POWER CONSTRUCTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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THE

ABSTRACT

POWER CONSTRUCTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

By

Thomas R. Kilian

Recent events in the higher educational system in the United States suggest some degree of confusion, division and uncertainty concerning the nature, locus, purposes and uses of power in the higher educational institution. Rapid growth in size, diversity of purpose and complexity of structure have produced new problems for institutions. Widespread student unrest and a growing professionalism among educators has produced new issues related to power on the campus. The effectiveness of the system appears to be hampered by a lack of a satisfactory theory of power to guide its organization and operation.

The objectives of the study were: 1) to propose some basic definitions for and to describe some relationships between: power, authority, influence and responsibility, in the context of higher education; 2) to formulate several original theoretical constructs

related to the origins, nature, locus, purposes and characteristics of power in higher education, to the end that they may offer aid and direction in future research, and 3) to formulate several original procedures which may provide means for empirical testing of the constructs proposed. A lack of definitions and theoretical formulations of power in higher education was seen as a serious limitation hampering research in the field.

For the design and conduct of the study, historical, philosophical, expository and descriptive research methods were used. The study made an extensive examination of definitions and concepts of power offered in the literature of sociology, political science and thought and higher education. There are detailed discussions of the definitions, origins, sources and classifications of power, authority and influence, as broad social concepts. Relationships between authority and responsibility are explored, together with questions of the legitimacy and locus of power. The role of power in the creation of organizations, organizational goals and in democratic organizations and states is discussed.

The nature, sources and locus of power in higher educational institutions is examined, together with the role of power and goals in educational institutions. Authority, responsibility and influence on the campus and the concept of the campus as a democracy are

analyzed. The interest of various campus intramural groups in the securing of a larger measure of authority is discussed in the context of the origins and structure of the educational institution.

The study offers six theoretical constructs related to the nature and functions of power in higher educational institutions and proposes specific tests by which these constructs might be tested, by descriptive and experimental methods.

Principal conclusions of the study were: 1) The study of the role of power in the establishment and operation of the higher educational institution has been seriously neglected; 2) Internal relationships of the higher educational institution can be seriously disrupted as a consequence of a lack of understanding of the function and uses of power in education; 3) Some current scholarship reveals a limited view of the complexity of power and of its pervasiveness in social relationships; 4) The functions of power in higher education are not different from the functions of power for other social purposes within the state; 5) The employment of the construct as a theoretical tool, combined with descriptive research and experimental methods, may offer promise for the examination of problems of power in higher education.

The study contains a schedule of hypotheses which are suggested as worthy of further examination and suggests the involvement

in future research of more educators with actual experience in the institutional power process. It proposes the establishment of new educational institutions for the specific purpose of experimentation in problems of power.

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Thomas R. Kilian

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CHAPTER I

CRISIS ON THE CAMPUS

Introduction

Wide diversity characterizes American higher educational institutions in 1969. From very small institutions with less than 100 students, the spectrum expands to include vast academic communities that are virtually city-states, with enormous political and social power and whose annual operating budgets exceed by two or three times the total budgets of some entire states for all purposes. Keezer,[1] Corson,[2] Ayers[3] and numerous other observers have noted the remarkable diversity of objectives in higher educational institutions.

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[1]Dexter M. Keezer, ed., Financing Higher Education: 1960-1970 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959), pp. 13-14.

[2]John J. Corson, Governance of Colleges and Universities (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), p. 85.

[3]Archie R. Ayers and John H. Russel, Internal Structure: Organization and Administration of Institutions of Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Education, 1962), pp. 6-9.

As higher educational institutions in America grow in size, complexity and diversity of interests and services, their goals become more transcendent and diffuse and generalized. Such institutions become more difficult to administer. Pressures in the larger society for the provision of wider services become more insistent; the institution is asked in a thousand subtle ways to be all things to all men.

Often, divergent or conflicting interests arise within an institution. In large institutions, made up of complex groupings of schools, colleges, institutes, libraries, museums, hospitals and other associated agencies, such divergent and conflicting interests are seldom absent. Indeed, the very philosophical underpinnings of certain departments and disciplines may be in conflict with those of others. Further, departments, colleges and other interest groups often find themselves at odds with institutional policies and even with the larger goals of the institution, quite as often as they find differences between themselves.

Where such differences of purpose, belief or aspiration seem seriously important, and may appear irresoluble, an interest group may seek to gain its ends through the exercise of some form or degree of power against another group, or the institutional administration or even the institution itself. In recent years, such

manifestations of the uses of power have become more frequent, to the extent of hampering, or in some instances, totally disrupting the ability of the institution to function.

The Need for the Study

Few, if any, periods in American higher educational history have been characterized by more evident confusion, division, uncertainty and dissension, based on questions of the nature and exercise of institutional power, in disagreements concerning the nature of the relationship of various groups to the institution and in widespread contention for the right of some measure of its exercise.[1]

A reflection of the extent of this confusion will be found in the fact that, in 1968 alone, over 300 campuses have been the scene of student demonstrations and disorders which have seriously affected institutional operation. The nation's oldest, largest and most prestige-laden institutions are included among those torn by strife.

Certain student organizations have been established on a national basis which include among their avowed purposes the gaining of effective control of the higher educational system.[2] Groups such

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[1] Sidney Hook, "The Trojan Horse in American Higher Education," Educational Record, L, No. 1 (Winter, 1969), 21-29.

[2] Chronicle of Higher Education, III, No. 19 (June 16, 1969), 7-8.

as The Students for a Democratic Society, which claims over 35,000 members on 250 campuses, and the Progressive Labor Party, The Young Socialist Alliance, The Youth International Party and the Third World Liberation Front may comprise from 3 to 4 per cent of the student population of the nation.[1] Such groups tend to use educational institutions as devices of convenience in efforts to gain larger political power in the larger society.[2]

Increasingly, faculty groups question the limits of their authority in the determination of basic institutional operational policies.[3] Questions concerning interest-group power on campus have risen to the extent that the 1968 American Association of State Colleges and Universities National Convention theme was "Who's in Charge Here?"[4] When top educational leaders in the nation's largest institutions are found actively participating in discussions on such a topic, questions relating to power on the campus are of serious national concern.

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[1] Robert Hessen, "What Campus Rebellions Mean to You," Nation's Business, LVII, No. 6 (June, 1969), 31-32.

[2] Carl Davidson, "University Reform Revisited," Educational Record, XLVIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1967), 5-10.

[3] "Professors Press Toward Goal in Governance," Chronicle of Higher Education, III, No. 18 (May 19, 1969), 3.

[4] "State Campuses Stiffen Stands on Militants," Chronicle of Higher Education, III, No. 6 (November 25, 1968), 1.

Widespread violence and disorder on campus has been cited by the President's National Commission of the Causes and Prevention of Violence as being of ominous import to the nation. The report states that ". . . hundreds of student demonstrations have resulted in the seizure of university facilities, police intervention, riot, property damage and even death."[1]

The Significance of the Problem

The existence of a general, pervasive unrest on the American campus hardly seems necessary of documentation. Virtually every newspaper edition, every popular magazine is filled with accounts of the most recent outbreaks of violence and institutional disruption. Few topics are of wider public interest. Leaders in all fields are widely quoted as to their assessment of the causes and remedies for the general unrest.

The future capabilities and the social usefulness of the higher educational system may well depend on the understanding, acceptance and support of defined concepts of the source, purposes and uses of power as it relates to the establishment and functioning of the campus community.

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[1]"Nixon Gets Shocking Violence Report," Argus-Leader (Sioux Falls, South Dakota), January 29, 1969, p. 6.

The Problem

Few educational problems seem to be more perplexing or filled with import for the future than questions of power on the modern campus. Administrators, governing boards, faculties and students together with others interested in the future of higher education need to reach new levels of understanding of power and its uses, if the educational system is to serve the growing needs of the nation and society.

While it appears evident that some of the current campus unrest is rooted in concerns of its perpetrators which have little to do with the basic educational goals and purposes of the institutions, and are centered in the interests of groups who seek a general political and social restructuring of the nation, the consequences can be none the less serious for the educational institution.[1] If the administration building is burned to the ground, it is gone. The loss is real, whether or not the purposes of the incendiaries had their roots in indigenous campus issues. The property has been illegally destroyed and the institution has become crippled in its ability to serve its purposes.

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[1] Chronicle of Higher Education, June 16, 1969, op. cit.

Basic Questions

Some questions basic to an understanding of power and fundamental to the operation of institutions and systems of higher education would seem to include:

1. What is power and what is its nature?
2. Where is the locus of power in educational institutions?
3. What is the function of power in a democracy and in higher education?
4. How can power be used in higher education?
5. How does power relate to goals and purposes in educational institutions?

There are indications that the present unrest on the American campus, as well as in other nations, will continue for the foreseeable future. The issues are much too complex and indicative of the uncertainty of conviction of values in the larger society to be susceptible to simple solution.[1] However, attempts to use power, and to use institutions as levers for social change, suggest the imperative of serious study of the nature and uses of power if the educational system is to survive and fulfill social and human needs. Widespread misunderstanding, confusion of institutional purposes,

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[1] Ibid.

and misuse of power in education present the possibility of such serious disruption of the system as to endanger its usefulness toward the purposes for which such institutions were established.

The study of these questions will require the examination of a number of highly abstract concepts, such as have perplexed men for centuries. It will be necessary to consider definitions which will help to illuminate the phenomenon called power. Relative to the function of power in higher educational institutions, the origins of such institutions must be examined, together with the origins of power in institutions and in society. In addition, the relationship between power and institutional goals appears relevant. In these processes, some deceptively simple questions present themselves, as: Where do educational institutions come from? Why and by whom are they established? How are they maintained? Who serves them and is served by them? Who owns them? How are they governed? Why are they governed as they are? To whom are such institutions responsible? Who governs, within the institutions? By what right do they do so? Are there limits on the extent of their authority? Wherein are such limits found? Such questions, expressed or implied, are legitimate questions which relate directly to the operational processes on campuses today. In addition, at the present time, there appear to be serious questions about the nature of the

university as a social organism that may vitally affect its purposes: Is the university an instrument for active intervention toward social or political change? Is it solely an educational institution? Is it a tool of a socio-economic caste, to further narrow interests? While the examination of such value questions will not be a concern of this study, an understanding by educators of the nature and workings of power on campus will affect the course of the future, whatever the social purposes of the institutions may be thought to be at any point in time.

The Objectives and Limitations of the Study

Three specific objectives were undertaken in the study:

1. To propose some basic definitions for and to describe some relationships between: power, authority, influence and responsibility, in the context of higher education.
2. To formulate several original theoretical constructs related to the origins, nature, locus, purposes and characteristics of power in higher education, to the end that they may offer aid and direction in future research.
3. To formulate several original procedures which may be suggested to provide means for empirical testing of the theoretical constructs proposed.

Certain limitations were established for the study in an effort to focus attention on several basic concerns, and to attempt to describe a pattern of exploration in an area which at best might be defined as a semantic swampland of abstraction.[1] No satisfactory taxonomy of power exists, either in sociological or political approaches to it. No effort has appeared in the literature toward a taxonomy in the relationships of power to higher education. The meanings of the principal terms have no fixed, accepted content. Concepts of power are extremely complex and are formed and are affected by subjective premises as well as the interplay of an immense variety of social forces. While a number of attempts have been made at establishing typologies of power, the results have been largely unsatisfactory; the number of typologies appears to be roughly the equivalent of the number of scholars who have considered the problem. Power is an elusive concept, unique in every instance of its manifestation and compounded of different elements of social force in every case. It is a dynamic force, in a state of constant flux and change. Its description is not eased by reason of this fact, for, as one regards it, it can change its colors like a chameleon as one watches. As Bierstedt recalls, in paraphrasing St. Augustine's

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[1] Robert A. Dahl has suggested the analogy in "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, II (July, 1957), 201.

reflections on time: everyone knows what power is until he is asked![1]

Limitations

It seemed useful to suggest some limitations of the scope of the study, to establish boundaries between concerns within the study and several possible approaches which were not developed or included as a part of the study. This study did not attempt:

1. To survey or review recent specific instances or case studies of the uses of power on campus;
2. To analyze or seek causes for specific instances of campus unrest relating to the uses of power;
3. To provide prescriptive proposals for the use of power to serve possible specific or current campus needs or interests;
4. To survey current attitudes or opinions or practices now found on the campus, relating to power;
5. To conduct any experimental, predictive or analytical research or to make use of inferential statistics for the interpretation of data;

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[1] Robert Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," American Sociological Review, XV (1950), 730-738.

6. To replicate any known existing study relating to the phenomenon of power in higher education.

Methods and Procedures Used in the Study

For the conduct of this study, historical, expository, philosophical and descriptive research methods were used. Since this study was exploratory, in attempting to develop and describe some definitions for concepts of power, authority, influence and responsibility in the context of higher education, and to attempt to formulate certain theoretical constructs and testing procedures with respect to power in higher education, no purpose was seen in attempts toward experimentation. Indeed, this was a thesis of the study: the lack of such definitions and theory was seen as a major and critical problem, both in educational and social research and in the practical operation of institutions of higher education. Beveridge has described the hypothesis as the principal intellectual instrument in research: "Its function is to indicate new experiments and observations and it therefore sometimes leads to discoveries even when not correct itself."[1] The greatest promise and the greatest need appeared to be

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[1]W. I. B. Beveridge, The Art of Scientific Investigation (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1950), pp. 63-66.

in the direction of attempts at concept definition and the formulation of the beginnings of theory.

Political scientists and sociologists have provided a number of useful studies of attempts to measure degrees or amounts of power. There would appear to be a limited utility in attempts to measure power in higher education (if, indeed, it can be measured) before concepts as to its nature are more clearly defined.

The Organization of the Study

The study is organized into five divisions, in addition to bibliographic notes.

This chapter has included a statement introductory to the study and its purposes, a review of the problem for the study including basic questions relating to the nature of power and its uses on the campus, an outline of the objectives and limitations upon which the work of the study was based and a description of the methods and procedures used in the design and execution of the project.

A review of the recent pertinent literature dealing with theories of power, with implications for its manifestations and uses in organizations and on the campus, is included in Chapter II, together with a brief overview of some of the substantive literature relating to power in sociological and political research, and thought.

Chapter III is devoted to an exposition of definitions and theoretical conceptualizations of power, authority, influence and responsibility and to historical and philosophical interpretations of the relationships of power to the origin, structure and function of the higher educational institution. Attempts are made to describe the manifestations of social and political power which create and support the higher educational institution and with which it must be concerned as a matter of practical necessity in attempting to achieve the purposes for which it was established.

Theoretical constructs on the nature of power in higher education are contained in Chapter IV, together with several suggested methods and procedures by which such constructs might be subjected to empirical tests. Attempts are made to suggest ways in which the methodology might be extended in further research.

The concluding section, Chapter V, contains a summary of the principal findings of the study, and includes recommendations and conclusions based on the experiences gained through the research and conduct of the study.

CHAPTER II

A REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES

Introduction

Power will be considered in this study as essentially a sociological and political concept, relating to the governance of institutions in higher education. Cartwright has pointed to the dearth of research on power by social psychologists.[1] Fellman has noted the "paucity of reliable, objective research in decision-making in colleges" and the irony of this fact, considering the great amount of research that has been completed in other areas of education.[2] There has been remarkably little attention given by scholars in any discipline to the study of power as it affects higher education. One

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[1]Dorwin Cartwright, "Power: A Neglected Variable in Social Psychology," in The Planning of Change, ed. by Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne and Robert Chin (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 411-422.

[2]David Fellman, "The Academic Community: Who Decides What?" in Whose Goals for American Higher Education?, ed. by Charles G. Dobbins and Calvin B. T. Lee (Washington, D.C.: The American Council on Education, 1968), p. 106.

can scarcely say that a literature exists on theoretical problems of educational power.

The literature on the history and administration of the higher educational system in the United States is enormous.[1] It contains thousands of accounts and anecdotal reports of the administrations of college presidents (as, McVey and Hughes),[2] institutional histories, accounts of fiscal affairs, reflections of efforts toward curriculum and methodological reform and toward the achievement of a commonly held view of the nature of academic freedom (as Hofstadter).[3] In all, little notice has been taken of the phenomenon of power. Only in very recent years, chiefly since 1960, have scholars begun to recognize the existence of power on campus as a productive direction for inquiry.

The recent review by the author of over 900 titles and brief abstracts of current research projects in higher education offered

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[1] Probably in excess of 30,000 books, research reports and articles have been published on the administration of higher education alone, since 1950, based on projections of U.S. Office of Education estimates. See: Walter C. Eells and Ernest V. Hollis, Administration in Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Education, 1960), p. 3.

[2] Frank L. McVey and Raymond M. Hughes, Problems of College and University Administration (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press, 1952).

[3] Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955).

bare encouragement. All too many of the current studies are simply attitude and opinion surveys, of existing campus governance practice, subjected to merciless statistical analysis. Often, these studies reveal little more than a general evident confusion on the subject. Widely circulated studies such as the current one by Gross and Grambsch[1] are, finally, only reflections of opinion. Whatever the utility of such studies, they offer little assistance in efforts toward the development of power theory in higher education.

Hunter[2] has noted that it is easily ". . . possible to get 'bogged down' in a survey of theories of power relations . . . ," if one were to attempt to review everything recorded on the subject in a number of related disciplines. In his study, Hunter recorded the necessity of bypassing several "residual" categories of concern in the social sciences, areas that are related to the problem and of interest but which cannot be included in the study.

Similarly, in this study, only bare acknowledgment is given to a vast literature related to power, in history, philosophy and social thought. Nor has it been possible to pursue many interesting

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[1]Edward Gross and Paul V. Grambsch, University Goals and Academic Power (Washington, D.C.: The American Council on Education, 1968).

[2]Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1962), p. 2.

questions of the psychological relationships between power and individual and group behavior.

Some of the most engaging and difficult areas of human relationship to power fall within the areas of values, morals and ethics and the philosophical basis for the creation and uses of power. The attempt is made in this study to view power from a neutral position, and to avoid prescription as to how power "ought" to be used, or to define "correct" or "right" actions with respect to dispositions concerning power.

Further, any attempt at the inclusion of a "complete" review of the literature related to definitions and concepts of power in the broad fields of sociology, political science, economics and psychology would be a virtually endless pursuit. Few subjects have so attracted and held the interest of philosophers, historians and scholars in the social sciences since classical times and particularly during the past three centuries. As Hawley notes, few aspects of human organization or accomplishment are free of the influence of varying forms of power.[1] Thousands upon thousands of books, studies, and research reports in many languages have been produced, dealing (sometimes

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[1]Amos H. Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," American Journal of Sociology, LXVIII (January, 1963), 422-431.

implicitly) with questions of military, economic and political power since the rise of the modern state.

