AMERICA MUST NOT SLEEP:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JOHN F. KENNEDY'S FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES, 1946-1960

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By

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INTRODUCTION

Very appropriately, Senator Mike Mansfield and the late Senator Everett M. Dirksen called John F. Kennedy's tenure in Congress the "years of emergence" for the ideals and policies he pursued as President. But since some of Kennedy's most deeply-rooted beliefs on foreign policy were formed before he entered Congress, during and even before the war years, the introductory chapter is devoted to this formative period. Kennedy came of age, both emotionally and intellectually, amid the upheaval of World War II and that experience left a lasting imprint on his outlook.

His interest in international relations was first publicly exhibited in 1940, shortly after the fall of France, when his senior thesis at Harvard, "Appeasement at Munich," was published as Why England Slept. Here Kennedy explained the various reasons for Britain's lack of military preparedness in the face of German rearmament which, he believed, made Neville Chamberlain's "surrender" at Munich inevitable. As a warning to America, he wrote in the introduction: "In studying the reasons why England slept, let us profit by them and save ourselves her anguish." This was a message he continued to urge throughout his years in Congress. The importance of armaments to the conduct of foreign policy registered deeply on Kennedy; he remained steadfastly convinced that military power was the essential ingredient of successful negotiation.

The story of Kennedy's meteoric rise to political prominence has been told well in James MacGregor Burns' John F. Kennedy, A Political Profile. Only the highlights need be mentioned here to serve as a frame of reference. He entered the House of Representatives in 1947 at the age of twenty-nine and served there for six years. In 1952 he scored an upset victory over Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., for the Senate, the only Massachusetts Democrat to withstand the Eisenhower tide. At the Democratic National Convention in 1956, he was narrowly edged out by Senator Estes Kefauver for the vice-presidential nomination. In 1958 he was re-elected to a second Senate term by a record-smashing margin, the largest in Massachusetts history, thus setting the stage for his drive for the presidential nomination in 1960.

Kennedy once remarked to an aide that his central interest in public life was the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. This is vividly borne out by his enthusiastic and informed participation in the give and take of debate on the major foreign policy issues of the day. He prized his appointment to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the beginning of the legislative session in 1957.

As one reads through Kennedy's speeches on foreign policy during the years 1947-1960, three predominant unifying themes are apparent. The first was his constant emphasis on military preparedness in conventional weapons as well as nuclear striking-power. Kennedy disagreed with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on many issues during the 1950's but his major criticism centered on the so-called New Look defense policy and Dulles' concept of massive retaliation. He believed that total reliance upon such a retaliatory policy, coupled with the scaling down of conventional forces, was both ineffective and

dangerous in an era of brush-fire wars. And he suggested further that this policy actually encouraged guerrilla-type aggression. Kennedy was always the advocate of a flexible military capability, which required a larger military establishment and a larger defense budget.

The second theme was anti-colonialism. Kennedy spoke often of the "challenge of imperialism", which he called the single most important test of American foreign policy. He urged the United States to oppose both Soviet and Western imperialism, and by so doing win the support of the emerging nations of Africa and Asia. As a young Congressman, he became aware that the growing importance of the newly emerging nations demanded changes in America's foreign policy. He recognized very early the force of nationalism in the nations of the Third World and beginning in 1951, after he returned from a study trip to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, he repeatedly urged the United States to dissociate itself from Western colonialism. He was not unaware of the dilemma this posed for the United States--caught between the need to support the interests of its major European allies, Britain and France, while at the same time remain sympathetic to the drive for independence in the emerging nations.

Although Kennedy persistently spoke on the need for the United States to adopt a forthright policy of anti-colonialism in support of self-determination, there were two particularly dramatic episodes, and each of these involved an attack on France's colonial policy. Since 1951, Kennedy had warned that France and the United States had underestimated the importance of the independence movement in Indochina and in 1954, at the height of the military struggle there, he advocated independence for the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos

and Cambodia. However, there was always to remain a fundamental contradiction in Kennedy's attitude toward the independence movement in Indochina. In a Senate address three years later he once again criticized French colonial policy when he called for the Eisenhower Administration to support the cause of Algerian independence.

The third theme was closely related. Just as he urged the United States to pursue a policy of anti-colonialism in order to win the support of the emerging nations and thwart Communist advances, so, too, did he place an increasing emphasis on economic and technical assistance programs to the underdeveloped countries. Over the years he became steadily disillusioned with military aid programs which, he believed, tended only to perpetuate military hierarchies which lacked the support of the people. He underscored the importance of economic growth in the new and uncommitted nations, and came to believe that economic and technical assistance from the West was the only effective basis on which the emerging nations of Africa and Asia could be encouraged to resist the lure of Communism.

As many have noted, one of Kennedy's strongest and most idealistic beliefs was that the United States shared a common bond with the emerging nations of the world and could help them advance their social revolutions. This fundamental conviction permeated all of his speeches. Many American politicians and statesmen, of course, have shared this belief, including President Franklin D. Roosevelt. However, as perhaps with others, Kennedy's commitment to the cause of the emerging nations was not motivated strictly by idealism. It is true that in his speeches he expressed a concern for the people who sought independence, and a concern for the principle of self-determination, but his primary

concern was that the West, and the United States in particular, was losing to the Soviet Union the support of those nations struggling for independence. He stated on many occasions his belief that the emerging post-colonial nations would increasingly control the world balance of power. So, he was always the "pragmatic idealist", as he liked to refer to himself--support of the worldwide movement for independence was clearly in America's national interest.

There was, of course, change as well as continuity in Kennedy's outlook during his fourteen years in Congress. He had adopted the unyielding Cold War state of mind earlier than most. As far back as the campaign of 1946 he advocated a "get tough policy" toward Russia and characterized that nation as a "ruthless dictatorship" that was "on the march". And in 1949 he assailed the Truman Administration for having "lost" China even before Senator Joseph McCarthy convulsed the country with his witch-hunt. But gradually he evolved from this stridently hard-line, anti-Communist frame of mind to become more moderate and flexible in his thinking.

Yet, Kennedy always operated from a premise of aggressive anti-Communism. His increased flexibility, which was so apparent during the 1950's, indicated two very different things. On the one hand, it reflected his growth, his greater sophistication and, to a degree, his mellowing of attitude. But his advocacy of flexibility in dealing with the Communist world, in contrast to the rigid outlook of Secretary Dulles and others, was primarily because he simply considered this approach to be a more effective method by which to combat and restrict the advance of Communism.

Although Kennedy was not representative of all post-war American politicians and statesmen, the development of his thinking on foreign policy reflects, in important ways, the changing climate of opinion in the Cold War from 1947 to 1960. During this period, American attitudes, generally, evolved from a rigid, simplistic view of the Communist world and became more enlightened and moderate.

CHAPTER I

THE AMBASSADOR'S SON

The international scene during the final years of the 1930's was increasingly turbulent and ominous. The unsteady structure of international order established at Versailles following World War I was teetering on the verge of collapse. In the Far East, Japan was on the march, determined to strengthen her position on the Asian mainland. Even more foreboding was the growing militancy of Nazi Germany and the general heightening of tensions in Europe.

The response of the two major European democracies, Great Britain and France, to the threat of aggression was not unlike that of the United States. Like many Americans, large numbers of Englishmen and Frenchmen were disillusioned with the unsatisfactory results of World War I. As much as they disliked and feared Japanese, German, and Italian expansion during the 1930's, they disliked the thought of war even more. Pacifism reached new heights. The appeasement policies of the British and French governments, combined with the neutrality laws of the United States, failed completely to meet these bold challenges to the prevailing structure of international order.

In the autumn of 1937, a sick and dying Robert Worth Bingham, the United States Ambassador to the Court of St. James since 1933, returned home from London and submitted his resignation to President Roosevelt. The President, in the closing months of 1937, departed from tradition and appointed a Catholic, Joseph P. Kennedy, to replace Bingham in London.

For Joseph P. Kennedy, his tenure as ambassador, from 1937 to 1940, was doomed to end in personal frustration, humiliation and defeat. He was an outspoken and controversial figure. His close identification with Neville Chamberlain and Britain's policy of appeasement angered Roosevelt and was one of the prime factors that led eventually to his resignation.[1] But the appointment provided his son with a rare opportunity to observe firsthand the impending European crisis.

It was in this setting of international upheaval that the young John F. Kennedy first developed an interest in foreign affairs and began to express his views. Kennedy was an undergraduate at Harvard during most of his father's tenure as ambassador. As a result of privileged opportunities, he had an uncommonly broad exposure to foreign affairs as a young man. Not surprisingly, his opinions during those years were strongly influenced by the views of his father.

As Kennedy began his junior year at Harvard in September, 1938, Britain's policy of appeasement reached its zenith. In an effort to reach an accommodation with Hitler, Britain and France, led by Neville Chamberlain, compelled the Czechoslovaks to yield the Sudetenland to Germany. The underlying reasons for Chamberlain's policy at Munich would later consume Kennedy's interests and become the subject of his senior thesis.

By the time of Munich, relations between Ambassador Kennedy and President Roosevelt were beginning to grow strained. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, no friend of Kennedy, wrote later that the President was irritated by the Ambassador's close association with the Cliveden Set, (the informal Conservative clique that was supposedly the center of the pro-appeasement policy in England).[2] Kennedy did have a close

relationship with Chamberlain and they were in basic agreement on policy. During the Munich crisis they consulted almost daily.[3] This association reportedly led Roosevelt to exclaim: "Who would have thought that the English [the Cliveden Set] could take into camp a redheaded Irishman?"[4]

A few weeks after Munich the Ambassador spoke in defense of Chamberlain's policy. He addressed the Trafalgar Day Dinner of the Navy League and urged coexistence between the dictatorships and the democracies. "After all," he said, "we have to live together in the same world, whether we like it or not."[5] His Navy League speech was not popular with certain groups in Britain, of course, especially the foes of appeasement. But from Harvard, James MacGregor Burns noted, John Kennedy wrote his father that the speech "was considered to be very good by everyone who wasn't bitterly anti-fascist. . . ."[6]

In 1939, Kennedy was granted a leave of absence from Harvard for the entire second semester of his junior year to allow him to take an extended trip to Europe. The purpose of the trip was to see if he wanted a career in the diplomatic service after he graduated from Harvard. A New York Times dispatch from London on February 13, 1939, quoted Mrs. Kennedy as saying that "it was Mr. Kennedy who thought of John's making the experiment."[7] Kennedy's older brother, Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., had served as a secretary to his father in the London Embassy and he planned to transfer to some other American legation in Europe. It was this position in London that Kennedy was to fill. But first, his father arranged for him to take a wide tour of Europe and the Middle East.

Kennedy arrived in London in the late winter of 1939 just before Germany seized the rest of Czechoslovakia. From London he went to Paris

where he stayed with United States Ambassador William C. Bullitt during the spring. From there he went on to Poland where he spent two or three weeks. Here he visited Warsaw and Danzig, the pressure point of the coming crisis between Poland and Germany. He travelled on across the Soviet Union to Moscow. From the Soviet capital he went to Turkey, Palestine, and then back through the Balkans, stopping over at Berlin and Paris before returning to London.[8] The Ambassador had arranged for him to stay at the United States embassies during the trip and asked only that he submit back to London detailed reports from each capital. James MacGregor Burns noted that Kennedy sought out representatives of all parties in order to get a balanced point of view and that his reports revealed a "cool detachment".[9]

In a long letter outlining the Polish and German positions on Danzig, he concluded that: "Probably the strongest impression I have goten [sic] is that rightly or wrongly the Poles will fight over the question of Danzig."[10] The Ambassador received another letter from his son on June 7, 1939, in which he reported on some talks he had had with certain Nazi officials in Danzig. He wrote that he was very disappointed in the unsoundness of the Danzig arguments put forth by the Danzig Germans. He wrote of the "petty grievances" of the Danzig Nazi officials and concluded that although the Poles would negotiate on specific issues they "have made their stand for fear that defection might spread and will prevent their making any compromise."[11]

Kennedy had just returned to London when Germany invaded Poland. In early September, just after war was declared, the Ambassador sent his twenty-two year old son to Glasgow to assist the American survivors of the British liner Athenia, which had been torpedoed by a German

submarine. A short time later Kennedy sailed for home to begin his senior year at Harvard.

Kennedy had been stimulated by his European trip and his observations became the subject of his senior thesis. The complete title of his thesis, which reveals his central argument, was "Appeasement at Munich: The Inevitable Result of the Slowness of the British Democracy to Change From a Disarmament Policy."[12] The idea grew out of the various impressions he had gathered in Europe--most particularly from the criticisms he had heard of Chamberlain's policy at Munich. The work was his first real success as a student and shortly after his graduation in 1940, he re-wrote parts of the thesis, largely following his father's direction and advice, and had it published under the title Why England Slept. James MacGregor Burns noted that one of the most striking aspects of the book, which differed little from the thesis, was its agreement with his father's position on the European war. This can be seen in the Ambassador's reports to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull during the same period of time that Kennedy was researching and writing the thesis.

The book was timely, of course, being released when the United States was preoccupied with problems of national defense. At the time of its publication in the summer of 1940, France had fallen and Britain was fighting the blitz. Kennedy wrote his father that Arthur Krock, of the New York Times, a family friend, suggested the title, Why England Slept, as a contrast to Churchill's While England Slept.[13] The implication of the title was that Kennedy's study would probe deeper into the reasons for the conditions described by Winston Churchill's collection of speeches, While England Slept. Henry Luce, of Time, Inc.

wrote a highly laudatory foreword insisting that the book should sell a million copies! The Ambassador sent copies of the book to Harold Laski, Winston Churchill and Queen Elizabeth. Ultimately, the book became a best-seller and sold about 40,000 copies in both the United States and Britain.[14]

There is some slight question concerning the original motivation for the study. In August of 1940, shortly after Why England Slept came out, the Ambassador, a firm supporter of Chamberlain's policy at Munich, told a British correspondent that the study had been his idea: "When I was in the States with Jack, and heard some professors talking about Munich, I realized they knew nothing about it. I said to Jack, 'You get down to it and tell them all about it.'"[15] Many years later, on the eve of the 1960 election, Kennedy himself had a different recollection: "The subject interested me ever since I was over there to see the results of the Chamberlain thing. I wouldn't say that my father got me interested in it. They were things that I saw for myself. No, the book didn't contain anything that differed with my father's opinions at that time except perhaps in the final part. There was the Chamberlain episode in Munich and all that resentment in America about Munich and I didn't think that it was justified on our part in view of the fact that we weren't ready to do anything."[16]

Why England Slept was not concerned with the consequences of appeasement at Munich. Rather, it was an analysis of the various influences operating within Britain during the 1930's--pacifism, public apathy, business and labor self-interest, and weak political leadership which, in Kennedy's opinion made Chamberlain's concessions at Munich inevitable and even desirable because the Pact gave Britain

precious time to rearm. Mainly, he argued, it was the "poor condition of British armaments that made the "surrender" inevitable. . . ."[17] Although he recognized that Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, as national leaders, bore a heavy responsibility for Britain's military unpreparedness, his primary target in explaining Britain's failure to rearm was the entire British people.

Even though the content of Why England Slept differed little from the thesis, the Ambassador did suggest one significant change. His advice was ironic considering his close identification with Chamberlain and Britain's policy of appeasement. However, in a longer letter written on May 20, 1940, he informed his son that he had gone too far in absolving Chamberlain and Baldwin from blame for Britain's weakness at the time of Munich. According to James MacGregor Burns, he urged his son to blame both the people and the leaders. Kennedy responded: "Will stop white-washing Baldwin."[18] Although he dutifully followed the advice, his main focus remained on the diverse, impersonal forces underlying Britain's weakness, rather than on personalities. It is entirely probable that the Ambassador, in his advice to his son, was influenced by the mounting popular hostility, both in England and the United States, toward the spokesmen for appeasement.

Kennedy began his account of Britain's policy toward armaments with the year 1931 and traced its slow evolution to the outbreak of war in 1939. He supported his analysis with figures showing money spent on armaments, and included a sampling of the views of the major British spokesmen as expressed in the Parliamentary Debates, the Times of London, and various journals, most notably the Economist.

He clearly established that the slow conversion from a disarmament

psychology in Britain, at the beginning of the 1930's, to one of rearmament at the end of the decade, was impeded by a diverse variety of influences that reached into all sectors of British society. Rearmament in Britain was opposed by pacifists and by those who supported the League of Nations. It was opposed by many members of the Labour Party, he argued, as well as by the Conservatives. This was a point well worth emphasizing because many later analysts absolved the Labour Party of any such complicity. Also, the national mood was affected by a general disillusionment over the results of World War I and the feeling that certain German claims were justified. It was public opinion generally, he argued, that was to blame for Britain's state of military unpreparedness. The opposition to rearmament in Britain, much like the policy of appeasement, he reasoned, could not be limited to any single group. Both developed out of a state of mind that was identifiable in virtually every sector of British society.

From this general line of reasoning, of course, it was but a short step to defend Chamberlain's policy at Munich. It was short-sighted, he argued, to blame Britain's position on "one man or one group of men's blindness."[19] Rearmament had begun slowly in 1934 and had picked up by 1936, but the rate was still woefully inadequate. Britain did not wake up effectively to the need of rearmament until Munich, he contended.

Kennedy did detect, however, a certain flaw in Chamberlain's outlook that contributed to Britain's tardiness in rearming. Chamberlain's foreign policy, he noted, was motivated by two factors. Through appeasement he tried to remove the causes of war. But, on the other hand, he urged rearmament. His rearmament efforts were weakened,

Kennedy suggested, because Chamberlain had so much hope and confidence in his appeasement policy that he could not conceive of a war as being inevitable. Kennedy likened the state of mind of Britain and especially Chamberlain to that of a boxer "who cannot work himself into proper psychological and physical condition for a fight that he seriously believes will never come off."[20] Nonetheless, Kennedy defended Chamberlain's actions at Munich and declared that the criticism should be directed not at the Pact itself but to the underlying conditions such as the state of British public opinion and Britain's military unpreparedness, which made the policy "inevitable .

Quite apart from the defense of Chamberlain, Why England Slept had another major theme. Kennedy saw Britain's disastrous failure to rearm as, in large part, a weakness of democracy itself and a warning to the United States. He suggested that democratic, capitalist nations, such as Britain and the United States, contain inherent disadvantages that prevent speedy and effective responses to a threat from a totalitarian form of government. A democracy, subject to the will and self-interests of the people, moves slowly. This was especially true in the short run. A totalitarian state, in contrast, is geared to mobilize swiftly. "We must realize," he argued, that "democracy and capitalism are institutions which are geared for a world at peace. It is our problem to find a method of protecting them in a world at war."[21] He was aware of the dangerous possibility that democratic nations might not be able to meet the demands of war without becoming totalitarian states themselves. In his conclusion he cautioned the United States that it is one of democracy's failings that it seeks to make scapegoats for its own weaknesses,

and warned the United States to profit from Britain's example.

Kennedy was thorough, perceptive, and judicious in his outlining of the broad impersonal forces which left Britain unprepared. He did not fall victim to the common oversimplification of making Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain the scapegoats--although he did criticize their leadership and he praised Winston Churchill for his warnings. His description of the problem, however, was far more developed than his remedy.

He concluded that it was only through strong political leadership that the apathy, self-interests, and party squabbles, which were inherent in a democracy, could be overcome. He was forever after to place great importance on the necessity for strong political leadership as an activator of public opinion.

Why England Slept was highly praised by a wide range of reviewers.[22] They were impressed both by the perceptive observations and Kennedy's mature handling of the research data involved. The London Times Literary Supplement for example, remarked that although it was "a young man's book", it contained "much wisdom for older men."[23]

Kennedy's views in Why England Slept are interesting in a strictly historiographic sense. The Munich crisis remains one of the great historical controversies of modern history. For the most part, historians, much like the public, have been bitterly critical of Chamberlain's policy. Indeed, Munich and appeasement have become words of universal scorn and nothing is ever likely to change that image in the public mind. This predominant view, it is fair to say, was strongly influenced not only by the disastrous consequences of Munich, when seen in retrospect, but also by Winston Churchill's highly popular The Gathering Storm, which

offered a blistering assessment of Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. So, Kennedy's understanding explanation of Munich and Chamberlain's policy has not been the prevailing view. In more recent years, however, there has been a growing awareness among historians of the tremendous complexity of problems that Chamberlain was confronted with as he approached Munich.[24] Many of these problems--political, military, and psychological--were discussed in Kennedy's Why England Slept. In this sense, the book was more in line with historiographical trends in the 1960's than it was in the late 1940's and 1950's.

Until quite recently, one of the most neglected factors in weighing the Munich decision was the role of the Dominions.[25] For the most part, historians tended to focus exclusively on the European situation. But, at the British Imperial Conference of 1937, some of the Dominion Prime Ministers refused to give a firm commitment to resist Hitler by force and, during the Munich crisis they stated that they did not consider a German attack on Czechoslovakia an adequate reason for war. Kennedy, in Why England Slept, wrote of this additional restraining pressure on Chamberlain and that increases the value of his analysis.[26]

Kennedy spent an aimless year following his graduation from Harvard in 1940 and the publication of Why England Slept. At first, he decided to enter Yale Law School, then abruptly changed his mind. Instead, he entered Stanford's Graduate School of Business in the fall, but dropped out after six months and left for a long tour of South America. Finally, he was commissioned in the United States Navy in September, 1941. At first, he was assigned to rather tedious administrative duties in Washington, D.C., but was then transferred to Charleston, South Carolina.

Ultimately, late in 1942, he prevailed upon his father to obtain an assignment for him in PT boat training which would provide overseas service.

In early March, 1942, while Kennedy was still stationed at Charleston, he read Blair Moody's recently published book, Boom or Bust. A Washington news correspondent, Moody later became a United States Senator from Michigan. Although the central focus of Moody's book was on the economic policy of the United States in the post-war world, Kennedy was stimulated by some of Moody's observations on international relations prior to the outbreak of war. Kennedy typed a long letter to Moody challenging certain of his ideas about the causes of World War II. There is no indication that Moody ever responded to the letter.[27]

In the first part of his letter, Kennedy contended that it was the failure of the Western democracies to solve the problem of disarmament that "really doomed peace for our time." He recognized the importance of the various crises of the 1930's--Manchuria, the Rhineland, Spain and Munich--but he suggested that the pivotal turning point came during the Disarmament Conference of 1932, when the French refused to grant any concessions to the German moderates on armaments. This action, he said, weakened the position of the German moderates at home and paved the way for the rise of Hitler. The German people, he continued, "despairing of achieving equality through negotiations, decided to gain superiority through force." Kennedy's brief assessment displayed a sharp awareness of the intricate workings of international politics.

Kennedy's second point related to Munich and appeasement. Moody had expressed the common view that it was the "British upper-crust" who should be blamed for the policy of appeasement. Although Kennedy agreed that one of the bases of Britain's appeasement policy was the British aristocracy's fear of Red Revolution at home, he emphasized that this feeling was not confined to the Tories but permeated the entire country. Kennedy also agreed, and this is a debatable issue among historians even today, that a "fundamental of British foreign policy during the 30's was to see that Hitler never forgot that his principal objective, as set down in his Kampf, was Russia." At this point, Kennedy reiterated the thesis of Why England Slept; Munich and appeasement were the natural result of Britain's failure to provide armaments.

Kennedy did not know Moody personally and it is unlikely that he was in the habit of writing to authors. His letter mainly illustrated his continued interest in foreign affairs and his commitment to armaments. According to the recollections of his war-time friends, Kennedy maintained a lively interest in international relations during his war years.[28]

As is well known, Kennedy served most of 1943 on PT Boat assignment in the South Pacific. In August, 1943, PT 109 went down in the Solomon Islands and his experience has since become a part of American folklore. The PT 109 sinking marked the virtual end of Kennedy's war-time service. He was shipped back to the States in December, 1943 because of his aggravated back injury. He also had a siege of malaria which dropped his weight to 125 pounds. In the spring

of 1944, still ailing, he was admitted to Chelsea Naval Hospital near Boston for a disk operation on his back. In June, 1944, he was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal for "extremely heroic conduct."

Kennedy was discharged from the Navy in January, 1945 and in February he wrote a short essay titled "Let's Try An Experiment in Peace". It was a curious piece for the author of Why England Slept. Here he dramatically reversed his pro-armament outlook expressed in the earlier thesis and book and came out against the buildup of armaments in the post-war world. It was the only time that he took such a position on armaments and national defense. Throughout his public career, his constant concern for national defense was much more in tune with the views in Why England Slept. Essentially, Kennedy advanced the argument that after the war, nations should make efforts to prevent the recurrence of an arms race. He advocated that the United States the Soviet Union and Britain reach an agreement for limiting postwar rearmament plans. But, the question how Big Three unity was to be maintained, was not effectively answered.

Apparently, his essay, which was never published, was in rebuttal to Harry Hopkins' plea for rearmament, published in the American Magazine. Kennedy recalled sometime later that he wrote it "more as a kind of exercise for my own satisfaction than as a serious effort," because, he said, he was "outraged" at Hopkins' judgment that "we did everything possible to prevent war--except prepare for it."[29] Why Kennedy was "outraged" with a viewpoint that he once held was not apparent. Perhaps the long years of war caused him to pin his hopes on mutual international trust and cooperation as the key to peace.

There is something intriguing about this essay. He had written earlier in Why England Slept of the double-barrelled policy pursued by Chamberlain; on the one hand Chamberlain had sought to eliminate the causes of war through negotiation, but on the other hand, he built up the nation's armaments. Kennedy was caught by this same dualism; much like Chamberlain, he was now urging international negotiation and trust as the basis for a peaceful world. But, he would later revert back to his emphasis on armaments. The reconciliation of these two divergent ideas, of course, is the central dilemma which confronts anyone who grapples with the shaping of foreign policy.

In the essay, Kennedy took a sympathetic view toward Russia and he noted that mutual trust would not come easily between the United States and the Soviet Union. Many Americans distrusted the Russians, he said, because of the Soviets' actions in Eastern Europe and he recognized that a radical change in the Soviet attitude was necessary before arms limitations could be worked out. But, he also declared that Americans would have to demonstrate to the Russians their own willingness to try to work out European problems on equitable lines. Only then, he said, would the Russians place any genuine confidence in America's protestations of friendship. "The Russian memory is long." he explained, "and many of the leaders of the present government remember the years after the last war when they fought in the Red Armies against the invading troops of many nations, including Britain's and the United States'."[30]

Through his father's connections, Kennedy became a special correspondent for Hearst's New York Journal American shortly after writing this essay. This was in the spring of 1945 and it was a brief

stint. His column was billed as "the GI viewpoint". He was first assigned to cover the organizational convention of the United Nations in San Francisco.[31] Later, he reported on the British elections of 1945 in which Churchill was upset.[32]

In his early dispatches from the San Francisco conference, Kennedy wrote of the general organizational problems being encountered. But increasingly, during his month on the scene, he focused on the growing conflict in aims between Russia and the West. Like everyone else, he was skeptical about continued cooperation among the powers. Generally, he continued to express the understanding but realistic view toward Russia that he had outlined in his essay. In attempting to explain the reasons for the Russian intransigence in one of his early columns, he pointed out that "there is a heritage of twenty-five years of distrust between Russia and the rest of the world that cannot be overcome completely for a good many more years. . . ."[33] In a later column, on May 4, 1945, he observed, realistically that because of this it would be a long time "before Russia will entrust her safety to any organization other than the Red Army." Russia remembered, he noted, the years before the war when she was ostracized and kept "only looking in the kitchen window." With this being the case, he concluded that the new United Nations could only be a skeletal organization with very limited powers. "It will reflect the fact," he noted, "that there are deep disagreements among its members."

In one of his last columns from San Francisco, written on May 18, he mentioned that there was talk there of fighting the Russians within the next ten or fifteen years. The mutual distrust between Russia and the West, he lamented, was "causing grave concern and

considerable discouragement." But, he personally did not regard war as probable. Because Russia, the United States, and Britain were all "have" nations, he reasoned, they would have little to gain from a "ruinous war."

Generally, during his month covering the conference, his view evolved from one of restrained optimism for the new United Nations to one of deepening pessimism. This was conditioned, of course, by the increasing deterioration in the relationship between Russia and the United States and Britain. But Kennedy continued to hope for cooperation between the Big Three and, as the conference ended, he gave his approval to the new organization even though he recognized that it was a product of many of the same compromises that had rendered the League of Nations ineffective. It is important to note his sympathetic view of Russia's position in the post-war world, because his attitude was to stiffen later.

Kennedy ended his stint at journalism with his coverage of the British elections in the summer of 1945. The only notable aspect to his columns here is that he warned that Churchill might be defeated at a time when scarcely anyone thought so, thus displaying a sharp political sense. He headlined his first article, "Churchill May Lose Election" and went on to say" "This may come as a surprise to most Americans, who feel Churchill is as indomitable at the polls as he was in war." However, he cabled, "Churchill is fighting a tide that is surging through Europe, washing away monarchies and conservative governments everywhere, and that tide flows powerfully in England. England is moving towards some form of socialism--if not in this election, then surely at the next."[34] Arthur Krock recalled later

that Kennedy was the only one who intimated to him that Churchill would be defeated, and that Kennedy, therefore, "had the makings of a very good political observer."[35]

Unfortunately for Kennedy, allegedly under pressure from Hearst, he changed his position in his subsequent dispatches and predicted a moderate Conservative victory over Labour. Years later, he recalled to reporter Peter Lisagor his experience: "One of my first stories predicted that Winston Churchill and the Tory Party were going to lose the election to Attlee and Labour. No sooner did that story hit New York than I got a rocket from Hearst, practically charging me with being out of my mind. Well, in the next several days, I gradually worked it around to where Churchill had rallied and now looked like an easy winner. If I had stuck to my original story, I'd have been a red-hot prophet."[36]

When the war ended, Kennedy was twenty-eight. He faced the problem which confronted many millions of his generation--assimilation back into civilian life. And he had yet to form definite plans on a career. During the war his older brother, Joe, Jr., had been killed in an experimental bomber mission over the Belgin coast. Joe, Jr., was the "star" of the family and the one who was planning a political career after the war. Kennedy once told Theodore Sorensen: "I never would have run for office if Joe had lived. . . ."[37] He told Sorensen that he had considered careers as a lawyer, a journalist, a professor of history or political science, or as an officer in the Foreign Service.[38] Ironically, no one at the time, including himself and his parents, felt that he was suited to a career in politics because of his shy, reserved manner.[39]

Notwithstanding these considerations, Kennedy's political career began in the Eleventh Congressional District of Massachusetts--a Democratic stronghold, where the party's nomination was equivalent to election. In 1945, James Michael Curley, a political enemy of the Kennedys', had vacated the seat to become Mayor of Boston again. The district was a study in contrasts; it was made up largely of Irish and Italian slum areas in the Boston area, but also included Cambridge and Harvard and some old Yankee families.[40] Kennedy had various political disadvantages. Not only was he shy and reserved but he did not have the support of the political bosses in the district. Furthermore, he did not live in Boston and he knew virtually nothing about the district he wanted to represent in Congress. But both of his grandfathers had been prominent Boston politicians and he did not lack money. At first, he was laughed off by the ten other Democratic primary candidates and was quickly dubbed "the poor little rich kid".

But Kennedy began his campaigning several months before the others--this was to become one of his characteristic campaign techniques. Also, he built his own personal organization composed of friends from his days at Choate, Harvard, and the Navy, plus new-found Boston contacts. Most were young and politically inexperienced, but they were zealous and loyal. At the center of the group, of course, was the candidate's father, Joseph P. Kennedy, who made use of his power, wealth, and influence. The campaign was a wide-open affair and Kennedy ran long and hard, canvassing the entire district. John Hersey had written an account of the PT 109 episode for The New Yorker

in the summer of 1944, entitled "Survival". This was condensed into pamphlet form, mass produced, and distributed widely throughout the district. Kennedy won an immediate rapport with veterans, of course. He was elected general chairman of a Veterans of Foreign Wars national convention held in Boston during the campaign.[41] He campaigned on bread-and-butter issues of jobs, housing, low rents, medical care, veterans' benefits and social security, taking the New Deal-Fair Deal position and he won the primary with about 42 percent of the votes in a ten-man race.[42]

One foreign policy issue during the campaign was the 3.75 billion dollar low interest American loan to Britain, which Kennedy supported. Here he was supporting the position of the Truman Administration, which held that Britain's recovery was crucial for world recovery. During the campaign, he also came out strongly for the United Nations and urged a strong Army and Navy for the United States.[43]

By the time of the campaign of 1946, the mounting animosity between Russia and the West was becoming increasingly apparent and Kennedy's speeches reflected this development. Speaking on October 21, 1946, before the Boston Business and Professional Women's Club, he gave strong support to Secretary of State Byrnes' so-called "get tough policy" with Russia and stressed the necessity of blocking Russian expansion. His tone now was much more emotional than it had been heretofore. "We should recognize the fact," he urged, "that internally Soviet Russia is a ruthless dictatorship and externally is on the march."[44] In his speech, Kennedy was also sternly critical of Henry A. Wallace, Truman's Secretary of Commerce, who was urging a more

conciliatory policy toward Russia at the same time Secretary of State Byrnes was advocating a "get-tough" policy. Kennedy compared their conflicting interpretations of Russia's actions and then sided with Byrnes. Wallace, said Kennedy, contended that Russia must be understood because since 1917, that nation had been threatened with capitalistic encirclement, was cruelly maligned in the twenties, and made the object of British appeasement in the thirties. This being the case, Kennedy continued, Wallace believed it natural that Russia should be suspicious of America and England in the post-war days. These, of course, were precisely the sentiments that Kennedy had aired at San Francisco. But now, he made clear, he supported Byrnes' "get-tough" policy toward Russia as "the best hope for peace."

The reason for the dramatic shift in Kennedy's attitude toward Russia is not entirely clear. By mid-1946, however, American public opinion generally was swinging around to favor a hard-line policy against Russia. This was primarily due to Russia's domination of the satellites in Eastern Europe. Being now a politician, rather than a casual observer, it is probable that Kennedy became much more attuned to the shifting trends of public opinion. And, certainly his Congressional district, with its large Catholic constituency, and especially its Polish-Americans, was one of the most anti-Communist in the nation. At this point in his career, and on this particular issue, Kennedy appeared less as a man committed to one point of view than as a barometer registering the shifting winds.

After the election campaign of 1946, Kennedy continued to speak out against Russia. Speaking in late November, before 500 members of

the Boston Boot and Shoe Club he attacked Russia as a "slave state run by a small clique of ruthless, powerful, and selfish men."[45] It was essentially the same speech he had delivered in October. He again assailed Henry A. Wallace and called his statements "irresponsible" and stated he "vigorously" favored the policy of Secretary of State Byrnes.

Kennedy was now about to enter Congress. The pre-Congressional phase of his life was at an end. He had travelled extensively during these early years, and had given serious and thoughtful consideration to the problems of international relations. He had written an impressive book. Over the years his views remained essentially consistent, with the exception of his temporary shift on the issue of armaments outlined in his February, 1945 essay. But during the campaign of 1946, he reverted to his pro-armament position and there he remained. The intellectual detachment he displayed in his early writings was clearly abandoned during the election speeches of 1946, but that was to be expected since he was now playing a different role. Kennedy entered the Cold War earlier than most but, as has been suggested, the shift in his thinking toward Russia between the spring of 1945 at the San Francisco conference and the campaign in the fall of 1946, to some degree reflected the changing climate of opinion in the United States in general during this period, and most especially in his district.

There are a few points that should be emphasized. To a large extent, Kennedy's views seem to be much like the views of others of his generation. The main difference was that, because of his father's position and money, he was privileged to have a greater exposure to

foreign affairs. During this period of his life, also, the influence of his father's opinions on his thinking cannot be overemphasized.

As one observer noted, very accurately, some of the ideas Kennedy developed in Why England Slept guided his thinking for the remainder of his life--the difficulty for democracies to adjust to the challenge of totalitarian states and, most significantly, the importance of armaments to the conduct of foreign policy.[46] The essence of Kennedy's concluding remarks in Why England Slept was to be repeated many times during his years in Congress: "We must always keep our armaments equal to our commitments. Munich should teach us that; we must realize that any bluff will be called. We cannot tell anyone to keep out of our hemisphere unless our armaments and the people behind these armaments [italics is Kennedy's] are prepared to back up the command, even to the ultimate point of war."[47]

In a certain sense Why England Slept seems dated. Based upon the experience of the 1930's, Kennedy was worried that democracies were unwilling to devote enough of their budgets to armaments. "There is no lobby for armaments," he said, "as there is for relief or for agriculture."[48] Times have changed. His concern has almost a ring of quaintness in an era when the defense budget of the United States is astronomical and many fear the power of the military-industrial complex. Without doubt, it was Munich, and Hitler's dominance in armaments, and the searing experience of World War II, and books such as Why England Slept, which transformed, perhaps forever, Americans' commitment to a colossal defense establishment.

In this regard, one final word must be said of Munich because it

had a profound influence on Kennedy and all post World War II politicians and statesmen. The Munich Conference of 1938 was clearly the most controversial episode in international relations between the wars. It was the high point of appeasement. It has since become common to conclude that if there had been no concessions made at Munich, if a hard line had been taken, there would have been no World War II. Even though today there is still no agreed interpretation of Munich among historians, foreign policy-makers in the post-war world repeatedly point to the "lesson" of Munich. It became for many the one certain lesson of the 1930's--aggression must be checked early and forcibly and negotiation of issues must not be considered, except from a position of military superiority, because of the insatiable appetites of aggressors. Negotiation could invite greater transgressions. A hard line seemed the only sensible course to pursue.

There developed something of a Munich syndrome in the post-war world; there was a certain fear to negotiate.[49] The so-called lesson of Munich became one of the accepted premises in the deliberations of the Cold War. Many were quick to draw historical analogies and the practice has continued to the present day. Historical parallels are usually inappropriate and risky at best, but that does not prevent them from being drawn.

All this warrants emphasis because during Kennedy's years in Congress the "lesson" of Munich and the resultant frame of mind was a dominant influence on the discussion and formulation of foreign policy; And the memory of Munich, coupled with the threat from another "aggressor", was especially sharp when Kennedy entered the House of Representatives in January, 1947.

FOOTNOTES

[1]For a full account of Joseph P. Kennedy's role as ambassador see: William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952); Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (ed.), The Diplomats 1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 649-681; Richard J. Whalen, The Founding Father: The Story of Joseph P. Kennedy (New York: The New American Library, 1964), 207-348.

[2]Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 58.

[3]Craig and Gilbert, The Diplomats, p. 661.

[4]Ibid., p. 660.

[5]Ibid., p. 664-665.

[6]James MacGregor Burns, John Kennedy, A Political Profile (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1959), p. 37.

