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THESIS

 

This is m’ééetfiiiy 'that the

“"3. -:_:
thesis entitled:

Power Constructs in Higher Education

presented ‘bg

Thomas R. Kilian

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Education

Date November 13, 1962

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Michigan

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THE

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AB STRAC T

POWER CONSTRUCTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
By

Thomas R. Kilian

Recent events in the higher educational system in the United

 

States suggest some degree of confusion, division and uncertainty
concerning the nature, locus, purposes and uses of power in the
higher educational institution. Rapid growth in size, diversity of
purpose and complexity of structure'have produced new problems
for institutions. Widespread student unrest and a growing profes—
sionalism among educators has produced new issues related to power
on the campus. The effectiveness of the system appears to be
hampered by a lack of a satisfactory theory of power to guide its
organization and operation.

The objectives of the study were: 1) to propose some basic
definitions for and to describe some relationships between: power,
authority, influence and responsibility, in the context of higher

education; 2) to formulate several original theoretical constructs

__—___l

Thomas R. Kilian

related to the origins, nature, locus, purposes and characteristics
of power in higher education, to the end that they may offer laid and
directionin future research, and 3) to formulate several original
procedures which may provide meansfor empirical testing of the
constructs proposed. A lack of definitions and theoretical formula-
tions of power in higher education was seen as a serious limitation
hampering research in the field.

For the design and conduct of the study, historical,

philosophical, expository and descriptive research methods were

 

used. The study made an extensive examination of definitions and
concepts of power offered in the literature of sociology, political
science and thought and higher education. There are detailed dis-
cussions of the definitions, origins, sources and classifications of
power, authority and influence, as broad social concepts. Relation—
ships between authority and‘responsibility are explored, together
with questions of the legitimacy and locus of power. The role of
power in,the creation of organizations, organizational goals and in
democratic organizations and states is discussed.

The nature, sources and locus of power in higher educational
institutions is examined, together with the role of power and goals in
educational institutions. Authority, responsibility and influence on

the campus and the concept of the campus as a democracy are

________J

Thomas R. Kilian

analyzed. The interest of various campus intramural groups in the
securing of a larger measure of authority is discussed in the context
of the origins and structure of the educational institution.

The study offers six theoretical constructs related to the
nature and functions of power in higher educational institutions and
proposes specific tests by which these constructs might be tested,
by descriptive and experimental methods.

Principal conclusions of the study were: 1) The study of
the role of power in the establishment and operation of the higher
educational institution has been seriously neglected; 2) Internal
relationships of the higher educational institution can be seriously
disrupted as a consequence of a lack of understanding of the function
and uses of power in education; 3) Some current scholarship reveals

a limited View of the complexity of power and of its pervasiveness in

social relationships; 4) The functions of power in higher education

 

are not different from the functions of power for other social purposes
within the state; 5) The employment of the construct as a theoretical
tool, combined with descriptive research and experimental methods, ‘
may offerpromise for the examination of problems of power in
higher education.

The study contains a schedule of hypotheses which are sug-

gested as worthy of further examination and suggests the involvement

l

Thomas R. Kilian

in future research of more educators with actual experience in the
institutional power process. It proposes the establishment of new
educational institutions for the specific purpose of experimentation

in problems of power.

-» _ “...... -__«_-. ‘w‘ufl-h

POWER CONSTRUC TS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

By
. {t3
\ $I
‘0‘

Thomas Rf’wKilian

A THE SIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Administration and Higher Education

1969

CG //6 f
35/ 3""- 70

Copyright by
THOMAS RANDOLPH KILlAN

October 1, 1969

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A project such as this study is always the result of the
encouragement and assistance of many people.

Special thanks and appreciation are gratefully extended
to the members of the Guidance Committee for this study:
Dr. Norman T. Bell, Mr. James H. Denison, Dr. Ernest O. Melby
and especially to Dr. Vandel C. Johnson, chairman, for warm
encouragement, personal concern and wise guidance.

To Lorna and to James, Peter, Mary and Susan, my deep
gratitude and thanks for their cheerfulness, patience and considera-
tion in the acceptance of inconvenience and sacrifice in order that

this study might be accomplished.

iii

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter
I. CRISIS ON THE CAMPUS

Introduction .
The Need for the Study .
The Significance of the Problem
The Problem. .

Basic Questions .

The Objectives and Limitations of the Study .

Limitations . .
Methods and Procedures Used in the Study
The Organization of the Study

II. A REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES .

Introduction

Power Concepts in the Literature of
Sociology and Political Science

Studies of Power in the Literature of
Higher Education

Summary

III. POWER AND HIGHER EDUCATION .

PART I
ON THE NATURE AND QUALITIES OF POWER

Introduction .

What Is Power? . .
Definitions of Power .
The Origins of Social Power
The Sources of Social Power

iv

15

19

31
35

37

37
40
41
47
48

 

 

Chapter
III.

Classifications of Power
Power Classified by Source

Power Classified by Methods of Wielding It .

Power Classified According to Extent
Power Classified by Effects
Authority .
Definitions and Conceptions of Authority
The Locus of Authority
Authority and Control
Hypotheses on Authority
Influence
Concepts and Definitions of Influence
Responsibility .
Definitions and Concepts of Responsibility
Hypotheses on Responsibility
The Legitimacy of Power
Power in Organizations .
The Locus of Power
Organizations Defined
Goals in Organizations .
Power and the Democratic State
Law in a Democracy

PART II

THE NATURE AND QUALITIES OF POWER
IN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Introduction

The Nature and Sources of Power .
The Locus of Power in Higher Education
The Purposes of Power in Higher Education .
Authority in Higher Education
Democracy and the Campus
Influence in Higher Education .
Responsibility in Higher Education .
The Quest for Authority .

The Faculty .

The Students .

Campus Governments
Summary .
Summary of Chapter III, Parts I and II

Page

48
49
52
54
58
61
62
63
64
66
68
69
72
73
75
77
79
79
81
82
83
87

89

89

95

97
100
104
107
108
113
114
124
126
127
128

Chapter
IV. POWER CONSTRUCTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Introduction

Theory Building

Power Constructs

Verification Methods for Power Constructs
Proposed Tests for Power Constructs

The Need for Replicative Studies .
Summary . . . .

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary of the Study . .
Statement of Conclusions and Implications

Recommendations for Future Effort
Conclusion

SE LE C TED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vi

 

Page
1 30

130
134
135
138
140
146
147

149

149

.‘152

153
157

159

CHAPTER I

CRISIS ON THE CAMPUS

Introduction

 

Wide diversity characterizes American higher educational
institutions in 1969. From very small institutions with less than
100 students, the spectrum expands to include vast academic com-
munities that are virtually city-states, with enormous political and
social power and whose annual operating budgets exceed by two or
three times the total budgets of some entire states for all purposes.
Keezer, 1 Corson, 2 Ayers3 and numerous other observers have noted
the remarkable diversity of objectives in higher educational institu-

tions.

 

1Dexter M. Keezer, ed. , Financing Higher Education:

W-

1960-1970 (New York: McGraw—Hill Book Co., 1959), pp. 13—14.

 

2John J. Corson, Governance of Colleges and Universities
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. , 1960), p. 85.

3Archie R. Ayers and John H. Russel, Internal Structure:
Organization and Administration of Institutions of Higher Education
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Education, 1962), pp. 6-9.

As higher educational institutions in America grow in size,
complexity and diversity of interests and services, their goals
become more transcendent and diffuse and generalized. Such insti-
tutions become more difficult to administer. Pressures in the larger
society for the provision of wider services become more insistent;
the institution is asked in a thousand subtle ways to be all things to
all men.

Often, divergent or conflicting interests arise within an
institution. In large institutions, made up of complex groupings of
schools, colleges, institutes, libraries, museums, hospitals and
other associated agencies, such divergent and conflicting interests
are seldom absent. Indeed, the very philosophical underpinnings of
certain departments and disciplines may be in conflict with those of
others. Further, departments, colleges and other interest groups
often find themselves at odds with institutional policies and even
with the larger goals of the institution, quite as often as they find
differences between themselves.

Where such differences of purpose, belief or aspiration
seem seriously important, and may appear irresoluble, an interest
group may seek to gain its ends through the exercise of some form
or degree of power against another group, or the institutional admin-

istration or even the institution itself. In recent years, such

 

manifestations of the uses of power have become more frequent, to
the extent of hampering, or in some instances, totally disrupting

the ability of the institution to function.

The Need for‘the Study

 

Few, if any, periods in American higher educational
history, have been characterized by more evident confusion, division,
uncertainty and dissension, based on questions of the nature and
exercise of institutional power, in disagreements concerning the
nature of the relationship of various groups to the institution and in
widespread contention for the right of some measure of its exercise.

A reflection of the extent of this confusion will be found in
the fact that, in 1968 alone, over 300 campuses have been the scene
of student demonstrations and disorders which have seriously affected
institutional operation. The nation' 8 oldest,_ largest and most prestige-
laden institutions are included among those torn by strife.

Certain student organizations have been established on a
national basis which include among their avowed purposes the gaining

of effective control of the higher educational system. 2 Groups such

 

1Sidney Hook, ”The Trojan Horse in American Higher
Education, " Educational Record, L, No. 1 (Winter, 1969), 21-29.

 

2
Chronicle of Higher Education, III, No. 19 (June 16,
1969), 7-8.

 

 

as The Students for a Democratic Society, which claims over 35, 000
members on 250 campuses, and the Progressive Labor Party, The
Young Socialist Alliance, The Youth International Party and the Third
World Liberation Front may comprise from 3 to 4 per cent of the
student population of the nation. 1 Such groups tend to use educational
institutions as devices of convenience in efforts to gain larger politi-
cal power in the larger society.

Increasingly, faculty groups question the limits of their
authority in the determination of basic institutional operational
policies. 3 Questions concerning interest-group power on campus
have risen to the extent that the 1968 American Association of State
Colleges and Universities National Convention theme was "Who' 3
in Charge Here?"4 When top educational leaders in the nation' 3
largest institutions are found actively participating in discussions
on such a topic, questions relating to power on the campus are of

serious national concern.

 

1Robert Hessen, "What Campus Rebellions Mean to You, "
Nation's Business, LVII, No. 6 (June, 1969), 31-32.

 

2Carl Davidson, "University Reform Revisited, " Educa-
tional Record, XLVIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1967), 5-10.

 

3”Professors Press Toward Goal in Governance, " Chronicle
of Higher Education, III, No. 18 (May 19, 1969), 3.

 

 

4"State Campuses Stiffen Stands on Militants," Chronicle of
Higher Education, III, No. 6 (November 25, 1968), 1.

 

 

 

Widespread violence and disorder on campus has been cited
by the President's National Commission of the Causes and Prevention
of Violence as being of ominous import to the nation. The report
states that ". . . hundreds of student demonstrations have resulted
in the seizure of university facilities, police intervention, riot,

property damage and even death. "1

The Significance of the Problem

 

The existence of a general, pervasive unrest on the Ameri-
can campus hardly seems necessary of documentation. Virtually
every newspaper edition, every popular magazine is filled with
accounts of the most recent outbreaks of violence and institutional
disruption. Few topicsare of wider public interest. Leaders in
all fields are widely quoted as to their assessment of the causes and
remedies for the general unrest.

The future capabilities and the social usefulness of the
higher educational system may well depend on the understanding,
acceptance and support of defined concepts of the source, purposes
and uses of power as it relates to the establishment and functioning

of the campus community.

 

1"Nixon Gets Shocking Violence Report, ” Argus-Leader
(Sioux Falls, South Dakota), January 29, 1969, p. 6.

 

 

The Problem

 

Few educational problems seem to be more perplexing. or
filled with import for the future than questions of power on the
modern campus. Administrators, governing boards, faculties and
students together with others interested in the future of higher edu-
cation need to reach new levels of understanding of power‘and its
uses, if the educational system is to serve the growing needs of the
nation and society.

While it appears evident that some of the current campus
unrest is rooted in concerns of its perpetrators which have little to
do with the basic educational goals and purposes of the institutions,
and are centered in the interests of groups who seek a general politi-
cal and social restructuring of the nation, the consequences can be
none the less serious for the educational institution. 1 If the admin-
istration building is burned to the ground, it is gone. The loss is
real, whether or. not the purposes of the incendiaries had their‘roots
in indigenous campus issues. The property has been illegally. de-
stroyed and the institution has become crippled in its ability to serve

its purposes .

 

1Chronicle of Higher Education, June 16, 1969, op. cit.

 

 

 

Basic Questions

 

Some questions basic to an understanding of power and
fundamental to the operation of institutions and systems of higher
education would seem to include:

1. What is power and what is its nature?

2. Where is the locus of power in educational institutions ?

3. What is the function of power in a democracy and in

higher education?

4. How can power be used in higher education?

5. How does power relate to goals and purposes in

educational. institutions ?

There are indications that the present unrest on the Ameri-
can campus, as well as in other nations, will continue for the fore-
seeable future. The issues are much too complex and indicative of
the uncertainty of conviction of values in the larger society to be
susceptible to simple solution. 1 However, attempts to use power,
and to use institutions as levers for social change, suggest the
imperative of serious study. of the nature and uses of power if the
educational system is to survive and fulfill social and human needs.

Widespread misunderstanding, confusion of institutional purposes,

 

1Ibid.

 

 

 

and misuse of power in education present the possibility of such
serious disruption of the system as to endanger its usefulness toward
the purposes for which such institutions were established.

The study of these questions will require the examination
of a number of highly abstract concepts, such as have perplexed men
for centuries. It will be necessary to consider definitions which will
help to illuminate the phenomenon called power. Relative to the
function of power in higher educational institutions, the origins of
such institutions must be examined, together with the origins of
power in institutions and in society. In addition, the relationship
between power and institutional goals appears relevant. In these
processes, some deceptively simple questions present themselves,
as: Where do educational institutions come from? Why and by
whom are they established? How are they maintained? Who serves
them and is served by them? Who owns them? How are they
governed? Why are they governed as they are? To whom are such
institutions responsible? Who governs, within the institutions? By
what right do they do so? Are there limits on the extent of their
authority? Wherein are such limits found? Such questions, expressed
or implied, are legitimate questions which relate directly to the

operational processes on campuses today. In addition, at the present

time, there appear to be serious questions about the nature of the

 

 

university as a social organism that may vitally affect its purposes:
Is the university an instrument for active intervention toward social
or political change? Is it solely an educational institution? Is it a
tool of a socio—economic caste, to further narrow interests? While
the examination of such value questions will not be a concern of this
study, an understanding by educators of the nature and workings of
power on campus will affect the course of the future, whatever the
social purposes of the institutions may be thought to be at any point

in time.

The Objectives and Limitations of the Study

 

Three specific objectives were undertaken in the study:

1. To propose some basic definitions for and to describe
some relationships between: power, authority, influence
and responsibility, in the context of higher education.

2. To formulate several original theoretical constructs
related to the origins, nature, locus, purposes and
characteristics of power in higher education, to the
end that they may offer aid and direction in future
research.

3. To formulate several original procedures which may
be suggested to provide means for empirical testing

of the theoretical constructs proposed.

 

'1" .
a q..- M

.sv- '*vi¢‘.v1“nrm
.

\

 

 

10

Certain limitations were established for the study in an
effort to focus attention on several basic concerns, and to attempt
to describe a pattern of exploration in an area which at best might
be defined as a semantic swampland of abstraction. 1 No satis—
factory taxonomy of power exists, either in sociological or political
approaches to it. No effort has appeared in the literature toward a
taxonomy in the relationships of power to higher education. The
meanings of the principal terms have no fixed, accepted content.
Concepts of power are extremely complex and are formed and are
affected by subjective premises as well as the interplay of an immense
variety of social forces. While a number of attempts have been made
at establishing typologies of power, the results have been largely
unsatisfactory; the number of typologies appears to be roughly the
equivalent of the number of scholars who have considered the prob-
lem. Power is an elusive concept, unique in every instance of its
manifestation and compounded of different elements of social force
in every case. It is a dynamic force, in a state of constant flux and
change. Its description is not eased by reason of this fact, for, as
one regards it, it can change its colors like a chameleon as one

watches. As Bierstedt recalls, in paraphrasing St. Augustine's

 

1Robert A. Dahl has suggested the analogy in ”The Concept
of Power, " Behavioral Science, II (July, 1957), 201.

 

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11‘;
71:,

a _»; Tux-we; ir‘s‘s_..¢:~i>.¢‘.uN-Qr~<az._w

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11

reflections on time: everyone knows what power is until he is

asked!1

Limitations

It seemed useful to suggest some limitations of the scope

of the study, to establish boundaries between concerns within the

study and several possible approaches which were not developed or

included as a part of the study. This study did not attempt:

1.

To survey or review recent specific instances or case
studies of the uses of power on campus;

To analyze or seek causes for specific instances of
campus unrest relating to the uses of power;

To provide prescriptive proposals for the use of power
to serve possible specific or current campus needs or
interests;

To survey current attitudes or opinions or practices
now found on the campus, relating to power;

To conduct any experimental, predictive or analytical
research or to make use of inferential statistics for the

interpretation of data;

 

1Robert Bierstedt, ”An Analysis of Social Power, " Ameri—
can Sociological Review, XV (1950), 730—738.

 

“we: *

 

 

6. To replicate any known existingstudy relating to the

phenomenon of power in higher education.

Methods and Procedures Used in the Study

 

For the conduct of this study, historical, expository, philo-
sophical and descriptive research methods were used. Since this
study was exploratory, in attempting to develop and describe some
definitions for concepts of power, authority, influence and responsi-
bility in the context of higher education, and to attempt to formulate
certain theoretical constructs and testing procedures with respect to
power in higher education, no purpose was seen in attempts toward
experimentation. Indeed, this was a thesis of the study: the la_ck_
of such definitions and theory was seen as a major and critical prob-
lem, both in educational and social research and in the practical
operation of institutions of higher education. Beveridge has described
the hypothesis as the principal intellectual instrument in research:
"Its function is to indicate new experiments and observations and it
therefore sometimes leads to discoveries even when not correct

itself. "1 The greatest promise and the greatest need appeared to be

 

1W. I. B. Beveridge, The Art of Scientific Investigation
(New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1950), pp. 63—66.

 

 

.‘ ,1.» . .. _ “g 'r “3“,, .r Mn ‘0» 03".»)...
q... ' V. 3 , . .. .. J... t”...

L t‘

 

in the direction of attempts at concept definition and the formulation
of the beginnings of theory.

Political scientists and sociologists have provided a number
of useful studies of attempts to measure degrees or amounts of power.
There would appear to be a limited utility in attempts to measure
power in higher education (if, indeed, it can be measured) before

concepts as to its nature are more clearly defined.

The Organization of the Study

 

The study is organized into five divisions, in addition to
bibliographic notes.

This chapter has included a statement introductory to the
study and its purposes, a review of the problem for the study includ-
ing basic questions relating to the nature of power and its uses on
the campus, an outline of the objectives and limitations upon which
the work of the study was based and a description of the methods and
procedures used in the design and execution of the project.

A review of the recent pertinent literature dealing with
theories of power, with implications for its manifestations and uses
in organizations and on the campus, is included in Chapter II,

together with a brief overview of some of the substantive literature

relating to power in sociological and political research, and thought.

 

 

 

14

Chapter III is devoted to an exposition of definitions and
theoretical conceptualizations of power, authority, influence and
responsibility and to historical and philosophical interpretations of
the relationships of power to the origin, structure and function of
the higher educational institution. Attempts are made to describe
the manifestations of social and political power which create and
support the higher educational institution and with which it must be
concerned as a matter of practical necessity in attempting to achieve
the purposes for which it was established.

Theoretical constructs on the nature of power in higher
education are contained in Chapter IV, together with several sug—
gested methods and procedures by which such constructs might be
subjected to empirical tests. Attempts are made to suggest ways
in which the methodology might be extended in further research.

The concluding section, Chapter V, contains a summary of
the principal findings of the study, and includes recommendations
and conclusions based on the experiences gained through the research

and conduct of the study.

 

‘ ....a. .1
.-:~ ~

“‘2‘

 

 

 

   

CHAPTER II

A REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES

Introduction

 

Power will be considered in this study as essentially a
sociological and political concept, relating to the governance of
institutions in higher education. Cartwright has pointed to the dearth
of research on power by social psychologists. 1 Fellman has noted
the "paucity of reliable, objective research in decision-making in
colleges" and the irony of this fact, considering the great amount of
research that has been completed in other areas of education.