Sociologists have been increasingly drawn toward attempts to systematically measure power in communities, organizations and as held by individuals. Administrative theorists have made similar attempts to assess the uses and functions of power in commercial, non-profit and in military organizations.

For the investigator to profess a familiarity with the total literature of power is simply a revelation of a rather limited view of its dimensions, and of the varied facets of the total concept. It is evident, however, that studies dealing with abstract approaches to concepts of power as they affect the higher educational institution are found almost exclusively in the literature of sociology and political science. It is to these areas that one must have recourse in any responsible attempt to review the varied theoretical concepts that have been produced up to the present time and which may lead toward useful insights in understanding and using power in higher education.

Power Concepts in the Literature of Sociology and Political Science

A study which includes an interest in the origins and functions of power in organizations within the modern democratic state

can be illuminated by an examination of the evolution of concepts that have given rise to such organizations and states. Man's need to cooperate and the rise of the social contract theory were given expression early in the literature of political philosophy. Consider these observations of Plato, in The Republic:

> A state comes into existence because no individual is self-sufficing; we all have many needs. We call in one another's help to satisfy our various requirements and when we have collected a number of helpers and associates to live together in one place, we call that settlement a state. If one man gives another what he has to give in exchange for what he can get, it is because each finds that to do so is for his own advantage.[1]

The notion that greater power is present in the group than in the individual far predates the Greek philosophers and is lost in antiquity, with the formation of the first band or kinship group of humans. The evolution from the family, kinship band, tribe, feudal confederation to the modern federal state demonstrates the process. The process by which this concept of cooperation and exchange, and the division of labor, has been expanded upon and made more complex is basic to an understanding of the basis of power in the organization and the state, and thus, within the higher educational institution.[2]

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[1] Plato, The Republic, abstracts in The Great Political Theories, ed. by Michael Curtis (New York: Avon Books, 1961), p. 30.

[2] Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 5-7.

Students of political and social power can feel indebted to Franz Neumann for his perceptive study of the complexities of power. Neumann traces political thought relating to power from Plato to Aristotle, the Augustinians, the Thomists, the Epicurians and Anarchists, to the Marxists, Rousseau and the modern liberal democrats. He has offered a typology of power in politics and described political power as simply an aspect of social power.[1]

In nearly 500 years, probably few theorists of the practical uses of coercive power have exceeded the influence of Niccolo Machiavelli.[2] Neumann has suggested that Machiavelli's observations and practical prescriptions of the uses of political power may have contributed more than any other single factor to the popular concept of (and aversion for) power as force. Lerner has noted the influence of Machiavelli in political Europe from Frederick the Great to Joseph Stalin, and describes Machiavelli as "the first modern analyst of power."[3] Social scientists (as well as empire builders) may well reflect on the basis for the persistance in the literature of this unusual work.

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[1] Franz L. Neumann, "Approaches to the Study of Political Power," Political Science Quarterly, LXV (1950), 161-180.

[2] Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses (New York: Random House, 1950).

[3] Ibid., p. xxvi.

A highly useful analysis of the evolution of concepts which have led to the placing of political power in the hands of the people and the rise of the modern democratic state (and, of organizations within the state) is contained in Friedrich, beginning with concepts advanced in Althusius' Politica in 1603 and with theories of John Locke.[1]

Deininger clarified contrasting views of the study of political power in several varying philosophical schools, noting that Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau viewed the study of political theory and power as an aspect of moral inquiry. The Utilitarians, however, beginning with Bentham and including the Positivists and Marxists, tend to substitute race, class, nation, party and culture as proper objects for concern with respect to power. Contemporary ideologists are identified by Deininger as viewing power from a sociological vantage point and with the implication of evolutionary political progress.[2]

Catlin traced some of the philosophical origins of concepts of political power in history which have given rise to the modern

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[1]Carl J. Friedrich and Charles Blitzer, The Age of Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 2, 12, 151.

[2]W. T. Deininger, "Political Power and Ideological Analysis," in Politico, XXVI, No. 2 (1961), 277-298.

state and which form the basis of much of present-day political and social organization.[1]

Curtis has offered a comprehensive analysis of the principal ideas in political philosophy, which have basic implications for the organization and application of power, as they have evolved through the centuries from Plato to Martin Luther. Of special interest is a typology of power from Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, which is remarkably similar to some being proposed by scholars today.[2]

MacIver concluded, in a study of power relationships in government, that studies on the nature of power to date are unsatisfactory:

> There is no reasonably adequate study of the nature of social power. The majority of works on the theme are devoted either to proclaiming the importance of the role of power, like those of Hobbes, Gumplowiez, Ratenhofer, Stienmetz, Treitschke and so forth, or to deploring that role, like Bertrand Russell in his Power.[3]

Bertrand Russell considered power from a philosophical and ethical viewpoint and emphasized the possibility of ethical commitment as a source of power: "If you love your neighbor, you wish for

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[1] George E. Gordon Catlin, The Story of the Political Philosophers (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1947), pp. 159-255.

[2] Curtis, op. cit., pp. 297-302.

[3] Robert M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 458.

power to make him happy. To condemn all love of power, therefore, is to condemn love of your neighbors." Russell examined limitations of power out of ethical concern, in a social and political context.[1]

A. A. Berle, Jr., has provided a useful analysis of the historical development of a theory of social power, in the process of describing new manifestations of economic and political power in the modern industrial state. His conclusions concerning the processes of the legitimization of power provide many helpful insights.[2]

The pioneering conceptualizations of power and authority by the German social scientist, Max Weber, have been the impetus for much modern research and several attempts at theory building.[3] Weber's definition of power continues to generate controversial views as to the nature of power. More recent refinements of the power theory of Weber have been advanced by Goldhamer and Shils.[4] Weberian concepts of types of power and their application are

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[1]Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1938), p. 25.

[2]Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Power Without Property (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1959), pp. 98-109.

[3]Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 190-195.

[4]Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A. Shils, "Types of Power and Status," American Journal of Sociology, XLV (September, 1939), 171-178.

expanded, including the concept of charismatic power in individuals. Miller included important abstracts of Weber's theories on charisma and the legitimacy of power in his selections of Weber's essays.[1]

A typology of power is proposed by Etzioni, who makes useful comparisons with typologies suggested by other scholars. Etzioni presents one of the most exhaustive treatments of the phenomenon of charisma (of which Weber was a pioneer) found in modern power studies, in reference to individuals who are believed to hold power. The study makes helpful distinctions between types of power by identifying characteristics of the means used in its employment.[2]

One of the most useful examinations of authority in modern literature has been provided by Barnard in his classic study, The Functions of the Executive. He makes insightful distinctions between authority and power and is one of few modern scholars to take substantial account of the relationship of authority and responsibility. Barnard's identification of the formal and informal organizations, together with his theory of authority, help to reveal the complexity of power in relation to legitimacy.[3]

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[1] S. M. Miller, Max Weber (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1963), pp. 16-22.

[2] Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 4-6, 14-16, 262.

[3] Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 65-282.

In an analysis of social power, Tannenbaum contrasted the relative power of the family, the church and the state as institutions in society. He proposed that a condition of competition must exist between these institutions to insure a balance of power in society. He suggested that revolution is the result of the acquisition of excessive power by one of these institutions.[1]

Few scholars have attempted a more broad examination of varied abstract concepts of power than Bierstedt.[2] Together with others who have seriously considered the question, Bierstedt observes, "Few problems in sociology are more perplexing than social power." Bierstedt concluded that the power problem lies deeper than in political philosophy and that it is rooted in society itself; its study must therefore be broader than political science and can only be approached through sociology. In his study, Bierstedt examined the origins, sources, loci and uses of power in society and offered helpful definitions of power.

Some of the most exhaustive and detailed descriptions of the forms and manifestations of power in recent literature are found in

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[1] Frank Tannenbaum, "The Balance of Power in Society," Political Science Quarterly, LXI (December, 1946), 481-504.

[2] Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," op. cit., pp. 730-738.

Lasswell and Kaplan.[1] A substantial portion of the study is devoted to comparisons of power and influence and the qualities that distinguish them. Like many other observers, the authors discuss the varieties of sources of power; they expose the myth that power is by definition self-seeking and aggressive. In another more recent study, Lasswell assigns the study of the shaping and sharing of power as the special concern of political science.[2]

Bachrach and Baratz have called attention to what they believe are differing approaches to the study of power within sociology and political science:

> Sociologically oriented researchers have consistently found that power is highly centralized, while scholars trained in political science have just as regularly concluded that in "their" communities, power is widely diffused.[3]

As this present study attempts to demonstrate, their discovery is hardly surprising; power appears to have many more "faces" than the two identified by Bachrach and Baratz. Indeed, as will be detailed below, there is a bewildering variety of "faces" of power,

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[1]Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 55, 71-102.

[2]Harold D. Lasswell, "Political Science," in A New Survey of the Social Sciences, ed. by B. N. Varma (London: Asia Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 15-20.

[3]Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, LVI (December, 1962), 947-952.

depending on circumstances. Some recent scholars appear to have taken too limited an account of its complexity, perhaps out of zeal to simplify it, in order to take its measure.

Dahl, an experienced student of theoretical concepts of power, has pointed to numerous pitfalls that confront those who attempt its systematic study: ". . . there are students of the subject . . . who think . . . the whole study of 'power' is a bottomless swamp." Dahl offered highly useful distinctions between concepts of power, authority and influence. He has described difficulties attendant to attempts to find methods by which power can be quantified and measured.[1]

Danzger called attention to aspects of the immense complexity of attempts to measure power, especially as it is presumed to be held by individuals. He concluded that power can probably be usefully considered from the viewpoint of goals and resources. He called attention to the concept of power as potential for action.[2]

Abramson, Cutler, Kautz and Mendelson have noted important relationships between power and goals and concerning a number

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[1]Dahl, "The Concept of Power," op. cit., pp. 201-218.

[2]M. Herbert Danzger, "Community Power Structure: Problems and Continuities," American Sociological Review, XXIX (October, 1964), 707-717.

of significant characteristics of power and authority, and of attempts to measure quantities of power.[1]

Some recent studies related to power in education, such as those of McKenna[2] and of McLain,[3] suggest the direction of some current interest by scholars toward measurement of the understandings and opinions of individual educators concerning power.

Among the more generally known studies of power in recent years is that of Mills, which presents power as a means of the achievement of self-interest goals of groups and individuals.[4] Parsons has criticized Mills' conception of power as a limited one, concerned mainly with power over others. He described this view as being in the tradition of ". . . Veblen and a long line of indicters of modern industrial society." Parsons supported the view that the primary locus of power in society is in the political system, rather

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[1]E. Abramson, H. A. Cutler, R. W. Kautz and M. Mendelson, "Social Power and Commitment: A Theoretical Statement," American Sociological Review, XXIII (1958), 15-22.

[2]David L. McKenna, "A Study of Power and Interpersonal Relationships in the Administration of Higher Education" (unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958).

[3]John D. McLain, "Relationships between Administrative Tenure and Attitude of Administrators and School Board Members Toward Authority" (unpublished dissertation, University of Oregon, 1962).

[4]C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

than in covert groups or alliances of individuals of high socio-economic status, who band together against the mass of people.[1]

A useful philosophical analysis of authority as it relates to individuals and groups was conducted by Simon. He examined the relationship of authority to freedom and liberty and the function and utility of authority in organizations and in society. He has studied concepts of the locus of authority and of differences in coercive and persuasive power.[2]

Relationships between power and democracy as they affect the functions of organizations and civil governments in modern society, with a particular emphasis on the role of authority in the organization, have been explored by D'Antonio and Ehrlich.[3]

Additional insights concerning the development of current views of power within the concepts of liberal political philosophy have been described in a study by Girvetz. He has distinguished between political and economic power, and suggested a variety of

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[1] Talcott Parsons, "The Distribution of Power in American Society," World Politics, X (October, 1957), 123-143.

[2] Yves Simon, The Nature and Function of Authority (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1940), pp. 1-33.

[3] William V. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich, eds., Power and Democracy in America (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), p. 132.

methods by which power may be classified, and has discussed the difficulties in measuring it.[1]

A recent study by Rose provided an extensive analysis of a number of recent and traditional definitions of power and authority. He presented the contrasting views of power as a potential for action, and as evidenced by a demonstrated capacity to act. Few, if any, recent works have offered so detailed a catalogue of the varied forms and characteristics of power.[2]

The foregoing review of studies and reports of social and political power is by no means exhaustive; it is believed to be representative of the more advanced attempts at the description of power and of attempts to develop a theory concerning it, within these domains of knowledge.

Studies of Power in the Literature of Higher Education

Reference has been made in Chapter I of this study to the growing complexity and diversity of goals, purposes and interests that characterize the modern higher educational institution. Some

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[1]Harry K. Girvetz, The Evolution of Liberalism (New York: Collier Books, 1963), pp. 264-267.

[2]Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 1-52.

insight into the process by which these institutions have evolved from simple colonial academies to the highly complex and diverse institutions of the present day is provided in historical studies such as those of Rudolph[1] and Hofstadter.[2] In both of these comprehensive works, there are detailed illustrations of the sources of the origin, the legal basis of establishment and the growth and expansion of many institutions in the American system of higher education. In Rudolph, a chronological account of the growth of the American system is presented, from colonial New England to the present generation, in narrative form. In Hofstadter, one is offered a remarkable collection of the original documents which describe the process of educational institutional growth. Both studies are helpful in tracing the increasing delegation and diffusion of authority in higher educational institutions, together with some of the reasons for its occurrence, as have been concluded by these scholars.

Many aspects of the basis and function of power in higher education have been described by Corson, who has raised numerous complex questions concerning campus power relationships. Corson traced the principal differences between higher educational institutions

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[1] Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University (New York: Random House, Inc., 1962).

[2] Richard Hofstadter, American Higher Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

and other large organizations such as business and governmental groups, in the degree to which power is delegated and diffused.[1]

A current study by Dykes has described the faculty role in decision making in higher educational institutions, and examined factors that encourage or tend to impede faculty participation in decision making.[2]

Griffiths distinguished between power and authority in a study of administrative theory in education which has implications for higher educational organizations. Griffiths related power to effectiveness in the educational administrative process.[3]

The basis of legal authority in higher educational institutions was examined by Henderson, together with the powers of governing boards and the role of the faculty in the establishment of policy in higher education. He called attention to the value of goals in relation to the uses of institutional power.[4]

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[1]Corson, op. cit., pp. 118-142.

[2]Archie Dykes, Faculty Participation in Academic Decision Making (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1968), p. 40.

[3]Daniel E. Griffiths, Administrative Theory (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959), pp. 71-91.

[4]Algo Henderson, Policies and Practices in Higher Education (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1960), pp. 217-230.

Problems relating to power and the legal status and position of the higher educational institution have been described by Blackwell, in an analysis of the relationships between higher educational institutions and the state. Blackwell traces the origins, legal powers and responsibilities of institutions to the state, together with the varieties of forms that such relationships may take.[1]

The legal basis for power in the higher educational institution and the authority of institutions and their governing boards was examined by Chambers, who presented specific conclusions concerning the locus of power in the institution.[2] Additional insights into the power and authority of institutions and governing boards is contained in College and University Business Administration.[3]

Mayhew discussed the legality of the power of the institutional president and its effects in faculty-administrative relationships.[4]

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[1] Thomas E. Blackwell, College Law (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1961), pp. 22-55.

[2] M. M. Chambers, "Who Is the University," Journal of Higher Education, XXX, No. 6 (June, 1959), 320-324.

[3] College and University Business Administration (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1968), pp. 18-27.

[4] Lewis B. Mayhew, The Smaller Liberal Arts College (New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education, Inc., 1967), pp. 74-90.

The role of governing boards as the legal holders of power for higher educational institutions has been reported by McGrath. He has described the function of institutional charters in defining the roles of trustees in institutions.[1]

Sullivan reported observations of a number of colleges and universities with respect to the dispersion of power among administrators and faculty members. He discussed the relationship of authority and responsibility and the legal and traditional basis for the delegation of authority in most institutions.[2]

The origins and locus of power in colleges and the authority and responsibility of trustees have been cited by Ruml and Morrison, together with an analysis of the relationship of faculties to the institution and the trustees.[3]

Summary

This Chapter has included an evaluative statement concerning the availability of literature relating to the theoretical study of

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[1] Earl McGrath, "The Control of Higher Education in America," Educational Record, XVII (1936), 259-272.

[2] Richard H. Sullivan, "Administrative-Faculty Relationships in Colleges and Universities," Journal of Higher Education, XXVII (1956), 308-326, 349.

[3] Beardsley Ruml and Donald H. Morrison, Memo to a College Trustee (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 3-13.

power in higher education and reviewing the nature of much of the existing literature in higher education which deals with institutional organization and governance.

The Chapter includes a review of a representative selection of some of the most useful theoretical studies in the fields of sociology and political science dealing with problems of power and with attempts to define and describe social and political power, in organizations.

The Chapter is concluded with an overview of some of the current research and descriptive studies of the origins, sources, functions and uses of power within the higher educational institution, which seem to offer insight into the problem of power on the campus.

CHAPTER III

POWER AND HIGHER EDUCATION

PART I

ON THE NATURE AND QUALITIES OF POWER

Introduction

As Bierstedt noted, few social problems are more perplexing than "power."[1] While difficult of precise definition and conceptualization, and therefore difficult to study,[2] power in its various meanings and conceptions appears to be one of the oldest legacies of man. Berle observes that next to sex and love, it is perhaps the oldest social phenomenon in history, yet that there is no presently accepted theory of power.[3] Few of the most ancient myths are free of the theme of power; indeed, it constitutes the

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[1] Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 730.

[2] Danzger, op. cit., pp. 707-717.

[3] Berle, op. cit., p. 77.

central thread of meaning of many of man's most ancient tales and legends.[1]

In historic times, the advance of civilization and the growing complexity of human organization is a record of the creation, application and effects of power.[2] That so basic and pervasive a phenomenon in man's existence should have escaped attention for serious, systematic study by scholars in the social disciplines until this century is an enigma of history; it may be simply because only lately have attempts been made to formulate concepts rigorously enough to support systematic study.[3]

Kaufman has identified difficulties in the study of power:

> There is an elusiveness about power that endows it with an almost ghostly quality. . . . we "know" what it is, yet we encounter endless difficulties in trying to define it. We can "tell" whether one person or group is more powerful than another, yet we cannot measure power. It is as abstract as time yet as real as a firing squad.[4]

Dahl has observed the general intuitive conception of power and concurs that no theory of power satisfactory for systematic study has

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[1]Sir James Frazer, The Golden Bough (New York: Macmillan Company, 1960).