[7]Harold Faber (ed.), The Kennedy Years (New York: The Viking Press, 1964), p. 21. Kennedy was interviewed by a Boston Globe reporter on January 24, 1939, shortly before he departed for England.

[8]A report came back that Kennedy shocked the British in Palestine by wearing a lounge suit instead of the traditional morning coat to the British High Commissioner's party given in honor of King George VI's birthday. See Boston Globe, June 9, 1939. Kennedy's father had created a similar stir in England because of his violations of tradition.

[9]For an account of the trip see Burns, p. 37-38.

[10]Quoted in Burns, p. 38.

[11]Jan Wszelaki (ed.), John F. Kennedy and Poland, Selection of Documents, 1948-1963 (New York: Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, Inc., 1964), p. vi.

[12]Goddard Lieberson and Joan Meyers (ed.), John Fitzgerald Kennedy. . .As We Remember Him (New York: A Columbia Records Legacy Collection Book, 1965), p. 35.

[13]Ibid., p. 33.

[14]Over the years there has been some question as to the degree of help Kennedy received in writing the thesis and subsequent book. Certainly, he had privileged access to his father's files and benefited from his advice as well as others. The historian John Wheeler Bennett, for instance, is thanked in the preface of the book for his suggestions. But informed opinion makes it clear that the work was mainly the result of his own efforts. In an Oral History for the John F. Kennedy Library Waltham, Massachusetts, Arthur Krock recalled when Kennedy first brought the thesis to him: "It was in the shape of his senior thesis at Harvard which his professor had given good marks to, but his father wanted me to read it, I suppose; I doubt that Jack would have had any idea of showing it to me particularly, but I had been visiting the Embassy in London at the time that the war was developing and the time of Munich and since this book concerned the study of the reasons for Britain's lack of preparedness, for the war that came, I assumed that's why his father suggested that he should show it to me. At any rate, it was amateurish in many respects but not, certainly not, as much as most writings in that category are. And the result was that I told him I thought it would make a very welcome and very useful book, and I would if he wanted me to, and his father wanted me to, I would attempt to get him a publisher, but before we thought of that it ought to be gone over a bit. So he would come to my library in Georgetown and we would work over the book a bit but I can't say that I did more than polish it and amend it here and there, because it was very, very definitely his own product."

[15]George Bilainkin, Diary of a Diplomatic Correspondent (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1942), p. 194.

[16]Ralph G. Martin and Ed. Plaut, Front Runner, Dark Horse (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), p. 127-128.

[17]John F. Kennedy, Why England Slept, (New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1940), p. xxvii-xxviii.

[18]Cited in Burns, John Kennedy, p. 43.

[19]Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. xxi-xxii.

[20]Ibid., p. 157.

[21]Ibid., p. 226. This was a major theme of Stanley Baldwin's in the House of Commons in 1935 and after and probably influenced Kennedy's thinking. See Winston Churchill's The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 216.

[22]See: Christian Science Monitor, (August 31, 1940), p. 10; Commonweal, (September 13, 1940), p. 433; Current History and Forum, (September, 1940), p. 6; New Republic, (September 16, 1940), p. 393; New York Times, (August 11, 1940), p. 3; Saturday Review of Literature, (September 7, 1940), p. 20; Spectator (October 18, 1940), p. 391; Times Literary Supplement, (October 12, 1940), p. 514.

[23]Review of Why England Slept by John F. Kennedy, London Times Literary Supplement, (October 12, 1940), p. 514.

[24]For an excellent summation of the issue see: D. C. Watt, "Appeasement, The Rise of A Revisionist School?", Political Quarterly, XXXVI (1965), p. 191-213; and "Appeasement Reconsidered, Some Neglected Factors," Round Table, LIII (1962/63), p. 358-371.

[25]For a full analysis of this aspect of the issue see: D. C. Watt, "The Influence of the Commonwealth on British Foreign Policy: The Case of the Munich Crisis," in Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, (1965), p. 159-176.

[26]Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. 192-193.

[27]The background information on Kennedy's letter to Moody was taken from: "A Dreamer Wide Awake," American Heritage, (October, 1965), p. 71. The original letter is in the Michigan Historical Collections at the University of Michigan where it was deposited by Senator Moody's widow after his death in 1954. The letter, with a brief introduction, was published in American Heritage, October, 1965, p. 71.

[28]Paul B. "Red" Fay, Jr., a long-time Kennedy friend, and former officer in Kennedy's PT Boat squadron, stated later that the officers of the squadron "used to gather in his quarters and get him talking on world affairs, politics, and the war. We enjoyed it more than playing poker." See: Joe McCarthy, The Remarkable Kennedys (New York: The Dial Press, 1960), p. 188. Another war-time friend, James A. Reed, recalled a spirited argument over Chamberlain and Munich in which, of course, Kennedy argued in behalf of Chamberlain. Not surprisingly, Reed, who had taken the position against Chamberlain, was impressed by Kennedy's "knowledge" on the subject. See: Lieberson & Meyers (ed.), John Fitzgerald Kennedy, p. 39.

[29]See Victor Lasky, JFK, The Man & The Myth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 86-87; and Burns, John Kennedy, p. 55 for an analysis of the essay.

[30]Lasky, p. 87.

[31]These columns are found in the New York Journal American (April 28, 30, and May 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23 and 28, 1945).

[32]These columns are found in the New York Journal American (June 24, July 10, and 27, 1945).

[33]Ibid., April 30, 1945.

[34]Ibid., June 24, 1945.

[35]See: Arthur Krock Oral History, p. 12, John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Massachusetts.

[36]James Tracy Crown, The Kennedy Literature: A Bibliographical Essay on John F. Kennedy (New York: New York University Press, 1968), p. 31.

[37]Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1965), p. 16.

[38]Ibid., p. 15.

[39]For his father's assessment see: Lieberson & Meyers (ed.) John Fitzgerald Kennedy, p. 26.

[40]For a useful discussion of the shifting political alliances in the district see: Burns, p. 58-62. J. J. Huthmacher's Massachusetts People and Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), offers a much more comprehensive and definitive account.

[41]See Boston Globe, December 8, 1945 and Look, June 11, 1946, p. 32.

[42]The most thorough account of the 1946 campaign is in Burns, p. 64-70.

[43]See: Time, July 1, 1946, p. 23.

[44]The speech can be found at the John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham Massachusetts, Pre-Presidential Papers, Boston Office Files, 1946-1952, Box #25. For newspaper coverage of the speech see the Boston Globe, October 22, 1946.

[45]See: Boston Globe, November 21, 1946.

[46]Crown, The Kennedy Literature, p. 52.

[47]Why England Slept, p. 183-184.

[48]Ibid., p. 180.

[49]It seems clear that it was to this state of mind to which Kennedy himself referred years later in his Inaugural Address: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

CHAPTER II

COLD WARRIOR, 1947-1950

During Kennedy's first two terms in Congress, from 1947 to 1950, he was mainly preoccupied with the bread-and-butter domestic concerns of his district. According to James MacGregor Burns, Kennedy closely followed the Truman Fair Deal policies; he favored labor, social-welfare programs, broadened social security, higher minimum wage provisions, more immigration and, most importantly for his district, expanded housing programs for veterans.[1] However, Kennedy spoke out on the major foreign policy issues of the day.

The Cold War was the dominant reality in international relations. To many Americans at the time it seemed that Communism was winning in the struggle for power in the world. These were the years when the Truman Doctrine, the policy of containment, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, NATO, the Point Four program of technical assistance, the Korean War, the House Un-American Activities Committee, Senator Joseph McCarthy, Alger Hiss, and the charge that President Truman was "soft" on Communism, became topics of major public concern in the United States. American attitudes toward the Soviet Union and the Communist world hardened when, in early 1948, Czechoslovakia fell into the Soviet orbit and more especially, in 1949, when the Chinese Communists forced Chiang Kai-shek to flee the mainland of China for Formosa. The "loss" of China unleashed a bitter storm of criticism.

Truman and the State Department were charged by Republicans, and many Democrats, with responsibility for the loss. In fact, many alleged that Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Chinese had been "sold-out" by a pro-Communist clique in the United States Government. This line of criticism was, in part, a continuation of the anti-Roosevelt feeling caused by what many considered the "betrayal" of China and Poland at the Yalta Conference.

As a young freshman Congressman with a keen interest in foreign affairs, of course, Kennedy was swept up in the public debate over these issues. In addition to his being strongly defense-minded, there were several important characteristics to his thinking during this early phase of his career that deserve emphasis. First, and most striking, was his stridently anti-Communist attitude; he was among the first to ride the bandwagon of anti-Sovietism. Second, although he fully supported much of the Truman Administration's foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, he very early ascribed to the "betrayal" theses on Poland and China and bitterly attacked these aspects of the Roosevelt and Truman record in foreign policy. Third, although Kennedy and his father were both violently anti-Soviet, and although their views coincided at times, they increasingly took opposite positions on the issues of the day. This indicates, at least, that the son was beginning to grow independent of the father's influence.

Joseph P. Kennedy continued to advocate a policy of isolationism as the most prudent course for the United States to follow. He favored the fortress America concept and considered foreign assistance programs a waste. John Kennedy, in contrast, perhaps as a concession to his

party's policy, supported foreign economic and military programs although he demanded that the Allied nations of Western Europe do more to bear their share of the burden. Unlike his son, Joseph Kennedy opposed both the Truman Doctrine's aid to Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan's authorization of aid to Western Europe.

President Truman first outlined his program of aid to Greece and Turkey on March 12, 1947, before a joint session of Congress. In Boston five days later, Congressman Kennedy told an audience: "If Greece and Turkey go down, the road to the Near East is open. We have no alternative but to support the President's policy."[2] In a lengthy speech at the University of North Carolina several days later, on March 27, he further outlined his reasons for his complete support of the Doctrine and he defended the policy as being "consistent" with America's traditional foreign policy even though, in point of fact, the Truman Doctrine actually reversed the nonintervention principle of the Monroe Doctrine.[3]

In his speech Kennedy answered the various objections that had been raised against the Truman Doctrine. Although the Doctrine was generally popular with the American public, critics charged that it would cost too much; that it would weaken the United Nation's influence; that it could goad the Soviet Union into war; and that it established a precedent of meddling in the internal affairs of other nations. Kennedy argued that the United Nations was not capable of handling the problem at that time. Further, he disputed the view that international loans were unfriendly acts which enhanced the prospects of war. He feared that American neutrality or inaction on this question would result in the loss of Greece and Turkey and open the Middle East to Russian expansion. Moreover, he argued that war with

the Soviet Union could come as a result of that country underestimating American resolve. At this point in his speech, he recalled how Nazi Germany's intelligence system had misled Hitler into believing that Britain and France would do nothing if Poland were invaded in 1939. Kennedy then contended that Russia's information gathering system was among the poorest in the world because of the absence of Russian newspapermen, foreign traders and tourists through the world. Because of possible misinformation, he argued, Russia might attack a country while believing that the United States would not respond in its defense. Due to this possibility, he believed the Truman Doctrine would clarify America's resolve to the Soviet Union and thus avert any repetition of the process that led to World War II. All in all, this was an unusual defense of the Truman Doctrine. However, the central theme of American foreign policy at issue, Kennedy concluded, was "the prevention of Russian domination of Europe and Asia."[4]

Throughout his first two terms in Congress, Kennedy consistently urged that America bolster the nations of Western Europe against the threat of Communism. On November 20, 1947, he rose in the House of Representatives and spoke in favor of Secretary of State Marshall's request for a grant of $227 million interim aid to Italy on the grounds that Italy "can become a bastion of democracy in Europe" in its struggle against the Communist Party of Italy.[5] In part, at least, his speech was designed to appeal to the Italian-American sector of his constituency for he had the speech printed for wide distribution. Italian-Americans were numerous in Kennedy's district and he was naturally influenced by their interests. His campaign literature stressed that he was the only Congressman who had ever been decorated by the Italian

Government for his constant assistance to Americans of Italian descent. In his speech, his anti-Soviet attitude was apparent. He spoke of the "cold contempt" that was the attitude of the Soviet Government, "which seeks to destroy the freedoms of all peoples everywhere."

In mid-February, 1948, Kennedy had an interesting interview with the Boston Globe.[6] The purpose of the interview was to see if the author of Why England Slept saw any parallels between England's situation in the 1930's and America's position in 1948. Kennedy stated that their positions were similar in the sense that they were both democracies facing a struggle against totalitarianism. However, the main difference as he perceived it, was that England during the 1930's was not aware of the Nazi danger whereas America in 1948, he said, was "very definitely aware of the Russian menace." Kennedy stated that he still favored a strong defense program although he was "not quite sure" if the emphasis should be on a powerful airforce or a strong peace-time army. He voiced his complete approval to the Marshall Plan as a bulwark against Russian expansion, and termed the program "the only hope for world peace". British public opinion during the 1930's had worried that a strong defense program and a build-up in armaments would indicate a lack of faith in the League of Nations and could lead to war. Kennedy was asked if he saw a similar attitude in America in 1948. His answer was a strong, "No". "The measures before Congress right now prove it," he said. "And the people today aren't afraid defense measures will indicate a lack of faith in the United Nations. If you're strong in national defense, you have a force for maintaining your own security because a strong national defense will result in diplomatic strength."

Shortly after this interview, in a speech in which he again

strongly supported the Marshall Plan, Kennedy unleashed his first attack on President Roosevelt's war-time foreign policy.[7] It is entirely possible that in his criticism of Roosevelt, he was, in part at least, echoing the sentiments of his father. He branded Roosevelt's Lend Lease program with Russia as America's "greatest mistake during World War II." He was speaking in Boston to a mass meeting of Lithuanian societies. It was a receptive audience for this kind of speech, of course. Lithuania, like the other former Baltic nations, had been annexed by the Soviet Union; a fact that the United States (officially) refused to recognize. Kennedy urged passage of the Marshall Plan to prevent further Russian aggression. Lithuania, and especially Lithuanian-Americans, received Kennedy's attention again in early 1949 when he rose in the House of Representatives to pay honor to the 31st Anniversary of the Lithuanian Declaration of Independence even though that independence, he noted, existed "only in their hearts."[8] He praised the United States for not granting official recognition to "Russia's greedy annexation."[9]

In a Massachusetts speech in March, 1948, Kennedy again slapped at Roosevelt's war-time foreign policy, this time more boldly.[10] He told his audience that the Communist grab of Poland and Czechoslovakia was the direct result of the Yalta and Teheran Conferences where Roosevelt failed to recognize that he had been misled by Stalin. He contended that Roosevelt had been "fooled completely" by the mistaken belief that he could trust Stalin. Secretary of State Marshall came in for criticism also. This was in reference to China and Kennedy claimed that Marshall erred when he encouraged Chinese Communist participation in the Chinese National Government. Kennedy's speech

was delivered more than a year before the Chinese Communists ousted Chiang Kai-shek. When Chiang fled the mainland for Formosa in 1949, Kennedy's criticism of Marshall became much more bitter and emotional. In subsequent speeches, he continued to attack both Roosevelt's wartime policy toward Russia and Marshall's attempt to form a coalition government in China. Speaking in Massachusetts in the spring of 1948, Kennedy held that the coalition concept was a mistake. However, he was by no means clear as to what alternate policy he favored. He appeared to be hopelessly confused; he concluded that the answer to the China situation was either to send more relief to China or to attempt once again to forge some type of coalition government.[11] On this issue his criticisms shed more heat than light.

Kennedy's criticism of Roosevelt's war-time foreign policy reached its height when he spoke to the Massachusetts Association of Polish-American Citizens Club in Roxbury on June 6, 1948. The bold headline in the next morning's Boston Herald read: KENNEDY SAYS ROOSEVELT SOLD POLAND TO REDS.[12] This happened, Kennedy declared, because Roosevelt did not understand the Russian mind." To his Polish-America audience, he advocated passage of an immigration bill, which would have aided Polish citizens, and predicted that the Marshall Plan would forge non-Communist Europe into a great third power. This optimism was tempered slightly when Kennedy made a brief tour of Europe in the summer of 1948 which persuaded him that the Marshall Plan was not working satisfactorily. He stated that Europe was shirking its responsibilities. He was constantly wary of the European Allies not bearing their share of the burden and relying too heavily upon United States aid.[13]

Kennedy's most emotional revolt against the Democratic Party's foreign policy came in January of 1949, when it became apparent that Chiang's position in China was hopeless. In January, 1949, Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists captured Peking and destroyed the main Nationalist force north of the Yangtze. In the House of Representatives on January 25, Kennedy levelled a scathing one minute address against President Truman, the State Department, and certain prestigious Far Eastern scholars.[14]

'Mr. Speaker," he intoned, "over this weekend we have learned the extent of the disaster that has befallen China and the United States. The responsibility for the failure of our foreign policy in the Far East rests squarely with the White House and the Department of State.

"The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming, unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed, was a crippling blow to the National Government.

"So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the Lattimores and the Fairbanks,[15] with the imperfection of the democratic system in China after 20 years of war and the tales of corruption in high places that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China.

"Our policy, in the words of the Premier of the National Government, Sun Fo, of vacillation, uncertainty, and confusion has reaped the whirlwind.

"This House must now assume the responsibility of preventing the onrushing tide of Communism from engulfing all of Asia."

Just a few days later, on January 30, Kennedy expanded upon this

criticism in a highly intemperate speech at Salem, Massachusetts.[16] He wanted to "search out and spotlight," he said, "those who must bear the responsibility of our present predicament." He briefly sketched the United States's war-time efforts to aid China and concluded that at Yalta a "sick Roosevelt, with the advice of General Marshall and other Chiefs of Staff, gave the Kurile Islands, as well as the control of various strategic Chinese ports, such as Port Arthur and Dairen, to the Soviet Union." He castigated the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations for trying to force Chiang Kai-shek to bring Chinese Communists into his government and blamed General Marshall for not giving full military support to Chiang's National Government. United States assistance, he decried, was "too little and too late" and Marshall "blundered". Kennedy even criticized President Truman and the United States State Department for their treatment of Madame Chiang Kai-shek which in his opinion bordered on "indifference, if not contempt." Kennedy again lashed out at the professional diplomats and their advisers "the Lattimores and the Fairbanks" and concluded that in the tragic story of China: "What our young men had saved, our diplomats and our President have frittered away."

James MacGregor Burns commented, quite properly, that these were far stronger words than Kennedy had used against Chamberlain and the proponents of appeasement in Why England Slept, ten years before.[17] Then he had perceived the complexities underlying public policy. Here he did not. He gave no indication that he had an understanding of the complex forces within China which produced the Communist victory. Many wondered about Kennedy's motive in attacking the leader of his party and so respected a figure as

General Marshall. And why did he not fear political retaliation from the leadership of his party? Burns quoted Kennedy as explaining: "We were just worms over in the House--nobody pays much attention to us nationally, and I had come back from the Service not as a Democratic wheelhorse who came up through the ranks--I came in sort of sideways. . . . I never had the feeling I needed Truman."[18] His speeches certainly indicated that he did not consider Truman's support essential to his political future.

Kennedy differed with President Truman and the Democratic Party's foreign policy position on other issues as well. In February, 1949, shortly after his initial speeches on China, he voted to kill a bill to extend the Reciprocal Trade Program, although when the bill finally passed he reversed his position and voted in its favor. Quite accurately, Burns interpreted Kennedy's opposition to the three-year extension of the Trade Agreements Act as an attack on one of the programs most sacred to the Democratic Party--the reciprocal trade policies created by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and backed by both Roosevelt and Truman.[19] A further example of Kennedy's revolt against President Truman was his public complaint about the inadequacies of the nation's civil defense regarding air raid shelters.[20]

He also opposed the Truman Administration's economy program in the defense establishment. He preferred a seventy-group air force over the fifty-five groups requested by Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson. Defense Secretary Johnson, who had succeeded James Forrestal in the post, was denounced in many quarters for the country's state of military unpreparedness; critics argued that he had overly emphasized economy and sacrificed security. And in February, 1950,

Kennedy inserted an article by Joseph and Stewart Alsop into the Congressional Record in which they warned of the effect that defense economy was having on the American defense structure. In his introduction to the article in direct reference to Defense Secretary Johnson, Kennedy declared: "Important economies should be made in other sections of our appropriations because upon the degree of strength in our armed services rests our survival."[21]

However, it was on the "loss" of China that Kennedy clashed most dramatically with the Truman Administration. In December, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his defeated army fled to Formosa and a heated controversy developed in America over whether Chiang and the Nationalists on Formosa should receive United States military aid and support. For a variety of reasons, the Truman Administration staunchly opposed the granting of such aid. But many leading Republicans demanded action. At this time there were many "Asia-first" Republicans who urged a strong American military commitment to Chiang and the Nationalists. Ironically, many of these Republicans were isolationist-minded when it came to the question of American assistance to Europe. During this period, certain of the more bellicose "Asia-first" Republicans were charging that China had fallen to the Communists because there were Communist agents in the United States State Department who had blocked any effective aid to Chiang and the Nationalists. The highly publicized trial and conviction of the former State Department officer, Alger Hiss, made this charge seem credible to many Americans.

In some of his speeches on the China issue, Kennedy appeared to share some of the views of the "Asia-first" Republicans. In January,

1950, he spoke to a Veterans of Foreign Wars conference. He warned that the United States lacked a policy in the Far East and declared that "in our zeal to protect the integrity of Western Europe we are permitting the Russians to gain dominance over an area containing a billion people.[22] He demanded a "shake-up" of the Far East section by the State Department, he said, "so that those who were connected with our failure in the Far East may not have further jurisdiction in that area." Regarding Truman's refusal to provide military aid to Chiang, Kennedy voiced his complete agreement with General Douglas MacArthur and the Chiefs of Staff, and others who urged that the United States send military aid and advisers to Formosa. He likened the situation to that of Greece and Turkey when the Truman Doctrine was implemented. "Unless we take immediate and vigorous action," he concluded, "our lack of policy in the Far East will reap the whirlwinds. Our bases in the Far Pacific, from the Philippines to Alaska, must be brought up to date, and the Communists must be clearly warned that any military act against the countries to the South of it will be viewed as a threat to the security of the United States."

In all of Kennedy's fiery outbursts against the Truman Administration's China policy, he was stronger on criticism than positive proposals. And he was also guilty of the very error in judgment he saw in the critics of Chamberlain's policy at Munich as outlined in his Why England Slept. Then he had carefully examined the various underlying causes which explained the necessity of Chamberlain's appeasement policy and he had warned against over-simplification and the making of scapegoats. But on the China issue he fell victim to the same sort of over-simplification which caused him to search for

scapegoats. For the most part he spoke in sweeping generalities and did not come to grips with the problem of delineating a specific policy which might have been effective, or for that matter, even helpful.

The day came, however, some years later, when he modified his view of Truman's China policy. In these early years he was a leading exponent of what came to be known as the China Lobby line. The China Lobby included both Republican and Democratic critics of Truman's China policy, who favored a hard line against Communist China and support for Chiang, in the hopes of re-establishing a non-Communist China on the mainland. But gradually, over the years, Kennedy's attitude evolved to where he favored a more flexible and conciliatory policy. From the mid 1950's on, for example, he urged the exclusion of the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu from the Formosa Straits defensive perimeter not only because of their military vulnerability but because he considered them a needless irritant in Sino-American relations. In several of his speeches during the 1950's, he acknowledged that he had modified his 1949 opinion on Truman's China policy. When a Republican Congressman in 1961 quoted one of his free-wheeling 1949 China speeches Kennedy made this response: "In my speech of 1949 I placed more emphasis on personalities than I would today. . . . I would say that my view today is more in accordance with the facts than my view in 1949."[23]

In the summer of 1950, Kennedy focused his concern on Europe rather than the Far East. This was a surprising development for two reasons. First, he had stated in previous speeches that, in his view, the United States had neglected the Far East in favor of Western Europe.

And secondly, in the summer of 1950, the Korean War had broken out. Considering Kennedy's earlier blasting of Truman for the inadequacy of his policy against Communist aggression in China, one would have expected him to give enthusiastic support to the President's forceful policy in Korea, but such was not the case. Not only that, during this period when American eyes were glued on Korea, Kennedy was warning that Western Europe was in military danger from Russia and arguing that the United States should send sufficient American divisions there to demonstrate to the Europeans, and to the Russians, the United States commitment to that area. "Western Europe armed forces," he stated, "are in a deplorable condition in relation to the strength the Soviets could bring to that area."[24] This required, he realized, the mobilization of additional American troops to send to Europe, and in the debate over appropriations for the Mutual Assistance Act, that was precisely what he called for. Mere financial aid to the area was "a waste of money," he concluded, "unless we are willing to raise troops and put them in Western Europe."

In connection with his concern over Western Europe's military vulnerability, Kennedy offered an amendment to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which was being debated on the floor of the House of Representatives on July 19, 1950.[25] He indicated that he favored realism and expediency in foreign policy and suggested that a nation should not be restricted by moral or ideological considerations. He felt that it was unfortunate that Spain was excluded from the current United States military assistance program to Europe. His amendment would have given Spain $74 million in military assistance.

Many American and European liberals opposed aid to the Fascist regime in Spain for ideological and moral reasons but Kennedy regarded this as unrealistic. He argued, simply, that Spain could make a substantial contribution to the defense of Western Europe and pointed out that the United States gave aid to Marshall Tito, the Communist dictator of Yugoslavia, even though that government was not completely acceptable ideologically: "If we are willing to help Yugoslavia in her struggle for independence from Russia because it is to our benefit," he concluded, "so we should be willing to help Spain." Kennedy continued to hold this view. Nearly five years later, on May 24, 1955, he was one of the authors of concurrent resolution #34 which called for Spain's admission to NATO.

As his speech on aid to Spain illustrated, Kennedy favored a pragmatic, flexible approach to foreign policy. He made this attitude more evident on September 22, 1950, when he inserted into the Congressional Record a letter to the editor of the New York Times which openly advocated expediency in foreign policy.[26] The letter, written by William S. Reisman, who supported an American alliance with Franco's Spain, cited various instances in the past when the United States had formed alliances or close working relationships with anti-democratic powers. This practice began, he noted, with America's alliance with the very undemocratic, absolute monarchy of Louis XVI of France during the Revolutionary War and it appeared again when President Lincoln courted the friendship and aid of Czar Alexander II of Russia during the Civil War. It was very evident in the 20th Century, he contended, first when President Wilson fought against German imperialism "with every other imperialist nation in

the world" and again during World War II when the United States was allied with the Soviet Union. Reisman concluded his letter by stating that it was indefensible for "confused liberals" to refuse to accept reality on "moral" grounds. This, apparently, was Kennedy's view as well.

There was one other instance during 1950 when Kennedy inserted in the Congressional Record a statement concerning foreign policy which further illustrated his thinking at that time. The issue this time was the nation's defense program. For some months during 1950, a group of scholars (including John K. Fairbank, whom Kennedy had earlier denounced) from the Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology faculties had been meeting to discuss the problem of American security, and specifically, the issue of America's national defense policy.[27] It was this group's conclusion that the defense policy of the United States was weakened by relying too heavily on the use of atomic weapons and strategic bombardment or, in other words, massive retaliation. They urged that steps be taken immediately to correct the deficiencies in conventional armaments. This was a position that Kennedy was to argue consistently with the Eisenhower Administration through the 1950's. He opposed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' reliance upon massive retaliation. Since this document constituted his first reference to the problem it is quite possibly the original source of his attitude on the subject. The document outlined several reasons why the United States' predominant reliance on atomic warfare weakened the defense posture of the country. The first argument, and the one used most frequently by Kennedy in subsequent speeches on the issue, was that a policy relying on atomic weapons and strategic air power was not well equipped to deal

with the problems of limited aggression or guerrilla warfare. Only a conventional military force, which could supplement the bomb as a deterrent, would be an effective response to guerrilla war. So, even though a defense policy with its emphasis on atomic weapons promised great economies in financial outlay, or what became commonly known under Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson as "a bigger bang for the buck," these scholars, and later Kennedy himself, were urging the development and buildup of conventional military forces, which would provide the President with an option of responses. Of course, one of the prime aims of both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations was to try to hold defense costs down and these suggestions were not especially helpful in that respect.

On November 10, 1950, Kennedy addressed a small seminar of Harvard University students and professors.[28] He was very candid and his remarks caused a sensation. John P. Mallon, then a teaching fellow in government at Harvard was present and in 1952, during Kennedy's election campaign against Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. for the Senate, Mallon published his account of the seminar in the New Republic, which caused some embarrassment to Kennedy. During the seminar, according to Mallon, Kennedy said that "(a) he could see no reason why we were fighting in Korea; (b) he thought that sooner or later we would "have to get all these foreigners off our backs" in Europe; (c) he supported the McCarran Act and felt that not enough had been done about Communists in government; (d) that he rather respected Joe McCarthy and thought he "knew Joe pretty well and he may have something;" (e) that he had no great respect for Dean Acheson or indeed almost any member of the Fair Deal Administration; (f) that he

personally was very happy that Helen Gahagan Douglas (a noted liberal) had just been defeated in California by Richard Nixon." The article, of course, was a bombshell during the 1952 campaign and especially angered liberals who never really trusted Kennedy anyway. Friends and supporters of Kennedy, of course, challenged the accuracy of some of Mallon's statements, but James MacGregor Burns, who interviewed witnesses of the episode, indicated that Mallon's account was essentially accurate.[29] Strictly on the question of foreign policy Kennedy's remarks generally conform to the sentiments expressed in his previous speeches, but his reference to getting the Europeans "off our backs" was somewhat contrary to his public stance and appeared to be more in line with his father's isolationist views on the subject. However, the remark was ambiguous. Getting the Europeans "off our backs" may have referred to getting them to contribute more to the NATO defence forces and their own security, and this would be consistent with his earlier statements. Kennedy's earlier castigation of President Truman, General George Marshall, the State Department, Owen Lattimore and John K. Fairbank was not unlike the later sledgehammer blows Joe McCarthy ultimately directed against the same subjects. So it was not surprising that Kennedy should imply sympathy for McCarthy's efforts.

The motivation for Kennedy's maverick speeches on foreign policy puzzled many observers. If he was not adhering to the Democratic Party's policy line, as he clearly was not, then was he merely echoing the sentiments of his father? There were some similarities in their views. However, there were many more instances where Kennedy expressed opinions which were diametrically opposed to the views of

his father. Unlike his son, Joseph Kennedy was flatly against United States military involvement in Europe, or the Far East for that matter. If necessary, he was willing to write off Western Europe to Communism.

In a well-publicized speech at the University of Virginia in December, 1950, Joseph Kennedy denounced the foreign policy of the Truman Administration as "suicidal" and "morally bankrupt". He favored abandoning Asia and Europe in the face of the "massed manpower and military strength of a type that the world has never seen."[30] He preferred to concentrate United States troops and arms strictly in the Western Hemisphere. It was the voice of the isolationist. His viewpoint was essentially the same as the one he held prior to World War II. Korea, he said, was a "costly and staggering extravaganza." Postwar handouts to Western Europe, he contended, had netted the United States not one "foul-weather friend." He depicted the United Nations as a "hopeless instrumentality for world peace." America must rely on its own strength and restrict it commitments and the first was "to get out of Korea. . . ." He held the same view toward Europe. "What have we gained by staying in Berlin?" he asked. "Everyone knows we can be pushed out the moment the Russians choose to push us out. Isn't it better to get out more and use the resources that otherwise would be sacrificed, at a point that counts?" Clearly, unlike his son, Joseph Kennedy recognized no vital American interest in Western Europe.

During this period, 1947 to 1950, Joseph Kennedy attacked the United States' loan to Britain, the Truman Doctrine's aid to Greece

and Turkey, and by implication at least, the Marshall Plan. John Kennedy supported all these policies, and in addition urged a United States troop commitment to Western Europe. Although they both criticized aspects of Truman's foreign policy, Joseph Kennedy's criticism was much more far-reaching and all inclusive. For the most part, Joseph Kennedy opposed overseas commitments whereas John Kennedy supported foreign economic and military commitments even though he was determined that the Allies carry their share of the burden. Given all their differences of opinion, it does not seem adequate to simply suggest that Joseph Kennedy's influence inspired his son to revolt against parts of Truman's foreign policy.

Kennedy's main criticism of Truman was with his China policy. Considering the high-pitched emotionalism in America at the time of the "loss" of China, and the fuzzy and shallow thinking Kennedy displayed on the issue, it is probable that he was genuinely shocked and that his speeches were the result of an instinctive, emotional reaction. It is also probable that his speeches were conceived primarily as popular attention-getting devices rather than as substantive critiques of policy. His speeches were undoubtedly popular with his strongly anti-Communist constituency. The issue allowed him to play the maverick against the leadership of his party without antagonizing local interests. And Kennedy later acknowledged that he never had the feeling that he needed Truman. Victor Lasky contends that Kennedy's personal revolt against the Truman Administration was motivated in part by the findings of pollsters, financed by his father, which concluded that Truman's policies, particularly in the foreign policy sphere, were becoming increasingly unpopular in Massachusetts.[31]

As Kennedy's second term in Congress drew to a close in 1950,

he focused on an issue that became a major theme of his Congressional years--that of anti-colonialism. Specifically, he referred to France's struggle with the Viet Minh nationalists in Indochina. His speech at Boston University on May 26, 1950, was the first of his many addresses on the problems in French Indochina.[32] Kennedy spoke of the steadily mounting pressure against the French in Indochina and he emphasized the necessity for France to win the support of the Indochinese people in that struggle. This was to become the major point of his frequent speeches on Indochina during the early years of the 1950's. The Communists, he argued, gained control of the nationalist movements in Southeast Asia following World War II because nationalism expressed itself in protest against Western colonial systems. "The Communists in Southeast Asia rarely sell Communism," he stated. "They sell nationalism." This was especially true in French Indochina, he said, the "new frontier" in the Cold War. "In that country the Nationalist movement held the stirrup by which Ho Chi Minh, a Communist of unusual ability, has mounted to control." As he was to advocate much more openly and vigorously following his 1951 visit to Indochina, his statements in this speech implied that the French should grant increased independence to the Indochinese states in order to win the support of the nationalist sentiment.

Kennedy recognized the difficult position of the United States. America was confronted with a dilemma. "Faced with the choice of supporting the French or the Communists," he said, "we have had by necessity to choose the French, and have thus become involved with a colonial power which is opposed by the majority of the people." Partly as a result of the disastrous French experience in Indochina,

Kennedy began to urge the United States to adopt a clearly defined anti-colonial policy. In this speech, Kennedy indicated his acceptance of what came to be known as the "domino theory". In addition, he believed that America's national interest was at stake in Indochina. "Not merely the fate of Indochina hangs in the balance," he warned, "not merely the fate of the whole of Southeast Asia, but in some measure the fate of the United States." This was a sweeping proclamation. As he was to continue to do, Kennedy firmly backed the sending of American military assistance to the French but urged that they make efforts to broaden their popular support among the people.

There was to be a persistent contradiction in Kennedy's thinking on Indochina, and in particular Vietnam. In essence, the French were waging a colonial war against nationalist forces led by Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh. Kennedy became very well-informed on the Indochina issue and he clearly recognized that it was nationalism, not Communism, that was the driving force in Indochina. He opposed French colonialism and he consistently urged France to grant "genuine" independence to the Vietnamese in order to rally the people against Ho and the Viet Minh. However, enlightened as he was, that was the contradiction. Ho Chi Minh was the true spokesman for the nationalist movement in Vietnam and any real independence for that country necessitated the recognition of that fact. There was no viable third alternative between French colonial rule and Vietnamese independence under Ho. However, Kennedy consistently opposed both French colonial rule and Ho Chi Minh and sought an elusive, and perhaps illusory, third alternative.

During his first two terms in Congress, Kennedy was curiously inconsistent on the question of whether the United States should concentrate its efforts in Western Europe or the Far East. In 1949 when he assailed Truman's China policy and again in his speech at Boston University in the spring of 1950, he asserted that the United States had "neglected and ignored" the Far East in favor of Western Europe. But, as has been indicated, he displayed no strong enthusiasm for Truman's resolute stand on Korea. In fact, in August of 1950, after the Korean War had begun, he urged increased deployment of American troops to Western Europe, not the Far East. But in 1951, following his trip to Southeast Asia, he returned to his earlier theme and contended that the United States had concentrated its attention too much in Western Europe. So there was inconsistency but in general he favored an American commitment to both areas. He fluctuated on which should receive priority. It is unclear why Kennedy was lukewarm in his support for Truman's Korean action--especially since he was so concerned about the future of the struggle in French Indochina. It is possible that on the Korean issue, he was influenced by his father's opposition to the war. However, why should this be the case when they differed on so many other issues? Many members of the United Nations, of course, most notably Britain, were less than enthusiastic in their support for Truman's policy in Korea. Perhaps Kennedy was influenced by this attitude. In any event, from his statements and the available evidence, it is unclear why he was not more consistent in his urging of an increased American commitment to the Far East.

In 1950, Kennedy was about to enter his final term in the House of Representatives. During 1951 and 1952, just prior to his Senate race against Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., he increased the frequency of his speeches on foreign policy. He was stimulated, in part, by his two study trips abroad, the first to Europe in early 1951 to gather information regarding the sending of American ground troops to Western Europe to bolster that area against a possible Russian attack, and the second to the Middle and Far East late in 1951. It was this second six-week trip, in particular, on which he was accompanied by his brother Robert, that had lasting significance for Kennedy. French Indochina became the dominant topic of his speeches during these next few years and once in the Senate, because of his early interest in the area, many considered Indochina, or Vietnam, to be "his" issue. In the main, his views on the subject were shaped by the information he gathered on this 1951 trip.

FOOTNOTES

[1]James MacGregor Burns, Kennedy, p. 79.

[2]Boston Post, March 18, 1947.

[3]See: U.S. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947, XCIII, Part 10, A1422. In the speech Kennedy stated: "Our foreign policy is the same as it has always been, from the day that discerning Monroe first enunciated the principle of the Monroe Doctrine. It merely means that time and space have brought a new interpretation to that historical document."

[4]In the spring of 1947, in contrast to his son's view, Joseph P. Kennedy stated his opposition to the entire concept of the Truman Doctrine and contended that the United States could best combat Communism by developing its own prosperity at home. See: New York Journal-American, May 25, 1947.

[5]U.S. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947, XCIII, Part 9, 10695.

[6]Boston Globe, February 15, 1948.

[7]Ibid., February 16, 1948. For another John F. Kennedy speech in support of the Marshall Plan see his address to the National Guard of Massachusetts on January 6, 1948. This speech can be found in the John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Massachusetts, Pre-Presidential Papers, 1946-1952, Boston Office Files, Box 25.

[8]U.S. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, XCV, Part 12, A904.

[9]Ibid.

[10]For an account of the speech see the Springfield Union (Massachusetts) March 15, 1948.

