personal and official files and the book was a semi-official
campaign biography but he maintained his independence of judgment and found
points to criticize in Kennedy's record while remaining generally impressed
by Kennedy's intellectual depth and abilities. His one reservation concerned

the depth of Kennedy's moral leadership. All students of the life and

238
thought of Kennedy must rely heavily on this scholarly study.

Victor Lasky's JFK: The Man and the Myth (New York: The Macmillan

 

Company, 1963), offers a harsh attack on Kennedy's record from all
available angles. Lasky is a right-wing journalist and his book developed

out of his shorter John F. Kennedy, What's Behind the Image. . .?

 

(Washington, D.C.: Free World Press, Inc., 1960), which he wrote in the
heat of the 1960 campaign as a rebuttal to a pro-Kennedy study by Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr. Lasky's book is Openly biased but it serves as a use-
ful counter-balance to the many equally uncritical pro—Kennedy studies.
Lasky submits many provocative interpretations, some of which deserve
serious research, and his book, too, provides extensive source notes.
There were two additional sources that were of value for this study.

Joan Meyers, (ed.), John Fitzgerald Kennedy. . .As We Remember Him (New

 

York: A Columbia Records Legacy Collection Book, Atheneum, 1965) is a
unique, highly informative volume which includes some Kennedy letters,
excerpts from speeches, interviews with those close to him, documents, and
many pictures. James MacGregor Burns, who wrote the concluding essay,
quite properly called it "the most evocative portrait of Kennedy that

we have." Unfortunately, the volume is now out of print.

James Tracy Crown's The Kennedy Literature: A Bibliographical Esspy_

 

on John F. Kennedy (New York: New York University Press, 1968), offers

 

an excellent annotated bibliography of selected books and articles by

and about Kennedy arranged chronologically within topical categories.

In addition to being an invaluable reference guide, Crown's extended intro—
ductory essay, which comprises one-third of the book, is knowledgeable,
interpretive, well-balanced and insightful. The volume is useful to

both the general reader and the researcher.