[2]Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 735.

[3]Dahl, op. cit., pp. 201-218.

[4]Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," Public Administration, XIV (Summer, 1954), 205.

yet emerged.[1] The term power is intuitively understood by people generally as providing its possessor with the ability to more nearly achieve his purposes, goals and aspirations.

Many scholars have observed the apparent universal interest of man in acquiring power. Friedrich noted that "power has always been one of man's dominant ends, and the search for it one of his great passions."[2] Over 300 years ago, Thomas Hobbes noted that man has a broad inclination to seek power: ". . . I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire of power, after power, that ceaseth only with death."[3]

Observations as to possible motivations for a quest for power were offered by Russell: "Every desire (among men), if it cannot be instantly gratified, brings about a wish for the ability to gratify it, and therefore, some form of the love of power."[4] Catlin suggested, "The demand for power is a secondary and self-protective phase of the demand for liberty." Catlin observed that its pursuit is natural to all humanity and that ". . . it is an illusion to suppose

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[1]Dahl, "The Concept of Power," op. cit., p. 201

[2]Friedrich and Blitzer, op. cit., p. 2.

[3]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by Michael Oakeshott (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 64.

[4]Russell, op. cit., p. 25.

otherwise, and a very dangerous one, especially among equalitarian idealists."[1]

What Is Power?

In common lay terms, a dictionary definition offers illustrations of the varied nuances of meaning contained in the word, with which scholars must cope:

> 1) ability to do; capacity to act; capability of performing or producing. 2) a specific ability or faculty: as, the power of hearing, beyond one's powers. 3) great ability to do, to act or affect strongly; vigor, force, strength. 4) the ability to control others; authority, sway, influence; legal ability or authority; a document giving it. 5) physical force or energy, as: electric power. 6) the capacity to exert physical force or energy. 7) a person or thing having great influence, force or authority.[2]

An indication of still other meanings which add to the complexity of the definition of "power" include: a nation; national might or strength; a spirit or divinity; an armed force; a large quantity or number. In mathematics and in optics, power has special meaning; in theology, power may refer to "one of nine orders of angels"![3]

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[1] Catlin, op. cit., p. 762. Also see: Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), pp. 191-203.

[2] Webster's New World Dictionary (College edition; New York: World Publishing Co., 1957).

[3] Ibid.

In order to proceed from a common basis of understanding of the variety of meanings of power, it will be useful to consider some of the more commonly offered definitions of power as a social phenomenon provided by social philosophers and scientists. Such a review will provide illustration of the varied emphasis that such concepts provide.

Definitions of Power

Power has been described as a universal phenomenon in human societies and in all human relationships.[1] Rose has called attention to the lack of an adequate taxonomy of power, and to the use of a number of terms related to the problem, such as: "power," "authority" and "influence" as if they were interchangeable.[2] Dahl noted the importance of making distinctions between the meanings of "power," "influence" and "authority."[3]

Of definitions of power that have been offered, Girvetz[4] accepted Russell's: "Power may be defined as the ability to produce

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[1]Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 730.

[2]Rose, op. cit. An engaging and helpful review of definitions of power and related concepts is found on pages 49-52.

[3]Dahl, op. cit., p. 202.

[4]Girvetz, op. cit., p. 264.

an intended effect."[1] Some scholars define power only in terms of control over other people or groups, as: Banfield: "Power is the ability to establish control over another";[2] Etzioni: "Power is an actor's ability to induce or influence another actor to carry out his directions or any other norms he supports";[3] Goldhamer: "A person may be said to have power to the extent that he influences the behavior of others in accordance with his own intentions";[4] Haer: "Power refers to the ability or authority of individuals or organizations to control, effectively guide or influence other individuals or groups";[5] Tawney: "Power may be defined as the capacity of an individual or group of individuals to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner which he desires . . .";[6] Hunter: "Power . . . will be used to describe acts of men going about the business of moving other men to act in relation to themselves or in relation to

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[1] Russell, op. cit., p. 35.

[2] Edward Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press, 1961) p. 348.

[3] Etzioni, op. cit., p. 4.

[4] Goldhamer, op. cit., p. 171.

[5] John L. Haer, "Social Stratification in Relation to Attitude Toward Sources of Power in a Community," Social Forces, XXXV, No. 2 (December, 1956), 137.

[6] R. H. Tawney, Equality (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1931), p. 230.

organic or inorganic things."[1] This last definition leaves much to be clarified and tends to confuse the role of power in the social and physical worlds.

Other investigators have defined power in terms of the decision-making process, as: "Power . . . is conceived as the ability to exercise influence in a decision-making process,"[2] Hawley; "Power is participation in the making of decisions,"[3] Lasswell; "Power has to do with whatever decisions men make about the arrangements under which they live . . . ,"[4] Mills.

Some scholars define power in relative terms; Dahl's statement of the "intuitive definition of power," referred to above, is: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."[5] Stinchcombe describes power as the amount of difference that the decision of an individual makes in some aspect of social activity. Such differences might vary from

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[1]Hunter, op. cit., pp. 2-4.

[2]Hawley, op. cit., p. 422.

[3]Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 75.

[4]C. Wright Mills, Power Politics and People, ed. by Irving L. Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 23.

[5]Dahl, "The Concept of Power," op. cit., p. 202.

none to total.[1] Karlsson, in efforts to mathematically study power in group relationships, defined power as: A's power over B is the difference between the best A can do to B and the worst he can do. Thus, both are considered holders of power, in relative amounts.[2] Scholz called attention to this relativity: "He who can resist the efforts of others to modify his conduct contrary to his own wishes also wields power."[3] Under such terms, no one is all-powerful, or completely powerless.

Max Weber's definition of power has given rise to a number of investigations as to whether power is fact or potential: "In general, we understand by 'power' the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal act even against the resistence of others who are participating in the action."[4] Abramson was declarative: "Power is considered to be potentiality for action."[5] Kurt Lewin spoke of power as a concept referring to

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[1]Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968), p. 8.

[2]Georg Karlsson, "Some Aspects of Power in Small Groups," Mathematical Methods in Small Group Processes, ed. by Criswell, Solomon and Suppes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 193-202.

[3]Karl Scholz, "Transitions in the Exercise of Power," Social Science, XVIII (July, 1943), 136.

[4]Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 180.

[5]Abramson et al., op. cit., p. 17.

a "possibility of inducing forces" of a certain magnitude on another person.[1] Power is thus regarded as a potential force. Schulze concluded:

> It seems far more sociologically sound to accept a Weberian definition which stresses the potential to act. Power may thus be conceived as an inherently group-linked property, an attribute of social statuses rather than of individual persons. Whether or not the specific individuals in these statuses cash in on their control potential . . . is not important in the conceptual classification of the key term, power.[2]

Such a definition may be convenient in attempts to identify power as a property or consequence of social status. That it assists in clarifying our view of the nature of power seems doubtful. Such a view of power could bolster attempts to measure the comparative amounts of power presumably held by individuals and groups in studies of "power structures" in social systems, where such estimates are based on opinion surveys which describe presumed power holders, but where no actual test of such power has been made. Other scholars agree that the definition of power as potential is unsatisfactory: Lasswell and associates found that the difference between actual and potential power is hard to determine and may

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[1]Dorwin Cartwright, ed., Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers by Kurt Lewin (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1951), p. 40.

[2]Robert O. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City," in Community Political Systems, ed. by Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1961), p. 20.

rest finally on performance.[1] Polsby has suggested that the only certain way to establish the existence of power is to see it used to successfully achieve its purpose.[2] Coser observed, "It is difficult to appraise the relative power of the contenders before a conflict has settled the issue."[3] Scholz concurred that only in action can objective evidence of the existence of power be established: "The test of our ability to do anything is to do it."[4] Bierstedt's view of power as a potential requires different concepts of the nature of power. He stated that ". . . power is always 'potential'; that is, when it is used, it becomes something else, either force or authority." He defined power as latent force; force as manifest power and authority as institutionalized power. Unlike force, power is always successful; when it is not successful, it is not, or ceases to be, power.[5]

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[1]Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and C. Eaton Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 8.

[2]Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 3.

[3]Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 134.

[4]Scholz, op. cit., p. 135.

[5]Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 736.

In attempting to summarize the varied definitions and conceptions of power as described by scientists and philosophers, one may be reminded of the East Indian legend of the four blind men, confronted with an elephant, who said, successively, that he was like a wall, a snake, a tree and a whip, as indeed, he was, depending on the part of him with which each came in touch. For purposes of this study, reduced to simple terms, social power will be defined as: the capacity to achieve a desired result.

The Origins of Social Power

It will be evident from the definitions of power considered and offered, that social power has its origin in the objectives, goals and aspirations of an individual or of groups. Something must be wanted; something must be sought.[1]

Thus, it may be hypothesized that:

> the idea, resolution or conscious commitment to attain something desired or sought is the beginning of power, though the actual achievement of the sought condition may only be effected by accretions of power sufficient to effect it.

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[1] Russell, op. cit., p. 25. Also see: Abramson, op. cit., p. 15.

Social objectives or goals can probably be attained most often by group effort; the accretions of power necessary for achievement may come only from the combined abilities of a group. Such resolutions or commitments toward a goal may be held separately by individuals or concurrently in a group. That the uses and effects of power may vary as between individuals and group power holders seems clear, and will be developed below. In summary, it may be hypothesized that power has its beginnings at a point in time and place where conscious resolution is made toward a desired social result.

The Sources of Social Power

It is implicit in the definitions of power considered above that power can have its basis in a variety of sources. Further, these definitions suggest that power can serve the purposes of an individual or a group, though the uses and effects may vary as between individuals and groups. In either case, power can serve as a resource for the achievement of social goals.

Classifications of Power

Students of social power have identified several ways of distinguishing or classifying power. Girvetz[1] has devised a system

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[1]Girvetz, op. cit., p. 264.

which appears to be one of the most useful suggested to date. He states that power may be classified by reference to: 1) its source; 2) the methods employed in wielding it; 3) its extent, and 4) its effects. The Girvetz system of classification will be used below, to assist in the examination of a number of possible sources of power.

Power Classified by Source

Among types of power classified as to source, Thomas Hobbes, in 1651, listed riches, knowledge and honor as ". . . but several sorts of power."[1] Many scholars cite economic resources as a source of power. Berle says economic power is never absolute, though it is virtually unlimited when in combination with police, military or political power. Absent these other combinations of power, economic power is controllable.[2] Kuhn discusses types of power in terms of "money" and "non-money" based power.[3]

Prestige should not be regarded as a source of power, but rather a consequence of it, according to Bierstedt. "Similar observations may be made about the relations of knowledge, skill,

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[1]Hobbes, op. cit., p. 46.

[2]Berle, op. cit., p. 87.

[3]Alfred Kuhn, The Study of Society: A Unified Approach (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., and The Dorsey Press, 1963), Part V.

competence, ability and eminence, to power. They are all components of, sources of or synonyms of prestige."[1] Some scholars do not agree with Bierstedt concerning these latter observations, as will be evident below; to suggest that power may or may not be developed from such sources seems hazardous, at best. Bierstedt states further that power arises "only where there is competition, conflict or opposition." This seems to be a difficult position to defend: there may well be instances where a social goal is sought and where there is no organized social opposition (as, perhaps, a community medical service) but where considerable power is required for its accomplishment.[2] Bierstedt concluded that power stems from three sources: 1) numbers of people; 2) social organization, and 3) resources. However, he listed as resources: money, property, prestige, knowledge, competence, fraud and other variables as factors which, though not in themselves power, may help tip the scales in favor of their possessor.[3] This seems as a circular reasoning at best, as suggestive of uncertainty by Bierstedt as to what may constitute power sources.

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[1] Bierstedt, op. cit., pp. 731-732.

[2] Ibid., pp. 736-737.

[3] Ibid.

In contrast to widely held views of power as being physical or coercive force, Stinchcombe notes that values may be a principal source of power.[1] Lasswell states that "Power may rest on faiths and loyalties as well as interests, to say nothing of habits and apathy."[2] Merriam has observed, "It cannot be concluded that the essence of the power situation is force, in the sense of violence and physical brutality. Altruism as well as egoism has a place in human relations and organization and cooperation has as genuine a position as coercion."[3]

Charisma in individuals and leaders is often listed as a source of power by investigators. The charismatic qualities of leaders are discussed by Neeley.[4] An extensive analysis of charismatic power is provided by Etzioni, by whom the phenomenon is defined as "an extraordinary quality of a person."[5] While the social and political effects and consequences of charisma are undoubtedly

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[1] Stinchcombe, op. cit., p. 183.

[2] Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 76.

[3] C. E. Merriam, Political Power (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934), p. 20.

[4] Twila E. Neeley, "The Sources of Political Power: A Contribution to the Sociology of Leadership," American Journal of Sociology, XXXIII (March, 1928), 769-783.

[5] Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, op. cit., pp. 201-262.

significant, it is not a quality usually assigned to organizations and will not be examined in this study. Pape has classified other types of political power according to sources.[1]

Ehrlich has observed that the sheer fact of the possession of power may deter action in others.[2] In such an instance, the possession of power might be a source of still greater power; such a process serves as an example of the nearly infinite sources from which power can come.

Power Classified by Methods of Wielding It

In classifying power according to Girvetz's second type, methods employed in wielding it, Etzioni has concurred that "power differs according to the means employed to make the subjects comply." The means may be: 1) physical, 2) material, or 3) symbolic. Physical or coercive powers rest on the application or threat of physical sanctions (pain, deformity, death), restriction of movement, or forceful control of satisfaction of human needs, as food, comfort and the like. Material power is based on control of material

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[1] Leslie M. Pape, "Sources and Limits of Political Power," Social Forces, XVIII (March, 1940), 424-428.

[2] Howard J. Ehrlich, "Power and Democracy: A Critical Discussion," in Power and Democracy in America, ed. by William V. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), p. 92.

sources and rewards, as, salaries, and economic benefits. Normative power rests on the allocation or maniplation of symbolic rewards, as: esteem, prestige, acceptance, fame and honor.[1]

Sanctions may take many forms, as: custom, social pressure, psychological domination, goals and purposes, economic pressures--even the unwillingness to accept personal responsibility.[2] According to Banfield, coercion or control is the ability to cause another to give or withhold action; one who is controlled acts as the agent of the one who controls.[3] The use of coercive force reaches a high level in military organizations. Because their actions center on violence in situations of crisis, they preserve the right to exercise drastic sanctions against their personnel.[4]

Concerning the wielding of power, Ehrlich notes that holders of social power may not use it.[5] Conflict may be a means of wielding power and may consist of a test of power between antagonists.

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[1] Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, op. cit., p. 5.

[2] Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 130-133.

[3] Banfield, op. cit., p. 348.

[4] Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 43.

[5] Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 91.

Accommodation between them may be possible only if each is aware of the relative strength of both parties.[1] Kimbrough observes that the use of power may involve coercion, domination, command, manipulation, charisma, influence or varying combinations of these.[2] Rossi has identified what he calls the "polylithic" power system, in which groups within a larger organization (such as schools or colleges within a university) may seek to acquire authority by taking it from each other, in order to attain a larger measure of influence over policy in the total organization.[3]

In order to wield power over others, it is important for the power holder to know what they are doing. Thus, power and authority are closely related. Communications through an organization are effected by hierarchical structures of authority.[4]

Power Classified According to Extent

A third classification of power, according to extent, has confronted scholars with many perplexing problems, where attempts

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[1] Coser, op. cit., p. 137.

[2] Ralph Kimbrough, Political Power and Educational Decision Making (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964), p. 7.

[3] Peter H. Rossi, "Power and Community Structure, in Political Sociology, ed. by Lewis A. Coser (New York: Harper, 19__), pp. 141-145.

[4] Stinchcombe, op. cit., p. 9.

have been made to measure the extent of power, and to describe the range and directions that it may include. It is evident that the extent of power cannot be considered apart from the circumstances and actors in each instance of its manifestation.

Berle has found that power has at least two aspects: the power of an organization over its members, and power over, or capacity to affect, people outside the organization.[1] Rose has classified power in several ways, one of which is scope or extent.[2] Power as to extent might also be considered from the viewpoint of the social and geographic outreach of various forms or types of it. Power has been classified as being composed of two sub-types, authority and influence, both of which are necessary to its successful employment.[3]

In assessing the extent of power, Danzger noted that power and a reputation for power are two different things.[4] He underscored the dangers attendant to the careless study of power and the building of fanciful structures of community or organizational "power

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[1]Berle, op. cit., p. 81.

[2]Rose, op. cit., pp. 49-51.

[3]William V. D'Antonio and William H. Form, Influentials in Two Border Cities (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), p. 11.

[4]Danzger, op. cit., pp. 708-710.

structures" upon estimates of power which are based on opinion surveys of observers and which do not take into account actual ability or disposition to perform. The size or amount of resources of power is no guarantee of success; one may not use it at all, or if so, badly or ineptly.[1] Dahl concluded that a reputation for power is not a valid index for power. Reputation for power has provided the basis of the difficulties to be faced in evaluating studies such as those of Hunter[2] and Miller[3] and others. In these studies, individuals are presumed to have power because someone in the community believed they did. Dahl has held that it would be more useful and productive in any attempt to measure power to study actual series of concrete decisions, to find out who actually made them.[4]

Abramson and associates established difficult criteria as the basis for the comparative measurement of power: the presence

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[1]Robert A. Dahl, "Equality and Power in American Society," in Power and Democracy in America, ed. by William V. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), pp. 76-80.

[2]Hunter, op. cit.

[3]Delbert C. Miller, "Democracy and Decision-Making in the Community Power Structure," in Power and Democracy in America, ed. by William V. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), pp. 47-49.

[4]Dahl, "Equality and Power in Americal Society," op. cit., p. 76.

of open lines of action, the definition of a common objective for two or more actors and the specification of the actors being compared.[1] Access to such knowledge would probably always be severely limited and based heavily on subjective evaluation of either observers or subjects. Similar hazards would seem to accompany Dahl's prescription: one must compare power actors with respect to the resources they are capable of evoking.[2] How the nature and extent of such resources is to be learned is not made clear.