There has been remarkably little attention given by scholars in any

discipline to the study of power as it affects higher education. One

 

1Dorwin Cartwright, "Power: A Neglected Variable in
Social Psychology, " in The Planning of Change, ed. by Warren G.
Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne and Robert Chin (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 411-422.

 

2David Fellman, "The Academic Community: Who Decides
What?" in Whose Goals for American Higher Education?, ed. by
Charles G. Dobbins and Calvin B. T. Lee (Washington, D. C. :
The American Council on Education, 1968), p. 106.

 

15

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    

16

can scarcely say that a literature exists on theoretical problems of
educational power,

The literature on the history and administration of the
higher educational system in the United States is enormous. 1 It
contains thousands of accounts and anecdotal reports of the adminis—
trations of college presidents (as, McVey and Hughes), 2 institutional
histories, accounts of fiscal affairs, reflections of efforts toward
curriculum and methodological reform and toward the achievement :11
of a commonly held View of the nature of academic freedom (as V
Hofstadter). 3 In all, little notice has been taken of the phenomenon
of power. Only in very recent years, chiefly since 1960, have

scholars begun to recognize the existence of power on campus as a

   

productive direction for inquiry.

Arum- . ”‘11 1‘1: i- a -.

 

43:3
“yer.

The recent review by the author of over 900 titles and brief

‘<\~>1 .

«1': f?’ 1

abstracts of current research projects in higher education offered

 

1Probably in excess of 30, 000 books, research reports p;
and articles have been published on the administration of higher edu-
cation alone, since 1950, based on projections of U. S. Office of 1
Education estimates. See: Walter C. Eells and Ernest V. Hollis, :1 1
Administration in Higher Education (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Office 31 "
of Education, 1960), p. 3.

2Frank L. McVey and Raymond M. Hughes, Problems of .11
College and University Administration (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State 11
College Press, 1952).

 

3Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, The Develop— 5L1
ment of Academic Freedom in the United States (New York: Columbia 1

 

University Press, 1 955).

 

   

bare encouragement. All too many of the current studies are simply
attitude and opinion surveys, of existing campus governance practice,
subjected to merciless statistical analysis. Often, these studies
reveal little more than a general evident confusion on the subject.
Widely circulated studies such as the current one by Gross and
Grambschl are, finally, only reflections of opinion. Whatever the
utility of such studies, they offer little assistance in efforts toward
the development of power theory in higher education.

Hunter2 has noted that it is easily ". . . possible to get
'bogged down' in a survey of theories of power relations . . . , "
if one were to attempt to review everything recorded on the subject
in a number of related disciplines. In his study, Hunter recorded
the necessity of bypassing several ”residual" categories of concern
in the social sciences, areas that are related to the problem and of
interest but which cannot be included in the study.

Similarly, in this study, only bare acknowledgment is given
to a vast literature related to power, in history, philosophy and

social thought. Nor has it been possible to pursue many interesting

 

1Edward Gross and Paul V. Grambsch, University Goals
and Academic Power (Washington, D. C. : The American Council
on Education, 1968).

 

2
Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1962), p. 2.

 

 

 

 

questions of the psychological relationships between power and
individual and group behavior.

Some of the most engaging and difficult areas of human
relationship to power fall within the areas of values, morals and
ethics and the philosophical basis for the creation and uses of power.
The attempt is made in this study to view power from a neutral
position, and to avoid prescription as to how power "ought" to be
used, or to define “correct” or "right" actions with respect to dispo—
sitions concerning power.

Further, any attempt at the inclusion of a "complete" review
of the literature related to definitions and concepts of power in the
broad fields of sociology, political science, economics and psychology
would be a virtually endless pursuit. Few subjects have so attracted
and held the interest of philosophers, historians and scholars in the
social sciences since classical times and particularly during the past
three centuries. As Hawley notes, few aspects of human organiza-
tion or accomplishment are free of the influence of varying forms of

power. 1 Thousands upon thousands of books, studies, and research

reports in many languages have been produced, dealing (sometimes

 

1Amos H. Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal
Success, " American Journal of Sociology, LXVIII (January, 1963),
422—431.

"Ty; - ’
~«:-‘ A;—E.'.“ .

.‘x z

,1 .1.
11'“

 

 

 

 

19

implicitly) with questions of military, economic and political power
since the rise of the modern state.

Sociologists have been increasingly drawn toward attempts
to systematically measure power in communities, organizations and
as held by individuals. Administrative theorists have made similar
attempts to assess the uses and functions of power in commercial,
non-profit and in military organizations.

For the investigator to profess a familiarity with the total
literature of power is simply a revelation of a rather limited View of
its dimensions, and of the varied facets of the total concept. It is
evident, however, that studies dealing with abstract approaches to
concepts of power as they affect the higher educational institution
are found almost exclusively in the literature of sociology and
political science. It is to these areas that one must have recourse
in any responsible attempt to review the varied theoretical concepts
that have been produced up to the present time and which may lead
toward useful insights in understanding and using power in higher
education.

Power Concepts in the Literature of
Sociology and Political Science

A study which includes an interest in the origins and func—

tions of power in organizations within the modern democratic state

 

 

<-,~‘.‘9« . u:

‘17::ésy'l't’: -

; .-»..<~T’. ‘ihv‘

 

 

 

20

can be illuminated by an examination of the evolution of concepts
that have given rise to such organizations and states. Man' s need
to cooperate and the rise of the social contract theory were given
expression early in the literature of political philosophy. Consider
these observations of Plato, in The Republic:
A state comes into existence because no individual is self—
sufficing; we all have many needs. We call in one another' 5
help to satisfy our various requirements and when we have
collected a number of helpers and associates to live together
in one place, we call that settlement a state. If one man gives
another what he has to give in exchange for what he can get, it
is because each finds that to do so is for his own advantage.
The notion that greater power is present in the group than in the
individual far predates the Greek philosophers and is lost in antiquity,
with the formation of the first band or kinship group of humans.
The evolution from the family, kinship band, tribe, feudal confedera—
tion to the modern federal state demonstrates the process. The
process by which this concept of cooperation and exchange, and the
division of labor, has been expanded upon and made more complex

is basic to an understanding of the basis of power in the organization

2
and the state, and thus, within the higher educational institution.

 

1Plato, The Republic, abstracts in The Great Political
Theories, ed. by Michael Curtis (New York: Avon Books, 1961),
p. 30.

2Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice—Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 5-7.

 

22;" -.7
“i

 

 

 

 

21

Students of political and social power can feel indebted to
Franz Neumann for his perceptive study of the complexities of power.
Neumann traces political thought relating to power from Plato to
Aristotle, the Augustinians, the Thomists, the Epicurians and
Anarchists, to the Marxists, Rousseau and the modern liberal
democrats. He has offered a typology of power in politics and
described political power as simply an aspect of social power. 1

In nearly 500 years, probably few theorists of the practical
uses of coercive power have exceeded the influence of Niccolo
Machiavelli. 2 Neumann has suggested that Machiavelli' s observa-
tions and practical prescriptions of the uses of political power may
have contributed more than any other single factor to the popular

concept of (and aversion for) power as force. Lerner has noted the

 

influence of Machiavelli in political Europe from Frederick the Great
to Joseph Stalin, and describes Machiavelli as ”the first modern
analyst of power. "3 Social scientists (as well as empire builders)
may well reflect on the basis for the persistance in the literature of

this unusual work. 1 ,1

 

1Franz L. Neumann, "Approaches to the Study of Political
Power, " Political Science Quarterly, LXV (1950), 161—180.

 

2Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses (New
York: Random House, 1950).

 

3Ibid., p. xxvi.

22

A highly useful analysis of the evolution of concepts which
have led to the placing of political power in the hands of the people
and the rise of the modern democratic state (and, of organizations
within the state) is contained in Friedrich, beginning with concepts
advanced in Althusius' Politica in 1603 and with theories of John
Locke. 1

Deininger clarified contrasting views of the study of political
power in several varying philosophical schools, noting that Locke,
Hobbes and Rousseau viewed the study of political theory and power
as an aspect of moral inquiry. The Utilitarians, however, beginning
with Bentham and including the Positivists and Marxists, tend to

substitute race, class, nation, party and culture as proper objects
for concern with respect to power. Contemporary ideologists are
identified by Deininger as viewing power from a sociological vantage
point and with the implication of evolutionary political progress.

Catlin traced some of the philosophical origins of concepts
of political power in history which have given rise to the modern

1Carl J. Friedrich and Charles Blitzer, The Age of Power
(Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 2, 12, 151.

2W. T. Deininger, "Political Power and Ideological
Analysis, ” in Politico, XXVI, No. 2 (1961), 277—298.

 

23

state and which form the basis of much of present—day political and
social organization.

Curtis has offered a comprehensive analysis of the. principal
ideas in political philosophy, which have basic implications for the
organization and application of power, as they have evolved through
the centuries from Plato to Martin Luther. Of special interest is a
typology of power from Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, which-is remark-
ably similar to some being proposed by scholars today.

MacIver concluded, in a study of power relationships in
government, that studies on the nature of power to date are unsatis-
factory:

There is no reasonably adequate study of the nature-of social
power. The majority of works on the theme are devoted either
to proclaiming the importance of the role of power, like those
of Hobbes, Gumplowiez, Ratenhofer, Stienmetz, Treitschke and
so forth3i or to deploring that role, like Bertrand Russell in his
Power.

Bertrand Russell considered power from a philosophical and

ethical viewpoint and emphasized the possibility of ethical commit—

ment as a source of power: "If you love your neighbor, you wish for

 

1George E. Gordon Catlin, The Story of the Political Philoso-
phers (New York: Tudor Publishing.Co., 1947), pp. 159-255.

2Curtis, op. cit., pp. 297-302.

3Robert M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 458.

24

power to make him happy. To condemn all love of power, therefore,
is to condemn love of your neighbors. " Russell examined limitations
of power out of ethical concern, in a social and political context. 1

A. A. Berle, Jr. , has provided a useful analysis of the
historical development of a theory of social power, in the process
of describing new manifestations of economic and political power in
the modern industrial state. His conclusions concerning the pro-
cesses of the-legitimization of power provide many helpful insights. 2

The pioneering conceptualizations of power and authority
by the German social scientist, Max Weber, have been the impetus
for much modern research and several attempts at theory building. 3
Weber' s definition of power continues to generate controversial
views as to the nature of power. More recent refinements of the

4

power theory of Weber have been advanced by Goldhamer and Shils.

Weberian concepts of types of power and their application are

 

1Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1938), p. 25.

 

2Adolph A. Berle, Jr. , Power Without Property (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1959), pp. 98-109.

 

3Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. , From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press,
1946). pp. 190-195.

 

 

4Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A. Shils, "Types of Power
and Status, " American Journal of Sociology, XLV (September, 1939),
171-178.

 

25

expanded, including the concept of charismatic power in individuals.
Miller included important abstracts of Weber' s theories on charisma
and the legitimacy of power in his selections of Weber' s essays.

A typology of power is proposed by Etzioni, who makes
useful comparisons with typologies suggested by other scholars.
Etzioni presents one ofthe most exhaustive treatments of the phe-
nomenon of charisma (of which Weber'was a pioneer) foundin modern
power studies, in reference to individuals who are believed to hold
power. The study makes helpful distinctions betweentypes of power
by identifying characteristics of the means used in its employment. 2

One of the most useful examinations of authority in modern
literature has been provided by Barnard in his classic study, lhg

Functions of the Executive. He makes insightful distinctions between

 

authority and power and is one of few modern scholars to take sub-
stantial account of the relationship of authority and responsibility.
Barnard' s identification of the formal and informal organizations,
together with his theory of authority, help to reveal the complexity

of power in relation to legitimacy.

 

1S. M. Miller, Max Weber (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, 1963), pp. 16—22.

 

2Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Daggni-
zations (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 4-6, 14-16, 262.

 

3Chester 1. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968,), pp. 65-282.

 

26

In an analysis of social power, Tannenbaum contrasted the
relative power of the family, the church and the state as institutions
in society. He proposed that a condition of competition must exist
between these institutions to insure a balance of power in society.

He suggested that revolution is the result of the acquisition of exces-
sive power by one of these institutions. 1

Few scholars have attempted a more broad examination of
varied abstract concepts of power than Bierstedt. 2 Togetherwith
others who have seriously considered the question, Bierstedt observes,
”Few problems in sociology are more perplexing than social power. "
Bierstedt concluded that the power problem lies deeperthan in
political philosophy-and that it is rooted in society itself; its study
must therefore be broader than political science and can only be
approached through sociology. In his study, Bierstedt examined the
origins, sources, loci and uses of power in society and offered help-
ful definitions of power.

Some of the most exhaustive and detailed descriptions of the

forms and manifestations of power in recent literature are found in

 

1Frank Tannenbaum, "The Balance of Power in Society, "
Political Science Quarterly, LXI (December, 1946), 481-504.

 

2
Bierstedt, ”An Analysis of Social Power, " op. cit. ,
pp. 730-738.

27

Lasswell and Kaplan. 1 A substantial portion of the study is devoted
to comparisons of power and influence and the qualities that distinguish
them. Like many other observers, the authors discuss the varieties
of sources of power; they expose the myth that power is by definition
self-seeking and aggressive. In another more recent study, Lass-
well assigns the study of the shaping and sharing of power as the
special concern of political science.

Bachrach and Baratz have called attention to what they
believe are differing approaches to the study of power within soci-
ology and political science:

Sociologically oriented researchers have consistently found that
power is highly centralized, while scholars trained in political
science have just as regularly concluded that in "their" com-
munities, power is widely'diffused.
As this present study attempts to demonstrate, their discovery is
hardly surprising; power appears to have many more "faces" than

the two identified by Bachrach and Baratz. Indeed, as will be

detailed below, there is a bewildering variety of "faces" of power,

 

1Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and
Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 55, 71-102.

 

2Harold D. Lasswell, "Political Science, " in A New Survey
of the Social Sciences, ed. by B. N. Varma (London: Asia Pub—
lishing Co., 1962). pp. 15-20.

 

3Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "'I‘wo Faces of
Power, " American Political Science Review, LVI (December, 1962),
947-952.

 

28

depending on circumstances. Some recent scholars appear to have
taken too limited an account of its complexity, perhaps out of zeal
to simplify it, in order to take its measure.

Dahl, an experienced student of theoretical concepts of
power, has pointed to numerous pitfalls that confront those who
attempt its systematic study: ". . . there are students of the sub-
ject . . . who think . . . the whole study of 'power-' is a bottomless
swamp. " Dahl offered highly useful distinctions between concepts
of power, authority and influence. He has described difficulties
attendant to attempts to find methods by which power can be quanti-
fied and measured.

Danzger called attention to aspects of the immense com-
plexity of attempts to measure power, especially as it is presumed
to be held by individuals. He concluded that power can probably be
usefully considered from the viewpoint of goals and resources. He
called attention to the concept of power as potential for action.

Abramson, Cutler, Kautz and Mendelson have noted impor-

tant relationships between power and goals and concerning a number

 

1Dahl, ”The Concept of Power, " op. cit. , pp. 201-218.

2M. Herbert Danzger, "Community Power Structure:
Problems and Continuities, " American Sociological Review, XXIX

(October, 1964), 707 -7 17 .

 

29

of significant characteristics of power and authority, and of attempts
to measure quantities of power.

Some recent studies related to power in education, such as
those of McKenna2 and of McLain, 3 suggest the direction of some
current interest by scholars toward measurement of the understand-
ings and opinions of individual educators concerning power.

Among the more generally known studies of power in recent
years is that of Mills, which presents power as a means of the
achievement of self—interest goals of groups and individuals. 4
Parsons has criticized Mills' conception of poweras alimited one,
concerned mainly‘with power over others. He described this View
as being in the tradition of ". . . Veblen and a long line of indicters
of modern industrial society. " Parsons supported the view that the

primary. locus of power-in society is in the political system, rather

 

1E. Abramson, H. A. Cutler, R. W. Kautz and M. Mendel-
son, "Social Power and Commitment: A Theoretical Statement, "
American Sociological Review, XXIII (1958), 15-22.

2
David L. McKenna, "A Study of Power and Interpersonal
Relationships in the Administration of Higher Education" (unpub-
lished dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958).

3John D. McLain, "Relationships between Administrative
Tenure and Attitude of Administrators and School Board Members
Toward Authority" (unpublished dissertation, University of Oregon,
1962).

4EC. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1956).

 

 

30

than in covert groups or alliances of individuals of high socio-
economic status, who band together against the mass of people. 1

A useful philosophical analysis of authority as it relates to
individuals and groups was conducted by Simon. He examined the
relationship of authority to freedom and liberty and the function and
utility of authority in organizations and in society. He has studied
concepts of the locus of authority and of differences in coercive and
persuasive power.

Relationships between power and democracy as they affect
the functions of organizations and civil governments in modern
society, with a particular emphasis on the role of authority in the
organization, have been explored by D' Antonio and Ehrlich.

Additional insights concerning the development of current
views of power within the concepts of liberal political philosophy
have been described in a study by Girvetz. He has distinguished

between political and economic power, and suggested a variety of

 

1Talcott Parsons, "The Distribution of Power in American
Society," World Politics, X (October, 1957), 123-143.

 

2Yves Simon, The Nature and Function of Authority (Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1940), pp. 1-33.

 

3William V. D' Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich, eds. ,
Power and Democracy in America (Notre Dame, Ind. : University
of Notre Dame Press, 1961), p. 132.

 

31

methods by which power may be classified, and has discussed the
difficulties in measuring it.

A recent study by Rose provided an extensive analysis of a
number of recent and traditional definitions of power and authority.
He presented the contrasting views of power as a potential for action,
and as evidenced by-a demonstrated capacity to act. Few, if any,
recent works have offered so detailed a catalogue of the varied forms
and characteristics of power.

The foregoing review of studies and reports of social and
political power is by no means exhaustive; it is believed to be
representative of the more advanced attempts at the description of
power and of attempts to develop a theory concerning it, within these
domains of knowledge.

Studies of Power in the Literature
of Higher Education

 

 

Reference has been made in Chapter I of this study to the
growing complexity and diversity of goals, purposes and interests

that characterize the modern higher educational institution. Some

 

1Harry K. Girvetz, The Evolution of Liberalism (New York:
Collier Books, 1963). pp. 264-267.

 

2Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967), pp. 1-52.

 

32

insight into the process by which these institutions have evolved
from simple colonial academies to the highly complex and diverse
institutions of the present day is provided in historical studies such
as those of Rudolph1 and Hofstadter. 2 In both of these comprehen-
sive works, there are detailed illustrations of the sources of the
origin, the legal basis of establishment and the growth and expansion
of many institutions in the American system of higher education.
In Rudolph, a chronological account of the growth of the American
system is presented, from colonial New England to the present
generation, in narrative form. In Hofstadter, one is offered a
remarkable collection of the original documents which describe the
process of educational institutional growth. Both studies are helpful
in tracing the increasing delegation and diffusion of authority in
higher educational institutions, together with some of the reasons
for its occurrence, as have been concluded by these scholars.

Many aspects of the basis and function of power in higher
education have been described by Corson, who has raised numerous
complex questions concerning campus power relationships. Corson

traced the principal differences between higher educational institutions

 

1Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1962).

 

2Richard Hofstadter, American Higher Education (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1961).

 

33

and other large organizations such as business and governmental
groups, in the degree to which power is delegated and diffused.

A current study by Dykes has described the faculty role in
decision making in higher educational institutions, and examined
factors that encourage or tend to impede faculty participation in
decision making.

Griffiths distinguished between power and authority in a
study of administrative theory in education which has implications
for higher educational organizations. Griffiths related power to
effectiveness in the educational administrative process.

The basis of legal authority in higher educational institu-
tions was examined by Henderson, together with the powers of
governing boards and the role of the faculty in the establishment of
policy in higher education. He called attention to the value of goals

in relation to the uses of institutional power.

 

1Corson, op. cit., pp. 118-142.

2
Archie Dykes, Faculty Participation in Academic Decision
Making (Washington, D. C. : American Council on Education, 1968),
p. 40.

 

3Daniel E. Griffiths, Administrative Theory (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959), pp. 71—91.

 

4Algo Henderson, Policies and Practices in Higher Educa-
tion (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1960). pp. 217-

230.

 

34

Problems relating to power and the legal status and position
of the higher educational institution have been described by' Blackwell,
in an analysis of the relationships betweenhigher educational institu-
tions and the state. Blackwell traces the origins, legal powers and
responsibilities of institutions to the state, togetherwith the varieties
of forms that such relationships may. take. 1

The legal basis for power in the higher educational institu-
tion and the authority of institutions and their governing boards was
examined by. Chambers, who presented specific conclusions con-
cerning the locus of,power in the institution. 2 Additional insights
into the power and authority of institutions and governing boards is

contained in College and University Business Administration.