[11]Boston News, May 8, 1948.

[12]Boston Herald, June 7, 1948. Kennedy had earlier expressed his views to the Polish-Americans in a speech over radio station WCOP (Boston) delivered to the Polish-American Congress on June 16, 1947. See John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Massachusetts, Pre-Presidential Papers, 1946-1952, Boston Office Files, Box 25.

[13]For an account of his views see the Boston Gazette, September 20, 1948 and the Boston Sunday Post, October 31, 1948.

[14]U.S. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, XCV, Part 1, 532-533. See the Boston American, January 25, 1949, for an account of the speech. For an earlier example of Kennedy's excited concern on the China issue see an account of his Milton, Massachusetts speech in the Boston Globe, November 15, 1948.

[15]Kennedy was referring here to Owen Lattimore, the Johns Hopkins specialist on Far Eastern Studies, and John K. Fairbank, Harvard's specialist on China, both eminent scholars.

[16]See: U.S. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, XCV, Part 12, A993. The speech can also be found at the John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Massachusetts, Pre-Presidential Papers, 1946-1952, Boston Office Files, Box 25.

[17]James MacGregor Burns, John Kennedy, p. 81.

[18]Ibid., p. 93.

[19]Ibid., p. 81.

[20]See the New York Times, October 10, 1949, "Kennedy Upset Over Shelters" and the New York Times, October 31, 1949, which indicated Bernard Baruch's support for Kennedy's position.

[21]For the Alsop's article see U.S. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, SCVI, Part 13, A1242. See also James MacGregor Burns, Kennedy, p. 81.

[22]Boston Post, January 13, 1950.

[23]Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1966, p. 27.

[24]U.S. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, XCVI, Part 10, 13489-13490.

[25]U.S. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, XCVI, Part 8, 10645.

[26]U.S. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, XCVI, Part 18, A7010.

[27]U.S. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, XCVI, Part 15, A3251. The group included: Duncan S. Ballentine; Crane Brinton; McGeorge Bundy; Saville R. Davis; Martin Deutsch; John K. Fairbank; Francis L. Friedman; J. K. Galbraith; Myron P. Gilmore; Seymor Harris; William R. Hawthorne; John E. Sawyer; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr.; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.; Charles H. Taylor; Robert Wolff; Jerome Weisner; and Jerrold R. Zacharias.

[28]J. P. Mallon, "Massachusetts: Liberal and Corrupt," The New Republic, October 13, 1952, p. 10-12. Professor Arthur Holcombe of Harvard who was also present at the seminar later disputed this account. See The New Republic, November 3, 1952, p. 2.

[29]Burns, Kennedy, p. 133-134 and 289.

[30]U.S. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, XCVI, Part 18, A7723-7724. For an account of the speech see the New York Times, December 13, 1950, and Time magazine, December 25, 1950, p. 9.

[31]Victor Lasky, JFK, The Man and The Myth, p. 118.

[32]The speech can be found in the John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Massachusetts, Pre-Presidential Papers, 1946-1952, Boston Office Files, Box 23.

CHAPTER III

PREPARATION FOR THE SENATE, 1951, 1952

Kennedy had been re-elected to the House of Representatives with little difficulty in 1948 and 1950. He had never planned to remain in the House for long. As early as 1948, after just two years in the House, he had considered, then discarded, the possibility of challenging Republican Leverett Saltonstall for his Senate seat. During 1951 and 1952, Kennedy actively broadened his political base in Massachusetts. He travelled extensively through the state making speeches wherever and whenever he could. He divided each week between Washington and Massachusetts, leaving Washington late on Thursday night and returning on Monday morning after a full and hectic weekend of campaigning.[1]

During Kennedy's last term in the House, 1951-1952, his legislative accomplishments were as minimal as they had been during his previous two terms. His record of absenteeism was one of the worst in the House. To be sure, he carefully looked after the needs of his constituents, but the legislative concerns of the House did not stimulate him. He felt politically insignificant in the House.[2] The main thrust of his energy and interest during these years was directed toward increasing and broadening his voter appeal throughout Massachusetts.

But Kennedy maintained his keen interest in foreign affairs during this period when he was gearing for his campaign against

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and he greatly intensified the frequency with which he spoke on foreign policy issues. In Massachusetts he spoke to many different clubs and organizations and foreign policy was the predominant topic. He was clearly stimulated by his two study trips abroad, the first to Europe in early 1951, and the second to the Middle East and Far East in the fall of 1951. In addition to his ever-present concern for America's military preparedness, there were three conspicuous foreign policy issues that attracted Kennedy's attention during 1951 and 1952. The first concerned the heated debate over whether or not the United States should commit ground troops to the Western Europe NATO Allies, to help protect them against a possible Russian attack. The second issue grew out of his trip to the Middle East and Far East. Although Kennedy supported American military assistance to the NATO Allies for the defense of Europe, he strongly criticized the colonial policies of Britain and France for thwarting the nationalistic aspirations of the people in the underdeveloped world. Specifically, he attacked French policy in Indochina and British policy in Iran. The theme of anti-colonialism was consistently evident. The third issue which also developed out of this trip, concerned America's economic assistance programs to the underdeveloped nations, especially those to the Middle East. During this phase of his career, Kennedy adamantly opposed straight economic aid to the underdeveloped world but, as a result of his trip, he reversed his opinion sufficiently to become an enthusiastic supporter of technical assistance programs as a means to combat Communism.

During 1951 and 1952, Americans were frustrated with the military

stalemate in Korea. Partly as a result of the huge military commitment in Korea, many Americans vigorously opposed sending any additional troops to Europe for defense purposes. However, in late 1950, President Truman announced that he was substantially increasing the strength of American forces in Western Europe. This statement angered many leading Republicans, such as former President Hoover and Senator Taft and others, who strongly opposed the sending of more troops to Europe. They argued that Europe's defense was the responsibility of the Allies. Many Senators also contended that Truman's commitment of troops to Europe was a usurpation of Congress's authority. In this vein, Senator Kenneth Wherry introduced a resolution in early January, 1951, which stated that no American ground forces could be assigned to Europe without Congressional approval.

Beginning in January, 1951, at his own expense, Kennedy took a five-week tour of Europe, visiting the major nations of NATO in order to determine his position on the issue. He managed an interview with Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia, who told him that 1951 would be a "dangerous year" for the peace of Europe and the world. At a news conference in Belgrade, Kennedy stated that Tito vowed to support the United Nations if Russia attacked Western Europe.[3] Kennedy explained that he included Yugoslavia on his tour because it was "useless to talk about the defense of Europe without also talking about Yugoslavia in its position against Russia." Kennedy had an audience with the Pope and interviews with Franco in Spain and some cabinet level officials in the various countries. However, according to James MacGregor Burns, most of his information on Western Europe's defense efforts and capabilities came from off-the-record talks with

second-level government officials such as deputy ministers.[4] While on his tour, Kennedy kept a record of his various observations and interviews and on his return home, in early February, he delivered a nationwide radio report of his findings, broadcast over the Mutual Broadcasting network, originating from New York.

Kennedy had visited England, France, and Italy, the major European members of the North Atlantic Pact and three other countries--West Germany, Yugoslavia and Spain, which were not members of the Pact, but whose problems, loyalties, and capabilities, Kennedy explained, were vital to the question of the defense of Western Europe. In his radio broadcast, Kennedy made a lengthy assessment of each nation's defense efforts.[5] On the whole he charged that Europe was not carrying its share of the defense burden. Except for Yugoslavia and Spain, where he detected a willingness to fight, he thought the nations of Western Europe were not drafting enough men, were not devoting enough money, and were not in a sufficiently determined mood for a real defense effort. In his country-by-country appraisal of national defense abilities, Kennedy sympathized with the general war weariness of the European peoples and recognized the argument that their economic recovery could be hampered by a heavy burden of rearmament. But he felt that it was necessary for them to do more. They were not making enough sacrifices.

He made an attempt to understand the attitudes of the various countries toward rearmament. In addition to the general war weariness in England, he noted clear resentment against the United States' policy in Korea, partly because the British thought it a waste and a diversion of valuable resources which might be devoted

to Europe, and even more because it enhanced the chances of war with Russia. Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia stated this view to Kennedy also. Kennedy was most critical of France's efforts. In France he detected a "sense of division and confusion" and charged that her economy gave "little sense of being attuned toward a war effort." In short, he felt that France's military production and planning was both ineffective and inefficient.[6]

Kennedy was impressed by West Germany's post-war economic resurgence and considered it imperative to incorporate that nation into the Western European defense system. With respect to Italy, he voiced his sympathy for its precarious economic state and he understood the prevalent argument that the burden of rearmament might so lower the standard of living that it would aid the growth of the Communist parties. The peace treaty with Italy following World War II, he pointed out, still placed limitations on the size of an armed force permitted. But even so, he contended that Italy could do more to fill her allowable quota. The great need in Spain, as in Yugoslavia, was for military equipment. Kennedy considered Spain vitally important to Europe's defense and argued that the nation should be involved in any plans for the defense of Western Europe, even though he found sharp "distrust and distaste" for the Franco regime in both Britain and France. But, Kennedy concluded, Spain, with an army willing to fight, and "as a base for operations, as a source of power, and because of its strategic position straddling the Mediterranean, [Spain] can no longer be ignored." Kennedy had urged this general policy earlier, in the summer of 1950, when he offered his amendment to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, calling for the United States to direct

$75 million in military assistance to Spain.

In his radio address, Kennedy essentially argued that the United States should help Europe but only if Europe was willing to help itself. Compared to the gloomy defeatism of his father's December, 1950, University of Virginia speech, in which the ex-Ambassador declared that Europe was physically and morally bankrupt and that the United States should forego assistance there, Kennedy was more hopeful at least. He was not ready to write off Europe as an ally. However, in his conclusion he declared: "We can and will survive despite Europe, but with her it will be that much easier." It is interesting that Kennedy was understanding of Italy's position and harsh on France, despite some parallels in their economic situations. However, Kennedy's district was heavily populated with Italian-Americans.

One of the more controversial issues in Congress during 1951 concerned President Truman's decision to integrate American troops within a North Atlantic Pact military force with General Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander. There was substantial Congressional opposition to this policy. Senator Wherry's resolution would have denied the President the authority to send American troops abroad in peacetime without Congressional approval. President Truman, of course, believed that he had the authority without Congressional approval. The issue ultimately led to a Congressional hearing conducted by the Joint Senate Committees of Foreign Relations and Armed Services. There were two questions under consideration--the proposed assignment of American troops to Europe and the related issue raised by the Wherry resolution. Kennedy was invited to present his on-the-spot

observations to the joint committee hearing. He followed such notables as General Eisenhower, Dean Acheson, General Marshall, and various other military figures. Serving on the joint committee, along with Senators Tom Connally, Richard Russell, Wayne Morse, and others, ironically, was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

In his testimony Kennedy stated that he was convinced of the strategic importance of Western Europe.[7] He urged that the troops be sent and feared the possible collapse of the European defenses without more American troops. However, he was adamant in his demand that Western Europe increase its military efforts. In order to ensure this he advocated the adoption of a ratio system, 6 to 1, by which the Europeans would be compelled to supply six military divisions for every division sent from the United States. He felt this was the only way the United States could force Europe to do more. Kennedy avoided taking a position on the constitutional question involved in the Wherry resolution itself but he did favor Congressional supervision of his proposed ratio system. He left the implication that he favored Congressional supervision of the ratio system because he felt the Truman Administration might not enforce it. The Truman Administration was opposed to any ratio system--all the more so if it was subject to Congressional supervision, of course. So, once again, Kennedy was exhibiting his independence from the Truman Administration's policy. In response to a question from Senator Morse, however, he emphasized that he was not advocating a ratio system in order to reduce the American commitment to Western Europe but only to make the Europeans do more. "It is not a backhanded way of trying to pull out of Western Europe," he said.

Kennedy was asked by Senator Wiley if he felt that increased European rearmament might not stimulate Russia to attack. Kennedy stated that he recognized the inherent danger of this possibility but that to refuse to rearm Europe because of this reason would, in his opinion, be the "height of foolishness." Senator Wiley also asked the Congressman if he considered Europe to be the first line of United States defense. Kennedy said yes. This statement, of course, was in conflict with the view held by his father, who most emphatically did not consider Europe to be the first line of American defense. It was to this matter of the elder Kennedy's views that Senator Walter George directed his next question: "The question I am going to ask you, I want to assure you in advance is an impersonal one," he said, "although you might at first blush to think it is a personal question, I mean it not as personal."

"You come from a very distinguished American family that exercises a great influence on American public opinion. I want to ask you very impersonally, whether you remember the able speech of your father in December, 1950?" At this point, Senator George quoted from Joseph P. Kennedy's speech delivered two months earlier at the University of Virginia Law School in which he strongly opposed American commitments overseas. In that speech the Ambassador had urged the United States to get out of Korea and Berlin and confine American defenses to the Western Hemisphere.

Senator George asked if the Congressman agreed with his father's views. Kennedy's reply was both thoughtful and diplomatic. He did not presume to speak for his father, he said. Personally, he would regard the loss of Europe and its productive facilities as a threat

to American survival so he urged that "we do our utmost within reason to save it." He was in favor of sending four additional American divisions to Europe. But, he said, as a result of his trip, he realized the tremendous difficulties in building a sufficiently strong military force in Western Europe. He was aware of the reasons for his father's skepticism: "To him and to a lot of other Americans it looks like an almost hopeless job and that we are committing troops to be lost."

"But after adding up all the factors," he continued, "and considering them as cold-bloodedly as I can, I still feel that we should take the risk to save Western Europe. . . ."

"That is my position. I think you should ask my father directly as to his position."

A few months later, Kennedy returned to the issue of developing military strength for the defense of Western Europe against the threat of a Soviet attack. On the floor of the House, he denounced the harshness of the 1947 Italian Peace Treaty, realizing that Italy was needed in the military defense system.[8] The treaty placed sharp military restrictions on Italy's ability to contribute effectively to Western European defenses. Kennedy spoke of the paradox of United States policy toward Italy. On the one hand, the United States adhered to a policy which severely limited Italy's defense rearmament, yet on the other hand, gave substantial assistance to the present Italian defense program. He explained that the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty had been negotiated during the days when the United States was "appeasing Russia" in the hope that America could live in peace with Russia. But now the United States pursued a

policy of containing Russian expansion, he explained, and strong Italian assistance was needed. Kennedy introduced a resolution which provided for the release of the Government of Italy from its obligations to the United States under the present treaty, and called for the negotiation of a new peace treaty. His speech would have strong appeal, of course, to the large Italian-American population in Massachusetts.

Kennedy's substantial Irish-American constituency also found something to favor in the Congressman's advocacy of strengthening the European defense system. In the House on September 27, 1951, Kennedy spoke in favor of a resolution which would have paved the way toward the unification of Ireland. In addition to the other obvious motivations, the defense-minded Kennedy argued: "A free, united, integrated Ireland would provide an important bastion for the defense of the West, and would contribute to the strategic security of the United States."[9] His fellow Congressmen must have been amused by this line of argument.

During 1951, of course, the Korean War was the dominant issue in American foreign policy. In the spring of 1951, Americans learned that Great Britain, and other countries, were supplying Communist China with rubber and other articles which could be considered useful to China in her war effort in Korea. Kennedy was outraged by this shipment of materials to China which he termed "trade in blood."[10] He urged Congress to take action that would forbid any further shipment of materials, useful in war, to Communist China directly, or even indirectly through Hong Kong. This ban would apply to the United States as well as any other member nation of the United

Nations whose military forces were engaged in Korea. He cited statistics which indicated the increased importance of Hong Kong as a gateway for goods to China. Natural rubber was the most crucial item going to China from Great Britain, but lesser amounts of iron and steel were also involved. According to Kennedy, the United States had placed an effective embargo on American shipments of goods directly to China, but there was still a substantial export trade with Hong Kong. The bill also attempted to restrict exportation of war materials to China or Hong Kong by other nations. This would be accomplished by denying American economic aid, except assistance granted under the Mutual Defense Act, to any nation that engaged in such trade.

Kennedy did not speak very often on the Korean conflict itself. However, he did voice his opinion on the dramatic Truman-MacArthur controversy which finally resulted in the General being removed from all his commands on April 11, 1951. The removal of MacArthur from command touched off an emotional nation-wide debate. In a speech in Worcester on May 7, 1951, Kennedy came out against General MacArthur's proposal to bomb Manchuria because he believed Russia would go to war to prevent the collapse of Communist China.[11] However, he supported three of MacArthur's main proposals; prevention of Communist seizure of Formosa; naval and economic blockades of Communist China; and the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. But Kennedy did not want to "risk World War III" by a direct attack on Communist China. Kennedy praised the General, especially for his "tremendous performance" in the Congressional hearings then being conducted. It was unfortunate, Kennedy felt, that the MacArthur

removal had a tendency to follow party lines--Republicans often pro-MacArthur and Democrats, anti-MacArthur. In this speech, Kennedy returned to the issue of the military situation in Europe and stated he was against sending any more troops to Europe until the North Atlantic Pact nations had provided 36 divisions for General Eisenhower's command.

Kennedy's concern for America's national defense affected his attitude toward domestic programs. In a debate in the House on May 15, 1951, over a Department of Agriculture flood control program, Kennedy introduced an amendment that would have sharply reduced the appropriation from $8,000,000 to $2,500,000.[12] He thought the program was "most worth while" but believed it could be postponed. This was a "critical" year for defense, he argued, and "we should not go ahead with projects which are not of a defense nature." Kennedy was conservative fiscally except when it came to defense expenditures and, of course, the flood control program did not vitally effect his state.

In August, 1951, the House was debating the issue of building United States air bases in Europe as a deterrent to possible Soviet aggression. Some raised the question whether the rearmament of Western Europe generally would serve as a deterrent to war or as a stimulus. Would a speedy rearmament program cause Russia to feel sufficiently endangered that she would attack? Kennedy believed the opposite to be true--that a slow rate of rearmament would be more likely to invite a Soviet attack. The rearmament of Europe was not being done quickly enough, he stated. And the European nations were not doing their part. Not one of these nations, with the possible exception of Breat Britain, he argued, was "devoting the percentage

of her income anywhere near equal to that of our country for rearmament."[13] "I do not object to sending American troops or American money there if I thought that the Europeans were doing their part," he asserted. And he felt that a half-hearted rearmament program would be "the best way to bring on a war with Russia."

In the fall of 1951, Kennedy prepared to take his extended study trip to the Middle East and Far East. His observations on this trip caused him to revise his earlier attitude on America's economic aid program to the Middle East, especially under the Point Four Program. In August, 1951, prior to his trip, he introduced an amendment calling for a reduction in United States economic aid to the Middle East but the following year, after his trip, he admitted he had been mistaken and came out for economic-technical aid to the area as a means of preventing Communist advances. In the August debate in the House, Kennedy's amendment would have cut economic aid from $175,000,000 to $140,000,000. He supported military assistance to the area but did not think the United States could afford to "raise the standard of living of all the people all over the globe who might be subject to the lure of communism because of a low standard of living."[14] The debate also related to military and economic aid to Europe. Kennedy felt it would be a great mistake to cut military assistance to Europe, as one proposed amendment would have done, but he did favor an amendment which called for a cut in economic aid to Europe. He again stated his disappointment with the slowness and the inadequacy of the European commitment to rearmament.

Congressmen Jacob Javits and Abraham Ribicoff tried to change Kennedy's mind on his amendment to reduce economic aid to the Middle

East, arguing that the aid was necessary if you supported technical assistance and the Point Four Program. Kennedy believed that his cuts could be applied to selected specifics of which he disapproved. Javits and Ribicoff tried to explain to him that the cuts would be across the board but Kennedy did not yield. If his amendment had passed, which it did not, it would have hurt the new state of Israel. Some contended later that Kennedy simply misunderstood the language of the original bill.[15] In any event, it was clear from Kennedy's statements, at this time, that he was not an eager advocate of economic aid to underdeveloped countries.

However, at the time of this debate the question of aid to Latin America was also under consideration. Kennedy offered another amendment, which was also defeated. Here he wanted to reduce aid from $40,000,000 to $20,000,000. But there was a difference. Whereas in Europe and the Middle East he supported military assistance and opposed economic aid, in Latin America he took the opposite position. He favored giving the Latin American nations economic assistance but saw no point in giving them $40,000,000 of military assistance when Latin America "was not in the line of the Soviet advance."[16] Military equipment was needed much more in Western Europe, he said. He suggested that it might be feasible to cut out military aid to Latin America completely but conceded "there may be some use for it." Therefore, he proposed a reduction. However, his amendment was defeated by a vote of 108 to 98.[17]

Even before taking his trip to the Middle-East and the Far East in the fall of 1951, Kennedy was critical of United States policy in those areas. On April 21, 1951, he spoke to the Annual Meeting of the

Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Associations.[18] He spoke of the rise of nationalism in the Far East as well as the Middle East and observed that the force of these movements was directed "primarily against the colonial policies of the West." He expressed sharp concern over the recent nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by the Iranian Government and the effect this could have on the strategic position of the West. He understood the reasons for Iran's action, however, and the reasons for discontent in the underdeveloped nations generally. He spoke of the exploitation by foreign countries of the resources and manpower of backward nations, and of the widespread illiteracy, misery and starvation. He noted the "domination by venal and corrupt politicans," and the "massive and inefficient bureaucracy." All this breeds turmoil and discontent, he said. And faced with these disruptive forces in a vital strategic area, he asserted, "United States policy has been weak and vacillating." He believed Britain's "exploitation policy" in the area was even more "short-sighted" and he feared the consequences if the British Government decided to retaliate by moving troops into Iran. "We could be carried into World War III," he warned, "by a series of chain reactions over which our control would be limited."

He urged the United States to develop a firm policy with respect to the Middle East because of the importance of that area to the system of collective defense that the United States was developing throughout the world. For strategic reasons, the United States could not afford to allow the Soviet Union to gain control of the Middle East. Therefore, he suggested the advantages of initiating a regional defense pact there, similar to the North Atlantic Pact or of extending

the North Atlantic Pact to include both Greece and Turkey, and the other countries of the Middle East. He recognized the importance of attempting to correct the serious domestic conditions which caused the internal instability in these countries, but he was quick to point out that because the economy of the United States was "already strained from bearing the financial burdens of the free world," only economic measures that could be considered "primarily in relation to the security" of the area must be considered.

With respect to alleviating the abject poverty of the peoples throughout Asia, Kennedy felt that the policy of the United States was inadequate. "Asia's problem is landlordism," he declared. Because the United States did nothing to urge a basic revision in the land systhem in these nations, he believed the various United States technical assistance programs would be hopeless and ineffective. He was critical of the billions of dollars the United States placed behind "corrupt and reactionary governments" which only tightened the hold of the oligarchy. The great weakness of United States policy in this area he lamented, was that it was merely anti-communist and "Pro-nothing". Too often the United States was placed in partnership with reactionary groups, he said, "whose policies breed the discontent on which Soviet Communism feeds and prospers."

All in all, Kennedy's address dealt in sweeping generalities and focused more on criticisms than in offering thought-out alternatives. Just how does the United States force a policy of land reform in an undeveloped nation against the wishes of the ruling oligarchy? His speech was perceptive but short on specific suggestions. He recognized the need for fundamental reform programs

in the underdeveloped nations, but stated his unwillingness to initiate a broad program of economic assistance because of the "strained" economy of the United States. In subsequent speeches following his trip to the Middle East, he returned to many of the themes stated in this speech. The only shift in his opinion was his switch to support for technical assistance programs.

Kennedy left on his trip in early October, 1951, accompanied by his brother Robert and sister, Pat. In addition to the Middle East, he stopped in Pakistan, India, French Indochina, Malaya, Korea, Okinawa and Japan. The trip ended on November 8, in Japan, after Kennedy suffered a relapse of malaria with which he was stricken during the war in the Pacific. He became ill on Okinawa and had to postpone a trip to Formosa.[19] For a time there was some doubt that he would survive.

At the outset of the trip Kennedy flew to Israel after having first conferred with General Eisenhower in Paris.[20] He proceeded to Iran. He spoke with a number of high government officials in Iran and concluded that there was danger Iran might fall under Soviet influence unless the oil revenues were restored to Iran and aid was received from the United States.[21] "I believe the overriding United States consideration here should be to keep Russia out of Iran," he said.[22] But he spoke with a measure of uncertainty. "If we give economic aid to Iran," he said, "the British may accuse us of interfering with her efforts to squeeze Iran into negotiating a settlement in the oil controversy. If we don't aid Iran, then Iran will think we are siding with the British." It was not clear just what he was advocating that the United States should do.

As on his European tour earlier in the year, Kennedy kept notes on his observations and interviews on this seven week trip. Among others, Kennedy had managed interviews with General Eisenhower and General Ridgway, with Prime Ministers Ben Gurion, Nehru, and Liaguat Ali Khan of Pakistan (only hours before his assassination), and with Emperor Bao Dai of Indochina.

When interviewed upon his arrival in New York, and again in a nation-wide radio broadcast two days later, Kennedy stressed the same themes.[23] He said that America's diplomacy in Southeast Asia had been in many ways a failure and he saw the situation as deteriorating. America's prestige which had been high in Southeast Asia following World War II, he said, had been "lost" in the minds of the people. His major criticism was that the United States had tied itself too closely with the colonial policies of Great Britain and France and, as a result, had lost the support of the peoples of the underdeveloped world. In contrast, he said, the Communists had allied themselves with the desires of the people for complete independence.

Of American policy in Indochina, Kennedy had little good to say: "We have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of power," he said. He emphasized that there was no broad, general support for the native Vietnam Government among the people of that area and he said there would be none "until the French give clear indications that, despite their gallantry, they are fighting not merely for themselves but for the sake of strengthening a non-Communist native government so that it can move safely toward independence." His criticism was sharp and constructive. He

stated that the Indochinese states were merely puppet states and were as typical examples of empire and colonialism as could be found anywhere. Force of arms alone would not stop the southern drive of Communism. It was necessary to build strong native non-Communist sentiment, he said, and rely on that rather than upon the legions of General de Lattre. And to do this, he said, "apart from and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure."

He said the United States should not merely support the French but "should stand for the aspirations of the people for independence and reforms." The American position in Indochina, he said, should have been defined "in the beginning" as backing independence. He warned that the position of the French in Indochina was "extremely serious" and he declared flatly that there was "no doubt that the majority of the people are on the side of the guerrillas." He urged that the position of the United States be made distinct from that of the French: "We should make it clear to the people that while we are helping a colonial power fight Communism, that we stand for independence and better conditions once the fight against the Reds has been won."

Kennedy made it clear, however, that he did not want the French and the Americans to pull out of Indochina. He firmly believed in the domino theory and warned that if Indochina fell, "we can write off the rest of Southeast Asia." He went even further. If Indochina was lost, he said, it would be "a major crisis" for the United States. India would be endangered and the Middle East would be in a serious position. He also suggested that the Far East generally had been neglected by the United States because of its concern with

Western European defense. He quoted a State Department official in Saigon as saying that no member of Congress had visited there in the past two years.

In his radio broadcast, Kennedy also spoke of the Middle East. He lamented, but understood why, the Arab nations' hostility toward England and France was directed toward the United States. Not only did America support the colonial policies of Britain and France, but America also supported Israel. In contrast, he noted the growing friendship between Russia and the Arab nations. He emphasized, however, that "Communism cannot be met effectively by merely the force of arms." The main problem in the Arab world was poverty and want and the United States should focus its policy there. Instead, he observed, the United States had too often supported an "inequitable status quo" involving the protection of foreign investment. He recognized the adverse consequences of America's support for England's oil investments in Iran. In all, he offered a very sympathetic understanding of the Arab nations' problems and the valid reasons for their distrust and suspicion of the West. Kennedy spoke of the anti-Western and anti-America sentiment he observed in India but noted it was more of a neutralistic attitude than was the case in the Arab world. India simply wished to remain outside the confines of either America or Russia.

Kennedy's comments constituted a bold criticism of America's tendency to support its European allies' policies at the expense of the peoples of the Middle and Far East. He blamed American representatives stationed in these critical areas for "toadying to the shorter aims of other Western nations, with no eagerness to understand

the real hopes and desires of the peoples to which they are accredited, too often aligning themselves too definitely with the "haves" and regarding the actions of the "have-nots" as not merely an effort to cure injustice but as something sinister and subversive." Viewed from the perspective of 1971, Kennedy's criticisms take on an even heightened measure of validity. He quite effectively pinpointed the shortcomings of American foreign policy in the underdeveloped world but he did not specify exactly what the United States could do to alter appreciably British or French policies. Should the United States ever align itself with the nationalist groups in opposition to British or French policy? This problem, of course, is an extremely difficult and sensitive one. However, Kennedy gradually became persuaded that such a policy was at times necessary. Several years later, in regard to France's colonial policy in Algeria, Kennedy did openly urge the United States to actively support the cause of the Algerian nationalists in their fight for independence from French colonial rule. At the time, he referred to the harsh and tragic lesson of Indochina.

According to both Victor Lasky and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Kennedy's views on Indochina were influenced substantially by Edmund A. Gullion who was attached to the Saigon legation at the time of Kennedy's visit to Vietnam. Also, according to reports, Kennedy annoyed and argued with the United States minister to Vietnam, Donald M. Heath, and the Commander-in-Chief of the French forces, General Jean Marie de Lattre de Tassigny, during his ten-day stay in Saigon. The official American policy line at the time was uncritical support for the French in their struggle against the Vietnamese

nationalists. However, Gullion strongly disagreed with the pro-French American policy and considered France's military and political policies to be doomed to failure. Evidently, Gullion continued to influence Kennedy's views on Indochina throughout the 1950's.[25] Schlesinger wrote that years later, as President, Kennedy wanted to send Edmund Gullion to Saigon as Ambassador but that Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "in a rare moment of self assertion," was determined to make the appointment himself. Ironically, the eventual candidate was none other than Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Kennedy's opponent in the 1952 Senate race.[26]

In November, 1951, just a few days after his radio broadcast on his trip, Kennedy delivered a major foreign policy address to one of the largest audiences in the history of the Boston Chamber of Commerce.[27] He again attacked British and French colonial policies, but the main thrust of his speech was his strong opposition to unlimited economic assistance to foreign nations. He warned that "Uncle Sugar is as dangerous a role for us to play as Uncle Shylock." He reasoned that grants of money were "debilitating and wasteful" and that they tended to favor the "ins" as contrasted with the "outs." However, he stated his approval of technical assistance programs. Quite obviously, Kennedy drew a sharp distinction between technical assistance and economic aid.

"We cannot reform the world," he asserted. "There is just not enough money in the world to relieve the poverty of all the millions of this world who may be threatened by Communism. We should not attempt to buy their freedom from this threat." He stated further that expenditures of money bring no lasting results--"people who are with us merely because of things they get from us are weak reeds to

lean upon." He criticized the "naive belief" that the export of money would solve the world's ills. He advocated the export of techniques. As a result of his trip, Kennedy had also formed some strong opinions on the quality of United States diplomats overseas. He was not impressed. With some exceptions, he said, "our representatives abroad seem to be a breed of their own, moving mainly in their own limited circles, not knowing too much of the people to whom they are accredited, unconscious of the fact that their role is not tennis and cocktails. . . ."

Kennedy also criticized America's propaganda efforts in the form of the Voice of America because it did not reach the rank and file of the people. He explained that the Voice of America broadcasts were picked up on short-wave radios that only the rich could afford; and that the broadcasts were often transmitted in languages that only the rich were educated to understand. Therefore, he said, we do not reach the poor, have-not peoples of the world. Communist propaganda methods were much more effective, he declared.

In a similar speech the following day, Kennedy spoke further about the crisis in Iran.[28] The Iranians, under Premier Mossadegh, had nationalized the British oil refineries and many feared that if the British reacted militarily, the Russians might retaliate in force. Kennedy declared that the Iranian oil issue offered no simple solution. He did not wish to see the Russians move into Iran, nor did he wish to gain the enmity of Iran or see its economy collapse. He feared such an economic collapse would more likely result in a Communist coup "than bring about an invitation to the British to return." He also recognized that America should not create

unnecessary enmity with the British "as long as we link their fortunes so closely to ours in Europe." Finally, he did not want to see the tide of nationalization, attempted by Iran, "sweep southward to the American operated oil fields of Kuweit and Saudi Arabia, or westward to the important oil producing area in Iraq." What should be done? What did he advocate? "We may be damned if we do, but we are certainly damned if we don't" he said. "Personally, I believe we should work to prevent an economic collapse on the part of Iran, preserve her integrity as a nation, and thereby help her to resist whatever Russian pressure may develop from the north." Just how that should be done he did not say.

On December 2, 1951, Kennedy made his first appearance on Meet The Press.[29] Lawrence Spivak, the regular panel member, asked Kennedy about his recent trip to the Middle and Far East. Why did United States policy fail to win friends? First, Kennedy mentioned the problem of United States identification with Western imperialism. Also, there was a racial element to the problem, he said, the yellow versus the white and the United States had fallen heir to much of the hatred the British and French had incurred. Secondly, he stated that American policies "have not been too wise since the end of the war." He did not elaborate on that statement. "In the third place," he suggested, "we are a strong power and a rich country and therefore, I think there's a natural animosity that goes with that sort of power, especially when we try to impose our will on those countries." Spivak also asked if Kennedy really meant the "tennis and cocktails" quote in reference to United States diplomats overseas. Kennedy responded in the affirmative and stated the need for more well-rounded

young people in the foreign service.

Miss May Craig asked Kennedy for his view with respect to General MacArthur's recommendations for Korea. Kennedy said he would support some of the General's recommendations, "Perhaps the use of Chiang's troops in Korea," but stated that he would not support the bombing of Manchuria due to the danger of drawing the country into a war with Russia.

Mr. Ernest Lindley asked Kennedy how he would improve the position of the United States in the Middle and Far East aside from improving the quality of the Foreign Service personnel. First, Kennedy stated that our propaganda methods must be improved. Secondly, he said, that the United States should expand its program of technical assistance. He also emphasized the harmful effects of America's identification with French colonialism in Indochina. He stated the importance of winning the support of the people in Indochina and said: "I think we shouldn't give the military assistance until the French clearly make an agreement with the natives that at the end of a certain time when the Communists are defeated that the French will pull out and give this country the right of self-determination and the right to govern themselves. Otherwise, the guerrilla war is just going to spread and grow and we're going to finally get driven out of Southeast Asia."

James Reston asked him: "Would you do that in other parts of the world that you were in? Iran, for example, would you ally yourself there with the nationalistic forces?"

Kennedy replied: "I certainly would. It's the only hope. I think we've allied ourselves too closely with the British. After the

last year the British position was hopeless. They haven't got a chance to come back and we have paid the price for it."

The moderator interrupted. The time was up. Next week's guest would be Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. . . .

Not everyone agreed with the general foreign policy views of the Congressman. The editorial page of the Boston Traveller took issue with Kennedy's statement that America's close alliance with Britain and France had lost the United States many friends in the Middle and Far East. What was Kennedy proposing? Did he suggest that the United States should dissociate itself from its strongest allies? Was he proposing that the United States maintain no close allies? The editorial asked that "in the interest of world safety and that of America," Kennedy should elaborate his position.[30] Kennedy replied to the papers. He stated that he recognized that it was essential to the security of the United States that Western Europe remain free and he supported American assistance to the European nations to help them rebuild their military strength. But, he said, in American policy in the Middle East and the Far East, the United States "should not oppose the nationalistic aspirations of the people of these areas because of our European ties." He favored, for instance, the American support of independence in Indonesia against the Dutch, even though the United States was closely allied with the Dutch in Western Europe. In a personal letter to the paper submitted on December 7, 1951, Kennedy focused on Indochina and Iran. To win the struggle in Indochina, he argued, the support of the people must be gained and and to accomplish that a guarantee of future independence must be given. In Iran, he said, "our support of the British position increases

greatly the possibility of a Communist seizure of power." He closed his letter with some quotes from his Boston Chamber of Commerce speech.

In late 1951, Kennedy delivered a speech in Massachusetts that was similar to those delivered earlier which dealt with his trip, but he expanded his remarks.[31] He placed more emphasis on racism as one of the root causes of America's problems in the underdeveloped world. "We are a white race," he explained, "and it is against the white race that all of these peoples have had to make their fights for independence." He spoke of the Iranians and the Indians ousting the British and of the French trying to hang on in Indochina. The clash of races was also involved in the Korean campaign, he said. In each case, the enemy of the people seemed to be the white peoples and as a result, he said, "the prestige of the United States sank to an all-time low with that of Great Britain and France." He noted also that the drive for independence in these areas was always against a Western power, not Russia.

He spoke of the pressing need for technical assistance to the Arab nations of the Middle East. Concluding his informal talk, Kennedy told his listeners that "young college graduates would find a full life in bringing technical advice and assistance to the underprivileged and backward Middle East." "In that calling," he said, "these men would follow the constructive work done by the religious missionaries in these countries over the past 100 years." Essentially, this was the general idea of the Point Four program and later, the Peace Corps.

Kennedy spent the Christmas holidays of 1951 in Miami with his

father and the family. But he continued to be heard from. On December 27, he sent a bold telegram to President Truman. It concerned the treatment four American airmen had received from the Hungarian Government. Kennedy urged Truman that once the airmen were released, to summon the Hungarian Minister in Washington and demand restitution. "If such restitution is not forthcoming," he demanded, "I urge you to immediately sever diplomatic and commercial relations with that barbarous government." "I believe that the prestige of the United States throughout the world is involved and that vigorous determined action must be taken forthwith."[32] President Truman may not have appreciated this timely advice from the young Congressman.

During early 1952, Kennedy increasingly spoke out on what he considered unnecessary waste in American foreign economic aid programs. He had once been an enthusiastic supporter of the Marshall Plan but in mid-January, 1952, he assailed the "shocking" Marshall Plan waste in Europe. He asserted that the billions of dollars in aid to Europe was not "getting down to the people."[33] Speaking at a luncheon of the Springfield, Massachusetts Rotary Club a short time later, Kennedy demanded an immediate investigation of America's foreign aid program in order to "clamp down on mushrooming costs and extravagance in overseas expenditures."[34] He revealed that he had filed legislation calling for a bipartisan commission composed of eight members from Congress and from the executive branch to study and report on the entire foreign aid program. He stated that almost every member of Congress who had returned from an overseas inspection trip had brought back "startling examples of confusion and inefficiency in our government's activities abroad." One of the main objectives

of his bill was to keep Congress informed of overseas programs so that an efficient administration of foreign aid could be achieved. This idea was in general agreement with the proposals of the Hoover Commission then being discussed which called for government reorganization. Kennedy's father was a member of the Commission. In this luncheon speech, Kennedy stated his support for the general recommendations of the Hoover report.