Other investigators, such as Hawley, have been concerned with efforts to attempt to measure comparative power in organizations.[3] Girvetz has observed that modern power theorists do not accept the traditionalist view that power exists, in extent, only in fixed quantities.[4] Dykes is among those who do not accept the concept of power as a specific amount, which can be divided.[5] Thus, the classification of power as to extent seems to require some basis for the determination of extent; such efforts to date have been largely unsuccessful.

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[1]Abramson et al., op. cit., p. 17.

[2]Dahl, "The Concept of Power," op. cit., p. 206.

[3]Hawley, op. cit., pp. 423-424.

[4]Girvetz, op. cit., p. 265.

[5]Dykes, op. cit., p. 40.

Power Classified by Effects

In the classification of power by its effects, there are additional difficulties, among which are the establishment of the effects, in some instances. Rose has examined power through the observation of actual behavior, with intended effects, though such effects must necessarily be presumed, in many instances.[1] Berle has found that the use of power may often have unintended effects, which may even be of greater consequence than those intended.[2] As to the effect of power on individuals and organizations, the familiar dictum of Lord Acton, "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely,"[3] appears to have influenced the presuppositions of many students of power. The statement has been sharply challenged by Neumann, who called it a "facile, half-true generalization" and who has offered examples in refutation.[4] Yves Simon concluded that the effect of power in the form of coercion is physical while that of persuasion is moral, with the origination of a disposition in the will.[5]

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[1]Rose, op. cit., p. 52.

[2]Berle, op. cit., p. 83.

[3]John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1948), p. 365.

[4]Neumann, op. cit., p. 163.

[5]Simon, op. cit., p. 8.

A number of additional ways of classifying power have been proposed in addition to that by Girvetz. Weber suggested another possible system, that of classification by the purposes for which men seek power, as, social honor.[1] Such a system would seem to be endless, in practical effect, for there is no evident limit to the reasons for which men might seek power. Another typology of power by French and Raven suggests that power be identified as: 1) Reward Power (the ability to reward); 2) Coercive Power (ability to punish); 3) Legitimate Power (based on acceptance of the right of the holder of it); 4) Referent Power (based on some identification, as, charisma) and 5) Expert Power (based on knowledge, expertness).[2] This typology seems even less helpful, in that it introduces confusions of legitimacy, sources and effects of power.

Etzioni has noted still other typologies of power, as: Boulding: identification, economic means and coercion; Niebuhr: coercion, self-interest and love; Neuman: persuasion, material benefits and violence; Commons: physical, econimic and moral;

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[1] Gerth, op. cit., p. 180.

[2] John R. P. French, Jr., and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," in Studies in Social Power, ed. by Dorwin Cartwright (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1959), pp. 150-167.

Janowitz: economic, violence and persuasion, and a comparable typology by Deutsch.[1]

In summary of the examination of the sources of power, certain observations and hypotheses concerning the classifications and characteristics of power may be offered. Money, knowledge, intelligence, competence and skill, physical force, coercion in many forms--all may be significant sources of power under circumstances that favor the advantage that each may offer. There is an additional group of sources for power, each of which have their origins (in relative strength) in individuals, but which may become the characteristics of groups and organizations, as Selznick has pointed out.[2] These might include: motivation, zeal, dedication, clearly perceived values, where such values or qualities are held to be important by those who will be affected by power based in them. Other individual qualities which may pervade a group and become primary sources of power could include: courage, audacity, energy, speed, agility, and other like qualities. Human experience substantiates instances in which such sources of power appear to have been primary and crucial, in the resolution of major social issues.

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[1] Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, op. cit., p. 5.

[2] Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), pp. 90-119.

Indeed, one might list most of the identifiable capabilities of humanity and defend them as sources of power, where circumstances might require or allow them, individually, to prevail. To suggest that there are "three" or "two" or "five" sources of power seems naive in the extreme, in the face of the evidence.

Hawley has observed that power in the social sphere, like energy in the physical sphere, is ubiquitous: it appears in many forms: "Every social act is an exercise of power, every social relationship is a power equation and every social group or system is an organization of power."[1]

It remained for Friedrich to summarize the often confusing views of the sources of power with sufficient insight to reveal the dimensions of the problem: neither things nor ideas are ". . . power taken by themselves; they become instruments in the hands of one seeking power. To convert them to power, the power seeker must find human beings who value the things sufficiently to obey his orders in return. . . ."[2]

Authority

In this study, authority is hypothetically defined as being derivative of power. Authority is less than full or total power.

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[1] Hawley, op. cit., p. 422.

[2] Friedrich, op. cit., p. 12.

Authority is specific power, a degree of power, a part of the total power of an organization, which has been delegated from the whole.

As with definitions of power, scholars over several decades have supplied varied descriptions of their conceptions of authority. A dictionary defines authority as:

> 1) the power or right to give commands, enforce obedience, take action or make final decision; jurisdiction. 2) this power as delegated to another; authorization: as, he has my authority to do it. 3) power or influence resulting from knowledge, prestige, etc. 4) a person, writing, etc., cited in support of an opinion. 5) usually in plural, a government official or other person having the power or right to enforce orders, laws, etc. 6) a person with much knowledge or experience in some field, whose opinion is hence reliable; expert. [1]

Definitions and Conceptions of Authority

Simon has defined authority as the power to make decisions which guide the actions of another, as a relationship between two individuals, one "superior" and the other "subordinate."[2] Banfield stated that, "Authority is the right to give or withhold action requisite to the adoption of a proposal; only an actor who can perform such actions (who is 'authorized') has authority."[3] D'Antonio saw authority as ". . . the right to control the decision

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[1] Webster's, op. cit.

[2] Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 125.

[3] Banfield, op. cit., p. 348.

making process in prescribed areas and under specialized conditions."[1]

The function of authority is to assure the unity of action of an organized group, aiming at a common goal, which may only be attained by common action.[2] Authority permits specialization in decision making, secures expertise in the making of decisions and permits coordination of activity. It may also enforce responsibility to those who wield authority.[3]

The Locus of Authority

Several investigators have found that authority resides in a position within an organized group rather than in a person; it is the position which is invested with authority, not the individual.[4] Bierstedt: "The right to use force is . . . attached to certain statuses within the association and this right is what we ordinarily mean by authority." He concludes that power is attached to statuses, not persons, and is wholly institutionalized as authority, which is

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[1] D'Antonio and Ehrlich, Power and Democracy in America, op. cit., p. 132.

[2] Yves Simon, op. cit., p. 17.

[3] Herbert Simon, op. cit., pp. 134-135.

[4] D'Antonio and Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 132. Also see: Hawley, op. cit., p. 423.

essentially a view of Max Weber.[1] However, Yves Simon has suggested that the seat of authority is in a person and not in the form of an impersonal necessity.[2] It probably cannot be said that the holder of a position of authority is not a factor in the effectiveness of authority. Bierstedt noted that authority may at times be tenuous and related to the personal qualities of its holder, as: a dean may have the authority to dismiss a professor, but does not dare to do so because of the professor's popularity. While such a condition does not change the locus of authority, it may reveal something of the holder of the position.[3] Personal charismatic qualities and other personal attributes may be presumed to have a definite effect in the acceptance of the authority delegated to the position.

Authority and Control

Authority and control are not synonymous. As Lasswell noted, "the king who reigns may not rule."[4] In such instances, we may assume or postulate the intervention of a force of power that is real, which does maintain control, whether legitimate or not.

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[1] Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 734.

[2] Yves Simon, op. cit., p. 7.

[3] Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 734.

[4] Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell, op. cit., p. 8.

Day has found that in political sociology, authority means power to command voluntary obedience. This power is causative, not coercive. In legal discussions, authority means not actual power, but power prescribed by political rules. Thus, it is possible for a ruler to have "legal" without sociological authority, and visa versa.[1]

Barnard stated that the question of whether or not authority exists lies with the people to whom it is addressed and not with the person or position of authority.[2] When the behavior that is expected to follow a command or request from authority does not occur, no authority can be said to exist, whether or not it is theoretically present, according to Simon.[3] It may be noted that Barnard's and Simon's requirement is essentially a test of legitimacy of authority; such a test serves simply as a validation of acceptance for a system of authority already established and claimed. Thus, legitimacy becomes only one requirement for the successful function of authority in the power process, after a system for the use of authority has already been established. Legitimacy of power and authority will be further examined below. Thus, as with tests

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[1] J. Day, "Authority," Politische Studien (Oxford), XI, No. 3 (October, 1963), 257-271.

[2] Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, op. cit., pp. 160-184.

[3] Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 125.

for power, some scholars require a test of performance for authority, to establish its existence. Thus, too, subtle differences in definition are established. Concerning acceptance of authority, Arendt has suggested that a general acceptance of authority is declining in the world, in the sense of people's acceptance of organizations, structures or ideas which have formerly been accepted or respected as authoritative.[1]

Abramson and his associates have made the interesting observation that

> power tends to be dissipated in the assignment of authority. The assignor commits himself to the one who accepts the authority and to certain lines of action. He is restricted because the other is acting in his name. The one who accepts the authority must accept also the limitations of the assignor.[2]

Hypotheses on Authority

The capacity to delegate authority implies the existence of a hierarchical structure or organization, in which holders of greater power assign a part of their power to subordinates, in a successive number of steps or stages, to accomplish specific purposes. Thus, power is channeled from its source in the total organization to various organizations or individuals who have been variously elected,

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[1]Hannah Arendt, "Authority in the Twentieth Century, Review of Politics, XVIII, No. 4 (October, 1956), 403-417.

[2]Abramson et al., op. cit., p. 20.

selected, employed or otherwise chosen as delegates of the more powerful body, to accomplish certain specific things.

Characteristically, the amounts of power that are passed down through such a hierarchical system or structure tend to be successviely less and less and to be delegated for increasingly more specialized and specific tasks. Authority must be clearly and specifically delegated, in order that it may not be misunderstood, misinterpreted, illegally assumed or taken by default, in the absence of resistance from the power source, where it has not been formally or intentionally granted to the delegate.

Authority that is delegated can also be taken away or modified; superior power rests in the hands of the source delegating the power. Authority cannot exist in the absence of a superior power source. By definition, it is a delegation of a portion of a larger concentration of power. Such a delegation of a portion of power may not be permanent, but rather, is a temporary trust to an individual or group, to accomplish specific purposes. The actual power still resides in the original source, which has simply delegated an agent to perform for it.

Further, it appears that authority cannot be delegated without the power to do so. Unless power exists in a source, no delegation of a portion of it can occur. Where authority is claimed,

and as those people over whom such authority would be used accept it and other elements in the society do not challenge it successfully, it is not authority alone but the expression of authority of a new source of power.

Authority can become power in and of itself, only as the original source which delegated it loses the capacity or interest in reclaiming or withdrawing it, abdicates it or otherwise relinquishes its claim to that portion of power.

Authority extends to and includes whatever the power source delegates to its agent, whether formally and intentionally, or whether by acquiescence or by default in the reservation of powers for itself.

From the viewpoint of its establishment, the real degree or extent of authority is the degree of the grant of it, not the actual use or effective discharge of it by the grantee. That more authority may be appropriated than was originally granted can be regarded as an additional delegation of authority, where the power source makes no effort to retain, regain or withhold such additional power.

Influence

The introduction of the term "influence" as descriptive of some aspects of the functioning of the power process in society seems both to assist and to obscure understanding of power and of the characteristics of its workings and effects. Influence is

sometimes used to describe the application of a degree of power insufficient to control a situation but adequate to modify or change conditions as they would have been without its introduction. In other usages, influence is regarded as synonymous with power, or even with authority. Again, to establish the basis of the lay understanding of the term, a dictionary definition states:

> 1) originally, the supposed flowing of an ethereal fluid or power from the stars, thought to affect the characters and actions of people. 2) the power of persons or things to affect others, seen only in its effects. The effect or action of such power. 3) the power of a person or group to produce effects without the exertion of physical force or authority, based on wealth, social position, ability, etc. 4) a person or thing that has influence.[1]

As with other terms related to power, scholars have provided varied interpretations of the meaning of influence, as opposed to "power" and "authority." Consideration of some of these concepts may provide perspective and insights into the general problem of power.

Concepts and Definitions of Influence

An unfortunate tendency for some investigators to use the terms "power" and "influence" interchangeably presents some difficulties for systematic study; as, Banfield: "By influence is meant

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[1] Webster's, op. cit.

ability to get others to act, think or feel as one intends" and: "Influence is a generic term including authority, control and power."[1] Goldhamer and Shils found three types of "influence": force, domination and manipulation.[2]

Parsons defined influence as a means of persuasion, and offers a typology of the kinds of influence he has identified: 1) political; 2) fiduciary (money); 3) appeal to differential loyalties; 4) influence oriented to the interpretation of norms.[3] Bierstedt pointed to the necessity to maintain a distinction between influence and power: "Influence is persuasive, while power is coercive." One submits voluntarily to influence while power requires submission. He noted that power and influence can be independent variables; one might have enormous influence but very little power.[4] Gamson used influence to describe power, where power is not strong enough to be decisive.[5]

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[1]Banfield, op. cit., pp. 3, 348.

[2]Goldhamer and Shils, op. cit., p. 172.

[3]Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVII (Spring, 1963), 48, 52.

[4]Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 731.

[5]William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 18-19.

Rossi[1] and Lasswell and Kaplan[2] distinguish between power and influence by the presence of the threat of sanctions in power. Simon noted that in influence, an actor may receive a suggestion toward a given course of action, but acts on his own conviction; in authority or power, the actor holds his own decisions or judgments in abeyance and acts on the basis of an order or request.[3] Parsons has observed that influence may or may not change an opinion or prevent a possible change.[4]

Influence has been identified by D'Antonio as a phenomenon related to the individual, based on personal qualities such as popularity, reputation, skills, obligations and persuasiveness. He believed the capacity for influence resides in the individual and that "in some measure, . . . influence is a component of every social act."[5] The characteristics of individuals who have major influence has been described by Miller.[6] Katz and Lazarsfeld found that

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[1]Rossi, op. cit., p. 425.

[2]Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 76.

[3]Herbert Simon, op. cit., pp. 126-127.

[4]Parsons, op. cit., p. 38.

[5]D'Antonio and Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 132.

[6]Delbert Miller, op. cit., pp. 47-49.

influence in and by groups appears to be limited to specific areas of interest which are valued by those upon whom the influence is being used.[1] As with power, Parsons stated that the amount of it is not fixed,[2] and Dahl emphasized the difficulty attendant to any attempt to measure amounts of influences precisely.[3]

Responsibility

The concept of responsibility in relation to questions of power and authority is largely unexamined by scholars and power theorists. Since the functioning of a hierarchical social structure (such as the college or university) is dependent on the acceptance of authority by the delegate and upon some disposition to discharge this commission according to the terms of his trust, it is curious that this phenomenon has received so little attention.

Responsibility can be defined as the condition, quality or fact of being accountable. It is useful to consider the lay or common usages of the term, responsibility, in order to examine its role in the power process. A dictionary definition of responsibility provides these interpretations:

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[1] Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), pp. 321-334.

[2] Parsons, op. cit., p. 61.

[3] Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 164-165.

> 1) expected or obliged to account (for something to someone); answerable; accountable: as, he is responsible for the car. 2) involving accountability, obligation or duties; as, he has a responsible position. 3) answerable or accountable as being the cause, agent or source of something (with for): as, who is responsible for this state of affairs? 4) able to distinguish between right and wrong and to think and act rationally, and, hence, accountable for one's behavior. 5) trustworthy; dependable; reliable; able to pay debts or meet obligations.[1]

Webster's defines the term "responsible" as applying to one who has been delegated some duty or responsibility by one in higher authority and who is subject to penalty in case of default. The term "answerable" in this context implies a moral or legal obligation for which one must answer to someone in higher authority, sitting in judgment. "Accountable" in this usage implies liability for something of value, or responsibility for one's own actions, for which one may be called to account.[2]

Definitions and Concepts of Responsibility

The concept of responsibility must be a central issue in any consideration of the relation between administrative and legislative bodies, or in any analysis of the law of organizational administration.[3] Barnard found that "Responsibility . . . is the power

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[1] Webster's, op. cit.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 137.

of a particular code of morals to control the conduct of the individual in the presence of strong contrary desires or impulses." He states that there cannot be authority without corresponding responsibility.[1] Accountability is the basis of the right to exercise authority; such a right to authority is grounded in group norms and legitimized by the fact that those in authority can be held accountable for their actions and decisions.[2] This is the function of responsibility: to enforce conformity to norms and regulations laid down by the group delegating authority.[3]

Ayers has noted that the delegation of responsibility in no manner or degree diminishes that of the group or official making the delegation of it.[4] Simon has concluded that the concept of an administrative hierarchy in a democratic state or organization would be unthinkable without the corresponding idea of a mechanism whereby that hierarchy is or may be held to account.[5] He has observed that

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[1] Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, op. cit., pp. 174, 263-267.

[2] D'Antonio and Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 132.

[3] Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 136.

[4] Archie R. Ayers and John H. Russel, Internal Structure: Organization and Administration of Institutions of Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Education, 1962), p. 15.

[5] Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 136.

the probabilities are that most individuals accept responsibility because of socially indoctrinated ethical notions rather than out of fear of sanctions. One might conclude that by far the majority of such acceptances are so based.

Responsibility is but a synonym for authority, according to Drucker. The one condition always accompanies the other. Drucker states that those who are asserting responsibility should always be asked whether they have authority. For, those who do not, seek power, not contribution: people ordinarily shun responsibility; one must suspect those who volunteer for responsibility to be seeking power. Whatever their intention, they seek power to which they have no legitimate claim.[1] Thus, authority and responsibility are considered as indispensable complements.

Hypotheses on Responsibility

While there is no objective basis for comparison, it is a common experience of those placed in authority that they are given responsibility equal in some reasonable measure to the degree of authority. In a theoretical sense, it would seem necessary that

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[1] Peter Drucker, "Freedom and Effective Government," in Power and Democracy in America, ed. by William V. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1961), p. 15.

responsibility should exactly equal authority. In practical application, it is probably rare that such a matching can actually occur, or that there exists any accurate measure of those circumstances under which such a condition can be achieved. In the interest of harmonious functioning within an organization, an agreement between measures of delegated authority and responsibility would seem essential: the responsibility attendant to a delegation of authority should not be at variance with the measure of authority delegated.

Many hypothetical inequities might be conceived, in the relation of responsibility and authority. Practically, it would seem impossible to have the assignment of responsibility without authority; the reverse seems only slightly more likely. The exchange would seem to be in the nature of a contract: one offers responsibility in exchange for a delegation of authority. Both conditions are assigned and a part of the agreement.