 

Mayhew discussed the legality of the power of the institu-
tional. president and its effects in faculty-administrative relation-

4
ships.

 

1Thomas E. Blackwell, College Law (Washington, D. C.:
American Council on Education, 1961), pp. 22-55.

 

2M. M. Chambers, "Who Is the University," Journal of
Higher'Education, XXX, No. 6 (June, 1959), 320—324.

 

3Collgge and University Business Administration (Wash-
ington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1968), pp. 18-27.

 

4Lewis B. Mayhew, The Smaller Liberal Arts College
(New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education, Inc.
1967). pp. 74- 90.

 

35

The role of governing boards as the legal holders of power
for higher educational institutions has been reported by McGrath.
He has described the function of institutional charters in defining
the roles of trustees in institutions. 1

Sullivan reported observations of a number of colleges and
universities with respect to the dispersion of power among admin-
istrators and faculty members. He discussed the relationship of
authority and responsibility and the legal and traditional basis for
the delegation of authority in most institutions.

The origins and locus of power in colleges and the authority
and responsibility of trustees have been cited by Ruml and Morrison,
together with an analysis of the relationship of faculties to the insti-

tution and the trustees.

Summary

This Chapter has included an evaluative statement concern-

ing the availability of literature relating to the theoretical study of

 

1Earl McGrath, "The Control of Higher Education in
America," Educational Record, XVII (1936), 259-272.

 

2Richard H. Sullivan, "Administrative—Faculty Relation-
ships in Colleges and Universities, " Journal of Higher Education,
XXVII (1956), 308-326, 349.

 

3Beardsley Ruml and Donald H. Morrison, Memo to a
College Trustee (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 3-13.

 

 

36

power in higher education and reviewing the nature of much of the
existing literature in higher education which deals with institutional
organization and governance.

The Chapter includes a review of a representative selection
of some of the most useful theoretical studies in the fields of
sociology and political science dealing with problems of power and
with attempts to define and describe social and political power, in
organizations.

The Chapter is concluded with an overview of some of the
current research and descriptive studies of the origins, sources,
functions and uses of power within the higher educational institution,

which seem to offer insight into the problem of power on the campus.

CHAPTER III

POWER AND HIGHER EDUCATION

PART I

ON THE NATURE AND QUALITIES OF POWER

Introduction

 

As Bierstedt noted, few social problems are more
perplexing than "power. "1 While difficult of precise definition and
conceptualization, and therefore difficult to study, 2 power in its
various meanings and conceptions appears to be one of the oldest
legacies of man. Berle observes that next to sex and love, it is
perhaps the oldest social phenomenon in history, yet that there is
no presently accepted theory of power. 3 Few of the most ancient

myths are free of the theme of power; indeed, it constitutes the

 

1Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 730.
2Danzger, op. cit., pp. 707—717.

3Berle, op. cit., p. 77.

37

38

central thread of meaning of many of man' s most ancient tales and
1
legends.
In historic times, the advance of civilization and the grow-
ing complexity of human organization is a record of the creation,

. . 2 . .
apphcation and effects of power. That so ba31c and pervas1ve a
phenomenon in man' s existence should have escaped attention for
serious, systematic study by scholars in the social disciplines until
this century is an enigma of history; it may be simply because only
lately have attempts been made to formulate concepts rigorously
enough to support systematic study. 3

Kaufman has identified difficulties in the study of power:

There is an elusiveness about power that endows it with an

almost ghostly quality. . . . we "know" what it is, yet we

encounter endless difficulties in trying to define it. We can

"tell" whether one person or group is more powerful than

another, yet we cannot measure power. It is as abstract as

time yet as real as a firing squad.

Dahl has observed the general intuitive conception of power and con—

curs that no theory of power satisfactory for systematic study has

 

1Sir James Frazer, The Golden Bough (New York: Mac—
millan Company, 1960).

 

2Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 735.
3Dahl, op. cit., pp. 201—218.

4Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, ”The Mystery of
Power, " Public Administration, XIV (Summer, 1954), 205.

39

yet emerged. 1 The term power is intuitively understood by people
generally as providing its possessor with the ability to more nearly
achieve his purposes, goals and aspirations.

Many scholars have observed the apparent universal interest
of man in acquiring power. Friedrich noted that "power has always
been one of man's dominant ends, and the search for it one of his
great passions. "2 Over 300 years ago, Thomas Hobbes noted that
man has a broad inclination to seek power: ”. . . I put for a generall
inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire of power,
after power, that ceaseth only with death. "3

Observations as to possible motivations for a quest for
power were offered by Russell: "Every desire (among men), if it
cannot be instantly gratified, brings about a wish for the ability to
gratify it, and therefore, some form of the love of power. "4 Catlin
suggested, "The demand for power is a secondary and self-protec-
tive phase of the demand for liberty. " Catlin observed that its pursuit

is natural to all humanity and that ". . . it is an illusion to suppose

 

1Dahl, "The Concept of Power, " op. cit. , p. 201

2Friedrich and Blitzer, op. cit., p. 2.

3Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by Michael Oakeshott
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 64.

4Russell, 0p. cit., p. 25.

4O

otherwise, and a very dangerous one, especially among equalitarian

idealists. ”1

What Is Power ?

In common lay terms, a dictionary definition offers
illustrations of the varied nuances of meaning contained in the word,
with which scholars must cope:

1) ability to do; capacity to act; capability of performing or
producing. 2) a specific ability or faculty: as, the power of
hearing, beyond one' s powers. 3) great ability to do, to act
or affect strongly; vigor, force, strength. 4) the ability to
control others; authority, sway, influence; legal ability or
authority; a document giving it. 5) physical force or energy,
as: electric power. 6) the capacity to exert physical force
or energy. 7) a person or thing having great influence, force
or authority.

An indication of still other meanings which add to the complexity of
the definition of ”power” include: a nation; national might or strength;
a spirit or divinity; an armed force; a large quantity or number. In
mathematics and in optics, power has special meaning; in theology,

.. ,3

1

power may refer to 'one of nine orders of angels

 

1Catlin, op. cit., p. 762. Also see: Hans Morgenthau,
Scientific Man vs Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago

 

Press, 1946), pp. 191—203.

2Webster' 3 New World Dictionary (College edition; New
York: World Publishing Co. , 1957).

 

3Ibid.

41

In order to proceed from a common basis of understanding
of the variety of meanings of power, it will be useful to consider
some of the more commonly offered definitions of power as a s_o_g_ia_l
phenomenon provided by social philosophers and scientists. Such a
review will provide illustration of the varied emphasis that such

concepts provide.

Definitions of Power

 

Power has been described as a universal phenomenon in
human societies and in all human relationships. 1 Rose has called
attention to the lack of an adequate taxonomy of power, and to the
use of a number of terms related to the problem, such as: "power, "
"authority" and ”influence" as if they were interchangeable. 2 Dahl
noted the importance of making distinctions between the meanings of

" "influence" and "authority. "3

"power,
Of definitions of power that have been offered, Girvetz4

accepted Russell' 8: "Power may be defined as the ability to produce

1Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 730.

2Rose, op. cit. An engaging and helpful review of defini-
tions of power and related concepts is found on pages 49—52.

3Dahl, op. cit., p. 202.

4Girvetz, op. cit., p. 264.

42

an intended effect. "1 Some scholars define power only in terms of
control over other people or groups, as: Banfield: ”Power is the
ability to establish control over another";2 Etzioni: ”Power is an
actor' s ability to induce or influence another actor to carry out his
directions or any other norms he supports”;3 Goldhamer: "A person
may be said to have power to the extent that he influences the behavior
of others in accordance with his own intentions”;4 Haer: "Power
refers to the ability or authority of individuals or organizations to
control, effectively guide or influence other individuals or groups";5
Tawney: ”Power may be defined as the capacity of an individual or
group of individuals to modify the conduct of other individuals or
groups in the manner which he desires . . .";6 Hunter: ”Power .
will be used to describe acts of men going about the business of

moving other men to act in relation to themselves or in relation to

 

1Russell, op. cit., p. 35.

2Edward Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The 1
Free Press, 1961) p. 348.

3Etzioni, op. cit., p. 4.

4Goldhamer, op. cit., p. 171.

5John L. Haer, "Social Stratification in Relation to Attitude
Toward Sources of Power in a Community, " Social Forces, XXXV,

No. 2 (December, 1956), 137.

6R. H. Tawney, Equality (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
1931), p. 230.

43

organic or inorganic things. “1 This last definition leaves much to
be clarified and tends to confuse the role of power in the social and
physical worlds.

Other investigators have defined power in terms of the
decision—making process, as: "Power . . . is conceived as the
ability to exercise influence in a decision-making process, ”2
Hawley; "Power is participation in the making of decisions, "3 Lass-
well; "Power has to do with whatever decisions men make about the
arrangements under which they live . . . , "4 Mills.

Some scholars define power in relative terms; Dahl' s

' referred to above,

statement of the "intuitive definition of power,‘
is: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do some—
thing that B would not otherwise do. "5 Stinchcombe describes power

as the amount of difference that the decision of an individual makes

in some aspect of social activity. Such differences might vary from

 

1Hunter, op. cit., pp. 2-4.

2Hawley, op. cit., p. 422.

3Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 75.

4C. Wright Mills, Power Politics and People, ed. by

Irving L. Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963),
p. 23.

 

5Dahl, ”The Concept of Power,” op. cit. , p. 202.

 

 

 

44

none to total. 1 Karlsson, in efforts to mathematically study power
in group relationships, defined power as: A' s power over B is the
difference between the best A can do to B and the worst he can do.
Thus, both are considered holders of power, in relative amounts.
Scholz called attention to this relativity: "He who can resist the
efforts of others to modify his conduct contrary to his own wishes
also wields power. "3 Under such terms, no one is all-powerful,
or completely powerless.

Max Weber‘ s definition of power has given rise to a number
of investigations as to whether power is fact or potential: ”In
general, we understand by 'power' the chance of a man or of a
number of men to realize their own will in a communal act even
against the resistence of others who are participating in the action. "4
Abramson was declarative: ”Power is considered to be potentiality

for action. "5 Kurt Lewin spoke of power as a concept referring to

 

1Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories
(New York: Harcourt, Brace 8: World, Inc., 1968), p. 8.

 

2Georg Karlsson, "Some Aspects of Power in Small Groups, "
Mathematical Methods in Small Group Processes, ed. by Criswell,
Solomon and Suppes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962),
pp. 193—202.

3Karl Scholz, ”Transitions in the Exercise of Power, "
Social Science, XVIII (July, 1943), 136.

4Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 180.

5Abramson et a1. , op. cit., p. 17.

45

a "possibility of inducing forces" of a certain magnitude on another
person. 1 Power is thus regarded as a potential force. Schulze
concluded:
It seems far more sociologically sound to accept a Weberian
definition which stresses the potential to act. Power may thus
be conceived as an inherently group-linked property, an attri—
bute of social statuses rather than of individual persons.
Whether or not the specific individuals in these statuses cash
in on their control potential . . . is not important in the con-
ceptual classification of the key term, power.
Such a definition may be convenient in attempts to identify power as
a property or consequence of social status. That it assists in
clarifying our view of the nature of power seems doubtful. Such a
View of power could bolster attempts to measure the comparative
amounts of power presumably held by individuals and groups in
studies of "power structures" in social systems, where such esti-
mates are based on opinion surveys which describe presumed power
holders, but where no actual test of such power has been made.
Other scholars agree that the definition of power as potential is

unsatisfactory: Lasswell and associates found that the difference

between actual and potential power is hard to determine and may

 

1Dorwin Cartwright, ed. , Field Theory in Social Science:
Selected Theoretical Papers by Kurt Lewin (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc., 1951), p. 40.

2

 

Robert O. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a
Satellite City, " in Community Political Systems, ed. by Morris
Janowitz (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1961), p. 20.

 

46

rest finally on performance. 1 Polsby has suggested that the only
certain way to establish the existence of power is to see it used to
successfully achieve its purpose. 2 Coser observed, "It is difficult
to appraise the relative power of the contenders before a conflict
has settled the issue. "3 Scholz concurred that only in action can
objective evidence of the existence of power be established: "The
test of our ability to do anything is to do it. "4 Bierstedt' s View of
power as a potential requires different concepts of the nature of
power. He stated that ". . . power is always 'potential' ; that is,
when it is used, it becomes something else, either force or authority."
He defined power as latent force; force as manifest power and au-
thority as institutionalized power. Unlike force, power is always
successful; when it is not successful, it is not, or ceases to be,

5
power.

 

1Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and C. Eaton Rothwell,
The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1952), p. 8.

 

2Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 3.

 

3Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 134.

 

4Scholz, op. cit., p. 135.

5Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 736.

47

In attempting to summarize the varied definitions and
conceptions of power as described by scientists and philosophers,
one may be reminded of the East Indian legend of the four blind -
men, confronted with an elephant, who said, successively, that he
was like a wall, a snake, a tree and a whip, as indeed, he was,
depending on the part of him with which each came in touch. For
purposes of this study, reduced to simple terms, social power will

be defined as: the capacity to achieve a desired result.

The Origins of Social Power

It will be evident from the definitions of power considered
and offered, that social power has its origin in the objectives, goals
and aspirations of an individual or of groups. Something must be
wanted; something must be sought. 1

Thus, it may be hypothesized that:

the idea, resolution or conscious commitment to attain .
something desired or sought is the beginning of power,

though the actual achievement of the sought condition may

only be effected by accretions of power sufficient to effect

it.

 

1Russell, op. cit., p. 25. Also see: Abramson, op. cit., _

48

Social objectives or. goals can probably be attained most often by
group effort; the accretions of power necessary .for achievement
may come only from the combined abilities of a group. Such resolu—
tions or commitments toward a goal may be held separately by
individuals or concurrently in a group. That the uses and effects

of power may vary as between individuals and group power holders
seems clear, and will be developed below. In summary, it may be
hypothesized that power has its beginnings at a point in time and

place‘where conscious resolution is made toward a desired social

result.

The Sources of Social Power

 

It is implicit in the definitions of power considered above
that power can have its basis in a variety of sources. Further, these
definitions suggest that power can serve the purposes of an individual
or a group, though the uses and effects may vary as between indi-
viduals and groups. In either case, power can serve as a resource

for'the achievement of social goals.

Classifications of Power

 

Students of social power have identified several ways of

distinguishing or classifying power. Girvetz1 has devised a system

 

1Girvetz, op. cit., p. 264.

49

which appears to be one of the most useful suggested to date. He
states that power may be classified by reference to: 1) its source;
2) the methods employed in wielding it; 3) its extent, and 4) its
effects. The Girvetz system of classification will be used below, to

assist in the examination of a number of possible sources of power.

Power Classified by Source

 

Among types of power classified as to source, Thomas
Hobbes, in 1651, listed riches, knowledge and honor as ". . . but
several sorts of power. "1 Many scholars cite economic resources
as a source of power. Berle says economic power is never absolute,
though it is virtually unlimited when in combination with police,
military or political power. Absent these other combinations of
power, economic power is controllable. 2 Kuhn discusses types of
power in terms of "money" and "non-money" based power.

Prestige should not be regarded as a source of power, but
rather a consequence of it, according to Bierstedt. "Similar obser-

vations may be made about the relations of knowledge, skill,

 

lHobbes, op. cit., p. 46.

2Berle, op. cit., p. 87.

3Alfred Kuhn, The Study of Society: A Unified Approach

(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., and The Dorsey ’ 1
Press, 1963), Part V.

 

50

competence, ability and eminence, to power. They are all
components of, sources of or synonyms of prestige. "1 Some
scholars do not agree with Bierstedt concerning these latter
observations, as will be evident below; to suggest that power may

or may not be developed from such sources seems hazardous, at
best. Bierstedt states further that power arises ”only where there
is competition, conflict or opposition. " This seems to be a difficult
position to defend: there may well be instances where a social goal
is sought and where there is no organized social opposition (as,
perhaps, a community medical service) but where considerable
power is required for its accomplishment. 2 Bierstedt concluded
that power stems from three sources: 1) numbers of people; 2) social
organization, and 3) resources. However, he listed as resources:
money, property, prestige, knowledge, competence, fraud and other
variables as factors which, though not in themselves power, may
help tip the scales in favor of their possessor. 3 This seems as a
circular reasoning at best, as suggestive of uncertainty by Bierstedt

as to what may constitute power sources.

 

1Bierstedt, op. cit., pp. 731—732.

2Ibid., pp. 736-737.

3Ibid.

 

51

In contrast to widely held views of power as being physical
or coercive force, Stinchcombe notes that values may be a principal

source of power. 1 Lasswell states that "Power may rest on faiths

and loyalties as well as interests, to say nothing of habits and apathy. "2

Merriam has observed, "It cannot be concluded that the essence of
the power situation is force, in the sense of violence and physical
brutality. Altruism as well as egoism has a place in human relations
and organization and cooperation has as genuine a position as
coercion. "3

Charisma in individuals and leaders is often listed as a
source of power by investigators. The charismatic qualities of
leaders are discussed by Neeley. 4 An extensive analysis of charis-
matic power is provided by Etzioni, by whom the phenomenon is
defined as ”an extraordinary quality of a person. "5 While the social

and political effects and consequences of charisma are undoubtedly

 

lStinchcombe, op. cit., p. 183.
2Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 76.

3C. E. Merriam, Political Power (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1934). p, 20.

4Twila E. Neeley, ”The Sources of Political Power: A
Contribution to the Sociology of Leadership, " American Journal of
Sociolog , XXXIII (March, 1928), 769-783.

5Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organiza-
tions, op. cit., pp. 201—262.

 

 

52

significant, it is not a quality usually assigned to organizations and
will not be examined in this study. Pape has classified other types
of political power according to sources. 1

Ehrlich has observed that the sheer fact of the possession
of power may deter action in others. 2 In such an instance, the pos—
session of power might be a source of still greater power; such a
process serves as an example of the nearly infinite sources from
which power can come.

Power Classified by
Methods of Wielding It

 

In classifying power according to Girvetz' s second type,
methods employed in wielding it, Etzioni has concurred that "power
differs according to the means employed to make the subjects com-
ply. " The means may be: 1) physical, 2) material, or 3) symbolic.
Physical or coercive powers rest on the application or threat of
physical sanctions (pain, deformity, death), restriction of move-
ment, or forceful control of satisfaction of human needs, as food,

comfort and the like. Material power is based on control of material

 

1Leslie M. Pape, "Sources and Limits of Political Power, ”
Social Forces, XVIII (March, 1940), 424—428.

2Howard J. Ehrlich, "Power and Democracy: A Critical
Discussion, ” in Power and Democracy in America, ed. by William V.
D' Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich (Notre Dame, Ind. : University
of Notre Dame Press, 1961), p. 92.

 

 

53

sources and rewards, as, salaries, and economic benefits.
Normative power rests on the allocation or maniplation of symbolic
rewards, as: esteem, prestige, acceptance, fame and honor.1

Sanctions may take many forms, as: custom, social pres—
sure, psychological domination, goals and purposes, economic
pressures-—even the unwillingness to accept personal responsibility.
According to Banfield, coercion or control is the ability to cause
another to give or withhold action; one who is controlled acts as the
agent of the one who controls. 3 The use of coercive force reaches
a high level in military organizations. Because their actions center
on violence in situations of crisis, they preserve the right to exer-
cise drastic sanctions against their personnel. 4

Concerning the wielding of power, Ehrlich notes that holders
of social power may not use it. 5 Conflict may be a means of wielding

power and may consist of a test of power between antagonists.

 

1Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations,
op. cit., p. 5.

 

2Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The
Free Press, 1968), pp. 130—133.

 

3Banfield, op. cit., p. 348.

4Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York:
The Free Press, 1960), p. 43.

 

5Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 91.

 

 

 

54

Accommodation between them may be possible only if each is aware
of the relative strength of both parties. 1 Kimbrough observes that
the use of power may involve coercion, domination, command,
manipulation, charisma, influence or varying combinations of these.
Rossi has identified what he calls the "polylithic" power system, in
which groups within a larger organization (such as schools or col-
leges within a university) may seek to acquire authority by taking it
from each other, in order to attain a larger measure of influence
over policy in the total organization.