Kennedy's concern for military preparedness was characteristically in evidence during his last year in the House of Representatives. On April 9, 1952, he offered an amendment to a Defense Department appropriation bill which would have increased funds to the Department of the Air Force from $12,125,044,000 to $13,560,044,000.[35] He explained that America's most serious deficiency in military strength was the weakness in the air. "We started late," he urged, "and even with a maximum effort at the present time it will be 1955 before we overtake the lead the Soviets developed during the "locust years" of 1946 to 1950." The Committee on Appropriations had cut the budget for the air program and Kennedy did not believe the country could afford "this calculated risk with our national security." In support of his amendment, Kennedy read into the Congressional Record a letter that he had received that day from R. L. Gilpatric, Under Secretary of the Air Force, which emphasized the sense of urgency.[36] The following month, in May, Kennedy again displayed his concern for defense. He labelled a proposed J. William Fulbright amendment to reduce the Defense Production Act as "injurious" to the nation.[37]

On the floor of the House on May 23, 1952, Kennedy addressed his remarks to Israel. He spoke in support of a $76,000,000 appropriation

in a mutual security bill for the Israel refugee program.[38] He extended his remarks by reading into the Congressional Record a speech he had just delivered to a group of Jewish war veterans in Boston.[39] In an election year, his speech did not convey the same sense of sympathetic understanding toward the plight of the Arab nations that he had spoken of earlier after returning from his trip to the Middle East. His speech was fervently pro-Israel.

As has been mentioned, Kennedy's trip to the Middle East caused him to change his mind on the value of technical assistance programs to the area. In 1951, he had offered an amendment to cut technical assistance to the Middle East, but in June, 1952, the technical assistance program was again under debate. Now, Kennedy rose to oppose any cuts in the program to the Middle East.[40] "We would be making a tremendous mistake to cut this money out of the bill," he warned. He mentioned that as a result of his trip to the area, he had changed his mind. Communism was making giant strides in these areas, he said, and technical assistance was the most effective weapon America had to stop it. In fact, he went so far as to say: 'Many of us feel that the United States has concentrated its attention too much on Western Europe." The situation, he warned, was desperate. The people need some hope to prevent them from being attracted to the Communists. He concluded: "We are planning to spend a very large amount of money in this area for military assistance, which is of secondary importance compared to this program. To cut technical assistance when the Communists are concentrating their efforts in this vital area seems to me a costly and great mistake." This is, of course, precisely the opposite view from that which he argued in 1951 when he

had favored only military aid to the area.

Before his trip in 1951, he had also proposed another amendment to cut military assistance to the South American Republics from $40,000,000 to $20,000,000. But on this matter he had not changed his mind. During this same debate he re-introduced the amendment. Since the South American Republics were not in a direct line of Soviet invasion, he argued, this military aid was unnecessary. In fact, he said, "we are giving them a much smaller sum of money for technical assistance which they need far more than military assistance."[41]

By the summer of 1952, Kennedy was increasingly preoccupied with his hectic campaign for the Senate against Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. The two candidates made an interesting contrast. Lodge, age 50, was the national figure. Kennedy, age 35, was the comparative unknown. It was not supposed to be a contest. Their grandfathers had opposed each other for the Senate in 1916, with Henry Cabot Lodge emerging the easy victor. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. had first entered the Senate in 1937, and thus had a record of fourteen years service. Unlike his grandfather, and to the surprise of many, he became an internationalist. Like Kennedy, he supported the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the commitment of American troops to Europe. He was an important member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. During World War II Lodge had resigned from the Senate for a tour of combat service. He had an excellent war record, with service in Libya, Italy and France. After the war he returned to the Senate by defeating the isolationist Senator David I. Walsh. In all, Senator Lodge was an impressive figure. In addition, he was a

formidable vote-getter. No other ranking Democrat in Massachusetts had dared to challenge him in 1952.

But Senator Lodge had certain political weaknesses. In the eyes of many, he was the leader of the Republican party's internationalist faction. This did not endear him to those who favored a more unilateral, nationalist position. His image as an internationalist made him vulnerable to an attack from the right flank on foreign policy. Also, Lodge was the national campaign manager for General Eisenhower. He had engineered Eisenhower's successful nomination campaign in Chicago and this won him the lasting enmity of supporters of Senator Robert Taft. Because of his duties as the national campaign manager for the Eisenhower campaign he was forced to neglect his own re-election campaign in Massachusetts. In contrast, Kennedy had been criss-crossing the state for years and was now devoting all of his time to the campaign. He launched one of the most intensive Senate campaigns Massachusetts had ever seen. But he had some weaknesses also. His comparative youth and inexperience were a drawback in some quarters. His record of absenteeism was the worst of any member of the Massachusetts Congressional delegation and was one of the worst in the entire House. During the campaign, however, in addition to Kennedy's popularity, his money, and his help, he was aided by the strong Republican factionalism of 1952. Taft Republicans' hatred for Lodge and his record proved useful to Kennedy.

On the whole, Senator Lodge had been less critical of President Truman's foreign policy than Kennedy had been. As a result, some Kennedy advisers urged that the candidate attack Lodge from the right flank rather than from the left. James MacGregor Burns found

that elaborate studies were prepared by Kennedy's staff to show that on foreign policy Kennedy stood closer to Taft's position than did Lodge.[42] The staffers used Kennedy's Congressional record to show that he had attacked some of Truman's foreign policies, that he had supported cuts in certain foreign-appropriations bills, that he had generally supported governmental economy, and that he had criticized Europe for not carrying its share of the defense burden. These advisers, Burns noted, saw Kennedy's record as not too far from the Republican nationalists, who believed that Europe was worn out, that the Democrats had "lost" China, and that Korea was "Truman's war."[43] The leader of this "Keep Right" group of advisers was Kennedy's father. But there was another group of advisers who recommended that Kennedy attack Lodge from the left. They would select different examples of Kennedy's record in the House to emphasize. He favored overseas military commitments, and to a lesser extent, some form of economic or technical assistance to underdeveloped areas. In the minds of these advisers, therefore, he should campaign as a Fair Deal Democrat. As any shrewd candidate would do, Kennedy used both battle plans when each most effectively suited his needs.

Taken separately, neither of these two conflicting images of Kennedy's foreign policy record was entirely accurate, of course. To some extent, Kennedy's record supported both claims. While he did support much of Truman's foreign policy, he also had certain views in common with the Taft Republicans. His record did not fit into a neat category and suggested, quite strongly, that he had pursued an independent course on foreign policy. Certainly, it would be a distortion to depict Kennedy as a quasi-nationalist-isolationist

on foreign policy who was in complete agreement with the views of men like his father. But he did not fit the mold of the complete Democratic-internationalist either.

In any event, after studying the campaign of 1952, Burns concluded that Kennedy did receive significant behind-the-scenes assistance from some Taft Republicans. But Burns also concluded that the Senate campaign was not won on issues, but more on personality. The voters, he contended, were not able to see any clear distinction between the two candidates on foreign policy. Their records were very similar. However, Kennedy won the election by a margin of some 70,000 votes in a year when Eisenhower carried the state by a substantial margin. Indeed, it was an impressive upset.

Shortly after the election, on November 9, 1952, Kennedy made his second appearance on Meet The Press. He was fresh from his sensational victory. Lawrence Spivak, in his introduction, in rather expansive terms, hailed Kennedy as "the most important Democratic figure in New England" as a result of his upset victory.[44]

The first question addressed to the Senator-elect focused upon the foreign policy issue in the recent campaign. Senator Lodge was "the outstanding Republican symbol of international foreign policy, a symbol of bipartisan foreign policy." Did Kennedy believe his defeat of Senator Lodge was a repudiation of that policy? Kennedy thought not since, he said, "there was not a tremendous difference between us on foreign affairs." How then, the panelist asked, did Kennedy explain the support he received from the Taft wing of the Republican Party in Massachusetts? Kennedy replied that his help from that quarter was small. The panelist reminded Kennedy that he

had also had the support of the Chicago Tribune which was a very "strong isolationist pro-Taft paper." As was well-known, the paper had long been an enthusiastic supporter of Joseph Kennedy's views but Kennedy stated that he did not know exactly why the paper had supported him. He suggested that the support came not because they agreed with his politics but because "they disagreed with the part Mr. Lodge played in defeating Senator Taft." In any event, he said, while he appreciated their support, the Chicago Tribune did not have great influence in Massachusetts. The Senate election could not have been a repudiation of Lodge's foreign policy, he said, because he "had supported it in the main."

Later in the interview, the questioning returned to foreign affairs. Kennedy was asked what he would suggest in terms of a new policy for the Middle East since he had been critical of the Truman Administration's policy in the area. He stated that as a result of his trip to the Middle East a year ago, he concluded that Britain's position in Iran was hopeless. He believed the United States "should have thrown its weight completely with the Iranians." He thought time would prove him correct. Also, Kennedy pointed to his record of encouraging more extensive assistance to the area under the Point Four program. He implied that this assistance should be expanded. He did not say so, but he was undoubtedly referring to technical assistance rather than straight economic aid. He acknowledged that he had agreed with the Truman Administration's policy of support for Israel.

What did he think the United States should do in French Indochina? Should the United States increase its aid to the French in that

struggle? Kennedy re-stated the view that he had uttered many times following his trip, that the United States had identified itself too much with the French. He regretted that American assistance to the French had not required, as a prerequisite, that the French guarantee to the people of Indochina that they would leave the country once the Communist movement had been crushed. Only this, Kennedy felt, would win the support of the native people in the struggle. He urged that the United States do more to win the support of the native groups, but he did not suggest exactly how this should be done. He was certain, however, that the war would eventually be lost if the support of the natives was not won. Most of the Asiatics regard the French as imperialists, he said, and the United States, by merely supporting the French with no guarantees to the people, ran the risk of financing a losing cause. However, he favored continued assistance to the French. The implication of his remarks was that America should continue to support the French effort, but should somehow force the French to offer meaningful guarantees of independence to the people, which was necessary to win the native support, which in turn was so vital to the success of the struggle against the Communists. Unfortunately, he did not suggest exactly how the United States could achieve such cooperation. Following the questions on Indochina, the panelists shifted to domestic issues concerning the budget, parochiaid, and Taft-Hartley.

During Kennedy's final term in the House of Representatives, 1951-1952, he consistently supported America's military commitment to Western Europe, although he demanded that Europe contribute more. Similarly, he was consistent in his criticism of British and French

colonial policies, especially in Iran and Indochina. And, he warned that the United States suffered from too close an identification with Western colonialism. During this period, he reversed his opinions on the value of technical assistance programs, especially in the Middle East. He became convinced that technical assistance was an essential tool with which to combat Communism in the underdeveloped world. However, he consistently opposed straight economic aid programs for two reasons; first, the United States did not have sufficient capital to "reform the world", and second, he contended that economic aid frequently served to entrench the anti-democratic ruling oligarchies and did not reach the people.

As the campaign of 1952 illustrated, during his years in the House, Kennedy had managed to develop an independent record on foreign policy which enabled him to project a double image. He had shared common views with both the Taft-Republican-nationalists and the Truman Administration. During the period 1953-1956, he greatly expanded his involvement in Congressional debates on foreign policy. The issues were many but the heightening crisis in French Indochina attracted more of his time and was the subject of more of his speeches than any other.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Goddard Lieberson and Joan Meyers (ed.), John Fitzgerald Kennedy . . . .As We Remember Him (New York: A Columbia Records Collection Book, 1965), p. 54. Francis X. Morrissey, Kennedy's executive assistant in Massachusetts, who accompanied him on automobile trips throughout the state reminisced: "In four and a half years we never took more than ten minutes to eat. We lived on cheeseburgers, hamburgers, malted milks and "frappes"--milk shakes with ice-cream in them. By election day, 1952, he had been in 351 cities and towns, appeared many times in each. I'll bet he talked to at least a million people and shook hands with 750,000."

[2]See James MacGregor Burns, John Kennedy, p. 93. Kennedy later reflected to James M. Burns, "We were just worms over in the House--noboby pays much attention to us nationally." Charles Bartlett, a long-time Kennedy friend, recalled: "I don't think he ever was really stimulated by the House of Representatives. I always had the feeling that when he ran against Henry Cabot Lodge in 1952, he really wanted to get out of the House of Representatives, even if it cost him his political life. He said it was an odds-on effort against Lodge, but he really didn't care. I think he felt that the House, for him, had become a waste of time. . . I think the same frustration that he felt in the newspaper business worked against him here." For Bartlett's remarks, see: As We Remember Him, p. 54.

[3]For an account of this press conference see: New York Times, January 26, 1951. The Boston Herald, January 26, 1951, carried the lengthiest account of the conference. See also the Boston Post and the Worcester Telegram both on January 26.

[4]Burns, Kennedy, p. 82.

[5]A complete account of the radio broadcast can be found in: U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, XCVII, Part 1, 1301-1303. The following newspapers carried an analysis of the speech on Feburary 7, 1951: The Boston Globe; the Worcester Telegram; the Boston Herald; and the Boston Post. For a critical editorial comment on the speech, which offered a sympathetic defense of Europe's efforts see, the Worcester Gazette, February 8, 1951.

[6]Kennedy reiterated many of these same points in a speech to the Crosscup-Pishon Post of the American Legion in Boston. See: Boston

Post, February 9, 1951. Several days after Kennedy's address, Albert Chambon, the French Consul in Boston, sharply disagreed with Kennedy's assessment of France's efforts. Kennedy had implied that one reason France was tardy in taking the necessary steps to meet the Russian threat was the presence of 5 million Communists in France. Chambon charged that this figure was based on the 1945 election records and was, therefore, outdated and a gross exaggeration. The strength of the Communists had greatly decreased, Chambon insisted. Also, he contended that France' rearmament program had doubled in the past year, that the French economy was healthy, and that France had already agreed to furnish 25 divisions to the Pact. For Chambon's criticisms see: the Boston Globe and the Boston Post on February 11, 1951. Kennedy's response to Chambon's comments appeared in the Boston Globe, on February 11, 1951.

[7]See: Hearings Before The Committee on Foreign Relations and The Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, on S. Con. Res. 8, A Concurrent Resolution Relative To The Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States To Duty In The European Area. pp. 424-444. For a newspaper account of the hearing see: Boston Globe, February 23, 1951. On March 1, 1951, about a week after testifying, Kennedy spoke to a Junior Chamber of Commerce meeting in Massachusetts and repeated the same points. See: Lawrence Evening Tribune, March 2, 1951. He delivered another variation of the same speech on March 4, 1951, to 500 alumnae of Emmanuel College in in Massachusetts. See: Boston Globe, March 5, 1951. Kennedy returned to the same theme again in an early April speech. See: Berkshire Evening Eagle, April 9, 1951.

[8]U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, XCVII, Part 3, 3561-3562. The Boston Globe carried an account of the speech on April 9, 1951.

[9]U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, XCVII, Part 9, 12276. Three years later, on January 6, 1955, Kennedy submitted a resolution for the unification of Ireland.

[10]U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, XCVII, Part 4, 5145-5146, and 5154. For an account of his remarks and resolution see: New York Times, May 10, 1951.

[11]Worcester Telegram, May 7, 1951.

[12]U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, XCVII, Part 4, 5352. See also Boston Globe, May 16, 1951.

[13]U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, XCVII, Part 8, 10185-10186.

[14]U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, XCVII, Part 8, 10265, and 10234-10235.

[15]See: Ralph G. Martin and Ed Plaut, Front Runner, Dark Horse (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), p. 171.

[16]U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, XCVII, Part 8, 10290.

[17]Ibid.

[18]The speech can be found in the John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Massachusetts, Pre-Presidential Papers, 1946-1952, Boston Office Files, Box 25.

[19]See: Lawrence Evening Tribune, November 8, 1951.

[20]Boston Globe, October 4, 1951.

[21]Lawrence Evening Tribune, October 11, 1951.

[22]Ibid.

[23]For newspaper accounts of the airport press conference see: Boston Globe; Boston Daily Record; Boston Evening American; Boston Daily Globe; Manchester, New Hampshire Union-Leader; and the Lawrence Evening Tribune, all on November 12, 1951. For a copy of the radio report see John F. Kennedy Library Boston Office Speech Files, 1946-1952, Box 23. The Boston Herald and the Boston Globe carried an account of the address on November 15, 1951. There is another Kennedy speech, undated, in Box 23 devoted entirely to the question of French Indochina. It appears as though it was written a short time after the radio address. In this speech he spoke of General de Lattre's death. Here Kennedy opposed the idea of direct United States intervention in Indochina. He favored rather the intervention of the nations of Asia, such as India, Pakistan and Indonesia. Without the support of the people of Asia, he believed any intervention would fail. But with the support and leadership of these nations he felt the war in Indochina "would cease to appear as a war between native communists and western imperialists, between the white and yellow man." "It would then become a struggle to preserve Asiatic democracy and the independence of native governments against the new imperialism of the communists."

[24]See Victor Lasky, JFK, The Man and the Myth, p. 127-128, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1967), A Fawcett Crest Book, pp. 299-300.

[25]In his Kennedy, Sorensen stated that one of Kennedy's 1954 speeches on Indochina was checked with Gullion. See p. 74.

[26]Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 299-300.

[27]For various accounts of the speech see: Boston Globe and New York Herald Tribune on November 19, 1951; and the New York Times, Boston Herald, and Boston Evening American on November 20, 1951. Between the time of his radio address and the Boston Chamber of Commerce speech, Kennedy spoke to 400 members of the Goodyear Parent Teachers Association at the Goodyear Elementary School, Boston. Here he emphasized the theme that many Asians saw the United States as imperialistic because of the close identification with Britain and France. See the Boston Globe, November 18, 1951.

[28]For an account of this speech see: Lowell Sun, November 21, 1951.

[29]Meet The Press, December 2, 1951. Transcript.

[30]See Dec. 4,1951 issue. Kennedy replied to the paper Dec. 5-14, 1951.

[31]For an account of the speech see the Lowell Sun, December 9, 1951. Kennedy spoke on the same general themes in a speech on December 18, 1951. He outlined a "Four-Point Plan" to thwart Communist expansion in the underdeveloped world: (1) Improved propaganda methods that would effectively reach the people; (2) Encouragement of technical assistance programs; (3) Encouragement of an "economic confederation of homogeneous peoples" in the Middle East an Southeast Asia--"peoples divided too often by artificial, historical barriers," as a foundation for eventual political union; (4) 'Make plain that at all times that our objective is not aggrandizement but peace." The speech was carried in the Springfield Union, December 19, 1951. For a subsequent speech which offered some further elaboration see: Haverhill Gazette, February 12, 1952.

[32]The telegram was carried in the Boston Globe, December 28, 1951.

[33]See the Boston Globe, January 20, 1952.

[34]For an account of this speech see the Waltham-News-Tribune, January 25, 1952.

[35]U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1952, XCVIII, Part 3, 3871-3872.

[36]Ibid., 3871.

[37]Boston Globe, May 18, 1952.

[38]U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1952, XCVIII, Part 5, 5894.

[39]Ibid.

[40]U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1952, XCVIII, Part 7, 8492-8493.

[41]Ibid., p. 8493.

[42]Burns, Kennedy, p. 104. Burns offers a very thorough account of the campaign on pages 98-116.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Meet The Press, November 9, 1952. Transcript.

Chapter IV

THE YOUNG SENATOR AND INDOCHINA, 1953-1956

On January 3, 1953, Kennedy was officially sworn in as a United States Senator. In many ways, both public and private, the years 1953-1956 form a distinct phase in the development of his career. His life during these early years in the Senate was touched by both happiness and tragedy. On September 12, 1953, he married Jacqueline Bouvier, who was then twenty-three years old. He was no longer the "gay, young bachelor," as the Saturday Evening Post characterized him in a June, 1953 article. Life looked promising. But during the legislative year 1954-1955, Kennedy was hospitalized for several months. On two separate occasions during this period he hovered near death as a result of two delicate spinal operations to correct his old back injury. Any proper assessment of his early Senate career must consider this illness that disabled him for several months. It was during his extended convalescence in 1955 that he wrote his Pulitzer Prize-winning Profiles in Courage.

During these years, also, Kennedy confronted two of the most difficult and troublesome decisions of his political career. While neither concerned foreign policy directly, they warrant brief mention because his actions in each case indicate something of the man's character and conviction. One issue catches him at his best while the other finds him lacking.

During the 1952 campaign Kennedy had pledged to do more for Massachusetts and immediately upon entering the Senate, with the help of his new assistant, Theodore Sorensen, he concentrated his efforts on researching the economic problems of the entire New England region. In May of 1953, in his maiden effort, he delivered a series of lengthy speeches in the Senate in which he outlined various proposals designed to alleviate the area's problems. Many of his proposals were accepted and enacted, but the following year the St. Lawrence Seaway bill was once again up for consideration in the Senate. Previously, Massachusetts representatives had always opposed the Seaway because of the adverse economic effect it would reputedly have on the state, especially the port of Boston. In fact, on six different occasions over a period of twenty years not one Senator or representative from Massachusetts had ever voted for the Seaway. Kennedy publicly admitted it was one of his most agonizing decisions, but in January, 1954, he delivered a forceful speech in the Senate in support of the Seaway.[1] Even though his arguments in justification of his vote were sensible and pragmatic it was a bold decision to make, politically. For his action certain Massachusetts newspapers dubbed him the "suicide" senator.[2]

The most politically damaging issue to Kennedy was the McCarthyism issue, at its height in 1953-1954, and the charge that Kennedy straddled the fence when the Senate voted to censure the controversial Wisconsin senator in December, 1954. To many, McCarthy symbolized the complete negation of American liberalism and the censure vote, therefore, was considered a moral one. Kennedy did not cast a vote on the censure motion. He was in the hospital at the time but critics charged that he could have "paired" his vote as other absent senators had done, or at

least have made his position known publicly. In fairness, Kennedy's record in relation to the rise and fall of McCarthyism was a mixed one but, nonetheless, he carefully avoided taking a public position on the matter. The issue, to be sure, was a particularly difficult one for Kennedy--McCarthy was very popular among Kennedy's fervently anti-Communist constituents; for a time, his brother Robert was a member of McCarthy's staff; and Kennedy's own father was a supporter of McCarthy. But when all the evidence is considered, Kennedy's evasion of the December censure vote warranted the criticism it received. The issue dogged him throughout his remaining days in the Senate. In the ensuing years, Kennedy had many interviews and it was a rare occasion when someone failed to ask if he had not in fact dodged the issue in 1954. It became one of the vulnerable spots in his political armor.

The years 1953-1956 serve well as a separate unit by which to examine the development of Kennedy's foreign policy attitudes. For the most part, his interests and attitudes remained consistent with those expressed earlier. He remained concerned about Europe's defense posture. In March, 1953, for instance, he introduced a resolution calling for a plebiscite to settle the dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia concerning the free area of Trieste because he considered that area strategically essential to the defense of Western Europe.[3] On other issues, also, there was continuity: he continued to make speeches of encouragement to those nations in Communist East Europe, most notably Poland; he remained staunchly pro-Israel; and he continued to favor increases in technical aid, to Latin America and elsewhere.[4] But these were not Kennedy's primary foreign policy concerns.

One particular foreign policy issue dominated his attention during

this period and that was the steadily deteriorating situation in French Indochina. During 1953 and 1954, especially, when the debate on Indochina was most intense, and the real possibility existed that the war might involve the major powers, Kennedy was one of the leading Congressional spokesmen on the issue. In fact, he touched off one of the major debates by calling for France to promise independence to the people of Indochina in order to stimulate them to support the French effort against the Viet Minh guerrillas.

Kennedy saw two larger issues of American foreign policy manifested in the Indochina war and he consistently referred to them, either explicitly or implicitly, in virtually all of his speeches on Indochina during this period. First, he saw the West's problems in Indochina as the direct result of a history of colonial domination which either alienated the native people or made them coldly neutral to any Western military effort. He frequently asserted that one essential element of American policy, and Western policy generally, must be the granting of independence to all peoples who were sufficiently prepared for self-government but were currently under Western colonial domination. The theme of anti-colonialism was consistently apparent in his speeches and at the height of the crisis in Indochina, in July, 1954, when frustration was high, Kennedy made his most forthright statement on colonialism. The United States must "clarify" its position on colonialism, he demanded, "and then adopt a policy of encouraging all the peoples of the earth, regardless of what alliances we may have in other parts of the world, to move towards independence."[5]

The second theme related to his criticism of the Eisenhower Administration's new defense strategy. The new Administration under

the leadership of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, revamped America's defense policy by cutting defense spending on conventional arms and relying more on nuclear weapons. This "New Look" strategy with its emphasis on "massive retaliation" meant direct savings in defense spending but, for a variety of reasons, Kennedy opposed the defense cuts and the shift of emphasis from conventional to nuclear power. In June, 1954, in a debate on the Administration's military budget, Kennedy and six other democrats offered an amendment in opposition to the Administration's plan to reduce army strength from 20 divisions to 17. The Kennedy amendment, which was ultimately defeated by a vote of 50 to 38, would have provided funds for maintaining 19 divisions rather than 17.[6] On more than one occasion in his speeches on Indochina, Kennedy remarked that he thought it particularly unwise that at a time when the United States was considering military intervention in the war the Administration was reducing conventional military strength.[7] Throughout the first term of the Eisenhower Administration, Kennedy repeatedly questioned the wisdom of the "New Look" defense strategy but perhaps his most comprehensive single attack on the policy came in a New York speech in January, 1954, shortly after Dulles announced the new strategy. He addressed the Cathedral Club in a speech entitled "A Strong and Vigorous Foreign Policy".[8]

In Kennedy's opinion, the war in Indochina illustrated one of the glaring weaknesses in Dulles' strategy. In essence, he argued that the threat of massive retaliation was ineffective in guerrilla or brush-fire wars. In these cases, strength in conventional forces

was required. On more than one occasion, in fact, Kennedy asserted that the new defense strategy actually encouraged expansion by the Communists in guerrilla-type action, such as Indochina. He reasoned that by announcing a decrease in the strength of American resistance to localized wars the United States invited expansion "through those techniques which they [Communists] deemed not sufficiently offensive to induce us to risk atomic warfare."[9]

Following World War II, the French were bent on re-establishing their Empire in Indochina. The three French colonies in Indochina, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, had been under attack by nationalist, guerrilla forces since 1946 and it was clear that in Vietnam the rebel leader Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh had broader support among the people than did the pro-French regime of Bao Dai. American policy-makers were faced with a dilemma. Uniformly, they did not want the area to fall to the Communists but they were not happy with supporting a colonial power, especially against a popular nationalist movement. But there did not seem to be a viable alternative. As France became increasingly bogged down in the war, the United States assumed a greater proportion of the financial burden under a mutual defense assistance agreement. By 1952, the United States was bearing roughly a third of the cost of the French effort in Vietnam but the French military position continued to crumble.

Kennedy spoke often of the serious dilemma Indochina presented to American policy-makers. On the one hand, to gain native support, which he deemed necessary, and to conform to America's tradition of support to the principle of self-determination, the United States had to urge a French grant of genuine independence to the

people of Indochina. But on the other hand, many American policy-makers feared that with an immediate and total grant of independence, the French would probably withdraw, with disastrous political consequences for all Southeast Asia. In all of the speeches on Indochina, Kennedy's and others, this was the essential problem being grappled with.

On June 30, 1953, Kennedy rose in the Senate and spoke emphatically in support of continued aid to France in Indochina but urged that the funds "be administered in such a way as to encourage through all means available the freedom and independence desired by the peoples of the Associated States" [Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia].[10] He did not criticize the French and he did not wish his proposal to discourage their continued military efforts. But he felt that only with a grant of genuine independence could the French mission succeed. In his speech, Kennedy spent some time reviewing the French history in Indochina, and interestingly, he suggested that political concessions might profitably have been made to Ho Chi Minh in 1945 or 1946 which might have "changed the entire history of that area." This view indicated something of a change of attitude from 1949, when Kennedy scornfully rebuked the State Department for advocating just that policy with the Communists in China. There were other indications in subsequent speeches that he now saw the "loss" of China in somewhat different terms.

In this Senate speech, Kennedy restated his belief in the domino theory which he had espoused on earlier occasions. His words were strikingly alarmist. A French defeat would not only mean the loss of all Southeast Asia and endanger the French position in North Africa,

he warned, but it could threaten the "security of Metropolitan France itself." So, France must fight on, and the United States must continue its wholehearted support. But the grant of independence, he believed, would not only enhance the prospects for military victory but would improve the image of the West in Asia generally. Even though Kennedy was a firm believer in the domino theory, it is certain that he did not regard the possible loss of Indochina as a "threat" to metropolitan France. The French were fighting an exhausting and inconclusive war and he was plainly worried about their willingness to continue, especially in light of its increasing unpopularity at home. Statements like this were designed to help spur France on.

On July 1, 1953, a few days after Kennedy's speech, the Senate considered an amendment to a foreign aid bill, submitted by Senator Goldwater, designed to prod France to make an early promise of independence to the Associated States. Goldwater's amendment, which had the support of Senator Dirksen and others, was a strongly worded ultimatum to the French which provided for a withholding of American funds unless France made "satisfactory assurances" to the President of the United States of its intention to grant independence. Kennedy was in complete agreement with the objective of Goldwater's amendment but he offered a substitute amendment which eliminated the ultimatum but conveyed the same sentiments. Kennedy's amendment, similar to his remarks on June 30, urged that France administer United States funds in such a way as "to encourage the freedom and independence desired by the peoples of the Associated States."[11] Goldwater accepted Kennedy's substitute amendment but a lengthy debate ensued. In the course of the debate, Senator Cooper voiced his

objections to both amendments and he reminded the Senate of the Chinese precedent where conditions were imposed on American aid to the Nationalist Government. Many Americans have since charged, he asserted, that China "fell" because of these American restrictions and the ultimate withholding of aid from the Nationalist Government. (This, of course, had been the essence of Kennedy's charge in 1949 and later, before he modified his view). Cooper urged that that mistake not be repeated.

Senator Knowland, who led the opposition to the amendment, emphasized that independence was clearly desirable but he feared the amendment might discourage the French and cause them to consider a military withdrawal from the area, leaving the United States alone to pick up the burden. The debate was long and both sides argued effectively. Kennedy and his supporters contended that the French would be more likely to remain if the prospects for success were enhanced and this could only happen if they won the popular support of the people. And this, he maintained, would require the promise of independence.

According to a New York Times account the following day, it appeared as though the Kennedy amendment might carry until Senator Walter George, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spoke in opposition and concluded the debate. Senator George was one of the most prestigious of Senate members and was then at the peak of his influence. He, too, was concerned that the amendment might encourage a French withdrawal from the area but he also emphasized that the United States should not challenge a nation that was so necessary to the defense of Western Europe. He characterized

the amendment as an "offense to a sorely beset and sorely pressed friend and ally". We cannot be helpful, he warned, "by officious intermeddling in the affairs of a friendly nation." In the end, the opposition view prevailed. By a vote of 64 to 17 the Senate rejected the Goldwater amendment as modified by Kennedy.[12] In light of future images, the Goldwater-Kennedy alliance seems like a curious one but at this time, on this issue, their views were the same.

Kennedy spent much of August in France, with his old friend Torbert MacDonald, attempting to assess French opinion at the governmental level on the divisive Indochina issue. When he returned he told reporters that he found French opinion sharply divided on continuation of the war in Indochina and divided also on his proposal encouraging independence for the Indochinese. Again, he lamented the French failure to grant the necessary political concessions to achieve Indochinese support for the war. The war was a terrific drain on the French economy, he added, and without it France could contribute more to the defense of Western Europe. But, once again, he emphasized the strategic importance of Indochina to the West. "Indochina is the key to Southeast Asia," he said, and was very important to America's defense.[13]

By early 1954, the French military position in Indochina had grown desperate. Secretary of State Dulles was eager to use the Foreign Ministry Conference at Berlin in January, 1954, to end the Indochina war but he was unsuccessful. It was at this time, in January, 1954, in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, that Dulles outlined his "New Look" in American foreign policy strategy. Interestingly, it was the mounting crisis in Indochina in 1954 that

ultimately provided the initial test of Dulles' new strategy.

Kennedy reacted to Dulles' new policy immediately. In his speech before the Cathedral Club in New York, he sharply challenged the viability of the entire concept of massive retaliation.[14] He perceived various weaknesses in the concept, one of which was its ineffectiveness in combating guerrilla insurrections. This brought him to a brief discussion of the current state of affairs in Indochina. He restated his view that Indochina was vital to the security of all Southeast Asia but he introduced something new. He spoke of the heightening tendency within France to favor a negotiated settlement with the leaders of the Viet Minh, and asserted that such a settlement would "inevitably result in Communist domination of French Indochina" because, he warned, Indochina was the only country in the world where the Communist faction would win a free election. It was not clear what he was suggesting. He implied that the United States should intervene if France was on the verge of a military defeat or weakening such so as to consider a negotiated settlement. He also implied that if Indochina was the key to all of Southeast Asia, as he believed it was, then the United States should pick up the burden if France withdrew.

As a guest on Meet The Press a few days later, one of the panelists, Miss May Craig, pursued these questions.[15] Kennedy stated that he did not believe American intervention would be successful owing to the hostility of the native population. He explained that the Indochinese people withheld their support from the French because (1) they were not convinced the French would win and (2) because the French refused to provide real guarantees of independence. A similar

situation would prevail, he said if the United States replaced the French. But, Miss Craig asked,: "Are you saying if France gives up Indochina we should give up all Asia?" Kennedy responded that he did not mean that. He stated that should France withdraw the United States could not hope to hold French Indochina so it would be necessary "to move back to a secondary line."

His response to Miss Craig's questions indicated just how difficult the issue was, especially when one was pressed to answer the hard questions involved. Clearly, it was much easier to make speeches. Kennedy believed that French Indochina was the key to all Southeast Asia and he believed in the domino theory. But yet, he did not believe that unilateral American intervention would be any more successful than was the French experience. How then, could Indochina be held? The only hope, as he saw it, was to encourage the French to remain and also gain the active support of the people--thus the absolute necessity of urging independence. But, if necessary, he favored moving "back to a secondary line" [wherever that might be] over American intervention. Kennedy here was both vague and confused. To suggest that the French remain while at the same time grant independence was a basic contradiction.

A few months after the interview, in March of 1954, at a time when the French forces were under siege at Dien Bien Phu, certain Senators were worried that the presence of American mechanics in Indochina might draw the United States into the war. Senator Stennis requested that American Air Force mechanics be withdrawn because the risk of direct military involvement by the United States was becoming too great. Kennedy objected to this. He did not wish

to see them withdrawn.[16] He, too, along with Senator Stennis, regretted that American mechanics had been sent in the first place, but since they were there, he emphasized, it was important they remain. He feared that at the upcoming Geneva conference, scheduled for April, the Communists might successfully negotiate a partition of Indochina and the total withdrawal of French forces. The position of the United States, he said, should be one of firm support for the French military effort. If the United States should withdraw its mechanics "at this very sensitive time" he warned, it would indicate a lack of American support for the French and perhaps encourage them to withdraw their forces or agree to a partition. And he did not wish any such settlement to be made at Geneva. The position of the United States at Geneva, he said, should be to oppose any such agreement. "The war should be continued and brought to a successful conclusion," he declared. Although he was opposed to withdrawing the American mechanics from Indochina, he and Senator Stennis did agree that it would be wise to transfer them to a better protected area.

Talk of outright American intervention in Indochina became widespread in March and April. In late March, Paris informed Washington that only an American air strike could save the French from disaster at Dien Bien Phu. At first, intervention was considered by the Eisenhower Administration, and in Washington, Vice President Nixon spoke of the possibility of committing American troops. But the Administration's policy was contradictory and unclear. Support was needed. In early April, Secretary of State Dulles met with a group of senators and representatives in an attempt to secure their support for intervention. Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, persuaded Dulles that a massive carrier-based air strike might save Dien Bien Phu. Dulles wanted a resolution from Congress authorizing the President to commit air and naval forces in Indochina. The congressmen withheld their support, however, when it became known that no other chief of staff supported the idea and that England had not been consulted. Gradually, the air-strike proposal grew less persuasive with highly-placed policy-makers. Ultimately, Dulles abandoned the Radford proposal and concentrated his efforts on persuading the British to join in a Southeast Asian organization equivalent to NATO, in an attempt to stem Communist aggression. Meanwhile, the Senate debated.

On April 6, 1954, Kennedy precipitated a sharp argument in the Senate when he delivered a major address on the war in Indochina. In his speech he stated that he did not wish to demean the gallant French effort, or criticize the policy of the Secretary of State, but he felt "the time has come for the American people to be told the blunt truth about Indochina."[17] He chastized the Eisenhower Administration and the Truman Administration for the long history of falsely optimistic reports on both the prospects for military victory in Indochina and the prospects for a French grant of independence to the Associated States.

Kennedy saw three basic alternatives concerning the war in Indochina. First, the United States could allow France to withdraw from Indochina, paving the way for a Communist take-over of the area. This was clearly unthinkable. Second, France, with the support of the United States, could sue for a negotiated peace on the basis of the present military situation. But, as he had done earlier, he again

warned that a negotiated settlement of the war, resulting in either partition or a coalition government, would result in the eventual domination by the Communists, who had the support of the people. So this alternative must be resisted.

The third available alternative was to encourage France to continue the war. This Kennedy favored. He supported Dulles's efforts to win the support of the free nations of Asia for united action in Indochina and he realized that this may have necessitated the involvement of United States manpower. But because the Asian nations regarded the Indochina war as a war of colonialism he was not optimistic about the prospects for meaningful united action. He feared that united action, "which is so desperately needed for victory in that area" might end up as unilateral action by the United States--and he fervently opposed unilateral intervention because he thought it would certainly fail. In principle, he supported Dulles' plan for united action but he emphasized that so long as the French withheld the promise of genuine independence for the Indochinese, Asian help would not be forthcoming and no amount of military intervention by the United States could win the war. But he was hopeful that with a grant of independence the Indochinese would raise a "reliable and crusading native army"[18] that would make all the difference.

Should the French persist in their refusal to grant legitimate independence, however, he hoped Secretary Dulles would "recognize the futility of channeling American men and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle."[19] He emphasized that before the United States attempt to call on the nations of Asia for united action in Indochina, France must grant a sufficient degree of independence. And because the

United States was carrying such a heavy percentage of the cost of the war and considering that outright American intervention was being considered in order to extricate the French, he believed the United States was justified in placing these demands on France.