Final responsibility for the outcome of a situation must clearly rest with the power source which has the capacity of delegation of authority. It alone has the capability of making a delegation; the purposes for which the delegation of authority and responsibility is made are its purposes, <u>not</u> those of the delegate, initially. Thus, failure of accomplishment of a part or all of a total program of purposes must be regarded as a failure of the

initiating power source; sanctions applied or whatever measures the power source may take to seek adjustment or restitution from its delegate of authority are incidental. In summary, a condition of inseparability exists between authority and responsibility; one cannot be delegated without the other, nor can one be claimed or assumed without the other.

The Legitimacy of Power

Legitimate power has been defined as power that is acknowledged by a subordinate. "Legal" power is that based on laws and decrees.[1] Berle has found that power rests with individuals or groups because it is believed that the holder is entitled to it by some test or standard. The corollary is that "the holder can be deprived of it if demonstration is made that there is no title or right to his possession of it." Thus, Berle has defined legitimacy as the rightful possession of power. Legitimacy assumes a criterion of judgment; in a democracy, no other instrument of judgment has been devised other than the public consensus. "There is . . . no instance in history in which any group, great or small, has not set up some theory of right to power. A feudal prince derived his right from his overlord, who in turn claimed to derive it from God."[2]

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[1] Goldhamer and Shils, op. cit., p. 172.

[2] Berle, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

Sources of power in groups and in the larger society are made effective by social norms, consensus, traditions and customs, which themselves have evolved from the interplay and workings of power over time. Whether these accepted norms are highly structured within a group or unstructured in the larger society does not negate their influence, except relatively.

Effectiveness and the continuity of power itself thus rests on an ideological structure. Attempts to secure compliance with authority, the results sought and even the ways in which the process is pursued must be in some measure of harmony with the body of concepts which inspire the loyalty at the outset. And, the "violation of this structure in time leads to dissolution of the allegiance, to lack of cooperation and eventually to the decay of the power."[1] Stinchcombe has noted that doctrines of legitimacy of power both reinforce and limit power by specifying conditions under which an exercise of power may be supported by other sources of power.[2] Berle stated that public concensus is not static; it is in a constant state of development and transition. But it is the final arbiter of legitimacy.[3] Legitimacy of power thus may bolster the holder,

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[1] Berle, op. cit., p. 80.

[2] Stinchcombe, op. cit., p. 9.

[3] Berle, op. cit., p. 110.

liberal or traditionalist, alike, in the uses of power, whatever its sources.

Power in Organizations

It has been observed that the various classifications of power cited above can serve either the individual or the group, in differentiated ways. By definition, if sufficient power exists to effect an end, it may be achieved.

Over the passage of time, informal groups and formal organizations have been formed from numbers of individuals. The primitive hunters pooled their capabilities in order to successfully hunt the mammoth: a group was formed to achieve a definite purpose. Political scientists have described the process by which civil governments and states have arisen as a consequence of the coalition of tribes, bands and territorially-based groups.[1] The literature of political organization treats the rise of modern civil states in detail, together with the varying benevolent or tyrannical forms which such governments may take.

The Locus of Power

Power is essential to order in society. Bierstedt has stated that "Power supports the fundamental order of society and

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[1] Catlin, op. cit.

the social organization within it, wherever there is order. Power stands behind every association and sustains its structure. Without power, there is no organization and without power there is no order."[1] Power other than that required to administer immediate brute force can only be exercised through organization; it must be capable of partial delegation and redelegation. Organization is the system by which decisions can be made causative at distant points of application.[2]

The building of an organization requires the bringing together and the consolidation of the aggregate powers of individuals and then, the redistribution of these powers within the organization. Each individual contributes something to the organization, in the form of some of his individual freedom to do as he wishes. This contribution is made out of the expectation of receiving some desired value in return for his cooperation.[3] Thus, it may be concluded, "The locus of power is in groups; it expresses itself in intergroup relations."[4]

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[1] Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 734.

[2] Berle, op. cit., p. 81.

[3] Ibid., p. 81.

[4] Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 732.

Danzger has observed that "power may be cumulative and numerous individuals each with a little power, may have great power when united."[1] One is compelled to note that this concept has always been the basis of social organization. The critical question is unity; all attempts toward the accumulation of effective power must be predicated on unity of purposes and goals.

McKeon has found that the use of power in organizations is toward the satisfaction of the aspiration of the group and in the influencing of the actions of others.[2]

Organizations Defined

Organizations are social units established deliberately for the achievement of particular goals. Organizations utilize systems for the division of labor, resources of power and communications, which are not random or traditional. They have centers of power and practice the interchangeability of personnel in various positions of authority.[3] Stinchcombe has described organizations as "decision making systems to which a defined group of powers have been

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[1] Danzger, op. cit., p. 711.

[2] Richard McKeon, "Power and the Language of Power," Ethics, LVIII, No. 2 (January, 1958), 98-115.

[3] Etzioni, Modern Organizations, op. cit., p. 3.

entrusted so they can achieve certain purposes."[1] Dimock concluded that organization itself implies power.[2]

Goals in Organizations

Etzioni defined goals as a state of affairs which the organization is attempting to realize.[3] It is necessary that there be some measure of agreement and consensus as to the organizational purposes or goals, in order for authority to be effective,[4] (and indeed, for the organization to have been founded at the outset). Thus, goals are "an image of a future state, which may or may not be brought about."[5] Coser, in discussing goals, noted that whatever they may be within an organization, power is necessary for their accomplishment.[6]

Goals are the critical condition for the establishment of organizations. Social power has no meaning apart from purposes and goals: "It is imperative that there be some objective, for without

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[1] Stinchcombe, op. cit., p. 154.

[2] Marshall Dimock, A Philosophy of Administration Toward Creative Growth (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 167.

[3] Etzioni, An Analysis of Complex Organizations, op. cit., p. 71.

[4] Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 134.

[5] Etzioni, An Analysis of Complex Organizations, op. cit., p. 71.

[6] Coser, op. cit., p. 134.

it there can be neither power nor social action."[1] One cannot consider power apart from the purposes of power; thus, one may join with Dahl, in asking: Power over what? Power to accomplish what?[2]

Rose stated that formal organizations are required for the exercise of power, with the largest concentrations of social power tending to center in political organizations.[3] Bierstedt concluded that powers tend not to become institutionalized in informal groups.[4] He credited power as being the impetus for the formation of organizations as well as the source of the stability which is maintained within them throughout their history. Authority within the organization cannot exist without the immediate support of the organization's power and the ultimate prospect of the sanction of force.

Power and the Democratic State

Lasswell and Kaplan have defined the state as distinguishable from other political systems or governments by its ability to retain exclusive right to decide conditions under which physical

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[1] Abramson et al., op. cit., p. 15.

[2] Dahl, "Equality and Power in American Society," op. cit., p. 76.

[3] Rose, op. cit., p. 244.

[4] Bierstedt, op. cit., pp. 734-736.

coercion is to be employed.[1] Althusius, in the fifteenth century, traced the rise of states from social units beginning with the family, as noted centuries earlier by Aristotle, wherein such units unite and build up, in pyramid fashion, to form a state.[2] Both Locke and Althusius were advocates of a central political idea: the sovereignty of the people, acting through popularly elected representatives.[3] John Locke stated a fundamental concept of democratic systems of government in 1690: ". . . thus, that which begins and actually constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society, and this is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world."[4] Russell noted that John Stuart Mill's view of the proper role of power in a democracy was that ". . . men were to be free in so far as their actions did not injure others, but when others were involved they might, if expedient, be restrained by action of the state."[5]

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[1] Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

[2] Catlin, op. cit., p. 159.

[3] Friedrich, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

[4] John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, ed. by J. W. Gough (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 49-50.

[5] Russell, op. cit., p. 228.

Scholz stated that democracy is based on the idea of equal political rights for all citizens and upon intelligent compromise.[1] The public consensus (majority) is the final authority in a democratic system; the will of the public is expressed through the state or through free acquiescence.[2] Bierstedt has observed, "The power which resides in numbers is clearly seen in elections of all kinds, where the majority is conceded the right to institutionalize its power as authority--a right which is conceded, because it can be taken." He concluded that the power of the majority ". . . always threatens --or sustains--the stability of the association."[3]

The decisions reached in a democracy which give rise to its power are decisions which are reached in a formal process. They are not merely the result of the informal interaction of people in the society; democracy is not simply societal, it is governmental.[4] It is important to note that the democratic process is one of ". . . decision by partial consent, whereas cooperative action requires substantially complete conformance. . . . the democratic

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[1] Scholz, op. cit., p. 137.

[2] Berle, op. cit., p. 99.

[3] Bierstedt, op. cit., p. 737.

[4] Chester I. Barnard, Organization and Management (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 26-13.

process means decision by division--by majorities, and usually by small pluralities. . . ."[1] Consensus is achieved as a consequence of individual decision; each participant must judge for himself what is offered to him--the "only true democracy of minds."[2] The majority must rule, or the system fails and will be replaced by a new attempt or by a system in which a minority holds power. The people are the basis of power; while the form permits a plurality of opinion, the majority must prevail or the system fails, by definition.[3]

The commonly-held purposes and goals of the people comprise the consensus which gives rise to the democratic governmental system and which gives it power to continue to exist.[4] It seems clear that many of the values widely held in a democracy are maintained simply by the consensus on norms and are not made the subject of formal regulations or laws. The persistence of such a system is evidence of the willingness of the people to voluntarily accept certain values without legal sanction.[5]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Jacques Barzun, The Teacher in America (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1946), p. 276.

[3] For a detailed study of the role of power in political philosophy, see Neumann, op. cit., pp. 161-180.

[4] Abramson, op. cit., p. 18.

[5] Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1947); see Ch. VII, Book I.

Law in a Democracy

The formal action of a democratic government in the establishment of laws represents the expression of majority opinion. The provision of a body of law represents an attempt to avert chaos and minority rule.[1] While in other forms of government, the source of power found in a monarch or in an authoritarian minority may successfully establish laws, such laws may not represent the will of the majority.[2] Statutory laws in a democratic system may thus be said to represent the opinion of the majority as to how best their goals and purposes may be reached; their system of courts and legal experts serves to interpret their laws and serve as a decision-making apparatus working in behalf of the majority-established laws.[3] Thus, the function of legal power in a democracy and in democratic organizations is for the creation of the political and social machinery which the majority believes is most likely to achieve its goals. Where, for example, an educational system is among the social goals of a democracy, laws are provided and norms and traditions accepted which will support the existence of such a system.

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[1] Errol E. Harris, "Political Power," Ethics, LXVIII, No. 1 (October, 1957), 1-10.

[2] William Zelermyer, The Process of Legal Reasoning (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 3.

[3] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

In summary, it may be said that law in a democracy represents the formal expression of the legitimization of those selected norms, customs, traditions and values which the majority accept and support as most important, out of a much larger collection of norms which are supported simply by the pressures of common informal acceptance. While this entire body of norms may be said to be legitimatized, only those elements of the total body of norms which are the most seriously regarded are likely to be formally expressed in the form of written laws.[1]

Thus, power in a democracy is expressed in law which is formally expressed, as well as in norms which are informally accepted, in an effort to achieve commonly held goals of the majority of its members. While law may be regarded as a dynamic process, rather than a set of fixed or rigid rules, the interpretations of law at any point in time are the consequence of the precedents established by past interpretation, together with current interpretation of social norms. Laws thus express a portion of the goals of the group contained within the democratic system.[2]

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[1] S. Miller, op. cit., p. 22.

[2] Zelermyer, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

PART II

THE NATURE AND QUALITIES OF POWER IN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Introduction

Like many other institutions in society, higher educational institutions are the creation of political systems, or of private and political groups, through the agency of a legal system. The elements of the legal structure authorizing the establishment of educational institutions may be regarded as an expression of the interest of the people of the state in the establishment of educational institutions as social goals.

The Nature and Sources of Power

A significant feature of the nature of power in higher education is that it is limited and specific. Educational power is an extension or delegation or grant of power from the state (the people of the state), in an express and specific direction: the creation of an educational institution, to educate its youth and to accomplish such other specific purposes as the state may encourage or permit. Whether a public or private institution, whether established by state charter, by statute or by the incorporation of public or private

groups, the institution bases its existence on the legal power of the state.[1]

Most American higher educational institutions are private, charitable corporations. A college or university founded by private enterprise and endowed or supported by private donations is a eleemosynary institution, that is, a charitable corporation. If a college receives its primary financial support from public funds, it is usually considered public in character. In general, origin is the chief determinant of legal status; if founded by private individuals, privately endowed and supported, the courts will consider it a private corporation, even though it may receive a substantial amount of public funds. If the institution was organized and established by the legislature and receives its primary support from public funds, it is treated as a public corporation, or as an agency of government. Thus, the source of power for the public institution is found in the state; in the private institution, the power is in the nature of a grant or authorization to perform certain specified functions which are deemed to be in the public interest.[2] The resources, public and private, that are used to achieve these specific functions

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[1] Blackwell, op. cit., pp. 22-55.

[2] Ibid., pp. 22-24.

are channeled toward goals that are within the authorized limits of power.

There is enormous variety in the types of institutional government within American higher educational institutions. In church-related institutions, systems of control will vary greatly from one church body to another; they are by no means as rigid as is suggested by some scholars. Some church bodies exercise a high degree of control, while some exert virtually none at all, insofar as academic policies, methods and content are concerned.[1] Most public institutions are responsible to an agency of government, where great variety in method and degree of control exists. The study of institutional charters and related laws of both public and private institutions provides opportunity for a comparison of powers typically granted institutions.[2]

The charters of American colleges and universities, from the earliest times, reflect the disposition of the state to specify the

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[1]Manning M. Pattillo, Jr., and Donald M. Mackenzie, Church Sponsored Higher Education in the United States (Washington, D. C.: The American Council on Education, 1966). This is the definitive current study of church-related higher education in America; it examines relationships in and among 817 colleges and universities; pp. 249-277.

[2]Edward C. Elliott and M. M. Chambers, Charters and Basic Laws of Selected American Universities and Colleges (New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1934).

powers which the institution was to be granted, on behalf of the state.[1]

The laws or charters establishing the power to be delegated or granted to an institution may describe broad or narrow limitations on such power and the purposes for which it is granted. However described, the institution finds its existence in the state.

The principle of centralized administrative authority, responsible to powers outside the institution, obtains in practically all American institutions of higher education today. Since the foundation of Harvard in 1642, the principle of placing all responsibility for the administration of the institution in the hands of a body of laymen, neither selected by or responsible to the faculty of the institution, has been the pattern. Practices such as were followed from time to time during the medieval period in Europe, wherein systems of self-government of universities by councils of faculty members and students (such as those at the Universities of Salerno, Bologna and Padua) have not existed for 500 years and have never been adopted in the United States. The social systems of medieval Europe would appear to offer little assistance in the solution of higher education's needs in the United States today.[2]

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[1] Hofstadter and Smith, op. cit., pp. 1-54.

[2] Blackwell, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

Probably few American scholars have pursued the history of medieval university government with the thoroughness of Cowley. He challenges the persistent "myth" of universities ever having been governed by a "free republic of scholars" during that era. Cowley states that the University of Bologna was operated by the students--not the faculty--until it drifted into civil control.[1] In the medieval universities of northern Europe, at Paris, Oxford and Cambridge, students were never permitted a strong voice in government.[2] The University of Paris was actually under the authority of the church rather than a "band of scholars."[3] Wilson has stated that it has been seldom, if ever, that faculties have governed themselves, free of responsibility to authority outside themselves.[4]

Wilson has reported that the concept of a lay board of governors is not an American invention, as is widely supposed, but was adopted from institutions in Ireland and Scotland, which, in

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[1]W. H. Cowley, "Professors, Presidents and Trustees," AGB Reports, IX, No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: The Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, 1967), pp. 4-24.

[2]Blackwell, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

[3]Cowley, op. cit., pp. 4-24. Also see W. H. Cowley, "Some Myths About Professors, Presidents and Trustees," Teachers College Record, Columbia University, November, 1962, pp. 164-165.

[4]Logan Wilson, Emerging Patterns in American Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: The American Council on Education, 1965), p. 18.

turn, borrowed the idea from the University of Leyden in Holland and from Calvin's academy in Geneva; the University of Basle has followed the practice of the use of a lay board since the fifteenth century.[1]

The relationship of faculty to institutional government and to self-government based on medieval traditions stems from the fact of the rise of the civil state about 400 years ago. It then became clear that all other kinds of government could exist only with the approval of the civil government.

> In short, the civil government made "concessions" to other governments to perform certain social functions. These "concessions" were made in the form of patents or what we today commonly call charters . . . instruments licensing the recipients to perform certain specified activities.[2]

Thus, through charters and statutes, modern college and university governing boards have plenary powers to manage institutions to the limits of the authority established for them in the constitution and statutes of the states, as interpreted by their courts. Chambers has also referred to a kind of "common law of universities" based on old customs which may be invoked by courts when not negated by statute.[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Corson, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

[3] M. M. Chambers, "Who Is the University?" Journal of Higher Education, XXX, No. 6 (June, 1959), p. 322.

The Locus of Power in Higher Education

Institutions are founded through and function under charters from public authority or under grants of authority from legislatures. Henderson concluded that the central legal authority is vested in the chartered body of trustees and "it is this body that has the final responsibility to the state and hence to the public."[1] Trustees in public institutions are most commonly elected by the people, or appointed by the governor, sometimes with the consent of the senate. In private institutions, they are usually elected by church bodies or corporation members, selected by cooptation, or elected by alumni groups.[2] In the exercise of its powers, the trustees of the non-public institution must look to its charter provisions, to the laws of its state, and to the general provisions of corporate law. The legal corporate status of the church related college is the same as the private corporation.[3]

Among the duties and responsibilities of the governing board of the college or university are: the establishment of fundamental institutional policies; the selection and appointment of

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[1]Henderson, op. cit., pp. 226-228.

[2]Earl McGrath, "The Control of Higher Education in America," Educational Record, XVII (1936), 259.