In order to wield power over others, it is important for the
power holder to know what they are doing. Thus, power and author-
ity are closely related. Communications through an organization

are effected by hierarchical structures of authority. 4

Power Classified
According to Extent

 

 

A third classification of power, according to extent, has

confronted scholars with many perplexing problems, where attempts

 

1Coser, op. cit., p. 137.

2Ralph Kimbrough, Political Power 3nd Educational
Bacision Makipg (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. , 1964), p. 7.

 

 

3Peter H. Rossi, "Power and Community Structure, in
fglitical Sociology, ed. by Lewis A. Coser (New York: Harper,
19____). pp. 141-145.

 

4Stinchcombe, op. cit., p. 9.

 

55

have been made to measure the extent of power, and to describe the
range and directions that it may include. It is evident that the
extent of power cannot be considered apart from the circumstances
and actors in each instance of its manifestation.

Berle has found that power has at least two aspects: the
power of an organization over its members, and power over, or
capacity to affect, people outside the organization. 1 Rose has clas-
sified power in several ways, one of which is scope or extent.
Power as to extent might also be considered from the viewpoint of
the social and geographic outreach of various forms or types of it.
Power has been classified as being composed of two sub—types,
authority and influence, both of which are necessary to its success-
ful employment.

In assessing the extent of power, Danzger noted that power
and a reputation for power are two different things. 4 He underscored
the dangers attendant to the careless study of power and the building

of fanciful structures of community or organizational "power

1Berle, op. cit., p. 81.
2Rose, op. cit., pp. 49—51.

3William V. D' Antonio and William H. Form, Influentials
iiTwo Border Cities (Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre Dame
Press, 1965), p. 11.

4Danzger, op. cit., pp. 708-710.

56

structures" upon estimates of power which are based on opinion
surveys of observers and which do not take into account actual
ability or disposition to perform. The size or amount of resources
of power is no guarantee of success; one may not use it at all, or
if so, badly or ineptly. 1 Dahl concluded that a reputation for power
is not a valid index for power. Reputation for power has provided
the basis of the difficulties to be faced in evaluating studies such as
those of Hunter2 and Miller3 and others. In these studies, individ-
uals are presumed to have power because someone in the community
believed they did. Dahl has held that it would be more useful and
productive in any attempt to measure power to study actual series of
concrete decisions, to find out who actually made them.

Abramson and associates established difficult criteria as

the basis for the comparative measurement of power: the presence

 

1Robert A. Dahl, "Equality and Power in American Society, "
in Power and Democracy in America, ed. by William V. D' Antonio
and Howard J. Ehrlich (Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre
Dame Press, 1961), pp. 76-80.

2Hunter, op. cit.

3Delbert C. Miller, ”Democracy and Decision-Making in
the Community Power Structure, " in Power and Democracy in
America, ed. by William V. D' Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich
(Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre Dame Press, 1961),
pp. 47-49.

4Dahl, "Equality and Power in Americal Society, " 3p.
p_i_t_. , p. 76.

57

of open lines of action, the definition of a common objective for two
or more actors and the specification of the actors being compared.
Access to such knowledge would probably always be severely limited
and based heavily on subjective evaluation of either observers or
subjects. Similar hazards would seem to accompany Dahl' 3 pre—
scription: one must compare power actors with respect to the
resources they are capable of evoking. 2 How the nature and extent
of such resources is to be learned is not made clear.

Other investigators, such as Hawley, have been concerned
with efforts to attempt to measure comparative power in organiza-
tions. 3 Girvetz has observed that modern power theorists do not
accept the traditionalist view that power exists, in extent, only in
fixed quantities. 4 Dykes is among those who do not accept the con—
cept of power as a specific amount, which can be divided. 5 Thus,
the classification of power as to extent seems to require some basis
for the determination of extent; such efforts to date have been

largely unsuccessful.

 

1AbramsongLa1., op. cit., p. 17.
2Dahl, "The Concept of Power, " op. cit., p. 206.
3Hawley, op. cit., pp. 423-424.

4Girvetz, op. cit., p. 265.

5Dykes, op. cit., p. 40.

58

Power Classified by Effects

 

In the classification of power by its effects, there are
additional difficulties, among which are the establishment of the
effects, in some instances. Rose has examined power through the
observation of actual behavior, with intended effects, though such
effects must necessarily be presumed, in many instances. 1 Berle
has found that the use of power may often have unintended effects,
which may even be of greater consequence than those intended. 2 As
to the effect of power on individuals and organizations, the familiar
dictum of Lord Acton, ”Power tends to corrupt and absolute power
corrupts absolutely, "3 appears to have influenced the presuppositions
of many students of power. The statement has been sharply chal-
lengedby Neumann, who called it a "facile, half—true generalization"
and who has offered examples in refutation. 4 Yves Simon concluded
that the effect of power in the form of coercion is physical while that
of persuasion is moral, with the origination of a disposition in the

will. 5

 

1Rose, op. cit., p. 52.
2Berle, op. cit., p. 83.

3John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, Essays on Freedom
and Power (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1948), p. 365.

 

4Neumann, op. cit., p. 163.

5Simon, op. cit., p. 8.

59

A number of additional ways of classifying power have been
proposed in addition to that by Girvetz. Weber suggested another
possible system, that of classification by the purposes for which
men seek power, as, social honor. 1 Such a system would seem to
be endless, in practical effect, for there is no evident limit to the
reasons for which men might seek power. Another typology of
power by French and Raven suggests that power be identified as:

1) Reward Power (the ability to reward); 2) Coercive Power (ability
to punish); 3) Legitimate Power (based on acceptance of the right
of the holder of it); 4) Referent Power (based on some identifica—
tion, as, charisma) and 5) Expert Power (based on knowledge,
expertness). 2 This typology seems even less helpful, in that it

introduces confusions of legitimacy, sources and effects of power.

Etzioni has noted still other typologies of power, as:
Boulding: identification, economic means and coercion; Niebuhr:
coercion, self—interest and love; Neuman: persuasion, material

benefits and violence; Commons: physical, econimic and moral;

 

1Gerth, op. cit., p. 180.

2John R. P. French, Jr., and Bertram Raven, ”The

Bases of Social Power, " in Studies in Social Power, ed. by Dorwin
Cartwright (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research,
University of Michigan, 1959), pp. 150-167.

 

60

Janowitz: economic, violence and persuasion, and a comparable
typology by Deutsch. 1

In summary of the examination of the sources of power,
certain observations and hypotheses concerning the classifications
and characteristics of power may be offered. Money, knowledge,
intelligence, competence and skill, physical force, coercion in many
forms--all may be significant sources of power under circumstances
that favor the advantage that each may offer. There is an additional
group of sources for power, each of which have their origins (in
relative strength) in individuals, but which may become the char-
acteristics of groups and organizations, as Selznick has pointed
out. 2 These might include: motivation, zeal, dedication, clearly
perceived values, where such values or qualities are held to be
important by those who will be affected by power based in them.
Other individual qualities which may pervade a group and become
primary sources of power could include: courage, audacity, energy,
speed, agility, and other like qualities. Human experience sub—
stantiates instances in which such sources of power appear to have

been primary and crucial, in the resolution of major social issues.

 

I

1Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations,
op. cit., p. 5.

2Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York:
Harper & Row, 1957), pp. 90-119.

 

 

61

Indeed, one might list most of the identifiable capabilities of humanity
and defend them as sources of power, where circumstances might
require or allow them, individually, to prevail. To suggest that
there are "three" or "two" or "five" sources of power seems naive
in the extreme, in the face of the evidence.

Hawley has observed that power in the social sphere, like
energy, in the physical sphere, is ubiquitous: it appears in many
forms: ”Every social act is an exercise of power, every social
relationship is a power equation and every social group or system
is an organization of power. "1

It remained for Friedrich to summarize the often confusing
views of the sources of power with sufficient insight to reveal the

dimensions of the problem: neither things nor ideas are ".

. power
taken by themselves; they become instruments in the hands of one
seeking power. To convert them to power, the power seeker must
find human beings who value the things sufficiently to obey his orders

2
in return. . "

Authority

In this study, authority is hypothetically defined as being

derivative of power. Authority is less than full or total power.

 

1Hawley, op. cit., p. 422.

2Friedrich, op. cit., p. 12.

62

Authority is specific power, a degree of power, a part of the total
power of an organization, which has been delegated from the whole.

As with definitions of power, scholars over several decades
have-supplied varied descriptions of their conceptions of authority.
A dictionary defines authority as:

1) the power or right to give commands, enforce obedience,
take action or make final decision; jurisdiction. 2) this power
as delegated to another; authorization: as, he has my authority
to do it. 3) power or influence resulting from knowledge,
prestige, etc. 4) a person, writing, etc. , cited in support of
an Opinion. 5) usually in plural, a government official or other
person having the power or right to enforce orders, laws, etc.
6) a person with much knowledge or experience in some field,
whose opinion is hence reliable; expert.

Definitions and
Conceptions of Authority

 

 

Simon has defined authority as the power to make deci-
sions which guide the actions of another, as a relationship between
two individuals, one ”superior" and the other "subordinate. ”2
Banfield stated that, "Authority is the right to give or withhold
action requisite to the adoption of a proposal; only an actor who
can perform such actions (who is 'authorized ' ) has authority. ”3

D' Antonio saw authority as ". . . the right to control the decision

 

1Webster's, op. cit.

 

2Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 125.

3Banfield, op. cit., p. 348.

63

making process in prescribed areas and under specialized
. . "1

cond1t10ns.

The function of authority is to assure the unity of action
of an organized group, aiming at a common goal, which may only

2

be attained by common action. Authority permits specialization
in decision making, secures expertise in the making of decisions
and permits coordination of activity. It may also enforce responsi-

bility to those who wield authority. 3

The Locus of Authority

 

Several investigators have found that authority resides in a
position within an organized group rather than in a person; it is the
position which is invested with authority, not the individual. 4 Bier—
stedt: "The right to use force is . . . attached to certain statuses
within the association and this right is what we ordinarily mean by

authority.‘ He concludes that power is attached to statuses, not

persons, and is wholly institutionalized as authority, which is

 

lD' Antonio and Ehrlich, Power and Democracy in America,
op. cit. , p. 132.

 

2Yves Simon, op. cit., p. 17.
3Herbert Simon, op. cit., pp. 134—135.

4D'Antonio and Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 132. Also see:
Hawley, op. cit., p. 423.

64

essentially a view of Max Weber. 1 However, Yves Simon has
suggested that the seat of authority is in a person and not in the
form of an impersonal necessity. 2 It probably cannot be said that
the holder of a position of authority is not a factor in the effective-
ness of authority. Bierstedt noted that authority may at times be
tenuous and related to the personal qualities of its holder, as: a
dean may have the authority to dismiss a professor, but does not
dare to do so because of the professor' s popularity. While such a
condition does not change the locus of authority, it may reveal some-
thing of the holder of the position. 3 Personal charismatic qualities
and other personal attributes may be presumed to have a definite

effect in the acceptance of the authority delegated to the position.

Authority and Control

 

.. Authority and control are not synonymous. As Lasswell
noted, ”the king who reigns may not rule. "4 In such instances, we
may assume or postulate the intervention of a force of power that

is real, which does maintain control, whether legitimate or not.

 

1Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 734.
2Yves Simon, op. cit., p. 7.
3Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 734.

4Lasswell, LernerandRothwell, op. cit., p. 8.

65

Day has found that in political sociology, authority means power
to command voluntary obedience. This power is causative, not
coercive. In legal discussions, authority means not actual power,
but power prescribed by political rules. Thus, it is possible for a
ruler to have ”legal" without sociological authority, and visa versa.
Barnard stated that the question of whether or not
authority exists lies with the people to whom it is addressed and
not with the person or position of authority. 2 When the behavior
that is expected to follow a command or request from authority does
not occur, no authority can be said to exist, whether or not it is
theoretically present, according to Simon. 3 It may be noted that
Barnard' s and Simon' s requirement is essentially a test of legiti-
macy of authority; such a test serves simply as a validation of
acceptance for a system of authority already established and claimed.
Thus, legitimacy becomes only one requirement for the successful
function of authority in the power process, after a system for the
use of authority has already been established. Legitimacy of power

and authority will be further examined below. Thus, as with tests

 

1J. Day, "Authority," Politische Studien (Oxford), XI,
No. 3 (October, 1963), 257-271.

 

ZBarnard, The Functions of the Executive, op. cit. ,
pp. 160—184.

 

3Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 125.

 

66

for power, some scholars require a test of performance for authority,
to establish its existence. Thus, too, subtle differences in definition
are established. Concerning acceptance of authority, Arendt has
suggested that a general acceptance of authority is declining in the
world, in the sense of people' s acceptance of organizations, struc—
tures or ideas which have formerly been accepted or respected as
authoritative. 1
Abramson and his associates have made the interesting

observation that

power tends to be dissipated in the assignment of authority.

The assignor commits himself to the one who accepts the

authority and to certain lines of action. He is restricted

because the other is acting in his name. The one who accepts
the authority must accept also the limitations of the assignor.

Hypotheses on Authority

The capacity to delegate authority implies the existence of
a hierarchical structure or organization, in which holders of greater
power assign a part of their power to subordinates, in a successive
number of steps or stages, to accomplish specific purposes. Thus,
power is channeled from its source in the total organization to

various organizations or individuals who have been variously elected,

 

1Hannah Arendt, "Authority in the Twentieth Century,
Review of Politics, XVIII, No. 4 (October, 1956), 403-417.

 

2Abramson et al. , op. cit. , p. 20.

67

selected, employed or otherwise chosen as delegates of the more
powerful body, to accomplish certain specific things.

Characteristically, the amounts of power that are passed
down through such a hierarchical system or structure tend to be
successviely less and less and to be delegated for increasingly more
specialized and specific tasks. Authority must be clearly and spe-
cifically delegated, in order that it may not be misunderstood,
misinterpreted, illegally assumed or taken by default, in the absence
of resistance from the power source, where it has not been formally
or intentionally granted to the delegate.

Authority that is delegated can also be taken away or modi-
fied; superior power rests in the hands of the source delegating the
power. Authority cannot exist in the absence of a superior power
source. By definition, it is a delegation of a portion of a larger
concentration of power. Such a delegation of a portion of power may
not be permanent, but rather, is a temporary trust to an individual
or group, to accomplishspecific purposes. The actual power still
resides in the original source, which has simply delegated an agent
to perform for it.

Further, it appears that authority cannot be delegated with-
out the power to do so. Unless power exists in a source, no

delegation of a portion of it can occur. Where authority is claimed,

68

and as those people over whom such authority would be used accept
it and other elements in the society do not challenge it successfully,
it is not authority alone but the expression of authority of a new
source of power.

Authority can become power in and of itself, only as the
original source which delegated it loses the capacity or interest in
reclaiming or withdrawing it, abdicates it or otherwise relinquishes
its claim to that portion of power.

Authority extends to and includes whatever the power source
delegates to its agent, whether formally and intentionally, or whether
by acquiescence or by default in the reservation of powers for itself.

From the viewpoint of its establishment, the real degree
or extent of authority is the degree of the grant of it, p9_t_ the actual
use or effective discharge of it by the grantee. That more authority
may be appropriated than was originally granted can be regarded
as an additional delegation of authority, where the power source

makes no effort to retain, regain or withhold such additional power.

Influence

The introduction of the term "influence" as descriptive
of some aspects of the functioning of the power process in society
seems both to assist and to obscure understanding of power and of

the characteristics of its workings and effects. Influence is

69

sometimes used to describe the application of a degree of power
insufficient to control a situation but adequate to modify or change
conditions as they‘would have been without its introduction. In
other usages, influence is regarded as synonymous with power, or
even with authority. Again, to establish the basis of the lay under-
standing of the term, a dictionary definition states:
1) originally, the supposed flowing of an ethereal fluid or
power from the stars, thought to affect the characters and
actions of people. 2) the power of persons or things to affect
others, seen only in its effects. The effect or action of such
power. 3) the power of a person or group to produce effects
without the exertion of physical force or authority, based on

wealth, social position, ability, etc. 4) a person or thing that
has influence.

As with other terms related to power, scholars have pro-
vided varied interpretations of the meaning of influence, as opposed
to "power" and "authority. " Consideration of some of these con-

cepts may provide perspective and insights into the general problem

of power.

Concepts and
Definitions of Influence

An unfortunate tendency for some investigators to use the
terms "power" and "influence" interchangeably presents some dif-

ficulties for systematic study; as, Banfield: "By influence is meant

 

1Webster's, op. cit.

70

ability to get others to act, think or feel as one intends" and:
”Influence is a generic term including authority, control and
power. "1 Goldhamer and Shils found three types of "influence":
force, domination and manipulation.

Parsons defined influence as a means of persuasion, and
offers a typology of the kinds of influence he has identified: 1) politi-
cal; 2) fiduciary (money); 3) appeal to differential loyalties; 4) influ-
ence oriented to the interpretation of norms. 3 Bierstedt pointed to
the necessity to maintain a distinction between influence and power:
"Influence is persuasive, while power is coercive. " One submits
voluntarily to influence while power requires submission. He noted
that power and influence can be independent variables; one might
have enormous influence but very little power. 4 Gamson used
influence to describe power, where power is not strong enough to

be decisive.

 

1Banfield, op. cit., pp. 3, 348.
2Goldhamer and Shils, op. cit., p. 172.

3Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence, " Public
Opinion Quarterly, XXVII (Spring, 1963), 48, 52.

4Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 731.

5William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood,
Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 18—19.

 

71

Rossi1 and LassWell and Kaplan2 distinguish between power
and influence by the presence of the threat of sanctions in power.
Simon noted that in influence, an actor may receive a suggestion
toward a given course of action, but acts on his own conviction; in
authority or power, the actor holds his own decisions or judgments
in abeyance and acts on the basis of an order or request. 3 Parsons
has observed that influence may or may not change an opinion or
prevent a possible change. 4

Influence has been identified by D' Antonio as a phenomenon
related to the individual, based on personal qualities such as popu-
larity, reputation, skills, obligations and persuasiveness. He
believed the capacity for influence resides in the individual and that
"in some measure, . . . influence is a component of every social
act. "5 The characteristics of individuals who have major influence

has been described by Miller. 6 Katz and Lazarsfeld found that

 

1Rossi, op. cit., p. 425.

2Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 76.
3Herbert Simon, op. cit., pp. 126—127.
4Parsons, op. cit., p. 38.

5D'Antonio and Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 132.

6Delbert Miller, op. cit., pp. 47-49.

72

influence in and by groups appears to be limited to specific areas of
interest which are valued by those upon whom the influence is being
used. 1 As with power, Parsons stated that the amount of it is not
fixed, 2 and Dahl emphasized the difficulty attendant to any attempt

to measure amounts of influences precisely. 3
Responsibility

The concept of responsibility in relation to questions of
power and authority is largely unexamined by scholars and power
theorists. Since the functioning of a hierarchical social structure
(such as the college or university) is dependent on the acceptance of
authority by the delegate and upon some disposition to discharge this
commission according to the terms of his trust, it is curious that
this phenomenon has received so little attention.

Responsibility can be defined as the condition, quality or
fact of being accountable. It is useful to consider the lay or common
usages of the term, responsibility, in order to examine its role in
the power process. A dictionary definition of responsibility pro—

vides these interpretations:

 

1Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (New
York: Macmillan Co. , 1966), pp. 321-334.

2Parsons, op. cit., p. 61.

3Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1961), pp. 164—165.

73

1) expected or obliged to account (for something to someone);
answerable; accountable: as, he is responsible for the car.
2) involving accountability, obligation or duties; as, he has a
responsible position. 3) answerable or accountable as being
the cause, agent or source of something (with fo_r): as, who -
is responsible for this state of affairs? 4) able to distinguish
between right and wrong and to think and act rationally, and,
hence, accountable for one' s behavior. 5) trustworthy;
dependable; reliable; able to pay debts or meet obligations.
Webster's defines the term "responsible" as applying to one who
has been delegated some duty or responsibility by one in higher
authority and who is subject to penalty in case of default. The term
"answerable" in this context implies a moral or legal obligation for
which one must answer to someone in higher authority, sitting in
judgment. "Accountable" in this usage implies liability for some—
thing of value, or responsibility for one' s own actions, for which
one may be called to account.

Definitions and
Concepts of Responsibility

The concept of responsibility must be a central issue in
any consideration of the relation between administrative and legis-
lative bodies, or in any analysis of the law of organizational admin—

istration. 3 Barnard found that ”Responsibility . . . is the power

 

1Webster's, op. cit.
21bid. #

3Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 137.