Kennedy was vitally aware of the clear danger of a French withdrawal from Indochina if the United States should make attempts to force them to grant immediate independence to the Indochinese. But he did not believe the resulting military difficulties following a French withdrawal would be any greater than those resulting from having the United States intervene unilaterally in support of the French under the present political setup. "Both policies," he said, "would end in disaster."[20]

Following Kennedy's speech, Senator Knowland spoke in agreement with much of what he had said. However, Knowland sharply urged America's allies to be ready to contribute their share should intervention be necessary. He had not been entirely happy with the Korean situation in this regard. Also, he wanted to emphasize the difference between the nations of the West, especially the United States and England, who had a proud history of granting independence to the peoples of Asia--the Philippines, India, Pakistan, and Burma--from the leaders of the "godless Communist tyranny" in Russia who destroyed freedom in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The senator did not believe that the "true" story had been made sufficiently clear to the people of Asia.

Senator Dirksen took issue with one of Kennedy's suggestions. Dirksen believed that it would be a disaster for France to grant immediate and complete independence to the Indochinese states because

they were unprepared and the Communists would quickly take over. He argued, rather, for a future target date for independence, much as the United States had done with the Philippines. He asked Kennedy if he was advocating that France grant immediate and complete independence to the people of Vietnam. Kennedy replied that he favored two treaties, one of which would grant Vietnam independence immediately. The second treaty would bind Vietnam to the French union on the basis of equality. He did not comment upon the obvious contradiction in such an arrangement. However, he believed these treaties should be a prerequisite to any United States intervention. As time passed, however, Kennedy agreed more and more with Dirksen's view.

All of the senators who engaged in the debate essentially agreed with Kennedy's view that American intervention, without the support of the local population, must be avoided. They also agreed that a French guarantee of independence was essential to win the support of the people. If a genuinely united effort could be managed, involving the free nations of Asia, however, they were willing to consider American military intervention. Various senators, including Senators Jackson, Mansfield, Symington, Anderson, Stennis, and Magnuson complimented Kennedy on his speech and his remarks received significant approval in press editorials.[21]

In his editorial comment, Walter Lippmann praised Kennedy's remarks.[22] He noted, as had Kennedy in his speech, that a sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee headed by Representative Judd, had reported in January that "until political independence has been achieved, an effective fighting force from the Associated States cannot be expected." Lippmann remarked, however, that the Indochina

states were ill-prepared by the French for independence. And he cautioned the United States not to delude itself into thinking that the promise of independence would have an immediate impact. It will not result in a mass movement "eager and willing to conquer the Viet Minh," he said. Following a guarantee of independence, Lippmann envisaged a ten year interregnum in which the Indochinese would have to be trained for independence such that they could effectively resist the Communists.

During these fateful days in the spring of 1954, while the French military position continued to crumble at Dien Bien Phu, a nineteen-nation conference was scheduled to assemble at Geneva to discuss the future of both Korea and Indochina. The essential fact relating to the Indochina problem was that the military situation favored the Communists. Also, whereas the Communists operated from a united front, there was no common agreement among the United States and England and France on how to best deal with the problem. Secretary Dulles was eager to establish an anti-Communist, collective security pact in Southeast Asia. However, he was unable to persuade Foreign Minister Eden of Britain. Eden preferred to wait until after the Geneva Conference and then include the neutral countries of Asia, such as India, Burma and Indonesia, in the pact. In mid-April, despite Britain's wishes, Dulles convened a conference, minus the neutral nations of Asia, to discuss the pact. Eden was dismayed and refused to send a British delegation to the conference. In all, there was substantial dissension and distrust between Washington and London and this, of course, further aided the Communist cause at Geneva.

On April 14, 1954, Senator Mansfield addressed the Senate on the urgent need for Western unity on Indochina as the major powers prepared to convene at Geneva. Mansfield had visited Indochina the preceding October and had reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his return. His assessment of the essential problem in Indochina was identical to Kennedy's--France's failure to grant meaningful independence to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In the discussion following Mansfield's opening remarks, Kennedy questioned Dulles's emphasis on the establishment of a collective security pact as the best defense of Indochina.[23]

He did not think that Dulles' attempt to build up a mutual defense system among the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand and Australia met the immediate problem at hand. And he did not think that guarantees by these nations to come to the aid of Indochina in the event of an invasion by Communist China were of particular value or importance because he considered it unlikely that China would feel the need to intervene. Thus, he did not expect these Asian nations to intervene. The critical problem, as he saw it, and the one that should be the center of attention was the need to establish an "effective native army" to combat Communist aggression.

Later in the month, in a speech to a Democratic Party meeting in Chicago, Kennedy repeated the view that the war in Indochina was an internal one which, ultimately, could only be won by the native peoples of Asia--the Indochinese themselves, with the essential support of India, Burma, and Indonesia. Guarantees of military assistance from other nations in the event of outright aggression by the Chinese, he said, were of little value in a war that was primarily civil. "We

cannot save those who will not be saved," he declared.[24]

The Geneva Conference had begun in April, 1954 and Dien Bien Phu fell on May 7. That gave caution to those considering American intervention. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of Dien Bien Phu, many Democrats criticized the Eisenhower Administration's handling of Indochina. Kennedy, appearing on the CBS television program "Man of the Week" on May 9, termed the Administration's policy "too little and too late".[25] But, he said there was no outright action that the United States could take that would be effective and he predicted that the war "will be won or lost with the forces already there." His views coincided substantially with the statements of three fellow Democratic senators, Douglas, Mansfield, and Humphrey, who were also interviewed that day.[26]

On May 11, Kennedy participated in Princeton University's American Whig-Cliosophic Society's colloquium as one of six debating both the domestic and foreign policies of the Eisenhower Administration.[27] Three attacked and three defended the Administration's policies. Kennedy spoke on "The Dangerous Implications" of the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy. On the subject of Indochina he made some fresh statements along with the old. He stated that he understood why the British preferred to await the results of the negotiations at Geneva before considering a military intervention that would have widened the war. And he also understood why the Asians, who because of a long history of Western exploitation, viewed any call for "united action" with outright hostility or cold neutrality. Once again, he criticized the Eisenhower Administration for the falsely optimistic reports on the state of the war and charged further that the American military

intelligence estimates were "woefully and inexcusably inaccurate."

Kennedy was vague on what direction he felt the Geneva negotiations might take. He stated that "ideally", should the Communists refuse the French proposals, he hoped that France, with the help of the United States would "intensify" the training of native troops, grant complete independence to the people of Vietnam, and continue the fight long enough to allow the native armies to be trained and equipped sufficiently to eventually carry the major burden of the struggle. He realized, however, that the French might be unwilling to continue the war and if so, the United States would have to settle for far less satisfactory terms--coalition government or partition. He still believed, however, that a coalition government would mean ultimate Communist domination. He feared that it might be necessary, if the situation became desperate, "to draw a line at Cambodia and Laos, beyond which the Communists would be warned not to move."[28]

It is interesting that in this speech Kennedy admitted a further change of mind from his 1949 position on the reasons for the defeat of the Chinese Nationalists by the Communists. "I am not as sure as I once was," he said, "that it ever could have been saved."[29] He now agreed with those who placed the primary responsibility for the defeat on the Chinese Nationalist Government itself, rather than on President Truman and the State Department. But he still regarded American policy there as "inadequate" and implied, at least, that the commitment of American troops, which he saw as "essential to success", might have made the difference.

On May 28, 1954, Kennedy journeyed to Chicago and delivered a major foreign policy address to a luncheon meeting of the Executives

Club on recent events in Indochina.[30] There was a note of urgency in his speech. He thought it quite possible that President Eisenhower might soon ask Congress to support intervention. In briefly tracing the history of American involvement in Indochina, he focused on four major American miscalculations. First, he believed the United States had erred in relying on the so-called Navarre plan, the assumption of which was that the French could win a total military victory against the Viet Minh in a pitched battle. The fall of Dien Bien Phu, of course, was bitter testimony to the lack of reality in that plan. Secondly, he underscored the United States's persistent inability to recognize the significance of the independence movement in Indochina.

The third miscalculation, he said, was the gross underestimation of the complexities involved in achieving united action in Indochina. The attempt to co-ordinate and unify the non-Communist nations of Asia, Western Europe and the United States on a single course of united action in a brief period of time, he maintained, was an "impossible" task. He believed American leaders were overly influenced by the experience of successful collective security arrangements in Europe and failed to comprehend the "fluidity and instability" which was more the case of the political situation in Asia. Also, he believed insufficient attention was given to the "traditional hatred for the white man" in Asia which was a result of the years of Western exploitation. "The cause of the West," he declared, "was blurred by the visual impact of colonial powers fighting native people." The fourth and final miscalculation was America's decision to reduce conventional forces and to rely on massive retaliatory power. This strategy, he reminded his audience, was completely ineffective in guerrila wars

such as the one in Indochina.

Kennedy then turned to the state of negotiations at Geneva and the question of United States intervention. He suggested five points for consideration. First, he thought it doubtful that the neutral nations of Asia, India, Burma and Indonesia would support the American desire for united action, so this fact must be considered. Secondly, even a French grant of complete independence to the people of Indochina, as a prerequisite to American support was desirable, he suggested that it might not be practical. Not only did he fear a possible French withdrawal as a result but he believed that Ho Chi Minh would win any free election. Thirdly, he maintained that American intervention could not be considered if the French were unwilling to continue the struggle, and there were clear signs of such unwillingness. Fourth, thought of American intervention must consider the lack of popular support for the war among the Vietnamese people. And, fifth, because of the difficult jungle terrain, the general unfriendliness of the population, and the possibility of the introduction of Chinese troops, American intervention must be considered sheerly in terms of military soundness. These, he said, were the five conditions that must be weighed. However, he did not make it clear under what conditions he personally would support intervention.

Kennedy concluded his remarks by citing four "lessons" the United States should have learned from the Indochina conflict. First, he hoped the country had learned the importance of allies, and that America could not rely solely on the traditional European allies but must secure the support of the Asian nations. Secondly, he hoped Indochina revealed the weaknesses of the New Look military strategy which had

the effect of actually encouraging guerrilla aggression. Thirdly, he hoped the United States realized the importance of the "moral and ideological principles" at the basis of the world's struggle between colonialism and nationalism, and of the necessity to adhere to America's traditional policy of "helping all oppressed people, even though it may require unpleasant pressures in our relations with colonial powers and friends." In the long run, he argued, insistence upon complete Vietnamese independence, granted at the outset, would have not only better served the cause of the entire free world but that of France herself. Fourth and finally, he hoped the United States now more fully realized the trials of world leadership, so long experienced by Britain in years past. American policy in Indochina, he said, was criticized from all sides. The British felt we moved too fast, while the French felt we moved too slowly. Many Asiatics interpreted American policy as supporting French colonialism and many felt the United States should have interceded more to help the Vietnamese, but others felt our policy was pushing France too hard. Leadership was difficult, he warned, but the criticisms and burdens must not result in an attitude of disgust and withdrawal. America's position of world leadership was inescapable.

Kennedy's Executive Club address was knowledgeable and thoughtful but he cautiously avoided recommending a specific course of action. He neatly outlined the factors that must be considered and the lessons that had been learned, but he did not state if he, personally, favored intervention to aid the French. Also, there were some apparent shifts in attitude. In earlier speeches he had argued that Asian support was absolutely essential to the success of any united intervention. Now

he implied at least, that more limited, non-Asian support could be considered. Secondly, in earlier speeches he had been adamant in his insistence upon immediate and complete independence for the Vietnamese people. Now he was hedging, at least, on the granting of free elections. Aside from these two important points, his comments were in general agreement with his earlier expressed views.

After the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May, a cease-fire had been agreed upon. The negotiations at Geneva finally resulted in an armistice agreement in mid-July. To a certain degree, Ho Chi Minh had been persuaded to negotiate by the promise of Vietnamese reunification through elections. From the point of view of the West, much of the settlement was unsatisfactory. Vietnam was partitioned between Communist North and Nationalist South with eventual unification to be provided for in an election in 1956. Laos and Cambodia were declared independent but the settlement terms provided that neither could join a regional alliance, solicit foreign military aid, or permit foreign bases in their territory. It was notable that neither the United States nor the South Vietnamese government signed the agreement on Vietnam. Many Americans regarded the settlement as a "Munich" of the Far East. Unhappy with the situation, Secretary Dulles continued his quest for a mutual defense Pact and on September 8, 1954, he brought three Asian nations, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines, together with the United States, Britain, France and New Zealand into the new Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) pact. However, SEATO lacked the support of many important Asian nations. India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia refused to join the pact and Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam were not permitted because of the terms of the Geneva

agreement.

Most Americans regarded the Geneva settlement as unsatisfactory and unfortunate and a possible prelude to total Communist domination of all Indochina. There is no record of Kennedy's attitude on the Geneva settlement in 1954, but he later recalled that, at the time, he feared that Ho Chi Minh and his Communists "would ultimately come to dominate all Indochina. . . ."[31] In 1954, Kennedy's close assistant, Theodore Sorensen, labelled the settlement a victory for the Communists and predicted further Communist gains in the area.[32] In the Senate on July 29, Kennedy voiced concern about the vast supply of military equipment still in Indochina. He believed that the United States still had title to it and since the material had a huge financial potential, he urged that future aid to South Vietnam be delayed until this matter was cleared up.[33]

Following the Geneva settlement, America's attention no longer focused on Indochina. The crisis over, that area receded into the background of world problems. For the next few years, the critical problem in Indochina was political, rather than military, and, therefore, less newsworthy. In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem replaced Bao Dai as the President of South Vietnam. Many Americans, including Kennedy, were highly optimistic in their hopes for the Diem regime to meet the problems of South Vietnam. In June of 1956, Kennedy addressed the Conference of American Friends of Vietnam.[34] He lamented the decreasing attention Vietnam was receiving from the American public and policy-makers. He attributed America's complacency to the "amazing success" of President Diem in solving Vietnam's problems and to America's unfortunate tendency to neglect areas once the crisis

stage had passed. He joked that he hoped it would not be necessary for the Diem government or the organization he was addressing, to subsidize the growth of the South Vietnam Communist Party in order to focus American attention on its needs! He spoke of the continued need for American capital, technicians and guidance to help Vietnam achieve the necessary "political, economic, and social" revolution. Of course, military aid was also necessary to "rebuild" the new Vietnamese Army. With one brief exception, this speech marked the end of Kennedy's statements on Indochina until he became President.[35] Other, more pressing issues crowded in to consume his attention.

In summary, what can be said of Kennedy's involvement with the Indochina issue, especially during 1953-1956? Certainly, he was no Johnny-come-lately on the Indochina issue. His views were based upon the personal observations and interviews dating from his 1951 trip, and he was well-informed. When his views are considered in the context of the time, and contrasted with the remarks and proposals of others, he appeared enlightened. Many others echoed his sentiments during 1953 and 1954 but he was one of the very first to warn that France would never evoke the essential peoples' support for the war until it was made clear that the objective of the war was genuine independence for Indochina rather than the retention of French colonial rule. Much of what he said in 1951 and 1952 was prophetic. He consistently held that the French gestures of independence were "too little and too late", and urged that the United States apply pressure. His defeated amendment of June, 1953, although weak, was along this line. He predicted in 1951 that Indochina would develop into an area of crisis if French policy remained unchanged. His criticism was

non-partisan. Over the years, he criticized many men--French Generals De Lattre and Navarre, Secretaries of State Acheson and Dulles and many others, for creating the illusion that the war was being won and that meaningful independence was being granted.

Because of France's refusal to grant independence to Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh effectively captured and symbolized the nationalist movement in that country. Kennedy fully recognized that in Indochina nationalism had become largely identified with Communism. And unlike many Americans, he appeared to realize that Communism, except as identified with nationalism, was a meaningless concept to most Asians. Nationalism, not Communism, was the driving force.

Kennedy's suggestions were not simplistic; he was aware of the terrible dilemma involved and the crucial strategic significance of Indochina. He realized that United States policy must not be such that it would encourage the French to withdraw but, on the other hand, native support for the war must be won. He considered the grant of independence to the Indochinese as the one viable solution. But as one considers his remarks it was clear that he felt the independence should have been granted early. Independence for South Vietnam, based on partition and involving the withdrawal of French forces, he held little hope for. He did not think that state alone could withstand the force and popularity of the Communists.

For the most part he was consistent. The dominant reality of Indochina in 1953-1954 was that the position of France, and the West generally, was steadily becoming less tenable. The fall of Dien Bien Phu in May, 1954, was the great watershed. Kennedy's remarks must be considered in that context. In June, 1953, he offered his

amendment to encourage France to grant independence but he wholeheartedly supported the French military effort. In March, 1954, prior to Dien Bien Phu, he speculated about the upcoming Geneva negotiations and urged that neither partition, nor coalition be accepted--the position of the United States, he said, should be to see the war continued and brought to a successful conclusion. In the context of 1954, a successful conclusion to the war meant a continued French presence in Indochina and the prevention of Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh from gaining dominance. But at no time, then or later, did Kennedy favor United States military intervention. He saw no prospect for victory in such a venture. Kennedy very effectively analyzed the various errors in judgment and the faulty assumptions concerning United States policy toward Indochina but he was not able to solve the essential dilemma--how to pressure France effectively, short of causing a withdrawal. He favored pressure but he did not support the idea of an ultimatum, as did Goldwater and Dirksen in 1953. However, he did urge that genuine independence be a prerequisite to any United States intervention. In the years following the Geneva settlement, Kennedy grew more optimistic and hailed President Diem as the savior of South Vietnam. In this misjudgment Kennedy was by no means alone. In essence, there was insight and wisdom in much of what Kennedy said on Indochina. He understood the significance of an aroused Asian nationalism. But, nonetheless, he must have wondered, then and later, if the problem of Indochina was amenable to an American solution.

However, despite Kennedy's generally enlightened attitude on Indochina, and in particular Vietnam, there was an important and fundamental flaw in his thinking. He favored the end of French colonialism

in Indochina; he favored the grant of "genuine" independence to the Vietnamese; but he also strongly opposed both Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh and any compromise settlement. Along with most American observers, he realized that Bao Dai could never hold his own in any coalition government with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh. The essential problem in all this is that Ho Chi Minh was the true spokesman for the nationalist movement in Vietnam. Any real independence in Vietnam necessitated the recognition of this fact. There was no third force of major consequence in Vietnam, the alternative to pro-French Bao Dai was Ho Chi Minh. This was the fundamental contradiction in Kennedy's policy. He urged the turning of an essentially colonial war against nationalists (Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh), into a war for independence, but all the while opposing the true leaders of the independence movement. However, this was part of the American dilemma. The Indochina war had always been portrayed not as a colonial war but as a struggle against Communist imperialism and American policy-makers uniformly resisted concessions to Ho Chi Minh because that would mean appeasement to international Communism. In part, Kennedy's thinking was strait-jacketed by the milieu of the times. The rhetoric of the Cold War, the "loss" of China, the Korean War, McCarthyism, and the view of Communism as an international monolith, all combined to freeze flexibility of thought. No one wished to appear "soft" on Communism.

The recurrent problem of the struggle between colonialism and nationalism and the implications this had for relations between the United States and her allies, continued to dominate Kennedy's speeches on foreign policy. One of his very best speeches on this theme was

delivered at Rockhurst College, Kansas City, Missouri, on June 2, 1956.[36] He criticized the Eisenhower Administration for failing to dissociate the United States from Western colonialism and referred specifically to Indochina and Algeria. He disagreed with the Administration's policy of remaining neutral on colonial issues. While he understood the complexities involved, he urged the United States to "speak out boldly for freedom for all people," against both Communist imperialism and Western colonialism, even though it may displease American allies.[37] Western colonial policy, he maintained, only made the way easier for Communist inroads. The task would not be easy, he warned, because of the colonial hatred for "the white man who bled them, beat them, exploited them, and ruled them."[38] He thought it perhaps already too late for the United States to undo the centuries of ill-will but, he said, the United States dare not fail to make the effort.

While the Indochina war had revealed serious divisions within the Western alliance, it was the Suez crisis in the summer of 1956 that brought the alliance to its postwar nadir. The dissension and mutual distrust among Britain, France, and the United States, intensified by the conflicts over Indochina policy, in fact, contributed to the Suez fiasco. Kennedy's reaction to the Suez crisis was characteristic and predictable. In a speech in Boston in the fall of 1956, he wholeheartedly approved Eisenhower's Suez policy. According to a Boston newspaper, he declared: "Since 1945 we have been tremendously hampered by diplomatic ties with Britain and France who wish to preserve their colonial ties. We have taken a definite moral stand [against colonialism] for the first time since 1945."[39] In a speech to a Zionist organization in

Baltimore in November of 1956, Kennedy further analyzed the various reasons for discord in the Middle East. Once again he emphasized the importance of the struggle between colonialism and nationalism.[40]

Kennedy's political fortunes rose dramatically in 1956 when he narrowly missed defeating Senator Estes Kefauver for the Democratic Party's Vice-Presidential nomination that year at the Democratic convention in Chicago.[41] As a further indication of his ascending political prominence, he won an appointment to the prestigious Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the following legislative session over the candidacy of Senator Kefauver who had greater seniority.[42] In the years after 1956, Kennedy continued to challenge Dulles' foreign policy and general defense strategy, especially the concept of massive retaliation, and his statements in opposition to Western colonialism reached a new pitch.

FOOTNOTES

[1]U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953, XCIX, Part 1, 238-240. In his speech Kennedy argued that the Seaway was inevitable--that Canada was set to build it with or without U.S. cooperation. Also, he reasoned that if New England helped the states that stood to benefit from the Seaway, especially the mid-West, then those states might be more willing to help lift New England out of its economic problems. For a lengthy series of complimentary editorials on Kennedy's stand, mainly from the mid-West, see Ibid. A1332-A1338. Senator George Aiken of Vermont, in an Oral History for the John F. Kennedy Library, conducted on April 25, 1964, recalled: "When President Kennedy voted for the construction of the Seaway, and the Power Project, that, I think, was the first time I realized that he had a great deal of courage, because he was voting against the desires of influential people in his own community and his own state." p. 4-5.

[2]Boston Globe, July 5, 1956

[3]U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953, XCIX, Part 2, 1849-1850.

[4]For a sampling of his speeches on Poland see Congressional Record, 1953, A2649-A2443; Record, 1954, Part 2, 2035-2036; Record, 1955, Part 4, 5370; and Record, 1956, Part 3, 3962-3963. For a representative speech on Israel see: Record, 1956, Part 6, 7506. For remarks on Latin America see: Record, 1954, Part 9, 12694. During these early years Kennedy did an interesting foreign policy piece for the New York Times Magazine Section entitled "Foreign Policy is the People's Business" in which he emphasized the role of a well-informed public on the shaping of foreign policy. The article appeared August 8, 1954, pp. 5ff.

[5]U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C, Part 8, 10003. The anti-colonial theme ran through virtually all of Kennedy's speeches on Indochina but for a sampling of speeches not cited elsewhere and which deal specifically with anti-colonialism see: New York Times, January 27, 1956--a speech to National Women's Democratic Club; John F. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Speech Files, Box 2--an April 13, 1956 speech to a Los Angeles Town Hall Luncheon entitled "Colonialism and Foreign Policy"; and a June 2, 1856 speech at Rockhurst College, Missouri, found in Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, CII, Part 7, 9614-9615.

[6]U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C, Part 6, 8432-8441. For a sampling of Kennedy's many speeches urging a defense build-up see: Boston Globe, April 16, 1953; October 26, 1953; and New York Times, February 20, 1956.

[7]U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C, Part 4, 4677.

[8]Ibid., A727-A729.

[9]As indicated, the themes of anti-colonialism and defense strategy exist in most of his speeches on foreign policy during this period. This particular quotation is taken from a speech delivered on May 11, 1954, at Princeton University. See: John F. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Speech Files, Box 2, and also Press Releases File, Box 621.

[10]U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953, XCIX, Part 6, 7623.

[11]Ibid., 7779-7789.

[12]Ibid., 7789.

[13]Boston Globe, August 27, 1953, and Boston Post, August 28, 1953.

[14]U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C, Part Appendix, A727-729.

[15]Meet The Press, transcript, February 14, 1954.

[16]U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C, Part 3, 2904.

[17]Ibid., Part 4, 4672. For the speech and subsequent debate see: 4672-4681. The remarks by Kennedy and Knowland were reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, May 1, 1954, and Foreign Policy Bulletin, May 15, 1954.

[18]Ibid., 4674.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid., 4676.

[21]For editorial comment see Ibid., A2882-A2884. In an interview, President Eisenhower stated his general agreement with Kennedy's views: New York Times, April 8, 1954 and Boston Globe, April 8, 1954.

[22]Boston Morning Globe, April 12, 1954.

[23]U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C, Part 4, 5111-5118, for Mansfield's remarks and the subsequent debate. For Kennedy's comments see p. 5120.

[24]For the Democratic Party speech see Sorensen Speech Files, Box 2, and also Press Releases File, Box 621. The Springfield, Illinois State Register carried an account of the speech on April 21, 1954. Similar sentiments were expressed by Kennedy in a May 17, 1954 speech in Burlington, Vermont. See Press Releases File, Box 621.

[25]The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 10, 1954.

[26]Ibid.

[27]A transcript of the speech is in Sorensen Speech File Box 2, and the Press Releases File, Box 621.

[28]Ibid. Kennedy had a long question and answer interview with the Hearst newspapers on the subject of Indochina in which he repeated many of the points in this speech. See the San Francisco Examiner, May 19, 1954. A rough copy of the interview is in the Sorensen Speech Files, Box 2.

[29]Kennedy Library, Princeton University speech, Sorensen Speech Files, Box 2.

[30]For a full text of the speech see: U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C, A4144-A4145. A partial text is in the Press Releases File, Box 621. Kennedy repeated some of the points made in this speech in a Senate debate on Indochina on July 8, 1954: Record, 1954, Part 8, 10003 and 10008.

[31]I was not able to locate any statement by Kennedy om the Geneva settlement made in 1954. However, he later commented on his reaction at that time in his Strategy of Peace (New York: Popular Library, 1960), p. 91.

[32]Springfield, Massachusetts, Springfield Union, July 27, 1954.

[33]U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C, Part 9, 12516, and 12554-12555.

[34]The speech can be found reprinted in Vital Speeches, August 1, 1956, p. 617-619, and also in Strategy of Peace (1960), p. 91-94.

[35]The last pre-presidential comment Kennedy made on Vietnam was in 1959 in an introduction to a 1954 speech in Strategy of Peace. In 1954, he recalled, he had feared a Communist takeover of all Indochina. But in 1959 he was much more optimistic. He lauded the "near miracle" Diem had accomplished in Vietnam. See p. 91.

[36]U.S. Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, CII, Part 7, 9614-9615.

[37]It should be noted that while France bore the brunt of most of Kennedy's attacks on colonial policy, he did single out Britain as well. See: U.S. Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, C, Part 8, 10003.

[38]U.S. Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, CII, Part 7, 9614-9615.

[39]The Reporter, December 10, 1959, p. 30.

[40]Strategy of Peace, p. 142-145.

[41]Kennedy had been suggested as a possible candidate prior to the convention. He was interviewed on Face The Nation on July 1, 1956, and on Meet The Press on October 28, 1956. Both interviews focused on his potential candidacy.

[42]The Boston Globe on January 9 and 10, 1957 carried an analysis of the reasons behind Kennedy's victory as did the January 21, 1957 issue of Time magazine, p. 14.

CHAPTER V

THE MIDDLE-EAST AND ALGERIA, 1957-1958

During the Eisenhower years, the problems of the Middle East continued to defy solution and that strategic area became increasingly the focal point of tensions between the Soviet Union and the West.

Kennedy took part in the formulation of the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, which he supported, with qualifications. Despite this support he found much to criticize in United States Middle Eastern policy. But, for Kennedy at this time, by far the most explosive and urgent issue was Algeria's prolonged and bloody struggle for independence from France. His outspoken attack on French and American policy, coupled with his own proposal for settlement, generated a heated international controversy. His major Algerian speech of July 2, 1957, stimulated more public attention and reaction than any other single speech he delivered in his pre-presidential career. However, Kennedy had spoken out on America's Middle Eastern policy generally, before he became involved in the Algerian controversy.

The United States' general policy of containment had given rise to NATO in Western Europe and SEATO in Southeast Asia and American policy-makers saw the need to draw a mantle of anticommunism around the Middle East. However, the Middle East was rife with regional nationalist rivalries that greatly complicated the situation. There were three particularly divisive conflicts in the Middle East during

the middle and late 1950's that hampered any policy of containing Soviet expansion. First and foremost, there was the continuing impasse between the Arab world and Israel. Second, there was the rivalry and antagonism between Gamal Abdel Nasser, the new ruler of Egypt and Nuri Al-Said of Iraq, who had long held British support. Third, there was the Anglo-Egyptian disagreement over the Suez Canal.

The Soviet Union's policy in the Middle East was based on traditional geopolitical concerns--the security of her southern border and an open Bosporus passage to the Mediterranean. And with a bitter colonial heritage and an impassioned sense of nationalism, the Middle East was ripe for Soviet penetration. The vulnerability of the region to Soviet advances was heightened by the crushing poverty of the masses and also by the uncertainties and divisions within Western policy in the area. The Middle East, of course, had long been a region of British predominance and her economy was dependent upon the region's fabulously rich oil deposits.

In his moralistic aversion to Communism, Secretary of State Dulles hoped to overcome the national rivalries and conflicts in the Middle East and establish a pro-Western Middle East defense pact involving those nations bordering the Soviet Union's southern border--the so-called "northern-tier" states, with the added membership of Great Britain. Dulles wanted a mixed Arab-non-Arab coalition and, in early 1955, the Baghdad Pact was formed, bringing together Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain. The United States cooperated with the Pact nations, but resisted British pressure to become an official member for two basic reasons. First, Dulles had hoped to include Egypt in the Baghdad Pact as the key to the Middle East's

military alliance against Communism. He was disappointed that Britain and Iraq had combined to exclude Egypt from membership. Second, and more importantly, Dulles was not anxious to become directly involved in the conflicting ambitions of the Middle Eastern nations, and did not wish to antagonize Israel.

The question of American arms shipments to members of the Baghdad Pact was always a delicate matter. For instance, the United States could not send arms to Iraq without alarming both Egypt and Israel and, similarly, military aid to Pakistan alienated India. The United States had been eager to maintain the status quo in the Middle East arms race but, increasingly, Iraq relied on Great Britain for arms; Egypt turned to Russia, and Israel turned to France, who was then embroiled in the Algerian war. In any case, the Baghdad Pact, which became the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO, in 1959 after Iraq withdrew, was a weak and ineffective barrier against Soviet influence. And, in addition, the Pact alienated President Nasser because Iraq's inclusion challenged the notion of Egyptian hegemony in the Arab world.

For a variety of reasons, the West's relations with Egypt reached a low point in 1956. American policy-makers were offended by President Nasser's decision to exchange Egyptian cotton for arms from Communist Czechoslovakia and they were likewise upset by Nasser's decision to formally recognize Communist China. In July, 1956, Dulles withdrew America's offer to subsidize construction of Egypt's Aswan Dam. Nasser was publicly humiliated and his nationalization of the Suez Canal shortly followed.[1] The subsequent Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt had a divisive effect on Anglo-American

relations. Kennedy was in complete agreement with the Eisenhower Administration's diplomatic intervention in opposition to the military venture. Both Kennedy and Dulles opposed Western colonialism almost as much as they did communism. Indeed, Kennedy considered the former an invitation to the latter. Ironically, in the Suez crisis, Dulles and Britain's Anthony Eden reversed the stands they had taken regarding intervention in Indochina in 1954.

The Suez fiasco was a sharp setback for the Western alliance and seriously weakened the Baghdad Pact. Nasser emerged stronger than before, Russo-Egyptian ties were strengthened, the British and French appeared in the worst tradition of old-style imperialism, and Western unity had been weakened. Following the failure of the Suez venture, American policy-makers worried that the Soviet Union might make advances to fill the Middle East power vacuum created by the sudden decline of British and French power. However, at the time of the Suez crisis, Russia had a serious crisis of her own--the Hungarian revolt of October, 1956, and was in no position to consider expansion into the Middle East.

President Eisenhower's Middle East Resolution or the "Eisenhower Doctrine" as it was termed by the press, first outlined to Congress on January 4, 1957, was designed to reinforce the Baghdad Pact in blocking Soviet expansion. Once again, as in the Formosa Resolution of 1955, Eisenhower asked Congress for authority to provide direct economic aid and military support to any Middle East nation that requested assistance against overt aggression by "international communism".

During the two-month Congressional deliberation over the

Eisenhower Doctrine, or Senate Joint Resolution 19, Kennedy voiced his support both in Senate Foreign Relations Committee sessions and on the floor of the Senate. However, he would have preferred a much more far-reaching policy. In a speech in Albany, Georgia, in early February, while the resolution was under consideration, he outlined the major issues the Doctrine did not solve.[2] No settlement was offered, he emphasized, for the Arab-Israeli dispute, the control of the Suez Canal, or the resettlement of Arab refugees. And he was most concerned with the policy's failure to combat "indirect" Communist penetration by subversion and sale of arms. On this point, we see that Kennedy was inclined to favor a more aggressive kind of anti-Communism than even the Eisenhower Administration. He regarded the Doctrine as "a first step" and stated that he would vote for the resolution because it would help assure the world of "American concern" for the Middle East.

On March 1, when the Senate resumed consideration of the resolution, Kennedy led the debate in favor of passage without any revisions.[3] He did this even though he viewed the resolution as "unsatisfactorily worded", "unsatisfactorily designed", and "largely unnecessary" in terms of the real problems of the Middle East. In his view, the resolution was an unnecessary repetition of existing aid programs and was too hastily presented. But most importantly, it did not offer a solution to the various long range crises of Communist subversion, arms traffic, Suez, refugees, boundaries and other factors in the Arab-Israeli dispute, which he had mentioned earlier in his Georgia speech.[4] However, Kennedy stated that he feared opposition to the resolution would be interpreted as a

repudiation of President Eisenhower's leadership before the eyes of the world. Defeat of the resolution, he warned, would indicate domestic dissension and a "lack of confidence" in President Eisenhower in a time of crisis.

Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon believed the Middle East Resolution, as worded, sapped Congress of its constitutional authority to declare war. In Morse's view the Resolution was a dangerous and unconstitutional extension of presidential power. With the advance authority the Resolution granted, the President could send United States troops to the Middle East prior to a declaration of war by Congress. Kennedy joined with other Senators to defeat a Morse amendment which would have required the President to secure prior congressional approval before committing armed forces. Kennedy did not believe the Resolution affected the basic constitutional separation of powers. In his view, the President, as Commander in Chief, had the authority to commit United States forces without congressional approval if he believed the national interests were at stake.[5]

Kennedy also joined with other Senators in opposition to an amendment to strip the resolution of Presidential authority to spend up to $200 million in available mutual security funds on a crash basis in the Middle East. The sponsors of this amendment, principally Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, feared the resolution would be used as a springboard for launching a massive Middle East spending program. The amendment, offered as a substitute for the resolution, would limit the resolution to a pledge of readiness to use troops to assist nations requesting help in resisting Communist armed aggression in the Middle East. Kennedy insisted that to keep the

military authority and drop the economic provisions of the resolution would lead to "disastrous effects" on American leadership in the area. He said America's friends as well as Communist agitators would cite it as proof the United States viewed the Middle East "only in terms of guns and bases and military allies against Communism, not in terms of friendly people and their economic well-being and stability."[6] In the course of the debate Kennedy lamented on how little economic aid the Arab nations had received from the United States over the preceding five years.

Although there was some opposition to the resolution, mainly complaints about the cost and the unwarranted extension of Presidential power, the measure won easy Congressional approval. On March 5, the Senate passed the resolution by a vote of 72 to 19 and two days later it passed the House by a margin of 350 to 60. Vice-President Nixon, then in Uganda, praised Kennedy for his "very statesman-like speech" in support of the Middle East resolution.[7]

Although Kennedy voted to support Eisenhower's "prestige" in the Middle East, less than one month later he criticized Eisenhower's announcement from Bermuda that the United States had joined the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact.[8] He charged Secretary of State Dulles with inconsistency. Dulles, he said, had stated in recent Middle East hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee, his opposition to United States membership in the Pact because of the divisive effect it would have among the Arab nations that were not members of the Pact. Furthermore, Kennedy stated that he did not consider the Bermuda announcement a "logical development" of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In fact, he believed the announcement aroused "irritation, suspicion,

and resentment" among the very Arab states the United States attempted to woo through the Eisenhower Doctrine. And the fact that the announcement came as a result of bilateral talks with the British, he said, would only serve to aggravate its divisive effects. He considered it folly to pretend to Baghdad Pact members that the United States was a full participant, while pretending to the other Arab states the United States was not a full member after all. He questioned whether the purpose of this elusive status of full participation without formal membership might be designed to avoid Senate approval. However, Kennedy did not oppose fuller American participation in the Baghdad Pact if the Pact was a part of a comprehensive policy for the Middle East "understood and accepted" by all the nations in the area and a policy which attacked the major problems of the Middle East.

Kennedy attempted to come up with some answers of his own to these problems. In a speech to the National Conference of Christians and Jews on February 24, 1957, entitled "Comity and Common Sense in the Middle East", Kennedy had proposed the following solutions to the problems of the Middle East: (1) Egypt should keep control of the Suez Canal and most of the revenue derived from it, but should allow open transit to the ships of all nations with no discrimination or political interference. Future disputes concerning the Canal should be referred to impartial arbitration; (2) Permanent international boundaries should be fixed by an International Boundary Commission, staffed with experts in geography, economics and international law. Such a solution, he said, would reduce tensions and the need for arms expenditures by Israel and the Arab states. A United Nations force would police the area; (3) All Arab refugees who desire should be

repatriated to Israel. Those who wished to remain in Arab jurisdiction should do so. Those who suffered loss of property or bank accounts in flight should be compensated by Israel; (4) A Middle East Regional Resources Fund should be established under the auspices of the United nations and the World Bank. This fund would be controlled by the nations of the Middle East and would be used to develop irrigation projects, to establish a Middle East nuclear center and to provide a loan to Israel to help her make compensation payments to refugees.[9] Kennedy recognized that it was much easier to propose than to implement these proposals on Suez, boundaries, arms, refugees, and economic development, but he believed his proposals were based upon comity and common sense.

Throughout the debate over the Eisenhower Doctrine, Kennedy took care to voice his support for Israel's interests. In February he sent Secretary Dulles a letter in which he stated his strong opposition to the possibility that the United States might support United Nations sanctions against Israel because of Israel's refusal to abide by the resolution calling for the complete withdrawal of her troops from Egyptian territory.[10] Even though Kennedy always displayed an enlightened concern for the plight of the Arab nations and was eager to improve American-Arab relations, his views regarding Israel remained essentially the same as they were in the spring of 1956, when he addressed a huge Israel celebration in Yankee Stadium and declared: "It is time that all nations of the world, in the Middle East and elsewhere, realized that Israel is here to stay. She will not surrender--she will not retreat--and we will not let her fall."[11] Granted, this speech was delivered before a Jewish audience--but Kennedy always

maintained a strong pro-Israel stance, as did most American politicians. The essential dilemma that confronted Kennedy and others was the difficulty in advocating improved relations with Nasser's Egypt and the other Arab nations, as Kennedy favored, without thwarting Israel's interests.