[3]Blackwell, op. cit., pp. 24, 42.

presidents; the delegation to the president of powers commensurate with his responsibilities; and the preservation of the capital assets and financial integrity of the institution. These responsibilities are fixed in the governing board and may not be delegated.[1]

> The president, in turn, delegates many of his duties and responsibilities to his administrative offices, deans and faculty committees. However, the governing board remains the repository of power, since it may, at its pleasure, withhold or withdraw its delegation of power.[2]

Chambers has noted that the university makes hundreds of contracts beside those made with faculty members and administrators; these include contracts with suppliers, land owners, public and private agencies and many others. While the management of the business and practical affairs of the university is necessary, it is secondary in importance to the educational policies and goals for which the institution received its charter at the outset. Whether the institution is public or private, the trustees are the university, not only for business purposes but for educational purposes as well. Thus, the newest freshman, the president, every faculty member and every other employee is an agent of the trustees.[3] Chambers has observed:

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[1] Blackwell, op. cit., pp. 40-49.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Chambers, op. cit., p. 321.

> The university does not exist for its faculty, nor even for its students, alone. It is a servant of society, and each of its individual agents, of whatever class or level, is in a sense, a servant of the public. Therefore, the university is appropriately governed, in the eyes of the law, by a body of men and women chosen as representatives of the general public. This body--the governing board, constituting a single artificial person--legally is the university. Complete understanding of this simple concept could go far toward clarifying roles of subordinate organizations, all of which have their useful spheres in the intricate complex of university administration.[1]

Virtually all authorities agree that the locus of such powers as are delegated to higher educational institutions is in the governing board, who are the trustees of the constituency which established the institution, and the embodiment of the delegation of legal authority from the state.

The Purposes of Power in Higher Education

The educational system of the nation is one of the major agencies of government and is essential to the development of the modern industrial society.[2] Thus, the purposes of power in the college and university are to achieve, so far as possible, the social functions of education, research and public service, however defined by law and charter. The institution was conceived by its founders

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[1] Ibid., p. 324.

[2] R. F. Campbell and R. T. Gregg, Administrative Behavior in Education (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 41.

as a means of providing certain services to its constituency. Its power was marshalled for that purpose. Institutions have been called concentrations of power in the service of some value.[1] The sought values in question in the instance of each institution may be found defined in its charter and the laws establishing and maintaining it. In addition, a substantial body of interpretations of such laws and charters and other regulations which guide institutions are provided by actions of governing boards and by the courts. Perkins has noted that institutional power can also come from service; that is, it may acquire more resources and wider delegations of authority as a consequence of effective service.[2] Conversely, when an institution fails to respond to the needs of society, it loses vitality and becomes irrelevant, according to Mayhew.[3] Cowley has concluded, relative to the purposes of power in higher education, that institutions of higher education ". . . have not been founded for the sole or even the primary benefit of professors, students, trustees or all of them taken together but, instead, for the benefit of society at large. Hence in all countries, civil government, the most inclusive

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[1] Stinchcombe, op. cit., p. 9.

[2] J. A. Perkins, The University in Transition (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 113.

[3] Lewis B. Mayhew, Higher Education in the Revolutionary Decades (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Co., 1967), p. 3.

agency in society, retains the right to set them in motion and further, to require that their governing boards represent the public interest."[1]

In summary, the following hypotheses concerning the purposes of power in higher education can be offered:

1. The purposes of power in higher education are the purposes of the social body or bodies that create the institution and that continue to maintain it, whether public or private or both.

2. Since the power in higher educational institutions is a part or fraction of the power of its parent body, it cannot be larger or stronger or more broadly described than that of the parent body.

3. In a social sense, a quality of power is direction: toward the specific goals of the society that created it, to achieve an educational goal.

4. Power in higher education is meaningless, apart from purpose; its existence can be questioned. It is impossible to escape the question of whose power it is with which the institution was created and is operated. If the institution

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[1] Cowley, "Some Myths About Professors, Presidents and Trustees," op. cit., pp. 164-165.

itself is a delegation of authority, a part of a greater power, the general purpose of power is clearly the purpose of the creator of the institution.

Authority in Higher Education

In colleges and universities, the process of the delegation of authority begins with the power-source organization: the state or a private organization acting under authority from the state. The state provides certain statutes, laws or charters creating an institution, on its own initiative or at the instance of a private group. The authority created by these public actions is delegated to a specific small group, the governing board, to serve as the legal entity to receive the authority.[1]

From the governing board, progressively lesser and more specific amounts of authority are delegated, first to the president[2] and through him, to various administrators, teachers, students and all other individuals associated with the institution. Thus, through delegation, a hierarchy of authority is created, which is the institutional structure.

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[1] Ayers and Russel, op. cit., p. 15.

[2] Mayhew, The Smaller Liberal Arts College, op. cit., p. 85.

So far as he relates to the institution, the president has no power--only authority. (He may well possess power in his own right, for other purposes.) The president's authority is only that which he has been specifically granted, and in addition, that authority which he may have appropriated from the governing board and which they have not forbidden, or resisted. The president is ". . . superior to all others and alone responsible to the board. He recommends all other employees for appointment and proposes all changes in the policies and programs of the university."[1]

Similarly, the authority of every other officer or member of the institution: his authority is a delegated authority; the extent of his authority is the extent of his delegation.[2] Its limits can be extended only by action of the source from whom it was delegated, or by the failure of the source to resist his appropriation of more extensive authority,[3] or by his illegal appropriation. Where the delegate accepts a specific, defined delegation, he cannot legally exceed it. In the higher educational institution, the delegation of

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[1] Chambers, op. cit., p. 322.

[2] College and University Business Administration, op. cit., pp. 18-27.

[3] Orley R. Herron, Jr., The Role of the Trustee (Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Co., 1969), p. 24.

authority should increase in direct proportion to the increase in size, according to conclusions reached by Sullivan.[1]

Corson states that "it is idle to assume that all authority flows from the board." He reaches this conclusion because ". . . analyses of their decision making indicate clearly that they do not presume to extend their authority over all questions that arise in the operation of a college or university."[2] Such an interpretation suggests a serious misconception of the nature of authority and its delegation. While the governing board may not provide specific instruction for the trimming of lawns, and similar details, it is difficult to conceive of the functioning of a modern, complex organization such as the university without "all" authority flowing through the structure from its source, by delegation. To suggest that the governing board somehow has less authority as a consequence of its failure to prescribe every action of every member of the community reveals a failure of comprehension of the nature of the process of delegation.

Even less useful is the conclusion of Jencks and Riesman that the role of the trustee has diminished in American higher

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[1]Richard H. Sullivan, "Administrative-Faculty Relationships in College and Universities," Journal of Higher Education, XXVII (1956), 308-326, 349.

[2]Corson, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

education with the delegation by trustees to administrators of increasing amounts of authority; they conclude that trustees are being relegated increasingly to a "ceremonial role"![1] This is a curious assignment of position for the body that legally constitutes the institution!

As noted in Chapter I, there is considerable unrest, uncertainty and confusion on the modern campus as to where the ultimate authority for decision lies. Interest groups of many kinds, mainly composed of faculty members and students, seek to play a greater role in the determination of policy throughout the entire institution, in every phase of its operation. The effectiveness of the president and his delegates at every level of authority may derive from the acceptance of the legitimacy of his position by subordinates, as well as from authority delegated from the governing board. Where the higher authority or power fails to support its delegates, serious disruption of the organization may occur.[2]

Barnard has been a powerful exponent of the definition of authority as existing only when it is accepted by those over whom it is supposed to control; under such terms, the failure of acceptance

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[1] Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1968), p. 17.

[2] "Statement by Violence Commission on Campus Protests," Chronicle of Higher Education, III, No. 19 (June 16, 1968).

of authority means that no authority exists.[1] Under such circumstances, the organization fails by definition, and must be reformed or abandoned.

Hungate has found that in higher education, governance by consensus is essential, but that the governing board must have authority to override proposals by other elements in the community; any other arrangement implies the transfer of authority rather than its delegation.[2]

Democracy and the Campus

Throughout higher education in the United States, democracy is widely accepted as the most desirable form of government, consistent with widely held values in education and concerning the nature of man and the physical world. Democracy is held to be the governmental form most likely to provide the widest dimensions of personal freedom and of opportunity for personal development and free inquiry.[3]

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[1] Barnard, The Functions of an Executive, op. cit., p. 164.

[2] Thad L. Hungate, Management in Higher Education (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964), pp. 238-252.

[3] Carl H. Gross and Charles C. Chandler, The History of American Education through Readings (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1964), Part IV, pp. 335-479.

Perhaps as a consequence of a general confusion in the minds of many members of the campus community as to the locus of ultimate authority on the campus, often combined with a pervasive innocence as to the rudiments of organizational and administrative theory and practice, and because of a dedication to the concept of democracy, many members of the campus community mistakenly seek to interpret the institution as a self-contained, imperfect democracy, wherein powers or authority which are rightly theirs have been usurped. The usurpers are often seen as administrators, trustees, legislators, corporate officials and others whose relationship to the institution is only dimly understood.

The university is not a democracy, by any accepted definition of the concept.[1] The majority (the students) does not rule; it does not elect the institutional leadership by general ballot of the community; members of the community are by no means equal in status or in community rights; the majority is not responsible for the establishment of policy, nor may it rescind such policy; the university does not even supply its own resources to meet physical needs, but is primarily supported by outside financial resources.[2]

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[1] See "Power and the Democratic State," above.

[2] Ibid.

The university is a service agency, with narrowly prescribed social authority, established, owned and operated by people who are outside its walls. The owners of the public institutions are the taxpayers; the owners of the private institutions are the designees.[1] The majority in the community (the students) are not permanent members of the community but are transients; many of them are minors. They are in the community as a consequence of a contract between them and the institution, under which they are to receive specified services in exchange for fees and prescribed types of behavior. Upon completion of their program of study, they leave the institution, free of any legal responsibility for it, or to it. The balance of the community, the "permanent" residents in the university, are all employees of the institution, hired for the purpose of helping it to achieve its objectives.

Within the limits of its authority and toward the achievement of its objectives, the university may well function democratically, as to its operational procedures. Probably, it could do so to its profit. The requirements for organizational consensus, harmony, adherence to group values and for the legitimacy of authority probably result in the employment of democratic processes in the day-to-day operational processes of most colleges and universities. However,

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[1]Herron, op. cit., p. 22.

the concept of the institution as an independent, self-contained, democratic social system, answerable to no one but itself and free to choose its own destiny or to pursue any purpose it chooses, and with its power to be regarded as an object of contention by administrators, students and faculty members appears ill-founded. Analysis of the sources for university authority will not support such a view. Such a concept of the campus community suggests a lack of perception of the social system under which such institutions are founded, under which they receive their authority and by which such authority may be withdrawn.

In summary, it may be said that power does not exist on the campus; only authority exists there. Such authority as does exist is specific and limited and delegated; it may be modified or withdrawn at the pleasure of the power source.

Influence in Higher Education

Influence has been defined as a kind of persuasive power which does not carry the threat of sanctions.[1] Probably few social organizations are subject to greater varieties and kinds of interplay of this form of power than are institutions of higher education. Among the principal related groups (alumni, parents, professional

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[1] Corson, op. cit., pp. 36-38.

constituencies, prospective donors, commercial groups, public and church bodies), influence is regularly used to guide and direct the institution. Indeed, the allegiance and support of these groups is necessary for the continued existence of the institutions.[1] Within the institution, the effects of influence as exerted by various interest groups of faculty, students and other members of the community are profound, and may well be the most pervasive form of organized effort by which the institution is affected by these groups. Etzioni has noted that organizations such as educational groups and churches tend to emphasize normative power, based on esteem, prestige, acceptance, fame, honor and similar values.[2] In summary, the effects of influence in higher education are probably substantial and may exceed those of the formal structure of authority.[3]

Responsibility in Higher Education

While there is a substantial difference in the forms of charters granted to institutions, they generally give governing boards complete legal responsibility for the welfare of the institution. Governing boards are necessarily, therefore, invested with extensive

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[1] Etzioni, Complex Organizations, op. cit., p. 6.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

powers in determining the character of the educational offerings and the management of the institution.[1]

Henderson states that "trustees do have a legal, overall responsibility that goes much beyond that of the faculties. If the welfare of the college demands it, they should take drastic action." Trustees can define budgets, eliminate departments, raise salaries and a great many other things beyond the authority of faculties.[2] Ruml contended that trustees are responsible for the institution's educational programs as well as its management. Trustees are accountable to the state and national community, parents, students, faculty members, donors of property and other identifiable groups. Ruml concluded that too much authority has been delegated to faculty members and that some measure of it should be withdrawn, since trustees have the authority to do so and because they are legally responsible and accountable.[3]

It seems generally agreed by students of the subject that the responsibility for decision making is more widely distributed in colleges and universities than in most commercial or governmental organizations. Indeed, on many campuses in recent times, authority

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[1]McGrath, op. cit., p. 259.

[2]Henderson, op. cit., pp. 230-231.

[3]Ruml, op. cit., p. 13.

has become so diffuse and its locus so uncertain that the institution appears to be under a system of several governments, composed of faculty members, administrators, students or other interest groups. Faculty systems which include senates, councils, elaborate systems of committees, often give the appearance of a second or dual system of government on the campus.[1]

Some scholars speak of the delegation of responsibility with attendant authority, rather than the converse. That such delegations do in fact occur is essential; authority and responsibility must be delegated in equal amounts, so far as that is possible, from the president to the last member of the community.[2]

Sullivan calls attention to a crucial difference in the nature of responsibility in the college or university:

> There is a basic difference between the responsibility of the faculty man and the president. The faculty man has responsibility only for his own duties: teaching and research. The Dean or the President has the whole place. The teacher can, and perhaps inevitably will, be a partisan for his own field and its values. He can be irresponsive to the demands and criticisms of others, and he can be himself an irresponsible (if not immoral) member of the university or college society.

Sullivan has noted the prevalent failure of faculty members to understand and recognize the nature of administrative problems.[3]

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[1] Corson, op. cit., p. 11.

[2] Ayers, op. cit., p. 15.

[3] Sullivan, op. cit., p. 314.

Grant described the necessity for those in positions of top authority to be persons who have the interests of the entire institution to guide them, rather than the more narrow concerns of the individual discipline, department or even of self-interest.[1]

Wilson has also noted the variations in degree and nature of responsibility on the campus:

> Although nobody seems to bother very much about whether administrators themselves are restive concerning their working conditions and faculties, they, too, have their chronic complaints. Their accountability is spread more widely than that of the faculty, however, and hence, causes of their tension are more diffuse and perhaps less likely to be rationalized in terms of faculty provocations. Like the ancient deity Janus, they must always look in different directions for hazards in the offing, but unlike him, they are endowed with neither immortality or omnipotence.[2]

It is highly important to note that the delegations of authority which are contained in the laws and charters creating colleges and universities frequently do not spell out in any detail the specific ways and means by which the delegates are to accomplish educational goals of the founders. Education at the university level

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[1] Arnold M. Grant, "Men Whose Concern Is the Institution," in Whose Goals for American Higher Education? by Charles G. Dobbins and Calvin B. T. Lee (Washington, D.C.: The American Council on Education, 1968), p. 123.

[2] Logan Wilson, "Nature and Sources of Faculty-Administrative Tensions," in Faculty-Administration Relationships, ed. by Frank C. Abbott (Washington, D.C.: The American Council on Education, 1958), p. 4.

is a highly complex endeavor. Faculty members and administrators alike are specialists and professionals; they are hired precisely because they do "profess" the specialized knowledge which is generally lacking in the founding group: the methods and content of education, research and public service. Thus, the enterprise is guided partly by subjective judgment, common law, custom and precedent, as well as clearly defined legal commissions of authority.[1]

Since the higher educational institution exists as a manifestation of a specific delegation of authority from a more powerful organization, its role with respect to responsibility emerges more clearly. The authority for the existence of the institution having been created for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the power source, the responsibility of those in authority must be governed by the terms of their delegation. To any extent that these terms are undefined, broadly defined, unclear or ambiguous, it is less possible to establish the certainty or precision of the standards by which the delegates are to be held responsible.

Further: the role of individuals in various levels and degrees of authority-responsibility within the institution becomes more evident: from a legal standpoint, they are the responsible agents and specific delegates of the power source and in no sense

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[1] Sullivan, op. cit., p. 315.

independent of it.[1] All employees of the institution are under contract and hold responsibility to discharge the areas of authority which have been delegated to them, in pursuit of the accomplishment of the goals of the power source. The only purpose for the existence of the position of authority which each such delegate holds is to assist the founding organization and the larger society, through the agency of the institution, to accomplish the goals of the power source.

To the extent that delegates of authority attempt to substitute their own purposes or goals for those of the power source, or, as they divert, subvert or oppose the purposes of the power source, the action is a breach of contract and an action in opposition to their legal and moral position. Thus, the personal goals of the delegate can be achieved only insofar as they may coincide, approximate or parallel those of the power source.

The Quest for Authority

Competitive internal special interest groups form naturally in all large organizations, as a result of the total organization being, in a sense, a polity of a number of sub-groups, according to findings of Selznick. The direction of the total organization with respect to its goals may be seriously affected by changes in the internal balance

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[1] Herron, op. cit., p. 17.

of power. It is an obligation of the leadership of the organization to maintain a balance of power internally, in order to permit the fulfillment of the organization's key commitments.[1]

The Faculty

As noted above, Corson suggests the existence of an organizational "dualism" in institutional government in higher education, wherein traditional structures for the formation of faculty decisions (such as senates, councils) parallel the administrative structure. He suggests that "much of the authority of governing boards" has been delegated to--or been claimed by--these parallel faculty organizations:

> Faculties, by and large, have sought a larger role in decision making related to educational and faculty policy. Together . . . the incapacity of governing boards and the ambitions of faculties have accounted for the large and increasing control that the faculties have gained over educational policy.[2]

Corson has catalogued some of the extensive claims to authority being made by faculty groups, beyond the realm of traditional academic concerns, in university management.[3] Internal interest groups may take many forms, from small, informal groups

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[1] Selznick, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

[2] Corson, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

[3] Ibid., pp. 97-98.

to large, formal divisions, such as the school or college of the university. Some such groups cut across formal organizational structural lines. Such internal groups may subvert the enterprise or give it life and strength. They represent sources of energy within the total organization.[1]

Wilson has noted, "Many academicians strongly feel that everybody on the faculty is entitled to have a hand in all important policy matters, so that there is a sentiment favoring committee management, innumerable committee meetings, and other time consuming procedures, on the grounds that they are democratic."[2] The terms "democracy" and "authoritarianism" are widely used and misunderstood on the campus, according to Sullivan: "'Democracy' is chiefly being used as shorthand for the participation of the faculty in the formulation and execution of institution policy and for the passage of almost any kind of power and authority from the administration to the faculty."[3]

Hofstadter, a leading historian of higher education in America, states that the interest of faculty members to extend their influence and power over their own affairs had much to do with the

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[1]Selznick, op. cit., p. 93.