74

of a particular code of morals to control the conduct of the individual
in the presence of strong contrary desires or impulses. " He states
that there cannot be authority without corresponding responsibility. 1 -
Accountability is the basis of the right to exercise authority; such a
right to authority is grounded in group norms and legitimized by
the fact that those in authority can be held accountable for their
actions and decisions. 2 This is the function of responsibility: to
enforce conformity to norms and regulations laid down by the group
delegating authority. 3

Ayers has noted that the delegation of responsibility in no
manner or degree diminishes that of the group or official making
the delegation of it. 4 Simon has concluded that the concept of an
administrative hierarchy in a democratic state or organization would
be unthinkable without the corresponding idea of a mechanism whereby

that hierarchy is or may be held to account. 5 He has observed that

 

1Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, op. cit. , pp. 174, ‘
263w267. _ 1

 

2D'Antonio and Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 132.

3Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 136.

4Archie R. Ayers and John H. Russel, Internal Structure:
Organization and Administration of Institutions of Higher Education

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Education, 1962), p. 15.

5Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 136. . ”

75

the probabilities are that most individuals accept responsibility
because of socially indoctrinated ethical notions rather than out of
fear of sanctions. One might conclude that by far the majority of
such acceptances are so based.

Responsibility is but a synonym for authority, according to
Drucker. The one condition always accompanies the other. Drucker
states that those who are asserting responsibility should always be
asked whether they have authority. For, those who do not, seek
power, not contribution: people ordinarily shun responsibility; one
must suspect those who volunteer for responsibility to be seeking
power. Whatever their intention, they seek power to which they
have no legitimate claim. 1 Thus, authority and responsibility are

considered as indispensable complements.

Hypotheses on Responsibility

 

While there is no objective basis for comparison, it is a
common experience of those placed in authority that they are given
responsibility equal in some reasonable measure to the degree of

authority. In a theoretical sense, it would seem necessary that

 

1Peter Drucker, "Freedom and Effective Government, "
in Power and Democracy in America, ed. by William V. D' Antonio
and Howard J. Ehrlich (Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre
Dame, 1961), p. 15.

 

 

76

responsibility should exactly equal authority. In practical application,
it is probably rare that such a matching can actually occur, or that
there exists any accurate measure of those circumstances under
which such a condition can be achieved. In the interest of harmonious
functioning within an organization, an agreement between measures
of delegated authority and responsibility would seem essential: the
responsibility attendant to a delegation of authority should not be at
variance with the measure of authority delegated.

Many hypothetical inequities might be conceived, in the
relation of responsibility and authority. Practically, it would seem
impossible to have the assignment of responsibility without authority;
the reverse seems only slightly more likely. The exchange would
seem to be in the nature of a contract: one offers responsibility in
exchange for a delegation of authority. Both conditions are assigned
and a part of the agreement.

Final responsibility for the outcome of a situation must
clearly rest with the power source which has the capacity of dele—
gation of authority. It alone has the capability of making a delega-
tion; the purposes for which the delegation of authority and
responsibility is made are its purposes, p_o_t_ those of the delegate,
initially. Thus, failure of accomplishment of a part or all of a

total program of purposes must be regarded as a failure of the

 

 

77

initiating power source; sanctions applied or whatever measures the
power source may take to seek adjustment or restitution from its
delegate of authority are incidental. In summary, a condition of
inseparability exists between authority and responsibility; one can-
not be delegated without the other, nor can one be claimed or assumed

without the othe r.

The Legitimacy of Power

 

Legitimate power has been defined as power that is acknowl-
edged by a subordinate. "Legal" power is that based on laws and
decrees. 1 Berle has found that power rests with individuals or
groups because it is believed that the holder is entitled to it by some
test or standard. The corollary is that "the holder can be deprived
of it if demonstration is made that there is no title or right to his
possession of it. " Thus, Berle has defined legitimacy as the right-
ful possession of power, Legitimacy assumes a criterion of judg—
ment; in a democracy, no other instrument of judgment has been
devised other than the public consensus. "There is . . . no instance
in history in which any group, great or small, has not set up some
theory of right to power. A feudal prince derived his right from his

overlord, who in turn claimed to derive it from God. "2

 

1Goldhamer and Shils, op. cit., p. 172.

2
Berle, op. cit., pp. 98—99.

 

 

78

Sources of power in groups and in the larger society are
made effective by social norms, consensus, traditions and customs,
which themselves have evolved from the interplay and workings of
power over time. Whether these accepted norms are highly struc-
tured Within a group or unstructured in the larger society does not
negate their influence, except relatively.

Effectiveness and the continuity of power itself thus rests
on an ideological structure. Attempts to secure compliance with
authority, the results sought and even the ways in which the process
is pursued must be in some measure of harmony with the body of
concepts which inspire the loyalty at the outset. And, the ”violation
of this structure in time leads to dissolution of the allegiance, to
lack of cooperation and eventually to the decay of the power. "1
Stinchcombe has noted that doctrines of legitimacy of power both
reinforce and limit power by specifying conditions under which an
exercise of power may be supported by other sources of power. 2
Berle stated that public concensus is not static; it is in a constant
state of development and transition. But it is the final arbiter of

legitimacy. 3 Legitimacy of power thus may bolster the holder,

 

1Berle, op. cit., p. 80.
2 _ .
Stinchcombe, op. c1t., p. 9.

3Berle, op. cit., p. 110.

79

liberal or traditionalist, alike, in the uses of power, whatever its

sources .

Power in Organizations

 

It has been observed that the various classifications of
power cited above can serve either the individual or the group, in
differentiated ways. By definition, if sufficient power exists to
effect an end, it may be achieved.

Over the passage of time, informal groups and formal
organizations have been formed from numbers of individuals. The
primitive hunters pooled their capabilities in order to successfully
hunt the mammoth: a group was formed to achieve a definite pur-
pose. Political scientists have described the process by which
civil governments and states have arisen as a consequence of the
coalition of tribes, bands and territorially-based groups. 1 The
literature of political organization treats the rise of modern civil
states in detail, together with the varying benevolent or tyrannical

forms which such governments may take.

The Locus of Power

 

Power is essential to order in society. Bierstedt has

stated that ”Power supports the fundamental order of society and

 

1 Catlin, op. cit.

80

the social organization within it, wherever there is order. Power

stands behind every association and sustains its structure. Without

. . . . . 1
power, there 15 no orgamzatlon and Without power there 15 no order. "

Power other than that required to administer immediate brute force
can only be exercised through organization; it must be capable of
partial delegation and redelegation. Organization is the system by
which decisions can be made causative at distant points of applica-
tion. 2

The building of an organization requires the bringing
together and the consolidation of the aggregate powers of individuals
and then, the redistribution of these powers within the organization.
Each individual contributes something to the organization, in the
form of some of his individual freedom to do as he wishes. This
contribution is made out of the expectation of receiving some desired
value in return for his cooperation. 3 Thus, it may be concluded,
”The locus of power is in groups; it expresses itself in intergroup

4
relations. ”

 

1Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 734.
2 .

Berle, op. c1t., p. 81.

3

Ibid., p. 81.

4Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 732.

 

 

81

Danzger has observed that "power may be cumulative and
numerous individuals each with a little power, may have great power
when united. "1 One is compelled to note that this concept has always
been the basis of social organization. The critical question is m;
all attempts toward the accumulation of effective power must be
predicated on unity of purposes and goals.

McKeon has found that the E of power in organizations
is toward the satisfaction of the aspiration of the group and in the

2
influencing of the actions of others.

Organizations Defined

 

Organizations are social units established deliberately for
the achievement of particular goals. Organizations utilize systems
for the division of labor, resources of power and communications,
which are not random or traditional. They have centers of power
and practice the interchangeability of personnel in various positions
of authority. 3 Stinchcombe has described organizations as ”decision

making systems to which a defined group of powers have been

 

1Danzger, op. cit., p. 711.

2Richard McKeon, "Power and the Language of Power, "
Ethics, LVIII, No. 2 (January, 1958), 98-115.

3Etzioni, Modern Organizations, op. cit., p. 3.

 

 

 

82

entrusted so they can achieve certain purposes. "1 Dimock concluded

2
that organization itself implies power.

Goals in Organizations

 

Etzioni defined goals as a state of affairs which the organi-
zation is attempting to realize. 3 It is necessary that there be some
measure of agreement and consensus as to the organizational purposes
or goals, in order for authority to be effective, 4 (and indeed, for the
organization to have been founded at the outset). Thus, goals are
"an image of a future state, which may or may not be brought about. "5
Coser, in discussing goals, noted that whatever they may be within
an organization, power is necessary for their accomplishment. 6

Goals are the critical condition for the establishment of
organizations. Social power has no meaning apart from purposes

and goals: "It is imperative that there be some objective, for without

 

1Stinchcombe, op. cit., p. 154. ,

2Marshall Dimock, A Philosophy of Administration Toward
Creative Growth (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 167.

 

3
Etzioni, An Analysis of Complex Organizations, op. cit. ,

 

4Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 134.

5Etzioni, An Analysis of Complex Organizations, op. cit. ,

6Coser, op. cit., p. 134.

 

83

it there can be neither power nor social action. "1 One cannot
consider power apart from the purposes of power; thus, one may
join with Dahl, in asking: Power over what? Power to accomplish
what ?2

Rose stated that formal organizations are required for the
exercise of power, with the largest concentrations of social power
tending to center in political organizations. 3 Bierstedt concluded
that powers tend not to become institutionalized in informal groups. 4
He credited power as being the impetus for the formation of organi-
zations as well as the source of the stability which is maintained
within them throughout their history. Authority within the organi—
zation cannot exist without the immediate support of the organization' s

power and the ultimate prospect of the sanction of force.

Power and the Democratic State

 

Lasswell and Kaplan have defined the state as distinguish-
able from other political systems or governments by its ability to

retain exclusive right to decide conditions under which physical

 

1Abramson et al., op. cit. , p. 15.

2Dahl, "Equality and Power in American Society, " op. cit. ,

p. 76.
3 .
Rose, op. Cit., p. 244.

4Bierstedt, op. cit., pp. 734—736.

 

84

coercion is to be employed. 1 Althusius, in the fifteenth century,
traced the rise of states from social units beginning with the family,
as noted centuries earlier by Aristotle, wherein such units unite and
build up, in pyramid fashion, to form a state. 2 Both Locke and
Althusius were advocates of a central political idea: the sovereignty
of the people, acting through popularly elected representatives. 3
John Locke stated a fundamental concept of democratic systems of

government in 1690: ".

. thus, that which begins and actually
constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent of any
number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate
into such a society, and this is that, and that only, which did or
could give beginning to any lawful government in the world. "4
Russell noted that John Stuart Mill' 8 view of the proper role of
power in a democracy was that ". . . men were to be free in so
far as their actions did not injure others, but when others were

involved they might, if expedient, be restrained by action of the

5
state."

 

1Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 75—76.
2Catlin, op. cit., p. 159.
3Friedrich, op. cit., pp. 12—13.

4tJohn Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, ed. by
J. W. Gough (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 49-50.

 

5Russell, op. cit., p. 228.

85

Scholz stated that democracy is based on the idea of equal
political rights for all citizens and upon intelligent compromise. 1
The public consensus (majority) is the final authority in a democratic
system; the will of the public is expressed through the state or
through free acquiescence. 2 Bierstedt has observed, "The power
which resides in numbers is clearly seen in elections of all kinds,
where the majority is conceded the right to institutionalize its power
as authority-—a right which is conceded, because it can be taken. "
He concluded that the power of the majority ". . . always threatens
—-or sustains——the stability of the association. "3

The decisions reached in a democracy which give rise to
its power are decisions which are reached in a formal process.
They are not merely the result of the informal interaction of people
in the society; democracy is not simply societal, it is governmental.
It is important to note that the democratic process is one of
". . . decision by partial consent, whereas cooperative action

requires substantially complete conformance. . . . the democratic

 

1Scholz, op. cit., p. 137.
2Berle, op. cit., p. 99.

3Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 737.

4Chester 1. Barnard, Organization and Management (Cam—

bridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 26—13.

 

86

process means decision by division—-by majorities, and usually by
small pluralities. . . . "1 Consensus is achieved as a consequence
of individual decision; each participant must judge for himself what '
is offered to him--the "only true democracy of minds. "2 The
majority must rule, or the system fails and will be replaced by a
new attempt or by a system in which a minority holds power. The
people are the basis of power; while the form permits a plurality of
opinion, the majority must prevail or the system fails, by definition. 3
The commonly—held purposes and goals of the people com—
prise the consensus which gives rise to the democratic governmental
system and which gives it power to continue to exist. 4 It seems
clear that many of the values widely held in a democracy are main—
tained simply by the consensus on norms and are not made the subject
of formal regulations or laws. The persistence of such a system is
evidence of the willingness of the people to voluntarily accept certain

5
values without legal sanction.

 

11bid.

2Jacques Barzun, The Teacher in America (New York:
Little, Brown and Company, 1946), p. 276.

3For a detailed study of the role of power in political
philosophy, see Neumann, op. cit. , pp. 161—180.

4Abramson, op. cit., p. 18.

5Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (Glen—
coe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1947); see Ch. VII, Book I.

87

Law in a Democracy

 

The formal action of a democratic government in the
establishment of laws represents the expression of majority opinion.
The provision of a body of law represents an attempt to avert chaos
and minority rule. 1 While in other forms of government, the source
of power found in a monarch or in an authoritarian minority may
successfully establish laws, such laws may not represent the will
of the majority. 2 Statutory laws in a democratic system may thus
be said to represent the opinion of the majority as to how best their
goals and purposes may be reached; their system of courts and legal
experts serves to interpret their laws and serve as a decision-making
apparatus working in behalf of the majority—established laws. 3
Thus, the function of legal power in a democracy and in democratic
organizations is for the creation of the political and social machinery
which the majority believes is most likely to achieve its goals.
Where, for example, an educational system is among the social
goals of a democracy, laws are provided and norms and traditions

accepted which will support the existence of such a system.

 

1Errol E. Harris, "Political Power, " Ethics, LXVIII,
No. 1 (October, 1957), 1—10.

2William Zelermyer, The Process of Legal Reasoning
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 3.

 

3Ibid., pp. 19—20.

88

In summary, it may be said that law in a democracy
represents the formal expression of the legitimization of those
selected norms, customs, traditions and values which the majority
accept and support as most important, out of a much larger collec—
tion of norms which are supported simply by the pressures of
common informal acceptance. While this entire body of norms may
be said to be legitimatized, only those elements of the total body of
norms which are the most seriously regarded are likely to be
formally expressed in the form of written laws. 1

Thus, power in a democracy is expressed in law which is
formally expressed, as well as in norms which are informally
accepted, in an effort to achieve commonly held goals of the
majority of its members. While law may be regarded as a dynamic
process, rather than a set of fixed or rigid rules, the interpreta-
tions of law at any point in time are the consequence of the precedents
established by past interpretation, together with current interpreta—
tion of social norms. Laws thus express a portion of the goals of

2
the group contained within the democratic system.

 

1S. Miller, op. cit., p. 22.

ZZelermyer, op. cit., pp. 19—20.

89

PART II

THE NATURE AND QUALITIES OF POWER
IN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

 

Introduction

Like many other institutions in society, higher educational
institutions are the creation of political systems, or of private and
political groups, through the agency of a legal system. The elements
of the legal structure authorizing the establishment of educational
institutions may be regarded as an expression of the interest of the
people of the state in the establishment of educational institutions as

social goals.

The Nature and Sources of Power

 

A significant feature of the nature of power in higher edu—
cation is that it is limited and specific. Educational power is an
extension or delegation or grant of power from the state (the people
of the state), in an express and specific direction: the creation of
an educational institution, to educate its youth and to accomplish
such other specific purposes as the state may encourage or permit.
Whether a public or private institution, whether established by state

charter, by statute or by the incorporation of public or private

90

groups, the institution bases its existence on the legal power of the
state. 1

Most American higher educational institutions are private,
charitable corporations. A college or university founded by private
enterprise and endowed or supported by private donations is a
eleemosynary institution, that is, a charitable corporation. If a
college receives its primary financial support from public funds,
it is usually considered public in character. In general, origin is
the chief determinant of legal status; if founded by private individ—
uals, privately endowed and supported, the courts will consider it
a private corporation, even though it may receive a substantial
amount of public funds. If the institution was organized and estab—
lished by the legislature and receives its primary support from
public funds, it is treated as a public corporation, or as an agency
of government. Thus, the source of power for the public institution
is found in the state; in the private institution, the power is in the
nature of a grant or authorization to perform certain specified func-
tions which are deemed to be in the public interest. 2 The resources,

public and private, that are used to achieve these specific functions

 

1Blackwell, op. cit., pp. 22—55.

21bid., pp. 22-24.

91

are channeled toward goals that are within the authorized limits of
power.

There is enormous variety in the types of institutional
government within American higher educational institutions. In
church-related institutions, systems of control will vary greatly
from one church body to another; they are by no means as rigid as
is suggested by some scholars. Some church bodies exercise a
high degree of control, while some exert virtually none at all, in—
sofar as academic policies, methods and content are concerned. 1
Most public institutions are responsible to an agency of government,
where great variety in method and degree of control exists. The
study of institutional charters and related laws of both public and
private institutions provides opportunity for a comparison of powers
typically granted institutions. 2

The charters of American colleges and universities, from

the earliest times, reflect the disposition of the state to specify the

 

1Manning M. Pattillo, Jr. , and Donald M. Mackenzie,
Church Sponsored Higher Education in the United States (Washing—
ton, D. C. : The American Council on Education, 1966). This is
the definitive current study of church—related higher education in
America; it examines relationships in and among 817 colleges and
universities; pp. 249-277.

2Edward C. Elliott and M. M. Chambers, Charters and
Basic Laws of Selected American Universities and Colleges (New
York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1934).

92

powers which the institution was to be granted, on behalf of the
state. 1

The laws or charters establishing the power to be delegated
or granted to an institution may describe broad or narrow limitations
on such power andthe purposes for which it is granted. However
described, the institution finds its existence in the state.

The principle of centralized administrative authority,
responsible to powers outside the institution, obtains in practically
all American institutions of higher education today. Since the
foundation of Harvard in 1642, the principle of placing all responsi-
bility for the administration of the institution in the hands of a body
of laymen, neither selected by or responsible to the faculty. of the
institution, has been the pattern. Practices such as were followed
from time to time during the medieval period in Europe, wherein
systems of self-government of universities by councils of faculty
members and students (such as those at the Universities of Salerno,
Bologna and Padua) have not existed for 500 years and have never
been adopted in the United States. The social systems of medieval
Europe would appear to offer little assistance in the solution of

higher education' s needs in the United States today.

 

1Hofstadter and Smith, op. cit., pp. 1-54.

2Blackwell, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

93

Probably few American scholars have pursued the history
of medieval university government with the thoroughness of Cowley.
He challenges the persistent ”myth" of universities ever having been
governed by a "free republic of scholars” during that era. Cowley
states that the University of Bologna was operated by the students-—
not the faculty--until it drifted into civil control. 1 In the medieval
universities of northern Europe, at Paris, Oxford and Cambridge,
students were never permitted a strong voice in government. 2 The
University of Paris was actually under the authority of the church
rather than a "band of scholars. "3 Wilson has stated that it has been
seldom, if ever, that faculties have governed themselves, free of
responsibility to authority outside themselves. 4

Wilson has reported that the concept of a lay board of
governors is not an American invention, as is widely supposed, but

was adopted from institutions in Ireland and Scotland, which, in

 

1W. H. Cowley, "Professors, Presidents and Trustees,"
AGB Reports, IX, No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: The Association of
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, 1967), pp. 4-24.
2Blackwell, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

3Cowley, op. cit., pp. 4—24. Also see W. H. Cowley,

”Some Myths About Professors, Presidents and Trustees, " Teachers

College Record, Columbia University, November, 1962, pp. 164-
165.

4Logan Wilson, Emerging Patterns in American Higher
Education (Washington, D. C. : The American Council on Education,
1965), p. 18.

 

 

94

turn, borrowed the idea from the University, of Leyden in Holland
and from Calvin' s academy in Geneva; the University of Basle has
followed the practice of the use of a lay board since the fifteenth
century.

The relationship of faculty to institutional government and
to self-government based on medieval traditions stems from the
fact of the rise of the civil state about 400 years ago. It then became
clear that all other kinds of government could exist only with the
approval of the civil government.

In short, the civil government made ”concessions" to other
governments to perform certain social functions. These "con-
cessions" were made in the form of patents or what we today
commonly call charters . . . instruments licensing the recipi—
ents to perform certain specified activities.