In an October, 1957 article in Foreign Affairs, Kennedy touched on the problems of the Middle East.[12] He criticized the Eisenhower Administration for relying on the "paper defenses" of the Baghdad Pact which rested, he said, "on the false assumption that there was an identity of interest among all the states of the Middle East." America's response to the Soviet challenge in the Middle East, he asserted, had been "exaggeratedly military". Kennedy found many inconsistencies in the Eisenhower Administration's Middle East policy to criticize, and his own policy proposals were completely non-military. He urged an American policy which would include a multilateral regional development fund, the "Jordan River scheme," a food pool making use of American agricultural surpluses, and a program for Arab refugees. In his references to the Middle East in this article, however, Kennedy offered more criticisms than he did proposals.

In a 1959 interview, Kennedy spoke further, in a brief fashion, of America's general policy in the Middle East. Although there was much consistency with his views of 1957, there was change also. For instance, he now rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine which he had earlier approved: "We must rethink all of our policies in the Middle East", he said, "the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the refusal to go ahead with the Aswan Dam--all mistakes." "They were all based on concepts of the Middle East," he remarked, "that were no longer

valid."[13] Just which concepts, precisely, he considered no longer valid was not clear. The implication was that United States policy should have been more conciliatory and sympathetic to the Arab nations.

Certainly the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine were unsuccessful in the sense that they failed to limit either the nationalist rivalries in the Middle East or contain the expansion of Russian influence. President Nasser's influence in the Middle East continued to grow, as did his relations with the Soviet Union, partially as a result of American misconceptions and diplomatic blunders. Kennedy searched for a new policy direction and made some thoughtful and constructive suggestions, but at no time did he offer a clear policy alternative on the tough, basic problems confronting Secretary of State Dulles. Essentially, he advocated a general policy of increased United States aid to Middle East nations for development purposes. But the Arab-Israeli conflict was the main obstacle to stability in the area and Kennedy did not suggest how United States policy could best ameliorate that issue. Also, if both the Baghdad Pact and Eisenhower Doctrine were "mistakes", Kennedy neglected to specify with any clarity an alternate course by which the United States could effectively block the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East. However, it was one of America's basic misconceptions that the Middle East could ever be an exclusively Western sphere of interest and influence. Any effective guarantee of international stability in the area necessitated the Soviet Union's influence and support and to pretend otherwise was unrealistic. The Middle East was of vital strategic importance to the Soviet Union.

During the years of the Baghdad Pact, the Suez crisis, and the

Eisenhower Doctrine, France was struggling with the revolt in Algeria. The Algerian revolt was inextricably entangled in Middle Eastern affairs. President Nasser, for instance, supported the cause of the Algerian nationalists. Relations between the United States and France deteriorated at the time of the Suez crisis, when the United States intervened to support Nasser, and they remained strained. France was unhappy with the Middle East policy of the United States. One leading Gaullist complained that the United States was "willing to sacrifice its European Allies in its ridiculous search for Arab friends, lest they fall under Communist influence.[14]

That comment could have been directed at Kennedy. Although he was clearly unwilling to sacrifice America's European allies, he was emphatically in agreement with the latter part of that statement and his outspoken involvement in the Algerian struggle for independence was a clear example of that concern.

In 1954, shortly after France had been forced to capitulate in Indochina, a bloody and prolonged civil war broke out in French Algeria. The inflamed nationalism in the Middle East had spread westward to Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. Tunisia and Morocco had been French protectorates which, after a comparatively brief struggle, eventually gained their independence. But Algeria was a much more complex issue. Constitutionally, it was a part of France proper and was under direct French administration. And although the country was composed of nearly nine million Moslems, there were one million French residents, or "colons", and they were strongly represented in French politics. 'Algérie francaise' was a powerful slogan in France and not one Paris cabinet members took lightly. Algeria was not a simple question of

imperialism. It was an extraordinarily complex problem with political, economic, racial and military factors all entwined.

The Algerian revolt presented American policy-makers with the usual dilemma--the problem of maintaining unity in the Western alliance, while at the same time maintaining a posture in support of independence and opposition to colonialism. Should the United States support self-determination for the Algerian Moslems and risk alienating its old European ally, France, or should it take the position that the conflict was strictly a domestic matter and one in which the United States should not interfere? This latter course had one major weakness. Such a policy appeared to condone colonialism and would alienate the emerging nations of Africa and Asia who sensed a common cause with the Algerian nationalists. American interests were effected in another way. While the Algerian struggle dragged on, France was forced to virtually 'denude' her military commitment to NATO and the defense of Western Europe.

France consistently resisted all efforts to place the Algerian problem before the United Nations. French spokesmen argued the common refrain that, legally, Algeria was an integral part of France, and the Algerian revolt, therefore, was a purely internal matter. The United Nations had no more justification to intervene in the dispute, they asserted, than it would have in a dispute between the state of Texas and the United States Government. The Eisenhower Administration, through its representatives at the United Nations, upheld the French position and worked to prevent debate of the issue in the General Assembly. Essentially, the Eisenhower Administration sought a middle course in the conflict, one that would avoid offending either the Afro-Asian

nations or France. But in reality, United States policy was one of genial compliance with French efforts. In fact, France was heavily supplied with American military equipment. United States policy was one of being neutral on France's side--much as it had been with the French in Indochina.

This was the essential situation when Kennedy rose in the Senate on July 2, 1957, and outlined a bold new policy designed to break the impasse in the French-Algerian conflict. In a lengthy speech, he attacked both France's unyielding Algerian policy and the Eisenhower Administration's failure to support the cause of Algerian independence. Whether by coincidence or not, the date of Kennedy's speech was symbolic--two days before America's Independence Day celebrations. The speech touched off a major international discussion and received more public attention and criticism at home and abroad than any foreign policy speech Kennedy ever delivered. For his remarks, Kennedy received a heavy barrage of criticism. Much of it, from the Eisenhower Administration and official sources within France, was predictable, but some of the criticism came from high ranking fellow Democrats such as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. This underscored the sensitivity of the issue.

Kennedy's Algerian speech of July 2 was the first of a two-part address of the United States's failure to meet "the challenge of imperialism" which he called the "single most important test of American foreign policy".[15] He urged the United States to oppose openly both Soviet and Western imperialism and by so doing, win the support of the emerging nations of Africa and Asia. This first speech dealt with America's failure to oppose French imperialism in Algeria, and the

second speech, delivered on August 21, focused on Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland.

At the outset of his speech, Kennedy took care to praise France as a valued ally and he recognized that France was a war-weary nation that had been engaged in a continuous state of war since 1936--against the Axis, then in Syria, in Indochina, in Morocco, in Tunisia, in Algeria. And although he strongly denounced France's intransigence on the Algerian issue, he believed his proposal was in France's national interest as well as that of Algeria and the United States. After a lengthy and tightly-reasoned attack on France's refusal to grant meaningful concessions to the Algerian nationalists, he came out strongly for international negotiations leading to Algerian independence.

At the conclusion of his speech he submitted a forthright two-part resolution which called for the Eisenhower Administration to intervene and actively utilize either NATO machinery or the good offices of the Prime Minister of Tunisia and the Sultan of Morocco to achieve a solution to the war which recognized "the independent personality of Algeria". And if there was no substantial progress toward that goal by the time the United Nations General Assembly met in September, 1957, his resolution, Number 153, urged the United States to support "an international effort to derive for Algeria the basis for an orderly achievement of independence."[16] His greatest concern, he said, was that the United States' "retreat from the principles of independence and anti-colonialism" had damaged America's image and position of leadership in the eyes of the Afro-Asian world.

In attacking the Eisenhower Administration for its pro-French posture, Kennedy singled out United States Ambassador to the United

Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., for having opposed United Nations consideration of the Algerian question, and C. Douglas Dillon, Former United States Ambassador to France and then Under Secretary of State, for supporting France's unyielding position. To those who said that Algeria was not a proper concern for American policy-makers, Kennedy pointed out that France had been forced to strip her NATO forces "to the bone" thereby weakening Western Europe defenses against the Soviet Union. And American military supplies to France, he said, intended for use in the defense of Western Europe, were being used against the Algerians. Also, he emphasized, America's support for France's policy undermined United States relations with Tunisia, Morocco and other nations who had a sense of common cause with the aims of the Algerian leaders. And in a broader context, he warned that the United States' pro-French posture supplied powerful ammunition to anti-Western propagandists throughout the Middle East and Asia. American policies in colonial areas, he asserted, must no longer be "tied to the French".

Interestingly, it was almost exactly four years earlier to the day that Kennedy had offered his unsuccessful resolution encouraging France to grant independence to the Indochinese. And in this speech Kennedy referred to the lesson of Indochina: "Did that tragic episode not teach us that, whether France likes it or not, their overseas territories are sooner or later, one by one, inevitably going to break free and look with suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to independence?" Kennedy's Indochina resolution had been defeated and he openly admitted that prospects were "rather dubious" that his Algerian resolution would be adopted. But he felt the effort

had to be made in order to convey to the people of North Africa that there was support in the United States for their cause. Also, he believed that there were many people in France who agreed with his general view.

Essentially, Kennedy favored the continuation of French influence in North Africa. But he believed this could only be maintained if Algerian independence was established along the lines of Morocco and Tunisia. He argued for a solution under which Algeria would gain political independence and France would maintain some form of economic inter-dependence.

Of those who engaged in the debate following Kennedy's speech, Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois voiced the main opposition. He had two essential criticisms and they anticipated those unleashed the following day by various other spokesmen. First, he emphasized the importance of France, America's oldest ally, to the security of the United States and urged that nothing be done to antagonize that country. Secondly, Dirksen argued that even if one agreed with the goal of Kennedy's proposal, his method was unhelpful. "Caution", "prudence", "patience" were called for, he said, in such a delicate situation. He kindly reminded Kennedy that diplomacy was "not always effectuated with a brass band."[17]

In a front page account, the New York Times characterized Kennedy's speech as "perhaps the most comprehensive and outspoken arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an American in public office."[18] Reaction to Kennedy's speech followed a predictable pattern. He was attacking an entrenched policy. At a press conference the following day, President Eisenhower remarked that the best policy the

United States could follow was to "try to be understanding to both sides" while working behind the scenes for a solution to the problem. And he remarked: "That means you don't get up and begin to shout about such things, or there will be no effectiveness." Secretary of State Dulles, with advance knowledge of the speech, remarked that if Kennedy wanted to "tilt against colonialism" he ought to concentrate on the Communist variety rather than the French and he repeated his view that Algeria was primarily a French problem. He stated that he would be "very sorry" to see the Algerian dispute, with its "exceptional difficulty and complexity" become a United States problem.

According to New York Times' reports, various French spokesmen suggested that Kennedy was encouraging the Algerian nationalists to prolong the rebellion. Robert Lacoste, the French Minister for Algeria, was bitterly critical and he invited Kennedy to visit Algeria. Lacoste described Kennedy as a spokesman for "the old maids of the United States Senate", and suggested that the United States should solve its "Negro problem" before telling France how to get along with the Moslems. French Defense Minister Andre Morice was even more harsh: "I don't know whether Monsieur Kennedy has nights without nightmares [but] I know well that [Kennedy's proposal] will result in a great increase in innocent victims and the prolongation of a drama that would have been long ended if so many of our unthinking friends had weighed their words or their acts. It is the blood of others that pays for their errors."[19]

Of all the early criticism levelled at Kennedy's proposal, a New York Times editorial was the most responsible and persuasive.[20] The major point was that Kennedy probably "added fuel to a raging fire" and

made a compromise solution more difficult, not less. Algerian nationalist resistance against the French would now stiffen because of the impression that the United States may attempt to mediate on their behalf. And even those Frenchmen who favored a more conciliatory Algerian policy would "resent interference from a foreigner." The editorial also held that Kennedy minimized the unique complexity of the Algerian problem and contended that Kennedy's comparisons to Indochina, Tunisia, and Morocco were only partly valid. The editorial supported Dulles' position that the problem must be left to the French and Algerians and suggested that to be helpful, quiet diplomacy was required and "not a smashing public attack on the floor of the United States Senate."

In the Senate on July 8, Kennedy responded to his critics in a brief, forceful manner.[21] When he prepared his July 2 speech, he said, he realized that the State Department and the French Government would view it with disfavor. He also acknowledged that Algeria was a very complicated problem. But he believed the Algerian revolt had "grave international implications" and that if the struggle persisted with no fresh approach taken, the chances increased that the moderate Algerian nationalists, with a "pro-western orientation" would lose control to the extremists. And, he asked, how will the Algerians, when they inevitably gain their freedom, view an America that pretended neutrality while at the same time furnished arms that helped crush them?

"We dare not overlook," he warned, "in our concern over legal and diplomatic niceties, the powerful force of man's eternal desire to be free and independent. The worldwide struggle against imperialism,

the sweep of nationalism, is the most potent factor in foreign affairs today." Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, who had been absent from the Senate on July 2 and had not heard Kennedy's initial address, voiced his agreement with Kennedy's view. In his concluding remarks, Kennedy referred to the Soviet Union's suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, and the United States's support for a United Nations resolution condemning Soviet imperialism. What will be the decision of the United States, he asked, when a resolution concerning Algerian independence is submitted? "We cannot vote 'yea' in one instance and abstain from voting 'yea' in another."

Kennedy's rebuttal to his critics was persuasive but he did not answer the major criticism of his proposal. Would not the speech encourage the Moslem nationalists and also harden French attitudes, thus making a compromise even more difficult? Although Kennedy did not address this question directly, it was apparent that he did not regard this as the paramount issue. He believed that Algerian independence was inevitable. He was primarily concerned that the West, and the United States in particular, was losing to the Soviet Union the support of those nations struggling for independence. When the United Nations General Assembly meets again, he asked in rebuttal to his critics, will the United States again vote against the "anti-colonial block that controls the world balance of power? Or will we finally take back from the Soviets the leadership that is rightfully ours of the worldwide movement for freedom and independence?"

Kennedy's remarks on Algeria inspired many editorials to be written in evaluation of his position.[22] Although there was substantial sentiment in the press both for and against his stand, the majority

opinion was critical--especially that from influential spokesmen. Even leading Democrats took issue with his assessment of the Algerian situation. Adlai Stevenson, in a speech that won the favor of the French Government, stated that immediate independence for Algeria would be "an invitation to chaos".[23] But by far the sharpest cut from a fellow Democrat came from former Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a speech sponsored by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.[24] In reference to Kennedy's speech, Acheson remarked with acerbity that "nothing could be more injudicious than this proposal, except making it." He was particularly concerned that Kennedy did not have a proper appreciation for the "humiliating agony of the loss of power and position" that France was experiencing and he argued persuasively the need for a continued French presence in North Africa. Kennedy, however, was in full agreement with this last point. At no time did Kennedy ever suggest that the French should completely sever ties with Algeria. Acheson recognized that a political adjustment was necessary and inevitable in Algeria but he cautioned patience: "It will not help for us to snap impatient fingers at a people who were great before our nation was dreamt of, and tell them to get on with it." In essence, he believed France needed American help and understanding in solving her problems in Algeria and he considered Kennedy's remarks not only unhelpful but harmful. "There is no remote possibility," he concluded, "that his speech can advance solution." Kennedy and Acheson were not in complete disagreement. Both recognized that an accommodation was necessary; but Kennedy's call for independence was excessively radical for Acheson's

taste. But, primarily, it was Kennedy's method of persuasion that Acheson attacked.

In an October article in the magazine, America, entitled "The Algerian Crisis: A New Phase?", Kennedy once again answered the various critics of his Algerian proposal.[25] In a summary fashion, he repeated the main outlines of his earlier stated position. He admitted that editorial reaction to his speech had been generally unfavorable and hostile but he noted that individual letters he had received were heavily favorable. Some of the most common criticisms he quickly dismissed: that Algeria was strictly an internal problem, that criticism was not helpful to an old and valued ally, that America had similar internal problems (race relations) of its own that it should first solve, and that the issue was too "explosive" for foreign comment.

In Kennedy's opinion, the most important and persuasive criticism of his stand was the argument that a French withdrawal in Algeria would lead to control either by the Communists or Arab extremists and possibly turn the country into a state of uncontrollable terrorism and anarchy. Kennedy shared these fears. However, he did not advocate a complete French disengagement. And, he did not agree that a continuation of the current French policy was the best means to avert such a danger. Quite the contrary, he held that the longer moderate Algerian aspirations were suppressed, the greater the danger of a reactionary or Communist takeover. He hoped for a direct negotiated settlement of the conflict resulting in Algerian independence, and preferally within "a federative or interdependent framework." The West could not afford another Indochina, he said. And it was not a sentimental and dogmatic anticolonialism", he declared, but "the

harsh realities of the world" that necessitated all nations to help solve the Algerian problem.

Without mentioning the New York Times directly by name, in his America article, he sniped at its editorial position on the Algerian war.[26] He acknowledged, as he had earlier, that the New York Times' reports from the field furnished him with much of his factual data in his July 2 speech. But he objected to what he termed the "passive fatalism" on the issue displayed in the paper's editorial column. This view, he said, seemed to hold that events must run their natural course and that Americans must stand by sympathetically "while fate makes its decrees in the tragic dilemma of the French." The New York Times, editorially, had also stated that Kennedy's intervention in the struggle had made a compromise settlement more difficult, but once again, Kennedy did not answer that particular criticism.

The bloody and exhausting struggle in Algeria dragged on through the end of 1957 with no solution in sight. In February, 1958, the Tunisian city of Sakiet Sidi Youssef was bombed by French aircraft stationed in Algeria--by planes that were mostly American made. The incident created an international crisis. The French claimed they were pursuing Algerian rebels who enjoyed a privileged sanctuary on Tunisian territory. As a result of the use of United States planes, Algerian nationalists demanded a "reappraisal" of all agreements for American bases in North Africa. Mongi Slim, the Tunisian Ambassador to the United States, told Secretary of State Dulles that Tunisia intended to appeal to the United Nations Security Council against the French attack. Dulles sidestepped the Tunisian dispute and declined to take a stand. In the Senate, Kennedy blasted Dulles' policy and

that of the State Department: "We have ignored the explosive situation in Algeria and neglected our anxious friends in Tunisia for too long, both in the United Nations and in our economic aid program, while handing the Communists and the anti-American extremists every opportunity to pose as the champions of freedom." He proposed that the Algerian question, despite French opposition, be submitted to the United Nations and NATO for settlement. The alternative, he said, "may well be the loss of all North Africa to our enemies."[27]

Appearing as a guest on Face The Nation a few weeks later, in March, 1958, Kennedy took a more subdued tone.[28] He was asked what he would do that the Administration had not done with respect to the Algerian conflict. First, Kennedy replied that the United States was already indirectly involved in the struggle because of the military and economic assistance the American Government provided the French, so a position of neutrality was out of the question. He appreciated the difficulty of the situation, he said, but he would urge the French "diplomatically and every other way" to set a future date, perhaps five years or ten years, at which time the Algerians would have the right to choose their own future relationship with France. Once again the old dilemma presented itself, as it had in the case of Indochina years earlier. Kennedy was asked how far the United States should go in pressuring France--should military supplies be terminated? Kennedy thought not because it would probably "result in a rupture" with France. In this interview he was vague as to the means by which the United States should persuade France to grant independence to Algeria.

However, in an article in the Boston Globe appearing at the same

time, Kennedy was more specific, at least with respect to the most advisable course for France to follow.[29] Under America's policy of "drift", he said, the Algerian situation was steadily worsening. He recognized that only France could forge the ultimate solution but he believed the good offices of the United States and Great Britain could be helpful. He discussed the various possible solutions available: (1) France could abandon Algeria as it did Indochina in 1954, but Kennedy was flatly opposed to this option for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, he argued that a viable, independent Algeria required continued economic interdependence with France. (2) France could attempt a military reconquest of all northwest Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria) but, he warned, such a victory could only be temporary and such a policy would destroy NATO, inflame the uncommitted world, and preclude the possibility of establishing an African government with Western associations and outlook. (3) France could partition Algeria along national lines. However, Kennedy thought the time had passed for such a solution to be workable. (4) The fourth and final alternative was the formation of a Mediterranean pact, or North African federation, in which Algeria was offered a realistic time-table for self-determination. Kennedy believed this option offered the best chance for peace in North Africa. France's legitimate interests would be protected and such a solution, he said, would channel the nationalist forces sweeping Africa into "constructive outlets".

At some point during the heated controversy over his Algerian proposal, Kennedy had some doubts about the wisdom of his remarks. Time magazine reported that he telephoned his father, then in France,

sometime in late 1957, and wondered aloud if he had not been mistaken. His father replied: "You lucky mush. You don't know it and neither does anyone else, but within a few months everyone is going to know just how right you were on Algeria."[30] Unfortunately for the Senator, that was by no means the case and the war dragged on for many more months. Gradually, Kennedy came to regret that so much emphasis had been placed on his use of the term "independence" in relation to Algeria rather than on his plan for negotiation. And he admitted that he had underestimated the emotionalism attached to the Algerian issue within France. In 1959, he stated: "We might have spoken about permitting the Algerians to determine their relationship with France. The use of the word "independence" may have been unwise I have never seen an issue which has as much emotion in it as Algeria in France."[31]

There were clear signs of cautious reservations in some of Kennedy's subsequent comments on the issue in 1958 and 1959. He had had his fingers burnt as a result of his speeches and perhaps that was the reason for his increased caution. It is also possible that the West's loss of Iraq and the rise of de Gaulle in France had a bearing on his views. At any rate, in a New York speech in November, 1958, Kennedy spoke on the theme of anti-colonialism, in which he expressed his regret that the United States had not been as "vigorous" in condemning colonialism in the West as it was in attacking imperialism in the East.[32] According to a New York Times account, Kennedy's prepared text specifically criticized the United States for "trying to remain aloof from the Algerian and similar controversies, in the United Nations and elsewhere." But in speaking, he deleted the comments.

He told reporters later that he had "decided not to get involved in a particular controversy, as against the whole general question of colonialism."

A few months later, in February, 1959, Kennedy once again appeared on Face The Nation and was asked why he hadn't spoken on Algeria in recent months.[33] He stated that he hoped the recently elected de Gaulle government would make some progress toward a satisfactory solution. Then, he said: "I have refrained [from comment] because I think that it is unhelpful for a Westerner to make a comment, an American to make a comment." But, he said, if some progress toward solution was not made by spring of 1959, then he felt it was incumbent upon the United States, and Americans generally, to indicate their views. This was something of a shift in opinion. At first, it sounded as though he was agreeing with Dean Acheson's general criticisms of his earlier remarks--that foreign advice to France was unhelpful. However, he indicated that this silent posture should only be maintained as long as there was a hope of meaningful progress. Quite possibly, Kennedy had become cautious partially because it was politically wise to do so. By 1959, he was clearly a leading candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination and to repeatedly maintain his July 2 position, which had evoked such strong and influential opposition at home and abroad, would be risky politically and not in his best interests. Perhaps he thought that it would be wise to allow the controversy to subside and hope for a French resolution of the problem.

Ultimately, Algeria gained its independence. The issue had torn France apart internally for several years, and the country verged on civil war but in the spring of 1958, General Charles de Gaulle returned

to power following a rapid succession of French governments. He very cautiously and courageously eased toward a settlement with the Algerian nationalists despite violent opposition from various factions within France, Algeria, and the French Army. Emotions ran high and an attempt was made to assassinate de Gaulle, but Algerian independence became a fact in 1961. It was an historic decision. De Gaulle sought to continue France's special links with Algeria and he hoped that the settlement would render a model relationship between an industrialized European nation and its former colony. The final Algerian settlement was similar to that which Kennedy had proposed in July, 1957--political independence for the Algerians within a framework of economic interdependence with France.

How should Kennedy's involvement in the Algerian struggle for independence be assessed? Much can be said in favor of his remarks. As a spokesman on the issue, he was concerned, knowledgeable, and generally restrained, despite the outburst of criticism his speech produced. The harsh reaction to his speech came more from the sensitivity of the issue rather than from any rashness or unreasonableness in Kennedy's proposal. Few critics challenged the content of his criticism of French policy, most questioned his method. Certainly, France was intransigent in dealing with the Algerian nationalists and did place unrealistic demands on the rebels as a prerequisite to negotiations. In 1957, progress was not being made and American support of a failing French policy did not appear at all helpful in resolving the conflict. And Kennedy was justified in pointing to the inconsistency in United States foreign policy which condemned the Soviet Union for its practices in Poland and Hungary, while

supporting France's policies in Indochina, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria at the expense of the support of the emerging nations of Africa and Asia. It was reasonable to argue that some fresh, new American effort was necessary to resolve the Algerian conflict.

The wisdom of Kennedy's outspoken involvement in the Algerian issue can be fairly questioned, however--especially his method. Perhaps such harsh truths on such a sensitive issue should not have been spoken in a public forum. He later admitted that he had underestimated the sensitivity of the Algerian struggle within France. It could be argued, also, that Kennedy oversimplified and underestimated the difficulties involved in reaching a solution. Certainly the general political instability within France, coupled with the fierce resistance to independence, made a compromise solution exceedingly difficult. It took a masterful effort on the part of de Gaulle to accomplish the separation. And it is possible that his speech, signifying a measure of support for the nationalists' cause, did serve to stiffen their resistance to the French, while at the same time enraging the French "Ultras", thereby making a compromise solution more difficult. In other words, perhaps his speech did have the effect of adding fuel to the fire--at least in the short run. One cannot conclude, however, that the speech generated only heat and no light. Kennedy spoke some harsh truths and his speech was not one that would have been proper for a Secretary of State to give but Kennedy, as a senator, was not in that sensitive position and he was entitled to criticize both French and American policies, especially given the attitude that he had regarding the harmful effect of Western colonialism.

Throughout the controversy, Kennedy was consistent in his insistence on the need for Algerian independence, although in 1958 and 1959 he became more cautious and generally toned down his remarks. Certainly he was a sensitive and astute politician and, as has been suggested, he might have considered this a politically wise posture to assume. But in 1958 and 1959, with the election of de Gaulle there was a new promise that the Algerian war might be resolved--a hope that had not existed in 1957 when Kennedy delivered his initial address. So his new found caution and restraint, and disinclination to speak out on the subject, was understandable strictly in terms of the changed French-Algerian situation.

Human motivation is always difficult to determine. Some have charged that Kennedy's remarks were politically motivated in an attempt to enhance his image as a foreign policy spokesman on an issue that carried no particular risk to his career. Britisher Alistair Cooke, for instance, observed in The Manchester Guardian on July 11, 1957: "Senator Kennedy is too shrewd to make a hobby out of Algeria. It has brilliantly served its purpose of pitching him into center stage. . . . Precisely because it is a country that knows neither friend nor enemy in Massachusetts it has no liability to his own constituents. But it has nicely suggested to his newspaper supporters that the Senator is a statesman, something like Stevenson, of majestic disinterestedness."[34] Cooke's assessment certainly makes sense and has the ring of truth. But there were many issues that Kennedy could have used in his quest for national prominence and there were far less enlightened positions he could have taken.

Other commentators praised Kennedy's boldness and courage for

assuming an unpopular position against an entrenched policy.[35] It is probable that both assessments bear some truth. The speech enhanced his image in certain quarters but it damaged it in others. Considering the predictably hostile reaction to his speech from influential sources, both American and foreign, Democratic and Republican, it is highly doubtful that his motivation was entirely political. Kennedy, of course, denied that he was politically motivated, and argued that his Algerian speech was a natural outgrowth of his earlier attack on French colonialism in Indochina. Certainly, his support of Algeria's fight against France was entirely consistent with his long held opposition to Western colonialism, dating from 1951.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Major disagreements in interpretation exist over President Nasser's motivation and intent during this period.

[2]The Boston Globe, February 8, 1957, carried an account of this speech. Kennedy delivered a similar speech in Springfield, Missouri in late February: The Boston Globe, February 24, 1957.

[3]U. S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957, CIII, Part 3, 2877-3887, March 1, 1957.

[4]Ibid., 2877.

[5]Ibid., 2881.

[6]Ibid., 2878.

[7]The New York Times, March 11, 1957.

[8]U. S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957, CIII, Part 4, 4276-4277, March 25, 1957.

[9]U. S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957, CIII, Part 3, 3178-3180, March 5, 1957. See also: Kennedy's Strategy of Peace, p. 146-151; and John F. Kennedy, "Comity and Commonsense in the Middle East," Vital Speeches, April, 1957, 359-361.

[10]John F. Kennedy Library, Press Releases Files, 1953-1961, Box 626. The letter was sent on February 13, 1957. On October 28, 1957, Kennedy stated that the interest of American minority groups in causes such as Israel's was in line with basic American traditions. His address on "multiple loyalties" was given at a dinner sponsored by Yeshiva University at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel where Kennedy was presented with an award. See: New York Times, October 28, 1957.

[11]U. S. Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, CII, Part 6, 7506, May 7, 1956.

[12]John F. Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks At Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, October, 1957, p. 44-59. This article is examined more fully in Chapter VI.

[13]Quoted in Burns, Kennedy, p. 272.

[14]Quoted in Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, And The Cold War, 1945-1966 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 211.

[15]U. S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957, CIII, Part 8, 10780-10792, July 2, 1957. Even in 1955, Kennedy had criticized the French action in North Africa on the grounds that the withdrawal of French troops from Europe weakened NATO. See Boston Globe, November 16, 1955.

[16]Ibid., 10788.

[17]Kennedy responded that in July of 1953, a "younger, more youthful and vibrant" Dirksen had supported a similar amendment calling for independence in Indochina. Dirksen replied that responsibility and four years had "sobered" him.

[18]New York Times, July 3, 1957. On July 7, the New York Times described some amusing behind the scenes public relations manoeuvering by Kennedy and Secretary of State Dulles prior to the delivery of the speech. Instead of following the usual routine of distributing the speech in the press gallery, Kennedy had taken care to deliver advance copies of the speech to the home of all Washington correspondents a few days before delivery. Herve Alphand, the French Ambassador, heard of the speech and on Monday, July 1, he informed Dulles that unless the speech was "officially disavowed quickly" it would cause bad feeling in France. As a result, when Dulles met reporters on the morning of July 2, he was able to react to the speech before it was delivered and thus reduce the impact of Kennedy's criticism within France.

[19]All these accounts are taken from the New York Times, July 3 and 4, 1957. Years later, in an Oral History for the Kennedy Library, Couve de Murville, a prominent French policy-maker, recalled the strong negative reaction Kennedy's speech had produced in France. Couve de Murville had discussed the Algerian problem with Kennedy some time before the July 2 speech and he recalled that, generally, he did not think Kennedy's views were completely wrong even though his speech, he said, was "very much in contradiction with French feelings in general at that period." p.2.

[20]New York Times, July 3, 1957, p. 22:2.

[21]U. S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957, CIII, Part 8, 10966-10967, July 8, 1957.

[22]For a limited sampling of press opinion both pro and con, see New York Times, July 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, August 3; Washington Post, August 1. For a cross-country sampling, all of it favorable to Kennedy see Congressional Record, 1957, Appendix A5550-5552; A5769-A5770; A5875-A5876; A5917-A5918; A6066-A6067; A6388; A6445-A6446. On page A5550 Kennedy introduced an article on Algeria by New York Times correspondent Homer Bigart. Kennedy stated that reports from Bigart and other New York Times correspondents in North Africa furnished much of the data from which he drew the conclusions for his speech on July 2, 1957.

[23]New York Times, July 30, 1957.

[24]The New York Times carried an account of the speech on October 26, 1957. Acheson's speech was subsequently published in his book Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 122-126. In his Oral History at the Kennedy Library, Acheson spoke of an amusing chance meeting he had had with Jackie Kennedy in 1958 shortly after the publication of Power and Diplomacy. Coincidentally, they were seated next to each other on a train. Acheson recalled: "She began to attack me about the statement I made on Jack Kennedy's speech. I pointed out to her that we were likely to be spending some hours together--we had looked at our tickets and found that I had the chair next to hers on the train--and I said that we could either spend this time fighting or we could be pleasant. And she said, "All right, let's be pleasant." It was a good thing we did, because we arrived in Washington at 7:00 o'clock the next morning, after having sat up all night with desultory conversation and some troubled sleep So I got the impression that the Kennedy family was not pleased with my [speech]. . . ."

[25]John F. Kennedy, "The Algerian Crisis: A New Phase?" America, October 5, 1957, p. 15-17. Some of these same points were briefly touched on in his more comprehensive review of United States foreign policy in Foreign Affairs, October, 1957, pp. 44-57.

[26]Ibid., p. 16.

[27]An account of the Tunisian bombing and Kennedy's remarks was carried in the New York Times on February 12, 1958, and in the Boston Globe on February 11, 1958. French Ambassador Herve Alphand and Tunisian Ambassador Mongi Slim both attended a White House diplomatic dinner and musical that evening but their attitude toward one another was reported as distinctly cool. Alphand said they shook hands and "we spoke but we didn't say anything." Slim said he came only because he considered a White House invitation a "command". He left soon after President and Mrs. Eisenhower retired from the party. He termed the bombing incident a "very bad situation" and said that he was going to New York to seek United Nations action. In an Oral History for the Kennedy Library Mongi Slim recalled an interview he had had

with Kennedy shortly after the bombing incident. He stated that the Senator was "sincerely troubled" about the bombing and searching for a way to prevent further acts without alienating France, In the interview, Mongi Slim spoke of several conversations he had with Kennedy on the Algeria problem during this period and, of course, he recalled that he had been very pleased and encouraged with Kennedy's position.

[28]Face The Nation transcript, March 30, 1958.

[29]Boston Globe, March 28, 1958. The speech was also introduced in the Congressional Record, 1958, CIV, Part 5, 6757-6758, by Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin.

[30]Time, December 2, 1957, p. 20.

[31]Quoted in Victor Lasky's JFK, The Man and The Myth, p. 286. Both Lasky and Burns' Kennedy, p. 196, cite this development in Kennedy's attitude.

[32]New York Times and Boston Globe, November 24, 1958.

[33]Face The Nation transcript, February 22, 1951.

[34]Quoted in Victor Lasky's John F. Kennedy, What's Behind The Image...? (Washington: Free World Press, Inc., 1960), p. 211. Many observers speculated as to Kennedy's source of information on the French-Algerian situation and wondered who his advisers might have been. Kennedy credited New York Times reports as a basic source of information. In The Man and the Myth, p. 285, Lasky quoted a statement made by Robert Lacoste, the French Governor-General in Algiers, to the effect that Kennedy was advised by "the son of an important North African political personage," who, according to Lasky, was presumably Habib Bourguiba, Jr., the son of the Tunisian Premier, a diplomat in Washington, and a friend of Kennedy. In his Oral History interview, Mongi Slim, who was then the Tunisian Ambassador, mentioned that he and other North African diplomats did all they could to help inform Kennedy by translating for him and reporting information. Mongi Slim also noted that Kennedy had contact with Algerian nationalists in New York.

Lasky was absolutely convinced that Kennedy's motivation was sheerly political but in The Man and the Myth, p. 287, he made reference to an influence which Kennedy suggested helped shape his thinking on Algeria. Kennedy had never been to Algeria, but in 1956, his youngest brother, Teddy, and Frederick L. Holborn, a Harvard government instructor, visited the troubled area and when they returned they urged the Senator to support Algerian independence. According to Lasky, Kennedy stated that he had been "receptive" to their urgings.

[35]Numerous editorials praised Kennedy's courage. Many of these are cited in footnote 22. In his Oral History interview, Mongi Slim praised Kennedy's courage and added further that Kennedy was more intelligent and far-sighted on questions of colonialism than were most other Congressmen and officials that he spoke with during this period.

CHAPTER VI

A DEMOCRAT LOOKS AT FOREIGN POLICY, 1957-1958

Shortly after Kennedy initially spoke out on Algeria, he submitted a more general, far-ranging critique of the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy program to the prestigious quarterly Foreign Affairs in which he also outlined his own philosophy.[1] Interestingly, his article, which was entitled "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy," immediately followed a much publicized article written by Secretary of State Dulles in defense of American policy.[2] It has been suggested that this article of Kennedy's, more than anything else written by him at this time, convinced observers that he should be taken seriously as a thinker on foreign policy.[3]

The essential thrust of his article was to urge greater flexibility in American foreign policy in the light of rapidly changing world conditions--within the Communist bloc, the West, and the emerging nations. After taking a partisan slap at the Eisenhower Administration's lack of "decision" and "leadership", he launched into his most familiar theme. One of the prime weaknesses of the present administration, he said, was its failure to recognize the impact of the forces of nationalism in the world, especially in North Africa, southeastern Europe and the Middle East.

Kennedy went on to say that there was a "double pull" at work in the world--the nations emerging from Western colonialism were

searching for a new political identity while the older nations of Europe were moving toward a greater political unity, such as the Common Market. The problem for American policy-makers, he explained, although difficult, was "to strike a realistic balance between the legitimate appeals of national self-determination which pulsate through the uncommitted world and the gravitational pulls toward unity which grow from the technological and economic interdependence of modern states."

In the course of the article Kennedy found much to fault in the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy. As James MacGregor Burns noted, Kennedy warned against rigidity of policy, against relying on "paper defense" like the Baghdad Pact, against irresponsible promises such as "liberating" the Communist satellites, against America's unwillingness to accept partial gains, against getting "lashed too tightly" to a single man and party, such as Chancellor Adenauer and his Christian Democrats, against the American tendency to seek absolutist solutions, against "old liberal bromides" that had no appeal to nations seeking a quick transition to industrialization and admiring "the disciplined attack which Communism seems to make uoon the problems of economic modernization and redistribution." He also attacked the use of foreign-policy bipartisanship to stifle dissent.

Kennedy suggested fresh new departures. He advocated amendment of the Battle Act and other restrictive acts to permit American aid to the Communist satellites, particularly Poland. Since a "new generation" was coming to power in Europe, he urged closer ties with younger leaders and opposition parties such as the West German

Socialists. And, of course, he also urged independence for the Algerians within a framework of economic interdependence with France, and heightened economic aid to the nations of the Middle East.

Kennedy also urged greater flexibility of policy with the neutral nations of the world such as India. There were social forces at work in the world, he declared, "which have a validity apart from the bipolar struggle." He noted that Communist gains were being made at the polls in India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. In his mind, this nullified the old concept that such Communist gains could only be made through aggression and subversion. In order to block these Communist successes, he saw an urgent need to reassess current American foreign aid programs which, he said, in reference to the Dulles school of thought, "have reflected an ill-conceived and ill-concealed disdain for the 'neutralists' and 'socialists' who--in a nation such as India--represent the free world's strongest bulwarks to the seductive appeal of Peking and Moscow."