[2]Wilson, op. cit., p. 10.

[3]Sullivan, op. cit., p. 319.

numerous controversies over "academic freedom," during the past century.[1] Just where the limits of their affairs are to be set remains undefined, in most institutional faculties, except that it is a limit beyond whatever area of authority is now described. Harter states that intellectuals do not often hold the highest positions of power, but tend to be advisors or expressors of ideas.[2] Corson has concluded that "Neither the assurance of academic freedom nor the faculty's superior understanding of what should be taught, and how, makes it essential that the faculty should have the exclusive right to determine what education should be offered."[3]

Concerning the professional status of the faculty member, Sullivan refers to a statement of Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., which has been widely circulated:

> A university is the historic consequence of the medieval 'studium generale'--a self-generated guild of students or of masters accepting as grounds for entrance or dismissal only criteria relevant to the performance of scholarly duties. The men who become full members of the faculty are not in substance our employees. They are not our agents. They are not our representatives. They are a fellowship of independent scholars answerable to us only for academic integrity.[4]

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[1] Hofstadter, op. cit., p. 750.

[2] Carl L. Harter, "The Power Roles of Intellectuals: An Introductory Statement," Sociology and Social Research, XLVIII, No. 2 (1964), pp. 176-186.

[3] Corson, op. cit., pp. 105-106.

[4] Sullivan, op. cit., p. 308.

Henderson has acknowledged that faculty members are employees of the institution and have a contractual relationship with it. However, he distinguishes between their labors and those of the "staff workers," who he equates with the "labor" force of other organizations. By contrast, faculty members are "professional personnel" and not employees in the usual sense of a labor force. He credited administrators with little or no competence in determining academic policy or program and stated that "the faculty is the institution." Administrators are needed for participation in the operation of the institution, however, because "space, funds and equipment" are needed. Presumably, all other organizational needs could be handled by the faculty.[1]

Cowley stated that college professors as individuals (except some in the lower ranks) decide as individuals what courses they teach, the methods of instruction and examination, the time of the few office hours a week they schedule and the part of the day that their classes will meet. He holds that "such facts patently belie the criticism" that colleges and universities are full of administrative constraints and instead "sustain the generalization that professors have more individual freedom in deciding upon their

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[1]Henderson, op. cit., pp. 223-226.

procedures and in allocating their time and energies than perhaps any other variety of professional people."[1]

In any literal or factual sense, faculty members, together with all other workers in the higher educational institution, must be regarded as employees; they are under contract, to do specified kinds of work for a particular period of time and at a fixed salary. The other party to the contract is the governing board. The corporation, represented by the trustees, legally is the university, whatever may be said of the competence and professional ability of the faculty in the design and conduct of the academic program, which they are hired to provide.[2] The professional competence of the employee or faculty member is not at issue; the governing board or its delegates are under no obligation to accept the judgment or recommendations of the faculty member, however academically sound or however ill-founded they may be. The responsibility for effectiveness of the institution remains with the governing board. If the faculty member prefers not to think of himself as an employee, the fact is that he is gainfully employed by the institution. Whether he would fare better under policies developed for an institution managed

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[1] Cowley, "Some Myths About Professors, Presidents and Trustees," op. cit., p. 168.

[2] Chambers, op. cit., p. 320.

by one or more faculty committees seems uncertain at best.[1] The practical problems of existence and operation for the institution would not have changed. Individuals would still be needed to accept responsibility to perform all of the varied operational functions of the institution, through a system of authority and accountability.

While the president delegates much of his authority to administrators, faculty members and to student groups, such delegations of authority are revocable; devolution of a function does not remove it from the jurisdiction of the president and the governing board. Similarly, appeals resulting from actions of various kinds of community governments, composed of faculty members, administrators and students, may not be allowed. An orderly process of such appeals must be maintained or the organization will disintegrate when "everyone decides everything."[2] Henderson was reluctant to identify the authority that the faculty does possess as having come to them as a delegation of authority from the president and the governing board, though in the nature of the organization, it could not become theirs in any other way, despite the invocation of tradition and natural rights.[3]

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[1] Sullivan, op. cit., p. 321.

[2] Chambers, op. cit., p. 322.

[3] Henderson, op. cit., pp. 226-228.

The restiveness with which faculty members have viewed their authority role, as subordinate to the governing board, is described in various statements of the American Association of University Professors, beginning with the 1915 "Declaration of Principles" which has been described as the "turning point" in the concept of faculty status, by those who support a more powerful, or a central, role of authority for them. This statement noted that while faculty members are appointees of trustees,

> They are not, in any proper sense the trustee's employees, just as federal judges are appointed by the President without becoming, as a consequence, his employees. For, once appointed, the scholar has professional functions to perform in which the appointing authorities have neither competence nor moral right to intervene.[1]

However, it is difficult to regard the president--or the dean--as an intruder in the affairs of an academic department, or as one looking in from the outside, when he is responsible for that department, together with all the others that make up the entire university. Nor can he be excluded under a rationale that supports teamwork, joint effort and cooperation by all elements of the community.[2]

David Fellman, "The Academic Community: Who Decides What?" in Whose Goals for American Higher Education?, ed. by Charles G. Dobbins and Calvin B. T. Lee (Washington, D.C.: The American Council on Education, 1968), p. 108.

[2]John W. Oswald, "The Inherent Authority of the President," ibid., pp. 125-126.

Without question, the professor is in a stronger position today than at any time in the nation's history, insofar as the definition of his own role is concerned. Rapid growth in systems of tenure, widespread acceptance of the concept of academic freedom, a strong demand in the market place for his services as an advisor and specialist (possibly as an alternative source of employment) all serve to strengthen his independence. Among teachers today, the concept of the teacher as an "employee" of a university is not a popular one.[1]

The report of the AAUP Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure in 1920 underscored their viewpoint that the role of the faculty member as an employee of the governing board was insupportable.[2] Similarly, in 1960, an AAUP statement of principles on "Faculty Participation in College and University Government" declared that the basic functions of the college and university are to "augment, preserve, criticize and transmit knowledge" and to foster creative related activities. Such functions ". . . are best performed by a community of scholars who must be free to exercise independent judgment in the planning and execution of the educational responsibilities."[3] Where such responsibilities begin

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[1] Fellman, op. cit., p. 107.

[2] Hofstadter and Metzger, op. cit., p. 409.

[3] Fellman, op. cit., p. 109.

or end is not made clear, or in what respect any activity of the institution might not be construed as such a responsibility.

A joint statement of principle in 1966 issued by the AAUP, The American Council on Education and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges stated that only through "joint action" of all elements of the campus community can increased capacity to solve educational problems be developed. Among the educational problems referred to were: institutional long-range planning, physical facilities, budgeting, and selection of chief academic officers, including the president. The statement also recognized the faculty as having "primary responsibility" with respect to curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status and the elements of student life that relate to the educational process, degrees offered and degree requirements, appointments, tenure, and dismissals. The faculty is to be consulted on the selection of department heads, deans and the president. Further, there must be regularly scheduled meetings of the faculty, and of senates, assemblies or similar bodies; committees of the faculty are to be elected by the faculty, under terms of the statement.[1] According to Fellman, the only reason presidents retain any material influence is the faculty's inability to successfully exert

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[1] Ibid., pp. 109-110.

its influence: "Presidents are strong because faculties fail . . . to exercise the authority that is within their grasp if they wish to take it."[1] Examination of this viewpoint suggests authority is seen as something that can be--and may be--taken, where no resistance to such a procedure is offered by the legal authorities of the institution. This position seems to suggest little interest in the "team" or "joint action" effort.

The position of the AAUP with respect to the authority role of the faculty member is not held by all members of the academic community; many faculty members, together with administrators, trustees and others, sharply disagree with the AAUP and believe that the governing board must have final authority. Faculty members together with every other interest group on the campus are expected to take a leadership role in helping to shape institutional policy, but in no sense as participants equal in, or superior to, the authority of the governing board. Such opponents of the AAUP viewpoint would hold that the governing board must have final authority.[2]

The joint statement of the three agencies consigns the governing board to the tasks of relating the institution to its

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[1] Ibid., p. 112.

[2] J. Broward Culpepper, "All Have Major Roles to Play," in Whose Goals for American Higher Education?, ed. by Charles G. Dobbins and Calvin B. T. Lee (Washington, D.C.: The American Council on Education, 1968), p. 131.

constituency, securing the money to support the institution and to serving as champion of the institution in times of "grave crisis." While the statement observes that "there are no rights without duties," it does not state what the responsibilities of the faculty are in such exact terms, or describe to whom they are accountable, if anyone, in more than a prefunctory or ceremonial way.[1]

The Students

While the students in higher education have been variously regarded as restless rebels; indifferent, apathetic, practical consumers; at least occasionally as inspiring junior colleagues; and, even as customers in an aim-to-please knowledge cafeteria, they are rarely regarded as among the delegates of authority of the governing board of the institution. Indeed, the current turbulence on campus may suggest the question of whether some students recognize any authority superior to themselves, in most aspects of academic life. At the least, probably many members of the campus community regard the students as one of several sovereign interest groups of which the government of the university is comprised.

While students have displayed a sharply increased interest in authority on campus in recent years, their role as holders of

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[1] Ibid., pp. 114-121.

authority is limited, by the nature of the institution and the nature of the social and legal authority which comprises the institution. Not only faculty members and other employees, but students as well have contracts with the university. The student is admitted under certain conditions which are established by the institution and are stated in the institution's catalog. The university is obligated to give the student opportunity to complete his course of study, when he has paid prescribed fees, met other entrance requirements and provided he does not breach the contract through failures of scholarship or conduct.[1] Chambers has stated that the same principles should apply in the provision of constitutions for student governments and for campus governmental systems composed of faculty members and administrators. ". . . student governments are, in the last analysis, only recommendations to the legal authority governing the university. In a legal sense, the students are not the university, nor are they self-governing."[2] Students can be fresh and energetic in providing insights and direction toward the formation of institutional policy, according to Culpepper, but the notion of placing students in a position of responsibility for basic

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[1] Chambers, op. cit., p. 321.

[2] Ibid.

decisions affecting the future of the institution is "inconceivable" for the reason of their inexperience.[1]

Campus Governments

Chambers stated that,

> The constitution (of the institution) often provides for a faculty senate and other appropriate organs for the expression of faculty opinion and the formulation of faculty policies and their transmission to the president and the board. If approved, new policies thus presented become accretions or amendments to the existing regulations. But any such proposed policy may be ignored or disapproved by the board, in which event it is of no legal effect. This provision has occasionally given rise to some pain and protest on the part of faculty members who take seriously the proposition that the faculty is the university, or at least ought to govern the university. Such is not the plan of university control in this country, as almost everyone knows; and there are ample reasons for believing that ultimate legal control by the faculty as a so-called guild of scholars might not be in the public interest.[2]

It has been observed that administrators are often better paid than faculty members, are more visible to the public and seem often to be the recipients of public recognition and approbation on behalf of the institution, while faculty members who may have served to create the stature of the institution remain in relative anonymity. Also, there are fewer administrators, seemingly a disproportionately few, in terms of authority. These and other

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[1] Culpepper, op. cit., p. 132.

[2] Chambers, op. cit., pp. 322-323.

reasons may cause some faculty members to resent administrators.[1]

Few scholars writing on the subject of faculty-administrative relationships have noted the possibility that some administrators may also be highly skilled professionals, quite capable of demonstrating their professional stature, even in the domain of the teacher. Many administrators have served as teachers. Most others have skills which are also vital to the success of the institution, in business and public affairs. Higher education is a highly competitive enterprise; few institutions have all the money they want or need, which administrators are expected to secure. There are needs for the institutions to compete successfully in society for students, faculty members, financial support, public understanding and many similar needs. These needs require specialized skill, knowledge and hard work which could not be accomplished by a faculty committee or guild of scholars on a part-time basis.[2]

Summary

Thus, as Etzioni has observed, organizations tend to contain interest groups that tend to oppose each other; the task of

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[1] Sullivan, op. cit., p. 324.

[2] Ibid.

leadership is to keep such groups in balance in order to permit the institution to carry out its purposes, which, in turn, are the purposes of those who established it, and who have delegated authority to it. Janowitz has found that "no bureaucracy ever conforms to the ideal model of rational organization"; quite evidently, this is true of higher educational institutions.[1] And, Brameld has said that both knowledge and power are neutral and amoral; the task is to make them moral.[2]

Summary of Chapter III, Parts I and II

Part I of Chapter III contains an introductory statement on the nature of power, an extended examination of definitions of power and discussions of the origins, sources and locus of power. Distinctions are drawn in the definitions and concepts of power, authority and influence. The relationships between authority and control and authority and responsibility are defined. Concepts of responsibility and accountability in relation to power are defined and discussed. The problem of the legitimacy of various forms of power is examined.

The role of power in organizations, the nature of organizations and the relationships of organizations to goals and to power are

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[1] Janowitz, op. cit., p. 35.

[2] Brameld, op. cit., pp. 1-10.

considered. Analytic interpretations are included of the role of power in democratic organizations and states and the role of power and law in democratic organizations.

In Part II, the nature, sources and locus of power in higher educational institutions are discussed. The role of power and goals in institutions is considered. Authority, influence and responsibility on the campus and the concept of the campus as a democracy are examined. Finally, the interest of various intramural campus groups in the securing of a larger measure of authority is discussed, in the context of the foregoing concepts of power, authority, influence and responsibility, to attempt to illuminate the function and process of power in the higher educational institution.

CHAPTER IV

POWER CONSTRUCTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Introduction

Man's hope for the development of a scientific study of the social melieu rests on the assumption that social events are recurrent and that they tend to follow a pattern of "laws" which guide their occurrence.[1] The pioneer sociologist, Emile Durkheim, stated this presumption in the last century: "All doctrines . . . concern us, provided they admit the postulate which is the condition of any sociology, namely, that laws exist which reflection, carried out methodically, enables us to discover."[2] Inkeles has noted that while a science is based on the assumption of recurring or multiple events, and that a science cannot be developed on a single event, there are many non-recurring events in all sciences that are

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[1]Alex Inkeles, What is Sociology? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 93-96.

[2]Kurt H. Wolff, ed., Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917: A Collection of Essays, with Translations and a Bibliography (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1960), p. 345.

subjected to detailed study. Thus, each Ice Age, the Jurassic Period or the birth of a star is a unique event, which is subjected to detailed examinations through methods and with knowledge that has been achieved chiefly through the study of recurring events.[1] Similarly, in the social sciences, where many if not all events are unique and are the consequence of the effects of a great number of variables, the hope of progress lies in the application of methods developed and knowledge gained which is based on recurring behavior which appears to be based on "laws."[2]

It can be observed that scholars in the social sciences are less confident today than during the era of Durkheim, or during the past generation, concerning the easy establishment of laws of social behavior. Some, indeed, like Morris Cohen, have suggested the possibility that there are no laws of social behavior. In any event, there is a new appreciation for the enormous complexity of the effects of an almost infinite number of variables, which make each social event virtually unique.[3] The complexity of even the identification of the variables is awesome, not to say the attachment to them of an assessment of their proper significance in the event. Thus the task becomes more complex as insights sharpen.

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[1] Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 93-96.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Despite the problems and hazards, the quest continues. Cohen has observed that, "The fact that social material is less repeatable than that of natural science, creates greater difficulty in verifying social laws, but it does not abrogate the common ideal of all science."[1] Catlin has suggested that the hazards of study of social events can be lessened by concentrating on small, simple situations. In the study of power, he suggests such simple acts, ". . . of which in an average day of an average life, there will be a thousand examples," to permit observation, comparison and experimentation.[2]

As was suggested in Chapter II, there has been a substantial amount of research in many areas relating to higher education, but virtually none in efforts toward the establishment of theories of educational power. One is compelled to agree with Boulding that without research to provide a theoretical framework and to guide inquiry, man simply accrues an increasing, disordered store of isolated and bewildering detail. Without research

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[1]Morris Cohen, Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of the Scientific Method (New York: Macmillan Company, 1931), p. 345.

[2]Catlin, op. cit., p. 762.

directed at the production of theory, order will ever evade us.[1]

Similarly, Hayman has concluded that research cannot exist on any advanced level without theory.[2] Kneller has observed that,

> What is popularly considered science--basically, prediction and experimental testing--begins only after the hypothesis has been formulated, and this requires something more than generalization and verification. It calls for imaginative daring, the ability to sense order and pattern in things where they have not been sensed before.[3]

However, in the scientific community, a theory is not a theory unless it fits the ground rules for experimentation: it must be subject to disproof or verification.[4] So far as the study of social behavior would be a science, it must meet this test. Simon has stated the situation plainly: "A statement about the observable world

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[1]Kenneth E. Boulding, "General Systems Theory--The Skeleton of Science," in Educational Data Processing, ed. by Richard A. Kaimann and Robert W. Marker (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1967), pp. 6-15.

[2]John L. Hayman, Jr., Research in Education (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968), p. 13.

[3]George F. Kneller, Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), p. 4.

[4]Daniel Tanner, "Curriculum Theory: Knowledge and Content," Review of Educational Research (Washington, D.C.: American Educational Research Association, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3, June, 1966), p. 362.

is factual, if, in principle its truth or falsity can be tested. That is, if certain events occur, we say the statement is true; if other events occur, we say that it is false."[1] Clearly, if social phenomena such as power in education are to be more manageable for study, some means must be found to verify its origins, nature and qualities.

Theory Building

A well developed theory is a network of processes that lead from one event to another, according to Coleman.[2] As noted in Chapter III, most scholars agree that there is no adequate theory of power, not to say a theory of power relating to education; the challenge for the development of such theory lies before us.

The process of theory building must begin with the securing of information. This can be accomplished through direct observation, experimentation, through study of the work and theoretical formulations of others, or by some other means. From such information, assumptions, postulates or constructs can be derived. The process may be pursued with the construction of new theory, with hypotheses derived from the theory, with tests of verification of the

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[1] Herbert Simon, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

[2] James S. Coleman, "Comment on 'On the Concept of Influence,'" Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVII (Spring, 1963), p. 68.

predictions and finally, with modification of the theory and continued testing and modification.[1]

It was believed that, as concerns the building of theories of power in education, the focus of this study should be with the first and second stages: the securing of information through the study of the work and formulations of the past, assisted by the experience of a number of years of direct observation of institutional processes, and with the derivations from these of tentative constructs relating to aspects of the problem of power.