Thus, through charters and statutes, modern college and
university governing boards have plenary powers to manage institu-
tions to the limits of the authority established for them in the con-
stitution and statutes of the states, as interpreted by their courts.
Chambers has also referred to a kind of "common law of universi—

ties" based on old customs which may be invoked by courts when

not negated by statute. 3

 

1Ibid.

 

2
Corson, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

3M. M. Chambers, "Who Is the University?" Journal of

Higher Education, XXX, No. 6 (June, 1959), p. 322.

 

95

The Locus of Power in HigflierEducation

 

Institutions are founded through and function under charters
from public authority or under grants of authority from legislatures.
Henderson concluded that the central legal authority is vested in the
chartered body of trustees and ”it is this body that has the final
responsibility to the state and hence to the public. "1 Trustees in
public institutions. are most commonly elected by the people, or
appointed by the governor, sometimes with the consent of the senate.
In private institutions, they are usually elected by church bodies or
corporation members, selected by cooptation, or elected by alumni
groups. 2 In the exercise of its powers, the trustees of the non—
public institution must look to its charter provisions, to the laws
of its state, and to the general provisions of corporate law. The
legal corporate status of the church‘related college is the same as
the private corporation.

Among the duties and responsibilities of the governing
board of the college or university are: the establishment of funda-

mental institutional policies; the selection and appointment of

 

1Henderson, op. cit., pp. 226-228.

2Earl McGrath, "The Control of Higher Education in

America, " Educational Record, XVII (1936), 259.

 

3Blackwell, op. cit., pp. 24, 42.

96

presidents; the delegation to the president of powers commensurate
with his responsibilities; and the preservation of the capital assets
and financial integrity of the institution. These responsibilities are
fixed in the governing board and may not be delegated. 1
The president, in turn, delegates many of his duties and
responsibilities to his administrative offices, deans and
faculty committees. However, the governing board remains
the repository of power, since it may, at its pleasure, with—
hold or withdraw its delegation of power.

Chambers has noted that the university makes hundreds of
contracts beside those made with faculty members and administra—
tors; these include contracts with suppliers, land owners, public
and private agencies and many others. While the management of
the business and practical affairs of the university is necessary,
it is secondary in importance to the educational policies and goals
for which the institution received its charter at the outset. Whether
the institution is public or private, the trustees a: the university,
not only for business purposes but for educational purposes as well.
Thus, the newest freshman, the president, every faculty member

and every other employee is an agent of the trustees. 3 Chambers

has observed:

 

1Blackwell, op. cit., pp. 40—49.

21bid.

3Chambers, op. cit., p. 321.

97

The university does not exist for its faculty, nor even for its

students, alone. It is a servant of society, and each of its

individual agents, of whatever class or level, is in a sense,

a servant of the public. Therefore, the university is

appropriately governed, in the eyes of the law, by a body of

men and women chosen as representatives of the general

public. This body--the governing board, constituting a single

artificial person--legally E the university. Complete under—

standing of this simple concept could go far toward clarifying

roles of subordinate organizations, all of which have their

useful spheres in the intricate complex of university adminis-

tration. 1

Virtually all authorities agree that the locus of such powers

as are delegated to higher educational institutions is in the governing
board, who are the trustees of the constituency which established
the institution, and the embodiment of the delegation of legal author-

ity from the state.

The Purposes of Power in Higher Education

The educational system of the nation is one of the major
agencies of government and is essential to the development of the
modern industrial society. 2 Thus, the purposes of power in the
college and university are to achieve, so far as possible, the social
functions of education, research and public service, however defined

by law and charter. The institution was conceived by its founders

 

11pm., p. 324.

2R. F. Campbell and R. T. Gregg, Administrative Behavior
in Education (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 41.

98

as a means of providing certain services to its constituency. Its
power was marshalled for that purpose. Institutions have been
called concentrations of power in the service of some value. 1 The
sought values in question in the instance of each institution may be
found defined in its charter and the laws establishing and maintaining
it. In addition, a substantial body of interpretations of such laws
and charters and other regulations which guide institutions are pro—
vided by actions of governing boards and by the courts. Perkins

has noted that institutional power can also come from service; that
is, it may acquire more resources and wider delegations of authority
as a consequence of effective service. 2 Conversely, when an institu-
tion fails to respond to the needs of society, it loses vitality and
becomes irrelevant, according to Mayhew. 3 Cowley has concluded,
relative to the purposes of power in higher education, that institu-
tions of higher education ". . . have not been founded for the sole

or even the primary benefit of professors, students, trustees or all
of them taken together but, instead, for the benefit of society at

large. Hence in all countries, civil government, the most inclusive

 

1Stinchcombe, op. cit., p. 9.

2J. A. Perkins, The University in Transition (Princeton:
The Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 113.

 

3Lewis B. Mayhew, Higher Education in the Revolutionary
Decades (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Co., 1967),

p. 3.

 

99

agency in society, retains the right to set them in motion and further,
to require that their governing boards represent the public interest. ”1

In summary, the following hypotheses concerning the pur—

poses of power in higher education can be offered:

1. The purposes of power in higher education are the purposes
of the social body or bodies that create the institution and
that continue to maintain it, whether public or private or

both.

2. Since the power in higher educational institutions is a part
or fraction of the power of its parent body, it cannot be
larger or stronger or more broadly described than that of

the parent body.

3. In a social sense, a quality of power is direction: toward
the Specific goals of the society that created it, to achieve

an educational goal.

4. Power in higher education is meaningless, apart from
purpose; its existence can be questioned. It is impossible
to escape the question of whose power it is with which the

institution was created and is operated. If the institution

 

1Cowley, "Some Myths About Professors, Presidents and
Trustees, " op. cit., pp. 164—165.

100

itself is a delegation of authority, a part of a greater power,
the general purpose of power is clearly the purpose of the

creator of the institution.

Authority in Higher Education

 

In colleges and universities, the process of the delegation
of authority begins with the power—source organization: the state
or a private organization acting under authority from the state.

The state provides certain statutes, laws or charters creating an
institution, on its own initiative or at the instance of a private group.
The authority created by these public actions is delegated to a spe—
cific small group, the governing board, to serve as the legal entity
to receive the authority. 1

From the governing board, progressively lesser and more
specific amounts of authority are delegated, first to the president2
and through him, to various administrators, teachers, students and
all other individuals associated with the institution. Thus, through
delegation, a hierarchy of authority is created, which i_s the insti—

tutional structure.

 

1Ayers and Russel, op. cit., p. 15.

2Mayhew, The Smaller Liberal Arts College, op. cit. ,

 

101

So far as he relates to the institution, the president has no
power-—only authority. (He may well possess power in his own
right, for other purposes.) The president' s authority is only that
which he has been specifically granted, and in addition, that author—
ity which he may have appropriated from the governing board and
which they have not forbidden, or resisted. The president is
”. . . superior to all others and alone responsible to the board.

He recommends all other employees for appointment and proposes
all changes in the policies and programs of the university. "1

Similarly, the authority of every other officer or member
of the institution: his authority is a delegated authority; the extent
of his authority is the extent of his delegation. 2 Its limits can be
extended only by action of the source from whom it was delegated,
or by the failure of the source to resist his appropriation of more
extensive authority, 3 or by his illegal appropriation. Where the
delegate accepts a specific, defined delegation, he cannot legally

exceed it. In the higher educational institution, the delegation of

 

1Chambers, op. cit., p. 322.

2College and University Business Administration, op. cit. ,
pp. 18-27.

3Orley R. Herron, Jr. , The Role of the Trustee (Scranton,
Pa.: International Textbook Co., 1969), p. 24,

 

102

authority should increase in direct proportion to the increase in
size, according to conclusions reached by Sullivan. 1

Corson states that ”it is idle to assume that all authority
flows from the board. " He reaches this conclusion because
”. . . analyses of their decision making indicate clearly that they
do not presume to extend their authority over fl questions that
arise in the operation of a college or university. "2 Such an inter-
pretation suggests a serious misconception of the nature of authority
and its delegation. While the governing board may not provide
specific instruction for the trimming of lawns, and similar details,
it is difficult to conceive of the functioning of a modern, complex
organization such as the university without "all" authority flowing
through the structure from its source, by delegation. To suggest
that the governing board somehow has less authority as a consequence
of its failure to prescribe every action of every member of the com—
munity reveals a failure of comprehension of the nature of the pro—
cess of delegation.

Even less useful is the conclusion of Jencks and Riesman

that the role of the trustee has diminished in American higher

 

1Richard H. Sullivan, ”Administrative—Faculty Relation—
ships in College and Universities, " Journal of Higher Education,
XXVII (1956), 308—326, 349.

 

2Corson, op. cit., pp. 57—58.

103

education with the delegation by trustees to administrators of
increasing amounts of authority; they conclude that trustees are

. 1 . .
"ceremonial role"! This IS a

being relegated increasingly to a
curious assignment of position for 313 body that legally constitutes
the institution!

As noted in Chapter I, there is considerable unrest,
uncertainty and confusion on the modern campus as to where the
ultimate authority for decision lies. Interest groups of many kinds,
mainly composed of faculty members and students, seek to play a
greater role in the determination of policy throughout the entire
institution, in every phase of its operation. The effectiveness of
the president and his delegates at every level of authority may
derive from the acceptance of the legitimacy of his position by sub-
ordinates, as well as from authority delegated from the governing
board. Where the higher authority or power fails to support its
delegates, serious disruption of the organization may occur. 2

Barnard has been a powerful exponent of the definition of
authority as existing only when it is accepted by those over whom

it is supposed to control; under such terms, the failure of acceptance

 

1Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic
Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 8: Co. , 1968), p. 17.

2”Statement by Violence Commission on Campus Protests, ” --,,,,_
Chronicle of Higher Education, III, No. 19 (June 16, 1968).

 

104

of authority means that no authority exists. 1 Under such circum—
stances, the organization fails by definition, and must be reformed
or abandoned.

Hungate has found that in higher education, governance by
consensus is essential, but that the governing board must have
authority to override proposals by other elements in the community;
any other arrangement implies the transfer of authority rather than

2
its delegation.

Democracy and the Campus

 

Throughout higher education in the United States, democ—
racy is widely accepted as the most desirable form of government,
consistent with widely held values in education and concerning the
nature of man and the physical world. Democracy is held to be the
governmental form most likely to provide the widest dimensions of 1
personal freedom and of opportunity for personal development and

free inquiry.

 

1Barnard, The Functions of an Executive, op. cit. , p. 164.

 

2Thad L. Hungate, Management in Higher Education (New
York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia Uni-
versity, 1964), pp. 238-252.

3Carl H. Gross and Charles C. Chandler, The History of
American Education through Readigs (Boston: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1964), Part IV, pp. 335—479. '

 

105

Perhaps as a consequence of a general confusion in the
minds of many members of the campus community as to the locus
of ultimate authority on the campus, often combined with a pervasive
innocence as to the rudiments of organizational and administrative
theory and practice, and because of a dedication to the concept of
democracy, many members of the campus community mistakenly
seek to interpret the institution as a self-contained, imperfect
democracy, wherein powers or authority which are rightly theirs
have been usurped. The usurpers are often seen as administrators,
trustees, legislators, corporate officials and others whose rela—
tionship to the institution is only dimly understood.

The university is not a democracy, by any accepted defini—
tion of the concept. 1 The majority (the students) does not rule; it
does not elect the institutional leadership by general ballot of the 5
community; members of the community are by no means equal in
status or in community rights; the majority is not responsible for
the establishment of policy, nor may it rescind such policy; the
university does not even supply its own resources to meet physical

needs, but is primarily supported by outside financial resources.

 

1See "Power and the Democratic State,‘ above.

2Ibid.

 

106

The university is a service agency, with narrowly prescribed
social authority, established, owned and operated by people who are
outside its walls. The owners of the public institutions are the tax—
payers; the owners of the private institutions are the designees. 1
The majority in the community (the students) are not permanent
members of the community but are transients; many of them are
minors. They are in the community as a consequence of a contract
between them and the institution, under which they are to receive
specified services in exchange for fees and prescribed types of
behavior. Upon completion of their program of study, they leave
the institution, free of any legal responsibility for it, or to it.

The balance of the community, the "permanent" residents in the
university, are all employees of the institution, hired for the pur—
pose of helping it to achieve its objectives.

Within the limits of its authority and toward the achievement
of its objectives, the university may well function democratically,
as to its operational procedures. Probably, it could do so to its
profit. The requirements for organizational consensus, harmony,
adherence to group values and for the legitimacy of authority probably
result in the employment of democratic processes in the day—to-day

operational processes of most colleges and universities. However,

 

1Herron, op. cit., p. 22.

107

the concept of the institution as an independent, self— contained,
democratic social system, answerable to no one but itself and free
to choose its own destiny or to pursue any purpose it chooses, and ‘
with its power to be regarded as an object of contention by admin—
istrators, students and faculty members appears ill-founded.
Analysis of the sources for university authority will not support
such a view. Such a concept of the campus community suggests a
lack of perception of the social system under which such institutions
are founded, under which they receive their authority and by which
such authority may be withdrawn.

In summary, it may be said that power does not exist on
the campus; only authority exists there. Such authority as does
exist is specific and limited and delegated; it may be modified or

withdrawn at the pleasure of the power source.

Influence in Higher Education

 

Influence has been defined as a kind of persuasive power
which does not carry the threat of sanctions. 1 Probably few social
organizations are subject to greater varieties and kinds of interplay
of this form of power than are institutions of higher education.

Among the principal related groups (alumni, parents, professional

 

1Corson, op. cit., pp. 36—38.

108

constituencies, prospective donors, commercial groups, public and
church bodies), influence is regularly used to guide and direct the
institution. Indeed, the allegiance and support of these groups is
necessary for the continued existence of the institutions. 1 Within
the institution, the effects of influence as exerted by various interest
groups of faculty, students and other members of the community are
profound, and may well be the most pervasive form of organized
effort by which the institution is affected by these groups. Etzioni
has noted that organizations such as educational groups and churches
tend to emphasize normative power, based on esteem, prestige,
acceptance, fame, honor and similar values. 2 In summary, the
effects of influence in higher education are probably substantial and

may exceed those of the formal structure of authority. 3

Responsibility in Higher Education

 

While there is a substantial difference in the forms of
charters granted to institutions, they generally give governing boards
complete legal responsibility for the welfare of the institution. Gov—

erning boards are necessarily, therefore, invested with extensive

 

1Etzioni, Complex Organizations, op. cit., p. 6.
21bid.

3Ibid.

 

109

powers in determining the character of the educational offerings and
the management of the institution. 1

Henderson states that "trustees do have a legal, overall
responsibility that goes much beyond that of the faculties. If the
welfare of the college demands it, they should take drastic action. "
Trustees can define budgets, eliminate departments, raise salaries
and a great many other things beyond the authority of faculties. 2
Ruml contended that trustees are responsible for the institution' s
educational programs as well as its management. Trustees are
accountable to the state and national community, parents, students,
faculty members, donors of property and other identifiable groups.
Ruml concluded that too much authority has been delegated to
faculty members and that some measure of it should be withdrawn,
since trustees have the authority to do so and because they are
legally responsible and accountable. 3

It seems generally agreed by students of the subject that
the responsibility for decision making is more widely distributed
in colleges and universities than in most commercial or governmental

organizations. Indeed, on many campuses in recent times, authority

 

1McGrath, op. cit., p. 259.
2Henderson, op. cit. , pp. 230—231.

3Ruml, op. cit., p. 13.

110

has become so diffuse and its locus so uncertain that the institution
appears to be under a system of several governments, composed of
faculty members, administrators, students or other interest groups.
Faculty systems which include senates, councils, elaborate systems
of committees, often give the appearance of a second or dual system
of government on the campus. 1
Some scholars speak of the delegation of responsibility
with attendant authority, rather than the converse. That such dele—
gations do in fact occur is essential; authority and responsibility
must be delegated in equal amounts, so far as that is possible, from
the president to the last member of the community.
Sullivan calls attention to a crucial difference in the nature

of responsibility in the college or university:

There is a basic difference between the responsibility of the

faculty man and the president. The faculty man has responsi—

bility only for his own duties: teaching and research. The

Dean or the President has the whole place. The teacher can,

and perhaps inevitably will, be a partisan for his own field and

its values. He can be irresponsive to the demands and criti-

cisms of others, and he can be himself an irresponsible (if not

immoral) member of the university or college society.

Sullivan has noted the prevalent failure of faculty members to under-

. . . 3
stand and recognize the nature of adminlstrative problems.

 

lCorson, op. cit., p. 11.
2 .
Ayers, op. c1t., p. 15.

3Sullivan, op. cit., p. 314.

111

Grant described the necessity for those in positions of top
authority to be persons who have the interests of the entire institu-
tion to guide them, rather than the more narrow concerns of the
individual discipline, department or even of self—interest. 1

Wilson has also noted the variations in degree and nature
of responsibility on the campus:

Although nobody seems to bother very much about whether
administrators themselves are restive concerning their working
conditions and faculties, they, too, have their chronic com—
plaints. Their accountability is spread more widely than that

of the faculty, however, and hence, causes of their tension are
more diffuse and perhaps less likely to be rationalized in terms
of faculty provocations. Like the ancient deity Janus, they

must always look in different directions for hazards in the offing,
but unlike him, they are endowed with neither immortality or
omnipotence.

It is highly important to note that the delegations of
authority which are contained in the laws and charters creating
colleges and universities frequently do not spell out in any detail

the specific ways and means by which the delegates are to accomplish

educational goals of the founders. Education at the university level

 

1Arnold M. Grant, "Men Whose Concern Is the Institution, "
in Whose Goals for American Higher Education? by Charles G.
Dobbins and Calvin B. T. Lee (Washington, D. C.: The American
Council on Education, 1968), p. 123.

 

2Logan Wilson, "Nature and Sources of Faculty—Adminis-
trative Tensions," in Faculty—Administration Relationships, ed. by
Frank C. Abbott (Washington, D. C. : The American Council on
Education, 1958), p. 4.

 

 

 

112

is a highly complex endeavor. Faculty members and administrators
alike are specialists and professionals; they are hired precisely
because they do "profess” the specialized knowledge which is
generally lacking in the founding group: the methods and content of
education, research and public service. Thus, the enterprise is
guided partly by subjective judgment, common law, custom and
precedent, as well as clearly defined legal commissions of authority. 1

Since the higher educational institution exists as a mani—
festation of a specific delegation of authority from a more powerful
organization, its role with respect to responsibility emerges more
clearly. The authority for the existence of the institution having
been created for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the power
source, the responsibility of those in authority must be governed
by the terms of their delegation. To any extent that these terms
are undefined, broadly defined, unclear or ambiguous, it is less
possible to establish the certainty or precision of the standards by
which the delegates are to be held responsible.

Further: the role of individuals in various levels and
degrees of authority—responsibility within the institution becomes
more evident: from a legal standpoint, they are the responsible

agents and specific delegates of the power source and in no sense

 

1Sullivan, op. cit., p. 315.

113

independent of it. 1 All employees of the institution are under contract
and hold responsibility to discharge the areas of authority which have
been delegated to them, in pursuit of the accomplishment of the goals
of the power source. The only purpose for the existence of the posi—
tion of authority which each such delegate holds is to assist the
founding organization and the larger society, through the agency of
the institution, to accomplish the goals of the power source.

To the extent that delegates of authority attempt to substitute
their own purposes or goals for those of the power source, or, as
they divert, subvert or oppose the purposes of the power source,
the action is a breach of contract and an action in opposition to their
legal and moral position. Thus, the personal goals of the delegate
can be achieved only insofar as they may coincide, approximate or

parallel those of the power source.

The Quest for Authority

 

Competitive internal special interest groups form naturally
in all large organizations, as a result of the total organization being,
in a sense, a polity of a number of sub—groups, according to findings
of Selznick. The direction of the total organization with respect to

its goals may be seriously affected by changes in the internal balance

 

1Herron, op. cit., p. 17.

J

114

of power. It is an obligation of the leadership of the organization
to maintain a balance of power internally, in order to permit the

fulfillment of the organization's key commitments. 1

The Faculty

As noted above, Corson suggests the existence of an
organizational ”dualism" in institutional government in higher edu-
cation, wherein traditional structures for the formation of faculty
decisions (such as senates, councils) parallel the administrative
structure. He suggests that "much of the authority of governing
boards" has been delegated to——or been claimed by——these parallel
faculty organizations:

Faculties, by and large, have sought a larger role in decision
making related to educational and faculty policy. Together

. the incapacity of governing boards and the ambitions of

faculties have accounted for the large and increasing control
that the faculties have gained over educational policy.