While Kennedy stressed the need for increased economic aid to the Communist satellites, the neutralist nations such as India, and the various nations of the Middle East, as an effective means to combat the Soviet Union, he believed that American aid had to be selective and not merely scattered at will. American assistance should not attempt to reach "each parched patch of misery and need" in the world, he said, an eye should be kept for the "likelihood of success". Also, he warned that if the foreign aid program was not carefully directed and planned it could serve only to fortify ruling military dictatorships and "perpetuate feudalism".

On the issue of the Cold War, Kennedy declared that the State Department, under Dulles, was as rigid and "unrelenting" as the Soviet Union and implied that he favored a more conciliatory policy.[4] He even cautiously suggested the future recognition of Communist China. Although there were still "compelling" reasons for non-recognition, he said, the United States must be careful not to "strait-jacket" its policy "as a result of ignorance and fail to detect a change in the objective situation when it comes."

There were a few uniquely interesting points raised in the article which indicated Kennedy's present state of mind on some old issues. For example, he referred to America's "current and increasingly successful policy in Indochina. . . ." At this point in time, Kennedy had great faith in the ability of the Diem regime to solve South Vietnam's problems and serve as an effective bulwark against the spread of Communism in Indochina.

His views on the "loss" of China had swung 180 degrees since 1949, when he had charged that President Truman and the State Department had "frittered away" victory in China because of poor advice from "the Lattimores and the Fairbanks." Now he stated that it was a myth to suggest "that China was lost because of the action of a few diplomats, for instance, rather than because of underlying revolutionary forces. . . ." Kennedy now had a more sophisticated view of the China situation but as critic Victor Lasky pointed out, quite fairly, if there was a myth, then Kennedy himself had helped create it.[5]

Kennedy touched on the issue of nuclear weapons for defense. In his own Foreign Affairs article, Dulles had modified his concept of massive retaliation as a means of defense in favor of a more

limited "tactical" response with nuclear weapons. While criticizing America's "pose" of neutrality on the Algerian issue Kennedy commented on one of the weaknesses of relying on nuclear weapons for defense: "Washing one's hands of responsibility [Algeria], like plans for 'sanitary war' and 'clean bombs', induces an illusion of antisepsis and tidy order, but it is only an illusion."

Near the end of the article, after discussing the many difficulties, complexities, and dilemmas involved in the decision-making of foreign policy, Kennedy made an intriguing remark: "If Don Quixote is a poor inspiration for the makers of our foreign policy, so, too is Hamlet." The former appears to be a clear reference to Secretary of State Dulles but the latter could have been directed at President Eisenhower, whom Kennedy had charged with vacillation and drift in the past, or it could possibly have been a subtle swipe at his competitor, Adlai Stevension, whom many considered overly indecisive.

In the course of the article, while emphasizing the need for increased allowances for ambassadors so that career Foreign Service men could serve in the highest posts, Kennedy mentioned "'l'affaire Gluck". This comment stemmed from a controversy surrounding the recent appointment of Maxwell H. Gluck as Ambassador to Ceylon. It was revealed that Gluck was completely ignorant of Ceylonese affairs. Gluck was being rewarded, it was charged, because he had contributed liberally to the 1956 Republican campaign. At the time of the appointment, Ceylon had just elected a neutralist government under the leadership of Prime Minister Bandaranaike. As Gluck prepared to leave for Ceylon he unwisely made some disparaging remark about the Prime Minister which added fuel to the controversy.[6]

Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter appeared before a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the appointment. At the hearing, Kennedy and the other Senators complained of the general tendency to appoint wealthy non-career men to ambassadorships because of the inadequacy of salaries and he urged that allowances be increased. But more importantly, because of the repercussions in Asia caused by Gluck's appointment, Kennedy made a formal request to the Secretary that Gluck be reassigned. Ceylon was an emerging post-colonial nation, Kennedy pointed out, and as such had strategic importance. He was concerned that the Soviet Union was exploiting the ill-will caused by Gluck's appointment.[7]

As James MacGregor Burns noted, quite accurately, Kennedy's article served as a prologue to his various foreign policy stands during 1957 and the following two years. In addition to his involvement in the Algerian dispute and the Middle East policy generally during 1957 and 1958, there were three other main foreign policy issues which dominated Kennedy's attention during this period. First, he fought long and hard for an amendment to the Battle Act to permit American economic aid to Poland and other Communist satellites, thereby weakening their dependence on the Soviet Union. Second, he worked closely with Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, a former ambassador to India, and co-sponsored a resolution which urged stepped-up American aid to bolster India's sagging economy. The resolution was designed to commit the United States to the success of India's second five-year plan. And third, in the wake of the launching of the first Soviet satellite (Sputnik) in 1957, he became identified with the famous "missile gap" issue. Along with the

ever-present anti-colonialism theme and his increasing emphasis on economic and technical assistance as opposed to military aid in foreign aid programs, these were his main concerns during 1957-1958.

Each of these issues was touched on when Secretary of State Dulles appeared before hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the subject of the Mutual Security Act of 1958.[8] "Don't you think," Kennedy asked Dulles, "that while it is very important that we maintain our own national defense, particularly in the missile field, the Soviet Union may be using better judgment in concentrating on the economic, rather than the military, in contradistinction to ourselves?" In his response, Dulles stressed the necessity for military aid to the recipient nations in order to combat internal Communist subversion.

Burns noted that Kennedy's question suggested a shift in emphasis in his thinking since the days when he had stressed military aid. Although that is true, the shift had been gradual, not abrupt. Also, Kennedy had long advocated economic rather than military aid to Latin America and the Middle East.

As the questioning continued, Kennedy declared: "Mr. Secretary, the point I want to make is that I think the economic assistance that is proposed in this bill [Mutual Security Bill] is inadequate, in view of the very serious nature of the problems within those underdeveloped countries, the population increase and the effort that the Soviet Union is making."[9] Quite notably, however, in view of later developments, Kennedy recognized the need for military assistance and defense support programs to certain underdeveloped countries, such as Vietnam, which, he said, were faced with "a strong enemy army across the border."

Kennedy and Dulles went on to talk of the special economic needs of India and the necessity to amend the Battle Act. Kennedy asked Dulles if he thought such an amendment would be in the national interest. Dulles answered in the affirmative and noted his awareness that Kennedy had already made a proposal along these lines.

From the time he first entered Congress in 1947, Kennedy had expressed his concern for the plight of the Polish people. While on a European trip in October, 1955, he visited Warsaw and cabled back a press release which urged the United States not to forget the plight of the Polish people.[10]

The liberation of the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, of course, was a prime desire of the Eisenhower Administration but the question centered on how this could best be accomplished. Prior to the 1956 revolts in Poland and Hungary the speeches of Secretary of State Dulles left the implication that the United States encouraged satellite resistance to Soviet control, but the 1956 revolts caught the Eisenhower Administration flat-footed. The United States did not come to the aid of the Poles, or more particularly the Hungarians and the Soviet Union crushed the Hungarian insurrection. In the aftermath of the bloody and futile Hungarian revolt, many wondered if the implied promises of America's policy of liberation had not in fact led the Hungarian Freedom Fighters to expect United States intervention and then, when the chips were down, left them in the lurch. President Eisenhower was forced to clarify the American position and in a November 14, 1956 press conference, he declared that his Administration had never advocated open rebellion for the satellite states against Soviet control.

The Polish revolution, more limited in its aims than was the Hungarian Revolution, achieved a degree of independence from Soviet control, while remaining within the Soviet orbit. Despite strong pressures from the Soviet Union the Poles elected their own nationalist Communist government under the leadership of Wladyslaw Gomulka. And in the fall of 1957, the Polish Government turned to the United States for increased trade and economic assistance. The Soviet Union, quite naturally, was suspicious about Poland's new policy of seeking closer relations with the West and the Gomulka government had to move cautiously.

In negotiations between a Polish delegation and the Department of State, the Poles requested $200 million worth of surplus farm products to be paid for in Polish currency, and a $100 million Export-Import Bank loan to purchase machinery. From the American side, the chief barrier to the loan was the Battle Act of 1951 which prohibited such aid to countries trading in war materials with the Soviet Union. Such a definition, of course, included all the Soviet satellite nations. The Battle Act was inflexible as was the general American attitude toward the Communist world at the time of its passage. It recognized only two categories of nations in the world--those in the Western camp and those of the Communist bloc, and no distinction was made for those Communist nations, such as Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent, Poland, that were partially or wholly independent of the Soviet Union.

The Battle Act was passed during the Korean War and it prohibited giving aid to any Communist country except under extremely restrictive conditions. Under the law, the President could authorize economic

assistance and trade with Communist satellites if (1) the recipient nation could be defined as free of Soviet control or (2) the President certified to Congress that United States trade with such nations would be in the security interests of the United States. In practice, these restrictions prohibited virtually all trade and assistance to the Soviet satellites, especially under the normal foreign assistance program. Over the years, those who sought to aid Yugoslavia, and more recently Poland, had been able to circumvent the Battle Act, but the Act greatly restricted the President's manoeuverability. The State Department had long favored a more flexible approach believing that any policy which weakened the dependence of the Communist satellites on the Soviet Union was in America's best interests.

The Soviet Union regarded United States aid to Poland as interference and a threat to her national interests. But, for a variety of reasons, many Americans also opposed such aid. It was argued that American assistance to the Soviet satellites would strengthen the economy of the entire Communist bloc and relieve pressure from the Soviet Union. Also, United States aid would serve to reduce discontent within the satellite nations and delay the day when the Communist system would disintegrate from within. This was a pervasive view within the country at the time and one of its leading spokesmen was Senate Republican Leader, William F. Knowland of California.

Kennedy immediately became involved in the Polish aid issue. In March of 1957, he wrote a letter to Secretary of State Dulles which argued in favor of the economic assistance to Poland despite the fact that the Polish government was still within the orbit of the Soviet Union.[11] To Kennedy, the Polish request indicated a new

degree of independence from Soviet domination, and Poland's ability and willingness to turn to the United States for assistance, he said, should be "encouraged, not castigated". He recognized the arguments of those who opposed aid to Poland but he said: "If there is even a slight chance that the demonstration of friendship on our part will help to loosen further the bonds of Soviet domination then the obvious gains to this nation and the free world will have been well worth the effort."

A few weeks later, in a speech to a Jefferson-Jackson fund-raising dinner in Omaha, Nebraska, Kennedy once again called on the United States to grant Poland's request for aid: "I realize the dangers involved," he said, "[but if the U. S. rejects the Poles], we will either be forcing a suffering nation into a fruitless revolt or we will be forcing the Polish government to again become hopelessly dependent on Moscow. If we fail to help the Poles, who else in Germany, Czechoslovakia, or anywhere else behind the Iron Curtain will dare stand up to the Russians and look westward?"[12] The issue of aid to Poland was a sensitive one, of course, because no Senator wished to go on record as supporting anything that could possibly be interpreted as helping Communism.

In June of 1957, the United States agreed to commit $95 million in aid to Poland. This was approximately one-third of the Polish request but it did not begin to meet their needs. More could have been done. However, it should be noted that Poland still relied heavily on the Soviet Union for economic assistance and realistically, no matter what the United States had been willing to do, that basic arrangement could not have been altered radically, in the short run,

at least. The loan illustrated the Administration's lack of manoeuverability in this area. As Kennedy later pointed out, in order to circumvent the restrictions of the Battle Act, the Administration had been forced to stretch the truth and define Poland as free from Soviet control.

On August 21, 1957, Kennedy delivered a major speech in the Senate entitled "The Struggle Against Imperialism, Part II--Poland and Eastern Europe."[13] Part 1 of the address was the July 2, 1957 Algerian speech which concerned the problem of Western imperialism. Now Kennedy spoke of the challenge of Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe and the emerging opportunities that were open to the United States.

At the outset, Kennedy noted that the Russians regarded their actions in Eastern Europe much as the French regarded their actions in Algeria--as not of the affair of the United States. However, Kennedy felt that American foreign policy should actively oppose both forms of imperialism, Western and Soviet. Although his speech related to all the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, he focused his discussion on Poland because he believed Poland, with its recently acquired freedom of action and cautious turn to the West, offered the best opportunity for the United States to initiate a policy which would encourage its gradual evolution away from Soviet domination.

In summary fashion, Kennedy recited the failures of the Eisenhower Administration's pre-1956 liberation policy and its more current policy which he characterized as merely "waiting and hoping" for the satellite nations to become independent. He did not believe that the satellites in Eastern Europe would become independent as a result

of a violent revolt--the revolts of 1956 had proven that. Also, he said, since the United States made it clear that it was not prepared to help the satellites revolt or send them arms, then some new alternative was needed. Independence would more likely come gradually as a result of a cautious, evolutionary process, Kennedy said, and therefore, the United States must be ready to take advantage of any opportunity to lessen satellite dependence on the Soviet Union by having ready alternative forms of economic aid. The Battle Act and other acts prevented the President from having such flexibility. Also, because of these statutory restrictions, there were great delays in granting aid--delays that resulted in frustration and missed opportunities. Kennedy termed the June grant of $95 million in United States aid to Poland as "too little and too late". The Gomulka government, he said, had taken a great risk in turning to the United States for aid and this "frustration of hopes" served to strengthen the anti-Gomulka faction in Poland, which argued that American aid was essentially verbal and propagandistic. Also, he continued, because of the long delay and the inadequacy of the loan, the Gomulka government had been forced to turn to Moscow once again for assistance.

For all these reasons, Kennedy believed that a more flexible, imaginative approach was needed to pry the satellites away from Soviet domination. At the end of his speech, he introduced a bill to amend the Battle Act. His amendment, which was designed to ease restrictions on United States trade and assistance to Communist countries, would free the President to furnish aid to satellite nations whenever he determined that such assistance would help them achieve increased independence from the Soviet Union. Kennedy's

amendment did not provide actual funds, it merely removed the prohibitions contained in the Battle Act which restricted Presidential action.

In the conclusion of his speech, Kennedy listed various other measures which would also be helpful: (1) Increased people-to-people contacts between Poles and Americans (2) Expanded trade between the two countries (3) United States technical assistance to the Gomulka government (4) United States aid to those Polish repatriates still returning from Russia following World War II (5) Creation of a tougher policy of action in the event of another revolt. (Kennedy did not elaborate on what this might entail). In his sixth and final point, he emphasized that Poland must be viewed in the wider European setting. "Especially," he said, "we cannot honestly overlook the close connections between our policies toward Germany and those toward Poland." In this regard, Kennedy stated, as he did in his Foreign Affairs article, that United States policy under both Democratic and Republican administrations had "unduly neglected" the German Socialists in favor of Chancellor Adenauer.

During Kennedy's speech, Senator Mansfield of Montana interrupted to voice his complete agreement with Kennedy's position. He, too, recognized that there was a calculated risk involved in granting aid to a Communist country but he thought it a risk worth taking. However, Senator Knowland spoke out in strong opposition to Kennedy's amendment, as well as his general line of reasoning. It was in America's intersts to have discontent in the Communist satellites, he said, not contentment. Economic discontent would not only place a greater burden on the Soviet economy but would lead to a disillusionment within the

Communist system. American aid to the satellites, on the contrary, would reduce discontent and generally strengthen the Communist bloc. It was clearly evident that to him, Kennedy's proposal made no sense. Kennedy replied that discontent could lead to revolt but since the Administration was opposed to direct intervention and since any revolt lacking outside support would fail, some alternate means must be established to weaken the satellite's dependence on the Soviet Union.

Not surprisingly, the policy of American aid to Poland not only met opposition in America, it also raised the suspicions of many Polish Communists. Because of the delicacy of the situation, the Gomulka government had to publicly praise the lack of political strings on the loans and credits given to Poland by the United States. This stance was necessary because it was mainly Gomulka's decision to resist strong Soviet objections to his policy of seeking American aid and there were many Polish Communists who opposed the aid because they suspected political motives. The very reasons used to justify the Polish aid policy in America--that it could cause a break between Poland and the Soviet Union--served to arouse opposition in Poland.

It was a delicate matter. However, no American politician could risk supporting a policy of United States aid to Poland, or any Communist country, without substantial justification. It had to be shown that it was in America's interests. That such a policy would help buttress Polish independence was fine, but it was far more persuasive to argue that it would drive a wedge between Poland and the Soviet Union. This, of course, was the line of reasoning that Kennedy employed. But on

at least one occasion, according to press reports, his remarks "roused the wrath" of certain Polish Communists in Warsaw.[14] This reaction came from a speech he delivered in March, 1958, to a Polish group in Chicago, in which he outlined his reasons for supporting United Sates aid to Poland. The speech was subsequently published in Dziennik Chicagoski (The Chicago Polish Daily News.) Ironically, the occasion for the speech was the newspaper's naming of Kennedy as its Man of the Year. It was reported that Kennedy was not available for comment on the Polish anger in Warsaw over his remarks.[15]

Almost a year elapsed before Kennedy's amendment was brought before the Senate for a vote. He had introduced the proposal in his speech on August 21, 1957, and it reached the floor of the Senate for debate on June 4, 1958. In the interval the proposed amendment was sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the State Department for consideration. The Eisenhower Administration publicly endorsed the proposed amendment to the Battle Act and, in fact, the State Department helped draft the exact wording of the final amendment. In its final form, the amendment authorized the President to furnish economic assistance to any Communist nation except the Soviet Union, Red China and North Korea, whenever he determined that such aid would help them achieve increased independence and reduce their economic dependence on the Soviet Union. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the amendment and passage looked certain but a few days before the Senate voted on the measure, the Administration began to reverse its position.

The Administration's sudden reversal on the Kennedy amendment was generally interpreted in the Senate and the press as being dictated by

threats from Republican Senators Knowland, Dirksen, and Styles Bridges of New Hampshire to the effect that if the Administration persisted in supporting the Kennedy amendment, they would lead a fight to slash foreign aid funds from the entire program.[16] At first, the President only partially retreated from his position. He issued a statement that while he liked the "principle" of the Kennedy amendment he was leaving it entirely to the Senate to decide. In other words, he withdrew his open support. But after a second visit from the three Senators, Knowland, Dirksen and Bridges, and listening to their reported threats, the President authorized Knowland to announce to the press that while he still approved the Kennedy amendment in principle he opposed including it in the present foreign aid bill. This statement was released shortly before the final vote.[17]

The Senate debate on Kennedy's amendment to the Battle Act, on June 4 and 5, 1958, was long and heated and the discussion carried late into the evening.[18] Kennedy's proposal called for a new departure and this raised many collateral issues of great complexity. All the general arguments, pro and con, were tossed back and forth. In the debate it was clearly substantiated that Secretary of State Dulles and the State Department had endorsed the amendment when it had been before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and many senators, including some Republicans, assailed the Administration for shifting its position.[19] Senator Aiken, Republican of Vermont exclaimed: "I am amazed that the President does not favor the proposal. Why did he let the Secretary of State favor it all this time without interposing any objection? If we cannot understand where the Department of State stands how can a representative of a foreign country credit what the Department of State says? To me, it is a shocking situation. It

destroys confidence."[20] Major press reaction was equally hostile to the Administration's abrupt shift under pressure.

Senator Knowland had submitted an amendment of his own to strike the Kennedy provision from the foreign aid bill and on a roll call vote shortly before 11:30 P.M. on June 5, Knowland's amendment carried by a single vote, 43 to 42.[21] The vote was nonpartisan, 17 Democrats joined with 26 Republicans to defeat Kennedy's amendment. Most commentators agreed that if the Administration had sustained its support, Kennedy's proposal would have carried with ease.

A few days after the defeat of Kennedy's proposal, President Eisenhower was asked in a press conference if he again would seek authority from Congress to give aid to the Soviet satellites. Considering the President's last-minute opposition to the Kennedy amendment, his response was amusing: "I would give aid to anything that I would think would help to weaken the solidarity of the Communist bloc. If we can set up centrigufal as opposed to centripetal forces, we are, in my mind, doing a great service to the free world."[22]

In addition to the aid to Communist satellites amendment, there was another Kennedy amendment, adopted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which became a part of the Mutual Security Bill of 1958 under consideration by the Senate in June, 1958--this was the Kennedy-Cooper resolution which urged vastly increased aid to India. Kennedy had been interested in this program since the beginning of the 1958 legislative session.

Writing in the January, 1958 issue of The Progressive magazine, in an article entitled "If India Falls," he warned that India's second five-year plan was on the point of failure and that "bold" new assistance

in the form of several hundred millions of dollars was needed to save India's economy from collapse.[23] It was not enough, merely to "proclaim a position of anti-colonialism" he declared, action must be taken to meet the economic needs of the emerging nations. The United States had a direct stake in the survival of a free India, he asserted, because it was the "showcase of the democratic 'experiment' in Asia," and the only real contender with China for the "faith and following" of the Asian people. He called for a 'Marshall Plan for India".

He emphasized the importance of economic growth in the new and uncommitted nations as a means of combating the lure of communism. "It has been one of Marxism's cruelest ironies," he said, "that it [Communism] has gained special force not in the advanced industrial societies, but in areas of stagnation, peasant economy, or petrified authoritarianism." And, military aid was inadequate, he said: "We have begun to learn that a purely military response to the tides in the Middle East and Asia is an illusory breakwater. For military pacts and arms shipments are themselves new divisive forces in areas shot through with national rivalries. . . ."

Kennedy realized that India's stance of neutrality in the Cold War, the existence of nationalized industries, and the fact that Russia sent aid to India, all had the effect of cooling America's interest in committing aid, but he urged that these issues should not be central considering the importance of India to the West. On the subject of Russian aid to India, Kennedy said there was no suggestion that President Nehru was playing off the East against the West: "India has attempted no such intimidation," he said.

Although Kennedy did not picture the United States as coming alone to the aid of India--he envisioned contributions coming also from Germany, Great Britain, Canada and the Colombo Plan countries--he realized that it was primarily the United States, the West's "wealthiest leader," that held the key to India's future. However, in his concluding note he admitted the difficulties of "selling" the India aid program to the American people at a time of high taxes and pressing defense needs.

About two months later, on March 25, 1958, in an expanded version of his article in The Progressive, Kennedy made the same appeal on the floor of the Senate.[24] At the end of the speech, which was entitled "The Choice in Asia-Democratic Development in India," Kennedy submitted a resolution on behalf of himself and Senator Cooper, which pledged Congress to support, in cooperation with other nations, assistance of the "type, magnitude and duration adequate to assist India to complete successfully its current program for economic development." The resolution did not authorize a specific sum of money, it merely expressed "the sense of Congress" that it was in the interest of the United States to aid India.

India was currently receiving American aid but the Kennedy-Cooper resolution called for vastly increased assistance during the last three years of India's second five-year plan. The aid would come mainly in the form of long term loans and technical assistance. Kennedy proposed that Congress and the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) appoint study committees to go to India to survey its needs in a massive coordinated plan for help.

In his speech, he examined the various criticisms of any special

aid program for India. Many contended that India's economic future had to rest with private investment and Kennedy agreed that this was the most "durable and resilient" form of assistance. However, he noted that private investment alone could not underwrite such programs as education and health. A second objection held that America's treaty with Pakistan precluded the possibility of a stepped-up aid program to that nation's prime enemy, India. To this, Kennedy answered that the United States should help both of these nations in their basic economic needs. To the argument that foreign aid funds could better be used to combat the recession at home, Kennedy stated that foreign aid would invigorate America's international trade relations: "There is no question," he emphasized, "but that foreign assistance now will mean trade later." The fourth and final source of criticism concerned the Soviet Union's assistance to India. On this point, Kennedy said the United States could learn from the Soviet Union's effective use of technical assistance and cultural and educational exchange programs. He emphasized that the Soviet Union could not compete with America's capacity for economic assistance. Therefore, he concluded, India offered an "extraordinary opportunity to match systems with the Soviet Union on favorable terms, to show our true concern for economic development, and to push India well ahead in its competition with the Chinese economy."

At the conclusion of his speech, Kennedy emphasized that India was the most important of the uncommitted nations of the world and he urged understanding for India's policy of neutrality. Wisely, he pointed out that the United States, during its formative years, had also pursued a neutralist policy. Economic aid from the West, he said,

was the only effective basis on which the emerging nations of Africa and Asia could be encouraged to resist the Communist alternative and America's friendships, he warned, "should not be equated with military alliances or 'voting the Western ticket.'"

"The Russians," Kennedy concluded, are trying to repeat in other parts of Asia and Africa their takeover of China. They are counting on the Indian disenchantment with the inadequacy of Western assistance, and democratic methods of planning and economic life."

Following Kennedy's remarks, Senator Cooper rose to voice his agreement. The need for economic advancement, he said, was the "primary fact of political life in Asia." He asserted that if the democratic governments of Asia failed to better the living standards of their people, they would lose their support, and their people would look to the example of Soviet Russia and Communist China. "This," he warned, "rather than aggression is the threat to the growth of democracy in Asia."

Several weeks passed. On May 21, Kennedy read into the Congressional Record three newspaper articles, written by Mr. William Clark, which emphasized the crucial importance of India to the West's struggle to win the uncommitted nations. On the same day the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Kennedy-Cooper resolution but Senator Knowland, an opponent to aid to neutralist nations, said the Committee's decision was tentative and subject to further review.[25]

Russell Baker, writing in the New York Times, noted that the Kennedy-Cooper resolution, for three basic reasons, had only a slender chance of winning approval in Congress. First, he said, Congress had grown increasingly reluctant to make long-term advance commitments of

foreign aid. Secondly, the resolution lacked both strong senatorial backing and a "national sense of crisis" about India. Thirdly, he was of the view that Senatorial opinion was becoming increasingly hostile toward aid to neutralist nations like India.[26]

As part of the Mutual Security Bill of 1958, the Kennedy-Cooper resolution reached the Senate for debate on June 6, the day after the Senate rejected Kennedy's other amendment on aid to Communist satellites.[27] In the course of the debate, Republican Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire and Everett Dirksen of Illinois, introduced amendments designed to strike out that section of the bill which singled out India for special economic assistance on the grounds that India should receive no greater consideration than other recipient nations of United States aid, especially considering India's neutralist policy.

Both Kennedy and Cooper, of course, spoke out strenuously in opposition to the Bridges and Dirksen amendments as did many other Senators. Without going into specific details, both Kennedy and Cooper drew an analogy between the situation in India in 1958 and the situation in China following World War II, when the United States might have done more to prevent a Communist victory. This was a fairly prevalent view at the time and one to which Dulles also subscribed. They did not want to see democracy in India fail because of a lack of United States commitment.

On the roll call vote the Kennedy-Cooper resolution carried as it had been adopted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Bridges-Dirksen amendments, combined as one, was defeated by a vote of 47 to 35.[28]

A few days later, however, at a Senate-House of Representatives Conference committee meeting, which was called to resolve differences on the Mutual Security Bill, the Kennedy-Cooper resolution was struck from the bill.[29] The House conferees did not disagree with the purposes or objectives of the Kennedy-Cooper resolution, they merely felt that individual countries should not be given special attention in the bill. This was the view expressed in the Dirksen-Bridges amendments. In a conference committee report, however, it was noted that most of the conferees, from the Senate and the House, recognized the crucial importance of India's economic development and urged that the Mutual Security Act funds be administered with this in mind.[30]

Before the conference report on the Mutual Security Act of 1958 was agreed to, Kennedy delivered a sharp, dissenting report which focused on both of his defeated amendments--on Poland and India.[31] The first of the amendments, aid to Poland, was defeated, he charged, because "the administration withdrew the support that had been freely given during the weeks preceding the debate." Kennedy considered it a "serious error" for the House conferees to reject the Kennedy-Cooper resolution on India. Once again, he referred to the example of China. The danger to democracy in India, he said, was "unmistakable--the peril of another China story." He criticized the tendency for the United States to respond only to outright crises, when money was often of little help. "The challenge of India," he warned, "is the challenge of whether we as Americans have yet learned to act in foreign affairs on our opportunities, before crisis has closed in."

As with any issue, it is impossible to determine the precise source of Kennedy's ideas. However, the essence of his India proposal,

increased economic aid to assist a democratic state in its competition with Communism, was in accord with his constant concern for the future of underdeveloped nations and his heightened emphasis on economic and technical assistance programs. Critic Victor Lasky suggested that Kennedy was influenced in October, 1957 by Miss Barbara Ward, a former editor of London's Economist, whom Lasky characterized as a "high priestess in the foreign-aid cult."[32] Apparently, Kennedy met Miss Ward in 1945 when he covered the British elections for the Hearst newspapers. In 1957, Miss Ward was an advocate of vastly increased United States economic aid to India to meet the challenge of Chinese Communism for the allegiance of the Asian peoples. "So impressed was Kennedy with her arguments," Lasky contended, "that the Senator began telling audiences that 'when I asked Barbara Ward where the United States should concentrate in Asia, she said, 'India first, India second, India last.'"

Miss Ward's was not a lone voice, however. Aid to India as a means of combatting the challenge of Chinese Communism was a very common sentiment within the United States in 1957 and 1958, as the Senate's passage of the Kennedy-Cooper resolution indicated. But it is possible that Miss Ward's views had a special influence on Kennedy's thinking.

Kennedy maintained his heightened interest in economic aid programs, as opposed to military assistance, throughout 1957 and 1958. However, this did not effect his emphasis on the need for a strong defense system at home. He continued to advocate a buildup in conventional weapons and in late 1957, he began to warn Americans of the so-called "missile gap"--or the disparity between the missile

strength of the Soviet Union and the United States.[33]

In the wake of the launching of Sputnik in late 1957, Kennedy wrote an article for the New York Times in which he assessed the implications for America's defense and foreign policy posture.[34] New American missiles must be produced, he said, and America's allies should be given intermediate range missiles until the United States developed an intercontinental missile capable of reaching Moscow from America's shores. However, he warned: "Sputnik has implications for conventional weapons and armies as well as modern. If we are prepared only to fight total wars of massive retaliation. . .we shall witness further Soviet advances through the 'sputnik diplomacy' of intimidation and peripheral wars." In speeches a few weeks later Kennedy warned about brush-fire guerrilla wars. He noted that there was "little value" in spending billions on nuclear weapons if the United States was unprepared to meet this challenge.[35]

However, although Kennedy continued to urge a strengthening of conventional military might for a flexible defense he soon focused on the more dramatic "missile gap". Sputnik had shown that at least in the field of guided missiles the Soviet Union had overtaken the United States. Many commentators made ominous predictions of the effect the new Soviet dominance would have on American security and in a well publicized Senate speech on August 14, 1958, Kennedy gave his assessment.

To convey the mood of bizarre alarmism in the Senate that day properly, it should be noted that, prior to Kennedy's speech, the Senate debated an amendment to a military appropriations bill, submitted by Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, which forbade the

Defense Department to spend any of its appropriated funds on any plan for the surrender of the United States to the Soviet Union! The amendment was inspired by an article published in the St. Louis Post Dispatch by Brigadier General Thomas Phillips. General Phillips pointed out that the Rand Corporation had been looking ahead to the years when the Soviet Union would have an overpowering superiority in nuclear striking power. In contemplation of this future situation, scientists at the Rand Corporation made a study of the circumstances under which the United States ought to surrender. Comfortingly, by a vote of 88 to 2 the Russell amendment was agreed to.[36]

That was the atmosphere when Kennedy rose to deliver his speech. His predictions were gloomy but he offered an alternative.[37] He warned that the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union in certain vital areas of military defense, namely, nuclear striking power. He compared America's position in 1958, with that of the British who, four hundred years earlier, had been forced to surrender Calais to the French. Calais, Kennedy pointed out, had long been considered the symbol of British supremacy in Europe. However, the British recovered from their initial panic to their loss, Kennedy said, and successfully redirected their policies from Europe to an emphasis on maritime trade and the navy. America's Calais, which had been likewise lost, was its superiority in nuclear striking power. This superiority, Kennedy noted, had been the foundation of America's basic military and diplomatic strategy since Hiroshima but adjustments in thinking now had to be made in the light of the new reality of Russian nuclear superiority.

Kennedy agreed with Lieutenant General James M. Gavin's

prediction that the "gap" between the missile strength of the Soviet Union and the United States would continue to widen until it reached its most dangerous and critical point in the years 1960-1964. The nuclear gap would be so large, Kennedy warned, that the Soviet Union would have "a new shortcut to world domination." In addition, their superiority in missile power would enable them to make advances short of actual nuclear attack--through "sputnik diplomacy". "The periphery of the Free World will slowly be nibbled away," Kennedy continued, "as the balance of power shifts to the Soviet Union."

Kennedy had never fully supported the Eisenhower-Dulles emphasis on massive retaliation as a means of defense and now, with the new Soviet superiority, it was even more apparent that the United States could not rely on such a concept. In his remarks he stated his agreement with Professor Henry Kissinger who contended that the concept of massive retaliation had developed a "Maginot-line mentality" in the United States which prevented the development of new alternative defense policies.

"In the years of the gap," Kennedy continued, "every basic assumption held by the American public with regard to our military and foreign policies will be called into question." He listed ten such assumptions but the final one was the most pertinent: "Victory ultimately goes to the nation with the highest national income, gross national product, and standard of living." This led him into an attack on the Eisenhower Administration's willingness to "place fiscal security ahead of national security."

Kennedy detected a sense of national complacency regarding armaments and this caused him to draw another analogy: "We have been

passing through a period aptly described by Stanley Baldwin, in a great House of Commons debate, in disclosing Britain's unpreparedness to the House of Commons in 1936, as 'the years the locusts have eaten.'"[38] To clarify this point Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, who was also strongly defense-minded, asked Kennedy if he saw a "considerable comparability" between the situation faced by Britain in the late 1930's with that faced by the United States in the late 1950's? Kennedy replied that he did. Just as Britain, because of various misconceptions, had allowed the balance of power to shift to Germany, the United States had permitted a similar shift to the Soviet Union, he said. And the situation in the 1950's was even more perilous than the 1930 counterpart, Kennedy noted, because the United States had no strong ally to turn to as did the British.

It was a glum picture, indeed, that the Senator presented. What remedies did he suggest? First, he advocated stepped-up spending on new weaponry in order to reduce the Soviet nuclear advantage, but even with this he did not believe the missile gap would be closed until 1964. Therefore, something additional was required. Because the United States no longer held the "trump cards" and was in a "temporarily disadvantageous position," he declared, American negotiators must demonstrate a new sense of urgency for disarmament and a reduction of world tensions. He did not comment upon the apparent contradiction of a policy which called for increased military spending, coupled with an invigorated quest for disarmament.

The main thrust of Kennedy's advice, however, was that the United States must adopt "the classic strategy of the underdog" which, he pointed out, had been employed by the Soviet Union during the years

of their gap. By taking advantage of America's strengths and the Soviet Union's weaknesses the United States could "buy the time" necessary to "regain the upper hand." What should be done? Since the United States still maintained an economic superiority, the foreign aid program could be used to advantage to assist such "key areas as India and Tunisia." Also, the United States must make the most of its ideological advantage--it must "lead, not frustrate, the nationalist movement against imperialism, of any variety, East and West."

After referring to the importance of the nationalist movements in the underdeveloped world, Kennedy made an indirect slam at Dulles' penchant for military alliances. He suggested that certain military commitments abroad be reduced--"no commitment at all is better than one which we cannot or should not honor, which the local populations did not request, which our Allies do not support and which is politically or militarily unfeasible." On this point, he criticized the commitment to the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. (At this time, in the late summer of 1958, the Formosa crisis was looming large and many feared that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek might draw the United States into a confrontation with Communist China over these two highly vulnerable islands.) There was one Soviet weakness which should be probed, Kennedy continued, and that was the "Achilles heel of the satellite nations." He lamented the one-vote margin defeat of his amendment in June which would have provided the necessary flexibility to "wean the satellites from the Soviets."

So, Kennedy saw hope in the midst of the gloom. For effect, he concluded his remarks by quoting one of Sir Winston Churchill's

famous exhortations of encouragement to the British people. Once he finished, several Democratic senators rose to congratulate him for his excellent speech, but Republican Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana was highly disturbed by Kennedy's remarks.

In the ensuing debate, Capehart attacked the speech vehemently on the grounds that it was selling the United States short and giving comfort to the Soviet Union.[39] Capehart was "alarmed" and "amazed" that Kennedy had said at least "35 times" that the United States was behind the Soviet Union. He did not think these weaknesses should be divulged in a public forum and he served notice that if any similar remarks were made from then on he would invoke Senate rule XXXV which provided that the galleries be cleared and the Senate proceed in closed session. Kennedy replied to Capehart, rather sarcastically, that all of the facts in his speech had been a matter of public knowledge and public discussion for several months although, he said, "it is obvious they have come as a total surprise to the Senator from Indiana." Kennedy and several of his colleagues made reference to the various public articles and reports which had utilized the same basic facts. To prove his point, Kennedy quoted from an article by General Gavin which had appeared in Life magazine a few weeks earlier. Unfortunately for Capehart, when he attempted to invoke Senate rule XXXV, no one was willing to second his motion. The following day Kennedy introduced into the Congressional Record quotations from President Eisenhower, the Secretary of Defense, and various military leaders which proved that his remarks and warnings were neither confidential nor new.[40]

As has been indicated, the views of Lieutenant General James Gavin

had had a prime influence on Kennedy's thinking. General Gavin had resigned from the Army and his recently published book War and Peace in the Space Age, was being widely read at this time. Kennedy reviewed the book in The Reporter magazine and he was in complete agreement with the contents.[41] The "missile gap" was not inevitable, the General argued, it was caused by the Eisenhower Administration's attempt to achieve a "New Look" defense system "on the cheap". General Gavin also pointed to the inherent weaknesses of Secretary Dulles' concept of massive retaliation. Kennedy and Gavin could not have been in more essential accord on defense policy.

There is an interesting twist in all this. As a potent political issue, the "missile gap" became completely identified with Kennedy and he reaped the benefits. However, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri had spoken out on the issue with frequency long before Kennedy picked it up. It has been suggested that it was Kennedy who attracted the excitement because he was a fresh spokesman on the subject. In any case, not only was Symington the long-time voice in the wilderness on defense, but he was also a personal friend of General Gavin--however, it was Kennedy, not Symington, who reviewed his book.[42]

Kennedy's first term in the Senate drew to a close in 1958. His issues of the past two years--anti-colonialism,[43] Algeria and the Middle East, aid to Communist satellites, support of India's five-year plan, increased economic assistance in foreign aid, the buildup of conventional arms as well as nuclear weapons, and the vacating of Quemoy and Matsu[44]--all of these helped to establish an identity for Kennedy in the foreign policy sphere and many

of these issues recurred in 1959 and 1960, but it was the sensationalism of the "missile gap" issue that dominated center state during the next two years.