Power Constructs

The construct appears to have merit as a device for the formulation of the difficult and abstract concepts to be found in the consideration of power. Hayman has defined the construct as,

> . . . a carefully defined and articulated abstract entity which, though not directly observable, is considered to exist. [Emphasis added.] Ideally, a construct should have both theoretical import and empirical meaning--it should be useful in building theories and meaningful in terms of observable behavior. A problem in the behavioral sciences is that many constructs of theoretical interest are difficult to relate directly to behavior, the phenomenon with which they are concerned. This is partly a problem of measurement, partly of definition, and partly of logic. An attitude is an example of a construct. It cannot be directly observed, yet it is inferred to exist.[2]

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[1] Hayman, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

[2] Ibid., p. 11.

Thus, following the suggestion of Catlin, in the selection of situations which are readily available for examination on every campus and which lend themselves to analysis, an attempt is made below to suggest certain qualities and characteristics of the nature and uses of power which may help provide insight into its workings on the campus.

Power has its origins in the purposes of the social source that creates it; thus, one may propose: Power Construct 1 (PC1):

PC1: Power for the accomplishment of a purpose remains in the hands of those who create it.

PC1.1: While the authority to accomplish specific purposes sought by the power-dominant or originating group may be delegated, the delegation is simply an extension of the power of the original group.

PC1.2: In delegation, the power of the dominant group has not been lost and the power delegated can be reclaimed, at the pleasure of the power source.

An often perplexing question of power in higher education is its locus; within the institution, where is final authority to be found? And, what is the extent of such authority? Power Construct 2 (PC2):

PC2: Within the higher educational institution, the only authority extant is a delegated portion of the authority of the governing board; every function performed in or by the institution is based on a delegated portion of that authority.

Among the questions frequently raised on the contemporary campus is the question of the purposes of the institution, and the question of where or by whom these purposes are established:

PC3: Power in higher educational institutions has direction; it is limited and specific and can be used only to accomplish the purposes of the power source, of whom the governing board is the representative.

A widespread problem of power in higher education is the extent of authority of various officers and employees of the institution, together with the question of the degree of force which such authority may have. The following construct, PC4, may assist in the examination of this problem:

PC4: When delegated authority is not clearly defined and described, delegates tend to press outward into their community to seek the boundaries of their authority, or to establish their own definitions of the extent of their authority.

A question basic to the maintenance of institutional ability to progress toward its goals is the question of the maintenance of a unified, common effort by the institution and at least the majority of its members:

PC5: Within a higher educational institution, where a delegated authority is not supported by total institutional authority, the legitimacy of that authority will be

> challenged and gradually rejected and authority in that position will become less effective and ultimately will be lost, unless or until it is restored by the authority of the organization.

While many lay individuals view the campus as a benevolent retreat from the strivings and contentions of the "outside" world, higher educational institutions tend to function internally much as do other organized human groups: interpersonal and intergroup competition is common, as Etzioni has reported.[1]

PC6: Groups with limited authority within a higher educational institution will seek to acquire a greater relative authority, from other individuals or groups within the institution, to extend the interests and objectives of their group.

The foregoing constructs may serve as illustrative examples of abstract conditions or qualities in the educational power process which are believed to exist. They may be examined and, in at least some measure, tested through the study of behavior by which these conditions may be made manifest.

Verification Methods for Power Constructs

There appear to be several possible methods by which constructs such as those suggested above might be subjected to test.

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[1]Etzioni, Modern Organizations, op. cit., p. 85.

While the nature of the on-going processes of operation within a higher educational institution may not often lend themselves to experimentation, that possibility should not be ruled out. There may be instances, especially where there is a genuine institutional concern to extend the knowledge of how the institution functions, where real experimentation is possible.

Another alternative is suggested by Griffiths: the observational method. It will be noted that the physical science of astronomy, which has made very notable advances in recent years, has been obliged to rely on the observational approach. It is not possible for astronomers to determine the relative positions of planets and stars at points in time, by experiment. Nor may they determine the composition of the atmosphere of a planet by experiment. Instead, they have perfected techniques of observation which supply the data sought.[1]

Similarly, the anthropologist must rely heavily on observational methods. These scholars study human interactions and their results and effects and are thus able to develop descriptions of the social systems under study. That the observational method is limited by the ability of the observer to report his observation accurately and clearly is well known; the reports must be developed in such a

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[1]Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 35-37.

way that other observers can replicate and verify the reported conditions.[1]

A variation of the observational method might be devised through a system of specific empirical tests, wherein such tests are created and applied to specific delegations of authority within an institution and where such delegations may not have led to the results and purposes achieved as intended by the higher delegating authority.

Other types of descriptive research beside the observational method should not be disregarded. Probably the most popular descriptive method, the survey (wherein the subjects are asked to cooperate and to supply information) may also find application. Similarly, techniques of content analysis may well find an application in the examination of written documents relating to the delegation and use of power within the institution.

Proposed Tests for Power Constructs

It is proposed that the description of possible specific tests for the above proposed constructs may contribute toward the development of a more systematic approach to the study of power processes in higher education.

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[1] Ibid.

In consideration of PC1, the descriptive research technique of content analysis could be employed, in Power Construct 1 Test (PC1T). The question posed by the construct is whether, in fact, the critical and decisive power over the future of the institution remains with the public body or private organization which founded or now maintains the institution and whether, in fact, the institution draws its existence from authority delegated from the parent body. A content analysis of the recorded actions, resolutions, regulations, laws, fiscal appropriations and similar activities over a specific period of time may establish the comparative extent of the power and the authority of the parent body, its capacity to administer sanctions, and to withdraw or extend delegated authority. Such an analysis might supply the empirical evidence to test the construct. The comparative degree of effective power delegated and retained could provide such a test.

Concerning PC2, the construct proposes that within the institution itself, no power exists, but only authority, and of that, only a portion of the authority granted to the institution's governing board by the state has been delegated to members of the institution. Further, all functions and activities within the institution derive from that portion of authority delegated by the governing board. Here, a test might be employed using content analysis, PC2T. Studies

might be conducted of the basis by which every identifiable group in the institution has its relationship to the institution, together with its position in the institutional structure, through an examination of the documents which describe the institutional structure and which provide for the existence of each group. Such a test ought to reveal the basis under which each person or group was introduced into the institution and his relationship to it. Such a test should reveal the extent to which activities of the institution are conducted under authority and the source from which such authority stems, in each case, and whether from the governing board or any other source.

The concerns suggested by PC3 relate to a hypothesized quality of power, and in the case of educational institutions, an implication of its extent and specificity, as well as its possible uses. A test, PC3T, might include the application of both of the descriptive research techniques of observation and content analysis. A content analysis of the stated purposes and goals of the institution as expressed in charter, laws and regulations might be conducted, to be followed by an observational study of the extent to which such stated purposes are actually an influence on the activities of the institution. The actual program of activity of the institution might be acceptable evidence of the degree of limitation as to purpose, and the extent of agreement between stated purposes and actual

performance. A possible experimental test, PC3T.1, might be conducted. A group within the institution, possibly a student or administrative group, might propose the establishment of a service or activity outside of the defined and specified purposes contained in the various institutional statements of purpose. The disposition of the proposal, or preferably, a series of such proposals over time, may serve to suggest the degree to which institutional authority possesses direction and is limited. Analysis of similar descriptive or experimental studies over a number of institutions, in replicative studies, might serve to describe more precisely the social limitations of the higher educational system.

Observational, content analysis and survey techniques may be combined to reveal the extent of the reliability of PC4. In a test of this construct, PC4T, an examination of the defined authority, responsibilities and duties of institutional officers or workers might be established by a content analysis of documents describing such delegations. These might be combined with surveys of the workers under study, and of their superiors in authority, to provide additional data concerning the extent of delegations, as well as the actual limits of authority being exercised by the worker. These surveys might be supplemented by observations of the activities of the worker. These data sources together may describe the efforts

of workers to accommodate themselves to the actual delegations of authority provided them by the institution, and to provide a measure of the extent of disparities where such exist. An experimental study, PC4T.1, might also be conducted, of the behavior of two groups composed of either students, faculty members or administrators, where one group is given express and detailed delegations of authority and a second group, which is given a broad, very generalized delegation of authority, toward the solution of the same problem. Resulting behavior may assist in the verification of the construct, or in its disproof.

The existence of authority is dependent on its having been created by a power source on the one hand, and by the acceptance of the legitimacy of the authority by those over whom it is to be effective, on the other. PC5 hypothicates a tendency toward the rejection of the legitimacy of authority on the modern campus. A test, PC5T, employing a third descriptive research method, the case study, might be employed. Instances of the rejection of the legitimacy of authority on the campus are by no means rare. Detailed examination of the sequence of events leading to a rejection, the behavior of the authority holder and his superiors and the subsequent behavior of the rejectors may shed light on the truth or falsity of the construct. As with other such tests, a substantial

number of replications would seem indicated to establish any behavior patterns that may be involved. Another possible test, PC5T.1, could involve an observational method, wherein the investigator would study all possible identifiable instances within a single institution where rejection, or some substantial measure of it, has occurred. It should be noted that such rejections of legitimacy can probably occur in a considerable variation in degree.

Barnard, Selznick, Etzioni and many other scholars in organizational dynamics have reported the tendency to competition and attempts at dominance by sub-groups within organizations. The construct PC6 proposes the existence of such tendencies within the higher educational institution. A test of such a construct, PC6T, might be conducted with the employment of the case study technique of new or recently established departments or service agencies within an institution, over a period of several years. The accretions of authority, influence, resources and the relative political position of the group within the institution and the sources from which these additions come, together with the means by which these accretions were acquired, may serve to support or disprove the construct.

The Need for Replicative Studies

As suggested by Inkeles, the variables in each social event or situation probably serve to obviate the possiblity of a true replication of studies in the social sciences. Yet, replication is probably among the greatest needs, if anything approaching the identification of "laws" of social behavior is to become possible. The domain of the social scientist is not that of the natural scientist and can never be so; the increased difficulty and complexity of the task of the social scientist ought not to discourage his efforts or to defend the lack of persistence required to seek patterns in behavior.[1] And, as Coleman has suggested, the application of the sometimes inappropriate methods and devices of the natural scientist to social science problems may only serve to create the illusion of a false simplicity in social processes. The use of paradigms, pseudo-mathematical symbolic formulations and other similar devices doubtless offer a contribution to the solution of some types of problems. Their use toward solutions in really complex social situations may offer the illusion of precision and rigor where, in fact, the real complexity and dynamic character of the situation become hopelessly obscured. Concerning the use of paradigms, Coleman has counseled a particular caution:

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[1] Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 93-96.

> [Paradigms] constitute a way of giving definition and nothing more. . . . they perform a disservice . . . when they substitute for theory construction itself. The paradigms are seductive in a complex science like sociology for they appear to bring simplicity and order, to substitute for the numerical measure that quantities like money bring to the economist. But I suggest we will advance more quickly and soundly if we attempt to set down the processes that comprise a system of behavior, and neglect the typologies for a time.[1]

In summary, there would appear to be no substitute for the rigorous study and replications of study of processes in the "real world" of the day-to-day social process within the educational institution, to reveal the varied facets of the processes of educational power. Only through the modifications that can come from the execution of tests of hypotheses can greater capacility be developed in the study of these human institutions.

Summary

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to present certain constructs relating to the nature and functions of power in relation to the higher educational institution and to suggest specific tests which might be developed in detail by which these constructs might be verified or disproved. The constructs have been created from concepts and formulations of the nature and uses of power by many scholars and observers. The tests have been devised from

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[1] Coleman, op. cit., p. 68.

methods considered appropriate for use in a real-life situation, where opportunities for formal experimentation are limited or non-existent. It is believed that the processes by which both constructs and tests have been created may illustrate a procedure by which an orderly and systematic approach may be mounted against some of the most abstract and complex problems in the study of social relationships.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary of the Study

Chapter I of this study includes an introductory statement and rationale, a brief discussion of the problem, including basic questions relating to the nature of power and its uses on the campus. The objectives of the study were: 1) To propose some basic definitions for and to describe some relationships between: power, authority, influence and responsibility, in the context of higher education; 2) To formulate several original theoretical constructs related to the origins, nature, locus, purposes and characteristics of power in higher education, and 3) To formulate several original procedures which may be suggested to provide empirical tests of the constructs proposed. Limitations under which the study was conducted were cited. The historical, expository, philosophical and descriptive research methods were employed in the design and conduct of the study.

There is an evaluative statement in Chapter II, relating to the availability of literature on the theoretical study of power in higher education, with a discussion of the nature of some of the existing literature concerned with higher educational organization and governance. Selections of some of the most useful theoretical studies of problems of power in sociology and political science are included, together with attempts to define and describe social and political power in organizations. Chapter II is concluded with an overview of some recent research and descriptive studies of the origins, sources, functions and uses of power within the higher educational institution.

A preliminary discussion on the nature of power is offered in Part I, Chapter III, followed by an extended examination of definitions of power, and of the origins, sources and loci of power. Distinctions are made in concepts of power, authority and influence. Some relationships between control and authority and responsibility and authority are examined. Accountability and responsibility in relation to power are discussed and defined. The problem of legitimacy of various power forms is considered.

The nature of organizations, and the relationships of power and goals to organizations are discussed. Analytic interpretations of the role of power in democratic organizations and states

are included in this Chapter, together with some interpretations of the role of power and law in democratic organizations.

The nature, sources and locus of power in higher educational institutions are discussed in Part II, Chapter III. The role of power and goals in educational institutions is considered. Authority, responsibility and influence on the campus and the concept of the campus as a democracy are examined. The Chapter is concluded with a discussion of the interest of various campus intramural groups and the securing of a larger measure of authority, in the context of the preceding discussions of power, authority, influence and responsibility; this discussion attempts to illuminate the function and process of power in the higher educational institution.

Original theoretical constructs, together with specific proposals for tests of the constructs, are presented in Chapter IV. The constructs are based in part on the implications and formulations in the studies of scholars and observers whose contributions are examined in this study. The tests are conceived as appropriate to the real-life campus situation, where opportunities for formal experimentation with power problems may be severely limited.

The study is concluded with an overview of its content, and with a statement of findings and conclusions, a discussion of implications of the results of this study and suggestions for possible

ways in which the work initiated in this study might be profitably extended.

Statement of Conclusions and Implications

As has been noted above, there are few problems in the study of social behavior more perplexing than power or which have been more intransigent, in attempts by scholars toward definition and analysis. This study has attempted to demonstrate some of the reasons for these difficulties, as well as to offer some exploratory efforts toward analysis and to encourage interest in the problem by the research community in higher education and by other interested scholars.

There appear to be several conclusions that may be tentatively offered, which may assist in further efforts in this field:

1. The study of the role of power in the establishment and operation of the higher educational institution has been seriously neglected, both by research scholars and by practicing educators within the institutions.

2. Relationships within higher educational institutions are often seriously disrupted as a consequence of a general lack of understanding of the function and uses of power

within the institution and within the society, for educational purposes.

3. Some current scholarship reveals a limited appreciation of the complexity of the nature of power and for its pervasiveness in social relationships.

4. Among some scholars, power is still viewed as a negative force which must be contained, rather than as a neutral, value-free phenomenon.

5. The functions of power in higher education are not different from the functions of power for other social purposes within the state.

6. The employment of the device, the construct, with the application of social science techniques of descriptive research and of experimentation, appears to offer promise in the examination of questions of power in society and in higher education.

Recommendations for Future Effort

The following statements are presented as a summary of some of the principal unsupported hypotheses which have been

developed in the course of the study. They may not be regarded as demonstrated conclusions in any proper sense. They appear to be worthy of more serious examination, based on the evidence supplied through the work of scholars in the past and by the relationships suggested in the data assembled in this study. They are offered here in the hope that they may encourage further study which may substantiate or disprove them. Detailed examination of this study will reveal other related hypotheses, which may have a bearing on the study of those cited in this schedule:

1. Power may be defined as the capacity to achieve a desired result.

2. Power may have its origin at the point in time and place where a conscious resolution is made toward a desired result.

3. Social power may have its source in anything that can be valued.

4. Power cannot exist apart from purpose.

5. Authority is a specific, defined, delegated portion of a superior power.

6. Authority and responsibility cannot be effectively separated.

7. Influence is a degree of power insufficient to control a situation.

8. Legitimacy is essential to the persistence of power.

9. A quality of social power is direction, toward the specific goals of the society that created it, as: an educational goal.

10. No power exists in higher educational institutions, except authority.

11. In higher educational institutions, the locus of authority is the governing board of the institution.

12. The educational institution is not a democracy; it is a service agency with narrowly prescribed authority.

In addition to the above conclusions and implications, the following observations may be of some value, in a search for directions in future study:

1. It is suggested that some means be found to encourage experienced higher educational administrators to become more fully engaged in studies of power in higher education. Institutional officers with actual and extended experiences of the power process could offer invaluable contributions from personal observations and experiences. The literature is seriously lacking in contributions by persons whose experience would fit them to offer valuable assistance.

2. Professional associations of administrators, academic leaders and others who are directly engaged in the higher educational power process should be encouraged to assist to a greater degree in the initiation and support of further studies in this field.

3. Far too much of the literature in the study of educational power appears to be influenced by value and group loyalties as over against the nature and uses of power. Means must be found to assist scholars to confront power as an amoral, neutral phenomenon that functions indifferently as to values.

4. New, experimental institutions should be established expressly to permit the introduction of methods of the

application and uses of power and authority which are not possible in existing systems. While the cost of such experimental institutions would be substantial, it would probably be small in contrast to the social and financial cost of the misunderstandings and misuses of power now evident in the higher educational system. Such experimental institutions might be financed by combinations of public and private, philanthropic funds. They could serve as exhibits and models in which anyone interested might observe the results of experiments. Organizations such as the Association of University Professors, the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, the American Council on Education, the National Federation of Teachers and similar groups, together with national foundations and the federal government, might be expected to display interest and support for such experimental institutions.

Conclusion

Finally, it must be concluded that the study has raised far more questions than it has answered, if, indeed, any answers may be said to have been supplied. The study has been an exploratory

one, with no known comparable effort having been attempted in higher education. That additional studies are needed, in an effort to shed additional light on the power question in higher education, seems clear. Many individual questions to which only general allusion has been made in this study might be profitably pursued. The social need is great and the rewards seem promising and exciting. Greater understanding of the question of power in higher education presages more productive and useful service for those institutions to our society.

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