Corson has catalogued some of the extensive claims to
authority being made by faculty groups, beyond the realm of tra—

. . . . . . 3
ditional academic concerns, in un1vers1ty management. Internal

interest groups may take many forms, from small, informal groups

 

1Selznick, op. cit., pp. 63—64.
2Corson, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

31bid., pp. 97—98.

 

 

115

to large, formal divisions, such as the school or college of the
university. Some such groups cut across formal organizational
structural lines. Such internal groups may subvert the enterprise
or give it life and strength. They represent sources of energy with-
in the total organization. 1

Wilson has noted, ”Many academicians strongly feel that
everybody on the faculty is entitled to have a hand in all important
policy matters, so that there is a sentiment favoring committee
management, innumerable committee meetings, and other time
consuming procedures, on the grounds that they are democratic. "2
The terms ”democracy" and "authoritarianism" are widely used and
misunderstood on the campus, according to Sullivan: "' Democracy'
is chiefly being used as shorthand for the participation of the faculty
in the formulation and execution of institution policy and for the
passage of almost any kind of power and authority from the admin-
istration to the faculty. "3

Hofstadter, a leading historian of higher education in
America, states that the interest of faculty members to extend their

influence and power over their own affairs had much to do with the

 

1Selznick, op. cit., p. 93.
2Wilson, op. cit., p. 10.

3Sullivan, op. cit., p. 319.

116

numerous controversies over "academic freedom, ” during the past
century. 1 Just where the limits of their affairs are to be set
remains undefined, in most institutional faculties, except that it is
a limit beyond whatever area of authority is now described. Harter
states that intellectuals do not often hold the highest positions of
power, but tend to be advisors or expressors of ideas. 2 Corson
has concluded that "Neither the assurance of academic freedom nor
the faculty' 5 superior understanding of what should be taught, and
how, makes it essential that the faculty should have the exclusive
right to determine what education should be offered. "3
Concerning the professional status of the faculty member,

Sullivan refers to a statement of Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. ,
which has been widely circulated:

A university is the historic consequence of the medieval

' studium generale ' —— a self—generated guild of students or of

masters accepting as grounds for entrance or dismissal only

criteria relevant to the performance of scholarly duties. The

men who become full members of the faculty are not in sub—

stance our employees. They are not our agents. They are

not our representatives. They are a fellowship of independent
scholars answerable to us only for academic integrity.

 

1Hofstadter, op. cit., p. 750.

2Carl L. Harter, ”The Power Roles of Intellectuals: An
Introductory Statement, " Sociology and Social Research, XLVIII,
No. 2 (1964), pp. 176—186.

 

3Corson, op. cit., pp. 105—106.

4Sullivan, op. cit., p. 308.

117

Henderson has acknowledged that faculty members are
employees of the institution and have a contractual relationship with
it. However, he distinguishes between their labors and those of the
"staff workers, ” who he equates with the ”labor" force of other
organizations. By contrast, faculty members are ”professional
personnel” and not employees in the usual sense of a labor force.
He credited administrators with little or no competence in deter-
mining academic policy or program and stated that ”the faculty i_s
the institution. " Administrators are needed for participation in the

"space, funds and

operation of the institution, however, because
equipment" are needed. Presumably, all other organizational needs
could be handled by the faculty. 1

Cowley stated that college professors as individuals
(except some in the lower ranks) decide as individuals what courses
they teach, the methods of instruction and examination, the time of
the few office hours a week they schedule and the part of the day
that their classes will meet. He holds that "such facts patently
belie the criticism" that colleges and universities are full of admin-

istrative constraints and instead "sustain the generalization that

professors have more individual freedom in deciding upon their

 

1Henderson, op. cit., pp. 223-226.

118

procedures and in allocating their time and energies than perhaps
any other variety of professional people. "1

In any literal or factual sense, faculty members, together
with all other workers in the higher educational institution, must be
regarded as employees; they are under contract, to do specified
kinds of work for a particular period of time and at a fixed salary.
The other party to the contract is the governing board. The cor—
poration, represented by the trustees, legally is the university,
whatever may be said of the competence and professional ability of
the faculty in the design and conduct of the academic program, which
they are hired to provide. 2 The professional competence of the
employee or faculty member is not at issue; the governing board or
its delegates are under no obligation to accept the judgment or rec—
ommendations of the faculty member, however academically sound
or however ill—founded they may be. The responsibility for effective—
ness of the institution remains with the governing board. If the
faculty member prefers not to think of himself as an employee, the
fact is that he is gainfully employed by the institution. Whether he

would fare better under policies developed for an institution managed

 

1Cowley, ”Some Myths About Professors, Presidents and
Trustees," op. cit., p. 168.

2Chambers, op. cit., p. 320. ( --,, .-

119

by one or more faculty committees seems uncertain at best. 1 The
practical problems of existence and operation for the institution
would not have changed. Individuals would still be needed to accept
responsibility to perform all of the varied operational functions of
the institution, through a system of authority and accountability.
While, the president delegates much of his authority to

administrators, faculty members and to student groups, such dele-
gations of authority are revocable; devolution of a function does not
remove it from the jurisdiction of the president and the governing
board. Similarly, appeals resulting from actions of various kinds
of community governments, composed of faculty members, admin-

istrators and students, may not be allowed. An orderly process of

such appeals must be maintained or the organization will disintegrate

when "everyone decides everything. ”2 Henderson was reluctant to
identify the authority that the faculty does possess as having come
to them as a delegation of authority from the president and the
governing board, though in the nature of the organization, it could
not become theirs in any other way, despite the invocation of tradi-

tion and natural rights. 3

 

1Sullivan, op. cit., p. 321.

2Chambers, op. cit., p. 322.

3Henderson, op. cit., pp. 226—228.

120

The restiveness with which faculty members have viewed
their authority role, as subordinate to the governing board, is
described in various statements of the American Association of
University Professors, beginning with the 1915 "Declaration of
Principles” which has been described as the "turning point" in the
concept of faculty status, by those who support a more powerful, or
a central, role of authority for them. This statement noted that
while faculty members are appointees of trustees,

They are not, in any proper sense the trustee' 8 employees,
just as federal judges are appointed by the President without
becoming, as a consequence, his employees. For, once
appointed, the scholar has professional functions to perform
in which the appointing authorities have neither competence
nor moral right to intervene.
However, it is difficult to regard the president--or the dean--as an
intruder in the affairs of an academic department, or as one looking
in from the outside, when he is responsible for that department,
together with all the others that make up the entire university. Nor

can he be excluded under a rationale that supports teamwork, joint

2
effort and cooperation by all elements of the community.

 

David Fellman, "The Academic Community: Who Decides
What?" in Whose Goals for American Higher Education?, ed. by
Charles G. Dobbins and Calvin B. T. Lee (Washington, D. C.: The
American Council on Education, 1968), p. 108.

 

2
John W. Oswald, "The Inherent Authority of the Presi-
dent, " ibid., pp. 125-126.

 

121

Without question, the professor is in a stronger position
today than at any time in the nation' 8 history, insofar as the defini-
tion of his own role is concerned. Rapid growth in systems of tenure,
widespread acceptance of the concept of academic freedom, a strong
demand in the market place for his services as an advisor and
specialist (possibly as an alternative source of employment) all
serve to strengthen his independence. Among teachers today, the
concept of the teacher as an "employee" of a university is not a
popular one.

The report of the AAUP Committee on Academic Freedom
and Tenure in 1920 underscored their viewpoint that the role of the
faculty member as an employee of the governing board was insup—
portable. 2 Similarly, in 1960, an AAUP statement of principles
on "Faculty Participation in College and University Government"
declared that the basic functions of the college and university are
to "augment, preserve, criticize and transmit knowledge" and to
foster creative related activities. Such functions ". . . are best
performed by a community of scholars who must be free to exer-
cise independent judgment in the planning and execution of the

educational responsibilities. "3 Where such responsibilities begin

 

1Fellman, op. cit., p. 107.
2
Hofstadter and Metzger, op. cit., p. 409.

3Fellman, op. cit., p. 109.

122

or end is not made clear, or in what respect any activity of the
institution might not be construed as such a responsibility.

A joint statement of principle in 1966 issued by the AAUP,
The American Council on Education and the Association of Governing
Boards of Universities and Colleges stated that only through "joint
action" of all elements of the campus community can increased
capacity to solve educational problems be developed. Among the
educational problems referred to were: institutional long—range
planning, physical facilities, budgeting, and selection of chief
academic officers, including the president. The statement also
recognized the faculty as having "primary responsibility" with
respect to curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction,
research, faculty status and the elements of student life that relate
to the educational process, degrees offered and degree requirements,
appointments, tenure, and dismissals. The faculty is to be con-
sulted on the selection of department heads, deans and the president.
Further, there must be regularly scheduled meetings of the faculty,
and of senates, assemblies or similar bodies; committees of the
faculty are to be elected by the faculty, under terms of the state-
ment. 1 According to Fellman, the only reason presidents retain

any material influence is the faculty' s inability to successfully exert

 

11bid. , pp. 109-110.

123

its influence: "Presidents are strong because faculties fail . . . to
exercise the authority that is within their grasp if they wish to take
. ”1 . . . . . . .

1t. Examination of this Vieprint suggests authority is seen as

something that can be-—and may be—-taken, where no resistance to

such a procedure is offered by the legal authorities of the institution.

This position seems to suggest little interest in the "team" or "joint
action” effort.

The position of the AAUP with respect to the authority role
of the faculty member is not held by all members of the academic
community; many faculty members, together with administrators,
trustees and others, sharply disagree with the AAUP and believe
that the governing board must have final authority. Faculty mem-
bers together with every other interest group on the campus are
expected to take a leadership role in helping to shape institutional
policy, but in no sense as participants equal in, or superior to, the
authority of the governing board. Such opponents of the AAUP view—
point would hold that the governing board must have final authority. 2

The joint statement of the three agencies consigns the

governing board to the tasks of relating the institution to its

 

11bid., p. 112.

2J. Broward Culpepper, "All Have Major Roles to Play, "
in Whose Goals for American Higher Education?, ed. by Charles G.
Dobbins and Calvin B. T. Lee (Washington, D. C.: The American
Council on Education, 1968), p. 131.

 

 

124

constituency, securing the money to support the institution and to
serving as champion of the institution in times of ”grave crisis. "
While the statement observes that "there are no rights without
duties, " it does not state what the responsibilities of the faculty are
in such exact terms, or describe to whom they are accountable, if

anyone, in more than a prefunctory or ceremonial way.

The Students

 

While the students in higher education have been variously
regarded as restless rebels; indifferent, apathetic, practical con-
sumers; at least occasionally as inspiring junior colleagues; and,
even as customers in an aim-to-please knowledge cafeteria, they
are rarely regarded as among the delegates of authority of the
governing board of the institution. Indeed, the current turbulence
on campus may suggest the question of whether some students
recognize any authority superior to themselves, in most aspects of
academic life. At the least, probably many members of the campus
community regard the students as one of several sovereign interest
groups of which thegovernment of the university is comprised.

While students have displayed a sharply increased interest

in authority on campus in recent years, their role as holders of

 

11bid., pp. 114-121.

 

125

authority is limited, by the nature of the institution and the nature

of the social and legal authority which comprises the institution.

Not only faculty members and other employees, but students as well
have contracts with the university. The student is admitted under
certain conditions which are established by the institution and are
stated in the institution' 5 catalog. The university is obligated to
give the student opportunity to complete his course of study, when
he has paid prescribed fees, met other entrance requirements and
provided he does not breach the contract through failures of
scholarship or conduct. 1 Chambers has stated that the same
principles should apply in the provision of constitutions for student
governments and for campus governmental systems composed of
faculty members and administrators. ". . . student governments
are, in the last analysis, only recommendations to the legal
authority governing the university. In a legal sense, the students
are not the university, nor are they self—governing. "2 Students

can be fresh and energetic in providing insights and direction toward
the formation of institutional policy, according to Culpepper, but the

notion of placing students in a position of responsibility for basic

 

1Chambers, op. cit., p. 321.

2Ibid.

 

126

decisions affecting the future of the institution is "inconceivable"

for the reason of their inexperience.

Campus Governments

 

Chambers stated that,

The constitution (of the institution) often provides for a faculty
senate and other appropriate organs for the expression of faculty
opinion and the formulation of faculty policies and their trans-
mission to the president and the board. If approved, new policies
thus presented become accretions or amendments to the existing
regulations. But any such proposed policy may be ignored or
disapproved by the board, in which event it is of no legal effect.
This provision has occasionally given rise to some pain and
protest on the part of faculty members who take seriously the
proposition that the faculty i_s_ the university, or at least ought

to govern the university. Such is not the plan of university
control in this country, as almost everyone knows; and there
are ample reasons for believing that ultimate legal control by
the faculty as a so-called guild of scholars might not be in the
public interest.

It has been observed that administrators are often better
paid than faculty members, are more visible to the public and seem
often to be the recipients of public recognition and approbation on
behalf of the institution, while faculty members who may have
served to create the stature of the institution remain in relative
anonymity. Also, there are fewer administrators, seemingly a

disproportionately few, in terms of authority. These and other

 

1Culpepper,~ op. cit., p. 132.

2Chambers, op. cit., pp. 322-323.

 

127

reasons may cause some faculty members to resent administra-
tors.

Few scholars writing on the subject of faculty-administrative
relationships have noted the possibility that some administrators
may also be highly skilled professionals, quite capable of demon-
strating their professional stature, even in the domain of the teacher.
Many administrators have served as teachers. Most others have
skills which are also vital to the success of the institution, in
business and public affairs. Higher education is a highly competi-
tive enterprise; few institutions have all the money they want or
need, which administrators are expected to secure. There are needs
for the institutions to compete successfully in society for students,
faculty members, financial support, public understanding and many
similar needs. These needs require specialized skill, knowledge
and hard work which could not be accomplished by a faculty com-

mittee or guild of scholars on a part-time basis.

Summa ry

Thus, as Etzioni has observed, organizations tend to con—

tain interest groups that tend to oppose each other; the task of

 

1Sullivan, op. cit., p. 324.

2Ibid.

 

128

leadership is to keep such groups in balance in order to permit the
institution to carry out its purposes, which, in turn, are the purposes
of those who established it, and who have delegated authority to it.
Janowitz has found that "no bureaucracy ever conforms to the ideal
model of rational organization"; quite evidently, this is true of
higher educational institutions. 1 And, Brameld has said that both
knowledge and power are neutral and amoral; the task is to make

them moral.

Summary of Chapter III, Parts I and II

 

Part I of Chapter 111 contains an introductory statement on
the nature of power, an extended examination of definitions of power
and discussions of the origins, sources and locus of power. Dis-
tinctions are drawn in the definitions and concepts of power, authority
and influence. The relationships between authority and control and
authority and responsibility are defined. Concepts of responsibility
and accountability in relation to power are defined and discussed.

The problem of the legitimacy of various forms of power is examined.

The role of power in organizations, the nature of organiza-

tions and the relationships of organizations to goals and to power are

 

1Janowitz, op. cit., p. 35.

2
Brameld, op. cit., pp. 1-10.

129

considered. Analytic interpretations are included of the role of
power in democratic organizations and states and the role of power
and law in democratic organizations.

In Part II, the nature, sources and locus of power in
higher educational institutions are discussed. The role of power
and goals in institutions is considered. Authority, influence and
responsibility on the campus and the concept of the campus as a
democracy are examined. Finally, the interest of various intramural
campus groups in the securing of a larger measure of authority is
discussed, in the context of the foregoing concepts of power, author-
ity, influence and responsibility, to attempt to illuminate the function

and process of power in the higher educational institution.

 

CHAPTER IV

POWER CONSTRUCTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Introduction

Man' 5 hope for the development of a scientific study of
the social melieu rests on the assumption that social events are
recurrent and that they tend to follow a pattern of "laws" which
guide their occurrence. 1 The pioneer sociologist, Emile Durkheim,
stated this presumption in the last century: "All doctrines .
concern us, provided they admit the postulate which is the condition
of any sociology, namely, that laws exist which reflection, carried
out methodically, enables us to discover. "2 Inkeles has noted that
while a science is based on the assumption of recurring or multiple
events, and that a science cannot be developed on a single event,

there are many non—recurring events in all sciences that are

 

1Alex Inkeles, What is Sociology? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. :
Prentice—Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 93—96.

2Kurt H. Wolff, ed., Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917: A

Collection of Essays, with Translations and a Bibliography (Columbus,
Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1960), p. 345. ’

130

 

131

subjected to detailed study. Thus, each Ice Age, the Jurassic Period
or the birth of a star is a unique event, which is subjected to detailed
examinations through methods and with knowledge that has been
achieved chiefly through the study of recurring events. 1 Similarly,
in the social sciences, where many if not all events are unique and
are the consequence of the effects of a great number of variables,
the hope of progress lies in the application of methods developed and
knowledge gained which is based on recurring behavior which appears
to be based on "laws. "2

It can be observed that scholars in the social sciences are
less confident today than during the era of Durkheim, or during the
past generation, concerning the easy establishment of laws of social
behavior. Some, indeed, like Morris Cohen, have suggested the
possibility that there are no laws of social behavior. In any event,
there is a new appreciation for the enormous complexity of the
effects of an almost infinite number of variables, which make each
social event virtually unique. 3 The complexity of even the identifi-
cation of the variables is awesome, not to say the attachment to
them of an assessment of their proper significance in the event.

Thus the task becomes more complex as insights sharpen.

 

1Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 93-96.

2Ibid.

3Ibid.

 

 

132

Despite the problems and hazards, the quest continues.
Cohen has observed that, ”The fact that social material is less
repeatable than that of natural science, creates greater difficulty in
verifying social laws, but it does not abrogate the common ideal of
all science. "1 Catlin has suggested that the hazards of study of
social events can be lessened by concentrating on small, simple
situations. In the study of power, he suggests such simple acts,

". . . of which in an average day of an average life, there will be a
thousand examples, " to permit observation, comparison and experi-
mentation.

As was suggested in Chapter II, there has been a sub-
stantial amount of research in many areas relating to higher
education, but virtually none in efforts toward the establishment
of theories of educational power. One is compelled to agree with
Boulding that without research to provide a theoretical framework
and to guide inquiry, man simply accrues an increasing, dis—

ordered store of isolated and bewildering detail. Without research

 

1Morris Cohen, Reason and Nature: An Essay on the
Meaning of the Scientific Method (New York: Macmillan Company,
1931), p. 345. " ‘-

 

2
Catlin, op. cit., p. 762.

133

directed at the production of theory, order will ever evade

1
us.

Similarly, Hayman has concluded that research cannot
exist on any advanced level without theory. 2 Kneller has observed
that,

What is popularly considered science--basically, prediction
and experimental testing-—begins only after the hypothesis has
been formulated, and this requires something more than gen—
eralization and verification. It calls for imaginative daring,
the ability to senseorder and pattern in things where they have
not been sensed before.

However, in the scientific community, a theory is not a
theory unless it fits the ground rules for experimentation: it must
be subject to disproof or verification. 4 So far as the study of social
behavior would be a science, it must meet this test. Simon has

stated the situation plainly: "A statement about the observable world

1Kenneth E. Boulding, "General Systems Theory--The
Skeleton of Science, " in Educational Data Processirig, ed. by
Richard A. Kaimann and Robert W. Marker (Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin Co., 1967), pp. 6-15.

 

2
John L. Hayman, Jr. , Research in Education (Columbus,
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968), p. 13.

 

3George F. Kneller, Introduction to the Philosophy of
Education (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), p. 4.

4Daniel Tanner, "Curriculum Theory: Knowledge and
Conten , " Review of Educational Research (Washington, D. C. :
American Educational Research Association, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3,
June, 1966), p. 362.

 

134

is factual, if, in principle its truth or falsity can be tested. That is,
if certain events occur, we say the statement is true; if other events
occur, we say that it is false. "1 Clearly, if social phenomena such
as power in education are to be more manageable for study, some

means must be found to verify its origins, nature and qualities.

Theory Building

A well developed theory is a network of processes that lead
from one event to another, according to Coleman. 2 As noted in
Chapter 111, most scholars agree that there is no adequate theory of
power, not to say a theory of power relating to education; the chal—
lenge for the development of such theory lies before us.