In the election of 1958, Kennedy won by a margin of some 870,000 votes--the largest in Massachusetts history and the largest of any senatorial candidate in the nation. It was a stunning victory and his campaign for the Presidency shifted into high gear.

FOOTNOTES

[1]John F. Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks At Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, #1, October, 1957, pp. 44-59.

[2]John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," Ibid., pp. 25-43.

[3]James Tracy Crown, The Kennedy Literature, p. 57.

[4]There was also an article by Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia in this issue of Foreign Affairs. Tito blamed many of the tensions of the Cold War on the rigidity of Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov but he asked whether the time had not come when the West should view with "more realism and greater confidence" the steps he said the Soviet Union was taking to alleviate tensions. See: Josip Broz-Tito, "On Certain Current International Questions," Ibid., pp. 68-77.

[5]Victor Lasky, JFK, The Man and the Myth, p. 293.

[6]On July 28, 1957, the Washington Post carried an article on the implications of Gluck's appointment.

[7]For Kennedy's remarks see: "Ambassadorial Appointments," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session, August 1, 1957, pp. 26-30. Approximately two years later, at a Hearing on the nomination of Ogden R. Reid to be Ambassador to Israel, Kennedy again expressed his belief that career men should be selected for ambassadorial appointments. For Kennedy's remarks see: "Nomination of Ogden R. Reid," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 86th Congress, 1st Session, May 12 and 19, 1959, pp. 45-51.

[8]"Mutual Security Act of 1958," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, March 24, 1958, pp. 179-184.

[9]Later in the year, Kennedy and seven other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, all Democrats but one, urged President Eisenhower to place greater emphasis on economic aid to under-developed countries. In a letter to the President they spoke

of the "serious distortion" between military aid and economic assistance. "Overemphasis on military assistance," they wrote, "has tended to involve the United States in situations in which our aid may have contributed to the maintenance in power of regimes which have lacked broad support within the countries we have assisted." The policy tended to project a "militaristic image" abroad, they said, and also military assistance by its very nature "tends to create and then perpetuate military hierarchies which even in the most well-developed countries may endanger the very values of individual freedom which we seek to safeguard." The other eight Senators who signed the letter were Republican William Langer of North Dakota and the following Democrats: Theodore Francis Green of Rhode Island, Committee Chairman; J. William Fulbright of Arkansas; John J. Sparkman of Alabama; Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota; Mike Mansfield of Montana and Wayne Morse of Oregon. See: New York Times, September 10, 1958.

[10]A portion of the press release is quoted in Evelyn Lincoln, My Twelve Years With John F. Kennedy (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1965), p. 70.

[11]Kennedy Library, Press Releases File, 1953-1961, Box 626. The letter was dated March 12, 1957 and the press release was dated March 13. The text of the letter, along with a rebuttal on the issue, by Senator William F. Knowland of California, was reprinted in Foreign Policy Bulletin, April 15, 1957, p. 117-119, under the title "Should the U. S. Give Aid to Communist Countries?"

[12]New York Times, May 18, 1957, and Time magazine, May 27, 1957, p. 19.

[13]U.S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957, CIII, Part 11, 15446-15454. August 21, 1957.

[14]New York Times, March 25, 1958.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid., June 6 and 7, 1958.

[17]Time magazine, June 16, 1958, pp. 12-13.

[18]U.S. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, CIV, Part 8, 10139-10163 and 10260-10303. June 4-5, 1958.

[19]Ibid., 10278, 10294.

[20]Ibid., 10278.

[21]Ibid., 10302.

[22]New York Times, June 19, 1958.

[23]John F. Kennedy, "If India Falls," The Progressive January, 1958, pp. 8-11.

[24]Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, CIV, Part 4, 5246-5255. March 25, 1958.

[25]Ibid., A4672-A4674. May 21, 1958. Also, New York Times, May 22, 1958.

[26]New York Times, March 26, 1958.

[27]Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 10384-10414. June 6, 1958.

[28]Ibid., 10413-10414.

[29]New York Times, June 19, 1958.

[30]Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, CIV, Part 10, 12480. June 27, 1958.

[31]Ibid., 12481-12482. June 27, 1958. Kennedy and Cooper also wrote a joint letter to the New York Times on July 29, 1958, which outlined the strategic importance of India and its vital need for economic assistance. The New York Times had endorsed the Kennedy-Cooper resolution.

[32]Lasky, JFK, The Man and the Myth, p. 291.

[33]New York Times, November 7, 1957, p. 16:5.

[34]Ibid., December 8, 1957, p. 81:1.

[35]Ibid., January 21, 1958, p. 19:2. Also, on February 3, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Nathan Twining, appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to present an evaluation of the comparative military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition to questions on America's missile strength, Kennedy voiced concern about the United States' ability to fight limited wars. See: "Review of Foreign Policy," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, February 3, 1958, pp. 34-38.

[36]Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, CIV, Part 14, 17743. August 15, 1958.

[37]Ibid., 17569-17575. August 14, 1958. The speech is also included in Kennedy's The Strategy of Peace, pp. 60-73.

[38]Interestingly, this brief quotation was deleted from the speech when the speech was later published in Kennedy's Strategy of Peace. The reason seems clear. Kennedy implied here, mistakenly, that it was Baldwin who termed Britain's years of unpreparedness as "the years the locusts have eaten." Actually, the famous remark was made by Winston Churchill in his charges against the Baldwin Government in an angry debate in the House of Commons in 1936. This undoubtedly explains why the quotation was deleted.

[39]Ibid., 17574-17575; 17600-17613.

[40]Ibid., 17714.

[41]"General Gavin Sounds the Alarm" The Reporter, October 30, 1958, pp. 35-36.

[42]Ralph G. Martin and Ed Plaut, Front Runner, Dark Horse, pp. 194-195.

[43]This, of course, had been a persistent theme since 1951. His most recent proclamation on that issue came shortly after his re-election in 1958 in a speech to a Jewish Theological Seminary. The New York Times, in its coverage of the speech, carried the following caption: "Kennedy Decries Colonial Policy--Says U.S. Has Not Always Backed Self-Determination for Dominated Peoples." New York Times, November 24, 1958, p. 7:3.

[44]This was a sensitive issue and Kennedy received substantial mail because of his position. In response to questions, he prepared a statement which suggested that a clear distinction should be drawn between the defense of Formosa and the defense of the off-shore islands. New York Times, October 1, 1958, p. 1:6. A few days later, commenting on the Formosa Crisis of 1958, Kennedy charged that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek should not be allowed to decide America's foreign policy. In an apparent reference to Chiang, Kennedy stated further that the United States should not try to maintain world leadership "simply through paper alliances with reactionary, unpopular governments." Boston Herald, October 9, 1958, p. 14.

CHAPTER VII

THE CAMPAIGN YEARS, 1959-1960

During the 1959 legislative session, Kennedy pursued many familiar themes. He continued to speak out in favor of his two defeated proposals, on India and Poland, and finally, they both won acceptance in the Senate.[1] Kennedy and Cooper offered a compromise resolution on India which was broader in scope and provided for economic aid to other Asian nations as well as India. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the resolution in July and the Senate passed the measure on September 10, 1959.[2] With respect to American aid to Poland, Republican Senator George Aiken of Vermont joined Kennedy and co-sponsored a re-introduction of his amendment to the Battle Act (S.1697, April, 15, 1959) and in September, 1959, the Senate passed the bill.[3] Unfortunately, opposition in the House of Representatives prevented final action in this bill.

Kennedy also continued to warn Americans of the "spectacular" Russian gains and American "gaps" in missiles, economic growth, education, and science and research. In a speech delivered before the Wisconsin State Democratic Convention, he accused the Eisenhower Administration of allowing the United States to slip behind the Soviet Union and characterized the Eisenhower years, in words borrowed from Sir Winston Churchill, as "the years the locusts have eaten."[4]

In addition to the "threatening" missile gap, Kennedy perceived

another equally disturbing problem for American policy-makers--the increasing "economic gaps" between the wealthy, industrial nations of the West and the poverty-ridden nations of the underdeveloped world. In a major Senate speech in February, 1959, he called for a revitalized and sustained American policy to meet the economic problems of the underdeveloped areas of the world.[5] He criticized the Eisenhower Administration for not doing enough and for expending money only on a crisis basis, without any follow-through programs. The Russians, he said, were exploiting the gap between the have and the have-not nations with their stepped-up "aid and trade penetration" of the underdeveloped world. The United States had failed to give the poorer nations hope, he warned, and they were being attracted to Russia and China.

In the course of his speech, Kennedy referred to the crucial economic contest between India and China for the leadership of the Asian people. He also spoke of the need for a better balance between America's military and economic assistance programs and the need for expanded technical assistance programs.[6] However, he declared, the "heart of any solution" was a substantial long-term program of productive loans to the underdeveloped nations. He urged that the Development Loan Fund, established by Congress in 1957, be given the funds and long-range authority to meet the needs of the underdeveloped areas.

Later in the year, in a speech to the Conference of the American Society of African Culture in New York, he returned to the same theme.[7] At the time, he was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs. The Development Loan Fund and the

technical assistance programs must be used to build a strong, independent Africa, he said, but not because that continent was a pawn in the Cold War. He insisted that the primary object of America's policy should be to make Africa strong and he observed that the people of Africa "were more interested in achieving a decent standard of living than in following the standards of East or West." The European nations who "for centuries extracted the wealth of that continent," he declared, also bore a responsibility to help. Kennedy returned to the anti-colonialism theme by emphasizing the importance for the United States to support the African nations' quest for independence even if, he said, "it brings us into disagreement with countries of Western Europe who have been our traditional allies."[8]

During 1959, nuclear tests, the defense of Berlin, disarmament, Quemoy and Matsu, Fidel Castro's emergence, and Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States, were topics of public discussion. Kennedy favored an extended suspension of nuclear tests;[9] he agreed with President Eisenhower that it was vital to retain American rights of access to Berlin;[10] he hoped for meaningful disarmament negotiations but cautioned Americans not to "neglect" its armaments in the meantime;[11] he indicated that he considered the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu as militarily indefensible and not essential to the defense of Formosa;[12] although he quickly became anti-Castro, he originally praised Castro as "part of the legacy" of the great "Liberator", Simon Bolivar;[13] and he warned Americans that Khrushchev was "shrewd", "tough", "well-informed", and "confident" even though he viewed his visit as a hopeful sign for a relaxing of tensions.[14]

At the close of The Strategy of Peace there is an interesting

discussion of future American foreign policy between Kennedy and John Fischer, editor-in-chief of Harper's magazine. The discussion took place in New York City on December 9, 1959, and according to the publishers, Kennedy's answers were given extemporaneously.[15] Kennedy displayed a broad grasp of the issues, and even his most bitter critics would have to admit that his remarks were intelligent and knowledgeable.

In the course of the discussion, Kennedy noted that events had dictated an expansion of Presidential control over foreign policy and a lessening of the power of Congress. But he was not alarmed; he considered this to be a natural development. Did he believe Senator Vandenberg's old concept of bipartisanship in foreign policy was still practicable? Kennedy thought not. Realistically, only the "appearance" of bipartisanship could exist, he said. He could recall only one example during the 1950's when the Democratic opposition had a significant influence on a major foreign policy decision and that was in the Indochina crisis of 1954 when the leaders of Congress influenced Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford to reconsider their plan for intervention at the time of Dienbienphu.

Kennedy outlined his views on specific questions of policy. He said that chances were "dim" for any permanent solution to the problem of Berlin; that the United States must be willing to go to war over the defense of Berlin; that conventional forces in NATO were inadequate; that he opposed a mutual Russian and American disengagement from Central Europe because Russian troops would still be in close proximity; that although America's commitment to Israel must be maintained, steps should be taken to solve the economic problems of the Arab nations; that a strong, independent Arab world was in the long-range interest

of the United States and would provide stability to the Middle East; that the nations of the underdeveloped world must be allowed to pursue neutralist foreign policies; that the United States must commit vastly increased economic aid to the underdeveloped nations in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, especially to India, so that she would be successful in her competition with Communist China.

Throughout 1959, Kennedy had been asked repeatedly about his political aspirations and intentions. And to the surprise of no one, he formally announced at a news conference in the Senate Caucas Room the day after New Year's, 1960, that he was a candidate for the Democratic nomination for President. He challenged others seeking the nomination to enter the presidential primaries. Thereafter, he was little seen in the Senate. He missed most of the roll-call votes during the session and according to Mr. Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Kennedy attended only three out of ninety-six Committee sessions during 1960.[16] He was busy campaigning.

Yet, in February, 1960, he delivered a dramatic Senate speech on the theme of the "missile gap", which stimulated a lengthy discussion.[17] In his opening statement he quoted Sir Winston Churchill's famous remark: "We arm--to parley." He was concerned, he said, about both defense and arms control. Accordingly, he devoted this speech to a call for much larger defense spending in both the missile program and conventional forces. The purpose, however, was not to prepare for war but to enable the United States to bargain effectively for disarmament from a position of strength. As he indicated he would, he spoke a week later, at the University of New Hampshire, on the need for the United States to make "positive preparations" for disarmament.[18]

In the discussion following this initial Senate speech on defense, Senator Goldwater agreed with Kennedy's sense of urgency about America's military posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union's position. But Goldwater contended that the American people were too willing to compromise to avoid war; what was needed was a national resolve "to win the Cold War".[19] He asked if Kennedy agreed. Kennedy deftly responded that while he was unclear about the Senator's precise meaning of "win the Cold War", he did not believe the United States should attempt to impose its will on Russia or China at the risk of war; he preferred a policy of co-existence.

In early 1960, the Cold War appeared to be thawing. Following Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September, 1959, there had been some lessening of tensions in American-Russian relations and plans were made for a summit conference involving Eisenhower, Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan of Britain and de Gaulle of France. These chiefs of state of the major powers were to meet in Paris in mid-May to discuss the arms race and the vexatious problem of Berlin. But in early May, in the wake of the downing of America's U-2 reconnaissance plane well within Soviet territory, the conference collapsed. The Eisenhower Administration's handling of the U-2 affair was clumsy and America's national image was tarnished. Kennedy impulsively remarked that Eisenhower should have "expressed regrets" to Khrushchev for the incident. He was, of course, immediately attacked for making such a suggestion, and being aware of the damaging position he had placed himself in, he quickly modified and toned down his subsequent remarks on the issue.

On June 14, 1960, in the wake of the U-2 incident and the collapse of the highly-publicized summit conference, Kennedy rose in the Senate and outlined a twelve-point foreign policy which he believed the United States should pursue.[20] His suggestions were familiar. First, the United States must strengthen its nuclear striking power. Second, in order to fight limited wars, the conventional forces must also be strengthened. Third, NATO must be rebuilt into a "viable" and "consolidated" military force. Fourth, the United States, Western Europe and Japan must greatly increase the flow of capital to the underdeveloped world to frustrate Communist hopes. Fifth, America must improve its relations with Latin America through increased economic aid programs and expanded cultural exchanges. Sixth, the Arab nations of the Middle East must be helped with their economic problems. Seventh, the United States must encourage and assist the newly emerging post-colonial nations in Africa. Eighth, while searching for a solution to the problem of Berlin, America must show "no uncertainty in its determination to defend the city. Ninth, a more flexible policy was needed in dealing with the nations of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union's most "vulnerable" area. Tenth, America must "reassess" its China policy and be willing to increase its contacts with Communist China, especially in nuclear test ban talks, even though official recognition and United Nations membership must still be opposed. Eleventh, workable programs must be found for a nuclear test ban and arms control. Twelfth, and finally, America's economy, educational system, and research programs must be expanded and improved. As Senator Capehart remarked in the discussion following the speech, Kennedy's proposals "covered the entire waterfront."[21]

As a result of his jet-propelled political bandwagon, Kennedy was nominated on the first ballot at the Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, which convened in July. The Republican convention met in Chicago that year and Richard Nixon was also chosen on the first ballot with Kennedy's old opponent, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., being selected as his running mate. Throughout the campaign, Kennedy effectively forced Nixon and the Republicans on the defensive; he contended that America's prestige abroad had declined, and that the Soviet Union had forged ahead in both missile development and economic growth. He proclaimed over and over again: "It is time to get this country moving again." Nixon, of course, denied the validity of Kennedy's charges; America's prestige had not sagged and there was no "missile gap". The highlight of the campaign was a series of four joint television debates on September 26 and October 7, 13, and 21.[22]

In the course of the debates, Kennedy reiterated all of his old foreign policy concerns and proposals on Eastern Europe, India, foreign aid, the "missile gap", and disarmament. But on two specific foreign policy issues which arose in the last three debates, Nixon managed to seize the initiative. He accused Kennedy of appeasement and retreat when Kennedy indicated that he would yield the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu because they were militarily indefensible and not essential to the defense of Formosa.[23] Kennedy believed the line of defense should be restricted to Formosa and the Pescadores. However, under heavy attack, he adjusted his stand and adopted the official Eisenhower Administration position which called for a defense of the two islands if the primary thrust of a Communist Chinese attack was actually aimed at Formosa. As the campaign progressed, and as

Kennedy consistently moved closer to Nixon's position, the issue faded from prominence.

The other conspicious foreign policy issue involved in the debates related to Cuba. And there was a bizarre twist. Kennedy charged that Castro's victory in Cuba was a striking example of Republican ineptitude and he openly advocated American support for the "non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces" who were seeking to overthrow Castro. This was a common theme for Kennedy; his basic solution for revolutionary instability in the Third World was to seek out and support the non-Communist, non-fascist, liberal, democratic nationalists. Such leaders, however, were not in vast supply. At the time, the CIA was secretly training an exile invasion force and Nixon, who was aware of the top-secret invasion plans, was unable to discuss the preparations. But in the debate he indignantly condemned Kennedy's recommendations for intervention as being "dangerously irresponsible. . . ."[24] Nixon subsequently asserted that Kennedy had been briefed on the CIA operation all the while and that he had taken unfair advantage of Nixon's position.[25] At any rate, outside of these two particular issues, the candidates did not differ significantly on other foreign policy matters.

Interestingly, during the campaign, Kennedy found time to read and review H. Liddell Hart's Deterrent or Defense, A Fresh Look at The West's Military Position.[26] It is possible, of course, that a staff member wrote the review, but the words sound like Kennedy's and certainly the themes are familiar. He agreed completely with Hart's attack on the concept of massive retaliation and the author's emphasis on the need to expand conventional forces to deal with limited warfare. The review also further illustrated Kennedy's firm belief in the

importance of military strength as a bargaining point in disarmament negotiations.

There is one recurring question concerning Kennedy's adoption of issues in the presidential campaign of 1960. He very effectively used the "missile gap" as a potent vote-getting device but his talk of the "gap" disappeared almost as soon as he became President. And subsequent evidence has made it clear that there was no "missile gap". It is still debatable in 1971, whether Kennedy's use of the issue was the result of honest misinformation, or outright distortion and opportunism, or a combination of both. All that can be said at present is that the belief in the existence of a missile gap was widespread during 1958-1960. Whether Kennedy actually believed in the existence of a gap is unknown, but he definitely capitalized on it as an issue.

There were no real fresh departures for Kennedy during the campaign years 1959-1960; he continued to stress all the old themes. The only theme that was conspicious in its absence was that of anti-colonialism. But since Kennedy had soon to deal personally with the leaders of the nations of Western Europe it is not surprising that he avoided comment on that issue.

Since the candidates were not in disagreement on the basic direction of American foreign policy, Kennedy's razor-thin election victory cannot be interpreted as a mandate from the voters for or against any specific change in policy. But Kennedy was now the President-elect and he would soon be in a position to create and implement policy along the lines that he had so long advocated.

FOOTNOTES

[1]For a series of Kennedy speeches during 1959 on the importance of U. S. economic aid to India see: "The Basis of U. S. Interest in India--Its New dimensions," delivered to the Conference on India and the United States, May 4, 1959. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Speech Files, 1953-1960, Box 11. The speech can also be found in the U. S. Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, CV, Part 7, p. 8721. Accounts of similar speeches on India can be found in the New York Times, May 3, 1959, pp. 54:4, and The Strategy of Peace, pp. 177-179. For his remarks on Poland see U. S. Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, CV, Part 5, pp. 5901-2, and Ibid., Part 15, p. 18933.

[2]New York Times, July 24, 1959, p. 6:8.

[3]Ibid., September 11, 1959, p. 17:7.

[4]The Strategy of Peace, pp. 235-241.

[5]U. S. Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, CV, Part 2, pp. 2737 2740. The speech can also be found in The Strategy of Peace, pp. 73-82.

[6]Eric Sevareid, in a CBS radio news analysis on May 13, 1959, emphasized many of these same points and Kennedy inserted his analysis into the U. S. Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, CV, Appendix, June 4, 1959, pp. A4750-A4751.

[7]Kennedy Library, Press Releases File, 1953-1961, Box 626, and The Strategy of Peace, pp. 158-165. In October, 1959, Kennedy delivered a similar speech on Africa at Wesleyan University, Lincoln Nebraska. See The Strategy of Peace, pp. 165-167.

[8]Interestingly, as Victor Lasky pointed out, this quotation, which appeared in the New York Times account of the speech, was excised from the text of the speech as it was published in The Strategy of Peace. See Victor Lasky, John F. Kennedy, What's Behind The Image? p. 223. Undoubtedly, as a Presidential aspirant in 1960, Kennedy did not wish to provoke an unnecessary controversy such as this quotation might generate.

[9]New York Times, November 3, 1959, p. 3:1,2.

[10]Face The Nation transcript, February 22, 1959.

[11]The Strategy of Peace, pp. 51-66.

[12]Ibid., pp. 134-138.

[13]Ibid., pp. 167-169. During the campaign of 1960, of course, the Republicans attacked his characterization of Castro as being in the revolutionary tradition of Bolivar. Unlike the bulk of The Strategy of Peace, Kennedy's remarks on Castro were not a part of a speech. Theodore Sorensen recalled that Kennedy "regretted the implication," and "was angry that he had not caught it," but "nevertheless he refused to disown either the words or the junior staff member who had written them from a wholly different perspective." See Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 231-232.

[14]The Strategy of Peace, pp. 33-39.

[15]Ibid., pp. 245-269. James MacGregor Burns had a similar, although shorter discussion with Kennedy in 1959, which appears at the close of his biography. See Burns, John Kennedy, pp. 268-276.

[16]U. S. National Archives, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Records, John F. Kennedy Folder, Sen. 86 A-F8. Marcy advised Kennedy of his attendance record in a memo dated October 28, 1960.

[17]U. S. Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960, CVI, Part 3, pp. 3801-3808.

[18]Ibid., pp. 4707-4709.

[19]Ibid., p. 3806.

[20]U. S. Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960, CVI, Part 10, pp. 12523-12429, June 14, 1960. The speech minus the ensuing debate, was published in The Strategy of Peace, pp. v-XV.

[21]Ibid., p. 12528. Two days later, on June 16, 1960, Senator Dirksen attacked Kennedy's speech for downgrading America's strength and for blithely promising "more of everything, for everybody, everywhere." Ibid., pp. 12847-12848.

[22]A complete transcript of the four debates can be found in the following government report: Freedom of Communications: Report of a Subcommitee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Washington: G.P.O., 1961. Part III, The Joint Appearances of Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon and Other Campaign Presentations. September 26 debate, pp. 73-92; October 7, pp. 146-165; October 13, pp. 204-222; October 21, pp. 260-278.

[23]Ibid., See pp. 162-164; 204-207; 208-210; 224; 260-263.

[24]Ibid., p. 265.

[25]See Richard Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), p. 354. Former CIA director Allen W. Dulles denied that Kennedy had been briefed. See New York Times, March 21, 1962.

[26]John F. Kennedy, "Book in the News," Review of H. Liddell Hart's Deterrent or Defense, Saturday Review, September 3, 1960, pp. 17-18. The editor noted that both Kennedy and Nixon had been invited to review the book but Nixon explained that his "present schedule prevented him from accepting the invitation."

CHAPTER VIII

EPILOGUE

As previously mentioned, Kennedy's tenure in Congress has been called the "years of emergence" for the ideals and policies he pursued as President. Certainly, the origins of the ideas behind many of his major Presidential programs are discernible during this period. As far back as 1951, for example, he told an audience that "young college graduates would find a full life in bringing technical advice and assistance to the underprivileged and backward Middle East."[1] In an expanded fashion, this was the general idea behind the Peace Corps. As he had in Congress, he continued to emphasize the importance of the underdeveloped nations in the world balance of power. In a special message to Congress on May 25, 1961, he warned: "The great battle-ground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is. . .Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, the lands of the rising peoples."[2] Of the three recurring themes of his Congressional years, military preparedness, foreign assistance, and anti-colonialism, the first two remained dominant in his pronouncements and policies as President. Inevitably, however, on the third theme, anti-colonialism, his policies as President reflected the vast chasm between the rhetoric of anti-colonialism and the harsh dictates of international politics.

Kennedy remained strongly defense-minded as President. As a Congressman, he had gained substantial mileage out of Winston Churchill's

"locust years" comment. He first characterized the years 1946-1950, under the Truman Administration, as the "locust years"[3] and he later directed the charge against the Eisenhower Administration.[4] Kennedy was always more flexible in his proposals to combat and restrict Communism than was the Eisenhower Administration but his proposals were also frequently more aggressive and dangerous. While Eisenhower was alerting America to the dangers of the "military-industrial complex," as he left office, Kennedy was ordering a spectacular increase in the defense establishment, in the missile development program, in conventional forces, and in the strengthening of America's counterinsurgency forces. All of this was a natural development of his expressed views during the 1950's. He had long warned of the challenge of guerrilla insurgency and his concern with the problem began in 1951 with his trip to Indochina. On many occasions during the 1950's he pointed to the weaknesses of Dulles' strategy of massive retaliation in an era of guerrilla wars. The main point of his program of increased military strength was the strategy of flexible military response, an idea advocated by General Maxwell Taylor, among others. Accordingly, it was logical that Kennedy as President should select General Taylor to serve as his military advisor.

In many ways, the "Alliance for Progress" most perfectly embodied Kennedy's "pragmatic idealism". Although as a young Congressman Kennedy originally labelled grants of economic aid "debilitating and wasteful," he came to believe strongly that foreign aid could be an effective means by which to combat Communism and revolutionary instability. The large-scale economic aid program, "Alliance for Progress,"

for the countries of Latin America was also a natural culmination of the concerns he expressed while in Congress. The Alliance, which was designed to stabilize Latin America and prevent Castro-type revolutions, provided vastly increased economic aid to Latin America and in return the Latin American governments were to make the necessary social-economic reforms. Kennedy always believed that the United States could help the underdeveloped nations advance their social-economic revolutions. In this regard, he said on more than one occasion: "Those who make peaceful revolutions impossible, make violent revolutions inevitable." However, despite his faith in foreign aid, he was always aware that American aid programs could be counter-productive and actually foment revolution by artificially propping up unpopular dictatorships. For this reason, he preferred technical assistance and long-term development programs which would reach the people.

Very early in his career, Kennedy became identified with the upheaval in Indochina. The original purpose behind American involvement there was to contain Communism, but yet, with tragic irony, the thrust of American policy had the effect of strengthening the appeal of the Communists. Kennedy's ideas on Indochina as President were shaped during the 1950's when he became one of the more enlightened leaders with insight into the problems in Indochina. He recognized that it was nationalism, not Communism, that was the driving force in Indochina and he opposed French colonialism and urged the French to grant "genuine" independence to the Vietnamese in order to rally the people against Ho Chi Minh and the Communists. He consistently sought an elusive, and perhaps illusory third alternative between colonial rule in

Indochina on the one hand, and Vietnamese independence under Ho Chi Minh on the other. For this reason he placed great hope in Ngo Dinh Diem's ability to solve the problems of South Vietnam and serve as a bulwark to Communism. As a Congressman, Kennedy opposed Western colonialism almost as much as he did Communism; indeed, he considered the former an invitation to the latter. He perceived France's colonial errors. Yet, as President, he pursued a policy in Indochina that repeated their tragic mistakes and, which ultimately had even more catastrophic consequences.

There have been few American Presidents better prepared to conduct foreign policy than John F. Kennedy. He had travelled extensively, was well-informed, flexible and inventive. He was both idealistic and a tough-minded realist. He shared the liberal belief that revolutionary instability in the underdeveloped world was primarily attributable to poverty and he believed the United States could effectively attack these causes, thereby thwarting the spread of Communism. As a Senator, he always sought liberal, democratic, nationalist, anti-Communist leaders to support in the underdeveloped world and he criticized the Eisenhower Administration for failing to oppose Western colonialism and for failing to develop policies in support of constructive reform programs in these areas. But as one author observed, Kennedy was too inclined to believe that it was Eisenhower and not America's position itself which frequently forced the United States to assume a counter-revolutionary posture throughout the underdeveloped world.[5] He was to learn.

FOOTNOTES

[1]For an account of the speech see the Lowell Sun, December 9, 1951.

[2]U. S. Government Printing Office, Public Papers of the Presidents, J. F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington: 1962), p. 397.

[3]See U. S. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1952, XCVIII, Part 3, 3871-3872.

[4]See Strategy of Peace, pp. 235-241.

[5]James Tracy Crown, The Kennedy Literature, pp. 59-60. Crown noted that The Strategy of Peace, which advanced Kennedy's belief that the United States could help the underdeveloped nations speed their social-economic revolutions, ultimately "proved embarrassing" to Kennedy once he entered the White House. According to Crown, Kennedy's "relatively small reservoir of irritation was spent liberally on those who pointedly asked whatever became of those specific hopes." Ibid., p. 60.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

This study is based chiefly on primary sources. These materials fall into four separate categories: United States Government Publications, materials at the John F. Kennedy Library in Waltham, Massachusetts, newspaper coverage of Kennedy's speeches and remarks, and books and articles written by John F. Kennedy.

Government Publications

Of government publications, of course, the most important and essential was the Congressional Record, for the years 1947-1960. In 1964 the United States government published a collection of Kennedy's Congressional speeches entitled: John Fitzgerald Kennedy: A Compendium of Speeches, Statements and Remarks Delivered During His Service in the Congress of the United States. 88 Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document No. 79. Washington: G.P.O., 1964. This is a very useful compilation of Kennedy's speeches made while he was in Congress but it is not an entirely complete record. Statements he made while engaged in debate, as opposed to the delivery of a prepared speech, for instance, are not included, nor are his votes, or many of the articles he read into the Congressional Record, which offered a further guide to his thinking on foreign policy. Consequently, in order to examine the complete record of Kennedy's statements and thought on foreign policy matters, the Congressional Record must be relied upon, but the Compendium is a useful guide.

The Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the years 1957-1960, when Kennedy was a member, provided a further indication of his thought and involvement but due to his substantial absenteeism the Hearings were of marginal value for this study.

The official record of Senate Foreign Relations Committee correspondence which is housed in the National Archives, contains some correspondence between Kennedy and the chairman, J. William Fulbright, but the file on Kennedy is slight and the exchanges between him and Fulbright of little value.

For the presidential campaign of 1960 there exists a unique six-part government report which provides a complete and exhaustive record of the speeches, statements, remarks, and press conferences of both candidates, Kennedy and Nixon. The report is entitled: Freedom of Communications: Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: G.P.O., 1961. The two parts most useful for the study were: Part 1, The Speeches, Remarks, Press Conferences, and Statements of Senator John F. Kennedy, August 1 through November 7, 1960; and Part III, The Joint Appearances of Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon and Other Campaign Presentations.

John F. Kennedy Library

Of the materials at the Kennedy Library, the Speeches and Statements File, 1946-1960 was by far the most useful. This file of some 50 boxes contains drafts, reading copies, and transcripts of Congressman and Senator Kennedy's speeches. The file is much more complete for the Senate years, 1953-1960, than for the House of Representatives years. This is due in part to the systematic organization of the files by

Theodore Sorensen when he became a staff member in 1953.

The Press Release File, 1947-1960, 42 boxes, was also of value as were the twenty overflowing scrapbooks of news clippings that were maintained by Kennedy's office staff during his career. The news clippings on matters pertaining to foreign policy speeches were especially helpful for the early years, 1946-1953, when the record of his speeches in the Speeches and Statements File was less complete.

The oral history program of the Kennedy Library is one of the largest in the nation. To date, almost 900 people have been interviewed, ranging from heads of state to the White House gardener. A few hundred of these oral history transcripts are currently available and open for research. However, since the emphasis of these interviews is on the presidential years, these transcripts were of limited value for this study.

Newspapers

As a further means of tracing the development of Kennedy's involvement in foreign policy issues, every article by or about him relating to foreign policy during the years 1946-1960, contained in the New York Times and the Boston Globe, was consulted, This task was made less laborious by using the New York Times Index and a guide kindly provided by Edward W. Quill, librarian for the Boston Globe. Both of these newspapers were very helpful as a further source. There were many occasions, for instance, when a Kennedy speech delivered outside of Congress was not inserted into the Congressional Record or found in the speeches file at the Kennedy Library but was recorded in one or both of these newspapers.

Research was limited to these two newspapers for coverage primarily

for reasons of time. Coverage of Kennedy's speeches, and editorial analyses, from other newspapers were consulted only when they appeared in the Congressional Record or, as previously mentioned, as they appeared in the News Clippings File at the Kennedy Library. The clippings in the File for the early years, of course, were drawn almost exclusively from local Massachusetts newspapers.

Two other valuable primary sources which fall into this general category were the transcripts of NBC's Meet The Press and CBS's Face The Nation. Kennedy was a frequent guest on both of these programs and the discussions often touched on foreign policy issues. Transcripts of Meet The Press, prior to 1960, are unpublished but they were donated to the Library of Congress by the Meet The Press staff and are available. Face The Nation transcripts are likewise unpublished but the producers of the program courteously provided them to this writer on request.

Kennedy Publications

Of the several Kennedy writings in book form there are two that are indispensable for assessing the development of his thought on foreign policy. They are Why England Slept (New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1940), the published version of his senior honors thesis at Harvard, and The Strategy of Peace, edited by Allan Nevins, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), which is a selective collection of Kennedy speeches on foreign policy during the 1950's. The volume concludes with an absorbing informal discussion of future American foreign policy between Kennedy and John Fischer, Editor-in-Chief of Harper's Magazine. This discussion took place on December 9, 1959, in New York City and Kennedy's answers were given extemporaneously.

Articles

The following is the complete chronological list of articles, published speeches, and book reviews, written by Kennedy on various foreign policy issues, that were used in this study:

"War in Indo China," Vital Speeches, May 1, 1954, pp. 418-24.

"What Should The U.S. Do in Indo-China?" Foreign Policy Bulletin, May 15, 1954, pp. 4-6.

"Foreign Policy is the People's Business," New York Times Magazine, August 8, 1954, pp. 5 ff.

"America's Stake in Vietnam," Vital Speeches, August 1, 1956, pp. 617-19.

"Comity and Common Sense in the Middle East," Vital Speeches, April 1, 1957, pp. 359-61.

"Should U.S. Give Aid to Communist Countries?" text of Kennedy letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Foreign Policy Bulletin, April 15, 1957, p. 117-18.

"A Democrat Looks At Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1, October, 1957, pp. 44-59. Also in Jacobson, Harold K., ed. America's Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 349-64.

"Algerian Crisis: A New Phase?" America, October 5, 1957, pp. 15-17.

"If India Fails," Progressive, January, 1958, pp. 8-11.

"General Gavin Sounds the Alarm," Reporter, October 30, 1958, pp. 35-36.

"Book in the News: Review of B. H. Liddell Hart's Deterrent or Defense, Saturday Review, September 3, 1960, pp. 17-18.

"The Crisis in Foreign Affairs," American Federationist, November, 1960, p. 7-11.

Other

There are a few other Kennedy writings, which were useful for this study, that do not fall neatly into the above categories. In March, 1942, Kennedy wrote a lengthy letter to Blair Moody, then a Washington news correspondent, in which he challenged certain interpretations concerning the causes of World War II. The letter was subsequently published by American

Heritage, October, 1965, under the title "A Dreamer Wide Awake." The original letter is in the Michigan Historical Collections of the University of Michigan. In addition to Why England Slept, the letter to Moody provides one of the few available indications of his ideas on foreign policy prior to his entering Congress.

Of a similar nature are Kennedy's by-line articles for William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal American (and other Hearst newspapers) which he wrote in 1945 when he covered the San Francisco Conference in April and May, and the British elections in June and July.

In the Manuscript Collections at Yale University and Boston University there are small collections of Kennedy materials but they contained little of value for this study.

Secondary Sources

Hundreds of books have been written on the life and career of Kennedy but only a few shed light on his involvement in foreign policy during his years in Congress. By far the most authoritative single book on Kennedy's career during the pre-presidential years is James MacGregor Burns' John Kennedy: A Political Profile (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1960), a solid, well-balanced and highly readable biography. The book's value is enhanced by the lengthy chapter-by-chapter source notes and by the informal discussion between the author and Kennedy on matters of policy at the conclusion of the book. Burns had unrestricted access to Kennedy's personal and official files and the book was a semi-official campaign biography but he maintained his independence of judgment and found points to criticize in Kennedy's record while remaining generally impressed by Kennedy's intellectual depth and abilities. His one reservation concerned the depth of Kennedy's moral leadership. All students of the life and

thought of Kennedy must rely heavily on this scholarly study.

Victor Lasky's JFK: The Man and the Myth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), offers a harsh attack on Kennedy's record from all available angles. Lasky is a right-wing journalist and his book developed out of his shorter John F. Kennedy, What's Behind the Image. . .? (Washington, D.C.: Free World Press, Inc., 1960), which he wrote in the heat of the 1960 campaign as a rebuttal to a pro-Kennedy study by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Lasky's book is openly biased but it serves as a useful counter-balance to the many equally uncritical pro-Kennedy studies. Lasky submits many provocative interpretations, some of which deserve serious research, and his book, too, provides extensive source notes.

There were two additional sources that were of value for this study. Joan Meyers, (ed.), John Fitzgerald Kennedy. . .As We Remember Him (New York: A Columbia Records Legacy Collection Book, Atheneum, 1965) is a unique, highly informative volume which includes some Kennedy letters, excerpts from speeches, interviews with those close to him, documents, and many pictures. James MacGregor Burns, who wrote the concluding essay, quite properly called it "the most evocative portrait of Kennedy that we have." Unfortunately, the volume is now out of print.

James Tracy Crown's The Kennedy Literature: A Bibliographical Essay on John F. Kennedy (New York: New York University Press, 1968), offers an excellent annotated bibliography of selected books and articles by and about Kennedy arranged chronologically within topical categories. In addition to being an invaluable reference guide, Crown's extended introductory essay, which comprises one-third of the book, is knowledgeable, interpretive, well-balanced and insightful. The volume is useful to both the general reader and the researcher.