The process of theory building must begin with the securing
of information. This can be accomplished through direct observa—
tion, experimentation, through study of the work and theoretical
formulations of others, or by some other means. From such infor—
mation, assumptions, postulates or constructs can be derived. The
process may be pursued with the construction of new theory, with

hypotheses derived from the theory, with tests of verification of the

 

1Herbert Simon, op. cit., pp. 50—51.

2James S. Coleman, ”Comment on 'On the Concept of
Influence, ' " Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVII (Spring, 1963), p. 68.

135

predictions and finally, with modification of the theory and continued
testing and modification. 1

It was believed that, as concerns the building of theories
of power in education, the focus of this study should betwith the first
and second stages: the securing of information through the study of
the work and formulations of the past, assisted by the experience of
a number of years of direct observation of institutional processes,
and with the derivations from these of tentative constructs relating

to aspects of the problem of power.

Power Constructs

 

The construct appears to have merit as a device for the
formulation of the difficult and abstract concepts to be found in the
consideration of power. Hayman has defined the construct as,

. a carefully defined and articulated abstract entity which,
thogghinot directly observable, is considered to exist.
[Emphasis added.] Ideally, a construct should have both
theoretical import and empirical meaning-~it should be useful
in buildingtheories and meaningful in terms of observable
behavior. A problem in the behavioral sciences is that many
constructs of theoretical interest are difficult to relate directly
to behavior, the phenomenon with which they are concerned.
This is partly a problem of measurement, partly of definition,
and partly of logic. An attitude is an example of a construct.
It cannot be directly observed, yet it is inferred to exist.

 

 

1Hayman, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

2Ibid. , p. 11.

136

Thus, following the suggestion of Catlin, in the selection
of situations which are readily available for examination on every
campus and which lend themselves to analysis, an attempt is made
below to suggest certain qualities and characteristics of the nature
and uses of power which may help provide insight into its workings
on the campus.

Power has its origins in the purposes of the social source
that creates it; thus, one may propose: Power Construct 1 (PCl):

PC1: Power for the accomplishment of a purpose remains
in the hands of those who create it.

PCI. 1: While the authority to accomplish specific purposes
sought by the power-dominant or originating group
may be delegated, the delegation is simply an exten—
sion of the power of the original group.

PCl. 2: In delegation, the power of the dominant group has not
been lost and the power delegated can be reclaimed,
at the pleasure of the power source.

An often perplexing question of power in higher education
is its locus; within the institution, where is final authority to be

found? And, what is the extent of such authority? Power Construct 2

(PCZ):

PC2: Within the higher educational institution, the only
authority extant is a delegated portion of the authority
of the governing board; every function performed in
or by. the institution is based on a delegated. portion of
that authority.

 

137

Among the questions frequently raised on the contemporary
campus is the question of the purposes of the institution, and the
question of where or by whom these purposes are established:

PC3: Power in higher educational institutions has direction;
it is limited and specific and can be used only to
accomplish the purposes of the power source, of whom
the governing board is the representative.

A widespread problem of power in higher education is the
extent of authority of various officers and employees of the institu-
tion, together with the question of the degree of force which such
authority may have. The following construct, PC4, may assist in
the examination of this problem:

PC4: When delegated authority is not clearly defined and
described, delegates tend to press outward into their
community to seek the boundaries of their authority,
or to establish their own definitions of the extent of
their authority.

A question basic to the maintenance of institutional ability
to progress toward its goals is the question of the maintenance of
a unified, common effort by the institution and at least the majority
of its members:

PC5: Within a higher educational institution, where a dele-

gated authority is not supported by total institutional
authority, the legitimacy of that authority will be

 

1‘-

138

challenged and gradually rejected and authority in that
position will become less effective and ultimately will
be lost, unless or until it is restored by the authority
of the organization.

While many lay individuals view the campus as a benevolent
retreat from the strivings and contentions of the "outside" world,
higher educational institutions tend to function internally much as do
other organized human groups: interpersonal and intergroup compe-
tition is common, as Etzioni has reported.

PC6: Groups with limited authority within a higher educa-
tional institution will seek to acquire a greater relative
authority, from other individuals or groups within the
institution, to extend the interests and objectives of
their group.

The foregoing constructs may serve as illustrative examples
of abstract conditions or qualities in the educational power process
which are believed to exist. They may be examined and, in at least

some measure, tested through the study of behavior by which these

conditions may be made manifest.

Verification Methods for Power Constructs

There appear to be several possible methods by which

constructs such as those suggested above might be subjected to test.

‘

1Etzioni, Modern Organizations, op. cit., p. 85. ' ’ i

 

-_a-ll

139

While the nature of the on-going processes of operation within a
higher educational institution may not often lend themselves to
experimentation, that possibility should not be ruled out. There
may be instances, especially where there is a genuine institutional
concern to extend the knowledge of how the institution functions,
where real experimentation is possible.

Another alternative is suggested by Griffiths: the observa-
M method. It will be noted that the physical science of astronomy,
which has made very notable advances in recent years, has been
obliged to rely on the observational approach. It is not possible for
astronomers to determine the relative positions of planets and stars
at points in time, by experiment. Nor may they determine the
composition of the atmosphere of a planet by experiment. Instead,
they have perfected techniques of observation which supply the data
sought. 1

Similarly, the anthropologist must rely heavily on observa-
tional methods. These scholars study human interactions and their
results and effects and are thus able to develop descriptions of the
social systems under study. That the observational method is limited
by the ability of the observer to report his observation accurately

and clearly is well known; the reports must be developed in such a

 

1Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 35-37.

 

 

140

way that other observers can replicate and verify the reported
conditions. 1

A variation of the observational method might be devised
through a system of specific empirical tests, wherein such tests
are created and applied to specific delegations of authority within
an institution and where such delegations may not have led to the
results and purposes achieved as intended by the higher delegating
authority.

Other types of descriptive research beside the observational
method should not be disregarded. Probably the most popular
descriptive method, the survey (wherein the subjects are asked to
cooperate and to supply information) may also find application.

Similarly, techniques of content analysis may well find an applica—

 

tion in the examination of written documents relating to the delega—

tion and use of power within the institution.

Proposed Tests for Power Constructs

 

It is proposed that the description of possible specific tests
for the above proposed constructs may contribute toward the develop-
ment of a more systematic approach to the study of power processes

in higher education.

 

11bid.

 

141

In consideration of E, the descriptive research technique
of content analysis could be employed, in Power Construct 1 Test
(PClT). The question posed by the construct is whether, in fact,
the critical and decisive power over the future of the institution
remains with the public body or private organization which founded
or now maintains the institution and whether, in fact, the institution
draws its existence from authority delegated from the parent body.
A content analysis of the recorded actions, resolutions, regulations,
laws, fiscal appropriations and similar activities over a specific
period of time may establish the comparative extent of the power
and the authority of the parent body, its capacity to administer
sanctions, and to withdraw or extend delegated authority. Such an
analysis might supply the empirical evidence to test the construct.

The comparative degree of effective power delegated and retained

could provide such a test.

Concerning Q, the construct proposes that within the
institution itself, no power exists, but only authority, and of that,
only a portion of the authority granted to the institution' 5 governing
board by the state has been delegated to members of the institution.
Further, all functions and activities within the institution derive from
that portion of authority delegated by the governing board. Here, a

test might be employed using content analysis, PC2T. Studies

142

might be conducted of the basis by which every identifiable group
in the institution has its relationship to the institution, together with
its position in the institutional structure, through an examination of .
the documents which describe the institutional structure and which
provide for the existence of each group. Such a test ought to reveal
the basis under which each person or group was introduced into the
institution and his relationship to it. Such a test should reveal the
extent to which activities of the institution are conducted under
authority and the source from which such authority stems, in each
case, and whether from the governing board or any other source.
The concerns suggested by E relate to a hypothesized
quality of power, and in the case of educational institutions, an
implication of its extent and specificity, as well as its possible
uses. A test, w, might include the application of both of the
descriptive research techniques of observation and content
analysis. A content analysis of the stated purposes and goals of the
institution as expressed in charter, laws and regulations might be
conducted, to be followed by an observational study of the extent to
which such stated purposes are actually an influence on the activities
of the institution. The actual program of activity of the institution
might be acceptable evidence of the degree of limitation as to pur—

pose, and the extent of agreement between stated purposes and actual

 

 

143

performance. A possible experimental test, PC3T. 1, might be
conducted. A group within the institution, possibly a student or
administrative group, might propose the establishment of a service
or activity outside of the defined and specified purposes contained

in the various institutional statements of purpose. The disposition
of the proposal, or preferably, a series of such proposals over
time, may serve to suggest the degree to which institutional authority
possesses direction and is limited. Analysis of similar descriptive
or experimental studies over a number of institutions, in replicative
studies, might serve to describe more precisely the social limita—
tions of the higher educational system.

Observational, content analysis and survey techniques may
be combined to reveal the extent of the reliability of E' In a test
of this construct, P_C4_T, an examination of the defined authority,
responsibilities and duties of institutional officers or workers might
be established by a content analysis of documents describing such
delegations. These might be combined with surveys of the workers
under study, and of their superiors in authority, to provide addi— 1
tional data concerning the extent of delegations, as well as the
actual limits of authority being exercised by the worker. These
surveys might be supplemented by observations of the activities of

the worker. These data sources together may describe the efforts ' r

144

of workers to accommodate themselves to the actual delegations of

authority provided them by the institution, and to provide a measure

of the extent of disparities where such exist. An experimental study,

PC4T. 1, might also be conducted, of the behavior of two groups
composed of either students, faculty members or administrators,
where one group is given express and detailed delegations of
authority and a second group, which is given a broad, very gener-
alized delegation of authority, toward the solution of the same
problem. Resulting behavior may assist in the verification of the
construct, or in its disproof.

The existence of authority is dependent on its having been
created by a power source on the one hand, and by the acceptance
of the legitimacy of the authority by those over whom it is to be
effective, on the other. fighypothicates a tendency toward the
rejection of the legitimacy of authority on the modern campus. A
test, PC_5T, employing a third descriptive research method, the
m: might be employed. Instances of the rejection of the
legitimacy of authority on the campus are by no means rare.
Detailed examination of the sequence of events leading to a rejec-
tion, the behavior of the authority holder and his superiors and the
subsequent behavior of the rejectors may shed light on the truth or

falsity of the construct. As with other such tests, a substantial

145

number of replications would seem indicated to establish any behavior
patterns that may be involved. Another possible test, PC5T. 1, could
involve an observational method, wherein the investigator would
study all possible identifiable instances within a single institution
where rejection, or some substantial measure of it, has occurred.

It should be noted that such rejections of legitimacy can probably
occur in a considerable variation in degree.

Barnard, Selznick, Etzioni and many other scholars in
organizational dynamics have reported the tendency to competition
and attempts at dominance by sub—groups within organizations.

The construct £26 proposes the existence of such tendencies within
the higher educational institution. A test of such a construct,

_l_3_C_6_T, might be conducted with the employment of the case study
technique of new or recently established departments or service
agencies within an institution, over a period of several years. The .
accretions of authority, influence, resources and the relative
political position of the group‘within the institution and the sources
from which these additions come, together with the means by which
these accretions were acquired, may serve to support or disprove

the construct.

 

146

The Need for Replicative Studies

 

As suggested by Inkeles, the variables in each social event
or situation probably serve to obviate the possiblity of a true repli-
cation of studies in the social sciences. Yet, replication is probably
among the greatest needs, if anything approaching the identification
of ”laws” of social behavior is to become possible. The domain of
the social scientist is not that of the natural scientist and can never
be so; the increased difficulty and complexity of the task of the social
scientist ought not to discourage his efforts or to defend the lack of
”persistence required to seek patterns in behavior. 1 And, as Cole-
man has suggested, the application of the sometimes inapprOpriate
methods and devices of the natural scientist to social science prob-
lems may only serve to create the illusion of a false simplicity in
social processes. The use of paradigms, pseudo-mathematical
symbolic formulations and other similar devices doubtless offer a
contribution to the solution of some types of problems. Their use
toward solutions in really complex social situations may offer the
illusion of precision and rigor where, in fact, the real complexity
and dynamic character of the situation become hopelessly obscured.
Concerning the use of paradigms, Coleman has counseled a particu-

lar caution:

 

1Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 93-96.

147

[Paradigms] constitute a way of giving definition and nothing
more. . . . they perform a disservice . . . when they substi-
tute for theory construction itself. The paradigms are seductive
in a complex science like sociology for they appear to bring
simplicity and order, to substitute forthe numerical measure
that quantities like money bring to the economist. But I suggest
we will advance more quickly and soundly if we attempt to set
down the processes that comprise a system of behavior, and
neglect the typologies for a time.

In summary, there would appear to be no substitute for the
rigorous study and replications of study of processes in the "real
world" of the day-to-day social process within the educational insti-
tution, to reveal the varied facets of the processes of educational
power. Only through the modifications that can come from the

execution of tests of hypotheses can greater capacility be developed

in the study of these human institutions.

Summary

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to present
certain constructs relating to the nature and functions of power in
relation to the higher educational institution and to suggest specific
tests which might be developed in detail by which these constructs
might be verified or disproved. The constructs have been created
from concepts and formulations of the nature and uses of power

by many scholars and observers. The tests have been devised from

 

1Coleman, op. cit., p. 68.

 

148

methods considered appropriate for use in a real-life situation,
where opportunities for formal experimentation are limited or non-
existent. It is believed that the processes by which both constructs
and tests have been created may illustrate a procedure by which an
orderly and systematic approach may be mounted against some of
the most abstract and complex problems in the study of social rela-

tionships.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary of the Study

 

Chapter I of this study includes an introductory statement
and rationale, a brief discussion of the problem, including basic
questions relating to the nature of power and its uses on the campus.
The objectives of the study were: 1) To propose some basic defini—
tions for and to describe some relationships between: power,
authority, influence and responsibility, in the context of higher
education; 2) To formulate several original theoretical constructs
related to the origins, nature, locus, purposes and characteristics
of power in higher education, and 3) To formulate several original
procedures which may be suggested to provide empirical tests of
the constructs proposed. Limitations under which the study was
conducted were cited. The historical, expository, philosophical
and descriptive research methods were employed in the design and

conduct of the study.

149

 

 

150

There is an evaluative statement in Chapter II, relating
to the availability of literature on the theoretical study of power in
higher education, with a discussion of the nature of some of the
existing literature concerned with higher educational organization
and governance. Selections of some of the most useful theoretical
studies of problems of power in sociology and political science are
included, together with attempts to define and describe social and
political power in organizations. Chapter II is concluded with an
overview of some recent research and descriptive studies of the
origins, sources, functions and uses of power within the higher
educational institution.

A preliminary discussion on the nature of power is offered
in Part 1, Chapter III, followed by an extended examination of
definitions of power, and of the origins, sources and loci of power.
Distinctions are made in concepts of power, authority and influence.
Some relationships between control and authority and responsibility
and authority are examined. Accountability and responsibility in
relation to power are discussed and defined. The problem of
legitimacy of various power forms is considered.

The nature of organizations, and the relationships of
power and goals to organizations are discussed. Analytic interpre-

tations of the role of power in democratic organizations and states

151

are included in this Chapter, together with some interpretations of
the role of power and law in democratic organizations.

The nature, sources and locus of power in higher educa-
tional institutions are discussed in Part 11, Chapter III. The role
of power and goals in educational institutions is considered.
Authority, responsibility and influence on the campus and the con-
cept of the campus as a democracy are examined. The Chapter is
concluded with a discussion of the interest of various campus intra-
mural groups and the securing of a larger measure of authority, in
the context of the preceding discussions of power, authority, influ-
ence and responsibility; this discussion attempts to illuminate the
function and process of power in the higher educational institution.

Original theoretical constructs, together with specific
proposals for tests of the constructs, are presented in Chapter IV.
The constructs are based in part on the implications and formula-
tions in the studies of scholars and observers whose contributions
are examined in this study. The tests are conceived as appropriate
to the real-life campus situation, where opportunities for formal
experimentation with power problems may be severely limited.

The study is concluded with an overview of its content, and
with a statement of findings and conclusions, a discussion of impli—

cations of the results of this study and suggestions for possible

152

ways in which the work initiated in this study might be profitably

extended.

Statement of Conclusions and Implications

As has been noted above, there are few problems in the
study of social behavior more perplexing than power or which have
been more intransigent, in attempts by scholars toward definition
and analysis. This study has attempted to demonstrate some of the
reasons for these difficulties, as well as to offer some exploratory
efforts toward analysis and to encourage interest in the problem by
the research community in higher education and by other interested
scholars.

There appear to be several conclusions that may be tenta—

tively offered, which may assist in further efforts in this field:

1. The study of the role of power in the establishment and
operation of the higher educational institution has been
seriously neglected, both by research scholars and by

practicing educators within the institutions.

2. Relationships within higher educational institutions are
often seriously disrupted as a consequence of a general

lack of understanding of the function and uses of power

 

 

153

within the institution and within the society, for educational

purposes.

3. Some. current scholarship reveals a limited appreciation
of the complexity of the nature of power and for its per-

vasiveness in social relationships.

4. Among some scholars, power is still viewed as a negative
force which must be contained, rather than as a neutral,

value-free phenomenon.

5. The functions of power in higher education are not different
from the functions of power for other social purposes

within the state.

6. The employment of the device, the construct, with the
application of social science techniques of descriptive
research and of experimentation, appears to offer promise
in the examination of questions of power in society and in

higher education.

Recommendations for Future Effort

 

The following statements are presented as a summary of

some of the principal unsupported hypotheses which have been

154

developed in the course of the study. They may not be regarded as
demonstrated conclusions in any proper sense. They appear to be
worthy of more serious examination, based on the evidence supplied
through the work of scholars in the past and by the relationships
suggested in the data assembled in this study. They are offered
here in the hope that they may encourage further study which may
substantiate or disprove them. Detailed examination of this study
will reveal other related hypotheses, which may have a bearing on

the study of those cited in this schedule:

1. Power may be defined as the capacity to achieve a desired

result.

2. Power may have its origin at the point in time and place
where a conscious resolution is made toward a desired

result.

3. Social power may have its source in anything that can be

valued.

4. Power cannot exist apart from purpose.

5. Authority is a specific, defined, delegated portion of a

superior power.

155

6. Authority and responsibility cannot be effectively

separated.

7. Influence is a degree of power insufficient to control a

situation.

8. Legitimacy is essential to the persistence of power.

9. A quality of social power is direction, toward the specific
goals of the society that created it, as: an educational

goal.

10. No power exists in higher educational institutions, except

authority.

11. In higher educational institutions, the locus of authority

is the governing board of the institution.

12. The educational institution is not a democracy; it is a

service agency with narrowly prescribed authority.

In addition to the above conclusions and implications, the
following observations may be of some value, in a search for

directions in future study:

156

It is suggested that some means be found to encourage
experienced higher educational administrators to become
more fully engaged in studies of power in higher education.
Institutional officers with actual and extended experiences
of the power process could offer invaluable contributions
from personal observations and experiences. The litera-
ture is seriously lacking in contributions by persons whose

experience would fit them to offer valuable assistance.

Professional associations of administrators, academic

leaders and others who are directly engaged in the higher
educational power process should be encouraged to assist
to a greater degree in the initiation and support of further

studies in this field.

Far too much of the literature in the study of educational

power appears to be influenced by value and group loyalties
as over against the nature and uses of power. Means must
be found to assist scholars to confront power as an amoral,

neutral phenomenon that functions indifferently as to values.

New, experimental institutions should be established

expressly to permit the introduction of methods of the

157

application and uses of power and authority which are not
possible in existing systems. While the cost of such
experimental institutions would be substantial, it would
probably be small in contrast to the social and financial
cost of the misunderstandings and misuses of power now
evident in the higher educational system. Such experi-
mental institutions might be financed by combinations of
public and private, philanthropic funds. They could serve
as exhibits and models in which anyone interested might
observe the results of experiments. Organizations such
as the Association of University Professors, the Associa-
tion of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, the
American Council on Education, the National Federation of
Teachers and similar groups, together with national founda-
tions and the federal government, might be expected to
display interest and support for such experimental institu-

tions.

Conclusion

 

Finally, it must be concluded that the study has raised far
more questions than it has answered, if, indeed, any answers may

be said to have been supplied. The study has been an exploratory

158

one, with no known comparable effort having been attempted in
higher education. That additional studies are needed, in an effort
to shed additional light on the power question in higher education,
seems clear. Many individual questions to which only general
allusion has been made in this study might be profitably pursued.
The social need is great and the rewards seem promising and excit-
ing. Greater understanding of the question of power in higher edu-
cation presages more productive and useful service for those

institutions to our society.

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